KrantBgffl ffnUfll rsa UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES A TEEATISE THE METHODS OBSERVATION AND REASONING POLITICS. BY GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, ESQ. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. II. LONDON: JOHN W. PARKER AND SON, WKST STRAND. m DOOOLII. ty p r o ^ LONDON: S A VI LI AND EDWARDS, PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 3L* CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIII. On the Determination of the Hypothetical Effects of a Political Cause. § i General hypothetical effects p. 1 2 Special hypothetical effects. Method of determining the effects of a proposed law 2 3 Extent to which the effects of a proposed law can be calculated 8 4 Means of counteracting the probable impediments to a pro- posed law .' 11 CHAPTER XIV. On the Continuing Operation of Causes in Politics. § i Meaning of the cessation of a cause 15 2 In politics, effects generally outlast their original cause ... 16 3 Question whether a law ceases with the cessation of its cause . IS CHAPTER XV. On Political Theory, and the Universality of Propositions respecting Political Causation. § r Mode of investigating the general problem of causation to politics 20 2 Universal propositions can be laid down in positive politics . . 25 3 Principles of universal jurisprudence, liou far thej can be called universal 27 4 Universal principles of human nature j their limits :{,s - Universal propositions respecting political power ic. iv CONTENTS. § 6 Universal propositions respecting forms of government. Ex- amples of the mode in which the subject has been treated p. 49 7 Analysis of the method of constructing universal propositions respecting the tendency of the forms of government . • . 60 8 Method of investigating the general characteristics of monar- chical or despotic, as distinguished from free or republican government 70 9 Method of investigating the general characteristics of aristo- cracy and democracy ; meaning of the ' entire community' 78 io Average results respecting forms of government are attainable 84 1 1 Distinction between an inquiry into the characteristics of each form of government, and the problem of the best form of government 85 1 2 General propositions as to other political relations 86 CHAPTER XVI. On Partial Theories, or Principles of Limited Causation, in Politics. § i True general propositions respecting political causes can be more easily laid down, if they are confined to a certain set of communities 87 2 Such limitations ought to be made expressly 88 3 Classification of communities. I. Savage and wandering tribes ; II. Oriental ; III. European. Characteristics of the two latter classes illustrated 90 4 Similar characteristics for other classes of communities . . . 106 5 National character 108 6 Eesults of the observation of national character ; formation of limited theories and limited maxims 112 CHAPTER XVII. On Hypotheses in Politics. i Different sorts of hypotheses used in politics 117 2 Hypotheses are arbitrary 121 3 Hypotheses imply uncertainty 122 4 Special hypotheses imply possibility, but general ones do not . 123 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XVIII. On the Existence of a Science of Politics. i Positive politics possess the scientific character .... p. 125 2 Speculative politics admit, though in a less degree, of general scientific expression 127 3 The necessity of local and temporary limitations in politics does not deprive the subject of a scientific character . . . 127 4 Constantly recurring necessity of new inductions in politics . 130 5 Science of legislation ; meaning of the phrase 131 6 Law of nature ; its supposed universality ; opposition between nature and institution 133 7 Resemblance of political institutions in different countries ex- plained 139 CHAPTER XIX. On the Art of Politics, and the Formation of Political Precepts. § i Different sorts of arts 141 2 Relation of art to science 144 3 Relation of art to nature 150 4 An empirical art of politics has existed since the existence of government 151 5 Speculative writers on politics have treated the subject partly as an art, and partly as a science 152 6 The precepts of political art are general 155 7 In order to convert political theorems into general precepts, the end must be given 156 8 Political apophthegms, preceptive in substance, but not in form 167 (j Two classes of political maxims — I. Maxims of policy; II. Maxims of legislation 159 io Limited political maxims 1G1 ii Other modes of guiding conduct employed in political art . . 1G1 VOL. II. b \ i CONTENTS. CHAPTER XX. On the Application of Political Tlieories and Maxim* in Practice. § i Conversion of political theorems into maxims ; importance of distinguishing between a false theory and an unsound maxim P- 163 2 Form of the argument in politics when a maxim is applied to a practical case 165 3 Allowance must be made for disturbing causes in the practical application of general maxims— first, for those arising from internal variations in the subject itself 166 4 Secondly, for those arising from external causes ; external re- tarding causes 171 5 Meaning of the dictum, ' True in theory, false in practice' . . 172 6 Manner in which general maxims are circumscribed with re- ference to actual cases 175 7 Meaning of the dictum that a case must be decided on its own merits 177 8 External accelerating causes 177 9 Constant counteraction of habit, with respect to political changes ; nature and operation of habit in politics .... 179 io Modification of universal theorems by theories of limited ap- plication 200 1 1 Distinction between unsound or inapplicable maxims and false theories 200 CHAPTER XXI. On Practical Examples and Real Models in Politics. § i Imitation of real and ideal models 203 a The unsoundness of theory engenders a preference for the direct argument from experience ; distinction between the Dogmatici and Empirici 203 3 Mode of arguing from precedents or real examples in politics . 208 4 Precedents are usually adduced without the principle which they involve 211 5 Importance of precedents in practice 213 6 Eules as to the selection and application of precedents ... 215 CONTENTS. vu j 7 Practical examples may be affirmative or negative ... p. 219 8 Advantage of real models 220 9 Good political institutions are generalized by being treated as real models 221 io Distinction between the cases in politics where a real model can be multiplied by imitations, and those which require a measure peculiar to themselves 223 1 1 Tendency to idealize real models in former states of society . 226 1 2 Differences between the practical argument from a single ex- ample and that founded on a general maxim 231 CHAPTER XXII. On Ideal Models in Politics. ] i Characteristics of an ideal model 230 2 Analogy between ideals in politics and ideals in the useful arts 237 3 A political ideal is not founded on real data 241 4 Ideal models may be faultless 241 5 Ideal models belong to the constructive department of politics 242 6 Examples of ideal models of a perfect state 243 7 The plan of Hippodamus of Miletus 243 8 The speculations of Socrates 244 9 The Cyropadia of Xenophon 245 io The Republic and Laics of Plato 246 1 1 The plan of the best constitution in the Politics of Aristotle . 254 12 The ideal model of Zeno 258 13 The Republic and Lawn of Cicero 25S 14 Imaginary communities in antiquity 263 15 The Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and the New Atlantis of Lord Bacon 2<'>."> 16 The Civitiis Soils of Campanella 268 17 The Oceana of Harrington 269 iS The Ma, iilns alia- , t iih m of Bishop Hall 5 The II istory of the Sevarambians ; The Aventurea 8e Jaquea Sadeitr . . . 27<» 19 Descriptions of a happy people in 'I'lli'mat/nc, in The J'uyageade Cijf"s ;\,w\ Sillnts, in the fj/lns /', rsmirs, ;iml in Caiulin- tio di Z/ucca. /\'tii//ii Iter Subterranewm 27*2 20 Notions of tlu> ancients respecting a golden age, and the pri- mitive state of mankind 274 21 Connexion between the conception of agolden age and the ideal commonwealths 277 \iii CONTENTS. 22 Limited politioal ideals ; perpetual peace p. 283 83 Fichte'e Qeackloasener Semdelsstaat, or Perfect Commercial Stair; tlu- Catholic and the Invisible church 287 .•4 Utility of ideal models in politics ; all political improvements imply an ideal conception 288 a5 Conditions for the advantageous use of ideal models — first, the model must admit of imitation 293 i<5 Secondly, the model must not imply conditions unsuitable to the case in hand; ideal states always imply impossible conditions 296 :; [deal plans of a best possible commonwealth imply a denial of the progressive character of society 301 28 Descriptions of imaginary governments afford faculties for the expression of opinion 301 29 Distinction between ideal perfect states and ideal institutions; inquiry into the possibility of determining the best form of an}' political institution 302 30 2s ature of the problem of the best form of government . . . 307 CHAPTER XXIII. On Political Conduct. 1 Political action consists in the choice of alternatives .... 310 2 The alternatives may be prescribed by law, or by moral necessity 310 3 The alternatives may be practically unlimited 312 4 Deliberation consists in the comparison of alternative courses . 312 5 Analogy between public and solitary deliberation 315 6 Alternative courses often consist of two extremes and a mean ; prevalence of compromises in politics 317 7 The easiest alternative is often preferred 320 8 The choice of alternatives is often determined by the probable conduct of another party 321 9 Connexion of political conduct with the question of freedom and necessity 322 10 Mature of political liberty 323 CONTENTS. ix CHAPTER XXIV. Upon Prediction in Politics. i All political practice concerns the future p. 327 2 Comparison between the powers of prediction in the physical and the moral sciences 328 3 Prediction in those branches of physics whose phenomena are not periodical 329 4 Prediction in geology, mineralogy, and geography 333 g In the vegetable and mineral kingdoms 334 6 In human physiology 335 7 In astronomy, meteorology, and the science of the tides. . . 337 8 Prediction in the sciences relating to man as a rational being . 343 9 In metaphysics 344 io In logic and philology 344 1 1 In esthetics 346 1 2 In ethics 346 13 Prediction in positive politics 348 14 Prediction in history 349 15 Prediction in speculative politics 350 16 Prediction in practical politics 353 1 7 Causes of the difficulty of prediction in practical physics and politics 355 is I ncertainty of political predictions 358 19 Uncertainty of predictions in other departments of practice . 364 20 Results of the chapter 366 CHAPTER XXV. On the Fallibility of Political Practice, and its Causes, § 1 Causes of error in political practice 369 2 Unsoundness of the maxim 'M>[) 3 Inapplicability of the maxim to the case :$76 4 Choice of a bad precedent ;179 5 Misapplicaf ion of a good precedent 880 c> [mperfect knowledge of the facta of the case 885 7 Ambiguity of terms :JH7 8 Necessity of supposing ;i gn;il<>i' simplicity than rxists in reality 388 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXVI. On tin Securities against the Fallibility of Political Practice. i The practical politician ought to consider how far his problem is dependent on the conduct of other men p. 390 ;; And how far on physical causes % . . 392 3 Chance is an element in the problem of practical politics , , . 395 4 In practical politics, it rarely happens that the choice lies between an absolutely right and an absolutely wrong course 396 5 The problem of practical politics is always individual .... 397 6 Qualifications of a practical politician 399 7 Analogies between practical politics and practical medicine . . 403 CHAPTER XXVII. On Political Progress. § i Nature and causes of pobtical progress 409 2 Mode of investigating the problem of progressive civilization . 410 3 How far the origins of civilization can be ascertained ; conjec- tural history _ .,■» .... 411 4 The elements of the progress of mankind may be distributed into four series — I. Politics ; II. Keligion and ethics ; HI. Science and the useful arts; IV. the fine arts and literature 417 5 Progress of mankind in politics illustrated 418 () In religion and ethics 419 7 In science and the useful arts 422 8 In the fine arts and literature 426 9 The general progress of improvement in each of these series constitutes the advance of civdization 429 10 Civilization is confined to the highly endowed races .... '430 1 1 Change in the proportionate rate of progress in some countries '< as compared with others 436 1 2 The progress of civilization cannot be treated as an abstract problem, or with reference to all mankind 437 13 Supposed analogy between the life of a man and the life of a community ^$ CONTENTS. xi §14 Theories of a cyclical change and of degeneracy in human affairs p- 441 15 Tendency to further improvement in the most highly civilized nations 449 16 The means of ulterior political improvement fall into two classes, viz. — I. Internal and domestic ; II. International . 452 INDEX 455 ON THE METHODS OF OBSERVATION AND REASONING IN POLITICS. Chapter XIII. ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF A POLITICAL CAUSE. § 1 A FTER the examination in the preceding chapter, it -*--*- remains for us to inquire into the method of deter- mining the hypothetical effects of a given political cause, either generally, or in some supposed special case. The previous inquiry concerns effects as they have actually occurred ; that on which we are about to enter concerns only supposed or calculated effects. The general case of this problem is similar to the correspond- ing case in the determination of causes from effects, already adverted to.(') It requires, for example, that an answer be given to such questions as the following : ' What effects does a monarchical, an aristocratic, or a democratic government pro- duce ? What are the consequences of capital punishment, of transportation, of imprisonment ? What are the effects of direct, and what of indirect taxation ? What are the effects of universal suffrage, of a censorship of the press, of liberty of the press, of a military conscription?' If an answer can be given to each of these questions, it must be general in its terms — it must be de- void of any limitation as to time, but must apply equally to the past and the future. For the present, we must be contented (i) Aliovo, cli. xi. VOL. II. I* 2 HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [chap. xiti. with indicating the nature of the general problem of hypothetical effects, and must reserve the investigation of its solution until we arrive at the subject of political theory. (") ^ 2 The special case of the hypothetical problem in ques- tion i-, when it is proposed to determine the effects which a certain supposed political measure would probably hereafter pro- duce in a certain country, and with reference to a denned set of circumstances. This problem may relate to the probable future operation, either of a law already in force, or of a mere legislative scheme, to which it is proposed to give the force of law. The first of these cases is in general so much easier of solu- tion than the second, that it need not be considered separately. When a law has been for some time in force, we are assisted by the light of experience in estimating its future effects. If the medium in which it operates is likely to remain unchanged, the effects of the law may be expected to remain unchanged like- wise. If, on the other hand, that medium is about to undergo a change, the probable effects of the law, in the midst of a new set of circumstances, must be determined by a process similar to that adopted for determining the probable effects of a proposed law, except so far as the analogy of its prior effects, as they have actually occurred, may facilitate the process of reasoning, and afford firmer resting-places for conjecture. A law which is in force in one country, and which it is proposed to extend to another country, properly belongs to the second case of the pro- blem. With respect to the country into which it is to be intro- duced, it is altogether a new and untried law.( 3 ) Confining our attention, therefore, to a new legislative plan proposed for adoption, let us first consider the process by which the draft of a law is framed. The end in view, positive or nega- tive, being given, the framer of the law sets about considering what are the proper means within the reach of the legislature (2) Below, ch. xv. (3) See Bentham, Traites de Legislation, torn. iii. p. 356 : ' Maximes relatives a la Maniere de transplanter lea Lois.' SECT. 2.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 3 for its attainment. Having devised these means, he adapts them to his purpose, by imagining all the different contingencies which are likely to arise, and by providing against these contingencies by suitable regulations. For example, if the draftsman is framing a law for the prevention of theft, he will provide for theft within a house, and in the open air ; if within a house, whether by break- ing into the house or not, and whether by day or by night. He will provide for theft from the person with violence, and for theft from the person without violence ; for theft involving a breach of trust, and so on. All written instruments intended to have a binding force, whether public, such as laws and treaties, or private, such as deeds and wills, are framed in this manner. Thus, in a settle- ment of property, all possible contingencies which can befal a certain family are provided for, as that A survives B; that B survives A ; that A dies leaving male issue; that he dies leaving only female issue; that he dies without issue, &c. Now, in seeking to predict the effects of a proposed law, we put a certain construction upon its provisions, and thus deter- mine the classes of persons or acts which will fall within them. The rules for the interpretation of written laws, which properly belong to the science of jurisprudence, and to the positive law of each country, are thus called in aid for the purpose of legis- lative prediction. The rules according to which the written laws are interpreted by the tribunals of the country — whatever they may be — arc the rides which should be applied to the construction of projects of law, and to the determination of their probable effects when en- forced in practice. Accordingly, the attempt to anticipate the future effects of a legislative proposal, assumes the existence of fixed rules of interpretation for written laws, and of regular judi- catories and other executive officers for their enforcement. A similar remark applies to treaties and other compacts between nations. Unless some customary rules of interpretation, as sanctioned by international law, are recognised by each <>t" the b 2 1 HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [chap. xiii. contract in;; parties, discussion of the terms to be agreed upon between them would be a mere waste of words. When, how- ever, the meaning of those terms in an existing treaty is dis- puted, there is no authoritative tribunal by which the contro- versy can be decided. ( 4 ) Taking, then, as our basis, the existence of a fixed system of interpretation for written laws, the method which is adopted for arguing upon the probable effects of a proposed legislative mea- sure is to imagine hypothetical cases, in order to try its provisions, by considering how they would bear upon such a case if it actually occurred. This is generally expressed by the phrase, ' putting a case.' The problem is stated in this form : ' What would be the operation of the proposed law in such or such a case?' In fact, the discussion of a proposed law is a develop- ment of the process adopted by the draftsman in its preparation. In the attempts which are made to solve this problem, ques- tions usually arise as to the manner in which a certain hypothe- tical case would be affected by the proposed law. These questions (as we have already explained) can only be determined by apply- ing to the proposed law the received rules of judicial interpreta- tion ; by treating the proposed law as if it were already in force, and the hypothetical case as if it had actually occurred, and by reasoning accordingly. When this question has been settled, it remains to be decided whether the law producing such an effect, in such a case, is expedient or inexpedient. The argument has, therefore, two stages : 1, How would the law under discussion bear upon the given case? 2, Assuming its operation in that case to be determined, would that operation be beneficial or otherwise ?( 3 ) (4) The interpretation of laws generally is treated by writers on gene- ral jurisprudence (as by Savigny, System des hent. Rom. Redds, b. i. c. 4), and specially by the writers on each national system of law. — See Dwar- ris on Statutes, c. 12, 13, 14. The interpretation of treaties is discussed by the writers on international law. — See, e.g., Vatel, b. 2, c. 17. Concerning the hermeneutic art, or the method of interpreting ancient authors, sacred and profane, see Bernhardy, Grundlinien zur Encyclopadie der Philologie, p. 59-111. This department of phdology is of great extent and importance, (5) Casus, for a case falling under a rule of law, is used occasionally SECT. 2.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 5 Thus, if a measure, changing the law of marriage, the law of debtor and creditor, or the law of landlord or tenant, in any country, were brought forward, various cases would be suggested with respect to existing rights, to inchoate rights, and to future rights, for the purpose of trying the proposed enactment, and of determining its probable operation. In some cases, perhaps, it would appear upon examination that the existing law met the alleged evil, and, therefore, that the proposed change was super- fluous : in others, that it would aggravate the evil, and would, therefore, be mischievous : in others, that it would remove or mitigate the evil, and ought therefore to be adopted : as in the construction of a statute, the old law, the mischief, and the remedy, ( G ) would be the points for consideration. A similar mode of reasoning would be applicable to a proposition for a new tax, for new regulations respecting the army and navy, or for a new measure respecting the maintenance of the clergy, the repair of roads, or the carriage of letters : various suppositions would be made, some having reference to a particular state of facts, some having reference to various legal rules, for the purpose of testing the probable operation of the new scheme, and of considering it under a vai'iety of aspects. The imaginary cases which are supposed in legislative debate, for the purpose of trying the probable influence of a proposed law, are therefore analogous to the actual cases which come before a court, and to which a judge is required to apply the existing law. Such hypothetical cases bear the same relation to real cases, as fictitious narrative bears to history. Opinions of counsel upon actual cases are exactly similar to the decisions of a court upon judicial questions, and arc given upon similar grounds. The problem of the judge or legal practitioner, bow- by the classical Roman jurists. — Sec Dirkscn, Man. Jur. Civ. Rom. in v. Sjurirx is likewise used in ( li<- same Bense; and ponere, for putting a case. — See l)i(/. iii. •">, § :i I. A case is an aggregate of circumstances, considered with reference <<> the manner in which the} are allcctcd hy some leyaJ rule or enactment. The sane expression is used will: respect to B treaty -casus 1'n BYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [CHAP. XIII. ever, is simply to apply the words of an existing law to the facts of an actual case :('") the problem of the legislator is to apply the words of a proposed law to a hypothetical case, and then to determine if the operation of the law, in such a case, would be beneficial. It may be remarked, that the complexity of actual cases is, in general, far greater than that of hypothetical cases. Practice spontaneously turns up difficulties far harder of solution than any which the most fertile imagination, or the most hostile criticism, can devise beforehand. ( s ) This arises in part from the unforeseen combination of the new enactment with other pre- existing rules of law. If every case fell under only one legal rule, the application of law to facts would be a comparatively easy art. It is sometimes said, that the probable operation of a pro- posed law is best tried by supposing an extreme case. But this argumentative artifice must be employed with great reserve. Extreme cases, although they serve to make the arguer's meaning clear, do not in general try a law fairly, or lead to a safe practical inference. ( 9 ) Rare and improbable cases may be sug- gested, which would undoubtedly lead to absurd consequences, provided that the law is to be enforced with inflexible rigour, and that no discretion is to be exercised in its administration. We know, however, from experience, that laws are not ad- ministered in this manner. In the first place, it is laid down by the text-writers, both of international and national law, that, (7) Hypothetical cases, vrith respect to the application of a rule of law, may likewise be put by lawyers, for the sake of argument. (8) ' Sapientissima res tempus (ut ab antiquis dictum est), et novorum casuum quotidie auctor et inventor.' — Bacon, De Augm. Sot. viii. aph. 32. The saying as to the wisdom of Time, as being the great discoverer, is attributed to Thales. — Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 9. Time was prover- bially said to be the wisest of counsellors, Plutarch, Pericl. 18. (9) It is a maxim in Westminster Hall, that ' hard cases make bad law.' The meaning of the maxim is, that when an extreme case occurs in practice, for which the law has not provided, the court is disposed to strain the legal rule beyond its proper extent, in order to give relief in the case before them. In thus stretching the rule to meet an extraordinary case, they are likely to render it applicable to some ordinary cases, to which it ought not to apply. SECT. 2.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 7 ill the construction of any instrument, absurd consequences are to be rejected. This is the doctrine of Grotius,( 10 ) followed and enforced by Puffendorf( n ) and Vatel.C") Even the English law, which holds that where the words of a statute are plain, the courts are bound to enforce them, without regard to con- sequences, yet admits important limitations to this general rule. Wherever the meaning is doubtful, or there is a conflict of provisions, or the consequence is indirect, the argumentum ab inconvenienti is allowed to have great weight. ( 13 ) Various technical contrivances, and forced constructions, are likewise resorted to by courts of justice, for the purpose of eluding the absurdities and inconveniences which would arise from an enforcement of the plain meaning of statutes. ( u ) Whenever a discretionary power is vested in the executive authorities, the administration of a law is so conducted as to avoid any obviously mischievous consequences, and the expression of popular opinion with respect to its anticipated operation restrains the action of the government. Hence, the supposition of extreme cases does not furnish a fair practical test of the probable working of a legislative enactment. It is quite con- ceivable that a law, which is on the whole likely to be attended with a great preponderance of beneficial consequences, might lead, in certain imaginary cases, to absurd results, provided that it were enforced with a blind and mechanical rigour. It has been shown above, that the argument upon the probable effects of a proposed law has two stages — 1, How would it operate in a given case ? 2, Would that operation be beneficial, or otherwise ? Now the second stage of this argument becomes unnecessary, if it appears that the supposed case is so unlikely to occur, or, if it were to occur, so unimportant, thai the operation of the pro- (ioj J.fi.ff P. ii. ]<;,§ 6. (ii) L. v. o. 12, §8. (12) ii. § 282. Compare Cic. dc Invent, i. o. 38. (13) Pwarris, ib. p. 755. (14) On the subject of forced construction! of statutes) tee the Brs< Report of the Criminal Law Commissioner!. 8 HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [CHAP. XIII. posed law with respect to it is not -worthy of consideration. De nunimu nun curat lex is a maxim applicable to the making, as well as to the execution of laws. Extreme cases, however, are not only improbable as to their event, but also limited in their application. Nevertheless (as has been already stated) an extreme case may, in arguing upon the effects of laws, be properly used for the purpose of illustrating the objector's mean- ing; and although it does not, as in mathematics, effectually bring about a reductio ad absurdum, yet it shows clearly the character and scope of the objection, by raising it to its highest power. The same method as that employed for investigating the probable effects of laws, is also applicable to treaties and other international agreements. Thus, if an alliance for mutual defence with a foreign state is proposed for discussion, the various contingencies under •which the treaty would be called into action, the casus foederis, would have to be considered, and, according to the probable results of the treaty in the supposed circumstances, would a judgment as to its expediency or inex- pediency be formed. So, if it were proposed to consider w r hat would be the effect of a clause in a treaty, by which two nations agreed to refer all differences to arbitration, various hypotheses might be made as to the probable effects of such a clause under different contingencies. What (it might be said) would be the event, if one party refused to submit to the arbitration before it was made, or, when it was made, objected to it as unjust and unreasonable ; if the arbitrators appointed could not agree, or were corrupted or intimidated, or exceeded their powers ; if the terms of reference were improperly framed? ( 15 ) § 3 Having described the process by which the probable effects of a legislative scheme are calculated, and having illustrated the method of putting hypothetical cases to try its operation in various contingencies, we have next to inquire how far the future operation of a proposed law can be ascertained by (15) See Vatel, b. 2, § 329. SECT. 3.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 9 these means, and how far the predictions thus made are likely to accord with the event when it actually occurs. In assigning the effects of a past and historical cause, our attention is mainly directed to that aggregate of positive condi- tions which determined their occurrence; we take little note of the negative conditions, of the absence of those circumstances which, if they had been present, would have counteracted the operation of the composite cause. When one event has been produced by other antecedent events, we usually describe the sequence absolutely, without suggesting all the hypothetical cases which, if they had occurred, would have prevented the sequence. When such hypothetical cases are suggested (for example, when it is said that if such and such steps had been taken, a battle which was lost might have been won, a town which was taken might have been defended), they are in general made the subjects of separate consideration. But in anticipating the probable effect of a hypothetical cause in politics, we are unable to follow so direct a road. It is necessary to take account, not only of the positive, but also of the negative conditions for the operation of the cause in question. In physics, the negative as well as positive conditions for the operation of a cause can sometimes be predetermined ; and the future effect can then be anticipated with certainty. We expect, for example, without any doubt, that the sun will appear to-morrow above the horizon at the customary time, and change night into day. If no solar eclipse has been calculated for that period, we anticipate confidently, from our experience of the past, and our confidence in the stability of nature, that no opaque body intervening between the sun and the earth, nor any other impediment, will prevent the illumination of our planet by his rays. Again, in the experimental physical sciences, all negative conditions counteracting the operation of a given cause can be artificially removed; so that in this department of physics the effects of a given cause can he known beforehand. But in politics, we can neither enumerate all the negative con- 1" HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [chap. XIII. ditious requisite for the operation of a given cause, and the pro- duction of a hypothetical effect, nor can we control the influence of those conditions, as in the experimental sciences. In politics, therefore, we can only say, with reference to the future, that a specified cause will produce a certain effect, in case not only the conditions requisite for its production are present, but the circumstances adverse to its production are absent. The circumstances which may, by possibility, impede the operation of a political cause are so numerous, that they may be considered as infinite ; they defy enumeration, and cannot be exhausted by any preliminary view. This multiplicity of possible impediments to the action of a cause is not peculiar to politics ; it is common to all human affairs, and is, indeed, shared by a large number of physical causes. ( 16 ) Thus, when Ave put a letter into the post, or charter a ship for a voyage, we know that, if certain obstacles do not occur, the letter or the ship will reach its destination ; but the existence of possible impediments is a matter of uncer- tain conjecture. So, in mechanics, when a body is set in motion, it will advance until its motion is arrested by counter- acting causes. In the operations of animated nature, the action of numerous causes can be anticipated, subject to the uncer- tainty which attends their repression by adverse influences. Again, the action of any political cause may be accelerated by concurrent causes, tending in the same direction. In this manner, the operation of a law may be carried beyond the intention of its authors ; it may produce effects deeper, wider, and more acutely felt, than they anticipated. By the addition of such unforeseen forces, a pressure which was intended merely to support, may be sufficient to overthrow — a remedy which (16) See Mill's Logic, vol. i p. 523 : ' All laws of causation, in conse- quence of their tendency to be counteracted, require to be stated in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results. In those sciences of causation which have an accurate nomenclature, there are special words which signify a tendency to the particular effect with which the science is conversant; thus, pressure, in mechanics, is synonymous with tendency to motion ; and forces are not reasoned upon as causing actual motion, but as exerting pressure. A similar improvement in terminology would be very salutary in many other branches of science.' SECT. 4.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 11 was intended to act as a medicine, may be converted into a poison. §4 In speaking, therefore, of the probable or hypothetical operation of a specific political cause, we can only say that, if it be neither wholly impeded and overborne, nor partially repressed and retarded, nor unduly accelerated in practice, it will produce a given effect ; in other words that it tends, in the particular instance, to produce a given effect. Now, in anticipating the probable effects of a law or other political measure, proposed for adoption, we can, in general, by the methods of reasoning explained above, form a well-grounded judgment as to its tendency; that is to say, we can predict its effects, upon the assumption that its operation is left to its natural course. We can, however, do more than this : although the number of conceivable impediments to the operation of a political cause may be considered as unlimited, yet the number of probable impedi- ments is often susceptible of previous calculation. When a law is under consideration, it can be perceived that its tendency, or intended operation, is likely to be impeded by various counter- acting forces, the direction and intensity of which can, within certain limits of error, be measured beforehand. Hence the promoters of the law, foreseeing the impediments which it is likely to encounter, are able to devise and prepare means for overcoming these impediments. A simple illustration of this anticipation of consequences is afforded by the case of a tax, imposed with the view of raising a revenue for the government. If resistance to the collection of the tax is expected, the government may provide a sufficient force of police and military to assist the collectors in levying the impost. In this manner, it may be expected that the causes likely to counteract the intended operation of the law \\\\\ themselves be effectually counteracted. Not unfrequcntly, however, it is necessary to advance, in the anticipation of consequences, one or more steps beyond this point. It maybe foreseen that the defences provided against tin' adverse influences will themselves be attacked : \\v.\\ an attempt "ill be 12 HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF [CHAP. XIII. made to counteract the measures employed to counteract the coun- teracting causes. Thus, it may be proposed to levy a customs' duty upon an article of import, for the purpose of raising its price in the country, and of stimulating its native production by the prevention of foreign competition. If the duty be fixed at a high rate, it maybe expected to lead to smuggling; and, accordingly, provision may be made for guarding the frontier by sea and land, in order to prevent the contraband introduction of the article. At the same time, it may be anticipated that the operations of this preventive force may be resisted or eluded; that the persons employed in this service may be at one time overpowered by numbers, at another misled by false information ; and that the counteraction of the influences counteracting the law may thus be defeated. Other examples may be found in the criminal law: thus, if it is proposed to render a certain class of acts penal, the fear of the punishment, provided its infliction were tolerably certain, might be expected to repress the offence; but it is expected that it will be counteracted by intimidation of the witnesses — or of the jurors, if the trial be by jury. Accordingly, provision may be made for protecting the witnesses and jurors, by keeping them in a place of safe custody, by guarding their persons, by securing them a maintenance elsewhere when the trial is over. It may, however, be foreseen that these protective measures are likely to be only partially successful, and that the means employed to counteract the influences counteracting the operation of the law, may themselves be counteracted by other adverse influences. Again, when a fine is imposed upon the commission of a certain act, it may be anticipated that the penalty may be rendered nugatory, by subscriptions to pay the fine when inflicted by a legal sentence upon an offender. Such subscrip- tions may, accordingly, be rendered penal by a subsidiary enact- ment ; but it may be apprehended that attempts will be made to evade this defensive prohibition by clandestine subscriptions, or by presents, made ostensibly for a different purpose. Cases such as these are among the simplest which present themselves in estimating the probable effects of a proposed law. SECT. 4.] A POLITICAL CAUSE. 13 In almost all legislation, some subsidiary enactments are requisite, to protect the main enactment against impediments which are likely to obstruct its course. Whenever these probable impedi- ments can be foreseen, and are of such a nature that they can be guarded against by proper precautions, the law may be expected to produce its designed effect ; its tendency and its actual result are likely to coincide. But (as we have already seen in a former chapter) the undesigned and unforeseen consequences of a law are often important, and are sufficient to outweigh its designed effects. ( ir ) Besides, it happens not unfrequently that events occur, wholly unexpected by the authors of the law, which impede or modify its operation in various manners. In such a case as this, the tendency of the law, and its actual result, differ; the effects which it would naturally produce, if it acted in an un- resisting medium, have been stifled and repressed, or modified and compounded, by adverse and counteracting influences. In order to show how the series of unforeseen events, springing out of a political cause, becomes complicated in practice, we will take an example from international relations : — Two states, A and B, enter into a treaty for the sake of mutual defence against the aggressions of a third state, C. The object of this alliance is mainly to deter C from invading either of the allied states: incase, however, of its failing to produce this effect, then to increase the defensive power of the state which may be attacked. After a time, however, all doubt as to the success of the treaty in restraining the ambition of the aggressive state is removed: C invades A, and thus counteracts the principal objed of the treaty. B then proceeds to make military preparations, in order to assist A in repelling the attack. (', on the other hand, attempts to neutralize this opposition to its counteracting force, by creating jealousies between the two states, A and II \ by sowing dissensions between the go\ernmeut and people in state B; or by bribing members of the legislature to vote against military preparations; or by persuading the government, with the (17) Above, oh. \ii. § LO. 11 HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS. offer of commercial or other advantages, to postpone or evade the fulfilment of its treaty-obligations j or by inducing a fourth state, D, to invade B. The state B may, in return, adopt various measures for frustrating these attempts of C to prevent it from assisting A : for example, it may suppress the insurrectionary movements excited with a view of diverting its troops, or it may negotiate separately with state D for a cessation of hostilities. These measures may be met by other counter-measures on the part of state C, until the position of the parties becomes as complicated as a game of chess. Now, upon a retrospect of the operation of the treaty, of the influences used to counteract it, of the influences used to counteract these influences, and so on in succession, and upon a comparison of the prospective views with the actual result, it will be readily perceived that, in anticipating the probable operation of a political cause, where large bodies of men and powerful conflicting interests are involved, we can only speak of its tendency, and can never venture to predict its actual effect. It happens perpetually, in political as in private life, that un- foreseen obstacles to the best- calculated plans arise in practice ; and that the tendency, or natural operation, of a cause is frus- trated by events which no sagacity could have predicted, and no contrivance could have prevented. In the preceding remarks, we have attempted to elucidate the prediction of future political events, considered as a hypo- thetical problem for the discovery of a specific effect. We shall, however, have occasion hereafter, in another part of this treatise, to investigate the general subject of political prediction, when we shall endeavour to trace more fully the conditions to which it is subject. ( 1S ) (18) Below, ch. xxiv. 15 Chapter XIV. ON THE CONTINUING OPERATION OF CAUSES IN POLITICS. § 1 TF every phenomenon owes its existence to a certain set -L of conditions, which together constitute its cause, it must cease to exist with the cessation of that cause. If the cause be withdrawn, the effect likewise must be at an end. This general meaning is expressed in the axiom, ' Cessante caus£, cessat effectus/ or, ' Sublata causa, tollitur effectus.'(') The axiom in question is universally true, provided it be correctly applied. If the cause of the present existence of any effect be removed, the effect will cease. In some instances, the present cause and the original cause are identical ; in other words, the effect is due to the continued operation of the same cause. But, in others, the operation of the original cause ceases, and a new cause succeeds in its place. Now, wherever such a change of causation has occurred, the axiom is only true if it be referred to the present and substituted cause : if it be under- stood to refer to the original and extinct cause, it is erroneous. The distinction which has just been pointed out may be easily exemplified : — In many cases of causation, a continually- renewed action of the same cause is necessary for keeping up the effect. Such, for example, is light, which is constantly di Unset I from a luminous centre; and if that centre is extinguished, or (i) See Mill's Logic, 1>. 3, ch. 5, § 6. There is a maxim similar to the maxim 'cessante causa, eessal eH'eclus,' which is fuller in its statemenf ' Posita conditions ponitur eonditionalum, et suhlato COnditionatO toll: tur conditio.' — K'ru^, Phil. Lex. in ' Bedingtes.' The first of these two clauses is universally true, if hy conditio is meant the sum of the conditions necessary for the sequence of the effect. The meaning of the second is not clear: if the effect, or condWonatum, is re- moved, the conditioning circumstances or cause may remain. Perhaps conditionanle is intended; if so, the maxim would be Open t" the tame remark as the maxim just examined. 1(3 CONTINUING OPERATION OF [CHAP. XIV. intercepted by an opaque body, the illumination ceases. Such, too, is heat : the caloric diffused from a centre of heat is after a time lost, and, if not renewed, the temperature falls. So, when a body is set in motion in a resisting medium, the effect of the original cause of motion is after a time exhausted, and the body returns to a state of rest, unless fresh pressure be applied. Again, certain animals may be domesticated by man, and changes, both in their physical form and in their habits and intelligence, may thus be produced. But the domesticating influence must, in order to operate, be continuous : if the control of man is with- drawn, the domesticated species relapses into a state of wildness, and loses, both in its form and habits, all traces of its artificial modifications. There are, again, in physics many instances of effects out- lasting the causes to which they were first due, and, when once produced, acquiring an existence independent of their original antecedent. An example is afforded by the extensive class of causes which are included under the name of generation. The parent is the cause of the offspring ; the seed, or other instrument of botanic reproduction, is the cause of the plant : but, when once the young animal or plant is produced, it acquires a life of its own, which is not extinguished by the death of its author. Many habits, again, in the animal economy of the human body, which were originally the result of volition, become after a time mechanical and involuntary. A further set of examples may be found in the effects of the destructive forces of nature, such as hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes, inundations, conflagrations, and the like. When these causes have ceased to operate, their effects by no means cease, but are felt in permanent devastation of the earth's surface and of the works of man. Again, the effects of disease or violence upon the body of men or animals do not cease with the cessation of the cause — organs may be permanently destroyed or impaired, although the cause of mischief has been withdrawn. § 2 Now in politics the latter, and not the former, is the common case. In political causation, it rarely happens that the SECT. 2.] CAUSES IN POLITICS. 17 removal of the cause removes the existing effect, although it may prevent the fresh creation of similar effects. For example, the deposition of a ruler who has exercised his supreme power in an oppressive manner will prevent the continuance of his oppressions, but it will not obliterate the effects of his past misgovemment. The revolution of 1789, which destroyed the system of the old monarchy of France, did not extinguish its enduring consequences; nor were the ill effects of Napoleon's rule cancelled by his de- thronement, and detention at St. Helena. A similar remark may be extended to all laws and political institutions, which influence the texture of society, and produce a certain social state. Whatever creates a national habit or custom, creates an effect which becomes independent of its original cause, and is likely to outlive it. If a law forms a large portion of the community to habits of industry and frugality, or impels them to laziness and improvidence, it produces consequences which will themselves, in their turn, become causes, and act inde- pendently of their first origin. Again, not only bad political institutions, but wars, famines, commercial crises, and revolutions, which destroy wealth, and disturb trade and industry, arc attended with consequences which survive their temporary cause. They leave a large arrear of loss to be worked off by slow and successive efforts — they demolish rapidly, what can only be rebuilt slowly. A nation long subjected to bad laws, which have vitiated its social system, resembles a chronic patient. The cause may be removed, but the effect is there, and can only be remedied by a long course of regimen and alterative treatment. The effects have become a substantive malady, independent of their origin. If a disease has been caused by any excess, as in eating, drink- ing, bodily or mental exertion, the first care of the physician will probably be, to put a stop to the l>:iot vo/ioi) first occurs in (lie funeral oration of Pericles, in Thucyd. ii. 37, where it appears to denote those laws of the state which arc corroborated by the moral sanction. It next occurs in a conversation between Socrates and Hippias, reported in the McmonthiHa of Xenoplion, iv. I, § 1U-25. In this passage, it signi- fies moral rules of universal application, such as the duty of honouring parents. Compare Xcn. C&con. 7, § 30-1. The expression was doubtless adopted by Socrates from popular usage. Thus, Plato speaks of ra K(ihovfMPu vno tn i/6(uua. — /.'l Phil. h'i/>. xui. p. ">(•>:*. Jn Plato, Politicut, o. 87, aypa/fa tti'itjuu (Otj are opposed to written laws. Diony- sius, Ant. Hom. vii. II, speaks of aypafpOV kiu ai»>ix<>OiTi)Ti>v (j>v(T((j><> StKOtOV. On flic opposition of i'0>i and i/o/xot, t. e. of CUBtOmS ami written laws, see .Ut ad Plat. Leg. i. 8, p. 636. Aristotle, however ( Eht t. i. L3, § 2), makes unwritten law a species of JUS civile, OT Of the law peculiar to each slate ; and opposes ii to the universal law of nature. See the notes to the pas* s;i■/., t,nl Fall, c. i. ad Jin., who refers to Bergier, J list, des Grands Chemi/M >>< V Empire Ttomain, liv. ill- c. 1. (19) See Horace, Carm. iii. 24 Campestres melius Soythee Quorum plaustra ragas rite trahunt domos, Vi\ unt . ei ngidi ( tato, Imiiietat.i quibus iugera liberas I'Vu-rs ct ( Vi crciii ferunt ; Nee culture placet Longior annuo. Speaking of the Buevi, Cssearsays: ' Privati aoseparati agri apud eot nihil est ; neque longius anno remanere ono in loco, inoolendi causa, licet.' — 11. a. iv. i. • Arva per annes mutant,' of the Germans.' — Tacit. Germ. 2<>. On the nomad .state of society, hit Cotnte, Traiti Legisla- tion, 1. iv. c. 14; Gibbon, c. 2d: V*olney, tBgypU i 82 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xv. fore arc ignorant of the various complicated rights which, in civilized societies, grow out of this relation. Again, with respect to marriage, monogamy is recognised by the law of the most civilized nations, both ancient and modern ; but the law of the Oriental nations, as well as of the ancient Mexicans and Peru- vians, has always sanctioned the practice of polygamy. f°) More- over, the rules as to the permitted degrees of consanguinity and affinity for marriage have differed widely in different countries. ( 21 ) No legal institution was more universally diffused throughout the ancient civilized world than slavery ; it was pre-eminently juris gentium. The law of modern civilized states rejects slavery ; having, however, admitted it, in the qualified form of villenage or serfage, up to a comparatively recent date. The torture of slaves for judicial purposes was a principle of Greek and Roman jurisprudence, though the torture of freemen was an exceptional measure. In Oriental countries, no limit has existed to the use of torture for the extraction of evidence from suspected persons. The use of torture was recognised by the law of all European countries, except England, up to the French revolu- tion : (") it was, amongst the continental nations, an institution juris gentium. Since that time, its use has been legally abolished (20) Selden considers polygamy as an institution of natural law. See the chapter, ' De polyg-aniia ex jure naturali, seu universali illo quod turn ante legem Mosaicam, turn post, juxta Ebrseos pariter obtinuit,' in his treatise, De Jure Naturali et Gentium sec. disc. JSbrceorum, v. 6. (21) ' De conjugiis eorum, qui sanguine aut affinitate junguntur, satis gravis est qua^stio, et non raro magnis motibus agitata. JNTani causas cer- tas ac naturales, cur talia conjugia, ita ut legibus, aut moribus vetantur, illicita sunt, assignare qui voluerit, experiendo discet, quam id sit difficile, imo prsestari non possit.' — Grotius de J. H. et P. ii. 5, § 12. Compare Nepos, prgef. : ' Neque enim Cimoni fuit turpe, Atheniensium summo viro, sororem germanam habere in matrimonio ; quippe quum ejus cives eodem uterentur institute. At id quidem nostris moribus nefas habetur.' (22) As to the law concerning torture in France, see Granier de Cassagnac, Hist, des Causes de la Rev. Francaise, torn. i. p. 398-400. The parliaments refused to register the decree of Louis XVI., in 1788, abolish- ing the question prealable ; that is to say, torture after sentence of death, for the purpose of extracting a confession of accomplices. At that time, therefore, professional opinion in France was in favour of torture, within the limit indicated. The embarrassed manner with which Montesquieu treats the subject is very perceptible, Esprit des Lois, vi. 17 ; published in 1748. SECT. 3.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 33 in Europe. The legal responsibility of magistrates and public officers to the people for then acts was a practical principle generally recognised in the ancient republics; but no such prin- ciple could be admitted in any country under a despotic mo- narchy. "When, therefore, we speak of universal principles of juris- prudence, meaning certain practical principles recognised in the positive laws of all states, it will be found that few or no such principles exist, though there is a general agreement among civilized nations, and, indeed, among nations at the same degree of civilization, in the recognition of certain common principles of this sort^ 23 ) No principles of law are, in strictness of speech, ubiquitous. Accordingly, all attempts to found a universality of legal principles upon a supposed ' law of nature/ a law which nature is declared to have engraved upon the hearts and implanted in the bosoms of men — to establish a universal standard of legis- lation, by the name of ' natural justice/ or ' natural equity/ and to set up certain ' natural rights/ to which the positive law of every state must yield, are necessarily vain and delusive. ( M ) The (23) This subject is illustrated incidentally in Story's work, On the Conflict of Laws, in which it may be seen to what extent the laws of modern civilized nations, agreeing in Bubstance, differ in their practical principles. The following passage will serve as an example: — 'To make a contract valid, it, is a universal principle, admitted by the whole world. that it should be made by parties capable to contract; that it should be volun- tary ; thai it should be upon a sufficient consideration ; thai ii sin mid be lawful in its nature; and that it should be in its terms reasonably certain. But upon some of these points there is a diversity in the positive and customary laws of different nations. Persons capable in one count ry are incapable by the laws of another ; considerat ions good in one count ry are insufficient or invalid in another; the public policy of one country permits or favours certain agreements which are prohibited in another; the forms prescribed by the laws of one country to insure validity and obligation of Contracts are tin- known in another ; and the rights acknowledged by one country are not commensurate with those belonging to another.'— -( Conflict of Laws, 5 232. Klseuhere he sa\ (§ 270) ; 'There are general rules of interpretation, recognised by all nations, which form the basis of all reasoning on the Bubject of contracts.' ' C'CbI Is regie des regies, et generate loi <\>-^ lois, que chacun observe celle dn lieu ou il est,' Bays Montaigne (i. 22); but even this universal rule is subject to numerous exceptions. (34) rjpon the meaning of natural law, see Belden, ib. lib. i. c. 3; Grotius, •/. It. ,1 /». proleg. § 5, 6, lib. L 0, 1. § L0; Puffendorf, I. ii. 0. S . vol. 11. 11 3 1 ox POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. w. only propositions of jurisprudence which admit of universality arc descriptive propositions : no preceptive propositions, no pro- positions laying down a legal 'rule, are universal. All those Yatel, introd. § 6-11 ; Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, i. 2. With respect to the insufficiency of the test, see Bentham, Traites de Legislation, torn. i. p. 12 ; Comte, TraitS de Legislation, liv. i. c. 9 and 10. On the non-ex- istence of natural laws, and the diversity of national laws, see Montaigne, Essais, ii. 12. Compare Stewart's First Dissert, p. 86, 93. ' I call natural laws those which nature dictates in all ages, to all men, for the maintenance of that justice which she (say what they will of her) hath implanted in our hearts. Theft, violence, homicide, ingratitude to bene- ficent parents, perjury against innocence, conspiracies against one's country, are crimes that are universally and justly punished, though with more or less severity. ' I call political laws those that are made in compliance with present necessity, whether it be to give stability to the government, or to prevent misfortune.' — Voltaire, Commentary on Beccaria, c. 14; Engl. tr. ' S'il n'existoit pas une loi ecrite, il existoit des coutumes universelle- ment reverees, plus puissantes chaque jour par cela meme, qu'elles etoient plus antiques. Ces coutumes etoient de veritables lois ; elles en avoient toute la force : on pourroit citer des peuples dont les institutions furent celebres, et le sont encore, quoi qu'elles n'aient jamais ete confiees a la memoire des hommes. Parlerons nous de cette loi plus ancienne que tous les decrets, aussi ancienne que le genre humain? Fondee sur ce qui convient le plus a nos facultes, a notre organisation, a nos besoins, elle est comme le centre d'oii partent et ou doivent aboutir tous nos sentimens, toutes nos affections, tous nos droits, tous nos devoirs. Des rivages glaces d' Archangel aux terres fe'eondes de la Sicile, la loi naturelle atteint tous les hommes ; elle les atteint sous le dais d'un trone comme sous le toit use d'une cabane antique ; elle atteint leurs actions comme leurs pensees, dirige leur instinct, corrige leurs penchans, domine leur conscience : elle inspire les seules regies qui puissent partout et toujours determiner le veritable interet de tous, et assurer par la vertu ce bonheur, objet constant des societes humaines.' — Pastoret, Traite de la Legislation, torn. i. p. 32. The application of the word law both to external and human nature was familiar to the ancients ; thus, in Ovid, Met. xv. 71 : ' qua sidera lege mearent.' Lucan, i. 641-5 : ' Aut hie errat (ait) nulla cum lege per sevuni Mundus, et incerto discurrunt sidera motu ; Aut, si fata movent, orbi generique paratur Humano matura lues.' See also ii. 2, 10; x. 228. The same application of the word lex to laws of nature occurs in the following passages: * Fruges maturitatem statuto tempore expectant : adeo etiam ilia, sensus omnis expertia, tamen sua lege mitescunt.' — Curt. vi. 3. ' Quid ergo miramur cometas, tam rarum mundi spectaculum, nondum teneri legibus certis : nee initia illorum fines- que notescere, quorum ex ingentibus intervalhs recursus est?' — Seneca, Nat. Quasi, vii. 25. The phrase ' lex natural was also applied to the moral world. It was a saying of Epicurus, that ' divitia sunt ad legem natura? composita paupertas.' — Seneca, Ep. 27, § 8. SECT. 3.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 35 methods which attempt to universalize the matter, as well as the form of law, are fallacious. At the best, they serve to confuse, and not unfrequently they lead to practical errors of serious magnitude, by investing with a fictitious dignity a set of prin- ciples, which persons possessed for the moment of supreme power, in some country, have thought fit to call natural. As there are no universal principles of the civil jurisprudence which belongs to each community, so there are no universal principles of international law which are common to all com- munities. The proof of this proposition has been satisfactorily set forth by Mr. Ward, in his History of the Law of Nations: ' What is commonly called the law of nations (he says) is not the law of all nations, but only of such sets or classes of them as are united together by similar religions and systems of morality.' ("') Afterwards he adds: 'We see, then, the effect of religion, morals, and government, not only upon the genius and laws of particular people, but upon whole districts of the earth ; and where there are such opposing principles acting upon the minds and conduct of different classes of nations, it is in vain that you expect them all to conform to the same law in their public intercourse ; equally, perhaps, in vain, as if you expected the spirit of every government, and of every code of municipal law, to be the same throughout those states which, according to us, obey the same law of nations. When, therefore, we make use of the common expressions, ' the law of nations/ or ' the whole world/ they arc seldom to be taken in the extensive sense which is implied by those terms, but always with such modifications as the subject we may happen to be upon will point out to us. Thus, in relating the transactions of Indian or African empires, such expressions would merely mean the law of Indian or African nations, and the Indian or African world; and so, also, in OUT own daily transactions in Europe, we mean by them nothing more than the law of the European nations, or the European world/(-') Again, he remarks thai when we } natives of Europe, (25) Ch. 4, vol. i. p. L27. (a6) Tb. p. L57. i) 2 .'><') OH POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xv. or of European colonics, speak of the law of nations, we mean only the nations of OUT own set — that is, of Europe. ( :r ) The theory of a universal natural law, and of universal natural rights, is often connected with the belief in a ' state of nature/ as to which wc shall say more hereafter. (" 8 ) By the state of nature, is meant that state in which each community is assumed to have been before the formation of its government. It is further assumed that we are informed concerning this state of things; and, next, that a certain law and certain rights existed in this assumed state of nature, which law and rights either are, or ought to be, still in force. The whole reasoning consists of a series of arbitrary assumptions, which fall asunder upon the first touch of criticism ; its currency and acceptance have been owing to the habit, illustrated elsewhere, ( 2D ) of taking for granted that the origin of every community is known to us as a matter of fact, and that we can argue down from it to the actual state of things, as from a fixed point. ( 30 ) The attempt to found universal principles of legislation and jurisprudence upon a supposed state of nature, may be compared with the attempt to found a universal rule of Christian faith upon (27) lb. p. 162. Wheaton (Elements of International Law, part i. eh. 1, § 9) lays it down, that there is no universal and immutable law of nations binding upon the whole human race. (28) Below, ch. xviii. § 6 ; ch. xxii. § 20. (29) Below, ch. xxvii. § 3. (30) ' Of all the terms that we employ in treating of human affairs, those of natural and unnatural are the least determinate in their meaning. Opposed to affectation, frowardness, or any other defect of the temper or character, the natural is an epithet of praise ; but, employed to specify a conduct which proceeds from the nature of man, can serve to distinguish nothing, for all the actions of men are equally the result of their nature. At most, this language can only refer to the general and prevailing sense or practice of mankind; and the purpose of every important inquiry on this subject may be served by the use of a language equally familiar, and more precise. What is just or unjust? what is happy or wretched, in the manners of men? what, in their various situations, is favourable or ad- verse to their amiable qualities ? are questions to which we may expect a satisfactory answer ; and whatever may have been the original state of our species, it is of more importance to know the condition to which we our- selves should aspire, than that which our ancestors may be supposed to have left.' — Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society, part i. sect. i. SECT. 3.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 37 the supposed catholicity of the church. Both the state of nature and the catholicity of the church are, in truth, not facts but hypotheses ; they are ideal, not actual states ; and, therefore, all deductions from them which assume their reality, and involve the assumption that they are positive phenomena, must be de- ceptive. It sometimes happens that a real model is propounded for universal imitation, as the doctrine and discipline of the church of Rome and its canon law, the civil law of Rome, the common law of England; so the Latin and the French have been severally recommended as a universal language. More often, however, an ideal model is conceived, which is thought worthy by its author of adoption in all countries. Political models of this sort may be compared with the projects of a universal scientific language, to be current throughout the whole world of science, (") and of a universal system of weights and measures, to be used, like the algebraic and arithmetical notation, by all civilized nations. ('-) Lord Bacon, in treating of universal jurisprudence, has in- dicated the only point of view from which this subject can In- correctly regarded. He speaks of exhibiting a ' character quidam et idea jnsti,' which shall serve as a general type or model for the special legislation of each separate state.( xi ) By substituting an ideal pattern for a universal law of nature, we express thai portion of truth which the theory of natural law includes. The (,y) ' Feut-etre seroit-il utile aujoiird'hni d'instiltier mic laiujuc cVrilo (|ui, ivscrviV miiijuemcnt pour les sciences, n'exprimant que cea oombi- naiaona d'ideea Bimples qui se retrouvent exactemen.1 Lea me a dans tons les csprits, u'c'tant employee que pom- dee raiflonnemena d'une rigueur logique, pour dee operations de I'entendement, precises el calculeea, tut entendue par les hommes de bona Lea paya, el Be traduisit dans tons Leura ididmea, aana pouvoir B'alterer comme eux, en paaaant dans L'uaage commun.' — Condorcet, Tableau Hwtorigw des Progrea de VJEtprit Ewnam,^.d; and see p. 290, 301 (ed. L822). (32) Compare Comte, Cuius fj.eva, ecos av 17 avrf) cpvcris CivQpunrav r), fiaWnv t)e kcu rjcrvxairepa Kai reus eiSecrt HirjWayfjLtva, cos uv £Kcicttcu cu fifratoiXal ra>v £wtvx<-<>)v c'cptcrTcovTcu. — Thuc. hi. 82. opoia yap cos eirl to ttoXu tci ut\- \ovTa Tois yfyovocrt. — Aristot. Ithet. ii. 20, § 8. ' The nature of man seems to be the same in all times and places, but varied, like their Btatures, c plexions, and features, by the force and in- fluence of the several climates where they are born and bred, which pro- duce in them, by a different mixture of the humours and ope ration of 1 1 1. ■ air, a different and unequal course of imaginations and passions, and con- sequently of discourses and actions.' — Sir AY. Temple, Essay upon the ( triijnml and Nature nf (.Ion nunc nt j Wo, 'Jc8, vol. ii. p. 29, ed. 8V0. Spinoza (True/. Pol. ,-. 7, § 27) lays down, in arguing, the proposition, ' natura una el communis omnium est.' ' Remarquez-le avec soin : Les memes lois, les memos passions, les mdmes moeturs, les memes vertus, les memes vices, out constammenl produil les memesefl'cts ; le sort .1 - . ' 1 ; 1 1 3 1 ieni, d s, : i des principes Axes, unmuables, et certains.' — Mably . (,-57) See De Leg. i. 1", LI, where the identity of human nature in differenl countries is insisted on with much amplification. I'> ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV eyes ? hatli not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affec- tions, passions ? fed with the same food, hurt with the same \\ eapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Chris- tian is ? If you prick us, do we not bleed ? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge ?'( 3S ) To say that a man is liable to anger and fear, that he seeks pleasure and avoids pain, is, indeed, equivalent to saying that he is a red-blooded animal, and that he has a heart with four cavities — one proposition expresses an ethical, the other a physio- logical, fact common to the human race. In every country, and in every form of civilization, there are certain common desires and feelings, which determine men to action and govern their practical conduct. But the circumstances which awaken these feelings differ so much, according to time and place, that it is difficult to lay down general propositions concerning them. The feeling of anger or pity may be substantially the same in all men ; but the circumstances which call it into active operation are wholly dissimilar. That which would arouse the anger of a man in one state of civilization, would produce no such effect in another. The man of European culture would feel sympathy or compassion on occasions which would create no such feeling in the mind of an Oriental. A similar remark applies to different countries of the western civilization, and also to different classes and different persons in the same community. All men seek what is pleasant, and avoid what is painful; but their notions of pleasure and pain, in the concrete, are almost infinitely various. It is a very different proposition to say, that all men are liable to anger and pity, that they avoid what is painful and seek what is pleasant ; and to say that, under certain defined circumstances, all men will feel anger or pity, or that certain things are painful or pleasant to all men. In like manner, it is one thing to say (38) Merchant of Venice, act iii. sc. 1. Compare Seneca de Ird, iii. 2 : ' ]S"ulla gens est, quam non ira instiget, tarn inter Graios quam barbaros potens.' SECT. 4.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 41 that all men have a brain, a spinal column, a heart, &c, and another to say that certain sorts of food, or certain modes of life, are healthy or unhealthy for all men. Attempts have, indeed, been made by historians and politicians, from the earliest commencement of intelligent political observa- tion, to generalise the operation of certain active principles, and to lay down universal propositions with respect to the manner in which men in large bodies, or the average ordinary man, will act under certain assumed circumstances. Propositions of this sort do not profess to express a law of nature winch shall be abso- lute, immutable, and unerring, like the law of gravitation, the law of reflection of light, and other laws in physics. They aim only at being general presumptions, which, like presumptions in law, are taken to be true until they are shown, in the individual case, to be false. Many propositions of this land, founded on a wide induction of facts in the countries within the writer's horizon, and therefore useful within those limits as a practical guide to conduct, may be cited. Tims, Thucydides describes the Athe- nians, in the Melian conference, as saying, that it is a universal law of man's nature for the strong to govern the weak ; that the Athenians neither established this principle, nor were the first to use it, and that it will continue in use by all others, in their position, to the end of time.(' J ) In another place, a speaker in an assembly of delegates from different Sicilian states, is repre- sented as declaring, that he does not blame the Athenians for their encroachments upon Sicily, for that it is the universal nature of man that he should exercise dominion over those that submit, but that he should take precautions against aggression. ('") The (,39) v. 105. Compare the argument of Callicles, in the Qorgicu of Plato, c. 80-7, p. 483-4; and the fifth axiom of Plato, above, |>. 28. ' Et qnoniam enm prius ageretor pro injustiliir parlilms OOntrajuati- liiim, et diccrctur, nisi per injusi iti.nn rempublioam stare augexique non fiossc ; hoc \cluti ralidissimum positum erat, injustum esse, at homines lominibus dominantilma acrviant : quarn tames injustil iani nisi sequatnx imperiosa eivitas, cujus est magP" roHpublica, imn cam posts!" provinciis impcrare.' — Cic. dc Sep. iii. 21 ; ap. Angostin, Oiv. Dei, xix. 21. (40) iv. 61. Compare Dionysius, Ant. Horn, i. 5: virteas yX (lv " f>< Tu>v i]TT('>vu>v TOVS kjh'it- Tovas. L2 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [cilAr. XV. principle thus laid down by Thucydides is not intended to give a scientific explanation of the manner in which government is conducted, for in this case he would have enounced an identical proposition ; but it is intended to enforce the doctrine, that when- ever one community has the power of reducing another community to subjection, it will invariably exercise that power ; and that the exercise of power under such circumstances is a universal law of human nature. ( 41 ) Machiavel, in his Prince, lays it down that men in general are wicked and faithless, whence he infers that any ruler who relies on other men keeping faith with him is sure to be deceived, and that it is necessary for him to anticipate the treachery of others, by his own constant use of deceit and falsehood. ( 4: ) Something similar to these general affirmations respecting the conduct which all men are likely to pursue, under certain circumstances, is the proposition, that all men act according to their interest ; from which it has been attempted to deduce a general theory of government. ( 43 ) But propositions such as those which have been just adduced, namely, that the strong always reduce the weak to subjection — that all men are bad, and violate then promises and engagements — that all men act accord- ing to their own exclusive interest, ("") unless they are so limited and attenuated by verbal interpretations, as to become nearly identical propositions, and to lose their obvious meaning — can- not be taken as absolute and universal truths. In many cases, (41) Conquest and power over neighbours are the end of some consti- tutions, according to Aristot. Pol. vii. 2 : trap eviois 8e /cat T^f irokiTeias ovtos opos rap vopwv, cirrus 8e cttto^uxti ray 7reXas. The Cretan laws were framed merely with reference to war, according to Plat. Leg. iv. 2, p. 705. Compare Aristot. Pol. ii. 9. (42) ' Non puo pertanto un Signore prudente, ne debbe, osservare la fede, quando tale osservanzia gli torni contro, e che sono spente le cagioni che la fecero promettere. E se li uomini fussero tutti buoni, questo pre- cetto saria buono ; ma perche sono tristi, e non V osserverebbero a te, tu ancora non Thai da osservare a loro.' — Principe, c. 18. (43) See Mill's System of Logic, b. vi. c. 8. (44) ' It is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of vanity or ambition intervene.' — Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. vii. p. 258. sect. 4.] ON POLITICAL ^THEORY. 43 sometimes in the majority of cases, they may prove true j but in many other cases they prove false. Men do not always act in the manner which these propositions describe. Nor even when they do violate engagements, and act for then* own exclusive advantage, to the detriment of others, do they always carry their breaches of faith, and their pursuit of their interest, to the same length, or seek to attain then ends by the same means. Propo- sitions of this extent, if taken as practical guides in politics, in then full acceptation and literal construction, without qualifica- tion or adjustment to circumstances, and recognised as descrip- tive of a universal fact, are sure to mislead. In following the successive events of political history, and in tracing the operation of political causes, much will doubtless occur to show the pre- dominance of the bad part of human nature ; but the political philosopher, as well as the practical politician, must beware of looking on mankind with the eye of the satirist, and of seemg only the vices of men and communities, and the follies or oppres- sions of governments. Speculative and practical error may as well arise from assuming men to be worse, as from assuming them to be better, than they really are. The sarcasms of Swift or Larochefoucauld, must not be mistaken for a true account of universal human nature. Many other apophthegms or general propositions concerning man, similar to those just mentioned, occur in the works of historians and politicians, and arc accepted as truths in political discussion. Such, for example, is the saying of Bias, that 'the possession of political power shows a man's true character and capacity/ ( 4,r ') According to Tacitus, it is a characteristic of (45) "PX*! '"vbpa Sfi'two-i. Sec Ari.slot. /.'///. Xir. v. 2; Diogenian, Prov. ii. 94, cum not. ('oni|i;irc J';u-iin, h'.ssai/ x i . 'Ofdreal Place.' The same thought occurs in Telemaque s ' La condition prive*e, quand on y joint no pen d'espril pour bien parler, convre tons les defauts naturels, releve des talents eblouissants, el fait paraifrc un liomme clique dc Ionics les plaoes dont il est eloigned R£ais oest L'autorite qui me\ tons les talents a une nidi' rprcuvc, ct qui deoonvre de grands detents.' — liv. x. J Fence the well- known remark of Tacitus respecting (Jalba: ' Omnium consensu eapax imperii nisi imperassct.' — Jlisl. i. I'.». II ON POLITICAL THEORY. [ciIAP. XV. human nature to hate those whom you have injured :( 4fi ) also, that those who have endured ill usage from others should themselves be cruel. ( i; ) It has been remarked, that a common danger draws together the bitterest enemies :(**) that he whom many fear, must liar many :("') that the maintenance of faith on one side produces a disposition to maintain it on the other : that soldiers fight best in a just cause :( 5 ") that expressions of hatred against men in power are more often sincere than professions of friendship. ( 51 ) The mutability and inconstancy of a large multitude — its proneness to pass from one extreme of feeling to another, from servility to insolence, from exultation to depression, from anger to pity, and its moveability by external influences, have often been re- marked.^ 52 ) On the other hand, it has been maintained that (46) ' Proprium kuruani ingenii est odisse, quern keseris.' — Tacit. Agric. c. 42. See Sen. de Ira, ii. 33, § 1 : ol 8'ev neTroirjKOTes (piXovcri kol uycnraxri roi/s ev nenavOoTas. — Aristot. Etli. N. ix. 7. (47) Pufus, an old soldier who had risen from the ranks : ' Vetus operis ae laboris, et eo immitior quia toleraverat.' — Ann. i. 20. ' Les hommes extremement heureux, et les hommes extremement malheureux, sont egalement portes a la durete, temoin les moines et les conquerants. II n'y a que la mediocrite, et le melange de la bonne et de la mauvaise fortune, qui donnent de la douceur et de la pitie.' — Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, vi. 9. Also Juvenal, of the great : ' Rarus enim ferine sensus communis in ilia Fortuna.' viii. 73. The remark of Tacitus appears to be oftener true than that of Juvenal. (48) crvvayei rovs e^dio-rovs 6 koivos v tv)(oi, Trpos irvevfia /3pa^v Kopvaaerai, kuv tis airia yevrjTai, tov 7to\itt)v Karernev. (Meineke. Com. Fragm. vol. iv. p. 615.) ' Militis animum mitigavit, ut est mos vulgo, mutabilem subitis. et tarn SECT. 4.] OX POLITICAL THEORY. 45 popular bodies are not fickle in their attachments to persons; ( S3 ) and Mr. Macaulay says that the common people are constant to their favourites, but chuse them ill.( 54 ) All treatises of descriptive ethics, all collections of apo- phthegms and proverbs, contain propositions of this sort, which profess to state generally how men act in a certain set of cir- cumstances. (") It is true, for example, in general, that parents love their children, and that children love their parents; that husbands love their wives, and that wives love their husbands — though these propositions are not universally true. In all general reasoning, even for practical purposes, such propositions may be assumed as representing the ordinary and prevalent state of things, but in individual action, such general presumptions must, where it is possible, be corrected by positive testimony as to the actual facts of the case. For example, in framing a law with respect to the testamentary disposition of property for an entire nation, it may be assumed that parents are desirous of providing for and benefiting their children ; but if Sir Robert Walpole, in his political conduct, had applied the general presumption of a friendly relation between father and son to the special case of George the Second and Frederick Prince of Wales, without in- pronum in miscricordiam quam immodicum sn?vitia.' — Tacit. Hist. i. 69. 'Ut vcro deformis et dens et prater spem incolumis valens process il . gau- (liimi, miseratio, favor; versi in hctitiam, ut est valgus utroquc immodicum.' — Ih. ii. "J!». Speaking of the military system of Augustus, Gibbon says: ■ Tii'' ii""[' ' • ' ■' i iic fondest attachment I" the bouse of Caesar ; I ml the attachments of the multitude arc capricious and inconstant.' — Decline (tinl Fall, c. :*, vol. i. |>. 96. ' Nihil tain inccrlum ncc tain inastiinaliile est, quam animi multitudinis.' — Livy, xxxi. 34. (53) Grote, Hist. "J' <•'/•. vol. iv. p. 504 (54) History of Eng. vol. i. p. 631. The rarietj of opinions expi by eminent writers on the Bubject of popular fickleness may perhaps be somewhat diminished by the remark, thai insincerity lias sometimes been mistaken for instability, and thai the withdrawal of popular favour from the (alien may be owing rather to meanness than to change of opinion Hence Juvenal : 'Sequitur fortunam ut Bemper, et odil I ).ininaliirt . . . .' x. l'.\. Sec Plutarch, Demetr. 80. (55) The Politico,, or ( Hmlis Doctrina, of Lipsiua t Opt ra, torn, iv.), eon tains ii large collection of general sentences from the classical writers upon all branches of politics. H'> ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. quiring into the actual facts, he would have committed serious practical errors. Genera] presumptions respecting the operation of the moral sentiments likewise require to be modified, not only according to persons, but also according to time and place, as will be shown more at length in the next chapter. Feelings which operate with intensity in one state of civilization, and in one community, sometimes act feebly in another state of civilization and in another community. § 5 Another class of propositions belonging to the same head, are those which attempt to lay down universal affirmations respecting the character and influence of political power, and of certain political forms or institutions. Taking for granted the definitions of positive politics, and assuming that we know what a government is, what are its parts, organs, and functions — in short, that we know of the body politic what a physiologist teaches us of the body natural — we may pro- ceed to ask what is the character and operation of a government constituted in a certain manner, or composed of persons belong- ing to a certain class? what is the operation of a law making certain enactments, prohibiting or permitting certain things ? what are the practical effects of such and such a tax ? what general propositions can be laid down concerning the actual working of government? With respect to the operation of political power, and the character of persons invested with or affected by it, there are such general propositions as the following : ' That no man is a good governor unless he has previously been a subject/ ( 66 ) ' That political power is easily retained by the same arts as those by which it was originally acquired/ ( 57 ) (56) hio Kai Xeyerai Kai tovto KaXcos, cos ovk ecrriv ev ap£ai firj apx^evra. — Aristot. Pol. iii. 4. ' Qui bene imperat, paruerit aliquando necesse est.' — Cic. de Leg. iii. 2. ' Nemo regere potest, nisi qui et regi.' — Seneca tie Ira, ii. 15. (57) ' Imperium facile Lis artibus retinetur, quibus initio partum est.' — Sallust, Bell. Cat. c. 2. SECT. 5.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 47 ' That all men obey willingly those who are worthy of govern- ing/f) 'That every one would rather govern than be governed. f 9 ) f That the seat of power in any state is dependent on the preponderance of property/ ( 60 ) 1 That money is the sinews of war/( fil ) 1 That no large state can long remain quiet, both at home and abroad/ ( G -) ' That it is easier to mount to high office, than to retain it. 5 ' That men fall from a high station, through the same quali- ties which enabled them to achieve it.'C 3 ) ' That the institutions and manners of maritime and insular states are peculiarly liable to change and corruption. ( M ) ' That the plains arc the seat of indolence and slavery; the mountains, of energy and liberty/ ("J (58) ' Omnes aequo animo parent, digni ubi imperant.' — Publ. Syr. 52fi. (59) ' Praterea certum est, unumquemque inalle regere quam regi.' — Spinoza, Tract. Pol c. 7, § 5. (60) ' That ' empire follows the balance of property,' whether lodged in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the first that ever made out ; and is a noble discovery, whereof the honour solely belongs to him, as much as those of the circulation of the blood, of printing, of guns, of the com- pass, or of optic glasses, to the several authors.' Of Harrington, in reference to hi< Oceana — Toland's Life, p. xviii. prefixed fco his works, vol. i. fob, ed. 1737. (61) ' Nervi belli, pecunia infinita.' — Cicero, Philipp. v. 2. Compare Machiavel, Disc. ii. 10 : ' I danari non sonoil nervo della gnerra, secondo one e la comune opinione.' (62) ' iVulla magna civitas diu quiescere potest: si foris hostem non habct, domi invenit.' — Livy, xxx. I I. (03) La Bruyere, Caracteres, c. 8. (64) Cic de Sep. ii. I. Speaking of the Greek islands, he says: 'Quid dicam insulas Grasciffl, qua: fluctibus cincta- nalant pa'nr ipsa 1 simul ctiin civitatium institutis ct moribufl.' The neighbourhood of the sea produces a mercantile life, and a mercan- tile life produces faithlessness and cunning. Plato, Leg. iv. i. p. 704-6 Compare Aristot. Pol. rii. 6 j with Grote, aist. of Or. 70I. i. p. Z96. (65) Montesquieu, Esprit <>> Lois, xviii. 1-8 j v'olney, Voyageen Egypte etenSyrie, torn. 1. p. K'>.>. The latter writer, however, perceives thai this proposition requires limitation. A different remark with reaped fco a mountainous country occurs in the Baron de Toil's Memoirea awr lea '/'"res et leu Tartarcs : ' Lea Lieux lea pins escarpe' on! fcoujours 6ti I'asyle de la liberty, ou le repaire de la fcyrannie.' ' Lea rochers aonl en effel le Bite le plus capable de dumper lee oraintea qui assie'genl lea oppreaaeura et les oppri nn's. — Tom. ii. p. 95 I s ON POLITICAL THEORY. [CHAP. XV. 1 That inequality is always the cause of political revolution or conflict.' (" fi ) ' That absolute princes love bad men and flatterers, and hate good men and honest counsellors/ ( 6 ") ' That courtiers are the flatterers of the prince ; and that they are characterized by falsehood, treachery, perfidy, faithless- ness to engagements, low ambition, pride to inferiors, servility to superiors, and a habit of turning virtue into ridicule/ ( r ' s ) ' That demagogues are the flatterers of the people, and that they are characterized by venality and falsehood, by an unscru- pulous desire of using the people for their own purposes, of in- flaming their bad passions, of misleading their judgment, and of stimulating their antipathy against the better class of citizens/ ( 69 ) ' That clergymen understand the least, and take the worst measure of human affairs, of all mankind that can write and read/( 70 ) (66) TravTaxov Sta to avicrov rj crracris. — Aristot. Pol. V. 1. (67) TTovrjpofyikov rj Tvpawis. — Aristot. Pol. v. 11. ' Regibus boni, quani inali, suspectiores sunt, seruperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est.' — Sallust. Catil. 7. On the meaning of rex in the Latin authors see above, vol. i. p. 89, n. 22. ' Souvent les princes, faute de savoir en quoi consiste la vraie vertu, ne savent point ce qu'ils doivent chercher dans les liommes. La vraie vertu a pour eux quelque chose d'apre ; elle leur parait trop austere et indepen- dante ; elle les effraye et les aigrit : ils se tournent vers la natterie. Des lors Us ne peuvent plus trouver ni de sincerite ni de vertu ; des lors ils courent apres un vain fantome de fausse gloire, qiu les rend indignes de la veritable. Ils s'accoutument bientot a croire qu'il n'y a point de vraie vertu sur la terre ; car les bons connaissent bien les mediants, mais les mechants ne con- naissent point les bons, et ne peuvent pas croire qu'il y en ait.' — Teld- tnaque, liv. xviii. (68) ' L'ambition dans l'oisivete, la bassesse dans l'orgueil, le desir de 8'enricliir sans travail, l'aversion pour la verite, la flatterie, la trahison, la perfidie, l'abandon de tous ses engagemens, le mepris des devoirs du citoyen, la crainte de la vertu du prince, l'esperance de ses foiblesses, et, plus que tout cela, le ridicule perpetuel jete sur la vertu, forment, je crois, le caractere du plus grand nombre des courtisans, marque dans tous les lieux et dans tous les temps.' — Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, iii. 5. Compare La Bruyere, Caracteres, c. 8, ' DelaCour.' The description of Montesquieu, though couched in general terms, is in fact derived from the French court. (69) See Hermann's Pol. Ant. of Greece, § 69, and the writers quoted by him. Compare Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. vii. p. 257. (70) The words of Lord Clarendon, Life, vol. i. p. 66 ; ed. 8vo. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 49 The following general character of seamen occurs in Lord Clarendon's History of the Rebellion. ' The seamen are a nation by themselves, a humorous and fantastic people ; fierce and rude in whatsoever they resolve or are inclined to, unsteady and inconstant in pursuing it, and jealous of those to-morrow by whom they are governed to- day.'H Tacitus says that astrologers are a race of men faitliless to the powerful, and deceitful to the sanguine, who will always be prohibited at Rome, yet always retained there. ( 7 ' 2 ) Sir Henry Wotton's jocular definition of an ambassador is well-known : f Legatus est vir bonus pcregre missus ad mentien- dum reipublicse causa/ (" 3 ) Propositions such as those just mentioned, like the other more general principles of human nature cited before, have no other claim to universality than that they are, or may be, general presumptions, which represent the majority of cases, and may be accepted as true until, in any given instance, they are dis- covered to be false. § 6 The most common form of the universal proposition respecting the practical operation of government, is an attempt to lay down the effects of certain political forms, laws, and institu- tions. This is the region in which the political theorist expa- tiates : he takes a certain form of government, a law of a certain sort, or a certain mode of administration or judicature, and he lays down universal propositions respecting the effects which it produces, without reference to time, place, or nation. Thus, it may be said that the tear of punishment deters men, the hope of reward stimulates them: that insecurity of property represses industry and frugality, and prevents the accumulation of wealth : that high rates of taxation diminish consiunpl ion. Thoc are propositions of causation applicable to all forms of government, (71) B. xi. vol. vi. p. 33 ; ed. Oxford, L839. (72) J fist. i. 22. (73) Izaak Walton's TJwet, p. 87j edi Oxford. Compare the Long character of diplomatic agents in La Bruyere, o. L0. vol. ir. r. T)0 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xv. but we may likewise take certain political forms, and inquire what effects they produce, and M'hat are their essential characteristics. For example, assuming that the precise nature of the three forms of government, and the demarcation between them, have been ascertained by positive politics, we may proceed to ask what are the practical effects and operation of monarchy, of aristocracy, and of democracy. This is a question to which numerous answ r ers have been given by nearly all the speculative writers on politics. From Plato downwards, there is scarcely one who has not attempted to characterize the several forms of government, under the names of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, or under some kindred appellations. Of all these writers, however, there is none who has traced the several forms of government to such remote con- sequences, or has connected them with such heterogeneous facts, as Montesquieu ; and for that reason, a series of extracts from the Esprit des Lois, in which his views on this subject are con- tained, will serve to exemplify the method adopted by eminent writers for describing the characteristics of political forms. According to Montesquieu, each of the two main divisions of forms of government — viz. the government of one, and the government of several, ( 74 ) is subdivided into two classes. The government of one has no generic name; its two species are called monarchy and despotism : monarchy is where a single person governs, but by fixed and established laws — despotism is where a single person, without laws and rules, determines every- thing by his will and caprice. The government of several bears the generic name of republic. Republics are of two sorts. When the people in a body possess the sovereign power, the government is a democracy. When the sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the people, the government is called an aristocracy. ( 75 ) Such is Montesquieu's division of the forms of (74) ' La force generale peut etre placee entre les mains d'un seul, ou entre les mains de plusieurs.' — 1-3. (75) ii. 1 and 2. With respect to the definition of despotism, compare vi. 3. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 51 government, a division which it is necessary to bear in mind, in order to understand the respective characteristics which he assigns to them. Its chief peculiarity consists in the use of monarchy, as a specific term, distinguished from despotism. In general, when the three forms of government are spoken of, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, are meant. When Montesquieu speaks of the three forms of government, monarchy, despotism, and republic are signified. This classification, however, is so far defective, that it co-ordinates the generic name republic (which is itself subdivided into species) with the two specific names, monarchy and despotism. He ought properly to speak of the four forms of government — monarchy, despotism, aristocracy, and democracy . (~ fi ) His distinction between monarchies and despotisms rests on an intelligible difference — inasmuch as a government of one may be conceived as administered either ac- cording to law, or arbitrarily. The same distinction, how- ever, is equally applicable to aristocracies and to democracies, as Aristotle has long ago remarked in his Politics,^ 7 ) and is not peculiar to any one form of government. (76) The ordinary triple division is partly open to the same criticism ; but it may be defended on the ground that, though monarchy is a generic, and aristocracy and democracy are specific terms, yet monarchy is not subdivided. The two divisions stand thus : ORDINARY DIVISION. 1. Government of one — 2. Government of several — Monarchy. Itepublic. 1. Aristocracy. 2. Democracy. Montesquieu's division. Government of one — 2. Government of several — (anonymous.) Republic. 1. Monarchy. 2. Despotism. 1. Aristocracy. 2. Democracy. (77) iv. 4, 5, 10. According i" Aristotle, an oligarchy aol adminis- tered according to law is called abvveurrtla \ while a monarob.3 not adminis- tered according to law is called a rc/mi'i'/v. In this respect, the rvpawlt of Aristul le corresponds to the di-s]><>lis»i of Montesquieu. The nature of the distinction between acts of a government in accordance with law and acts of a government not in accordance with law, or arbitrary, is fully illus- trated in the introduction to the author's Essay on the Government of D(]>i inii licit x, p. ir>-n;. Mr. Ilallain remarks, thai 'even English reader of the Esprit des /.fix has heen struck by the want of a pr< i distinction between despotism and monarchy. 1 — Lit. of Europe, vol. ii. p. 212. 1 •-' 52 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. It should be premised, moreover, that the scope of Montes- quieu's work is, as declared by himself, to describe the spirit of existing laws. Taking the world as it had previously been, and as it then was, he traces the relations between the laws of different countries and the circumstances of those couutries.( 78 ) The propositions which he lays down, therefore, do not represent an ideal of his own — they are, in his view, a concentrated extract of the legislative experience of mankind. In characterizing republics, he says that appointment by lot is of the nature of democracy — election by votes is of the nature of aristocracy. ( 79 ) He lays it down that the best aristocracy is that in which the part of the people wliich has no share in the governing power is so small and poor, that the domi- nant part has no interest in oppressing it.( sn ) He considers a monarchy as characterized by the powers intermediate between the prince and the people. The fundamental maxim of a monarchy is — f No monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch/ Without a nobility, the monarch becomes a despot. The power of the clergy, though dangerous in a republic, is wholesome in a monarchy, especially in one which verges to despotism. ( 81 ) It is essential to despotism, he thinks, that the despot should be lazy, ignorant, and voluptuous, and that he should, in practice, delegate .all the powers of government to a single minister, who becomes like an Oriental vizier.^) (78) See i. 3. (79) ii. 2. This seems to be his meaning, though he says : ' Le suffrage par le sort est de la nature de la democratic.' Appointment by lot evi- dently excludes voting. This distinction between aristocracies and demo- cracies seems to be borrowed from Aristotle's Politics. It has little reference to modern, or even to mediseval institutions. — See Pol. iv. 15. (80) ii. 3. (81) ii. 4. ' Abolissez dans une monarchie les prerogatives des seigneurs, du clerge, de la noblesse et des villes, vous aurez bientot un etat populaire, ou bien un etat despotique.' From the reference made to the example of England, he seems here to treat England as an 'etat populaire,' and not as a monarchy. Elsewhere, however, he makes an ' etat popu- laire' synonymous with democracy. — See iii. 3, 4. In v. 19, England is referred to as a country ' ou la republique se cache sous la forme de la monarchic' (82) ii. 5. It is difficult to know to which head of Montesquieu's divi- sion the government of Eome under Augustus, of England under Crom- SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 53 He next proceeds to describe the principles of the several forms of government. The principle of a government is its motive power — the human passions which set it in action. A monarchy and a despotism (he says) may be maintained without a great amount of honesty. The power of the law in the former, the prince's arin in the latter, preserve order. But in a demo- cracy another engine of government is necessary: viz., virtue. ( 9r ) In an aristocracy, virtue is less necessary. The people are kept down by the laws, but it is difficult to compel submission among the nobles themselves, who form a body of equals. Hence, a spirit of moderation, founded on virtue, is the principle of an aristocracy. ( 8I ) In monarchies, virtue is banished by the influ- ence of courtiers, in whose character the bad part of human nature predominates :( s5 ) its place is supplied by honour, which aims at preferences and distinctions. ( Sli ) Ambition is pernicious in a republic, but is beneficial in a monarchy. ( sr ) In a des- potism, virtue is unnecessary, and honour would be dangerous — fear is the principle of this form of government. ( ss ) In a despotism, the action of the governing power is more direct and resistless than in a monarchy ; there are fewer compromises and remonstrances ; but in both, the nature of the power wielded by the one ruler is the same. The only difference is, that in a monarchy the prince is more enlightened, and the ministers well, and of France under Napoleon, ought to be referred. (ITe considers the government of Domitian as a despotism, on account of its military character. — iii. 9.) If these governments were despotisms, the character which lie assigns to the despot is wholly inapplicable to them. Even those Oriental despots who founded dynasties, such as Cyrus, do not correspond with his description. In truth, the distinction which Monlesipiieu makes between monarchies and despotisms is one which it. is nearly impossible to draw. Every government is, to a great extent, administered according to law. A despot may set, aside the law when he thinks lit; hul in ninely- nine cases out of a hundred, he does not (hinl lit. [f wc confine our- selves to a siiujlv act of a government, we can say whether it is in accord- ance with law or not ; but it is impossible to -ay generally, thai a govern- menl is not administered according to law. There may be B habil of dis- regarding the law when it suits the wishes or supposed interest of the government. (83) iii. 3. (84) iii. A. (85) iii. 5. (86) iii. 6. (87) iii. 7. (88) iii. 9. 5 I ON POLITICAL THEORY. [CHAP. XV. more able, than in a despotism. ( s ") Such, he adds, are the principles of the three governments ; but he does not expect to find them in every case. There may be a republic without virtue, a monarchy without honour, and a despotism without fear ; but without its proper principle, each government would be imperfect. ( B ") He next proceeds to apply these distinctions. The laws of education, he says, have a different object in each of the three forms of government. In monarchies, it is honour ; in republics, virtue; in a despotism, fear.( 91 ) In monarchies, honour, which permits gallantry, is the standard of manners, and, hence, private morality is never so pure in monarchies as in republics. ( 92 ) In monarchies, education strives to elevate the feelings — in des- potisms, to depress them and make men servile. In a despotism, every house is a separate empire, and education is limited to inculcating fear, and teaching the elements of religion. ( 93 ) Edu- cation is most important in republics. In these, it teaches patriotism and attachment to the law. These feelings are par- ticularly manifested in democracies. ( 94 ) The next subject is the relation of the laws to each form of government.^ 5 ) Virtue, in a republic, means the love of the republic ;( 96 ) in a democracy, the love of the republic is a love of the democracy, and a love of a democracy is a love of equality and frugality. The love of equality in a democracy limits each man's ambition to the desire of rendering greater services to his country than the other citizens ; while the love of frugality limits the desire of wealth to an endeavour to obtain necessaries for one's self, and superfluities for the state. ( 97 ) In monarchies and despotisms no one aims at equality or frugality. In a democracy, these ends ought, as far as possible, to be attained by an equal division of the land into small lots. (89) iii. 10. (90) iii. 11. (91) iv. 1. (92) iv. 2. (93) iv. 3. (94) iv. 5. (95) v. 1. (96) v. 2. (97) y- 3. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 55 In a commercial democracy, however, there may be persons of great wealth, without corruption of manners ; the reason is, that the spirit of commerce produces frugality, economy, industry, moderation, wisdom, and order. ( 98 ) In an aristocracy, the spirit of moderation takes the place of the spirit of equality in a democracy. Modesty and simplicity of manners form the strength of aristocratic nobles. The two chief sources of disturbances in aristocratic states are extreme inequality be- tween those who govern and those who are governed, and the same inequality between different members of the governing body. An aristocracy in which the nobles divide among them- selves taxes levied upon the people, is the most harsh of all governments. Distributions made among the people are per- nicious in a democracy, but beneficial in an aristocracy. In an aristocracy, the nobles ought to be prohibited from engaging in trade — for trade is the profession of men who are equal. (") Honour being the principle of a monarchy, the laws ought to be so framed as to maintain the hereditaiy importance of the nobles. ( lou ) Monarchical government has a great advantage over republican government in this respect, that its affairs being managed by one person, there is greater rapidity in the execution. It has like- wise a great advantage over a despotic government, because, in a monarchy, the orders intermediate between the prince and the people give greater solidity to the constitution and security to the subject. ("") In a despotism, whose principle is fear, the law s are few and simple : the despot himself rarely makes war in person, and is afraid of trusting its management to his (98) v. 4-7. (99) v. 8. (100) v. 9. (101) v. 10, 11. In the time of Montesquieu, the solidity of (lie French monarchy was still undoubted. The Esprit dea Eott WBS published jus! fifty-one years before the breaking out or the French revolution. Niebuhr remarks, thai ' Montesquieu lived at a time when men bad grown weary of repose, and not having known a revolution for many generations, longed for one to season the insipidity of life.' //is/my of Uome, vol. Li. p LSI, Eng. tr. In the time ofMontesquieu, the French monarchy was believed, both by natives and foreigners, to res< on an immovable basis; nobody feared a revolution, but, on the other band, it can hardly be said with truth that a revolution was generally desired. o\ 7 (3 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. lieutenants. ( 1K ) In a despotism, all that is required is to recon- cile the political and civil government with the domestic govern- ment — the officers of the state with those of the seraglio. Reli- gion has more influence in a despotism than in any other state — it is one fear added to another. ( 103 ) Presents to rulers are odious in a republic, because virtue does not require them. In a monarchy, honour is a motive more powerful than presents ; but in a despotic state it is custo- mary to give presents, because, where there is neither honour nor virtue, a ruler can only be influenced by wealth. ( 104 ) In a despotic government, the prince rewards only by gifts of money. In a monarchy, the rewards are distinctions, and also hoDours, which lead to fortune. In a republic, the state rewards only by testimonials of virtue. ( 105 ) Offices ought to be saleable in a monarchy, but not in a despotism. ( 106 ) Severity of punishment suits a despotic government, whose principle is fear, better than a monarchy and a republic, which depend on honour and virtue. ( lor ) Clemency is the distinctive quality of monarchs. In republics, it is less necessary. In a despotic state, it is less used, because the grandees must be restrained by examples of severity. ( 10s ) In republics, private crimes are more public — that is, they affect the constitution more than individuals. In monarchies, public crimes are more private — that is, they affect the fortunes of individuals more than the constitution^ 109 ) Satirical writings are hardly known in despotic states. In a democracy they are permitted : in a monarchy they are prohibited, but not by severe penalties. An aristocracy is the government which proscribes them with the greatest severity. ( uo ) (102) This seems one of the most singular of Montesquieu's generaliza- tions, and most manifestly repugnant to experience. It is not even true of the Oriental despots, whom he had principally in his mind. (103) v. 14. (104) v. 17. (105) v. 18. (106) v. 19. (107) vi. 9. (108) vi. 21. (109) iii. 5. (no) xii. 13. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 57 The nature of a republic is to have a small territory ; with- out this it can hardly subsist. In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations — in a small one it is better understood. ( m ) A monarchical state ought to be of a middling size; a large empire implies a despotic form of government, without which its unity cannot be maintained. ( U2 ) Governments of one are generally in fertile, and governments of several in barren countries. ( lla ) The condition of nations conquered by a people having either a democratic or an aristocratic government is bad.f 14 ) The necessary state of a con- quering monarchy, is frightful luxury in the capital, misery in the surrounding provinces, abundance in the new acquisi- tions. ( 115 ) Immense conquests imply despotism. They can only be effected with the assistance of a praetorian guard, ready to suppress revolt at home.( 116 ) A monarch who knows each of his provinces may establish different laws, or maintain different customs ; but a despot knows nothing, and attends to nothing. He must, therefore, have a uniform and unbending ride, which permits no local diversities. ( 117 ) Luxury is necessary in monarchies, and also in despotisms : republics are destroyed by luxury, monarchies by poverty. ( U8 ) The less luxury there is in a republic, the more it approaches perfection. In proportion as luxury is established in a republic, the minds of the people are turned to their individual interest. ("") Dowries ought to be considerable in monarchies, and of middling amount in republics; wlule, in despotic states, they ought scarcely to exist, as in these the women arc almost slaves. ('-") In republics, the taxes are almost always collected directly by (III) viii. 16. (1 i-') lb. 17, 19,20. (113) xviii. 1. (1 14) x. 7. (115) x. 9. This description is probably intended to represent the effect produced upon France by the conquests of Louis X I V. (116) x. 10. ( t 1 7) vi. 1. The first part of this description refers to France. It is difficult to conjecture t<> what the second pari refers, u there are great diversities in the provincial governments of the Oriental despotisms. (118) vii. 5. mm;) vii. 2. (120) vii. 15. 58 ON POLITICAL THEOltY. [CHAP. XV. the government ; in despotic and monarchical states they are generally farmed out.( 121 ) In the government of one, trade is usually founded upon luxury : in the government of several, it is more often a commerce of transit. Great commercial enterprises are necessarily mixed "with public affairs ; hence they suit republics, and not monarchies ; as, in the former, merchants rely on the government, and in the latter they distrust it. In a despotic country, men labour rather to preserve than to acquire ; in a free country, they labour rather to acquire than to preserve. ('") With respect to religion, a moderate government is most suitable to Christianity, and a despotic government to Mahomet- anism.( 123 ) Within the limits of Christendom, the catholic religion is most suitable to a monarchy, and the protestant religion to a republic. ( 124 ) Many other writers have incidentally laid down general pro- positions on the characteristics of the several forms of govern- ment, similar to those of Montesquieu. Thus Hume, in his Essays, declares it to be a general truth in politics, ' invariable by the humour or education either of subject or sovereign/ that free governments, though commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, are the most ruinous and oppres- sive to their provinces ; that the provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states. ( 125 ) It has been further affirmed that the arts and sciences, and also trade, can only flourish under a free government, ( 126 ) and that, the arts and sciences can only arise in a free state ; but that, when they have once arisen, they may be transplanted into a state of any political form j and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, and a civilized monarchy to that of the (121) xiii. 19. (122) xx. 4. (123) xxiv. 3. (124) lb. 5 (125) Part i. Essay 3, * That Politics may be reduced to a Science.' (126) See Hume, part i. Essay 12, ' Of Civil Liberty,' who controverts these positions. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL THEOKY. 59 arts.('- r ) Again, it has been said that in a republic there must in general be more orators, historians, and philosophers, and in a monarchy more poets, theologians, and geometers. ( 12s ) It has likewise been asserted, that none but a free government can maintain a maritime superiority.^' 29 ) M. de Tocqueville also, in his work on the United States, has, in assigning the general characteristics of democracy, carried this mode of reasoning to great lengths. Thus, he thinks that a democratic people has a tendency to pantheistic opinions, and to the use of abstract terms ; that in art, it prefers cheap and perishable productions, and that in poetry it loves a wild and monstrous style of fiction. He even goes so far as to affirm that, in an aristocracy, every person has a single object, which he pursues without cessation : whereas, in a democratic society, each person usually follows several objects at the same time.( i:!0 ) These examples show in detail the manner in which the characteristics of each of the three forms of government have been laid down by political philosophers. The propositions are in an abstract and absolute form ; they have, in their mode of expression, all the generality of a mathematical theorem ; there is nothing to suggest any qualification, or to indicate the neces- sity of limiting them according to time, place, or people. For example, when Montesquieu declares that luxury is necessary in monarchical and despotic states, whereas republics are destroyed by luxury; and again, when he says that the nature of a republic (127) lb. Essay 14, ' Of the lliso and Progress of the Arts and Sciences.' (128) ' II doit y avoir en general dans uno republique plus d'orateurs, d'historiens, et de philosophes, et dans uno monarchic plus de poiitcs, do theologiens, et de geometrcs. Cette regie n'est pourtant pas si absolue, Ju'elle ne puisse etrc altcreo et modi (ice par uno infinite do causes.' — ►'Alcmbert, Discours Prtliminaire de V EncyclopMie ; QiJuvres, torn. i. p. 297. (129) ' All history shows that, for maintaining a superiority at sea, the government at home must be, if not a free, at least a popular one.' — Lord Nugent's Memorials of Hampden, vol. i. p. 129. (r/50) La Democratic en Amerique, torn. lii. p. 59, 100, L85; torn. iv. p. 122. Compare some remarks on these and other of M. de Tocqucvillo's generalizations, in the author's Essay r "< Authority in Matters qfOpinio»i p. 412-5. 60 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. is to have a small territory, whereas a large empire implies a des- potic form of government, — the propositions are couched in as general terms as propositions in mechanics and optics, descrip- tive of the properties of solid bodies and of light. § 7 It is not consistent with the object of this inquiry to analyze in detail the general propositions which have been cited; but, for the purpose of trying this method of reasoning, let any body make a list of states, ancient and modem, divided by periods according to the changes of government ; and let him arrange these under the heads of the author's own classification, being mindful, for example, that if he is examining Montesquieu's theorems, he draws the distinction between despotisms and monarchies, between monarchies and republics, and between aris- tocracies and democracies, according to a uniform principle. If he then tests these propositions by the various instances in his list, he probably will arrive at the result, that the distinctions are, for the most part, founded on the generalization of one or a few cases, without such a previous dissection as warrants the induc- tive extension. Without, however, attempting to analyze the particular cha- racteristics of the forms of government assigned by Montesquieu and other writers, we will proceed to inquire, by more direct means, whether the method which they have adopted is sound, and whether the mode of reasoning which they have employed can lead to correct results. If it should appear that their method is sound, it might lead to correct results in different hands, even if their results should be for the most part incorrect ; on the other hand, if it should appear that their method is unsound, it ought not to be used, even if the results obtained by it should, in a few cases, have accidentally turned out to be correct. With this view, we will first attempt to classify the several forms of government under their proper heads, and then examine how far their con- sequences admit of a general expression. Despotic or absolute monarchy has been the prevailing government of the human race ; the communities under an aris- tocratic or democratic government have always been a numerical minority (though in importance sometimes the most eminent SECT. 7.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. Gl part) of mankind. ( 131 ) Until the establishment of the Greek oligarchies, after the cessation of the heroic royalty, no republican form of government, no government in wlrich the sovereign power was legally shared by several persons, had existed in the world. ( 13 -) The Oriental form of government — the type of the most advanced social system at the birth of Hellenic civilization — was purely monarchical. ( m ) The Asiatic monarch was as absolute a master of his subjects, as a Greek or Roman free citi- zen was of his slaves. He had an entire dominion over them. He could deal with them as if they were his goods or chattels, as if they were the passive instruments or insentient objects of (131) Locke (On Government, b. 2, § 105) considers monarchy as the original form of government ; and lie proceeds to assign the reasons of this fact, § 107. ' 11 sembleroit que la nature humaine se soulevcroit sans cesse contre le gouvernement despotique ; mais, malgro l'amour des hommes pour la liberte, malgre leur haine contre la violence, la plupart des peuplcs y sont soumis. Cela est aise a comprendre. Pour former un gouvernement modere, il faut combiner les puissances, les regler, les temperer, les faire agir; donner, pour ainsi dire, un lest a l'une pour la mettrc en elat de resister a une autre ; c'est un chef-d'oeuvre de legislation, que le hasard fait rarement, et que rarement on laisse faire a la prudence. Un gouverne- ment despotique, an contraire, saute, pour ainsi dire, aux yeux; il est uniforme partout : comme il ne faut que des passions pour l'etablir, tout le monde est bon pour cela.' — Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, v. 14. (132) According to Aristotle, ftacriXela was the universal primitive form of government. ku\ tovs Oeovs 5« 81a tovto nuures (pua\ fiavihfvicrQai, on Kal avrol 01 /xeV en Kai vvv, 01 de to dp\aiov etZaaChevovro. — Pal. i. 2. Compare Plat. Leff. iii. I>. p. 681. Cicero makes the same statement : ' Omncs antiquse gentes regibus quondam paruerunt. — De Leg. iii. 2. Likewise Sallust, C'atil. 2: ' Igitur initio reges (nam in tcrris nomen imperii id primum fuit) divcrsi,' &c. Justin, i. 1: ' Principio reruni, gentium n;i- tionumque imperium penes regeserat.' Compare Augustin, Ctv. Dei, iv. 6. According to Polyoma, the earliest government was monarchy, after- wards improved into royalty (vi. •"). Tacitus -ays tlial kings succeeded the golden age (Ami. iii. 26) J Seneca, that they governed during that ieriod [JSpist. 90, § '■'•-">). All these writers refer to absolute Lings. vrachiavel (Disr. \. 2) conceives mankind as ftrsl living dispersed, in a brutish state, and afterwards forming a government, by ohnsing the best man as monarch, whose descendants degenerated into tyrants. Zaoharia (/'-»,// si, mil, vol. iii. p, 97) considers absolute monarchy as H uly natural government. All other constitutions are, be think.-, the work of art. (13/5) ■ In the more early ages of the world, whilst the forest that covered Europe afforded a retreal to a fe^ wandering savages, the inhabit- ant - of \ -1 a were already collected into populous cities, ana reduced under e.xleii ue empires, the seal of t he arts, of luXUTV, and of despotism.' — (Jililiou, Deri, and Full, c. s. Speaking of inventions, Pliny says 'Hegiam civitatem .Kgvptii, popularem Attici posl Theseum.' //. A vii. 57 ; which pa sage implies thai the Greeks firs! established a popular government. E 62 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [CHAP. XV. his will.( 134 ) The same was the character of the Mexican and Peruvian governments under their native princes ; and such is the character of all Oriental governments at this day, as well as of all other barbarous communities which enjoy the advantages of a regular government. Such, too, was substantially the cha- racter of the semi-Oriental kingdoms governed by the successors of Alexander ; of the continental governments of Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ; of the government of Russia, and of the empire of Napoleon. When the Greek communities had established their political system, they were for the most part governed according to oli- garchical or democratic forms — despotism being abhorrent to the Greek sentiment and custom, and submitted to only from necessity. The same system of government prevailed throughout the states of Italy, and it lasted until the extraordinary changes produced by the conquests of Rome, and the formation of its vast empire, necessitated also a change of political system. The republican government of Rome became first in substance, and (134) The similarity of a master of slaves to a rupavvos or despot is pointed out by Plato, Pep. ix. 5, p. 578 ; and by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 10; viii. 12. rrjv i\tv6eplav Kai to prjbeva ex elv oeaw&rriv avrwv, a rots irpoTepov "F,\\t)o-iv opoi tg>v dyada>v rjaav Kai Kavoves, duarerpaCpoTes, are the words of Demosth. Cor. p. 324. Antipater (says Plutarch) was kokos 8eo-7TOTT]s Kai rvpawos. — Phocion, c. 29. Inasmuch as it was the constant aim of Augustus to exercise the substance of supreme power, without its form or appear- ance (above, ch. iv. § 3), he objected strongly to the title dominus, which would have implied that he stood in the same relation to the people, in his capacity of ruler, as a master stood to his slaves. ' Domini appellationem, ut maledictum et opprobrium, semper exhorruit.' — Sueton. Oct. c. 53. Tiberius followed the example of Augustus. — Sueton. Tib. c. 27 ; and see Pliny, in his Panegyric of Trajan, c. 2. 55. Alexander Severus likewise refused the title of dominus. — iElius Lamprid, c. 4. The Roman emperor is, however, called 6 Kvpios by Festus, in Act. Apost. xxv. 26. ' The epithet of dominus, or lord (says Gibbon), in its primitive signification, was expressive, not of the authority of a prince over his subjects, or of a commander over his soldiers, but of the despotic power of a master over his domestic slaves. Viewing it in that odious light, it had been rejected with abhorrence by the first Csesars. Their resistance insensibly became more feeble, and the name less odious ; till, at length, the style of our Lord and Emperor was not only bestowed by flattery, but was regularly admitted into the laws and public monuments.' — Decline and Fall, c. 13. ' Julian absolutely refused the title of dominus, or lord, a word which was grown so familiar to the ears of the Romans, that they no longer re- membered its servile and humiliating origin.' — lb. c. 22. The application of the word dominus to political or social superiors by the Romans is illustrated by Selden, Titles of Honour, part i. c. 4, § 1 ; and by the Abbe de la Bleterie, Hist, de Jovien, torn. ii. p. 99. SECT. 7.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 63 afterwards in form, a despotic monarch}' ; and as the Roman empire now included every community partaking of the Hellenic civilization, republican government was everywhere extinguished, and the whole world was governed by purely monarchical forms. After a time, however, the traditions of the Roman municipal institutions, combined with the activity produced by commercial wealth, led to the formation of independent town communities in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries. These subsisted for some time, with a considerable variety of oligarchical and democratic forms, ( i:i5 ) until most of them were at length in- corporated with monarchical states, or changed into a monarchi- cal regimen. The wars of the French revolution, and the con- quests of Napoleon, nearly completed the work which remained unfinished, so that the Swiss cantons, Frankfort, and the Hansc Towns, are the only subsisting remains of the republican com- munities of mediaeval origin. The chief exemplar of free, and (properly speaking) of re- publican government, in modern times, is to be sought in Eng- land. ( 136 ) The struggle between the crown and the parliament, which first assumed a serious character in the reign of Charles I., which produced the civil war, and which was not finally settled till the revolution of 1G88, was substantially a contest for the sovereign power. It was the aim of the crown, on the one hand, to assume the entire functions of government, both legislative and executive, as they were assumed by the continental kings, whose countries, like England, had feudal constitutions of estates. It was the aim of the parliament, on the other hand, to establish the practical principle, that no tax coidd be levied, and no law made, by the crown alone, without the consent of the two houses. This principle having been irrevocably esta- blished at the revolution of 1(588, the constitution, which had been previously unset i led, became unquestionably a parliamentary (135) For a detailed description of the oonatitutionB of the free towns of the middle ages, sec Raomer, Qeachichte der Kohenstattfbn, voL v. (136) That a republican in properly a non-despotic government— a government in which the supreme power ia ihared by leveral, whether Few or many, and whatever may be the title of the head of the stnte — is shown above, eh. iv. §§ 3 nwl 4. 6i ON POLITICAL THEOKY. [chap. xv. constitution. The king, therefore, was properly not a monarch ; though exempt from legal responsibility, his legal powers were limited, ( nr ) and the government, though called monarchical, was, in strictness of speech, republican, because the sovereign power was shared by a body of persons. England, however, did not exhibit a specimen of free, or (as we have called it) republican government merely on her own soil. Various colonies were planted by English settlers in North America and the West India Islands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and these, for the most part, received charters for their local government, founded on the plan of municipal government established in our boroughs. The model constitution of the English borough, in the form which it had assumed in the seventeenth century, consisting of a common council, with a court of aldermen, was thus transferred to the English colonies, and became the general type of the colonial constitution. Hence arose the house of assembly and the legis- lative council — the former appointed by the election of the colonists ; to which was added, a governor appointed by the crown. The constitution thus formed in many of the colonies of English settlement resembled the triple division of the English constitu- tion — king, lords, and commons ; but the resemblance was acci- dental, inasmuch as the origin was different. This constitution existed in the North American colonies at the time of their separation from the mother-country. The temporary confederation which they had formed for the purpose of carrying on the war against England was converted into a permanent federal system ; but the local institutions of each state remained substantially unchanged, with such modifications only as the transition from a lax dependence to independence rendered necessary. The revolutionary changes in France, accomplished in 1789 (137) ' L'Angleterre est a present le plus libre pays qui soit au moude, ie n'en excepte aucune republique ; j'appelle libre, parce que le prince n'a le pouvoir de faire aucun tort imaginable a qui que ce soit, par la raison que son pouvoir est controle et borne par un acte.' — Montesquieu, Notes sur V Angleterre, torn. vi. p. 269. SECT. 7.] ON POLITICAL THEOKY. 65 and the following years, and extended by conquest to other con- tinental countries, produced nothing durable in political forms. Since the peace of 1815, parliamentary governments have been established in France, Holland, Belgium, Saxony, Wirtemberg, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, not derived from native models, but imitated froru the English constitution. In 1818, the French constitution was converted into a copy of the American model; and constitutions have since been introduced or promised in other European states, founded partly on English and partly on American institutions. The system of the United States has likewise served, in general, as the model of the independent states formed out of the Spanish colonies on the same continent. From the experience of different forms of supreme govern- ment thus obtained, can we affirm that despotic monarchy on the one hand, and free or republican government on the other, are attended respectively with certain constant and peculiar effects ? Can it be said that all monarchies, or all republics, produce the happiness or misery, the wealth or poverty, the intelligence or ignorance, of the people, in the same sense in which it can be said that all fire produces heat, and that all cold of a certain degree freezes water ? Now, on considering in succession each of the despotic monarchies which have been enumerated, and observing its character throughout its existence, we shall find it very difficult to discover, by a strict logical process, such as has been exem- plified in a former chapter, any constant causation: we shall scarcely be able to say that every despotic monarchy produces a certain effect. We shall scarcely be able to detect any charae teristic influence which we can predicate of the Persian monarch.} of Darius and Xerxes, of the Greek despotisms, of the monarchy of the Ptolemies, of the Roman empire, of the monarchy of ancient Mexico, of the Italian mediaeval despot isms, of the monarchies of the Aral) kaliphs, the Indian moguls, the Persian shahs, and the Turkish sultans, of the monarchies of Philip II., Louis XI Y., Frederic the Great, and Napoleon. We cannot say that all these governments, at every period of their existence, VOL. II. ' 00 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. were either good or bad, strong or weak, enlightened or ignorant, stable or unstable, favourable or unfavourable to science, arts, and literature, or to trade, manufactures, and agriculture ; that they all relied on military support, or not j that they were all fond of war and conquest ; that they were all faithless or true to international engagements ; that they all protected person and property, effectually or ineffectually; that they all established private rights and duties of a peculiar character ; that they all treated their dependencies with harshness or lenity. When we have applied to these governments the Method of Agreement, and have stripped them of all that they have not in common — when we have removed race, religion, climate, geographical posi- tion, national manners and morals, state of the arts, personal character of the monarch or his ministers, and other similar influences, together with their respective effects, we shall find it very difficult to trace a constant and universal sequence between the despotic form of government and any other phenomenon. Assuming that we designate despotic monarchy by A, and the other influences just mentioned by other capital letters, then we shall certainly have ABC and be, ABD and bd, ACF and cf, and so on : but the difficulty will be, to discover with certainty a phenomenon, a, in constant connexion with be, bd, cf, fyc, which can be fairly considered the mere consequence of the form of government ; which not only occurs in each complex case, but which, when analytically examined, can be satisfactorily traced to this source. If, indeed, we break down the whole mass of despotic govern- ments into smaller groups, and take, for example, all the Oriental or all the Greek despotisms separately ; or if we take the succes- sive rulers in one monarchy, as in the Roman empire, we may find it easier to discover such a constant connexion. At the same time it is more difficult, in a problem thus shaped, to elimi- nate the effects of other possible causes, inasmuch as the limita- tion of the form of government to a class having several attri- butes in common, prevents a clear distinction being made between the effects of the despotism and those of its invariable concomi- SECT. 7.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 67 tants. Speculators on the forms of government have, in fact, generally treated the problem in this manner; and though the}' have used a generic term, they have considered it as designating a limited species, which served in their mind as a representative of the entire genus. Their universal idea was embodied in a real type. Thus, Aristotle, in describing the characteristics of oligarchy and democracy, has in his mind exclusively the oli- garchies and democracies of the small states, which existed at and before his time on the coast of the Mediterranean. Montesquieu, again, in speaking of despotisms and monarchies, appears to have mainly in view the Oriental despotisms and the French monarchy of his own time.( 138 ) So M. de Tocqueville, in treating of democracy, confines his regards almost exclusively to the United States, without thinking of the democracies of antiquity and of the middle ages. We shall say more upon this mode of investi- gating this problem in the next chapter, when we come to the consideration of theories of limited application. If, in considering the three forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy), Ave confine ourselves to what is strictly involved in the idea of each, namely, the proportionate number of persons who share in the sovereign power j and if we then attempt to lay down general theorems upon the characteristics of each, we shall find that the mere numerical difference in the governors is a narrow foundation for such inferences. If we are investigating the character of a severe or a mild system of punishments, of a free or restricted system of trade, of* a direct or indirect system of taxation, we may reasonably expect thai the effects of each system would bo different ; but arc we enti- tled to expect that the conduct of one man will, uniformly or generally, be different from that of a feu nun, or that flic conduct of a few men will, uniformly or generally, be different from that of many men, all other circumstances in which they (138) See, for example, tin' chapter of the "Esprit dea Loi$, on the dele- on of power, (v. 16,) where the contrast between despotisms and larchies, though expressed in general terms, is, in fact, between the gaf ion hi'iiiarr].,, satrapical system of the Oriental states, and the provincial government of the old French monarchy. v 2 68 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [ciIAP. XV. arc respectively placed, save their numerical ratio to the commu- nity, being supposed to be identical? Again : are we entitled to expect, upon the same supposition, that the conduct of different men, though their numerical ratio to the community may be similar, will always be the same. Unless we can make these two assumptions, it is impossible to lay down any universal attribute of monarchy, of aristocracy, and of democracy, con- sidered as governments in action, and influencing the condi- tion of the community. Unless we can affirm that, other cir- cumstances being the same, the ruling one will always act differently from the ruling few or many ; that the ruling few will always act differently from the ruling one or many ; that the ruling many will always act differently from the ruling one or few ; and, again, unless we can affirm that all persons standing respectively, in the relation to the community, of the ruling one, few, or many, whether simulta- neously in different states, or successively in the same state, will always act in the same manner, we cannot infer that any constant operation belongs to either form of government. Be- fore we can arrive at universal propositions on this subject, we must be able to say, not only that every monarch, and every oligarchical and democratic body, will, in the same position, re- spectively act in a different manner if compared with one another, but also that every monarch and every oligarchical and democratic body will, in the same position, respectively act in the same manner if compared with themselves. For example, if the political com- munity is represented by the number 500,000, then Ave must assume not only that one ruler, 500 rulers, and 250,001 rulers would, in similar circumstances, always act differently from each other, but that the successive persons in the position of the one ruler, the 500 rulers, and the 250,001 rulers would, in similar circumstances, always act in the same manner as their predeces- sors; and also, that persons standing to other communities in the same relation as the one ruler, the 500 rulers, and the 250,001, would all act respectively in the same manner, when placed in similar circumstances. SECT. 7.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 69 Now the proposition, already adverted to, that ' human nature is always the same/ might lead us to expect that every monarch, and every oligarchical and democratic body, would, in the same circumstances, act in the same manner. But it could not lead us to expect that the mere variation in the numerical ratio to the community would lead the ruling one, few, and many, always to act differently from each other, when placed in similar circumstances. On the contrary, it would rather indicate the probability that their conduct would respec- tively be similar. ( 13u ) The question, therefore, resolves itself into this — whether, all the circumstances in which the ruling one, few, or many, are placed (with the necessary exception of their numerical relation to the community) being supposed to be identical, we can affirm that they will severally act in a certain manner; and whether, therefore, we can lay down any constant and invariable charac- teristics of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy? Does the variation in the numerical ratio of the rulers to the community necessarily involve corresponding variations in the character of the government ? As the index in the scale moves along from one to the opposite extreme, indicating the sum of the commu- nity, can wc predicate a simultaneous change in the operation of the government, as we can point to certain constant changes in outward nature as the thermometer rises from zero to tem- perate, and from temperate to summer heat? When the problem is presented in this form, wo see that it admits of no universal solution. Nobody can persuade himself that a uniform and invariable character can he separately traced (139) The reasoning of Spinoza, in his TSractatus Politicus, 0. 7. § 27, implies that the few and the many would not act differently it' placed in the same circumstances. It is, he saj . b frequent mistake to confine to the populace the vices which are common to all men. Human nature \b the same in all. We are deceived l>\ power and culture. 'Atque base quae scripsimns, nan foraan excipientur ab Lis, qui vitia, qua? omnibus mortalibus insunt, ad solam plebem restringunt; nempe quod in vulgo nihil modicum, terrere ni paveant, ei quod plebs aut numiliter Bervit au1 Buperbe dominatur, nee ei Veritas aut judicium, etc. At naturaunaet communis omnium est. Bed potentifl ei cultu decipimur,' &o. Spinoza here refers to Tacit. Ann, i. 29: Hut, i. :*2; ii. 29: LAvy, \\iv. -J".. 70 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. in all monarchies, all aristocracies, and all democracies — that every monarch exactly resembles every other monarch — and that every aristocratic or democratic body is the exact counterpart of every other such body. Let us, then, lay aside this inquiry, and attempt to render the problem more tractable, by omitting to look for absolute effects, and seeking only for tendencies — by substituting a presumptive proposition for one declaratory of invariable consequences. Without, therefore, looking for invariability of actual effects, we may ask whether the influence of the numerical relation of the rulers to the community, of the interests, feelings, subor- dinate institutions, usages, and manners, which that relation engenders, is so decisive and powerful as to outweigh the variety of human character and disposition, and to impel all monarchs, and all aristocratic and democratic bodies respectively, in the same direction, though the impulse may be often counteracted or accelerated, or otherwise modified ? § 8 It is, perhaps, difficult to maintain that all monarchs and all aristocratic and democratic bodies are, by the mere force of their position, and by the circumstances in which they are necessarily placed with respect to the community, urged to adopt a certain course of conduct. Nevertheless, a broad fine may be drawn between all despotic or absolute monarchies on the one hand, and all republics, or governments of several (whether aris- tocracies or democracies), on the other, in respect of the position of the rulers. ( uo ) The despotic monarch, being alone, and legally uncontrolled, has the utmost facilities for abuse of (140 j According to Plato {Leg. iii. 12, p. 693) there are two parent governments — monarchy and democracy. The Persian government is the type of the former, the Athenian of the latter. AH other governments are variations from these two. Sir "W. Temple has a similar observation : — ' Though the old distinc- tions run otherwise, there seem to be but two general kinds of government in the world ; the one exercised according to the arbitrary commands and will of some single person ; and the other according to certain orders or laws introduced by agreement or custom, and not to be changed without the consent of many' — Essay upon the Original and Nature of Govern- ment ; Works, vol. li. p. 30. See also Montesquieu, quoted above, p. 50, n. 74 The government of an absolute prince is contrasted with popular government generally in Eurip. Med. 119-30. SECT. 8.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 71 power. The only restraints upon him are his own humanity, sense of justice, moderation, and prudence, the influence of rela- tions, friends, favourites, advisers, and of public opinion, and the fear of offending powerful persons or bodies. A republican body, on the other hand, however composed, and whether con- sisting of few or many persons, is, indeed, considered in its corporate capacity, as free from legal control as the despotic monarch ; but the persons who compose it, not being individually sovereign, act as legal checks upon one another, and control each other's conduct, not only by their mutual opposition and dissent, but also by their want of sympathy in the passions and appetites of the others. Tliis effect is produced even in a small number; so that, as long as the republican constitution can be preserved, in reality as well as in form, and a substantial division of the sovereign power among co-ordinate members of a body can be maintained, there is a legal restraint upon the conduct of each person, which never can exist in the case of a despotic monarch. No single member of a sovereign body can exercise the supreme power for liis own personal gratification. In whatever abuses of power the body may indulge, they must be for a common advan- tage, real or supposed. Whereas a single despotic ruler may seize women, destroy life vindictively or capriciously, and use the powers of government for satisfying his sensual appetites, his frivolous fancies, or his love of selfish amusement. Gratifi- cations of this sort arc essentially individual; the cruelties, the lusts, the caprices, the follies, of a Caligula, a Nero, a Commodus, a Ilelagabalus, an Eccelino, a Caesar Borgia, a Tamerlane, a Nadir Shah, or a Louis XV., cannot be put in commission. An absolute monarch is, as such, necessarily, and by the force of his position, free from all legal restraint or control in every relation of life.('") Every command of liis is legally binding, and he is subject to no law ; be is, according to the Roman expression with respect to their princeps OT emperor, legibus solutm. On the Other hand, it is of the essence of tin (141) The divorce of Josephine by Napoleon afforde » good example of the immunil v of the despotic inmwireh from olili^ationa uliirh would 7:2 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. republican form of government, that every member of the ruling body is, in his private relations, subject to the laws of the country. He has a share of the sovereign power, and, when he acts as a member of that body, his conduct is, like that of the absolute monarch, free from legal restraint : but when he acts in any other capacity, and as a mere private person, he is amenable to legal obligations and sanctions. In accordance with the monarchical principle, the constitutional government of England retains the maxim, that ' the king can do no wrong :' that is to say, the king can commit no breach of positive law, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of any tribunal. The king of England, though he might kill a person, could not commit murder or manslaughter : though he might take away the goods of another, he could not commit a theft. But the maxim, though it is a historical memo- rial of the monarchical theory of the constitution of England, is practically nullified by the restraints upon the legislative and executive power of the crown, and by the doctrine, that the ministers of the king's will are legally responsible for then acts. The crown is likewise, by a fiction of law, subject to the jurisdic- tion of the civil courts. From this difference, inherent in the constitution of all monarchies and all republics, it may be inferred that the despotic or purely monarchical government has a stronger tendency to a misuse of the supreme power than a free or republican govern- ment, and that this tendency can only be counteracted by extra- ordinary moral qualities in the despot. That such exceptions were rare in antiquity, may be collected from the universal dread with which a despot was regarded — a master of the common- wealth, who could treat all the citizens as the citizens treated bind the mere member of a sovereign body. Henry VIII., who assumed to be a despotic prince, furnishes another instance. Clytsemnestra, in the tragedy of Seneca, thus addresses iEgisthus, in reference to Agamemnon and Cassandra : — ' Permisit aliquid victor in captas sibi, Nee conjugem hoc respicere, nee dominam decet. Lex alia solio est, alia privato in toro.' Affam. 262-4. SECT. 8.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 73 their slaves. ( 14 -) They may, however, occur, as is proved by the reigns of Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the Antonmes, which Gibbon considered the happiest period of the human race;( 14s ) and by the examples of other beneficent despots in the European states during the eighteenth century. Some other circumstances may be mentioned which are common to all despotic monarchies, as distinguished from all republican governments, and are characteristic of unity as opposed to plurality of rulers. One of these is the dependence of the entire sovereign power upon a single life, and the consequent inducement to consummate treason by the assassination of the monarch. ( 144 ) All despotic princes have been pecu- liarly liable to attacks upon their life, from the Greek despots, whom it was the noblest feat of civic virtue to remove by the universally-eulogized act of tyrannicide, ( 146 ) to the Italian signori, (142) Thucydides considers evvopia, or good government, as implying the absence of despotic power. — i. 18. See above, p. 62, n. 131. (143) Speaking of the two Antonines, Gibbon says: — 'Their united reigns are possibly the only period of history in which the happiness of a great people was the sole object of government.' Afterwards lie adds: ' If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world, during which the condition of the human race was most nappy and prosperous, be would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from (he death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus.' — Decline and Fall, c. 3. A simdar opinion had been previously expressed by Fielding: 'Man- kind have never been so happy, as when the greatest part 01 the then known world was under the dominion of a single master; and this state of their felicity continued during the reigns of live successive princes (Nerva, Trajan, .Adrian, and the two Antonini). This was the true ara of the golden age, and the only golden age which evi r had any existence, unless in the warm imaginations of the poets, from the expulsion from Eden down to this day.' — Tom Jones, b. xii. c. 12. (144) Compare Spinoza, Tract. Pol. v. 7, § 11, 23: Preeterquam quod cito pent, quern Bui milites Balvum esse nolunt, certum est regibus (». 0., absolute prince-) Minimum semper periciiluni esse a I > iis, qui 618 proximi sunt Quo magiB absolute imperii jus iii uniini translatuin est, 60 facilius ipsum e.\ uno in alium Iransl'erri potest.' (145) ' Ad geuerum I 'ereris .-1 issde el sanguine pauei Descendant reges, ei sices' morte tyranni.' .luv. x. L12. With reaped to attacks apon the per- f the des pot in the Greel despotisms, and their motives, see Anstot. Pol.y. LO. The frequency of cons|>iracies to assassinate an absolute prince is com men led on by iWachiavel, Disc. iii. 6. Sec the curious account in Plutarch, Dion. 0, 9, of the pre- cautions against assassination adopted bj Dionysiusthe ESlder. Speaking ol the kfameluke dynast] in Egypt, Volney says: ' Le pre 74 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xy. the Turkish sultans, and the Russian emperors. ( 14G ) The reigning prince is peculiarly exposed to this danger from his nearest rela- tions, and hence the system of sanguinary ostracism for members of the monarch's family in despotic states. ( 14 ') Now the plurality of riders is a powerful obstacle to all designs of assassination : they are rarely assembled in one place, so as to afford an oppor- tunity for such an attempt as that meditated by Guy Fawkes mier chef qu'ils elurent, ayant oecupe cet esprit turbulent a la conquete de la Syrie, il obtint un regne de dix-sept ans ; mais depuis lui pas un seul n'est parvenu a ce terme. Le fer, le cordon, le poison, le meurtre public, ou l'assassinat prive, ont ete le sort d'une suite de tyrans, dont on compte quarante-sept dans un espace de deux cent cinquante-sept ans.' — Voyage en Fgypte et en Syrie, torn. i. p. 86. This gives an average of about five years and a barf to each. (146) The French monarchy of the eighteenth century was described as a ' monarcbie absolue, limitee par des epigrammes.' Mdme de Stael ap- plied this description to the Russian government, by saying that it was a ' monarchie absolue, limitee par l'assassinat.' (147) The frequency of murders of kinsmen, in the families of the suc- cessors of Alexander, is mentioned by Plutarch, Demetr, c. 3. Tacitus speaks of ' fratrum, conjugum, parentum neces,' as being customary to ab- solute kings, especially with reference to the east. — Hist. v. 8. Bang, a narcotic drug which destroys the intellect, was given by the Hindus to children of the blood royal, in order to render them incapable of ruling : they said that this was less inhuman than killing them, as in Turkey, or than blinding them, as in Persia. — Chardin, Voyages en Perse, torn. iv. p. 79 (ed. 1811). AH male children of the blood royal are blinded in Persia, which is thought more humane than putting them to death, as in Turkey. All persons of the blood royal, particularly the males, are kept in perpetual captivity. — lb. torn. v. p. 241, 244. On the practice of blinding the king's male relations, and of putting them to death on the slightest suspicion, Tavernier, liv. v. c. 9. The Oriental princes may be compared with the series of priests of Aricia, de- scribed by Ovid, each of whom obtained the office by killing his prede- cessor : ' Eegna tenent fortesque manu pedibusque fugaces, Et perit exemplo postmodo quisque suo.' Fast. hi. 271. Spinoza remarks that kings (i. e., absolute princes) fear their sons. — Tract. Polit. c. 6, § 7. Compare Gibbon's account of the fears enter- tained by Constantine of his son Crispus, and his execution by his father's command.— Beel. and Fall, c. 18. Measures of this kind are prompted by the fear of dethronement or assassination. ' Fear (says Plutarch), is the great incentive to bloodshed in absolute monarchies :' rj yap beiXia (poviKararov ecrriv iv ra'is rvpavvicriv. — Artaxerx. c. 25. So Gibbon remarks, alluding to Justinian the Second, in the seventh century : ' Since the days of Commodus and Caracalla, the cruelty of the Eoman princes had most commonly been the effect of their fear.' — c. 48. SECT. 8.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 75 and his associates, ( 14S ) and a massacre on a large scale is a diffi- cult enterprise. In order that the members of a republican body, whether aristocratic or democratic, should admit of being easily cut off at one blow, it would be necessary to realize the wish of Caligula with respect to the Roman people, and to give the com- posite body only one neck.( 149 ) A persona moralis may in general defy the dagger or the pistol. Another circumstance necessarily connected with the nume- rical relation of despotic monarchies is the mode of succession. A republican body is a persona moralis, and it is capable of renewal by the successive substitution of members, as vacancies from time to time occur. Hence, there is not necessarily any complete change in the entire number of the persons composing the government ; a supreme body may thus last for centuries, prolonged in a perpetual stream, without any solution of conti- nuity. A despotic monarchy, however, is renewed in its entirety at the death or removal of each successive monarch : the chain is formed of single links, and is broken as each link is snapped. Hence, in absolute monarchies, the succession is always a critical moment, by whatever principle, whether inheritance or choice, it may be determined. As the entire sovereign power is in abey- ance until it is assumed by a new monarch, there is nothing to facilitate the transfer of the insignia of empire, while the induce- ment to impede the institution of the successor is at its maximum. The fiction of the English law with respect to a corporation sole, can be applied without difficulty to a succession of bishops or deans ; but when a succession of supreme riders is in question, the practical difference between a corporation sole and a corpo- ration aggregate is all-important. C 60 ) (i48) Nero threatened to extirpate the en tire order of aenatora : ' M ul- tasquo nco dnbiaa rigniflcationea ssepe jeoit, ne reiiqnia quidem Be par- sunirn Heiiatoribus, enmque ordiiicin sublalurum quandoque e republics.' — Sueton. .V' ro, c. 37. (149) ' Infenaua torbce faventi adveraua Btudium suum, exolamavit, Utinarn PopuluH Kmnanus imam ccrvicen baberet.'— Suet. OaUg. 0. 30. According to Dio Cassius, flix. :'><>,) those who were present al the assassi* nation of Caligula reminded him of Ins « ish, iaj ing, thai be bad only one neck, whereas they bad many banda. (150) Speaking <>f the n^lit of Buooession in a de potic tat* . Btfontea- 76 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xv. It may be added, that the eulogies which numerous politi- cians, of widely different schools, have, from the very dawn of political speculation, bestowed upon a mixed government ,( lbl ) are a quieu says : ' Chaque prince de la famille royale ayant une egale capacite pour etre elu, il arrive que celui qui monte sur le trone fait d'abord et: rangier ses freres, corame en Turquie ; ou les fait aveugler, comme en Perse ; ou les rend fous, comine chez le Mogol ; ou, si Ton ne prend point ces precautions, comme a Maroc, chaque vacance de trone est suivie d'un aff reuse guerre civile. Par les constitutions de Muscovie, le czar peut clioisir qui il veut pour son successeur, soit dans sa famille, soit hors de sa famille. Un tel etablissement de succession cause mille revolutions, et rend le trone aussi chancelant que la succession est arbitraire.' — Esprit des Lois, v. 14. ' In elective monarchies (says Gibbon), the vacancy of the throne is a moment big with danger and mischief.' — Decline and Fall, c. 3. In c. 7, ad init., he shows how this danger is counteracted by a fixed rule of here- ditary succession : ' To the firm establishment of this idea, we owe the peaceful succession and mild administration of European monarchies. To the defect of it, we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers.' On the frequency of bloody successions among the Greek kings after Alexander, see Plutarch, Demetr. c. 3. Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone (Account of Caiibul, vol. i. p. 232) remarks that, in the Oriental despotisms, a succession is almost always attended by a civil war, with its consequent evils. (151) The doctrine of a government mixed of the three simple forms was first promulgated by Plato, with reference to the Lacedaemonian con- stitution. See Leg. iii. 11, p. 691 — a celebrated passage, and often imitated by the ancient writers. Compare also, Leg. iv. 5, p. 712, with respect to the Lacedaemonian and Cnosian constitutions. Aristotle states that, in the opinion of some, the best form of govern- ment is that which is mixed of all the forms ; whence they praise the Lacedaemonian constitution, as being compounded of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy. — Pol. ii. 6. Aristotle also shows how the Lacedamionian constitution is rendered stable by comprehending the kings, the aristo- cratic class, and the people, Pol. ii 9 (Set yap ttjp iroXireiav tt)v peXXovaav o-a&crdai, &c.) ; and Polybius refers to the same government as an actual example of a constitution mixed of the three simple forms, which he con- siders absolutely the best (vi. 3, 10). The same view is to be found in the Doric fragment of the Pseudo-Archytas, Stob. Florileg. tit. xliii. n. 134. See the commentary in Orell. Opiisc. Grcec. Moral, vol. ii. p. 666. A similar fragment, attributed to Hippodamus, another Pythagorean philo- sopher, contains the praise of a mixed constitution. — Lb. n. 94. Polybius likewise eulogizes the Boman government as being mixed of the three forms, (vi. 11,) which view is adopted and fully illustrated by Cicero, in his treatise De Republica, i. 29, 35, 45 ; ii. 23. See below, ch. xxii. § 13. Tacitus considers a government compounded of the three simple forms as an almost unattainable ideal : ' Nam cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt : delecta ex iis et consociata reipublica? forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, baud diuturna esse potest.' — Ann. iv. 33. It is singular that Tacitus should not have adverted SECT. 8.] ON TOLITICAL THEORY. 77 tribute to the superiority of the republican, or plural, over the despotic, or single principle. In every mixed government, the power of the leading person in the state is tempered by the association of other members, so that the sovereignty is divided, in some shares or proportions, among a body. No mixed government can be a despotism or absolute monarchy; its mix- ture implies, of necessity, the division of the supreme power to the fact, that the Greek writers in general considered the Lacedaemonian constitution as mixed of the three simple forms, and the Lacedaemonian was the most stable of all the Greek governments. Polybius and Cicero likewise consider the Koman government, in its republican type, as a mixed government. Aristotle often dwells upon the advantages of a well-tempered consti- tution, not running into extremes, but forming a just medium between the pretensions of the different classes, and not being an absolute monarchy, or an unmixed oligarchy or democracy. See particularly, Pol. iv. 11. Plato likewise says, that a constitution ought to be a medium between monarchy and aristocracy- — Leg. vi. 5, p. 756. Dicaearehus, the disciple of Aristotle, wrote on the advantages of a government mixed of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy. — Fragm. Hist. Gr. vol. ii. p. 242 ; Didot. Plutarch describes Pericles as having tempered the extreme democracy of Athens with an aristocratical and regal element, arising from bis per- sonal character and influence. — Pericl. c. 15. ' Unmixed' (uKparos) is always a term of censure, when applied by the ancient politicians to a government. See Plutarch, Cimon, 15; Dion, 12,53. In the latter pas- sage, it is stated that Dion wished to abolish the unmixed democracy at Syracuse, and to substitute for it an aristocratic constitution, compounded of royalty and democracy, after the Spartan and Cretan model. The speech or Manius Valerius (in Dion. Hal. vii. 55) praises a constitution which is not an unmixed oligarchy or democracy, but is compounded of both. See below, n. 155. For the praise of a mixed government in modern w riters, see Maehiavel, Disc, i. 2; Paruta, Pcrfczione della Vita Politico, (ed. 1582), |>. .In."): lil.n-kstone, Com. vol. i. p. 51; Burlamaqui, Principles of Polit. /.air, part ii. c. 2, § 35; Pales. Moral ami Pol. Phil. 1>. vi. c. ; Zacharia, /'"/// Staate, vol. in. p. 8; Bellarminc (!)<■ Rum. Pont, i. 'A, § 1) lays it down that a government mixed of the three forms is, on account of the corruption of huniMii nature, better than a simple monarchy. On the character and working of a mixed government, see also Filangieri, Scienza della Leais- lazione, 1. i. c. 11, whose definition points clearly to the division of ilie sovereign power among a body, in this form of government. Bentivoglio describes the government of Flanders, in the seventeenth century, as com- posed of the three forms. — Opere, tom. i. p. I 13; ed. Ism;. It is unnecessary here to inquire into the meaning of those writers who, like Bodinus, (De Bt />. ii. I, p. 287,) deny that :i mixed government has ever existed. In Btrictness, indeed, the proposition is true. If the definitions of a monarchy, aristocracy .-mil democracy , exclude one i mof her, a government cannol be more than one of these forms at the same time A mixed government is an obscure, and. indeed, inaccurate phrase, but it invariably implies that the governmenf baa passed from the despoti the republican type 78 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [CHAP. XV. among several persons — in other words, it implies the republican principle. § 9 From what has been said, it follows that governments of several, whether aristocratic or democratic, have in common those characteristics which belong to a persona moralis, invested with supreme power, in contradistinction to a single person, replaced by a single successor. If any peculiar and universal tendency can be predicated of aristocracy and democracy, seve- rally, it must arise, not from the antithesis of unity and plurality, but from the varieties of plurality : it must be connected with the greater or less number of the members of the body, in com- parison with that of the entire community. Now, as these numbers may vary along the entire scale, and may either be placed at the opposite ends of that scale, or may approach one another indefinitely, it is manifestly difficult to conceive, that all aristo- cracies and all democracies respectively are characterized by any constant tendency. If we take an extremely narrow oligarchy, we may presume that the powers of government will be exercised in a partial and oppressive manner. We may presume that the governors will have little sympathy with the body of the people, and that, without indulging individual appetites, caprices, or animosities, they may have in common certain interests, or permanent desires, hostile to the interest of the community at large. ( 152 ) But oligarchical bodies, composed of a few persons, generally soon become, either in form or in substance, absolute monarchies. Jealousy of co-ordinate power urges the strongest member of the body to put down his colleagues, as in the Roman triumvirate and the French consulate. Or if they do not end in this manner, then duration is short, like the Thirty at Athens, ( 153 ) and the Roman decemvirs. The partition of the (152) Critias remonstrated with Theramenes for his folly in thinking that the government of the Thirty, at Athens, was not to be conducted on the same principles as a despotism (rvpavvis), Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, § 16. A close oligarchy is declared in the speech of the Thebans, in Thucyd. iii. 62, to border on a despotism. (On the meaning of Swao-reia, see Aristot. Pol. iv. 5.) ' Populi imperium juxta libertatem ; paucorum dominatio regise libidini propior est.' — Tacit. Ann. vi. 42. (153) Gibbon has remarked that (setting aside the discrepancy of number) no real resemblance exists between the thirty tyrants of Athens. SECT. 9.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 79 dominions of Alexander among his generals, and of the Roman empire among rival competitors, proves the difficulty of establish- ing a very small oligarchy, and the unwillingness of supreme rulers to endure the existence of an equal, unless the ruling body is tolerably numerous. ( 154 ) Where the government is democratic, and the so-called thirty tyrants of Eome, in the third century : ' In every light the parallel is idle and defective. What resemblance can we discover between a council of thirty persons, the united oppressors of a single city, and an uncertain list of independent rivals, who rose and fell in irregular succession through the extent of a vast empire ?' — Decline and Fall, c. 10. (154) Thucydides (viii. 89) remarks that, in an oligarchy formed from a democracy, the rivalry of its members, and their intolerance of equality in their colleagues, is the main cause of its destruction. The dissensions of the two co-ordinate Lacedaemonian kings were frequent, and were en- couraged, for the purpose of weakening: the royal power. — Herod, vi. 52 ; Aristot. Pol. ii. 9; Paus. iii. 1. G; Plutarch, Agesil. 5. Curtius thus speaks of the dissensions of Alexander's generals : ' Sed jam fatis admove- bantur Macedonum genti bella civilia. Nam et insociabile est regnum, et a pluribus expetebatur. Primum ergo collegere vires, deinde disperserunt ; et quum pluribus corpus, quam capiebat, onerassent, cetera membra de- ficere cicperunt ; quodque imperium sub uno stare potuisset, dum a pluribus sustinetur, ruit.' — x. 28. ' Quando unquam regni societas aut cum fide ccepit, aut sine cruore disccssit?' — Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 18. Livy (i. 14) speaks of the ' infida regni societas,' in reference to Eomulus and Tatius. 'Insociabile regnum,' (Tacit. Ann. xiii. 17,) which expressions are borrowed from Ennius, ap. Cic. de Off', i. 8 : ' Nulla sancta societas, Nee fides regni est ' ' Non bene cum sociis rcgna Venusque manent,' . •. , i 1 o a oca Ovid, Ars. Am. iii. 564 ; imitated by benec. Ac/am. 259 : ' Nee regna socium ferrc, nee tedee sciunt.' Compare, id. Thyest. 444: ' Non capit regnum duos ' The jealousy of the triumvirs is repeatedly alluded to, and powerfully de- scribed, by Lucan : , Tu 0?uga m;ilonmi Facta tribus dominis communis, Koma, nee unquam In tnrbam missi feralia fcedera regni.' 1. 84. ' Nulla fides regni sociis, omnisqne | >< >( csl ;is Impatiens consortiH erit.' Hi. 92. 'Temporia angnsti manait concordia discors, Paxque fuit non spontc diicum.' lb. 98. 'Tu nova nc voteres obseureiil aria triimipbos, Et victis cedal piratica laurea Gallia, Magna, times: to jam aeriea uausqne laboram Eri^it, impatienaque loci fortuna Becundi. Nee quemquam jam ferrc potest, Casarve priOTOU, Pompeiuave parem. 1 Hi- L22. Lucan compares Crassus to the [athmtU "I' Corinth, serving as a mole to keep i\\v two seas asnuder. — //>. 1 ' M >. The discord and deadly aniiii'^ity between the imperial brothers, Cara- calla and Geta, is described by < iibbon, Dec/, and Fall, 0. 8. vol. i. p, 171 -M 80 ON POLITICAL THEORY. [CHAP. XV. it is reasonable to expect that there will be a sympathy in the ruling body with the mass of the people, and that the laws will be of such a character, as to guarantee the private citizens against a harsh exercise of power. But between a wide aristocracy and a democracy, ('"') the boundaries may be faintly marked, and it may be scarcely possible to affirm any general tendency of the one, which is not also true of the other. Certainly, it is im- possible to lay down such distinctive characteristics of aristocracy and democracy, respectively, as have been cited from Montesquieu, ' Sucli a divided form of government (lie says) would have proved a source of discord between the most affectionate brothers : it was impossible that it could long subsist between two implacable enemies, who neither desired nor could trust a reconciliation. It was visible that one only could reign, and that the other must fall ; and each of them, judging his rival's designs by his own, guarded his life with the most jealous vigdance from the re- peated attacks of poison or the sword.' Caracalla dedicated in the temple of Serapis the sword with which he boasted to have slain his brother. — Dio Cass, lxxvii. 23. So Artaxerxea wished to have the reputation, both among Barbarians and Greeks, of having given the death-wound to his brother Cyrus at the battle of Cunaxa. — Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16. The joint empire of jS^eoptolemus and Pyrrhus first produced an attempt of the former to poison his colleague, but the latter anticipated his deadly intention by assassinating him at a banquet. — Plutarch, Pyrrh. 6. Concerning the supposed jealousy of power between Romulus and Remus, see Dion. Hal. i. 85. The co-ordinate government of Romulus and Tatius, as equal kings, in the same city, has no parallel in authentic history. — Dion. ib. ii. 46 ; Livy, i. 13. A similar remark applies to the ten interreges, who are related to have governed Rome in succession, each for five days, after the death of Romulus. — Dion. ii. 57 ; Plut. Num. 2 ; Livy, i. 17. On the sanguinary dissensions of the beys of Egypt, see Comte, Traite de Legislation, liv. iii. c. 38. A duarchy, composed of a husband and wife, may subsist without contention, as in the cases of Ferdinand and Isabella, Philip and Mary, Albert and Isabella, "William and Mary ; but the throne of Egypt was contested between Ptolemy XII. and his sister Cleopatra. See the interesting description of the perfect concord which subsisted between the archdukes Albert and Isabella, in Bentivoglio, Pelazione delle Provmcie Ubbidienti di Fiandra, parte i. e. 1 ; Opere, torn. i. p. 140, ed. 1806. The difficulty of establishing a duarchy, or duumvirate, is well illus- trated by Bodinus, De Rep. ii. 2, ad init. Plutarch remarks that the envy of equals is the characteristic of ambitious natures. — Pyrrh. 23. (155) As to a large oligarchy being practically equivalent to a demo- cracy, see Thucyd. viii. 92 ad fin. Thucyd. (ib. c. 97) praises the govern- ment of the Five Thousand at Athens, as being a fair compromise between the oligarchical and democratic interests. This is the sort of constitution which Aristotle recommends, Pol. iv. 11, 12; v. 7, 8. An dpio-TOKparia, or government of the best men, is a mean between despotism or royalty, on the one hand, and democracy on the other: it is a mixture, or tempera- ment of the two extreme forms. —Plat. Pep. iii. 12, p. 693; Plutarch. Dion. c. 12, 53. See above, note 151. SECT. 9.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 81 or to attribute to all democracies such tendencies as are enume- rated by M. de Tocqueville.( 156 ) In attempting to distinguish between the tendencies of aristocratic and democratic government, it is necessary first to exclude all the miscellaneous influences of race, religion, man- ners, arts, geographical position, &c, as well as the general con- sequences of plurality of governors, common to both these forms of government ; and, next, to confine the attention to the conse- quences which flow legitimately from the numerical relation (as being greater or less than half) of the governing body to the entire community. It is, moreover, important to observe that the political aggregate, constituting the ' entire community' must, in the several instances brought into comparison, be computed upon uniform principles. In enumerating a political community for statistical pui-poses, every individual man, woman, and child in the country is included. Again, for purposes of civil rights, and also as objects of the protection of the government both against natives and foreigners, all women and children are con- sidered as members of the political community. But inasmuch as women and children are in general destitute of political rights and franchises, they are excluded from the 'entire community/ when its members are computed for the purpose of determining whether the government is aristocratic or democratic. As this exclusion is uniform, and is common to all cases,('" 7 ) it introduces qo error in the comparison ; it takes equal weights out of both scales ; and it only deserves notice with reference to the assertion, that democracy is a government of a majority of the 'entire commu- nity.' So far as any inferences are drawn from the assumption that a sovereign democratic body is a majority of the entire com- munity, it is to be borne in mind that this 'entire community' is limited to the adult males, and is therefore always less than 1 1 ,-/>) Mr. Grote, pointing nut, that some Greek democracies were iniicli more Warlike, enterprising, and a^'ivssive llian others, remarks thai ii Lfl dangerous to indulge in general predications about all democracies. - I list. of Or. vol. vii. p 250, 267-8. (157) As to the ground of excluding women from political rights in a democracy, lee Spinoza, Tract. Pol. 0. \i. § 4. VOL. 11. <• 82 ON TOLITICAL THEORY. [chap. XV. half the entire population, or the aggregate political community, properly so called. There are, however, other cases in which care is necessary in order to avoid the comparison of disparate quantities, and therefore to guard against error in referring different communi- ties to the respective classes of aristocracy or democracy. The first of these is where there is a class of slaves, necessarily ex- cluded from all political, and nearly all civil rights, and standing to the community in the relation of mere living instruments. If communities are compared with reference to the aristocratic or democratic form of their government, and if one possesses a slave class, whereas in the other the whole community is free, this circumstance ought to be taken into account. It may be time that the body of freemen may be organized democratically, as in the Athenian and Roman states ; but if such a democratic com- munity, connected with a body of slaves out-numbering the citizens, is simply compared with a modem community, consist- ing exclusively of freemen, and the difference in this respect is not adverted to, confusion and error can hardly fail to arise. On the other hand, two states, each possessing a slave-class, may be compared simply without danger of error ; for example, the Lace- daemonian and Athenian states, one of which was oligarchical, the other democratic, considered without reference to the slave- class, which was present in each community. There is, again, another circumstance which ought not to be left out of sight in determining the f entire community/ with reference to the aristocratic or democratic character of the go- vernment. This is its possession of imperial subjects; of dependent communities, to which it stands in the relation of the dominant or paramount state. Thus Athens and Rome, though democra- cies with regard to the free citizens of the imperial territory, had not only a class of slaves, but also a body of imperial or foreign subjects, who, though freemen themselves, were not considered as forming part of the Athenian or Roman free community. Now, in comparing one community with another, with reference to the question of aristocracy and democracy, it is right that this SECT. 9.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 83 element should be adverted to, inasmuch as the absence or pre- sence of imperial subjects is a material circumstance, affecting the character of a government, and these subjects are a part of the political community over which the government of the paramount state presides. However democratic may be the internal orga- nization of a community with respect to its own peculiar members, it can scarcely fail to be oligarchical in respect of its imperial subjects : thus, F. v. Raumer remarks that the Italian republics (though popularly constituted at home) were often oligarchical in reference to their districts. ( ir,s ) At the same time, care must be taken to distinguish between a republican government, whether aristocratic or democratic, in its relations to the paramount com- munity, and in its relations to dependent communities. If this caution be not observed, we may fall into the same mistake as Mitford in his History of Greece, who applies the expressions of the ancients respecting the imperial rule of Athens, to its internal government with respect to its own citizens. ( 159 ) There is a further circumstance to be considered in reference to the question of aristocracy and democracy — viz. the nature of the power, or share in the sovereignty, which constitutes a person a member of the governing body. In an ancient state, whether aristocratic or democratic, each member of the governing body exercised his powers in person. Every Lacedaemonian, Athenian, or Roman citizen, for example, might vote in the supreme assembly. In modern states, where the representative system exists, no such direct exercise of the sovereign power takes place, (158) Qeschiohti der Wohenstaufen, vol. v. p. 294. (159) A ft it describing the deterioration of the measures of Solon with respect to the Areopagus and Council of K ■ Hundred - measures which exclusively concerned the internal government of Athens, and dated from ;i time when Athens was nol yef an imperial stat< — Mr. Cilitford proceeds as follows : ' Interested demagogues inciting, restraint \mis Boon overborne, and sol Ik- Athenian governmenl became what, in the very age, We find it wan called, and the people Beem to have been even pleased to bear if called, a tyranny in the bands of the people.' — Hist. <,/' Or. <-. 21, Beet. 2, citing rvpamlda tvm t^p &pxfl v i Thuoyd. u. 63 ; iii. 37. The words in the speeches of Pericles and Cleon, cited bj Mr. Mitford, mean this: 'Tour empire over the dependenl states is in the nature of a despotism.' They have no reference to the action of the Athenian government upon the Athenians themselves. 84. ON POLITICAL THEORY. [chap. xv. but the political suffrage which determines the form of govern- ment is simply a right of electing representatives to be members of the sovereign body. If, for example, we compare the legisla- ture of France in the years 1848-9, when the suffrage was universal (that is, belonged to all adult males), with the supreme assembly of Athens or Rome, we shall find that France, as com- pared with those states, is a narrow oligarchy ; and we are only entitled to consider the French constitution of these years as democratic, if we reckon the suffrage of the Frenchman (that is, his right of voting for representatives) as equivalent to the suf- frage of the Athenian or Roman (that is, his power of voting in person in the sovereign assembly of citizens). It will be observed that the questions last adverted to (viz. the mode of determining the ' entire community/ the distinction between domestic and imperial rule, and the distinction between the direct and indirect suffrage) only concern aristocracies and demo- cracies, and do not affect despotic monarchies. § 10 It follows, therefore, that with respect to the two main classes, of absolute monarchies and republics, and, in some mea- sure, with respect to the two species of republics, aristocracies and democracies, we may, by considering their several characters, ascertain certain general and prevailing properties, which enable ns to attribute to them a certain average influence. Where the subject can be reduced to a numerical expression, an average can be computed with perfect precision ; as when the average duration of human life, the average rate of prices, the average temperature, is calculated from a series of arithmetical data. Where the subject does not admit of a numerical expression, averages are less precise, but are possible. The characteristics of a certain form of government may converge about a certain point, and those that deviate from it on different sides may be few. There may be a medium state between opposite extremes, which represents the prevailing character, and admits of a general expression. We may be unable to predicate any invariable and universal tendency of a form of government, just as we may be unable to sav that all men live a certain number of vears. But SECT. 11.] ON POLITICAL THEORY. 85 as we can say of men, that the average duration of their life is a certain number of years — so we may say of a form of government, that it has a certain prevailing average character. General pro- positions of this sort are constructed upon the authority of a plurality of the cases, in the same manner that the majority is held, in the decisions of public bodies, to represent the entire number. ( 16 °) Propositions expressive of the average state of any class are, as we shall show lower down,( 1G1 ) only probable, and, when they come to be applied to actual cases, only serve to raise a presumption, which may be overpowered by counter-evidence. § 11 An inquiry as to the characteristics of each form of government is distinct from an inquiry as to the best form of government j though the latter may imply the former. In order to determine the prevailing characteristics of each form of govern- ment, it is only necessary to take a survey of facts, and to give them a general expression. We assume the existence of govern- ments, but construct nothing — whereas the problem of the best form of government is essentially constructive, and the solution of it does not necessarily represent any state of things which has ever had an actual existence. Thus Spinoza, in treating of the three .forms of government in his Tractatus Politicus, docs not describe the characteristics of monarchy, aristocracy, and demo- cracy in general, and according to a scientific method, but he proceeds constructively, and builds up, according to his own views, that type of each form of government which he considers best.n (iob) Ucfrrlur ad universos, quod publico fit per majorem partem.— Dig. L. 17, 1. 160. (161) (Ii. x\. §6; and compare ch. xiii. § 4. (162) See Tract. /'>>/. <•. 8, § 31, where 1><- describes himself a- omit- ting certain points, 'quia ad meum inatitutum, 'i'"" 1 Bolnmmodo est im- perii cujuscumque optimum Btatum 'J'' oribere, non speotant.' Tli.-' Tractatus Politicus of Spinoza is incomplete. He was prevented from finishing it by his death, which tool place in 1<''"7. The descriptions of monarchy and aristocracy are entire; l"it of 1 1 1 * - description of demo* cracy there 'arc: only lour inl'mduelory | paragraphs. The title, prefixed by the posthumous editor, thus describes tin' work : ' Tractatus Politicus, in quo demonstratur quoi I" societaa nbi imperium monarchicum locum habet, sicut ot eaubi optimi imperant, debel inetitui, ne in tyrannidem Labatur, el nl paz libertasque civium inviolata manent.' 80 ON POLITICAL THEORY. § 12 Similar theorems as to the general character of certain political relations and laws may be laid down, affirmative of prevailing tendencies, and representing its influence in the majority of cases. Thus, the general character or tendency of imperial, as distinguished from national, government — of slavery, as distinguished from freedom, of the working classes — of direct, as distinguished from indirect, taxation — may be laid down. In like manner, the tendencies of persecution and endowment, with respect to the suppression or diffusion of religious opinion, may be severally traced. Such propositions, however, are, like those respecting the forms of government, only probable ; they raise a presumption of a certain result — they do not indicate an invariable sequence ; and hence, when they come to be applied in practice to actual cases, they often require correction and limitation, as we shall show at greater length when we come to treat of the application of political theory to practice. 87 Chapter XVI. ON PARTIAL THEORIES, OR PRINCIPLES OP LIMITED CAUSATION, IN POLITICS. § 1 TT7E have, in the previous chapter, investigated the circum- ' " stances under which universal propositions and theories of general or unliniited application can be laid down in politics ; and we had occasion to remark that, in affirming the general tendency of any political cause — such as a form of government, or other political institution — it was difficult to establish any true theorem respecting its operation, which should be applicable under all variations of circumstances, and be independent of race, religion, manners, climate, social and intellectual state of the people, state of the useful arts, and other similar extraneous and variable influences. It was shown, for example, that setting aside all attempts to predicate absolute or invariable causation, the number of true propositions which can be laid down respecting the general or prevailing tendency of monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy, in all countries and at all times, is wry limited. The same may be said of any other political institution, such as imperial government, shivery, the use of standing armies in lime of peace, laws respecting the succession to land, the use of paper money, &c. But if we narrow the field of observation — if we eonlinc our view to political communities possessing many attributes in common, communities having a certain resemblance to, and affinity with, one another, and agreeing in race, religion, hn- guage, climate, manners, arts, arms, dress, of several at least of these circumstances, and if we exclude from our attention all communities whose circumstances, other than the one 1 point of comparison, differ widely from those which are under considera- tion, then the number of general propositions which we can lay down respecting the pasl operation and future tendency of the 88 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [cHAP. XVI. cause in question becomes much greater. If, for example, in examining the operation of despotic monarchy, we confine our- selves to the Oriental despotisms — or if, in examining the opera- tion of aristocracy and democracy, we confine ourselves to the Greek and Italian republics of antiquity, we shall find that the number of characteristic influences of the form of government Avhich can be truly predicated is far more numerous, than if we include in the one case the despotic monarchies of Greece and Home and of modern Europe, and, in the other, the aristocratic and democratic governments of modern Europe and America. In proportion, too, as the propositions are more numerous, they become less abstract and more individual; their intensity increases as their extent diminishes ; they have a closer bearing upon action, and are both more instructive, and more available for purposes of practice. § 2 When, however, limitations of this kind are made, it is right that they should be made avowedly. The historian, or speculative writer, ought to announce that his generalization is meant to be comprehended within certain bounds, and that the inductive extension of the particulars on which his inference rests is not intended to go beyond a certain area. He ought not, as is the too common practice, to imply a limitation, and, while he enounces an universal proposition, to leave the reader to annex for himself the restrictions with which it is meant to be understood. Thus Plato, in his sketch of a purely ideal state, conceives it is applicable only to an Hellenic community; while Aristotle's masterly analysis of oligarchical and democratic governments is necessarily limited to the small city-communi- ties on the shores of the Mediterranean — the only republican or non-monarchical governments which the world had at that time seen. Machiavel, according to Hume's just remark, derived his views upon monarchy from the despotisms of antiquity, and of Italy in the middle age ; and thus his precepts respecting mon- archical government rest on too narrow a foundation. (') Montes- (ij See Essays, part i. essay 12. SECT. .] IN POLITICS. 89 quieu, in like manner, as we have already seen, in speaking of despotisms and monarchies, generally understands the Oriental despotisms and the European monarchies, especially the French monarchy of his own time. His character of courtiers, though declared by him to be applicable to all times and places, is manifestly painted from the French court of the eighteenth century. And M. de Tocqueville, in his theorems on democracy, means, not democratic government generally, but the particular democratic government of the United States, with all its acci- dental and complex accessories. Upon a close scrutiny of these unlimited expressions, we shall find that the character of scien- tific generality which they profess to bear disappears, and collapses into the single instance or narrow class which they in fact represent; just as the plaster with the false inscription dropped off the Egyptian Pharos, and exhibited underneath the permanent record of the true architect, engraven in the solid stone. In the speculations of modern European and American writers respecting legislation and political economy, it may be generally observed that they tacitly assume, as the basis of their reasonings, the existence of a modern civilized Christian com- munity, with its numerous peculiarities, intellectual, moral, reli- gious, political, and social. The ancient heathen communities of Greece and Italy, the despotically-governed nations of Asia, both ancient and modern, and, still more, the widely-spread savage communities, are excluded from the import of their general pro- positions, and, when referred to, are for the most part expressly mentioned as examples, for the sake of contrast. Sometimes even a writer silently assumes the existence of a state of tilings peculiar to his own country — thus, ;m English political economist, in his theoretical discussions, may assume that the persons inter- ested in the land are divided into the three classes of landlords, tenants, and labourers, a division which rarely exists out of England. ( 2 ) (2) Bee Mill's Pol. /<>. ii. 3,§ 2. 90 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. Human society (as we have already remarked) is essentially political, and political society is essentially national. Govern- ment implies constant communication between the governors and the governed, and great space renders such communication im- possible. Hence, political societies consist of nations occupying areas of manageable dimensions, and dwelling within those limits. Each of these nations possesses an independent government, and acquires by its separation from all other independent states certain peculiarities, which are its prominent characteristics.^) § 3 One large classification of communities for the purpose of a common predication is — 1, those communities which are in a wild and unsettled state, such as the African and Indian savages, the Bedouin Arabs, the Nomad Tartars; 2, those Oriental communities which live under a regular political government, but whose social state is nevertheless fixed and unprogressive, such as the Turks, the Persians, the Hindus, the Chinese, the Japanese ; 3, Christian communities partaking of the modern European civilization. In framing general predications respecting the operation and tendency of forrus of government and political institutions, a limitation made expressly to either of these three classes will often assist the historical theorist, and enable him to move with greater ease and safety. As the material upon which a law or measure of the government operates is more similar, its effects can be more securely comprehended within a general expression. The social and moral state of savage nations, their manners and customs, the state of their intelligence, their knowledge of the useful arts, then mode of procuring food, of treating then wives, of rearing and training their children, of constructing their habitations, of waging war, and other similar facts, admit of a general description, as may be seen in the faithful pictures of savage life drawn by M. Charles Comte, in his Traite de Legisla- tion. Savage nations are, however, in general destitute of any (3) See Story's Conflict of Laws, p. 1. on the division of the world into independent nations ; and above, eh. ii. §§ 6, 7. SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 91 regular and stable government ; they are communities, but scarcely political communities : whatever political institutions they may from time to time possess, exist only in a shapeless and rudimentary state. Hence, in considering political data, savage nations may be conveniently omitted : and in order to illustrate the manner in which several communities, having cer- tain attributes in common, may be classified together, and com- pared with other communities, having different but common attributes, we will adduce the Oriental and European countries, and specify the characteristic peculiarities of each class. The following may be regarded as the principal points of opposition. Oriental. European. 1. Despotism. 1. Free government. All the Oriental states, from the dawn of history to the present time, have been governed by despotic princes. Simple despotism, in the most unmitigated shape, has been the unvarying rule. Both in its form and its practice, every Oriental government has been despotic. On the other hand, from the Greek republics downwards, many European states have had a free government; that is to say, the supreme power has been shared by several rulers. (') Throughout Europe, free government has alternated (4) 81a to SovXiKcoTfpot tlvai tu rjdrj (f>vo~ei 01 fj.(v ftdptapoi t5>v 'FjWj'jvcoi/, 6t 8e Trtpl Tr)V 'Aalau ru>v ir€p\ rrjv Mvpa>TTr)v, vnopfvovai Trjv ftfanoTiKijv (ipxi)i> oi8ev 8vo-x(f>alvovT€s. — Aristot. Pol. iii. 14. With respect to the despotic character of the Asiatic governments and their deadening effect, Bee Hip- Socrat. de Acre, Aquis et Locis, c. 10. The absoluteness of the Persian espotism is briefly characterized l>y Ilorod. iii. 31; its character and effects arc described hy Plato, Leg. iii. L3, p. <>'.i7. The antithesis of the Persian principle of despotism and ahsolute submission to the king, and the Greek principle Of < i vil freedom and equality, is clearly and simply expressed in Plutarch, Thcmist.c. 27. On the Oriental veneration for ahsolute kings, B66 Curtius, v. 10. ' Servirent Syria Asiaque et BUetUB regibus Oricns,' is the remark of Civilis, in Tao. I/iaf. IV. 17. Also Virgil, Georg. iv. 210-2. ' Pra;tcrca regem non sic J33gyptos el ingens Lydia, nee populi Parthorum, aut Modus Eydaspes Observant.' Speaking of a Persian, Gibbon says: 'His language afforded n<>i words for any form of governmenl excepl absolute monarchy. The history of the ESasI informed bin thai men bad ever been the condition ol mankind. ' — Deri, and Vail, c. '•*>■ ■ Le gouvernemeni de Persi esl monarchique, despotique, el absolu, 92 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [chap. XVI. with despotism, and hence, when an absolute monarchical form was in the ascendant, the people considered themselves as retain- ing the capacity of free government. "Whereas, in Asia, the idea of vesting the supreme power in a body never occurs ; and the only political change which the most grievous oppression suggests, is to substitute one despot for another. ( 5 ) In Europe, again, when the form of a government was monarchical, the spirit has often been republican. The absoluteness of the despotic theory has been moderated in practice. Moral have been substituted for constitutional checks ; and usage, manners, and opinion have opposed powerful barriers to the mere caprice of the monarch. ( 6 ) etant tout entier dans la main d'un seul homme, qui est le chef souverain, tant pour le spirituel que pour le temporel, le maitre a pur et a plein de la vie et des biens de ses sujets. II n'y a assurement aucun souverain au monde si absolu que le roi de Perse; car on execute toujours exactement ce qu'il prononce, sans avoir egard ni au fond, ni aux circonstances des choses, quoiqu'ou voie clair comme le jour, qu'il n'y a la plupart du temps nulle justice dans ses ordres, et souvent pas meme le sens commun.' — Chardin, Voyages en Perse, torn. v. p. 229. ' Le gouvernement republicain est tout-a-fait inconnu en Perse, de sorte que les Persans ne savent pas qu'il y ait au monde de tel gouvernement, et qu'ils ne peuvent pas meme comprendre quel il peut etre.' — torn. v. p. 291, cf. p. 123. On the purely despotic character of the Persian government, see Tavernier, Voyages, liv. v. ch. 9. On Hindu despotism, see Mill, Mist, of Brit. India, b. ii. c. 3. (5) ' The races of Asia acquiesced in their own immemorial despotisms, to which they had been abandoned by Sulla and Pompeius. To them the names of liberty and equality, invoked in turn by each of the Roman fac- tions, were unintelligible The sympathies of the Orientals centered always in men, and never in governments. A Cyrus, an Alexan- der, an Arsaces, commanded all their devotion ; for them, the foundations of law lay in the bosom of the autocrat.' — Merivale's History of the Romans under the Empire, vol. ii. p. 141. (6) The difference between the practical working of an Oriental des- potism and of the Roman empire is thus pointed out by Tacitus, in the admonitory address of Galba to Piso : ' Neque enim hie, ut in ceteris gen- tibus qua? regnantur, certa dominorum domus, et ceteri servi : sed impe- raturus es hominibus, qui nee totam servitutem pati possunt, nee totam libertatem.' — Hist. i. 16. Compare the remarks of Mably on the Euro- pean monarchies of the eighteenth century : ' Quoique le prince, dans toutes les monarchies de l'Europe, possede seule la puissance souveraine, l'exercice de cette puissance n'est pas le meme par-tout. Les peuples ont un caractere qui assigne des bornes a un pouvoir qui n'en reconnoit aucune. D'anciennes traditions, de vieilles lois, des prejuges, des passions, forment dans chaque etat des mceurs pubbques, et une sorte de routine et d'allure, qui se font respecter jusqu'a un certain point par le souverain meme. Le monarque le plus absolu a beau se dire qu'il peut tout, il sent qu'il n'est qu'un homme, et que s'd choque et revoke tous ses sujets, il ne pourra SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 93 In the East, the practice of the government has always been not less absolute than its form ; and no effectual system of moral restraints upon the arbitrary will of the despot has ever been established by public opinion. Despotism is the universal government of Oriental nations, as being the rudest, simplest, most primitive and unimproved form of government. It is the nearest approach to the more natural, and the furthest removed from the more artificial, form of politi- cal rule. This is the character of all their institutions, military as well as civil. Though their society is one of perpetual inse- curity, and there is constant resort to arms, yet their military system is rude, inefficient, and impotent. (') Generally, their government is more feeble, and possesses less energy and fewer resources, than that of an European state. This is owing to the backward state of the sciences and useful arts, ( s ) to the imperfect leur opposer que les forces d'un scul homme.' — De V Etude de V Histoire, part ii. c. 1. On the other hand, says Gibbon, ' it has always been the pride and policy of Oriental princes to display the titles and attributes of their om- nipotence ; to upbraid a nation of slaves with their true name and abject condition, and to enforce, by cruel and insolent threats, the rigour of their absolute commands.' — c. 46. (7) 'The science of Mar, that constituted the more rational force of Greece and Home, as it now docs of Europe never made any considerable progress in the East.' — Gibbon, Decl. ana Fall, c. 8 ad Jin. The opinion entertained by the Ivomans of Oriental warfare is expressed in Livy's comparison of the difficulty which Alexander found in conquer- ing Darius, with the opposition which he would have received from a Roman army and general. ' Non cum Dario rem esse dixisset : quem, rnulieruin ac spadonum agmen trahentent, inter purpuram atque aurnm, oneratum fort una' apparatibus sua;, pra"dam verius ipiam hostem, nihil ciliiiil quam bene aiuua vana contemnere, ineruentus devicit.' — ix. 17. [mean (viii. 'Aa\ is's Chinese, vol. i. p. 261*3. (15) The belief that polygamy is to he fcri 1 t<> a physiological cause (see Winer, Bibl. "Real fPTfrterbueh, in ' Vielweiberei') is quite erroneous. The simple explanation is, that in a rude Btate of society, rich ami powerful mm will not Bubmil t<> tin' restraint of monogamy those of] lerate wealth have not the means of escaping from it. Sec the passage of Tacitus quoted above, ami the following statement of Ammianus Marcel- linus respecting tin- Persians: ' (Sfiusius plerique Boluti in venerem, eegreque content] multitudine pellicum .... pro opibus quisque asoiscens matnmonia plura ve) pauca.' — wiii. <">. A king is aol t" aave many wives, according to Dent. xvii. 17. \ olne) (»6« tom, i. p. Il">l says that the Druses may marry several wives, hut that, with the exception of tin' emix and some great men, the cases are very rare; and ho states that in Turke] vol,. II. II 98 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. and the morals of domestic life, will be seriously affected. The Greeks introduced monogamy, or at least adhered to it strictly, since the commencement of their history. ( 16 ) It became prevalent it is only the rich who have several wives, torn. ii. p. 314 ; see also Niebuhr, Toy. en Arable, torn. ii. p. 353. Mr. Elphinstone gives the same account of the Afghauns, Caubul, vol. i. p. 241, 8vo. ' Polygamy seems to have been generally allowed among the Americans ; but the privilege was seldom used, except by the caciques and chiefs, and now and then by others in some of the fertile provinces of the south, where subsistence was more easily procured. The difficulty of supporting a family confined the mass of the people to one wife.' — Malthus, Essay on Population, vol. i. p. 42. In China, none but the rich keep several concubines, or inferior wives. — Davis, ib. p. 2G3. As to the same fact in other nations, see Comte, TraitS de Legislation, liv. iv. c. 19. ' Cette polygamic meme n'est pas si universelle en Orient qu'on le croit en Europe. Car si quelques Mahometans m'ont tres-fort vante ce droit, d'autres, assez x*iches pour avoir plusieurs femmes, m'ont franchement avoue qu'ils n'ont ete heureux qu'avec une seule. C'est pourquoi il y a peu d'hommes d'un etat mediocre qui aient plus qu'une femme, et beaucoup de gens distingues s'en tiennent a une pour toute leur vie.' — Niebuhr, De- scription de V Arable, p. 65. The fable of there being more female than male births in the East is refuted by Niebuhr, ib. p. 63. Speaking of Morocco, Mr. Jackson says : ' It must not be imagined that this insatiable desire for young females pervades the mass of the people : Mooselmin, in general, are satisfied with one wife, and, in a tract of country possessing a population of 100,000 souls, a hundred men will scarcely be found who keep four.' ' The emperor, the princes, and some of the bashaws, have often four wives.' — An Account of the Empire of Morocco, p. 161 (Lond. 1814; ed. 3). (16) With respect to the notions of monogamy in the Homeric age, see Odyssey, i. 432, referring to Laertes and Euryclea : 'Icra 8e piv Kebvfj ako^a rUv iv p.eyapoio'iv, evvfj § ovtvot e/xiKTo' ^okov Oakeeive yvvaiKos. Also, Iliad, ix. 449-52, in the story of Phoenix. The following verses in Odyss. vi. 182, are likewise significant : oli pev yap rovye Kpelaaov Ka\ apeiov, fj Z6 1 opocppoviovre voTjpao~iv oIkov €%r]TOv avrjp r)8i yvvrj. See also the remark of Aristotle, in Athen. xiii. p. 556 D. Cecrops is said to have first introduced monogamy into Athens, whence he received the appellation of Si(pvr]s, or geminus. See Clearchus, ap. Athen. xiii. p. 555 D ; Charax in Fragm. Hist. Grr. vol. iii. p. 638. Suidas, in Tlpop.r}6evs. This fabulous a'lnov assumes the antiquity of the monogamic institution in Greece. The Greek view of marriage, as the union of a man with one woman, is fully developed in Xenoph. (Econ. c. 7, § 18 sq. av6pa>7ros (pvo-ei crvvBvao-- tikov, Aristot. Eth. Nic. viii. 14. Anaxandrides, king of Sparta in the sixth century b. c, was compelled by the ephors and gerontes to marry a second wife, in consequence of the barrenness of his first wife ; but this (says Herodotus) was altogether contrary to the Spartan usage : pera 8e yvvalicas 'dx&v bvo, bii-as lo-rias o'iKee , tvoucov ovdapcos STrapTirjrucd, V. 40. The Romans likewise, throughout their entire history, held strictly to the rule of monogamy : see Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law, p. 339-47 ; ed. 1786. Lucan contrasts the Parthian and Roman laws of marriage — SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 99 in Judaea after the Babylonian exile, ( 1? ) was the common laAv of the Roman empire, and, having been adopted by Christianity, it has descended to modern Europe. 6. Seclusion of women. 6. Freedom of women. It might, at first sight, appear that polygamy and seclusion of women were inseparably connected, and it is probably true that, wherever polygamy exists, the women are either secluded, or subject to severe restrictions. ( ls ) But that there may be ' Nuni barbara nobis Est ignota Venus, qua? ritu ca?ca ferarum Polluit innumeris leges et foedera taxla? Conjugibus ?' viii. 397-400. Compare the apophthegm in Sen. Agam. 257 : ' Ultimum est nuptsB malum, Palam mariti possidens pellex domum,' which describes the ordinary state of conjugal life in an Oriental country. The insult and injury to the wife, arising from the open assumption of a concubine by the husband, are strongly portrayed, according to the Greek and Roman feeling, in some of Ovid's Her aides, as in the epistle of Deianira to Hercules, v. 121-6 ; and of Medea to Jason, v. 137-82. On some supposed exceptions to the law of monogamy among iho Greeks, sec Luzac de Digamid Sacra//*; Wachsmuth, Hellen. All. ii. 1, J). 204; F. Jacobs, Vcrmischte Schriften, vol. iv. p. 218. The supposed aw of Valentinian I., permitting bigamy in the Roman empire, has been proved to be a fiction. — Gibbon, c. 25. The only real exceptions to the practice of monogamy in Greece were among kings and despots, some of whom married two wives, as Dionj sins the Elder, and some of the Macedonian and Egyptian kings, sec Luzac, ibid. p. 35. Ca;sar likewise meditated the assumption of this licence : ' Ilelvius Cinna tribunus plcbis pic risque con fessus est, liabuisse se script am paratamque legem, quam Ca?sar ferrc jussisset, t sufficiently love her, and to envy those wives who are kept and watched with greater strictness.' — Modern Egyptians, vol. i. p. 217. Plain, in his Laws, vi. 21. p. 781, proposes public tables for the women as well as the men ; but he thinks that, women, accustomed to a retired life in their houses, will with dilliculty be com- pelled to eat in public (24) See the excellent account of the elferls produced by polygamy and seclusion of women in Turkey, in Volmy, ib. tom. ii. p. 310-8. The (25) Sec Chencvix, Essay upon National Character, vol. i. p. L84-8. ■ massacres of the Tartars and Huns arc illustrated by Gibbon, e. 31. 102 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. of the tongue, than in Occidental countries. The employment of eunuchs, on account of their supposed trustworthiness, and also as guardians of the women, lias likewise lasted in Asia from the times recorded in the sculptures of Nineveh to the present day.C) Tortures, sometimes of the most horrible and disgusting nature, (" 2 ") have been constantly practised in the East, both for punishment and for the extraction of evidence. Among the Euro- pean nations, there has doubtless at times been great cruelty, and men have been destroyed in cold blood by thousands ; but, there has been, on the whole, a much greater moderation in bodily inflictions than among the Orientals. Penal mutilations appear in the German codes, (- s ) but have been disused in later times. Torture was for some centuries established in the criminal jurisprudence of Europe; but it was at first regulated, with a view of subjecting it to restraint, and is now abolished. (26) Eunuchs were anciently employed in the Oriental states in all offices of trust and confidence about the king's person. They were his wine-bearers ; they brought his food, and thus protected him from poison (Joseph. Ant. xvi. 8, § 1) ; they also acted as his instruments in deeds of secrecy, such as poisoning his sons and other near relations (Livy, xxxv. 15). They were not merely chamberlains, or guardians of the women, but were also employed in affairs of state (Tac. Ann. vi. 31) ; they like- wise accompanied the king into the field, and fought like other men (see the Nineveh sculptures). They were peculiarly employed in the responsible office of treasurer (Plutarch, JDemetr. 25 ; compare Acts, viii. 27). Eunuchs were preferred on account of their superior fidelity to their master (Herod, viii. 105), and compare the conduct of the eunuchs in the attack of the seven Persian conspirators upon Smerdis, ib. iii. 77-8. avbpas evvovxovs kcu nKTTovs (3ao-i\e~i, in Plutarch, Artax. c. 17, where the text does not re- quire alteration. On eunuchs and their fidelity, see also Chardin, Voyage en Perse, torn. vi. p. 43. Their fidelity was owing to the absence of family ties, or feelings of love, and to their consequent single-minded devotion to their employer's service. — Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, § 60-5. Compare Winer, B. B. Worterbuch, art. ' Verschnittene.' The institution of eunuchs was referred to Semiramis, the Assyrian queen, or to the Persians. — See Ammian. Marcellin. xiv. 6; Steph. in ^ndda ; Brisson. de Bean. Pers. p. 217. As to the light in which castration was viewed by the Romans, see the expressions of Dio Cassius, lxxv. 14, on the act of Plautianus. As the Roman empire, however, assumed a more Oriental character of govern- ment, eunuchs advanced into favour. — Gibbon, c. 19, ad init. In modern Europe, castration has been only practised, under the patronage of the Pope, for musical purposes. (27) See Plutarch, Artax. c. 16, 17 ; Xen. Anab. i. 9, § 13 ; ii. 6, § 29 ; Brisson de Beq. Pers. p. 242-8. (28) See Grimm, Deutsche Bechts Alterthiimer, p. 701-11. SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 103 9. Loose dress. 9. Dress closely fitting the body. The Orientals have, from an early time, shown a preference for a looser dress, and one less admitting of active bodily exer- tion, than the Europeans. The dress of the Medes, adopted by the Persians, was of tins character, and was considered by the Greeks more suitable to women than to men.( ;9 ) It was even said to have been invented by Seniiramis in order to make it uncertain whether the wearer was man or woman. ( :, °) The assumption of the Oriental dress by Alexander was highly offensive to the Greek feeling, as the assumption of the same dress by Elagabalus was offensive to the Romans. ( ;u ) The dress of men in Europe is likewise generally plain. Orna- ment is the characteristic of female dress. In the East, women do not appear at public ceremonials, or even in private society; and the splendour of dress, particularly in the matter of jewels, (29) BrjKva-Tokf'iv virtfiavav, Strab. xi. 13, § 9. As to the effeminate dress of the Lydians, Herod, i. 155 ; Polyam. vii. § 4. The cognati regis, in the army of Darius, were 15,000 men : ' H»c veroturba, muliebviter pro- pemodum culta, luxu magis quam decoris armis conspicua erat.' — Curt, iii. 3. On the ornaments of Persian dress, Plutarch, Cimon, 9 ; Aristid. 16. Justin (xli. 2) says of the Parthians : ' Vestis olim sui moris ; pos- teaquam accessere opes, ut Mcdis, perlucida ac iluida.' ' Et Syria' gentcs, ct laxo Persis amictu, Vestibus ipsa suis barrens.' Manilius, Astronom. iv. 750. ' Quicquid ad Eoos tractas, mundique teporem Labitur, cmollit Rentes dementia ccoli. Illic et laxas Testes, et lluxa virorum Velamenta vidcs.' Lucan, viii. 365. See "Winer, in Kleider. The use of umbrellas, as a protection against the sun, held by slaves over the head, is likewise characteristic of Oriental usage. See the Xanthian marbles ; and Plutarch, Themist.16. ' Les Tores, les Axabes, en nn moi tons lea Mahometans, portenl des habits longs et large* : cependant, ohaque nation Be distingue, au premier coup d'cBU, par quelque mode, qui lui eel particuliere. D'ailleurs, les Orientaux qui habitent les rilles changenl de modes, fcoul oomme les Europeans.' — Niebuhr, Voyagi en Arable, torn, i. |». 1-7. Oriental dress varies little IV.. in one age to another, Chardin.tom. iv. |>. l. Mr. Elphin- stone confirms Niebuhr, and siaies thai fashions of dress change iii the Bast. — Account «f Caubul, vol. i. |>. 323, ii. (30) Diod. ii. 6. (31) See Plutarch, Alexand. c. L5; Curtius, vi. c> . Diod. zvii. 77: Justin, xii. 3 j and with resped t" Elagabalus, Gibbon, c* 6. 104 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [chap. xvi. is principally reserved for the men. In Asia, all the finest jewels are worn by the princes, not by their women. ( 3 ") 10. Intricate alphabet. 10. Simple alphabet. The mode of alphabetical writing exercises so important an influence on civilization, that it deserves a separate mention. The Sanscrit, the Chinese, the Arabic, the Persian, and other Oriental modes of writing, are so intricate, the forms of the letters and their combinations are so deficient in simplicity and perspicuity, that the difficulty of writing and of reading written characters is far greater than in the European alpha- bets^ 33 ) and printing with moveable types is thus rendered either impossible, or more expensive. ( 34 ) (32) Compare the description of the dress of Darius, in Curt. hi. 3 : ' Cultus regis inter omnia luxuria notabatur : purpurea? tunica? medium album intextum erat : pallam auro distinctam aurei accipitres, velut rostris inter se corruerent, adornabant ; et zona aurea muhebriter cinctus acina- cem suspenderat, cui ex gemma erat vagina.' (33) See Niebuhr, Descript. d' Arable, p. 89 ; Volney, lb. torn. ii. p. 284. ' Mon maitre Turc conmienca par me faire apprendre a ecrire, c'est la regie. L'habitude du dessin m'y fit faire quelques progres ; je lus ensuite, et alors les difBcultes se multiplierent. La suppression des voyelles sufSt de donner une idee de mes premiers embarras et du travail penible et fastidieux qu'il me fallut subir ; mais il y a plus encore — les Turcs, en sup- pleant a la pauvrete de leur langue originelle par l'adoption totale de l'Arabe et du Persan, en se composant cinq alphabets, dont les differens caracteres sont, cependant, au choix des ecrivains, ont encore cree de nou- veaux obstacles a l'instruction ; et quand la vie d'un homme suffit a peine pour apprendre a bien lire, que lui reste-t-il pour choisir ses lectures, pour profiter de ce qu'il aura lu ?'— Memolres du Baron de Tott, torn. i. p. 7. ' Bien ne fondera certainement l'instruction des Turcs, tant que les diffi- cultes de la langue en fixeront les bornes au seul talent de lire et d'ecrire.' — lb. p. 112. (34J ' Non seulement il y a disette de bons livres en Orient, mais meme les livres en general y sont tres rares. La raison en est evidente : dans ces pays, tout livre est ecrit a la main : or, ce moyen est lent, penible, dis- pendieux ; le travail de plusieurs mois ne produit qu'un seul exemplaire ; il doit etre sans rature, et mille accidens peuvent le detruire.' — Volney, lb. p. 285. Speaking of the Arabs, Volney says : ' Leurs sciences sont absolument nulles; ils n'ont aucune idee ni de l'astronomie, ni de la geometrie, ni de la medecine. Ils n'ont aucun livre, et rien n'est si rare, meme parmi les chaiks, que de savoir lire. Toute leur litterature consiste a reciter des contes et des histoires, dans le genre des Mille et Une Nulls.'' — lb. torn. i. p. 373. Chardin (torn. iv. p. 89, 274) says that the Persians have not the art of printing. Niebuhr {Descript. d Arable, p. 188) states that there is no printing-press in Arabia. The obstacle to the use of printed books is, SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 105 The characters of the European alphabet; and of the nume- rical notation, were both derived from Asia; but the nations which borrowed them gave them a practical value and finish which they never have attained in the East^ 35 ) 11. Poetry and mystical 11. Argumentative prose. prose. The literature of the East has been, for the most part, confined to poetry and tales of fiction. Its histories have been rare, and, when they existed, have been mere dry, unin- structive chronicles. It has produced some collections of apophthegms, ( 36 ) and some meagre scientific treatises, chiefly borrowed from the Greek. Argumentative prose composition, such as was originated by the Greeks after Socrates, and in- structive histories, such as those of Herodotus and Thucydides, are not to be found within the circle of Oriental literature. The application of ridicule or irony to the investigation of truth, and to matters of serious import, is also purely European. An Aristophanes, a Lucian, a Swift, a Voltaire, or even a Socrates, he says, not the existence of a prejudice against tliem, but the difficulty of representing the forms of the letters in print. He adds that he had often shown to Arabs books printed in their language, which they could scarcely read. (35) Litteras semper arbitror Assyrias fuisse. — Plin. H. ]V. vii. 57. If the Arabic numerals really were of Asiatic origin (sec Hohlcn, Altcs Jndien, vol. ii. ]>. 221-7), they are an example of the simplification and perfection of scientific instruments, proceeding from an < friental people. In this case, then; would be a remarkable coincidence with the European alphabet, which the Greeks certainly derived from the Phoenicians. — Soo Murc's //<■;/. ofGr. Lit. vol. i. p. 78. 1 Phcenices primi, famao si creditor, ausi Mansuram rudibus vocem signare liguris.' Lucan, hi. 220-1. ' Si famsB libet crcdero, hsec gens [the Phoenicians] litcras prima aut docuit :nii didieit.' — Curt. iv. 4. Tacit. (Arm. \\. 1 I) places the Egyptians first, and the Phoenicians second. Strabo (xvi. 2) says thai astronomy and arithmetic came from the Pho'iiicians, as geomel ry or land-measuring came from I be Egj pi ians. The metrical system of Greece was ultimately derived from the Babylonians. — Poeckh, Slctroloyic, c. 4. (,)(>) The Oriental nations have always included their ffisdom in pro verbs and fables, partly on accounl 01 the despotic character of their governments, winch rendered it dangerous to speas openly. — Chardin, torn. v. p. 3. ' II ii ' v a que les Europeans au monde qui voyagent par curiosite. 1 — lb, p. 118. 106 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. a Plato, or a Pascal, is only to be found in the Occidental nations. Only two Oriental nations have possessed a native drama — the Chinese and the Hindus. The Chinese drama serves for popular amusement, and is acted to large audiences, ( 37 ) but the Hindu drama, composed in Sanscrit, could only, on the rare occasions when it was acted, have been understood by a select and learned audience, and by them but imperfectly^ 38 ) The drama, considered as a refined, intellectual amusement, ad- dressed to the emotions, the taste, or even the political passions, of large bodies of people, is unknown in Asia. § 4 Carrying our views from Asia to Africa, we may observe that the negro communities of the latter continent, from Abyssinia to Morocco, from Morocco to Dahomey, and from Dahomey to Caffraria, live for the most part in a state of political society, but that their level is considerably lower than that of the Oriental nations. ( 39 ) Both classes of communities are governed despotically ; both are without any refined law of nations ; both recognise slavery and polygamy. But the government of the African races is ruder than the Oriental system j the punishments are more cruel, and the disregard of human life and pain more pronounced ; the criminal and civil law, and the military organi- zation, are all in a more barbarous state ; the women are not secluded, but enslaved ; their condition is too menial and de- graded for the indolent and luxurious life of the harem or zenana. Among the African nations, the mode of living is more squalid, (37) See Davis's Chinese, c. 17. (38) Sec Wilson's Theatre of the Hindus (ed. 2 ; London, 1835), pref. p. xiii. Bohlen (Altes Indien, vol. ii. p. 429) ascribes to the Hindu theatre a more popular character ; but the reasons for the opposite opinion adduced by Prof. "Wilson appear decisive. With respect to Hindu dramatic criticism, Prof. Wilson remarks : ' Indian criticism has been always in its infancy. It never learned to connect causes and effects ; it never looked to the influence exercised by imagination or passion in poetry ; it never, in short, became either poetical or philosophical.' — lb. p. xvii. The Par- thian court was sufficiently Hellenized to enjoy the representation of Greek tragedies. — Plutarch, Crass. 33. (39) Concerning the political and social state of the African nations see Comte, Traitd de legislation, liv. iii. c. 29, 30, 35. sect. 4.] IN POLITICS. 107 abject and filthy, than in the East, and their food is lower and more precarious. The useful arts are less advanced ; the towns are little better than collections of huts, without any of that decora- tive architecture which has distinguished Oriental cities. ( 40 ) Writing, instead of being intricate and hard of acquisition, is scarcely practised at all. There are no sciences, and no literary works; and, in general, it may be said that the African are to the Oriental, what the Oriental are to the European nations. An antithesis, analogous to those which we have been examining, existed between the Greeks and Barbarians in anti- quity. All Greeks differed in certain respects from all Barba- rians;^ 1 ) and these common differences exercised a material influence upon the political institutions of each group of commu- nities. Now it is plain that, when we are seeking to determine generally the operation of any political cause, such as a certain system of judicature, taxation, punishment, military or naval organization, &c, our researches will be greatly facilitated if we assume as our basis some definite state of political society, such as that belonging either to the Oriental or the European type. (40) ' Le monarque do Loango est un negre, qui ne porte point do vetemens, qui marche pieds nuds, qui habite une huttc de padle, qui s'asseoit par tcrre, et mange avec les doigts.' — Comte, ib. c. 30. A similar description applies to the reguli of the other negro tribes of Western Africa. (41) On the antithesis between Greeks and Barbarians, see Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. ii. p. :'»77 ; K. F. Hermann, dr. Ant. § 7 ; Wacbsmuth, Ui II. Alt. i. 1, j». 139. Compare the remarks of Dionysius, Ant. Rom. 1. 89, as to llome not being of barbarous origin. Plutarch speaks of the native Epirots being Rellenized in manners, letters, and laws. — "Pyrrh. i. The antithesis of Barbarians was transferred by tin' modern Italians to their own countrymen ; bul it designated in this case no marked difference of civilization. See Maohiavel, cri/novpe, c. 26 : ' Esortazione a Liberare I'ltalia dai BarbarL' similar ethnological distinctions may be drawn mother eases; thus, Gibbon says : ' If we inquire into the characteristic marks of the people of Germany and of Sarmal ia, we shall discover thai those two ereat por- tions of human bind w ere principally lo-.l by fixed huts or move- able tents; by a close dress or How ina garments; by the marriage of one or of several wives ; by a militarj force, consisting, for the most part, either of infantry or cavalry j ami. above all, bj the use of the Teutonic orol the Slavonian language, the las! of which has been diffused by conquesf from the confines of Italy to the neighbourhood of Japan.' — 0. 1" 108 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. We may even limit our field of vision still further. We may, instead of co-ordinating several cognate nations, confine ourselves to a single nation, and investigate the operation of political causes in reference to its peculiar position and circumstances. For this purpose, we must look to its history and historical statistics, and to the facts which serve to distinguish it from all other nations. In tins way, we are brought to the question of national character — its nature and causes. § 5 That nations (hke individuals and smaller bodies, as regiments, schools, clubs, &c.) have a character, both moral and intellectual, is a fact which has been long since recognised. ( 42 ) In speaking of national character, however, we must distinguish between the collective character of the nation, considered as an individual, and the separate characters of the individual persons of whom it consists. A nation, as represented by its government, may have a collective character, independent of the character of any of its citizens, and this character may appear in its acts at successive periods of time. A government may, for example, be faithless in its public engagements, though the persons composhig that government may be honourable in their private transactions. A false morality respecting national interest and patriotism may induce persons to resort to means, in behalf of their country, which they would scorn to use for themselves. Again, there may be a predominant character of the indivi- duals of a particular country — they may be daring and impetuous, or timid and cautious ; they may be warlike or unwarlike, lazy or (42) See the elaborate comparison between the national characters of Athens and Sparta, in the funeral oration of Pericles, Thuc. ii. 37 ; and the general remarks in Polyb, iv. 21. As to the peculiar laws and customs of each country, see Zenob. v. 25, in the proverb vofios ko\ x™P a - ' Tarn civitatium, quam singulorum hominum mores sunt : gentes quo - que alise iracunda?, alia; audaces, quaedam timidse : in vinum, in venerem proniores alia; sunt. Atheniensem populum fama est celerem et supra vires audacem esse ad conandum : Lacedsemoniorum cunctatorem, et vis in ea quibus fidit ingredientem.' — Livy, xlv. 23. ' Fa ancora facilita il conoscere le cose future per le passate, vedere una nazione longo tempo tenere i medesimi costumi, essendo o continuamente avara, o continuamente fraudolente, o avere alcun altro simile vizio o vhtu.' — Machiavel, Disc. iii. 43. On the varieties of national character, see Bodinus, Method. Mist. c. 5. SECT. 5.] IN POLITICS. 109 industrious, thrifty or improvident, slow or quick, reserved or communicative. The people may be distinguished by a love of literature and the fine arts, or may be indifferent to them ; they may be religious in belief and practice, or the contrary ; their prevalent pursuits may be agricultural, commercial, or manufac- turing. Thus Italians, Spaniards, Germans, French, Dutch, English, ( 4:i ) Americans, and, again, Russians, Turks, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, may have certain leading characteristics, which may be further subdivided into the characteristics of particular towns, provinces, and districts. Among the Greeks each state, and even city, had its peculiar character — the Athenians were lively and acute, as were also the Sicilians ;( 44 ) the Boeotians were slow and heavy ; the Lacedaemonians were noted for the brevity of their speech ; the Thessalians for their licence : ('') again, in Italy, the Etruscans were distinguished by their pronencss to religious observances ;( 46 ) the Ligurians by their deceitfulness.( 47 ) (43) Upon the national characters of the French, English, Spaniards, Italians, and Germans, see Kant, Anthropologic ; Werhe, vol. vii. p. 250-7. The national characters of the French and Spanish are drawn by Filan- gieri, Scienza della Legislazione, i. 13. Compare also Goldsmith's Traveller. (44) ' Siculi — lascivi et dicaces.' — Cadius ap. Quintilian, vi. 3, § 41. ' Quod essct acuta ilia gens et controversa natura.' — Cic. Brut. 12. Com- pare Yerr. iii. 8 ; De Orat. ii. 54. On the national characteristics (it the Spartans, Ionians, Thracians, and Thessalians. see Plutarch, Alcih. 'S.L (45) See Wachsmuth, Hell. Alt. i. 1, p. 59-75 ; Bernhardy, Qrtmdris8 der Griechiichcn Litteratur, vol. i. p. 9. ' Inde Afros versipellcs, (ira-cos leves, Gallos pigrioris videmus ingenii ; quod natura climalum I'acit, sicut, Ptohiuaus deprehendit, qui elicit, translatum ad aliud cliuia liomincm naturam ex parte mutare.' — Servius ad yJC/i. vi. 723. ' The people of Alexandria (a various mixture of nations) united the vanity and inconstancy of the Greeks with the superstition and obstinacy of the Egyptians.' — Gibbon, c. 10. (46) 'Gens ante omnes alias eo xnagis dedita religjonibus, quod excel- leret arte eolendi eas.' — Livy, v. 1. Compare Dion. Hal. .////. Rom. i. ilo. So Cajsar says of the Gauls: ' Natio est omnis (lallorum admodum dedita religionibus. — //. Q. \i. 1<*>. (41) 'Vane F . i m 1 s , frustrai|ue animis elate BUperbu, Nequidquam patriot tentasti Lubricua artet, Nee fraus te mcoluxnem fallaoi perferel Anno.' Virg. -/-;«. xi. 716 7. Cato, Orig. ii. ap. Serv. ad v. 7<>o: ' Ligores autem oxnnea fallaces sunt.' Nigidius, to. ▼. 715 : 'Namet Ligurei qui Apenninum tenuerunt, latrones, insidioai, fallaees, mendaces.' Compare Cio. d\ Earuep, Reap. 0. 9 ' Quam volumus licet, patron conscript i, ipsi 008 ainemus s taiiien nee numero Iiispanos, nee rohore Gallon, nee calliilii.it. PcenOB, nee artibua 110 ON PARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. A certain character may likewise, as Macliiavel remarks, ( 48 ) be hereditary, even in a family, as was the case with many of the great Roman houses : the Claudian family, for example, was long noted for its arrogant and antipopular demeanour ;( 49 ) while the Valerian gens, in early times, was distinguished for its attach- ment to the popular cause. Similar characteristics have marked particular families in modern states. ( 50 ) Many of these national, provincial, or local peculiarities have been embodied in proverbs, and have thus fixed a character upon a district, similar to that which may belong to it in connexion with some physical attribute, or some article of production. ( 51 ) A fragment of a topographical work of Dicaearchus, a disciple of Aristotle, upon Greece, has preserved several sayings of this sort upon the cities of Boeotia;( 52 ) and similar proverbs exist with Graecos, nee denique lioc ipso hujus gentis ac terra? dornestico nativoque eensu, Italos ipsos ac Latinos ; sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus.' 48 ' Pare che non solamente l'una citta dalT altra abbi certi modi e in- stituti diversi, e procrei uomini o piii duri, o piu effeminati ; ma nella medesima citta si vede tal differenza essere nelle famiglie l'una dalT altra.' — Disc. iii. 46. (49) See the speech of Sempronius the tribune against Appius Claudius, in Livy, ix. 34. Tacitus ( Ann. i. 4) mentions the ' vetus atque insita Claudia? familiee superbia.' Compare Sueton. Tiber, c. 2. (50) ' Such free states as are not mere aggregates of individuals, changing their character and sentiments with every outward impression and momentary impulse, owe this steadiness mainly to the subsistence of houses and corporations, in which principles and feelings are transmitted for ages as an heirloom from generation to generation. Were a Russell to prove false to the principles of 1688, he would be deemed a shocking instance of unnatural degeneracy. But above all other nations did the Romans maintain this unity between forefathers and their posterity, so that the life of a house in the republic was like that of one man ; the descendant received the principles of his ancestor as a law, and his plans as a trust that he was charged to execute.' — Niebuhr's History of Rome, vol. ii. p. 377. (51) Compare Athenams, i. c. 49. (52) 'laTopovai 8 01 Bottoroi ra . (56) Upon the causes of national character, sec Hume's Essay on National Charar/, ,-.:. pari L 88Sa) -I ; ami Chenevix, "Eaton upon National Character, vol. i. p. 16. See likewise Kant, ib. p. 217, and the treatise of Zinunermann, Vom Nattonalstolte, (57) 'Territory influences the character of nations— 1, by its extent ; 2, by the manner in which it bfll been acquired; :i. by the uses to which it is applied; I, by the nature of ita boundaries, as contributing to its security.' — Chenevix, ib. p. I') (-H) On the assimilating influence of a common government with re- spect to national character, .^ff Chenevix, ib. p. 801. In p. :tl I. be poinl - out that government is an effect, as well as a cause, of national character. 112 ON TARTIAL THEORIES [CHAP. XVI. action of the character which they create. The moral conditions of national character, on the other hand, are subject to a reflex influence, and are affected in return by the result which they assist in producing. § 6 By studying the prominent peculiarities of a given com- munity, or class of communities, we are enabled to accomplish a double object, or rather we arrive at results which admit of a twofold use. In the first place, we are enabled to form limited theories, to predicate general tendencies, and prevailing laws of causation, which might not be true, for the most part, if extended to all mankind, but which have a presumptive truth if confined to certain nations. Theoretical propositions thus formed may be used for all the purposes to which theory is applicable, whether for construing past, or predicting future phenomena. ( 59 ) Again, this special knowledge enables us, in the application of universal theorems to practice, to circumscribe their import, and to qualify them by restrictions and exceptions, which adapt them to our present purpose. This latter process, as we shall show lower down, properly belongs to the department of practice. C 50 ) If, however, general were converted into limited theories by the political philosopher, with reference to a certain defined subject, the labour of the practical man would be abridged. Moreover, the reduction would take place under circumstances more favour- able to accuracy if it was made deliberately and slowly, and not on the spur of the moment. Thus Yolney, in commenting upon the general proposition, that ( the plains are the seat of indolence and slavery, and the mountains the seat of energy and liberty/ observes that it requires circumscription, inasmuch as some inde- pendent and active races, as the Arabs and Tartars, have inha- bited the plains. ( 61 ) If this proposition were closely examined, and compared with numerous cases, its limits might be fixed, so as to fit it for use in practice without a long preliminary adapta- . tion. (59) See Macbiavel, quoted above, p. 108, n. 42. (60) See below, cb. xix. § 10 ; xx. § 6. (61) lb. torn. i. p. 163. See above, p. 47, 11. 65. SECT. 6.] IN POLITICS. 113 The limited theories to which we are now referring, whether in their primitive form of mere general enunciations of fact, or as converted into preceptive maxims fitted for practical application, correspond to the axiomata media of Bacon. These, he declares, are the really solid and living truths in which the business and fortunes of men are involved j they differ, on the one hand, from mere statements of particular facts, and, on the other, from the highest abstractions, which are notional, and devoid of solid in- struction. ('-) It is easy to perceive that, in estimating the actual influence of any political cause with reference to the past, in any given community, we ought to understand the individual charac- teristics of that community, and not, as Bacon says, to work with mere general principles of human nature; such as — that men seek pleasure and avoid pain, that they resent injuries, and the like; or, on the other hand, to rely merely on single and unconnected facts. For example: an Englishman recently arrived in India would be less likely to form a sound judgment as to the cause of any insurrection, or disturbance, or discontent among the native population of any part of the country, than one who had long resided in India, and had learnt by experience the opinions, feelings, and modes of thought prevalent among the natives. It is from the absence or insufficiency of this sort of knowledge that judgments upon the politic; 1 1 affairs of foreign countries are often shallow and erroneous. After all due allowance is made for national predilection on the one pari, and national antipathy mi the other, every one must feel that the opinions of foreigners respecting his own country are frequently unworthy of serious attention. Again, with reference to the probable future opera- tion of a political cause in a given country, such knowledge is still more requi ite. Propositions descriptive of general tenden (62) 'Etenim axiomata infima non multum ab experientil mnl.'i the | i i AIkivp, cli. iii. ;.' ii ; eh. 7. § 8 126 EXISTENCE OF A [CHAP. XVIII. work of man, and the other is not. But the import of science cannot be thus restricted. The sciences are, doubtless, occupied to a great extent with the investigation of phenomena which are " not of human origin. Even the physical sciences, however, go beyond these boundaries. The science of mechanics derived its name from the consideration of mechanical contrivances, such as the lever, the inclined plane, the wheel and axle.( 2 ) These, to- gether with other similar works of man's hands, as the pulley, the pendulum, &c, form that branch of mechanics which is called statics. It was only by a later extension of the name that the doctrine of motion, even of the motion of the heavenly bodies, was included in mechanical science, and that the theory of astronomical motions and attractions has been treated under the title of mecanique celeste. The science of hydrostatics, likewise, is occupied to a great extent with the motion and pres- sure of fluids when subjected to the influence of human con- trivances, such as tubes, vessels, pumps, &c. ; and a similar remark applies to the science of optics. ( 3 ) If any department of human nature is to be the subject of science, we must admit that there may be a science of things which owe their form to man. Not only such subjects as lan- guage, education, and strategics, but even ethics, imply the existence of relations which are of human institution. Without the fundamental ideas of political government, marriage, family, possession, and property, no scientific investigation in ethics or the cognate sciences can proceed a step.( 4 ) It is from a percep- tion of the necessity of these ideas to ethical and political science (2) See the introduction to Aristotle's short collection of mechanical problems, entitled Mrj^aviKd, p. 847, ed. Bekker. In this introduction, Aristotle defines urjxavr] to be a contrivance of art intended to assist the wants of man ; and he points out the difference between an inquiry into the causes of natural phenomena, and an inquiry into the contrivances of art. He seems, however, to be embarrassed by the relation of mechanical to physical problems : "'Earn 8e ravra (he says) rois (pvoriKoh Trpo€\r)- fjuuriv ovre ravra irauirav ovre Keycap tcr/ieva Xlav, aXka. Koiva raiv re (laOrj^ariKaiv 6ea>pr}fiara>v Kalrav (pvcriKwv. (3) See Whewell's Hist, of the Inductive Sciences, b. ii. ch. i. ; b. vi. ch. i. (4) See above, ch. ii. § 9. SECTS. 2, 3.] SCIENCE OF POLITICS. 127 that there has been, in some cases, a disposition to treat the in- stitutions in question as natural, and thus, as it was thought, to give them a scientific generality, by withdrawing them from the domain of human influence. But this explanation is a mere verbal artifice, which (as we shall see presently) avails nothing; and it is better to admit, without resistance, that the human origin of political institutions is not a valid reason for excluding politics from the region of science. We may conclude, therefore, that positive politics, as defined in previous parts of this treatise, possesses the distinctive pro- perties and marks of a science. Whether, however, speculative politics — that branch of politics which considers the tendencies, character, and goodness of political institutions — equally admits of a scientific treatment, is less certain. § 2 We have, in a former chapter, ( 5 ) inquired how far uni- versal propositions, or theorems of unlimited application, can be laid down in politics ; and the result at winch we arrived was, that the number of such true theoretical propositions is small, and that these are often uninstructive, from their vague and abstract form. So far, however, as true theorems, expressive of fact, can be laid down in this department of politics, they have properly a scien- tific character. It was shown, however, in the succeeding chap- ter, (") that it is possible to enlarge the region of speculative politics, consistently with the true expression of facts, by narrow- ing the range of observation, and confining ourselves to a limited class of communities. By the adoption of this method, we are enabled to increase the number of true political theorems which can be gathered from the facts, and, at the same time, to give them more fulness, life, and substance. Instead of being mere jejune and hollow generalities, they resemble the Malm Axiomata of Bacon, which arc generalized expressions of fact, but, never- theless, are sufficiently near to practice to serve as guides in the business of life. § 3 Tt is chiefly by considering how much is involved in i-i above, oh. w , (6) Oh. ivi 128 EXISTENCE OF A [CHAP. XVIII. the diversities of nations — their national character, habits, and other circumstances — that Mr. Mill, in his System of Logic, is led to the conclusion, that ' there can be no separate science of government.' ( 7 ) All theories (he afterwards adds) respecting forms of government in the abstract, are fruitless and worth- less. ( 8 ) There can, in his view, be only a general science of society ; but a speculative system of political science, in the sense here in question, is, he thinks, impossible. "With respect to the existence of a science of society inde- pendent of political science, we refer to the remarks in a former part of tins treatise. ( 9 ) We will here confine our attention to so much of Mr. Mill's reasoning as is founded on the necessity of adapting political theorems to national peculiarities, and thus de- priving them of then scientific generality. It may be, and is doubtless, true, that the number of universal propositions which can be safely laid down in specu- lative politics is not large, and that even these are not in general very instructive. It may be necessaiy to limit our theorems both in time and in place. Vfe may be compelled, by the nature of the subject, to select a definite period of history, and a definite portion of the inhabited earth, for our generalizations, or perhaps to combine both limits together. But the necessity for such limitations does not prove that speculative politics are essentially devoid of the scientific character. There are other subjects, considered to admit of a scientific treatment, in which the field of observation and description is partitioned into limited areas : meteorology, natural history, botany, geology, and physical geography, are subject to this law. The climates, winds, and other atmospheric phenomena of different countries cannot be reduced into a common expression. The animal and vegetable species of different regions are not the same ; and, moreover, the same species is influenced by change of (7) Vol. ii. p. 578. (8) Ibid. p. 598. He qualifies this proposition to a slight extent, but the qualification is not material in this context. (9) Above, ch. ii. § 9. SECT. 3.] SCIENCE OF POLITICS. 129 place. Geology and physical geography must follow the varia- tions in the earth's surface. Linguistic science must take note of the varieties of languages, both simultaneous in different lan- guages, and successive in the same. Even physiology and patho- logy must, to a certain extent, adapt their descriptive theories to races of mankind, and to varieties of climate and place of habitation. Yet the necessity of circumscribing the generality of theoretical expression in these subjects, and of distributing the descriptions into certain adjacent compartments, has not pre- vented these branches of knowledge from being considered as portions of the domain of science. We must keep clear of the error of the ancient philosophers, who, having distinguished between necessary and eternal truths on the one hand, and contingent and temporary truths on the other, made the former exclusively the subjects of science and of demonstrative proof. ( in ) Unless it is admitted that there may be a science of things which are liable to change in successive periods of time, the chief part of politics, and, indeed, of all other subjects involving human action, must be excluded from scientific treatment. In this respect, man, as we have already had occasion to remark, differs not only from the insentient objects of nature, but from other animals. He has within himself a principle of change, by which the course of every national history is influenced; but there is no reason why this peculiarity of his nature should exclude him from the generalizations of science. It is, as Aristotle has observed, a mark of an instructed mind to rest satisfied with that degree of precision which the nature of the subjects admits, and not to seek for exactness where only an approximation to the truth is possible. (") (10) Sec Aristot. Eth. Nic. vL '■'<■, Anal. Post. i. I. An argument in Cic. de ' h-nf. ii. 7, assumes thai there cannot be an arl of things which real merely on opinion, and ilui there oan only be an arl of things which are the subjects of certain knowledge. Compare i. 20 : ' Artem \ ero aegabal esse ullam, nisi qua; cognitis, penitusque perspectis, el in onumexituxn spcctantihu8, et nunquamjallentibus, rebus i bineretur.' This is an arbi- trary limitation of the idea of art, similar tol liat ben- indicated with respect, to science. (n) Eth. Nic. i. 1 ; Eth. End. i. 6. Sec above, ch. i. § 8. vol. ir. K 130 KXISTENCE OF A [CHAP. XVII I. § 4 The difference just adverted to between politics and the physical sciences, is a material fact with respect to the compara- tive use of the inductive and deductive methods in these two classes of sciences respectively. The matter of the physical sciences is unchangeable, except so far as it is subject to cyclical alternations. When once the facts have been determined by accurate and complete observations, deductive reasoning may be founded on these, to an unlimited extent. No scientific light is derived from fresh observations of phenomena iden- tical with those already observed correctly. It is a mere re- travelling of ground already travelled over — a re-measuring of distances already measured — a re- weighing of bodies already weighed — a re- enumeration of items already enumerated. When once the periodic times of the planets have been determined, it may be assumed that their cyclical recurrences will be invariable. When once the periodical blowing of the monsoons and of the trade-winds, in each part of the earth, has been settled by a suffi- cient number of observations, their regular reappearance at the same intervals may be confidently anticipated. When once the specific gravity of a piece of gold or platina has been ascer- tained, it may be assumed that the specific gravity of other specimens of these metals will be similar. It is therefore true that, as observation in the physical sciences is extended — as it is more precise, more complete, and better registered, the inductive reasoning founded immediately on such observed phenomena is less in demand. The extent of the classes for which the partially-observed phenomena are to serve as specimens has been settled. These generaliza- tions, therefore, serve as fixed points, from which deductive reasoning may proceed. Hence it is true, as Mr. Mill has observed, ( l -) that in the physical sciences reasoning is now under- going a transition from the inductive to the deductive stage. But this description cannot be extended to politics. The subject-matter of politics is in an ever-varying state. There (12) Stfst. of Logic, b. iii. c. 13, § 7. SECT. 5.] SCIENCE OF POLITICS. 131 is a succession of acts in every community, constituting its history, which require an unintermitting observation and regis- tration. The general theorems of politics need to be constantly revised and corrected, as these new series of events arise — as a fresh harvest of facts is annually gathered into the garner of the historian and statistician. They must be confronted with the perpetually-accruing phenomena, and their testimony tried by this test. New forces introduced into society, such as gun- powder, printing, steam-navigation and railways, or new systems of pliilosophy, or forms of religious belief, or states of religious indifference, render it necessary to modify the propositions founded upon the prior experience. The means of intellectual and physical communication, and the mode of warfare, often determine the action of government : hence the facts bearing on such subjects must be re-classified, and new inductive processes gone through. From the new inductions thus successively obtained, the political philosopher may construct new theorems, either universal or limited — either extending to all mankind, or confined to certain communities. It follows, therefore, that whereas the physical sciences, as their foundations are better ascertained, will become more and more deductive, the occasions for induc- tive reasoning in politics will be incessantly renewed. ( in ) 8 5 The department of politics which we have called speculative, and to which such works as the Discourses and the Prince of Machiavel, and the Esprit ties Lois of Montesquieu, in great part belong, has by some writers been denominated 1 1 1 < - science of legislation. Filangieri gave this title to his political work, the object of which is to lay down the principles with which laws ought to conform. The TraiU de Legislation of M. (13) ' On admire encore, par habitude, dea ecrivaina qui onl joui d'une juste celi'lii'iti', parcequ'an moment ou Us onf paru, il -■>■ son! fcroi beaucoup plus avancla que ne l'£taien1 leura contemporains. <>m cite quelquetbu Leura oui ragea, maia on lee cite Baua y oroire, el Bouvenl mdme lea avoir Iuh ; on les con.siiKTe mom.-, eomme dea corps de doctrine, que commc dea araenaxu qui peuvenl noua fournir dea annea contre dea ennemia. Oeux qui ae donnenl la peine de lea e'tudier, aentenl qu'ila onl ete fails pOUT U /» Ord '/'< cko86» '/"i ii'i.ristr plus, '/ pnnr * tov Kptirrovos ovptf)ipov. See i. 12, p. 338, with Ast's note, who says : ' Scilicet sophistic, virtutcm ipsani pcrvertcntes, ct moralem guam dicimus, bominis oataram tollentes, qua juata el bonesta oenserentur, non perse ((ftvan, natura) justa ct lioncsta, esse slaiucbant, sed le^e ct conventions guadam (p6p«p et fluru).' The opinion is bere cor- rectly stated, though Mr. Grote ia doubtless righl in denying thai it can be truly attributed to ' the Sophists' in ;i mass, Witt. <;/' Of. vol. viii. p. 530-3: compare the remarks (p 524) on the Bame opinion. A similar doctrine was maintained by Carneades: ' Carneadea ergo, quoniam erant infirma qua? a philosophis cuFerebantur, rampsil audaoiam refellendi, quia refelli posse intellexit. Ejus dispntationia somma base rait: jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxissc, scilicrt varia promoribos; <'t apnO SOSdem pro temporibus s;c])c mutata : jus autcm naluralc esse nullum: omni 134 EXISTENCE OF A [CHAP. XVIII. The indistinctness which pervades almost all the arguments on the subject, from Plato and Aristotle down to the writers of our own age, is chiefly owing to the indeterminate sense of the word nature. An antithesis is established between that which exists by institution, and that which exists by nature ; and the consequences of this opposition are then deduced, before it is made clear what are the two ideas which are thus opposed to each other. The obvious meaning of this opposition is, that nature is a negation of law or positive institution, as it is of art; that it is the state which excludes human agency or inter- ference. (") Thus marriage, with its accessory rights, is an insti- homines, et alias animantes, ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri; proinde aut nullain esse justitiam, aut, si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam.' — Lactant. Div. Inst. i. 16. Compare Bitter, Gesch. tier Phil. vol. iii. p. 671-3. The arguments of Carneades on justice and injustice are recited at length in the speech of Philus, in the third book of Cicero de Sepublicd ; in which, though it is not preserved entire, the course of the reasoning can be followed. The same doctrine is expressed in the following verses of Horace : ' Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est, Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi. Nee natura potest justo secernere iniquum, Diviclit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis' — Sat. i. 3, v. 111-4 ; where Orelli says : ' Ex doctrina Sophistarum Epicurique nihil justum aut injustum est natura, sed legibus ac moribus ; contra naturale est discrimen inter bona et mala, et suopte instinctu homo ducitur ad ilia appetenda, hsec fugienda.' The same doctrine is implied in the celebrated dictum of Pindar, vopos 6 irdvrav fiao-ikevs, as interpreted in the curious passage of Herodotus, iii. 38 (Fragm. inc. 48.) The opposition of nature and law is laid down by Callicles, in the Gorgias of Plato, (c. 84-87, p. 482-4,) and is stated by Aristotle {Soph. Flench, c. 12, § 8) to have been acknowledged by all the early philoso- phers. Compare FtJi. JVic. i. 1 : ra Se Ka\a Kal Siicaia, irep\ a>v r) ttoXitikt) CTKOTreirai, roo~avTr]v e^et 8ia be decided by natural reason, hut by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience before that a. man can attain to the cognizance 01 it.'— Cited from Coke's ttc/iorls, in Lord Campbell's l/n Kill aOlKOV, KUv fj.rj8ffj.iu Koivatvia nfius in mimical ion with eaeh other.'— L\fb "j' si,- Jfyctncu Drake; Works, vol. vi. p. IM7. (31) ' Ksl quidem vera lex recta ratio, natura COngruenS, ilill'usa m onmes, oonstans, sempiterna. . . . Quia legi nee abrogari fas est, neque derogari ea bac aliquid licet, deque tots abrogari potest. Necveroaul per senatum aut per populum solvi bac li mus, neque est qucerendus 140 EXISTENCE OF A SCIENCE OF POLITICS. — that it is impelled by every wind — that it is guided by the same steerage — that its boats are urged by the same oars — that there is not one ship in the Mediterranean, and another in the Atlantic — that there was not one ship in the sixteenth, another in the nineteenth century ; but that there is one invariable and all- pervading ship, whose form has been predetermined by the laws of the universe. Descriptions of this sort, however, exaggerate the uniformity of the works of man, as well in government as in arts. The laws of human nature are immutable; but the opera- tions of man vary according to circumstances. The conditions by which each problem is narrowed may serve to furnish a general type ; but this type is reproduced under different forms : in its various manifestations, it is c another and the same/ In order to represent pohtical institutions as identical, it is necessary to confound the conditions of the problem with its solution ; it is necessary to assume, that the laws of nature are identical with the products of human contrivance which are formed in subjec- tion to those laws.( 32 ) Politics, when properly understood, may, like other subjects whose matter is variable, receive a scientific treatment ; but no benefit will arise from claiming for its theorems a universality which they do not possess, by means of a confu- sion which can only lead to error. explanator aut interpres ejus alius, nee erit alia lex Itomae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac ; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex, et 8empiterna et immutabilis, continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus.' — De Hep. iii. 22 ; compare De Leg. ii. 4. (32) ' Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, et ad recte faciendum impellens, et a delicto avocans ; qu» non turn denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed turn cum orta est. Orta autem est simul cum mente divina.' — Cic. de Leg. ii. 4. In this passage, the confusion between a political law, the creation of man — and the natural or divine laws, which are the coudi- tions subject to which he acts, is very manifest. This confusion is still more apparent in the following passage of Montesquieu : ' Les etres par- ticuliers intelligents peuvent avoir des lois qu'ils out faites ; mais ils en ont aussi qu'ils n'ont pas faites. Avant qu'il y eut des etres intelligents, ils etoient possibles ; ils avoient, done, des rapports possibles, et par consequent des lois possibles. Avant qu'il y eut des lois faites, il y avoit des rapports de justice possibles. Dire qu'd n'y a rien de juste ni d'injuste que ce qu'ordonnent ou defendent les lois positives, e'est dire qu'avant qu'on eut trace le cercle, tous les rayons n'etoient pas egaux. II faut, done, avouer des rapports d'equite anterieurs a la loi positive qui les dtablit.' — Esprit des Lois, i. c. 1. Ill Chapter XIX. ON THE ART OF POLITICS, AND THE FORMATION OF POLITICAL PRECEPTS. § 1 ~\^[7"E nave > m two preceding chapters, considered the * ' nature of political theory, and have inquired how far politics can be reduced into the form of a science.^) We shall next approach one step nearer to practice, and treat of politics regarded as an art. For this purpose we must premise some general remarks, on the relation of art to science on the one hand, and to action on the other. In the original acceptation of the word, the arts were merely the useful arts — those mechanical contrivances by which man operates upon external nature, and converts her powers and objects to his use. In this sense, the ancient poets say that all arts were given to mankind by Prometheus, who was considered as the universal civilizer, as the inventor of clothing, houses, ships, metallurgy, and other like appliances. ( 2 ) In the arts of this class, there is something made or manufactured; there is a certain physical or material product, which may be the subject of exchange, of sale and purchase. The arti/an, in fact, creates nothing new, but he gives a new form, colour, size, or consistency to existing objects, and fashions them ac- cording to his will, by a proper employment of their natural properties ; or, as in the case of agriculture or horticulture, he converts the powers of nature to his use. These are the operations of labour to which political economists have usually appropriated the name of productive, apparently upon the (i) Ch. xv. and xviii. (2) So- 2Esch. Prom. !»)!», 477, 606. The word rixyr) is applied to 1 1 it- trade of a shipwright, TUad iii. 6] ; <■(' ;i worker in metal, in Odysa. iii. 433; to the steering of a vessel, ib. v. 270. The word ri^vt] is connected with Tfvxv, to make, to form — and with Wktcd, to beget, I" l>riiij, r forth. 142 THE ART OF POLITICS. [CHAP. XTX. ground, that they result in producing something which can be separated from the producer — which can be made the subject of exchange, independently of the producer's presence. ( 3 ) By an obvious extension of the word art, it was afterwards applied to the processes in which the product was purely in- tellectual, or in winch its intellectual predominated greatly over its material character. Such are the works of sculpture and painting; of music and poetry; of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. The object of these is to amuse, delight, or instruct, not to satisfy any bodily want. Moreover, they furnish a cer- tain product, though not in strictness a material product : a picture, a statue, a poem, an oration, are products of the skill which the practitioner of the proper art possesses. The word art is further applied to processes in which there is no product, either physical or intellectual, but there is a series of connected acts, a course of conduct directed to a common end. Such are the occupations of those persons, whose industry is not of the mechanical, manufacturing, or agricultural kind. Domestic servants, retail-dealers, carriers, merchants, bankers, physicians, lawyers, civil officers of the government, sailors, soldiers, belong to this comprehensive class. The first of these classes corresponds generally with the useful arts ; the second comprehends the fine arts. The useful arts are (3) See Mill's Essays, p. 75. ' Productive labour' is generally restricted to that sort of labour which makes something saleable, independently of the presence of the producer himself, such as the work of a tailor, shoe- maker, spinner, weaver, smith. When the labour consists merely in ren- dering a certain service — in doing something which has not in itself a saleable value, the labour is generally called unproductive. Such would be the labour of a carrier, sailor, policeman, domestic servant, actor, phy- sician, advocate. A farmer or gardener makes nothing at the moment, but he sets in motion natural influences, which lead ultimately to a saleable product. It would be most convenient to extend the term ' productive' to all sorts of labour which produce something possessed of exchangeable value — which are remunerated by a payment in the nature of wages, salary, fees, &c, determined by free competition. According to this acceptation of the word, the labour of a carrier or an actor would be pro- ductive, as well as the labour of a spinner or weaver ; whereas the labour of a man working at a treadmill, or the labour of an artist or an author, who is unremunerated for his works, would be unproductive. In the case of slave-labour, the slave must be considered as the mere instrument of the master, like a horse or ox ; and if the labour of the slave produces something which has an exchangeable value for the master, it is productive. SECT. 1.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 143 those which seek merely to make a material product for the physical wants of mankind. The fine arts are those which produce something to gratify the taste or the imagination. Those arts which are merely intellectual instruments, as arith- metic or logic, or which render a service without creating a physical product, as trade or medicine, fall under the head neither of the useful nor of the fine arts.( J ) There is, however, no valid reason for restricting the idea of art to those operations, physical or mental, in which something is produced — in which there is a piece of workmanship, as a clock — or an intellectual creation, as a poem.f) There may be an art of action, as well as of production. A course of conduct, not less than a mechani- (4) The distinction made by the ancients into liberal and illiberal arts, (rexvai ftavavaoi, artes illiherales, sordidce,) docs not correspond with tbe distinction into the fine and tbe useful arts. The liberal arts were those arts which a freeman could exercise without dishonour. The illiberal arts were those arts which dishonoured a free- man, and which wore properly exercised by slaves. The ancients considered every lucrative profession as unworthy of a citizen. All mercenary arts (not being fine arts) were illiberal. ' Trade on a small scale (saj-s Cicero) is sordid ; on a largo scale, particularly if the trader gives freely to others, it is not deserving of much censure (nou est admodum vituperanda). Me- dicine, architecture, and instruction in honourable pursuits, are fit ted for freemen of inferior rank. Of all the gainful occupations, agriculture is the most worthy of a freeman.' — De Off. i. 42. The arts are divided into ftuvavaoi and f"Kev0epioi ; the smith's and car- {jenter's trades belong to the former — sculpture, painting, andmedicine tot he atter, according to Menandcr, T)c Eneom. iii. 1 ; RIi s 7. Eng. tr. ed. :t. Pliny (A'. //. xiv. 1) complains thai the liberal arts were, in his time. abandoned by freemen, and cultivated by slaves. (5) According to Aristot. [JEth. 2V»c. \i. I), the essenoeof art is, thai ii makes or produces s( thing; that it Ls not concerned morel] with, action, Cioero says of Zeno : 'Censei enim ortismaxime proprium esse, creare ei gignere.' — De A'. I), ii. 22. Dr. Whewell likewise seems to give a similar limitation to the idea of art: 'The object of science (he says) is knowledge; the objects of arl are works. The latter is satisfied with producing its material results : to the former, the operations of matter, whether nai oral or artificial, are interest- ing only bo far u they can be embraced i>\ intelligible principles.' — Phil. qflnd.Sci. b. ri. 0. 8,' § 2. 144 THE ART OF POLITICS. [chap. xtx. cal trade, can be made the subject of a body of precepts, or even of routine practice. § 2 Now in each of the three species of arts which have been enumerated — the handicraft or mechanical arts, the esthetical or fine arts, and the ministerial or professional arts — the art itself is exercised in a rude and unsystematic manner, before any attempt is made to reduce it to a body of precepts, founded upon a scientific investigation of the proper subject-matter. ( 6 ) There were smiths before there was a scientific art of metallurgy; there were ships and seamen before there was a scientific art of navigation ; there were poets and orators before there were scientific arts of poetry and rhetoric; there were medical practi- tioners before there was a scientific art of medicine; ( r ) there (6) On the existence of empirical arts, before they receive a scientific cultivation, see Wliewell, Hist, of Ind. Sci. vol. i. p. 333 ; Phil, of Ind. Sci. vol. ii. p. 271. Celsus remarks that, before the existence of physicians, the healthy perceived that they sometimes became sick from excess of food, and the sick perceived that they sometimes recovered through abstinence : ' Haec similiaque cum quotidie inciderunt, diligentes homines notasse quae ple- rumque melius responderent ; deinde aegrotantibus ea pracipere ccepisse. Sic medicinam ortam, subinde aliorum salute, aliorum interitu, perni- ciosa discernentem a salutaribus. Repertis deinde medicinae remediis, homines de rationibus eorum disserere ccepisse ; nee post rationem, medi- cinam esse inventam ; sed post inventam medicinam, rationem esse qusesi- tam.' — Lib. i. praef. p. 9. Lord Bacon has correctly rendered the sense of this passage, but he draws from it an inference unfavourable to the ancient philosophy, which does not appear to be justified : ' Idque Celsus ingenue ac prudenter fate- tur ; nimirum experimenta medicinae primo inventa fuisse, ac postea homines circa ea philosophatos esse, et causas indagasse et assignasse ; non ordine inverso evenisse, ut ex philosophic et causarum cognitione, ipsa experimenta inventa aut deprompta essent.' — Nov. Org. i. 73. Qumtilian argues, justly, that the name of an art is not to be denied to rhetoric, because there were orators before there were rhetorical pre- cepts or teachers : ' Illud admonere satis est, omnia, quae ars consumma- verit, a natura initia duxisse. Aut tollatur medicina, quae ex observa- tione salubrium atque his contrariorum reperta est, et, ut qiiibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis : nam et vulnus deligavit aliquis antequam haec ars esset ; et febrem quiete et abstinentia, non quia rationem videbat, sed quia id valetudo ipsa cceperat, mitigavit. Nee fabrica sit ars ; casas enim primi illi sine arte fecerunt ; nee musica : cantatur ac saltatur per omnes gentes quoque modo.' He thus shows that, in each art, the rude practice preceded the systematic method. — ii. 17, § 7-10. (7) 'Quant a la maniere dont on a pratique originairement la medecine, il faut distinguer, dans la recherche de l'antiquite, la medecine, considered comme art, de la medecine qu'on peut appeler naturelle. Celle-ci a ete en SECT. 2.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 145 were land-measurers before there was a scientific art of geo- metry; there were wars before there was a scientific art of stra- tegics. An art, in this state, having grown out of the first promptings of necessity, and been contrived to meet the most obvious demands of our physical and mental nature, is princi- pally dependent on the imitation of predecessors in the same line.( s ) It is a mere blind unreasoning routine, founded on certain traditionary empirical maxims, and on the mechanical copying, by learners, of the established processes in the handi- craft or profession. An art which is in this original and instinctive state may nevertheless attain to considerable perfection, if its works are addressed mainly to the taste. Esthetic philosophy has succeeded usage long-temps avant qu'il y eut des medecins de profession. Chacun, dans les commencements, se mela de pratiquer la medecine. Celui qui avait fait quelque experience sur lui-meme, ou sur les autres, la communiquait a ses amis ou a ses voisins, lorsqu'ils paraissaient attaqxies des memes accidents. Ces experiences raisonnces auront forme insensiblement une sorte de systeme de medecine naturelle. Les peres avaient soin d'enseigner a, leurs enfants ce qu'ils pouvaient en savoir.' — Goguet, Origine des J. nix, des Arts, et des Sciences, torn. i. p. 213. 'La cliirurgie ne consistait que dans une pratique aveugle et grossierc, telle que pouvait le pcrmettre l'dtat d'ignorance ou elaient les arts etles sciences dans ces Biecles recules. Les premiers operatcurs n'avaient pour guide qu'une simple routine, sans prin- cipes, sans connaissances, et destitute des Lumieres que pent Beule donner une tln'orie savante et raisonnee.' In a note he adds : 'On peul bien com- parer ces premiers cbirurgiena a ces gens connus dans certaines provinces sous les nom de renoueurs ou baillews, qui fonl profession de remettre les membres demis ou rompus,' p. 217. Similar unskilled practitioners are in England called bone-setters. Speaking of the obstetric art, he says : • II v a bien de L'apparenoe que les femmes auront etc les premieres qui se seront mole de soulager leurs semblables dans ces moments critiques. Les meres ont du rendre oe Bervice a leurs Biles. [/experience les mettail en etat de leur procurer du seemirs dans les aeeidenls ipii s'opposaienl a une promote delivrance< Les reflexions qu'on li' depuis, sur les divers accidens auxquels on reconnui que Les femmes en travail Betrouvaienl exposees, firenl sentir La Q^cessite* de reMuire en m^thode une pratique donl Lea con- sequences etaient si importantes.'- lb. p. 21^. (8) ' Per varios qsus artem experientia fecit, Exemplo monstrante viam.' Manil. Astron. i, 61-2. As to arte being originally suggested by the pressure of nocej ity, com pare the well-known lines oi Virgil : ■ Pater ipse colendi Hand facilem esse viam roluit, primusque per artem Movit agros, em-is acuens mortalis coroa, Nee torpere gravi passus sua membrs reterno. 1 Oeorg, L. 121 L VOL. II. I- 1 10 THE ART OF POLITICS. [cHAP. XIX. iii analyzing the conditions of poetical and artistic excellence ; but it has not been able to lay down precepts which teach a modern poet or sculptor how to surpass, or even to equal, the unsystematic productions of Homer, vEschylus, or Phidias. On the other hand, the useful arts, which deal with the powers of external nature, can never reach a high state of perfection, and in many cases cannot even emerge from a rude and feeble pro- cess of handicraft, until their methods have been investigated by the theorist, and a body of systematic rules been formed upon a scientific basis. "Without the aid of science, the arts of metal- lurgy, engineering, navigation, mining, or medicine, could never have made much progress, and certainly could never have received the extension which, under the influence of scientific methods, they have actually reached. It has been said, that wherever there is a process which one person can execute more successfully than another, there a scientific art may exist. (°) The truth of this dictum cannot be disputed; but there are some subjects in which a scientific art renders greater practical assist- ance than in others; and in which success is less dependent on maxims derived from analytic reasoning. The comparative utility of preceptive arts, in different departments of produc- tion and action, is, however, a subject of too great extent to be here examined. Eveiy art, therefore, considered as a set of practical opera- tions directed to a given end, is prior to the corresponding science. ( in ) But an art, considered as a coherent system of (gj 'All inen,' says Aristotle, 'are practically, up to a certain point, logicians and rhetoricians ; and as some succeed by chance, and others through habit, it is possible to investigate the cause of their success, to/tick is now universally admitted (he adds) to be the business of a scientific art.' — Rhet. i. 1, § 1, 2. ' Sed nee ilia omittenda sunt, qua in re alius se inartificialiter, alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem : et in eo, quod qui didicerit, melius faciat, quam qui non didicerit, esse artem.' — Quintil. ii. 17, § 42. (io) It is to this acceptation of the word art that the following remarks of Dr. Whewell are applicable : ' The real state of the case is, that the principles which art involves, science alone evolves. The truths on which the success of art depends lurk, in the artist's mind, in an undeveloped state, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, 8ECT. 2.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 147 written precepts, and not as a set of practical examples, is necessarily posterior to the corresponding science. ( ]1 ) A technical method, or body of precepts, cannot be formed without the pre- vious existence of a theory or science, more or less sound and but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions.' — lb. b. xi. c. 8, § 6. Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his 8th note to Mason's translation of Du- fresnoy's Poem on the Art of Painting, who (v. 78) speaks of purblind prac- tice, says: 'Practice is justly called purblind; for practice that is tolerable in its way is not totally blind ; an imperceptible theory, which grows out of, accompanies, and directs it, is never wholly wanting to a sedidous practice ; but this goes but a little way with the painter himself, and is utterly inex- plicable to others. To become a great proficient, an artist ought to see clearly enough to enable him to point out to others the principle on which he works; otherwise he will be confined, and, what is worse, he will be uncertain.' But when the grounds of a practice cannot be explained by the practitioner, can it be said that he is in possession of any theory of his art? Uniformity of practice merely proves that there is a theory of the art — not that it is known to those who empirically practise it. Technical terms — termes d'art — are equivalent to scientific terms. In general, they are borrowed by science from the antecedent art, as it exists in a rude, unsystematic state. Hence we may see that the art, in one sense of the word, is prior to the science. — See above, vol. i. p. 77, n. 1. (u) It is in this latter sense that the word art is understood by Plato and Aristotle, and by the ancient philosophers generally. Plato opposes rtyvi to rpitt) or e'/x7retpi'a ; he makes drexyms equivalent to aXuyas — Hi;ii is to say, he restricts the idea of art to scientific art — to a practice guided by precepts which have their proper rationale and theory ; and lie opposes art to a mere knack, or empirical routine. — Phcedrus. c. 95 ; Gorgias, c. 121 ; and compare Grote, Hist, of Or. vol. viii. p. 601, where the Platonic doc- trines on this subject are fully illustrated. The same view is takes by Aristotle, and expounded with great precision in the first chapter of his Metaphysics. Be distinguishes between mere experience (or Blind prac- tical skill) and art. Experience is of singulars; whereas arl is general. A man of mere experience or routine dors, not know the reason of bis operations — the man of art does. So, in Poet. o. i., he distinguishes imita- tion, whicli is the result of mere habit, from that which is the result of art. In the following passage, Cicero, by art, understands a scientific method of practice, formed upon a knowledge of the empirical art i ' Nihil est quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi Qle prius, qui ilia tenet, auorum artem instituere vult, habeal illam scientiam, u1 ex iis rebus quorum ars aondum sit artem efficere possit.' — D< Or at. i. ll i and compare the de- velopment of this dictum in the next chapter. The two definitions of arl in Qumtilian, ii. 17. § 1 1 — the former thai of Cleanthes, the latter the received definition— likewise assume thai an art is a systematic body of rules : '.\rs< via. id est, online efficiens' which may lie Ihns rc-l ranslated, i'lmv 17 t/^ct; bwafili fuBodlf tvtpyowa • Ajs constat ea praceptionibus oonsentientibus el coexeroitatia ad Bnem \ its tit ili-iii.' Speaking of rhetoric, Qumtilian says : 'Quidameam aeque rim, aeque scientiam, aeque artem putaverunl : sed Critolaui usum dicendi, 'nam hoc T/nhY/ sin nilieat .' '— ii. L6, § 28. Here, again, *"■/ \- OSed in the ■ ni' ;i jcienl tfic arl , Science, art, and empiricism, are defined b) Sopater, On H ap. Jthet. ]u ttjs d\t]d(ias. QeoiprjriKrjs fiiv yap re Aos dXr/deia, 7TpaKTiKrjs b'epyov. — Aristot. Met. i. min. C 1. SECT. 2.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 149 it does not legislate. It expounds truths, but gives no advice. The theorist casts his eye over the world and its inmates, and records the results of his observations, but he constructs nothing, and enjoins nothing. ( 13 ) Art, unlike science, deals in precepts — its essence is to advise ; but, like science, it is general. It is not conversant with particulars, or with any actual case of practice. It is founded on a scientific investigation of the subject-matter, and its rules are formed from the general expressions of the phenomena with which the practitioner will come in contact. ( H ) It undertakes to teach how a person ought to act in a supposed set of circum- stances. These circumstances can only be defined by a general description : they represent a class of cases j and it is intended that, when the time for action arrives, the precept should be applied to each case belonging to the class. This application the practitioner must make for himself: the art only supplies him with a general precept. ( 15 ) But the art supplies a precept, whereas the corresponding science only supplies a general theorem. Art teaches how to make something, or how to act, whereas science only expounds the relations of existing phenomena. From this explanation, we may see why art and nature should be opposed, and whj^ science and nature should not be opposed. Science is a knowledge of phenomena, but a mere knowledge, (13) On the respective characteristics of science and art, see Whcwell, "Philos. '//' the />/. \i. c. K; Mill's Sj/st. of "Logic, 1>. vi. c. 11 ; Essays, p. 124, 151 ; also Comte, Traitd de Legislation, liv. i. c. 11, torn. i. p. 209; Zachariii, /"/// titautv, vol. i. p. 1(>'.». (14) The generality of art is indicated by Aristotle, in the definition at the beginning of his "Metaphysics', yiyvfrai. fit Tf\vr), Crav 4k 7roXXd>i' rnj ffiTTfipiiis tvvt>r)iiuTu>v fxla K(i6(')\nv ytvr]Tai nf/n tmv <'>n<>i vni'>\rj\j/n;. Again : fiiriop fi'ori T] fxtv €jj.Tr(i[)ia twv Ka6iKU(TTuv tOTt yi'dxrty, t) fit Tt'x 1 ") T ^" / KOOTAOV. (if,) The difference between tli>- genera] precepts of an art, and theii application to an actual case of practice, is described in the following pas- sage : ' (^na-ilaiii nun 1 1 i s i a prsBsente monstrantur. Non potest medious per epist'ilas cihi ant halnei lein|ins eligere : vena tangenda est. Veins proverbinm est: G-ladiatoreni in arend. capere consilium. Aliquid adver- sarii vulins, aliqnid manus mota, aliquid ipsa inolinatio corporis, intuentem monet. Quid fieri soleat, quid oporteat, in universum el mandari potest el scribi : tale conailium mm bantum absentibos, Bed etiam postens datur. Qlud alteram, quando fieri debeat, ant quemadmodum, es longinquo nemo suadebit: can rebui ipsii deliberandum eat.' — Seneca, TSpist, mi. . k . L, 2 150 THE ART OF POLITICS. [CHAP. xix. whereas art, when in action, is an operation upon nature. The one is contemplative, the other practical. Hence, as art disturbs the natural course of the phenomena, (" 3 ) as it produces changes and effects which would not be produced if man did not inter- fere, art is opposed to nature. It may be added that art, whether it be in the rude and unsystematic, or in the scientific and refined stage, is equally an innovation upon nature. That primitive medicine, which Goguet has called natural, ( 1? ) is not less artificial, though it is less skilful, than the medicine of our own times, derived from a long course of scientific observation and reasoning. In like manner, natural magic (as it has been called), though it does not profess to be derived from any super- natural power, consists of a series of artificial contrivances. § 3 The useful arts produce something original — some- thing of w r hich there is no archetype in nature. They invent, construct, or create : they do not imitate. Their works are all manifestly artificial; and in these, the appearance of art and contrivance is gratifying. But in the productions of the fine arts, and in some other subjects, which admit of being guided by a set of technical maxims, the appearance of art is dis- pleasing; and the perfection of art consists in its concealment. ( 18 ) (16) r £*X v ll KpaTOVfiev a>v (fivcrei viKafieda. AntipliOD, ap. Aristot. Meek. i. Compare Lord Bacon's characteristic of nature and art, in Lis Descri-ptio Globi Intellectual™ : ' Aut enim libera est natura, ac sponte fusa, atque cursu consueto se explicans, cum scilicet ipsa natura per se nititur, nulla- tenus impedita aut subacta, ut in ccelis, animalibus, plantis, et universo naturae apparatu aut denique ab arte et ministerio humano constringitur, et fingitur, et plane transfertur, et tanquam novatur, ut in artificialibus. Etenim in artificialibus natura tanquam facta videtur, et conspicitur prorsus nova corporum facies et veluti rerum universitas altera.' — vol. xi. p. 4. (17) See above, p. 144, note 7. (18) Speaking of deHvery, in public speaking, Quintilian says : ' Si qua in bis ars est dicentium, ea prima est, ne ars esse videatur.' — i. 11, 3. ' Desinit ars esse, si apparet.' — lb. iv. 2, § 127. ' Ubicunque ars ostentatur, Veritas abesse videtur.' — ix. 4. 102. On the concealment of art, see Longinus, c. 17. Inasmuch as art often imitates sometbing real, it is con- nected with the idea of deceit : ovb' 6 yepcov boktrjs inekrjOero Te)(vrjs. — Odyss. iv. 455. ' Ille dobs instructus et arte Pelasga.' — Virg. JEn. ii. 152. Tbe words artful and artfulness likewise have the same origin. On tbe other band, tbe useful arts bave been taxed with deceit, and SECT. 4.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 151 Wherever any process can be done naturally, and the natural but imperfect efforts made for its performance admit of being improved by art, the simulation of unaided nature by the artist is pleasing to the taste. ( I9 ) For a like reason, the use of technical terms, where words in popular currency might be employed, is received with disfavour. ( 20 ) § 4 Having made these preliminary remarks, we will proceed to apply them to the more immediate subject of the present chapter. In the first place, then, we may assume that the idea of art is not to be restricted to those subjects in which there is a material or intellectual product — in which something is manufac- tured or composed. It is no longer disputed whether there can be an art of painting, of logic, or of rhetoric :("') according to Longinus, there is an art of sublimity :('") it is admitted that there is a histrionic art,( Ji ) an art of medicine, a military art, for this reason have been considered immoral. Dyeing, in particular, has fallen under this condemnation, on the ground that it involved the assump- tion of false colours. See a supposed saying of an Ethiopian king, in Herod, iii. 22, and the Spartan doctrine in Midler's Dorians, iv. 2, § 5. Thus, too, Virgil : ' Nee varios discet mentiri lana colore?.' — Eel. iv. 12. ( Siemens of Alexandria condemns the use of dyes, as being contrary both to utility and truth. — Pcedag. ii. 10. He also treats the use of false hair as impious. — iii. 11. See Barbeyrac, Traite" de In M<>r. 259-88; Stewart's Memoir of Adam Smith, p. 1 12, aote. (44) ' Tria dcindc 62 pTSBCepti \rlnv | d-.i ~ ( ;i 1 m l.i Mini ut \ 1 1 < -i 1 1 11 1 odiom, invidia, contemptue.' Sen. Epist. toy. 9. SeeMaoh, Princ. 0. L9 (45) Principe, c 5, 6j Dt*< i 25, 28 160 THE ART OF POLITICS. [CHAP. XIX. ought to use cruelty or clemency ; in what manner they ought to keep faith ; how they ought to avoid being despised and hated; how they should conduct themselves in order to obtain reputation; how they ought to avoid flatterers. ( 46 ) These are all general maxims, which, whether good or bad, profess to guide the rulers of states in certain postures and contingencies of public affairs. The ' regulse bellorum generales/ in the treatise of Vegetius,( 4 ') though many of them are not in a pre- ceptive form, are intended to serve as practical maxims : for in- stance, the apophthegm, that ' he who does not prepare corn and the necessary supplies for an army is conquered without a battle/ ( 4S ) has the force of a maxim prescribing these preparatory measures. Many other maxims of public policy, such as those relating to defence of the country, to war and peace, to large and small territory, to dependencies and colonies, &c, might be mentioned which are of a similar character, but the instances which have been adduced appear to suffice for illustration. The other class of maxims consists of the rules which have been laid down by politicians for the formation and construction of certain laws or institutions — practical guides for executing the work of a government — similar to the rules laid down for the practical engineer or builder. If, for example, a government is called on to establish or regulate a system of prison-discipline, or an inland post, or a system of roads and bridges, it would have recourse to such maxims as it could find in existence with respect to each of these subjects. The four maxims of taxation laid down by Adam Smith, ' the evident justice and utility of which (he says) have recommended them more or less to the attention of all nations/ may serve to exemplify such canons of practical legislation. (46) Principe, c. 17, 18, 19, 21, 23. (47) Be Be Mil. iii. c. 26, (48) ' Qui frumentuin necessariumquo commeatum non praparat, vin- citur sine ferro.' SECTS. 10, 11.] THE ART OF POLITICS. 161 ' 1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in propor- tion to their respective abilities. ' 2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. 1 3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time or in the man- ner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contri- butor to pay it. ' 4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.' ( 49 ) § 10 All political maxims, it will be observed, are general in their effect, not less than theoretical truths. But the lesson which such a maxim inculcates may either be universal — it may extend to all places and times — or it may, like the theories examined in a previous chapter, ('") be limited to certain nations, or to a single nation. ( 61 ) Maxims of the latter kind, like the theories upon which they must be founded, are most available in practice as requiring less adaptation, and agreeing more closely with the circumstances of the case, than maxims of universal import. § 11 Political art may further convey its lessons by means of models. Instead of teaching by preceptive maxims, it may propose certain pattern governments, or laws, or institutions, for imitation. These models may be either real or ideal ; that is to say, they may either have an actual existence, or they may be described from the imagination. In either case, there are certain conditions to which the imitation of a political model is subject, and which the art of politics undertakes to lay down. Thus the (49) Wealth of Nations, 1>. v. c. 2, part ii. Compare M'Culloch'a Treatise on Taxation, p. 17-11; Mill's Principles of Pol. Economy, b. v. c. 2. (-0) Above, ch. wi. (-1) Such is the maxim of Florentine gOTernmem 1 mentioned 03 Macniavel: ' Biaoena tener Piatoja con le parra, <• Pisa con le forfcezze.'— Disc. iii. 0. 27. Also the maxim of Venetian goyernmenl : ' Pane in piazza, giual izia in palazzo.' vol.. II. M 16.2 THE ART OF POLITICS. art of drawing may teach either by precepts or by real models, that is, living subjects, or by ideal models conceived by the sculptor or painter. "What has been said in this chapter will suffice to explain the nature of political precepts or maxims, and the relation which they bear to scientific theorems. In the following chapter, we shall investigate the application of maxims in actual practice, and shall afterwards proceed to the consideration of real and ideal models. 163 Chapter XX. ON THE APPLICATION OF POLITICAL THEORIES AND MAXIMS IN PRACTICE. § 1 AS we have already seen, political theory, containing the -*--*■ condensed results of a wide experience, and formed by proper deductive processes from an induction of facts, merely expresses general truths. It lays down propositions respecting matter of fact, past or present ; but it prescribes or enjoins nothing. In order to give to theory a monitory effect, in order to transmute a general truth into a rule of action, the theorems of science must be converted into the precepts of an art. Now, in the case of politics, this conversion has not been systematically made. The science and art have in general been combined in the same treatise ; and rules of action are often con- veyed rather by implication than in a distinctly preceptive form. Moreover, many political inquiries have been limited to the determination of general facts, and the results have never been examined with a view of casting them into the form of maxims. Hence, in considering the application of maxims to practice, we shall be unable to confine ourselves strictly to rules reduced into a monitory form ; we must include all general propositions in- tended to have a didactic or doctrinal use ; and we must assume that the reduction of the theorem into a maxim is sometimes made by the practitioner himself, at the time when he is called upon to deliberate and act. We have remarked in the previous chapter^ 1 ) that the anti- thesis of theory and practice is not identical wit li the antithesis of science and art. Theory and science may, indeed, be con- sidered as identical : but there is a wide difference between art and practice. By an art, we Q0VI understand a system of rides (0 §5, P . L55. m 2 164 THE APPLICATION OF [chap. XX. of conduct founded on scientific principles : by practice we mean the actual cases and occurrences to which the rules of the art arc intended to be applied. Art is intermediate between science and practice ; but both science and art are conversant about generals, whereas practice is made up of singulars. On the other hand, science takes no note of practice ; whereas art thinks only of the practical application of its rules. "When, therefore, we speak of the application of theory to practice, we must not overlook the fact that there is a stage between the two, which, though it may not receive much atten- tion, is a necessary part of the process. Before theory can be applied to a practical case, the theoretical truth must be converted into a general maxim. Whether the practical politician finds the maxim ready made to his hand, or is compelled to perform the conversion for himself, the change of form must be effected before the practical conclusion can be drawn. It is important to bear in mind this intermediate stage, for it will probably be found that much of the censure which is cast upon political theorists, and much of the distrust with which the practical application of political theories is regarded, is owing, not to any defect in the theory itself, but to the defective manner in which general maxims have been derived from the theory, either by speculative writers in their closet, or by men of action in the hurry and excitement of business. With respect to the practical result, it is indifferent whether the error is produced by a false theory or by an unsound maxim deduced from a true theory. Practical error is equally the result in the individual case. But for the amendment of our practice in future, it is very material to detect the true cause of the error ; and hence it con- cerns us to know whether the defect is in the theory, or in the rule of conduct constructed from the theory ; whether it is in the science or the art. For example, if any rule in the art of navi- gation for determining the ship's place at sea by an observation of one of the heavenly bodies, were to prove erroneous, it would be important to ascertain whether the error arose from some defect in the astronomical theory upon which the rule was SECT. 2.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 165 founded, or whether the astronomical law was correctly laid down, but the process founded on it was defective. § 2 Whenever, therefore, any case arises in which the politician seeks to guide himself by a general proposition, he must first consider whether there is any maxim ready for his use; if not, he must perform for himself the preliminary process of con- verting the theory into a preceptive form. This latter process, on account of the irregular cultivation of the art of politics, he will, in a large number of instances, be compelled to perform himself. As soon as he is in possession of the maxim, however obtained, which he considers suited to his case, he will have constructed a syllogism : the major premise of which is the general maxim, and the minor premise is the particular case ; from which the practical conclusion follows. The following may serve as an example of the complete operation : — General Maxim. When a customs duty is so high that it produces extensive smuggling, it ought to be reduced. Particular Case. The existing customs duty in country A, upon tobacco, or brandy, or hardware, &c. [as the case may be], leads to extensive smuggling. Practical Conclusion. Therefore the duty in question ought to be reduced. When the application of political theorems or maxims to practice has been reduced into this form, the difficulty of the case lias been overcome. The Bagacity and judgment of the practician is shown in constructing the Byllogism. When it is once constructed, its Logical force is apparent to every one. The difficulty consists in bringing together the premises. The minor premise must, be formed by an intelligent observation and selec- tion of material facts, and it must then be placed under a maxim, the Universality Of which must be corrected so :is to suit it to the circumstances of the given case. It is the subsumption 166 THE APPLICATION OF [chap. xx. of the minor under the major premise which really constitutes the originality, or invention, of the argument. § 3 Now, in preparing a proposition for application to practice, in order to form his general maxim, the politician must, in the first place, consider what is the manner in which universal propositions require to be modified with reference to actual cases. Every political theorem or maxim may require circumscrip- tion, with reference to an actual case, on either or both of the two following grounds : 1, There may be internal variations of the phenomena in the subject itself; or, 2, their natural or spontaneous operation may be disturbed by external causes. We have already had occasion to advert to both these reasons for limiting the extent of theoretical propositions in politics ; ( ; ) but the present is the proper place for a full inquiry into them. It rarely happens in politics that a cause, even uncounteracted, operates universally in the same direction ; it rarely happens that any affirmation can be made as to men's actions, which is inde- pendent of the casual varieties of individual character and dispo- sition. It may perhaps be laid down universally that punishment tends to deter, and reward to encourage ; that a duty upon a commodity tends to raise its price; that the issue of an incon- vertible paper money tends to raise the prices of commodities ; or that wrongs inflicted on foreign nations tend to provoke retalia- tion. In these and other instances the natural tendency, or nisus, of the cause is nearly constant in one direction ; though (as we shall see presently) that tendency or nisus may be over- come by external resistance. But in the subject-matter of many, perhaps of most, political aphorisms, there is a variation through a long series of degrees; the majority of instances occurring about the middle of the scale, while the minority are scattered over the intervals towards both extremes, growing rarer as they recede from the middle. In a subject such as this, a general affirmation may be constructed which represents its prevailing and ordinary character, and which, though not universally true, (2) Above, cli. ix. § 19 ; cli. xiii. § 4 : cli. xv. §§ 8, 9. sect. 3.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 167 is applicable to the majority of instances. A characteristic ob- tained by this method is analogous to a numerical average of a number of unequal magnitudes. ( 3 ) Now, when from a proposi- tion thus established we make a general maxim, in order to apply it to a particular case, we must consider whether the case in question is one of those which form the nucleus of the subject, or is one of the extreme and rare cases which are grouped around it. For if it be in the latter position, the application of the maxim to it, without correction, will inevitably lead to practical error. Suppose, for example, that we seek to apply to a given abso- lute monarch, or to a given popular assembly, maxims of conduct founded on the following propositions : Absolute monarchs prefer bad men to good. Popular assemblies prefer flatterers to honest advisers. Now, these propositions may have been generalized from a wide induction, and this induction may be supported by many collateral reasons, showing that the circumstances in which an absolute monarch or a popular assembly is necessarily or naturally placed, are likely to produce the preference in question. Yet, the peculiar character of a given absolute monarch, or popular assembly, may be such as to lead them to have no strong pre- ference either way, or even to prefer good men and honest advisers to bad men and flatterers. It is remarked by Tacitus, as a general truth, that the next successor to an existing ruler, whether by inheritance or otherwise, is regarded by hiiu with suspicion and hatred. (') A similar remark has been sometimes made in modern times. Yet, even if we admit that this propo- sition represents t lie ordinary state of things, it is highly probable that cases will occur in which an existing ruler may regard his presumptive successor with favour and a Hi -el inn. may rejoice in (3) Bee above, cli. xv. § LO. (4) (Klio l.rlicvrd hiiuM'll' to !>!■ ; bjed of jealousj and dislike to Qalba, as being his probable successor. ' Suspectum semper Invisumque dominantibus, qui proxLmus destinaretur.' — Hut. i. 22. At the death oi Germanicus, the Roman people Baids ' Displicere regnantibus civilis filiorum ingenia. 1 — Ann. ii. 82. Compare the popular belief ai the death of Augustus, thai he chose Tiberius as his successor in order in cause the people i" regrel Ins I<>sh. — Ann. i. LO, Sec also Plutarch) Demetr. 3 1C8 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. his good qualities, and may select him on account of his popu- larity and fitness for the station. ( 5 ) Before, therefore, a practical maxim founded on either of these propositions is applied to a particular case, it is necessary to examine the nature of that case, and to observe "whether the character of the principal per- sons concerned agrees with the average and ordinary character represented in the inductive proposition. Without this precau- tion, Ave incur the danger of applying the rule to the exception, and of acting on a maxim, the ground of which is accidentally absent. General propositions of this sort may be considered as pre- sumptive truths, which are more likely to be applicable than not to be applicable to a given subject. Hence we may start, in our analysis of the subject, from the presumption, and examine whether it does not apply : we may call on the specific instance to show cause why it should not come under the general rule. If this inquiry should lead to the result that the case is not ex- ceptional, we may proceed, without further hesitation, to frame a practical maxim out of the theoretical proposition. If, on the other hand, a negative result should be obtained, and the case should appear to be exceptional, we must abstain from acting upon a general presumption which is founded only upon a pre- ponderance of cases, and is false in the actual instance. General aphorisms of this sort resemble that class of legal presumptions which are not conclusive, and which admit of proof to the contrary ; but until that proof is afforded, hold good in the individual case. Thus it may be a presumption of law r that a man is innocent until he is proved to be guilty, according to the maxim, ' Quilibet prsesumitui- bonus, donee probetur contra- rium.' It may be a presumption of law that possession is prima facie evidence of property. But these presumptions have only (5) ' Xec tellus eadem parit omnia. Yitibus ilia Convenit ; ha?c oleis ; bac bene farra virent. Pectoribus mores tot sunt, quot in orbe figurae : Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.' Ovid, Be Art. Am. i. 757-60. sect. 3.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 169 a provisional validity ; they are susceptible of refutation ; and they are only applied to a given case until they are rebutted by special proof. The propositions respecting forms of government are, for the most part, presumptions of this nature. They represent, not the invariable tendency of a uniform cause, which would always act if unresisted, but the average and predominant character of the subject. We must, therefore, be careful to examine the subject, and observe its individual peculiarities, before we bring it under a practical maxim, formed out of the general theorem. For in- stance, in reasoning upon the probable operation of despotism in any individual case, Ave must not omit to note the character of the absolute monarch, and the established practice of his govern- ment; without this precaution, we might confound the probable acts of a Tiberius or Nero with those of a Titus or Antoninus Pius ; or those of a Nadir Shah with those of a Joseph II. or Frederick the Great. The same precaution is necessary in esti- mating the probable acts of an aristocratic or democratic govern- ment in a given case. General presumptions, though they may assist the judgment, cannot supersede the necessity of investigat- ing the facts of each case. General presumptions as to the operation of political forms and institutions may be falsified in either one of two ways. When the average and predominant operation of the form or institution is good, it may be frustrated by the baducss of those who use it. They may, from their moral defects, convert whole- some food into poison. Thus a popularly elected legislative body may be described as being in general a beneficent institution; yet, in a particular case, its operation maybe so perverted by the fac- tiousness, violence, corruption, or timidity of its members, as to render it productive of more <\il than good. Other institutions of a refined nature, which work well in a highly civilized com- munity, may, in a less civilized country, be found to fail, on account of the want of skill, intelligence, paticmc, and habits of sustained attention and mutual forbearance in the persons upon whom their execution depends. They are like tools of a refined 170 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. make in the hands of a clumsy or ignorant artisan. Again, the average and predominant operation of the form or institution may be bad, but its defects may be supplied hy the moderation, good sense, or skill, of those who use it. Thus Aristotle says : ' Some oligarchies continue to exist, not because the form of government is stable, but because those in power bear themselves well, both towards the other members of the governing body, and those who are not members of it. As to the latter, in not wronging them, and in admitting into the governing body such as are of an aspiring disposition ; in not wounding the ambitious in their feelings of honour, and not affecting the multitude in their purse : as to the former, in treating them on terms of equality.' ( 6 ) Again, he remarks, elsewhere: ' It has often hap- pened that the constitution according to law is not popular, but that, from the character and practice of the ruling persons, it is administered in a popular manner ; and in other cases, that the constitution has been according to law of a popular tendency, but in its working and conduct is rather oligarchical/ (") Bodin, likewise, in his treatise, De Rejmblicd, observes that a few nobles may either administer the state according to popular principles, or may govern it in an aristocratic spirit. ( s ) The probable opera- tion of any institution or law can only be determined by con- sidering how persons of an average character will act when they are placed under its influence. If, however, the persons in question deviate, either wholly or to a great extent, from this average character, the generalization will fail with respect to them. The presumption, though true generally, may be over- ruled by special evidence to the contrary. Hence it is most important to bear in mind the nature of such presumptive theorems, and not to confound a provisional and prima facie (6) Polit. v. 8. (7) lb. iv. 5. (8) ii. 2, p. 295. The following remark of Montesquieu is too absolute, but it recognises the fact, that the evil tendency of laws may be remedied by the goodness of the persons who administer them : ' II y a peu de lois qui ne soient bonnes, lorsque l'etat n'a point perdu ses principes : et comme disoit Epicure, en parlant des richesses. cen'est point la liqueur qui est corrompue. c'est le rase.' — Esprit des Lois. viii. 11. SECT. 4.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 171 with a conclusive and absolute proposition. Such presumptions apply in the first instance to an individual case, and throw on the inquirer the burden of proof that the fact is otherwise ; but they do not conclude the question. To suppose that they have a greater force would be equivalent to reading the legal maxim as to guilt without its final clause, ' Quilibet prsesumitur bonus, donee probetur contrarium,' and therefore acting on an inflexible and imiform maxim, that every man is innocent. § 4 We now pass to the second reason, stated above, for the circumscription of a universal political theorem or maxim, with reference to the circumstances of an actual case : viz., that the natural or spontaneous operation of the phenomenon may be disturbed by external causes. The instances wliich we have already examined, are where, from a peculiarity of character, the persons conducting the affairs of a government are not likely to act according to general pre- sumptions derived from average experience. In these instances therefore, the cause is not set in motion ; there is no attempt at action, no unsuccessful endeavour, which an antagonist influence counteracts. The instances which we are about to consider, are of two sorts : viz., where a political cause is either counteracted or aggravated by some external agency. A cause acting freely may be disturbed in either of these ways. Its natural influence may either be arrested or retarded j or it may be stimulated and increased. We will first examine the former of these disturbing influences. Where a cause is set in motion, and acts constantly in one direction with a steady and uniform nisus, its operation may sometimes be suppressed by an overwhelming opposition, some- times repre Bed and weakened, though not quite overbornej by impeding and retarding forces. Tims the fear of punishment is a cause constantly acting in the same direction. Its tendency is always to deter; but this tendency may be counteracted in each actual case by a variety of circumstances which sometimes weaken and sometimes uullif) its operation. Freedom of trade tends constantly to facilitate Bupply, and thus to produce cheap- 172 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. ncss ; but ill considering the probability of this effect being pro- duced in any individual case, we must estimate the probability of such events as deficient harvests, difficulty of freight, insecurity arising from war or civil commotions, and the like. The reduc- tion of a high customs duty on any article would naturally tend to increase its importation ; yet a change in the public taste, or the discovery of a cheaper or preferable substitute, might prove an effectual counteraction to this tendency. Before, therefore, we form a practical maxim out of a general theorem, or use a maxim formed from a theorem without any limitation, we must consider whether the cause is likely to operate freely, or to be impeded by counteracting influences. If the latter is likely to be the case, we must attempt to calculate their force, direction, number, duration, and combined action ; and having made this calculation, we must correct our general theorem accordingly. It is in this process that the value of theory and the skill of the practician are equally perceptible. Without theory, the practical politician would be bewildered in a crowd of unconnected and unarranged particulars. He would be like a solitary wanderer in a trackless forest, without any knowledge of the ground. But with theory alone as his guide, and without any inquiry into the facts of the case, he would almost infallibly be led into error. He would apply to a concrete case a practical maxim founded upon a theorem, which supposes only an arbi- trarily limited abstraction. He would therefore commit the same error as that of a military engineer who should calculate the actual course of a cannon ball by equations in which the friction of the atmosphere is neglected. § 5 "Whenever it is affirmed that anything is ' true in theory and false in practice/ or that it is ' good in theory and bad in practice/ ( 9 ) the meaning intended to be conveyed is, apparently, that which has been just described. This objection is taken when it is proposed to apply a general theorem to some m part (9) Compare the Essay of Kant : ' Ueber den gemeinspruch : Das mag der theorie richtig sein, taugt aber niehtfiir die praxis' — Werke, vol. vii. rt i. p. 177. sect. 5. J POLITICAL THEORIES. 173 actual case, and the objector admits that the theorem is, scientifi- cally or abstractedly, true ; in other words, that if the phenomena supposed in the theory all co-exist, and co-exist alone, without anything to impede their operation in any actual case, the result predicated will also exist. But he affirms that in the actual case under consideration, either some of the phenomena sup- posed in the theory are absent; or (what is more common), that certain other phenomena not supposed in the theory, are present, and that the theoretical proposition therefore requires correction before it can be safely applied to the case in question. If we assume A, and A alone, to exist, it may be true that B will follow; but if, in the actual case, Ave have A + a + a ; then it may not be true that B will follow. In this manner, the proposition which is true in theory may be false (that is to say, inapplicable without correction) in an actual case of practice. The question therefore which the objector raises, is not as to the truth of the theorem, so long as it remains a mere scientific abstraction, but as to the construction from it of a practical maxim, to be applied to the case under discussion. Now it may indeed happen that the objection is unfounded, and that the practical maxim may be properly formed from the theory, and applied directly to the individual case. The circumstances alleged by him may be irrelevant; they may not be sufficient to differentiate the case, and to prevent the general rule from in- cluding it. The exemption may be really urged by the arguer, not because the case is abnormal, but because it is his own, and because his personal interest is at stake;. On the other hand, it may happen that the general theorem is not applicable to the case in question without corrections which nullifj its effect. Jt may be apparent, upon an examination of the facts. Hint the natural tendency of the cause will !><• counteracted by so many obstacles as to prevent it from reaching its appointed goal ; or that other circumstances exisl which withdraw the case from 1L general rule, and place it among the exceptions, Tims the follow ing are practical maxims for the management of an army in wsx 174 THE APPLICATION OF [chap. XX. taken from an ancient treatise, embodying the results of Roman experience. ( lu ) ' 1. If you discover that your plan of operations has been betrayed to the enemy, you ought to change your arrangements. '2. Soldiers in quarters are best kept in discipline by punish- ment and fear; when they are in the field, hope and reward produce the best effect. ' 3. It is better to press your enemy with hunger than with the sword/ These are practical maxims founded upon general theorems which have been derived from an intelligent induction of particulars, and which represent average experience. But they are not absolute and universal; they are presumptions, not inflexible precepts ; they cannot be applied blindly without a scrutiny and a consideration of the facts of the given case. Thus, it may be generally true that when an intended plan of attack has been betrayed to the enemy, a different point of attack may be selected with advantage. But this maxim is not invariable : the plan originally chosen may offer such prospects of success, and the alternative plans may be so inferior to it, that it may, on the whole, be preferable even with the drawback of being known beforehand to the enemy, who is thus able to meet it with counter-preparations. In an instance of this sort it may be said (with some laxity of language) that the rule is theoreti- cally true but practically false, or, more correctly, that the general presumption fails, and the case is exceptional. Again, it may be laid down generally that certainty of punish- ment is the most effectual mode of repressing crime. ( n ) From this general proposition a practical maxim arises which may be safely applied to the majority of actual cases. Nevertheless, conjunctures occur in political affairs when clemency produces a more tranquillizing and healing effect, than an inflexible and (io) Vegetius, Be Be Mil. iv. 26. (u) See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, b. vi. c. 9, vol. 4, p. 445. sect. 6.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 175 mechanical infliction of the legal punishment ; when pardons and commutations of sentences are more likely to repress crime than a strict execution of the law. It may likewise be laid down generally that punishment operates chiefly by way of example to the community at large, and that the removal of the convict him- self is a matter of secondary moment. Nevertheless, cases may occur where the ostracizing principle is more important than the deterring example of the offender's punishment, and where it is the first object to get rid of the criminal, and eliminate him from the state. ( 12 ) § 6 The circumscription of general maxims, with reference to actual cases of practice, is thus effected by adding the circum- stances of the given case, and considering the combined result. A general theorem is founded on a limited set of hypothetical data, and the more limited they are, the more abstract is the theorem. The intensity varies inversely with the extent of its signification. Now a theoretical proposition, when converted into a rule of conduct, may be conceived as taken in connexion with an indefinite number of sets of concomitant circumstances, which may modify its operation. If, therefore, we add a definite number of circumstances to the proposition, we exclude all un- certainty as to the possible combinations, and we in fact perform a sort of practical abscissio injiniti. We substitute a real and definite for an ideal and indefinite compound. The addition of a limited number of terms operates as the exclusion of an unli- mited number. Thus, let it be supposed that our general theorem is as to the operation of legal punishment. Legal punishment, if left to itself, may be expected to produce abstinence from crime; but it may be accompanied, and as it were, held in solution by a \:i^t variety of collateral circumstances which may influence its opera- tion. Thus, it maybe combined with an inefficienl or unskilful (12) The circumstances which rendered this mode of punishment ex- pedient in a Grees state are enumerated in Mr. Grote's Htstory qfQ ret <•<■. vol. iv. j>. 2i)0-l7. Plato, {Leg- i- 8, \> 886) remarks! thai institutions maj suit some stateB, but not others ; that im universal rule can be laid down, ('pyu> (cnl Xfiy&), both in practice nml theory. Compare vol. i- p. 22, n. 29 176 • THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. police, a venal, weak, or tardy administration of justice, difficulty of detection, unwillingness to prosecute or to give evidence, or a fanatical contempt of suffering. Various other circumstances might likewise be mentioned which diminish the deterring force of the fear of legal punishments on the minds of given indivi- duals. ( 13 ) Now, all that can be said with reference to such a general theorem, so long as it remains an abstraction, is that it describes a prevailing tendency, liable to be resisted and modified by an unlimited number of counter-influences with which legal punishment may be combined. But when an actual case is laid before us, we can perceive whether any, and which of those other circumstances are present. Of such as are wanting we take no account, we note those which are discernible, and we then form a definite practical problem, in this shape : ' How will the denun- ciation of legal punishment operate, taken in connexion with a reluctance of witnesses to give evidence, or with a willingness of judges to take bribes (as the case may be) ?' ' What will be the effect of legal punishment, combined with a hope of impunity, or a disregard of pain, of some special ascertained nature V Again, let it be assumed that the general maxim to be applied to a particular case is, that when the population of a country becomes redundant, it ought to be relieved by the foundation of a new colony. In order, however, to determine the fitness of applying this rule to the given case, we must add the material circumstances of the actual problem : such as the distance of the proposed settlement, its situation with respect to other countries, the expense of defending it, the political relations in respect of dependence which would subsist with the mother-country, the military and naval resources of the mother-country, and the like. When all these circumstances have been enumerated and arranged, a practical problem arises in this form : f Is it expedient for a country having a redundant population to found a new colony in such a position, with such political relations, with such a (13) See in Aristot., Rhet. i. 12, an enumeration of mauy of the motives which induce a man to commit crime, and to brave the danger of punish- ment. SECTS. 7, 8.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 177 prospect of expense to the mother country V However the general maxim might be combined with peculiar circumstances for the indefinite number of other colonies which may be con- ceived to exist, the question before us is to determine its applica- bility under the circumstances of this individual case, and subject to the conditions thus indicated. § 7 In the discussion of a practical question, it is not un- frequently said that the case must be decided on its own merits, and that every new case will depend upon its own circumstances. Now every case, however peculiar and abnormal it may be, must be decided on some principle or combination of principles. Every practical syllogism must have its major premise, affirming the general maxim, as the minor premise lays down the facts. The meaning of the remark just adverted to is, that when the circumstances of a case are numerous or exceptional, it is neces- sary to specialize the governing principle in the manner above described. Its generality must be limited, by making allowance for the additional circumstances beyond those assumed in the abstract hypothesis. These additional circumstances differentiate the problem, and thus create a necessity of modifying the general maxim accordingly. This is the meaning of what, in legal language, is called a ' special case/ Every case, however special, involves some prin- ciple ; but the principle involved in a special case is not of ex- tensive generality and wide application. It is encumbered by qualifications, and entangled with other principles, which corre- spond with the complexity of the facts, and therefore it is inapplicable to cases which are simpler, or which, though com- plex, have a different complexity, and are formed by (lie aggre- gation of a different set of circumstances around the same nucleus. § 8 The other species of disturbing influences to which a political cause is subject, is where its operation, instead of being retarded, is accelerated — instead of being counteracted, is Pig- mented, by an external agency. Thus, legislative measures intended to lower the prices of VOL. II. N 178 THE APPLICATION OF [ciIAP. xx. food by encouraging importation, may be assisted by plentiful harvests ; a concession to popular demands, which would have been prudent under ordinary circumstances, may be rendered dangerous in its consequences by the outbreak of revolutionary excesses in a neighbouring state, which are contagious, and com- municate a disposition to violence which otherwise would not exist. Inasmuch as a given effect may not only be due to several conditions, together constituting one cause, but may be produced by several causes acting independently of each other, it follows that, where one cause is set in motion, and other inde- pendent causes of the same effect accidentally supervene, the combined effect of all the causes is greater than that of any one singly. Thus, in medicine, the effect of a curative pro- cess may be accidentally increased by some unexpected concurrent circumstance; some natural action of an organ, or change of temperature, may conspire with the treatment in producing a given effect. "Where a decisive blow is to be struck, the concurrence of other unforeseen causes tending in the same direction is a gain. For example : in war, if at the time of an attack on the enemy some of his forces unexpectedly desert, or change sides, or if the effects of a blockade are assisted by a pestilence, the concurrent cause helps. But if the intention is to hold a middle course, and to avoid all extremes, an unexpected circumstance increasing the action of the cause, and carrying the effect beyond the cal- culation, defeats the original design. Hence, in fitting a general maxim into a practical syllogism, it is necessary to consider, not only whether the cause is likely to be resisted, but whether it is ldcely to be aggravated in the individual case, and to make allowance accordingly. A rule is always weakened, and not confirmed, by exceptions to it.( 14 ) If we form a practical maxim upon the proposition, that absolute monarchs hate good men, the maxim is defective in the exact proportion to the number of absolute monarchs who (14) See above, ch. ix. § 19 (vol. i. p. 387). SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 179 do not hate good men, as compared with those who do. Exceptions to a rule may often be enumerated and classified, and the rnle amended accordingly, as in grammatical rules. To the extent of the exceptions thus admitted, the ride is inapplicable and false; but when a cause is disturbed in its operation, in the way either of counteraction or aggravation, the general maxim cannot be said to be unsound, because it is founded on a theorem which does not contemplate the disturbing agency. The dis- turbance is not in the nature of an exception, but it is a super- vening external influence, which must be allowed for in the individual case, if its occurrence can be foreseen and its force measured. § 9 One important set of circumstances which modifies the operation of all political causes, for which an allowance must be made in all the practical applications of political theory and political maxims, and which enters as a perpetual though variable term in all political equations, may be comprehended under the name of habit. The habits of a people exercise so constant a modifying influence upon all the political forces to which it is exposed, that their nature and action require a full examination. The subject of habit has the closest bearing upon everything which concerns human nature and human action. Even in the involuntary and instinctive functions of the body, with which the science of physiology deals, habit is of great importance. The body, considered without reference to the mind, is capable of contracting both healthy and morbid habits, and even tem- peraments may be acquired. The ordinary animal functions, such as eating, sleeping, &C., arc determined, within certain limits, by habit; diseased actions of t lie system likewise become recurrent and periodical. (") Thai ethical or moral science is intimately connected with habit, its names alone beat- w it ness.( ir ) (15) Cabanifl, "Rapports chi Physiqtn et du Moral de V Homme, mem. ix. § 3, torn. ii. p. I 15 : ' Personne ne pent ignorer,' &c. (16) i) (i'i'iOikii aptTtf\ t'£ tdovs TTtpiylverai, uOrv kiu toCvojui fox*)** pt pv ■naptKKK'ivnv (\n<)T<>v (6. '(^ui;i pertinel ad mores, quod fjdot illi rocant,nos 180 THE APPLICATION OF [chap. XX. ' Mankind (says Paley) act more from habit than reflection. . . . There are habits not only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of some other things, which are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and called so, but of every modification of action, speech, and thought. Man is a bundle of habits. There are habits of industry, attention, vigilance, advertency ; of a prompt obedience to the judgment occurring, or of yielding to the first impulse of passion; of extending our views to the future, or of resting upon the present ; of apprehending, methodizing, reasoning ; of indo- lence and dilatoriness : of vanity, self-conceit, melancholy, par- tiality ; of fretfulness, suspicion, captiousness, censoriousness; of pride, ambition, covetousness ; of overreaching, intriguing, pro- jecting ; in a word, there is not a quality or function, either of body or mind, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature.' ( ir ) Even the more intelligent animals are capable of contracting habits, ( 18 ) and are thus susceptible of domestication. Some of these habits, when once acquired, are transmissible through successive generations, and become, so long as the domestication is preserved, a part of the animal's nature. (") In general, how- ever, continuity of action is produced in animals, not by habit, but by instinct. The uniformity of food and habitation in animals arises, not, as in man, from a habit more or less variable founded on reason, but from a blind impulse, working invariably. The predominance of habit is a peculiarity characteristic of man ; and habit corresponds, in the human economy, with instinct in earn partem philosophise 'demoribus' appellare solemus: sed decet, augen- tem linguain Latiijarn, nominare moralem.' — Cic. de Fato, c. i. The word rnoralis never became current in classical Latinity ; it is, however, used by Seneca, Ep. 89, § 8, and Quintilian, vi. 2, § 8. After the revival of letters, it was much employed by the translators of Greek, and has thus passed into all the modern languages. (17) Moral and Political Philosophy, b. i. c. 7. The nature of moral habits is well expounded and discussed in Sydney Smith's Sketches of Moral Philosophy, lectures 26 and 27. (18) On the force of habit in animals, see Leroy, Lettres Philoso- phiques sur V Intelligence des Animaux, p. 30. (19) See Prichard's Natural History of Man (1845), p. 34,40,70; Carpenter's Zoology, § 109, 110; Cabanis, Rapports du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, mem. ix. § 3, torn. ii. p. 147 ; ed. 1824. SFX'T. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 181 the animal economy . (- ) At the same time, all animated nature is, to a certain extent, susceptible of the influence of habit. Not only animals can be domesticated, or trained to certain acts, but even plants can be acclimated ; whereas the nature of inanimate things is immutable. No habituation can render gunpowder incombustible, or teach water to run up an inclined plane. Habit is the state of mind which is produced by a repetition of the same act. Repetition is essential to the formation of habits ; but the effects of repetition vary, according to the nature of the act repeated. Thus, sensual pleasures are diminished and weakened by repetition ; they do not admit of variety, and after a time they pall upon the senses. Increased quantities and more stimulating agents are resorted to, in order to keep up the excitement. The drinker rises from wine to brandy — the opium-eater multiplies his doses ; but these additional stimuli, if carried beyond a certain point, destroy the sensibility of the organ.( n ) On the other hand, the pleasures of the intellect, the imagi- nation, the taste, and the affections, are (within moderate limits) heightened rather than impaired by repetition. These admit of an infinite variety in the mode of their manifestations j their repetition consists in similarity, not in sameness — and hence they do not, like a renewed application of the same stimulating meat or drink, weary the jaded senses, or pall upon a listless appetite. (20) As to the correspondence of habits in man with instinct in animals, Flourens, Dc V Instinct, p. 57-8. (21) 'It appears to be a general law. that habit diminishes physical sensibility; whatever affects any organ of tin' body, affects ii Less by repe- tition.'— Sydney Smith, ib. p. :'>'.ni. ' L'abus (In \ in, comme oelui des autres Btimulans, peui Bans donte detruire les forces du systeme nerveux, affaiblir ['intelligence, abrutir tout a la fois le physique el le moral de l"homme: mais poor produire de tels effets, il faut que cet abus soit porte* jusqu'au dernier terme j ileal mdme rare qn'il Le produise sans le concours des esprits ardens, auxquels Lei grands buvcnrs (iiiisscnl |irrs<|in- lotijoin-H p/n- rccourir, quand !<• \ in n'iigit plus asaez rivemenl snr Leur palais et buz leur oerveau.' -Cabanis, ib. 1 1 1 • ' 1 1 1 . viii. § L{. ' !.<• propre de L'habitude esl d'emoussex Le sentiment; de ramener toujours Le plawir on Is douleur a L'indifferenoe, qui en esl le terme nioyen.' — Bic-li.i l , l\< <-ln r<-h< * I'ln/xiologiquet tw In lie tois- tpyois. /-'III. Xi<\ ii. 2. 184 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. When the mind is not stimulated by new pleasures, or occu- pied by pursuits which habit has rendered agreeable, it is subject to that oppressive and wearisome state of languor, which the French have designated by ennui. ( :fi ) Ennui may sometimes be caused by the superfluous iteration of the same idea, or a mono- tonous repetition of the same act ; but in general it arises from a want of excitement or employment for the mind, or from a participation in pursuits foreign to our tastes and habits^ 27 ) The habits of which we have been speaking refer properly to man, considered as an individual, and they are the subject of ethics, or of any other science or art which deals with the acts of men. An aggregate of habits, either successive or contem- poraneous, in different individuals is denoted by the words custom, usage, or practice.^) When many persons — either a class of society, or the inhabitants of a district, or an entire nation — agree in a certain habit, they are said to have a custom or usage to that effect. Customs may be of two kinds. First, there may be volun- tary customs — customs which are adopted spontaneously by the people, and originate from their independent choice, such as the modes of salutation, dress, eating, travelling, &c, prevalent in any country, and most of the items which constitute the manners of a people. Secondly, there are the customs which are the result of laws — customs which have grown up in consequence of the action of the government upon the people. The latter are more uniform and predominant, as being the result of coercion, and being enforced by the legal sanction, whereas the other class (26) Concerning ennui, see Helvetius de V Homme, sect. viii. (27) One peculiar effect of repetition is its producing a sense of the ridiculous. This arises where certain words, expressions, or unmeaning or singular gestures, are frequently repeated. The frequent repetition of anything which is, in itself, trifling, implies a foolish solicitude about a matter undeserving of such attention, and therefore provokes laughter. (28) A similar distinction between mos and consuetudo is made by Macrobius, Saturn, hi. 8, commenting on Virgil, JEn. vii. 601. He quotes Varro, as stating that mos is the unit, and consuetudo the resulting aggre- gate : ' Varro de moribus morem esse dicit in judicio animi, quem sequi debeat consuetudo.' He adds, in reference to the words of Virgil, ' Mos ergo praecessit, et coitus moris secutus est, quod est consuetudo.' SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 185 of customs are enforced only by the sanction of popular opinion. Thus, when successive judges in a court of justice have laid down certain rules of procedure, and the advocates pleading before the court have observed these rules, such is called the established practice of the court. The sum of the habits of the successive judges and practitioners constitutes the practice of the court. The same may be said of a deliberative assembly, or any other public body, renewed by a perpetual succession of its members. In churches, the equivalent name is rites and ceremonies. Now, when a new law is introduced in any country, or a political change is made, by which existing customs and usages are disturbed, the alteration is displeasing and painful to the people, unless they are widely dissatisfied with their institutions, and desire a reform. Even when a law is unpopular, and a change is loudly demanded, its unpopularity is generally limited to a portion of the population, and the rest view it with indif- ference, so that, upon the latter, the full effects of a disruption of old habits are felt. As we have already seen, the test of the existence of a habit is the production of pain by its discontinu- ance, so that no habit can be broken off without pain. The influence of habit in modifying and counteracting the operation of new laws is twofold : it arises — 1, from the attachment of the people, considered as the subjects of legislation, to the old law ; 2, from the reluctance of the executive func- tionaries to alter their habits, and to adopt new modes of action. As we have already shown, a person who has been accus- tomed to see a thing done in a particular manner, acquires a predilection for that mode of doing it, which is independent of any share of his own in the act. Hence, if ;i person is accus- tomed to sec prisoners tried, or soldiers armed and exercised, is a particular manner, he contracts from habil ;i preference for that mode. In like manner, a person who lias been accustomed to a certain form and ceremonial of worship, and to B certain eccle- siastical vestment, views with displeasure any change in these matters, though it may affect no article of faith. It is to be observed, moreover, that in polities we are not concerned with 186 THE APPLICATION OF [cHAF. XX. single habits, but with habits in the aggregate, or customs. Now, as Lord Bacon says, ' if the force of custom, simple and separate, be great, the force of custom copulate and conjoined and collegiate is far greater; for there example teacheth, com- pany comforteth, emulation quickeneth, glory raiseth ; so as in such places the force of custom is in its exaltation /(- 9 ) The effect of custom is likewise enhanced, if the habits of which it is com- posed were common to the preceding as well as to the contem- porary generation. If the institution has descended to the living persons from their forefathers, it is strengthened by the associa- tions of childhood, of ancestry, and of national history ; it is ennobled and hallowed by patriotic, religious, and popular senti- ments. Hence it is a theme of exhortation, ' traditum ab antiquis morem servare •/ and one of the commonest incitements to exertion is an appeal not to degenerate from the customs of our ancestors. A reference to ancient usages and time-honoured insti- tutions rarely fails to strike a chord of feeling which thrills in many breasts. To say that anything is national, is a theme of praise in each nation. The epithet English is laudatory in England, German in Germany, French in France, Spanish in Spain; as the epithets un-English, un-German, un-French, and un-Spanish imply censure, each within its own territory.^ ) All national usages become a sort of second nature to many (29) Essay, xxxix. ' Of Custom and Education.' (30) Herodotus, in commenting on tke folly of Cambyses, in outraging the religious feelings of the Egyptians and others, remarks that all nations think their own laws and customs the best ; and he tells a story of Darius in illustration of this dictum. — iii. 38. Nepos, in the preface to his biographies, expresses a fear that his readers may object to some of the anecdotes which he relates respecting eminent Greeks : ' Sed hi erunt fere, (he continues,) qui expertes literarum Graecarum, nihil rectum, nisi quod eorum moribus conveniat, putabant. Qui si diclicerint, non eadem omnibus esse honesta atque turpia, seel omnia majorum institutes judicari ; non admirabuntur nos in Graiorum virtutibus exponendis mores eorum sequutos.' JS"epos, therefore, assumes that national custom is the standard of right and wrong in ethics. As to the authority which an established government derives from custom, see Sir TV. Temple, Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government ; Works, vol. ii. p. 37. SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 187 persons, especially to those who have read, thought, and travelled little. Persons of this sort are properly called narrow- minded — the horizon of their ideas is contracted; neither by per- sonal observation, nor through the medium of books, have they extended it beyond their own neighbourhood.^ 1 ) Ileuce, when they are brought into contact with customs and institutions different from their own, they are filled with amazement, and believe the order of nature to be violated. The most lively picture of such a state of mind is afforded by Orientals who visit Euro- pean countries, or who become witnesses of European manners. ( 32 ) But the uneducated classes of every civilized country exhibit it, in a greater or less degree. They confound the habitual with the natural, and the unusual with the unnatural. They are shocked at practices to winch they are unaccustomed, as if they involved a departure from the system of the universe. But, while we remark the undue resistance to legislative improvements which ai*ises from a froward and stiff-necked ad- herence to ancient customs, having nothing but a long prescrip- tion to recommend them, we must not overlook the security which every government derives from the principle of habit. It is the unreasoning attachment of the people to the existing insti- tutions of the country which constitutes one of the main safe- guards of a government. ( M ) Such an attachment, indeed, will (31) ' Fuisset imperitum animal, ct sine magna experientia rcrum homo, si circumscribcretur natalis soli fine.' — Seneca, Nat. Quasi, v. 18, §12. (32) Hence tlie form of lcttrcs Persancs, &c, has been adopted as a vehicle for unprejudiced comment on European manners and customs, or for hostile sarcasm, inasmuch as to an Oriental everything ifl Btrange, and different from his own. — See Dunlop's History of Fiction, vol. iii. p. 329-38. (,33) Aristotle lavs it down, in bis Vnliiirs, thai when the legislative improvement is small, and danger may arise from too great facility in altering the laws, it is better to acquiesce is certain defects of the Iawi and the governors -. for the advantage of change will not counterbalance the disadvantage of a habit of disobedience to the laws, h 1- a fallaci (he adds) to compare laws and arts; for a law derives iti force only from the habit, of obedience, for which the lapse of time is necessary; 10 that a readiness to change from the existing Laws to other new laws weakens the power of the law. — "Pol. ii. 8 ; ad fin. fjkiiajv Vlo\vv <\'• r6 tOoe.— Aristot. dfiet, i, min. c. •'. 188 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. probably not arise, unless the institution is, on the whole, bene- ficial ; but when it has once arisen, it is confirmed and augmented by habit ; it derives strength from the existence of similar habits in others, and it creates a patriotic feeling, which prompts every citizen to action, independently of any special process of reason- ing in the individual case, or of any prospect of direct personal advantage. At the same time, it ought to be borne in mind that the principle of habit in politics, as well as in physiology, is a neutral principle ; and that in the body politic, as in the body natural, bad as well as good habits may be formed, which harden into a second nature, and can only be gradually abandoned, as they have been gradually established. In like manner, as a confirmed habit of drinking spirits, or of eating opium, cannot be suddenly broken through, so a community which may have formed a habit of lawless violence, of indolence, or of improvidence, cannot be suddenly cured of it by new legislation^ 34 ) It may be added, that a large part of every system of law is avowedly founded upon custom. Every country admits, to a greater or less extent, consuetudinary or customary law, or, according to the expression of the Roman jurists, jus moribus constitutum.i 35 ) Usage, that is, the systematic habits of a body of persons, extending through a continuous period of time, is fre- quently the origin of law. Thus, it may be customary to hold a fair at a certain town on a certain day. The law may step in, and declare that it shall be holden at that place and time. It (34) ov yap oiov re rj ov pahiov ra in naXaiov rols fjdeai KareiXrjppeva \6ya fieraa-Trja-ai. — Aristot. Eth. Nic. x. 10. (35) ' Inveterata consuetudo pro lege non immerito custoditur, et hoe est jus quod dicitur moribus constitutum.' — Rig. i. 3, 32. Compare Inst. i. 2, § 9 : 'Ex non scripto jus venit, quod usus comprobavit. Nam diu- turni mores, consensu utentium comprobati, legem imitantur.' On customary law, see Savigny, System des Heut. Rom. Rechts, vol. i. p. 34, 76. According to the language of the English law, a legal custom is local or personal. The common law is a legal custom extending over the whole country, in the same manner as the Rook of Common Prayer is opposed to prayers for private devotion. See the second part of Matter's work, Re V Influence des Marnrs sur les Lois, et de V Influence des Lois sur les Mceurs (Paris, 1832). SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 189 may be customary for persons filling certain offices, or occupying certain stations, to have a certain precedence, and to wear cer- tain distinctive dresses, or marks of honour. By the interposi- tion of the legislature, a legal right to such precedence and marks of honour may be conferred. It is a custom, in all civilized countries, to wear mourning for the dead. This custom might be rendered obligatory by law, and be subjected to regulation. In like manner, where, in a country, there are certain prevalent usages with respect to the distribution of property by will, the letting of land, the hours of work, and the rate of wages, those usages might be converted into inflexible rules of law. So the ordinary price of an article, determined by the natural competi- tion of the market, might be enacted by law. In a country where slavery exists, and where it is customary to make a certain daily allowance of food to a slave, a law might be passed fixing this allowance as a minimum. There is, indeed, a constant ten- dency to fortify prevailing customs with the legal sanction — to convert the general into the universal — to substitute the legal for the moral sanction, the power of the magistrate for that of public opinion. In so far, therefore, as any parts of a system of law have this origin, any alteration of them will be counteracted, not only by the habits which have grown up under the legal enactment, but also by the habits which existed in the form of voluntary custom, before the legal enactment was made. Besides the disinterested attachment which is produced in the manner just described, there is a second cause of the support which habit gives to ancient institutions. If a person is not only familiarized with a certain practice by seeing it as a by- stander, but is himself concerned in ils performance, Ik* is attached to it not only by sentiment, but also by the facility of execution which arises from repetition, while, :it the same time, he is disinclined to any new system which he may he required to administer, on account of the necessity for additional exertion, attention, and reflection which is imposed upon him by novelty and strangeness. Men of practice become habituated to a cer- 190 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. xx. taiu routine of business, and depart from it unwillingly. Use has rendered it familar to them, and has at last made easy what they acquired slowly and with difficulty. A change makes their acquired skill valueless, and thus either deprives them of their superiority, or compels them to fresh exertion in order to main- tain the advantage. In this respect, public functionaries resemble the practical men of any profession or branch of industry : a judge is unwilling to alter the practice of his court, or an admi- nistrator the routine of his office, in the same manner that a physician adheres to old systems of medical treatment, or a farmer persists in following antiquated modes of cultivation. Owing to the double operation of habit just described — viz., the disinterested preference for that to which we are accustomed, and the facility of execution arising from practice — there is a force perpetually operating in favour of existing laws, and against changes in legislation. Habit in politics, like the atmosphere in mechanics, is a constant force, which steadily opposes the operation of all motive agents. All political reforms are founded, to a great extent, upon an existing state of things, and are adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the country. They are often made with reference to some immediate object, and are only moulded gradually into harmony with the other institutions of the state. Where an attempt is made to draw a scheme of a new constitution, and to put it in force immediately, the attempt is usually frustrated in part, when it comes in contact with the customs and established practices of the people. It is the irre- gular and successive formation of a complex constitution which has given rise to the metaphor, that governments are not made, but grow, and has suggested the contrast of this process of gradual accretion, with the simultaneous act by which a statue, for example, is cast in a foundry. ( 36 ) (36) ' Nostra autem respublica non unius est ingenio, sed niultoruin, nee una hominis vita, sed aliquot constituta sseculis et aetatibus.' — Cic. de Hep. ii. 1, where this remark is attributed to Cato the Elder, Eome being contrasted with the Greek states, whose constitutions were as- cribed to single lawgivers. ' Mankind (says Dr. Ferguson), in following the present sense of their SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 191 The pain which is inflicted upon men by the disruption of their ancient habits, and the difficulty of overcoming the vis inertia which holds them to accustomed modes of execution, render all changes of laws and institutions a toilsome work. minds, in striving to remove inconveniences, or to gain apparent and con- tiguous advantages, arrive at ends which even their imagination could not anticipate Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future ; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design No constitution is formed by concert, no government is copied from a plan We are therefore to receive, with caution, the traditionary histories of ancient legislators and founders of states. Their names have long been celebrated ; their supposed plans have been admired ; and what were probably the consequences of an early situation, is, in every instance, considered as an effect of design. An author and a work, like cause and effect, are perpetually coupled together. This is the simplest form under which we can consider the establishment of nations ; and we ascribe to a previous design, what came to be known only by experience, what no human wisdom could foresee, and what, without the concurring humour and disposition of his age, no authority could enable an individual to execute.' — Essay on the History of Civil Sociefi/, part iii. sect. 2. A similar line of observation is pursued by .Mr. Stewart in the following passage : ' Of the governments which have hitherto appeared in the history of mankind, few or none have taken their rise from political wisdom, but have been the gradual result of time and experience — of circumstances and emergencies. In process of time, indeed, every government acquires a systematical appearance ; for, although its different parts arose from cir- cumstances which may be regarded as accidental and irregular, yet there must exist, among these parts, a certain degree of consistency and analogy. "Wherever a government has existed for ages, and men have enjoyed tran- quillity under it, it is a proof that its principles are not essentially at variance with each other. Every new institution which w:is introduced, must have bad a certain reference to the laws and usages existing before, otherwise it could imi bave been permanent in its operation. If any one, contrary to the spirit of the rest, should have occasionally mingled with them, it must SOOn have fallen into dcsucluile and oblivion ; and those alone would remain which accorded in their general tendency.' — li/ewciifs of the "Philosophy if Hi' II a mmi Mind, c. I, sect. 8. ' Attempts to form a \>frCcc\ constitution have uniformly failed, and those instil ui ions bave thriven besl which bave Bprung out of the neces- sity of the occasion. Constitutions are, in Fact, productions that can neither be created aor transplanted ; the} are the grow ih of time, dot the invention of ingenuity ; and to frame b complete system of government, depending^ on habits of reference and experience, is an attempl as absurd as to build a tree, or manufacture an opinion. ' The chief objection to a constitution complete in all its parts is, thai in the course of the hist twenty yeaTS the c\ peri men I has hecli tried under various circumstances, and among different people, and thai in no one instance can it be said to bave succeeded. A constitution so drawn rs expectations which arc not easily realized, and the disappointment pro- duces cither entire indifference to all law, or, on the contrary, ■ fresh en- deavour, by the exaggeration of every principle of liberty, and the subver- 192 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. No legislative novelty can be introduced without some incon- venience. In every case, there will be some opposition to be overcome — some new exertion to be made. Hence, there is a certain presumption in favour of remaining as you are ; of hold- ing to an existing institution j of repudiating all ideals ; and of abstaining from all practical experiments upon the great levia- than of society. ( 3r ) It is, indeed, only by means of ideals, by trying upon society what has never been tried before, that political progress can be effected, and civilization be advanced. On this subject we shall say more elsewhere, f 8 ) It is clear that, if mankind were solely governed by the principle of habit, and never made political experiments for the purpose of realizing an ideal conception, the world would be stationary, and successive generations of men would resemble successive generations of wild animals. But the question which the political reformer is called on to solve is, whether the probable advantage of his innovation may be ex- sion of every practicable provision in the constitution, to attain an ideal perfection, of which, perhaps, no human society is capable. Securities are devised against dangers which never exist, and inconveniences are soon felt which were not foreseen, and which no means are left for providing against. These difficulties must be submitted to, or, if removed, the alteration shakes the confidence of the public in the stability of laws, the funda- mental nature of which has been represented to them as their only security.' — Sketch of a Constitution for the Kingdom of Naples, in 1815, by Lord Holland, pp. 8, 12. ' Government may be, in some degree, reduced to system, but it can- not flow from it. It is not like a machine, or a building, which may be constructed entirely, and according to a previous plan, by the art and labour of man. It is better illustrated by comparison with vegetables, or even animals, which may be, in a very high degree, improved by skill and care, which may be grievously injured by neglect, or destroyed by violence, but which cannot be produced by human contrivance.' — Mackintosh, Hist, of England, vol. i. p. 72. ' Le pouvoir des parlemens, comme tous ceux de l'ancienne France, s'etait forme, pourrait-on dire, par alluvion. Les evenemens les avaient accrus, et non les lois. Aucune regie supreme et incontestee ne definis- sait et ne delimitait leur action.' — Granier de Cassagnac, Hist, des Causes de la RSv. Fr. torn. ii. p. 257. M. Comte remarks that spontaneous changes, produced by the gradual course of events, are generally superior to what the most eminent reformers could have conceived.' — Phil. Pos. torn. iv. p. 580. (37) See Montaigne, 1. i. c. 22 : ' De la Coutume, et de ne changer aisement une Loi recue.' Compare 1. hi. c. 13. (38) Below, ch. xxii. SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 193 pected to outweigh its certain disadvantages. Now the charac- teristic defect of political theorists ( M ) is considered to be, that in resolving this practical problem they estimate at its full value the probable advantage of their reforms, while they make no sufficient allowance for the evils arising from an interference with existing habits, feelings, and modes of thought, and for the counteraction to which their measures will be thus exposed. They consider society, it is said, as a mere subject of experiment, which, like a dead body under the knife of the surgeon, or like a metal in the chemist's laboratory, is devoid of sensation. ( 4I! ) Or, again, it is said they look upon human brings as mere pieces upon a chess-board, who can be moved about at the will of the lawgiver, and will assume, impassively, any position which he may think fit to give them. They appear to think that civil government is like a military parade, and that the population of a state will, at the word of command, fall into their ranks, and (,59) ' There are (says Mr. Stewart) among the men who are accus- tomed to the exercise of their intellectual powers two classes, whose habits of thought are remarkably distinguished from each other; the one class comprehending what we commonly call men of business, or, more properly, men of detail ; the other, men of abstraction — or, in other words, philosophers.' lie proceeds to explain the characteristic menial habits of these two classes respectively.' — Elements qf the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. ch. 1, sect. 7. (40) 'II agissait comme un ehirurgien qui opere sur les cadavres, el il ne songeait pas qu'il ope*rait sur des Stares sensibles: il ne voyaii que les choses, et ne s'occu|i;nt pas assez des personnes. C'ette apparcnte dtirele avait pour principe la purete* de son ame, qui lui peignait les homines comme anime's d'un de*sir egal da bien public, <>u comme des fripons, qui ne iin'ntaieiit aucuo management.' — Judgment upon Turgot, quoted by Blanqui, Histoire de VJEconomie Politique, torn. ii. p. L08. Mercier de laBivierewas an example of a rash theorist, attempting legislation in ignorance of the facts. -Say, Cows d' 12c. Pol. torn. i. p. 5 1 . Necker, says ML. Granier de Cassagnac, 'demeura persuade* jusqu'au dernieT menl que lea bommes Be Laissaieni manier dans la politique comme lea idees dans les -\ iteme de la philosophic.' - Hist, des Causes dt la "Rev. Wranc. torn. i. p. 20. ' Vivre dans on cabinet, e'tudier dea livres, comparer des id£es, batir <\i-^ Bystemes, organiser des mondea dans oe champ sans limite des hypotheses -c'esl faire, aon pas meme de la philo Bophie, mais de I'ideologie. Vivre au milieu des bommes, 6pier leura p n chants, e"oouter leurs plaintes, apprdcier leun desirs, me una- leura boaoins, el les guider vers ce qui esl 'al, juste, el utile, dans la limite de ce que rendenl possible hair intelligence, leur force, 1 1 mdme li or faiblca . c 1 I faire de La politique.' — lb. p. 516. Compare also the remarks 00 Sii .■ (("in n p, 34/0,) who lays n down thai social mechanism muBt be analysed like an ordinary machine. \ hi,. 11, o 194 THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. execute the various movements prescribed to them with the promptitude, uniformity, and unhesitating obedience of well- drilled soldiers. The practical error which has just been pointed out is not peculiar to philosophical and speculative reformers. It is shared by all political fanatics, by all men who have a panacea for the state, by all eager party-leaders and promoters of revolutionary plans. If the day-dreamer in his closet — if the philanthropic contriver of Utopias, is subject to this delusion, on the other hand the headlong man of action, who believes that he can regene- rate the world by the enforcement of some novel principle, which he cherishes with the blind and intolerant enthusiasm of a religious zealot, is equally under its influence. Persons of both these classes are prone to believe that a community of men are, to the politician, like clay under the potter's hand, whereas habit has often hardened them into a definite form, having the consistency of stone ; or that, like the insentient materials with which the architect operates, they can be built up into a new edifice, arranged according to a uniform and coherent plan. Idealists of both these sorts assume the existence of a simplicity of relations, and a ductility of matter, which do not exist in any real community. Above all, they overlook the very obvious fact, that ideal plans are difficult of realization in proportion to their extent. It is one thing to propose an ideal law, and another thing to attempt to establish an ideal constitution, or an ideal state of perpetual peace. The tendency to this error is to be avoided by a reference to such considerations as have been adverted to in this chapter, showing the deductions to which political theory is subject in practice, on account of existing usage. The attentive perusal of history, personal observation of the working of contemporary political measures, or personal experience in the conduct of public affairs, likewise serve as correctives. For example, the spectator of a review of soldiers may believe, when he sees their uniform dress and armour, and their mechanically true move- ments, that an army is to be governed like a machine. But if SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 195 he is employed in any post of military command, he will soon find that an army is, like a state, composed of sentient beings, and that a sudden and uncalled-for interference with the esta- blished habits of the men, and with the customs and practice of the sendee, is as likely to produce a mutiny, as a similar interference in the commonwealth is likely to produce an insurrection. Critical periods, indeed, arise in the history of nations, when usage furnishes no guide to legislation, when new institutions must be created, and a new political system must be established — when all the materials of government must be put into the crucible, and re-cast. Such turns in human affairs occur, when an existing government has been overthrown by a successful revolutionary movement — when a dependent province has esta- blished its independence by force of arms, or an independent state has been conquered, and its territory permanently annexed to the territory of the conquering state. Political hurricanes of this kind sweep away existing institutions from the face of the country, and overwhelm, for a time, the habits which have either produced or grown out of them. A necessity then arises for a new machinery of government, and the statesman must organize everything de novo. At such a moment, abstinence from decisive action,and a recourse to a gradual and temporizing policy, would be as ill-timed, as if a general in the face of the enemy, in the open field, were to employ the dilatory operations of a blockade. Modern instances of occasions of this sort arc furnished by the independence of the American colonics, and by the separation of Belgium from Holland, and of Greece from the Turkish empire. In each of these cases, a country, previously dependent, found itself in a state of independence, and required the formation of anew government. In the United Stales, the existing institu- tions were adapted, with the fewest possible changes, to the new state oi* things. The exigency of the case was met with the smallest possible amount of innovation, and the existing materials were, ;i- Gar as possible, worked up into the new build- ing which it u:is nece>sary to ereel. The old subordinate colo- nial governments were somewhat strengthened and enlarged, 19G THE APPLICATION OF [CHAP. XX. while the federal council, which hud been formed for the tempo- rary purpose of the war, received a more perfect organization, and was converted into a permanent federal government. ( 4I ) Belgium and Greece did not possess any popular provincial insti- tutions which admitted of being used as the framework of an independent government : their governments were accordingly created out of nothing; but, in order to assimilate them to the political atmosphere of Europe, they were formed upon the Euro- pean model of a parliamentary constitution, presided over by a limited king. When the government of an independent state is forcibly overthrown by a sudden revolution, as that of England during the civil war, that of France at various times since 1789, and as frequently happened in the ancient republics, and in the Italian republics of the middle age, there is a similar necessity for speedy action, and a new government must be run up for the moment, which, indeed, like a temporary building constructed in a hurry, is seldom formed of solid and durable materials. When a government exists — and there is no necessity for (41) Compare, on this subject, the remarks of Mr. Madison (in the Fede- ralist, No. 14), who, in 1788, thus addresses the Americans : ' Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recom- mended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world ; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of thewildestprojectors ; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish Why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new ? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not sufFered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience ? . . . Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered — no government established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of mis- guided counsels Happily for America — happily, we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no pai'allel in the annals of human society : they reared the fabrics of government which have no model on the face of the globe.' ' What custom wills in all things, should we do it, The dust on antique time would lie unswept, And mountainous error be too highly heapt, For truth to o'erpeer.' Coriolanus. act ii. SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 1 «J7 creating a new government where none existed before — political changes which are gradual, which advance, not by a rapid onset, but step by step — which proceed with a constant reference to the existing habits and feelings of the people, are the most lasting and beneficial. ( 4: ) Even in provinces which are annexed to another state, and in which the necessity for creating a new administrative system hence arises, it has been found that the connexion with the paramount power has been most permanent, when the changes introduced have been limited to measures indis- pensable for maintaining the dependence of the province, and have not interfered with the native customs and usages, beyond the extent which the establishment of the imperial rule demanded. ( 43 ) With respect to the political reforms introduced in independent states, the advantage of considering established habits, and of allowing for their disturbing action in all new measures, is still more apparent. Hence the recognition of such political maxims as ' Stare super antiquas vias/ ' Quieta non movere :' and hence (42) ' It is true that what is settled by custom, though it be not good, yet at least it is fit, and those things which have long gone together are, as it were, confederate within themselves; whereas new things piece not so well ; but, though they help by their utility, yet they trouble by their inconformity : besides, tiny are like strangers, more admired and less favoured. All this is true, if time stood still ; which, contrariwise, moveth so round, that a froward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation; and they that reverence too much old times, are but a Bcorn to the new. 1 1 were good, therefore, that men in their innovations would follow the example 01 Lime itself, which indeed innovateth greatly, bul quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived It is good also aol to fry experiments in states, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident; and well to beware that it be the reformat ion that draw eth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendetb the reformation.' Lord Bacon, Essay on Twnovations. Compare the article 'Innovatio,' No. 40 of the antilhela, in the sixth book, I )< I tignu ill is, vol. v'ni. p. 876. 'The noblest and most salutary forms and insl it nt ions, whether in civil or moral societies, when bequeathed from generation to generation, after the lapse of centuries will prove defective! However exquisitely lit they may have been, when tiny were first framed, it WOUld he ncces-.i r\ that the vital power in stales and churches should act instinctively, ana evince a faculty of perpetually adapting itself to the occasion, as (he ship ArgO did when it Spoke, if SUch a fitness is to last. As it is, they either Continue without any outward alteration, and then are only I he more cer- tain of becoming a mere lifeless shell — or thej are gradually developed ami transformed, during which process then- original purpose is usually little thought of, and often totalis misunderstood.'— Niobuhr, History of li'tnih . \ o|. i. p. 622. (43) See Machiavel, / V; ,/,■; /■■ , I . 3, 5, 6. 198 THE APPLICATION OF [cKAP. XX. men of action, who have been placed in positions where the creation of a new government was necessary, have sought to dis- guise the extent of then' changes by retaining the names and forms of the old institutions — by performing a process similar to that which the metaphysical theology of the church of Rome teaches to take place in the miracle of transubstantiation, viz. that the internal and unseen substance is transmuted, while the external and visible qualities of the elements remain un- changed^ 44 ) Augustus Csesar, as is well known, adopted this policy in making the transition from the republican to the monarchical government of Rome ; and Napoleon followed it, in some particulars, for effacing the remains of the revolutionary government in France. Obstacles, at first apparently insupe- rable, can be conquered by delay. Objections are gradually softened by an experience of the actual effects of a partial change. Even an individual has rarely the hardihood and resolution to break through a bad habit by a single effort ; in general, he dis- continues it by slow gradations — he weans himself from the beverage, by continually taking smaDer draughts at longer intervals. ( 45 ) Bodies of men, and entire nations, are still less (44) Machiavel, in his Discorsi, i. 25, lays it down, that he who wishes to reform an ancient state into a free city ought to retain at least the shadow of the ancient institutions. Men, he says, are affected as much by appearances as by realities; sometimes even more by appearances. Hence the Romans, when they had abolished their royal government, divided the same number of lictors between the two consuls as the king alone had previously possessed; and they established an officer of high rank, entitled Rex Sacrificulus, and assigned to him certain sacrifices. This example, he proceeds, should be followed by all who wish to introduce free institu- tions in a state. Things, new in substance, should preserve their ancient forms ; and if the number and powers of magistrates are altered, their name at least shoidd be retained. See above, ch. iv. § 3. (45) See Bacon, Essay 38, ' Of Nature in Men.' ' Difficilius desuescere est quam assuescere.' Jani Anysii Sent. v. 196. ' Sed meliore fide paulatim extinguitur ignis, Quam subito : lente desine : tutus eris. Flumine perpetuo torrens solet acrius ire, Sed tamen hsec brevis est, ilia perennis aqua. Fallat, et in tenues evanidus exeat auras, Perque gradus molles emoriatur amor.' Ovid, Rem. Am. 649-54. SECT. 9.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 199 prone to make abrupt changes : out of a number of rnen, the great majority will be attached to ancient habits, and will cling tenaciously to national customs. A nation, however, like an individual, may be induced to overcome its repugnance, by trying a slight degree, or a small amount, as the fears and dislikes of children are removed by leading them on from one point to another. In this manner, deep-rooted habits may be overcome, and a nation may be trained to a novel course. A fort which has resisted an assault may be carried by slow approaches and lines of circumvallation. Capta vides aero Pergama, capta tamen. Moreover, the hostility to an existing law is sometimes the result of a temporary sentiment, or of a transient impulse, so that when the new law has been introduced, and has been for a short time in operation, it has to encounter not only the difficulty arising from a change of habits, but also that arising from a collapse of feeling. ("') Hence there is a revulsion of popular opinion to the old state of things : thus, when the gusts of popular fury which cause revolutions are overpast, the traditionary national sentiments and usages rear their heads, and reassert their former, though temporarily-suspended power. The habits which impede the action of new laws are not always common to the entire nation, but may be confined to a particular section of the community. Whenever it happens that a class of persons who have formed habits of acquired skill in any department of profitable labour will find the demand for their services diminished, or the produce of their industry dis- placed, by a new legislative measure, their hostility to it may be calculated on with certainty, and their resistance may be taken as a steady counteracting force. They cannot easily turn their hands to a new employment : their acquired skill becomes, like (4A) * in other things, the predominancy of custom ii everywhere risible; inasmuch as 8 man would winder to dear men profess, protest) en* gage, give greal words, and then do just as thei have done before, as if thej were dead images and engines, moved only bythe wheels of custom.' — Lord Bacon, Essay 39, 'Of Custom and Education 200 THE APPLICATION OF [chap. XX. capital invested in a losing trade, devoid of value. The services which formerly produced a return are no longer in demand. It is for the interest of society that skilled habits thus formed should not be an impediment to measures which tend to the general good of the community, and that no new class of persons, simi- larly situated, should grow up. With regard to the existing class, their loss (like the loss incurred under similar circumstances by the owners of propertj 7 ) may sometimes be made the subject of compensation, as when soldiers and sailors, at the close of a war, are discharged with a pension. § 10 We have now illustrated the ways in which the universality of theorems in politics is circumscribed when they come to be applied in practice, and we have shown that the necessity for narrowing and specializing their import sometimes arises from accidental variations in the subject itself, sometimes from external causes, disturbing its natural operation. It ought now to be added, that universal theories require always to be modified by theories of limited application, whenever such exist. We have already shown, ( 4r ) that the peculiarities of each nation demand a limitation of the practical maxims applicable to it : there are theorems which are true of communities having certain manners, religion, opinions, and standing at a certain degree in the scale of civilization, and which are not true of other communities, differing in these respects. These axiomata media (to use Bacon's expression), ( 48 ) which are neither so abstract as propositions applicable to mankind at large, nor so special as to be confined to a single case, are of great utility in political practice. When they have been formed, the prudent politician will use them, in preference to maxims relating to human nature in general : when they have not been formed, he will endeavour, before he uses such unlimited maxims, to reduce them to the dimensions of his own age and country. § 1 1 It results from the preceding inquiry, that the appli- cation of theory to practice is a process consisting of two distinct (47) Above, cli. xvi. (48) Nov. Org. i. 101. SECT. 11.] POLITICAL THEORIES. 201 stages ; first, the conversion of theorems into maxims, and, secondly, the application of the maxims to actual cases. Both these stages are subject to their appropriate errors — an unsound maxim mar be formed from a true theorem ; a sound maxim may be incorrectly used in practice. Precepts may be formed from theoretical propositions which the theorist never intended to suggest, and which he Avould have disapproved if they had been presented to him. Again, practical politicians may apply general maxims without the requisite corrections and limitations, and may thus arrive at wrong practical results, although the maxims were well-framed, with respect to the ordinary and average state of things. Politics, like other departments of human knowledge, both mental and physical, have not escaped the dominion of false theories. In the various branches of government, in civil and criminal law, in judicature, in taxation, in economical and commercial subjects, false theories have abounded, and have often been received with general assent. Upon these false theories numerous maxims have been founded, which have guided the discretion of monarchs, statesmen, and parliaments, and have governed the most important Legislative and administrative acts. Not unfrcqucntly, however, theorists have been unjustly censured for maxims, which have been incorrectly deduced by others from their abstract principles, by writers who wished to give them a preceptive form. Still more often have they been unfairly blamed, when this conversion has been hastily and crudely performed, on the spur of the moment, by practical men, without a due comparison of the elements in- volved in the theory, and those present in the actual case. The theorist cannot be held responsible for the want of caution, or practical skill, or logical acumen, or knowledge of facts, which may be exhibited in the application of his theories. lie places a certain instrument in the hands of t lie practician, hut is not answerable for the manner iii which it may be used, lie can neither foresee the eases to which his general proposit ions m;i\ be applied, nor control the persons \\li" apply them. Even when sound maxims have been formed out of theories, tliev m;i\ 202 APPLICATION OP POLITICAL THEORIES. be misapplied. The rules of the art of arithmetic are sound aud scientific, but they do not guarantee the unskilful or careless accountant against errors of computation. Hence we see that the practical man who applies a theory, and then complains of its falsity, may be himself the author of the error which he condemns. His application may be made without a proper allowance for the generality of scientific expres- sion, and for the necessity of taking account of the facts neglected in the theory, but present in the actual case. The maxim has been deduced from the theoretic principle without due limitation and correction, and the result obtained by the combination of such maxim with the particular case is consequently erroneous. But this error must be imputed to the framer of the practical syllogism, and of the maxim, which serves as its major premise — not to the theorist, who merely laid down an abstract truth. 203 Chapter XXI. ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, AND REAL MODELS, IN POLITICS. § 1 "\^7"E have already remarked, that the art of politics may " ^ convey its lessons, not only by general maxims or precepts, but also by selecting certain models, and holding them up for imitation. These models — like the models in a school of design — may be either real or ideal : they may be either actually existing objects, or they may be ideal works conceived and executed by an artist. In either sort of models — whether they be real or ideal — the subject recommended for imitation is individual; but it is generalized in the imitation, by being proposed as a type, which many persons endeavour to copy. In this way, a single object, used as a model, obtains the force of a general precept. Identical copies of the same original are multiplied, instead of numerous cases being brought under the same rule. Before, therefore, we can complete our survey of the art of politics, we must investigate that mode of political reasoning, which consists in the imitation of real and ideal models for prac- tical purposes, and attempt to ascertain the conditions for its proper conduct. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to the former class. § 2 The field of politics, like other departments of human knowledge, has been the subject of much unsound theory. Where the space was so vast, the facts to he ascertained so numerous, the survey so comprehensive, the passions and the interests involved so powerful and active;, it was inevitable thai many rash and unsuccessful attempts at theory would he made, before scientific truth coidd be determined. All the methods for the investigation of causation in polities, and tor the esta- blishment of general truths, which have been indicated in this treatise, have been violated by different theorists. It was not to 204 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. xxi. be expected, when every branch of human science, as well physi- cal as mental, has been tainted with unsound speculation — when there have been false theories in astronomy, mechanics, optics, hydrostatics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, not less than in metaphysics and ethics, that politics alone should escape. The wildness of many pohtical theories, together with the absence of due caution in their conversion into maxims of con- duct, and in their practical application, has created a fear and distrust of all scientific generalities, (') and has induced practical politicians to resort in preference to the direct argument from experience. Hence, the persons engaged in pohtical action, and in the contemporary pohtical discussion, fall generally into two classes, the former consisting of those who hold some body of doctrine or theoretical principles, or rationale, with respect to the measures which they promote (called by the French, doctrinaires), the latter proclaiming no set of theoretical principles, but pro- fessing to be guided exclusively by experience, and calling them- selves practical men. These two classes correspond with the two sects of the Dogmatici or Rationales, and the Empirici, in the ancient schools of medicine. ( 2 ) The Dogmatici did not re- ject the lessons of experience, though they held that modes of treatment must be founded on some intelligent design ;( 3 ) but (i) 'In all matters of taste and criticism (says Mr. Payne Knight), general rules appear to me to be, like general theories in government and politics, never safe but where they are useless ; that is, in cases previously proved by experience. A rule implies a general negation ; and so limited and uncertain is human knowledge, in all subjects of this kind, that it never can reach every possible case, nor make any general assertion which will not be liable to many exceptions.' — On the Principles of Taste, part ii. ch. 2, § 109, 110. (2) Concerning these two sects, see Celsus de Med. prsf. ad lib. i. Compare Sprengel, Geschichte der Arzneikunde, vol. i. p. 428, 610. Gregory, in his Conspectus Medicince Tlieoreticce, generalizes the distinction : ' Medici vero est, cognita natura et causa morbi, judicare quid mutationis requiratur, ut morbus in sanitatem mutetur. Haec quidem est medicina rationalis sive Dogmatica. Est et altera, Empirica nimirum, quae, missis hujusmodi ambagibus, sola remedia quarrit et profert certa et definita vi pra;dita ad certos morbos delendos.' — § 72. See above, ch. vi. § 10. (3) ' Neque vero inficiantur experimenta quoque esse necessaria ; sed ne ad hrcc quidem adituin fieri potuisse, nisi ab aliqua ratione, contendunt.' — Celsus, ib. SECT. 2.] AND REAL MODELS. 205 they maintained that a knowledge of the causes of disease, and of the bodily functions, Mas necessary for the art of medicine. The Empirici, on the other hand, repudiated all inquiry into the causes of disease which were not apparent upon the surface ; they professed to be guided solely by the experience of modes of treatment which had been made the subject of actual trial and experiment, and they sought no other guide for medical practice than the success or failure of former remedies. Hence they ex- cluded anatomy, physiology, and pathology from their course of medical studies, ( 4 ) confining themselves to an empirical treat- ment of therapeutics. This view of medical science has descended to modern times : since the renovation of medicine, there has, on account of the abuse of theory, been often a tendency to a close and servile adherence to the results of mere experience, and the medical art has run the risk of degenerating into a mere study of materia medica and remedies, ("') a tendency which (4) Dr. Grecnhill, in his article on the Empirici, in Dr. Smith's Vict, of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities, remarks that 'their rejection of anatomy, physiology, and pathology as useless studies would of course (at least in the opinion of modern physicians), prevent their ever attaining any higher rank than that of clever experimentalists, though it must not be denied that materia medica is indebted to them for many valuable drags.' (5) ' Non est dissimulandum, thcorirc medica? scriptures hominum patientia multum abusos esse, et sibi aliisque auper el olim miria ineptiis lmposnisse. Sine factum est, non prorsus sine rationis specie, ut multis, cum medicorum, turn aliorurn hominum, pcrsuasum sit, omnem tbeoriam medicam prorsus vanam et futilcm esse, et nun modo non prodesse, Bed revera multum nocere, animum nempe a vera notitia, qua- sola, ul volant, experientia discatur, ficta scientia avocando Parum certo medici profecerunl hactenus, el parum, ni fallor, profecturi sunt in posterum, qui, nulla adhibita ratiocinatione, sold experiential semel occupaverint, Plurimas res novas hoc modo facile didicisse potuerint, sed sibi aliisque pariter inutiles, nee onquam scientiam medicam proveoturasj Boihoel quarum rationem, et ad usum medicum accommodationom, ignotas esse oporteret Uiud rero vitium, ab hocomninodiversum, etexdivcrso prorsus fonte derivatum, medicinam nunc corrumpit, graviusque, ul opinor, periculum minitatur. Rejecta" auctoritate, rejects fere omni ratiocinatione atquedoctrina, medici tandem artem Balutiferam augereet locupletare u ce perunt, oli ob ervationibus e( experiments quorum nullum e set dubium. Ilmr credula Bdes, et insane admiratio medicamentorum, quotquol ve] ipse deceptus, \r\ alios decipere cujpiens, quisquam in medium proferret, Bum- misque landibus tolleret, el audacter assereret certo oertis morbis rcmodio fuisse.' ( '1 1,1 s 1 a ct. Med. Theoret. introd, pp, wii. \w . txxix, ; ed. L0, I slid. ■ \\ 1 1 1 1 evi !•> advance in patho ence will the art of therapeutics rolj empirical character, and become more and more rational} that is, the rules laid down for the treatment of disease will be less and 206 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP, xx r. has, doubtless, been promoted by a misconception of the Baconian precepts respecting experience. Bacon, however, in placing science on the basis of experience, intended not to narrow, but to strengthen its foundation. He wished not to diminish the extent of the edifice, but to build it on the solid rock. Accordingly, he points out distinctly the error of those who rely on a mere accumulation of particulars, and grope their way by a blind empiricism. The following is his aphorism on the respective errors of the doctrinal and empirical schools : ' Qui tractaverunt scientias, aut Empirici aut Dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formica? more, congerunt tantum, et utuntur: Rationales,aranearummore, telas ex se conficiunt : apis vero ratio media est, quae materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit; sed tamen earn propria facultate vertit et digerit.'( G ) Bacon's meaning is not the less clearly conveyed, for being couched in the figurative comparison of the ant, the spider, and the bee. Under the image of the ant, he condemns the mere collection of facts, applied nakedly and directly by the observer : under the image of the spider, he condemns the speculator, who spins cobweb theories out of his own brain, without checking them by the evidence of facts, and confronting them with the results of experience. By the example of the bee, he recom- mends that mixed process, which consists first in the discriminating selection of facts, and next in the conversion and elaboration of these facts into a systematic doctrine. The feeling of the multitude towards superior knowledge and less founded upon the results of a limited experience as to the efficacy of particular remedies in removing certain abnormal phenomena ; and will have reference more and more to the nature of the morbid action which is indicated by the symptoms.' — Carpenter's Human Physiology, p. 3. (6) Nov. Org. i. 95. The same passage, with a few trifling verbal variations, occurs in the Cogitata et Visa, vol. x. p. 499, and in the fiedar- gutio Philosophiarum, vol. xi. p. 474-5. In the Apophthegms, Xo. 21, it appears in this form : ' He likewise often used this comparison : the Em- pirical philosophers are like to pismires — they only lay up, and use their store. The Rationalists are like to spiders — they spin all out of their own bowels. But give me a philosopher, who, like the bee, hath a middle faculty, gathering from abroad, but digesting that which is gathered by his own virtue.' — vol. i. p. 415. SECT. 2.] AND REAL MODELS. 207 intelligence has been well described as a mixture of admiration and dislike. ( 7 ) There is a sense of intellectual power, combined with a belief that it is used for a dangerous purpose, and in a forbidden manner. This repugnance is, with respect to contem- poraries, often strengthened by a feeling of envy j but the latter sentiment is, with respect to the great thinkers of a former age, sometimes replaced by a blind submission of the judgment. In the earlier periods of the Greek philosophy, the specula- tors upon nature were the main objects of popular apprehension and antipathy. As compared with modern times, physics had made less progress among the ancients, and was cultivated by them with less success, than logic, ethics, and politics. ( 8 ) In modern philosophy, this relation is reversed. The uncertainty and ob- scurity which the ancients found in physics, are now universally considered as characteristic rather of the moral and political sciences. But besides the greater certainty and solidity of the physical sciences in modern times, their subjects remove them further from the business and interests of life j and as the pur- suit of them is no longer considered an impious intrusion into the secrets of nature, or an attempt to supplant the direct divine agency by mechanical causes, they neither excite the alarm, nor offend the feelings of the multitude. For these various reasons, the successful investigator of nature is, in modern times, the (7) See Grote's Mist, of Gr. vol. viii. p. 4.81. (8) ' Quoniam philosophia in tros partes est tributa, in natures obscuri- tatcm, in disserendi subtihtatein, in vil;uii atque mores ; duo ilia relinqua- mus, atque largiamur inertia? nostraV &c. — C10. de Oral. i. 15. As to tli<- uncertainty of physics, according to the views of the ancients, sec the long pa age 01 Cicero, Acad. ii. 39-41 ; also, Minucius Felix, 0. 5, Compare Bitter, Oesch.der Pkilos. vol. iv. p. 125; Grote, ib. vol. \ iii. p. 669-78, 596-8. Upon the division of sciences into certain and uncertain, see A.ber> erombie's Inquiries concerning th Intellectual Powers , p. 16-20. Belays it down that we easily attain to certainty in the purely physical sciences, or those in which we have to deal only with inanimate matter. M. ('. Comte (TraitS de Legislation, liv. i. 0. h lays it down thai the moral and political are inferior in certainty to the physical sciences, and explains the causes of the inferiority. Compare the remarks of ML Ghiizofc Hist. d< la Civilisation' en France, lecon 1, who remarks, with truth, thai although the moral are inferior to the physical sciences in precision, they are nol inferior in certainty. 208 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. XXI. object of admiration and esteem, while the moral and political philosopher is, if his opinions depart from those of his age and country, generally regarded with disfavour and dislike. Kepler and Galileo are gratefully enumerated among the teachers of mankind. Newton is never named but with reverence ; while Adam Smith and Mai thus have been denounced by the popular voice as miscliievous sophists, who distort truth and inculcate error. Not the least forward in promoting the aversion for political theory, and in resisting its application to practice, are statesmen and practical politicians. They often act on the maxims of the Empiric school of medicine : they profess to eschew all sys- tematic doctrine, and to steer their course simply by the light of experience. Now those who guide themselves in practice by experience rely in general upon precedents ; that is to say, they argue directly from one actual case to another, without laying down, in express terms, the principle which serves to connect them. This mode of reasoning is perfectly legitimate, if it is kept within proper bounds, and is not used to the exclusion of theory. We will, therefore, now try to ascertain what is the proper use of precedents in politics, and how they may be com- bined with general maxims in practical reasoning. § 3 The argument from a precedent consists in the juxta- position of two actual cases, the case which has formerly hap- pened constituting the precedent, and the case under considera- tion being that upon which the practical decision is to be made. Every precedent contains a number of circumstances which are not similar to the circumstances of the case in hand. Where a parallelism between two cases is discerned, the immaterial facts are to be rejected, and attention is to be paid merely to the material facts. Much knowledge of the subject-matter, and much sagacity, are necessary for disentangling the facts of each case — for winnowing the chaff from the corn — for separating the husk from the kernel. When this process has been performed, an analogy between the two cases is perceptible, an analogy dependent on their common relation to a general principle, which SECT. 3.] AND REAL MODELS. 209 was tacitly assumed in the first case, and is tacitly applied to the other. When the selection of the previous case is happily made — when its correspondence with the case in hand is shown by pruning away from each the immaterial circumstances, and comparing together the nucleus of each which remains, — then it is said that the precedent is apposite, that the case is in point, that it is relevant to the question under deliberation. The argument from precedents or examples is sometimes used to establish a general conclusion. When so used, it serves as the foundation of an inductive argument, the cases adduced being taken as specimens or samples of the entire class, which justify the inferential extension. Nothing is more common than tcenforce a practical maxim by actual cases or examples, as in Johnson's Vanity of Human Wishes : What gave great Villiers to th' assassin's knife, And fixed disease on Harley's closing life ? What murdered Wentworth, and what exiled Hyde, By kings protected, and to kings allied? What, but their wish indulged in courts to shine, And power too great to keep, or to resign ? Here the last couplet contains the general lesson which the moralist teaches. In the next verses it precedes the examples : There mark what ills the scholar's life assail, Toil, envy, want, the patron, and the gaol. See nations, slowly wise, and meanly just, To buried merit raise the tardy bust. If dreams yet flatter, once again attend ; Hear Lydiat's life, and Galileo's end. In the following passage, again, the folly of an excessive care for beauty is implied by examples, but not expressed : The teeming mother, anxious for her race, Begs for each birth the fortune of a face ; Yet Vane could tell what ills from beauty spring, And Sedley cursed the form that plcanrd a king. Such arguments from example as these have no immediate reference to action; they serve, indeed, to establish a maxim or rule of conduct, but they arc merely a form of the inductive argument, which leads from one or more singulars to a general VOL. II. p 210 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. xxi. conclusion, and there stops. The argument from precedent, however, as employed in political practice, always has an imme- diate reference to action, and bears upon some actual case. Its essence is, that something which some person or persons did for- merly, is alleged as a reason why some person or persons should do the same at present. ( 9 ) This reason rests upon a principle which forms the intermediate link between the two cases. In all valid arguments from example, as Archbishop Whately has properly remarked, ( 10 ) such a connecting principle must exist, though it is not always expressed. It is impossible to argue directly from one singular to another, without implying some general principle, which serves as their bond of union. Not unfrequently, in practical reasonings, tins intermediate principle, which the precedents are adduced to establish, is formally stated and proved before it is applied to the case under discussion. Such is often done when precedents are alleged to prove the existence of a custom, a practice, a uniform or predominant habit, or a course of business or dealing. The continuous acts of wise, experienced, or successful men, whose conduct is reco- gnised as constituting authority, may likewise be appealed to as evidencing an intelligent habit, and proving the policy of a certain practical maxim. In legal argument, precedents are adduced for the purpose of establishing the fact, that a certain rule of law, or construc- tion of a statute, has been recognised in the administration of justice, and this proposition is stated before it is applied to the case in litigation. A similar mode of reasoning is likewise adopted in questions of international law; and, indeed, it is chiefly by precedents, constituting an accumulated usage, that rules of international law can be proved ; for international law has no written statutes, and treaties between independent nations only supply imperfectly the absence of a written code. (9) ' Utilissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus est, cogitare, quid aut volueris sub alio principe aut nolueris.' — Tacit. Hist. i. 16. (10) Elements of Rhetoric, part i. cb. 2, § 6. SECT. 4.] AND REAL MODELS. 211 § 4 Iu ordinary political discussion, however, with respect to questions of concrete expediency, it is usual to cite precedents, without a distinct statement of the principle which they involve, and to apply them directly to the actual case in debate. The perception of this principle, which is necessary for the clue com- bination of the two cases, but without a power of giving it an articulate form, and expressing it in distinct words, is called practical tact, or sagacity. ( n ) The principle, however, must admit of being stated ; and if the relevancy of the example is challenged, it can only be defended by enouncing the principle which it involves, and demonstrating the applicability of this principle to the case in hand. The examples of the Ninevites, and the Queen of Sheba, which are cited in the gospel as admonitions to the unrepenting Jews, are practical precedents, in which the argument is direct from one actual case to another. ' The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it : because they repented at the preaching of Jonas ; and behold, a greater than Jonas is here. ' The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it : for she came from the uttermost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon; and behold, a greater than Solomon is here.'C") On the other hand, the parables of the gospel arc merely illustrations : they are fictitious or imaginary cases, rendering a doctrine perspicuous by a striking analogy, as in the parable of the Sower, where the mode of eliminating the example, and of substituting a literal and unfigurative statement of the doctrine, (it) The Greet terms for this quickness of apprehending materia] re- semblances in matters of practice arc hi XP'"" 1 .' Tol ~ f* tv - (13) Matt. xii. 41, 42. See Luke, xi. 81, 32. p 2 212 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. XXI. is expressly indicated. ( 13 ) The force of a precedent, however, consists in the very fact alleged ; and if that fact is supposed not to exist, its logical value is destroyed. In the argument from a practical example adduced by Aris- totle, in his Rhetoric, the reasoning is from one actual case to another. He supposes the practical question to be, the policy of a Greek interference to prevent the king of Persia from conquer- ing Egypt : now Darius, it might be said, did not invade Greece until he took Egypt, nor did Xerxes make his attempt until he had subdued the same country : hence it is to be inferred, that the existing king of Persia will attack Greece if he should get possession of Egypt : the Greeks ought, therefore, to prevent the 02currence of this event. ( H ) The same is the nature of the argu- ment from practical example cited by Quintilian : ( 15 ) 'Dionysius asks the people to allow him a body guard. He makes this demand with a view of seizing the despotism ; for Pisistratus became despot by obtaining a body guard/ The Discorsi of Machiavel are a series of commentaries upon political examples chosen from Livy : the particular case furnishes the groundwork for a general maxim. ( 16 ) In other collections, such as the Memorable Deeds and Sayings of Valerius Maximus, (13) Mark, iv. 2-20; Luke, viii. 4-18. Compare Matt. xiii. 24-30, 36-43. Other practical examples are called tvttoi by St. Paul, 1 Cor. x. 6, 11. (14) Rhet. ii. 20, 3. (15) Inst. Orat. v. 11, § 8. Speaking of the Greek rrapdSeiyna, Quin- tilian says : ' Quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium apposi- tione, et specialiter in iis, quae rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur.' — lb. § 1 ; afterward he adds : ' Potentissimum autem est inter ea, quae sunt hujus generis, quod proprie vocamus exemplum, id est, rei gestae, aut ut gestae, utilis ad persuadendum id, quod intenderis, commemoratio.' — lb. § 6. The technical Greek word for precedent is aplo-is, see Aristot. Rliet. i. 15, § 15 ; and Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. in v. The technical Latin words are > prcejudicium and auctoritas, see Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Lat. in vv. The meaning of prcejudicium is thus explained by Quintilian : ' Jam prae- judiciorum vis omnis tribus in generibus versatur ; rebus, quae aliquando ? x Paribus caussis sunt judicatae, quae exempla rectius dicuntur .... judiciis ad ipsam caussam pertinentibus .... aut cum de eadem caussa pronuntiatum est.' — v. 2, § 1. (16) On the advantages of discourses upon political examples, see Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 266 ; De Augm. Scient. vol. ix. p. 35. On the Discorsi of Machiavel, see Hallam, Lit. of Eur. vol. i. p. 561. SECT. 5.] AND REAL MODELS. 213 and the military compilations of Polysenus and Frontinus, the examples are given nakedly, without any expository comment or practical deduction. ( 17 ) § 5 Arguments from practical examples abound in deli- berative oratory, as may be easily perceived upon an examination of the speeches delivered in ancient or modern assemblies. One reason for employing them is, that each country has a certain constitutional practice, certain usages and customs, a certain procedure in public affairs of its own, and reference is made to precedents for the purpose of preserving the continuity of that chain unbroken. ( 1S ) Hence, with respect to any political act which falls within this category, to pronounce it unprecedented or unexampled is to condemn it. Another reason is, that as no human society is motionless, there is a perpetual necessity of recurring to recent events and recent changes as a guide in prac- tical conduct. All practical maxims, formed upon facts and theories of old standing, require a constant revision and control by the results of fresh experience. They require to be perpe- tually confronted with the new witnesses which are springing up, and claiming to be heard in the matter. The argument of pre- cedents is excluded from all science relating both to nature and to man, but it pervades the whole realm of practice — wherever there is a question of action, it has place. It is thus employed not only in politics, but in medicine, war, education, agricul- (17) The Strategematics of Frontinus contains a collection of examples of military practice in four books, intended for imitation. See pra-fatio to book i., where he says : ' Ita enim consilii quoque et provident i;c exemntil euccincti duces erunt ; undo illis excogitandi gerencuque similia facultas nutriatur. Pra-terea continget, ne de cventu trepidet inventioni.s sua-, qui probatis cam experimentis comparabit .' (18) Aristotle remarks thai although, with the assistance of philosophic studies, fictitious examples can be easily invested, yet practical examples have the greatesl freight in deliberation) inasmuch as the future for the most part resembles toe present. — Hint. iL 20, § 7-8. In problem wiii. 3, he explains why examples are more used in public speaking than general arguments. Cicero likewise points out the importance <>(' historical ex- amples in deliberative oratory i ' Commemoratio antem antiquitatis, exenv plorumque probatio summA cum deleetatione ot auctoritatem orationi afferl et liileni.'- -Orator, c, 34. Hooks of geography are useful for legisla- tion, because they contain the laws of different nations; while, for political deliberations, works of history aro useful. — Aristot. lihrt. i. 1, § La, 214 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. xxi. ture, manufactures, and, indeed, in all the useful arts. Wherever there is a progress or a decline — wherever existing habits, national customs, personal accidents, peculiarities of locality or climate, exercise an influence, practical examples of recent occur- rence are important guides to conduct. Wherever there is a history, there is a necessity for attending to the successive crops of examples which each successive year produces. Without these precedents, the man of practice would be as incapable of discreet action, as the corn-merchant would be of supplying the market without the annual harvests. Aided by these appliances he is able, as time rolls on, and as new events change the rela- tions of men and things, to verify his general maxims, and to supply the imperfections of science and art. Even in medicine, recent cases are useful, and guide the prudent and experienced physician. Some diseases have their history ;( 19 ) there is a rise and fall, a prevalence, a mitigation, and a suspension of diseases. All diseases, again, are influenced by local circumstances, and by the habits, diet, constitution, or race, of the people whom they affect. New modes of treatment are continually tried, and meet with various success. Hence the use of precedents, even in medicine, though man's body is less mutable, and less accessible to human influences, than his mind. In the useful arts, again, there is a necessity for perpetual reference to practical examples of a late date. Precedents borrowed from the rude and unim- proved state of a manual art are worthless to the refined arti- ficer of a civilized age. In like manner, precedents in military tactics, chosen from a period when the weapons were the spear, the sword, and the bow, would be in general inapplicable to the practice of war since the invention of gunpowder, and the per- fection of artillery and fire-arms. (19) Some diseases (as fevers) appear to be constant in their type, and to undergo no change in successive periods of time. Other diseases, how- ever, have a rise, a culmination, and a declension. Some disappear alto- gether : others are suspended, and afterwards reappear. Such are various plagues — the small-pox, the sweating sickness, the cholera, and certain nervous affections, for which, see Hecker's Epidemics of the Middle Ages. Murrains or epizootic diseases in cattle, and the recent potato- disease in plants, are similar in their character. Compare ch. xviii. § 4. SECT. 6.] AND REAL MODELS. 215 § 6 Hence Lord Bacon, speaking of legal precedents, re- marks that those of an early period must be received with cau- tion and discrimination, for that the course of ages alters many things, and what is ancient in respect of time, is novel in its disturbing effects, and its inconformity with existing circum- stances. Accordingly, he lays it down that the more recent precedents are the safer; for why, he asks, should not that which has lately been done without inconvenience be done again? On the other hand, he remarks that recent precedents have less authority; improvement may sometimes be effected by a restoration of the past, and he therefore concludes in favour of precedents neither very recent nor very remote, or at least taken from an age resembling the present, winch sometimes is to be found at a period not immediately antecedent. ( M ) Whenever recent practice is, as yet, ill established — when the successive acts have not acquired the consistency of a continuous custom, or when the consequences of the course of action have not been fully developed, new precedents are less instructive and less conclusive than those of a somewhat earlier date.( sl ) A precedent is at its maxi- mum of proving force, when it is sufficiently near our own time to ensure similarity of circumstances, and sufficiently distant from it to ensure the consolidation of practiee, and the experimental exhibition of the practical result of the case adduced. (20) ' Iii exemplis, recentiora habenda mint pro tutioribus. Quod euimpaullo ante factum est, ande nullum Bil Becutum inoommodum* quidnj itiriim repotatnr? Sed tainen minus habent aucloritatis nrentia; et si forte roe in melius rcstitui opus sit, reccntia exempla magis savulum suum sapiunl quam rectam rationem.' 1 At retustiora exempla oaute ct cum deleotu reoipienda: deoursua Biquidem EBtatis multa mutat, m quod tempore i ideatui antiquum, i>l per- turbatione el inoonformitate ad prsesentis sit plane novum. Medii itaque temporis exempla sum optima, \«'l etiam talis temporis quod rum tempore ourrente plurimum eonvenial : quod aliquando prostal tempus remotius magis quam in proximo. 1 — De Aumn. Scient. lib. viii. aph, 23, 24, Aris- totle, in treating of witnesses in his Rhetoric, points ou1 the value of recenl opinions delivered by persons of authority : irpdV^aroi <■< . oiK(im' x^r/m/ioi yhj> ul tovtiou Kj>lcr(ii to'is n(p\ T&V OVT&V (i/if/jKr^ToOcn. — i. 15, § l.v (21) Aristotle (Problem. Kviii I") observes thai men take most delight in hearing of event,-, which are aeither rery anoienl nor very recent : l>e- cause they disbeliere the former class, and are familiar with the latter. 216 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. XXI. Precedents ought always to be chosen from a period of just authority — from a period whose example is appropriate to the present time. The importance of this caution is peculiarly percep- tible in legal and constitutional matters. Legal precedents, taken from a period when justice was partial or venal, or when a court was filled with incompetent judges — constitutional precedents, taken from a period of arbitrary power or anarchy, would be of little value. Such examples, to use Lord Bacon's expression^ 22 ) are the spurious progeny of time — not its legitimate offspring, having rights of hereditary descent. Historical examples, when they are used to throw light on a practical case, must, in order to prove anything, be apposite. Then logical force depends on their appropriateness. Now, in order to decide upon the appropriateness of an example, it is necessary to understand both terms of the comparison. Before we can pronounce that the inference suggested by the comparison is a valid one, we must know what are the circumstances of both cases. Hence, great caution is requisite in the application of historical examples. It is dangerous to borrow a lesson from a remote state of society. Unless we have thoroughly analyzed the circumstances of the case, we are likely to misread the lesson which is contained in it. Examples drawn from ancient history, and applied crudely to modern practice, are peculiarly liable to error, f 3 ) Thus, the importations of corn from the provinces, which undermined the agriculture of Italy, have been used as a warning against the repeal of the English corn-laws ; whereas there is this essential difference between the (22) 'Exempla a temporibus bonis et moderatis petenda sunt, non tyrannicis aut factiosis aut dissolutis. Hujusmodi exempla temporis partus epurii sunt, et magis nocent quam docent.' — lb. apb. 22. (23) ' To recal the examples of ancient and modern history for the imitation of future times, is a mode of instruction which, without proper limitations and precautions, will often be found highly dangerous. Such is the variety in human affairs, that in no two instances are the circum- stances in all respects alike, and on that account experience, without prin- ciples, must ever be a fallacious guide. To close our eyes to the examples of past ages would, indeed, be absurd; but to regulate our conduct by them without bringing them to their proper test, would be still more so.' — Eoscoe's Leo X. vol. iv. p. 156. SECT. 6.] AND REAL MODELS. 217 two cases, that the provincial corn was a tribute to the govern- ment, or purchased at the public cost, and was distributed gra- tuitously, or sold at a reduced price, to the pauper population of Rome, while the repeal of the English corn-law merely allowed the free importation of corn, but without providing for its gra- tuitous distribution. Again, the large landed estates under the Roman empire have been cited as an example to prove the evil of extensive holdings of land in a modern state, whereas the detriment which they produced in fact arose from the consolida- tion of small estates tilled by freemen, and their conversion into plantations cultivated by slaves. Under these circumstances, wealth produced depopulation;^) but it would be a serious error to suppose that a wealthy landowner would use his estate in a similar manner in a country where slavery does not exist. When the ancient French monarchy was swept away by the revolution of 1789, all connexion with the past was cut off, and the precedents of the former government were not only in- admissible as guides to action, but would rather have been quoted as warnings to dissuade. In this state of things, the leaders of the revolutionary movement fell back upon ancient, and especially Roman precedents, which were often quoted and applied in a manner perfectly puerile and inappropriate. The modern imitators of Brutus and Cassius bore about as much resemblance to the originals, as the heroes of Fenelon, in his Telemaque, bear to the heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey. ( 2 ') Napoleon's plan of universal conquest was founded on a belief that he could revive the system of the Roman empire, and that he could reduce all the European kingdoms to French dependencies, similar to the Roman provinces. In order, how- ever, to render this attempt practicable, it was necessary that (24) ' F ) Thus, Bacon cautions us against supposing that we can do what other men, of different character and abilities, have done before us, and he illustrates his advice by the instance of Pompey, who was accustomed to exclaim : ' Sylla potuit, ego non potero/ Avhereas the one was of a -violent and impetuous, the other of a grave and sober nature. ( 2r ) Historical examples and precedents ought to be clear, authen- tic, and undisputed : Nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit. Not only must the parallelism of the cases be apparent, but the fact must rest on good testimony . ( 28 ) No two cases are similar in all their circumstances — it is therefore always necessary to establish the parallelism, by omitting what is immaterial to the subject in hand ; but if this process is complex and doubtful, the argument from the precedent is weak. Allowance must likewise be made for the difference of the surrounding medium ; and where an example is derived from a remote and dissimilar state of society, it requires a certain preliminary arrangement in order to adapt it to the service which it is made to perform. (26) M. Comte (Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. vi. p. 392) condemns the error of representing war, in modern times, as an instrument of civilization, ' par un ehimerique rajeunissement de l'antique politique Eoinaine.' Again, (in p. 428,) he speaks of ' cette grossiere imitation retrograde de la grande politique Eomaine, que nous avons vue, en sens inverse, essentiellement destinee, sous cles conditions sociales radicalement opposees a celles du milieu moderne, a. comprimer partout, excepte chez un peuple unique, l'essor imminent de la vie ruihtaire, que cette. vaine parodie stimulerait, au con- traire, simultanement chez des nations des long-temps livrees a une activite eminemment pacifique.' Compare the author's remarks, in his Essay on the Government of Dependencies, p. 141. (27) De Augm. Sci. vol. ix. p. 49. (28) Quintilian (v. 2, § 2-4) enumerates the arguments by which pre- cedents may be supported and impugned. See also Bacon (ib. aph. 27 and 28) on the faithful registration and contemporaneous publication of precedents, as securities against error. SECT. 7.] AND REAL MODELS. 219 Such examples, however, when duly prepared and illustrated, may become highly appropriate and instructive. (* 9 ) In order that a precedent may be safely used, it is necessary that its circumstances should be completely known. Unless the statement of the case is full, we cannot be sure that material circumstances have not been omitted which affect the compari- son, and render it inapplicable to the question under discussion. It is not, indeed, necessary that, in adducing the case as an example, we should recite all its circumstances ; but unless we have the means of ascertaining them, and examining their bear- ings, we can never be confident that the precedent is rightly applied. § 7 Practical examples are in general positive, that is to say, they are alleged for the purpose of recommending some particular course, or of establishing some affirmative result. The case adduced is proposed for imitation. Sometimes, however, they are negative, and are held out as warnings against a course to be avoided. An example of the former kind illustrates by its resemblance ; an example of the latter kind, by its contrast. ("') Negative precedents merely serve to deter from a wrong course — they do not point out the right course; and as rectitude is one, while error is infinite, they arc less useful than positive pre- cedents. Nevertheless, the lessons derived from the errors or the failures of others are important. Experimental trials, even when unsuccessfid, afford instruction by being used as warnings. Like lighthouses, they admonish the uncertain mariner to steer away from the rocks and shallows. According to the proverb, ' Experience taught is better than bought :' and again, experience i> said to be the mistress of fools. (/") A wise man learns what (29) ' Bxempls in consilium adhibenturi non atique jubenf sul fan* pcrant. I^itur ita regantor, ul auelorilns pneleriti Innporis fleetjitur ad usum pnesentifl.' — 1>< Augm. Scient, lib. viii, apt. 31. (30) These two classes of historical examples are opposed to eaob other by Livy, in the following passage from the preface to his history: ' Hoc illud est prrccipuo in coirnitione rcnim salubre ac frugiferum, omnia te exempli documents in illustri posits monumento intueri ■ inde til>i tunque reipublicse, quod imitere, capias ; indefcedum inoeptu, fesdum exitu, quod • itJ (31) Sep Etay'i Proverbt,tp. L03; ed. L768. The German rersion oi 220 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. XXI. is to be avoided from the mistakes of others :( 32 ) a wise states- man derives a similar lesson from the unsuccessful measures of his predecessors. § 8 Practical examples (as we have already said) are real models. The conduct of men formerly distinguished as rulers, statesmen, or warriors, serves as an exemplar and pattern to the present generation. Living men, likewise, in high stations, or at the head of parties, furnish real examples for the imitation of their contemporaries. Governments well constituted or well administered — good systems of municipal law, moderation and good faith in international affairs, also create actual patterns, which other nations may copy. Keal models have this great advantage, that they exhibit what has been done, and what, therefore, may be done again. They establish a standard manifestly attainable by human powers; they hold out to our imitation no impracticable paragon of ideal perfection. There is something peculiarly impressive in the reality of great excellence. Hence the proverb says, that ' example is better than precept/ ( 33 ) Eveiy example, in fact, in- volves a general precept ; if it did not, the example would prove nothing, and teach nothing. But the lesson is enforced by the contemplation of high qualities in real persons, subject with our- this proverb is, 'Erfahrung ist der narren vernunft.' — Korte, Sprichworter, No. 1157. Experience, in this proverb, means personal experience, or ex- perience bought. The contrast between Prometheus and Epimetheus turns upon prescience and after-wisdom — the former founded on the experience of others, the latter on self-experience : avrap 6 hf^ap.evos ore 8r] KaKov ciyf, (vo-qcrtv, says Hesiod of Epimetheus, Op. et Di. 89. (32) 'Ex vitio alterius sapiens emendat suum.' Publius Syrus, v. 212. ' Bonuni est fugienda aspicere in alieno malo.' lb. v. 106. Compare Hesiod, Op. 216, naOcov Se re vtjitlos i'yv. (35) According to the French proverb, ' Le Wen cut ['ennemi eta mieux.' 822 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. xxi. manentf 8 ) It is undoubtedly true, that the exertions of the inventor or improver of the mariner's compass, the printing-press, and the steam-engine, are more cosmopolitan and diffusive in their results, than the political reforms and improvements of a statesman, however beneficial these may be in his own country. At the same time it is to be borne in mind, that he who suc- ceeds iu producing an excellent political institution exercises an influence which extends beyond his own nation and age. The institution which he has created attracts attention and admira- tion by its successful working. Those who live under its opera- tion, and therefore experience its benefits, extol its merits, and recommend it to the imitation of the world. It serves as a real model to other nations, particularly to those enjoying the same degree of civilization ; and it may be safely affirmed that good political institutions will be propagated from one country to another, if not as rapidly, at least as surely, as inventions in the useful arts. Such institutions as roads, a government post, banks, hospitals, museums, &c, are copied by one country from another, not less than such inventions as clocks, coaches, or thermometers. If any one of the larger states of the ancient world — either of the Oriental or Hellenic civilization — had hit upon the contrivance of a representative government ; if an Oriental state, instead of governing its provinces by satraps — if a conquer- ing Greek republic, or Rome, or Carthage, had incorporated its dependencies with the paramount state by means of permanent elected representatives, there is no doubt that the system would have attracted attention ; it would have been described by the historians, commented upon by the philosophers, and scrutinized and judged by the practical politicians. And if the system had been successfully worked in any instance, there would un- doubtedly have been a disposition to imitate it in countries similarly situated. Nor is it true that the influence of a really (36) ' Etenim inventorum beneficia ad universum genus liunianum per- tinere possunt ; cmba ad certas tantummodo hominum sedes : hac etiam non ultra paucas setates durant; ilia quasi perpetuis temporibus.' — Nov. Org. i. aph. 129. SECT. 10.] AND REAL MODELS. 223 valuable improvement in political subjects is necessarily obli- terated by its extinction in the country where it originated. The Greek invention of government by a political body has been per- petuated by the civilized world, and has long survived the fall of the diminutive commonwealths in which it took its rise. Much of the Roman law, having been adopted and copied by the modern European states, is in force at present; and, although the Roman empire has long been dissolved, it remains as a living monument of the wisdom of Roman legislation and juris- prudence.^) § 10 There is a difference in the mode of employing real models in politics, which is also observable in the employ- ment of similar models in the useful arts. In the works of the useful arts, it sometimes happens that the demand of numerous persons for a given article is uniform — that their wants are identical, and therefore copies of it are multiplied from the same original. If the circumstances admit, these copies are obtained by impression, as typographic prints, engravings, printed cottons; by stamping, as coins, buttons ; by casting, as iron and bronze casts, plaster ornaments ; if not, they are made according to a pattern, as stockings, gloves, shoes, hats, and other articles of dress, articles of hardware, tools of all sorts, and, in fact, all articles manufactured on a large scale. If, however, the demand is individual, and not general — if it is for a single peculiar article, and not for articles precisely similar to others of the same class, it is necessary to adapt the type to the conditions of the given case. Thus, if a bridge, or a road, or B dock, or a large building or ship of any sort, is to be constructed, or if any extensive machinery is to be erected, the work must be made to suit the peculiar circumstance! of t he ease. The general type of b bridge, or a road, or a palace, or a church, or a ship, must be modified, so as to fulfil the conditions of the special problem. A specu (37) The Roman law wu itself in part founded on the Attio law, the most complete system of Qreel jurisprudence! ' Jus Bomanum mazimam Jiartcm ox jure Atttco efBctum atque expressum <•- ie, rei Dots est ao mani esta omnibus.' — Luzao, Lectiones Atitoa, p. 76. Sec, however, Cic. dt Oral, i 44. 22 1 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. XXI. lator may build a street of identical houses, because there is a class of persons whose wants, in the way of habitation, are iden- tical, but there is no class of persons who want several churches such as St. Peter's or St. Paul's — several bridges such as the Menai bridge — several palaces such as Versailles — several roads such as that of the Simplon — several buildings for the exhibition of works of industry, like the gigantic glass structure recently erected in Hyde-park. The difference between these two modes of dealing with a real type, in the useful arts, may be illustrated by comparing a suit of clothes made from measure, to fit a given person, with a suit of clothes purchased of a ready-made dealer, or supplied by contract, as a uniform dress in the army or navy, or to the inmates of a public establishment : or, again, by com- paring a dinner ordered for the occasion with a dinner provided according to a dietary table. Now in politics it is possible, in a considerable number of cases, to adopt the method of the identical multiplication of real types. In the execution of laws, the circumstances of different cases are often so simple and so similar, that the same mode of dealing with them can be adopted. Hence, in judicial matters, the same formulas of procedure — in administrative matters, the same instructions and regulations, are applied to large classes of cases, and are not varied, by the executive authorities, to suit each successive case. When once a set of regulations or in- structions has been carefully prepared, it may be applied to many prisons, to many schools, to many workhouses, to many regi- ments, to many ships' crews, &c. But it is in politics as in the useful arts — if the circumstances of the case are complex, the general type must be individualized, and adapted to them by proper modifications. For the same reason that a palace or a fortress is built from a special plan, while cottages may be built in a class — that a coat is best made to order, while a hat or gloves can be chosen from similar articles, made of a certain size — it is necessary, in politics, to desert the general formula, and frame instructions for the individual case, where its circumstances are complex and intricate. SECT. 10.J AND REAL MODELS. 225 The advantages of these respective modes of dealing with the subject are similar in politics and in the useful arts. "When the general type is adapted to the individual case, the work is more perfect. If everything that we use or consume was made to order, and was adapted to its special destination, our wants would be most perfectly satisfied. But, on the other hand, we must be content with fewer things. Articles made to order demand more labour, and are therefore more expensive, than articles manufactured uniformly from a fixed type. If gloves were made to measure, like shoes, they would be proportionally dearer. Impressions from a die can be multiplied at a cheap cost ; but if every medal was engraved by hand, the price would be greatly increased. So, in politics, a measure of the government is most perfect when the real type is taken merely as a guide, and is adapted by a special operation to the circumstances of the given case. But to repeat this process of adaptation on every occasion would be tedious and difficult, and hence, where the circumstances of different cases are simple, and closely resemble one another, there is much economy of labour, together with some incidental advantages, in resorting to a multiplication of the same real type without alteration. Legislation for an entire country by a single law is, so far as it limits the discretion of the executive authorities, equivalent to the multiplication of copies from a master-type. Thus, if a law is passed that all the prisons, all the schools, all the sewers, all the roads and bridges, throughout the country, shall be ma- naged in the same manner, the principle enforced is that of identical repetitions of* a single pattern. When, however, the Legislation is local, the law is adapted to the circumstances of the particular district, and the general type is modified according to the specialities of the given case. For example, if there is a local ad for the drainage and lighting of town A or parish /»', or lor the maintenance of its poor, or the repair of its roads, or any <>i her public purpose, the general principles of legislation applicable to the subject are moulded to suit the peculiarities of the place. There are certain advantages in politics which belong to vol. n. Q 826 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. xxr. uniformity— there arc certain advantages which belong to local adaptation. Thus, uniformity of institutions in different places facilitates inspection, comparison, and simplicity of management — a class of advantages which may be compared with the conve- nience of opening several locks with a master-key; whereas local adaptation produces a measure in which the wants of the locality are more exclusively considered. The present, however, is not the proper place for a detailed investigation of the respec- tive advantages of these two systems. ^•11 While we recognise the importance and value of real models, we must be careful to bear in mind that there is a ten- dency in mankind to see in the past what does not exist there — to people a bygone age with forms of their own creation — to idealize historical realities — to evoke from the dead imaginary states of society — and to fill up the obscure parts of history with a phantasmagoria reflected from their own conceptions. Under the influence of this optical delusion of the mind, political insti- tutions and states of society assume new shapes, colours, and combinations : then defects and deformities disappear, their beau- ties are embellished, their proportions are magnified. The real and the idealized portraits bear the same relation to one another, which a company of actors at a rehearsal bear to the same actors dressed for their parts, and assisted by the stage illusions and theatrical decorations. It was this disposition which led the Lacedaemonians to imagine that they saw in the legislation of Lycurgus a plan for the equal division of lands among the citi- zens, — thus transferring to a semi-fabulous age the later theories of a philosophical communism. ( 38 ) In like manner, the proto- (38) The unhistorical nature of the equal division of lands bv Lycurgus was first proved by Mr. Grote : see his Hist, of G-reece, vol. ii. p. 528-47. After showing that this belief was suggested by the patriotic reforms of Agis III., combined with the idea of equality among the citizens contained in the legislation of Lycurgus, he proceeds thus : ' It was thus that the fancies, longings, and indirect suggestions of the present assumed the cha- racter of recollections out of the early, obscure, and extinct historical past. Perhaps the philosopher Sphscrus of Borysthenes, author of works now lost, both on Lycurgus and Socrates, and on the constitution of Sparta, may have been one of those who gave currency to such a hypothesis ; and we shall readily believe that, if advanced, it would find easy and sin- SECT. 11.] AND REAL MODELS. 227 type of the free constitution of England has been sought and found in the Anglo-Saxon times ; while Blackstone has been able to discover the theoretical perfection of its public law in the reign of Charles the Second. ( :I9 ) Literature and theo- logical learning have been discerned among the half-savage septs of Ireland ( 4 ") and the Hebrides ; nor do the authentic records of the primitive church altogether represent that picture of unity, harmony, and sound doctrine, which it has been supposed to exhibit. An imaginary state of popular happiness and prosperity has been perceived in the mediaeval centuries; feudalism and chivalry have been refined and sublimated into an ethereal essence, almost devoid of human grossness.( 41 ) Every nation, cere credence, when we recollect how many similar delusions have obtained vogue in modern times, far more favourable to historical accuracy — bow much false colouring has been attached by the political feeling ot recent days to matters of ancient history, such as the Saxon Wittanegemote, the Great Charier, the rise and growth of the English House of Commons, or even the poor-law of Elizabeth.' — lb. p. 529. (39) He fixes it at the year 1679, after the Habeas Corpus AH was passed, and that for licensing the press bad expired, 1. Com, p. 439, n. Blackstone (1 Com. p. 70) mentions the dictum of the old lawyers, thai the common law is the perfection of reason — another instance of a reality being idealized by the imagination. (40) Compare Berington's Literary Kwtoryofthe Middle Ages, p. 122-3; ed. 1810. (41) ' D'autrc part, lorsqu'on cherche k faire commit re lViai social, la legislation, lea moyens de pouvoir, lea droits et lea devoirs dea hommes d'autrefois, on pent ae fcrouver entraine" a introdnire dans ['esprit une notion fausse. La forme meme dans Laquelle on expose Leresultal dea recherchea donneatoul one apparence de Bysteme et de regularity. On presente comme un ensemble legal, comme des institutions bien ordonnees, cc qui, dans la realite, n'l'iaii qn'une sorte d'esprit gi'iii'i-al, de caractore commun, qui se retrouvail an milieu du desordre. Des indices fortuita d'nn avenir plus on tnoins prochain Bonl donnea en prenve ■ roler desiderare ogni cosa, e dalla fortune di potere conseguirne poche j aerisulta continua> mente una mala contentezza nelle menti omane, ed on fastidio delle cose che si posseg^ono ; /'/ chefa biasi/man i presenti tempi, laudan ipasiati, e desicU ,-">■< t fuinri, ancorche a far questo non fussino mossi da alcuna ragionevole cagione.' &80 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [chap. xm. lied wit li their present condition, and seek to improve it; but, instead of advancing into an untried ideal future, they wish to recede to an idealized past. AVliile the impatience of their present lot urges some persons to invent a pattern constitution, to ■which they attempt to lead on society, others are prompted by the same feeling to see an imaginary state of perfection in the past, to which they desire that society should return. In this maimer, a mythico-historical age — a generation of heroic war- riors, benevolent princes, and wise statesmen, whose heads are encircled with a dim but luminous halo, whose existence is real, but whose acts and character are unreal — may serve the purpose of an Utopia. There is, besides, a general disposition to admire what is remote and imperfectly known, and to fill up the voids of information with ideal excellences, which extends to other sub- jects than ancient states of society^ 45 ) Accordingly, when the region is remote, or little visited, the same effect may be produced by distance in space as by distance in time. Tacitus, in his Germania, drew an embellished picture of the simple manners of the barbarous Germans, as a foil to the corrupt manners of polished Rome.( 46 ) Some eminent writers of the eighteenth century found a model of political and social excellence in the Chinese, whose remoteness, and exclusion of strangers, afforded a free scope to an active imagination; ( 4 ~) (45) T(i Sui TrXeiaTov Travres 'icrfiev davfia^o/xeva, ical ra Trelpav tJkkttci tt)s dogrjs Swra. — Thucyd. vi. 11. ' Major e longinquo reverentia.' — Tacit. Ann. i. 17. ' Omne ignotuni pro niagnifico est.' — Agric. c. 30. ' Men admire what is absent (says Aristotle), and admiration is pleasing.' davfiaarat ru>v anuvrav eiViV rjbv Se to 6av\xa; xxix. 18. Benjamin Constant comments upon ! he absurd eulogies of Chinese institutions by Filangicri and others, re- marking that, as the writers of the last century were prevented from direct censure of their own governments, they resorted to the indirect censure conveyed in the commendation of remote countries, and ancient stales of society.- -CEuvi-cs de Filangicri, torn. iii. p. 265, 309-11. Speaking of Dryden's tragedy of Awengzebe, Johnson Bays: ' His country is at such a distance, thai the manners might lie Bafely falsified, and die incidents feigned; for the remoteness of place is remarked, by Racine, to afford the same conveniences to a poet as length of time XAfe of hni'ii a. (4*) See Comic, TraiU de legislation, liv. v. c. 32. (40) "Seven friends and philosophers, Diogenes and Herniias, Kulalius and Priscian, Damascius, Isidore, and Simplicius, who dissented from the religion of their sovereign, embraced the resolution of seeking in a foreign land tin- freedom which was denied in their native country. They had heard, and they credulously believed, that the republic of Plato was realized in the despotic government of Persia, and thai a patriot King reigned over the happiest and most nrtuous of nations. They were soon astonished bj the Datura] discovery, that Persia resembled the other countries of the globe ; that Chosroes, who affected the oarne of a philo- sopher, «;i- rain, cruel, and ambition ; that bi [otry, and ;i sipirit of in« tolerance, prevailed among the magi; thai the nobles were haughty, the courtiers Bervile, and the mag ist; that the guilty a iti i,ped, and thai the innocent were often oppressed.' — Gibbon, Declini md Fall, 0. I/O. Bee Agathio , ii. 30, from whom the account is derived, (50) Pindar, Pjfth. k. 66; Mela, iii, 5, 232 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. xxi. from practical example or precedent, and it only remains for us to consider the relation which it bears to theory and to general pivivpts. As we have seen, there are two modes of political practice ; one, in which the judgment is guided by a general maxim ; the other, iu which the argument is from a singular, through an universal but unexpressed proposition, to a singular. The main difference between the Dogmatic, or doctrinal politician, and the Empiricist, or practical man, is, that the former states his prin- ciple, but omits the facts on which it is founded; while the latter states his precedent, and suppresses his principle. Archbishop "Whately, in exposing the inconsistencies of those who condemn the study of political economy, has remarked that all persons who discuss and decide questions relating to national wealth are, in fact, though not in name, political economists. The objectors to political economy, wdien they discuss subjects included within the limits of this science, would thus assume the very character of which they themselves disapprove. ( 31 ) There is, however, this material difference between persons who discuss a practical question upon grounds of political economy, and those who discuss it upon grounds of common sense and simple expe- rience. The former have certain principles, a certain rationale, or system of doctrine, to which they refer as their ultimate criterion and guide : the latter refer only to certain facts, or a certain practice, by which they profess to be determined. It is true that the latter must, in reality, assume certain general pro- positions by which the two sets of facts are connected ; but these are not distinctly expressed — they are not reduced into a dogmatic form, and they must be first stated by the antagonist as premises involved in the practical man's argument, before their truth can be examined. The practical man, in short, who discusses a question of political economy by a reference to precedents and individual cases, may be a political economist, but he is not a theorist. He is not a political economist, in the sense in which (51) Lectures on Political Economy, lect. 3, p. 73-5. SECT. 12.] AND KEAL MODELS. 233 Adam Smith and Say are political economists : he does not lay down universal scientific propositions on the subject. However difficult and liable to error may be the process of applying political theory to practice, as described in the previous chapter, yet, if it be properly performed, the logical result is much clearer to the understanding than in the argument from one case to another. The reason of this comparative obscurity is, that in the argument from example or precedent, the principle upon which the inference rests is usually suppressed. The reason- ing is much more perspicuous when the general principle is stated first, the particular case is placed under it, and the conclusion is then drawn. In order to argue from one case to another, it is necessary to reject from each the circumstances immaterial to the matter in hand, and to compare those in which they agree. In complex cases, this process is often extremely difficult. Much sagacity and knowledge of the subject are required, in order to discriminate between material and immaterial facts — to reject enough, but not more than enough. For if immaterial facts are retained, the comparison becomes obscure and uncertain ; if material facts are rejected, it becomes fallacious. This process, which, in the argument from precedent, must often be performed mentally, though it may be easy and sure to the experienced practician, perplexes the tiro. Hence, students of the law have great difficulty in collecting legal rules from cases, though they are soon able to apply a rule of law, laid down in general terms, to a particular ease of practice. It happens not unfrequently thai a politician professes a belief in certain theoretical principles, and even recommends them to others, while he h> fact governs Ins conduct by prece dents involving principles wholly inconsistent with those which he proclaims. A remarkable example of this species of incon- sistency is often furnished by discussions upon laws for the relief of the poor: principles are in general broadly laid down l>\ advo- cates for a liberal system of relief, which would lend to a dmsion of all property among the working classes. The same persons, however, when they proceed to frame a practical measure, or to 234 ON PRACTICAL EXAMPLES, [CHAP. XXI. administer an existing law, artopt restrictions, founded upon pre- cedent, wholly inconsistent with their own doctrines. The citizens of a free state, who maintain the institution of slavery — as the Athenians and Romans in antiquity, and the Americans of the present day — are in a similar position. They lay down certain doctrines with respect to liberty, equality of rights, and legal protection, to which they make no express exception, and to which they constantly appeal in their own behalf; but in exer- cising their power over their slaves, they follow the established practice of the country, which is altogether at variance with the other set of doctrines. ( 62 ) Every religious sect, again, invokes the principle of toleration for itself, but it is often intolerant in practice towards other sects. When a person is in the habit of laying down certain doc- trines, which he either neglects in Ins practice altogether, or else applies them only to a certain class of cases, or to a certain class of the community, Avhile, with regard to other cases and the rest of the community, he is guided by existing practice and prece- dent, it often happens that, after a time, he becomes conscious of his inconsistency, and that he then attempts either to correct his principles by his practice, ' or his practice by his principles. If, upon consideration of his practice, he finds that it involves principles sounder than those which he enounces in theory, he reforms his theory according to the indications of his practice. This process is of perpetual occurrence while a theory is still in an immature state. The practitioners in the subject to which it relates are constantly able to verify the maxims derived from (52) ' Eien n'est si cominun que de rencontrer, dans tous les pays, des hoinmes qui out deux doctrines opposees : l'une, qui leur sert a combattre l'oppression qu'ils suppoi'tenl ; l'autre, qui leur sert a justifier l'oppression qu'ils exercent. C'est la l'histoire de toutes les revolutions. On forme la theorie quand on est oppriine ; mais c'est quand on est vainqueur qu'on etablit la pratique.' — Conite, Traite de Legislation, liv. v. en. 11, note. Compare liv. v. ch. 19, where the inconsistency between the maxims of freemen for themselves and for their slaves is pursued in detail. Compare Arist. Pol. vi. 3 : aei yap £t]tovo~i to 'Lvov na\ to dUaiov 01 t/ttovs, 01 8e Kpa- tovvtzs ovSev (ppovTi^ovai. lb. vii. 2, dXX' eoiKacriv 01 7roXXoi ttjv tfairoTLKTjv 7to\itlkt)v o'ucrdai eivcu, Kai onep avTols eKaaroi ov (paaiv eivai 8iKatop ov8e o~v/a- (pepov, tovt ovk aio~xvvovTai npos tovs liXXovs daKovvTes' ai/To\ pev yap Trap" avrois to 8t(cai'o)j up^eiv £tjtov. 63. Concerning the ideal in art, sec Sir Edmund Bead's preface to ELugler's Handbook of th <^r,n.iii, Flemish, . § 3j l. The Bubject of illusion in dramatic representation is discussed by \jt. Johnson, in his preface to Shakspeare. (7) Drawii . and models for practical purposes stand on b differenl footing: they do not belong to the One arts. (8) On the beauty of architecture arii ing from utility, see Oio. de Orat. iii. id. ' Bouses are buill to live in, no! to l""l> on ; therefore lei u e be preferred before uuiformity, except where both may be had.' Lord B "Essay on Building 2 10 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. and unserviceable ; .and, even if applied, would be broken and worn oil' by friction and use. Decorated carriages or ships are only employed for occasions of ceremony, and not for daily use. Buildings, however, being stationary, admit of being decorated in relief, within certain limits, without impairing their utility, or exposing their decorations to damage. The ideals of the arts of design are, therefore, essentially imitative; the ideals of architecture, and of all the useful and constructive arts, are essentially original. The former represent something in outward nature — the latter represent nothing in outward nature. Every work of the useful arts must be con- ceived, in the mind of the inventor or improver, as something novel and non-existing, as having no archetype in nature, as a pure hypothesis of his own creation, before it assumes an out- ward form. "When it has been actually made, and tried, and found to succeed, it can be copied for the use of others, and can afterwards be varied for different adaptations. Now the ideals of government resemble those of the construc- tive and useful arts, not those of the arts of design. An imagi- nary state, or system of legislation, resembles an idea of an in- strument, or machine, or building, which the inventor or architect has conceived in his mind, and has designed upon paper, but has not yet executed, so as to try it in practice. The metaphors used in describing the practical ideals of politics are often derived from the useful arts. Thus, we hear of a political plan, outline, sketch, all of which expressions are borrowed from architecture or other constructive arts. Our ancestors spoke of ' a platform of government' — a platform being a ground-plan arranged in a pattern. ( 9 ) Cicero describes the perfect state of Plato under the image of a building erected upon an open space. ( 10 ) (9) Thus, in Pope : • Grove nods at grove, each alley has its brother, And half the platform just reflects the other.' (10) ' Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumpsit, in qua civitatem exstrueret arbitratu suo.' — De Rep. ii. 11. Compare his expressions in Epist. ad Fam. ix 2 : ' JS~on deesse, si quis adhibere volet, non modo ut architectos, verum etiam ut fabros, ad sedifi- candam rempublicam.' SECTS. 3, 4.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 241 § 3 All practical plans and measures in government (as we shall see hereafter) involve an ideal conception. It is, however, an idea founded on real data, and applied to an individual case. Ideal models in politics, on the other hand, are founded on imaginary data, and are not limited to a single case. They are intended to serve as universal guides in practice. The essence of an ideal state is, that it does not start from an historical basis — that it does not suppose an actual community. It is not only an imaginary fabric, but it assumes an imaginary founda- tion. All improvements which have been carried into effect have involved an ideal plan, but the ideal plan rested upon actual facts. For example, the plan of a uniform penny-post- age was ideal : it had never had any actual existence; there had been no experience of its operation. But the plan was founded on real data, and was adapted to the existing circumstances of England. On the other hand, an ideal commonwealth, or the idea of perpetual peace, is not only a mental creation, but it pre- supposes no actual state of things, and is adapted to no given community. An Utopia has no special reference to any country: it is a fictitious frame of government, into which a society in a state of nature might be formed. §4 A real and an ideal model are each, considered as models, equally general in their application. They have uo peculiar reference to any actual case. An ideal model, however, possesses this advantage, that it is, or may be, free from defects, and that all which it holds mil for imitation is worthy of being imitated. In all real models, there is some admixture of human defects; and since the model, as ;i whole, is consecrated in the minds of its admirers, its accidental peculiarities, however Canity, are sometimes imitated, as well as the excellences which wen the cause of its acquiring authority, Hence as Horace says), ' Decipit exemplar ritiis unitabile/(") Now, by establishing (u) 'Ergo hoc ail primum in prooeptia meis, al demonstremuc quem imitemur; atque ita al qua maxime excellant in eo quem imitabitur, ea diligentissime persequatur ; turn acoedat exeroitatio, qu6 ilium quem ante delegerit, imitando effingat, atque ita exprimat, non ul multon imitat VOL. ii. " -MJ ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. models of ideal perfection, we exclude those incidental defects which are inherent in all really existing individuals. However hard of imitation they may he, however much their imaginary ex- cellence may transcend our feeble powers of execution, they do not mislead our judgment by defects, or indulge our love of ease by peculiarities which can be repeated with a slight effort. The great works of poetry, painting, and sculpture may, indeed, serve as ideal models, if properly used,('-) but no real model in politics, or other department of practical life, is faultless. § .j The use both of real and ideal models belongs to the art of politics ; but for the use of real models, nothing more is needed than rules for their selection and adaptation — no original invention is required. Ideal models, on the other hand, imply not only selection and adaptation with respect to their use, but also invention and construction with respect to their origin. They fall within the constructive department of political art. The use of real models supposes that an institution already exists, which is held worthy of imitation ; and the art of politics sup- plies the precepts by which the process of imitation is to be effected. On the other hand, the function of constructive poli- tics is to create an ideal model, upon which real institutions are afterwards to be fashioned. It teaches what are the circum- stances which admit of the formation of such ideal models, and what are the conditions for their application in practice when they have been formed. A dictum is cited (which is attributed to M. Lamartine), that an ideal is f truth seen at a distance/ Now an ideal in politics is constructive ; it does not represent real relations, and does not deal with truth. It may, indeed, like other constructive hypotheses, be made the subject of predication ; but the propo- ssepe cognovi, qui aut ea qua; facilia sunt, aut etiam ilia qua; insignia, ac pame vitiosa, consectantur imitando. Nihil est facilius quam amietum imitari alicujus, aut statum, aut motum. Si vero etiain vitiosi aliquid est, id sumere, et in eo vitiosum esse, non magnum est.' — Cic. de Orat. ii. 22. (12) See Longinus, c. 13, 14, on the advantage of imitating fine models of composition. He gives to this species of imitation the name of ano- SECTS. 6, 7.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 248 sitions relating to it do not express matter of fact, and cannot be said to be true or false. Whereas political theory, which is concerned with truth and matter of fact, constructs no plans for practical purposes j it draws no scheme of a constitution, no systems of legislation, administration, or judicature; it frames no pattern code of laws. § 6 Having endeavoured to explain the nature of ideal, as distinguished from real, models in politics, we will proceed to describe the most remarkable instances of ideal models proposed by different political writers, and especially those relating to an ideal commonwealth or perfect state. It is natural that the first efforts of political speculation should have an immediate view to the application of the doctrine — art of a certain sort is always prior to science ; the practice precedes the theory. ( 13 ) Hence, the persons who first began to speculate on politics were naturally led to frame plans intended for practical use, before they treated the subject in a purely scientific manner. Now, political idealists deal with politics as an art, not as a science. They seek, not to represent, but to construct. Practical invention, not truth, is their aim. They do not describe the essential properties of a government or law, but they endeavour to make an excellent form of government, or an excellent code of laws. Science always deals with thai which exists, or has existed : the political idealist frames something which never existed. § 7 Hippodamus of Miletus — contemporary with Pericles — a practical architect, who first laid out towns in regular streets, also applied himself to philosophical inquiries, and was, according to Aristotle,(") the first speculative politician who sketched a (13) Sec above, oh. xi\. § 2. (14) 7r/;a)Toy tow fifj 7roXiTf vnfiiviav tv(\('nirjiri ri 7Tf/>i fftlAiTfUM /i ipUrnje. — Pol. ii. 8. These worat might seem to imply, thai tome praot ioaJ politicians had previously Brained a perfect state; imi there is aoreoord of any such plan : and Aristotle probably had in bii mind the performances of practical lawgivers, snob as Lycurgus and Solon. Sec his expressions at the beginning of e. 12. Bolon, however, &fl if well (mown, is Said to have declared that his laws woro not the best absolutely, but tin- best which the circumstances of the Athenians admitted. — rlutarch, Solon, a 2 2 l I ON IDEAL MODELS. [chap. xxn. plan of a perfect state. He supposed a community containing 10,000 male citizens, and lie divided the citizens into three classes, the artisans, the cultivators of the soil, and the military class. He likewise made two other triple divisions — one, of the territory into sacred, public, and private land ; the other, of the laws, according as the judicial proceeding related to homicide, assault, or civil injury. He constituted one supreme com't, com- posed of certain selected old men, and he directed that all per- sons filling the administrative offices should be chosen by the votes of the people comprehending the three classes above-mentioned. He likewise appointed public rewards for those who originated anythmg beneficial to the state, and pensions for the children of those who were killed in war.( u ) There is nothing remarkable in this plan, except as showing the first attempt to construct a state upon a purely ideal basis. Hippodamus was a practical engineer, who had risen to the conception of a town as an organized whole, and he appears to have transferred his notions respecting the physical distribution of the parts of a town, to the political distribution of the parts of a state. Each of his plans was constructive, and framed with a view to a practical applica- tion. "Whether he published his scheme of a perfect state in writing is uncertain : at all events, he must have promulgated it as a mere scheme, unaccompanied with speculative disquisition. A plan of an ideal state, supported by philosophical argument, soon, however, proceeded from the true author of scientific inquiry upon politics. § 8 "When Socrates had diverted the nascent philosophy of the Greeks from attempted solutions of physical and celestial c. 15. For some supposed apophthegms of the seven sages on the best government, see Plutarch, Sept. Sapient. Conviv. c. 11 ; Stob. Anthol. t. xliii. n. 131. Plutarch {Solon, 3) observes, that all the seven wise men, except Thales, derived their fame for wisdom from their knowledge of politics, not of physics. (15) Aristot. Pol. ii. 8, where there is a detailed criticism of the ideal state of Hippodamus. Compare vii. 11, where the modern and symme- trical fashion of laying out streets, introduced by Hippodamus, is re- ferred to. SECT. 9.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 245 phenomena to the affairs of men,( 16 ) and had thus laid the foundation of ethical and political science, he appears to have directed his own speculations and the thoughts of Ins companions and listeners, to inquiries into the best form of government. These inquiries, it is true, do not form a part of political science, strictly so called, nor does a scheme of a perfect state necessa- rily suppose a scientific foundation. But the Socratic researches into this subject were blended with political theory, and with a system of political doctrine, and they were, to a certain extent, preceded by a scientific analysis of the nature of a state. § 9 The two famous disciples of Socrates have left us their several draughts of a perfect state, or model government, and although their works differ widely in form from each other, we may reasonably assume that the problem which they attempted to solve had been proposed and discussed by their common master. Xenophon's political romance, The Education, or, as it ought rather to be called, The Life of Cyrus,{ 17 ) though the product of ( i ()) Aristotle states that in the time of Socrates to fyTt'iv tu ntpl (jwo-eas fXr/^(, njMi de ttjv x/jr/frifiov uperrjv ku\ ttjv 7To\itik))i> dirtickivav oi (fuXoo-n(J>ovvTfs. — De Tart. Anim.i. 1: compare Cic. Tusc. Diep, v. 4; De Tcj>. i. 10 j Acad. i. 4; ii. 3U ; Minuc. Felix, c. 13; Lactant. Die. //is/, iii.20. (it) Xenophon appears to have written bis Oyrqpadia, together with his other historical works, at Bcillus, to which he retired in the latter part of his life: see Diojj. Laert. ii. § 52. The title of the work may, perhaps, be accounted for, by supposing thai it was originally confined to an account of the early years of Cyrus ; and thai when M was afterwards enlarged, it retained its original title. The epilogue was composed, or revised, after '.i()2 H. (., sec viii. X, I, and Schneider's note. Kenophon died aboul :{.",!» b.c. Diog. Laert. (Hi. 34) places the Oyropeedia of Kenophon and the lit jiublii- of I'lalo in juxtaposition. Stallbaum (prof, ad Putt. />'>/>■ p. lxvi.) conjectures thai the Republic of Plato was written or published between Olymp. 99 and LOO, 884-7/ B.C.; hence ii would follow, thai the Republic was anterior to the publication of the Cyropeedia in its existing form. The story.in Gellius, A../, civ. 8(oomp. Allien, xi. p. 606 A ; Diog. Laert. hi. 84), though doubtless apocryphal, likewise assumes thai a pari of the Republic was published before the Oyropeedia was written. Looking, however, to the period of Xenophon's retirement at Scillus, it seems to me doubtful whether the Oyropadia was posterior to the Republic. The Lawt of Plato were written when he was an old man (Plutarch, dt Ts. et Otw. o I s '. and were nol published till after his death: Philip of Opus is said to have I ranscribed the work from the waxen tablets (Diog. Laert. iii. 87). They were, therefore, posterioi both to the Oyropeedia and the Republic : rovi N6povt rowi vartpovypa' 2 l(> ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. his mature mind, and stamped with the marks of his Asiatic ex- perience, is probably no unfaithful representation of the ideal government conceived by Socrates. The benevolent despot, skilled in all the arts of civil and military rule, would apparently have satisfied the conditions which Socrates required for his per- fect state. ( |s ) Both Cyrus and his Persian subjects are treated by Xenophon with almost as much freedom, and as little regard to fact, as if they were the inhabitants of an Utopia, or a happy valley. It would be a vain search to look in the Cyropcedia, either for historical materials, or even for the genuine spirit of an Oriental people and government. Many of the institutions and usages which Xenophon describes are transplanted into Asia from Greece, and especially from Lacedsemon, the favourite poli- tical model of the Greek philosophers. ( 19 ) § 10 Plato has left to posterity his views upon an ideal state, in the two dialogues of The Republic and 77ie Laws.( 20 ) In the first of these, Socrates is introduced as the main interlo- cutor^- 1 ) and the opinions entertained by Plato are placed in his mouth. How far even the rudiments of these opinions can be safely attributed to Socrates, is doubtful ; but that, in their deve- loped form, they belong exclusively to Plato, must be considered (ptvras, Aristot. Pol. ii. 6 j Atlien. xi. p. 507 F. The mention of the victory of the Syracusans over the Locrians, in Leg. i. 9, p. 638, fixes this passage to a date later than 356 b.c. (18) See Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. viii. p. 628-30, on the political opinions of Socrates : ' His positive ideal state (Mr. Grote remarks), as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the Cyropcedia of Xenophon.' — p. 630. Plato is not quite clear about the form of his state, but he conceives it as governed by a king, and apparently by a king with unlimited powers. See below, n. 28. (19) Socrates was in the habit of praising the governments of Lace- da?mon and Crete. — Plat. Crit. c. 14. They were likewise the subjects of general admiration, according to Plat. Rep. viii. 1. (20) Bitter considers these his two greatest works, Gesch. der Phil. vol. ii. p. 436. Ast (Platons Leben und Schriften, p. 341) calls the Republic the most perfect of all the works of Plato. See his account of this dialogue, p. 318-54. The subject of government is likewise discussed in the dialogue entitled Politicus ; concerning which, see Ast, ib. p. 217. (21) The Republic is in the form of a narrative, by Socrates, of a dialogue held by him with several persons. The Laws are treated as a spurious work by Ast, (ib. p. 384-92,) a judgment wholly unsupported and er- SECT. 10.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 247 certain, The dialogue of the Laws was written subsequently to the Republic, (~) and is supposed to be held by three fictitious persons — an Athenian, a Cretan, and a Lacedaemonian — who are represented as meeting in the Island of Crete. Socrates has no part in it j and it is in form, as well as in substance, the work of Plato, f) (22) See above, p. 215, note 17. Aristotle, in his criticism of the Laws ( Pol. ii. 6), appears to have forgotten that Socrates is not an interlocutor in the dialogue. He attributes the supposition of 5000 landowners (which he considers an impossibility) to Socrates. See Leg. v. 8, p. 737. In Pol. ii. 7, Aristotle ascribes an opinion in the Laws, concerning the acquisition of land, to Plato himself. See Leg. v. p. 71-1. (23) Aristotle, Pol. ii. 1-5, in his detailed criticism of the Platonic repub- lic, attributes the doctrines of it to Socrates. How far he means to imply that the opinions are really the opinions of Socrates, is uncertain. He may mean only to show, that he does not impute to Plato opinions which are put in the mouth of secondary personages, and which are introduced in order to be refuted. Thus, in referring to the argument concerning the opposition of law and nature, attributed in the Gorgias to Callicles, Aris- totle distinctly names Callicles : SxnrtpKa). 6 Ka\\iKkrjsevT& YopylaytypniTTai. Xeyoiu. — De Soph. El. c. 12. Brandis thinks that Aristotle's references to Socrates, in connexion with the doctrines of the Platonic state, are in- tended to imply merely that they were his opinions in substance. — QescA. der Gr. R'6m. Phil. vol. ii. p. 05. Mr. Grote, however, thinks that tho political and social views of the Republic must not be attributed to Socrates, LList. ofGr. vol.viii. p. 550. There is no ground for supposing, with Goeit- ling, ad Aristot. Pol. p. 317, that Aristotle names Socrates instead of Plato, 'non sine cavillatione.' Cicero, like Aristotle, speaks of Socrates as the author of the ideal state in the Republic: ' Quare prima sit bar forma et species et origo tyranni, invent a. nobis in ea republica, quam auspicato Komulus condiderit, non in ilia quam, ut perscripsil Plato, sibi ipse Socrates peripatetico illo in scrmone depinxerit' — Rep. ii. 29 5 also, ii. 1 and 11, ' apud l'latonent Socrates.' It, seems improbable that, if Socrates had publicly, in the presence of hostile or indillcrent persona, maintained the doctrines of tlie "Republic concerning the community of property and women, they should not have been used against him on his trial by his accusers, of which there is DO trace. On t lie other hand, it can hardly be supposed thai Plato, both in the Republic and in the Timcetu, should have deliberately ascribed these doctrines to hint without an] foundation. The probability is, that be really entertained these opinions, and had expressed them in private to some friends. Community or women is treated as the doctrine of Bocrates, flol of Plato, by Lucian, I it. Auct. c. 17 ; where, see Gesner's note. It is ascribed to both bj Agathias, Hist. i. 4. As to the historical ralue of Plato's reports of the opinions of Bocrates, see Brandis, ib. vol. ii. p. 18-28 j Allien. \i. p. .">u."> D-Fj Diog. Laert. in. 36. The argument of Cicero, in Rep. i. to, concerning the reference to arithmetical matteri in the Republic, implies thai Plato assumed the liberty of attributing to Bocrates what doctrines be pleased. It is remarkable that A ristoi le a .-en ben the doctrinesof the Laws to Bocrates, although Bocrates is do! an interlocutor in thai dialogue. Pol. ii. 6. Brandis thinks thai this reference of the laws to Socrat< - is aol because A K3 ON IDEAL, JUUL>J£1,S. |_eHAl\ SJk.ll. Tlie division of the treatment of the ideal problem of govern- ment into a Republic, or organic constitution of a state, and Laws, or products of the legislative power in action, introduced by Plato, was imitated by later writers, particularly by Cicero, who composed a treatise De Republicd, and a treatise De Legibus.^ 4 ) Aristotle remarks, that all inquirers add idea] laws to ideal con- stitutions, but not the converse. (" 5 ) As the Republic and Laivs of Plato are the earliest works in which the problem of an ideal state was systematically treated, and, moreover, as they far exceed in dialectical skill and literary excellence all their successors in the same hue, it will be proper to give a brief account of the mode in which he has discussed the subject. The ideal state of Plato is founded on the intellectual and moral qualifications of the rulers. They are to be formed for the exercise of their high function by a proper training, and are to possess the philosophical character. Until philosophers become kings, or kings become philosophers, the ideal state of Plato, as Aristotle identifies him with the Athenian interlocutor in the dialogue, but in order to designate Plato as the author both of this work and of the Republic. — lb. p. 178, n. This purpose might, however, have been better attained by using the name of Plato himself. Quintilian considers the name of Socrates as merely a mask for Plato's own opinions : ' Qua omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro [the Gorgias], dictaque a Socrate, cujus persona videtur Plato significare quid sentiat.' — ii. 15, § 26. Aristotle wrote a summary of the Laws, and also of the Republic of Plato, the former in three, the latter in two books, according to the divi- sion of the subsequent editors. — See Diog. Laert. v. 22. The titles are, -a €< tow Nofiaiv YtKciTaivos, and to. ck ttjs YloXireias. Theophrastus likewise wrote an eniTOfxTj ryys TiXdrcopos TloXirdas, in two books. — lb. v. 43. (24) ' Atqui si quaeres, ego quid expectem : quoniam scriptum est a te de optimo reipublica? statu, consequens esse videtur ut scribas tu idem de legibus. Sic enim fecisse video Platonem ilium tuum, quern tu admiraris, queni omnibus anteponis, quern maxim e diligis.' — De Leg. i. 5. ' Sed ut vir doctissimus fecit Plato, atque idem gravissimus phdosophorum omnium, qui princeps de republica conscripsit, idemque separatim de legibus ejus, id mihi credo esse faciendum, ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam.' — Lb. ii. 6. A supposed dialogue of Diogenes with Plato, in which the former re- proaches the latter with the inutility of writing a work on laws., after his work on the republic, is given in Stob. Anth. xiii. 37. (25) Pol. iv. 1. SECT. 10.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 249 he expressly declares, can never be realized.^ 6 ) In the Republic, the form of the perfect government is not distinctly specified. It is an aristocracy,( 17 ) that is, a government of the best men in the community ; but one of these best men — these philoso- phers, according to the Platonic conception — is, by some process which is not described, to be appointed for a time king, with unlimited powers. ( 28 ) The aristocracy, or best form of govern- ment, is, therefore, the government of an absolute king. In this respect, the views of Plato agree with those of Xenophon, as set forth in the Cyropadia. In the ideal state of the Laws, these views are somewhat modified. This commonwealth — a supposed colony in the island of Crete — is to be a golden mean between monarchy and democracy ;("' J ) it is to be governed by a council (26) Rep. v. 18, p. 473 ; vi. 12, p. 499 ; vii. 17, p. 540. Marcus Anto- ninus always had in his mouth the saying of Plato : ' Plorere civitates si aut philosophi imperarcnt, aut imperatorea philosopharentur.' — Jul. Capi- tolin. c. 27. Compare also the account of the Platonic philosophers in the reign of Justinian, who, according to Agathias (Hist. ii. 30), expected to find in Persia the ideal excellences of the Platonic common wealth reduced to reality : a>s f'uj -nap' eKfivois biKauWaTov p.iv to ap^ov, /cat tmoiav tivai 6 TlXuToivos fiavkcTat. Xuyos, (piKoaixfiias re kcii (Sacriketas eV tuvto crvvikOoixrqs. (27) Rep. viii. 2, p. 55 1 . (28) The ideal state is a ftao-iXda, Rep. viii. ad init. p. 543. Royalty is at the head of the live forms of government enumerated bj Plato, viz. : 1. /■JaaiXeui. 2. TipiiKpdTia. the government of ambition, equivalent t<> the Cretan and Lacedu'iimnian constitution. IS. uXiyap^la. 4. brjuoKpuria. 5. Tvpavuis. See A''/'- v ''i- ' ; ""1 2, p. 541-5; and ix. 0, p. 5M0. The same govern niriits (with the exception of the second) .an; mentioned i.\. II. p. f>87, where apiaroKpcerla and (3atri\fia are identified. The rifUMcpteria of Plato, the government of honour (Sep, viii. 2), must lie distinguished from the TifioKpuria of Aristotle, the government founded apon the rifirifia, or valuation of property. In Rep. vii. 17, p. ."> I»>, he speaks of one or several true philosophers ruling the perfect state. According to Bitter, Qeechtchte aer Philosophic, vol. ii. p. III. the ideal republic of Plato is an absolute royalty, or a monarchical kingdom. In the Laws, an ipurroKparla is snid to be an imitation of the reign of Batnrn apon earth, or the golden age. — Leg. iv. p. 718. Cn iii. I. p. < ">m 1 . the word hpurroKparla is nearly equivalent to oXiyapxla. Bui in iv. 5, p. 712, aristocracy and oligarchy are distinguished, at in Rep. \ui. :t. 1 1 . 5 1 7 . (29) Leg. \ 1. •">. p. 766. 250 ON IDEAL MODELS, [CHAP, xxi i. and various magistrates, of whom thirty-seven nomophylaces are the eh iff. H In the first ideal state, or that of the republic, the free com- munity is divided into three classes — the guardians, the fighting men, and the artisans. ( 3I ) The most characteristic institution of the Platonic state, however, is, that there is a community of women, children, and goods. The grounds of this institution are developed at great length, and with a manifest predilection, under the person of Socrates, in the Republic. ( i2 ) In the Law*, likewise, where a gradation of ideal states, and three degrees of comparison, are admitted, the absolutely best or perfect state is described as characterized by the absence of all appropriation, and by the community of women, children, and goods. ( Si ) Plato is a complete communist ; and Aristotle, in criticizing his ideal state, considers its communist doctrines as its principal feature. ( 34 ) At the same time, like all the other speculative politicians of antiquity, he retains slavery . ( 3 *) The state or government like- wise exercises an extensive and searching control over the expres- sion of opinion on religious subjects, and on the acts of the gods, through the medium of poetry. Hence, poets are placed under severe restrictions.^") It moreover regulates the whole system of education. All free children are the children of the state. (30) Leg. vi. 2, p. 753. (31) Rep. iv. 10, p. 434. (32) Rep. v. (33) Leg. v. 9, 10, p. 739. The plan of community of goods and women, under the imaginary gynsecocracy of Athens, is humorously described by Aristophanes. — Eccles. 555-709. Many of the real objections to the system are suggested in the course of the dialogue. (34) Compare the excellent remarks on community of goods in Pol. ii. 5, beginning fimpocrcmos fiev ovv f] Toiavrr] vopoBea'ia. ' All the arguments of Socrates in the Republic (s'ays Aristotle) are dis- tinguished by their brilliancy, neatness, and originality, and their analytic spirit ; but it is hard to possess every sort of excellence.' — lb. c. 6. (35) Leg. vi. 19, p. 777. Above, p. 28, iii. 30, p. 690, he enumerates the dominion of masters over slaves among the seven fundamental axioms of government. For Plato's legislation respecting homicide of slaves by free- men, and homicide and wounding of freemen by slaves, see Leg. ix. 9, p. 808, 869; ix. 11, p. 872; ix. 15, p. 879. Compare Politicus, c. 46, p. 309. (36) As to the sorts of poetry which are to be admitted, see Rep. ii. 17-21, p. 377-383 ; x. 7, p. 606-7. Plato speaks of the old quarrel between SECT. 10.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 251 Plato conceives the conditions or groundwork of his state as purely ideal. ( 37 ) In the Republic, he identifies it with no actual community — he assigns to it neither place nor time. In the Laws, he imagines a new colony in Crete ; but the community is not yet formed, and its basis is altogether hypothetical. He does not, like Xenophon, idealize a real model, but he builds upon a purely imaginary foundation. He describes the condi- tions of his state under the image of a pure tablet ready to receive a painting, or a model in wax,( as ) and the state itself as an ideal pattern, ( 3y ) which can only be realized when certain cir- cumstances, which never have occurred, shall occur. In another place, he compares his ideal state with a description of a dream; ( 40 ) and he more than once assimilates it to a mythical legend. (") If it is nowhere on the earth, he says, there is an archetype of it philosophy and poetry, ib. x. 8, p. 607. See also, Leg. iv. 9, p. 719 — vii. 9, p. 801, in which last passage a ooard of licensers, or censors, of poetical publications is instituted. Orators were expefied by most ancient writers from the perfect state, see Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 'I'l. Compare Ammian. xxx. 4. According to Hitter (ib. vol. ii. p. 439-43), the two chief defects of the Platonic state are — I, that the action of the state is too comprehensive ; 2, that men are treated as mere members of classes, and not as substantive individuals. The first of these criticisms is just; but i\w fault is not peculiar to Plato. It is common, more or less, to all [Jtopianists. The justice of the latter is more doubtful; apolitical theorist must look at nun in the ag- gregate, and not as single individuals. (t,1) Compare Brandis, Gesch. dev (•'/■. Rom. Phil. vol. ii. p. 540; Bit- ter, ib. vol. ii. p. I")7. (38) Rep. vi. 13, ]». 501; Leg. v. 11, p. 7 16. (•59) He calls it a nui»ifi( iyii(i. — R(ji. v. 17, p. 472 ; cf. vi. \'.\, p. 600; Leg. i. 7, p. 632; v. L0, p. 7-VJ ; v. II. p. 746. It is a pftXovora ixprn aiKflv irSkie, in Hep. viii. ad inil ; a KaXX/froXtr, vii. '.». p. - r >-7. In ii. "J 1 . |i. 383, a model institution is called B rtarof. In the Tim,, us. c. i. p, 17. the Bcope of the dialogue of the Republic is staid l.y Socrates to be, to determine how, and 01 whal sort ,>\' men. the besi state could be fon I. In "Leg. iii. L6 ( p. 702, be Bays: ravra yhp trdvra tlpnrcu th Kortofiv < i« *-.i nut nor' tiv ttSKis Hpurra olioolrj. Ib. \. '■'. LQ, p. 789, be makes tin of ideal governments —the g I. better, and best. lb. rii, p. 801, s pat* tcm law is an iKpLoyiiov, a model or die, from « bioh an impression ii taken. (40) Leg. v. 1 I, p. 746 : otov ivtipaxa X-ywy, */ tt\('ittu>v Kddimfj) in lafpov nun 7roAii' Kdl iroAvras. (41) "Leg. i. 7, p. 632: 7rtipcur6fttoa ctdro irapaottypa ututvot koi ts els hvvafiiv rj nepi to. dvdpamva cpikoaocfiia. TfXetco^. — lb. Com- pare the first chapter of the Meteorologies, where he traces out his encyclo- paedia of physics. SECT. 10.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 255 together, he is to consider what are the circumstances which preserve and destroy each form of government, and for what reasons some states are well, and others ill governed. Having ascertained these matters, he hopes to be able to discover which form of government is the best ; how each government is to be ordered, and what laws and customs it must possess in order to fulfil this condition. ( 5 ") Such is the announcement at the close of the Ethics, with which the actual plan of the Politics, as executed by him, on the whole coincides. After an introductory book upon the nature of political, as distinguished from domestic government, he pro- ceeds to examine the plans of an ideal or perfect state, proposed by Plato and others ;(") after which he analyses those real models — particularly the Spartan and Cretan constitutions — which the ancient politicians considered as approaching nearest to an ideal perfection. ( M ) Having, in the third book, investigated the nature of a state, and the differences between the forms of a government, he returns to the problem of the best constitution. ( 5i ) On this subject, he lays it down that it is the business of the same science to consider, what is absolutely the best form of govern- ment ; what one would wish, supposing that no impeding cir- cumstances existed; and what form of government suits a given community. To these two he adds a third ideal problem, viz., to consider how a given constitution ought to have been origi- nally framed; and, if so framed, would have been preserved for the longest time. Lastly, lie says it is necessary to know thai form of government which is best suited to the generality of states (-o) Compare T£th. Tfic. v. lo. 6poUn ii *«i tu fu) tpwudi AW amp&nriva biKiuu <>u TOVrh Tvavra\(tv, tn(\ rwfi'a'i IToXlTtUU, liXXa fiia (iOVOV 1TCBlTa)(pV KOTO (\>v(Tiv l] a^irrri). (-1) See Pot. i. mi Jin. ■. and ii. ad vnit. (-2) With respect to the real models, there are (he utj 1) two question! L, what ia its relation to the ideal type P 2, whether its laws nave been made in accordance with the end proposed for the constitution F ii. i>, ad init. The real constitutions, alleged aa models, are called bj Axi Kupiat (as we might say, masterpieces), a opposed to those viri tiv&p tlpqiuvat, or ideal models, ii. L2, ad fin. (53) ^ t ''' h. iii- flei 7roXXa irpovnorfduadtu KaOi'mfp euxo/^tW's, IWM pMVTOt f-l^v TovTcav ahvvarov, vii. 4. Lower down he says, ru tthXitiko) kBrqj hf'i tt)v oLKf'uiv vXr/v inrapx^v fmrrffif Idts (\ovativ. "he expression KOT < Vjmv, Bach a government as one would wish or pray for, is used elsewhere l>y Aristotle, ii. 1. ml inil. iv. I, and appears to be borrowed from l'lato, Sep. \i. 12, p. 490. (57) Compare riii. 7, ml fin. ittp\ ptv ovv r&v ntthiTtvnptvw, nwrovt n wrdpytiv bd ica\ irolovs ruths ttji> (J>v y< l l> T h v inputliap fifi fart'iv fiti't r< riov \nyoiv kv yiyv<>\xivu>v hut TX]t ulrrorjfTfios. Again, after some details upon the beat sites for market »places, jrj mnasia, public offices, temples, &c., he adds : aXXA rb burrplttu> vi v oKpitoKoyovptvovt Ku\ Xtyovrat ntpi r&v rotovretv apy&p <'«tw. ov yap ^omitov fori ra roiavra voijaat, eEXXd noifjtrat fi£k\of ro aiv yap \rv«v "',Y'/t 'i>y'"' '"" '" "' wptrpnu TVYr/i. This remark applies witn greal force to some of the later booki of Plato's Lowe, as well as to other Utopian plans. 258 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. treatise. ( M ) xlristotle's political treatise, therefore, like the Republic and Laws of Plato, is a search after the best form of government. The material difference in the treatment of the problem is this, that whereas, in Plato, the ideal element pre- dominates over the scientific, in Aristotle, the scientific element predominates over the ideal; and that, whereas one is in the constructive form of an ideal state, and appears to deal with singulars, the latter treats of the best form of government, and deals with generals. § 12 Greek philosophy produced nothing important and original in the speculative department of politics after Plato and Aristotle. ( 59 ) Both the Stoic and Epicurean sects confined themselves almost exclusively within the circuit of logic, physics, and ethics. Zeno, indeed, the founder of the Stoic sect, pro- posed his ideal model of political perfection, namely, that man- kind should not live in separate states, each having its own institutions, but that all men should be fellow-citizens, and form, as it were, one flock, with one mode of life and one system of law.( co ) § 13 The Romans opened a new vein of thought in prac- tical politics, and have even bequeathed a system of jurisprudence to the modern world. But in political speculation they were mere imitators and followers of the Greeks. Cicero, as we have already seen, wrote two political treatises, ( 61 ) after the model of (58) Biese (Philosophie des Aristoteles, vol. ii. p. 532-72) gives a sum- mary of the physical and political conditions for the perfect state of Aris- totle. See also Eitter, ubi sup. vol. iii. p. 371 ; and Nickes, De Aristotelis Politicorum Libris (Bonn, 1851), c. 5. (59) Above, ch. iii. § 7. Theophrastus wrote a treatise, nepl tjjs dpiartjs TToXireias, and another on the question, tvws apiar av nokis oIkoIto. — Diog. Laert. v. 44, 49. Cicero alludes to his having written on the question, ' qui esset optimus reipublicse status.' — De Fin. v. 4. (60) Plutarch, De Alexand. Fort. i. 6: tovto (says Plutarch) Zrjvav pev eypa^ev axrnep ovap rj ('I8o>\ov evvopias (piXoaofpov na\ Trokireias ava.TV7ra>o-dp.evos. Compare Bitter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. iii. p. 635. (61) Cicero, in enumerating his writings, at the beginning of the second book of his treatise De Divinatione, thus speaks of his work De Republicd : ' Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de Republicd, quos tunc scripsimus, quum gubernacula reipublicse tenebamus. Magnus locus, philosopbiajque proprius, a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto, totaque Peri- SECT. 13.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 259 the Republic and Laws of Plato. They were composed with a view of applying the theories of the Greek philosophers to Roman affairs j of illustrating the institutions of Rome by the abstract doctrines of the Greek political speculators. (''-) The problem which Cicero undertakes to solve, in his dialogue De Republicd, is to determine what is the best form of govern- ment. C 3 ) He decides that each of the simple forms, viz. the govern- ment of a king, the government ofoptimates or nobles, and popular government, is defective. Instances may occur in which one of these simple forms is tolerable, and one may be better than another, but none is perfect or excellent. ('") If any simple, and unmixed pateticorum familia tractatus uberrime.' — ii. 1. Compare De Leg. iii. 6. The work was written in the year 54 B.C. It had great success, JEp. ad Div. viii. 1, ad fin. The treatise De Legibus was composed three years afterwards, 51 B.C. See Drumann, Geschichte Moms. &c\, vol. vi. p. 83-7, 104-7. The Emperor Alexander Severus, when the business of the day was over, used to study the Republic of Plato, and the Republic and Oflun a of Cicero. — Lamprid. in Vit. c. 30. (62) See Mai, prsef. ad Mep. p. iii. Hitter remarks upon the want of originality in Cicero's two political works (vol. iv. p. 164-8). Their value consists in his comments upon the constitution and legislation of Some, subjects on which he speaks with the highest authority. (63) ' Scipionem rogemus, ut explicet quern cxislimct esse optimum statum civitatis' (i. 20). It is the same problem as that proposed by the Greek writers : ris apiarr) iroXireia. In the dialogue De lOegibus, Aniens says, in allusion to the * 1 i .• 1 1 ■ > lt n * • Dr. R< jmhlica .• ' (,}iioniam script um est a (e de ojitimo rei|iuhlie;e statu.' — i. 5. Again, he says (De Leg. iii. 2), ' Nns aiiteni, quoniam leges ditiniis lihei-is ]Ki]iu]is ; quaipie de optima" republic! sentiremus, in sex lihris ante iliximus; accommodabimus hue tempore leges ad ilium, quern probamus, civitatis statum.' Again (iii. 5) •■ ' Atqui pleraque dicta sunt in illis lihris; quod faciendum fuit, quum de optima republicd quseritur.' In a letter to bis brother, he describes himself as engaged in the composition of the dialogue D< Republicd, and as uncertain about the plan of the work : ' Sermo autem in uovem ei dies et libros dis- tributus de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo rave.' — TSpiet.ad Quint. Frat. iii. •"». (64) 'Quum penes onumesl omnium Bumma rerum, regem ilium unum vocamus, et regnum ejus reipublica statum. Quum autem es1 penei deleetos, turn ilia civitas optimatium arbitrio regidicitur. Ilia autem est civiias popularis, sic enim appellant! in quft in populo rant omnia. Atque borum tnum generum quodVis .... non perfectum illud quidem aequo jm-M seiiteniia optimum, sed tolerabile tamen; ut aliud alio potsil esse prsBstantius.' — i. 26. Primum enim aumero definieram genera civitatnm tria probahilia ; pernieiosa autem tribui illis totidem oontraria ; uullumque ex eis unuin esse optimum ; sed id ; ingulil quod 6 Malms primis esset modice temperatum, ii. 89. The three pain of ibnni of government — a good and a had in each are borrowed from Aristotle. s 2 260 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. government is deserving of approbation, it is the regal form.C 55 ) The government of an absolute king is liable to degenerate into ty ranny j but so long as he governs with wisdom and justice, it is preferable to the other two.( 66 ) The best form of all, how- ever, is that which is mixed of the three simple forms, in which the ruling power is divided between the king, the optimates or nobles, and the people. Each of the simple forms, however good, is liable to its characteristic degeneracy : it contains within itself the seeds of change into evil. A king may become a despot ; a body of nobles may become a faction ; a people may become a mob — but a mixed government, by the mutual action of its com- ponent elements, is able to maintain its equilibrium, and to resist the tendency to depravation. C 7 ) (65) ' Si unum ac simplex probandum sit, regium probem atque in primis laudem' (i. 35 ; also, i. 45). 'Nam ipsam regale genus civitatis non modo non est repreliendendum, sed haud scio an reliquis simplicibus longe ante- ponendum, si ullum probarem simplex reipublica) genus.' — ii. 23. (66) Cicero falls into confusion by using tbe term royalty instead of monarchy. Hence be loses tbe logical advantage, enjoyed by Plato, who calls tbe good monarcb a king, and tbe bad monarch a rvpawos, or despot. See his remark on the Greek phraseology. — Rep. ii. 26. Cicero follows Plato in approving of royalty ; but he is perplexed by the proneness of the absolute king to govern ill. See ii. 23, 26 ; iii. 35. It is a ' bonum, ut dixi, reipublicse genus, sed tamen inclinatum et quasi pronum ad perniciosissimum statuni.' — ii. 26. Compare Tnsc. Disp. iv. 1, where, in reference to Pome, he says that ' progressio admirabilis incredibilisque cursus ad omnem excellentiani factus est, dominatu regio republica liberata.' Compare Sallust, Cat. 7. Sp. Mummius, however, one of the interlocutors in the dialogue, prefers the government of the good few, to the government of a single king, which reminds him of a slave- master (dominus). He prefers, however, even an absolute king to a de- mocracy. — iii. 34. (67) ' Itaque quartum quoddam genus reipublicas maxime probandum esse sentio, quod est ex his, quae prima dixi, moderatum et permixtum tribus' (i. 29). ' Pecte quseris, quid maxime e tribus : quoniam eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo ; anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus' (ib. 35). ' Quod ita quum sit, tribus primis generibus longe prsestat, mea sententia, regium ; regio autem ipsi prsestabit id, quod erit a?quatum et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerumpubhearum modis.' He proceeds to say, that each of the simple forms is liable to change and depravation ; but he adds : ' Hoc in hac juncta moderateque permixta conformatione reipublicse non ferme sine magnis principum vitiis evenit' (i. 45). ' Statu esse optimo constitutam rempublicam, qua; ex tribus generibus illis, regali et optimati et populari confusa modice, nee puniendo irritet animum immanem ac ferum . . . .' ii. 23 (the latter passage is a fragment preserved by Nonius). Compare ii. 9, 39; iii. 14; Leg. iii. 5, where the doctrine of Scipio in the dialogue De R. P. is referred to. SECT. 13.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 261 As an example of his views respecting the best form of government, Cicero selects the positive instance of the Roman state, which substantial and actual model he considers as prefer- able to any ideal and shadowy type, such as that of Plato j ( 6S ) and he accordingly traces its constitutional history from Romulus downwards. The dialogue of the Laws, like that of the Republic of Cicero, has only reached us in an imperfect state. Out of five or six (68) ' Facilius autem quod est propositum consequar, si nostram rem- publicam vobis et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et jam firmaru atque robustam ostendero ; quam si mihi aliquant, ut apud Platonem Socrates, ipse finxero' (ii. 1). ' Nam princeps ille (Plato) quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumpsit, in qua eivitatem extrueret arbitratu suo ; praeclaram quidem illam foi'tasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrent em et a moribus. Keliqui disseruerunt, sine ullo certo exemplari formaque reipublica;, de generibus et de rationibus civitatum. Tu, mihi videris vtrumqucfacturus; es enim ita ingressus, ut, quae ipse reperias, tribuere aliis malis, quam ut facit apud Platonem Socrates, ipse fingere ; et ilia de Urbis situ revoces ad rationem, qua; a Komulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt ; et disputes non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una rcpublica. Quaro perge, ut instituisti : prospicere enim jam videor te reliquos reges perse- quentem quasi perfectam rempublicam' (ii. 11). Tbis passage well illus- trates tbe difference between tbe purely ideal model, and the real model partially idealized. Again (in c. 30) speaking of Plato, be contrasts tbe two sorts of models : ' Ego autem, si quo modo consequi potuero, rationibus eisdem, quas ille vidit, non in umbra et imagine civitatis, sed in amplissima rcpublica enitar, ut cujusque et boni publici et mali caussam tamquam virgula, videar attingere.' Again (c. :V.)) : 'Quod autem exemplo nostra civitatis usus sum, non ad definiendum optimum Btatum valuit; nam id fieri ]>otuit sine exemplo; sed ut acivitate maxima reapse cemeretUT quale C88et id, quod ratio oratioque describcret.' The description of the Roman Ktate, as an example of an excellenl government, in the dialogue Ih litpithUcA, is alluded lorn Two, Disp.lV. 1. The opinion that the Etonian constitution is the 'optimus longe si at us civitatis, ' is referred to in Rep. i. 21. Compare likewise the passage in the dialogue Dc Legibus, iii. 5 : — ' Q. Quam brevi, (rater, m conspeel u posita est a to magistratuum descriptio : sed ea pamc nostra) civitatis: et.-i a te paullum ulatum est tun L ' I/. IJcetissime, Quinte, animadvertis. EEflBC esl enim, quam Seipio laudat in bin-is el quam mazime probal temperationem reipubliosB: qua cflici non potuissct, nisi tali deseriptione niagisl latniiin. Nam lie habetotO] magistratiDus, iisque qui prasunt, contineri rempublioam, et ei eorum compositione, quod cujusque reipublica genus ut, intelligi. QueB res quum lapientissime moderatissimeque oonstituta essel a majoribus aostris, nihil habui, sane non modo Diultum, quod putarem oovandum in Legibus.' In this passage, Oicero refers to Seipio in his own Republic, as Aristotle refers to Socrates in the Republic of Plato. The [toman constitution is treated as an actual model of excellence by Polybius, vi. is-. ;;„jt< in) ol6v t' tTvot, ravTr/i tvpttV Afifiixo IToKlTIUU OVOTWTIP, 262 ON IDEAL MODELS. [c'HAP. XXII. books, only three, and those not entire, have been preserved. The early part of it is occupied with an inquiry into the nature of law : the latter section contains the outline of a model legisla- tion, founded on the Roman laws, of which the portion extant relates to religion and magistrates. Though there may be little originality in the political philosophy of Cicero, yet he writes on political subjects with the authority derived from his practical experience as a Roman statesman, ( C9 ) and he avoids the extrava- gances of many speculators upon the best government, by adhering closely to a real model. It appears, therefore, that the entire political speculation of the ancient philosophers substantially took the form of inquiries after the best form of government. Their problem was purely ideal ; but, however general their language, and however complete their apparent emancipation from the data of any actual case, they nevertheless, in fact, circumscribed their idea by the condi- tions of an Hellenic or Italian city community. While they professed to treat their hypothesis in vacuo, they in truth im- mersed it in matter. While they assumed to range through all space, they in truth only took a walk before their own doors. Even Xenophon, in recounting the actions of Cyrus the Great, and painting a supposed historical picture of Ins empire, cannot avoid representing his Oriental subjects, in part, under the image of the free citizens of a Grecian republic. ( r °) Plato visibly assumes an Hellenic community as the substratum of his perfect state. Even the views of the scientific and far-sighted Aristotle are bounded by the same horizon; and Cicero, in his political treatises, designedly holds up the Roman state as a model, instead of resorting to pure ideals. ( 71 ) (69) On his advantages over the Greek writers in this respect, see De Rep. i. 8 : De Leg. hi. 6 ; Epist. ad Quint. Frat. hi. 5. (70) Thus, in Cyrop. i. 3, § 17, he speaks of the Median judge giving his vote — transferring to Asia the Greek usage. (71) 'La debile portee de notre intelligence, et la brieve te de la vie individuelle, comparee a la lenteur du developpement social, retiennent notre imagination, surtout a l'egard des idees politiques, vu leur complica- tion superieure, sous la plus etroite dependance du milieu effectif dans lequel nous vivona actucllcment. Meme les plus chimeriques L T topistes, SECT. 14.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 263 § 14 Besides the philosophers who avowedly constructed an ideal state, there was, in antiquity, a class of writers who attained the same end by the description of a fictitious people, supposed to have a real geographical existence. The invention of imaginary communities dates from the commencement of Greek fiction. The yEthiopes, the Lotophagi, the Phseaciaus, the Lsestrygones, the Cyclopes, the Cimmerians of the Odyssey, are all poetical nations, without any place in positive geo- graphy. ('""■) The Hyperboreans and the Amazons, and some of the remote tribes of Herodotus, as the Issedoncs and the Arinias- pians, belong to the same category. These fictions formed a part of the poetical and popular mythology of Greece, and were devoid of any doctrinal purpose, like the kingdom of Prester John, imagined by the early travellers. ( r:i ) When, however, the primi- tive faith of the Greeks in their legendary lore had been shaken by the progress of intelligence, a demand arose for moral tales, under the garb of reality. Hence, Hecatseus of Abdera, a contem- porary of Alexander the Great, wrote a description of the innocent and sacred nation of the Hyperboreans, who passed a life of un- interrupted bliss, without toil and without war, in a mild region, situated beyond the cold blasts of the north wind.("') About qui croicnt s'etrc entierement aflranchis de toute condition de reality, subisscut, . : i li'iir insu, ccttc insurmontable ne'oessite', en r£fle*tan1 toujours fidelement, par leurs reveries, l'etat social contemporain. A plus forte rai8on, la conception d'un veritable systeme politique, radicalement dif« iVrcnt de celui qui nous entoure, doit-clle cxn'der les liorneH fondamen* tales de notrc faible intelligence.' — Comtc, Coins d< I'l/iloxopl/ic /'ositive, torn. iv. p. 157. (72( On these imaginary communities, Bee Nitzsch, Anmerkungen wur Odytsee, vol. iii. pref. p. ocvii. \wiii. Speaking of the countries related to nave been visited by Ulysses, .Mr. Payne ELnighl Bays: ' Neque serioria sevi geographi, qui eas gentea el regionea inter wets Sicula, Tyrrhena, &o., perquirebant, ahter mihi errasse ridentnr, quam riquia inter insulas I toeanj Australia Gulliverianua istaa Ldlliput, Blefuaoue, &c„ perquirere Buaceperit. 1 Vrol. ad llom. § lit; compare Qrote, "Hist, qfGhr. vo\. i. p. 884. (;>) Concerning Prester, or Presbyter, John, a tuppoaed Christian king in Central Asia, see fitter's A ten, vol. i. p. 288-99; Gibbon, Decl, mi, I Fall, c. 47. (74) Sec 1 lie fragments of thia worl of Elecateana of Abdera, in IFragm, Hi, 1. Gfr. vol. ii.p.886; ed. Didot, with the remara of the editor, 0. M tiller, upon the character of the work. The notion of the Byperbon as a sacred people ia embodied in I he paaaage of Pindar, Pytk, \. 56. Bee generally, ukert, Geogr, ier Gfr. und Romer, iii. 8, |>. 898. 264 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. the same time, likewise, another writer, calling himself Iambulus, published an account of an imaginary state of happiness and virtue to be found in an island of the Southern Ocean, four months' sail from the land of the /Ethiopians. ( 7S ) These islanders were four cubits in height, and lived 150 years : the climate was mild throughout the year, and the soil produced spontaneously the means of subsistence. They were free from diseases, and at a fixed age they put themselves to death, by sleeping upon a narcotic plant. They had no marriages, but the women were common ; the children were brought up as the offspring of the community ; hence, all incentive to discord was removed, and the people lived in perfect harmony. ( 7l! ) Euhemerus, likewise, who belonged to the age of Alexander, invented an imaginary island of Panchaia in the far east, the supposed seat of the monuments which, according to his system of interpretation, proved the gods of Greece to have been ancient kings and military leaders. ( ;7 ) Theopompus, the writer of the history of Philip, also described (75) A summary of liis account is given by Diodorus, ii. 55-60. Com- pare Lucian, Yer. Hist. i. 3. Iambulus ('IdpfiovXos) appears to be a fic- titious name. It does not occur elsewhere as the name of any real person. — See Pape, Worterbuch der Griech. Eigennamen, in v. It is, moreover, formed according to a false analogy. The law of composition in such proper names as 'EvtovXos, KXe6€ovXos, Nucotovkus, 'AptaTo^ovXos, Neo^oiAj?, is different. Voss (De Hist. Gr. lib. iii. p. 178) inserts Iambulus in his list of Greek historians ; with equal justice Jacques Sadeur, Capt. Siden, or Lemuel Gulliver, might be inserted in a list of French or English historians. (76) The idea of social harmony as the result of community is probably borrowed from Plato's Republic. Compare Aristot. Pol. ii. 5. There is a curious coincidence between a passage in the description of the Austra- lians of Iambulus, and a passage in Gulliver, which is probably accidental. The mode of writing among the Australian islanders is thus described : ypd(povcri be tovs aTi\ovs ova els to irkdyiov eKTeivovres, cbanep fjpe'is, dW avaBev Karat KaTaypdcpoirres els 6p66v. — Diod. ii. 57. Swift, on the other hand, thus describes the mode of writing at Lilliput : ' Their manner of writing is very peculiar, being neither from the left to the right, like the Europeans, nor from the right to the left, like the Arabians, nor from up to down, like the Chinese, but aslant, from one corner of the paper to the other, like ladies in England.' (77) Plutarch speaks of these records : ev Tldyxovri ypdppaai xp vo ~ ois dvayeypappevmv, ois ovre (3dp€apos ovbels ovre EXKtjv, aXXa povos Evqpepos, toy e'oiKe, Trkevcras els tovs prjbapodi yrjs yeyovoras, pr/be bvras Ilay\aovs Kai TpicpvWovs, evTeTv\r]Kei. — De Is. et Os. c. 23. The fabulous island in the Erythraean sea, where the monument of king Erytbras was said to exist, may perhaps have been the origin of the island Panchaia. — See Curt. x. i. SECT. 15.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 265 two imaginary communities of saints and warriors, in a conversa- tion supposed to have been held by Midas and Silenus. The former of these nations lived in peace and plenty; the earth produced them everything without labour, and they were exempt from diseases. ( 7S ) The Nephelococcygia of Aristophanes, and the islands described in the True History of Lucian, arc in a burlesque vein, and are the prototypes of the satirical imaginary states, which modern literature has produced. § 15 After the revival of literature, speculators on politics generally followed the treatise of Aristotle, and delivered their doctrines in a positive form. Machiavel and Bodin were acquainted with this work through the medium of Latin translations, and not only borrowed many of its conclusions, but imitated its method. Sir Thomas More, however, in the early part of the sixteenth century, collected his political ideas into the framework of an ideal state, to which he gave the name of Utopia, so called from its not existing in any real place. ( 7:I ) This work, from the peculiarity of its plan, acquired so much celebrity, that an Utopia has become a common appellative for any imaginary state^ 80 ) Its opinions are humane and mild, as compared with those of the age, and, being written with reference to the then existing state of Europe, it \v;is read with more interest than Plato's Republic, which assumed a different condition of the (78) Ap. ^Elian. V. II. iii. L8 \ Fragm. Hist. Or. vol. i. 1-. 289j ed. Didot. The conversation of Midas and Silenuw was placed in Macedonia, ll'i'il. viii. 138. Hence its introduction into the Philippics ofTheopom- t)us. Silenus was conceived, not merely us one of the retinue of Bacchus, mt also as a prophet and a aage. Aristotle, in bis dialogue entitled Eudemua, or nejA ^vx^s, represented him as imparting lessons of wisdom to Mida-*. — 1'lnt. Contol. ad Apollon.o. -7 \ Oio. Tueo. Disp.i. is. Com- pare Virg. Eel. vi. (79) See Eallam, /./'/. qf Europe, vol. i. ]». '-^7. The Brsl cdiin.ii ap- peared in L616-— Donlop's History qf Fiction, vol. iii. p, 132. (So) Suspecting the European celebrity of the Utopia soon after its publication, see Cresacre M ore's Life qfSir '/'. More, p. L9-68. Ortensio La.ndi, an Italian, who wrote upon inventions about the middle of the six- teenth century (1648), published anonymously, under the appellation of 'a citizen of Utopia.' — Bee Beckmann, Hist, qf Two. art. ' Bibliography of the Eist. of [nventions,' eol. i. p. 614. A colon) of Utopians are intro- duced in Rabelais, liv. iii. 0. i. 266 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXI I. civilized world. Being composed in Latin, moreover, it was accessible to the entire European republic of letters. Now, how- ever, it probably meets with few readers ; and of the many who speak of an Utopia, but a small proportion have had the curiosity to acquaint themselves with Sir T. More's romance. Utopia, or the best form of government, ( sl ) is in the form of a narration by a Portuguese gentleman, named Raphael Hythlo- dseus, whom Sir Thomas More meets at Antwerp. This Raphael had accompanied Americus Vespucius in three of his voyages, but had been left by him in the most distant place where they touched, whence he was enabled to visit the island of Utopia. The work was printed in 1515, and the fiction was doubtless suggested by the recent discovery of America. The island is described as 200 miles in diameter in its broadest part, and adjoining the American continent. Its name was derived from Utopus, who conquered it, and reclaimed the inhabitants from barbarism. It contains fifty-four cities, the principal of which is Amaurotus, upon the river Anydrus.( 82 ) The form of the Utopian government is thus described. Thirty families chuse every year a magistrate, who was anciently called the syphogrant, but is now called the phylarch; and over every ten syphogrants there is another magistrate, who was anciently called the tranibor, but of late the archphy larch. All the sypho- grants, who are in number two hundred, chuse the prince out of four names, which are selected by the people of the four divi- sions of the city. The prince holds his office for life, but the (8i) The title of the woi*k is De Optimo Heipublicce Statu, deque Nova Insula Utopia. (82) The principal names in this romance are, as Sir James Mackin- tosh has remarked ( Works, vol. i. p. 417), Greek derivatives, suggestive of the unreal character of the narration. Thus, Utopia, like Outis in the Odyssey, is the place which exists nowhere. The Achorians, Ademians, and Alaopolitae, are similar negations of country and people. Amaurotus, the capital city, is invisible. Anydrus, its river, is waterless. The Nephe- logeta?, a neighbouring nation, like ]N~ephelococcygia, are also mentioned ; also the Anemolians. Hythlodseus is a learner of trifles. It is true, as Scaliger has observed, that the name Utopus, or Utopia, is not correctly formed, according to the rules of Greek composition. It ought to be Atopia ; but as this word had a meaning in Greek, More was forced to make the barbarous compound Ovronia. SECT. 15.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 267 tranibors and other magistrates are chosen annually. The trani- bors form the prince's council, but two syphogrants are always present at the deliberations. Sir T. More, however, does not dwell on the form of the Utopian government. His main object is to describe its social institutions and laws. It is these which characterize his ideal state, and which contain whatever there is of original, important, or instructive in his views. Accordingly, he gives a copious survey of their system of agricultural and manufacturing labour — of their trade — their domestic institutions — their slavery — their military discipline and mode of warfare — their rules as to travelling — their punishments and rewards — their religious opinions — their science, literature, and arts. Sir T. More so far departs from the Platonic model of communism, that he recognises marriage — but he retains community of goods. He thinks that, ' as long as there is any property, and while money is the standard of all other things, a nation cannot be governed justly or happily.' (^) ' Until property is taken away, there can be no equitable or just distri- bution made of things, nor can the world be happily governcd.'( sl ) In Utopia, whatever is manufactured by private families is depo- sited in public magazines, from which every father of a family may take what he thinks fit, without payment. With reaped to the produce of the earth, the superabundance of one part of the island supplies the deficiency of another, freely, u ilhout exchange, so that the whole island is, as it were, one family. When the produce of the land exceeds the wants of the native population, the surplus is exported : a seventh pari of the exports is given to the poor of the countries to which they are sent — the real Is sold at moderate rates. | ') The Utopians, likewise, as well as the citizens of the Platonic state, mess together at puhlie tables. They make no use of money, and they set DO Value upon gold and silver, or precious Btones. They likewise prohibit lawyers — every one of them is skilled in their law : it i> a \ cry short st nd\ , and the plainest meaning of which word- are capable is always (83) B. 1. 1 Tbid. I'-. 11. 268 ON IDEAL MODELS. [chap. xxil. the sense of their laws. They detest war, and despise military glory, and only fight in self-defence. Sir T. More retains slavery, in a modified form, as an institution of his best possible state, which, considering that villenage was virtually extinct in England in his time, is a remarkable proof of the influence which the opinions of the ancient philosophers exercised upon his specu- lations. When the description of the constitution of the Utopian commonwealth has been completed, it is declared to be ' not only the best in the world, but to be, indeed, the only common- wealth which truly deserves that name/ The New Atlantis of Bacon — the name of which is borrowed from Plato's fiction of a supposed island or continent in the far west( 8B ) — is an unfinished work, containing a description of a col- lege, under the name of Solomon's House, established for the interpretation of nature and the production of beneficial inven- tions. His lordship (says Rawley) intended, in the same fable, 1 to have composed a frame of laws, or of the best state or moidd of a commonwealth/ but was prevented from executing his design. ( 87 ) § 16 Another work, belonging to the same class, and not long posterior to the Utopia and the Nova Atlantis, was the Civitas Solis of Campanella.( ss ) This writer — a Calabrese monk — had been a practical revolutionist in his native country; and, after having been subjected to torture and imprisonment by the Spanish viceroy of Naples, luckily escaped with his life, and was able to take refuge in Paris, where he published some works of great speculative freedom in religion and morals. The Civitas Solis is in the form of a dialogue between the grand master of the Hospitallers, and the captain of a Genoese (86) See Martin, Etudes sur le Timee de Tlaton, torn. i. p. 257 : ' Dis- sertation sur l'Atlantide.' (87) Bacon's Works, vol. ii. p. 321. (88) The Civitas Solis was first printed in 1637, at the end of his Philo- sophic* Realis Libri quatuor, Paris, fol. The author died in 1639. In the Utrecht edition of 1643, the title is thus given : F. Thomee Campanella; Civitas Soils Poetica — Idea Reipublicce Philosophicce.' There is a recent French translation of this work, by A^illegardelle (Paris, 1840), to which an account of Campanella is prefixed. SECT. 17.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 269 vessel, the latter of whom narrates the constitution of a common- wealth, which he is supposed to have found in the Island of Taprobane, or Ceylon. The head of this state was called II Oil — in our language the Metaphysician. He was assisted by three ministers, named Pon, Sin, and Mor — in our language, Power, AVisdom, and Love. The laws and administration of this ima- ginary state are described in detail, the most characteristic of which are community of women and of goods. The Solarians, moreover, never engage in any war which is not strictly defen- sive, and they use money only for buying, not for selling. § 17 Harrington's Oceana^'') was the fruit of the English civil war, and of the impulse which political speculation, and the formation of ideal constitutions, received from the execution of the king, and the destruction of the established government. The work was composed after the king's death, and published in 1656 — Cromwell's consent to its publication being with difficulty obtained. The names are fictitious, but the application of the scheme to England is direct and avowed. England, Scotland, and Ireland, are represented under the names of Oceana, Marpe- sia, and Panopsea, while Olphaus Megaletor, the lord archon of the ideal state, is the lord protector, 01ivcr.("") IIarrington(") declares in the introduction, that his work is the offspring of the civil war.( 92 ) Its details are too copious to admit of abridgment ; (89) Concerning Harrington's Oceana, see Hallam, Lit. qf F.ur.xcA. iv. p. 30(5; Hume's Essays, part 1, essay 10, 'On the Idea of a Perfect Common- wealth.' (90) See a list of the names in Toland's Life, (p. xxi.) prefixed I" bis Works, 1 vol. fol. 1737. (91) Harrington was one of the leading member! of a club called the Rota, which met under the Protectorate, to discuss and promote constitu- tional schemes. — lb. p. xxviii. (92) 'These countries, having been anciently distinct and hostile Iring- doms, came by Morpheus the Marpesian [James I. . who succeeded by hereditary right to the crown of < taeana, not only to be joined under one head, but to be r:\^, as it were by a charm, into that profound sleep, which, broken al length bythe trumpet of civil war, has produced those effects that have rriven occasion to the ensuing discourse, divided intofour parts. 1 OcriliK/, p. 'M'l. According to Toland, (Life, -p. svii.) the account which Harrington gave his friends of the origin of his Oceonawasaa follows: 'That ever since he began to examine things seriously, he had principally addicted himself 2 70 ON IDEAL MODELS. [ciIAP. XXII. but it is manifestly intended as a practical project for the re- modelling of the English government under the protectorship of Cromwell, and it was so considered by the author. ( 93 ) Though the form is that of a fiction, or (as Harrington himself called it, when soliciting permission to print it) a ' political romance/ ( 94 ) yet it consists principally of a plan of a constitu- tion drawn up under separate heads, and with the precision of a practical legislator, while the introductory part is in the form of a positive treatise on the principles of government. Harrington evidently wished to be the Sieyes of the English revolution, ( 95 ) and his Oceana was a practical plan, disguised, from prudential motives, in a masquerade dress. § 18 The representation of ideal states of society through the medium of imaginary nations, discovered by supposed navi- gators — sometimes in a literal, and sometimes in a satirical spirit — was continued about this time by various writers of greater or less celebrity. The Mundus alter et idem of Bishop Hall, pub- to the study of civil government, as being of the highest importance to the peace and felicity of mankind ; and that he succeeded, at least to his own satisfaction, being now convinced that no government is of so accidental or arbitrary an institution as 'people are tvont to imagine, there being in societies natural causes producing their necessary effects, as well as in the earth or the air. Hence he frequently argued, that the troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulness or faction, neither to the mis- government of the prince, nor the stubbornness of the people ; but to a change in the balance of property, which, ever since Henry the Seventh's time, was daily falling into the scale of the commons from that of the king and the lords, as in his book he evidently demonstrates and explains ...His chief aim, therefore, was to find out a method of preventing such dis- tempers, or to apply the best remedies when they happened to break out.' (93) See the epitome of the whole commonwealth, p. 204. (94) Toland's Life, p. xix. That Cromwell understood Harrington's work as being, in substance, a proposal for the establishment of a constitu- tion which would place limits upon his power, is evident from his remark upon it, as reported by Toland : ' After the perusal of it, he said the gentleman had like to trepan him out of his power, but that what he got by the sword he would not quit for a little paper shot ; adding, in his usual cant, that he approved the government of a single person as little as any of them, but that he was forced to take upon him the office of a high constable, to preserve the peace among the several parties in the nation, since he saw that, being left to themselves, they would never agree to any certain form of government, and would only spend their whole power in defeating the designs, or destroying the persons, of one another.' — lb. p. xx. (95) See Burke, Letter to a Noble Lord. SECT. 18.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 27\ lishetl in the early part of the seventeenth century, is a broad satire, composed under fictitious names of countries, each distin- guished by its appropriate vice, as Crapulia, Yvronia, Laver- nia.( 96 ) Swift's Lilliput and Brobdignag may likewise be con- sidered as ideal states, the conception of which was borrowed from some of the works already mentioned. ( 9r ) Even in the more serious of these, as the Utopia, the satirical vein is often very perceptible. The History of the Sevarambians, a description of an imagi- nary people in the Southern Ocean, appeared almost simulta- neously in London and Paris, near the end of the seventeenth century. Like other works of this class, it departed widely from received practices and opinions : thus, it proscribed all social distinctions arising from birth, all private property, and all arts which minister to luxury; it provided that all children, after seven years of age, should be adopted by the state ; and it recommended a system of natural religion. (^ The Awn! arcs fife Jacques Sadeur, another supposed description of an austral nation, in which similar communist notions occur, was published about the same time.( w ) In this Utopia, the difficulty about marriage, and the appropriation of women, is overcome by the hypothesis of an androgynous people. All things, however, are in common — the distinction between maun and tnnm is unknown. Thej () In Bishop ITall'a Works, vol. xii. (ed. L839). Sec Bayle, Viet. art. ' Ilall,' note G. Ilallam, Lit. of Europe, vol. iii. p. 684. !<)-) Concerning the resemblance <>f Gulliver to the Utopian class of fictions, see Scott's Life of Swift, p. 339, ed. Xvo. (p8) The authorship of this work is uncertain. Thai of the French version, which is considerably enlarged and altered ('nun the English original, appears to 1"' fixed by Bufficienl testimony to bo obscure French writer, nann • d'Allais. The author of the English work is un- known. — Sec JW'.v "//./ ({//< rir.s. vol. iii. (()()) This wort was firs! printed al Genera in L676. The author of it w;i- .-i French monk, named Gabriel Foigny, \\li" lefl lii« convent, and embraced i he protestanl faith. It baa since been reprinted more than once: the last edit ion is in t lie collect inn of Voyagi Imaginairet, tom. KXVf. The recent reprints are taken from an editi f L692, which ».> altered by the A lil >e oaguenet. An English translation was published at London, in L893. It was also translated into German. Bee Bayle, Diet, arl '■ Sadeur, ' noteG.; Biogr. Univ. in 'Foignj j' Barbier, Diet, det Anonyntee, Nos. 1441, 1.7,668; Mylius, Bibl. Anon, et Pteud. pari ii. p. L60 272 ON IDEAL MODELS. [('HAP. XXI r. live in perfect union, without division or discord. There is an entire social equality ; they are bom free, and continue in a state of freedom, without being subject to any superior power. In their army there is complete regularity, without discipline or commanders. They enjoy all the means of subsistence, without either parsimony or forethought. They wear no clothes, which they consider contrary to nature; they eat no animal food, and they are free from diseases. ( 10 °) §19 Fenelon's descriptions, in his Telemaque, of the happy land of Bsetica, in Spain, and of the city of Salentum, in Italy, ( un ) likewise serve to embody his ideas of a well-governed kingdom and a blissful state of society. The same style of political fiction, for purposes of instruction, is pursued by his imitators and admirers, the Chevalier Ramsay and the Abbe Terrasson — the former in the Voyages de Cyrus, the latter in the Egyptian romance entitled Sethos.( w -) The happy valley of Rasselas belongs to the same class of fictions, though its scope is ethical rather than political, and it does not profess to deal with historical or mythological names. Montesquieu, in his Lettres Persanes (xi.-xiv.), gives an account of the virtuous community of the Troglodytes, whose state was originally vicious. Like the happy valley of Rasselas, they are placed in Africa, which is also the seat of the ideal na- tion of the Mezoranians, described in the imaginary travels of (ioo) See Voyages Imag. torn. xxiv. pp. 301, 302, 315, 317-8, 320, 321, 334, 364, 372. (ioi) Salente, near Tarentum, liv. vii. and x. Mr. Stewart {First Dissert, p. 83) commends the enlightened opinions on government in Tele- maque. Terrasson, in the preface to Sethos, p. v. says : ' Je n'ai pas lieu de me repentir d'avoir dit autrefois, en parlant de Telemaque, que si le bonheur du genre humain pouvait naitre d'un poeme, il naitroit de celui-la : quoique ceux qui gouvernent le monde s'appliquent rarement a la lecture.' Dumont, in his edition of Bentbam's work on Legislation, remarks : ' Le Telemaque ne dut ses succes eclatans ni a sa morale, ni au charme du style, mais a l'opinion generale qu'il contenait la satire de Louis XIV. et de sa cour.' — Traites de Legislation, torn. i. p. 20. (102) See the dialogue between Cyrus and Solon, in b. v. of the Voyages de Cyrus, and that between Cyrus and Pythagoras in b. vi. Also, the de- scription of the nation of the Atlantes, and the sacred people of the Hespe- rides, in Sethos, b. viii. On political romances, see Dunlop, Hist, of Fiction, e. 10, vol. hi. p. 132-56. SECT. 19.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 273 Gaudentio di Lucca. ( I03 ) This people, governed by a magistrate named a pophar, divided into five nomes, and having for its capital the city of Phor, dwell in a fertile territory in the centre of Africa, where they are visited by Signor Gaudentio. Their government is simple and patriarchal ;(" 14 ) but what chiefly distin- guishes them is the system of community, fraternity, and equality according to which they live. ' The whole country is only one great family, governed by the laws of nature, with proper officers, constituted by the whole, for order and common preservation. Every individual looks on himself as a part of that great family. The grand pophar is the common father, esteeming all the rest as children and brothers, calling them universally by that name, as they all call one another brothers, bartering and exchanging their commodities as one brother would do with another Every man, wherever he goes, enters into what house he pleases, as if it were his own home One may say of them, that they are all masters and all servants ; every one has his employment. Generally speaking, the younger sort wait on the elders, changing their offices as is thought proper by their superiors, as in a well-regulated community. All their children universally are taught at the public expense, as children of the government, without any distinction but that of personal merit They arc the freest, and yet strictest, people in the world, the whole nation being more like one universal regular college or community than anything else. '("'"') They likewise enjoy perpetual peace, and rest from external and almost from internal broils. ( ,oc ) Lastly, it may be mentioned that Baron v. Ilolbcrg, a (103) This well-written fiction, which has been erroneously ascribed t" Bishop Berkeley, was in fact the work of Simon Berington, ■ oatholia priest. The statement in the Gentleman's Ufagomne, which ataigni to liim the authorship of this work, is confirmed bj the tradition of his family in Herefordshire, as I have ascertained from authentic information. See Notes and Queries, toL ii. p- 247,298, 827. Thai the Reverend. Simon Borintfton lived as chaplain with (lie f'ninily "f K«>wle* in Staffordshire, and vrai the author of Gaudentio > Arte Poet. 391-40] ; also to Romulus, Bacchus, and the Dioscuri, Epitt. ii. 1. 5-8. Somewhat similar (unctions are assigned to Menas, firsl king of Egypt, by Diod. i. l"> ; also to Evanderand Hercules, bv Dion. Hal, Ant, Bom. i.'.i'.i, 41 : to .bums, by Plutarch, Num. L9 i Quart. Uom.22, a.ooord- ingto 2E%ch\ ius, the advance from the rude and helpless state of mankind to the arts of civilization is due to Prometheus. Prom, 161-615. Euripides [Buppl. 201-16) attributes the same change to 'some u r "l. i. p. "Jiu; ed. Heeren), the transition from the savage ana cannibal state of primitive man to a state of arts and civil order is ascribed to Prometheus, or to the lessons of necessity. A rationalized account of the same change, from which all divine agency is excluded, is given bi several writers See Lucretius, v. 923, to the end of the book; Diod. 1. 8: Lucian, Amoree, 0.33,34. Critias, in the verses preserved in 8esct. Empiric, adv. Phy .i 64 (p 108 ] ed. Bek« kerb speaks of mankind as having been original!] in s brutish state, from Which they uciv rescued hv the i n - 1 il ill i< >li of UlWS for the pun l-li men I of open offenders. The gods (he Hunks) were a mbsequenl invention of 27G ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. According to another more poetical and legendary concep- tion of the primitive state of the world, mankind was in a state of innocence and bliss. The Greek mythology represented this period as the reign of Cronus, or Saturn, when the gods lived among men, and exercised a direct dominion over them. Other legends of the same mythology portrayed it under the form of the golden age — the first of a cycle of ages, designated by the names of metals, and forming, on the whole, a descending scale in happiness and virtue. During this mythical period, the earth produced its fruits spontaneously and without labour ; the tem- perature rendered clothing superfluous ; there was no agricul- some wise man, for the restraint of hidden offences. — See Bach, Crit. Tyr. Carmina (Lips. 1827), p. 56. Cicero (Pro Sext. c. 42) describes the change from primitive wildness and anarchy to a state of civil society, as having been effected by men eminent for virtue and -wisdom. He speaks of the savage state as a time ' nondum neque naturali neque civili jure descripto.' In the treatise De Invent, i. 2, he attributes this change to ' quidam mag- nus vir et sapiens,' who is endowed with eloquence as well as with wisdom. The power of eloquence as well as of reason, in reclaiming men from their primitive wildness, is also mentioned in De Orat. i. 9. In the Tusculan Disputations, v. 2, this merit is ascribed to philosophy : ' Tu urbes pepe- risti, tu dissipatos homines in societatem vitse congregasti,' &c. Lactantius (Div. Inst. vi. 10) recites and condemns an explanation, which refers the origin of civil society to the fear of wild beasts. Compare on this point, Lucret. v. 980-5. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 99) comprehends in a few verses some of the principal items of the change in question : ' Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris, Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro Pugnabant armis, quae post fabricaverat usus. Donee verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent, Nominaque invenere : dehinc absistere bello, Oppida cceperunt munire, et ponere leges, Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.' Polybius describes the human race as renewed after some great catas- trophe, and emerging from its original state of rudeness. Like the irra- tional animals, they are at first governed by the strongest man, who becomes a monarch. — vi. 5. Compare Sen. JEpist. 90, § 4, 5. The description of the Arcadians in Ovid. Fast. ii. 287-98, embodies the idea of primitive rudeness ; and compare Art. Am. ii. 467-78. Sallust (Catil. c. 6) says of the aborigines of Italy : ' Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum.' Compare Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 9, 10. Vitruvius (ii. 1) describes the introduction of building, and of the other arts. Concerning the food of men in their primitive state, see ./Elian, V. H. hi. 39. On the notions of the Greeks respecting the primitive state of man- kind, see Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griech. Litteratur, vol. i. p. 162. The Greeks conceived the first men as having been formed from trees, stones, or clay. — See Odyss. xix. 163, cum Schol. ; Hesiod. Op. et Di. 144 ; Aristoph. Av. 686 ; Asius, ap. Pausan. viii. 1, 4 ; Virg. JEn. viii. 315 ; Juven. vi. 12 ; also the mythus of Prometheus, who, from being the maker SECT. 21.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 277 ture, nor were arts necessary j there was no trade, and no money — the precious metals had not been discovered, nor was iron used for making the tools of industry or the weapons of destruction ; there was no travelling by sea or land, neither roads nor ships ; beasts were not noxious to man ; no blood was shed ; there was no eating of animal food, and wars were un- known. Everything was in common; the fields were without boundaries — land was unappropriated — there were no houses, no walled cities, no families, and no government except the mild rule of Saturn.( 109 ) § 21 This picture was, in fact, purely ideal : the ancients had no authentic traditions of any such state of society; never- of Pandora (Hesiod. Op. 61, 70), afterwards became the maker of men. — Weiske's Prometheus, p. 497. As to the formation of men from stones by Pyrrha and Deucalion, see Apollod. i. 6, 2 ; Ovid, Met. i. 393-415 ; Virg. Georg. i 61. Respecting avroxdoves, or men formed from the earth (like yqyfvf'is), see Harpocrat. in v. ; Wachsmuth, Hell. Alt. i. 1, p. 321, app. 11 ; Dion. Ant. Rom. i. 10 ; Censorinus, De Die Nat. c. 4. On the meaning of terree filii, see Minucius Felix, in Oct. c. 22, cum not. The origin of civil society, the invention of arts, the formation of governments, &c, are described by Thomson ('Autumn') : ' These are thy blessings, industry,' &c. (109) See, for the description of the kingdom of Saturn, Plato, Politicus, c. 12, p. 269 ; c. 15, p. 271-2 ; Leg. iv. 6, p. 713. The immediate govern- ment of the balfioves is much insisted on by Plato. Compare Dion. Dial. Ant. Rom. i. 36-8 ; Virgil, Georg. i. 125-49 ; Georg. ii. ad Jin. ; Hue. iv. ; Tibull. i. 3, v. 35-50 ; Ovid. Amor. iii. 8, 35 ; Lucian, Satumal. ; Macrob. Saturn, i. 7, 8 ; Justin, xliii. 1 ; Minuc. Fel. in Oct. c. 22, where Saturn is represented as a civilizer. For humorous descriptions of the abundance of the age of Saturn, eeo the comic fragments in Athen. vi. p. 267-8 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. vol. iii. p. 108, 362). The 'age of Saturn' is used by Plutarch (Aristid, 24) to signify the ' good old time.' In Cimon, 10, it refers to community of goods. For the golden age, see Hesiod, Op. et T>i. 109 ; Arat. Than. 100 ; Ovid. Met. i. 88-112; Cic. N. D. ii. 63; Juven. vi. 1-18; Babrius, Proem. i. ; Tacit. Ann. iii. 26; Senec. Epist. 90, § 3, 4. Compare Duttniann, Mytliologus, vol. ii. p. 1. According to Dicrcarchus, (fiiot 'KAXmW, Fragm. 1-5; Fragm. Hist. Gr. vol. ii. p. 23:5-5, ed. Didot,) the primitive state of man was the golden age rationalized. The virus of Dica-arrhuH arc im- portant, as showing the manner in which the poetical figments of the golden age were conceived by the philosophers. The reign of Saturn ana the gulden age were sometimes oonfonndedi Thus Virgil, in the Fourth Eclogue, after speaking of the return of the ' Saturnia regna,' adds: ' Tu modo nascenti pucro, qno ferrea primnm Desinet, ac toto surgel v tjs p.ip.rjpui i'xovtrd errnv rjris tu>v vvv apiara oiKelrai, Leg. iv. 6, p. 713. p.ip.elcrdai Stlv rjpds oiercu trdcrr) p-q-^avfj top eir\ rov Kpovov Xeyopevov j3iov. — lb. In like manner, Fenelon represents Minerva as informing Telemachus, that SECT. 21.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 279 notions. The resemblance of the idealized pictures of the state of nature — of the simple and primitive stage of human society — to the descriptions of the golden age is unmistakeable. Fene- lon's painting of the happy land of Bsetica( ul ) in his TeUmaque, and Pope's description of the state of nature in his Essay on Man,( n -) reproduce many of the features of the golden age — softened down, indeed, in order to give them some colour of pro- bability, but of unquestionable resemblance. Such are, for example, social equality, community of possessions, perpetual peace, absence of money and trade, dislike of the precious metals, preference of an agricultural life, abstinence froin animal food, contempt for riches, arts, and luxury. Some of these, such as community of goods, perpetual peace, abstinence from animal food, and proscription of money, ( U3 ) reappear in the ideal states. Dicsearchus, a distinguished peripatetic philosopher, and the duty of a good king is to renew the golden age : ' Lorsque vous regnerez, mettez toute votre gloire a renouveller l'age d'or.' — Xvldmaaue, liv. xviii. ' Le pays sacro des Hesperides e"toit un example do l'innocence, ou so conservent quelques hommes eloigned du commerce des peuplcs, pervertis par le luxe et par l'ambition. II ajouta que leur nation lui rappeloit verita- blcment l'agc d'or ; non pas lei que des hommes corrompus se le repr<5- sentcnt, mais tel que l'amour de la felicity publique en faisoit Bouhaiter le rctour a des hommes sages.' — Sethos, torn. ii. p. 188. The restoration of good government to Italy by Augustus, is represented by Virgil under the image of a return of the golden au r <'. and of the reign of Saturn : , . . , v , . Augustus Ciesar, divuni genus, aurea coiulet Bascule < 1 1 1 i rursus Latio, regnata perarva Baturno quondam.' JEn. vi. 792. (in) Liv. vii. : ' C'est ainsi quo parlcnt ces hommes sages, qui n'ont appris la sages.se qu'en etudiant la simple nature Ils vnenl tous ensemble sans partager lea terres .... Tousles biens sont oommuns . . . Ainsi, ils n'ont poinl n ne voit parmi bui auoune distinction que oelle qui vient de l'expeYienoe des sages rieillards, on de Is sagesse extraordi- naire de quelques jeunes hommes f the communists of the presenl day. The hist sentence is ;m anticipation of the St. Simonian iloetrine, 'ohaoun leloil sa capaciteV (112) Ep. 3. v. I 16. (113) The belief that the precious meials, and preoions st s, arc miiM'S of wickedness, is of uhl -landing and wide extent Tims, Horace — 280 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. ;v disciple of Aristotle, avowedly rationalized the golden age. He took the legendary description as founded on a basis of fact, and reduced it to conformity with the laws of nature, by sepa- rating and rejecting the marvellous ingredients. ( m ) He explained the subsistence upon the spontaneous bounty. of nature by the primitive ignorance of agriculture : to the scanty and hard fare which this state of things produced, he referred the exemption from disease ; and to the general poverty he traced the uninter- rupted peace and concord, inasmuch as there was nothing worthy of contention. Posidonius, on the other hand, transferred to the golden age Plato's celebrated dictum, of philosophers being kings in the ideal state. ( ns ) The idealized descriptions of states of society, supposed to be real, likewise reproduce many features of the golden age : thus, fraternity and equality exist in the polity of Lycurgus, who like- Avise proscribes the use of money in his commonwealth. ( 116 ) Numa, during his happy reign, maintains an uninterrupted peace with the neighbouring states, and never sullies his hands ' Vel nos in mare proximum Gemmas, et lapides, aurum et inutile, Suninii materiam mali, Mittamus, scelerurn si bene poenitet.' Carm. iii. 24. Also Ovid, in the description of the iron age : ' Itum est in viscera terrae, Quasque recondiderat, Stygiisque admoverit umbris Effodiuntur opes, irritamenta malorum. Jamque nocens ferrum ferroque nocentius aurum Prodierat ; prodit bellum, quod pugnat utroque.' Met. i. 138. It is observable that the golden age is particularly distinguished by the absence of the precious metals. Compare Livy (vii. 25), on the evils of wealth and luxury. The reign of Saturn was characterized by its social equality, of which the Roman festival of Saturnalia was commemorative, see Plutarch Comp. Lye. et Num. 2. (114) a br) kcu et-rj-yovfievos 6 AiK.ala.pxos rbv eVt Kpovov ftiov toiovtov eivai (prjo-iv, el del Xafitavecp p.ev avrbv cos yeyovora na\ fir) fiaTrjv eire!r€(f}t)fU(rfi4vQV, to 8e Xiav iS.v6iK.hv devras els to 8ia tov Adyou (pvaiKov avdyeiv. — Fragm. i. p. 233. (115) ' Illo ergo saculo, quod aureum perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum Posidonius judicat.' — Senec. Epist. 90, § 4. Posidonius was a stoic philosopher, contemporary with Cicero. See above, § 10. (116) Plutarch, Lycurg. 8, 24. SECT. 21.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 281 with the blood of an enemy. ( ur ) According to Plutarch, he ex- hibited a real type of the subsequent idea of Plato, that in a well- governed state the king must be a philosopher. Romulus like- wise, according to Dionysius, proscribed all popular sturirs and legends concerning the gods, which imputed to them acts un- worthy of the divine nature, ( 118 ) thus happily forestalling the principles laid down by Plato for his ideal republic. The state of nature, as described by political speculators, is, in fact, no representation of a positive state of society, derived, directly or indirectly, from the testimony of percipient witnesses. It is a mere ideal picture, into which the painter lias collected all those particulars which he considers characteristic of political and social excellence, and which embody his conception of human society as it ought to be.(" 9 ) If a state of nature is formed by this process, it is naturally held up to imitation. It is an idealized real model of perfection. (117) Dionys. Ant. Rom. ii. 00; Flutarcb, Num. 20; Livy, i. 21 ; Cic. de Rep. ii. 14; Augustin. de Civ. Dei, iii. 9. (118) See ii. 18. (119) In this sense Cicero speaks of nature as being the pattern "I positive legislation : * Secundum naturam que norma Kris est.' — I >, I ■ ii. 24 The state of nature, as conceived by Kousscau, and his political doc- trines on the subject, are well characterized by M. Oomtej ' One telle opposition s'i'tait dejft ouvertement manifested dea I'^poque meme de l'elaboration philosophique de oette doctrine, qu'on peul voir partoui oniformement dominec par 1'ct range notion me'taphysique d'un pretendu I'tat ilc nature, type primordial <•! invariable de boul etal social. Oette notion, radiealeinent eontraire a loute veritable idee de prOgrCS, n'cHt nullement particuliere an puissant sophietequi a le plus partioipd* dane le sh'ele denner, a la co-ordination deliuitive de la nielapli yiique revolution* naire. Bile appartienl egalemenl a bona lea philosophes qui, a diveraea epoqoea ei dans differeni pays, onl apontanement oonconru, sans aucun concert, a ce dernier eeaor de I'eeprit me'taphysique. B o u ece an a't fail reellement, par aa preasante dialectique, que developper juaq'au boul la doctrine commune . 5-62. I !oncerning the character of the Abbe dc St. Pierre, see Wachler, Oesch. der Wist. Forschtmg, vol. ii. j>. 112. (1/;-) Cardinal Alberoni formed a plan for placing Turkey under a Christian ^overmnenf, and for a |>crmanen1 diet, composed of deputies from all Christ* adorn, to hold its sittings al Ratisbon, to which all disputes arising among Christian states should be referred. The majority hereto decide, and the state refusing to Bubmil to the decision was to be proceeded against by the diet. — Moore's Lira < J' Alberoni, Eipperda, and Pombal (London, 1*1 I ; ed. 3), \>. L34 (136) Zitm Evrigen Frieden, 'in Philosophischer "Entuowf. 1795. Sdmmtliche Werlee, rol.vii. pari 1. \>.Tl'.). Condorcet {Tableau dee Pro- qree de V Esprit //",»"/'/', p. 296) looks forward to the time when wrara between nations will be prevented by institul 1 better contrived than ♦ he philosophical projects of perpetual peace. Other more recenl writings on the same subject are mentioned by Zaoharia '•.-„/ Staaie, voL v. p. L6. 288 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAI\ XXII. isolated and self-sufficient community, completely closed against all trade with the rest of the world. ( 13r ) A similar ideal may be formed by supposing the greatest possible freedom of trade with all foreign countries. Limited ideals of the same sort may be formed by considering the state merely in its religious or ecclesiastical character. Thus, the catholic or universal church is an idea, if it be understood in the sense of a church comprehending all men, or even all Christians. Christianity has hitherto been limited to a portion of mankind, and that portion have never been united in one church. The universal church, therefore, means a church which is conceived 'as virtually and potentially including all Christians, or all men. Its universality is ideal. The invisible, as opposed to the visible, church is also an ideal community. The supposition is, that it is a smaller community contained within the visible church, consisting of true, in the midst of erroneous, believers — of saints, in the midst of reprobates — of souls predes- tined to salvation, in the midst of souls predestined to condem- nation. ( 13s ) § 24 We have now ascertained the nature of ideal models in politics, and have seen, by a collection of the most remarkable instances, what are the methods which the fabricators of ideal states, and of other similar patterns of political perfection, have adopted in the execution of their work. It only remains for us to inquire, how far the method of ideal models in politics leads to satisfactory results, and may be expected to furnish the practi- cian with a safe and useful guide. In the first place, then, we may observe, that everything in the nature of an improvement in human affairs implies a pre- conception of a state of things different from their actual state. (137) Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat, first printed in 1800 : in Fichte's Sammtliche WerTce, vol. iii. p. 387. The editor states (Vorrede, p. xxxviii.) that Fichte considered this as his best and most matured work. See ib. p. 454, 472, 476, 478, 500, 502, 504. (138) The distinction between the visible and invisible church is reco- gnised by Burnet, on Art. xix. p. 242. Klee {Kathol. Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 154) rejects the distinction, as not admitting of any certain criterion. sect. 24.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 289 Before an improvement can be executed, it must be devised by somebody. Everything real, which is not a mere reproduction and mechanical imitation of something already existing, must have previously been ideal. Every human contrivance, of which better can be predicated — which, in comparison with other things of the same sort, has attained a higher degree of excellence, must have existed as a mental conception before it was reduced to practice. If we consider all the great items of political progress — such as the introduction of monogamy, of government by a political body, of representative institutions, of the abolition of slavery, of the liberty of the press, of religious toleration, of per- manent embassies, of a standing army, of a government post, of a civil police, &c, we shall find that every one must, when it was newly introduced, have been conceived by its author as an idea] scheme. It is true that important political institutions of this kind are rarely or never produced at a single cast : they arc the result of a scries of accumulations, and they arc formed by a gradual process of accretion. ( 1:,,J ) Still, each new institution may be analysed into a series of successive steps, and each of these must have been made by persons who conceived it as an untried novelty, so that the aggregate may be described as partaking of this character. All improvements in the useful arts arc made in the same manner. All mechanical contrivances for increasing human power, for aiding human faculties, and for abridging human labour, must be the result of an ideal image, conceived by the inventor before it was translated into a real instrument or machine. Alphabetical writing, the saw, the loom, the mill, the ship, the pump, the compass, the steam-engine, the telescope, the balloon, t he di\ ing-bcll, the thermometer — all these must ha\e existed in idea before they existed in reality. (inguet's work on the origin of laws, sciences, and arts, illustrates this analogy, inasmuch ;i- it includes both political institutions and the useful arts, and traces their respective origins by the same method 1 139) 8ee above, ch. xx. § 9. 290 ON IDEAL MODELS. [ciIAr. XX [I. Beckmann's History of Inventions likewise combines with Avorks of art, such as corn-mills and docks, social and political con- trivances, such as quarantine, foundling hospitals, and monts de picte. The analogy betAveen government and the useful arts ex- tends both to the original invention, and to the subsequent im- provements. ( u ") The original idea is usually, in both cases, a mere germ or rudiment, which undergoes a slow process of improvement by practical trials, through a series of fructiferous experiments. The positive institutions and laws of a government are, hke a spinning-machine, a gun, or a ship, first devised in a clumsy and imperfect form, and afterwards improved by a series of tentative inventions. Thus, representative government — a con- trivance unknown to the ancients — may be compared with fire- arms, or the steam-engine; Avhile government by dependencies — a system knoAvn to the ancients, into which the moderns have introduced an improvement by remoAdng the tributary obligation to the imperial state — may be compared with spinning or weaving. When, however, it is said that all improvements, either in government or in the useful arts, must have had an ideal before they acquired a real existence, it is not to be supposed that the neAV Avork is an original creation. Every new institution, every pohtical novelty, is resolvable into elements furnished by preAaous experience. The novelty consists in the combination and mutual adaptation of parts. When we say that a new building has been erected, or a new machine been made, we do not imply that the materials of AA 7 hich it is composed were not already in existence. In hke manner, a new law is framed out of existing elements, and the noA^elty consists in the manner in which those elements are compounded. The wildest products of the imagination are formed out of materials furnished by experience. The chimsera, the sphinx, the centaur, the unicorn, or the griffin — even the most monstrous figures of Oriental sculpture or of mediaeval heraldry — are all resolvable into simple elements, borrowed from (140) 01 hk vonoiTrjs ttoXltiktis epyois ioittcKTiv. — Aristot. Eth. JYic. x. 10. SECT. 24.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 291 external nature. In like manner, the wildest eccentricities of Utopian visionaries are all confined within the limits of political elements furnished by experience. The inventive and constructive faculties of man — whether employed upon outward nature, or upon politics — are his peculiar characteristic, and are the means by which his civilization is effected. They render him capable of progressive improvement. Animals invent nothing, and discover nothing. They detect no hidden laws or operations of nature ; they contrive no new in- struments or mechanical aids for their own use. When they construct, they construct instinctively, as the bee, the wasp, the beaver, and birds which build nests. Their constructions never vary from one generation to another — they neither dege- nerate nor improve ; nor do they vary contemporaneously in different animals of the same species. None is ever better or worse than another — they maintain a constant and uniform level characteristic of the blind and mechanical operations of instinct. Whereas reason, while it is capable of suggesting improvements, is also unsteady, and liable to retrograde movements, so that men may fall back from the point of advanced civilization which they have attained. The arts, also, may be n different states of ad- vancement in different communities of men at the same time. If a bee could form an idea of a better social arrangement for his insect community, or pf a better architectural construction of his comb, than actually exists, and he could instil this idea, either by example or precept, into the other occupants of the hive, the bees might carry these improvements into effect, and they would then be, like men, progressive animals. But having no capacity of forming an ideal picture of a state of tilings, de- pendent on their own acts, which should present advantages absent from their existing state, and should be tree from disad- vantages to which thai existing state is subject, Ihey uece -arilv remain for ever stationary. Animals, moreover, are not only Unable to teach one another, bul they arc unable to learn from one another. One specie: cannot imitate an actual example afforded by another species and make it Berve it in the •-lead of i 2 292 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XMT. an ideal example. They do not compare each other's lot, for the purpose of seeing what is worthy of imitation in the condition of others. Democritus represented man as having derived the arts of weaving and sewing from the spider, and the art of build- ing from the swallow. ( U1 ) Pope describes him as learning from the mole to plough, from the nautilus to sail, and as forming a political community after the pattern of the bees and ants.( 142 ) Whatever truth there may be in these ideas, nobody could have described one animal species as deriving a similar lesson from another. No animal learns anything new, except Avithin the narrow sphere of domestication produced by the influence and tuition of man. For the progress of civil society and political amelioration, three conditions are requisite — 1, the conception of a better state of things than that which actually exists ; 2, the desire to attain it j 3, the choice of apt means for the purpose. Upon the two last of these conditions we will not now dwell. ( 143 ) But with respect to the first, we may remark that the conception of an ideal pattern, better than anything which experience presents — except in a rudimentary state, or on a contracted scale — is a necessary condition for political progress. Out of the past, we may collect the materials for our imaginary structure, but their combination into a new edifice must be our own work. In the ordinary operations of political practice, this ideal project is formed upon real materials, and adapted to an actual case. The basis, (141) See Plutarch, De Solert. Anitn. c. 20 ; Vitruvius (ii. 1, § 2) assigns the same origin to the art of building. Dokius, the son of Ccelus, the supposed inventor of clay huts, is said to have imitated the swallow's nest. — Plin. H. N. vii. 57. According to Lucretius, v. 1378, men learnt music from the song of birds. ' Artes vero innumerabiles repertfe sunt, docente natura : quam imitata ratio, res ad vitam necessarias solerter consecuta est.' — Cic. de Leg. i. 9, where Turnebus says : ' Natura enim exordia quscdam artium nobis ostendit, ut sedificationis in hirundinibus, texendorum retium in araneis.' The story of the transformation of Arachne into a spider is the same idea read back- wards, and expressed in mythical language. See Ovid. Met. vi. 145. On the other hand, Aristotle says that the animals exhibit many points of resemblance to human life (no\\h fiifirjfiara ttjs avdpunr'ivrj^ £a>7]s), but espe- cially the smaller animals, whose intelligence is most exact ; instancing the building of the swallow. — H. A. ix. 7. (142) Esxay on Man, epist. 3. (14.3) See below, ch. xxvii. § 15. SECT. 25.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 293 as well as the superstructure, is, indeed, hypothetical ; but the case supposed is the nearest approach to reality which our powers of divination admit, and the conception or plan is intended to serve only as a model in the individual instance. When, for example, a practical politician prepares a draft of a new law, or a scheme of finance, or a system of prison discipline or of pauper lahour, his plan is ideal, but special j it is Iris own invention, but it is fitted to the circumstances of the actual case. Now the political models which we have been above considering, re- semble such models as these in being ideal ; but they differ from them, in not being framed with reference to a given case of practice. The former models are like a builder's working plan, intended only for a single house — the latter are like a standard measure or weight, from which all other measures and weights are to be imitated. The question, therefore, which we now have to examine is, whether political models, not adapted to a special case, but intended for universal imitation, are useful ? § 25 To this question we may answer, that if the possi- bility of imagining a political model superior to anything that exists be assumed, the contemplation of such an ideal would seem to be beneficial, unless it be subject to preponderating objections. Let us, therefore, consider the objections which may be made to the use of such models. In the first place, it may be said that ideal models in politics arc useless, because they are in general unattainable — because they hold up for imitation an inimitable pattern of perfection. This objection is valid, if the ideal standard be absolutely unattainable j if it consist, in the establishmenl of a goal which can never, by human efforts, be reached. There is a vasi dif- ference between the dillieult and the impossible, as much as there is between a finite quantity, however large, and infinity. A marks. man may improve his aim by shooting at long distances, but Q01 by firing at the moon. Hence, there is a radical unsoundness iu all schemes of ideal perfection, which emancipate themselves from the conditions aecessary to the existence of the institution which is in question as when it is proposed to improve the constitu- •J!) I ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. tion of human society by abolishing political government; to improve a penal system, by introducing a punishment which is nut painful ; or to establish a system for the organization of labour, without either resorting to coercion, or admitting the principle of individual appropriation. Theories which involve the moral and intellectual perfectibility of mankind — in other words, which assume man to be exempt from imperfections inse- parably connected with his nature, ( 1M ) fall under the same cate- gory. They are analogous to propositions for enabling man to live without food( H5 ) or sleep, or to be indifferent to extremes of heat and cold. On the other hand, the objection is not valid, or at all events its force is much weakened, if the standard is not absolutely un- attainable, but only appears to be unattainable relatively to our- selves. For we may, from want of energy, or of self-reliance, or of imaginative power, underrate our ow r n capacity, and over- estimate the difficulties of the case.( 14€ ) Even with respect to real models, the best are always selected, to which we strive to approximate, though Ave may not expect to reach them. A mili- tary man, studying his art, may have before Ins eyes the examples of Marlborough, Turenne, Napoleon, and "Wellington, but with- out hoping to rival any of these illustrious commanders. A sculptor may study the antique, without expecting to equal the Apollo or the Niobe. It is often desirable in politics to form an ideal model of perfection, in the hope, not of attaining, but of approaching it.( w ) We may conceive a state of things which shall be w r holly free (144) The indefinite perfectibility of mankind is maintained by Con- dorcet, Tableau Historique des Progres de V Esprit Sumain, p. 214, 305. ed. 1822. (145) See Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. 4, p. 4Gi, 629. (146) 'Nemo sciet quid potueris, ne tu quidem ipse. Opus est enim ad uotitiam sui experimento. Quod quisque posset, nisi tentaudo non didicit.' — Seneca de Provid. c. 4. (147; After speaking of the Platonic republic, aud the establishment of an ideal standard of political perfection, Kant proceeds thus : ' Ob nun gleich das leztcre niemals zu stande kommen mag, so ist die idee doch ganz richtig, welche dieses maximum zum urbilde aufstellt, um nach demselben die gesezliche vorfassung der menschen dcr moglich grossteu SECT. 25.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 295 from defects, and we may strive to reach as near to it as we can, by reducing the actual defects to a minimum. We may conceive a state of international relations which shall be uninterruptedly pacific. We can imagine perpetual peace : such a supposition, however improbable, is not repugnant to the laws of human nature. But although we may not be so sanguine as to expect that war will actually be banished from the earth, yet we may endeavour to secure the conditions favourable to the maintenance of peace, and to suppress, drive off, weaken, and counteract the influences productive of war. We can conceive a state of things in which few or no violations of the criminal law shall occur ; but although we may not venture to look forward to the actual occurrence of a paradisiacal state of innocence, yet we may attempt to strengthen all the causes which discourage, and to weaken all the causes which encourage, the commission of crime. It is by forming to ourselves ideal models, not im- mediately attainable in practice, but admitting a closer and closer approximation by repeated efforts, that man civilizes himself, that society is made progressive, that ameliorations in political institutions and political states are effected. If man could not frame to himself an ideal, as distinguished from an actual standard of conduct, he could never advance beyond the most civilized portion of his species. It is upon purely ideal models that the practical models of action, when any real im- provement and advance in civilization is effected, are for the most part framed. The purely ideal model is modified, fitted, and pared down, until it is brought within the exigencies of the practical case. rollkommenheit immer naher za bringen. Dens welches der btfohste grad Bern magi beywelchem die menschheil stehenbleiben masse, and tne gross also die klnft, diezwischen der idee and three ausfuhrang aothwendig iihri^ bleibt, seyn moge, il.is kana and soil niemand beatimmen, eben darum, weil es freiheit Lst, seiche jede angegebene grenze aberateigen kann.' — Kritih der Reinen Vemumfl t theil ii. abth. ii. boob L abschn. I. Hume lakes :i similar new: ' In all oases, ii mnsl beadrantag is to know whal is the most perfeoi in the kind, that we maybe able to bring any real constitution or form of government as near ai possible, by snob gentle alterations and renovations as may aol give too great disturbance to iv.' — Eaaayt, pari i. essay 16, '<>n the Cdea of a perfect Common* wealth. 1 296 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. The objection to ideal models, therefore, on the ground that they are beyond the limits of our own ability, is not valid, if they be attainable by human exertions. Even if, relatively to ourselves, they may happen to be unattainable, we may approxi- mate to them, and derive benefit from that which we actually reach, in the unsuccessful attempt to reach something beyond. Moreover, as we have already had occasion to remark, an ideal does not, like a real model, mislead by its imperfections. All that an ideal model contains either is, or ought to be, worthy of imitation, whereas every real model contains some alloy of evil — some defective elements ; and as it is generally easier, and sometimes more pleasant, to imitate what is bad than what is good, there is a danger that the imperfections of a real model, which, on the whole, is excellent, should be selected for imitation. § 26 On the other hand, an ideal model is useless, or even misleading, if it implies the existence of conditions which are unsuitable to our case. An excellent ideal standard, which is applicable, but is hard to imitate, may be compared with a place lying at a distance, which we strive to reach by the right road, but our strength fails before we have arrived at our journey's end ; whereas an ideal standard, which implies inapplicable conditions, may be likened to a place to which we have taken the wrong road, so that we travel on without the prospect of ever reaching our destination. The most remarkable example of this species of ideal model is furnished by the schemes of a perfect state. Every fabricator of a perfect state assumes, or tries to assume, a plain and open area for his edifice : however much he may, in fact, be influenced by contemporary facts, his plan is intended to be drawn upon a white piece of paper. He supposes the existence of a commu- nity ready to receive his laws — flexible, like wax, under his hands ; without recollections of the past, or expectations as to the future ; devoid of existing attachments, preferences, or habits ; having no feelings of vengeance or animosity to gratify, no party SECT. 26.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 297 divisions to embitter them, no patriotic or religious associations to endear the institutions of their couutry, or to inspire confidence in certain public men. Now such a community as this never did, and never can exist. The internal relations of the society which the idealist assumes as his basis are wholly unsuitable and inapplicable to every conceivable real and concrete commu- nity. Not only do they not exist in any actual state, and never have existed, but they cannot, consistently with the laws of our social nature, be even imagined to exist in any actual case. The external relations of the ideal state are, if possible, conceived in a form still more remote from anything which can have a real existence. The writers to whom we refer isolate it from the rest of the world ; they place it, as it were, under an ex- hausted receiver, and remove it from all international influ- ences. Like the republic of Plato, its prototype is in heaven, and it has no place and name upon earth ;( 148 ) or, like Utopia, it (148) The Cretan Utopia of Plato's Laws lias no immediate neighbour. The Athenian asks, yeiroiv 8e avrrjs m>\is ap carat tls tt\t](tiov ; lo which Clinias, the Cretan, answers, ov nduv, 8u> m\ KaTuiKi^erai. — Leg. iv. 1, p. 701. Eenelon describes the happy region of Pnctica, as enjoying perpetual peace: ' La fraude, la violence, le par jure, les proces, les guerres, ne fonl jamais entendre leur voix cruelle etempeste'edansce pays, cheri dea dieux.' This exemption is thus accounted for: 'II me reste, ajoutait Telemaipie, a savoir comment ils font pour evitcr la guerre aveo les autres pcuplcs voisins. La nature, dit Adoam, les a separes dee autrea peuplea dun cote* par la mer, et de L'autre par dea hautes montagnes du cod'' du nord. D'ailleurs, les peuplea voisins les respectcntacause de leur vertu.' — TSUmaque, liv. \ ii. The following accouni of the nation of the Atlantea is given in the poli- tical romance of Sethos : 'Pour passer maintenant a la police dn notre ■'tat, sa constitution nous dispense d'al>ord de celte urande partie qui fail ailleura Le mihtaire, puisque nous n'avona d'autre defense que la faveui dea autres nations, et I'estime qu'elles reulenl bien faire de notre simpli- city. Nous n'avona memo aucun besoin de la politique, en tant qu'elle est I'art do Buspendre lea guerrea, on de reouler lea frontieres par des traites. Peraonne ne nous dispute notre territoire enferme* par la mer a I'oooident, par dens rivieres, le Bubur an midi, el le Zilis an nord, ei par one ohatne de montagnes an levant. Nous ne oheroheronf poinl nonplus a I'acoroltre.' - -Vol. ii. p. 182. The land of the Rfezoranians, in the centre of Africa, is described as difficult to find, even for the natives, and 'unknown to all the world In 'side' (in mil a 1 in ,ii Lucca, p. 1 17. ' lie tells ns si range stories of one of the mosl beautiful countries in the world, in the ?ery heartof the vast deserts <>l' A frica, inaccessible to all the world but by one way, which seems aa extra- ordinary as the oountrj ll lead-, lo. II,. |,. L2. The bappi rallei olRasselat is surrounded on all sides bj impassable mountains, The onlj entrance is through a cavern, closed with iron gates 298 ON IDEAL MODELS. [ciIAP. xxil. is a remote island in an unknown ocean ; or, like the happy valley of Rasselas, and the land of the Mezoranians, it lies amidst the deserts of Africa, and is cut off by an impassable barrier from the rest of mankind. Every real community, however, is influenced in important respects, not only by its internal, but also by its external relations. It is a member of the great community of nations ; it breathes a political atmo- sphere which is common to other countries, and which circulates round the entire civilized world ; it recognises the established principles of international law; its trade, its provisions for defence, and often, in some degree, its form of government, depend upon the character of the states which it immediately adjoins. ( 149 ) It may, therefore, be said, without exaggeration, that the search after the ideal model of the perfect state — which has occu- pied the thoughts of so many illustrious speculators, intent upon the amelioration of mankind — is necessarily, by the very condi- so massy, that they cannot be opened without the help of engines. ' The sages who instructed them, told them of nothing but the miseries of public life, and described all beyond the mountains as regions of calamity, where discord was always raging, and where man preyed upon man.' — C. 2. (149) ' II est une circonstance qui eserce sur la civilisation ou sur la barbarie de certains peuples une influence immense : e'est la position dans laquelle ils se trouvent relativement a d'autres peuples. Une nation qui serait placee ail milieu d'une multitude decirconstances favorables a son deve- loppement, mais qui serait en meme temps exposee aux invasions de peuples condamnes, par leur position, a une eternelle barbarie, ne pourrait faire des progres que dilBcilement. C'est la un des obstacles les plus puissans qu'ont trouves a leur avancement les peuples de la Perse, de la Chine, de l'lndostan, et, je pourrais dire, de presque toutes les parties du globe.' — Comte, Traite de Legislation, liv. iv. c. 10. ' Se questo reame fosse sorto, come un' isola in mezzo all' oceano, spiccato, e diviso da tutto il resto del mondo, non s'avrebbe avuta gran pena a sostenere, per compor di sua civile istoria molti libri ; iinperciocche sarebbe bastato aver ragione de' principi, che lo dominarono, e delle sue proprie leggi ed istituti, co' quali fu governato. Ma poiche fu egli quasi sempre soggetto, e parte, o d' un grand' imperio, come fu il Romano, e dapoi il Greco, o d'un gran regno, come fu quello dTtalia sotto i Longobardi, o finalmente ad altri principi sottoposto, che tenendo collocata altrove la regia lor sede, quindi per mezzo de' loro ministri '1 reggevano ; non dovra imputarsi, se non a dura necessity, che per ben' intendere la sua spezial pohtia, si dia un saggio della forma e disposizione dell' imperio Romano, e come si reggessero le sue provincie, fra le quali le piu digne, ch' ebbe in Italia, furon certamente queste, che compongono oggi il nostro regno.' — Giannone, Istoria Civile del Regno di Napoli ; introd. SECT. 26.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 299 tions of the problem, a search not less irrational and vain than that after the philosopher's stone or the elixir of life. No arti- fice can defeat, no ingenuity can elude, the logical absurdities which the data of the problem involve. They may, at first, be concealed beneath the surface, but as the work proceeds they inevitably come to light. Ideal plans of government assume that the lawgiver has a greater power over the society for which he is to legislate than he really possesses. This supposition lies at the bottom of all schemes of a perfect state, considered as a working model. They suppose a ductility of materials, a plastic nature in the human conglomerate, which does not exist. ( 15u ) Hence the constructor of an Utopia is tempted to pass those bounds, indicated by universal experience and recognised utility, which even the most capricious and self-willed despots have respected. One remark- able example of this error is afforded by the disposition shown, in some of the plans of an ideal state, to treat man, with respect to generation, as man himself treats the domesticated animals, and to establish institutions having for their aim the propagation of a fine human breed. Plato distinctly enounces this object, hiving it down that, in his perfect state, the guardians are to breed from the handsomest individuals, and in the vigour of life — as is done with horses, hunting-dogs, and the nobler species of birds. He accordingly directs that the couples should be selected by the magistrates, the best and the worst of each sex being respectively combined :(" ) he regulates the ages for each (i.-o) Speaking of the Utopian plana of government, Mr. Stewart says: ' Of these plans, Uylartlie ^realrr number proceed <>n the BUppOflitlon, thai i In' social order is entirely the effect of human art ; and that wherever this order is imperfect, the evi] maj be traced bo some want of foresight on the part 01 the legislator or 1 me inattention of the magistrate to the complicated structure of thai machine of which he regulates the move- ments. The projects of reform, therefore, which Buch plans involve are, in general, well entitled to all the ridicule and contempt they have met with, inasmuch as they imply an arrogant and presumptuous belief, in their authors, of the superiority of their own political sagacity to the accumu- lated wisd of former ages.' — Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. ch. I...' 8. \ to political government being a work of human art, see ahove, ch. sviii. § <>. ii-D Bee Sep. v. 7-9, p. 158-01. 1 1 -j) The manner in which this leleotion is appointed to be made is 300 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. sex during which this union is to take place, and the children of the defective couples are, as it appears, not to be reared, in order that the breed of tlie guardians may be maintained in a state of purity. ( 1:,:I ) Campanella likewise, in his Civitas SoIis,( lM ) lays it down that the generation of the citizens is to be entirely under the control of the magistrates, and that the public interest in the selection of the couples is alone to be consulted, the object in view being the physical perfection of the race. The regulations for this purpose which he describes are, like those of Plato, founded on the assumption, that the propagation of the human race is, by legislative enactments, to be regulated on the same principles as the propagation of those domestic animals which are under the control of man.( 155 ) Yet even the contu- bernia of slaves, when the law has regarded them as mere worthy of notice. Plato perceives that the choice exercised by the magis- trates in assigning the most beautiful women to one portion of the guardians, in preference to the other, would give rise to discontent. He therefore directs that this distribution of the two sexes into pairs should be effected apparently by lots ; but that the lots should in fact be prepared secretly by the magistrates — that the dice should be loaded, so as to bring out the result which they desire, without exposing themselves to the charge of favouritism. — See Rep. v. 8. p 460 ; Timceus, c. 2. p. 18. Now, if this pro- position is to be made the subject of serious criticism, it must at once be seen that no trick of this kind could be successful as a permanent system : it would inevitably be disclosed, if it was not detected, and woidd therefore fail of its purpose. If it be said that it is unfair to subject such proposi- tions to serious criticism, it may be asked in return, what, then, is the value of an ideal state ? and whether the reluctance to submit it to serious criti- cism does not imply that it is devoid of practical value ?' (153) Aristotle has a similar set of regulations, among the conditions for the best form of government. Physical excellence in the human breed is the object which he proposes to the legislator : rbv vopo6err)v opav Set oncos fttXTMTTa ra aapara yevrjrai twv Tpe(f)op.eva>i'. — Polit. vii. 16. It is on the same principle that deformed or defective children are, in the ideal states, directed to be killed immediately after birth. See Plat. Rep. v. 8, 9, p. 459, 460; also Aristot. Pol. vii. 16. The Australians visited by Iambulus had the same law, Diod. ii. 57. The government of Sparta appears, indeed, to have recognised these principles in practice : thus, the Ephors fined Archidamus for marrying a little wife, saying that she would breed a puny race of kings : ov yap pamXets clp.p,iv dXka. /3acriXeidia yevpaxrei. — Theophrast. ap. Plut. Ages. 2. (154) 'Non copulant nisi foominas grandes ac pulcras nisi grandibus ac studiosis viris, ct pingues macribus [sic], et macras pinguibus, ut bene tem- perentur et utiliter.' — P. 33 ; see also, p. 35. (155) Campanella refers to the fraudulent method proposed by Plato for determining the unions of men and women in his perfect state ; but he SECTS. 27, 28.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 301 chattels — as mere domestic animals — have never been subjected to sncli merely physical conditions as those indicated by Plato and Campanella. But with regard to free men and women, no practical legislator has ever seriously proposed to regulate their unions on the same principles as the breeding of horses or cattle, and to transfer to human marriages the maxims of the stable and the farm.( 15f ) § 27 Another valid objection to an ideal government, pro- pounded as a type of perfection, which professes to be, not merely better, but the best, is, that it assumes the possibility of our see- ing with our present lights what is the most perfect form of government, and thus implicitly denies the progressive character of human society; unless, indeed, it assumes that this ideal will never be in fact attained, and that society will be the asymptote which, though perpetually approaching the line of ideal perfec- tion, will never touch it. If the writings ' de Optimo reipublica: statu/ were ' de meliore reipublica; statu/ they would at least attempt to solve a soluble problem. But there is nothing to show that, when we have actually climbed to the height indicated by the idealist, we may not discern other heights above us. Until we have had practical experience of an ideal plan of govern- ment, wo do not discover all its defects; and it is by mounting up one platform that we see how another is to be scaled. § 28 One inducement to the composition of imaginary commonwealths has been the facility which they afford for the free expression of opinion, and for the proposal of plans which, if put in a practical form, might give umbrage to rulers, or offend the prevailing sentiments of readers. ('■'') By assuming to describe declares thai any such contrivance is unnecessary in hi* commonwealth, inasmuch as the women lead such active and healthy lives as i>> be all beautiful. Ji is by gratuitous suppositions of this sorl thai the fabricator of an Utopia smooths down difficulties and eludes objections. (156) ( 'in 1 1 pare the remark of M Ghranier de Cs a jnae upon St. Just's propositions respecting marriage for bis ideal state, Hiatoin des Causes 7'.>. (157) Speaking of the TListovrt des Sevarambes, Prosper Marchand (Dili. nist.axt, ' Allais,') says : ' Fiction tres ingenieuse, qui a fail beauoonp de broil parmi les gens de lettres, ei qui parail a'avoir 6te" imagines que SOS ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. xxil. institutions and manners apparently real, the writer is able co- vertly to make recommendations, without delivering any express opinion. A similar advantage belonged to that class of compo- sitions (such as the Lettres Persanes) in which an Oriental traveller describes the government and manners of Europe. These indirect ways of conveying suggestions, and of insinuating blame and praise, are, however, useless in countries where the press is free for the expression of opinion on political subjects, and in which the public is tolerant of political heresies. Although some bold and original thinkers have shown a fondness for tins class of compositions, yet the formation of ideal states seems to be characteristic of the infancy, rather than of the maturity of the human mind. Precocious children, gifted with an active fancy, often amuse themselves with these creations, and produce imaginary sketches of ideal countries with a fertility which seems scarcely to belong to so early an age-D § 29 We have inquired in a previous chapter how far universal propositions can be laid down with respect to the best form of government, and whether it can be said absolutely that monarchy, or aristocracy, or democracy, is the best constitution pour y debiter adroitement, et sans aucun risque, un nouveau systeme de gouvernernent politique et de religion naturelle.' The free-thinking cha- racter of this work is adverted to in Morhof s Polyhistor, vol. i. p. 74 ; ed. 1717. He places it among the libri damnati. See, likewise, the remarks of Bayle, Diet. art. ' Sadeur' : ' Ce tour la seroit assez bien imagine pour tromper la vigilance des censeurs de livres, et pour prevenir les diificultes du privilege,' &c. (158) M. Mignet, in his Historical Xot ice of the Life and Works of 31. de Sismondi, gives the following account of his early attempts at ideal legis- lation : ' He was of the same country which had produced Rousseau, and he came into the world at the moment of revolutions. Thus, when scai'cely ten years old, the natural disposition for imitation in children had for its object the gravest subjects, and he amused himself in founding a little ideal republic with his young friends, among whom was the brother of Benjamin Constant. This was in 1783, and the amusements and sports of children already announced the future labours of men and fathers. As- sembled in a little grove, where they had raised a monument to Rousseau, the little republicans had decreed, as was fit, that in their republic every- body should be virtuous and happy. Sismondi, without any ceremony, was ordained its Solon, and established this doctrine, at the end of a dis- course of fourteen pages. — Essays from the Works of M. de Sismondi (London, 18i7), p. 3. SECT. 29.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 303 for every community.^ 59 ) But between such propositions as these, and the model of a perfect state, there is the same differ- ence as between abstract propositions respecting virtue, and the wise man of the Stoics — the one (to use Kant's language) is the idea, the other is the ideal. ( lfil ) The ideal of the perfect state can never be embodied in a description, without involving postu- lates destructive of its applicability to every real community which can ever exist. This impossibility is owing to the large scale upon which the problem is tried. In some cases, a differ- ence of degree is as important as a difference of kind ; and to these an ideal state belongs. "When we have to deal with the whole sum of human interests, opinions, feelings, habits, and wants, as comprehended within the wide circle of the state, we incur the blame of barren and jejune abstraction, we make a mere shadowy and unsubstantial figure, in proposing an ideal model for imitation. "We abstract from our imaginary common- wealth, until wc reduce it to a mere skeleton, without the flesh muscles, nerves, vessels, and organs, which constitute a Hvin and (i. (160) 'Tugend and mil ihrmenachlicheweiaheil in ibrerganzen reinig- K'-it. Bind ideen. Aber der weiae (dea Stoikera) ial ein ideal, d. i. ein menach der bloa in gedanheii exiatirt, der aber mil der nice der weisheil vollig congrniret. s<> trie die idee die regel giebt, so dient das ideal in aolchem falle zum nrbilde der dnrchgangigeo beatimmnng dea onchbildt and wir haben kein anderes richtmaaaa nn erer bandlungen, aJa daa ver- halten dieaea e6ttlicben menacben in ana, vromii wix ana rergleichen, l)curtheilen, und dadurchnn beaaern, obgleicb ea niemala erreieben kbnnen.' — Kritik ih /■ Hi 'an „ I i rim nj'i '. bheil ii. abtheil. ii. I>. ii. 8« abaohn. 1. (r6i) ' For the more pubUcparl of government, which ia laws, I think good to note only one deficiency j which is, thai all thoae which ban 304 ON IDEAL MODELS. [( HAP. x\U. condition of things, and to seek for an advance of civilization, is perpetually raising the question, whether something which is pro- posed woidd not be better than that which exists — whether what we have is the best possible. Now, in attempting to solve the problem of the ideal best, wc must first consider whether its data involve conditions de- pendent on laws of social phenomena and of external nature, or on matters of exclusively human contrivance. Nothing is easier than for ns, in imagination, to reconstitute the order of the world, and to frame an ideal best, by altering the conditions of human existence. The idea of a golden age — when man's body is as free from disease as his mind is free from sin — when the earth produces its fruits spontaneously — when there are no ploughs or ships — no gold or iron — no guile, no rivalry, no wars — is, as we know from experience, easily formed. By this ideal, the evil is extracted from human life, and a residuum of unmixed happi- ness — a maximum state of bliss — is left behind. ( lfG ) But in order to form this best possible state of things, we reverse the funda- mental laws of human nature, and place ourselves in a fairy land of our own creation. After having virtually recognised the dualistic doctrine of the origin of evil, we blot out the maleficent Ahriman, and leave the influence of Ormuzd to operate uncon- trolled. Such ideals may have a poetical charm, but they are devoid of all philosophical value. They are a coinage which may have an esthetical, but never a scientific currency. Evil, which is a part of the conditions of human existence, may be mitigated and reduced to a lower term, but cannot be extirpated. Man can diminish hunger, cold, and disease ; he cannot extinguish them. He may lengthen the duration of life, but he cannot written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths ; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high.' — Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 295. The passage is less full in the Treatise de Augmentis, vol. is., p. 82. (162) In the happy valley of Rasselas, ' all the diversities of the world were brought together, the blessings of nature were collected, and its evils extracted and excluded.' — C. i. SECT. 29.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 305 abolish death. All ideals, therefore, which suppose a violation of the laws of human nature — which alter the foundation of society — are a mere sport of the imagination, undeserving of a moment's serious attention. Yet Plato says that the perfect state is an imitation of the reign of Saturn, and Fenelon describes Minerva as teaching Tclemachus, that the glory of a virtuous king is to renew the golden age.( 163 ) On the other hand, when the matter under consideration is a positive institution, devised and established by man — as a re- presentative system, judicial procedure, revenue-laws, police, military discipline, education, and the like — an ideal may be framed which is better than the existing state, and which is within the limits of human power. What man has made, he can unmake — he can alter his own handiwork. Political insti- tutions in this respect, as in others, are analogous to the works of the useful arts : these admit of being improved indefinitely by new inventions, conforming with the laws of nature. Can it, however, be said that anything is best absolutely, either in politics or in the useful arts ? Is there a best form of government, a best system of taxation or judicature, a best plan of military or naval discipline ? Is there a best plough, a best knife, a best carriage, a best house, a best ship ? Is it the busi- ness of any art or system to construct an ideal model of the besl possible form of anything ? There is no doubt that it is practicable to establish degrees of goodness with reference to the ordinary and average circum- stances in which the subject is placed. Thus, if we take t In- ordinary case of a ship — we may say that a ship of a certain build is better fitted to sail across the ocean than a ship of a certain other build. So, if we take the ordinary case of a court <>f jus- tice, we may say that a court of a certain constitution is better fitted to try causes than a court of a certain other constitution. But when we come to actual practice, we find thai best is a re- (163) Above, § 21. vol.. II. 306 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXII. lative, uot an absolute term. It implies the fitness of means to ends, and unless the end is given specifically, the means cannot be determined. That which is best under one set of circum- stances is not necessarily the best under a different set; that which is the best ship for one purpose, may not be the best for another — a construction which is excellent for a river or a lake may be unfitted for the open sea, and the converse. A consti- tution of a court of justice, which may be excellent for one species of jurisdiction, may be unsuited to another. It is the business of every art to consider what — under the average circumstances proper to be taken as the hypothetical conditions of an abstract problem — are the means best fitted for the attainment of its end. Thus, arithmetic teaches how to com- pute best ; logic, how to reason best ; rhetoric, how to persuade best; the art of education, how to teach best; architecture, how to construct the best houses; ship-building, how to construct the best ships; horsemanship, how to ride best; music, how to sing and play best; dancing, how to dance best; painting, how to paint best.( in4 ) But when the time comes for applying these technical rules in practice, then there is a necessity for judgment ; for precepts as to the best possible mode of doing anything are never absolute — there is, for this purpose, no inflexible exceptionless rule, no universal ideal model. The maxim merely raises a pre- sumption in its favour, but circumstances may so differentiate the practical case as to render it inapplicable. Thus, an ideal house may be better than an actual house, but circumstances of expense, comfort, health, or time, may render it prudent for a man to retain his actual house unaltered, or to make only slight alterations in it, rather than to pull it down to the ground, and replace it by a new house, built according to an ideal model of the best possible. In like manner, it may be advisable to acquiesce in an imperfect political institution, rather (164) ' Quoniam de oratore nobis disputandum est, de summo oratore dicam necesse est. Vis enim et natura rei nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intelligi non potest.'— Cic. de Orat. iii. 22. SECT. 30.] ON IDEAL MODELS. 307 than replace it by a new institution, framed on a model of ideal excellence. Expense, and other similar considerations, may be of weight ; besides which, there is this important element in the practical problem of politics, which is wanting in the case of a house, that whereas the materials of a house are insentient, and therefore make no resistance to the change, the persons who are affected by the substitution of one political institution for another, and who are the necessary instruments for effecting the change, have habits and feelings, and therefore preferences and antipathies on the subject, and may, by their volition, frustrate the success of the measure. § 30 It may be observed, finally, that the problem of the best form of government is essentially constructive. AVhether it be treated by supposing a perfect state as an individual model, or by a description couched in general terms, it supposes an ideal constitution, framed by the invention of the writer. On the other hand a positive, not a constructive, problem ma}' be pro- posed, by taking governments which have, or have had, a real existence, and comparing their respective goodness. Hence, it may be possible to determine whether monarchies, or aristocra- cies, or democracies, as they have actually existed, have been most beneficial in their operation. Those, however, who speak of the problem of the best form of government; for the most part appear to mean, not the best which has ever existed, but the best which can be contrived and be conceived to exist. Some political speculators — adopting the opinion expressed in the well-known lines of Pope — hold that forms of government are indifferent, and that no real security is to be derived from them. Unless this opinion he so qualified ms to become nearly unmeaning, it may be treated as a paradox, unsupported by ex- perience. The recent progress of political philosophy has, how- ever, certainly tended to shake the exclusive importance attached by the earlier speculators <<» political forms, and to show thai, some of the most important political influences pervade all civilized communities, whether under a monarchical, an aristo- x 2 308 ON IDEAL MODELS. [CHAP. XXTT. cratie, or a democratic regimen. ( in5 ) The influence of forms of government may have been exaggerated, though it may still be important. Another class of writers undertake to pronounce summarily which is the best form of government, by an appeal to experi- ence. ( 16IL (yu> \abv tr&v f';i dreadfo] thing Ami the first motion, all tli" interim is Lake ;< phantasma, or :i hideotu dream. The genius ami the mortal instrwnt nts Are tht a in rum/til ; and the state of a man, Like to ;i little kingdom, suffers then The nature of an Insurrection I ,n,i, Storia d Italia dal L789 al IM I, lib. iii. isi Julius < 'atar, act ii. sc. 1. 316 ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. [chap, xxili. The description given by Quintus Curtius of the hesitation of Alexander in his Asiatic campaign, when he was stopped by a hill-fort, will serve to illustrate this internal debate : ' Ille, ut crat animi semper obluctantis difficultatibus, cum et progredi arduum, et reverti periculosum esset, versabat se ad omnes cogi- tationes; aliud atque aliud (ita ut fieri solet ubi prima quseque damnamus) subjiciente animo. Hsesitanti, quod ratio non potuit, fortuna consihum subministravit.'( 9 ) Accordingly, deliberation can be predicated not less of solitary meditation than of joint consultation in an assembly. This is the sense of the Avord in the fine verses of Milton, which Sir James Mackintosh applied to Mr. Pitt : Deep on his front engraven Deliberation sat, and public care. The deliberation of an individual as to his own future con- duct in some matter of private concern is, again, similar to his deliberations upon political affairs. No better exemplification of such a course of reflection can be found, than the soliloquies in which dramatic writers represent their personages communing with themselves, and thinking aloud for the benefit of the audience, many of which will occur to the reader. Thus, Medea, in Euripides, enumerates the different means by which she may put her husband and his paramour to death — either by setting fire to their palace, or by secret assassination, or by poison, or by openly stabbing them with a sword — and doubts which she shall adopt. ( I0 ) The two celebrated soliloquies, in which Ajax and Hamlet resolve the question of suicide in different directions, may be referred to as furnishing an apt illustration of the manner in which the mind compares, and decides between, alternative courses in a case of individual conduct. Ajax asks himself, first, whether he shall leave the Grecian army, and return ingloriously to his father at Salamis; or, next, whether he shall attack the Trojans single-handed, and seek a warrior's death in the encoun- ter. He rejects each of these alternatives, for different reasons, (9) vi. 6. (10) Med, 376-93. SECT. 6.] ON POLITICAL- CONDUCT. 317 and decides in favour of suicide. (") Hamlet, on the other hand, after considering the various evils of life, and the facility of putting an end to them by suicide, begins to reflect on the un- certainty of the relief which would be derived from a plunge into a new and unknown state of being, and concludes that — 'Tis better to endure the ills we have, Than fly to others that we know not of. § G In all human conduct, but particularly in political affairs, the alternative courses to which our choice is prac- tically limited are often only three in number — that is to say, two extremes and a mean. We may take either the road which branches off to the right, or that which turns away to the left, or we may follow that wliich runs in a middle course between the two. Certain slight deviations from these main roads may be practicable, but in general it is along one of these great lines that our way must lead. For example, a law, or regulation, or treaty, may either be upheld in its integrity, or it may be altogether repealed and rescinded, or it may undergo modification. Aristotle has founded his ethical theory upon the prin- ciple, that virtuous conduct is a mean between vicious extremes ;('') for example, that courage is a mean between fool hardiness and cowardice — liberality, between parsimonious- ncss and profuscness, and so on. This mode of viewing con- duct cannot be extended universally to political practice, inasmuch as an extreme course may, in certain cases, be the right one. For instance, the choice lying between entire inac- tion, or a petty war, or a military effort in which all the national resources arc exhausted, the latter may be the wisest course. Or, again, if some extension <>(' political rights is demanded by a popular party, and the choice" lying between an absolute refusal, a partial concession, and an entire concession, hi) Boph. Aj. 457-80. (12) ' Virtus est medium dtiorum, el atrinque redaotam.' Horace, F.pi.sl. i. is, v. '.). 318 ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. [CHAP. XXII I. the latter course may offer the most reasonable prospect of a permanent settlement of the question. But although, in poli- tics, it cannot be affirmed that the middle course is the virtuous one, yet it is often the only course which can be adopted with safety. Even in cases where, if they are abstractedly considered, and with reference to general tendencies, an extreme course would be preferable, existing habits and interests, and the state of public opinion, render some temperament — some intermediate course — expedient. Hence the prevalence of compromises in politics, by which each contending party abates something of its pretensions, and acquiesces in an arrangement less favourable to itself than that which it claims, but less unfavourable than that claimed by the other party. Thus, if two nations have a ques- tion of disputed boundary, they may settle the dispute by agreeing to an intermediate line, which gives each country less than it claims, but more than it would have if the fidl claim of the other side were admitted. So, if two rival interests contend about a rate of duty, one wishing for a high rate, and another for a total abolition, the matter may be compromised by fixing a moderate rate.( 13 ) Compromises are inadmissible where a principle is to be maintained, and where a partial concession cannot be made without surrendering the entire question at issue between the parties. Thus, it might happen that the non-assertion of a national right, even for a time, would be construed as its aban- donment. The choice of the via media, though it is often highly salutary, must be made with discretion; for sometimes success is only to be found in one or other of the extremes, and an attempt to partake of the advantages of both, ends in a failure to obtain the benefits of either. Machiavel is particularly ear- nest in cautioning rulers against the adoption of a middle course between government by fear and government by kindness. ( 14 ) (13) ' Extremes are to be disclaimed,' is a maxim laid clown in Hamil- ton's Parliamentary Logic, p. 14. In general, the disclaimer of extremes conveys an impression of moderation and fairness, and is acceptable to the majority of a largo and mixed assembly. (i4) See Discord, ii. 23; iii. 40. SECT. G.] ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. 319 He says that the true mode of governing is either to render your subjects incapable of injuring you, or to exercise your power in such a manner, that they are not likely to desire a change of governors. He appeals to the practice of the Romans in support of this maxim, -who, he says, never followed the other pernicious rule of action, but always, when they annexed a state to their empire, destroyed its power of resistance, or placed it in a position which left no motive for rebellion. ( 15 ) And he coutrasts this wise practice with the error of the Samnites, who, having en- closed the Roman army in the Caudine pass, compelled them to walk under the yoke, but allowed them to escape with their lives, contrary to the advice of the aged Pontius, who recom- mended that they should cither be released without harm, or be all put to death ; whereas the middle course actually chosen left them with undiminished power of injury, but added a gall- ing sense of disgrace. ( ir> ) A similar remark applies to the policy which has been sometimes pursued with respect to the enforcement of religious opinions by the state. Heretical opinions may be crushed and extinguished by consistent severity, as was done by the Italian and Spanish governments in the sixteenth, and to a considerable extent by Louis XIV. in the seventeenth, century. On the other hand, the government may abstain altogether from dictating in religious matters to its subjects — in which case, it avoids all the evils of religious discord which do not arise spontaneously between members of the different sects. But (15) He cites tho following remarks of L. Fvirius CamilluB, the consul, (335 B.C.) respecting the treatment of Latiam: ' Dii Lmmortales Ita voa potentee Erajoa consuii feceront, at, Bil Latiam deinde, an non Bit, in rostra maun posaerint. [taque pacem vobis, qaod ad Latinos attinet, parare in per p etnnm, vel BSBviendo, rel ignosoendo, potestis. v'ultis crudeliter eon« aolere in deditos victosqae P [iced delere omne Latium, vastas indesolitn- dines faccre, ande social] egregio exereita per multa bells magnaque same usi estis. Vnliis exemplo majorum angere rem Etomanam, nctoa in civi- tatem accrpiendoP materia creacendi per rommam gloriam Bappeditat. Certc id lirinisHimuii) longc iinnerinm esl,, (juoobediantes gandent. Lft j . viii. 13. (iC>) The comment of Herennias Pontiaa npon tbia middle oonrae was: 'lata < 1 M i < I < ■ 1 1 1 sententia ea 1 it, quaa aeque amicos parat, aeque ini- mieos tollit. Serrate modo, quoa ignominia irritaveritia. Ea eal Etomana pens, quse ricta quiesoere aeqaeat.' — iz. •'!. 320 ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. [chap. XXIII. the intermediate course of moderate legal pressure (which was that adopted by England towards Ireland after the revolution of 1688) neither extirpates heterodoxy, nor conciliates the sup- port of the heterodox sects. It subjects the member of a proscribed creed to a teasing and vexatious regimen, but neither drives him out of the country, nor brings him over to the religion of the government. MachiavePs maxim, however, is not of very extensive applica- tion, for political alternatives do not often consist of two definite and clearly -marked hues. In general, political differences are differences of degree ; and, hence, the dominion of compromise over the region of politics is very extensive. A government often finds, or ought to find, itself in the posi- tion of an impartial arbitrator between the conflicting claims of rival bodies and interests among the people. Having considered and weighed the merits of their several pretensions, it attempts, by mediating between them, to bring them to a common under- standing, and to effect such an arrangement as shall reconcile the general interest of the community with a partial satisfaction of the opposing interests. Where the conflict takes the form of an attack upon an institution, which one section of the commu- nity considers as advantageous to itself, the government may compromise the matter by modifying the institution, without going to the length of its entire abolition. In the management of private affairs, compromise likewise often has a place, as, when two persons dispute about a right of property, they may settle the matter by dividing the subject of dispute, according to some proportion to be agreed upon. It is, however, less often applicable in private than in public affairs; because a person, in deciding upon the choice of a profession or trade, upon marriage, upon the education of children, and the like, is not called upon to shape his course with reference to classes of men, and contending bodies in the state, but has merely to decide between alternative courses in reference to his own circumstances. § 7 In chusing between several alternatives, men in general ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. 3.21 prefer that which promises the most open and traversable course to the attainment of then object. They rather avoid obstacles by tinning the flank of the position, than attack them in front, and endeavour to beat them down. Hence, in taking a retro- spective view of the history of a community, we are reminded of a river, which is constantly moving onwards ; its winding though progressive course being determined to the right or left by the impediments which resist the pressure of the current. § 8 The choice between alternative courses in politics, and the preference of that which seems to be the most advantageous, is often influenced by a calculation of the probable conduct of another party, who is acting in an adverse sense. Hence poli- tical action, especially when independent states are concerned, has often been compared to a game of chess. The move of each player depends on his calculation as to the next move of his antagonist. In politics, however, as in chess, it is seldom pos- sible to anticipate the precise move which an opposing party will make in a certain contingency. The nearest approach to a sure prediction which can be made is, to reduce his choice to a limited number of foreseen alternatives. By our move, we perforin a practical abscissio infiniti — we cut off our antagonist from all possible courses except a certain small number, and we await with confidence his adoption of one of those courses. We know that, unless he throws away the game, he must make one out of a few moves; but which of these he will prefer, we are uncer- tain until his choice is made. Thus, if two governments are negotiating about a claim which one makes upon the other, and that which makes the claim puts in an ultimatum, it knows, in taking this step, that the other government must cither submit absolutely, or incur the chance of war. It may, however, be quite unable to form even a probable conjecture which of these two courses the other government is likely to adopt. When the Emperor Alexander refused to negotiate with Napoleon after the French army had entered Moscow, he knew that Napoleon must chusc between three alternatives; 1, either- to advance further into Russia in pursuit of the Russian army ; or, 2, to occupy VOL. II. V 822 ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. [CHAP. XXIII. Moscow (luring the winter ; or, 3, to make a winter retreat to- wards France. He might not be able to judge with certainty which of the three courses Napoleon would prefer ; but it was sufficient for his purpose to leave the enemy to chuse one of them, and when the step was taken to act accordingly. § 9 The choice between alternative lines of conduct, which we have been considering, involves the question of free will and necessity : and it is therefore incumbent upon us, before we con- clude the present chapter, to advert to this subject. The nature of the will, with respect to the freedom of its determinations, may be the subject of metaphysical science. It may be treated simply with reference to psychological grounds, of which mode of treatment, the essay of Brown upon cause and effect affords an example. Again, it may form a part of ethical science, and may be considered in connexion with the subject of moral responsibility. Lastly, it may be made a theological ques- tion, and be viewed in reference to the predestination of human actions by Divine providence. Now, whichever of these points of view the inquirer may adopt, they equally He beyond the confines of political science and political practice. All political discussion, whether specula- tive or practical, constantly assumes that man is a self-moving agent, that he determines his own will, that he has the power of chusing or rejecting any given course of conduct, and that he is responsible for his own acts. All the proceedings of a govern- ment rest upon the same assumption. They imply that men's conduct can be influenced by punishment and reward; that punishment will deter, and reward encourage. All deliberation likewise assumes, that the choice between alternative courses of action is free — that we are not impelled to any one course by an overruling necessity, and that our conduct does not follow in the track prescribed by a blind fatality. The argumentative difficulties connected with the subject of human volition belong rather to metaphysical than to political, or even to ethical inquiry. ( ir ) Like many other questions which (17) See Mill, System of Logic, b. vi. c. 2 (' Of Liberty and Necessity'). SECT. 10.] ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. 323 involve merely a description or statement of facts with respect to the operations of the mind, the nature of the will admits of wide divergences of opinion. But the controversies thus arising do not, in general, give birth to equally wide divergences of prac- tice — they confound and perplex the understanding, rather than mislead men's practical judgment. They are like a logical puzzle, which we may be unable to solve, but which does not in- fluence our belief, — or like the tricks of a conjuror, which we cannot explain by natural causes, but which we nevertheless do not believe to be supernatural. If there be any inaccuracy of language connected with the subject of the will, which may be considered as likely to lead to practical error in politics and jurisprudence, it is that which describes as involuntary a voluntary act, accompanied with pain. Moreover, the question of liberty, considered with refer- ence to government, is of primary importance in political discus- sion. Liberty is a word with which a variety of stimulating associations are connected; it is of constant occurrence in prac- tical politics ; and some speculators have regarded it as the end of all political government. For these reasons, it will be fitting that we should inquire what is the nature of political liberty or freedom, and what is meant when it is said that political liberty is abridged or restrained. § 10 A man is said to be free when there is nothing which hinders him from doing or forbearing what he desires to do or forbear. That which hinders a man from doing what he desires to do, is called restraint : that which hinders a man from for- bearing what he desires to forbear is called constraint, or force. Restraint, is when there is an obstacle which the physical power, or the will, cannot overcome, as, when a man is bound hand and foot, he is restrained from exercising his -will to move ; when ■ man is imprisoned, he is restrained from exercising his will to go out of prison. Force, is when there is a power which overcomes the desire of inaction, and renders motion necessary, as whens man is dragged or carried to prison. In the one ease, the exer- tion of the will is frustrated when the agent desires to exert it; v 2 32 1 ON TOLITICAL CONDUCT. [CHAP. XXIII. in the other, its want is supplied when the agent refuses to exert it.n Liberty, therefore, in its primitive sense, implies three things: 1, power or capacity of action or forbearance ; 2, absence of an obstacle which the will cannot overcome, when there is a desire to act ; 3, absence of superior power compelling bodily motion, when there is a desire to abstain from action. The word liberty is used in this strict acceptation when it denotes the ab- sence of imprisonment, in the sense of being at large. Thus, we say that a captive has regained his liberty when he escapes from the place of his confinement ; for we signify by it the absence of physical restraint. This is the original and appropriate mean- ing of liberty ; and, according to this use of the term, a man is said not to have his liberty, or not to be free, when either force or restraint is actually applied to him. But, in a metaphorical sense, it is used when pain, to be inflicted by the application of force or restraint, is threatened, if a certain act is not done or forborne, the force or restraint being employed, not to compel the agent to do or forbear the act, but to inflict pain upon him for not doing or forbearing it. In this case, an agent is said not to have the liberty, or not to be free, to do or forbear the act, although there is no physical impediment which prevents him from doing it, nor any force which prevents him from forbearing it, his choice being determined by a painful motive, viz. by the fear of suffering greater pain if he does what he desires than if he does not. Thus, it would be said that a man had not the liberty of going into a certain field, if, the gate being left open, he was liable to a heavy penalty for walking in it, for although there is no physical impediment which prevents him from entering it, yet, if he enters it, he will suffer pain, inflicted by force or restraint. According to the strict sense of liberty, a man would only be deprived of the liberty of entering a field if it were surrounded by an impenetrable fence, or if the only accessible approach were strongly guarded by armed men. Be- (18) On this subject, see Tucker's Light of Nature, vol. iv. p. 140. Compare Godwin's Political Justice, b. 4, c. 7. SECT. 10.] ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. 325 tween these two cases, there is the same difference as between an army being unable to gain a post after many fruitless attempts, and their abstaining to attack it from the fear of being defeated by superior numbers. In like manner, a man is said not to have his liberty to remain at home, if he is commanded by the govern- ment to serve in the army or navy, in which case no force is used to carry him, nor restraint to keep him from home, but an infliction of pain is threatened if he does not serve as he is com- manded. If a man is gagged, his liberty of speech is taken from him in the original sense of the word ; if he is threatened with death in case he speaks, it is taken away in the secondary and more usual sense. A man in prison has not his liberty in the first sense — a prisoner on parole has not his liberty in the second. In every case, therefore, where a person is determined by the fear of punishment, either to do an act which he desires to leave undone, or to abstain from an act which he wishes to do, he is said not to be a free agent, and to be deprived of liis liberty. In strictness of speech, no command can restrain from an act or force to an act, and consequently no command can take away liberty ;(''■') but as a command operates by the fear of its sanc- tion, and as the will is determined contrary to the agent's wish by a painful motive, which bears an analogy to restraint or force, a command is said to restrain, and to force, and to take away liberty. It follows that liberty, in its primary and proper sense, sig- nifies a power of acting without being restrained, or a power of forbearing without being forced • and ihat, in its secondary and derivative sense, it signifies a power of doing or forbearing eer- (19) ' Chorus. Wh ere the bear! joins not, outward acta defile not. 'Sams. When- outward force constrains, the sentence holds. I'ui who constrains me to ili<' temple of Dagon, Not dragging F The Philistian lords command — Command* are no constraints. If I obey tht m. I do itjrt 1 ///, \ enturing to dispL God for the fear of man, and man prefer. 1 Samson Agonistes, v. L368-74. In these verses, Milton describes the nature of constraint, and of the in' dom of the will, with metapbj sioal precision. 326 ON POLITICAL CONDUCT. tain acts, without apprehending an infliction of pain, by means of restraint or force, as a punishment for those acts or forbearances. Political liberty, therefore, is merely an exemption from political duties, and is a purely negative term. But inasmuch as this exemption from duties would be unavailing, unless it were accom- panied Avith the possession of legal rights, the term liberty is often used as a compendious expression to denote both the negative and positive facts — the exemption from legal duty, and the rights which guarantee that exemption, and render it effectual. It is in this sense that we speak of the ' liberties of an Englishman.' Properly speaking, whatever a person does without the actual application of compulsive physical force, he does voluntarily. In the eye of the metaphysician, the man who pays a fine under the sentence of a court, or who walks to the scaffold, performs a voluntary act. But in popular language, a man is not a free agent, w T hose will is pressed against his inclination by a painful motive. In order to constitute free agency, the ordinary usage of words demands that the desire and the will should concur. Hence, a person who has to chuse between two painful alterna- tives — for example, to be shipwrecked, or to throw his goods overboard — is said to act involuntarily. And for a like reason, a person who is precluded from a certain course by the fear of legal sanctions, is said to be deprived of Ins political liberty. These remarks will suffice to elucidate the nature of political liberty, so far as it concerns the question of political conduct. As all conduct, whether political or not, has a prospective bear- ing, and is made upon certain anticipations of coming events, we will next attempt to ascertain how far the politician, both scientific and practical, is capable of determining the future. 327 Chapter XXIV. UPON PREDICTION IN POLITICS. § 1 TN political practice, every step which is taken concerns the future as well as the past. The decision of a court of justice upon a criminal prosecution, or upon a controversy of civil right, though founded upon antecedent facts, has a necessary bearing upon the future. In the one case, it either directs the liberation of the prisoner, or sentences him to a punishment ; in the other case, it denies or grants to the plaintiff the redress which he seeks to obtain from the defendant. In either of these contingencies the decision of the court is followed by certain effects, and therefore deals with a future period of time. Ad- ministrative proceedings, in like manner, though growing out of foregone facts, determine men's conduct for the future. The steps which are taken by a revenue department, for example, for the collection of a tax, govern the subsequent conduct of the tax-payers. And, lastly, legislative measures are, for the most part, wholly prospective in their operation. They are framed with reference to a pre-existing state of things, and to our expe- rience of the past, but their effect is necessarily future, even when it includes prior rights and contracts. (') In every case, therefore, where a political act is done, we are concerned with futurity, and we set in motion an influence which will operate upon men's conduct after the period of the Btep which we take. Whether we foresee the consequences of our act or not, it will undoubtedly be attended with consequences — it will modify the conduct of others, and determine their wills dj According t<> ,\risfot U- i Ithet. i. 8), the ecclesiast, or member of i Legislative assembly, judges concerning the future, whereas the dicast, or member of a judicial assembly, judges concerning die past. 'Tins distinc tion, however, cannot be supported. Both come to a practical deoisioo, founded on the past, bul having reference to the future. 328 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. in some direction different from that in which they would have moved if they had not been subjected to that influence. Now the great problem which a practical politician has to solve is, the determination of the effects of a proposed measure. In pro- portion as he can calculate the future effects of a present act, he will exhibit one of the main qualifications of his office. We have already, in a former chapter, (-) examined the process by which the future effects of a given cause in politics are to be investigated ; and we propose now to follow up that inquiry by considering, more at large, the extent to which political prediction can be carried, and the limits by which it is bounded, as com- pared with other departments of practice and knowledge. § 2 It is generally assumed that there is a broad distinction between the physical sciences, on the one hand, and the sciences relating to the moral and mental nature of man on the other, as to their respective powers of prediction. The common belief is, that the former can to a great extent anticipate the future with certainty, whereas the latter can only guess at it with various degrees of probability. For this distinction there is some foundation, but it is stated in too indiscriminating a man- ner, and it establishes a contrast between the physical and moral departments of theory and practice which a detailed analysis does not confirm. Before we proceed to compare the prophetic powers of these two classes of sciences, we may previously remark that the mathematical sciences — arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and the higher calculus — do not, by the form of their expression, involve any question of time, and therefore are not limited in their application to the past. The proposition that twice two is four, that two sides of a triangle are greater than a third, or that in the parabola the square of the ordinate is equal to the product of the parameter and abscissa — is as true with respect to all future, as it has been with respect to all past time. It is true that time admits of being measured by number, and that arith- (2) Above, ch. xiii. sect. 3.] IN POLITICS. 329 metic is applied to the computation of time ; but such arith- metical calculations are just as applicable to future as to past time. In fact, the idea of prediction does not at all apply to the abstract sciences of magnitude and number; nor, indeed, is it applicable to science in general, in the same sense in which it is applicable to art or practice. Those sciences which lay down general laws of sequence, do not affirm that a certain cause will produce a certain effect in any indi- vidual case. They affirm a certain relation of cause and effect with respect to an entire class of phenomena. This is virtually a prediction; but it is a prediction in a different sense from the prediction of the experimenter, who affirms that, in the actual case before him, a certain event will happen — or from the predic- tion of the astronomer, who affirms that the moon will be eclipsed at such a moment on such a day. Prediction, properly speak- ing, refers to a single event, and affirms that, in an actual and concrete set of circumstances, a certain effect will be produced; whereas the anticipations of science are general, and merely affirm that, in a hypothetical and abstract state of things, a certain cause will produce a certain effect. In other words, it predicts generally the tendency of a cause to produce a certain effect, in so far as its operation is undisturbed by other causes, of which the pure theory takes no account. § 3 One important class of the physical sciences consists of those which describe natural objects, and their permanent laws of causal ion, without reference to a cyclical recurrence. Under this head arc included mechanics, hydrostatics, optics, acoustics, chemistry, tliermology, and the sciences of electricity, magnetism, and galvanism. These sciences are principally occupied with determining the sequences of the proper phenomena! e.g. me* chanics, in explaining the laws of motion and equilihrium for solid bodies, and hydrostatics the same for fluids; optics, m explaining the properties of lighl ; acoustics, of sound ; chemistry, in tracing the relations of material particles, and bo on. These phenomena either co-exist according t<> ;i constanl relation, or succeed one 330 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. another in a constant sequence, which has no reference to a fixed period of time, and hence a law of physical causation, or a fact of physical co-existence, when once determined, is as true of the future as of the past.f) For example, the laws of motion in mechanics, or the law of equilibrium of fluids, are universal truths, not limited to the past, and will retain their truth as long as the order of nature remains unchanged. So the proposition that platinum is heavier that gold, that mercury becomes solid at a certain temperature, or that animals of the ox species rumi- nate, will be as true next year as it was last year, and as it is at the present moment. AVhen any physical fact or sequence has been completely determined, and the phenomena are of such a nature as to be within our command, we can reproduce them at avlU in the expe- rimental method, and can therefore predict them with certainty in an individual case. We know, for instance, that we can repeat Lavoisier's experiment upon the absorption of oxygen by com- bustion ; we know that white light can be analysed into its com- ponent rays, by refraction through a glass prism ; we know that electricity can be generated by the friction of certain sub- stances.^) But if the physical sequence (though capable of determination when the elements can be isolated) is out of our power, and is liable to be acted on by disturbing elements which we cannot command, then its prediction is subject to un- certainty. For example, the pressure of water upon a bridge or dyke may be computed, and the strength of the resistance arranged accordingly; but if the pressure should be increased by unforeseen circumstances beyond the amount calculated on, the bridge or dyke may be washed away. Hence, with respect (3) M. Conite (C'ours cle Phil. JPos. torn. vi. p. 815) speaks of the ' extreme imperfection, a la fois scientifique et logique, des etudes chi- miques, ou. la prevision rationnelle, qui caracterise surtout la veritable science, n'est presque jamais possible aujourd'bui qu'a certains egards secondaires.' This view of chemistry is only true with respect to those substances or phenomena which have not been the subjects of experiment. Experiments m chemistry which have been made can be repeated ad libitum, and in this sense prediction is possible. (4) Above, ch. vi. § 3. SECT. 3.] IN POLITICS. 331 to physical sequences which we cannot control, we can only affirm the tendency of causes to produce their appropriate effects, inas- much as we cannot exclude the operation of disturbing or counter- acting causes. Thus, we can affirm the tendency of a heavy body to roll down an inclined plane, but the extent to which that tendency may be checked, will depend upon the inclination of the plane, the smoothness of its surface, the shape of the body, its specific gravity, &c. These counteracting causes may be such as to overcome the downward tendency of the body, and to keep it at rest. It has been remarked that time is an element in dynamical, but not in statical problems. ( 5 ) Equilibrium is conceived as existing at a single punctum temporis, whereas motion is con- ceived as occupying a certain period of time. This distinction, however, does not limit the prophetic powers of dynamics, as compared with statics. Although time is an element of dyna- mical problems, it is a hypothetical, not an actual period, and the portion of time which enters into the calculation may as well be taken with reference to the future, as with reference to the past. So long as we describe facts or co-existences in nature — as when we say that gold is yellow, or that lead is heavier than iron — and so long as we lay down ascertained laws of sequence with respect to physical phenomena which wc can command, the pro- position is independent of time, and is as applicable to the future as to the past : it is expressive of the result of our universal experience of the past, which wc have every reason to believe will accord with our experience of the future. But when we come to apply our general scientific propositions in untried opera- tions of practice — when we proceed to make new and unascer- tained combinations of natural substances, or new applications of mechanical powers, our prediction in each individual case is un- certain, and tlie result can only be determined by actual expe- riment. Hence, the invention of all new machines and media oical contrivances is b tentative process: the mechaniatj however (5) Si e ( "Mi<-. Phil /'" . bom. i. p. '> K, ». 332 ON PREDICTION [chap. XXIV. skilful, and however well versed in the theory and practice of his art. cannot be sure of the working qualities of his new machine or instrument until he has subjected it to an actual trial. Operations in engineering, such as the construction of roads and bridges, of harbours, breakwaters, and sea-walls — or in drainage and irrigation, require to be tested by actual use before their success is certain. Inventions in the departments of chemistry and optics must also be verified by experience, and cannot be trusted to mere scientific anticipation. The aptitude of a room for hearing sounds cannot be determined, a priori, by the theory of acoustics, and must be made the subject of experiment before it can be known with certainty. In all such cases as these, the experimenta fructifera of Bacon must be applied, in order to determine how far the general predictions of theory have sufficed for guiding the operations of the practical man. In comparing the prophetic powers of physical and political science, we must bear in mind that no science can properly be said to predict anything. The general affirmations of a science apply, indeed, equally to the future and to the past ; but this is true of political as well as physical science, so far as human nature, the subject-matter of politics, is unchangeable. Scientific prediction, properly so called, is made in physics by the applica- tion of the principles of a scientific art, not of a mere science or theory, to the facts of an actual case. Now we may observe that, when the question relates to some mechanical contrivance of man's hands — some operation upon external nature — the uncer- tainty of physical prediction is, if not as great as that of political prediction, at least very considerable. When the sciences of mechanics, hydraulics, and acoustics come to be applied to con- structive works — to fortifications, dykes, moles, docks, harbours, breakwaters, lighthouses ; to the supply and transport of water by aqueducts, pipes, drains and sewers; to railways, roads, bridges, viaducts, canals, paving, to the size and shape of rooms, to ships, artillery, carriages, and machinery of all sorts — in short, to the various departments of engineering and architecture, the utmost uncertainty often prevails as to the future practical results, and the widest diversity of opinion exists among competent pro- sect. 4.] IN POLITICS. 333 fessional men with respect to the application of the principles of their art. It likewise often happens, that works constructed under the best practical advice fail of their purpose, just as laws made by the counsel of the ablest statesmen often fail in pro- ducing their anticipated effects. In both cases, the failure is owing to an imperfect determination of the future. § 4 Another important class of physical sciences is that which describes the mineral structure of the earth, and the livm" beings upon its surface. These are geology and mineralogy, with the sciences relative to the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and to the physical nature of man. The crust of the earth, and its component minerals, are not affected by any constantly-recurrent periodic changes, but they appear to be the result of a successive aggregation of parts, and they continue to be modified by atmospheric influences, by the action of superficial water, and by internal volcanic agency. Geology, therefore, is partly historical, and narrates successive changes in the earth's surface ; and partly it describes the exist- ing strata, their superposition, then character and component parts, and the animal and vegetable remains embedded in them. So far as the existing state of the superficial portion of the earth remains unchanged, the descriptions of geological science will continue to apply to the future. Minerals, and their respective properties (including crystallography), are subject to no variation ; and the results of scientific observation, when embodied in a proper classification and nomenclature, will therefore be as true of minerals hereafter as they are at the present moment. Geography, in like manner, is merely a descriptive science, and docs not predict the future. Such predictions as appear to belong to geography relate, in fact, not to the science itself, bnt to our knowledge of it, and to the progress of civilized man over the surface of the earth. Such, for instance, is the cele- brated passage in the tragedy of Beneca,(?) which has been applied to the discovery of America. (6) ' Vcnicnt annis saceula serin,' A. Mr, I, 575-9. See Bacon's Essay on Prophecies; and A. dfl Elumboldtj WxtUHM Critique de VHistoire de la G/ngraphic dn nouveou Continent, tom. i. |>. 1 '12-80. 334 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. xxiv. § 5 Animated nature, on account of the phenomena of re- production, growth, and death, is subject to a series of periodic changes. Though it does not move in fixed cycles, each indi- vidual member of the great aggregate lives only for a period, and the species is renewed by the perpetual generation of new individuals. ( r ) Each individual is mortal, but the race never dies. In the vegetable kingdom, each individual resembles every prior and co-existing individual of the same species in its physical properties. Being destitute of sensation, and neither conscious of pain and pleasure, nor endowed with any intelligence, plants are necessarily a mere succession of identical terms in a long series. In the animal kingdom, each individual resembles every prior and co-existing individual of the same species, not only in its physical, but in its sentient and mental properties. Animals, unlike plants, are all provided with organs of sensation, more or less perfect ; they are all conscious of pain and pleasure ; they have all an instinctive guide of their actions; and the highest orders of mammalia possess a limited share of reason. But (with the exception of the inconsiderable alterations produced by the domesticating influence of man) the successive animals of the same species are unchanged. ( s ) Their faculties do not enable them to accumulate knowledge, or to profit by the experience of their predecessors. The more intelligent mammalia are docile when man is their teacher, and obedient when man is their ruler; but they can neither teach nor govern one another. Hence their nature is stationary, not progressive ; they are bound, by the laws of their existence, to an unvarying condition, secure, indeed, against degeneracy, but incapable of improvement; and (7) Thi8 idea is expressed with equal truth and dignity of language by Virgil with reference to bees, whose life, according to him, lasts only for seven years : 'Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus cevi Excipiat — neque enim plus septima_ ducitur a?stas — At genus immortale manet, multosque per annos Stat fortuna domus, et avi numerantur avonim.' Georg. iv. 206-9. (8) On the unchangeability of animal species see above, ch. ii. §§ 4, 5. sect. 6.] IN POLITICS. 335 one generation of animals is as like another, as one generation of plants is like another. The lion and the horse of the present day as much resemble the lion and horse of the ages of Aristotle and Pliny, as the oak or the pine of the present day resembles the oak or the pine of the same epochs. Each generation of animals differs from its predecessors, in being com- posed of different individuals, but resembles its predecessors in being composed of individuals whose attributes cannot be distin- guished from those of any other generation. Like the planets, an animal species is always in motion, but it moves perpetually in the same orbit — ' mobilitas immota manet/ It is another and the same. Its character is unchanging, though its compo- nent parts are not identical. Hence, the classifications and descriptions of Cuvier and other scientific naturalists exhaust the entire subject-matter of animal life : animals have no history for the past, and no prospect of progress for the future ; and when their anatomy and physiology have been determined by accurate observation, the description will be as applicable to future, as it is to the previous and present generations of each species. § 6 Similar propositions apply to man, so far as he is an animal. AY hen his anatomical structure has once been described, when the observations and researches of physiologists have ascer- tained the normal action of his bodily organs, and when patho- logy has investigated their morbid deviations from the healthy type, the scientific truths thus established have no special refer- ence to the past, and they will retain their applicability so long as the physical nature of man is perpetuated without change through successive generations. Harvey's discovery of the circu- lation of the blood was not limited to the time before Charles the Second; it is as true of the present as of any other genera- tion, and no one doubts that it will continue true hereafter. All the ascertained facts of human physiology — all accurate de- scriptions of the processes of sensation, motion, digestion, secre- tion, &c, are independent of time ; and, inasmuch as they relate to a subject, which, though not identical, is perpetually renewed without variation, which is, as it were, reprinted from the same 336 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. type, re-coined from the same die, and re-cast from the same mould, they will be as true hereafter as they are at the present tiine.O The internal functions of the human body are, during life, for the most part withdrawn from our observation, and they can only be investigated by indirect means. Even, however, when they are known, both in their healthy and morbid state, the number of possible concurring influences upon their action is so great as to render prediction obscure and uncertain. Hence, medicine and surgery are, to a great extent, merely tentative arts. The nature of the malady is often obscure, and the dia- gnosis uncertain; the mode of treatment is still more doubtful, and the most skilful physician will often abstain from giving a con- fident opinion, either upon the future course of the disease or the efficacy of his remedies. All that concerns the expectation of life is subject to great uncertainty j though, by including large numbers of persons, an average probability for every successive period of life may be calculated. Medical science has made a successful inroad into the future, and subjected a large portion of it to the control of human skill and human knowledge ; but it must be confessed that much of the territory still remains in- accessible to the prescience of the physician. The power of anticipating the course of a disease in animals, and applying to it a proper curative treatment, is still more restricted than in man, inasmuch as animals are unable to describe their sensa- tions, and to afford that assistance in exploring the nature of a morbid affection which the physician derives from a human patient. ( 10 ) Animals, however, are less liable to morbid derange- ment than man : in the natural and undomesticated state, their life is generally terminated either by the voracity of some other animal, or by atmospheric changes; if they escape one of these two causes of mortality, they appear to die, not by disease, but by natural decay. ( n ) Vegetable life is still less liable to disease (9) ^pon the extent of prediction in physiology, see Comte, Phil. Pos. torn. iii. p. 458. (10) See above, ch. vi. § 5. (11) Above, cb. ii. § 4. SECT. 7.] IN POLITICS. 337 than animal life ; there are, indeed, blights affecting classes of plants. No botanist has ever found it necessary to treat of the pathology of plants, nor does any horticulturist practise vegetable medicine. The liability to disease, such as we see it in man, like the helplessness of the infant, implies as large an amount of reason as exists in the human race. But as both plants and animals are deficient in the mental and moral qualities which render a frequent liability to disease consistent with the continued existence of the species, their physiology is simpler than that of man, and their vital phenomena can be anticipated with greater certainty. Although Ave cannot predict, with certaint}', the duration of life in any given individual, yet the average duration of life, at different ages, is susceptible of calculation, and the limits beyond wliich life cannot be prolonged are fixed with certainty. Hence, we can conceive a future succession of generations of mankind, as we can predict a future succession of revolutions of a planet round the sun, or of other astronomical cycles. § 7 The last class of physical sciences which wc have to notice are those which concern the solar system and other heavenly bodies, the variations in the state of the terrestrial atmosphere, and the periodical changes in the level of the sea. These are astronomy, meteorology, and the science denominated by Dr. WheweU tidology.(' J ) So far as astronomy deals with the solar system, the phenomena which it considers recur in cycles, because each planet moves in a fixed orbit round the sun. When the orbit of each planet, and its motion in that orbit, have been determined, its place at any future time can be calculated, and the periodical return of the phenomena is known beforehand, All astronomical problems which relate to the motion of any heavenly body in its orbit involve the element of time ; hut the (12) Dr. WheweU certainly produces some precedents of hybrid com- pounds such as this ; Imt the main objection to a scientific word, formed partly of an English and partly of a Greek word, is, that it is unintelligible to a foreigner unacquainted with our language. M. Comte has proposed the word tociology; but what should we say to s German writer who used the word getellology, at ge$ellschaftology? VOL. [I. - I 338 ON PREDICTION [ciIAP. XXIV. time may be future as well as past, and can be as easily calcu- lated forwards as backwards. Inasmuch as the cycles of the heavenly bodies are assumed to be constant, and all the causes which influence their motion can be computed, every source of error or doubt is excluded, and the prediction is certain. The astronomer can calculate the precise place of the earth, or of any of the other planets, or of their attendant satellites, at any given time; he can ascertain when an eclipse will take place — how much of the luminous body will be obscured, and how long the obscuration will last. All cyclical changes in the solar system are within the grasp of the astronomer's prescience. Those all- pervading mechanical laws which govern the attraction of the heavenly bodies, and their gravitation to certain centres, (as, for example, the law, that bodies gravitate to one another with forces which vary directly as their masses, and inversely as the squares of their distances,) are constant, not recurrent in their action : their character is not cyclical; and, having been once determined, they are as applicable to the future as to the past. The essential characteristic of astronomical data is, that they are few and simple, that they are all derived from visual obser- vations, and that they all resolve themselves ultimately into the measurement of attractions, masses, spaces, and times. Com- bining these circumstances with the periodical character of as- tronomical phenomena, we obtain the key to the prophetic power of astronomy. Its problems being simple, admit of solution; and inasmuch as the data recur in cycles, the solutions vary according to future moments of time, and are adjusted to the chronological variation. In strictness of speech, however, scientific astronomy merely determines and describes the relations of the heavenly bodies, and the laws of then' real and apparent motions, and predicts nothing. By the aid of those laws and general formula?, the practical astronomer and almanac-maker calculates the future events of astronomy, and refers them to their computed times. Even astronomical theory, though it furnishes the ground- work for precise and remote predictions, itself makes no predic- tions. sect. 7.] IN POLITICS. 339 It should be added, that the astronomical movements are not only constant and cyclical, and therefore susceptible of measurement by anticipation, but they are beyond the reach of our muscular or mechanical powers. The united efforts of all mankind cannot accelerate or retard the motion of their own globe, or of their own satellite, by a second of time in a thou- sand years. From this element of disturbance — to which small bodies on or near the surface of the earth are subject, the astro- nomical movements are exempt, and, hence, there is nothing to prevent the practical astronomer, armed with the principles of a matured science, from applying the rules of his art to the exact determination of the heavenly bodies at future moments of time. Works, such as the Nautical Almanac and the Connoissance des Terns, containing specific predictions respecting abstract phenomena, are applications of the art, not of the science of astronomy. The science of astronomy lays down the laws of the solar system and the other heavenly bodies. From these law a the art of astronomy frames general formulae, to be used in prac- tice; and, with the help of these formulae, the practical astro- nomer calculates the places of the heavenly bodies at certain times, and arranges them in a calendar which anticipates the future. Hence, the course of the planets and their satellites, which, in the words of the philosophic poet, Print with faint steps the viewless paths of Time, can be tracked with unerring certainty by human prescience. The alternation of the tides is an astronomical phenomenon, inasmuch as it is due to the attraction of the sun and moon; and being at each place constant in it- sequences, it admits of being predicted empirically. Bat the disturbing causes which affect the course and height of the tide-wave arc BO numerous, that the theoretical explanation of the observed phenomena is inperfect. "The periodic motions of the waters of the ocean,' says Mrs. Somerville, ' on the hypothesis of an ellipsoid of revo- lution entirely covered by the sea, are very far & according with observation. This arises from the wry grcal irregularities 840 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. in the surface of the earth, which is but partially covered by the sea, from the variety in the depths of the ocean, the manner in which it is spread out on the earth, the position and inclination of the shores, the currents, and the resistance the waters meet with — causes which it is impossible to estimate, but which modify the oscillations of the great mass of the ocean. However, amidst all these irregularities, the ebb and flow of the sea maintain a ratio to the forces producing them sufficient to indicate their nature, and to verify the law of the attraction of the sun and moon on the sea Thus the problem of the tides does not admit of a general solution ; it is certainly necessary to analyze the general phenomena which ought to result from the attraction of the sun and moon, but these must be corrected in each par- ticular case by local observations, modified by the extent and depth of the sea and the peculiar circumstances of the place.' ( ls ) Meteorology — the science of weather, and of all other atmo- spheric phenomena — so far as it is dependent on astronomical cycles, deals with causes which can be determined beforehand with certainty. Temperature, moisture, and other phenomena of the atmosphere, forming in the aggregate the climate of a place, are partly regulated by the seasons, and by the alternation of day and night, both of which are cyclical and astronomical changes. The trade winds, and the prevalence of westerly winds in. northern latitudes, are dependent on an astronomical cause. (") But besides these constant influences, there are so many causes upon which the phenomena of meteorology (such as wind, rain, snow, hail, clouds, dew, mist, aurora borealis, &c.) are dependent, and these causes, moreover, are so far removed from om* powers of observation, that they defy the calculations of science. No precise scientific laws with respect to local weather have been determined, an( l therefore the practical meteorologist can only, from the data at his command, predict the weather within cer- tain limits : he can only assign a maximum and a minimum to (13) On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences, sect. xiv. p. 114. ( 1 4) Herschel, Treatise on Astronomy, §§ 199, 200. sect. 7.] IN POLITICS. 341 the variations of temperature at a given place and time, without attempting to fix the precise point. Hence, in an almanac, the great distinction between astronomical and meteorological predic- tions. The astronomical predictions are framed from scientific formulas and tables, and may be relied upon as certain ; whereas the predictions of the weather for certain days are the mere guesses of impostors, not founded upon any scientific basis, nor entitled to any credit ; and where the prediction of a weather- prophet occasionally proves true, the coincidence is to be attri- buted merely to a lucky chance. There are, indeed, certain indications afforded by the baro- meter and the hygrometer, by the temperature, the direction of the winds, the appearance and nature of the clouds, by fogs, dew, and other similar phenomena, which often enable a probable con- jecture to be made as to the state of the weather for a few hours beforehand. Sometimes, also, the actions of animals, such as the low flight of swallows, the early return of pigeons and rooks, the appearance of snails and worms — may serve as prognostics of weather. ( 15 ) These signs, however, even when they are correctly interpreted, only point to immediately-impending phenomena : no scientific formulas exist which enable the practical meteorolo- gist to predict the weather a year, or a month, or even a week beforehand, except within the limits fixed by the changes of the seasons, and by such periodical phenomena as the monsoons in certain latitudes. ( I0 ) ( i -) Virgil has collected many of tins class of signs in a passage of the Qeorgica: ' Nunqnam Lmprudentibus imber Obfuit: aut ilium BUTgentem vallilnis imis Aeriffl fugere grues ; aut buculs cobIuxq Suspicions patulis captavil aaribus auras j Aut arguta laous oircumvolitavil hdrundo, El veterem in limu rente eeoinere querelam,' &o. i. 873-6. They are chiefly borrowed from Axatus, who enumerates a long series of prognostics. — Pheen. 913 sqq. Concerning the argumenl fr< Bee above, ch. ix. § 14. (16) Polybius, in describing the qualifications of ;i general, includes an g them Buci an i mnl of practical astronomical knowledge as will enable bum to determine the times oi' the day and tnghi ; portable clocks 842 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. We may here observe, that all the aits whose operations are liable to be disturbed by meteorological influences are infected with the uncertainty which surrounds all the prognostications of meteorology. Thus, the art of navigation is disturbed by un- foreseen storms and winds; the art of agriculture, by unexpected and inopportune extremes of heat and cold, drought and moisture. The works of the engineer are liable to be undermined or de- stroyed by unusual storms, inundations, currents of water, &c. Even medical treatment is often deranged by casual changes of temperature ; and there appear to be atmospheric influences, inappreciable by our senses and artificial instruments, which generate epidemic diseases in men and animals, and also in vegetables. On the other hand, those meteorological changes which are closely connected with constant astronomical periods, such as the succession of the seasons, are sometimes accompanied with corresponding phenomena, which in consequence obtain a cycli- cal character. Hence the periodical recurrence of the growth of the leaf, and the renewal of vegetable activity in the spring; followed by the death of the leaf, and the torpor of vegetable life at the approach of winter. Hence, likewise, the reproduction of birds, reptiles, insects, &c, at stated periods of the solar year.( ir ) and watches being then unknown. The phenomena which measure these times are, he says, constant : but heavy rains, floods, severe cold, snow, fogs and mists, and other similar phenomena, which greatly disturb mili- tary operations, cannot, he adds, be foreseen. — ix. 16. (17) Thales is said to have predicted an eclipse of the sun, which was visible in Asia Minor, within the limits of a year (see Herod, i. 74, with the commentators, and the passages cited by Menage ad Diog. Laert. i. 23). But as Thales is reported to have predicted in winter the abundance of the olive crop for the following autumn, and to have made a large sum of money by speculating on his foreknowledge (Aristot. Pol. i. 11) ; and as Anaxagoras is also said to have predicted the fall of an aerolithe (Plut. Lysand. 12; Plin. H. N. ii. 59), neither of which predictions is within the reach even of modern science — the probability is, that the prediction of a solar eclipse attributed to Thales is fabulous. Helicon, of Cyzicus, a friend of Plato, is said to have predicted an echpse of the sun (Plut. Dion. 19), and Dion an eclipse of the moon (tb. 24). C. Sulpicius Gallus, a Roman military tribune, predicted an echpse of the moon in the year lfiO b.c. In his address to the soldiers sect. 8.] IN POLITICS. 3-13 § 8 "We have now obtained a general idea of the extent to which the methods furnished by the several physical sciences afford the means of predicting the future, and of the differences between the powers of prediction which they respectively possess. We have seen that while astronomy can foretel with certainty the motions of the solar system, the prophetic powers of me- teorology are feeble and limited, and consist principally in assign- ing certain limits to the possible variations of weather. We have likewise seen that, although the laws of motion, sound, and light, and of the chemical relations of bodies, are laid down in general propositions independent of time, and therefore as ap- plicable to the future as to the past, yet these propositions merely express the tendencies of causes operating freely ; and therefore, when we are unable in practice to exclude all disturb- ing causes, we are unable to anticipate the future with certainty. It has also appeared, that a similar distinction applies to the physical nature of man. The functions of the human body arc described by the physiologist in general terms, which are as true of the future as of the past ; but no medical skill can predict with accuracy the duration of life in any individual person, nor can a physician always anticipate truly the course of a disease, or the influence of his treatment upon a patient. Science, indeed, or theory, in itself (as we have seen), is in- capable of prediction. It merely co-ordinates phenomena, and lays down general laws of sequence. By the help of the laws of causation thus determined, the practitioner is able to predict the future in individual cases; and the instruments of anticipa- tion which theory places in his hand vary in their potency, ac- cording to the nature of the subject. Our object in making this review was, to compare the pro- phetic powers of the physical sciences with those of the sciences relating toman as a rational being. We therefore now proceed before the eclipse, lie is reported to have said: ' u quia oaturali ordine etatifl bemporibru fiat, et sciri ante el pr»dioi po o.' — Iivy, div. 87. Some I . -:i i-i i. -• 1 in. mi, in the large towns of the Beat, can predict an eclipse of the sun or moon.— Niebuhr, />■ eription ■'■ PArabiet p. i" : >- 3 14 ON PREDICTION [ciiav. xxiv. to a similar examination of the latter class ; and we will offer a l'rw remarks, in reference to this point, upon the sciences of metaphysics, logic, philosophy, esthetics, and ethics, before we arrive at the science of politics, the proper subject of our inquiry. § 9 Metaphysical science describes the perceptive and in- tellectual operations of the human mind. It teaches by what means, and through what channels, our knowledge is acquired ; how we represent our thoughts by language ; and in what the processes of sensation, abstraction, memory, imagination, &c, consist. The researches of metaphysics arm at nothing historical, nor do they relate to anything recurrent in its nature. "When, therefore, any metaphysical truth has been established, it applies as much to the future as to the past. If the origin of our visual judgments respecting distance has been correctly explained, the explanation will continue to hold good of all future time, as long as human nature remains unchanged. All propositions respecting the perceptions of our senses, the signification of general terms, and the like, are just as applicable to the future as propositions respecting the circulation of the blood, or the functions of the brain. The uncertainty of metaphysics, like the uncertainty of physiology, applies as much to the past as to the future. It is in many cases difficult to determine the ope- rations of our minds, as it is likewise difficult to determine the vital operations of our bodily organs. But when either the one or the other has been determined, a law of our nature, mental or bodily, has been ascertained, which is as true of the future as of the past. It is not a part of the present inquiry to estimate the comparative uncertainty of physiology and metaphysics, but we may remark that, although our mental operations are invisible and intangible, they are nevertheless the subjects of conscious- ness, whereas our bodily functions (such, for example, as diges- tion, secretion, circulation, &c.) are not in general the subjects of consciousness, and are not, during life, accessible to the ob- servation of the senses. § 10 The business of logic is to analyze the mental pro- cesses which are concerned in reasoning, and to found upon SECT. 10.] IN POLITICS. 345 this analysis precepts for the guidance of the mind in argumen- tative inquiries and in investigations after truth, speculative and practical. In either of its two capacities, either as describing the processes by which ratiocination is conducted, or as furnish- ing a practical method for the reasoner, its results are indepen- dent of time, and have no special application to the past. As a scientific analysis of our mental processes, its truths are universal — as a practical art and method, its rules are neces- sarily prospective, and, though founded on experience, are in- tended to direct the mind of the student with respect to its future movements. Connected in some degree with logic is philology, or the science of language. Philology is principally a historical de- partment of know ledge. It traces the origin of languages, their affinities, and their successive changes under the operation of different causes. It also lays down those empirical laws which govern the correspondence of vowel and consonant sounds, or of grammatical forms, in cognate languages, as in Sanscrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic — in the Romance languages, or in the High and Low German. It establishes the principles by which gram- mar expounds the forms and syntax, and lexicography expounds the etymology and signification of words. It likewise investi- gates the doctrine of hermeneutics, and shows how the writings of former times are to be interpreted. From this enumeration it will be seen that philology, so far as it is descriptive and his- torical, has no concern with the future, and docs not profess to predict. Each language is a system of conventional sounds, framed by an intelligent process, and concentrating the results of much observation and reflection. Philology undertakes to exhibit the empirical laws which have presided over the for- mation of this language, but it cannot IK the laWB for its ulterior changes, nor can it do more than form a probable con- jecture as to the course of those future changes. The rules of grammar merely express the formal and syntactical relations of words, according to the COrreci USagej and t he diet louary assigns their significations according to thi tandard. The gram 316 ON PREDICTION [ciIAP. XXIV. mar and dictionary, therefore, of each language merely collect the actual results of a certain usage ; hut they do not lay down permanent laws of human nature, or express universal truths. § 1 1 It is only in its function of interpreter of the records of the past that philology aspires to the establishment of princi- ples admitting of a universal application. In this department, it borders upon the province of literary criticism, and of esthetics, or the science of taste. Esthetical science investigates the causes of beauty in nature and art. It considers the principles of painting and sculpture — also of architecture, gardening, dress, &c, so far as they are decorative arts, and do not involve merely mechanical considerations. It likewise sits in judgment upon poetry, and other works of imagination. Esthetical criticism is, to a certain extent, historical, and confined to particular compo- sitions ; but its maxims are mainly founded on general princi- ples of human nature, and are not empirical. Hence, when sound canons of taste in painting, sculpture, poetry, or other department of the fine arts, have been established, they are per- manent in their application. A good model of style, either in the arts of design or in literature, remains a subject of imita- tion, though liable to the alternations and caprices of fashion. § 12 Our esthetical are closely connected with our ethical feelings, as may be observed in theatrical representations. The judgment of the audience upon a drama, considered as a work of art, is materially influenced by the extent to which their emotions have been affected. We pass, therefore, naturally to the consideration of ethics, together with those other depart- ments of social science which are not included in politics. Ethics, in the first place, may be limited to mere description — to a generalization of the results derived from an observation of men's moral actions. Such, for example, is a description of the moral sentiments — as anger, pity, fear, grief, indignation, and the like. There are certain emotions which are common to the whole human race, and which a similarity of circumstances tends to excite in every breast, although, in some cases, they may be repressed by a sense of duty, or other counteracting SECT. 12.] IN TOUTICS. 347 motive, while iu others they may be permitted to operate upon the will, and to lead to action. It may be true, universally, that an unmerited slight tends to produce the feeling of anger; but this feeling would, by many persons, be checked as soon as it arose, whereas others would be impelled by it to vindictive measures. Descriptive or positive ethics so far resembles meta- physics, that the one science represents the intellectual, while the other represents the moral or emotional principles of our nature. The descriptions of both, if true, are universal, and are as applicable to the future as to the past. The means by which our knowledge is acquired, and the emotions wliich accompany our sense of pain and pleasure, are as unchangeable in their nature as the functions of our bodily organs. The general pro- positions of metaphysics, positive ethics, and physiology, stand precisely on the same footing as respects their applicability to the future. In all human affairs, however, where the will is concerned, there is an alternative of action, and an occasion for doubt as to the choice. This is the case as much with domestic and private, as with public and political life. Hence, there is an uncertainty as to the future in all that concerns moral action. Each person has a free choice of different courses at each successive step j and knowing that others are similarly situated, he is uncertain what their course will be. It is in making this choice correctly, with reference to the agent's own circumstances, and the probable conduct of others, that prudence, foresight, sagacity, or practical wisdom, consists. Much of the future is necessarily veiled from our sight, but it can be anticipated to a considerable extent ; and it is by the comparative power of anticipating it, that the degrees of the qualities just named arc to be measured. Of some men we say, that they arc imprudent, improvident, short- sighted; that they take no thought for the morrow; that liny make no provision for future contingencies. When they fall into difficulties, we apply to them the fable «>i" the ant and the grasshopper, and we say that those who have not sown cannot expect to nap. On the other hand, we recognise success and 348 ON PREDICTION [cn.vr. x\i\ . prosperity as being the result of foresight and thrift, and we perceive in a man's life the fruits of a provident and sagacious principle of action. When this quality is marked in a higher degree, it may be compared, metaphorically, with a spirit of divination. Hence Horace, speaking of the sententious morality of the tragic chorus, says : Utiliumque sagax rerum et divina futuri, Sortilegis 11011 discrepuit sententia Delphis. It is the business of the preceptive department of ethics to assist the mind in making this choice, and to furnish maxims for the guidance of moral conduct. All treatises on propriety of demeanour, upon moral duties, upon the art of life — all collections of moral maxims, proverbs, apophthegms, have this object in view. § 13 Having passed in review, first the physical, and next the mental sciences and ethics, with respect to their powers of prediction, we have now arrived at politics ; and when we have traced the relation in which each of its branches stands to the future, it may easily be compared in this respect with the other departments of science and practice already examined. According to the division previously adopted, we will treat the subject under its four heads, of positive, historical, speculative, and practical. Positive politics and general jurisprudence do not, as we have already seen,( 18 ) involve any question of time. The pro- positions relative to the nature of government and laws are ab- stract and universal ; they lay down the invariable characteristics of the subject-matter, and they neither describe the past nor anticipate the future. Nevertheless, if they are properly genera- lized from a sufficient induction of facts, they have the truly scientific character, and are as applicable to future as to past time. For example : if it be said that a sovereign government is free from any legal restraint, or that international law is not administered by any supreme tribunal common to two states, propositions such as these are just as true of future as of past (18) Above, ch. iii. § 3 ; v. § 7. SECT. 14.] IX POLITICS. 349 governments, since they describe a state of things which must exist, supposing the meaning of words and the nature of man to remain unchanged. Propositions such as these are analogous to the propositions of anatomy and physiology. The descriptions of the body politic have the same scientific generality as the descriptions of the body natural, and, when once ascertained by :i correct induction, their truth remains unshaken. Whatever are the general properties of a former law will continue to be the properties of other laws hereafter, just as the properties of the nerves, the blood, or the muscles, in any former men, will continue to be their properties in other men hereafter. Positive politics, therefore, like anatomy or physiology, does not, properly speaking, predict anything, though it furnishes general truths by which the determination of future facts may be facilitated. Thus, a politician, in seeking to determine the future operation of a given law, may be assisted by a knowledge of the general nature and properties of a law, just as a physician, in seeking to determine the future course of a disease in a given patient, may be assisted by a knowledge of the general nature and properties of the several organs of the human body. But neither positive politics nor physiology undertakes, in form, to predict any future event ; each science generalizes the results of experience in a certain subject-matter, and if those generaliza- tions arc correct, their truth will be unimpaired by the lapse of time, so long as the structure of civil society and the structure of the human body remain in their existing form. § 14 While positive politics has a scientific generality, and (inasmuch as it, furnishes the results of observation without re- ference to any determinate period of time) is as applicable to the future as to the past, political history describes the pasl in connexion with ;i fixed chronological scries, and has no direct reference to anything which has not already happened. ('") It is employed exclusively in narration, and (except in reporting the words of other-! uses only the preterite, never the I'ntiirc, tenses of the verh. lake an epic or dramatic poem, ii is con- See above, ch i 350 ON PREDICTION [ch,U\ xxiv. cernecl with a succession of human actions, and only differs from these in narrating real, not fictitious events. But, as we shall see presently, political history, though it does not itself predict the future, furnishes the materials out of which political predictions are constructed. From our experi- ence of the past we are enabled to anticipate the future, and the results of this experience are embodied in history. Positive politics, it is true, does not concern itself with history. The description of the necessary and essential properties of a state and a law does not imply a reference to any particular political events, just as the determination of the laws of equilibrium does not imply a reference to any particular set of solid or fluid bodies. But for political speculation and practice, for all antici- pation of definite consequences of a given political measure, political history is an indispensable substratum — as a knowledge of the rate at which the sea had encroached upon a certain coast, or a river deposited silt in a certain estuary, would be a necessary element in predicting the future progress of these respective agencies. It is in this spirit that Thucydides writes his history : he records past events as they occur, in order that his readers may judge how future events will occur, under similar conditions of causation. ( 20 ) §15 We have seen that positive politics, though expressive of general truth, does not profess to predict any future event or state of society, and that political history has for its proper object merely a registration of past events. We now come to a department of politics which is more directly concerned with the future, viz. the speculative branch. Speculative politics (as we have already explained) is occupied with the influence and operation of political institutions, and with the comparative advan- (20) oo~oi 8e fiovkijaovTai to>v re yevofievav to o~a(pts o-KOTreiv ko\ tu>v /ie\- Xovtcov TTOTe avQis Kara to dvOpinveiov tolovtcov Koi Trapcnrkrjcriaiv eaeadai, acpeXifia Kpiveiv avTa dpKovvrms e£et, i. 22. See also, ii. 48 ; and upon the latter passage, compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, vol. vi. p. 210. Respect- ing the utility of historical composition, as compared with the active life of a Roman statesman, see the remarks of Sallust, Sell. Jug. c. 4. The ends of history are — 1, instruction; 2, delight, according to Vossius, Ars Hist. c. 5. (21) Above, ch. hi. § 4; v. § 8. SECT. 15.] IN POLITICS. 351 tages and disadvantages of different systems of government. ( :1 ) In judging upon these matters, it supposes a certain simple and abstract state of things, and leaves out of consideration all disturbing influences — it therefore only affirms the tendency of an institution to produce certain effects, but in its theoretic capa- city does not undertake to say that the institution imll produce those effects. We have already shown that political theory deals only with truth ; that it merely affirms certain constant or predominant relations of phenomena, and laws of causation; that it lays down no rules or maxims of conduct, and therefore that, as theory, it prescribes nothing. (") "NVc will now add, that it predicts nothing absolutely : it does not declare, formally and directly, that any event will happen. Virtually, indeed, and in substance, it may be said to predict, inasmuch as it lays down certain general affirmations and laws of causation, which are as applicable to the future as to the past or the present. These propositions, like similar propositions in physics, merely assert the tendency of a cause, supposing it to operate unchecked ; they are general and hypothetical — they neither refer to any single case, nor to any absolute set of data. Hence, if they are viewed in the light of predictions, they predict only in a qualified and conditional manner. They affirm only, that if all the data which they assume arc present, and all disturbing forces arc absent, a cer- tain consequence will follow; but this is not a positive predic- tion that a certain event will happen in an actual concrete case. For example : it may be affirmed that the tendency of severe ponishments is to prevent offences ; which may be regarded as a general prediction, thai Bevere punishments will actually pre- vent offences, lint this proposition must be understood as in- volving the hypothetical datum, that the punishments are regu- larly inflicted — it is qualified by this condition. Hence, in any case where a severe punishment is noi regularly inflicted, and the crime is not repressed (on account, for instance, of its re- (aa) \i>.'\<\ eh. i 352 ON PREDICTION [chap. xxiv. ^ular infliction being counteracted by the unwillingness of injured parties to prosecute, of witnesses to give evidence, and of tribunals to convict, as well as by the disposition of the government to comply with petitions for a mitigation of the Bentence), the fundamental condition of the theory is not satis- fied, and the dictum is inapplicable to the case. This, therefore, is not an instance of erroneous prediction — it is an erroneous application of a general theorem to a case not properly falling under it. The proposition, or prediction, is as true with re- ference to this case as with reference to a case in which the punishment is regularly inflicted, and the crime is in conse- quence repressed. In the one case, however, the data assumed by the theorem are present — in the other they are not. All such predictions in speculative politics are similar to the second law of motion, which declares that a body in motion will move for ever in a straight Hue, with a velocity proportioned to the force and mass. This prediction with respect to moving bodies is founded on the supposition, that the retarding influence of fric- tion and all other physical impediment is excluded ; and it would doubtless be verified, if the case supposed were to exist. The reality, however, never coincides with the hypothesis, and yet the general prediction, being not absolute but conditional, is true ; and it approaches to fulfilment in any individual case, in proportion as the real approach to the hypothetical circum- stances. Writers on speculative politics do not in general set out, in terms, their hypothetical data, though these ought to be dis- tinctly implied in their reasonings, if their scientific basis is properly laid. Sometimes, indeed, they have not themselves formed a clear conception of their own hypothesis, and of the elements of their own problem. For these reasons, it often happens that the conditional nature of the proposition is over- looked, and that it is understood to be absolute and categorical, when it is, in fact, qualified by a reservation which belongs to its very essence. Many true principles of speculative politics, which predict the operation of a given cause, have been taxed SECT. 16.] IN POLITICS. 353 with unsoundness, because, in a given case, the prediction was not fulfilled. But before the soundness of any such principle can be successfully impugned, it should be shown that the cause did not exert itself in the direction indicated, and that its ten- dency was not repressed by counteracting influences. Unless this point is established by proper evidence, nothing is proved against the soundness of the principle at issue. It would be as if a mechanical philosopher were to argue against the second law of motion, by saying that he had projected a body in a direction perpendicular to the earth's surface, and instead of moving continually upwards in a straight line, it had, after a time, fallen to the ground. § 16 The predictions of practical politics differ from the predictions of speculative politics in being particular, and not general. The speculative politician predicts the general tendency of all laws or institutions of a certain class — the practical poli- tician predicts the particular tendency of this or that law or institution, or measure of a government. The former, for in- stance, lays it down that all treaties containing certain stipula- tions produce certain effects — the latter predicts that a particular treaty, actually made and concluded between two nations, will produce certain effects. These two processes are quite distinct in their character, and it is only the latter which announces absolutely beforehand the occurrence of a real event, and there- fore deserves the name of a prediction. Hence it may happen, that persons who are well qualified to conduct the one arc not well qualified to conduct the other. A political speculator may be unfit for practical statesmanship, and a practical statesman may be unfit for political speculation. We have, in a former part of this treatise, examined tin- process by which the practical politician determine! Hie probable future effects of a proposed law or measure of a government, (") and we liave also seen liow lie applies a general theorem, or maxim, to an actual casc.(') Wc have likewise found thai (23) Above, I'll. xiii. (-• ») Oh. tx. VOL. II. \ J 85 I ON PREDICTION [dlAP. XXIV. political conduct consists in a choice of alternative courses, which present themselves to the free agent. (*) Now, whenever a poli- tician takes any practical step he makes, either avowedly or tacitly, a prediction — he forms an opinion with respect to some portion of futurity. With respect to matters simple, proximate, and dependent on the will of a few persons whom he can guide, or whose conduct can he reasonably anticipated, his prediction may he absolute : he may say, or think, that a certain event will positively happen. But with respect to matters intricate, remote, and dependent on persons many in number, and beyond his control, his prediction, like those of the speculative poli- tician, will be qualified, though, unlike those predictions, it will be special. He does not, indeed, consider the probable opera- tion of a principle acting in vacuo — he takes a measure clothed in circumstances, and anticipates its effects in the midst of those circumstances. But in proportion as those circumstances mul- tiply, the problem becomes more complex. Elements of doubt manifest themselves in various directions. Discordant influences threaten from opposite quarters of the horizon, and disturb the vision of the political seer. Hence his prediction, though con- fined to an actual case, and founded on real data, will be condi- tional. He will, if his judgment be discreet, content himself with saying that, provided certain disturbing circumstances, which may perhaps be partly foreseen, should not occur, a certain event will happen. Such a prediction, if made with the requisite theoretical guides, after a careful investigation of the facts of the case, and with the other conditions requisite for skilful practice, is the nearest approach to rational prediction which the conditions of political practice admit. It approaches far closer to a probable anticipation of futurity than any abstract theory, founded on unreal hypotheses, which, as we have already explained, does not properly predict any event. It may, indeed, be less happy than a fortuitous conjecture, or divination, not founded on a careful or comprehensive view of facts — which attracted little notice when (25) Cb. xxiii. SECT. 17.] IN POLITICS. 355 made, but when subsequently verified was rescued from oblivion. But such random shots mto futurity, though they may sometimes be more lucky than those of the most skilful marksmen, may be compared with the one lucky hit of the weather-prophet, which is remembered when his thousand misses are forgotten. ( :6 ) § 17 In the application of physical knowledge to practice, the difficulty of prediction arises, in general, from the imperfec- tion of the theory. For the imperfection of plrysical theories there are two main causes — viz., 1, the unapproachableness of the field of observation ; 2, the complexity of the data. Of the first of these, meteorological science affords an instance. The agencies by which weather is determined are so remote and in- accessible to our senses, that the laws of meteorology cannot be determined with sufficient precision to furnish rules for calcu- lating the temperature at a given spot for a future day. For the uncertainty of predictions respecting constructive works, the complexity of the data is the principal cause. The uncertainty of medical predictions arises from both causes combined : the mechanism of the human body is in the highest degree complex, and its internal vital operations are, to a great extent, with- drawn from the observation of our senses. The prediction of Darwin respecting the application of steam to navigation, and to locomotion by hind, may be considered as a happy anticipation of the future, founded on philosophical data. His prediction respecting the application of steam to motion through the atmosphere is probably not destined to receive a similar i'lilfilment.f 27 ) (26) See Nov. Org. i. 46, on tin- fallacy <>f attending to tho hits and overlooking the misses. (27) ' Soon shall thy arm, anoonqnered steam, afar I frag the alow barge, or drive the rapid oarj Or on wide-waving winL r< expanded bear The flying oharioi through the fields of air.' Darwin's "Economy "J' Vegetation, canto i. ' There is reason to believe il may in time I"- applied to the rowing of barges, and the moving of carriages along the road. As the specific lei it v of air is too great for the support "I' greal burthens by balloons, there seems no probahle method <>f living eonveniently Imi by the power of steam, or some other explosive material, which another hall'-i ■< n v. 264. 356 ON PREDICTION [ciIAP. XXIV. In practical politics, the difficulty of prediction arises not at all from the inaccessibility of the field of observation — the whole of which, as we have already seen, is witliin the compass of our senses and experience — but it proceeds partly from the imperfec- tion of theory, and partly from the complexity of the data which it is necessary, in every practical problem, to take into account. In addition to these, however, there is a cause of uncertainty more powerful than either, viz. the peculiar nature of the human will, which is so large an element in political affairs. In judging of the probable operation of a political measure, the practical politician is, or ought to be, materially assisted by theory. For instance, let the measure of which the effects are to be predicted be one affecting the currency or trade of the country, or the numbers of its population. Upon each of these subjects, the practical man would be naturally provided with the principles which have been more or less established by scientific reasoning. Wherever the political theory is imperfect, either from incompleteness, or from admixture of error, all prediction in which such theory bears a part is likely to be defective. The complexity of the data is, again, a source of uncertainty in the predictions of practical politics. Even where all the ele- ments of a judgment are ascertained, and he before us, it is not easy to calculate what will be their combined result when they are set in motion, and begin to act upon one another. In this respect, a new law is analogous to a new machine. All the component parts of a new machine are given, and it is known to what purposes it will be applied, yet a practical experiment is necessary in order to reduce to certainty the preliminary conjec- tures formed by the mechanist with respect to its probable work- ing. In like manner, however carefully a law may be framed for accomplishing its object, yet its authors can never be con- fident of its success until it has been tried in practice, so com- plex are the data which a judgment upon almost every law involves. There is, however, an element of uncertainty in politics which is not shared by physics, which is beyond the imperfection of SECT. 17.] IN POLITICS. 357 theory and the complexity of practical data — the important element which we have already adverted to, viz. the human will. The human will is not, like inorganic matter, governed by mechanical or chemical laws. Though it is steered by pleasure and pain, yet the objects in which different men find pleasure or pain differ widely from one another. Its motives, though they can be reduced to a philosophic system, and anticipated practically within certain limits — though they are not merely capricious and accidental, but follow definite trains of association and laws of sequence in each individual, are nevertheless almost infinitely various. Hence all subjects of practice, whether in ethics or politics, or in other branches of social science which involve the de- cisions of human volition, have a peculiar element of uncertainty. The human will, considered with reference to politics, may be acted on by either physical or moral agents. Thus, the conduct of men in a political capacity may be influenced by a pestilential disease or a deficient harvest, which are physical causes — or it may be influenced by the actions of other men. It is in the latter case, viz. when one mind operates upon another mind, that the uncertainty is at its height. The influence of the cause is uncertain ; the nature of the effect is uncertain; so that, taking the two together, the combined uncertainty is increased at a compound ratio. Thus, where a person is selected to fill a public office, it is in the first place uncertain in what manner he will discharge the functions of it; and, next, it is uncertain what effect his conduct, even supposing it to be such as is anticipated, may produce on the minds of the persons with whom he is brought into official relations. The most exercised judgments often Gail in estimating the fitness of a man for the discharge of new duties, though these duties arc similar in kind to those which lie lias been .accustomed to perform, and only differ from them in being greater in degree — Tel brillc au second ranfj 'e*olipS6 an premier. Some men are overwhelmed by tin- responsibilities of high station, who had performed with punctuality and discretion all the duties of a subordinate post. While others arc comparatively supine in 358 ON PREDICTION [ciIAP. XXIV. secondary positions, and only arc stimulated to a full exercise of their energies and capabilities by the difficulties of command. It is in the mutual action of mind upon mind, which is produced by entrusting a person with the exercise of political power, that we may perceive one main element of the uncertainty of political prediction. Even if we confine ourselves to a single known indi- vidual, we still find ourselves destitute of any method of exclud- ing doubt as to the future. So much is contained in that microcosm, the human mind, that it is unsafe to predict how any man will act in a given political contingency. It is still more difficult to anticipate what impression his conduct will make upon a council of ministers, upon a popular deliberative assembly, upon a political party, upon a certain interest, or class, or section of the community, upon the people at large. Yet these are among the every-day problems of practical politics, and they are often com- bined with problems, in which the difficulty of prediction is further increased by imperfection of theory and multiplicity of data. § 18 Our prescience of the political future is exclusively derived from our experience of the past. ( 2S ) The results of that expe- rience are recorded in history for the instruction of posterity; (28) The ancients attributed to their seers a view of the past as well as of the future. Thus, Homer says of Calchas — os t]8t} ra riovra, ra reaaofieva, 7rpd riovra — {Iliad, i. 70,) which Virgil applies to Nereus : ' Novit namque omnia vates, Qua; sint, qua; fuerint, quae mox ventura trahantur.' Georg. iv. 392. ' E' si conosce facilmente per chi considera le cose presenti e l'antiche, come in tutte le citta e iu tutti i popoli sono quelli medesimi desideri e quelli medesimi umori, e come vi furono sempre ; in modo che egli e facil cosa, a chi esamina con diligenza le cose passate, prevedere in ogni re- pubblica le future, e farvi quelli rimedi che dagli antichi sono stati usati, pensarne de' nuovi, per la shnilitudine degli accidenti.' — Machiavel, Disc. i. 39. A similar remark is made by Paruta : ' Aconoscere delle cose ancora non fatte la verita, quale potesse essere il loro successo, niuna via abbiamo piu sicura, che quella delle cose gia fatte, le quali per certa congettura ci guidano poi a penetrare a cio, che seguire ne fosse potuto dell' altre, quando venuto si fosse all' atto d'esse.' — Disc. i. 2. ' On a dit que le temps present est gros de l'avenir ; on aurait pu remarquer auparavant qu'il est l'enfant du passe.' — Say, Cours d 'JEconomie Politique, torn. vi. p. 351. Compare above, p. 39, n. 36. Concerning the nature and limits of political prediction, see Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. iv. p. 458-61, 527 ; Zachariii, Vom Staate, vol. ii. p. 235. sect. 18.] in POLITICS. 359 and by the light of that experience we guide our practical judg- ment. Sometimes the politician reasons directly from one ana- logous case to another : and he then proceeds empirically, or instinctively, as it is termed ; in others, he anticipates the future by maxims which have been previously derived by reasoning from the results of experience. ( :9 ) But notwithstanding all the light which can be derived from history, from theoretical inquiries founded upon history, and from a knowledge of the national character of the people, as well as of the characters of the heads of the state and leaders of parties, yet, when any new political measure is proposed, wide differences of opinion with respect to it often arise, even among the most competent judges. Consultation in a deliberative assembly, and other modes of discussion, afford the best means of approximating to a correct anticipation of the probable conse- quence of the measure in debate. By comparing different views and different conjectures, and by subjecting their respective reasons to analysis, much error is eliminated, and the ground is laid for a rational estimate of the most probable event. By these means, the anticipations of the practical politician proceed to a very considerable extent on a secure foundation, and (making certain allowances for extraordinary occurrences) are in general verified by the event. If we take the annual laws and measures of a government, we shall find that a large number of them produce the effects which they were intended to produce, and that their operation has been in accordance with the expec- tations of their authors and promoters. A similar remark applies to those influences which do not, like its laws and administrative measures, originate with a government, but affect it from with- out, and induce it to report to active proceedings. Such are in- vasions or host ile attacks from a foreign power, scarcities offood, pestilences, commercial convulsions, and internal disturbances or insurrections. (") (29) (UV TU 1Tapc\rjkv06ra flVrjpOVtVflS, "/""'"" n 'l 11 T ""' fuXKoVTtOV fiovkfvvu. — Ieocrat. ad Nicocl. § 48. (30) Compare tli*- n-iiuirk-; in eh. \ii. on the foreseen and unforeseen effects <)(' law*. 360 ON PREDICTION [CHAP. XXIV. With respect, however, to political prescience, and the veri- fication of political predictions, it is to be observed that the length of time by which the anticipation precedes the event is a material consideration. Nearly all f coming events cast their shadows before/ but those shadows can be discerned by some long before they are visible to others. The extremity of the shadow is faintly marked, and its first appearance is detected by few. After a time, the indications are stronger, and the reflected outline of the coming object can be distinctly made out, even by an ordinary eye. Great political events, such as a hostile inva- sion, an insurrectionary movement, a scarcity of food, or a com- mercial crisis, can in general be predicted when they are imminent; but he is most entitled to the praise of sagacity who foresaw the coming event from afar, and gave timely warning of its approach. Such warnhigs must, however, be founded on rational indicia, and be derived from symptoms which possess a significance resting upon experience — for otherwise, they are not deserving of atten- tion, and though the conjecture of the political prophet may be a lucky one, yet he will meet the fate of Cassandra, and find that his predictions, however true, are disregarded. The ordinary experience of every civilized government proves that the immediate future can be to a great extent anticipated in politics. Impending calamities and disasters are guarded against, so far as the resources of the country and its legislative and administrative ability will permit ; and the proximate conse- quences of the existing laws are foreseen with tolerable accuracy, whatever may be the soundness of the principles which are applied to their appreciation. Looking to immediate, and not remote results, the policy of each government is in general attended with the results which it contemplated. Nevertheless, this statement is subject to considerable deductions, even if we confine our view to a narrow horizon of futurity; and if, in making this compari- son, we include a more distant range, we shall find (as was shown in a former chapter) ( 31 ) that every important law, and every poli- (31) Above, ch. xii. § 10. sect. 18.] IN POLITICS. 361 tical change is followed by a train, sometimes a long train, of unforeseen consequences. It is indeed well if the blindness to coming political events is limited to the distant future, aud does not extend to the time immediately succeeding the present ; for the most sagacious judges, with the best means of information, have been mistaken as to important political events which were on the point of taking place. The course of the English civil war was certainly not anticipated, either by the king or by the leaders of the Long Parliament, when they appealed to arms; but when the king had been dethroned, the restoration of his successor was not anticipated. ( K ) The French revolution of 1 789 was unquestionably a great and universal surprise, not only to France, but to the rest of Europe, inasmuch as the old French monarchy was believed to rest on an immovable basis. ( M ) Eng- land has been repeatedly declared, by calm observers of politics, to be on the brink of ruin. Filangieri made that prediction in the middle of the last century, and it has since been renewed from time to time.( M ) A more remarkable example of erroneous political prognosti- cation can scarcely be found than the views of Mr. Pitt and his cabinet, in 1792, with respect to the probable duration of peace between England and France. The king's speech of 31st January, 1792, held out to the country the prospect of continued peace, and expressed an opinion that some immediate reduction might (32) Antony Wood, as quoted by Toland, Life of Harrington, -prefixed to liia works, p. xxix., says, in reference to the commonwealth, that, 'as to human foresight, there was no i>ossibility of the king's return.' (,■53) The supposed predictions of tin- French revolution by Rousseau and Voltaire arc shown to be mere rague conjectures by Granier do Cassagnac, Hist, des Causes de la Rev. St, torn. ii. p. 326-7< In torn. i. p. 21, he says, that the French revolution was ' one immense el uniwr- selle surprise.' See above, p. 55, n. In I. (34) ' C'ct empire est aujourd'hui snr le borddesa ruine.et sa decadence a sa source dans lea erreurs deaeslois.' Filangieri, Selena de l