v v - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 I I -J\ I 5 
 
 IS 
 
 
 
 
 
 f» 
 
 

 
 A 
 
 DEFENSE 
 
 O F 
 
 HUMAN LIBERTY, 
 
 In A n s w e r to the 
 
 Principal Arguments 
 
 which have been alledged againft it ; 
 
 And particularly to 
 
 CATO's Letters on That Subject. 
 
 In which Defense 
 
 The Opinion of theAntients, concerning Fate, 
 is alfo diftin&ly and largely confidered. 
 
 By JO H N JACKSON, 
 
 Redor of Rojjington in the County of Tork^ and Pre- 
 bendary of Whenvell in the County of Southampton. 
 
 Non eft igitur narura deorum prxpotens neque excellens, fiquidem ea 
 fbbje£ta eft ei vel necejjltati vel natarj;, qua caelum, maria, terra:que re- 
 gantur. Nihil autem eft pratltantius Deo, ab eo ig'uur necefle eft 
 mundum regi. Cu. de Ndt. Deorum, lib. z, 
 
 Fato quxdam agi verum eft ; & quod quajdam in mfira pattftate funt, hoc 
 quoque verum effe monftratum eft. Quare qui omnia Fato fieri dicunc 
 merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui probanc efte aliquid in no/Ira potrftate. 
 Demum qui omnia in nojlra poteflate conftituunt, nee quicquam Fato re- 
 linquunt, falli deteguntur. Quis enim ignore: efte aliquid in Fato & 
 extra nofirum jus if Sola igirur vera ilia ratio eft, fixaque & ftabilis fen- 
 tentia, qua: docet qusedam Fato fieri, alia porro ex hominum Arbitriv & 
 Volnntatc profkifci. Chalcid. Com. in Plat. Tim. c. 7, Sefl. 188.J 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for J. Noon at the White Hart in 
 Cheapfide near the Poultry, m. dcc.xxv.
 
 THE 
 
 PR EFAC E. 
 
 S Liberty of thinking and 
 judging for ourfehes is 
 the Privilege and Right 
 of all Mankind, as being 
 rational Creatures 5 and a 
 free impartial Enquiry after Truth is, 
 in Matters of Philofophy, the great 
 Principle of natural Knowledge, and 
 in Matters of Religion and Morality, 
 the Ground and Foundation of true 
 Virtue and fine ere Piety ; fo this Li- 
 berty ought to be labour" d after by our-' 
 felves, and encouraged as much as 
 pojjible in all others, 
 
 A i On
 
 The P R E F A C E. 
 
 On which Account I do not blame 
 the late Author of * Cato'j Letters for 
 applying his Reafon andUnderfianding 
 to the Search of the mojl nice and dif- 
 ficult Truths 5 or for any Defigns or En- 
 deavours [after a full and fair Exami- 
 nation of things) to inform the Minds 
 of others in that Knowledge which ap' 
 peared to him to be founded in Truth 
 and Reafon. 
 
 But as it is certain {and his own 
 good Senfe could not but convince him) 
 that a Thing or Matter, thd* true in itfelf, 
 is not worth the ftudying, and much 
 lefs the publifhing abroad, if it is of 
 no Ufe or Benefit either to ourfelves or 
 others : So, much more, if our Enqui- 
 ries lead us into Notions which are not 
 only of no Ufe but of great Hurt and 
 Mifchief unto all y fuch as not only do 
 
 * The Letters contained in the following Treatife, when 
 firft publilTied, were fubfcribcd Diogenes, and were written by 
 the late Mr. Trer.chnrd, as we are wform'd by the Editor of 
 CWo'j Letters. 
 
 not
 
 The PR EFACE: 
 not tend to promote the Service of God, 
 and the Inter efts of Religion , the Good 
 of Society or any ufeful Knowledge 
 whatsoever -> but on the contrary do ma-* 
 nifefily anddire&lyfubvert the Founda- 
 tion of all Morality tfWReligion, deflroy 
 the ejfential Difference of Virtue and 
 Vice, Good and Evil,- and take away 
 the Ground, and Reafon, and Obli- 
 gation of all both divine and human 
 Laws, and contradiB all our Know- 
 ledge and Experience concerning the 
 Works of Nature and Providence $ we 
 Jhould at leafi fufpeB fuch Notions to be 
 erroneous and falfe, and that their ap- 
 pearing to us to be true, may be the effeB 
 offome Prejudice or corrupt Judgment 
 in us 1 and therefore Jhould be very 
 cautious of giving our AJfent to them, 
 and wifh at leafi that after further 
 Examination thefe Notions may be 
 found to have no Truth in them y which y 
 
 if
 
 Tht P R E F A C E. 
 
 if thej Jhould prove true, every Thing 
 almofi befides mufi be falfe. 
 
 And fuppoftng it, after all, pojjible 
 for an unprejudiced Mind to think fuch 
 Notions to be true y or not to perceive 
 the Falfhood of them ; yet 'tis evident 
 that (.as being pernicious to every ra~ 
 tional Nature) they can have no right 
 to be defended; and therefore no wife 
 or well difpos'd Man woud, I think , 
 publifh to the World, what tends only 
 to corrupt and mifchief it, and to take 
 away thofe natural, moral, and civil 
 Obligations, on which the good Order, 
 the Peace and Welfare of it are entirely 
 built and fupported* 
 
 Of this Nature, and attended with 
 thefe Confequences, I take the follow- 
 ing Speculations of the forementiotfd 
 Author on the Neceffity of the Actions, 
 both of God and Men, and his De- 
 fen fes of it to be-, which Notion I 
 
 thinks
 
 The PREFACE. 
 
 think, and Jhall endeavour in the foU 
 lowing Sheets largely to prove, very 
 weak and groundlefs in it/elf, and 
 eppofite to the Suppofition of God's be- 
 ing a real and moral Agent, Creator, 
 and Governor of the World, and of 
 Man being a rational, moral and 
 accountable Creature $ and which by 
 true and immediate Confequence de- 
 Jiroys the very EiTence of Virtue and 
 Vice, Religion and Piety, and over- 
 throws the Ground and Obligation of 
 all the* Laws of God and of human 
 Society. 
 
 And as fuch a pernicious Scheme 
 cannot be too much oppofed and con* 
 fated; fo the Defenfe of human Li- 
 berty of Action , which prefuppofes the 
 Free-agency of the divine Nature, and 
 on which the Nature and Diftin&ion of 
 Good and Evil, all Piety and Wor- 
 ship towards God, Juftice, Righteouf- 
 
 nefs,
 
 The P R E F A C £ 
 nefs, and all focial Virtue towards 
 Men, is wholly and entirely founded y 
 cannot but be acceptable to all Jincere 
 Lovers of Truth and Virtue, andPro- 
 fejfors of true Religion and Godli- 
 nefs, 
 
 LETTER
 
 ( «) 
 
 
 
 Y3E£kE\ ^^Ty-^r 
 
 ^? 
 
 ^ri^P^f^ 
 
 
 
 US 
 
 Kb^S3 
 
 H6J5flg3»a^"ff^u»i 
 
 
 
 LETTER I 
 
 H E Author of CWo's Letters on the 
 Subject of Liberty* : , introduces' his 
 Thoughts with an Enquiry into 
 the Origin of Good and Evil-, and 
 he conceives moral Good, or Virtue, 
 to be nothing but the Relation of Mens Actions to 
 one another, either diclated by Reafon^ by the Pre- 
 cepts of Heaven, or the Commands of the Sovereign 
 acling according to his Duty. 
 
 In thefe W ords our Author does not fet out 
 with an Accuracy fuitable to his great Genius; 
 for Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil, in the moral 
 Senfe of them, are not founded in the Relation of 
 Mens Aclions to one another; but antecedently to 
 any fuch Relation, they are founded in the ejjen- 
 tial Difference of Things, and their neceffary A- 
 
 * Ctto's Letters, Vol. IV. p.i6S, CSV. 
 
 B grecmen:
 
 greements and D if agreements, confider'd with the 
 feveral Circumflances of them, and as being natu- 
 ral Objects of every rational Agent. 
 
 Suppofing indeed Society, Mens Actions muft 
 in many Cafes have a Relation to one another j 
 but this Relation is not the Origin of the Virtue 
 or Morality of Actions, any more than the Rela- 
 tion of a Cone to a Globe, or of a Square to a 
 Circle, is the Origin of their different Natures. 
 Mens Actions may be either good or evil, although 
 they have no Relation to other Men : It will al- 
 ways be virtuous and good in Men to employ and 
 improve thofe rational Faculties which God has 
 given them. To fludy the Works of Nature, 
 and contemplate the Being and Perfections of 
 God, with a fuitable Senfe of his wife and good 
 Providence, and of the manifold Bleffings of Life 
 which we derive from thence, always was, and 
 always will be, morally good. Temperance, So- 
 briety, and Contentment in his Condition, will al- 
 ways be a Duty and Virtue in every Man, tho' 
 he were alone, and there was no other Man in 
 the World : And Cato is aware that the Mora- 
 lity of Mens Actions is to be extended farther 
 than the Relation which they bear to each other, 
 by adding, towards the Concluflon of this Letter, 
 that it confifts alfo in the Relation of their Ac- 
 tions to the Supreme Being, (p. 174O 
 
 Therefore, though a great part of Mens Acti- 
 ons relates to one another, confider'd as having 
 a Property, and certain natural Rights, and are 
 
 more
 
 (3) 
 
 more or lefs virtuous or vicious, as they affect this 
 natural Property, and bring greater or lefs Good 
 or Evil to Men •, and fo, many Virtues and Vices 
 arc of a focial Nature, and have an immediate 
 Refpect to the mutual Relation of Men to each 
 other, infomuch that without fuch a Relation, 
 thofe Virtues and Vices cou'd not be exercis'd : 
 Yet neverthelefs, the proper Origin of Virtue 
 and Vice, Good and Evil, abftra&edly confider'd 
 as fuch, is founded, not in the external Relation 
 of Mens Actions, either to each other, or even 
 unto God > but in the effential Difference of Things 
 and their Circumftances, as they relate to, or are 
 Objects of a rational Nature. As Reafon confifts 
 in the Perception of the natural and unalterable 
 Congruity and Incongruity of Things, and of 
 their Circumftances and Relations to each other 5 
 fo Actions are good or evil as they are agreeable 
 to Reafon or not 5 or as they are reafonable or un- 
 reafonable : And therefore thofe Actions call'd 
 Juftice and Charity, Obedience, Sec. and their 
 Contraries, have, as being moral Virtues and 
 Vices, (tho' relative to others, ) the fame Foun- 
 dation with other Virtues and Vices that are not 
 relative-, namely, the Agreeablenefs or Difagree- 
 ablenefs of them to natural Reafon, in thofe par- 
 ticular Circumftances in which they are exercis'd ; 
 which Reafon is the Rule of their Morality ante- 
 cedent to the Consideration of Society: And 
 though Society, or the Relation of Men to each 
 other, gives Occaflon to the Exif.cncc and Exer- 
 
 B 1 cifc
 
 (4) 
 
 fife of fuch and fuch Aclions^ (6 that they cou'd 
 not be perform'd without fuch a Relation j yet it 
 plainly does not give Exiftence to the Morality of 
 them> and the formal Ground of thefe relative 
 Actions being virtuous or vicious is not this Rela- 
 tion, (tho' that is the Ground of their being re- 
 lative Actions) but is the fame with the Origin 
 of other Virtues and Vices > namely, the internal 
 Relation which they bear to the Mind endued 
 with Reafon, or their being effentially and unal- 
 terably agreeable or diftgreeable to the eternal and 
 immutable Principles of Truth and Reafon. In 
 fhort, Jujlice, &c. is a relative and focial Virtue, 
 and therefore fuppofes Society and Relation to 
 others as neceflary to its aclual Exiftence ; but 
 the Reafon why the Action call'd Jujlice is a Vir- 
 tue^ is not becaufe it bears a particular Relation 
 to other Men; but the Reafon is (as is juft now 
 obferv'd) becaufe it is an Action proceeding from 
 rational Principles, fuch as Reafon dictates in the 
 prcfent Circumftances and Relations of Things 
 to each other: And as the Nature and Properties 
 of a Triangle are the fame, whether a Triangle 
 actually exifts or not; fo the Nature and Proper- 
 ties of Jujlice j &C. are the fame, whether any 
 Men, or Society of Men, exift or not: The Mo- 
 rality of thefe Virtues confifts not in the Rela- 
 tion which they bear (a pojleriori) to Society, but 
 in the Relation which they bear {a priori) to the 
 eflfential and unalterable Truth and Reafon of 
 Things. 
 
 To
 
 ( J) 
 
 To make this Matter Hill plainer by an Ex* 
 ample: To deprive another of his Life, or any 
 Part of his EJlate, or on the contrary, to be the 
 Caufe of any great Good or Benefit to another, 
 (if Virtue and Vice proceeded merely from the 
 Relation of Mens Actions to one another) wou'd 
 be always the one morally evil, the other good : 
 Yet this is not foj and Men can neither be truly 
 faid to be vicious in the one refpect, or virtuous 
 in the other, if the Actions do not proceed from 
 Defign or Choice, or acting voluntarily upon Prin- 
 ciples of Reafon j if Men either ignorantly, uncle- 
 fignedly, or unavoidably, do either the one or the 
 other} or if in the former Cafe they act with 
 Reafon, or in the latter Cafe without Reafon. The 
 Obfervation of the Heathen Philofopher on this 
 Head deferves Confederation : " * The involuntary 
 " killing of a Man, as not proceeding from Choice 
 " and Will, and a Power of acting or not act- 
 " ing, is pardon' d: But the taking away the Life 
 " of another defervedly and juflly, is ever praife- 
 " worthy. 
 
 Wherefore, if Cato in faying that Virtue is a 
 Relation of Mem Aclions to one another, either die- 
 tated by Reafon, &c. means only, that facial Vir- 
 tue is an acting according to Reafon in a State of 
 
 Society,
 
 (O 
 
 Society, or focial Relation of Men to each other j 
 there wou'd be no other Fault than calling that 
 by a general Name which is particular. But if 
 he means either that all Virtue and Vice is found- 
 ed merely in the Relation of Mens Actions to 
 one another, as dictated by Reafon, &c. or as 
 contrary to it, and that there is no other Virtue 
 or Vice bcfides, this (as I have fhewn) is plainly 
 an Error : Or if he means that Virtue and Vice 
 are in the Nature of Things nothing but the con- 
 fequent Benefit or Hurt, Pleafure or Pain, which 
 arife from Mens mutual relative Actions ; which 
 Pleafure or Pain will generally (tho' not always) 
 follow, the former from that which is agreeable, 
 the latter from that which is difagreeable to Rea- 
 fon -, if he fuppofeth Virtue and Vice to confift. 
 in this only, without regard to the Actions being 
 the Refult of the free Determination of the rati- 
 onal Mind 5 then his Notion is (till more errone- 
 ous -, and, as I mall prove hereafter, is of very 
 fatal Confequence to Society, and inconfiftent 
 with the Suppofition of the Ditlates of any Rea- 
 fon, of any Precepts of Heaven, of any Duty ei- 
 ther in Sovereign or Subject, or of any # Virtue or 
 Vice whatlbevcr. 
 
 * Ovx. tu 7?(ci%tis c* izvzauc, t%xtr; tb tu M kakZic,, U.Xa inn T?? 
 «/f£5-£A'5 n 7i goxyt<rws tw* *$>' y.[M» Iytu* IwtTtciwrrou, Simpl. in 
 Epi<5t. c i. p. 14. A&ions in tbemfelves are neither good or evil* 
 but are cither the one or the other from Choice, and a Power of 
 a<fting freely. 
 
 z. Cato
 
 (7) 
 
 z. Cato proceeds to obferve, that " the com- 
 " mon Light of Reafon has told all Mankind, 
 a that there cannot be an Effect without a Caufe, 
 " and that every Caufe muft be an Effect of fome 
 w fuperior Caufe, till they come to the laft of all, 
 " which can be no other wife than felf-exiftentj 
 M that is, muft have exifted from all Eternity. " 
 (p. 169.) 
 
 All this is very right, excepting only that Self- 
 exijience and Eternal- exigence are not the fame, as 
 they are here fuppos'd to be: For Self-exiftence re- 
 lates to Caufality, and eternal Exiftence relates 
 to Duration of Exiftence. To be felf-exifent, is 
 evidently the fame as to exift necejfarily, by Ne- 
 cejfity of Nature abfolutely, without any Caufe 
 or Original-, it is to have no Caufe of Exiftence 3 
 and the Confequence of necejfary or Self-exiftence^ 
 is Eternity of Exiftence 5 but mere Eternity of 
 Exiftence does not, I think, infer necejfary or 
 §elf-exiftence. Suppofing that God, as having 
 eternal Power and Will, cou'd or did eternally 
 act, or produce Beings, thefc Beings, tho* eter- 
 nal) wou'd not be felf-exijlent. But, 
 
 3. Cato goes on to confider the Actions or Ef- 
 fects of the firft felf-exiftent Caufe, or God, and 
 fays, " Some think that he muft act: from the 
 u Necejfity of his own Nature: For fince hisBe- 
 " ing is necejfary, they think that his Will and 
 " Attributes (which are Parts of his Being, ef- 
 " fential to it, and infeparable from it) and con- 
 " fequently his Action^ which are the Refults of 
 
 " that
 
 (8) 
 
 " that Willy and of thofe Attributes, muft be 
 " neceffary too." (p. 170.) 
 
 If this and what follows (which I fhall alfd 
 confider) did not appear to be the real Sentiments 
 of this Writer, I fhould difmifs it (with the ab- 4 
 furd Syftem of the Materialifts, which he men- 
 tions and gives up) without taking any notice of 
 it: For certainly nothing can be more unreafona- 
 ble and abfurd, than what is here propofed, and 
 afterwards at large defended, by this Author. 
 
 That a necejfarily-exiftent Being muft act necej- 
 farily is no Confequence j and there is no Con- 
 nection at all between the NeceJJity of God's Ex- 
 iftence, which is no Acl, and the NeceJJity of his 
 Aclions: And the true Confequence of fuch a 
 Suppofkion is, that he docs not acl at all; and 
 fo the Suppolition is a Contradiction in Terms. 
 NeceJJity is contradictory to Agency, which latter 
 always fuppofeth Will and Choice in the Agent* 
 otherwife he is no Agent, but is merely pajjive; 
 and the Confequence of this is, that what Cato 
 calls the Aclions of God, wou'd be no Aclions, and 
 God no Cauje, but all wou'd be Effecl, without 
 any original Cauje at all, directly contrary to his 
 own Maxim ; that there cannot be an Effecl •with- 
 out a Cauje. 
 
 Secondly, it wou'd hence alfo follow, that 
 whereas Cato fays, and very truly, that every Cauje 
 muft be an Effecl of Jome Jupcrior Cauje, till we 
 come to one which is felfexiftent ; it wou'd, I fay, 
 follow, in direct Contradiction to his own jufi; 
 5 Reafoning,
 
 (?) 
 
 reafoning, that, if God acted neceffarily, or from 
 the Neceflity of his Nature; /'. e. if his Actions 
 were as neceffary as his Nature, all the Effects 
 or Beings produc'd or refulting from this Necef- 
 fity, would be neceffarily-exijlent ; and fo every 
 thing would be equally neceffarily-exijlent ; and 
 confequently there would not be any one fuperior 
 or felf-exijlent Caufe j which Cato himfelf (ces and 
 owns is contrary to the common Light of Reafon. 
 he is fo fenfible that God cannot be an Agent or 
 proper Caufe of any Thing, cannot be (aid to 
 act without Will, that he is forc'd exprellly to 
 allow that God has Will with other Attributes, 
 and that his Actions are the Re f tilts of his Will and 
 of thofe Attributes: But then he argues, that be- 
 caufe his Being is neceffary, his Will, &;c. (which 
 are Parts of his Being, CvC.J and confequently his 
 Actions which are Refults of that Will, See. mufl 
 be neceffary too \ than which there never was a 
 greater or a weaker Fallacy offered by a Man of 
 Senfe. The Fallacy lies in the Word Neceffary. 
 The Being of God {Cato argues) is neceffary, i. e. 
 he means neceffarily or felf-exijlent. Very well, 
 what then ? therefore his Will and other Attri- 
 butes, which are effential to his Being, are neceffary, 
 i. e. again neceffarily or felf-exijlent - y true, and 
 what then ? therefore the Actions, which are Re- 
 fults of that Will, mufl be neceffary too, i. e. accord- 
 ing to this Argument, neceffary or felf-exijlent •' 
 This, if any thing, is theConfequencc; and, as 1 
 have already obferv'd, is the true Rcfult of his 
 C Notion.
 
 ( io) 
 
 Notion, which makes all things equally necejfary 
 or felf-exiftent, which he himfelf owns is thcgrcat- 
 eft Abfurdity -, and therefore, had he been aware of 
 the Fallacy, which he here offers, he mult have 
 been afhamed of it. For not to take notice of 
 the grofs and improper way of his calling the At- 
 tributes of God (which are every one Attributes, 
 not of a Part, but of the whole divine Being) 
 Parts of his Being, how cou'd fo acute a man as 
 our Author think it to follow, that becaufe the 
 Will of God is necejfarily- exiftent, the Aclions re- 
 fulting from it are necejfary ? than which there 
 cannot be a more felf-evident Contradiction. It 
 is the fame as to fay, that becaufe God is necejfarily 
 endued with Will, therefore he has no Will at all. 
 The very Suppofition of God acting by his 
 Will makes his Actions voluntary, not necejfary j 
 and Cato's Argument makes Necejfity and Will, 
 which are oppofite and contrary in their Natures, 
 to be one and the fame, than which nothing 
 can be more abfurd. Surely it is one thing to 
 fay that God's Will is necejfary, i. e. necejfarily or 
 felf-exijlent, and another thing very different to 
 fay, that his Aclions refulting from his Will arc 
 ?iecejfary, i. e. do not remit from his Will, but 
 from the Necejfity of his Nature, which is an 
 evident Self-contradiction. If Cato had under- 
 flood the Word necejfary in one uniform Senfe, 
 and had meant by the Aclions being necejfary, the 
 fame as the divine Nature being necejfary, then he 
 cou'd not have avoided feeing the Confequence to 
 
 be
 
 ( » ) 
 
 be, that all things zxcfelf-exijlent alike : But to mean 
 by neceffary, as apply'd to God's Being and Attribute s 
 one Thing, (/. e . not Neceflity of Aclion or Ef- 
 fect, but of Exiflence only without Caufe) and as 
 apply'd to the Aclions of God a quite different 
 Thing, (i. e. Necefiity of Aclion or Effect pro- 
 ceeding from a Caufe) and then to argue confe- 
 quentially from the one to the other, is a Fallacy 
 not becoming a ferious Man in a ferious Argu- 
 ment, and therefore I fhall conclude was not de- 
 fignedly,but unknowingly offered. 
 
 To proceed -, our Author adds, as another Argu- 
 ment for the Neceflity ol God's Aclions, " that he 
 " cannot conceive how a Being, who has the Prin- 
 *' ciples and Caufes of all Things within itfelf, 
 " could exift without having feen every Thing in- 
 " tuitively from all Eternity, which mu-fthaveex- 
 " eluded Choice andPreference in his Action i7 ,which 
 <£ implies Doubt and Deliberation ." (p. 170.) He 
 fubjoins to this Purpofe in the laft Paragraph of 
 this Letter* " He (viz. God) fees all Things at 
 " one View, and nothing can happen without 
 " his Leave and Permiflion, and without his giv- 
 w z'»g Power enough to have it effected. (p. 174.) 
 
 That God, as having the Principles and Cauies- 
 of all Things within himfelf, muft fee everyThing 
 intuitively from all Eternity, is, I grant, very 
 true j but as Intuition does not imply Action y 
 and is not the efficient Caufe of Aclion, fo how it 
 excludes Choice and Preference in God's Actions I 
 cannot fee. Had Intuition^ which is mcefjary, 
 C 2, imply'd
 
 ( *l ) 
 
 imply'd Attion, the Confequence would be that 
 all pojfible Things which God had in View, muff 
 haveexifted at once, and from a\\ Eternity, which 
 no one is fo weak as to affirm to be fa£h Con- 
 trary therefore to Cato's Reafoning I think the 
 Truth to be, that God, feeing all things from 
 Eternity, faw, amongft the infinite Poflibilities 
 of Things, infinite Variety of Things and Circum- 
 fiances of Things, perfectly equal in themfelves; 
 and having within himfelf infinite Power, and 
 Will to exert that Power into Action, as he wilVd, 
 and when he will'd; he freely chofe one Syftem 
 rather than another, and at one Time rather 
 than another. That God mould create juft 
 fuch a particular Quantity of Matter, and no 
 more ; and fuch a Number of Planets, Comets and 
 fix'd Stars, and no more* and at one particular 
 Time, and in one particular Place, rather than an- 
 other j and that their Orbits, Difiance and gravi- 
 tating Powers mould be juft what they are, and 
 no other: Nay, that God mould place equal 
 Quantities of Matter in equal Forms here rather 
 than there; that he mould caufe the Propagation of 
 Mankind to come from two only, rather than 
 more, and in a different way from many other 
 living Creatures : that he mould create fo great a 
 Variety of Species of Things, as fuppofe of Birds, 
 Fijhes, Horfes, Dogs, Fruit, &c. with a thoufand 
 Things of like Nature, and which are indifferent 
 as to Time, Number, Manner and Place, can be 
 rationally deduced from no other Principle bur 
 
 Choice
 
 ( U ) 
 
 Choice and mil*. That all thefe Things fhould 
 bt necejfary, and could not pojjibly have been other- 
 wife, is very abfurd to affirm : for NeceJJity has 
 plainly no Relation to Time, Number, or Placet 
 whatever is necejfary at all, is equally necefTary 
 in all Time, in all Numbers, in all Place. 
 
 If NeceJJity therefore was the principle of God's 
 Actions, it mull have produced all poffible Things 
 in all poffible Time* and then, fince God's 
 Knowledge and Power are eternal and infinite, 
 the Effects necejfarily proceeding from them muft 
 be eternal and injinite. To fuppofe Matter to ex- 
 iffc necejfarily, is to fuppofe it to be necejfarily 
 eternal and injinite, which is abfurd. For nothing 
 is more evident than that there cou'd be no Ne- 
 ceJJity for Matter to exift at one Time and not at 
 another, in one Place and not in another j and 
 therefore if its Exiftence was at all necejfary, it 
 muft be necejfary in all Time, and in all Place, 
 i. e. muft be necejfarily eternal and injinite: But 
 it is evident that its Exiftence was not necejfary 
 in all Time (for we can conceive it to exift at a 
 particular Time, and even not to exift at all, 
 without a Contradiction, which we could not 
 
 * It is every whit as abfurd to fuppofe the Works of God's 
 Creation to be the Effc&s of NeceJJity, as it would be to fup- 
 pofe the Effedls of humane Art to be necejfary; as abfurd as to 
 fay, that a Hou/e, or Bed is made, or an Harp is tun'd by Fate 
 pr NeceJJity, as Alex, Apbrodifitts puts the Cafes. Hu<; ovk acx-one?, 
 riia iuuott, xx\ rLi xXwho xuff'^lyux^fjjiyUju teyuv yiyoviveu tj rfc? 
 fw?X» itffAo&Xi xx.6' ti(Xsfl{i/jivho. De FatO p. 23. 
 
 do,
 
 (i4) 
 
 do, if its Exiftence was necejfary) nor in all 
 Place (for we can not only conceive it not to be 
 in all Place, but in Fact know certainly that it 
 is notj and therefore it was plainly not necejfary at 
 any Time, and in any Place, i. e. it was not at all 
 necejfary. 
 
 Again, another Argument that Matter mud be 
 necejjarily infinite, if it is at all necefTary, may be 
 deduced from the Nature of Power : Operating 
 Power, if not hinder'd or limited by a fuperior 
 Power or by Will, will exert all its Force -, but 
 God's Power being omnipotent, no fuperior Pow- 
 er can hinder or limit the Force of it 3 and there- 
 fore either the Force and Operations of it are not 
 limited at all, $. e. are infinite as the Power is, or 
 they are limited by his Will. 
 
 Again 5 as Limitation of Power in Actions is a 
 Confequence of Will and free Agency, fo Va- 
 riety \& a Confequence of this Limitation-, if the 
 Exiftence of Matter was necejfary, as it would 
 be (as I have proved} necejfarily infinite j fo in 
 Confequence of this Infinity ic would be uni- 
 form and invariable, without any Difformity or 
 Variety whatfoever, even in fo much as a Mode 
 or Circumftance of Exiftence : No one Part of 
 Matter could have different Qualities from an- 
 other, nor could there be any Difiinclion in the 
 Nature of Things j and therefore it is unquestion- 
 ably true and certain that it is God's Choice and 
 Will that limits the Exertion of his Power, and 
 diftingiuilieth Things into their fever al Kinds by 
 
 diftincl
 
 diftinft Qualities and Modes of Exiftence, and 
 determines the particular Time, and Place, and 
 Number of them : And the great Variety of 
 Things, and of their Properties, and the appa- 
 rent arbitrary Difpofition of them, is fuch a De- 
 monftration of their being the Effects of a wife 
 and powerful Free-agent; that to fuppofe every 
 Thing to be the Effect of NeceJJity, is to fup- 
 pofe the Operations of NeceJJity to be the fame as 
 the Operations of Will; and Things to be pro- 
 duced and ordered in the fame various and arbi' 
 trary Manner by NeceJJity as by Will\ and fo is to 
 confound the Diftinction of Things the mod op- 
 pofke that can be in Nature, and to make NeceJJity 
 and Will one and the fame. Cato mud therefore 
 have faid that there could not be any thing more 
 or lefs exifting, than actually does exiftj that no- 
 thing could poffibly be otherwise than it is; that 
 there is and can be no Variety in Things or Pro- 
 perties of Things 5 that there is not nor can 
 poflibly be any determinate Quantity of Mat- 
 ter, or determinate Place or Duration of the 
 Exiftence of it* that it is impoflib.le for God 
 to create two Pieces of Matter of equal Quan- 
 tity and Form, as fuppofe two Cubes, or two 
 Globes of an Inch Diameter fit being evident that 
 being of the fame Form and Quantity, there can 
 be no NeceJJity why one fhould exift here or 
 there or any where, rather than the otherj and a 
 thoufand other Abfurdities contrary to all the 
 Senfe and Reafon of Mankind Cato muft have 
 
 z aflirm'd
 
 ( Itf) 
 
 affirm'd and held -, or elfe acknowledged that God 
 created all Things by the free Determination of 
 his Will by the free Exertion of his Nature 
 into A&ion. 
 
 But now if, upon the Hypothefis of Will aad 
 free Agency in God, the Reafon be ask'd why 
 God chofe one Scheme of Creation rather than 
 another ffuppofing, as hath been proved, another 
 could poflibly exift) it is eafily anfwered $ that 
 the Reafon was either becaufe it was the beft, or 
 as good as any other amongft the infinite Variety 
 of poflible Syftems which he had in his View: 
 And God, as Cato obferves, having all things in 
 his View at once, need not doubt ('which always 
 fuppofes Imperfection of Knowledge) which of 
 (fuppofe) equally good Syitems to choofe - 3 and if 
 one was the beft Syftem, he could not doubt or 
 deliberate in the Choice or Preference of it : and 
 its being the beft, tho' it is a Reafon why God 
 would infallibly choofe it, is none at all why he 
 could not choofe it, or why it is r.ecejfary j the 
 being beft, no way excluding Will and Choice*. 
 Suppofing a Will in God fas Cato does allowj 
 what Reafon can there be why, by that Will, 
 God, the beft Being, fliould not choofe what is 
 
 * Seneca, fpeaking of God and the fix'd Laws of his Provi- 
 dence, fays, Liceat illi hodieque decernere 8c ex ea lege Fato- 
 rum aliquid derogarej an majeftatis diminutio fir, 8c confefllo 
 eiroris mutanda fecifle : necefTe eft enim ei eadem placere, cui 
 nifi optima, placere non pofTunr, nee ob hoc minus liber 8c po- 
 tens eft, ipfc enim eft neceflitas fua. Qua:ft. Na.r. Praefat. 
 
 alfo
 
 (17) 
 
 heft ? on the contrary, fuppofing God to be en- 
 dued with // 7 /7/, he will infallibly always apply it 
 to the Choice and Preference of what is beft. So 
 weak and wholly deftitute of Truth is every Pare 
 of Cants Argument. 
 
 But Cato argues againft Choice in God, as im- 
 plying Doubt and Deliberation: In which he is 
 alfo miftakenj for the Reafon why God can- 
 not doubt or deliberate is, not that he hath no 
 Will or Choice^ but becaufe his Knowledge and 
 Wifdom is abfolutely perfect and unerring : And 
 tho' Choice does not imply Doubt and Delibera- 
 tion, yet on the other hand it is true that Doubt 
 and * Deliberation do imply Choice, and fo this 
 is an Argument that Men are endued with Choice 
 and voluntary Agency, which quite defhoys the 
 Scheme of NeceJJity. 
 
 * As all Deliberation and Confutation about our Actions would 
 be abfurd and ridiculous, if they were not in cur own Voveer ; 
 fo is it, if poffible, more abfurd to fuppofe that we arc by 
 Nature) necejjarily endued with a 'Power of Deliberation and Con- 
 futation, and mceflarily deliberate and confult about Things in 
 which we have no Choice or can aft voluntarily, " Wherefore 
 ("as Alex. Aphrodifus obfervesj " we never deliberate about 
 " Things in JEterntty, nor about Things confefledly neceffary, nor 
 " about Things, which, tho' not neceffary, are yet in the 
 " Power of others only; nor yet about Things done by our 
 " felves, which atcpafl: but we deliberate about thofe Things 
 " only, which are and will be in our own Power to do. 
 
 Atct touto, 'art arspi, t»» ctioiM (2tvtevcUji(<c,, art nipt rav of/joXa- 
 r /cvytiitat; y»6fji/ivuv, i'% kvct r /x.v& ~— a?.>. £ci S7ff< r2v s| oitccyx.-^ 
 
 fJb(V Uifi '/iVOUilVUV, \7C' «A/\0(S S'i TitTlll IvTOJV {lt$\U/0[Jji$jC . CiXX' 
 
 iidl Ttlfl fAlV YKIAV fJjH KfXKTVV 7TaflAi)>.v6(,TM di, fix^VafAi ?CC i .. 
 
 Tt»» De far. p. yy, y<5. 
 
 D I muft
 
 ( i8 ) 
 
 I mufl farther take notice that our Author, 
 whilit he is arguing againft the voluntary Agency 
 of God, directly maintains it in faying, that no- 
 thing can happen without God's Leave andPermiJJion, 
 which is very abfurd upon the Supposition of all 
 Things being from NeceJJity : If they arc necejjary 
 they are independent of any Leave or Permijjion of 
 God, and God can no more hinder their Ex iftence 
 and Effects, than his own Exiftence 5 and therefore 
 the fuppofing Things and their Effects to exiftby 
 God's Leave and PermiJJion, is faying they exifl 
 by his Choice and Will, as plain as can be ex- 
 prefs'd in Words, and fo Cato herein contradicts 
 himfelf. 
 
 Another Argument which is us'd for the Ne- 
 ceJJity of God's Actions is, that all his Attions tnuji 
 be inflantaneous Emanations of himfelf-, (p. 174J 
 which, I grant, is true, if they are necejjary, but 
 not otherwife'j and whether they are necejfary or 
 not is the Queftion: but however our Author 
 might eaflly perceive the Confequcnce of his Ar- 
 gument to be, that all Things are eternal: And 
 another unhappy Confequence is, that NeceJJity 
 being one and the fame in every Thing, all hu- 
 mane Actions mufl; alfo (If neceffaryj be inflanta- 
 neous j and NeceJJity mult as much exclude Doubt , 
 and Deliberation, and Sufpenfion in Men, as in God: 
 And therefore if Men can doubt, deliberate, and 
 Jufpend (as Cato would not, I fuppofe, deny) it 
 mufl proceed from Will, not NeceJJity. If Necef- 
 fty could caufe Deliberation in Men, it would in 
 5 God
 
 ( i?) 
 
 God alfo j and it is not fufficient to fay, that 
 Men's imperfeel Knowledge is the neceflary Caufe 
 of their Deliberation and Sufpenfion of Action j for 
 tho' the Senfc of their imperfect Knowledge makes 
 them deliberate and fufpend many Actions, yet 
 they can equally fufpend where they have the 
 cleared and mod perfect Knowledge. But when- 
 ever Nccefity operates, there is no Sufpenfion ; 
 there is no Sufpenfion of Rays ifluing from the 
 Sun, or in a Balance, whether it fhould move 
 when a Weight is in one of the Scales j or in the 
 Pulfe and Heart whether they fhould beat -, or 
 of any of the Effects of natural and neceflary 
 Caufes : And Life and Intelligence can alter no- 
 thing in the Cafe, for unlefs there is Will in this 
 Life and Intelligence, Necefity muft operate 
 equally in Things with or without Life and In- 
 telligence. 
 
 " 4. Cato could not apprehend how Reafon 
 " and Wifdom can be analogous in God to what 
 " are call'd by the fame Names in Men : For 
 " Judgment in them, as far as it regards their 
 " own voluntary Operations, is only the Balance 
 " of the Conveniences or Inconveniences which 
 " will rcfult from their own or others Thoughts 
 w and Actions, as they have Relation to Beings 
 " or Events out of their Power, and which de- 
 u pend upon other Caufes: But if a Being can 
 " have no Caufes without itfelf, but produces 
 *' every Thing by its own Energy and Power, 
 " fees all Things at once and cannot err, as Men 
 
 D 1 " may,
 
 ( »>) 
 
 " may, nor confequently deliberate and debate 
 " with itfelf j he thinks it mud act fingly, and in 
 " one way only ; and where there is no Choice, 
 " or which is the fame Thing, but one Choice, 
 " he conceives there is always NeceJ/ity" (p. 
 170,171. 
 
 Anfw. Re a fin and Judgment in God and in Men 
 are not different in Kind or in Nature-, if they 
 were, then what is mod contradictory to our 
 Ideas, might be true or agreeable to the divine 
 Reafon j then two and two may not be equal to 
 four in God's Judgment} and that which to hu- 
 mane Reafon is the plaineit and greater! Abfur- 
 dity, ImpofTibility, or Enormity, may, to the Rea- 
 fon of God, be true, poffible, and right; which 
 Suppoiition dcftroys the Foundation of all Reafon, 
 Truth and Right amongft Men; They do not 
 therefore differ in Nature or Kind, but only in 
 Degrees of Perfection. The Reafon and JVifdom 
 of God is founded on clear, infallible and perfect 
 Knowledge} but that of Men upon confus'd, 
 fallible and imperfect Apprehenfions of Things. 
 JVifdom and Judgment, whether in God or Men, 
 fo far as they regard Aclions, is the Knowledge 
 and Application of Means proper and effectual to 
 obtain the Ends intended by them : God, know- 
 ing the Natures and Powers of all Things, cannot 
 err in his Judgment, and in effecting his Ends} 
 but Mens Knowledge being erroneous and very im- 
 perfect, makes them often err in their Ufe and Ap- 
 plication of Means, and in effecting the Ends they 
 
 aim
 
 ( 1« ) 
 
 aim at. But as, no Doubr, in the Nature of 
 Thing', feveral Means are equally effectual to 
 produce the fame End 3 God, who fees all 
 Things, choofeth out of this Variety which he 
 pleafes : And Men alfo, who in many Cafes fee 
 that feveral Means are equally and certainly effec- 
 tual to certain Ends, choofe to make ufe of which 
 they pleafe. The Confcioufnefs of their imper- 
 fect Knowledge makes them, it may be, delibe- 
 rate before they choofe (which is otherwife in God 
 whofe Knowledge is perfect) but the Choice and 
 Action following is neverthelefs free, whether 
 it be with or without Deliberation. 
 
 Secondly ', God's acting uniformly, doing al- 
 ways what is good or be ft, is exactly all one whe- 
 ther we fuppofe him to act necejfarily or freely, 
 and fo can be no Argument for NeceJJity. 
 
 A Mind endued with perfect Freedom, which 
 confifts in having a perfect Knowledge of the 
 eternal and immutable Relations and Difference or" 
 Things, and an unbiaffed or unreftrain'd Power 
 of Action upon fuch a Knowledge, will always 
 as invariably atl one TVay, i. e. always do what 
 is right and good, and beft in the whole, as if it 
 was impell'd by Neceffity. The Agreeablenefs of 
 fome Things to Reafon will always as infallibly 
 induce God to prefer and choofe them, and the 
 Difagreeablenefs of other Things, to reject and re- 
 fufe thefe, as if NeceJJity was the Caufe of all his 
 Actions. As Seneca (noted above p. 13.J well 
 obferves, God's being always plcas'd with, and 
 
 doing
 
 ( » ) 
 
 doing what is hefty is no Argument that he is 
 therefore lefs a Free-agent. If Men had the fame 
 Perfection of Knowledge and Power that God 
 has, their Actions, proceeding from their Will, 
 would be as invariable and uniform as God's are* 
 and as much in one Way of moral Goodnefs, 
 as if Neceflity impelFd them to act. The Rea- 
 fon is j becaufe a rational Mind cannot be equally 
 or indifferently inclin'd to all different Things j 
 Vertue and Vice^ Good and Evil, which are op- 
 pofite in their Natures, and the one efTentially 
 agreeable to Reafon, the other efTentially dif- 
 agrecable to it, cannot appear equally eligible to a 
 Mind endued with Reafon-, and therefore the 
 Mind, if not impos'd upon, will certainly always 
 choofe the one, and reject the other: And 'tis cer- 
 tain that in this Refpect, the more uniformly 
 Men act, with the more Freedom they do act* 
 and the lefs uniformly, with the lefs Freedom j 
 becaufe they act with the lefs clear and fteddy 
 Perception of the efTential Difference of Good 
 and Evil. Every Vice darkens the Mind, and 
 proportionably takes away its Freedom and Power 
 of exerting into good Actions, as it deprives it 
 of the Senle of the Difference of Good and Evil. 
 Where the Mind is balanced with an equally 
 clear Perception of the Nature of Good and 
 Evil, of the Agreeablenefs of the one to a ratio- 
 nal Mind, and of the Difagreeablcnefs of the 
 other, having withal a Power of Action, and 
 being inclin'd by nothing to either fide but by 
 
 the
 
 ( *3) 
 
 the Nature of the Things themfelves j here is a 
 State of perfect Freedom, and in this State the 
 Mind will always uniformly choofe by its Will 
 (as uniformly as if impcll'd by Necejfity) that 
 which is right and good, and agreeable to 'Truth 
 and Reafon. But if the Perception of the Nature 
 and Agreeablcnefs of Vertue, and of the Nature and 
 Difagreeablenefs of Vice is diminifhed in any Pro- 
 portion, in the fame Proportion the Mind is biaffed, 
 and a6ts lefs freely in choofing the one and refujing 
 the other. It is a great Miftake to think that Free- 
 dom of Action confifts in the Mind's being of itfelf 
 indifferently inclin'd to Vertue and Vice, Good and 
 Evil: Since thefe are different in their Natures, and 
 the one effentially agreeable, the other effentially 
 difagrceable to Reafon j it is impoffible that zrati- 
 onal Mind, under a clear Perception of this Diffe- 
 rence, fhould be equally affected towards both of 
 them, and be indifferently difpofed to choofe the 
 one or the other. Moral Freedom therefore 
 does not confift in a Power of doing contrary Acti- 
 ons with the fame Indifference, but in the Nature 
 of Things it confifts in being endued with Rea- 
 fon and the Perception of the Difference of Good 
 and Evil, and in Confequence of that Reafon 
 having a Power of choofing and doing either the 
 one or the other j which Power is greater or lefs 
 in Proportion to the clear, regular, and uninterrup- 
 ted, or to the weak, decay'd and difordcred Senfe 
 with which the Mind is poffeffed concerning 
 them > fo that we may either conceive the Mind 
 
 (thro*
 
 (H) 
 
 (thro' Love and good Endeavours) fo well difpos'd* 
 and to have fuch a clear and ftrong Senfe of the 
 moral Difference of Things j as regularly and with 
 great Conftancy to choofe and perform Works 
 of Vertue and Goodnefs : Or on the other Hand, 
 we may conceive the Mind (thro' exceflive Care- 
 leflnefs, natural Ignorance, vicious Habits, or dif- 
 ordered Imaginations) to be by Degrees fo cor- 
 rupted and depraved in its Senfe of Good and 
 Evil, as to act with little or no Freedom, either 
 in doing the one or the other, being almoft ne- 
 cefTarily impelled by fuch Motives as excite the 
 appetites and PaJJions. In Actions refulting from 
 Minds thus difpofed we may fee fomething like 
 NeceJJity. But in this Cafe the Mind is not in a 
 natural State, is enflav'd thro' Accident or its own 
 Fault, and may be recovered to a State of Na- 
 ture and Freedom again, by being reftored to its 
 Underftanding, and the right Ufe of its Reafon. 
 The Words of the renowned Platonifi Plotinus 
 are very obfervable on this Head. 
 
 " *The Soul obtains a greater Power (over its 
 " Actions) as it becomes more good^ and a lefs 
 
 « as 
 
 * IlXttu J! xfxrfiv (t*,v yvjcw) »t otyjiivuV iXxrlu at » #sif&v tj 
 
 (lege yivxyx.xrxY') It 7Tmx^ txzhvv, li 7rXy70i$ %ccuv® J , vt aiwuf/jinn 
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 ( M ) 
 
 ec as it grows more evil. For either yielding to 
 " the Conftitution of the Body, it is compelled 
 " unto Lufl: or Anger 5 or it acts meanly in a 
 " State of Poverty, or infolently, if rich, or ty- 
 " rannically, if /'» Power. But the Soul that is of a 
 " good Nature, if in the very fame Circumftance?, 
 " refifts and overcomes (the Temptations of) 
 " them, and changeth them rather than is change 
 
 <c ed by them. -When therefore the Soul, 
 
 " fuffering a Change from external Means, exerts 
 " itfelf, and does any thing, being led as it were 
 " by a blind Impulfe, we cannot fay that either 
 " the Action or Difpofition of it is free: And fo 
 " in like manner, when of itfelf becoming 
 " worfe, it no longer makes ufe of the right and 
 fC governing Principles of Action. But when its 
 " own Reafon is the pure and active governing 
 t£ Principle that moves it to acl, this Exertion 
 " alone is that which we can fay is in our own- 
 <£ Power and voluntary j and this is our own Ac- 
 " tion, which proceeds not from external Im- 
 
 4U>T>i nty ouutya yjuem a<rx KtfHTToy oox. oflcuc, 7rxvTX%w v.>ot yyi- 
 Vticitic-Xif txk, ofu*M$ v, (lege v ) /Cf^/Ai**!. At'/o Si oTcft y.ytpox 
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 Mrrj eu.?no8i> y)Xlu, x>X tsatSty xtto kxQxcok; t«? y^W, xk ap^ijs 
 rc«r>j5 v.yKUii,y. r - xxl xueixs. x>.K eii ~'/,xylw i% xyntxi 57«(W>;?. V. 
 trio* in. fiix$ izrfufjuiiii, s« xpctri/,6oZcxi «ya<r* x'M */\xaoV r.xi c:k 
 in h'/ki (lege tfyx'J turn ttyxt, x>.>x 7tx(k^xtx %xe yt^w, 
 Enacad- 3. lib. 1. p. 234. 
 
 ]•' " pulfe,
 
 ( *6) 
 
 " pulfe, but from the internal Motion of the uvh 
 " corrupted Soul itfelf, from the primary, pre- 
 " fiding and governing Principle of it : And not 
 u from the Soul led pajjively into Error thro* 
 u Ignorance, or overcome by the Violence of its 
 " Lufts, which drag and draw it, and make 
 " every thing we do to become not properly 
 w AUion but PaJJion" And to the fame Pur- 
 pofe Simplicius fays ; * " When the rational Soul 
 * gives itfelf up to the Body 9 and to unreafon- 
 " able and corporeal PaJ/ions 9 it is moved (as it 
 " were) by mechanical Impulfe, and its Moti- 
 " ons are not free and in its own Power: But 
 " when it afts according to its own Nature, 
 " then it is moved by an inward felf-moving 
 " Principle, freely and of its own Accord, and 
 " is indifputably endued with freeWill." Again 5 
 
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 rue. . . i fJ*i< ret ih txto yjii xpntn *~i Ttuirm to etvrt^tiirtor 
 
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 iiti (riw/iplnpiw ^ v ?C x h *** T0 xyxOor cvcts[&i*xt t xxl uvTS%eoo~tep 
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 utl tXP rn * VT &* "^ * CTl T'* T0 *h»»tjw Itreav^ftanW a) -j i[*{- 
 npxi ■fyvxHt xyxiul ft ov<rxi tu* kyxSat ife/mrxt, xxl xxxxl ym- 
 
 fbiyXi, TU* KXKUr fJUtTX/ixXXtSt J) XXi OCTTO Tr,c, XXxUi f\« UftT» 
 
 ivifht/MitiitXi) KXt itTTo etpcrij; in xxxtxt ec ( i*fAowu»?> xi, xxi ixartp r 
 xxtx oHfttriv tikuxr, ei) xtnk btaiyx&u, ittmrm. in Epi&. p. 8» 
 
 « We
 
 ( *7) 
 
 " Wc ought not in all Cafes to judge of our Li- 
 " berty and Freedom of Action, by our having a 
 " Power of doing (indifferently) contrary 
 <c Things: for thofe Minds which are always in- 
 " clin'd to and choofe that which is good, do ne- 
 " verthelefs freely choofe it; this Choice is not 
 " forc'd: and they perfevere always in that which 
 " is good, without being drawn afide unto Evil. 
 " And thus our Minds, if they have good Dif- 
 u pofitions, dejire that which is good, if evil 
 u ones, that which is evil. By taking care alio 
 " they return, from Wickednefs unto Vertue, 
 " and by Neglect they fall from Vertue into 
 <c Vice; and do both by their own free Choice, 
 " not by NeceJJity. 
 
 Towards the Conclulion of this Letter (p. 
 173.) Cato very juftly and ingenioufly taxes the 
 Cheats and Impoflures which have been introduced 
 into Religion, and with a reafonable Indignation 
 cenfures the Rogueries and Perfections proceeding 
 from them : but then all this is faid with a very 
 ill Grace by one who is arguing for all Actions 
 being the Refults of Necefjity, according to which 
 Argument, all thefe Cheats, and Forgeries, and the 
 Mifchiefs and Perfections ingrafted on, and 
 fupported by them, are not culpable, becaufe 
 necejfary\ and are in reality no more Rogueries, 
 or can juftly be complain'd on, than the Mifchief 
 and Devastations caus'd by Storms and 'Tempefts, 
 Inundations, Earthquakes, Fire or Plague, or any of 
 thofe material Inftruments by which humane 
 E i Mileries.
 
 ( *« ) 
 
 Miferies arc effected, can be call'd Rogueries \ 
 they being, as thefe are, according to Cato's 
 Scheme, the natural and necejfary Effects of natu- 
 ral and neceffaryCmCes: And all the Malignity of 
 Men muft at lalt be fuppofed by this Hypothefis 
 to be not a moral, but a natural Evil only, and 
 muft centre at laft in the Malignity of the divine 
 Nature necefTarily producing it. 
 
 To this Purpofe Hierocks obferves # ; 
 <c We will not fay that our Purpofes of Juf- 
 <c tice, and our Judgments and Defires pro- 
 " ceed from an over- ruling Neceffity, for if 
 * c fo, we fhould not impute Virtue and Vice 
 * c to our/elves, but' to that Neceffity^ And 
 Plotinus fays, that the Conference of the No- 
 tion of NeceJJity is "f, te attribute to God the 
 Commijjion of all Evil. And Origen in Eufebius fays, 
 that the ** Maintainers of this Doctrine of Ne- 
 ceJJity do abfolve Men from all Manner of Crimes 
 
 * Ov y> m i ■t^ d(X/)5 Tfs«*pjo-£!?, x«j xg/iariti;, x,oa off*i«; #src 
 
 /IT > / •'<**>■»' r/ «£ » ~ 1 I > 
 
 xfurmog ce.vctyx.ifc iy/ivtcJ d (putrcf/jiv xtu y> «C£ths JtaJ kcckmc wjq 
 vfjj%$ civrm, <***' iy-wlua tuTixrctifJuiGct. De Fat. p. 16. 
 
 ■f T? 7rxvr\ ty,v rati cu^ui tcoIww civctTiitvct^ Ennead. 3 . lib. 
 '1. c. 4. 
 
 •** K.xi rt &ti Xtyuv vsfbue; %i£, tUv <rv[//fitti)/otTm h ctvSgaiXeic, 
 xcti cifX/xyTctvofjiiiwv It:' cturm ysjftM etruv "rvyxjMorrm, £? rivets ct 
 tuv yintewj xyc't'sxfiiiyoi rouruv Xcyuv, entohuerriS Karros iyx.?4[*>&- 
 >?(&>, Jr5 ©«£ irpoo-ypa^jsir* zasruy tudi kxkui %ai -^ivktoHs (lege 
 ^iktSc) x$xTTO}hiim rr,t atrtav. Eufeb. Prsep. Evang. lib. 6. 
 C, |I. p. 282, 
 
 committed
 
 ( *9) 
 
 committed by them, and make God the Author of 
 all the Evil and Wickednefs of the World. 
 
 And Eufebius* himfelf infills upon this Argu- 
 ment at large 5 viz. that the AfTertors of the JVe- 
 ceffity of humane Actions are guilty of Impiety ; 
 becaufe this Doctrine, fuppofing Men to do no- 
 thing of their own free Choice, abfohes them from the 
 Guilt of all their Wickednefs, and chargeth Providence 
 with it, making it, under the Name of NeceJJity 
 and Fate, to be the Caufe of all the Filthinefs and 
 Enormities, the Cruelty and Murders which are 
 committed by Men. And concludes that this No- 
 tion makes God and no one elfe the Author of all 
 Evil, and that Man cannot juflly be charged with 
 Sin, but only God that made him: 
 
 To conclude > according to Cato^s Scheme of 
 Neceflity j that Malignity, that moral Malignity, 
 which he calls Roguery, and which he is appre- 
 henfive prevails ftrongly in humane Nature, 
 could not pollibly exift. For if God (as he 
 conftantly affirms) is good, and his Goodnefs re- 
 
 * 'Clve c'vru (0 «vasyxij5 rt yuti x<?yav <p»fxs uvx^i£y rx TicctrxS 
 7tZ oxxtci^ax, ix.7Tt<flivyt Tqv xro7nx»' ixiiTX tuv cv etyitwxon; xuixo- 
 TXMfjbivuv, to'ji; /* 7rXy)fi)UiiXoZ]>TX$ xxaXua, ac, fhvjiir tu* xr'onuv t? 
 oiKttui yruifAiiis eiccxiz^x'/ftiiiaiH;, xvxyu •} th» xmxv tu* xxkui i#l 
 xxSohts TTfiroix?, ocyx'/Kw ccvtw xx\ iifjux^iftjy ot'fftKXXar, xx\ TT^mjj 
 Tfic, ci» u'vOquxoh; xi^xfyixc, x.xt upptjToxouics, ipoTJjTc's rt xul luixi- 
 Ponxi xnixv taxi Xtyar ■ . xvios (fcilicet 6 0£a«) «y tui kx\ 
 wk «/U(^ 6 xxvruv Kxx.ua jrottjTHcoi,icu} eox Witt e>Y*«j if/A«eTjjxff4» 
 }..*'/oiT «y i «^p<vr©-, «'AA* o Ttyru Tfewfa ©ley. Pxafp. Evang 
 lib. 6. c. C. p. ifi. 
 
 fultSt
 
 (3°) 
 
 fults, not from his Will and Choice, but from 
 the Neceffity of his Nature-, then it will follow, 
 that as Neceffity fif that alone is the Caufe of all 
 Things) cannot produce any Effect that is not 
 in the Gaule whence it proceeds, fo confequently 
 God being necejfarily good, without Will or 
 Choice, all Things proceeding from him by the 
 fame Neceffity by which he exifts, will be necejfa- 
 rily in like Manner good alfo : And as there is no 
 Evil j whether moral or natural, in God, fo 
 there can be none in the Beings necejfarily deriv- 
 ed from him 5 and no Account of the Difference 
 and Exiftence of Good and Evil ^whether natu- 
 ral or moral) can ever be given upon the Hypo- 
 thefis of Neceffity *. 
 
 But on the other Hand, fuppofing Goodnefs to 
 be the Refult of the perfect Rectitude of God's 
 Will, then there is plainly a phyflcal Poffibility 
 of the Exiftence of Evil; and fuppofing Things 
 to be produc'd not from the Neceffity of the di- 
 vine Nature, but from the Will and Free-agency 
 of God 3 then it will alfo follow that fince God 
 
 * * To thofe who made humane Aftions fubjecl: to Tate or 
 Kecejfity, Cholcidius, by way of Objection, futs the Shteftton $ 
 'viz,, conftituant quid efle Fatum velint. Virtutemne divinam ? 
 ied non eflet caufe malorum. An vero animam malignam ? 
 fed demum a malitia nihil boni fieri poteft; &. Fato dicuntur 
 ctiarn bona provenire, dicent fortafle mixtam quandam efle 
 fubfhntiam; at qui fieri poteft, ut unum 8c idem quid malitia 
 iimul £c bonitate fit praeditum, intemperantiamque & caftitatem 
 creet, caeteramque virtutum vitiorumque importet contrarieta- 
 fem. In Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. %6%* 
 
 <can»ot
 
 ( 3*) 
 
 cannot produce by his Will Beings equally per- 
 fect with himfelf, there mud be in the Will of 
 every Being produe'd by him, a lefs Rectitude 
 than in his Will-, and confequently a greater Pof- 
 libility of Evil : And fince farther upon the Sup- 
 pofition of God's acting by his Will, he can 
 produce all poflible Variety of Beings, and endue 
 them with all poflible Variety and Degrees of 
 Perfection, the leaft perfect Beings will have the 
 lead; Perfection of Will and greateft PofTibility of 
 doing Evil ; and from the Ufe of this Will and 
 Actions refulting from it, confider'd with the 
 Circumftances of this prefent State, all the moral 
 Good and Evil that is in human Nature may be 
 reafonably accounted for. 
 
 LETTER
 
 ( 3* ) 
 
 LETTER II. 
 
 N this Letter we are told, that Good 
 and Evil are Objecls of God's Will, 
 which alone can conjlitute Right or 
 Wrong *. 
 
 In this Obfervation Cato fhew'd 
 that he had either a ftrange Head, or a ftrange In- 
 clination to run counter to the common Reafon of 
 Things. The Aclions of God proceeding upon the 
 Ideas of Right and Wrong, he will have to be ne* 
 cejfary x.hd' they are truly, as I have fhewn at large, 
 the Refults of his Choice and Will: But here he 
 will have the Ideas and Nature of Right and 
 Wrong, which are truly necejfary, to be Objects 
 of his Willi meaning, as he explains himfelfj 
 
 * Cato's Letters, Vol. IV. p. »7Ji_&c. 
 
 2 that
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 that God's JFill alone conftitutes the Nature of 
 Right and Wrong ; the Confequence or* which 
 is (and which Confequence he infinuates) trut 
 they are not of a fix'd and immutable, but of an 
 uncertain and changeable Nature; that there i* 
 no elTential Difference between them, and what 
 ive efleem Right or Wrong, may be other wife 
 with God: And (o, that God's Actions may be 
 right and juft, tho' contrary to our cleareft Noti- 
 ons ofjuftice and Equity : Which Opinion is not 
 only very abfurd in itfclf, but of dangerous and 
 fatal Confequence, as making the Nature and 
 Difference of Venue and Vice, Good and Evil 5 
 precarious, uncertain and mutable. But befides, 
 all this while Cato did not confider, that tho' the 
 Notion of God's Will being the only Ground of 
 Right and Wrong does (as he intends it) confound 
 the Diitinction of Vertue and Vice, Good and 
 Evil j yet his Notion of God's Will entirely con- 
 futes and overthrows the Confequences he woulJ 
 draw from the Suppotition of its conjlituting 
 Right or Wrong. For when he fays God's Will 
 alone conftitutes Right er Wrong, he really means 
 in Contradiction to his own Words, that their 
 Natures refult not from God's Will, as that fig- 
 nifies Choice, but from his Will, as it fignifies 
 really in Oppofition to Will, Neccfjity: And 
 thence he might fee, that whatever refults from 
 God by Neccfjity, cannot be different in God 
 from what it is in Beings produe'd necejj'arily by 
 him ; where the Effect is necejjary, it mult be 
 
 F fail
 
 ( 34) 
 
 fhir. in the Caufej and fo contrary to his Rea- 
 Toning, the Ideas of Right and Wrong mutt be 
 the fame in God, as they are in us. 
 
 The Truth is ; Right and Wrong are indeed 
 Objetls of God's Will, as Truth and Faljhood are 
 of his Under {landing', but his Will no more con- 
 fiitutes the Nature of the one than of the other: 
 They are necejjary and immutable in their Na- 
 tures, as necejfary as the Nature of God is, and 
 are conjlituted not by his Will, but by his Exif- 
 tence. Suppofing a perfeel Being, as God is, to 
 exiit j the efTential Difference of Truth and Talf- 
 hood, Right and Wrong, the one as the Object of 
 God's Underflanding, the other as the Object of 
 his Will, immediately and neceiTary follows j and 
 they are as immutable in their Natures, as the 
 Nature of God is: God can no more by his 
 Will alter the Nature of Right or Wrong, or 
 the Objects of any of his moral Attributes, of 
 his Jufiice, Holinefs or Veracity, than he can make 
 a Globe to be a Cube, or give one the Properties 
 of the other ; or make two and one to be equal 
 to four, or not equal to three; or than he can 
 alter his own EJfence, or ceafe to be what he is. 
 
 Cato, in order to fupport the Abfurdity of Right 
 and Wrong being conjlituted by the Will of God, 
 and to mew that his Dealings with Men do 
 not fas he exprefTes it) quadrate with the Notions 
 which we form of Jujlice amongfl one another j 
 alledges feveral Inftances of God's providential 
 Difpenfations out of the Hiftory of the old Tef- 
 ument. As, i. God's
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 I. God's punijbing all Mankind for the Sin of 
 their firft Parents, which they could not 
 help. (p. i7f, 176.) 
 
 1. His punijhing all Ifrael with a P eft Hence for 
 the private Sin of David, which without 
 Doubt many of them condemned, (p. 176.) 
 
 3. His bringing Plagues upon the ^Egyptians, 
 
 becaufe he had hardned Pharoah's Heart. 
 ibid. 
 
 4. His deftroying all Mankind at the Deluge 
 
 for Crimes which he could have prevent- 
 ed, ibid. 
 
 In anfwer to the preceding Obfervations, I 
 defire, 
 
 Firft, To know to whatPurpofethcfelnftances 
 arc brought * if the Facts are true, can they be 
 folved upon the Scheme of NeceJ/ity better than 
 upon the Notion of Free-agency? juft the con- 
 trary is evident to Senfe and Reafon 5 for, 
 
 I. In the Nature of Things there could be no 
 abfolute Necefjity for God to make the Immortality 
 of Men to depend upon the Obedience of the 
 fir ft Man j tho' he might have Reafon to choofe 
 by his Will that it mould be fo. The firft Sup- 
 pofition is plainly abfurd, the latter, tho' not 
 clearly known to us, yet is no way contradictory 
 to Reafon^ as I fhall fhew prefently. 
 
 F 2, II. Tho*
 
 ( 3*) 
 
 II. T/k> 1 there may be wife and good Reafons 
 for God by his Will to caufe temporal Calami- 
 ties to fall upon a People for the Crimes of their 
 Rulers j yet 'tis highly abfurd to fuppofe it ne- 
 cejjary to be fo. And 
 
 III. Tho' God may juftly inflict a voluntary 
 PuniiTmient upon Men for their voluntary Wick- 
 cdnefs j yet it is no more right or * juft to de- 
 flroy them for nccejfary Actions, or doing what 
 they could not help, than it is to deftroy them 
 for being fat or lean, fick or weak, blind or lame, 
 or for any bodily Infirmity, which it was not in 
 their Power to prevent. 
 
 * Lucian reprefencs Socrates fpeaking thus to Minos; 6vk<,~* 
 
 KfOCiTUTTl, X.XI TO'JTOVS TlUjCOt TCVS OMK.Oy/l<Ti(-fAHI^VC, U>.\oT frUlt, ef/Ui- 
 
 a ~ ■ <5 K • ~ ' ~ " >\ < > , / h v r ~ 
 
 vt;;' cu <y> °i ix-tw ti~nt tx, ci 7 '5 <** ^5 uvTiXiyim otwuni w rote 
 i/jiTu. xa-vK itow/KW TryssTCiy/jt/ivoi;. " Do not you fee how 
 " unjuftiy you a<ft in puniflu'ng us who are only the Servants of 
 " the Decrees or Fate-, and in rewarding thofe *vlio are only 
 " mere Infirwnents in doing that Good which ought to be af- 
 " crib'd to others? for no one can fay ir is poffibic to with- 
 '' Hand thofe things which ere wholly ordained by Hecejfity. 
 Dial. Mort. p. iff. Edit. Par. 
 
 Again he argues in the Perfon of Cyri.fcus the Fatalift : " He 
 (Mines') " ought neither to punifh or reward any one— — 
 " becaufe we Men do nothing by our own free Mind, but 
 t; every thing by the Compulsion of an unavoidable Necejfity. 
 Q'joiva. cjTt tiujZv outs xoXuttiv c'vrai 7ryc<TY,xti . i ort euoit ix.ov- 
 
 ibid. p. 678. 
 
 Secondly
 
 ( 37) 
 
 Secondly, the preceding Examples of the di- 
 vine Difpenfations are not inconfiilent with our 
 Notions of Jufticc, for, according to the plained 
 Notions of Juftice, God might (without doing 
 Wrong) leave mortal Man in a State of Mortality^ 
 by withdrawing an extraordinary and fuperna- 
 tural Favour, which he made to depend on one 
 Man's Behaviour, without telling us the Rea- 
 fon of his Conduct: In the mean time, where 
 is the Iniquity (according to our Notions of 
 Right and Wrong,) of God's difpenfing mere 
 Favours on what Conditions he pleafes ; or where 
 is the Puni foment or the Injury done to Man in 
 being fubject to Death ? 
 
 His fecond and third In (lances only fhew that 
 in God's providential Government of the World, 
 we cannot always fee the Reafons of his Difpen- 
 fations, tho' we may fee that they are not con- 
 trary to Reafon. To fuppofe God by an imme- 
 diate Act of his Power to infli£t Pain or Death 
 upon any of his Creatures without any Reafon, 
 or in fuch Cafes where it is evident there can be 
 no Reafon, is, no doubt, contrary to the Noti- 
 ons which he hath given us of Right and Wrong 
 (and to which Notions he appeals in his Word 
 for the Equity of his own Proceedings) and is 
 derogatory to his Goodnefs. But when we con- 
 fider that we derive our Nature and the Dura- 
 tion of its Exigence merely from God's IVHI$ 
 and in Confequence fee that God may (without 
 (my Wrong j give us any determinate Continu- 
 ance.
 
 ( 38) 
 
 ancc of Life* it is impoflible to fay there is or 
 can be no Reafon for God to make the Conti- 
 nuance or temporal Happinefs of any Number 
 of his Creatures to depend upon things which 
 are not in their Power : And God may as well 
 have Reafons for making the Lives and Happi- 
 nefs of Men in many Cafes to depend upon the 
 Actions of other Men, as upon natural Caufes; 
 upon the Difpofition of the Air, upon Storms 
 and Inundations, and many other natural Caufes : 
 We are fure that the one is the Afl of God, as 
 much as the other ; and we can no more fay he 
 does Wrong in the one than in the other j becaufe 
 we cannot on the one Hand fee the Reafons of 
 his Providence, and the Grounds of the Depen- 
 dance, which he has made one Part of the Cre- 
 ation to have upon the other Parts, and of the 
 Connection of Things prefent with things pajl, 
 and in Futurity: But we can on the other Hand 
 very clearly fee that the Author of our Beings 
 may determine the Continuance of our Lives, 
 and confequently make them depend upon what 
 immediate Caufes he pleafes, and take them away 
 by what other Inftruments he thinks fit, as well 
 as by the ordinary Courfe of Nature, without 
 doing us any Wrong. Therefore, as God may 
 fconfiftently with our Notions of Right) make 
 any particular Men's Lives or temporal Good to 
 depend upon Earthquakes, Fire, Water, Sec. fo I 
 fee no Reafon why he may not make them depend 
 upon the A&ions and Behaviour of other Men, 
 
 who
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 who in his Providence are made Inftrnments of 
 bringing great Good (or Evil to a Nation as fuch. 
 And as God does no Wrong to Men, but is on 
 the contrary good and beneficent, in being the Au- 
 thor of Society; fo, from the Nature of Society, 
 there is fuch a Dependence between the Actions 
 of Governors, and the Good or Evil of their Sub- 
 jects, that it cannot be, but as they receive 
 much Good from their Virtues, fo they muft be 
 fubject to Evil from their Vices: And God's 
 caufing a People to fuflfer for the Wickednefs of a 
 Prince againft himfelf, feems to be no more than 
 his permitting them to fuffer by the Armies of other 
 Princes for the Crimes of their King committed 
 againft other States ; and there feems to be no 
 more in thefe divine Proceedings, than in mak- 
 ing any of the natural Elements to be Caufes 
 either of great Good or Evil to Mankind, which 
 yet for Reafons before-mentioned, cannot be 
 (hewn to be inconfiftent with our Notions of 
 Right and Wrong; or to be any Arguments that 
 Right or Wrong is alone conjlituted by the Will of 
 God. 
 
 One thing more I muft obferve with Refpect 
 to the third Inftancej that Cato, in order to 
 make God's punifhing the /Egyptians feem the 
 more inconfiftent with our Notions of Jufiice, 
 fays, that God brought the Plagues upon them be- 
 caufe he had hardned Pharoah's Heart: Which 
 is a very ill-natur'J Exprcflion, as thereby insi- 
 nuating that God firft by an Act of his irrdiftiblc 
 
 Power
 
 ( 4 o ) 
 
 Power har dned Pharoah' s Heart, and then maue 
 that Hardning the Caufe of bringing Plagues upon 
 him and his People: which, if it was indeed the 
 Cafe, it could not, I think, be reconciled to our 
 Notions ofjuftice. But the Matter is either very 
 ignorantly or very unfairly propos'd by Cato. If 
 he had attended to the Stile of Scripture, he 
 could not but know that any extraordinary Event 
 or Action of Men is frequently in Scripture afcrib'd 
 to God; and God isfaid to do what he either per- 
 mits to be done in extraordinary Cafes, or what 
 happens in Confequence of any extraordinary Act 
 of his Providence : And it is in the Example be- 
 fore us faid expreflly feveral Times that Pharoah 
 hardned his own Heart, in Oppofition to the di* 
 line Command to let the Jews goj which Com* 
 mand would have been unrcafonable, and impofTible 
 to have come from God upon the Suppofition of 
 his having by an immediate Act of his Power 
 hardned PharoaISs Heart, and thereby hinder'd 
 him from obeying it. 
 
 But the Caufe (as plainly appears from the 
 Text) of Pbaroalfs hardning his own Heart, was 
 the Event's of God's merciful Providence to him, 
 in removing the Plagues from him prefently after 
 they were inflicted. But when Pharoah /aw that 
 there was Refpite, he hardned his Heart, and 
 hearkned not unto them, as the Lord had faid. 
 Exod. viii. if. 
 
 Again, upon the removing of the Plague of 
 Flies it is faid 5 And Pharoah hardned his Pie art 
 
 at
 
 ( 4i ) 
 
 at this Time alfo, neither would he let the People 
 go. f. 32. Once more; And when Pharaoh jaw 
 that the Rain, and the Hail, and the Thunders 
 were ceafed, he finned yet more, and hardned his 
 Heart, he and his Servants. Chap. ix. f. 34. 
 Pharaoh, hoping every Plague was the Jail, as 
 foon as it was removed, returned to his obftinate 
 Refolution of refilling to let the People go; 
 and thus God is faid to harden his Heart, by doing 
 that which in the Event was a Motive for Pha- 
 raoh to continue in the Hardnefs of his Hearr, 
 which he had brought upon himfelf by his Sins 9 
 until God by repeated Plagues overcame the 
 Hardnefs andOppofition of his Will, and brought 
 it to yield to his Commands. Therefore Cato had 
 either not at all confidered the Stile of Scripture, 
 and the Expreffions of the Text in this particular 
 Relation ; or if he had, he was very unfair to 
 put the Inftance as he does; and to take Ad- 
 vantage of a mere * Figure of Speech and known 
 
 way 
 
 * Origen obferves in this very Infhnce ; Tropum vero vel 
 fignram Sermonis ejus qui fcriptus eft De Induratione, etiam ex 
 communi confuetudine exponcre puto, quod non videatur ab- 
 furdum : frequenter enim benigniores quique domini ad cos 
 fervos, qui per multam patientiam 8c manfuetudinem domi- 
 norum infolentiorcs improbiorefque fiunt, dicere folent : Ego 
 te talem feci; ego tc perdidi ; mea patientia te peffimum fecit; 
 ego tibi caufa hujus tarn durae 8c peffimas infolentiae exifto, 
 qui te non ftatim per fingulas culpas punio pro merito delic- 
 torum. Neceffe eft enim nos tropum vel figurum Sermonis ad- 
 vertere, 8c ita demum virtutem Dei intcliigere, nee inferre ca- 
 lumnias vcrbo, cujus interiorcm fenfum diligentius exploremus. 
 
 G Be
 
 U* ) 
 
 way of ExprefTion, efpecially in the Scriptures, 
 and Eaflern Forms, and to fet it again ft not only 
 the Reafon of the thing, but the plain literal 
 Senfe and Expreflion of feveral other Places ex- 
 plaining the figurative one. 
 
 But the fourth Example which is alledged is 
 moil unreafonable of all 5 viz. God's deflroying 
 (as he faysj all Mankind at the Deluge for Crimes 
 which he could have prevented. Which is very ab- 
 furd to affirm, either upon Suppofition of NeceJJity 
 or of Will, being the Ground of the divine^ or of 
 humane Actions. Suppoling this Event of the De- 
 luge to refult from the Neceffity of the divine 
 Nature, God could no more prevent the Event, 
 than the Operations of the NeceJJity which pro- 
 duced it j and if the Crimes of Men which caufed 
 it, were mcejfary Effects of necefjary Caufes, neither 
 could he prevent them, for the fame Reafon. 
 But it is natural for this Author to talk as if God's 
 Actions were voluntary^ at the fame Time that he 
 is arguing for the Neceffity of them; and tho' he 
 had laid slide his natural Notions of God and 
 
 De princip. lib. 3 . p. 716. Grsca Orig. apud Phi'oca'ia extant 
 
 his verbis : Oux. »To7rov 3 xcu bctth ctwt^uxi Tit Tctctvrci 7rcipuu,viyi~ 
 
 fcTTtra >ccti TJin fjuaKfe8v[/jiUf ixTqitiof&iyots eixtrcOfre, ip*> sn xcvvply 
 iifniifrcc, xcc] ijJ <r*i am©* ytyevct -roV ttiXucistuv UfaccfTtifAuYe/t 4 
 fii »yS t£ ilSaq &x.i(rxi, kui rvic, GMiocfjjiax, tow Xiyofjbitts, x'etffJJti <rv- 
 
 KSlpUVTi.V, [Jt,tj KOtTCCWfSOVTCCi To'C /^P^rt?©- ToZ XoyX- PhlloC. 
 
 C. 21. 
 
 Religion 3
 
 (43 ) 
 
 Religion, yet he could not layafide the Language 
 wherebv they are exprefledj and Truth ifiueth 
 from his Thoughts and Pen at the fame time that 
 he is ufmg both agiinft it. It is nothing but 
 Cant and Jargon to talk of Mens committing 
 Crimes, and of God preventing any thing, if all 
 Things are the Rcfult of NeceJJity, and nothing 
 proceeds from the Will or Choice, either of God 
 or Men. But the Supposition of God's preventing 
 Men's Crimes is equally abfurd, if their Crimes 
 were not necejfary but voluntary : For if God, as 
 a moral Governor of the World, has endued Men 
 with Will and Free-agency, and made the Deter- 
 mination of their own Minds acting by this Will 
 to be the Principle of their Actions ; then it is 
 evident, that as they are moral Jgents, and their 
 Crimes and Vertues depend only on the Free-agency 
 of their own Minds, God cannot abfolutely pre- 
 vent the Crimes of Men : He cannot prevent them 
 fo long as they have Will and free Power to 
 choofe either Good or Evil', he might indeed have 
 prevented the particular Crimes for which they 
 are punifhed by altering their Natures, or placing 
 them in other Circumftancesj but a Power or 
 PofHbility of committing Crimes cannot be pre- 
 vented, fo long as Men have Will and Power of 
 Action ; and if he takes away their Will (which 
 is the only Way whereby he can prevent them) 
 he at the fame time takes away the Foundation 
 of their Crimes, and makes it impoflible for them 
 to do either Good or Evil : And his delboying 
 
 G 2 Men
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 Men for their Crimes in this Cafe, is the fame 
 and no more than breaking a Stone to Pieces for 
 falling upon or hurting any one, which is as 
 much a Crime in the Stone, as any Aciion of Men 
 can be. 
 
 In the remaining Part of this Paragraph, Cats 
 defcants very ingenioufly upon the various and 
 wonderful Works of Providence, from whence, if 
 fome great Prejudice had not lain in the Way, he 
 could not but fee and confefs that they are the 
 Effects, not only of an intelligent , but of a rati- 
 naly wife and free- agent ; which is abundantly de- 
 monftrated from the 'various Forms, Orders^ 
 Number and ISfotions of Things, in all which 
 there appears the greateff, Arbitrarinefs of the 
 Author of them j and in none of which there 
 appears to be any Nccejfity that they fhould be 
 }uft what they are, and impoflible to be in any 
 Refpecl: other wife. But to proceed 5 
 
 Our Author, in order to ridicule and expofe the 
 Notion of humane Liberty (which he calls a new 
 Scheme, which Men have formed at the Expence of de- 
 nying all that they fee or can know. p. 177.) fays, that 
 thefe Formers of the new Scheme have made Man 
 the Primum Mobile, and his Mind the firfl Prin- 
 ciple or Spring of all his Actions^ independent of the 
 Author of his Being, and of all the fecond Caufesy 
 which evidently influence and concur to determine his 
 Refolutims and his AElions. (p. 177, 178.) 
 
 Here is much more of Art than of Reafon 01 
 Argument in what Cato offers. 
 
 1 1. This
 
 (45 ) 
 
 t. This Scheme of Liberty, which he calls new, 
 is far older than Cato, and is fo old, that it began 
 (as far as appears) with humane Nature, and has 
 been the conftant Opinion of both the learned 
 and unlearned part of Mankind in all ages (a few 
 only excepted.) It hath been the concurrent 
 Sentiment (as I (hall fully fhew hereafter) of 
 the greater!: as well as mod reafonable and learn- 
 ed Part of Men, that the Mind is (what Cato 
 here ridicules, under the Term of Primum Mo- 
 bile) ayToxcvnT©*, a felf-moving Agent, Principle 
 and Spring of Action. But 
 
 2. It is very unfair to fay, that the Maintained 
 x>f Liberty make the Mind independent of the Author 
 of its Being; as if they thought that God in his mo- 
 ral and providential Government did no way, by 
 his invi/ible Prefence to the Mind (as well as by 
 his revealed Word) excite, move or influence it 
 in its Operations, not by forcible, but by ratio- 
 nal Motives: That his Spirit did not concur to 
 form good Refolutions in the Soul, and to hin- 
 der bad ones ; and was not a Means, a perfua/ive 
 and rational, not necejfary, Means of the Mind's 
 exerting itfelf into virtuous Actions. Who ever 
 deny'd the Influence, as well of the Spirit of God, 
 as of external andfecond Caufes ? as being Motives, 
 not indeed to compel, but to incline the Mind, 
 and to be Reafons why it fhould proceed to act 
 by its Wil^ but not be driven by Force or Necef- 
 
 The
 
 The Heathens by the Light of natural Re- 
 ligion, were fenflble of this* and therefore * Ho- 
 mer introduceth the Deities working upon the 
 Minds of Men by their vilible Influences} excit- 
 ing Inclinations^ and diverting the Intentions of 
 themj which Paflages Plutarch explains thus, 
 ■viz. " -J* Homer does not by thefe Expreflions 
 w make God to take away the Liberty of A&i- 
 " on, but only to influence it} nor to be the 
 " efficient Caufe of the Exertions and Operati- 
 " onsof the Mind, but only of the Objecls which 
 
 " excite them. ■- — moving the efficient and 
 
 " voluntary Power of the Soul to aft by the 
 " Impreflion of fenfitive and intellectual Ideas 
 " upon it-, or on the other Hand difTuading and 
 " diverting it from Aclion. 
 
 The Words of the great Philofopher Hiero- 
 cles are very appofite to the prefent Purpofe? 
 viz. " ## All Things conducing to the Acqui- 
 
 * T2 i^* ug m tyurl 6wt Ota y?MVKWirn; 'A&inj* 
 'A>.A« t<$ x6xycctu> Tgtyt tyivcu, ■ 
 
 ■J- 'Ok ctvxtfouvTX 7iom (' Of/ur,f&' ) rev Qtov, uXXoi xtvouvrx rint 
 jrg2#ip$<n»* ou& c(fAXi *gyxC«fjbtw> <*AA« <pccvrc«ncc<; off/jam £y<yyj*s. 
 
 » ■ T«< "fyvxHi TO KfXKTtKSV XXI XfOXtgiTlKOH X£%XtS TUTt Xx\ $>X>- 
 
 ixt.x^ KXi ixmuhs iyufotTii, n twxvtjov <*5rorpt<pems xx\ <V«yrss. 
 
 ** TluvTX TX KfO$ THV KTrjtnv r mv OiyxdZv (TWUTiXoZlTX 2ilt}. (Sox- 
 
 Xiuv miy^x-ifxi b XoyGh, to t« 4'w^?? euuToxirvrtv, xx\ 77; > re^ 
 ©tow truutpyuxp. *E< »jB xx\ i<p' ijw/i> Ittfarts run xxXcov, uX?\x xx) 
 XUTO To 1$ v,yJiv Ciodf IfcOVTfS, TYfi TTXp ikuvx <ruutoyux<; ■ 
 
 Tmnui nu, xfr,%[Aw. In Pythag. Carm. p. 233. 
 
 fition
 
 (47 ) 
 
 " fition of that which is good, are briefly 5 the 
 " /elf-moving Power of the Soul, and the Affif- 
 w taflf? of God. For tho' it is in our Power to 
 " choofe that which is good, yet fince we derive 
 " this Power from God, we altogether ftand in 
 " need of his AfTiftance." But how does it ap- 
 pear (as Cato arguesj to the Senfes and Under- 
 ftanding, either that God himfelf, or any fccond 
 Caufes, compel and force the Mind into Action? 
 On the contrary, I think, that Cato in denying 
 humane Liberty of Action, does, much more than 
 his Adverfaries, deny all that he fees or can know : 
 as great a Philofopher as himfelf is of this Opini- 
 on, who fays, " * They who deny Free-will are 
 " ignorant of the voluntary Agency of the Soul, 
 " and take away the very formal Effence of itj 
 u for they take away that felf -moving Faculty in 
 " which the Nature of the Soul primarily con- 
 " lifts. For if it is afelf-moving Being, its Appe- 
 " tites and Defires are excited inwardly from it 
 
 * 'O* to ip' 'v.fv.v xtxtpeZvTis, Y.m Tfl uvTt^nctoii rifs Yt>£it5 uyyse>u<rt f 
 iyjt ui-ncti Tii? ■v}'^?5 2>l& toZto QStteonTi? to y> xvToxi»t)Te» eivrtfi; 
 itvxyoZtn, xx6' o f^,M?x inures, 'art y> aSfTojtirjjTes i?H,i)io\8ty u<p' ixv- 
 t«5 tyi (p£7«e< Tp«$ to? epulis Keci rx$ iffjuxs, xxi xxitpStv ttoSiv iXxo/jbini 
 r, ttivojim, ue-~tf TX e-aif&xTce. im t%a6iv xtyurxt, tix if a cbvroxi- 
 *rrr<&'' 'tziirx irf» fyrnxyi ixriwxv t«? tyvyji<„ xxl tjji» <rvyxxTx0uri* 
 «vt*s, -xxl iWpfjjrw c'j 5rpoo-Aeyt£o»T«* in to i<p' itfJUit x'vxttoZvTH;, T«« 
 3 eix t%u a-tuiKH&Yxnv -rev 6tMi>, xxi fbri 6tXw f TXi toZ etifite%, 
 xxl ixxXi'mi, kx i t w trwj-n6io% xxi aV«pvsic3£ 5 u7rio 7nLnx tickiiv **er« 
 y$ xw'wue, x% xt/rift tyx •$&$$, xxl oix itySw uGia-poi » oXxxi rati, 
 i»i iwi iHt xtyxjuv. Simp. Com. in Epidl, p. z6. 
 
 M,
 
 (48 ) 
 
 a f e tf* an d it xs not under any external Ccmpulfion, 
 u like Bodies : But if it is moved by external 
 ' c Force, then it has no Self-motion. Further} 
 " they who deny Free-will, do not at all confi- 
 <c der the vital Efficacy of the Mind, and its 
 " Power of AJfent and DiJJhit. For who is 
 <c not confeious to himfelf of his having a Pow- 
 <c er to will or not to will, to choofe and to re- 
 " /#/£, to confent and to <&»y ? all which are j#- 
 " /iron/ Self-motions of the Soul, and not *x/*r- 
 " rial Force and Impulfe, fuch as moves inani- 
 <l mate Beings." And nothing is more agreeable 
 both to Senfe and Reafon, than what Cato fup- 
 pofeth to be contrary to both, namely, That Al- 
 mighty God hath green to Man a Rule to act 
 by, and annexed Rewards and Menaces to the Ob- 
 fervance or Non-obfervance of this Rule; has given 
 a free, uncontrouVd and impartial Liberty to him 
 to * determine, without being coerced or reftrain'd by 
 any other Power to do or not to do an Action, or to 
 choofe Good or Evil to himfelf. (p. 178 .) 
 
 All this is a very fair and jult Reprcfentation 
 of the Notion of humane Liberty \ and is well 
 and elegantly exprefled ; and is fo agreeable to 
 the natural Notion of God, as being a wife, juft 
 and moral Governor of the World, and of Men, 
 as being rational Agents, and capable of Vertue 
 and Religion-, that I cannot but wonder any feri- 
 ous Man of Senfe, that ever at all confidered ei- 
 ther God's Nature and Perfections, or his own, 
 fhould doubt of the Truth and Certainty of this 
 ion. In
 
 (49) 
 
 In the next Particular, Cato is miftaken in lay- 
 ing it to the Defenders of Free-will, that they 
 fay that God's Jujlicc obliges him to this Conducl. 
 (p. 178.) We do not afcribc the Exiftence of our 
 Natures, and the Faculties of it to any Obliga- 
 tions in God, in which his Jujlice bound him 5 
 but to his Will and Choice directed by his Wifdom 
 and Goodnefs. We deny not but God might have 
 exerted his Power and Knowledge (confidently 
 with Jujlice) in making the whole Creation either 
 altogether unintelligent or intelligent without giv- 
 ing any part of it a Will and Power of Action, 
 But then we fay, that as to have made all things 
 unintelligent, would not have been fo great an 
 Exertion of Power and Knowledge, as to make 
 fome Things intelligent - y fo alio that the giving 
 Intelligence without Will and Tree-agency is not fo 
 great an Exertion of them, as the giving with 
 Intelligence, Reafon, and the Faculty of Will, and 
 Power of Aclim: This is a greater Perfection 
 than any other} and God could not be amoral 
 Governor (1. e. indeed a Governor properly at all) 
 if he had not endued his Creatures with Will and 
 a Power of Atlion: And there is as much Diffe- 
 rence of Power, Knowledge and Authority, and 
 confequently of Glory and Honour following ir, 
 in God's governing the rational P.irt of the 
 Creation endued with Liberty, and the other 
 Part which is unintelligent or irrational; as in 
 a Kings governing a Nation of learned and 
 eiviliz'd Men, and an Herd of Cattle, or direct- 
 
 H in &
 
 (So). 
 
 ing the Pofition and Order of a Set of Chefs* 
 men. 
 
 The next Argument which Cato alledges againft 
 the Notion of humane Liberty is, that it takes 
 away (he fays) and robs God of moji of his Attri- 
 butes. He argues (p. 178.) 
 
 1. That God's Prefcience or Knowledge {from all 
 Eternity) of every Event which does or can happen 
 in the Univerfe is denfd at once : His Reafon is, 
 for whatever is contingent in its own Nature^ and 
 may or may not happen^ cannot be forefcen. No, 
 the trueConcluiion is, that contingent Things can- 
 not be neceffary, cannot come neceffarily to pafs > 
 but fince contingent Things as certainly come to 
 pafs as if they were neceffary^ they may with Cer- 
 tainty be forefeen by him who (ees the Caufes pre- 
 ceding, and by means of which the Agent volun- 
 tarily effects them 5 where is the Difficulty or 
 Unreafonablenefs of this ? he adds, when any Be- 
 ing fees that a 'Thing will be, it muji be. But this 
 is mere Fallacy built on the Confuflon of the 
 different Terms Will and Mufl 9 as if they were 
 Confequences, the latter of the former, or there 
 were no Difference betwixt Certainty of Event, 
 and Necefjity of Event : It is true indeed that what 
 mufi be will be, but not vice verfa ; it only fol- 
 lows from what will be that there is a Certainty^ 
 but not that there is a* Necefjity of Event. This 
 
 therefore 
 
 * Celfus argued as our Author here does; ©105 a» %ptmt t 
 *.%k nanus i%ow y%nt% t» n%Qu^piiw>. " That whatever was 
 
 foretold;
 
 ( 5* ) 
 
 therefore is nothing but an old Quibble, which fo 
 far impofed upon Epicurus, tho' a Man of fine 
 Pares, as to make him deny that Axiom*, of 
 every Propofiion being either true or falfc ; tor fas 
 Cicero reprefents the Cafe) " + He was afraid, it 
 « he granted this, that he muft in Confcquence 
 « grant that every Event proceeded from Fate 
 « (or Neceffity.)" For (arguing like Cato) he 
 thought, " That if either Part of a Propofition 
 « was true from Eternity, that then it was cer- 
 w tain: And if certain, then necefary alio; and 
 « fo he thought this Argument made for Fate or 
 *< j\^#/y." The famc Quibble the #<w £>">- 
 
 , foretold by God, muft without all peradventure come to 
 .. pafs" To which Origen replies; 'E. £ r , «™* — ■ 
 
 «< Tr Kv rhe Word without aU peradventure, Celfus means tie 
 
 :: -SXet^s ^X S g b hinder S it 1^ **« 
 .« ho' there is a pfey of its not coming to pa* , and fo 
 « his Argument is nothing to the Purpofe. Cont. CelJ. 
 
 h J One of ******** ptlwria, top Arguments of the an- 
 tient Tatars was, as Starch tells us, T< ■****« «"* 
 
 iV, rib Aft" S ***« ••«* * f *W* (fcilicet om . 
 
 t Epicurus veretur ne fi hoc ^/°" C S/ con cedcndum 
 nern enunciationem, aut veram effe au ^i ~ xterniBt e 
 fit F«< fieri quxcuoque fiant: fi en \™^T™m necejfar.um : 
 verum fit, efle id et.am ***».& h ertum, en £ 
 
 ita 6c N«#««» & ™» m confiroian P utat ' ^ ' 
 
 H * 
 
 dorus
 
 ( 5> ) 
 
 dor us made ufe of j arguing " * That that only 
 *' could corpc to pafs, which either actually was y 
 " or would come to pafs : And whatfoever will 
 cc £?, that he fays muft necejfarily be : and what- 
 " foever will not be^ he denies that that can be" 
 To which Chryfippus the Stoic replies* " That 
 " what will not be, may be j as that this Gem 
 " may be broken, altho' it never will be broken : 
 " And that it was not necejfary for Cypfelas to 
 M reign at Corinth^ altho' it was foretold d, 
 * c thoufand Years before by the Oracle of jfpol- 
 " /<?." And Cicero himfelf argues on this 
 Head, " -\ That had Epicurus granted that every 
 ** Proportion was either true or falfe j he need- 
 ^ ed not have been afraid that it thence would 
 * c follow, that all Things come to pafs by Fate 
 
 * Me (fc. DiodorusJ id folum fieri pofle dicit, quod aut fit ve- 
 rum, aut futurum fit verum: & quicquid futurum fir, id dicit 
 fieri necejfeeffe: & quicquid not fit futurum, id negat fieri ftffe. 
 Tu (fcilicet Chryfippus,) & qua: non fint futura, pofTe fieri 
 dicis: ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiam fi id nunquam futurum 
 fit : neque necefle fuifie Cypfelum regnare Corinthi, quanquam 
 id millefimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum efTet. Lib. de 
 Tato. 
 
 f Licet Epicuro concedenti omne enunciatum aut verum aut 
 hlfumefTe, non vereri, ncomniaFa/e fieri fit neceiTe: non enim 
 xternis caufis naturae necefiitate manantibus verum eft id quod 
 ita enunciatur. Defcendit in Academiam Carneades: nee tamen 
 line caufis: fed intereft inter caufas fortuito antegreflis, 8c inter 
 caufas cohibentcs (forte, contincntes) in fe efficientiam natu- 
 ralem. Ira & fempcr verum fuit, morietur Epicurus, cum duo 
 £c feptuaginta annos vixerit, Archontc Pitarato : neque tamen 
 erant cauiie fstfjle?, cur ita accideret ; fed quod ita cecidilTcCj 
 certe caiurum, ficut cccidit, fuit. Ibid, 
 
 (o$
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 K (or Neceflity:,) For that which is true does 
 " not come to pals by a neceffary Chain of eternal 
 *' Caufcs. For Example, Carneades went down 
 " into the Academy j and not without a Caufe: 
 " But then there is a Difference betwixt an ante- 
 <c cedent contingent Caufe, and a natural efficient 
 " Caufe. So alfo this Proportion was always 
 " true, viz. Epicurus will die when he is feventy 
 " two Years of Age, in the Magiftracy o? Pita- 
 " ratus; but notwithstanding there was no Fa- 
 " tality (ox Neceflity) that this fhould fo happen : 
 " but becaufe it did fo happen, it was certain to 
 
 happen as it did. 
 
 And Origen obferves to this Purpofe ; " * But 
 
 if any one will underftand that which is faid 
 " will be, that it will be, fo, as that it may not 
 " be; this (fays he) I readily acknowledge to be 
 " true. For God cannot lie -, but of thofe things 
 " which may be or may not be, he can know 
 " which will be, and which will not be. 
 
 Cato proceeds (p. 178.) it is impojjiblc to know 
 that any Event will come to pafs, that may not 
 come topafs. But if it will certainly come to pafs 
 (tho' there be a Pofibility of its not coming to 
 
 * 'Et <& T(? oi>r/tj<r£T«<, to 7Tcc\iTUi ifcct, Xtyw en tfeti "pi recH 
 thx, itiOi^tTo 'j Kca '.Ttgut; v/cicSj, touto in, ctX>)8ts <rvy%6)(eu[tiw 
 Ttn ^a, yi 0£c» oCk ivoiyjrou •ytvtrcco% > , ud't^iTdi j 7tifi rm hoi'Xfi* 
 fjtji»uii ymo% Kttl (JM '/fv^, Qoovwxi ra yino% &vtcc ymi. p* yinoX,. 
 Orig. apud Eufcb. Prsp. Evang. lib. 6. p. a88. & Com. in 
 Gen. p. ?. 
 
 pafs) 
 
 u 
 
 «
 
 ( 54) 
 
 pafs) why may not this Certainty be forefeen? 
 Here is yet no Appearance of an Argument. Cato 
 concludes -, (ibid J 'tis equally impojjible to fore fee 
 qn Effect, without knowing the Caufes which pro- 
 duce it. 
 
 This indeed is, and the only Thing that is 
 true and to thePurpofe: And the Anfwer is eafy, 
 as in every Effect, whether contingent or neceffary, 
 there are Caufes which produce it > fo God the 
 Author of Nature, as well fees thofe Caufes 
 which are Caufes only of the Certainy of Events, 
 or of contingent Events, as thofe Caufes which 
 necejfarily produce Effects, or which are Caufes 
 of neceffary Events. 
 
 Origen argues j " * That God when he laid 
 <c the Foundation of the World, (nothing being 
 " produe'd without a Caufe) did contemplate in 
 <fc his Mind every future Event 5 and faw that if 
 <£ this was done that would follow j and from 
 <c that another, and fo on to the End of the 
 " World, whereby he knows whatever will be, 
 cc without being at all the Caufe of any Event, 
 " which he knew would come to pafs. 
 
 * 'E7TitixM.u* ©£05 Ti} &?%% TVi X0Tf/j07FeiYxt;y eudiw; ctvxtTiov 
 y./opitcv, iXirttyiviTXt rZ v<i \y.x<;c» t£ov sVojiasiwv, c(w on t7tu loot 
 •yvyert, "mot vrirxi' ixi S ytnrrou root to ixeuittoy, root c&KoXxdfit- 
 as t/^as-wr©-', rodi t?xi' xxt «x» ^X li T *^S5 T ^ v Ti^xyf/jxruv i7ti- 
 qtesnidiit;, ctdtv ec i?w, eu zmtu^ ikolsu t£jv ^ivutnto^tyuv oari®" reu 
 
 fttvTo cvih&hxi Tvy^wuv. Apud. Eufeb. Prsep. Evang. lib. 6' 
 p. 287. & Com. in Gen. p. 8. 
 
 This
 
 ( jj ) 
 
 This is the reafoning of the mod learned Men 
 of former Agesj and the whole ConfuGon of 
 Cato's Thoughts in this his grand (tho' trite) 
 Argument againft Liberty is owing to his noc 
 diftinguifhing betwixt Things certain and Things 
 neceffary^ and not confidering the diftind Nature 
 of God's Knowledge of thefe different Objects 5 
 tho' there is not a clearer Diftin&ion betwixt any 
 two Ideas whatfoever. 
 
 Will any one in his Senfes fay that becaufe it 
 was certain yefterday, that I fhould write thefe 
 Words to Day ; it was therefore necejfary ? and 
 that this Truth is of the fame Nature with ne- 
 cejfary Truths} with the Truth of three Angles, 
 of a Triangle being equal to two right Angles, 
 and all other either felf-evident or demonftrative 
 Truths? Or is the fame with the Truth of the 
 jijeent of light, or the Defcent of heavy Bodies, 
 or any other necejfary Effects of natural Caufes ? 
 
 If then the Diftinclion of certain and necej- 
 fary Truths is plain and undeniable, it unavoid- 
 ably follows that God can forefee Things whofe 
 Events are certain only and not necejfary: That 
 he can as well forefee Things that certainly will 
 be (tho' they are contingent and may not be,) by 
 forefeeing the Caufes which will certainly pro- 
 duce themj as he can forefeeThings that necejfa- 
 rily rnufl be, by forefeeing the Caufes that fnuji 
 produce them. God's Forefight neither makes 
 necejfary Events necejfary ; nor certain Events cer- 
 tain : And as fome Things are mcejjary, not be- 
 caufe
 
 ( jO 
 
 caufe God forefees them, but becaufe they are 
 necefTary in their Nature^ prior in order of Ideas 
 to this Forefightj fo" other Things are certain^ 
 not necejfary $ not becaufe God forefees the Cer- 
 tainty of them, but becaufe antecedently to this 
 Foreknowledge, they are certain in their Caufesj 
 and which would be exactly the fame, the one 
 certain^ the other neceffary^ whether God fore- 
 knew them or not, or fuppofing he did not fore- 
 know them. 
 'Tis Origen's Argument, " * As (faith he) if 
 any one feeing another, who thro' Ignorance 
 is ralli, and precipitately and irrationally walks 
 in a flippery Path, forefees, that he will flip 
 and fall, is not the Caufe of his Fall ; fo we 
 are to underftand that God forefees what eve- 
 ry one will be, and perfectly knows the 
 Caufes of what he will be, of both his Vices 
 and his Vertues : But neverthelefs (he adds,} 
 his Foreknowledge is not the Caufe of 
 them. 
 
 * "Cla-m^ ^ u t<? ep5» nvx Qg. rtjv i^afl/av s-poiriTti, 2^. 3 
 tijk Jffe7TtTtiU» ettojirui imf&xmiTX io\u o'AK&jjpas, **» KxrxXufiat 
 ff£Grsi<2§ oXH&H<ruvTX t ei!x» um&* roS otnt&g iicum ytnrou. tsrx per]' 
 Tier, rot Qto» xpotufxyyTX iKoH®* t?xi iKXf(§h t k»1 txs xitix$ to? 
 
 TCICUTCy CCVTVV ttrt&Xl KxCepxv, KXi OTt XfAiXOTtlftTXi T«jf, Jj Y.XTCt- 
 
 turu ruS't' Kui it %pn Xtytut, ev t*\* Tfoyw<riv itiTtxv rm yvaytl- 
 
 h». Apud Eufcb, Prxp. Evang. lib. 6. p» 287, & Com. io 
 Qcn. p. 8. 
 
 2, L „ ._•. The
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 The great Philofopher, as well as Orator, Cice- 
 ro, thus reafons on this Head of Argument, <c * Ic 
 " does not at all (fays hej follow from every Pro- 
 cc position's being cither true or fa Ife, that there 
 " are eternal and immutable Caufes, which ren- 
 " der it impoffible for any thing to happen other- 
 " wife than it will happen : There are contingent 
 u efficient Caufes of certain Truths, as that Cato 
 w will come into the Senate Houfe, which are not 
 " interwoven with the Nature of Things (or 
 " mundane material Caufes) and yet the 'Truth 
 " of that which will come to pafs, is as immu- 
 " table as that which is already come to pafs : 
 " Nor does Fate or NeceJJity at all follow. 
 
 Again ; as my Knowledge of any Event which 
 happened to day, no way influenceth the Exif- 
 tence, or Certainty, or NeceJJity of itj but it is 
 what it is, independent of my Knowledge : So 
 in like Manner God's Foreknowledge, which is to 
 him, to whofe Thoughts all Things are prefent, 
 the fame as Knowledge, no way influenceth the 
 Exiftence of any Event, which whether prefent 
 or future, is or will be the fame, whether hz 
 
 * Tully's Words are; Nee fi omne cnunciatum aut verum 
 aut falfum eft, fequitur illico efle caufas immutabiles, eafque 
 aeternas, qua: prohibcant quicquam fecus ceadre atque cafurum 
 fir. Fortuitae funt caufse quae efficianr, ut vcre dicantur, quae 
 ita dicentur, vemet Cato in Senatum, non inclufae in rerum 
 natura atque mundo; & tamen tam eft immutabile venturum, 
 cum eft verum, quam venifie: nee ob earn caufam Fatutn aut 
 Htcejfitas cxtimefcenda eft. Lib, de Fat. p. 3^4. 
 
 I foreknows
 
 ( J*) 
 
 foreknows it or not. Suppofing God did not' fore- 
 know any Event, it was equally true and certain 
 from all Eternity, that the Event which now is 
 come to pafs would come to pafs : Whence it is 
 evident, that the 7rutb and Certainty of it does 
 not depend on any Foreknowledge, fuppofing it to 
 have been foreknown. Therefore, as it is evident 
 to Senfe and Reafon, that fome Truths, as all felf- 
 evident Proportions, and mathematical Demon- 
 ft 'rations, are in their Natures (a priori) necejfary 
 and independent of God's Power or Will-, and his 
 Knowledge does not make them to be more or 
 lefs necejfary: And other Effects are alfo neceffary 
 ( but a pofieriori only) fo long as the immediate 
 Caufe of them continues ; fuch as the Rijing of 
 the Sun, the Return of the Seafons, and a thoufand 
 fuch like Events, which are necejfary in their 
 immediate Caufes fo long as they are permitted 
 to operate, which depends wholly on the Power 
 and Will of God : and his Foreknowledge of thefe 
 Events does not make them neceffary, nor arc 
 they necejfary becaufe he foreknows them, but 
 they are necejfary from the Nature of the Caufe 
 which immediately produces them, which Caufe 
 God being the Author of, ' muft forefee the Ef- 
 fects of it : fo alfo it is equally evident that there 
 are other Truths or Events proceeding from ra- 
 tional Agent.', or humane Actions, which are not 
 necejfary in either of the former Senfes, but zre con- 
 tingent only, i. e. fuch as might poflibly not have 
 been, or might have been otherwife, even whilft 
 
 the
 
 ( J9) 
 
 the immediate Caufe which produced them did ex- 
 iir. j fuch are all the Effects of Will and Choice j and 
 thefe alfo having Caufes, which as certainly pro- 
 duce them, as the others are neceffarily produc'd 
 from their Caufes, and God being the Author 
 of thefe Caufes of voluntary Effects alfo, mult 
 know their Effects as well as the other which 
 are necejary, and this Foreknowledge can no more 
 make contingent Events which certainly will be, 
 to become necejary, than necejfary Events to be- 
 come contingent : In Truth, God's Knowledge 
 or Foreknowledge is founded upon their Certainty 
 of Exiftence ^whether neceflary or not alters not 
 the Cafe} and not their Exiftence upon his Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 The Nature of no Truth is alter'd by being 
 known or foreknown j for it is only known to be 
 what it is. If I fee an Object (fuppofing that I 
 really fed it) in a certain Place, it is certain that 
 the Obje6t is there > but then 'tis evident, that 
 my feeing it is not the Caufe of its being there, 
 (for it would be where it is, whether I faw it 
 or not) but the Object's being there" caufeth my 
 Senfation, I fee it therey becaufe it is there : So 
 God forefees, or rather fees the Actions of Free- 
 agents, becaufe they will be, are certain in Futu- 
 rity, not that they will be, becaufe he forefees 
 them. It is the previous Truth or Certainty of 
 the future Choice of the Free- agent, that is the Ob- 
 ject of the divine Prefcience, and the Ground of 
 Foreknowledge, which yet maybe infallibly trues 
 I z fuppofing
 
 fuppofing Man to be a Free-agent; cannot he 
 certainly know beforehand what he will or will 
 not do, fo far as any Thing depends upon his 
 Choice ? and if fo, then a Man's own Foreknow' 
 ledge is confident with his Freedom. If we can 
 but further fuppofe that God who gave Man all 
 his intellectual Faculties, knows as much of him 
 as he does of himfelf, then will God's Foreknow* 
 ledge be confident with Man's Freedom. 
 
 In like manner the great Origen argues, " * To 
 " fpeak the Truth (faith he) the Foreknowledge 
 " of God is not the Caufe of Events; (for God 
 < c lays no Neceflity of finning upon him who 
 c ' he foreknows will commit Sin) but the Truth 
 <c (tho' not commonly underftoodj is, that 
 ^ that which will come to pafs, is the Caufe of 
 " his Foreknowledge; for the Event does not 
 " come to pafs becaufe it is foreknown, but it is 
 < c foreknown, becaufe it will come to pafs. 
 
 Wherefore we may conclude, with Auflin, 
 ic "(" That we are no way compelled, either by 
 
 " holding 
 
 * *E« £p» Aty«», & t»v 7t^oy»uiru cctTtxy uvXi yaofjuiwi ( eu y> 
 
 i<pU7TTlTCtl Tot? 7Tgeiyw<r[Jltt»tf XfJUXfTW>l/jitH Os«5, OTXV df/jXBTCCW^ 
 
 icXXx xugx2b%oTifoy p, oiXtjSii 3 ifou/Ati, re l<rof/itvo» cunev rej 
 Taiwai tincci tw Tfp» xvrou Trpoyvow eu yi inn \yiv<?xt, yinrxi 
 ixx' izril ytniBxi tfjuihXtv, lyvurxr Apud. Eufeb Pra?p. Evang. 
 lib. 6. p. 287, 288. 8c Com in. Gen. p. 8. Sec alfo cont. 
 Celf lib. 2. p. 73, 74. 
 
 f Quocirca nullo modo cogimur; aut retenta Prasfcientia 
 Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium ; aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, 
 Deum quod nefas eft, negare praefcium futurorum : fed utrum-
 
 ( 6i ) 
 
 *' holding the Foreknowledge of God, to reject 
 " the Freedom of the Will j or, by retaining the 
 " Freedom of the Will, to deny (which it would 
 " be impious to do^ the Foreknowledge of God : 
 " But we maintain both, we profefs both faith- 
 " fully and truly 5 the one, that we may believe 
 w aright j the other, that we may live well. 
 
 That which feems to have led Cato and others^ 
 both Antients and Moderns, to think that nothing 
 is the Object of Knowledge, but necejfary Truths 
 or Events, is, the taking all Knowledge to be 
 fcientificah, or undei Handing it in the Senfe of 
 Science, Demonjiration or Intuition, and fo imagin- 
 ing that every Object of Knowledge is a felf-evi- 
 dent, intuitive, demonjirative or natural Truth, 
 all which are indeed necejfary. But this Notion 
 of Knowledge (tho' indeed Men have no other 
 which is properly Knowledge in them^ is a great 
 Mi (lake when apply 'd to the Knowledge of God j 
 and the Knowledge which God hath of future 
 contingent Events, or of humane Actions, is of 
 another Nature. God doth not know what Free- 
 azenfs will do, in the fame manner as he knows 
 what will be the Effects of natural Caufes, or 
 as he knows the ejfential, eternal and immutable 
 Agreements and Difagreements of Things, and 
 their Proportions and Relations to each other: 
 
 que ample&imur, utrumque fideliter & veraciter confitemur. 
 Illud, ut bene credamuj; hoc, ut bene vivamus. Ee Civil. 
 Dei lib, f. e. 10. 
 
 This
 
 (6i ) 
 
 This is that Knowledge which is- called Science, 
 and belongs only to the Perception of necejfary 
 Truths or Events. But God knows the Effects 
 of free Caufes, or voluntary Agents, by the Per- 
 fection of his Judgment, by that Knowledge 
 which is called Wifdom, and is of a * different 
 Nature from Science, and the Objects of which 
 are in their Natures not necejfary, but contingent, 
 and fuch as tho' they certainly will be, yet have 
 a phyfical Poflibility of not being : And here I 
 mud obferve that it is another Miftake to think 
 that contingent Things, depending on the Will 
 and Choice of Free-agents, are uncertain ; if fo in- 
 deed, it would imply a Contradiction to fuppofe 
 them to be certainly foreknown, i. e. to be certain ; 
 but they are as certain in their Events, as thofe 
 Th ings which are necejfary: my prefent Writing was 
 as certain ViTxMlh yefterday iis'it is/0 day, i.e. it was 
 true and certain yefterday that I fhould write to day : 
 Tho' yet it is evident that it was not neceffarily 
 true or certain, becaufe I might not have lived to 
 day to write, or might not have wrote tho' I 
 did live j and God's Knowledge yefterday of my 
 writing to day was as certain and infallible (tho' 
 not fcientifical) as his Knowledge of any other 
 
 *Chalcidiusfays; Quod Deus fciat quidem omnia, fed unum- 
 quodque pro Natura fua ipforum fciat : neceffitati quidem fub- 
 jugatum, ut necelTirati obnoxium : anceps vero, ut quod ea fit 
 natura prsditum, cui confilium viam pandat. Neque enim ita 
 fcit ambigui Naturam Deus, ut quod certum 2c neceflltate con- 
 ftri&um. In Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 2/4. 
 
 Truth
 
 (*3) 
 
 Truth or Event the moft necejfary: And 'tis, I 
 think, eafy to conceive, that this fort of Know- 
 ledge or Wifdom (tho' in Men who cannot difcern 
 the Hearts or Wills of others it is very imperfect, 
 uncertain and fubject to Error, and fo is not pro- 
 perly Knowledge in them) may be fo perfect in God 
 (who fearcbeth the Hearts and Reins, and knows all 
 theWorkings of the Mind, and the Motives excit- 
 ing them, as well as he knows all the Operations 
 of Nature working natural and necejfary Effects,) 
 that he may with as much Certainty and Infalli- 
 bility forefee the certain fcho' contingent) Effects 
 of the one, as the certain and withal necejfary 
 Effects of the other. The Poffibility of the Fore- 
 knowledge of contingent Events, and the Recon- 
 ciliation and Conliftency of fuch a Foreknow- 
 ledge with Freedom or Choice of Action, would 
 not haveappear'd fo perplexed and difficult, to be 
 apprehended, had it been well confidered, that 
 every Event depending upon the Will of the 
 Agent, has as much Certainty in its Nature, as 
 any Effect proceeding from natural or necejfary 
 Caufes, and that what is call'd Chance or Fortune 
 is a mere empty Name without any Meaning: 
 And the Objection made from the Freedom of 
 humane Actions of the Poffibility of God's being 
 deceived, is juft fuch a filly Quibble as the other 
 of the Poffibility of his doing Evil, becaufe he is 
 freely and voluntarily good; The Perfection of 
 God's Knowledge in the one Cafe, as the perfect 
 Rectitude of his Will in the other Cafe, makes 
 j God
 
 («4) 
 
 God as free from Error and Sin, as if it was/%?- 
 eally impofllble for him to commit either. 
 
 In fhort, any Man may have as clear and cer- 
 tain a Perception that \i\sdblions arc voluntary, as 
 that any other Thing is necejfary. I as clearly 
 know that my prefent Writing is voluntary and 
 free, and depends upon my Choice and Will -, as 
 that the Beating of my Pulfe and Heart is necef- 
 fary, and depends not upon my Will, but upon 
 natural Caufes : And there is as much Reafon to 
 believe that all Things are voluntary, as that no- 
 thing is fo, or that all Things are necejfary, and 
 I delire any one to fhew me that the one is more 
 clear or certain than the other. If he fays, that 
 Motives which determine or caufe the Mind to 
 exert what I call voluntary Actions, are neceffary, 
 and therefore the Effects or Actions following the 
 Motives are alfo neceffary j this is juft as true a 
 Confequence, as that becaufe voluntary Actions 
 concur to the Production of necejfary Effects, 
 therefore thefe Effects are voluntary. As for Ex- 
 ample, the Motive of my prefent Writing is a 
 Perfuafion of the FalJliood of Cato's Scheme, and 
 this Perfuafion, I grant and fee is neceffary, I 
 cannot help this Judgment j but flill my Writing, 
 I alfo fee, is no more neceffary, than the Encreafe 
 of the Motion of my Blood, or of the Beating of 
 my Pulfe is voluntary, tho' the Caufe concurring 
 to it was my voluntary drinking a certain Quan- 
 tity of Spirits. Nay I can with as much Reafon 
 argue, that all natural Effects are voluntary in their 
 
 imm?~
 
 ( &5 ) 
 
 immediate Caufes, or proceed from their Choice Or 
 Will, becaufe God their firjl Caufe is a voluntary 
 and Free-agent ; as Cato can argue from the fe- 
 cond Caufes or Motives of humane Actions being 
 neceffary, that the immediate Caufe, the Mind, is 
 a necejfary, not a voluntary Agent : But there is no 
 end of arguing, or rather trifling, with fuch fort of 
 Fallacies. And if any reafonable Man could make 
 a Difpute about the Foreknowledge of God, it 
 muft be not to argue from the Suppofition of it, 
 that all Things are necejfary, which is contrary 
 to all the Senfe and Reafon in the World j buc 
 the Queftion muft be, fince Man is a Free-agent, 
 and his Actions plainly voluntary ^ whether they 
 can be forefeen or not, or are the Objects of 
 Foreknowledge. For if it can be prov'd that con' 
 tingent Events arc not Objects of Knowledge^ 
 then, as Cato obferves, *tis no Irreverence to the 
 fupreme Beings to fay that he cannot do ImpoJJibilities 9 
 and know Things which cannot be known, (p. 178.^ 
 But his adding, that 'tis certain he muft know all 
 Things which can be known, becaufe they all de- 
 pend upon his Will, (p. IJ9-) is very prepofterous 
 (as well as untrue) in him to affirm, who makes 
 all Things neceffary. If he means by Will ap- 
 probation only, viz. that God confents and ap- 
 proves of Things which are effected by the Ne- 
 cefiity of his Nature without any Choice, juft as 
 he wills or approves of his own Exifienccj this 
 is an egregious Fallacy and Abufe of Words-, 
 for in this Senfe things no more depend upon 
 
 K the
 
 ( 66) 
 
 the Witt of God than his own Exigence does, 
 But, if he means by Will the free or volunta- 
 ry Agency of God, he then destroys his own 
 Scheme of Neceffity ; and in this Senfe, tho' all 
 Effects of God's Power truly depend upon his 
 Willi or his Mind freely exerting that Power > 
 yet it is not true that the Exiftence of all Truths 
 depends upon his Will\ becaufe all felf-evident 
 and demonfirative Truths are necejfary and immu~ 
 table in their Natures, and independent of the 
 Will of God. Laftly, if he means fas he inad- 
 vertently expreffeth himfelf ) that all Things de- 
 pend upon God's Will exerted necejarily, and 
 this, becaufe God's Will is neceffarily-exifling ; 
 this is fo very grofs, abfurd and contradictory, as, 
 I truft, Cato, upon Reflection, mull and would 
 have been afham'd of having ever offered it. 
 
 The preceding Argument, concerning the In- 
 confiftency of the Foreknowledge of God with the 
 Freedom of humane Actions, having been much 
 urg'd by the antient Fatalifts againft humane Li- 
 berty, it may not be amifs to mew, briefly, what 
 thofe, who maintain'd that Men's Actions were 
 voluntary and free, reply 'd to it. 
 
 That Men are Free-agents, and their Actions in 
 their own Power, was always thought to be fo in- 
 difputably plain and certain, that many of the 
 Ancients, who could not clearly fee how this 
 Freedom was to be reconcil'd with the Foreknow- 
 ledge of God, deny'd the divine Prefcience, left it 
 fhould imply the Neceffity of humane Actions -, 
 i others
 
 others made a Doubt about it, but others thought 
 that Will in Men, and Prefcience in God, were 
 confident. 
 
 * Auftin tells us, that the Stoics, though they 
 hd&Fate in all things, yet rejected Preference with 
 refpecl: to Men's Actions, left it fhould thence 
 follow, that all things came to pafs by Necejfity. 
 And Cicero relates, that "j~ Carneades the Academic 
 deny'd there could be my Foreknowledge of things 
 future, without inferring the Necejfity of them, 
 which he ftrenuoufly oppos'd. 
 
 Again ## Aujlin affirms, that Cicero, " in his 
 <£ Books concerning Divination, does in his own 
 " Perfon openly oppofe the Foreknowledge of 
 " God 5 and that he feems to do this wholly to 
 " fhew his Diflent to the Notion of Fate, and 
 " that he may not deftroy the Freedom of the 
 " Will. 
 
 * Stoici (oppugnabant prsefcientiam) ut non omnia necefll- 
 tate fieri diccrent, quamvis omnia Fato fieri contenderent. De 
 Ctvit. Dei, lib.f.c 9. Whence we may obferve, that the Stows 
 held the Freedom of humane Actions, as will be demonftratcd 
 at large hereafter. 
 
 f Itaque dicebat Carneades, ne Apollinem quidem futura 
 polTe dicere, nifi ea, quorum caufas natura ita contineret, ut ea 
 fieri nccefie efTct— — . ita ne prxterita quidem ea, quorum nul- 
 la figna tanquam veftigia extarent, Appollini nota efle cenfebat: 
 quo minus futura. De F*t. lib. p. 5 5-6, 35-7. 
 
 ** In libris De Divinatione ex feipfo apertifllme oppugnat 
 prxfeientiam futurorum. Hoc autem totum facere videtur, ne 
 latum e(Te confentiat, 5c perdat libcram voluntatem. De Ci~ 
 •uit. Dti, lib, f, c, 0. 
 
 K a That
 
 («8 ) 
 
 That Cicero denies and ridicules alfo the fuper- 
 flitious Divination of Ajlrologers and Southfayers^ 
 is indeed evident from thefe Books -, but whether 
 he wholly deny -d God's Foreknowledge of future 
 Events depending upon the Will of Men,' is not, 
 I think, very clear from his Writings. He feems 
 indeed to think, that if God does forefee all future 
 Events, yet that he does not impart this Foreknow- 
 ledge unto Men : and in one place does expreflly 
 fayj " # that in his Opinion God cannot know 
 " fortuitous future Events." But whether he 
 efteem'd the future Actions of Men to be of this 
 Nature, does not certainly appear j only 'tis not 
 improbable, that being addicted moft to the Aca- 
 demic Sect, he might fall in with the Opinion 
 of Carneades before mentioned. 
 
 The learned Platonic, Alexander Aphrodifius 
 treats the Argument of Prefcience at large in the 
 following Manner. 
 
 " -f It any one fhall fay that it is agreeable to 
 " Reafon that the Gods foreknow Things future, 
 *' becaule it is abfurd to affirm that they are ig • 
 " norant of anything that is to come, and upon 
 a this Preemption fhall endeavour to prove that 
 
 * Mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videtur, ut iciat quid 
 cafu & fortuito futurum fit. De Divinat. lib. 2 t>. 2jz. 
 
 ■\ To -j Xiyv.v ivXcyov ttvzt tc-j% Qiauc, tol itr'cffj^u. rrautaivxi . 
 
 CCT6ZCV fp TO AzyiiV SKilVXS X*/?eHV Tt TO)V SfOIJttiVUV, KUi TOUTS >.Ct)*_ 
 fciisnclc rttTCCITKtVtcfytV Ti/pS?^ fi P61T0V-, TO %UyTZ l\ tWeC'/MM !(.
 
 ( h ) 
 
 w all things are effected by NeceJJity and Fate, this 
 " is neither reafonable nor true. For indeed, 
 " when the Nature of things will admit of ir, 
 " nothing is more reafonable than that the Gods 
 " ftiould foreknow future Events -, but when 
 u the Nature of them is fuch as makes it impof- 
 " fible for them to be foretold and foreknown, 
 <c then it is not reafonable to fuppofe that even 
 " the Gods know things that are impoflible to be 
 " known. For what things are lmpoflible in 
 " their own Nature, retain their Nature, and 
 *><■ are impoflible, even with refpe6b to the Gods. 
 " For it is impoflible even for the Gods to make 
 " the Diagonal equal to the Side, or twice two 
 " to be five, or any thing that is not, to be : 
 
 cc fo in like manner it is impoflible 
 
 " to forefee that which in its own Nature is 
 " poflible to be or not to be, as that which 
 w abfolutely will be, or will not be. For if the 
 M Foreknowledge of Things, which do not ex- 
 
 "ift, 
 
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 triuc, T/ d i rail xexypxTUv tovto %&'f»tr^?, tsatv ivMyaTi^ii uairxi 
 fjjlk>.\oi TaiQiaiv tx piAAevTss" xaiuuXTH £' xtrm TW roixurtjii xyoa- 
 $wn (lege 7rpopp>j<nv) xxl xyoywtnv ^fti^, io\ roiq ©ww? tvXoyo* 
 in yitiTXi to HOitxi n rm xdiwxTuf tx y> xabvxTX rt) xuraip 
 <P'j<ru, xxl xxfx T615 0£«5 t!)» Xvtw <PvXxttu Qua-ii* afuvxTov <yi 
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 tx o)c, §m xitTt taxi, k tud ytyo,ara, fi p* yrjfmaxi.m ■■i'Q<-. 
 oixjtiw, xiwxrm xxl to w t? iixuec tpuru t%ov, to 4u»xo% yivto% Tb 
 %'/.] pi ; itrlfJiiivQr nvirttn, *i m (M ire^itm, 'isra *fo{»#r«r h ft «
 
 ( 70 ) 
 
 ec ift, takes away their Contingency , it is evident^ 
 " that if they are contingent^ they cannot be fore- 
 <c known. And that this is fo, in their Opinion 
 <c alfo, is manifeft, from their fuppofing that the 
 cc Gods foreknow things future, and then ar- 
 " guing from this Supposition, that they arc 
 <e therefore necejfary^ or otherwife could not 
 <c be foreknown. But if Necejjity of Things 
 " is the Confequence of the Foreknowledge 
 " and Prediclion of the Gods, then, accord- 
 " ing to them, if things are not neceJJ'ary^ 
 " the Gods cannot foreknow their future Events. 
 cc Wherefore they alfo afcribe the fame Impo- 
 " tency to the Gods (with their Adverfaries) if 
 " it ought to be call'd Impotencyand Weaknefs, 
 " not to be able to do what is impoflible to be 
 <; done; and give not a whit more Power to the 
 <c Deity by attributing Prediction to him ; but 
 ^ by taking this for granted, they make the Na- 
 
 " ture 
 
 •Tsw, ccvrai ttoj avmi trpsyya-'ir*? ctpxtpt ro tv xvrof, ?v0i%of//s- 
 w, gv.Xcv aic, si (tol'^cito rovro, advvxroc, cty y Ttift uvtuv 7re>cyv&>(rt'i 
 ■us,. on <y-> KXi ycxiu. rvjrovc, rsuro xtwc, iy^a, J^Abv sjs r% XxfZovrxe, 
 at-jTGvc, art ct Qiai Z'feytyaxrjixtrt rot. t/jthXevret, tit' uvrcZ xxtx- 
 trKtvet&it ro s| a.vu.yy.-fo uvroc y;v£e>3jj, *»$ cvx. civ, it [An ovru y.votro 
 xwywcroiijivM. u 3 Ttj tuv i~h6>v xgeyvuiru n tun 7rfoxyspsv<rs t 
 •ro cmxyxciw Izircii, xxt tcur avrxc,, it ^ tb caxy koucv h rc7s 
 ytve[/j&i/>st(: itr;, cvk av scxr civrow, 01 Wis* 7>feyt]iai<rK0ttv } ru f/jiAAovru . 
 iti?i xxl cc-jrot v#V dvTyjv acuvxyjixv ro7<; ©sei? (pvAourvxtrit, (e$ 
 7j x-ar' ccowuximxv ~tf.i xtzi Lcdivuuv Mytw y.vto% ro rot, do\>xrx f/j^ 
 etivtio%). oi) -j ru ©iiai tta$ov ri o^i>vxo% 3>l& ty,<, Tfof^rsui oivx7rra<rtv 9 
 *AAx 2>l£ tou •syQ>st\ii$knvi twtc, t«v ^e'eny tm mr wt*.y\i>cLTw^
 
 ( 71 ) 
 
 tc ture of Things to be fuch, as neither follows 
 " from their own Supposition, nor is agreeable 
 
 " to plain Evidence of Fa£t. — But if to 
 
 u foreknow Things future, is to know things to 
 " be what they are (for it is one thing to fore- 
 " know Things, and another to make them) 
 " it is evident that he that foreknows contingent 
 u Things foreknows them as being fuch. For 
 " it is not Foreknowledge to fay, that that 
 <c which is contingent^ as being future, will necejfa- 
 " r//^ come to pafs. So that the Gods may fore- 
 < c know things contingent^ as being contingent^ and 
 ** it will not at all follow thence, that this Fore- 
 " knowledge makes them necejfary. And of 
 " this Nature are their Predictions: For when, 
 M in giving Counfel to any one to choofe and do 
 " what he ought, they foretel the Event, they 
 " do not foretel it as that which will necejfarily 
 
 " come to pafs. We therefore neither 
 
 u deftroy Divination nor the Foreknowledge of 
 
 " the 
 
 Toitcvrrjv atrot'/'xo'iy, ovexf/ja; xmaxvcc xxi vvjuwoa, ran; y.youjiyoit, re 
 y,»i f»«py«r* XiyoyTn' . i~s< 3 u to 7r»oyna<rx.tt» tx fjuiXXoyrce, 
 
 • f;, TO OXCIX £f'> TOiXDTX, Ct'JTX yWQiQilt <>>TX (iiXXo yx" TO Xt>4yi. 
 
 ttHTKUi tou 7Totiiv) a7,Xoy cTi Tot ivoifccuiitx. TrpcyiyuFKUt , &q tolxvtx 
 TpoyivbxriTXt. ou yap zyoyvutru, to to hsiy^y,uoy eoc itrof/jfyoy is.yotyx.utu.', 
 urto^Xiyny. u?i *xt ii&toiTXti3t^cfAttxeii<;fyai^of/iii»x oty 77ooyivwcr- 
 x-tlty, it ou7!mTUiitKOAfsO>iTii to Xvxy*.ccio\ 2^^. Tr,¥ T9iXvrbo7r(oyva/cru. 
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 fiuaotiTt xxt ■XfXTiay v- %e<j 7tQo?:iy>vTi',, si/v a<; t* ciyxy-.tw srofXitiav 
 Ttpi my ~etAty\t<nr. ■'■' '.i/iu-. p. v'< iiti xyx.oaZujiy /a/Mtik/.', o>jn r*, t
 
 (71 ) 
 
 " the Gods •, but we fay, that they foretei things 
 * c to be agreeably to their Natures. 
 
 There is a great deal of Acutenefs as well as 
 Caution in the Reafoning of this learned Wri- 
 ter. 
 
 jlmmoriius Hermias propofeth the Argument of 
 the FataHJis thus, viz. " * The Gods, fay they, 
 " either have an abfolute Knowledge of contingent 
 " Events, or no Knowledge at all of them, or 
 " elfe have an indefinite Knowledge of them, fuch 
 " as ours is. But (add they) it is impoffiblethat 
 " the Gods fhould be ignorant of any thing, 
 
 " who produe'd and govern all things. - 
 
 " Neither can they have an indefinite or conjec- 
 
 " tural Knowledge of future Events only. 
 
 " But {they proceed) 'tis evident and mud be 
 " own'd, that contingent Things are appointed 
 « { by the Gods, and the Events of them mull 
 " be abfolutely known by them. One of 
 
 " thefe two things therefore (they conclude,) 
 
 " mutt 
 
 n^oymtrn tu>v vyicov a>q s^si (puortas tx xoxyttjXTX, cureo^ xvrouc, Tti^i 
 uvtuu xfohi'/tiv Pi£y«v7-£5. De Far. p. 13^, 136, 139. 
 
 * Oj Q'coi (jpccu-iv) ijrei o^iTfAtvut; t'irutri tjjd txfieurir tuv ivoi%6» 
 f/ji-jav, n ffxvrct7TXG-(.v oofo [.oixv cI'jt&v t%tt<rn tvmccv. » x.x6x7tts 
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 uvro'jq hfofttTUt, rat -ttuvtx TTxpxyxycvTXs rt y,xl £iXK6<r[/ijeuiiTcte % 
 
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 fjc/3-,)(r«^t.£v&'v. . , .1 , Jj-Aei; or; kk\ ^ixtxtIio^ vtso tuv &iu> ru. 
 
 SVOl%ZfIjiyX pr.TiOV, KXi OtlfiTUiiVWC, y 'iy ■\UCKiO% > dJUTUV Tr,V iK($X<TW„ 
 
 ■' mow eiiv Qxrtecv, »j 7mvrec Uyaynxni/f kxi u$ iuli vnb t£*
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 " muft be Cud, either that all Events are ne~ 
 " cejjary^ and, as is fir, are known and foretold 
 " by the Godsj and fo what is called contingent 
 " will be but an empty Name ; or elfe we mull 
 " fay, that fome Things are neither known nor 
 " taken Care of by the Gods: Biit this is im- 
 " pofTible, wherefore there is nothing cont'w 
 " gent. 
 
 To the foregoing Argument Ammonias replies ; 
 " * By diflinguifhing the feveral Kinds of Know- 
 
 <c ledge. Thefe Things being fo (he adds) 
 
 " we fay that the Gods know all Things which 
 " have been, are, and fhall be hereafter, in away 
 " fuitable to the Gods, that is, by a flmple, 
 " abfolute and immutable Knowledge} where- 
 " fore theyalfo perfectly know contingent Things, 
 " iince all Things in the World are produced 
 
 " by them and they know not only their 
 
 " Natures, but their Powers and Operations. 
 cc — — They know Things contingent in a 
 
 " manner 
 
 &tuv ywu<rxi(Z'ut n kx\ nccXi'/i^, <f>K(rtu,iv *y. l Zxi*i.') i v.ca to hii- 
 
 TX trfii (py,G-C[JjiV CiAACt (/jj>,» TCUTi USuiXTCV, of/,17?.'. TO uJi^if/jlVCr. 
 
 * Tu. clu<pccx pirfcc run yvaxnwv J»ctipei» k\to)<rt^vt , ,. 
 
 tcutuv bv 8i/Tfc'? iyjjnu* f/;rioy rouq Qiouq yii&cTK<tv y, ttuvtx roe. 
 '/iyevorx, xXi rx o itx, Ktii tx ia-ofiiivxr, fjjiXXovTX, rev 0«si5^rjo<n)xo»- 
 
 TX TQC7TOY, TOUTO JV if' [A'*, **« »J»<T/A»J), X-Xi XyjiTXfiaTM "/VOKTJf 
 eio^jp KXi TU¥ iVOi%0(J!jlyW» XtfiiiA/,(f)i*Xl. Tr,» \tQ,,(T.V, un x.xt ttc.yTX 
 TU, CV 1<A y.CVf/jUl KXtX'/CiVTKC ■ KXi CUV l^WTXC, HX. U.VTIIC, (AlDiCII 
 
 jt*^ wr,s*c, oi'i\?^a nxl w'-, $m/x[/ah ivrun *«i tmc ».''f("/i«*s — — • 
 
 L ywantw
 
 ( 74) 
 
 " manner which is fuperior to the Natures 
 " of them ; wherefore thefe having an indeter- 
 M minate Nature, may be^ or may not be\ but 
 <c they having a Knowledge of them, which is 
 " more perfect than their Natures, know even 
 " thefe contingent Events in a determinate and ab- 
 
 " folute Manner. Wherefore we ought 
 
 " not to think that contingent Things will have 
 " a necejfary Event, becaufe they are known by 
 " the Gods in an ab folute manner 5 for the Gods 
 " knowing them does not make their future 
 " Events necejjary^ but fince, as being of a con- 
 " tingent and mutable Nature, they will cer- 
 " tainly have fuch or fuch an Event j for thi9 
 " Reafon it is necefTary the Gods fhould know 
 " what the Event will be. And the fame Thing 
 u which is contingent in its own Nature is not 
 <{ indeterminate, but determinate in the Know- 
 46 ledge of God. 
 
 yiyaxrxtty fjuir roi t<& iydi^e^tyx xfuTTtyvs vyc, xvruy ixnyuy <p!j<rtM$ 
 elctftp 7oivTct (Aft elofifoy i%oyT» t«» Qutrn, ouyxt&xt n ix&elmit 
 y-xt f/it) itifStciyuy, ixuyus p *rt xfiiTrcyaq ■&><; Quirtus uviuy ?%i 
 yyutrty eiwmy XfoitM<PoTct$, wpter^yw; x.xi tuvtcc uoiycti. < < , nxl 
 ei yjjii yofA^ay 'ort kyxyy.XiXy i^{^ry,y txfixiriy it teyo/Aity iy£l%oj/jSvx t 
 £>]$. t» vtto Qtay yiya><rxi<3xi oftrfAiyuf, & «£> SioTi yivaxTKatrty cLvrea 
 el Slot, 2y& t£?to otyxyxUiuc, ix/iyitriTXty ccXX' irrufy <piva t%oyrcc 
 iyhftopjiytui t£ xp,<p{(ZoXcy Ttt^xe, t\4 vmyTUi \ reToy « retey, jije^ touto t#$ 
 &iHi iihrxi ayxyxxioy 'oTuq tKfinVtTXi' kxI if i ro ctvrb Ttj ft Queu 
 tij ixvris iy&%o(Aiiyoy, Ttj ^ yvvtru ray Qtut, ixtrt ciopiroy, «AA* <»»piT« 
 
 t*iw> Com. in Ariftot. p. 204, 107, 208, tit. 
 
 The
 
 (75 ) 
 
 The Reafoning of thefe two great Philofophers 
 proceeds upon this, viz. that the Foreknowledge 
 of God is not fo evident in itfelf, as that fome 
 Things (fuch as humane Actions) are of a con- 
 tingent Nature j maybe, or may not be. The Ques- 
 tion therefore is, whether thefe contingent Things 
 are Objects of Foreknowledge ox not j if Foreknow- 
 ledge necefiarily implies that the Things fore- 
 known are neceffary, being not neceffary but con' 
 tingent, 'tis manifefi they are not Objects of Fore- 
 knowledge, and 'tis no Derogation to God to fay 
 that he does not foreknow what is impoffible to 
 be foreknown; and they who afTert that all the 
 Objects of God's Foreknowledge are Things 
 of a neceffary Nature, or that his Knowledge 
 makes them neceffary, ought to prove that God 
 foreknows contingent Things. For if he does 
 foreknow them, he muft foreknow them to be 
 what they are, and not what they are not; that is 
 contingent, not neceffary, and his Foreknowledge 
 cannot alter the Nature of any Thing, or make 
 Things, which are contingent in their Natures, 
 become neceffary by being foreknown. Whence 
 it follows, that the Notion of Fatality has no 
 Foundation j and it is reafonable to think, that 
 God, who produc'd and governs all Things, and 
 perfectly knows the feveral Natures, Powers and 
 Operations of every Thing, may have a certain 
 and abfolute Knowledge of contingent Events 
 (fince whatever will be, 'tis now true that it will 
 be 3 and mull be either thus or thus) without al- 
 L 2 tering
 
 ( 76 ) 
 
 tering the Nature of Things, and making the 
 Events forefeen to become necejfary. 
 
 In the next Place Cato fays, that the Notion 
 of Liberty of Action reflects upon God's Wifdom or 
 Power: Upon the firfl, as fuppofing he defires or 
 intends to bring any Defigns or Purpofes to pafs, and 
 yet that he has not chofen the proper Methods to attain 
 them; or upon the latter, that he cannot obtain 
 them if he wou'd. It intrenches upon his Providence 
 and Government of the Univerfe, by giving Part of 
 his Power out of his own Hands, and by leaving it 
 to the Difcretion of inferior and weak Beings, to 
 contradict himfelf, and difappoint his Intentions ; and 
 even his Jufiice it [elf, to which all the refl (of 
 Gods Attributes) are fo freely facrifced, is attacked 
 upon fuch Reafonings in charging Almighty God 
 with Severity in pumping Crimes, committed thro'' 
 JVeaknefs, Want, or predominant Appetite'., and 
 which he could have prevented by giving others. 
 (p. 1 79 .J 
 
 All this may feem plaufiblc, and impofe upon a 
 weak or unattentive Reader j but 'tis eafily 
 fhewn, that there is not the leail true Reafoning 
 in any Part of it j and that the Reverfe to every 
 Line of it is the real Truth. 
 
 Firfl: j the Notion of Liberty does not fuppofe 
 God to have us'd any improper Methods to bring 
 to pafs hisDefigns or Purpofes, or to be difappoint- 
 ed in the Attainment of them. God, in enduing 
 Man with Liberty^ or a Power of Action, origi- 
 nally
 
 (77) 
 
 nally intended fas is evident from the Nature of 
 the Thing) that his Actions fhould be the Re- 
 fult of that Liberty or Power; he never in- 
 tended they fhould be otherwife than they 
 are, or than fuch as he knew would |be the Ef- 
 fects of Liberty. He never did or could 
 defire or intend to bring any Defigns or 
 Purpofes to pafs by Men's Actions, but fuch as 
 fhould be effected by the JVill or Choice of Men, 
 whether Good or Evil. It was plainly God's 
 original Defign and End in the Creation of Men, 
 to make them moral Agents, capable of Vertue 
 and Vice, Good and Evil, and, in Confequence 
 of them, capable of Rewards and PunifomcntSy 
 Happinefs and Mifery, and the proper and only 
 Methods to complete this Defign and End were, 
 the enduing their Minds with Reafon, Liberty, 
 or a free Power of Action, without which they 
 could not be, in a moral Senfe, capable either 
 of the one or of the other 5 and God never in- 
 tended or defired that any one fhould be either 
 Good ox Evil (as indeed it was impoffible he fhould 
 be either) without being fo, willingly and volun- 
 tarily } and this End God does attain, and always 
 will attain. 
 
 But now on the other Hand, upon the Hy- 
 pothecs of Neceffity, God's Defigns or Purpofes 
 arc plainly fruftrated, and his Wifdom and Power 
 wholly taken away. It is contrary to Wifdom 
 for God, who is good (as Cato allows) to intend 
 the Happinefs of all his rational Creatures, and yet 
 
 tc
 
 (78 ) 
 
 to lay many of them under a NeceJJity of being 
 unhappy : It can never be a wife or proper Me- 
 thod of bringing Men to Felicity, to fubject them 
 under an inevitable Fate and NeceJJity of being 
 miferable*: And if Men's Actions, and thcConfe- 
 quences of them, are the Refult of NeceJJity^ 
 then it is evident that God hath not Power 
 to attain his Defigns or Purpofes* he hath no 
 Power to make thofe happy whom NeceJJity ren- 
 ders [miferable^ or to make thofe; miferable (how 
 oppofite foever to his Nature and Attributes 
 their Actions are,) whom NeceJJity makes happy : 
 And in fhort it follows, that God hath no Power 
 at all over Men, or any Thing they do, that 
 
 * Alexander Apkrodijius fays, that the Notion of the Necef- 
 fity of humane A&ions makes Men more miferable by Nature 
 than the Beafts are, becaufe the greateft Part of Men are made 
 miferable by thofe Vices of which the brute Creatures are not 
 capable. His Words arej 'Ot ^ ^c^ms *| emuyxtiq ^2$ uvxt 
 n xxt ym&xt roijfTits, xxl [&» xxtx^i^ovth; yfh» trft ifyoixr rtu 
 
 TCCVTX TTfUTTUV TJ Xx\ f/j>j } 04* W CiV TOlOUTCt ytVetfJtitSx, XXt Ji|#. 
 
 revro (Ann rets xo&kois ysvc[X>ivoi<; ifytyxt (//» tuvtx tc^xttm xe, 
 weeCTTcrrsi; yimTKi TOiooTot, f/jyjTi rot's ayxSoT^, True, ouk ifJUoXoyyitratri 
 %xxi<?of ysyowxt t£>v Zum x7nx.vTuy l/wo t^c, (putnas tov uvtyu7rov. 
 
 mi it «£> )} fl kfiTn Tt XXI VI XXXtX f/jOVXt, XXT OtVTCVS, Yi "(£ 
 
 *tyx&» it 3 xxxov, xxl «y«y ruv aXhrn Zfim ouohntti toutm ss"i» 
 iffi^ixTingy, tov i) avfyaxuv ot 7rXtifet xxxot ■ 7iu<; eux un xQXiu- 
 
 yxtcy £aiev ttuvtm 6 tttBgux®* «sj, ifta* w [w xxxixv xxl m> (AXi~ 
 n&ut vufttQvTH dvT? xxl <rv/KtK?infviiintt. De Fat. p. izS s 
 
 *l*2 
 
 they
 
 (79 ) 
 
 they are wholly independent of him, and in no 
 wife accountable to frim. 
 
 Secondly j God, by making Men Free-agents, 
 hath not fas Cato pretends) given any Power out 
 pf his Hands, nor do any of his Creatures contra* 
 die! or dif appoint his Intentions; and his providen- 
 tial Government of the Univerfe is more illustri- 
 ous in ruling over rational and Free-agents by ra- 
 tional and moral Laws, and conferring Rewards 
 and Punifhments on voluntary Obedience or Dif- 
 obedience, than in any other Part of the unintel- 
 ligent or irrational Creation ; or than it would be, 
 if he had fubjected humane Actions to NeceJJity 7 
 juft as it is more glorious for a King to govern 
 a Nation of Free-fubjecls by wife and rational 
 Laws, with a Power to punifli them for their 
 Difobedience, and to reward them for their Obe- 
 dience, than to govern a Company of Slaves^ 
 bound in Chains and Fetters, and thereby unca- 
 pable of doing either Service or Dijfervice. Thus, 
 with Refpecl to God's Government of the World, 
 if Men's Defires, Intentions and Aclions are nece][a~ 
 ry, their Minds, in this Cafe, as their Bodies in 
 the other, are bound in Chains, and not capable 
 of performing any Duty; there is no place for 
 pious Affections towards God, or Submijjion to his 
 Will\ no Room to offer Prayer for Benefits, or 
 Praife, or Thank/giving for receiving them : And 
 in Truth, there can be no Worfaip or Adoration 
 
 of
 
 ( 8o) 
 
 of God at all, which can proceed only from 
 Choice and 'voluntary Actions. 
 
 Alexander jfphrodifius fays, " How can the Af- 
 " fertors of Neceflity maintain God's Providence 
 
 " over Men ? How can any one rightly 
 
 <c call that Providence which has no Refpect to 
 " the Deferts of Men, but is founded in an an- 
 " tecedent Necejfity? And what becomes of 
 " Men's Piety towards God, if it is not in their 
 " Power not to do what they do do ? 
 
 Again, " \ If this is once believed (that we 
 " have nothing in our own Power) it will be ab- 
 " furd to reprehend any one, to praifc any one, 
 " tocounfel anyone, to exhort any one, to pray 
 " to God, to give him Thanks for any Thing, 
 " or to do any of thofe Things which ought to 
 w be done by thofe who believe they have in 
 u themfelves a Power of doing what they doj 
 
 * n*5 & xv araZjotHi TotavTCi Xr/ovri<; t\v lira t£j> 0i<5» '/ivef/jivut 
 tuv 6mt6>» 7i(><)v6ixv ; i 77zis xv 'in r£rc xycvoixv t<; Jixsg/ai; At- 
 
 *,o , thv » x.ccd' «|(«» ymofjjivijv, xXXx ku.tu. rivet, XtxyKxa ttdokxtx- 
 Gifitoljjjivl'M ; 7rw<; $'' xv (raZptro xx) if jrpoj reus 0£els ivai&tut i£iv 
 iwri/3«i» obxoZvrav, Mori f//>) *V xuroti; w, -ri revro /ah Tioiin iru 
 
 %qwtu<). De Fat. p. 91. 
 
 \ T&> 7^ Txro XimttviAivet, £k izhpwau rm, i* ixxina-xi 
 fivx, i rvpPisX'ivircH' tih, £ VfoTf Qx&xt thx, £k Xv%xS^ ©je,""?, e<2 
 %uf» kvroii yvam ititf rum, eU xXXo n vrotw, cm rt <n>, ipu- 
 bepvuv ivXcyuq y<>H>% uko rw xxl ri now ixccw «r Tfottsa-t tjj» 
 ilxrix* xvrifivKtTa*. xXXx pw tfy> rtsrai, «/3iW©- rui ktfya*- 
 Zt» tf&y XXi rift tjj» tCf%y xvtyx7T6iy 'In. Ibid. p. 99. 
 
 " without
 
 ( 8i ) 
 
 Ci without which Power Man's Life is no Life 
 " nor the Life of Men ? 
 
 Hierocles fays; u * Prayer is not to noFurpofe, if 
 <c Providence fuperintends humane Affairs, ap- 
 41 pointing righteous and juft Retributions to 
 " Men's voluntary Actions." Eufebius^ in like 
 manner, argues; " f If not only external Events, 
 cc but our internal Defiies proceeding from Rca- 
 cc fon, are fubjecl: to the Influence of the Stars 
 " Viiid to Fate; and if the Minds of Men are 
 *' under the Impulfe of an inexorable NcceJJity, 
 44 then farewell Philofophy, farewell Religion" 
 And Origen ; " * # It is in vain to offer Prayers j 
 
 <c for, if all Events are necejfary it is ir- 
 
 " rational to entreat God for any Thing." Again; 
 " \\ From the Notion (of Neceflicy) it fol- 
 ** lows, that the Faculty of Will is wholly 
 u taken away ; and with it, Prat ft and Difpraife^ 
 
 " and 
 
 vywro, t'.ut*) nul any 7us (*[Au{2cl$ nut) 7r^ex.^i(riu> Tdrrnca. 
 )Dc Prov. & Fat. p. \6. 
 
 + 'Et •£> U^Oti Kxl fifA,XfU>lW i fAjOVX TO J«.TJ^, uWct Kil TT.'.- 
 
 xxtx Mytcrfbcv irgcfofAi'ots xtxCtnov, xxi ra, cc~cccu>i vtG^ a-/xyK<i 
 -rue, kifynrnxt, ixQ,ix£tTXi yvufAXt, ci^cirui rra (pihotrcfyx, oi%f 
 triTcti xxl La-iS.Hu. Prxp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 242. 
 
 *• 'Ev%xl t«ojAx»o-» [AUTivu 7TUfct/.Ufju3uy(.yj;yui « yJ Kxriv.ay- 
 
 •H'/.SXi TU$( TUX yLi<3( - &IC» X'Myi^ilc, etfyxfAfV Tich TUX 
 
 itfMi fwpa-xo^. Apud. Eufeb. Prjep. Evang. lib. 6. p. 1S3. 
 
 ■\\ E^tT«» 'j Ttic, txvtx doyfjjxii^a-iv, i\ c>,m n *£>' y.fj^lv uvxt- 
 {?'► i fai.7t£ Kxl vttutw r.xl •j'oyoy, xxt 5Tf«|ii? kz(,n%7uc t) vxfat ft 
 
 M &
 
 ( Si ) 
 
 c< and the Difference betwixt Things that are 
 " commendable, and Things that are blame-wor- 
 " thy: and this being fo, the fo much pro- 
 " claimed Equity of the Judgment of God va- 
 " nifheth, and his Threatningg to punifh thofe 
 " who commit Sin, and the Promifes of Re- 
 lt wards and Bleflednefs to thofe who do well, 
 " fall to the Ground. For there is no Reafon 
 " for either the one or the other. 
 
 Secondly j from the Notion of Necefiity it ne- 
 ceffarily follows, that there can be amongft Men 
 no per Tonal Vertue or Vice, Good or Evil} no 
 Merit or Demerit, and confequently no Ground 
 for Praife or Difpraife, or for Laws to reward 
 or punijb ; and indeed there can be no Property, 
 or any Principles of Society and Government} 
 which are evidently founded upon the Suppofi- 
 tion of Men's having a Power of determining 
 their own Actions} and, without this Suppoii- 
 tion are unreafonable and vain. 
 
 That great Mailer of Reafon, Arijlotle, fays } 
 " That Vertue refpe&s the Affections and Acti- 
 " onsj and that Praife and Difpraife is due to 
 
 'voluntary 
 
 Ci%lTXI, Kill OC%uXx) JTglJS TS5 ijfJJXQTVKOTXS, a!', XcAflK&JJCTejtASVSS. TlpiX! 
 
 rt uv 7T(H)s TtfS t«<5 xp«r|o(T<» iccvtm tTrihauxorxi, %Xi f/jXKXfi'oTn* 
 t®- (lege pxx.x^oTi)Ti<; ut habet MSS.) oufiv >f> ir* riru* ivki- 
 y»5 t$xt "/Hof/jivo?. Ibid. p. 2$ I. 
 
 i«8tfJ64S
 
 ( «3 ) 
 
 " volnntary Actions* but Pardon to what is done 
 " involuntarily. 
 
 Again j " The End (of what is defired) being 
 " the Object of the Will; but the means to at- 
 " tain the End being the Object of Deliberation 
 " and Choice^ our Actions converfant about thefe 
 " rnuft need be voluntary and free. But the 
 " Practice of Vertue relates to thofe Things, 
 " and therefore Vertue and Vice alfo are in our 
 " own Power." Prefently he adds ; w And this 
 " is the Opinion of all private Perfons, and of 
 " Lawgivers themfelves-, for they punifh thofe 
 " who do wickedly, if what they do is not 
 " thxo\Compul/ion or wilful Ignorance} but they 
 " reward thofe who do well. 
 
 Simplicius reafons excellently on this Head of 
 Argument. 
 
 " * It proceeds (fays he J from Will and 
 " Choice that we are capable of Good and Evil-, 
 
 — where- 
 
 (av, &c. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1. 
 
 '0>t3- j j /3«A/;ri p t5 rtXtsi' /SaMvnov 'j k) rrpcciifnuv tuv tc^; 
 V5 r£>.©*, aJ ~sfi TaZru. 7?fC£%ii<; xaroi Trfoafitriv «« lev x.xi iKxo-ict. 
 
 tU 'j TZCV U^TUV fVlfyttXI, TTifl TOtUTCC, t<p' Y,I/AV 'J XOCl IJ UfiTTJ Of/iCiCdt; 
 2) *U.t *) KCCKUC' — — TOiSrOi? £>' f5<X£ fJ;CC(,TJ(llt>% KCC$ idiot, V<f>' f'^jeV- 
 Tft/V, JCC4J UI7 CUITUV TU.V VJf/lOQl-mV. KlAU^aC-l «y J *"*' Tlf/jUfCUiTCU 
 
 tj<? cja'vrcc? ^/9^(i/jflit, 5(r«< M<4 Bid k oi if/vota*, yc, yjr, uvrot uiTiei. 
 Tjj; j tu. x.ci/.x rp«r/«vToK rif/jutriv. Ibid. c. 7. 
 
 * Ai# 7?? aifio;tuq rail x^xiginvs rvy^otve^vt rou ti uyxitu y.ctl 
 
 M z iixrrix
 
 ( 8 4 ) 
 
 it , , wherefore that Goodncfs, which is the 
 
 tC proper Goodnefs of the Soul, is call'd Vertue % 
 " as being properly the Refult of Choice, and 
 
 <c proceeding from a real Option: for 
 
 " our Will and Choice are Things in our own 
 " Power j the forming of our Opinions, our Ap- 
 cc petites, Defires and Averfions arc Matters of 
 " Choice and Will, being internal Morions of 
 " the Soul itfelf, and not external Coaclion: 
 " Wherefore the Soul hath Power over thefe. 
 " On which Account, God, and Laws, and wife 
 " Men confidering that we are endued with Choice 
 ct and Will, make a Difference betwixt Vertue 
 cc and Vice j not reflecting the mere Actions 
 " themfelves, which are not always in our Power* 
 " and which receive their EJfence and Difference 
 " from Will and Choice. 
 
 Again j the fame great Philofopher obferves; 
 " * They who deny that we have a free Power of 
 
 " A&ion, 
 
 ivavTix. m i. fto 7i i^icv ec/xSov tv.c, ^vyjf,', cifmi hiytrxi &>$ cup-tr* 
 
 &TX KV^O.^, KXl Y.X.TX Tr,V OVTt)'? M01CH T. Xp-Xy I'/O fJt/iV/1 . m S,Tfl SC, 
 
 tsZto ifiy i<p' tifjM v) ccmith; x.xl Treocapur^ iifjuit' v, yi i/sre^yis, yJ., 
 ngpbH, text Ipi'fyi, tx.K>.ioi'- > itc -njv ccftrm, *.x\. 7rpox/£i(riv x.yx<pipoyTxi, 
 ivjdiv icrxi "7m(rca t^? yf^?? Kinjcrii?, ipx\ o-jk i%uSiv wQurf/j^. e;? 
 xxi xyajix favuv i9i. xm Slcf. tcvtc, xxt o ©£o$, xxt it vof/jct, r.ec\ 
 Tuy oii8^ci)~i)» hi tf/jCpQovts, tit, Try uip-i<rit xxi 7r gay party, »5 i<p' y)f/j~v 
 otrx, oi.7ioS>>.i7innc,, ru. ts xyjapTy,f/jxrx, xxi rx KXTceSufAxrx, on/.- 
 x^ya<nv. cc>.\' o'jx. lit, -rue, xpu^m; Xvrac, oTt ciix. i<p' ipiv ix.7tvxi? 
 y,xi In Txli xiPtviVi, x«< xpescwa-ur;, iiavjmwTXi. In Epift. 
 Euch. p. 13, 14,' 
 
 * 01 to tip' viftfCv l:yxifi-;Ttc , I? to SiMiy, £ to (/m B-tfatv, £ 
 
 2. a,\tw\*
 
 ( h ) • 
 
 <c A&ion, a Power of willing, and not willing y 
 " that we have Choice and Preelection , Deftrcs, 
 tc Averfions, Appetites, £cc. fuch take away the 
 " effential Difference of Virtue and Vice j and 
 " render Praife and Difpraife groundlefs 5 and 
 " fubvert the good Laws that are made concern- 
 <c ing thefe things. 
 
 * Cicero alfo lays j that the Confequence of 
 Men's Actions being necejfary, is, in the Opinion 
 of thofe who maintain the Freedom of them, with 
 whom he agrees j " that neither Praife nor Dif- 
 " />r£(/£ , Honours or Punifhments are > /«y?/y dif- 
 " pens'd. And this Suppofition being wicked and 
 " abfurd, they think it may with Probability be 
 cl concluded, that all Events do not come topafs 
 44 by Neceffity. 
 
 "X Aulus Gellius notes that it was objected to 
 thofe who were iuppos'd to be Defenders of Ne- 
 cefjity j " That it was unjuft for Laws to puniih Of- 
 " fender?, if Men did not commit Offences volun- 
 " tartly, but were drawn into them by Nccefjity. 
 
 <&;ff(TH xxt -sreoxavrii , xxi eps£<» xxt fiocA«ni> xxi cpf/jita , xxi rat 
 tcixutx, xrei y.Xi tv, tcotTK xxt xxxiXc, •v{.t^(xii» olxtyofxv xrxigStrr 
 
 KtH MXIV01 XXt •U/K'/BV OVK X.7t0AU7[0V<ri OiXXtOt ' XAAX XXt TtSS iTTl 
 
 7cvT6 xx/Zx, xiifXji>ivi vof/zew; utXTfiTTovtri, ibid. p. 26, 27. 
 
 * Ex quo efficitur, ut nequc kudationes juflse lint, nee vi- 
 tuperationes: ncc honorcs nee fupplicia. Quod cum vitiofum 
 fit, probabilirer concludi putant non omnia fato fieri quarcunquc 
 fiant. De Fat, P. 360. 
 
 f Nocentium pcenas Icgibus inique conftitutas, fi homines ad 
 maleficia non fponte veniunt, fed f?to trahuntur. tZocl.Attie, 
 lib. 6. t. 2. 
 
 Ammo-
 
 . (M) 
 
 Ammonius Hermias fays \ " (j Since we are Ma- 
 " fters of fome Actions, and it is in our own 
 " Power to choofe, or »s£ /# r#00/£ them, to do, 
 " or not to do them 5 hence it is we fay that our 
 " Choice and Actions are fometimes commendable, 
 " and fometimes blameable. 
 
 And Alexander Aphrodifius ; " * [If Men's Ac- 
 <c tions are neceflary] neither Reproofs, nor 
 a Punifhments, nor Exhortations, nor Praife, 
 " nor any Thing of this kind will retain its 
 " Nature, but every one of thefe Things will 
 " be nccejfary as thofe Actions are to which they 
 " are apply'd. 
 
 Again 5 " i* It is agreeable to the Nature of 
 " rational and aklive Animals to have it in their 
 " Power to do ill or well, becaufe they do nei- 
 " thcr of thefe by Necejfity. In this Senfe it is 
 ' ; truej but not to fay that all our Actions are 
 
 neceffary, 
 
 [j 'Ejtsj X.M61 Vfufyiar tivuy eVrt?, kx\ i<p' yfjjit ov i>ito% v [A* iteo^ 
 Tct o\ rtvx, v.cu xqxyxi n f*n Ttyutfti, TXt, p. %7exiviTX<;, raj? 3 ■yix.-mc, 
 
 tfJdt T&JV fi 7TQ0CCytrilM %x\ TW %$x\iW ^i'/Of/ttiV, CotTl. in. Arift. 
 
 p. 184. 
 
 * "OVTS *V<Tl^t/U<Til5, UTl KoXeCTilC, KT« STpor^e^U, iSTi Tt/Atj UTi 
 
 uaXo ti ran roiurav tkv oikuxv iru(rtt xxr ctvrits <pu<w, ot-XX t<;xi. 
 
 Xxl TXTWV 'tKX?6V "/IVOfAiVO* Y.XT UOCtf/ KXV UliVUC, UfTTie KCtKiltX ty' c(? 
 
 ruvrx yinrxi- De Fat. p. 87, 88. 
 
 ■J- Kxtx tputrtv p y> ro% vexxr ixoTs n xxl Xoytxci^ Zfsric, ro xxl 
 £ f/jxgr unn xxl y.xre^6oZv aviXo%, to fJUyih'ri^cv oivrav Tsroitiy kxt&c- 
 w/KX<ri*irci>i' xxi tout ItXqQk *V<, xxl tqutm t%$i rer rggvin, oJ
 
 ( 8 7 ) 
 
 " necejfary, and then to fay again, that they who 
 " aft rationally, do well, and others do ill, but 
 
 " ftill all we do is necejfary. For no one 
 
 " fays, that he does that which is good, who 
 " merely does a good Thing, in whatfoever 
 " manner he does it j nor that he commits Evil, 
 " who, in what manner foever, does an evil 
 " Thing j but in whatfoever manner he, who 
 <c is at his own Liberty, choofeth and doth that 
 " which is evil, he it is that truly doth it j or 
 " if he doth that which is good, then we fay he 
 " does well. 
 
 Again j " * They deferve to be pardon'd, who 
 " commit a Fault involuntarily, becaufe Punifh- 
 " ment is not intended to be inflicted for the 
 " mere Faft, but for the manner of doing it. 
 
 « . No Phalaris would be fo cruel and 
 
 " mad as to punifh any one for what he could 
 " not help. What then are thofe Things that 
 
 " ought 
 
 '«'ni7« t»« p xxTtqScw ruv Aoy«*®$ evtyytmruy, tts$ ei dfMsq-TUvuy, 
 i\ itm'/Ktft &'l 7TUVTX TTciedfAti' m i .j . 06 <f> ivy oTTaxrcuv %*&ti Koi- 
 
 GVyTX KXTCoQoUy TtC Aj'/f*, «AA* Ov£' CtfAUfTCCMY TOK oXVtToZf $Xv\c* 
 
 r» 5rp«r%v7-«, xM.' cTtxnvy o» *|a«<* *"*« *» **> xtyivM ut?*i~xi 
 tutl x- ( u<r<rih * to. /St Arf», rovro> Aj'yef*" *kt«$w*. Ibid. p. I ff. 
 * J Ef* S T ™ Te > r ° ci"/yiyZoTc.it>j£ ft fy'ovi, «>«» tw% xxainur, 
 
 TM6WTO Tl 7TyU%XyTXC„ o6k CO, IT* T* yivcpitm Tpciy^aTJ rfe xoAk- 
 
 <ti»«. ef»^«/*»B5, «.'*/.' it* *■« rgjs-9) t?<; ffp«$w?. ■> ., .- &'AA* ew- 
 Jii? <PxXx$k; itraq iu,c<, ts sal efr'sV^ 1 «« tW «•<« ray &V« ymj^i- 
 nti xeAxgtu Tit TlwyxiTX- tfri tiff*> vr *'* xsAi&rtis tthoyoi, vjk iV
 
 ( 88 > 
 
 " ought to be punifh'd and what not? namely 
 u thole Things which Men commit thro' a 
 " wicked Cheice. 
 
 Again j " * We ftiall be no better for know- 
 " ing what the Law commands, if there are an- 
 <c tecedent Caufes to which our Appetites are 
 " necejfarily fubjecT:. And thus the Benefit of 
 <c Laws commanding what wc are to do, and 
 " forbidding what we are not to do, is taken 
 
 " away. What are the Laws good for, 
 
 " when Fatality deprives us of the Power of 
 
 " obeying them ? the Law enjoyns what 
 
 " is to be done, and what not, as fuppofing that 
 " they who acT: have a Power of obeying the 
 " Commands of it * wherefore it punimeth th e 
 <c difobedient as Delinquents, and rewardeth the 
 " obedient as thofe who do well. But the Voice 
 " of Fate is that all Things are necejfary and pro- 
 
 " cecd 
 
 «A>10J? TKTiV) tXt T0I5 7T<X.p<X, Tt)lr eCVTWV [Aj0%8l}00i¥ CC^MTIV ytVOf/,i*Oii < 
 
 Ibid. p. pr, 96. 
 
 "* 'Of <£> ttMcv ti, v.fjjiv ix. tou Fuviivut ran 7tpo$oc.<nrcft/iy6JV Lxa 
 rat vc/Xiuv sxaa"« 7rfoaxTXfii/3^.)ifAiiixi ctmctc, ot.i<, Tff«5"<wcr«<5 osjco?*- 
 6ii? t\y it/Aw eivuyKi}. htu ai eiyxioch-' civ to in tm yof/jun '^Ttjjjot, 
 n yi ct p vofA>oi Tryofctx-TiKOi pjuir i.cri t£» Ttoirynui, oixct.yoctvTix.ek di 
 vu* & 7Totr t 7tm. rl >f> ctpiX^ vofbuv oiq !Tii0£c3jJ tw ihi<r.x» 
 
 VXO TK il/MUff/jlVM Ct<P'/l(>)f/jt6x ; m f/jiV VOfA^ 7rfCrCtKTlKCS if* 
 
 TU1 7>^UKTtUY Tl XUi jU>D, ft»$ TU) K^KTTGVTM dvJMpiiYM CCVTM 7?ti- 
 OttSg XifouOtTl, Ji© X»\ T»? (AY, TTHScffitVXS UC, clfXjU^TCllYOYTXC, tylfAM, 
 
 tiUMi. reus Tiuiof/jiiiijs ai xctTofSouvrxs' it j tlfAtctp[/jtv>i muiTX tu.
 
 ( 8 9 ) 
 
 M ceed from the fame Caufe$ but thofe Things 
 " which proceed from the fame (necefTary) 
 " Caufe, cannot be rightly call'd, fome Crimes, 
 *' and others good Aclions. 
 
 Again > he concludes his Book in thefe ad- 
 mirable Words } " * Thefe, O moft divine Em- 
 " perors ! are the Heads of Ariftotle's Opinion 
 <c concerning Fate, and that which is in our own 
 <c Power -, according to which, if we form our 
 " Sentiments, we fhall be pious towards God, 
 " returning him Thanks for thofe good Things 
 " which we have received from him, and di- 
 " reeling our Prayers to him for other Things, 
 " as having it in his Power to give or not. We 
 " fhall alfo be grateful to fuch good Princes as 
 " you are, all whofe Actions towards us pro- 
 " cecd from your own Choice, and who act as you 
 " do by taking Care to form a right Judgment, 
 " and then choofing that which is right ; and 
 
 " not 
 
 tfl optotxs ymt(/iin>)> xmx< tt% cm> rt tx p. xf/iXgrnfAXTX Atyur, 
 
 T(6 j KXTOfSoifAXTX. Ibid. p. 164. 
 
 * TxuTX, IfAiii, U du'oTtlTOi etUTOKfUTOfti, TMS Afi?OTiAiSS JoZtii 
 TtteJi rt tlpKflAttrX KCU TOU l<p' Jfpw, KXT i/AW 2b\x>, TO, KilpXAXiX, 
 
 kxP'w feZftfyiTH tk TtGtoy? ti<ri&<rop,it, tx JuLVJotj? (lege ^mvti«) 
 ooutcZ; %xfn x>6' ut ^(xtefJiiif U7c' xvtud tv XiffotSoTis, tx 3 xtrg- 
 (Aitoi xxp' ouurZy ue, o'tTuv, xx\ too ebZ>Ki t xxt tou /tf/», kvqaui. 
 
 i<ro(Atix $ xxl xtfl T0I5 ufjt/ui 6(Jnotx<; xf%e*TX$ iv%uqiroi, txutx 
 
 1 ,.«,.\ .■.•->/ ' ' * ~ 
 
 ■>rf*TTo>TX<; «; Hftixc, x iroiii uiauv omux izaaxtgKTH xpxTTHy t//**;, 
 
 UifiTU TcZ &tAT\OV<&* Kxl TOU Ttlt] Tt)K XflCW UVTOU fyoHTltyt* KOMI- 
 TXi K XuttTi, *M* ©V KfQKKTXptPWilW Tit™ XiVOH 'tXcpwovi 0*
 
 O) 
 
 not by following fome antecedent Caufes, by 
 which it is necejfary to be led wherefoever they 
 carry you. We {hall alfo be careful to exer- 
 cife Vertue^ as having it in our Power to be- 
 come better or worfe Men. 
 Laftly ; Eufebius thus argues upon the Point j 
 There is no Praife due to the Vertue of thofe 
 who do well j no Love of God j no Fruit 
 worthy of our Labour and Diligence to be 
 obtained if all Things proceed from Necejfity 
 and Fate. Therefore neither ought we to 
 blame thofe who lead finful Lives, and are the 
 moff. impious and profligate^ nor to admire and 
 praife thofe who are vertuous and good. Hence, 
 as I obferved, the great Glory that is due to 
 Philofophy, perifheth, if it is not the Effect of 
 voluntary Study and Meditation, but of the 
 necejfary Influence of the Stars. 
 
 Xuxi, ®5 orris oujth xofnoi tov (ItX-nxs « #«f8$ y *»£«&«*. Ibid. p. 
 17 f, 176. 
 
 * 'Ovah rt? w to<$ atfaoxUii t7rxtii&' uotrnq, ovh rn 6io@tXix t 
 evfo Tin cv okdcktu Tevwv KtcpTot; hck\if&', kvocy&ii %x\ tifX/X^f/jiyni 
 t*i» xenxr xuvrur xvxhdiyptinK' ovtft &y xooVfau icxrxfMi//^)i(rB-xi 
 rets rrtpt rev /Siw yrXifu/[*ji}/\ov<rit, ovH yt reu; asr^&c** ixtpfiT07tcTeis. 
 xXX' ovfo rev<; mrjSxixc, 8xv[A/x£tw' tuuTy ~y is itphu, ofcwirxL ra 
 fM'/x t«5 tyiXamtpsxc, tcXt®*, oux. cuuroXftx^ira fjutXinn kx) x'<r- 
 xtjrtus, xXX' ix, ty.c, rut ur^w xyx'yicys tcTryapfAivoy. Praep. 
 Evang. lib. 6. p. 14.3. 
 
 Again 3
 
 Again > M * This Opinion rabverts the Laws 
 " that are made for the Benefit of Men. For 
 " to what Purpofe is it, either to command or 
 " forbid any Thing to thofe who are under the 
 u Coercion of Nweffity ? Nor ought Offenders 
 u to be punifhed, as being really guilty of no 
 " Crime > nor ought they to be rewarded who 
 " perform the moll glorious Achievements. 
 « _ Further this Opinion deftroys all Piety 
 " towards God} if fo be neither God himfelf, 
 ** nor the Proclaimers of his Oracles confer any 
 " Benefits on us when we apply with Prayew and 
 " religious Affe&ions > but we are bound in the 
 " Chains of a necejfary Fatality. 
 
 Thirdly} God's Juflice is not attack'd fas is 
 alledg'd) by the Notion of Liberty j becaufe that 
 Notion doth not fuppofe that God punifheth 
 any Crimes but fuch as are wilful and might have 
 been avoided: and in Proportion always to the 
 fVilfulntfs and Obflinacy of them. Such Weak- 
 nejfes^ Wants or predominant PaJfion$> as by their 
 
 * K«i fc»*ir xxi tofMd ttwTftxv ** a? @" p A»y®-, t»? tS <rvp,- 
 
 tmhtiu, Aij<r« *oA«£siv, pit znx^ot m» itvrw am** ^u^tjjkot^?., 
 
 *e$ refi tk xxsMret XfUTT&rt ti/aus itXovtfttin . iMoc x«i 
 
 •n>» Xfef t» tuen iWf/3iw» ivctrpt To » m '*>h\ « ^e£* «* y* /*»«» vifJM 
 i 0ie?, j*>j/]e ^m> uvto] it raiiii jspjjcr^Jii fAnr' iv%oi4it»ot$, p^T 
 iu«rt/35(T« (rfM*/3«AAorr«» tifAittfiMms *r«ywe»« TfTiJ^MWs. Ibid. 
 p. 244, 2 4J-. 
 
 N j Sud-
 
 Suddennefs, Surprize, or Violence not caus'd by 
 our Fault, or to be prevented or refitted, lead us 
 unavoidably into any Sin, will not be punifh'd 
 by him. As the Principle of the Morality of all 
 Actions, whether Good or Evil, is the rational 
 Mind freely exerting itfelf to do a Thing, or 
 refuting to do it, in any Inftances of a moral 
 Nature j fo every Degree of Good or Evil is 
 proportionate to the Degree of Freedom with 
 which it is done j and in Proportion alfo to this 
 Degree of Freedom from whence Vice or Venue 
 proceeds, God has adapted his Rewards and Pu- 
 nijbments. If the Degree of Freedom in any 
 Agent is very great, and yet Evil enfues from 
 his Actions, then the Punifhment will be great 
 alfoj if the Degree of Freedom is very little, 
 then the Evil committed will be attended with 
 little Punifhment, and the Good that is done 
 will be greatly rewarded. But if the Action 
 proceeds not from the voluntary Exertion of the 
 Mind j but from either an irrefiftible Diforder 
 of the animal Spirits, forcibly impelling the 
 Mind, and leaving no Room for Deliberation; 
 or from unavoidable Ignorance, or from either a 
 mechanical or compulfive Motion of the Body, 
 (as particularly in the Cafe of Madnefs, Ideotifm, 
 Excefs of involuntary Pajfion, Surprize, or the Com- 
 pulfion of others againit our Will) in fuch Cafes 
 every Action, let the Confequence of it be what 
 it will, is neither perfonally good or bad, vertuous 
 3 °r
 
 (93 ) 
 
 or criminal; and the Perfon is not * accountable 
 for it. On thefe Principles the Juftice both of 
 divine and humane Laws is founded and exercifed j 
 and which the Opinion of Fate or Necejffity whol- 
 ly takes away and deftroys. God can neither be 
 holy or good in himfelf, if he has no Will to 
 choofe and prefer Right to Wrong, Good to 
 Evil j and it is altogether repugnant to the 
 cleared Notions of Holinefs, Goodnefs and Juftice 
 to fubject Men to Pain and Mifery for what 
 they cannot help, and for Things in which they 
 have no Power. 
 
 It is as abfurd to make Pain the Confequence 
 of evil Actions, and Pleafure of good Adtions, as 
 vice verfa upon the Suppofition of their being 
 neceffaryi which takes away both their Diftinclion 
 and very Natures , and makes all Things, the 
 greatelt Evil and the greateft Good, alike indif- 
 ferent with refpe£t to Morality : And upon the 
 Scheme of Necefiity, the Worfhip of the one 
 true God, and the moil impure Idolatry •, Piety 
 and Impiety, Profanenefs and Godlinefs, are all one -, 
 
 * Mcvcv iiXiuSvvev <x.7ti<pyicti (o'« ©£o<) tuv im troi, " We arc ao 
 •' countable for thofe Things only which are in our Fower." 
 Arrian. Epicx. p. 121. 
 
 And Alexander Aphrodi/ius fays; 'E<p' ypw to yivoptm (Aitx, 
 Tf)<, y.ci-ni Xtyw rt r£ neurit o-vyKXTaOtu-ias. " That which is in 
 m our Fower (and for which we are accountable) is done with 
 " the Affent accompanied with Reafon and a Power of judging. 
 DeFat. p. 73. 
 
 X the
 
 (94) 
 
 the one no more difagreeable to God, or contrary 
 to his Nature than the other; or juftly deferving 
 either prefent or future Mifery more than the 
 other, as proceeding equally, not from Men's 
 voluntary Actions (and confequently not being 
 their Afts) but from the * NeceJJity of the divine 
 Nature itfelf. So alfo again, 'truth and Faljhood^ 
 Mercifulnefs and Cruelty^ Jufiice and Injuftke^ 
 and, in {hort, the greatcft Vermes and moft hei- 
 nous Crimes muft be equally acceptable to God j 
 becaufe equally (that is neither of them truly,) 
 good or evil in themfelves; and equally derived 
 from the Nature of God, as the original Caufe 
 
 * Upon the Notion of Necejfity the Sarcafm of JFnomaus will 
 be juft. T« «WTi«» *![Ai?$, ot^X ouk it IfjutrifX avolyx-n ; n aix-xtx 
 sreais, a ''ATsMoy, a^* o$ac, fVirapacs rue, ioiv x^tKycrtv it^Jir 6 jj 
 Zf»$ ir®", «i T)5? ufbirtyxc, «v«yx))5 £Sy«y*ij, t X i v«//£<; tjvuvtxi, iAA' 
 
 eu^ tanTtfv, iw t*mutLo xxTtwitv wxs th\i emw/Kw ± " What are 
 u ' we to blame, is it not your NeceJJity that is only in the 
 " Fault? You are unjuft, Apollo, nor is it right in you to 
 " blame us who have committed no Crime. And this Jupiter, 
 « who is the necejfary Caufe of your NecefTity, why does he 
 *' punifh us, and not himfdf rather, for being the Author of 
 " fuch a NeceJJjty ? ApndFufeb. Trip. Fvang. lib. 6. c.j. 
 
 AndLucian, in like manner, ridicules Fatality: "Eiye tu.6ik.xhx 
 a Mi»»? e'ix.u^tm fbiXXoi, -njn iifjuctguiwho uvn rjf 2»<rt/ip« xohttnTXt, 
 xxi ir,i Me<£«» «m t» rxiTxXa' ii yi ix.ilyot ii^iKijTXt, iru&trrti 
 tcTc, fxtTtcy^xa-tv i " If Minos wou'd diftribute Juftice, he 
 81 fliould punifli Fate inftead of Sijypbus, and Dejliny inftead of 
 •« Tantalus : For what Wrong have they done who were fub- 
 if fervienr to the Commands of Fate? Jup'tt. Cwfut. p. 678. 
 
 of
 
 (95 ) 
 
 of them. And as there can be no real Guilt of 
 perfonal Crimes committed by Men, fo there 
 can be no Foundation for the making Laws, to 
 punifh any Men as Offenders. All Law is found- 
 ed upon the Suppofition of Men's having a Pow- 
 er over their own A&ions ; and never punifheth 
 Tranfgrcflbrs but upon a Suppofition of perfonal 
 Guilt, and that the criminal or illegal Fact was 
 committed by them voluntarily, and with Choice, 
 and might not have been committed. On this 
 is grounded the Nature of Laws and Reafon of 
 Punifhments for the Breach of them, that Men, 
 as rational and Free-agents, may avoid doing thofe 
 Things which they know are evil, and attended 
 with Punifhments; which is abfurd, and renders 
 all Punifhment ttnjufl, upon the Suppofition, that 
 they have no Power to avoid the doing of them. 
 There is as much Juftice in punifliing Infants, 
 Jdeots and Madmen, for the Mifchief which they 
 do, as in puniihing any others for the greater! 
 Enormities, upon the Suppofition of their Acti- 
 ons being necejfary : And there is as much Rea- 
 fon to punifh a Soldier for having a Fever or any 
 bodily Infirmity, which renders him unfit for 
 Service, as for deferring or running away j for if 
 Men's Aftions are not in their own Power and 
 Choice, it is as abfurd to think (be fides the evi- 
 dent Injujlice of the Thing) that the Terrors of 
 poenal Laws will prevent their doing Evil, as 
 that they will prevent their falling into Fevers, 6cc. 
 
 The
 
 (9<5) 
 
 The Notion of Necejfity alfo renders Fertue and 
 good Atlions undeferving of Praife or Commenda- 
 tion^ and incapable of Rewards : And there is as 
 much Senfe and Reafon in rewarding Men for 
 being tall, handfome or ftrong ; or in praifing and 
 commending Trees for their Fruitfulncfs, or 
 Flowers for their fweet Smells, or the Sun for 
 his Light} as in beftowing Commendations and 
 Rewards on Men for their bed Actions. 
 
 To this Purpofe Philo, the learned Jew ob- 
 ferves -, " # Man being endued with the Know- 
 ledge of his being & Free-agent, and his Actions 
 being in his own Power-, and the Operati- 
 ons of his Mind being, for the moll Part, 'vo- 
 luntary, is defervedly blam'd, if he knowingly 
 commits Evil, and defervedly prais'd for his 
 voluntary good Actions. But with Refpect to 
 other Things, fuch as 'Trees and Beafis, neither 
 is the Fruitfulnefs of the one praife- worthy, 
 nor the ill Turns of the other culpable ; be- 
 caufe the one or the other proceeds not from 
 Choice and Will. 
 
 :~qcxipiTtKXi<; ffla)[it,tv(&' tx %oXXx touc, ivigyuxis, iiKoTat; ^eyov ft 
 
 >%V> i<P OJ? IX Tl^OICiXi 0tOiX.it, 17TX119V -j itf 01c, iXCOV XXTOfBoi" TUY [A. 
 
 *f> uXXm (pvrav xxl taut, an xl ivtyopCxi ixcm/iral, eurt xl xxxe- 
 
 TtgXJiXl •ytXTXl, TXC, >f> ftp' IXKTtQX XHVjITtK; fC [AilTXfioXxs UTTfOXl- 
 
 ftTuc ^ Mtustivt t?iet@o>. Quod Deus fit immutab. p. 300. 
 
 And
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 And JEnomaus fays 5 " # 'Tis the fame as if 
 " any fhould praife and reward any one for being 
 " beautiful of Body, and fhould difpraife and pu- 
 " niJJj thofe who are deform 'd. 
 
 As to Cato'a again alledging, that God might 
 have prevented the Crimes he punijheth, by giving 
 other Faculties, i. e. by making us other fort of 
 Creatures than we arej this is nothing to the 
 Purpofe. God's Juflice (about which the pre- 
 fent Argument is) is only concern'd in propor- 
 tioning Punifhments to Men's Crimes, and Re- 
 wards to their vertuous Actions proceeding from 
 Choice and Will. The making us what we are, 
 is a Point in which God's Wifdom and Goodnefs is 
 concern'd, and which, I think, we have noReafon 
 to impeach, or can juilly call in Qyeftion. It is, no 
 Doubt, confident with Goodnefs and Wifdom in 
 God to exercife his Knowledge and Power in the 
 Production of all Variety of animate and inanimate, 
 unintelligent and rational Beings j and his Wif- 
 dom as much, or much more, appears in our 
 Creation, upon the Suppofition of human Acti" 
 ons being voluntary, as upon their being necejjary. 
 So that Cato has fail'd in every part of his Argu- 
 ment, and every Pretence to fupport it is weak 
 and groundlefs : and inftead of defending, he has 
 
 * "Emki ^ i; u rti roui p kxXo'jc, rx ccofActTci ixttimn xotl ys- 
 t*i'rot K r»u<; - D Ui%fa ^tyoi ml Kohxtyi. Apud Eufcb. Prxp. 
 Evang. lib, 6, c. 7. 
 
 O quite
 
 ( J>» ) 
 
 quite dertroy'd (how uridefigrjedly foever) all the 
 Attributes of God, which properly make him 
 God, i. e. a Moral Governor of theUniverfe. And 
 he has fatally fubverted not only the Foundation 
 of all Religion and Piety, but alfo of all Venue 
 and Vice, flight and Wrongs and has banifhed all 
 Property, and the Laws upon which all humane 
 Society is eftablifhed. 
 
 In the next Paragraph Cato, in a mod unac- 
 countable and contradictory Manner, at the fame 
 time that he is pleading for the Neceffily of hu- 
 mane Actions* fays, that they depend upon Men's 
 Will to do them. (p. 179.) Then furely they are 
 voluntary 5 no, but he will prove, that Men have 
 a JVillxo aft necejfarily, i. e. to act without TVill, 
 that they aft necejfarily by their WiHl, i. e. by 
 Necejfty, and not by Will. Such Reafoning, I 
 think, was never offered either by or to reafonab-le 
 Men before. But however let us hear him. 
 
 The Will (he fays) is directed by the reafoning 
 Faculties [no Doubt, it either is or ihould be, 
 tho' Experience fhews that it is not always direct- 
 ed by them] which depend again upon the good or ill 
 Organization of tin Body — and a thoufand 
 
 Events, Occidents and Obje&s which encom- 
 
 pafs him •• m all or mo(l of which Caufes, and 
 many more which probably determine him, mufl b 
 confefd to be out of his Power, (p. 179, 180.) 
 All this I granr, and as much more of this kind 
 as can be offer'd ; but what is all this to the Pur- 
 pofe ? Where is the Confequence that Men's 
 
 Aclions
 
 (99) 
 
 Anions arc necejfary? ffjinkiyg, judging, '-and rea- 
 foning well <?r #/, which is oft-times the Effect of 
 Things which are oat of our Power, is one 
 Thing, a,nd acljng is another Thing. The whole 
 of Cato's Reafoning is no more than this, name- 
 ly, that external Reafons, Caufts and Accidents of 
 various forts, which are out of our Power ^ necef* 
 ferily affect Men's Underjlandings, and occafion 
 various and different Judgments of Things, an4 
 even of the fame Things at different Times to 
 be form'd -in their 'Minds, all which they can- 
 not help, becaufe they muft judge (whether 
 right or wrong) according to the Evidence they 
 have of them : "But this is no Argument at all 
 that their Actions are necejfary : Suppofing Men 
 always to a& according -to their Judgments of 
 the Nature and Truth of Things (which it is 
 certain they do not) it can only thence be truly 
 concluded, that fuch as the Judgment is, fuch 
 will be< the Action refulting from itj but it can- 
 qptbe^tail truly concluded, that the Ac~li an is 
 -necejfary. And every Man has within himfelf as 
 clear and certain Evidence and Perception, that 
 -every Action of his is voluntary and free > as he 
 hath, that the precedent Judgment, which he 
 forms concerning the Objects, which are the 
 Motives of his acting, is necejfary, and not free. 
 The Truth is, God hath not made Men mere 
 unintelligent Machines j but hath given us (with 
 a Power of Action) Rcafon and Under/landing to 
 enable us to act rationally 5 to be as it were a 
 O i Light
 
 ( 100 ) 
 
 Light to {hew U5 the befl Way, that we may 
 walk in it if We will\ and that, if we lofe our 
 Way, or flip or fall, we may blame ourfelves only 
 for it. The Mind then always is or ftiould be 
 direcled and determined to acl upon precedent 
 Reafon, upon rational Motives, or what appears 
 to it at the time of acting to be fuch j but never- 
 thelefs it is direcled and determined by them to act, 
 not by Neceffity, but by its Will: And tho' the 
 Motives or Reafons upon which the Mind acls 
 are out of our Power, and the Judgment form'd 
 upon them is neceffary, yet the del following 
 them is not a neceffary Confequence, but Matter 
 of Choices the Mind by its Will choofes that 
 which either neceffarily appears to the Judgment 
 to be right to be done, or raoft for our prefent 
 Interefl or Good. 
 
 The Argument which is here urg'd for Ne- 
 cefjity, from every Aclion refulting from a pre- 
 cedent Motive or Reafon, which Reafon or Mo- 
 tive is often out of our Power, is one of the 
 famous * Objections which the Fatali/ls of old 
 made againft the Liberty of humane Actions; and 
 therefore it may not be amifs to let the Reader 
 
 * Plutarch obferyes that two of the great Objeftions againft 
 humane Liberty of Adtion were i. To pn^iv uvxmas yiyno^, 
 a\>u. wru xpor,y%f//ivx<; xi-nau' a. To !ToAwCpt/AA))ro» tcu to, 'en 
 7rxr k\utfMt tj khvfiU *Vi» yi ^wH$. De Fat, lib. p. J74. 
 
 fee
 
 ( ioi ) 
 
 fee how the greateft, both Heathen and Cbrijtian 
 Philofophers, reply'd to it. 
 
 Cicero* tells us, concerning Chryfippus, (who 
 was a rigid Stoick^ and whom his Adverfarics 
 charg'd as holding the NeceJJity of humane Acti- 
 ons in Confequence of his Aflertion, that all 
 Things proceeded from Fate or a Chain of ante- 
 cedent CaufesJ that in order " to aflail the Argu- 
 u ment from whence Necejfity was inferred, hold- 
 " ing at the fame time that nothing happened 
 " without a preceding Caufe^ he diflinguiflied 
 <c the Kinds of Caufes, that he might avoid 
 " Necejfity^ and (till hold Fate. Of Caufes, 
 " faith he, fome are per feci and principal^ (cttv< 
 " cient) Caufes, others are affrftant and imme- 
 " diately precedent. Wherefore, when we fay 
 " that all Things come to pafs by the Fatality off 
 " antecedent Caufes j we do not underftand this 
 " Fatality to belong to the perfecl and principal 
 M (efficient,) Caufes, but only to the immediately 
 " precedent afllftant Caufes j upon which Di- 
 " (Unction he thus rcafons ; If all Things come 
 
 « to 
 
 Chryfippus autem cum Sc necejfaatem improbare, & nihil 
 Vellet, fine praepoiitis caufis, erenire, caufarum genera diftinguit, 
 ut & Necejfitatem effugiat, 6c retincat latum. Caufaruin eniru, 
 inquit, ahae flint perredtx & principals, aliae adjuvantes 8c 
 proximac. Quaraobrem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri caufis 
 anttttdentibus, non hoc intelligi volumus, caufis perfeclis 8c 
 principahbus, fed cauiis ant«cedentibus, adjuvantitms, 8c proxi- 
 mis. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclufi, fie occur* 
 fie Si omnia UtQ fiauc, fec-ui illud quidem, ut; t?mnia caufis 
 
 fi&nt
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 * c to pa& by Fatality, it does indeed follow, that 
 " they come to pafs with antecedent Caufes^ but 
 M thefe -are not the perfefi and principal (efficient^ 
 " Caufes of the Event, but only the affiftant 
 " Caufes which areneareft to the other: Which 
 *' afliftant Caufes, altho' they are not in our Pow- 
 " er 9 it does not thence follow, that our Affec- 
 « turns are wt in jw Power', but this would fol- 
 " low 9 if the perfect and principal Caufes were 
 •* not in our Power. 
 
 Cicero f acknowledged this Reafoning of 
 Chryfippus to be very much labour' 'd and obfeure, 
 but what he meant, he endeavoured ingenioufiy 
 to explain by the rolling of a \\ Cylinder and Whip- 
 ping 
 
 fiant antepofitis, vcram non principalibus 8c per feci is, fed adju- 
 Vantibus 8c proximis. Quae fi ipfae non fint in noftra poteftate, 
 non fequitur, ut ne appetitus quidem fit m noftra pouftate : at 
 hoc fequeretur, fi omnia perfedtis & principalibus eaufis fieri 
 diceremus, ut cum has caufae non effect in noftra poteftate, nc 
 ille quidem effet in noftra poteftate. De Fat. lib. p. 360, 361. 
 
 f Apud A. Geliium lib. 6. p. 367. And JEvomatts charges 
 hi* Notion with making the human Mind (y,^lo\Xov) half a 
 i,lave. Apud Eufeb. Praep. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7. 
 
 JJ Revertitur ad Cylindrum 8c Turbinem fuum, quae moveri 
 incipere, nifi pulfa, non poffunt : id autem cum accidit, fk- 
 apte natttra, quod fupereft, 8c Cylindrum volvi, 8c verfari Tur- 
 binem putant. Ut igitur, inquit, qui protrufit Cylindrum, dedit 
 ei principium motionis ; volubilitatem autem non dedit : fie vi- 
 fum objedtum imprimet illud quidem 8c quafi iignabit in ani- 
 mo fuam fpeciem, fed afTeniio noftra erit in poteftate, caque 
 quem admodum in Cylindro dictum eft, extrinfems pulfa, quod 
 reliquum eft, fuapte vi, 8c natura movebitur. :Ctf» Hid. 361, 
 361,
 
 ( '°3 ) 
 
 ping of a top, 'which, tho' they could not begin to 
 move without being impelled by an external Force, 
 yet after Motion was given to them they would con- 
 tinue to move, as it were, of themfelves, by the in- 
 ternal Power of their own Volubility, which be- 
 longs to their Nature, and was not given to them 
 by that which was the firfl and immediate external 
 Caufe of their Motion. So in like manner he fup- 
 pos'd, that external impulfive Caufes, which were 
 fubjec~r. to Fate, or out of our Power, were the 
 antecedent and firft Caufes, or Occafions of the 
 internal Motion of the Mind, i. e. that they fet 
 the Mind on Work 5 but yet that our Incli- 
 nations, Purpofes and Attions following were in 
 our Power, and under the Direction and Govern- 
 ment of the Will. From which Explanation it 
 appears that Chryfippus meant, by the perfeel and 
 principal Caufe of Action, the internal efficient 
 Caufe, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the 
 Mind itfelf into Action j and by the affiftaut 
 precedent Caufe, he meant the external Caufe or 
 
 AulusGellius alfo reprcfents this Similitude of Chryfippus in Ex- 
 plication or human Liberty, very elegantly and clearly, viz,. Hujus 
 deinde rer exemplo non faercle nimis alieneneque illepide utitur. 
 licut, inquit, lapidem Cylindrum fi per fpatia terra; prona atque 
 deruta jaceas, caufam quidem ei, & initium praecipitantia; fe- 
 ceris; mox tamen ille praeceps volvitur, non qui3 tu id jam 
 facts, fed quoniam rta fefe modus ejus 8c forma: volubilitas ha- 
 bet : fie ordo, 8c ratio, 8c mceflitas rati genera ipfa 8c princi- 
 pia Caufarum movetj impetus vero cmfilwrum oientiumque 
 noftrarum, afltontsqae ipfas, voluntas cujufque propria, 8c ani- 
 morum ingenia moderantur. Hoct. Attic, lib. 6. p. 3 6f, %G6. 
 
 3 Motivs
 
 ( i°4 ) 
 
 Motive of Action j and fo his Reafoning is juft 
 and right. 
 
 And that Cbryfippus really meant that Men's 
 Actions were in their own Power feno' external 
 Caufes out of their Power, which he call'd 
 Tate, concurr'd to the Production of them) and 
 that they were the Effects of voluntary Choice: 
 Gellius # informs us from his own exprefs Words j 
 ( Wherefore (lays hej it is a Saying of the Py- 
 c tbagoreans-, you may know that Men bring Evils 
 ' voluntarily upon them/elves : Men's Calamities 
 ' proceeding from their own [elves ; and their 
 c Sins and Vices refulting from their own Appe- 
 tites, Intentions and Purpofes. Wherefore he 
 fays we ought not to endure or hear thofe 
 wicked, Jlothful, pernicious and audacious Men'j 
 who, when they are convicted of a Fault or 
 an Offence, fly to a necej/ary Fatality for Re- 
 
 " foge, 
 
 * Infert deindc (Cbryfippus) verba hxc, his, qua: dixit, con- 
 gruentia. 
 
 A.a \mo tuv n^txycftitii) wru<, i.:y,Tta 
 r»«ff">( a ecityaxyc, xuixiftrx ky^xt tytrru^. 
 
 'C.c, tui (&>jt&ui vtuxfev; rrxf' xvt<h$ -/mfjuttuit , £ %x&' cfpv x\nu; t 
 xyjXfTXrcrr&i ts ^ fiXxTisujira*, xxi ttxrec r\t xvtuv Slx'mxi yl 
 
 x^wu. Propterca ncgat oportere ferri audirique homines aut 
 nequam aut ignavos, & nocentes & audaces-- qui quurn in cul- 
 pa & in malefkio revifti funt, perfugiunt ad fati mctflittttm* 
 lanquam in aliquod faai Afylujn, 6c quae peflime feccrunt, ca 
 
 son
 
 ( icy ) 
 
 " fuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not 
 " to their own Temerity, but to Fate. 
 
 From this Explanation of the Notion of Chry- 
 fippus it will appear further, that the Difpute be- 
 twixt him and his learned Scholar Carneades and 
 others (who deny'd there were any antecedent 
 Caufes or * Fatality of Men's Actions, and affirm- 
 ed, that the Motion or Exertion of the Mind was 
 purely voluntary) was only a Difpute abouc 
 Words; each of them underftanding the Word 
 Caufe in a different Senfe. His Reafoning, which 
 the Epicureans urg'd againft Chryfippus, Cicero 
 fets forth thus, viz. 
 
 " -f When they (the Epicureans) had admit- 
 w ted that there was no Motion without a Caufe, 
 " they needed not (Carneades taught them) 
 " grant, that all Events came to pafs by antece- 
 " dent Caufes: For that there was no external 
 " and antecedent Caufes of our Will's therefore 
 w the common Cuftom of faying, that any 
 " one will or will not do a Thing without a 
 " Caiife^ is an Abufe of Speech , for when we fay 
 
 " without 
 
 non fux temcritati, fed fato effe attribuenda dicunt. Ibid,, 
 p. 366. 
 
 * Quibus vidercntur fine ullo fato effe animarum motris 
 voluntarii. Cicero de Fat. p. 3 5-9. 
 
 f Cum concefiiffent motum nullum effe fine caufa; non con- 
 cederent omnia, quxfierent, fieri caufisantecedentibus : volunta- 
 tis enim noftrae non efic caufas externas & antecedentes. Com- 
 nmni igitur confuetudine fermonis abutimur. cum ita dicimus„ 
 
 P -velit
 
 ( ,o<5 ) 
 
 11 without a Caufe, we mean only without an 
 " external and antecedent Caufe, not without any 
 
 " Caufe at all. An external Caufe is not 
 
 " requifite to the voluntary Motion of the Mind ; 
 " for voluntary Motion in the Nature of the 
 <c Thing is in our own Power and Choice: and 
 " that not without Caufe; for the Caufe of 
 " it is the Nature of the Mind itfelf." Pre- 
 fently after he fhews fwhich was the Point of 
 the Difputej what is truly and properly the 
 Caufe of a Thing, viz. 
 
 " # That is the Caufe, which e feels that, of 
 " which it is the Caufe-, as a Wound caufeth 
 " Death j ill Digeftion a Difeafe; Fire caufeth 
 " Heat. Therefore Caufe is not fo to be undcrftood 
 " as if that which is antecedent merely to a Thing 
 " was the Caufe of it; but that only is the 
 " Caufe which is the antecedent efficient Caufe. 
 
 Whence it is evident, as -j~ Cicero obferves 
 upon the Matter, that they who thought the 
 
 velle aliquid quempiam, aut nolle fine caufa. Ita enim dicimus 
 fine caufa, ut dicamus fine extern* 6c antecedeme cauia, non fine 
 aliqua. . . ad animorum motus voluntaries non eft requi- 
 renda externa caufa. Motus enim voluntaries earn naturam in fe- 
 :pfo continet, ut fit in noflra pctejlate, nobifque pareat : nee id 
 iine caufa; ejus enim rei caufa, ipfa natura eft. lie Tat. p. 
 
 * Canfa autem ea eft, quae id ejficit, cujus eft caufa : ut vui~ 
 nus mortis ; cruditas morbi ; ignis ardoris. Itaque non fie 
 caufa intelligi debet, ut quod cuique antecedat, id & caufa fir, 
 fed quod cuique efficient er antecedat. Ibid. p. 157 . 
 
 t Ex quo faciie intellectu eft, cum utrique patefadh atquc 
 explicata fenrentia fua, ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eo? 
 non re diffidere, &cc, Ibid. p. 363. 
 
 vohn-
 
 ( ">7) 
 
 voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected 
 by any Fatalit) ; and Chryfippus who held a Fate 
 to belong even to humane Actions, tho' he al- 
 low'd them to be voluntary^ and not effected by 
 Neceffity, really meant the lame Thing ; only 
 thofe external Motives which Chryfippus ffil'd an- 
 tecedent Caufes and Fate fexpreffly declaring his 
 Meaning at the fame Time, that they were not 
 the per feci and principal; i. e. efficient Caufes of 
 Action) CarncadeS) and others, the Academics^ 
 wou'd not allow to be properly Caufes at all j 
 infixing that the efficient Caufe only was the true 
 Caufe of Action ; " * and that in what Things 
 " foever the antecedent Caufes were fuch, that 
 <c it was not in our Power, that the Things 
 <c fhould be otherwife, thefe Things were pro- 
 " perly effected by Fate : but thofe Things, the 
 tc effecting of which are in our own Power, are 
 " wholly exempt from Fate.'" Underltanding/Tz/r, 
 which they excluded from Men's Action*, in the 
 Senfe of a neceffary impulfive Caufe > whilit Chry- 
 fippus underftood the Fate which he afcrib'd to 
 them, in the Senfe of a concurrent Caufe or 
 Motive of Action only : Which fhcw'd there 
 was no real Difference in their Opinions j and 
 that both agreed that Men's Actions were in 
 
 * Cenfl-nt, quibus in rebus caufe antccetferint ita, ut nan 
 fit in noftra poreftate, uc aliter ilia eveniant, illas fato fi-ri : 
 quae aucem in noftra potcftate lint ab his Fatum abefle. Dt 
 
 p z their
 
 ( i°8 ) 
 
 their principal^ perfeel or efficient Caufe truly w 
 luntary. 
 
 And hence we may obferve, that when Plu- 
 tarch charges Cbryjippus with holdings " * That 
 " not the leafl Thing either refts or moves other- 
 " wife than according to the Appointment of 
 " God, whom he makes the fame with Fate 
 
 « and that he makes Fate (which he 
 
 " calls Neceffity, 8cc.) an invincible and uncon- 
 " troulable and immutable Caufe." He either 
 miftakes or {trains Chryfppus's Notion too far 5 or 
 elfe Chryftppus is only fpeaking of the Fatality or 
 Neceffity of external Providential Events j and 
 not of humane Actions-, from which Fatality or 
 Neceffity Plutarch himfelf implies that he exempts 
 them ; owning that, with Refpect to Men's Ac- 
 tions, he (Chryftppus) u ~\~ made Fate y not the per- 
 " feci (\. e. the efficient , as hath been above ob- 
 ferved from Cicero) u but only the precedent (L e.) 
 " the concurrent Caufe only. 
 
 Again j Cicero himfelf anfwers the Argument 
 againil Liberty, which is here made, in thefe 
 Words j viz. 
 
 07T0V 
 
 » j ' i t ' - r » 
 
 KCtAti XXi A^XftMV, Kdi tiVcf/KM, XXI TffiXOUfliVIUJU W, Tti^Xi CCZAVW 
 
 i7HTi6tTgru». De Stoic. Repug. p. 10^6. 
 
 \ 'O'jx. xiiTOTiXy amity, (iAAx wfaKtlTtyKTiKua fiym ixcturo rm 
 uUiKffAivh' Ibid, 
 
 « * Altho 5
 
 ( I0 9 ) 
 
 " * Altho' fome are more inclin'd to fome Things 
 " than others are, thro' natural antecedent Caufes, 
 " it does not thence follow that there are natural 
 " antecedent (efficient) Caufes of our Wills and 
 " Defires : for if fo, nothing would be in our own 
 " Power. But now we readily own that to be acuts 
 " or dull, of Jlrong or of weak Conftitutions, is 
 " not in our Power: But he that thinks it 
 " thence follows, that even to Jit or to walk is 
 " not Matter of Will and Choice* does not per- 
 " ceive the Tendency of that Confequence. For 
 " altho' there are antecedent Caufes of Men's 
 " being born with quick or flow Capacities, with 
 " robuft or infirm Conftitutions; Yet it does not 
 " follow, that our fitting and walking, and doing 
 " any Aclion is determined and appointed by thefe 
 " Caufes." He adds prefently ; " 
 
 " "|~ Vices ( he means vicious Inclinaii- 
 " ons, as his preceding Inftances fhcwj may 
 " grow from natural Caufes ; but to extirpate 
 
 " and 
 
 * Non enim fi alii ad alia propenfiores fint propter caufas 
 naurales, 8c antecedentes, idcirco ctiam noftrarum voluntatnm 
 atque appetttionum func caufa; naturalcs 8c antecedentes : nam 
 nihil eflet in noftra potentate, fi res ita fe haberet. Nunc vera 
 fatemur, acuti hebetesne, vaientes imbecilline fimus, non efle 
 id m nobis: qui autem exeo cogi putat, ne ut feJea7ii its quidem 
 aut ambukmui voluntatis effe, is non videt qucc quantaque res 
 confequatur. Ut enim 8c ingeniofi, 8c tardi ita nnfeantur an- 
 tecedentibus caulis, itemque vaientes 8c imbecilli: non fequitur 
 rarncn, ut etiam ftden £< annulare 8c rem agere aliouam pnn- 
 cipalibus (Korfan naturalibu.-, ut fupra) definitum, 8: lonllitu- 
 turn fit. Ds Fat. p. 344, 345-. 
 
 I Ex naturajibus caufii vim nafci poflunt: extirpari autem
 
 ( 11° ) 
 
 " and eradicate them, fo as that he who hath 
 " thefe vicious Propcnfities may be wholly freed 
 " from them, is not in the Power of natural Gaufcs, 
 " but is effected by the /jF/7/, by Study znd Difci- 
 " pline" Than which Rcafoning nothing can 
 be more truly and ftrongly offer'd. 
 
 To the fame Argument the learned Alexander 
 Aphrodi/ius thus replies ; 4C * Thofe Things 
 u which proceed from a Caufe, do not always 
 " proceed from an external Caufe 5 on which Ac- 
 " count fomething is in our own Power, of which 
 " we our/elves are the proper Caufe, and not any 
 " external Caufe. Wherefore thofe Things 
 " which in this Refpecl are 'without Caufe, 
 " have yet a Caufe from ourfelves. For Man 
 " himfelf is the original and Caufe of thofe Aeli- 
 " ons which are done by him, and this is pro- 
 " perly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action 
 " within himfelf, as it is the Property of a Globe 
 " to be roll'd down a fteep Place. Wherefore 
 " other Things are impelled by external Caufes, 
 
 " but 
 
 St funditus tolli, ut is ipfe qui ad ea propenfus fuerit, a tantis 
 vitiis avocetur, non eft id potitum in naturaiibus caulis, fed 
 in Voluntate, Studio, Difciplina. Ibid. p. 345-. 
 
 * 'Ou yx° Xctvrcot; ecu Toe. ywof/jivx xxtx xinxv s%a8iv i%u t£ 
 
 ?iViO% TW XiTlCCV Qcj. Y> TY,1 TOlXurlu) ifysoixv, £f* 7* l<p' VfMV, OZt 
 
 rm htu ymfAwui iif/uus ia-f/ji* xueioi, ct\X' iv. tfaOiv th; cu'tjcl. <^« 
 
 Uvotmus ret ara ytvopbivx yiviTXi, nxp yy/aiv tv,v dinx? t"/,ovrx. o y> 
 
 tinioux^ 1 ufx* xxt utnee rm oV xvtis yiiofXjism nfufyav, >£ tSto sV* 
 
 to tuou e&vt)t>ci)77ai, to tu TreocTiM xtuc, tm x^yjtf s%,si* tv ut/TW , w, 
 
 7-jj trtpxyce to KXTei Ttf vtiuoui xuhieMtivy <pifi£j^, no rm j& u\>.6iv 
 
 >/ 
 
 iKXfOV
 
 ( 111 ) 
 
 li but Man is not j becaufe it is eflential to him 
 <c to have a Principle and Caufe (of Action) within 
 * c himfelf,fo as not to be impell'd by exteriorCaufes. 
 " If we had oneView in our judging about Actions, 
 " it might with Reafon be faid, that our Judg- 
 " ments about the fame Things was always the 
 " fame: But fince it is not fo j (for thofe Things we 
 " make choice of we choofe fometimes for the 
 " Goodnefsy fometimes for the Pkafure, fome- 
 cc times for the Profit of them, and thefe do not 
 " produce the fame Effects) it happens that we 
 " fometimes prefer the Motives to that which is 
 " good before all others j again, at other times 
 " our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is 
 " pk a feint or profitable. For as we feck for no 
 " other Caufe why the Earth is carried down- 
 " ward according to its Gravity, and why Animals 
 " act as they do by Appetite, than that each of 
 " thefe has of itfelf an efficient Caufe derived 
 
 " from 
 
 en sVw ci^tw to tivxt c* tw tfciw xp%w rt Kj xmxt c* xutS, /&• <nv.v- 
 
 rim KQAtris, ~ec$ i»x ynofjutv/j <r>co7roy, iime, tl%i Tivx Aoya» to is. 
 tmi rm eu/Tuv cutitut, ijy*v ?i'ic% fx<> K&k<ms. ix** o £% 'nrn^ 
 *%ti (ulfjfj,i8«, yj it x[pt<fM&x, xort pt &J^ to xtcXm r«, !P»ts j 
 
 2\u. To ijOV, ftOTl 3 ij# TO trVfJjQifW, >Cj tl l'«W« TST4/» T«*)f*>«*) U&m 
 %iTm Hill p. tTti TO KU/.CV KHi)6uT4Cf lf|tf/£s TXOt %Hl TTtpt-jUTW *£<>■■ 
 
 r.it'fAiyx, x'vSis J) uXXx, TP55 to *di) 3 t» to myjQtf*, td» ittxtpyxi t?s 
 xojio-iuc, 7rowuji»}t<;. o»s '% i fyrtiujii xXXLa tux xirix* oh' ijy x,ctr& 
 
 £*f!/TJJT« TUV C* «UT>J M '/» QiftTXi MXTU H A W XtTiXt ei 7!^CHrTi T« 
 
 £wey, v^xrcru r,x6' iff**?, rH tuvtIia \M.<,rt nirii rw tt'+Ui i\ x'urey
 
 ( II* ) 
 
 " from its Nature : To neither is there any other 
 " Caufe to be fought of thofe different Actions 
 " which we do at different Times, in different 
 " Circumflances, but only the Man himfelf. 
 " For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the 
 " Original and Caufe of thofe Actions which are 
 <c done by him. 
 
 To which, on the fame Argument, I fhali add 
 the Opinions of the two moft learned Chriftian 
 Philofophers, Eufebius and Origen. 
 
 Eufebius fays ; " # Altho' a thoufand external 
 <c fortuitous Obftacles oppofe the Temper of our 
 " Bodies, and the voluntary Defires of our Minds, 
 " yet the freely-exertedVenuc of the Soul is able 
 <c to withftand them all} demonftrating that the 
 " Power which we have within us of choofwg 
 a that which is good, is unmatchable and in- 
 <c vincible. 
 
 Origen's Obfervation is as follows, viz. 
 
 !T^o? Tec */ no pint (TuvTtAttv, tuootov ov tw (puriv, xtu$ vjo tin tui 
 v$>' ijfl/av ccaao r* uWuc, yivof/jivwv stj sripisyaJer* rtic, ccXXcic, uAXho 
 
 TllOt UiTiXV tC.7TCClT1ijTt6V t 7TU0 MUTOV Tcv UlQ£S07T0V T0U79 <yi w TO ct'l- 
 
 Stoma umi, to <y> «*p;£*i xect cutm mm rav oi uvtcu ywfJUiwv KPcc\ta\. 
 
 De Fat. p. 80, 83. 
 
 * KcCiTct fjWQtav *£afai tf/j7!oo\f, tX\ t£ tw cct>[/jXT(&' tyia-u tw, 
 
 71 XUTCC TTfOHtfitrUI ty' YlfMV OOfXiXiC, , XXTCC Ti av\b$i$WLo$ nbtanm- 
 r 'I \el ~ \ 1 n > ~ v >. /. »/ 
 
 rorrewy, opus ^p«5 cexuvTU, td? kutu. •yvyyp ucitik to sAit/Bioo* uvti- 
 yjtiy tt[Mc%ov x«» cttjTTiyrop to i<f>' iifMt rm %*hm T«» kifttnt cWmk* 
 
 rJfAwu Pracp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 2/2. 
 
 z tt * We
 
 ( "3) 
 
 tt # \y e con f e f s (faith he) that many Thirtg3 
 u which are not in our Power, are Caufes of many 
 " Things that are in our Power; without which, 
 " namely, thofe Things which are not in our 
 u Power, other Things, which are in our Pow- 
 " er, would not be done. But thofe Things 
 " which are in our Power, and are done confe- 
 " quentially to antecedent Things, which are not 
 " in our Power, are done fo as that notwith- 
 llanding thefe antecedent Things, we might 
 have done otherwife. But if any one would 
 have it, that our Free-will is wholly inde- 
 pendent of every Thing in the World, fo as 
 ct that we do not choofe to do fome Things by 
 " reafon of certain (precedent) Accidents, he 
 " forgets that he is a Part of the World, and 
 " comprehended within humane Society, and 
 " the circumambient Air. 
 
 Having thus fhewnfrom the Reafon of Things, 
 and the Arguments of the molt rational Enquirers 
 
 * On fit lroiyi iroX>.m rm s^' y.fjjT* xlrtx vtXusx rut eiix i<P' 
 MUt» fS"«, Xj rf^»i c/Me?.cyr,trefji,n' am [a* ytvefjuitNt, teya ^ ray ouk. 
 tip' iiu,H ovx. us Tutk tux ni i(p' iifJuTu kfurltTo. xpecrltt (lege 
 irquTttTXi, ut eft in Phi Joe) ^ Txh tux tuh i<p' vipTy a%i. 
 XitUx roTi -j t«k Tpeiyv&'^M/jroi; (lege 7rpoyivciU,t>oi<;, ut habet 
 M S S. & Philoc.) cix. i<p' rfx.it, iy^i^evuitH riu ix} ru; 
 x\irtA<, TfotywrfAm.s (lege iterum B-peyEie^i'va.s, ut Philoc. ) 
 
 X*» fTlfK 7Tfxlxt XCf.t X TT^XTTC^'.y' !»' h' Tu; $)TH TO itf 
 
 v,fAU xxrtfXviAin,) j.Vse* rev irx.rcc, un ^ 2\<f. Toth tux cvutfii- 
 faKorx yim, i,pui u,t^7<y o rxh, ixttfatirai xwp* jm^ ay, t& i* 
 xyifrju*vi<&' it\ti,uTsm KtitenU %ul tdu jripji^snT®-. Ori». ap'j.j 
 Eufcb. Przp. Evang. lib 6 p. 290. & Com in Gen p. : 1 ■'] 
 
 0.
 
 ("4 ) 
 
 of former Ages, that there is not the grand 
 Weight or Truth in the Argument which is 
 infilled on againft Liberty^ and for the Necejfity 
 of humane Actions, namely, their being confe- 
 quential to, directed and determined by external 
 Things which are not in our Power : becaufe that 
 altho' many outward Events which are not in our 
 Power may concur to excite the Mind to Actions, 
 which, without them, it would not do; yet it 
 is evident and plain that the Mind acts not by the 
 necejfary Impulfe of external Caufes or Motives, 
 but by an internal voluntary Motion or Exertion : 
 And tho* external Caufes or Accidents determine 
 the Mind to act, (as being Grounds which the 
 Mind may think it reafonable to act uponj yet it 
 is and can be determined to act only by its Will. 
 And for a further direct Proof of this Point, I 
 will offer one Argument more, namely, 
 
 It is evident, that after Reafons or Motives, not 
 in Men's Power, are offered to them to act, and 
 they cannot help thinking it right to act upon 
 them, and are in their kit Judgment determined 
 to act upon them (and the Event fhews that they 
 do act upon them) they can yet deliberate with 
 themfelves before they atl, and can fufpend the 
 Allion without any external Motive whatfoever; 
 which clearly fhews that the dclion proceeds 
 from Will and Choice, and is voluntary not necef- 
 fary. 
 
 Cato himfelf allows, that Choice and Prefe- 
 rence imply Doubt and Deliberation; which tho' 
 
 not
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 not true, as I have ihewn ; yet, on the other fide, 
 it is true, that Deliberation and Sufpenfion imply 
 Will and Choice : For it is, I think, Demonftra- 
 tion, that if the Motives of acting are fuch as 
 impel the Mind neceffiarily to act, i. e. to act not 
 by Will 9 but by NeceJJity^ then there can be no 
 Sufpenfion of Action j but the Moment that the 
 Mind is impelled it mult act juft as a Balance 
 moves the Inftant that thcWeight is hung upon it : 
 NeceJJity has no Regard to Time, but, if it acts at 
 all, acts equally in every Moment of Time) and, 
 if it is the immediate efficient Caufe or Power of 
 Action, mult act as foon as it takes place, or im- 
 pells the Mind ; and I would defire to be told 
 What Power of the Mind it is (if it is not that 
 which we call Will) which is able perpetually 
 to refill, without the Afliftance of any externa"! 
 Motive, the Operations of Neceffity by Sufpen- 
 fion of Actions. That this Sufpenfion is caus'd by 
 the Will) and confequently that the Action follow- 
 ing is voluntary) may farther appear by there being 
 no Sufpenfion or Deliberation) where the Actions 
 or Effects are not 'voluntary) as whether the Pulfe 
 or Heart fhould beat, and in the Cafe of the Acti- 
 ons of Madmen) of Men in a Fever) or under a vio- 
 lent Surprife or PaJJion j the more of Neceffity there 
 is, there is always thelefs of Deliberation and Suf- 
 penfion; and if the Motive necejfarily produces the 
 Action, it produces it alfo infant aneonfly. This 
 Argument may be worth Confideration ) and 
 to it 1 fhall fubjoin the Opinion of the great 
 Ari(l')tle> who thus argues ) " ■ De~
 
 ( II* ) 
 
 " # Deliberation and Choke is one and the fame 
 " Thing: for that which was deliberated upon 
 
 " is the Matter of Choice. Now the 
 
 <c elective Faculty, being deliberative^ and that 
 <e which de fires thofe Things which are in our 
 " Power; the Choice itfelf is the deliberative Dejire 
 " of thofe Things which are in our Power : For 
 u judging upon Deliberation we afterwards de- 
 " lire what we deliberated upon. 
 
 And the learned Alexander Aphrodifius fays ; 
 
 u -j- Certainly Man hath not the Power of 
 " Deliberation in vain, as it mud be if he acts 
 *' by NeceJJity. But it plainly appears that Man 
 u alone hath by Nature this Power above the 
 * c reft of Animals, that he is not like them led 
 <c merely by Senfe, but is endued with Reafou, 
 " whereby to judge of Objects. By which Reafon 
 *' examining the Objects of S&nfe^ if he finds them 
 ** to be really what at fir-ft they appcar'd to be, 
 
 # " he 
 .'_ ** 
 
 * BaXtVTov ~f kcu TrpeajffTcv to xlito' ■ . to >f> c* t!js /3aA?<; 
 T^ojtptDt;, n^exifiTti/ sg-f ■■ ovt(§>~ K m x^cxiotrov; fZaMrou, efix.~ 
 
 i oH r£>v i<P' iiibTv, KXi if Tpooeipiinc xv ei»i @%AfVTHcq Zfifys tuv i<p 
 vuav' cm Toy $a?ivg-xS^ y> xgsvxvTZt;, ietyofhiist y.XTX rw (S»Aiwrtv. 
 Ethic, lib. 3. c. $•. 
 
 •J- 'AAA* x.«* to ,3»Afj£o^ tov 'ccifycaxv;, my. £15 m/«st>jv oewTai v7rxf~ 
 
 %il. nil P' Mil SI? fXiXTW (&x'teVTkKO$, ti l\ etVW/KIK WfXTTt TX Tf#T- 
 
 reibsvx.' Xa\' fvx(;a)$ tyx\ivrxt. tuh xXauv Caiuv, xvffu7!(^ [lit*®* 
 icuto Ttx^x Td5 <pu<riac, t%cw 71X1011, to /U/» ou/otui tKitvaz t«i? $&v- 
 
 7XflXi$ tKtojl, Xaa' IKilll 7zZ» XftXO'tfTOVTtoV KQiTW TOV Ac*/™. 01 %? a ~ 
 
 MiSV®- ii ac i£lTx£efJUl¥X tx QxvTx£/t,TX , cix Toy ary/y ifxv,, XOti
 
 ( "7 ) 
 
 " he aflcnts to the Evidence of his Senfes, and 
 " purfucs the Objects of them. But if he finds 
 a them different from what they appeared, he 
 " does not continue in his firft Conception of 
 " them, being convine'd by Reafon upon Confi- 
 " deration of the Falfity of them. Wherefore 
 " we deliberate only about fuch Things as are in 
 " our Power to do or not : And when we ac"b 
 " without Deliberation, we often repent and 
 *' blame our felves for our Inconfideration. A\Co y 
 " if we fee others ad unadvifedly, we reprehend 
 " them as guilty of a Fault, and the Ground of 
 " our Confutation with others is, that Things arc 
 <c in our own Power. 
 
 Cato proceeds ; and argues next for the NeceJJi- 
 ty of humane Actions from the Proceedings of 
 divine Revelation. IVhat (lays he) can be meant 
 by (God's) offering Rewards and denouncing Punijh- 
 ments, but as Caufes to produce the Effecls defigrid^ 
 x.z.to fave thofe whom Almighty Godwin his deep 
 
 f«-i, <rvyx.ctTXTt6tTXi rjj Qxnxeict, xxi £tu pirurn xutx- it ~ D £>.- 
 Mm <p<tt»iT*<, xx 'in ifjuwn hi rr* xpXv&tat,, lxiy%x»T&> mtret 
 tcZ Xcy*> H& ro w*^"™^ **$ «wtwv. faXtvlptix yoZt irt(i 
 UjIim m fruuupiix Tf^xrlur. u el tsoti py fatevtrupim ^xrrot- 
 
 U,U, TTO/.XctXiC, (JJiTCCVOCVfAV XXI (AiptpepiSx tXVToTi Tni ZtilS*lX{. 
 
 «AA* xx> *AA«? 'Jaipv x&Xus 7rfXTTavTXs, iyxctXeZpn as xpxf- 
 TK<rx»TXi, i|.?j*w it cvp&XoK; Tourh xfi<%, »? *<?>' Yf*» o»w» 
 TO»™»r*r» Apud Eufeb. Prsp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 171, 272. 
 & Aphrodif. lib. de Fato. 
 
 Wifdom
 
 ( "8 ) 
 
 iVifdom has preordain *d to Blifs 9 and to be influenced 
 hy thefe Motives, (p. 180.) 
 
 All this is reafonable and right upon theSuppo- 
 fition of humane Liberty, and Men's Actions being 
 voluntary, but is very unreafonable and abfurd 
 upon the Hypothefis of NeceJJity. Suppofing 
 Men to be rational Creatures, and that their Ac- 
 tions are in their own Power-, nothing is more 
 reafonable, wife and good in God than to pro- 
 pofe fuitable Rewards and Punijhments, i. e. Hap- 
 pinefs and Mifery, whether here or hereafter, as 
 rational and perfuafive Motives for the Mind of 
 Man to exert its Will into Actions correfpondent 
 to the divine Will and Commands. A reafonable 
 Mind cannot but think it reafonable to act upon 
 thefe Motives j and they anfwer God's End in 
 propofing them, as being in their Natures mofl 
 effectual to procure a willing Obedience to his 
 Laws, and leaving the Sinner without Excufe 
 and felf-condemned in refuting to comply with 
 them. But now on the other Hand ; fuppofing 
 Men's Actions neceffary; and thefe Motives of 
 Rewards and Punifhments to be propofed and de- 
 iign'd by God to procure in Men a NeceJJity of 
 doing good Actions, and of avoiding evil ones, 
 in order to their Salvation $ then it is evident 
 that God's Defign is fruftrated, by their not pro- 
 ducing the Effects intended, and his Wifdom 
 thereby falls to the Ground : becaufe Men daily 
 do refill thefe Motives, and even the bed: Men 
 are not always influene'd by them, and fometimes 
 
 i act
 
 ( "?) 
 
 act oppofite to them ; which they could not pof- 
 fibly do, if they were neceffary Caufes working 
 neceffary Effects* for if their Operations were 
 neceffary, all Men's Actions to whom they are 
 propos'd, muft be neceffarily good. 
 
 Or if it is pretended, that all who are influ- 
 enced by them are neceffarily influenc'd > 
 
 Firftj This is not true, becaufe if they were 
 neceffarily influenced, the Motives being always 
 the fame muft have always the fame Effects 5 but 
 on the contrary the mod vertuous Men are not 
 always influenc'd by them, which proves that 
 they are not neceffarily influenc'd at all. 
 
 Secondly 5 To fuppofe neceffary Means to in* 
 fluence fome and not others of like Nature, and 
 equal Capacities and Paflions is a Contradiction j 
 and yet it hath always been found true by Expe- 
 rience, not only that Men of the fame Educa- 
 tion, equal Abilities, and as far as can be difcern- 
 ed, like natural Paflions, have been oppofite to 
 each other in their Actions > but alfo that Men 
 of the very worfl natural Difpofitions and Prac- 
 tice have reform'd themfelves, and become emi- 
 nently vertuous and good by their own Care, 
 and a diligent Ufe of their rational Faculties: 
 And that others of naturally good Difpofiti- 
 ons, and vertuous Behaviour, have, thro'Care- 
 leflhefs and Neglect of the Ufe of their Reafon, 
 been corrupted and become notorioufly wicked. 
 
 Which
 
 ( «o ) 
 
 Which plainly ftiews that Carts necejffary Motived 
 work only as Men's Wills permit them; and, 
 contrary to their Natures oft-times have the leafi 
 Effect on thofc Minds which are leafi difpos'd to 
 refift them, and the firongeft Effect on thofe 
 which are mofi inclined to oppofe them; which 
 proves that there is a Power within every one's 
 Breaft, which is able to conquer the ftrongeft 
 Propenfions of Nature, and the greateft Motives 
 that can be offer'd either to Vertue or Vice ; and 
 which cannot be compelled or fore'd by any ex- 
 ternal Means or Caufes whatfoever. 
 
 Thirdly; It is repugnant to the Notion of 
 the Wifdom of God, for him to propofe neceffary 
 Motives of Action to fuch as cannot poffibly be 
 influenced by them, or mull necejfarily act contra- 
 ry to them : To propofe equally to all, what he 
 is fuppos'd to know cou'd not poffibly influence 
 all, nay, and what was ordained by him, not to in- 
 fluence all, is contrary both to Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs : And, no Doubt, had the Motives 
 propos'd by God work'd as neceffary Caufes by 
 Force anjl Compulfion, his Wifdom and Good- 
 nefs would not have permitted him to have pro- 
 pos'd them to any necejfarily in vain, i. e. to 
 fuch as were incapable of being influenced by 
 them. 
 
 Fourthly; How comes Necejfity to make a 
 Diftin&ion betwixt one Man and another; and 
 
 abfo-
 
 ( "I ) 
 
 abfolutely to preordain one to Elifs, and another 
 to Mifery? If Men are to befaved or damned by 
 Neceffity, without any Actions properly of their 
 own, it is evident it muft work equally on all, 
 and fave all, or damn all; juft as Mortality, the 
 Light of the Sun, the Return of the Seafons, and 
 all other natural and neceffary Effects are com- 
 mon equally to all. And they, who erroneoujly 
 believe that fome are preordained to Blifs, and o* 
 thers to Mifery, by the abfolute Power and De- 
 crees of God, are not yet fo abfurd as to fuppofe 
 thefe abfolute Decrees to be the neceffary Refult 
 of the divine Nature {Neceffity not making any 
 fuch Diftinction and Preference of one Man to 
 another) but they fuppofe them to proceed from 
 the inicrutable divine Will. And as there is nei- 
 ther Jufiice, Wifdom or Goodnefs in preordaining 
 fome to Salvation, and fome to Deftructionj fo 
 it is plain there is no Neceffity for fuch a Preordi- 
 nation, and confequently there can be no fuch 
 Thing. 
 
 Therefore on the contrary to this Reafoning 
 of Cato, the Motives of Rewards and Punish- 
 ments being propofed by God indifferently to all, 
 and being comply'd with by fome, and rejected 
 by others j it hence follows, that thefe Motives, 
 or any other, which in their Nature muft be 
 lefs than thefe, do not neceffitate the Mind to 
 act, nor were intended by God to do foj but 
 were propofed as rational Means only to a ratio* 
 nal Mind, to excite, perfuade or determine it to 
 R act
 
 ad by its Willy correfpondent to the divine 
 Laws: and God thereupon preordained thofe to 
 Blifs, who mould voluntarily be led by thofe Mo- 
 tives to do good-, and thofe to Mifery, who 
 fliould wilfully refufe to be directed by them, 
 and fuffer any others to lead them into Evil. 
 
 From the preceding Obfervation of the Me- 
 thods of the divine Proceedings with Men, Cato 
 thus concludes ; 
 
 What Sort of Reafoning then is this to fay that 
 Heaven gives to every Man fufficient Power and 
 Motives to choofe the bejl, which yet prove ineffi- 
 cient? 'That he has made every Man free to acl 
 or not to atl by a Rule, and yet has placed him in 
 fuch a Situation as to find a thoufand Objlades in 
 his way to that Freedom; and that he has given 
 him a Judgment capable to determine right, and 
 Opportunities rightly to exercife that Judgment-, 
 and yet by making ufe of that Judgment and thefe 
 Opportunities, he often judges direclly contrary ? And 
 all this is to make good a Syflem, as yet own'd but 
 hya very fmall Part of Mankind, and for which I 
 can find no Foundation in Reafbn and Scripture. 
 (p. 181.) 
 
 But (in Anfwer.J Firftj What fort of Reafon- 
 ing is this? to fuppofe that Heaven has fubje&ed 
 every Man to two oppofite neceffary Principles or 
 Caufes, the one of Fertile, the other of Vice, 
 which draw them forcibly by Turns into Good and 
 Evil, Happincf and Mifery. 
 
 i To
 
 (,13) 
 
 To fuppofe God to be fo divided with himfelfj 
 as to have made it necejfary for every Man to do 
 both G§od and Evil, to obey his Laws and to 
 difobey them ? Nay, what fort of Reafoning is it 
 to fuppofe Evil neceffarily to proceed from a ne- 
 ceffarily good Nature} to fuppofe a neceffarily 
 good and happy God to lay a great Part of Men 
 his Creatures under a Neceffity of being * wicked 
 and miferable? But 
 
 Secondly j That the Power and Motives which 
 Heaven gives to every Man to chofe the heft, are 
 fufficient, is evident } becaufe they do influence 
 many; whereas, if they were in themfelves in- 
 efficient, none would be influenced by them : 
 and therefore their not influencing all, is an Ar- 
 gument againft Cato that it is the Oppofition of 
 Men's Will to them, and nothing elfe, that ren- 
 ders them (not infuffcient, but) tho' fufficient, 
 yet ineffectual. 
 
 Thirdly} That there are Obftacles in Men's 
 way to the right Uie of their Freedom, is no Ar- 
 
 * The Notion of Kccejfity dirc£i.iy makes God the Author 
 of ail Sin and Evil: And Men might juftly ailedge in Excufe of 
 their WickcJnefs what Homer rtprefents one faying, 
 
 _____ 'Eyu o 'ovx. xiTit-; hija, 
 
 'A/sm Zi'jt, xctt Uiucx teen fceopoTris 'Epwt/;' 
 
 Apud Amnion. Herm. p. :Sy 
 
 R i gumenc
 
 ( "4 ) 
 
 gumcnt at all againft Freedom, but only proves, 
 that Men, who are capable of Vice as well as 
 Vertue, have Motives to the one as well as to the 
 other, which they freely comply with or freely 
 reject. 
 
 Fourthly} That Men have contrary Judg- 
 ments of Things at different Times, is nothing 
 at all to the Purpofe, whether Men's Actions be 
 fuppofed 'voluntary or neceffliry, judging is one 
 Thing (and not in our Power farther than the 
 making ufe of the Means proper to form h) and 
 acling is another Thing. 
 
 And that Men have a Power given them to 
 choofe the bejl, and are free to acl or not to act by 
 a Rule, which Cato endeavours here to expofe 
 as a ftrange fort of Reafoning, has been largely 
 demonftrated to be juft and true Reafoning, both 
 (a priori) from the Nature and Attributes of Godj 
 and (a pofteriori) from the Works of Creation and 
 Providence ; and from all the Senfe and Reafon of 
 Mankind. And the Syftem founded upon this 
 Reafoning is attended with no Difficulties in the 
 Thing itfelf, but only in the Explanation of the 
 Modus of it. We do not know the Manner of 
 the Agency of the Mind j or the Manner of God's 
 Forejight of future and contingent Events j yet the 
 Things thcmfclves are very evident : nor do 
 we know any more the manner how necejfary 
 Caufcs work necefjary Effects, and how God 
 
 forefees
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 forefees them. But on the other Hand we fee 
 very clearly from the Nature of Things, that 
 God is a Free-agent, and has endued Man with 
 Freedom of Action -, and our own Senfe and Reafon 
 as much convince us of the Certainty of this Li- 
 berty, as they do of the Exiftence of any Thing 
 without us, of the Exiftence of even Matter it- 
 felf. 
 
 I am not more fare, that when my Eyes are 
 open to the Sun I muft neceflarily fee Light, 
 than that, by my mere Will-, I can freely ihut 
 them, and hinder the Light from coming to 
 them. But 
 
 I havealfo ihown, that the Syftem of NeceJJi- 
 ty is inconfiftent with the divine Perfeclions, de- 
 flroys God's Poiver, /Vifdom, Holinefs, Goodnefs 
 and Juftice, and all the moral Attributes of his 
 Nature, and confequently his very Being and 
 Exiftence. It befides rnanifeftly overthrows the 
 Notion of all Religion and Morality, and the 
 Foundation of all humane Society. And for Cato 
 to fay that the Syftem of Liberty is own'd but by 
 a very /mall Part of Mankind, and has no Founda- 
 tion in Scripture, is fo very unreafonable and un- 
 accountably romantick, (as may appear from the 
 foregoing Obfervations) that one might think 
 he had never read one Book of Heathen or 
 JevjiJJo Philofophy •, or ever look'd into Scripture 
 and the Writings of the antient Chriftians. But 
 he proceeds j 
 
 / muft
 
 ( i*<S ) 
 
 I muft beg leave to think it very audacious in a 
 [mall number of Men to determine the Workings of 
 Providence by their own narrow Schemes, at the 
 Expence too of condemning the Opinions and Rea- 
 fonings of the greateji Part of the World in all 
 Ages. All or mo ft of the Seels of Pbilofophers in 
 Greece and Rome held Fate or Necefjity as the fe- 
 ver al Sects among ft the Jews did, except the EiTenes, 
 a very fmall Sect indeed, not exceeding few thou- 
 fands. 'the Mahometans thro'' the World hold 
 Predeftination; the Calvinifts and fame other Pro- 
 teflant Seels hold it now. (p. 1 8 1, iSz.J 
 
 Here Cato difcovers the whole Weaknefs on 
 ■which his Notion is founded} he had either heard 
 or read of the Words Pate and Neceffity, with- 
 out at all knowing what they mean 5 and fup- 
 poiing them (without any Consideration at all 
 of the Matter) to have been always apply'd to 
 Men's Actions, and to be underftood to be the 
 efficient Catties of them, leems to have built his 
 Scheme of Neceffity on this Imagination, with- 
 out enquiring into the Reafon of Things, or 
 the real Sentiments of any Seels of Philofophy 
 whatfoevcr. 
 
 In order therefore to undeceive and convince 
 the Reader of this fundamental Error, which, 
 I hope, Ignorance and not Dehgn had led our 
 Author into : I will briefly fbefides what has 
 been already obferv'd en this Head above) fliew 
 hire 5 
 
 Firftj
 
 ( "7 ) 
 
 Fir ft j Directly and diftin&ly, that the moft 
 celebrated Philofophers of all Sects (even the 
 Stoics themfelvesj both amongft Heathens and 
 Jews, as well as Chrifiians, have ever held and 
 maintained, both that God himfelf is a Free-agent , 
 and that Men's Atlions are in their own Power , 
 and that they acl: with IVill and Choice. 
 
 Secondly} I will fhew him what the antient 
 Philofophers meant by Fate; and that they 
 thought it confident with the Freedom of humane 
 Atlions. 
 
 Firft j ThatGod is a Free-agent, I obferved above 
 (p. 16.) was the Opinion of the learned Stoic 
 Seneca amongft the Romans: And Epicietus him- 
 felf plainly was of the fame Opinion : Jupiter 
 is reprefented fpeaking thus to him, viz. 
 
 " * I have given to Thee a Part of myfelf, 
 " viz. the Power of dejiring and rejecting, of 
 " choofing and refufing •, and in fhort the Power of 
 " making a right ufe of Objects. 
 
 And he had obferved a little before, " That 
 " the GoJb, as was fit, had f put alone into our 
 
 " Power 
 
 i\% £p>j«-4Kn» tu'i's pxvTxnxic. Amaa, Epidt. lib. I. p. 84. 
 
 0l«»
 
 ( "« ) 
 
 " Power the right ufe of Objects, which is the 
 " mod excellent Endowment, and that which 
 " governs every Thing befides. 
 
 Philo, the learned Jew, fays-, that * God is 
 an aclive, not a pafjive, Being. And again j 
 " -j- That the Soul of Man alone, receiving from 
 " God the Power of voluntary Motion (or Ex- 
 " ertionj and being in this Refpect made in the 
 " Likenefs of him, is fet at Liberty, as far as 
 " poflible, from the grievous Tyranny of Ne- 
 « ceffity. 
 
 And indeed the Notion of God being a Free- 
 agent, and doing all Things according to his 
 Will, was fo univerfally receiv'd among all Sects 
 of Philofophers, that I do not find that even 
 thofefew ('for they were indeed but a few, and 
 thofe chiefly Aftrologers and Genealogijis) who did 
 hold the NeceJJlty of humane Actions, did main- 
 tain, that the Actions of God were necejjary. 
 
 The frequent Expreflions, both amongft Po- 
 ets and Philofophers, thac Jupiter and the Gods 
 were fubject to Fate, and their filling God 
 fometimes Neceffity, mean quite a different Thing 
 
 Gsaj ufjiin \<p' v.uai i%t>w,<rxv Tr,v tyWiv r»v ofCqr rx7$ tpxvTXT,xi',, 
 Ibid. ' 
 
 * Ap«f»;f;«v -j TO OlTfe)? CP, X 7TU%W COIXyX-XiU^ tlYKt. p. I g< 
 
 ty,v twricv x.iii?ia-iv, y.Xi y.xrx rare o/AiciaeiHrcc xut<*> ^xtezns *-x\ 
 etcyxXic-JTciT:;, &l<r7rc~vi)' i tys, a-jX'/Kr^, l'c eicv r«, fAtv^pecSutrx, 8c<% 
 Lib. quod Deus fit immutab, p. 3 c©. 
 
 from
 
 ( 11 9 ) 
 
 from God being a neceJJ'ary Agent, or the Effects 
 of his Power being the necejfary Reiiilts of his 
 Nature (as I fhall prove preiently.) Whence I 
 proceed to fhew, that the Doctrine of the Free- 
 dom of humane Actions was the general receiv'd 
 Opinion of the Philofophers of all Ages. 
 
 A. Gellius, fpeaking of the Freedom of humane 
 Actions, obfervcs, " * That Homer, the wiicff 
 4 " and mail antient Poet, fays ; 
 
 " O ! how do mortal Men accufe us Gods ? 
 " They fay their Evils all proceed from us : 
 " But they, not Fate, bring Mifchicf on them- 
 
 felves 
 u Thro' their own voluntary Wickednefs. 
 
 And * Diogeniantis the Peripatetic, fhows from 
 this Paflage, that Flomer did not hold the Noti- 
 on of the Nccejjity of humane Actions, and that 
 his Expreffions about Fate, meant quite another 
 Thing. 
 
 * Primus autem Homcrus fapientifiimus 8c antiquifllmus 
 Poe f arura dixit in hifce verhbus; 
 
 CI Tri-Tti cl'.t or, n Of*? HecTCi utTioaitreti. 
 
 E% itfbiut rp pan xmx.' iUiU/tvcti' »l j >o ulri\ 
 
 ~$vfw ec.TcccC'-i>in<n-/ l~i% pc'iv «■>'/*, t%wri*. 
 
 t Apud Eufeb. Prx-p. Evang. lib. 6. c. S 
 
 S And
 
 ( x 3 o ) 
 
 And Lucian in the Perfon of Triephon fheweth 
 that Homer taught a conditional Fate only j which 
 varied according to the different Nature of 
 Men's Actions. To Critias, who had afTerted 
 from Homer the Notion of abfolute Fate, Trie- 
 phon replies ; " # How then does this fame 
 " Poet, good Critias, make Fate of a twofold 
 " and ambiguous Nature, viz. That one Event 
 " befalls a Man's doing one Action, and another 
 " Event his doing another ?" Of which he pro- 
 duces Inftances out of Homer. 
 
 That the ancient Pythagoreans were Maintainers 
 of the Freedom of humane Actions has been fhewn 
 above (p. 104.) and may be farther concluded from 
 their known Agreement with the Platonijis after- 
 wards, who. as I fliall prove, were zealous Af- 
 iertors of Free-will. 
 
 Balbus, the Stoic, in Cicero fays* " f Let us 
 " hear Plato, a God, as it were, of Philofophers> 
 " who teacheth that there are two forts of 
 <c Motion, one that is properly our own, another 
 " that is external j but that which moves it/elf 
 
 by 
 
 r * K#j 7mc. ctvrai; JTeurrij?, to x«As Kf met, ^Jtthv iTttXtyii Tr,v ilfXtcif- 
 (Jjiviui %tu it^i&oXai, a? to j [hii 71 XfettytiTt t«i« et TiXii o-vy- 
 xZftrut. t«w> 3 TFotytrcWTt hifta TfAft hrv%,i7v 7 In Philopat. 
 p. I 12J. 
 
 i Audiamus Platonera quafi quendam Deum Philofopho- 
 rum: cui duos placet efl'e Motus, unum, futon; alterum, ex- 
 ternum: efle autem divinius quod ipfum ex fe ftta/ponte mo- 
 
 vsatur,
 
 ( '30 
 
 ** £y i/i own Choice^ is of a more divine Nature, 
 " than that which is impelled by an external 
 " Force. This Self-motion he placeth in the 
 " Mind only, from which he thinks the Be- 
 " ginning of Motion is derived." This Teftimo- 
 ny of Plato's Opinion is not only moft clear and 
 ftrong in itfelf, but is more remarkable, as mew- 
 ing at the fame Time the Senfe of the Stoics to 
 agree with it, as I fhall diftin&ly (hew pre- 
 fently. 
 
 Plutarch in like manner tells us, that Plato 
 " * Demonftratcd that the Soul is an intelligent 
 <c Subftance endued with Self-motion." Again j 
 " -j~ That it is always a Self-moving Being, and 
 " the Fountain and Beginner of Motion. 
 
 Xenocrates, Plato's Scholar, " IJ Taught, that 
 " the Subftance of the Soul was a Self-moving 
 <c Principle. 
 
 The famous Platonic Hierocles faysj " ** The 
 " Action of humane Minds proceeds from a free 
 
 veatur, quam quod pulfu agitetur alieno. Huncautem motum 
 in fo'.is animis efte ponit, ab hisque principium motus efle 
 ductum putat. De Nat. Deo. Lib. 2. 
 
 * ^tvyjo tuna* torjijy cc7ti<pv t \ixTo i% txvTvi xjhjtijv De Placitv 
 Philof. lib. 4. c. 2. 
 
 ■\ 'O TI?mtzj» rr,> yv%r.v 7rg6<rti7rtv <pv>riv ocuTOKiv/jrcy uu kcu kihi- 
 a-iuc, Tr-.iyiv kxI fyxh. Idem de Anim. Procreat. p. 101 3. 
 
 j] "Zivcy^otTYfi tU; <yvyj,c, ryv xoiccy, apifyAsv uuroy l<p' ictvrS KMs- 
 fMW U7ro<f>y l yu[&ii>&>. Ibid. p. I 01 2. 
 
 ** ' 'AtSguTrmav ~j -^u^M inf/ttu. it <l<JTcy.,WT& ^"pe«»p£C<5 *#» ts 
 
 biycfjtttm iq>' iuw. De Fat. p. a 8. 
 
 S z Self-
 
 ( i3» ) 
 
 " Self-moving Principle j and is that which is 
 " properly laid to be in our czvn Power. 
 
 Again; " # Our Nature is rational, and therc- 
 " fore is endued with a Power of Deliberation, 
 " and is led either to good or evil Counfels by 
 u its own free Choice. 
 
 And that Plato and his Followers constantly 
 maintained the voluntary Motion or Exertion 
 of the Soul, and the Freedom of humane Acti- 
 ons is fo indifputable and well known to all 
 who are vers'd in the antient Gentile Theology, 
 that I need not cite more Teftimonies from 
 Writers of this Sort : And, if any has the lead 
 Doubt in this Point, he may find abundant Sa- 
 tisfaction in "j* Plotimts and I] Chalcidius, fkc. 
 
 Leucippus, Democritus and Empedodes, indeed 
 the Founders of the Epicurean or Atomical Syf- 
 tem, Her adit us, the PrcdecefTbr of the Stoics, 
 and fome others (whofe Notions fhall be di- 
 stinctly confidered hereafter) held Fate in the 
 Senfe of Necefj'ty, asi Cicero informs us, and made 
 
 the 
 
 -') !r««ifjsn' treys to *'J '■'■ kxku^ /SgAivfouK TZ^otretyof/ji^'.. Ill Ca r . 
 P/th. p. 161. 
 
 f Ennead. 3. de Fa'o Sc Provid. Lib. 1. 2, 3. 
 
 j : In Plat. Tim. c. 7. Fabric, vol. 2. 
 
 I Ac mihi quidem videtur cum dux fententia: tuiflent vete- 
 rum Philoiophorum, una eorum qui cenferent omnia ita fata 
 Btri, ut id mum vim XtceJfitAtis afferrc-, in qua fententia De 
 
 mocritu?
 
 ( i33 ) 
 
 the Motion and Exertion of the Mind fubjecl: to 
 it. But yet Epicurus and his Followers, and :he 
 mod eminent of the Stoical Seel: alio rejected the 
 Notion of Necefjity^ and held the Motions and 
 Aclions of Men's Minds to be voluntary and 
 free. 
 
 " * Epicurus taught that there might be a 
 " voluntary Motion (or Exertion,) of the Mind. 
 
 Again j " \ Epicurus wrought and laboured the 
 " Point to deliver the voluntary regency of the 
 " Mind from the eternil (neccilary) Motion (of 
 " his Atoms] that Wickcdncls might not be 
 " lert unblamcable. 
 
 Again j " \ Epicurus taught that our Power of 
 " Aclion was uncontroulable, the Confequence 
 " of which was, that ibme Things were blame- 
 " able and other Things commendable. 
 
 mocntus, Heraclitu?, Empedocles, Ariftoteles fuit : altera eorum 
 tjuibus viderentur fine ullo fato efie animorum motm lotuntant. 
 Lib. de Far. p. 35-9. 
 
 * Doceret (Epicurus^) .efie pofie quendam animi motum 
 volun;arium. Ibid. p. 35-2. 
 
 ^ O fx. 'E/n^f®- cUiua-yiTrui rzipiTxt x.xt (ptXon^u ry^ kill* 
 Kwipiuc, fi l i- l yyji.iU(iiii^>' tXtvitfva-Xi kxi XzcXvcrm to tKistrict unto t£ 
 /u/» kxtxXwi'v x/i'/K/'.ttTcy rw koduuv. Plat, de Stoic. Repug. 
 p. 10/0. 
 
 • ~\ . . ~ > K ' r \\ <»\ \ \ . / 
 
 ] 15 TtXP yUiUV UiMrTTCTCV, On K.XITO U,iUi~ 10V K.Xi TO IVXVTIOV 7TXtX- 
 
 »oh\tCuy ztyvKw, Apud. Piog. Laert. lib. jo. p. 6fy. 
 
 Laftlyj
 
 ( '34) 
 
 Laftly *, the Epicurean Notion of Liberty is ve- 
 ry elegantly defcrib'd by II Lucretius. 
 
 The antient Stoics alfo maintained the Free- 
 dom of humane Actions. 
 
 ZenO) the Father of the Stoics (as Cicero calls 
 him) in his Letter to King Antigonus tells him* 
 " * It is manifeft that you are not only by Na- 
 " ture inclin'd to Greatnefs of Mind, but bv 
 " Choice alio. 
 
 Again j "f That which is good is eligible, as 
 cs being that which is moil worthy to be chofen. 
 
 It hath been already prov'd p. 104 — 108, and 
 will be farther fhewn hereafter that Zeno's fa- 
 mous Scholar Chryfippus profefled that humane 
 Actions were in Men's own Power; whence it 
 
 jj Ncc fimile 'ft, ut cum impulii procedimus i£lu, 
 Viribus alterius magnis, magnoque coactu. 
 Nam turn materiam totius corporis omnem 
 Perfpicuum 'i\ nobis invitis ire, rapique, 
 Donicum earn refrenavit per membra Voluntas. 
 Jamne vides igitur, quanquam vis extima multos 
 Peilit & invitos cogit procedure ixpe, 
 Praecipiteisque rapit ; tamen efTe in peftore noftro 
 Quiddam qucd contra pugnare, obftareque pofiit: 
 Quoius ad arknr'tum quoque copia material 
 Cogitur interdum fle&i per membra, per artus • 
 Et projefta refrenantur, retroque refidit? 
 
 De Rer. Nat. lib. i\ 
 " <Vuvspe)<; u a fiicvet <pu<ru ftaoc, wytmtiY xhwuv, tiXXcc %v.i ff'fo-' 
 
 pt.fsrsi. Diog. Laert. lib. 7. p. 370. 
 
 f Aiotrcv j (to ctyvdov) (iTt tcjStcv Ism, »fs ivAcy&c uuto ai~ 
 
 itit^* Ibid. p. 42. 6, 
 
 appears
 
 ( i35 ) 
 
 appears that the learned Dr. Cudwortb* is mis- 
 taken, when he fays, that the antient Stoics, Ze- 
 no and Chryfippus, affierted that God atled neceffia- 
 rily in the general Frame of Things in the World $ 
 from whence, by a Series of Caufes (they thought) 
 doth unavoidably refult whatfoever is done in it. 
 Which Fate is a Concatenation of Caufes, all in 
 themfelves neceffary. 
 
 For which Opinion concerning thefe two moft 
 eminent Stoics the learned Dottor produceth not 
 the leaft Evidence. That which deceived him, 
 and hath alio deceived others both antients 
 (as Cicero and Gellius obferve) and moderns-, is 
 their Notion of a Series and Concatenation of 
 Caufes -, which Caufes, tho' they were fuppofed 
 neceffiarily to produce each other, yet they 
 were not fuppofed to proceed necejfarily from 
 God, the original and firft Caufe, but to be de- 
 rived from the perfect Wifdom of his Nature, 
 and his Will, as Seneca, the Stoic, has informed 
 us: And were not thought to be the efficient 
 Caufes of humane Actions, (which they exprefilv 
 exempted from the Coercion of them; but were 
 only underftood to be Motives or fecondary 
 Caufes, whilft they placed the -principal and effi- 
 cient Caufc of Action within the Mind itlelf : So 
 that the Neceffity of this Stoical Chain of Caufes 
 was only fuppofed to operate in the Production 
 
 * Intel Syfl. p. 4. 
 
 Of
 
 (*3* ) 
 
 of external providential Events confequentiai to 
 Men's Actions, which were taught to be 'volun- 
 tary and in their own Power. And it plainly 
 appears from the Words of Balbus, the Stoic, 
 ftlledg'd above (p. i $c.) out of Cicero, that the 
 antient Stoics agreed with the Platonics in aflert- 
 ing the free and voluntary Motion, Exertion or 
 Agency of the humane Mind. To proceed there- 
 fore i 
 
 The great Stoic, Philofopher, and Emperor 
 Marcus Antoninus fiysj " * God hath put it 
 " altogether in Man's Power not to fall into real 
 " Evils." (He means moral Evil or Sin.) 
 
 Again j he £iysj " "f The governing Princi- 
 " pie of the Soul is that which moves and 
 <c turns itfelf, and makes itfelf what it wills to 
 " be, and makes alfo every Event which be- 
 " falls it appear to itfelf to be what it wills 
 " to be. 
 
 Again 5 " j] Whatfoever are the Actions of 
 " the Soul, are all in its own Power. 
 
 * Tc<s pi kxt' ec^Suxv y,ot>KOi<i, »X (Jur, Xift7nrTq o uvfya7T& ix 
 
 v.Itu to 7ru.v tfcvTo (&icl.) De Seip. lib. 2. Sett. 2. 
 
 ■}• To if/ifjimx-oi i?i to ixvto sysiipov, y.xt Totprev, y.al ?7e<£» y. 
 kxvTo e<6» ctv xxi, 6iXv{ rtoiouv j ixvjca <punio% tto> to <rv^;3xun 
 
 r/io> xuto hXu. Lib. 6. Sc£l. y. 
 
 j] ' Otx uCt^c, (^vx/is) ifi» iystyKtAXTK, txjth 7mntc iV et£r7, 
 ejj'r. Ibid. Se&. 32. 
 
 Z Again 3
 
 ( t 3 7 ) 
 
 Again j " \ The Good and Evil of a rational 
 " and political Creature, confifts not in PaJJion 
 " but in Action: As neither does his Virtue and 
 *' /^/Vff confiit in PaJJion but in Action. 
 
 Again j " *It is the Property of the rational 
 K Soul to make itfelf fuch as it wills to be. 
 
 Once more 5 " f A Man ought to come to 
 <c the End of his Life with Purity, Quietnefs 
 " and Readinefs, fubmitting to his Fate without 
 " Compulfion. 
 
 Nothing is more noted in ancient Philofophy 
 than that famous Aphorifm of the Stoic EpicletuSy 
 whereby he diftinguiflieth Things into two forts, 
 viz. " |j Thofe that are in our Power, and thofe 
 *' that are not in our Power. The Things in our 
 " Power are our Opinions, Appetites, Dejtres, 
 u Aver/ions, and, in one Word, all our Ablions. 
 " But the Things not in our Power are the Body, 
 " Pojfejftons, Reputation, Authority, and, in one 
 " Word, whatfoever are not our own Anions. 
 
 •^ 'Ok* it TliKrii, «AA* inpyitcc, to to£ Xoykxw TtoXtTixov, £«j< 
 xttxsy xtcl etyxler. u<T7rt( iH n itfivi *<*» xxxi'x xutcu c# JTficri* «AA' 
 iitgytuf. Ibid. Jib. 9. fe&. 16. 
 
 * Ta JJW tjJ<; Myuitif ^vftti ■ > •— ictvrw, eTetew »» |S»AtT«<> 
 jre»i~. Lib. z. §. 1. 
 
 \ *L<p' (to t/a©~ reu /3»»J Ji~ fAdtu xxBxfev, ii<ru%i6» f ivXvrey, 
 afactsac, r'v] ixvroZ //<!>;(* <rvuut,^wr^h%tti. Lib. 3. iu fia. 
 
 |j T2» e»Tfci» tx fjbir i^m i<p' yfjuw, rx-j eux i<p yuM' i<p' ypw pc, 
 w« , «A»rt'»5, of/Ati, opt|(?, ixxMrn. xxl in Aoya oV<» v.piTiyx tpycc* 
 xx. tip y^Tr, -j to trapx, it m^, ifyxt, rtp#«i> xx\ in boya, erX 
 wk ipiTiqx i'fv** Euchirid. c. 1. 
 
 T On
 
 (i3« ) 
 
 On which Aphorifm of Epictetus, Simplkius 
 comments thus ; 'viz. " f| Thofe Things, he 
 " faith, are in our own Power which we can 
 Cc command, and over which we have Power: 
 <c And thofe Things we fay are m every one's Power 
 <c which he receives not from another, and 
 " which another cannot hinder. Such are the 
 <c internal Motions (or Exertions) of the Soul 
 * c proceeding from the Determination and Choice 
 " of the Soul itfelf. For the Will cannot be 
 * c mov'd by an external Caufe : and tho' the 
 w Thing chofen be an external Object, yet the 
 '* Choice itfelf, and the Exertion of the Soul to- 
 u wards the Thing chofen, is internal. 
 
 Again 3 " # Thefe are properly our own Abti* 
 %i ons, as being perform'd by our own free Choice 
 <c alone ■ ■ to form oup Opinions and De- 
 ** fires are our own proper Actions, and in our 
 
 own 
 
 ftitt' rxurx xasi in atirS ixx^ca teyeyjiv, It //jy, nxy 'ccXXh t%£h 
 pnoi V7r' ctXXx t»»s5 ifijiro&i^tc^ oivxrxi, roixihx di i?i ret xtttj- 
 
 {AiXTX T9li "yVjCK TOt. tVOoSlV V7r' CCUTK XXTX TY,1 CtUTVli KgJ(TtV XCCi 
 
 «<«f<nv yvefAivct' ou y> diwctrm t%u x.tmo% rw xlcanv. ctXXk x.ctv to 
 «i'f £ta» i£u6iv y, it Xifitrn Kurt} y.di ij iit\ th x'^irov xiWr<s ttJbSiy i? k . 
 
 Comment, in Epift. p. 7. 
 
 * OiKiXx 3 v.fbm tpyx gj-j return, #$ v<p' vfjbaui [Aotcoi/ stark t\? 
 v.ffjiTtciiv cctficnv ittpytSfAtyet . , ■ to -j wzrePis^//$#v£<i' xxl xfyiio%, 
 VUiSv x-Jraiv iyiv tdlx Ipyas ci ry, i\wrix rvj yfAtrtfci x^f/Avx. &o xxi
 
 ( '39) 
 
 w own Power j wherefore the Good and Evil that 
 " we do are in our own Power. 
 
 And. the Expreilion [to £<p' /i/juv] the internal 
 Agency of the Mind, or Power of ASlion, fo much 
 noted and ufed by antient Philofophers of all 
 forts- is thus interpreted by the learned udlexander 
 Aphrodifws, viz. " * All. who are not prejudie'd 
 in any particular Opinion underfland the Ex- 
 preflion, viz.. the Power of abling that is in 
 us, to mean our having a Power to acl or not 
 to atl, without being impeWd by any external 
 Caufes, or carried whitherfoever they drive us. 
 And this Choice is the proper Action of Men. 
 For Choice is the Exertion (of the Mind) with 
 Defire towards that to which we were before 
 deliberately inclin'd. Wherefore there is no 
 Choice concerning thofe Things that are necef" 
 fary ; nor about thofe Things, which, akho* 
 not necejfary, are not yet done by ourfelves- y 
 nor even in refpe6t of all Things which are 
 done by ourfelves, but: in thofe Things only 
 
 " which 
 
 ei ix-jTiir, to uyu6o ifjtsZv *<*» ro x.ttn$v Ism. Ibid. 2S, 29. 
 
 * Ti/uTO rJi i<P' y[/AV, XUVTK, 0<T0i f/jYI 6l<TH TlVt 770i^/.?O,tTUi, %CH- 
 
 fii>.*:$tcn» £.'»«!, a yell's p t^ tw 7rpx0wcti xca rou ^ TTfoi^tivxt 
 xvptciy oux. iltouiifi Tier ti> i^ahv v.^jxc, 7rx^isx<nv xitioh;, ouol ivoiai>}t$ 
 
 (IUTB5 >) iXMX W/ll. >CXl *) ZpOXIfHrti TO «0<cy Jf/CV TU1 XifyoiZU)! 
 
 vifl retire, y] <f> izl to *rpexp*5« c* ty\c, (Zu>.m $ opfetuc, o'f^, 
 
 TTsoxigMrtt;. $\o tit iti rate, xvxytuuuc, yi;tyAvoi<i *) KfoMfHns, 'htb im 
 
 ■ret"; f/ir) xvuyKwwi, p, h f^n °V v.pm «M' ciH ci nun to7< «V 
 
 T 2 «/*«»»
 
 ( i4° J 
 
 " which arc fo done byourfelves, that it is in our 
 " Power either to do them or do them not. 
 
 Carneades, the eminent Scholar of the Stoic 
 Chryfippus, and the Founder of the Academical 
 Seel:, was a great AfTertor of the Freedom of 
 humane Actions, as * Cicero tells Us at large ; in- 
 fomuch that he would not allow that Things 
 future, which depended on humane Actions, 
 could be -[foreknown. And that Cicero himfelf 
 was a Defender of the Doctrine of Liberty, has 
 been fhewn above (p. 108. ) and his Book 
 concerning Fate is an ample Proof of it, and is 
 highly deferving the Perufal of all thofe who fa- 
 vour or maintain the Scheme of the Necefjtty of 
 humane Actions. 
 
 Nothing remains to complete the Proof of 
 the Liberty of humane Actions, being the gene- 
 ral and receiv'd Opinion of all Sects of antient 
 Gentile Philofophers, but the Confideration of 
 the Ariftotelic Doctrine in this Point. 
 
 Cicero, as hath been obferv'd above (p. 153.) 
 reckons Arijiotle amongft thofe who held that hu- 
 mane Actions were fubject to Fate, taken in the 
 Senfe of Neceffity : But herein Cicero was certainly 
 miftaken, for Plutarch in his Treatife of the Opi- 
 
 it/Mun, «AA* si t»t«5 tc«5 y»o[Xjmi$ ft ijft/Ut, At ypHi raw xfcfyct, 
 tied TtZ fbn 7sfa%M x,fyoi. Lib. dc Fat. p. $9> 60, 
 
 * Dc Fato, p. 3/z «■<■■• 363. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 3/ 6. 
 
 2 nions
 
 ( r 4 i ) 
 
 nions of the antient Philofophers remarks no fucfi 
 Thing concerning Arijlotle, tho' he does obfervc 
 that Detnocritus and Heraclitus (to whom he adds 
 Parmenides) were of that Opinion which Cicero 
 afciibes to them* and had Arijlotle, who was 
 fo much more eminent than the others, been of 
 the fame Opinion, he could hardly have neglect- 
 ed to have taken notice of it. 
 
 But farther, * Hierocles expreflly fays that Ari- 
 lotlfs Philofophy agreed with Plato% and that 
 he mod learned Ammonius, who perfectly under- 
 stood the Philofophy of both of them, fhew'd 
 that they agreed together. 
 
 This Concurrence of the Platonic and Arifto* 
 tclian Philofophy he again infifts on, and fpeaks 
 with -J- Contempt of thofe who pretended they 
 difagreed : and in particular declares that they were 
 of the fame Opinion in the Notion of Fate, and 
 that he himfelf agreed with them. " fj That it 
 " was not the fenfelefs NeceJJlty of the Fortune- 
 
 w tellers-, nor the Stoical Compulsion but 
 
 " that it was the judicial Operation of the divine 
 w Power, effecting Events according to the Laws 
 
 " of 
 
 * De Provid. p. 42. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 46. 
 
 (j 'Ovx. uXKw nymKuv uvtc» tlf/iKftoir/.y ct\\' r,i 'AiiroTiXfi r.U) 
 nA«Twi ttf/jl^iiv ilouari, rv;v7trp ray yiytQXtiiXiywv ccXoyifor cctuy^ 
 
 Ktr> oCa' aA«s ZfcntTXt, oval rnn Eroi'ajj* fyou ir.ztrrp 3 m 1 . 1. 
 
 •j t<5 7»> \%Z*»9irm kxtx ra tk< ir»mieet Surfa)* eWfcfiXi? t»5* 
 
 iJUtt
 
 ( '4* ) 
 
 " of Providence, and determining the Order and 
 " Series of our Circumstances in the World ac* 
 " cording to the free Purpofes of our voluntary 
 " Actions. 
 
 And Anflotle himfelf expreflly aflerts and ex- 
 plains at large the Freedom of humane Actions. He 
 lays the Foundation of * Praife and Difpraife in 
 Men's voluntary Actions. He proves Freedom 
 from j Deliberation and Defre, which he makes 
 to be the fame with Choice. He exprerlly de- 
 clared! that our Actions are + voluntary and by 
 Choice; that the Practice of Vertue and Vice 
 is in our own Power : And that this is evidently 
 the Opinion not only of all private Perfons, but 
 
 B-La IzatftU inpysix, tu\ii xxi t!ffju5 n^s toss ts-ooxicitikxi; LzoOs- 
 crui tuv cujTtfyiaiM igym izxic^xf/jir/i tx kx6 ' v.iaxi, Apud Phot. 
 Bibliot. p. ffi. 
 
 * T>?5 (£fjT?5 or, 5T£p» nu£n ti jcxi ^f«|si? 'acna' j£ ci (a rote, ikx- 
 oion; i~cuicoy kxI '\iym yHofAtvuy, ci ^ rots XKtscioti, u-vpyvaptw, Sec. 
 Ethic, lib. 3. c. 1. 
 
 ■J- Ba>.VJTcy jj y.xt 7:goxt%zTcv to ouuto. ■ to »£> cJx T1J4 0sA>;s 
 
 jrfoxftStv, TifoeHftTer tft' 1 - c;t<2>° 3 Tc ^ 7TeexifiTcv, figXtvrou,. 
 C^iKTCU ra» i<P' y.fAiU' y^ V) 5T«Oa/J£0"<5 XI UtI (ZxXlVTiKK ef£|*5 tZ'J ip' 
 
 v,[aH, q}/. tcZ GzXiCtrcA-Sl *p K^tyXiiTis ooiyoft/iSz kxtx tjj» bgAswwa 
 Ibid. c. f. Sec above p. 78. 
 
 J- "Ont^r 3 5hv.-5Tco fc rcu TiXov;' fiv>wnZy -j y.xl VtooxafrSv 
 tuv 7IQ% to TsA©~, ui TTifi TxijTX 7Tfx^i:<; kxtx TTpo&fso-iv zfsv Xp 
 
 %Xi SX»(Ttflt' Oil I) TWV «p£77J)' tVif/HXt, Xltl TXVTX. i<P' YjJb7)l OW KCil 
 ij XflT-/} Of/jOiO.^ 3 KXi q X.XYAX. ■ T01XTCI$ O tCUCi UjXOTV- 
 
 6110% xou liix i><p iy.as&iv, text v~' uotuv tZv vafjuoQiTuv . tcohaQort 
 
 *£> %Xi Tll/jCOoZllXl T8} OfWTX, f/jOfcHr/fX 0(T0l fl/q fiiX, Y, oi X'/VOIXV 
 V,5 (W»iJ UOTOi x'.TM, TZ$ jj TX XX'AX TS^XTTOVTXi 7ifiatTiV, Ibid. 
 
 C. 7. See above ^7. 
 
 of
 
 ( i43 ) 
 
 of Legijlators themfehes, who punijlj thofe who 
 commit Evil, if they do it not thro' Compulfion or 
 'voluntary Ignorance ; and reward thofe who do 
 well. And the learned Alexander slphrodifius and 
 uimmonius Hermias have wrote each a Treatife 
 to fhew the Agreement of Ariflotle with the 
 Platonic Notion of Fate and humane Liberty. 
 
 Thus it appears (and I might add many more 
 Teftimonies to the fame Purpofej that the mod 
 antient celebrated Philofophers of all Sects, even 
 the Stoics themfelves, unanimoufly taught the 
 Freedom of humane Actions. And the principal 
 Maintainers of abfolute Fate or NeceJJIty were 
 the Aflrologers and Fortune-tellers amongft the 
 Stoics, who were condemned and defpifed by the 
 truly learned in Philofophy of all Seels. And 
 from hence I proceed to {hew the Notion of the 
 antient Jews. 
 
 Philo fays, befides what has been already be- 
 fore-mentioned, (p. 06, 128.J " * The Author 
 cc of the Soul, who created it, hath given to 
 tc it alone the Privilege of Freedom, and hath 
 c< taken from it the Chains of NeceJJIty, and fet 
 ct it at Liberty; and hath endow'd it with the 
 " Power of JVill, to be a moft fuitable and pc- 
 
 <c culiar 
 
 * Ma»ij» <£ xutkv (fcilicet -^vx/y) o yimreti 7txry.f ttevh&'at 
 
 Kiry T» Z-£ST»*V*T8 *M.\ «<»«»» *ty*«T©" XVT'M (lege OtfVS) roZ
 
 ( t.4.4 ) 
 
 K euliar Property of its own, which it was ca- 
 " pable of receiving. 
 
 And with refpe£t to the feveral Setts amongft 
 the Jews, who all (Cato affirms) except the 
 EJfcnes, held Fate or NeceJ/ity, Jofephus, on the 
 contrary informs us, that of the three Se&s, the 
 Pharifees, the Sadduces and the Effenes j ** * The 
 11 Pharifees zfcribefome, not all Things to Fate ; 
 * c but fay that fome Things are in our Power, 
 " and way he or may not be. 
 
 Again j " f The Pharifees, tho' they afcribe 
 <c all Things (all Events) to Fate, do not yet 
 " deny the free Exertion of the humane Will-, 
 " fuppofing God to have fo conftimted Things, 
 <c that Men advance in Vertue or Vice, partly 
 <c by his Influence, and partly by their own 
 « Will. 
 
 «»«'« fjbeTfuv iw tJlWw <^'|*«^. Quod Deus fit immutab. 
 p. 300. 
 
 * O* ft. iff ^X^itfxXok TUX *«» Oil 7fUVTt6 T?5 t'lfACCffJlitW; tlfXt 
 
 >iywn *f/ci>. ztvx <J° i<p' iscvroTs uzuffltw, o-vpfZxinn rt %x\ ov ■£- 
 «<Jg. Judaic, antiq. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 44a. 
 
 \ ITpefq-ff-fcSg il\titi^vi^ tx 7rxvrx it^ioum^ (Qafurxw) !srt rev 
 <&vfyw7rini to (ivXo'fAtiw t«5 W cwt^c, (forte legendo xvtZ) cppvs 
 *i$xtficuvTXi' ffoxn<rxv (lege e^KtitrxnTn;') tm 3-sS xg^errt ytvic%, Xj t5 
 lnwrn (forte legendo txiiw) (ZxXtvTrfiu, xxl rm ktyirxtn B-t*>r 
 e-xvTi 7r(o^uft7)i (forte TTfo^uy) f$ «f£T«s « KXKixf. Antiq. Ju- 
 daic, lib. 18. c. 2„ 
 
 And
 
 ( uj ) 
 
 And this Notion of the Pbarifees he more 
 clearly explains elfewhere, viz. " || The Pbarifees 
 " afcribe all Things to Fate and God. But to 
 f do right or not, is (they teach) for the moft 
 " part in Men's Power : But that Fate alfo af- 
 " fills them in every Thing. 
 
 Whence their real Notion appears plainly to 
 have been thztfome Things, i. e. outward Events 
 which happen to Men proceeded from Fate or 
 the divine Providence -, but that Men's Aclions, 
 their doing Right or Wrong, was in their own 
 Power ■} yet fo as Fate, or providential fecond 
 Caufes operated with them j concurring to their 
 Actions, either as Motives, which Chryjippus in 
 Cicero call'd (adjuvantes Caufa) ajjiftant Caufes $ 
 or by their Influence > Providence ordering (they 
 thought,) external Events to befal them 5 accord- 
 ins to their Actions. That this was the true 
 Opinion of the Pbarifees, and that they did not 
 think Men's Actions were fubjecl: to any abfolute 
 Fate ox Necejfity, appears further from the Notion 
 of the Sadducees, who, he fays, " * Wholly de- 
 < c ny'd Fate, afTerting there was no fuch Thing. 
 
 « and 
 
 *mi to ft %p*TTH» r'ac SiKXut, kccI (An, kxtu to %\{i<;n 1X1 rou; uj- 
 fyuzoK, Ktu%. Por,8it* 5 «s s*#foy kxi td» tlfbXfpitlui. Dc Bel. 
 
 Jud. lib. 1. c. 12. p. 788.
 
 ( i4«) 
 
 «■ and that it was not the Caufe of any Events 
 " unto Mcnj and that all Things were in our 
 " own Power, fo that we ourfelves were the 
 " Caufes of our own Happinefs ; and that Evils 
 " befell us thro* our own Folly." To which he 
 adds, 
 
 " * It was their Opinion that God neither did 
 " any Evil or regarded any* but they fay that 
 " Good and Evil is propofed to Men's Choice, 
 u and they indifferently befall every one accord- 
 " ing to the Condudt of his own Will" So 
 that the Sadducees not only attributed all Men's 
 Actions to their Will and Choice-, but fuppos'd 
 alfo that their good or bad Fortune in the World, 
 their outward Happinefs or Mifery, was not di- 
 rected by Fate or Providence at all, as the Phari- 
 fees held, but was merely the Confequence of 
 their own voluntary Doings. 
 
 Thus it is prov'd, that the two great and nu- 
 merous Se&s amongft the Jews agreed in the 
 Opinion of the Freedom of humane Actions* 
 and juft on the direct contrary to Cato's Relate 
 
 xfycutrtq. in xxt* «Jt*ik tx utSguffivct TiXac, Xxf&fimtw 'xxxvrx ^ 
 
 S#' V.flM XUTtHf 7l6i*TXi. ue, KXl TUV XyxSav xltlOVC, V)[X/X$ XUTcifc '/<• 
 
 nefjt/svev<;, y.x\ rx £«f« ©~P)a yf/jiTifXi> kfiovXixt Xxy/fixvwTUf. An 
 tiq. Jud. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442. 
 
 htTxir ((sxTi 'j ip' ayfycDTTw iKhoyvj, rort kxXm xxl ro xxncr [*f»~ 
 xs'ic% y y.xl to y.%tx yvufju&o ixx^a txtui inxTifti Xfantmi. Df 
 Bel. Jud. lib, 2. c. 12. p. 788.' 
 
 on
 
 ( H7) 
 
 on of the Matter, it can only be alledged, that 
 the fmall Se£t of the EJfenes, not much above 
 four thou/and in Number, as * Philo and Jofepkus 
 tell us, held the Opinion of Fate or Necejjity in 
 Cato's Senfe j but neither does that at all certainly 
 appear} for Jofepbus only fays of them* 
 
 " f The Sect of the EJfenes make Fate to be 
 <c the Director of all Things j and teach that 
 u nothing happens unto Men, but by the Decrees 
 " of it. 
 
 In which Words he does not fay that they 
 afcrib'd humane Actions to the over-ruling Power 
 of Fate, or to Necejffity, but only all outward 
 Events which befel Mankind. 
 
 In which refpect Philo explains their Notion 
 to be } « c t That they thought God was theAu- 
 " thor of all good Things, but of nothing that 
 w is evil." So that their Opinion feems not to have 
 been much different from that of the Pharifecs: 
 And they did not deny the Freedom of Men's 
 A6iions, but only afcrib'd all external Events, 
 cfpecially all good Things that befel them, to Fats, 
 God, or divine Providence. 
 
 • Tl>Z$<&' \ZZi? TtTfXKl%l*itSC. p. 876. 'Av^pi -CSlip TlTfXKtfc- 
 
 Pu« recoil/Act em?. Jofeph. Antiq. Jud. lib. 18. 
 
 + To t<vv 'E<ro-/ooa» '/i'»^ ttuhtu* rr,* tiutXffAitltc xvgAXt &n- 
 PtariTXi. )C, Usr.su « ijjf, kxt' ixinv, y<#>sv (tvSeaz-oic, xzxitcc. An- 
 tiq. Jud. lib. 1 j. c. 9. p. 441. 
 
 £ To TniiTut "JZ U'/xtui uiTitv, xxx* -j fMjesvc? *ou>Qn ifrxt m 
 diTor. (iege vel r $;«» vd jo $iu».) p. 877- 
 
 V 2. And
 
 ( «4* ) 
 
 And accordingly * Jofephus tells us, that they 
 agreed in Opinion with the Pharifees in all other 
 Points, excepting what he had mentioned, viz. 
 their not facrificing in the Temple, and having 
 a particular and more reclufe way of living, and 
 pofleffing all Things in common with each o* 
 ther. 
 
 Laftlyj Nothing can be more unreafonable 
 than Cato's pretending that the Doctrine of hu- 
 mane Liberty has no Foundation in Scripture j when, 
 on the contrary, nothing can be more clear and 
 certain, than that the whole Scriptures, both of 
 the old and new Teftament, are built upon, and 
 prefuppofe, as well as expreflly teach, that 
 Men's Actions are in their own Power, and the 
 Refult of their Will and Choice. That God has 
 propos'd to their Choice, Good and Evil, Life 
 and Death, Happinefs and Mifery, and has not 
 only commanded them to choofe the one, and 
 refufe the other, but has made all his Promifes 
 and Threatnings "j - conditional -, which would be 
 
 abfuid, 
 
 * Ta p. Xcmx TttttTX yvaf/jy ray Qfuyurcuuv cpeAayain. Jud. 
 Antiq. lib. i8.c. 2. 
 
 f Hebrazis quoque confilium datum eft a Deo cum pras- 
 dictione rerum futurarum, in iftum modum: Si puceptis meis 
 pxrebitis, bona t err arum omnia, penes 10s erunt. Lac itaque & 
 mellifiui fluttus non ■ deerunt. Si contemferith, poenarum immi- 
 nentium feriem divina vox profecuta eji. Quippc quod eflet 
 iubium id quod erat pofitum in hominis poteftate, parere ve 
 uontemnere juiTa cceleftia. Quod fi optionem eorum prsecederet 
 
 decrctum
 
 ( 149 ) 
 
 abfurd, if it was not in Men's Power to per- 
 form or not perform the Conditions propofed to 
 them. And if Cato had had any regard for, or 
 had ever read the Writings of the primitive 
 Cbriftians, he muft have feen and own'd, that 
 no Doctrine was more unanimoufly and univer- 
 fally infilled on, and inculcated by them than 
 that of humane Liberty : And the contrary Doc- 
 trine of the Necejjity of humane Actions was a 
 principal Branch of the Error of the * Falenti- 
 nians^ Marcionites^ and Manicbees, who, in con- 
 fequence of it, led moft f profligate and wicked 
 Lives. 
 
 If the Reader has a mind to know the Noti- 
 on of the antient Chriftians on this Subject, I 
 would recommend to his PeruHil two as learned 
 Writers, and as well fliU'd in the Philofophy 
 of their times as any the World affords, namely 
 Origen and Eufebius^ who have treated this Ar- 
 gument at large, one in the firft Chapter of his 
 third Book of ^Principles; and the other in the 
 
 decretum incvifabile, nectjfarioque contemnendum ciletj abtin- 
 daret praedictio, abundarent etiam promifla & minae. ChtlciJ. 
 in Flat. Tim. p. 263. 
 
 * Sec Ir en. contra Haeref. lib. 1. c. 7. p. 2j\ TertuL 
 contra Marc. lib. 2. c. 6. & dc Anim. lib. c. 21. Orig. Phi- 
 loc. c. 21. p. $-4. & Huet. Origen. p. 106. Auguft. Tom- 
 6. p. 14, &c. 
 
 f Ircn. cont. Haeref. lib. 1. c. 6. 
 
 II Or Pbilocalia c, 21. where the Creek is extaat. 
 
 I fixtb
 
 ( i jo ) 
 
 ftsth Book $f his Praeparatio Evangelica. But to 
 alledge the Opinions of fuch ignorant Enthufiajls 
 as the Mahometans, and fomc few rigid Calvi- 
 nifts Notion of Predeflination (neither of which 
 Notions are yet the fame with this Author's 
 Notion of Necejfity, as might eafily be proved, 
 if it was any Thing to the Purpofe) is below a 
 Man of Senfc in the Way of Reafon and Argu- 
 ment. 
 
 I proceed in the next Place to fhew what was 
 the antient philofophical Notion of Fate or iW 
 cejfity, and that it was thought to be confiflent 
 with the Freedom of humane Actions. 
 
 That there is fuch a Thing as * Fate, and 
 that many Events arc effected by it, was the ge- 
 neral Opinion of all Philofophers, "f Anaxagoras 
 amongft the Gentiles and the II Sadducees amongft 
 the Jews only excepted, who were both of Opi- 
 nion that nothing was the Effect of Fate, and 
 that it was a mere empty Name. And as thefe 
 wholly deny'd Fate in every Senfe, fo it muft be 
 
 * To fc wxi U typ ufjuu^fbuiw xxi anictv uvxi rou ytvt&Xi t*v* 
 yect' eu'iTw Ikxiuc, y. -to* LvfiotTtm trtwfeifo-i irgeX>$is. Alex. Aphro 
 dif. de fato lib. p. i r. 
 
 •f- Av«£osyef«$ o KXci?<>iJtjiYi.&', x.iu roi T'iAAas w ci to?s t»> $v- 
 riKA* $>ihe<re<pui> q>iXotre<p*<rxviv Grm X/Tispif/jfjiiit^', am e&%io7rtf<&' 
 
 CCtt IfJUXfTVfci)! T*j KOtyjJ TW» ivPfWTWV THCff <H%< tlf/bttf[/b!Vtl$. Xi'/U <S 
 
 ire? yt ujiou iiui '/mof/titm }iH9% Kxi' fiujxfi/jiirjt, u>.>,x thxi ki- 
 jo/ tSto r'avcfjux. 
 
 !} See above p, }0. 
 
 confeffed
 
 confefled that there were fome others, who car* 
 ried the Notion of it as far in the other Extreme, 
 and taught that every Thing, all Events, and 
 even humane Actions were effected by the impul- 
 five NeceJJity of it. I (hall therefore (to obviate 
 the Cavils and Pretences of the Fatalijls, and Al- 
 ienors of the NeceJJity of humane Actions, who 
 are apt, at random, and without having confi* 
 der'd the Matter, to alledge the antienr. Philofo* 
 phers for their Opinion) fhew the Reader who 
 thofe were who really held their Sentiments, and 
 on what Reafons and Arguments their Notion 
 of Fatality was founded j and then fet forth di- 
 llinctly and particularly that Notion of Fate or 
 NeceJJity) which was the concurrent receiv'd Opi- 
 nion of all Se&s oi Philofophers. 
 
 Plutarch tells us, that # Parmenides and Demo- 
 critus held, " That all Things came to pafs by 
 " NeceJJity j and that this NeceJJity was Fate, and 
 u Jujiice and Providence, and the Maker of the 
 « World. 
 
 -\ Her adit us was of the fame Opinion. To 
 
 * nxffAiitwrii xj Ar)f/J)x.yiT&* TmyTct x.ccTU iwW t»» air** 5 
 niixt Kj ui/jccy.[jutw, y.xl Aixjji'jjMtt frpo'wav, xxt xou-f/joTretov. De Placit. 
 Pbilof. p. 884. And JEnomatts chargeth Democritus with mak- 
 ing the humane Mind ($%*■») a Slavt to Neccffity. A$»d Eufeb. 
 Tr&p. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7. 
 
 ' Ht-sty.}.nT<§h mi>T(C xxQ' iif/jx<>p,iir)*4 TV 3 ewrni "cattffcw x»\ 
 icrxyy.r.t. Ibid. 
 
 thefe
 
 ( »J> ) 
 
 thefe Cicero joyns |j Empedocles, and, by Miftake* 
 * drift otle, as I prov'd above. It appears alfo 
 from Cicero, that the antient $ Diodorus was of the 
 fame Opinion, who maintain'd that all Truths 
 in Futurity, as well as thofe which are aclual, 
 are neceffarily fuch, and cannot but be. 
 
 Thefe are the principal Aflertors of the Doc- 
 trine of abfolute Fatality that we know of ; and 
 they who followed their Opinion, all founded 
 the Arguments and Reafons of it in the Suppofi- 
 tion of the Truth of the material Syftem, or that 
 nothing exifted but Body and Matter, which No- 
 tion our Author himfelf rejects. 
 
 Firft; Thofe of the atomical Seel:, who fol- 
 lowed the Opinion of Democritus, alledg'd, that 
 all Things, even humane Actions, were effected 
 by the eternal f neceffary Motion, and perpendi- 
 cular Impulfe of felf-exiftent corporeal Atoms, 
 by whofe fortuitous Concourfe and Union all 
 
 |j De Fat. lib. p. 379. 
 
 * See above p. 140, 14T. 
 
 £ Ille ('Diodorus) id folum fieri pofTe dicit, quod aut fit ve- 
 rum, aut futurum lit: verum : 2c quicquid futurum fir, id dicit 
 fieri nccefTe cCfc: Sc quicquid non fit futurum, id negat fieri 
 pofTe. Lib. deFaio,p. 346. and again p. 349. 
 
 t Id (fciiicet quod atomus gravitate ferrctur naturali & 
 necelTaria cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu coge- 
 retui) Dcmocritus autor atomorum acciperc maluit, neceflitate 
 omnia ferri, &c. ibid. p. 3^2 = 
 
 Things-
 
 ( *53 ) 
 
 Things were form'd. But this Notion is alrrroft 
 too ridiculous even to be mentioned, and is par* 
 ticularly confuted by * Plotinus, and, I think, is 
 now univerfally exploded. 
 
 Secondly 3 Thofe among.ft the Stoics, who 
 adher'd to the Doctrine of Heraclitus, were of 
 three feveral Opinions. 
 
 " f Some derived all Things from the firfi Caufe 
 " of the Univerfe, which they faid pervaded ail 
 " Things, and not only gave Motion to, but was 
 " the efficient Caufe of every Thing, (tiling it Fate, 
 " and the fupreme Caufe, and fuppofing it to be it 
 " felf all Things, and that not only all other Things 
 " which exift, but even the inward Purpofes of our 
 " Minds alio proceeded from the efficient Power 
 " of it; as the Members of an Animal are not 
 " mov'd of themfelves, but by that governing 
 " Principle, which is in every Animal. 
 
 This was making no Agent in the World but 
 God only, and humane Actions to be nothing 
 but the Operations of God in Men, actuating 
 
 * Ennead. 3. lib. 1. 
 
 ■J- Ol i7c\ t»» tS nuvTci eifX-'i" f^6c»rt(, «W efc/'rijj xxruyxri 
 vmirx, 2}$ 7mnTu» <pciT*)<rx<rxv xlnxi, x^ txutw f^vey i khSo-mv 
 etXXx >£ Xoicurxt ixMrx A**/o»ti$, tl[AXf(jt,tvnv txut^v ^ *vywjuTr,t 
 ccmut ,7£/^£voi, cti/Tv.t tttrctv rx Tmrrx' eu [a$iov tx xaax »<rx ytn- 
 rxi, «AA# K) rici itf/tiTifXi Pyyvoyirus c/x tuv ixhmk iwxi xwjj^* 
 rut. otot £uov f/jog/.cut ijj/i Ku>ov[/it*cM tKxruii i\ xiiut, <M 3 Toy 
 K'/iyjonZnOih h inarm mi Zinn, Plotin. Ennead, lib, 1. C. 3. 
 
 X :hcm
 
 ( 1*4 ) 
 
 them and every Thing elfe as the Soul does the 
 Body. 
 
 And * Pfotimts excellently argues againft the 
 precedent Notion, as being " an Excefs of Ne- 
 M ceffity." And that in Confequence of it, 
 u We are neither our own Perforts nor any Acti- 
 w on is oar own-, neither is it we that purpofe, 
 <c but our Purpofes are the the Purpofe of ano- 
 u ther Perfon 5 neither do we att at all. < 
 u But (he concludes) every individual Thing 
 u ought to be iH own felf, and our Aftions 
 a and Purpofes be our own', and every one's 
 tc good and bad Actions to proceed from every 
 n One's fe If ; and we ought not to afcribe the 
 il doing of Evil to the univerfal firft Caufe. 
 
 Thirdly j " Others thought that the Circum- 
 te volution of the Univerfe effected all Things 
 " by its Motion, and by the Pofitions and Ap- 
 <c pearances of the Planets and hVd Stars with 
 
 " Refped 
 
 tpyor eih Aoyi^ofA/iCx xvto), u>X kri^a Myi<r[/ia<;, *x v.Ujitwx /3et/- 
 Xi'j/jjXTX, ouoi ZfoiTrofjijiii yf/jit,',' osAAaj y> £u y^ ixxsti, ixx^o u»eu ' 
 xxl xfxfyu; iifjUiTi^Xi, xxi 2^.\iolxt D7«f^ji». xxl rug ixx^cv xx>,ut 
 rt xxi «;<£p«5 7?yx\zi$ 7TXf' ixvrcu ixotrit, xXXx fjuij ta trxurl Tjjf 
 yew tuv xiotfZn Te;Ww x\xji6zvxi. Ennead. 3. lib. i. c, 4. 
 
 f ' AAAo* T»r T9» 'Kxiret, facx* x^n^ovc-xt, xxl ifsIvtx ireievrm 
 Ty yathth, xx\ Txi<i n£v «rf<w nhxwpiiyeH ti xxi kxhwih %iatv- i
 
 ( '5J ) 
 
 ** Refpeft to each other, and, founding upon 
 " thefe the Art of Prognostication, would have 
 <{ it that every Thing came to pafs thereby. 
 
 This was the aftrological Notion of Fate, 
 founded upon mere Ignorance in Aftronomy and 
 natural Philofophy, and therefore was ridicul'd 
 by the learned Antients, as it is by all truly learn* 
 ed Philofophers at this Day. 
 
 Plotinus obferves concerning it, " That it is 
 " another way [viz. different from the Stoics be* 
 " fore mentioned, who made God alone or the 
 *' firftCaufe a£t every Thing] of afcribing every 
 " Thing we do, our Purpofes and Paflions, our 
 w Wickednefs and Appetites to the Univerfe 
 u (or to God :) and attributing nothing to our- 
 " felves, leaves us like Stones that are caft, and 
 " not as Men, who act of themfihves, and from 
 w their own Nature:" Adding, " But we 
 " ought to afcribe that which is our own (viz. 
 " our Actions) to our/elves; and making a Di- 
 " function, viz. that we ourfelves are the tffi- 
 " cient Caufe of* fome Things, and that in fome 
 X z « Things 
 
 tutrix, hntSiv yiifo% k\icZ<ri. Ibid. cap. 2. Alex. Aphrodif. re- 
 prcfents their Opinion in like manner, p. 103, 104. 
 
 * 'Out®* trim t^cxq* iximoii &v(£Tiiv<ri tu. ifA/tr^x, £«>.«$ x.xi 
 Trztl/ijKctKUHf rt xulif/fixc. ijp 3 ww. moifi, *i3oi% tyi^ptuw, kxtk- 
 Piuttu £.W<, «sAA' GW u»v?cti7rac, tyjttn nctf uuiim Kjiic? cwtuv pv<rta$ 
 »fye». fnw^ «AA« yjn a\eiixi ]£ to ituiinoet v,[A~v. ■■■ ■■-. 2^.pp»/*f..
 
 ( IJ« ) 
 
 " alfo we are pa/Jive and under the Impulfe of 
 " NeceJJity^ not afcribe all Things to the fore* 
 u mentioned Catrfes. 
 
 Fourthly} Another Notion of Fatality was 
 * c founded in the Supposition of * a mutual 
 " eternal Concatenation and Chain of Caufes, 
 " whereby Things posterior always follow thofe 
 <c which are antecedent,and are refolved into them, 
 " as exifting by them, and having no Exiftencc 
 *' without them \ and are neccfTarily confequent 
 " to thofe which precede them : This was ano- 
 " ther way of afferting an abfolute Fatality." 
 And this was the moll; plaufible and mod infilled 
 on by the Maintainers of NeceJ/ity, and was 
 grounded on the Suppofition that every Motion 
 was caufed by an external Impulfe of Matter, 
 and that there was no internal Principle or 
 Caufe of Motion or Action in the Mind at all 5 
 which the Oppofers of this Fatality prov'd there 
 was by ftrong undeniable Evidence both of Senfe 
 and Rcafon. 
 
 yex' tivx "p. yyjiiz ifyxtyfXjidx, -nix |j 'Tix^ofjbiv l\ «v#y*>js, fhv) ttxv- 
 Ttt zKtivcis xvx-nfcvxi. Ibid. C. f. 
 
 * Tty <mv alrim sTjsrAofcjjv ^pa? xXXuXx, %xi toy xvada siffAov, 
 
 X.CU T3 ST£:S£ roTi !Tf0T^0(5 XH TX VflfX, X.XI TXUTCt £T fKlWX «U£- 
 
 vxi ok xiiiziv yuof/jivx, kxI xviv itmmv Cine lev ymefA/tvx, oaXiuitv rt 
 rti? Tf V 35 (lege Tf>a) xurSv rx vftpx. rxurx t* t»? Xiyu, il^x^m* 
 
 inf.* rpova iWxym QciviTrxi. Ennead. 3. lib. 1, c. 2. 
 
 Plotinus's
 
 Plotinus's Reply to the foregoing Opinion is 
 " * That it is near akin to that which makes 
 " every Affettion and Exertion of ours to proceed 
 " from the Soul of the Univerfe. And if any 
 u one who holds this Fatality is willing ftill to 
 w grant that we and every one of us have a 
 " Power of abling from ourfehes^ yet neverthe- 
 w lefs he holds an abfolute A^r^"/^ of all Things -, 
 " and fince all Things are comprehended in this 
 u Chain of Caufes, every Thing mud be as it is: 
 " For fince all Things are contain'd in this Fate, 
 u there is nothing to hinder, or make them to 
 " be otherwife than they are. And Things being 
 " thus impelled as by one univerfal Caufe, no- 
 " thing will be left in our Power, but to be 
 tc carried wherefoever they impel us : For our 
 " Senfes will follow thefe antecedent Caufes, and 
 <c ourDefires will be form'd according to them; 
 u and fo our Power of Aclion will be only an 
 " empty Name." Whence, he adds, there will 
 
 " be 
 
 * Eft fC Kxl XUTYl i Obfa Ii7«5 iXHVYIS "£ 7tZ(TUV KXTX (\c^t 
 
 yjtl) ylira x-xt xt'>ri<n» iyjiTipxv ix t tuv oXaiv •yvxvis y,kuv Xt- 
 
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 nXITi YUiiv TTolit'f Tt. \x n l^ 1 " * f Tyy 7i&TM<i X&ITM UvxyxLo, 
 
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 '■vwrxt. obu/x t« f/jt>oy to t<p Y.fbn t?xt, " ■ ' oto» xxt to Tar
 
 ( «J8 ) 
 
 be only a mere fponianeous Motion or Impetus in 
 us, " fuch as there is. in other Ammahy and in 
 *' Infants and Madmen^ who are acted upon by 
 " the blind Impulfe of their Appetites. 
 
 Cicero agrees with Phtimts, that the * Notion 
 of an eternal Chain of Caufes deprives the Mind of 
 Man of its free PVill^ and fubj eels it to a neceffary 
 Fatality, which Opinion, he fays, -\ is not to- 
 lerable. 
 
 Plotinus concludes his Arguments againft the 
 Fatalifts by putting the Queftion; " il What 
 " other Caufe then beiides thefe (forementioned) 
 * c can be introduced, which will both folve the 
 « Difficulty of anything being without a Caufe, 
 <c and preferve the Series and Order of Things, 
 < c and allow fomething to be in our Power, and 
 « neither yet deftroy Prognostication and Di- 
 " vination?" To which he anfwersj " That 
 " we ought to admit the Soul to be another 
 
 principal 
 
 acXXav Coinv xcci to t&v vv,7nm x.x6' o^fiioci rv^Xae.^ jovr^., xxi t» 
 ■tZv f/Mtuiay/tvvv, cfi^jZcrt ^ iroi. Ibid. §. 7. 
 
 * At qui introducunt caufarum feriem fempiternam, ii men- 1 
 tem hominis voluntate libera fpoliatam neceiTitate fati devin- 
 aunt. Lib. de Fmo p. 3^0. 
 
 -f Hsec (fcilicct fententia omnia fato fieri) non eft tolerabilis. 
 Ibid. p. 55-1. 
 
 jj T<; *K 'ccXXq KSTZX XK?& TCC'JTCU tXlX&liFK UnXJTtll T« iaiV 
 
 (.KrxXif^u, ukoXxSmv t* rr,ft<rti x-at rctty. vtptix, ri rt wut truy%&>- 
 
 >>«•«;, Wp«pp'iJC«i5 TS K<X>1 ft/*tTH<*i GVK *'i XlHUtKTit > ^V^,1 3 Oil &(~
 
 ( IJ9) 
 
 u principal Caufe (of Acr.ionJ •" '- » n t only 
 u the Soul of the Univerfe, but the Soul of 
 • c every particular Man alfo, as well as that 
 k i - mn and that it is a primary efficient Caufe'* 
 And then he proceeds to {hew at large wherein 
 the Freedom of the humane Soul confifls. 
 
 Thus I have confidered the fevcral Opinions 
 oftheantient Fatalijis^ which refolv'd into two 5 
 the one made every Thing the neceflary Effecr. of 
 the eternal Motion and Concourfe of Atoms j the 
 Abfurdity of which, as fuppofing an eternal 
 Chain of Effects without any original Caufe or 
 Agent at all, evidently appears ; and which, by 
 inferring the Neceflity of human Actions, and 
 thereby taking away the Foundation and diftinc- 
 tion of Firtue and Vice^ and the confequent 
 Praife and Difpraife due unto them, Was rejected 
 by * Epicurus himfelf on this very Account. 
 The other made no Agent in the World but God, 
 who was fuppos'd to be infus'd like a Soul thro' 
 the whole Univerfe, and to aft in every Thing 
 by an eternal Chain of Caufes, neceilarily con- 
 nected with each other, and all derived from 
 
 %K» tiTXn *>.>.*}* 1 ■■ 81/ yjvot rut tf TfxvTci, a£AA* xxi 7w ixx^lt 
 fQ TUkT/,c 1.1 -TfttTypyS eu-nxq Jm*;. lb:d. C. 8. 
 
 * 'O fJUU 'Ez-/xKf(&* ilMtfylxvi fftQlTXI XXi ftAaTi^wiV *U4:'k 
 %f.v.riui u,>)%x>MfA,ii'3>- iXivGitHo-Xi xxi ^m}.-j<rxi to hceoa'tu* \jarcp 
 v*f /*>} KXTit/.xii* x>iyx*r,Tot Tr,i Kuxi'ec*. Plutarch de Stoic 
 Repug. p. re jo. 
 
 I God
 
 ( «*> ) 
 
 God (who was call'd Fate) as the original and 
 fupreme Caufe of all. 
 
 This latter, tho'more plaufible than the former, 
 yet fo plainly inferred (as both * Plotinus and 
 ■j" Cicero obferve) fuch a Fate as made Men's Acti- 
 ons necejfary, whereby the Nature of Virtue and 
 Vice, of Rewards and Punifhments were fo whol- 
 ly deflroy'd, that it made the Notion itfelf into- 
 lerable^ as Cicero calls it} infomuch that the De- 
 fenders of it were forc'd to allow notwithstand- 
 ing (tho' inconfiftently with themfelves) that 
 there was a Power of Aclion or free Agency in 
 Men's Minds } and durft not affirm that humane 
 Actions were necejfary : and the Oppofers of it 
 were fo averfe to it on this Account, as to recur 
 to the other Extreme, and maintain that the § r u'c- 
 luntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind was not at 
 all influenced by Fate, or antecedent Caufes. Thefe 
 two rigid oppofite Tenents, as they were thought, 
 made the famous # Chryfippus., and the moil rea- 
 fonable and learned of the Antients of all Sects, 
 ftep in as Moderators betwixt thefe two Opini- 
 ons, and come to an Agreement on all fides, that 
 
 *Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4. Cic. lib. de Fat. p. 35-0. 
 
 f Ibid. p. 3 j- 1. 
 
 § Curn dua; fententije fuiflent veterum Philofophorum, una 
 corum qui cenferunt omnia ita rato fieri, ut id fatum vim nc- 
 ceffitaris afferrer*. .. altera eorum quibus viderentur fine ulio 
 fato elTc animorum motus voluntarii, ibid. p. 3^9. 
 
 * Ibid p 35-9, 3<5o, 
 
 as
 
 ( 'rfl ) 
 
 as on the one hand NeceJJity was to be excluded 
 from humane Aclions^ that fo the Diftin&ion of 
 Virtue and Vice ^ and the Rewards and Punifi- 
 ments both of divine and humane Laws founded 
 upon them, might be preferv'd inviolated ; fo on 
 the other handF<*/£, even with refpecl: to humane 
 Actions (us well as to external Events confequent 
 upon them, in which it was abfolute and uncon- 
 troulable) was fo far to be retain'd, as that it 
 was to be allow'd that antecedent Caufes were the 
 Motives of acting, or influcne'd the Mind to act, 
 tho' the principal and efficient Caufe of Action was 
 a natural Power and free Exertion of the Mind 
 itfelf. 
 
 This Diftinction of Fate and NeceJJity , and 
 middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail'd amongft 
 all forts of Philofophers, Stoics as well as Plato- 
 nics^ Sec > (excepting the ignorant Aftrologers 
 and Fortunetellers amongft the Stoics) according- 
 ly we learn from Plutarch that * Plato (the great 
 AfTertor of the Freedom of the Mind) " admitted 
 " Fate with refpect to the humane Soul and Life $ 
 <c but adds withal, that the Caufe (of Action) is 
 " in ourfelves. The Stoics in Agreement with 
 
 * TlXotTm i'/xft vu ft th» Uf/jotp/juivii* Its i. rut ett6pe7ntut '^v^Zt t£ 
 frat , vwutw/u di K) tw uccg' xfAcii xinxt ' ct ZruiKet neuron 
 ifju<Pi^uc, K) Tt» (a, Ufxyx-nt otrnxriToi $xat xinxi tCj fiiUfixw. Tti» S 
 *i[*xf[jt,tn)t, (th/axAokjjv «j'r»*» rtTetyfjutvw , it tj <rt/(U/5i"Ae»*f jj <& to 
 ■srxf ^2s,*!,-i rx "pi t!a,Kf6*t, Tit 3 impcy ixt , dc Placit. PhilofI 
 p. 884, 88;\ 
 
 Y « Plato
 
 ( irfl ) 
 
 " Plato fay, that NeceJJity is an invincible and 
 u compuliive Caufe 5 but that Fate is the deter- 
 u min'd Connection of Caufes, in which Con- 
 " nection our Power of Action is contain'd : fo 
 *' that fome things are deltin'd, and others not. 
 
 And Juflin fays, M *That the Stoics diftin- 
 u guifli'd the Caufes of Things (into antecedent 
 " and efficient, as hath been before obferv'd) that 
 " they might exempt fome from Neceffity, and 
 " fubject others to it : and amongfl thofe which 
 " they allow'd not to be under Neceffity , they 
 " plac'd our Wills \ left otherwife if fubjected to 
 " Neceffity, they fhould not be free. 
 
 Hence it appears that there is no real Diffe- 
 rence betwixt the Platonical and Stoical Philofo- 
 phy in the Opinion of Fate and the Freedom of 
 humane AUions\ and that which hath led Men 
 thro' Miiiike to think that it was the conftant 
 and fettled Doctrine of the Stoics, that humane 
 Actions were fubject to an abfolute Fatality or 
 Neceffity, is their afTcrting in general Terms that 
 all things were originally fix'd and determin'd by 
 the Laws or Decrees of Fate, and are carried on 
 and effected by an immutable Connection and 
 
 *Unde nee ills NecrJJItas formidanda eft, quam formidando 
 Sto<ci laboraverunt rauias rerum ita diftinguere , ut quafdam 
 fubtnherent Nmffitari, quafdam fubderent : atque in his, quas 
 rile lub KtceJJicate noluerunt, pofuerunt etiam noftras ichntatcs, 
 Be videlicet non effl-nt libera*, fi fubderentur KtcJJttnti. De Ci- 
 rit. D^i, lib. r, c ir. 
 
 Chain
 
 ( i*3 ) 
 
 Chain of Caufes : whereas this Fatality or Necef- 
 fity with refpect to Men was only underflood of 
 external providential * Events which were appoint- 
 ed confequential to the Nature of their Actions, 
 prefuppos'd to be free and in their own Power. 
 For the molt eminent and rigid Stoics plainly a{- 
 fert the Freedom of humane Actions, as hath been 
 prov'd above; and the Platonics^ who are known 
 to be molt zealous for the Caufe of Liberty y do 
 yet with the Stoics constantly maintain Fate^ and 
 a determined Order and Series of antecedent 
 Caufes. 
 
 From the preceding Obfervations then we learn 
 what was the true Opinion in general both of 
 the Platonics and Stoics concerning Fate; namely, 
 that it was no other than the Laws of Divine 
 Providence, whereby all Things are govern'd ac- 
 cording to their feveral Natures; and therefore 
 particularly in refpecl: of Men, it was underftood 
 to be the Rules and Decrees of Divine Providence 
 determining the Events of humane Life, and dif- 
 peniing Rewards and Punifhments according to 
 the Nature of Mens voluntary Actions. 
 
 They thought that God govern'd the World by 
 his fovereign Will, which theycall'd Providence; 
 by which he made flx'd and unalterable Laws for 
 the Administration of the whole Univerfe; and 
 that he determin'd Mens Conditions, and their 
 
 € rijir tvtov o-ufjt,@xriK M, Anton. lib. 10. feft- j\ 
 
 Y z. Happinefs
 
 ( i«4 ) 
 
 Happinels or Mifery, whether here or hereafter, 
 according as their Aclions freely chofen, and done 
 voluntarily^ fhould be. So that Pate in reality 
 was no other than * Providence^ or the immutable 
 Law and Rule of God's Government of the 
 World j and which was call'd NeceJJity (not as 
 being fuppos'd to effect ncccjjarily^ or to be the 
 necejjary efficient Caufe of humane Actions, but) 
 becaufe it was the necejjary Law of all Nature j 
 •and the external Effects of it, or the Events pro- 
 duced by it by a Series of antecedent Caufes, in 
 Confequence of Mens voluntary Actions, were un- 
 avoidable and neceflary. 
 
 That this is the true antient Notion of Pate 
 or NeceJJity, I fliall further diftinctly prove by a 
 brief and indifputable Deduction of Particulars. 
 
 Chryjippus fays; " -\ Fate is the Reafon of the 
 " World, or the Law of Providence by which 
 cc all things in the World are governed." And 
 Qellius tells us, that Chryftppus held that the 
 " \ Order and Reafon and NeceJJity of Fate was a 
 
 " Motive 
 
 * Nonnulli putant praefumi differentiam providential fatique, 
 cum res una fit: quippe providentiam Dei efle volunfatera , 
 voluntatem porro ejus feriem efle caufarum—— . porro feries 
 caufarum eft fat urn cognominatum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. c. 7. 
 p. 2.37. edit. Fabric. 
 
 ■J- Eipccfptn) *«■» Tts icoa-fAX Aoy®- , *i v»/*©- rm eWw h rm 
 xoo-p? zrfom* haMvpaw. spud Plutarc. de Placit. Philof.p. 88j\ 
 
 + Ordo & ratio £c necefikas foti genera ipfa Sc principia cau- 
 /arum movet : impetus vero coufiliorum mentiumque noftra- 
 
 rum.
 
 ( Itfj ) 
 
 " Motive of Action to the general and efficient 
 " Caufes of it j but that every ones own Will 
 " and Difpofitions directed the Exertion of our 
 <c Minds and Purpofes, and the Actions of them." 
 And Diogenianus the Peripatetic writing againit 
 Chryfippus fays, " * It is manifeit fFom the Di- 
 " ftinction which he (Chryfippus) makes, that 
 " the Caufe (of Action) which is in us, is ex- 
 " empt from Fate." And he cites Chryfippus as 
 declaring, u -fThat it is evident that many things 
 " are done by our own Power^ but yet neverthe- 
 " lefs that thefe things are connected with Fate, 
 " by which the Univerfe is govern'd. 
 
 Cicero in the Pcrfon of Velleius reprefents the 
 Stoical Notion of Fate to be, " || That all Events 
 u proceed from the eternal Truth and Connec- 
 " tion of Caufes." Diogenes Laertius fays it was 
 their Opinion, " § That Fate is the Connection 
 
 rum , a&ionefque ipfas voluntas cujufque propria & animo- 
 rum ingenia moderantur. Noc. Attic, lib. 6. p. 36^, 366. See 
 s,bove p. 85-. 
 
 u7;t}.i>.ij<rQcti'$ u[iiuyityJK to ^c*( v.yjcis uathli, Apud Eufeb. Pracp. 
 1'vang. lib. 6. c. 8. 
 
 + ^>>)tIh — — 7B (2 i% v.f/jm TtoXXot, r /iit<r6cn ^IjAev tivctt, iai j 
 y,TTo> (rw/x.x£iiuiuf8cti tc, 7XvTcc Ty ruv oXuv ilxix.vi<rn. ibid. 
 
 |] Llf^xff^r,y dicunt : ut quicquid accidat , id ex cterna veri • 
 tate caufarumque continuations fluxiflc dicatur. De Nat. Deo- 
 rum lib. 1 . 
 
 »«(tia©- SlffyeyfTcu, lib, 7. p. 4/Q, 460, 
 
 " Of
 
 ( Itf« ) 
 
 « of the Caufcs of things, or that Reafon by 
 " which the World is govern'd. 
 
 Seneca (the Stoic) fays -, " * Fate is nothing 
 elfe but the Connection of Caufes. 
 
 Marcus Antoninus -\ the Emperor and Stoical 
 Philofopher frequently exprefles his Notion of 
 Fate in like manner. But that in this Fate or 
 Chain of Caufes the Power of Action in Men was 
 contain'd, and was (uVsp /utogov) exempt from the 
 Necefjity of Fate , we are aflur'd (Trom Plutarch \\) 
 was the common Opinion of Stoics and Platonifts. 
 And Tacitus , fpeaking of the Stoics , faysj 
 " \ They attribute indeed a Fatality unto Things, 
 " but not as proceeding from the Motion of the 
 <c Planets (which was the Aftrological Notion 
 <c only) but from the Principles and Connection 
 " of natural Caufes: And yet they leave theCon- 
 " duct of our Life to our own Choice, which be- 
 u ing chofen, a certain Order of Events (they 
 " think) follow. 
 
 Alcinous fets forth Plato\ Opinion of Fare in 
 the following Manner : " § He underitandsFate 
 
 to 
 
 * Faium nihil aliud fit quam feries implexa Caufarum. D& 
 Jlsnef. lib. 4. c. 7. 
 
 t DeSeip. lib. f. §. 8. lib. 10. §. 5-. 
 
 (| De Placit Phil. p. 884, 88/. cited above. 
 
 ■$. Fatum quidem congruere rebus putant; fed non e vam's 
 flellis, verutn apud principia 8c nexus naturalium caufarum : ac 
 tamen Electionem vitas nobis rclinquunt, quam ubi elegeris, cer- 
 tum imminentium ordinem. Annal. Lib. 6. 
 
 § Elf&XffAiVq m ?\tyu m i OTt « Tt$ UV 'iXqiCCl '\'W TCliSTOV file*
 
 ( i*7 ) 
 
 cc be this; that if any Perfon chofeth fuch a fort 
 " of Life, and will do fuch and fuch Actions, 
 " fuch and fuch Confcquenccs will follow. 
 " Wherefore the Soul is unreftrain'd, and hath 
 " it in its own Power to act or not, and in this 
 " Rcfpect (of any particular Action) is not com- 
 " pelled : But the Confequence of it's Action will 
 ** be effected by Fate : As for Example, if Paris 
 w will carry away Helen, which it is in his Pow- 
 " er to do or not, the Event will be, that the 
 " Grecians will make War againft the Trojans 
 " for her. 
 
 Hierocks tencheth that " # Fate is the judici- 
 u al Operation of the Deity, effecting Events ac- 
 " cording to the Laws of Providence, and di- 
 " recting humane Affairs in the Order and Courfe 
 w that is fuitable to their/ra'Purpofcs and volun- 
 " tary Actions." The precedent Arguments up- 
 " on which he builds his Notion are; viz. 
 
 " f If (fays he) bodily and external Events fall 
 cc out fortuitoufly and by Chance, what becomes 
 
 " of 
 
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 io-ir* irtfl tv,c, 'ExinK cl"JL\>Juiti, De Dor. Plat. c. 6. 
 
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 eiK«r(K!j rau 3-f*8 -caufzu ivt^yux, Txlti xxt u\fJjy 5Tp<55 **<*$ 7rfoxt- 
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 De Fat. p. 41. 
 
 f now <£> 6T* \ I* T({T* T« iiiXf Kf/{<TtW<i Kxl V W{0< i^'**" *H$~
 
 ( i« ) 
 
 " of the Stiperintendency of God, to judge and 
 " recompenfe every one according to his De- 
 " ferts ? For we will not fuppofe thefe Things to 
 " happen without Appointment, and fay that 
 " our jufb Purpofes, and our Judgments and De- 
 " fires proceed from an overruling NeceJJity : for 
 " if fo we fhould not impute Virtue and Vice 
 " to our/elves, but to that NeceJJity. Nor is it 
 " reafonable to fuppofe all Things to be the ne- 
 " cejfary Effects of them, I mean the Actions of 
 <c the Soul, as well as the Things that are with- 
 " out us, and concern the Body. Nor ought we 
 " to afcribe all Things to the unintelligent and 
 " undirected Circumvolution of the Univerfej 
 " there being a Mind that prefides over all 
 " Things, and a God who is the Author of the 
 " World. That which neceflarily remains there- 
 " fore is j that the Choice we make is in our own 
 " Power, and that a righteous Recompenfe is 
 " awarded according thereto by celeftial Beings 
 
 " and Judges appointed by God, and who have 
 
 " the 
 
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 «rjff-« eV.wa? <i^si,Sa5 hi ts<$ x,h^/,ta XJK^, xxl 1^30 Qtcl 
 3 Tt7*y-
 
 ( i<?9 ) 
 
 *' the Cite of us committed to them. — 
 
 " And the Suppofition of a Recompence, ac- 
 " cording to our Merit, immediately infers a 
 " Providence and Fate as the conlequent of it$ 
 " and judicial Providence, which orders the 
 " Events of humane Affairs, according to Right 
 " and Equity, depends upon the Principle of our 
 " Will and Choice : So that Fate is a Part of uni- 
 c; verfal Providence, and the Rule of Judgment 
 ' ; upon the Souls of Men. 
 
 To which he adds prefently afterj " * To 
 " choofe is in the Power of the Mind} but the 
 " Events following the Choice are determined by 
 " a judicial Providence, recompensing the Pur- 
 t; pofesof the Soul, according to its Deferr : and 
 " thence we are faid both to choofe our Conditi- 
 " on of Life, and to have it deilin'd to us. For 
 " the Recompence, ordain'd to follow our 
 " Works, both manifefts the free Motion (or 
 " Operation) of our Mind, and the divine Su- 
 
 " perin- 
 
 Tixyfjutvct; cucas-xTc, *«« ztQvy.o<ri* v.fXAt irtiUtiXi!^ « 7t 
 
 r<> t'£ !Tj5«? <i|.'a» xzaiiuric, iteurut, (rtM.t.<rw/u tv* cct' cvjty.c, tijAxi- 
 iiiinjv' y-cci i r, |)o»flt)T »x>» x*i'<ri; oix.y £ 9cfXja> tcc ocifycoxux TXTrmrx, 
 
 *»>.iii; xpovolus tiiAXfUiiyr,, 7o Tpu; txc «yCpw97W«? \'jy^ atxx^iKa; 
 ecgf/jotyfhMv, Ibid. p. l6, 1J. 
 
 * Koc» to p i>.ie% i~' ct'JTY.y (fcilicct '\'-yJr) •-t-rxr tx -\ tzi- 
 
 r i>f/j Basts; tx Tout, ccrtKnri, rjt tk', TTCoy'AXc x.2A<n. w^.ix;, Kmc, v.'-.? . 
 
 kai\iZtwilY t TXC. -^/ij'/JlCxr, 2>{<LQi<Tilc, »dl VTUC (tltMlXi TS 'iklJjX i 
 xAfOBo^ T(» UUTcf &.'.i >.r/C[Ai&U. v. 'ft i~t T«r? up/OtTfAituc in,; 
 TiTXyfJMr, itiMiti*. £ T'.i '•<■'■ Tf?a7"C5v x.v/.cr,v, y.K, TV,1 ^ifU, t~.~x. -'.•:'
 
 ( 17° ) 
 
 " pcrintcndency over us. So that it is evident 
 " that the Motions (or Operations) of our 
 
 " Minds from Beginning to End are free • 
 
 " and that the Recompence of our Deferts is not 
 
 <c without appointment, as neither is Fate, 
 
 " which is the Chain and Connection of the 
 " humane Will with the divine Judgment: So 
 " that we choofe what we will thro' an unre- 
 " ftrain'd Liberty , but often fuffer againft our 
 <c Will, thro' the unavoidable Power of Provi- 
 « c dence. 
 
 Chalcidius exprefTeth the Platonic Notion of 
 Fate in like manner -, viz. u * Such, (fays he) 
 " in my Opinion, is that heavenly Law, which 
 " is call'd Fate, commanding Men that which is 
 *' right, and forbidding the contrary} but to 
 " obey is in our own Power, and free from the 
 " Coercion of Fate. To praife him that does 
 " well is both agreeable to this Law and to the 
 
 " common Judgment of all. Moreover to 
 
 live 
 
 uh<P'wn «f« iff *$$& ii<,ri\<&''a.\iTi%K<run % tx,u* v.i*xs TXiKt>K<rtt<; 
 „„■»■■—■- GtTK k^iMoTUc, -j ras ffp«5 rt-y ufyut ewTMtrtH , 
 
 <* 7jj» tlutaofk'm* xXiyf/jct &<rui> £ crcwfyafAtii av6fumnK ffp««;*j<r£»{ 
 xxl 3i*«? xpto-ws. «f£ e>it«^ ii/Mue, at £aAej*E0#, ty* r# t 2 xfoxigt- 
 
 <T!«5 (AO%>.VT0V , 7tCC%M j 'XoXhOLK'.t, « fUn (ZxXcpiiu, 2^ TO TYft 
 XMICiW, CtQvKTW. Ibid. p. 3I, $2> 
 
 * Talis eft, opinor, lex ilia caeleftis, quse fatum vocatur. 
 fcifcetis hominibus honefta, prohibens contraria; fequi porro 
 noftrum eft, 8c a fati jugo liber urn : laudari vero agcntem bene, 
 ram juxta legem quam juxta commune judicium, mm— male 
 
 porro
 
 ( >7i ) 
 
 " live ill is in the Power of Man, and therefore 
 " Punifhment proceeds from a fatal Nccejfity, 
 w in confequence of the Law. All thefe Things 
 " relate to the Mind of Man, which is free, and 
 " acts by its own Choice. 
 
 Again j u * Fate is the Decree of Providence, 
 ^ comprehending our voluntary Actions, as the 
 <c precedent Grounds of it : comprehending alfo 
 " the Recompence of our Deferts. Punijhment 
 " and Approbation^ which are by Fatality^ and all 
 " thofe Things which happen fortuitouily or 
 M by Chance, are the Confequents of it. 
 
 But in order to understand more fully and di- 
 ftinctly the antient philofophicai or theological 
 Notion of Fate or Necejffity (the mifunderitanding 
 and mifappplication of which has been the great 
 Occafion of producing this monftrous Scheme of 
 the Necejjity of humane Aclions^ which our Cato 
 maintains) we are to obferve that ic was diftinguifli- 
 ed into two Senfes (tho' in Reality amounting to 
 the fame,) in the one of which it was understood 
 fubfiantially to mean that intelligent divine Being 
 
 porro vitam difponere proprium eft hominis, proptereaque pu« 
 niri plane eft ex neccflitate fatali; utpote quod legem fequatur. 
 Ha:c porro omnia fedem habent in animis hominum; qua: ani- 
 ma libtra eft, & agit ex arhtrio fuo. In Plat. Tim. p. 271. 
 
 * Fatum providentiae fcitum eft, continet autem ca qua: 
 funt in noftra poteftate ue prascedentia : continet etiam meri- 
 torum collationem. Sequuntur animadverfio & approbatio, 
 qua? funt fatalia ; caque orania quae cafu fortunaye fiant. lbii. 
 t> 1 79> 
 
 Z l or
 
 ( 171 ) 
 
 or Subftance, which govern'd the World by the 
 Administration of the Laws of Providence ; in 
 the other it was taken abftracledly or virtually, for 
 the Laws or Decrees themfelves of the divine Go- 
 vernment of the World. 
 
 « # p at:e ^f a y S the great Philofopher Chalet' 
 & dius) was underflood by Plato in a twofold 
 " Senfe, the one relating to its Subftance; the 
 " other to its Energy and Power. 
 
 Thus alfo -j- Platarch reprefents it. 
 
 Fate, in the Senfe of Operation or Power, is 
 call'd by Plato, " in his t Ph<edrus, an unavoidable 
 " Decree 5 in his Timteus the Laws which God 
 " endited to ijcceleftial Beings concerning the Na- 
 " ture of the Univerfc." The Senfe of which he 
 immediately explains 5 viz. 
 
 * Fatum, juxta Platonem, dupliciter intelligitur 8c dicitur : 
 unum, cum fubftantiam ejus animo intucmur : alterum cum 
 ex his quae agit, &: efTe id, 8c cujufraodi vim habeat, recog- 
 nofcimus. Com. in Flat. Tim. p. 236. 
 
 n p y«p if m itipyuu, i j o'jcicc. Lib. dc Fat. 
 
 £ In Phsdro quidem fcitum inevitable, in Timazo, lege; 
 quas Deus de univerfse rei natura dixerit cceieftibus animis. 
 Chalcid. ibid. Plutarch exprejfes it; Nc'/i!^ o» iiri rtj t* jravrtc 
 #wr*j ©is? iiT£ t«c»? «(?ay«re(? "fyvftxTf. De Fat. p. 5*68. 
 
 jj By coelefiial Beings Chalcidius feems to mean (xywu) Provi- 
 dence, which he ipeaks of as the fecmd God ; and the ("\vxs>) 
 Saul of tic World, 
 
 « # 
 
 By
 
 ( i7 3 ) 
 
 w * By unavoidable Decree we may underfland 
 * c an irrepealable Law proceeding from an irrer 
 " fiftible Caufe (viz. the fupreme God) and by 
 c< the Laws which God endited to (cceleftial) 
 u Beings concerning the Nature of the Univerfe, 
 * s the Law which is confequential to the Nature 
 <c of the World, and by which the Univerfe is 
 " governed. 
 
 " f Fate, in the Senfe of Subftance fhc pro- 
 " ceeds to tell usj is the Soul of the World. 
 Which Plutarch alfo informs us it was. 
 
 It was call'd Lachejis or (dvdyxri) NeceJJity 5 both 
 as being fuppofed to be necejfarily-exiflent, and the 
 necejfary Subflratum for the Formation of rational 
 Beings j as alfo becaufe the Laws of it were fix'd and 
 immutable, and to which they fuppofed God had 
 fubjected all Beings, and even bound himfelf m> 
 der an irrcverfible and necejfary Obligation. 
 
 * Poffuraus ergo inevitaiile quidem fcitum interpretari legem 
 minime mutabilem ex inevitabili caufa: leges vero quas «/* 
 uhtvwfn natura dixit animis Deus, legem, qua: mundi naturam 
 fequitur, & qua reguntur mundana omnia, ibid. C? £. 257. 
 
 In which Explanation he follows Plutarch, who calls the 
 one; At'y^ S-a^ octtu.o^^u.t'^' h' xiiictv «»£/*^o^fe». And the 
 Other i Nt'fii^' ct.^X-a^^' Ttj tS xttoToc, (purst, *ccl' on eli^otyiTUi 
 Tec yuefAuct. Lib. de Fat. p. c48 . Again,- A/yoy uihn xoti 
 
 yo'/Aey ulthn Ttis TtZ Xd-rtot, <pt>Vi*5. De Placit. Philof. p. 88/"- 
 
 t In Subjluntia pofitum, Fatum mundi anima eft. Chalcibid. 
 2lutarch has it; ufjuet^m iccct' euriec* u»a tliou (rt/fX/Traa-x it rcZ 
 r.ia-ibv tyfXfl. Lib. dc Fat. 
 
 2 Chalci"
 
 ( 174 ) 
 
 Cbakidius Miles this Lachefis or Neceffity " lithe 
 " divine Law, by which Things future are con- 
 *' nected with Things paft and prefent. 
 
 And it 13, with Refpeck to the immutable 
 Laws of Providence, that "f Plotinus calls God 
 " the Neceffity and Law of all Things. 
 
 Cicero $ in like manner (fpeaking of the Pla- 
 tonic Philofophy) obferves, that this Fate or 
 Soul of the World, by whofe providential IVif- 
 dom all Things, both in Heaven and Earth, are 
 governed, is cali'd Neceffity, becaufe nothing can 
 happen otherwife than according to the Laws of it, 
 whereby the eternal Order of the Univerfe is immu- 
 tably preferved by Fatality. 
 
 The Stoics exprefs their Notion of Fate (fub-> 
 ftantially) in Agreement with the Platonifts. 
 
 cc * Heraclitus ftiles the Subjlance of Fate that 
 * c Reafon which pervades the Subftance of the 
 
 " Univerfe, 
 
 ij Laehefis, hoc eft, mcejfitntu orationem, divinam legem, 
 qua prxtcritis 8c item praefentibus conne&untur futura. p. 237. 
 
 f 'Avxym tw ccXXuv *xl vifi,®^. Ennead. 6. p. 74.3. 
 
 £ Quam vim arimum efle dicunt mundi: eandemque efFe 
 wientem, fapientiamque perfactam, quern Deum appellant, om- 
 tiiumque rerum quae funt ei fubjectae, quafi prudentiam quan- 
 dam procurantem cceleftia maxime, deinde in tern's ea quae per- 
 tinent ad homines ; quam interdum necejfitcttem appellant, quia 
 nihil atiter pofiit atque ab ea conftitutum fit, inter quafi fata- 
 lem & immutabilem continuation em ordinis fempiterni. Aca- 
 dtm* J>ht&Jl. lib. 1.
 
 ( 175 ) 
 
 ** Univerfe, the fame (he addsj is an ethereal 
 " Body, the generating Seed of the Univerfe. 
 
 Euripides exprefles the Stoical Senfe -, " * Ju- 
 tl piter^ or the NecelTity of Nature, or theRea- 
 " fon of Men. For Necefity and Mind is the 
 " (fubftantial) Power which diffufeth itfelf thro' 
 " the Univerfe. 
 
 " Velleius, in Cicero, reprefents the Opinion 
 « of the Stoic Chryfippus j " i~ That he fays - 9 
 " that the Power of that perpetual and eternal 
 " Law which is, as it were, the Guide of our 
 " Life, and Director of our Duty, is Jupiter; the 
 " fame he alfo calls Fate and Necefity T Again; 
 " The |] Stoics held a Necefity which they call'd 
 " Fate. 
 
 Again •, Diogenes Laertins tells us it was the 
 Stoical Notion, " # That God, and Mind, and 
 " Fate, and Jupiter was one and the fame, to 
 " which they gave many other Names alfo. 
 
 %xit»<, $i>iKorrx. awry JV f'r' ^a «#epiei> a-upx, aaifthx Ttjs t<Z 7;xt~ 
 tU yuirtvs. Pluc. Piacit. Phil. p. 885-. 
 
 * Ziiic in' xixyxri (puvw,, art vx<; fycm*. 
 
 t& ^ itrxyr.ri xxl i&e, i?iv it hr^.\s<rx ^|* miiruf $JtXfx>i<;.. Apud 
 
 Plut. de Anim. Procrear. p. 1026. 
 
 f Idemque ctiam legis pcrpecux & reterna: vim, qua; quail 
 dux vitse 8c magiftra officiorum fir, Jovem dicic efle, e3ndera- 
 eue fatalem neccffittttem, appeilat. De Nar. Dcor. lib. 1. 
 
 || Fataleii necejjitatefn % quam iluuxpyAvw diccbanr. Ibid. 
 
 * 'Ek Tt U-.'Ai hlw, KXi *oZl, KXt lifJUXCf/jlvLo KXi l\,'A, TTl/J.X, .i 
 fTJ^*<5 OJC&Xcictte, ~IWj7<.v,x Y \Q. Lib. "7. p. 4 JO. 
 
 'V.. y:\ndcv
 
 ( 176 ) 
 
 Alexander Aphrodifius fays> " * They (the 
 " Stoics) fay that Fate, and Nature, and Reafon, 
 " by which the Univerfe is governed, is God. 
 
 Laftly, Seneca the Stoic fays 5 " -f What elfe 
 " is Nature but Gu^and the divine Reafon which 
 " is infufed into the whole World and the Parts 
 
 « of it ? and if you call the fame Fate 
 
 u you will not be miftaken. 
 
 There was no other Difference betwixt the Pla- 
 tonic and Stoic Notion of Fate, but only that the 
 Stoics thought that Fate confidered (Subftantia or 
 Y.O.T 'xaiav) as zfubftantial divine Being which was 
 the Soul of the JVorld, was the (-&£&?(& ^so<r) fu- 
 $reme God, whom they ftiPd " IJ The firft Caufe 
 " of the Univerfe j" and " \ Fate and the Ne- 
 ceflity (ox neceflary Caufe) of Things:" Where- 
 as the Platonics made Fate (eMmgov S^ov, sts^ov 
 yjsv, fecundam Mentem) a fecond God, a fecond 
 Mind, inferior and fubfervient to the fupreme 
 God. 
 
 The preceding Obfervations will explain the 
 Meaning of the flrong poetical ExprefTions of 
 the Gods, or even of Jupiter himfelf the fupreme 
 
 * Ta}» 3 u/Axefbivlta u.uty,v x.x) th» <pu<rt*, kuI to* Xoyoi y.ec6' <; v - 
 ditHKitrxi to xaai, friov shea (pxa-.v. Lib. de Fat. p. 107. 
 
 f Quid enim aliud eft natura, quam Deus 8c divina ratio toti 
 mundo 8c partibus ejus inferta ? ,. . eundemque 8c Fattim (i 
 dixeris, non mentieris. De Benefic. lib. 4. c. 7. 
 
 |] TV tS 7t*noe, ocfXflv i n , , lifjt/upftjivw. Plotin. Enncad 3* 
 lib. 1. 
 
 £ Fatum 2c necefiitatem rerura. Ttrtttl, A$oL c. zi, 
 
 Gody
 
 (177) 
 
 God, being fubjeft to Fate; by which, agreeably 
 to the PJatonical and Stoical Philofophy, was un* 
 derflood, that ail fubordinate Beings, how divine 
 foevcr, were fubjeft to the immutable Laws of 
 Providence, which were the Will and Command 
 of the fupreme Godj and according to which 
 God himfelf was determined invariably to a£V, 
 and fo was faid to be bound by and to obey his 
 own Laws, as being moil wife and per feci. 
 
 With RefpecT: to the Subjection of the infe- 
 rior Deities to Fate, Cbalcidius gives us Plato's 
 Opinion: 
 
 " # The Command of God, which the fubor- 
 u dinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reafo% 
 " call'd Fate, which contains the eternal Go- 
 u vernment of Things, and is derived from Pro- 
 a vidence. 
 
 To the fame Piirpofe Plato himfelf cites Pin- 
 dar faying, '• f That the Law (of Providence) 
 " rules over all, both mortal Men and the im- 
 " mortal Gods. 
 
 And Simonides\ " || The Gods tnemfelves do 
 " not refift Necef/ity," i. e. the uncontroulable 
 Laws of divine Providence. 
 
 * JulTum Dei, cui parent Dii fecundi, ratio eft, opinor., con- 
 'inens ordinationem perpetmm, quce fatum vocarur, idque 
 rrahit originem ex providentia. In Flat. Tim. p. 239. 
 
 •?/>:. in Gor?. 
 
 Atti'/KV O'J 
 
 A. 
 
 And
 
 ( '78 ) 
 
 And Seneca ; " * Whatfoever it is that com- 
 " mands us thus to live or die, it binds the Gods 
 " alfo under the fame Neceffity : an irrevocable 
 " Courfe (of Providence) carries on both human 
 ce and divine Things; the very Maker and Go- 
 " vernor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, 
 " but alfo follows them j commanded once for 
 " all, and himfelf always obferves what hejCom- 
 " manded. 
 
 Lucan\ exprefles the fame Notion in a lively 
 and poetical manner. 
 
 Wiih RefpecT: to God's being unalterably de- 
 termined to aft according to the fix'd Laws of 
 his Providence, and fo to be, as it were, bound 
 by them ; Seneca ftiles God f| his own NeceJJity. 
 
 And Cicero interprets a Greek Poet as faying* 
 « § That the fupreme Jupiter cannot prevent 
 " that which is decreed to come to pafs. 
 
 * Quicquid eft quod nos fie vivcre jufilt, fie mori, cadem 
 neceflitate 2c deos alligat: irrevocabilis humana parirer ac dt- 
 vina curfus vehit. Illc ipfe omnium conditor ac re&or, fcrip- 
 fit quidem fata, fed fequitur. Semper paret, femel juifit. Z> 
 Trovid. c. 5. 
 
 | Fixit in seternum caufas qua cun&a coercet, 
 Se quoque lege tenensi &. fecula jufla ferentem 
 Fatorum immoto divifit limite mundum. Lib. z. 
 
 jj Ipfe (Deus) eft neceflitas fua .Prtf.ad jguejl. Nat. 
 § Quod fore paratum eft, id fummum exuperat Jovemj 
 tic. de divinat- lib. z, p. 27 j\ 
 
 And
 
 ( *79 ) 
 
 And Herodotus*-, " It is impofiible for God 
 * c himfelf to avoid the deftin'd Fate." And 
 again j " "j" God himfelf is a Servant of Necef- 
 " fity. 
 
 Which Paflages do not mean as if there was 
 thought to be any Fate or Necejfity diitincl: from 
 and really fuperior to the fupreme God j but on- 
 ly that the Laws of divine Providence, as being 
 the Refult of infinite and perfect IVifdom, were 
 the immutable Rule by which God was deter- 
 mined to order the Events of Things, and to acl: 
 in the Government of the World. To proceed 
 therefore; 
 
 Fate (y.ar hifyetav) in the abftrad Senfe, as 
 implying Energy, Power, or Operation, " * is 
 " the Laws (of Providence) with which the 
 <c Soul of the World is inverted for the good 
 " Government of the Univerfe." Hence we fee 
 the Reafon why the Soul of the World is call'd 
 Fate, viz. as containing in it thofe Laws of 
 Providence, which are that which is call'd 
 Fate. 
 
 Try 77i7T^UfJbl;lV fJjsTfXf ttCUfXTX l$i iv7z4>yysiV XXi tZ $*£, 
 
 Cudw. Intel. Syft. p. j. 
 
 \ Aj-a^- S'ios utttfitK. Cudw. ibid. 
 
 * Leges (fcilicet Providential difta: funt fatura ,• idque di 
 vina Lex eft mundi anima: infinuata, falubre rcrum omniurr. 
 regimen, Cbulcid. m Plat. Tim. p. 239. 
 
 A a 2, Again j
 
 ( i8o ) 
 
 Again > " f It is a Decree, exiftent Order, and 
 " an all-comprehending Law, which derives its 
 " precedent Caufes from our Deferts, as the 
 " Grounds (of the Events) of it : and the Events, 
 " which proceed mcejfarily from it are the confe- 
 " quential Effects of our precedent Merits, and 
 " of the Neceffity (or immutable Sanction) of 
 " that Law. 
 
 Chalcidius goes onj " # The Foundation there- 
 <c fore of the divine Law, that is, of Fate, is Pro- 
 * c vidence: But it is call'd i^/f, becaufe it contains, 
 w as in a Decree, the Duty of our Obedience, and 
 " the Contumacy of our Difobedience to it. And 
 * c Punifhments and Rewards proceed from it 
 * c according to our precedent Deferts. But our 
 ^ precedent Deferts, whether good or bad, are 
 il the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judg- 
 * c ment, Confent, Defire, and Averfion of them, 
 *$ which are in our own Power \ becaufe the 
 
 Choice 
 
 -J- Sandtio, ordinatio exiftens, 8c lex omnia eomplexa, cau- 
 fas prascedentes ex meritis noftris habet ut mitia qusedam, quae 
 porro necefiltatibus conftri&a proveniunt, juxta praecdTionem, 
 neceflitatemque ejus (fcilicet legis) coniequenter eveniur.*,. 
 Jbid. p. 240. 
 
 * Ergo initium divince legis, id eft, Fati, Providentia. Fa- 
 tum vero quod 8c parendi iibi obfequium, & nonparendi con- 
 tumaciam vdut cdicio comp!ecl:itur. Animadveriiones porro rel 
 prxmia oriuntur fecundum collati meriti prxcefHonem. Coliati 
 autem in akerutram partem meriti praeceilio animarum noftra- 
 *um rnotus eft; judiciumcH't 6c conienfus earum, 8c appetitu:; 
 
 v
 
 ( i8i ) 
 
 * c Choice of thefe and their contraries is in our 
 
 " own Power. Therefore the Soul of the 
 
 " World is Fate, as it fignifies a fubftantialBe- 
 ' c ingj and that Law alio, with which it is in- 
 tf ftru£ted for the well governing of all Things, 
 " is that Fate which confilts in Operation and 
 " jict, and the Order and Confequence of it is j 
 " if we do this, that will follow : Therefore the 
 " precedent Action is in our Power j the Event 
 " that follows it, is the Decree of Fate > which 
 " is otherwife calPd Fatal, and differs very much 
 " from Fate. So that there are three Things, 
 4C viz. that which is in our own Power j and 
 *' Fate (or the Law of Providence) and the 
 " Recompence of our Deferts according to the 
 " Law of Fate. 
 
 Cbalcidius concludes the Platonic Notion of 
 Fate from many foregoing Arguments in thefe 
 Words, viz. 
 
 vdckclinatio,qua: funt in nobis pofita, quoniam tarn horum.quani 
 eorum quae his con traria funt, optio penes nos eft.— — Eft igitur 
 univcrfx rei anima Farum in fubflnntia pofuum : eft item data 
 Jiuic informatio rem omnem recte gerendi lex, qua: in nw 
 nere atque nciu pofita fatum vocatur, 6c habet textum 8c con- 
 kquentiam talem. Si hoc erit, fequetur illud : ergo quod ex 
 his prcecedit, in nobis eft; quod fequitur, fecundum fatum. 
 Quos a!io nomine fatale dicitur, a i.ito plurimura difFerens 
 ut fin: tria; quod in nobis pofitum eft (fcilicet ut npud Grx- 
 cos eft, to i<p' v.jmi) 8c ipfum Fatum, fcilicet [&<»?#, fati iex) 2c 
 quod fecundum Fati legem pro meritisimminet (fciltcet t) plf- 
 fiin/m, fatalis poena vel prccmium> Ibid. 242, 243. 
 
 " * That
 
 ( i8* ) 
 
 " * That fome Things are effected by tate is 
 * fc true* and that fome Things arc in our own 
 " Power , has been prov'd to be true alfo. 
 " Wherefore they who afcribe all Things to 
 * 6 Fate, are juftly found fault with by thofe, who 
 " prove that fome Things are in our own Power. 
 *' Again , they who place every Thing in our 
 « Power, and attribute nothing to Fate, are 
 " plainly roiftaken. For who knows not that 
 *' fomething is effected by Fate, and is not in 
 * c in our Power ? Therefore that Reafoning alone 
 " is true, and that Opinion firm and folid which 
 " teacheth, that fome Things happen by Fate, 
 < c and other Things proceed from the Choice and 
 « mil of Men. 
 
 Thus, I think, it is clearly and indifputably 
 prov'd, that the Freedom of human Aclions was 
 the general and prevailing, and almoft unanimous 
 Doctrine, not only of the ant ientChriftians (amongfl 
 whom it was univerfally, and without any Contro- 
 verfy receiv'd and maintain'd) but alfo of the moil: 
 eminent and numerous Sects of Philofophers, 
 
 * Fato quxdam agi, verum eft ; 6c quod qusedam in nojlrtt 
 foteftate lint, hoc quoque verum efle monftratum eft. Quare 
 qui omnia Fato fieri dicunt, merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui 
 probant efte aliquid in nojlra potejlate. Demum, qui omnia in 
 voftm potpQafe conftituunt, nee quicquam Fato relinquunr, falli 
 deteguntur. Quis enim ignoret efle aliquid in Fato, £c extra 
 noftrum jus? Sola igitur vera ilia ratio eft, fixaque 8c ftabilis 
 ^ntentia, qua? docet quaedam Fato fkrf, alia porro ex homi- 
 nm arbitrio 6c Volcntate proflcifci. f, 179, 280, 
 
 both
 
 ( i«3) 
 
 both Jewiflj and Heathen: Particularly that it 
 was the Doctrine of the two principal Sects a- 
 mongli the Jews, the Sadducees, and Pharifees^ 
 and not improbably of the little Fraternity of the 
 Effenes alfo 5 and that it was taught by the five 
 great Sects amongft the Heathens, which com- 
 prehended all the Philofophy of Greece and Rome, 
 namely, the Epicureans, Stoics, Platonics, Arifio- 
 telians and Academics •, and that the Oppofers of 
 this Doctrine were chiefly Leucippus, Empedocles y 
 and Democritus, the firft Founders of the Epicu- 
 rean Sect, but oppos'd herein by Epicurus and his 
 Followers ; Heraclitus, Diodorus, and fome Afiro- 
 logers and Fortune-tellers amongft the Stoics, which 
 were greatly defpifed and condemned by the moll 
 learned of that Sect alfo. And I have alfo fhewn 
 diftinctly, and at large, that the antient Platonic and 
 Stoical Notion of Fate and Neceffity agreed with 
 each other, and was declar'd to be confident with 
 the Liberty of Men's Actions -, and was not under- 
 ftood to be a neceffary efficient Caufe of human 
 Actions at all, but only to be the determinate 
 Will and Decrees of God, or the Laws of his 
 Providence, by which theUniverfe was govern'd, 
 and good and livil was difpenfed unto Men ac- 
 cording to the free and voluntary Actions and 
 Conduct of their Life. 
 
 And from the preceding Proofs of the Free- 
 dom of hum. 7 ,)} Anions, as being the Senfe and 
 Opinion of the moft 'wife and learned, as well 
 as grealejl Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg 
 
 leave
 
 ( l»4 ) 
 
 leave to make one Obfervation, namely, that up- 
 on the Suppofition of the NeceJJity of Men's Ac- 
 tions, it muft appear very extraordinary and di- 
 rectly abfurd, that the Light of natural Reafon 
 {hould neceflarily lead Mankind at all times to 
 conclude their Actions to be in their own Paver 
 and Choice, and to be voluntary and free, if they 
 are indeed neceffary : that NeceJJity {hould form 
 Men's Minds and Notions fo oppofite to its own 
 Operations, and make them necejfarily think their 
 Actions are not neceffarybnt voluntary. To which 
 Purpofe the learned Ammonius Hermias argues > 
 « # £) ocs this Reafon which (as they teach) ne- 
 <c ceffarily effects all Things, make it necefTary 
 ic for Men to affirm, either that all Things are 
 <c neceffary, or that fome Things are in our Power? 
 " If the latter is true, then all Things are not 
 4C neceffary; but if the former, how come many 
 " to think the contrary, viz. that many Things 
 <c are in our Power ? for it is altogether abfurd to 
 " fuppofe that Nature, which fthey fay) neceffa- 
 " rily effects all Things, (hould move us againfl 
 " Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own 
 
 * OA<y? ■j o TTWi'TSt ooxfy.x^av Acy®-, rroTiicv y.xt cuiro t£to 
 *~ oivctfx>K tmf/ifZxmiv tgi's ccvQavzcic, $>:?i, ro >.iynv or* 7reltTX woc[- 
 xx$xi % in t$>' i}p«!' xi7o% tx$ Trspj tS TpeVa t^? ysyitrzat; rm 7Tgxy- 
 f/zccreuv JV|«s ; u fx>i» y> to oi'Jrsfot <iAjj0s<;, cine xfx 7ruirx i\ ctyx'f- 
 xjjs, «' jj to ;rpoTfp6i>, nac, do^MCaai Ttn<; to a*TMii(/jivov, oTi xoXXx 
 *ri* ip' y.fAw ; to yi \z;o £ <pu<ri&><; tijs tkIvtu. ccvxfx.xZJso-ifc {ate, £ 
 iKtivuv Aoy©-) jcjhio^ SraK <ptl<rtv ifAXi tsr» to KXTX-^YitpifyaO^ t&> 
 •6a cwTYii ymfitivm, xxitiXuk, uXoyn. Com. in Ariflot. p. i if. 
 
 " Ope-
 
 ( i«y ) 
 
 * c Operations." In like manner Eufebius before 
 him hath remarked: 
 
 " # What fort of Fate is it that teacheth all 
 " Men that God is the Creator of theUniverfcj 
 " and forcetb them to declare that there is no 
 " fuch thing as (this pretended) Fate? And 
 " how comes Fate to compel Men both to think 
 u and lay that fhe does not exift ? 
 
 tiyjXffjjitY) fjur, tivxi ixvr/]v Xiytn ti %Xi ^fovsti ifitxrXTo ; Prxp. 
 
 Evang. lib. 6. p. 25-3. 
 
 B b 
 
 LETTER
 
 ( »«o 
 
 LETTER III. 
 
 N this Paper* our Cat o purfuesvery 
 warmly the Defenfe of his Notion 
 of the Necejfity of human Atttons. 
 He introduceth it with fome flight 
 Cenfures on the Notions of two 
 very learned Men, concerning the Eternity, and 
 Omniprefcnce or Immenjity of God> whereby he 
 fhews how little he had thought about thefe 
 Matters, which, he pretends thole eminent Men 
 knew nothing of. I fhall therefore briefly, by the 
 way, take notice of his Obfervations. 
 
 Firft; He fays, that Duration is our Conception 
 
 of the Coutinuance of Things — has certain 
 
 Boundaries in our Imaginations, and we can multi- 
 
 * Cttto'a Letters, Vol. IV. p. 1S5"-, C?V. 
 
 ply
 
 ( **?) 
 
 piy this Conception backwards and forwards, with* 
 out ever being able to come to the End of it, and 
 fo may be fure it is without End. (p. 186, 187.^ 
 
 Duration is not a mere abftracl Idea of the 
 Mind, as our Author feems here to fuppofe 5 and 
 is in itfelf a diftin£fc Thing from our Conception of 
 the Continuance of Things: if every Thing which 
 is the Object of our Senfes or Imagination ceas'd 
 to exift, Duration wou'd (till exift, and be what: 
 it is, independent of our Ideas, and of every finite 
 and created Thing whatfoever. And if Gato had 
 thought clofely upon the Matter, he would have 
 found, that he could not fit Bounds to Duration 
 in his Imagination or Underftanding, (Duration is 
 not an Idea of the Imagination, but of the In- 
 tellect or Under Handing only) he cou'd not fup- 
 pofe it to have any Beginning or that it can have 
 any End; or to be dependent upon the Exiftence 
 of any finite or fcniible Beings. The Idea (if 
 we continue to think of it) will force its mcejfa* 
 ry Exiftence, and its paft and future Infinity upon 
 us, whether we will or not. We may indeed 
 think of a particular Portion of Duration, if we 
 pleafc, and no more* but this is not fitting 
 Bounds to it ; for we cannot conceive this Por- 
 tion to exift and no more, tho' we may actu- 
 ally think of no more 5 and, as we cannot con- 
 ceive Duration not to exift, or not to have 
 always cxifted, or not to continue to exift al- 
 ways, or to be more or lefts than it is, as we can 
 other Things, it thence follows that it is fome- 
 r.hing which is in itfelf neceft/arily-exiften! j and 
 Bb i which
 
 ( i8« ) 
 
 which not only we can multiply, but which we 
 mufi (if we think of it) multiply backwards and 
 forwards to Infinity, and which cannot poflibly 
 have an End. 
 
 We borrow indeed the Conception from consi- 
 dering the SucceJJion of our own Ideas , or the 
 Continuance of I'hings^ but (till it evidently is not 
 a mere abjiratl Idea ; for if it was, we cou'd con- 
 ceive it to be more or lefs, or even ceafe to be, 
 •as we can thofe Things from which we borrow- 
 ed the Idea ; but it has a neceffary Relation to 
 fomething without ?;/, which is eternal and infi- 
 nite ; and not being itfelf a Subjlance 9 mud be a 
 Property of a felf-exijient Being. 
 
 Secondly j This Author fays, that Extenfion or 
 Space is the Conception of the Exiftence and Im- 
 metifity of Bodies, (p. 187.J But this is by no 
 means true; and the Idea of Space or Extenfiom 
 tho' it may be taken from Body 9 (which yet is 
 accidental) is very different from the Idea of Bo- 
 dy. We can fuppofe Body or Matter not to ex- 
 5 it i but yet Space will continue to exift, and 
 we cannot, without a Contradiction, fuppofe it 
 not to exift. We can fuppofe Body to be more 
 or /p/r, finite or infinite; as we can create it, fo 
 we can annihilate it in our Imagination; but wc 
 cannot conceive Space or Extenfion to be more 
 or hfs than it really is ad extra; we cannot 
 r.ak ,< away one Fnch from it, or add one Inch to 
 '»t in our Thoughts; but the Infinity of it necef- 
 
 iirily
 
 ( i8 ? ) 
 
 farily forceth itfelf upon us j which fhews that 
 Space or Extenfion has a real and necejfary Exis- 
 tence diftincl: from Body ; and not being a Sub- 
 fiance, mud be a * Property of Tifelf-exiftent, and 
 omniprefent or immenfe Being. 
 
 Thirdly; 
 
 * A very learned and excellent Author, in a late Book, en- 
 titled, The Religion of Nature delineated, fays, that " Space tak» 
 " en feparately from the Things which poflefs and fill it, is 
 " but an empty Scene or Vacuum : and to fay that infinite 
 " Space is God, or that God is infinite Space, is to fay that 
 M he is an infinite Vacuum, than which nothing can be more 
 " abfurd or bUfphemous. How can Space, which is but a vafl: 
 '• Void, rather the Negation of all Things than pofitively any 
 " Thing, a kind of" diffus'd Nothing j how can this, I fay, be 
 " the firft Caufe, &c. or indeed any Caufe? What Attributes> 
 " befide Penetrability and Extenfion, what Excellencies, what Per- 
 " fecliom is it capable of? p. 74, jf. (the fame Notion he has 
 of Duration.) ibid. 
 
 To which I reply, that Space (and the fame is true of Du- 
 ration) taken feparately from the Things which fill it, is not a 
 mere abflracl Idea, as this learned Author feems to think, is already 
 prov'd from the Arguments aliedg'd againft Cato's Notion of ir. 
 And they who make it to be fomerhing real, diftincl from the 
 Extenfion of material, fenfiblc and finite Things, do not yet fup- 
 pofe it to be the Subflance of God, but to be an Attribute of his 
 Subfiancc, ^iz.. the Property of the divine Immenfity . And if by 
 calling Space, taken feparately from the Things in it, an empty 
 Vacuum, this icarned Writer had meant « •;'/ that it was an Im- 
 menfity void of Matter, or an infinite immaterial Diftufion, it 
 wou'ei neither fa;c been abfurd or LlafpLemous to fay that it was 
 a Property of ( od, or the divine Ommprefence, comprehending nnd 
 containing all Things. But to iuppulc Space, abftractcd from 
 the Things in ii, to fuvc no real Kxiftcnce, to be a «?>•? X'-ga 
 
 i-.iiii
 
 ( ipo ) 
 
 Thirdly ; Cato's faying, that in Infinity there is 
 no whole nor confequential Parts, (p. ibid.) is ab- 
 furd 5 for infinite Space and Duration is as much 
 real Space and Duration as finite is ; and is as 
 much a Whole confiding of Parts or Conftituents : 
 The Difference only is, the Parts of finite Matter 
 are partable 5 but if it was necefTarily infinite as 
 Space is, they cou'd not be partable, but ftill 
 wou'd be Parts, and the exiftent infinite Body 
 would be a real Being or whole Being. 
 
 He proceeds to the Exiftence of God, and 
 allows that he muft exifl necejfarily, and be the 
 Caufe of all other Things 5 bur, adds he, by what 
 Energy or Power he effects this (i. e. the Exigence 
 of Things) we are wholly ignorant, (p. i8p.) 
 
 tion or diffus'd Nothing, zs,he is ■pleas'd to ftileit, is what I could not 
 have expected from fuch a learned and rational Writer : as if any 
 Things cou'd pojfefs or fill a mere Negation, that which hath r>« 
 Exigence ; as if a mere Negation, or mere nothing cou'd be dif- 
 fus'd; as if a Negation, a mere Nothing, that which hath no real 
 Exiftence, could have (as he owns Space has) the poftthe and 
 real Properties of Penetrability and Extmfion, to which he might 
 have added Eternity and Self -exiftence, which laft is the higher! 
 Excellence and Perfeclion. But if Penetrability is any Thing; if 
 Extenfion, Eternity and Self-exiflence are any Thing ; if Thing3 
 foflefs or Jill any Thing ; then furely that which is penetrable, 
 extended, eternal, and felf exiftent, that which contains and com' 
 ■prehtnds all Things, is not a mere Negation, a mere Nothings 
 but is fomething and hath a real Exiftence feparate from the 
 Things which exift in it. 
 
 If
 
 ( 1*1 ) 
 
 If fo, why does our Author prefume to aflert and 
 infift that Necejfity, the Neceffty of the divine 
 Nature is the Power from which all Things re- 
 fult and are produc'd as necejfary Effects ? 
 
 To which he fubjoins prefently* I do not fee 
 how a greater Abfurdity can be put together in 
 Words ) than that one Being Jh all make another, cre- 
 ate the Matter of which it was made, give it all 
 the Faculties it has, all its Capacities »f Reafoning, 
 Powers of Action, Means of 'thinking, and prefent 
 it with all its Objecls for Thinking, and yet leave 
 it at Liberty to atl againfl them; which I conceive 
 is a downright Impcffibility. (p. ipo.) 
 
 This is only a round about Way to tell us, 
 that the Notion of Liberty is an Abfurdity and 
 Irnpoffibility : for fuppofing Liberty pofible, then 
 all that is here put together, as implying Impofji- 
 bility, is true by necefTary Confequence: It ncccC- 
 farily follows from Liberty, that Man mull be 
 endued with a Power of abling or not acting in 
 every Cafe, of conferring to or rejeclmg every 
 Motive of Action. So that this Harangue is no- 
 thing but a mere begging of the Queflion. Be- 
 fides, fuppofing Man a necejfary or in reality no 
 Agent, yet ilill the Evidence of Senfe and Expe- 
 rience lhews, that he does acl againfl every Mo- 
 tive j and therefore if the Abfurdity or Impojfibi- 
 lity lies in his acting againfl the Objecls of his 
 Thoughts, it equally follows from his being fup- 
 pos'd to be a necejfary, as from his being a Free* 
 agent '3 with the Addition of this Abfurduy to 
 i the
 
 ( Jp* ) 
 
 the former Suppofition, the Confequence of 
 which is, that a reafonable Being necejfarily acts 
 perpetually againit Reafon ; an intelligent Being 
 necejfarily acts perpetually againft Senfe and Under- 
 /landing: which, I think, is not only an Abfur- 
 dity in itfelf, but a fevere Reflection alfo upon the 
 Author of our Being: Not to take notice, that 
 upon the Suppofition of the NeceJJity of the Ex- 
 iftence of Things, and of human Aclions^ every 
 Part of Cz/o's Reafoning in the foregoing PafTage 
 is direct Nonfenfe. For, upon this Hypothefis, 
 nothing is created by Godj the Matter and Fa- 
 culties of every thing are as necejfarily- exiflent as 
 God isj neither can Man have any Powers of 
 Atlion^ or Capacity of * Reajoning, both which ne- 
 ceiTarily imply Will) and Choice^ and Free-agency. 
 
 He 
 
 tly.ii.ct, jj IJtMifiMTti K£Z1 ts sv, « KCir.ai fix?Avto% ZpotrxyojAtrn. 
 
 « Our Nature is fwionrd and therefore capable of Deliberation, 
 li and or" being led unf.0£<W or e^rf Counfels by />; own Choice, 
 Htcro. in Fytb. Carm. p. 162. 
 
 And OrigC'i. O; rotiuo 3-sAsyrs? ^;;^£v eik«i s<£>' if/AW, Utufx.&ac, 
 
 y},l8ta)TCl7C> U IfXfXOltoVTStt. TTfOITm (/, CTl CinC £CTM/£V £<2«, O'i'JTiQCV 
 
 ■y erf jj^t Aoy;jiK. itA/i' ci'sv vzco i'^aQiv x,iviv>7& j cwrol i^xujuc. 
 HivzibtvoL, Ttoith 'czr' szuvy Xiyoifbt&x, he. ttohw ve/A/ityjAtSx. cc>.>mc. 
 n <£ rciz idiots ^uSitny mftjeraj (lege s^fuVa?) tjs cti.ru, u uj\ 
 k-ixiouc, ifii, (Ajk, aoToc, 5-itetv, £cc. " They therefore who 
 " wou'd have it that nothing is in our tower, by neceiTary 
 " Confequence admit the greateft Abfurdity. For, firft, it 
 «' hence follows that we are not Animals, and, fecondiv, that 
 *-_ we are no: rational Animals 5 but being impelled, as it were, 
 
 " bv 
 
 «
 
 ( >93) 
 
 He goes on ; A Pair of Scales, perfectly pois'd, 
 cannot ponderate on either fide, and a Man, who 
 has no Motives to acl, will not aft at all. (p. 
 
 ibid.) 
 
 'Tis very true, that if the Mind was merely 
 pajjive, like a Pair of Scales, and perfectly pois'd 
 by equal Motives or tV eights, it cou'd not pon- 
 derate or Aft. But this is begging the Queflion, 
 and luppofing (when the Thing is to be prov\l 
 not fuppos'd) that the Mind has not Will and a 
 free Power of Action within itfelf, and confe- 
 quently can act by its Will merely, .without any 
 other Motive : And when a Man does not do 
 any particular Action, becaufe he has no Motive 
 to act, his not acting is ftill Matter of Choice ; 
 anci it was in his Power to have acted. I can 
 
 *' by an external Force, without any Motion from ourfelves, are 
 " thereby faid to do thofe Things, which we feem to do. 
 *' Further, let any onc.who knows his own Affections confider, 
 " whether it is not Impudence to affirm that he has not a 
 " Will. De Or at. §. 20. See alio De trincip. lib. 3. c. 1. 
 f. 712, 713. 
 
 And Alex. ApbtodiJiHS. To K ir mutm ZStvact tS» ynofhiw* 
 "Jot" «t)rS, loicy ec*fyct>7?x' tSto y«p »<,-«» mutZ tS> tlttx.i AayuwJ, to 
 \yjtit ov ctuTu X»yw tup XfecxtZ'TctsG-up ^xtirua-tiv x.oa oXuc, tZi 
 TrfUKTtw* rt xMi (iiii, XHTW n kui ivftrvii. " It is the peculiar 
 " Property of Man to have thofe Things which are done by 
 " him in his own Vosetr : for it is effentia! to him, as being am- 
 " tional Agent, to have in him Reafox to be the finder out 
 " and Judge of fenfitive Objects, and of all thofe Things 
 " v/hich are to be done or not done. Be fat. p, jf. 
 
 C c open
 
 ( *?4 ) 
 
 .open and Jbut my Eyes and Mouth merely by the 
 Motive of my Will to do foj and do ten *thou^ 
 fand A&ions, without any external Motive what- 
 fbever. 
 
 I dare fay Cato had done many Things in his 
 J^ife-time by Choice merely, and when it was per- 
 fectly indifferent to him whether he did them or 
 not, or without having, or being fenfible of, 
 ^ny Reafon or Motive for the doing of them- 
 And fuppofe any one was to offer to me two Gui- 
 neas fo exactly alike as one could not be diftin- 
 guifhed from the other, and to place them at 
 
 w Utov to Kuw-xi U tuv txvry [jtjism, x.cu rw tv%x<tx* tov rpx%i<- 
 >K Trififfoty/.v, KXi T*fl roZ ocuctuXh txrxcrw, xoct ra izxpxi tx /3>i/- 
 QctfX, x.xt T itxQiZc fXjitov wirxi, xxl T Ktvoupzvey ytftfjbvrxt, kxI T 
 
 . . ~ ~ v > \ / .1 q A \t i q , i 
 
 3\xax*zx ciyiicxt, xxi iui [iiV&iM wpei Ue, os.v avvUfjut* Utx tvvTrccs- 
 yj><rxt to» tvxvT.av ctx.Tix.v.v, a ota uv ytvuro t£ nfjjx^fAjir^ rx <f> 
 s| x'jty& » difttTxi too ci ai tV* ro ivxvno*. " Namely to move 
 " any of ones Limbs, to turn one's Neck this way or that, 
 " to put forth the Finger, to lift up the Eyebrows, to ftand 
 " when one has been fitting, to give over walking, to hold 
 *' ones peace from talking ; and in a thoufand other Inftanccs one 
 <l may obierve a Power of acting contrariwife, which cannot 
 ei proceed from Fate (or Neceffity) ; for what Things proceed 
 Ci from that do not admit of Contrariety. Fufeb. Frsp. Evang. 
 lib. 6. p. 271. 6* Alex. Aphrod,/. dt Fato, p. 43, 44. 
 
 Flutarch in like manner obferves j To j xifprxTiui %x\ /ah, kxI 
 ecx rotcuiTX, aiv tKXTipov fT« t\\ Uf6(U7n»y cfpbq issroTtrxicTXi, 3 
 id> xfiAi kx\ X.XTX irpoxifuru XtytTM. De Fat. p. 5*71 • " To 
 «' walk or not, either of which is wholly in Man's Power, is 
 «« that which is call'd Choits and the Power of Action that is 
 *' in us. 
 
 equal
 
 ( *95 ) 
 
 etjual Diftances from me, and then tdl me I 
 might take one of them if I pleas'd ; does he 
 think I fhould not have a Power of taking either 
 of them ? 
 
 He may try the Experiment if he has any 
 Doubt of it : and yet 'tis evident there is no 
 Motive to determine me to take one rather than 
 the other, and fo my taking one mull be determin- 
 ed merely by my Will, without any other Motive 
 whatfoeverj and is a direct Proof of a free inter- 
 nal Power of Action. The only Shift which is 
 lefc in fuch a Cafe is his faying, that minute 
 Caufes may determine the Actions of Men, which 
 neither others nor they themfehes are fenfible of. 
 (p. ibid.,) But to fuppofe a Man to act by Mo* 
 fives and Caufes, of which he is not confeious 
 or fenfible, is the fame as to fuppofe him to act 
 without any Reafon or Mot he at all j to act 
 without Under ft andirrg and without Intelligence^ 
 which is fomething, if poflible, more groflly ab- 
 furd than any thing our Author had fallen into 
 before j and if fuch Reafoning is to be allowed, 
 I might with equal Reafon argue againft Neccfji- 
 ty, that my Heart and Pulfe beat by fome imper- 
 ceptible Direction of my Will, which neither 
 others nor ivy felf are fenfible of. 
 
 It is plain that Men are in great Straits* 
 when, in arguing that all Men's Actions are ne- 
 ceffary Effects of impulfive Caufes, they are 
 fore'd to allow, that thofe impulfive Caufes, 
 which are fo ftrong as to force the Mind into 
 C c z Action.
 
 ( *9* ) 
 
 Action, even againft apparent Motives to the 
 contrary (as in taking fuppofe one Guinea rather 
 than two, when each are offered, which, no 
 doubt is in every ones Power to do) and are 
 able to put the Body into Motion, yet are fo 
 minute and imperceptible, that neither others, 
 nor they who are by them impelled into Action, 
 are fenfible or confcious of any fuch impulfive 
 Caufes, but on the contrary cannot help think- 
 ing, that the A£Hon wholly proceeds from Will 
 and Choice. 
 
 If our Senfes are deceived in our Anions, they 
 may as well be deceived in every thing befide j 
 and I think 'tis not clearer to the Senfes or JJn- 
 derftanding (nor indeed fo clear and certain to the 
 latter) that Matter or any external Object of the 
 Senfes exifts at all, than that our Allium are the 
 Refult of an inward felf -moving and free Power 
 of the Mind : and I defire to be inform'd where 
 the Blunder (as Cato calls it) is of fuppofing fuch 
 a [elf moving Principle. 
 
 Any one will find it as difficult to conceive 
 and give an Account how one Thing is mov'd 
 by another, as how the Mind moves itfelf or the 
 Body j and yet it is evident that there is Motion 
 in the World, and, I think, as evident that there 
 is Self-motion. 
 
 The only Argument of Cato that remains to be 
 confider'd, is ; that he fays, ""Tis ridiculous to fay, 
 that tbo* the Mind has a Principle of Self-motion, 
 vet other Caufes cooperate to produce the Aclion j 
 
 for
 
 ( '57 ) 
 
 for if any other Caufe makes it to do what it wottd 
 not otberwife do, that is the Caufe or Co-caufe of 
 the Aclion produced to all thePurpofes of this Argu~ 
 ment. (p. 19$.) 
 
 This is only arguing, that becaufe the Mind, 
 endued with Reafon, does not chufc to a&, buc 
 upon precedent Reafon to do (o, or upon the In- 
 ducements of what appears to it to be reasonable 
 Motives of Action, rather than upon mere Hu- 
 mour and Wilfulnefs, therefore it does not aft 
 at all, or, what is all one, does not act freely. 
 Becaufe the Mind will not do many Things 
 which it can do and has a Power to do, with- 
 out fome Caufe to do them, or becaufe it docs 
 not and will not always exercife its Power of 
 Action, as Children do, in trifling and indiffe- 
 rent Things, and to no Purpofe* becaufe it acts 
 generally upon precedent Motives, that is, acts 
 reafonably rather than otherwife> therefore, ac- 
 cording to this Author, it acts neceffarily. Thu$ 
 that very Reafon of our Natures, which the mod 
 learned and thinking Men have thought to be 
 an Argument and Proof of our Liberty of Aclion % 
 is by this Gentleman made ufe of to infer on the 
 direct contrary, that our Actions are ncceffary 5 
 and the Sum of his Reafoning is, that a ra- 
 tional Nature cannot act voluntarily-, which, 
 whether it be more ridiculous in Cato to afTert, 
 or in others to deny, I leave every intelligent 
 Reader to confldcr. 
 
 lit.
 
 ( ip8 ) 
 
 In Conclufion; Our Cato replies to an Argu- 
 ment, which Dr. Clarke had made ufe of to 
 fhew, that the Reafons and Motives upon which 
 a Man alls, are not the immediate and efficient 
 Caufe of the Aclion j becaufe, if foj then either 
 abflracl Notions (as all Reafons and Motives are) 
 are in themfelves Subfiances, or elfe that which 
 has no real Subftjlence can put a Body into Mo~ 
 tion, 
 
 Cato's Reply is; We fee and feel, that Defires 
 and Fears, that abflracl Notions or Images of 
 the Brain, alter the Difpofition of the whole Fa* 
 brick, and often deftroy the whole Contexture of it. 
 
 (p. I9f.) 
 
 This is true, but nothing to the Purpofe to 
 ihew, that abflracl Notions are the immediate and 
 efficient Caufe of Aclion or active Motion, which 
 is Dr. Clarke's Argument. 
 
 I grant that abflracl Notions^ fuch as fudden 
 Surprifes, violent Pafjions, or Madnefs will, by a 
 forcible and irrefiftible Impulfe, compel the 
 Mind to move the Body; in fuch Cafes, tho' 
 the abflracl Notions do not immediately them- 
 felves move the Body, yet, which is all one, 
 they force the Mind to move it whether it will 
 or no ; but then this Motion (tho' call'd Aclion) 
 is no more really or properly Aclion, than the 
 Motion of a Man, who is driven by a Storm or 
 Whirlwind, is an Aclion 5 or than the Impreffion, 
 made upon the Foetus by the Longings of Women. 
 (which is Cato'% Inftance) is the Aclion of the 
 
 Women,
 
 ( *99 ) 
 
 Women. If it fhall be infifted on that every 
 Event or Effecl, howfoever produc'd, is an A6ti- 
 on, then the Motions of Ships and Clocks arc 
 Actions, and all Motion is Aclion, and there will 
 be no fuch Thing as Pajfion in Nature : and yet 
 never thelefs there will appear to be as much 
 Difference betwixt thefe natural Motions and 
 human Aclions, as between the Ideas of Necejfity 
 and Freedom. The Argument of Cata there* 
 fore proves no more, than that as the Mind may 
 in fome Inftances be depriv'd of its Memory and 
 reafoning Faculties, fo it may alfo be depriv'd of 
 its Will: but this is no more an Argument that the 
 Mind rightly difpos'd has not a Will, than that ft 
 has not the Faculty of Memory or Under ftanding\ 
 and he might as well have argued that the Mind 
 has no Memory or Under/landing, becaufe it fof- 
 gets and does not underjland many Things, as that 
 it has no Will, becaufe it cannot make ufe of it 
 in fome Cafes. Therefore the Effects ofexcej/ive 
 De fires and Fears are not Aclions but PaJJions$ 
 but wherever the Mind has Power to *reafon 9 
 
 refletlj 
 
 * Alex. Aphrodifius makes a Diftin£lion betwixt mere Sport* 
 tar.eity (which he afcribes to Beafts) and "voluntary Agency ; and 
 fuppofeth no Exertion of the human Mind to be an Aftion and 
 the Effect of Choice, but where the Exertion is preceded by 
 Fen/on and a deliberate Judgment in theAgent. His Words are; 
 (Ji/ [tip t *<jto to Tt ucona-tor xcti to ty> y,[/j». ikoucm p. «jO, to t{ 
 
 KttTtC
 
 ( 200 ) 
 
 reflecl and deliberate, the Effect following is pro- 
 perly an Atlion, and is voluntary and free; and 
 the immediate and efficient Caufe of the Action, is 
 liot the abjtracl Motives, upon which the Mind 
 acts, but the voluntary Exertion of Power in 
 the Mind itfelf. 
 
 There is another Letter of Cato on the fame 
 {Subject:, which, containing no Argument that 
 Jias not been already confidered, needs not to be 
 particularly reply 'd to. 
 
 Thus I have examined every Argument which 
 Cato hath offered againft the Freedom of the A8i- 
 ?ns of both God and Men, and in Defenfe of the 
 Neceffity of them 5 and have, I think, fully fhown 
 the Infufficiency and Weaknefs of every one of 
 
 xtcrx Asy** T * *«* K&trii o-t>f*«7«&c-£»5. " Spontaneity and rbe 
 — Agtncy that is in us, is not one and the fame; for that is 
 c « fpontaneoHs which is done merely with an unfore'd Ajfent ; 
 * r but Agency is when a Thing is done with Aflent accompa- 
 •« nied with Keafort and a Power of judging in the Agent. 
 
 J)t Tat. p. 72. 
 
 Again > T« y> yt/j>« Ta/* xad' of^H* yitif/jitwv rn ty' Yfjjii iyj.i 
 4ftt xatcc XoyiKta cffAw utspyttrtu. XoyiKti 'j if it effjuq ov tojs /3a- 
 },WTi)toi$ xtti Zyo*igtTtxMi yitefjttivv), run fit it rmt cttfyuxwy, orxt 
 «rj Twrue, ymtrtm. " Thofe Exertions of the Mind only are 
 " properly Agency, which are the Exertions of a rational 
 c* Being; but the Exertion of a rational Being is that which 
 «' proceeds upon Deliberation and Choice, that is, fuch k an Exer- 
 *l tion as is proper to Men. It'nL p. ijs. 
 
 them ;
 
 ( i01 } 
 
 them j and at the fame time have prov'd on the 
 one Hand that God is a Free-agent, and hath en- 
 dued Man with a free and [elf-moving Power of 
 Action ', and on the other Hand, that the Scheme 
 of NeceJJity is clearly inconfiftent with the Na- 
 ture, Exiflence and Rcafon of Things 5 and is not 
 only the moft _/?//>• but the molt wicked Hypothe- 
 cs that ever enter'd into the Thoughts of Men. 
 Therefore as a Conclufion of the whole, I will 
 briefly fet before the Reader's View the diffe- 
 rent Nature and Confequences of the two Notions' 
 of Liberty and of NeceJJity. 
 
 I. The Notion of God's being a Free- 
 agent reprefents him as having (befides the 
 natural Perfections of necefjary Exijlence, Eter- 
 nity, Immenfity, Otnnipotency and Omnifciency) 
 the moral Perfections of Wifdom, Holincfs, Good- 
 nefs and Jujlice: That he is not only in himfelf 
 molt perfect and independent, but is properly the 
 firft Caufe, and the original Agent and Author 
 of all other Things-, that the Exiftence of all 
 other Beings depends upon his Will, by which 
 Will, as the immediate efficient Caufe of all his Acti- 
 ons, his Power and Knowledge are exercis'd in 
 the Production of a wonderful Variety of unintel- 
 ligent and intelligent Beings, endued by him with 
 various Properties, Faculties and Modes of Exi- 
 ftence, all mod wifely contriv'd and adapted to 
 the fcveral Ends intended by them. 
 
 D d t That;
 
 ( 202 ) 
 
 That the unintelligent Creation is wholly 
 directed and governed without any Agency of 
 its own, by thofe natural Powers and Laws 
 of Motion which God originally imprefs'd 
 upon it j by which it is fupported and hu> 
 der'd from falling into Diforder and Confufion, 
 and is continually fubjedfc to God's Power and 
 Dominion j but that the intelligent and rational 
 Part of the Creation is endued with Liberty and 
 a Power of Self-motion, and of directing its own 
 Actions ', and is therefore governed by God, as 
 being not a mere efficient but a moral Agent by 
 the eternal and immutable Laws of Reafon, which 
 are propos'd to its Choke-, and Obedience or 
 Difobedience to which are attended with fuh> 
 able Rewards and Punifhments. Upon this Prin- 
 ciple of Free-agency is founded the Nature 
 and Original of Good and Evil ; of all 
 Religion and Piety towards God, and of all 
 Vertue and Righteoufnefs towards Men. God 
 hereby renders himfelf an Object of JVorfhip^ 
 and a Rewarder or Punijher of Men's Beha- 
 viour. 
 
 It is thro* the free Exercife of God's providen- 
 tial Power that he has made many Events to 
 depend upon our free Aclions, and thereon is 
 founded the Reafon and Obligation of our Prayers 
 and Praifes to him, and the Ground and Expec- 
 tation of receiving Mercies and BleJJings from 
 him. 
 
 i Upon
 
 ( *o 3 ) 
 
 Upon this Principle alfo is founded the 
 Notion of natural Right and Property among 
 Men, of Society and Government, and the Reafon 
 of Laws for the Protection and Encourage- 
 ment of thofe who do well, and for the Dis- 
 couragement and Punifhment of thofe who do 
 Evil. 
 
 In fliortj the Perfetlions of God, all the 
 Works of his Nature and Providence, all the 
 Effects of his Power, and all the Proceedings 
 and Actions of Men, and their Condition both 
 here and hereafter, plainly prefuppofe Liberty of 
 Aclion, and can be accounted for on no other 
 Principle. 
 
 II. From the Notion of Neceffity it demon- 
 ftratively follows, that God has no moral Attri- 
 butes or Perfections, is neither wife, holy, jnfl 
 or good', all which depend upon his being fo, 
 not by Neceffity but by Choice; befides that the 
 fame is demonftrated from the Works of Crea- 
 tion and Providence, which, upon the Suppofi- 
 tion of Neceffity, cannot be reconcil'd to the 
 Notion of a wife, juft, or good Being. 
 
 It follows hence alfo, that God is not an Agent 
 or real Caufe at all of the Exiftcnce of any thing ; 
 that all the Effects of his Knowledge and Pow- 
 er in the Creation are no more properly his Atls, 
 than the Existence of his own Nature and Attri- 
 butes are his Acts > that either God is a fafivc 
 D d i 15 mug.
 
 ( *°4 ) 
 
 Iking, and does not acl, but is afted upon by a 
 coercive Caufe in the Works of Creation, or 
 elfe that nothing is created, but Matter is felf- 
 txiftent, eternal, immutable and infinite as God 
 Jiimfelf is, and independent of him, both which 
 are equally and infinitely abfurd. 
 
 It follows alfo from the Notion of Neceffity, 
 that nothing could be varied, or exift in any 
 other Manner, Form, Time and Place than it is, 
 or be different in any Mode or Circumjlance from 
 \vhat it is. 
 
 It follows again hence, that as God is not the 
 proper and efficient Caufe, and confequently not 
 the natural Governor or Creator of the Uni- 
 verfej fo hereby his moral Government is entire- 
 ly excluded \ for not being a Free-agent him- 
 felf, he could not make Man to be fo j the Cou- 
 fequcnce of which is, that as there are no mo- 
 ral Attributes in God, fo there can be no Mo- 
 rality in Men : Upon this Principle therefore 
 God cannot be an Object of Worfhip at all, 
 or a Re warder or Puni flier of Virtue and Vice, 
 Good and Evils becaufe the Eflence of thefe 
 Things depends upon their being Matters of 
 Choice, and in our Power to do or not : So that 
 .ill Religion and Piety towards God is funda- 
 mentally fubverted by the Scheme of Neceffity. 
 And not only fo, but the Difpofitionj and Events 
 of Things, if proceeding from Neceffity, fhew 
 chat the Nature whence they are derived is not 
 
 only
 
 ( "J ) 
 
 only not good or jujt, but that it is unjuft and 
 evil. 
 
 By this Notion alfo the Difference of Right 
 and PVrong, and of all facial and perfonal Merit 
 and Demerit amongft Men, and confequently 
 the Principles and Laws of all Society and Go- 
 vernment are wholly deftroy'dj the EfTence of 
 thefe being founded on the Suppofition of 
 Men's having a Power over their own Acti- 
 ons, and freely doing Good and abftaining from 
 doing Evil. In fhort, the Scheme of Neceffity 
 deftroys the Perfections, and confequently the 
 Being and Exiftence of God j it contradicts all 
 our Knowledge of the Works of Nature and 
 Providence j and all the Senfe of our own Con- 
 duct and Behaviour here, and takes away the 
 Ground of all our Hopes and Expectations here- 
 after. 
 
 And fince this Doctrine fo manifeftly tends 
 to corrupt Men's Natures, and their Notions of 
 God, and of the Difference of Good and Evil-, 
 and can ferve no End but to let Men loofe to 
 * indulge their Lulls and Paflions, without 
 
 ufing 
 
 * 'E<? uwnx* *«» oto'tKiuv, km ttXXu. fXivpx wt^y. TTeefetfAx, 
 >.-m srporptVu tutI to Kypci xmT(o7r*i» t5 jr«»r«s /3»» ccfyoai 
 KetTipyx<?oft,(»ov. 
 
 " This Opinion (of NcceflTity) is an Incentive and Encou- 
 " ragcment to Licentioafnep, Injttfitcz, and a, thoufand other 
 
 " Evils
 
 ( zt>6 ) 
 
 ufing their Endeavours to reflxain themj and 
 fo to throw all Societies into Diforderand Con- 
 fufion, and render the Communion of Men 
 with each other more pernicious and mifchie- 
 vous than that of wild Beads ; leaving no Re- 
 ftraint to their worft Actions and greateft Enor- 
 mities but the Terror of human Laws, taking 
 away at the fame time the Reafon and Obligation 
 of them > and fupporting Men in the Practice of 
 fuch Vices and Impieties as will make them 
 miferable both here and hereafter. 
 
 Since all this, I think, is demonftratively the 
 Confequence of the Notion of the NeceJJity of 
 human AUions^ it may well become the Defen- 
 ders of this Opinion, who, I hope, are ferious 
 Men, to revife what they have written on this 
 Subject, and to be well perfuaded that there is 
 no corrupt and immoral Prejudice in their 
 Breafts which has engag'd them in Defenie of fo 
 unhappy a Caufe, fo deftructive of all Piety ^ Vir- 
 tue and Honour : and in which therefore, I think, 
 they ought (with all Men) to wiih at leaft that 
 they may l be found to be miftakenj and to be 
 both willing and ready upon their own Convicti- 
 on to -wet-heir Endeavours to undeceive thofe 
 of unthinking or corrupt Difpolltions, who may 
 
 «• Evils, and dire&ly tends to the Subverfion of every Con- 
 [' dition of Life. lufeb. Pr&p. Evang, lib. 6. c. 6. />. 243. 
 
 have
 
 ( 107 ) 
 
 have been mifled by their fallacious but artful 
 Methods of Reafoning, pleating to Men's Lufts 
 and Paffions, into an Opinion fo contrary to their 
 Reafon and Underflanding as Men^ to their true 
 Intereft and Property as Members of a Commu- 
 nity, and above all to their future Happinefs 
 and Salvation, as Believers and Worfhippers of 
 the true God, and ftill more fo, as Profeflbrs of 
 the Chriftian Religion. 
 
 F I N I S. 
 
 Corrigenda. 
 
 PAge ^7. line 26. read cadere. p. 72. 1. 26. r. yima-miK 
 p. 88. 1. 22. r. t%wi. p. 116. 1. pen. r. «#«». p. 1^4. 
 1. ult. r. %t<rt<n. p. i6j\ 1. if. r. fiaiMo-t. p. 172. 1. 10. r. 
 Plutarch, p. 184. 1. penult, r. Ut»m. 
 
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