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 A SELECTION 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 INDIAN DESPATCHES, MEMORANDA, &c. 
 
 OF THE 
 
 DUKE OF WELLINGTON 
 
 5. /. OWEN 
 
 a
 
 Hontron 
 HENRY FROWDE 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE 
 7 PATEKNOSTER ROW
 
 A SELECTION 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 DESPATCHES, MEMORANDA, AND 
 OTHER PAPERS 
 
 RELATING TO 
 
 INDIA 
 
 OF FIELD-MARSHAL 
 
 THE 
 
 DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 SIDNEY J. OWEN, M. A. 
 
 Reader in Law and History, and Tutor at Christ Church 
 
 Reader in Indian History in the University of Oxford 
 
 Formerly Professor of History in the Elphinstone College, Bombay 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, MAPS AND PLANS 
 
 1 Truth-lover was our English Duke : 
 Whatever record leap to light, 
 He never shall be shamed.' 
 
 #*forb 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 
 MDCCCLXXX 
 
 [AH rights reserved']
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington's Despatches have long taken their 
 place as the finest and most valuable literature of the kind in 
 our language. Their strong and various claims to such a 
 position are obvious and unquestionable. The appearance of 
 the first series, for which the public was indebted to the in- 
 defatigable labours of the lamented Colonel Gurwood, produced, 
 as the late Lord Ellesmere pointed out, 1 a remarkable impression, 
 both at home and abroad ; and for ever set at rest all doubts 
 as to the originality of the writer's military genius, and the 
 greatness of his intellectual and moral nature. The Despatches 
 have long been not only a familiar text-book to soldiers, states- 
 men, and historians, but a favourite subject of study with 
 the general reader. Thus, I have known many instances of 
 busy professional men, who have preferred to occupy their brief 
 leisure with such reading, rather than with works more con- 
 ventionally called popular. The unrivalled interest of the 
 
 1 ' I do not think that till his own Despatches were published, for which the world 
 is under large obligation to their editor, Colonel Gurwood, his qualities and talents 
 were duly appreciated, by those, at least, who had not been his followers in war, or to 
 whom his politics were not congenial. Politics ran high in those days. For years after 
 he had returned to civil life, I am convinced that he was considered a very ordinary 
 man by many, themselves of no ordinary capacity. There was a prevalent notion that 
 even in war his successes had been due to the advice of subordinates, and men were 
 cited as his advisers who would have been the first to ridicule the supposition, had 
 they heard of it ; for they knew better than any that no commander ever trusted more 
 exclusively to his own resources. These hallucinations disappeared at once on the 
 publication of these Despatches, which illustrate so unostentatiously and so clearly, 
 so much better than any history, the wonderful qualities of the writer. The simplicity, 
 
 b
 
 li PREFACE. 
 
 events with which these Despatches are concerned, the mo- 
 mentous and decisive part played by the Duke throughout the 
 great .transactions which they describe so simply yet so vividly, 
 the noble and attractive character of the writer, which is so 
 fully and so unaffectedly disclosed in the correspondence, and 
 the admirably clear and vigorous style, sufficiently account for 
 such a preference. 
 
 But besides the indiscriminate readers of the Despatches as 
 a whole, there is good reason to think that very many persons 
 who, in this busy age, have neither leisure nor inclination for 
 so long a course of study as is presented in Colonel Gurwood's 
 thirteen volumes, would yet gladly avail themselves of the 
 opportunity of perusing, in a compendious form, the more in- 
 teresting and important documents. Such an idea no doubt 
 suggested the Selection published by the original Editor in a 
 single volume. 
 
 The case, however, in favour of such an abridgement, is now 
 
 the strong sense, the varied resources of his mind, the patience, the forbearance, the 
 indulgence of his temper, his assiduity, his capacity for labour — all leavened by his 
 sense of duty — are all there, in nervous English, under his own seal and signature. 
 Political opponents were candid enough to acknowledge the impression they derived 
 from the perusal. I have heard that one of these, of great eminence, was requested by 
 a Russian general, then on a visit to England, to recommend him an English work for 
 the study of our language, and that he replied, " I can recommend you nothing better 
 than the Despatches, just published, of the Duke of Wellington." ' — Lord Ellesmere's 
 Lecture on the Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington, London : Murray, 1852, 
 PP 44, 45- 
 
 The following remarks on the Despatches, by a Belgian writer, are interesting on 
 more than one account. M. Jules Maurel says : — 
 
 ' There are but few amongst the privileged men who have staked the destinies of 
 nations on the battlefield, who have the right to appear before posterity (evidence in 
 hand), and to say — This was my starting place ; that was the goal at which I aimed ; 
 and that was the place that I actually reached ; here also you see the paths by which 
 I reached it. I do not forget what I owe to fortune, which has invariably a great 
 share in every success ; but this is what I have done to diminish this share. These 
 were my dreams, those were my projects, and those my plans ; you see the means at 
 my disposal, my victories, and the causes of my victories. Judge and pronounce your 
 verdict. 
 
 ' Such a discourse has a theatrical manner about it that clashes with the character of 
 Wellington. Yet it contains the exact summary of his military life. He might have
 
 PREFACE. iii 
 
 much stronger than it was when that volume appeared. His 
 Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, has since re-inforced the 
 first series by so copious an additional instalment, that the 
 number of volumes is now trebled ; although twenty years of 
 a life so persistently characterised by literary activity remain 
 to be accounted for. 
 
 Nor is this the only, nor indeed the chief reason for a new 
 attempt to condense the essence of one portion of this vast 
 collection into a small space. Wellington, on the great stage 
 of the world, played many parts ; and, as a writer, deals ac- 
 cordingly with very different departments of the history of his 
 age. And these, however closely connected, it is not only 
 possible, but usual, to study more or less separately. Thus, the 
 Duke's early laurels were culled, and his literary activity was 
 developed, in a field which is only too apt to be considered a 
 world apart from the meridian of his later fame ; and which is, 
 in fact, so extensive and intricate a region, and so peculiar 
 in its special features, that it both deserves and requires to 
 be treated, in the first instance at least, as a distinct province 
 
 spoken after this fashion without distressing his friends, without shocking his enemies, 
 and without disguising one tittle of the truth. But he adopted a wiser course. He 
 hath bequeathed to history the substance of his Despatches, his General Orders, his 
 plans and his reports, his memoranda of events, his official and his private letters, from 
 the first to the last day of his holding a command. He has classified all this matter 
 in a strict chronological order ; he has not withdrawn a line ; nor has he added a 
 syllable of comment or of reflection, of accusation or of justification. A considerable 
 number of these letters are written in French ; and these letters contain many happy 
 thoughts and expressions, but their style is very incorrect. Nothing was more easy 
 than to retouch them without altering the fundamental sense, and even without affecting 
 the bearing of the sentiment. Yet Wellington invariably refused to do this. He had 
 written these badly rounded periods, and he did not think himself entitled to suppress 
 or disguise them. He kept them thirty years in his portfolio, and he drew them forth 
 in the same state as he had placed them there. He would not spare himself a single 
 solecism or barbarism. He wished to be what he was and nothing more. His 
 literary honesty can match that of his public and private life. What he wrote badly 
 he has left badly written ; it will be one of his peccadillos, if too great honesty be 
 such, but it will be a crowning testimony of that fanatical love of truth, and of that 
 inflexible horror of falsehood, that were the rule of his whole life.' Wellington. His 
 character, — his actions, — and his writings. London: Murray, 1853, pp. 50, 51. 
 
 b2
 
 IV PREFA CE. 
 
 of enquiry : although the intelligent student quickly discerns 
 that Anglo-Indian history is still an integral and indispensable 
 portion of the general history of the British Empire. 
 
 Moreover, Wellington's career in India was coeval with his 
 eldest brother's eventful administration as Governor-General ; 
 and it is impossible to estimate that administration fairly and 
 exactly, either as a whole, or in its details, without constant 
 reference to the Duke's contemporary correspondence and 
 memoranda, which throw a broad and bright light upon almost 
 every part of the subject. To Colonel Gurwood's three volumes 
 of Wellington Papers, penned in India, have since been added 
 four entire Supplementary volumes, of the same date, besides 
 detached letters, &c, relating to the same subject though 
 written subsequently, and interspersed in the two later series, 
 edited by the present Duke. 
 
 Again, Colonel Gurwood's Indian Selections were arranged 
 simply in chronological order, with no classification according to 
 the various topics of which they treat, nor any general account of 
 their import, nor discussion of their bearings upon the policy of 
 the Governor-General. Nor were they accompanied by Maps 
 and Plans, an indispensable assistance in following the Duke's 
 military operations, and his minute and circumstantial comments 
 on the course of the war elsewhere than where he was principally 
 responsible or directly concerned, as well as on the territorial 
 demarcations and re-arrangements of a time, when the political 
 geography of India may be said to have varied almost from 
 day to day, and to have been completely transformed in the 
 course of Wellesley's period of office. 
 
 And besides their entire omission of so much valuable matter 
 that has since been published, the Indian Selections were pre- 
 fixed to those relating to the great European war, of which 
 Wellington was the hero, and which tended to throw his career 
 in the East comparatively into the shade. Thus the ordinary 
 reader, whose interest in Indian affairs is apt to be languid; and
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 easily diverted, is tempted to ' skip ' the Oriental prelude : while 
 the Indian specialist is encumbered with a goodly array of 
 documents which, however important on other accounts, are 
 irrelevant to his immediate purpose. 
 
 While lecturing at Oxford, for the purposes of the Honour 
 School of History, upon what is there technically called ' The 
 Indian Special Subject j' 1 and subsequently, in preparing for the 
 press a Selection of Marquess Wellesley's Indian Despatches ; 
 I was much impressed with the desirableness of collecting, in 
 a separate form, the pith of the Duke's correspondence, and his 
 principal official Despatches and Memoranda, on a larger scale 
 than Colonel Gurwood's plan embraced, and with the necessary 
 additions from the Supplementary Despatches. 
 
 While the carrying out of this, or rather of a part 2 of this 
 design, was requisite for the local purpose ; the intrinsic interest 
 of the general subject, and of the separate documents, seemed 
 likely to make such a collection, if properly executed, more 
 generally acceptable ; and I ventured to hope that it might be 
 useful both on its own account, and as a clue to the Despatches 
 in cxtenso, and an incitement to their study by outsiders. 
 Especially as the Duke's papers not only cover the same 
 period as his brother's, but in discussing the topics of the time, 
 often illustrate also earlier history ; anticipate and account for 
 many later administrative difficulties ; and sometimes enter upon 
 what are still unsolved and anxious problems, if not burning 
 questions. 
 
 Moreover, the two later series present an entirely new and 
 very important source of interest and instruction ; which no 
 Selection, however compendious, ought now to ignore. Wel- 
 lington's connexion with our greatest and most perplexing 
 
 This includes the history of British India in detail, and from original sources, 
 between the years 1784 and 1806. 
 
 2 The Military Appendix, and the papers relating to events subsequent to the year 
 1806, do not come within the scope of the Indian Special Subject, as studied at Oxford, 
 and periodically offered (I may add) for examination at Cooper's Hill College.
 
 v i PREFACE. 
 
 Dependency was by no means limited to the eight years which 
 he passed on its soil ; and in one or other capacity, either 
 as a Minister of the Crown, as Commander-in-Chief, or as the 
 British Nestor, he continued throughout his long life to take 
 a strong interest in its affairs ; x to tender advice concerning 
 them at important crises ; and to interpose with authority, both 
 official and personal, in its military regulation. The evidence 
 of this interest, and the records of this advice and interposition, 
 abound in the Supplementary Despatches. And as they deal 
 with questions which turned up, from time to time, for nearly 
 thirty years after the Duke left India, and approach already 
 so near to our own day; they are even more important, in an 
 immediately practical point of view, than the earlier papers. 
 This new and prominent feature, therefore, ought clearly to be 
 exhibited also in the abridgment. 
 
 If any further justification of the present attempt be required, 
 it may be added, that while the increasing attention to Indian 
 subjects makes it most desirable that the public mind should 
 be instructed by solid information, and determined by the voice 
 of authority, rather than led astray by casual and untrustworthy 
 statements, crude speculation, and irresponsible suggestions ; 
 there are few matters of present controversy relating to India 
 which are not either directly or indirectly illustrated, and at 
 least cleared for solution in their historical and more general 
 aspects, by the Wellington papers, and some of them by the 
 documents inserted in this volume. 
 
 The favourable notices, in this country and in India, of the 
 
 1 'The accuracy of the Duke's memory was in no instance more conspicuous than 
 in everything which related to India. The details of its territorial divisions and 
 nomenclature — which are the despair of the students of its history — were to the last 
 engraved on his tenacious recollection. I remember well his reading to me, with much 
 emphasis, a memorandum which he had just prepared for the use of the Government 
 at one of the most critical periods of the fortunes of our Indian empire, on the subject 
 of its defence. It embraced all three Presidencies, and was full of geographical details. 
 It had been written, as he told me, without reference to a map or a gazetteer.' — Lord 
 Ellesmere, ut supra, pp. 20, 21.
 
 PREFA CE. Vli 
 
 Selection from Marquess Wellesley's Despatches have stimulated 
 me to make the best acknowledgment I can, by sparing no pains 
 in the prosecution of the present undertaking. But it has proved 
 more difficult and laborious than I at first anticipated. Far 
 more even than on the former occasion, the responsibility of 
 choosing such documents as should occupy a single volume 
 only has been felt to be a delicate and anxious one. For the 
 majority of Marquess Wellesley's more important Despatches 
 were necessarily printed entire, as they are strictly official com- 
 munications, intended to furnish a consecutive narrative of events 
 for the information and judgment of the authorities in England ; 
 or a complete argument on behalf of an original and disputable 
 policy ; or again, a mutually related body of instructions to the 
 Governor-General's agents for the detailed execution of his 
 measures. Thus they have an organic unity ; and each part 
 is indispensable in order to convey a just sense either of the 
 sequence and general drift of occurrences, or of an entire plan of 
 action, or again, of the converging and cumulative force of the 
 writer's arguments. And to mutilate the document is to make 
 it, if not unintelligible, at least fragmentary as a narrative, in- 
 definite as a record of orders, or inconsequent in its reasoning. 
 But a large proportion of Wellington's Despatches consists of 
 private correspondence ; in which his thoughtful and discursive 
 mind pours itself out on several subjects in the same letter ; or 
 surveys the same subject from different points of view ; and 
 frequently sums up, in a few pregnant sentences, the results of 
 that survey, or of previous or subsequent discussions. At the 
 same time, so well articulated are his compositions as a whole, 
 and so coherent, clean-cut, and well-finished in their separate 
 sections, that it is both obvious and easy to detach fragments 
 complete in themselves, as well as valuable for the concise 
 elucidation of a particular topic, or of some special aspect of 
 a large and complicated question. Yet, though this is an ad- 
 vantage in so far as it facilitates the separation of extracts
 
 viii PREFACE. 
 
 from the body of the document ; that circumstance is counter- 
 balanced, I had almost said overbalanced, by the abundance of 
 rich material that thus offers itself, where the author writes on 
 the whole so copiously, yet so pithily and so weightily in each 
 case, and thus pleads so powerfully against exclusion. The 
 scissors must be handled freely : but the operation is inevitably 
 attended by many and serious misgivings. Thus it will be 
 observed that the bulk of the present volume consists not of 
 complete papers, but of extracts. Nothing could better shew 
 the logical mind of the writer, and his faculty of distributing 
 and working out his subject methodically, than the fact, that 
 when his letters are thus broken up into fragments, the de- 
 tached parts are not only perfectly intelligible, but lose, as it 
 seems to me, little or nothing of their individual significance 
 and force. 1 It is for others to judge how far I have succeeded 
 in re-combining them into an orderly, instructive, and fairly 
 representative whole. 
 
 To this end, I have classified them under distinct heads ; 
 though it is obviously impossible to avoid occasional repetition 
 (when views already explained in one connexion are to be en- 
 forced afresh in another,) or the relegation of a paper to a section 
 which is not the only, or, as some may think, the most suitable 
 one in which it might be placed. I have also, as before, added 
 a running summary along the tops of the pages. But instead of 
 the short note of the contents of each paper, which was prefixed 
 in the Wellesley Selection, an analysis, fuller in substance, 
 though as terse in wording as seemed compatible with com- 
 prehensiveness, has been given ; and this, repeated collectively 
 in the classified Synopsis, will, it is hoped, supply a ready means 
 of reference to the text. It is intended, in fact, as an analytical 
 Index. And as the critical reader may wish to compare the 
 extracts with the complete documents ; and as, moreover, this 
 
 1 The principal official Despatches and Memoranda have, of course, been given entire.
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 book is designed not to supersede, but to serve as an in- 
 troduction and a key to the miscellaneous contents of the 
 voluminous original ; I have appended, in the Synopsis, re- 
 ferences to all the Editions of the Despatches in which the 
 selected papers occur. 
 
 The elaborate refutation of Lord Castlereagh's strictures on 
 the Treaty of Bassein has been omitted, partly on account of 
 its length, where space was so sorely needed ; but chiefly be- 
 cause, having been incorporated by Mr. Martin in his Edition of 
 the Wellesley Despatches, it was inserted in my own Selection 
 from those papers. Moreover, the Memorandum which forms 
 the Introduction both to that volume and to this gives the 
 Duke's view of the same subject more concisely. 
 
 In the preliminary Essay I have endeavoured to trace dis- 
 tinctly and consecutively Wellington's share, both as an adviser 
 and an agent, in the great drama occasioned by his brother's 
 enterprising foreign policy, and which wrought such extensive 
 and permanent changes in the political condition of India, and 
 in the relations of the Company to the native States. From 
 first to last it will be seen, that even when Wellington was not a 
 prominent actor on the public stage, he was not the less potent 
 as a confidential adviser, a diplomatic mediator, or a skilful 
 organizer and director of forces that were to be wielded by 
 others. His information and his counsels enabled the Governor- 
 General to shape his early course with a precision, a confidence, 
 and an adaptation to the circumstances of the case, which would 
 otherwise have been almost incompatible with his recent arrival 
 in the country. And though Colonel Wellesley occupied a sub- 
 ordinate station in the army, he was throughout the animating 
 spirit of the Mysore expedition ; so much so, indeed, that a 
 recent French historian of repute 1 actually ascribes the conquest 
 
 1 In his Histoire du XIX 6 Steele (vol. ii. p. 315) M. Michelet, making no mention of 
 General Harris, says : — ' Tippoo, non secouru par nous, n'en eut pas moins d'abord 
 un avantage sur le jeune colonel Wellington.' And again (p. 317), 'Wellington fin
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 of Tippoo to him. The success of the Governor-General's 
 experiment of restoring the Hindoo Kingdom in a portion of 
 the conquered territory was, in a great measure, due to his 
 professional ability and zeal as Commandant of Seringapatam, 
 and to his salutary ascendancy over the mind of the Rajah's 
 Minister. The previously indomitable Malabar Coast and its 
 adjacencies were subdued and settled partly by his personal 
 exertions, partly under his orders, and by Poorneah's adoption 
 of his suggestions. A Memorandum drawn up by him was the 
 starting-point of the Governor-General's military reforms in 
 Oude. The projected capture of the French islands, which was 
 prevented by the Admiral's scruples, he recommended soon after 
 his brother's arrival, as well as other precautions against the 
 revival of French power in India. At every stage of the 
 prolonged Mahratta entanglement, his wisdom in the Cabinet 
 is as notable, as his military capacity in preparing the equip- 
 ments, devising the plan, and conducting the operations of the 
 campaign in the Dekkan ; and subsequently in suggesting and 
 commenting upon the disposition and movements of the British 
 forces in the war against Holkar, in which he was not personally 
 
 oblige de brusquer l'attaque, n'ayant de vivres que pour huit jours.' He seems to be 
 unconscious of the existence of the Commander-in-Chief; though, in connexion with 
 the Mahratta War, he does refer to Lake, or as he calls him in a note ' Lacke.' 
 
 The whole account of the period is a strange medley of inaccuracies, gratuitous 
 assumptions, and injurious imputations against our countrymen,— at which an English- 
 man may afford to smile ; though not without regret that the last utterances of so 
 brilliant a writer should be disfigured by such a melancholy caricature of a great epoch. 
 
 It may be well to illustrate the peculiarities just mentioned. M. Michelet con- 
 jectures that the Wellesleys were of Spanish extraction (which the Dean of Windsor 
 has kindly assured me is absolutely untrue); and asserts that both the Governor- 
 General and the Duke were educated by Tarcheveque Cornewallis, frere du 
 vice-roi des Indes.' He says of the ruler of Mysore, ' Tippoo n'eut qu'un defaut, 
 l'orgueil, la haine et le mepris des idolatres, Chretiens et indiens brahmaniques.' The 
 signal of Tippoo's ruin was, he says, given by ' un petit sultan que Tippoo croyait 
 sur, who betrayed the passage of the Ghats to the Bombay army. If this means any- 
 thing, it must refer to the Rajah of Coorg. And if so, it is unnecessary to specify how 
 many blunders it includes in a few words. His idea of the ' Peishwaw ' is that he was 
 ' chef de religion des Mahrattes ; ' I suppose, because he was a Brahmin and Head of 
 the Confederacy (though a nominal subject of the non-Brahmin Rajah of Satara).
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 engaged. The weak points in the Governor-General's policy, 
 or rather in the one-sided application of that policy, and the 
 serious consequences to be apprehended from the non-fulfil- 
 ment, by the allied Native States, of conditions indispensable 
 to their own well-being and the success of Lord Wellesley's 
 great scheme of pacification, he discerns with prophetic sagacity, 
 and expounds with unanswerable force, and with every variety of 
 illustration. And when his brother, for a time, swerves into too 
 exacting a line towards the conquered confederates, his urgent 
 remonstrances and sombre predictions are quickly justified by 
 the reiterated disturbances and mortifying failures which, though 
 partially redeemed by a new career of victory, cast a dark shade 
 over the close of an administration otherwise so successful and 
 so splendid. 
 
 In other cases the Governor-General sought and obtained his 
 brother's advice respecting threatened dangers, which his own 
 ingenuity actually averted. Thus, the anticipated renewal of 
 Zemann Shah's invasion, which the memory of the Paniput 
 campaign, the Shah's haughty language and avowedly ambitious 
 pretensions, and the critical state of our relations with Tippoo 
 and the Mahrattas, had invested with exaggerated terrors, was 
 
 The Anglo-Indian religious establishment is as accurately appreciated as the Mahratta 
 religious polity. Thus it is said : — ' L'Eglise indienne qui releve de Cantorbery est 
 la plus riche du monde.' After explaining the danger of M. Raymond's corps to the 
 English interests, M. Michelet adds: — 'Tout a coup, Raymond meurt. Cette mort 
 fut sans doute un miracle accorde aux pneres du parti anglais.' Does he — or does 
 he not — mean to insinuate that Raymond was assassinated at English instigation? 
 Of the young Rajah of Mysore he says : — ' L'enfant avait trois ans. Par une bizarre 
 hypocrisie, on lui donna un serail, pour faire croire qu'on voulait que cette dynastie se 
 perpetuat.' The whole account of the ' Culte de la mort,' and of the disinterested and 
 beneficent Thugs reads like an elaborate feu d 'esprit, as in the following passage : — 
 ' Comme le medecin a droit a un honoraire du malade qu'il a gueri, le thug croyait 
 avoir le droit de se porter heritier du mort. Mais souvent il lui laissait ce qu'il 
 portait, se contentant du merite d'avoir fait une bonne action.' Lastly, the following 
 observation is worthy of Voltaire himself, who rarely tossed off a historical generaliza- 
 tion in neater words, or with a more sublime disregard of dull particulars: — 'Les 
 Anglais sont d'autant plus discrets sur l'lnde, que c'est pour tant de families une 
 affaire d'interet personnel. Pour se dispenser de mentir ils ne disent absolument rien.'
 
 xii PREFACE. 
 
 staved off by Wellesley's diplomacy. But had this failed, he was 
 fore-armed for its repulse by a plan with which Wellington had 
 supplied him, and which shews that the subject had been very 
 carefully considered. 
 
 Again, from the same quarter he was provided with facts and 
 arguments in support of his demand for the maintenance of an 
 adequate military force ; when the home authorities were bent 
 on reducing the Indian army to a dangerously low limit. And 
 Wellington perhaps suggested to him, certainly confirmed him 
 in, the bold course of encouraging private trade, and thus pre- 
 paring the way for the abolition of the Company's commercial 
 monopoly. 
 
 Nor was it only on questions of general policy that the great 
 soldier came in aid of the great statesman. Wellesley, however 
 public-spirited and magnanimous, was at the same time a man 
 of very sensitive feelings ; and keenly resented the illiberal 
 and unworthy treatment which he experienced at the hands of 
 his employers. And when to this was added the half-hearted 
 support of the King's Ministers ; and he began to hesitate 
 between the claims of his unfulfilled programme of public 
 usefulness, and a sense of comparative political impotence, and 
 endangered self-respect ; he had, at each stage of the painful 
 struggle, the full benefit of his brother's sympathetic, upright, and 
 judicious counsels. 
 
 Lastly, Sir Arthur, on his return home, was indefatigable in 
 vindicating the Governor-General's character, and pleading his 
 cause, both in public and in private ; and, on the whole, it may 
 be said, that he fully redeemed the promise which he had given 1 
 at the opening of Lord Mornington's administration. 
 
 In developing, in the introductory Essay, the interesting 
 subject which has been here sketched, it seemed desirable to 
 add a certain amount of collateral information ; and occasionally 
 
 1 Seepage 524.
 
 PREFA CE. Xlil 
 
 to take a short review of the general antecedents of important 
 matters which come under Wellington's cognizance, and on 
 which he pronounces an opinion evidently based on historical 
 considerations. Thus, it is hoped, the distinctive features and 
 stirring controversies of the time, and the merits and historical 
 position of the entire administration, may be more readily and 
 accurately appreciated by the general reader. Where the 
 brothers differed in opinion, it was necessary to endeavour to 
 shew, both textually and by remarks of my own, not only the 
 nature and extent of the divergence, but how it came about, and 
 even which of them appears to have been in the right. But 
 in general I have been more anxious to collect and summarise 
 Wellington's views, than to obtrude my own. 
 
 In a Survey of Marquess Wellesley's administration, prefixed 
 to the Selections, an attempt was made to explain and estimate 
 the chief features of his policy. But the Survey was not — and 
 was not meant to be — a narrative. For a more continuous 
 as well as a critical account of the administration, full enough 
 for the purposes of the general reader, recourse may be had 
 to a recent Article in the Edinburgh Revieiv (No. 303), which 
 might, with advantage, be reprinted separately, as it is well 
 adapted to supply a popular want. 
 
 Anglo-Indian history is full of perplexity to those who are 
 not acquainted with the great revolutions of the century imme- 
 diately preceding the establishment of the British Power. The 
 experience of this fact induced me, some years ago, to deliver a 
 course of lectures introductory to Anglo-Indian history ; the sub- 
 stance of which was published under the title of India on the 
 Eve of the British Conquest (London: Allen & Co., 1872). To 
 this, and to Mr. H. G. Keene's Fall of the Mogliul Empire^ which 
 carries on the story of the imperial fortunes, or rather misfortunes, 
 
 1 The same author has since published a most lively, and at the same time a most 
 judicious account of the earlier so-called Moghul emperors. — The Turks in India 
 (London : Allen & Co , 1879).
 
 XIV PREFA CE. 
 
 from the battle of Paniput to Wellesley's date, I venture again 
 to refer those who may wish for information on the subject in 
 a simpler form than that which Mr. Elphinstone has given to his 
 standard but rather intricate narrative, or for the explanation of 
 events omitted by him. 1 
 
 It remains to mention an obligation which is not the less felt, 
 because I know not how adequately to acknowledge it. His 
 Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, most generously per- 
 mitted me, without any restriction, to use all his illustrious 
 father's papers already published, together with the historical 
 Map of India herein inserted. Such a permission could not but 
 be regarded as a very serious trust. And my earnest endeavour 
 has been to discharge that trust faithfully, and to the best of 
 my ability, however inadequately. Not the less because, apart 
 from personal obligation, these impressive memorials of the 
 mighty dead cry aloud for careful and reverent handling. They 
 are the noblest and most imperishable monuments of their 
 author's fame ; and are thoroughly typical of one of the world's 
 greatest men, and one of England's wisest and truest-hearted 
 citizens. 
 
 1 Thus Mr. Elphinstone's History closes at the battle of Paniput ; and he gives no 
 account of Hyder Ali. It seems to have been his original intention to continue the 
 work. But the destruction of his papers in the attack on the Residency, at the 
 opening of the last Mahratta War, was perhaps connected with the abandonment of 
 this design.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface ........... i 
 
 Introductory Essay ........ xvii 
 
 Precis of Wellington's Indian Services . . xci 
 
 Synopsis of Despatches, &c. ....... xcvii 
 
 Explanation of the Plans ....... clvi 
 
 Selections from Wellington's Indian Despatches . . i — 534 
 
 Appendices : — 
 
 I. General ......... 535 
 
 II. Military ......... 593 
 
 III. Illustrative Quotations 652 
 
 Maps and Plans At the end of the Volume.
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 159, No. 77. After the summary insert ' Extract.' 
 
 169, line 5. After ' countryman ' read [countrymen ?] 
 13. For ' Madras ' read ' Bombay ' 
 For ' alienees ' read ' alienees ' 
 For ' writes ' read ' has written ' 
 For ' inuendos ' read ' innuendos ' 
 For ' trade ' read ' and Indian trades ' 
 For ' Marauders ' read ' marauders ' 
 
 557, lines 22 and 23 should be transposed. 
 
 585, line 34. For 323. read 323 a. 
 
 631, line 32. For ' Mouron ' read ' Meuron ' 
 
 -4' '! 1 
 
 410, 1 
 
 1 6- 
 II. 
 
 419. . 
 
 7- 
 
 4 2 4- . 
 
 25- 
 
 487. . 
 
 29 
 
 547- - 
 
 26
 
 WELLINGTON IN INDIA 1 . 
 
 (by the editor.) 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 This paper deserves particular attention on several accounts. Although 
 it omits all mention of several important items of Lord Wellesley's ad- 
 ministration, it was well adapted to serve the purpose for which it was 
 originally written. Its object was to explain and vindicate what in 
 Anglo-Indian official language would be called the foreign policy of the 
 Governor-General. Thus the College question, the encouragement 
 afforded to private trade, even the organization of the Secretariat, and 
 the separate constitution of the Adawlut Courts, are naturally excluded. 
 And although the embarrassed state of the finances, and the Company's 
 impaired credit, on Lord Mornington's accession to office, are pro- 
 minently referred to, Wellesley's defence against the charge of profligate 
 and ruinous expenditure is reserved for Parliamentary handling ; and 
 was undertaken by Sir Arthur in a vigorous speech, published by Colonel 
 Gurwood. But why is nothing said of the war against Holkar? Perhaps 
 its discussion was felt to be premature. Perhaps the writer preferred to 
 make strong points, and so leave the matter, rather than weaken the 
 general effect by a closing reference to half-completed events, which 
 must involve the admission of at least temporary disaster and apparent 
 collapse. Probably he was loth to defend even his brother at the cost of 
 exposing the personal failings and professional mismanagement of the 
 Commander-in-Chief in India, and that Commander the gallant and 
 generous, though headstrong and rather puzzle-headed Lake. Or, again, 
 he may have preferred that Wellesley, on his speedily expected return, 
 should tell his own tale of this unfortunate complication. Nor, lastly, am 
 I quite clear, for reasons which will be assigned later, that Sir Arthur 
 was prepared to acquit his brother of the heavy responsibility of having, 
 though with the best intentions, indirectly precipitated an untimely and 
 unnecessary war. Another conspicuous omission is indicated in the 
 following words : ' In this review of the measures of the Marquis 
 
 1 Throughout this paper, the Editor's Selection from the Indian Despatches of 
 Marquess Wellesley is referred to as Wellesley Selections, 
 
 C
 
 XVlii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 Wellesley's government, it is not intended to detail the movements or 
 the actions of the different armies.' Thus a reader, unacquainted with 
 the general subject, would fail to gain from this document any idea of 
 much which is distinctively associated with the great name of Wellesley. 
 But, considering the part played by the writer in India, not the least 
 notable, and a very characteristic circumstance, is his rigid and systematic 
 effacing of himself. The march of the British troops on Poona, and 
 the occupation of that city, are mentioned impersonally. Once, and once 
 only, it is said : — ' The commander in the Deccan wrote, &c.' ; and the 
 success of the war is ascribed to various true causes, but nothing is said of 
 the General. Such abstemiousness was, of course, quite proper. But would 
 many men have practised it ? Would the conqueror of Sinde, who was 
 fond of taking lessons from ' the Great Master ' (as he calls the Duke), 
 have been so reticent ? But here, as ever, Wellington attended strictly 
 to the business before him ; and did it thoroughly, because he did not 
 allow himself to be distracted by personal considerations. 
 
 To represent, exactly though tersely, the unpromising aspect of the 
 political world of India, on Lord Mornington's arrival in the country; 
 to describe and justify the remedial processes conceived and adopted 
 by the Governor-General ; to exhibit the orderly and majestic march 
 of his policy, as it successively braced up our own energies, revivi- 
 fied our alliances, struck down our enemies, extended our influence for 
 good, and incidentally our dominions ; removed inveterate evils ; guarded 
 against the recurrence of serious dangers; and laid wide and deep 
 the strong foundations of good government, such as had never hitherto 
 existed, or been thought possible, in such a state of society ; to dis- 
 close the natural connexion of one measure with another, so that the 
 whole administration seemed but a series of graduated upheavals from 
 chaos to cosmos ; to remove prejudices and answer objections, not by 
 fine phrases and special pleading, but by a well-marshalled array of 
 indisputable and massive facts : — such appears to have been his aim ; 
 and in this he has certainly succeeded. 
 
 The style of the paper is as notable as its substance. Easy and 
 unpretending, it inspires confidence like an unstudied colloquial narrative. 
 There is no mannerism, to disturb the attention, or revolt the taste ; no 
 rhetoric, to awaken suspicion, and excite critical antagonism ; no verbal 
 redundancy to check the onward flow into the reader's mind of the 
 closely-packed matter. From first to last, the subject seems to unrol 
 itself with the distinctness of a diversified landscape, viewed from a com- 
 manding position, on a clear day. And these circumstances surely 
 betoken literary ability of a high order. To disentangle the really 
 material issues in so vast and complicated a controversy; to note the
 
 INTRODUCTION. XIX 
 
 essential points simply and forcibly ; to avoid overstating administrative 
 difficulties ; to throw no verbal veil over awkward facts ; to reproduce 
 faithfully the transitory aspects of politics, and the actual circumstances 
 which determined each move in the anxious and eventful game ; to avoid 
 the equivocal advantages of later colouring ; to do adequate justice, but 
 only justice, to the high-minded though high-handed and adventurous 
 line of the Governor-General ; to bring out each topic in sufficient 
 relief, but to maintain the just proportions of the parts ; and to make 
 the whole blend harmoniously in one distinct and general view ; to 
 vindicate, without exaggeration or extenuation, the unity, prudence, 
 justice, and beneficence of a policy so extensive in its range, and 
 so diversified in its circumstantial applications ; and, finally, to convey 
 the impression, that throughout we have been listening to a plain, un- 
 varnished tale of events, evolving themselves successively in their proper 
 course : — such a feat is assuredly no small literary achievement. And 
 is this an untrue description of the paper before us ? 
 
 But it may be objected by a cynical critic, Wellington was Wellesley's 
 brother, and, of course, a very clever man. He would naturally make 
 out the best case he could for the Governor-General. And he was 
 shrewd enough to be aware, that the more calmly and simply he wrote, 
 the more credit was likely to be attached to his statements. Ars est 
 celare ariem. Was not his naivete calculated ? Did he not write on the 
 understanding, that his studiously ' unadorned eloquence ' was more 
 likely to enlist attention, and steal into the convictions of his readers, 
 than the ' lofty and commanding eloquence,' the exhaustive, and what he 
 himself calls the ' too ingenious ' reasoning of his Academic brother ? 
 Especially as his own intimate connexion with the measures which he 
 had undertaken to interpret made his confident assertion of facts to a 
 great extent authoritative, and almost conclusive ? It may be replied : 
 undoubtedly the last circumstance gave Wellington the strongest right 
 to speak, and to be listened to with confidence, undiminished by the 
 captious objection that he was too much interested to speak dispassion- 
 ately. No one who knew him could be entitled to suspect him of falsi- 
 fying or distorting facts. And the truth is, that the style and tone of the 
 paper are homogeneous with those of his general Despatches, ' documents 
 (in Charlotte Bronte's phrase 1 ) written by Modesty to the dictation of 
 Truth,' and of his other compositions throughout his long literary career ; 
 and have been, once for all, adverted to on that very account. But, 
 moreover, whoever will take the trouble to examine the Selections in this 
 volume will be convinced that the views expounded in this paper are, in 
 
 1 Shirley, p. 138, Ed. 1874. 
 C 2
 
 XX WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 the main 1 , a short and honest summary of those which the writer had 
 entertained and expressed at each crisis, as it occurred ; and which he 
 had shared with or communicated to his brother. While the Wellesley 
 Selections, by the present Editor, will in turn prove, that the Governor- 
 General had all along announced and acted on them. And this, it may 
 be added, makes the paper so appropriate an Introduction to both volumes. 
 Another curious circumstance, which gives an additional interest to it 
 is, that it occasionally illustrates the writer's immediate contact with 
 Mahratta affairs, by the mention of important facts which will be vainly 
 sought in the voluminous communications of the Governor-General. 
 Thus, for instance, that Sindia's minister was the Peishwa's dewan ; 
 which fact made Sindia's affectation of ignorance as to the conclusion 
 and character of the Treaty of Bassein the more incredible and absurd. 
 Also, that Sindia's minister, in the first instance, not only courted British 
 intervention for the restoration of the Peishwa, but undertook to 
 guarantee part of the cost of that measure. And whereas Lord 
 Wellesley's repeated statement that Holkar, in the battle of Poona, 
 defeated the united armies of the Peishwa and Sindia, has led to the 
 constant misconception that Sindia was present, with a large part of his 
 forces, on that occasion; Wellington here states the fact correctly, 
 namely that Sindia, continuing in Hindostan, had sent only an insignifi- 
 cant detachment southwards, which was actually routed, in concert with 
 Baji Rao's tumultuary levies. This is the more important, inasmuch as the 
 Governor- General habitually laid far too much stress on the reverse as a 
 direct blow to Sindia's military power ; however completely it did subvert 
 his influence over the Peishwa, and his political authority at Poona. 
 
 I. MYSORE. 
 
 1. War with Tippoo. 
 
 Though Wellington's Indian reputation is popularly connected almost 
 entirely with the Mahratta War, it may be doubted whether the successful 
 result of the operations against Tippoo was not really, though less 
 obviously, as much due to him as the break up of the Mahratta con- 
 federacy. In the political crisis which precedes the war, the Governor- 
 General consults him, and attaches just weight to his advice. Corn- 
 wallis had once already overcome the long-standing difficulties which 
 had obstructed our conquest of Mysore. But Tippoo had been re- 
 prieved ; and the old problem, under altered conditions, amply exer- 
 cised the care and skill with which it was handled, both in the general 
 plan, and in detail, by Colonel Wellesley. Little less important was his 
 
 1 The exceptions to this statement will be noticed and authenticated in the sequel.
 
 MYSORE. WAR WITH TIPPOO. XXI 
 
 personal influence with the Governor and officials of Fort St. George ; 
 whereby the danger of a factious opposition to the Governor-General's 
 measures was prevented ; the administrative machine adjusted to the 
 arduous and urgent work of preparation ; and the way smoothed for a 
 mutual good understanding on Lord Mornington's arrival at Madras. 
 Meanwhile, the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley in organizing the 
 departments of the army for the campaign, will be understood from his 
 own statements in the text. Among his brother officers also, it is obvious 
 that he was well employed in keeping up a good tone, counteracting the 
 tendency to make light of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and 
 in fact supplying, as far as possible, the want of a master mind at the 
 head of the army. It has often been asked, why Harris appointed 
 Colonel Wellesley to command in Seringapatam, after the storm? The 
 Duke of Wellington's own account of the matter will be found in the 
 Appendix. But besides what he says, is it not probable, that in the ante- 
 cedents and course of the campaign, Harris had learned to appreciate the 
 governing capacity of the man, and to be grateful for the steady and 
 respectful support which his subordinate had given him in his difficulties ? 
 The efficiency of the Nizam's contingent in this campaign was not a 
 little due to the stimulating and controlling authority of Colonel Wel- 
 lesley ; and more remotely, to his timely exposition of the dangerous 
 state of our old ally's affairs on the eve of the war, and the suggestions 
 for their improvement which the Governor-General at once adopted, and 
 which were carried out with perfect success. The battle of Mallavelly 
 displayed, on a small scale, some of the great military qualities, which 
 were destined later to decide the fate of the world ; and the attack on the 
 Sultanpettah position, though unavoidably unsuccessful in the first 
 instance, contributed materially to advance the work of the siege. The 
 prompt restoration of order in the city, and the confidence displayed by 
 the inhabitants in returning to their homes, and resuming their ordinary 
 avocations, spoke well for the selection of the Commandant. And the 
 short but active and brilliant operations against Dhoondiah Waugh 
 averted a really formidable danger ; considering the unsettled state of 
 a country teeming with all the elements of military disorder, and bor- 
 dering on the Peishwa's territories, where Sindia, full of restless ambition 
 and jealousy of our unexpectedly rapid success, would have been very 
 ready to take advantage of a plausible pretext for embroiling us in new 
 troubles. The partition and settlement of Mysore, in their mature form, 
 were the work of the Governor-General. But Colonel Wellesley was an 
 active member of the Commission, which carried out those great measures 
 with laudable promptitude. And besides other useful suggestions, the 
 importance of retaining Seringapatam in our own hands, and of repair-
 
 XXII WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 ing and keeping up its fortifications, was so elaborately and powerfully 
 urged by the Colonel, that, remembering how useful a military base that 
 city proved not only in the Dhoondiah Waugh campaign, but later in the 
 Mahratta war ; the success both of the Mysore arrangement, and of the 
 Governor-General's Mahratta policy, may be in a great measure ascribed 
 to the adoption of this comprehensively conceived and closely reasoned 
 view. Thus, however unobtrusive in some cases at the time, the 
 influence of Wellington is now indisputable and conspicuous at every 
 stage of the conquest and settlement of Mysore. 
 
 2 and 3. Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. 
 
 The contrast is very striking between Anglo-Hindoo Mysore, in the 
 days of Wellesley, and every other native State. The documents in- 
 serted in this volume will enable the reader readily to appreciate the 
 fact, and to understand its causes. The introductory paper clearly 
 explains the fundamental deficiencies and practical solecisms of the 
 older subsidiary alliance system ; and how, personal errors on the part 
 of our rulers both in India and at home being added to the general 
 account, we had been landed at last, on Wellington's arrival, in a sort of 
 political quagmire. It explains, also, though more concisely than the 
 Governor- General in his elaborate Minute of Aug. 12, 1798 (See Wel- 
 lesley Selections, pp. 11-57), now comprehensively Lord Mornington 
 reviewed the situation, and how strenuously he devoted himself to the 
 task of improving it, and extricating us from a labyrinth of dangers which 
 threatened the very existence of our Empire. The fatal effects of Sir 
 John Shore's inaction, in the case of the Nizam, were promptly and 
 brilliantly counteracted; and our relations with him were placed upon 
 an excellent footing, and step by step improved, until they assumed the 
 appearance of extreme cordiality and a real unity of interests. The 
 irremediable evils of native misrule in the Carnatic and in Tanjore were 
 redressed, by converting those regions into British Provinces. The rather 
 arbitrary attempt to annex Oude failed ; but the military frontier there 
 was rectified ; the Vizier's dangerous martial rabble reduced ; the area 
 of long-standing anarchy narrowed ; and an unmistakeable warning was 
 given to the Nawab to set his house in order at last, lest worse should 
 befal him. The Peishwa, in the fullness of time, accepted the regulating 
 trammels which he had so long and so resolutely evaded ; and the 
 Governor-General flattered himself, that his control over that slippery 
 Potentate, and through him over the whole Mahratta Confederacy, was 
 thenceforth assured. Nor did the difficulties which he experienced from 
 the outset in this case prevent his ardent mind from anticipating that the
 
 ANGLO-HINDOO MYSORE. Xxiii 
 
 defeat of Sindia and the Bonslay would enable him not only to dominate, 
 but to reform their governments, in accordance with his cherished 
 scheme. The Guikwar was already our decided ally, though his ad- 
 ministrative feebleness and his poverty impeded our operations in the 
 Holkar war, and gave our authority over him too much the appearance, 
 for the time at least, of a burdensome rather than a profitable connexion. 
 The adventurer Holkar, whose fortune (in his own words) was on the 
 saddle of his horse, illegitimate both in a natural and political sense, 
 was to be obliterated as a ruler. In the Governor-General's phrase, 
 he was not one of the regular Powers of India. And the defection to 
 him of the Rajah of Bhurtpore was instantly met by a decree that the 
 Rajah should be deposed, and his dominions annexed, as the penalty of 
 his faithlessness. The Rajput States were to be protected, so as to 
 impose an additional barrier against the revival of Sindia's power in 
 Hindostan. 
 
 Such was the Governor-General's extensive scheme of Indian pacifi- 
 cation and political re-organization. It is needless here to specify how 
 much of this remained for the time unaccomplished. It will, however, 
 be necessary presently to consider Wellington's testimony as to the 
 working of his brother's system in the cases of the Nizam, the Peishwa, 
 and Sindia. This is the more necessary from the desponding and, at 
 first sight, almost unaccountable picture presented by Lord Cornwallis in 
 some of his last Despatches. 1 Though his statement is obviously over- 
 coloured, the attentive reader of Wellington's correspondence will be at 
 no loss to understand the amount of truth which underlies it, and its 
 apparent inconsistency with the general impression conveyed by Lord 
 Wellesley's glowing description of the results of his measures. 
 
 Meanwhile let us turn to the more pleasing subject of Anglo-Hindoo 
 Mysore. It was a fortunate circumstance that, so early in his career, 
 the Governor-General had an opportunity of setting up a model Hindoo 
 State, the pure result of conquest, unaffected by previous diplomatic con- 
 ditions, owing its very existence to the spontaneous benevolence of the 
 British Power, determined from the first, in the fashion of its life, by the 
 stipulations and restrictions imposed by the victor in the charter of its 
 constitution, avowedly dependent upon British support, naturally anta- 
 gonistic to the anti-English traditions of the Mahometan dynasty, and 
 
 1 Thus, e. g. he says, ' The states who are most intimately connected with us, such 
 as the Peshwa and the Nizam, are reduced to the most forlorn condition ; — these Powers 
 possess no funds or troops on whom they can depend ; — anarchy and disaffection 
 prevail universally throughout their dominions, and — unless the British Residents 
 exercised a power and an ascendancy that they ought not to exert, those Govern- 
 ments would be immediately dissolved.' See Wellesley Selections, p. 803,
 
 XXIV WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 actually united with us in interest and in the consciousness that our 
 friends and foes were the same as its own ; or rather, that we were 
 its only sincere friends and protectors against the otherwise overwhelm- 
 ing chances of its speedy destruction by the more independent and 
 powerful States in its neighbourhood. There might be danger of a 
 want of internal vitality. But there was no reason to fear systematic 
 obstruction, treachery, or the unmanageable and suicidal inaptitude, 
 which had degraded and destroyed the Arcot State, and made Oude 
 proverbial for misgovernment. The minority of the Rajah postponed 
 some serious difficulties. Under the government of Tippoo and his 
 father, the people, both great and small, had been trained to implicit 
 obedience ; and the blighting influence of Mahratta anarchy and spoli- 
 ation had been favourably contrasted by the cruel and capricious, yet 
 comparatively orderly and fostering tyranny of the Sultan. Thus the 
 elements of national wealth and prosperity did not require creating ; 
 though they had hitherto been too exclusively employed in maintain- 
 ing a disproportionately large army, in constructing fortifications, and 
 in other military purposes. The re-employment of Poorneah was a 
 most judicious step. An able Brahmin accountant, an experienced 
 minister of finance under Tippoo, clear-sighted in his plans for the 
 improvement of the country, and active and persevering in carrying 
 them out ; jealous of the honour and qualified independance of the 
 State, but not incapable of appreciating and working cordially with such 
 men as the Resident and Colonel Wellesley ; a good man of business, 
 and one who inspired confidence in so severe a judge of native character 
 as the Colonel 1 : — such a man was certainly very happily adapted to 
 promote the success of so delicate, and, at that time, so novel an ex- 
 periment. But Wellington's authority and example were also most 
 important, not to say indispensable ingredients in the full cup of triumph 
 quaffed by the Governor-General in his capacity of king-maker. It is 
 impossible, in a few paragraphs, to do full justice to Wellington's 
 administrative merits, as they are exhibited incidentally and unostenta- 
 tiously in the long array of letters, on a curious variety of subjects, 
 which flowed from his ever active brain and ready pen, in the course of 
 his duty as Commandant of Seringapatam, and military guardian of the 
 resuscitated State. But the specimens of his official and private cor- 
 respondence here given will, it is hoped, sufficiently indicate the spirit in 
 which he ruled, and the principles which guided his conduct. He is, in 
 the best sense, an amicus curiae to the dewan ; sustaining him by 
 his sympathy; counselling him in his difficulties; carefully refraining 
 
 1 See p. 535.
 
 ANGLO-HINDOO MYSORE. XXV 
 
 not only from harsh dictation, but from untimely and excessive inter- 
 ference ; making much of the native authorities ; rebuking the insolence, 
 and sternly repressing the licentious tendencies of the English officers, 
 and teaching them to respect the civil power ; cordially approving, and 
 handsomely acknowledging Poorneah's ability, rectitude, punctual fidelity 
 to the stipulations of the alliance, and successful conduct of public 
 affairs ; and parting with him at last, on the best terms, with a few 
 seasonable and impressive words of good advice, and with the gift of a 
 portrait, which must often, in after times, have inspired in his old coad- 
 jutor sentiments akin to those with which the veteran sepoys, in earlier 
 days, were wont to salute the picture of Sir Eyre Coote. Fortunate 
 indeed was the Governor-General to possess at once two such instru- 
 ments for the working out of his favourite problem ! 
 
 Besides one or two more summary references to the prosperous state 
 of Mysore, there will be found in the Appendix a detailed and interest- 
 ing account of Poorneah's system and its good results, submitted to the 
 Governor-General on the eve of the writer's return to England. The 
 general condition of the native States with which we had been pre- 
 viously connected had, as a rule, been most unsatisfactory. The govern- 
 ment had been equally improvident of its own interests, of its obli- 
 gations to the Company, and of the welfare of its subjects. Little care 
 had been taken either to maintain internal order, to guard against 
 foreign aggression, or to rule, in any sense, paternally. The appliances 
 of civilization had been allowed to go to ruin, and the natural resources 
 of the country had been progressively impaired. Thus the revenue had 
 dwindled more and more ; and what was realized had been lavished on 
 courtly luxury, vicious indulgence on the part of the ruler and his 
 sycophants, and in maintaining a wretchedly disciplined and equipped 
 body of troops, who, systematically kept in arrears of pay (Orme says) 
 from fear of their deserting, had been useless against the enemy, formidable 
 to their employers, and had preyed on the population, and aggravated 
 the general poverty and misery. The corruptly appointed ministers and 
 collectors had impartially plundered both the people and the ruler. And 
 the subsidiary claims of the Company had been either allowed to accu- 
 mulate unsatisfied, or had been satisfied only by a ruinous plan of mort- 
 gaging the revenue to money lenders, who by their rapacity still further 
 blighted agriculture ; kept their creditor in an ignominious thraldom ; 
 and tended to commit him more and more to courses, which were sure 
 to end in a serious quarrel between him and the English Government. 
 Although this picture is a too familiar one to the reader of early Anglo- 
 Indian history, it seems well to recal it, in order to do full justice, by the 
 contrast, to Poorneah's management.
 
 XXVI WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 The flourishing condition of the Sultan's dominions, compared to other 
 native territories, had surprised the English at the time of the conquest. 
 Seringapatam had on that occasion been plundered. But the shortness 
 of the war, the directness of the march of the invaders on the capital, and 
 the rapid pacification of the country, had averted the devastation which 
 might otherwise have ensued. Dhoondiah was soon driven out of the 
 Mysore territory. And the troubles that followed were mostly beyond 
 the boundaries of the new State, or at least, of its better cultivated dis- 
 tricts. Thus the sword was sheathed, or rather energetically employed 
 in guarding the fruits of industry ; new and peaceful settlers were invited 
 to enter the country; and the dewaris liberal expenditure on public 
 works, and remission of land tax on emergencies, promoted agriculture 
 so effectually, that Wellington describes the country as a garden. An 
 increasing revenue was realized without oppression, a stated proportion 
 of which was set apart annually, to meet the extraordinary demands 
 which the British Government, under the Treaty, was entitled to make. 
 Wellington does not even think it necessary to mention, that the ordinary 
 payments to the Company were regularly defrayed. But he does, else- 
 where, object to Poorneah's voluntary proposal of going beyond the 
 terms of the Treaty, in contributing to the cost of the Mahratta War. 
 The prosperity and elasticity of the resources of Mysore were also strik- 
 ingly exhibited in the ease and completeness with which Wellington's 
 large applications for stores and transport were satisfied both at that crisis, 
 and when he had been in the field against Dhoondiah. Lastly, Mysore 
 was in a condition to export much corn to the Malabar Coast, for sup- 
 plying the wants of Bombay and Poonah. 
 
 Equally notable is the fact, that we hear of no extortion, injustice, or 
 misgovernment of any kind, on the part of this remarkable ex-minister of 
 the truculent Sultan. Wellington rejoiced at the spectacle of Mysorean 
 prosperity. But he rejoiced with trembling. For too well he knew that 
 it was due to a singularly favourable conjuncture of circumstances ; and 
 with prophetic insight he earnestly deprecated the interference of the 
 Madras officials in its management ; and insisted that it ought to be placed, 
 like the Rajput States in our own day, under the immediate authority of 
 the Governor-General, through an agent to be sent from Bengal. 
 
 The minority of the Rajah, as I have already said, postponed some 
 serious difficulties, and allowed free scope to the minister's abilities. 
 
 Internal order was maintained by a military organization well suited 
 to the special character and circumstances of the people. In the first 
 place, while in the regular army the cavalry service attracted the higher 
 class of native gentlemen, Tippoo's veteran battalions were re-embodied, 
 commanded by the sirdars of the State, and punctually paid, on the same
 
 DHOONDIAH WAUGH. XXVlt 
 
 scale as the Company's sepoys. Thus one great danger of disturbance 
 was removed ; and a force was provided for the defence of the State, and 
 for co-operation with the English, which, as Wellington strongly and re- 
 peatedly testifies, was found most useful in the stress of the Mahratta 
 War. Next, a considerable body of peons, or irregular infantry, was per- 
 manently entertained, for important garrison duty, state escort, and at- 
 tendance on government officials. Of these troops it is said, ' they are 
 select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are con- 
 sidered to be entirely trustworthy.' 
 
 The population was not likely to suffer at the hands of such men, vigi- 
 lantly supervised. But thirdly, as Mysore had been, under Mahometan 
 sway, one vast camp, there was much ground for fearing that the bulk of 
 the people, so long associated with war, in one way or another, would be 
 loth to settle down to peaceful occupations, and might by their turbu- 
 lence seriously endanger the stability of the new rule. This was skilfully 
 guarded against by another institution. ' The ancient military force of the 
 country,' as distinguished from the mere cultivators an 1 artificers, under 
 the name of Candachar^ww, were embodied in very laige numbers in 
 the first instance (though gradually reduced when the new government 
 became more settled), as a local militia, with a small constant pay, ' half 
 in money, and half in lands,' from their respective villages ; but with an 
 additional stipend, apparently from the State, when called out in Mysore, 
 and batta, or extra service allowance, if ordered out of the country. Each 
 military family contributed one of its members to the corps ; and might 
 relieve him, at discretion, by another. The Candachar peons were also 
 cultivators ; and their ordinary duty was to garrison the village fort, and 
 act as police in their own immediate district. Such well considered 
 guarantees of order speak for themselves. Wellington gives the whole 
 credit of the arrangement to the deivan ; but it was in all probability a 
 good deal due to his own suggestions. 
 
 II. DHOONDIAH WAUGH. 
 
 Wellington's campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh was his first enter- 
 prise as an independent commander in the field. The importance of the 
 service, both at the time and afterwards, was very great. Indeed, as I 
 have already intimated, while the prompt and complete reduction of this 
 dangerous adventurer was essential to the successful establishment of the 
 Mysore government; the working out of the Governor- General's Mah- 
 ratta policy, on which the issues of his whole administration mainly 
 turned, was greatly facilitated by it. That campa'gn proved Wellington's 
 fitness for the practical conduct of Indian warfare ; and thereby both
 
 XXVlii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 suggested and justified his selection for the delicate task of restoring the 
 Peishwa, and assuming the management of the diplomatic and military 
 operations in the Dekkan. It enabled him to bring to the test of suc- 
 cessful experiment many of his favourite and well-pondered ideas on the 
 strategical and tactical requirements of a field of action similar in some 
 respects, but on the whole more dissimilar, to a European theatre of war. 
 It brought him into intimate relations with the country, the authorities, 
 the chiefs, the troops, the people, that it was so essential for him to un- 
 derstand thoroughly, when the great crisis, which he thus early foresaw, 
 should at last arrive. It strongly impressed on his mind the salutary con- 
 sideration of the importance of Seringapatam as a military base for ope- 
 rations in the North. It inspired the minor Mahratta feudatories with 
 confidence in his star ; and what was equally essential, cemented a cordial 
 and lasting friendship between him and many of the ' Southern Jaghire- 
 dars,' whose co-operation was of primary consequence to the accomplish- 
 ment of the first great object, the replacing of the Peishwa on the musnud, 
 with the acquiescence of his immediate dependents. And it converted 
 one who might easily have become an instrument in the hands of Sindia 
 for disturbing the Mysore Settlement, and involving us in premature hosti- 
 lities with the Peishwa and his people, into an indirect means of daunting 
 Sindia at the time, and of ultimately depriving him of his dangerous 
 ascendancy in the South, and crushing his power altogether. Thus in 
 this case, as throughout his whole career, Wellington forged each link of 
 his course so patiently and solidly, that it became a strong security for the 
 indefinite lengthening of the chain. 
 
 Though it was not surprising that the Commandant of Seringapatam, 
 the responsible military authority in Mysore, and so careful an observer 
 of the events of Indian history, should at once appreciate the importance 
 of suppressing Dhoondiah ; yet Wellington's determination to do the work 
 himself; his anticipation that it might have to be done on a great scale; 
 the deliberate and methodical course of his advance ; his careful exposi- 
 tion of his plan to Colonel Stevenson ; his happy device of coursing an 
 enemy, whom circumstances made it almost impossible to overtake in a 
 direct run, and catching him in his doublings ; the vigour which brought 
 him within reach of the game when he was believed to be at a safe dis- 
 tance ; and the summary and complete catastrophe, are all characteristic, 
 and in accordance with his precepts and conduct on similar occasions. 
 Until Mysore is quiet, he is no more inclined to go to Batavia, than later, 
 in spite of Massena's taunts, he was to quit Torres Vedras, and compro- 
 mise the security of Portugal, and other still more extensive interests. 
 ' How great a matter a little fire kindleth,' in such a combustible atmo- 
 sphere as that of India, he knew full well, and insists upon frequently and
 
 LHOONDJAH WAUGH. XXIX 
 
 forcibly, as on occasion of the second outbreak in Wynaad, at the open- 
 ing of the war with Holkar, and after the failure of the assaults on Bhurt- 
 pore. And the most expeditious march he ever made (see p. 548) was 
 in pursuit of a body oUooties, whose impunity might soon have rekindled the 
 warlike fire, that was still smouldering in so many native breasts. His 
 admirable and exhaustive account of Monson's disaster illustrates through- 
 out the serious consequences apt to result from the neglect of such pre- 
 cautions as he took in this campaign, and which made it so rapidly 
 successful, that, as in other cases, the preliminary merits of the chief 
 performer are apt to be overlooked, and the catching of the hare to be 
 assumed as a matter of course. And whereas we shall have to observe 
 later, how clearly Wellington foresaw and predicted the great develop- 
 ment of the Pindari system, in consequence of the neglect of those safe- 
 guards and prompt measures against marauders, which he provided as 
 far as he could ; it is worth while to observe here, that what I have ven- 
 tured to call his plan of coursing Dhoondiah, was pursued over much of 
 the same ground in the case of the Peishwa after the battle of Kirkee ; and 
 ended in his being caught, to continue the comparison, on his form, and 
 compelled to surrender to Malcolm. Wellington again practised much 
 the same tactics against the Bullum Rajah, who however experienced a 
 sterner fate, being hanged without scruple, as 'the King of the World' 
 would probably have been, had he fallen alive into the hands of his 
 pursuer. The victor's care for Dhoondiah's son gives a pleasing touch 
 of sentiment to the closing scene of a contest, which to a fastidious mind 
 might seem rather an ignoble occupation for the future antagonist of 
 Napoleon. But it was because he did not despise the day of small 
 things ; because he gleaned knowledge from every available quarter, and 
 was ever ready to apply it to new uses 1 , that he learnt, after subduing 
 barbarism in its native haunts, to overthrow revived barbarism, in the 
 guise of Caesarism, in Europe. 
 
 III. THE MALABAR COAST. 
 
 The papers collected under this head illustrate what may be called, 
 except to the readers of the Duke's Supplementary Despatches, an un- 
 known chapter of Anglo-Indian history. The standard narratives of the 
 period to which they relate give no account of it. Mill does not notice 
 it. Wilks unfortunately brings his admirable history to a close at the 
 fall of Seringapatam. Colonel Gurwood, intent on matters of greater 
 
 1 Thus e.g. having read his Cresar carefully, he proceeded to construct basket 
 boats for the crossing of rivers.
 
 XXX WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 and more general interest, suppressed, with two exceptions, the documents 
 here selected, and which relate to what, in Wellington's own words, may 
 be called these little wars of a great country. But the thanks of the 
 public are certainly due to the noble Editor of the Supplementary 
 Despatches, for no longer withholding a series of papers which, however 
 subordinate in immediate importance to those which deal with the more 
 celebrated events of the time, and however obscure occasionally for want 
 of a systematic narrative of the occurrences which elicited them, yet 
 throw much light on Wellington's judgment and activity in his southern 
 command ; and upon the measures which he pursued or recommended 
 for the settlement of the most inaccessible and turbulent country ever 
 subjected to our direct or indirect authority in India. 
 
 In the present case, the difficulty of selection has been greater than 
 usual. It was indispensable to confine the extracts to such proportions as 
 were compatible with the dimensions of a single volume, which attempts 
 to include what is most important in the long array of Wellington's Indian 
 papers. But it was not easy to do this without presenting the chosen 
 materials in a more than ordinarily fragmentary form. If both Editor 
 and reader are thus placed at some disadvantage, it is hoped that what 
 here appears will exhibit clearly enough, as well as from a new point 
 of view, the same spectacle of conscientious and untiring intelligence 
 which meets us in every part of the great Duke's military career. 
 
 The interest attaching to the Malabar Coast, south of Goa, and 
 its conterminous regions on and around the Ghats, was great and 
 various. Among its crowd of historical associations, it may be enough 
 now to mention that Gama had landed on its shore, and opened the 
 European era of Indian history. The physical characteristics of the 
 country were remarkable and impressive ; — its indented coast, its preci- 
 pitous, nullah - scored, and towering mountain-chain, its deep, dark 
 gorges, its magnificent forests of tall trees and dense underwood, its 
 luxuriant and varied flora, stimulated by the terrific monsoon deluge, its 
 furious torrents in the rainy season, and the grand perspective of sea and 
 shore and wild woodland, disclosed from its majestic elevations. The 
 people had always, within historical memory, been as strange and wild as 
 the country they inhabited. A curious colluvies gentium had gathered 
 along the coast, the result of long intercourse with the West ; though, as 
 in Ireland, the uncouthness of the surroundings seemed to have exerted 
 a transforming influence on the settlers, and to have converted their 
 descendants into very irregular types of their respective races. Inland, 
 the Nairs and Moplahs, the former Hindoos, the latter of alleged 
 Arabian origin, and Mussulmans in faith, but both very unlike their 
 co-religionists elsewhere, were the most prominent and influential classes ;
 
 THE MALABAR COAST. XXXI 
 
 and, like the Druses and Maronites in the Lebanon, had long been 
 pitted against each other in traditional hostility, though ready enough to 
 make common cause against all who would deprive them of the freedom 
 of the forest. Chiefs they had, but mostly of the polygar class, rude and 
 turbulent rulers over followers of the same stamp. The village system, 
 which elsewhere, amid a state of general warfare, had often maintained 
 some trace of order and fostered peaceful industry, was here made con- 
 ducive to perpetual strife. The single village was virtually a fortress ; and 
 the union of several for the purpose of common defence converted the 
 whole into a strongly though roughly entrenched camp. There was little 
 cultivation in the forest region ; and besides plundering their more peaceable 
 neighbours, these wild men of the woods supplied their simple wants by 
 bartering the spontaneous productions of their country for rice and other 
 commodities at the European factories, and other towns along the coast. 
 Yet, by a singular caprice of nature, in the midst of this primeval wild, 
 and with no advantages of training, arose a chief who in intelligence, 
 frankness, generosity, and delicacy, would have put to shame many of 
 the fine gentlemen of more civilized climes. Such, however his character- 
 istics are to be accounted for, was the Rajah of Coorg, who impressed 
 Wellington so favourably, and of whom many remarkable stories are 
 recorded. But the Pyche Rajah in Wynaad, and the Rajah of Bullum in 
 the North, were men of a very different stamp, and more closely re- 
 sembled the robber chieftains of the Rhine in the days of Rudolph of 
 Hapsburg. 
 
 It may be desirable to say a few words on the later fortunes of this 
 wild region, before it came under English control. It had been overrun 
 and annexed by Hyder a few years after he had become supreme in 
 Mysore, and on the eve of his first war with the Company. He used it 
 chiefly as a recruiting-ground for his chela battalions, which he raised by 
 a forced conscription in his own dominions, and by kidnapping the sub- 
 jects of his neighbours. But, unlike Bednore which he conquered once 
 for all, it baffled even his military skill, activity, and resolution. Its 
 inhabitants rose in frequent and obstinate rebellion against him ; and he 
 never succeeded in effectually pacifying them. Again and again he made 
 fierce raids into the country, left terrible monuments of his vengeance, 
 and established military posts ; but only to experience renewed resistance, 
 and fatal proofs of the determined spirit of independence which glowed 
 in the hearts of the desperate jungle-wallahs. Twice the English attacked 
 him on this coast, relying on the sympathy in their favour which a common 
 hatred was likely to excite. On the first occasion Hyder expelled them 
 summarily in ignominious rout ; but he did not live to repeat the process 
 on the second invasion. Tippoo was at once more cruel and still more
 
 XXXli WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 unsuccessful in his dealings with the people of these regions. To 
 political tyranny, and military severity, he added a systematic and whole- 
 sale religious persecution of the Nairs. The Peace of Mangalore had 
 delivered him, for the time, from English interposition. But he could 
 not subdue a people who, aided by their local advantages, had proved 
 too strong for his father. And when he again became involved in war 
 with the Company, his weakness in this part of his dominions was soon 
 revealed. The coast was rapidly reduced by Hartley. Above the hills, 
 the Rajah of Coorg, who had escaped from a Mysorean dungeon, became 
 a serious thorn in Tippoo's side, and an useful ally to Cornwallis. And as 
 the war proceeded, extensive desertions occurred among the Malabar 
 chelas ; and in the confusion of the night attack on the lines covering 
 Seringapatam, 10.000 of them escaped with arms in their hands, and 
 many of them with their families (whom the Sultan's suspicious tyranny 
 had detained as hostages for the fidelity of their relatives), and returned 
 to their secluded haunts in the Western forests. At the Peace, the 
 Province of Malabar Proper was ceded to the British ; and Cornwallis 
 extorted from the reluctant and vindictive Sultan the independence of 
 the Rajah of Coorg. The disputed district of Wynaad was restored to 
 Tippoo shortly before the final war ; but it fell again into our hands on 
 the conquest, together with Canara, which the Mauritius embassy had at 
 once determined Lord Mornington to demand. Thus politically we 
 were now established along the whole length of the Malabar Coast, from 
 Goa to Cochin. 
 
 But, though our zealous confederates in destroying the tyranny under 
 which they had so long groaned, the people of its new domain were little 
 disposed to brook the dominion of the Company, however mild in com- 
 parison with the iron bondage of Hyder, and the ferocious and indis- 
 criminate rigour of his son. Except at the coast stations, the Company's 
 authority in the country was, for some time, little more than nominal, as 
 may be inferred from Wellington's language. In Malabar Proper, though 
 it had been longest in our hands, property and life were still very in- 
 secure ; and were made the more so by the proximity of Wynaad, the 
 focus of sedition and a mere robber den, presided over by the redoubt- 
 able and inaccessible Pyche Rajah. Canara, a recent acquisition, and 
 within range of the Bullum Rajah's influence and incursions, was not 
 likely to prove less troublesome. From the Coorg Rajah personally we 
 had nothing to fear, and much to hope. But his hold over his subjects 
 was precarious, at least when it ran counter to their predatory disposition. 
 And though Bullum was included in the new Kingdom of Mysore, and 
 Poorneah was most anxious to tranquillize it ; this could only be done 
 under Wellington's auspices, and with the aid of British troops. Thus
 
 THE MALABAR COAST. XXX111 
 
 the Commandant of Seringapatam, in addition to his other cares, was 
 called upon to solve a knotty problem in the West. 
 
 He addressed himself to the task with his usual sagacity, thoroughness, 
 and careful consideration of the special circumstances of the case. His 
 plan differed essentially from Hyder's rough and ready expedients, and 
 was fundamentally opposed to Tippoo's merciless and exasperating 
 attempts at terrorism. It was not less vigorous, and far more systematic 
 and definitive than the former ; and was guided by a principle precisely 
 the reverse of that which dictated the latter. Its object was to hunt 
 out resistance, follow it up, step by step, in every direction, and com- 
 pletely prostrate it everywhere, in the first instance; next to occupy 
 permanently such positions, and to lay the country so entirely open to 
 our troops, as would secure the military command of every part of it ; 
 bring our power promptly to bear wherever it was required; and thus 
 check any symptoms of renewed disorder before it could gather to a 
 head, or diffuse its baneful influence elsewhere. Lastly he proposed, 
 while continuing the pursuit of the Pyche Rajah, summarily executing 
 obstinate rebels, and disarming the people generally, to apply lenitives to 
 the chronic maladies of the community, by establishing a mild and just 
 civil government ; by convincing those whom he had vanquished, not only 
 that he was in a condition to vanquish them again if necessary, but that 
 their immediate interest lay in submitting to the moderate requisitions of 
 the British Power, securing exemption from the mutual wrongs and 
 general anarchy that had so long afflicted and impoverished them, and 
 enjoying rights and privileges which would indefinitely improve their 
 social condition, but which were incompatible with the continuance of 
 their lawless habits. Thus by well-concerted and actively-conducted 
 military measures at first, by the prompt chastisement of turbulent indi- 
 viduals and instigators of disaffection when the war should have ceased, 
 and by a vigilant, righteous, and beneficent administration, he hoped 
 to dominate their spirits as well as their bodies, to conciliate them, and 
 to plant the fruitful seeds of a civilization, which was as yet to them an 
 utterly unknown Gospel. 
 
 Such was the general outline of his scheme. And if its success was 
 more tardy and qualified than might have been hoped, rather than 
 confidently expected, it certainly was not his fault. The almost insu- 
 perable difficulties presented by the geographical character of the upper 
 country, and the active hostility of its irreconcileable chief; together with 
 the remissness and want of cordiality among the subordinate British 
 officers, the capricious temper and inveterately evil tendencies of the 
 Nairs — ' gentlemen, and probably the idlest of that character,' — and 
 latterly, the confidence imparted to the disaffected by the Mahratta defi- 
 
 d
 
 XXxiv WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 ance of the British Government, must be taken into account. As Holkar 
 broke out desperately even after Sindia and the Rajah of Berar had 
 been so suddenly and completely crushed ; so, when Wellington marched 
 against the Mahrattas, Malabar, as well as Wynaad, was again in commo- 
 tion, although he had previously subdued it so thoroughly. But not the 
 less was the scheme of conquest and pacification judicious, and effectual 
 in the end in both cases, except so far as the errors of others limited its 
 application. And the best proof of its merits is, that under all the dis- 
 advantages of the situation, Wellington accomplished, in the course of a 
 few months, much more than Hyder had effected, or indeed attempted, 
 throughout his reign. For the first time in history, the dense jungles 
 were made accessible ; small bodies of troops could now traverse, without 
 fear of being cut off, districts where formerly ' armies whole had sunk ;' 
 and could readily join or co-operate with similar corps, acting on adjacent 
 lines of new road. And whereas Hyder's ' block-houses ' had been 
 isolated, beleaguered, and sometimes overwhelmed by the wily and 
 tumultuous insurgents, whom even his long arm was unable to reach, 
 when the monsoon aggravated the constant obstacles to the march of his 
 troops ; Wellington's well-selected and well-supplied posts were both 
 stronger in themselves, better able to support each other, and within hail 
 of a relieving force, which his roads brought within easy distance at 
 all times of the year. Thus even while the Pyche Rajah continued at 
 large, and before the people were disarmed, tranquillity, and an approach 
 to civilized life altogether unprecedented in such a country, prevailed for 
 some time. And when a casual occurrence interrupted this fair prospect, 
 Wellington wrote : — 
 
 ' I hear that the insurrection is by no means pleasing to the majority of the 
 inhabitants, and that the common cry is for you [the civil magistrate] to 
 return' (p. 150). 
 
 So much progress had already been made in realising even that part of 
 his plan which might have seemed least hopeful, or feasible only after a 
 long lapse of time. 
 
 As to the road-cutting, it is worth mention, that one of the greatest 
 generals of mediaeval India, Sultan Ala-u-din, had, according to a con- 
 temporary and credible Mussulman historian, conquered the Mewattie 
 wilds in the same way; after its inhabitants had long kept the capital 
 itself in terror by their bold raids into the open country, and even to 
 the gates of Delhi. Also that Wellington, who had been a military 
 student at Angers, and was not likely to fail in gathering lessons from 
 the war in La Vendue, was perhaps the more impressed with the neces- 
 sity of opening such wide roads, and guarding well the flanks of the 
 parties which traversed them (as he so repeatedly directs), from his per-
 
 THE MALABAR COAST. XXXV 
 
 ception of the fatal results which had attended the neglect of similar 
 precautions by the Republican generals. 
 
 Energetic and determined as he was in prosecuting military measures, 
 and unsparing in the chastisement of red-handed rebellion, Wellington's 
 antipathy to martial law, and strong faith in the ameliorating efficacy of 
 civil institutions, are here fully brought out. He sets his face as a flint 
 against the request to ' allow the full operation of martial law ' in Malabar 
 and Canara ; and disclaims in the most comprehensive terms all sympathy 
 with so crude a form of personal government as the will of the General. 
 When his decided opinion has been, to a certain extent, overruled, he 
 deeply regrets the temporary necessity of suspending the civil adminis- 
 tration^ and reconciles himself to it only by the consideration that such 
 a step was essential in order to carry out the disarming of the people : 
 this done, he looks forward with complacency to the re-establishment and 
 salutary action of the ordinary magistrature. He argues that this is 
 not only a more respectable and trustworthy machinery for keeping the 
 country quiet than the military regime ; but, in spite of its alleged costli- 
 ness, a cheaper expedient in the end, because it is more likely to super- 
 sede the necessity of repeated military operations. And he strenuously ex- 
 culpates the Collector from the charge of having by his harshness driven 
 the inhabitants to revolt. He does indeed advise him to assess Wynaad 
 more lightly ; and offers to bear him out, if he is afraid of seeming by 
 so doing to condemn himself for his previous arrangements. But this is 
 on account of the peculiar character of the district, which is ' no object 
 to the Company as one from which revenue is to be drawn. It is essen- 
 tial to us to hold it as a military position, which awes the whole of the 
 province of Malabar.' Thus he implies no censure of Macleod, much 
 less any misgiving as to the preferableness of civil administration to 
 martial law. When the troubles recommence in the upland region, he 
 is most urgent with this officer, who though a soldier was engaged in 
 civil functions, that he should instantly ' take a trip to Wynaad,' as the 
 surest and only effectual way of nipping the evil in the bud. And so 
 convinced is he of this, that though he contemplates marching in person 
 to suppress it, he plainly states that he will not ' go in ' unaccompanied by 
 the civil authorities. It may be added that his directions to the officer 
 who proposed to demolish indiscriminately the deserted villages in the 
 disaffected country shew the same civic spirit, which is also pointedly, 
 and sometimes amusingly, manifested in other military awards and 
 directions, inserted in the Appendix \ Equally significant is his desire 
 to quarter as few troops as possible in the scene of the insurrection ; and 
 
 1 See e.g. Nos. 334, 343, 364, 366, 367, 373, 375, 377, 378. 
 
 da
 
 XXXVi WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 quite consistent with this general desire, his later request for a reinforce- 
 ment, not that he may let loose upon the people the horrors of war, but 
 as a • moral demonstration,' lest the idea that we are fully occupied with 
 the Mahrattas should promote the rising, and so paralyse the civil govern- 
 ment. To the same effect the Proclamation issued in Wynaad may be 
 cited. 
 
 The case of the Rajah of Bullum and his peculiarly strong country 
 afforded a crucial test of the efficacy of Wellington's method of establish- 
 ing order in the backwoods. The Company's maritime provinces had suf- 
 fered much from the incursions and malign influence of this determined 
 aggressor ; and he and his people utterly set at naught the authority of 
 their nominal Sovereign, the Rajah of Mysore. But after a while, he 
 was driven out of the lower country, and intrenched himself within his 
 own territory at Arakeery, a district which is graphically described by 
 Wellington, who fully explains both its natural and artificial advantages 
 for resistance. Here then the chace became hot ; and the English com- 
 mander proceeded to apply his various means of constraint. Bouche va 
 toujours was ever in his thoughts ; and he promptly takes steps to cut off all 
 supplies to his enemy from Canara and Coorg, and to foil his attempts 
 to forage nearer home. In concert with Poorneah, to whose ability and 
 zeal, and the activity of his soldiers, he bears high testimony, he sur- 
 rounds the devoted district with a cordon of troops ; planting also rein- 
 forcements below the Ghats, cutting no less than three roads through the 
 passes from Canara, and another right through the heart of Bullum itself. 
 He maintains a strong post in the immediate neighbourhood of the 
 Rajah's quarters, and others at suitable places, especially where they 
 command the passes. Poorneah's troops, meanwhile, explore and 
 occupy Bullum in all directions, and station themselves in the accessible 
 villages. As their success, backed by the progress of the Company's 
 arms, becomes more certain, Poorneah, by Wellington's advice, proposes 
 an accommodation to the people — as distinct from their chief; on condi- 
 tion of their demolishing their defences, surrendering their arms, and 
 substantially recognizing the sovereignty of Mysore by paying their 
 arrears of revenue. To this they consent, and the fulfilment of the terms 
 goes on apace, but not without the stimulus and precaution of securing 
 the head-men, the former leaders of sedition, detaining them as hostages, 
 and impressing them with the edifying spectacle of the public execution 
 of the most guilty. Thus, deserted by the bulk of his subjects, and 
 straitened for provisions, the unfortunate Rajah is fain to change his 
 quarters once more ; and with a daily diminishing number of attendants, 
 flies to the inaccessible jungles that clothe the Western slopes of the 
 mountains. Here he is beset and watched, as before, on all sides ; and
 
 THE NIZAM. XXXVli 
 
 at last, like Cceur de Lion, his quest of food betrays his lurking-place, and 
 he is captured by a party of dismounted horsemen. But his fate is more 
 summary than that of the great Crusader. And what Wellington, with 
 grim jocularity, calls his ' suspension ' closes the sylvan tragedy, strikes 
 terror into his people, facilitates the settlement of his country, and attests 
 the accuracy of his conqueror's judgment. 
 
 Not the least of Wellington's anxieties, it will be observed, was lest 
 the public service should suffer from the differences of opinion, misunder- 
 standings, or misrepresentations that prevailed among his subordinates, 
 and which tended to make them unsympathetic, if not antagonistic. To 
 this circumstance we are indebted for the memorable testimony which he 
 has recorded in favour of Cornwallis, as specially skilful in discerning the 
 merits of public officers, and habitually happy in the choice of his instru- 
 ments. Not less interesting is his advice to Macleod, which prophetically 
 describes so exactly his own attitude, when defamation was busy with 
 his name during the earlier years of the Peninsular War. Such manly 
 counsels must have cheered and fortified at the time the mind to which 
 they were addressed ; and how vividly must the desponding Collector 
 have recalled them in after years, if he survived to witness their exempli- 
 fication by his whilome monitor ! 
 
 IV. THE NIZAM. 
 
 Lord Mornington, soon after his arrival in India, embodied in the 
 Minute 1 already referred to his views on the dangerous crisis which had 
 been provoked by Tippoo's restless and vindictive intrigues, culminating in 
 the mission to the Mauritius. In this celebrated document the Governor- 
 General took a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Native 
 Powers, and of our relations with them ; and vindicated a line of action 
 with reference to the Subahdar of the Dekkan, which was adopted with 
 complete success, so far as its immediate objects were concerned. By 
 the Treaty then concluded, Nizam Ally was assured that the ultra- 
 abstemious policy of Shore was definitively abandoned, and that the 
 English meant to stand his fast friends. And, in return, he was disposed 
 to co-operate cordially against the Sultan. His Prime Minister was 
 favourable to us. With some gentle pressure, the French battalions 
 were quietly broken up ; the officers were deported to Europe ; a large 
 proportion of the sepoys entered our service ; an efficient subsidiary force, 
 under our own control, was organized, which was to be supplemented 
 by a contingent of the Nizam's own troops ; and in the Mysore war he 
 rendered us much more substantial aid than he had given to Cornwallis. 
 
 1 See WelleJey Selections, pp. n-57.
 
 XXXVni WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 How much this was due to Wellington's personal influence, and 
 official authority in the Nizam's camp, will be readily estimated by ob- 
 serving his activity in arranging the other preliminaries of the campaign. 
 But it is also worth while to remark, that our feeble ally's military 
 condition had suggested ideas to Wellington, which are freely reproduced 
 in the Governor-General's Minute. Wellesley has been accused of over- 
 rating the danger threatened by the French corps in the service of the 
 Native Princes. If he did so in this case and at this time, his military 
 brother certainly misled him ; although it will appear that after the 
 Mahratta war the latter modified his view on the general question. ' The 
 existence,' says Wellington, ' even for a short time of such a power as 
 Raymond — maybe fairly stated as almost incompatible with the existence 
 of the British power in the Carnatic' That Raymond's force must be 
 dissolved, and the Frenchmen removed ; that even Englishmen — ad- 
 venturers as they must be — could not safely be allowed to repeat 
 Raymond's experiment ; that we must provide, and the Nizam defray 
 the cost of, the troops which are to defend him and his dominions 
 from external enemies : — all this Wellington asserts ; and the Governor- 
 General repeats and acts upon it. Yet, on the other hand, no less 
 notable is the contrast between Wellington's suggestions, and the 
 Governor-General's subsidiary alliance system, in its mature form ; espe- 
 cially after the Treaty of 1800, which professed permanently to identify 
 the Nizam's interests with our own, and actually turned him into a 
 thoroughly dependent, though an uneasy and troublesome vassal. In 
 Wellington's conception, at this stage, the military association is assumed 
 to be far looser, and more conditional, not to say occasional. To 
 prevent the payment of the subsidiary troops from falling into arrear, 
 the Nizam is, on the older plan, to appropriate to that object the 
 revenues of certain districts. But these are to be collected by the com- 
 manding officer, who is to account for them to the English Government. 
 The districts themselves are not to be assigned to the Company, lest 
 it should be drawn into a war in their defence (this seems not very 
 consistent with the object of the arrangement) ; and that the revenues 
 may not be absorbed in the general system of the Company's finance, 
 and so imperil in a new way the maintenance of the troops. This 
 proposal was ignored by the Governor-General, and indeed did not fit 
 into his scheme. But it will appear hereafter that Wellington was 
 sensitive on the point ; and that when the cry was raised in England 
 for diminishing the Anglo-Indian army, he laid great stress on the fact, 
 that large territories having been ceded outright for the keeping up of 
 the subsidiary forces, it was not only expedient but simply just, that 
 a much larger army should be retained than the arbitrary assumptions
 
 THE NIZAM. XXXIX 
 
 of the Directors had led them to prescribe. In the present paper he 
 is calculating what is required for the protection of the Nizam's domi- 
 nions against foreign foes. But when he considers later the necessity 
 of preserving internal tranquillity, he shews clearly, repeatedly, and with 
 great force, how much the Governor-General's Treaties, or rather their 
 imperfect execution, had left to be desired. While Wellesley plumed 
 himself upon having rescued the Subahdar from the French first, and 
 from the Mahrattas afterwards, and on having induced him to contribute 
 largely to the marshalling of a force, which was available for the general 
 defence and pacification of India ; Wellington, with local experience, 
 saw too clearly that the Native State, as a governing machine, was in 
 the worst possible working order. It had long been badly administered. 
 And, since Wellesley had taken it in hand, it had learned to lean too 
 exclusively on the English Power. It had paid heavily to be protected 
 by that Power ; and it interpreted this claim very liberally, as exempting 
 itself from the obligation of maintaining internal order by its own servants 
 and soldiers. It had practically abandoned the sword, without which no 
 ruler, especially in India, could be a terror to evil doers. It had still, 
 certainly, a quasi feudal array of Jaghiredars and their followers. But 
 such levies were ill-adapted to secure permanent tranquillity. 
 
 The authority of the Government was openly and constantly defied 
 by active freebooters, and required a very different force for its vin- 
 dication. Failing this, either the State must fall to pieces, or the sub- 
 sidiary troops must be doubled, the fortresses be placed in British 
 hands, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered. 
 
 This subject must be taken up again later. But one or two remarks 
 connected with it may not be out of place here. i. There is, at first 
 sight, as the passage quoted above from the Cornwallis correspondence 1 
 will show, a startling contradiction between Wellesley's estimate of the 
 favourable results of the subsidiary alliance system, and the melancholy 
 picture of imbecility and disorder in the allied States presented by 
 his successor. Though it may be said generally, that the out-going 
 Governor-General was perhaps almost as much disposed to give a 
 rose-tinted representation of the state of affairs, as Cornwallis was 
 inclined to paint them in the darkest hues, still Wellington's corres- 
 pondence proves that the contradiction was really less complete than 
 it seems on the surface ; and that the difference arose not a little 
 from the point of view in which the troubled scene was surveyed. 
 Wellesley's eager and commanding vision ranged at a glance from the 
 past to the future. Cornwallis was absorbed and overwhelmed by the 
 
 1 See p. xxiii, note.
 
 xl WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 spectacle immediately presented to his failing sight. Wellesley com- 
 memorated the destruction of the vast armaments that had so long 
 oppressed the country, turned a great part of it into a desert, and per- 
 petually menaced the very existence of our power ; and he proudly 
 announced the establishment of a system, which, when the strife was 
 over, should guarantee our pacific ascendancy, and the progressive 
 development of the hitherto latent or wasted resources of the native 
 States, under our inspiring and beneficent guidance. He may have 
 discounted somewhat too liberally his hopes of the future. But he was 
 fully justified in entertaining them, and in pointing out the tendency of 
 general causes to realise them. Cornwallis unfortunately arrived when 
 the strife was not over, in the midst of the confusion caused by the 
 Holkar war, and before Wellesley had had leisure to attend to the internal 
 regulation of the States more immediately involved in the previous hos- 
 tilities. Even had this not been the case, the inherent weakness and 
 vices of those States, and the diplomatic restrictions which limited his 
 right of interference, must have made the task of inducing them to fulfil 
 their duties, and place their so-called independent establishments upon a 
 proper footing, a slow and arduous one. Thus Cornwallis's picture 
 reflects partly the inveterate evils of previous misgovernment, partly the 
 exhausting effects of the desperate crisis through which India had been 
 passing, partly the still inchoate elements of a period of transition to 
 better times. Wellington is the connecting link between the two states- 
 men, and the interpreter, and to a certain extent the reconciler, of 
 their discordant utterances. While he justifies, in the main, his 
 brother's foreign policy, in its more general or imperial aspect, he 
 enables us to understand how unpromising and even disastrous it must 
 have seemed, at the moment, to the ultra-pacific and ultra-economical 
 Cornwallis, when he regarded only the actual condition of the Nizam's 
 or the Peishwa's internal or municipal government. 
 
 2. Perhaps even he might have taken some comfort, had he consi- 
 dered carefully the state of Mysore, and read Wellington's report upon it. 
 I have already said that circumstances were peculiarly favourable for the 
 establishment of good government there. Still it had actually been 
 established. And, apart from the subsidiary force, the Rajah's military 
 system presented an excellent specimen of what might be accomplished, 
 under British auspices, in a Native State, and a model for imitation else- 
 where. And the objection, that it was the greater preponderance of 
 English power there which had brought about this exceptionally favour- 
 able state of matters, would come with a bad grace from those who 
 complained of Wellesley's officious interference with the affairs, and 
 destruction of the independence, of our allies.
 
 THE NIZAM. xli 
 
 3. Wellington admitted the evil as fully as Cornwallis himself. 
 Writing as late as Jan. 10, 1804, he describes the state of the Nizam's 
 country as 'chaos itself (p. 184). But he was more hopeful of a 
 remedy. ' The state,' he says, ' must have troops paid by the public 
 revenues, through the medium of the public officers, without the inter- 
 vention of the jaghiredars.' In the same letter he suggests that our 
 Treaty relations with the Subahdar would justify the Resident in insisting 
 upon the requisite reform, as a condition precedent to the cession to 
 him of his allotted share of the conquests from the Mahrattas. The 
 Nizam was already bound to co-operate with a contingent of his own 
 troops. To stipulate that this should be fully kept up, or rather increased 
 after the peace, and should be paid by the Treasury, not by assignments 
 to jaghiredars, and should be in all cases directly in the service of the 
 government, and not consist, as did the infantry, of retainers of the feu- 
 datories, was indispensable, but was also feasible. To meet the increased 
 cost of these reforms additional revenue would be required. The most 
 obvious and only available internal resource appeared to be the re- 
 sumption of the jaghires. But Wellington shews that this would be an 
 objectionable expedient, and holds that, with proper management, the 
 Nizam's acquisitions in Berar will furnish the requisite funds. 
 
 A propos of this attempt to improve the terms of the connexion 
 between the Company and the Nizam, and thus to serve the interests of 
 both parties, it is not uninteresting to have a contemporary and inde- 
 pendent criticism on that connexion, from a native statesman and subject 
 of our ally. Meer Allum's peculiar position at the time may have made 
 him regard the arrangement with a rather prejudiced eye. But it is 
 evident that Wellington attached importance to his remarks, and he 
 seems to have taken some hints from them. 
 
 The veteran sovereign whose wily and chequered career was co-eval 
 with the rise of our Indian Empire, died at the opening of the Mahratta 
 War. But his successor, along with his territories and Treaty obligations, 
 inherited much of his treacherous and unscrupulous disposition. He con- 
 strained even Sir George Barlow to depart from his stereotyped policy of 
 non-intervention. And there is a strong family likeness in the un- 
 satisfactory circumstances noticeable in the conduct of both, after the 
 conclusion of the English alliance, which was supposed to associate their 
 interests so strictly with our own. Thus Wellington is convinced that 
 Nizam Ally was in collusion with Holkar, when that adventurer played 
 his great part in the Dekkan. The sly trick by which it was attempted 
 to entrap the English Government into bearing half the expense of sub- 
 sidizing Meer Khan, and the difficulties raised in the execution of the 
 Treaty of Peace, though experienced directly from subordinates, were no
 
 xlii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 doubt encouraged by the sovereign. But however symptomatic of a 
 faithless temper, such acts sink into insignificance in comparison with 
 the conduct of the Nizam and his people during the Mahratta War. It 
 is the more important to observe the strong expressions of Wellington 
 on this occasion, amounting to a declaration that the principal object of 
 the campaign was in a fair way to be compromised, because Wellesley's 
 lordly disclaimer of the Nizam's right to share the conquests, on the 
 ground that he had forfeited all such claim by failing to fulfil his part of 
 the compact, might otherwise appear rather in the light of a ' too inge- 
 nious ' after-thought. Some excuse may perhaps be made for the non- 
 admission of the English into Dowlutabad, when Bussy's treacherous 
 occupation of that famous stronghold is remembered. But as Wellington 
 does not exaggerate when he states that the war was for the defence of 
 the Nizam ; and as, in his very careful and detailed reply to Castlereagh's 
 strictures on the Bassein Treaty \ the argument turns mainly on the 
 necessity of making this defence good, at all hazards ; it must have 
 seemed the very irony of fate, that we should be thwarted in this 
 operation by the very Prince whom we were befriending ; and that 
 Wellesley's general policy should be liable to be stultified by the dry 
 bones, which he had undertaken to vivify, rising up in sullen recal- 
 citrance and silent judgment against him. Wellesley has described 
 admirably the advantages of the intimate alliance with Nizam-ul- 
 Mulk's successor. But the transmuted Subahdar of the Dekkan could 
 not forget his lofty lineage and august pretensions, nor fail to writhe 
 uneasily in the toils in which British policy had enmeshed him. And 
 Wellington's revelations of the inconveniences to which we were exposed 
 by our haughty but helpless dependent are necessary to enable us to 
 balance the political account. 
 
 V. MAHRATTAS. 
 
 .1. Antecedents of the Treaty of Bassein. 
 
 That, after Wellington's successful restoration of the Peishwa had 
 pointed him out for the conduct of the ensuing campaign, he com- 
 manded the Dekkan army in the field against Sindia and the Rajah of 
 Berar ; that he distinguished himself greatly in this service, and in fighting 
 the battle of Assye shewed that the most cautious of generals could be 
 bold, even to rashness, when the occasion required it, are familiar facts 
 to the tiro in Anglo-Indian history. He may also remember, that the 
 coup de tonnerre of Assye was soon followed by the rapid and final rout 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, pp. 273-298.
 
 MAHRATTAS. ANTECEDENTS OF THE TREATY. xliii 
 
 of Argaum ; that what the victor's military genius had accomplished, his 
 diplomatic address, firmness, and moderation followed up, by the con- 
 clusion of the two Treaties of Deogaum and Surje Angengaum, which 
 restored peace on equitable terms. And even the cursory reader of the 
 Wellesley Despatches is not unlikely to have been impressed by another 
 example of Wellington's intimate knowledge and versatile handling of 
 Mahratta politics, which Mr. Montgomery Martin inserted in his Ap- 
 pendix, and the present Editor in his Wellesley Selections (pp. 273-298), 
 and which, in a recent and able paper in the Edinhirgh Revieiv (No. 303, 
 p. 41) is described as 'an exhaustive and convincing refutation of the 
 argument contained in Lord Castlereagh's Minute ' — impugning the 
 terms of the Governor-General's Treaty with the Peishwa. 
 
 But far as all this goes to establish Wellington's claim to a very close 
 connexion with his brother's Mahratta policy; the papers before us prove, 
 that his influence on the moulding and working out of that policy, both 
 as a formal adviser, an agent, and an independent critic, was much 
 greater and more general than less authentic and detailed sources of 
 information would lead us to imagine. 
 
 According to the principles laid down in the Governor-General's 
 Minute of August 12, 1798, it was essential to give renewed effect to 
 the Triple Alliance which had resulted in the signal defeat of Tippoo a 
 few years before ; and to secure the co-operation of the Peishwa in 
 overaweing or, if necessary, making war upon him. But Sindia's 
 ascendancy at Poona made this impossible. An impatient politician, 
 or an ambitious soldier, especially if conscious of military capacity, 
 might have been inclined to insist, that the Sultan's active hostility being 
 proved, and the Peishwa being bound to assist us against him, Sindia's 
 contravention of our just claim for aid itself amounted to an act — or 
 rather a course — of hostility, and made it allowable for us to coerce 
 him into the adoption of a less obstructive line. And the more so, as 
 he was shrewdly suspected of being in positive league with our enemy. 
 Not so Wellington. He regards the question as an English citizen, 
 strictly bound by the authority of Parliament. To take up arms for the 
 purpose of rescuing the Peishwa from Sindia's tutelage, would violate 
 both the spirit and the letter of the Act of Parliament. And though 
 Sindia's actual alliance with Tippoo would fully justify us in attacking 
 him, that alliance ' must not be a mere surmise.' Thus, long after 
 Tippoo's rapid overthrow had bafflled Dowlut Rao's calculations, he 
 continued with impunity to thwart the Governor- General's persevering 
 attempts to ante-date the Treaty of Bassein ; and Wellington had to 
 complain, that both the suppression of Dhoondiah, and the tranquil- 
 lization of the Peishwa's southern dominions, and consequently the
 
 xliv WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 security of our own frontier, were seriously impeded by his sinister 
 influence. Though from an early period he assumed, that our armed 
 intervention at Poona would ultimately become necessary, and regarded 
 with unfeigned anxiety the formidable power of Sindia; he was equally 
 anxious to be well-prepared for the crisis when it should arrive, and to 
 guard against the renewed temptations to premature action, which both 
 Sindia's and the Peishwa's disinclination to the alliance on the one 
 hand, and the Governor-General's impatience on the other, were con- 
 tinually occasioning. Thus he recommends, that the family of our old 
 coadjutor, Pursheram Bhow, should be reconciled to the Peishwa, and 
 restored to their possessions, so as to form both a check on Sindia's 
 encroachments southward, and a friendly medium for us, on approaching 
 the future scene of hostilities. Thus also, he is at first anxious that 
 Sindia should be constrained to leave Poona, and return to Hindostan ; 
 although, when the truth dawns gradually on him, that Baji Rao is by no 
 means simply the mouthpiece of his domineering subject, but is himself 
 decidedly averse to the Governor-General's proposed arrangement, he is 
 less inclined, for the present, to press this step. So too, he gives timely 
 intimation that when we interpose, it must be with a commanding force, 
 so as to prove that we are in earnest, and thus fix at once the wavering 
 disposition of the southern jaghiredars. And the Memorandum on 
 military operations in the Mahratta country — at once so comprehensive 
 and so minute — shews how closely he has scanned the expected theatre 
 of war, and how methodically he has digested the information acquired 
 in the course of the campaign against Dhoondiah. But on the other 
 hand, he is as much averse as ever to breaking the law, and providing 
 either for our own security, or for the alleged welfare of India at large, 
 by doing evil that good may come, and violating obvious principles of 
 natural equity, in the pursuit of problematical advantages. His language 
 on this subject is really remarkable, not least (many may think) in its 
 applicability to a recent and not very dissimilar combination of political 
 circumstances. After concluding that ' hostility on our part might be 
 thought a breach of the laws for the government of this empire,' he 
 proceeds : — 
 
 ' But not only might it be considered in that light, but as an act of great 
 political injustice. In fact, one country has no right to commence a war upon 
 another because at some time or other that other may form an alliance with 
 its enemy prejudicial to its interests, and because it refuses to draw closer the 
 terms of its alliance with the country which proposes it. The question of 
 peace or war is not, and cannot be, only the probability of success, but must 
 depend upon other circumstances, and in this country must depend upon the 
 prospect of being attacked by the power with which it is proposed to go to 
 war. These general principles are certain.' (pp. 202, 3.) 
 
 And he suggests that the withdrawal of his own army from the Peishwa's
 
 MAHRATTAS. FROM THE TREATY TO THE WAR. xlv 
 
 country will be likely to counteract Baji Rao's inclination to throw him- 
 self into the hands of the French, in order to curb our influence. 
 
 But it was not only on grounds of legality and justice that he depre- 
 cated a hasty resort to force. His intuitive insight into native character, 
 and his sagacity in anticipating the probable course which such capricious 
 tempers would be apt to pursue, have been noticed by the historian of 
 the Mahrattas. And he began very early to mistrust the Peishwa, and to 
 beware of making any forward movement to help him, at the risk of being 
 afterwards disavowed by Baji Rao. This mistrust gradually ripened into 
 a full conviction of that Prince's faithlessness to the alliance, after it had 
 been concluded, and later into an assurance of his personal antipathy to 
 Wellington himself, an antipathy easy to understand, and quite mutual. 
 
 Considering the use afterwards made of Amrut Rao by Holkar, it is 
 worth notice that, in October 1800, Wellington is inclined to be guided 
 by the opinion of Amrut ' and the Peishwa's friends,' in determining when 
 he is ' to begin to act.' Circumstances changed ; and the crisis came 
 about in a manner altogether unexpected. But Wellington did, after all, 
 turn Amrut Rao to good account ; and in the Appendix will be found 
 a curious chapter of secret history penned long afterwards, which explains 
 this matter, and will demand attention in its proper place. 
 
 2. From the Conclusion of the Treaty to the Rupture with the 
 
 Confederates. 
 
 The Treaty of Bassein was, even in its immediate consequences, the 
 most momentous compact ever concluded by the Anglo-Indian Govern- 
 ment. Like the earlier Treaty with the Nizam, it degraded the Peishwa 
 from an independent Prince to a vassal of the Company. It broke up 
 for ever the loose and jarring, but still, in some sense, real political con- 
 federacy, or as it perhaps ought rather to be called ' family compact ' 
 between that Prince and its other members ; two of whom, the Bonslay 
 and the Guikwar, belonged to the official hierarchy established by Sivaji ; 
 the other two, Sindia and Holkar, had risen to power subsequently, as 
 the Peishwa's lieutenants in Malwa ; though in the course of a genera- 
 tion they had come to rival, and had eventually overshadowed, their 
 patron and master. Again, the treaty of Bassein completed the diplo- 
 matic cordon whereby the Nizam, whose security was essential to our own, 
 was fenced off from the ever imminent aggressions of the Mahrattas, 
 acting in the name of their head. For it constituted the British Govern- 
 ment the arbiter of -all differences between him and his traditional foes. 
 It further justified the Governor-General, from his own point of view, in 
 regulating, to an almost unlimited extent, the political relations of the
 
 xlvi WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 Mahrattas themselves; while the command of the Peishwa's country, 
 which it secured to us, greatly facilitated our control over their military 
 movements. 
 
 And as these consequences were sufficiently obvious, and sufficiently 
 unpalatable both to Baji Rao himself, and to the three greater Mahratta 
 Chiefs, they one and all entered their hearty protest against it, though 
 in different ways, and with different results. The Peishwa had no sooner 
 concluded the alliance, and begun to realise his position — as that of the 
 horse in his fabled contest with the stag, than he began to repent of it, 
 and to pursue that course of secret obstruction and restless chicanery, 
 which eventually led to his dethronement, the formal abolition of his 
 office, and the annexation of his territories. Sindia and the Rajah of 
 Berar sulked, grumbled, blustered, and shuffled, until the tempest of a 
 war which they had provoked swept them from the field, placed them at 
 our mercy, at their expense added a large part of India to our dominions, 
 placed the imperial city at our disposal, and consigned to our hands the 
 custody of the Emperor himself. Holkar, unwarned by their fate, followed 
 their example, and was not less signally routed ; but was rescued by the 
 intervention of a Dcus ex ??iachi?uz in the person of Sir George Barlow. 
 And stoutly as the new Governor-General strove to roll back the tide 
 of time, and to dispute the inexorable logic of facts, it soon became 
 apparent that, for good or for evil, the remoter consequences cf the 
 Treaty of Bassein were unavoidable ; that, in our case, not to advance 
 was to recede ; that the Mahrattas must once for all learn to recognize 
 their fallen fortunes, and respect the greatness to which their hostility 
 had exalted us ; that the Peishwaship, the symbol of an extinct political 
 system, must be suppressed ; and the defensive alliance scheme, having 
 served its turn, must be replaced by the definitive and avowed supremacy 
 of the Company over friends and former foes alike. 
 
 Thus it is hardly too much to say, that while previously to the conclu- 
 sion of the Treaty of Bassein there existed a British Empire m India, 
 that Treaty, by its direct or indirect operation, gave the Company the 
 Empire of India. Cornwallis himself had spoken of the Directors as 
 collectively Emperors ; and had removed one great obstacle to their uni- 
 versal supremacy by breaking the power of Tippoo, and stripping him 
 of one half of his dominions. But Cornwallis still regarded, and aimed 
 at maintaining, the Company as one among several independent sove- 
 reigns ; though the innate superiority of his countrymen's, and especially 
 of his own character over that of their native rivals tended to make him, 
 as the representative of British rule in the Peninsula, primus inter pares. 
 He was not indeed so ignorant of the temper of the Indian Princes, or so 
 wanting in discernment of the moving springs of their activity, as to con-
 
 MAHRATTAS. FROM THE TREATY TO THE WAR. xlvii 
 
 template the possibility of effecting a stable political equilibrium, by the 
 establishment of a balance of power, with the general concurrence and 
 sincere co-operation of such Potentates. But he no doubt hoped, that 
 while the military efficiency of the Company, so strikingly displayed in 
 his Mysore war, and its reputation, so greatly enhanced on that occasion, 
 would shield both us and our allies from wanton attack ; our cordial de- 
 fensive alliance with the Nizam and the Peishwa, the moderation which 
 he had shewn in sparing Tippoo, when he might have destroyed him, the 
 spectacle of our growing prosperity from the cultivation of the arts of 
 peace, and the personal and official influence of himself and his suc- 
 cessors, might gradually wean over the Indian rulers to a better mind, 
 and a stronger mutual disposition to live and let live. Failing this, he 
 was prepared to let them prey on each other; while the British 
 Government, quietly reposing on its laurels, and improving its adminis- 
 tration, but not unprepared for war, would naturally grow stronger ; 
 as its ambitious and anarchic competitors would, by an opposite course, 
 proportionally decline ; if not, at last, spontaneously succumb to our 
 superior force, moral authority, and regulative capacity. Such, so far 
 as he faced the problem of the remote future, was perhaps the rather 
 vague hope, or the dream, of this excellent and enlightened, but gentle, 
 cautious, and scrupulous statesman. 
 
 Lord Mornington's mind was cast in a different mould. Constitution- 
 ally imperial, profound and far-sighted in his conception of the con- 
 ditions of political order and social well-being, conscious of great powers 
 of organization, confident in his own judgment, when duly informed by 
 an indefatigable examination of experts in their several departments, 
 dauntless in accepting responsibility, unwearying in his endeavours to 
 bend circumstances to his will, fertile in expedients, sagacious in antici- 
 pating and providing for the shifting combinations of political elements, 
 and master of a style so lofty, high-principled, argumentative, and ex- 
 haustive, that it tends to silence opposition, even when it fails to carry 
 conviction, and that the eager advocate assumes with no bad grace 
 the attitude of the deliberate and impartial judge : — such a man was, in 
 no case, likely to rest satisfied with Cornwallis's modest estimate of a 
 Governor-General's proper part in the international politics of India. 
 And although both the wishes of his employers, the embarrassed state of 
 the Company's finances at his accession, and the Parliamentary prohibi- 
 tion not only of offensive measures, but even of new defensive alliances 
 except in extreme and rigidly defined cases, presented the most serious 
 obstacles to an enterprising policy ; yet the serious emergency — as he has 
 so fully explained in his great Minute — certainly called for special precau- 
 tions; and impelled him to devise his ingenious subsidiary alliance system,
 
 xlviii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 which besides reducing the Sultan to order, in one way or other, was in- 
 tended, without violating the Act of Parliament, to assure the permanent 
 predominance of the British Power over the native States, to exclude the 
 French from their dominions, to pacify the country, and to extend, as far 
 as possible, the blessing of better government to its miserable inhabitants. 
 That Tippoo was not the man to acquiesce without a struggle in such a 
 system, could not reasonably be doubted. But his hostility led to its im- 
 mediate acceptance by the Nizam, and to its establishment in the revived 
 Hindoo Kingdom of Mysore. Nor can Lord Mornington have seriously be- 
 lieved that the Peishwa would voluntarily accede to it. But he hoped much 
 both from his fears and his cupidity. With Sindia, however, at his elbow, 
 Baji Rao was not to be bribed into compliance by a share of the Sultan's 
 spoils, nor charmed over by the Governor-General's diplomatic blandish- 
 ments, nor coerced by the terror of threats which, though unuttered, his 
 lively and timorous imagination was quite capable of reading between the 
 lines of the persevering and rather peremptory correspondence. Even in 
 his extremity, Baji Rao yielded — eK&v deKovrl ye Svfia. And what had been 
 really gained by the transaction ? Would the Governor-General be thereby 
 enabled to dominate not only the Peishwa, but the whole Mahratta 
 League? Or was it simply, in Wellington's words, 'a Treaty with a 
 cipher?' Events only could determine. I have elsewhere 1 endeavoured 
 to estimate fairly this very difficult question. I will now try to collect the 
 most important indications of Wellington's sentiments on the same sub- 
 ject, as they were thrown out freely and fully in his correspondence at 
 the period comprised in this Section. His systematic vindication of the 
 Treaty, in answer to Lord Castlereagh's objections, was of course more 
 cautiously worded, as became a formal apology. 
 
 It is evident that he did not regard the Peishwa's tardy and con- 
 strained assent to the Treaty with the complacency and eagerness 
 which the Governor-General testified, by signing its fundamental stipu- 
 lations on the same day that he received them. He knew too well 
 Baji Rao's character, his treatment of the southern jaghiredars, and 
 the sentiments they entertained towards him. Nor had he much faith 
 in the quasi feudal lineaments detected in the Mahratta ' constitution ' 
 by the Governor-General, according to whom the greater Chiefs as 1 
 feudatories owed allegiance to the Peishwa as over-lord. Nor did the 
 assumption appear to him a very practical one, that the Peishwa was 
 their sovereign, they simply his subjects ; or that he was the head, they 
 the subordinate members of the body politic ; so that, when the Peishwa 
 had been put in leading strings, the rest ought to have followed suit, 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c, pp. xviii — xxx.
 
 MAHRATTAS. FROM THE TREATY TO THE WAR. xlix 
 
 as a matter of course ; given in their respective adhesions to the sub- 
 sidiary alliance system, and thus become doubly dependent on the 
 English Power. His strong common sense reminded him too forcibly 
 of the facts, that useful as the assumption of the Peishwa's supremacy 
 over these Chiefs might be in putting them in the wrong in an argument, 
 or in getting up a case for adjudication in England, the Peishwa had 
 long been a puppet in their hands ; that the despised and outlawed 
 Holkar had just dethroned him, and set up an anti-Peishwa ; that 
 Sindia had long comported himself as an independent Prince ; and in 
 spite of the rout of one of his detachments at Poona, was still dominant 
 at Delhi and over a large part of Hindostan, and was by far the most 
 powerful native ruler in India ; while the Rajah of Berar, though weaker 
 in a military sense, had not only acted independently, but by his alleged 
 relationship to Sivaji had a reserved claim to the allegiance of the whole 
 Mahratta people. In the face of these facts the Governor-General's 
 plausible theory of the Peishwa's feudal, hegemonic, or sovereign authority 
 resolved itself into a cobweb tissue ; and Wellington notices it only to 
 disparage it. Indeed, he goes further. He finds in the Treaty itself 
 a virtual recognition of the past independence of the so-called feudatories 
 or rebels, by its sanction of their encroachments upon their putative 
 sovereign or lord paramount. For he maintains that so far from being 
 injured, they are actually benefitted by an arrangement, which guaran- 
 tees to them possessions acquired, at the Peishwa's expense, during 
 the recent troubles. Again, although he writes sympathetically to the 
 Governor-General on the conclusion of the Treaty ; supplies him with 
 facts for its vindication ; exhorts him to dismiss anxiety as to the criti- 
 cism of ' little minds' about its mischievous tendency ; insists on the 
 danger of going back from it on account of the rising murmurs and 
 threatening demonstrations of Sindia and the Bonslay ; carries it out so 
 energetically by his march on Poona ; confirms it by beating down the 
 opposition of the Confederates, and defends it so elaborately against 
 Castlereagh's strictures: — still, in spite of all this, his utterances from 
 day to day are as far as possible from expressing an unqualified approval 
 of it, and sometimes amount to a most decided disapproval. The causes 
 of this unfavourable tone are not far to seek. Besides a more general 
 objection, to be mentioned presently, Baji Rao was his bete noir : he 
 almost despaired of doing any good work with such a yoke-fellow. 
 He sometimes speaks the truth to the Governor -General, without 
 thinking it advisable at the moment to speak the whole truth, much less 
 to inflict on him, in the midst of his anxious toils, the full bitterness of 
 his heart, which he pours forth, in the confidence of private friendship, 
 to less responsible agents in the great enterprise. And this suppressio 
 
 e
 
 1 WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 veri might be easily garbled and distorted into something very like a 
 suggestio falsi. Thus he encourages his brother in the idea, that it was 
 clearly right to take up the Peishwa's cause against Holkar, and to 
 conclude a Treaty with him for his restoration, even at the remote risk of 
 thereby occasioning a Mahratta war. For this he thinks the most likely 
 mode of averting such a war, which otherwise must have occurred under 
 less favourable circumstances. But before going so far he had already, 
 in a few pregnant words, hinted his uneasiness on the subject, which 
 at a later day led him to the momentarily despairing conclusion, that 
 the Treaty ought to be replaced by an arrangement entirely different 
 in its leading principles. 'We must depend/ he had said (p. 219), 
 ' upon the personal character of the Peshwa, and upon the manner in 
 which the new Treaty will work, upon which points I shall defer to 
 write anything until I am better informed.' When he was better in- 
 formed, and experienced how badly the Treaty did work, from "the 
 Peishwa's misconduct and confirmed treachery, he submitted the facts 
 to the Governor-General, and left him to draw his own conclusions. 
 But to Close and Malcolm he unbosomed himself unreservedly. Thus 
 to the latter he writes, repeating an old objection to which he gives new 
 force, and which in fact goes far to impugn the indiscriminate applica- 
 tion, if not the abstract policy, of Wellesley's cherished instrument : — 
 
 ' One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely 
 annihilate the military power of the governments with which we contract 
 them ; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us ' (p. 244). 
 
 And he continues : — 
 
 ' In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, 
 we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal 
 chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up 
 our connexion with the Peshwah, so that he might not be trampled upon ; at 
 the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the 
 Empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the 
 state should be called upon to decide. In short, I would preserve the exist- 
 ence of the state ; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, 
 rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary 
 treaty.' 
 
 And he concludes : — 
 
 ' Uppn the whole, I see no prospect under the present treaty, and I should 
 decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity may offer.' 
 
 Nor is this the last occasion on which he speculates on the desirable- 
 ness of leaving Baji Rao more to his own devices. 
 
 The truth is, there seems to have been a constant and severe struggle 
 in his mind between the practical soldier's antipathy to military shams 
 and 'too ingenious' political fictions, and an almost invincible repug- 
 nance to a close and responsible connexion with such a man as Baji 
 Rao, on the one hand ; and on the other, the claims of political expe-
 
 MAHRATTAS. FROM THE TREATY TO THE WAR. \{ 
 
 diency and loyal deference to the Governor-General's authority, and 
 determined preference for the subsidiary alliance system. He had, from 
 the first, a sufficiently bad opinion of the Peishwa. But he gave him 
 the benefit of the doubt, how far he would amend his ways, when 
 reduced to depend on our help. And at first he seemed cordial ; then 
 cool ; then feckless ; next suspiciously supine, if not obstructive ; later 
 unquestionably and actively unfriendly ; at last, ' in the shape of a friend, 
 our worst enemy.' Such are the phases which are faithfully reflected 
 in Wellington's correspondence, and which successively modify his whole 
 view of the position of affairs. There was nothing surprising in this 
 series of phases. But it was not reassuring, and to Wellington personally 
 it was almost intolerable. Yet, on the other hand, there were positive 
 and considerable advantages in the alliance : it would not be easy at 
 any time, it was out of the question at the moment, to cancel it, and the 
 Governor-General must decide how far it could or should be modified. 
 Such, on the whole, seems to have been Wellington's frame of mind 
 towards the end of the period preceding the war. 
 
 What, then, were the advantages of the Treaty which he did recog- 
 nize? (i) I have already said, that it was a necessary complement of 
 our engagements for the general defence of the Nizam, and that his 
 security was by no means unessential to our own. He had been con- 
 stantly threatened, and frequently plundered by the Mahrattas ; and only 
 by controlling the Peishwa's Durbar could we peacefully protect him, 
 perhaps save him from destruction. Wellington's apology for the 
 Treaty is very emphatic on this point. (2) Had Holkar been left 
 undisturbed, the exhausted state of the Peishwa's territories must have 
 compelled him to seek subsistence for his Pindari bands in the Nizam's, 
 and after a while in our own districts. We must then have fought him 
 with a less exclusive command of our own and our ally's resources. It 
 may indeed be objected that Holkar might have preferred to return north- 
 wards, as he afterwards did. But Wellington (I suppose) assumed that 
 the fear of Sindia's unbroken power and unslaked animosity, combined 
 with the less wasted condition of the Nizam's country, and the still 
 stronger attractions of our own, would have outweighed the dread of 
 offending the British Government. (3) The Treaty, and the prompt 
 steps taken in pursuance of it, not only averted this danger, but made 
 it highly probable that we should avoid a Mahratta war altogether, at 
 least at that juncture. It is curious to observe how confidently this 
 probability is asserted, how persistently it is repeated, how late it is 
 abandoned. But though every instrumentality that Wellington had 
 recommended was employed, he was for once completely wrong in his 
 prophecy, nay, doubly wrong, considering Holkar's subsequent explosion. 
 
 e 2
 
 lii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 (4) Again, in case of such an issue, he assumed that the Peishwa's 
 country would afford an advanced base for assailing the Confederates. 
 On this point he lays much stress, and recurs to it frequently. And 
 the great campaign of 1803 fully illustrated it. But the advantage 
 was much diminished by the previous devastation of the country, and 
 the character and conduct of its ruler. His treatment of the southern 
 jaghiredars made them, at best, lukewarm in his cause, and endangered 
 the communications of the British armies with the Company's provinces, 
 and with Mysore. After making all fair allowance for previous disorder 
 and administrative inability, Wellington was convinced that much of 
 the difficulty which he experienced in obtaining transport and other 
 military requisites from Poona and the country around was deliberately 
 created, and clearly proved that Baji Rao was playing us false. Thus 
 to Close he writes in terms which contrast strikingly with his earlier 
 language to the Governor-General : — 
 
 ' The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved will 
 be an useful lesson to governments, and to us all : first, to avoid entering into 
 a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is 
 insincerity ; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the 
 distance of 700 miles from our own resources ; not only not having the govern- 
 ment of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst 
 enemy ' (p. 247). 
 
 Yet the contradiction is more apparent than real. He had reserved 
 his opinion on the Peishwa's character and the working of the Treaty. 
 He now finds that his worst fears are confirmed ; and he moralises ac- 
 cordingly. But when the actual contest came, he contrived to supply his 
 wants, in spite of obstacles very similar to those with which he afterwards 
 so ably and successfully grappled in Spain. 
 
 On the whole, though he appreciates the Governor-General's ulterior 
 objects, and shews a real anxiety to avert war, his estimate of the situa- 
 tion is determined mainly by professional considerations. We have 
 made a good bargain, but with a bad customer. And if we are to fight 
 his battles, we must take care that he does not mar our efforts by shirking 
 and contravening his part of the agreement, as its very terms incline him 
 to endeavour to do. And when the present business is finished, it may 
 be well to revise the contract. Its recommendation, I may add, from the 
 Gallophobic point of view, he thinks doubtful. For it may combine the 
 Mahrattas against us, rather than with us against the French. Still the 
 question is of the less moment, as the French can never co-operate effec- 
 tually with the Mahrattas. 
 
 But if the Treaty, which to the Governor- General seemed a master- 
 piece of diplomacy, and the coping stone of a solid political structure, 
 was in his eyes rather a piece de circonsiance in a sudden emergency ; he
 
 MAHRATTAS. FROM THE TREATY TO THE WAR. liii 
 
 showed no want of alacrity in carrying out his brother's policy. His dis- 
 criminating and guiding hand is discernible in the whole conduct of 
 affairs preceding the appeal to arms. The primary requisite was to evoke 
 a decent amount of popular sentiment on the Peishwa's behalf, and es- 
 pecially to obtain the concurrence of the southern jaghiredars. Without 
 this the Governor-General declared l he should not persist in acting on the 
 Treaty. Wellington, in the course of his campaign against Dhoondiah, 
 had established friendly relations with many of these chiefs ; and those 
 who co-operated in his march to Poona were just those on whom his 
 personal influence had been brought to bear ; though Baji Rao's ungra- 
 cious reception of their advances afterwards alienated most of them. The 
 next steps, the re-occupation of Poona, and the restoration of the Peishwa 
 to the musnud, were accomplished with characteristic promptitude and 
 economy of force. The city was saved from destruction ; Holkar spirited 
 away without a blow being struck ; and the army judiciously distributed 
 in stations convenient for its immediate subsistence, and for rapid con- 
 centration, if further operations should be required. When the Confe- 
 derates assumed their threatening position, Wellington at once perceived 
 and explained what our ultimatum ought to be, and why it should be 
 insisted upon, and brought to the issue of performance, without delay. 
 In his Memorandum he had already shown that the Monsoon was the 
 fittest time for a Mahratta war. And the tedious negotiation which now 
 ensued did not prevent his justifying that opinion by his brilliant cam- 
 paign. For no sooner was he in a condition to command, instead of 
 suggesting, than he cut short the hollow talking against time, and de- 
 clared war. The extreme importance, on many accounts, of Stuart's 
 position at Moodgul — ' the mainstay of our operations * — he has fully ex- 
 plained. And this position he suggested : and he deprecated its abandon- 
 ment, when the Madras Commander-in-Chief was inclined to move nearer 
 to Pondicherry, to watch the motions of the returning French. He also 
 pointed out the great importance of preventing Sindia from visiting 
 Poona at such a time ; and thereby no doubt averted much mischief. To 
 obviate the clashing of authorities and divided counsels he had at first 
 recommended, that the Governor-General should move nearer to the 
 scene of negotiation ; subsequently, that he should appoint a local pleni- 
 potentiary. And highly as the Directors resented the adoption of this 
 salutary suggestion, when Wellington himself was entrusted with this 
 authority, his judicious exercise of it could not be disputed ; although 
 Wellington himself, when indignantly denouncing the misapplication of 
 some of his Treaty clauses in Bengal, was half inclined to think that he 
 had laboured in vain. Nor was it only the confederate chiefs whom he 
 
 1 See Welledey Selections, page 222.
 
 liv WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 strove to bring to reason, and save from the crushing humiliation which 
 he never doubted his power of inflicting on them. I have already noticed 
 his successful negotiation with Amrut Rao, whose dynastic pretensions 
 were not to be despised, while his personal ability was really formid- 
 able. For the flying enemy Holkar he made a bridge ; advising that his 
 extortions at Aurungabad should be condoned, and that he should be as- 
 sured of our peaceful intentions towards him, so long as he should avoid 
 forcing us into war. And he adopted the same tone in addressing him. 
 He penetrated Jeswunt Rao's design of finessing for the purpose of 
 gaining certain districts from Sindia ; and these granted, the wily Mahratta 
 so far justified Wellington's treatment of him, as to postpone his hostility 
 until a season less inconvenient to us. Through Close, again, Wellington 
 laboured strenuously to arouse in the Peishwa's breast a sense of his 
 responsibilities, to reconcile him with his estranged supporters, and to 
 fathom, by a rather startling expedient, his crooked and treacherous in- 
 trigues. And he was equally active in endeavouring to reclaim those of 
 the southern jaghiredars, whom Baji Rao's perversity had provoked to 
 join his and our enemies. 
 
 Thus did he survey the crisis in all its bearings : thus indefatigably 
 and wisely did he interpose to make the best of bad material ; to avert 
 evils which he clearly saw were almost inevitable ; to animate and direct 
 the exertions of our able diplomatists ; to retain wavering friends, and 
 overawe half- declared enemies, by the position and moral force of our 
 armies ; and thus provide either for the continuance of peace, or for every 
 attainable advantage if we were compelled to take up arms. Lastly, 
 it must not be forgotten, that the chief of these advantages — the selection 
 of an able general — was suggested by Wellington himself. This appears 
 from a short extract (see p. 527) inserted in the text, wherein the writer 
 proposes this step, in case Stuart does not take the field in person. 
 
 3. The War with Sindia and the Rajah of Berar. 
 Wellington's Mahratta campaign, though lightly regarded at the time, 
 as he complains, by the highest authorities in England, and eclipsed by 
 his subsequent achievements in Europe, must ever be memorable in 
 several ways. Its rapidity, its unchequered course, the completeness of 
 its victories in the field, the speedy reduction of the strong places 
 attacked, the entire prostration of the Confederates after two defeats, 
 astonished friend and foe alike, betokened a general of no common 
 order, and showed that a new military era had dawned in India. As a 
 work of art, as a model of the skilful and successful adaptation of means 
 to ends, of the triumph of intelligence, energy, and perseverance over 
 great obstacles, it was equally remarkable in itself, and serviceable to the
 
 MAHRATTAS. WAR WITH THE CONFEDERATES. lv 
 
 victor as a 'study' or prelude for the mightier work which was to absorb 
 his maturer powers, fix the attention of the world for years, and re- 
 volutionize the political condition of Europe. It would be well worth 
 while, though it is far beyond my present scope, to consider in how 
 many ways, while solving the problem of Eastern campaigning, Wel- 
 lington was educating himself for warfare in the half-Asiatic Iberian 
 Peninsula; and while experiencing the crying evils of native Indian 
 misrule, he was learning to tolerate and rise superior to the imbecility, 
 peevishness, and corruption of the Portuguese and Spanish "Govern- 
 ments. Meanwhile, this consideration makes it the more desirable to 
 realise as exactly as may be, with the aid of the papers in the text, the 
 nature and extent of his success ; his diversified thoughtfulness and 
 activity in preparing and working it out; and the circumstances which, 
 under a common-place commander, would certainly have given a very 
 different turn to affairs, even if they had not made the campaign an 
 absolute failure. 
 
 The immediate object was to protect the Nizam's territories both from 
 the Confederates, and from internal disorder, which the expected death 
 of Nizam Ally was likely to occasion. The capture of Ahmednuggur 
 was essential both for this purpose, for covering Poona, and for securing 
 a post important in connexion with the theatre of war further to the 
 north. Most desirable as it was to fight a pitched battle as soon as 
 possible, this had generally been the great difficulty in the case of 
 Mahrattas, whose original forte had been irregular warfare ; and who, 
 even after they had freely adopted the formation and armaments of 
 their European rivals, still retained vast masses of irregular cavalry, 
 re-inforced by swarms of utterly undisciplined and lawless Pindari horse- 
 men; and who would, accordingly, be sure to lose no opportunity of 
 overrunning the invaded country in every direction, levying contributions 
 on its inhabitants, ruining its revenues, interrupting our communications, 
 cutting off convoys, picking up stragglers, watching our motions, evading 
 pursuit, and attacking us unawares, and at advantage. Hence it was 
 essential to improve our marching power as much as possible ; to secure 
 a constant supply of trustworthy intelligence en route ; to feed the army 
 not only from hand to mouth, but in such a manner that a reserve fund 
 should be always available on an emergency; to maintain free access to 
 and from our original and remote base in the Carnatic, the Ceded Dis- 
 tricts, Mysore, and Malabar ; and that not only by preventing the 
 enemy's cutting in between the forces in the front and those regions, 
 but by neutralizing Holkar, subsidizing his alter ego, the Pathan ad- 
 venturer Meer Khan, gaining over, even in the Peishwa's despite, his 
 brother Amrut Rao, who was maintaining an observant and suspicious
 
 Ivi WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 attitude on the hills far in advance ; and retaining the friendship of the 
 South Mahratta chieftains, at least to the extent of inducing them to 
 permit the passage of our convoys and re-inforcements. Thus, and thus 
 only, could our armies, secure from starvation, surprise, and destruction 
 in detail, marching rapidly, co-operating readily with each other, feeling 
 the country as they advanced, skilfully manceuvered with a view to in- 
 tercepting the enemy, and having les bras longnes : — thus only could they 
 hope, after a time, to bring their Parthian foe to bay; and then — 
 Wellington was very ready to answer confidently for the issue. 
 
 How all this was accomplished, the papers in the text explain (it is 
 hoped) with sufficient fullness for most purposes. But those who are 
 anxious to follow the great artificer in all the details of his handicraft 
 will find ample satisfaction in a mass of professional matter, which is 
 necessarily excluded from this volume. 
 
 But besides all this, other duties equally imperative, and not less 
 difficult to discharge properly, claimed the General's attention. To 
 appease the disorders, instruct the inexperience, and develop the latent 
 capacities of the Bombay Government, was more than even Wellington 
 could thoroughly accomplish. And between the worthy Governor 
 Duncan's official sophistry, the mutual jealousies of his subordinates, 
 the quarrelsomeness and general incompetence of Colonel Murray, and 
 the muttering thunder of renewed civil war in Guzerat, he was driven to 
 abandon the thankless office of controlling in that quarter operations 
 so hopelessly enfeebled and embroiled. That the task was hopeless, 
 appeared too clearly at the opening of the Holkar war, when the state of 
 affairs in Guzerat, and Murray's failure to co-operate with Monson, cost 
 us so dear. Again, to supply the military chest, the failure of which 
 would have produced the certain defection of our dubious and greedy 
 allies, and the rapid dissolution of our own army, was at times almost 
 impossible, and required occasional resort to measures, which did not 
 always meet with the Governor-General's immediate approval. That 
 this should have been the case, shews the extraordinary advance in 
 political morality since the days of Hastings ; while not only is Wel- 
 lington's justification complete ; but he certainly turns the tables very 
 successfully on his brother, when he contrasts his own impecunious 
 condition with the long catalogue of costly requirements from Calcutta, 
 and above all the paramount duty of winning the campaign, which he 
 could not have done unless he paid his way as he went. A letter, 
 addressed to the Governor of Fort St. George (see pp. 550-553) further 
 illustrates this point, and the curious economical conditions involved in 
 the financial competition of the Local Governments. Another constant 
 source of extreme perplexity has been elsewhere considered ; and it may
 
 MAHRATTAS. WAR WITH THE CONFEDERATES. Ivil 
 
 be enough here to quote a short, but very significant example of its 
 operation. After describing the rapidity of his marches, and its good 
 effect, he adds: — 
 
 ' But these exertions, I fear, cannot last ; and yet, if they are relaxed, such 
 is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, 
 that it must fall. It makes me sick to have anything to do with them; and 
 it is impossible to describe their state' (p. 320). 
 
 Though his health had been impaired at an earlier period, and 
 suffered later from the stress of this campaign, it seems to have stood 
 out stoutly throughout the war, in spite of his extraordinary activity, 
 both bodily and mental, and to have justified his soubriquet in our own 
 days — 'the Iron Duke.' 
 
 The wished-for chance of fighting a decisive battle presented itself 
 sooner than he had anticipated. Indeed, the irony of fate ordained that 
 after taking so much thought for the organization of his intelligence 
 department, he should, on this crucial occasion, have been almost as 
 much surprised as the enemy, on coming so awkwardly upon them. 
 Their change of front seems to have been well managed, but their 
 carelessness was notable in not guarding the ford. That to cross that 
 Rubicon at once was a very bold step, but one justified by the cir- 
 cumstances and by all previous experience of Mahratta warfare, has been 
 (I believe) the almost unanimous opinion of competent critics. The 
 severity of the action is evident from the descriptions and statistics in 
 the text ; but Wellington is silent as to his personal gallantry, which 
 secured the victory. How great that victory was, and why it was not 
 more actively followed up at once, he has explained. And the sub- 
 sequent delay in the pursuit, after Stevenson rejoined him, was due to 
 his humanity and habitual care for his soldiers. But Dowlut Rao's 
 spirit was broken, and he began to make clumsy advances towards a 
 reconciliation. Wellington, who had refused to stop the firing at 
 Ahmednuggur until the surrender was concluded, was not to be so 
 trifled with ; though, on more regular overtures, for his own reasons 
 he granted an armistice, hardly in accordance with ordinary rules, but 
 saddled with conditions which enabled him, through Sindia's characteristic 
 breach of them, to inflict a second and final defeat upon him, and so 
 effectually to demolish the Bonslay's army, that the further prosecution 
 of the attack upon his territories became unnecessary ; and he, too, was 
 reduced to sue humbly for peace. Yet how near this crowning victory 
 was to ending in an English defeat, we should perhaps never have 
 known but for the conqueror's own strong expression, on a subject 
 upon which he must be assumed to have been the best judge. The 
 swift reduction of Gawilghur and Asseerghur is the more notable, con-
 
 Iviii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 sidering the part played by those fortresses down to the end of the 
 later war, when the hunted Baji Rao sought refuge within their walls. 
 
 Such were the difficulties, the perils, the precautions, and the achieve- 
 ments of this remarkable campaign. Its sudden and complete collapse 
 on the part of the Confederates was of course greatly promoted by 
 Lake's brilliant operations in Hindostan, the prompt occupation of 
 Cuttack, and other causes. But no one who carefully studies Welling- 
 ton's plan and its execution can fail to see that it had a completeness 
 of its own ; that it was well adjusted in all its parts ; that it attained its 
 end thoroughly as a natural consequence of the means employed ; and 
 that its not least meritorious feature was a negative one, the absence of 
 the minor but serious catastrophes which were so inseparably associated 
 with the idea and experience of Mahratta warfare. 
 
 4. Pacification. 
 
 The papers collected under this head are not the least interesting in 
 the volume, nor the least indicative of their writer's honourable character, 
 political capacity, and resolute and persevering exertions to bring to 
 a happy issue his brother's bold undertakings. But it is with much 
 hesitation and real regret that two lengthy Memoranda have been 
 omitted, which exhibit Wellington's diplomatic powers in a conspicuous 
 and, it may be added, in an amusing way. These will be found in the 
 Supplementary Despatches 1 . As the Governor-General's plenipoten- 
 tiary Wellington settled the two treaties of Surgee Anjengaum and 
 Deogaum with the ministers of Sindia and the Rajah of Berar respec- 
 tively, and has carefully recorded his conferences with them from day 
 to day. In this diplomatic campaign the whole quarrel is fought over 
 again ; and the Anglo-Irishman's shrewdness and imperturbable common 
 sense prove more than a match for the aggravating cunning and 
 plausible, but often self-convicting, sophistry of the Orientals. He states 
 his own view clearly and forcibly ; demolishes objections with remorse- 
 less logic : from a cloud of specious and rambling words he disengages 
 promptly the relevant issue ; follows it up closely across successive lines 
 of evasion ; presses alternately each horn of the dilemmas in which the 
 too fertile phrase-mongering of his antagonists has helped him to catch 
 them ; brings them back again and again to the material point from 
 which, either to gain time or in the hope of shirking it by their im- 
 portunity, they have wandered ; detects and exposes the insidious reserve 
 
 1 Vol. iv. pp. 221-272 and 274-285.
 
 MA HRA TTAS. PA CIFICA TION. lix 
 
 of disputed claims latent in an affectedly frank but ambiguous con- 
 cession ; and leaves them at last silenced if not satisfied, and with no 
 argumentative barrier against the acceptance of the proffered terms, 
 modified only so far as their more genuine statements and reasonable 
 objections have convinced his judgment, and as is consistent with the 
 general tenor of the Governor-General's instructions. In short, though 
 too long for insertion in this volume, the records of these conferences are 
 well worth attention, not only as historical documents, but as a curious 
 and lively illustration of character on both sides. 
 
 At last all was amicably settled, and Wellington satisfied himself 
 that he had ' made two very good treaties of peace.' But, after all, the 
 end was not yet ; and we soon after find him lamenting, not without 
 indignation and dark forebodings, that he had ' not influence to carry 
 them into execution,' and that the violation of their spirit, if not 
 of their letter, was too likely to involve us in a more serious and 
 extensive war than the one so recently and happily concluded ; to 
 dim the lustre of Wellesley's ' great name' in England, and to im- 
 peril the future of our aggrandized Indian Empire. Apart from the 
 merits of the moot points involved in the interpretation of his Treaties 
 of Peace, there can be no question that his forebodings were well 
 founded, and were justified in the sequel. However necessary the 
 war with Holkar may ultimately have been, its occurrence at such a 
 juncture was assuredly a great public misfortune, and a most convenient 
 and timely 'handle' to Wellesley's personal enemies and political op- 
 ponents. It seemed to belie his professions, to confirm the hackneyed 
 charges against him, and to involve us in an indefinite course of trouble, 
 anxiety, expense, and danger. Its brighter aspects and heroic feats 
 poorly atoned in popular estimation, either in India or in England, for 
 the opening humiliation of Monson's retreat, or for the unwonted and 
 mortifying failure of the Bhurtpore escalades. And Wellesley had no 
 time thoroughly to obliterate these alleged blots on his scutcheon. 
 He was compelled to leave the threads of his policy dangling in the 
 gale of popular disfavour ; and though he still had staunch friends and 
 ardent admirers, and his brother's and his own return to England 
 enabled them to confront, and to a certain extent rectify, public opinion ; 
 and though the attempt to inflict a Parliamentary censure on him 
 collapsed ignominiously, as it deserved to do, yet it was long before 
 he was rightly appreciated, and his policy justified by its resumption 
 and consummation. I have elsewhere endeavoured to shew 1 that if 
 his counsels had been followed, Monson's disaster would probably not 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c., pp. xxv, xxvi.
 
 lx WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 have occurred. And this it was which gave new life to a falling cause, 
 and tempted the Rajah of Bhurtpore to throw in his lot with Holkar. 
 Nor ought Wellesley to have been held responsible for Lake's disregard 
 not only of the rules of war, but of the dictates of common prudence. 
 Still the fact remained that, even in its conduct, the Governor-General's 
 last war was, in several ways, a very unsatisfactory one. And this to 
 him, who as a war minister might have been called the spoiled child of 
 victory, was a peculiarly damaging fact. 
 
 But a more serious question than the conduct of the war, and one 
 more immediately involving his own responsibility, remained to be con- 
 sidered : — How came the war to happen at all? And this brings us back 
 to Wellington and his forebodings. Granting that it was necessary to 
 destroy Holkar, that considering his character and position, and the 
 composition of his forces on the one hand, on the other our extensive 
 alliances at the moment, it was almost inevitable that he should, in order 
 to feed his army, plunder one or other of our allies, and so come into 
 collision with us ; granting again, which, considering Wellington's lan- 
 guage 1 , is a liberal concession, that he was not justified in acting on his 
 assumed right to levy contributions on the Rajah of Jyepore; granting, 
 once more, that his tone was intolerably insolent, and his demands were 
 utterly extravagant ; granting even, which considering the vast armies 
 which we still retained under canvass, or in their allotted stations, is not 
 very probable, that he counted upon our exhaustion from the greatness 
 of our late efforts ; it must still be asked, how came he to assume so 
 insolent a tone, and to defy us to mortal combat, almost before the 
 exultation at our late triumphs had died away? 
 
 Now it is abundantly clear that, in spite of his original quarrel with 
 Sindia, and the grudge borne to him both by that Prince and by the 
 Rajah of Berar for deserting them at the critical moment, after Sindia 
 had paid the price of reconciliation and assistance against the English ; 
 Holkar was tempted to assume this audacious tone by his knowledge of 
 the indifferent understanding subsisting at the time between our Govern- 
 ment and its late enemies, and the strong and not unreasonable hope 
 that his resentful, rash, and capricious fellow-tribesmen were well- 
 inclined to avail themselves of the opportunity which he offered them 
 of reversing the late arbitrament, and retrieving their fallen fortunes. 
 And the papers included in this Section fully account for the bad un- 
 derstanding on special grounds, and apart from the inevitable soreness 
 
 1 See p. 313. In this passage the actual occasion of the collision with Holkar is 
 anticipated. 'The protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us 
 with Holkar.'
 
 MAHRATTAS. PACIFICATION. lxi 
 
 of the vanquished; and too clearly indicate Wellington's decided 
 opinion, that they had real cause to complain ; that the Governor- 
 General and his agents had overweighted the scale in adjusting their 
 ransom ; that vce victis ! was too much the order of the day ; and 
 that especially Sindia, his sirdars, and his soldiers, were all in that state 
 of mortified desperation, which, even without Holkar's incitement, would 
 have been too likely to end in a new war. So far then as Wellesley was 
 too stiff and masterful in interpreting the Treaties, however honestly 
 persuaded that his construction of them was the right one, so far must 
 he be held responsible for indirectly encouraging Holkar in his temerity, 
 and increasing the probability of a contest, which he had so much reason 
 to regret. But this was not all. Wellington says significantly that the 
 contest ought not to last a fortnight if, ' above all, Sindia should co- 
 operate heartily in the war.' But when it broke out, so far from doing 
 so, he was not only very passive, but gave pretty clear tokens of a 
 disposition to take part against us ; which, but for Holkar's repeated 
 defeats, would probably soon have ripened into decided action. And, 
 as it was, his officer and namesake Bappojee Sindia, by deserting Monson 
 on the approach of Jeswunt Rao, greatly contributed to precipitate and 
 ensure the catastrophe, which so much impaired our military reputation 
 at the moment, and exalted the lately fugitive and desperate freebooter 
 into a formidable foe. And Sindia's flimsy explanation of this defection 
 in no degree weakens the strong probability, that it was quite in ac- 
 cordance with his own wishes, if not with his positive instructions. His 
 own conduct during the siege of Bhurtpore tends to confirm this view. 
 Thus, on the whole, Wellington's Cassandra prophecy was fulfilled, 
 though not exactly in the way which he had anticipated. As before at 
 Poona, so now in Hindostan, Holkar replaced Sindia as the leading 
 actor, and our immediate antagonist. 
 
 I have hitherto referred to the mere fact, that Wellington thought the 
 Governor-General's too exacting interpretation of the Treaties of Peace 
 injudicious, because it was likely to occasion new troubles in India, and 
 aggravate the prepossessions against his policy in England ; and that 
 this opinion was amply confirmed by the event. But as this is the 
 occasion on which, if their views were not more diametrically opposed 
 than at any other time, Wellington spoke out in the most unqualified 
 terms ; and as his letters depict very clearly his own impressions of 
 Wellesley's disposition and surroundings, and consequent temptations to 
 go wrong ; it is important to observe both what he says, and what he 
 does not say on these topics. Moderation, he assumes, had been the 
 order of the day when the Treaties were made. So far the Governor- 
 General and his plenipotentiary were perfectly agreed. The defeated
 
 lxii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 Chiefs, in addition to their military losses, were to pay a heavy political 
 penalty; were to acquiesce in the Treaty of Bassein; make large ter- 
 ritorial cessions ; and renounce rights which they had long enjoyed, and 
 privileges upon which they peculiarly prided themselves, and the assertion 
 of which was, indeed, most distinctively characteristic of them as members 
 of the Hydra that had preyed upon the Mogul Empire. Still, they were 
 not to be destroyed, but reduced to less formidable dimensions ; bound 
 over to keep the peace, but preserved as respectable powers in India : 
 their aggressive fangs were to be extracted, but their heads were to be 
 exalted once more, as dominant within their own still spacious limits. 
 They were not even to be constrained, but only invited, to enrol them- 
 selves among the other members of the general defensive association, 
 and to accept along with its imperious conditions the solid guarantee of 
 their dynastic and territorial maintenance, included in the subsidiary 
 alliance overture. That their freedom of choice, in this respect, was 
 not a solemn mockery, was proved by the fact that Berar did not accept 
 the offer. While the way was smoothed for Sindia's accession to it by his 
 exemption from the cost of the arrangement, which was excused on the 
 ground of his impoverished condition, and by a convenient fiction (upon 
 which Mr. Mill comments with his usual bitterness and pedantry) was 
 assumed to have been defrayed in the course of his large territorial 
 cessions. That Wellesley, in the full tide of success, and when Sindia 
 seemed at his mercy, should have sanctioned this assumption, proves, no 
 doubt, his eagerness to introduce his political panacea even at the sacrifice 
 of what, under ordinary circumstances, would have been the indispens- 
 able equivalent paid by the native State for the privilege of the guarantee. 
 Thus much may be granted to Mr. Mill ; though it is obvious that, in 
 any case, to have disarmed Sindia, and turned him into a vassal of the 
 Company, even without his paying a rupee, or ceding any territory at all, 
 would have greatly promoted the pacification of India. And this was 
 what both Wellesley and Wellington calculated on effecting. But the 
 Governor-General's acquiescence in the assumption proves also, that he 
 really was, as his brother says later, ' sincere in his notions ; ' that modera- 
 tion, as he understood it, was actually his aim, and that in this, as in so 
 many other cases in the course of the negotiation, he was amenable to his 
 plenipotentiary's recommendations. And though the Confederates and 
 their followers could not but resent deeply the fortune of war, and long to 
 reverse it ; yet Wellington, at this period, saw good reason to hope, that 
 they would gradually reconcile themselves to their new position ; that 
 our influence in Sindia's Durbar, strengthened by the stipendiary hold 
 which he had contrived to establish over that Chief's sirdars, would 
 counteract both their restlessness and that of their master ; and that the
 
 MA HRA TTA S. PA CIFICA TION. Ixiii 
 
 peace would not again be broken. Such was the promising aspect of 
 affairs at the close of the campaign. 
 
 But presently a great change comes over the scene ; and Wellington's 
 language becomes unusually severe towards the Governor-General. Thus 
 he writes in confidence to their brother Henry : — 
 
 ' The system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or 
 wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so highly approved 
 and extolled, is now given up.' 
 
 And the result is that, — 
 
 1 We are all shaking again : the public interests may again be exposed to the 
 risk of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion of ingenuity' 
 (P. 397). 
 
 And to Malcolm he had already written of 'the moderation of the 
 Governor-General, which in any other man would pass current for am- 
 bition '(pp. 369-370). And again to the same correspondent he bad 
 said, — ' We shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all 
 these questions will not bear inquiry' (p. 392). 
 
 And to Mr. Webbe : — 
 
 ' The Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta ; we must 
 conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his business ; and all his 
 treaties, without conciliation and an endeavour to convince the Native powers 
 that we have views beside our own interests, are so much waste paper' (p. 399). 
 
 The documents in the text fully explain this change of tone. But the 
 key to the writer's sentiments seems to be contained in the following 
 passage : — 
 
 ' I have made two very good treaties of peace, but I have not influence to 
 carry them into execution in any of their stipulations ; and there is no person 
 about the Governor-General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, 
 and to resist the importunities of the local authorities,' &c. * (p. 370). 
 
 Instead of heeding his brother's counsels, and duly allowing for all the 
 circumstances of the case, Wellesley, intent on local objects, biassed for 
 evil by inferior agents, too heavy metal to be checked by his Council, 
 and beguiled by his own argumentative cleverness, is both overstepping 
 the limits of justice, endangering the results of the late campaign, and 
 compromising the character of his plenipotentiary. The last inference 
 may seem harsh ; but when it is observed that Wellington had, through 
 Mr. Elphinstone (p. 369), pledged his word to the Rajah of Berar that 
 
 1 So also he says elsewhere : — ' In fact, my dear Henry, we want at Calcutta some 
 person who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. Since you and Malcolm 
 have left him, there is nobody about him with capacity to understand these subjects, 
 who has nerves to discuss them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is 
 wrong' (p. 397).
 
 Ixiv WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 not only he, but the Governor-General wished to do, what he complains 
 the latter is determined not to do ; I cannot but think that some such 
 feeling aggravated his dissatisfaction. Not the less because he appears 
 to have given the above pledge, rather hastily, in reliance on his own 
 view of the case, and on the deference that the Governor-General had 
 hitherto paid to his suggestions, but before he had obtained the sanction 
 which he confidently anticipated, but which was unfortunately withheld. 
 
 As to the merits of the particular questions which had caused this re- 
 markable change of tone, it will be observed that, upon the Gohud point, 
 Wellington thinks that the technical right was on our side, but that it was 
 injudicious to insist upon it ; that we had no right to retain Gwalior, and 
 could only do so by breaking the spirit, if not the letter of the Treaty; 
 and that to abide by, and compel the Rajah of Berar to recognize, the 
 loose verbal engagements made with his outlying tributaries — or rather 
 with their wives or ministers — was not only a forced construction of the 
 Treaty of Peace, but was distinctly opposed to the very practice which 
 in Wellington's case, approved by the Governor-General, had secured 
 the prompt ratification of that Treaty by the Rajah. Lastly, the inclusion 
 among the treaties which he was to recognize of those not concluded 
 until after the peace, or even the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, 
 was known on the spot, was a transaction which even the ' ingenuity ' of 
 the Governor-General would be much taxed to justify. 
 
 What then is Wellington's opinion of his brother, upon the whole, at 
 this most unfavourable crisis for such an estimate ? Wellesley is over- 
 confident in himself; too easily assured that his own reading of the Treaties 
 is the right one ; too impervious to advice, even when tendered by the 
 experienced, dispassionate, and familiar counsellor who had negotiated 
 them ; too ready to resort to nice distinctions, far-fetched arguments, and 
 questionable principles of international law, unrecognized by, and unin- 
 telligible to, semi-barbarous Orientals ; too regardless of circumstances in 
 particular cases, as well as of our general position at the time, and therein 
 of the danger of wounding our recent enemies' pride — their strongest 
 passion — and of thus driving them to extremities, and experiencing the 
 truth of the old adage, that a State never knows what it can do till it is 
 ruined ; lastly, too negligent of the pronounced and growing hostility to 
 his policy in England, and of the slight support he could count upon 
 from the Ministry. Thus far he goes ; and this is a long way ; and if 
 fully revealed at the time, it would have gladdened the hearts of the 
 Governor-General's opponents in both countries. 
 
 But, on the other hand, there is no general condemnation of the policy 
 that had metamorphosed India in so short a time ; no hint that Wellesley 
 is indiscriminately ambitious, and recklessly greedy of territory ; that he
 
 MAHRA TTA S. PA CIFICA TION. lxv 
 
 is at heart but a vulgar conqueror, a Napoleon of the East ; and that his 
 former moderation was only a passing whim. And even now, he is ' sin- 
 cere in his notions,' and ' considers his decisions to be strictly correct.' 
 Wellington never accuses his brother, either directly or by implication, 
 of saying one thing and meaning another ; of consciously violating or 
 overstraining the Treaties ; of deliberately and insolently crying Vae victis ! 
 or of intentionally circumventing the humbled but still formidable Princes. 
 While thus new storms seemed to be brewing in the North between us 
 and our recent enemies, our ally the Peishwa was busily engaged in 
 giving occasion to hardly less perilous disturbances in his own dominions. 
 His political weakness, his selfishness, insincerity, and vindictiveness were 
 the daily experience and indignant theme of the hero who had done so 
 much for him, only to find himself baffled in every attempt to bring him 
 to a better mind, and his affairs into working order. His petulant objec- 
 tions to the pacification, and his extravagant demand of the lion's share 
 of the spoil acquired in a contest undertaken on his behalf, but in which 
 he had been worse than passive, though according to the Governor- 
 General easily overborne by the force of reasoning preconceived by him- 
 self and applied by his agents on the spot, boded no security for the 
 future. And both Baji Rao's general conduct, and certain sinister pro- 
 jects which he propounded by way of cutting the knot of the difficulties 
 relating to the settlement of his southern territories, were admirably 
 adapted to sow a new crop of dragon's teeth. He would do nothing 
 effectual to organize his government : intent on his own frivolous 
 pursuits and vicious pleasures, he lavished on their gratification the 
 funds that ought to have been applied to the maintenance of order in the 
 country; and compelled Wellington to check the growing anarchy by 
 threatening or inflicting the stern penalties of martial law (see p. 649). 
 He favoured and entertained at Court men of the worst repute, and 
 whose special merit in his eyes was their secret or even avowed hostility 
 to the English alliance. And he not only looked coldly upon the feuda- 
 tories who, in spite of his unpopular character, had aided in restoring 
 him ; but was confidently accused of encouraging the Rajah of Kola- 
 poor's aggressions upon them ; and presently conceived a notable and 
 characteristic scheme of cutting up root and branch the most important 
 of them, especially the Putwurduns. That this family was our oldest and 
 staunchest Mahratta connexion in that quarter ; that their immediate 
 ancestor, Pursheram Bhow, had, however waywardly and intermittently, 
 as became a true Mahratta, still on the whole actively and usefully co- 
 operated with Cornwallis against Tippoo ; that Wellington had always 
 been on good terms with them, and had been formerly anxious (see 
 p. 194) to reconcile them to the Peishwa, and set them up as a barrier 
 
 f
 
 lxvi WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 against the advance of Sindia's power under Baji Rao's auspices ; that 
 though persistently ill-treated by their sovereign, and therefore inactive in 
 his cause during the late war, they had offered no positive obstruction to 
 Wellington's operations, and had been, indeed, of essential service to him, 
 in ways already explained : — all this made it perfectly natural that Baji 
 Rao should regard them with peculiar aversion, as accomplices in the 
 plot for his own degradation. And to bethink himself of remunerating 
 his more congenial adherent Gokla, by making over to him the Put- 
 wurduns' military fiefs, was also natural, and on his shewing plausible : 
 indeed, such an expedient must have presented several attractions to such 
 a man, so situated. But to propose such a plan to Wellington ; to solicit 
 him or his brother not only to sanction, but to carry it out by force, at 
 the risk of provoking a general combination of the southern chieftains in 
 opposition to a step which so obviously portended their common de- 
 struction ; and to count on practising, and inducing the English general 
 and Government to practise, a course of deceit which was to enable the 
 Peishwa to devour his victims one by one, until in the solitude thus 
 created all should be peace ; — this was certainly a remarkable proceeding, 
 even for such an unblushing votary of crooked and insipient counsels. 
 
 The serious light in which Wellington regarded this proposal; the 
 alternatives that he suggested as to our course with relation to the long- 
 standing animosities between the Peishwa and his dependents ; his ar- 
 guments in favour of the line which he finally recommended ; and the 
 careful instructions which he accordingly issued to the British agent 
 employed in this difficult business, are all evidences of his sincere desire 
 and earnest endeavour to establish peace upon a secure foundation, and 
 to justify in the end his brother's precarious connexion with the personi- 
 fication of misrule and untrustworthiness. But they shew, not less clearly, 
 how little the Governor-General's exact scheme of alliance found favour 
 with him, or seemed practicable in this instance ; how Wellesley himself 
 was led by the force of circumstances, though perhaps by no means 
 unwillingly, to authorise its abandonment in an essential particular ; and 
 how inevitably alliance, if it was to attain its ends, entailed supremacy as 
 its indispensable sequel. I have already explained how Wellesley con- 
 templated the control of the international or external relations of the 
 States with which he contracted his subsidiary alliances ; but that their 
 internal government, or municipal regulation was, except partially in the 
 case of Mysore, to be left to themselves. And in this spirit, the Treaty 
 of Bassein had stipulated that the Company's Government 'have no 
 manner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, sub- 
 jects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute' (See 
 Wellesley Selections, p. 240.)
 
 MAHRATTAS. WAR WITH HOLKAR. lxvii 
 
 Now however, in spite of this strong language, it became evident how 
 impossible it was for us thus to interfere, so to speak, by halves ; and 
 how our own safety in a time of peril, and the general security and 
 tranquillization of India, the ultimate objects of the defensive alliance 
 policy, imperatively demanded that we should control also the internal 
 organization of the allied State, and its ruler's treatment of his subjects 
 and servants ; although, as before, this act of dictation was diplomatically 
 veiled under the decent fiction of friendly mediation. And, I may add, 
 this new encroachment upon his liberty to do wrong being equally 
 intelligible to the Peishwa, made him writhe all the more uneasily in the 
 toils that had been thrown round him ; and hastened the later collision 
 between himself and his soi-disant allies, and the final catastrophe which 
 put an end at once to his authority and to our ambiguous attitude. 
 
 5. War with Holkar. 
 
 Short as are the extracts under this head, they are most instructive, 
 and show how thoroughly Wellington understood the nature, difficulties, 
 dangers, and consequent requirements of a war that differed, in some 
 important respects, even from that with the Confederates, and funda- 
 mentally from that with Tippoo; but which his historical gleanings, 
 personal experience, and reflective turn of mind, made familiar to him 
 in all its bearings. There seems, at first sight, some inconsistency, even 
 contradiction, in his estimate of the character and seriousness of the 
 contest. Wellesley throughout systematically represents Holkar as a 
 mere adventurer, who in contradistinction to ' the established states of 
 India,' was indebted to adventitious circumstances for a brief and pre- 
 carious importance. And so his brother says that the contest with 
 Holkar ought to be regarded ' as a mere Polygar war,' and more than 
 once that, ' if vigorously pushed, it ought not to last a fortnight.' Yet, 
 on the other hand, he regards him ' as the most formidable of the three 
 supposed confederates ' ; and again he remarks ; — ' if it [the war with 
 Holkar] is not soon brought to a conclusion, — it will be the most serious 
 affair in which the British Government have ever been engaged.' These 
 last words, indeed, he explains elsewhere. In short, our recent victories 
 had for the time paralysed, but not thoroughly pacified our foes ; and 
 any appearance of prolonged and successful resistance to our arms 
 might arouse them to renewed exertions against us, which would involve, 
 at a peculiarly inappropriate period, operations on a gigantic scale, and 
 over an immense extent of country. But to reconcile the other statements, 
 it is necessary to consider attentively Wellington's estimate of Holkar's 
 
 f 2
 
 lxvili WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 strong and weak points ; and how, accordingly, upon the spirit and 
 method with which we should confront him would depend the question, 
 whether we found him a contemptible, or a very formidable opponent. 
 I have already observed, that he had taken precisely the same view of 
 Dhoondiah Waugh ; and that his skilful arrangements and vigorous 
 action had so promptly and effectually removed the potential danger 
 threatened by that earlier adventurer, that the merit of the performance 
 has been often overlooked. Yet, if his proceedings from first to last on 
 that occasion be carefully studied, they will attest his rare proficiency in 
 this department of warfare not less decidedly, than it is shewn by com- 
 parison with the failures of others in analogous cases, and illustrated 
 by his prophetic warnings of the imminence of those failures, and the 
 wise counsels by which he strove to prevent their occurrence, to remedy 
 their evil consequences at the moment, and to avert their repetition by 
 his luminous comments on Monson's disaster. 
 
 On the one hand, then, he says, Holkar is a contemptible foe, inas- 
 much as he cannot stand up to us in fair fight for a moment, if our 
 power is properly brought to bear upon him. The very existence of 
 his army depends on his keeping out of our way, and avoiding a general 
 action. But, on the other hand, he is a formidable enemy, if we treat 
 him carelessly or timidly; and if we do not bring our power to bear 
 properly upon him. And herein lies the great difficulty. His fortune 
 (as he himself said) being on the saddle of his horse, and that horse, 
 typical of his whole force, being a very fleet one, he possesses peculiar 
 advantages for playing the part of the persistent but still menacing 
 fugitive, the sworn foe of order, and the chronic devastator. Celerity is 
 thus everything in such a war. But celerity requires both lightness of 
 equipment and constant command of supplies, which to carry with the 
 army will retard its march ; and which Holkar may prevent our procuring 
 upon the spot, by choosing his own theatre of war, while his troops can 
 always, as ours cannot, subsist on the jowarry of the country in which 
 they operate. Wellington's general prescription therefore is as follows : 
 — Our army must march as light as possible : however far its operations 
 may extend, it must constantly keep up its communications with our own 
 country, whence, in the last resort, it may be supplied. But to this end, 
 and to lessen the inconvenience of depending upon so remote a base, we 
 must secure, as far as possible, the active co-operation of the Mahratta 
 jaghiredars in the intermediate country. Thus we shall be able both to 
 introduce supplies through their districts, to make those districts minister 
 to our subsistence as far as their means allow ; to procure intelligence 
 from the same quarter ; and to obtain a large force of light cavalry, for 
 subsidiary purposes rather than for actual battle ; and as the jaghiredars
 
 MAHRATTAS. WAR WITH HOLKAR. lxix 
 
 are the Peishwa's military tenants, at no additional expense, and on the 
 sole condition of guaranteeing to them the future security of their tenure, 
 thus avoiding awkward and burdensome political obligations. I may 
 observe incidentally that, Baji Rao being what he was, the last point was 
 not found to be very easy of execution, as appears elsewhere. But the 
 terms of the Treaty of Bassein left us no choice in the matter; and 
 Wellington (as we have seen) did his utmost to carry out the spirit of the 
 Treaty, and to secure the rights of those whom their sovereign so shame- 
 fully and ungratefully requited. Military posts and a due supply of boats 
 at the rivers were, of course, included in this well-considered plan, which 
 was, in its chief features, a re-application of the method already so suc- 
 cessfully adopted in the campaign against Dhoondiah. And though 
 Wellington's march on Poona, and his subsequent precautions, averted 
 an immediate contest with Jeswunt Rao, Sindia and his ally soon proved 
 the efficiency of the machinery originally devised for the suppression of 
 his rival. 
 
 Perhaps it may be thought that another trace of inconsistency is 
 observable between Wellington's contemptuous estimate of Holkar's 
 capacity as a belligerent at close quarters, and his cautious advice to 
 Colonel Murray (see pp. 432-4). But it must be remembered that the 
 Monson affair, as well as Colonel Fawcett's mishap, had occurred in the 
 interval ; that Holkar's army had been augmented in consequence of that 
 and other events ; that Murray was both heedless and timorous ; and 
 that, though his force was stronger than he affected to consider it, Holkar, 
 emboldened by his previous success, and at the head of a large and 
 well-appointed army, might prove unusually adventurous and dangerous, 
 when pitted against such an officer. Thus his advice is not really in- 
 consistent, under the circumstances, with his previous language. Though 
 Jeswunt Rao's army, he urges, is mainly composed of light cavalry, he 
 has also a strong body of infantry, and a numerous and powerful park of 
 artillery. The last circumstance makes it most inexpedient that the 
 commander even of an army containing more than the ordinary com- 
 plement of Europeans should allow himself to be assailed in his camp. 
 He must keep moving, and contrive to take the offensive, avoiding 
 retreat, unless absolutely necessary; and then turning frequently to bay, 
 and cowing his pursuers by repeated attacks. This is the gist of his 
 advice ; and if it seems to admit that Holkar might be a formidable 
 assailant, it is because he knows that Murray, on the defensive, would 
 be half conquered already; while to pluck up his courage, and beard his 
 vaunting antagonist stoutly, was the sure way to baffle him. 
 
 When the war actually began, it is interesting to observe how exactly 
 Wellington anticipated both its adverse and its prosperous phases. He
 
 lxx WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 urges Murray to march promptly into Malwa, but predicts that he will 
 not get far from the Myhie, and that this will have the worst effect. 
 And so it proved. He insists that Lake ought either to dash at once 
 against Holkar, or if not able to move at once, that he ought to do so in 
 person when he is able, and not leave his work to others. And the de- 
 tachment of Monson, and its result, are the best confirmation of the 
 wisdom of this view. He objects to alliances with petty Rajahs ; and 
 the conduct of those with whom Monson had dealings justified the 
 opinion more fully than Wellington was at the time aware, though he 
 refers to Jyepore and Bhurtpore. Again, he early deprecates our getting 
 involved in sieges before utterly running down Holkar; and Lake's 
 ill-advised proceedings at the latter place could not have been better 
 contrived to shew that Wellington was right. Lastly, the headlong pur- 
 suit of Holkar along the Doab, and afterwards northwards into the 
 Punjab, did not more completely ruin that Chief, abate the inclination of 
 other powers to join a cause thus proved desperate, and confirm the 
 reputation of the gallant veteran, in spite of his mistakes, than it 
 evinced how accurately Wellington had, from the first, discerned the 
 appropriate way of dealing with such an enemy; and was certainly 
 indirectly (see pp. 423-424), but more probably directly, due to his 
 suggestion. 
 
 On the whole, it is not too much to say that Wellington, though he 
 took no immediate part in this last contest, and no doubt deeply regretted 
 its occurrence, was not only throughout its discriminating critic, but con- 
 tributed much to animate and direct its active and successful operations ; 
 and that not without reason does he exclaim — at Barrackpoor, in August 
 1804: — 'Would to God that I had come round here in March, and 
 Holkar would now have been in the tomb of all the Capulets ! ' 
 
 VI. DEFENCE OP THE INDIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 1. Anglo-Indian Army. 
 
 It will be familiar to the student of the Wellesley Despatches, that 
 the Governor-General had a hard and constant battle to fight against 
 those who advocated the reduction of the Anglo-Indian army, especially 
 after the Treaty of Amiens. He states that he has consulted the mili- 
 tary authorities upon the spot, and has based his requisitions on their 
 estimates, though he adds that they went further than he has -thought 
 proper to do. Hence his brother's facts and arguments deserve the 
 more attention. On the following points Wellington is emphatic.
 
 DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY. lxxi 
 
 i. The army, on its older footing 1 , had been decidedly inadequate 'to 
 give protection against a foreign enemy, and to maintain internal tran- 
 quillity at the same time'; and he asserts that the Mahratta war was 
 the first occasion on which, in the absence of their usual complement 
 of troops, our own provinces had been exempt from internal disturbances. 
 2. That our Indian military establishment having been carried to its 
 existing amount, not in consequence of the European war, but for local 
 purposes, the conclusion of peace with France affords no good ground 
 for its diminution, except so far as popular impatience makes some 
 reduction imperative. 3. That on the contrary, the influx of Frenchmen 
 into India, likely to follow upon the peace, their still hostile spirit, and 
 their inclination to organize and discipline the armies of the native States, 
 are rather reasons for increasing our forces, as a precaution against 
 this danger. After the experience of the Mahratta war he modified 
 this opinion, and objected (see p. 356) to the Governor-General's clause 
 in the Treaties of Peace, which excluded Frenchmen, &c, from the 
 armies of Sindia and the Bonslay ; for he now urged that those armies 
 were likely to prove more troublesome to us if left to their old forma- 
 tion, when cavalry was their principal and most effective arm. 4. That 
 the Directors had made an arbitrary estimate of the force required, and 
 betrayed a marked tendency to ignore not only the large demands on 
 our troops resulting from annexation, or from new obligations to supply 
 subsidiary forces, but the ample pecuniary or territorial cessions, which 
 had been made for the express purpose of providing the subsidies. 
 5. He enters into a detailed calculation of the troops actually indis- 
 pensable throughout the Dekkan, in its largest sense, ' the only mode in 
 which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.' This in 
 November, 1804, on the eve of his departure. And the result is that 
 five new regiments, which as he shews, have been already paid for, are 
 found necessary, and are ordered to be raised forthwith for Fort St. 
 George. Thus, on the whole, he fully vindicates his brother's demands. 
 And he had said expressly, soon after the European peace, ' The 
 Governor-General appears disposed to make every reduction in the 
 military expenses which is at all practicable.' 
 
 I have more than once noticed changes of opinion to which Wel- 
 lington, not being a doctrinaire but a docile pupil of experience, was 
 naturally led by his observation of the complicated and shifting pano- 
 rama of Indian public life. This is one circumstance which makes his 
 correspondence so instructive. He is not content to be oracular, 
 though he occasionally expresses his conclusions very sententiously, 
 
 1 See pp. 656-657.
 
 lxxii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 almost epigrammatically. His weighty facts and cogent reasoning, 
 besides leading up to his immediate point, and accounting for the 
 change when he has altered his view, give much curious and minute 
 information on what might otherwise have been obscure to the historian ; 
 while to the student of the art of war such familiar but well digested 
 expositions must, as far as a civilian may presume to judge, be invalu- 
 able. Thus, for instance, attention has already been drawn to the 
 papers on jungle warfare. Those which occur here on the comparative 
 advantages of concentrating the army in a few permanent stations, or 
 on detaching a moveable field-force to overawe disaffection, and strike 
 it down wherever it broke out actively, not only give a lively idea of the 
 state of the newly-acquired provinces, but abound with considerations 
 more generally applicable, such as the tendency of the field-forces' castra 
 stativa to differ little, after a time, from permanent barracks. 
 
 It is also interesting to observe that Wellington's change of opinion 
 as to the necessity of the field-force was in a great measure due, not 
 only to his own reforms in the mobilization of the army, but to his 
 perception of the improvements effected by Wellesley in the civil 
 government, and which had created a greater respect for law. We 
 have here an incidental proof of the rapid consolidation of our power 
 resulting from the combined exertions of the two gifted brothers. As 
 far as the soldier was concerned, the whole secret of his success is 
 epitomised in the words : — 
 
 ' The mere readiness of the troops is nothing in comparison with the pre- 
 parations required for the departments of the service.' 
 
 How thorough were these preparations whenever he was called upon 
 to make them, may be sufficiently understood from the papers included 
 in this volume ; though they form a very small instalment of the evidence 
 left by their author that, in India as elsewhere, what his hand found to 
 do he did with his might. 
 
 It is noticeable, in contrast to the Governor-General's constant and 
 absorbing anxiety as to a French invasion of India, that Wellington, 
 though he says in 1797, 'Mauritius ought to be taken,' and explains 
 why he regards it as a thorn in the side of our Eastern Empire, yet 
 observes as early as March, 1802: 'We have long ceased to fear an 
 attack from the French;' and while describing the best method of 
 baffling such an enterprise, he remarks : — 
 
 ' I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy 
 in India, and least of all in this war.' 
 
 Elsewhere (see p. 244) he states why he thinks the French could not 
 combine effectively with the Mahrattas.
 
 DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY, lxxili 
 
 Although both the state of Europe and the limits of our Indian 
 Empire at present are so different from what they were in the earlier 
 years of this century, the papers on the scheme for exchanging sepoy and 
 negro corps, and on the defence of the North West frontier, have gained 
 new interest from recent events and discussions. As I formerly intimated 1 , 
 the Red Sea expedition seemed not ill-adapted to impress the imagina- 
 tion both of Orientals and of Buonaparte himself with an idea of the 
 solidarity of the British Empire, and of the formidable reserved forces 
 which the possession of such a wide recruiting-ground as India enabled 
 us to muster in case of need. Mr. Goldwin Smith has since z pointed 
 out that any such advantage would be far too dearly purchased. Without 
 disputing so general a proposition, I still venture to think that in Egypt, 
 Arabia, and Syria, Baird's contingent might have rendered important if 
 not decisive service, especially in a short campaign, and when our 
 command of the sea might have compelled Buonaparte to rely much 
 upon the precarious expedient of enlisting against us the inhabitants of 
 the countries in which his romantic and gasconading enterprise was con- 
 ducted. But however that may have been, no one who carefully studies 
 Wellington's searching investigation of the plan proposed by Castlereagh 
 will be inclined to dispute that, for either American or European 
 service, and against Europeans, to rely upon sepoys would be to lean 
 on a bruised reed, and to encumber ourselves with a serious impediment. 
 Nor, after the exhaustive condemnation, contained in the same document, 
 of the use of negro corps in India, is such a plan likely to be revived, 
 even if free negro recruits instead of liberated slaves were enlisted. 
 Much the same may be said of another recent proposal, to replace 
 sepoys by Chinamen. In the course of his argument Wellington goes 
 too far when he says of the English soldiers, ' An instance of their 
 misbehaviour in the field has never been known/ as will be remembered 
 by the student of Orme. On the other hand, his statement, — ■ 
 
 ' It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen under my 
 observation, that the Natives of India have no fear or respect for the military 
 qualities of the soldier of any European nation excepting the English,' 
 
 is not a little remarkable, as based on such ample experience, and 
 coming from so calm and keen an observer. Lastly, note the pithy 
 saying : ' The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, 
 offensive, if they can be made so.' 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c, pp. xxxiii, xxxiv. 
 
 2 See Fortnightly Review for September, 1877, p. 309,
 
 1XX1V WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 2. Subsidiary Alliance System, and the Armies of Native 
 
 States. 
 
 The subject chiefly discussed under this head has been to a certain 
 
 extent anticipated, and may be shortly disposed of here, namely, the 
 
 tendency of the subsidiary alliance system, as developed by Wellesley, to 
 
 sap the spontaneous energy of the native State; to make its ruler, 
 
 relying on the new force, neglect independent precautions for the police 
 
 of his dominions ; and thus (the subsidiary troops being too scanty to 
 
 supply the deficiency) to foster indirectly the growth of Pindaris, Dakoits, 
 
 and other disturbers of the peace. It must be observed, however, that 
 
 so far from condemning the expedient itself, Wellington from one point 
 
 of view entirely approves of it. Thus he says : — 
 
 ' Upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you that I am 
 perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of them have been, that 
 in this war with the Mahrattas, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner 
 or later, the Company's territories have not been invaded ; and the evils of 
 war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and our 
 power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which could be enumerated 
 as benefits resulting from those alliances, would be sufficient to justify them ' 
 (p. 464). 
 
 But he thinks that the Governor-General relies too much upon his part 
 of the bargain, and lets off the other side too easily ; and that he does 
 not sufficiently consider two most material circumstances. 1. However 
 useful for securing our ascendancy over the particular State, and our 
 military preponderance in India generally, the subsidiary forces cannot 
 tranquillise the continent, unless they are supplemented by a really 
 efficient body of troops, actually in the service of the allied State, and 
 which shall both make it respectable in a community that respects no 
 power but that of the sword, and be systematically and constantly 
 employed in maintaining internal order, and facilitating the collection 
 of the revenue. Impressed, on the one hand, with the successful insti- 
 tution and good conduct in the field of the new subsidiary troops, and 
 on the other, with the worthless and dangerous character of the Nawab 
 Vizier's ' rabble,' as described by Sir J. Craig, it was not unnatural that 
 the Governor-General should be rather slow to appreciate a fact which 
 daily local experience forced upon his brother's attention. Yet the 
 consideration of the Mysore arrangements might have given a very 
 different impression of the value of the native force itself; however little 
 it might have availed to counteract the misgiving to which Wellington 
 refers, and which he shews to be misplaced, — that where the disposition 
 of the native Government was unfriendly, its possession of such a force 
 as he recommended would be dangerous to our power, or rather as
 
 DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCES, lxxv 
 
 dangerous as the anarchy which must result from the non-existence of 
 such a force. 2. The greatness and the rapidity of our progress, both 
 by conquest and alliance, made it far more necessary than before to 
 guard against the inveterate tendency to lawlessness in every native 
 State. The vast masses of defeated and disbanded soldiers, utterly 
 unaccustomed and indisposed to a life of peaceful industry, would not 
 only swell (as they did in Holkar's case) the ranks of our avowed 
 enemies, but would be rapidly organized into Pindari hordes, prey upon 
 the vitals of the native States, and even extend their ravages into our 
 own temptingly richer and more cultivated provinces, unless the evil were 
 nipped in the bud, partly by retaining them in the service of their old 
 masters, partly by employing them against marauders. More than a 
 century before, Aurungzib had defeated his immediate purpose of 
 thoroughly conquering the Dekkan, involved himself in inextricable 
 difficulties, and hastened the downfall of his Empire, by destroying the 
 kingdoms of Bijapoor and Golconda, and thereby greatly strengthening 
 the hosts of the Mahrattas whom he originally despised, but who proved 
 too strong for him in the end. And though the Governor-General aimed 
 at sustaining instead of annihilating the Powers which it was his fixed 
 determination to dominate ; yet Wellington shews very clearly that his 
 otherwise hopeful plan, unless accompanied by the real and efficient 
 execution of the stipulations which it included for the maintenance of 
 a contingent by the allied State, was likely to end in the dissolution of 
 native society, and to prepare the way for our own subversion. 
 
 Thus, true as it undoubtedly is that the abandonment of Wellesley's 
 policy proved so disastrous to India, and encouraged the Pindaris in 
 their enterprises ; it is true also that the neglect of his brother's warn- 
 ings, on a subject on which (as he says) he wrote volumes, and a mis- 
 placed dread of allowing our allies to be too strong, had not a little to 
 do in bringing about the later crisis. It must be observed, however, 
 that the objection to the establishment of an efficient force in the service 
 of the native State did not come from one side only, and that it was not 
 enough to allow — it was necessary to compel — our allies to raise and 
 maintain it. In the case of Oude it had been otherwise, as to the 
 existence of troops, however indifferent their character. ' Money,' says 
 Wellington, ' is always wanted for the expenses of luxury and debauchery, 
 and armies are discharged to procure it.' And knowing too well the 
 character of the Nizam, and his disinclination to incur the cost of the 
 required force, he thinks it worth while to suggest to the Governor- 
 General the very elementary truths that ought to be impressed upon 
 him, in order to overcome that reluctance, as ' that he will be able to 
 curb his aumils and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar
 
 1XXV1 WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 dues ; and that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own 
 
 expenses.' Here, again, the example of Mysore was in point. 
 
 But perhaps the most remarkable circumstance connected with this 
 
 subject is the early date at which Wellington insists upon his favourite 
 
 topic, while his brother's bold scheme is still immature, and little more 
 
 than a year after the fall of Seringapatam. On August 20, 1800, he 
 
 descants upon it, and says — even then : — 
 
 ' In my opinion the extension of our power and influence has been greater 
 than our means. — I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough, as 
 much, at least, if not more, than we can defend' (p. 463). 
 
 This being his view at that time, it is easy to understand why he 
 wrote volumes in deprecation of our undertaking, later, so colossal a task, 
 without obtaining good security that our allies should fulfil their part of the 
 compact 1 . On February 26, 1804, he says, under all the altered circum- 
 stances of the case, but with complete consistency of general aim : — 
 
 ' The measure which I propose goes no further than to insist upon having 
 that body of troops really, which the treaties require they should have ' (p. 468). 
 
 3. North- West Frontier. 
 
 The first Memorandum on Oude shews how early Wellington became 
 his brother's military councillor, and how consistent with his later views 
 was the advice which he then tendered. We have here the starting- 
 point of the military reform in Oude. But Wellington, it will be 
 observed, recommended the dismissal of the Nawab Vizier's troops only 
 as an alternative. ' The Nawab of Oude ought to be called upon,' he 
 says, ' either to regulate or dismiss his force.' And it may be assumed 
 that the former course would have been preferred by the soldier, whereas 
 the civilian insisted on the latter. Again, that stores, grain, and carriage 
 bullocks should be collected betimes, was a suggestion quite in accord- 
 ance with what I have already said was the great secret of Wellington's 
 success, fully alive as he was to the fact that such deficiencies had been 
 uniformly the disastrously weak point in our Indian warfare. He else- 
 where also explains, to the same effect as here, the nature and extent 
 of the advantages to be derived from the small fortified posts recom- 
 mended by Kydd. 
 
 On the other hand, he is careful not to intrude his advice beyond the 
 limits of his knowledge ; and the application to Sir J. Craig, and the de- 
 tailed measures submitted in consequence by that officer to the Governor- 
 General, are here seen to have been due to this professional caution. 
 
 1 That his opinion on this subject continued unchanged in later years will be seen 
 by reference to p. 568.
 
 DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE. NORTH-WEST FRONTIER. Ixxvii 
 
 From the allusion in the next paper to the Paniput campaign, as from 
 other passages, it is clear that Wellington had not neglected to study 
 and derive useful hints from the native as well as the British-Indian 
 military history. 
 
 The undated Memoir on Oude gives a terse and forcible explanation 
 of the process by which the older subsidiary system impaired the in- 
 tegrity of the native State, and compelled us to intervene in its internal 
 concerns. This, no doubt, his brother duly pondered over; and his 
 modification of the system, while it guarded against such a misappli- 
 cation of the subsidiary force as had occurred in the case of the Rohilla 
 War, was intended also to obviate the pecuniary difficulty and its dis- 
 astrous consequences. But the weak point in the new arrangement has 
 already been dwelt upon, and hence Wellington observes at a much 
 later period : — 
 
 ' The reform of the army [of the Nizam] is the point upon which I am not 
 of the same opinion with the Governor-General' (p. 465). 
 
 The strategic plan for opposing an European invasion of India on 
 the North West is an appropriate sequel to the various precautions 
 devised or adopted by Marquess Wellesley for guarding our Eastern 
 Empire against the French. But being written in Ireland, when his 
 brother's administration had become a matter of history, and Welling- 
 ton's own thoughts and energies were being fast concentrated on the 
 struggle in the Peninsula, it belongs rather to that class of documents in 
 which, throughout his long after career, the illustrious writer continued 
 to interpose, both with personal and official authority, in our Asiatic 
 affairs. And the subject thus opened is so extensive and important, 
 that it would require to be discussed separately, and with an amount 
 of reference to later events and changed circumstances, quite incom- 
 mensurate with my present limits. One passage, however, is retro- 
 spective, and illustrative of the writer's systematic vigilance in providing 
 for the future tranquillity of the Dekkan ; in this instance by per- 
 manently hedging in its northern frontier with a cordon of subsidiary 
 troops : — 
 
 ' Before I left India,' he says, ' I gave in a plan for the positions of the sub- 
 sidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Nizam, which, however, I am 
 afraid that they have never been able to carry into execution. It went to the 
 establishment of these corps upon the river Godavery, in communication with 
 each other. If this plan had been adopted, no foreigners could enter the 
 Deccan.' 
 
 But untoward events already adverted to prevented the carrying out of 
 this, as of so many other of his wise suggestions.
 
 Ixxviil WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 The topics insisted upon in these extracts have been mostly noticed 
 elsewhere; e.g., the desirableness of capturing the French Islands; of 
 avoiding the false economy involved in keeping the subsidiary depart- 
 ments of the army too low in time of peace ; of giving due consideration, 
 prominence, and independence within his own sphere, to the Presiden- 
 tial Commander-in-Chief; of conciliating Sindia, as far as was reason- 
 able and practicable: — on the other hand, the undesirableness of en- 
 tangling ourselves in embarrassing alliances with petty chiefs, or in 
 inglorious warfare with the wild tribes of the hills. The hint of the 
 panic fear excited by Tippoo at Madras, confirmed probably by Lord 
 Mornington's own observation when he visited that settlement on his way 
 to Calcutta, was not likely to be forgotten, and perhaps inspired the 
 Governor-General's indignant words when he wrote : — 
 
 ' So sensible indeed is the Government of Fort St. George to the terror of 
 Tippoo Sultaun's arms, as to be apprehensive of making any effort for resisting 
 their progress. — It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that letter 
 from the Government of Fort St. George occasioned in my mind ' ; ' 
 
 and went on to speak of — 
 
 ' The danger which it is the duty of this Government to avert by counsels of 
 another spirit than that of despondency, and by measures of another character 
 than that of inaction, or of implicit submission to the will of the enemy.' 
 
 It will be observed that Wellington, although fully agreeing with the 
 Governor-General in the belief that Tippoo would too willingly avail 
 himself of Zemaun Shah's inroads into India for the furtherance of his 
 hostile schemes, does not attach to the Shah's separate designs and 
 operations the importance assigned to them by his brother. Also, that his 
 estimate of the prospect of success in the Egyptian diversion is con- 
 ditional, and not very sanguine. But he helped to make the best of 
 the situation by discussing it in a characteristic Memorandum addressed 
 to General Baird, and which will be found in the Appendix. 
 
 VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE. 
 
 The Memorandum on Bengal, penned apparently as the writer's 
 private reflections on an occasional publication at Calcutta, has yet 
 permanent interest in several ways. It was probably submitted to Lord 
 Mornington, and seems to have influenced his conduct, or at least 
 strengthened his determination, in the matter of the private trade. It 
 shews, moreover, the activity of the young soldier's mind, and his 
 
 1 See Welledey Selections, pp. 39, 40.
 
 TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE. lxxiX 
 
 readiness to grapple with great public problems not immediately in his 
 line. But it shews also how much Wellington's views of commercial 
 policy at home and social freedom in the East were warped by pro- 
 fessional considerations, and by the course of contemporary or recent 
 history. Still, even where his assumptions are most disputable, and his 
 reasoning is least conclusive, the sober tone, the measured words, the 
 evident desire to be fair and judicial, and the attempt to base conclu- 
 sions on general principles (as when he asserts that the Company is 
 entitled to tribute from Bengal), are worthy of the theme and of the 
 man. Although the paper has thus a very old-world air, awakening the 
 echoes of once bitter, but now almost forgotten controversies, and ad- 
 vocating restrictions which would now be generally pronounced intoler- 
 able and iniquitous ; it exhibits a raciness and an originality in the 
 general handling of some topics, and a suggestiveness in many details, 
 that make it still by no means uninteresting or uninstructive reading. 
 Indeed, what such a man thought, rightly or wrongly, on such subjects, 
 can never be an immaterial question either to the historian or to the 
 statesman. It is, for instance, certainly desirable to know precisely why 
 he, as well as Cornwallis and other eminent and disinterested men of 
 local experience, so strongly objected to permanent European coloniza- 
 tion in India \ It is well also to observe how, in discussing the propriety 
 of high import duties on Indian goods, the professional bias pre- 
 dominated ; and the paramount expediency of manning our wooden 
 walls threw economical considerations, and even the claims of abstract 
 justice, into the shade. In such an age, and in the stress of such a war 
 as we were then waging, it was perhaps not unnatural that this should 
 have been the case ; although, as I have elsewhere pointed out 2 , the 
 Governor-General, as might have been expected, took a very different 
 view. Pitt, though a disciple of Adam Smith, and an early and powerful 
 ally of Wilberforce and Clarkson, certainly did not help to improve 
 the state of the case when, while his continental strategy was so un- 
 prosperous, and we were threatened with invasion, he diverted so much 
 of the national energy to the acquisition of sugar islands ; and thereby 
 contributed to throw more dust in the eyes of those who were disposed 
 to be blinded by the hollow argument about vested interests. 
 
 In a Minute recorded many years afterwards, and which will be found 
 in the Appendix, Mr. Tucker, one of the authors of the ' Remarks,' 
 does not forget this plea of investment, which was no doubt a stock one, 
 or fail to set up a correspondingly formidable claim on behalf of those 
 
 1 See Wellington's words on the same subject later, pp. 589, 590. 
 
 2 See Wellesley Selections, Survey, Sec., p. xliv.
 
 1XXX WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 interested in our Eastern commerce. But though the Minute is at 
 times rhetorical, and enables us to understand Wellington's language 
 as to the acrimony displayed in the anonymous publication, Mr. Tucker 
 wields more trenchant weapons than this clumsy argumenium ad 
 hominem. 
 
 As to the objections to colonization, the unfavourable action of the 
 climate of India upon Europeans, and the proneness of our race to 
 degenerate in that country, will hardly be disputed at present; though 
 hill-life, of course, mitigates these irremediable evils. But the colonist 
 has accepted the facts, and shaped his course accordingly. Moreover, 
 facility of communication has altered the whole state of the case, and 
 simplified the issue raised by Wellington. The planter of our day, like 
 other Europeans in India, is for the most part a bird of passage ; and 
 escapes the penalty of rooting himself in the soil by simply not doing 
 so. He has taken hints from his neighbour the civilian, and even from 
 the private soldier. Occasional furlough and eventual retirement are not 
 beyond his ken ; even ' the short service system' is not unknown to him. 
 The political argument had lost much of its force long before the de- 
 struction of the Company. And there is another side to it. The 
 intelligent and fair-minded planter is a valuable link between the Govern- 
 ment and the native community; loyal to the former, sympathising with 
 the latter, he strengthens the hands of the ruler all the more, the less he 
 is ' a man under authority ; ' and his familiar intercourse with the natives 
 is calculated not only to improve them (as Wellington admits), but to 
 promote international friendliness. Moreover, a strong body of enter- 
 prising, hardy, and active planters may surely be considered a real and 
 not inconsiderable bulwark of the British power in the East ; capable of 
 anticipating, averting, or combating disaffection. The ' mean white ' is 
 no doubt a serious nuisance, and a political peril. But he differs, toto 
 coelo, from the respectable planter. 
 
 Whether this paper did, or did not, suggest to the Governor-General 
 his measures in relation to the private trade, it certainly dealt a heavy 
 argumentative blow against the commercial monopoly. In spite of the 
 alleged ' necessity of bringing home the surplus of the revenues through 
 the medium of trade,' that the Company traded at a loss, was itself a 
 staggering statement. That this was the case, although the Company 
 monopolized the exportation of the most valuable articles, might seem to 
 afford little hope that private adventure could prove lucrative ; especially 
 if the Company could ' aver— with some truth ' that the high rate of 
 freight which they charged to the private trader, under the recent regu- 
 lation, ' cost them more ' than they thus exacted. But the estimate of 
 the complainants as to what could be effected in the open market was
 
 TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE. lxxxi 
 
 hopelessly at variance with the Company's figures. And Wellington 
 says : — ' It seems certain that tonnage can be procured at a much 
 cheaper rate than that at which the Company supply it ' ; and the 
 flourishing commerce maintained between Bengal and Continental 
 Europe told the same tale. Advancing a step further, Wellington 
 remarks : — ' It may still be necessary that the trade with Bengal should 
 be carried on through the medium of an exclusive Company.' But in 
 the same sentence he notices 'the mismanagement natural to an ex- 
 clusive Company in all its commercial concerns.' He soon after insists 
 that ' the Company ought to be obliged to find freight at the lowest rate 
 to as great an extent as private merchants might think fit to call for it ; ' 
 which Wellesley's Despatch 1 shews could only be done by chartering 
 Indian shipping. This he follows up by other recommendations, the 
 general result of which will probably, he assumes, involve ' the anni- 
 hilation of the Company's commerce.' And then comes the coup de 
 grace ; — ' no great evil will arise from that circumstance.' On the con- 
 trary, he says, both trade and government 'will be better and more 
 cheaply carried on.' Yet in spite of all this he pronounces judgment at 
 last ' that it is not advisable to throw open the trade.' If this seems a 
 halting and inconsistent conclusion, the truth would appear to b* that, 
 for one reason or another, he thought it premature to advocate the direct 
 repeal of the monopoly, and preferred to undermine it indirectly by in- 
 sisting on changes of detail, which would make what remained not worth 
 retaining, and thus provide for it a tranquil euthanasia. But the steps 
 which his brother took in this direction showed that such a peaceful 
 solution must be sought through war ; and the storm which they pro- 
 voked in Leadenhall Street was one of exceptional violence even in that 
 tempestuous region. 
 
 It is to be regretted that the paper on Dearth in India is unfinished. 
 The source of the evil in the Dekkan is so exhaustively traced to the 
 failure of the monsoon rains, that the general impression conveyed may 
 be expressed in the dismal aphorism that ' in the East, nature dominates 
 man.' And this desponding conclusion has received too much en- 
 couragement from recent events and comments upon them. Wellington 
 does refer to the expense which must attend the process of extensive 
 well-digging. And he would probably have enlarged upon the poverty, 
 short-sightedness, and selfish extravagance of native Princes, and the 
 sluggishness of natives generally, as at that time insuperable obstacles 
 to any effectual measures of relief out of our own provinces. Thus he 
 says : — 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, p. 700. The italics are the Governor-General's. 
 
 g
 
 lxxxii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 1 1 know of no tanks or canals in any part of India excepting in the Com- 
 pany's territories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore, and in the 
 Carnatic' 
 
 Had he been well acquainted with the vast undertakings of Firoz Shah, 
 he would perhaps have formed a more sanguine view of native capacity, 
 when the plague of perpetual warfare should cease to distract and paralyse 
 the energies of princes and people. Meanwhile, he would not have 
 forgotten the state of the Company's finances at the close of his brother's 
 administration, and the precariousness of attracting English capital to 
 India for such a purpose, and at such a crisis. Though Government 
 has since done so much to avert, and British benevolence has been so 
 strongly aroused to palliate, the calamities of famine ; we are still con- 
 stantly threatened, and periodically confronted, by this primitive and 
 monstrous scourge, which seems a strange anachronism, and a humi- 
 liating satire on our boasted civilization. Dr. Hunter, in an extract in 
 the Appendix, has recorded great though partial triumphs, and pointed 
 the way to a more general campaign against famine. And though 
 Wellington's paper, in its present state, gives little prospect of improve- 
 ment; the energy and skill which have successfully grappled in the 
 East with so many evils once thought incurable, and the increasing 
 humanity of a people which, in the last generation, devoted twenty 
 millions to hasten, in the West, the advent of negro emancipation, will 
 assuredly be little disposed to intermit the contest with the gaunt spectre 
 of famine, in deference to doctrinaires who complacently assert, that India 
 is already over-peopled, and seem to imply that this ' positive check ' has 
 its points of consolation. 
 
 The forethought and activity of Government, the progress of science 
 and art, the development of native education, and the awakened sym- 
 pathy of our countrymen at home, will in due time add one more to the 
 many marvels of Anglo-Indian remedial administration ; and justify our 
 unique position by a new example of its salutary and unique results. 
 But such a social revolution cannot be completed hastily; and famine, 
 like slavery, though for a different and more excusable reason, will 
 probably die hard. 
 
 VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY. 
 
 1. Lord Clive. 
 
 The earlier extracts in the text reveal Wellington in an interesting 
 light, as the Governor-General's agent and mouthpiece in rousing the 
 energies of the Madras Government, and reconciling its halting members 
 to the spirited policy and prompt steps which the occasion demanded.
 
 PERSONAL HISTORY. LORD CLIVE. lxxxiii 
 
 The whole picture here disclosed is, indeed, a striking one. We see 
 on the one hand, standing out from this unpretending canvass, the high- 
 souled, eager, and imperious Governor-General, like another Chatham, 
 conscious that he can save the country, and that he alone can do it, 
 chafing at every obstacle to his great design, fully resolved to endure no 
 public criticism of his measures, and ready to launch the thunderbolts 
 of his sonorous and scathing periods against the faintest murmur of 
 opposition. On the other hand, we see the well-meaning but inexpe- 
 rienced and bewildered Governor of Fort St. George, in spite of his 
 heroic parentage and of the genius loci slow to appreciate the emer- 
 gency and its exigencies, and surrounded by a staff traditionally captious 
 and self-willed, unequal to the crisis, well-disposed to find difficulties, 
 but ill-adapted to remove them, ready scribes, but quite unable to cope 
 with such a master of their art as had now taken up the pen against 
 them. And lastly, we discern the calm, sagacious, and practical soldier, 
 fully master of his brother's plans and their expedience, taking in at a 
 glance the whole aspect and special needs of the local situation, working 
 patiently and indefatigably at his post, as mediator and interpreter, while 
 insinuating cautions at head-quarters through the third able member of 
 the family triumvirate, and dreading each moment a premature and fatal 
 explosion on one side or the other. Such a picture, with the grand 
 tableau of the fall of Seringapatam as a pendent, takes the sting out 
 of Byron's suppressed line in Don Juan — 
 
 ' How many Wellesleys have embarked for Spain ; ' 
 and makes the words sound rather as an omen of good fortune. 
 
 When Wellington wrote, ' A violent or harsh letter from Fort William 
 would spoil all,' he pointed to a real danger, which must have seemed 
 to him not only serious but very near when, in spite of his exertions 
 and advice, the Governor-General proceeded to animadvert, in a severe 
 and haughty tone, upon more than one proceeding of the subordinate 
 Government. The transmission of Mr. Webbe's memorandum *, though 
 written ' for General Harris,' and the official adoption and announce- 
 ment of its view by that officer and his Council, had already excited his 
 highest indignation, and had been denounced in terms of lofty scorn. 
 But Wellington's good offices, and his own personal intercourse with Mr. 
 Webbe, completely altered the Governor-General's opinion of him : he 
 soon fully recognized his great merits, and, by a curious coincidence, 
 was afterwards again provoked to the uttermost by that valuable public 
 servant's treatment at the hands of the Directors, which he regarded as an 
 attack upon Lord CKve, and a violent side-blow at himself. But to return. 
 
 1 See Wellesley Selections, pp. 4-11. 
 g 2
 
 Ixxxiv WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 Wellington's judicious suggestion that Lord Mornington should repair 
 to Madras, when the Mysore war became inevitable, produced the 
 best effects. The dangerous activity of pens was exchanged for close 
 and familiar converse. The Governor-General's courteous and delicate 
 magnanimity quickly won over Lord Clive, and he became an enthu- 
 siastic sympathiser with Wellesley's policy, and in some sense a con- 
 fessor on its behalf. The 'little men' followed the example of their 
 chief, and were soon eagerly and usefully engaged in the serious 
 business of preparation for the great enterprise ; and Wellington him- 
 self, relieved from his diplomatic responsibilities, had leisure to organize 
 the details of the forthcoming campaign. 
 
 But Wellesley made proselytes of Lord Clive and Mr. Webbe, and 
 secured henceforth their loyal assistance, only to find his views thwarted, 
 and his hands more effectually tied, by the conduct of the Directors 
 towards the Governor of Fort St. George, and his right-hand man. 
 Lord Give's grievances are summed up in the following passage : — 
 
 ' The points on which he and the Court are at issue are the interference of 
 the Court in the appointments to offices under this government, the sending 
 back to India persons sent home for their crimes, and the encouragement given 
 by the Court of Directors to a spirit of controversy and opposition in the 
 Councils' (p. 516). 
 
 The two first subjects may be postponed, as they will demand 
 attention in connexion with the Governor-General's own complaint on 
 the same grounds. And as to the third, any one who has the slightest 
 acquaintance with Anglo-Indian History in its earlier days, and who 
 recals the internecine contests of Hastings and his opponents in the 
 Council, the desperate anarchy that had so long reigned at Madras from 
 a similar cause, and the serious perils, manifold evils, and almost 
 ruinous consequences to our dominion in the country, that had re- 
 sulted from these constant and scandalous dissensions, will not be slow 
 to condemn the conduct described by Wellington as not only the height 
 of injustice, but as suicidal impolicy on the part of a Governing Body, 
 which could not be ignorant either of the above facts, or of their too 
 obvious moral. 
 
 2. Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 From a very early period the disposal of Indian patronage had been 
 a problem very difficult of adjustment, and a bone of contention be- 
 tween the several powers which by right, or from the fact of being able 
 to control the Company's destiny, were inclined to assert pretensions 
 to it. In the seventeenth century, royal favourites were fond of in- 
 truding their creatures into the service of those who were incorporated
 
 PERSONAL HISTORY. MARQUESS WELLESLEY. lxxXV 
 
 by Royal Charter, and therefore owed their collective existence and 
 their privileges to the royal bounty. Great nobles who patronized the 
 Company, even when they did not condescend to take shares in the 
 annual 'adventures,' naturally expected that their personal recommen- 
 dations should receive much attention. Thus very undeserving, in- 
 capable, and troublesome persons were often foisted into the service, 
 to the great detriment of the Company affairs ; and the original job 
 at home was too often followed by scandalous affairs abroad. The 
 blighting influence of this aristocratic Upas tree became at one time so 
 serious, that the Directors protested that they did not want any gentlemen 
 in their service ; which, if it indicated the proud humility of the bourgeois 
 class, was at least as much an expression of jealous concern for their 
 monopoly of appointment, and of disgust at the unbusiness-like and 
 insolent habits of the needy slips of gentility and other dependents of 
 great men, thus illegitimately domiciled in their factories. When, later, 
 it became necessary for the Company to strengthen themselves in Par- 
 liament, support was procured, or opposition bought off, not only by 
 the grosser expedient of pecuniary 'gratifications,' but by a similar 
 prostitution of the Company's patronage. As time went on, other 
 irregular and sinister influences were at work in the same direction. 
 Thus, even after Lord Cornwallis had gone out avowedly bent upon 
 reforming and purifying the Civil Service, his high character and 
 known intentions did not prevent the Prince of Wales, Lord Rawdon, 
 and other titled persons from importuning him with applications on 
 behalf of their clients, which he uniformly staved off in a character- 
 istically decisive though courteous tone. But meanwhile the Directors 
 themselves, who at least, even in such a lax age, might have been 
 supposed to have the well-ordering of their establishments at heart, 
 and to have felt the importance of strengthening the hands of their 
 Governor-General, by leaving him as much as possible unfettered in the 
 choice of his instruments, and free to avail himself of his local oppor- 
 tunities of making merit the general ground of promotion, were too 
 often, as individuals, foremost and most persevering in privately re- 
 commending unfit persons for special favour. Of this disgraceful fact 
 also Cornwallis's letters afford ample evidence, as well as of the futility 
 of such attempts to induce that upright and sensible ruler to stultify 
 himself. The Wellesley Despatches do not show any symptoms of the 
 repetition of such practices during the period over which they extend. 
 Even the First Gentleman in Europe seems to have hesitated to air his 
 fine moral taste by favouring Wellesley, as he had favoured Cornwallis, 
 with insidious petitions on behalf of his hangers-on, wrapped up in 
 unctuous compliments.
 
 1XXXV1 WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 But, if exempt from individual and private importunity, the Governor- 
 General had serious reason to complain of the public interference of the 
 Directors, as a body, with the patronage which he considered an im- 
 portant branch of his prerogative, and indispensable to the maintenance 
 of his full authority, and to the success of his administration. And 
 when, so far from being simply inconsiderate and casual, this interference 
 assumed the aspect of a deliberate attempt to deprive him of a dis- 
 cretionary power, which he could not consent to forego, and even looked 
 too like a studied design of insulting him, and wreaking upon him 
 personal spite ; it is more easy to imagine than to describe the loathing 
 which he conceived for ' the cheesemongers of Leadenhall Street,' who 
 had already galled him to the quick by their petty-minded, ungenerous, 
 and arrogant communications in relation to Mr. Henry Wellesley's Oude 
 Commission. That such a man, under such circumstances, should 
 tender his resignation, was to be expected, even if he surmised that he 
 was thereby justifying the calculations, and gratifying the wishes, of his 
 opponents in the Directory. And though to them he assigned other 
 grounds for his resignation, and even consented to retract it, and comply 
 with their grudging and half-enforced request, that he would remain at 
 his post for another year ; his long and bitter letter to Mr. Addington * 
 very clearly reveals his personal feelings, while it fully establishes his view 
 of the public evil inevitable from the interference of the Directors, or of 
 the Board of Control, with the Governor-General's patronage. 
 
 How fully his brother Arthur sympathised with him, both on public 
 and private grounds, is evident from the extracts printed in this volume. 
 Thus the attacks on Lord Clive are treated as levelled against the Gover- 
 nor-General. At the same time Wellington is careful, as usual, not to 
 yield to mere feeling, or to exaggerate the crisis, when the orders for 
 abolishing the College arrive. He deprecates a light abandonment of the 
 determination to remain in India another year, ' on certain conditions.' 
 But when, after the Mahratta War has compelled Wellesley to prolong 
 his stay beyond that time, the prospect of ministerial support also begins 
 to vanish, and the cup of injustice is full ; he is equally decided in 
 recommending the Governor-General to seize the first opportunity of 
 notifying his intention of promptly departing, and to act on it as soon 
 as he can. The Chairman's mysteriously curt note 2 , when Wellington, 
 on his return, proposed to ' wait upon the Directors,' was not calculated 
 to improve his opinion of their behaviour to his brothers. And when 
 he reports to the Governor-General his conferences with various states- 
 
 1 Mr. Martin prefixes the whole letter to his third volume. An extract will be 
 found in the Wellesley Seleclions, pp. 690-694. 2 See p. 560.
 
 PERSONAL HISTORY. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. lxxxvii 
 
 men on Indian subjects, he intimates that ' Bucky' dwelt upon ' the 
 means of revenging the injuries you have received from the Court of 
 Directors;' but adds, 'about which body I suppose you will never think 
 after you will arrive in England.' Though this could not be literally the 
 case, he did not under-estimate Wellesley's magnanimous readiness to 
 abstain from the course which 'Bucky' so disinterestedly and delicately 
 pointed out. But it is pleasant to turn from these mutual animosities, 
 and the attempt, by a third party, to make political capital out of them, 
 and to contemplate the final harmony between the Second Founder of 
 our Eastern Empire and the successors of his suspicious and wrathful em- 
 ployers. Yet even then, in the serenity of his green old age, the touching 
 words in which the 'glorious little man' of other days acknowledged 
 the munificence of the Court, and its emphatic and practical approval of 
 his policy, revealed also how deeply he had felt his previous grievances, 
 though he was not the man to become ' Bucky's ' tool in avenging them. 
 
 3. Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 The extracts in the text are intended to illustrate Wellington's position 
 and personal feelings at several important crises of his Indian career. 
 He preceded his brother by a short interval both in going out, and in 
 returning to England. And in both cases, this circumstance was very 
 beneficial to the Governor-General. To find, on his arrival, so scrutinizing 
 a student, so impartial a judge, and so clear and systematic an expounder 
 of the characters of men and the state of affairs, animated alike by fraternal 
 affection and public spirit to assist in disentangling and solving the great 
 and pressing problems of the time, was precisely the sort of advantage 
 which Lord Mornington, full of zeal, abstract principles, and ingenious 
 ideas, but destitute of local experience, would most covet, and which 
 completely accorded with his disposition to seek information eagerly from 
 the best sources, and to employ the most efficient instruments; but to 
 decide eventually himself both what should be done, and how it should 
 be carried out. Thus the first extract alone would go far to account for 
 his confident tone from the beginning, and for his masterly grasp not 
 only of the general position, but of details, which is exhibited in the 
 able Minute of August 12, 1798. On the other hand, the Introductory 
 paper, the account of Sir Arthur's interviews with English statesmen on 
 his return (pp. 561 — 567), and his speech in Parliament on the financial 
 aspects of Marquess Wellesley's administration, are enough to shew how 
 vigorously he exerted himself to allay the storm of disapproval, which 
 had set in at the close of his brother's career, and to prepare the public 
 mind to welcome home the great Proconsul in a spirit more befitting his 
 noble character and patriotic achievements,
 
 lxXXVlii WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 What, between these two periods, the soldier had done to promote 
 the success of the statesman, it is the object of this essay to explain, and 
 it is unnecessary here to recapitulate. 
 
 But what, meanwhile, had been the soldier's views and feelings about 
 his own situation and professional prospects ? This question, which the 
 papers in the text answer pretty fully, is the more interesting, because 
 they shew very clearly that Wellington's early disappointments were 
 apparently, in the ordering of Providence, at least as essential as his early 
 successes to the development and strengthening of a character which 
 should be adequate to the extraordinary demands to be made on its- 
 fortitude ; a character which was to be the instrument for resisting and 
 undermining the power of Napoleon, so often and so confidently pro- 
 nounced irresistible, but which was eventually overwhelmed in the tempest 
 foreshadowed by the little cloud that had arisen out of the Western 
 sea. In a word, the soi-disani slighted Indian officer is here learning, 
 by bitter but bracing experience, to become the sorely-vexed, but still 
 indefatigable, indomitable, and at last triumphant hero of the Peninsula. 
 
 That the Colonel anticipated no special opportunities of promotion 
 from his brother's exaltation, he made very clear at once in the words : — 
 
 ' Such are the rules in the disposal of all patronage in this country, that 
 I can't expect to derive any advantage from it which I should not obtain if any 
 ether person were Governor-General.' 
 
 And his appointment at Seringapatam was not his brother's, but 
 Harris's act. But he did expect fair play; and he was very sensitive 
 about his professional reputation. Thus, while he was no doubt gratified, 
 and perhaps not a little surprised, when the Governor-General selected 
 him for the chief command of the Mauritius and Red Sea expedition ; 
 he was intensely mortified when he was subordinated to Baird. Why, he 
 has very fully explained in a letter which shews that, however habitually 
 deferential to authority, he was by no means disposed to brook what he 
 conceived to be unjust and injurious treatment, even from the Governor- 
 General — as such ; for he adds: — ■ 
 
 ' Under any other government, I should certainly have asked, whether any 
 misconduct or incapacity of mine had occasioned my supercession.' 
 
 He had formerly (see page 57) complained of Harris's grudging re- 
 cognition of his services in preparing the equipments for the Mysore 
 War. The appointment at Seringapatam had made handsome amends 
 for any such omission. But having proved his competence for inde- 
 pendent command in the campaign against Dhoondiah, and having been 
 entrusted by the Governor-General with what he calls 'the drudgery' of 
 arranging the preliminaries of the new expedition, he seems to have 
 feared that, in spite of evidence to the contrary, he was in danger of
 
 PERSONAL HISTORY. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. IxxxiX 
 
 being 'ticketed' and shelved as a good organizer, simply; and he no 
 doubt felt the stigma the more keenly, from his consciousness that the 
 secret of his success in the field lay so much (as I have said) in this 
 arduous but unostentatious work, the merit of which was too apt to be 
 overlooked; and he was therefore the less inclined to see its more showy 
 results appropriated by those who had not borne the burden and heat of 
 the long day of preparation. The Governor-General does not appear to 
 have himself answered this severe arraignment. And it may be doubted 
 whether their brother Henry's soothing epistle ministered more than very 
 equivocal and cold comfort by referring to the reputation acquired by 
 the Dhoondiah exploit ; inasmuch as it was precisely that which had 
 mainly justified the appointment, and therefore made the sting of the 
 supercession the more unexpected and galling. It is hardly necessary 
 here to enter upon other disagreeable circumstances connected with 
 this subject, which gained too much prominence for a while from Mr. 
 Theodore Hook's injudicious advocacy, in his biography of the gallant 
 and distinguished, but too impetuous Baird. Although illness compelled 
 Wellington to remain in India, personal mortification did not prevent 
 him from contributing an important Memorandum (see pp. 537-541) 
 in aid of the enterprise. 
 
 Attention has already been drawn to the fact that Wellington solicited 
 the command in the Dekkan against the confederated Mahratta Chiefs, 
 in case Stuart should not conduct the campaign in person. Although, 
 under the circumstances, this arrangement was appropriate, if not in- 
 evitable, it is pleasing to read the cordial and grateful terms in which the 
 successful General acknowledges his obligations to his superior officer, 
 who seems to have been well entitled to them ; and whose high character, 
 valuable services, and thoughtful counsels were fully appreciated by the 
 Governor-General. 
 
 The Bombay Reply to the congratulatory Address is a model com- 
 position of its kind ; epitomizing happily the several aspects of the war, 
 dignified and modest, but instinct with the chastened enthusiasm which 
 the occasion could not but arouse even in so staid a breast. The writer 
 seems indeed for the moment, while quite coinciding with the Governor- 
 General's point of view, to have caught also a touch of his style. 
 The subjoined sentence might well have been penned by Marquess 
 Wellesley l . 
 
 1 ' The contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command en- 
 abled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the estab- 
 lished discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in 
 the uniform effects of our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of 
 our national reputation in India.'
 
 XC WELLINGTON IN INDIA. 
 
 But while unmixed complacency 1 breathes through this review of the 
 great public transactions on which Wellington's Indian fame has been 
 mainly founded, the writer's mind was ill at ease on his own account ; 
 and a fortnight only elapsed before he stated his professional grievance 
 to the Commander-in-Chief in India, and applied for leave to quit the 
 scene of his prolonged activity, and recent glory. To the Governor- 
 General's Military Secretary he opens his mind more unreservedly; and 
 the ' crabbing ' of Wellington at this juncture, though, as he intimates 
 (page 566), due to the temporary unpopularity of the administration with 
 which he was so necessarily identified, may console others who, even if 
 (as he says of himself) ' not very ambitious/ are still conscious of merit, 
 and while anxious (as he again says) to ' get forward,' experience the 
 unpleasant sensation of being left out in the cold. But let the full moral 
 of the precedent be noted. Wellington, though very sore at his treat- 
 ment by the authorities at home, does not throw up in a pet. He will 
 not desert Lake, much less his brother, in their difficulties. He hesitates 
 much before declining to resume his command in the Dekkan; and 
 decides at last on reasonable grounds. And his wish to go home is not 
 only connected with the impaired state of his health, but springs a good 
 deal from the conviction, that he can be more useful in England, and 
 that the time is come, when his presence there is very desirable on 
 public grounds. He is not going home to sulk, to 'ventilate' his 
 personal grievances, or to live otherwise than for the advancement of 
 the public service. Thus he affords no justification for half-mutinous 
 manifestos, and sentimental resignations ; but shows essentially, even 
 in his most exasperated mood, the same temper as when he patiently 
 endured his supercession in Portugal, and persevered for years in living 
 down, and putting to open and endless shame, by his stupendous 
 exertions and brilliant achievements in Spain, the blind prejudice and 
 determined incredulity which so long dogged his footsteps, only, in the 
 end, to enhance his glory. 
 
 1 Perhaps there is an exception to this statement in an implied rebuke to the Bombay 
 staff, which is pretty discernible in the expressed hope of future efficiency.
 
 Extract from Colonel G-urwood's 
 PRECIS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, 
 AND PUBLIC HONOURS 
 
 OF 
 
 FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 
 
 Born i May, 1769 
 
 Ensign 7 Mar. 1787 
 
 Lieutenant ........ 25 Dec. 1787 
 
 Captain ......... 30 June, 1791 
 
 Major 30 April, 1793 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel ....... 30 Sept. 1793 
 
 Colonel 3 May, 1796 
 
 Major General 29 April, 1802 
 
 Lieutenant General ....... 25 April, 1808 
 
 General, in Spain and Portugal . . . . .31 July, 18 n 
 
 Field Marshal 21 June, 1813 
 
 1794. 
 
 Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regt. to join the 
 Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at 
 Ostend June. 
 
 Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . July. 
 
 *795- 
 
 As senior officer commanded 3 battalions on the retreat of the 
 
 army through Holland ....... Jan. 
 
 Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, in- 
 cluding the 33rd regt., re-embarked at Bremen for England. 
 
 On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd 
 regt., on board the fleet commanded by Adm. Christian, 
 for the West Indies Oct.
 
 xcii PRECIS. 
 
 1796. 
 But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being 6 weeks 
 
 at sea, returned to port . . . . . . .19 Jan. 
 
 Destination of the 33rd regt. changed for India . . . 12 April. 
 Joined the 33rd regt. at the Cape of Good Hope . . . Sept. 
 
 1797. 
 
 Arrived in Bengal Feb. 
 
 Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival 
 
 at Penang ......... Aug. 
 
 Returned to Calcutta Nov. 
 
 1798. 
 
 Proceeded on a visit to Madras Jan. 
 
 Returned to Calcutta Mar. 
 
 The 33rd regt. placed on the Madras establishment . . Sept. 
 
 1799. 
 
 Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 
 
 33rd regt. being attached to it Feb. 
 
 Advance of the army on Seringapatam ; Col. Wellesley moving 
 
 on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . 10 Mar. 
 
 Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly ; the attack and defeat 
 of his right flank by the division under Col. Wellesley, and 
 the cavalry under Major Gen. Floyd . . . .27 Mar. 
 
 Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam . . .3 April. 
 
 The army before the west face of that fortress : first attack on 
 the Sultaunpettah Tope, by the 33rd regt. and 2nd Bengal 
 Native regt. under Col. Wellesley 5 April. 
 
 Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th 
 
 regt.), 2 battalions of Sepoys, and 4 guns . . .6 April. 
 
 Siege of Seringapatam, until 3 May. 
 
 Assault and capture : Col. Wellesley commanding the reserve 
 
 in the trenches ........ 4 May. 
 
 Col. Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam . . 6 May. 
 
 A Commission, consisting of Lieut. Gen. Harris, Lieut. Col. 
 Barry Close, Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. 
 Wellesley, and Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, appointed by the 
 Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore ter- 
 ritories 4 June. 
 
 Commission dissolved 3 July. 
 
 Col. Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and 
 
 Mysore 9 July. 
 
 1 Colonel Gurwood dates this event — 8 July. But the Governor-General says, ' the 
 commission was then dissolved on the 3rd of July.' See Wellesley Selections, p. 145.
 
 PRECIS. xciii 
 
 1800. 
 
 Col. Wellesley named to command an expedition against 
 Batavia, in conjunction with Adm. Rainier; but declines 
 the service, from the greater importance of his command 
 in Mysore ......... May. 
 
 The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a 
 Marhatta freebooter. Col. Wellesley takes the field against 
 him July. 
 
 Defeat and death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . 10 Sept, 
 
 Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trin- 
 
 comalee ......... Oct. 
 
 Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, 
 or in the Red sea, in the event of orders from Europe to 
 that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile 
 attempt upon India 15 Nov. 
 
 1801. 
 
 A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with 
 
 orders, dated 6th Oct. 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt . 6 Feb. 
 
 The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor 
 General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red 
 sea ; and appointed Gen. Baird to command in chief, and 
 Col. Wellesley to be second in command . . .11 Feb. 
 
 In the mean time Col. Wellesley, having received from the 
 Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland 
 dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for 
 Bombay in command of the troops .... 15 Feb. 
 
 Col. Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appoint- 
 ment of Major Gen. Baird to the chief command . . 21 Feb. 
 
 Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to 
 Egypt ; Col. Wellesley is ordered to resume his govern- 
 ment of Mysore 28 April. 
 
 1803. 
 
 Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march 
 
 into the Marhatta territory 27 Feb. 
 
 Advance from Hurryhur ....... 9 Mar. 
 
 Arrival at Poonah . . . . . . . .20 April. 
 
 The Peshwah replaced on the musnud . . . .' .13 May, 
 
 Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all 
 the political and military affairs of the British government 
 in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the 
 Marhatta States and Chiefs in the Deccan ; similar autho- 
 rity being given to Gen. Lake in Hindustan . . .26 June,
 
 XC1V 
 
 PRECIS 
 
 The Marhatta War commenced 6 Aug. 
 
 Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur 1 1 Aug. 
 
 Siege and capture of Baroach 29 Aug. 
 
 Battle of Assye 23 Sept. 
 
 Siege and capture of Asseerghur 21 Oct. 
 
 Battle of Argaum 29 Nov. 
 
 Siege and capture of Gawilghur ...... 15 Dec. 
 
 Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar . . . .17 Dec. 
 
 with Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . .30 Dec. 
 
 1804. 
 
 Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed 
 and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near 
 Munkaiseer 5 1 Feb. 
 
 A sword of the value of £1000 voted to Major Gen. Wellesley 
 
 by the British inhabitants of Calcutta . . . .21 Feb. 
 
 Visited Bombay ) 4 Mar. to 
 
 Fetes and address by the garrison and inhabitants . . j 16 May. 
 
 A golden vase voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, by the officers of 
 his division ; afterwards changed to a service of plate, em- 
 bossed with ' Assye ' ....... 26 Feb. 
 
 Returned to the army near Poonah . . . . .17 May. 
 
 Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations . .25 May. 
 
 Resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the 
 
 Governor General . . . . . . .24 June. 
 
 Left the army for Seringapatam . . . . . .28 June. 
 
 Address voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, on his return from the 
 
 army, by the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . 6 2 July. 
 
 Received by the Governor General at Calcutta . . .12 Aug. 
 
 Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath . . . . 1 Sept. 
 
 The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th June, 
 1803, and resigned on the 24th June, 1804, renewed by 
 the Governor General ....... 9 Nov. 
 
 Returned to Seringapatam by Madras 30 Nov. 
 
 1805. 
 Resigned the political and military powers in the Deccan, and 
 
 proposes to embark for Europe . . . . .24 Feb. 
 
 Addresses on quitting India : 
 
 From the Officers of the division lately under his 
 
 command . . . . . . .27 Feb. 
 
 Answer ........ 8 Mar. 
 
 1 Gurwood says, 6. But see page 548. 
 
 2 The address is dated — 16. See Gurwood's 2nd Edition, Vol. II. p. 1281.
 
 PRECIS. XCV 
 
 From the Officers of the 33rd regt 28 Feb. 
 
 Answer Mar. 
 
 Addresses on quitting India : 
 
 From the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . 4 Mar. 
 
 Answer 4 Mar. 
 
 Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, 
 
 by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency . . 5 Mar. 
 Appointed Col. Wallace, Major Barclay, and Capt. Bellingham 
 
 to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan 6 Mar. 
 The Thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the 
 command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in 
 General Orders by the Governor General . . .8 Mar. 
 Embarks in H. M. S. Trident for England .... Mar. 
 
 Landed at Deal 11 Sept. 
 
 Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, 
 
 under Lord Cathcart Nov. 
 
 1806. 
 
 Appointed Col. of the 33rd regt. vice Marquis Cornwallis, de- 
 ceased ......... 30 Jan. 
 
 On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to 
 
 command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district . Feb. 
 
 Returned to serve in the Imperial Parliament for the town and 
 
 port of Rye 12 April.
 
 SYNOPSIS. 
 
 Where a document is inserted entire, an asterisk is prefixed. The first 
 edition of the Despatches published by Colonel Gurwood is denoted by 
 G 1 . A reprint of the earlier volumes only, with additions and the papers 
 differently arranged, was called not second, but new Edition. This re- 
 issue is here quoted as G la ; and Colonel Gurwood's complete and so- 
 called second edition as G 2 . The Supplementary Despatches, edited by 
 his Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, are cited as S. D. The 
 series, still in course of publication by the same Editor, in continuation 
 of the Supplementary Despatches, is referred to as S. D. C. The Roman 
 numerals denote the volume ; the Arabic, the page. 
 
 * INTRODUCTION. . . Page 1 
 
 Memorandum on Marquess Wellesley's Government of India. 
 
 [G. 2 II. I474-I503- s - D. IV. 546-586.] 
 
 I. MYSORE. 
 
 1. War with Tippoo. 
 
 *1. Draft of Observations upon Mornington's Minute . 40 
 28/6 June, 1*798. 
 Inexpediency of a prompt breach with Tippoo. [S. D. I. 52-55.] 
 
 2. Memorandum upon the Barahmahal . . . .43 
 
 iSth/uly, 1798. 
 Measures recommended for defending the Carnatic, and prosecuting 
 the war offensively. [S. D. I. 63-67.] 
 
 3. To the Earl of Mornington 45 
 
 Fort St. George, igtk Sept., 1798. 
 Desirableness of prompt negotiation with Tippoo. [S. D. I. 90.] 
 
 4. To the Earl of Mornington 45 
 
 Fort St. George, 21st Oct., 1798. 
 Should Tippoo be required to renounce his connexion with the 
 French? [S. D. I. 110-112.] 
 
 h
 
 xcviii SFNOPSIS. 
 
 5. Reflections upon the plan for having the army in the 
 
 Carnatie at all times in a state of preparation Page 46 
 
 26//1 Oct., 1798. 
 
 Is a Bengal reinforcement necessary for besieging Seringapatam ? 
 
 Madras and Bombay can supply an army equal to that of Cornwallis ; 
 
 and our present circumstances are more favourable than his were. 
 
 Assuming that a reinforcement is requisite ; by what arrangement it 
 
 can most conveniently be provided ; and what local preparations 
 
 should be made for mobilizing the Madras army. [S. D. I. 1 19-124.] 
 
 6. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley 51 
 
 Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 2nd Jan., 1799. 
 
 Articles of the ultimatum to be offered to Tippoo. 
 
 [S.D.I. 153-158.] 
 
 *7. To the Earl of Mornington 53 
 
 Camp near Vellore, 29th Jan., 1799. 
 Why the Governor-General should not join the army ; and Lord 
 Mornington's reply. [S. D. I. 187-188.] 
 
 8. To the Earl of Mornington 54 
 
 Camp near Vellore, 4I/1 Feb., 1799- 
 Authority and prestige of the Commander-in-Chief to be strength- 
 ened. [S. D.I. 191-192.] 
 
 *9. To the Earl of Mornington 55 
 
 Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 27 Ik Feb., 1799. 
 Prospects of the war. The writer's personal exertions, and their 
 official recognition. [S. D. I. 195-200.] 
 
 *10. Draft of the Description of our march to Major-General 
 
 St. Leger 58 
 
 [March, 1799.] 
 March of the army to Seringapatam. [S. D. I. 203-205.] 
 
 *11. To the Earl of Mornington 61 
 
 Camp, 2 miles west oj Seringapatam, ^th April, 1799. 
 Mismanagement of the bullock department. Battle of Mallavelly. 
 Prospects of the siege. [S. D. I. 206-209.] 
 
 *12. To the Earl of Mornington 63 
 
 Camp bejore Seringapatam, 18//2 April, 1799. 
 Night attack on the enemy's outposts. Deficiency of rice in camp. 
 
 [S. D. I. 209-210.]
 
 SVNOPSIS. XC1X 
 
 13. To Lieutenant- General Harris .... Page 65 
 
 yd May, 7 a.m. 
 Description of the breach on the eve of the storm. 
 
 [G. 1 I. 29. G> I. 30. G. 2 I. 26.] 
 
 2. Settlement of Mysore. 
 
 14. To the Earl of Mornington 65 
 
 Seringapatam, 8i/i 3 fay, 1799. 
 Misconduct of the troops after the storm. Disposal of the con- 
 quered territory. Governor-General's presence unadvisable. Colonel 
 Wellesley's uncertain status. [S. D. I. 212-216.] 
 
 *15. To the Earl of Mornington 70 
 
 Seringapatam, lyh J) 'fay, 1799. 
 Cummer-u-Deen's services, and their requital. [S. D. I. 217.] 
 
 16. To the Earl of Mornington 70 
 
 Seringapatam , 2yd May, 1799. 
 Political treatment of Tippoo's family. His anti-English designs 
 disclosed by his archives. [S. D. I. 221-222.] 
 
 17. To the Earl of Mornington 71 
 
 Seringapatam, \\lh June, 1799. 
 Objections to an article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam. 
 
 [S. D. I. 244-245.] 
 
 18. To the Earl of Mornington 72 
 
 Seringapatam, 2yd June, 1799. 
 Inexpediency of placing the Company on the Mahratta frontier. 
 
 [S.D.I. 250.] 
 
 3. Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. 
 
 19. To the Secretary of the Military Board . . .72 
 
 25//; Nov., 1799. 
 Improvements recommended in the fortifications of Seringapatam. 
 
 [S.D.I. 399] 
 
 *20. Memorandum upon Seringapatam . . . .73 
 
 [Jay, 1 80 1.] 
 
 Its fortifications ought to be maintained, because (1) its power and 
 
 influence over the country are very commanding ; (2) it is the most 
 
 suitable depot for service in Malabar and Canara; (3) as well as for 
 
 h 2
 
 C SYNOPSIS. 
 
 warfare on the northern frontier, as my experience has proved. 
 Answer to objections, that (i) it requires too large a garrison; (2) it 
 is unwholesome; (3) it is not well situated for arresting an enemy; 
 (4) to repair it would be too costly; (5) the river isolates it incon- 
 veniently. [GM^ioo-m.* OI.343-354. G. 2 I. 271-278.] 
 
 21. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close Page 83 
 
 Seringapatam, 29th July, 1801. 
 Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Rajah's servants. 
 
 [01. 341-343. G. 2 1. 269-270.] 
 
 22. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley 85 
 
 Seringapatam, icth Oct., 1801. 
 Close's political abilities. Danger to Mysore from its isolated 
 situation. [S. D. II. 573-574.] 
 
 *23. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 86 
 
 Camp, $th Feb., 1802. 
 Additional reasons for maintaining the fortifications of Seringa- 
 patam. [S.D. III. 63-65.] 
 
 24. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 88 
 
 Seringapatam, 2*[th Feb., 1802. 
 Advantage of Mysore's isolated situation. [S. D. III. 102.] 
 
 25. To J. H. Piele, Esq 88 
 
 Sera, 26th Sept., 1802. 
 Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Resident's servants. 
 
 [S.D. III. 314-316.] 
 
 26. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 90 
 
 Seringapatam, 3rd Dec, 1802. 
 Purneah not to go beyond the Treaty, by paying gratis military 
 expenses. [S. D. III. 450.] 
 
 27. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 90 
 
 Seringapatam, 15th Dec, 1802. 
 Objections against ceding Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg. 
 
 [S.D. III. 472-473-] 
 
 28. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 91 
 
 Seringapatam, 1st Jan., 1803. 
 Active co-operation of Purneah in providing for the Mahratta war. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 10. 01.394. G. 2 I. 323.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CI 
 
 *29. To Colonel Carlisle Page 92 
 
 Ca??ip, "jth July, 1803. 
 The Garrison of Seringapatam not exempted from the control of the 
 police. [S. D. IV. 132-134.] 
 
 30. To the Governor- General 94 
 
 Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov., 1803. 
 Efficiency and good discipline of the Mysore cavalry. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 481-482. G> II. 684. G. 2 II. 826.] 
 
 31. To Major Shawe 94 
 
 Camp, 14th Jan., 1804. 
 Mysore ought to be placed directly under the Governor-General. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 34-35. G> II. 666. G. 2 II. 968-969.] 
 
 32. To the Governor- General 95 
 
 Camp at Chowke, gth March, 1804. 
 Good working of Wellesley's settlement of Mysore. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 154. G> III. 134-135. G. 2 II. 1089-1090.] 
 
 33. To Captain Wilks 96 
 
 Fort William, gth Sept., 1804. 
 Relations of the English Government with the Rajah's servants. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 379-380. G> III. 451-452. G. 2 II. 1 303-1 304.] 
 
 34. To Purneah, Dewan of the Bajah of Mysore . . 96 
 
 Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805. 
 Farewell testimony to Purneah's merits, and parting advice. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 593-594. G> III. 662-663. G. 2 ILi 4 37-i438.] 
 
 II. DHOONDIAH WAUGH. 
 
 *35. To the Earl of Mornington 98 
 
 Camp at Cuddapa, 2 gth May, 1800. 
 Necessity of destroying Dhoondiah. Hence a possible complication 
 with the Mahrattas. Colonel Wellesley doubtful as to going to 
 Batavia. [G. 1 1. 52-54. G> 1. 133-134. G. 2 1. 105-107.] 
 
 *36. To the Adjutant- General , 99 
 
 Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Manowly, 31 st July, 1800. 
 Successful attack on Dhoondiah's camp. 
 
 [G. 2 I. 154-156. S. D. II. 80-82.]
 
 cii SYNOPSIS. 
 
 37. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close .... Page 101 
 
 Camp at Kiltoor, $th Aug., 1800. 
 Characteristic precaution in the pursuit. [G> 1. 196. G. 2 1. 159.] 
 
 38. To Colonel Stevenson 102 
 
 Camp at Jellahall, 30th Aug., 1800. 
 Dhoondiah to be circumvented. [S. D. II. 130-131.] 
 
 39. To Colonel Stevenson 104 
 
 Camp at Jellahall, 1st Sept., 1800. 
 Detailed plan of pursuit. [S. D. II. 135-136.] 
 
 40. To Lieutenant- Colonel Close 105 
 
 Camp at Kanagherry, jlh Sept., 1800. 
 Dhoondiah's arrangements with the Brinjarries. 
 
 [G>I. 217. G. 2 1. 176-177.] 
 
 *41. To the Adjutant-General, Army of Port St. George . 106 
 
 Camp at Yepulpuny, 10th Sept., 1800. 
 Final defeat, and death of Dhoondiah. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 75-77. G> I. 218-220. G. 2 1. 177-179.] 
 
 *42. The Governor- General in Council to the Secret Committee 
 of the Honourable Court of Directors . . .108 
 
 Fort William, yd October, 1800. 
 Pursuit, final defeat, and death of Dhoondiah. 
 
 [G. 1 I. 79 -*2o. S.D.II. I55-I59-] 
 
 III. THE MALABAR COAST. 
 
 43. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick . . . .113 
 
 Cannanore, >jth April, 1800. 
 Physical and social obstacles to the settlement of Malabar. Character 
 of the Koorg Rajah. [S. D. I. 503-507.] 
 
 *44. To Colonel Sartorius .116 
 
 Camp at Kanagherry, i8lh Sept., 1800. 
 The best mode of carrying on war in jungly countries. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1615-1617. S.D.II. 165-168.] 
 
 45. To Captain MoncriefT 119 
 
 Camp at Koorooly-cotta, is I Oct., 1S00. 
 Same subject. Answer to objections. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1628-1630. S. D. II. 193-194.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. cm 
 
 *46. To J. Smee, Esq Page 120 
 
 Camp ten miles south of Copaul, 15th Nov., 1800. 
 Colonel Wellesley's strong objection to the establishment of purely 
 military law. [S. D. II. 262-263.] 
 
 47. To Major-General Baird 121 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st fune, 1801. 
 Pursuit and distress of the Rajah of Bullum. [S. D. II. 459.] 
 
 48. To Colonel Stevenson 122 
 
 Seringapatam, \st fuly, 1801. 
 The use and abuse of martial law. [S. D. II. 484-485.] 
 
 49. To Colonel Sartorius 124 
 
 Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1801. 
 The Rajah of Bullum to be dashed at summarily. 
 
 [S.D. II. 557-558.] 
 
 50. To J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq 124 
 
 Seringapatam, gth Oct., 1801. 
 The Rajah of Bullum to be straitened on all sides. [S. D. II. 570.] 
 
 51. To Major Macleod 125 
 
 Seringapatam, 19th October, 1801. 
 True and false remedies for a debased coinage. 
 
 [S.D. II.582-584.] 
 
 52. To Major Walker 127 
 
 Seringapatam, zyd Oct., 180 1. 
 Semi-military rule in Malabar, provisionally, a necessary evil. For 
 without it, we cannot disarm the people. When that is effected, civil 
 government should be re-established. [S. D. II. 593-594.] 
 
 53. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 129 
 
 Seringapatam, 31st Oct., 1801. 
 Description of the Bullum Rajah's country and position, and pro- 
 posed steps for reducing him. [S. D. II. 607-609.] 
 
 54. To Colonel Stevenson 131 
 
 Camp at Hutty Hilly, 2yd fan., 1802. 
 Pacification of Bullum. Danger of diminishing the force in 
 Malabar ; increased rather than lessened by the Peace in Europe. 
 
 [S.D. III. 40-42.]
 
 CIV SFNOPSIS. 
 
 55. To Lieutenant- General Stuart .... Page 132 
 Camp at Hutly Hilly, 24//1 /an., 1802. 
 Amount and distribution of force required in Mysore, Soonda, and 
 Wynaad. [S. D. III. 43-47.] 
 
 *56. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 134 
 
 Camp, 2nd Feb., 1802. 
 Settlement of Bullum. Strength of the country. Difficulty of 
 seizing the Rajah. [S. D. III. 60-61.] 
 
 57. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 136 
 
 Camp, gth Feb., 1802. 
 The Province of Malabar ought to be an entirely separate command. 
 
 [S.D.III. 71.] 
 
 58. To Purneah 136 
 
 10th Feb., 1802. 
 Systematic plan for maintaining order in Bullum. 
 
 [S.D.III. 77-78.] 
 
 59. Memorandum. — Instructions for Captain M'Farlane 138 
 
 10th Feb., 1802. 
 The same subject. [S. D. III. 80-82.] 
 
 60. To the Deputy Adjutant- General . . . .139 
 
 Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802. 
 
 Reduction of the Bullum country. Capture and execution of the 
 
 Rajah. [S.D.III. 86-87.] 
 
 61. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 141 
 
 Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802. 
 The same subject. Activity of Purneah and his troops. 
 
 [S.D.III. 89-90.] 
 
 62. To Colonel Stevenson 142 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th March, 1802. 
 Why General Stuart leans to the police. Their operations ought to 
 be submitted to the commanding officer. [S.D.III. 108-109.] 
 
 63. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles 143 
 
 Seringapatam, iStA Oct., 1802. 
 Renewed rising in Wynaad. Prompt and thorough measures to be 
 taken. Censure of a 'supine' officer. [S. D. III. 325-328.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CV 
 
 64. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles .... Page 145 
 Seringapatam, 20 th Oct., 1802. 
 The wrong and the right way of dealing with the insurrection in 
 Wynaad. Neglect of the master's lessons. [S. D. III. 330-332.] 
 
 *65. To Major Macleod 147 
 
 Seringapatam, 2\lh Oct., 1802, 9 a.m. 
 Presence of the civil magistrate necessary to the tranquillizing of 
 Wynaad. [S. D. III. 346-347-] 
 
 66. To Captain G. Gurnell 148 
 
 Seringapatam, 24th Oct., 1802. 
 
 Rapid and cautious advance of troops into Wynaad insisted upon. 
 
 [S.D.III.348.] 
 
 *67. To Major Macleod 148 
 
 Seringapatam, 3rd Nov., 1802. 
 Feebleness and unpopularity of the movement at present. Danger 
 of neglecting it. Civil authority indispensable to prevent its spreading. 
 
 [S. D.III.363-364-] 
 
 68. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence . . . .150 
 
 Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1802. 
 Precaution against failure of provisions. [S. D. III. 368-369.] 
 
 *69. PROCLAMATION 151 
 
 [Same date.] 
 Appeal to the peaceable inhabitants, in the cause of order. 
 
 [S.D. III. 371-372.] 
 
 70. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 151 
 
 Seringapatam, gt/i Nov., 1802. 
 Reasons for employing a small force in Wynaad. 
 
 [S.D. III. 374-375-] 
 
 71. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 153 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th Nov., 1802. 
 'A smart action with the Nairs.' Their repulse. [S. D. III. 394.] 
 
 72. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence . . . .153 
 
 Seringapatam, i$th Nov., 1802. 
 Precautions against needless loss. [S. D.III. 398.]
 
 CV1 SVNOPSIS. 
 
 *73. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence . . . Page 154 
 
 Seringapaiam, 16th Nov., 1802. 
 Promiscuous destruction of deserted villages forbidden. 
 
 [S.D. III. 398-399-] 
 
 74. To Colonel Montresor 155 
 
 Seringapaiam, 30th Nov., 1802. 
 
 Conciliation of the military with the civil authority. 
 
 [S.D. III. 439-] 
 
 75. To Colonel Montresor 155 
 
 Seringapaiam, 27 in Dec, 1802. 
 
 Casual origin of the Wynaad insurrection. Not due to Macleod's 
 revenue system. His character and achievements. A friendly caution. 
 
 [S.D. III. 498-501.] 
 
 76. To J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq 158 
 
 Seringapaiam, wth Jan., 1803. 
 
 Exportation of grain from Canara to be discouraged — for the 
 present. [S. D. III. 534.] 
 
 77. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 159 
 
 Seringapaiam, igihjan., 1803. 
 
 ' Some prospect of tranquillity in Wynaad.' Colonel Montresor's 
 measures, in concert with the collector. [S. D. III. 542.] 
 
 78. To Major Macleod 160 
 
 25/^ Jan., 1803. 
 
 'Approaching tranquillity in Wynaad.' Flight of Coongan Nair. 
 The country important as a military position. Delicate suggestion to 
 the Collector. [S. D. III. 555-556.] 
 
 79. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 161 
 
 Seringapaiam, isi Feb., 1803. 
 
 Rising in Malabar; a contrecoup of the Mahratta crisis. Rein- 
 forcements to be sent into Wynaad. [S.D. III. 570-572.] 
 
 *80. To Major Macleod 162 
 
 Camp at Beroor, 18th Feb., 1803. 
 
 Topics of consolation from retrospect of Malabar affairs. Advice 
 to live down misrepresentation. [S. D. IV. 13-15.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. CV11 
 
 *81. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor . . . Page 164 
 Camp at Kandegy, 16//1 March, 1803. 
 Provisional plan for arresting the insurrection in Malabar. 
 
 [S. D. IV. 46-48.] 
 
 82. To Sir W. Clarke, Envoy at Goa . . . .166 
 
 Camp at Akowla, nth July, 1804. 
 Suppression of piracy. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 342-344. 0111.416-418. G. 2 II. 1279-1281.] 
 
 IV. THE NIZAM. 
 
 *83. Memorandum on the French Force at Hyderabad 167 
 
 [1798.] 
 Danger to the Company from the French force at Hyderabad. 
 How it may be destroyed. To what extent it should be superseded 
 by a British force. Financial and political difficulties connected with 
 the establishment and service of such a force. Plan for obviating 
 these difficulties. Military adventurers not to be encouraged. 
 
 [S.D.I. 71-76.] 
 
 84. Memorandum of Conversations which passed between 
 
 Seyd-oo-Dowlah, Captain Ogg, and Colonel Wellesley, 
 
 and between Meer Allum and Colonel "Wellesley . 172 
 
 Dummul, 26th Sept., 1800. 
 
 Meer Allum's views on the Treaty of General Defensive Alliance, 
 
 and its tendencies. [S. D. II. 179-180.] 
 
 85. To Colonel Stevenson .174 
 
 Camp at Panowullah, yd May, 1803. 
 Probabilities as to Meer Khan entering the Nizam's service. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 99-100. G. la I. 537. G. 2 I. 425.] 
 
 86. To Major Kirkpatrick 174 
 
 Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803. 
 Expediency of the Nizam's taking Meer Khan into his service. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 152-153- G> 1.538-539. G. 2 1.426.] 
 
 *87. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 175 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803. 
 
 Sly attempt to pledge the English Government to the payment of 
 half the cost of Meer Khan's subsidy. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 148-149. G> 1. 605-606. G. 2 1. 474-475.]
 
 CV111 SFNOPSIS. 
 
 88. To Colonel Stevenson Page 176 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803. 
 Instructions for the frustration of the above attempt. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 150. G> I.607. G. 2 I 475-] 
 
 89. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq 176 
 
 Camp, 2nd July, 1803. 
 
 The Nizam probably in connivance with Holkar. 
 
 [S.D.IV. 128.] 
 
 90. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq 177 
 
 Camp, 13th July, 1803. 
 The same subject. Fate of inferior agents engaged in the intrigue. 
 
 [S.D.IV. 136-138.] 
 
 *91. To Major Kirkpatrick 178 
 
 Camp, \6ih Sept., 1803. 
 Misconduct of the killadar of Dharore. The Nizam's ministers to 
 be urged to insist on the friendly co-operation of his commandants 
 with the Company's troops. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 379-380. Oil. 306. G. 2 1. 7 1 1-7 1 2.] 
 
 *92. To Major Kirkpatrick 179 
 
 Camp at Assye, 2pn Sept., 1803. 
 Unfriendly conduct of the Nizam's servants towards their English 
 allies. [G. 1 1. 405-406. OII.346-348. G. 2 1. 734-735-] 
 
 93. To Major Kirkpatrick 180 
 
 Camp at Adjuntee, 25th Oct., 1803. 
 The Nizam bound to do his utmost to help us in a war essential to 
 his security. [G. 1 1. 471. OIL 452. G. 2 I.8i2.] 
 
 94. To Major Kirkpatrick 181 
 
 Camp at Waukode, on the Pay en Gunga, igth Nov., 1803. 
 Defensive imbecility of the Nizam's government. 
 
 [GM. stz. OII.525. G. 2 II. 873.] 
 
 95. Remarks upon Major Malcolm's Memorandum on a pro- 
 
 posed Treaty of Peace 182 
 
 2 3rd Nov., 1803. 
 
 Necessity of strengthening the Nizam's government, and of British 
 arbitration on the Peshwah's claim to choute from him. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 385-386. G> II. 538-539. G. 2 II. 882-883. j
 
 synopsis. cix 
 
 96. To Major Kirkpatrick Page 183 
 
 Camp, 21st Dec, 1803. 
 The Nizam's army ought to be placed on a respectable footing. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 402-403. G> II. 603-604. G. 2 II. 926.] 
 
 97. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 184 
 
 Camp, bottom of the Badowly ghaut, 10th Jan., 1804. 
 Inconvenience and danger to the Company's government of the 
 disordered state of the Nizam's and Peshwah's dominions. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 16-17. G> II. 650-651. G. 2 II. 958-959.] 
 
 98. To Major Kirkpatrick 185 
 
 Camp at Waroor, 1 6th Jan., 1804. 
 Military reforms desirable in the Nizam's state. Their introduction 
 ought not to compromise our character, and so weaken us with the 
 natives. [G. 1 II. 45-47. G. la II. 678-680. G. 2 II. 977-978.] 
 
 *99. To the Governor- General 187 
 
 Camp at Yailum, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 Shuffling conduct of the Nizam's servants in arranging the details of 
 the peace. [G.MI. 80. G> III. n. G. 2 II. 1000.] 
 
 *100. To Major Kirkpatrick 188 
 
 Bombay, 25th April, 1804. 
 
 The Nizam's agent to be punished for disobeying General Wellesley's 
 orders for the execution of the articles of the peace. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 218. G> III. 241-242. G. 2 II. 1158.] 
 
 V. MAHRATTAS. 
 
 1. Antecedents of the Treaty of Bassein. 
 
 *101. Observations respecting Scindiah's position at Poonah 189 
 
 [1798.] 
 Legal impediments to counteracting Scindiah's influence at Poonah 
 in favour of Tippoo. [S. D. I. 68-70.] 
 
 102. To J. TTnthoff, Esq 190 
 
 Camp at Qram, igth Nov., 1799. 
 The Peshwah's power desirable as a counterbalance to the possible 
 hostility of the Nizam. [S. D. I. 391-392.]
 
 CX SFNOPSIS. 
 
 103. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer .... Page 191 
 
 Camp at Gudduck, 2*1 th July, 1800. 
 Dhoondiah Waugh's progress favoured by private war in the South 
 Mahratta country. Necessity of a strong government there ; and plan 
 for establishing one. [G. 2 II. 1609-16 10. S. D. II. 78-79.] 
 
 104. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer 193 
 
 Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Hoobly, 16th Aug., 1800. 
 
 Scindiah's formidable strength, ambition, and covert hostility to us. 
 
 We ought to raise a barrier against him, by inducing the Peshwah 
 
 to restore their possessions to the Bhow's family. A Mahratta war 
 
 looming in the distance. [S. D. II. 109- no.] 
 
 105. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer 194 
 
 Camp ten miles north of Badamy, 28th Aug., 1800. 
 Scindiah, instead of co-operating against Dhoondiah, practically 
 assists him. [S. D. II. 127-128.] 
 
 106. To Colonel Kirkpatrick 195 
 
 Camp at Chinnoor, 15th Sept., 1800. 
 
 The Mahratta country, reconquered from Dhoondiah, restored to 
 
 those from whom he took it. Advantage of this plan. Peculiarity of 
 
 the local tenures. Services and claims on us of Pursheram Bhow's 
 
 family. Military importance of Darwar. [S. D. II. 159-162.] 
 
 107. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer 198 
 
 Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct., 1800. 
 What circumstances would authorise military intervention at Poonah ? 
 
 [G. la I. 248-249. G. 2 1. 203-204.] 
 
 108. To Lord Clive . 199 
 
 Camp at Hoobly, gt/i Oct., 1800. 
 A strong force needed, if we are to help the Peshwah against 
 Scindiah. The South Mahratta chiefs must assist us ; and will not, 
 unless we prove our determination by our military strength. 
 
 [G> I. 255-256. G. 2 I. 208-209.] 
 
 109. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer 201 
 
 C a ?np aJ Hoobly, 20th Oct., 1800. 
 Scindiah's influence not our only difficulty at Poonah. It may be 
 better for us that he should remain there. Our army must retire from 
 the Mahratta territory. [S. D. II. 225.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. CXI 
 
 110. To Captain Kirkpatrick Page 202 
 
 Camp at Mayoondie, loth Nov., 1800. 
 Armed intervention in Mahratta affairs would be seasonable, and 
 likely to succeed. But would it be legal, or just? In any case it 
 would be right and politic that I should quit the Mahratta territory. 
 
 [S.D. II. 255-256.] 
 
 *111. Memorandum upon operations in the Mahratta ter- 
 ritory 203 
 
 [Sept., 1 80 1 — Jan., 1802.] 
 Reasons for beginning the war in the monsoon. Plan for a steady 
 advance, and solid occupation. Topographical information, and sug- 
 gestions for the conduct of particular operations. Co-operation of the 
 Nizam's army. Why the defence of Mysore should be included in the 
 plan. [G. 1 !. m*-*i2o. G>I. 357-365. G. 2 1. 295-300.] 
 
 112. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 211 
 
 Seringapatam, 30/// March, 1802. 
 The natural tendency to anarchy in the Mahratta government, 
 exemplified in the contest between Baba Saheb and Goklah. 
 
 [S.D. III. 129-130.] 
 
 113. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 212 
 
 Seringapatam, \th Dec, 1802. 
 Goklah disposed to be true to the Peshwah. The Putwurduns 
 waiters on Providence. Holkar's reported intentions. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 92-94. G> I. 384-386. G. 2 1. 311-313] 
 
 114. To Major Malcolm 214 
 
 Seringapatam, nth Dec, 1802. 
 Our action, and the amount of our force, must depend on circum- 
 stances. Hence, in case of a Mahratta war, the Governor-General 
 must come to Madras. [G. 2 I. 317. S.D. III. 460-461.] 
 
 *115. Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from 
 Goklah, to Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley . 215 
 Seringapatam, 16th Dec, 1802. 
 Profession of personal devotion to General Wellesley. 
 
 [G. 1 I. 9 4. G> I. 386-387. G. 2 I.3i8.] 
 
 116. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 215 
 
 Seringapatam, 1st Jan., 1803. 
 Turbulent state of the South Mahratta country. Consequent danger 
 of losing our communications with Mysore. Project of a new base 
 near Bombay. [G. 1 HI. 9-10. G> I. 393-394. G. 2 1. 322-323.]
 
 cx11 svnopsis. 
 
 2. From the Conclusion of the Treaty to the 
 Rupture with the Confederates. 
 
 117. Lieutenant- General Stuart to Major- General the Hon. 
 
 A. Wellesley Page 216 
 
 Hurry hur, glh March, 1803. 
 Major-General Wellesley's course, in case of opposition by the 
 Southern Jaghiredars. [GM. 114. 01.424-425. G. 2 1. 346.] 
 
 118. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 217 
 
 Camp at Erroor, on the Kistna, 1st April, 1803. 
 Prevalence of private war in the South Mahratta country. General 
 Wellesley appeases it ; and induces the belligerents to co-operate in 
 the Peshwah's cause. Good military results. 
 
 [G. ] L 124-125. G>I.458-45 9 . G. 2 I. 3 73-] 
 
 119. To the Governor- General 218 
 
 Camp at Aklooss, 15th April, 1803. 
 Partial and hesitating co-operation of the South Mahratta Jaghire- 
 dars. They distrust, hate, and fear the Peshwah, and are jealous of 
 our alliance with him. But they look to, and help, us. Their conduct 
 will depend on the Peshwah's. 
 
 Same date. 219 
 
 Why the alleged confederacy should be promptly dealt with, by 
 requiring Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda ; and why, if he does so, 
 our army should be broken up. 
 
 [G. 1 I.i39-i 4 i. G> 1.494-498. G. 2 1. 396-398.] 
 
 120. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 221 
 
 Somergaum, junction of the Neera and Kurrah, \*]th April, 1803. 
 Diplomatic precautions to prevent the burning of Poonah. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 74-75. G> I. 500. G. 2 1. 400.] 
 
 *121. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 221 
 
 Camp at Somergaum, at the junction of the rivers Neera and 
 Kurrah, 17 th April, 1803. 
 Warm eulogy on Collins' diplomacy. Importance of Scindiah's 
 declaration. The Nizam's troops not to go to Poonah. 
 
 [S. D. IV. 58-60.] 
 
 *122. To the Governor- General 223 
 
 Poonah, 21st April, 1803. 
 Forced march to Poonah. Unresisted occupation of the city. 
 Military advantages of the position. The step justifiable on the
 
 synopsis. cxiii 
 
 ground of the imminence, in any case, of a Mahratta contest. The 
 Governor-General should not be anxious about the criticism of ' little 
 minds.' [G. 1 1. 142-144. G. ,a T. 506-509. G. 2 1. 404-406.] 
 
 123. To Colonel Stevenson Page 225 
 
 Camp at Poonah ., 23rd April, 1803. 
 The Confederacy probably not concluded ; but reported in order to 
 alarm the Nizam. The Resident with him should not encourage such 
 reports. [G. 1 III. 82. G. Ia I. 511-512. G. 2 1. 407-408.] 
 
 *124. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 226 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803. 
 The Peshwah's Sirdars hold off; and he does not seem to favour 
 the Jaghiredars, whom our influence has attracted. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 83. G> I. 512-513. G. 2 1. 408.] 
 
 *125. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 227 
 
 Camp at Panowidlah, 10 m./rom Poonah, 2pk April, 1803. 
 Improbability of the Confederacy. Holkar not likely to become 
 Scindiah's tool. The Mahratta Chiefs aware of our power and reso- 
 lution. They have not threatened British agents, only their native 
 servants, and the Nizam's Court. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 88-89. 01.520-522. G. 2 1. 414-415.] 
 
 126. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 228 
 
 Camp at Panowidlah, yd May, 1803. 
 
 Proposed military movements in case of Scindiah's advance to 
 
 Poonah, or junction with Holkar, and attack on the Nizam's country. 
 
 His approach would probably lose us the support of the Southern 
 
 Jaghiredars. [G. 1 1. 150-15 1. 01.532-536. G. 2 1. 424.] 
 
 127. To Major Kirkpatrick 229 
 
 Camp, 3rd May, 1803. 
 Our advanced military position may avert war. To abandon it, and 
 our engagements with the Peshwah, would be dangerous both to us 
 and to the Nizam. [G. 1 1. 155. G> I. 541. G. 2 1. 428.] 
 
 128. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 230 
 
 Camp, gth May, 1803. 
 Inherent weakness of the Confederacy. Our best means of dis- 
 solving it. Circumstances favourable for Colonel Collins' negotiation 
 with Scindiah. [S. D. IV. 73-74]
 
 CX1V SFNOPSIS. 
 
 *129. To the Governor- General .... Page 231 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803. 
 Danger of Scindiah's marching to Poonah. Colonel Collins does 
 not see this. Desirableness of one decisive local authority, under the 
 Governor-General's instructions. 
 
 [G.nil. 114-115. G> 1.557-558. G. 2 L 4 38.] 
 *130. To Lord Hobart, Secretary of State . . . 232 
 Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803. 
 Retrospect of measures for the restoration of the Peshwah. Mili- 
 tary dispositions for the defence of the Nizam's and the Company's 
 territories, and of Mysore. The Peshwah's government settling fast : 
 he appears decided to abide by the Treaty. Without it, a Mahratta 
 war must have occurred, which it may prevent. 
 
 [G^III. 115-119. G> I.560-564. G. 2 1. 438-441.] 
 
 131. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 236 
 
 Camp, 10th May, 1803. 
 Colonel Collins' withdrawal from Scindiah's camp premature and 
 mischievous. [G. 1 1. 156-157. G. la I. 558. G. 2 1. 441.] 
 
 132. To the Hon. H. "WeUesley 236 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803. 
 Holkar apologises for his conduct at Aurungabad. Scindiah's in- 
 consistency. Proposed remonstrance with him, and march into the 
 Nizam's country. The Peshwah seems true to the alliance. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 123-124. OI.572-574. G. 2 1. 448-449-] 
 
 *133. To the Governor- General 238 
 
 Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803. 
 Failure of the Peshwah to perform his engagements to secure the 
 Southern Jaghiredars. Their consequent absence from General 
 Wellesley's army. Mischief of delay. General Wellesley thinks the 
 Peshwah incapable only, not treacherous. The importance of promptly 
 compelling Scindiah to take a decided line — increased by the news of 
 peace in Europe. Need of special powers from the Governor-General 
 insisted on. [G. 1 III. 155-157. G. la I. 614-616. G. 2 1. 481-483.] 
 
 *134. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 240 
 
 Camp near Charoivly, \th June, 1803. 
 Scindiah's language would justify immediate war. Yet he will 
 probably yield at last. Still, both local circumstances and the pro- 
 spect of renewed war with France require that he should be brought 
 to a prompt decision. [S. D. IV. 105.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. cxv 
 
 135. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close .... Page 241 
 
 Camp, 8th June, 1803. 
 
 Stubborn facts, which impugn the Peshwah's sincerity in the alliance. 
 Ought we not to withdraw from it, and negotiate with the Confederates 
 on a different basis ? 
 
 [G. 1 III. 166-167. OI.628-629. G. 2 I.4 9 i.] 
 
 *136. To Major Malcolm 242 
 
 Camp at Rooie, 20 th June, 1803. 
 Doubtful policy of the Treaty. Want of independent authority in 
 the Peshwah. Bad tendency of subsidiary alliances, in weakening the 
 governments subject to them. Effect of the Treaty in case of war 
 with the French — the crucial test. It gives us a good military posi- 
 tion ; but may overbalance this by uniting the Mahratta Chiefs against 
 us. War with France will involve war with the Mahrattas. Yet they 
 could not efficiently unite with the French. Proposed modification of 
 our alliance with the Peshwah. His dislike of us, and unsteadiness to 
 it. Scindiah's hostile attitude really due to him. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 189-192. G. la II. 20-23. G- 2 1- 513-515] 
 
 137. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 245 
 
 Camp, 2">,rdjiine, 1803. 
 Holkar's conduct will probably determine that of Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Berar. Hence, the impolicy of threatening him with war on 
 our part. General Wellesley's want of grain and transport. The 
 Peshwah's faithlessness to the alliance, and his failure to provide 
 transport bullocks. Political and military moral of the situation. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 197-201. OII.33-36. G. 2 1. 521-523.] 
 
 138. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 247 
 
 Camp, 24th June, 1803. 
 Want of communication with Holkar ; and of singleness and unity 
 of authority in the conduct of the negotiation. 
 
 [^1.193-194. OII.38. G. 2 I. 5 2 5 .] 
 
 139. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 248 
 
 Camp, 2§lh June, 1803. 
 
 The Governor-General's instructions no longer meet the actual case. 
 The Peshwah's misconduct alters our whole position. Hence, we 
 ought to alter our line, and retrace our steps. The Governor-General 
 should go to Bombay. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 202-203. 011.41-43. G. 2 1. 527-528.] 
 i 2
 
 CXV1 SYNOPSIS. 
 
 140. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins .... Page 249 
 
 Camp, 29I/1 June, 1803. 
 War to be avoided, if possible. The Mahratta Chiefs jealous of us, 
 but also of each other; and more afraid of us than of each other. 
 Profit and loss to them from the Treaty of Bassein. Why they affect 
 to be united, while they are probably not, nor will be. We ought to 
 avert war by acting on their fears, and lessening their hopes of gaining 
 by it. Course suggested to accomplish this. [S. D. IV. 123-127.] 
 
 141. To the Governor- General 253 
 
 Camp at Peepulgaum, 8t/tjuly, 1803. 
 Time lost through Col. Collins' mistaken belief in peace between 
 Scindiah and Holkar, and the Peshwah's plausible inactivity. ' General 
 Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations.' 
 
 [G. 1 III. 221-222. OII.74-76. G. 2 1. 544-545-] 
 
 142. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 254 
 
 Camp at Baungairm, 10th July, 1803. 
 War with Holkar to be avoided, if possible. Goklah restless and 
 dissatisfied. [G. 1 III. 223. G> II. 7 7-78. G. 2 1. 547.] 
 
 *143. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 255 
 
 Camp, nth July, 1803. 
 Intimation of his intention to countermarch the British army when 
 the Confederates withdraw theirs. [S. D. IV. 136.] 
 
 *144. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 256 
 
 Camp, 14th July, 1803. 
 
 The language of the Confederates inconsistent with itself and with 
 their conduct. The latter hostile. They are finessing to gain time, 
 and to secure Holkar, and a better season for war. They must at once 
 be brought to the test of action — must retire, or have war. 
 
 [^1.218-220. G> II. 82-83. G. 2 1. 549-551.] 
 
 *145. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 258 
 
 Camp, \\th July, 1803. 
 The Peshwah sends only a fraction of his stipulated contingent ; 
 provides no adequate means for paying this ; and diverts it from the 
 general objects of the armament. Explicit remonstrances to be 
 addressed to his ministers. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 220-222. G> II. 86-88. G. 2 1. 552-554.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CXVli 
 
 *146. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah Page 260 
 
 Camp, 14th July, 1803. 
 
 You have pledged your word for peace. Yet you have threatened 
 
 war, both in word and deed. This has required counter precautions. 
 
 You must be the first to withdraw — then I shall. Otherwise, I shall 
 
 attack you. Your condition — that we shall respect Treaties — is otiose. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 222-224. 011.88-90. G. 2 1. 554-555.] 
 
 *147. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar 262 
 
 Camp, 16 In July, 1803. 
 Your interests are secured by the Treaty of Bassein, of which I send 
 you a copy. Hence, I have little doubt that you will remain at peace 
 with the Company, which is your best course. 
 
 [G. 1 1.2 2 5 . G> II. 94-95. G. 2 L 5 58.] 
 
 148. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 263 
 
 Camp at Sangwee, ijthjuly, 1803. 
 Why no day named for Scindiah's countermarch. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 227-228. OIL 98. G. 2 1. 560-561.] 
 
 *149. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 263 
 
 Camp, ljthjuly, 1803. 
 Scindiah may send a news-writer, if he retires — not otherwise. Why 
 no day fixed for his retiring. [S. D. IV. 139-140.] 
 
 150. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 264 
 
 Camp, 18 f A July, 1803. 
 Instructions to insist on the immediate countermarch of the Con- 
 federates, as an ultimatum ; and to leave Scindiah's camp unless they 
 comply. Information to be obtained about their forces. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 228-230. 011.99-101. G. 2 1. 561-562.] 
 
 *151. To the Governor- General 266 
 
 Camp at Sangwee, 24th July, 1803. 
 Report of proceedings relating to the Confederates. Advantage in 
 case they comply with our ultimatum. The weakness of the Peshwah's 
 government, the state of the country, and the wavering disposition of 
 the chiefs — our great difficulties. The state of the Guickwar's govern- 
 ment, and the Nizam's failing health, also inconvenient. An European 
 war cannot shake our strength in India. Success in the war not 
 doubtful. The difficulty of reconciling the Peshwah to Amrut Rao. 
 Intercourse with Holkar. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 237-244. G. la II. 120-126. G. 2 1. 572-576.]
 
 CXV111 SrNOPSIS. 
 
 152. To Colonel Collins Page 272 
 
 Rooie, on the Seenah, %ist July, 1803. 
 Excuses of the Confederates for not retiring, futile, and justify our 
 course. Unless they withdraw, if still in their camp, leave it at once. 
 [G. 1 L262-263. OIL 149-151. G. 2 1. 600-601.] 
 
 153. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 273 
 
 Camp at Walkee, 1 st Aug., 1803. 
 Underhand dealings of the Peshwah with the Confederates, and 
 insidious advice of his ministers to Col. Collins. The drift of the 
 Peshwah's negotiations to be ascertained by remonstrance, or by paying 
 his ministers for the information. This may enable us to settle the 
 Poonah government on a better footing. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 253-254. OIL 160-161. G. a I.6o3.] 
 
 *154. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 274 
 
 Camp, $th Aug., 1803. 
 The same subject. Answer to objections against buying the secrets 
 of the Peshwah's durbar from his ministers. Our relations to him and 
 to the Nizam contrasted. Necessity of doing in the former case what 
 would be inappropriate in the latter. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 257-260. G> II. 175-178. G. 2 1. 614-616.] 
 
 *155. To Ramchunder Pursheram 277 
 
 %rd Aug., 1803. 
 An earnest remonstrance against defection. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 255-256. OII.174. G. 2 I.6i 3 .] 
 
 *156. MEMORANDUM 278 
 
 6th Aug., 1803. 
 Resort to war vindicated by a retrospect of the negotiations with the 
 Confederates, from the Treaty of JBassein to the rupture. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 289-292. OLL181-183. G. 2 I. 618-619.] 
 
 *157. To Dowlut Rao Seindiah 280 
 
 6th Aug., 1803. 
 Declaration of War. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 287-288. OIL 178-179. G. 2 I.6i6-6i7.J 
 
 3. The War with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 158. To Colonel Stevenson 281 
 
 Camp, 1 8 th July, 1803. 
 Instructions to check the advance of the Confederates, until General 
 Wellesley can co-operate. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 232-233. OH. 103. G. 2 1. 563-564.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CX1X 
 
 159. To General Lake Page 282 
 
 Sangwee, 29//$ July, 1803. 
 Amount and position of General Wellesley's forces, and of those of 
 the Confederates. Proposed plan of operations. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 260-261. G. la II. 142-143. G. 2 I. 594-595.] 
 
 160. To Major Kirkpatrick 283 
 
 Camp at Walkee, is I Aug., 1803. 
 Importance of garrisoning the principal posts in the Nizam's terri- 
 tories, and of massing troops at Hyderabad ; both to foil the enemy's 
 cavalry, and to prevent disturbances in case of Nizam Aly's death. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 277-279. G.MI. 162-163. G. 2 1. 604-605.] 
 
 161. To the Governor of Bombay 284 
 
 Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug., 1803. 
 Desirableness of authorising the collectors to raise sebundy corps, 
 for time of war; and of treating the Bheels in a forbearing and 
 conciliatory manner. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 283-286. G> II. 169-173. G. 2 1. 609-612.] 
 
 *162. Proclamation by Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley 286 
 
 Camp near Ahmednuggur, *jlh Aug., 1803. 
 The people not to be molested, if they remain quiet ; otherwise to 
 be treated as enemies. [G. 1 1. 299. G. la II. 192-193. G. 2 1. 624.] 
 
 *163. To the Governor- General 286 
 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug., 1803. 
 Capture of Ahmednuggur. Military importance of the place. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 299-302. G. 2 1. 625-626.] 
 
 164. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 289 
 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug., 1803. 
 The Confederates not likely to succeed in a predatory warfare with us. 
 
 [G.*I. 309. G>II. 203. G. 2 1.6 3 5.] 
 
 165. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 289 
 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, ijth Aug., 1803. 
 A bold offensive our true policy, and guarantee of success in the war. 
 [G. 1 1. 313-314. G> II. 208-209. G. 2 I. 639.] 
 
 166. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 290 
 
 Camp, N. of the Nimderr ah ghaut, iSth Aug., 1803. 
 Political expediency ought to overrule the Peshwah's private feelings, 
 and induce him to be reconciled to Amrut Rao ; our engagements with 
 whom were the result of the Peshwah's non-fulfilment of the Treaty. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 315-316. G> II. 2x1-2x2. G. 2 1. 640-641.]
 
 cxx SYNOPSIS. 
 
 *167. To the Governor of Bombay .... Page 291 
 Camp, 29th Aug., 1803. 
 Reasons for resigning the control of operations in Guzerat. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 342-343. 011.247-248. G. 2 1. 665-666.] 
 
 168. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 292 
 
 Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug., 1803. 
 The same subject. Mr. Duncan's unintelligible hair-splitting. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 345-346. G> II. 250-251. G. 2 1. 668.] 
 
 *169. To Colonel Stevenson 293 
 
 Camp near Unierwarry, 31st Aug., 1803. 
 Plan of combined operations explained and accounted for. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 274-275. G> II. 257-258. G. 2 1.672-673.] 
 
 *170. To Major Malcolm 294 
 
 Camp, 6th Sept., 1803. 
 Narrative of the opening operations of the war, Holkar's designs 
 uncertain. Gen. Wellesley's precautions against him ; and intention 
 of invading Berar. The Rajah the instigator of the war. Good 
 marching trim. Reasons for resigning the command in Guzerat. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 281-286. G> II. 273-277. G. 2 1. 684-687.] 
 
 171. To Major-General Campbell ..... 298 
 
 Got ah Pangree, 20 th Sept., 1803. 
 Wavering disposition of the Southern Mahratta chiefs. Importance 
 of General Campbell's position as a check upon them and the Nizam's 
 officers. [G. 1 1. 383-384. G> II. 318— 319. G. 2 1. 720.] 
 
 *172. To the Governor- General 299 
 
 Camp at Assye, 24th Sept., 1803. 
 Battle of Assye. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 386-388. G> II. 323-327. G. 2 1. 723-726.] 
 
 *173. Extract from a letter by Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Colin) 
 Campbell relative to the Battle of Assye, written at the 
 time of the transaction . . . . . .302 
 
 Battle of Assye. [S. D. IV. 184-187.] 
 
 *174. Marquess Wellesley to Major-General the Hon. A. 
 Wellesley 305 
 
 Fort William, 2>]lh Oct., 1803. 
 
 The same subject. [S. D. IV. 187-188.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CXX1 
 
 *175. Memorandum on the Battle of Assye. Subsequently 
 
 transmitted Page 307 
 
 [G. 1 1. 390-393. 011.329-332. G. 2 1. 728-730.] 
 
 176. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro 310 
 
 Camp, 1st Oct., 1803. 
 Theory and practice of successfully arresting predatory warfare. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 415-416. G> II. 361-362. G. 2 1. 747-748.] 
 
 177. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 311 
 
 Camp, ^rd Oct., 1803. 
 Alleged cruelty of Scindiah's English officers. [S. D. IV. 189.] 
 
 178. To the Governor- General 311 
 
 Camp, 6th Oct., 1803. 
 Irregular and abortive attempt at negotiation. 
 
 [GM. 425. G 1 * II. 381-382. G. 2 1. 763-764.] 
 
 179. To Major Shawe 312 
 
 Camp at Adjiintee, Sth Oct., 1803. 
 
 (1) The weakness of the allied governments hampers the conduct 
 of the war. 
 
 (2) Complicated claims of the Mahratta Chiefs on the Rajpoots. 
 Our protection of the latter may involve us with Holkar. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 431-433- G. 1 * II. 387-389. G. 2 1. 765-767.] 
 
 *180. To Colonel Stevenson 314 
 
 Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct., 1803. 
 Three lines of operation open to Colonel Stevenson in dealing with 
 the enemy. Relative advantages of each. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 328-330. 011.403-404. G. 2 1. 775-777-] 
 
 181. To Major Shawe 315 
 
 Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct., 1803. 
 Capture of Allyghur, an extraordinary feat. Speculations on Holkar's 
 movements and intentions. [G. 1 1. 446-447. G. la II. 414. G. 2 I. 783.] 
 
 *182. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro 316 
 
 Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov., 1803. 
 Answer to Munro's first criticism on the battle of Assye. Col. 
 Stevenson's not a detachment, but a separate corps. Gen. Wellesley 
 was misled as to the enemy's position. Why he preferred to attack at 
 once. An officer's mistake doubled our loss, and prevented immediate 
 pursuit. Causes of Col. Stevenson's late co-operation. His subsequent 
 movements, and those of Gen. Wellesley and the enemy. 
 [G. 1 1. 400-404. OIL 338-342. G. 2 II. 820-823. S.D. IV. 210-213.]
 
 CXXU SYNOPSIS. 
 
 183. To Major Malcolm Page 320 
 
 Camp, nth Nov., 1803. 
 The Bombay Government a prey to factious disputes. Danger of 
 political connexion with petty chiefs. Costly requirements of the 
 Governor- General, unsustained by remittances. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 364-365. 011.494-496. G. 2 II. 851-852.] 
 
 184. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 321 
 
 Camp at Rajoora, 23rd Nov., 1803. 
 Motives for agreeing to a suspension of hostilities with Scindiah. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 382-383. G> II. 530-532. G. 2 II. 877-878.] 
 
 *185. To the G-overnor- General 322 
 
 Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov., 1803. 
 Battle of Argaum. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 528-531. O II. 556-559. G. 2 II. 892-895.] 
 
 186. To Major Shawe 325 
 
 Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec, 1803. 
 Capricious misconduct of the Company's troops at Argaum. 
 
 [G. 1 1.533- Oil. 561. G. 2 II. 897.] 
 
 187. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 326 
 
 Camp before Gawilghur, gth Dec, 1803. 
 Importance of Gen. Campbell's position, in securing the tranquillity 
 of Gen. Wellesley's rear. [S. D. IV. 294-295.] 
 
 188. To Colonel Murray 327 
 
 Camp before Gawilghur , 14/// Dec, 1803. 
 Proper way of treating the Bheels. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 549-550. OII.582-583. G. 2 II. 9 i2.] 
 
 189. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 327 
 
 Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, ^th Jan., 1804. 
 The Bombay Government perhaps judged too harshly. Personal 
 friendliness to the Governor. [S. D. IV. 312-313.] 
 
 190. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 328 
 
 Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804. 
 Recognition of the services of Bombay officers. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 313-314.] 
 
 191. To Major Malcolm 328 
 
 Camp on the lop of the Badowly ghaut, i^lhjan., 1804. 
 Justification of the levying of a contribution on Burhampoor. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 421. 011.659-660. G. 2 II. 964-965.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CXX1U 
 
 *192. To Major Shawe Page 329 
 
 Camp, i^ihjan., 1804. 
 The same subject. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 29-33. OIL 660-664. G. 2 II. 965-967.] 
 
 *193. To the Secretary of Government, Military Department, 
 Fort William 333 
 
 Bombay, >\th May, 1804. 
 Satisfaction at the approval of the requisition. Employment of the 
 money. [S. D. IV. 382-383.] 
 
 194. To Colonel Murray 333 
 
 Camp, 2\st Jan., 1804. 
 A friendly rebuke and frank warning to a disputatious officer. 
 
 \Q}\\.^. OII.705. G. 2 II. 995] 
 
 *195. To the Hon. H. WeUesley 334 
 
 Camp, 40 miles N.E.from Ahmednuggur, 24th Jan., 1804. 
 Conduct of the Deccan war after Assye; and of the Pacification. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 69-78. O III. 1-9. G.*IL 1024-1030.] 
 
 *196. To Lieutenant-General Stuart 341 
 
 Fort St. George, 2nd Aug., 1804. 
 Efficiency of the bullock establishment : — a novelty in our Indian 
 experience. The new system should be retained. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 359-362. O HI. 435-437- G. 2 II. 1292-1293.] 
 
 *197. Memorandum submitted to the Governor- General by 
 
 Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley, detailing the system 
 
 for regulating trie Supplies of an Army in the Deccan, a 
 
 copy of which was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, &c. 343 
 
 Fort William, 3rd Nov., 1804. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 460-464. OKI. 535-533. G. 2 II.i 3 53-i356.] 
 
 *198. Memorandum on the system adopted for regulating the 
 
 Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command 
 
 of Major- General the Hon. A. "Wellesley . . .346 
 
 Fort William, Nov., 1804. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 464-465. O III. 538-540. G. 2 II.i356-i 3 57.] 
 
 199. To the Right Hon. Robert Dundas .... 348 
 
 London, 2*1 th March, 1808. 
 
 Character, influence, and formidable military position of Amrut Rao, 
 
 during the Mahratta war. His good service in detaching Holkar from 
 
 the Confederacy. The arrangement with him desirable, and its terms 
 
 not extravagant. [S. D. IV. 541-544-]
 
 CXX1V SyNOPSIS. 
 
 4. Pacification, and Results of the War. 
 
 200. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close .... Page 351 
 
 Camp at Ahmednnggur, I'jtk Aug., 1803. 
 The Nizam ought to have no part of the Ahmednuggur district. 
 A promise may be given to the Peshwah that he shall share it. 
 
 [GM. 313. G> II. 207-208. G. 2 1. 638-639.] 
 
 201. To the Governor- General 351 
 
 Camp at Senboogawn, 21st Aug., 1803. 
 Why the Nizam's name was not inserted in the proclamation issued 
 on taking possession of Ahmednuggur. 
 
 [G. 1 I. 32I-322. G. la II. 2 20-22 1. G. 2 I. 647.] 
 
 202. To the Governor- General 352 
 
 J awn, 11th Nov., 1803. 
 Objections against assigning Asseerghur to the Nizam. Policy of 
 cessions to Scindiah in Berar. The Nizam, though he has not fulfilled 
 the terms of the alliance, should share conquests, on consenting to an 
 improvement of those terms. Suggestions to that effect, for strength- 
 ening his government. What his share should be. How the Peshwah's 
 claim to choute from the Nizam should be settled. The Peshwah has 
 no valid claim to share conquests ; but may be allowed to do so, on 
 consenting to new terms of alliance similar to those to be imposed on 
 the Nizam. [G. 1 1. 499-502. G> II. 501-505. G. 2 II. 855-858.] 
 
 203. To Major Shawe 356 
 
 Camp, iStA A r ov., 1803. 
 The Mahrattas should be allowed to retain Europeans. For without 
 them, their armies would be more formidable — as cavalry, in the old 
 Mahratta style of warfare. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 507-508. G> II. 518-519. G. 2 II. 868-869.] 
 
 204. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 357 
 
 Camp before Gawilghur, 14/h Dec, 1803. 
 Political imbecility of the Peshwah. 
 
 [G. 1 ! 547. G. 1 * II. 580. G. 2 II. 910.] 
 
 205. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone 358 
 
 2\th Dec, 1803. 
 Instructions as Resident with the Rajah of Berar : as to closer 
 alliance of the Rajah with the Company; execution of the articles of 
 the peace ; obtaining information political, military, and financial ; 
 consorting directly and constantly with the ministers ; and reporting 
 progress. [G. 2 II. 931-932. S. D. IV. 302-305.]
 
 SVNOPSIS. CXXV 
 
 206. To the Governor- General . Page 361 
 
 Camp, -$oth Dec, 1803. 
 A peace concluded with Scindiah, likely to last, either through his 
 accepting a subsidiary alliance, or through our influence over his 
 government, by the terms of the Treaty. His cessions ; and why he 
 retains land in the Deccan. Why the British Government is to pro- 
 vide for his sirdars; and he is not to pay extra for the subsidiary 
 force. Arrangement as to the treaties with Rajahs tributary to him. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 565-570. OIL 616-620. G. 2 II. 933-937.] 
 
 207. To the Governor- General 364 
 
 Camp, \^ih Jan., 1804. 
 The Peshwah's government a name only. Wretched state of his 
 territories. Old and capable officials imprisoned. They should be 
 released, and employed in settling the country. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 41-42. OIL 673. G. 2 II. 973-974.] 
 
 208. To Major Shawe 365 
 
 - Camp, 16//1 Jan., 1804. 
 
 Why the cessions were made to the allies generally. 
 
 [S. D. IV. 317 and 324.] 
 
 209. To Lieutenant Frissell, Residency at Poonah . . 365 
 
 Camp, 24th Jan., 1804. 
 Universal mistrust of the Peshwah among his subjects. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 79. G> III. io. G. 2 II. 999.] 
 
 210. To Major Shawe 366 
 
 Camp, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 
 (1) Undue dependence of the Nizam and the Peshwah on British 
 support ; and consequent bad effects on our reputation with the natives. 
 
 Same date ......... 367 
 
 (2) The Peshwah's bad character, and jealousy of Gen. Wellesley. 
 Amrut Rao would be an abler administrator, but, if false to us, more 
 dangerous. [G^ILSs-SS. G. la IIL 17 and 19. G. 2 II. 1004-1006.] 
 
 211. To Major-General Campbell 368 
 
 - Camp, 31J/ Jan., 1804. 
 
 Caution required in ascertaining the relative rights of the Peshwah 
 and of the Southern Jaghiredars. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 444-445- G> III. 38. G. 2 II. 1018.]
 
 CXXV1 SYNOPSIS. 
 
 212. To the Governor- General Page 368 
 
 Camp, 10th Feb., 1804. 
 Nature, and relation to the Treaty with the Bonslay, of previous 
 engagements with his dependents. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 106. G> III. 57-58. G. 2 II. 1038-1039.] 
 
 213. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone 369 
 
 Camp, wth Feb., 1804. 
 Only bona fide engagements, antecedent to the peace, to be main- 
 tained. [G. 2 II. 1 04 1.] 
 
 214. To Major Malcolm 369 
 
 Camp, nth Feb., 1804. 
 The national faith endangered by the overstrained interpretation of 
 loose engagements with zemindars, and the violation of the spirit of 
 our treaties with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 455. G>III.6 4 . G. 2 II. 1043.] 
 
 215. To Lieutenant Frissell 370 
 
 Camp, lph Feb., 1804. 
 Detailed evidence of the Peshwah's falseness to the alliance, inex- 
 plicable on the assumption of mere weakness and folly. 
 
 [G. l IL 115-117. G> III. 79-81. G. 2 II. 1052-1054.] 
 
 *216. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 372 
 
 Camp, 23rd Feb., 1804. 
 
 The Peshwah's plan for remunerating Goklah: — inexpedient for 
 
 Goklah ; unjust to the Putwurduns ; impolitic and dangerous for us to 
 
 co-operate in. Our traditional friendship with the family ; and its services 
 
 to us and the Peshwah. His real object is revenge for old grievances. 
 
 [GMI. 121-126. G> III. 93-98. G. 2 II. 1062-1065.] 
 
 217. To Major Shawe 377 
 
 Camp, jih March, 1804. 
 Difficulties with the Peshwah in arranging the terms of peace. His 
 consent must be bought. [G. 1 II. 138. G. ]a III. 116-117. G. 2 II. 1078.J 
 
 218. To the Governor- General 377 
 
 Camp at Chowke, >jth March, 1804. 
 The Peshwah's complaints of the neglect of his interests at the 
 peace. His vindictiveness, and shuffling apology for inaction. General 
 Wellesley's answer and advice. General remarks on his character, 
 views, and conduct. The settlement of the South Mahratta country, 
 a burning question. Alternatives open to us. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 140-149. G. la III.n8-i2 8. G. II. 1079-1085.]
 
 SYNOPSIS. CXXV11 
 
 *219. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . Page 383 
 Bombay, 15/h March, 1804. 
 Precariousness of the peace with Scindiah. Its permanence probably 
 dependent on a liberal interpretation of the 9th Article of the Treaty. 
 Summumjus he will hold to be summa injuria. Difficulties and danger 
 which would attend the renewal of warfare, and its bad effect at home. 
 We ought to make every sacrifice for peace compatible with honour 
 and safety. Though I was ill informed on Gohud, our argument seems 
 technically good, that Scindiah ought not to have it. But should we 
 risk peace for it, or for Gwalior ? Is not a compromise feasible ? 
 I do not fear war, and its success might be personally gratifying to 
 me; but, on public grounds, I strongly prefer peace. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 355-360.} 
 
 220. To Major Malcolm 388 
 
 Bombay, I'j/h March, 1804. 
 
 Discussion of our right to retain Gwalior ; and conclusion in the 
 
 negative. To do so would also be inexpedient, as tending to impair 
 
 our character for good faith, the ground of so much of our late success. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 486-488. G> III. 166-168. G. 2 II. 1105-1106.] 
 
 221. To the Governor- General 390 
 
 Bombay, 21st March, 1804. 
 British mediation essential for settling the South Mahratta country. 
 Comparative recommendations of the alternatives previously proposed 
 for that purpose. The third course preferred. 
 
 [GUI. 181-183. G> III. 177-179. G. 2 II. 1114-1115.] 
 
 222. To Major Malcolm 392 
 
 Bombay, 30th March, 1804. 
 Further illustration of the injustice of sustaining the Treaties with the 
 Rajah of Berar's feudatories ; and danger of renewed war. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 501-502. 0111.193. G. 2 II. 1126.] 
 
 223. To Major Malcolm 393 
 
 Bombay, 18/h April, 1804. 
 Dilemma as to giving up Asseerghur, resulting from the Gwalior 
 question. [G. 1 III. 516-517. O III. 228-229. G. 2 II. 1148-1149.] 
 
 224. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close 393 
 
 Bombay, 12th May, 1804. 
 Imbecility, unpopularity, and unreasonable demands of the Peshwah. 
 Will the GovernOr-General continue to support him ? 
 
 [G. 1 II. 239-241. O III. 268-269. G. 2 II. 1 1 75-1 176.]
 
 CXXV111 SYNOPSIS. 
 
 225. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley .... Page 395 
 
 Bombay, i^th May, 1804. 
 Prospect of war with Holkar, which ought to be very short. Famine 
 in the Deccan ; its causes. Difference with the Governor-General on 
 Gwalior and treaties with Berar tributaries. Danger of renewed war 
 with the ex-Confederates. The Governor-General ' sincere in his 
 notions,' but over ingenious, and lacks capable and independent 
 advisers. Consensus of opinion against our right to retain Gwalior. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 383-386.] 
 
 226. Translation of a Mahratta letter from Major-General the 
 Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 9th 
 SufTun, answering to the 20th May, 1804 . . 398 
 
 Advice to Scindiah on the Gohud and Gwalior question. First 
 perform the Treaty ; then remonstrate, in reliance on your close ally, 
 the British Government. [G. 1 II. 267-268. G> III. 306. G. 2 II. 1190.] 
 
 227. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 399 
 
 Camp at Panowullah, 2yd May, 1804. 
 Report of discussion with Scindiah's envoys on Gwalior, &c. 
 Paramount necessity of conciliating the natives, and consulting their 
 interests. [S. D. IV. 391-392.] 
 
 228. To Colonel Close 399 
 
 Camp at Meritch, \st July, 1804. 
 Hurry Pursheram seeks reconciliation with the Peshwah, through 
 the influence of the British Government. Gen. Wellesley's advice to 
 him, and to the Resident at Poonah, on the general question of the 
 Southern Chiefs. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 319-322. G> III. 385-388. G. 2 II. 1255-1257.] 
 
 229. To E. Strachey, Esq 401 
 
 Camp at Bindegherry, &thju/y, 1804. 
 The British Government to arbitrate the differences between the 
 Peshwah and the Southern Chiefs. Nature of their relation to the 
 Peshwah. Appah Saheb to be first dealt with. Articles of agreement 
 to be proposed to him. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 324-329. G>HI. 397-402. G. 2 II. 1266-1270.] 
 
 230. To Major Shawe . . 404 
 
 Seringapatam, i^th Dec, 1804. 
 
 Strange circumstance of Scindiah's inclining to Holkar against us. 
 
 He has broken the treaty of defensive alliance. But war with him 
 
 would be most ill-timed. Proposed mode of dealing with him, and 
 
 with Holkar. [G. 1 II. 493-495. 0111.567-569. G. 2 II. 1 374-^376.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. CXX1X 
 
 231. To Colonel Close Page 406 
 
 Fort St. George, \th March, 1805. 
 Scindiah most blameable for not punishing those concerned in the 
 attack on Mr. Jenkins. He is probably overawed by Ghautky. Neither 
 probably desires war with the Company, or they would have acted 
 sooner. Difficulty of interposing to save Mr. Jenkins, and yet avoid 
 war. To write a letter, and advance a corps near to Scindiah's 
 army, — the safest and most pacific plan. Alternative courses likely to 
 be adopted by Scindiah. How far each is compatible with peace. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 596-600. G. la III. 665-669. G. 2 II. 1441-1444.] 
 
 232. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick . . . .410 
 
 Fort St. George, $th March, 1805. 
 Choute a regular branch of revenue, and a vested interest. Its 
 varied and intricate arrangement in the Nizam's territories. Owned 
 by him and his alienees ; — rarely by the Peshwah. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 602-603. G> III. 672-673. G. 2 II. 1445-1446.] 
 
 *233. To Major Shawe 411 
 
 Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805. 
 War with Scindiah to be carefully avoided now. We are in no 
 condition for it. [G. 1 II. 605. G> III. 674-675. G. 2 II. 1447.] 
 
 *234. To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm . . . .412 
 Hastings, 31J/ July, 1806. 
 Sentiments on the final arrangements with Scindiah and Holkar. 
 Strong feeling in England in favour of peace, at any price. 
 
 [G. 2 III. 2-3. S. D. IV. 586-587.] 
 
 5. War with Holkar. 
 
 235. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 414 
 
 Seringapatam, 2*]th Nov., 1802. 
 The object of the campaign is to bring Holkar to a general action, 
 as soon as possible. This he will avoid as long as he can. His 
 advantages over us in this respect. We cannot choose the seat of 
 war ; he can. Thus we must keep up our communications with our 
 own country, to ensure supplies. Hence we should obtain the alliance 
 and co-operation of the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India. Answer 
 to political objections against such alliances. Military advantages of 
 the connexion. [S. D. III. 432-436.]
 
 CXXX SYNOPSIS. 
 
 236. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. .... Page 418 
 
 Camp, 22nd June, 1803. 
 
 Expediency of direct — inexpediency of indirect — communications 
 with Holkar. [S. D. IV. 11 9-1 20.] 
 
 *237. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins 419 
 
 Camp, 16 th July, 1803. 
 
 General Wellesley has written to Holkar, with a copy of the Treaty. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 138-139.] 
 
 238. To his Excellency the Marquess "Wellesley . .419 
 
 Camp, 31st Jan., 1804. 
 A contest with Holkar not to be precipitated. [S. D. IV. 337-338.] 
 
 239. To Colonel Montresor 420 
 
 Bombay, 261/1 March, 1804. 
 War with Holkar probably avoidable : if not, he ought to be promptly 
 suppressed. [S. D. IV. 363-364.] 
 
 *240. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 420 
 
 Bombay, 20th April, 1804. 
 
 General Lake ought to dash at Holkar at once ; or postpone hosti- 
 lities until he is strong enough to do so. [S. D. IV. 373-374.] 
 
 241. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 421 
 
 Bombay, 2 3rd April, 1804. 
 
 Why the English government ought not to support Cashee Rao 
 Holkar. [S. D. IV. 376.] 
 
 242. To Colonel Murray 421 
 
 Bombay, 30th April, 1804. 
 
 Murray to march quickly into Malwa, when the war with Holkar 
 begins. [G. 1 II. 222. G> III. 247. G. 2 II. 1161.] 
 
 243. To Colonel Murray 422 
 
 Bombay, >jth May, 1804. 
 
 Instructions for the conduct of the war with Holkar. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 232-234. G> III. 257-259. G. 2 II. 1 168-1 170.] 
 
 *244. To General Lake 423 
 
 2>jih May, 1804. 
 Rapid and continuous pursuit, with corps capable of sustaining an 
 action, the best mode of dispersing such an army as Holkar's. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 536-537. G.'a III. 316-317. G. 2 II. 1200-1201. S.D. 
 IV. 97-98.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. CXXxi 
 
 245. To Colonel Murray Page 424 
 
 Ca??ip at Nigger ee, z^th June, 1804. 
 Murray's force adequate to its requirements. Mischief of innuendos 
 that it is not. [G. 1 II. 318-319. G. la III. 381. G. 2 II. 1252-1253.] 
 
 246. To Major Malcolm 425 
 
 Barrackpoor, z^th Aug., 1804. 
 Peril involved in the prolongation of the war. Murray and Monson 
 both afraid of Holkar ; and each justifies his retreat by that of the 
 other. [G. 1 II. 371-372. G. la III. 443-444. G. 2 II. 1297.] 
 
 "247. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace .... 426 
 
 Fort William, izth Sept., 1804. 
 Narrative of Monson's retreat. Rationale of his disasters. Lessons 
 from his campaign. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 384-390. G> III. 456-463. G. 2 II. 1306-1311.] 
 
 248. To Colonel Murray 432 
 
 Fort William, 14II1 Sept., 1804. 
 Advice on the conduct of the war with Holkar. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 392-394. G> III. 464-466. G. 2 II. 1312-1313.] 
 
 249. To Colonel Agnew 434 
 
 Seringapatam, i^lhjan., 1805. 
 Dangerous impression produced on the native mind by Monson's 
 retreat. [S. D. IV. 480.] 
 
 250. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 434 
 
 Seringapatam, i^lh Jan., 1805. 
 Navigable rivers the only natural barrier against Mahrattas. 
 Alliances with petty Rajahs unprofitable. [S. D. IV. 481-482.] 
 
 251. To Colonel Malcolm 435 
 
 St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805. 
 Assaults on Bhurtpoor mismanaged, and of dangerous consequence. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1457- S.D.IV.511.] 
 
 k 2
 
 cxxxii synopsis. 
 
 VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 1. Anglo-Indian Army. 
 
 252. To Lord Clive Page 436 
 
 Camp ai Hurry hur, 20th June, 1800. 
 Alteration of the military system in the Company's territories 
 desirable. There must be an active field force; and as few garrisons 
 as possible. [G. la I. 156-157. G. 2 1. 123-124.] 
 
 253. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 437 
 
 Seringapatam, 22?id March, 1802. 
 Peace in Europe no good ground for reduction of the army in 
 India. How it may best be reduced. [S. D. III. 1 19-120.] 
 
 254. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 439 
 
 yd July, 1804. 
 Distribution of the military establishment required for the pacification 
 and defence of the Madras Presidency. The conquest of foreign 
 enemies does not alone enable us to reduce our armies. The in- 
 creasing influence of the civil government may do so; and make 
 a field force less necessary than I once thought it. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 565-571. G> III. 390-395. G. 2 II. 1259-1263.] 
 
 "255. To Lord W. Bentinck 444 
 
 Fort William, 29th Aug., 1804. 
 Necessity of adding five regiments to the Madras army. Their pay 
 has already been provided. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 372-374. G> III. 444-446. G. 2 II. 1 298-1 299.] 
 
 *256. Memorandum submitted to the Governor- General by 
 Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military 
 establishments of India 445 
 
 Fort William, Nov., 1804. 
 Arbitrary and inadequate provision of the Court of Directors for the 
 military requirements of Madras and Bombay. Rapid and large ex- 
 pansion of those requirements since ; coincidently with, and in con- 
 sequence of, the acquisition of territorial and pecuniary resources for 
 the support of the additional troops. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 448-452. G> III. 522-526. G. 2 II. 1345-1348.]
 
 SVNOPSIS. CXXX111 
 
 257. Memorandum on the plan proposed of an interchange 
 of Native troops of India and the Negro Corps of the 
 
 West Indies. 1805 Page 449 
 
 The plan involves replacing English soldiers in India by negroes. 
 The high qualities of the former are unique, and the foundation of our 
 power in India. Negroes will possess no such peculiar combination 
 of remarkable qualities; and will be a source of weakness and danger. 
 They might with less disadvantage be sent to Ceylon. Considering 
 their inferiority, they will be more costly than European troops. The 
 plan also contemplates sepoys replacing, in the West Indies, European 
 as well as negro troops. Considering the general character of the 
 defensive service required there, only a third of the Europeans could 
 thus be replaced ; and that would require twice the number of sepoys. 
 As light troops, for offensive operations, against savages, &c, sepoys 
 are quite unsuitable. Nor will the climate agree with them. They 
 can only be sent as volunteers. And few will volunteer for such 
 service. The difficulties and expense connected with their peculiar 
 food, their attendance, and the allowances of their European officers, 
 make the plan, on a large scale, impracticable. And it would check 
 future recruiting in India. The King's officers might recruit in Chitta- 
 gong, for partial service, as in Jamaica ; but not without a tendency to 
 increase the cost of native troops. A better plan would be, to raise 
 Malay corps. On the whole, negroes would not suit India, nor sepoys 
 efficiently defend the West Indies. The certain difficulties and cost 
 overbalance the too hastily assumed advantages of both parts of the 
 plan; and make the second, on a large scale, impossible. The pre- 
 vious objections also apply to sending sepoys to the Cape ; but negroes 
 might be sent thither. [G. 2 II. 1468-1473. S. D. IV. 520-532.] 
 
 2. Subsidiary Alliance System ; and the Armies 
 of Native States. 
 
 258. To Major Munro . . . 462 
 
 Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug., 1800. 
 Scindiah's overweening influence at Poonah threatens our tran- 
 quillity. Perils attending the extension of our own power and 
 influence. [G. 1 1. 65-66. G. la I. 209-210. G. 2 1. 169-170.] 
 
 259. To Major Shawe 463 
 
 Camp, \\th Jan., 1804. 
 The good and the evil of subsidiary alliances ; and the necessity of 
 modifying them according to special circumstances. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 36-37. G> II. 667-668. G. 2 II. 969-970.]
 
 cxxxiv SVNOPSIS. 
 
 260. To Major Shawe Page 465 
 
 Camp, 26th Feb., 1804. 
 
 The subsidiary alliances, on their present footing, are inadequate 
 to secure the tranquillity of the Native States, or, ultimately, of the 
 Company's territories. We are threatened with a vast development 
 of the free-booting system, which our great and rapid expansion tends 
 to promote. The appropriate remedy is to put the military establish- 
 ments of the allies in a state of efficiency. This will not make them 
 dangerous to us, but the reverse. The freebooters would be powerful 
 instruments in their hands against us. 
 
 [G.UI. 126-131. G> III. 99-103. G.'II. 1066-1069.] 
 
 *261. Memorandum submitted to the Governor- General by 
 Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the 
 Freebooter system in India ..... 469 
 
 Fort William, 2nd Nov., 1804. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 446-448. G> III. 520-522. G. 2 II. 1344-1345.] 
 
 262. To Major Shawe 471 
 
 Seringapatam, 2jth Dec, 1804. 
 
 Vital importance of compelling our allies to maintain an adequate 
 force for the suppression of rebels and plunderers. They are too 
 weak to be made responsible for the misdeeds of their lawless 
 subjects. [G. 1 II. 509-510. G> III. 583-584. G. 2 II. 1384-1385.] 
 
 263. To Colonel Close 472 
 
 Seringapatam, 2)tk Dec, 1804. 
 The same subject. [G. 1 II. 512. G> III. 585. G. 2 II. 1 385-1 386.] 
 
 3. North-West Frontier. 
 
 *264. Memorandum on the Defences of Oude . . 472 
 
 [1798.] 
 
 [Forwarded to the Governor-General.] 
 Advantages of small fortified posts, especially against cavalry. Sir 
 J. Craig to be consulted on the defence of the N. W. Frontier. Depots 
 to be formed at Allahabad and Futtyghur; and carriage bullocks 
 systematically provided. The Nabob of Oude to regulate or diminish 
 his force : new regiments to be raised. Suggestions on a plan of 
 operations for the defensive army. [S D. I. 82-83.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. CXXXV 
 
 265. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley .... Page 474 
 Fort St. George, 10th Nov., 1798. 
 The line of the Jumna probably preferable for the defence of the 
 North- West frontier. A corps de reserve to be formed near Chunar. 
 
 [S.D.I. 128-129.] 
 
 *266. Memorandum on Oude 475 
 
 (Undated.) 
 The control of Oude naturally coveted by the rulers of Bengal and 
 Bahar, for defensive purposes. Character and ulterior tendency of the 
 connexion of the Company with the Nabob. Inevitable depression of 
 the native State, and interference of our Government with its internal 
 economy. [S. D. II. 615-617.] 
 
 *267. To the Right Hon. H. Dundas .... 477 
 
 Dublin Castle, 20th April, 1808. 
 Plan for defending India against a Franco-Russian invasion. The 
 enemy should be met on the Indus, though that is a weak barrier. 
 The main British army to be cantoned on the Ganges and Jumna, 
 and near Delhi : supplies to be collected gradually: native light troops 
 engaged to join when wanted. A strong corps to cover Delhi and the 
 cantonments ; and to act promptly on the enemy's advance, supported 
 by the main army. Position of reserves and subsidiary forces. A 
 flotilla useless. The pirates to be encouraged to defend the Lower 
 Indus. [G. 2 III. 13-15. S.D. IV. 592-601.] 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 268. To the Earl of Mornington 480 
 
 Fort William, 1 2th July, 1797. 
 
 The retention of Mauritius by the French dangerous to our Indian 
 
 Empire. Tippoo's alleged military preparations — a constant bugbear 
 
 at Madras. Zemaun Shah's expected movements, and probable 
 
 designs. [S. D. I. 13-15-] 
 
 269. To Sir Ralph Abercromby 482 
 
 Bombay, 6th April, 1801. 
 Prospect of success in the Red Sea Expedition. [S. D. II. 349.] 
 
 270. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 483 
 
 Seringapatam, gthjuly, 1802. 
 The Bombay pioneer corps to be maintained, for service in Malabar. 
 
 [S.D. III. 221.]
 
 CXXXvi SYNOPSIS. 
 
 271. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. .... Page 483 
 
 Camp, nth June, 1803. 
 Relations of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief. De- 
 sirableness of magnifying his office, in order to obviate the defects, 
 and promote the efficiency, of the army. [S. D. IV. 1 1 2-1 1 3.] 
 
 272. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay . .485 
 
 Camp, $th Nov., 1803. 
 We should not exact tribute from wild tribes ; and can do so only 
 to the injury of our military reputation. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 487-488. G> II. 474-475- G. 2 II. 833-834.] 
 
 273. To Major Malcolm 486 
 
 Bombay, gfk April, 1804. 
 Impolicy of over-weakening Scindiah, and of raising small powers 
 to independence. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 509-510. G> III. 2 1 1-2 1 2. G. 2 II. 1138.] 
 
 VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE. 
 
 274. Memorandum on Pulo Penang 487 
 
 [i797-] 
 
 The Company trade at a loss, except with China. This results 
 
 from their political character and obligations. Objects subserved by 
 
 their Indian trade. They have almost an European monopoly of the 
 
 China trade. [S. D. I. 29-30.] 
 
 *275. Memorandum on Bengal 488 
 
 [1797-8.] 
 The agriculture of Bengal is not more heavily taxed by the British, 
 than by previous native rulers ; and is more encouraged by the Per- 
 manent Settlement. Sanitary and political objections against permitting 
 Europeans to colonize, and purchase, land. Agriculture might be 
 fostered by markets, and improved communications by land and water. 
 Bengal has free trade with India and the Eastern seas. The Company, 
 though monopolists of the more valuable home traffic, trade at a loss. 
 The cost of freight is almost prohibitive of private trade with England, 
 (in spite of the recent regulation). This private trade, therefore, goes 
 mostly to the foreigner. Bengal loses the English market : but Eng- 
 land suffers equally. The price of freight should be lowered. This 
 will probably destroy the Company's commerce : but that would be no 
 great evil. The salt and opium monopolies produce a surplus, which 
 is drawn away in trade. But this is better for Bengal, than if it were
 
 SYNOPSIS. CXXXV11 
 
 dissipated on the Zemindars, as, if remitted, it probably would be. 
 England is entitled to levy a tribute on Bengal ; and to protect West 
 Indian sugars, at the expense of East Indian. The vested interests of 
 West India proprietors should be considered. The political impor- 
 tance of those Islands, and their superior facilities as a school for 
 seamen. Other Indian articles saddled with heavy duties to promote 
 the general diffusion of English trade, and prevent our. depending too 
 much on so distant a market as the East. General conclusions. 
 
 [S.D.I. 34-49-] 
 
 *276. On Dearth in India Page 503 
 
 [1805.] 
 Occasion of the discussion. Personal experience of the calamity 
 which suggested it. The discussion falls under three heads. 1. Diffe- 
 rent modes of cultivation ; and effect upon them of deficient rainfall. 
 Area watered by the two monsoons respectively. Speaking generally, 
 the natives avail themselves of one monsoon only, in each place. The 
 cultivation is either of wet or of dry lands ; the former mostly producing 
 rice. Rice lands are watered by either (1) rain, (2) canals from rivers, 
 (3) tanks filled directly by rain, or by canals supplied from monsoon 
 floods, or (4) by wells, filled by rain. How these methods of irrigation 
 are carried out ; and their comparative dependence upon the monsoons. 
 Limited extent of the rice-producing country. The dry lands are 
 watered by the western rains. The produce throughout, of both kinds 
 of lands, ultimately depends mainly on the timely arrival and extent of 
 the periodical rains. To improve the cultivation of either kind of lands, 
 so as to supersede this dependence, seems not very feasible. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1463-1467. S. D. IV. 514-520.] 
 
 VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY. 
 
 1. Lord Clive. 
 
 277. To the Earl of Mornington 510 
 
 Fort St. George, i$th Sept., 1798. 
 Colonel Wellesley explains the Governor-General's policy and 
 proposed measures. Lord Clive's character and bearing. 
 
 [S. D. I. 86-88.] 
 
 278. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley 512 
 
 Fort St. George, 19th Oct., 1798. 
 Lord Clive's disposition. The Governor-General should treat him 
 with forbearance and confidence. [S. D. I. 109.]
 
 CXXXV111 SVNOPSIS. 
 
 279. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley .... Page 512 
 
 Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1798. 
 
 Lord Clive is only unfamiliar with official routine, not hostile to the 
 
 Governor-General. A private letter from Lord Mornington would set 
 
 him right. [S. D. I. 134.] 
 
 *280. To Josiah Webbe, Esq 513 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st Oct., 1801. 
 Corrupt and mischievous interference of the Directors «in the 
 patronage of the Madras Government. [S. D. II. 586-587.] 
 
 281. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 515 
 
 Seringapatam, $th Nov., 1801. 
 The same subject. [S. D. II. 612-613.] 
 
 282. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 516 
 
 Seringapatam, 4th June, 1802. 
 The same subject. Members of Council incited to oppose their 
 Governors. [S. D. III. 191-192.] 
 
 2. Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 283. To Major Malcolm 517 
 
 Seringapatam, 20th April, 1802. 
 The Madras permanent settlement well carried out by Malcolm. 
 Corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall Street in the operations 
 ■ of Lord Wellesley's government, incompatible with his retention of 
 office; and ruinous in tendency to British power in India. 
 
 [G. 2 1. 284-285. S.D. III. 150-151.] 
 
 *284. To Major Malcolm 518 
 
 Seringapatam, 12th July, 1802. 
 Lord Wellesley justified in suspending the execution of the Court's 
 orders for abolishing the College. The question of his resignation not 
 affected by those orders. [G. 2 1. 288-289. S. D. III. 226-230.] 
 
 285. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . .519 
 
 Camp, 31J/ Jan., 1804. 
 
 The Ministers have broken faith with, and are not prepared to 
 
 support, you ; nor are they properly alive to the value of your services. 
 
 You are in danger of being dismissed ; which would be a great evil on
 
 SVNOPSIS. CXXX1X 
 
 public grounds, as well as injurious to your character. You should 
 therefore fix, and announce to the Directors, the earliest convenient 
 time for your departure, i.e. the ist of October. Were the war not at 
 an end, I should have recommended an earlier time. For you could 
 not then have wound up affairs, as you may now do by October. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 334-336.] 
 
 286. To Colonel Malcolm Page 523 
 
 St. Helena, yd July, 1805. 
 Is not the appointment of Lord Cornwallis intended as a mark of 
 disapprobation of Lord Wellesley ? 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1456-1457. S.D. IV. 510.] 
 
 3. Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 287. To the Earl of Mornington 524 
 
 Fort William, 2 > ]th July, 1797. 
 Relations of Colonel Wellesley to the Governor-General. 
 
 [S.D.I. 18.] 
 
 *288. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . .524 
 
 Bombay, 16th April, 1801. 
 
 The circumstances connected with Colonel Wellesley's supersession 
 
 contribute to make that step an injustice, and a slur on his military 
 
 character. [S. D. II. 362-365.] 
 
 289. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 527 
 
 Camp at Hoonelly, yd March, 1803. 
 Desire to serve under General Stuart in the Mahratta War ; or to 
 command, if General Stuart does not take the field. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 22. 01.413. G. 2 I. 338.] 
 
 *290. Reply of Major-General Wellesley to the Address of the 
 British Inhabitants of Bombay 527 
 
 [March, 1804.] 
 
 [G. 1 II. 164-165. G> III. 146-148. G. 2 II. 1096-1097.] 
 
 291. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 529 
 
 Bombay, jlh April, 1804. 
 Testimony to Lieutenant-General Stuart's merits, as Sir Arthur's 
 (Presidential) Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 506. G> III. 206. G. 2 II. 1 134.]
 
 Cxi APPENDIX. 
 
 *292. To Lieutenant- General Lake .... Page 529 
 Bombay, 2yd April, 1804. 
 Equivocal treatment at Head Quarters ; and application for leave to 
 go home. [G. 2 II. 1153-1154. S. D. IV. 376-377.] 
 
 *293. To Major Shawe 531 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1 804. 
 Additional reasons for wishing to return to England, subject to the 
 Governor-General's pleasure, and need of his services. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 292-294. G. la III. 339-340. G. 2 II. 1219-1220.] 
 
 294. To Major Shawe 532 
 
 Seringapaiam, 4th Jan., 1805. 
 Public reasons do not require his remaining in India. On private 
 grounds he wishes to go home. His treatment by the Directors, in 
 spite of unique services, and by the King's Ministers, is discouraging. 
 The public interest claims his presence in England. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 519-521. G> III. 592-594. G. 2 II. 1 390-1 39 1.] 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. GENERAL. 
 
 295. To the Earl of Mornington 535 
 
 Fort William, 1 2th July, 1797. 
 
 Severe estimate of native character. Two circumstances which tend 
 
 to degrade it. [S. D. I. 16-17.] 
 
 296. Transmitted to the Governor- General . . .536 
 
 iSlhJu/y, 1798. 
 
 Grain depots for the army in the Baramahal should be placed near 
 the frontier. [S. D. I. 65-66.] 
 
 297. To Major-General Baird 536 
 
 Bombay, gin April, 1801. 
 Personal explanation to General Baird, a propos of the Red Sea 
 Expedition. [G. 1 I. 89*-*90. G.M.313. G. 2 1. 246.]
 
 sfnopsis. cxli 
 
 *298. Memorandum on the operations in the Red Sea . Page 537 
 
 [Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major-Gen. Baird.] 
 Proposed objects of the expedition. Cosseir should be gained. 
 Morad Bey, apparently, the head of the Mamelukes, and formerly 
 reputed to have been friendly to us. He has made peace with the 
 French, who have ceded to him Upper Egypt. But neither party 
 trusts the other ; and Sir R. Abercromby's operations will leave him 
 free to consult his own interest. He will probably be induced to join 
 us for the expulsion of his present allies. This he ought to be 
 promptly urged to do, by a full explanation of their critical position, 
 and by an offer of arms, ammunition, and an auxiliary force. Our 
 possession of Cosseir will tell strongly to the same effect. Neither 
 the expeditionary force, nor a detachment of it, ought to cross the 
 Desert (though that, however difficult, is feasible) unless assured of 
 being joined by a body of natives at the Nile. For otherwise, the 
 army will starve, as efficient means of transport for adequate supplies 
 cannot be provided. And to cross the Desert without them will only 
 expose our weakness, and incline the natives to side with the enemy. 
 Arrangements recommended, in case the Mamelukes are heartily with 
 us. The French may annoy us in the passage of the Desert. Arms, 
 &c, should be promised, not given, till native co-operation is certain ; 
 then furnished liberally. 
 
 [G. 1 I. *90- 9 5*. G 1 * I. 314-319. G. 2 I. 246-250.] 
 
 299. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley 541 
 
 Seringapalam, 26/h May, 1801. 
 Prosperity of Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. [S. D. II. 410-41 1.] 
 
 300. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley 542 
 
 Seringapalam, 8/h/u/y, 1801. 
 
 A receipt for health in India. Good temper rare there. 
 
 [S.D.II. 501.] 
 
 301. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq 542 
 
 Seringapatam, 24/A Aug., 1801. 
 Projected abolition of the Government of Bombay. 
 
 [S. D. II. 553-554-] 
 
 *302. To His Highness the Nizam 543 
 
 2IJ7 Sept., 1802. 
 Courtly letter to the Nizam. [G. 2 1. 293-294. S. D. III. 309-310.]
 
 Cxlii APPENDIX. 
 
 *303. To Pa g e 544 
 
 Seringapatam, 20th Jan., 1803. 
 Diagnosis of corrupt overtures, and of their reception. 
 
 [G. 2 I. 3 28. S.D. III. 547-548.] 
 
 304. To the Governor- General 545 
 
 Poonah, 27/A May, 1803. 
 Holkar's plunder of Aurungabad to be condoned. 
 
 [G. 1 ! 176. 01.505. G. 2 I. 4 65-] 
 
 305. To Colonel Murray 545 
 
 Camp at Phoolmurry, i^th Oct., 1803. 
 Why Residents at Native Courts should have authority over the 
 military force. [G. 1 I. 443-444. G. la II. 41 1. G. 2 1. 781.] 
 
 306. To the Governor- General 546 
 
 Camp at Ellichpoor, ijth Dec, 1803. 
 Mr. Elphinstone's experience, acquirements, and services. 
 
 [GM. 561. G.MI.595. G. 2 II. 919.] 
 
 *307. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar 546 
 
 ^th Jan., 1804. 
 Pacificatory letter after the conquest of the Confederates. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 411. G> II.625. G. 2 II. 940-941.] 
 
 308. To Marquess Wellesley 547 
 
 Ca?np, 21st Jan., 1804. 
 Why General Wellesley writes to Major Shawe. Ludicrous scene 
 at Scindiah's Durbar. [G. 1 II. 62. G. la II. 700-701. G. 2 II. 992.] 
 
 *309. To the Governor- General 547 
 
 Camp at Munkaiseer, §th Feb., 1804. 
 Forced march, and summary chastisement of marauders. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 97-99. G. la III. 42-44. G. 2 II. 1022-1024.] 
 
 310. To Major Graham 549 
 
 Bombay, nth April, 1804. 
 Measures for providing against the effects of famine. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 202-203. G> III. 215-216. G. 2 II. 1 1 40-1 1 4 1.] 
 
 *311. To Lord W. Bentinck, Governor of Fort St. George 550 
 
 Chowhe, 18th May, 1804. 
 The project of raising money at Poonah, for the service of the 
 Madras government, inexpedient, because (1) it is not likely to sue-
 
 synopsis. cxliii 
 
 ceed at present; (2) it will embarrass the Bombay government. The 
 inadequate resources of Bombay are eked out by bills on Bengal, 
 negotiated largely, through the soucars, at Poonah. The exchange 
 on Bengal has lately fallen very low. Causes of the fall. This has 
 led me to refrain from drawing on Calcutta, (while I depend much on 
 Bombay) ; as the competition of my bills and those of the Bombay 
 government would tend to depreciate the value of both. Why the 
 plan is not likely to produce much money. Publication of the tenders 
 of the Fort St. George government, therefore, suspended. Why I 
 have been unable to avoid charging that government with the pay- 
 ment of the subsidiary force. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 254-258. G> III. 285-290. G. 2 II. 1183-1186.] 
 
 *312. G. O Page 553 
 
 Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24//1 June, 1804. 
 Farewell address to the Deccan army. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1236. S.D. IV. 442-443.] 
 
 *313. To the Governor- General 555 
 
 Seringapatam, 1SI/1 July, 1804. 
 Present amount and proposed reduction of the Rajah's cavalry. 
 His gross revenue; the result of Poorneah's good management. 
 Expenses regulated by the fixed condition of laying by an annual 
 surplus to provide a fund for meeting extraordinary calls by the 
 British government, for military assistance. Detail of peace esta- 
 blishment. Composition, pay, and service, of the Candachar peons. 
 Composition, pay, armament, command, and discipline, of the regular 
 infantry. The Dewan's zeal and efficiency in supplying the Deccan 
 army, during the Mahratta war; and in maintaining troops for the 
 defence of the Mysore frontier. General success of the plan for settling 
 the Rajah's government. 
 
 [G. 1 II. 349-353- G> III. 423-428. G. a II. 1 283-1 286.] 
 * 314. General Orders by the Governor in Council at Madras 558 
 28//$ July, 1804. 
 Official recognition of General Wellesley's services. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 457-458.] 
 *315. To the Magistrate at Seringapatam. . . . 559 
 Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805. 
 Provision for Dhoondiah Waugh's son. [S. D. IV. 500.] 
 
 *316. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors . . 560 
 19th Sept., 1805. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley proposes to wait upon the Directors. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 532.]
 
 cx li v APPENDIX. 
 
 * 317. [The Chairman to Sir Arthur Wellesley] . Page 560 
 India House, 23rd Sept., 1805. 
 A diplomatic answer. [S D. IV. 532.] 
 
 *318. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors . . 560 
 
 No. 18, Conduit Street, 24th Sept., 1805. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley will wait on the Chairman. [S. D. IV. 532.] 
 
 *319. To the Earl of Mornington 561 
 
 Deal, 21st Dec, 1805. 
 Report of communications with Pitt, Castlereagh, and other states- 
 men as to Lord Wellesley's administration, and political course on his 
 return to England. Sir Arthur's view on the latter subject. His own 
 treatment by the Commander-in-Chief and the Directors. 
 
 [S.D. IV. 533-541.] 
 
 *320. ToViseountMelviIle,President of the Board of Control 567 
 Elvas, 12 th March, 1812. 
 European troops in India should be the King's ; native troops the 
 Company's ; so long as the Company exercises sovereign rights. The 
 Presidential armies should be distinct. Suggestions for subordinating 
 the military to the civil power. Discipline should be in the hands of 
 the Commander-in-Chief. How military patronage should be adjusted 
 between the Governor and him. [G.' a VIII. G. 2 V. 545-547.] 
 
 *321. To the Right Hon. George Canning . . .568 
 
 London, nth Aug., 181 6. 
 
 The Subsidiary System, as distinct from looser alliances, should not 
 
 be extended to other Powers than the Peshwah and the Nizam. And 
 
 they should be urged to maintain efficient cavalry, according to their 
 
 Treaties with us. [S. D. XI. 459.] 
 
 *322. Memorandum on the Deecan Prize Money . 569 
 
 10/6 Sept., 1825. 
 In preferring an exclusive claim to prize taken at Poonah, Nagpour, 
 and Mahidpour, Sir T. Hislop and the Deecan Army were wrong both 
 in their main fact, and their reasonings. They urge that (1) There 
 was no previous concert or association between them and Lord 
 Hastings and the Grand Army, in the operations against the Mahratta 
 Powers. But Lord Hastings did anticipate the fact, though not the 
 circumstances, of the Mahratta rising ; and his appointment of Sir T. 
 Hislop, with special powers in the Deecan, proved this, and met the
 
 SYNOPSIS. Cxlv 
 
 occasion. (2) There was no actual co-operation on the part of the 
 Grand Army. But it kept Scindiah and Meer Khan from interposing 
 in the Deccan. Thus it co-operated politically at Poonah ; and in a 
 military way at Nagpour; and more completely and extensively at 
 Mahidpour. (3) Sir T. Hislop's was a separate command. It was, 
 in no sense, intended to be so, after he should have crossed the Ner- 
 buddah. And, throughout, Lord Hastings did not, and could not, 
 renounce his authority as Commander-in-Chief; though he might 
 issue his orders through Sir T. Hislop. His words prove that he 
 deemed the Deccan army part of his own. (4) He commanded Sir 
 T. Hislop only as Governor-General, in a political, not military, 
 manner. This is untrue; though, combining the two functions, he 
 exercised also the political authority, which all Governors-General 
 have over the army. As to the original fact : — the spoils of Poonah, 
 Nagpour, and Mahidpour, had been already banded over to the prize 
 agents. The sum in question was a later acquisition, the result of the 
 general war, and of the exertions of the united armies. 
 
 [S. D. C. II. 489-499.] 
 
 *323. Memorandum on Mutiny at Barrackpoor . Page 577 
 io//j Oct., 1825. 
 
 Summary of the conduct of the mutineers. The Commander-in- 
 Chief did his duty in compelling them to lay down their aims, before 
 he would consider their demands. The Committee find that the 
 mutiny arose from : — (1) antipathy to the scene — and (2) to the 
 character — of the war. This is true. But government could not 
 yield to such antipathy. (3) Dislike to serving on board ship. This 
 (they had reason to know) was an ungrounded fear. (4) Want of 
 baggage cattle. Why the sepoys require this. The government, and 
 the commanding officer, did their best to supply the want. (5) The 
 exactions of those engaged in this service. But the service was occa- 
 sional, as contrasted with (6) The alleged inadequate pay of the sepoys. 
 Besides permanent employment, they have batta, pensions, &c. It- is 
 not unjust to exact a premium, when they are paid in Sicca rupees. 
 Nor is their pay, judged by the price of food, really inadequate. 
 (7) The want of knapsacks, for which they were charged. No fair 
 cause, though the charge should have been postponed. (8) The 
 undue influence of two native officers. Their influence was for good, 
 not harm. 
 
 The indiscipline and bad feeling of the Bengal army are naturally 
 accountable for by the detachment, from regimental duty, of a large, 
 and the better, part of the European officers ; and by the little interest 
 
 1
 
 Cxlvi APPENDIX. 
 
 taken by those who remain (including, on this occasion, the staff offi- 
 cers, adjutant, and quartermaster) in the wants and proceedings of the 
 sepoys. General conclusion : — The government not to blame. Real 
 rationale of the mutiny. Its vigorous suppression was salutary, not 
 censurable. [S. D. C II. 521-530.] 
 
 * 323<7. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn . . Page 585 
 Stratfield Saye, 18 th January, 1826. 
 Terms of peace to be concluded with Ava. [S. D. C. III. 68-69.] 
 
 324. To the Duke of Newcastle 587 
 
 Stratfield Saye, §th Nov., 1826. 
 
 Lord Combermere's capture of Bhurtpoor. The Duke declines to 
 put himself in a false position. [S. D. C. III. 444-445.] 
 
 *325. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn . . 588 
 
 London, nth November, 1826. 
 
 Importance of retaining Arracan and Tenasserim ; and of dis- 
 couraging European colonization. [S. D. C. III. 449-451.] 
 
 326. To Lord Cornlbermere 590 
 
 Sudbourne, 22nd December, 1826. 
 
 Danger of disputes between the Commander-in-Chief and the 
 Governor-General. [S. D. C. III. 501-502.] 
 
 327. To Lord Ellenborough 591 
 
 Middleton, gtk October, 1828. 
 How we may help the Shah and the Pacha of Bagdad. 
 
 [S.D.C. V. 1 18-119.] 
 
 *328. To the Right Hon. J. W. Croker . . . .592 
 
 London, 2 4th January, 183 1. 
 
 Why Col. Wellesley was preferred to General Baird as commandant 
 of Seringapatam. [S. D. C. VII. 396.]
 
 sfnopsis. cxlvii 
 
 IT. MILITARY. 
 
 1. Organization. 
 
 329. To Major-G-eneral St. Leger .... Page 593 
 Fort William, nth April, 1797* 
 Suggestions on the proposed introduction of ' galloper guns.' 
 
 [S.D.I. 1-3.] 
 
 *330. Regimental Rank in the Army of the East-India 
 
 Company 595 
 
 [1798.] 
 Why promotion was originally general. Early system of officering 
 Sepoy corps. King's commissions given to Company's officers. Pro- 
 motion still general, in each Presidency. Lord Cornwallis' plan im- 
 perfectly carried out. Present system of organizing Sepoy regiments, 
 with European and native officers. Promotion is still not regimental. 
 This circumstance makes the discontent at the slowness of promotion, 
 and at the loss of old perquisites, a general grievance throughout the 
 service. In Bengal, it also seriously impairs discipline, by the removal 
 of officers from corps to corps : less so in Madras, where such removal 
 is rare. And it greatly increases the cost of the Bengal army. 
 
 [S.D.I. 77-81.] 
 
 331. To Major- General Sydenham 599 
 
 Seringapatam, i6i/ijan., 1800. 
 In future Indian wars, celerity of movement will be a primary re- 
 quisite. Hence the whole corps of bullock-drivers ought to'be retained. 
 Purposes to which the permanent bullock-train should be applied. 
 
 [S. D. I. 433-434.] 
 
 332. To Colonel Pater 600 
 
 Camp 2 miles south of Cullumbella, 1st June, 1800. 
 Dealers not to be constrained by the civil government to supply the 
 troops on march. If you pay what they ask, self-interest will induce 
 them to sell; and competition will lower the price. [S.D. I. 584-585.] 
 
 333. To the Secretary of Government, Madras . .601 
 
 Camp at Luckmaisir, 24th July, 1800. 
 Inefficiency of the bullock system, from the absence of the real 
 owners of the cattle. Officers ought to be responsible for the trans- 
 port of their tents ; and be put on tent allowance. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1606-1607. S.D. II. 70-71.] 
 1 2
 
 cxlviii APPENDIX. 
 
 334. To Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister . . Page 602 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st May, 1801. 
 Military corvees forbidden. [S. D. II. 400.] 
 
 335. To Major Paterson 603 
 
 Seringapatam, 31 si July, 1801. 
 Military bazaars ; and discouragement of a disputatious spirit. 
 
 [S.D. II. 535-536.] 
 
 336. To Lieutenant-Colonel Shee 603 
 
 Seringapatam, 2nd Oct., 1801. 
 Eurasians in European regiments. [S. D. II. 567.] 
 
 337. To Captain Wilks 604 
 
 Seringapatam, i6lh Aug., 1802. 
 Retiring pensions of officers in the Company's army. 
 
 [S.D. III. 272.] 
 
 338. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 605 
 
 Walwajee, 17 ill Sept., 1802. 
 Native elephant-keepers require European superintendence. 
 
 [S. D. III. 307-308.] 
 
 339. To Lieutenant- General Stuart 606 
 
 2\th Jan., 1803. 
 To what extent, and on what conditions, advances should be made 
 to the brinjarries. [S. D. III. 553-555.] 
 
 "340. Memorandum upon Forage 607 
 
 [21st Feb., 1803.] [S. D. IV. 20-21.] 
 
 *341. To Lieutenant- Colonel Dallas 609 
 
 Camp near Poonah, 2\th April, 1803. 
 Unnecessary expense for forage disallowed. [S.D. IV. 61-62.] 
 
 342 To Lieutenant- General Stuart 610 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 27M May, 1803. 
 Predatory tendencies of the brinjarries. We ought not to depend 
 on them far from their homes. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 141. 01.597-598. G. 2 I. 467.] 
 
 *343. G. 610 
 
 Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21 si Nov., 1803. 
 Grain to be paid for before removal. [G. 2 II. 874. S. D. IV. 290.]
 
 svnopsis. cxlix 
 
 *344. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay . Page 611 
 
 Camp at Tiraloo, 27 th June, 1804. 
 
 Expediency of a provision for wounded silladars, and for the 
 
 families of those killed ; and of a compensation for horses killed or 
 
 wounded. [G. la III. 372-374. G. 2 II. 1247-1248.] 
 
 345. To Sir William Clarke, Bart 612 
 
 Fort St. George, $th March, 1805. 
 Expediency of training infantry to work guns. [S. D. IV. 502-503.] 
 
 *346. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn . . . .612 
 
 London, 6th August, 1826. 
 Reasons against amalgamating the Presidential armies ; and equaliz- 
 ing their pay. [S.D. C. III. 368-371.] 
 
 *347. Memorandum. — East India Company's Army . 615 
 
 31.57 July, 1828. 
 Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field. Rank of 
 colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and 
 of battalions of artillery. Officers in the service of the E. I. C. in 
 civil employments, or on the Staff, not properly attached to the 
 army. [S. D. C. IV. 561-564.] 
 
 2. Operations. 
 
 *348. G. M. 617 
 
 Camp at Hurry hur, Monday, 16th June, 1800. 
 
 Instructions for troops crossing rivers. 
 
 [G. 2 I. 119. S.D. II. 19-20.] 
 
 *349. Memorandum respecting Basket Boats . . .618 
 
 Camp, 2>i th March, 1803. 
 
 [G. 2 1. 368-369. S.D. IV. 55-56.] 
 
 *350. Memorandum on the manner of laying a bridge 
 
 of boats across a river . . . . . .619 
 
 [nth April, 1803.] 
 
 [G. 1 III. 68-69. G. 1 " I. 487-488. G. 2 I. 392-393.] 
 
 *351. G. 620 
 
 Poonah, 23rd May, 1803. 
 ■Memoranda on cavalry manoeuvres. 
 
 [G. 2 1. 459-460. S. D. IV 91-92.]
 
 d APPENDIX. 
 
 *352, G. O ■ Page 622 
 
 Camp at Jaum, Friday, nth Nov., 1803. 
 
 Discretion of officers as to the execution of orders. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 850. S.D. IV. 287.] 
 
 *353. G. 622 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 16 fh June, 1804. 
 Instructions for the combined march in line of infantry battalions. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 1228. S. D. IV. 429-430.] 
 
 3. Discipline. 
 
 *354. To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny . . .623 
 
 Seringapatam, 2nd July, 1801. 
 Embezzlement of Stores, and manifold rascality. [S. D. II. 487-489.] 
 
 *355. To the Right Hon. Lord Clive . . . .626 
 Seringapatam, 23rd Oct., 1801. 
 Mercy seasons justice. [S.D. II. 592.] 
 
 356. To Major- General Baird 626 
 
 Bangalore, 2\th Nov., 1801. 
 Wellington's abhorrence of corrupt practices. [S. D. II. 625.] 
 
 357. To the Commander-in-Chief, Fort St. George . . 626 
 
 Seringapatam, \2lf1 June, 1801. 
 A low official estimate of professional character reprobated. 
 
 [G. 2 I. 259-260. S. D. II. 440-441.] 
 
 *358. G. 627 
 
 Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801. 
 The same subject. [G. 2 1. 268. S.D. II. 520-521.] 
 
 *359. To the President of the General Court Martial . 628 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st Sept., 1801. 
 Witnesses before Courts Martial not to be drilled by the accused or 
 his agents. [S.D. II. 561-562.] 
 
 *360. G. 629 
 
 Seringapatam, I'jt/i July, 1802. 
 Intoxication most degrading to the character, and ruinous to the 
 efficiency, of an officer. [G. 2 1. 288. S.D. III. 236-237.]
 
 synopsis. cli 
 
 361. The D. A. G. to Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage . Page 630 
 lotk Aug., 1802. 
 Commanding officers to communicate personally with their subor- 
 dinates in garrison — not write to them. [G. 2 I. 291.] 
 
 *362. To Mr. 630 
 
 Seringapatam, 23rd Aug., 1802, 
 A sharp stimulant to a malingerer. [S. D. III. 280-281.] 
 
 *363. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron Bulot . .631 
 
 Seringapatam, 1st Sept., 1802. 
 
 Abuse of invaliding. The rules of the service do not favour 
 neat jobs. [S. D. III. 289-290.] 
 
 *364. G. 632 
 
 Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1802. 
 Officers forbidden to beat natives. [G. 2 1. 291. S. D. III. 296-297.] 
 
 365. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles 632 
 
 Seringapatam, Sept., 1802. 
 
 The paymaster not to live away from head-quarters. 
 
 [S. D. III. 300.] 
 
 *366. G. O 633 
 
 Seringapatam, 10th Sept., 1802. 
 
 Military insolence tested by the rules of the service. 
 
 [G. 2 1. 293. S. D. III. 301-302.] 
 
 *367. The D. A. G. to Major * * * *, commanding a de- 
 tachment of H. M. — regt 634 
 
 <jth Dec, 1802. 
 
 Exposition of the futility of excuses pleaded for levying purveyance 
 in the Mysore country. Restitution required. [G. 2 I. 314-315.] 
 
 368. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor . . . .635 
 Camp, yd July, 1803. 
 Subalterns not to put each other in arrest, except in case of abso- 
 lute necessity. [S. D. IV. 129.]
 
 c lii APPENDIX. 
 
 369. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General 
 Court Martial Page 636 
 
 Camp, i8tkjuly, 1803. 
 Courts Martial ought not to give sentence of honourable acquittal 
 ' merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt.' 
 
 [S.D. IV. 141-142.] 
 
 370. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor .... 636 
 
 Camp, 30th July, 1803. 
 Scribendi KaKorjdes among officers to be checked. [S. D. IV. 148.] 
 
 371. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay . .637 
 
 Camp, ut/i Nov., 1803. 
 The same subject. [G. 1 III. 367. G. 1 * 497. G. 2 II. 853.] 
 
 372. To Colonel Murray 637 
 
 Camp, 14th Sept., 1803. 
 The service not to suffer through the private quarrels of officers. 
 
 [G. 1 1. 375-377- G> II. 300-302. G> I. 708.] 
 
 *373. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General 
 
 Court Martial 638 
 
 Camp, 5th Oct., 1803. 
 A private reprimand an inadequate punishment for insulting a 
 magistrate in consequence of his acts, as such. [S. D. IV. 190-191.] 
 
 374. To Major Doolan 639 
 
 Camp, dlh Oct., 1803. 
 
 Frivolous and factious regimental quarrels highly dangerous to the 
 public interests, especially in time of war ; and to the European 
 officers engaged in them. [S.D. IV. 193-195.] 
 
 *375. G. A. 640 
 
 Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec, 1803. 
 Officers to pay ready money for shop goods. 
 
 [G. 2 II. 923. S.D. IV. 300-301.] 
 
 376. To Colonel Murray 640 
 
 Camp, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 
 Military inefficiency, from improper use of men or equipments, 
 worse than indiscipline. [G. 1 II. 84-85. G.' a III. 16. G. 2 II. 1003.]
 
 synopsis. cliii 
 
 377. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron, commanding at Serin- 
 gapatam Page 641 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804. 
 
 Strong obligation of British officers to support the authority of the 
 civil magistrate. [S. D. IV. 424.] 
 
 378. To Major Symons 641 
 
 Ca??ip at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804. 
 The same subject. [S. D. IV. 426-427.] 
 
 379. To Lord Ellenborough 642 
 
 Stratfield Saye, jth Sept., 1829. 
 
 How the officers of the East India Company's army are excited to 
 mutiny. [S. D. C. VI. 1 38-1 40. j 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 *380. To the Adjutant-General, Bombay . . . .644 
 Seringapatam, 2 3rd April, 1800. 
 All the public means ought to be applied to the public service when 
 necessary. [S. D. I. 533-535-] 
 
 381, To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick . . . .645 
 
 Camp at Chiltledroog, 11th June, 1800. 
 The hill forts ought to be destroyed. [S. D. II. 10.] 
 
 *382. To Lieutenant-Colonel Spry 645 
 
 Seringapatam, ^lh June, 1802. 
 
 Officers who build houses on cantonment ground are entitled, strictly 
 speaking, on selling them, to receive the price of the materials only. 
 
 [S.D. III. 193-195.] 
 
 *383. To the Officers commanding Chittledroog, Paughur, Nun- 
 dydroog; to be communicated to those commanding 
 Mudgherry, Mergasie, and Goorybunda . . .647 
 
 2\st Aug., l802. 
 
 Detailed information to be supplied by the commandants of forts, on 
 occasion of their inspection by Major-General Wellesley. 
 
 [S.D. III. 276-279.]
 
 div APPENDIX, 
 
 384. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace . . . Page 649 
 
 Bombay, 27/$ March, 1804. 
 
 Martial law indispensable in a lawless land. 
 
 [G. 1 III. 496. G. 1 * III. 186. G. 2 II. 1122.] 
 
 385. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace .... 650 
 
 Camp at Nigger ee, 2%ih June, 1804. 
 Importance, to a commanding officer, of habitual secrecy on public 
 matters. [G. 1 III. 563- G. 1 * III. 382-383. G. 2 II. i25 3 - I2 54.] 
 
 386. To Lord Bathurst 650 
 
 London, 26th Jan., 1824. 
 Position of officers of King's troops in India. 
 
 [S.D.C. II. 193-194.] 
 
 *387. To the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn . . .651 
 
 London, 20ijuly, 1826. 
 
 At what age European soldiers may most safely be sent to India. 
 
 [S.D.C. III. 351-352.] 
 
 III. ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTATIONS. 
 
 388. Colonel George Chesney 652 
 
 Rise and Development of the Indian Army. 
 
 [Indian Polity, pp. 275-284. First Edition.] 
 
 389. Dr. W. W. Hunter 659 
 
 Preventives of Famine. 
 
 [The Annals of Rural Bengal, 1868, pp. 50-56.] 
 
 390. H. St. G. Tucker, Esq 662 
 
 Indian Sugar. 
 
 [Memorials of Indian Government, etc. edited by J. W. Kaye, 
 1853, pp. 178-190.] 
 
 391. Memorandum by the Prince Consort. . . .668 
 Re-organization of the Indian Army. 
 
 [Life of H.R.H. the Prince Consort, by Theodore Martin, 
 Vol. IV. pp. 310-312.]
 
 SFNOPSIS. civ 
 
 MAPS AND PLANS. 
 
 1. Historical Map of India. 
 
 [Wellington Supplementary Despatches, Vol. I. 1858.] 
 
 2. Battle of Mallavelly. 
 
 [Lushington's Life of Lord Harris, 1840.] 
 
 3. Environs of Seringapatam. 
 
 [Beatson's War with Tippoo Sultaun, 1800.] 
 
 4. Siege and Storm of Seringapatam. 
 
 [Beatson, ut supra.] 
 
 5. Map to illustrate the Partition of Tippoo's Dominions. 
 
 [Beatson, ut supra.] 
 
 6. Battle of Assye. 
 
 [Marquess Wellesley's Notes Relative to Transactions in the 
 Mahratta Empire, 1804.] 
 
 7. Battle of Argaum. 
 
 [Welsh's Military Reminiscences, 1830.]
 
 EXPLANATION OF THE PLANS. 
 
 Mallavelly. — The following is given in Mr. Lushington's Life of Lora 
 Harris, to explain the Plan reproduced from that work in this volume : — 
 
 ' References. Red, denotes the first position of the English army. Blue, the 
 2nd ditto. Purple, the 3rd ditto. Yellow, Tippoo's, the 1st ditto. Green, the 
 2nd ditto. Orange, shows the encampment of the army after the action. 
 
 A. A large body of the enemy's horse kept in check by the 25th regiment 
 of light dragoons. B. A party of the horse and rocket boys driven off by the 
 picquet. C. A small party of the enemy's horse charging the 1st, or European 
 brigade, and repulsed. D. The 2nd regiment of cavalry advancing to charge, 
 but halted on the European brigade beginning to fire. E. A large body of the 
 enemy which retreated on the party C being repulsed. F. A party of the 
 enemy's infantry engaged with the left of the European brigade, and obliged 
 to retreat. G. Another party that attacked the 33rd regiment, the head of 
 Colonel Wellesley's division. H. Retreat of the party G charged by the 33rd 
 regiment. I. Charge of three regiments of cavalry, under General Floyd, 
 on the fugitives H. K. Two brass 18-pounders on a high spot, cannonading 
 the enemy while the line formed. L. Ditto advanced to some commanding 
 rocks, from which they opened on the enemy as the line advanced.' 
 
 The two Plans of Seringapatam, and the Map descriptive of the partition 
 of Tippoo's territories, are taken from the semi-official work of Lt.-Col. 
 Alexander Beatson, Aide de Camp to the Marquess Wellesley, and Sur- 
 veyor General to the Army in the Field, entitled A View of the War with 
 Tiftftoo Sultann. It seems unnecessary to add anything to the explanations 
 which that author gave in the margin of each ; and which will enable the 
 reader to follow, in detail, the military operations, and the political 
 arrangements. 
 
 The Plan of the Battle of Assye is reproduced from the Governor- 
 General's Notes Relative to Transactions in the Mahratta Empire. The 
 following details result from a comparison of that work with Major Thorn's 
 Memoir of the War in India. 
 
 Battle of Assye. — A. English army advancing to the ford. 1, 2, 3, Nizam's 
 and Peishwa's cavalry. X. The left of the enemy's infantry line, in its original 
 position, which it was proposed to attack. B., B., Second position of the 
 enemy's infantry (first line), and of the English army confronting it. D. 
 Enemy's second line of infantry, after its re-formation. C. English army 
 pursuing the enemy's routed first line. E. Mahratta cavalry charging the 
 74th regiment. F. Countercharge of the English cavalry. G. General 
 Wellesley's charge with the 78th regiment and 7th regiment N. C. H. 
 Position of the General and these troops, after the charge. 
 
 Battle of Argaum. — The Governor-General did not insert in his Notes, 
 nor Major Thorn in his Memoir, a plan of this engagement. But Colonel 
 Welsh, who was present on the occasion, has supplied the want in his 
 Military Reminiscences. The array, on both sides, was so simple, and the 
 catastrophe so prompt, that this rough sketch will, it is hoped, be sufficient 
 for the purpose.
 
 SELECTIONS 
 
 FROM 
 
 WELLINGTONS INDIAN DESPATCHES. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 MEMORANDUM 1 ON MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT 
 
 OF INDIA. 
 
 In order to understand the merits or demerits of Marquess 
 Wellesley's government in India, it is necessary to review the 
 state of that country when his Lordship assumed its govern- 
 ment in May, 1798, and that in which it was left in April, 1806, 
 which was the close of the official year in which Marquess 
 Wellesley resigned the government. This subject is large, and 
 will require a minute detail of many measures, of the causes 
 which led to them, and of their consequences. But this paper 
 shall be made as short as possible ; and nothing shall be inserted 
 in it which is not necessary for the elucidation of the subjects on 
 which it is written. 
 
 The first intelligence which reached Marquess Wellesley, upon 
 his arrival in India, was that the ancient Native enemy of the 
 Company had formed an alliance with the French at Mauritius, 
 for the purpose of attacking the British nation in India ; and 
 that, in consequence of this alliance, a body of Frenchmen had 
 already been landed at the port of Mangalore on the coast of 
 Malabar, and had marched to Seringapatam. Shortly after the 
 receipt of this intelligence, it was known in India that Buonaparte, 
 with a large French army, had landed and taken possession of 
 Egypt, and that the avowed object of this expedition was to 
 invade India by that route. 
 
 The state of warfare which was to be expected in consequence 
 of the intelligence of these measures and movements of the 
 enemies of the British government, rendered necessary a review 
 
 1 Written after the Session of Parliament of 1806. The sums and 
 dates left in blank in the original memorandum, were filled up at the 
 Board of Control and the India House. — Note in the original editions. 
 
 B
 
 2 ' FINANCIAL DISTRESS, AND Ml LIT A RF INEFFICIENCY. 
 
 of its situation in all its branches ; and what follows is the result of 
 that review, and of the measures which were adopted to apply a 
 remedy to the inconveniences and evils which were found to exist. 
 
 The Company were found to have a revenue of 8,059,880/., a 
 sum less than that which they had been found to have in 1793, at 
 the renewal of their charter, by 165,748/. The debt amounted 
 to 10,866,588/., having increased since 1793 ; and the interest 
 was annually 746,933/., having increased since 1793. The total 
 amount of the charges of the government in India, including the 
 interest of the debt, was 8,178,626/. ; and the deficiency of the 
 revenues, in comparison with the charges, at a time of profound 
 peace in India, was 322,530/. At the same time the Company's 
 credit was at the lowest ebb. Money could not be borrowed in 
 Bengal at 11 per cent, interest; the Company's bonds and 
 securities at that rate were circulated at such a discount, as well 
 at that Presidency as at Madras and Bombay, as to amount 
 nearly to a stagnation ; and with this great war in expectation, 
 the Company's financial servants in India were entirely at a loss 
 to find the means for supporting and carrying on the ordinary 
 operations of the government in time of peace. The Company s 
 armies, although in a high state of discipline, and maintained, 
 that of Fort William at the expense of 1,996,487/., that of Fort 
 St. George at the expense of 1,868,498/., and that of Bombay at 
 the expense of 641,469/., were not in a state of preparation and 
 efficiency to perform the operations which the crisis of the 
 Company's affairs was likely to require from them. The Com- 
 mander in Chief and Adjutant General of Fort St. George 
 reported that 6 months would be required to prepare for service 
 the army serving under that Presidency, upon which the brunt 
 of the contest was likely to fall ; and the government of that 
 Presidency were apprehensive of the consequences of drawing 
 the attention of the enemy by making the smallest preparation 
 for defence against the attack which they well knew he had 
 meditated. The army of Bombay, on which naturally the task 
 would have fallen of co-operating in the contest with that of 
 Fort St. George, was necessarily scattered in the disaffected 
 provinces under the government of Bombay ; and the army of 
 Bengal was stationed principally in the Vizier's territories, with 
 a view to keep them in tranquillity, and to defend them from the 
 expected invasion of the King of Caubul. 
 
 Those powers on whom experience of former wars with Tippoo 
 had shown that the Company ought to rely for assistance were
 
 OUR ALLIES UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO HELP US. 3 
 
 the Nizam, the Peshwah, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the 
 petty rajahs and zemindars on the coast of Malabar. Since 
 the peace of 1792 with Tippoo, which had attained the object 
 of the alliance between the first two and the Company, the 
 situation of these powers had been considerably changed. The 
 Nizam, by the result of an unfortunate state of hostility with 
 the Mahrattas, which ended in battle, and a peace, or rather 
 capitulation, concluded at Kurdlah in the year i795» had fallen 
 from the state of a great and leading power in Hindustan to 
 that of a tributary to the Mahrattas. His ministers were 
 appointed by the Mahrattas ; his army was disbanded ; and 
 the only support of his authority was a corps consisting of about 
 14,000 men, trained, disciplined, and commanded by French 
 officers. These officers had possession of a considerable portion 
 of the Nizam's territories, from the revenues of which they were 
 to pay their troops ; and by the power which they acquired by 
 this possession, and by the state of confusion of the government 
 of the Mahrattas at Poonah, the weakness of that of the Nizam, 
 and the supine indifference of that of the Company, they were 
 becoming a French state in the peninsula of India. By their 
 power and violence they overawed the Nizam's councils, and 
 precluded all hope of his co-operation in the war which was 
 expected with Tippoo and his French allies in the year i 798. 
 
 The Mahratta government of Poonah, which had afforded such 
 material assistance to the British government in the war which 
 had ended in 1792 by the treaty of Seringapatam, was become 
 equally incapable with the Nizam of affording any aid in that 
 which was expected in 1798. After the peace of Kurdlah in 
 1795, the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, threw himself from a 
 window in his palace at Poonah, and died upon the spot. A con- 
 test then ensued for the possession of the power of that govern- 
 ment, in which all the principal Mahratta chiefs were engaged, 
 and which, having lasted with various success during the years 
 1796 and 1797, had ended by placing all the power at Poonah in 
 the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This Chief already possessed 
 the Mahratta territories upon the Jumna and Ganges bordering 
 upon those of the English and the Nabob of Oude, and the actual 
 sovereignty of all those situated to the northward of the rivers 
 Nerbudda and Taptee. By the gain of the influence over the 
 government of the young Peshwah, Bajee Rao, he extended his 
 power to the northern frontier of Tippoo's dominions in Mysore ; 
 thus holding in his own hands all the different Mahratta states. 
 
 B 2
 
 4 SCINDIAH UNFRIENDLY, AND UNDER FRENCH INFLUENCE. 
 
 In 1798 this extended power was but feebly established, and 
 would have been unequal to the exertion to be made in the 
 expected contest with Tippoo, even if it could be supposed that 
 Scindiah's policy would have led him to enter into it. But when 
 that Chief became the sole head of the Mahrattas, his policy 
 would have led him to support Tippoo rather than the English 
 in the impending contest, supposing his power to have been in 
 that state to enable him to enter into it. He must have been 
 aware that, with respect to him, the English were the most 
 formidable of the two powers ; and that his objects would have 
 been forwarded by their defeat. Besides this, Scindiah's prin- 
 cipal force consisted in a body of infantry, raised, disciplined, 
 and commanded by French officers ; and although the influence 
 of these officers over the government of Scindiah was by no 
 means of the description of that exercised by those in the service 
 of the Nizam over the government of that prince, it was still suffi- 
 ciently strong to prevent Scindiah from adopting a measure which 
 was contrary to his obvious policy, as the sole possessor of all the 
 Mahratta power from the Ganges to the Toombuddra. 
 
 Thus, then, nothing was to be expected from the two powers 
 which had been the principal allies of the Company in the 
 former war with Tippoo ; and as the French were likely to be 
 actively and personally engaged in this expected war, it was to 
 be apprehended that they would derive assistance from the force 
 commanded by Frenchmen in the service of those powers who 
 had formerly been considered as the firm allies of the British 
 government. 
 
 Since the peace of 1792 the Nabob Mahomed Ali of the 
 Carnatic had died, and had been succeeded by his son, Omdal 
 ool Omrah. This prince, who was very unpopular in his 
 territories, showed every disposition to impede rather than 
 to forward the operations of the British army. He gave them 
 no assistance ; and it was afterwards found at Seringapatam 
 that he was in correspondence with the Company's enemy. 
 
 As for the rajahs of Malabar, they (with the exception of the 
 Rajah of Koorg) had been in a state of hostility with the Company 
 from the conclusion of the peace of 1792 till the year 1798, and had 
 kept a considerable proportion of the Bombay army in constant 
 hostile operations against them. No assistance was to be expected 
 from them ; but, on the contrary, everything which was in their 
 power to annoy and harass the army and to aid the enemy. 
 
 Add to this representation of the state of our affairs in India
 
 BAD STATE OF OUDE ARMY, AND OF DEPENDENT STATES. 5 
 
 at this period, that a revolution had just been effected in Oude 
 by Lord Teignmouth ; that the government of the reigning 
 Prince Saadut Ali was most unpopular, and by no means firmly 
 established throughout the country ; that his army was mutinous 
 and disaffected ; that an invasion of his country was expected 
 from Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, against which it was 
 necessary to provide by the assembly of a large force in Oude 
 under the command of Sir J. Craig ; and that, in this emergency 
 of affairs in Oude, such was the state of mutiny and disaffection 
 of the Nabob's troops, that his Highness could not trust to them 
 the guard of his person, but was obliged to call for British troops 
 to preserve him from the effects of their treachery ; and Sir 
 J. Craig, to whom was intrusted the defence of Oude, considered 
 these troops in the light of an enemy's fortress in his rear. 
 
 Another circumstance which embarrassed government in 
 India at all times, and was a considerable source of embarrass- 
 ment at the period under consideration. Avas the nature and state 
 of the alliances between the British government and its 
 dependent and tributary states. 
 
 These alliances had always been formed in a moment of 
 extreme weakness, and generally after the Native and depend- 
 ent state had been conquered. The principal stipulation was 
 uniformly protection by the British government, in consider- 
 ation of subsidy to be paid by the Native state, and in other 
 respects the Native state was declared or was considered to 
 be independent in the management of all its internal concerns. 
 
 The Native states having in every instance contracted these 
 alliances in a moment of weakness, in which, of course, all the 
 powers of their governments were paralysed, they have invariably 
 been under the necessity of calling for the assistance of the 
 British protecting government for the support of their authority 
 in the management of their internal concerns. 
 
 The system of government in India, the foundations of autho- 
 rity, and the modes of supporting it and of carrying on the opera- 
 tions of the government, are entirely different from the systems 
 and modes adopted in Europe for the same purposes. 
 
 The foundation and the instrument of all power there is the 
 sword ; and when these alliances have been formed, the sword, 
 or, in other words, the army of the East India Company, became 
 the only support and the only efficient instrument of authority 
 of the protected Native states. 
 
 This position of affairs, which was the result of the principle
 
 6 ARMY OF FORT ST. GEORGE REHABILITATED. 
 
 of government long established in the East, and of the weakness 
 of the Native state, was attended by a stipulation in some cases, 
 or an understanding in others, that the Native state should be 
 independent in all the operations of its internal government ; and 
 at the very moment in which this stipulation was made, the in- 
 terference of the British government was required, and all the 
 internal concerns of the Native state submitted to its judgment, 
 in order that its agents might see whether the cases in which its 
 interference was called for were of a nature to justify it. 
 
 Here, then, the door was necessarily opened to the inter- 
 ference of the British government in every concern ; and the 
 result was increased weakness in the Native state, jealousy of 
 this interference, and disunion bordering upon treachery. 
 
 These evils had long appeared to require a remedy ; and they 
 must have been felt particularly at the moment in which the 
 British government was likely to be involved in a most extensive 
 warfare with the most formidable of the Native powers, assisted 
 by the French. 
 
 This having been the state of India at the time Marquess 
 Wellesley assumed the government in the year 1 798, the measures 
 adopted to apply a remedy to the evils which existed will form 
 an epitome of the history of his Lordship's administration. I shall 
 detail them in that order which is most likely to make them clear 
 to the understandings of those who will read this paper. 
 
 The objects which pressed most upon his Lordship's atten- 
 tion in May and June, 1798, were to place the army of Fort 
 St. George in a situation to resist the expected hostility of the 
 enemy, to relieve the finances from the difficulties under which 
 they laboured, and to bring back the allies of the Company to the 
 state in which they had been left by the peace at Seringapatam 
 in 1792, so that the allies might be able to render the assistance 
 in the war which they were capable of affording. 
 
 The measures of finance which were at that time successfully 
 adopted laid the foundation of the system which was sub- 
 sequently acted upon, and which will be fully considered in 
 another part of this paper. 
 
 Effectual measures were immediately adopted to put in a situ- 
 ation to enable them to defend themselves the whole disposable 
 force of Fort St. George, and eventually to perform the service 
 which might be, and was afterwards, required from them. 
 
 The army of Fort St. George was reinforced by European 
 troops from Bengal, and preparatory measures were adopted to
 
 FRENCH REPLACED BY ENGLISH TROOPS AT HYDERABAD. 7 
 
 enable government to reinforce it still further with Native troops, 
 when the most favourable season for transporting them by sea 
 should come round. 
 
 But the principal measure of those days, that which gave a turn 
 to the state of the Company's affairs in India, and to the general 
 sentiment of the people of that country respecting the British 
 government, was the negotiation at Hyderabad, which ended by 
 the substitution of a British for a French force at the capital of 
 the Nizam. 
 
 The Nizam had long been connected with the British govern- 
 ment, and by the treaty of 1789 it had been stipulated that he 
 should have the assistance of two British battalions when he 
 should call for them. This article of the treaty had not been 
 performed till the war broke out with Tippoo, which ended by 
 the peace of 1792, when Lord Cornwallis made a new treaty 
 [1790] with the Nizam, and attached to his army two British 
 battalions, which acted with them during that war. At the 
 same time two British battalions were attached to the Mahratta 
 army under Pursheram Bhow. 
 
 The services of these battalions stationed with the Nizam, as 
 will be observed by the treaty, were to be confined to operations 
 against foreign enemies and domestic rebels ; but not to be 
 directed against the Mahrattas, and in particular not against 
 certain tributaries of the Nizam stationed upon the Mahratta 
 frontier, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah. 
 
 After the defeat and capitulation of the Nizam at Kurdlah in 
 1795, which has been above referred to, the Mahrattas had 
 obliged his Highness to send these battalions back into the 
 Company's territories ; but during the disputes at Poonah for 
 the succession to Madhoo Rao, his Highness had taken advan- 
 tage of the momentary weakness of the Mahratta government, 
 and had recalled these battalions to his capital. 
 
 The object of the negotiation which Marquess Wellesley com- 
 menced with the Nizam was to prevail upon his Highness to per- 
 form the defensive treaty of Hyderabad, 1st Sept. 1798 ; and as it 
 appeared that his Highness was unable to perform it on account 
 of the power which the French officers and their faction had over 
 his councils, it was proposed to his Highness that he should dis- 
 miss them and their troops from his service for ever ; and an offer 
 was made to supply British troops to enable his Highness to ac- 
 complish this object, and to remain thereafter at Hyderabad as sub- 
 stitutes for the troops under the command of the French officers.
 
 8 NEW TREATY WITH NIZAM. NEGOTIATION WITH TIPPOO. 
 
 A treaty was concluded on this basis with the utmost secrecy 
 and despatch, which contained all the restraining articles for the 
 service of the troops which had been in the treaty of 7th May, 
 1798; and a body of British troops entered the Nizam's terri- 
 tories, and had made some marches towards Hyderabad before 
 the French officers were aware of their fate. This body of troops, 
 having joined those already at Hyderabad, performed the service 
 on which they were sent without bloodshed ; and the Nizam 
 was thus restored to the power of performing his defensive en- 
 gagements with the Company, and one of the great and fruitful 
 sources of the evils impending over us in 17 98/ which has been 
 already described, was removed by a timely, well contrived, and 
 able exercise of the power of the British government. 
 
 This negotiation at Hyderabad was accompanied by another 
 at Poonah, with a view to the same objects. But this failed, for 
 reasons which will be reviewed hereafter. In the course of this 
 negotiation all the circumstances attending that carrying on at 
 Hyderabad were described to the Peshwah, with a view to 
 prevent the jealousy which might otherwise have been expected 
 upon the renewal of the ancient alliance between the Company 
 and the Nizam. 
 
 After one of the principal allies of the British government had 
 thus been placed in a situation to be enabled to perform his 
 treaty of alliance, a negotiation was opened with Tippoo Sultaun, 
 the object of which was to bring that Prince to an early decision, 
 whether he should be at peace or at war with the Company. It 
 was obvious that the assistance which he had hitherto received 
 from his allies, the French, was small in comparison with that 
 which he might expect from them ; and that it was not of an 
 extent and description to be very formidable to the British 
 government, particularly as its alliance with the Nizam had been 
 renewed, and the source of danger in that quarter had been 
 removed. All that was required from Tippoo, therefore, was a 
 renunciation of this offensive alliance, and such an unequivocal 
 proof of it as should be satisfactory to the whole world ; and the 
 adoption of arrangements which should facilitate the usual 
 friendly communications between states not in hostility with 
 each other. 
 
 These negotiations were attended by military preparations 
 which were calculated to secure early success and a speedy 
 termination to the war, which it was determined should be the 
 consequence of Tippoo's refusal to give the allies the reasonable
 
 CONQUEST, PARTITION, AND SETTLEMENT OF MYSORE. 9 
 
 satisfaction which they had required. The wisdom of these 
 early preparations was soon proved ; for on the very day that 
 Tippoo, after a delay of some weeks beyond the period fixed 
 for his answer to the remonstrance of the British government, 
 despatched his answer, and desired that a British officer might 
 be sent to negotiate with him, he commenced his march to 
 attack the Bombay army, which was assembled in the territories 
 of the Rajah of Koorg. 
 
 In this review of the measures of Marquis Wellesley's govern- 
 ment, it is not intended to detail the movements or the actions 
 of the different armies. The result of the well prepared and 
 well combined operations of the war against Tippoo was the 
 capture of his capital, with all his arsenals, treasure, &c. ; his own 
 death, on the 4th May, 1 799 ; and the subsequent reduction and 
 submission of all his territories to the allied governments. 
 
 The army of the Nizam, with the subsidiary force as formed 
 by the late Treaty of 1798, co-operated in this war with the 
 British army ; and his Highness's government shared equally 
 with the British government in the advantages arising from its 
 successful termination. The territories of the Company were 
 increased by the addition of those belonging to Tippoo, situated 
 upon the sea coast of Malabar, and those which gave possession 
 of important military positions. The Nizam received an equi- 
 valent, contiguous to his frontier ; and a portion was reserved 
 for the Peshwah, to be given on the condition that his Highness 
 should become a party to the alliance between the other 
 governments, and should accede to certain stipulations which 
 were proposed to him, and which will be discussed in a sub- 
 sequent part of this paper. His Highness having refused to 
 accept these conditions, this portion was divided between the 
 Company and the Nizam. 
 
 The principal and all the centre part of the territories of 
 Tippoo were given to a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of 
 Mysore, in whose person a state was formed under the im- 
 mediate influence and protection of the British government. 
 This state was connected by a treaty of alliance with the 
 Company, which was bound to defend it on condition of the 
 payment of a stipulated tribute. As alliances of this description, 
 by conferring a nominal independence on the Princes connected 
 by them with the Company, had been found in other instances 
 to be attended with many inconveniences, to render necessary 
 a constant interference by the protecting government in the
 
 I O S VMM A RY OF RES UL TS OF FIRST YEA r's A DMINIS TRA TION. 
 
 internal affairs of the Native subordinate state, and to occasion 
 internal weakness, jealousy of the protecting power, and a waste 
 and embarrassment of the resources of the government, it was 
 thought best, in the treaty of alliance with the government of 
 Mysore, to provide for the interference of the British government 
 in all its concerns when such interference might be necessary ; 
 and the state in which this government is found to be at this 
 moment, the cordial and intimate union which exists between 
 the government of Mysore and the British authorities, and the 
 important strength and real assistance which it has afforded to 
 the British government in all its recent difficulties, afford the 
 strongest proofs of the wisdom of this stipulation of the treaty. 
 
 Thus, then, in less than one year from the period at which the 
 perils which I have above described threatened the existence of 
 the British government in India, our principal ally, the Nizam, 
 was restored to us, the French state growing in the peninsula of 
 India was destroyed, our formidable Native enemy, Tippoo, the 
 certain ally of the French in India, was subdued, and in his 
 place was established in Mysore a government calculated to 
 afford, and which has afforded, the most substantial assistance to 
 Great Britain in all her difficulties. 
 
 The Governor-General having now relieved the peninsula of 
 India from the danger by which it was threatened, and affairs 
 in that quarter having been placed on foundations of strength 
 calculated to afford lasting peace and security, turned his 
 attention to the great and increasing cause of the weakness 
 of the north-west frontier of the Bengal provinces. These 
 provinces were covered in that quarter by the territories of 
 the Nabob Vizier of Oude, who was connected with the 
 Company by a treaty of alliance, by which, in consideration 
 of a subsidy amounting to a sum not exceeding 50 lacs sicca 
 rupees per annum, the Company were bound to defend him ; 
 and with this view to maintain at all times at least 10,000 men 
 in his territories ; and in case this number should for any cause be 
 increased beyond 13,000 men, the Nabob was to pay the actual 
 expense incurred by the Company. This treaty was attended 
 by the usual stipulation of the independence of the Nabob in 
 his internal concerns ; which stipulation had been uniformly 
 frustrated by the necessary and uniform interference of the 
 Company in all those concerns for the support of the Nabob's 
 authority, for the preservation of tranquillity in the country, and 
 for the security of the funds from which the Company derived
 
 STATE OF OUDE, AND NECESSITF OF REFORM THERE. II 
 
 so important a portion of the resources applicable to the 
 payment of their military establishments. 
 
 For some years previous to 1798 apprehensions had been 
 entertained that Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, would carry 
 into execution an old and favorite plan of the Affghan govern- 
 ment to invade Hindustan ; and these apprehensions had 
 appeared so well founded in 1798 that the Governor-General, 
 Marquess Wellesley, had found it necessary to assemble a large 
 British army in Oude, under the command of Sir J. Craig, for 
 the protection of the Nabob's territories against this expected 
 invasion, notwithstanding the difficulties under which the govern- 
 ment laboured at the same period in the peninsula of India. 
 
 At the close of the year 1797 the Nabob, Azof ool Dowlah, 
 died, and was succeeded in his government by his supposed son, 
 Vizier Aly. This usurper had been formally deposed by the 
 authority of the British government under Lord Teignmouth, 
 after a full examination of the justice of his claim ; and Saadut 
 Ali had been placed in the government of Oude. 
 
 This prince was very unpopular with the army, and was not 
 generally agreeable to his subjects. His disposition was par- 
 simonious, and his habits were not of a nature to conciliate the 
 affections of his turbulent subjects. 
 
 When the preparations were making to resist the expected 
 invasion of Zemaun Shah, the Nabob, Saadut Ali, although 
 fully convinced of the necessity of collecting the largest force 
 upon the frontier, called for a detachment of the British troops 
 to attend and guard his person against his own turbulent and 
 disaffected troops. He declared repeatedly that these troops 
 were not to be trusted in the day of battle, or on any service ; 
 and after viewing their state of discipline and equipment, and 
 obtaining a knowledge of their principles and attachment to the 
 cause of the allied governments, Sir J. Craig considered these 
 troops as worse than useless, as dangerous, and of the nature of 
 an enemy's fortress in his rear ; and he actually left a detachment 
 of British troops to watch them, and the turbulent inhabitants of 
 Rohilcund, the frontier province of Oude to the north-west. 
 
 The Governor-General, by his negotiations at the court of 
 Persia, had drawn the attention of the King of Caubul to the 
 defence of his own western frontier ; and availed himself of the 
 certain tranquillity which he had obtained on the frontiers of 
 Oude to arrange the affairs of that country on a basis better 
 calculated to give it permanent security and tranquillity, and to
 
 12 NEW ARRANGEMENT, AND GAIN TO THE COMPANY. 
 
 increase the strength of the British government on its north-west 
 frontier, which was one of its weakest points. 
 
 Towards the close of the year 1799 the Governor-General 
 called upon the Nabob of Oude to dismiss his expensive, useless, 
 and dangerous troops, and to fill their places by increased 
 numbers of the Company's troops. The Nabob had desired 
 the assistance of the Governor-General in the reform of the 
 different establishments of his government ; but the British 
 government had a right, under the article of the treaty of 1798, 
 to require that this reform should be made. After some diffi- 
 culties, arising principally from the defective principle on which 
 the military establishments were formed, paid, and commanded, 
 this great object was effected ; and arrangements were made for 
 introducing into the Vizier's territories 3000 additional British 
 troops, at the expense to the Nabob Vizier of 76 lacs of Oude 
 sicca rupees per annum. 
 
 In order to improve the security of Oude still further, a 
 reform of the civil administration of the government was 
 necessary ; and this reform was pressed upon the attention of 
 the Nabob. But while the negotiations for this purpose, and for 
 the final arrangement of the military establishments, were going 
 on, the Nabob gravely declared that he was not able to pay the 
 expense of the troops which had been stationed in his country 
 for its defence at the time of the expected invasion of Zemaun 
 Shah, or the expense of the additional troops wnich had been 
 necessarily stationed in his country upon the occasion of the 
 reform of his military establishments, although he was bound by 
 treaty to defray the whole of these charges. 
 
 A demand was then made upon him to give territorial security, 
 according to the 1 ith article of the treaty of 1798 ; and, after a 
 long negotiation, a treaty was concluded on the 10th Nov. 1801, 
 by which, in commutation for subsidy, and for the perpetual 
 defence of his country, the Nabob ceded to the Company the 
 territory of Rohilcund, the Dooab, and Gorruckpoor ; the two 
 former being his frontier provinces towards the Mahrattas, the 
 Seiks, and Affghans. and the latter bordering upon the Company ; 
 and he engaged, further, to introduce a better system of manage- 
 ment into the territories which remained in his hands. 
 
 By the whole of this arrangement the Company gained, 
 
 1st. The advantage of getting rid of a useless and dangerous 
 body of troops stationed on the very point of their defence, and 
 ready at all times to join an invading enemy :
 
 THE VIZIER A GAINER BY THE TRANSACTION. 1 3 
 
 2ndly. The advantage of acquiring the means of placing upon 
 this weak point additional numbers of the British troops, and 
 thereby increasing its strength, and the general security of the 
 provinces in their rear : 
 
 3rdly. Ample territorial security for the regular and perpetual 
 payment of these funds for the support of their military estab- 
 lishments in Bengal : 
 
 4thly. By the introduction of their own system of government 
 and management into the countries ceded to them, and the 
 employment of their own servants in the administration, they 
 secured the tranquillity of those hitherto disturbed countries, the 
 loyalty and happiness of their hitherto disaffected and turbulent 
 inhabitants ; and, above all, they acquired the resources of those 
 rich but hitherto neglected provinces for their armies, in case of 
 the recurrence of the necessity for military operations upon that 
 frontier. 
 
 These advantages, the full benefit of which, as will be seen 
 hereafter, were felt in a very few years, were gained without 
 incurring any disadvantage whatever ; in particular, that was 
 not incurred which appears most likely to weaken a great con- 
 tinental power, such as the Company is in India, viz. the frontier 
 was not increased. The Company were equally bound to defend, 
 and had actually defended, this same frontier in 1798 and 1799, 
 when the country was governed by the Nabob ; so that all was 
 gain and strength, without the smallest degree of disadvantage 
 or weakness. 
 
 But the advantages in this arrangement were not gained by 
 the Company only ; those of the Nabob were at least equal to 
 those of the Company. Whatever increased the security of the 
 Company manifestly increased his security likewise ; and here 
 he acquired a great advantage. But this was not all. It is 
 known that the Nabob of Oude had never collected from the 
 countries ceded, and realised in his treasury, even the sum of 
 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees, being the old subsidy paid under 
 the treaty of 1798 ; much less had he realised the increased sum 
 which he was obliged to pay in consequence of the increase of 
 the number of troops stationed in his country. His pecuniary 
 gain was the difference between the annual sum he realised and 
 that which he was bound to pay. Under the new treaty of Nov. 
 1801, the Company were bound to defend the territories of the 
 Nabob under all circumstances ; and no new demand could be 
 made upon him on any account, whatever might be the extent
 
 14 THE PLAN GOOD, DESPITE ' DIFFICULTIES IN SETTLING IT. 
 
 of the service, or of the expense incurred in their defence. The 
 Nabob has already felt the full advantage of this stipulation. 
 
 Besides these advantages of a pecuniary nature, the Nabob 
 derived others from the arrangement. The cession of the pro- 
 vinces had been preceded by the discharge of a large proportion 
 of his troops ; and those which remained in his service scattered 
 over the whole surface of his enlarged territories, were unequal 
 to the performance of the duties required from them. These 
 duties could not, with convenience, be performed by the Com- 
 pany's Native troops, commanded as .they are by European 
 officers, as the civil government remained in the hands of the 
 Nabob's Native servants. Both the Company's government 
 and the Nabob suffered inconvenience ; the former from the 
 frequent calls of the Nabob for the service of their troops in the 
 detail of the collections of the revenue ; and the latter from 
 the want of habit of these troops in duties of this description, 
 and the difficulties of performing them through the agency of 
 European officers directed by Native servants. When the 
 provinces were ceded to the Company, the Nabob had the means 
 and advantage of employing in a reduced territory the troops 
 which had been found insufficient for the conduct of the adminis- 
 tration of one of greater extent ; and these troops, being more 
 immediately under his inspection, and within the reach of his 
 authority, were kept in better order. 
 
 Thus, then, upon the whole, this arrangement has been 
 advantageous, and has proved satisfactory, to both the parties to 
 it, whatever may have been the difficulties in settling it ; and 
 Marquess Wellesley removed by it all the inconveniences and 
 weakness felt upon the north-west frontier of Bengal, and added 
 considerably to the resources of the British government. 
 
 The evil to which Marquess Wellesley next directed his efforts 
 was the nature of the British alliances with its tributary states 
 in general, and particularly with the Nabob of Arcot. The 
 alliance between the Company and the family of this prince had 
 commenced in the infancy of the British power in the peninsula 
 of India, and the terms of it had been altered at different periods. 
 The general purport of them, however, at all times, had been 
 protection of the Carnatic by the Company, on the condition of 
 the regular monthly payment of a stipulated subsidy by the 
 Nabob ; that the Nabob should have no political communication 
 with any foreign power, excepting through the intervention or 
 with the consent of the Company ; that the Company should
 
 EVILS OF DOUBLE GOVERNMENT OF CARNATIC. 1$ 
 
 not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's govern- 
 ment ; and the last treaty of 1792 provided particularly that, in 
 case of failure in the payment of the stipulated subsidy, certain 
 countries should be ceded to the Company. 
 
 One of the great evils in this alliance, as in all those of this 
 description which had been formed in India, was that it provided 
 that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns 
 of the Nabob's government, at the same time that the inter- 
 ference of the Company in every possible case was absolutely 
 and essentially necessary for the support of the Native govern- 
 ment, and was practised on every occasion. 
 
 Another evil which affected this, as well as every alliance of 
 the same description, was that the amount of the subsidy to be 
 paid to the Company was to be realised from the country by 
 the Nabob ; and that this subsidy necessarily bore so large a 
 proportion to the revenues which the country could afford, that 
 it was scarcely possible to realise it so as to make the regular 
 monthly payments required by the nature of the Company's 
 service, and stipulated in the treaty. The consequence was that 
 the Nabob was obliged to borrow money, at large interest, to 
 make his payments at the stipulated periods ; and as the Natives 
 were unable or unwilling to come forward to lend their money 
 upon these occasions, the loans were made from the Company's 
 civil and military servants, and the European inhabitants of Fort 
 St. George and its dependencies. 
 
 The interest upon these loans was usually 3 per cent, per 
 mensem ; and the security for the payment of the interest, as 
 well as the principal, was generally a tuncaw, or order, or assign- 
 ment, from the Nabob, upon the revenues of certain portions of 
 his territories. It is obvious that the tuncawdar, or holder of 
 these orders, could have no interest in the prosperity of the 
 country of which he was thus appointed by the Nabob the 
 temporary collector, excepting to recover from it as he could, 
 and at the earliest possible period, the sums supposed to be due. 
 Here, then, was established a system which tended not only to 
 the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the im- 
 poverishment of the Nabob, and to the destruction of the 
 revenues of the Carnatic, but it was carried into execution by the 
 Company's civil and military servants, and by British subjects. 
 
 In this view of the evil it was of enormous magnitude. The 
 practice of lending money to the Native powers by British 
 subjects had been repeatedly forbidden by the Company, and
 
 l6 ' THE NABOB OF ARCOT'S DEBTS.' 
 
 the continuance of it, therefore, was a breach of their most 
 positive orders ; but it was so general, and the profits so large, 
 that no government had been found sufficiently strong entirely 
 to prevent it. But the evil did not consist only in the ruin of 
 the Nabob and his country, and in this breach of order and 
 discipline, but it established at Madras, and in the subordinate 
 territories, a body of men in the service of the Company, or 
 living under its protection, whose interests and objects, as 
 relative to the Nabob of the Carnatic, were different from those of 
 the Company. On all occasions, whether trifling or important, 
 of difference between the Company and the Nabob, the latter 
 was certain of the advice, assistance, and active exertions of 
 this description of men ; and he never failed to succeed in his 
 objects. It is not astonishing, therefore, that a Prince whose 
 views were directed to an increase of his political power, and 
 whose vanity was flattered by the services performed and court 
 paid to him by so many Europeans of the first rank and con- 
 sequence in that country, should have promoted every object 
 which could have a tendency to continue this system, and 
 should have set his face against every measure calculated to 
 restrain it, although it was evidently ruinous to his finances, 
 to the revenues of his country, and to his real interests and 
 independence. 
 
 The countries which by the treaty of 1792 had been assigned 
 as security to be assumed by the Company, in case of the failure 
 in the regular payment of the subsidy, were among the richest 
 of all those under the government of the Nabob ; and it had 
 been particularly provided by the treaty that tuncaws should 
 not be granted upon these districts. Those who lent his High- 
 ness their money, however, had no objection to take these 
 countries as their security ; and it was natural that the Nabob 
 should feel a slighter degree of interest in the permanent pros- 
 perity of those countries than in that of the other provinces 
 subject to his authority. Accordingly, tuncaws were generally 
 granted, contrary to treaty, upon these provinces assigned by 
 treaty for the Company's security ; and in aggravation of the 
 accumulated evils of this system, the Company's governments 
 abroad had the mortification to observe the daily and increasing 
 ruin of the resources of Fort St. George, and the deterioration 
 of the prosperity of the provinces allotted as their security by 
 the means of their own servants and those living under their 
 protection. Not a month elapsed that did not afford matter of
 
 TIPPOC-'s FALL BRINGS CARNATIC MATTERS TO A CRISIS. 1 7 
 
 speculation whether the Nabob could continue to pay his stipu- 
 lated subsidy; and not one in which he did not procure the 
 money by loan at a large interest, by means which tended to 
 the destruction of the country. 
 
 From the time the operation of the treaty of 1792 was 
 observed, every Governor had endeavoured to prevail upon the 
 Nabob to consent to an alteration of it, by which the Company's 
 resources should be secured, and the evils above described should 
 be prevented. The endeavours, however, of Lord Buckingham- 
 shire, Marquess Wellesley, and Lord Powis, equally failed in 
 prevailing upon the Nabob to consent to a modification of the 
 treaty ; and when the war broke out with Tippoo, the country 
 was labouring under all the accumulated disadvantages of the 
 system, its resources were ruined, and its inhabitants, from long 
 oppression, disaffected. 
 
 Besides these evils, there was a manifest indifference, or rather 
 disaffection, in the Nabob, Omdal ool Omrah, himself, to the 
 cause of the British government and its allies, the meaning of 
 which was not discovered till Seringapatam was taken, and 
 the papers of Tippoo had fallen into the hands of the British 
 government. Among them were found all the written com- 
 munications and correspondence which had been carried on 
 between the Nabob Mahomed Ali and the Nabob Omdal ool 
 Omrah, his son, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, without 
 the knowledge of the Company's government. 
 
 The fact of the existence of the correspondence alone was a 
 breach of the treaties by which the Nabobs of the Carnatic had 
 been allied to the British government ; but in addition to this 
 fact it was found that the correspondence referred to objects 
 under discussion by the different parties to it, and entirely incon- 
 sistent with the principle of the connexion between the British 
 government and the Nabobs of the Carnatic, with the terms of 
 the treaties by which that connexion had been formed, or the 
 existence of friendly intercourse between any states in any part 
 of the world. 
 
 As soon as Marquess Wellesley had ascertained all the circum- 
 stances attending these communications, by an examination of 
 the persons who had been instrumental in carrying them on, he 
 referred the whole subject to the authorities in England, and 
 stated in detail his sentiments on the conduct of the Nabob, and 
 on the measures which it would be advisable to adopt. These 
 sentiments having been approved, his Lordship proceeded to 
 
 C
 
 1 8 CARNATIC ANNEXATION PREVIOUSLY APPROVED AT HOME. 
 
 carry into execution the measures which he had proposed to 
 adopt. 
 
 His Lordship's principles on this question were, generally, 
 that the Nabobs, by their communications with Hyder Ali and 
 Tippoo Sultaun, had broken their treaties of alliance with the 
 Company ; and that in consequence of this breach of treaty the 
 Company had a right to act in the manner that best suited their 
 own interest. That which best suited their own interest was, 
 to take into their own hands the entire management of the civil 
 and military government of the Carnatic ; giving to the Nabob, 
 for the support of himself and his family, such a proportion of 
 the revenues as should be sufficient for those objects, provided 
 his Highness would acquiesce in the arrangements which should 
 be carried into execution. These principles were considered to 
 apply equally to the son, or supposed son, of the Nabob Omdal 
 ool Omrah, as it was obvious that he could claim to inherit the 
 authority of his father in the Carnatic, and the advantages 
 derived from the connexion with the Company, only under the 
 treaties between the Company and his family, all of which had 
 been broken by the correspondence carried on with Hyder Ali 
 and Tippoo Sultaun, by Mahomed Ali and Omdal ool Omrah. 
 
 When the orders from Marquess Wellesley upon this subject 
 reached Madras, the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah was in such a 
 state of health as to be incapable of attending to business ; and 
 soon afterwards he died. The supposed son was then apprised 
 of the discoveries which had been made at Seringapatam, of the 
 sentiments of the British government in consequence of these 
 discoveries, and of the measures which they proposed to adopt 
 in the Carnatic. Buf he refused to accept the situation held out 
 to him under the new arrangement. As the claim of this Prince 
 to succeed to his father, supposing that circumstances had 
 allowed of the succession, was by no means clear, and as it was 
 desirable for the peace of the Carnatic that the Nabob's family 
 should adopt the arrangement, Lord Clive (now Earl of Powis) 
 determined to set aside Ali Hussein entirely, and to propose it 
 to Azeem ool Dowlah, the eldest legitimate son of Ameer ool 
 Omrah, who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, 
 and brother of the late Nabob Omdal ool Omrah. This Prince 
 having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty was concluded by 
 which the whole of the civil and military government of the 
 Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company ; and the 
 Nabob Azeem ool Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their
 
 ITS BENEFITS. NIZAM STILL PRESSED BY MAHRATTAS. 1 9 
 
 title and dignity, and to receive one fifth part of the net revenues 
 of the country \ 
 
 Thus was this important arrangement concluded in a peace- 
 able manner, by which a remedy was provided for all the evils 
 which had attended the former connexion between the Company 
 and the Nabobs of the Carnatic ; additional security was given 
 to the British government, and an addition of 800,000/. per 
 annum, value of 20 lacs of star pagodas, was made to their 
 pecuniary resources. This improvement in their situation was 
 not attended by any extension of their frontier (for the Company 
 was bound before, both by treaty and positive interest, to defend 
 the same line of country), or any circumstance which tended to 
 weaken the British government in the Carnatic. 
 
 The arrangement, the nature of which I shall next discuss, is 
 the treaty of 1800, with the Nizam. It will be recollected that 
 the treaty of 1798, which had been a remedy for some of the 
 inconveniences existing at that time in the connexion between 
 the Company and the Nizam, had been directed principally to the 
 object of enabling his Highness to perform his part of the triple 
 alliance of 1790, formed against the power of Tippoo Sultaun, in 
 which object it had completely succeeded. But in reference to 
 the Nizam, there were objects in contemplation also at that 
 moment, which could not be carried into execution ; and some 
 inconveniences had grown out of the treaty of 1798 for which it 
 was necessary to provide an early remedy. Between the years 
 1792 and 1798 the power of the government of the Nizam had 
 fallen under the influence of the Mahrattas. This power had 
 large claims upon his Highness ; some founded upon the treaty 
 or capitulation of Kurdlah, which claims had been afterwards 
 modified and given up by other treaties ; and others founded 
 upon the general principle of overbearing extortion of the 
 Mahratta government. 
 
 As will appear in a subsequent part of this paper, the Governor- 
 General had endeavoured, in 1798, to prevail upon the Peshwah 
 to become a party to the treaty made that year with the Nizam, 
 and to allow the British government to arbitrate in the Mahratta 
 claims on the Nizam's government, but without success ; and 
 the Mahrattas continued to bring forward these vexatious and 
 groundless claims, and at different periods, as well during the 
 
 1 Unless the revenue exceeded the sum of 25 lacs of star pagodas, in 
 which case the 5th part of the excess was to be applied to purposes of 
 military defence. 
 
 C 2
 
 20 NIZAM UNABLE TO KEEP ORDER IN HIS TERRITORIES. 
 
 war against Tippoo as subsequently, Scindiah, who at that time 
 possessed the power at Poonah, had collected armies upon the 
 Nizam's frontier for the purpose of enforcing them. 
 
 Another evil which had existed in 1798 affecting the Nizam's 
 government, and for which the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, had 
 been no remedy, was the state of the Nizam's government in 
 relation to its tributaries, who were likewise tributaries to the 
 Mahrattas. A considerable proportion of the pecuniary re- 
 sources of the Nizam was derived from this source ; but the 
 Nizam was unable to enforce payment of his just demands, 
 which the tributaries were encouraged by the Mahrattas to 
 withhold from his Highness. 
 
 Under the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, the Nizam was not 
 entitled to the assistance of the British troops stationed in his 
 country, either to defend him against the Mahrattas, or to assist 
 him in overawing those of his tributaries who were likewise 
 tributaries to the Mahrattas ; and after the conquest of Mysore 
 the British government, which by that event had become para- 
 mount in India, was obliged to determine the precise nature of 
 the relation in which it would stand, as well to the Nizam's as to 
 the Mahratta government, and that in which those powers should 
 stand to each other. 
 
 It was obvious that the Mahrattas would continue to make, 
 and would at length enforce, their unjust demands upon the 
 Nizam's government to the length of replacing affairs at Hyder- 
 abad in the situation in which they had been left by the treaty 
 of Kurdlah in 1795) when a Mahratta minister had governed the 
 Nizam's territories. But this was not the only danger. The 
 Nizam's government could not proceed unless its tributaries were 
 brought under subjection. This measure was necessary as well 
 on account of the pecuniary relief which it would afford to the 
 Nizam, as because the rebellion of these tributaries was a 
 dangerous example of insubordination to the governors and 
 collectors of the revenue of the distant provinces of the Nizam's 
 territories. The existence of rebellion and insubordination in 
 any country must always be formidable to its neighbours ; but 
 it is particularly so in India : and in the years 1799 an d 1800 the 
 existence of these evils was peculiarly inconvenient to the British 
 government, and impeded the settlement of the new government 
 of Mysore and the conquered provinces. 
 
 After the peace of Seringapatam, therefore, the British govern- 
 ment were compelled to advert to the means of strengthening
 
 ALTERNATIVES FOR STRENGTHENING THE NIZAM. 21 
 
 the government of the Nizam. Those which occurred were 
 first to encourage and aid the Nizam in raising an army, to be 
 disciplined and commanded by European officers. It would 
 have been impossible to provide the number of English officers 
 which his Highness's service would have required, even if all 
 the persons of this description who might have been prevailed 
 upon to go to India could have been depended upon, and if the 
 national policy in respect to India had allowed of the emigration 
 to that country of such a large body of persons. These European 
 officers must therefore have been foreigners, all of whom have 
 been invariably found to be inimical to the British interests, and 
 principally Frenchmen. Here, then, the evil would have been 
 revived, of which the inconvenience and danger had been felt 
 previous to 1798, and for which the treaty of 1798 had been 
 a remedy. 
 
 The second mode which occurred was to encourage the Nizam 
 to raise a Native army. From the treachery of the Native 
 chiefs, from their habits of correspondence and communication 
 with the Mahrattas, and the superiority which this nation had 
 acquired over them in a long series of contests, nothing effectual 
 was to be expected from this measure, and it would have led 
 directly to place the Nizam in a state of subjection to the 
 government of Poonah. The Mahrattas would thus have been 
 brought to the Company's frontier in the Northern Circars, the 
 Carnatic, and to the boundaries of the new government of 
 Mysore. The power of the Poonah state was at that time 
 exercised by Scindiah, who was in his own right in possession 
 of all the Mahratta power in Hindustan. Thus one Mahratta 
 would have had in his hands all the power from the Ganges and 
 Indus to the frontiers of the Carnatic and Mysore ; touching the 
 Company's frontier on the whole line, and possessing the means 
 of attacking it where he should think proper. Such a power has 
 never appeared in India, and it is to be hoped never will ! 
 
 The third mode was to extend the basis of the treaty of 1st 
 Sept., 1798 ; to make it generally defensive against all powers; 
 and, in fact, to take the Nizam under the protection of the 
 British government. 
 
 Adverting to the state of the government of the Nizam, to the 
 fact that it was incapable from weakness of carrying on its 
 ordinary operations over the countries and people submitted to 
 his Highness's authority, excepting by the assistance of a 
 GalloTndian army, by means which would have subjected his
 
 22 NECESSITY OF CONCLUDING TREATY OF I 800 WITH NIZAM. 
 
 Highness to the Mahrattas, or by the assistance of the British 
 government; and that in either of the former cases it would 
 have fallen into the hands of our rivals or enemies, and would 
 have been exercised to our disadvantage, there is no man who 
 will doubt of the propriety of the arrangement made by the 
 treaty of 1800. 
 
 But this treaty was preceded and attended by other circum- 
 stances, which, as a political measure, rendered it more necessary. 
 It has already been stated that, since the peace of Kurdlah in 
 1 795, the Mahrattas had never ceased to make vexatious demands 
 upon the Nizam, supported generally by the assembling of armies 
 upon his frontier. The remonstrances and negotiations of the 
 British government had prevented the invasion of his Highness's 
 territories, with a view to enforce the payment of these demands ; 
 and there is no doubt that any symptom of an intention to 
 withdraw from his support would have been followed by their 
 immediate conquest, in the same manner as the omission of the 
 British government to interfere between the two powers in 1795 
 had been the occasion of the war, and the disasters which were 
 followed by the capitulation of Kurdlah. 
 
 Here, then, is a new view of the case — a Mahratta conquest 
 made of the Nizam's territories, in consequence of our modera- 
 tion at least ; and the conqueror placed upon our frontier. 
 
 If there had been no treaty with the Nizam, if the British had 
 no interest in his preservation excepting what related to them- 
 selves, they would have been bound to interfere to prevent this evil. 
 
 But besides the great views of policy which rendered the 
 alteration of the treaty of 1798 desirable, as far as related to the 
 employment of the forces, there were other circumstances, of 
 inferior importance certainly, which rendered expedient the other 
 alterations made by the treaty of 1800. 
 
 Under the treaty of 1798 the British government had been 
 bound to furnish the Nizam with a certain force, for the payment 
 of a stipulated sum of money monthly. As was usual in all these 
 cases, this subsidy fell in arrear ; and the records of the Presi- 
 dency are filled with accounts of the complaints made of the 
 existence of these arrears, and of the measures adopted to secure 
 their liquidation. These arrears gave rise to complaints and 
 remonstrances from the British government, which of course must 
 have tended to weaken the good understanding which ought to 
 have existed between the Nizam and them ; and they were 
 equally prejudicial to the interests of both powers. The grant
 
 TREATY WELCOME & BENEFICIAL TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS. 2$ 
 
 of territorial security for the payment of the subsidy removed 
 all these causes of misunderstanding. 
 
 The territory which was granted to the Company was that 
 which had been under the government of Tippoo Sultaun, and 
 had been ceded to the Nizam by the treaties of Seringapatam of 
 1792 and 1799. The authority of the Nizam had never been 
 firmly established in those countries ; and the state of confusion 
 in which they were in 1 799-1800 was highly prejudicial to the 
 British interests in Mysore, and in the Company's recently ac- 
 quired countries. The Nizam's treasury had never received any 
 thing from those countries ; and his Highness had supported the 
 Company's subsidiary troops by funds acquired from other parts 
 of his territories. It was hoped that the introduction of a better 
 system of government would have produced order and regularity 
 among this hitherto turbulent people, a hope which has been 
 completely fulfilled ; and this territory now yields a revenue of 
 , a sum fully equal to pay the expenses of the 
 subsidiary force stationed with the Nizam, and of the adminis- 
 tration of government in the provinces which his Highness 
 ceded. 
 
 Under this arrangement the Company's frontier is defined by 
 the course of the Toombuddra to its junction with the Kistna ; 
 and then by the course of the Kistna to its entry into the 
 province of . The provinces acquired under 
 
 this treaty cover the Mysore country to the northward ; and 
 have removed the source of danger to be apprehended to that 
 newly established government, from the neighbourhood and 
 example of a turbulent and disaffected people, paying no revenue 
 or obedience to the government under which it is placed. 
 
 From the general view which has been given of this arrange- 
 ment, it will readily be believed that the Nizam wished to ac- 
 complish it much more eagerly than the British government did. 
 In fact, his Highness felt that before this arrangement was made 
 his government was not in a state of security ; and it will be 
 observed that the security of his Highness' government was the 
 principal object and motive of this treaty. Other objects were 
 connected with this principal motive, equally interesting and 
 advantageous to both the parties to the treaty ; and upon the 
 whole it may be said that it does not contain an article or an 
 arrangement in. which both parties were not equally interested. 
 
 The next subject to which I shall advert is the arrangement 
 made with the Peshwah by the treaty of Bassein. It will be
 
 24 MA HR ATT A POLITICS ON WELLE SIEVES ACCESSION. 
 
 recollected that the Mahratta government of Poonah had been 
 connected with the British government by a treaty made by 
 Lord Cornwallis on ist Sept. 1798, commonly called the Treaty 
 of Triple Alliance, against Tippoo Sultaun. Under this treaty 
 his Highness was bound to assist the British government and the 
 Nizam, in case either of these powers were attacked by Tippoo. 
 
 After the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, the Mahrattas 
 attacked the Nizam, and the war ended by a peace or capitula- 
 tion concluded at Kurdlah, by which the Nizam ceded half his 
 territories, placed the remainder under the influence of the 
 Mahrattas, paid a large sum of money, gave up his minister as 
 a prisoner, and appointed other ministers nominated by the 
 Mahrattas. Shortly after this peace the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao 
 Narain, died. A contest ensued among the different Mahratta 
 chiefs for the succession to the office of Peshwah, and the pos- 
 session of the influence and power of the government, which, 
 after various success, ended in the establishment of the present 
 Peshwah, Bajee Rao, and the possession of all the power and 
 influence of the government by Dowlut Rao Scindiah. 
 
 This chief already had, by right of succession to his relative 
 Mahdajee Scindiah, all the Mahratta territories in Hindustan, 
 situated between the river Nerbudda and Taptee, and the 
 Ganges and Indus. The principal support and instrument of 
 his government was an army disciplined and commanded by 
 French officers, with a formidable train of artillery ; and, by his 
 influence at Poonah, he had now acquired that part of the power 
 of the Mahratta government which was not already in his hands. 
 
 This was the general state of Mahratta affairs in the year 1798, 
 when Marquess Wellesley assumed the government. But this 
 power of Scindiah's was by no means consolidated. A formid- 
 able rebellion prevailed in his territories north of the Nerbudda, 
 which was directed and encouraged by the female relations 
 of his predecessor : and the confusion in the southern parts of 
 the Empire which had attended the progress of the contest 
 for the possession of the power at Poonah, had not subsided 
 upon its establishment in the hands of Scindiah. 
 
 Besides these causes of disquietude, Scindiah was not uninter- 
 ested in the invasion of India by Zemaun Shah, at that time 
 expected. The first effects of that invasion would have been 
 felt by Scindiah ; and his only hope of safety was in the assist- 
 ance which he might derive from the British government. 
 
 It appears that, from this state of affairs, the Governor-General,
 
 NEGOTIATION WITH PESHWAH THWARTED BY SCINDIAH. 2$ 
 
 Marquess Wellesley, endeavoured to derive additional strength 
 and security to every part of the British Empire in India. His 
 first object was to procure the assistance of the Peshwah in the 
 war against Tippoo Sultaun, which was impending, according to 
 the stipulations of the Treaty of Triple Alliance ; and with 
 this view he endeavoured first to prevail upon Scindiah to return 
 to Hindustan for the protection of his northern frontier against 
 Zemaun Shah ; and secondly, he acquainted the Peshwah with 
 the course of measures he was pursuing for the restoration of the 
 power and activity of the other party to the alliance, the Nizam ; 
 and offered to adopt similar measures for the establishment and 
 support of the power of the Peshwah. 
 
 With the object of obtaining the assistance of the Mahrattas 
 in the war against Tippoo, was connected another equally im- 
 portant to the permanent interests of Great Britain in India. I 
 have already related the effect which the existence of the 
 Mahratta claims upon the Nizam, and the mode in which they 
 had been enforced, had produced upon the strength of his High- 
 ness's government, and upon the general strength and efficiency 
 of the Triple Alliance formed against Tippoo Sultaun, in 1798. 
 
 In the view which the British government must have taken of 
 the probable issue of their discussions with Tippoo in 1798, they 
 naturally considered the continuance of that alliance and the 
 strength of all the parties to it as essential to the preservation of 
 the peace of India ; and in any event, even if they could have 
 anticipated that which occurred in May, 1799, they must have 
 considered the security of the Nizam's government to be essential 
 to the peace and security of the British territories in the peninsula 
 of India. 
 
 The propositions made to the Peshwah, with a view to obtain 
 his assistance in the war, were accompanied by offers to arbitrate 
 in the Mahratta claims on the Nizam, and were attended by 
 a negotiation with Scindiah, to induce him to return to his 
 territories in Hindustan, for their defence against the invasion 
 of Zemaun Shah. 
 
 The influence of Scindiah, however, occasioned the failure of 
 this negotiation, and the war against Tippoo was carried on and 
 concluded without the assistance of the Peshwah. 
 
 After this event, which ended in the death of Tippoo, the 
 destruction of his power, and the transfer of it to the British 
 government and the allies, the principal object of the Triple 
 Alliance of course existed no longer. The other objects of the
 
 %6 MAHRATTA EVENTS PRECEDING TREATY OF BASSEIN. 
 
 alliance with the Peshwah, viz. the independeace of his power 
 in relation to Scindiah, and the arbitration and settlement of 
 the Mahratta claims in his name on the government of the 
 Nizam, still existed. The British government therefore repeated 
 the offers which it had made to the Peshwah, accompanied by 
 others, to allow his Highness to participate in the advantages 
 resulting from the war, which were likewise rejected by the 
 influence of Scindiah. 
 
 The negotiation was renewed by the Peshwah at different 
 periods, particularly in the year 1800, when his power and the 
 safety of his person were threatened by Scindiah ; but their 
 object was always defeated by the influence and violence of that 
 chief, and by the apprehension of the Peshwah of their effects in 
 the period which must elapse between the moment in which 
 Scindiah might become acquainted with the negotiation and 
 that at which the British troops would be in a position to protect 
 the Peshwah. 
 
 At length the confusion which had existed in the northern 
 parts of Scindiah's territories from the period of the death of 
 Mahdajee Scindiah came to a crisis towards the close of the 
 year 1800, which drew Scindiah's attention, and required his 
 presence in that quarter ; and here commenced a new scene in 
 Mahratta affairs, which led immediately to the treaty of Bassein, 
 and the subsequent transactions in which the British government 
 have been engaged. 
 
 It has already been noticed that the female relations of the 
 predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were at the head of a party 
 in Hindustan, who were in rebellion against the authority of 
 Scindiah's government. When the contest had lasted for some 
 time, the Mahratta chief, Tuckajee Holkar, who had been next 
 in rank and power to Scindiah, died in the year 1797 ; and the 
 sons of that chief came to Poonah to arrange with the Peshwah 
 the succession of one of them to the territories of their father. 
 Scindiah's objects in this arrangement were to procure the 
 succession for Cashee Rao Holkar, the legitimate son most 
 likely to favour the pretensions and objects of Scindiah in the 
 Mahratta Empire. The wishes of the family were for Mulhar 
 Rao Holkar, with whom were connected his illegitimate brothers, 
 Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Vittojee Rao Holkar. 
 
 While the negotiations were going on at Poonah between 
 these different branches of the Holkar family and the Peshwah, 
 Scindiah, on the night of the Sept. 1797, attacked the camp
 
 CONTEST BETWEEN SCINDIAH & HOLKAR IN HINDUSTAN. 2j 
 
 of Mulhar Rao Holkar, put him to death, seized his widow, and 
 dispersed all his adherents, including his illegitimate brother. 
 Vittojee Rao Holkar was soon afterwards taken in rebellion 
 against the Peshwah, and was put to death at Poonah. Jeswunt 
 Rao Holkar fled first to Hyderabad, and then to Nagpoor, the 
 capital of the Rajah of Berar, where, by the influence of Scindiah, 
 he was put in confinement ; and, after a short time, having made 
 his escape from Nagpoor, he fled into Hindustan, where he joined 
 the army of the rebels against the authority of Scindiah's 
 government, assembled under the influence of the female 
 relations of his predecessor. In a short time Holkar acquired 
 considerable influence in the councils and the army of these 
 females, which he soon turned to his own advantage ; and he 
 suddenly attacked and plundered them, and placed himself at 
 the head of their troops. He then increased his forces to the 
 utmost extent that was practicable, and on the 17th and 18th 
 July, 1801, made an attack upon a large detachment of 
 Scindiah's regular infantry stationed at Ougein, the capital of 
 Scindiah's government, which detachment he defeated with great 
 slaughter, particularly of their European officers ; and he 
 plundered the city of Ougein. This event drew Scindiah's 
 serious attention to the situation of affairs in Hindustan ; and he 
 removed from Poonah with his army in the month of Dec. 1800. 
 His agents, however, still conducted the operations of the 
 Peshwah's government. His Highness 's prime minister had been 
 appointed by Scindiah ; and, although his Highness's person and 
 his councils were in some degree relieved from the previous 
 constraint under which they had labored for some years, no act 
 of the government could be carried into execution without the 
 consent of Scindiah's servants. 
 
 When Scindiah arrived in Hindustan with his army the 
 contest between him and Holkar continued with increased 
 violence; and at length Holkar was defeated in a great battle, 
 which was fought at Indore, the capital of the possessions of 
 the Holkar family, on the [14th Oct., 1801]. After this battle, 
 Holkar was obliged to withdraw from Hindustan into the hilly 
 countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, into which 
 Scindiah was unable to carry the war, as his attention was still 
 taken up by the settlement of his government in the north of 
 Hindustan, and his armies were not reunited sufficiently from 
 the loss sustained in the different battles which had been fought. 
 Holkar took advantage of this respite to carry the war across
 
 2 8 BATTLE OF POONAH. PESHWAH FLIES TO BASSEIN. 
 
 the Taptee into the Peshwah's country. In the course of the 
 year 1802 he had several engagements with the Peshwah's 
 troops in Candeish and on the Godavery, in which he was 
 uniformly successful, and at length, in the month of October, 
 1802, he approached Poonah. Scindiah had sent a small 
 detachment of his regular infantry and a body of cavalry to 
 join the remnant of the Peshwah's army ; and on the 25th 
 October, 1802, a great battle was fought between these armies, 
 almost within sight of the city of Poonah, which ended in the 
 complete defeat of the troops of the Peshwah and Scindiah. 
 After this battle the Peshwah fled from Poonah into the 
 Konkan, or low country on the sea-coast between Bombay and 
 Goa. Having been pursued by Holkar's troops, he embarked at 
 Severndroog, on board a ship which was sent from Bombay for 
 his accommodation, and he arrived at Bassein, opposite to the 
 Island of Salsette, on the 16th Dec. ; and Holkar remained in 
 possession of the authority of the government of Poonah. 
 
 During the progress of Holkar in his invasion of the Peshwah's 
 territories, his Highness the Peshwah renewed the negotiations, 
 which had been so frequently broken off, for the assistance of 
 the British government. These negotiations, however, were not 
 brought to a close on the day of the battle near Poonah ; and 
 after the result of that day was known, and immediately previous 
 to his flight, his Highness signed a paper, by which he engaged 
 to perform all the material stipulations required by the British 
 government as the conditions on which they would consent to 
 give him the assistance for which he asked. These were, 
 principally, that his Highness would allot a territorial security 
 for the payment of the troops which the Company would detach 
 into his country ; that those troops should occupy a position 
 within his territories ; that the Company should arbitrate on the 
 differences between him and the Nizam ; and that the Peshwah 
 should not enter into any treaty or correspondence with any 
 foreign power excepting with the knowledge and consent of 
 the Company. 
 
 When the Governor-General received this paper from Poonah, 
 it was necessary that he should revise all the proceedings in the 
 negotiations at Poonah, and all the reasonings which had led to 
 and operated upon them ; and that he should decide according 
 to the new appearance which affairs had taken in the Mahratta 
 Empire since the late revolution. 
 
 The principle on which the negotiations at Poonah had turned
 
 NECESSITY OF CHIEF ARTICLES OF TREATY OF BASSEIN. %g 
 
 since the death of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th May, 1799, had 
 been, the necessity of introducing the arbitration of the British 
 government in the disputes and claims which existed between 
 the Peshwah and the Nizam. It was obvious that unless the 
 British government should interfere, the Nizam must fall under 
 the power of the Mahrattas ; and for this reason the treaty of 
 1798 with the Nizam had been made generally defensive against 
 all powers whatever by the treaty of October, 1800. When this 
 treaty was concluded there existed a necessity for continuing to 
 urge the Peshwah to admit of the arbitration of the British 
 government in the Mahratta claims ; or the British government 
 must have been prepared for, and must have expected, war with 
 the Mahratta nation, whenever these claims should be made, and 
 the Mahrattas should find themselves in a condition to enforce 
 them. The attainment of this political object, therefore, was the 
 only one likely to insure the peace of the Peninsula of India. 
 
 The introduction of the British troops into the Peshwah's 
 territories was a mere military question, and turned exactly upon 
 the chance of being able to support the Peshwah's power, and of 
 giving him sufficient authority in his own government to enable 
 him to perform his treaty with the Company in favour of the 
 Nizam. 
 
 The cession of territory for subsidy was the best mode of 
 avoiding the disputes and inconvenience which had invariably 
 attended these subsidiary alliances in other instances ; and the 
 article respecting the intercourse of the Peshwah with foreign 
 states was rendered necessary by the nature of the constitution 
 of the two governments, the alliances by which each was bound, 
 and the laws which regulated their intercourse with foreign 
 states. The necessity for this connexion with the head of the 
 Mahratta Empire was rather increased by the successful inva- 
 sion of the Peshwah's territories, and by the usurpation of his 
 Highness's authority by Jeswunt Rao Holkar ; and the circum- 
 stances which existed at the close of the year 1802, and in the 
 commencement of 1803, afforded the fairest prospect of effecting 
 this great object without hostilities. 
 
 Immediately after the flight of the Peshwah from Poonah, 
 Holkar took upon himself the government of the Peshwah's 
 territories ; but finding that this arrangement was not popular, 
 and gave offence to the chiefs in the southern parts of the 
 Empire, he appointed the son of Amrut Rao, who was the 
 adopted son of the father of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, to be the
 
 30 TREATY CONCLUDED, WITH PRIVITY OF SCINDIAH' S MINISTER. 
 
 new Peshwah ; and Amrut Rao to be his minister, and himself 
 to be the head of his armies. He endeavoured to obtain the 
 consent and acknowledgment of the Nizam and of the British 
 government to this arrangement ; and while the negotiations 
 were going on upon this subject, it is well known that he was 
 collecting about his person all the pretenders to authority, and 
 the disaffected subjects of the Company and their allies, that 
 could be found ; and he was preparing the documents on which 
 he intended to found the vexatious claims of the Mahratta 
 government on the Nizam, the territories of Mysore and Arcot. 
 He was at the same time urging the British government to 
 acknowledge his new dynasty at Poonah, and to interfere in the 
 settlement of the Mahratta affairs. Scindiah, who had been 
 informed by the Governor -General of the progress of the 
 Peshwalv's negotiations with the British government in the year 
 1802, and who must have been aware of the engagement which 
 the Peshwah had signed upon his departure from Poonah, earnestly 
 urged the British government to interfere in the Mahratta affairs, 
 as the only mode of settling their actual confusion. 
 
 The animosity between Scindiah and Holkar still existed with 
 the greatest violence; and in the operations which must be 
 carried on to relieve the Peshwah and to restore his authority, 
 there was every reason to expect that Holkar would find himself 
 exposed singly to the hostility of all the great powers in India, 
 and that he would withdraw from the Peshwah's territories. 
 
 Orders were therefore issued for the conclusion of a treaty 
 with the Peshwah, upon the basis of the paper which had been 
 delivered by his Highness to the Resident at Poonah on the day 
 preceding his flight ; and the treaty was concluded accordingly 
 on the 31st Dec. 1802. Scindiah's minister, who, as was before 
 related, was the Peshwah's dewan, was privy to the whole trans- 
 action ; and he, on the part of Scindiah, and on the 
 part of Cashee Rao Holkar, engaged to make good to the Pesh- 
 wah a part of the expense which he should incur in procuring 
 the interference and assistance of the British government. 
 
 The treaty having been concluded on the 31st Dec. 1802, 
 and all the preparatory arrangements made, the British troops 
 marched from the frontiers of Mysore on the 12th March. They 
 were joined on their march by the principal of the Mahratta 
 chiefs and of the Peshwah's officers in the southern parts of the 
 Mahratta Empire. The detachments of Holkar's army, which 
 had been upon the Kistna and Godavery, successively fell back ;
 
 PESHWAH RESTORED TO POONAH. BENEFITS OF TREATY. 3 1 
 
 and the British troops formed a junction with the Nizam's army 
 and the subsidiary British troops in his Highness's service on the 
 15th April, within 100 miles of Poonah. Nearly about the same 
 time Holkar withdrew from Poonah to the northward, and left 
 that city to be occupied by the British army. A communication 
 was immediately opened with the Peshwah, who was at Bassein, 
 under the protection of a detachment of the army of Bombay, 
 and his Highness entered Poonah and took upon himself the 
 government of his country on the 13th May. 
 
 In this manner this great arrangement was effected without 
 the loss of a man. By a skilful and ready application of the 
 forces and resources of the government, and by taking advantage 
 of opportunities, the ally of the Company was restored to his 
 dignity and to the exercise of his authority ; the usurpation of a 
 most rapacious freebooter was destroyed ; and this dangerous 
 neighbour was removed from the frontier of the Company's 
 allies. At the same time an arrangement was made which was 
 calculated to preserve peace between the Company's allies, and 
 secure the weak government against the unjust claims of the 
 strong ; and, by preserving all in the relative situation in which 
 they were at the moment the arrangement was made, to 
 strengthen all the powers of India against the attacks of a 
 foreign invader, and to secure its internal tranquillity. 
 
 From the knowledge which the British government possessed 
 that Scindiah was aware of all the circumstances of the negoti- 
 ations which the Peshwah was carrying on, that he had earnestly 
 desired their interference in the Mahratta affairs, and, above all, 
 because he must have known that they had acquired a most 
 formidable position for their armies in the Peninsula, of which 
 nothing could deprive them excepting great military success, 
 it was confidently expected that this arrangement would not 
 have occasioned any subsequent hostilities. 
 
 But these were not the only grounds on which this expectation 
 of the continuance of peace was founded. Scindiah had, in 
 point of fact, no right to interfere in an arrangement between 
 the Company and the Peshwah, particularly in one concluded 
 under all the circumstances which had attended the treaty of 
 Bassein. 
 
 The Mahratta Empire has at times been considered as an 
 institution, in some degree, of the same description with the Em- 
 pire of Germany ; at others it has been considered as the union 
 of a number of chiefs possessing territory and power, acknow-
 
 32 scin'diah's consent to treaty not necessary. 
 
 ledging the Peshwah as their nominal head ; and at others, the 
 Peshwah has been considered as the real head of a government 
 of which Scindiah and others were only the powerful officers. 
 Arguments have been drawn from the supposed existence of all 
 these imaginary forms of government to prove that the Peshwah 
 had no right to enter into the treaty of Bassein without the 
 consent of Scindiah and other chiefs of the Mahratta Empire. 
 
 Admitting the existence of all, or any, of these forms of 
 government (and excepting the similarity to the Empire of 
 Germany, all have in reality existed at different periods of the 
 Mahratta history), the fact is, and cannot be denied, that the 
 Peshwah has frequently made treaties, not only to which none 
 of the Mahratta chiefs consented, but to which some of them 
 objected. For instance, the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in 1798, 
 was objected to by Mahdajee Scindiah and Tuckajee Holkar. 
 The treaty of peace in 1792, at Seringapatam, and of partition, 
 was not consented to by any of the Mahratta chiefs. But if it 
 be true that the Peshwah, who is acknowledged by those who 
 reason upon all these different forms of government to be either 
 the real or the nominal head of what is commonly called the 
 Empire, cannot make a treaty without the consent of Scindiah 
 and the other chiefs, it may be presumed that Scindiah and the 
 other chiefs, who are supposed to be of the second rank, cannot 
 make a treaty without the consent of the Peshwah. How is 
 this fact? They make war and peace in their own names 
 against whom they please, when they please, and as they please ; 
 and never use the Peshwah's name, or refer to its authority, 
 excepting as a last subterfuge in the discussions which may 
 attend their negotiations. In point of fact, Scindiah, instead of 
 being a powerful subject, and in that light a party to be 
 consulted in an agreement to be entered into by the Peshwah 
 with the British government, was himself the guarantee of the 
 treaty of Salbye between the same parties. 
 
 In this very capacity of guarantee of a treaty he must have 
 been considered, and must have been, in fact, independent of the 
 two powers contracting it. Before he became a guarantee, the 
 history of those times shows that he was independent of the 
 Peshwah. But this very act of guarantee has always been 
 considered important in India, particularly by the Native 
 politicians, as it afforded complete evidence of the division of 
 the Mahratta power. 
 
 The hopes of the continuance of peace, then, were founded as
 
 MOTIVES OF THE BONSLAF'S ANTI-ENGLISH LEAGUE. 33 
 
 well upon the right of the Peshwah to conclude the treaty of 
 Bassein, as upon the circumstances which attended its negotiation 
 and its execution. 
 
 A new party, however, came forward upon this occasion, 
 through whose means and by whose exertions a peace was 
 patched up between Scindiah and Holkar, on which was founded 
 a confederacy against the British government. 
 
 The Rajah of Berar had not been engaged in hostilities since 
 the year 1780, when he had marched to the British frontier of 
 Bengal, and had received a sum of money to desist from his 
 hostilities, excepting during the short campaign of 1795, in 
 which he had co-operated with the other Mahrattas against the 
 Nizam. He was the oldest of the chiefs of the present day, 
 and was renowned among them for his wisdom and political 
 knowledge and skill. He had claims upon the power of the 
 state of Poonah, from his relationship to the Rajahs of Sattarah ; 
 and he was known to have entertained serious designs of form- 
 ing an union of all the Mahratta powers against the British 
 government. 
 
 When he perceived the advantage which the British govern- 
 ment had taken of the existence of the disputes among the 
 Mahratta chiefs, he saw that he must become the victim of the 
 arrangement. Holkar had been obliged to retire to the north- 
 ward in front of the British troops ; but he could not venture to 
 cross the Taptee, as he would then have been exposed to 
 Scindiah's hostility. Holkar would have been unwilling to 
 discharge his army ; he could not remain in the Peshwah's 
 territories, or invade those of the Nizam ; and his only resource 
 to provide for their subsistence would have been to enter Berar. 
 
 The Rajah, who clearly perceived this consequence (and who 
 has since acknowledged this motive for his conduct), determined 
 to endeavour to organise a confederacy of the Mahrattas against 
 the British government. 
 
 Whatever might have been the claim of Scindiah to the 
 possession of the power of the Peshwah's government, and the 
 degree of encouragement he gave to the conclusion of the treaty 
 of Bassein, there is no doubt that he lost solid power by the 
 arrangement, which he could not hope to recover. He had 
 nothing to gain by the continuance of hostilities against Holkar ; 
 and the sacrifices which he made, and which he intended should 
 be only nominal, were more than compensated by the advantages 
 which he hoped to acquire from the confederacy, in which, from 
 
 D
 
 34 WAS GOVERNMENT TO BLAME FOR NOT FORESEEING THIS? 
 
 the efficiency and the general state of his power, he must act the 
 principal part. Holkar could hope nothing from the continuance 
 of his hostilities with Scindiah. The latter had driven him from 
 Hindustan; and in the course of the years 1801, 1802, in which 
 he had settled his government in the northern parts of India, he 
 had acquired additional strength which he could apply in his 
 contest with Holkar, if it should continue. 
 
 A combination of all the Mahratta chiefs, with their forces, 
 had long been an object with the Mahratta politicians ; and the 
 plan flattered the national vanity, although it was impracticable, 
 unless attended by great and important military successes at its 
 outset. The Rajah of Berar, therefore, succeeded in patching up 
 a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, none of the important 
 articles of which were performed by either party. 
 
 Before I proceed to the relation of the events which followed 
 the treaty of Bassein, it will be proper to discuss the justice and 
 policy of the British government in entering into the treaty of 
 Bassein, on the ground that they must have expected the event 
 which followed it. 
 
 I have already pointed out the objects of the treaty, the 
 favourable circumstances under which it was negotiated, and the 
 probability which existed that its arrangements would be carried 
 into execution without a war, and that it would secure the per- 
 manent peace of India. But the faithless nature of the Mahratta 
 character, and the habits of the councils of all the chiefs, are so 
 well known, that it may be admitted that the British govern- 
 ment ought to have contemplated the chance of a confederacy of 
 the Mahratta chiefs to oppose the arrangement. 
 
 Considering the nature of the materials of which that confed- 
 eracy was to be formed ; that the two most powerful of the chiefs 
 entertained the most rooted and inveterate animosity against 
 each other ; that after they had signed their treaty of peace their 
 hostilities continued, and they could not trust each other so far 
 as to place their armies within reach of attack ; that none of the 
 chiefs trusted the other; and that the pride of all prevented 
 them from placing the management of the affairs and the 
 command of the armies of the confederacy in the hands of one ; 
 the British government had but little to apprehend from this 
 confederacy, provided vigorous measures were adopted at an 
 early period of time to oppose it effectually, and to prevent it 
 from acquiring strength and consistency by success. 
 
 The arrangements which had been made by Lord Wellesley, viz.
 
 LEAGUE NOT FORMIDABLE, IF PROPERLY OPPOSED. $$ 
 
 the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, the treaty with the Guickowar, 
 the arrangement at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty 
 with the Nizam, of October, 1800, and, above all, the treaty of Bas- 
 sein, afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy 
 with success. If the troops did their duty with their usual bravery, 
 its early dissolution became certain ; and by the advanced 
 position in which the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein placed 
 the British troops, the evils of the war would be removed to a 
 distance from the British territories, the seat of the resources of 
 the government. 
 
 But it is not clear that the omission to conclude the treaty of 
 Bassein would not have led equally to a war with all the powers 
 of the confederated Mahratta states, under circumstances of 
 increased disadvantage. The removal of Holkar from Poonah 
 was absolutely necessary on every ground of justice, policy, and 
 good faith ; and if the treaty of Bassein had not been made, the 
 British government must have aided Scindiah in effecting that 
 object. Holkar's armies would have been defeated, and the 
 power of his rival, Scindiah, would have been established in full 
 vigour at Poonah. He would thus again have been in possession 
 of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges and the Indus to the 
 Toombuddra ; and his situation would have been so far more 
 advantageous, as in the course of the years 1801 and 1802 he 
 had overcome the rebellion which had till then prevailed in 
 his northern dominions, and had completely established the 
 authority of his own government in those rich countries. His 
 first demand would have been upon the Nizam ; and here at 
 once the Company would have come in contact with a Mahratta 
 confederacy, but under very different circumstances of strength 
 from that with which they were engaged in 1803. In this contest 
 Scindiah would have been really, as well as nominally, at the 
 head of the confederacy ; he would have had no rival, or rather 
 actual enemy, in Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and would have been 
 able to direct all his forces against the British government. 
 He would have had on his side, instead of against him, all the 
 strength of the Peshwah, including, what is of no small im- 
 portance, all the strength of the southern chiefs situated on the 
 frontier of Mysore. The Company, on the other hand, would 
 have been obliged to engage with this more formidable con- 
 federacy with diminished means and resources, as they would 
 not have had the Peshwah and the southern chiefs on their 
 side. But their principal loss would have been the position 
 
 D %
 
 $6 TREATY JUST & POLITIC; & AVERTED WORSE STRIFE. 
 
 for their armies which the treaty of Bassein gave them. By- 
 adopting this position in the Deccan in 1803, the armies were 
 enabled immediately to render offensive the operations of a war 
 which had been undertaken solely for defence. In the war 
 which must have been expected if the treaty of Bassein had not 
 been concluded, the operations must have been defensive upon a 
 frontier extending above a thousand miles, assailable in all its 
 parts ; and the seat of the war would have been either the heart 
 of the territories of the Nizam, or those of the Rajah of Mysore. 
 
 Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein 
 was a wise, just, and politic measure ; that none of the chiefs had 
 any right to interfere in it or question its stipulations ; and that 
 it was concluded under circumstances and at a time which 
 promised that it would be followed by lasting tranquillity. 
 If it should be contended that the British government ought 
 to have expected, as a consequence of the treaty, the confederacy 
 and war which happened in 1803, I answer that, with the military 
 and political advantages they acquired by the treaty of Bassein, 
 they had nothing to fear from that confederacy ; and that if 
 they had not concluded the treaty of Bassein they would in 
 a few months afterwards have been involved in a war with 
 the same power, much increased in strength and resources, and 
 possessing superior advantages, while those of the Company, in 
 every point of view, would have been diminished. 
 
 As soon as the British government was made acquainted with 
 the measures which had been adopted by the Rajah of Berar to 
 arrange a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs against the Com- 
 pany, the Governor-General directed that measures should be 
 taken to make the Rajah of Berar and Holkar acquainted with 
 the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to all 
 the chiefs the innocent and defensive nature of the treaty, and 
 the arrangement contained in the article which provided for 
 the security of all their rights. They were at the same time 
 called upon to declare the nature and object of their negotiations, 
 and their views in marching to join each other in a station at 
 so great a distance from the Nizam's frontier. In answer to 
 these representations, Scindiah declared that he could not say 
 whether there would be peace or war till he should meet the 
 Rajah of Berar. After Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had 
 joined their troops in a position which enabled them in one 
 march to enter the Nizam's territories, letters were presented to 
 them from the Governor-General, in which the nature and objects
 
 THE CRISIS ENDED IN SUCCESSFUL WAR. tf 
 
 of the treaty of Bassein were fully discussed and explained. 
 Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar wrote the following answers to 
 these letters. In the mean time the peace between Scindiah 
 and Holkar had been signed, although but one article of it had 
 been carried into execution, viz. that which stipulated that 
 Hindoo Rao Holkar, the infant and posthumous son of Mulhar 
 Rao Holkar, should be delivered over by Scindiah to Jeswunt 
 Rao Holkar. The object of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in 
 writing these answers to the Governor-General's letter was to 
 gain time, to allow the season of the rains to pass over, to 
 conciliate the confidence and receive the co-operation of Jeswunt 
 Rao Holkar, and to complete their preparations for attack on all 
 parts of the frontier of the Company and the allies. Early 
 measures, however, had been adopted by the British government 
 to resist their hostilities, and their armies were completely 
 prepared in the middle of July, 1803. It was an object of 
 importance to bring the confederates to a decision whether 
 there should be peace or war before the season of the rains 
 should pass over, before they should have time to complete 
 their preparations, and to conciliate the confidence of Holkar. 
 Accordingly the following letter was written to them by the 
 commanding officer in the Deccan, in answer to their letters 
 to the Governor General. They refused to comply with the 
 reasonable demand contained in this letter, and the British 
 Resident quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 
 3rd Aug. and hostilities immediately commenced. 
 
 It is useless to follow the operations of the British armies. It 
 is sufficient to state, that, owing to the preparations which were 
 made, the positions which they had taken, and the favourable 
 season in which the military operations were commenced, they 
 were uniformly successful ; and the result was, the early dissolu- 
 tion of the confederacy, in which Holkar never joined, and that 
 in less than two months the confederates sued for peace. 
 
 Treaties were concluded with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar 
 in the end of December, 1803, by which the allies gained an 
 acknowledgment of the treaty of Bassein. The Company ac- 
 quired from the Rajah of Berar the district of Cuttack, &o, by 
 which they insured the defence of a weak part of the frontier of 
 Bengal, and the continuity of their possessions, and the certainty 
 of a communication at all times between the Presidency of Fort 
 William and Fort St. George. On the north west frontier they 
 acquired from Scindiah all his possessions on both banks of the
 
 38 GAINS TO COMPANY & ITS ALLIES, FROM THE WAR. 
 
 Jumna ; by which they got that river for a frontier, and secured 
 its navigation, an object of infinite importance to the commerce 
 of that part of the country. They also acquired from Scindiah 
 the town, port, and territory of Baroach, in Guzerat, by which 
 they secured the government of the Guickowar, and all the 
 Company's interests in that quarter. Scindiah was also obliged 
 to relinquish the influence which he had exercised over the 
 person and power of the Mogul ; and to admit the inde- 
 pendence of all the petty states in the north of India, who, 
 during the war, had connected themselves by treaty with the 
 Company. By this arrangement, which affected the Rajpoot 
 state of Jeypoor, and all the petty Rajahs to the northward 
 of that state, the Mahrattas were removed to a distance from 
 the Company's frontier, which was surrounded and guarded by 
 these petty states. 
 
 The Nizam acquired by these treaties an exemption from 
 all demands of all descriptions on his territories by the con- 
 federates. He also acquired on the side of Scindiah a defined 
 boundary, and all the territories belonging to Scindiah which 
 were within that boundary. 
 
 From the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam acquired the province of 
 Berar, with the river Wurda and the hills to the northward as a 
 frontier; by which cession he gained an addition of revenue 
 amounting to 800,000/. annually. 
 
 The Peshwah acquired from Scindiah the fort and territory of 
 Ahmednuggur, and, by an arrangement made with Amrut Rao 
 at the commencement of the war, he had acquired the jaghire of 
 this chief upon the Godavery. By these arrangements his terri- 
 tories became compact ; the city of Poonah was rendered more 
 secure, and the pretext of posting troops in the neighbourhood 
 for the purpose of collecting the revenues of territories in that 
 quarter was annihilated. 
 
 Besides these advantages acquired by each of the allies by 
 this war, the British government destroyed entirely the corps 
 in the service of the enemy, which was commanded and officered 
 by Frenchmen, and took from them not less than 823 pieces 
 of ordnance. The advantages resulting from these military 
 successes will be best understood by reflecting on the diffi- 
 culties and losses sustained in gaining them, and on the reputa- 
 tion for bravery and other military qualities acquired by our 
 officers and troops. 
 
 During this war with the confederacy the conduct of Holkar
 
 holkar's conduct, meantime, favourable to US. 39 
 
 had been rather favourable than otherwise to the British govern- 
 ment. This chief had employed his army in levying contribu- 
 tions in the countries under the government of Scindiah situated 
 north of the Nerbudda, and in endeavours to establish the 
 authority of his infant nephew in the jaghire of the Holkar 
 family. When Scindiah was obliged to collect a body of troops 
 at Ougein, in consequence of the progress made by the army in 
 Guzerat towards that capital, Holkar proceeded to the north- 
 ward, and began to plunder the Rajpoot states. Shortly after- 
 wards, peace was concluded between the British government and 
 the other members of the confederacy.
 
 40 TIPPOO'S CONDUCT A JUST GROUND FOR WAR. 
 
 I. MYSORE. 
 
 i. War with Tippoo. 
 1. Draft of Observations upon Mornington's Minute. 
 
 Inexpediency of a prompt breach with Tippoo. 
 
 28th June, 1798. 
 
 The reasoning upon the proclamation of the Governor of Mau- 
 ritius, and upon the evidence of the persons who were there at 
 the time it was issued, is conclusive. 
 
 There is not a doubt but that Tippoo offered to conclude, and 
 that he, in fact, has concluded with that Government, an alliance 
 offensive and defensive against the British nation, and that the 
 immediate object of that alliance is to drive us out of India. 
 These circumstances I must, however, say do not appear upon 
 the face of the proclamation, or even upon a cursory and slight 
 view of it ; nay, the proclamation itself, unaccompanied by the 
 evidence which has been procured of the conduct of the Ambas- 
 sadors at Mauritius, would not be sufficient evidence to lead to 
 the two conclusions which I have above stated, neither would the 
 landing of the troops at Mangalore lead to it ; but the evidence 
 of the officers of the Brisk, which throws a light upon the 
 conduct of the Ambassadors whilst at Mangalore, is what leads 
 to the strong conclusion that the alliance, as stated in the pro- 
 clamation, was offered, and has been concluded. 
 
 The consequence of that alliance has been an addition to 
 the forces of Tippoo of 150 men at most, and a certainty 
 that he can receive no more assistance from the island of 
 Mauritius. 
 
 I shall presently inquire what chance he has of assistance from 
 France ; but as he stands at this moment, we know that in con- 
 sequence of his late negotiations and offensive alliance he has got 
 no more than 150 men. If we had not had a long and expensive 
 war in Europe, if our allies were all ready to assist even as they 
 did in the last war, if the Company's resources in this country 
 were in a nourishing condition, or if any resource existed to
 
 BUT WAR WOULD BE ILL-TIMED, AT PRESENT. 41 
 
 which recourse might be had in order to carry on the war at all, 
 short of lessening the investment, which must be so severely felt 
 both here and in England, I should not hesitate to declare that 
 the cause of war was sufficient, and that either security must be 
 given that no steps will be taken in consequence of this alliance, 
 or that Tippoo must be attacked, and put in such a state as will 
 secure us against his machinations in future. As, however, we 
 are not in the fortunate circumstances which are desirable before 
 we enter into a war, I have considered whether it is not possible 
 to get rid of this subject without going so deeply into it as to 
 render it requisite to save our honour that we should do that 
 which makes a war almost inevitable, 
 
 The consequence of the alliance to Tippoo I have above stated 
 to be an additional force of 150 men. That certainly cannot 
 be very dangerous to us ; and whatever might have been his 
 hope and his intentions before he received it, he cannot now 
 have an idea of carrying the intentions of the alliance into 
 execution. 
 
 If we are to have a war at all, it must be one of our own 
 creating ; a justifiable one, I acknowledge ; one which we shall 
 think necessary, not on account of any danger which we may 
 immediately apprehend, but one which we suppose may eventually 
 be the consequence of this alliance with the French, and in order 
 to punish Tippoo for a breach of faith with us. 
 
 Here arises the question whether it is probable that the French 
 will or can assist Tippoo with troops, and whether that assistance 
 will be such as to give us any just cause to apprehend much 
 greater danger from delaying the war than we shall certainly 
 derive benefit to our resources by it. 
 
 Upon the first question it is useless to say much. The obstacles 
 to the departure of any French force from Europe are obvious to 
 everybody. They must then pass the squadron at the Cape, 
 and, even if their first object were not the recovery of the French 
 settlement at Mauritius, they would then have to elude the vigil- 
 ance of the squadron here, which would have but a small extent 
 of coast to watch, and it is therefore probable would succeed in 
 intercepting them. 
 
 The next question is, what is the extent of the force which 
 France could give and he would receive. In men France could 
 assist him to any extent, provided she could transport them ; but 
 I don't believe he would accept, nor do I believe she could trans- 
 port, a larger number than 3000 men. She certainly could not
 
 42 DEFER IT, IF YOU CAN WITH HONOUR. 
 
 send them away without the knowledge of our Government, and 
 increasing the chances of their being intercepted. The Govern- 
 ments in India would likewise know of their being sent ; the 
 squadron would be prepared to intercept them, and the forces in 
 the field to make the attack upon Tippoo, probably before they 
 were landed at Mangalore. 
 
 But even if this force were landed, considering that they would 
 be in the service of a native power who neither can nor will under- 
 stand the manner in which Europeans must be treated in this 
 climate in order that they may render effectual service, and that 
 they will be for a considerable time at a distance from the scene 
 of action, they would be reduced to half their number before they 
 saw their enemy, and even then the service they would render 
 would not be equal to that of half their number in the Company's 
 service. 
 
 Is there, then, any danger in deferring the war to that period 
 when your resources will have revived, when you will have the 
 benefit of the assistance of all your allies and others which it is 
 not necessary to mention, but the want of which will be most 
 severely felt at present ? 
 
 In my opinion, if it be possible to adopt a line of conduct 
 which would not lead immediately to war, provided it can be 
 done with honour, which I think indispensable in this Govern- 
 ment, it ought to be adopted in preference to that proposed in 
 the conversations. I would, therefore, propose that, in canvassing 
 this question, the evidence of the officers of the Brisk should be 
 sunk. That, in my opinion, alone proves the alliance to have 
 been concluded, and enables us to prove -it from the proclama- 
 tion and the landing of the troops. Let the proclamation be 
 sent to Tippoo with a demand that he should explain it and the 
 landing of the troops. Don't give him reason to suppose that 
 we imagine he has concluded an alliance with the objects stated 
 in the proclamation ; and finding he has derived so little benefit 
 from the alliance, there is every probability that he will deny the 
 whole, and be glad of an opportunity of getting out of the 
 scrape. In the mean time we shall believe as much as we please, 
 and shall be prepared against all events. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 DEFENSIVE MEASURES RECOMMENDED. 43 
 
 2. Memorandum upon the Barahmahal. 
 
 Measures recommended for defending the Carnatic, and 
 prosecuting the zvar offensively. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 1 8th July, 1798. 
 
 I will now recapitulate the measures, purely defensive, which I 
 recommend, First, with a view to prevent devastation by looties : 
 
 1. That the pettahs of the occupied hill forts and the mud 
 forts should be kept in such a state as to prevent cavalry from 
 riding into them. That old guns may be left in them, and a 
 small quantity of ammunition, and that a few matchlock peons 
 may be hired for the defence of the latter in time of war. 
 
 2. That the villages may be enclosed by good bound hedges 
 and gateways. 
 
 3. That measures may be taken to form good partisans, with 
 a particular local knowledge of those countries in which they are 
 likely to act. 
 
 Secondly, with a view to defence against a solid enterprise I 
 recommend : 
 
 1. That Amboor and Sautghur may be strengthened. 
 
 2. That a good engineer may be called upon for a plan for 
 fortifying and making tenable the hill fort Sasarow, above Vel- 
 lore. It is commanded by the neighbouring hills, and was in 
 danger of being taken by Hyder in the war of '80. It made an 
 admirable defence. 
 
 3. That Chinroyen Droog may be repaired again. 
 
 4. That a plan may be adopted for contracting the defences 
 of Kistnagherry upon similar principles to those upon which 
 Ryacotta has been strengthened. It will then require fewer men 
 to defend it, and will spare more for la petite guerre. 
 
 5. That Verabudder Droog may be put in a state of defence. 
 
 6. That the defences of the Lingarpet and Changama Pass 
 may be reversed. 
 
 7. That Sankerry Droog may be repaired again, and its works 
 contracted. 
 
 8. That Namkool may be put in a state of defence. 
 
 9. That the Nabob may be required to finish the fortifications 
 which he has begun at Trichinopoly. 
 
 10. That in all these places, ordnance, stores, and provisions,
 
 44 STEPS WITH A VIEW TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 
 
 and every requisite which the necessary garrison may want for 
 a siege of 1 months,, may be placed as soon as possible. 
 
 ii. That all the other hill forts and strong holds which are not 
 to be kept as garrisons (excepting mud forts, &c. &c, which I 
 have noticed) in the Barahmahal and Salem countries, and in the 
 valley of Amboor, may be immediately destroyed effectually. 
 ******* 
 
 In general it is a rule that no part of the equipment of an 
 army ought to be placed too near the enemy's frontier. What- 
 ever advantage there might be in having provisions, artillery, 
 and stores far advanced towards the point of attack, unless the 
 army is on the same spot the enemy might place himself between 
 its equipment and it, might cut them off for a time, or if skilful, 
 might deprive your army of them entirely. The risk is greater 
 than the advantage ; and therefore in general the equipments 
 of an army ought to be placed in a centrical spot, where the 
 largest part of the army may collect, and from whence it may 
 commence its operations. Applying that general rule to the 
 circumstances of the army in the Carnatic, I recommend that the 
 equipments, such as artillery, military stores, &c, may be placed 
 eastward of the Changama Pass or in Vellore. 
 
 ******* 
 
 The measures, then, which I recommend with a view to offen- 
 sive operations are : 
 
 i. That 450,000 maunds of grain may be stored in Kistna- 
 gherry and Ryacotta, and 100,000 maunds in Arnee. As I 
 find that for certain reasons a contract for the grain for cattle is 
 preferred to an agency, a smaller quantity would be necessary. 
 In that above mentioned I include grain for cattle, rice for fol- 
 lowers, &c. &c. 
 
 2. That Arnee may be made the dep6t for battering-train, 
 field-train, and their equipments ; for camp equipage and military 
 stores of all kinds. 
 
 3. That that place may be properly fortified. 
 
 4. That an establishment of 1 draught bullocks for the ar- 
 tillery may be constantly kept there. 
 
 5. That the disposable force of the army may be stationed 
 there. 
 
 6. That the communications and roads to and along the fron- 
 tier may be shortened as much as possible, and perfected. 
 
 1 Blank in MS.— Ed.
 
 AVERT AN ATTACK, By TREATING AT ONCE. 45 
 
 3. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Desirableness of prompt negotiation with Tippoo. 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, 19th Sept., 1798. 
 
 There is one circumstance, however, of which I was not aware 
 till lately, which has had great weight upon my mind. It is this : 
 unless you can march from hence early in January, you can't 
 expect to do any good, as the Malabar monsoon in May will 
 oblige you to retire from Seringapatam. Will you be able to 
 march in January ? Certainly not, as the Bengal troops will not 
 arrive till the latter end of that month. If, then, you cannot 
 expect to do anything effectual this year, it is not worth while, 
 by keeping back your proposition, to risk to engage in hostilities 
 in which everything short of the most complete success (viz. 
 being able to invest Seringapatam with a good prospect of 
 taking it) is ruin. 
 
 Therefore, as it is probable that it will prevent him from com- 
 mencing hostilities, which, from circumstances, must be ruinous 
 to us, I think your proposition ought to be made as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 4. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Should Tippoo be required to renounce his connexion with the 
 
 French ? 
 
 (Extracts.) Fort St. George, 21st Oct., 1798. 
 
 I still think, as I always have, that the want of a Commander- 
 in-Chief, the scarcity of money, the war in Europe, are strong 
 reasons to avoid a war here if possible ; and that the re-establish- 
 ment of the alliance, forcing Tippoo to receive an ambassador, 
 and placing the army in the Carnatic in a respectable state of 
 preparation permanently, might be considered as taking as 
 great advantage of the circumstances of the times as any man 
 could expect. 
 
 There being, then, these difficulties in the way of carrying on 
 a war, I recommend that nothing should be demanded which is 
 not an object of immediate consequence ; and therefore, although 
 I acknowledge that a great object would be gained if the French 
 were sent away, and if Tippoo were prevailed upon to engage 
 not to take them or others into his service again, I would con- 
 fine the demand to his receiving an ambassador from us.
 
 46 SHOULD TIPPOO BE REQUIRED TO BREAK WITH FRANCE? 
 
 I think that he will agree to that, but the personal interest 
 which the French have in remaining in his service will induce 
 them to endeavour to prevent him from signing a treaty so pre- 
 judicial to them and the avowed objects of their government in 
 Europe. Considering how late the message from you will go, 
 his conduct upon the last treaty at Seringapatam, and his 
 disposition to hostilities, no additional inducement ought to 
 be given to him to break with us. 
 
 # * * •# * * * 
 
 At the same time I am aware of the advantages of the terms 
 which you propose in your minute. 
 
 Perhaps it is not so necessary that he should send away the 
 Frenchmen which [sic] he has now, as that he should agree to 
 take no more. We must expect that at the close of this war in 
 Europe hordes of Frenchmen will come out here. They are not 
 to be considered hereafter in this country in the same light in 
 which they were formerly. They were then under some regu- 
 lation, as are the subjects of Great Britain ; but now not only 
 they will be under no regulation, but they will come here for no 
 reason excepting to make mischief; and if Tippoo does not 
 become cordially our friend, his durbar will be a perpetual 
 scene of French intrigue against the British nation. It is true 
 that that is an evil which may bring its own remedy ; he may 
 become jealous, and tired of their constant tracasseries. 
 
 5. Reflections upon the plan for having the army in the Carnatic 
 at all times in a state of preparation. 
 
 Is a Bengal reinforcement necessary for besieging Seringapatam? 
 Madras a?id Bombay can supply an army equal to that of 
 Cornwallis ; and our present circumstances are more favourable 
 than his were. Assiiming that a reinforcement is requisite ; by 
 what arrangement it can most conveniently be provided ; and 
 what local preparations should be made for mobilizing the 
 Madras army. 
 
 26th Oct., 1798. 
 
 The first question to be considered is, whether, with any pre- 
 paration, the greatest army which it is possible for the Company 
 to maintain in the Carnatic can, in co-operation with the army 
 on the Malabar coast, take the field with any prospect of success 
 without assistance in men from Bengal. The object which these 
 armies must have is the siege of Seringapatam, and can they
 
 IS A BENGAL REINFORCEMENT NECESSARY ? 47 
 
 undertake it with any reasonable prospect of success, with the 
 numbers which it is possible for them to bring into the field ? 
 
 Cavalry: 
 
 Native .... 1,600 
 
 European . . . 800 
 
 2,400 
 
 Artillery 400 
 
 Native infantry .... 9,000 
 Europeans .... 3,500 
 
 i5>3°° 
 These numbers are according to an enlarged calculation of 
 General Harris, which provides for leaving in Fort St. George, 
 and other necessary garrisons in the Carnatic, a sufficient number 
 of troops to defend them. What the army from the Malabar 
 side would be, it is impossible to say; but I will suppose it 5000 
 men, composed as usual of European and Native infantry, and 
 of European artillery. Thus the army destined for the siege of 
 Seringapatam would consist of 20,000 men. 
 
 It is impossible to decide absolutely whether this army would 
 be sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam without having been 
 at that place, and knowing not only its former but its present 
 situation. We must therefore have recourse to conjecture upon 
 this subject, and must be led by probabilities founded upon the 
 experience of the former war ; and we must at the same time 
 take into consideration the circumstances which bear upon the 
 question, and which have occasioned an alteration in our situation 
 since that time. When Lord Cornwallis made his attempt he 
 had about 20,000 men. He had, it is true, a larger number of 
 Europeans than the army would have at present, and a larger 
 proportion of artillery ; but I believe the total numbers of his 
 army were not greater than what I have above stated that we 
 should have under the arrangement proposed by General Harris. 
 
 There are some circumstances, however, in the relative 
 situation of this army and Tippoo's which are considerably 
 advantageous to us. The first of these is, that we have now a 
 considerable body of regularly disciplined cavalry: at that time 
 we had none. Another is, that he had at that time the frontier: 
 we have it now. He had parties which acted constantly in our 
 rear, which obliged Lord Cornwallis occasionally to detach large 
 bodies not only for the immediate protection of his convoys, but 
 for the safety of the Carnatic, and probably that of his own
 
 48 FROM CORNWALLIS'S CASE, I SHOULD SAY — NO / 
 
 army : as we have now that iron frontier, the fortresses of which 
 we never had in our possession in the last war, there is no reason 
 to expect that the same detachments which were then necessary 
 will be equally so in any war that we may have in future. 
 
 Another consideration is, that in the former war the operations 
 from unavoidable causes took two campaigns. One of these 
 was the necessity of reducing Bangalore. At present Bangalore 
 is destroyed ; and although that may by some be reckoned a 
 disadvantage, yet as it is not absolutely necessary to adhere to 
 that route to Seringapatam, the disadvantage of wanting the 
 place as a depot is more than counterbalanced by the advantage 
 of not being obliged to wait to take it. Either by the route 
 of Cauveryporam or Ryacotta, the communication between 
 Seringapatam and one of our own fortresses is nearly as short 
 as it is between that place and Bangalore ; and there is this 
 additional advantage by using one of these last routes, that there 
 will be no necessity to take many of those large and strong hill 
 forts to which Lord Cornwallis laid siege and took in the last 
 war. This will save much time. 
 
 Another circumstance of advantage in the destruction of 
 Bangalore is, that, as probably the operations will not linger out 
 to two campaigns, there will not be so much necessity for a 
 junction with the Allies as there was in the last war, and time 
 will not be lost in effecting the junction, and time and troops 
 will be saved in taking the places of which it was necessary to 
 have possession in order to insure their communication with their 
 own country, and all the benefits which we must expect to derive 
 from their co-operation. In every future war the possession of 
 our present frontier will enable us to commence our operations 
 more from the southward, and the measures taken to secure a 
 supply of grain upon the scene of action will enable us to pro- 
 ceed without the immediate assistance of our Allies. 
 
 Under these circumstances, then, it appears not only that the 
 army would be as large as that which Lord Cornwallis had, and 
 with which he succeeded, but that this country has many advan- 
 tages at present which it had not at that time, and which would 
 enable the Government to undertake the operation with a better 
 prospect of success than it had formerly, and of success in a 
 shorter period of time. 
 
 Those, however, who know most upon this subject, at least 
 whose official situation enables them to be the best judges, say 
 that this number of men is not sufficient, and that it is impos-
 
 BUT WE MUST ASSUME, THAT IT IS. 49 
 
 sible to commence the operations against Tippoo Sultaun 
 without assistance in men from Bengal. It becomes therefore 
 necessary to consider the question relating to the state of pre- 
 paration of this army with a reference to that assertion, supposing 
 it to be well grounded. 
 
 The march of a detachment, say of six thousand men, from 
 Bengal, may be supposed to take six months at least. Whether 
 the number of men is six thousand or eight thousand, it is a 
 matter of indifference ; but it is certain that, whatever the num- 
 ber may be, it cannot take less than six months, and probably 
 it will take more, to bring them down by land. 
 
 If then it will take six months to bring down that which will 
 alone enable the Government to undertake anything effectual 
 against the enemy, why may not the preparations be making 
 during the time that the reinforcement is on its march? Why 
 should the Company be put to the expense of keeping up an 
 immense army of 15,000 men constantly in a state of preparation 
 for the field, when those who are in the command of it, and who 
 propose that it should be kept up to that extent, are of opinion 
 that even then it can do nothing? 
 
 The question then is, is it advisable to incur this large expense 
 under these circumstances? Those articles of preparation which 
 will occasion expense are, 1st, an establishment of bullocks for 
 the train; 2ndly, one for carriage; 3rdly, a depot of grain; 4thly, 
 an augmentation of the Native troops, in order to make the 
 number of those in the centre division in readiness equal to 
 9000 ; 5thly, camp equipage for the officers. 
 
 There is no doubt but that bullocks might be provided for 
 the train during the time that the Bengal detachment would 
 be coming down, if it is to come down by land ; and therefore 
 that it may be said that the expense of keeping up draught 
 bullocks in time of peace, with a view to their use in war, 
 would not be necessary. However, in answer thereto, it may be 
 said, 1st, that the measures which I shall propose presently may 
 bring the Bengal detachment here in a shorter period than six 
 months ; 2ndly, that the draught bullocks which will have been 
 trained for a certain time, will be better than any which are 
 provided just at the moment when they are wanted ; 3rdly, 
 not a military, but a political object will be gained by having 
 some bullocks, as it will not be necessary that foreign powers 
 should know the full extent of our preparations, and probably 
 they may have the effect of preventing the execution of any 
 
 E
 
 50 HO W IT CAN BEST BE PROVIDED. 
 
 hostile design. I therefore think that at all events it is advis- 
 able to have always 1500 draught bullocks ready. 
 
 2ndly. The carriage bullocks. 
 
 I understand that these are to be had in any number by 
 making advances to the bullock owners or maistries in proportion 
 to the number wanted ; that two months will give any number 
 that the army may want ; and that any permanent expense, 
 however great (short of the expense of keeping at all times the 
 entire number wanted), would not produce them in a shorter 
 time. If this is the case, it is not advisable to incur any expense 
 under this head. 
 
 3rdly. The expense of a depot of grain is so trifling, it gives 
 so much ease to all the first movements of the army, and renders 
 its operations so certain, that it ought certainly to be incurred. 
 
 4thly. The augmentation of the army. 
 
 General Harris proposes that * regiments should be added 
 
 to its present numbers, even supposing that all the regiments 
 were in the Carnatic, &c, and that other means of defence were 
 found for Ceylon and the conquests to the eastward. According 
 to his distribution, there would then be 9000 disposable Native 
 infantry in the centre division, and all the garrisons would be 
 amply provided for. Here will be the great expense ; and as even 
 that number of men will not enable this Government to make a 
 forward movement, and as a reinforcement from Bengal must still 
 be waited for, I recommend that no part of it should be incurred. 
 
 The number which I think sufficient is from 4000 to 5000 
 Natives in the centre division ; and the number of regiments 
 which therefore ought to be struck off General Harris's account 
 is two. The manner in which I propose to provide the re- 
 mainder of the men is, 1st. To put the Bengal marine battalion 
 upon the establishment, and make it a regiment of two bat- 
 talions, or 2000 men, all to be raised at Chittagong. 2ndly. To 
 turn the Calcutta militia into another marine regiment of 2000 
 men. 3rdly. If the Nawab-Vizier will consent to reduce his 
 establishment of troops, and to take our troops in lieu of them, 
 to raise at Chittagong and upon the sea coast all the regiments 
 which must be added to the establishment in consequence 
 thereof; but at all events to add a third marine regiment of 
 2000 men to the establishment, even if you should be obliged to 
 reduce one of the high caste regiments at present in the service. 
 
 1 Blank in MS.— Ed.
 
 HOW TO MOBILIZE THE MADRAS ARMY. 51 
 
 These marine regiments should always be kept at Barrackpoor, 
 Midnapoor, Burhampoor, &c. &c., in the neighbourhood of 
 Calcutta : they would answer equally well with the others for 
 doing the duty of those places ; and they would not only enable 
 the Supreme Government, in addition to volunteers, to send to 
 this country a large body of troops in a short time at short 
 notice, but they would be a body of troops which might be 
 employed in all parts of India, and would therefore add infinitely 
 to the power of the Company, which is cramped by the pre- 
 judices and habits of the Bengal Native troops. 
 
 If it should be necessary to add any regiments to this esta- 
 blishment in consequence of the arrangements with the Nizam, 
 they ought to be raised here ; as the sepoys of this country are 
 cheaper, and I must say better, than any that can be got in 
 Bengal. It may then be said, why not raise in this country 
 any force which must be raised avowedly for the purposes of 
 its defence? It must be observed, however, there will be no 
 additional force, at least a very small one : it will be only an 
 arrangement, making a battalion a regiment, turning militia into 
 regulars, and making a high caste regiment one which will go 
 to sea. 
 
 4thly. Camp equipage for the officers. 
 
 What has been said upon the subject of carriage bullocks 
 applies equally to the means of conveying camp equipage. It 
 can always be got ready before the army is ready to take the 
 field, but a sufficiency for a very large body of troops ought to 
 be kept in the stores in the centre division. 
 
 Having noticed those subjects which General Harris has men- 
 tioned, I come now to the consideration of one of which he has 
 taken no notice. It is the repair of the garrisons upon the 
 frontier and in the Carnatic. Both require it, and it will cost 
 some money immediately, as well as annually a certain sum. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 6. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 Articles of the ultimatum to be offered to Tippoo. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 2nd Jan., 1799. 
 Your propositions to Tippoo ought to be moderate, at least 
 so much so as to make it probable that he will acquiesce in 
 
 E %
 
 52 WHY CESSION OF CANARA NOT TO BE DEMANDED. 
 
 them, because I am of opinion that our war cannot be success- 
 ful in one campaign. First, there is a general scarcity of grain 
 in the country, which will greatly impede our military opera- 
 tions. Secondly, there is a want of money, which must be 
 fatal. Thirdly, there is a chance that the Nizam's troops will 
 not join us in time to enable us to advance together to the 
 siege of Seringapatam. Fourthly, preparations do not appear 
 to be sufficiently advanced on the Malabar side of India to 
 make it certain that we shall have the co-operation of the 
 Bombay army. Fifthly, we have no General. I have repeated 
 some of these objections to hostilities so frequently, that I am 
 afraid I shall be accused of boring Mornington ; but some of 
 them are new, and have been occasioned by the circumstances 
 of the present time. 
 
 There are three demands which can be made upon Tippoo. 
 First, that he should receive an ambassador. Secondly, that he 
 should dismiss his Frenchmen, taken into his service under his 
 offensive treaty. Thirdly, that he should give up to us his sea 
 coast. I think still that the first would give security, but I see 
 that preparations are very forward, and I know that our war 
 must in the end be successful, and therefore I would demand 
 the second. As to the third : first, I don't think it absolutely 
 necessary for our security, as, in consequence of having a 
 resident with him, we shall be able to watch his transactions 
 with the French, and can guard his coast by our cruisers when 
 we find it necessary to prevent his communication by sea with 
 European powers. But I think it will be difficult hereafter to 
 prevail upon any French to adventure in this country when it 
 will be known that Tippoo has sent away those whom he took 
 into his service under the terms of the most solemn treaty. In 
 the next place, I don't think that we have any right to expect 
 that he should give up territory without a war, which even the 
 most successful war might not enable us to gain. If that be 
 true, we must give him something in exchange, and I don't 
 see anything that we can give him to lose which would not be 
 a greater disadvantage than we can possibly reap benefit from 
 the acquisition. If the Allies would give up a portion of their 
 territory for what we now demand, and would take compen- 
 sation from us in peshcush or remission of subsidy for our 
 troops they have in their service, it might answer ; but I 
 imagine it will be as difficult to persuade them to do that as to 
 persuade Tippoo to give up his coast.
 
 WHY GOVERNOR-GENERAL NOT TO JOIN THE ARMY. 53 
 
 Thirdly, there is another view of the question which relates 
 to the Allies. How are we to divide with them what we may- 
 acquire? The fairness of the division in the last war is the 
 cause of the ease with which they are prevailed upon to join us 
 at present ; and no division at all, which must be the case if we 
 get the sea coast, or a division disadvantageous to them, may 
 occasion jealousies which will eventually do us more harm than 
 anything we can gain will do us good. 
 
 7. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Why the Governor-General should not join the army ; and Lord 
 Morningtorts reply. 
 
 Camp near Vellore, 29th Jan., 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 I have just received a letter from Henry, in which he has 
 desired that I should give you my opinion respecting the pro- 
 priety and utility of your joining the army and accompanying 
 it during the campaign. 
 
 I am entirely ignorant of the objects which you may have 
 in view in coming, which may certainly counterbalance the 
 objections I have to the measure ; but it appears to me that 
 your presence in camp, instead of giving confidence to the 
 General, would in /act deprive him of the command of the 
 army, and that scene would be acted over again, probably in 
 the presence of the enemy, which, to my annoyance, I have so 
 often witnessed at Madras. Every thing which the General 
 might think necessary will be thwarted and canvassed, not by 
 you probably, but by those whom you will naturally wish to 
 consult ; the General's own staff, and the principal officers of 
 his army, who ought to think of nothing excepting how his 
 orders are to be carried into execution, instead of their pro- 
 priety, and in what manner they shall thwart them if they 
 should not approve of them. All I can say upon the subject is, 
 that if I were in General Harris's situation, and you joined the 
 army, I should quit it. 
 
 In my opinion he is at present awkwardly situated, and he 
 will require all the powers which can be given to him to keep 
 in order the officers who will be in his army. Your presence
 
 54 LORD MORNINGTON TAKES THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 will diminish his powers, at the same time that as it is im- 
 possible you can know anything of military matters, your 
 powers will not answer the purpose, which even those which 
 he has at present may, if you or Lord Clive are not in the 
 
 army \ 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 The General arrived in camp this morning. 
 
 8. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Authority and prestige of the Commander-in-Chief to be 
 strengthened. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp near Vellore, 4th Feb., 1799. 
 
 The rules of patronage ought to be the same at Madras 
 as they are in Bengal, where the Governor-General, although 
 
 1 Lord Mornington thus replied to the above : — 
 
 Fort St. George, 2nd Feb., 1799. 
 My dear Arthur, 
 
 You will not be surprised at my long silence under all the circum- 
 stances of the late crisis. Nothing has given me more pleasure than to 
 hear from all quarters such unqualified commendations of your arrange- 
 ments in your late command. I wish to God the whole were under your 
 direction ; but even as it is, I think our success is certain : and I found 
 my opinion on the united sentiments of Close, Beatson, Macaulay, and 
 Agnew. 
 
 I entirely concur in your opinion respecting the impropriety of my 
 taking the field with the army : my judgment was always the same as 
 yours; but certain persons made such a clamour on the subject, that 
 I wished to learn how you thought upon it. Your observation with 
 respect to military counteraction in this place is perfectly just : it is with 
 the utmost difficulty that I can restrain the Council (I except no one) from 
 interference in the Commander-in-Chiefs arrangements ; but I have now 
 plainly declared war against every attempt of the kind, and I trust that 
 Harris will now find no impediment to the prompt execution of such 
 orders as must be carried into effect here. Henry means to proceed to 
 the army in a day or two : he will communicate fully to you all my 
 sentiments and intentions. 
 
 Ever yours most affectionately, 
 
 Mornington.
 
 THE GENERAL NOT TO BE l A MONSTER ADJUTANT.' $$ 
 
 probably the most powerful subject in the world, cannot in the 
 ordinary course of business make a corporal. Here the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, by the encroachments of Lord Hobart, first 
 upon General Brathwaite, and lastly upon Sir A. Clarke (and 
 by the operation of throwing all the business of the army into 
 the Military Board, where he debates with the officers who ought 
 to execute his orders), has no more power over the army than 
 if he were a common soldier. The whole establishment look 
 to the Governor for favour and promotion instead of to their 
 legal head ; and thus it is that the Commander-in-Chief becomes 
 contemptible to the army which he is to lead. I told Lord Clive 
 all this long ago, and particularly stated to him the necessity 
 of giving the General credit at least for the appointments of 
 the different Commissaries, if he did not allow him to make 
 them. It was impossible to make him too respectable, or to 
 hold him too high, if he was to be placed at the head of the 
 army in the field. 
 
 This want of respectability, which is to be attributed in a 
 great measure to the General himself, is what I am most afraid 
 of: however, I have lectured him well upon the subject, and I 
 have urged publicly to the army, in which I flatter myself I 
 have some influence, the necessity of supporting him, whether 
 he be right or wrong. 
 
 9. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Prospects of the war. The writer's personal exertions, and their 
 official recognition. 
 
 Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 
 27th Feb., 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 In a letter which I received from General Harris yesterday 
 he informed me that you had appointed me one of a Commission 
 with Colonel Close, Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm ; but 
 I have not yet seen the instructions, nor any of the papers 
 relating to the objects with which you have intrusted us, to 
 which you have referred me. 
 
 I expect General Harris in this camp to-morrow, when I 
 will read all those papers. 
 
 I am glad that you are prepared for a failure, and that you
 
 $6 OBSTACLES NOT TO BE IGNORED — TILL TOO LATE. 
 
 have framed instructions accordingly, which I will give at the 
 proper moment. Considering the lateness of the season, and 
 that we are run almost to a day, it is possible for the enemy 
 to throw such impediments in our way as to prevent us from 
 laying siege to his capital in this year ; and as matters have 
 been already in some degree mismanaged, I should be sorry to 
 see our future operations and the safety of the army committed 
 to the dictates of 's judgment. 
 
 My despondency goes thus far, and no farther ; and as it has 
 induced you to think it possible for us to fail, and to provide for 
 such an event, I think I have done better to make it known to 
 you, than to tell you that it was impossible that we should not 
 succeed. 
 
 It is better to see and to communicate the difficulties and dan- 
 gers of the enterprise, and to endeavour to overcome them, than 
 to be blind to everything but success till the moment of diffi- 
 culty comes, and then to despond. 
 
 No force which the French can land on the Malabar coast 
 must prevent us from following up our object. I understand 
 that our stores and provisions which are to come from the 
 Malabar side will be in safety at the top of the Ghaut under 
 charge of a small force, and a garrison must be left in Canna- 
 nore. Not another man ought to be sent even to watch them, 
 if he can be usefully employed at the siege. 
 
 Tippoo is the main spring of their means of annoying us in 
 India ; and their arrival on the Malabar coast ought to have 
 no effect upon us, excepting to induce us to accelerate our ope- 
 rations against Seringapatam. Till they join him they cannot 
 move, and will probably subsist with difficulty : they will depend 
 upon him for everything, and I think that we can contrive to 
 occupy his attention sufficiently to prevent him from moving 
 towards them. 
 
 If we succeed in our attempt upon Seringapatam, their de- 
 struction is certain ; as the Malabar monsoon, the climate, their 
 intemperance, their want of Native allies, and consequently of 
 everything, will nearly effect it for us before the season comes 
 round in which we can operate against them. If we fail in 
 our attempt, the question will be, whether we shall retire 
 to the Malabar province, or towards the Carnatic, or what 
 portion of the army ought to go to the one, and what to the 
 other. 
 
 If the French land, it will certainly be necessary to send a part
 
 GRUDGING RECOGNITION OF GOOD SERVICE. S7 
 
 of the army back to the Malabar side ; but as in the next season 
 we shall have to carry on a very extensive warfare, for which the 
 Carnatic is best, or indeed alone, able to furnish the supplies of 
 troops, rice, and cattle we shall want, I should imagine that the 
 largest part of the army ought to retire towards this part of 
 India. 
 
 I don't think that anything can be done at present excepting 
 to desire that the Admiral will remain upon the coast as long 
 as he possibly can, and even leave something there during the 
 monsoon. 
 
 General Harris has sent me an extract of a letter from Mr. 
 Webbe to him, written by your desire. I am much obliged to 
 you for the notice you take of what I did for the public service, 
 and I wish for several reasons that you had a Commander-in- 
 Chief under you, who, when he approved of the conduct of an 
 officer, would have a sufficiency of spirit to make known his 
 approbation. The fact is that when I went to the army there 
 was not a grain of rice to be got in the country: I bustled 
 through the difficulty, and in a short time had plenty in my 
 camp ; and not only I took nothing from the public stores, but 
 if what I desired had been done, I should have thrown a large 
 supply into them which I did not want ; and, notwithstanding 
 all opposition, I did form a small store, which, if they had 
 known how to use it, would have been of essential conse- 
 quence in the moment of difficulty and scarcity. Besides that, 
 I paid a sum of money into the General's hands for the 
 public service which other officers had always heretofore taken 
 to themselves. 
 
 The General expressed his approbation of what I had done, 
 and adopted as his own all the orders and regulations I had made, 
 and then said that he should mention his approbation publicly, 
 only that he was afraid others would be displeased and jealous. 
 One of these others, General Floyd, had been in a similar situa- 
 tion with mine, but his army was starving : he had been supplied 
 from the public stores at Madras, Vellore, and Arnee, and lat- 
 terly by me from my own camp. 
 
 As in fact there is nothing to be got in the army but credit, 
 and as it is not always that the best intentions and endeavours 
 to serve the public succeed, it is hard that when they do succeed 
 they should not receive the approbation which it is acknowledged 
 by all they deserve. I was much hurt about it at the time, 
 but I don't care now, and shall certainly continue to do every-
 
 58 MARCHING ORDER OF THE ALLIED ARMIES. 
 
 thing to serve General Harris, and to support his name and 
 
 authority. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 Pray don't show this letter to anybody but Henry, and tell 
 him that Mons. de Meuron has just been here about du ris an 
 bazar. 
 
 Upon reading over my letter, I find that in stating my own 
 grievances I have omitted one thing, which is, that the moment 
 General Harris came to the army, and relaxed or altered the 
 system which I had adopted, he began to want, which want in- 
 creased to distress, and I assure you was at last very near 
 famine. It is now, however, all over; we have plenty, and not 
 too cheap. 
 
 10. Draft of the Description of our march to Major- General 
 
 St. Leger. 
 
 March of the army to Seringapatam. 
 
 The British grand army and the Nizam's army had joined 
 previous to our entering Mysore, and marched together. The 
 former consisted of about 3000 excellent cavalry, five strong 
 regiments of European infantry, all good, and eleven battalions 
 of sepoys, with about fifty pieces of cannon. 
 
 The Nizam's army, under my command, consisted of the 33rd, 
 six excellent battalions of the Company's sepoys, four rapscallion 
 battalions of the Nizam's, which, however, behaved well, and really 
 about 10,000 (which they called 25,000) cavalry of all nations, 
 some good and some bad, and twenty-six pieces of cannon. 
 These armies marched in two columns parallel to each other ; 
 one from its right, the other from its left, at the distance of about 
 three miles from each other. 
 
 The British cavalry generally led the British column, about 
 500 of the best of the Nizam's led that of the Nizam ; these two 
 generally closed towards each other. 
 
 One regiment of British cavalry was generally in the rear of 
 the British column, the whole of the cavalry of the Nizam in the 
 rear of mine, and these rather closed to each other, so that the 
 march of these two armies was almost in the form of a square or
 
 IMMENSE ARRAY OF TRANSPORT BULLOCKS, 59 
 
 oblong, of which the front and rear were formed of cavalry, and 
 about two or three miles in extent ; the right and left (owing to 
 the immense space taken up in the column by field-pieces drawn 
 by bullocks) about six or seven miles. In this square went 
 everything belonging to the army, and the whole space was 
 filled excepting what lay between the leading brigade of infantry 
 of each column, which was left clear, lest it should become neces- 
 sary to form. 
 
 You will have some idea of what there was in that space 
 when I state to you the number of bullocks that I know were in 
 the public service, and in the employment of brinjarries or grain 
 merchants, which did not compose one-half of the whole number 
 that were with the army. There were in the department of the 
 commissary of stores about 25,000, in that of the commissary of 
 grain about 20,000, in that of the commissary of provisions about 
 5000, in that of the camp equipage department about 5000, 
 making in all in the service of the British grand army about 
 60,000 bullocks, of which about 15,000 were draught, the others 
 carried loads. 
 
 The Company's bullock department in the Nizam's army had 
 in it about 3000, divided among different departments. Besides 
 these there were with the grand army about 20,000 bullocks 
 loaded with grain belonging to the brinjarries, about 8000 loaded 
 with gram for the cavalry horses belonging to the gram agents. 
 The Nizam's army (to my constant daily annoyance) had with it 
 25,000 bullocks loaded with grain belonging to the brinjarries. 
 Besides all these, the number of elephants, camels, bullocks, carts, 
 coolies, plunderers, &c. &c, belonging to individuals in the army, 
 particularly in that of the Nizam, was beyond calculation ; but 
 as upon one occasion I had an opportunity of seeing one wing of 
 the British army, and the whole army of the Nizam, move light 
 to attack the enemy, that is to say, without anything belonging 
 to the public excepting what was necessary for the field train, and 
 a few days' provisions for the Europeans, I was able to form a 
 judgment of the quantity of private baggage in the army, and I 
 have no scruple in declaring that the number of cattle and people 
 in the employment of individuals was double that in the employ- 
 ment of the public. Yet on that day it is fair that I should men- 
 tion to you the Nizam's army marched above twenty miles. 
 You may have some idea of the thing when I tell you that when 
 all were together, there was a multitude in motion which covered 
 about eighteen square miles.
 
 60 TIPPOO'S FORCE AT THE OPENING OF THE WAR. 
 
 We brought forward from Madras to Seringapatam a battering 
 train, and in fact a moving arsenal. The former consisted of 
 50 pieces of iron cannon, for each gun of which were brought 
 forward 1200 rounds of shot and immense quantities of 
 powder, and every kind of small stores which are used in an 
 arsenal. 
 
 Our march was usually as long as those made by large armies 
 in Europe, from ten to twelve miles ; we always started at six, 
 and we arrived at our ground about twelve, sometimes later, if 
 there were difficulties on the road. We encamped in two lines 
 fronting different ways, and this heap of baggage between 
 us. What is most extraordinary, by the order of march and 
 encampment above described, we did not lose anything to 
 signify during our whole march, notwithstanding the efforts 
 of the enemy's light troops who constantly attended us, and 
 who are certainly the best troops of that kind that I have 
 ever seen 1 . 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 1 Return of Tippoo Stilt autis Army at the commencement 0/ the Campaign 
 
 of 1799. 
 
 Names. 
 
 Meer Meerans (Generals) 
 
 Meer Suddoors (Officers in general superintending 
 
 of Forts) 
 
 Buckshees, or Commanders of Brigades . 
 
 Stable Horse ........ 
 
 Silladar Horse (a horse the property of the rider) . 
 Infantry, Regulars ....... 
 
 Geish (Armed Militia) 
 
 Ashaam (Matchlockmen and Peons) 
 
 Total Fighting Men . 
 Mootsuddies, Lascars, Pioneers, Artificers, Establish- 
 ments, &c. &c 
 
 Total of every description of Persons 
 attached to the Army 
 
 Out Garrisons, 27 Principal Forts . 
 „ 113 Lesser Forts . 
 
 Total . . . . 
 
 Number 
 
 of lighting 
 
 Men. 
 
 Monthly Expense. 
 
 26 
 9 
 
 IOI 
 
 3.5°3 
 9.392 
 
 23.4S3 
 6,209 
 
 4-747 
 
 Cant. Pagodas. 
 2,800 
 
 750 
 
 4,840 
 
 25-799 3 ° 
 86,800 
 132,884 9 2 
 25,518 8 
 12,956 6 8 
 
 47.47o 
 22,392 
 
 292,349 
 67,971 
 
 6 10 
 5 12 
 
 69,862 
 
 360,321 
 
 4 6 
 
 M.947 
 14,981 
 
 43.338 
 
 H'955 
 
 1 14 
 1 14 
 
 29,928 
 
 58.293 
 
 3 12 
 
 Return
 
 CASUALTIES AMONG HIS OFFICERS IN THE WAR. 
 
 6l 
 
 11. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Mismanagement of the bullock department. Battle of Mallavclly. 
 Prospects of the siege. 
 
 Camp, 2 miles west of Seringapatam, 
 5th April, 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 We arrived here this morning, and I take the opportunity of 
 writing to you which is offered by General Floyd going to meet 
 General Stewart. I wrote you two letters before : one to inform 
 you that we should cross the Maddoor on the 26th ; the other to 
 let you know that we had had an action with Tippoo, in which 
 his troops had been driven and defeated by ours. 
 
 We had much difficulty to contend with after the army entered 
 the Mysore country. The bullocks in the department of the 
 Commissary of Stores failed almost entirely, notwithstanding 
 that there were quantities of forage in the country, of which they 
 might have had their share. This failure of the bullocks increased 
 in so alarming a manner by the time that we got in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Bangalore, particularly on the last march towards 
 that place, that I had serious apprehensions that we should have 
 been obliged to take post there, and defer our further operations 
 to an ensuing season. However, upon inquiry, it was found that 
 
 Return of Killed and Wounded Sirdars, from the 6th March, 1799, to 
 the 4th May inclusive. 
 
 Rank. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Jaghiredars 1 (Noblemen of Rank) .... 
 
 Meer Khazuns ( Lords Treasurers) .... 
 Meer Asufs (Members of the Revenue Board) 
 Buckshees (Commanders of Cutcherries) 
 Sepahdars and Mokubdars (Commanders of Cu- ) 
 shoons of Foot and Horse) . . . . ) 
 
 2 
 
 5 3 
 1 
 
 3 
 7* 
 
 H 6 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 7 7 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 2 
 
 3 
 10 
 
 21 
 
 
 32 
 
 15 
 
 47 
 
 1 Hussein Ali Khan, on the 6th April, at the Sultaunpettah Tope. 
 
 2 Seyd Sahib, on the 4th May, wounded during the assault, and since dead. 
 
 3 2 killed at Sedaseer, on the 6th March. 
 * 1 wounded at Malla-velly, since dead. 
 
 5 2 wounded at Sedaseer on 6th March, since returned to Seringapatam. 
 
 6 2 killed at Mallavelly, 1 at Sedaseer. 
 T 2 wounded at Sedaseer.
 
 6% FAILURE OF OUR BULLOCKS. BATTLE OF MALLAVELLY. 
 
 the root of the evil lay in a parcel of absurd, impracticable, shop- 
 keeping regulations which had been made for the bullock depart- 
 ment, under which no great undertaking could ever prosper, and 
 the first step taken was to abolish them all. The spirit and zeal 
 of the army were then called forth with the greatest success. 
 Many stores (absolutely useless excepting as lumber, and which 
 I had pressed the General to leave behind him at Vellore) were 
 destroyed ; and, in short, we have contrived to bring on the 
 largest useful equipment that ever was known in this country. 
 We have plenty to take this place, which appears to me at present 
 to be strong only from its situation. I have great satisfaction in 
 informing you that the Nizam's sirdars exerted themselves, as 
 well as the rest of the army, in carrying stores. Above eight 
 thousand shot have been brought here from the neighbourhood of 
 Bangalore by Meer Allum and the people immediately belonging 
 to the Nizam alone, without counting what have been brought by 
 the Company's servants. 
 
 We shall commence all our preparatory operations to-morrow, 
 and probably we shall break ground before General Stewart 
 arrives. It is the General's intention to attack, from both sides 
 of the river, the western angle, and I think that we shall contrive 
 to have such a fire upon it as will make it impossible for the 
 Sultaun's troops to remain long in the place. 
 
 I reckon that we have forty days before us from this time, and 
 even more, if we can contrive a passage over the river when it 
 swells. However, five days will make a breach for us after we 
 once begin to batter, out of which his troops will not be able to 
 keep ours. 
 
 In the action of the 27th of March, at Mallavelly, his troops 
 behaved better than they have ever been known to behave. His 
 infantry advanced, and almost stood the charge of bayonets of 
 the 33rd, and his cavalry rode at General Baird's European 
 brigade. He did not support them as he ought, having drawn 
 off his guns at the moment we made our attack, and even pushed 
 forward these troops to cover the retreat of his guns. This is the 
 cause of the total destruction of the troops he left behind him, 
 without loss to us, and of the panic with which we have reason 
 to believe all his troops are now affected. His light cavalry, 
 looties, and others, are the best of the kind in the world. They 
 have hung upon us, night and day, from the moment we entered 
 his country to this. Some of them have always had sight of us, 
 and have been prepared to cut off any persons venturing out of
 
 HOPEFUL PROSPECT, DESPITE BLUNDERING, ETC. 6$ 
 
 the reach of our camp-guards. We came by a road so unfre- 
 quented that it was not possible to destroy all the forage, which 
 would have distressed us much ; but they did as much, even in 
 that way, as could be expected from them. If Tippoo had had 
 sense and spirit sufficient to use his cavalry and infantry as he 
 might have done, I have no hesitation in saying that we should 
 not now be here, and probably should not be out of the jungles 
 near Bangalore. 
 
 We have had much blundering and puzzling, and I have been 
 present at many strong and violent discussions in the cabinet. 
 However, all parties are apparently well together, and we are now 
 here with a strong, a healthy, and a brave army, with plenty of 
 stores, guns, &c. &c, and we shall be masters of his place before 
 much more time passes over our heads. 
 
 The fatigue and heat of the weather (which is greater here 
 than even at Calcutta) and bad water had given me a bowel 
 complaint, which did not confine me, but teased me much. I 
 have nearly got the better of it, and I hope to be quite well in a 
 few days. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 I omitted to mention to you that we have thirty-three days' 
 rice for thirty thousand men at full allowance, besides what the 
 brinjarries have, so that there is no danger of our feeling want. 
 General Harris does not write, trusting to my giving you an 
 account of our state. 
 
 12. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Night attack on the enemy's outposts. Deficiency of rice in camp. 
 
 Camp before Seringapatam, 
 18th April, 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 Since I wrote to you on the 5th instant, we have, by the 
 junction of the Bombay army, been enabled to take up such a 
 position as makes it as certain as these things can be that we 
 shall very shortly be in possession of Seringapatam. 
 
 On the night of the 5th we made an attack upon the enemy's 
 outposts, which, at least on my side, was not quite so successful 
 as could have been wished. The fact was that the night was
 
 64 FAILURE OF NIGHT ATTACK, AND OF RICE SUPPLY. 
 
 very dark, that the enemy expected us, and were strongly posted 
 in an almost impenetrable jungle. We lost an officer killed, and 
 others and some men wounded (of the 33rd) ; and at last, as 
 I could not find out the post which it was desirable I should 
 occupy, I was obliged to desist from the attack, the enemy also 
 having retired from the post. In the morning they re-occupied 
 it, and I attacked it again at daylight, and carried it with ease 
 and little loss. In the course of the night of the 5th and the 
 day of the 6th the General was enabled to occupy a line of posts 
 which gave complete security to his camp till the Bombay army 
 joined, at the same time that they enable him to commence his 
 operations for the siege with advantage. 
 
 I got a slight touch on the knee, from which I have felt no 
 inconvenience, on the night of the 5th ; and I have come to a 
 determination, when in my power, never to suffer an attack to 
 be made by night upon an enemy who is prepared and strongly 
 posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitred by daylight. 
 We remained in the posts which we occupied on the 6th till the 
 Bombay army joined on the 14th. It crossed the river on the 
 16th, and yesterday occupied a post close to the fort, which gives 
 us every reason to believe that we shall carry our object without 
 much difficulty. 
 
 I cannot write with common temper about our rice concerns. 
 The last time I wrote to you I had reason to believe that we 
 had plenty : you will probably hear that we have now rice for 
 only eighteen days at half allowance. This is unpleasant, and, 
 considering the quantity of rice we brought with us, and the 
 pains taken upon the subject, it is shameful. However, if Read 
 comes we are still safe, and we must only redouble our exertions 
 to get the place before the 4th of May, up to which day we 
 have rice. 
 
 The brinjarries who go down to the Barahmahal at present 
 ought to be loaded without delay, and prepared to move to us 
 again by the first opportunity. With this view, the magazines 
 at Vellore and Arnee ought to be sent forward as fast as possible. 
 Every exertion should be made to do this. 
 
 I hope that Read marched on the 17th, and that he has 
 been joined by Colonel Brown. If we can't take the place, our 
 salvation depends upon that ; but I trust we shall have the 
 place. 
 
 Believe me, &c. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 THE EVE, AND THE MORROW, OF THE ASSAULT. 6$ 
 
 13. To Lieutenant- General Harris. 
 
 Description of the breach on the eve of the storm. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 3rd May, 7 a.m. 
 
 Lieut. Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, 
 on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes 
 to be the retaining wall of the glacis, 7 feet high, and the water 
 (included in those 7 feet) 14 inches deep. It is in no part 
 more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other 
 officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieut. 
 Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. 
 The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c, 
 notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was 
 impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the 
 5 gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired 
 the other. 
 
 2. Settlement of Mysore. 
 
 14. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Misconduct of the troops after the storm. Disposal of the con- 
 quered territory. Governor-General 's presence inadvisable. 
 Colonel Welleslefs uncertain status. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 8th May, 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 I wrote to you on the 18th or 19th of last month, and sent 
 my letter by General Floyd. A series of successful attacks 
 upon the enemy's posts, particularly one which I made upon 
 his posts close to the river and within about 400 yards of the 
 fort on the 26th of April, enabled us to erect our breaching 
 batteries at a very short distance, and to complete our breach in 
 the place where it was thought most advisable to have it by the 
 4th instant. On that day, as you will probably have been in- 
 formed by General Harris, the place was stormed, and was in 
 our possession in about two hours after the troops first began to 
 
 F
 
 66 DEATH OF TIPPOO, AND PLUNDER OF THE CITY. 
 
 move out of the trenches. Tippoo was killed in one of the 
 gateways, and to complete our good fortune his body was found 
 among about 5°° others piled one upon the other in a very 
 narrow compass. All his family and treasures fell into our 
 hands that night, excepting Futteh Hyder and Abdul Kaliz. 
 The latter came in and gave himself up the next morning. It 
 was impossible to expect that after the labour which the troops 
 had undergone in working up to the place, and the various 
 successes they had had in six different affairs with Tippoo's 
 troops, in all of which they had come to the bayonet with 
 them, they should not have looked to the plunder of this place. 
 Nothing therefore can have exceeded what was done on the 
 night of the 4th. Scarcely a house in the town was left un- 
 plundered, and I understand that in camp jewels of the greatest 
 value, bars of gold, &c. &c, have been offered for sale in the 
 bazaars of the army by our soldiers, sepoys, and followers. I 
 came in to take the command on the morning of the 5th, and 
 by the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging, &c. &c, in the 
 course of that day I restored order among the troops, and I 
 hope I have gained the confidence of the people. They are 
 returning to their houses and beginning again to follow their 
 occupations, but the property of every one is gone. Many of 
 Tippoo's principal sirdars were killed in the storm : Meer Saduck, 
 Seyd Sahib, Seyd Ghoffar fell upon that occasion, and others 
 of some consequence had fallen in the different affairs which 
 he had with our troops since the commencement of the war. 
 Cummer u Deen, Purneah, and AH Reza are out with troops 
 which had been sent either to intercept the convoy coming 
 under General Floyd, or to annoy the rear of the army employed 
 in the siege. We have sent cowle to Cummer u Deen, Purneah, 
 and Futteh Hyder. The former (before he received the cowle) 
 sent in Ali Reza to propose to give up himself and his troops 
 (about 4000 horse) without terms, at the same time stating 
 claims which he had to a certain jaghire, which I presume 
 will be made known to you by General Harris. I expect 
 that Purneah and Futteh Hyder will come in likewise with 
 Cummer u Deen in the course of a day or two, and then I 
 may congratulate you upon having brought the war to a 
 most fortunate conclusion in the course of about two months, 
 and of having destroyed the greatest enemy the British nation 
 ever had in India, and one whose powers were most for- 
 midable.
 
 HOW SHALL WE DISPOSE OF THE CONQUEST? 6 J 
 
 The question respecting what is to be done with the Mysore 
 Empire at the present moment is certainly a most important 
 one ; and although it is impossible that I should have been able 
 to turn it over sufficiently in my mind to have formed any de- 
 cided opinion upon it, and although even the discussion of it 
 requires more information than I possess of the political views 
 and interests of our Allies, particularly the Mahrattas, I shall 
 communicate to you what has suggested itself to me since I have 
 been in the command of the place. 
 
 From the conduct of Meer Allum at the time the species of 
 negotiation with Tippoo was going on, it appears to me to be very 
 clear that the Allies will expect more than half of the dominions 
 of Tippoo to be divided among them and the Company. After 
 the total destruction of Tippoo and his government, and its means 
 of annoyance and defence, by our capture of this place, I am 
 afraid that any government which you might establish here, with 
 the remaining half or rather third of Tippoo's revenues as its sup- 
 port, would fall an easy prey to either of the other two which 
 might think proper to attack it ; unless the Company either take 
 it under their protection, as they have the Rajah of Tanjore and 
 the Nabob of Arcot, or unless they bind themselves to support 
 the government, which I suppose to be established, in all cases 
 of war either with the Nizam or Mahrattas. In short, this new 
 government must be dependent upon the Company for its sup- 
 port ; and the question is, whether that dependence may not 
 weaken the bonds of alliance between us and one or both of our 
 Allies, may not draw us into a new war, and whether upon the 
 whole it will not be more safe and better, and more creditable, 
 to keep Seringapatam ourselves as a check upon both, and 
 to make such a division of Tippoo's country as will satisfy 
 them and all parties concerned. In order to decide this ques- 
 tion, I must have more information than I have at present of the 
 views and interests of the Mahrattas ; but from the unfavourable 
 impression I have already received of the system of (what may 
 be called) a divided government in the Carnatic, in Tanjore, and 
 even in Oude, I am inclined to prefer the latter, not only as 
 most creditable, but as most safe, and not so likely to lead us 
 into new wars. 
 
 Every man who has had an opportunity of gaining any know- 
 ledge of the politics of these times has framed a system which 
 he thinks will answer best for the future government of these 
 countries. My system is to take it all as a conquest, subject to 
 
 F a
 
 68 WE MUST HAVE SERINGAPATAM AND CANARA. 
 
 the following restrictions, ist. The family of Tippoo ought to 
 be provided for. His women and those of his father ought to 
 have suitable jaghires. Each of his sons ought to have a large 
 jaghire. 2ndly. The great sirdars in his service ought to be 
 provided for. Cummer u Deen asks for Gurrumcondah, which 
 probably for many reasons cannot be granted ; but he, Budder u 
 Zeman, Ali Reza, Gholam Ali, Purneah, and others of different 
 ranks in this government, ought to have jaghires given to them 
 for their subsistence. These jaghires ought not to be sufficiently 
 large to enable them to keep up troops, nor ought they to have 
 upon them any strongholds to tempt their owners to rebel against 
 their superiors. After giving these jaghires, the jaghiredars 
 ought to have the choice under which of the three Governments 
 they would live, and ought to hold from that Government which 
 they prefer ; but their choice ought not to alter the proportions 
 of the remaining territory which each of the Allies would divide. 
 3rdly. The remainder of the territory (after deducting these 
 jaghires) to be divided into three parts, either equal or otherwise, 
 as you may think fit, and taken by each of the Allies. We must 
 have Seringapatam and a safe communication with it from 
 the Carnatic, likewise the sea-coast. What part the Nizam 
 ought to have, and what the Mahrattas, must depend as well 
 upon their own choice as upon the line of frontier which you 
 might think it advisable to take for yourself; but I should 
 imagine with our superiority there would be no difficulty in 
 settling their respective shares. 
 
 Many persons in camp, and particularly those about the Gen- 
 eral are exceedingly anxious that you should come here to settle 
 everything. I am (as I was upon a former occasion) of a different 
 opinion. That which is to be settled is a political question, of 
 some consequence certainly, viz. whether you will at all, and in 
 what manner, and in what proportion, take possession of the 
 territory which has been conquered ; but there is no information 
 to be got here which can aid you in deciding that question : it 
 can be done equally well, if not better, in your closet at Madras, 
 and we here can execute your orders. I mention this because I 
 know that you must have been pressed by them to undertake a 
 most fatiguing journey here, and yet when I give the above-men- 
 tioned reason why you should not be asked to come, there is no 
 answer to it. Your presence cannot be necessary to induce a set 
 of persons in our power to take what will enable them to live in
 
 YOU NEED NOT COME. MY EXACT POSITION? 69 
 
 the manner to which they have been accustomed, and, excepting 
 to be teased by them to increase that stipend, I don't see what 
 other end it can answer. 
 
 General Harris ought to go away as soon as he can, as the 
 plunderers of his army and of that of the Nizam still occasion 
 great confusion and terror among the inhabitants, and tend to 
 obstruct our settlement of the country. 
 
 Before the General goes, I intend to come to a thorough under- 
 standing with him respecting the nature of my situation here. I 
 certainly wish that he would give me all the power which he has 
 himself till you can give your orders upon the subject. Whether 
 I have that power or not, I shall be considered, and probably 
 shall be really, responsible for everything that happens : but I 
 have felt so sensibly my disagreeable situation in the Nizam's 
 army for which I was responsible, although another man by a 
 political manoeuvre in fact commanded it (particularly latterly), 
 that I should have resigned it if it had not been for the fear of 
 
 displeasing Meer Allum. I do not mean to insinuate that 
 
 and I are not upon the very best terms ; but what I mean is, 
 that upon one or two occasions he sent me orders which he said 
 came from Meer Allum, and which never could have entered his 
 head excepting from his own suggestions, and which if I had 
 obeyed I should probably have lost part of the detachment. 
 This is of course between ourselves. I intend to ask to be brought 
 away with the army if any civil servant of the Company is to be 
 here, or any person with civil authority who is not under my 
 orders, for I know that the whole is a system of job and corrup- 
 tion from beginning to end, of which I and my troops would be 
 made the instruments. 
 
 9th May. 
 
 The Mahrattas having failed in the performance of their 
 engagements, and as there is reason to believe that they have 
 entered into some with Tippoo, of course nothing will be given 
 to them. The country will be to be divided between us and 
 the Nizam, and in my opinion there is now more reason than 
 ever for not suffering any part of the family of Tippoo to have 
 any power.
 
 70 CUMMER-U-DEEN HAS DESERVED WELL OF US. 
 
 15. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Cinnmer-u-Deens services \ and their requital . 
 
 Seringapatam, 13th May, 1799. 
 My dear Mornington, 
 
 Since I wrote last, Cummer u Deen and Purneah have come 
 in, and Futteh Hyder is expected in to-morrow. General Floyd 
 and his convoy have joined the army. 
 
 General Harris has not informed me of his plans, nor of the 
 proposals which have been made to him by Purneah. I have 
 altered my mind respecting Cummer u Deen ; he has behaved 
 so well, and by coming in so early has rendered us so great a 
 service, that, coute qui coute, we ought to give him what he 
 wishes for. If he had remained in arms, we never could have 
 settled this country unless we incurred the enormous expense of 
 keeping our army in the field, and even then the operations to be 
 carried on would be liable to all the hazard of protracted military 
 operations. He has saved us this at least, and has thereby 
 rendered us a service almost as great as any of those rendered 
 by His Highness the Nizam. But the Nizam may be satisfied 
 by another part of the territory, and in that case there can be 
 no doubt of the propriety of rewarding Cummer u Deen. 
 
 I wish that the army were gone ; we should then soon settle 
 every thing. 
 
 I hope that you mean to punish . 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 16. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Political treatment of Tippods family. His anti-English 
 designs disclosed by his archives. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 23rd May, 1799. 
 I think that the persons about the General now seem to be of 
 opinion that it would be best to restore part of the country to 
 one of the sons of Tippoo, keeping garrisons in its forts and 
 strongholds, or taking from him annually a certain sum as 
 tribute. This is one of Purneah's proposals, upon which it must 
 be observed that they were all framed with a view to his own 
 interest, and the future management of the revenues of the
 
 SHOULD TI Prod's SONS RULE? HIS ARCHIVES. J I 
 
 country to be restored by himself. Although I don't think that 
 there is any reason to believe, as he states, that the country 
 cannot be settled unless part of it is restored in some manner to 
 one of Tippoo's sons, that, on the contrary, I am certain that it 
 can be settled under any arrangement that you think proper, it 
 is not quite clear that the most politic and most proper measure, 
 and certainly the most generous one, would not be to place one 
 of them in the Government of part of it. This is a question of 
 policy, which however has no relation whatever with the settle- 
 ment of this country, and one upon which you might decide 
 with as much propriety in Calcutta as you could in Seringa- 
 patam. 
 
 I forgot to mention to you that I have found some capital 
 French letters among Tippoo's papers, likewise some from his 
 vakeels at Poonah, which you might find useful. I gave the 
 former to Macaulay some time ago to have copied for you. They 
 have translated the latter, I imagine, and will send them. If 
 any proof were wanting of his designs against us, these letters 
 afford it amply. 
 
 17. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 Objections to an article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th June, 1799. 
 
 Colonel Kirkpatrick will have written to you yesterday 
 respecting the 6th article of the Subsidiary Treaty. We all 
 agreed that that ought to be modified in some manner. As it 
 now stands, it will give ground for the belief that we give the 
 Rajah the country at the present moment with the intention of 
 taking it away again when it will suit our convenience. Suppos- 
 ing that the candid and generous policy of the present Govern- 
 ment should weaken that belief as far as it regards them, it must 
 be allowed that the conduct of the British Government in India 
 has not at all times been such as to induce the natives to 
 believe that at some time or other improper advantage will not 
 be taken of that article. They know as well as we do that 
 there may be a change of government immediately, and that 
 there certainly will be one in the course of a few years, and the 
 person then appointed Governor-General may not have such
 
 72 POWER OF RESUMPTION. MAHRATTAS BAD NEIGHBOURS. 
 
 enlarged systems of policy as those by which we are regulated 
 at the present moment. This induces me to believe that they 
 will object strongly to that article, and I don't think that it 
 will be very creditable to us to insist upon it. 
 
 18. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Inexpediency of placing the Company on the Mahratta frontier. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 23rd June, 1799. 
 
 I recommend it to you not to' put the Company upon the 
 Mahratta frontier. It is impossible to expect to alter the 
 nature of the Mahrattas ; they will plunder their neighbours, be 
 they ever so powerful. The consequence of their plunder of 
 the Company's territories will be perpetual representations at 
 Poonah of grievances which it will not be in the power of Poonah 
 to redress, and a bickering which will have no end. It will be 
 better to put one of the powers in dependence upon the Com- 
 pany on the frontier, who, if plundered, are accustomed to it, 
 know how to bear it and to retaliate, which we do not. 
 
 3. Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. 
 
 19. To the Secretary of the Military Board. 
 
 Improvements recommended in the fortifications of Seringapatam. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 25th Nov. 1799. 
 
 To conclude then, I recommend that the inside rampart may 
 be thrown into the inside ditch on the north and south-west 
 faces. That the outside rampart on all faces, and its defences, 
 may be made of the proper thickness, with the usual slope. 
 That the stone glacis on the north and south-west faces should 
 be completed, and that a work of the nature of a redoubt should 
 be constructed at each flank of the inner rampart, which I pro- 
 pose should remain on the south and east faces. 
 
 That the ditch in front of the south and east faces should be 
 formed into a covert way and palisaded, and that a second 
 glacis should be formed on those faces. 
 
 In this I have considered the subject only as the Military 
 Board are desirous that it should be considered.
 
 IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FORT AT SERINGAPATAM. 73 
 
 But if every thing is to be done to the place which, in my 
 opinion, would render it complete, I should recommend that 
 the ditch on the northern and south-west faces may be deepened, 
 so that it may in all parts contain the quantity and depth of 
 water which there will be at the sluices at the north-east and 
 south-west angles ; that the ditch on the esplanade in front 
 of the east and south faces may be filled, the glacis and 
 esplanade completed, and the ditches of the outworks at the 
 east angle, in front of the Bangalore and Mysore gateways, and 
 others, should be joined to the main ditch of the place. 
 
 20. Memorandum upon Seringapatam *. 
 
 Its fortifications ought to be maintained, because (i) its power and 
 influence over the country are very commanding ; (2) it is the 
 most suitable depot for service in Malabar and Canara ; (3) as 
 well as for warfare on the northern frontier, as my experience 
 has proved. Answer to objections, that (1) it requires too large 
 a garrison ; (2) it is unwholesome ; (3) it is not well situated 
 for arresting an enemy ; (4) to repair it would be too costly ; 
 (5) the river isolates it inconveniently. 
 
 1 . In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary 
 to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore, after 
 the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy 
 the fortifications of Seringapatam ; not only as a measure of 
 precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling 
 into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it 
 were certain that the arrangements for the government of Mysore 
 would remain as they are. 
 
 2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to 
 make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the 
 hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the 
 destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a consider- 
 able drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till 
 the place could be rebuilt : the position, which is the great 
 strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new 
 and a stronger fort might in time be raised. 
 
 3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connect- 
 ing it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several considerations 
 which lead me to be of opinion, that it would be an improper one, 
 
 1 July, 1 80 1, given in Colonel Gurwood's Index, 1 August, 1801. But 
 see p. 86. — Ed.
 
 74 NATIVE RESPECT FOR SERINGAPATAM. 
 
 if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are 
 likely to continue. 
 
 4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive 
 and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, 
 or under the government, or under the immediate influence, of 
 the Company's government of Fort St. George. The conquest 
 of Seringapatam, which was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, 
 and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company 
 the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire. 
 
 5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the 
 power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its posi- 
 tion in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives 
 look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves 
 under the government of that power in India which has possession 
 of that fortress. 
 
 6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of 
 which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be 
 no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of 
 the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. 
 But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that 
 government is at present, may establish his system, can it be 
 certain that it will last ? Is it known who will succeed to him ? 
 Who will be the Native successor of the present Dewan ? If the 
 French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be 
 allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known 
 the effect that such a change may have upon the system of 
 government in Mysore ? 
 
 7. The treaty with the Rajah provides that, under certain 
 circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor- 
 General in Council. It is to be supposed that, whenever the 
 Governor-General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it 
 will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general 
 government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive 
 warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in 
 which the resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. 
 In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to 
 force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah should be inclined 
 to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and 
 influence over the country which will be necessary under such 
 circumstances, and which, doubtless, Seringapatam has ? 
 
 8. Seringapatam has been found, by experience, to possess 
 means for equipping an army, which no other place in the
 
 ITS UNIQUE CAPACITY FOR EQUIPPING AN ARMY. J$ 
 
 Company's territories, or under their influence, has, Madras 
 excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be 
 attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large 
 garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah's servants 
 in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this 
 effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be 
 done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon 
 the former government ; that the means which are the conse- 
 quence of the size of the garrison will exist wherever there may 
 be an equal number of troops ; and that those which are the 
 consequence of the residence of the Rajah's principal servants 
 will remove with them to Mysore. 
 
 9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would 
 draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to 
 Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah's 
 servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population 
 of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of 
 Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the 
 least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, 
 if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation ; 
 and, supposing that those who were attached to his government 
 and person should be inclined to leave it, which they are not, 
 they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula 
 in which they would not live under a British government. 
 
 ic. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equip- 
 ping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place 
 affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other 
 causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. 
 Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not 
 equally populous with Seringapatam : some of them are places 
 of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and 
 doubtless afforded, to Tippoo, the means of bringing his troops 
 into the field. 
 
 11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah's government 
 had the strongest interest in my success ; and I do them no more 
 than justice in saying, that they did every thing in their power 
 to forward it : yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of 
 the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a 
 bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to 
 remain in the field, from any place excepting Seringapatam. 
 
 12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more 
 numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam ; but still,
 
 j6 BEST DEPOT FOR SERVICE ON MALABAR COAST. 
 
 the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the 
 latter ; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of 
 Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of 
 its garrison ; and that even those means which depend upon its 
 garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the 
 troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was 
 brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which 
 were sent from Seringapatam. 
 
 13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam 
 may be destroyed, and its garrison and depot of stores removed 
 to another place, the island will still belong to the Company ; 
 and that the population and means of equipment which it affords 
 will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But 
 admitting that to be true, I contend that we shall not enjoy the 
 same advantages from them which we have hitherto : we shall 
 not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, 
 if it should be possible to procure them for it at all. 
 
 14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army 
 at Seringapatam ; we know that those means still exist ; and 
 we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the 
 garrison and depot of stores are at that place. We do not know 
 that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed 
 and the garrison removed ; and we have reason to know, from 
 experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if 
 the garrison and stores were removed thither ; and I believe 
 that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to 
 that place. 
 
 15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage 
 of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we know it is 
 acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depot in 
 point of locality for service in the province of Malabar : I might 
 also add, in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the 
 opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the 
 possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have 
 possession of it appears to me to be the most important. 
 
 16. From Goa to Cochin, there is not a single post which could 
 be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Can- 
 nanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could 
 not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man-of-war 
 anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner 
 as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, 
 if the fort should be attacked on the land side ; and the fort is
 
 SAFER THAN A FORT ON THAT COAST WOULD BE. 77 
 
 so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores 
 which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar 
 province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports 
 made to the Military board. The stores in Canara are now in 
 the open town of Mangalore. 
 
 17. The state of the seasons on the coast of Coromandel and 
 Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of 
 Seringapatam, and making it the depot of the troops in those 
 provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey 
 stores could keep up the communication only in the months of 
 January, February, March, April, and part of May ; and, even 
 during those months, with considerable difficulty and delay. 
 In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, 
 it is impossible for vessels to approach the Malabar coast ; and 
 in October, November, and December, it is equally so to ap- 
 proach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between 
 Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the 
 troops in those provinces with stores, either from Madras or 
 Bombay, is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must 
 be built, for their preservation. The question is, therefore, 
 whether it is better to keep Seringapatam, with all its supposed 
 inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below 
 the ghauts to the westward. 
 
 18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in 
 those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently obvious ; 
 but there is one objection to which particular attention is re- 
 quested, as it may bear upon the general question in other 
 respects. 
 
 19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular 
 objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the 
 power of attacking it, and, unless it is of great strength, would 
 possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This 
 would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger 
 at sea ; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the 
 present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger 
 at sea. 
 
 20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of 
 the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the pro- 
 tection of every part ; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going 
 to all parts of both coasts must for ever render the situation of 
 a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous. 
 
 21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an
 
 78 BEST DEPOT FOR SERVICE TO THE NORTHWARD. 
 
 establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would 
 require an army, and the equipment for a siege ; whereas, his 
 landing, under any other circumstances, would be an event, the 
 bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the 
 body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those 
 above the ghauts, could be collected. 
 
 22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against 
 them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from 
 Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, 
 and grain might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay ; 
 but a fort must be built to receive them, and then there are no 
 means of moving them in those provinces independent of the 
 assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no 
 doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these 
 means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat. 
 
 23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing 
 that Seringapatam is the most convenient depot for the coast of 
 Malabar, I proceed to consider that place, in the same point of 
 view, in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I 
 must first beg, that the principles of European warfare may not 
 be applied to this country, in arguing this question, to a greater 
 degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be 
 carried on. 
 
 24. It would be convenient, that a depot of stores, for a 
 service intended in any particular country, should be as near the 
 scene of operations as possible. In European warfare, it is 
 absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c, should be 
 on the spot ; and they are usually moved forward in proportion as 
 the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which 
 armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with 
 arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with 
 them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that 
 the depot, which is to supply those equipments, and the wants 
 of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of 
 the scene of action. 
 
 25. My experience of service, in this country, proves the 
 truth of that observation. In Gen. Harris's war, notwithstanding 
 the number of posts in advance, in which depots had been 
 formed, every article of provisions, and stores and ordnance, 
 was brought from Madras ; and, in fact, if the cattle could 
 have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been 
 a necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the
 
 EUROPEAN AND INDIAN ARMAMENTS CONTRASTED. Jg 
 
 speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, Gen. Harris 
 would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and 
 marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. 
 In the last campaign, in the same manner, although Chittledroog 
 was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from 
 Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or incon- 
 venience ; and, in both cases, the armies would have been as well 
 provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun, or an 
 article of military stores or grain, in any of the advanced posts. 
 
 26. I do not contend that, in the one case, it would not have 
 been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras 
 at Vellore or Kistnagherry ; or, in the other, that it would not 
 have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of 
 Seringapatam at Chittledroog : but I contend that it was not 
 inconvenient to have them otherwise ; and that the service, in 
 either case, did not suffer from the distance of the depots, as it 
 would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in 
 Europe, without moving forward the magazines. 
 
 27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the 
 service in India, in which immense equipments always accompany 
 the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually 
 posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before 
 a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service ; and 
 the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from 
 Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the 
 troops for the service could be collected. 
 
 28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes 
 the length of giving up Chittledroog : upon which I have to 
 observe, that, if I am to choose between Seringapatam and 
 Chittledroog, for a general depot for all possible services, 
 I should certainly prefer Seringapatam ; and that I have no 
 desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in 
 the Mahratta territory. I prefer, by far, the fort of Hullihall in 
 Soonda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other; 
 and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting 
 such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them, at the time 
 the service should be going on. 
 
 29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little 
 difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore 
 from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from 
 Sera : Seringapatam is 104. It is true, that those articles of 
 ordnance and stores, which must come from the Presidency, by
 
 80 DOES NOT REQUIRE TOO STRONG A GARRISON. 
 
 going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they 
 would if the depot were fixed at Bangalore. But, in the first 
 place, it is to be considered, that, if the resources of the Mysore 
 country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be 
 required from the Presidency. In the next place, it is to be recol- 
 lected, that a large proportion of those articles, which might be 
 wanted from the Presidency, will be required in the western pro- 
 vinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that 
 the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from 
 this country ; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being 
 transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the 
 circuitous route to the frontier, by Seringapatam, should be an 
 objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a pre- 
 ference for Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam 
 be taken into consideration : the general opinion of its power, 
 the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping 
 an army, its superior convenience as a depot for the Malabar 
 coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling dis- 
 advantage of being obliged to go 80 miles of distance to 
 reach it. 
 
 30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam, which, if 
 well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first 
 place, it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even 
 in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, 3 battalions of 
 sepoys, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full 
 of Moorish inhabitants ; and, as it contains a large arsenal, it is 
 not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, 
 till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures 
 are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the pettah ; and 
 when they, and the Rajah's servants, shall have left the fort, 
 there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the 
 arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they 
 have never been repaired since the siege : the weather and river 
 have done them damage to a much greater degree than they 
 would if they had been in good repair ; and they are accessible 
 in many places. The communication between one part and 
 another of these works is not complete ; and it is, therefore, 
 necessary that the guns which may be required for the works 
 should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, 
 which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a 
 necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the 
 works, than would otherwise be required. The garrison of
 
 DOES NOT SEEM TO BE INCURABLY UNWHOLESOME. 8 1 
 
 Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the 
 Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, 
 which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men 
 on duty : it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and 
 cattle, and other small detachments ; and as the paymaster, 
 the treasure, and the stores, are at Seringapatam, the detach- 
 ment with the treasure and stores for the out stations are 
 furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally 
 create a want of troops ; but the removal of the Moorish 
 inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, 
 would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the 
 arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam, 
 as at any other place in the country. In time of war, and in 
 case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a 
 smaller, garrison for its defence, than any other place that has 
 been proposed as a great depot. An army which should besiege 
 Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the 
 north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. 
 No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form 
 3 divisions, or even 2 divisions, large enough ,to make 2 or 3 
 attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be 
 effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong 
 enough to defend itself against the army which would be 
 employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the 
 defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be 
 necessary, no more men would be required than to defend 
 it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as 
 a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over 
 every other fort in India, viz. that, from the month of June 
 to the month of December, in every year, it is impossible to 
 approach it. 
 
 31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and 
 that art cannot remedy that defect ; but that Bangalore is 
 otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be un- 
 wholesome to the European troops ; and, indeed, in the last 
 year, the same objection applied to all parts of the upper 
 country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not 
 really more unwholesome than Bangalore ; and, upon that 
 point, I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. 
 I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam 
 is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the 
 officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and 
 
 G
 
 82 FITTER THAN OTHER FORTS TO CHECK AN INVADER. 
 
 buildings, which do not keep out the weather, cannot be supposed 
 to answer in this country ; and have been equally fatal in all 
 parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, 
 the health of the troops has improved ; and, in this season, we 
 have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have 
 been in other garrisons. 
 
 32. It is also said, that the position of Seringapatam is bad, 
 not only in reference to a depot for service on the frontier, but 
 as a fortress to cover the country, and stop the enemy. In this 
 respect, Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog 
 to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress 
 more than once ; and it appears to have been no impediment to 
 his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, 
 no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army 
 in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on 
 which the army must necessarily march ; or excepting it is 
 provided with a garrison of such strength and activity, as to 
 afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of 
 the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company 
 should be involved in hostilities of such extent, as that they 
 should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, 
 when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the 
 government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in 
 this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to 
 operate upon the enemy's line of communication with his own 
 country ; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as 
 depots would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping 
 an enemy. 
 
 33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would 
 be the power which each would have over the country ; and their 
 relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. 
 I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is 
 attached to the possession of Seringapatam ; and the history of 
 this country has pointed out more than one instance, in which 
 the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, 
 which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not 
 possession of Seringapatam. 
 
 34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account 
 of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that 
 place. These repairs will not cost one third of the sum at which 
 they have been estimated ; but it is said that, at all events, they 
 will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the
 
 TO REPAIR IT, ON THE WHOLE, THE CHEAPEST PLAN. 83 
 
 buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much 
 doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for 
 one regiment of Europeans at least ; and that it will afford cover 
 for 2 regiments, when the family of the Sultaun shall have been 
 removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will 
 also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In com- 
 paring the expense of the repair of Seringapatam with that of 
 Bangalore, and the establishment of the depot at that place, or 
 at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, 
 hospital, &c, to be built, ought to be added to the latter. 
 Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort 
 on the Malabar coast, in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the 
 expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of 
 establishing the depot at Bangalore or at Chittledroog. 
 
 35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better 
 provided with timber than almost any other place in the 
 peninsula : that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam 
 than it is at Madras. Provisions, and every other article, are 
 cheap : firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittle- 
 droog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were 
 equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, 
 although a greatly inconvenient, consequence of large popu- 
 lations, in almost every part of India. 
 
 36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. 
 The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for 
 more than 2, or at most 3, days at a time, and even then not 
 entirely. Six iron 18 pounders, four 12 pounders and howitzers, 
 with all their equipments, were sent to the northward, in the 
 year 1 799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience ; 
 and, in the last year (1800), the army in the Mahratta country 
 received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not 
 only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, 
 and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any incon- 
 venience. 
 
 21. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Rajalis 
 
 servants. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 29th July, i8or. 
 
 The claim of Butcha Rao to interfere in this case brought 
 
 G 2
 
 84 SHOULD OUR COURT TRY THE RAJAHS SERVANTS ? 
 
 a letter from Capt. Symons to me, in which he desired that I 
 would consider and state my opinion whether, and how far, the 
 Rajah's servants are. and should be, liable to the jurisdiction of 
 the Court. 
 
 I have done so nearly to the following purport ; and I hope 
 that this opinion, and the practice which I have recommended, 
 will be agreeable to you and to them. In the first place, the 
 regulation makes no exception of any persons, being Natives ; 
 all of that description residing upon the island of Seringapatam 
 are liable to the jurisdiction of the Courts which it establishes. 
 It could not have been in the contemplation of the government 
 to make an exception in favour of the Rajah's servants, because, 
 in fact, it is not supposed that they reside on the island ; and the 
 tendency of such an exception would have been to confine the 
 jurisdiction of the Court to those who should choose to submit 
 to it, and to those of whom it could be proved that they received 
 the pay of the Company, or were in the service of some of their 
 officers and servants. 
 
 I have therefore no scruple in laying down the principle 
 broadly, that every person, being a Native residing in the 
 island of Seringapatam, is liable to the jurisdiction of the 
 Court. 
 
 I now come to consider the restrictions upon acting upon that 
 principle thus laid down, which are required by expediency, policy, 
 and good manners. Purneah resides in the Fort, with all his 
 property and his family ; and the principal officers of the Rajah's 
 government reside there likewise. I do not see any necessity for 
 restricting the operation of that principle in the Court of Phous- 
 darry. It is not very probable that the persons, in whose favour 
 we might wish to restrict it, will commit crimes for which they 
 could be tried there ; and it is clear that their servants and 
 adherents must be subject to its jurisdiction, as long as they 
 remain on the island. 
 
 The question is entirely different when the crimes are con- 
 sidered which it is possible might come before the Cutchery. In 
 the course of the administration of the government of this 
 country, it is not possible but that Purneah, or his officers, must 
 occasionally do injury to, or seize, private property. It would 
 be a curious circumstance if the person, whose property should 
 thus receive injury, should have a right, by taking a house at 
 Seringapatam, to bring Purneah into the Court of Cutchery. 
 
 Considering the connexion between the island of Seringapatam
 
 RULING ON THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. 85 
 
 and the Rajah's country, it is impossible but that questions must 
 arise daily between the inhabitants and the Rajah's servants, 
 residing on the island, some of whom it would be highly im- 
 proper, and others it would be very necessary, to bring into the 
 Cutchery ; and yet without more experience than we have had 
 of the operation of the Court (of the manner in which the 
 machine works), it is not possible to define cases so as that 
 government may enforce a regulation which will secure the 
 jurisdiction of the Court on one hand, and will prevent the 
 Rajah's principal servants, residing upon the island, from suffer- 
 ing inconvenience on the other. I have therefore proposed to 
 Capt. Symons the following arrangement and rules for his pro- 
 ceedings in the cases above described. 
 
 In the 1st place, I have proposed that, whenever a complaint 
 is made in the Court of Cutchery against any of the Rajah's 
 principal servants, or any of his servants, for an act of govern- 
 ment, the matter of it should be referred to the Resident, or 
 to the commanding officer, before any further steps should be 
 taken. 
 
 2ndly : That, whenever a dispute shall be brought into the 
 Cutchery between 2 persons notoriously in the Rajah's service, 
 that dispute shall be referred to the Rajah's tribunals, provided 
 both parties consent. 
 
 3rdly : That disputes regarding property in which no act of 
 the Rajah's government is concerned, and in which one of the 
 parties is not one of his principal servants, shall be tried and 
 decided in the Cutchery. 
 
 22. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 Close's political abilities. Danger to Mysore from its isolated 
 
 situation. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 10th Oct. 1801. 
 
 I regret exceedingly Close's departure. Although there is no 
 doubt whatever but that he is the ablest man in the diplomatic 
 line in India, and that his knowledge of the languages is so 
 extraordinary, and so superior to that of any other European 
 in India, that that alone renders him the most fit for a diplo- 
 matic situation ; and besides that qualification, he has others 
 in an equal, if not a superior, degree to other candidates for
 
 86 DEFICIENCY OF MONEY IN MYSORE. 
 
 those situations. Nevertheless, I consider that his presence 
 in Mysore for a few years longer would have been of great 
 benefit, and would have established the new government on 
 so firm a foundation that nothing could hereafter shake it. 
 The great want in this country is of money. There is plenty 
 of everything to bring it into the country ; but as it is entirely 
 cut off from the sea, and has no navigable streams, there is 
 no commerce, and accordingly in many parts of the country the 
 revenue is paid in kind and the common purchases are made by 
 barter. As the Company will take nothing but money in pay- 
 ment of the subsidy, I am always afraid that the government 
 will, at some time or other, be reduced to borrow upon the crops 
 from the Madras sharks, and the first time they do that they take 
 a stride towards their downfall, which will soon be followed by 
 others. Close had a thorough knowledge of this evil, and, by 
 his care and management, I think that he would have prevented 
 its bad effects. 
 
 23. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Additional reasons for maintaining the fortifications of 
 
 Sermgapatam. 
 
 c- Camp, 5th Feb. 1802. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose a memorandum upon the subject 
 treated of in your letter of the 27th of January. 
 
 This memorandum was written in the month of July last, 
 and I never intended to communicate it to anybody in its pre- 
 sent form. I thought it probable that before the Governor- 
 General should order the destruction of the fort of Seringa- 
 patam, he would require from me my sentiments upon Mr. 
 Webbe's memorandum, and I wrote them at the time of 
 perusing it, intending to put them in the form of a letter when 
 I should be called upon for them. However, I think it better to 
 send you this paper, with this explanation, than to delay it in 
 order to make any alteration whatever. 
 
 I beg to observe that the more I consider the subject, the 
 more convinced I am of the utility of Seringapatam. 
 
 Upon a subject of this kind, in my opinion, we ought to take 
 into consideration every event at all within the verge of proba- 
 bility. We have seen the French navies contend with those of 
 Great Britain ; and an opinion has frequently been advanced 
 by those who are in the habit of considering these questions,
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THE FORT OF SERINGAPATAM. 87 
 
 that during this war the navy of France would have been as 
 formidable as her army if it had not been for the Continental 
 contest, which rendered the land service more necessary to her. 
 ' It is not then absolutely impossible for France and her allies 
 or dependents to have a formidable navy. 
 
 If she should in a future war have a navy in this country 
 equal to contend with that of Great Britain, upon what will the 
 power of the Company in the Peninsula depend? Not upon 
 Fort St. George, or any place upon the coast, because those 
 places will follow the fate of the fleet, whatever that is ; but 
 upon the stability of the power and resources of the Company 
 in the inland country. 
 
 As I have pointed out in the enclosed memorandum, there 
 is no place which gives such power or has such resources as 
 Seringapatam, and which, in case of such an event as that 
 which I have in contemplation, would be so capable of keeping 
 in awe the Native powers, or of affording a foundation on which 
 the edifice of the Company's power in the Peninsula might be 
 raised again, and their affairs retrieved. ' 
 
 In addition to the 27th paragraph of the enclosed memo- 
 randum, I have to observe that, considering the manner in 
 which the troops in general are necessarily posted in India in 
 times of peace, to place the great depot of stores at Chittle- 
 droog, or in any very advanced situation, might be either unsafe, 
 or that depot might be useless to the troops. 
 
 When hostilities should become necessary on the northern 
 frontier, a length of time must elapse before a body of troops 
 could be collected ; and till they were collected, unless there were 
 a large garrison in Chittledroog (a much larger garrison than 
 Seringapatam would require under any circumstances whatever), 
 the depot of stores w 7 ould be in danger. 
 
 The enemy would be at all times nearer to this depot than the 
 great body of our army, and before a body could be collected 
 to be opposed to him, he would place himself between us and 
 our stores. Our army consequently, which would be intended for 
 operations on the northern frontier, and for the use of which 
 this depot at Chittledroog would have been formed, would have 
 to be equipped from some other place, which would of course 
 be Madras. Thus the depot at Chittledroog would be ren- 
 dered entirely useless, and the operations of the army would be 
 stopped for months. — I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 88 purneah's ignorance of European politics. 
 
 24. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Advantage of Mysore's isolated situation. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 27 th Feb. 1802. 
 
 It is impossible for a man to be more ignorant of European 
 politics than Purneah is ; indeed, he does not appear to me to 
 have had any knowledge of the late orders from Europe, and 
 the proposed changes of men and measures at Madras, which 
 were so likely to affect his own situation. I attribute his salutary 
 ignorance upon these points to his not having any communica- 
 tion with Madras dubashes, who know everything. 
 
 25. To J. H. Piele, Esq. 
 
 Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Resident's 
 
 servants. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Sera, 26th Sept. 1802. 
 
 All the Native inhabitants of the island of Seringapatam are 
 subject to the jurisdiction of the courts established by the regula- 
 tion, and of course to the police. I am aware that even under 
 the best institutions for the administration of justice political 
 considerations must have their weight, and must at times operate 
 to prevent the natural course of justice. This is particularly the 
 case in this country, and is so at Seringapatam probably more 
 than at any other place ; and accordingly you will perceive in 
 my correspondence with Colonel Close that I have restricted the 
 jurisdiction of the courts as far as lay in my power in respect to 
 the servants of the government of the Rajah of Mysore residing 
 upon the island, and I have desired that certain complaints of, 
 and questions regarding, them might be referred in the first 
 instance to the Resident. This restriction was adopted because 
 Purneah and many of the principal servants of the government 
 resided at Seringapatam, and had property there, and it ap- 
 peared probable that persons who might have complaints and 
 claims against them for acts done in the common transactions 
 of the government might lodge their complaints in the Cutchery, 
 and thus that the ordinary transactions of this government might 
 come under the review of the judge. In a place situated as
 
 THE RESIDENT'S SERVANTS SUBJECT TO OUR COURTS. 89 
 
 Seringapatam is, it is scarcely possible that questions should not 
 arise between the Rajah's subjects and those of the Company on 
 the island, many of which it is exceedingly proper, and others very 
 improper, that the judge should decide on ; but you will per- 
 ceive that the line is clearly drawn in my letter to Colonel Close ; 
 and I have the pleasure to add that in this, as upon most other 
 occasions, he and I agreed in opinion. The question is, whether 
 the people attached to you are at all of the description of those 
 belonging to the Rajah's government in respect to whom the 
 jurisdiction of the court is restricted ; some of them are cer- 
 tainly people of a better description ; others, against whom the 
 majority of these complaints are made, are peons, gardeners, 
 shepherds, horsekeepers, &c. &c. This description of people 
 are liable to the jurisdiction, even if in the Rajah's service, and 
 are certain of punishment if they misbehave or break the peace. 
 The reason for which the jurisdiction was restricted in respect 
 to the higher rank of the Rajah's servants was, that they might 
 not be brought before the Court for acts purely of government, 
 and that Purneah and his principal people might not be 
 frightened out of the place by the danger of being brought 
 before the Foujdarry by every drunken sepoy, dubash, or maty 
 boy who might choose to complain of them. But I beg to know 
 whether the same reasons apply to the principal people in your 
 service? They are not concerned in the government in any 
 manner, and as long as they are in your service they are 
 obliged to remain at Seringapatam if you do. The only reason 
 then for which they should not be brought before these courts 
 appointed by government to have jurisdiction over them is, the 
 prejudice they have themselves to it, and the desire they have 
 in common with every man to live under no control, and to be 
 the judges of their own actions. But this reason, in my opinion, 
 has no weight against the principle that the law is common to 
 all, particularly in a case in which it is evident that no political 
 consideration can have any influence. In this view of the 
 subject, I think that your servants, particularly the lower classes 
 of them, ought to be made to attend the Cutchery when called, 
 in the same manner as other Natives, and even Europeans are, 
 and ought to be punished there for their public offences. 
 
 It may happen, however, that you or Mr. Webbe may think 
 that the character of the Resident is lessened in the opinion of 
 the Natives in general by the obligation that his servants should 
 attend these courts, and you may therefore be desirous that all
 
 90 PURNEAH NOT TO DO TOO MUCH FOR US. 
 
 complaints against them should be referred to you. I acknow- 
 ledge that I am not of this opinion ; I should imagine that 
 Webbe is not, and I know Colonel Close was not ; and when 
 you consider the question on a broad principle, I think you 
 will not. 
 
 26. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Purneah not to go beyond the Treaty, by paying gratis military 
 
 expenses. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 3rd Dec. 1802. 
 
 Purneah says that he proposes to pay all the horse whom he 
 will entertain in Mysore himself, but I have discouraged this 
 notion. He may make an advance of the money to the Com- 
 pany, but he ought not to incur an expense of this kind which 
 he is not required to incur by the treaty, and it is better that 
 we should owe him money for the services he will render upon 
 this occasion than gratitude. The expenses incurred by him, 
 which probably ought to be incurred by the Company, on 
 account of useful works for the country, stand upon grounds 
 entirely different. 
 
 27. To Josiah "Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Objections against ceding Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 15th Dec. 1802. 
 
 I have always thought it advisable to conciliate the Rajah of 
 Koorg by every kind of indulgent and liberal policy. We owe 
 him much : the position of his country is highly important to us, 
 and it is more so to our character in this country to keep him 
 in the situation in which he is, and in good humour with our 
 government. For this reason I would give him the territory in 
 Canara proposed to be given to him, and I would arrange his 
 boundary on the Mysore side permanently, by means of a 
 European gentleman, in a manner that would be satisfactory 
 to him. 
 
 I observe in your letter to Piele that Malcolm has started a 
 proposition to give Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg. I think
 
 HIS AID IN THE WAR. KOGRG NOT TO HAVE WFNAAD. 9 1 
 
 that it would be convenient to us to get rid of that district, and 
 it is probable that the Rajah of Koorg would be glad to have it ; 
 but we must recollect that the Rajah of Mysore has an interest 
 in it as well as ourselves, for which we must make provision in 
 case of such arrangement. We ought also to recollect that when 
 we give Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg, he will have in his 
 possession all the passes from Mysore to Malabar, between 
 Soobramany and Paulghautcherry. I am convinced that as 
 long as the Rajah lives, and we continue towards him the liberal 
 policy by which we have been guided in our transactions with 
 him hitherto, they could not be in better hands ; but we don't 
 know what kind of man his successor may be, and if we adopt 
 this arrangement, and indeed in any case if we give him territory, 
 we ought to urge him to point out his successor. In fact, a 
 dispute for the succession to the government in those territories 
 would be almost as inconvenient and prejudicial to us as to 
 have in it a man whoshould be inimical to our interests. 
 
 28. To Lieutenant- Co.onel Close. 
 
 Active cooperation of Purncah in providing for the MaJiratta 
 
 war, 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1803. 
 
 I cannot conclude this letter without letting you know how 
 amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment 
 of the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily 
 our little friend Purneah has come into all my plans for the 
 service. 
 
 1 st. I have raised here 8000 bullocks before they had got one 
 at Madras ; besides the bullocks for the cavalry gram. 
 
 2ndly. At the end of the gram harvest, one month before 
 the new gram comes in, the cavalry Gram Agent Gen. is 
 supplied with 7000 loads ; and the cavalry are brought upon 
 the frontier, with 500 loads each regiment, where they find 
 6000 loads to supply their consumption while they remain 
 there. 
 
 3rdly. A depot is formed of 7000 loads of rice at Hurryhur. 
 
 4thly. Mysore alone gives 32,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded, 
 which will meet the General at the back of the Chittledroog 
 hills, at the end of this month.
 
 92 POLICE JURISDICTION STRICTLY CIVIL; 
 
 5thly. 60,000 sheep, assembled in different flocks between 
 Sera and Chittledroog ; and 
 
 6thly. A body of silladar horse, amounting to above 5000. 
 
 29. To Colonel Carlisle. 
 
 The Garrison of Seringapatam not exempted from the control 
 
 of the police. 
 
 Camp, 7th July, 1803. 
 My dear Colonel, 
 
 I have received a letter from Mr. Knot, in which he informs 
 me that he has had some difficulties in carrying on the duties of 
 the police which have been imposed upon him, in consequence 
 of the interference of officers and others to screen their servants 
 from the powers of his Cutchery, and of the non-attendance of 
 sepoys, lascars, &c, when required either as witnesses or prisoners ; 
 that lately the shroffs had left the fort because they had found 
 that the police had not strength to protect them, and particularly 
 in one instance had not been able to punish a man who had 
 beaten one of them. 
 
 The police of the fort and island of Seringapatam is, by the 
 judicial regulation of government relative to that place, submitted 
 to the commanding officer in the Mysore country. I have not 
 by me at present the regulation of government, but I desire 
 Lieutenant Knot by this post, to give you the copy to read, 
 which must be in Major Symons's possession, and among the 
 papers in his office. 
 
 You will perceive from a perusal of that paper that, although 
 for obvious reasons the police is placed under a military officer, 
 its jurisdiction is strictly civil, and it must be considered in every 
 respect in the same light as the police of Madras, or that of any 
 other town in the Company's territories which may be under the 
 direction of the Company's civil servants. 
 
 The objects of criminal police are principally the prevention 
 of crimes, but they refer also to the punishment of them, 
 particularly those of a trifling nature, such as are likely to occur 
 daily in a bazaar. But no police can possibly answer any end 
 for which it may have been established if any set of inhabitants 
 can hold themselves superior to its regulations and its power, or 
 can be screened from punishment when their conduct deserves 
 it, or even from inquiry. Much less can it answer if the 
 persons claiming these privileges are above all others the most
 
 AND EXTENDS TO MEMBERS OF THE GARRISON. 93 
 
 likely and the most accustomed to commit the crimes which 
 it must be the object of the police to prevent if possible, and 
 to punish the criminals if the crimes cannot be prevented, 
 viz. the followers of officers and soldiers, and the sepoys, 
 artificers, and lascars of the garrison. 
 
 Accordingly, with every wish to indulge the military, and to 
 protect them as far as may have been in my power, I have 
 thought it proper upon all occasions to support the power of 
 the police and of the civil magistrate. I have given directions 
 that any person who may be seen in the act of committing a 
 crime shall be liable to be arrested by the servants of the police ; 
 that if such person should be a military man, of course the 
 police officer must give notice of this arrest to the commanding 
 officer of the garrison ; that all persons residing in the fort or 
 on the island of Seringapatam may be obliged to attend the 
 Cutchery when their attendance may be required either as 
 witnesses or to answer any charge that may be made against 
 them ; but that if the person whose attendance is required should 
 be a military man, the police officer must write to the com- 
 manding officer of the garrison to request that his attendance 
 may be ordered. Under these rules the police has been kept 
 up as well as local circumstances would permit ; at least 
 I have had the satisfaction of seeing the place prosper, and 
 become the most populous and most useful town in the Mysore 
 country. 
 
 I most anxiously therefore request from you an adherence to 
 this same system, and the support of the gentleman upon whom 
 the duties of the police have been imposed, much against his 
 inclination, and by no means to his advantage. 
 
 I write to him to desire that he will give orders to his officers 
 to arrest any person who may be guilty of crimes or irregu- 
 larities, giving notice to the commanding officer of the garrison 
 if such person should be military, and to enforce the attendance 
 of all those whose presence may be required either as witnesses 
 or to answer to charges brought against them, excepting military 
 persons, for whose attendance he must make application to the 
 commanding'officer. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 94 MYSORE SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 
 
 30. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Efficiency and good discipline of the Mysore cavalry. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803. 
 
 I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your 
 Lordship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah 
 Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed 
 all the light troop duties of this division of the army since I was 
 detached from the Toombuddra, in the month of March last. 
 They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, 
 and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this 
 description. They have frequently been engaged with the 
 enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have 
 lost many men and horses. To the credit of the government of 
 Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British 
 troops ; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them 
 in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example 
 that I attribute the conduct of the Mahratta troops serving with 
 this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to 
 complain. 
 
 31. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Mysore ought to be placed directly under the Governor-General. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp, 14th Jan. 1804. 
 
 In respect to Mysore, I recommend that a gentleman from 
 the Bengal civil service should be Malcolm's successor there. 
 The government of that country should be placed under the 
 immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor- 
 General in Council. The governors of Fort St. George ought 
 to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the 
 Soubah of the Deccan, or the Peshwah. The consequence of 
 the continuance of the existing system will be, that the Rajah's 
 government will be destroyed by corruption ; or, if they should 
 not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or 
 military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the 
 first evil ; or who has strength of character or talents to defend 
 the government against the second. In my opinion, the only 
 remedy is, to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor-
 
 ITS SETTLEMENT HITHERTO VERY SUCCESSFUL. 95 
 
 General ; and this can be done effectually only by appointing, as 
 Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal civil service, and by 
 directing him to correspond only with the Governor-General. 
 To fill this office with advantage to the public will not require 
 very extraordinary talents when this arrangement shall be made. 
 Good character, and decent, respectable manners will be far 
 more important. 
 
 32. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Good ivorking of Welleslefs settlement of Mysore. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Chowke, 9th March, 1804. 
 
 While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting to 
 
 the conduct of the government of Mysore during the late war, 
 
 and congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your 
 
 measures, and the accomplishment of all your objects in 
 
 establishing it. In consequence of the regularity of the system 
 
 of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements 
 
 of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable 
 
 him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the 
 
 equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the 
 
 subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the 
 
 frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, 
 
 or for the large quantities of grain required for the cavalry, and 
 
 by the brinjarries. All these supplies were furnished with a 
 
 facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India. 
 
 He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under 
 
 my command, as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take 
 
 them up ; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the 
 
 corps under Major Gen. Campbell, he has lately forwarded large 
 
 quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable the collectors 
 
 in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of 
 
 Bombay and Poonah. Besides the troops employed with me, to 
 
 whose services I have already drawn your Excellency's notice, 
 
 the Dewan has had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's 
 
 frontier since I marched from the Toombuddra, which he has 
 
 commanded in person ; and a detachment of these troops, under 
 
 Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves upon a late 
 
 occasion, in the destruction of a numerous band of freebooters 
 
 who had assembled in the Savanore country, and threatened 
 
 Mysore.
 
 96 HOW WE MAY INTERFERE WITH RAJAH'S SERVANTS. 
 
 33. To Captain Wilks. 
 
 Relations of the English Government with the RajaJis servants. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804. 
 
 I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to be very cautious 
 in our interference with the servants of the Rajah's government ; 
 and I have always proceeded upon that principle. In the case 
 of Govind Rao, in particular, I requested Purneah to fix upon 
 the person who should be sent to the southern chiefs, and the 
 allowance which should be given to the person upon whom he 
 should fix. Accordingly, this allowance has been paid from that 
 time by Purneah. 
 
 I think, however, that it is not inconsistent with the principle 
 not to interfere with the Rajah's servants, to give rewards to 
 those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with 
 fidelity ; particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these 
 instances, to bring forward the government of Mysore as much as 
 possible ; and to provide that the rewards given shall go through 
 the hands of the Rajah's government, and shall be dependent 
 upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and 
 in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan. 
 
 Purneah, like other men, has his faults. He is particularly 
 jealous of the intercourse between the servants of his government 
 and the European gentlemen, and of the favours which the 
 former may receive from the Company. This jealousy arises 
 principally from ignorance of the European character, and partly 
 from being insensible of the strong impressions in his own favour, 
 which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon 
 all the persons who have at present any power in India. But I 
 am of opinion that we should not act as we ought, if we were to 
 allow that jealousy to prevent us from giving those rewards which 
 are justly due, and which policy urges us to give as strongly as 
 justice and gratitude. 
 
 34. To Purneah, Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore. 
 
 Farewell testimony to PurncaJis merits, and parting advice. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805. 
 I part with you with the greatest regret ; and I shall ever con- 
 tinue to feel the most lively interest for the honour and prosperity
 
 FAREWELL, AND ADVICE, TO PURNEAH. 97 
 
 of the government of the Rajah of Mysore over which you 
 preside. For 6 years I have been concerned in the affairs 
 of the Mysore government, and I have contemplated with the 
 greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your admin- 
 istration. 
 
 Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which 
 was first made of the government of Mysore ; and I am con- 
 vinced that under no other management would it have been 
 possible for the British government to derive such advantages 
 from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in 
 the various difficulties with which we have contended since your 
 authority was established. Every principle of gratitude, therefore, 
 for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense 
 of the public benefits which have been derived from your admin- 
 istration, render me anxious for its continuance and for its increas- 
 ing prosperity ; and in every situation in which I may be placed, 
 you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony 
 of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, 
 and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass which I may think 
 favourable for rendering you service. 
 
 Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the 
 liberty to recommend to you to persevere in the laudable path 
 which you have hitherto followed. Let the prosperity of the 
 country be your great object ; protect the ryots and traders, 
 and allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, 
 to oppress them with impunity ; do justice to every man ; and 
 attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by 
 the British Resident ; and you may depend upon it that your 
 government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it 
 to be. 
 
 ******* 
 
 As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public 
 have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and 
 of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, 
 I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to 
 you from Bengal. 
 
 If
 
 98 IMPORTANCE OF SUPPRESSING DHOONDIAH. 
 
 II. DHOONDIAH WAUGH. 
 
 35. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Necessity of destroying Dhoondiah. Hence a possible complication 
 with the Mahrattas. Colonel Wellesley doubtful as to going to 
 Batavia. 
 
 Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800. 
 
 I have received your letter of the 13th inst., and I am very 
 much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of send- 
 ing me with the Admiral to Batavia. 
 
 I do not deny that I should like much to go ; but you will 
 have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the 
 field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous 
 that I should remain in this country, until its tranquillity is 
 ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different 
 garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have 
 desired him to accept your offer for me, or not, as he may find it 
 most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained 
 from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the 
 coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the 
 year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go 
 with him. I do not know which of the services will answer 
 best ; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops 
 from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, 
 than it is at this moment. 
 
 Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy; but, from circum- 
 stances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make 
 a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace 
 of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be 
 given up to us ; and I doubt not that before now you will have 
 made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If 
 we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all 
 the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have 
 information that letters have been received by most of them, 
 either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon 
 them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's 
 government, or that of their allies ; and his invasion of our 
 territory is looked to as a circumstance favourable to their views.
 
 TILL THIS IS DONE, MY POST IS HERE. 99 
 
 The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary 
 for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Mar- 
 hattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are 
 not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a 
 question whether the whole power of the Company ought not 
 to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case, 
 before the troops were collected ; and although I was certain 
 that it was the only mode of saving this country from being 
 plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord 
 Clive's orders. 
 
 It was clear that, when an army should be collected to oppose 
 a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who 
 may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the 
 government would be committed with that of the Marhattas ; 
 and our honour would require that we should go through with 
 the business, until that man should be given up to us, or that we 
 should have some adequate security for his good behaviour. If, 
 then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man 
 up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may be 
 possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters 
 here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage, 
 or of credit to be gained, shall induce me to quit this country. 
 Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other 
 objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. 
 The attainment of these might be given in charge to other 
 people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the 
 expedition to Batavia, until matters are settled on the Marhatta 
 frontier. 
 
 36. To the Adjutant- General. 
 
 Successful attack en DlwondiaJis camp. 
 
 Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Manowly, 
 31st July, 1800. 
 
 I have the pleasure to inform you that I have had it in my 
 power to strike another blow against Dhoondiah. After I had 
 got possession of Gudduck, having heard that he was encamped 
 near Soondootty, and that he was endeavouring to cross his 
 baggage over the river Malpoorba, at Manowly, I formed a plan 
 of attacking him and his baggage at the same time, by the 
 co-operation of the detachment under Lieut. -Col. Bowser. He 
 did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was, therefore, 
 
 H 3
 
 IOO SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON DHOONDIAH'S CAMP. 
 
 i marches in my rear, but it was possible that Dhoondiah might 
 wait at Soondootty, to cover the passage of his baggage, till 
 Lieut.-Col. Bowser should come within reach ; and as it was 
 important that I should be near the enemy to take advantage 
 of any movements he might make, I marched on, and, on the 
 29th, reached Allagawaddy, which is about 15 miles from Soon- 
 dootty and 16 from this place : at Allagawaddy I proposed to 
 halt till the 31st, on which day I expected Col. Bowser to be at 
 Nargoond. 
 
 As soon, however, as Dhoondiah heard of my arrival at 
 Allagawaddy he broke up from Soondootty; one part of his 
 army went to Doodwar, another to the eastward, towards 
 Jellahal, and a third towards this place with the baggage ; and 
 
 1 am informed that, upon this occasion, he was deserted by a 
 large proportion of his troops. I marched yesterday morning, 
 the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, to the eastward of the Pursghur hill, as 
 a centrical situation, at which I was most likely to procure good 
 intelligence, and there I heard that Dhoondiah had come here 
 with his baggage. I determined then to move on and attack 
 him. I arrived here with the cavalry at about 3 o'clock in the 
 afternoon, and found the camp standing, and that we had sur- 
 prised the enemy. I instantly attacked his camp with the 
 cavalry only. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Torin attacked their left with the 1st and 4th 
 regts., and Col. Stevenson and Col. Pater their front and right 
 with the 25th dragoons and 2nd regt. of cavalry. The camp 
 was strong, with its rear to the Malpoorba, covered by the fort 
 of Manowly on the other side of it, and a deep nullah along its 
 front and left. The 2nd regt. of cavalry, under these circum- 
 stances, was the only corps which got into it ; but every person 
 there was either killed or driven into the river. All the baggage, 
 
 2 elephants, many camels, horses, bullocks, &c. &c, fell into our 
 hands. Numbers of people were drowned or shot in attempting 
 to cross the river, and many prisoners, women and children, 
 &c. &c, were taken. 
 
 Major Blaquiere, with 4 troops of the 25th dragoons, pursued 
 to the eastward a party which appear to have been outside of the 
 camp, and drove them into the river. 
 
 Upon the whole, the disposition of the attack of this camp was 
 most ably made by Col. Stevenson, and well executed by Col. 
 Pater and Lieut.-Col. Torin, and the troops under their orders, 
 who conducted themselves much to my satisfaction. Dhoon-
 
 FESTINA LENTE. TOI 
 
 diah's guns had been passed over the river before we reached 
 the camp, and when the infantry came up we made an endeavour 
 to dismount them ; but night coming on, and the troops having 
 undergone great fatigue, I withdrew my guns to my camp. 
 
 It is not certain whether Dhoondiah was with this part of his 
 army or not : if he was, he went off with the party which was 
 pursued to the eastward, and was driven into the river by Major 
 Blaquiere. 
 
 I have this morning received messages from the brinjarries to 
 ask for cowle, which I have granted. Among other families 
 which have fallen into my hands, I have got that of the head 
 brinjarry, and I hope soon to have the whole of that class of 
 people on my side. 
 
 P.S. I have the pleasure to inform you that, since writing 
 the above, I have got possession of Dhoondiah's guns, 6 in 
 number. 
 
 There was a boat immediately under the fort, which Lieut. 
 Fitchet and Lieut. Jackson, and some men of the yyd and 77th 
 regts., swam over the river to seize. The fort was evacuated, 
 and I have brought away and have given over the guns to the 
 Marhattas. 
 
 37. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 Characteristic precaution in the pursuit. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Kittoor, 5th Aug., 1800. 
 
 I arrived here this morning upon the plan which I stated to 
 you in my letter of the 3rd. Dhoondiah is gone quite into the 
 jungles, and his head is beyond the sources of the Malpoorba. 
 Stevenson is at a place called Eytegul, about 6 miles from 
 hence, and will follow the tail of Dhoondiah to-morrow, part of 
 which he may probably cut off. I halt here to construct boats, 
 to make certain other arrangements which I am about to detail. 
 
 1st. It is very certain that, as Dhoondiah has crossed by the 
 sources of the Malpoorba, I could follow him by that route ; but 
 I must have a communication with this country, which by the 
 same route would be long and difficult, and would be liable to 
 constant interruption from the violence of the rains in these 
 jungly countries. I have therefore determined to have my 
 communication by boats, and at Sungoly, which is 3 coss from 
 hence, and I halt here to construct the boats, as it is in the 
 neighbourhood of a bamboo jungle, and of Darwar, where I can
 
 102 AS DHOONDIAH CAN OUTMARCH US, 
 
 get hides, and it is a plentiful country, with rice, green and dry- 
 forage, &c. 
 
 2ndly. I must throw my sick and wounded into a place of 
 security, and none will answer so well as Hullihall, which place 
 is 5 coss from hence. 
 
 3rdly. I propose to make a collection and depot of rice at 
 Hullihall, and that cannot be done, unless I go there myself to 
 have a little conversation with the dubash in office. What do 
 you think of the difficulties stated in procuring the supply for 
 that garrison, when I tell you that, about half an hour after my 
 arrival, a buccall of this place told me that he would let me 
 have 500 bags to-morrow, and would make it 1000 before 8 days 
 elapsed ? 
 
 4thly. It is necessary to curb Munro's amildars a little, who 
 are taking possession of every place in the country, whether 
 belonging to friends or to foes, and who have given great disgust 
 to the allies. 
 
 The first is the only reason which induces me to halt ; but I 
 shall have a sufficiency of occupation while I am here. I have 
 made all the arrangements for constructing the boats ; and I 
 shall go over to Hullihall to-morrow morning to settle the other 
 points which are objects of my attention. 
 
 38. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 • Dhoondiah to be circumvented. 
 (Extracts.) Camp at Jellahall, 30th Aug., 1800. 
 
 In my opinion our last operations against Dhoondiah had this 
 fault : we pushed him from the westward before we were pre- 
 pared to the eastward to stop him ; and we must take care to 
 avoid the same error in future. It is impossible to expect to 
 catch him or to distress him so as to reduce his force by any 
 direct movement upon his rear, because, in truth, he can march 
 as far in one day without distress, as we can in two days by 
 making the greatest efforts ; he lives upon the grain which is 
 the produce of the country, we upon that which comes from a 
 distance, and for supplies of which we must occasionally halt ; 
 and therefore the best mode of proceeding with him is, to place 
 ourselves so that some of us may be enabled to stop him, while 
 the others pursue him. We never had so good a chance as we 
 have now that the rivers Toombuddra and Kistna are full, and 
 likely to remain so for a month longer.
 
 WE MUST 'PUSH HIM FROM OPPOSITE SIDES.' 103 
 
 I come now to consider the plan which you have proposed for 
 renewing the pursuit. In the first place, it is absolutely neces- 
 sary that we should all halt to give time to supplies of grain 
 and rice to come up. The last of Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser's 
 brinjarries left Hooley on the 25th ; and if they make the same 
 marches as I did, they must be with us on the 1st of September, 
 and with Colonel Bowser on the 2nd. 
 
 The supplies which I have with me were calculated as suffi- 
 cient for an operation to which the rivers were likely to put an 
 end ; and I trusted that its success in some degree would have 
 given us a halt of a few days, which would have brought up the 
 remainder of the supplies. 
 
 But even if we had supplies to enable you to move forward 
 immediately, your doing so would only drive Dhoondiah to a 
 greater distance, and he would certainly then be able to adopt, 
 and carry into effect, some plan for his escape, before it would be 
 possible for any of the other parts of the detachment to come 
 up with him. My idea is to march by Kanagherry or Hunmun- 
 sagur into the Dooab ; if Dhoondiah goes that road, to keep 
 farther to the southward. When I shall have got well forward 
 on my march you may begin yours, and push him towards 
 Raichore, and the fork of the Toombuddra and the Kistna. If 
 he attempt to cross the latter you will have him, and he will not 
 like to go between you and me, or to push for the former. 
 
 There is another reason why we ought to have a force to the 
 southward of him before we push him from the northward and 
 westward. The Toombuddra empties earlier than the Kistna. 
 His object certainly is to go to the Soorapoor Polygar ; but there 
 are other polygars south of the Toombuddra, bordering upon 
 Gurrumconda and Nundydroog, who have already commenced 
 a war with Colonel Cuppage, in correspondence and connection 
 with Dhoondiah, who would readily give him an asylum, and 
 receive from him great assistance. It .is, therefore, necessary 
 that we should be prepared to follow him if he should attempt 
 to go that way. In order to be able to carry on the operations 
 which I propose with effect, it is necessary that I should have it 
 in my power to send out another detachment ; this I cannot do 
 without another regiment of cavalry, and I shall be obliged to 
 you if you will send me back the 1st regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser proposes that we should have one 
 corps north of the Kistna, and another south of the Toombuddra,
 
 104 yOU 'MAKE A RUN AT HIS BAGGAGE* ; 
 
 This would certainly be very desirable, but the truth is, that 
 there are no means of supplying large detachments at such a 
 distance. Hitherto I have fed the Colonel with some difficulty, 
 on account of a short distance between us ; hereafter he will be 
 able to feed himself, but he will not be able to feed a detachment 
 from his corps, which will be moving north of the Kistna, any 
 more than I shall one from mine, moving south of the Toom- 
 buddra. 
 
 39. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 Detailed plan of pursuit. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Jellahall, ist Sept., 1800. 
 
 It appears by all accounts that Dhoondiah's family and his 
 baggage are gone towards Goodygonta and Deodroog, at the 
 last of which places they are to cross the Kistna into the country 
 of the Soorapoor Polygar. Dhoondiah himself, it is said, is at 
 Moodgul, and he will either keep near his baggage or he will 
 turn to the southward and endeavour to cross the Toombuddra, 
 and get among the polygars on the Mysore frontier. We must 
 make a run at his baggage ; and we must, by all means, prevent 
 him from approaching Mysore ; and what follows is the plan. 
 
 I shall march the day after to-morrow with my whole force 
 by the route which is enclosed No. 1 ; and my object will be to 
 keep to the southward of the enemy, if possible, until I find 
 a convenient opportunity of striking a blow at him. If I find he 
 strikes up to the northward I shall not proceed further east, 
 and I shall follow him or not, according as I may find it may 
 be advantageous, in order to prevent him from getting to the 
 southward, or to distress him. 
 
 I beg that you will march upon the baggage and the detach- 
 ment that is with it, as soon as you will have got what you may 
 think sufficient supplies by the route enclosed (No. 2) towards 
 Goodygonta and Deodroog ; but, of course, if an opportunity 
 should offer of striking a blow, which you may think of more 
 importance at the time it offers than that of seizing and routing 
 the baggage, you will deviate from this route ; and you will 
 also deviate from it if you can hear of a shorter or better road 
 to Goodygonta, or if you find that the baggage is gone by 
 any other road. 
 
 As soon as you have got possession of the baggage, or if 
 you should find it impossible to get it, I then wish you to move
 
 WHILE I ' COVER THE SUPPLIES FROM MYSORE.' 105 
 
 directly upon Dhoondiah, wherever he may be. Let me have 
 constant intelligence of your motions. 
 
 I have ordered Noor Khan and Saddoolah Khan to come here 
 to cross the Malpoorba, and those sirdars shall follow you. 
 
 I don't mean that the Mahrattas should pass their own 
 frontier, but they shall be collected in one body, and I hope will 
 be strong enough to prevent the enemy from returning to the 
 Savanore country. At all events, if he does return, I shall be 
 so far to the southward, that, by a movement to my left, I shall 
 be able to cover the supplies from Mysore before he can reach 
 them to do any mischief. 
 
 It is clear to me that we can never do anything by a direct 
 movement upon his army ; we may catch his baggage as we did 
 before at Manowly, and thus distress him ; and afterwards, by 
 pushing him from opposite sides, his numbers may decrease ; so 
 that if he does escape to this country, which, until the Kistna 
 and Toombuddra fall, is his only resource, our allies may think 
 themselves sufficiently strong to dash at him. 
 
 40. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Dhoondiah 's arrangements with the Brinjarries. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Kanagherry, 7th Sept., 1800. 
 
 These brinjarries give a curious account of the manner in 
 which Dhoondiah goes on. They say that he has with him still 
 above 40,000 of their class, that he employs them and gives 
 them the means of living in the following manner. When he 
 approaches a village or a town which is unprotected by a fort, 
 he sends a body of horse, and of brinjarries, to levy a con- 
 tribution : he takes to himself all the money he can get, and 
 gives them at a certain low price all the grain and all the cattle 
 they can find. They pay him this price for the grain and cattle, 
 and they are allowed to sell them at such profit as his camp will 
 afford. They say that he has with him nearly all the brinjarries 
 of this part of India. These people who were taken belonged to 
 the Baramahl, and they say there are many others from that 
 country, from the Nizam's and Mahratta country. In the latter, 
 indeed, there is not now a brinjarry to be found, and, from the 
 state of Col. Bowser's supplies, I should imagine that there can 
 be but few in the Nizam's country.
 
 106 dhoondiah's dealings with the brinjarries. 
 
 41. To the Adjutant-General, Army of Fort St. George. 
 Final defeat and death of Dhoondiah. 
 
 Camp at Yepulpurvy, ioth Sept., 1800. 
 
 After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahall, I marched on 
 the 3rd inst., and entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmun- 
 sagur on the 5th. As Col. Stevenson was obliged to cross the 
 Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river 
 till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that, when Dhoondiah 
 should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side 
 of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry 
 and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication ; or, if 
 favoured by the Patans of Kurnool, and the polygars on the 
 right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and 
 would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore 
 determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to 
 prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them ; 
 and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such 
 advantage of his movements as I might be able ; while Col. 
 Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance 
 of between j 2 and 20 miles from the Kistna, and the Mahratta 
 and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps 
 and mine. 
 
 I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th ; and on the 8th moved 
 with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place ; 
 the infantry being on those days at Nowly and Chinnoor, about 
 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah 
 moved from Mudgherry, a place about 25 miles from Raichore, at 
 which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna ; 
 but on his road having seen Col. Stevenson's camp, he returned 
 and encamped about 9 miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. 
 It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him ; and 
 I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor. 
 
 I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place 
 called Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence. He was on his 
 march, and to the westward ; apparently with the design of 
 passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry and my 
 detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had 
 only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I imme- 
 diately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 
 2nd regts. of cavalry. 
 
 The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank
 
 HIS FINAL DEFEAT, AND HIS DEATH. I07 
 
 covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for 
 some time with apparent firmness ; but such was the rapidity 
 and determination of the charge made by those 4 regts., which 
 I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalise in 
 length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were 
 pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others 
 Dhoondiah, were killed ; and the whole body dispersed, and 
 were scattered in small parties over the face of the country. 
 Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp 
 about 3 miles from Conahgull ; I returned thither, and got 
 possession of elephants, camels, and every thing he had \ 
 
 The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and, 
 above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare ; 
 and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my 
 sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, 
 their determined valour and discipline were conspicuous ; and 
 their conduct and that of their commanding officers, Col. Pater, 
 Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Capt. Doveton, and Capt. Price, 
 have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time 
 I must inform you, that all the troops have undergone, with the 
 greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services. 
 
 It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason 
 I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the 
 business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding 
 the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources 
 of supplies, and rapidity of my marches ; and the necessity, 
 from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering 
 their direction, I have always been well supplied with every thing 
 which the troops could want. The Mahratta and Mogul cavalry 
 are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives ; and I propose to 
 draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days. 
 
 1 Among the baggage was found Salabut Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, 
 a child of about 4 years old. He was taken to Col. Wellesley's tent, and 
 was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir 
 Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the 
 use of the boy in the hands of Col. J. Hely Symons, the judge and 
 collector at Seringapatam. When Col. Symons retired from service, the 
 Hon. A. Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, 
 and had him placed in the Rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, 
 intelligent youth. Salabut Khan died of cholera in 1822. — Note by Col. 
 Gurwood. [See Sir Arthur's Letter on this subject, To the Magistrate at 
 Seringapatam, in Appendix. — Edi\
 
 108 THE INSURRECTION IS AT AN END. 
 
 42. The Governor- General in Council to the Secret Committee 
 of the Honourable Court of Directors. 
 
 Pursuit^ final defeat, and death of Dhoondiah. 
 
 Fort William, 3rd October, 1800. 
 ' Honourable Sirs, 
 
 ' 1. Our last letter to your Honourable Committee in this 
 department was dated and closed on the 31st of August. 
 Since that time further details have reached us of the operations 
 of the army under the command of the Honourable Colonel 
 Wellesley, and, finally, we have received the satisfactory intelli- 
 gence of the happy and honourable issue of the expedition 
 against Dhoondiah Waugh, which terminated, on the 10th of 
 September, by a decisive and brilliant victory obtained, under 
 the personal command of Colonel Wellesley, over the remnant 
 of the rebel army ; by the death of Dhoondiah Waugh, who fell 
 in the action ; and by the entire destruction or dispersion of the 
 troops which that insurgent had assembled on the frontier of 
 Mysore. Deeming these details to be equally interesting and 
 important, we propose to submit them to your Honourable 
 Committee in the present despatch. 
 
 ' 2. After the destruction (on the 30th of July) of that part of 
 the revolted army encamped near Manowly, Dhoondiah retired 
 precipitately in the direction of Kittoor, whence he effected his 
 escape by penetrating through the jungles in the vicinity of that 
 place, and by taking a circuitous route round the sources of the 
 river Malpoorba. He thus surmounted the difficulty to which 
 he had been reduced by the want of boats, and on the 7th of 
 August he reached Shawpoor, in the vicinity of the river Gutpurba. 
 
 ' 3. Colonel Wellesley, marching from Soondootty on the 3rd 
 of August, arrived at Kittoor on the 5th. Here he was detained 
 until the 10th of August in preparing boats for the passage of 
 the Malpoorba. Colonel Wellesley justly concluded that boats 
 might be constructed for the passage of the river with more 
 expedition and facility than the movement of the army, with 
 its guns and stores, could have been effected through the jungles 
 of Kittoor, in the track of Dhoondiah's route. 
 
 ' 4. In the meanwhile Colonel Stevenson, with Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Bowser's detachment and the 4th regiment of Native 
 cavalry, lightly equipped, was detached to some distance in
 
 MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 109 
 
 Dhoondiah's track, for the purpose of cutting off a part of the 
 insurgent's baggage. This detachment afterwards crossed the 
 Malpoorba before Colonel Wellesley was able to effect the 
 passage, and for some time menaced Dhoondiah's rear. Colonel 
 Stevenson's detachment was ordered not to push the rebel force 
 closely until the troops under Colonel Wellesley 's personal com- 
 mand should attain a position sufficiently advanced to support 
 the operations of the detachment. 
 
 ' 5. Dhoondiah, continuing his march along the river Gutpurba 
 to the eastward, attempted to pass that river west of Gokauk, 
 but was prevented, in consequence of Colonel Wellesley's express 
 desire, by a polygar named Narity Seerjary. Colonel Stevenson's 
 detachment continued its march along the Gutpurba, while 
 Colonel Wellesley, having completely effected the passage of 
 the Malpoorba, moved along the left bank of the latter river, 
 being accompanied by a force of Mahratta and Mogul cavalry 
 from the Peshwah's and the Nizam's armies, acting as our allies 
 against the rebel force. 
 
 ' 6. With a view to prevent Doondiah from crossing the river 
 with any large body of troops and followers by the passes of 
 the Malpoorba, east of Manowly and near Badamy, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Capper's brigade, with the Mahratta cavalry under Chin- 
 tomeny Rao and Baba Saheb, was detached by the road to the 
 right of the river Malpoorba, and was ordered to occupy the 
 passes most likely to be fordable. 
 
 ' 7- Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, marching for this purpose 
 through the valley of Purusghur, assaulted and carried by es- 
 calade, on the 22nd August, the fort of Hooley, situated in that 
 valley. The garrison of this fort had received cowle from Colonel 
 Wellesley after the action of Manowly on the 30th July, but had, 
 notwithstanding, plundered the baggage of the dragoons as it 
 passed the fort on the march to Soondootty on the 1st August. 
 Colonel Wellesley was prevented by other more urgent objects 
 from punishing the perfidy of this garrison at the time, but the 
 direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Capper's march affording a 
 favourable occasion for the purpose, it was not neglected. From 
 Hooley, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper proceeded on the same day 
 to Syringhy, another fort, situated about eight miles to the east- 
 ward of the former, and occupied by a polygar in the interest of 
 Dhoondiah. The escalade of this fort being found impracticable, 
 the gateway was attacked and the outer gate carried ; but the 
 passage being too narrow to admit a gun upon its carriage, the
 
 HO CAPTURE OF HILL FORTS. 
 
 gun was immediately taken off the carriage and transported to 
 the inner gate under a very heavy fire from the fort. This gallant 
 enterprise was happily accomplished by Sir John Sinclair and a 
 detachment of the Coast and Bombay artillerymen, and the gate 
 was speedily burst open. The fort of Syringhy is represented 
 as being very strong. 
 
 ' 8. The gallantry of the action performed by Sir John Sinclair 
 and his party is highly commended by Colonel Wellesley, and, 
 we are persuaded, will attract the notice and approbation of your 
 Honourable Committee. 
 
 ' 9. Colonel Wellesley having been informed that the Polygar 
 of Talloor had in his possession and under his care some guns, 
 stores, and ammunition belonging to Dhoondiah Waugh, de- 
 spatched Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, on the 24th of August, 
 with a detachment, to seize and destroy them. This service was 
 performed very satisfactorily by Colonel Montresor. In the 
 place were found one iron and four brass guns, with excellent 
 carriages, several tumbrils, a quantity of ammunition, several 
 (Company's) muskets, ammunition for them, &c, all of which 
 were destroyed. The hill fort of Catar Ghur was abandoned on 
 Colonel Montresor's approach. 
 
 ' 10. Before any part of our army could reach Dhoondiah's 
 force, the river Malpoorba suddenly fell so considerably that 
 Dhoondiah was enabled, on the 24th August, to cross that river 
 near Boodeyhaul, and to enter the Nizam's country. Colonel 
 Wellesley immediately prepared to pursue the rebel, but the 
 British force was not able to cross the Malpoorba until the 29th 
 August, at a very deep and rapid ford near Jellahall. Here 
 Colonel Wellesley was detained until the 3rd September, being 
 obliged to wait the junction of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, 
 and to allow time for Colonel Stevenson's passage of the river, 
 which it was necessary to perform in boats. These operations 
 delayed the advance of the British army until the 4th of Sep- 
 tember. On the 5th of September Colonel Wellesley, following 
 the track of Dhoondiah, entered the Nizam's territories at 
 Hunmunsagur. 
 
 'n. It appeared probable to Colonel Wellesley that when 
 Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the 
 northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by 
 Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede the supplies 
 and interrupt the communications of our army ; or, if favoured 
 by the Patans of Kurnool and the Polygars on the right bank of
 
 PLAN OF RENEWED PURSUIT. Ill 
 
 the river Toombuddra, Dhoondiah might pass that river and 
 might enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore : Colonel ■ 
 Wellesley therefore judiciously determined, by moving his own 
 detachment to the southward, to preclude the execution of either 
 of those designs, and afterwards to push Dhoondiah to the east- 
 ward, taking such advantage of the movements of the rebel force 
 as might be practicable. Colonel Stevenson, in the meanwhile, 
 was ordered to move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance 
 of between twelve and twenty miles from the Kistna ; and the 
 Mahratta and Mogul cavalry (collected in one body) was put in 
 motion between the divisions of the forces under the respective 
 commands of Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson. 
 
 ' 12. Having thus, with a degree of judgment and skill which 
 cannot fail to attract the notice of your Honourable Committee, 
 combined his future operations, Colonel Wellesley proceeded, on 
 the 7th September, to Kanagherry. On the 8th he moved with 
 the cavalry alone to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to Yepulpurvy, 
 the infantry being, on the last day, about fifteen miles in his 
 rear. 
 
 1 13. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah appears to have 
 moved from Mudgherry, a place about twenty-five miles from 
 Raichore (where he had been encamped for some days), towards 
 the river Kistna ; but, on his road, having seen Colonel Steven- 
 son's camp, he returned, and encamped about nine miles in 
 Colonel Wellesley 's front, between Colonel Wellesley's posi- 
 tion and Bunnoo. It was evident that Dhoondiah was not 
 apprised of the vicinity of Colonel Wellesley's force ; the latter 
 was well informed that Dhoondiah believed him to be still at 
 Chinnoor. 
 
 1 14. On the morning of the 10th of September Colonel 
 Wellesley moved forward, and met Dhoondiah's army at a place 
 called Conahgull, about six miles from Yepulpurvy. Dhoondiah 
 was then on his march to the westward, apparently with a design 
 of passing between the body of the Mahratta and Mogul 
 cavalry and Colonel Wellesley's detachment, which Dhoondiah 
 supposed to be at Chinnoor. The insurgent at that time was 
 accompanied by a large body of cavalry, consisting of about five 
 thousand men, which Colonel Wellesley immediately attacked 
 with the 19th and 25th dragoons and 1st and 2nd regiments of 
 Native cavalry. 
 
 ' 15. The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left 
 flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood
 
 112, dhoondiah's final rout, and his death. 
 
 for some time with apparent firmness. Colonel Wellesley was 
 obliged to form the four regiments of cavalry in one line in order 
 to render his line in any degree proportioned in length to that of 
 the enemy, and such was the rapidity and determination of the 
 charge made by the four regiments, that the whole line of 
 the enemy gave way, and was pursued for many miles. Many 
 persons (among others, Dhoondiah Waugh himself) were slain, 
 and the whole body of the rebel force was scattered in small 
 parties over the face of the country. Part of the enemy's bag- 
 gage was still remaining in his camp, and was taken possession 
 of by our troops. 
 
 ' 1 6. Colonel Stevenson, on the same day (ioth of September), 
 took near Deodroog the only two remaining pieces of cannon 
 belonging to the enemy, together with a large quantity of 
 baggage, camels, bullocks, and brinjarries. 
 
 ' 17. Colonel Wellesley has borne the most ample testimony 
 to the bravery and perseverance of all the troops employed 
 under his command during the whole of this active and rapid 
 expedition. When it is considered that the expedition was 
 commenced and prosecuted in a season of the year most un- 
 favourable to military operations, through a country presenting 
 various impediments, and in pursuit of a bold, active, and skilful 
 enemy, at the head of a numerous body of light cavalry, the zeal 
 and the gallantry manifested by our troops on this occasion, and 
 the ability and energy with which they were commanded, are 
 entitled to particular commendation. 
 
 '18. In our despatch of the 31st August it was our public 
 duty to express our sense of the able and spirited conduct of the 
 Honourable Colonel Wellesley in the former part of the cam- 
 paign against Dhoondiah ; the same obligations of public duty 
 and of justice to merit require that we should declare to your 
 Honourable Committee that Colonel Wellesley's subsequent 
 operations have realized every expectation which we were 
 induced to form from our confidence in his professional know- 
 ledge, in his skilful management of his resources and supplies, 
 and in his enterprising and active spirit. 
 
 ' 19. The manner in which the expedition against Dhoon- 
 diah Waugh has been conducted and terminated has effectually 
 removed the immediate danger which menaced the possessions 
 of the Company and of their allies and dependents in the penin- 
 sula of India, and the impression made by our success against 
 this insurgent cannot fail to contribute in an eminent degree to
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONQUEST OF MALABAR: 113 
 
 the permanent establishment of tranquillity in our recent 
 conquests and on the whole line of our new frontier. 
 ' We have the honour to be, 
 ' Honourable Sirs, 
 
 ' Your most faithful, humble servants, 
 
 (Signed) ' By the Governor-General in COUNCIL. 
 
 ' (A true Copy) W. KlRKPATRICK, 
 
 ' Secretary to Government for Political Department.' 
 
 III. THE MALABAR COAST. 
 
 43. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Physical and social obstacles to the conquest of Malabar. 
 Character of the Koorg Rajah. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Cannanore, 7th April, 1800. 
 
 Mr. Smee, the gentleman who has for some time had charge 
 of the Cotiote district, has made an arrangement with the 
 friendly Nairs for opening certain roads which are essentially 
 necessary for our future military operations. I have given 
 directions that certain coolies and others who had been collected 
 for the service of the troops which were to have been employed 
 on the expedition may be sent to their assistance, and I have 
 great hopes that these works will be finished before the rains set 
 in. I then propose, if possible, to construct places of strength 
 and security for grain, provisions, and stores, in the centre of 
 Cotiote, with which, by means of these roads, the communication 
 will be easy and secure ; and during the rains I propose to 
 employ the same people in filling them with such articles in 
 sufficient quantities to last a detachment of 3000 men for two 
 months. The troops on this side will then be well advanced for 
 a co-operation on Wynaad early in the next season. 
 
 # * * * * * * * 
 
 The annihilation of the Pyche Rajah will have a great effect 
 on the minds of the disaffected, with which this province abounds. 
 
 1
 
 114 A COUNTRY SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR TURBULENCE. 
 
 There never was a country which, from its nature, its situation, 
 the manners of its people and its government, was so well cal- 
 culated for turbulence ; but the fall of the Pyche Rajah, and the 
 reduction of Wynaad, will curb it considerably; and I shall direct 
 my inquiries to ascertaining the means of settling the other 
 parts of this province which are disturbed. 
 
 The whole country is one jungle, which may be open in some 
 parts, but in others is so thick that it is impossible to see objects 
 at the distance of two yards ; and till roads are made, the country 
 is impracticable for our troops. In this jungle, criminals who 
 deserve punishment, those who wish to evade the payment of the 
 dues to Government, and those who oppose its authority, take 
 refuge, where they are supported by chiefs who have strongholds 
 in the upper country, and by the fruits of the trees and a little 
 cultivation scattered in different parts in valleys in the jungle. 
 The province of Malabar is bounded on the N.E. by the Koorg 
 country, and on the E. by Wynaad, Mysore, and Coimbatoor. 
 From Malabar into Wynaad there are many Passes, and it has 
 been the constant practice of all those who have disturbed the 
 peace of this province, when they have been pressed by the 
 troops below the Ghauts, to slip up into Wynaad, which country 
 it would almost appear that Tippoo had allotted to the purpose 
 of giving an asylum to those who should disturb our Government. 
 Accordingly, in Wynaad, and Todinaar bordering upon it, they 
 have many strongholds, from whence they issue to burn, plunder, 
 and destroy below the Ghauts, and to which they retire when 
 pressed. The subjection of Wynaad therefore, and of the Pyche 
 Rajah, who is at the head of the disturbers of the peace, is the 
 first object ; and the next will be the establishment of easy 
 communications for our troops through that district between the 
 upper and lower country, and then easy access to every consider- 
 able stronghold both above and below the Ghauts. Small posts 
 and small detachments of our troops will then be able at all 
 times to give effectual assistance to the civil magistrate, with 
 whom it will rest to do his duty. The nature of the people is 
 considerably influenced by that of their country and its situation. 
 They are savage, cruel, and everything that is bad. Every man 
 is armed against his neighbour. The Nair destroys the Moplah, 
 and the Moplah the Nair, and both agree in despising and 
 resisting the authority of the Company's government, and of its 
 magistrates. Property has been established without a symptom 
 of civilisation, and English law administered by Native agents.
 
 FAVOURABLE ESTIMATE OF THE RAJAH OF KOORG. 115 
 
 The consequence is, that the whole system is tyranny, and 
 corruption, and impunity. The great Landholder, as he is 
 called, when he finds it most convenient to tyrannise legally, 
 pays the Native judge, and supports him in his office by his 
 influence. The complaints of the inferior landholders and 
 cultivators reach the European gentleman superintending, who, 
 instead of dismissing and punishing the judge, finds him too 
 strong for him. On the attempt to punish, the judge and his 
 patron retire to the jungles, the whole country flock to their 
 standard, the cultivation is neglected, and the revenue is lost. 
 To pursue them in the jungles would be useless and dangerous, 
 and under these circumstances the superintendent is obliged to 
 submit and to restore the judge to his situation, and to wink at 
 future enormities. Various remedies have been proposed ; some 
 have proposed to disarm the people, others have made pro- 
 positions which would not tend more to remedy the evil. To 
 disarm the people entirely, would in the first place be impossible ; 
 and in the next it would have the effect of delivering over the 
 disarmed part of the community (that is to say, those who should 
 submit themselves to the orders of Government, and allow their 
 arms to be taken) to the mercy of those who should oppose its 
 authority, and would therefore be cruel. To disarm the people 
 may be practicable and proper hereafter ; but it will first be 
 necessary to conquer them. 
 
 The plan for this I have already stated, and if I receive the 
 orders of Government, and there should be nothing more im- 
 portant for the troops in the next season, I think this country can 
 be settled. It will afterwards remain with Government, by a 
 reform of those parts of the system of tenure of lands not 
 applicable to this country, and of the judicial system, to establish 
 the civil authority upon a firm foundation. 
 
 In my journey through Koorg I saw the Rajah. He appeared 
 to be much afraid that we on the eastern side of the Peninsula 
 were not aware of the services which he had had it in his power 
 to render to the Company, and that we should listen to his 
 enemies, who he said were very desirous of prejudicing us against 
 him. After a long conversation he appeared better reconciled to 
 us than he was at first. 
 
 There is more simplicity in his manners, and in what he says, 
 and apparently more sincerity, than in any native that I have 
 yet seen. He is much attached to the English, and it would 
 certainly be a misfortune if he were to be estranged from us. 
 
 I 2
 
 Il6 AS OUR TROOPS CANNOT DISPENSE WITH BAGGAGE; 
 
 44. To Colonel Sartorius. 
 The best mode of carrying on war in jungly countries. 
 
 Camp at Kanagherry, 18th Sept., 1800. 
 
 I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th 
 inst. The first object of your attention must be to throw into 
 Montana such a supply of provisions as will secure that garrison 
 from a probability of want. To that every thing else must give 
 way. To weaken Cotee-angary or any other post in the country 
 which has heretofore been reckoned of importance is a matter of 
 immaterial consequence, when compared with the necessity of 
 getting the better of, or, I may say, of defending yourself against 
 the Pyche Rajah. When he shall have been subdued, every 
 thing else will be quiet, and probably the numerous posts now 
 out in Malabar will be found to be of no use. The Rajah presses 
 you now upon Montana; you must relieve that post by all means, 
 and at all events in the first instance, and it will be time enough 
 afterwards to consider in what mode we shall carry on the war. 
 
 The result of my observations and considerations upon the 
 mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this, that as 
 long as the jungle is thick, as the enemy can conceal himself in 
 it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers 
 and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our 
 side. You propose as a remedy to move in small compact bodies 
 in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no 
 mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, 
 and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that 
 your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops 
 which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind; 
 I say only some purposes, because their success would not be 
 complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as 
 the Nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some 
 place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But as 
 we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to 
 answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, 
 and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not 
 answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system, 
 the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that 
 necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to 
 deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower 
 part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road.
 
 CLEAR THE JUNGLE FROM THE ROAD-SIDE. 117 
 
 This you say is a work of time ; it is true it is so, but it must be 
 recollected that the labour of every man turns to account, that 
 the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and 
 we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and 
 treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same 
 desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following 
 season, as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the 
 case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security 
 to the followers is adopted. 
 
 We will suppose that my principle is conceded, and that it is 
 agreed that in order to be successful we must secure those who 
 supply us with all we want, and that the best mode of doing 
 this is to cut away the jungle in order to deprive the enemy of 
 his concealment ; I proceed to state in what manner I should 
 carry on my operations in Cotiote. 
 
 I would assemble my troops at Cotaparamba, and begin by 
 laying open the country back to Tellicherry, lest when I should 
 move on towards Montana the enemy should take advantage of 
 the close jungles between Cotaparamba and Tellicherry in order 
 to interrupt my communication with the latter, which must be 
 secure before I can hope for success. After having done this I 
 should push forward my advanced posts, well strengthened in 
 different directions, as you propose in your letter of the 6th inst. 
 Under their cover strong working parties should be employed in 
 clearing the jungle. When they should have cleared forward to 
 the distance of 2 or 3 miles I would move the camp that dis- 
 tance, and remain in that new position till more road and country 
 should have been cleared for me. By degrees I should get for- 
 ward to the most advanced of my posts, and the result of my 
 labours would be, that no Nair would venture into a country where 
 I had deprived him of his advantage, viz. his concealment. But 
 even if he should venture in my rear, tempted by the prospect 
 of interrupting my communication and distressing me for pro- 
 visions, he could not do so without my knowledge, and a very 
 small body of troops would answer to protect my convoys when 
 the country will have been opened, and I should be thus enabled 
 to derive all the advantage of the discipline of my troops. 
 
 After having thus got myself well forward in the country, my 
 posts well established and supplied, and my communication with 
 my rear well secured, as well as that between one post and 
 another, I would begin to carry on the war on a more active 
 plan, and I would send out light detachments in all directions in
 
 Il8 SUCCESS IN INDIAN WARFARE TURNS ON SUPPLIES. 
 
 order to hunt out every nair who should be in the country. If 
 at the same time another body of troops was carrying on opera- 
 tions on a similar system in Wynaad, I would endeavour to open 
 a secure communication with that country. In the end you may 
 depend upon it that the Pyche Rajah, nor no other man, could 
 hold out ; he would be deserted by his people, and probably 
 at last would fall into the hands of one of my detachments, as 
 Dhoondiah did a few days ago. 
 
 Depend upon it, my dear sir, that the success of military 
 operations in India depends upon supplies ; there is no difficulty 
 in fighting, and in finding the means of beating your enemy 
 either without or with loss : but to gain your object you must 
 feed, and you can feed only by communication with the sea, and 
 you can secure that communication only by the operations which 
 I have above described. 
 
 In the mean time, however, many modes of distressing the 
 Pyche Rajah might be adopted. Nairs, I am informed, are 
 gentlemen, and probably the idlest of that character. The 
 Wynaad country, which is in their possession, is almost a desert, 
 and certainly does not produce a sufficiency for their consump- 
 tion. They live there upon what is sent to them from the coast, 
 and they pay for what they get by sandal wood, pepper, &c. 
 I am informed that the Company's servants buy these articles 
 from the Nairs of Wynaad. In the first place you should call 
 upon the Commissioners publicly (and do so in my name if you 
 like it) to put a stop to all communication between Wynaad 
 and Malabar, and particularly to stop the trade from the latter 
 in rice. 
 
 There is a fellow, by the name of Mousa, at Tellicherry who 
 supplies the Rajah with rice, to my certain knowledge. A hint 
 might be given to him that I am in the habit of hanging those 
 whom I find living under the protection of the Company and 
 dealing treacherously towards their interests ; that I spare neither 
 rank nor riches ; but that, on the contrary, I punish severely 
 those who by their example create the evils for which the un- 
 fortunate people suffer. 
 
 I have written you this letter in a private form, but I beg that 
 you will hand it over to your successor if you should think of 
 going to Bombay, as containing my sentiments on the operations 
 to be carried on in Cotiote, and the grounds upon which I have 
 formed them.
 
 STRONG POSTS NOT ENOUGH WITHOUT CLEARED ROADS. 1 10 
 
 45. To Captain Moncreiff. 
 
 Same subject. Answer to objections. 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 1st Oct., 1800. 
 
 I conclude that you will have seen a letter which I wrote to 
 Col. Sartorius on the 18th Sept., in which I enter fully into a 
 statement of my opinion regarding the mode of carrying on war 
 in a jungly country, and I apply those opinions to the state of 
 the Cotiote district and to the enemy with whom we have to 
 contend in that quarter. The great principle upon which I 
 ground my opinion is that you must have a secure communica- 
 tion between your posts and the sea, or between your detach- 
 ments in that country and the sea ; and I contend that that 
 communication will not be rendered secure till the Nairs are 
 deprived of their concealment. 
 
 Your idea is, that to open the road more than it is at present 
 will be attended with bad consequences, and you say that the 
 greatest loss was sustained at those places at which the road 
 was most exposed ; and you propose to secure the communica- 
 tion with Montana by means of posts, to be established at inter- 
 mediate stations between that place and Cotaparamba. I agree 
 with you entirely, that in order to subdue a country more is 
 required than to be able to march through it ; but before you 
 can subdue it you must certainly have that ability with very 
 small detachments at least. Indeed the security of the com- 
 munication appears to be the great object of your consideration 
 as well as of mine ; we differ only as to the means of obtain- 
 ing it. 
 
 I will suppose that all the posts which you propose should be 
 established are finished, garrisoned, and provided ; and that the 
 Pyche Rajah should enter Cotiote at the head of jooo Nairs, and 
 should attack any one of those posts. In what manner is it to 
 be relieved ? Is it to be left to its chance, or must the army 
 which can be collected move to its assistance ? If the latter is 
 the plan to be adopted, is it not probable that the same loss will 
 be incurred as was suffered upon the late occasion ? 
 
 You say that the Nairs will not dare to post themselves be- 
 tween our garrisons when they will be so near one another ; but 
 experience has shown us that they will approach as near to us as 
 one enemy will approach another ; and as they would take care
 
 120 ESTABLISH YOUR POSTS ON MY CLEARED ROADS. 
 
 to cut off the communication between one post and another, 
 there could be no concert, which is all that they might have to 
 fear from their position between any two of our posts. I don't 
 mean to assert that the number of our posts would not diminish 
 our risk, but still it would not give us security, which is what we 
 must look for. 
 
 I now come to consider your objection to opening the jungle 
 on the sides of the roads. It is that the enemy takes a position 
 inaccessible directly to our troops, from which the openness of 
 the jungle enables him to see them, and he annoys them. This 
 is the constant practice every where ; but it is the business and 
 duty of the commanding officer to make his arrangements for 
 dislodging the enemy from such situations before he exposes the 
 great body of his troops to the fire which can be given from 
 them ; and after this has been done sometimes, the enemy is not 
 so ready to trust himself in a position of the kind. I don't pre- 
 tend that, by opening the jungle, I shall gain absolute security, 
 as I am aware that even in an open country the communication 
 is always liable to be interrupted ; but I contend for it that where 
 concealment is the great object and the principal resource of the 
 enemy, the diminution of the means of affording it to him is the 
 most effectual mode of distressing him. It is certainly true that 
 it is necessary to have posts in the country along the road which 
 is to be used as the communication, particularly if the enemy 
 should be disposed to operate upon your line of communication 
 with your rear ; and I may, therefore, conclude that the esta- 
 blishment of your posts upon my roads would be the most 
 effectual plan to subdue this Rajah. 
 
 46. To J. Smee, Esq. 
 
 Colonel Wellcsley's strong objection to the establishment of purely 
 
 military law. 
 
 Camp ten miles south of Copaul, 15th Nov., 1800. 
 
 I beg that you will do me the favour to send me your opinion 
 upon a point on which I have received a letter from Colonel 
 Sartorius. He applied to me some time ago for powers to try 
 by general court-martial. I have procured for him from the 
 Commander-in-Chief the usual powers to try military offenders, 
 and the government of Fort St. George have authorised me to 
 extend to Malabar the powers which I have of trying by military
 
 PURELY MILITARY LAW ALWAYS OBJECTIONABLE, 121 
 
 process rebels and persons conspiring against the government. 
 The question is, whether the exercise of that power will super- 
 sede or suspend that of the ordinary tribunals, and whether in 
 that case it will not do more injury than good. 
 
 I am fully aware that the military gentlemen in Malabar are 
 exceedingly anxious to establish what they call military law. 
 Before I should consent to the subversion of one system of law, 
 and to the establishment of another, I should be glad to know 
 what the new law was to be ; and I have never procured from 
 any of those gentlemen yet a definition of their own idea of 
 military law. I understand military law to be the law of the 
 sword, and. in well-regulated and disciplined armies, to be the 
 will of the General. 
 
 I should not wish to have the trouble of managing a country 
 like Malabar myself, and I acknowledge that I should not think 
 it very proper to commit the management of that province (by 
 the establishment of military law) to any other officer under my 
 orders. 
 
 The question then is, whether the systems of revenue, of juris- 
 prudence, of police, now established will not be either suspended, 
 if I give to Colonel Sartorius the power of trying offenders by 
 military process, or they will be supposed to be suspended, and 
 the officers of the army will deem it their right and their duty to 
 interfere in them all, in consequence of the establishment, as they 
 will imagine, of their favourite system of military law. 
 
 I shall be glad to have your opinion upon this point. If the 
 overthrow of the present system can be avoided, it may perhaps 
 be proper to give to Colonel Sartorius the power of trying rebels, 
 &c, by military process ; but I acknowledge that I for one shall 
 always object to the establishment of a purely military law in 
 any country to which I have anything to say. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 47. To Major- General Baird. 
 
 Pursuit and distress of the Rajah of Bulliim. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st June, 1801. 
 The campaign in the province of Malabar ended in May, when 
 the rains commenced. Colonel Stevenson had not been able
 
 122 SUCCESS OF WELLESLEV'S PLAN OF WARFARE. 
 
 to get possession of the Rajah's person, although he had upon 
 more than one occasion pushed him so hard as that he had been 
 obliged to leave his clothes and provisions. In one flight from 
 our troops the Rajah had been so hard pushed as that it is well 
 known he had not been able to stop to dress his victuals, and 
 he had not eaten for four days, and that subsequently he was 
 abandoned by all his followers, and was wandering alone in the 
 southern parts of the Malabar province. His followers have not 
 collected since the rains commenced, and our troops have re- 
 mained in the undisputed possession of all their posts in Wynaad 
 and Malabar. 
 
 48. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 The use and abuse of martial law. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, ist July, 1801. 
 
 By the former orders of the Right Honourable the Governor 
 in Council, you were authorized to try by military process and 
 to punish persons taken in rebellion, or aiding and assisting or 
 exciting others to rebel ; and there can be no doubt, therefore, of 
 the propriety of your carrying into execution those orders in 
 the instances to which you have alluded. 
 
 I have in my hands an authority of the same kind, extending 
 to the province of Canara ; of which authority I made use in the 
 last year to punish those concerned in Vittel's rebellion and in 
 the capture of Jemalabad. 
 
 Canara is now in tranquillity, and I conceive that my authority 
 to try by military process is no longer in activity ; but in case 
 of rebellion in that province it will be in full force, and you shall 
 be empowered to make use of it. 
 
 In the exercise which I have made of the power intrusted to 
 me to try the persons above described by military process, I 
 have not thought it necessary at all times to proceed by a general 
 court martial. In some cases, as in that at Dummul, I have 
 given orders for punishment without farther inquiry ; in other 
 cases, when it has been inconvenient or impossible to assemble a 
 general court martial, I have given orders to officers to assemble 
 as a court of inquiry to examine evidence upon the case, and 
 to report that evidence and their opinion as to the guilt of the 
 prisoner to me ; and I have given orders for his punishment.
 
 CIVIL RULE NOT TO BE SUPERSEDED BY THE SWORD. 12$ 
 
 I conceive that the orders of government giving me authority 
 to try by military process, and to punish, were founded upon the 
 necessity of the case, and that punishment, whether inflicted in 
 consequence of the sentence of a court martial, or in consequence 
 of evidence taken before a court of inquiry, or in consequence of 
 my own personal view and knowledge of the crime, was equally 
 legal and proper, and intended by the orders of the Right 
 Honourable the Governor in Council. 
 
 I am of opinion, however, that it would be desirable at all 
 times to try a prisoner by a court martial, if it should be possible 
 or not attended by a delay or inconvenience which would 
 frustrate the object proposed in the authority given to try and 
 punish by military process ; but I communicate to you my 
 opinion and practice upon this subject, in order that you may 
 not be embarrassed by a notion that it is necessary to assemble 
 a court martial in all cases. 
 
 Having thus stated to you what I think regarding the powers 
 intrusted to you, I come to consider the request made in the 
 ninth paragraph of your letter to the Right Honourable the Go- 
 vernor in Council, to ' allow the full operation of martial law ' 
 in Malabar and Canara under the sanction of his Lordship's 
 government. The object of the request is to have the power of 
 punishing rebels and rebellion, which you have already ; but the 
 consequence of granting it would be the suspension of all the 
 civil authorities and establishments in those provinces. Instead 
 of the tribunals and persons established for the consideration of 
 the common questions which arise, and for the transaction of the 
 common business of those provinces, all would be referable and 
 referred to the military commanding officer, as in a camp, and 
 would be decided upon military principles either by himself or 
 his officers. 
 
 I am convinced you did not intend this, and that his Lord- 
 ship will not consent to the establishment of martial law in a 
 greater degree than it is at present established. 
 
 I mention it merely as an inducement to urge you to lose no 
 time in using the powers which you have already to try rebels, 
 &c, by military process, in waiting for other powers which are 
 not necessary, and which I am convinced will never be granted.
 
 124 0UR SUCCESS REQUIRES, NOW, ALTERED TACTICS. 
 
 49. To Colonel Sartorius. 
 
 The Rajah of Bullum to be dashed at summarily. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1801. 
 
 I cannot think it necessary either to establish the posts or to 
 cut the road which you propose in order to enable you to 
 pursue the Rajah wherever he may go, as experience has proved 
 that our troops can go wherever he can. When the Rajah had 
 the upper hand, and when we found that we could not move 
 from one place to another without a vast loss in men, it was 
 necessary to open roads everywhere, and to establish posts upon 
 them ; but that system and our greater strength having given 
 us the upper hand, the Rajah being now a fugitive, attended 
 only by a few followers, the same precautions are no longer 
 necessary ; and as the operations which you propose would in- 
 evitably point out the line on which you would have thought of 
 acting, they would impede rather than accelerate the accom- 
 plishment of the only object which we ought to have in view. 
 This object is the apprehension of the Rajah's person, which can 
 be effected only by the number of our detachments and the 
 activity of their movements. But if more posts are to be 
 occupied, fewer troops can be employed in detachments ; and if 
 roads are to be made before the troops move, the pursuit will be 
 an endless one. 
 
 It may be necessary, however, upon other grounds to open 
 the road which you propose, and I can have no objection to it 
 if that work be preferred to the others above mentioned. I only 
 protest against it as a measure to enable the troops to perform 
 the operation which you have in view, in concert with Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Burrowes ; and, at all events, I hope that you 
 will not occupy any more posts. 
 
 50. To J. G-. Ravenshaw, Esq. 
 
 The Rajah of Bullum to be straitened on all sides. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 9th Oct., 1801. 
 
 Within these few days I have had a conversation with the 
 Rajah's Devvan respecting the Rajah of Bullum. It appears
 
 FOLLOW UP, AND STARVE OUT, THE RAJAH. 1 25 
 
 that this Rajah is blocked up entirely in his district of Bullum 
 by the troops employed by the Rajah of Mysore, and that he 
 depends entirely for all his supplies, excepting rice, which his 
 country produces in abundance, upon his communication with 
 Koorg and with the sea-coast of Canara. I have written to the 
 Rajah of Koorg to request that he will stop his communication 
 with Koorg, and I shall be obliged to you if you will take 
 measures to prevent his receiving any supplies, particularly of 
 salt, from Canara. His principal means of communicating with 
 Canara are by the Soobramany and, I believe, the Jemalabad 
 Ghauts. 
 
 51. To Major Maeleod. 
 
 True and false remedies for a debased coinage. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 19th October, 1801. 
 
 I have long considered one of the evils which you mention 
 in the province of Malabar, viz. the exchange of money. The 
 exorbitancy of this evil in that province is to be attributed not 
 only to the circumstances which have occasioned it in other parts 
 of India, and which are, I am afraid, irremediable till there is 
 a total change in the system of traffic in all parts of the country, 
 but to another circumstance which has come to my knowledge. 
 Some years ago Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay (who is 
 an excellent, well-meaning man, and with good abilities, but is 
 sometimes misled), purchased at Bombay at a low price, and 
 sent into Malabar, a large number of rupees, called in that part 
 of the country hookery rupees. These rupees, although of a 
 value probably greatly inferior to that of the money which was 
 given for them, were issued to the troops, and were circulated at 
 one greatly superior, and the government had some paltry gain 
 upon the transaction. 
 
 The merchants of Bombay, however, were unwilling that the 
 advantage of this traffic should be confined solely to the govern- 
 ment, and they began immediately to send down oceans of 
 rupees to Malabar; and next the Rajahs, who saw the advantages 
 of it, wished to participate in it, and they coined rupees worse 
 even than those which Mr. Duncan and the Bombay merchants 
 imported by sea. The result was that Malabar was inundated 
 by bad rupees ; and the inconvenience felt by the troops and 
 Company's servants in consequence of the depreciation of the
 
 126 PENNY WISDOM AND POUND FOOLISHNESS. 
 
 exchange became so great that it was necessary to apply a 
 remedy. 
 
 In this situation the only remedy to apply would have been 
 to meet the evil at once, whatever might be its extent, or the 
 expense attending the remedy; but this was a measure too strong 
 for those who were to conduct it. They ought to have stopped 
 entirely the circulation of hookery rupees after a certain period, 
 and ought to have called them into the Treasury, and have given 
 a certain value for them if brought before a certain day. They 
 ought then to have issued a good coin to the province. 
 
 The expense of this operation would have been exactly equal 
 to all that had been originally made by government in the first 
 purchase and issue of the rupees, to all that had been made by 
 the merchants, and by the different Rajahs. Instead of doing 
 this, however, they adopted a different mode, which was less 
 expensive at the time ; and the consequence is, that the expenses 
 of the reform of the coin will be far greater now than they would 
 have been if the coin had been reformed at the proper period. 
 The remedy adopted at that period was to call in the rupees at 
 the expense of about one lac of rupees ; but instead of issuing 
 in their place a good coin, the rupees, when melted down, were 
 somewhat refined, and were coined over again into fanams, which 
 are now in circulation. These fanams are still of considerably 
 less value than the sum of which they are the representatives ; 
 and the consequence is that there is a great importation of them 
 from Bombay, and a great coinage of them by the Rajahs. 
 
 The result then of the half remedy which was applied when 
 the inconvenience of the circulation of the base rupees was first 
 found out is, that when the whole remedy will be applied the 
 expense of it will have been increased by all the profit which will 
 have been made by the merchant importers and by the coining 
 Rajahs in the intermediate period. You will perceive that the 
 consequence of this reasoning is, that the longer the complete 
 measure is delayed, the greater will be the expense, and there- 
 fore that you cannot too soon give your attention to it. 
 
 Some of the speculators in Malabar, upon this subject, have 
 notions of different palliatives, none of which will answer at all, 
 excepting you should determine to begin your administration by 
 an act of flagrant injustice. One measure which they propose 
 is, to reduce by authority the current value of the fanams, and 
 to order that they should pass in Malabar only for that which 
 they would really bear any where else, or, in other words, that
 
 OUR FIRST STEP MUST BE TO DISARM THE PEOPLE. 127 
 
 the fanams should be received in revenue or other payments to 
 government only at their real value. This measure would imme- 
 diately stop the importation, and certainly the coinage ; but 
 these speculators forget that it would rob, for the advantage of 
 government, to whom the debasement of the coin ought entirely 
 to be attributed, all the holders of fanams of the exact sum 
 which would be the difference between that at which they are 
 now current and that at which they would be current hereafter 
 in consequence of this proposed measure. 
 
 You see that I have given you a fine dissertation on coin and 
 coinage. 
 
 52. To Major Walker. 
 
 Semi-military rule in Malabar, provisionally, a necessary evil. 
 For without it, we cannot disarm the people. When that is 
 effected, civil government should be re-established. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 23rd Oct., 1801. 
 
 These countries become daily more interesting; and I am glad 
 to find by your account of their present state, that they are likely 
 to become valuable appendages to the British territory in India. 
 Whatever may be the fate of the new system of government 
 lately established in them, there can be no doubt of the merits 
 of the former one, any more than of the zeal and ability of those 
 who conducted it. The great fault which, I understand, has been 
 found with that system is its expense : that certainly is a fault 
 which must be more felt at the present moment than at any 
 other, and has probably been the cause of a departure from it ; 
 but I acknowledge that I wish that it had been tried a little 
 longer, and that, before we abolished it entirely, we had waited to 
 see the effects upon the country which may be expected to be the 
 result of the probable arrest of the person of the Pyche Rajah. 
 
 As soon as the person of this rebel shall be taken, it is pro- 
 bable that the inhabitants will be more ready than they have 
 been hitherto to give up their arms ; and the day on which the 
 inhabitants give up their arms, and acquiesce in the orders and 
 regulations of government, which require that no man shall 
 appear armed, will be the date of the establishment of civil 
 government in the province. Till then every thing must be 
 chance or force. The question in my mind, upon a comparison 
 of the two systems for Malabar, that heretofore and that lately
 
 128 THAT DONE, CIVIL RULE SHOULD BE RESTORED. 
 
 established, is, which is most likely to complete the disarming of 
 the inhabitants, supposing the Pyche Rajah still to remain at large. 
 
 As to their comparative expense there can be no doubt, be- 
 cause no man will deny that the perpetual contests which have 
 existed in Malabar, and will for ever be the consequence of 
 governing an armed people, are much more expensive than the 
 largest civil establishments. 
 
 In order to complete this measure of disarming the inhabit- 
 ants, you will have observed the large share of power which has 
 been placed in the hands of the military commanding officer, 
 not only in districts disturbed by rebellion, but in all parts of 
 the province. This power has been given in conformity to the 
 opinions of all those who have written upon this subject, who 
 have almost unanimously declared that it would require an army 
 to disarm the inhabitants of Malabar. This power, then, being 
 necessary, the question is, could it exist with the old civil govern- 
 ment ? I put the difference of men out of the question, as, not- 
 withstanding my partiality for the present collector, I have a 
 very high opinion of those to whom he succeeded : but could a 
 military power, such as has lately been established, go on in 
 co-operation with a regular civil government, with all its branches 
 separately established and balanced, and must not the latter 
 have given way? The judicial powers and the powers of the 
 magistrates must have been suspended immediately, and the 
 whole business of the civil government must have been confined 
 to the collection of the revenue ; and that being the case, the 
 number of servants employed on that duty at present is perhaps 
 as large as it ought to be. 
 
 Supposing, then, that the Pyche Rajah is to remain at large, 
 and that to disarm the inhabitants requires the extensive military 
 powers which have been lately given, without which I look upon 
 all civil government in Malabar to be mere chance, there is no 
 doubt that the new system will be more suitable to the exercise 
 of those powers than the old could ever have been ; and it is to 
 be hoped and looked for, that eventually it will accelerate, more 
 than the old could have done, the great objects for which the 
 military powers have been granted. That being the case, 
 according to my principle it ought to be preferred. 
 
 I acknowledge, however, that I long for the return of the civil 
 government. Although a soldier myself, I am not an advocate 
 for placing extensive civil powers in the hands of soldiers merely 
 because they are of the military profession, and I have always
 
 THE BUL RAJAH'S COUNTRY DESCRIBED. 129 
 
 opposed the idea excepting in cases of necessity. The case of 
 Malabar is one of these, which I regret exceedingly; but I hope 
 that the necessity will not be of great duration. 
 
 53. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Description of the Bnllnm Rajatis country and position, and 
 proposed steps for reducing him*: 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 31st Oct., 1801. 
 
 The larger the force employed upon an occasion of this kind 
 the greater the prospect of success, and the smaller the pro- 
 bability of sustaining a severe loss in officers and men. 
 
 The district of the Bui Rajah extends about thirty-five or forty 
 miles along the Western Ghauts, between the Currut Kull or 
 Jemalabad Ghaut, the road to which is its northern boundary, 
 and the district of Koorg, which bounds it to the southward. 
 
 Its general breadth from west to east is about twenty-five 
 miles, and it is bounded to the eastward by the river Hemavutty, 
 which rises nearly in the Cundacull Ghaut, and falls into the 
 Cauvery after passing the boundary of the districts of the Rajahs 
 of Koorg and of Bui. 
 
 The country enclosed in the space above described is in gene- 
 ral mountainous ; the hills in some parts jungly, in others open ; 
 the valleys wet, and under cultivation ; and the sides of the hills 
 jungly. The country is populous, with many villages, which are 
 all enclosed by strong hedges and ditches. Tippoo built a small 
 fort at Munserabad, in order to keep this country in subjection, 
 to cover Mysore on that side from the Rajah of Koorg, and the 
 approach into it from Mangalore by the Soobramany or Bissolee 
 Ghaut. This fort is situated about ten or twelve miles north of 
 the Koorg boundary, and about four or five west of the river 
 Hemavutty. It has been in the possession of the troops of the 
 Rajah of Mysore since it was delivered over to them by a de- 
 tachment under the late Captain Campbell which went into that 
 country in the year 1799. 
 
 At the distance of about four miles south-east of this fort is 
 a high jungly tract called Arrekeery, lying on the right of the 
 road from Seringapatam to Munserabad, and between it and the 
 river Hemavutty. In this tract, which is about eighteen miles 
 in circumference, and in the neighbourhood of which the country 
 
 K
 
 130 PROPOSED OPERATIONS AGAINST ARREKEERY, 
 
 is in general open, there are many villages, valleys, and rising 
 grounds, such as I have already described to be all over the 
 country; and here it is where the Bui Rajah has established 
 and fortified himself in the Polygar style, and has hitherto re- 
 sisted all the efforts which have been made to dislodge him. 
 
 In the last year Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor carried several 
 barriers and the principal village in this tract, called Arrekeery, 
 which he destroyed. He drew off to an encamping ground 
 outside of the tract, however, in the evening, and the Bui Rajah 
 took again, and has ever since remained in the possession of, the 
 whole of it. The warfare which has since been carried on between 
 him and the troops of the Rajah of Mysore has been with a view 
 to throwing provisions into Munserabad on the part of Mysore, 
 and to impede that operation on his ; and it has been so far 
 successful on our side, as that the Bui Rajah has not been able 
 to prevent the provisioning of Munserabad, and he has been 
 entirely prevented from making any plundering excursions to 
 the eastward of the river Hemavutty. 
 
 In a country such as that which I have described there may 
 be other positions in which opposition may be expected, as well 
 as in that one to which I have already alluded, and there are 
 particularly some barriers towards the Bissolee Ghaut ; but I 
 imagine that the possession of Arrekeery will settle the business, 
 and to that our attention ought to be directed. 
 
 I should accordingly propose to attack it from this side, and 
 to move from hence with the troops intended for this expedition 
 towards the end of December, when troops may be expected 
 from the southward and the country will be tolerably dry. I 
 should propose to have two field-pieces for each battalion, which 
 are drawn with ease in all parts of the country by the sircar 
 bullocks. At the same time I should think it advisable to put 
 in the field, and to assemble at the Soobramany Pagoda at the 
 bottom of the Bissolee Ghaut, the five companies of the 75th 
 which are at Mangalore, and the 1st of the 3rd Bombay regi- 
 ment ; the detachments of which last at Jemalabad and Cunda- 
 poor might be relieved by detachments from the 1st of the 8th 
 Bombay regiment, and that at Bednore by a detachment from 
 the 2nd of the 4th at Hullihall in Soonda. These troops might 
 move up the Ghaut, or not, according to circumstances and the 
 mode in which the Bui Rajah should defend himself. I have 
 everything here which the troops can want excepting tents and 
 a few carts. These, with your orders, I can have made previous
 
 SUCCESSFUL. MALABAR EVER RIPE FOR REBELLION. 13] 
 
 to the time when it will be proper to put the troops into the 
 field. 
 
 54. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 Pacification of Bullnm. Danger of diminishing the force in 
 
 Malabar ; i?icreased rather than lessened by the Peace in 
 
 Europe. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Camp at Hutty Hilly, 23rd Jan., 1802. 
 
 Since I wrote to you last we have pressed the Bullum Rajah 
 so hard that he has been left entirely alone ; we have taken his 
 Dewan (a Brahmin), and his brother-in-law called Conetty Naig. 
 The Rajah is in some danger of being taken also, I hope. While 
 all this is going on, we are opening a road to the Ghauts through 
 the centre of the rebel country. The inhabitants are in their 
 villages, everything is quiet, and they are destroying their bamboo 
 hedges and ditches in consequence of their cowle. So much for 
 
 Bullum. 
 
 ****** ** 
 
 Troops are wanted everywhere, and that is one reason for de- 
 laying to dismiss or reduce any even of the worst kind ; but there 
 is another reason for not doing so in Malabar, which is applicable 
 peculiarly to the state of that country. We are now trying a new 
 system of government there, which we are resolved to force upon 
 the people whether they like it or not. We have also determined 
 to prevent the practice of carrying arms, which has been common 
 there hitherto, and to which we have been informed that the 
 people are particularly partial. The people of Malabar are not 
 to be coaxed into submission to government, or to give up their 
 arms : terror, however, will induce them to either or both. But 
 they are sufficiently sagacious to see that when we reduce a large 
 number of our troops, and make detachments into other parts 
 where their services may be required, they have no reason to fear ; 
 and when they don't fear the government, they will not submit 
 to it, and will not deliver in their arms. A contrary mode of 
 reasoning will lead to all the conclusions drawn by the Commis- 
 sioners, which ended in their dismissal from office, and the over- 
 throw of their system of government. In my opinion Malabar can 
 never be reckoned upon excepting as a country ripe for insurrec- 
 tion, a state in which it has probably ever been till you entered 
 it ; and whenever I hear that the force stationed in it is to be 
 
 K 2
 
 133 PEACE IN EUROPE BODES NO GOOD IN MALABAR. 
 
 diminished, I consider that insomuch is the chance of the per- 
 manence of its tranquillity diminished likewise. 
 
 ******** 
 I have this instant heard of the peace at home. As far as we 
 can judge of its terms they are favourable to us ; but we are to 
 admit the French and the Dutch to their settlements in India, 
 particularly to those on the Malabar coast. Our situation in 
 Malabar, therefore, becomes still more critical than it was, and 
 all our measures in that country must be still more decided, 
 though cautious, than they have been even lately. 
 
 55. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Amount and distribution of force required in Mysore, Soonda, 
 
 and Wynaad. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Camp at Hutty Hilly, 24th Jan., 1802. 
 
 As it is probable that the presence of the Company's troops 
 will not be required in this district for a much greater length of 
 time, and that you will then be desirous that they should be dis- 
 tributed in quarters, I proceed, in obedience to your former orders, 
 to state my opinion, first, regarding the force which ought to be 
 in Mysore, including Soonda and Wynaad ; secondly, regarding 
 the places at which the troops ought to be stationed. 
 
 There ought to be in Mysore one regiment of dragoons, one of 
 Native cavalry, three companies of artillery, two regiments of 
 European infantry, if possible, and eight battalions of Native 
 infantry. 
 
 The stations which it is necessary to occupy are, Hullihall, in 
 the province of Soonda, with one battalion ; Nuggur with one 
 battalion ; Chittledroog with one battalion ; Nundydroog and its 
 dependencies and Paughur with one battalion ; Wynaad one 
 battalion ; Seringapatam one regiment of Europeans and three 
 battalions. 
 
 The dragoons ought to be cantoned at Sera, the Native cavalry 
 at Santa Bednore, and the other regiment of European infantry 
 might be at Bangalore. The largest body of them ought to be 
 collected at Seringapatam for the sake of practice, and there 
 ought to be detachments from this body, one at Chittledroog, and 
 another for a brigade of guns at Hullihall in Soonda. These
 
 TROOPS NEEDED IN MYSORE, SOONDA, AND WYNAAD. 1 33 
 
 ought to be relieved frequently. The surplus two battalions of 
 the infantry ought likewise to be at Seringapatam. 
 
 The principles upon which I have made this calculation and 
 distribution are as follows : 
 
 There are certain points in Mysore and places upon the fron- 
 tier which it is absolutely necessary to occupy with troops. These 
 are, 1st, Hullihall in Soonda, where there must always be a 
 battalion on account of its vicinity to the Mahratta frontier, its 
 distance from, and its local situation relative to other posts. 
 
 2nd, Nuggur : to which place some of the reasons apply which 
 apply to Hullihall, and this additional one, viz. that it is a place 
 of great riches, which would certainly be plundered by some of 
 the marauders upon the frontier if it were not held by the Com- 
 pany's troops. A smaller garrison, however, than a battalion has 
 held it, particularly when troops have been in the field on the 
 northern frontier ; and, if this distribution should be adopted, 
 I propose that for this year the battalion of Nuggur should 
 furnish a detachment for the Bullum country. 
 
 3rd, Chittledroog : this place is important both in regard to its 
 local situation and its great strength. A much larger garrison 
 than one battalion would be required for it ; but it has been found 
 so unfavourable to the health of Natives as well as Europeans, 
 its means of supply are so barren, and its inhabitants so unwilling 
 to afford the assistance which would be required in case of the 
 necessity of moving troops from thence, that I have preferred to 
 place the disposable force in another situation. 
 
 4th, Nundydroog : this fort is in the centre of a Polygar country. 
 One battalion stationed here keeps the Polygars in order from 
 the frontiers of the Carnatic to Sera. 
 
 5th, Wynaad : a battalion in this district will be for some time 
 absolutely necessary. It lies on the back of the most disaffected 
 districts in Malabar; and our troops stationed there not only give 
 us an opportunity of curbing the disaffected in that province, but 
 if we don't occupy it in strength they will fly into it. An equip- 
 ment and a body of troops must then be fitted out to drive them 
 from thence. 
 
 6th, Seringapatam : till Seringapatam is repaired and its works 
 reformed it is necessary that the guards should be very numerous, 
 and consequently the place requires a large garrison. Besides, 
 this garrison furnishes a detachment for the Rajah at Mysore, a 
 guard at Cancancotta, a company for the Resident, guards for 
 the public elephants and cattle, and constant detachments with
 
 134 PURSUIT OF THE RAJAH OF BULLUM ; 
 
 treasure and stores to all parts. It is, however, very evident that 
 about 400 European infantry, one company of artillery, and one 
 complete battalion, will do the duty of Seringapatam ; and those 
 troops would be sufficient for its security if a body of troops were 
 in the field in the Mysore country or in any of the neighbouring 
 provinces. 
 
 In all these newly-conquered territories, where there are neces- 
 sarily a number of weak garrisons, particularly in Mysore, which 
 country is bordered by the Mahrattas, is full of Polygars, and is 
 surrounded by provinces in which there are numbers of the same 
 description, it is impossible to be certain of tranquillity unless 
 there is a force which is disposable, and can be put into the field 
 at a short notice without inconvenience or danger to the garrisons 
 which are to be occupied permanently. 
 
 The disposable force in Mysore would be : 
 
 One regiment of dragoons ; one of Native cavalry ; two com- 
 panies of artillery ; one of European infantry, if a second regi- 
 ment of European infantry can be spared ; two battalions of 
 Native infantry ; and the detachments of Native infantry which 
 might be drawn from other posts without endangering them, as 
 there would be in that case a body of troops in the field. 
 
 The whole of the artillery ought to be decidedly at Seringa- 
 patam, where the arsenal and stores are ; and the two battalions 
 of Native infantry ought to be there likewise. When their services 
 will not be wanted in the field they will give such strength to the 
 garrison as to make its duty easy, and the discipline of the troops 
 can be carried on. On the other hand, if they are to take the 
 field, they will be at the spot from whence they and all the troops 
 must be equipped with everything. 
 
 56. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Settlement of Bullum. Strength of the country. Difficulty 
 of seizing the Rajah. 
 
 Camp, 2nd Feb., 1802. 
 
 Since I wrote to you last the pursuit of the Bullum Rajah has 
 been continued till he has been driven quite into the Ghauts, with 
 about half a dozen followers. The Rajah's troops are in posses- 
 sion of all the villages in the neighbourhood of the jungles in 
 which the Bullum Rajah is supposed to be, so that unless he is
 
 • GRADUAL PACIFICATION OF HIS COUNTRY. 1 35 
 
 favoured and assisted by the Canara aumildars he must starve. 
 We have caught many of his principal people and relations, some 
 of whom must, I imagine, be executed ; and Purneah has col- 
 lected in this camp the patels of the different villages to the 
 number, he says, of 250. 
 
 The Sampighee Ghaut is opened, and the Company's pioneers 
 and a Native corps and some of the Rajah's bildarsare employed 
 upon the Bissolee or Soobramany Ghaut. I am now in the neigh- 
 bourhood of two other Ghauts, the Hubby Nala and the Seisul 
 Ghaut, which I propose also to open. 
 
 The country is settling fast ; the inhabitants are in their vil- 
 lages, and have made some progress in dismantling them. They 
 have likewise delivered in some of their arms and ammunition. 
 Purneah has assembled the gours here in order to complete the 
 settlement, that they may witness the execution of some of the 
 Bullum Rajah's adherents who have been caught, and that he may 
 secure the persons of some who, it might be expected, would re- 
 new the rebellion if the force in the country should be weakened. 
 He talks with confidence of getting from them the revenue of the 
 two last years. 
 
 Although we still continue the pursuit of the Rajah, I am not 
 very sanguine in my expectations of success. The whole of the 
 western face of the Ghauts, from Soopah to Palghautcherry, is 
 covered with a thick short jungle, which appears impenetrable, and 
 we have no intelligence to what quarter he is gone. All the vil- 
 lages in the country, particularly those in the neighbourhood of 
 the Ghauts, are held by the Rajah's troops, who are at the same 
 time kept in motion both in the upper country and in Canara ; 
 but it is very evident to me that if he can get food he will remain 
 in those jungles to all eternity, notwithstanding our efforts to 
 catch him, or drive him out, unless some of his few people should 
 quit him and give us intelligence of the exact spot in which we 
 may find him. 
 
 These efforts, however, shall be continued, and everything shall 
 be done which I can devise to bring the business to that best of 
 all conclusions. In the mean time, I have strongly urged Purneah 
 to insist upon the performance of all the terms of the cowle as 
 a certain mode of keeping the country quiet, whether the Rajah 
 is caught or not. I don't think that I ever saw a country natur- 
 ally so strong as this is, and to the strength of which so many 
 additions have been made by the natives themselves. Every vil- 
 lage is a strong fortification, of which it would require good troops
 
 136 MALABAR SHOULD BE A SEPARATE COMMAND. 
 
 to get possession ; and in some cases ten or a dozen of these 
 villages are connected by natural or made defences of great 
 strength. Within these defences the inhabitants have all that 
 they want ; and here they would hold out for ever against the 
 troops which the aumildars might bring to force them to pay 
 the revenue. The only mode, therefore, of settling the country 
 permanently, even supposing the Rajah should be caught, is to 
 destroy its strength and to force the inhabitants to give up their 
 arms. 
 
 I shall be glad to hear the result of Malcolm's mission. I think 
 Lord Clive will stay. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 57. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 The Province of Malabar ought to be an entij'ely separate 
 
 command. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp, 9th Feb., 1802. 
 
 I should recommend that the province of Malabar may be an 
 entirely separate command ; it is fully enough to occupy the 
 attention of any one man, and will be more interesting when 
 the French and Dutch return to their settlements. No addi- 
 tional expense would be incurred by this arrangement, as the 
 troops in Canara might report directly to the commanding 
 officer in Mysore. Indeed, the communication between Seringa- 
 patam and all parts of Canara is so much shorter than between 
 Cannanore and the same places, that this arrangement would be 
 a more convenient one in every respect. 
 
 58. To Purneah. 
 Systematic plan for maintaining order in Bicllum. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 10th Feb., 1802. 
 
 In my opinion it will be proper that for some time some of 
 the Rajah's troops should remain in every village, at least until 
 the inhabitants shall have cut the hedges and levelled the 
 ditches which surround them. Afterwards they may by degrees 
 be withdrawn from the smaller villages ; but there ought to
 
 HOW PURNEAH SHOULD KEEP BULLUM QUIET. 1 37 
 
 be detachments in those whose names are in the margin during 
 the rains. Besides this, there ought to be a post on Beema- 
 nara Hill, and one at the top of the Bissolee, the Sampighee, 
 and the Seisul Ghauts. 
 
 In order to support and give strength and confidence to these 
 small, dispersed parties, there ought to be a party of 500 of 
 your best infantry collected in one body under an active sirdar. 
 He should keep in motion from place to place, in communica- 
 tion with, but at a distance from, Captain M'Farlane's party ; 
 and as soon as he should hear of any disturbance anywhere, he 
 ought to fly to that place. 
 
 The remainder of the troops might withdraw. 
 
 In sundry conversations and by letter I have pointed out to 
 you frequently the mode which in my opinion ought to be 
 adopted to bring this country to a regular state of subjection 
 to your government. The fortifications of the villages must be 
 destroyed, or an army will be required to collect the revenue, 
 and you must make the people give up their arms. Orders are 
 given to the Company's officers and pioneers to destroy the 
 fortifications of the villages effectually. The next business will 
 be to prevent the people from constructing them again. 
 
 For this you have nothing to depend upon but the vigilance 
 and the activity of the person whom you leave here as aumildar. 
 He ought to be particularly instructed upon this subject. In 
 those villages in which your troops will be stationed he cannot 
 fail to obtain a knowledge of it, in case any designs should be 
 entertained which may be injurious to your authority ; but he 
 should endeavour to establish a channel of intelligence from 
 every part of the country. As soon as he hears of any design 
 of that kind he should proceed immediately to the place himself 
 with the utmost celerity, and punish the guilty with the rigour 
 which they will deserve. On these occasions everything will 
 depend upon his activity, and he cannot be too quick. 
 
 When the rains will be over, it may be expected that some 
 of the trees which we shall have cut down will have grown 
 again. The aumildar, or some person immediately under him, 
 ought to force the inhabitants to cut them again, and he ought 
 not to withdraw his troops from the village till the roads to it 
 are laid open, and in the state in which we shall now leave 
 them. I need not point out to you the necessity that there is 
 that the person to whom you will give charge of this district 
 should be one of sound discretion, in whom you can place the
 
 138 BRITISH COOPERATION TO THE SAME END. 
 
 utmost confidence. It is absolutely necessary that he should 
 possess your confidence and have your full support in all he 
 does, and that he should understand clearly that he is certain of 
 remaining in his situation as long as he conducts himself well. 
 
 In case, notwithstanding all our exertions and precautions, 
 there should be disturbance in this country again, and the com- 
 munication should be cut off between the Mysore country and 
 the posts upon the Bissolee, the Sampighee, and the Seisul 
 Ghauts, I write to the Company's officers in Canara to desire 
 that they will take care to keep them supplied with provisions 
 and everything they can want. Those posts, therefore, must be 
 kept at all events. 
 
 59. Memorandum. — Instructions for Captain M'Farlane. 
 
 The same subject. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 10th Feb., 1802. 
 
 It has been proposed to dismantle the fortifications, and to cut 
 the jungle and level the ditches which surround the villages in 
 this country ; and the inhabitants have been ordered to carry into 
 execution these works. In some cases they have made some 
 progress, in others but very little : it is therefore desirable that 
 Captain M'Farlane should proceed with the bildars and pioneers 
 to the places mentioned in the enclosed paper, and lay them 
 open in such a manner as that the villages will be accessible to 
 any, the worst species of troops that the aumildars can employ, 
 and that it will not be possible for the inhabitants to fortify them 
 again without the knowledge of the aumildars, and without 
 giving them time to put a stop to their work before they can 
 have made any considerable progress in it. 
 
 It will probably be impossible to lay open any village entirely, 
 but it will be possible to level the ditches which surround them 
 and to cut through the jungle one or two broad ways into each, 
 from which the roots of the trees ought to be taken. 
 
 If there should be any such disturbance or opposition, or if 
 Captain M'Farlane should receive notice from the aumildar or 
 principal person employed in the district on the part of the 
 Sircar (who will receive directions to communicate with him con- 
 stantly) that there is an appearance of disturbance in any part,
 
 A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH NATIVES ESSENTIAL. 1 39 
 
 he will move thither directly, and will take the most prompt 
 and efficacious measures to put an end to such disturbance, and 
 to punish those who may have ventured to oppose the authority 
 of government. Five companies of the 5th regiment and seven 
 companies of the 10th regiment will be encamped at Bailoor. 
 In case of such disturbance as is above supposed, Captain M -Far- 
 lane will give immediate notice thereof to the commanding 
 officer of these troops, who has orders to move in the most 
 expeditious manner into the Bullum district to such place as 
 Captain M'Farlane may point out. 
 
 The posts ordered to be constructed at the head of the Bissolee, 
 the Sampighee, and the Seisul Ghauts, are to be given over to 
 the Rajah's troops as soon as they are completed. 
 
 The great object in leaving Captain M'Farlane in this district 
 is that he may see the plan above mentioned carried into execu- 
 tion, and that the inhabitants may not lose the impression which 
 they have received of the activity and vigour of the operations of 
 a body of British troops. The first object is, as he will perceive, 
 to lay open the country so that the aumildar's peons and troops 
 may at all times go to all parts of it ; the next is, that in case of 
 opposition, or the slightest appearance of disturbance, he should 
 collect with the greatest celerity, and appear in force at the spot 
 where such opposition may have existed or disturbance may 
 have been threatened, and that he should then act with the 
 utmost vigour and despatch. 
 
 It is unnecessary to recommend to Captain M'Farlane a 
 constant communication with and a conciliating conduct towards 
 the natives and the servants of the Rajah's government. All his 
 intelligence of the country will depend in a great measure upon 
 it, and he will succeed in nothing excepting he adopts such a 
 line of conduct. 
 
 60. To the Deputy Adjutant- General. 
 
 Reduction of the Bullum country. Capture and execution of 
 
 the Rajah. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802. 
 
 In pursuance of. the intention of which I apprised you in my 
 letter of the 17th January, I opened a road from the forest of 
 Arrekeery towards the Ghauts, which was carried in the first
 
 140 PURSUIT, CAPTURE, AND EXECUTION OF THE RAJAH. 
 
 instance to the head of the Sampighee Ghaut, which is some 
 distance from that which leads into Canara by the Soobramany 
 Pagoda. I preferred this line, as I understood that the Bullum 
 Rajah had at Cagenkeerah, on the top of this Ghaut, a stronghold, 
 which it was necessary to destroy. After the road into Canara 
 was completed by this Ghaut, I commenced upon that by 
 Bissolee and the Soobramany Pagoda, to finish which I left 
 the great body of the pioneers and the ist battalion ist regi- 
 ment, and I marched with the remainder of the detachment to 
 the northward of Munserabad, where I laid open another road 
 through the Bullum country, and into Canara, by the Seisul 
 Ghaut. 
 
 In the mean time the Bullum Rajah had been pushed so hard 
 that he had been abandoned by nearly all his followers. Many 
 of his relations and principal people had fallen into our hands, 
 and he had taken refuge in the extensive jungles which cover the 
 western face of the Ghauts. To pursue him in these jungles 
 would have been useless unless we had had accurate intelligence 
 of the spot in which he had concealed himself; and I therefore 
 thought it best to disperse the troops of the Rajah of Mysore in 
 all the villages on the borders of, as well as in, the jungles, in 
 which provisions could be got, in hopes that we should in this 
 manner either find out where he was concealed, or force him to 
 fly to another part of the country, in which we might have a 
 better chance of procuring intelligence of his motions. On the 
 9th instant the Bullum Rajah sent for provisions to a village 
 which was occupied by some horsemen in the service of the Rajah 
 of Mysore, who in consequence received intelligence of the spot 
 where he was concealed, and went into the jungles dismounted, 
 and took him and the people who were with him. He was exe- 
 cuted on the 10th with six others, some of whom were with him 
 at the time he was taken, and others had afforded him assistance 
 since they had been pardoned by the Dewan. 
 
 While these operations were going on, other measures were 
 adopted to prevent the possibility of the renewal of the rebellion 
 even if those taken to secure the person of the Bullum Rajah had 
 failed. All the villages in the Bullum country are surrounded by 
 a strong jungle and ditches. In some instances several of these 
 villages are connected within what may be called one line of de- 
 fence, the inhabitants having inside all that they want, and by 
 means of which they had secured a communication with the 
 Western Ghauts and the sea. The country, naturally strong, was
 
 MEASURES TO PREVENT RENEWED INSURRECTION. 14I 
 
 so much strengthened by these defences that none but the best 
 troops could penetrate it ; and consequently, whatever might be 
 the fate of the Bullum Rajah, it was to be expected that as soon 
 as the season should oblige the Company's troops to withdraw, 
 the rebellion would be renewed. I therefore prevailed upon the 
 Dewan to take advantage of the impression which had been made 
 by the success at Arrekeery, and to offer cowle to the inhabitants 
 upon the terms of their destroying the fortifications which sur- 
 round their villages, delivering up their arms and ammunition, 
 and paying the arrears of the revenue. These terms have been 
 accepted, and a commencement has been made to carry them 
 into execution in all parts of the country. Besides this, the 
 principal people of the country, to the number of 300, were 
 assembled in my camp with their families, and the Dewan had 
 determined to detain as hostages those who had been principally 
 concerned in the late rebellion, and to suffer none to depart till 
 they shall have delivered in all their arms, and should have paid 
 the arrears of the revenue. 
 
 61. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The same subject. Activity of Ptirneah and his troops. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802. 
 
 It will have given you pleasure to hear from Piele of our 
 complete success in the Bullum country. We took the Rajah on 
 the 9th, and hanged him and six others on the 10th, and matters 
 are brought to such a settlement that I have broke up the detach- 
 ment, and am on my return to Seringapatam. 
 
 I have opened three roads into Canara, one by Bissolee and 
 the Soobramany Pagoda, another by the Sampighee Ghaut, a 
 third to the northward by the Seisul Ghaut. I have built a 
 redoubt on the top of each of these for the Rajah's troops, and 
 one on the heights of Arrekeery. The fortifications round all 
 the villages in the country are destroyed, and the Company's 
 pioneers remain to complete this work, with a small light de- 
 tachment under Captain M'Farlane, to keep alive the terror 
 which we have inspired, and to give confidence to the Rajah's 
 servants. 
 
 Purneah's troops have been indefatigable. They ran the Bul- 
 lum Rajah into the jungles on the western side of the Ghauts,
 
 142 ABILITY OF PURNEAH : ACTIVITY OF HIS TROOPS. 
 
 into which it would have been useless to follow him if we could 
 not have got intelligence of the place in which he was concealed. 
 I therefore placed them in small parties in every village in the 
 country in which it was possible for the Rajah to procure provi- 
 sions. I sent some of them into Canara, and I kept Mr. 
 Ravenshaw's peons and aumildars upon the look-out. My inten- 
 tion was to force the Rajah out of the jungles to a part of the 
 country in which I might have a better chance of intelligence of 
 his motions, or if he remained in them, to find out where he was 
 concealed. 
 
 On the 9th he sent into one of the villages for provisions. 
 The families of the principal inhabitants had been seized, and 
 they promised to show where he was concealed if their families 
 were given back to them. The horsemen went into the jungle 
 dismounted, and caught the Rajah and all his people. 
 
 Purneah contrived to collect in my camp 300 of the patels. 
 You must recollect enough of the politics of Bullum to know that 
 they are the leaders of all the mischief. They witnessed the 
 suspension of the Rajah and their brethren. 
 
 Purneah proposes to detain some of them, and the families of 
 others entirely ; to suffer none to depart till they shall have de- 
 livered in all the arms, ammunition, and property of which we 
 got an account from the Rajah before he was hanged, and shall 
 have paid the revenue of two years and a half, which he has de- 
 manded from them. Purneah's abilities have astonished me ; he 
 is so different from another man of the same kind whom I before 
 dealt with, I mean Ball Kishen Bhow. He has done everything 
 that I could wish him to do. 
 
 62. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 Why General Stuart leans to the police. Their operations ought 
 to be submitted to the commanding officer. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th March, 1802. 
 
 I think I understand the cause of General Stuart's opinion 
 regarding the police. He knows well the jealousy at home and 
 among some in this country of military power and military ex- 
 penses, and he knows also that the former is necessary for a 
 government which exists only by the sword, and that the greater 
 part of the latter is occasioned by that necessity and by the 
 constant support given to the civil by the military power. Lat-
 
 UTILITY AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE IN MALABAR. 143 
 
 terly the complaints of the growth of the military expenses have 
 been more frequent than usual ; and inasmuch as they have been 
 likely to occasion a very great diminution of the numbers and 
 strength of the army, it is probable that they will do much mis- 
 chief. General Stuart, therefore, is glad to avail himself of any- 
 thing which does not create a military expense (that is, an expense 
 paid by the military paymaster), which will perform some of the 
 service required from the military, and will give some support to 
 the civil government. The police in Malabar is of this descrip- 
 tion, and that is the reason why the General wishes that it should 
 be maintained. What you say, however, regarding the operations 
 of this police is very true. These ought to be submitted to the 
 commanding officer, particularly if they are of any consequence, 
 before they are attempted, otherwise he may be unexpectedly 
 involved in hostilities of the most extensive and serious nature. 
 I will give a hint to Macleod upon the subject, which I am con- 
 vinced will be sufficient. 
 
 Your ideas and mine regarding the powers of the military in 
 the common affairs of police agree entirely. 
 
 63. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles. 
 
 Renewed rising in Wynaad. Prompt and thorough measures to 
 be taken. Censure of a ' supine' officer. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 18th Oct., 1802. 
 
 As far as the information which you have transmitted to me 
 goes, it does not appear that there has been any act of insurrec- 
 tion anywhere excepting at Pancoorta Cottah. 
 
 If the insurrection should be only partial, and confined to the 
 surprise of the post at Pancoorta Cottah, it appears that you have 
 adopted the measures most likely to check it. In addition to 
 these measures, however, I should wish you to send into Wynaad 
 
 a company of Europeans, and to order Major forthwith 
 
 to encamp his battalion, and to prepare to fall upon the insurgents 
 wherever he may hear that they are collecting. 
 
 I beg you also to call upon him for an account of his conduct 
 in having omitted this obvious measure the moment he heard 
 that the post at Pancoorta Cottah was attacked. 
 
 An officer within nine miles of him suffers himself to be
 
 144 H0W T0 ADD F UEL TO THE FLAME OF REBELLION. 
 
 surprised, and with his whole detachment is cut off; and Major 
 
 , instead of putting the battalion under his command into 
 
 camp, and moving quickly upon the rebels, sits quietly in 
 his cantonment and takes no one step to oppose or stop the 
 insurrection, or for the security of the troops or district under 
 his command. I declare that after such supine conduct, to say 
 no worse of it, I should not be astonished if I were to hear that 
 
 Major and the remainder of the battalion had been cut 
 
 off likewise. 
 
 This is not the mode in which the former rebellion in Wynaad 
 and Cotiote was suppressed ; it is not that in which this insurrec- 
 tion is to be stopped ; but it is the certain mode of continuing it 
 as long as a British soldier remains in that part of India. 
 
 Tell Major that the troops lately sent to his assistance 
 
 are not to be kept in a fort or cantonment ; they are to be in 
 the field in one or more bodies, according to his information of 
 the strength of the enemy ; and let him know that whatever may 
 be the enemy's strength at present, I expect that when he will 
 be joined by these reinforcements he will move out. and attack 
 him, and that by his future activity he will remove from my 
 mind the impression which has been made upon it of the certain 
 evil which the public interests will sustain from his late supine- 
 ness. The unarmed Nairs must not be suffered to pass our posts 
 in Cotiote towards the Ghauts. At all events, whether this 
 insurrection is only partial or likely to become general, it must 
 be a warning to every officer in Malabar of the danger which 
 must always attend the want of precaution in military men ; and 
 I shall take an early opportunity of drawing their attention to it 
 in this point of view. 
 
 In the mean time I request that you will take into your im- 
 mediate consideration the state of the posts mentioned in the 
 margin; that you will fix in your own mind the number of 
 troops that are absolutely necessary for their defence in case of 
 a general insurrection, and that you will see that each has in it 
 six months' provisions for that number. I beg you to bear in 
 mind that the great difficulty under which we laboured at the 
 commencement of the last rebellion was to be attributed to our 
 having shut up in Montana, by mistake or accident, a larger 
 number of troops than we had provisions there to feed, or than 
 were necessary for the defence of the post. In case, therefore, 
 of this supposed general insurrection, I beg you to have no 
 more troops in each of these small posts than are absolutely
 
 PRESENT APATHY CONTRASTED WITH FORMER VIGOUR. 145 
 
 necessary, and to keep every man you can for active and offen- 
 sive operations. 
 
 64. To Lieutenant- Colonel Boles. 
 
 The wrong and the rigJit way of dealing with the insurrection in 
 Wynaad. Neglect of the master s lessons. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 20th Oct., 1802. 
 
 I have received your communications upon the subject of 
 Wynaad and Cotiote, sent to me and Captain Barclay, and I 
 approve of all the measures you have taken to be prepared with 
 your force. I wish I could say as much of the conduct of the 
 officers under you ; but that is impossible. I declare that I 
 cannot bring myself to send their reports to be laid before the 
 Commander-in-Chief; they are so different from those which I 
 have always been accustomed to send, and they show so little 
 animation or activity in the officers in a cause in which success 
 depends almost upon those qualities alone. 
 
 In the report you have lately sent me from Captain , he 
 
 informs you that the communication between Cotaparamba and 
 Montana is cut off; he does not tell you how he comes by that 
 intelligence, in what manner, or by whom this communication is 
 cut off ; and above all I observe that he omits to tell you that 
 he proposes to move out to ascertain these points, or to en- 
 deavour to re-establish this communication. The other reports 
 are nearly in the same style ; every thing that is bad is taken 
 for granted, and every body appears determined to remain in his 
 post on the defensive. 
 
 Consider, my dear Sir, how different the situation of our 
 affairs is now from what it was in the years 1800 and 1801. 
 Then the insurgents were in force, and had long been prepared 
 for us ; they had all the strong posts and holds, and every 
 thing above the Ghauts ; they were all well armed and were ac- 
 customed to success, and we were obliged to confine our feeble 
 efforts to completing the roads to our posts, and to keeping them 
 supplied with provisions, and we had no knowledge of the 
 country. They were beaten, however, upon that occasion, and 
 their chief became a wanderer ; and the efforts which he has since 
 made to re-establish his cause in a manner similar to his late 
 attack upon Pancoorta Cottah have uniformly been defeated by 
 
 L
 
 145 WHY SHOULD WE REMAIN ON THE DEFENSIVE ? 
 
 the activity of the officers and troops. The consequence was, 
 that till a week ago we were in quiet possession of Cotiote and 
 Wynaad ; we had posts established in both those districts, well 
 supplied with provisions, and every thing they wanted ; we had 
 good communications between these posts and the sea, between 
 each other, and through the hills into the upper country ; we 
 had a knowledge of the country : on the other hand the rebels 
 have no strong hold, they are not armed (I understand that 
 those who attacked Pancoorta Cottah had only bows and 
 arrows), they cannot be organised, and they have experienced 
 more than one defeat. Under these circumstances for what 
 reason are we to remain even for a moment upon the de- 
 fensive ? 
 
 During the former rebellion I saw many accounts of the Pyche 
 Rajah's strength, and I declare that not one of them ever made 
 it amount to 2000 men. It is said that he is now collected in 
 great force in Wynaad. I should like to know who has seen 
 that force, and who knows that it consists of a larger number 
 than the few assassins who surprised Captain Dickenson ? Has 
 he got his old 2000 men or not ? If he has, how does he feed 
 them, how are they armed, and have they any ammunition ? 
 
 But if he has this large force in Wynaad, he cannot have it 
 also in Cotiote, and it would be surely worth while for somebody 
 to try the strength of the party below. 
 
 I beg that you will urge the officers to active measures. Let 
 them put their troops in camp forthwith, excepting the number 
 of men that may be absolutely necessary for the defence of the 
 small posts against surprise. If the rebels are really in force, let 
 a junction be formed, and then not a moment lost in dashing 
 at them, whatever may be their force. If the rebels are not in 
 strength, let the troops be kept in constant motion in different 
 directions, and let the alarm be kept up, and they will never be 
 in strength. At all events let them make long and frequent 
 marches, and let them move, not in the column style, but with 
 the flanks covered, particularly where danger is apprehended ; 
 and when an attack is to be made in paddy grounds or other 
 places where the enemy may be posted, let a party get round 
 upon their flank. 
 
 If something is not soon done, the rebellion will become regu- 
 larly organised, and will get ahead, and then the system of 
 warfare must be changed, and will become more tedious.
 
 THE SOLDIER DESIDERATES THE REIGN OF LAW. 147 
 
 65. To Major Macleod. 
 
 Presence of the civil magistrate necessary to the tranquillizing 
 
 of Wynaad. 
 
 Seringapatam, 24th Oct., 1802, 9 a.m. 
 
 I have just received your letter of the 22nd. The experience 
 which I have had of insurrections, similar to that now in Wynaad, 
 makes it clear to me that the presence of yourself, or of some 
 person possessing the supreme civil authority in that district, is 
 essentially necessary to settle it. The first operations must 
 depend upon the troops. Either the rebels must be beaten, or 
 they must be dispersed ; and at the moment at which either of 
 those events takes place the presence of the civil magistrate is 
 necessary in order to reap the good consequences of the success 
 of the troops. If the civil magistrate be present, he will imme- 
 diately re-establish the civil organisation of the district, will 
 recall the tahsildars and aumildars of districts and villages to 
 perform their functions, the inhabitants will return to their 
 homes, the whole will regain confidence, and the troops will 
 enjoy the benefits of the resources of the country ; but if the 
 civil magistrate be absent, whatever may be the success of the 
 troops, the country will not settle, there will be no communica- 
 tion between the inhabitants and the commanding officer, 
 the villages will remain deserted, and the troops, instead of 
 enjoying the benefits of the resources of the country, and being 
 thereby enabled to continue their active operations against, 
 and pursuit of, the rebels, must forthwith turn their atten- 
 tion to procuring subsistence, which must be drawn from a 
 distance. 
 
 The consequence therefore of the absence of yourself, or of 
 some person possessing the supreme civil authority in Wynaad 
 at present, may be that, even if the troops should be successful, 
 of which from the latest accounts I have not the smallest doubt, 
 the rebellion may still exist, the contest will be lengthened, and 
 will be concluded at last only by the arrival in the district of 
 a person having civil authority, whom I now urge you to send 
 there. 
 
 In opposition to this request you state the inconvenience which 
 will be the result of your communication with the other districts 
 being cut off. Upon this subject I have to observe, firstly, that 
 it is not likely that it will be even precarious, as soon as the 
 
 L 2
 
 148 MARCH QUICKLF, AND COVER FOUR FLANKS. 
 
 troops commence their operations in Wynaad, particularly if the 
 country be settled as they get on ; secondly, that even if it should 
 be so, the inconvenience, loss, and expense to the public will not 
 be so great as they will be by the lengthened contest in conse- 
 quence of your absence. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I most earnestly urge you to re- 
 consider this subject, and, if you should not think it proper to 
 enter Wynaad with the troops yourself, at least to send there 
 Mr. Wilson and Mr. Warden, with full authority and instructions 
 from you to settle the country. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 66. To Captain G. Gurnell. 
 
 Rapid and cautions advance of troops into Wynaad insisted upon. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 24th Oct., 1802. 
 
 Recollect, however, that not only your success, but even your 
 safety, depends upon the rapidity and length of your movements, 
 and I strongly recommend you not to remain more than one day 
 in any place. 
 
 On your marches you must always cover your flanks by parties ; 
 and in your attacks of the enemy, which will probably always be 
 in a jungle, you must push parties through the jungle upon the 
 flanks of the enemy, at the same time that you make your great 
 attack ; and in passing paddy-valleys, in particular, great atten- 
 tion must be paid to occupying the sides of the valley with your 
 parties before the main body enters it. 
 
 67. To Major Macleod. 
 
 Feebleness and unpopularity of the movement at present. Danger 
 of neglecting it. Civil authority indispensable to prevent its 
 spreading. 
 
 Seringapatam, 3rd Nov., 1802. 
 
 I imagine that you will by this time have arrived at Calicut, 
 and I therefore write to inform you of the state of affairs in 
 Wynaad. 
 
 Captain Gurnell was opposed in crossing the nullah at San- 
 galoo, on the borders, by some Nairs in a stockade ; but he sue-
 
 WE CAN BEAT REBELS; YOU MUST DISARM THEM. 1 49 
 
 ceeded in carrying it with the loss of only one man wounded by 
 crossing the nullah on both flanks, and thus entering it. The 
 Nairs sustained some loss. He marched on the following day, 
 the 28th, from Sangaloo to Manundwaddy, seventeen miles. He 
 was opposed in many places, and the opposition appears to have 
 been brisk, but we lost only one sepoy wounded. The Rajah's 
 horse sustained some loss in killed and wounded, and some 
 followers were killed ; but I attribute this to the badness of the 
 road and its narrowness, which obliged them to extend their line, 
 and prevented them from effectually covering their flanks. This 
 they were prevented from doing also by the nullahs, which were 
 full, and across which the Nairs fired at them. 
 
 A party went on the 29th to attack a pagoda, about three 
 miles from Manundwaddy, but the Nairs had left it. On the 
 30th five companies of the 1st of the 8th marched back from Man- 
 undwaddy to Sangaloo to escort the Rajah's horse, which were 
 found to be useless, as the country was so wet, and to procure 
 supplies of provisions. They were not opposed on their march, 
 and they were to return to Manundwaddy yesterday. 
 
 I have not yet had from Captain Gurnell any accurate account 
 of the numbers of the enemy, which can enable me to form an 
 opinion of the extent of the insurrection, or of the measures 
 which must be ulteriorly taken to suppress it. I have, however, 
 called for the troops which will be necessary in case we must 
 proceed in force, and I shall be ready for operations before the 
 season will be sufficiently advanced. I am clearly of opinion 
 that before any farther expense is incurred, it will be worth while 
 that you should take a trip to Wynaad. All accounts, public 
 and private, agree that although the inhabitants are still in their 
 villages, they fly from them upon the approach of our officers 
 and troops : they hold no communication with us, we have no 
 intelligence, and they afford us no supplies. 
 
 The reason is that which I before gave you in my public 
 letter, the civil organization is destroyed ; but your arrival in 
 the country with your Cutchery would set all that matter to 
 rights directly. It is obvious from what has passed already that 
 a battalion can march anywhere without loss ; but till the country 
 is resettled the communication will be interrupted, that force 
 will be put to shifts for its subsistence, and in the end the insur- 
 rection will get so far, so many people will be embarked in it, 
 that we must proceed regularly to work with a large force. 
 
 I have information from Wynaad by means of the woodcutters.
 
 150 THE BULK OF THE PEOPLE DESIRE FOUR PRESENCE. 
 
 I hear that the insurrection is by no means pleasing to the 
 majority of the inhabitants, and that the common cry is for you 
 to return. Indeed our government must be strangely odious 
 to the people if it were otherwise, as I understand from you 
 that they have paid their revenue, which cannot, therefore, 
 be very burthensome on them, and it is not possible that they 
 can already look to the permanence of the power of the 
 Pyche Rajah, considering that the insurrection is only a fort- 
 night old. 
 
 Allow me to entreat you, then, to go into Wynaad. But 
 if you cannot go yourself, send there a sensible, discreet 
 man, with full powers and instructions, and, above all, the 
 Cutchery. By means of that alone will you communicate with 
 the inhabitants. 
 
 When I hear next from Gurnell, I shall probably be able to 
 decide what is to be done further in a military way. If I send 
 more troops, I shall go with them. But I am so sensible that 
 nothing can be done by any military men unless the country is 
 settled as they go on, that I have determined not to go in till 
 your people are prepared to accompany me. I arranged the 
 settlement of Wynaad upon this principle before, and I have 
 always acted upon it in Soonda, in the Mahratta country, and in 
 Bullum, and I may say in the Ceded Districts, which were taken 
 possession of by troops sent in by me, and by my plans. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 By the bye, I hear that since Major Drummond has been 
 released from Kyde, he says that the insurrection is nothing 
 at all. 
 
 68. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence. 
 
 Precaution against failure of provisions. 
 (Extracts) 
 
 Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1802. 
 
 By all accounts I judge that our first object in Wynaad must 
 be to secure the subsistence of the troops. I have no doubt 
 whatever of being able to effect that object most amply from this 
 country, provided we can bring forward to the troops the cattle 
 and people in safety. The communication appears to be safe on 
 the side of Malabar, but interrupted on this. However, you will
 
 TROOPS MUST BE FED. APPEAL TO THE PEACEFUL. 1 5 1 
 
 observe, by the enclosed instructions to Captain Gurnell, that- 
 I have taken measures to cover and secure the communication. 
 
 If you should find that your provisions are running short, you 
 will do well to order some of the troops to approach the maga- 
 zines in Malabar, and to retain no more in Wynaad, till you have 
 plenty of provisions, than are necessary to keep up the terror 
 of the insurgents. But the troops which, under this suggestion, 
 may thus approach the magazines, are not to remain below the 
 Ghauts, or even on the borders, for any length of time, but they 
 are to return to the scene of action as soon as they will have 
 received the provisions which they will require. 
 
 69. PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Appeal to the peaceable inhabitants, in the cause of order. 
 
 Major-General Wellesley, commanding the troops in Mysore, 
 Malabar, and Canara, &c, has heard with concern of the renewal 
 of the disturbances in Wynaad, which have been the cause here- 
 tofore of such loss to the inhabitants of the country, and the 
 occasion of the dreadful but well-merited punishments which they 
 have witnessed. In the force now collected for the purpose of 
 reestablishing tranquillity, the peaceable inhabitants of Wynaad 
 must see the means of their own safety and the determination of 
 the government to subdue the insurgents with celerity, and to 
 bring them to the punishment they deserve. 
 
 Major-General Wellesley, therefore, calls upon them to return 
 to and remain in their villages ; to communicate with and give 
 intelligence of the haunts of the insurgents to the commanding 
 officers of the troops ; to supply them for payment with the 
 produce of the country ; and to wait in security under the protec- 
 tion of the Company's arms till they receive the orders of Major 
 Macleod, the principal collector. 
 
 70. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Reasons for employing a small force in Wynaad. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 9th Nov., 1802. 
 Since I wrote to you on the 31st October I have commenced 
 the operations in Wynaad, by means of which I propose to throw
 
 152 CHARACTERISTIC ECONOMY OF MEN AND MONEY. 
 
 into that country the supplies of Mysore, without stopping the 
 pursuit of the rebels by the troops in order to form escorts, &c. 
 &c. If Major Macleod will enter the district, I think it possible 
 that everything may still be settled without employing more 
 troops ; and if I should find that to be the case, I will order the 
 companies of the 33rd and the 1st battalion 14th regiment to halt 
 for your farther orders. 
 
 The great object is now to supply the troops who are already 
 in Wynaad, and I hope that may be effected, and I am certain 
 will be so without employing a larger force if Major Macleod 
 will come up ; and although I am clearly of opinion that in this 
 species of warfare it is better to have too many than too small 
 a number of troops, yet as soon as we find that the insurgents are 
 so far subdued or terrified as that small parties of our troops can 
 march through the country, and that all that is required is to 
 secure their baggage and provisions and their communication 
 with their rear, which the settlement of the country with the 
 other measures adopted will effect, it is better to pause a little 
 and to omit to collect more troops for this service. There are 
 two considerations which have much effect on my mind on this 
 occasion : one is that of expense, which will certainly be much 
 increased by every increase of our force ; the other is that of our 
 credit. Although we must take care to have a body of troops 
 fully sufficient to crush this rebellion at once, it will not be very 
 creditable to us, particularly in the eyes of foreign nations, who 
 will be witnesses, that it should be necessary that we should have 
 a large army to cope with a few Nairs. 
 
 I have made preparations to throw a large quantity of rice 
 from this country into Wynaad at a small expense, viz. half a 
 pagoda a bullock load ; at the same time I have arranged the 
 business in such a manner with the bullock-owners as that, if 
 they are wanted, I shall have all their bullocks in the service. 
 Thus I have provided for the present exigency at a small ex- 
 pense; and if events should oblige me to go into the country in 
 force, I have at command the cattle by means of which I shall 
 be enabled to move from hence on the day after the troops sent 
 by you will arrive.
 
 DEFEAT OF THE NAIRS. GUARD FOUR APPROACHES. 1 53 
 
 71. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 ' A smart action with the Nairs. ' Their repulse. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th Nov., 1802. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose a letter which I have received 
 from Mr. Anderson upon the subject on which you wrote to me 
 on the 6th instant. 
 
 Since I wrote to you on the 9th instant a detachment of the 
 1st battalion 8th regiment has had a smart action with the 
 Nairs in Wynaad, in which they sustained a considerable loss. 
 They had marched to Manundwaddy with a despatch to Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Lawrence, and on their return were attacked 
 near a swamp at which the battalion had been hard pressed 
 heretofore. The Nairs took the advantage of a nullah which 
 was impassable, across which they fired at them, and killed 
 nine and wounded eighteen. The officer in command of the 
 battalion, however, at Sangaloo, sent out three companies to the 
 support of the other detachment, and the Nairs were driven off 
 with considerable loss. Many of those on this side of the 
 nullah were put to death in the road. By all accounts the 
 troops behaved remarkably well upon this occasion. 
 
 We are continuing the plan of operations which I mentioned 
 in my letter of the 9th. All that is wanting in Wynaad is 
 provisions, and the presence of the collector. I believe they 
 have troops enough, if not to check, at least to prevent the 
 insurrection from spreading. 
 
 72. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence. 
 
 Precatitions against needless loss. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 15th Nov., 1802. 
 While encamped in the neighbourhood of this swamp, I wish 
 that you would reconnoitre and ascertain whether there is not 
 some mode of turning and avoiding it ; or if not, whether it 
 would not be possible, by taking possession of some of the hills 
 in the neighbourhood, to command the ground from which the 
 Nairs fire on the parties who may be passing the swamp. 
 
 I trust that you have taken measures to construct the post 
 which I recommended between Manundwaddy and Sangaloo.
 
 154 don't avenge involuntary rebellion. 
 
 73. To Lieutenant -Colonel Lawrence. 
 
 Promiscuoits destruction of deserted villages forbidden. 
 
 Seringapatam, 16th Nov., 1802. 
 
 I have received your letter of the 15th. I conclude that 
 Captain Barclay's letter of yesterday will have prevented you 
 from marching, and that you will have received mine of yesterday 
 in the course of this day. 
 
 I leave it to you to fix on the spot which you think will answer 
 best for the post between Manundwaddy and Sangaloo ; but it 
 appears to me that it would be desirable to fix one post in the 
 neighbourhood of the swamp in question. 
 
 I have taken into consideration your proposal to destroy the 
 villages which you may find deserted, to which I cannot consent 
 for the following reasons : It is probable that the inhabitants of 
 the villages in question have been forced by the rebels to join 
 them, and their own safety requires that they should remain with 
 them till our superiority is so decided as that they may remain 
 in their villages in safety under our protection. The fact you 
 mention, that Chuttoo is with Captain Watson, at the same 
 time that the inhabitants of the villages on his estate fly upon 
 the approach of our troops, is a strong proof that this is the 
 case ; even his influence cannot prevent them from adopting 
 that line of conduct, which it appears their safety absolutely 
 requires. 
 
 Before the villages are destroyed, when the inhabitants are 
 found to have quitted them, it will be necessary that the supe- 
 riority of our arms should be established, and that the civil 
 authority should make an effort to settle the country again. If 
 the inhabitants then remain away, their spirit of disaffection will 
 be manifest, and that will be the time to lay waste the country, 
 and destroy the property within it. 
 
 The case of Coongan Nair's property, however, is entirely 
 different ; he is a proscribed rebel, and ought not to have been 
 allowed to hold any property after he had been proscribed. The 
 proper measure to be adopted with his property would be to con- 
 fiscate it ; but as it is probable that you would not find any 
 person to take charge of it, the best thing to do would be to 
 destroy it entirely ; and I authorise you to destroy the houses 
 and property you mention belonging to this man lying between 
 Poollingal and Manundwaddy.
 
 A WORD IN DUE SEASON, HOW GOOD IS IT/ 1 55 
 
 It will be necessary, however, that before you destroy those 
 houses you should ascertain from Mr. Riddle that the owner of 
 them is really the proscribed Coongan Nair. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 74. To Colonel Montresor. 
 
 Conciliation of the military with the civil authority. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 30th Nov., 1802. 
 
 You will find Macleod a good, an able, and a zealous servant 
 of the public ; candour and firmness on your part will beget the 
 same on his, in all his communications with you ; and you will 
 find him not disinclined to your opinions upon all subjects relat- 
 ing to his duties, provided he finds them to be formed on your 
 own observations, and not on the reports of others, who he must 
 know to be his enemies. When I write this to you, I beg that 
 you will not imagine that I think you have formed any opinion 
 on these subjects, grounded in the manner that I deprecate ; for 
 you have positively told me in your letter of the 26th that you 
 have not. But you must attribute it to the real motive, my 
 sincere desire that you should succeed in all your objects, and 
 my knowledge of the great use which you can be to the public 
 by the adoption of the line which I recommend. 
 
 75. To Colonel Montresor. 
 
 Casual origin of the Wynaad insurrection. Not due to Macleod 's 
 revenue system. His character and achievements. A friendly 
 caution. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 27th Dec, 1802. 
 
 In respect to the present disturbances in Wynaad, as far as 
 I have it in my power to form a judgment, it is my opinion they 
 are to be attributed to accident, and the circumstance of the 
 Rajah and some of his principal adherents being still at large. 
 I have been informed that the insurrection began by an acci- 
 dental murder and riot, subsequently to which the party concerned 
 in them went to surprise the post and murder the officers at 
 Pancoorta Cottah. The troops did nothing to revenge this loss,
 
 I5<5 THE RISING NOT DUE TO FISCAL OPPRESSION. 
 
 and Coongan Nair, who was at the head of those who performed 
 these feats, issued a proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants 
 of Wynaad to meet him at a pagoda in the neighbourhood of 
 Manundwaddy, where they did meet him to the number of 5000, 
 and they have been in rebellion ever since. At the time when 
 this insurrection broke out the revenue year was closing, and not 
 one farthing of the revenue remained unpaid. There had been 
 no symptoms of disaffection before ; and if there had, Captain 
 Dickenson, who was well acquainted with the affairs of the 
 country and the disposition of its inhabitants, would not have 
 been surprised in his post : and upon the whole, I am induced 
 to believe that accident alone was the original cause of an 
 insurrection which has grown to be a rebellion from the sub- 
 sequent inactivity of the troops. Indeed, one strong proof to 
 my mind that it cannot be attributed to the officers of the 
 revenue, is, that it broke out after the revenue of the year had 
 been realized, and at so late a period of the monsoon that it was 
 every day probable that the country would be in such a state as 
 that our troops would carry on operations against the insurgents. 
 If the oppression of the people had been the cause, it would have 
 commenced before they had paid their money, and at an earlier 
 period of the monsoon. This being the case, candour would 
 induce me to pause before I formed a decision respecting the 
 system of management of any man who might have had in his 
 hands the civil and financial government of that district ; and 
 I should certainly not decide that the insurrection is to be 
 attributed to him unless conviction was produced upon my mind 
 that it was so, not by any single detached fact, much less by 
 rumours and reports, but by a careful examination of the whole 
 question, and every circumstance relating to it. This would be 
 my mode of proceeding if any man were collector of Malabar 
 and Wynaad, but I shall consider it particularly necessary to 
 adopt this mode when called upon to form a decided opinion in 
 a case where Major Macleod is concerned. 
 
 This gentleman was originally selected by Lord Cornwallis 
 as one of the agents to introduce the British government into 
 the Barahmahal when that district was conquered from Tippoo. 
 If Lord Cornwallis has one quality as a man at the head of a 
 great government more conspicuous than another, it is the 
 talent of choosing proper instruments to be employed in the 
 different departments under him ; and this is so well known, that 
 to have been selected by Lord Cornwallis for any situation is
 
 MACLEOD'S CAREER CLAIMS CAUTIOUS JUDGMENT. 157 
 
 strong presumptive evidence in a man's favour that he is fit 
 for it. 
 
 When it was thought proper to try a new system of govern- 
 ment for Malabar, Major Macleod was the person fixed upon 
 to carry it into execution, and he undertook the duty, to my 
 certain knowledge, much against his inclination. The result of 
 his administration in Malabar has been, first, that the revenue 
 has been increased 1 lac and 20,000 pagodas, and has been 
 realized ; secondly, that a saving has been made of civil expenses 
 to the amount of 70,000 pagodas per annum ; thirdly, that 
 a saving has been made of military expenses to the amount 
 of 1 lac of pagodas/^r annum; making Malabar, upon the whole, 
 a better concern to the Company than heretofore by nearly 
 3 lacs of pagodas per annum. This saving of military expenses 
 is not of those which ought properly to be called military : they 
 are those on account of sebundies, peons, &c. &c, who attended 
 the government of the Commissioners, who were actually useless 
 in a military point of view, and with whom the military command- 
 ing officer had nothing to do, and which ought never to have 
 been carried to the head of military charges. 
 
 I contend, therefore, that it is peculiarly due to Major Macleod 
 to examine with minute care and attention all points relating 
 to his management before any decided opinion is formed and 
 delivered upon that subject. 
 
 I don't mean, my dear Colonel, to insinuate that you have 
 formed any opinion upon this subject on light grounds ; but 
 I am perfectly aware of the strange and improper conduct of 
 some in Malabar, and of the dangerous steps taken by them 
 against Major Macleod and his system. I know the advantage 
 which such a party would derive from the sanction of the opinion 
 of a person of your character in your situation, and the pains 
 they would take to convince your mind of the truth of those 
 statements and reports which they are putting in circulation. I 
 have therefore written thus much to warn you upon this subject, 
 to urge you again to an unreserved communication with Major 
 Macleod on all points, and to avoid forming any opinion either 
 regarding his character or his system of management not founded 
 upon your own observation, your complete knowlege of facts, 
 and your own reasoning upon them. 
 
 In respect to Major Macleod's conduct in Wynaad, as alluded 
 to by you in your letter of the 1 9th, I have to observe that it is
 
 158 HE IS NOT LIKELY TO TURN A DEAF EAR TO NATIVES. 
 
 natural he should have no knowledge of the interests of the 
 inhabitants of that district, and no influence over them, because 
 till now all of them have declined to have any communication 
 with him. The same cause must prevent his inquiries into their 
 grievances and the sources of them. But you have entirely 
 mistaken the character of Major Macleod, or he must be strangely 
 altered, if you suppose that he is not a candid man with the 
 natives, is unwilling to enter into inquiries, or is a character to 
 which the natives of any part of India will ever have an 
 antipathy. 
 
 It is notorious that Major Macleod is the most elaborate inquirer 
 in this part of India, and he is so happy as to enjoy a mildness 
 of temper and of manners and a patience which are supposed to 
 be the qualities which have never failed to conciliate the natives 
 of India. I have known him for many years, and I declare that 
 in my opinion he possesses the qualities which I have above 
 stated to be notorious ; and if I were called upon to state what 
 I thought the fault of Major Macleod's character as a public 
 man, I should say that he had too good an opinion of the 
 natives in general, and that he paid too much deference and 
 attention to what they said to him. 
 
 76. To J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq. 
 
 Exportation of grain from Canara to be discouraged— for 
 
 the present. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, nth Jan., 1803. 
 In a private letter from you, which General Stuart has sent 
 me, you inquire whether it would be desirable that you should 
 prevent the great exportation of grain from Canara in this 
 season, in order that you may provide for the possible demands 
 of the army. One of the consequences of the exportation of 
 grain from Canara is that much grain is carried from the rice 
 countries of Mysore, bordering on the Western Ghauts, into 
 that province, particularly since the settlement of the disturb- 
 ances in Bullum. This trade is highly beneficial to Mysore, 
 and it is very desirable that in general it should be encouraged ; 
 but under present circumstances, as the army must depend in 
 a great measure upon Mysore for its subsistence, and as every 
 drain from this country will lessen the chance of procuring it
 
 MAHRATTA WAR DISTURBS THE COURSE OF TRADE. 159 
 
 with ease, it is better that this trade should cease for the 
 present ; and as the best mode of putting a stop to it, that the 
 markets in Canara should be kept full by a general discourage- 
 ment of the exportation of grain for some time. I know that 
 the trade can be prevented in some degree by other means, and 
 I have urged the Dewan to prevent as much as possible the 
 exportation of grain by the western passes. But the best mode 
 of putting a stop to it will be to deprive those who carry it on 
 of all prospect of advantage by keeping the markets in Canara 
 tolerably well supplied by a general discouragement of expor- 
 tation. 
 
 Another reason for which I am desirous that the exportation 
 of rice from Canara should be discouraged is, that I have 
 recommended to General Stuart the formation of a depot of rice, 
 by means of the Bombay government, at one of the Mahratta 
 ports, opposite the island of Bombay or Salsette. In case he 
 should adopt this plan, I apprehend that the government of 
 Bombay must draw the supplies of rice which will be required 
 from Canara, and they will not be available unless the exporta- 
 tion is discouraged immediately. 
 
 77. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 ' Some prospect of tranquillity in Wynaad? Colonel Montresor's 
 measures, in concert with the collector. 
 
 Seringapatam, 19th Jan., 1803. 
 
 I have received letters from Colonel Montresor, by which it 
 appears that there is some prospect of tranquillity in Wynaad. 
 He had continued the system of calling upon the inhabitants to 
 return to their habitations, and to hold communication with and 
 lay their complaints before the collector ; and he had moved 
 through the district in different directions, and had destroyed 
 the houses and property which he had found abandoned. Many 
 of the principal inhabitants had met him ; and in his last letters 
 he told me that he was about to march to a centrical position in 
 the district, from which he would be better able to communicate 
 with the inhabitants of all parts. 
 
 The rebellion, however, still exists, and the rebels plunder 
 and destroy the property of those who communicate with the 
 British officers as soon as the troops are removed to a short 
 distance.
 
 l6o WYNAAD ESSENTIAL TO US AS A MILITARY STATION. 
 
 78. To Major Macleod. 
 
 ' Approaching tranquillity in Wynaad? Flight of Coongan Nair. 
 The country important as a military position. Delicate 
 suggestion to the Collector. 
 
 (Extract.) 25th Jan., 1803. 
 
 It is long since I have heard from you, but I think it proper 
 to write to congratulate you upon the prospect of approaching 
 tranquillity in Wynaad. Colonel Montresor informs me that 
 excepting in the districts in which Yeman Nair's estates are 
 situated, the inhabitants have returned to their villages, and 
 have communication with him, and that they have manifested 
 a disposition to submit themselves to government ; he also says 
 that Coongan Nair has retired to the Ghauts, with about 200 
 followers. You will now have an opportunity of effecting a set- 
 tlement of Wynaad, which I hope will be lasting, and will 
 insure its peace. Upon this occasion I wish to recall to your 
 recollection that the district of Wynaad is no object to the 
 Company as one from which revenue is to be drawn. It is 
 essential to us to hold it as a military position, which awes the 
 whole of the province of Malabar ; but it will fail entirely of pro- 
 ducing that effect, if, in order to hold it at all, we are obliged to 
 keep in that district all the troops which can be spared from the 
 general service for the defence of Malabar and Canara. I wish 
 you to keep this in mind in making the settlement in Wynaad. 
 
 I hope that you will not conceive that I have travelled out 
 of my line in writing you the above, or that I entertain 
 the opinion which has been industriously circulated, and as 
 firmly combated by me, that the late insurrection in Wynaad is 
 to be attributed to your revenue arrangements, or to the faults 
 of your revenue officers. I assure you, my dear Macleod, that 
 I entertain no such opinions, and I believe that I have success- 
 fully exposed their fallacy to those who have entertained them ; 
 but feeling strongly the benefits of the possession of Wynaad, 
 particularly if we can keep it in peace, and knowing that it is 
 most likely that it will be kept in peace if the people residing in 
 it have a practical knowledge of the benefits to be derived from 
 living under the British government, such as they would have if 
 they should find that they pay less to the Company than they 
 would to their own Rajah, I take the liberty of an old friend to 
 recall these principles to your recollection. At the same time I
 
 TREAT IT AS SUCH; AND I WILL JUSTIFY YOU. l6l 
 
 well know how difficult it is for a man in your situation, who 
 must have based his former arrangements and settlements upon 
 facts, which facts he must have reported together with the set- 
 tlements founded upon them to his official superiors, to alter 
 those settlements without adducing any material alteration of 
 the facts originally brought forward in their support. I am also 
 aware of the difficulties of this nature with which a man of your 
 profession, in particular one holding a revenue employment, would 
 have to contend. However, upon this point I have to tell you 
 that if you should think it desirable to yourself in any point of 
 view that I should put in a public form what I have herein 
 written privately, as a ground for which you should depart from 
 your former settlement in Wynaad, I will do it with pleasure ; 
 nay, more, I will send a copy of my proposed letter to you to 
 the Commander-in-Chief, and obtain for it the sanction of govern- 
 ment. Let me hear from you upon this subject as soon as you 
 can, as I am very anxious about it. 
 
 79. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Rising in Malabar ; a contrcconp of the Mahratta crisis. 
 Reinforcements to be sent into Wynaad. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, ist Feb., 1803. 
 
 I am sorry to have to inform you that the disturbances which 
 have prevailed in Wynaad have spread into Malabar. The inha- 
 bitants of the district of Corumnaad are in rebellion, and I enclose 
 the copy of a letter upon that subject, which Colonel Montresor 
 has received from the collector. 
 
 It appears that Captain Leighton had been in Corumnaad with 
 a detachment of the 2nd of the 4th ; and upon first hearing of 
 these disturbances, Colonel Montresor detached Major Drummond 
 with a force from Wynaad to his assistance. Captain Leighton 
 was, however, attacked on the day that Major Drummond joined 
 him, and lost a considerable number of men, as by the enclosed 
 copy of the return of killed, wounded, and missing upon this 
 occasion. Colonel Montresor, therefore, informs me in a letter, 
 of which I enclose a copy, that he proposes to proceed imme- 
 diately into Corumnaad. He leaves the troops in Wynaad under 
 the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence. 
 
 I don't give much credit to private accounts received from 
 
 M
 
 1 62 MORE TROOPS REQUIRED TO CHECK A NEW RISING. 
 
 Malabar, because I know that the writers of them are much pre- 
 judiced, and have lost all recollection of the state of affairs in that 
 province from the time that it first came under the government 
 of the Company. They all agree, however, that it is probable 
 that the insurrection will become more general ; that the inhabi- 
 tants look forward to the prospect of the troops on this side being 
 engaged in the Mahratta territory, and that they will have to 
 oppose those only which are usually placed in the country as the 
 ordinary guards. 
 
 I cannot forget that, till within these few years, the province of 
 Malabar has always been in a state of either partial or general 
 rebellion ; and the opinion which I have formed, that nothing but 
 a force which will be formidable to its inhabitants can keep them 
 in subjection. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I think it advisable that the 2nd of 
 the ist should be sent into Wynaad. There is no doubt whatever 
 that the inhabitants of that district, as well as of Malabar, have 
 talked of the war with the Mahrattas for a length of time ; and 
 Major Macleod, in his private letters, has more than once stated 
 his fears of an increase of the rebellion as soon as the accounts 
 should arrive in Malabar of the march of the troops from this 
 place. The arrival of a corps from this side therefore will have 
 the very best effects upon their minds, and will show them that 
 the government is able to send troops to keep them in order not- 
 withstanding its exertions against a foreign enemy, besides the 
 great additional strength which it will give to Colonel Montresor. 
 
 I have written to Colonel Montresor to inform him that I had 
 applied to you for this corps ; and I had desired him to make it 
 public that he expects it, and even to make preparations for its 
 reception. 
 
 80. To Major Macleod. 
 
 Topics of consolation from retrospect of Malabar affairs. 
 Advice to live down misrepresentation. 
 
 Camp at Beroor, 18th Feb., 1803. 
 
 I ought before now to have answered your letter of the 2nd ; 
 but it arrived at the moment when I was marching from Sering- 
 apatam, and I have been so much occupied ever since that I have 
 not had time to write to you. 
 
 It gives me pain to observe that you feel so strongly the various 
 disagreeable circumstances attending your situation in Malabar. I
 
 YOU HAVE INDISPUTABLY DONE GOOD SERVICE. 1 63 
 
 cannot deny that they are of a nature to distress you to the greatest 
 degree ; but I urge you most earnestly to bear up against them. 
 You are certain of the approbation and support of the govern- 
 ment, and of the good wishes of every honest and unprejudiced 
 man concerned in the administration of the affairs of Malabar, 
 or interested in them, or who may turn his attention to that sub- 
 ject. You have also to reflect that, however bad the situation of 
 affairs in that province may be at present, however general the 
 disturbances, and however disaffected the people, the general 
 situation of the province is mended even in those respects since 
 you took upon yourself the administration of its affairs, and that 
 this must be allowed by every man who knows anything of the 
 subject, and is not unwilling to give a fair and candid opinion. 
 
 I cannot forget that in the year 1800 I was obliged to go in 
 secret to Cotaparamba to view the roads then making by my 
 directions from that place forward towards Montana and Canote ; 
 that with this view I left my staff behind me, and went with Cap- 
 tain Moncrieff alone ; at the same time no gentleman either in 
 the civil or the military service could move 100 yards from his 
 station unattended by sepoys or armed police, even although that 
 station was upon the sea coast ; and as for the interior of the 
 country, we saw it, and knew it existed, but no man had ever 
 ventured into it. In the southern districts, supposed to be the 
 most civilized and those in which our government was best esta- 
 blished, the civil and military servants were shot at in that very 
 year more than once ; they and their escorts were attacked and 
 were driven by the rebels, nearly in the same manner that these 
 have since been driven by us. At that time the force in Malabar 
 was much stronger than it is now. 
 
 Disaffection, disturbance, and rebellion exist in Malabar now 
 in some parts ; but I should like to know whether the country 
 is not upon the whole more civilized, more quiet, and more sub- 
 missive to government than it was in March, 1800, previously to 
 the last rebellion of the Pyche Rajah? I beg also to ask those 
 who are most loud in their animadversions upon the administra- 
 tion of civil affairs, whether they have not foreseen, at least have 
 not repeatedly foretold, that the rebellion could not be considered 
 at an end so long as the Pyche Rajah was alive and at large, that 
 it would be renewed as soon as the force in Malabar should be 
 weakened, and particularly so if there should be employment for 
 the troops in the Mysore country ? 
 
 Without blaming the executive government in Malabar, those 
 
 M %
 
 164 PERSEVERE ; IN SPITE OF MEN OF BELIAL. 
 
 about me know well that this has always been my opinion, as I 
 believe it has that of every well-judging man ; and I have given 
 proofs that I held this opinion upon the occasion of every pro- 
 position that has been made for the reduction of the force in 
 Malabar. 
 
 All these considerations must be gratifying to you, and should 
 induce you to bear up against an adverse turn in the state of 
 affairs, which, after all, can be but momentary. 
 
 It is true that you have a formidable party against you ; but 
 when you are to adopt any measure of consequence, when that 
 occupies your attention, allow me to advise you never to take 
 into consideration what that party may think, say, or do upon 
 the occasion ; do not allow yourself to think that they exist, and 
 do your duty as you would if they were where they ought to be, 
 and I dare say will be hereafter. It is impossible, and not 
 perhaps very proper, that you should be ignorant of what they 
 are doing against you ; but I recommend you not to allow any 
 man in Malabar to know that you even suspect it ; and if govern- 
 ment does not deliver you from this intolerable grievance, for 
 which end I am about to exert myself, you may depend upon it 
 that the party will not long hold together. Let me hear from 
 
 you. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 81. To Lieut.-Colonel Montresor. 
 Provisional plan for arresting the insnrrectio7i in Malabar. 
 
 Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803. 
 I received yesterday your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding 
 that my attention is much occupied by other objects, I have for 
 some time been turning over in my mind the state of our affairs 
 in Malabar ; the subject is not new to me, and I am fully pre- 
 pared to give you an opinion upon it. It appears now that, 
 notwithstanding the reinforcements which have been sent into 
 Malabar (and which have consisted of all the troops that could 
 possibly be spared), and the exertions of yourself and the officers 
 under your command, the rebellion has continued to increase, and 
 there is every appearance of its becoming general throughout the 
 province. The European settlements upon the coast have been 
 threatened, and the efforts of the troops will be required in a
 
 PLAN FOR CHECKING THE RISING IN MALABAR. 16 
 
 O 
 
 great measure to keep them in safety during the monsoon. The 
 utmost length of the season which now remains for operations is 
 two months from this time ; and supposing the earliest and most 
 favourable termination of the operations which have brought a 
 great portion of the army to the northern frontier, or even if a 
 part of that army could be spared immediately for the service in 
 Malabar, it would not be possible for it to arrive in the disturbed 
 districts so as to effect any benefit before the commencement of 
 the rainy season. 
 
 We must, therefore, immediately turn our thoughts to the 
 adoption of such measures as will secure to us some essential 
 points, in case the state of the Company's affairs in general 
 should allow of the employment of a large force for the suppres- 
 sion of the rebellion in Malabar at the opening of the next season. 
 To do anything else will be useless, and to attempt it may pre- 
 vent you from providing effectually for the security of those points 
 which, in this view of the case, will be necessary to us hereafter. 
 With this view, you ought, in my opinion, first to provide for the 
 safety of Cannanore, Tellicherry, Mahe, and Calicut, and, as far 
 as possible, for the communication along the coast ; secondly, you 
 ought to have posts at Ercoor and Cotaparamba, and, if the 
 southern districts should be disturbed, at Angarypur ; thirdly, 
 you ought to occupy Manundwaddy in Wynaad, and the heads 
 of the Ghauts ; and, fourthly, the posts at Montana, and Canote, 
 and Pereweil, in Cotiote, if possible. I am not so anxious 
 respecting those, however, mentioned in the fourth instance, 
 although they are of importance in respect to Cotiote, because 
 I know that, even if we hold them, we must still cut our way 
 through that district, which never can be subdued or kept in 
 tranquillity excepting by a commanding force in Wynaad above 
 the Ghauts. That is the outline of the disposition of the troops 
 which I would recommend to you for the monsoon. Your nearer 
 view of the subject may enable you to form a better, but this 
 embraces all the great points of our situation in Malabar, and 
 provides some resting-places for us at the opening of the next 
 fair season. 
 
 I recommend that of the posts mentioned in the third instance, 
 you should make those at the heads of the passes the strongest, 
 in order that they may be enabled to detach to the rear of the 
 rebels defending the pass when the troops from below will have 
 to attack it in front. 
 
 After you will have determined the number of troops you will
 
 l66 HOW PIRACY SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY PUT DOWN. 
 
 have in each post, I recommend you to throw into each post 
 eight months' provision for them. I need not give you the caution 
 which I gave to one of your predecessors under similar circum- 
 stances three years ago, for want of attention to which we lost 
 many men. 
 
 Your whole efforts ought now to be directed to supplying the 
 posts with provisions, ammunition, and medicines ; to putting 
 them in a state of decent repair ; to destroying the posts which 
 you will not occupy ; and to removing or destroying the stores 
 they contain. Let the sea coast, Cotaparamba, Ercoor, and 
 Angarypur be the last provided for, as they are nearer the 
 source of supply, and the communication with them will never 
 be very difficult. While you are making these arrangements in 
 your posts preparatory to the monsoon, you might keep a corps 
 in motion in the lower country, in order to prevent the rebels 
 from meditating anything against the settlements upon the coast 
 before you have made your arrangements for their safety during 
 the monsoon. But the former is the chief object, for the attain- 
 ment of which every effort ought to be made. 
 
 I am getting on as well as I could expect. I wish that the 
 task you have in Malabar was not attended with more difficulties 
 than I have yet met with. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 82. To Sir W. Clarke, Envoy at Goa. 
 
 Suppression of piracy. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Camp at Akowla, nth July, 1804. 
 Nothing can be more scandalous than the system of piracy 
 which has long been carried on on the coast of Malabar ; and I 
 am convinced that the measure which I have proposed to the 
 Rajah is an expedient which will answer the purpose expected 
 from it, only for a time. I indeed doubt much, whether the 
 Rajah of Kolapoor or the Bhoonslah have the power, supposing 
 them to have the inclination, to prevent piracy; and that object 
 is, in my opinion, to be effected only by severe instantaneous 
 punishments of pirates on their coasts, and in sight of their own 
 people ; and if it should still be persisted in, by sending strong 
 armaments within all the creeks and rivers, with orders to destroy 
 boats, vessels, the fortifications which protect them, and even the
 
 ADVANTAGES OF MY EXPEDIENT TO CHECK IT. l6j 
 
 habitations of the pirates. In this manner the business would 
 be done effectually, otherwise nothing less than the occupation 
 of the whole coast by the Company's troops would answer the 
 purpose. 
 
 ^U vt* jlj jt jk vU *jLr J* 
 
 In the present state of the Company's power, the Rajah of 
 Kolapoor cannot be considered a formidable enemy ; but it may 
 be observed of him, as well as of others, that he is formidable, or 
 otherwise, in an inverse proportion to the arrangements made 
 for bringing the Company's power into action. The contest with 
 him would be long, and possibly some of its effects doubtful, 
 if he were to be attacked by a small force ; and very probably 
 it would be but momentary, if the circumstances of the time 
 should permit the government to bring to act upon the Rajah 
 the disposable forces which must be in his neighbourhood. 
 
 The question is, whether the mode proposed by the agreement 
 will prevent piracy? My opinion is, that after the soucar, who 
 is to be security, shall have paid the value of one or two cap- 
 tures, he will declare that he can be security no longer ; and for 
 this reason, I deem the measure only an expedient which will 
 afford leisure to the government to consider of others which will 
 be more permanent. Still, if the soucar should withdraw his 
 security, it will be in the power of the government of Bombay to 
 blockade his ports again ; and in the meantime, the incon- 
 venience, the expense, and the risk of that measure, which after 
 all is not effectual, will be avoided. 
 
 IV. THE NIZAM. 
 
 83. Memorandum on the French Force at Hyderabad. 
 
 Danger to the Company from the French force at Hyderabad. 
 Hoxv it may be destroyed. To what extent it should be super- 
 seded by a British force. Financial and political difficulties 
 connected with the establishment and service of such a force. 
 Plan for obviating these difficulties. Military adventurers not 
 to be encouraged. [1798.] 
 
 For some time past a very extraordinary, and, to the Company's 
 interest in this country, a very dangerous influence has existed at
 
 1 68 PERIL TO BRITISH INTERESTS FROM RAYMOND'S CORPS. 
 
 the Court of Hyderabad. M. Raymond, a Frenchman, who, I 
 am informed, was originally encouraged to go there by the British 
 Government, in the view of getting the command of a small body 
 of troops, increased it to the number of 14,000 well-disciplined 
 infantry, commanded by European officers, and paid by the pro- 
 duce of a country given over to the collection of M. Raymond. 
 In proportion as the number of his troops increased, he shook off 
 his allegiance to the British Government ; and he latterly adopted 
 all the violent republican doctrines of his countrymen. Of these 
 sentiments there are several signs, viz. the use of the national 
 colours and cockades ; and from these, as well as from his con- 
 duct at the durbar of the Nizam, there does not remain a doubt 
 of his enmity to the English interests, nor of his wishes to gratify 
 it if an opportunity offered. He uniformly acted in a contrary 
 interest at Hyderabad : he held communications with Tippoo, 
 with Scindiah, and even with Zemaun Shah. 
 
 The weakness of the Nizam's government has suffered this 
 power to grow up in the heart of his state, and his ministers 
 have been at a loss in what manner to get rid of it, or, at least, 
 to counterbalance it. For this purpose they have had in the 
 Deccan two battalions of the Company's sepoys. These, however, 
 notwithstanding their insufficiency effectually to oppose and 
 counteract the views of M. Raymond, have been sent away, and 
 then again demanded, according as the influence of M. Raymond 
 or of the Nizam's minister became most powerful. These are there 
 at present, and are alone what the Nizam has to depend upon. 
 
 M. Raymond, whom I have above described as being at the 
 head of that system, which has by degrees been introduced into 
 the Deccan, is now dead, and it is reported that the officers 
 
 under him have elected l to succeed to his 
 
 command. The Nizam has nominally appointed him to the 
 same situation. This man is a violent democrat, and one who, it 
 is imagined, from his violence and folly, will overturn the system 
 established by his predecessor ; but whether he does so or other- 
 wise, the existence even for a short time of such a power as Ray- 
 mond established in the Deccan may be fairly stated as almost 
 incompatible with the existence of the British power in the Car- 
 natic. It is more fatal to it than if the Nizam were inimical to 
 us. It might be expected that his enmity might be qualified by 
 motives of personal interest, by the recollection of former defeats, 
 
 1 Blank in MS. - Ed.
 
 WE MUST HELP THE NIZAM WITH TROOPS TO DESTROY IT. 1 69 
 
 by the chance of his being attacked by the Mysoreans, or Mah- 
 rattas, whilst engaged with us ; and, above all, by the ruin to 
 his country attendant upon a state of war : but such a man as 
 
 at the head of such a force, when supported 
 
 by the opinions and advice of his countryman established at 
 Pondicherry, would be actuated by no such considerations, or 
 indeed by no considerations excepting such as regarded his per- 
 sonal interest, his own glory, and the interest and glory of his 
 countrymen. The chance of defeat would not be considered, as 
 it would not be his loss, but that of the Nizam ; and even if it 
 were considered, it would be more than balanced by the certainty 
 of ruin to the British interest from being involved in a war at all. 
 
 All this leads me to the conclusion that it is essentially neces- 
 sary to annihilate this power as soon as possible. It appears 
 that this cannot be more an object to the Company than it is to 
 the governing power at the Nizam's Court. They (the prime 
 Minister Azim ul Omrah in particular) have long been desirous 
 that the detachment of sepoys should be increased, and since the 
 death of M. Raymond, have anxiously pressed for British assist- 
 ance to remove those dangerous troops which he had collected 
 and disciplined. There cannot be a doubt of the propriety of 
 granting it ; and the only question is, in what manner. 
 
 The question whether Raymond's power is to be annihilated is 
 entirely distinct from that of the propriety of establishing a similar 
 one in the Deccan ourselves. I shall canvass that by and by. 
 
 The first step must be to enable the Nizam to dismiss this 
 force without danger to himself or to his court. This must be 
 done by sending to his assistance such a body of sepoys as must 
 keep them in awe, and which may be afterwards withdrawn or 
 otherwise, as may be found necessary. 
 
 The question then arises, whether it will be proper to keep in 
 the Deccan a force which will answer all the purposes which it 
 was intended that that of Raymond should answer. The Nizam's 
 states, being surrounded by Tippoo and all the tribes of Mah- 
 rattas, are liable to invasion on all sides. If the Company fur- 
 nish a force to defend him on all sides, they must be paid in the 
 same manner as that of Raymond is ; by the assignment of the 
 revenue of a certain district, to be collected by themselves : other- 
 wise their payment will become uncertain, and they will in that 
 case be involved in every war which the ambition, either of the 
 Nizam or of any one of his restless neighbours, may occasion. 
 I consider that the territory which might be assigned to pay
 
 170 BUT HOW FAR SHOULD WE HELP HLM AFTERWARDS? 
 
 these troops would soon be considered as part of the general 
 dominion of the Company ; its produce would be considered as 
 part of the general revenue, instead of something to be applied 
 particularly to the payment of this force ; and the Company's 
 Government would think it as necessary to involve itself in a war 
 in its defence as in the defence of any other portion of their 
 dominions. For this reason I object to taking territory as a 
 security for the payment of the troops employed in the Deccan. 
 On the other hand, there will be no reason why the Nizam 
 should be involved in our wars ; and thus we shall gain a long 
 defenceless frontier to preserve, without the advantage of assist- 
 ance in the moment when those territories in which we are most 
 interested may be attacked. It is, therefore, not advisable to 
 assist the Nizam in the way of sending him sepoys to a much 
 greater extent than he has been assisted already ; I mean, if 
 territory is to be taken by the Company as a security for their 
 payment. 
 
 If it were possible to extend the influence of the Company to 
 the Mysorean, it might become a question whether it would not 
 be advisable to hire our troops to the Nizam, and to hire, or, in 
 other words, to make them subsidiary to the Company's Govern- 
 ment ; but as that cannot be expected, and considering the topo- 
 graphical as well as the political situation of the Nizam's country, 
 to run the risk of involving the British nation in all the wars to 
 which he may be stated to be liable cannot be advisable. If the 
 Company do not give him the assistance of their own troops, is 
 it advisable to encourage any British or other adventurer, under the 
 protection of the Company, to raise a body of troops for the ser- 
 vice of the Nizam, upon the same footing as those of Raymond ? 
 
 The Nizam's country is more exposed than that of any of his 
 neighbours ; his own great age, and the consequent intrigues and 
 divisions in his durbar, have occasioned a weakness in his govern- 
 ment which has pervaded all departments of the state. His 
 troops are the most wretched of Hindustan, and he depends for 
 his preservation upon that force of Raymond's, and upon the 
 assistance which the Company has afforded him. If, then, he is 
 deprived of that, and another is not substituted in its place, it 
 may be said that he will fall an easy prey to some one of his 
 ambitious neighbours. 
 
 Necessary as the preservation of the independence of the 
 Nizam's power is to the Company, I cannot recommend that 
 encouragement should be given to any British adventurer to
 
 NATURE AND EXTENT OF HELP TO BE GIVEN TO HIM. 171 
 
 raise and discipline a force for his service. It must be recol- 
 lected that Raymond went to Hyderabad originally under the 
 British protection ; and although it may be said that he was a 
 Frenchman, it cannot be said that similar danger is not to be 
 apprehended if an Englishman were employed in a similar situa- 
 tion. Those to whom that confidential situation might be given 
 would not be men of the best character, and it is well known 
 that none but men of the best character could be trusted with 
 the species of power which must be given. 
 
 The question then arises, is the Nizam to be abandoned to 
 himself? From what I have above stated it appears that I am 
 fully aware of the danger and impolicy of such a measure, and 
 therefore I decide that question in the negative, and proceed to 
 state the nature and extent of the assistance which ought to be 
 afforded to him. 
 
 Raymond's force consisted of 14,000 men : that was employed 
 partly in the defence of the country, and partly to oppress the 
 Nizam's durbar, and to oppose the English interest. A corps of 
 5000 sepoys, and a small body of the Company's artillery, would 
 be fully adequate to the defence of the country, which is all that 
 could be wanted. These ought to be in the Company's service : 
 they ought to be relieved occasionally, and be removed entirely 
 if the Government thought it necessary. They ought to be paid 
 by, and be under the orders of the Nizam ; and it should be 
 stipulated, that in case they are suffered to fall in arrear, they are 
 forthwith to be withdrawn. 
 
 The practices of the country governments are so unsafe where 
 troops are concerned, that I fear that it would be necessary, in 
 order that the troops may receive their pay regularly, and con- 
 sequently be always in a sufficient state of discipline, that the 
 revenues of certain territories should be assigned for their pay- 
 ment. The danger which I have before stated of taking territory 
 as security is, that the Company's Government may consider it 
 as part of the general dominion, and may think it necessary to 
 involve themselves in a war in its defence, in the same manner 
 as in the defence of the other territories more immediately be- 
 longing to them. But I cannot see the danger or the impropriety 
 of taking the revenues of certain districts as security for the pay- 
 ment of troops, if it can be clearly understood that they are for 
 this purpose only.; and that the jurisdiction of the Company's 
 Government, and consequently the necessity of protecting them, 
 does not extend to them,
 
 172 APPROPRIATION OF SUBSIDIARY SUPPLIES. 
 
 This force I presume to be sufficient to repel any attack which 
 might be made by any one of the powers which border upon 
 him ; and if it is not, or if he should be the object of any combi- 
 nation, it will become the interest of the Company to support 
 him in the same manner as it is their interest at this moment. 
 Thus, however, it will not be necessary that they should be in- 
 volved in a war whenever he, or the Mahrattas, or Tippoo, think 
 fit ; nor will they be deprived of his assistance when their do- 
 minions may be attacked by either of those powers. On the 
 other hand, his government will be entirely under the control of 
 that of the Company : the threat to withdraw troops, or the more 
 forcible one, to make them act in his country, must keep him in 
 awe at all times. For this purpose the revenues ought to be 
 assigned to the commanding officer of those troops, who ought 
 to be personally responsible for their regular payment, in the 
 same manner, and at the same times, as if they were within the 
 Company's provinces. This commanding officer ought to be re- 
 movable at the pleasure of the Company and of the Nizam. It 
 should be particularly understood that the Company have not 
 over him, in his capacity of collector of these assigned revenues, 
 any control, excepting that which is necessary to insure the pay- 
 ment of the troops and of the military services. For this purpose 
 he ought to be obliged to send a monthly account to the Govern- 
 ment, and a certificate that the amount has been paid.- If it 
 should be clearly made out that the produce is not equal to the 
 expense, to get the assignment of more territory must become 
 the subject of a future negotiation. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 84. Memorandum of Conversations which passed between 
 Seyd-oo-Dowlah, Captain Ogg, and Colonel Wellesley, and 
 between Meer Allum and Colonel Wellesley. 
 
 Meer Allunis views on the Treaty of General Defensive Alliance, 
 and its tendencies. 
 (Extract.) Dummul, 26th Sept., 1800. 
 
 A conversation then followed upon politics. Meer Allum said 
 that the great object of the Nizam and of the minister was to 
 amass money ; that for this object they would sacrifice every- 
 thing, and that for this they had lately made the treaty by which 
 they were to cede all the Nizam's territories south of the Toom- 
 buddra and the Kistna. He said that, owing to their own bad
 
 THE MEER THIXKS THE TREATY UNWISE OX BOTH SIDES. ] 73 
 
 management and the weakness of their own government, the 
 troops kept by the jaghiredars who held jaghires in those coun- 
 tries were useless to his Highness, and therefore he gained by 
 the treaty all the money which he had before paid to the British 
 government for our troops, and the service of as many more 
 troops as the treaty should give him. 
 
 That he besides would gain our protection against the Mah- 
 rattas ; and Meer Allum said that, if we were not very cautious, 
 the Nizam's government would involve us in a war with the 
 Mahrattas before it was long. 
 
 Colonel W. said that he was indifferent upon that subject. He 
 was ready then, and would engage to beat all the Mahrattas in 
 Hindustan, and to feed his army even if it were to march to 
 Delhi. Meer Allum asked, ' Can you feed the Nizam's army? 
 Ask Lord Cornwallis who fed the Nizam's army in the former 
 Mysore war ? Ask yourself who has fed it in the last campaign ? 
 If you are to go to war with the Mahrattas, you must be pre- 
 pared to feed not only your own troops, but the Nizam's, for 
 there are no magazines in this country, no preparation of any kind, 
 although a war with the Mahrattas is constantly expected and 
 now wished for.' 
 
 Colonel Wellesley then asked Meer Allum what was the 
 strength of the Nizam's army? Meer Allum said, after the 
 territory would be ceded, and the jaghiredars would have dis- 
 charged their troops, the Nizam would have no infantry, and 
 only about five thousand horse ; that he would depend upon us 
 for protection, not only against his foreign enemies, but against 
 the host of discontented and idle people created by the late 
 treaty, and by his having already disbanded nearly all his troops. 
 
 He said that he had always looked upon a treaty such as that 
 about to be concluded as very impolitic for both parties ; that it 
 deprived the Nizam of territory, reputation, and power, and gave 
 the English nothing but the burden of defending their ally against 
 the Mahrattas and against his own discontented subjects, and 
 would, at some time or other, infallibly create a division between 
 the two courts. 
 
 He said that he had often represented this to Captain Kirk- 
 patrick, ever since his last return from Madras ; but that now that 
 he was so completely under the influence of the minister it was 
 to be expected that he would attend more to the objects of the 
 Nizam's court than to those of his own government. 
 
 Here the conversation ended.
 
 174 THE NIZAM SHOULD SUBSIDIZE MEER KHAN / 
 
 85. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 Probabilities as to Meer Klian entering the Nizanfs service. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803. 
 
 It is very probable that Meer Khan intends to enter the 
 Nizam's service : but he found the durbar rather dilatory in giving 
 an answer to his proposals ; and although he said that he had de- 
 sired to be dismissed from Holkar's service, it is probable that he 
 delayed to express that desire till he should be certain that he 
 was to be received by the Nizam, with the number of followers 
 that he should think proper to bring with him. Indeed, I think 
 that, if he should quit Holkar's service, he will not take a formal 
 leave : in the mean time, so long as he remains in it, it is natural 
 that his troops should be enumerated amongst the forces of 
 Holkar, and that the hircarrahs, who report what they hear, or 
 the more numerous people who report what they invent, should 
 detail the intended operations of that body as well as of the 
 others. 
 
 86. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 Expediency of the Nizam taking Meer Khan into his service. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803. 
 
 I have received several letters from Col. Stevenson upon the 
 subject of the negotiation between the officers of the government 
 of his Highness the Nizam, and Meer Khan, to take that chief into 
 his Highness' service. It appears that his Highness consents to 
 take into service only 3000 men, whereas the number of Meer 
 Khan's followers amounts to 25.000, according to his statement. 
 
 From my experience of these Native armies, I doubt whether 
 Meer Khan will produce, at muster, more than double the number 
 of men that his Highness consents to receive ; but, when I am 
 considering the means of defending his Highness' long line of 
 frontier from the plunder of a light body of horse, I cannot re- 
 frain from recommending that, whatever may be Meer Khan's 
 numbers, his Highness should take them into pay. If hostilities 
 should be commenced, the expense will be more than repaid to 
 him, and the people under his government ; and the very circum- 
 stance of the purchase of the service of a chief, commanding so 
 large a body of horse, of such repute as Meer Khan, and much in
 
 BUT NOT TRICK US INTO PAVING HIM HALF THE MONEY. 1 75 
 
 the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will certainly shake the 
 general confidence of his army, and may have the effect of pre- 
 venting the threatened hostilities. 
 
 87. To Lieut. -General Stuart. 
 
 Sly attempt to pledge the EnglisJi Government to the payment 
 of half the cost of Meer Khan's subsidy. 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803. 
 
 After the Nizam's officers had informed Col. Stevenson that 
 Meer Khan, with his whole army, was to be taken into the ser- 
 vice, and that the expense was to be paid equally by the Com- 
 pany and the Nizam, they came forward on the following day 
 with a paper, which they said required only the Colonel's signa- 
 ture, in order that they might conclude with Meer Khan. The 
 purport of this paper was, that the Colonel engaged that the 
 British government would defray half of the expense of enter- 
 taining Meer Khan and his troops. Col. Stevenson refused to 
 sign this paper, and there the matter rested. In the mean time, 
 he received a letter from me, of the 25th, in which I enclosed the 
 copy of a report of moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, stating that the 
 Nizam's minister had declared that Col. Stevenson had engaged 
 that the British government would defray half the expense ; and 
 I desired Col. Stevenson to set the Nizam's servants right upon 
 this subject. 
 
 The Colonel then drew from them a paper, being a copy of 
 their letter to the minister, from which it appears clearly, not only 
 that Col. Stevenson never did enter into these engagements, as 
 stated by the Nizam's minister, but that his Highness 5 servants 
 never thought that he did, and never wrote that he had. It 
 appears, therefore, that the whole has been a trick, in which the 
 Nizam and his minister have been concerned, and his officers the 
 instruments to endeavour to draw some Englishmen into an 
 engagement to pay half the expense of hiring Meer Khan ; and 
 then to take advantage of our scrupulous adherence to our good 
 faith, to make the government adhere to this engagement. How- 
 ever, it has entirely failed ; and I think there is reason to hope 
 that Col. Stevenson will not have dispatched the letter to Meer 
 Khan, which I yesterday reported to you that he had written. 
 I think we are not getting on so quickly at this durbar as we 
 hoped we should. None of the sirdars have yet been satisfied, 
 although great promises have been made.
 
 176 THE NIZAM'S SECRET DEALINGS WITH HOLKAR. 
 
 88. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 Instructions for the frustration of the above attempt. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803. 
 
 What has passed is now all well ; particularly if you have not 
 sent your letter to Meer Khan. It ought, however, to be a lesson 
 to us to beware not to involve ourselves in engagements either 
 with, or in concert with, or on behalf of, people who have no faith, 
 or no principle of honour or of honesty, or such as usually among 
 us guide the conduct of gentlemen, unless duly and formally 
 authorised by our government. 
 
 If you should have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, the 
 letter which I desired you to write to him will set all matters 
 right, as far as the British government may be concerned. It will 
 rest with the Nizam's servants, either to abide by the agreement 
 made in that letter, or not, as they may think proper. For the 
 sake of the Nizam's territories, I hope they will abide by it ; but 
 if there should be the most distant hint, or even idea, that the 
 British government is bound by your letter to Meer Khan, I hope 
 that you will have written him a second letter, as directed by me 
 in my letter of the 29th. 
 
 89. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 The Nizam probably in connivance with Holkar. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 2nd July, 1803. 
 
 The truth is I believe, that the Nizam's government, nay, the 
 Nizam himself, encouraged Holkar and Amrut Rao to invade 
 the Peshwah's territories, and the object was either to make of 
 Holkar a permanent balance against Scindiah, or to give the 
 latter a temporary employment, and thus divert his views from 
 the Nizam's country. Nizam Nawaz Jung and his brothers and 
 relations were, I imagine, the medium of the communications 
 between the Nizam's government, and Holkar and Amrut Rao. 
 
 There is no doubt of the bias of the Nizam's government in 
 favour of that party in the Mahratta empire, and it appears 
 clearly from the recommendation sent by the Azim ul Omrah to 
 the Governor-General, soon after Holkar's success in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Poonah. I know also from other quarters that the 
 Nizam's government did give Holkar great encouragement. But
 
 WE KNOW THE AGENTS ; BUT CANNOT PUNISH THEM. 1 77 
 
 it frequently happens that when a particular scheme of politics 
 has been adopted by a government, and fails from any cause, all 
 the instruments who have been employed in carrying that scheme 
 into effect are sacrificed. This is particularly the case in India, 
 where the governments are all weak, and their instruments 
 generally comparatively powerful ; and these are commonly more 
 interested in the success of the scheme, and persevere longer than 
 suits the views of their principals. I imagine what I have above 
 stated to be nearly the outline of the history of the disgrace of 
 the family of Nizam Nawaz Jung; and I am farther convinced 
 that I am right, because the Nizam's government, as far as I 
 know, have never fully explained the ground of their complaint 
 against that family, and most probably never could explain it 
 without implicating the Nizam. 
 
 I think still that we shall have no war. But we have not 
 altered our system. Indeed no system will answer with people 
 who have seated themselves upon the Nizam's frontier, except 
 that of determined opposition till they remove from their 
 position. 
 
 90. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 The same subject. Fate of inferior agents engaged in the intrigue. 
 (Extracts.) Camp, 13th July, 1803. 
 
 In my opinion Fukker u Deen would never disclose the cir- 
 cumstances of the intrigue which I mentioned to you, because, 
 in the first place, it ought never to have existed, and in the next, 
 if it did exist, and came to his knowledge, it was peculiarly his 
 duty as a British agent to give notice of it to his employer. He 
 cannot how disclose it without acknowledging that there was an 
 intercourse between his family and Holkar, which it is his object 
 to deny, and without at the same time acknowledging a breach 
 of trust in himself. 
 
 I have the very best authority for saying that Holkar and 
 Amrut Rao were encouraged by the Nizam's government, and 
 that this family were, the medium of the communication. I 
 agree entirely in opinion with you, that inquiry ought to precede 
 punishment ; but it must be recollected that the punishment 
 in this instance does not come from us, but from the Nizam's 
 government, and if w r e were to interfere so far in the interior 
 government of His Highness as to inquire for what reason he 
 thought proper to dismiss one of his servants, still more if we 
 
 N
 
 178 WE MUST NOT BE EXTREME TO MARK WHAT IS AMISS. 
 
 were to desire that that inquiry should be entered into before 
 English gentlemen, we should go a step farther than is allowed 
 by our treaties with His Highness. This state of affairs as 
 affecting this family is to be regretted, but cannot be remedied. 
 * •* #• * ■* *■ *• 
 
 I am for the principle of amnesty, as referable to all inferior 
 agents; I have recommended it strongly to the Peshwah's dur- 
 bar, and I am convinced that if it had been adopted at an early 
 period, the critical circumstances of the present moment would 
 not exist. It is the principle upon which we have settled Mysore 
 and the Ceded Districts, and that upon which we have made our 
 way to this place. Eternal enmity against every petty agent 
 concerned against us or our allies will never answer, and in my 
 opinion we ought rather to rejoice when we see one of them 
 employed in the service of a friend : it is then at least possible 
 that he may not be serving our enemy. 
 
 91. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Misconduct of the killadar of Dharorc. The NizawCs ministers 
 to be urged to insist on the friendly co-operation of his com- 
 mandants with the Company s troops. 
 
 Camp, 1 6th Sept., 1803. 
 
 I have received a letter from Major Hill, by which I learn that 
 the killadar of Dharore would not allow him to encamp in the 
 neighbourhood of that fort, so as to derive any protection from 
 it for his convoy. This conduct is of little consequence at pre- 
 sent, as the enemy have been obliged to draw off to the north- 
 ward ; but it might have bad consequences hereafter, particularly 
 if it should be imitated by the killadars of other forts. 
 
 I have written a letter to the killadar of Dharore, in which I 
 have enclosed a copy of the Soubahdar's letter to me, by which 
 his Highness has given me authority to issue orders to the civil 
 and military officers in his service, and I have desired the killadar 
 to allow the British troops to encamp near his fort, and to give 
 every protection and assistance in his power to the convoys of 
 which they shall have charge. But as no attention has been 
 paid, indeed no answer has been returned to letters which I 
 addressed above a fortnight ago to this and other killadars, in 
 which I desired them to store grain for the use of the troops, 
 I suspect that no attention will be paid to this letter ; and I
 
 CHURLISH BEHAVIOUR OF THE NIZAM'S KILLADARS ; I 79 
 
 therefore request you to apprise the durbar of the conduct of the 
 killadar of Dharore towards Major Hill, and urge the Soubah- 
 dar's ministers to send positive orders to the killadars of all his 
 Highness' forts, and the commanding officers and heads of all 
 his walled towns and villages, to give all the protection and 
 assistance in their power to the Company's troops and their 
 convoys passing in their neighbourhood, and to communicate, to 
 the officer commanding a detachment, any intelligence they may 
 have of the enemy's motions. If we are not considered and 
 treated as friends in the Soubahdar's territories, we shall find 
 it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring up any important 
 convoy, and his Highness' interests must suffer materially. 
 
 92. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Unfriendly conduct of tJic NizavCs servants towards their 
 English allies. 
 
 Camp at Assye, 27th Sept., 1803. 
 
 I am concerned to be under the necessity of making a formal 
 complaint of any of the officers in the service of the Soubahdar of 
 the Deccan, but justice to the troops under my command, and to 
 the service, the conduct of which is intrusted to me, obliges me 
 to do so. 
 
 Some time ago, having observed that the city of Aurungabad 
 was by no means in a state fit for defence, and as it was proba- 
 ble that the course of the operations of the war would draw the 
 troops to a distance from it, I desired Col. Stevenson to remove 
 the hospital to Dowlutabad. and to place the sick in the lower 
 fort. Application was accordingly made to the killadar, in my 
 name, by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to admit the hospital into the 
 place proposed for them, and he positively refused to receive 
 them. 
 
 Rajah Mohiput Ram has made a report upon the subject to 
 the durbar, and possibly orders may be sent in consequence of 
 this report. But I think it proper to mention the subject to you 
 now, as the consequence of this refusal to admit the sick and 
 wounded troops into Dowlutabad at present is, that I must 
 either send them to Ahmednuggur, and thereby delay my opera- 
 tions for a month, or I must leave these brave men exposed in an 
 open place to the violence and ferocity of a barbarous enemy. 
 I have also with me above 70 pieces of brass ordnance, having 
 
 N 2
 
 l80 CONTRARY TO THE ALLIANCE, AND TO HIS OWN INTEREST. 
 
 destroyed the iron ordnance captured. These must likewise be 
 sent to Ahmednuggur, or I must leave them exposed to be 
 retaken in Aurungabad. 
 
 While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should in- 
 form you that I am by no means satisfied with Rajah Sookroo- 
 door. He throws all kinds of difficulties in the way of my people 
 sent into the districts under his management to purchase supplies 
 of dry grain ; he has not yet taken any steps whatever to collect 
 the magazines which I requested him to prepare in different 
 situations in the end of last month ; and when I spoke to him 
 upon the subject, he sent me a paper which contains an account 
 of the value of grain which he says the Soubahdar's government 
 have laid in at different forts, no part of which, however, can be 
 got for the service of the troops. 
 
 I have also to mention to you, that there is a man in charge 
 of this part of the country, on the part of Rajah Ragotim Rao r 
 by name, I believe, Anund Rao, whose conduct, if it were guided 
 by Scindiah's ministers, could not be more inimical to us than it 
 has been. It is reported that this man has fled with the enemy's 
 army ; and I sincerely hope that he will not return. 
 
 We may win battles, and may drive the enemy before us ; but 
 all that I can do will not save the Soubah's country from 
 destruction, if his servants are not true to his cause, if they do 
 not exert themselves in his service, if the British troops are not 
 treated with confidence as friends, and if they do not enjoy the 
 resources which the country can afford. 
 
 93. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 The Nizam bound to do his utmost to help us in a war essential 
 to his security. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Adjuntee, 25th Oct., 1803. 
 
 3. The war in which the British government is engaged is in 
 support of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The 
 immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Mahratta Chiefs 
 to remove from his Highness' territories the large armies which 
 they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote 
 cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein ; but how- 
 ever desirable in other respects to the British government that 
 treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential
 
 HIS COUNTRY LACKS THE COMMON MEANS OF DEFENCE. l8l 
 
 object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness 
 derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment. 
 
 4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness' interests, in 
 which the greatest exertions have been made by the British 
 government, and the most complete success has attended them, 
 his Highness has not calculated how far the terms of the treaty 
 with the British government are to bind him. I do not recollect 
 the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, pro- 
 tection on the part of the British government, which his Highness 
 has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent 
 on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would 
 not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance 
 into his Highness' forts of our small detachments and convoys is 
 an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the 
 terms of the treaty to give. 
 
 94. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Defensive imbecility of the Nisams government. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Waukode, on the Payen Gunga, 
 19th Nov., 1803. 
 
 6. No sooner, however, have I begun my march, than the amil- 
 dars, killadars, &c. &c, in all parts of the country have called 
 out for assistance, not against the common enemy, but against 
 the freebooters who have long been in the frontier, and who have 
 been kept out of the Ahmednuggur districts by the collector's 
 peons, with very little assistance from the battalion in the garrison 
 of Ahmednuggur. The amildar at Bheer, in particular, has de- 
 sired to have one of the Company's battalions of sepoys placed 
 in garrison at Bheer, in order to defend that place against this 
 rabble. 
 
 7. It is distressing to witness the state of the Soubah's terri- 
 tories for want of the common means of defence. In obedience 
 to the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General, I observe 
 that you have urged the Soubah's ministers to take measures to 
 drive the enemy's amildars and troops from those districts ; the 
 revenues of which have heretofore been collected partly by the 
 Soubah's government, and partly by that of one of the confe- 
 derates. 
 
 8. Instead of taking any measures to effect this object, which
 
 I 82 HIS STATE CAN'T LAST WITHOUT INHERENT STRENGTH. 
 
 is one of great importance, they have not even taken possession 
 of their districts bordering upon the Godavery, from which we 
 drove the enemy's amildars i months ago, and I cannot prevail 
 upon them to entertain peons to keep possession of the valuable 
 towns and districts of this quarter, from which my detachment 
 daily drive the enemy. 
 
 9. In order, therefore, to secure these places from falling again 
 into the hands of the enemy, by which he could have an oppor- 
 tunity of annoying my communication, I have been obliged to 
 call in the freebooter Ghazy Khan, and to give him possession of 
 the places which I take from the enemy. 
 
 95. Remarks upon Major Malcolm's Memorandum on a 
 proposed Treaty of Peace. 
 
 Necessity of strengthening the Nizam 's government, and of British 
 arbitration on the Peshwatis claim to choute from him. 
 
 (Extract.) 23rd Nov., 1803. 
 
 The next plan is to increase the subsidiary force, and to keep 
 a body of horse. My object in proposing a plan for obliging the 
 government to have some force, was, that I felt severely, in carry- 
 ing on the war, the want of it ; and I wished not to increase the 
 dependence of the government upon the British power, but to 
 create some force in the state which could carry it through ordi- 
 nary events. Without such a force in the state, all will look well at 
 Hyderabad and in a dispatch from the Resident to the Governor- 
 General, but really, and at bottom, all will continue to be weak- 
 ness and confusion ; and in the end the Nizam's government will 
 fall to pieces. 
 
 If such a force is not established in the state, in my opinion, 
 the subsidiary force ought to be doubled ; and there ought to be 
 a body of horse besides : and, moreover, the British government 
 will be involved in constant warfare and constant expense to 
 support the Nizam's government in the exercise of its ordinary 
 functions. Let Major Malcolm come into the country, and he 
 will soon perceive the truth of this statement. 
 
 In respect to the Peshwah's claim of choute, it is one, as 
 I understand, founded on treaties ; and the British government 
 is bound, by treaty to both parties, to arbitrate and decide it 
 according to the principles of justice, on the ground of the treaty 
 of Mhar.
 
 OUR GOVERNMENT MUST SETTLE THE CHOUTE QUESTION. 1 83 
 
 There never was such an opportunity for a government to show 
 its justice and its power ; and surely that opportunity ought not 
 to be lost. But the fact is, that choute is collected in all parts 
 of the Nizam's territories at this moment; and when Major Mal- 
 colm shall come here, he will know it. The strongest advocate 
 for the Nizam ought, therefore, to wish that that question should 
 be decided. 
 
 Major Malcolm says that the Nizam has claims upon the 
 Peshwah for expenses incurred in restoring his government. That 
 is a point for the justice of the British government to decide, and 
 is no argument at all against canvassing the question. He then 
 says that the Peshwah might be induced, by some concession or 
 consideration, to give up his claim of choute upon the Nizam. In 
 my opinion it would not be right to urge him to do so ; as, if that 
 is done, there will be no other mode of satisfying the claims of 
 the Nizam under the peace. But, supposing the Peshwah could 
 be induced, by any concession, to give up his claims of choute 
 upon the Nizam, the Governor-General has to choose between 
 the Attavesy and Bundelcund. I shall deliver no opinion upon 
 this subject, excepting that I consider the Attavesy as no object 
 for the defence of Surat ; and that I consider Bundelcund as 
 a great object for the defence of Benares. 
 
 96. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 The Nizam's army ouglit to be placed on a respectable footing. 
 (Extract.) Camp 21st Dec, 1803. 
 
 In the present state of the war, it is, in my opinion, a matter 
 of immaterial importance whether the Soubahs army is increased 
 or not ; but I consider it as one of very great importance, with 
 a view to the future settlement and management of his terri- 
 tories. These objects cannot be attained without a large body of 
 effective troops in the service of the state, or the assistance of the 
 subsidiary force. If the latter are required for the support of the 
 internal government upon all the occasions that must be expected 
 to occur, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that its number must 
 be doubled at least ; the forts must be delivered over to the British 
 government, and the whole system of the connexion must be 
 altered. Tnis would certainly end in the annihilation of the 
 Soubah of the Deccan. If the government are willing really to 
 have in their service a body of effective troops, for the purpose
 
 184 THE NIZAM'S WANT OF TROOPS, A BREACH OF TREATY. 
 
 of the support of the internal government in time of peace, and 
 to act with the British troops in time of war, their own system in 
 regard to their troops must be in some degree altered ; the state 
 must have troops paid by the public resources, through the me- 
 dium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jag- 
 hiredars. This last system appears to me to be most consistent 
 with the Governor-General's views and liberal policy ; and I think 
 it probable that he will be desirous of seeing the Soubah's army 
 placed on a respectable footing. If you should be of this opinion, 
 I anxiously recommend to you to turn your attention to this 
 subject : and as, from the disposition already manifested by his 
 Highness, it is not probable that he will spontaneously adopt the 
 measures which are necessary in order to give him an army, I 
 suggest for your consideration the propriety of continuing to 
 press upon his ministers the breach of the treaty by his High- 
 ness, in not producing the requisite force, as a ground-work of 
 an amendment of the treaty of defensive alliance in this point, 
 before the territories ceded by the enemy at the peace are 
 given over to him. 
 
 97. To Lieut.-Col. Close. 
 
 Inconvenience and danger to the Company's government of the 
 disordered state of the Nizam s and PcsJnvatis dominions. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp, bottom of the Badowly ghaut, 
 
 10th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I must get farther to the southward, and see the real state of 
 the country of the Soubah of the Deccan, which I am informed 
 is chaos itself. We must introduce a reform into that govern- 
 ment ; we must give it some public force, and establish that 
 force on permanent principles, otherwise the government must 
 fall to pieces. Six British battalions are not equal to keep in 
 subjugation and tranquillity a country 600 miles long by 400 
 broad. Its disturbances will at some time or other prove fatal 
 to our military operations : they would have distressed us much, 
 if the late war had continued ; and even now that we have made 
 peace, I much doubt whether I shall not be obliged, in conse- 
 quence of their existence, to draw the troops to the southward 
 to insure their subsistence. 
 
 *T* "7v *T» »J* ^ 5j< ^ 5fC 
 
 What is to be done about settling the Peshwah's countries?
 
 INEFFICIENCY OF HIS MILITARY SYSTEM. 1 85 
 
 My opinion is, that until his Highness raises sebundy to take and 
 keep possession of his tannahs, and puts his government into 
 some kind of regular train, the British government ought not to 
 take the trouble of interfering in the business. Any interference, 
 unless he should take these previous steps, will be entirely use- 
 less. Either our troops must be scattered up and down the 
 country to garrison mud villages, and the officers to carry on 
 the amildary ; or the mud villages must remain without tannahs, 
 and the amildary in the hands of the thieves who now hold it, 
 unless the Peshwah should put his government into some form. 
 The first will be insecure, and, indeed, impracticable ; and the 
 last will incur disgrace, which we must by all means avoid. I 
 should, therefore, think it best to withhold all assistance, and to 
 remain neutral, till we shall see what steps the Peshwah will 
 take, or whether it is possible to throw his government into any 
 form ; therefore, in order that the troops might not suffer want 
 from the existence of this confusion, and that they might not be 
 involved in it, I shall recommend Ahmednuggur as their station, 
 at least for some time. 
 
 98. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Military reforms desirable in the Nizam s state. Their introduc- 
 tion ought not to compromise our character, and so weaken us 
 with the natives. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Waroor, 16th Jan., 1804. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the best plan would 
 be, that the Soubah of the Deccan should have a moderate es- 
 tablishment of infantry, possibly but little stronger than that 
 which he is required by the treaty of defensive alliance to supply. 
 But this establishment ought to be kept complete, and in the 
 immediate pay of the government ; and not made up, as at 
 present, of 60 or 70 men, or possibly as far as a battalion, in the 
 service of each chief who commands a body of horse. It is 
 obvious that as long as that system shall continue, the govern- 
 ment cannot command the services of these people ; they are 
 never paid, as the jaghiredars have not the means of defraying 
 their expenses upon distant expeditions, and are totally unfit for 
 the purposes of external war. 
 
 In respect to regular cavalry, it is my opinion that it ought not 
 to be attempted. The formation and discipline of a body of
 
 l86 HOW IT MAY BE REMODELED WITH ADVANTAGE. 
 
 cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experi- 
 ence and patience in the persons who attempt it. After all, it is 
 doubtful whether they will succeed, and whether the body of 
 cavalry thus formed will be worth the expense of maintaining it ; 
 for at the same time that nothing can be more useful in the day 
 of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more 
 expensive, and nothing more useless, than a body of regular 
 cavalry half and insufficiently disciplined ; I should therefore re- 
 commend that this may not be attempted. 
 
 In respect to cavalry, I should recommend that the Soubah 
 might have in his own immediate service, and paid by the treasury, 
 either silladar or Pagah horse, to the full amount of the number 
 which he is obliged by treaty to furnish, in a joint operation 
 with the British government. I should prefer silladar horse : 
 1st, because the employment of these will give subsistence to 
 a greater number of people ; 2ndly, because they are more useful, 
 and better troops ; and, 3rdly, because they are less dangerous, 
 and, being more divided, less liable to create disturbances by 
 mutinies and sedition. 
 
 The question respecting the jaghiredars comes next to be con- 
 sidered. There is certainly no mode by which the revenues of 
 the state can be increased, excepting by depriving the jaghiredars 
 of their jaghires. The necessity of increasing the revenues of the 
 state may be doubted, considering the addition to his Highness' 
 territories and revenues, consequent on the late war ; and con- 
 sidering the vast increase which may be given to these revenues 
 by inspecting closely the conduct and the accounts of Ragotim 
 Rao, and the management of all the persons on the frontier em- 
 ployed by that person. 
 
 From what I have seen, I have no scruple in declaring that I 
 am convinced that, with proper management, the Soubah of the 
 Deccan will gain, by the peace, the whole amount of revenues of 
 Berar on this side of the Wurda ; for, as far as I have been able 
 to gain any knowledge of the facts, his share of those revenues 
 has heretofore gone to the Rajah of Berar, has been dissipated 
 in the country by the amildars, the creatures of Ragotim Rao, or 
 has gone into Ragotim Rao's pocket. It may be a question, 
 therefore, as it will not be necessary, whether it will be proper to 
 encourage the resumption of the jaghires. 
 
 The British government has been left, by the late war, in a 
 most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part 
 of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators,
 
 OUR CHARACTER MUST NOT SUFFER IN THE OPERATION. 1 87 
 
 by treaty, of the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess 
 is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foun- 
 dations, than any before known in India : all it wants is the 
 popularity which, from the nature of the institutions, and the 
 justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, 
 and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall 
 have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness 
 and security which they enjoy. But the resumption of these 
 jaghires will bring ruin and distress on many noble families and 
 ancient servants of the Nizam's government. Some of these may 
 possibly have assisted in the different wars in which the British 
 government have been engaged, and in the establishment of the 
 present happy state of affairs ; and all the odium which the 
 measures must produce will not fail to fall upon the British 
 government. I think, therefore, that it is advisable to avoid 
 it, if it should be possible, and, at all events, that the British 
 government should not appear in the execution of the measure. 
 
 99. To the G-overnor -General. 
 
 Shuffling conduct of the Nizam's servants in arranging the 
 details of the peace. 
 
 Camp at Yailum, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, 
 and the copy of one which I have written to that gentleman, 
 which explains my sentiments upon the subjects to which Mr. 
 Elphinstone's dispatches relate. 
 
 It is impossible for persons to have behaved in a more shuffling 
 manner than the Soubah's servants have in every transaction re- 
 lative to the peace. Their conduct has been entirely inconsistent 
 with every principle of policy or good faith ; they have withheld 
 from me information upon every point, particularly upon the 
 subject of the revenues of Berar, only with the miserable view 
 of delaying the cession of the districts near the hills, in order 
 that they may have an opportunity of plundering them for some 
 time longer ; and at last, after delaying the decision on this 
 question for nearly 6 weeks, for want of the accounts, I am 
 obliged to decide it on this day, fixed by myself, on the accounts 
 of the revenues produced by the Rajah of Berar. After all, 
 I suspect that I shall be obliged to make use of the British troops 
 to put the Rajah in possession of those districts.
 
 l88 SHARP DISCIPLINE REQUIRED TO TEACH GOOD FAITH. 
 
 100. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 The NizanCs agent to be punished for disobeying General IVelleslefs 
 orders for the execution of the articles of the peace. 
 
 Bombay, 25th April, 1804. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., 
 and I insert in the margin the dates of all the letters received 
 from you of a date posterior to the 1st Feb. 
 
 Gungaram Pundit may have given over the districts ceded by 
 the 5th article of the treaty of peace, since the 1st April ; but 
 the arrangement respecting those districts was concluded in the 
 beginning of February, and he was then ordered to deliver them 
 up. He omitted to do so, till he found that his disobedience of 
 orders was not likely to be supported at Hyderabad, and retained 
 the districts for six weeks at least. I cannot, therefore, acquit 
 him of disobedience of my repeated orders. As far as I am per- 
 sonally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me whether he 
 is punished or not ; but if it is to be a principle of British policy 
 to introduce among the Native powers, the allies and dependents 
 of the British government, the principles of good faith and poli- 
 tical moderation ; and if it is intended effectually to check the 
 depredations of the Mahratta powers not connected with the 
 British government, and of all freebooters, it is necessary to begin 
 by preventing the nominal servants of our allies from infringing 
 the treaties of peace, and from committing hostilities, and carry- 
 ing on petty warfare under the shadow of the British power, in 
 direct disobedience of orders. This object can only be effected 
 by punishment, where it is deserved. 
 
 In respect to villages and districts in Berar, seized by the Rajah's 
 servants, I know of none, excepting those for which Rajah Mohiput 
 Ram gave sunnuds. If the result of an inquiry into the subject 
 should be, that they have possession of such villages for which 
 they had not sunnuds, it will be easy, by a correspondence with 
 Mr. Elphinstone, to procure their release of them. I beg to 
 observe, however, that the Peshwah has some villages in Berar 
 which are held by the Rajah's servants, for which, of course, they 
 have no sunnuds from any authority acting on the part of the 
 Soubah of the Deccan.
 
 LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON INTERVENTION. 189 
 
 V. MAHRATTAS. 
 
 1. Antecedents of the Treaty of Bassein. 
 
 101. Observations respecting Scindiah's position at Poonah. 
 
 Legal impediments to counteracting Scindiatis influence at 
 PoonaJi in favour of Tippoo. 
 
 [1798.] 
 
 It appears by the letters from Major Palmer that Scindiah is 
 inclined to prevent any arrangement which, in consequence of 
 our interference, may be made to restore to the Peshwah his 
 power, and therefore a question arises whether this Government 
 is legally entitled to make war upon Scindiah. in order to force 
 him to suffer the Peshwah to reassume such power in the Mah- 
 ratta State as will enable him to render us assistance in case of 
 a war with Tippoo Sultaun. 
 
 The Act of Parliament says that war is not to be declared nor 
 hostilities to be commenced against any native Prince or State, 
 excepting where preparations are made against the British nation, 
 or against one of their dependents, or against one whose territo- 
 ries the Company have guaranteed or are engaged to defend ; 
 nor is any treaty of guarantee to be made, nor any treaty for 
 commencing hostilities, excepting in the cases above mentioned. 
 
 The Company is bound by treaty to defend the dominions of 
 the Nizam and of the Peshwah against Tippoo, as these are to 
 defend it against him ; but there is no treaty which binds the 
 Company to defend the Peshwah against Scindiah ; and there- 
 fore to make war against him upon the grounds of his attack 
 upon the Mahratta States, is against the words and spirit of the 
 Act of Parliament. 
 
 The next question is, whether, if Scindiah have made a secret 
 engagement with Tippoo Sultaun, and in consequence thereof by 
 his position prevents the Mahrattas from rendering the Company 
 the assistance for which they are bound in case of his meditated 
 attack, he is not to be considered as an enemy, and is not to be 
 attacked. If he be secretly in alliance with Tippoo, and makes 
 his attack upon the Peshwah in consequence thereof, we are 
 bound to assist the Peshwah against him, as much as we should 
 be if Tippoo himself made the attack ; but it must be clear that
 
 190 THEIR BEARING UPON THE CASE OF SCINDIAH. 
 
 the alliance exists, and must not be a mere surmise. In conse- 
 quence of the meditated attack of Tippoo, it is in the power of 
 the Government to make a new alliance with the Peshwah. In 
 that treaty a stipulation cannot be made that Scindiah shall be 
 attacked by the English if he does not quit Poonah. 
 
 The Act of Parliament allows the Government to make trea- 
 ties for guaranteeing the possessions of a country, prince or state, 
 in case of preparations of hostilities against the Company. But 
 the Act says that a treaty shall not be made to guarantee pos- 
 sessions, or to make war against any other prince or state than 
 that which has commenced hostilities, or made the preparations. 
 Therefore, even in case of hostilities commenced by, or in con- 
 templation of, Scindiah against the Mahrattas, the Government 
 cannot in a new treaty make an engagement to attack him. It 
 is true that this almost entirely annihilates the power of making 
 treaties ; but I imagine that to have been the purpose and inten- 
 tion of the Act of Parliament. 
 
 The insertion of an article that the Company shall attack 
 Scindiah in a treaty of defensive alliance against Tippoo, will 
 make the treaty a double one ; and it cannot therefore be argued 
 that, the Act not pointing out what stipulations shall be made in 
 a treaty, the Governor may subscribe such articles as he may find 
 necessary. 
 
 Upon the whole then, I consider that in any case the Govern- 
 ment cannot attack Scindiah excepting he be secretly allied with 
 Tippoo to attack the Peshwah, and that in a new treaty an article 
 against Scindiah cannot be inserted excepting upon the grounds 
 that by the old treaty the Government was bound to defend the 
 Peshwah against him in consequence of his (Scindiah's) alliance 
 with Tippoo Sultaun. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 102. To J. Uhthoff, Esq. 
 
 The Peshwah' s power desirable as a counterbalance to the 
 possible hostility of the Nizam. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Gram, 19th Nov., 1799. 
 
 Matters cannot last long as they are at Poonah : the Peshwah's 
 Government must either fall to pieces or he must accept our 
 support. If he should still be obstinate, out of his ruins some 
 power may be formed whose authority it may not be difficult for
 
 THE PESHWAH's STATE OUGHT TO BE PRESERVED. T9I 
 
 us to secure, and afterwards to enlarge to such a degree as we 
 may think proper ; but until time and the common course of 
 events bring about his ruin, I don't conceive that it is either 
 consistent with the British character in India, or safe, to give 
 assistance to any inferior member of the Mahratta empire. 
 
 There may be some who imagine that the best thing that could 
 happen to us would be to see the Mahratta government crumble 
 to pieces, and upon its ruins the establishment of a number of 
 petty states. With those who think thus I differ entirely. Not 
 only we should not be able to insure the tranquillity of our own 
 frontiers, and could not expect to keep out our enemy, but we 
 should weaken the only balance remaining against the power of 
 the Nizam. This, it is true, is contemptible at present, but in 
 the hands of able men might be turned to our disadvantage ; and 
 as I conceive that we ought never again to be involved in a country 
 war, we ought to have such a balance as would always keep the 
 Nizam's state in order. With this view the Mahratta power, as 
 it stood prior to Lord Cornwallis s war, ought to be preserved if 
 possible, and we ought with equal care to avoid its entire destruc- 
 tion and the junction in one body of all the members of the 
 Mahratta empire. 
 
 I have written more upon this subject than I originally in- 
 tended ; but what I have said will show you that I have not been 
 inattentive to it, and will prove that the best method of treating 
 these offers from the Mahratta chiefs is not to negotiate, but to 
 refer ail to Poonah, and at the same time to maintain an inter- 
 course upon which a treaty may be grounded, whenever cir- 
 cumstances may induce Government to think that it would be 
 consistent with the British interests. 
 
 103. To Lieut.-Col. Palmer. 
 
 Dhoondiah Wauglis progress favoured by private war in the 
 South Mahratta country. Necessity of a strong governmefit 
 there ; and plan for establishing one. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800. 
 
 It appears to me very clear that Dhoondiah's power and 
 former success are to be attributed originally to the weakness of 
 the government at Poonah, but immediately to the contests 
 between the different jaghiredars and chiefs upon the frontier, 
 and their consequent weakness. It is almost certain that Dhoon-
 
 192 POLITICAL MORAL OF DHOONDIAH'S CAREER. 
 
 diah's force will be dispersed, and it is possible that his person 
 may be in my power ; but in the one case there is no security 
 that his force will not assemble again the instant I retire to the 
 Mysore country, under the same leader, or in the other case 
 under another, perhaps equally daring and with more ability. 
 Under these circumstances, in order to insure the tranquillity of 
 our own territories, it will be necessary that we should take some 
 steps to remedy the deficiency in the government of our neigh- 
 bours, which has endangered it, and has been the cause of the 
 expense which has been incurred in the assembling of the troops 
 under my command. 
 
 It will perhaps be scarcely practicable to remedy the first 
 great cause, viz. the weakness of the government at Poonah, but 
 it may be practicable in some degree to remedy the second. 
 
 The history of Dhoondiah's progress is as follows. Appah 
 Saheb, who, as the representative of Pursheram Bhow, I under- 
 stand to be the jaghiredar of Savanore, was involved in a war 
 with the Rajah of Kolapoor. Dhoondiah entered into the service 
 of the latter, but soon became too strong for him, quarrelled with 
 him, set up for himself, collected about him the disaffected and 
 discontented of all parts of India, and took advantage of the 
 absence of Appah Saheb and of Goklah (who I understand to 
 have been a jaghiredar under Pursheram Bhow and his son) at 
 the siege of Kolapoor, to seize the strong places in this country, 
 and to establish himself in it in such manner that no force which 
 they could bring could ever drive him from it. The quarrel, 
 then, of the Rajah of Kolapoor and Appah Saheb, and their 
 weakness, have brought forward Dhoondiah, and we must get 
 the better of him and of such as he is, by reconciling these two 
 chiefs, and by establishing one strong government on this frontier. 
 To do the former may not perhaps be a matter of much diffi- 
 culty, as, from all the inquiries which I have made, I find that 
 the quarrel, originating in the confusion at Poonah, in which 
 Pursheram Bhow unfortunately took part, has been continued 
 for various bad reasons, and particularly because Pursheram 
 Bhow was killed in a battle which was fought in consequence of 
 it. The Rajah of Kolapoor has sent a vakeel to my camp, and 
 when he arrives I shall endeavour to make peace between the 
 Rajah and Appah Saheb, of course without pledging our govern- 
 ment to any thing. In this probably you may be able to give 
 some assistance at Poonah. I certainly disapprove much of the 
 government of Appah Saheb, and if it were possible to give over
 
 SCINDIAH'S POWER & VIEWS MOST DANGEROUS TO US. 193 
 
 the country to another without a further convulsion and conse- 
 quent weakness, I should be glad to do so : but as that is imprac- 
 ticable, I should propose that Appah Saheb should become the 
 sole jaghiredar or jemidar of the Savanore and Darwar countries, 
 that all the strong places should be given over to him, and that 
 all the other jaghiredars and officers of the Mahratta government 
 should be under him. 
 
 104. To Lieutenant-Cole nel Palmer. 
 
 Scindiatis formidable strength, ambition, and covert hostility to 
 ns. We ougJit to raise a barrier against him, by inducing 
 tJie Peshwah to restore their possessions to the Show's family. 
 A Mahratta war looming in the distance. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Hoobly, 
 1 6th Aug., 1800. 
 
 If I should have it in my power to withdraw from these 
 countries, and should be obliged to leave matters in the unsettled 
 state in which they are at present, it is more than probable that 
 Scindiah will possess himself of the provinces of Kittoor, Darwar, 
 and Savanore, and that he will become our neighbour on this 
 frontier. I conceive that this object, or at least that of prevent- 
 ing us from making such an arrangement of the countries which 
 may pass through our hands in consequence of our success in 
 the present warfare as may be consistent with our interests, is 
 the secret motive of the increase of his forces which I am in- 
 formed has been made, and of their advance towards this country. 
 The objects of our arrangements are avowedly, and our practice 
 has been, to restore the country which we have conquered to the 
 rightful possessor, and to establish for him a government of such 
 strength as that he will be able to prevent his subjects from dis- 
 turbing the tranquillity of ours or of the subjects of our allies. 
 In order to prevent our carrying into effect these objects, Scindiah 
 brings an army with which, if he do not take the countries to 
 himself, he will give them to one of his dependents. In my 
 opinion the extent of the influence and territory of this one man 
 becomes a matter of anxiety to every friend to the British 
 interests in India. He now embraces the whole extent of our 
 frontier and of that of the Nizam, and in his person we expe- 
 rience that which we learn that all our policy ought to be directed 
 

 
 194 THE PESHWAH SHOULD RESTORE THE BHOW's FAMILY. 
 
 to prevent, viz. one man holding and exercising nearly all, if not 
 all, the power of the Mahratta empire. 
 
 It is surely desirable that we should exert ourselves to pre- 
 vent this ; and there appears to me no method so certain of pre- 
 venting it as that of urging the Peshwah to establish the Bhow's 
 family in their ancient possessions, and to force the Kolapoor 
 Rajah to make peace with them. They are fully aware of the 
 benefits which they have already derived from our assistance, 
 and we should find in them at all times zealous and probably 
 the most useful allies that we have in India. At the same time, 
 by establishing them upon our frontier, we secure its tranquillity, 
 which is all that we can desire. 
 
 If Scindiah is to be allowed to ruin the Bhow's family, to seize 
 their possessions north of the Kistna for his own use, and those 
 south of that river probably for the same purpose, or, at all 
 events, to deprive the family of them, and to bestow them on 
 one of his dependents, it will become incumbent on us to look 
 for the security of our own frontier, and of that of the Rajah of 
 Mysore, under such an arrangement. 
 
 If we suffer it to be made, we may depend upon it that our 
 tranquillity will be disturbed, and that, sooner or later, we shall 
 be forced into a war with the Mahrattas, which will probably be 
 commenced under many circumstances of disadvantage. 
 
 105. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer. 
 
 Scindiah, instead of co-operating against Dhoondiah, practically 
 
 assists him. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp ten miles north of Badamy, 28th Aug., 1800. 
 
 In order to throw more light upon Scindiah's assurances made 
 to you upon this subject, I have the honour to enclose the copy 
 of a letter which I have received from Mr. Uhthoff, in which 
 are stated the suppositions of the Rajah of Kolapoor respecting 
 the line which Scindiah will adopt towards Dhoondiah. From 
 this letter it is clear that whatever Scindiah may propose to do, 
 he has not yet adopted any plan of co-operation with me in 
 concert with the Kolapoor Rajah ; nor can he yet have opened 
 the subject to the Rajah. But from a Mahratta letter, which 
 I have the honour to enclose, you will perceive that not only he 
 does not co-operate with me, but by taking advantage of the
 
 SCINDIAH IS PLAYING INTO DHOONDIAH'S HANDS. 1 95 
 
 absence of those who do co-operate with me in order to attack 
 and deprive them of their strong places, he, in fact, assists the 
 enemy. 
 
 The writer of this letter is a Polygar, who, at my request, 
 placed himself upon the left bank of the Gutpurba, and pre- 
 vented Dhoondiah from crossing that river. While he was em- 
 ployed upon this service Scindiah's army attacked and deprived 
 him of Raibaug. I hope that through your interference this 
 will be prevented in future, and that Scindiah will return the 
 places which his troops will have taken from those who have 
 been employed in giving me assistance. 
 
 In consequence of your letter I shall not interfere further 
 between the Kolapoor Rajah and the sons of Pursheram Bhow 
 than to recommend peace. 
 
 106. To Colonel Kirkpatrick. 
 
 The Mahratta country, reconquered from DJioondiah, restored to 
 those from whom lie took it. Advantage of this plan. Pecu- 
 liarity of the local tenures. Services and claims on zts of 
 Pursheram BJiozv's family. Military importance of Darwar, 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Chinnoor, 15th Sept., 1800. 
 
 The Mahratta territory is divided in an extraordinary, and, 
 I believe, an unusual manner; and probably the information 
 which I have obtained regarding its division may be of some use 
 in completing the arrangements now under consideration. I will 
 confine what I have to say to the territory in which I have been, 
 which lies south of the river Gutpurba. 
 
 Large districts belong to Polygars, some of whom pay a tribute 
 to the Peshwah, others to his jaghiredars. The greatest part of 
 the Savanore and Darwar countries has been made over to the 
 family of Pursheram Bhow, not as a jaghire, but as payment 
 of a debt for expenses incurred by Pursheram Bhow in Lord 
 Cornwallis's war. Those parts not thus ceded to the family of 
 Pursheram Bhow are under tuncaws for the support of certain 
 garrisons, and for the payment of the Mahratta army under the 
 command of Goklah. The countries north of the Malpoorba, not 
 in the hands of the Polygars as I have above described them to 
 be, are the jaghires of different chiefs of the Mahratta empire, 
 such as Rastia, Gunput Rao (who, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer 
 
 O %
 
 196 ADVANTAGE OF MY DISPOSAL OF CONQUERED COUNTRY. 
 
 informs me, the Peshwah intends should command his troops in 
 this quarter), and others, all of whom either have, or ought to 
 have, a proportionate number of troops in the Peshwah's service. 
 I don't understand that the Peshwah has ever confiscated the 
 possessions of Pursheram Bhow, which are situated, as I have 
 above described those to be, in the provinces of Savanore and 
 Darwar, viz. possessions given to them as the payment of a debt. 
 Those which have been confiscated (in consequence, as Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Palmer informs me, of the violence of Scindiah) 
 are the jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum, which are situated 
 north of the Kistna. The arrangement, then, which I have made 
 of the countries which have fallen into my hands, viz. to give 
 them over to those who had possession of them before they were 
 taken by Dhoondiah, is not likely to create doubt in the minds of 
 the real friends of Bajee Rao regarding our object in interfering 
 in his concerns. I have already derived considerable advantage 
 from this arrangement : I have always had a quiet rear. I am 
 afraid that if I were to adopt any other plan, not only I should 
 lose that advantage when I should advance again, but there would 
 be suspicions of my views. 
 
 From what I have above stated, however, regarding the 
 different tenures in this country, it will appear to you that this 
 arrangement must be as favourable to those who really wish well 
 to the Peshwah as any other which could be made ; that it is 
 such a one as he would make himself if he had the power, and 
 if he did justice to all parties ; and, as far as it regards the 
 cause for which we are likely to contend, it has this additional 
 advantage, that it enables me to bring my whole force at once 
 upon the common enemy, instead of being obliged to fritter 
 it away in detachments to preserve tranquillity in my rear, and 
 to keep up my communication with Mysore. From the state- 
 ment which I have above made, you will perceive, first, that I 
 have no reason to expect any supplies of money or provisions 
 (excepting such as I shall pay for) from the countries which are 
 south of the Kistna ; secondly, that the transfer of these coun- 
 tries to the Company will be attended with some difficulty. 
 
 In regard to the first point, every farthing which is derived 
 from these countries is applied to a particular purpose. It is 
 procured from the ryots with difficulty, particularly since 
 Dhoondiah's rebellion ; and the moment it is received it is paid 
 to the troops kept by the jaghiredars. 
 
 As usual, these troops are six or eight, and twelve months in
 
 WHY WE SHOULD INTERPOSE FOR THE BHOW'S FAMILY. 1 97 
 
 arrear ; and instead of being able to give me any assistance in 
 money, there is not one of the chiefs who have acted with my 
 troops who has not called upon me for pecuniary assistance. 
 If, then, I should require the revenues of the country, I must first 
 use force to obtain them, which would take away so much from 
 my disposable force in the field ; and in the next place, I should 
 lose the cordial co-operation and assistance of those whose 
 troops depend upon those revenues for their subsistence. In 
 regard to provisions, it is much more convenient to me to pay 
 for them than to take them upon receipt ; and paying for them 
 has this advantage, that I am sure of getting them when I 
 want them. 
 
 In regard to the second point, it must be observed that it 
 will be necessary that the Peshwah should make some other 
 provision for the payment of his debt. Powerful states may do 
 anything, and they are not probably bound by the rules which 
 regulate these transactions among individuals : but feeling as I 
 do that we have derived most essential advantages in the last 
 contest from the assistance of the family of Pursheram Bhow ; 
 that if they had been as lukewarm, or, I may say, as hostile in 
 the cause as those more immediately connected with the 
 Peshwah, the result would probably not have been so successful 
 as it has turned out ; I cannot but think that we shall be bound 
 to interfere to procure for them some compensation. In all the 
 conversations I have had with them regarding the delivery of 
 the country and its strongholds to those who held them pre- 
 vious to Dhoondiah's rebellion, I have uniformly told them that 
 if I found I was mistaken regarding the persons into whose 
 hands the places ought to be delivered, I should have as little 
 scruple in taking them from them as I had in taking them from 
 the enemy, and of course I shall avoid everything like an 
 engagement in future. 
 
 All Dhoondiah's papers fell into my hands, and they will 
 throw some light upon his connection with Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Kolapoor. I shall send them to Madras as soon as 
 they are arranged. 
 
 P.S. — Upon reading over my letter I have to add, that the 
 Peshwah receives nothing from these countries : the peshcush 
 due from the Polygars have tuncaws upon them, and every 
 farthing is appropriated. I know of no way of taking posses- 
 sion of the country in the name of the Peshwah but that which 
 I have adopted.
 
 198 WHEN AM I TO INFER THAT THE PEAR IS RIPE? 
 
 It would be convenient to me to have Darwar, the killadar 
 of which place is a lukewarm friend, if not an enemy. I pro- 
 pose to write to Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer to procure an order 
 to have it delivered over to me, and I shall inquire from him 
 the Peshwah's opinion of the killadar. He will certainly not 
 deliver over to me the fort ; and, if I find that the Peshwah does 
 not deem him a friend, I shall take it. 
 
 107. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer. 
 
 What circumstances would autJwrise military intervention at 
 
 Poonah ? 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct., 1800. 
 
 When you wrote to me on the 7th Sept., that Scindiah had 
 occupied Poonah, with his troops, under pretence of disarming a 
 party of Arabs, but really to watch the Peshwah, and to prevent 
 him from making his escape, which his Highness meditated ; and 
 when I heard from other quarters that guards had been placed 
 over the houses and persons of all his Highness's friends and 
 adherents ; and all that could be said in regard to the Peshwah 
 was, that he was not immediately under a guard, I concluded 
 that the crisis was nearly arrived, and I expected every moment 
 to receive further intelligence, which would enable me to act. 
 But I now find that on the 15th the crisis was farther removed 
 than it was on the 7th ; and it is desirable that I should receive 
 from you a statement of your sentiments regarding this part of 
 my instructions. 
 
 At what time am I to understand that the Peshwah is in 
 imprisonment? The difficulty which occurs in the decision of 
 that question arises from the wiliness of Scindiah, and from the 
 weakness and duplicity of his Highness's own character. When 
 I received information that Scindiah had possession of the city, 
 by introducing his troops there, and posting guards over the 
 Peshwah's adherents, and had most probably taken possession of 
 all the avenues to his Highness's palace, I should have had no 
 scruple of acting immediately as I was instructed, only that there 
 was reason to fear that his Highness would disavow every 
 thing that I should do in his behalf. 
 
 I conceive that this duplicity in his Highness's character is the 
 cause of the strictness with which my instructions are worded. 
 In truth, if his Highness is at liberty at all, he can call for our
 
 WE MUST SHOW OURSELVES ABLE TO COERCE SCINDIAH. 199 
 
 assistance if he wants it ; and it may not be deemed assistance 
 if it is given to him before it is called for. What, then, is the 
 degree of duresse which is to constitute imprisonment? My 
 opinion is, that, when the secret provisional commission com- 
 mences to exercise its functions, when Amrut Rao and the 
 Peshwah's friends think that it is necessary for them to take a 
 decided part for the restitution of his authority, I ought to begin 
 to act, whatever may be the degree of restraint in which his 
 Highness's person is held. I do not conceive that it will be safe 
 or proper to do so in any other case, excepting when I hear that 
 there is actually a guard over the person of the Peshwah. I should 
 be glad to receive your opinion upon this point. 
 
 108. To Lord Clive. 
 
 A strong force needed, if we arc to help tlie Pcshivah against 
 Scindiah. The South Mahraita chiefs must assist us ; and 
 will not, unless we prove our determination by our military 
 strength. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hoobly, 9th Oct., 1800. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of 
 the 2nd inst, and I am prepared to proceed to whatever point 
 your Lordship may order me, or to make such detachments as 
 you may think proper. The acquaintance which I have obtained 
 in the late war with the characters and views of the Mahratta 
 chiefs in this part of the Empire, renders it my duty to state to 
 your Lordship the effects which are to be apprehended from 
 weakening, to any degree, this body of the troops, by whose 
 exertions we hope to accomplish all that is wished at Poonah. 
 
 The object appears to be, to establish the legal power of the 
 Peshwah over the Mahratta Empire. In order to effect this, 
 Scindiah must be removed to his own territories. It is not to be 
 supposed that he will relinquish all that he has been endeavouring 
 to obtain for the last 4 or 5 years, without a contest ; and all 
 the chiefs of the Mahratta Empire look to the event of this ex- 
 pected contest with the utmost anxiety. They will join the one 
 party or the other, according to their own ideas of their relative 
 strength, and of the chances of ultimate success ; and in case of 
 our interference, which is not expected, the question with them 
 will be, whether our force employed is sufficient to get the better 
 of that which will be brought against us by Scindiah.
 
 200 WHY WE WANT HELP FROM SOUTH MAHRATTA CHIEFS. 
 
 It therefore appears necessary that, at least at first, the inter- 
 ference of the Company should be by the means of a powerful 
 body of troops, such as will convince the whole Mahratta Empire 
 of our firm determination to attain our object, and to establish 
 the Peshwah in the enjoyment of the whole of his legal authority. 
 The force which I have at present under my command in the 
 field consists of 690 European dragoons, 975 Native cavalry, 142 
 British artillery, 1160 British infantry, 3538 Native infantry, in- 
 cluding sick, present and absent, of which there are but few. This 
 force, with the assistance which may be expected from the sub- 
 sidiary troops at Hyderabad, will be fully sufficient ; but any 
 diminution of it, or any detachment made to other parts of the 
 Company's territories, will occasion doubts of our intentions to 
 adhere steadily to our object till it is accomplished. 
 
 The assistance of the chiefs of this part of the Mahratta Empire 
 is necessary to us for several reasons. 
 
 1st : They give protection to our convoys of provisions which 
 must come from Mysore : if we could suppose that they would 
 remain neuter in this contest, we should still experience great 
 difficulty and inconvenience from the necessity of detaching our 
 own troops from this small force, for the protection of our con- 
 voys. But they will not remain neuter. If they do not join the 
 enemy, they will, under various pretences, render the communi- 
 cation with Mysore so difficult, as to be almost impracticable. 
 
 2ndly : By having them with me, the country in my rear will 
 certainly be in tranquillity, and I shall draw from it all the re- 
 sources which it can afford. The whole of the Mahratta empire 
 is divided in jaghire among the Mahratta chiefs or polygars, as 
 I heretofore represented to your Lordship ; and each of these 
 chiefs can command the resources of his own jaghire. The jag- 
 hiredar or polygar, who will doubt of our success, and will wish 
 well to the cause of the enemy, will of course impede our progress 
 by the various means in his power. This I experienced in the 
 late contest in several instances ; and it is probable I should ex- 
 perience it in many more in a contest, the object of which will 
 be, in whose hands the power of the empire should be placed 
 hereafter. 
 
 31-dly : By having the Mahratta chiefs with me, I keep so many 
 out of the opposite scale. 
 
 I may therefore conclude that, if this object is to be attained 
 with celerity, we must have on our side the largest proportion of 
 the Mahratta chiefs in this part of the Empire. They will not
 
 IS IT DESIRABLE THAT SCINDIAH SHOULD QUIT POONAH ? 201 
 
 come forward unless they are clearly convinced, by the efforts 
 which we shall make, that it is our firm determination to attain 
 our object. Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me to 
 consider of the means of collecting a body of troops from Mysore 
 for the Ceded countries, which will be at least equal in size to 
 that which I should conceive myself authorized by your Lord- 
 ship's orders to detach. 
 
 109. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer. 
 
 Scindiatis influence not our only difficulty at PoonaJi. It may be 
 better for us that lie should remain there. Our army must 
 retire from the Mahratta territory. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hoobly, 20th Oct., 1800. 
 
 From all the accounts which I have received from Poonah I 
 judge that there is a material change in the situation of affairs 
 at that place. It appears now that it is possible, if not probable, 
 that Scindiah will withdraw to Hindustan, and yet the Peshwah 
 is as adverse to the British government, and to a closer connec- 
 tion with it, as the court of Poonah has been since its councils 
 have been guided by Scindiah. 
 
 Our wishes and our efforts were heretofore directed to remove 
 Scindiah from Poonah, as being the great or the only bar to their 
 final accomplishment ; our policy must vary with the change of 
 circumstances and of sentiment which has made its appearance, 
 and we must now direct them to other objects. 
 
 If Scindiah does not proceed to Hindustan with his army, he 
 will probably lose his power in that quarter. A new power will 
 spring up there, with which new political combinations may be 
 formed, and Scindiah will be no more powerful in the southern part 
 of the Mahratta state than any other chief. Under this view of 
 Mahratta affairs it might perhaps be the best policy to suffer 
 Scindiah to remain at Poonah, and to endeavour to prevent him 
 from pushing himself to the southward too fast, but that as soon 
 as he should have established himself thoroughly in this quarter, 
 he should turn his views and direct his efforts again to the re- 
 establishment of his power to the northward. It is necessary that 
 our army should withdraw, not only because an engagement was 
 made that it should do so as soon as Dhoondiah's rebellion should 
 be suppressed, but because it is very clear that it is the wish of
 
 202 WOULD A MAHRATTA WAR BE LEGAL, OR JUST? 
 
 the Peshwah and of Scindiah that we should not maintain any 
 position within the Mahratta state. 
 
 110. To Captain Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Armed intervention in Mahratta affairs woidd be seasonable, and 
 likely to succeed . But would it be legal, or just ? In any case 
 it would be rigJit and politic that I should quit the Mahratta 
 territory. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Mayoondie, ioth Nov., 1800. 
 
 I am obliged to you for the communication of your sentiments 
 regarding the situation of our affairs with the Mahrattas. I 
 agree entirely in your opinion that it is most desirable that they 
 should be speedily brought to an issue ; that the present period 
 appears favourable to bring them to a crisis ; and that, parti- 
 cularly at this moment, there is no reason to apprehend the 
 consequences even of an appeal to arms for that purpose. 
 
 The only questions then are the propriety and justice of com- 
 mencing a war to obtain our ends. I can give no opinion upon 
 this point, as I am unacquainted with the particulars of the 
 late unsuccessful negotiations ; but if war should be determined 
 on, I am convinced that we shall suffer no inconvenience from 
 my having withdrawn from the Mahratta territory ; if we are 
 not to go to war, you appear to be of opinion that it is proper 
 that I should withdraw without loss of time. 
 
 As to the justice of such an appeal ; our governments in India 
 are strongly prohibited from commencing wars excepting in case 
 of attack, or preparation for an attack, by one of the Native 
 powers. The refusal of the Mahrattas to accede to our terms of 
 closer alliance cannot be deemed an attack, and I have not heard 
 of any circumstances in their late conduct which can be deemed 
 one. Hostility then on our part might be thought a breach of 
 the laws for the government of this empire. 
 
 But not only might it be considered in that light, but as an 
 act of great political injustice. In fact, one country has no right 
 to commence a war upon another because at some time or other 
 that other may form an alliance with its enemy prejudicial to its 
 interests, and because it refuses to draw closer the terms of its 
 alliance with the country which proposes it. The question of 
 peace or war is not, and cannot be, only the probability of suc- 
 cess, but must depend upon other circumstances, and in this
 
 MF RETIRING WILL .SHEW OUR MODERATION. 203 
 
 country must depend upon the prospect of being attacked by the 
 power with which it is proposed to go to war. 
 
 These general principles are certain, and must be familiar to 
 you, who are more in the habit of considering these questions. 
 I mention them only as the groundwork of my opinion that it is 
 proper that I should withdraw from the Mahratta territory. From 
 these principles I conclude that we shall not go to war with the 
 Mahrattas ; and in that case you are of opinion that I ought 
 not to maintain my position within the territories of the Peshwah. 
 If from any circumstances in our situation it is inexpedient that 
 we should have recourse to arms, the more plain that we make 
 the real moderation of our views, the more we conciliate the 
 Peshwah's government, the less likely will he be to throw himself 
 into the hands of the French to curb our influence. 
 
 In truth, the conduct of our government in withdrawing 
 from the Mahratta territory, after having had possession of a 
 great part of it, is unexampled, and will be a lasting argument 
 to those about the Peshwah who, however disinclined they may 
 be to a closer connexion with us, may be still more so to see the 
 French established in the centre of the Mahratta empire. We 
 ought, therefore, to withdraw as soon as possible. 
 
 If, however, the wisdom of government should decide that it is 
 proper to go to war, I am fully prepared. 
 
 111. Memorandum upon operations in the Mahratta territory. 
 
 Reasons for beginning the tear in the monsoon. Plan for a 
 steady advance, and solid occupation. Topographical informa- 
 tion, and suggestions for the conduct of particular operations. 
 Co-operation of the NizarrCs army. Why the defence of 
 Mysore should be included in the plan. 
 
 [Sept., 1801 — Jan., 1802.] 
 As before long we may look to war with the Mahrattas, it is 
 proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experi- 
 ence which has been acquired, in the late contest with Dhoon- 
 diah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, 
 its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing 
 them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these 
 points, for the benefit of those, in whose hands may be placed the 
 conduct of the operations of the army, in case of such a war as I 
 have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is 
 most convenient to commence a campaign with the Mahrattas, is
 
 204 WHY A MAHRATTA WAR SHOULD BEGIN IN THE MONSOON. 
 
 
 that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western 
 ghauts, fill. This happens, generally, in the month of June. In 
 this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th June, 
 the day before the army reached Hurryhur ; and in other seasons, 
 I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time. The 
 reasons why I think that the most favourable season for opera- 
 tions against the Mahratta nation are as follow : 
 
 1st. The Mahratta army is principally composed of cavalry, 
 and their plan of operations against a British army would be to 
 endeavour to cut off its communication with its rear, and to im- 
 pede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As 
 the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means 
 of passing them, excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, 
 and might be rendered impossible, to procure, the fulness of the 
 rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain, that the enemy cannot 
 pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would 
 not venture to throw across a small body, or rather, that they 
 would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a 
 different side from the main body of their army. The inconveni- 
 ence and delay which the British army experience in crossing 
 the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling ; and, 
 in fact, they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good 
 pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each 
 river for the passage of the army. The communication might 
 afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. 
 If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Mahrattas 
 would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the pur- 
 pose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should 
 enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the 
 line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass 
 with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare 
 to detach a small body ; and we should have it in our power 
 to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconve- 
 nience and delay, as we should experience if the river were 
 fordable. 
 
 2dly. The Mahratta country in general is but ill supplied with 
 water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at 
 the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nul- 
 lahs ; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied 
 with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never 
 find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be appre- 
 hended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain
 
 THE QUESTION OF SUPPLIES IN THE MAHRATTA COUNTRY. 205 
 
 would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in 
 such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. 
 But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in 
 the Mahratta territory ; and particularly not early in the season. 
 During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon 
 the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain ; but we had 
 some rain nearly on every day. 
 
 The Mahratta country is in general a fine black soil, very fer- 
 tile, and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting 
 when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould 
 becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a 
 man to move ; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, 
 are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw 
 them. The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally} 
 and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty 
 with which our army would have to contend. The rice which 
 must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice 
 countries in Mysore, or from Canara, with which country, in the 
 rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication. The 
 army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks 
 in the Mahratta territory ; but if its European force should be 
 large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, 
 and, in any case, supplies from thence of the latter. It is well 
 known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses 
 and cattle, and of this there is an abundance everywhere ; and 
 besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot 
 be found. 
 
 The means of defending this country are trifling ; and it must 
 depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared 
 with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable 
 to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps, Darwar or Koosh- 
 gul ; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken, 
 if attacked by resolute troops. 
 
 Having thus detailed my observations on the Mahratta terri- 
 tory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those 
 which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be 
 taken, in order to have the means of carrying them on with 
 vigour, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Mahratta 
 war, commenced in the season which I think most favourable to 
 a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, 
 and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from 
 which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior
 
 206 PLACES D'ARMES, DEPOTS, AND BRIDGE MATERIALS. 
 
 objects as might be held out. I would propose, then, to assem- 
 ble the troops at Chittledroog ; but they must be provided with 
 every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful 
 to military operations can be procured at that place. 
 
 The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other 
 materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of 
 procuring rice and arrack in the Mahratta territory, a large store 
 ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at 
 Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a 
 defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of com- 
 munication with the Mysore country for the army when it should 
 be advanced into the Mahratta territory, as for a post to guard 
 the basket boats, &c, which must be made use of to convey over 
 the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The 
 fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. 
 Granaries and storehouses, for arrack and for military stores, 
 ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack 
 for the supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the 
 Mahratta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be col- 
 lected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an 
 excellent depot, and would be supplied at all times without 
 difficulty, from Bombay by Goa. 
 
 The army, being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the 
 Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive 
 the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself be- 
 tween these two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might 
 cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between 
 Deogherry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that, although 
 the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be neces- 
 sary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that 
 its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to 
 make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogherry, and the 
 boats must, therefore, be brought from the Mysore country. 
 The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country. It 
 w r ill be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah, as a guard 
 for the boats, which, otherwise, it would be in the power of the 
 enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with 
 Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in 
 the country between that river and the Toombuddra. 
 
 The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The 
 straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. 
 If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should
 
 DETAILED PLAN FOR ASSAULTING DA R WAR. 20 J 
 
 be from Savanore to Bindigherry, and along the Soonda hills. 
 The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, 
 even in rainy weather. In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by 
 a coup de main. The attack ought to be made on the south- 
 west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire 
 of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the 
 Bhow's and the British batteries were erected in the former war, 
 and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the 
 north-west angle. The assailants might move, under cover of the 
 back of that tank, to the foot of the glacis, where they would be 
 covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along 
 the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the hills 
 above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of 
 a square and a round work in the glacis, by turning them by 
 the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill 
 a part of the ditch, and they might escalade the outer wall, taking 
 care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalading the 
 inner wall. 
 
 After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to 
 their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along 
 the back of this tank, it is said, there is a passage over the inner 
 ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than 
 20 feet high, and might easily be escaladed. This passage is re- 
 presented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the 
 north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There 
 is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is 
 probable that it leads over both the ditches. At the same time 
 that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed 
 against the gateway, which is on the south-east face. There are 
 other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack 
 might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above 
 mentioned ; only it should proceed along the northern face, and 
 round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the 
 gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, 
 is not more than 20 feet high. This party ought also to be 
 provided with scaling ladders. 
 
 If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be 
 thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a 
 breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting 
 the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be 
 attacked will be the same. The troops would establish them- 
 selves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within
 
 2o8 OCCUPATION OF SUCCESSIVE RIVER LINES. 
 
 it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excel- 
 lent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would 
 have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the 
 Bhow's batteries were erected in the last war; and at which 
 would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches. 
 
 Having, by one of these modes, got possession of Darwar, but 
 particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would 
 fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison 
 and the depots in that place. 
 
 The garrison, &c, might be moved forward from Hullihall, 
 which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of com- 
 munication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven 
 across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should 
 be cleared entirely. Boats should be made and prepared, and 
 the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and 
 Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the 
 care of the boats. 
 
 The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the 
 Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and there- 
 fore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country 
 between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the 
 Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which, on this 
 route, is worthy of attention, is Belgaum : this place has a wet 
 ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the 
 place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaum lies to 
 the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in 
 a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this 
 country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have 
 a garrison of British troops in Belgaum : otherwise it will be 
 useless. 
 
 The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies 
 north of the Malpoorba, but about 70 or 80 miles from the road 
 to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about 
 this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to 
 attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they 
 hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more 
 properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts 
 on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It 
 appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by 
 approaching them from the westward. 
 
 After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, 
 this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Mai-
 
 OUR NEW POSITION REQUIRES NO NEW PLAN. 200. 
 
 poorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be estab- 
 lished upon it. 
 
 Jan. 1802. Since the commencement of this Memorandum 
 was written, the Company have got possession of the countries to 
 the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their 
 northern boundary ; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the 
 plan of operations, in case of a war with the Mahrattas, ought to 
 be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they 
 should continue to be the same. 
 
 Firstly : The treaty, by which the countries to the southward 
 of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied 
 it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to 
 be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the 
 Company, therefore, with the Mahrattas, which may create a ne- 
 cessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam ; 
 and it will be necessary that measures should be takem either by 
 himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incur- 
 sions of the Mahrattas. 
 
 Secondly : The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of 
 the Ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the 
 Nizam's army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied 
 with strength, it would be impossible for the Mahratta army to 
 make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate 
 the Ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question 
 whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at 
 Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross 
 the Kistna, and guard his Highness's frontier to the northward of 
 that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. 
 At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the 
 Mahrattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of 
 the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the 
 Company have now got possession of extensive countries imme- 
 diately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the Mahratta territory, they ought to carry on their 
 operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence. 
 There are several objections to this measure, which I will 
 
 detail. 
 
 1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Mahratta territory ; 
 a body of Mahratta horse w r ould overrun the whole of the rich 
 province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might 
 push their devastations to within 60 miles of Seringapatam, 
 without the chance of danger or molestation. 
 
 P
 
 210 ORDER OF PROCEEDING, IF THE PLAN IS MODIFIED. 
 
 2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act 
 in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western 
 ghauts, as far as Koorg ; and probably the provinces of Malabar 
 and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Com- 
 pany's dependants in those provinces would take arms. 
 
 3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push them- 
 selves are those from which supplies of rice for the army must 
 be drawn, when it enters the Mahratta territory; and thus rice 
 must come by the road of which the enemy would have posses- 
 sion. 
 
 4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra 
 (supposed at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries 
 beyond the Werdah, of the detachments of the enemy which 
 would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be 
 lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to 
 assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them 
 quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure 
 a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in 
 that quarter. 
 
 In case it should be determined to enter the enemy's country 
 by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, 
 leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam's army in co- 
 operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first 
 place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This 
 is a stone fort, the walls of which are above $$ feet high, with 
 a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides 
 there is the flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings 
 which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In 
 the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now 
 blocked up, where the place may be escaladed with ease. There 
 is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, 
 however, may be easily passed. The gateway, also, on the north 
 face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage. 
 
 The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry 
 weather ; but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there 
 are about 20 miles of the black cotton soil which I have above 
 mentioned. If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body 
 of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by 
 Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills. 
 
 Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by 
 Hoobly, to Darwar. This place is strong, from its situation and 
 its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground.
 
 THE PESHWAH's ARRANGEMENTS PROMOTE CIVIL WAR. 211 
 
 There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an 
 army: and it is surrounded by 2 walls, 2 ditches, a covert way, 
 and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, 
 and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. 
 On the east side of the south face there is a dam of some water 
 across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to 
 pass ; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault 
 the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, 
 that, after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assail- 
 ants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the 
 outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there 
 is no ditch. It is clear that this place can be taken by a coup de 
 main, and probably in no other manner ; but I strongly recom- 
 mend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should 
 be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar. 
 
 112. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The natural tendency to anarchy in the Mahratta government, 
 exemplified in the contest between Baba SaJieb and Goklah. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 30th March, 1802. 
 
 I hope that there will not be much longer delay in the course 
 of your negotiations at Poonah. It is very desirable that they 
 should be brought nearly to a close before the Republicans 
 come to India. 
 
 I don't understand exactly the nature of the present dispute 
 between Baba Saheb and Goklah, but they are fighting daily; 
 hitherto their skirmishes have tended to the advantage of the 
 latter. You know that the claim of the Bhow's family to the 
 Savanore and Darwar countries is grounded upon their charges 
 for the expenses of Lord Cornwallis's Mysore war. It appears 
 that those countries were given over by the Peshwah to Hurry 
 Punt to pay the expenses of his and the Bhow's army; Hurry 
 Punt could come to no settlement with the Bhow, and at last 
 gave him over the countries in liquidation of his claim. 
 
 In these countries thus given by the Sircar in jaghire, or in 
 payment of debts due by the state, it is usual, I believe, for the 
 Sircar to hold the strong places, and to keep the revenues of 
 certain districts to pay the troops which may be employed in 
 the countries ceded. Goklah's troops are immediately in the 
 
 V 2
 
 212 WHY GOKLAH JOINS THE PESHWAH AGAINST HOLKAR. 
 
 employment of the Sircar, and he depends for their payment 
 on the revenues of the districts thus held by the Sircar. The 
 Savanore and Darwar countries have been so frequently overrun 
 by armies that it stands to reason they cannot be so productive, 
 although certainly in a high state of cultivation, as they have 
 been heretofore. It is probable, therefore, that Goklah finds 
 that the districts belonging immediately to the Sircar, which 
 have been given to him for the payment of his troops, are not 
 sufficient for that purpose, and that he is desirous of encroaching 
 upon the other, who stands in the light of a public creditor. 
 I suppose he uses the old argument : the public force must be 
 paid first, and next the public debts. This I imagine to be the 
 groundwork of the present dispute, and I dare say that it is kept 
 alive by the intrigues at Poonah. 
 
 After a consideration of the arguments for and against Sering- 
 apatam, it has been determined to keep it, and repair it. 
 
 113. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Goklah disposed to be true to the Peshwah. The Puhvurduns 
 waiters on Providence. Holkar s reported intentions. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 4th Dec, 1802. 
 
 It gives me great pleasure to be able to send you so imme- 
 diately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Mahratta 
 chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning 
 with Goklah's vakeel, the purport of which was as follows : He 
 says that Bappojee Goneish Goklah was the person who arrested 
 Holkar, afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwah : as 
 consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Jeswunt Rao 
 Holkar : that he is determined to be faithful to the Peshwah, 
 whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders 
 I have to give him. 
 
 ■* * -5f * * -x- * 
 
 I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general 
 conversation regarding the views and objects, and probable line 
 of conduct, of all the Mahratta chiefs in this part of India, in the 
 present crisis of Mahratta affairs. It is obvious that Goklah 
 must be very decided in his conduct : he has no favour to expect 
 from Holkar; and this is probably the reason for which he, 
 so immediately after his success, dispatched this vakeel to me.
 
 HIS FORCE, AND THAT OF THE PUTWURDUN. 213 
 
 The vakeel says that the Putwurdun family (Pursheram Bhow's) 
 are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz. 
 in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt 
 a line of conduct suitable thereto ; or, in other words, to take 
 part with the strongest. He says, that it is reported that Holkar 
 intends to place on the musnud a son of Amrut Rao ; and that, 
 if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the 
 hands of Amrut Rao himself, the minds of people, in general, 
 may be more reconciled to him than they are under the exist- 
 ing order of things : for that, at present, every man is doubtful, 
 and determined to take part with the strongest. He says that 
 Goklah, although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his 
 ground, if power should be thrown into the hands of Amrut Rao. 
 I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present : 
 he says that Goklah's body of troops consists of 4000 horse, and 
 3000 foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2000 good, 
 and 2000 indifferent ; that 500 of the good are pagah, and 1500 
 silladar; 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by 2 European 
 officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000, I believe, of 
 the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Goklah's force 
 I believe to be true : it is nearly the same as I recollect it to 
 have been in 1800. 
 
 The Putwurdun have 4 bodies of troops, nearly of the same 
 strength and description as Goklah's ; and they are situated, for 
 the present, in the neighbourhood of the Kistna. One com- 
 manded by Appah Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another 
 by Dada Saheb, being 3 brothers, and sons of Pursheram Bhow, 
 and a fourth by Chintomeny Rao, who is the son of Pursheram 
 Bhow's brother, and is, in fact, the head of the family. I have 
 no doubt that all these chiefs will join you forthwith ; but I pro- 
 pose to send a man into that country to find out their intentions 
 exactly, and the strength of their troops, and to discover the 
 intentions of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and of 
 the Rajah of Kittoor. Both these chiefs have now bodies of 
 troops on foot.
 
 2 [4 GOV.-GENERAL SHOULD MEET THE CRISIS AT MADRAS. 
 
 114. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Our action, and the amount of our force, must depend on circum- 
 stances. Hence, in case of a Mahratta war, the Governor- 
 General must come to Madras. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, nth Dec, 1802. 
 
 If the war is to go on, on the great scale for which prepara- 
 tions are making, the Governor-General must come round to 
 Madras. All the reasons which operated to induce him to come 
 to Madras at the commencement of the war with Tippoo exist 
 at present, and there are others which did not exist at that time. 
 You are well acquainted with the state of the government of 
 Madras at present : Gen. Stuart I consider as the heart and soul 
 of it, and, as soon as he shall depart to take the command of 
 this army, the whole will fall to pieces, and a scene of confusion 
 will follow, which must be disastrous to the army in the field. 
 
 I don't know enough of Mahratta politics to be able to give 
 an opinion as to the necessity of the great preparations which 
 are making. I understand that the object is to support the 
 Peshwah in his government ; and that operation, supposing that 
 hereafter it should be deemed advisable to undertake it, may or 
 may not require a very large army, according to the real strength 
 of the power in rebellion against the Peshwah. It appears to be 
 imagined now that there is a chance that Holkar and Scindiah 
 will unite against us and the Peshwah, if we should interfere in 
 his affairs. It is possible that the disunion of those Chiefs may 
 be more advantageous to us than any arrangement we could 
 make with the Peshwah, and that we ought not to interfere in 
 such a manner as to induce them to unite. If that should be 
 the case, it will be proper to pause for a time ; and the great 
 preparations at present making will not be necessary. 
 
 It is possible that the Peshwah's authority at Poonah may be 
 restored by the natural cause [course ?] of the contest between 
 these two Chiefs, and that will be the time for us to conclude 
 our arrangements with his Highness to lodge our subsidiary force 
 at Poonah. The Governor-General alone can decide upon these 
 questions, and many others connected with this subject. But it is 
 possible that the nature of them will change every day ; and he 
 will have much earlier intelligence of every event at Madras than 
 he can at Calcutta. Besides, if the General takes the field, nothing 
 but his presence can keep the government of Madras in the direct 
 line. I wish that you would urge him upon this subject.
 
 GEN. WELLESLEY S WILL PARAMOUNT WITH GOKLAH. 21 5 
 
 115. Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from 
 Goklah, to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. 
 
 Profession of personal devotion to General Wellesley. 
 
 Seringapatam, i6th Dec, 1802. 
 
 As it is probable that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will claim the 
 protection of the English, Goklah has a great desire to join their 
 army, and to act in their cause ; and Goklah wishes to make 
 known to Gen. Wellesley, that, should he receive orders from 
 Sree Munt Bajee Rao, it is his intention to acquaint him (the 
 General) with the nature of those orders, to take his advice on 
 the subject, and to act accordingly; and, should he receive any 
 from Amrut Rao, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, he will act in the 
 same manner ; as it is his particular desire to act agreeably to 
 the General's wishes upon every occasion, let his orders from the 
 people above mentioned be what they may. 
 
 Goklah wishes that the friendly communication, which at 
 present exists between him and the General, may continue ; and 
 he will make known to him, in his correspondence, every circum- 
 stance, of a public nature, which may occur in the Mahratta 
 country ; and he hopes that the General will be kind enough to 
 let him know any of importance, that may be determined on, 
 relative to arranging the affairs of the Mahratta empire. 
 
 Goklah has sent his vakeel, Suddasheo Rao, to Gen. Wellesley, 
 not only to request a place for his family to remain in, but also 
 to cultivate his friendship. 
 
 116. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Turbulent state of the SontJi Mahratta country. Consequent 
 danger of losing our communications with Mysore. Project 
 of a neiv base near Bombay. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 1st Jan., 1803. 
 
 I have not yet had any satisfactory communication from the 
 Putwurdun family, of their intentions upon the present occasion : 
 it appears that they and Rastia's family are leagued against 
 Goklah, whose troops they are driving from the Kistna towards 
 the Toombuddra. It is possible that, when they shall see our 
 army in the field, they may be induced to join our standard, but 
 at present I very much doubt their intentions. It will not be 
 very practicable to make great progress through the southern 
 Mahratta territories, with such a heavy equipment as Gen. Stuart
 
 2l6 CAN WE RELY ON MYSORE AS A MILITARY BASE? 
 
 has proposed, if the chiefs of this family and Rastia are united 
 against us. 
 
 At all events, at present, owing to the confusion at Poonah, 
 and the delay in assembling our troops on the frontier, the 
 countries on the other side of the Toombuddra are in a sad state 
 of disorder. The heads of districts and of villages have seized 
 the supreme authority, and have raised troops, and are carrying 
 on against each other a petty warfare, which will be as destructive 
 to our supplies and our communications with Mysore as it is to 
 the country itself. Unless, therefore, the Putwurdun, and all the 
 chiefs in this part of the empire, join cordially with us, and take 
 advantage of our presence to settle the country, it is very obvious 
 that we shall lose our communication with Mysore on the day we 
 shall quit the Toombuddra. 
 
 These circumstances have made me turn my mind seriously to 
 a project, which the great distance between Mysore and Poonah 
 had induced me before to take into consideration ; viz. to es- 
 tablish a depot, by means of the Bombay government, either at 
 Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to 
 the island of Bombay, or Salsette, of not very difficult access 
 from the ghauts : this post to be occupied by the Bombay 
 troops, and to be filled with rice, arrack, salt provisions, and 
 military stores for a field train, if we should have fought an 
 action. By this arrangement we should carry on the war at 
 Poonah with an army provided with cattle, &c, from the eastern 
 side of the peninsula, and with the resources of Bombay ; and we 
 should shorten our line of communication many hundred miles. 
 
 2. From the Conclusion of the Treaty to the 
 Rupture with the Confederates. 
 
 117. Lieutenant- General Stuart to Major-Gen. the Hon. 
 A. Wellesley. 
 
 Major- General Wellesleys course, in case of opposition by the 
 SontJiern Jaghiredars. 
 
 (Extract.) Hurryhur, 9 th March, 1.803. 
 
 I have not noticed, in the foregoing orders, the conduct to be 
 observed, on your part, in case of the opposition of any chieftain ; 
 and, in particular, of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom we are 
 led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.
 
 GUARDED INSTRUCTIONS FOR A DELICATE EMERGENCY. 21 J 
 
 The instructions of the Governor-General and Lord Clive 
 contain no orders, and afford no positive rule, to guide my 
 determination on this important head. I infer, however, from 
 the spirit of those instructions, that, if the majority of the 
 southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the 
 people, are found to declare in favour of the restoration of Bajee 
 Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavour 
 to re-establish his authority ; and should the detachment, during 
 the prosecution of that endeavour, encounter the hostility of any 
 individual jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the 
 well-affected jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome 
 his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory 
 opposing resistance to the restoration of the Peshwah, after you 
 have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the 
 chieftains are favourable to that measure, I am of opinion that 
 the instructions which I have received justify me in authorising 
 you to compel his submission. 
 
 This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the 
 case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Mahratta 
 chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor-General's 
 policy is, to avoid a war ; and as his Excellency has directed me 
 to bear this principle in mind, as the rule of our conduct on every 
 emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the 
 adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence 
 of hostilities with any of the parties of the Mahratta empire. 
 
 118. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Prevalence of private zvar in the South Mahratta country. Ge- 
 neral Wcllcsley appeases it; and induces the belligerents to 
 co-operate in the Pes/nvah's cause. Good military results. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Erroor, on the Kistna, ist April, 1803. 
 Since the year 1800, when I was in this country before, it has 
 been one continued contest for power and plunder between the 
 different chiefs who have armies under their command ; between 
 the Putwurdun's (Pursheram Bhow's) family and Goklah, in the 
 countries bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba; 
 between the Putwurdun and the Rajah of Kolapoor in those 
 bordering on the Gutpurba and Kistna ; between Bappojee 
 Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and the Rajah of Kittoor;
 
 1 1 8 GEN. WELLESLEY PA C1FIES SO UTH MA HRA TTA CO UNTR Y. 
 
 between Goklah and the Rajah of Kittoor, and Goklah and 
 Bappojee Scindiah ; besides various others of inferior note, either 
 immediately employed under these, or for themselves, under 
 their protection. I have prevailed on all these chiefs to cease 
 their contests for the present, and to join this detachment with 
 the troops, which would otherwise be employed in the plunder 
 of the country, or in the prosecution of their private quarrels, 
 and to co-operate with me in the service of the Peshwah. They 
 have also allowed me the use of the supplies of the countries 
 under their management or protection, on payment ; and have 
 protected the people belonging to my camp in their passage 
 through their countries. 
 
 For the further protection of the people with supplies, who are 
 on their road to join this camp, I have placed posts on the 
 Werdah, the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, at the places at 
 which it will be necessary to have posts hereafter, if this detach- 
 ment should be in advance of the army, when the rivers shall fill 
 which rise in the western ghauts. I have been joined by the 
 troops of Goklah, of Bappojee Vittell, of Appojee Rao Nepau- 
 neekur (commonly called Appah Dessaye), of the Putwurdun 
 family, of the Rajah of Kittoor, and of Bappojee Scindiah, the 
 killadar of Darwar, whose son is in camp. 
 
 I expect to be joined at Meritch by the troops of Prittee 
 Niddee, of Rastia, and some others. It is impossible to say to 
 what number the whole will amount, but I imagine not less than 
 20,000 horse. 
 
 119. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Partial and hesitating co-operation of the South Mahratta 
 Jaghiredars. They distrust, hate, and fear the Peshwah, 
 and are jealous of our alliance with him. But they look to, 
 and help, us. Their conduct will depend on the PesJnvaJis. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Aklooss, 15th April, 1803. 
 
 My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have re- 
 ceived from the country all the assistance which it could afford. 
 I have been joined by some of the southern jaghiredars, and of the 
 Peshwah's officers, who quitted him, by his desire, at Mhar, after 
 he had fled from Poonah ; but there are many of both descrip- 
 tions still absent. The jaghiredars who have joined are princi- 
 pally those who served with the troops under my command in 
 the campaign of 1800 ; and the sirdars are those lately raised by
 
 JAGHIREDARS THERE COLD IN THE PESHWAH' S CAUSE. 210. 
 
 the Peshwah to high offices in the state from very inferior situa- 
 tions. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the 
 cause of the Peshwah ; but, particularly in the jaghiredars, I have 
 observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detesta- 
 tion of his person, and an apprehension of his power, founded 
 upon a long series of mutual injuries. 
 
 None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of 
 our engagements with the Peshwah, or their sentiments upon 
 them : as, however, these engagements may affect the interests 
 of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable 
 to suppose that they view them with jealousy. I am far from 
 thinking, however, that if, in consequence of these engagements, 
 we should be attacked by any thing like a confederacy of the 
 greater Mahratta powers, we shall have to carry on this contest 
 unassisted by these chiefs ; but the number of those who will 
 assist us, and the degree of assistance which they may give, will 
 depend much upon the Peshwah. 
 
 We have, undoubtedly, an influence over those chiefs, one which 
 is daily increasing, to which I attribute our successful progress to 
 this moment. This influence is founded, in some degree, upon 
 their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our 
 support in forwarding their views, and of our protection against 
 the violence and oppression of their own government, and the 
 greater Mahratta powers. Here we must depend upon the per- 
 sonal character of the Peshwah, and upon the manner in which 
 the new treaty will work : upon which points I shall defer to w r rite 
 any thing until I am better informed. 
 
 Why the alleged confederacy should be promptly dealt with, by 
 requiring ScindiaJi to rccross the Nerbudda ; and ivhy, ?/ 
 he does so, our army should be broken up. 
 
 (Extract.) Same date. 
 
 The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, 
 and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought 
 to a decision as soon as possible : 
 
 1 st. Because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with 
 great advantage during the rainy season. 
 
 2ndly. Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are 
 not ; and every day's delay after this time is an unnecessary 
 increase of expense to us, and an advantage to them. 
 
 3rdly. Because we shall immediately ascertain the views and 
 intentions of the Peshwah regarding the alliance in general ; and
 
 220 SCINDTAH TO BE REQUIRED TO RECROSS THE NERBUDDA. 
 
 we shall leave no time for intrigues among the jaghiredars in his 
 and our interest. 
 
 4thly. Because nothing but our determined and early oppo- 
 sition to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing it to exist. 
 To withdraw from our engagements with the Peshwah will rather 
 accelerate its attack, with the addition of the Pesh wall's force. 
 
 In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peshwah 
 should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive 
 at Poonah) to desire Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda. This 
 chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by 
 our minister at his camp ; and all the screws, menaces, &c, might 
 be brought to bear upon him, upon his Frenchmen, and upon the 
 Rajah of Berar. 
 
 If Scindiah should cross the Nerbudda, and our minister is 
 kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend. We ought 
 immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care 
 to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce 
 the Poonah detachment, whenever their services shall be required, 
 and to keep our north-west frontier of Mysore and the Ceded 
 districts in strength. My reasons for thinking that the army 
 here ought to be broke up, if Scindiah goes across the Nerbudda, 
 are : 
 
 ist. That it does not weaken us, because the same number of 
 Native troops as we have at present will be at Poonah ; we shall 
 have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the 
 Poonah detachment ; and the cavalry in the Ceded districts can 
 always join the Hyderabad detachment in a short time. 
 
 2ndly. Because the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, thus 
 reinforced, can join as soon as Scindiah shows an intention to 
 cross the Nerbudda. 
 
 3rdly. Because, by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing 
 more at Poonah than the usual detachment, the jealousy of our 
 strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in 
 what manner the new treaty will work. 
 
 I think it probable that a system of menace towards Scindiah, 
 his Frenchmen, and the Rajah of Berar, will put a stop to the 
 negotiations for the formation of the confederacy, to which there 
 are already many natural obstacles, particularly as we and the 
 Nizam are prepared, and already in the field. But if Scindiah 
 should refuse to give an unequivocal symptom of his good inten- 
 tions by retiring across the Nerbudda, I can have no doubt of the 
 confederacy ; and, for the reasons I have above stated, we ought
 
 IF HE DOES SO, OUR ARMY SHOULD BE BROKEN UP. 221 
 
 to attack it without loss of time. The operations in this event 
 will be of a nature so general, that it is difficult to give an opinion 
 concerning them. The battle must be fought either on the Ni- 
 zam's frontier, or near Poonah, by these troops ; but the impres- 
 sion which will put an end to the contest, like that which will 
 prevent the confederacy, must be made from the northern frontier 
 of Bengal, and from Midnapoor. 
 
 120. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Diplomatic precautions to prevent the burning of Poonah. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Somergaum, junction of the Neera and Kurrah, 
 17th April, 1803. 
 
 You will observe the communication to Lord Wellesley of the 
 intention of burning Poonah. With a view to prevent the exe- 
 cution of this plan, I have written a very civil letter to Amrut 
 Rao, to announce my approach, in which I have stated that I shall 
 take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on 
 my arrival there. I think it possible that this letter may draw 
 from him an answer, and that he will send me a vakeel ; and if he 
 does, and remains at Poonah, I shall keep up the correspondence 
 till I get within reach of Poonah with the cavalry, when I shall 
 move forward briskly to prevent the execution of this horrible 
 plan. 
 
 121. To Lieutenant- Colonel Collins. 
 
 Warm eulogy on Collins' diplomacy. Importance of Scindiatis 
 declaration. The Nizavis troops not to go to Poonah. 
 
 Camp at Somergaum, at the junction of the rivers 
 Neera and Kurrah, 17th April, 1803. 
 
 After so much time has elapsed since I have had any com- 
 munication with you, it gives me the most sincere pleasure to 
 commence one by the expression of the great gratification which 
 I received in the perusal of your despatch to the Governor- 
 General of the 25th ultimo, a copy of which reached me yester- 
 day from Colonel Close. In the important conference of which 
 you therein give the details, it appears to me that you have dis- 
 played the moderation, the candour, and the dignified firmness 
 which ought to be the characteristics of the diplomatic agents of 
 the British nation in India ; you spoke as a man ought who is
 
 222 IMPORTANCE OF SCINDIAIi's DECLARATION TO COLLINS. 
 
 
 sensible of the justice of the cause which he is urging, and who 
 is certain of being supported ; and notwithstanding the chicane 
 of his ministers, you drew from the Prince with whom you were 
 sent to negotiate a declaration which must be considered as 
 formal, and to which must be attributed the future peace of 
 India, if he should act in conformity to his declaration. 
 
 You will have heard from Colonel Close that I am advancing 
 towards Poonah with a detachment of the army, which is so well 
 equipped and composed, that I should not be apprehensive of the 
 consequences if it were opposed by all the forces of Hindustan. 
 I am now within a few marches of Poonah, where I expect 
 to arrive on the 22nd or 23rd. Colonel Stevenson, with the 
 subsidiary force in the service of the Nizam, reinforced by me 
 by one European regiment, together with His Highness's con- 
 tingent, is on his march up the Beemah, towards Gardoon ; he 
 will leave there, within the Nizam's frontier, all His Highness's 
 troops, and will take a position with those of the Company 
 upon the Beemah,. between Poonah and Gardoon. 
 
 I had determined upon this disposition of part of the troops 
 under my orders before I had seen your letter to the Governor- 
 General, in which you mention the desire of Scindiah that the 
 Nizam's troops should not be brought to Poonah, because it 
 holds out a probability that all the troops will thereby procure 
 some forage ; but I inform you of it that you may make such 
 use of the information as you may think proper. 
 
 I at the same time tell you that I do not propose to bring 
 the Nizam's troops within the Mahratta territory, unless it 
 should be absolutely necessary. 
 
 My first object after I shall reach Poonah will be to bring 
 up the Peshwah from Bassein, for which I have arranged a plan, 
 and have communicated it to Colonel Close. According to this 
 plan he ought to arrive at Poonah at the end of this month. 
 But I cannot answer for the movement of His Highness's person, 
 and therefore cannot say when he will reach that city. 
 
 I shall afterwards take such a position as will appear most 
 likely to enable the troops to subsist with facility in an ex- 
 hausted country, and to form a junction if that measure should 
 be necessary, in which I shall wait the result of the pending 
 negotiations. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 PRESERVATION, AND QUIET OCCUPATION, OF POONAH. 223 
 
 122. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Forced march to PoonaJi. Unresisted occupation of the city. 
 Military advantages of the position. The step justifiable on 
 the ground of the imminence, in any case, of a MaJiratta 
 contest. The Governor-General should not be anxious about 
 the criticism of ' little minds' 
 
 Poonah, 21st April, 1803. 
 
 I arrived here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and 
 the Mahratta troops under Appah Saheb, Goklah, and others of 
 the Peshwah's officers. 
 
 I had received repeated intimations from Col. Close, that 
 Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to burn that 
 city, when I should approach with the British troops ; and, at 
 last, a request from the Peshwah, that I would detach some of 
 his officers with their troops, to provide for the safety of his 
 family. It was obvious, that, even if I could have prevailed 
 upon these officers to go to Poonah, their force was not of the 
 description, or of such strength, as to prevent the execution of 
 Amrut Rao's design ; and I, therefore, determined to march 
 forward with the British cavalry and the Mahrattas, as soon as 
 I should arrive within a long forced march from Poonah. In the 
 mean time, I received intelligence that Amrut Rao was still in 
 the neighbourhood on the 18th; and that he had removed the 
 Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure which was generally 
 supposed to be preparatory to burning the town ; and I marched 
 on the 19th, at night, above 40 miles to this place, making the 
 total distance which the cavalry have marched, since the 19th in 
 the morning, about 60 miles. Amrut Rao heard of our march 
 yesterday morning, and went off with some precipitation, leaving 
 the town in safety. It is generally believed here that he intended 
 to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The 
 infantry will come here to-morrow. 
 
 I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao, in answer to 
 one which I wrote to him. He says that he will send a person 
 to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very im- 
 portant that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing 
 in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwah/s 
 government. 
 
 Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all 
 will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have
 
 224 DEVASTATION CAUSED BY HOLKAR'S ARMY. 
 
 heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our 
 station at this place ; and, notwithstanding their threats, have 
 taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention 
 to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from 
 which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength 
 daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among 
 themselves ; much less have they agreed to attack us, or on any 
 particular plan of attack. If I should be mistaken, and that, in 
 opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our 
 affairs with each of the Mahratta chiefs, who, we are told, were 
 to combine to attack us ; and, upon a comparison of our means 
 of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the 
 Nizam (which is all that they can do), we should still have a war 
 with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that, in 
 consequence of the course of measures which you have already 
 pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from 
 the Company's territories ; and that you have the means of 
 carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its 
 speedy and successful termination. 
 
 In thus reasoning upon the subject, I conclude that we should 
 have had to contend with this confederacy at all events ; or, at 
 least, that we should have had a war with the Mahratta powers, 
 in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peshwah had not been 
 concluded. Upon this point I have only to observe, that the 
 establishment of Holkar's power at Poonah, founded, as it was, 
 upon repeated victories over Scindiah's troops, would probably 
 have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But, supposing that 
 I may be mistaken, I declare, that, from what I have seen of the 
 state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar 
 to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's 
 territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance 
 of 150 miles from Poonah; they have eaten the forage and 
 grain ; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials 
 as firewood ; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. 
 Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature 
 since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch : so that the result 
 of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwah, 
 which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must 
 have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if only for the 
 subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march 
 to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last 
 course might have procrastinated the evil, as they might, in
 
 THIS FACT CONCLUSIVELY JUSTIFIES YOUK'LINE. 225 
 
 those countries, have found subsistence for another year ; but 
 then their next step would have been to seek for it in the 
 Company's territories, the very sources from which we should 
 have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which 
 must have ensued. 
 
 Supposing, therefore, that you should be blamed for adopting 
 a course of measures, in which there is a distant risk that you 
 may have a contest with the Mahratta powers, you have the 
 satisfaction of reflecting, that, in consequence of those measures, 
 the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's 
 territories ; and that you are in such a state of preparation as 
 to insure its speedy success : at all events, it is probable that, 
 if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company 
 or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without 
 having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their 
 duration. 
 
 In all great actions there is risk, which the little minds of 
 those who will form their judgment of your's will readily perceive 
 in that which I am now considering ; but their remarks ought 
 not to give you a moment's uneasiness ; and I have, in this 
 letter, made you acquainted with a fact which must silence 
 every objection to your measures, and which I shall take care to 
 send in an official form, through the channel which I believe to 
 be the source of the croaking which I hear. 
 
 123. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 The Confederacy probably not concluded ; but reported in order 
 to alarm the Nizam. The Resident with him should not 
 encourage such reports. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803. 
 
 The fact is, here I am at Poonah, unopposed, and in strength ; 
 and the Resident knows, or ought to know, that those chiefs, who 
 are supposed to intend to combine against us, have not yet made 
 peace, and cannot have settled any plan of operations. It is true, 
 that, as we have taken into our hands the bone for which they 
 have been contending for some years, not one of them is very 
 well pleased ; and each gives out that the whole will combine 
 against us. But there are many considerations which must be 
 maturely weighed, by at least two of the parties, Scindiah and 
 the Rajah of Berar, before they will venture upon a war with the 
 English, particularly when we are prepared, and they are not. 
 
 Q
 
 2 26 DISCOURAGING ATTITUDE OF PESHWAH & HIS SIRDARS. 
 
 It may be asked, why they give out that they intend to 
 combine? I answer, because they know that some of us are, 
 like other men, to be frightened by their threats ; that, par- 
 ticularly, they have their effect at the Nizam's durbar, in 
 which they are daily brought forward ; and for this reason it is 
 that our Resident at that durbar, instead of listening to the fears 
 of that Court, and propagating them, ought, above all other men, 
 to inculcate the improbability of this combination ; or its certain 
 failure, if it should ever be attempted. 
 
 124. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The Peshwah's Sirdars hold off; and he does not scan to favour 
 the JaghiredarSy whom onr influence has attracted. 
 
 Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803. 
 
 I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th. 
 You will have been informed, by mine of yesterday, that Appah 
 Saheb will remain in this neighbourhood ; and that it is my 
 opinion he will be satisfied with a very moderate settlement of 
 his differences with the Kolapoor Rajah. In respect to the 
 Peshwah's interference in those affairs, I have to observe, that 
 the Putwurdun must be considered as his subjects ; and that 
 they have a right to expect that he will interfere to afford them 
 a protection, which it is his duty to give them. 
 
 According to the instructions I have received, I have entered 
 into no engagements ; but I have promised generally, that those 
 who should join this army, in their master's cause, should be 
 recommended to his favour. From respect to the British nation, 
 and I may almost call it a personal attachment, the chiefs of 
 the Putwurdun family, and Goklah, have joined us ; but not a 
 chief belonging to the Peshwah, excepting Bappojee Vittell. 
 Indeed, as appears by the enclosed letter from Col. Stevenson, 
 some of these are employed in the plunder of the Nizam's 
 country. If our recommendation of these chiefs, who have joined 
 us, is to be unattended to, we must expect, not only that they 
 will leave us, but that no others will ever join us. Soobarow 
 Mooty showed me the Peshwah's sunnuds : they may be forgeries, 
 but I have him here, and you will judge for yourself. 
 
 I wrote to Mr. Duncan this day, respecting his forwarding to 
 us certain of the stores, as my carriage bullocks are so com- 
 pletely done up, that, if I attempt to send them down the ghauts 
 till they have had some rest, I shall lose them alL
 
 THE CHIEFS PROBABLY PLAYING THE GAME OF BRAG. 22J 
 
 125. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Improbability of the Confederacy. Holkar not likely to become 
 Scindialis tool. The Mahratta CJiiefs aware of our power 
 and resolution. They have not threatened British agents, only 
 their native servants, and the Nizam's Court. 
 
 Camp at Panowullah, 10 m. from Poonah, 
 27th April, 1803. 
 
 I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 19th last 
 night. I have great hopes, notwithstanding the threats held out 
 at Hyderabad, that the combination of the northern Chiefs will 
 end in nothing. 
 
 The Governor-General has a strong check upon Scindiah to 
 the northward, and another upon the Rajah of Berar ; and it 
 is not very probable that these Chiefs will involve themselves 
 in a war in which they must be certain losers, merely for the 
 pleasure of plundering the Nizam's country. 
 
 The result, then, of the peace between Scindiah and Holkar. 
 and of this combination, may be, that Holkar will be made the 
 tool to annoy the Nizam : but, supposing that to be the case, 
 against which there are many probabilities, the enemy, although 
 not to be despised, will not be very formidable. But I should 
 doubt Holkar entering, immediately, so far into the views of his 
 rival as to undertake to conduct this contest, as principal, merely 
 for the gratification of his feelings of disappointed ambition. It 
 is much more probable that Holkar will avail himself of the 
 moment of peace to gain possession of the territories belonging 
 to his family, which will probably be ceded to him. Upon the 
 whole, therefore, I think that, although there will be much bad 
 temper and many threats, there will be no hostility. 
 
 I have observed, from the commencement of the negotiations 
 with the Peshwah to the present moment, that no British agent 
 has ever been threatened with this combination. We have heard 
 of it principally from the Court of Hyderabad, and from the 
 Native servants in the employment of our Residents, upon which 
 description of people threats are supposed to have some effect ; 
 but these threats have never been held out to Major Kirkpatrick, 
 Col. Collins, or Col. Close, in their communications with the ser- 
 vants of the principal Mahratta chiefs, or the principals themselves. 
 Amrut Raos vakeel, with whom I had a long conversation the 
 other day. never hinted that there was an idea of a combination 
 
 Q 2
 
 2 28 HOW WE MUST FOIL THEM, IF THEY ARE IN EARNEST. 
 
 of the Mahratta chiefs. I do not conclude, from this silence of 
 theirs towards us, that they have no such idea, because I know 
 it is the common conversation ; but I conclude from it, that they 
 are well aware that we are not people to be frightened by threats ; 
 and that they know that, as soon as they should hold out this 
 threat, we should immediately take some steps to ward off its 
 effects. They know well that we have it in our power both to 
 defend ourselves and annoy them, of which I believe them to be 
 much more afraid than we are of their combination. 
 
 I have heard frequently of the supposed combination of diffe- 
 rent Mahratta chiefs ; but when the nature of our situation upon 
 the frontiers of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has been ex- 
 plained to them (of which they are in general very ignorant), and 
 they have been informed of Scindiah's answers to Col. Collins, 
 they will be satisfied that the combination, if ever formed, will 
 not do us much harm. I marched this morning with an idea of 
 procuring forage with more ease. 
 
 126. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Proposed military movements in case of Scindialis advance to 
 Poonah, or junction zvith Holkar, and attack on the Nisanis 
 country. His approach zvonld probably lose us the support of 
 the Southern JagJiircdars. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803. 
 
 It is my opinion that it is by no means certain that Scindiah 
 will advance to Poonah, and it is most probable that the report 
 of his intended march has been circulated for the purpose of in- 
 timidating us, or the Nizam : however, it is as well to be prepared 
 with a consideration of the measures to be adopted in case 
 Scindiah should advance to Poonah. 
 
 I have no doubt whatever but that the force which will be here 
 when the Peshwah shall arrive will be more than equal to con- 
 tend with his, of which I enclose you an account : I am also of 
 opinion that Col. Stevenson's force with the Nizam's army are 
 fully equal to the defence of the Nizam's country against either 
 Holkar or Scindiah. If both should unite in an attack on the 
 Nizam's country, Col. Stevenson and I must co-operate or join 
 in the defence of it, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the 
 protection of the Peshwah's person against straggling parties : on 
 the other hand, if both should approach Poonah, Col. Stevenson 
 must come nearer to me.
 
 scindiah's advance would detach s. jaghiredars. 229 
 
 You will probably be desirous that I should give my opinion 
 regarding Lieut. -Col. Close's proposal contained in the enclosed 
 paragraph of his letter. In the event of Scindiah's advance, our 
 military position ought to be such as to give confidence to those 
 connected with us, and to show the wavering, and our enemies, 
 that we are really in strength. It would not answer to move at 
 once to Hyderabad, as you would thereby leave open the Rajah 
 of Mysore's country, and the Company's ; and would remove the 
 check upon the southern jaghiredars. But if you were to cross the 
 Toombuddra, and move to Moodgul, you would be nearer the 
 scene of action at Poonah, within 12 or 14 marches from Hy- 
 derabad, and close upon the southern jaghiredars. You would 
 also be in a better situation to defend the Company's frontier. 
 
 In 6 weeks from this time the rivers which rise in the western 
 ghauts will fill. I know that Native armies are then very inca- 
 pable of carrying on their operations ; and you will be so near 
 the Kistna, that you can decide whether you will cross it, and 
 at once carry your decision into execution. We are upon very 
 good terms with those of the southern jaghiredars who are with 
 us. I have prevailed upon Appah Saheb to remain here till the 
 Peshwah shall arrive ; and in consequence of a letter from Col. 
 Close, in which he communicates the desire of the Peshwah that 
 I should distribute 30,000 rupees among his officers who may be 
 most distressed for money, to be repaid on his Highness's arrival 
 at Poonah, I have advanced 20,000 rupees, at two different times, 
 to Goklah. He also appears in very good temper. It is very 
 probable, however, that, in case Scindiah should advance towards 
 Poonah, the jaghiredars will become at best neutral, and will re- 
 turn to- the southward under various pretences ; and if there 
 should be nothing to check their enterprises, their neutrality 
 would very soon degenerate into enmity. 
 
 127. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Our advanced military position may avert war. To abandon it f 
 and our engagements with the Peshwah, would be dangerous 
 both to us and to the Nizam. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 3rd May, 1803. 
 
 A war with the Mahrattas must have been the consequence of 
 the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October 
 and November last, and the Nizam's territories must have been 
 the scene of its operations.
 
 l^O WE CANNOT SAFELY RETRACE OUR STEPS. 
 
 The advantageous military positions which we have taken up 
 in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah, 
 and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may, 
 in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended ; 
 at all events, will considerably alleviate their evil ; but this must 
 depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are 
 much mistaken if we suppose that, to depart from our engage- 
 ments with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous 
 military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed 
 intentions of the northern Mahratta powers to go to war, or will 
 save the Nizam's territories. Such a line of conduct not only 
 would expose his Highness' interests and power, but those of the 
 Hon. Company, to the most imminent danger. 
 
 128. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Inherent weakness of the Confederacy. Our best means of 
 dissolving it. Circumstances favourable for Colonel Collins 1 
 negotiation ivith Scindiah. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 9th May, 1803. 
 
 The confederacy against which, according to appearances, we 
 may have to contend, is composed of persons and powers among 
 whom there can be no common interest excepting that of plunder, 
 and there are many sources of jealousy and enmity. They will 
 soon find that they have everything to lose by hostilities with the 
 English government, and such is the state of our military prepa- 
 rations in this quarter that they have but little hope of gain. 
 Some of them, also (please God), may come in for harder blows 
 than they expect, and upon the whole we may reasonably look 
 for the speedy dissolution of this confederacy. 
 
 But there are two modes of pressing upon it, or rather the one 
 must be the immediate consequence of the other : I mean, nego- 
 tiation and arms. By the position of our forces in this quarter 
 we must deprive our enemies of the only hope for the attainment 
 of which they have formed this confederacy, viz. the plunder of 
 the Nizam's country. By the operations of those in Bengal we 
 must show them that they have something to lose ; and we must 
 press these points upon their minds by means of the ability and 
 diligence of our diplomatic agents. 
 
 The Prince at whose court you have resided is one of the 
 principal members of the confederacy ; he has most to lose and
 
 FOUR ARTS MUST POINT THE MORAL OF OUR ARMS. 23 1 
 
 least to gain in the contest, because, whatever may be the suc- 
 cess of this plundering expedition, his troops are not of that 
 description to partake of its benefits in proportion to their num- 
 bers and importance, and his territories are most exposed to our 
 invasions. His mind also appears to be adverse to the course of 
 measures which his ministers have adopted ; he is of a disposi- 
 tion to take sudden measures in consequence of the failure of the 
 military operations, against those who advised them ; and it ap- 
 pears that he has a great respect and regard for you. Under all 
 these circumstances I anxiously hope that he may have endea- 
 voured to prevail upon you to remain with him, and that you 
 may have stayed. 
 
 129. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Danger of ScindiaJis marching to Poonah. Colonel Collins does 
 not see this. Desirableness of one decisive local authority, 
 under the Governor-General s instructions. 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803. 
 
 I received, this day, your letter of the 22nd April ; and I shall 
 immediately write the dispatches which you have desired I 
 should. As, however, appearances are doubtful to the north- 
 ward, as you will perceive by Col. Collins s late dispatches, I 
 cannot fix the time at which the troops can return to their 
 stations ; but I still think we shall not have a war. 
 
 We are playing a little at cross purposes here. Col. Collins 
 encourages Scindiah to march to Poonah, or rather does not 
 object to that march, which ought to be done at present. Col. 
 Close and I think that the Peshwah ought to write to Scindiah, 
 to inform him that he has regained his power, and that he must 
 not come here ; and that I ought to write a letter to Scindiah, in 
 similar terms. The consequence of his coming will be a contest, 
 preceded by a long Mahratta negotiation, in the course of which 
 he will intrigue with all the Peshwah's chiefs, shake their alle- 
 giance, and throw the country (which is getting into order) into 
 a new scene of confusion. It is better, by far, that the contest 
 should be at a distance ; but there is a far better chance of 
 avoiding it entirely, if we keep him away. 
 
 We ought to have some authority here to settle matters with 
 all these chiefs, under some general instructions from you. The 
 state of affairs varies daily; and, before orders can come from
 
 232 THE DANGER OF DIVIDED AUTHORITY AND COUNSELS. 
 
 Bengal upon any question, the circumstances which ought to 
 guide the decision have entirely changed. Besides, the fact that 
 Col. Collins does not object to Scindiah's march to Poonah, and 
 that Col. Close and I think it necessary to object to it, shows 
 the propriety of vesting some person with authority to direct all 
 our affairs in this quarter. 
 
 Malcolm is not very well, and is gone into Poonah ; but I 
 have proposed to him to go to Bengal, to point out to you the 
 state of affairs in this quarter, and to urge the adoption of this 
 measure. 
 
 You will hear, from Col. Close, how the Peshwah is going on. 
 As soon as he makes his entry into Poonah, and 1 shall have 
 settled, at that place, the detachment which may be deemed 
 sufficient for the protection of his person, I intend to move 
 towards the Nizam's frontier. 
 
 130. To Lord Hobart, Secretary of State. 
 
 Retrospect of measures for the restoration of the Peshivah. Mili- 
 tary dispositions for the defence of the Nizanis and the 
 Company s territories, and of Mysore. The Peshwah 's go- 
 vernment settling fast : he appears decided to abide by the 
 Treaty. Without it, a Mahratta war must have ocacrred, 
 which it may prevent. 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803. 
 
 In consequence of orders from his Excellency the Governor- 
 General, of which I enclose a copy, I transmit to your Lordship 
 an account of the proceedings of the British troops under my 
 command, to this date. 
 
 You will have heard from the government that I was detached 
 in the month of March from the army assembled on the frontiers 
 of Mysore, with about 9000 men, to effect a junction with the 
 Company's troops subsidized by the Nizam, and his Highness's 
 army assembled on the western frontier ; and then to proceed to 
 Poonah, in order to assist in the restoration of the Peshwah to 
 the exercise of the power of his government. I marched nearly 
 600 miles through the territories of the Mahrattas, not only 
 unopposed by them, but receiving all the assistance which their 
 country could afford. As the country, however, through which 
 I marched since I crossed the river Kistna had been the scene of
 
 NARRATIVE OF THE MARCH TO POONAH. 233 
 
 the horrid depredations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's troops, I could 
 not draw much from it. 
 
 I was joined on my march by several of the jaghiredars in the 
 southern districts, principally those who served with the British 
 troops under my command in the year 1800 ; and by the Pesh- 
 wah's officers who had quitted his Highness, by his desire, when 
 he fled from Mhar, after the defeat of his army by Jeswunt Rao 
 Holkar, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. At length I formed a 
 junction with the subsidiary force and the Nizam's army, to the 
 northward of Punderpoor, on the 15th April. 
 
 Jeswunt Rao Holkar quitted Poonah in the end of March, and 
 went towards Chandore, a fortress in his possession to the north- 
 ward of the river Godavery. His detachments, which had been 
 as far to the southward as the neighbourhood of Meritch and 
 that of Beejapoor, fell back as I advanced, and at length went 
 off to the northward when I formed the junction with the Nizam's 
 army. I was thus enabled to make a disposition of the troops 
 which would provide for the security of the Nizam's frontier ; and 
 for that of the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to his capital. 
 Accordingly, having reinforced the subsidiary force by a regi- 
 ment of European infantry, I broke up immediately again and 
 moved upon Poonah, with my own division and the Mahrattas, 
 where I arrived on the 20th April ; and I left the Nizam's troops 
 upon his Highness's frontier. 
 
 From thence, in the neighbourhood of Gardoon, our line ex- 
 tended to the western ghauts, and the troops could subsist with 
 ease, and could assemble at any point at a short notice. After 
 I had made this disposition, I learned that Jeswunt Rao Holkar 
 had entered the Nizam's territories in the neighbourhood of 
 Aurungabad, that he had surrounded that city with his troops, 
 and had demanded large sums of money from the inhabitants. 
 
 The Peshwah was not arrived at Poonah; but as he was 
 attended by a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of 
 the 78th regt., 5 companies of the 84th, and a battalion of Native 
 infantry, with artillery, under Col. Murray, there was every ap- 
 pearance that his march to his capital would be uninterrupted. 
 
 On the 28th April, I ordered Col. Stevenson, the commanding 
 officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, to move 
 to the northward with that force and the Nizam's army. I 
 expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whom I apprised of these 
 orders, would draw off", as soon as he should find that Col. 
 Stevenson was approaching him, and he has done so. Col.
 
 234 MEASURES FOR DEFENDING THE NIZAM'S COUNTRY. 
 
 Stevenson is now posted upon the river Seenah, about 50 miles 
 to the northward of Gardoon ; from which place he can protect the 
 Nizam's frontier as far as Aurungabad, or he can move towards 
 Hyderabad, or can join with my division, as may appear advisable. 
 
 The Peshwah arrived at Chinchore, about 8 miles from Poonah, 
 on the 7th inst., and his Highness proposes to make his entry 
 into his capital on the 13th inst. By that time the detachment 
 from the Bombay army, under Col. Murray, will have got pos- 
 session of the fort of Carnallah, in the Konkan, the killadar of 
 which refused to deliver the fort to his Highness the Peshwah ; 
 and I shall then move towards the frontier of the Nizam. 
 
 It is impossible to obey the orders conveyed in the second and 
 third paragraphs of the enclosed copy of a letter from his Excel- 
 lency the Governor-General, for reasons connected with certain 
 political events which have occurred since the probable date of 
 his Excellency's dispatches to your Lordship. At that period 
 the Governor-General must have received the accounts from the 
 Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; from which there 
 was every reason to believe, from his own declarations, that that 
 prince was satisfied in his own mind that the treaty of Bassein 
 contained no stipulations injurious to his interests, and that he 
 would not endeavour to prevent the parties from carrying it into 
 execution. But by dispatches written to the Governor-General 
 by the Resident with Scindiah, on the 25th April and the 1st 
 and 2nd inst., copies of which I have perused, it appears that the 
 disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam is not 
 so friendly as might have been expected, and that that prince 
 intended to march from Burhampoor on the 4th inst. I am 
 doubtful of the direction of his march ; but it is reported that 
 he intends to approach the Nizam's frontier, to meet there the 
 Rajah of Berar. 
 
 Your Lordship will observe, that I have already taken mea- 
 sures for the defence of the territories of his Highness the Nizam ; 
 and that I propose to march to that quarter with my own divi- 
 sion, as soon as the Peshwah shall have entered Poonah, leaving 
 at that city such a detachment of the Bombay troops as may be 
 deemed sufficient for the protection of his Highness's person. 
 These measures, as they must preclude all hopes of forming an 
 establishment within the Nizam's frontier, or of any very lucrative 
 plunder, in the short space of time between this and the period 
 at which the rivers will fill that rise in the western ghauts, may 
 probably prevent the supposed march into the Nizam's territories.
 
 THE COURSE PURSUED HAS BEEN JUDICIOUS. 235 
 
 At all events, it is my opinion that neither Dowlut Rao Scindiah, 
 the Rajah of Berar, nor Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will venture to 
 remain within our reach, where their operations will be confined 
 by the rivers. Therefore, the invasion of the Nizam's territories, 
 if it should be made, will be confined to his frontiers. 
 
 Upon the whole, considering the slight hopes of advantage 
 which these Chiefs can have in this invasion, and the certain loss 
 to which two of them at least must be liable, from a state of 
 hostility with the British government, with which your Lordship 
 must be well acquainted, I cannot believe that they will venture 
 upon a course of measures so hopeless ; and it is probable that 
 the reports of the march of the Rajah of Berar, and of the 
 direction of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the 
 Nizam's territories, have been circulated with a view to intimidate 
 the Peshwah and the Nizam. But until the views of these princes 
 are decided, it is impossible to recommend that the army in this 
 quarter should be broken up. In the mean time, the Peshwah's 
 government is settling fast ; and his Highness appears to be 
 decided to adhere to the treaty with the Company, and to for- 
 ward all the objects of the alliance. If, contrary to my expecta- 
 tions, the northern Chiefs should be determined upon hostilities 
 with the British government, the military position which we have 
 obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and by the rapid march of the 
 division under my command, and the advanced state of our 
 military preparations, afford means of protecting the territories 
 of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore. 
 
 It is unfortunate that the territories of the Nizam should have 
 suffered by the irruption of a freebooter at Aurungabad, and 
 that they should be threatened again by Dowlut Rao Scindiah 
 and the Rajah of Berar. But scarcely a year has passed in 
 which his Highness has not suffered or apprehended a similar 
 misfortune ; and there is no doubt but that he must have suf- 
 fered in a greater degree in this year, if the treaty of Bassein 
 had not been concluded. 
 
 The certain consequence of the establishment of the power of 
 Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah must have been the invasion of 
 the Nizam's territory, if only for the subsistence of the troops. 
 It would not have been possible to draw subsistence for those 
 numerous bodies of horse, for another year, from the countries 
 between the Godayery and the Kistna, through which I have 
 marched ; and they must have sought for it either in the Nizam's 
 territories or in the countries to the southward of the Kistna.
 
 2$6 COLONEL COLLINS TOO HASTY IN LEAVING SCINDIAH. 
 
 In either case, the Nizam's territories would have been invaded ; 
 and in the latter, those of the Company and of the Rajah of 
 Mysore. 
 
 Although it is by no means certain that endeavours will be 
 made by any of the Mahratta chiefs to interrupt the execution 
 of the treaty of Bassein, yet, as appearances are doubtful, and 
 the reports which are in circulation may reach your Lordship, 
 I have thought it proper to avail myself of the orders of his 
 Excellency the Governor-General, to make you acquainted with 
 the real state of the public affairs in this quarter ; and with the 
 means which we have of resisting this interruption, and of de- 
 fending the Company's ally, the Nizam. 
 
 131. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Colonel Collins' ivithdraival from Scindiah's camp premature 
 and mischievous. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 10th May, 1803. 
 
 I hope that Col. Collins will have been induced to remain in 
 Scindiah's camp. I think that he was rather hasty in his deter- 
 mination to withdraw ; and that, by withdrawing, on the grounds 
 of Scindiah's altering the direction of his march, he has done 
 no good. Scindiah's ministers will still go on negotiating with 
 Col. Collins's Native agents, and they will persuade their master 
 that the absence of the Colonel from his camp is not a novel 
 occurrence, and is not a sign of war. Thus we shall lose all the 
 advantages of the check upon them of Col. Collins's presence, 
 and of his influence over Scindiah ; and, by the manner in which 
 he has withdrawn, he has not given Scindiah any reason to fear 
 the commencement of hostilities with the Company. 
 
 132. To the Hon. H. Wellesley. 
 
 Holkar apologises for /us conduct at Aurtingabad. Scindiah's 
 inconsistency. Proposed remonstrance with him, and march 
 into the Nizam's country. The Peshwah seems true to the 
 alliance. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803. 
 
 Holkar, to whom I wrote a letter to desire that he would re- 
 frain from the plunder of the Nizam's country near Aurungabad, 
 has written a very civil answer, in which he says that he went to
 
 MAHRATTAS MUST BE KEPT IN ORDER BY FEAR. 1$*] 
 
 Aurungabad to claim some money, which the Nizam's soubahdar 
 had received, for 5 years, from 2 villages belonging to him, in the 
 neighbourhood of that city; that he had received part of what he 
 wanted, and that he had done no injury to the country, and was 
 then about to depart. It is true that he has 2 villages near 
 Aurungabad ; and I am informed that it is true that he has done 
 no injury to the country ; but I do not believe that he has moved 
 farther than 6 or 7 miles from Aurungabad. 
 
 It is reported here, that the Nizam's soubahdar of Aurungabad 
 invited Holkar to the plunder of that place ; and I think there is 
 some foundation for this report. 
 
 Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th inst., but on 
 the 7th he had made only one march. He waited for the 
 Peshwah's vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, who was the person deputed 
 by the Peshwah to communicate the treaty of Bassein to Scindiah. 
 In fact, Ballojee Koonger was Scindiah's vakeel at Poonah, and 
 he continued to act in that capacity after he was appointed to be 
 the Peshwah's Dewan. He was in that situation when the Peshwah 
 concluded the treaty of Bassein, to which he was privy. After 
 this circumstance, and Scindiah's declaration to Collins, which you 
 will read in the Governor-Generals dispatch to the Secret Com- 
 mittee, it is strange that there should be now a prospect that 
 Scindiah will oppose the arrangement. I have had more dealings 
 with the Mahrattas than any other man now in India ; and it is 
 my opinion that they must be brought into order by an operation 
 on their fears. 
 
 The Governor-General tells me that he is going to send me 
 instructions, and I delay to do any thing till I hear further from 
 him. My own opinion is, that I ought to write to Scindiah, to 
 point out to him the danger of involving himself in hostilities 
 with the British government, and to tell him that I was going into 
 the Nizam's territories ; that we are bound by treaty to defend 
 them, and that he must expect very unpleasant consequences if 
 I should find him there. At the same time, I should recall to 
 his recollection his own sentiments on the treaty of Bassein ; and 
 I should press him to state openly his doubts, if he entertained 
 any, as well as his claims upon the Nizam. If this letter should 
 have any effect, I would press him by another to cross the Ner- 
 budda. In the mean time, at all events, whether I write to him 
 or not, I shall march into the Nizam's country; and if the govern- 
 ment of Bombay supply me with a bridge of boats, for which 
 I have asked them, I shall carry on the campaign during the
 
 238 IMPRACTICABLE CHARACTER OF THE PESHWAH. 
 
 rainy season, which the Mahrattas cannot do ; and I think that 
 a few months will entirely settle the question. I have got a fine 
 army, in excellent order ; and I think that this combination or 
 confederacy, with which we are threatened, will find that we can 
 march as well as fight. 
 
 The Peshwah appears determined to adhere to the alliance, and 
 to forward all its objects : he has written to Scindiah, and to the 
 Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not enter his country. 
 
 133. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Failure of the PesInvaJi to perform his engagements to secure 
 the Southern JagJiiredars. Their consequent absence from 
 General Welleslcys army. Mischief of delay. General 
 Welle sky thinks the Peshwah incapable only, not treacherous. 
 The importance of promptly compelling Scindiah to take a 
 decided line — increased by the news of peace in Europe. Need 
 of special powers from the Governor-General insisted on. 
 
 Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803. 
 
 I marched from Poonah this morning, and shall proceed towards 
 the Godavery. I am sorry to tell you that, notwithstanding our 
 strong recommendation of the southern jaghiredars and the 
 Peshwah's officers to his Highness ; his solemn promise to me 
 that he would satisfy their claims in order to secure their future 
 services ; and the assurances of his servants from time to time to 
 Col. Close, that his Highness was taking measures to satisfy them, 
 and to send out an army with me, I have not got with me one 
 Mahratta horseman. Ragonaut Rao, however, has told Col. Close 
 that the Peshwah will give the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb, 
 and will not make the demand of the nuzzer. Appah Saheb has 
 visited him, and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath is in treaty with Appah 
 Saheb respecting the satisfaction of his other claims. But the 
 Peshwah trusts none of his ministers, and pretends to do his own 
 business ; although his time is much taken up by religious cere- 
 monies and his pleasures, and he is very undecided. These faults 
 in his character, added to a slowness natural to every* Mahratta 
 negotiator, render hopeless the conclusion of any important 
 transaction. 
 
 In the mean time the season is advancing, the rivers which rise 
 in the western ghauts will soon fill ; and then, if I am not on the 
 spot to urge the chiefs, to take all the trouble, and to make all
 
 SPECIAL POWERS, TO TREAT, & ACT PROMPTLY, NEEDED. 239 
 
 the arrangements which are necessary to cross the rivers with the 
 troops, months will elapse before they will overtake me ; even if 
 the Peshwah should settle their claims, as far as to induce them 
 to march from Poonah at all. This conduct of the Peshwah would 
 appear like treachery; but I declare that I do not suspect him of 
 treachery. I really believe that he thinks his only safety is in 
 the alliance with the Company, and that he wishes to carry into 
 execution all the stipulations of the treaty. But he is incapable 
 himself of doing business ; he will not trust his ministers ; and 
 he is jealous of, and detests, his sirdars. The news which came 
 from England yesterday makes it very desirable that we should 
 break up in this quarter. 
 
 I have seen Col. Collins's letter to you of the 29th May; and 
 as I think it possible that the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah may 
 never meet, I have urged the Colonel to press Scindiah to name 
 a day on which he will explain his intentions ; and if Scindiah 
 should decline to name a day, he should fix one for him, beyond 
 which, in my opinion, he ought not to remain in his camp, if the 
 explanation should not be satisfactory. 
 
 If Scindiah should move off, which I still think is very pro- 
 bable. I shall break up immediately. There must be troops in 
 the Carnatic when the French arrive at Pondicherry. There will 
 be none, unless Gen. Stuart's army can march to that quarter ; 
 and if he should move before Scindiah shall have declared him- 
 self, the movement may have much effect upon Scindiah's de- 
 claration. And if there should be a war, the operations of this 
 body of troops, at such a distance from our own frontiers, will be 
 unpleasant, unless Gen. Stuart's force should be so posted as to 
 preserve tranquillity in our rear, and defend the Company's terri- 
 tories. Upon the whole, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that 
 Scindiah should immediately declare himself, and that, if his de- 
 claration should be favourable to our wishes, we should break up. 
 Holkar's army is melting away: he is gone to the northward of 
 the Taptee, and it is reported that he is going into Hindustan. 
 
 I wish that there were powers here to act at once, and to direct 
 the negotiations with the different Mahratta chiefs to certain 
 points as they arise. These questions occur daily, and nearly six 
 weeks elapse before your orders can be received upon every fresh 
 occurrence. At this moment Col. Collins ought to be ordered to 
 press Scindiah to give an answer, particularly as he has hinted 
 that he is wavering between peace and war; and time, which is 
 all that Scindiah requires, and which is fatal to us, will be gained
 
 240 YOU MUST BRING SCINDIAH TO A DEFINITIVE ISSUE. 
 
 by the necessity of waiting for your orders, unless Col. Collins 
 should attend to my suggestion. A communication ought also 
 to be opened with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar, upon the sub- 
 ject of the treaty of Bassein, and endeavours made to separate 
 them from Scindiah ; and the Peshwah ought to be made to show 
 his correspondence with Scindiah. I conclude, however, that Col. 
 Close will ascertain whether his Highness has written to that 
 chief, as he asserts he has. 
 
 134. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Scindiah's language would justify immediate war. Yet he will 
 probably yield at last. Still, both local circumstances and the 
 prospect of renewed war with France require that he should 
 be brought to a prompt decision. 
 
 Camp near Charowly, 4th June, 1803. 
 
 I marched from Poonah this morning, and I shall continue my 
 marches towards the river Godavery. Colonel Stevenson has 
 crossed that river at Puttun. 
 
 I have just received your letter of the 30th of May, and 
 Colonel Close has sent me that which you have transmitted to 
 him of the same date. I am concerned that Scindiah should not 
 have given you at once the answer which I think he will give 
 you in the end. 
 
 I observe that in the 16th paragraph of the note of instructions 
 to you, the Governor-General requires that Dowlut Rao Scindiah 
 should instantly explain himself without reserve ; but instead of 
 making this explanation, he tells you that when he will meet the 
 Rajah of Berar he will let you know whether it is to be peace or 
 war. That very answer might justify an immediate attack upon 
 Scindiah's possessions ; but when it is connected with the pro- 
 bable delay of the arrival of the Rajah of Berar, and of the pro- 
 posed meeting (which, after all, I believe will never take place), 
 it appears to be absolutely necessary that there should be some 
 farther explanation, or that, at all events, Dowlut Rao Scindiah 
 should be called upon to fix the time at which he will give the 
 asked for explanation. You will observe that I am directed to re- 
 gulate my conduct in conformity to ^ the instructions to you and 
 to Colonel Close ; but it is obvious that unless I am to consider 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah's delay to explain himself as a refusal, 
 I cannot act ; and unless he is called upon to fix the time when
 
 IS THE PESHWAH PLAYING US FALSE? 24 1 
 
 he will give his explanation, we shall be obliged to remain in the 
 situation which we ought particularly to endeavour to avoid, 
 viz. with armies in the field incurring all the expense and incon- 
 venience of war, without any of its honours or advantages. 
 
 You will observe that the object of all the Governor-General's 
 instructions is to bring the question to a speedy decision, and 
 to break up the army in this quarter. The necessity of this 
 becomes more evident when we reflect upon the intelligence of 
 the nth of March received from Europe last night, from which 
 it appears that there is a probability of the renewal of the war 
 
 with France. -n ,. 
 
 Believe me, & c. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 135. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Stubborn facts, which impugn the PesJnvah's sincerity in the 
 alliance. Ought %ve not to withdraiv from it, and negotiate 
 with the Confederates on a different basis ? 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 8th June, 1803. 
 
 My being in the field here, without any of the Peshwah sirdars, 
 is rather an awkward circumstance ; and, in my opinion, we must 
 immediately take into consideration the general situation of our 
 affairs, and act in such manner as may appear best for the 
 public interest. I have always thought the Peshwah to be in- 
 capable rather than disaffected ; and I have imagined that he 
 would send out an army with us, if he could : but two or three 
 facts have occurred which rather warrant a conclusion to the con- 
 trary. One of these is, that he has not ordered out even Bappojee 
 Vittell, whose troops were sent to encamp in my front, with great 
 parade, on the day after I had the interview with his Highness ; 
 another is his shuffling backwards and forwards with Goklah and 
 Appah Dessaye ; and the third is his offer of the Zereen Putka 
 to Appah Saheb, without the power attached to it, and, of course, 
 without the honour. These are three stubborn facts, which we 
 cannot conceal from ourselves, and which prove that there is 
 something to prevent our having a Mahratta army in the field, 
 besides his Highness's incapacity for business. 
 
 The present moment is critical. Our appearance in strength 
 may prevent the threatened hostilities ; but if it is clear that we 
 are not strong at Poonah, which it must be to the whole world, if 
 we continue in the field without even one Mahratta horseman, it 
 
 R
 
 242 OUGHT WE NOT TO CHANGE OUR POLITICAL LINE ? 
 
 is obvious that we are weak, not only in appearance, but in 
 a military point of view. There can be no doubt but that a war 
 With these confederated Mahrattas would be rather a difficult 
 undertaking, and attended with some kind of risk, if this body 
 of troops be not accompanied by a corps of the light cavalry. 
 The question is, whether, by our own influence and negotiations, 
 we can bring forward immediately the body of cavalry, and the 
 chiefs who came with me to Poonah, and, at the same time, keep 
 up an appearance of an understanding with the Peshwah. If that 
 can be effected in any manner, it is my opinion that the public 
 interests imperiously demand it, and I shall do every thing to 
 bring them forward. My objects in bringing them forward would 
 be to give us such strength as would probably prevent hostilities, 
 or, if the hostilities should take place, would give us a prospect of 
 bringing them to a speedy conclusion. In either case, I am de- 
 cidedly of opinion, that the alliance, in its present form, and with 
 the present Peshwah, will never answer; and my efforts would be 
 directed to withdrawing from it with honour and safety. If we 
 cannot bring forward a body of this horse, and as, in my opinion, 
 the alliance will not work in its present form, or at all with the 
 present Peshwah, with whom it is not possible to have a com- 
 munity of interests, the question is, whether we ought not to alter 
 the mode, and form, and object of our negotiations with Scindiah, 
 Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. All these questions press for 
 immediate decision, and I put them to you and Malcolm for your 
 consideration. 
 
 136. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Doubtful policy of the Treaty. Want of independent authority in 
 the I 'es/nuah. Bad tendency of subsidiary alliances, in tveak- 
 ening the governments subject to them. Effect of the Tj-eaty 
 in case of war with the French — the crucial test. It gives 
 tts a good military position ; but may overbalance this by 
 uniting the Mahratta Chiefs against us. War with France 
 will involve -war with the Mahrattas. Yet they could not 
 efficiently unite with the French. Proposed modification of 
 our alliance with the Peslrwah. His dislike of us, and un- 
 steadiness to it. Scindialis hostile attitude really due to him. 
 
 Camp at Rooie, 20th June, 1803. 
 I have received your letter of the 18th, with the memorandum 
 
 enclosed, and I agree almost entirely in the opinions which you
 
 WE HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE MAHRATTA POLITY. 243 
 
 have given. Till the question with the confederacy is decided 
 we must stick to our ground in this country, otherwise the Nizam, 
 and we, eventually, must suffer ; and, even supposing that by 
 withdrawing now we could stop the hostilities, which I doubt, we 
 should only defer them to a period at which, probably, we should 
 be less prepared than we are at the present moment. But as 
 soon as there shall be no threats of the confederacy, either by the 
 withdrawing of Scindiah, or from the success of the war, it is my 
 opinion that we ought either entirely to new model the alliance, 
 or to withdraw from it. You are well acquainted with my opinions 
 on this subject. 
 
 The greater experience I gain of Mahratta affairs, the more 
 convinced I am that we have been mistaken entirely regarding 
 the constitution of the Mahratta Empire. In fact, the Peshwah 
 never has had exclusive power in the state : it is true, that all 
 treaties have been negotiated under his authority, and have been 
 concluded hi his name ; but the chiefs of the Empire have con- 
 sented to them ; and the want of this consent, on the part of any 
 one of them, in this case, or of power in the head of the Empire, 
 independent of these chiefs, is the difficulty of this case at the 
 present moment. I put out of the question the consent of the 
 Putwurduns, Goklah, &c, because I have always considered, and 
 it must appear to every body to be one which proceeds from 
 causes entirely independent of the treaty, and of the circum- 
 stances which occasioned it, and of the Peshwah himself. These 
 chiefs act under the treaty, because they had a previous ac- 
 quaintance with us ; and because they saw some prospect of being 
 relieved from their difficulties by our interference, and of becom- 
 ing in some degree independent under our protection. Had it 
 not been for this hope, not one of them would have been with us, 
 and we should have had a treaty with a cipher, bearing the name 
 of Peshwah, without a particle of power. 
 
 Whatever may be the result of the present crisis, we shall gain 
 nothing by the treaty. Scindiah, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, 
 and possibly others, will be separate and independent powers in 
 India, very probably leagued for the present in a defensive alli- 
 ance. We must look to that, and must not reduce our military 
 establishments. Is the peace of India secured ? I doubt it, as 
 far as we are concerned. Supposing there should be no war with 
 the confederates, the first consequence of the alliance must be to 
 re-establish the government of the Peshwah in the northern coun- 
 tries, then to settle the Kolapoor question, &c. ; and, supposing 
 
 R 2
 
 244 IS A FRENCH WAR COMING? — THE PIVOT QUESTION. 
 
 that we have another war with the French, there is no doubt but 
 that we shall have a war with the Mahrattas. 
 
 One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they 
 entirely annihilate the military power of the governments with 
 which we contract them ; and their reliance for their defence is 
 exclusively upon us. This treaty with the Peshwah has certainly 
 given us a good military position ; but the question is, whether, 
 in case the nation should be involved in a war with the French, 
 which, in my opinion, is the hypothesis upon which all Indian 
 politics should turn, the military position is so good that it cannot 
 be forced ; and whether we do not lose more by the risk of having 
 all the powerful Mahrattas against us, at such a time, than we should 
 gain by having the Peshwah certainly on our side, and by the good- 
 ness of our military position. Upon this point I have to observe, 
 that the more I see of the Mahrattas, the more convinced I am 
 that they never could have any alliance with the French. The 
 French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would 
 cost money, or money to procure them ; and there is not a Mah- 
 ratta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest 
 horseman, who has a shilling, or who would not require assistance 
 from them. 
 
 In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled ? In 
 my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some 
 chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state 
 in their hands ; we ought to keep up our connexion with the 
 Peshwah, so as that he might not be trampled upon ; at the same 
 time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the 
 Empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases 
 in which the state should be called upon to decide. In short, I 
 would preserve the existence of the state ; and guide its actions 
 by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and 
 establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty. In this 
 consideration of the subject I have not touched upon the disin- 
 clination of the Peshwah to the alliance, of which I have scarcely 
 a doubt, and, at all events, upon his inability to perform the con- 
 ditions to which he has bound himself. But he has not even per- 
 formed those conditions which must be in his power. Has he not 
 now daily communications with Scindiah's durbar, and even with 
 Holkar, of which the British Resident has no knowledge what- 
 ever? His very letter to Scindiah, which has been extorted from 
 him, almost by force, contains a breach of treaty. In it, he de- 
 sires that chief to remain where he is, pointedly; whereas, he
 
 TREATY TO BE MODIFIED, WHEN THE CRISIS IS OVER. 245 
 
 knows that the requisition of the Governor-General, and the 
 only event which can ensure peace, is Scindiah's recrossing the 
 Nerbudda. 
 
 You may depend upon it, that, if Collins had not pushed the 
 negotiation as he has done ; and if Scindiah had any option be- 
 sides moving into the Nizam's territories, or returning to his own 
 to procure subsistence : in short, if he could procure subsistence 
 where he is, he would remain there, in consequence of this para- 
 graph in the Peshwah's letter. Besides, I see, in the ackbar, that 
 he is going to send another vakeel to Scindiah. For what pur- 
 pose ? And let it be stated for what reason the Peshwah did not 
 give his letter to the British minister to be forwarded to Scin- 
 diah, knowing that that Chief says the last did not reach him, 
 instead of sending it through his own vakeel, whom he must 
 mistrust. Upon the whole, I see no prospect under the present 
 treaty, and I should decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity 
 may offer. 
 
 Collins is just in the right state. The fellow will explain him- 
 self, and will ask him to stay, and will pretend that he cannot 
 move off on account of the rain, the swelling of the rivers, or be- 
 cause my troops are in this country; and thus the matter may 
 hang on for some time longer. I think that, if the war had not 
 been still doubtful, Collins would have got an answer inimical 
 to his memorial. The truth is, they are all shaking ; and, 
 if the allies had come out of Poonah with me, there would 
 be no war. 
 
 I wish you would take up money wherever you can get it, and 
 not from me. The Company maybe losers, but my treasury will 
 be richer. 
 
 137. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Holkars conduct will probably determine that of Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Bcrar. Hence, the impolicy of threatening him 
 with war on our part. General Wellesley's want of grain 
 and transport. The Peshwah's faithlessness to the alliance, 
 and his faihtre to provide transport bullocks. Political and 
 military moral of the situation. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp, 23rd June, 1803. 
 
 I think it probable that the confederates have not yet arranged 
 their matters, that Holkar has not yet come into their views, and
 
 246 WE OUGHT NOT TO THREATEN HOLE A R WITH WAR. 
 
 that for that reason they wish to delay the decision for some 
 time longer. Holkar's object would appear to be to get hold 
 of the Holkar territory, and his game to effect it by a war 
 between Scindiah and us. If there should be no war between 
 Scindiah and us, he will get hold of that territory, but not so 
 certainly, either by a peace mediated by Ragojee Bhoonslah, 
 and guaranteed by him, or by the continuation of the contest 
 with Scindiah. Holkar's object must be, obviously, to keep 
 himself out of the contest with us, and to urge the others into 
 it. But it is probable that Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah 
 perceive that inclination, and want to urge him to go hand in 
 hand with them. They have now a fair opportunity of doing 
 this, by apprizing him that he is to be attacked by the English ; 
 and upon this ground it is unfortunate that Col. Collins's 
 moonshee should have said, and that the Peshwah should have 
 written, that we intended to attack Holkar. In addition to the 
 impolicy of such a declaration, at the present moment, it is any 
 thing but true, and ought, in my opinion, under the instructions 
 of the Governor-General, to be firmly contradicted. If you 
 should be of that opinion, it would be well if you were to make 
 a suggestion upon the subject to Col. Collins. 
 
 I apprized you in my letter of yesterday of my want of grain. 
 I started from Poonah with 5900 bags of rice, which, upon a 
 moderate calculation, would have lasted me 59 days, and I might 
 have spun it out to 90 days. The losses in cattle obliged me to 
 leave some behind in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and to 
 consume much larger quantities than were necessary in camp ; 
 but even with these drawbacks I ought to have had now a 
 sufficiency to last me for a month, but the brinjarries have 
 contrived to make away with two-thirds of it. 
 
 * * *• # *■ * -se- 
 
 lf the answer of Scindiah to Collins should be at all peaceable 
 and friendly, in my opinion we ought to accept it ; and I ought 
 to inform him that I intend to recross the Beemah, and to break 
 up the army, as soon as I find that he commences to recross the 
 Nerbudda. 
 
 What has happened already, and the situation of this body of 
 troops, are sufficient proofs that we cannot carry on a war in this 
 country, after having been 4 months from Seringapatam, and 
 having marched nearly 700 miles, without having the assistance 
 of the resources of Bombay and Poonah. The government of 
 Bombay is unable (and always will be so with its present in-
 
 WHAT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES MAY TEACH US. 247 
 
 struments) to afford us any assistance, and the Peshwah is both 
 unable and unwilling. With half the means in their power, and 
 without the assistance of the store collected at Poonah, it is 
 pleasing to see how the Nizam's government have supported 
 the army under Col. Stevenson ; but, although the provision is 
 at their door at Poonah, and brought there without the smallest 
 aid from them, they will not give us a bullock to remove it. 
 
 I can have but one opinion upon this subject, and that is, that, 
 supposing the Peshwah's inability to be of the lowest kind, there 
 must be besides an unwillingness on his part, which has con- 
 tributed to prevent us from enjoying any of the resources of 
 Poonah. It is not to be believed that there are no cattle in 
 that city. Let a house or a shop be produced in which there is 
 not a bullock, and I will agree that I am mistaken ; and the 
 police can command every bullock in the place, particularly 
 when it is known that we are willing to pay highly for all that 
 we receive. But it is useless to search for proofs of the Peshwah's 
 dissimulation to us, or of his unwillingness to come forward to 
 our assistance in a contest in which we are likely to be involved 
 from our interference in his favour. We must look for a remedy 
 for these evils ; and I acknowledge that I see none that are not 
 of a nature more violent than are likely to be adopted. 
 
 The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be 
 involved will be an useful lesson to governments, and to us all ; 
 first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only 
 principle of whose character that is known is insincerity ; and 
 next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the 
 distance of 700 miles from our own resources ; not only not 
 having the government of the country on our side, but, in the 
 shape of a friend, our worst enemy. 
 
 138. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Want of communication tvith Holkar ; and of singleness and 
 unity of authority in the conduct of the negotiation. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 24th June, 1803. 
 
 I think that it cannot be sufficiently lamented that we have 
 not a communication with Holkar, or that the Governor-General 
 is not nearer the scene of operations and negotiations, or has 
 not empowered some person to conclude with those chiefs at.
 
 248 THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ORDERS OUT OF DATE. 
 
 once. Our negotiators are able men, certainly : but in ap- 
 parently trifling points I have observed that they have more 
 than once deviated from the general plan of the negotiation ; and 
 when a fault has occurred, it has not been possible to apply a 
 remedy without a reference to Bengal, which takes 2 months. 
 That which I have above mentioned is one of those errors ; 
 and the pains which Col. Collins took for some time to persuade 
 Scindiah to march towards Poonah is another. 
 
 139. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The Governor-General 'j instructions no longer meet tJie actual case. 
 The PesJnvalis misconduct alters our whole position. Hence, 
 we ought to alter o?tr line, and retrace our steps. The Governor- 
 General should come to Madras. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 25th June, 1803. 
 
 In respect to your suggestion, that I should urge Col. Collins 
 to quit Scindiah's camp, I have to observe, that I have already 
 written to urge him to accelerate his negotiation. I have no 
 direct communication with him ; indeed, I never received from 
 you the account of his dawk stages. The muttaseddee at 
 Aurungabad occasionally sends me letters, but they are longer 
 on the road than those which come by Poonah. Besides, I think 
 it much to be doubted whether the negotiation with Scindiah, 
 on the present footing, ought to be accelerated under present 
 circumstances. It is true that we must go to war under any 
 difficulties rather than lose our honour ; but we must keep out 
 of the war if it is practicable. 
 
 In my opinion, the state of affairs is much altered since the 
 Governor-General wrote the instructions under which Collins 
 is acting at this moment. It was then supposed that we had 
 the Peshwah with us. I think that is, at least, doubtful at the 
 present moment ; and the question is, whether, instead of 
 urging forward Collins's negotiation, on the footing established 
 under that notion, we ought not rather to procrastinate it ; to 
 report the state of the case at the present moment at the 
 Peshwah's durbar to the Governor-General, and ask for further 
 orders. This opinion of mine, that the Peshwah is not with us, 
 may, it is true, be erroneous. But it is founded upon the fact 
 that his Highness has not yet taken any steps, recommended to
 
 HE MUST TAKE COUNSEL ON THE PESHWAH S TREACHERY. 249 
 
 him by the Company's government, or which a sense of his own 
 interests would have suggested, either to prevent the combination 
 of the northern chiefs, or to assist us, or to enable us to carry on 
 the contest against them, if it should be formed ; and his acts, as 
 far as they have come to our knowledge, have tended rather to 
 our prejudice. And if we may believe Col. Collins and the 
 assertion of Scindiah and his ministers, the Peshwah has a 
 correspondence with Ballojee Koonger and Scindiah's durbar, of 
 the nature of which we are entirely ignorant. I cannot but feel 
 that, if we are to have a war under these circumstances, it will 
 be one much more complicated than that expected to be the 
 result of the course of action pointed out by the Governor- 
 General's instructions ; but one to which our resources are, 
 I trust, fully equal. It is a duty, however, that we owe to our 
 country, to avoid it, if we can, with honour ; and I should hope 
 that, if timely measures are taken, it might be avoided. 
 
 Upon the ground of the Peshwah's duplicity, the question is, 
 what line we ought to suggest to the Governor-General ? The 
 first thing he ought to do should be to come to Bombay. As for 
 the settlement of the Mahratta question, that appears to be 
 beyond a possibility : in that case the best thing we can do is to 
 restore matters nearly to the state in which they were when we 
 entered the country, and allow them to fight out their own 
 quarrels. The very hint of our taking this step would dissolve 
 the confederacy at once. We should then have to defend the 
 Nizam's country and our own territories, which, probably, they 
 would never attack. 
 
 140. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 War to be avoided, if possible. The MaJiratta Chief s jealous of 
 us, but also of each other ; and more afraid of us tJian of 
 each other. Profit and loss to them from the Treaty of 
 Basscin. Why they affect to be united, while they are probably 
 not, nor will be. We ought to avert war by acting on their 
 fears, and lessening their hopes of gaining by it. Course 
 suggested to accomplish this. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 29th June, 1803. 
 
 I proceed to give you my opinion on the present state of our 
 affairs. I think it is much altered in many respects since the 
 Governor-General wrote the instructions under which you have
 
 250 POSITION OF THE CHIEFS AS AFFECTED BY THE TREATY. 
 
 been acting lately. You will perceive by late letters from Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Close, that it is probable that the treaty of Bassein 
 will not work as was expected even in the Peshwah's durbar ; 
 and, on the other hand, the intelligence received from England 
 in the beginning of June gives great reason to believe that the 
 war with the French may have been renewed. Every circum- 
 stance, therefore, points out the necessity that, if possible, the 
 war with the northern Mahratta chiefs should be avoided. 
 
 The question is, in what manner is this desirable object to be 
 attained ? I have long been accustomed to view these different 
 Mahratta governments as powers not guided by any rational 
 system of policy, or any notion of national honour, but solely by 
 their momentary fears of loss or hope of gain. Since the fall of 
 Tippoo there is no doubt but that they have viewed the British 
 power with jealousy and apprehension, and various endeavours 
 have been made to unite their discordant politics in one object, 
 that of attacking and lessening it ; but these endeavours have 
 constantly failed, not because each chief was not sensible of the 
 greatness of the British power, but because each wanted con- 
 fidence in his neighbour, each felt that he had more to appre- 
 hend immediately from him than he had from the British 
 government, and that he ran less risk of loss from a contest 
 with his own neighbour than he did from one with the British 
 government. 
 
 Upon this view of our situation in respect to the Mahrattas 
 the treaty of Bassein was concluded. This treaty does not 
 deprive any of the northern chiefs of anything excepting of 
 two objects of ambition : one, the power of the government of 
 Poonah ; the other, the benefit resulting from the claims of that 
 government upon the Nizam, which would be naturally in the 
 hands of that chief who should have the power of the govern- 
 ment of Poonah. Under every other point of view the treaty of 
 Bassein is beneficial to each of the northern chiefs. It secures 
 to each, under the guarantee of British faith, not only the pos- 
 sessions which have long belonged to his family, but likewise 
 those which he may have usurped from the weakness of the 
 Peshwah's government during the last six years of troubles, 
 occasioned by the contests of these very chiefs for the power of 
 His Highness's government. They could not have this security 
 under any other possible establishment of the Peshwah's power. 
 If it should be established by means of any one of them, the 
 others know well that they would lose their possessions ; and if
 
 IMPROBABILITY OF THEIR UNITING TO RESIST IT. 2^1 
 
 it should be established by means independent either of any of 
 them or of us (of which I see no probability), the possessions of 
 these chiefs, at least those which they have usurped from the 
 weakness of the government, would be lost. 
 
 The motive for war, therefore, with these chiefs at the present 
 moment cannot be the fear of the immediate, or even remote, 
 consequences of the establishment of our power in the govern- 
 ment of Poonah, but it must be a desire to regain that object of 
 ambition for themselves. Here I might enter into an argument 
 upon the improbability that these chiefs would ever unite for the 
 purpose of regaining that power for any one of them ; but these 
 topics have been already adverted to in some degree, and are, 
 besides, well known to every body. But I should wish to know, 
 is it true that they have united ? Are there any signs that 
 Scindiah and Holkar have made peace ? Is there any confidence 
 between these chieftains ? Or dare either of them trust himself 
 in the camp of the other, or in an operation in which their 
 mutual safety depends upon their mutual assistance ? Whatever 
 each of them may hold forth, therefore, I contend for it that they 
 are not united, and that their fear of danger is not from us, but 
 from each other. 
 
 It may be asked, if they are not united, why should they 
 declare they are, and risk a war with the power of the British 
 government ? In answer, I say that they know our moderation, 
 and that as long as they refrain from hostility, they do not risk 
 a war. They are not unacquainted with our fears of a war with 
 a Mahratta confederacy, and they hope by their threats to 
 frighten us or our allies, and to induce us to abandon our situa- 
 tion at Poonah. 
 
 Upon the whole, then, I am convinced not only that the con- 
 federacy is not, but that it will not be formed. 
 
 But the question whether there will be peace or war does not, 
 in my opinion, depend upon the fact whether the confederacy is 
 formed or not, or upon any political question, excepting upon 
 the hope of advantage or the fear of loss entertained by the 
 chiefs in the camp with you. To withdraw from the alliance 
 with the Peshwah, if it were practicable after what has passed, 
 would affect this question only in this manner : it would give 
 reason to our enemies to suppose that we wanted confidence in 
 ourselves, and that their menaces had had their effect ; and their 
 hope of advantage from the war would be increased. 
 
 In my opinion, therefore, our course of action at this moment
 
 252 A PEREMPTORY ULTIMATUM LIKELIEST WAY TO PEACE. 
 
 
 ought to be calculated in such manner as to increase their sense 
 of danger, and decrease their hope of gain from the war, as the 
 best means of preserving the peace. There is no doubt but that 
 at this moment Scindiah's territories on this side of the Godavery 
 and at Baroach are exposed to certain loss, and that those of the 
 Rajah of Berar bordering upon the sea coast are in the same 
 situation. On the other hand, there is no hope of immediate 
 gain. Holkar has passed the Taptee, and cannot return in time 
 to assist the other two, supposing them to be united ; and the 
 Nizam's army in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad is fully 
 equal to defend His Highness's territory north of the Godavery 
 till I shall be enabled to cross that river. This, therefore, appears 
 to me to be the time best calculated for bringing these chiefs to 
 a decision on the question of peace or war. 
 
 On this ground I would immediately send a memorial to 
 Scindiah stating the earnest desire of the British government to 
 remain at peace. I would explain the defensive and innocent 
 nature of the treaty of Bassein, the security it affords to the 
 territories of each of the chiefs, and the provision it makes for 
 the peace of India. I would point out the right which the 
 Peshwah had to conclude that treaty independently of Scindiah. 
 
 I would repeat his declared approbation of the measure in 
 his letters to Colonel Close. I would advert to the fact that 
 neither he nor his ministers have ever made any detailed ob- 
 jection to any part of the treaty, I would recall to his recollection 
 his friendly declaration to yourself, and I would contrast that 
 declaration with his recent declared doubt whether there should 
 be peace or war. 
 
 I would call upon him to perform his engagement to explain 
 that doubt in three days from the delivery of that paper, and I 
 would announce my intention of departing on that day if I 
 should not then receive his explanation ; at the same time I 
 should call upon him to act in conformity with his declarations, 
 and if he were inclined for peace that he should withdraw his 
 army from the Nizam's frontier into its usual stations, and allow 
 us also to withdraw our troops to our own territories. 
 
 If Scindiah should not give the explanation which you require, 
 and should not act in conformity to his declaration, you cannot 
 stay in his camp one moment after the time fixed by yourself 
 for your departure. 
 
 You will observe that my object is the preservation of peace. 
 If I saw the smallest prospect of avoiding the war by any poli-
 
 COL. COLLINS LACKS THE SERPENTS WISDOM. 253 
 
 tical negotiation, I should recommend you to enter upon it ; but 
 under present circumstances nothing can be done till the Rajah 
 of Berar and Scindiah will have withdrawn from the Nizam's 
 frontier. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Welleslev. 
 
 141. To the Governor-General. 
 
 Time lost through Col. Collins' mistaken belief in peace between 
 Scindiah and Holkar, and the Peshwatis plausible inactivity. 
 'General Stuarts position the mainstay of all our operations.'' 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Peepulgaum, 8th July, 1803. 
 
 Holkar has crossed the river Taptee, with his whole army, and 
 appears disinclined, and I hear has positively refused, to trust his 
 person in the same camp with Scindiah. 
 
 Notwithstanding Col. Collins's assertion, Indore has not been 
 given over to Holkar ; and I believe that the peace which the 
 Colonel supposed to have been concluded is only a cessation of 
 hostilities, which Scindiah has been prevailed upon to grant by 
 Ragojee Bhoonslah, in order to gain time for the negotiation of 
 a peace ; and of which Holkar has taken advantage, in order to 
 place the Taptee between his army and that of Scindiah. 
 
 In the mean time, we, who were ready on the 4th June, have 
 lost that month and part of this for our operations ; and, unless 
 Col. Collins has attended to a second representation, which I made 
 to him in the end of June, we are as far from our point as we 
 were in the month of May. The Colonel has gone upon a false 
 notion from the beginning. He has supposed that peace was 
 concluded between Holkar and Scindiah, because Scindiah's 
 ministers had told him so ; and he has had no other information, 
 and has never produced any one proof of the fact, the truth of 
 which he believed, and invariably asserted. Under this notion, 
 he has been timid, and has afforded them time to conclude the 
 peace, and to intrigue, which is all that they desired. 
 
 Matters also at Poonah are nearly in the same state in which 
 they were when I marched. The Peshwah promises every thing, 
 and performs nothing. The Mahratta sirdars are still in that 
 city, excepting Goklah, who is encamped at a small distance 
 from me. The Peshwah has not satisfied them, and they wait
 
 254 IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL STUART'S POSITION. 
 
 to see the result of the first operations against Scindiah, and 
 who has the upper hand. They are prevented from joining the 
 confederates at present by Gen. Stuart's position at Moodgul in 
 the Dooab I observe, however, that Gen. Stuart is inclined to 
 withdraw from this position, in consequence of the arrival of the 
 French at Pondicherry. But I have written to represent to him 
 the advantage which we all derive from it. I have shown him 
 that he keeps in tranquillity the territories of the Nizam and 
 Hyderabad, notwithstanding his Highness's sickness, the proba- 
 bility of his death, and the absence of all his troops beyond the 
 Godavery; that he awes Poonah, and keeps in tranquillity all the 
 Mahratta territory south of the Beemah, notwithstanding the 
 conduct of the Peshwah, which must appear to his subjects like 
 treachery, and a desire to break his treaty with the British 
 government ; that, by threatening Meritch and Darwar, he secures 
 at least the neutrality of thePutwurduns, and the continuance of 
 the cessation of hostilities between that family and the Rajah of 
 Kolapoor, which is so necessary to the existence of my commu- 
 nications ; and that he defends the Company's territories, and 
 those of the Rajah of Mysore, and secures their tranquillity. At 
 the same time, in the event of the Nizam's death and consequent 
 disturbance of Hyderabad, he can reach that capital in a few 
 marches ; or in the event of any accidents happening to the 
 troops in this quarter, he has equal facility in moving to Poonah. 
 In short, I may call Gen. Stuart's position the mainstay of all our 
 operations ; and it is that which, in case of a war with the Mah- 
 rattas, will prevent a general insurrection in the territories of the 
 Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and the southern 
 Mahratta Chiefs. It was with a view to these advantages that 
 I first recommended to Gen. Stuart to take it up ; and every 
 day's experience has shown the benefits which we have derived 
 from it. 
 
 142. To Lieutenant- Colonel Close. 
 
 War zvith Holkar to be avoided, if possible. Goklah restless 
 and dissatisfied. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Baungaum, ioth July, 1803. 
 
 Goklah has just paid me a visit. He has expressed a most 
 anxious desire to hoist the Pesh wall's colours in a village called 
 Mandegaon, belonging to Holkar, and one of the ancient posses- 
 sions of the Holkar family. I have requested him most earnestly
 
 GEN. WELLESLEYS CARE TO AVOID WAR WITH HOLKAR. 255 
 
 to desist from this measure for some days ; as I wish to be at 
 peace with Holkar, and do not intend to attack that chief, unless 
 he should attack the Company or their allies. 
 
 Goklah is rather anxious upon this subject, as he received the 
 Peshwah's orders to hoist his colours in all the possessions of 
 the Holkar family, near which he should march. I wish that you 
 would explain that I have prevented him from taking possession 
 of this village. Goklah is also very anxious respecting his pay. 
 I wish that you would urge the durbar to make some perma- 
 nent provision for him. If they would promise that we should 
 be repaid the sums which we should advance him, we might 
 contrive to keep him afloat, by means of bills upon Bombay or 
 Bengal, upon which he would be able to get money. Consider 
 this subject, as it is really very desirable that we should have 
 this body of troops paid. 
 
 143. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Intimation of his intention to countermarch the British army 
 when the Confederates withdraw theirs. 
 
 Camp, nth July, 1803 
 
 As I have not received an answer to the letter which I wrote 
 you on the 29th June, I much fear that it may have missed 
 you, and I send you a duplicate of it. 
 
 I have seen your letter to the Governor-General of the 6th. 
 It occurs to me that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar may be 
 inclined to withdraw to their own capitals, if they should be 
 assured that we would withdraw likewise. I certainly propose 
 to repass the Beemah myself, and to order Colonel Stevenson to 
 repass the Godavery, as soon as I find that those chiefs commence 
 their march towards their own territories ; and I shall break up 
 the army in this quarter as soon as I shall be convinced that 
 they no longer threaten the territories of the Peshwah or the 
 Nizam, and are settled, the one to the northward of the Ner- 
 budda, the other at Nagpoor. 
 
 I communicate to you these intentions, in order that you may 
 make such use of them as you may think proper. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 256 WORDS OF THE CHIEFS AMBIGUOUS ; ACTS HOSTILE. 
 
 144. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 The language of the Confederates inconsistent with itself and 
 
 with their conduct. The latter hostile. They are finessing to 
 
 gain time, and to secure Holkar, and a better season for war. 
 
 Tlicy must at once be brought to the test of action — must 
 
 retire, or have war. 
 
 Camp, 14th July, 1803. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., 
 and I have taken into consideration the subject upon which you 
 have desired that I should communicate to you my opinion. 
 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared, 
 in their letters to the Governor-General, that they have no inten- 
 tion to obstruct the arrangement concluded at Bassein between 
 the British government and the Peshwah ; and that they are 
 desirous of maintaining the relations of amity which so long 
 subsisted between the British government and them, and that 
 they will not ascend the Adjuntee ghaut, or march towards 
 Poonah. I am sorry to observe, however, that they still intend 
 to advance with their armies to the Adjuntee ghaut, upon the 
 Nizam's frontier, notwithstanding their peaceable declarations. 
 These declarations have been preceded by others of a directly 
 opposite tendency. The chiefs have declared that they were 
 united for the purpose of attacking the British government and 
 their allies ; and Scindiah, in particular, has said that it was 
 doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the English. Is 
 the advance to the Adjuntee ghaut, which is the acknowledged 
 boundary between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, consistent with 
 the hostile or with the pacific declaration ? Upon this point there 
 can be no doubt ; there can be no use in assembling an army 
 upon the Nizam's frontier, particularly at the present moment, 
 when their services must be required elsewhere, excepting to 
 attack the Nizam. 
 
 But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs en- 
 deavour to deceive the British government, if their intentions are 
 hostile? To this, I answer, that their measures are not prepared ; 
 they have not yet brought Holkar into them ; the British troops 
 are prepared for action, and they are not ; some vulnerable points 
 in Scindiah's territories are exposed to the attacks of the British 
 troops ; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are 
 defended at present at all points. By the delay of the com-
 
 UNLESS THEY RETIRE, WE MUST ATTACK THEM. 257 
 
 mencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better pre- 
 pared ; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power 
 to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories ; 
 and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and 
 their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them 
 at the present moment. Therefore, I conclude that the advantage 
 of delay is theirs ; that they have made their pacific declara- 
 tions in order to gain time ; and that their real intentions are 
 to be known only from their actions. 
 
 If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or 
 the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented us 
 from viewing, with indifference, the assembly of their armies upon 
 the Nizam's frontier, and the British government must have in- 
 sisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, 
 in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam ; 
 nor can they, in that at present under consideration, particu- 
 larly as I have, above, pointed out the great advantages which 
 those Chiefs will derive from delaying to commence hostilities. 
 
 I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that, if the Rajah of 
 Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not 
 remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north 
 of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hos- 
 tile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack 
 them without loss of time. Accordingly, I have written a letter 
 to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a trans- 
 lation of it. 
 
 If you should find that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah 
 of Berar remain encamped in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's 
 frontier, I request you to deliver that letter, unless you should be 
 of opinion that a verbal communication from yourself of my sen- 
 timents and intentions would be more likely to induce that chief 
 to withdraw ; or unless you should have other solid grounds for 
 believing that he is sincere in his last declaration, and that his 
 intentions are pacific. But, in my opinion, his declaration and 
 his intentions cannot be trusted, unless he separates from the 
 Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations 
 for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences 
 his march to Nagpoor.
 
 2 j 8 THE PESHWAH LEAVES APPAH DESSAYE UNPAID. 
 
 145. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The Peshwah sends only a fraction of his stipulated contingent; 
 provides no adeqiiate means for paying this ; and diverts it 
 from the general objects of the armament. Explicit remon- 
 strances to be addressed to his ministers. 
 
 Camp, 14th July, 1803. 
 
 Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered 
 much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented 
 that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the 
 places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in 
 jaghire, and that, when his amildars had gone to the villages 
 with the Peshwah's sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their 
 troops attacked, and his Highness's sunnuds torn. He said that 
 the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the 
 expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched 
 with me to Poonah. He had been obliged to discharge, and pay 
 the arrears of, all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained 
 grants of serinjaumy lands ; and that, in order to pay those 
 arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his 
 possession. That, under these circumstances, he had no means 
 of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the 
 Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to 
 obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds ; and 
 that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the 
 lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and 
 that he should derive no benefit from them for some time ; and 
 he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees per mensem to 
 pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his 
 jaghire. They had consented to his proposal, but, hitherto, they 
 have paid him nothing. 
 
 I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah's ministers, 
 whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he 
 should receive 25,000 rupees per mensem, till he should be in the 
 receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghire. If they did, 
 I beg of you to urge them to pay him the money. At all events, 
 whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is 
 very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund 
 from which it can draw its subsistence ; and I request you to 
 urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available. 
 If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged
 
 REMONSTRANCE WITH THE PESHWAH'S MINISTERS, 2$<) 
 
 Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the 
 subsistence of his troops, till he should receive the benefits to be 
 expected from his jaghire ; or if, in consequence of the re- 
 presentation which I now send you, they should consent to 
 provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will 
 endeavour to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements 
 with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may 
 advance him. I beg you to represent these matters to the 
 Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them 
 to provide means for the payment of his Highness's troops. 
 
 In the course of the conference which I had with him this 
 morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had 
 received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer, to proceed, in concert 
 with Bappojee Goneish Goklah, to attack the troops of Amrut 
 Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had 
 occupied between Poonah and Nassuck, and to go as far even 
 as to the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed 
 there. 
 
 I beg you to remind the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness 
 is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce 
 an army of 1 6,000 men, to act with the British troops ; instead 
 of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision 
 has been made for the payment even of that number. You will 
 be so kind as to represent to them, 
 
 1st. That, when a large body of the enemy's troops are 
 assembled upon the frontiers, and when the Rajah of Berar has 
 in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness's 
 musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small 
 force which his Highness has produced. 
 
 2ndly. That, as long as those armies are assembled upon the 
 frontiers, his Highness may depend upon it that his government 
 will not settle, his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to, 
 and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they 
 have seized. 
 
 3rdly. That no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any 
 other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by 
 the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from 
 the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the 
 neighbourhood ; but that this expedition against Amrut Rao's 
 troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number 
 of them that there are of the Peshwah's. 
 
 4thly. That the only chance of success against the hostile 
 
 S 2
 
 %6o ON BAJI RAO'S FAITHLESS AND FATUOUS CONDUCT. 
 
 armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops 
 should be united, and that they should have no other object 
 excepting to attack the enemy in the front. 
 
 5thly. That many rivers will divide these detachments with 
 Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops ; that their 
 co-operation with the latter will become impracticable ; and that, 
 upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye 
 from going upon this expedition. 
 
 It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he 
 has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao : although, 
 in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a 
 distance from my camp only for the sake of forage. I propose, 
 however, to endeavour to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg 
 you to apprize the Peshwah's ministers. 
 
 146. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah. 
 
 You have pledged your ivord for peace. Yet you have threatened 
 war, both in zvord and deed. This has required counter pre- 
 cautions. You must be the first to withdrazv — then I shall. 
 Otherwise^ I shall attack you. Your condition — that we shall 
 
 respect Treaties — is otiose. 
 
 Camp, 14th July, 1803. 
 
 In consequence of the reports that you had confederated 
 with other chiefs to oppose the execution of the treaty of 
 Bassein, between the Hon. Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun ; 
 of your military preparations, and your advance to the frontiers 
 of the Nizam ; and, above all, of your declaration to the British 
 Resident with your camp, that it was doubtful whether there 
 would be peace or war with the Company ; I received the orders 
 of his Excellency the Governor-General to move with the troops 
 to the frontiers, to take means of precaution, and to be prepared 
 to act if you should carry your threats into execution. 
 
 The treaty of Bassein has since been communicated to you, 
 and you must have observed that it provides amply for your 
 security ; and that, in consequence of this instrument, you will 
 hold your territories in the Deccan by the same secure tenure 
 that you have long held those in Hindustan, bordering upon the 
 Company's frontier, notwithstanding your absence from them 
 with your armies. 
 
 I perceive, by your letter to his Excellency the Governor- 
 General, of which Col. Collins has communicated to me a copy,
 
 SUMMARY OF THE CASE, AND ULTIMATUM. 26 1 
 
 that you have declared that you have no intention to commence 
 hostilities against the Company or their allies, or to oppose the 
 execution of the treaty of Bassein by the parties who had a right 
 to enter into it. 
 
 I have, accordingly, the greatest pleasure in contemplating the 
 probability of the duration of peace between the Hon. Company 
 and your government, which has long subsisted with much 
 benefit to both parties. But, if you are sincere in this decla- 
 ration of your friendly intentions, there appears to be no occasion 
 for assembling your army, and joining it with that of the Rajah 
 of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier. That measure, uncombined 
 with other circumstances, would, at any time, render necessary 
 corresponding measures of precaution, the result of which would 
 be either your removal from the frontier of the Company's ally, 
 or an appeal to arms ; but when it has been accompanied by 
 declarations of an hostile nature, when you have declared that it 
 was doubtful whether there would be peace or war between the 
 Company and your government, it becomes more necessary that 
 you should remove your troops to their usual stations. 
 
 Whatever respect I may have for your word, so solemnly 
 pledged, as it is, in your letter to the Governor-General to which 
 I have alluded, common prudence requires that I should not 
 •trust to that alone for the security of the Company and their 
 allies, which has been given to my charge. Accordingly, I call 
 upon you, if your professions are sincere, to withdraw, with your 
 troops, to their usual stations across the river Nerbudda. 
 
 You were the first, by your hostile measures and declarations, 
 and the expression of doubts of the duration of the peace 
 between the Hon. Company and your government, and by the 
 movement of your troops, to render necessary corresponding 
 measures of precaution by the Company's government ; and you 
 ought to be the first to withdraw your troops, if your intentions 
 are really as pacific as you profess them to be. When you shall 
 have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations beyond the 
 Nerbudda, I also shall draw back those under my command to 
 their usual stations. 
 
 But if, unfortunately, I should have learnt that, after the 
 receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories 
 of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march 
 of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, 
 I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding 
 your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies
 
 262 HOLKAR HAS NO GROUND FOR WAR WITH US. 
 
 in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility ; and I 
 shall immediately carry on those operations against you which 
 are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of 
 the Company's armies. 
 
 In your letter to the Governor-General, you have declared 
 that you do not intend to oppose the arrangement concluded at 
 Bassein, provided the arrangements of the Peshwah with you and 
 Ragojee Bhoonslah, and other chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, 
 are respected. The treaty of Bassein secures your interests ; 
 and it is not consistent with that treaty, or with the principles of 
 the British government, to support any power in the breach of a 
 treaty : you may, therefore, be satisfied on that head. 
 
 147. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar. 
 
 Your interests arc secured by the Treaty of Bassein, of which I 
 scud you a copy. Hence, I have little doubt that you will 
 remain at peace with the Company, which is your best course. 
 
 Camp, 1 6th July, 1803. 
 
 Much time has elapsed since I have had the pleasure of 
 hearing from you, although I am anxious to cultivate the good 
 understanding which has subsisted between the Hon. Company's, 
 government and you. With this view, I now send you a copy of 
 the treaty concluded at Bassein, between the Hon. Company and 
 Rao Pundit Purdhaun ; from the general defensive tenor of which 
 you will observe that the peace and security of India are provided 
 for. You will also perceive, that the 12th article provides effec- 
 tually for the security of all the great Mahratta jaghiredars, and 
 that those of the Holkar family are particularly named. This 
 article will satisfy your mind, notwithstanding the endeavours 
 which have been made to raise your doubts ; and you will see 
 that the interest and security of your family are connected with 
 this treaty, and that, in fact, they can be provided for in no other 
 manner. That being the case, whatever others may do, I have 
 little doubt but that you will conduct yourself in the manner 
 which your own interests will dictate, and that you will continue 
 in peace with the Company. 
 
 I send this letter in charge of Kawder Nawaz Khan, a re- 
 spectable officer, who enjoys my confidence, and who will explain 
 any thing you desire to know respecting my wishes.
 
 SCINDIAH MUST NOT BLOW HOT AND COLD AT ONCE. 263 
 
 148. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Why no day named for Scindiatis countermarch. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803. 
 
 I have not fixed when he should withdraw: 1st, because I 
 wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities 
 will be commenced ; by which advantage it becomes more pro- 
 bable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile 
 operations to be necessary: 2ndly, there is every reason to ex- 
 pect instructions from the Governor-General, applicable to the 
 present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe. 
 
 149. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Scindiah may send a news-writer ; if he retires — not otherwise. 
 Why no day fixed for his retiring. 
 
 Camp, 17th July, 1803. 
 
 I have received your letter of the 13th instant, in which you 
 communicate the wishes of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that a news- 
 writer on his part should be permitted to reside in this camp, 
 and that a dawk should be allowed to run from thence to him. 
 
 Provided Dowlut Rao Scindiah is determined to preserve the 
 relations of amity, and to remain at peace with the Company, 
 and if he withdraw his troops from the frontiers of His Highness 
 the Nizam, and proceed with them towards his own territories, 
 which is the only proof I desire, or can admit, of his amicable 
 intentions, I have no objection to his sending here a newswriter, 
 or to his communicating with him in any manner that he may 
 think proper. On the contrary, I wish him to be made fully 
 acquainted with all that passes here, as I am certain that the 
 more his people see of us the more convinced they will be that 
 the British government have no intention to injure them. 
 
 But if Dowlut Rao Scindiah perseveres in retaining his hostile 
 position upon the Nizam's frontier, and does not withdraw to his 
 own territories, I must consider him in a state of hostility with 
 the Company. I can allow of no communication between my 
 camp and his by the means of newswriters, and it will be useless 
 for him to send a person of that description to this camp. 
 
 I have perused a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Close's letter to 
 you of the 15th. The only difference between the letter which
 
 264 WHY NO DAY SPECIFIED FOR SCINDIAH' S RETIRING. 
 
 I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and that which Colonel Close 
 proposed I should write is, that I have not fixed a day on which 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall depart. My reasons for preferring 
 the mode which I have adopted are, that it leaves me the choice 
 of the day on which to commence my operations, supposing 
 them to be necessary; it renders greater the probability that 
 I shall strike the first blow ; and it leaves matters open so far 
 as that, if the Governor- General should alter his plan, I can 
 alter my proceedings. On the other hand, to fix a day for his 
 departure has an appearance of harshness and hostility which 
 is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the Governor-General's 
 instructions. 
 
 I mention these circumstances lest you should suppose that 
 there is any difference of opinion between Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Close and me upon the main point. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 150. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Instructions to insist on the immediate countermarch of the Con- 
 federates, as an ultimatum ; and to leave ScindiaJis camp 
 unless they comply. Information to be obtained about their 
 
 forces. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp, 18th July, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have 
 received from his Excellency the Governor-General, from a 
 perusal of which you will perceive that his Excellency has been 
 pleased to intrust to me extraordinary powers, for the purpose 
 of concluding whatever arrangements may become necessary, 
 either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active pro- 
 secution of war. I request you to be so kind as to communicate 
 this circumstance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of 
 Berar. 
 
 You will be so kind, at the same time, as to inform those Chiefs 
 that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the 
 British government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their 
 interests, and to enter into negotiations with them upon objects 
 by which they may suppose those interests to be affected. But 
 they must first withdraw their troops from the position which 
 they have taken up on the Nizam's frontier, and return to their 
 usual stations in Hindustan and Berar respectively; and, on my
 
 HOW THE RESIDENT IS TO PRESS THE ULTIMATUM. l6§ 
 
 part, I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. 
 You will point out to those Chiefs, that, as they have declared 
 they have no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of 
 Bassein. or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of 
 the Nizam, to withdraw their troops to their several stations is 
 only consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they 
 are sincere. On the other hand, to retain their position upon 
 the Nizam's frontier is the strongest proof they can give of the 
 insincerity of those declarations. You will, therefore, again call 
 upon them to retire, as being the only measure by which the peace 
 between the British government and them can be preserved. 
 
 It may happen that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will urge the dif- 
 ficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, as an excuse 
 for not withdrawing his troops at the present moment ; that 
 excuse will not apply at all to the Rajah of Berar, to whose 
 return to Nagpoor there are no impediments whatever, and 
 therefore his march to his capital is indispensable. It might be 
 disputed in respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; for it is certain, 
 that the passage of the army of that chief over those rivers will 
 be attended with some difficulties. Those difficulties, however, 
 are to be surmounted ; and, at all events, there is nothing to 
 prevent his retiring to Burhampoor, and commencing to send his 
 troops across the Taptee, and making arrangements for sending 
 them across the Nerbudda. If he should urge these difficulties, 
 you will make known to him my sentiments upon them as above 
 stated, and you will require him to give a proof that his declara- 
 tions are not insincere, by falling back to Burhampoor, and by 
 commencing to pass his troops over the Taptee, and his arrange- 
 ments for crossing the Nerbudda. 
 
 If the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpoor, and Scindiah 
 should adopt the measures above pointed out, as preparatory to 
 his crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, I shall be satisfied. 
 But if you should find those chiefs obstinately determined to 
 remain in their positions upon the Nizam's frontier, you will be 
 so good as to inform them, that I have requested you to with- 
 draw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and, accordingly, 
 you will leave it on the following day. 
 
 * * ■* * * * * 
 
 Before you quit Scindiah's camp, it would be very desirable 
 that you should endeavour to ascertain the general position of 
 his troops, and the numbers and description in each station, and 
 by whom commanded. Indeed, this measure would be desirable
 
 266 SCINDIAH HAS BEEN SHUFFLING TO GAIN TIME. 
 
 at all events, whether that chief consents to retire or not; as, 
 supposing that he should retire, you cannot be certain that he 
 will have withdrawn all his troops, unless you are acquainted 
 with their numbers, and the stations they at present occupy. 
 
 I request you also to endeavour to ascertain the same circum- 
 stances respecting the troops of the Rajah of Berar, and to com- 
 municate the intelligence you will receive regarding the troops 
 of each chief to Col. Stevenson, as well as to me. 
 
 151. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Report of proceedings relating to the Confederates. Advantage in 
 case they comply with our ultimatum. The weakness of the 
 PcsJiwaJis government, the state of the country, and the 
 wavering disposition of the chiefs — our great difficulties. 
 The state of the Guickzvars government, and the Nizanis 
 failing health, also inconvenient. An European zvar cannot 
 shake our strength in India. Success in the war not doubtful. 
 The difficulty of reconciling the Pes/nvah to Amrut Rao. 
 Intercourse with Holkar. 
 
 Camp at Sangwee, 24th July, 1803. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letters 
 of the 26th and 27th June. 
 
 Before they had reached me, in obedience to your Excellency's 
 orders of the 8th and 30th May, and in consequence of a reference 
 made to me by Col. Collins, I had written a letter to Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah, to require that chief to separate himself from the Rajah 
 of Berar, and to retire with his troops across the river Nerbudda. 
 A copy of that, and a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 
 14th inst. to Col. Collins, have been already transmitted by Lieut.- 
 Col. Close, to be laid before your Excellency. 
 
 From the day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah was called upon, 
 in the name of your Excellency, to declare his views in his nego- 
 tiations with the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and 
 that he was urged not to advance to Poonah, it was obvious that 
 his only design was to gain time. He had not concluded his 
 negotiations with Jeswunt Rao Holkar till a late period in this 
 month ; and he, as well as the Rajah of Berar, saw clearly the 
 disadvantages under which they would commence hostilities 
 during the season in which the rivers are full. Those disad- 
 vantages were so great, particularly as the troops of Jeswunt Rao
 
 HIS COUNTERMARCH THE BEST SECURITY FOR PEACE. 26 J 
 
 Holkar were to the northward of the river Taptee, that it was 
 probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar 
 would separate, and order their troops to their usual stations. In 
 this they incur the risks of those evils which must result from the 
 commencement of hostilities at that moment. I therefore thought 
 it proper to urge forward the decision, whether there should be 
 peace or war ; and at the same time that I gave Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah every assurance of the pacific views and intentions of 
 the British government, I called upon him to adopt that measure, 
 which your Excellency conceived would give the British govern- 
 ment a security that the peace would last. 
 
 On the 1 8th I received your Excellency's letter of the 26th 
 June; and I wrote a letter to Col. Collins, of which I enclosed 
 a copy, in which I desired that officer to apprize Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the powers with which your 
 Excellency has been pleased to trust me. I requested him again 
 to call upon those chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to 
 their usual stations ; and to inform them that, if they refused to 
 do so, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut 
 Rao Scindiah on the following day. Since I have written that 
 letter, I have received your Excellency's letter of the 27th ; and I 
 am induced to hope that you will approve of all the steps taken till 
 that moment, to bring to a decision the question of peace or war. 
 
 I have perused a copy of Col. Collins's dispatch to your Ex- 
 cellency, of the 1 8th, which contains a recognition on the part of 
 Scindiah of the benefits which he will derive from the treaty of 
 Bassein, and other symptoms of a change of councils in the durbar 
 of that chief. But, notwithstanding the contents of that dispatch, 
 the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah cannot be 
 considered pacific, unless they shall separate, and each shall with- 
 draw his troops to their usual stations. I have therefore made no 
 alteration in the instructions which I gave to Col. Collins on the 
 1 8th, and he will certainly depart from Scindiah's camp if he 
 finds that the chiefs will not retire. 
 
 If, however, they should retire, I consider that the British 
 government will have security for the duration of the peace, as 
 amply as it can have while the power of these chiefs shall last. 
 On the one hand, it will be obvious that fear of the power of the 
 British government was the cause of their retreat ; on the other, 
 it will be equally obvious that the power which will have removed 
 these formidable armies to a distance must increase ; that no 
 circumstances of distress from European enemies can prevent the
 
 268 DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ALLIANCE WITH PESHWAH. 
 
 growth of the strength of the British government in this quarter, 
 and therefore that an attempt to attack it hereafter must be 
 hopeless. 
 
 The difficulties under which the force of the British govern- 
 ment labours at the present moment, and which give the greatest 
 encouragement to the confederate chiefs, are the state of weakness 
 and confusion of the Peshwah's government ; the general un- 
 settled and ruinous state of the country; and the wavering disposi- 
 tion of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, who alone preserve 
 the appearance and relations of fidelity towards the Peshwah. 
 
 The weak and confused state of the Peshwah's government is 
 to be attributed principally to his personal character, but also, in 
 a great degree, to the rebellions and disturbances which have 
 prevailed throughout the Mahratta Empire for the last 7 years. 
 It could not be expected that even a government regularly 
 organized would be able to resume its functions and its powers 
 immediately after a revolution such as that effected by the vic- 
 tories of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preceded as they were by the long 
 usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, much less one conducted by 
 a man so weak as Bajee Rao. But it may be reasonably expected 
 this state of affairs will improve with the assistance of the British 
 government, and that the Peshwah will have an authority for 
 which there will be some respect. 
 
 The whole of the Mahratta territory is unsettled and in ruins. 
 Holkar's armies consumed the produce of the last year, and, owing 
 to their plunder and extortion, entire districts were depopulated, 
 and the habitations of the people destroyed. But it is obvious 
 that, for a series of years, the government, and even jaghiredars, 
 can have received but little, if any, revenue ; and both have been 
 obliged to wink at, and even authorize, the plunder of their own 
 territories, for the subsistence of their troops. The consequence 
 is, that every man is a plunderer and a thief; and no man, who 
 can find any thing to seize or to steal, will cultivate the land for 
 his subsistence. The jaghires and forts, many of them close to 
 Poonah, are in the hands of the adherents of Holkar, who are 
 rebels to the government of the Peshwah. His Highness has 
 passed orders for the resumption of these forts and jaghires ; but 
 there is no strength to carry them into execution ; and thus a set 
 of rebels and adherents of the confederate chiefs are in the midst 
 of his possessions. 
 
 The state of affairs must improve, indeed it has improved 
 already in those parts of the country in which the British army
 
 THE CHIEFS MISJUDGE OUR RELATIVE STRENGTH. 269 
 
 has been ; and where the necessity of employing the troops to 
 oppose the confederate chiefs will no longer exist, it will be 
 possible to enforce the Peshwah's orders for the resumption of 
 the forts and jaghires, and to place in them those who will be 
 faithful to his Highness's government. But the possession of these 
 countries by the adherents of the Peshwah's enemies, at the 
 present moment, must encourage the confederates. 
 
 The chiefs of the Mahratta Empire have been accustomed to 
 look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them, as a 
 force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success 
 against the British government in former times, and they antici- 
 pate the same success in the expected contest. They do not 
 compare the strength of the British government at this time with 
 its former weakness ; nor do they consider the difficulties under 
 which the British government laboured at the time of the former 
 contest ; nor do they compare their own strength at that time 
 with their weakness at the present moment. 
 
 The southern chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, 
 wish well to the British government, and see clearly that the only 
 chance of security they have is in the establishment of the power 
 of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the 
 power of the confederated chiefs, and fear to venture into the 
 contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The 
 first success in the contest will bring those forward who may 
 not be rebels to the Peshwah's government ; and will preserve 
 Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they 
 can make terms for themselves. But if the confederates should 
 withdraw, the southern chiefs will be convinced that the northern 
 chiefs have no confidence in their own strength, opposed to the 
 British government ; and in case of any future contest, they will 
 not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to 
 which they will attribute many of the advantages which they 
 might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have 
 more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its 
 orders than it has at the present moment ; and they will be more 
 fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates 
 are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern chiefs, 
 and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war. 
 
 Another circumstance of difficulty, at the present moment, 
 which probably could not exist hereafter, is the state of the 
 Guickwar government. The rebels have only lately been ex- 
 pelled from that country, and the government has not yet had
 
 270 THEIR RETIRING WILL INCREASE OUR STRENGTH. 
 
 time to gain strength. The hopes of the confederates must be 
 founded, in some degree, upon the certainty of a renewal of the 
 rebellion in the case of a war. 
 
 The precarious state of the Nizam's health is another circum- 
 stance of encouragement to the confederates, which it is probable 
 would not exist at any future period. It does not weigh as a diffi- 
 culty upon the British force now, and Major Kirkpatrick writes with 
 confidence, that Hyderabad will not be disturbed if his Highness 
 the Nizam should die. But in the event of a war, particularly if 
 there should not be speedily a signal success on the part of the 
 British troops, it must be expected that the Nizam's death will 
 be attended by the assumption of independence by some of his 
 chiefs, and by confusion and disturbance in parts of his Highness's 
 territories. It may be very certain that the confederates will en- 
 courage any symptoms of these evils ; and that the hope of success 
 in producing confusion in the Nizam's territories is one of the 
 principal inducements to go to war at the present moment. 
 
 Your Excellency will observe, in this view of the question, the 
 improvement of the British strength in this quarter will be owing, 
 and in proportion, to the improvement in the state of the govern- 
 ment of the allies, to that of the country, to that of its interior 
 state, and to the confidence which the southern jaghiredars will 
 have in the superior strength of the British government, from 
 contemplating the effect which that strength will now have upon 
 the northern confederated chiefs. 
 
 No war in which the British government can be involved with 
 an European power can shake this strength. As long as the 
 British troops maintain their formidable position in the territories 
 of the Peshwah, the Nizam, and Guzerat, it must increase with 
 the strength and prosperity of those governments to which it gives 
 protection ; and there will be daily a smaller prospect that the 
 northern chiefs will venture to confederate against it. The break- 
 ing up of the confederacy, therefore, as it will add so much to the 
 strength and reputation of the British government, will be the 
 best security for the duration of the peace. 
 
 Although, in considering the various advantages which must 
 result from the retreat of the confederates, and must add to the 
 strength of the British government, I have pointed out to your 
 Excellency certain disadvantages under which we labour at the 
 present moment, I do not wish to impress your Excellency with the 
 notion that I consider them to be of such magnitude as to render 
 doubtful the event of a contest. They are certainly inconvenient,
 
 WE NEED NOT FEAR WAR. AMRUT RAO'S JAGHIRE. 271 
 
 and we should be stronger if the Peshwah's government was in 
 strength : but if we can strike such a blow during the rains as 
 will give us the superiority, and keep our rear in tranquillity, 
 we shall not probably feel those inconveniences further than in 
 the want of pecuniary resources by the Peshwah's government. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Close has laid before your Excellency the corre- 
 spondence which passed between Amrut Rao and me, since my 
 arrival at Poonah ; and the memorandum which he proposed to 
 the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness should give to me, by 
 which his Highness was to consent to give to Amrut Rao a re- 
 venue amounting to 4 lacs of rupees per annum. The Peshwah 
 would not agree to the proposed arrangement, but, on his depar- 
 ture to Wahy, referred the subject to his ministers, who made 
 a proposition to Lieut.-Col. Close respecting Amrut Rao, which 
 he will have laid before your Excellency. This proposition ap- 
 peared to me inadmissible : it went to place Amrut Rao in the 
 state of a prisoner, under the most degrading circumstances ; and 
 I was convinced that, if I had communicated it to the vakeel of 
 that chief, he would have instantly joined the confederates. In 
 the mean time, however, this vakeel pressed me for a decision on 
 his employer's case. He urged that, at my desire, Amrut Rao 
 had separated himself from the councils of Holkar and of Scin- 
 diah nearly 3 months ago ; that those chiefs were become his 
 enemies ; that, in his position beyond the Godavery, he was 
 liable to be attacked by them ; and that he was not at peace with 
 the Peshwah. 
 
 As, in the Memorandum received from the Peshwah's minis- 
 ters, they consented to give 4 lacs of rupees per annum to Amrut 
 Rao, (although the gift was to be attended by conditions to 
 which Amrut Rao would never consent,) I thought it proper to 
 write that chief a letter, of which the enclosed is a translation, 
 in which I gave him assurances that the British government 
 would take care that he should have a provision which would be 
 agreeable to him. 
 
 I am convinced that, excepting in the event of the retreat of 
 the confederates, Amrut Rao will not be satisfied with a jaghire 
 of that amount ; but I am also of opinion that nothing will in- 
 duce him to come forward in support of the British government, 
 excepting his conviction that, in case of a contest with the con- 
 federates, the former will be successful. 
 
 The promise of some provision will be sufficient to keep him 
 in a state of neutrality for a time ; and hereafter, (when it shall
 
 272 scindiah' s continued evasion of the ultimatum. 
 
 be certain that he will come forward in support of the British 
 cause,) will be the proper season to fix the amount of the jaghire 
 which he is to have. 
 
 I enclose the translation of a letter which I sent to Jeswunt 
 Rao Holkar, with a copy of the treaty of Bassein. I sent this 
 letter by soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan, of the Native cavalry, 
 with orders to write to Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Amrut Rao's 
 camp, to inform him that he had a letter from me, which he would 
 deliver in person, if Jeswunt Rao chose to receive him. I instructed 
 the soubahdar to tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar that the British 
 government had no intention to injure or interfere with him ; 
 that I was much pleased at his having crossed the Taptee, and 
 that I should be still more pleased to hear that he had gone 
 across the Nerbudda into the territories of his family. 
 
 152. To Colonel Collins. 
 
 Excuses of the Confederates for not retiring, futile, and justify 
 our course. Unless they withdraw, if still in their camp, 
 leave it at once. 
 
 (Extracts.) Rooie, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th 
 inst. I am concerned that there should have been any fresh 
 delay on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to engage to depart 
 with his troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, and 
 particularly that the ministers of that Chief should have given 
 such futile reasons for refusing to comply with my requisition 
 that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should retire. 
 
 ^ * * * % * -x- 
 
 I have observed that the Chiefs have declared that they would 
 not ascend the Adjuntee ghaut, or march towards Poonah, or 
 attempt to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein ; and 
 they are satisfied with the assurance which I had given them, 
 that the British government has no intention to interfere with 
 them, and will never encourage or give support to the breach of 
 treaties by the Peshwah, or by any of its allies. They now 
 pretend that they want the same assurance from the Peshwah, 
 although they must know that his Highness has no power to 
 do them any injury, excepting that which he derives from the 
 support of his government by the British troops. 
 
 In respect to the treaty between Scindiah and Holkar, not- 
 withstanding the boasted union, it now appears that the peace is
 
 UNLESS HE COMPLIES, COLLINS TO LEAVE HIM AT ONCE. 273 
 
 not yet concluded. But that can be no reason why Scindiah and 
 the Rajah of Berar should be allowed to remain encamped in 
 a position in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier ; on the 
 contrary, it ought to be a reason for which Scindiah at least 
 should be induced to move with his troops into those territories 
 which he ought to guard against Holkar's depredations. These 
 futile reasons for remaining with their troops in their positions 
 on the Nizam's frontier are the strongest proofs of the insincerity 
 of the declarations which the Chiefs have made ; and I hope 
 that, if they should not have satisfied you in your interview, you 
 would have withdrawn from their camp, according to the request 
 conveyed in my letter of the nth inst. 
 
 But in case you should still be in their camp when this letter shall 
 arrive there, I repeat the request which I made in my letter of the 
 29th, that you will withdraw forthwith, if they should not commence 
 their march, with all their troops, towards their usual stations. 
 The fact that Scindiah has not concluded his peace with Jeswunt 
 Rao Holkar, which is now acknowledged, is the strongest reason for 
 pressing forward at the present moment the decision, whether there 
 shall be peace with security, or war : besides, it is in conformity 
 with the instructions from his Excellency the Governor-General. 
 
 153. To Lieutenant- Colonel Close. 
 
 Underhand dealings of the Peshwah with the Confederates, and 
 insidious advice of his ministers to Col. Collins. The drift 
 of the PesJizvalCs negotiations to be ascertained by remon- 
 strance or by paying his ministers for the information. This 
 may enable us to settle the Poonah government on a better 
 footing, 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug., 1803. 
 
 The enclosed paper is probably an answer to that letter, written 
 by Salabut Khan, and what I have above stated will account for 
 part of its contents. But that is not the most material part ; 
 for it likewise contains intelligence that the Peshwah is treating 
 with the enemy. I should pass unnoticed this intelligence, if 
 I had not observed that Salabut Khan's correspondent in 
 Ragojee Bhoonslah's camp is far more intelligent than the 
 general run of these news writers ; and I know that he writes 
 accounts of almost every thing that passes in the durbar of that 
 chief. But whether the intelligence is true or false, it is very 
 certain that we have not the smallest knowledge of the nature or 
 
 T
 
 274 TRACK THE PESHWAH'S INTRIGUE WITH THE CHIEFS. 
 
 the objects of the communications between the Peshwah and 
 Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar ; notwithstanding the obvious ne- 
 cessity that we should have that knowledge, as well as the stipula- 
 tions of the treaty which provide for it. Indeed, the Peshwah's 
 ministers in Scindiah's durbar, instead of acting in co-operation 
 or communication with the British Resident, have recommended 
 to Col. Collins a line of conduct which, in the opinion of all the 
 persons employed by the British government, must lead to a war, 
 to be carried on under very disadvantageous circumstances. 
 
 I most earnestly request you to adopt all means in your power 
 to find out what passes in the Peshwah's durbar; and particularly 
 the nature and objects of his communications with Scindiah and 
 the Rajah of Berar. If representations founded on the treaty 
 will not produce the effect of disclosing what we must know, let 
 other means be adopted ; let expense be incurred to gain the 
 necessary intelligence ; and if you should find that Ragonaut 
 Rao will not disclose to you all that he knows, it is my opinion 
 that you ought to hold no further communication with him, as 
 it is very obvious that he has no influence over his employer. If 
 he does not disclose all, he is not honest to the British cause ; 
 and his communications have uniformly been found to be false. 
 
 I am aware that, although you may make a friend of Ragonaut 
 Rao, and even of Suddasheo Munkaiseer, you will not be able to 
 guide the Peshwah's councils ; because, in fact, he is guided by 
 nothing, excepting his own caprice and resentment. But you 
 will have intelligence of what is passing in the durbar, upon 
 which we can rely, instead of groping our way in the dark, as we 
 do at present. If the Peshwah should be really carrying on a 
 correspondence with Scindiah, in breach of the treaty, we may 
 in this manner have it in our power to lay hold of it, and thus 
 have a ground for making a solid arrangement of the Poonah 
 government. 
 
 154. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 The same subject. Answer to objections against buying the secrets 
 of the Pcslni'a/is durbar from his ministers. Our relations 
 to him and to the Nizam contrasted. Necessity of doing in 
 the former case ivhat would be inappropriate in the latter. 
 
 Camp, 5th Aug., 1803. 
 I have received your letter of the 3rd. It is very desirable 
 that we should have the Governor-General's opinion on the
 
 RAGONAVT RAO IS READY TO BE FOUR TOOL. 2J$ 
 
 proposition which I made to you ; but time must elapse before 
 we can receive it, and the critical moment will pass by, in which 
 we should derive all the benefits that I expect from the adoption 
 of the measure. You have stated two objections to it : one, that 
 Ragonaut Rao has never made any advances, since you informed 
 him that the British government would reward his services ; the 
 other, that the ministers at the Nizam's durbar were pensioned, 
 with the knowledge of his Highness, from which I conclude that 
 you are of opinion that the same course ought to be adopted in 
 respect to the rewards to be given to those of the Peshwah. 
 
 In respect to the first objection, I have to observe that 
 Ragonaut Rao has lately urged a request that he might be con- 
 sidered by the British government, in case his enemies should 
 prevail, and should drive him from the situation which he at 
 present fills ; but, supposing that he had not urged this request, 
 it is not possible that a better opportunity should offer of bringing 
 this subject forward, than that which suggested it to me some 
 days ago. 
 
 You might, in my opinion, communicate to Ragonaut Rao 
 the ackbar from Scindiah's camp, which states that the Peshwah 
 had written a letter to that Chief, and that which I sent to you, 
 which states that he was dissatisfied with his alliance with the 
 British government ; the uneasiness which I, and every person 
 concerned on the part of the British government, felt upon this 
 subject ; particularly, as we all observe that there was a constant, 
 nay, a daily intercourse, between the Peshwah and the northern 
 Chiefs ; and that, notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty 
 of Bassein, not only we were unacquainted with the nature and 
 objects of these communications, but we could get no account 
 whatever of them from the Peshwah or his ministers. On these 
 grounds, in my opinion, you might urge Ragonaut Rao to a 
 disclosure of the objects of this correspondence ; and might tell 
 him that you should reward him, if you found that he was so 
 far a friend to the alliance, as to make you acquainted with all 
 that passed at the Peshwah's durbar, of which you ought to 
 have a knowledge. 
 
 It will not be objected to this measure, that a Mahratta, 
 bred at Madras, particularly after he has solicited the rewards 
 of the British government, will be hurt or offended at this 
 proposition : but you may be of opinion, that as he knows that 
 you have promised him a reward, and that he must be equally 
 satisfied with that engagement as he would be with the possession 
 
 T 2
 
 Z76 WE CAN'T TREAT THE PESHWAH LIKE THE NIZAM. 
 
 of the reward, to give it is attended with risk, and may produce 
 no benefit. In answer, I have to observe that no Native ever 
 trusts to a promise ; and, as the bribery of the ministers of a 
 Native durbar is so very common, it is astonishing that you 
 should have been able to transact any business at the Peshwah s 
 durbar to this moment, without having had recourse to it. 
 
 In respect to the example of the Nizam's durbar, it is my 
 opinion that, in the whole of the transactions at Poonah, we 
 have adhered too closely to what has been done at Hyderabad. 
 The constitution and customs of two governments cannot be 
 more different than those of Poonah and Hyderabad are ; and 
 they differ materially in the circumstances which ought to guide 
 our decision upon' this question. 
 
 In the Nizam's durbar, the minister has all the power ; and 
 it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the 
 interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is 
 favourable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce 
 that result ; and the Nizam has been told that that pension is 
 the sum which the minister would have received from the 
 southern districts, if they had not been ceded to the Company. 
 The Nizam also, it is to be supposed, is so well satisfied with the 
 administration of the government by his minister, and with the 
 tranquillity which it enjoys, that he entertains no jealousy on 
 account of the receipt of this pension. 
 
 But how is it with the Peshwah? He has no minister; no 
 person has influence over him, and he is only guided by his own 
 caprices. He cannot be paid, in order that he may conduct his 
 government according to our views ; and it would be useless to 
 pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no 
 corresponding service. But, although they cannot conduct him 
 and his government, they can let you know in what manner he 
 conducts it, and for that they ought to be paid. That for which 
 they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every 
 thing that passes that comes to their knowledge ; in order that 
 you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether 
 the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking 
 him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of 
 its stipulations. But, if they are to be paid with his knowledge, 
 it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes 
 you should not know ; and that he will, in fact, have two sets of 
 ministers, one set to deceive the British Resident, and another 
 to conduct the real business of his government.. Upon the
 
 A SOUTHERN JAGHIREDAR WARNED NOT TO FALL OFF. 277 
 
 whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you 
 should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the 
 Peshwah's durbar ; that it is not possible that you should have 
 that knowledge without paying for it ; that you will not obtain 
 it if you pay for it with the consent of the Peshwah ; and that 
 you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao. 
 
 In my last, I believe I told you the reason for which I attended 
 to the news sent by Salabut Khan's writer. He has always 
 given accurate reports of what passed in Col. Collins's con- 
 ferences with the northern chiefs, and of other matters, which 
 I knew to be true ; I therefore conclude that he has some good 
 source of intelligence. I do not think it possible to find out the 
 foundation he has for writing the story. If you should send this 
 letter to the Governor-General, I recommend that it should be by 
 a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very 
 proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be 
 to consider it. 
 
 155. To Ramchunder Pursheram. 
 
 An earnest remonstrance against defection. 
 
 3rd Aug., 1803. 
 
 I am concerned to find that, notwithstanding you were satisfied 
 on all the points which you referred to me at different times, in 
 your march in company with the troops under my command 
 from the river Kistna to Poonah, and your repeated promises to 
 Major Malcolm, conveyed to me from time to time, stating that 
 you would march from Poonah to join me, you have hitherto 
 remained behind : and at last you have moved to the southward. 
 to a greater distance from the city ; and, in disobedience of the 
 orders of his Highness the Peshwah, in breach of your promises 
 to me, and in opposition to the remonstrances of Lieut.-Col. 
 Close, you intend to return to }'our residence in the neighbour- 
 hood of the river Kistna. You know well that there is no 
 occasion for your presence in that quarter ; because, since I have 
 interfered between you and the Rajah of Kolapoor, all matters 
 there have been in a state of greater tranquillity than has been 
 known for years : your presence in that quarter, therefore, may 
 be more hurtful than beneficial to your own interests. 
 
 But that consideration is trifling in comparison with the evils 
 which your interests must sustain from a breach of the solemn 
 promises you have made to me. A performance of these would
 
 2j8 scindiah' s earlier tone about the treaty. 
 
 insure to you, at all times, the powerful protection of the 
 Company's government : your interests would always be con- 
 sidered as their own, and, as their friend in this state, you must 
 have risen to the honours which your ancestors enjoyed. But 
 the crooked policy which you appear disposed to adopt must 
 preclude all hope of those advantages ; and, on the other hand, 
 you are much mistaken if you suppose that it can lead to your 
 advantage, under any contingency. Therefore, for your own 
 sake, I most anxiously entreat you to review your situation ; 
 to consider well your own interests and future prospects ; and 
 adopt at once a decided line of conduct, and join this army. 
 I write to you as a friend who knows your interests well, and 
 also has an anxious desire to see your affairs prosper. 
 
 156. MEMORANDUM. 
 
 Resort to war vindicated by a retrospect of the negotiations with 
 the Confederates, from the Treaty of Bassein to the rupture. 
 
 6th Aug., 1803. 
 
 His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged 
 to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein, with the Hon. Company, 
 a treaty, by which the British government bound itself to defend 
 his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should 
 attack hirn. 
 
 The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this 
 treaty, which is purely defensive ; and it contains an express 
 stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to 
 attack the great Mahratta jaghiredars, unless they should first 
 commit hostilities against the allies. 
 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British government to 
 give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud : subse- 
 quently, when informed that the relations between the Hon. 
 Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed 
 his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd March, 
 to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the 
 most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the 
 execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities 
 against the British government or its allies. Notwithstanding 
 this declaration, accounts reached the British government, from 
 various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined 
 with the Rajah of Berar, and with other chiefs, for the purpose of 
 hostility against the British government and its allies.
 
 HIS LATER ATTITUDE, AND THAT OF THE BON SLAY. 2 J 9 
 
 The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah on the 27th May ; and that Chief was called upon to 
 state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to 
 make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of 
 Berar and other chiefs ; and was called upon to retire with his 
 troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to 
 the British government or its allies. 
 
 In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British 
 Resident, that, until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, 
 he could not decide whether there should be 'peace or war;' 
 but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with 
 the determination of the united Chiefs, as soon as their meeting 
 should take place. 
 
 The Chiefs met in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor on the 
 3rd June ; and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive 
 and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly 
 explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest 
 objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just 
 demands of the British government till the 8th July. 
 
 Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then 
 declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or 
 their allies ; or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, 
 provided the Hon. Company would not prevent the execution of 
 the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and 
 those Chiefs : they still, however, manifested an intention of 
 advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and 
 of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his 
 Highness's boundary. 
 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley, therefore, on the 14th July, wrote a 
 letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprised that Chief, 
 that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his 
 declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the 
 Rajah of Berar, and if both Chiefs did not retire with their 
 troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that 
 the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when 
 the united chiefs should have retired : but he informed them, that 
 if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain 
 with their troops in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the 
 positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their 
 possessions ; an event which he most anxiously deprecated. 
 
 Major- Gen. Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut
 
 280 THEY HAVE FORCED US TO MAKE WAR ON THEM. 
 
 Rao Scindiah, ' that it was not consistent with the treaty of 
 Bassein, or the principles of the British government, to support 
 any power in the breach of a treaty;' and, therefore, he might 
 be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his 
 government. 
 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared 
 themselves to be satisfied with this declaration ; and the former 
 acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major-Gen. Wellesley, 
 that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they 
 usually occupy : but, instead of retiring with their troops, these 
 Chiefs have persevered in retaining the position which they took 
 up for the purposes of hostility against the British government 
 and their allies ; and they have written letters to propose to 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Serin- 
 gapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for 
 the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the 
 rights and territories of the allies ; while they should keep their 
 troops united in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, and 
 in readiness to take advantage of the absence of the troops of the 
 British government and its allies, to carry into execution their 
 hostile designs. 
 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Berar peace on terms of equality, and honourable to 
 all parties : they have preferred war, and they alone must be 
 considered responsible for the consequences. 
 
 Under these circumstances, Major-Gen. Wellesley is obliged 
 to commence operations against them, in order to secure the 
 interests of the British government and its allies. 
 
 157. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah. 
 
 Declaration of War. 
 
 6th Aug., 1803. 
 
 I have received your letter. [Here the contents are recapitu- 
 lated.] You will recollect that the British government did not 
 threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened 
 to commence hostilities against the British government and its 
 allies ; and, when called upon to explain your intentions, you 
 declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or 
 war; and, in conformity with your threats, and your declared 
 doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to 
 the Nizam's frontier.
 
 IF THE ENEMY ASCEND THE GHAUTS, ATTACK THEM. 28 1 
 
 On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to 
 its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were 
 sincere ; but, instead of complying with this reasonable re- 
 quisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops 
 which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against 
 your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be 
 suffered to remain, with your troops assembled, in readiness to 
 take advantage of their absence. 
 
 This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible ; and you 
 must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself 
 obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions. I offered 
 you peace on terms of equality and honourable to all parties ; 
 you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences. 
 
 3. The War with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 158. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 Instructions to check the advance of the Confederates, until 
 General Wellesley can co-operate. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 18th July, 1803. 
 
 If you should receive notice from Col. Collins that he has 
 withdrawn from Scindiah's camp, you will be so kind as imme- 
 diately to take up a position as near to the Adjuntee ghaut, 
 which leads into the Nizam's territories, as the conveniences of 
 water and forage will permit. From this position you will watch 
 with vigilance the designs and movements of Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If you should find that those 
 chiefs attempt to ascend that, or any other ghaut, you will fall 
 upon them immediately, before they shall have time to deploy 
 their forces above the ghaut. 
 
 I do not, however, propose that your troops should descend 
 the ghaut, but only that they should attack that part of the 
 enemy which shall ascend, before the remainder can come to 
 their assistance. It is possible that they may leave the Adjuntee 
 ghaut, and endeavour to penetrate by the Casserbarry ghaut, 
 towards Aurungabad. You will, in that case, move towards the 
 latter, and place yourself in such manner as to attack them with 
 advantage, if they attempt to pass there. 
 
 My object is to avoid, if possible, that your troops should be 
 engaged with the whole of Scindiah's infantry, with his guns, 
 before my operations to the southward of the Godavery shall be
 
 282 ESTIMATE AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES. 
 
 so far advanced as to enable me to reinforce you. Your efforts 
 to prevent Scindiah from penetrating by some one of the pas- 
 sages may not be successful ; and, indeed, it is probable that 
 they must finally fail : but the delay of a few days is all I 
 require, and that I conceive must be gained. 
 
 I have, however, no apprehension of the result, even if you 
 should be ena-a^ed with the whole of Scindiah's force. 
 
 159. To General Lake. 
 
 Amount and position of General Wellesleys forces, and of those of 
 the Confederates. Proposed plan of operations. 
 
 (Extract.) Sangwee, 29th July, 1803. 
 
 The troops under my command are stationed as follows : the 
 Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, are posted at 
 Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my 
 immediate command, including about 3000 Mahratta horse, and 
 2000 excellent horse belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, are at 
 Sangwee upon the Seenah, about twenty miles south eastward 
 from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging 
 to Scindiah ; and there are 2 battalions of Native infantry under 
 the command of Col. Murray at Poonah. 
 
 In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to make 
 any impression on Guzerat ; but since the troops in that province 
 have been placed under my command, I have not been able to 
 get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, 
 that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal 
 entrance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our 
 troops ; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat, north of the 
 Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which 
 place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah. 
 
 The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of 
 Golkar's army is to the northward of the river Taptee : his 
 troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he 
 has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions 
 of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 
 20,000 horse, 6,000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear 
 of the Adjuntee pass, near the Nizam's territories. Scindiah 
 has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjuntee 
 hills.
 
 GEN. WELLESLEF's INTENDED PLAN OF OPERATIONS. 283 
 
 My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack 
 Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which 
 place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bom- 
 bay, and keep the Nizam's army on the defensive upon his 
 Highness' frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, 
 and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring 
 the enemy to action. 
 
 As the passes through the Adjuntee hills are difficult, par- 
 ticularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy 
 have, it is probable that Col. Stevenson may be able to succeed 
 in preventing them from deploying their force on this side of the 
 hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong 
 enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult 
 to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the 
 Godavery. 
 
 The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and, after having 
 got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that 
 province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render 
 necessary. 
 
 160. To Major Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Importance of garrisoning the principal posts in the Nizatris ter- 
 ritories, and of massing troops at Hyderabad ; both to foil 
 the encmfs cavalry, and to prevent disturbances in case of 
 Nizam Alys death. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug., 1803. 
 
 I think that there is some reason to hope that we may have 
 peace, but we may also be obliged to commence hostilities : even 
 in this event, some time will elapse before any impression can be 
 made on the Nizam's territories ; but, as I observe that Dowlut 
 Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are sending away their in- 
 fantry to Hindustan, and retaining, with their camps, only their 
 cavalry and some of their guns, it is probable that, if there should 
 be a war, they will carry on their operations with those troops 
 only. Even if this should be their plan, I have no apprehensions 
 for the result of the contest ; but it becomes more necessary to 
 guard against all sudden attacks on points of importance. Not- 
 withstanding the best intelligence of the enemy's designs, and 
 the best arrangements, it is obvious that a body of cavalry may 
 pass one of our armies, and that much mischief may be done be- 
 fore a remedy can be applied, unless every point of importance
 
 284 PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY NIZAM'S GOVERNMENT. 
 
 is in some degree guarded. If places of this description should 
 be guarded and prepared for their defence at all, this mode of 
 operation, which I have supposed that the confederates have in 
 their contemplation, cannot have any permanent effect, and will 
 do but little temporary injury to the country. 
 
 I therefore most earnestly recommend that garrisons, even of 
 peons, should be placed in all the principal posts and forts in the 
 Nizam's territories, particularly Aurungabad, Moongy Puttun, 
 Kurdlah, Bheer, Perinda, Beeder, &c. &c, and that a body of 
 troops should be collected at Hyderabad. Even if the enemy 
 should be able to pass our armies, the adoption of these means 
 will prevent them from gaining any thing by this invasion : the 
 village peons alone will render their subsistence difficult and 
 precarious, and they will be obliged to retire. 
 
 But I recommend these measures not only with a view to the 
 defeat of the enemy's designs, but to insure the tranquillity of the 
 country in the event of the Nizam's death. The establishment 
 of the British troops at Hyderabad has been the cause of a great 
 diminution of the numbers of his Highness' army, and many, who 
 subsisted on the pay they received in his Highness' service, have 
 been obliged to look for subsistence in other employments not so 
 agreeable to them. There must be many discontented people 
 in those countries, all of whom would be ready to join the stan- 
 dard of any chief who might be desirous to take advantage of the 
 weakness of the new government, and of the moment in which 
 the British troops and those of his Highness should be employed 
 against the enemy upon the frontier, to assume independence. 
 Considering the ambition of the Natives in general, it will not be 
 denied that there may be chiefs disposed to adopt this line of 
 conduct ; but the measures of precaution which I have recom- 
 mended will give employment to a great proportion of the 
 military classes of the community, and will prevent such chiefs 
 from finding instruments to carry their purposes into execution. 
 
 161. To the Governor of Bombay. 
 
 Desirableness of authorising the collectors to raise scbundy corps, 
 for time of war; and of treating the Bheels in a conciliatoiy 
 and forbearing manner. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug., 1803. 
 
 14- * * * These small detachments are ruinous to the discipline 
 and spirit of the troops ; they weaken the corps to such a degree,
 
 SEBUNDIES CORPS TO BE RAISED ; BHEELS WELL TREATED. 285 
 
 that they are unfit for service in the field, and they answer no 
 adequate purpose. In my opinion, in time of war, and particu- 
 larly in such a war as one with the Mahrattas, it would be best 
 to authorize the collectors to raise sebundy troops for these ser- 
 vices : the expenses would be but trifling, and, in fact, cannot 
 bear a comparison with the benefit which must be derived from 
 the measure. 
 
 1 $. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which 
 have belonged to the Mahrattas, there is a numerous class of 
 people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring 
 subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually 
 entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the govern- 
 ment of those countries to the Company; and they are driven 
 to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the 
 British troops are engaged in foreign wars., or in the armies of our 
 enemies : these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all 
 the knowledge derived from long residence and service within 
 them, and they become, in fact, our most dangerous enemies. 
 
 24. It is true that, in the absence of the detachment from either 
 the northern or the southern division, that in which there are no 
 troops is in some degree liable to be injured by marauding horse. 
 That is an evil which cannot be entirely avoided, so long as the 
 British armies are composed entirely of infantry, and those of the 
 enemy of cavalry ; but, if the forts in the country are kept up, 
 and in times of war the sebundy of the country are hired and 
 paid, even that evil must be of short duration, as it is well known 
 that no number of horse can find their way into a fort without 
 the assistance of guns. 
 
 34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you 
 will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels : 
 these appear to be a race of the same description with those who 
 inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and re- 
 fraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove 
 our best friends ; and a contrary line of conduct will make them 
 our worst enemies. It must not be expected that we should in- 
 volve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for 
 tribute.
 
 286 WE ARE AT WAR WITH CHIEFS, NOT THE PEOPLE. 
 
 162. Proclamation by Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley. 
 
 Tli£ people not to be molested, if they remain quiet ; otherwise 
 to be treated as enemies. 
 
 Camp near Ahmednuggur, 7th Aug., 1803. 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having threat- 
 ened with hostilities the British government and their allies,. Rao 
 Pundit Purdhaun, and the Nabob Nizam Aly ; and, in pursuance of 
 those threats, having advanced with their large armies to a position 
 contiguous to the frontiers, and having refused to depart from it, 
 notwithstanding the repeated representations and entreaties of 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley, as the only mode of preserving peace, he 
 at last finds himself obliged to commence hostilities against 
 those Chiefs. He does not, however, intend to make war upon 
 the inhabitants ; and, accordingly, all amildars and others are re- 
 quired to remain quietly in their stations, and obey the orders 
 they will receive; and if they do no injury to the British armies, 
 none will be done to them. But notice is hereby given, that if 
 any of the inhabitants of the country either abandon their dwell- 
 ings, or do any injury to the British armies or their followers, 
 they will be treated as enemies, and suffer accordingly. 
 
 163. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Capture of Ahmednuggur. Military importance of the place. 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug., 1803. 
 
 The weather cleared up so much on the 7th inst. as to allow 
 me to march to this place on the 8th. I had, in the morning, 
 dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to re- 
 quire him to surrender his fort ; and, on my arrival in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This 
 was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of Arabs, who were 
 supported by a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry and a body 
 of horse, encamped in an open space between the pettah and 
 the fort. 
 
 I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the in- 
 fantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regt., under 
 the command of Lieut.-Col. Harness ; in another place, with the 
 74th regt. and 1st batt. of the 8th, under the command of Lieut.- 
 Col. Wallace ; and, in a third, with the flank companies of the 
 74th, and the 1st batt. 3rd regt., under the command of Capt.
 
 SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF AHMEDNUGGUR. 287 
 
 Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, 
 and had no rampart : so that, when the troops had ascended to 
 the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand ; and 
 the Arabs, who occupied the towers, defended their posts with 
 the utmost obstinacy. 
 
 At length, they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the 
 houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the 
 troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked our troops, 
 after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, 
 after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of 
 it ; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your 
 Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy's 
 loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater 
 than ours ; and, on the night of the 8th, all that part of their 
 force which was not required for the defence of the fort went off 
 to the northward ; including all the Arabs who survived the 
 contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended 
 one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther 
 than the fort. 
 
 On the 9th, I reconnaitred the ground in the neighbourhood 
 of the fort ; and, on that evening, Lieut. -Col. Wallace, with 
 5 companies of the 74th regt, and the 2nd batt. 12th regt., 
 seized a position within 400 yards of it ; on which, in the course 
 of that night, a battery was constructed for 4 guns, to take off 
 the defences on the side on which I proposed to make my 
 attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th ; and it was so 
 advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce 
 the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he 
 might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer, 
 I told him that I should not cease firing till I should have taken 
 the fort, or he should have surrendered it ; but that I would 
 listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate. Yesterday 
 morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, 
 on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, 
 and that he should have his private property. 
 
 Although I consented to this proposal, it was 5 in the evening 
 before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence 
 I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According 
 to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort 
 this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the 
 troops under my command took possession of it. 
 
 In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands : our loss
 
 288 
 
 MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF AHMEDNUGGUR. 
 
 since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the 
 spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on. 
 
 I have to draw your Excellency's notice towards the conduct 
 of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut.- 
 Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the 
 trenches ; Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery ; Capt. 
 Johnson, of the engineers ; and Capt. Heitland, of the pioneers, 
 in the short subsequent siege. 
 
 Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advan- 
 tageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the frontier of 
 his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important 
 point of support to all our future operations to the northward. 
 It is considered, in this country, as one of the strongest forts ; 
 and, excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country 
 fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the 
 part exposed to the fire of the British troops. 
 
 I shall hereafter have the honour of transmitting to your 
 Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which 
 it contains. 
 
 I propose to cross the Godavery immediately ; and I shall, in 
 a future dispatch, lay before your Excellency the measures which 
 I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah's possessions south 
 of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing 
 their resources for the use of the British troops. 
 
 Return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Major-Gen. 
 the Hon. A. Wellesley, during the siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the 8th, 
 9th, 10th, and nth Aug., 1803. 
 
 19th light dragoons 
 
 Artillery . . . 
 
 II. M. 74th regt. . 
 
 78th . . . 
 
 Europeans 
 
 Killed . 
 Wounded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 _c 
 
 u 
 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 0. 
 
 
 
 
 U 
 
 3 
 OT 
 
 I 
 
 P 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 — 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 — 
 
 - 58 
 
 5th regt. cavalry "| 
 
 1st batt. 2nd regt. N. I. 1 
 
 1st 3rd 
 
 do. 
 
 1st 8th 
 
 do. 
 
 2nd 1 2th 
 
 do. 
 
 2nd 18th 
 
 do. 
 
 1st Pioneers 
 
 do. 
 
 \ Natives 
 
 Killed . 
 Wounded 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 !3 
 
 
 
 •0 
 
 
 
 J3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 s 
 
 ■3 
 
 cn 
 
 B 
 
 B 
 
 — 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 3
 
 PREDATORY WARFARE OUT OF DATE. 289 
 
 164. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 The Confederates not likely to succeed in a predatory warfare 
 
 with us. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug., 1803. 
 
 The Mahrattas have long boasted that they would carry on a 
 predatory war against us : they will find that mode of warfare 
 not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, 
 supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless 
 they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same 
 corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the 
 Mussulmann in the last century, they cannot expect much success 
 from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation 
 in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow 
 that they cannot meet us in the field ; when they are obliged 
 to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the 
 remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our 
 hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they 
 suppose that their lighter bodies will act ; and still less of the 
 British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do 
 the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be 
 first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests. 
 
 165. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 A bold offensive our true policy \ and guarantee of success 
 in the war. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803. 
 
 I have received rather unpleasant accounts from Col. Steven- 
 son. On the 13th he heard that a party of horse was passing the 
 Adjuntee hills, but, instead of dashing at them, he called in a 
 battalion of infantry and some horse which were in his front : 
 he afterwards, however, countermanded these orders, and sent 
 forward Salabut Khan and Noor ool Oomrah, and intended to 
 move out with the piquets on the 14th. He had a variety of 
 plans in contemplation, of none of which I entirely approved, 
 because they led him into a long defensive operation, in which 
 he must be a loser. I have therefore desired him to move 
 forward himself with the Company's and the Nizam's cavalry ; 
 
 U
 
 290 WE MUST BEAT THEM BY DASHING AT THEM. 
 
 to leave the infantry in a centrical situation for his supplies to 
 collect upon ; and to dash at the first party that comes into his 
 neighbourhood. In this manner he will, at all events, have his 
 supplies, and if he cuts up, or only drives off, a good body of 
 horse, the campaign is our own. 
 
 We must get the upper hand, and, if once we have that, we 
 shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we 
 begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys 
 which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack 
 briskly, we shall soon be in distress. 
 
 168. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Political expediency ought to overrule the PesJnvatis private feel- 
 ings, and induce him to be reconciled to Amrut Rao ; our 
 engagements with whom were the result of the Peshzvah's 
 non-fulfilment of the Treaty. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp, N. of the Nimderrah ghaut, 18th Aug., 1803. 
 
 The Peshwah's feelings respecting the proposed meeting with 
 Amrut Rao are unpleasant ; but I do not think that, under 
 present circumstances, the meeting can be avoided. His High- 
 ness must recollect that he was repeatedly informed that the 
 British government would be obliged to adopt the measures 
 which might appear necessary for its own security, unless he 
 should perform his treaty, and this agreement with Amrut Rao 
 is one of those measures. His Highness has no ground on which 
 he can found an objection to this agreement, excepting one 
 sought for in his own implacable resentments. I can never 
 admit these as rational grounds either for the adoption, or for 
 the rejection, of any political measure. The benefits or the evils 
 which the public interest will derive or suffer from such a 
 measure are alone what must decide whether it is to be adopted 
 or rejected. 
 
 But in his Highness's conduct respecting Amrut Rao, there 
 appears to be caprice as well as resentment ; for it must be 
 recollected, that, when his Highness was at Bassein, he offered to 
 be reconciled to his brother. It is true that Amrut Rao then 
 rejected the offer, by which his Highness's feelings may have 
 been wounded : but, considering the reconciliation as a measure 
 of political expediency, and putting private feelings out of the
 
 THE PESHWAH'S UNWISE HATRED OF AMRUT RAO. 29 1 
 
 question, I think it full as necessary at this time, as it was when 
 his Highness was at Bassein ; and, excepting that the reconcili- 
 ation was then refused by Amrut Rao, there is nothing in it 
 more injurious to his feelings at the present moment than there 
 was at that period. However, all that is asked from his Highness 
 is to refrain from hostility against Amrut Rao, and not to increase 
 the number of his or our enemies. I will engage for Amrut 
 Rao's conduct ; and I will take care in my intercourse with that 
 Chief to do nothing which is inconsistent with the treaty between 
 the British government and the Peshwah. 
 
 167. To the Governor of Bombay. 
 
 Reasons for resigning the control of operations in Guzerat. 
 
 Camp, 29th Aug., 1803. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd inst. 
 
 2. When I proposed, for your consideration, a plan for the 
 military organization of the troops in Guzerat Proper, and the 
 Attavesy, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not 
 intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the 
 Resident at Baroda ; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary 
 force in Guzerat, such as at this moment is in force in respect to 
 the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. 
 
 3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you 
 approved of that plan ; and you desired that I would recommend 
 Col. Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if 
 you should adopt it ; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that 
 you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to 
 carry it into execution. 
 
 4. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any 
 measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the 
 public service. But the measures in question are of a general 
 nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our 
 military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must 
 have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those 
 districts, are of opinion that they are not and you object to 
 them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous, 
 indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the 
 adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur 
 the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen. 
 
 5. At the same time, I have to observe to you, that the com- 
 
 U 2
 
 292 A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE. 
 
 munication between me and the troops in those provinces is 
 necessarily very long ; that circumstances may render it longer, 
 and may prevent it entirely ; and, therefore, I request that you 
 will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat 
 and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference 
 to me. 
 
 6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable 
 me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the 
 authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion 
 that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public 
 service. 
 
 168. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 The same subject. Mr. Duncan's unintelligible hair-splitting. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug., 1803. 
 
 Mr. Duncan, after having acquiesced in the plan suggested 
 by me for the organization of the troops, and the plan of opera- 
 tions in Guzerat, has informed me that ' acquiescence' did not 
 mean ' approbation ' ; and he has detailed his objections to the 
 general system, as well as to the particulars of the plan, which go 
 to fundamentals. He has, however, informed me that I may take 
 upon myself to order its execution, if I think proper. I cannot 
 understand the nice distinction between the ' acquiescence ' of a 
 Governor in a plan for the defence of the provinces under his 
 government, and his ' approbation ' of that plan. However, be 
 that as it may, I cannot take upon myself to order the execution 
 of measures which circumstances may render unfortunate, even if 
 they should be regulated as I wish, but to which I am certain 
 that every opposition in the power of every officer in the govern- 
 jnent will be given, particularly after I have been informed that 
 those measures are decidedly disapproved of by the Governor. 
 Neither can I, at this distance, undertake to conduct the details 
 of a piece of machinery so disjointed as would be the military 
 duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy, under the separated author- 
 ities of the Resident at Baroda and the Committee of Surat : I 
 have, therefore, requested to be relieved from all interference in 
 those concerns.
 
 GEN. WELLESLEY AND STEVENSON TO CO-OPERATE. 293 
 
 169. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 Plan of combined operations explained and accounted for. 
 
 Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug., 1803. 
 
 I marched here this morning, with a view to check the opera- 
 tions of the enemy to the southward. I rather believe that he 
 was encamped yesterday at Caulaygaum, to the south of Jaulna. 
 He did not march before 12. I have not heard from his camp 
 since. We must endeavour to drive him out of the Nizam's 
 country, or he will certainly oblige us to draw nearer to our sup- 
 plies. More pindarries will follow those already come in. They 
 will penetrate to the south of the river ; and then I, at least, must 
 recross to subsist. I do not expect that we shall be able to bring 
 the enemy to an action, but we must try to keep him in move- 
 ment, and tire him out. 
 
 I cannot permanently move to the eastward at present, for 
 several reasons : one of the most pressing is, that I am obliged to 
 look out for a battalion marching from the Kistna with bullocks, 
 treasures, &c, &c. Besides, I do not think it impossible but that 
 Holkar may come down and increase the number of our enemies ; 
 and I must return to impede his progress. I propose, therefore, 
 to leave my baggage and heavy stores here in an intrenched 
 camp, with a battalion, and to move forward with a light army. 
 I shall march upon this plan on the day after to-morrow ; and I 
 shall keep as nearly as I can, in a due E. direction from hence, 
 between Jaulna and the river. I recommend that you also should 
 march with your cavalry only, if you think yourself sufficiently 
 strong in that description of troops, and a battalion with its guns, 
 on the same plan, on the day after to-morrow. You might direct 
 your march immediately upon the enemy : we shall frighten him. 
 at least, if we do not .hurt him ; we shall drive him from the 
 territories of the Nabob, and oblige him to retire into those of 
 the Rajah of Berar. If we succeed in this plan, the parties will 
 possibly become tired of the game ; and, at all events, we shall 
 have gained time by it for my supplies to come up. 
 
 Your infantry might remain in your camp at Donegaum, for 
 your treasures, &c, to collect upon ; and they would be a check 
 upon the return of the enemy to this quarter. Keep your intentions 
 secret. None of the Natives can be trusted with the secrets of 
 our plans in this war, till our success is decided.
 
 294 CONFEDERATES STEAL A MARCH ON STEVENSON. 
 
 170. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Narrative of the opening operations of the war. Holkars designs 
 uncertain. Gen. Wellcslefs precautious against him ; and 
 intention of invading Berar. The Rajah the instigator of the 
 war. Good marching trim. Reasons for resigning the com- 
 mand in Guzerat. 
 
 Camp, 6th Sept., 1803. 
 
 I have not written to you for some time, but I have had much 
 to do, and I knew that you would see the letters which I have 
 written to Col. Close and Mr. Duncan. I shall, however, en- 
 deavour to give you, in this letter, an idea of our situation. 
 
 The enemy deceived Col. Stevenson in the march they made 
 to the eastward on the 20th and 21st of last month ; and, rinding 
 that they had induced him to pass Jaffierabad, they returned to 
 the westward on the 22nd, and ascended the Adjuntee ghaut on 
 the 23rd and 24th. On the 23rd, Col. Stevenson sent a patrol down 
 the Badowly ghaut, which picked up some bullocks and horses 
 loaded with grain ; and on the 23rd, at night, he had intended to 
 go still farther to the eastward, in quest of a detachment, under 
 a relation of the Rajah of Berar, which had gone that route. I 
 did not receive his letters written about that time ; and I cannot 
 say exactly what he was doing between the 23rd and 29th ; but 
 the enemy penetrated into the country, and passed between him 
 and Jalnapoor ; and I have seen letters from his camp, which say 
 that one of the brigades lost its baggage on the march to Jaffier- 
 abad ; that the pindarry horse were very troublesome, and that 
 the Moguls did not behave as they ought. This is probably true ; 
 otherwise the pindarries would not have come near the troops 
 a second time. 
 
 On the 28th, a party of pindarries came to Aurungabad, but 
 were driven off by the Nizam's infantry stationed there ; and, on 
 the 29th, I arrived at Aurungabad. Scindiah was at that time 
 at Jalnapoor, a fort and district belonging to himself, about 40 
 miles east from Aurungabad ; and he tried, whilst there, to 
 plunder Budnapoor, a fortified village of the Nizam, from which 
 he was beaten off. As soon as he heard of my arrival at Au- 
 rungabad, he marched off still farther to the eastward and south- 
 ward, and went to the neighbourhood of a place called Purtoor, 
 belonging to Soubahan Khan. Col. Stevenson moved down to 
 Jalnapoor on the 1st, and took it on the 2nd; and I moved to
 
 PREDATORY WARFARE NOT PROFITABLE. 295 
 
 the southward, towards the Godavery, on the road to Hyder- 
 abad, having found that, contrary to all former experience, at 
 this season of the year, the river had fallen, and was fordable in 
 many places. We were all stationary on the 3rd and 4th. 
 Scindiah has evidently been waiting for Begum Sumroo's infan- 
 try, and, they say, the brigade under Pohlman : the former of 
 which has certainly come up the ghaut, and, it is supposed, the 
 latter. He has made various detachments towards this body, and 
 at last moved himself yesterday to Jalnapoor, leaving Ragojee 
 about 5 coss in his rear, with the little baggage they have, and 
 a body of horse. 
 
 Col. Stevenson moved yesterday also towards Aurungabad, as 
 he tells me, in order to meet Rajah Mohiput Ram ; but it is 
 either to be hoped or feared that this movement may be con- 
 sidered as a retreat, and will encourage the enemy to come to 
 an action. At all events, it ensures the secure junction of the 
 campoos. 
 
 I made a march yesterday, and another this day, to the cast- 
 ward from Rackisbaum ; and I am now about 6 miles north of 
 the Godavery, and shall have a fair start with the enemy for 
 Hyderabad. The enemy have done but little mischief hitherto 
 to the country. The pindarries have been driven away from 
 many villages ; grain is very dear in their army, which is a 
 certain sign that they get but little plunder ; they are terribly 
 alarmed, and, I am told, much dissatisfied. They certainly 
 intend to avoid an action with either of us, if they can, unless 
 Col. Stevenson's movement of yesterday towards Aurungabad 
 should encourage them to come to blows with him ; and I believe 
 it is their intention to cross the Godavery, now that the river is 
 fordable, and to make a dash to the southward, although it is 
 certain that they do not like my position upon that river, and my 
 readiness to cross with them. They know that the river must 
 rise again, and they do not like to be cut off from their own 
 countries, and all assistance. 
 
 Whether they go to Hyderabad or not, I have determined to 
 commence an offensive operation against Berar ; and I have ac- 
 cordingly arranged that Col. Stevenson shall march with his 
 corps towards Ellichpoor, and thence to attack the Rajah's fort of 
 Gawile, or Gawilghur, and possibly plunder Nagpoor. If they 
 should march upon Hyderabad, I intend to reinforce Poonah 
 with 3 battalions, and move to Hyderabad with the remainder of 
 my corps. If they do not, I shall endeavour to bring them to an
 
 2g6 PRECAUTIONS AGAINST HOLKAR AND PUTWURDUNS. 
 
 action on this side of the river ; and if I find that they lead me 
 far to the eastward, I shall still detach to Poonah. 
 
 Holkar has not yet come down, and you will observe that he 
 has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to him ; and that he wrote him 
 the letter about the 7th or 8th Aug., after he must have heard 
 that Collins had come away from Scindiah's camp. It is impos- 
 sible to be certain what a fellow of this kind will do, but I augur 
 well from this circumstance ; and I met this morning the Nizam's 
 vakeel returning to Hyderabad from Ragojee Bhoonslah, (from 
 his conversation, I suspect him to have been Major Kirkpatrick's 
 intelligencer,) who told Govind Rao that Scindiah had not yet 
 settled his affairs with Holkar. 
 
 If Holkar joins, Poonah will be safe with 4 battalions and 5 
 companies of Europeans ; but the countries thereabout will be 
 exposed to his ravages, while I am engaged with Scindiah and 
 Ragojee towards Hyderabad. But I think it better to risk that, 
 than to remove Gen. Campbell's corps from Moodgul towards 
 Hyderabad. The consequence of that would be the invasion of 
 the Ceded districts, and probably Mysore, by the Putwurduns 
 and Holkar, who, we must expect, would be able to pass by me, 
 notwithstanding all my efforts to prevent it. By keeping Gen. 
 Campbell at Moodgul, we certainly have a check upon the Put- 
 wurduns ; and it is possible that Holkar would not much like to 
 leave behind him the force at Poonah, and move down upon Gen. 
 Campbell. 
 
 I have some hopes, however, that the invasion of Berar will check 
 the expedition to Hyderabad. Collins, whom I saw at Aurung- 
 abad, declares that Ragojee is the only one of the three who cares 
 one pin about his country, or who has any thing to lose by an 
 invasion of it ; and I declare that, from what Collins told me, I 
 am of opinion that we are involved in this war because Ragojee 
 saw plainly, that, if the Mahratta armies did not subsist this year 
 in the Nizam's country, they must have subsisted in his. 
 
 As I have before me such active operations, you will be glad 
 to hear that I never was in such marching trim. I marched the 
 other day 23 miles in 7I hours; and all our marches are now 
 made at the rate of 3 miles an hour. 
 
 You will have seen, by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I have 
 relinquished the command in Guzerat. Mr. Duncan ' acquiesced ' 
 in my arrangement ; and although he stated some objections to 
 it in his private letters, I concluded that he ' approved ' of it ; for 
 it never occurred to me that it was possible for a Governor to
 
 REASONS FOR RESIGNING GUZERAT COMMAND. 297 
 
 'acquiesce' in a proposed system of military operations, for the 
 defence of provinces under his government, of which he did not 
 ' approve.' However, he afterwards informed me that he did not 
 approve of my propositions, and he entered into detailed argu- 
 ments against the principle, as well as the execution, of them ; 
 but he told me that I might order that they might be carried 
 into execution if I should think proper. Without flying in his 
 face, and being guilty of the greatest presumption, I could not 
 give such orders ; and at this distance from Guzerat, and with 
 such imperfect, and so long a communication, I could not take 
 upon me to conduct a machine so complicated and disjointed as 
 the military commands of the Committee of Surat, and the Resi- 
 dent of Baroda, and I therefore resigned the whole concern. I 
 was much annoyed, for several reasons, at finding myself obliged 
 to take this step ; but I found that to keep the command would 
 have involved me in constant hot water, would have taken my 
 attention away from other objects here, and would have answered 
 no good public end whatever. 
 
 I have received the copy of a public letter from the Governor- 
 General to Gen. Lake, from the tenor of which I fear that he 
 does not approve of my letter to him of the 24th July. I wish 
 you would let me know what Shawe says about that letter. I 
 hope you are getting better, and that you will soon come back. 
 If Holkar negotiates, I should wish to send you to him with carte 
 blanche. 
 
 We are again unlucky in the early fall of the Godavery, and in 
 the enemy having contrived to pass to the southward and east- 
 ward of Col. Stevenson ; particularly if it be true that the Moguls 
 have not behaved well. Otherwise our affairs are in a good 
 state. I have Appah Dessaye and Goklah with me, and have 
 promised to pay them. This will be one lac of rupees per men- 
 sem. Amrut Rao and followers will probably cost half a lac 
 more. Besides these heavy drains, Col. Stevenson has no money, 
 and the Nizam's troops begin to call out for pay. All this is bad ; 
 but I have taken measures to increase our supplies of cash from 
 Poonah, and I have written both to Madras and Calcutta for 
 supplies. Griffiths and Hill are getting on well, and will be in 
 safety at Dharore in a few days. Amrut Rao is not come yet, 
 but you will observe what his vakeel and Kawder Nawaz Khan 
 said about his troops.
 
 298 CONFLICTING MOTIVES OF SOUTHERN JAGHIREDARS. 
 
 171. To Major- General Campbell. 
 
 Wavering disposition of the Southern Mahratta chiefs. Import- 
 ance of General Campbell's position as a check upon them and 
 the Nizam s officers. 
 
 (Extract.) Golah Pangree, 20th Sept., 1803. 
 
 7. All the southern chiefs have written me friendly letters, in 
 answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the 
 commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation, in relation to 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is much altered since the fall of Ahmed- 
 nuggur ; and, at all events, I believe they are aware that they 
 have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the 
 English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in confor- 
 mity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been 
 suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement 
 of the war. 
 
 8. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed 
 enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been 
 strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We 
 cannot conceal from ourselves, that our cause in this war is very 
 unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and con- 
 duct of these Chiefs ; and that each individual of them is strongly 
 urged by every motive of national and family pride to oppose the 
 British government, in a war which will certainly destroy the 
 national power of the Mahrattas. 
 
 9. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all 
 occasions ; and although they see that their personal interest de- 
 pends in a great measure upon the success of the British govern- 
 ment, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe 
 that the British government will be successful in this contest, 
 I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they 
 did not see your corps encamped at their gates, ready to fall upon 
 and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies ; at 
 all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solici- 
 tations of the confederates, and their notions of family and national 
 honour, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon 
 their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are in- 
 volved in the success of the British government, the position of 
 your corps at least affurds them a plausible excuse for declining 
 to join their countrymen in the war. 
 
 to. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to con-
 
 CAMPBELL'S POSITION LIKELY TO TURN THE SCALE. 299 
 
 tend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority 
 by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the 
 Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village 
 and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have 
 very unpleasant consequences : your division, the position of 
 which is well known, tends to check this disposition. 
 
 11. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of 
 troops, in the position occupied by the division under your com- 
 mand, is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company's 
 territories ; that they render probable the continuance of the 
 neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, 
 and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the govern- 
 ment of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume 
 independence. 
 
 172. To the Governor- General. 
 Battle of Assy e. 
 
 Camp at Assye, 24th Sept., 1803. 
 
 I was joined by Major Hill, with the last of the convoys ex- 
 pected from the river Kistna, on the 18th ; and on the 20th was 
 enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been 
 joined, in the course of the last 7 or 8 days, by the infantry under 
 Col. Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and byanother 
 brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander l I have not 
 ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, 
 and between that place and Jaffierabad. 
 
 I was near Col. Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a con- 
 ference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack 
 the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 
 24th, in the morning ; and we marched on the 22nd, Col. Steven- 
 son by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the 
 hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna. 
 
 On the 23rd, I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report 
 that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morn- 
 ing with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, 
 but were still in camp at the distance of about 6 miles from the 
 ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that 
 the attack was no longer to be delayed ; and, having provided 
 for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched 
 on to attack the enemy. 
 
 1 M. Dupont.
 
 300 NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF ASSVE. 
 
 I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah 
 of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the 
 ground which I had been informed they occupied. Their right, 
 which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and 
 extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the 
 neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their 
 right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps 
 of infantry was most likely to be effectual : accordingly I marched 
 round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of 
 infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Mahratta 
 and Mysore cavalry on the right flank. 
 
 We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left 
 flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with 
 the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space be- 
 tween that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Mah- 
 ratta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna, 
 on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's 
 cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own 
 position. 
 
 The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous 
 to our attack : it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna ; but 
 extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the 
 nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them imme- 
 diately, and the troops advanced under a veiy hot fire from cannon, 
 the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry 
 and the 74th regt, which were on the right of the first and second 
 lines, suffered particularly from the fire of the guns on the left of 
 the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also 
 made an attempt to charge the 74th regt., at the moment when 
 they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the 
 British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the 
 enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry 
 cut in among their broken infantry; but some of their corps went 
 off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many 
 of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by indi- 
 viduals who had been passed by the line under the supposition 
 that they were dead. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one 
 large body of infantry, which had retired, and was formed again, 
 in which operation he was killed ; and some time elapsed before 
 we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by 
 individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven.
 
 A COMPLETE VICTORY. WITH SERIOUS LOSS. 
 
 3 OT 
 
 The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us 
 throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the 
 last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and 
 left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon. The victory, which was 
 certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency 
 will perceive, by the enclosed return \ that our loss in officers and 
 men has been very great ; and, in that of Lieut.- Col. Maxwell 
 and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to 
 be regretted. 
 
 I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops ; 
 they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadi- 
 ness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far 
 superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with 
 them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by 
 the bayonet ; and, notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's 
 cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an inten- 
 tion to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry. 
 
 I am particularly indebted to Lieut.-Col. Harness and Lieut- 
 Col. Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their 
 brigades ; and to all the officers of the staff, for the assistance 
 
 1 A return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the battle of Assye, against the 
 army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd Sept., 1803. 
 
 H. M.'s 19th Lt. D."| 
 
 1st bat. Madras art. | , T -. n , 
 j 1 j ( Killed 
 2nd do. do. r , ) , v , , , 
 Det. Bombay do. Europeans Wounded 
 H. M.'s 74th regt. | (Missing 
 78th do. J 
 
 O 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 d, 
 
 CS 
 
 U 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 W 
 
 7 
 20 
 
 in 
 
 9 
 
 33 
 
 g 
 3 
 
 Q 
 6 
 
 si 
 
 141 
 
 343 
 
 8 
 
 <u 
 
 
 w 
 
 77 
 3 
 
 4th regt. cavalry 
 5th do. do. 
 7th do. do. 
 1st bat. 2nd N.I. 
 1st do. 4th do. 
 1st do. 8th do. 
 1st do. icth do. 
 2nd do. 1 2th do. 
 Pioneers. 
 
 ( Killed 
 - Natives I Wounded 
 ( Missing 
 
 O 
 
 -d 
 
 
 m 
 
 5 
 12 
 
 g 
 1 — > 
 
 3 
 16 
 
 13 
 
 39 
 
 a 
 
 H 
 6 
 
 pi 
 224 
 
 n?8 
 
 iS 
 
 O 
 
 B 
 
 228 
 
 75 
 1
 
 3 02 
 
 lord Clyde's account of the battle. 
 
 I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly 
 all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had 
 their horses shot under them. I have also to draw your Excel- 
 lency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieut. - 
 Col. Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons. 
 
 The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuntee ghaut, and I 
 propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns 
 and wounded in security. Col. Stevenson arrived this morning 
 at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening. 
 
 173. Extract from a letter by Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Colin) 
 Campbell relative to the Battle of Assye, written at the time 
 of the transaction. 
 
 Battle of Assye. 
 
 The detachment waited for several days near the Godavery 
 for supplies, which joined us on the 19th September. On the 
 2 1st we marched, and encamped near Colonel Stevenson at 
 Budnapoor, where General Wellesley had a conference with that 
 officer, and it was agreed that the two detachments were to march 
 by different routes upon the enemy, whom they expected to come 
 up with on the 24th. There was a range of hills between us 
 and the enemy. Colonel Stevenson marched by the western pass 
 and General Wellesley by the eastern on the 22nd, and encamped 
 about eight coss asunder at the two extremities of the range of 
 hills. On the 23rd we again marched, and came to our ground 
 about 1 1 o'clock (and supposed that the enemy were about ten 
 or twelve miles off by the information from our hircarrah). The 
 General was with the advance ; and some dragoons, who were 
 covering the Quartermaster-General, brought in some brinjarry 
 men with bullocks, who said that the combined armies were en- 
 camped about two coss off ; that part of their cavalry had marched 
 that morning, and that their infantry was to follow ; that if the 
 General would go to the rising ground in front, he would have 
 a view of their camp. 
 
 The General immediately formed his plan. As he thought 
 there was not a moment to be lost, and was suspicious that the 
 enemy would make off and not stand an action, he wrote a note, 
 on the first intimation he had of the enemy, to Colonel Steven- 
 son, who, he expected, could not be far distant. He ordered on 
 the cavalry, followed by the infantry piquets under the command 
 of Colonel Orrock, and reinforced the rear-guard with a battalion
 
 LORD CLYDE'S ACCOUNT OF ASSYE. 303 
 
 under Colonel Chalmers, to protect our stores, camp-equipage, 
 &c. At the village where we had intended to encamp we came 
 in sight of the enemy's camp about one o'clock ; our cavalry drew 
 up near a large body of the enemy, who had come out to recon- 
 noitre us. The General, on seeing their camp, immediately de- 
 termined to attack their left, where their campoos with their guns 
 were. Their position seemed very strong : a deep rocky nullah 
 in their front and another in their rear, which nullahs joined a 
 little below the village of Assye and protected their flank. They 
 appeared to be in three different encampments : Scindiah, with 
 all his cavalry, on the right ; the Berar Rajah in the centre ; cam- 
 poos on the left of them ; the two nullahs ran along all their 
 front and rear, and their camp extended from five to seven miles. 
 We moved forward to the attack with the 74th and 78th regi- 
 ments and four battalions of sepoys. The piquets led, and our 
 cavalry brought up the rear to protect us from their horse (our 
 whole force brought into action did not amount to 5000 men). 
 They fired at us when at a considerable distance, and did some 
 execution ; but by the time we came to the first nullah they had 
 got our range completely, and opened a most tremendous fire on 
 us, which galled us much. We were detained by our guns for 
 a little time at the nullah, and when we crossed we were obliged 
 to bring up our right shoulders to attack their left flank. The 
 enemy, upon this, were obliged to change their front, which they 
 did with the greatest regularity and precision. We were now 
 getting very near them. They advanced with their guns upon 
 us. The line was ordered to form. Colonel Harness's brigade 
 at this time were only across the nullah, and the 74th regiment, 
 of the 5th brigade, which brigade was ordered to form a second 
 line, and the 74th regiment to support the piquets on our right, 
 and to keep two or three hundred paces in their rear ; the cavalry 
 formed a third line. During these formations we lost numbers of 
 officers and men, as the enemy fired mostly grape and chain-shot. 
 The village of Assye was on our right ; the piquets were ordered 
 not to go too near it, as there appeared to be some infantry in it, 
 and, in advancing, on no account to incline towards it. The line 
 was ordered to advance. The piquets at this period had nearly 
 lost a third of their number, and most of the gun-bullocks were 
 killed ; some of the corps, I think, waited too long, wishing to 
 bring forward their guns, which could be of no service. The line 
 moved forward rapidly (I may say without firing two rounds) and 
 took possession of the first line of guns, where many of the enemy
 
 304 BEARING OF THE 'SEPOY GENERAL' IN THE ACTION. 
 
 were killed. They then moved on in equally good order and re- 
 solution to the second line of guns, from which they very soon 
 drove the enemy ; but many of the artillery, who pretended to 
 be dead when we passed on to the second line of guns, turned 
 the guns we had taken upon us, which obliged us to return and 
 again to drive them from them. Things at this period did not go 
 on so well on our right, owing to some mistake of the piquets in 
 having, when ordered to advance, inclined to their right, which 
 brought the 74th regiment into the first line. Major Swinton 
 went to the piquets, and asked them why they did not move on ? 
 On his return to his regiment he found that numbers of his offi- 
 cers and men had fallen. He immediately moved forward. At 
 this period the cannonade was truly tremendous. A milk-hedge 
 in their front, which they had to pass to come at the enemy's 
 guns, threw them into a little confusion ; but they still pushed 
 forward and had taken possession of many of their guns, when 
 the second line, which opened on them, obliged them to retire 
 from what they had so dearly purchased. The numbers of the 
 74th regiment remaining at this period were small ; on their re- 
 turning some of the enemy's cavalry came forward and cut up 
 many of the wounded officers and men. It was at this critical 
 moment that the 19th charged, and saved the remains of the 74th 
 regiment. General Wellesley at the same time threw the 78th 
 regiment forward on their right, to move down on the enemy, 
 who still kept their position at Assye. This movement and the 
 charge of the 19th light dragoons made the enemy retire from 
 all their guns precipitately, and they fled across the nullah to our 
 right at the village of Assye, where numbers of them were cut 
 up by the cavalry. It was in this business that Colonel Maxwell 
 fell. It was unfortunate that the cavalry were obliged to be in- 
 troduced into the action, as it rendered them unfit for pursuing 
 the enemy. We began to advance a little after three, and the 
 action was not entirely over till near six o'clock. We were all 
 greatly fatigued, having marched by the perambulator that day 
 twenty-four miles to the first nullah. 
 
 The General was in the thick of the action the whole time, 
 and had a horse killed under him. No man could have shown 
 a better example to the troops than he did. I never saw a man 
 so cool and collected as he was the whole time, though I can 
 assure you, till our troops got orders to advance, the fate of the 
 day seemed doubtful ; and if the numerous cavalry of the enemy 
 had done their duty, I hardly think it possible that we could have
 
 HOW HIS YOUNG OFFICERS MET THEIR FATE. 305 
 
 succeeded. From the European officers who have since surren- 
 dered, it appears they had about twelve thousand infantry, and 
 their cavalry is supposed to have been at least twenty thousand, 
 though many make it more. We have now in our possession one 
 hundred and two guns, and all their tumbrils. The remains of 
 the enemy's infantry deserted after the action. 
 
 Your dear son was killed near the milk-hedge ; I cannot yet 
 for certain ascertain whether when advancing or returning, but 
 I think the former, as he was shot in the breast by a grape ; he 
 had no other wound. Major Svvinton talks of him in the highest 
 terms for his conduct on that day. He informs me that he was 
 the last officer of the regiment killed. The last time I saw him 
 was when forming in rear of the piquets ; he was obliged to dis- 
 mount, as his horse became unruly. He was then, poor fellow, in 
 high spirits, and we had a short conversation. He had a biscuit, 
 which he divided with me. Poor M'Leod was at this period killed. 
 Lorn 1 was twice wounded in the legs, but persisted in going on ; 
 he at last, poor fellow ! I believe, fainted, and was left behind when 
 the troops were retiring, and cut up by the cavalry. These are all 
 the particulars I have been able to gather of these gallant youths. 
 
 We remained by our arms that night in the field, and in the 
 morning our baggage came up. 
 
 Colonel Stevenson, with part of his detachment, joined us in 
 the night of the 24th. He had been led astray by the guides or 
 hircarrahs, and if we had deferred the action a day he would not 
 have been with us. The enemy that night retired twelve miles 
 in the greatest confusion, and on the 24th descended the Ghauts. 
 Colonel Stevenson pursued them on the 26th, and found some of 
 their guns, &c, on the road. He has since taken Burhampoor 
 and Asseerghur, with the loss of only five or six men, and is now 
 following Scindiah into Berar. 
 
 (Signed) COLIN CAMPBELL, 
 
 Brigade Major to General Wellesley. 
 
 174. Marquess Wellesley to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. 
 
 The same subject. 
 
 Fort William, 27th Oct., 1803. 
 My dear Arthur, 
 
 You will conceive the pride and delight with which I received 
 
 the details of your most splendid victory of the 23rd September ; 
 
 1 The brother of the writer of this account. 
 X
 
 306 THE STATESMAN'S ESTIMATE OF THE SOLDIER 's DEEDS. 
 
 you will also feel my disappointment at not having received 
 them from yourself; the interruption of the dawk through Cuttack 
 induced the collector to embark all your despatches down to the 
 3rd of this month, and not a syllable from yourself has yet 
 reached me of any date between the 12th of September, and the 
 3rd of October. 
 
 But from various quarters the particulars of your glory have 
 reached me, although not in a form which can yet admit of a 
 Public Order, (beyond the honours of a salute,) yet in substance 
 sufficiently solid to found the basis of hopes as auspicious, as your 
 fame must be durable, and, in India, unrivalled. With much 
 solicitude for the success of your operations on public grounds, 
 and with every additional anxiety, which affection could inspire. 
 I have fixed my attention on your progress, from the hour of your 
 departure from General Stuart's camp, to the moment of your 
 action of the 23rd of September ; and I declare to you most sin- 
 cerely, that you have infinitely surpassed all that I could have 
 required from you in my public capacity; and have soared be- 
 yond the highest point, to which all my affection and all the pride 
 of my blood could have aspired, in the most ardent expectations 
 which could be suggested by my sentiments of respect and love 
 for a brother, who has always held the highest place in my heart 
 and in my judgment. 
 
 Your battle of the 23rd (of which I have seen plans) is equal 
 in skill and fortitude to any of which the account exists in his- 
 tory. Your loss certainly was dreadful (if not exaggerated to me) 
 — the result must I think reduce the enemy either to peace, or to 
 the condition of mere freebooters ; accompanied as your success 
 is by such a crowd of victories, as, I believe, never before were 
 condensed in so small a space of time. You may be assured, that 
 your reputation is of the first lustre and magnitude ; and splendid, 
 matchless, as was your victory on the 23rd, it was not more than 
 was expected from you ; nor in my judgment does it excel the 
 honour you have acquired in conducting your army from Mysore 
 to Assye, and in accomplishing all the great objects, which were 
 finally secured on the 23rd of September. 
 
 I am in hourly expectation of your despatches, and therefore 
 I shall not write more at present ; you will be glad to receive 
 this short note, and when you reflect on the troubles by which 
 I have been surrounded, you will pardon my long omission of 
 private letters. 
 
 I enclose two notes; one containing the general outline of
 
 ERRONEOUS ACCOUNT OF THE ENEMF'S POSITION. 307 
 
 the reports of your victory as they have reached me ; another 
 some hints respecting peace. God protect you my dear Arthur, 
 and preserve you for your country, and for your most affectionate 
 brother 1 , Wellesley. 
 
 175. Memorandum on the Battle of Assye. Subsequently 
 
 transmitted. 
 
 1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of 
 an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. 
 We cannot send out Natives in the Company's service, who, from 
 long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because 
 they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well 
 known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans ; 
 and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up 
 the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always 
 surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, 
 that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the 
 country, and to trust to their reports. 
 
 2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which 
 I had concerted with Col. Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. 
 I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted ; 
 and Col. Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of 
 being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended 
 above 6 miles to Assye, where was its left : it was all in the 
 district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake. 
 
 3. My march of the 23rd was so directed as that I should be 
 within 12 or 14 miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which 
 I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension 
 of their line to the eastward, I found myself within 6 miles of 
 them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; 
 at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must 
 have reconnaitred. I could not have reconnaitred without taking 
 the whole of my small force ; and, when I got near them, it would 
 have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their 
 numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really 
 believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true. 
 
 4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was 
 false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had 
 a most formidable position, 3 or 4 times my number of infantry 
 
 1 The 'hints respecting peace,' and a 'Note respecting the victory' 
 have been omitted. — Ed, 
 
 X 2
 
 308 WHY GEN. WELLESLEY ATTACKED AT ONCE. 
 
 only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I 
 should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according 
 to the plan. 
 
 5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that 
 I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and 
 possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would 
 have harassed me all that day ; and, as I had only ground 
 fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one 
 whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on 
 the following morning ; and, at all events, I should have been 
 obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During 
 the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the 
 baggage was ; and, although it was so close to them, they never 
 went near it. 
 
 6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed 
 a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Col. Stevenson also 
 would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their 
 infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make 
 the attack. 
 
 7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the 
 deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, 
 and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with 
 my camp, baggage, &c. 
 
 8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. 
 The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages 
 everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I deter- 
 mined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, 
 to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river 
 at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right 
 up to Assye. 
 
 9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or 
 discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered 
 their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed 
 across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye ; but in more 
 than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepul- 
 gaum : if they had, I must have gone lower down ; and possibly 
 I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which 
 would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day 
 enough for the attack. 
 
 10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered 
 my plan ; and determined to manoeuvre by my left, and push 
 the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye
 
 OUR GREAT LOSS ALSO DUE TO MISTAKE. 309 
 
 must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given 
 accordingly. 
 
 11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which 
 frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which 
 were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of 
 Assye : the 74th regt.. which was on the right of the second line, 
 and was ordered to support the piquets, followed them. There 
 was a large break in our line between these corps and 
 those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible 
 cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry 
 belonging to the campoos ; consequently, in the piquets and 
 the 74th regt. we sustained the greatest part of our loss. One 
 company of the piquets, of one officer and 50 rank and file, lost 
 the officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the 
 battalion left at Naulniah. 
 
 12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, 
 the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too 
 early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the 
 enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right ; and, luckily, it charged 
 in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was 
 thus brought into the cannonade ; horses and men were lost : 
 it charged among broken infantry, and separated ; the unity of 
 the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as 
 I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and 
 cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the 
 victory still more complete than it was. 
 
 13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated 
 till worked upon by the centre and left of our line, notwith- 
 standing the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry ; 
 and then it went off directly, and was cut up. 
 
 14. The annexed plan is correct, excepting in the following 
 instances : 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward 
 (it ought to be where I have marked in pencil). 2ndly, the form- 
 ation of the Mahratta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have 
 marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, 
 was nearer the Kaitna ; and the 74th was not in an ccliclon, as 
 represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one 
 line of infantry. 
 
 N. B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable 
 for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.
 
 3io 
 
 HOW TO BAFFLE PREDATORY CAVALRY. 
 
 176. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. 
 
 Theory and practice of successfully arresting predatory warfare. 
 (Extract.) Camp, ist Oct., 1803. 
 
 I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter upon the 
 subject of offensive and defensive war : however, I think that you 
 are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive 
 measures, a predatory war, carried on by horse only ; indeed, 
 I have done it already in this campaign. The fact is, that a 
 predatory war is not to be carried on now as it was formerly. 
 All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting 
 in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that 
 fortifications are of no use) ; a few peons keep the horse out ; 
 and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp 
 and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing 
 they get is very dear ; besides, this necessity of seeking sub- 
 sistence in the camp prevents them from extending their 
 excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury. 
 
 The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind 
 must subsist must be rather heavy : besides, there are great 
 personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other 
 sewary ; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to 
 guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such 
 a camp must consequently be very large. 
 
 Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain 
 intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well combined 
 movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to 
 prevent the execution 'of any favourite design, or its mischievous 
 consequences, soon bring them to their bearings : they stop, look 
 about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off. 
 In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon 
 Hyderabad, which they certainly intended : they were obliged to 
 return, and bring up and join their infantry ; and you will have 
 heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole 
 army, with one division only, on the 23rd Sept., I completely 
 defeated them, taking about 100 pieces of cannon, all their 
 ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Bur- 
 hampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will 
 not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight ; and 
 what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the 
 greater part of India at the present day.
 
 BARBARITV OF SCINDIAH'S ENGLISH OFFICERS. 311 
 
 177. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 Alleged cruelty of Scindiatis English officers. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 3rd Oct., 1803. 
 
 I have some reason to complain of Scindiah's English officers, 
 and I shall bring the subject forward publicly as soon as I can 
 ascertain the matter more completely. My soldiers say that after 
 they were knocked down by cannon or grape shot, they were cut 
 and piked by the horse belonging to the campoos, which indeed 
 is perfectly true, and that horse was cut to pieces by the British 
 cavalry. But they say besides that they heard one English officer 
 with a battalion say to another, ' You understand the language 
 better than I do : desire the jemidar of that body of horse to go 
 and cut up those wounded European soldiers/ The other did 
 as he was desired, and the horse obeyed the orders they re- 
 ceived. 
 
 It is bad enough that these gentlemen should serve the enemies 
 of their country, particularly after the British government had 
 offered them a provision ; but it is too bad that they should make 
 themselves the instruments, or rather that they should excite the 
 savage ferocity of the Natives against their brave and wounded 
 countrymen. 
 
 As soon as the soldiers are sufficiently recovered from their 
 wounds, I shall have them examined particularly respecting this 
 report. ; and if I find it is substantiated, I intend to make a 
 public report on the subject to government, with which I shall 
 send a list of names of the officers engaged in this battle, and 
 I will request that the whole may be made public, that they 
 may be held up to the execration of their country and the 
 world. 
 
 178. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Irregular and abortive attempt at negotiatioft. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 6th Oct., 1803. 
 
 It is impossible to say whether the object in making the pro- 
 position contained in the enclosed papers was really to commence 
 a negotiation for peace ; or to raise the spirits of the enemy's 
 troops, by showing a British officer in his camp, respecting whom 
 it would be industriously reported that he had come to sue for 
 peace. I rather believe that they had both objects in view, as 
 Capt. Johnson, the Persian interpreter to the commanding officer
 
 312 AN AMBIGUOUS APPROACH TO PEACE-MAKING. 
 
 of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, whom they have 
 expressed a wish to see, is an officer much respected by the 
 Natives, particularly by Salabut Khan, who has been heretofore 
 connected in friendship with the Rajah of Berar ; and it is 
 probable that the enemy would not have particularly desired his 
 attendance, if they had not intended to commence a negotiation 
 for peace. However, the desire that he should go there is ex- 
 pressed in so extraordinary a manner, and as there is no mention 
 made of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of 
 Berar for writing at all ; and above all, as I am convinced that 
 the presence of a British officer in the enemy's camp at the 
 present moment would tend to raise the spirits of their troops, 
 and to keep their army together, I have thought it proper to 
 decline to send one. 
 
 In my answer to Ballojee Koonger, I have thought it neces- 
 sary to explain once more the cause for which Col. Collins 
 quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, as your Excellency will 
 observe that he alludes to the manner in which he quitted it, in 
 his letter to me ; and I know that the enemy have been very 
 busy in circulating reports on that subject among the servants of 
 the allied governments, equally distant from the truth, and pre- 
 judicial to the British government. In refusing to send a British 
 officer to the enemy's camp, I have deemed it proper to point out 
 the mode in which they might open a negotiation for peace, if 
 they wished it ; upon which I have only to observe, that if they 
 should send here a sirdar, the exertions of their troops hereafter 
 will be but trifling. 
 
 179. To Major Shawe. 
 
 (i) The zveakness of tlie allied governments hampers the conduct 
 
 of the war. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Adjuntee, 8th Oct., 1803. 
 
 On the other hand, these things called allied governments are 
 in such a state of deplorable weakness, they depend so entirely 
 on us for the defence of their territories, and their power is so 
 feeble over their own servants, who have so much connexion with, 
 and even dependence on the enemy, that I have not means to move 
 forward, at once, upon Asseerghur with my whole force ; although 
 I know that if I could take that step with safety, it would put an 
 end to the war. But not one of the Soubah's forts is sufficiently
 
 INTRICACY OF THE MAHRATTA REVENUE SYSTEM. 313 
 
 garrisoned. He has not a soldier in the country, excepting those 
 belonging to the Company; and his killadars and amildars would 
 readily pay the money they may have just to be allowed to sit 
 quietly in their forts and towns. As for the Peshwah, he has 
 possession of his palace at Poonah, and nothing more, and he 
 spends the little money he receives either upon the Bramins or 
 upon women, rather than give any to his troops, or even to his 
 menial servants. 
 
 The consequence, then, of my proceeding to the northward 
 with my whole force might be, that the enemy would get posses- 
 sion, or levy contributions upon some important place belonging 
 to the Nizam ; or they might move down upon Poonah itself. 
 They would certainly stop our supplies, and the consequence of 
 such a movement might thus be fatal to us. In this manner does 
 the radical weakness of these governments operate against us. 
 
 (2) Complicated claims of the Mahratta Chiefs on the Rajpoots. 
 Our protection of the latter may involve ns with Holkar. 
 
 I wish you would let me know, at an early period, what pro- 
 gress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. This 
 is important, because our engagements with them must have a 
 great effect on the negotiations for peace. By the by, does the 
 Governor-General know that the peshcush, paid by the Rajpoots, 
 does not belong to Scindiah only, but to the Peshwah and the 
 Holkar family? Of every rupee paid, 6 annas belong to the 
 Peshwah, 5 to Scindiah, and 5 to Holkar. It is true that, for these 
 many years past, Scindiah has collected and applied the whole to 
 his own use : but he has lately consented to allow Holkar to collect 
 his own share and half the Peshwah's ; and I understand that the 
 dispute between these Chiefs, and the cause of Holkar not joining 
 the confederates, is that Holkar claimed the right to collect all 
 the peshcush for the number of years that Scindiah had received 
 the whole. He refused to join, unless Scindiah acquiesced in the 
 exercise of this right, or paid him the sum of money which he 
 ought to have received, as peshcush, from the Rajpoots, for the 
 number of years that Scindiah had collected the whole. If this 
 story be true, and I believe it is, the protection that we shall 
 afford to the Rajpoots may involve us with Holkar. However, 
 on the other hand, should Holkar be really inclined to remain at 
 peace with the English, which I think he is, we may be able to 
 satisfy him upon that point.
 
 314 HOW COL. STEVENSON MAY PROSECUTE THE WAR. 
 
 180. To Colonel Stevenson. 
 
 Tlirce lines of operation open to Colonel Stevenson in dealing with 
 the enemy. Relative advantages of each. 
 
 Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct., 1803. 
 
 I have reason to believe that the enemy have not come through 
 the ghaut ; and it is possible that they will now return to attack 
 you, with all the force they can bring. Your first object will of 
 course be to beat the campoos, before the cavalry under Scindiah 
 and the Rajah of Berar can join ; or to drive them across the 
 Taptee, and to such a distance, as that they cannot come back so 
 quickly as to join with the cavalry in an attack upon you, before 
 I can reinforce you. If, however, they should be able to join be- 
 fore you can attack the campoos, you must decide what line you 
 will adopt. There are three lines of operation to be adopted : to 
 attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to draw off towards me. 
 
 In respect to the first, it is impossible to say what quantity of 
 cannon they may have collected at Burhampoor ; or what their 
 real force may now be. I recommend that you should adopt this 
 with caution, and only in case of necessity. 
 
 In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than the 
 first ; as, unless you intrench your position, which I should re- 
 commend, if you adopt this line, your inferiority of cannon will tell 
 against you still more than it would in the case of your attacking 
 the enemy. 
 
 In regard to the third, it might be attended with risk, and even 
 loss, excepting in this case. When I shall descend the ghaut, 
 which I shall on the 4th, after leaving this, you might make two 
 marches towards me, which would bring us within one march of 
 each other. Till they are prepared for their attack, which, as 
 they are very slow, will take some time, they will not stay nearer 
 to you than at the distance of two marches ; and supposing them 
 to be able to make two in one day, I shall have joined you before 
 they can do you any mischief. 
 
 Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I re- 
 commend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack 
 their position, because they always take up such as are confound- 
 edly strong and difficult of access ; for which the banks of the 
 numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not 
 remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or how- 
 ever well you may have intrenched it ; but when you shall hear
 
 SUGGESTIONS, IN CASE HE PREFERS THE OFFENSIVE. 315 
 
 that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, 
 and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common 
 disorder of march ; they will not have time to form, which, being 
 but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, 
 you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground 
 which they will not have chosen for the battle ; a part of their 
 troops only will be engaged ; and it is possible that you will gain 
 an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might 
 choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might 
 meet them upon that very ground. 
 
 There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep 
 constantly in motion ; but unless you come towards me, that 
 would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the 
 beating they received on the 23rd Sept., they are not likely 
 to stand for a second ; and they will all retire with precipitation. 
 But the Natives of this country are rashness personified ; and I 
 acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as 
 I sustained on the 23rd Sept., even if attended by such a gain. 
 Therefore, I suggest to you what occurs to me on the subject of 
 the different modes, either of bringing on, or declining the action 
 which it is possible, although by no means probable, that they 
 intend to fight. I shall march the moment I hear that they have 
 moved to the northward. I have many people out for intelligence. 
 Your hircarrah, however, who brought the account that it was re- 
 ported in their camp on the 7th that I had come this way, was 
 premature, as I did not show any inclination to do so till the 9th. 
 
 181. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Capture of Allyglinr, an extraordinary feat. Speculations 
 on Holkar's movements and intentions. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Phoolmuny, 14th Oct., 1803. 
 
 I think that Gen. Lake's capture of Allyghur is one of the 
 most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I 
 never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, viz. 
 to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded. I have 
 always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been im- 
 possible in this instance. I hope soon to hear that the General 
 has again returned from Delhi. We must watch Holkar closely. 
 His sudden march to the northward shows no good intention ; 
 and it may be depended upon that he will enter into the war, if
 
 316 why stevenson's was a separate corps. 
 
 he should see a prospect of advantage. Holkar has now a stake 
 in India, which depends upon the existence of his reputation as 
 a soldier ; and I think that he will not venture to risk it, by 
 crossing the Jumna or the Ganges, and being on the same side of 
 these rivers with Gen. Lake. But how is your province of Bahar 
 defended ? That, in my opinion, will be the point to which he 
 will direct his march, in case he should enter into the war. 
 
 182. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. 
 
 Answer to Munrd's first criticism on the battle of Assyc. Col. 
 Stevensons not a detacJiment, but a separate corps. Gen. 
 Wellesley zvas misled as to the enemy's position. Why he 
 preferred to attack at once. An officer s mistake doubled onr 
 loss, and prevented immediate pursuit. Causes of Col. Steven- 
 soil's late co-operation. His subsequent movements, and those 
 of Gen. Wellesley and the enemy. 
 
 Camp at Cheesekair, ist Nov., 1803. 
 
 As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous 
 of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an 
 account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter 1 of the 
 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which 
 must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction 
 without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. 
 
 Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen 
 my public letter to the Governor- General regarding the action, a 
 copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will 
 give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection 
 to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, 
 I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, 
 equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to 
 engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accord- 
 ingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th September. We 
 separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the 
 eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna : 
 and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary ; first, 
 because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one 
 day ; secondly, because it was to be apprehended that, if we left 
 open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have 
 
 1 The letter referred to will be found in Sir Thomas Munro's Life by 
 Mr. Gleig, vol. iii. pp. 177-179. It is there dated 14th Oct. — Ed.
 
 PLAN OF JOINT ATTACK BASED ON ERROR. 317 
 
 passed to the southward while we were going to the northward, 
 and then the action would have been delayed, or, probably, 
 avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more 
 than twelve miles distant from each other ; and when I moved 
 forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than 
 eight miles apart. 
 
 As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's 
 position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse 
 were so numerous that, without an army, their position could not 
 be reconnoitred by an European officer ; and even the hircarrahs 
 in our own service, who are accustomed to examine and report 
 positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the 
 Carnatic, they are as well known as an European. 
 
 The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their 
 right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their 
 position, and gave the name to the district in which they were 
 encamped ; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I 
 was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from 
 Bokerdun. 
 
 I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen 
 miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. 
 But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I 
 was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed 
 that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to 
 follow, but were still on the ground : at all events, it was necessary 
 to ascertain these points ; and I could not venture to reconnoitre 
 without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, 
 and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still 
 upon the ground. I apprised Colonel Stevenson of this deter- 
 mination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, 
 I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a 
 most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been 
 impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their 
 front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was 
 across the Kaitna. 
 
 When I found their whole army, and contemplated their posi- 
 tion, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately 
 or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon 
 the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted 
 to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed 
 thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have 
 suffered some loss ; instead of attacking, I might have been
 
 31 8 SERIOUS RESULTS OF ANOTHER MISTAKE. 
 
 attacked there in the morning ; and, at all events, I should have 
 found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any 
 place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it 
 was : I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It 
 was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. 
 Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw the 
 guns, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on ; but some 
 were, and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of 
 any use. 
 
 Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded 
 one half of its actual amount if it had not been for a mistake 
 in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of 
 the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they 
 threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some 
 infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw 
 that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out 
 of shot from that village : instead of that, he led directly upon 
 it : the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed 
 the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two 
 bodies. 
 
 Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the neces- 
 sity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action 
 long before it was time ; by which the corps which I intended to 
 bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day, lost 
 many men, and its union and efficiency. But it was necessary to 
 bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and 
 the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. An- 
 other evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, 
 and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded ; and straggling 
 infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon 
 our backs. 
 
 After all, nothwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right 
 and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected 
 there till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken 
 from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated ; and it 
 would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that 
 movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any 
 reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the 
 consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was 
 not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he 
 did the piquets on that day against Assye. 
 
 After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was
 
 COL. STEVENSON'S PURSUIT VARIOUSLY DELAYED. 319 
 
 not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action 
 was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle. 
 
 Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as 
 he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved 
 upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. 
 He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at 
 Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight 
 in the morning of the 24th. 
 
 The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles 
 from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee Ghaut, and 
 eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Ste- 
 venson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never 
 stopped till they got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the 
 course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night 
 of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, 
 and did not do so until the. 26th. The reason for which he was 
 detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the 
 assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many 
 of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want 
 of the necessary number of medical men. 
 
 I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's 
 sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the 
 Nizam's forts ; and I could not allow them to depart until I had 
 settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed 
 the Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, 
 could make no difference. 
 
 Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseer- 
 ghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first 
 threatened them through the Casserbarry Ghaut, and I moved 
 to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad : I then 
 saw clearly that they intended to attempt to raise the siege of 
 Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, descended the 
 Adjuntee Ghaut, and stopped Scindiah. 
 
 Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st October ; I heard the 
 intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come 
 to the south with an army. 
 
 I ascended the Ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 
 miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys 
 and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of 
 Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five 
 times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, 
 finding that he can do nothing in this. If this be the case, I
 
 320 THE BOMBAY SERVICE, A HOTBED OF STRIFE. 
 
 shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exer- 
 tions, I fear, cannot last ; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is 
 the total absence of all government and means of defence in this 
 country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to 
 do with them ; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray 
 exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 183. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 The Bombay Government a prey to factions disputes. Danger of 
 political connexion with petty chiefs. Costly requirements of 
 the Governor-General, nnsnstained by remittances. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, nth Nov., 1803. 
 
 I see now that Col. Murray has involved himself in a dispute 
 with the Paymaster and Military Auditor Gen. at Bombay. 
 There are two parties throughout the Bombay establishment, 
 and these are — the civil and military services ; and the latter 
 are divided into two parties — those in the King's and those in 
 the Company's service. The disputes of these parties are the 
 sole business of every man under the government of Bombay ; 
 and they are maintained by the system of encouragement given 
 to correspondence, and the perpetual references to individuals by 
 government. In short, I see clearly that nothing can succeed 
 with those people as it ought ; and I wish to God that I had 
 nothing to do with them. 
 
 The Dhar man ought to be encouraged ; and if he should be 
 of any service to us, or even if he decidedly keeps away from 
 Scindiah, a stipulation shall be made in his favour, that he shall 
 receive no injury from Scindiah for his conduct during the war. 
 But we must be cautious in all our proceedings with these 
 fellows, otherwise we shall be burdened with the defence of a 
 pack of rascals of inferior rank, but of the same description with 
 their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah. Ragojee has 
 turned to the northward. Scindiah is still in the valley of the 
 Poorna, to the east of Mulcapoor. It is said that the former, as 
 well as the latter, is going to Nagpoor. God send it may be true. 
 If it is, we shall destroy him entirely. Amrut Rao is at no great 
 distance from me, and, I believe, is coming in. 
 
 In respect to money from Bombay, you are mistaken as to the
 
 CONFLICTING ORDERS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. $2 1 
 
 amount which it was expected that Presidency should supply. 
 I told Mr. Duncan that I thought we should require 16 lacs of 
 rupees. Gen. Stuart told him that we should require double that 
 sum. If 4 lacs coined from dollars belonging to the government 
 of Madras be taken out of the account, I believe that we have 
 not received the first sum ; and certainly not to the amount of the 
 last. It is true that Mr. Duncan may include in the expenses of 
 this army all those of Col. Colman's detachment, all those of the 
 troops in Guzerat, and all those of Bombay, civil and military ; 
 as he did in the account of the consumption of rice by this army, 
 the consumption of all the troops stationed in those places, at 
 Fort Victoria, &c. and that of the populace at Bombay. 
 
 However, there is no doubt whatever, whether it was foreseen 
 or not, that the calls upon the resources of Bombay have been 
 very heavy, and that they must increase. Upon this subject 
 I have written repeatedly to Bengal, and I have received no 
 answer upon that or any other matter, upon which I have 
 addressed either the Governor-General or his secretary. 
 
 I particularly requested that 7 lacs of rupees, in Bengal 
 mohurs, might be sent to Bombay for my use, as long ago as 
 during the siege of Ahmednuggur ; to which request I have 
 received no answer. Then the Governor-General writes the 
 most positive orders to spend money to draw off sirdars and 
 horse ; to pay Amrut Rao ; to entertain 5000 horse under the 
 modified treaty of Bassein ; to take Meer Khan into the service 
 of the Company and the Nizam : and, on the other hand, he 
 sends no money, and orders the government of Bombay not to 
 make a loan, and the government of Madras to have an enlarged 
 investment : these orders are not consistent, but who can alter 
 them ? 
 
 184. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 Motives for agreeing to a suspension of hostilities with Scindiah. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Rajoora, 23rd Nov., 1803. 
 
 My motives for agreeing to this suspension of hostilities are ; 
 
 1st ; That I have no power of injuring Scindiah any further. 
 I have taken all he had in the Deccan ; and the troops in Guzerat 
 cannot advance upon Ougein, for the reasons stated in a late 
 dispatch to the Governor-General, of which I enclosed you a 
 copy. His army now consists of horse only; and in order to 
 distress that, it will be necessary to follow it to a greater distance 
 
 Y
 
 322 WHY AN ARMISTICE WAS GRANTED TO SCINDIAH. 
 
 from our sources of supply ; which, considering the distance we 
 are from them already, becomes a matter of some consequence ; 
 and from our operations upon the Rajah of Berar, which are most 
 likely to bring about a peace. 
 
 2ndly; Scindiah's horse might do us much mischief, and might 
 derange our plans against the Rajah of Berar, supposing them to 
 be at liberty to act. The Rajah of Berar's infantry, and a corps 
 of cavalry, both under Manoo Bappoo, are encamped not far 
 from Gawilghur, the place which Col. Stevenson has been ordered 
 to attack. It is probable that both he and Scindiah would retire 
 upon Col. Stevenson's advance ; but they would attack Col. 
 Stevenson during the time that he might be employed at Gaw- 
 ilghur : or, possibly, Scindiah would make an irruption into the 
 Soubah's territories, to draw me off to a distance, and Manoo 
 Bappoo would attack Col. Stevenson. 
 
 3rdly ; Bappojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan to 
 defend Ougein against our troops, supposed to be advancing 
 from Guzerat. There is already at Ougein some infantry, which 
 have not been engaged, and the defeated infantry are on the 
 Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find Col. Murray 
 necessarily engaged with Canojee Rao Guickwar, and Dohud 
 held only by one battalion, and he would naturally make an 
 irruption into Guzerat. This is prevented by the cessation from 
 hostilities. Guzerat, instead of being our strongest, is, by far, 
 our weakest point in every respect. 
 
 . 4thly ; By leaving the Rajah of Berar out of the arrangement, 
 Scindiah's interests become separate from his ; all confidence in 
 Scindiah, if such a thing ever existed, must be lost, and the 
 confederacy becomes, ipso facto, dissolved. I see no incon- 
 venience that can result from the measure, particularly as I have 
 the power of dissolving the agreement whenever I please. I ac- 
 knowledge that this cessation of hostilities is against all the rules ; 
 but, in this instance, I think they are rules of which the breach 
 is more likely to be beneficial to the public than the observance. 
 
 185. To the Governor-General. 
 Battle of A rgaum. 
 
 Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov., 1803. 
 Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his 
 own territories ; that the body of troops he had with him was but 
 small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much
 
 HOW THE BATTLE OF ARGAUM CAME ABOUT. 323 
 
 mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, 
 I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to 
 support and cover Col. Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur, 
 in Berar. Col. Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur 
 for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where 
 he was joined on the 24th by the brinjarries, and other supplies 
 which had been saved from the enemy by Capt. Baynes' affair 
 at Umber ; and he marched forward on the 26th. 
 
 Your Excellency has been informed that, on the 23rd, I had 
 consented to a suspension of hostilities with the troops of Dowlut 
 Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on 
 which this agreement depended, viz. ' that Scindiah should 
 occupy a position 20 coss to the east of Ellichpoor,' had not 
 been carried into execution ; and Scindiah was encamped at 
 Sersooly, about 4 miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother 
 to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the 
 former consisted only of cavalry ; that of the latter, of cavalry, 
 and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah's regular 
 infantry ; and a large proportion of artillery. 
 
 In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops ; but 
 I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms 
 with Ragojee Bhoonslah ; and none with Scindiah. till he should 
 comply with the terms of his agreement ; and that I should 
 certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should 
 find them. 
 
 Col. Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place 
 yesterday; the Colonel having, with great prudence and propriety, 
 halted on the 28th at Huttee Andoorah, to enable me to co- 
 operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival 
 that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped ; and, from a tower 
 in Parterly, I could perceive a confused mass, about 2 miles 
 beyond Sersooly and Scindiah' s old camp, which I concluded to 
 be their armies in march. The troops had marched a great 
 distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it 
 proper to pursue them ; but, shortly after our arrival here, bodies 
 of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore cavalry 
 skirmished during a part of the day ; and when I went out to 
 push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore 
 cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could 
 perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, 
 regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaurn, immediately in 
 
 Y 2
 
 324 DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF ARGAUM. 
 
 front of that village, and about 6 miles from this place, at which 
 I intended to encamp. 
 
 Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack 
 this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the 
 British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of 
 the enemy's line ; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and 
 Mysore cavalry. The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left 
 of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah's 
 army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the 
 right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light 
 troops. Their line extended above 5 miles, having in their rear 
 the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum ; 
 and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by 
 watercourses, &c. I formed the army in two lines ; the infantry 
 in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right ; 
 and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to 
 that of the enemy ; with the right rather advanced, in order to 
 press upon the enemy's left. Some little time elapsed before the 
 lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my 
 division which led the column having got into some confusion. 
 When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order ; the 
 74th and 78th regts. were attacked by a large body, (supposed to 
 be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry 
 charged the 1st batt. 6th regt, which was on the left of our line, 
 and were repulsed ; and their whole line retired in disorder before 
 our troops, leaving in our hands 38 pieces of cannon and all their 
 ammunition. 
 
 The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, 
 destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, 
 and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued 
 the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter 
 are still following them ; and I have sent out this morning all of 
 the Mysore, Mogul, and Mahratta cavalry, in order to secure as 
 many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and 
 complete the enemy's confusion. For the reasons stated in the 
 commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till 
 late in the day ; and, unfortunately, sufficient daylight did not 
 remain to do all that I could have wished ; but the cavalry 
 continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were 
 under arms till a late hour in the night. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose a return of our loss in this action. 
 The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery.
 
 GOOD CONDUCT NOTES ; AND RETURN OF CASUALTIES. 325 
 
 The 74th and 78th regts. had a particular opportunity of dis- 
 tinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my 
 thanks. I am also much indebted to Col. Stevenson, for the 
 advice and assistance I received from him ; to the Hon. Lieut.- 
 Col. St. Leger, for the manner in which he led on the British 
 cavalry ; and to Lieut.-Cols. Wallace, Adams (who commanded 
 Lieut.-Col. Harness' brigade, the latter being absent on account 
 of severe indisposition), Haliburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major 
 Huddlestone, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; 
 to Major Campbell, commanding the 94th regt. ; to Capt. Beau- 
 man, commanding the artillery with the divisions under my 
 immediate command ; to Capt. Burke, commanding the artillery 
 with the subsidiary force ; and to the officers of the staff with my 
 division, and belonging to the subsidiary force. 
 
 I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry 
 under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah 
 Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard 
 from Scindiah's troops. The Mahratta cavalry were not engaged, 
 as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. 
 Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some 
 distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the 
 whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning ; but he sent for 
 orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy. 
 
 I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall 
 lose no time in attacking that place 1 . 
 
 186. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Capricious misconduct of the Company s troops at A rgaum. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec, 1803. 
 If we had had daylight an hour more, not a man would have 
 escaped. We should have had that time, if my Native infantry 
 had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the 
 
 1 Return of the killed and wounded at the battle of Argaum. 
 Europeans. Natives. 
 
 Cap. Sub. Drum. R. & F. Non-Com. Officers & Privates. 
 
 Killed ___ I5 3 , 
 
 Wounded 3 ' 6 6 145 148 
 
 Missing — — — — 5 
 
 N.B. The Officers being British are included under the head of Europeans.
 
 7,26 NATIVE CAPRICE. CAMPBELL TO HOLD FAST. 
 
 cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly 3 entire 
 battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, 
 being broken and running off, when the cannonade commenced 
 at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? 
 Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and 
 I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not 
 been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as 
 it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, 
 that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should 
 certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I 
 was on horseback, from 6 in the morning until 12 at night. 
 
 187. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Importance of Gen. Canipbelfs position, in securing the 
 tranquillity of Gen. Wellesleys rear. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp before Gawilghur, 9th Dec, 1803. 
 
 In respect to General Campbell's advance, I have frequently 
 considered that subject ; and notwithstanding all my difficulties 
 on account of the want of a reserve on the Godavery to keep the 
 enemy in my front, I have always decided that General Camp- 
 bell's corps could never be so well posted as in the spot originally 
 pointed out for him. The foundation of all our success here, the 
 destruction of the enemy's views, and our hopes of peace, depend 
 upon the continuation of tranquillity in the Company's territories 
 and in Mysore. That tranquillity might continue if those troops 
 were ordered forward, but I am not certain that it would. I am 
 certain it will as long as they remain in their position, because 
 they are superior to all that can be brought against them, and 
 they threaten the safety of all the strongholds of the southern 
 chiefs, if these should presume to declare themselves the enemies 
 of the Company. This was the case before our last success, and 
 my present operations, which go to Ragojee Bhoonslah's existence, 
 had brought that chief out of the Nizam's territories. 
 
 But now that friends and enemies and neutrals are all in Berar, 
 I don't want a reserve on the Godavery ; the removal of General 
 Campbell's corps would be useless, and all the chances of its being 
 prejudicial to us still exist. 
 
 I was the person who first suggested the position at Moodgul 
 to General Stuart ; every day's experience shows the benefit
 
 HOW TO GUARD A WILD FRONTIER. $2J 
 
 which we have derived from occupying it ; and I have contended 
 for keeping it against my own inclinations, and my sense of my 
 own ease and advantage, with Close, Malcolm, and every body 
 who has considered the question at all. In fact, whenever the 
 troops are withdrawn from thence, as they were when General 
 Stuart crossed the Toombuddra, and lately when General Camp- 
 bell made a march to Raichore, the first knowledge I had of their 
 march was the account of a disturbance in the countries situated 
 among the rivers, which has regularly ceased when the troops 
 *iave returned. After considering all this, I think you will agree 
 in opinion with me that, till we have peace, General Campbell 
 ought to remain where he is. 
 
 188. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Proper way of treating the B heels. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec, 1803. 
 
 I had always the idea of the Bheels stated in Col. Anderson's 
 letter. The Bheels (properly so called) are the uncivilized race 
 who inhabit the hills, and rob and plunder every body indiscri- 
 minately. The Rajahs, in and bordering on the hills, have great 
 influence over these people, and are besides formidable in them- 
 selves, on account of the natural strength of their countries, and 
 the numbers of armed men they can bring into the field for their 
 defence. Both would be our best defence against the attack of 
 a Native army ; and the adoption of a liberal policy towards them 
 at once will secure them to us for ever. The way of securing the 
 uncivilized, or thief Bheels, would be to conciliate the Rajahs, 
 and then we shall be secure. I recommend that, of all other 
 things, we should avoid any interference in their individual quar- 
 rels ; or the consequence will be, that we shall be involved in a 
 system of hostilities, more destructive than that which would 
 attend an attempt to subdue them to the British authority. 
 
 189. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 The Bombay Government perhaps judged too harshly. Personal 
 friendliness to the Governor. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804. 
 
 In the course of the correspondence which I have had with 
 your government during the war, I observe that there are some
 
 328 'IMPOSSIBLE IS THE WORD OF FOOLS AND COWARDS.'' 
 
 subjects upon which my opinion is different from yours. But I 
 assure you that nothing could ever alter the sentiments of respect 
 which I have always entertained for you, or of gratitude for the 
 kindness which I have always received from you. 
 
 I don't know whether I ought to regret the disposition which 
 I feel to consider nothing impossible, to suppose that everything 
 can be effected by adequate exertions, and to feel deeply and 
 to complain of the disappointments which must be met with in 
 carrying on such a service as I have had in hand. But I really 
 believe that I may sometimes have complained without much 
 cause, and you will see by my public letter of this day that I can 
 do justice to the persons acting under your orders at Bombay. 
 
 190. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 Recognition of the services of Bombay officers. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I take the liberty of adverting to the great assistance which I 
 have received from Bombay since the troops under my command 
 have been in this part of India. 
 
 I should do injustice to the officers under your government if 
 I did not report to you that I have had occasion to observe in 
 them the most anxious and zealous desire to forward the service 
 the conduct of which has been intrusted to me, and to obey the 
 orders they received from you. In the course of operations of 
 such extent and difficulty, and in the transaction of business so 
 novel at Bombay as the equipment and supply of an army so 
 numerous as this is, I must at times have been disappointed in 
 my hopes of assistance, and I may have acquainted you with my 
 disappointment ; but I must say that I have ever had reason to 
 be satisfied with the exertions of the officers under your govern- 
 ment acting under your orders. 
 
 191. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Justification of the levying of a contribution on Burhampoor. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp on the top of the Badowly ghaut, 
 13th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenham, 
 written by the Governor-General's order, from which I perceive
 
 READING BETWEEN THE LINES OF A DESPATCH. 329 
 
 that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety 
 of demanding the contribution at Burhampoor, the report of 
 which had reached the Governor-General through a private 
 channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham's letter to prove 
 to me that no suspicion is entertained, that the questions upon 
 the subject are asked merely for information ; but those very 
 pains prove the existence of the suspicion, and in fact, why is 
 he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon 
 which information must be given, unless some suspicion is en- 
 tertained ? 
 
 I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the 
 increase of my expenses, by measures not mine ; by the total 
 want of funds provided for this army; by my being left to chance ; 
 and by the Governor-General having employed the frigate sent to 
 Bengal for money; and by not paying my bills at Benares, and 
 not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay, there was every 
 reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of 
 funds to carry it on ; and that, in fact, I could not have paid the 
 troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of 
 money raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of 
 goods captured at Asseerghur. 
 
 I have told the Governor-General that if he disapproves of the 
 measure, he may order the money to be restored ; but I have 
 warned him, that if he does give those orders, Scindiah will 
 certainly put the money into his pocket. In fact, if I had not 
 exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, 
 what would have become of the campaign ? Where would have 
 been the national honour or character, if the campaign had been 
 lost ? 
 
 192. To Major Shawe. 
 
 The same subject. 
 
 Camp, 13th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I received last night Mr. Sydenham's letter of the 4th Dec, 
 which I take the earliest opportunity of answering. 
 
 When I sent a division of the army to Burhampoor, I deter- 
 mined to raise a contribution upon that city. My reasons for 
 this determination were: 1st ; I had reason to believe from Col. 
 Collins's report, that Burhampoor was an open town, which it 
 would not be possible for me to retain ; and, therefore, to levy 
 the contribution was a likely mode of distressing the enemy, who, 
 in fact, did give orders upon that city to part of his troops for
 
 330 THE SINEWS OF WAR THREATENED TO FAIL. 
 
 their pay: 2ndly; although I was not in immediate want of 
 money, I had the prospect before me of an approaching want. 
 
 The expenses of this army had been vastly increased, ist ; by 
 the course of the campaign, and the increased distance of our 
 operations from the sources of supply: 2ndly; by the increased 
 price of every article of consumption, particularly of grain for the 
 horses of the cavalry: and 3rdly ; by the necessity of paying the 
 Peshwah's troops, and at times those of the Rajah of Mysore, 
 when their money had not arrived. I had, besides, every reason 
 to hope that Amrut Rao would join ; and, by arrangement made 
 with the Peshwah, 5000 men were to be raised, 3000 of which 
 were to serve with my army, and to be paid by me. 
 
 The rough estimate of our expenses would then stand thus : — 
 
 My own division ..... 
 
 Col. Stevenson's ..... 
 
 The Peshwah's ...... 
 
 The Rajah of Mysore's .... 
 
 Amrut Rao and part of the 5000 troops, about 
 
 Rupees. 
 400,000 
 300,000 
 100,000 
 
 80,000 
 150,000 
 
 1,030,000 
 
 To answer these demands no fund had been provided, except- 
 ing what I could get at Poonah for bills upon Bombay and 
 Bengal, and what Major Kirkpatrick could get at Hyderabad. 
 In respect to the supply from Poonah, I have to observe, that, 
 besides my expenses, it was to pay those of the troops there, and 
 at Ahmednuggur ; and also that not a post came in that I was 
 not informed, either directly by Mr. Duncan or by Major Mal- 
 colm, that the government of Bombay could supply me no longer. 
 Mr. Duncan had been obliged to insist that we should draw at 
 30 days instead of 8 days ; and then we could get no more money 
 for our drafts ; and nearly at the same time we received accounts 
 from Benares, that our drafts upon that place had not been paid. 
 In the mean time, no money came from Bengal, and the frigate 
 which Mr. Duncan sent round for specie was detained for another 
 service. The supply from Hyderabad was likely to be more 
 plentiful, and has proved to be much so ; but still the supply was 
 liable to many accidents, from the number of desperate thieves 
 who infest the roads. 
 
 Besides all these demands upon me, compared with my means 
 of answering them, the Governor-General had desired that any 
 chief, who offered himself from the enemy, should be taken into
 
 7 WAS BOUND TO REPLENISH THEM AS I DID. 33 1 
 
 the service, and particularly Meer Khan, the Patan chief in Hol- 
 kar's service. This expense would also have fallen upon me, as 
 the Nizam government have not supplied one farthing ; and I 
 have lately been obliged to lend Rajah Mohiput Ram 35 lacs of 
 rupees, to prevent a mutiny among the troops usually in his 
 service. But I do not mention this circumstance as a reason for 
 levying a contribution upon Burhampoor, as I was not aware of 
 it at the time I ordered that measure. I knew that the moment 
 at which I should cease to pay the troops regularly would be the 
 date of the commencement of the disasters of the campaign in 
 this quarter; and, therefore, I conceive that I should have ne- 
 glected my duty to the Governor-General, if I had omitted to 
 take any measure which could avert or procrastinate that evil 
 day. 
 
 In respect to the amount raised at Burhampoor in this manner, 
 I did not order that any particular sum should be raised. I de- 
 sired Col. Stevenson, generally, to raise a contribution, if he should 
 be of opinion that the inhabitants would pay it. The most he 
 first demanded was 10 lacs of rupees. Upon finding that sum 
 could not be paid without difficulty, and without resorting to 
 measures which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to i\ lacs ; 
 and the inhabitants who had been charged to collect the money 
 then paid 75,000 rupees more, which they had levied beyond the 
 reduced sum. This is the fact related to me by Col. Stevenson, 
 and I have every reason to believe it is correct. You have now 
 the whole story, and the Governor-General may form his own 
 judgment upon it. I should have reported it before now, as I am 
 desirous that this and every other part of my conduct should be in- 
 vestigated ; only that I did not know the result of Col. Stevenson's 
 measures at Burhampoor till after he joined me at the battle of 
 Argaum : and I did not know the exact sum which had been 
 levied until a few days ago, when he was about to leave the army, 
 and gave me the receipt of the Paymaster. But I had intended, 
 and shall still make a regular report to the Governor- General, 
 upon this subject, as I have upon every other, either to him or to 
 Gen. Stuart. 
 
 The Governor-General has trusted me to carry on an extensive 
 service here ; and I conceive that my duty to him requires that 
 I should omit nothing which can insure its success. It would have 
 been no excuse to him, or to the world, if I had been obliged to 
 give it up for want of money; and yet I must tell you, that if it 
 had not been for this money levied at Burhampoor, and from the
 
 3$2 TO GAIN THE CAMPAIGN WAS MY FIRST DUTY. 
 
 produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, I should 
 not have been able to have paid the troops in December, and I 
 should not be able to pay them now, but for the sales of property 
 captured at Gawilghur. There is to the value of 2 lacs of rupees 
 of plate captured at Gawilghur, which, unless I get up money 
 from Poonah or Hyderabad, is my only-resource for next month. 
 
 It is impossible to reason on the effect on the national character 
 of levying a contribution, because no facts can be produced by 
 which a judgment can be formed. I know that to levy a contri- 
 bution is common in India and in Europe ; that I should have 
 levied one at Oomrawootty, and another at Nagpoor, if the 
 Rajah of Berar had not made peace ; and that it would have been 
 much more disgraceful and disastrous to have lost the campaign 
 from the want of money, than to have insured in this manner 
 the means of gaining it. 
 
 I believe I am as anxious as any other man that my character 
 should not suffer, I do not mean in the mouths of common re- 
 porters and scandal bearers, but in the eyes of a fair judging 
 people. I declare that I think that I have done what is right ; 
 but if the Governor-General thinks it was wrong, it is easy to re- 
 turn the money to the people of Burhampoor. However, if he 
 does this, he returns the money into Scindiah's pocket, for he 
 will take it immediately. I have many other important matters 
 to write to you upon ; but as nothing can go on smoothly till this 
 matter is explained, I have thought it best to begin with this, and 
 to send off the letter without delay. 
 
 P. S. At the same time with Sydenham's letter of the 4th, 
 I received yours of the 8th, and also his of the 9th, enclosing 
 the commencement of the Governor-General's instructions upon 
 the peace. As far as I can judge from his notes, in the margin of 
 the sheets transmitted by you, I believe I have made a better 
 peace than he expected. At all events, the Governor-General's 
 mind will very soon have been relieved from all anxiety respect- 
 ing the junction of the interests of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoon- 
 slah, as he must have received my letter on the subject of the 
 suspension of arms with Scindiah. 
 
 I have received Mr. Edmonstone's letters with the accounts of 
 the negotiations with the Rajahs, &c, and I think there is every 
 reason to believe that they have not been concluded by treaties. 
 I hear that Meer Khan is gone towards Bundelcund : if that 
 report be true, he must have done so in communication with 
 Ambajee.
 
 GOVERNOR-GENERAL SANCTIONS THE CONTRIBUTION. 333 
 
 193. To the Secretary of Government, Military Department, 
 
 Fort William. 
 
 Satisfaction at tJie approval of the requisition. Employment 
 of the money. 
 
 Bombay, 7th May, 1804. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 12th 
 and 16th of April, and I shall proceed immediately to carry into 
 execution the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General. 
 I am much gratified by the approbation of his Excellency the 
 Governor-General of the measure of levying a contribution upon 
 the city of Burhampoor. I always considered that I was fully 
 justified in using the advantages which the bravery of the troops 
 had put into my hands to increase the resources applicable to 
 the purposes of the war, and to diminish those of the enemy. 
 
 To restore the money levied upon the inhabitants of Burham- 
 poor would be a measure of generosity and of good policy, if it 
 were practicable ; and as the restoration has been preceded by 
 the approbation of government of the measure of levying the 
 contribution, it would not afford ground for belief among the 
 Natives that the conduct of the officers who authorised and 
 levied it had been disapproved of by his Excellency. But it is 
 not known from whom the money was taken ; and supposing 
 that any measure could be devised by which it could be restored 
 to the original proprietors, I doubt whether Dovvlut Rao Scindiah 
 would not immediately deprive them of it. However, his Excel- 
 lency the Governor-General must be the best judge upon this 
 subject, and I request to have his orders. 
 
 The money levied at Burhampoor has been applied to the 
 payment of the troops. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 194. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 A friendly rebuke and frank warning to a disputatious officer. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp, 21st Jan., 1804. 
 
 I mention these subjects to you, because I think it very desi- 
 rable, as well for yourself as for the public service, that you should 
 draw well with the government and its servants. For my part, I
 
 334 A FRUITFUL CAUSE OF FAILURE IN THE NORTH. 
 
 shall shortly resign my charge in this part of India ; and, except- 
 ing as far as my wishes may go, I shall be indifferent to what 
 passes. But I shall ever be sorry to hear that you misapply 
 your talents by entering into these questions and disputes, and 
 that you have thereby tired the government, and put it under 
 a necessity not to employ you. 
 
 195. To the Hon. H. Wellesley. 
 
 Conduct of the Deccan war after Assye ; and of the Pacification. 
 
 Camp, 40 miles n.e. from Ahmednuggur, 
 24th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I have not written to you, I believe, since I sent you the ac- 
 count of the battle which I fought at Assye on the 23rd Sept. 
 last, although many interesting events have occurred since that 
 time ; but the fact is, that I have not had leisure ; and I knew 
 that you would learn these events from the public dispatches. I 
 propose, however, in this letter to give you an outline of our 
 operations in this part of India, which have ended in treaties of 
 peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 After the battle of Assye, those two Chiefs fled into Candeish 
 with their armies in great confusion ; Scindiah's in particular was 
 almost entirely disorganized, and vast numbers deserted him. 
 Col. Stevenson followed them down the Adjuntee ghaut. They 
 fled to the Taptee, along which river they marched to the west- 
 ward. As soon as I had placed my numerous wounded in 
 security, I marched with my division to Adjuntee, and ordered 
 Col. Stevenson to advance towards Burhampoor, and levy a con- 
 tribution upon that city, and to lay siege to Asseerghur. 
 
 Upon my arrival at Adjuntee, I found that Scindiah and the 
 Rajah of Berar had quitted the Taptee, and had moved to the 
 southward, apparently with an intention of passing out of Can- 
 deish through the hills situated north of the Godavery, and of 
 invading the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and all the 
 remains of the defeated infantry had been sent across the Taptee 
 towards Hindustan. This movement was intended to divert my 
 attention from the siege of Asseerghur ; or, if I should persevere 
 in that operation, the confederates would have invaded the terri- 
 tories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would have entirely 
 destroyed the rich provinces of the latter, upon which I depended
 
 NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS AFTER ASSFE. 335 
 
 for resources of grain to enable me to carry on the war, and 
 would, at all events, have cut off or impeded the communication 
 which I had with Poonah and Bombay by Ahmednuggur. I 
 therefore determined to leave the siege of Asseerghur to Col. 
 Stevenson's division, and to march myself to the southward, in 
 order to follow the motions of the confederates. 
 
 On the nth Oct., I arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurung- 
 abad, and there remained till the 15th. On that night I received 
 most accurate accounts of the disposition of the enemy's army, 
 from which I was of opinion that they intended to move upon 
 Col. Stevenson, in order to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, 
 and I returned immediately towards Adjuntee. I arrived there 
 on the 18th, and descended the ghaut into Candeish on the 
 19th. Scindiah, who had returned to the northward, then halted 
 his army at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, within three marches of 
 Burhampoor. 
 
 Col. Stevenson arrived on the 15th at Burhampoor, of which 
 place he took possession ; he marched to Asseerghur on the 1 7th, 
 drove in the enemy, and took possession of the pettah on the 
 18th, by which means he had a fine situation from whence to 
 carry on his attack against the fort ; he broke ground on the 19th, 
 and the fort surrendered on the 21st. I did not receive intelli- 
 gence of the surrender, on which I could depend, until the 24th, 
 in the evening ; and at the same time I learnt that the Rajah of 
 Berar, who had separated from Scindiah when he had marched 
 to the northward for the relief of Asseerghur, had passed through 
 the hills which form the southern boundary of Candeish, and was 
 then encamped between the hills and the river Godavery. There 
 was no longer any reason for remaining below the ghauts, and I 
 therefore determined to re-ascend them. I sent orders to Col. 
 Stevenson to re-equip his division for the siege of Gawilghur, in 
 Berar, from the stores in Asseerghur ; and while he was making 
 the necessary arrangements for that purpose, to watch the mo- 
 tions of Scindiah's army, and prevent him from undertaking any 
 thing of importance. 
 
 I arrived at Adjuntee, on the top of the ghaut, on the 25th, 
 marched on the following days to the southward, and passed 
 Aurungabad on the 29th. The Rajah of Berar, in the usual 
 style of a Mahratta, had spent his time, after he had come out of 
 Candeish, in plundering the country, and negotiating with Amrut 
 Rao, who was encamped on the Godavery, to induce that Chief 
 to join him. The Rajah was still, on the 29th. between Aurung-
 
 336 CHARACTERISTIC ABSTINENCE FROM UNTIMELY DASH. 
 
 abaci and the Godavery, and I hoped to have been able to attack 
 him. He marched, however, on the night of the 29th, and between 
 that time and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which I 
 was in his neighbourhood, he marched with his camp five times. 
 On the 31st, in the morning, he detached a body of 5000 horse 
 to attack a large convoy on its march from the southward to 
 join the troops on the frontier, the arrival of which had been 
 delayed by the obstinacy of the officer who commanded, before 
 it crossed the Godavery, and which river it crossed only on the 
 30th. The Rajah's troops were beat off with considerable loss, 
 and the convoy joined me in safety on the 1st Nov. 
 
 The necessity of taking care of this convoy was unfortunate. 
 If I had not been under the necessity of directing the movements 
 of the troops in such a manner as to protect it, at the same time 
 that I pushed the Rajah, I should have had it in my power to 
 have destroyed him between the 29th and 31st Oct. But all the 
 subsequent solid operations of the war depended upon the arrival 
 of that convoy, and it was more important to secure it, than to 
 gain a victory over a body of horse ; in the attempt to obtain 
 which I might have failed, and then I should have lost the 
 convoy. 
 
 The troops had now been in march nearly every day, from 
 the beginning of October, and it was necessary to give them some 
 rest. Accordingly, I left the Rajah to go off to the eastward, 
 towards Berar, and I halted till the 4th, in the neighbourhood of 
 Umber. 
 
 Immediately after the battle of Assye, I had received from the 
 confederates a variety of propositions tending to the commence- 
 ment of negotiations for peace : they were ail made in the usual 
 Mahratta style, in such a manner, that it was possible either to 
 deny that they had been made, or to continue the negotiations 
 founded upon them, as it might suit the interests of the con- 
 federates. In answer to them all, I said that if the confederates, 
 or either of them, wished for peace, they might send a vakeel to 
 my camp with proper powers, who should be received with the 
 respect due to his rank and character ; and that I would listen 
 with attention to what he might have to communicate, and would 
 give him a distinct answer. 
 
 The result of the different propositions, and a variety of mes- 
 sages, was, that on the 6th Nov., a vakeel from Scindiah arrived 
 in camp. His name was Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a nephew of 
 the celebrated Morari Rao. He was received with due respect,
 
 ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH SCINDIAH ONLY. 337 
 
 but when we began business, it was found that he had no powers, 
 and then we came again to a stand. However, I allowed him to 
 remain in camp for a few days, till he should receive his powers, 
 which shortly afterwards arrived. In the mean time, Amrut Rao, 
 with whom, I believe I before informed you, I had made a treaty 
 in August, joined me on the 12th Nov. According to the Mah- 
 ratta custom, after making this treaty, he had waited to see which 
 of the parties was likely to succeed in the war ; and he had not 
 decided this question in his own mind, till after the battle of 
 Assye and its consequence, the fall of Asseerghur. As soon as 
 Goorparah received his full powers, the first measure he proposed 
 was a suspension of hostilities between the confederates and me. I 
 refused to suspend hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, but agreed 
 to suspend them with Scindiah, in the Deccan and Guzerat, upon 
 certain conditions, which appear in the treaty of which I enclose 
 a copy 1 . 
 
 I concluded this treaty on the 23rd Nov. While all this was 
 going on, I was advancing gradually towards Berar, and pushing 
 the Rajah before me to the eastward, and annoying his rear with 
 my Mysore horse. 
 
 Towards the middle of November, Col. Stevenson had com- 
 pleted all his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, and was 
 enabled to quit Burhampoor. He marched up the valley of the 
 Poorna river to Ballapoor in Berar, where he arrived on the 23rd, 
 and he was joined on the 24th by the convoy which had been 
 saved from the Rajah of Berar by Capt. Baynes's affair at Umber, 
 on the 31st Oct., and my march to the southward. As soon 
 as I found that the Rajah of Berar's march was decided, I deter- 
 mined to go into Berar to support and cover Col. Stevenson's 
 operations against Gawilghur. Scindiah had moved to the east- 
 ward in front of Col. Stevenson, and towards the end of Novem- 
 ber had encamped in the neighbourhood of an army commanded 
 by Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the brother of the Rajah of Berar, 
 consisting of the greater number, if not the whole, of the Rajah's 
 regular infantry and artillery, and a large body of cavalry. Thus, 
 in the end of November, no less than 4 armies were assembled in 
 
 1 The omitted passage is a brief statement of reasons for granting an 
 armistice to Scindiah, which are more fully detailed in an extract already 
 given. — Ed. 
 
 Z
 
 33% VICTOR Y OF ARGAUM. QUICK MARCHING. 
 
 Berar. A happy circumstance for the Rajah, who is supposed to 
 have planned the confederacy. 
 
 The united armies of Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah were 
 between Col. Stevenson and the fort of Gawilghur, and it was 
 necessary to beat them before the siege of that fort could be 
 undertaken. Col. Stevenson and I joined on the 29th Nov., at 
 Parterly, about 1 7 miles north of the Poorna river, and I attacked 
 the enemy that afternoon on the plains of Argaum, about 6 miles 
 from that village, and gained a complete victory with but small 
 loss on our side, having taken from them all their cannon, ammu- 
 nition, &c, numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, 
 &c. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin the 
 action till late in the day, and not more than 20 minutes' sun 
 remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge : but 
 they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight ; and 
 all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the 
 night. I do not send the detailed account of this action ; I think 
 it probable that you will have received it before you get this 
 letter. 
 
 It was an extraordinary and fortunate circumstance, that after 
 Col. Stevenson and I had been separated for above 2 months, at 
 a distance of nearly 300 miles, I should have joined him on the 
 very morning of this engagement ; and that, in order to enable 
 me to join him, he was not obliged to halt more than one day. 
 But the operations of this war have afforded numerous instances 
 of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining in- 
 telligence, and, above all, of movement. Marches, such as I have 
 made in this war, were never known or thought of before. In 
 the last 8 days of the month of October, I marched above 120 
 miles, and passed through 2 ghauts with heavy guns, and all the 
 equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency 
 of the army ; and in the few days previous to this battle, when 
 
 1 had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than 
 between 17 and 20 miles, and I marched 26 miles on the day on 
 which it was fought. 
 
 After the battle at Argaum, I moved on the 1st Dec. with the 
 
 2 divisions in 2 columns, towards Gawilghur. I arrived at Ellich- 
 poor on the 5th, and established there an hospital for the wounded 
 in the battle of Argaum. On the 7th, both divisions moved to 
 take up the ground for the siege of Gawilghur. Col. Stevenson's 
 division, which had been equipped for the siege of Asseerghur, 
 was destined to make the principal attack on the northern face ;
 
 GAWILGHUR TAKEN. PEACE WITH THE BONSLAV. 339 
 
 while that under my immediate command, with all the cavalry 
 (British and Native), should cover the siege, and co-operate with 
 Col. Stevenson as far as might be practicable, by attacks to the 
 southward and westward. The march of Col. Stevenson's division 
 through the mountains, to the northern face of the fort, was one 
 of the most difficult, and, in the success of the execution, extra- 
 ordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy 
 ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the 
 troops over high mountains, through valleys and ravines, for 
 nearly 30 miles from Ellichpoor, by roads made by themselves 
 with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were 
 equal. They were enabled to break ground on the 12th, and 
 on the same night I commenced an attack upon the southern 
 face. 
 
 On the 15th, in the morning, Col. Stevenson had effected a 
 breach in the outer walls of the fort, and we determined to storm. 
 While he attacked the breaches on the northern wall, the infantry 
 of my division were to attack the western and southern gates. 
 There remained a third wall, which had not been breached, and 
 this the troops escaladed, and we were shortly in possession of 
 the place. Our loss on this occasion was not great, but that of 
 the enemy was immense. The killadar, all the principal officers, 
 and the greater part of the garrison were killed. 
 
 During the siege, the negotiations for peace were going on 
 briskly, particularly with the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, who had 
 arrived in camp on the day after the battle of Argaum. I con- 
 cluded a treaty of peace with him, of which I enclose you a copy, 
 on the 1 6th Dec, and signed it on the following morning, 
 previous to my march towards Nagpoor, in order to keep 
 alive the impressions under which it was evident that it had been 
 concluded. 
 
 I halted, after making 3 marches towards Nagpoor ; as I found 
 that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and I saw that if I 
 marched forward I should destroy his government entirely. I 
 received the ratification on the 23rd Dec. 
 
 You will have observed, that after I had concluded the treaty 
 for suspending hostilities with Scindiah, I had fought his army 
 at Argaum on the 29th Nov. At that time he had not ratified 
 the treaty, and he had not performed any one of its stipulations ; 
 and I gave notice to his vakeels that I should attack him if I 
 should meet his army. After the battle he did ratify the treaty, 
 but he did not perform the condition which required that he 
 
 Z 2
 
 340 PEACE CONCLUDED WITH SCINDIAH. 
 
 should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor. However, he did not 
 interfere in the siege of Gawilghur, and did not take advantage 
 of my being employed in that operation, to attack the Peshwah 
 or the Nizam. 
 
 As soon as he found that the Rajah of Berar had made peace, 
 he began to be a little alarmed respecting his own situation ; and 
 the negotiations for peace with his vakeels, in which no great 
 progress had been made, then took a favourable turn. 
 
 On the 23rd, the day on which I received the Rajah's ratifica- 
 tion of his treaty, Scindiah's 2 principal ministers, Eitul Punt 
 and moonshee Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp to conclude the 
 treaty of peace. On the same day I gave them notice, that, on 
 the 27th, if the treaty of peace should not then be concluded, 
 hostilities would no longer be suspended ; and on the 24th I re- 
 turned to the westward, and joined Col. Stevenson (who had only 
 then come out of the mountains from Gawilghur), on the 26th, to 
 the westward of Ellichpoor. 
 
 On the 28th I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's 
 ministers, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th; and 
 on the 5th Jan. I received Scindiah's ratification of the treaty. 
 I enclose a copy of this treaty, and copies of my letters to 
 the Governor-General upon this treaty, and that with the Rajah 
 of Berar. 
 
 I have now brought you from the battle of Assye to the con- 
 clusion of peace, and my hand is almost tired ; but I have other 
 circumstances to mention to you, and if I do not continue now, it 
 is possible that I maybe delayed for another week before I shall 
 be able to finish this epistle, the first page of which was written, 
 as it appears, on the 24th Jan., and the remainder on the 1st 
 Feb. 
 
 Since the peace I have marched to the southward, and am 
 now encamped between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah. A banditti 
 were on this frontier, whom I intended to destroy, but they have 
 dispersed, and I propose to break up the army almost immedi- 
 ately. Malcolm is at Scindiah's durbar, endeavouring to arrange 
 the defensive alliance, in which he has not made much pro- 
 gress. Mr. Elphinstone is with the Rajah of Berar. The 
 Governor-General is well pleased with the treaty with the latter, 
 and has ratified it : he has sent me copies of your letters of the 
 30th Aug.
 
 INEFFICIENCY OF FORMER TRANSPORT SYSTEM. 34 1 
 
 196. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Efficiency of the bullock establishment: — a novelty in our Indian 
 experience. The new system should be retained. 
 
 Fort St. George, 2nd Aug., 1804. 
 
 I have the honour to inform you, that if you should have no ob- 
 jection to the measure, I propose recommending to the Governor- 
 General, to give a gratuity of one month's pay to the persons 
 belonging to the Public Bullock department, who served with the 
 troops under my command, during the late war. These persons 
 marched from Seringapatam with the troops ; they served 
 throughout the war in a country in which grain, when cheapest, 
 was in the proportion of 12 to 1 dearer than in Mysore; they 
 always did their duty without grumbling ; and I do not recollect 
 an instance of desertion. They were necessarily present in the 
 actions which were fought ; some of them were killed, and others 
 desperately wounded. 
 
 Upon the occasion of laying before you my intention to recom- 
 mend this description of the public servants of the army to the 
 favour of his Excellency the Governor-General, I cannot avoid 
 drawing your notice to the benefits which have resulted from the 
 establishment to which they belonged. It must be recollected, 
 that in former wars, the utmost exertion which it was possible 
 for the army to make, was to draw its train of artillery to Seringa- 
 patam. It was not possible, and never was expected, that the 
 guns and carriages which were drawn there, should be brought 
 away again ; and accordingly, notwithstanding the undoubted 
 talents and the great reputation of the officers who have at diffe- 
 rent times led British armies to that place, it has invariably 
 happened, that by far the greater part of the train and carriages 
 have been left behind when the army marched away. Those who 
 have seen the mode in which those armies made their marches, 
 and were acquainted with the system under which cattle were, 
 and must necessarily be, procured for the service, will not hesitate 
 to allow, that the slowness of all our operations, and the necessity 
 to which I have above alluded, of leaving our guns after they had 
 been drawn above 300 miles, were to be attributed entirely to 
 the faults of the system under which the cattle were procured for 
 the service. 
 
 But although I am addressing myself to an officer whose
 
 342 CONTRASTED WORKING OF GEN. WELLESLEY's PLAN. 
 
 experience reaches beyond the times to which I have alluded, it is 
 only necessary that I should advert, in proof of my assertion, to 
 the circumstances of the late war. From a variety of causes, it 
 was necessary, at the commencement of the war, to hire cattle to 
 draw the train from Madras to the frontiers of Mysore ; and you 
 will recollect the difficulties under which you laboured ; and that 
 in fact you could not have brought your carriages to the frontier 
 without the assistance of the public cattle sent to join you ; and 
 that if the circumstances of the times had required that the whole 
 army should have advanced to Poonah, you would probably have 
 thought it proper to have taken with you those carriages only for 
 which you might have had a sufficient number of the public 
 draught cattle. 
 
 All the carriages attached to the division under my command 
 were drawn by the public cattle ; and I shall advert to a few 
 facts, to point out the difference between this part of the equip- 
 ment of the troops in the late and in former wars. 
 
 We marched to Poonah from Seringapatam, the distance being 
 nearly 600 miles, in the worst season of the year, through a country 
 which had been destroyed by Holkar's army, with heavy guns, at 
 the rate, upon an average, of 13^ miles a day; and if the 12 days 
 on which we halted upon the Toombuddra for orders be included, 
 we arrived at Poonah in 2 months from the time we marched. On 
 this march we lost no draught cattle. I remained in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Poonah, in a country which deserves the name of a 
 desert, for 6 weeks ; and then marched again with the train, in 
 the same state, as to numbers, as when it left Seringapatam, and 
 the troops and cattle were in the field during the monsoon. 
 
 It is needless to advert to the distance marched during the war, 
 or to recapitulate the events, all of which must show the efficient 
 state of the equipments ; but it has been frequently necessary for 
 the troops to march, for many days together, a distance from 15 
 to 20 miles daily; the heavy artillery always accompanied them, 
 and I always found that the cattle could go as far as the troops. 
 Upon one occasion, I found it necessary to march a detachment 
 60 miles in 30 hours, and the ordnance and provision carriages, 
 drawn by the Company's bullocks, accompanied this detachment. 
 Instead of being obliged, as the Commanders-in-Chief of armies 
 in former wars have been, to leave guns and carriages behind, 
 such was the state of efficiency of this department throughout this 
 severe service, that I was able, but with little assistance, to draw 
 away the guns which the troops took.
 
 THE NEW SYSTEM SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. 
 
 343 
 
 After all this service, in which so much country has been 
 marched over, the number of cattle which have died is, I believe, 
 really not greater than it would have been at the grazing ground ; 
 and the department is at this moment in a state of great effi- 
 ciency. It would not be difficult to prove, that in point of actual 
 expense, this establishment is cheaper to the public, than to hire 
 cattle in the old mode ; but the consideration respecting a public 
 establishment of this description, is not referrible entirely to 
 cheapness. 
 
 It must be obvious to every man, that in a war, such as the 
 late war, there could be no success, unless the officer command- 
 ing the troops was able to move, at all times, with the utmost 
 celerity of which the troops were capable, and to continue his 
 movements so long as was necessary. Rapid movements with 
 guns and carriages cannot be made without good cattle, well 
 driven, and well taken care of; and without adverting to what 
 passed subsequently, it is more than probable, that if I had had 
 the service of such cattle only, as served Lord Cornwallis and 
 Gen. Harris in former wars, I should never have reached Poonah, 
 and that I should have been obliged to find my way back with- 
 out the wheel carriages, in the best manner I could. 
 
 I therefore take the liberty of recommending this establishment 
 of cattle to your protection. It is founded upon the most efficient 
 and most economical principles, and will never fail the army, so 
 long as it is superintended and conducted as it has been hitherto. 
 
 197. Memorandum submitted to the Governor- General by 
 Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley, detailing the system 
 for regulating the supplies of an Army in the Deccan, a 
 copy of which was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, &c. 
 
 Fort William, 3rd Nov., 1804. 
 
 After every inquiry I have been able to make, I cannot learn 
 the mode in which the system of supplies is conducted by the 
 Commander-in-Chief. I rather believe, however, that the whole 
 rests in the hands of Capt. Morrison, who is superintendent of 
 supplies of the army. 
 
 Without local knowledge, it is impossible for me to say whether 
 that mode is a good one ; I shall, however, detail that in use with 
 all the armies in which I have commanded in the Deccan, and 
 which has succeeded in enabling me to go to a very great distance 
 from the sources of supplies.
 
 344 MODE OF ISSUING SUPPLIES TO 'PERSONS OR ANIMALS.' 
 
 There are in every army four descriptions of persons or animals, 
 to be supplied with food, viz., 
 
 i. European soldiers, ii. Native troops, iii. Horses of the 
 cavalry, iv. Followers of all descriptions, including horses, cattle, 
 servants, &c, of officers, departments, soldiers, &c. 
 
 ist. To feed the European soldiers, a Commissary of provisions 
 is appointed. The quantity of provisions necessary for the num- 
 ber of men for any given period of time (2 or 3 months) is issued 
 to him from the public stores, or he purchases them, according 
 to the orders which he may receive. Carriage is allotted for this 
 provision, either carts or bullocks, &c. In this quantity of pro- 
 vision, the Commissary of provisions has only 5 days' grain, and 
 the carriage allotted for that quantity ; and he indents on every 
 fifth day on the Commissary of grain for that grain which will be 
 necessary for the European troops for the following 5 days. The 
 object of this arrangement is to keep the account of the grain 
 clear, and that it may always be known what length of time the 
 quantity of grain in camp will serve for the whole army. 
 
 2ndly. The Native troops receive grain only. 
 
 When the army is assembled, a quantity of grain which will 
 last the troops, including the Europeans, a given period of time 
 (2 or 3 months), is issued from the public stores to the Com- 
 missary of grain. Carriage is allotted for it ; viz., bullocks, either 
 the property of the Company, or hired for the purpose, and under 
 the immediate charge of the Commissary of grain. When the 
 Commissary of grain makes an issue, he replenishes it, either by 
 drawing again upon the stores, if he can communicate with them, 
 or by purchases in the country, or the bazaar, according to the 
 orders which he may receive from the officer commanding the 
 army. 
 
 31'dly. The horses of the cavalry. 
 
 When the number of horses to be fed is ascertained, a quantity 
 of grain is issued from the public stores to the Gram agent general, 
 to last them for a given number of days ; viz., 40, 50 or 60. The 
 quarter-masters of the regiments of cavalry have under their 
 charge a bullock for each horse in the regiment, which bullock 
 carries grain to last the horse 15 days. He receives this grain 
 from the Gram agent general. The Gram agent general has 
 under his charge and superintendence bullocks in sufficient num- 
 ber (either hired, or belonging to the Company) to carry the re- 
 mainder of the gram. When he makes an issue to the quarter- 
 master, he replaces it either by drawing again upon the stores, or
 
 AGENTS FOR SUPPLYING CAMP BAZAARS. 345 
 
 by purchases in the bazaar or the country, according to the orders 
 which he may receive from the commanding officer of the army. 
 
 4thly. Followers of all descriptions. 
 
 These persons live by the daily purchases they make in the 
 bazaar, the supply of which becomes an object of the greatest 
 importance. What follows is the mode of supplying the bazaar 
 which I have seen practised. The bazaars are placed under the 
 charge and superintendence of an officer called the superintendent 
 of supplies, and in him the whole business of the internal police 
 and supply of the camp rests. The following modes are adopted 
 to supply the grain required for it. 
 
 1st. Brinjarries. These are a class of carriers who gain a live- 
 lihood by transporting grain or other commodities from one part 
 of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly 
 in the same manner as they do in common times of peace. They 
 either purchase grain themselves in the country with their own 
 money, or with money advanced to them by the Company, and 
 sell it in the bazaar at the rates of the day on their own account, 
 or they take grain at the Company's stores at certain reduced 
 rates, and sell it on their own account in the bazaars ; or they 
 take up grain in the Company's stores, and carry it with the 
 army, and receive a sum of money for every march they make, 
 and the grain is sold in the bazaars on account of the Company ; 
 or they hire their cattle by the month to the Company, and take 
 up grain from the public stores and carry it with the army, where 
 it is sold in the bazaars on the account of the Company. It is 
 the business of the superintendent of supplies to settle all these 
 various accounts, and to see that the brinjarries get fresh loads 
 as fast as they empty them, and to know always, as nearly as 
 possible, the quantity of grain which this description of people 
 have got. 
 
 2nd. Biparries. This is another description of dealers. They 
 do not go in large flocks like the brinjarries, and to such dis- 
 tances, to look for grain. They are generally attached to the 
 camp bazaar, and they go out to the villages and towns in the 
 neighbourhood of the camp, and purchase grain, and bring it in 
 immediately for sale. These are a more civilized, industrious, 
 and useful people than the brinjarries ; they are much more 
 active, and if the country is open, the supply which they bring 
 is more plentiful. • 
 
 3rd. The Biparries of the country. These are of the same 
 class with the second, only not immediately attached to the
 
 34 6 CAMP STORES AND BAZAARS MUTUALLY HELPFUL. 
 
 camp. They bring grain to the camp from the neighbouring 
 villages, when ordered by the amildars and government, or ex- 
 cited by their own interests ; but their attendance is not so con- 
 stant. Besides these three principal descriptions, there are others, 
 but they may all be classed under one of the three general 
 heads. 
 
 From this statement it is obvious, that when the communi- 
 cation between the army and the country is not free, that alone 
 upon which the bazaar can depend is the brinjarries, who are 
 generally assembled in large numbers, and attend it when the 
 campaign is opened. It frequently happens, as was the case 
 with me in the last campaign, that the brinjarries desert the 
 army. The communication with the country may be cut off 
 from many causes ; the enemy, the swelling of a river, bad roads, 
 rainy weather, &c. On the other hand, the army may outmarch 
 the supplies which might be expected from biparries, &c. In 
 any of these cases, it is usual for the commanding officer of the 
 army to order the Commissary of grain to issue to the super- 
 intendent of supplies any quantity of grain that may be required 
 to supply the consumption which falls upon the bazaar. The 
 Commissary of grain makes his purchases again from the bazaar 
 when it fills. The Gram agent general also issues, by order, gram 
 to the superintendent of the bazaar when that article is wanted 
 for officers' horses and cattle. He frequently issues it by order, 
 to the agent for the public draught bullocks, when the supply 
 of grain in the bazaar is not sufficient for the cattle in his 
 department. 
 
 In this manner, the army can never be in want. The camp 
 stores are always kept complete, and supply the bazaars occa- 
 sionally ; while the bazaars, in more plentiful times (which, under 
 good arrangement, must occur frequently), supply the camp 
 stores. 
 
 198. Memorandum on the system adopted for regulating the 
 Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command 
 of Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley. 
 
 Fort William, Nov., 1804. 
 
 One of the great difficulties of war in this country is to obtain 
 intelligence of the enemy's movements and intentions sufficiently 
 early to take advantage of them. The following modes of pro-
 
 ELEMENTS AND WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. 347 
 
 curing intelligence were adopted in the late campaign in the 
 Deccan, and were generally successful. 
 
 1. Three distinct departments for intelligence were formed in 
 camp, the head of each of which communicated directly with 
 Major-Gen. Wellesley. To each department was attached 
 such a number of intelligence hircarrahs, as rendered it certain 
 that one would come into each department from the enemy's 
 camp on every day. 
 
 2. The heads of the intelligence departments reported imme- 
 diately on its arrival, the intelligence received, and questioned 
 the hircarrah particularly regarding the hour at which he had 
 quitted the camp. His intelligence was then compared with 
 that brought in by the other hircarrahs, as received from other 
 quarters, and a tolerably accurate opinion was generally formed 
 of the facts reported. 
 
 3. Great care was taken that the persons employed in one 
 department should not be known to those employed in the 
 others, and that they should not communicate. The hircarrahs 
 were highly rewarded, besides receiving monthly pay, particularly 
 when they brought any intelligence on which an operation could 
 be founded ; and were punished and turned out of the service 
 when they brought any which was known to be false. 
 
 4. The intelligence departments were kept, one by the Dep. 
 Adj. -Gen., one by Mr. Elphinstone, who acted as Persian inter- 
 preter, and one by Govind Rao, a servant of the Rajah of Mysore, 
 who was used in the communications with the Native sirdars. 
 
 5. Besides these departments for intelligence, a constant com- 
 munication was kept up and encouraged with the Native vakeels. 
 They came every evening to Major-Gen. Wellesley ; he com- 
 municated with them personally, and learned all that they had 
 heard in the course of the day. 
 
 6. A correspondence was also kept up with the amildars of the 
 country, and measures were taken constantly, by means of the 
 Mysore sirdars and horsemen, and their communications with 
 the heads of villages, &c, in the neighbourhood of camp, to find 
 out the reports of the country, and every thing which could throw 
 light upon the enemy's designs.
 
 $+8 IMPORTANCE OF SECURING AMRUT RAO FOR PESHWAH. 
 
 199. To the Right Hon. Robert Dundas 1 . 
 
 Character, influence, aud formidable military position of Amrnt 
 Rao, during the MaJiratta war. His good service in detach- 
 ing Holkar from tlie Confederacy . The arrangement with 
 him desirable, and its terms not extravagant. 
 
 (Extract.) London, 27th March, 1808. 
 
 Amrut Rao was the adopted son of the Peshwah's father 
 Ragoba. He was a very able man in the civil and political 
 affairs of the Mahratta empire, and had been deeply concerned 
 in all the intrigues and disturbances which had taken place since 
 the death of the former Peshwah. His reputation for ability was 
 higher than that of any other Mahratta, principally because all 
 the adherents of the late Nana Furnavees, in other words, all the 
 people of business in the country, were attached to him ; and he 
 had uniformly been opposed to the government of the reigning 
 Peshwah. He had been a principal in Holkar's rebellion and 
 short occupation of Poonah ; he had conducted the civil and 
 political affairs of the state while it existed ; and it had been 
 intended by Holkar to place his son on the musnud as Peshwah, 
 if the British government and the allies had not interfered in 
 consequence of the treaty of Bassein. When Holkar was obliged 
 to retire from Poonah in April, 1803, by the advance of the 
 British corps under my command, Amrut Rao was the last who 
 retired from that city, and he was hard pressed by my light 
 troops. 
 
 When I arrived at Poonah and had brought back the Peshwah 
 to resume the exercise of his government, the first object of my 
 attention was to give him and his government such strength as 
 to enable him to carry on its ordinary operations without having 
 recourse to us. It appeared to me and to the Resident that we 
 could not effect this object better than by reconciling Amrut 
 Rao and the Peshwah, for which we had an opening in a nego- 
 tiation which the former had commenced under the pretence of 
 recovering some property which had been taken from him by 
 my light troops in his retreat from Poonah. This negotiation 
 was carried on much against the inclination of the Peshwah, 
 who feared and detested his brother ; but we still considered it 
 so important to secure the neutrality or support of Amrut Rao 
 
 1 President of the India Board.
 
 FACTS AFFECTING THE NATURE OF THE BARGAIN. 349 
 
 in the contest, which even at that time we thought a possible 
 event, that we persevered so far as to ascertain his terms, upon 
 which we made a proposition to the Peshwah. 
 
 These turned principally upon what he had had previous to 
 the treaty of Bassein, and what he had lost by that arrange- 
 ment ; and we thought it reasonable that we should secure to 
 him, by any settlement which we should make, an income at least 
 equal to that which he had previous to the treaty of Bassein. 
 
 By a reference to the whole of the letters from me, quoted in 
 the paper to which I refer, and above all (if you have it) by a 
 reference to my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, 
 it will be seen that Amrut Rao's jaghire upon the Godavery 
 was worth four lacs of rupees per annum ; and what he had lost 
 in Savanore (which province was then to have gone to the Com- 
 pany) and near Surat, and what he still had depending upon the 
 fort of Poonadur, near Poonah, was worth more than three lacs 
 in addition to that sum. The demand, then, upon the Peshwah 
 for a jaghire of four lacs for Amrut Rao, on the commencement 
 of the negotiation, which was suspended upon His Highness's 
 unreasonable demand that Amrut Rao should be put in confine- 
 ment as soon as he should have received this jaghire, must have 
 been and was in addition to the jaghire of four lacs which he still 
 retained upon the Godavery. 
 
 The negotiation, thus suspended, was kept on foot, as much 
 by the inclination of Amrut Rao to connect himself with the 
 English, as by ours to attach him to the cause of the Peshwah, 
 till the war broke out in 1803, and then I found it necessary to 
 take decided steps to bring it to a conclusion, which I did, as 
 well as I recollect, on the morning after I took the fort of 
 Ahmednuggur. The writers of the paper to which I refer give 
 me credit for the necessity which they say might have existed on 
 military grounds, for concluding that negotiation by the treaty 
 which I signed, at the same time that they dispute the pro- 
 bability that Amrut Rao could have had a force which could 
 give me any apprehension at that time. You will see in my 
 despatches to the Governor-General and the Resident, to which 
 the Court have referred, that they have not taken into con- 
 sideration the extent of the military inconvenience resulting from 
 the position of Amrut Rao's force, which is stated in the de- 
 spatches ; much less have they adverted to the advantage to be 
 derived from any arrangement with Amrut Rao, which I have 
 detailed in this letter, or to other facts bearing upon this subject
 
 350 IT WAS RIGHTLY MADE, AND ON FAIR TERMS. 
 
 which appear in my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, 
 and with the Governor-General at that time. 
 
 Amrut Rao had placed himself, in July and August, 1803, in 
 a position near the hills, towards which I could not approach 
 in that season without risking the loss of the health of my troops. 
 In proportion as I advanced and carried my operations across 
 the Godavery (and by reference to the correspondence it will 
 be seen I was not one moment too soon), he would have been 
 behind me, and would have operated upon my communication 
 with Poonah. Admitting his corps to have been as small as it 
 is stated by the Court, it would have been materially inconve- 
 nient and dangerous ; but led by a man of the rank and influence 
 of Amrut Rao, by one who it appears by the same correspond- 
 ence had great influence over the southern jaghiredars, through 
 whose countries I kept up my communication with Mysore, it 
 was most important that, as I could not destroy it, I should have 
 it on my side. Besides these considerations, and those of a 
 political nature to which I have adverted at the commencement 
 of this letter, to induce me to conclude this treaty, I must men- 
 tion that Amrut Rao performed a service nearly about this time 
 which never ought to be forgotten. 
 
 By reference to the records of the day, it will be seen what 
 pains were taken by the confederates to bring Holkar's army 
 into active operation in the Deccan ; and if that chief had per- 
 formed his engagements with Scindiah, I cannot pretend to say 
 that I should have brought the army through its difficulties. 
 Amrut Rao intercepted a letter from Scindiah to the Peshwah, 
 in which Scindiah urged His Highness to break his alliance with 
 the English, and promised that, as soon as we should be de- 
 feated, he (Scindiah) would join with the Rajah of Berar and 
 the Peshwah to destroy Holkar. Amrut Rao sent this letter to 
 Holkar, and the consequence was that Holkar, after he had 
 made two marches to the southward with a view to co-operate 
 with the confederates, returned and crossed the Nerbudda, and, 
 in point of fact, never struck a blow ; on the contrary, he was in 
 friendly communication with me throughout the war. 
 
 I think I may conclude that I did right in making some 
 arrangement with Amrut Rao, and what I have above stated 
 shows that seven lacs per annum was a fair stipend.
 
 the nizam to have no lot in ahmednuggur. 351 
 
 4. Pacification and Results of the War. 
 
 200. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The Nizam ought to have no part of the Ahmednuggur district. 
 A promise may be given to the Peshwah that he shall share it. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803. 
 
 I know well that the Mahrattas have a particular aversion to 
 the Nizam's government ; and I thought it not improbable but 
 that the Peshwah and all the Mahratta chiefs would feel very- 
 uncomfortable under the notion that the Nizam was to get any 
 territory so near to Poonah as Ahmednuggur is ; particularly as 
 this territory is forced from one of their own chiefs by a body of 
 troops acting in the name, and on the part, of the Peshwah. 
 Although, therefore, the benefit of the war must be divided, 
 according to certain principles, among the allies, and the Nizam 
 will undoubtedly be entitled to a better share of the spoils than 
 the Peshwah, I cannot think that it would be politic, or con- 
 sistent with the attention which we ought to have for the feel- 
 ings of the Mahrattas. to allow the Nizam to have any part of 
 Ahmednuggur. He might have compensation elsewhere, either 
 to the northward or the southward. On this ground it is that I 
 have kept his name out of sight all along in my transactions 
 here ; and on this ground I should have no objections, if you 
 find it necessary for the satisfaction of the Peshwah's mind, to 
 assure him that he shall hereafter enjoy a share of this conquest, 
 and that he shall see the account of the manner in which the 
 present profits resulting from it are disposed of. 
 
 201. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Why the Nizam's name was not inserted in the proclamation 
 issued on taking possession of Ahmednuggur. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 Camp at Senboogaum, 21st Aug., 1803. 
 Although his Highness the Nizam, or his representative, the 
 present Soubahdar of the Deccan, would have a better claim, 
 from the exertions which that government has made to produce
 
 352 THE PESHWAH MAY SHARE AHMEDNUGGUR COUNTRY. 
 
 an army in the field, than the Peshwah, to a share of the benefits 
 to be expected from the successful prosecution of the war, I have 
 not included his name in the proclamation by which I have taken 
 possession of the country : because I was aware of the jealousies 
 of the Mahrattas respecting the possession of the fort of Ahmed- 
 nuggur, and of the countries depending upon it, so immediately 
 in the neighbourhood of Poonah, which I was desirous not to 
 excite. And as it will remain in your Excellency's power to 
 dispose of the fort, the districts, and their revenue, in any manner 
 you may think proper, it is a matter of immaterial importance 
 to the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, whether his 
 Highness' name is included in the proclamation, although to 
 have inserted it would certainly have excited the jealousy of the 
 Mahrattas. 
 
 202. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Objections against assigning Asseerghnr to the Nizam. Policy of 
 cessions to Scindiah in Berar. The Nizam, though he has not 
 fulfilled the terms of the alliance, should share conquests, on 
 consenting to an improvement of those terms. Suggestions to 
 that effect, for strengthening his government. What his 
 share should be. Hoiv the Pcslnvatis claim to cJioute from 
 the Nizam should be settled. The Peshwah has no valid 
 claim to share conquests ; but may be allowed to do so, on 
 consenting to nezv terms of alliance similar to those to be 
 imposed on the Nizam. 
 
 (Extract.) Jaum, nth Nov., 1803. 
 
 The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to 
 the Soubah of the Deccan ; and, from what I have seen and ex- 
 perienced of his Highness' government, I think there are weighty 
 objections to the increase of his Highness' territories on his 
 northern frontier. 
 
 His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the 
 exertions of the British government. The system of operations 
 on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature 
 of his Highness' government, from the deficiency of his means of 
 defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps 
 which the British government can allot in case of war to give 
 him assistance. But in proportion as the distance of the frontier 
 is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise.
 
 PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT WITH SCINDTAH. 
 
 353 
 
 The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it ; and as for 
 the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on 
 the extreme frontier, for the defence of which it would be neces- 
 sary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the 
 means provided by the treaties with the British government for 
 carrying on operations in the field. Another reason for ceding 
 these territories to Scindiah is that, unless they are given to 
 him, he has no motive for making peace. This reason is like- 
 wise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon 
 Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat. 
 
 I have also to observe that, as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept 
 himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not be 
 weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its 
 operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed 
 peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to pre- 
 serve a part of Scindiah's strength, to enable him to support 
 himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. 
 
 On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach 
 Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, 
 and of the Company's territories on the Toombuddra, will be in 
 a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to 
 Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories 
 which he will cede to the British government in the north of 
 Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the Company all the 
 territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the 
 war against the Rajah of Berar. This will make Scindiah more 
 powerful against Holkar and the Rajah of Berar than he was 
 before the war : it will probably induce him to conclude the 
 peace immediately ; at the same time that, relatively to the 
 British government, it will not alter the state of his power. 
 However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great 
 difficulty in obtaining the other objects. 
 
 If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be 
 made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the 
 Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British 
 government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no 
 doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions 
 of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company ; but, upon 
 the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with 
 the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of 
 the benefits of the peace. 
 
 However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage 
 
 A a
 
 354 NEW TERMS OF ALLIANCE WITH NIZAM PROPOSED. 
 
 ought to be taken of his Highness's breach of his engagements, 
 to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some 
 security in future for the due execution of its most material 
 articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, 
 would alone provide a sufficient security for this object ; but the 
 Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the 
 British government have in their preservation ; they will for ever 
 depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honour of the 
 British government for their support, and will never make any 
 exertion, the object of which is to provide for their own security, 
 so long as they have the support of the British power. 
 
 I would therefore recommend the following amendments to 
 the treaty of defensive alliance, which will ensure the existence 
 of some strength in the government of Hyderabad. 
 
 1st ; That the British Resident should have the power of mus- 
 tering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound 
 by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness's govern- 
 ment exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no 
 reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the 
 British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the 
 Soubah. 
 
 2ndly ; That for every horseman found absent at muster his 
 Highness should pay 50 rupees per mensem, and for every foot 
 soldier 20 rupees per mensem, till the numbers of each description 
 should be complete. 
 
 3rdly ; That the British Resident should have the power of 
 sending persons into the forts on his Highness's frontiers to in- 
 spect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled 
 with grain, according to the tenor of his Highness's engagement 
 with the Company. 
 
 Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the 
 Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength 
 to enforce obedience to its orders, and to preserve tranquillity 
 in the country, besides the Company's troops stationed at 
 Hyderabad. 
 
 If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness 
 will have Jalnapoor and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his 
 Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Ad- 
 juntee hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I 
 believe it is above 3 lacs of rupees per annum. 
 
 I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency to
 
 CHOVTE QUESTION. ARRANGEMENT WITH PESHWAH. 355 
 
 take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah's 
 claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If 
 the result of the discussions on that subject should be to sub- 
 stantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode 
 of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the 
 treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company 
 the satisfaction of the claims of the Peshwah ; and this might be 
 done, either by restoring to his Highness the territories in the 
 west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, 
 or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late 
 arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to 
 the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the 
 Soubah of the Deccan. According to this plan, his Highness 
 the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war 
 with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the 
 Mahrattas. 
 
 If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should 
 be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah 
 of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be 
 given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, 
 yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have 
 a claim. As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the 
 Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests ; and if he had 
 under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your 
 Excellency from the necessity of giving him any thing. How- 
 ever, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy 
 some of the advantages resulting from the war ; and the cession 
 of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction 
 for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to 
 his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent 
 to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above 
 recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah 
 of the Deccan. 
 
 I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to 
 be kept in the hands of the British government until all these 
 arrangements shall have been completed, and your Excellency 
 shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work. 
 
 A a %
 
 3$6 MAHRATTAS MOST FORMIDABLE TO US AS HORSEMEN. 
 
 203. To Major Shawe. 
 
 The Mahrattas should be allozved to retain Europeans. For 
 without them, their armies would be more formidable — as 
 cavalry, in the old Mahratta style of zvarfare. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp, 1 8th Nov., 1803. 
 
 It appears, however, that the Governor-General is desirous that 
 they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition 
 will go to their having no infantry or artillery, and this is a point 
 which I think deserves consideration. 
 
 Scindiah's armies had actually been brought to a very favour- 
 able state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by 
 the exertions of the European officers in his service ; but I think 
 it is much to be doubted whether his power, or rather that of the 
 Mahratta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least 
 to the British government, if they had never had an European, 
 as an infantry soldier, in their service, and had carried on their 
 operations, in the manner of the original Mahrattas, only by 
 means of cavalry. I have no doubt whatever but that the mili- 
 tary spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establish- 
 ment of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes ; 
 at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however 
 formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the 
 Mahrattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the 
 success of the contest, and to the re-establishment of peace : 
 because, having made them the principal object of their atten- 
 tion, (which they must do, in order to have them at all,) and that 
 part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they 
 become also the principal reliance of the army ; and, therefore, 
 when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will 
 not act. 
 
 Two questions occur here : one is, whether the Mahratta 
 cavalry were ever better than they now are : if they were, 
 whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establish- 
 ment were to be destroyed ? I believe they were formerly better 
 than they now are. In regard to the second point, I have to 
 observe, that if there were no infantry in a Mahratta army, their 
 cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which
 
 THE PESHWAH'S GOVERNMENT A NONENTITY. 357 
 
 they were formerly so famous ; and although I am aware of 
 the greater difficulties they would now have to encounter 
 than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is 
 universal in the Deccan, and, I believe, in Hindustan, of forti- 
 fying every village (and I know that these are means of 
 opposing them successfully), I should still consider these opera- 
 tions to be more formidable to the British government, than 
 any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body 
 of infantry that they can form. On this ground, therefore, I 
 think that they should be encouraged to have infantry rather 
 than otherwise. 
 
 204. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 Political imbecility of the Peskwak. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec, 1803. 
 
 The day, I hope, is not far distant, when I shall be able to 
 resign my charge in this country, and when the Peshwah will 
 have an opportunity of settling his countries. But how is it to 
 be done ? At present, he has not in his service a common carkoon 
 or amildar whom he can trust with the management of a single 
 district ; he has not a sepoy or a peon whom he can place 
 as a guard on any tannah ; and not a soul in his government 
 capable of giving a line of information upon any one point, 
 concerning the administration of the extensive territories, the 
 government of which is in his hands. His territories are 
 all either in the hands of his enemies, or without managers 
 on his part ; and all those persons belonging to his state who 
 are capable of arranging it, and of rendering its resources avail- 
 able for the service of his government, are either in the service 
 of his enemies, or the greater part of them imprisoned or op- 
 pressed by his Highness's government : this is a most serious 
 consideration.
 
 358 HOW TO TREAT WITH THE RAJAH OF BERAR. 
 
 205. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone. 
 
 Instructions as Resident with the Rajah of Berar : as to closer 
 alliance of the Rajah with the Company ; execution of the 
 articles of the peace ; obtaining information political, military, 
 and financial ; consorting directly and constantly with the 
 ministers ; and reporting progress. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 1 24th Dec, 1803. 
 
 A principal object of your attention, on your arrival in the 
 camp of the Rajah of Berar, should be to endeavour to convince 
 him of the sincere desire of the British government to consolidate 
 the peace. You will omit no opportunity of assuring him that 
 the British government is desirous that he should continue a re- 
 spectable power in India ; and that, if he should fulfil the articles 
 of the peace, and perform the common duties of friendship, the 
 British government will never break with him. If he should 
 make any propositions, such as you have heard his vakeel make> 
 in the conferences during the negotiations, to draw more closely 
 the alliance between the two governments, you will encourage 
 him to speak plainly upon that subject. Inform him that it is 
 probable his Excellency the Governor-General will be inclined 
 to attend to his wishes, provided you are enabled to state them 
 to him distinctly ; at the same time, apprise him that all govern- 
 ments must consider their own interests in such a case, and unless 
 bound by previous engagements, it might be possible that to give 
 him assistance, in the moment of danger, might be inconsistent 
 with the interests of the British government. On this ground, 
 you will urge to the Rajah the necessity of providing, by pre- 
 vious engagements, for the support and assistance of the British 
 government, and of his stating his wishes upon this point in the 
 most distinct manner. 
 
 1 No date in the copy ; but on reference to the Wellesley Dispatches, 
 ' Marquess Wellesley to the Court of Director ?,' 21st Feb., 1804, vol. hi. 
 p. 565, it appears that Mr. Elphinstone was dispatched by Major-Gen. 
 Wellesley to reside at the durbar of the Rajah of Berar on the 24th Dec, 
 1803. — Colonel Gurwood's note.
 
 INFORMATION OF HIS AFFAIRS TO BE GAINED. 359 
 
 Another object which I recommend to your attention, is to see 
 that the articles of the peace are carried into execution. 
 
 It is not impossible but that the Rajah's amildars and sirdars 
 in the province of Berar will be unwilling to withdraw ; and that 
 the person appointed to take charge of it will complain to you of 
 their delays, and of the irregularities of their troops, and of those 
 of the Rajah upon the borders. In every such case you will 
 remonstrate, in the strongest manner, in the name of the British 
 government. You will require the Rajah to give into your hands 
 written orders addressed to the persons complained of, and mes- 
 sengers of his to carry them ; and you will apprise him of my 
 determination to retaliate, in the manner which I may think 
 most efficacious, any injury done to the territories ceded by the 
 treaty. 
 
 I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah is sin- 
 cere in his desire for peace with the British government, and 
 that he will adhere to his treaty, even if the war should con- 
 tinue with Scindiah. But his treachery is notorious, and the 
 sacrifices which he has made are very great ; and he might be 
 induced to renew the war in hopes to regain part of what he has 
 lost. For this reason it is necessary that you should do every 
 thing in your power to be accurately informed of all that passes 
 in his durbar, particularly with the emissaries of Scindiah and 
 Holkar, and the southern chiefs. 
 
 Endeavour to obtain an accurate account of the numbers and 
 description and disposition of the Rajah's armies. Observe the 
 movements of each corps, and endeavour to trace the causes of 
 them ; and if you should find the movements of the troops to 
 correspond with the intelligence you may receive of the intrigues 
 carrying on in the durbar with the emissaries of Scindiah and 
 Holkar, you must remonstrate without loss of time, and point 
 out to the Rajah the certain loss of his government, which must 
 be the consequence of a renewal of the war. 
 
 An accurate knowledge of the numbers, description, and dis- 
 position of the troops will enable you to judge not only of the 
 truth of any reports you may receive of the existence of intrigues 
 between Ragojee Bhoonslah, Scindiah, and Holkar, and of Ra- 
 gojee's intention to renew the war ; but also of the fact whether 
 he does or does not impede the Soubah's officers in the settle- 
 ment of the countries ceded by the treaty of peace. 
 
 It is very desirable also, that you should endeavour to ascer- 
 tain the extent of the Rajah's resources, the amount of his revenue,
 
 360 HOW TO ASSOCIATE WITH HIS MINISTERS. 
 
 from what source it is derived, and how collected ; and the nature 
 of his tenure of the different portions of territory still remaining 
 in his possession. It is obvious, however, that much informa- 
 tion upon these last mentioned extensive and intricate subjects 
 cannot be acquired for a great length of time ; and, indeed, it 
 does not appear to be an object of such consequence at this 
 moment, as to obtain information regarding the communications 
 with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the strength and position of 
 the troops. 
 
 In regard to the modes of acquiring this intelligence, I have 
 but little to say. You must employ those which your own ex- 
 perience and discretion will suggest ; and as I know that no 
 intelligence can be gained without expense, I beg you to incur 
 such as you may think absolutely necessary to obtain that which 
 is required. 
 
 I beg leave also to recommend to you, as much as possible, a 
 constant personal intercourse with the ministers of Ragojee 
 Bhoonslah's durbar, instead of communicating by means of any 
 Native servants. The establishment of this mode of commu- 
 nicating at an early period, if it does not immediately lay open 
 to you sources of information which would otherwise be wanted, 
 will, at least, give the government the advantage of them 
 hereafter. 
 
 It is vain to hope that any Native, in the situation of a min- 
 ister at a durbar, will ever trust another in the situation of ser- 
 vant to the British Resident ; and it is equally so to hope that 
 the British Resident will ever be able to gain any useful intel- 
 ligence from the ministers at any durbar, if his intercourse with 
 them is to be a matter of state or parade, or any thing but 
 a daily occurrence for the transaction of the daily business. 
 I therefore most earnestly recommend it to you, to establish 
 this intercourse with the durbar of Ragojee Bhoonslah without 
 loss of time, as a measure from which may be derived, imme- 
 diately, all the information which can be required ; and, at 
 all events, from which the best consequences may be expected 
 hereafter. 
 
 I request you to make me acquainted with all that occurs, and 
 you will make your reports regularly to his Excellency the 
 Governor-General.
 
 PECULIAR ARTICLES OF THE TREATY ACCOUNTED FOR. 361 
 
 206. To the Governor- General. 
 
 A peace concluded with Scindiah, likely to last, either through his 
 accepting a subsidiary alliance, or through our influence over 
 his government, by the terms of the Treaty. His cessions ; 
 and why he retains land in the Deccan. Why the British 
 Government is to provide for his sirdars ; and he is not 
 to pay extra for the subsidiary force. Arrangement as to 
 the treaties with Rajahs tributary to him. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Camp, 30th Dec, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have this 
 day concluded, with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and 
 signed, a treaty of peace ; copies of which, in the English, Persian, 
 and Mahratta languages, I have the honour to enclose. 
 
 This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in 
 the name of the British government and its Allies generally, and 
 the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain 
 with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the 
 different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied govern- 
 ments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner 
 as you may think proper. 
 
 By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all 
 the important objects detailed in your Excellency's instructions 
 of the 27th June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more 
 complete alliance with Scindiah's government ; or, supposing that 
 he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to 
 ally himself more closely with the Company's government, such 
 an influence will be established in his as will render it very im- 
 probable that its means will ever be again directed against that 
 of the Company. 
 
 By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to 
 the Hon. Company all his territories north of the countries of 
 the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A 
 schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account 
 that can be procured of the revenue of those territories. 
 
 Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are 3 
 pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and 
 Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which were 
 formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have 
 never been carried into the dufters under the head of lands in
 
 §6% WHY SCINDIAH NOT TO PAY FOR SUBSIDIARY FORCE. 
 
 Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of 
 Scindiah's house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his pos- 
 session under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from 
 the line fixed upon by your Excellency. 
 
 Besides these pergunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands 
 of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and 
 those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut 
 Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 
 7th article, are to remain in the hands of their present possessors, 
 under the protection of the British government ; and the British 
 government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its 
 option, to sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of 
 17 lacs of rupees, including the value of those jaghires to remain 
 in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article. 
 
 It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in 
 the disturbed state of Scindiah's government, under all the cir- 
 cumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great dimi- 
 nution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with 
 that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some 
 degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the 
 ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's 
 hands, and to add to his armies, all the sirdars and troops who had 
 been subsisted by the resources of those countries ; and who 
 must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah's service, 
 and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future em- 
 ployment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent 
 with your Excellency's policy ; and it appears that, besides avoid- 
 ing the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only 
 freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence 
 in Scindiah's durbar which must guide its measures in a great 
 degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely 
 with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the 
 objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree 
 to the terms of the general defensive alliance. Upon the whole, 
 therefore, I hope that your Excellency will approve of this 
 arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about 14 lacs 
 of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in 
 the schedule. 
 
 The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency's 
 attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing 
 relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the 
 treaty; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a sub-
 
 STIPULATION AS TO HIS TRIBUTARY RAJAHS. 363 
 
 sidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the 
 cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty. 
 
 In the course of this war, Scindiah's power, reputation, and 
 military resources have been greatly diminished ; while his rival, 
 Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by 
 his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished 
 power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of 
 Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater 
 than they were previous to the war ; and I have little doubt but 
 that the contest between those Chiefs will be revived. This 
 would be a matter of little consequence to the British govern- 
 ment, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, 
 and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But 
 Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every 
 point of view ; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his 
 own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar ; or 
 if he should endeavour to avoid the contest, which I do not think 
 probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent 
 upon that of his rival. 
 
 Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of 
 your Excellency's determination to support the peace, and the 
 relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in 
 the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise 
 of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to 
 hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party of the 
 general defensive alliance ; and, as a further inducement to him 
 to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should 
 be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his 
 revenue. I was induced to make this last engagement, by the 
 conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general 
 defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should 
 unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be 
 obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive ; and 
 that, if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is 
 insured so far as it can be by human means. 
 
 I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall 
 wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a dis- 
 posable clear revenue, such as the British government would 
 require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given 
 to him. 
 
 There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th
 
 364 H0W T0 ORGANIZE THE PESHWAH'S GOVERNMENT. 
 
 article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The 
 ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah's 
 government might incur under this article, and they contended 
 strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless 
 they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which 
 it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from 
 the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and 
 the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect them- 
 selves by treaty with the British government. From the different 
 accounts, however, which I have received, I observe that treaties 
 have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding 
 the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless 
 they should have connected themselves with the British govern- 
 ment, would be, that the annual contest which they have had 
 with the Mahrattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the 
 British government would derive no additional security. I there- 
 fore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of 
 every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by 
 which your Excellency's object is insured in respect to all of this 
 description ; and in regard to the others, they are left to their 
 fate. 
 
 207. To the Governor- General. 
 
 The PesJiwatis government a name only. Wretched state of his 
 territories. Old and capable officials imprisoned. They 
 should be released, and employed in settling the country. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 15th Jan., 1804. 
 
 Besides this list of his own immediate dependents, to whom 
 injuries have been done by the Peshwah, Amrut Rao gave me 
 another list of the old servants of the Mahratta state, who had 
 been imprisoned by his Highness's orders, and were at that 
 moment confined in different hill forts. Amrut Rao declared 
 that he had nothing to say about these persons, excepting that 
 they were the old official people who had conducted the business 
 for years, under Nana Furnavees ; and he recommended that, if 
 the British government were desirous of seeing the Peshwah's 
 state recover, they should procure the release of these servants. 
 I have also recommended this point to Lieut. -Col. Close's 
 attention. In fact, my Lord, the Peshwah's government is at 
 present only a name. His Highness has not settled even the
 
 A PRECAUTION AGAINST NATIVE INTRIGUES. 365 
 
 country along the Beemah, 5 miles from Poonah. It is at this 
 moment a dreary waste, overrun by thieves ; and his Highness 
 is incapable of conducting his government himself : he gives no 
 confidence or power to any body, and he has no person about 
 him able to conduct the common business of the country. 
 
 I have called Lieut.-Col. Close's attention particularly to this 
 point. Amrut Rao could certainly settle the government ; but 
 the Peshwah's aversion to him appears to be so rooted, that 
 I am afraid I shall not be able to persuade his Highness to 
 refrain from acts of open hostility ; much less to receive him as 
 a brother, and employ him in a confidential situation under the 
 government. The only mode, therefore, that appears practicable, 
 is to persuade his Highness to release these old servants of the 
 state, to have them employed in the management of the revenue ; 
 to keep Amrut Rao at a distance, and at peace with the Pesh- 
 wah ; and to increase the power and reputation of the government 
 as much as possible, by giving it possession of Poonadur, and the 
 other hill forts near Poonah. 
 
 208. To Major Shawe. 
 Why the cessions were made to the allies generally. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 16th Jan., 1804. 
 
 2. It has also occurred to me that he may not approve of the 
 cessions being made to the allies generally. The fact is, that 
 if I had begun to draw up the treaty by stating the cessions to 
 be made to each of the different powers, the vakeels would have 
 begun intriguing with the Nizam's and the Peshwah's servants 
 in camp respecting the cessions demanded for them, and I should 
 never have got through the business. I might have entered in 
 the treaty every cession as made to the British government, but 
 this would have had the same consequences. 
 
 209. To Lieutenant Frissell, Besidency at Poonah. 
 
 Universal mistrust of the Peshivah among his subjects. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 24th Jan., 1804. 
 
 It is proper that the Peshwah should be informed, that, 
 from the highest man in his state, to the lowest, there is not 
 one who will trust him, or who will have any connexion or com- 
 munication with him, excepting through the mediation, and 
 under the guarantee, of the British government.
 
 366 OUR NATIVE ALLIES MUST NOT THROW ALL ON US. 
 
 210. To Major Shawe. 
 
 (1) Undue dependence of the Nizam and the Peshwah on British 
 support ; and consequent bad effects on our reputation with 
 the natives. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I give up the notion of posting the troops upon the Godavery 
 with great reluctance ; because I want to have it understood, 
 particularly at Hyderabad, that our troops are not to be the 
 only support of the government ; that they are to oppose foreign 
 invaders and great rebels, but are not to be the support of the 
 little dirty amildary exactions. It is, besides, very disadvan- 
 tageous and unjust to the character of the British nation, to 
 make the British troops the means of carrying on all the violent 
 and unpopular acts of these Native governments, such as, for 
 instance, the resumption of the jaghires of the Mussulmann 
 chiefs in the Soubah's countries. It makes our cause unpopular, 
 which it ought not to be, and would not be ; and, in our present 
 glorious situation, it is very desirable that we should avoid this 
 unpopularity. 
 
 In respect to the Peshwah's government, I have given my 
 opinion fully to Col. Close, that till the Peshwah organises his 
 revenue departments, and the other departments of his state, 
 which he cannot do without relinquishing the whole system of 
 revenge, which is the only principle of his government at present, 
 (excepting, indeed, jealousy of my influence,) the Colonel ought 
 to give him no assistance whatever in settling his country. The 
 consequence of a departure from this recommendation will be, 
 that the troops will take mud forts, which they must garrison, 
 and the British officers must be amildars ; or the forts, after 
 having been taken, must be abandoned to their old possessors, 
 who, instead of being in the light of friends, as they have hitherto 
 been, would be our worst enemies. I could settle the Peshwah's 
 countries in a few days, if I could bring him to act rationally, 
 or if I could inspire him with confidence in me or the British 
 government.
 
 PESHWAH VERY BAD: AMRUT RAO MIGHT BE WORSE. 367 
 
 (2) The Peshwatis bad character, and jealousy of Gen. Wellcslcy. 
 Amrut Rao would be an abler administrator, but, if false to 
 us, more dangerous. 
 
 (Extract.) Same date. 
 
 From many circumstances, and particularly from a letter which 
 I have received from Mr. Frissell, a copy of which will have gone 
 to the Governor-General, containing the Peshwah's answer to 
 a request I made, that he would pardon 400 or 500 of his Pagah 
 horse, who had been serving with Baba Phurkia, I am induced 
 to believe that he is very jealous of me, and of the influence 
 which he imagines the British government maintains through my 
 means ; notwithstanding all that I have done for him, his declared 
 sense of it, and the confidence he has expressed. If this be the 
 case, we shall never be able to prevail upon him to do any thing 
 which can be beneficial, either to his own government or the 
 common cause ; and if to maintain our influence in the Mahratta 
 Empire be an object, the sooner I withdraw from the scene, and 
 the sooner his jealousy is allayed, the better. In fact, this influence 
 can be maintained only by conferring benefits on the persons 
 who are the objects of it ; it is now fed and upheld by hope, 
 but as soon as people shall find that my recommendation is the 
 road to disgrace instead of to favour, they will not follow our 
 fortunes much longer. I therefore think that as soon as I shall 
 have settled every thing that I have to do, I ought to withdraw. 
 I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah ; he has no public 
 feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive 
 proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion 
 of it ; and I know that since he signed the treaty of Bassein, he 
 has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view 
 to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the 
 common safety during the war. 
 
 It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in 
 possession of that government ? I answer, I have no remedy ; 
 I cannot take it for the British government, without a breach of 
 faith and another war. I do not know whether I should mend 
 the matter in respect to treachery, by giving him either of his 
 brothers as a dewan ; but I do know, that if I was to give the 
 government over to Amrut Rao, I should establish there a most 
 able fellow, who, if he should prove treacherous, would be a 
 worse thorn in the side of the British government than the 
 creature who is Peshwah, at present, can ever be.
 
 368 PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE PACIFICATION. 
 
 211. To Major- General Campbell. 
 
 Caution required in ascertaining the relative rights of the 
 Peshwah and the Southern Jaghiredars. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 31st Jan., 1804. 
 
 I have requested the Resident at Poonah to be very cautious 
 respecting the rights of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of the Putwurdun, 
 and Goklah, and other great jaghiredars in the southern dis- 
 tricts ; and to give you the most accurate information respect- 
 ing the particular objects to which he will be desirous to direct 
 your attention. I know the Peshwah and his ministers, and the 
 character of every Mahratta amildar, sufficiently well to be very 
 certain that they would not scruple to involve the British govern- 
 ment in another war, were it only to get possession of, and 
 plunder, one village. It is, therefore, very necessary that we 
 should proceed with all this caution. 
 
 212. To the Governor-General. 
 
 Nature^ and relation to the Treaty with the Bonslay, of previous 
 engagements with J lis dependents. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 10th Feb., 1804. 
 
 The cases of the Rajahs of Sohnpoor, Boad, and Ramghur, 
 are similar. They have received and sent messages, they have 
 sent vakeels, have received cowle, and written letters in general 
 terms, but it does not appear that they have concluded engage- 
 ments. 
 
 My idea of the conclusion of an engagement is, that the party 
 should have positively agreed, at least verbally, to certain stipu- 
 lations, under which it was to enjoy the benefit of the protection 
 of the Company. It does not appear that any of these Rajahs 
 have entered into any such agreements ; although I am well 
 convinced that, having witnessed the effects of the Company's 
 power, and having reason to expect benefit from the protection 
 of the British government, they will now readily enter into all the 
 stipulations required. But that is not consistent with the letter 
 of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, much less with my promise 
 to the Rajah's ministers ; that this article should not be made 
 to extend farther than was necessary to preserve the good faith 
 of the British government, or with your Excellency's policy.
 
 WE SHALL RESPECT ACTUAL TREATIES ONLY. 369 
 
 It is certain, that when the party has not agreed to required 
 stipulations, as the price of the protection offered to it, it is not 
 necessary, for the preservation of good faith, to extend to it the 
 British protection. 
 
 I have been very particular in stating to your Excellency all 
 that occurs to me upon this subject, because it appears that the 
 Commissioners in Cuttack are not aware, or not sensible, of the 
 circumstances under which that article of the treaty was concluded, 
 and which must be a guide in its application. They have a 
 natural desire to extend it to as many cases as possible ; because 
 they feel that, in proportion as they can extend its benefits, they 
 increase the chance of the peace, the happiness, and the pros- 
 perity of the people whose country is committed to their man- 
 agement. But these, although important objects, are not to be 
 compared to the importance of preserving the national faith. 
 
 213. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone. 
 
 Only bona fide engagements, antecedent to the peace, to be 
 maintained. 
 (Extract.) Camp, nth Feb., 1804. 
 
 In respect to the lists of the feudatories with whom treaties 
 have been made, you may assure the Rajah that the delay in 
 giving him those lists arises from my desire to include in them 
 no person with whom an engagement had not been bond fide 
 made, before the accounts were received of the conclusion of the 
 peace ; and a wish to break as many of those engagements as 
 possible, consistently with the necessary attention to the preser- 
 vation of the faith of the British government. The Governor- 
 General has the same wish. 
 
 214. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 The national faith endangered by the overstrained interpretation 
 of loose engagements with zemindars, and the violation of the 
 spirit of our treaties with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, nth Feb., 1804. 
 
 I have had a great deal of trouble with the Cuttack gentle- 
 men. They construe general letters from zemindars about 
 ' master's favour,' and professions of obedience to orders, into 
 treaties ; and I think that the moderation of the Governor- 
 
 Bb
 
 370 WE MUST NOT DO EVIL, THAT GOOD MAY COME. 
 
 General, which in any other man would pass current for am- 
 bition, induces him rather to adopt the principles of the Com- 
 missioners in Cuttack, and to increase as much as possible the 
 limits of the province, and the number of people to enjoy the 
 benefits of the ioth article of the treaty of peace. I have, how- 
 ever, written to him 2 public letters upon the subject, in which 
 I have pointed out that the objects of the Commissioners, in 
 claiming to enlarge their province as much as possible, however 
 praiseworthy, are not very consistent with national good faith, 
 of which they, very naturally, have entirely lost sight. 
 
 It is really ridiculous to read the dispatches on this subject : 
 whole provinces must be considered to be included in Cuttack, 
 under the 2nd article of the treaty. The ioth article must be 
 construed to apply to many zemindars, who have only asked for 
 ' master's favour,' and taken cowle and safeguards, and the poor 
 national faith goes to the devil. In fact, my dear Malcolm, I see 
 very clearly that I have made 2 very good treaties of peace, 
 but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of 
 their stipulations ; and there is no person about the Governor- 
 General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and 
 to resist the importunities of the local authorities to force on the 
 treaties a construction which will tend to the increase of their 
 own petty power and authority. 
 
 215. To Lieutenant Prissell. 
 
 Detailed evidence of the Peslnvah's falseness to the alliance, inex- 
 plicable on the assumption of mere weakness and folly. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 17th Feb., 1804. 
 
 The Peshwah's conduct appears extraordinary only to us, who, 
 since he signed the treaty of Bassein, have trusted to his pro- 
 fessions, notwithstanding a variety of facts of which we have 
 a knowledge. The first of these was his telling me plainly, that 
 he could not say whether or not he wished Scindiah to come to 
 Poonah with his army, when I was pressing him to dispatch a 
 letter to that Chief with orders not to advance, which letter he 
 had promised to write. 
 
 The next fact was his contrivance to correspond with Scin- 
 diah's durbar, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty with the 
 Company, to the very day that I ordered the dawk to be drawn 
 off the road.
 
 REPEATED EVIDENCE OF THE PESHWAH S TREACHERY. 37 1 
 
 The 3rd fact was his breach of the treaty in not sending his 
 quota of troops to join the army. 
 
 The 4th fact, that he notoriously communicated with the 
 enemy, by means of Ballojee Pundit at Poonah, during the 
 existence of the war. 
 
 The 5th fact, that he never gave any demonstration of public 
 satisfaction upon the occasion of the successes in the war, in 
 which he was supposed to be the Company's ally. 
 
 The 6th fact, that since the signature of the treaty of Bassein, 
 to this hour, he has never adopted any one measure recom- 
 mended to him by the British government, either for his own 
 benefit, or for the general benefit of the alliance. On the con- 
 trary, he has always resisted those measures, only because they 
 were recommended by the British authorities, although he 
 acknowledged their benefit. 
 
 The 7th fact, that he has kept at his durbar, only for the pur- 
 poses of mischief, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, notwithstanding our 
 repeated remonstrances, and his own proposal, that he should 
 seize his person. By the by, while writing regarding this person, 
 I may mention, that a buckshee and a body of horse, belonging 
 to this same man, were opposed to me in the action of the 5th ; 
 whom I dare say that I shall have the pleasure of meeting, 
 shortly, at the Peshwah's durbar, as he and his horse, after having 
 plundered the Nizam's country, and having been employed to 
 cut off the supplies going to the British army, have gone direct 
 to Poonah. 
 
 The 8th fact, that the Peshwah wrote a letter to Scindiah, at 
 the time of the negotiation with Col. Collins, to desire Scindiah 
 to concede nothing, as he did not find the English as yet suffi- 
 ciently disposed to punish the rebels. Major Malcolm has a copy 
 of this letter, of which Amrut Rao has the original, which original 
 I shall bring with me to Poonah. Under this head I may men- 
 tion, that Amrut Rao has in his possession letters from Scindiah 
 to the Peshwah, intercepted, as this letter was, upon the road, 
 in which Scindiah gives the Peshwah accounts of his negotiations 
 with Col. Collins, which, by the description of them, I judge to 
 be far more detailed than those which the British government 
 received from Col. Collins. I have also to mention, under this 
 head, that Goorparah, in the course of many confidential con- 
 versations which I have had with him, told me repeatedly, that 
 Scindiah, in his negotiation with Col. Collins, never took a step 
 without consulting the Peshwah, and that his Highness ought, in 
 
 B b 3
 
 372 / WRONGLY THOUGHT HIM ONLY WEAK AND SILLY. 
 
 fact, to have been considered a party to the war on the side of 
 the confederates. 
 
 The 9th fact, which crowns the whole, that he has communi- 
 cated with Frenchmen, and has endeavoured to conceal his 
 communications from the agents of the British government, and 
 to screen the Frenchmen from their search. 
 
 I acknowledge that I always have been induced to view his 
 Highness's conduct as the effect of weakness and folly ; and I 
 believed him to be sincere in his alliance with the Company; but 
 while I encouraged this belief I shut my eyes against the facts of 
 which I had a knowledge, and which I have above detailed ; and 
 against his Highness's notorious treachery, which was the theme 
 of all the public dispatches, previous to his signing the treaty of 
 Bassein ; and I considered nothing but what I wished to be true, 
 and what I knew to be the Peshwah's interests. This last act, 
 however, has rendered it necessary that we should turn our minds 
 seriously to the consideration of the measures to be adopted for 
 the safety of the British government in this critical moment. 
 
 216. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close. 
 
 The Peshwatis plan for remunerating Goklah : — inexpedient for 
 
 Goklah ; unjust to the Putwurduns ; impolitic and dangerous 
 
 for us to co-operate in. Our traditional friendship with the 
 
 family ; and its services to us and the Peshzvah. His real 
 
 object is revenge for old grievances. 
 
 Camp, 23rd Feb., 1804. 
 
 Bappojee Goneish Goklah called upon me yesterday afternoon, 
 and, after some previous conversation, informed me that he had 
 applied to the Peshwah's government to make a permanent pro- 
 vision for the pay and support of his troops ; and that his agent 
 at Poonah had been told by the Peshwah's ministers that the 
 lands held by the family of Pursheram Bhow should be made 
 over to Goklah for this purpose. Goklah said he was desirous 
 to have my opinion upon this subject before he should send his 
 answer to his agent at Poonah. I pointed out to Goklah that 
 it was very improbable that the chiefs of the house of Pursheram 
 Bhow would resign their possessions without a contest ; that they 
 were masters of some strong places, and it was probable that 
 the contest would not be a short one ; but that, whether it was 
 long or short, the result of it would be, that the country which 
 was to be fought for would be ruined. That, in the mean time,
 
 GEN. WELLESLEY DISCOURAGES GOKLAH'S HOPE. 373 
 
 it did not appear that any funds had been provided to pay 
 Goklah's troops, who, I supposed it was intended, should fight 
 this battle ; and that certainly a ruined and exhausted country 
 would be but an inadequate reward to them if they should be 
 successful. I then said that it appeared to me that it would be 
 better for Goklah to endeavour to get possession of some coun- 
 tries for the support of his troops, for which he would not have 
 to fight with the most powerful family in the southern part of 
 the Mahratta empire. 
 
 Goklah said that he felt the force and truth of every thing I 
 had urged to him ; and that he saw clearly he was not equal to 
 a contest with the family of Pursheram Bhow, unless the Eng- 
 lish should assist him ; and that, in fact, he was not desirous of 
 having the possessions of those chiefs, or of seeing them ruined. 
 In answer, I said that it was not necessary that I should tell him 
 whether, in the attempt to gain those possessions, he would or 
 would not be assisted by the British government ; that to afford 
 that assistance would not diminish the inconveniences which he 
 would feel, in the mean time, for the want of pay for his troops, 
 or those he would feel for the same want after he should have 
 obtained full possession of a ruined and exhausted country. 
 
 Goklah said, that, of course, without the assistance of the 
 British government in money, he should feel those inconveniences. 
 In answer, I told him, that if the British government are to incur 
 all the expense, as well as their troops to perform the service of 
 this expedition against the family of Pursheram Bhow, it would 
 be desirable to ascertain clearly the necessity of destroying this 
 family before the measure should be undertaken ; and that, of 
 course, the British government would act in this instance with its 
 usual caution and wisdom. I desired him to understand clearly, 
 that I had given no opinion on the subject whether assistance 
 would be afforded or not, as that was a question which must be 
 referred to the Governor-General ; but I mentioned these circum- 
 stances to him as a friend, to point out the difficulties and delays 
 in the way of carrying this plan into execution ; and as a ground 
 for recommending that he should endeavour to obtain the grant 
 of other lands, either not already granted, or in the possession of 
 a family not so powerful as that of Pursheram Bhow. He said 
 that he should follow my advice in every thing. 
 
 I have thought it proper to communicate to you this conver- 
 sation much in detail, and I shall proceed to give you my opinion 
 upon the subject in general ; as the plan of the Peshwah, disclosed
 
 374 WE OUGHT TO DISCOUNTENANCE THE PESHWAH' S PLAN. 
 
 in this conversation, is one of the utmost importance in every 
 point of view, and will probably cause another war, if it is to be 
 carried into execution. 
 
 Goklah says most truly, that it is impossible to carry it into 
 execution without the assistance of the British government, both 
 in money and troops ; and it stands to reason, that the British 
 government must exercise its discretion regarding the propriety 
 of attempting it. To attempt it, unless these chiefs should be 
 guilty of some act of infidelity towards the Peshwah's govern- 
 ment, would be a breach of an engagement I made to those 
 chiefs in a letter which I wrote to them during the war. But 
 I think that reasons exist for which it should be discounte- 
 nanced entirely, and that the British government should not 
 assist in it. 
 
 The family of Pursheram Bhow are the most ancient friends 
 that the British government have in the Mahratta Empire. Pur- 
 sheram Bhow had under his command a body of British troops 
 during the former war against Tippoo. His sons and relations, 
 the present chiefs of that family, served in the same army, and 
 there gained a knowledge and respect for the valour and disci- 
 pline of a British army, which was the first cause of their joining 
 me in the campaign of 1800 against Dhoondiah Waugh. The 
 friendship then established, and the friendly terms on which I 
 was with those chiefs in the beginning of last year, enabled me 
 to bring them forward to Poonah to re-establish the Peshwah on 
 his musnud, although, with or without reason, these chiefs did 
 not wish well to his Highness's cause. This service ought never 
 to be forgotten by the Peshwah, and probably never will be for- 
 gotten by the British government, as it is a well known fact, that 
 if the chiefs of the Putwurdun family had done so little in the 
 cause of his Highness, or rather had done so much against that 
 cause at that moment, as others now enjoying his Highness's 
 favour, the success of the march to Poonah would have been a 
 matter of doubt, and if they had opposed the advance, it must 
 have been relinquished under the orders of his Excellency the 
 Governor-General. Afterwards, they did not come forward in 
 support of the cause of the allies in the war. But when I con- 
 sider the circumstances under which that war was commenced, 
 the nature of the Mahratta character, the fact, that for a Mahratta 
 to suppose the allies would be successful, was to relinquish every 
 idea of national pride, and to lose the recollection of their former 
 triumphs, I am not astonished that these chiefs should have kept
 
 THE PUTWURDUNS HAVE STRONG CLAIMS ON US AND HIM. 375 
 
 aloof. But some of the Mahrattas cordially supported the cause 
 of the allies in the war. That cause was supported by two Mah- 
 ratta chiefs of inferior rank and interest. The troops of both 
 were paid by the British government during the war ; and that 
 of the Peshwah did not give the assistance even of the grain and 
 cattle which it might have supplied. Neither of them was con- 
 sidered by the Peshwah as his servant when I marched to Poonah ; 
 neither was ordered by the Peshwah to accompany me : and both 
 came because they had known me before, and saw a prospect of 
 advantage. 
 
 The chiefs of the Putwurdun family were, at least, neutral in 
 the contest ; which neutrality, however, was a most important 
 object for the Company's possessions. I cannot say this for some 
 of the persons now in favour at the Peshwah's durbar. Under 
 the engagement that I have made, that they shall not be attacked 
 so long as they are the faithful servants of the Peshwah, it will 
 certainly be necessary that the Peshwah should produce some 
 proof of their want of fidelity to his government, before he can 
 receive the assistance of the British government in the execution 
 of this plan of destruction. It is probable, in the present state of 
 the Mahratta empire, that either the refusal of these chiefs to 
 resign their lands, or to come to Poonah without the guarantee 
 of the British government for their personal safety, will be deemed 
 acts of infidelity. But admitting them to be so, and that the 
 British government is at liberty, consistently with an adherence 
 to good faith, to act against these chiefs, I still doubt the expe- 
 diency of giving British assistance to work their destruction. The 
 Putwurdun family, connected, as I have above mentioned, as they 
 are with the British government, are certainly the most respect- 
 able of all the Peshwah's subjects properly so called. They are 
 the support of the system of order which exists on the Company's 
 frontier, and on the frontiers of Mysore ; and they are a check to 
 the nest of freebooters kept by the Rajah of Kolapoor, and to 
 the numerous polygars who inhabit the countries watered by the 
 Kistna, Malpoorba, and Gutpurba. 
 
 If the Peshwah had the power, or had manifested an inclination 
 to establish his government on a respectable footing, or on any 
 footing, I should doubt the propriety of allowing him to root out 
 this family of friends to the British government from their im- 
 portant position, in respect to the frontiers of Mysore and the 
 Company's territories. But when I see that the Peshwah does 
 nothing to settle his government ; that the only system of govern-
 
 376 TO EXECUTE THE PLAN, DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS. 
 
 ment is that of a robber, I cannot think it expedient to allow this 
 family to be destroyed. In a discussion upon this subject, the 
 motive for their destruction may be considered. It is revenge 
 for the acts of Pursheram Bhow, during the political disputes at 
 Poonah. If it was because these chiefs did not support the cause 
 of the allies in the war, why are not others punished as well as 
 the chiefs of the Putwurdun family? Why do some escape who 
 have actually been opposed to the British troops, and others who 
 did not assist in restoring the Peshwah to his government ? 
 
 In respect to the plan itself, it will be one of great unpo- 
 pularity, and of some difficulty in the execution. It is well 
 known throughout the Mahratta Empire, that those chiefs are 
 the ancient friends of the British government, and that they are 
 detested by the Peshwah, for former acts which have nothing to 
 do with the politics of the present day. The other chiefs of the 
 Empire will, I fear, have but little reliance upon the friendship of 
 the British government, to protect them against the effects of the 
 known feeling in the Peshwah's character, if we should be the 
 instruments of his revenge in this instance ; and each will expect, 
 in his turn, to become the victim of the same passion. This feel- 
 ing may operate to induce them to make the defence of the 
 possessions of the Putwurdun family a common cause ; and, in 
 that case, the attack of those possessions becomes a military 
 operation of some magnitude and extent. 
 
 At all events, whether all the chiefs do or do not make the 
 defence of those possessions a common cause, it is my opinion 
 that it would not be prudent to send any part of the subsidiary 
 force at present to the southern countries to attack them. The 
 attack, therefore, must be made by troops brought from the fron- 
 tiers of Mysore and the ceded countries : and here arises a new 
 question of expense ; another affecting the safety of the frontiers 
 of Mysore, and the Company's territories, while these troops are 
 to be employed in this manner ; and a third, regarding the pre- 
 ference of this operation to others in the Company's territories, 
 on parts of which it is absolutely necessary to take some effectual 
 measures to establish the authority of government. Upon the 
 whole, I think I may conclude that the Governor-General will 
 not attend to the Peshwah's wishes upon this subject, and I have 
 to request that, if his Highness should propose this plan to your 
 consideration, you will not encourage it till you have taken the 
 orders of his Excellency.
 
 MONEY THE ONLY STRONG ARGUMENT WITH PESHWAH. 377 
 
 217. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Difficulties with the Peshwah in arranging the terms of peace. 
 His consent must be bought. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 7 th March, 1804. 
 
 Take my word for it, that the Peshwah will come into no 
 arrangement for the partition of the conquered countries ; and 
 that he will commence his intrigues immediately with Scindiah's 
 durbar, respecting Jansi, Calpee, &c, which the Governor-General 
 may have taken for the convenience of our frontier. He will 
 grant sunnuds for them to Scindiah or Ambajee Inglia, or he 
 will intrigue in any other manner to distress the British govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In order to bring the proposed partition treaty and the cession 
 of Jansi and Calpee to a favourable conclusion, there is but one 
 remedy, and that is to bribe the Peshwah with money ; to supply 
 him with small sums occasionally, till he shall finally have come 
 into all the Governor-General's views, for the final settlement of 
 the peace, and for the frontier of Bengal. 
 
 Nothing but this will answer. The Peshwah is callous to 
 every thing but money and revenge. He will call upon the 
 British government to gratify the latter passion ; but he will 
 make no sacrifices unless to procure money. I must see Col. 
 Close before I give my opinion about his sincerity. I think it 
 will be difficult to account for his having the Frenchmen con- 
 cealed in Poonah for a month, and having never communicated 
 one word to the British Resident respecting their arrival. 
 
 218. To the Governor- General. 
 
 The Peshivatis complaints of tJie neglect of his interests at the 
 
 peace. His vindictiveness, and sJinffling apology for inaction. 
 
 General Welleslefs answer and advice. General remarks on 
 
 his cJiaracter, views, and conduct. The settlement of the 
 
 South Mahratta country, a burning question. Alternatives 
 
 open to us. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Camp at Chowke, 7th March, 1804. 
 Shortly after my arrival at Poonah. the Peshwah's minister, 
 Suddasheo Munkaiseer, appointed a day to meet and converse 
 with me on the Peshwah's affairs, previous to a meeting for the
 
 378 the peshwah'' s rights not ignored at the peace. 
 
 same purpose which, he said, his Highness was desirous of having 
 with me. 
 
 There were present at the meeting, which took place on the 
 ist March, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, Anund Rao, and Byajee 
 Naig. Suddasheo Munkaiseer first alluded to the fact, that peace 
 had been made with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of 
 Berar ; and he said, that his Highness the Peshwah had not 
 been consulted on the terms of the peace, and that his orders 
 had not been taken on many points in which his interest was 
 concerned. 
 
 In answer, I told Suddasheo Munkaiseer, that the fact of the 
 vakeels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar being in my camp, 
 and treating for peace, was notorious ; and that as his Highness 
 the Peshwah had troops and a vakeel there on his part, he must 
 have been apprised of it at a very early period after their arrival : 
 that Scindiah's vakeels were there nearly two months, and the 
 Rajah of Berar's nearly one month, before their negotiations 
 were concluded by treaties of peace ; and that there certainly 
 had been many opportunities for his Highness to intimate to me 
 his wishes regarding his objects with those Chiefs respectively. 
 He had omitted, however, to attend to his interest upon this 
 occasion, and the treaties of peace had been concluded. But I 
 observed, that though they had been thus concluded, and I had 
 not had the benefit of being made acquainted with his Highness's 
 wishes, I hoped, when your Excellency should give orders that 
 the treaties might be communicated to his Highness, that his 
 Highness would find that his interests had not been neglected by 
 me. Suddasheo Munkaiseer then adverted to the conclusion of 
 the foreign war ; but said there still remained the punishment of 
 rebels. I begged him to name them ; and he said, ' Amrut Rao 
 and the freebooters who had been plundering on the frontiers,' 
 and who had lately been defeated and dispersed by the British 
 troops. He went much at large into the subject of the Peshwah's 
 complaints against Amrut Rao ; and declared that even his name 
 was so odious to his Highness, that if it were only mentioned in 
 his presence, it would be necessary for his Highness to perform 
 his ablutions. 
 
 In answer to this speech, I related the progress of the British 
 government and their armies, from the date of the signature of 
 the treaty of Bassein, to the moment of the breaking out of the 
 war with the confederated Mahratta chiefs. I pointed out to 
 Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had derived all the benefit of his
 
 HIS FAITHLESSNESS TO THE ALLIANCE EXPOSED. 379 
 
 treaty with the Company, and that he had been restored to the 
 exercise of the powers of his government ; but that when he was 
 called upon to perform his part of the treaty, and to produce his 
 army, his treasure to pay his troops, his provisions and equip- 
 ments in the common cause in which the allies were subsequently 
 engaged, he was deficient in every respect. I said that I did not 
 mean to inquire into the causes of that deficiency. It existed at 
 the moment of difficulty, and for what cause the inquiry was not 
 then material ; but that as I was charged with the defence of his 
 Highness's territories and person, it was necessary that I should 
 take every step to preclude the possibility that his Highness 
 should suffer from this deficiency. 
 
 On this ground, as soon as the war broke out, it had appeared 
 important to me to secure, by a treaty of peace, one great branch 
 of the confederated chiefs, and I had made a treaty with Amrut 
 Rao, of which I, and of course his Highness, had received all 
 the advantage during the war ; and I further observed that his 
 Highness had been distinctly apprised that this measure would 
 be adopted if he should omit to furnish his quota of troops, &c, 
 for the war. 
 
 In respect to the freebooters upon the frontier, I observed, that 
 I had beaten and dispersed them. It was true that I had not 
 seized their persons ; but I informed Suddasheo Munkaiseer that 
 the principal of all those persons, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, had resided 
 at the Peshwah's durbar, where he had received marks of his 
 Highness's favour ; that I had reason to believe that his brother, 
 Viswaz Rao Ghautky, had fled to Wahy, after his action with 
 me on the 5th Feb., and that he had been received into his High- 
 ness's presence ; and that certainly I thought if one freebooter 
 deserved punishment, it was he who had been the principal, but 
 who had received marks of his Highness's favour. 
 
 In answer, Byajee Naig denied that Sirjee Rao Ghautky had 
 received the marks of his Highness's favour which I supposed he 
 had. He said that Sirjee Rao had been allowed to depart, 
 because it was not the custom of the durbar to seize the 
 persons of those who had been allowed, or who had been 
 encouraged, to come to Poonah to pay their respects to the 
 Peshwah. 
 
 Munkaiseer observed, that the reason for which the Peshwah 
 had omitted to perform his treaty was, that the Putwurdun and 
 other principal jaghiredars of the Empire had refused to serve, 
 and had disobeyed his Highness's orders. He said that Goklah
 
 380 HIS VENGEFUL PLANS PERILOUS AND IMPRACTICABLE. 
 
 and Appah Dessaye had served ; and it was his Highness's wish 
 to reward them with the lands held by the chiefs of the family of 
 Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia ; and he 
 asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, 
 and of punishing those who did not, was not fair? 
 
 I told Munkaiseer, that it was not possible for me .to give any 
 answer to a question asked in such a manner. I said that I con- 
 sidered the plan which he had then proposed to my consideration. 
 viz. to destroy all the great families of the state, as one of the 
 greatest importance, and likely to be attended with much diffi- 
 culty in the execution, in the present state of the Mahratta 
 Empire. I observed to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had not 
 even settled the country about Poonah ; and that after having 
 come out of a foreign war of great extent, he was about to com- 
 mence a domestic one. 
 
 I then asked Munkaiseer what resources of money and troops 
 his Highness had to carry on this war, and in what manner he 
 proposed to proceed ? In answer, he gave me to understand, that 
 his Highness expected the assistance of the British government ; 
 and he gave me the choice of two plans, either to begin with the 
 family of Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee ; 
 and to deceive, in the mean time, that party whose destruction 
 might be delayed. 
 
 I told Munkaiseer that his plan was impracticable : that those 
 chiefs were not to be deceived by the Peshwah ; that the whole 
 would join for their common defence ; that, in that case, the 
 operations against them would become of importance ; that they 
 could not, at all events, be undertaken without your Excellency's 
 orders ; and that while they were carrying on, the foreign enemy 
 might come in again, and his Highness and his territories would 
 be involved in fresh difficulties and troubles. 
 
 I observed to Munkaiseer that, in my opinion, it would be 
 much better for his Highness, after 7 years of difficulty and 
 civil wars, in the course of which, nearly every man in the 
 Empire had at some time or other been opposed to his govern- 
 ment and armies, to endeavour, by pardon and conciliation, to 
 settle his government and country, than to enter on any system 
 of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and so dangerous and 
 so imprudent. 
 
 Although I believe that your Excellency will have had before 
 you an account of the conference I had with the Peshwah's min-
 
 INCONSTANCY, AND GREED OF MONEY AND TERRITORY. 38 1 
 
 isters on the 1st inst, I have been particular in relating it to you, 
 as it alludes to points of great importance, and lays open, in a 
 great degree, the views of the Peshwah's durbar. The principal 
 object there is to procure money, not for the service of the state, 
 nor even to gain the power of inflicting punishment on the objects 
 of the Peshwah's hatred, but to bear the expense of the pleasures 
 of the Court. To incur expense, or to adopt any solid mode of 
 settling the country, is entirely out of the question. To incur 
 expense for troops is equally out of the thoughts of the Peshwah 
 and his ministers ; and although to gratify his revenge is a great 
 object of his government, and he really believes his personal 
 honour involved in it, he leaves that to the British government 
 and to the exertion of the British troops. 
 
 The question with Amrut Rao is completely settled ; and 
 Amrut Rao has proposed to go and reside at Benares, as soon 
 as the next rains shall be over. But it is strange, that notwith- 
 standing the Peshwah was professing such an invincible aversion 
 to Amrut Rao, one so forcibly described by Munkaiseer, his 
 Highness had opened a negotiation with him since my arrival at 
 Poonah. Amrut Rao's vakeel has attributed this negotiation to 
 the desire of the Peshwah to make for himself better terms than 
 he supposed I should propose to him, and to keep in confinement 
 some of Amrut Rao's servants. My opinion is, that it has been 
 entered into in order to avoid the necessity of attending, on any 
 subject, to the advice of an officer employed by the British 
 government. I encouraged this negotiation as much as possible ; 
 for nothing can settle so long as the Peshwah and his brother 
 are at variance. 
 
 Your Excellency will have observed the commencement of 
 Munkaiseer's discourse respecting the Peshwah's wishes in the 
 peace. In the course of the conversations which I had with his 
 Highness and his ministers, all expressed his Highness's hopes 
 that he should rise, and his state increase in proportion with that 
 of the Company, accompanied by strong expressions of confidence 
 in your Excellency's justice. 
 
 It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, that while I was 
 at Poonah, I received intelligence from more than one quarter, 
 that the Peshwah had determined to ask me, whether you did not 
 propose to give up to him all the territory which his servant 
 Scindiah had ceded by the late treaty of peace. I mention these 
 circumstances only because they tend to elucidate the foreign 
 policy of this Prince. In respect to his domestic policy, his chief
 
 382 WE MUST PREVENT HIS STIRRING UP A NEW WAR. 
 
 object is to destroy all the great families in what can be called 
 his Empire ; and he proposes to use his alliance with the British 
 government in effecting this object. 
 
 Besides this, his Highness encourages the Rajah of Kolapoor, 
 a foreign prince, to invade and destroy his own territories, in the 
 possession of the family of Pursheram Bhow. The Peshwah's 
 ministers scarcely deny this fact, and the chiefs of Pursheram 
 Bhovv's family allege it as the reason for not serving when 
 called for. 
 
 There is no doubt whatever that the Peshwah's government 
 cannot exist on its present footing. Unless the British govern- 
 ment interfere in some manner respecting the southern jaghire- 
 dars, there will be a contest in the southern part of the Empire, 
 which will, in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's 
 territories. They will be obliged to interfere in the end, probably 
 with less effect than they can at present, and in the mean time 
 all the benefit of the services of the southern chiefs and their 
 troops is entirely lost. 
 
 In my opinion, the first step to be taken is to give a check to 
 the Rajah of Kolapoor. His country is the resort of all the 
 freebooters driven from other places, and he is ready to place 
 himself at the head of every disturbance. He has received into 
 his territories the freebooters lately opposed to me on the Nizam's 
 frontiers ; on which subject I propose to write to him, and it will 
 remain with your Excellency to determine what shall be done 
 with him hereafter. 
 
 In respect to the southern jaghiredars, the following lines of 
 conduct may be pursued : 
 
 To concur with the Peshwah in destroying them ; to leave 
 them and the Peshwah to their fate ; and to allow both parties 
 to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without in- 
 terfering at all. To interfere in a certain degree to ascertain the 
 extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the 
 southern jaghiredars ; to oblige them to afford it ; and, on the 
 other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's 
 government ; and to guarantee to them their possessions as long 
 as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity. To 
 make them at once independent states, under the protection, 
 arbitration, and guarantee of the British government.
 
 SCINDIAH MAY BE INCLINED TO RENEW THE WAR. 383 
 
 219. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 Precariousness of the peace with Scindiah. Its permanence prob- 
 ably dependent on a liberal interpretation of the gth Article 
 of the Treaty. Summum jus lie will hold to be summa in- 
 juria. Difficulties and danger which would attend the re- 
 newal of warfare, and its bad effect at home. We ought to 
 make every sacrifice for peace compatible with honour and 
 safety. Though I was ill informed on GoJiud, our argument 
 seems technically good, that Scindiah ought not to have it. 
 But should we risk peace for it, or for Gwalior f Is not 
 a compromise feasible ? I do not fear war, and its success 
 might be personally gratifying to me ; but, on public grounds, 
 I strongly prefer peace. 
 
 Bombay, 15th March, 1804. 
 
 I send you some very interesting despatches just received from 
 Malcolm ; among others, one containing the copy of the Treaty 
 of Defensive Alliance agreed to by Scindiah. This completes 
 everything you wished for in this part of India. 
 
 It is proper, however, that I should inform you that my 
 opinion is that the duration of the peace with Scindiah depends 
 upon the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article. We must 
 not depend at all upon the annihilation of his army and re- 
 sources, or too much upon the influence we have established in 
 his durbar. In respect to his army, the men and horses remain ; 
 and the extreme distress to which the men are reduced renders 
 it more necessary to employ them in hostility against the Com- 
 pany's government. 
 
 It may appear extraordinary, but it is certainly true, that an 
 army in the state in which Scindiah 's army is described to be 
 by Malcolm is more dangerous in the present state of the Com- 
 pany's power than one well paid, and in a better state of disci- 
 pline, and under better command. In fact, the existence of the 
 individuals, and of their horses (their only property), depends 
 upon their being led into some rich provinces ; and they will 
 join any chief who will profess an intention to lead them to 
 plunder. I have many proofs that pay is not an object to 
 Mahratta horsemen compared with plunder ; and, notwith- 
 standing the wretchedness of Scindiah's resources at present, I 
 have no doubt but that if he were desirous to renew the war he 
 would not want the means of carrying his wishes into execution.
 
 384 OUR INFLUENCE WITH HIS CHIEFS MAY NOT AVERT THIS. 
 
 The influence established in Scindiah's durbar gives us a 
 better hold of him than the state of his army. But even this 
 must not be too much depended upon. The peace must intro- 
 duce new modes of acting and of thinking upon every subject. 
 The view from it must be tranquillity, and the hope of personal 
 or national aggrandizement must be laid aside. But much time 
 must elapse before the minds of any description of men can be 
 brought cordially to adopt such a change in their situation, and 
 to relinquish all the prospects to which they have looked forward 
 for years. We must not expect, therefore, that the chiefs of 
 Scindiah's durbar will entirely discourage the proposition to 
 renew hostilities with the Company ; founded upon the notion, 
 whether true or false, that Scindiah has not been treated with 
 the generosity which he expected in the arrangements consequent 
 to the 9th Article of the treaty of peace. 
 
 We must take care not to come to any conclusion respecting 
 the sentiments of the chiefs of Scindiah's durbar from what we 
 have seen of the sentiments of the persons composing the dur- 
 bars of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah. In fact, 
 there are no persons in the durbars of either of those princes 
 who were ever of any consequence, or had any power previously 
 to our connection with those durbars respectively (the Minister 
 at Hyderabad, I believe, excepted) ; all the persons of the de- 
 scription of Gopal Bhow, and others who appear to be at the 
 head of affairs in Scindiah's durbar, are either living in obscurity, 
 or are intriguing to render themselves independent, or are gone 
 over to the enemy. 
 
 I believe Scindiah to be disposed to preserve the peace with 
 the Company, and to have a strong feeling of resentment against 
 Holkar, and to know that he cannot support his power against 
 that chief unless by the assistance of the Company's government. 
 I believe him to have been much gratified by the manner in 
 which the treaty of peace was negotiated ; by which, after he 
 had been humbled to the dust, his pride wounded, and his power 
 destroyed, he was raised to a degree of power greater than that 
 possessed by any other prince in India, notwithstanding the im- 
 mense acquisitions which we have made ; and the prospect of the 
 generosity of the Company was afforded to him. 
 
 But if by the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of 
 the treaty he is to be deprived of a large portion of territory, 
 which he imagined he should hold ; if the arrangement is to be 
 one consistent with justice, not generosity, and with good faith
 
 HIS WOUNDED PRIDE MAY OVERRULE SELF-INTEREST. 385 
 
 as defined by the laws of civilized nations, and not as it is un- 
 derstood by these barbarians, these favourable feelings and 
 dispositions of Scindiah's mind must be effaced by one which 
 operates most strongly upon every native, viz. wounded pride, 
 and the fear and shame of hearing and bearing the insults of 
 his own followers for having sacrificed his power to the British 
 government. 
 
 We must not depend on Scindiah's sense of his interests, 
 although we may have found him and his ministers to know 
 • them well. None of the native princes are guided by a sense 
 of their permanent interest, even as they understand it them- 
 selves, but in every instance by their passions, of which the 
 strongest is pride. 
 
 Under these circumstances the arrangement under the 9th 
 Article of the treaty of peace is a matter of great delicacy ; 
 and the peace of India in a great measure depends upon its being 
 made in conformity with the negotiations for the treaty. 
 
 I have no fear whatever for the result of a recommencement 
 of the war, although possibly we might not enjoy all the advan- 
 tages in carrying it on which we had even in the last war. I 
 feel confident that we must be successful upon every occasion in 
 which we may employ the troops, and that the result of the war 
 must be honourable to us. But we should have to encounter 
 many difficulties, particularly in this quarter. The countries in 
 which we should act, or through which we should have to pass, 
 are entirely exhausted by having been the seat of the operations 
 of the late war, and by having been plundered for years ; and 
 a scarcity of rain in the last season, combined with these causes, 
 has produced a famine, of which the army must feel the con- 
 sequences. 
 
 Supposing that we should penetrate to Hindostan, matters are 
 there in a worse situation than they are in the Deccan, and we 
 should experience greater difficulties. 
 
 I have frequently apprised you of circumstances respecting 
 the Peshwah, which, if they do not prove insincerity, at least 
 show how difficult it would be to bring his government through 
 another war immediately ; and in respect to the southern chiefs 
 I have to observe that it is not possible to suppose but that they 
 are aware of the Peshwah's designs against them, and that they 
 would take the opportunity of the renewal of hostilities to force 
 us to adopt their plans for their own independence. 
 
 We are mistaken if we suppose that the Soubah of the Deccan 
 
 C c
 
 386 GREAT SCALE, AND BAD EFFECTS, OF A NEW WAR. 
 
 will be satisfied with the portion of the conquests allotted to 
 him, or that he will enter cordially into a new war, the cause of 
 which will be the failure of an arrangement in which he will have 
 no concern. 
 
 The Rajah of Berar will not remain at peace. He com- 
 plains loudly of the conduct of the Soubah's servants in Berar, 
 and he would renew hostilities if he should see a favourable 
 opportunity. 
 
 Under these circumstances we should be obliged to make the 
 most formidable arrangements both for offensive and defensive 
 operations that have ever yet been made by the British govern- 
 ment, far exceeding the scale of those made for the last war, 
 because every point must be defended, and our operations must 
 be most actively offensive. 
 
 In relation to the state of affairs at home, I consider the 
 renewal of the war to be the greatest misfortune that could 
 occur. In the eyes of those who are to judge of your conduct, 
 it would efface the glory of the last war and of your whole 
 administration. Believe me that neither the Court of Directors 
 nor the King's Ministers are capable of taking an enlarged view 
 of the present state of affairs in India. Everything has been 
 so much altered within these last five years that I doubt very 
 much whether there is any man in England who understands 
 our present situation. I am certain Lord Castlereagh does not, 
 and. as a proof of it, I enclose the copy of a letter which I have 
 got from Mr. Duncan in confidence. 
 
 Since I have learned the real state of the case regarding the 
 support that you are to expect in future from the Ministers, and 
 particularly since I have perused the letter of which the enclosed 
 is a copy, I have rejoiced at the peace as the most fortunate 
 event that could have occurred, and equal at least to any that 
 has occurred during your administration, both for the public 
 interest and your reputation. But what a falling off will it be 
 if the consequence of the peace should be a renewal of the war 
 under circumstances of greater difficulty than have hitherto 
 occurred ! You possibly may not feel this part of the subject 
 so strongly as I do ; but I acknowledge that I cannot separate 
 the notion of your great character with the public from the 
 public interests in India. 
 
 If all this be true, I think there is no doubt but that any sacri- 
 fice ought to be made to preserve the peace, and that everything 
 ought to be done to keep Scindiah's durbar in the temper in
 
 PROPOSED COMPROMISE TO AVOID RENEWED WAR. 387 
 
 which it was left when the peace was signed, which is not abso- 
 lutely inconsistent with the public faith or the public safety. 
 
 In the negotiations of the treaty of peace I was certainly not 
 sufficiently informed respecting the real state of Gohud. I under- 
 stood that the Ranah of Gohud existed as a state in the same 
 manner as the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor ; and Scindiah's 
 ministers encouraged that misunderstanding in order to deceive 
 me. It appears that the Ranah of Gohud has not existed as a 
 state for years ; that the territory of Gohud has been in the pos- 
 session of Scindiah ; and that your object was to restore the state 
 of the Jauts, not to preserve a state that existed already. I think 
 there is no doubt but that the argument is on our side ; and 
 that, both from the breach of the treaty and the understanding of 
 the persons who made it, Scindiah ought to have nothing to do 
 with Gohud. But he thinks he ought ; and his ministers have 
 flattered him with the possession of this country and Gwalior, 
 under the hope that I had been deceived, and that the words of 
 the treaty would give him both ; and in my opinion the whole 
 question of the peace of India turns upon this point. 
 
 I am fully aware of the benefit to be derived from having 
 forts, but I don't think that the possession of this or any other 
 fort is worth the risk of the renewal of the war. Gwalior would 
 be of use to us for offensive operations with Mahva, and perhaps 
 it is absolutely necessary if we keep possession of Gohud. But 
 it is of no use for general defensive purposes ; and I know of no 
 fort and no line of frontier excepting a navigable river that is of 
 any use against the Mahratta armies for mere defensive purposes. 
 But Gwalior may be of use to secure the navigation of the Jumna, 
 an object which is of the utmost importance, although it is too 
 distant, in my opinion, to affect that navigation in any great 
 degree, unless it has a very large garrison. 
 
 An arrangement might be made with Scindiah which would 
 secure the navigation of the Jumna, leaving in his hands the fort 
 of Gwalior. Under the circumstance of his having agreed to the 
 treaty of defensive alliance, this measure cannot be deemed a 
 dangerous one. 
 
 I would recommend that Scindiah should be informed that 
 under the treaty of peace he had forfeited all claim to the ter- 
 ritory of Gohud and to the fort of Gwalior ; that the object in 
 wishing to retain those territories and the fort w r as to secure the 
 navigation of the Jumna ; but that provided he would come into 
 arrangements with a view to that object, and would appoint a 
 
 C c 2
 
 388 IT IS THE PATRIOT, NOT THE GENERAL, WHO ADVISES. 
 
 person to be killadar who should be agreeable to the British 
 government, and in consideration of the intimate alliance lately 
 established between the two states, the British government would 
 restore to him Gwalior and the territory of Gohud, excepting 
 those parts of it which would be necessary to form a sufficient 
 state for the Ranah. If territory should not be wanted for this 
 purpose, it would be better to give him back the whole. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary that I should make any excuse for 
 giving you my opinion upon this subject ; I should be unpar- 
 donable if I omitted it. It agrees with that of Malcolm, and I 
 think it probable that you will adopt it when you will have before 
 you the real state of the case. If you should not, I will enter 
 upon the new state of things with all the zeal and ardour that is 
 possible ; and I have no doubt whatever of success. But how- 
 ever I may be pleased with the prospect of that success as far as 
 I am concerned, I should prefer the continuance of peace for the 
 public and for you. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 220. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Discussion of our right to retain Gwalior ; and conclusion in the 
 negative. To do so would also be inexpedient, as tending to 
 impair our character for good faith, the ground of so much of 
 our late success. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 17th March, 1804. 
 
 There is one part of the question into which I have not entered 
 in that letter very fully, that is, our right to Gwalior. This stands 
 upon two grounds : 1st, our right under the 9th article of the 
 treaty of peace, a treaty having been made with the Ranah of 
 Gohud ; 2ndly, our right, under the same article, a treaty having 
 been made with Ambajee Inglia. I think your argument with 
 Kavel Nyn is unanswerable, respecting the first ground. The 
 treaty of peace mentions the Ranah of Gohud and his territory 
 frequently ; these are the Company's boundary, &c. &c. ; and if 
 they do not exist, one of the parties who made that treaty was 
 guilty of a fraud, of which he has no right to the benefit. But, 
 supposing that the Ranah of Gohud is to have territory, the 
 question is, whether Gwalior is included in that territory ? I 
 have not got a translation of the treaty with that chief; but 
 I am informed that it does not notice Gwalior. The Governor-
 
 MORALLY, IF NOT LEGALLY, GWALIOR IS SCINDIAH'S. 389 
 
 General claims that on the other ground, the treaty with Ambajee ; 
 therefore the ground on which I, who made the treaty of peace, 
 considered that we should get possession of the fort of Gvva- 
 lior, entirely fails. 
 
 The fact is, that we now feel the consequences of my ignorance 
 of the real state of affairs in Hindustan. Till I received the 
 Governor-General's great dispatch regarding the peace, I thought 
 that the state of the Ranah of Gohud existed ; but that dispatch 
 for the first time informed me, that it was a state to be restored, 
 and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to 
 provide. There was the error ; and the same error will be found 
 in his own treaty. 
 
 In respect to the second ground of our claim to Gwalior, viz. 
 the treaty with Ambajee, on which alone the Governor-General 
 rests, it fails us in two instances: 1st, Ambajee held the fort as 
 a servant of Scindiah. The fort was Scindiah 's. and Ambajee 
 his amildar. The clause in the 9th article of the treaty will 
 therefore deprive us of it. 2ndly, Ambajee has broken his treaty, 
 and we have determined that he shall not enjoy any of the ad- 
 vantages for which he had stipulated. The Governor-General 
 will, I know, bring forward an ingenious argument, on which he 
 will claim the fort ; but I am afraid that it will be too ingenious, 
 and too much abstracted from all the circumstances of the case, 
 to elicit the other parts of the proceeding. 
 
 The question, in my opinion, stands thus. Is it consistent 
 with good faith to insist that the stipulations in our favour shall 
 hold good, not against Ambajee, but against Scindiah, when the 
 ground of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, that upon which 
 we claim the independence of the Rajahs, was the necessity of 
 preserving the Company's faith ? Where is the necessity of pre- 
 serving the Company's faith with Ambajee, who has broken his 
 treaty ? 
 
 I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we 
 canadhere to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although 
 I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the power- 
 ful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, in- 
 terest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor-General's 
 theme. But at the expense of what other party are those mea- 
 sures adopted ? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, 
 but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both. 
 The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken 
 is in the same state as one never made ; and, when that principle
 
 390 SCRUPULOUS GOOD FAITH, OUR BEST SECURITY. 
 
 is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom 
 the possessions belonged before the treaty was made, and by 
 whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by 
 any other instrument, ought to have them. 
 
 In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in 
 the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier 
 of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scru- 
 pulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by 
 the late war and the peace ; and we must not fritter them away 
 in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of 
 nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought 
 me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for 
 peace ? The British good faith, and nothing else. 
 
 221. To the Governor-General. 
 
 British mediation essential for settling the South Mahratta 
 country. Comparative recommendations of the alternatives 
 previously 1 proposed for that purpose. The third course 
 preferred. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 21st March, 1804. 
 
 The first point which it is desirable to obtain is, the Peshwah's 
 formal consent that the British government should interfere be- 
 tween his Highness and the southern jaghiredars. If this should 
 not be effected, the settlement will be imperfect ; intrigues will 
 be carried on by the Peshwah and his ministers, to derange the 
 settlement made ; and other sirdars of the Empire, possibly some 
 who have rendered services, and to whom the British government 
 may wish well, will be urged to excite disturbances in the coun- 
 tries allotted for the payment of the troops employed by the jag- 
 hiredars. By obtaining his Highness's consent to the arrange- 
 ment, persons of that description, or others, possibly really in 
 rebellion, and not employed by him, will be deprived of the use 
 of his Highness's name, which is the common instrument used by 
 every freebooter in the Empire, who takes up arms against his 
 Highness's authority, or that of the persons acting under the 
 authority of his government. 
 
 After that is done, the best mode of settling the questions be- 
 tween the Peshwah and the jaghiredars is that alluded to in the 
 third instance, in my address to your Excellency of the 7th 
 
 1 See p. 383, ad fin. — Ed,
 
 HOW TO SETTLE THE SOUTH MAHRATTA COUNTRY. 39 1 
 
 inst., viz. ' to interfere in a certain degree ; to ascertain the 
 extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the 
 southern jaghiredars ; to oblige them to afford it, and, on the 
 other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's 
 government, and to guarantee to them their possessions, so long 
 as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity.' 
 
 The modes proposed in the first and second instances, in my 
 address of the 7th inst., viz. 'to concur with the Peshwah in 
 destroying the southern jaghiredars,' or ' to leave them and 
 the Peshwah to their fate, and allow both parties to settle their 
 disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all,' 
 will infallibly occasion a contest, which will, in its consequences, 
 affect the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company and of 
 the Rajah of Mysore. 
 
 If the first mode be adopted, and the settlement of the country, 
 after it shall have been taken from the jaghiredars, is to rest with 
 the Peshwah's government, it will not be so advantageous to the 
 British government as that which exists at present ; and if the 
 second mode be adopted, the contest will be long, the issue un- 
 certain, the resources of the country will be destroyed, the com- 
 munications between Mysore and the troops at Poonah inter- 
 rupted, vast bodies of freebooters will be collected in the southern 
 provinces of this empire, and the British government will at last 
 be obliged to interfere, to provide for its own security and the 
 peace of the territories of the Hon. Company, and of the Rajah 
 of Mysore. 
 
 The mode proposed in the fourth instance, viz. 'to make the 
 jaghiredars at once independent states, under the protection, 
 arbitration, and guarantee of the British government,' is one 
 which would possibly provide more effectually for the security of 
 the Hon. Company, and their allies and dependents, than any 
 other that could be devised. But it must be founded upon the 
 fact, that the Peshwah has broken his treaty with the Hon. Com- 
 pany, in instances in which it was in his power to perform it ; 
 and upon a knowledge of the personal characters and dispo- 
 sitions, and military resources of all the southern jaghiredars, 
 which I am afraid we do not entirely possess. 
 
 The mode in which I have recommended to settle this ques- 
 tion arises out of the treaty of Bassein, and the present state of 
 his Highness's government and power. The measure is pressed 
 upon the British government by considerations relative to the 
 safety and peace of the Company's territories, as well as the
 
 392 LETTER, AS WELL AS SPIRIT, OF TREATY IGNORED. 
 
 advantage of the Peshwah, the increase of his power, and of 
 the means of his government to assist the British government in 
 any future war ; and it will be a preparatory step to the inde- 
 pendence of the jaghiredars under the Company's protection, if 
 circumstances should ever render that event necessary or de- 
 sirable. I have little doubt but that the southern jaghiredars, 
 particularly the family of Pursheram Bhow, will readily come 
 into this arrangement ; and, in my opinion, if affairs should settle 
 to the northward, the best period to complete it would be during 
 the rainy season. 
 
 222. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Further illustration of the injustice of sustaining the Treaties 
 with the Rajah of Berar's feudatories ; and danger of 
 renewed war. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 30th March, 1804. 
 
 I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing 
 the Governor-General to alter his intentions ; as, by a letter 
 which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone, it appears 
 that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made 
 with the feudatories of the Rajah of Berar ; some of which were 
 signed at Cuttack, not less than 10 days after the intelligence 
 of the treaty of peace. 
 
 I have to observe also upon those treaties, that they have 
 1 een negotiated and concluded, not with the real Rajahs or 
 feudatories, but with their rannees or ministers. The real 
 Rajahs are, and have always been, in confinement at Nagpoor. 
 The Governor-General has, however, offered compensation to the 
 Rajah of Berar for the loss he will sustain by the transfer of 
 these Rajahs from his authority. But this will not satisfy him, 
 as I know that his object was to establish his own authority in 
 those countries. 
 
 My dear Malcolm, w eshall have another war, and the worst 
 of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is 
 not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after 
 the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is 
 nothing ; the previous verbiage is thought sufficient to bind us, 
 as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and 
 bound the parties ; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, 
 we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our 
 operations till he had ratified his treaty. I declare that I am
 
 A NICE CASE FOR A POLITICAL CASUIST. 393 
 
 dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure ; 
 however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final ; 
 but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it. 
 
 223. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Dilemma as to giving up Asseerghur, resulting from the 
 Gwalior question. 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 18th April, 1804. 
 
 I have given the Governor- General my opinion, in very strong 
 terms, upon the consequence which I apprehend from his push- 
 ing one of his favourite projects, and I have told him that he 
 must expect a war with Scindiah. If this war occurs, it must be 
 carried on with disadvantage, if we have not Asseerghur ; and 
 will not the Governor-General have some reason to complain 
 of me, if, foreseeing that war, I should urge you to give up 
 Asseerghur on an occasion in which you and Gen. Lake enter- 
 tain doubts ? In fact, to adopt this measure is tantamount to an 
 anticipation of his final opinion on the subject of Gwalior. 
 
 I am aware that to retain Asseerghur is a breach of treaty, and 
 that it is a measure which will much annoy Scindiah's govern- 
 ment. But this is as much the affair of the Commander-in- 
 Chief and yourself as it is mine ; and where you doubt, I can 
 have no confidence, and cannot venture to act. 
 
 These are my deliberate sentiments upon the subject. I see 
 clearly that Asseerghur ought to be given up, but I cannot venture 
 to give an opinion upon it. 
 
 Confound these red boxes and the gentlemen in Bengal ! The 
 delays they occasion will send us to the devil. 
 
 224. To Lieutenant- Colonel Close. 
 
 Imbecility, unpopularity, and unreasonable demands of the 
 PesJnvah. Will the Governor-General continue to support 
 him ? 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 12th May, 1804. 
 
 It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported by a single 
 Mahratta sirdar or horseman, that he does not enjoy any revenue, 
 and that he has no means whatever of supporting his own 
 authority. The records at Poonah will show that he lately 
 applied to me to take measures to catch thieves who had taken 
 refuge in the jungles ; and it now appears that, in order to 
 enable the Peshwah to carry on his government at all, the
 
 394 THE PESHWAH THROWS AWAY HIS TRUMP CARDS. 
 
 country must be conquered again by the British troops. I do 
 not mean to urge the difficulty of this operation, but I allude 
 to these circumstances, in order to show the possibility that 
 the Governor-General might determine to adopt a mode of 
 settling the question with the jaghiredars which would not 
 occasion a necessity of employing the British troops to the 
 southward at the present crisis. 
 
 In respect to the list of talooks, of which the Peshwah requires 
 that the British troops should put his amildars in possession, it 
 contains the names of all the strong forts, excepting Darwar; 
 and of districts belonging to every chief, particularly a large tract 
 belonging to Madhoo Rao Rastia. 
 
 In respect to Goklah, he naturally refuses to give up the 
 districts which are to support his troops, till other means of 
 support shall have been assigned to him, upon which subject 
 the Peshwah will not, or has not, satisfied him. At the same 
 time, Goklah was the only chief on whom his Highness could 
 rely, and his the only body of troops whose services he could 
 command, either to support the ordinary operations of his 
 government, to overawe the southern jaghiredars, or to perform 
 his treaty with the Company. This sirdar, and these troops, 
 have slipped through his hands. Goklah has crossed the Kistna, 
 and is gone to the southward ; and his Highness now calls 
 upon the British government, not only to support him against 
 his foreign enemies, and to guard his person, but to perform 
 these services without the assistance which he is bound to afford, 
 to support the ordinary operations of his government, to under- 
 take an extensive service against certain of his subjects, whose 
 allegiance, by common management, might have been secured, 
 and, at last, to punish and destroy the chief who has served for 
 years with the British troops, whose conduct has always been 
 satisfactory, and whom I left at Poonah % months ago in a 
 disposition to undertake any service for the Peshwah's govern- 
 ment, provided he should be treated with common justice. 
 
 All these facts are so strong, they prove so much incapacity in 
 the Peshwah's government, and point out so clearly the aversion to 
 it of all the principal chiefs, and show the probable grounds of 
 that aversion, that I think it much to be doubted whether his 
 Excellency the Governor-General will choose to give his support 
 to his Highness's authority.
 
 DECCAN FAMINE. HOLKAR WAR SHOULD BE SHORT. 395 
 
 225. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 Prospect of war with Holkar, which onglit to be very short. 
 Famine in the Deccau ; its causes. Difference with the 
 Governor-General on Gwalior and treaties with Berar tribu- 
 tarics. Danger of renezved war with the ex-Confederates. 
 The Governor-General ' sincere in his notions,' but over 
 ingenious, and lacks capable and independe?it advisers. Con- 
 sensus of opinion against our right to retain Givalior. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 13th May, 1804. 
 
 I have been detained here ever since I wrote to you by 
 Houghton, by the want of the Governor-General's answers upon 
 a variety of points which I had referred to him at different 
 times, and by the chance which I saw that the result of General 
 Lake's discussions with Holkar would be the necessity of 
 attacking that chief. Accordingly I have within these few 
 days received the Governor-General's order to attack the pos- 
 sessions of Holkar in the Deccan, while General Lake will 
 attack him in Hindostan ; and I propose to join the army which 
 is now encamped between this place and Poonah in the course 
 of very few days. 
 
 There is at present a famine in the Deccan, which, in my 
 opinion, will destroy half of the inhabitants. It is occasioned 
 in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies for the last 
 ten years, particularly by those of Holkar in the year 1802 ; 
 in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies in the war, 
 and in part by the want of rain in the last season, and by the 
 want of arrangement and energy in the government of the 
 Peshwah. But whatever may be its cause, I fear that it will 
 prevent me from commencing my operations till a late period 
 in the rainy season, when I may expect that the new grass and 
 new crops of grain will afford some forage. In the mean time 
 it is my opinion that if General Lake attacks Holkar with 
 vigour, and pursues him with activity and perseverance, and 
 above all, if Scindiah should co-operate heartily in the war, it 
 will not last a fortnight. Holkar's power is like that of the band 
 of freebooters whom I destroyed in the month of February last : 
 it cannot stand a defeat of his army ; and the pursuit after the 
 defeat will make it crumble away to nothing. 
 
 Scindiah's government, although it has concluded the defen-
 
 396 DANGER OF RENEWED WAR WITH CONFEDERATES. 
 
 sive alliance, is not satisfied with us ; and the misfortune is 
 that, between ourselves, I think we are in the wrong. The 
 difference relates to the fort of Gwalior, which Scindiah thinks 
 ought to belong to him, and the Governor-General will not 
 give it up. I differ in opinion with the Governor-General both 
 as to the right and policy of keeping this fort : I have delivered 
 my opinion to him regarding the latter, but have said nothing 
 upon the former, as the question turns upon a nice point of the 
 law of nations, which the Governor-General has argued with 
 his usual ingenuity ; but I acknowledge I differ from him 
 entirely. 
 
 I could not make you understand this subject without writing 
 a volume, and you will probably see the papers upon it very 
 shortly after you will receive this letter. All I can say is, that 
 I am convinced, and so is Malcolm, that we should have 
 renewed the war upon this point if the Governor-General had 
 not determined to give Scindiah the whole of the Holkar pos- 
 sessions ; and this concession will probably reconcile Scindiah's 
 mind to the disappointment respecting Gwalior. 
 
 If Scindiah should not be satisfied, and should take advantage 
 of the state of our affairs with Holkar to attack us again, the 
 Rajah of Berar, who is equally dissatisfied, will likewise enter 
 into the war. He also is not satisfied with the manner in 
 which the treaty of peace has been carried into execution. 
 The Nizam's government have pressed upon him most power- 
 fully, and I think that the Governor-General has not treated 
 him with liberality. I promised that the tenth article of the 
 treaty of peace should not be applied in any instance in which it 
 was not necessary for the preservation of the Company's faith ; 
 and I reported this promise to the Governor-General in the 
 letter which accompanied the treaty, and in the minute of the 
 conferences in the negotiation. The Rajah has been called upon 
 to confirm, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace, verbal 
 offers (I may call them) which were scarcely accepted, and on 
 which treaties were not concluded till ten days after Colonel 
 Harcourt had received from Calcutta the intelligence of the 
 peace, and nearly twenty days after he had received private 
 intelligence of it from me. After all, the treaties were not con- 
 cluded with the real feudatories, who were in confinement at 
 Nagpoor, but with their ministers in some instances, and their 
 wives in others. The Governor-General makes an ingenious 
 argument to show that a verbal agreement is equally binding
 
 THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL SINCERE, BUT ILL-ADVISED. $97 
 
 with a treaty, which verbal agreement, by the bye, was never 
 made ; but supposing it had been made, let it be recollected that 
 after I had signed a treaty of peace with an authorized vakeel 
 of the Rajah of Berar, I refused to stop the operations : on the 
 contrary, I continued my march towards Nagpoor till the treaty 
 was ratified by this very Rajah of Berar, who is now told that 
 verbal agreements must be considered as binding upon the 
 British government. 
 
 From all this statement you will observe that the system of 
 moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or 
 wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so 
 highly approved and extolled, is now given up. Our enemies 
 are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and 
 want of faith ; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no 
 means secure. 
 
 However, the Governor- General is sincere in his notions 
 upon these subjects. He considers his decisions to be strictly 
 correct, and he has offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar, 
 and, as I have above told you, has adopted measures which will 
 possibly conciliate Scindiah. But still we are all shaking 
 again : the public interests may again be exposed to the risk 
 of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion 
 of ingenuity. 
 
 In fact, my dear Henry, we want at Calcutta some person 
 who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. . Since you 
 and Malcolm have left him, there is nobody about him with 
 capacity to understand these subjects, who has nerves to discuss 
 them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is wrong. 
 There cannot be a stronger proof of this want than the fact 
 that Malcolm and I, and General Lake, and Mercer, and Webbe, 
 were of opinion that we had lost Gwalior with the treaty of 
 peace. 
 
 I wish you to consider all that I have written to you upon 
 this subject as entirely between ourselves. I mention it to you 
 only that you may know the real state of the case if the war 
 should be renewed : however, I now think it possible that it 
 will not.
 
 39 ^ CARRY OUT THE TREATY: THEN REMONSTRATE. 
 
 226. Translation of a Mahratta letter from Major- General 
 the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 
 9th Suffun, answering to the 20th May, 1804. 
 
 Advice to Scindiah on the Gohnd and Gwalior question. First 
 perform the Treaty ; then remonstrate, in reliance on your 
 close ally, the British Government. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 My language to your ministers upon this subject has been 
 uniformly the same. I said, whenever they spoke to me, that 
 the possession of Gohud and Gwalior must depend upon the 
 treaties which had been made with Gen. Lake ; and I think I 
 have shown you in this letter, that the treaties which affect the 
 possession of Gohud and Gwalior ought to be confirmed under 
 the 9th article of the treaty of peace. 
 
 Under these circumstances, you cannot suppose that the 
 Company can or will relinquish their just demand that you 
 should confirm the treaties which affect Gohud and Gwalior, as 
 well as the other treaties : you are bound to confirm them by 
 the 9th article of the treaty of peace ; and, without being guilty 
 of a breach of faith towards the Ranah of Gohud, the Company 
 cannot avoid insisting upon your performing your engagement. 
 I most anxiously recommend you to perform it. 
 
 This transaction may be attended with greater loss to your 
 government than you were aware of at the time you engaged to 
 perform it ; and it may have reduced your power to a degree 
 much lower than I contemplated when I negotiated the peace, 
 or than the Governor-General ever intended. If you should feel 
 the pressure of your difficulties, state them to the Resident at 
 your durbar, and he will report them to the Governor-General ; 
 and rely upon it that the British Government will not fail to 
 adopt every measure, which is consistent with justice and pro- 
 priety, to relieve the difficulties of a state with which its interest 
 is so closely connected. But it is necessary, in the first instance, 
 to perform the treaty of peace.
 
 WE CANNOT HOLD INDIA BY PAPER BANDS. 399 
 
 227. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Report of discussion with Scindiatis envoys on Gwalior, &e. 
 Paramount necessity of conciliating the natives, and consult- 
 ing their interests. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804. 
 
 I have received a letter from Scindiah upon the subject of 
 Gohud and Gwalior, to which I have written an answer, which 
 I have given to Goorparah. I enclose the English draft and a 
 copy of the answer. From what Goorparah said, I think that 
 this letter will settle the question. In the argument yesterday, 
 which followed the perusal of the letter, they gave up Gohud 
 and Gwalior, and continued to dispute on the ground of other 
 districts which Ambajee had ceded, and which we had made 
 over to the Ranah. I told them that I could not go into details, 
 as I had no information ; that the decision upon every such 
 district depended upon two points : 1st, was it to the southward 
 of the territories of the Ranah ; 2nd, had it been Scindiah's, 
 or Serinjaumy ? In summing up the result of the discussions 
 I observed to them that they had given up Gohud and Gwalior, 
 and directed their arguments entirely to the possession of other 
 districts ; to which they answered in the usual style, that they 
 had done so because it was my pleasure. But the fact is, that 
 they had nothing to answer. 
 
 I pressed them to discontinue their angry discussions, to advise 
 Scindiah from me to bring this question to a close by confirming 
 the treaties, and afterwards to enter into a confidential commu- 
 nication with you on the state of his affairs in general. The 
 Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta ; we 
 must conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his 
 business ; and all his treaties, without conciliation and an en- 
 deavour to convince the Native powers that we have views besides 
 our own interests, are so much waste paper. 
 
 228. To Colonel Close. 
 
 Hurry Purshcram seeks reconciliation with the Peshwah, through 
 the influence of the British Government. Gen. Wellesleys 
 advice to him, and to the Resident at Poonah, on the general 
 question of the Southern Chiefs. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804. 
 
 I have the honour to inform you that Hurry Pursheram,
 
 400 GEN. WELLESLEV'S ADVICE TO THE PUTWURDVN. 
 
 commonly called Baba Saheb Putwurdun, one of the family of 
 Pursheram Bhow, paid me a visit yesterday, in my camp at 
 Rajahpoor, which I returned this morning on my road through 
 Tasgaum. He took the opportunity of this visit to talk to 
 me in private. He said that he was entirely at the mercy 
 of the British government, and it must rest with them either 
 to destroy him, or to allow him to retain his possessions. I 
 desired him to explain himself; he then said he heard 
 that the Peshwah was offended at his conduct, and that he 
 was at the mercy of the British government. That all he 
 was desirous of was to serve the Peshwah's government, as in 
 former times ; and that all he hoped for was the favour of 
 his Highness and the British government, in proportion to his 
 zeal and fidelity. 
 
 In answer, I told Baba Saheb that it was perfectly true that 
 the Peshwah was offended with him, and that his Highness 
 certainly had reason to complain of his conduct ; however, it was 
 possible that his Highness might be induced to forgive and 
 forget what had passed ; but that it must be in the confidence 
 that he should have no cause to complain in. future ; and that that 
 confidence must be founded on acts, — not professions of service. 
 I therefore urged him earnestly, if he had any regard for his own 
 honour and situation, to endeavour to reconcile himself to the 
 Peshwah, and to serve him hereafter with zeal and fidelity. I 
 pointed out to him the state of the Peshwah's government at the 
 present moment ; I observed that it was stronger in his Highness's 
 own opinion, and in reality, than that of any Peshwah had ever 
 been ; and I hinted to him, that it was not to be supposed that 
 the British government, which had done so much for the Peshwah, 
 would cease its endeavours in his support, till his power and 
 authority should be completely established and acknowledged in 
 all parts of his territories. I observed that the Peshwah was 
 not, in fact, so bent upon revenge as people supposed ; that I 
 had found him to be an indulgent master, when he had reason to 
 believe that his servants were in earnest in their profession of 
 repentance and future good conduct ; and that he might depend 
 upon it that there was nothing that the British government 
 wished so much, as to see his Highness surrounded by his sirdars, 
 and his government supported by its natural strength, and the 
 chief men of the Empire in the enjoyment of their rights and 
 possessions. In answer, Baba Saheb said that he wished and 
 intended to serve the Peshwah according to ancient custom ; and
 
 PLAN FOR SETTLING SOUTH MAHRATTA COUNTRY. 4OI 
 
 I told him that I should consider what he had then said and so 
 frequently repeated, as binding upon him in any future discussion 
 which might take place upon this subject. I observed that I had 
 no instructions to discuss the subject at this time, and did not 
 know what the ancient custom was ; but that it appeared that 
 the intention expressed by Baba Saheb was fair, and would be 
 satisfactory. 
 
 The circumstances that I have above detailed, which passed 
 at the meeting with Baba Saheb, appear to hold out a favourable 
 opportunity of settling the Peshwah's affairs with the Putwurdun 
 family, and eventually with all the southern chiefs ; and I pro- 
 ceed to give you my opinion regarding the mode in which that 
 settlement ought to be effected. In respect to Baba Saheb, it 
 is my opinion that, if he should open himself to you upon the 
 subject, you ought to urge the durbar to accept his offers of 
 service ; and if he should require that the British government 
 shall guarantee the security of his person while he shall be at 
 Poonah on the service of the Peshwah, and his possessions while 
 he shall serve his Highness with fidelity, it is entirely consistent 
 with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor-General to 
 give that guarantee. As the arrangement which there is a 
 prospect of making with Baba Saheb will be made in concert 
 and communication with the Peshwah, and as his Highness is 
 well aware that the British government will not permit him to 
 break engagements into which he may enter with his subjects or 
 servants, through their mediation, it is probable that he will have 
 no objection to this guarantee, and it is desirable that it should 
 be given with his knowledge and consent. If the arrangement 
 should be made with Baba Saheb, as I hope it will, it is probable 
 that offers to the same purport will be made by the other 
 southern chiefs ; and I anxiously recommend that you should 
 encourage them all, and urge the durbar to accept them ; and 
 that you should give the sirdars the Company's guarantee for the 
 security of their persons and their possessions, on the ground of 
 their faithful services to the Peshwah's state. 
 
 229. To E. Straehey, Esq. 
 
 The British Government to arbitrate the differences between the 
 Peshwah and tlie Southern Chiefs. Nature of their relation 
 
 D d
 
 402 NATURES OF TENURES IN SOUTH MAHARASHTRA. 
 
 to the Peshwah. Appall Saheb to be first dealt with. Articles 
 of agreement to be proposed to him. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp at Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804. 
 
 1. I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from 
 his Excellency the Governor-General, from which you will 
 observe that it is his Excellency's desire that the British govern- 
 ment should interpose its arbitration for the purpose of settling 
 the differences between the Peshwah and the southern jaghiredars; 
 and that I should appoint a person to conduct the inquiries and 
 negotiation connected with the proposed settlement. 
 
 2. I have fixed upon you for the performance of this service, 
 and I proceed to give you my instructions. 
 
 3. The persons who are the objects of the Governor- General's 
 orders are not properly jaghiredars. They are the serinjaumy sir- 
 dars of the Poonah state ; and it is peculiarly the case with serin- 
 jaumy lands, that the possession of them may be changed annually. 
 The chiefs in question, however, have held their lands of this 
 description for many years ; and they have other possessions 
 under the Poonah state, some in jaghire, others in enaum, and 
 others held only as comavisdars or amildars of the government. 
 
 4. Serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of troops 
 employed in the service of the state, and it stands to reason that 
 the condition of the tenure of serinjaumy lands is, that the holder 
 should render service to the state ; but the chiefs in question 
 have long been in the habit of rendering no service to the 
 Peshwah, under various pretences ; the principal of which is, that 
 the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked them, and has plundered 
 their possessions ; and that their troops are employed in the 
 defence of the territories from the revenues of which they are to 
 be supported. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 8. In my opinion, the best mode of arranging these affairs is, 
 to commence settling with Appah Saheb, who is commonly 
 supposed to be the head of the Putwurdun family. I have ac- 
 cordingly written to that chief, to inform him that I was desirous 
 of communicating with him on business of importance, and had 
 requested you to go to him ; and I have desired him to write to 
 you at Deogherry, on the Werdah, and to fix the time and place 
 at which you will meet him. 
 
 9. I have the honour to enclose with this a letter of introduc- 
 tion for Appah Saheb.
 
 TERMS TO BE PROPOSED TO APPAH SAHEB. 403 
 
 13. If you should find that Appah Saheb is disposed to serve 
 the Peshwah, you v/ill lay open the following propositions, as the 
 articles of an agreement for settling all differences between the 
 Peshwah and his family, and for defining their respective claims 
 and benefits hereafter. 
 
 i. There shall be a mutual oblivion and pardon of all injuries 
 on both sides. The British government will guarantee the 
 security of the persons of Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, 
 and adherents, so long as they shall serve the Peshwah with 
 fidelity, and refrain from intriguing or holding any communica- 
 tion with his Highness's enemies. 
 
 ii. Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, shall 
 hold the lands of which they have possession by virtue of sunnuds, 
 or legal grants from the state, whether as serinjaumy, or enaum, 
 or in jaghire ; and the British government will guarantee to 
 them the possession of all those lands as long as they shall serve 
 the Peshwah zealously and faithfully, and shall hold no com- 
 munication with his Highness's enemies. In order to ascertain 
 the lands, the possession of which the British government are to 
 guarantee to Appah Saheb, and his brothers, relations, &c, a list 
 of them is to be given in by Appah Saheb, which list is to be 
 referred to his Highness the Peshwah, who will make such objec- 
 tions as he may think proper to Appah Saheb's retaining any 
 particular portion of those described in the list. Appah Saheb is 
 to reply to the Peshwah's objections to his list : and the British 
 government is to decide between the parties. In the mean time, 
 till the decision shall be made, Appah Saheb is to remain in 
 possession of the lands. 
 
 iii. The condition on which the Hon. Company will guarantee 
 to Appah Saheb, &c, the possession of their lands is, that they 
 shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully. In considera- 
 tion of the injuries which the country has received from long 
 wars, and having been frequently plundered, and lately a famine, 
 Appah Saheb, &c, shall not be required to produce, at any time, 
 more than two-thirds of the forces; for the support of which 
 they will retain the serinjaumy lands. But that reduced number 
 must be produced whenever it may be called for, otherwise the 
 guarantee in the 2nd article shall be null and void. Also one- 
 third of the number of the forces Appah Saheb, &c, are bound 
 to supply, are always to be at Poonah, under the command of 
 one of the members of the Putwurdun family. The person who 
 shall command this force shall be under the guarantee of the 
 
 D d 3
 
 404 FREAKISHNESS OF SCTNDIAlfs DEFECTION TO HOLKAR. 
 
 Company, in respect to the security of his person. The number 
 of troops which Appah Saheb will have to furnish, according to 
 this arrangement, shall be ascertained and decided by the British 
 government, in the same manner as the quantity of lands which 
 Appah Saheb, &c, are to hold till the decision shall be made. 
 Appah Saheb, &c, are to supply for the Peshwah's service that 
 body of troops which they will allege they ought to furnish 
 according to the present arrangement. 
 
 iv. Appah Saheb, &c, are to restore to the Peshwah's govern- 
 ment all lands, &c, &c, which they may hold, for which they 
 have no sunnuds. In this article are included all lands of which 
 they maybe the comavisdars or amildars, unless the possession of 
 such lands should be material to their safety, or to enable them 
 to collect the revenues of their serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire 
 lands : in which case, the British government will interest them- 
 selves with the Peshwah, that the comavisdars may be continued 
 to the Putwurdun family, provided they give security that the 
 Peshwah shall regularly receive the revenue. 
 
 230. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Strange circumstance of Scindiatis inclining to Holkar against 
 us. He has broken the treaty of defensive alliance. But 
 tear with Jiim would be most ill-timed. Proposed mode of 
 dealing with him, and with Holkar. 
 
 (Extracts.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 14th Dec, 1804. 
 I think it almost certain, that the accounts of the victories of 
 the British armies of the 13th and 17th Nov. will produce an 
 alteration in the councils of Scindiah. He will not be so ready 
 to join himself with Meer Khan, and neither will be bold enough 
 to venture upon an attack upon the British possessions. The 
 facts, however, stated in Mr. Jenkins's dispatch are curious, and 
 well deserving the attention of every European politician who has 
 any thing to say to India. Scindiah, whose enmity to Holkar 
 was become proverbial ; who allied himself with the Company 
 for the express purpose of defending himself against, and eventu- 
 ally destroying, Holkar ; who rejoiced when he found that the 
 war was determined on and inevitable ; who has suffered severely 
 in its progress by Holkar's plunder of his town of Mundleysir, 
 and by Meer Khan's plunder of Bhilsa ; and who has every thing
 
 WAR WITH HIM WOULD BE JUST, BUT MISTIMED. 405 
 
 to hope from its successful conclusion, which the smallest exertion 
 on his part would ensure ; instead of making that exertion against 
 his enemy, joins his enemy, for the purpose of destroying his 
 friend and ally. 
 
 ******* 
 
 There can be no doubt but that Scindiah has already broken 
 the treaty of defensive alliance. 
 
 * * *■ # * * * 
 
 In the case of a breach of treaty, it certainly rests with the 
 British government to adopt that measure which will be most 
 convenient for its own interests. It would be fully justified in 
 having recourse to arms, at the same time that war is not the 
 necessary consequence of every breach of treaty. The question, 
 therefore, is simply one of convenience ; and upon this point I 
 have no scruple in declaring, that the present is of all others the 
 worst time to attempt the conquest of Malwa ; which must be 
 the object of the war, and the only one which can bring it to a 
 conclusion. We have neither troops, money, civil servants, 
 magazines, nor any one object which would be necessary to 
 carry this plan into execution. There are other reasons also 
 for delaying to attempt it, referable to the state of affairs in 
 England. It will not be easy hereafter for Scindiah to get any 
 European allies ; and his armies and resources will certainly not 
 improve during the interval in which we may think proper to 
 leave him to himself, and to the prosecution of his own plans 
 against Holkar. 
 
 The plan which I should recommend to the Governor-General 
 would be to call upon Scindiah now to take measures to seize 
 Holkar ; if he should refuse, or omit to take any measures for 
 that purpose, I would leave him to himself. I would form the 
 armies in Bundelcund, and in the conquered provinces, according 
 to the plan proposed in one of my memorandums ; and the sub- 
 sidiary forces with the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah 
 on the Godavery, according to a plan proposed in one of my 
 letters to you, and another to the Governor-General. I would 
 then intimate to Kavel Nyn, or whoever may be the head of the 
 English party at Scindiah's durbar, that the Governor-General 
 had been prepared to advance money to Scindiah, and to assist 
 him with troops in the true spirit of the defensive alliance, in 
 order to enable him to settle a government in Malwa, but that 
 Scindiah had broken it in all its essential articles, and that the 
 British government would not revive it ; or would not act upon it
 
 406 OUR BEST COURSE WITH SCINDTAH AND HOLKAR. 
 
 in any manner as long as Sirjee Rao Ghautky formed a part of 
 the council, or remained in Scindiah's presence. At the same 
 time, I would intimate an intention to perform every article of 
 the treaty of peace. 
 
 This plan of conduct may revive the English party, and if it 
 should, we may depend upon its permanence, and may act with 
 it in the spirit of the defensive alliance ; but if Ghautky should 
 last, we may have peace with Scindiah for a time, and possibly, 
 after the example which has been made of Holkar, for a 
 very long time, but we cannot venture to act upon the defensive 
 alliance. 
 
 It may be asked, what will be done with Holkar, who. I sup- 
 pose, has escaped alive ? I answer, he cannot now be formidable 
 to the British government. Let him be followed, as I proposed 
 in one of my memorandums to the Governor-General, with a 
 reward for his apprehension. If we should take him, so much 
 the better ; if not, leave him to his contest with Scindiah, which 
 will revive with double fury. 
 
 231. To Colonel Close. 
 
 Scindiah most blameable for not punishing those concerned in the 
 attack on Mr. Jenkins. He is probably overawed by Ghaut- 
 ky. Neither probably desires war with the Company, or they 
 would have acted sooner. Difficulty of interposing to save 
 Mr. Jenkins, and yet avoid war. To write a letter, and 
 advance a corps near to Scindiah 's army, — the safest and 
 most pacific plan. Alternative courses likely to be adopted by 
 Scindiah. How far each is compatible with peace. 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805. 
 
 There can be no doubt but that the conduct of Scindiah 
 throughout has been very improper ; but not, in my opinion, in 
 making an attack upon Bhopal or Saugur. There is no doubt 
 but that he had a claim upon the Nabob of Bhopal, and it is 
 more than probable that he had one upon Saugur, which, as you 
 observe, holds but very slightly on the Peshwah ; but his mis- 
 behaviour has been, in my opinion, principally towards Mr. Jen- 
 kins himself. The first attack upon Mr. Jenkins was a gross 
 violation of the law of nations, on a point perfectly understood 
 by the Mahrattas ; and it was Scindiah's business to punish the
 
 MISCONDUCT AND VIEWS OF SCINDIAH AND GHAUTKY. 407 
 
 persons guilty of making that attack, and to take special care 
 that it should not be repeated. The repetition of the attack adds 
 to the enormity of the first offence, particularly as no measures 
 have been taken to punish the persons guilty of it. 
 
 The Governor-General, in his dispatches, has decided that 
 Scindiah shall be considered guilty of Ghautky's acts, if he 
 retains Ghautky in his service, and does not restrain him ; 
 but the question upon this subject, is not whether Scindiah 
 has the inclination, but whether he has the power, of restraining 
 him. 
 
 I believe Scindiah to be very weak in intellect, although he 
 has been known at times to assert his own power and dignity 
 with a tolerably strong hand. But I am convinced that neither 
 he nor his real ministers could ever have been concerned in the 
 outrages to which I have referred. I am convinced also, that 
 Scindiah knows that if he were to go to war with the British 
 government, every respectable man in his state and army would 
 leave him. It is my opinion, therefore, that he is overawed 
 by Ghautky ; that he feels the danger of endeavouring to arrest 
 Ghautky's person, which can alone put a period to his practices; 
 and he thinks that the measure would, in the event, leave him 
 without resources and without army. 
 
 The result of this reasoning is, then, that we have reason to 
 complain of Scindiah's government for acts committed by 
 Ghautky, which, we have reason to suppose, are contrary 
 to Scindiah's inclination, and that of his real ministers, and all 
 his sirdars, but which he had not the power, or that he fears to 
 punish. 
 
 It is my opinion that neither Scindiah nor Ghautky means to 
 attack the Company. If they had intended it, they would not 
 have lost the time before Saugur, during which Holkar and 
 Meer Khan have been defeated ; and it is to be hoped that the 
 Rajah of Bhurtpoor will have been destroyed ; but they would 
 have dashed at once at Bundelcund and upon Benares, during 
 the time that they knew that the Commander-in-Chief and our 
 troops were engaged with Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's 
 forts. Scindiah's object is, I think, to get together a little money, 
 and to be guided by events ; and Ghautky appears to have no 
 object at all, excepting to keep together an army of plunderers, 
 which will give him the power over Scindiah. We must expect 
 that the course of events will be favourable to us ; and there- 
 fore it is unlucky that affairs have been brought to such a crisis,
 
 40 8 CAN WE SAVE MR. JENKINS, YET NOT GO TO WAR? 
 
 and that it is absolutely necessary to interfere with a strong hand 
 to save Mr. Jenkins and our honour, by which we shall again risk 
 a war. 
 
 I do not see what plan we can adopt, in the execution of which 
 Mr. Jenkins' life will not be in danger ; and although it is an 
 object of the first consequence to save his life, I declare that I am 
 doubtful whether a strong measure or a moderate one is most 
 likely to be successful. It is my opinion, that the Governor- 
 General or you ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him 
 the enormity of the acts committed against Mr. Jenkins, who 
 was residing with him in the quality of an ambassador ; and 
 who, therefore, by the laws of nations, as they are fully under- 
 stood by the Mahrattas, was entitled to his protection ; that the 
 Governor-General was disposed to believe that these acts had 
 been committed without Scindiah's knowledge, and against his 
 consent ; but they had passed without punishment or even 
 notice, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to withdraw 
 Mr. Jenkins from Scindiah's durbar, and to cease all communica- 
 tion with him, unless Scindiah should, immediately on the receipt 
 of that letter, seize Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and punish him as his 
 conduct had deserved. 
 
 But in case Scindiah should omit to punish Ghautky, and Mr. 
 Jenkins should withdraw from his camp, Scindiah should be con- 
 sidered responsible for his security, till he should reach one of the 
 posts occupied by the British army ; and if, unfortunately, any 
 accident should happen to Mr. Jenkins, Scindiah must expect 
 the consequences of placing himself in the character of an enemy 
 of the British government. 
 
 At the same time that this letter should be written, orders 
 ought to be given to the Bundelcund corps, if it is supposed to 
 be of sufficient strength, to approach towards Scindiah's position. 
 If it should not be of sufficient strength, it ought to be strength- 
 ened, particularly in cavalry. Our troops in the Deccan cannot 
 do anything in my opinion ; excepting Wallace's corps, to seize 
 Scindiah's possessions about Ahmednuggur, if the war should be 
 determined upon ; and Haliburton's to seize Burhampoor, and 
 lay siege to Asseerghur. 
 
 These operations can be carried on, without impeding the ar- 
 rangement detailed by me in my letters, of which I sent you 
 copies. The only thing to take care of, is to make Wallace's 
 corps approach Haliburton, as soon as he shall have placed the 
 collector in possession of the countries about Ahmednuggur ; in
 
 WHAT WE SHOULD, AND WHAT SCTNDIAH MAY, DO. 409 
 
 order that he may cover Haliburton's operations, and prevent 
 Scindiah from impeding the operations against Asseerghur, sup- 
 posing that he should fly before the Bundelcund corps, and move 
 in that direction. 
 
 When Scindiah shall have received the letter, which I have 
 above proposed should be written to him, he will either seize 
 Ghautky, or he will allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, with protec- 
 tion or without it ; or he will not seize Ghautky, and will retain 
 Mr. Jenkins. In the first case our triumph will be complete, but 
 I fear that cannot be expected. In the second case, and the 
 third, we shall remain at peace with Scindiah, provided Mr. Jen- 
 kins arrives in safety at one of our posts ; if he should not do so, 
 the war, in my opinion, is inevitable ; and it is not impossible 
 but that the Governor-General will go to war, at all events, 
 for what has passed, unless Ghautky should be seized and 
 punished : the only reason for which he may possibly not insist 
 upon Ghautky's punishment is, that the proofs against him 
 are not strong. In the fourth case, we must equally go to 
 war, for we cannot submit to have our ambassador ill treated by 
 a parcel of barbarians, without noticing the insult in the most 
 serious manner. 
 
 There is a line of conduct which Scindiah may adopt, which may 
 also leave peace as a possible event ; it is to retain Mr. Jenkins, 
 and to allow Ghautky to escape. When he does escape, he will 
 be followed by all his plunderers, and will join Holkar ; but this 
 is a point of immaterial consequence, and would be the event 
 most to be wished, next to that of his being blown from a gun. 
 In this view of the case, the only chance of immediate war with 
 Scindiah appears to rest on danger to Mr. Jenkins's person, or on 
 Scindiah's retaining him in camp, contrary to the Governor- 
 General's desire, while Ghautky shall still remain in power. 
 
 To ill-treat an ambassador is so violent a measure, one so 
 repugnant to the feelings, even of the Mahrattas, that I acknow- 
 ledge I do not imagine that Scindiah will venture upon it, 
 although Ghautky would. The measure then to be adopted 
 appears to be, to place a force in such a situation, when we shall 
 communicate with Scindiah upon this subject, as shall convince 
 him that we have the power of protecting him against Ghautky, 
 supposing that he is inclined to be freed from his tyranny ; 
 and, at the same time, shall show Ghautky himself, that he can- 
 not commit any act of violence against Mr. Jenkins's person with 
 impunity.
 
 410 CHOUTE A REGULAR FORM OF ALIENABLE PROPERTY: 
 
 The Bundelcund corps can easily be placed in such a position ; 
 and if the result of the measures to be adopted should be, 
 that Scindiah should allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, he will 
 be able to reach that corps with facility. It is my opinion, 
 then, that the approach of a British corps will induce all 
 Scindiah's real ministers, and the old adherents of his family, 
 to declare themselves against the violent measures of Ghautky. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that to write a 
 letter, such as I have proposed, and to place our Bundelcund 
 corps rather nearer to Scindiah's army, afford the best prospect 
 of maintaining the peace with Scindiah ; which, if we can do with 
 honour, I consider to be an object of the first importance. 
 
 232. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. 
 
 Choute a regular branch of revenue, and a vested interest. Its 
 varied and intricate arrangement in the Nizanis territories. 
 Owned by him and his alienees ; — rarely by the Peshwah. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805. 
 
 I conclude that Appah Dessaye's claim to the choute of 
 Aurungabad is quite clear ; and that this question is not one 
 referrible to the arbitration of the British government. Indeed, 
 I have reason to believe it is so, and, therefore, that Appah 
 Dessaye ought to be paid. The fact of the matter regarding 
 this choute is, that although originally a denomination of a 
 portion of revenue, established by the Mahratta exactions, and 
 in many instances a grievance upon the people, from the mode 
 in which it is collected, it could not be entirely abolished, without 
 making a very serious and dangerous attack upon property. 
 
 In some instances that I know of, the Nizam and his Mussul- 
 mann sirdars have the choute of Mahratta districts, which, of 
 course, was originally exacted by the head of the Mahratta 
 government ; and, by subsequent arrangements, has been ceded 
 to the Nizam, and granted by him to his servants. In many 
 instances the choute is arranged by the grant of a few villages in 
 a district in lieu of it ; in others, the quarter of the district is in 
 the possession of a choutear, in lieu of his claim to a quarter of 
 the actual revenue realized from the whole district ; and in 
 others, by a more complicated arrangement, the choutear has a 
 certain number of villages, and the sircar besides pays him the
 
 CANNOT BE SIMPLY ABOLISHED, WITHOUT INJUSTICE. 4H 
 
 sum in which the rent of these villages is deficient, to make up 
 the quarter of the revenue of the district. 
 
 In almost every instance that I have seen, the right of the 
 choute exists in some individual who resides in the country, and 
 who is but little more attached to the government of the Pesh- 
 wah than he is to that of the Nizam, if at all attached to the 
 former ; and in but very few instances does it belong to the 
 Peshwah's government. This very claim of Appah Dessaye's is 
 one attached to his office of sirlushkur, and every person hold- 
 ing the office before him has enjoyed it. It is' my opinion, 
 therefore, generally, that the question for arbitration by the 
 British government is, whether the Soubah shall pay to the 
 Peshwah the choute of Beeder, which is a question depending 
 upon treaties, and not whether his territories shall be exempt 
 from the payment of that portion of revenue called choute, 
 which has always been paid by them. This choute, to which I 
 have referred, is entirely distinct from that general kind of indis- 
 criminate plunder, to which the Mahrattas lay claim all over 
 India. This is a right of the sword, which, of course, ceases 
 when the sword is no longer in their hand ; and the Soubah has 
 a right to be exempt from it, excepting in instances in which he 
 has bound himself by acknowledged treaties to pay it. 
 
 233. To Major Shawe. 
 
 War with Scindiah to be carefully avoided now. We are in no 
 condition for it. 
 
 Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805. 
 
 I sent you yesterday the copy of a letter which I had written 
 to Col. Close, on the subject of the late events in Scindiah's 
 camp, the greatest part of which was written before I had received 
 your letter of the 18th Feb. I hope to God we shall be able to 
 avoid a war with Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not 
 now in a state to attempt the conquest of Malwa ; an operation 
 which, under other circumstances, would be a mere joke. The 
 army to whose share it would naturally fall is now drawn to the 
 Jumna, by the Commander-in-Chief; there is not a sepoy at 
 Bombay, and very few sepoys and not 200 Europeans in Guzerat. 
 The Peshwah's subsidiary force is not yet efficient ; and if it 
 were, neither that corps nor the Soubah's subsidiary force could 
 be moved from the Deccan with safety.
 
 412 LAST WORDS ON THE MA HR ATT A PACIFICATION. 
 
 You see the time and lives that have been spent in the 
 attempts to subdue the Rajah of Bhurtpoor ; and you will see 
 that the army of Bengal will not be clear of that country before 
 the season comes round, in which it will be necessary for them 
 to go into cantonments. I therefore most anxiously hope that 
 all that can be done with honour, will be done to preserve peace 
 with Scindiah as long as possible. 
 
 234. To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm. 
 
 Sentiments on the final arrangements with Scindiali and Holkar. 
 Strong feeling in England in favour of peace, at any price. 
 
 Hastings, 31st July, 1806. 
 
 I have received your letters up to the 14th Jan., for which I 
 return you many thanks. The subjects to which they relate are 
 too large to be discussed in a letter which must go to the post 
 this afternoon, in order to be despatched by the ships which will 
 sail in a few days. I shall therefore satisfy myself by telling 
 you that I consider that you have acted a part entirely con- 
 sistent with your own character, and in strict conformity with 
 my sentiments, in everything that you have done. The arrange- 
 ment with Scindiah is precisely that which you and I recom- 
 mended long before, and which I urged, and, I believe, was 
 ordered when I was in Bengal in 1804. I thought also at that 
 time, and so did you, that the Rajpoots ought to have been 
 subjugated to the control of Scindiah's government, as the only 
 mode of re-establishing it ; the state in which it must exist, if 
 it is to exist at all. This object might with care and justice 
 have been effected at that time, if the state of Scindiah's govern- 
 ment had permitted it ; and I am not sufficiently acquainted 
 with all that has passed between the Rajpoots and our govern- 
 ment since the period of Monson's defeat, to be able to decide 
 that we ought not to deliver them over to Scindiah, notwith- 
 standing the favourable change which has taken place in the state 
 and dispositions of his councils. 
 
 I regret that it has been necessary to allow Holkar to exist, 
 and to be at large. I should be induced to suspect that he will 
 never allow us to be at peace ; and without peace we cannot 
 reduce the debt, which must be the great object at present. 
 However, if it was necessary to allow him to exist, I see but one
 
 STRONG FEELING AT HOME AGAINST WAR IN INDIA. 413 
 
 amendment which could have been made to the treaty with him ; 
 that is, to have kept permanently Umber and Chandore in the 
 Deccan, and some place of similar consequence in Hindustan, 
 either in our own hands or those of our allies, as a perpetual 
 memorial to the whole world that we had defeated him. The 
 powers of India will not now believe that our moderation alone 
 has occasioned the treaty which has been concluded ; and I shall 
 not be surprised if it give ground for a belief, the most erroneous, 
 that Holkar's power and his mode of warfare had been more 
 destructive to us than the resources and the efficiency and disci- 
 pline of the armies of the other M ahrattas. 
 
 In respect to the necessity of peace with Holkar, no man can 
 be a judge of it who has not been in this country, who has not 
 sat in the House of Commons, and had means of ascertaining 
 the public opinion at its fountain head. I really believe, that in 
 the opinion of the majority of people in this country, it would 
 have been better to cede the whole of Oude to Holkar than to 
 continue the war with him. 
 
 As for myself, I am here in the command of a few troops 
 stationed in this part of the coast, the old landing place of 
 William the Conqueror. You will have seen that I am in Par- 
 liament, and a most difficult and unpleasant game I have had to 
 play in the present extraordinary state of parties. I have desired 
 Sydenham to send you a copy of a speech which I made upon 
 the budget. 
 
 I have seen your brothers, Pulteney and Charles, both well. 
 The former is in the Donegal, off Brest ; the other unemployed 
 in London. But Sir Thomas, whom I saw likewise, expects to 
 be able to get a ship for Charles soon. God bless you, my dear 
 Malcolm ; don't stay too long in India. 
 
 P.S. Pray remember me most kindly to Wilks and all friends 
 in Seringapatam. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 4h we cannot count on a short war with holkar. 
 
 5. War with Holkar. 
 
 235. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 The object of the campaign is to bring Holkar to a general action, 
 as soon as possible. This he will avoid as long as he can. 
 His advantages over us in this respect. We cannot choose 
 the seat of war ; he can. Thus we must keep up our commu- 
 nications with our own country, to ensure supplies. Hence we 
 should obtain the alliance and co-operation of the Mahratta 
 chiefs on this side of India. Answer to political objections 
 against such alliances. Military advantages of the connexion. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 27th Nov., 1802. 
 
 It is impossible to give a decided opinion upon the particular 
 operations before the decided object of the Governor-General 
 is known ; but whatever may be that object, as the means of 
 attaining it must be the defeat of the formidable body of troops 
 collected by Holkar, time is not thrown away in considering cer- 
 tain subjects connected with the operations against that chieftain. 
 
 It is obvious that the intentions of the British government re- 
 garding the affairs of the Mahratta empire cannot be carried into 
 execution unless Holkar's army is either defeated or dissipated. 
 The object of the campaign must therefore be to bring him to 
 a general action at as early a period as possible. This object, 
 I have to observe, is not one of which, like the siege of Seringa- 
 patam, or the operations of a former war against Tippoo, the time 
 it will take to attain it can be calculated. If it be our interest 
 to bring Holkar to a general action, it is his to avoid it ; and it 
 may be depended upon that he will avoid it as long as he can. 
 
 His army is light, and chiefly composed of cavalry. The 
 whole composition of our armies is heavy ; even our cavalry, 
 from the nature of their constitution and their equipments, 
 and owing to the food eaten by the horses, are not able to 
 march with greater celerity for any length of time than our 
 infantry. His troops and his horses subsist on the grain the 
 produce of the country. Our troops come from countries the 
 general produce of which is rice ; they, and even their followers, 
 must have a certain quantity of that grain ; and the horses of the 
 cavalry must likewise have a grain not the general produce of 
 the Mahratta territory, which, in addition to the inconvenience 
 of the necessity of boiling it, must be brought from a distance.
 
 HOW ARE WE TO GET SUPPLIES IN SUCH A WAR? 475 
 
 Holkar, therefore, will have not only the inclination but the 
 means of avoiding the result which, I take it for granted, can 
 alone bring the war to a conclusion ; and it is obvious that no 
 man possesses a datum on which he can calculate the length of 
 time which will elapse before he can bring the contest to that 
 state. 
 
 Putting the European troops out of the question, the mode 
 of equipping our Native armies, the food which they and their 
 followers and horses are in the habit of using, will render it 
 necessary that a large stock of provisions should be carried for 
 their consumption. But however large that stock may be, no 
 man can pretend to say that it will last till the general action 
 will take place, which will alone bring the contest to a con- 
 clusion, because I have already shown that the enemy will be 
 inclined, and will have the means of avoiding it. Therefore 
 I conclude that, after a certain period for which our stock of 
 provisions will have been provided, we shall be obliged to 
 return to our own country for a fresh supply. 
 
 There are but two modes of carrying on this war by which 
 we may avoid this disagreeable result : one is to place the seat 
 of it in a country so near our own resources as that we shall be 
 able with ease to command our supplies, or in one which is 
 capable of affording us the supplies we require ; the other is to 
 keep up our communication with our own country, whatever may 
 be the distance from it of the seat of the war. In regard to the 
 first, viz. to command the seat of the war, I have to observe that 
 we shall no more be able to do that than we shall to command its 
 operations. The result is to be a general action with the enemy, 
 and I have already shown that we must fight that action where 
 he pleases, and therefore we cannot fix upon the seat of the war. 
 
 The second mode then is that alone by which we can succeed. 
 By this mode we shall always supply ourselves ; the enemy may 
 protract his defeat, but sooner or later it must happen. The ques- 
 tion is, in what manner is this desirable object to be attained ? 
 
 The long operations of conquering and establishing ourselves 
 in the countries on this side of the Kistna I put out of the ques- 
 tion, as suitable neither to the state of our force at the present 
 moment nor to our finances. Besides, it is probable that before 
 we should have brought matters to that state that we should be 
 able to commence the operations against the enemy which are to 
 bring the war to a conclusion, other revolutions would happen in 
 India which would entirely alter the situation of affairs.
 
 41 6 WE MUST HAVE MA HR ATT A ALLIES IN OUR REAR. 
 
 The manner then by which I would propose to keep up the 
 communication with our rear would be to take into our alliance 
 and call for the co-operation of all the Mahratta chiefs on this 
 side of India. 
 
 Upon this subject I observe that my opinion is different from 
 yours, and I am aware that the question is political, upon 
 which I am not called to give an opinion at all ; but it is so 
 intimately connected with the military operations that it is not 
 possible to consider the one without considering the other. 
 
 In all cases of war, particularly with such a nation as the 
 Mahrattas, there can be no doubt but that generally it is 
 desirable that a part of them should be on our side ; and I 
 proceed to consider whether there is any reason which ought to 
 induce us to reject the alliance of those Mahrattas whose ser- 
 vices I believe we can now command. The great objection to our 
 adopting it is the engagements by which we or the Peshwah 
 may be fettered hereafter. I do not think it probable that we 
 shall be under the necessity of entering into such engagements ; 
 but even if we should, the object of the contest is not territory 
 for ourselves, but the defeat of a power from which we or our 
 ally apprehend danger ; and the question regarding the engage- 
 ments must be decided by that of the value or the necessity of 
 the assistance of those with whom they are to be entered into. 
 
 The Mahratta territory is divided among jaghiredars, all of 
 whom have troops in the service of the state, or it belongs to 
 Polygars, who pay a peshcush, or it is managed by the aumildars 
 of the Sircar. But the peshcush of these Polygars, and every- 
 thing collected by the aumildars, is applied to the payment of 
 the Peshwah's troops, whose chiefs have tuncaws upon the 
 revenues, or in payment of the debts of the state, also upon 
 tuncaws. The Mahratta government was formerly as regularly 
 organised as any in India, and these jaghiredars completely 
 under the control of the Peshwah as head of the empire ; but 
 during the late troubles they have become in some degree inde- 
 pendent of his authority, and they look to other sources besides 
 his favour for their security. There is no doubt, however, but 
 that all that they could claim from us in return for their assist- 
 ance would be protection in the enjoyment of their jaghires, 
 which, in case of our interference in the affairs of the empire 
 hereafter, it is more than probable that we should afford them 
 at all events. The promise of this protection would not prevent 
 us from availing ourselves of any advantages to be derived here-
 
 HOW SUCH ALLIES CAN HELP US. 4.T7 
 
 after from any subsidiary engagements which might be entered 
 into with the Peshwah. The countries which it is probable we 
 should wish to have under such an arrangement are Savanore 
 and Darwar, on which there are no jaghires. Their revenues 
 are applied in part to the payment of Goklah's army, being the 
 army of the state, and in part of a debt due by the state to the 
 family of Pursheram Bhow ; and all that would be necessary 
 would be to urge the Peshwah to make some other arrange- 
 ment for the payment of this debt. Upon the whole, therefore, 
 considering the nature of the tenures of the chiefs who com- 
 mand the troops in this part of the Mahratta territory, and their 
 probable objects and ours, I cannot conceive that we can be 
 fettered hereafter by any engagements we may enter into with 
 them. 
 
 I now come to consider what assistance they can give us. 
 
 In the first place, the government of the countries through 
 which the British army must pass to fight this battle is in their 
 hands. By having them in our camps the inhabitants of these 
 countries will be friendly to us ; we shall enjoy the supplies 
 which they can afford, and our own supplies will pass through 
 them with comparatively small 'escorts. In short, we shall 
 enjoy advantages nearly as extensive as we should supposing 
 that the countries were in our own hands, without spending time, 
 money, and lives to conquer them. 
 
 In the second place, we shall have the assistance of a body 
 of cavalry amounting to not less than 20,000 men. I don't 
 mean to hint that we shall require this assistance in the day of 
 battle, but we shall to escort our supplies, to guard our baggage 
 and provisions on our marches, to keep our camps quiet, to 
 cover our forage, and save our own cavalry. 
 
 In the third place, we shall have the advantage of the best 
 intelligence, particularly of any designs upon our rear. With 
 such a body of cavalry in your camp, the enemy would not dare 
 to detach small parties to your rear to distress your communi- 
 cations ; and if he did, those parties would not remain there, 
 as you would have the earliest intelligence of their movements, 
 and might detach superior bodies immediately ; and the fear 
 of weakening himself too much in front of such a body of cavalry 
 as you would have would equally prevent him from detaching 
 a large body. 
 
 There is no doubt but that the advantages to be derived from 
 this body of men are very great, and probably will more than 
 
 E e
 
 41 8 WE SHOULD COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH HOLKAR. 
 
 counterbalance the perils to be expected from an alliance with 
 them ; and when it is recollected that by their assistance a 
 prospect is afforded of keeping open our rear, and thus of 
 bringing the contest to the only possible conclusion, I think 
 that the necessity of encouraging them is obvious. 
 
 I have previously stated that these troops belong to the Mah- 
 ratta state, for whose subsistence payment is already provided 
 by the arrangements of that government ; therefore the em- 
 ployment of them will occasion no expense. They likewise and 
 their horses, like all other Mahrattas, live upon jowarry, the 
 grain of the country, and their consumption will not fall upon 
 our supplies. 
 
 I have, &c. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 236. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 Expediency of direct — inexpediency of indirect — communications 
 
 with Holkar. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 22nd June, 1803. 
 
 I am of opinion that one great fault of which we have been 
 guilty in the negotiations to prevent the confederacy, has been 
 that we have omitted to keep up a communication and inter- 
 course with Holkar, whom I consider as the most formidable of 
 the three supposed confederates. I endeavoured to remedy this 
 fault as soon as I arrived at Poonah, and proposed to Holkar to 
 send him a gentleman ; but he was at that time on his plunder- 
 ing plan in the Nizam's territories, and in his answer he pre- 
 tended not to understand the meaning of my proposition. I am, 
 therefore, clearly of opinion that the sooner we remedy this 
 fault the better; and I should not object much to any channel 
 by which we might obtain so desirable an object. But I don't 
 like the communications through third persons : they never lead 
 to any thing but inaction on our part, and give room for every 
 kind of intrigues. If Fukker u Deen has any proposition to 
 make of a mode by which the peace between Holkar and the 
 Honourable Company can be preserved, he is an old servant of 
 the Company's, and in constant communication with you, and 
 he ought to come forward and make it, and to state his au- 
 thority and his reasons for believing that the mode which he 
 proposes will have the desired effect. On the ground of such a
 
 WHAT COURSE WE SHOULD PURSUE WITH HIM. 419 
 
 communication some steps can be taken, the business can be 
 put in some kind of shape, we can see what prospect there is 
 of getting it forward, and its future progress ; but these second 
 and third hand communications are always intrigues, and lead 
 to disasters. 
 
 237. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins. 
 
 General Welksley writes to Holkar, with a copy of the Treaty. 
 
 Camp, 1 6th July, 1803. 
 
 Although the Governor-General mentioned in one of his 
 despatches that the treaty of Bassein ought to be communicated 
 to Holkar, no orders have been sent stating by whom ; and I 
 have not observed in any of the correspondence that it has been 
 communicated to that chief. I have long thought that it would 
 be very desirable to open a communication with Holkar, and 
 particularly to make known to him the treaty of Bassein. I 
 have therefore taken the opportunity of the departure from this 
 camp of a vakeel from Amrut Rao to show Holkar the treaty ; 
 and I have written him a letter \ of which I enclose a translation, 
 which I send to him by a Native officer. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 238. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley. 
 A contest with Holkar not to be precipitated. 
 (Extract.) Camp, 31st Jan., 1804. 
 
 It is difficult to say what line Holkar will take, or what 
 ought to be done with him. He is evidently only a freebooter, 
 and to crush him cannot be called a war in the present state of 
 the Company's power ; but whatever may be done hereafter, I 
 think it will be advisable not to touch him, unless he should 
 attack the Company or their allies, till the alliance with Scin- 
 diah will be concluded. If Scindiah sees us attack Holkar, he 
 will most probably not enter into the defensive alliance ; he 
 will attack Holkar at the same time, in order to get what he 
 can. 
 
 1 See No. 147, p. 262. — Ed. 
 E e 2
 
 420 A PROPHETIC STRICTURE ON LAKERS STRATEGY, 
 
 239. To Colonel Montresor. 
 
 War with Holkar probably avoidable : if not, he ought to be 
 promptly suppressed. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 26th March, 1804. 
 
 The subsidiary alliance offered to Scindiah, in the 5th 
 article of the treaty of peace, has been concluded. The know- 
 ledge of this event will, I think, prevent the supposed contest 
 with Holkar, which after all, in the present state of the Company's 
 power, could not have been considered more than a Polygar war. 
 But to say the truth, I have always considered Holkar's power 
 to depend upon his avoiding a contest with any of the British 
 armies, and I believe that he has been of the same opinion : 
 there are, therefore, good grounds for thinking that we shall now 
 have unqualified peace. Supposing that we should not, there 
 are four or five armies ready to move upon him, and we should 
 make a capital finishing of a Mahratta confederacy by destroy- 
 ing the chief who they say planned it, but who cautiously 
 avoided activity in the execution of his own plans after the two 
 other members had been destroyed. 
 
 240. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 General Lake ouglit to dash at Holkar at once ; or postpone 
 hostilities until he is strong enough to do so. 
 
 Bombay, 20th April, 1804. 
 
 Malcolm's letter of the 14th is certainly very important ; but 
 I by no means think the question of peace or war decided. It 
 will depend upon Holkar's conduct when he will find that General 
 Lake has moved. The General's intention not to quit Hin- 
 dustan, and not to follow Holkar, will be fatal. He ought to 
 leave a corps in Hindustan for its security, and move with alight 
 body in pursuit of Holkar, whose force will fritter away daily, 
 whether he retreats after fighting or without fighting. If he 
 should not pursue Holkar, the war will immediately become 
 defensive on our part in the most important quarter, and by such 
 operations we must lose. 
 
 Colonel Murray's offensive operations must be feeble in com- 
 parison with those of the Commander-in-Chief; indeed, I don't 
 think that he can venture far from the Myhie. No progress, 
 then, will be made in the war till I can reach the countries north
 
 WE SHOULD NOT COUNTENANCE CASHEE RAO. \1 1 
 
 of Ougein ; and supposing it to be safe for me to quit the Deccan 
 with any formidable corps of troops, I am almost certain that I 
 shall not have it in my power to collect a sufficient quantity of 
 provisions to subsist the troops till they would arrive in commu- 
 nication with the stores of Guzerat. At all events, months must 
 elapse before I could reach those countries ; and I really think 
 that if General Lake should push Holkar vigorously, the war 
 ought not to last a fortnight. 
 
 If General Lake should not be sufficiently strong to carry on 
 the war in this manner, he ought to delay its commencement till 
 he can be reinforced, or till Scindiah's subsidiary force can be 
 arranged. I return all your letters. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 241. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Why the English Government ought not to support CeisJue 
 Rao Holkar. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 23rd April, 1804. 
 
 I have always held the same opinion about Cashee Rao Holkar. 
 He is an infamous blackguard, despised by everybody, full of 
 prejudices, hatred, and revenge, and without one adherent or even 
 a follower. By adopting his cause we shall burthen ourselves 
 with the defence and support of another weak and helpless power, 
 we shall disgust Scindiah's government, and we shall not give 
 satisfaction to the followers and adherents of the Holkar family. 
 The act will be abstractedly generous ; but considering that 
 Cashee Rao was concerned in the murder of his brother, it will 
 be to support usurpation founded on murder, and, for the reasons 
 I have above mentioned, highly impolitic. 
 
 The question ought to be decided at the same time that the 
 Governor-General decides that he will go into the war, and I 
 must, of course, write to him about it ; but you ought to write 
 likewise. 
 
 242. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Murray to march quickly into Malwa, when the war with 
 Holkar begins. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 30th April, 1804. 
 
 At whatever period hostilities may commence with Holkar, it 
 will be necessary that your corps should move into Malwa. You
 
 422 HOW MURRAY IS TO COOPERATE WITH LAKE. 
 
 will observe, therefore, the necessity of keeping it prepared, at 
 least till the exact state of affairs in Hindustan shall be known ; 
 and when you break it up for the rains, you will take care to 
 occupy such positions as will be most useful to enable you to 
 advance with celerity into Malwa, as will at the same time cover 
 Guzerat from invasion, and as will enable you to collect in 
 strength whenever that may be necessary. 
 
 243. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Instructions for the conduct of the war with Holkar. 
 
 (Extracts.) Bombay, 7th May, 1804. 
 
 I have the honour to inform you that I have received intima- 
 tion from his Excellency the Governor-General, that he has given 
 directions to the Commander-in-Chief to attack Jeswunt Rao 
 ■ Holkar ; and his Excellency has ordered me to make arrange- 
 ments to co-operate with, and support the operations of, the 
 Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 It is impossible for me to say what the operations of the 
 Commander-in-Chief will be, but Holkar' s power appears to 
 consist principally in a considerable army in the field ; and I 
 imagine that his Excellency's operations will, in the first instance, 
 be directed to defeat that army ; or, if Holkar should avoid an 
 action by flying, to press upon him so closely as to oblige his 
 troops to disperse. This operation can be aided very materially 
 from Guzerat, and I proceed to point out to you in what manner. 
 ******* 
 
 If the operations of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief 
 should be directed to the defeat and dispersion of Holkar's army 
 according to the mode which I have supposed at the commence- 
 ment of this letter, your object will be to post yourself in such a 
 manner as to stop Holkar, and embarrass and impede his flight 
 as much as possible, and if you can, to engage him. 
 
 If the Commander-in-Chief should commence his operations 
 in a short time, it does not appear to me to be probable that 
 Holkar, who is now, I believe, about Ajmeer, will retire to the 
 south-westward, or towards Guzerat ; but he will, probably, move 
 towards Ougein. I have no ground, however, for this conjecture, 
 excepting the knowledge that the rains will commence in June, and 
 the probability that Holkar will be disinclined to trust himself in a 
 country in that season of the year, in which his operations would
 
 AN EXPERT'S FORESIGHT OF THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS. 423 
 
 be confined by the course of the rivers, the nature of the country, 
 &c. If he should move towards Ougein, it will be your business 
 to join Scindiah's army at the earliest practicable period ; and at 
 all events, to move with celerity upon Holkar, and attack him 
 whenever you shall have an opportunity. You will take with 
 you as large a body of the Guickwar cavalry as can be furnished 
 to you. 
 
 ******* 
 I understand that he has some strongholds in Malwa, particu- 
 larly at Rampoora, or Brampoora, to which he has lately sent 
 his infantry and guns ; but it will not be difficult to obtain 
 possession of them, and to make a final conquest and settlement 
 of his country, as soon as his army shall have been beaten and 
 dispersed ; and to employ our troops in sieges till this object 
 shall have been effected will only give Holkar leisure for his 
 predatory operations, will enable him to distress the troops by 
 operating on their communications during such sieges, and will 
 delay his final defeat. 
 
 244. To General Lake. 
 
 Rapid and continuous pursuit, with corps capable of sustaining an 
 action, the best mode of dispersing such an army as Holkar s. 
 
 27th May, 1804. 
 ***** 1 Th e accoun t you give of the state of Holkar's army 
 is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of 
 India against this description of freebooter ; and I think that 
 the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps 
 capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength 
 as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he 
 should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, 
 that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will 
 come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of 
 operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great 
 celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to 
 stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little 
 mischief: at all events the subsistence of his army becomes 
 difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they 
 perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in 
 numbers daily ; the freebooter ends by having with him only a 
 
 1 Sic in Col. Gurwood's Edition. — Ed.
 
 424 WAS MURRAY UNABLE TO COOPERATE WITH MONSON ? 
 
 few adherents ; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable 
 to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the 
 fittest troops to be then employed against him. 
 
 In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed 
 against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving 
 with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the 
 largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by 
 our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and 
 flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their 
 villages ; because their villages being in some degree fortified, 
 they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which 
 would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all 
 their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting 
 to separate ; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the 
 village people cut them off on their way to their homes. 
 
 You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Col. Murray 
 has moved before this time. 
 
 I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that 
 I shall be able to move, and to make the siege of Chandore in 
 the course of the month of June. Every thing is ready. The 
 troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a 
 fall of rain to insure water. 
 
 245. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Murray 's force adequate to its requirements. Mischief of 
 in uc iidos that it is not. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804. 
 
 You have a larger body of European soldiers than the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, or than I have ever had ; and Col. Monson has 
 driven Holkar before him out of the territories of the Rajah of 
 Jeypoor, of Bhoondy, and of Kota, without a single European 
 soldier or horseman, excepting the irregular horse of the country. 
 You will be joined by a large body of Scindiah's cavalry. 
 
 From your frequent allusions to this subject, I should be induced 
 to believe that you do not deem your force sufficient to perform 
 the service on which you are employed, if I was not aware of the 
 circumstances to which I have above referred ; and it is, there- 
 fore, necessary, that I should request you to explain yourself 
 fully to Mr. Duncan upon it. Your explanation of your senti- 
 ments ought to be full ; as, by allusions to your weakness, and
 
 BOTH FLED FROM HOLKAR. THE CRISIS MOST SERIOUS. 425 
 
 expressing your hopes that you will be reinforced, you expose 
 the government to the severe responsibility of omitting to rein- 
 force you on the one hand, if it should be necessary ; or of rein- 
 forcing you, on the other, if it should not. 
 
 246. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Peril involved in the prolongation of the war. Murray and 
 Monson both afraid of Hoik ar ; and each justifies his retreat 
 by that of the other. 
 
 (Extract.) Barrackpoor, 24th Aug., 1804. 
 
 You may depend upon it that the Commander-in-Chief will 
 not allow me to undertake the settlement of affairs in Malwa ; 
 indeed it would be improper to propose such an arrangement 
 to him, and unreasonable to expect that he would propose it 
 himself. 
 
 It is now reported that Holkar is crossing the Chumbul ; and 
 if that report be well founded, the Commander-in-Chief will have 
 a favourable opportunity of attacking him, and of bringing the 
 war to a conclusion. If it is not soon brought to a conclusion, 
 either in this manner or some other, it will be the most serious 
 affair in which the British government have ever been engaged, 
 and one which will require the exertions of all of us. In such 
 a case, I have no objection to go back to the Deccan : but other- 
 wise I am very desirous to avoid the journey. I shall speak to 
 the Governor-General respecting the arrangements you propose 
 for Close. 
 
 I have read over with the greatest attention all Monson's letters, 
 and all the information which has arrived here respecting the 
 late misfortunes ; and I am decidedly of opinion that Monson 
 advanced without reason, and retreated in the same manner ; and 
 that he had no intelligence of what was passing 5 miles from his 
 camp. 
 
 It is a curious circumstance that Monson and the Commander- 
 in-Chief should attribute their misfortunes to Murray's retreat, 
 and that Murray should attribute his retreat to a movement of 
 the same kind made by Monson. At all events both parties 
 appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and both to have fled from 
 him in different directions. 
 
 I do not think that the Commander-in-Chief and I have carried 
 on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves. There 
 is no news. The countries to the northward are in great alarm ;
 
 426 I WILL TELL THE TALE; AND POINT THE MORAL. 
 
 but it is to be hoped that the Governor-General's luck will not 
 leave him in this crisis : and that all will be settled before the 
 late misfortunes can have any serious effect. Would to God 
 that I had come round here in March, and Holkar would now 
 have been in the tomb of all the Capulets ! 
 
 247. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 
 
 Narrative of Monson s retreat. Rationale of his disasters. 
 Lessons from /lis campaign. 
 
 Fort William, 12th Sept., 1804. 
 
 1 You will have heard reports of poor Monson's reverses, but as 
 I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me ; 
 and as they give some important military lessons to us all, I do 
 not regard the trouble of writing them to you. When it became 
 necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from the 
 grand army with 3 battalions and their guns, and a body of 
 cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, 
 with an army composed only of horse (and as Gen. Lake was 
 at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa. 
 
 After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat 
 countries depending on Agra, the first country going to the 
 southward is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by 
 the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Scindiah and 
 Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from 
 his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to 
 the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the 
 same description ; and joining to Boondy is the territory of the 
 Rajah of Kota. These last two Rajahs had been, and are 
 still, tributary to Scindiah ; and Holkar has claims upon them 
 which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in 
 consequence of their conduct in the war ; at all events, they were 
 desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the 
 demands of Holkar. 
 
 Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort 
 called Rampoora, which, at the commencement of the war, be- 
 longed to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the 
 Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in 
 some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor. The 
 
 1 This letter is given entire, except three opening paragraphs, on 
 personal matters. — Ed.
 
 HOLKAR FLIES: MONSON MARCHES INTO MALWA. 427 
 
 whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, 
 which joins to the Kota territory,, and which is entered through a 
 pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and 
 nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are 
 filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. 
 Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between 
 Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between 
 Rampoora and Agra. 
 
 When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander-in- 
 Chief, Col. Monson followed him successively to Boondy and 
 Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were very desirous to have 
 the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and 
 promised supplies and every thing which Col. Monson could 
 want. At the same time that Col. Monson advanced, a detach- 
 ment under Col. Don, consisting of 2 battalions, was sent to take 
 Rampoora, of which place it got possession by storm ; and this 
 detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson's corps, 
 which then consisted of 5 battalions. 
 
 In the month of June, the Commander-in-Chief withdrew his 
 army into cantonments, leaving Monson's corps in the Kota 
 country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through 
 the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops 
 of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Scindiah's, under Bappojee 
 Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of 
 Hinglisghur ; and after this operation, he took up a position in 
 Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota. at some dis- 
 tance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him 
 he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected 
 to be able to communicate with Col. Murray, at that time on his 
 march from Guzerat towards Ougein. 
 
 After his retreat in front of the Commander-in-Chief, Holkar 
 had first threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundis- 
 soor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north-west 
 of Ougein, and on the left of the Chumbul. Between the middle 
 and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town ; and at 
 that time the river Chumbul was between him and Col. Monson, 
 who was encamped about 5 coss from the river, on the right 
 bank. 
 
 Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul 
 with his army. Col. Monson learnt that he was doing so, and 
 intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which 
 he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had
 
 428 MONSON RETREATS BEFORE HOLKAR TO RAMPOORA. 
 
 crossed the river ; nearly about the same time, he understood 
 that Col. Murray, who had made 2 marches towards Ougein 
 from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhie ; and upon the whole, 
 Monson, having only 2 days' provisions, thought it best to retreat. 
 Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following 
 morning, the 8th July, I believe, towards the Muckundra ghaut ; 
 and he followed with the infantry at about 9 in the morning, 
 meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about lj 
 miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee 
 Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard. 
 After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar 
 had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse ; 
 and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear 
 guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at 
 Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the 
 ghaut ; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many 
 passages practicable for cavalry. 
 
 On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked 
 by the whole of Holkars cavalry, in 3 separate bodies, who, how- 
 ever, could make no impression upon him ; and they "were beat 
 off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at 
 a camp within 2 or 3 coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their 
 guns, 175 in number; and he determined to retreat again. He 
 accordingly marched to Kota, the Rajah of which place urged 
 him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions ; 
 and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the 
 Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after 
 he had crossed. 
 
 The rain began about the 10th July, and became incessant, and 
 rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would 
 otherwise have been ; particularly in that country, which is a 
 black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, 
 he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he 
 continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until 
 he reached Rampoora. He was followed, but not much harassed, 
 by a body of Holkars horse, which overtook him at a nullah, 
 which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of 
 this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him. On his 
 arrival at Rampoora, Monson was joined by 2 battalions with 
 their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, 
 which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he imme- 
 diately began to collect provisions at Rampoora.
 
 THE LATER STAGES OF THE RETREAT. 429 
 
 The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson, likewise 
 impeded Holkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward 
 of the Muckundra ghaut. His progress to the northward was 
 likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of 
 Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and 
 towards the 20th Aug. again approached Monson at Rampoora. 
 
 By this time, Monson had collected only about 12 days' pro- 
 visions, and the Commander-in-Chief, foreseeing the difficulty in 
 which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th Aug. 
 to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he 
 might be distressed for provisions. 
 
 Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within 
 6 coss with his whole army, and on the 21st Aug., in the evening, 
 commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalghur, leaving 
 Jeypoor on his left hand. He left 15 companies as a garrison in 
 Rampoora. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found 
 that it was full : on the 24th, in the morning, it fell, and became 
 fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion ; and 
 between 12 and 3 o'clock, he passed over three more battalions, 
 leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the 
 southern bank. 
 
 Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen 
 crossing at different fords on the right and left flank ; and towards 
 evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They 
 attacked the piquets, but were repulsed ; and the piquets and 
 battalion took 8 guns ; but afterwards our troops were over- 
 powered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across 
 the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many 
 men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who 
 had crossed the river and moved up its bed. 
 
 Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, 
 leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalghur, about 40 miles 
 distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout 
 the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to 
 make any impression upon him. He halted on the night of the 25th 
 and the 26th at Kooshalghur, and on the 26th at night marched 
 towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I 
 have not received an account ; but on the 30th, Monson and his 
 detachment arrived at Agra. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief has taken the field, and it is to be 
 hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the 
 disgrace which we have suffered.
 
 430 CAUSES OF THE DISASTER ENUMERATED. 
 
 It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we 
 may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that 
 in future, if possible, they may be avoided. 
 
 In the ist place, it appears that Col. Monson's corps was never 
 so strong as to be able to engage Holkar's army, if that Chief 
 should collect it ; at least the Colonel was of that opinion. 
 2ndly : It appears that it had not any stock of provisions. 3rdly: 
 That it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged 
 its advance. 4thly : That no measures whatever were taken by 
 British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or 
 even at Rampoora, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a 
 British garrison. 5thly : That the detachment was advanced to 
 such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and 
 nullahs, without any boats collected, or posts upon those rivers ; 
 and in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of 
 Kota, who supplied them with his boats. 
 
 The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the 
 detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked 
 them with his infantry and artillery. 
 
 In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion 
 that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. 
 If he chose to retire, he ought to have supported the rear guard 
 with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with 
 the baggage. 
 
 When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer 
 than a night at Muckundra ; because he must have been certain 
 that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to 
 Muckundra, would also oblige him to quit that position. The 
 difference between a good and a bad military position is nothing 
 when the troops are starving. 
 
 The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at 
 Rampoora, unless he intended to fight. As he had been rein- 
 forced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his 
 supplies ; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and 
 particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in 
 infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him 
 before he retired. When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, 
 he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving 
 one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his bag- 
 gage ; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained 
 a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his 
 honour.
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM MONSON S CAMPAIGN. 43 1 
 
 We have some important lessons from this campaign. 1st: 
 We should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not 
 fully equal. 2ndly : Against the Mahrattas in particular, but 
 against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of 
 provisions. 3rdly : Experience has shown us, that British troops 
 can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. 
 Our own officers must purchase them ; and if we should employ 
 a Native in such an important service, we ought to see the sup- 
 plies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in 
 which they may want them. 4thly : When we have a fort which 
 can support our operations, such as Rampoora to the northward, 
 or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should imme- 
 diately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and 
 stores, in case of need. 5thly : When we cross a river likely to 
 be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it ; 
 as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, 
 I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery. 
 
 In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Mon- 
 son's, they must be decided and quick ; and in all retreats, it 
 must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to 
 the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But atten- 
 tion to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British 
 corps from retreating. 
 
 These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back to 
 the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders 
 have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to rein- 
 force the troops with you. 
 
 P.S. Of course I mean this letter x only for your own perusal, 
 and that of your particular friends. 
 
 1 The compiler takes the liberty to add, as notes, to this and the fol- 
 lowing letter, an opinion and an illustration of them. 
 
 Sir Robert Peel, in speaking of the Duke of Wellington, said that he 
 considered him the most powerful writer in the English language, and 
 that the letter upon Col. Monson's retreat was the best military letter he 
 had ever read, and quoted the line from Horace : 
 
 ' Scribendi recte, sapere est et principium et fons.' 
 
 De Arte Poetica, 1. 309. 
 
 Extract from a letter from Major-Gen. Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., after 
 the battle of Meeanee, dated Hyderabad, 20th Feb., 1843. 
 
 1 The Duke's letter on the retreat of Col. Monson decided me never
 
 432 MAHRATTA WARFARE; AND HOW TO MEET IT. 
 
 248. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Advice on the conduct of the war with Holkar. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Fort William, 14th Sept., 1804. 
 
 There are two modes in which the Mahrattas carry on their 
 operations. They operate upon supplies by means of their 
 cavalry ; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's 
 camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press 
 upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their 
 opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his 
 march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow 
 him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack 
 him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can 
 scarcely escape from them. 
 
 That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an 
 operation against a Mahratta power (indeed in any military 
 operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in your 
 camp as will enable you to command your own movements, 
 and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length 
 of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you 
 may be employed. 
 
 The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. 
 Experience has shown us that the Mahratta cavalry are not very 
 formidable when opposed to our infantry ; that of Holkar, in 
 particular, made no impression upon Monson's detachment in 
 its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry 
 and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is 
 the strength of Holkar's, as it is of every other army, and to that 
 I conceive your corps to be fully equal. 
 
 It is probable that the Commander-in-Chief will not be at 
 Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar 
 should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the 
 commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the be- 
 ginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have 
 
 to retire before an Indian army. If I have done wrong abstractedly (for 
 success, like charity, covers sins), the Great Master led me into it ; but 
 my own conviction is that I have done right ; and that my admiration of 
 him, and study of his words and deeds, as the great rules of war, have 
 caused this victory.' — Col. Gurwood's note.
 
 HOW TO OPERATE AGAINST HOLKAR. 433 
 
 at least a month's provision in your camp. If he should bring 
 his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your bag- 
 gage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to 
 cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will 
 leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. 
 If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together. 
 
 You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with 
 his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain 
 your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Mahrattas 
 have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close 
 to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure 
 your baggage in any manner, and move out to attack them. Do 
 not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account. 
 
 Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your 
 way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your 
 communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry 
 camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do 
 not allow the enemy to lie near you with impunity, and you 
 will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts to- 
 wards Kota of your situation ; and if you should hear of the 
 infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it. In this 
 consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have 
 no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in 
 attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable ; and if 
 you should support those attacks by your infantry and your 
 cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful. 
 
 If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that 
 Holkar's infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before 
 you think of any thing else. If you should be obliged to draw 
 off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the 
 regular hours ; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you 
 can ; if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, 
 attack them with vigour. Even if you should lose a day or two 
 by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will pro- 
 bably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, 
 as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the in- 
 fantry are beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry 
 on. But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient 
 quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps 
 is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat. 
 
 I do not know what orders you may have received from the 
 Commander-in-Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should 
 
 Ff
 
 434 CALAMITOUS TENDENCY OF MONSON'S REVERSE. 
 
 act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th May. At all events, 
 whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions 
 in your camp, or you will not be in safety, much less be of any 
 use to his operations. 
 
 249. To Colonel Agnew. 
 
 Dangerous impression produced on the native mind by 
 Monsorfs retreat. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 13th Jan., 1805. 
 
 After Colonel Monson's defeat I acknowledge that I considered 
 the peace with the Mahrattas very precarious ; and indeed if the 
 success of Holkar had continued, I consider that we should have 
 had to fight over again not only our battles with the Mahrattas, 
 but those with all the other powers of India, whether considered 
 as our dependants or our allies. I also believe that the Rajah 
 of Berar in particular, and very possibly Scindiah, considered the 
 advantages gained by Holkar to have been much greater than 
 they really were ; that they anticipated farther successes, and the 
 former prepared to take advantage of them. 
 
 250. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 Navigable rivers the only natural barrier against Mahrattas. 
 Alliances with petty Rajahs unprofitable. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805. 
 
 I have always been of opinion that this warfare with Holkar has 
 shown that there is no such thing in India as a frontier, properly 
 so called, particularly against the Mahrattas. In fact, with their 
 horse they can penetrate anywhere, excepting across a navigable 
 river ; and when once they have penetrated with their horse, they 
 have no difficulty in making roads for their guns. I have marched 
 with a British army through one of these impracticable countries 
 at the rate of from sixteen to twenty miles a day. 
 
 So far for the natural frontier ; but Captain Burr says that 
 the Bheels will defend this frontier, and that by a system of 
 connexion with Oudepoor and different other petty Rajahs, we 
 shall have the service of all these people. This is another error 
 which this warfare with Holkar has exposed. The British govern- 
 ment can form no connexion with petty powers of this descrip- 
 tion in India, excepting that of subjection on their part and
 
 ALLIANCES WITH PETTY RAJAHS UNDESIRABLE. 435 
 
 government on ours. Indeed, I doubt whether that connexion 
 can be formed ; and if I were to choose whether I would con- 
 nect the Company with them or leave them with the Mahrattas, 
 I would adopt the latter. Of this I am very sure, that I should 
 be much more certain of their assistance in the day of need by 
 this system than by taking them under the Company. 
 
 The conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, on the frontier of the 
 Jumna, is a strong proof of the conduct of these people. This Rajah 
 was made independent, had additions made to his territories, and 
 the whole guaranteed to him in the war with Scindiah, in which 
 he served with the Commander-in-Chief's army. Notwithstanding 
 this, he called in Holkar ; he supported him upon the Jumna ; he 
 is the cause of the invasion of the Dooab, and of the prolongation 
 of the contest at this moment by the support which he gives to 
 Holkar's defeated troops by his forts on our frontier. 
 
 The Rajah of Jyenagur is another instance. His country was 
 considered as one of the bulwarks of Bengal, yet Holkar galloped 
 through it with his cavalry, marched his infantry through it, has 
 communicated ever since with Malwa through it ; and the Rajah, 
 although rendered independent by the treaty of peace and called 
 an ally of the Company, has not only never given any assistance, 
 but is strongly suspected of having aided to distress Colonel 
 Monson on his retreat. There are many other instances of the 
 same kind on the frontier of Cuttack. So much for alliances with 
 petty Rajahs. 
 
 251. To Colonel Malcolm. 
 
 Assaults on BJmrtpoor mismanaged, and of dangerous consequence. 
 
 (Extract.) St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805. 
 
 The 4th and 5th failures before Bhurtpoor are disastrous 
 
 events, of which I apprehend the worst consequences. They 
 
 must have blundered that siege terribly, for it is certain that, 
 
 with adequate means, every place can be taken ; and 
 
 having been so long before the place, adequate means 
 
 must have been provided, or in his power. The fault lies there- 
 fore in the misapplication of them, or, most probably, in the 
 omission to employ all those which were necessary to accomplish 
 the object in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers, 
 
 or the impetuosity of 's temper, which could not 
 
 brook the necessary delay. 
 
 F f 3
 
 436 A FIELD FORCE REQUIRED IN OUR TERRITORIES. 
 
 VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN 
 EMPIRE. 
 
 i. Anglo-Indian Army. 
 
 252. To Lord Clive. 
 
 Alteration of the military system in the Company 's territories 
 desirable. There must be an active field force ; and as few 
 garrisons as possible. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800. 
 
 I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 
 14th inst., in which you desire to have my opinion regarding the 
 extent of the military force which will be necessary for the new 
 territory which your Lordship informs me will be assigned by 
 the Nizam to the exclusive management of the Company for 
 Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. It is difficult to give an 
 opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little 
 knowledge ; but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed 
 to state what has occurred to me upon the subject. 
 
 The question which your Lordship has put to me involves 
 considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this 
 country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the 
 Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept 
 in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realised by means of the 
 troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects 
 on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we 
 have been acting hitherto. This must be changed : neither the 
 new territory, nor the old, can be kept in awe by troops dis- 
 persed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety ; and, there- 
 fore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison 
 those posts only which are absolutely necessary to us, and to
 
 WEAK AND DISPERSED GARRISONS INADEQUATE. 437 
 
 have at all times in the field, and in motion, 2 or 3 regiments 
 of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of Native 
 infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, 
 not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, 
 Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear 
 more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, 
 when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which 
 they have been accustomed, are considered. 
 
 The whole of the country to be ceded by the Nizam is in- 
 habited by petty rajahs and polygars, who have never been 
 entirely subdued, and have never submitted to the species of 
 government which must be exercised by the Company's ser- 
 vants. They have been accustomed either to the rapacity and 
 corruption of Tippoo's government, or to the weakness of the 
 Nizam's ; but they are entirely unacquainted with the restraint 
 of a regular authority, constructed upon the principles adopted 
 by the Company's government. This they will resist ; and they 
 must be kept in awe, particularly at first, by a large and an 
 active force. For this purpose troops in garrison will never 
 answer. 
 
 253. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Peace in Europe no good ground for reduction of the army in 
 India. How it may best be reduced. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 22nd March, 1802. 
 
 I am very glad to find that the King's ministers are likely 
 again to take the power over this country into their own hands, 
 and make use of the control which they have over the gentry 
 in Leadenhall-street. I do not know exactly the points upon 
 which Lord Wellesley is at issue with them, but I judge from 
 Malcolm's account of the letters which he has received from 
 England, that whatever they may be, he will be supported by 
 the Board of Control, particularly as he appears disposed to 
 make every reduction in the military expenses which is at all 
 practicable. 
 
 I agree with you entirely about the peace. It establishes 
 the French power over Europe, and when we shall have dis- 
 armed we shall have no security excepting in our own abject-
 
 438 ARMY REDUCTION AS AFFECTED BY THE PEACE. 
 
 ness. There is a report that the finances were in a very- 
 embarrassed state, which I am afraid is true, as there could have 
 been no other inducement to make such a peace. 
 
 I look upon the question of reduction in this country to 
 stand upon grounds entirely independent of peace or war in 
 Europe. We have carried on no offensive operations in this 
 quarter, and we have long ceased to fear an attack from the 
 French. The size of our army is to be attributed to the 
 demands for its services existing in India, and is by no means 
 occasioned by the war in Europe. The question is, whether 
 those demands are likely to be lessened or to cease upon the 
 conclusion of the peace. I rather believe that as that event 
 will be accompanied by the return of the French and Dutch to 
 their settlements in India, it might be concluded with more 
 truth that the army ought to be increased rather than 
 diminished. 
 
 The people of England, however, will not willingly hear of 
 the existence of our large military establishments in India in 
 time of profound peace in Europe. They will not easily believe 
 that there is a necessity for them in India in the most peaceable 
 times, and some reduction is therefore absolutely necessary. 
 On this ground only does the peace influence the question of 
 reduction. But it is very clear that the army ought to be 
 reduced as little as possible, particularly that its effective 
 strength ought to be kept entire. 
 
 If there is to be any reduction of numbers below what they 
 will be after the supernumeraries are struck off, I think the 
 best mode will undoubtedly be to decrease the number of 
 men in each battalion, rather than to disband any of the regi- 
 ments. By this mode it will be more easy at all times to increase 
 the army to its present numbers ; and as by either mode the 
 officers must still be in the service, on the establishment, and 
 in the receipt of their pay and batta, it will be equally eco- 
 nomical for the present. Hereafter, however, when the number 
 of officers will have decreased, to disband some of the regiments 
 will be the more economical mode ; but it will be attended with 
 the disadvantage of great difficulty in increasing the numbers 
 of the army again.
 
 OBLIGATIONS OF EXTENDED EMPIRE. 439 
 
 254. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Distribution of the military establishment required for the pacifica- 
 tion and defence of the Madras Presidency. The conquest 
 of foreign enemies does not alone enable us to reduce our 
 armies. The increasing influence of the civil government may 
 do so ; and make a field force less necessary than I once 
 thought it. 
 
 (Extract.) 3rd July, 1804. 
 
 In respect to the general question of a military establishment, 
 it has always appeared to me that government has made an 
 erroneous calculation of the value of their conquests, as if they 
 were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and 
 their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the 
 success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their 
 external enemies ; and they have imagined that, in proportion as 
 they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means 
 of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be parti- 
 cularly the error of the Court of Directors. 
 
 They have not adverted to the fact that all government in 
 India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword ; 
 that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been 
 obliged to weaken the means of their internal government, 
 that is to say, the power of the sword in their own pro- 
 vinces, by which, till this last war, they have invariably suf- 
 fered ; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign 
 war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may 
 have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must, 
 bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because 
 the government must be established in the new territory, and 
 supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. 
 The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, 
 is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments 
 and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have 
 found yourself, from the want of troops. 
 
 This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so 
 severely felt. For the last 5 or 6 years, great exertions have 
 been made, and the Company's power has been vastly extended, 
 without any very great increase of their military resources. 
 What has been done has been by great military activity and
 
 44° THE SWORD, THE MAIN SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 exertion ; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of 
 the Company's military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, 
 they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis's 
 time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every 
 thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, 
 to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, 
 as well as to provide the means of making foreign conquests. 
 But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the 
 establishment of Fort St. George ; and the troops and military 
 resources of this presidency will be applicable to the defence of 
 the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide 
 for the peace of the country. 
 
 I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an 
 European enemy in India, and least of all in this war ; because 
 the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of 
 naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in 
 an attack on this country. 
 
 In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from 
 the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter 
 end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are 
 in their favour ; and we have also in their favour the practical 
 example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in 
 the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same 
 system ; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces 
 under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always 
 Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the 
 Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in 
 all their provinces in the Peninsula from which their troops were 
 withdrawn were not in rebellion. It is true that the circum- 
 stances and events of the war were favourable to internal peace, 
 and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil govern- 
 ment lately established. But, on the other hand, a Mahratta 
 war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely 
 to be disturbed, as the Mahrattas have their agents and intrigue 
 every where ; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the 
 general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout 
 the late war, to something more than chance, or than to the 
 circumstances and events of the war itself. Still, however, the 
 sword is the main support of the government ; and it is necessary 
 now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the 
 Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the 
 internal tranquillity: and I have adverted particularly to the
 
 BUT CIVIL AUTHORITY IS GROWING STRONGER. 44I 
 
 state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influ- 
 ence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each 
 of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought 
 to be disposed. 
 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the 
 great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to pro- 
 vide, on which it is most probable that the French would make 
 an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa on the western 
 coast, and Masulipatam and Fort St. George on the eastern, that 
 distribution of the army which would best provide for the 
 support of the internal government, and would preserve tran- 
 quillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula 
 against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, 
 therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject. 
 
 In the countries in which the new systems of government have 
 been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is 
 probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the 
 constant interference of the military in the support of the civil 
 government and of the police. In those districts it will be 
 possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or 
 two great stations. This arrangement will be advantageous to 
 discipline ; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you 
 the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the 
 coast which may be threatened or attacked ; you will always 
 have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion ; 
 and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in 
 these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil govern- 
 ment, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in 
 which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they 
 have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in 
 numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the whole, 
 and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold 
 them would appear most important. But although I thus 
 recommend the assembly of the troops in each division where 
 the new systems of government have been established, generally 
 in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the de- 
 struction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that 
 subject ; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these 
 countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, 
 or held by small detachments made from one corps at the 
 principal station. 
 
 In the countries in which the new system of civil government
 
 442 PARTIAL CONCENTRATION IN STATIONS DESIRABLE. 
 
 has not been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing 
 the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should 
 recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together 
 as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of 
 very evident necessity. If this principle can be carried into 
 effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might 
 in some degree, it will give you in each division a small dis- 
 posable force. This may not be equal to all the demands 
 which may arise, but it will give you some strength everywhere ; 
 and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, 
 and of the Company's territories under the government of Fort 
 St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your 
 force in one position. 
 
 In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, 
 for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even 
 of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection 
 and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops 
 constantly in the field. Both Native and European troops have 
 their camp equipage always in readiness ; and I can speak with 
 certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of 
 other principal stations of the army, that the time which would 
 be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, 
 and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be 
 sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to 
 carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for 
 the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram 
 for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as 
 the gram. 
 
 Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you 
 would not give it a gram department ; and, therefore, when it 
 would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country 
 for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly 
 from these great stations. The only advantage in point of 
 equipment that the field force would have would be carriage for 
 the sick ; but even some of that is always to be procured : and 
 it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which 
 event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick 
 behind them in their station. The objections to the centrical 
 field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, 
 they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a 
 cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawn- 
 pore and Futtyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this
 
 A FIELD FORCE LESS REQUISITE THAN FORMERLY. 443 
 
 observation. Those troops are in barracks, and the officers in 
 bungalows ; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move 
 a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must 
 be left to take care of the cantonment. 
 
 But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose 
 that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as 
 possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on 
 which the French might land, with directions to watch and 
 circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off 
 their communications with the country, and to prevent them 
 from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions. &c. Supposing the 
 landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the 
 French should land to be as large as any they have been able to 
 bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the 
 eastern division of the Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at 
 Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. 
 It is probable that the centrical field force, unless reinforced by 
 the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal 
 to more ; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advan- 
 tage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier 
 period than they would the field force. 
 
 On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the 
 western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the 
 same. The troops would collect in Malabar in their neigh- 
 bourhood ; they would be joined by those from Seringapatam ; 
 and they would certainly be felt before the field force could 
 approach. 
 
 When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, 
 such as the late war with the Mahrattas, the mere readiness of 
 the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations 
 required for the departments of the service. You could march 
 the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be 
 ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of 
 no use. I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon 
 this subject : but the state of the country has altered much since 
 I formed it ; the equipments of the army have been much im- 
 proved ; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the 
 real benefits of these field forces ; and I acknowledge that I am 
 sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil 
 government have established tranquillity in the districts in which 
 they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto 
 existed.
 
 444 THE MADRAS ARMY TO BE AUGMENTED. 
 
 255. To Lord W. Bentinck. 
 
 Necessity of adding five regiments to the Madras army. Their 
 pay has already been provided. 
 
 Fort William, 29th Aug., 1804. 
 
 The Governor-General has desired me to inform your Lordship 
 that it is his intention to send orders to Fort St. George, as soon 
 as they can be prepared, to authorise you to add 5 regiments to 
 that establishment. His Excellency, however, is desirous that no 
 measures should be taken in consequence of this intimation of his 
 intention till you shall hear further from him. 
 
 He intends that the troops of the government of Fort St. 
 George should occupy the territories and posts as detailed in 
 his notes of instructions dated the 25th May, excepting Goa, 
 which place he intends to occupy by Bombay troops. Accord- 
 ing to this arrangement, Scindiah's subsidiary force will be 
 permanently formed of Bengal troops. 
 
 This addition to the establishment of Fort St. George will 
 probably appear large ; but it is not so large within 4 bat- 
 talions as that required by Gen. Stuart ; and the establishment 
 will not be larger than that which existed in the end of the year 
 1802. 
 
 After a full review of the military establishments since the 
 year 1796, when they were first formed upon the model on which 
 the army stands at the present moment, it appears clearly that 
 all the additions which have been made to the armies of Fort 
 St. George and Bombay, including this addition of 5 regiments, 
 have been paid for by subsidies, or by revenues granted for 
 the express purpose of supporting troops. I enclose a copy 
 of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor-General 
 upon this subject, which will explain fully my sentiments 
 upon it. 
 
 It is difficult to say upon what principle the establishment of 
 1796 was formed. However, it was certainly not sufficient for 
 any purpose, even in the limited state of our territories under 
 Fort St. George at that time ; as, besides the regular regiments, 
 there were 4 extra battalions, which have since been formed into 
 the 1 2th and 13th regts., and there was a Madras battalion and 
 several corps of sebundies in the northern Circars. 
 
 Even thus increased, it was certainly not an establishment 
 adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to
 
 NEW REGIMENTS NEEDED, AND ALREADY PAID FOR, 445 
 
 maintain internal tranquillity at the same time ; as in the first 
 place, it is a well known fact that it was with the utmost diffi- 
 culty that an army was assembled in 1798 and 1799 tnat could 
 go to Seringapatam ; and in the second place, when that army 
 was drawn together and marched into Mysore, a rebellion broke 
 out in the provinces south of the Coleroon, and another in those 
 north of the Kistna. 
 
 The reduction of our great Native enemy, therefore, which was 
 the result of that war, could not be urged as a reason for the 
 diminution of the military establishments to be stationed in the 
 old territories, when it appeared that the moment the troops 
 marched out of those territories, the inhabitants were in rebellion. 
 I therefore conclude that the establishment of 1796 was adequate 
 only to the preservation of internal tranquillity in the Carnatic ; 
 and that when additions of territory were made, additional troops 
 were required. But supposing the establishment of 1796 to have 
 been an adequate peace establishment, which circumstances have 
 proved it was not, I think the facts stated in the enclosed memo- 
 randum show that all the corps raised since (including the 5 new 
 regiments) have been paid for by the means provided. 
 
 If the new levies had not been made, the Company's old terri- 
 tories would have been lost, or the Company must have failed to 
 perform their part of the treaties, by which they have gained such 
 large subsidies. 
 
 256. Memorandum submitted to the Governor -General by 
 Major- General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military 
 establishments of India. 
 
 Arbitrary and inadequate provision of the Court of Directors for 
 the military requirements of Madras and Bombay. Rapid 
 and large expansion of those requirements since ; coincidently 
 with, and in consequence of, the acquisition of territorial and 
 pecuniary resources for the support of the additional troops. 
 
 Fort William, Nov., 1804. 
 
 1. On the nth Feb. 1801, the Court of Directors wrote orders 
 that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist 
 of 7 regiments of European infantry and 14 regiments of Native 
 infantry, including 3 regiments for the subsidiary force serving 
 with the Nizam.
 
 446 CAPRICIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE DIRECTORS. 
 
 2. They ordered at the same time 3 European regiments and 
 8 regiments of Native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, 
 under the notion that all above 4 of the latter would be paid for 
 by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob 
 of Surat. 
 
 3. I shall advert hereafter to the European establishment for 
 those governments. It does not appear that the Court of Direc- 
 tors have had before them any detailed statements of the want 
 of troops when they gave these orders ; but they have given 
 them in an arbitrary manner, without considering at all the cir- 
 cumstances of the country to which they were intended to be 
 applied. 
 
 4. In respect to the establishment of Fort St. George, it was 
 not increased by these orders beyond that ordered in the year 
 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. 
 The establishment ordered in 1796 was 11 regiments, and one 
 for the Nizam, if he should require one; that of 1801 was 11 
 regiments, and 3 for the Nizam. Yet in 1799 an addition was 
 made to the Company's territories of Coimbatoor, of the districts 
 bordering on the eastern ghauts (besides Canara and Soonda, for 
 which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay esta- 
 blishment) ; and the Company engaged, in consequence of a 
 subsidy of 7 lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to 
 defend his territories and support his government. 
 
 5. As the Court of Directors have not condescended to parti- 
 culars, it is impossible to say whether they adverted to the 
 necessity of defending Mysore or not ; but whether they did or 
 not, 3 regiments were certainly necessary for the purposes of 
 Mysore and Coimbatoor, in addition to the old establishment 
 necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam's subsidiary force. 
 
 6. After the letter of Feb. 1801, was written, the treaty of 1800 
 was concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan, by which a large 
 territory was ceded, in perpetuity, in commutation of subsidy. 
 The principle on which this territory was ceded, was that the 
 Company should receive nearly double the amount of the sum 
 paid as subsidy, in order to defray the expense of defending and 
 governing the territory ceded : it cannot be denied that this 
 territory would require troops. 
 
 7. Subsequently to the dispatch of this letter from the Court 
 of Directors, the civil government of the Carnatic was trans- 
 ferred to the Company. The Nabob's troops were discharged, 
 and the duty which they had performed devolved upon those
 
 NEW RESOURCES FOR, AND REQUIRING, NEW TROOPS. 44.J 
 
 of the Company. This was a fresh demand for the services of 
 troops, for which the advantages gained provided the means of 
 payment. 
 
 8. These last two demands may be fairly stated to have occa- 
 sioned a necessity for 2 regiments ; and in this manner has the 
 establishment of Fort St. George amounted to '.9 regiments. 
 
 9. In respect to the establishment of Bombay, the Court of 
 Directors have decided that 2 battalions in Malabar, and 2 
 battalions in Canara, are fully sufficient. That establishment 
 has certainly never been sufficient, as the Court might see by 
 referring to their records. But the Court have admitted of 8 
 regiments on the Bombay establishment, and fortunately it has 
 been possible to post a large portion of the force in Malabar. 
 
 10. Since these orders have been written, the following addi- 
 tional demands have been made upon the establishment of 
 Bombay: viz. 2 battalions for Goa; 4 battalions, if they should be 
 of their present strength of 700 men, and if 1000 men, 3 battalions 
 for the Guickwar state. Only one regiment has been raised to 
 make up this deficiency, so that there remain 3 battalions to be 
 provided for. 
 
 11. Besides this deficiency, the subsidiary force at Poonah is 
 paid for, and to be supplied either by the government of Fort 
 St. George or Bombay ; and the territories ceded by the Guick- 
 war, the Peshwah, and Scindiah in Guzerat, which altogether are 
 of the value of 50 lacs of rupees, would appear to deserve some 
 troops to take care of them. 
 
 12. Reckoning that these territories require only one bat- 
 talion, the total deficiency of Native infantry, for the payment 
 of which provision is made (excepting for the 2 battalions at 
 Goa, and one in the territories in Guzerat, for which 12 lacs at 
 Baroach may be considered a fair equivalent), will amount to 
 10 battalions. 
 
 13. I shall now consider the subject in reference to the detailed 
 wants of each establishment, the only mode in which a question 
 of this kind can be fairly considered. 
 
 14. The Guickwar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or 3 
 battalions of Bombay troops ; there must be 2 battalions of 
 Bombay troops at Surat ; and one battalion of Bombay troops 
 at Baroach ; 6 battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah ; 4 at 
 Bombay ; and 2 at Goa : making the total of Bombay troops 
 18 battalions, or 9 regiments. 
 
 15. The battalions of Bombay infantry ought to be 1000
 
 448 DETAILED WANTS OF THE BOMBAY ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
 men in time of war at all events. Hereafter I -shall give a 
 memorandum regarding the mode of arranging the Guickwar 
 subsidiary force. 
 
 16. Gen. Stuart's distribution of the army at Fort St. George 
 will require 54 battalions, from which, if 2 battalions to be posted 
 at Goa, and to be found, according to this plan, by Bombay, are 
 subtracted, there will remain 52 battalions. He has now 38 bat- 
 talions, and if he should be authorised to raise 5 more regiments 
 to make up for his deficiencies of Bombay troops, the deficiency 
 in his distribution will be 4 battalions. These may be extra 
 battalions until the orders of the Court of Directors shall have 
 been received. 
 
 17. It is desirable that the orders for completing these 5 
 regiments should be given as soon as possible, as in their 
 present state the extra battalions are useless ; and in the season 
 of operations Gen. Stuart will be deficient — in fact, all the 
 Bombay troops which will have been relieved ; and the 5 Ma- 
 dras battalions, still remaining at Poonah, whose return cannot 
 be expected till the end of the year : making a total defi- 
 ciency of 15 battalions in an army of 48 battalions, or nearly 
 one third. 
 
 1 8. In respect to Europeans, the difference between the Court 
 of Directors and Gen. Stuart is not very great. They have given 
 20 battalions, and therefore we cannot tell on what they have 
 founded their calculation. But since they have made it, one 
 regiment has been given to the Nizam, for which he makes pro- 
 vision, and the Ceded districts certainly require one, and may be 
 fairly estimated as supplying the means of paying one. Gen. 
 Stuart's estimate is 11 regiments, including Goa. If Goa is to 
 be supplied by Bombay, the number demanded by Gen. Stuart 
 is reduced to 10 regiments, which is only one regiment more than 
 is allowed by the Court of Directors, adding one for the subsidiary 
 force at Hyderabad, and one for the Ceded districts, both of which 
 are paid for. 
 
 19. The Court of Directors have fixed 3 regiments of Euro- 
 peans as the establishment for Bombay, including one for Goa. 
 There ought to be 4, of which number 2 ought to be at Bombay, 
 one at Goa, and one to the northward. 
 
 20. In respect to cavalry at Fort St. George, the original esta- 
 blishment in 1796 was 4 regiments; since that time the Nizam 
 has paid for 2 regiments, and the Peshwah for one regiment. 
 There are now 8 regiments, so that the increase of the establish-
 
 75 ROMAN POLICY SUITABLE TO ENGLAND ? 449 
 
 ment is one regiment since the year 1796. Of all the increases of 
 establishments which have been made, and which are now neces- 
 sary, this is the only one which appears to me not to have been 
 paid for by subsidies from the Native powers, and this may be 
 fairly counted as provided for by the revenues of Coimbatoor, &c. 
 
 21. It may be urged against this statement, if no increase has 
 been made to the army, not provided for, how came the military 
 expenses of Fort St. George to be still such a burthen on the 
 finances ? I answer, because Fort St. George has now the burthen 
 of defending Malabar, which Bombay formerly had. 
 
 In case this Memorandum should be approved of, it would be 
 desirable to acquaint Mr. Duncan of the alteration of the arrange- 
 ment respecting Scindiah's subsidiary force and Goa ; and to 
 adopt Gen. Stuart's distribution for the territories of Fort St. 
 George, and to order the increase of the establishment. 
 
 257. Memorandum on the plan proposed of an interchange 
 of Native troops of India and the Negro Corps of the 
 West Indies. 1805 \ 
 
 The plan involves replacing English soldiers in India by 
 negroes. The high qualities of the former are unique, and 
 the foundation of our power in India. Negroes will possess 
 no such peculiar combination of remarkable qualities ; and 
 will be a source of weakness and danger. They might with 
 
 1 This memorandum was written at sea on the voyage from St. Helena 
 to England, in consequence of the observations contained in the follow- 
 ing letters from Lord Castlereagh to Marquess Wellesley. — Note by His 
 Grace, the present Duke of Wellington. 
 
 My dear Lord, East Sheen, 21st Aug., 1804. 
 
 The extreme difficulty of raising men at home for general service has 
 induced His Majesty's Ministers to turn their attention to foreign troops 
 of every description. A considerable number of Europeans has already 
 been procured, and an extensive augmentation of the black corps in 
 the West Indies has been ordered, but still the establishment of the 
 army will remain very far short of what the various and pressing exigencies 
 of our situation require. 
 
 Amongst other expedients for augmenting the public force, the pos- 
 sibility of raising sepoy regiments for service extra India has suggested 
 itself for consideration ; but as considerable doubts are entertained here 
 of the policy of such a measure as bearing upon the habits and feelings 
 of our Native subjects in that part of the globe, there is a reluctance in 
 
 G g
 
 450 TWO ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION. 
 
 less disadvantage be sent to Ceylon. Considering their in- 
 feriority, they will be more costly than European troops. 
 The plan also contemplates sepoys replacing, in the West 
 Indies, European as well as negro troops. Considering the 
 general character of the defensive service required there, 
 only a third of the Eiiropeans could thus be replaced ; and 
 that would require twice the number of sepoys. As light 
 troops, for offensive operations, against savages, &c, sepoys 
 are quite unsuitable. Nor will the climate agree tvith them. 
 They can only be sent as volunteers. And few will volunteer 
 for sue J i service. The difficulties and expense connected with 
 their peculiar food, their attendance, and the allowances of 
 their European officers, make the plan, on a large scale, im- 
 practicable. And it would check future recruiting in India. 
 The King's officers might recruit in Chittagong, for partial 
 service, as in Jamaica; but not ivithout a tendency to 
 increase the cost of native troops. A better plan would be, to 
 raise Malay corps. On the whole, negroes would not suit India, 
 7ior sepoys efficiently defend the West Indies. The certain 
 difficulties and cost overbalance the too hastily assumed advan- 
 tages of both parts of the plan ; and make the second, on a large 
 scale, impossible. The previous objections also apply to sending 
 sepoys to the Cape ; but negroes might be sent thither. 
 The plan of employing the negro troops in the East Indies, 
 and the sepoys in the West Indies, ought to be considered in 
 two views: ist, in a view to its efficiency, supposing it to be 
 practicable ; 2ndly, in a view to its practicability, supposing it to 
 be beneficial. 
 
 His Majesty's service to lend any countenance to such a plan unless 
 previously fortified by your Lordship's opinion in favour of its expediency 
 and practicability. 
 
 It .will be a great satisfaction to the King's Ministers to be favoured 
 with your Lordship's sentiments upon this subject in detail, with such 
 suggestions as occur to you with respect to the time for which the men 
 should be enlisted ; the best mode of constituting such a force, regard 
 being had to the importance of having a proportion of the officers con- 
 versant with the language and habits of the natives of India ; and also the 
 probable charge of raising and transporting a regiment of this description to 
 the West Indies, to which quarter, with perhaps the addition, under peculiar 
 circumstances, of Gibraltar and Malta, their services must be confined. 
 
 The difficulty of raising men in this prosperous country bears so
 
 ARE NEGROES TO REPLACE EUROPEANS TN INDIA ? 45 1 
 
 It is supposed that the negro regiments are to be substituted 
 for European regiments in India. It cannot be intended to sub- 
 stitute them for sepoy battalions ; as, supposing the ordinary and 
 
 much upon the security of India itself in necessarily limiting our 
 European force, that I am confident, exclusive of the ardour with which 
 your Lordship is naturally disposed to lend yourself to every public 
 object, that the question now submitted to your consideration will, in this 
 view, additionally claim your attention. There may be reasons why in 
 prudence we should not attempt to draw from India a resource which 
 it cannot yield without prejudice or hazard to higher and more im- 
 portant interests; but if from the immense population now within the 
 limits of our Indian sovereignty (there being no longer any difficulty with 
 respect to the recruiting of our own armies) a small proportion of force 
 could be drawn in aid of our service in other parts of the world, it would 
 certainly facilitate essentially the supplying India with a due proportion 
 of European troops. 
 
 I presume if the attempt is to be made at all, it would be prudent to make 
 a very limited experiment in the first instance ; that the nature of the service 
 should be fully explained to the men on entering, and that their return to 
 India, after a given number of years' service, should be assured to them. 
 
 Some doubts have been suggested as to the competence of the Indian 
 sepoy in robustness and bodily strength to cope with the European 
 enemy to whom they would generally be opposed in the West Indies : 
 a quality in which it is apprehended they are materially inferior as troops 
 to the African blacks. I should be glad to receive your Lordship's 
 opinion on this part of the subject. 
 
 Whilst I am upon the topic of African corps, I may as well mention, 
 though I can well conceive the objections to which such a plan may be 
 liable, an idea which has been thrown out in contemplating the difficulty 
 of feeding India with European force, namely, whether the introduction 
 of some regiments of a description similar to those which have been 
 found so serviceable in the West Indies, but to the extension of which 
 force beyond certain limits in that quarter there are serious objections, 
 might not supply India with a description of force possessing many of 
 the valuable qualities of European troops. I merely mention this, wishing 
 to attract your Lordship's attention to whatever hints may lead you to 
 a minute consideration of this subject. 
 
 I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord, 
 
 Your faithful humble servant, 
 
 Castlereagh. 
 
 If I recollect right, the sepoys employed to garrison the Moluccas in 
 the last war, were absent from the continent of India, many of them for the 
 last five or six years of the war. If so, it may have afforded your Lord- 
 
 Gg2
 
 452 TO REPLACE SEPOYS BY THEM WOULD BE IDLE. 
 
 constant expense of both descriptions of troops to be the same, 
 the levy and transport of negroes to India would cost consider- 
 able sums, whereas the levy of sepoys costs nothing. The 
 
 ship the means of judging how far the men can be reconciled to remote 
 and protracted service without shaking that disposition to embark which 
 happily has been, with good management, progressively increasing of 
 late years amongst our Native troops, and which for our Indian interests 
 it is essential to cultivate with the utmost care and attention. 
 
 My dear Lord, East Sheen, 25th Aug., 1804. 
 
 Having, in my letter No. 25, adverted to the defective supply of recruits 
 at home for general service, I think it may be satisfactory to your Lord- 
 ship to receive a detailed statement of our present military force at home 
 and abroad. 
 
 The statement enclosed is for the month of May last, but, as that for 
 July does not exceed it in amount more than 2000 men, it will answer 
 equally well for all the purposes of general information. 
 
 The line and militia at present amount, at home and abroad, to 
 241,217 effective rank and file. The deficiencies on our establishment 
 (almost entirely confined to the line) are not less than 40,000 men. 
 The additional force proposed to be raised under Mr. Pitt's last Bill, ex- 
 clusive of the gradual conversion of the supplementary militia, as vacancies 
 happen, into an army of reserve, may be taken at 20,000, making a gross 
 deficiency upon our proposed military establishment of about 60,000 men. 
 
 Your Lordship will perceive that, independent of volunteers, which in 
 the accompanying returns are stated from the effectives at the monthly 
 inspections, and not from their nominal establishment, the regular force 
 for home-defence is, in Great Britain, including Jersey and Guernsey, 
 138,000; in Ireland, 50,000 rank and file. It will require full 20,000 
 men more to place us at home as we wish to stand, and this before we 
 can consider ourselves as having a force disposable for foreign service. 
 
 The demands for disposable force are at the same time very pressing, 
 and it is impossible for us to look upon ourselves as in a situation to do 
 justice to the interests of the country in the war in which we are engaged 
 unless we can command the service of a corps of not less than 20,000 
 men for offensive operations, preserving at the same time our internal 
 defences on that high scale which the preparations of the enemy have 
 rendered indispensable. 
 
 Your Lordship will be able to estimate from the above sketch of our 
 military situation the difficulties I have to contend with in attempting to 
 rJrocure for India the European reinforcements which I deem to be 
 essential to our interests in that quarter ; so that your Lordship must be 
 satisfied to receive at present limited supplies, being assured that I shall 
 seize the first moment which more exposed interests will admit of
 
 SEPOYS MORE USEFUL THAN NEGROES IN INDIA. 453 
 
 negroes could not perform the duties of the sepoys better, or 
 so well, as these have always performed them. It cannot be 
 deemed necessary to send negroes to India to replace sepoys, 
 
 placing the British army in India on the most respectable footing ; and 
 I shall not cease to importune the Duke of York to allot a number of 
 recruits, beyond the very inadequate proportion the Company have 
 lately received from the recruiting depot, to restore the artillery corps to 
 its proper strength. In the mean time I trust you will avail yourself of 
 whatever resource can be derived for the support of this most important 
 feature of our army, either from the men volunteering from the King's 
 regiments ordered home, or from the Company's European regiments, 
 which are at present wholly inefficient; notwithstanding which evident truth, 
 and the little prospect of completing them by recruits from Europe, I find 
 either their reduction or their conversion into Native battalions much dis- 
 relished by the Court of Directors. Such of the men, however, as are fit for 
 the artillery will, I am sure, be much more usefully employed in that service. 
 
 Having apprised your Lordship that His Majesty's Ministers are not 
 yet satisfied with the amount of our force at home, which exceeds both 
 in quality of troops and in numbers what the country has possessed at 
 any former period, I think it necessary to state in explanation that the 
 preparations of the enemy continue with unbated vigour along the whole 
 line of their coast. Great exertions have been used in equipping and 
 even augmenting their regular navy, and they have now, including 8 
 Dutch, about 45 sail of the line from Toulon to the Texel in a state 
 to put to sea, though certainly, in many respects, little qualified to 
 contend with our ships. But their efforts have been principally directed 
 to the construction, equipment, and discipline, as far as that can be 
 accomplished in their own harbours and under the protection of their 
 batteries, of a lesser marine, which consists of four or five different 
 classes of vessels, descending from prames, which are square-rigged and 
 carry each about thirty heavy guns, to row-boats carrying one gun and 
 capable of receiving about fifty men. The former are good batteries, 
 sail reasonably well with a fair wind, and, from drawing very little water, 
 are well calculated to cover the landing of troops. 
 
 From the best information we are in possession of, they have ac- 
 cumulated not less than 2000 vessels of all sorts for the purposes of 
 descent; of these about 300 are of the class of stout gun-brigs and 
 vessels of a higher description ; the remainder are transports fitted for 
 the reception of horses and artillery, Dutch schuyts, Greenland boats, 
 and craft of various descriptions. They are now assembled in the ports 
 of Boulogne, Ostend, and Flushing, the former station, with several de- 
 pendent basins, having been enlarged for the reception of this flotilla, on 
 board of which a large proportion of the army is constantly embarked,
 
 454 AND PROCURABLE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS. 
 
 who may be withdrawn from thence for the service of the West 
 Indies, as hitherto there has existed no very great difficulty in 
 raising as many sepoys for the service in India as might be 
 thought necessary. 
 
 partly for the purpose of training and accustoming them to the manage- 
 ment of the boats, partly as affording them more convenient accommoda- 
 tion than huts on shore. Making due allowance for the proportion of 
 tonnage which must be employed in transporting artillery, stores, pro- 
 visions, and horses, the above fleet may be calculated as capable of 
 transporting on an average about sixty men each, or upon the whole 
 120,000 men; to which is to be added whatever may be embarked from 
 Brest and Rochefort on the one flank, or from the Texel on the other, 
 either on board or under the protection of their fleets. 
 
 It has been generally understood that Buonaparte's purpose has been 
 not to attempt the descent with less than 200,000 men. Your Lord- 
 ship will make your own calculation what proportion of this force is 
 likely to penetrate the succession of defences we happily possess before 
 the enemy can bring the contest to an issue upon land. 
 
 There are still sceptics upon the attempt being finally made. What- 
 ever may be the result, we must clearly act as if it were inevitable ; and 
 after all that has passed, the nature of the man and the object in view 
 compared with the risk being considered, I cannot bring myself to doubt 
 its being hazarded, the rather as there is nothing in the state of the Conti- 
 nent which is likely, at least for the present year, to give him any alarm 
 for his own security at home whilst he is employed on the expedition. 
 
 During the last three months the progress the Volunteers have made 
 in discipline is highly satisfactory, and there prevails amongst that 
 valuable and improving force the best possible spirit. Since encourage- 
 ment was given by Parliament to their coming out upon permanent 
 duty, there have been in Great Britain alone not less than 180,000 men 
 who have .passed from a fortnight to three weeks, at a distance from their 
 homes, in an uninterrupted improvement of themselves in the use of 
 arms, during which time they have been subject to the Mutiny Act and 
 been superintended and instructed by regular officers. 
 
 In addition to our preparations in point of numbers, the whole being 
 now brigaded under General officers, a plan is in considerable forward- 
 ness for moving with rapidity to the point of attack whatever proportion 
 of the Volunteer force it may be expedient to bring forward in aid of the 
 regular army ; and it is hoped that it may be so arranged as to admit of 
 the entire force (if necessary) of England being concentered for the secu- 
 rity of the metropolis on the ninth day, supplying a daily reinforcement 
 of about 25,000 men to the main army advanced in front of London. 
 
 I have already said enough to justify myself, I trust, to your Lordship
 
 EXCELLENCE OF ENGLISH SOLDIERS IN INDIA. 455 
 
 The plan, therefore, must be considered as substituting negroes 
 in India for English soldiers. 
 
 It must first be considered for what a substitute is to be found, 
 before it is determined that it is a good one. 
 
 The English soldiers are the main foundation of the British 
 power in Asia. They are a body with habits, manners, and 
 qualities peculiar to them in the East Indies. 
 
 Bravery is the characteristic of the British army in all quarters 
 of the world ; but no other quarter has afforded such striking 
 examples of the existence of this quality in the soldiers as the 
 East Indies. An instance of their misbehaviour in the field has 
 never been known ; and particularly those who have been for 
 
 for not having obtained for India, in the course of the past season, a 
 larger proportion of King's troops. The same considerations must also 
 reconcile your Lordship to a disappointment with respect to the naval 
 succours, which, upon consultation with Lord Melville, I felt myself 
 warranted in holding out to your Lordship in my letter of May last. 
 His Lordship desires me to express his regret that the pressing demands 
 at home preclude him at this moment from detaching from hence the 
 two ships then promised, and he is also unable to supply by the fleet now 
 under despatch any number of seamen for the ships which may have 
 been taken up in India in pursuance of the late orders from the Board 
 of Admiralty to Admiral Rainier, there being above thirty light-armed 
 ships, peculiarly adapted for service in the narrow seas, at this moment 
 in the river, completely equipped and only waiting for hands. It will, 
 however, be an early object of his Lordship's solicitude to furnish you 
 with the means of completing the naval armament ordered in India with 
 the least possible delay. 
 
 I cannot close this despatch without offering to your Lordship my 
 congratulations on the truly gallant and distinguished conduct of the 
 China fleet. The Court of Directors have liberally distributed about 
 50,000/. amongst the officers and men, which, in addition to the notice 
 the King has taken of their services by conferring on Captain Dance, as 
 Commodore, the honour of knighthood, cannot fail, I trust, to infuse into 
 the Company's marine a confidence in their own strength and a determina- 
 tion hereafter to redeem their character, which had suffered in one or two 
 instances towards the close of the last war. Few events have given greater 
 satisfaction to the nation than Linois' defeat. It is a novel description of 
 glory, and, as such, has produced a more lively impression on the public 
 mind than a repetition of triumphs to which our navy is so well accustomed. 
 Believe me, my dear Lord, with great truth and respect, 
 
 Most faithfully yours, 
 
 Castlereagh.
 
 456 NEGROES COULD NOT EFFECTUALLY REPLACE THEM. 
 
 some time in that country cannot be ordered upon any service, 
 however dangerous or arduous, that they will not effect, not only 
 with bravery, but a degree of skill not often witnessed in persons 
 of their description in other parts of the world. 
 
 I attribute these qualities, which are peculiar to them in the 
 East Indies, to the distinctness of their class in that country 
 from all others existing in it. They feel that they are a distinct 
 and superior class to the rest of the world which surrounds them ; 
 and their actions correspond with their high notions of their own 
 superiority. Add to these qualities that their bodies are inured 
 to climate, hardship, and fatigue, by long residence, habit, and 
 exercise, to such a degree, that I have seen them for years to- 
 gether in the field without suffering any material sickness ; that 
 I have made them march 60 miles in 30 hours, and afterwards 
 engage the enemy ; and it will not be surprising that they 
 should be respected, as they are, throughout India. Their 
 weaknesses and vices, however repugnant to the feelings and 
 prejudices of the Natives, are passed over in the contemplation 
 of their excellent qualities as soldiers, of which no nation has 
 hitherto given such extraordinary instances. These qualities are 
 the foundation of the British strength in Asia, and of that opinion 
 by which it is generally supposed that the British empire has 
 been gained and upheld. These qualities show in what manner 
 nations, consisting of millions, are governed by 30,000 strangers. 
 
 For this body, endowed with these excellent qualities, are ne- 
 groes a substitute? It does not appear that the fidelity of the 
 negroes can be depended upon ; they are prone to mutiny. 
 
 They are brave, undoubtedly ; but are they unhesitatingly so 
 as are the English soldiers ? 
 
 The Native public cannot but know that they have been pur- 
 chased slaves. There will be no distinction between the negroes 
 and the lower classes of Natives ; if any, unfortunately, one to 
 the disparagement of the former, and no respect will be enter- 
 tained for them. 
 
 It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen 
 under my observation, that the Natives of India have no fear 
 or respect for the military qualities of the soldiers of any Eu- 
 ropean nation excepting the English. I had under my com- 
 mand for some years the Swiss regiment De Meuron, which, 
 for good conduct, discipline, and other military qualities, was 
 not surpassed by the English regiments. But the Natives heard 
 that they were foreigners, that they had been bought into the
 
 NEGROES WOULD ENDANGER OUR RULE IN INDIA. 4$J 
 
 service, and they had no confidence in them. What respect or 
 confidence could be expected from them in a band of purchased 
 negroes ? 
 
 The introduction of the negro troops in India will bring with 
 it a new evil not hitherto known there. The government will 
 not be able to place implicit reliance on the fidelity of its 
 troops. Certain classes of them must be taken to watch and 
 balance the power and strength of certain other classes, which 
 evil in itself will obviously weaken the whole. Are the few Eu- 
 ropeans who must still be in India to be employed to watch the 
 negroes, or is this service to be performed by the faithful sepoys ? 
 In either case the power and strength of the government will be 
 lessened ; and yet it is well known that the only power in India 
 is military ; and that, if Great Britain should lose her military 
 pre-eminence there, her empire will no longer exist. 
 
 Will this evil be kept a secret from the Natives ? Our own sub- 
 jects, nay, our sepoys, would be equally ready with our enemies 
 to take advantage of this decided symptom of internal debility. 
 
 My opinions upon this subject are so strong, that, if it be true 
 that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the troops found ne- 
 cessary to maintain its empire in Asia, I would prefer to trust 
 the maintenance of it to a smaller and select band of English 
 soldiers, aided by their faithful and brave companions and 
 adherents the Company's sepoys, to the adoption of any such 
 substitute as the negro force of the West Indies. 
 
 Let them go to Ceylon, where the establishment is less of the 
 nature of a colony than these are on the continent of India. 
 The climate of that island is said to be more congenial to their 
 constitutions than it has been found to be to those either of Eu- 
 ropeans or Natives of India. Their mutinies or misbehaviour 
 can do no permanent mischief there, as the body required for 
 the service of that island must always be small. 
 
 There appear few, if any, difficulties in the execution of this 
 part of the plan, supposing that it should be determined on. 
 The negro regiments can be sent from the West Indies to India 
 either in transports or in Indian men-of-war, in the same man- 
 ner as other troops in His Majesty's service. They can be re- 
 cruited by purchases of slaves on His Majesty's account in the 
 West Indies, on the west coast of Africa, or on the east coast 
 of Africa, or in Madagascar, or in small numbers, possibly, in 
 the Portuguese settlements in India. They will be expensive 
 recruits, undoubtedly ; but if the plan be necessary on account
 
 458 NEGROES WOULD COST MORE THAN EUROPEANS. 
 
 of the difficulties in supplying English soldiers, the expense of 
 the article must not be considered. 
 
 It is supposed that they will receive in India the same pay and 
 provisions as the European troops in the same branch in the West 
 Indies. But they will still be less expensive than the European 
 troops, inasmuch as it will not be necessary that their barracks, 
 their field equipage, their hospitals, their arrack, should be equally 
 good and expensive as those now supplied to the European troops. 
 
 If, however, it should be intended to make up for the defi- 
 ciency in quality of the negro troops, in comparison with the 
 Europeans, by sending increased numbers to India of the former, 
 the expense to the Company of this negro establishment will be 
 heavier than that of the European establishment has ever been ; 
 and, as I have before observed, the confidence in their efficiency 
 as soldiers, whether in a view to their fidelity or to their bravery 
 and discipline, and other military virtues, can never be so great. 
 
 I come now to consider the other branch of the plan, viz. to 
 send the sepoys to the West Indies. First, I shall consider their 
 probable efficiency, as soldiers, in the West Indies. 
 
 The sepoys are to be substituted for the European as well as 
 the negro troops. There is no man who has a higher opinion, 
 or ought to have a higher opinion, of the sepoys than I have. 
 I have tried them on many serious occasions, and they never 
 failed me, and always conducted themselves well. But it must 
 be recollected that in India we never, or scarcely ever undertake 
 any service with the aid of sepoys only. The operations of war 
 in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be 
 made so ; and it is possible in an offensive operation to have 
 some of the troops who are to perform it, however desperate it 
 may be, of an inferior description. Accordingly, in proportion 
 to the service to be performed, we have seen £, j, ^, ^ of the 
 number of the operating army English soldiers ; and it has been 
 held by great authorities that •£ of the whole army in India ought 
 to be of that description. 
 
 Since the battle of Cuddalore, in the year 1783, the sepoys 
 have not been engaged in a regular battle with a European 
 enemy. Upon that occasion a very large proportion, I believe 
 half the army, was composed of European troops ; and it has 
 always been customary in the wars in India to increase the pro- 
 portion of the European troops to the Natives as the service 
 should appear more arduous. 
 
 The services which will be required from the sepoys in the
 
 SEPOVS WOULD BE INEFFICIENT IN THE W. INDIES. 459 
 
 West Indies will be generally of a defensive nature, against the 
 best troops, excepting the English soldiers, which the world has 
 produced. According to the Indian notion of employing sepoys, 
 I should say that one half at least of the whole number of troops 
 to be employed upon such an occasion ought to be English 
 soldiers ; and even upon that ground I should not think that I 
 could save to the mother country half the soldiers required for 
 the defence of the West India colonies. As substitutes, I could 
 not consider less than two sepoys an equivalent for one soldier; 
 and then there must be as many soldiers as sepoys every where. 
 So that the most that the country could gain by this arrange- 
 ment, supposing it is intended to provide fairly and upon known 
 principles for the defence of the West Indies, would be | of the 
 number of soldiers at present employed there. That is, suppos- 
 ing the number of soldiers now required for the West Indies is 
 15,000, it might be reduced to 10,000 ; and the deficiency I 
 should consider to be made good by 10,000 sepoys. 
 
 In respect to the offensive operations in the West Indies, I 
 mean those against Caribs, refractory negroes, brigands, &c, the 
 sepoys are entirely unfit for them. The light troops are best 
 adapted for these operations ; and the sepoys are the worst of 
 all troops for services of this description. The Europeans or 
 the country troops are always employed upon services of this 
 description in India when they occur, which is but seldom, as 
 the country is one generally of plains, and the sepoys are not 
 trained to them. Another reason why they will never make 
 good light troops is, that the services of light troops naturally 
 depend upon individual talents and exertion, and are carried on 
 out of the sight of the officer. Those acquainted with the 
 sepoys know well that they will do nothing against their enemy 
 excepting led by, and in the sight of, their officers. Add to 
 these defects, that the sepoys are very delicate troops ; that their 
 health is affected by unwholesome situations and climate, equally 
 with the Europeans ; that the service in hilly and woody countries 
 invariably affects them, and at times sends whole battalions to 
 the hospital ; and it will appear that this branch of the plan is not 
 less inefficient than the other, of sending the negroes to India. 
 
 The difference between them is, that the West Indies will 
 acquire at least a harmless defence ; but not so the East Indies, 
 as I have already shown. 
 
 But the difficulties which oppose the execution of this part of 
 the plan are much greater than those which affect the other ; and
 
 460 THEY CANNOT BE SENT THERE IN FORCE. 
 
 these are of a nature which, supposing it was likely to be efficient, 
 ought in my opinion to induce government to abandon it. 
 
 In the first place, the embarkation of sepoys in India has 
 never been otherwise, excepting on the coast of Malabar, than a 
 voluntary service. On the coast of Malabar it has long been 
 the practice to embark the sepoys at Bombay, and to send them 
 to the northern or southern provinces under that government. 
 But in the season in which those voyages are invariably under- 
 taken the weather is always good ; the length of the voyage is 
 known to be only a few days ; and short trips of that description 
 are not uncommon among the inhabitants of the country. 
 
 The Bengal sepoys have never yet embarked in whole bat- 
 talions. When Native troops are required for foreign service, 
 the practice has been to call for volunteers from the whole army; 
 and the numbers which turn out are formed into battalions, with 
 officers posted to them. Whole battalions have embarked upon 
 the Madras establishment ; but it has always been a voluntary 
 offer made by the soldiers. 
 
 The same mode of proceeding must be adopted with a view to 
 obtain sepoys for the service in the West Indies, not only at 
 Madras and in Bengal, but on the Bombay establishment ; as, 
 although the sepoys belonging to the latter have been in the 
 habit of embarking for short voyages of a few days' duration, 
 they would be unwilling, and it might create inconvenience to 
 make them embark for service in the West Indies. 
 
 To go on the service or not, then, must be left to the choice 
 of the sepoys ; and if the length of the voyage, the nature of the 
 country to which they are to be sent, and the length of time they 
 are to be absent, are fairly described to them, I think I may 
 venture to say that very few indeed will voluntarily offer their 
 services. 
 
 But I will suppose that they will offer them. They must have 
 with them a certain proportion of their women, and some of their 
 followers. Measures must be taken to feed them, not only on the 
 passage, but in the West Indies, with the description of grain and 
 other food to which each class of them has been accustomed. 
 
 Then they must be sent back to India in a reasonable period 
 of time ; suppose five years from the period of embarkation. 
 
 The European officers from the Company's service must ac- 
 company them, with their battalions, if whole battalions should 
 volunteer their services, or taken from the regular regiments, 
 supposing that the volunteers for the West Indies should be
 
 THEIR COST, ETC. WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. 461 
 
 taken from the whole army, and formed into separate and extra 
 battalions. In either case the European officers must be assured 
 that they will have in the West Indies the same allowances as 
 in India, or it may be depended upon there will be no Native 
 volunteers for the service. If the Company's officers are to have 
 Indian pay in the West Indies, discontent will be created among 
 the King's officers in the same country. If the volunteers for 
 the West Indies are to be formed into extra battalions, to be 
 furnished with European officers from the regular sepoy regiments, 
 the establishment of officers in India must be increased, as it is 
 already too small for the service. 
 
 There are numberless inconveniences of minor importance, 
 for which remedies can be found, such as the rank to be held 
 by the Company's officers in the West Indies, the mode of con- 
 ducting Native General Courts Martial, and the authority under 
 which they are to be held, and other matters. But those first 
 stated appear of such monstrous expense and difficulty as to 
 render the plan to any extent quite impracticable. 
 
 If it should be attempted in this mode, which is the only one 
 in which it can be effectual, it must be expected that the recruit- 
 ing for the sepoy regiments in India will receive a very serious 
 blow. The families of the Natives will see with additional dis- 
 quiet their relatives enlist in a service in which they will know 
 that they are liable to be sent to an unknown country, situated 
 in a different quarter of the globe. 
 
 If the plan went only to draw from India a certain proportion 
 of men for service in the island of Jamaica, for instance, where 
 particular prejudices prevail against the negroes, the best mode 
 of proceeding would be to recruit for this number at Chittagong, 
 in the Bay of Bengal, by means of the King's officers. 
 
 But, even according to this plan, much inconvenience would 
 be felt by the Indian service, as the recruiting officers must 
 either give bounty or promise additional pay, or they would get 
 no recruits. Bounty for enlisting is unknown in India, except- 
 ing where the King's officers enlisted for the Native regiments in 
 Ceylon, and this enlistment might introduce it. An increase of 
 pay to the troops in India would be equally unnecessary and inju- 
 rious ; and yet it might be necessary to promise it in the quarter 
 of the country in which these recruiting officers would have been. 
 
 Another plan for procuring soldiers for the West Indies from 
 India would be to recruit from the Malay coast, opposite Prince 
 o£ Wales's Island. The Malays are a hardy and brave race,
 
 462 NEGROES MIGHT BE SENT TO THE CAPE. 
 
 and would make better soldiers for the West Indies than the 
 people of India Proper; and to recruit these would not be 
 attended with any of the inconveniences expected from the 
 recruiting in India. 
 
 Upon the whole, I do not conceive that this plan would give 
 to India a force which it is suitable to British India to have, or 
 to the West Indies a force which would be efficient for their 
 defence. On the other hand, the difficulties and expense attend- 
 ing the execution of both branches of the plan are such as must 
 tend greatly to overbalance the advantages expected by the 
 more sanguine, but which I am convinced would never be found 
 to exist. Those, in particular, attending the execution of that 
 part of the plan which sends sepoys to the West Indies, must 
 prevent it from being carried to any useful extent, supposing it 
 could be useful at all. 
 
 All the arguments upon sending sepoys to the West Indies 
 apply to sending them to the Cape, with the difference only of 
 distance, which, in such distances as either is from India, the 
 sepoys would be unable to appreciate. But if troops are wanted 
 at the Cape, why not send negroes there, and leave India to its 
 old means, viz. English soldiers and sepoys. 
 
 2. Subsidiary Alliance System ; and the Armies 
 of Native States. 
 
 258* To Major Munro. 
 
 Scindialis ovenveening influence at Poonah threatens our tran- 
 quillity. Perils attending the extension of our own power and 
 influence. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug., 1800. 
 
 My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their 
 decline and fall, agree fully with yours ; and I acknowledge that 
 I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a 
 strong government on this frontier. Scindiah's influence at 
 Poonah is too great for us ; and I see plainly, that, if Col. 
 Palmer remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without 
 going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as 
 the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and 
 by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow's family, 
 under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and
 
 OUR DOMINION IS IN ADVANCE OF OUR MEANS. 463 
 
 secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I 
 despair of it ; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the 
 alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our 
 old frontier ; or of taking this country ourselves. If we allow 
 Scindiah to be our neighbour; or, if the country goes to any 
 other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has 
 passed, thieves of all kinds, new Dlioondiahs, and probably 
 Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I 
 do not expect much tranquillity. 
 
 In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence 
 has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to 
 the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of 
 employment those who heretofore found it in the service of 
 Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, par- 
 ticularly if we aggrandise ourselves at the expense of the Mah- 
 rattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and 
 of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the 
 revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered 
 the country. These people become additional enemies : at the 
 same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of 
 supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are pro- 
 portionably decreased. Upon all questions of increase of terri- 
 tory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am 
 in general inclined to decide that we have enough ; as much, at 
 least, if not more, than we can defend. 
 
 I agree with you that we ought to settle this Mahratta 
 business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return 
 to India : but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather 
 tend to delay, than accelerate, the settlements ; and that we 
 shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our 
 enemies. As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this 
 country, I put them out of the question. They are the only 
 philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if 
 indifference constitutes that character. 
 
 259. To Major Shawe. 
 
 The good and the evil of subsidiary alliances ; and the necessity of 
 modifying tJiem according to special circumstances. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 14th Jan., 1804. 
 
 In answer to the latter part of your letter of the nth Dec, 
 upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you
 
 464 SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCES NOT A PANACEA. 
 
 that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of 
 them have been, that in this war with the Mahrattas, which it is 
 obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company's 
 territories have not been invaded ; and the evils of war have 
 been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and 
 our power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which 
 could be enumerated as benefits resulting from those alliances, 
 would be sufficient to justify them. But they undoubtedly have 
 a tendency to reduce the strength of the powers with which we 
 are connected ; and this is an evil, the growth and inconvenience 
 of which daily increase. The memorandum to Malcolm will 
 show the great evils which will attend Scindiah's discharging his 
 military establishments ; and the present states of the countries 
 of the Nizam and the Peshwah show the consequences of their 
 discharging those formerly in their service. 
 
 The question is exactly this : Is it necessary for the general 
 tranquillity and security of the British government that the 
 banditti who infest those countries should be put down ? and that 
 the governments of the Peshwah and the Nizam should be 
 established in their territories respectively ? If so, it is absolutely 
 necessary that those powers should be obliged to keep up some 
 military force for the purposes of their own government ; or, if 
 they refuse to keep up their military establishments, and the 
 onus is to fall upon the British troops, their numbers must be 
 doubled, or even trebled ; for it stands to reason that they are 
 not now sufficiently strong to preserve order in countries of such 
 vast extent. 
 
 I do not object to the subsidiary alliances, but I do to forming 
 them all upon the Hyderabad model. The circumstances at 
 other durbars are entirely different ; and it is obvious that to 
 form the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah upon that model 
 would be attended with risk. In respect to my saying that 
 the establishments must be increased to the full amount of 
 the subsidiary forces, if established at the durbars of Scindiah 
 and the Rajah of Berar, I meant that the same number of troops 
 would still be necessary to support the authority of government 
 in their own provinces and immediate dependencies. 
 
 In the provinces depending upon Bengal, there is a civil 
 government, and some strength, besides that of the sword ; but 
 in the territories depending upon the subordinate governments, 
 there is no other power ; and the moment that is weakened, the 
 people rise in rebellion. I think, therefore, that the same
 
 NATIVE STATES SHOULD HAVE EFFICIENT TROOPS. 465 
 
 number of troops will still be necessary, at least for some time, 
 to support the authority of government in our own provinces. 
 
 260. To Major Shawe. 
 
 The subsidiary alliances, on their present footing, are inadequate 
 to secure the tranquillity of the Native States, or, ultimately, 
 of the Company 's territories. We are threatened with a vast 
 development of the free-booting system, which our great and 
 rapid expansion tends to promote. The appropriate remedy 
 is to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of 
 efficiency. This zvill not make them dangerous to us, but the 
 reverse. The freebooters would be powerful instruments in 
 their hands against us. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 26th Feb., 1804. 
 
 You will have observed that I agree in opinion with the 
 Governor-General regarding the resumption of the jaghires. It 
 is a measure which must be attended by great unpopularity, and 
 ought not to be adopted, excepting in a case of very evident 
 necessity ; and even in such a case the British government ought 
 not to appear in it, unless it should be necessary in order to 
 carry the measure into execution. This, I am afraid, would be 
 necessary ; and you will see that I dislike the whole proceeding, 
 and have pointed out to Heshmut other funds from which he 
 may draw the supplies of money which may be necessary in 
 the reform of the army. 
 
 The reform of the army is the point upon which I am not of 
 the same opinion with the Governor-General, and I think it very 
 possible that my opinion may be biassed by the inconveniences 
 which I have experienced during the war from the extreme 
 weakness of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. 
 However, on the other hand, I do not think that sufficient weight 
 is given in Bengal to the necessity that the army should be 
 employed in all these Native governments, in the administration 
 of the civil government and in the collection of the revenue. 
 
 Bengal, 'the paradise of nations,' enjoys the advantage of a 
 civil government, and requires its military force only for its 
 protection against foreign enemies. All the other barbarous 
 establishments called governments, without excepting even that 
 of Fort St. George, have no power beyond that of the sword. Take 
 from them the exercise of that power, and they have no other ; 
 and can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can 
 
 Hh
 
 466 THE PRESENT SUBSIDIARY FORCES INADEQUATE. 
 
 exercise no government. The Native governments, I mean 
 those of the Nizam and the Peshwah, are 50 times worse than 
 ours in this respect. They do not choose to keep armies them- 
 selves, their territories are overrun by a race of armed men, who 
 are ready to enlist with any body who will lead them to plunder; 
 and there is no power in the country to support the government 
 and give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, 
 excepting the British troops. 
 
 Upon this subject two questions occur for consideration : one 
 is, whether the subsidiary British troops, now with the Peshwah 
 and the Nizam, are sufficiently strong to be able to give the 
 requisite support to the civil government in all parts. As far as 
 I am able to form a judgment, I am of opinion that they are 
 not ; and that if the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are 
 not to entertain armies for the support of their own authority, 
 the number of troops supplied to each ought to be doubled. I 
 am clearly of opinion that each force is fully equal to any par- 
 ticular service in which they may be employed ; but their 
 services are required in so many places at the same time, in 
 these extensive countries, that the number of troops is not 
 sufficient for the demands upon them. 
 
 The next question is, whether the Soubah of the Deccan or 
 the Peshwah will pay for an increase of the forces subsidized. 
 It must not be expected that the Soubah of the Deccan will do 
 any such thing. The Peshwah, indeed, may be induced to grant 
 lands in Bundelcund, or in any other province of which he has 
 not possession, to increase his subsidiary force, if at any time he 
 should be disappointed in the execution of any favourite plan, 
 from its weakness ; but not otherwise. In fact, excepting in 
 Bundelcund, the Peshwah has nothing to give ; and the Soubah 
 of the Deccan will not give any thing. 
 
 I have no apprehension of any future foreign wars. Indeed 
 no foreign powers now remain ; even if Scindiah should not 
 come into the defensive alliance, we have got such a hold in his 
 durbar, by the treaty of peace, that if ever he goes to war with 
 the Company, one half of his chiefs and of his army will be on 
 our side. But I think that we run a great risk from the free- 
 booter system. It is not known to the Governor-General, and 
 you can have no idea of the extent to which it has gone ; and it 
 increases daily. I could state facts on this subject, which would 
 prove the extraordinary weakness of the allied governments, and 
 would show the necessity of strengthening them. But a letter
 
 DANGER FROM THE FREEBOOTING SYSTEM. 467 
 
 is not the proper place for them. Conceive a country, in every 
 village of which there are from 20 to 30 horsemen, who have 
 been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no 
 means of living excepting by. plunder. In this country there 
 is no law, no civil government, and no army to keep these 
 plunderers in order ; and no revenue can be collected ; indeed 
 no inhabitant can, nor will remain to cultivate, unless he is pro- 
 tected by an armed force stationed in his village. This is the 
 outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwah and the 
 Nizam. 
 
 The extension of our arms and influence certainly increases 
 this evil ; because, wherever we go, it is soon found out that we are 
 always ready and willing to fight ; money is always wanted for 
 the expenses of luxury and debauchery, and armies are discharged 
 to procure it. The danger of the evil is also increased by the 
 extension of our arms, our influence, and our protection : first, 
 by the increase of the number of the people, who must and will 
 subsist by plunder ; secondly, by narrowing the scene in which 
 the freebooters may plunder with impunity. 
 
 The first requires no illustration. In respect to the second, 
 I have to observe that, after having stood still nearly 40 years 
 (with the exception of the small acquisitions made by Lord 
 Cornwallis from Tippoo), we have, within the last 5 years, ex- 
 tended ourselves by our policy and our bravery over the whole 
 of India, excepting the territories of Holkar and the Rajah of 
 Berar ; supposing that Scindiah should come into the defensive 
 alliance. In this vast extent of country, in which the numbers 
 of the people, with arms in their hands, who have no means of 
 living excepting by plunder, are so much increased, no man can 
 venture to plunder without incurring the risk, at least, of being 
 destroyed by a British army. Habits of industry are out of the 
 question ; they must plunder for subsistence, or be destroyed, or 
 starve, or be taken into the service of some of the allied powers. 
 As we have now narrowed the scene so much, we must not 
 expect that our own territories will be entirely free from their 
 depredations. In fact, if they are to meet the Company's troops 
 in all countries, they have no choice excepting the richest and 
 best cultivated, and those in which they are likely to meet the 
 smallest number of these formidable troops. The Company's 
 territories answer the description in every respect ; and there, I 
 think, is the danger of our present exalted situation. 
 
 The Governor-General has never had this picture before him. 
 
 H h 2
 
 468 ARMIES OF NATIVE STATES LESS DANGEROUS. 
 
 No man has ever had so many opportunities of contemplating 
 the subject in all its parts as I have ; and possibly no man has 
 ever adverted to it. The remedy is clear, viz. to force the allies 
 to keep up their military establishments. This is the first step ; 
 I would then give them no assistance in carrying on their internal 
 government, excepting to oppose formidable rebellions. After 
 this is done, by degrees a regulation may be introduced, which 
 I recommended in 1800, in Mysore, viz. that no horse be kept 
 that is not registered, and that no horseman should be allowed 
 to travel through the country without a passport from the 
 government. In this manner the breed will, by degrees, be 
 diminished. But Mr. Edmonstone says, in his dispatch, that to 
 put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency 
 is inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which all the 
 treaties of defensive alliance have been framed, which were to 
 make the powers dependent upon the British government. 
 
 In the 1st place, the military establishments can never be 
 made so efficient as to place the Native powers in any other 
 excepting a state of dependence on the British government, in 
 respect to all their foreign concerns. 
 
 In the 2nd place, the measure which I propose goes no further 
 than to insist upon having that body of troops really, which the 
 treaties require they should have. 
 
 In the 3rd place, if, after all that has happened, I could 
 suppose it possible that any of our allies would rebel against 
 us (for I think that the breach of the defensive alliance ought 
 with propriety to be called rebellion), I should say that they 
 have in their hands at this moment a most formidable weapon 
 against us, in the numerous horse which reside in their countries ; 
 every one of whom would join their standard, if it were raised to 
 collect a body for the invasion of the Company's territories, by 
 any chief, no matter by whom. This weapon, the strength of 
 which my system would go to destroy, is far more formidable in 
 the hands of any one of them than the regular military establish- 
 ments of all of them put together. 
 
 I see clearly that the Governor-General has never contemplated 
 this state of the question ; indeed he could not contemplate it, 
 for it has never been brought before him in any shape. The 
 gentlemen at the Residencies see nothing excepting what passes 
 in the durbars, and therefore could not report it ; and it could 
 not reach the Governor- General in any other mannner. I have 
 had many opportunities of seeing and feeling the effects of the
 
 THEY WOULD ABSORB & SUPPRESS THE MARAUDERS. 469 
 
 evil. Scindiah's and Ragojee Bhoonslah's armies were composed 
 of horse drawn from the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah, 
 and from Mysore. The freebooters whom I destroyed the other 
 day, and who had become amazingly numerous, were, first of all, 
 500 horse belonging to Scindiah, who escaped from Ahmed- 
 nuggur the day the pettah was taken ; about 100 belonging to 
 Ragojee Bhoonslah's amildar of Neemgaum ; and about 300 
 brought from Scindiah's army by Viswaz Rao Ghautky. When 
 I destroyed them they were a very formidable body, which 
 nothing but British troops could venture to oppose ; and they 
 were composed of horsemen collected from Poonah and from the 
 districts of Bheer, Perinda, Dharore, Beeder, Puttun, &c. I men- 
 tion this as a fact, which I know from information collected 
 on the spot. 
 
 261. Memorandum submitted to the Governor- General by 
 Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Free- 
 booter system in India. 
 
 Fort William, 2nd Nov., 1804. 
 
 The letters which have been already laid before the Governor- 
 General have apprised him of the extent and danger of the 
 freebooter system in India, and of the causes of the evil. The 
 remedy would appear to be to find some employment for the 
 numerous military classes in India. It is not reasonable to 
 expect that persons of that description will adopt habits of 
 industry ; and unless they have some military employment, 
 they must remain a burthen upon the public. They will not 
 enter into the Company's service, as the system of restraint 
 necessary for our discipline and subordination is equally irk- 
 some to them with the habits of industry required for their 
 subsistence in a civil capacity. 
 
 The only remedy therefore is to find for them employment, 
 in the present system of India, of the same description which 
 they have had heretofore ; and of this remedy it may be said, 
 that it will cure the evil by two modes. 1st ; By giving employ- 
 ment to a number of persons, who must otherwise prey upon the 
 public, as these persons will certainly render some service, par- 
 ticularly against troops of the same description with themselves. 
 2ndly ; By giving strength to the governments in alliance with 
 or depending upon the Company. 
 
 These governments are the Soubah of the Deccan, the Peshwah,
 
 470 OUR ALLIES SHOULD ENLIST IDLE HORSEMEN. 
 
 Scindiah, the Guickwar state, the King. In respect to the Soubah 
 of the Deccan, it is my opinion that, in consideration of the 
 advantages which he gained by the last war, he ought to be 
 required to support a body of silladar horse, which should be 
 gradually increased to the full number he is required by treaty 
 to furnish to co-operate with the Company's troops in war. He 
 will naturally object to the measure, and will propose that, in 
 order to carry it into execution, he may be assisted to confiscate 
 jaghires, &c. 
 
 But it may be observed to him that a body of troops of this 
 description, which will strengthen his government so effectually, 
 must prevent the disorders which have either really caused the 
 diminution of his revenues, or have afforded to his aumils motives 
 for withholding payment ; that he will be able to curb his aumils 
 and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar dues ; and 
 that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own 
 expenses. At all events, the Soubah of the Deccan ought to 
 be obliged to have some silladar horse supported by the state, 
 and paid with regularity ; and the number might be increased 
 in proportion as the benefits of the measure could be felt. 
 
 The Peshwah cannot afford to keep any troops himself, but 
 the measures already in progress under Mr. Strachey's charge 
 will support a large body of troops of this description in his 
 Highness's territories. As soon as the war with Holkar shall be 
 concluded, the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ought 
 to be moved to the southward to enforce these measures, and in 
 order to force the Rajah of Kolapoor to a settlement. 
 
 The memorandum given to the Governor-General this day 
 respecting Scindiah's government, points out a mode of giving 
 employment and subsistence to troops of this description. 
 Besides this, Scindiah ought to be urged constantly to keep 
 up the number of troops required by treaty. 
 
 The finances of the Guickwar state are so deranged, that I 
 fear they cannot afford to keep any troops. However, Mr. 
 Duncan's attention ought to be drawn to this object, and he 
 should be desired to fix, in concert with Major Walker, the 
 military establishments which the Guickwar should support 
 hereafter. A part of the sum of money to be allotted for the 
 support of the King ought to be laid out for the support of 
 a body of troops, and these ought to be silladar horse. Besides 
 these measures, which will provide for the subsistence of 30,000 
 or 40,000 men, and which will give a disposable force of those
 
 OUR ALLIES SHOULD LEARN TO DEFE.ND THEMSELVES. 471 
 
 numbers to act against persons of a similar description, who are 
 now living by plunder, others may be adopted in the Company's 
 territories, to ... . 
 
 [The remaining part of this Memorandum is wanting, it having 
 been mislaid in the Political Department at Fort William, as 
 appears by a letter from Major Shawe. — Col. Gurwood's note.] 
 
 262. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Vital importance of compelling our allies to maintain an adequate 
 force for the suppression of rebels and plunderers. They are 
 too zveak to be made responsible for the misdeeds of their 
 lawless subjects. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 27th Dec, 1804. 
 
 Our policy and our arms have reduced all the powers in India 
 to the state of mere cyphers ; at the same time that their 
 intriguing, discontented, and rebellious followers still remain, 
 with increased causes of discontent, diminished sources of profit, 
 and field for speculation and plunder. Nothing can keep these 
 people in order excepting the Company's arms, or a complete 
 state of defence on all points which they can reach. 
 
 The Company's arms cannot be every where ; at this moment 
 we have 6 disposable battalions in the Deccan : and because the 
 allies do not choose to defend themselves or their territories, 
 their services are required on the frontiers of Candeish ; on the 
 frontier of Berar ; at Manik Droog ; on the Nizam's western 
 frontier, between the Godavery, Ahmednuggur, and Poonah ; and 
 upon the Kistna. There remains then only to force the allies to 
 take some measures to defend themselves ; and upon this point 
 I have already written volumes. 
 
 All that I can say upon the subject is, that it is not in the 
 power of the troops to march over the ground, much less to do 
 all that is required from them at this moment ; and we must 
 either alter our system in respect to our allies, or we must double 
 or treble the subsidiary force with each, or our Empire must 
 crumble to pieces from its size, and the inefficiency of the 
 measures adopted for its defence and preservation. 
 
 There is another supposed remedy, viz., to make the Rajah of 
 Berar in this instance, and other hostile powers in similar 
 instances, responsible for the acts of those who sally out from 
 their countries on these plundering expeditions. That would do 
 very well in Europe ; and if the Governor-General is prepared
 
 472 THEY CANNOT CONTROL THEIR OWN SERVANTS. 
 
 to take possession of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, what 
 has happened at Manik Droog affords a good pretence. But I 
 say that neither the Nizam, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Rajah of 
 Berar, nor the Guickvvar, have the power of controlling their own 
 servants, from causes which it is not necessary now to canvass ; 
 and therefore I think that it would not be quite just to punish 
 any of those powers for acts for which they cannot be responsible. 
 
 263. To Colonel Close. 
 
 The same subject. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 27th Dec, 1804. 
 
 There is no longer any power in any of the governments to 
 restrain the rebellious and discontented spirits, and we must 
 expect that they will fly out whenever they see a weak or un- 
 defended point. The only remedy is, to be guarded every where, 
 and to force our allies to keep up troops for their own defence. 
 Till that is effected, our system is rotten to the core, and our 
 empire must crumble to atoms by the operations of its size and 
 weakness. 
 
 3. North-West Frontier. 
 
 264. Memorandum on the Defences of Oude. 
 
 [Forwarded to the Governor-General.] 
 
 Advantages of small fortified posts, especially against cavalry. 
 Sir J. Craig to be consulted on the defence of the N. W. 
 frontier. Depots to be formed at Allahabad and Futtyghur ; 
 and carriage bullocks systematically provided. The Nabob of 
 Oude to regulate or diminish his force : new regiments to be 
 raised. Suggestions on a plan of operations for the defensive 
 army. 
 
 I send a memorial, which I have received from Colonel 
 Kydd, upon the defences of Oude, which, I believe, is the only 
 paper which exists upon that subject. The plan appears to be 
 well calculated to answer the purposes for which it is intended, 
 and the principal part of it has been already put in execution : 
 I mean that we have obtained possession of Allahabad and 
 the fort at Futtyghur, and that a plan has been formed for
 
 DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN OUDE RECOMMENDED. 473 
 
 strengthening both those posts. It requires a local knowledge 
 of the country lying between the Jumna and the Ganges, and 
 of the positions at Calpee, Etawa, and Anopsheer, to be able to 
 decide whether the part of the memorial which relates to them 
 be as well grounded as the first part. As, however, the attack 
 which is to be apprehended is from cavalry, generally speaking, 
 there is no method of annoying them and of preventing them 
 from doing mischief so effectual as the establishment of the 
 small fortified posts which Kydd recommends. I don't mean 
 that they should be made so strong as to stand a siege, or in 
 case of our omitting to occupy them, or if we should lose any 
 of them, that we should find any difficulty in retaking them ; 
 but that they should be of the nature of the mud forts in the 
 Carnatic, which afford protection to a small body of infantry 
 against a large one of cavalry, and enable officers proceeding 
 with convoys to put them in security almost every night. As 
 an attack upon the north-western frontier may be looked for, 
 and as it appears that nobody has any notion of acting either 
 upon the offensive or defensive in that quarter, I recommend 
 that your attention and that of the principal officers of the 
 army should be turned towards it immediately ; that Sir James 
 Craig, in particular, should be called upon for his ideas upon 
 the subject. 
 
 In the mean time Allahabad should be filled with stores 
 and grain. Some of both should be thrown into the fort at 
 Futtyghur. Kydd says that Allahabad can now defend itself, 
 and the proposed alterations will make it very strong indeed. 
 The post will not be weakened while they are making. A plan 
 should be devised for procuring carriage-bullocks. 
 
 The Nabob of Oude ought to be called upon either to regu- 
 late or dismiss his force. 
 
 If three regiments are sent into the Carnatic, or, indeed, 
 if only two are sent there, one or two regiments must be 
 raised here. The reduction of the Nabob of Oude's army will 
 supply the funds ; but, whether it is reduced or not, the mea- 
 sure is equally urgent. I do not conceive, however, that it 
 presses upon you immediately. There are two events which 
 are not impossible, either of which will make it necessary im- 
 mediately. One of them is the certainty of the war with 
 Tippoo : this will oblige you to send a force into the Carnatic, 
 which must be replaced immediately. The other is the advance 
 of Zemaun Shah, which, although it would not oblige you to
 
 474 DISPOSITION OF THE DEFENSIVE ARMY. 
 
 strengthen yourself here if it stood alone, as it will certainly 
 encourage Tippoo to go to, will oblige you to detach to the 
 Carnatic, and the detached force must be replaced. 
 
 As there is not much money in the treasury, unless the 
 Vizier can be brought to disband his force, I think it will be 
 prudent not to raise any force until towards November, when 
 you will be able to decide as to the necessity of sending a force 
 to the Carnatic, or as to the probability of Zemaun Shah's 
 invasion. Without a greater knowledge of the country than 
 I have, it is impossible to pretend to point out any plan of 
 operations. I may, however, venture to say generally that the 
 British army must be kept together in one body, providing 
 garrisons only for Allahabad and the fort at Futtyghur ; that 
 the Nabob's troops ought to occupy the inferior posts ; that 
 the main object should be to keep the enemy from Lucknow. 
 As I want local information, I can't tell whether it would be 
 possible, by moving forwards, to place the army in such a 
 situation as that an action must be fought with it before the 
 enemy can cross the Jumna. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 265. To the Hon. Henry t Wellesley. 
 
 The line of the Jumna probably preferable for the defence of the 
 North- West frontier. A corps de reserve to be formed near 
 Chunar. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, ioth Nov., 1798. 
 
 So little is known of the north-west frontier, notwithstanding 
 that it has been so long in our hands, that it is impossible to 
 give even a general opinion of what line it would be best to 
 pursue ; whether to confine ourselves to the defence of Lucknow 
 and Allahabad, or to prevent the enemy from crossing the 
 Jumna. I should prefer the latter as the most certain method 
 of defence; and it must be recollected that Abdallah beat the 
 Mahrattas by driving them from the Dooab over the Jumna. 
 It is a most fertile spot, and ought not to be given up in a 
 hurry. 
 
 Whatever plan is followed, Allahabad must be secured, and 
 quantities of stores and grain must be thrown into it. If the 
 passage of the Jumna be prevented, as long as the Ganges is 
 navigable the army in the Dooab can be supplied with ease from 
 thence by means of boats.
 
 POLITICAL AND MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF OUDE. 475 
 
 A corps de reserve ought to be formed somewhere about 
 Chunar, — I don't mean to weaken Sir James Craig's army, but 
 in case Zemaun Shah advances, all the corps and force in the 
 lower provinces should rendezvous thereabouts ; and in case of 
 accidents, which may happen, they will be ready to apply the 
 remedy. In case of insurrection or rebellion by any of the great 
 jaghiredars in Oude, they will be of great use. 
 
 Besides, an army of cavalry acting against infantry in an 
 extended country is so likely to give its adversary the slip and 
 get to his rear, that I should not think Benares and our own 
 provinces secure from plunder, if there were not a good corps de 
 reserve somewhere in the Zemindary. 
 
 266. Memorandum on Oude. 
 
 The control of Oude naturally coveted by the riders of Bengal and 
 Bahar, for defensive purposes. Character and ulterior ten- 
 dency of the connexion of the Company with the Nabob. 
 Inevitable depression of the native State, and interference of 
 our Government with its internal economy. 
 
 (Undated.) 
 
 The province of Oude is situated to the north-west of the 
 provinces of Bengal and Bahar, which are under the Bengal 
 government. It is bounded to the northward by impassable 
 mountains, which separate it from the country of Thibet, the 
 river Ganges forming its western boundary. As the Ganges 
 and Jumna run through it, part of it is on the same side of the 
 former as Bengal and Bahar. To the south-west are Corah, 
 Allahabad, and the Jumna; and to the south the province of 
 Bundelcund, which was possessed by a race of petty Rajahs. 
 
 Rohilcund, which lies on the left or east of the Ganges, was 
 not at that period in the possession of the Nabobs of Oude, nor 
 were Corah and Allahabad, commonly called the Dooab. and 
 lying between the Jumna and the Ganges. Benares, however, 
 was tributary to Oude, which province is also situated east, or on 
 the left of the Ganges. 
 
 Oude is a fertile country, was at that time well cultivated, 
 and is peopled by a hardy race, who have for a great length of 
 time supplied soldiers to all the states of India. 
 
 In this situation it is obvious that the government of Oude 
 must always have been an object of jealousy to that power which 
 possessed the provinces of Bahar and Bengal, which are situated
 
 476 CONNEXION OF OUDE WITH THE COMPANV's GOVERNMENT. 
 
 lower down upon the Ganges. In fact, these provinces had no 
 natural barrier against an invasion from Oude, and depended 
 for their security upon their own artificial means of defence. 
 
 This was the case not only in respect to the state of Oude 
 itself, but in respect to the Rohillas ; to the King, who was at 
 that period of time in some degree of strength ; and to the 
 Mahrattas ; each of which powers might have found an easy 
 and convenient passage through Oude to an invasion of the 
 Company's provinces of Bahar and Bengal. 
 
 On the other hand, by the possession of the provinces under 
 the government of Oude, or an intimate union with the govern- 
 ment, a barrier was immediately provided for the provinces 
 under the Bengal government. Nothing remained on the left 
 or east of the Ganges besides the Nabob of Oude and the Com- 
 pany excepting the Rohillas, and this river afforded a strong 
 natural barrier against all invaders. Besides this object, the 
 seat of war, in consequence of the alliance with or possession of 
 Oude, was removed from the Company's provinces, the source of 
 all the means of carrying on war, to those of the enemy, if it 
 should have been practicable to carry on offensive war ; or at 
 all events to those of the Nabob, if such supposed war should 
 have been reduced to the defensive. 
 
 By the first treaty with the Nabobs of Oude, the Company 
 were bound to assist the Nabob with their troops, on the con- 
 dition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption 
 of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weak- 
 ness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy 
 generally aggravates that evil. It is usually attended by a 
 stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly 
 instalments ; and as this subsidy is generally the whole or nearly 
 the whole disposable resource of the state, it is not easy to 
 produce it at the stipulated moment. The tributary government 
 is then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws 
 upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, 
 to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which 
 it may be supposed distress on the one hand and avarice and 
 extortion on the other can invent to procure the money necessary 
 to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies. 
 
 As soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably 
 been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary govern- 
 ment consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, 
 or rather protector ; and from that moment the respect, duty,
 
 NATURAL DECLINE OF THE NATIVE STATE. 477 
 
 and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become 
 more difficult to realize the resources of the state. To this evil 
 must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by 
 aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must 
 remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they 
 have advanced from those holding tuncaws and other claimants 
 upon the soil on account of loans to government, and the result 
 is an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state. 
 
 But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and in- 
 creased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of 
 disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the 
 protecting government, and then these last are obliged to inter- 
 fere in the internal administration in order to save the resources 
 of the state and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops 
 in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended 
 to resist the foreign enemy. 
 
 Arthur Welleslev. 
 
 267. To the Right Hon. H. Dundas. 
 
 Plan for defending India against a Franco-Russian invasion. 
 The enemy slwidd be met on the Indus, though that is a 
 weak barrier. The main British army to be cantoned on 
 the Ganges and Jumna, near Delhi : supplies to be collected 
 gradually : native light troops engaged to join when wanted. 
 A strong corps to cover Delhi and the cantonments ; and to act 
 promptly on the enemy's advance, supported by the main army. 
 Position of reserves and subsidiary forces. A flotilla useless. 
 The pirates to be encouraged to defend the Lozuer Indus. 
 
 Dublin Castle, 20th April, 1808. 
 
 I have perused with great attention the paper which you 
 enclosed with your letter of the 15th. My opinion is, that you 
 ought to make an effort to meet the enemy, if possible, upon 
 the Indus ; although that opinion is much qualified by a variety 
 of considerations which I shall now suggest to you. 
 
 1st. The art of crossing rivers is now so well understood, and 
 has been so frequently practised, and so invariably, I believe, 
 with success, in the late wars in Europe, that we cannot hope 
 to defend the Indus, as a barrier. It is true that the enemy will 
 not be in possession of the resources and means which they could 
 apply to such an operation on a river in Italy or in Germany ; 
 but they will experience no want of such resources as that
 
 478 THE INVADER SHOULD BE MET ON THE INDUS. 
 
 country will afford ; and I have made as good a bridge with 
 the basket boats (which are described in Caesar, and are in use 
 all over India, the materials for which are to be found every 
 where) as I could have made of the best pontoons. I acknow- 
 ledge, therefore, that although, in this impending war, I should 
 seize Attock at an early period, and should endeavour to make 
 the Indus the seat of its operations ; I have no great reliance 
 upon that river as the barrier to India. 
 
 2ndly. If it be true that we cannot rely upon the defence of 
 the Indus, although it is desirable to try it, and to carry the war 
 into the countries on its banks, the question is, what preparatory 
 steps ought to be ordered from hence ? We must look to the 
 state of the finances, to the fears and jealousies which will be 
 excited throughout India by a very large early preparation, to 
 a corresponding preparation by those in whom those fears and 
 jealousies will be excited, to the state of inefficiency and apathy 
 in which an army becomes in that country when long assembled 
 in preparation and does not act. 
 
 The measures which I should recommend would be founded, 
 ist, upon the conviction that the Indus cannot be completely 
 defended, do what you will ; and, 2ndly, upon the con- 
 siderations above referred to, of the inconvenience and evils 
 resulting from a large early preparation to meet the enemy 
 on that river. 
 
 I shall not now enter into a detailed consideration of all the 
 points to which I have above referred. I shall only tell you that 
 experience has convinced me, and, I believe, the late Lord Lake, 
 that active operations are not to be carried on in those countries 
 without the assistance of large bodies of the country light troops. 
 In this supposed war they would be absolutely necessary, to 
 enable us to cope at all with the same description of troops 
 which will be brought from the northern parts of Asia by our 
 enemies ; and I leave you to judge of the extent of abuse and 
 expense which will attend the employment of troops of this 
 description before the period of their active operations will 
 arrive. 
 
 The measure which I should recommend to you would be to 
 assemble your British army in the cantonments upon the Ganges 
 and the Jumna, and in the neighbourhood of Delhi ; to form 
 your magazines for its support ; to adopt all the preparatory 
 measures for its taking the field at the shortest notice which do 
 not create large expense, and even those which do create a large
 
 MOBILIZING AND POSTING OF THE ARMY. 479 
 
 expense, the completion of which would require much time ; 
 to form arrangements with the chiefs and leaders of the country- 
 light troops for their junction with the British army, when their 
 services should be called for. 
 
 Then I should assemble in the field in front of Delhi a large 
 corps consisting of from 6000 to 10,000 men, including a good 
 proportion of the British cavalry and a body of from 2000 to 3000 
 of country light troops, and provided with a small battering 
 train, the object of which should be to cover the cantonments 
 of the army, and to be in readiness to move with rapidity and 
 
 seize , as soon as intelligence should be received of the 
 
 intended advance of the enemy. The main body of your army 
 would follow and support this corps, and either the defence of 
 the Indus might be undertaken, or any other measure might be 
 adopted which would appear most advisable at the time. 
 
 If the battle is to be fought upon the Indus, it will be 
 absolutely necessary to station reserves upon the Bundelcund 
 frontier, on the Jumna, and one in the country of the Seiks. 
 But I do not now propose to enter so much into detail upon 
 this subject as to point out the situation of these reserves. 
 The station for the Bombay troops in Guzerat ought to depend 
 upon the temper and inclinations of Scindiah and Holkar. 
 If all is right in these quarters, the Bombay troops might be 
 assembled at Ahmedabad, from whence they would threaten the 
 enemy's right flank ; if not, I am afraid it would be necessary to 
 move them towards Dohud. It is certain, however, that the 
 enemy cannot spread in the direction of Guzerat ; and indeed 
 the Bombay troops would not find it an easy matter to move 
 northward, excepting in the winter, from Ahmedabad, on 
 account of the difficulty of the Desert, and of the Ajmeer and 
 Oudepoor countries. 
 
 Before I left India I gave in a plan for the positions of the 
 subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Nizam, 
 which, however, I am afraid that they have never been able to 
 carry into execution. It went to the establishment of these 
 corps upon the river Godavery, in communication with each 
 other. If this plan had been adopted, no foreigners could 
 enter the Deccan. Even as it is, not a shot has been fired in 
 the Deccan since the year 1803. But if this great attack should 
 be made upon Hindustan, the subsidiary forces must be moved 
 up to the northern frontier, towards the Taptee. If Scindiah 
 should misbehave, one of them should move across the Taptee
 
 480 HOW TO DEFEND THE LOWER INDUS. 
 
 and Nerbudda, and co-operate with the Bombay troops against 
 him ; and this corps ought to be replaced in the Peshwah's 
 territories by the advance of a corps of the same strength from 
 Mysore. Then you ought to have on the frontier of Mysore a 
 reserve in the field. 
 
 In respect to the flotilla, the expense of it will be enormous, 
 and the utility very doubtful. The enemy cannot spread to the 
 Lower Indus ; if they could, they would then fall in with the 
 pirates, who would stop them, or they must subdue the pirates. 
 If we send a flotilla to the Lower Indus, we must begin by 
 subduing the pirates, and, when we shall have effected that 
 object, as we cannot afford a sufficient army to protect ourselves 
 there, we shall have deprived ourselves of our best barrier in 
 that quarter, for the enemy would not be able to do more than 
 drive the pirates from their establishments on the continent, 
 considering the naval means which the latter have. 
 
 My opinion therefore is, that, instead of forming a large 
 flotilla, we should encourage the pirates in the mouths of the 
 Indus and in the Gulf to defend themselves ; and that we should 
 aid them to that end as far as may be in our power. However, 
 I may be mistaken upon this point, for I do not exactly recollect 
 all that bears upon it, and I am writing to you without either 
 paper or a map to refer to. 
 
 P.S. I sail to-night, and hope to be in London on Monday. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Welleslev. 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 268. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 The retention of Mauritius by the French dangerous to our Indian 
 Empire. Tippoo's alleged military preparations — a constant 
 bugbear at Madras. Zemann Shah's expected movements, and 
 probable designs. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort William, 12th July, 1797. 
 
 The destruction of Batavia would ruin the Dutch ; but it may 
 be a question whether it would be right completely to annihilate 
 them, and it is probably that consideration which has prevented 
 us from attacking them at this moment. Mauritius ought to be 
 taken. As long as the French have an establishment there,
 
 DANGER FROM FRENCH, TIP POO, AND ZEMAUN SHAH. 48 1 
 
 Great Britain cannot call herself safe in India. They must be 
 particularly guarded against after the war, as it may be 
 depended upon that swarms of them (aristocrats, democrats, 
 moderes, &c. &c.) will come here to seek service in the armies 
 of the Native princes, and all Frenchmen in such a situation are 
 equally dangerous. They would shortly discipline their nume- 
 rous armies in the new mode which they have adopted in 
 Europe, than which nothing can be more formidable to the 
 small body of fighting men of which the Company's armies in 
 general consist ; and in the end they would force us to increase 
 our armies and of course our expense to such a degree, that the 
 country could not be kept, or indeed would not be worth 
 keeping. At present the country powers are quiet. People say 
 that Tippoo Sahib has an army on foot, which I don't believe, 
 as I have observed since my arrival here that he is a constant 
 object of fear to the English, and whenever they want to add 
 a little colouring to a statement of danger, they find out that 
 he has an army in motion. I make no doubt but that if the 
 Nizam had died at the close of last year, and a detachment from 
 Bengal had not been sent into the Circars and part of it to 
 Hyderabad, he would have taken advantage of the threatened 
 invasion of Zemaun Shah, of the disturbed state of the Mahratta 
 government, of the dissensions in the Bengal army, and of the 
 weakness of that in the Carnatic, and would have attacked us 
 either there or in the Circars ; but now from what I can learn 
 all is safe, and certainly if it is not, Lord Hobart is not very 
 justifiable in sending six thousand men upon an expedition to 
 the eastward. They likewise say that Zemaun Shah will attack 
 Hindustan in the next season ; but that I equally disbelieve, from a 
 conviction of its difficulties, and of its inutility even if it should 
 succeed. There is no plunder to be got now ; and as to a 
 permanent establishment in India, he can expect to make it 
 only in the Punjab or the Delhi countries after a severe contest 
 with the Seiks and Mahrattas ; and after success he will have 
 a ruined country in lieu of his present possessions, which are 
 rich, of which he would undoubtedly be deprived. I don't 
 doubt but that he will again get Lahore, and occupy it in 
 strength ; but that only with a view of driving the Seiks (the 
 worst of neighbours) farther from him, and of getting an 
 additional barrier to his present territories. There is nothing 
 to induce him to advance any farther. 
 
 I i
 
 482 PROPOSED OPERATIONS OF GENERAL BAIRD. 
 
 269. To Sir Ralph Abercromby. 
 Prospect of success in the Red Sea Expedition. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 6th April, 1801. 
 
 The operations proposed by Mr. Secretary Dundas for the 
 troops in the Red Sea are, to get possession of Suez and 
 Cosseir and any port which the French may have on its shores, 
 to encourage the Mamelukes and natives of Upper Egypt to 
 shake off the French yoke, to commence hostilities against 
 them, to assist these natives with arms and ammunition, and 
 even to join them if that should appear practicable or likely 
 to be of advantage. As much of the season for sailing up the 
 Red Sea has unavoidably elapsed, it is probable that it will not 
 be possible for the troops under the command of Major-General 
 Baird to reach Suez. It is probable, however, that Admiral 
 Blankett, who sailed from hence in December with an inten- 
 tion to destroy Suez, will have succeeded in that object. The 
 General's first operations, therefore, will be directed against 
 Cosseir, and there is every reason to hope that they will succeed. 
 He is likely to be at Cosseir in the middle of May. 
 
 Measures have been already taken to open a communication 
 with the principal Mamelukes and natives of Upper Egypt, and 
 to urge them to commence hostilities against the French ; and, 
 considering the former enmity between them and the French, 
 the instability of their present connection with them, and the 
 distrust which has been manifested by both parties, I have 
 very little doubt of their success, particularly if your first 
 operations are successful. If General Baird should succeed in 
 rousing the Mamelukes of Upper Egypt, he proposes, I imagine, 
 to cross the Desert from Cosseir to Ghennah on the Nile, and 
 to join his force with theirs. The difficulty of this operation is 
 certainly great, but I apprehend is not insurmountable, if the 
 Mamelukes are forward in Upper Egypt, and if they are not 
 adverse to its execution ; but if they should not come forward, 
 or if they should be adverse to its execution, I fear that the 
 difficulties are of such a nature as to render the attempt not 
 justifiable even if the execution should be practicable.
 
 THE BOMBAY PIONEERS SHOULD BE KEPT UP. 483 
 
 270. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 The Bombay pioneer corps to be maintained, for service in 
 Malabar. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 9th July, 1802. 
 
 I have received a letter from Major Macleod, in which he 
 proposes to reduce half the corps of Bombay pioneers. I believe 
 that corps was raised when you were in Malabar, and you will 
 recollect the inconvenience which was felt for want of them. In 
 fact, people for common work are not to be procured in Malabar, 
 as in other parts of the country, and when wanted, they are sent 
 for at great expense to Bombay and Paulghautcherry. 
 
 But there are in Malabar works of the greatest importance, 
 which require the constant employment of such a body of men. 
 The communications with this country through the Ghauts and 
 the roads leading to them require repair annually after the 
 rains, and it is necessary that the roads in Cotiote and those 
 leading from the northern to the southern parts of the province, 
 which were made with a view to the subjection of the Pyche 
 Rajah, should be kept open. This can be done only by the 
 labour of men at the conclusion of the rains annually. It may 
 be said that men may be hired for these services when they are 
 required, and that this mode will be cheaper than to keep in 
 constant pay a corps of pioneers ; but I doubt whether men can 
 be hired for these or any other services at all in Malabar, and 
 even if they can and are cheaper, it is worth while to pay the 
 difference of expense in order to have always at command for 
 all services a body of men so useful as this is. 
 
 271. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 Relations of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief. De- 
 sirableness of magnifying his office, in order to obviate the 
 defects, and promote the efficiency, of the army. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, nth June, 1803. 
 
 I am not acquainted with your Commander-in-Chief, or with 
 his character ; but it appears to me that he has been very ill 
 treated by the government at home, and that he has been sent 
 to conduct the duties of a very arduous situation, which has been 
 clipped of its honours and of its substantial power (to say nothing 
 
 1 i 2
 
 484 HOW TO TREAT BOMBAY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 
 
 of its emoluments). There is no man in the army who is not 
 aware of this, and it is not possible that, under such circum- 
 stances, General Nicholls can command either their respect or 
 their ready obedience. 
 
 It is my opinion that an officer who is sent to command 
 troops in this country, particularly the Bombay army, ought to 
 be in the very highest situation under the government, and at 
 all events ought to be known to possess their full confidence in 
 all matters relating to his own profession. If the gentlemen at 
 home do not feel this truth, or, feeling it, do not act accord- 
 ingly merely to save a little money, that is no reason for which 
 you should not, as far as depends upon you, remedy their errors. 
 You can do this by placing the fullest confidence in the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of your troops (supposing him always to 
 deserve it), and by upholding his authority and opinion upon 
 all occasions. 
 
 With this view I would recommend it to you, whenever you 
 have determined upon the political expediency of any military 
 measure, to acquaint your Commander-in-Chief with your senti- 
 ments forthwith, and call upon him to give his opinion in 
 detail regarding the force which will be required, the mode of 
 collecting that force, and its operations, in order to carry your 
 object into execution. He ought also to acquaint you with the 
 nature and extent of the equipments, provisions, supplies, &c, 
 of different kinds which the troops will want upon the proposed 
 service. After having done this it will remain with you to give 
 your own orders regarding the different objects suggested by 
 him, recollecting always that he or any other military man has 
 no right, such as the Military Board now claims, to make con- 
 tracts for furnishing supplies independent of the power of 
 government. I mention this subject not from any desire to 
 push forward General Nicholls, with whom I have no acquaint- 
 ance, or any desire but the good of the service. 
 
 It is easy to foresee that with your territory and your con- 
 nections to the northward, and with the establishment of the 
 subsidiary force at Poonah, your military operations will increase 
 vastly. I don't like the mode in which they go on now. Every 
 thing appears to be a scramble for money, nobody is responsible, 
 and the Commander-in-Chief is indifferent. 
 
 It is not possible that you can have a knowledge of all the 
 details into which it is necessary to enter to equip a body of 
 troops properly for the field in this country, or that, having that
 
 TRIBUTE NOT TO BE EXACTED FROM THE BHEELS. 485 
 
 knowledge, you should have time to enter into them. What is 
 the consequence ? Your troops take the field without the 
 common necessaries for the service, they become sickly, a vast 
 expense is incurred, and nothing is done. Introduce your 
 Commander-in-Chief into your military affairs, make him give 
 his opinion, throw the details into his hands, and make him 
 responsible for them, and if your military operations do not go 
 on as they ought, you know who to blame. 
 
 On the other hand, if your officers of supply do not do their 
 duty, for his own sake he will apprise you of their neglect. By 
 these means not only your military operations will be effectual, 
 but you will raise to his proper situation the gentleman who 
 is at the head of your army, and you will relieve yourself from 
 a detail of business which must embarrass you. 
 
 You see that I have written my opinion with great freedom. 
 I hope that you will attribute it to my real motive, a wish that 
 the service may go on well, and that you will excuse it. 
 
 272. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 
 
 We should not exact tribute from wild tribes ; and can do so 
 only to the injury of our military reputation. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 5th Nov., 1803. 
 
 10. If the country should remain in the hands of the British 
 government, the revenue payable by the Bheels becomes an object 
 of greater consequence. But even in this case, the first question 
 that occurs is, whether this war was undertaken to obtain an 
 increase of revenue, and whether it is an object to obtain such 
 military advantage as the possession of the defiles in the countries 
 of the Bheels, and the assistance of these people, even at the 
 expense of the remission of the tribute which they paid to 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before we obtained possession of the 
 country ? 
 
 11. But even if, as is supposed, we continue to enjoy the 
 advantages which we at present possess in the countries of the 
 Bheels, without a remission of the tribute, I doubt the policy 
 of obliging them to continue to pay : experience teaches us 
 that tribute of this description cannot be collected from the 
 inhabitants of the hilly and jungly tracts of India, without 
 frequent appeals to arms. I have but little doubt the Company 
 would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military
 
 486 IMPOLICY OF WAR WITH WILD TRIBES. 
 
 reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and 
 that the power of government would have been greater, if all 
 tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally 
 remitted. 
 
 12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of govern- 
 ment should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in 
 hostilities such as those above described : their operations are 
 very difficult and uncertain ; they require large bodies of the 
 best troops, numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is 
 gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The government 
 have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which 
 must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the 
 tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their 
 own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a 
 foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel Rajahs ; and 
 it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of 
 them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other 
 parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion 
 the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the 
 strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India. 
 
 273. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Impolicy of ovcr-zveakening Scindiah, and of raising small 
 poivers to independence. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 9th April, 1804. 
 
 Powar is a Mahratta chief, of the same nominal rank in the 
 Empire as Scindiah and Holkar ; but he is not so powerful as 
 either, and latterly he appears to have considered himself as 
 inferior to the former, and served in Scindiah's army at the battle 
 of Assye. After that battle he fled to Dhar, and opened a 
 friendly communication with Major Walker, and since the peace 
 he has come to Baroda without leave. 
 
 We have no right to interfere in favour of Powar under the 
 9th article of the treaty of peace ; and in your letter to Mr. 
 Duncan you have pointed out clearly the inutility of attempting 
 it under the 10th article. 
 
 If we are not to interfere in favour of Powar in consequence of 
 either the 9th or 10th article of the treaty of peace, the question 
 is whether we ought to interfere on any other ground more 
 general.
 
 ALLIANCE WITH WEAK POWERS WEAKENS US. 487 
 
 I have always been of opinion that we have weakened Scindiah 
 more than is politic ; and that we shall repent having established 
 such a number of these little independent powers in India, every- 
 one of whom will require the support of the British government, 
 which will occasion a constant demand of employment of troops, 
 a loss of officers and men, and a claim of money. 
 
 In respect to Powar, he is naturally, and in consequence of the 
 local situation of his capital in the neighbourhood of both Holkar 
 and Scindiah, the weakest of the weak. For that reason I 
 objected to making a treaty with him; because I knew he would 
 render us no service in the war adequate to the expense of 
 supporting him in a state of independence in peace, which opera- 
 tion would have required an army. That opinion is not changed 
 by his having gone to Baroda ; and all that I can recommend 
 for Powar is, that if Scindiah's durbar should be brought into 
 tolerable temper, a general recommendation of this chief should 
 be given in by the Resident, founded upon his connexion with 
 the Guickwar, with whom the British government is so closely 
 allied. 
 
 In respect to the idea of supporting Powar's independence, as 
 a member of the Mahratta Empire, that in my opinion is equally 
 absurd with taking up the cause of Cashee Rao Holkar. 
 
 VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND 
 FAMINE. 
 
 274. Memorandum on Pulo Penang. 
 
 The Company trade at a loss, except with China. This results 
 from their political character and obligations. Objects sub- 
 served by their Indian trade. They have almost an European 
 monopoly of the China trade. 
 
 (Extract.) [1 797-1 
 
 By the papers which have been published at different times by 
 the East India Company, it appears thatas a trading company they 
 are losers upon their whole concern with India (excepting always 
 that with China) to a very considerable degree ; that if they did 
 not possess their immense territories in Bengal, &c, and if it
 
 488 HOW FAR DO THE COMPANY GAIN BY TRADE? 
 
 were not possible for them as merchants to carry on their trade 
 at a cheaper rate, they would do better not to carry it on at all. 
 This arises not from the nature of the trade itself, but from their 
 double character of merchants and governors, together with that 
 of their political character at home, which cause considerable 
 unnecessary expense and extravagance in their mode of con- 
 ducting their mercantile transactions. The surplus of the revenues 
 over the necessary expenditure, and the profits of the trade with 
 China, however, enable them to pay the expenses attending their 
 government and management at home, their dividend, and the 
 share which Government claims out of the surplus revenues. The 
 Indian trade is carried on with a view to render more easy the 
 transmission of the surplus revenue to Europe, without draining 
 Bengal of its specie, and in order to give that country a market 
 for its manufactured produce, which as its sovereigns the Com- 
 pany are bound to do. The China trade then, and that to the 
 eastward, are those upon which the Company and the nation 
 principally depend ; the Company for carrying home the revenue, 
 and the nation for that large sum in Customs which is annually 
 paid by the Company. Owing to the advantages which the 
 East India Company have had in the China market by means 
 of the territorial revenues, and to other causes incidental to 
 them, they have nearly monopolized the trade with China. 
 They supply nearly all Europe with the produce of that 
 country and of India, and thus Great Britain enjoys the advan- 
 tage of the consumption, not only of its own inhabitants, but 
 of those of the other nations in Europe, the English East India 
 Company having driven them nearly all out of the Chinese and 
 Indian markets. 
 
 275. Memorandum on Bengal. 
 
 The agriculture of Bengal is not more heavily taxed by the British, 
 than by previous native riders; and is more e neon raged by 
 the Permanent Settlement. Sanitary and political objections 
 against permitting Europeans to colonize, and purchase, land. 
 Agriculture might be fostered by markets, and improved com- 
 munications by land and water. Bengal has free trade with 
 India and the Eastern seas. The Company, though monopo- 
 lists of the more valuable home traffic, trade at a loss. The 
 cost of freight is almost prohibitive of private trade with 
 England, (in spite of the recent regulation). This private 
 trade therefore goes mostly to the foreigner. Bengal loses the
 
 THE COMPANY TAXED WITH OPPRESSING BENGAL. 489 
 
 English market: but England suffers equally. The price of 
 freight should be lowered. This will probably destroy the 
 Company's commerce : but that would be no great evil. The 
 salt and opium monopolies produce a surplus, which is drawn 
 away in trade. But this is better for Bengal, than if it weir 
 dissipated on the Zemindars, as, if remitted, it probably Would 
 be. England is entitled to levy a tribute on Bengal ; and to 
 protect West Indian sugars, at the expense of East Indian, 
 The vested interests of West India proprietors should be con- 
 sidered. The political importance of those Islands, and their 
 superior facilities as a school for seamen. Other Indian 
 articles saddled with heavy duties to promote the general 
 diffusion of English trade, and prevent our depending too 
 much on so distant a market as the East. General con- 
 clusions. 
 
 In the 'Remarks upon the Present State of the Husbandry 
 and Commerce of Bengal,' several circumstances are adduced in 
 order to prove that that country loses by its connection with 
 Great Britain, as that connection at present exists, through the 
 medium of an exclusive commercial Company. 
 
 The grievances principally complained of are the want of due 
 encouragement to the cultivation of its valuable produce ; the 
 commercial monopoly of the Company, which, as it raises the 
 price of freight, precludes the possibility of transporting that 
 produce to a valuable market ; and the proportion of the revenues 
 of the country which is drawn from it as a tribute to the Com- 
 pany and to the British Government. 
 
 Another circumstance of which complaint is made, but which 
 is totally distinct from the abuses of the management of an ex- 
 clusive Company, is the want of encouragement at home to the 
 raw and to some of the manufactured produce of Bengal, such as 
 sugar, tobacco, raw silk, &c, &c. I shall consider each of these 
 with that impartiality which should always reign in discussions 
 upon subjects of this nature. 
 
 The productions of India are grain, indigo, raw silk, tobacco, 
 sugar. It has often been a question whether the total rent which 
 is paid by the inhabitants of Bengal is greater at present than it 
 was during the dynasty of the Moguls or the subsequent govern- 
 ment of the native princes ; it however seems now to be under- 
 stood that it is about equal to what it was at those times, and I 
 shall take that for granted.
 
 490 NOT MORE OPPRESSIVE THAN NATIVE RULERS. 
 
 The sum which is paid to the Government is about equal to 
 that which was paid to the Government of the Moguls, and which 
 appears to have been divided into two parts : the one was ap- 
 plied to pay the expenses of the government in Bengal, the other 
 was sent to the treasury in Delhi. The expenses of the collec- 
 tion of those revenues were about equal to what they are at this 
 moment, and therefore the zemindar or landholder, or under 
 whatever title he might have been known, retained no more of 
 the rent than he does at this moment under the British Govern- 
 ment. If the profits of the zemindar are small now, they were 
 equally so formerly, which, in addition to its being a proof that 
 there were formerly no landlords in Bengal, or, in other words, 
 that the zemindars were not proprietors, is a proof that the 
 British Government gives as much encouragement to the cultiva- 
 tion and improvement of land as was given during the time of 
 the best of the native governors. 
 
 But the British Government not only have not taken more 
 rent than the native governments, but they have made an en- 
 gagement that they will not take more than they do at present, 
 by making a permanent settlement, and by giving to the zemin- 
 dars the property of the soil. Therefore, as far as security and 
 permanency give encouragement to agriculture, more encour- 
 agement has been given by the British Government than by the 
 natives. 
 
 It seems, however, that there are certain articles which are 
 produced in Bengal which require a superior cultivation and a 
 greater expense, which neither the tenants nor the landholders 
 are enabled to advance. Among these, indigo, sugar, tobacco, 
 and silk are enumerated. 
 
 In order that these articles may receive the cultivation which 
 they require, and in order that there may be a body of land- 
 holders capable of bearing the expense of giving it to them, it is 
 proposed that Europeans should be allowed to purchase and to 
 become proprietors in India. 
 
 The first question is, whether the cultivation would be mended 
 by their interference. The husbandry in India is said to be very 
 defective. The simplicity with which all its complex operations 
 are performed is not supposed to be advantageous to it, and it is 
 therefore imagined that superior ingenuity and management 
 would give a larger product at a cheaper rate, and that, in time, 
 the example set by skilful Europeans would be followed through- 
 out the country. Notwithstanding the objections which the
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST EUROPEAN COLONIZATION. 49 1 
 
 Hindoos have to alter any institution which has been handed 
 down to them by their ancestors, many of which are reckoned 
 sacred, it is believed that if the advantages of European or British 
 management could be made clear to them, it would, in time, be 
 universally adopted. It is also true that the expense of clearing 
 and stocking a farm as it ought to be cannot be borne excepting 
 by an European, and therefore the Europeans ought to be 
 allowed to purchase, if it is wished that the agriculture of the 
 country should be much improved. There are, however, objec- 
 tions to that measure, which arise partly from the character of 
 the natives, and partly from the effect which the climate has 
 upon European constitutions. The natives hold every European 
 in the greatest awe, and therefore it is imagined that, if these 
 were allowed to settle in such parts of the country as they might 
 think fit, they might be induced to tyrannise over the former, 
 who would fear to complain, and thus the British name and 
 character would become an object of detestation to the Hindoos. 
 However, regulations might be adopted to prevent this evil, of 
 which the natives might be made acquainted ; and as they have 
 had many opportunities of witnessing the rigour of British justice, 
 even upon British subjects, when they deserve it, it is believed 
 that they would not fear to complain in case of receiving an 
 injury. The climate is a great objection to suffering the uncon- 
 strained resort of British subjects to India. Those who have not 
 been in Bengal are not aware of the effects which its climate has 
 upon the European constitution ; but they are so great, and those 
 who have been there for any length of time become so enervated, 
 that it is doubted whether those benefits which are expected 
 would result from their residence. A European cannot with 
 safety expose himself to the sun : how then can he hope to super- 
 intend the various operations of husbandry with success? His 
 generation, even supposing him to be married to a European 
 woman, dwindles and falls off to such a degree that the third 
 generation from the original settler is but little removed, in 
 manners and disposition, from the old inhabitants of the country ; 
 and therefore, excepting by a constant drain from the mother 
 country, the full benefits of this colonization cannot be ex- 
 pected. 
 
 The policy of the Company's Government has hitherto been to 
 prevent, as much as possible, the residence of Europeans in India ; 
 and it has been grounded upon the necessity of preserving in 
 the minds of the natives a respect for the British name and cha-
 
 492 EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT BE LANDED PROPRIETORS. 
 
 racter, which, it is feared, an unrestrained intercourse would tend 
 to remove, as well as upon the danger which would result were 
 they to become acquainted with the language and character of 
 the natives in their territories, and then to enter into the service 
 of the native princes. If an unrestrained intercourse hitherto 
 would have produced either of these effects, it is equally danger- 
 ous at the present moment, even although every British subject 
 should become a proprietor ; and from some events which have 
 taken place lately, from the language which has been held in the 
 ' Remarks/ it is more than ever necessary for the Company to 
 prevent the resort of Europeans to Bengal. The circumstance 
 which tended most in the course of the last year to preserve the 
 allegiance of the army to the Company's Government was the 
 desire which every individual had to return to Great Britain, and 
 the certainty that if the violent measures proposed were adopted, 
 or that if encouragement were given to proceed to extremities, 
 the door to his return was shut for ever. To this no individual, 
 particularly none of those who have fortunes sufficiently large to 
 maintain them, could make their minds up ; and the consequence 
 was that, at the moment when everything appeared most desper- 
 ate, all subsided. If Europeans had been settled with their 
 families in India ; if these men had, or could have had, their 
 homes in that country, the Company would have lost it, and 
 nothing could ever have regained it. 
 
 By the violence of the language and of the sentiments 
 which are held forth in the ' Remarks,' by the bitter complaints 
 which are made of the British Government and connection, the 
 sentiments of the Company's civil servants and of those who 
 reside in India by the Company's licence are very apparent : how 
 much more violent would they be if they were proprietors of 
 a soil for the commercial advantages of whose inhabitants they 
 now so violently contend ! It is to be expected that they 
 would likewise make India their home ; and thus Great Britain 
 would lose its strongest hold upon their allegiance, their desire 
 to return to their native country. However desirable, therefore, 
 it may be that the natives of India should obtain the ad- 
 vantage of British skill and management in agriculture, it is not 
 advisable that the Company should suffer its servants or those 
 who reside in India by its licence, to become proprietors of land. 
 
 There are other measures, which, although they might not be 
 equally efficacious, might still tend considerably to the prosperity 
 of Bengal, as far as that is connected with its agriculture. Markets
 
 HOW INDVSTRV MAY BE ENCOURAGED IN BENGAL. 493 
 
 might be established throughout the country, which would enable 
 the cultivator at all times to sell his produce without the difficulty 
 and expense attending upon a long carriage. These would like- 
 wise insure a uniformity in price, which, above all things, has 
 been found in other countries the most favourable to agri- 
 culture ; and by enabling one district to profit by the plenty 
 of another, they would insure all parts of Bengal from that worst 
 of evils, with which it has been so frequently afflicted,— a famine. 
 Good roads should likewise be made at first from the principal 
 place in each district to those in its neighbourhood. These ought 
 to be kept in repair. The inland navigation ought to be en- 
 couraged, and every measure ought to be adopted, which, by 
 rendering its use more easy, will make more perfect the com- 
 munication from one part of this country to the other. 
 
 If these measures were adopted, the agriculture of Bengal 
 would not require the assistance of Europeans, in order that it 
 might be brought to a very sufficient state of perfection. 
 
 The commerce of Bengal consists at present in an unre- 
 strained intercourse with all parts of India and the Eastern 
 Seas ; in the commerce carried on by the Company, and in 
 its intercourse with Europe and America by means of foreign 
 nations, and clandestine trade carried on by the persons resident 
 in India under the Company's licence and by Americans, and 
 likewise the inland trade with the northern parts of India and 
 the Deccan by the water-carriage, caravans, &c. &c. The 
 amount of the whole is four millions and a half. 
 
 The freedom of the trade which is carried on with the dif- 
 ferent parts of India is highly to the honour of the Company; 
 it has more than trebled since the peace of '83. It has suffered 
 in some degree for want of naval protection in the course of this 
 war ; but a peace will re-establish it again upon its old footing, 
 and it is probable that, with the same freedom, it will increase 
 in a greater proportion than it has hitherto. 
 
 The commerce which the Company carries on with Bengal 
 by means of its monopoly is so little productive, that were it not 
 for the necessity of bringing home the surplus of the revenues 
 through the medium of trade, lest Bengal should be entirely 
 drained of the precious metals, it would be better for them as a 
 commercial body to give up the trade entirely. However, that 
 trade at present, amounts to above a million sterling. It con- 
 sists chiefly in piece goods and saltpetre, and some indigo ; but 
 the price of the Company's freight is so high, that the other
 
 494 THE PR ICE 0F FREIGHT SHOULD BE LOWERED. 
 
 articles which are produced in India, and which are marketable 
 in Europe, cannot be carried, as their bulk is too great in com- 
 parison with their value. Thus, then, the commerce which the 
 Company carries on with Bengal is disadvantageous to itself, 
 and does not tend so much to the advantage of that country as 
 it might were it differently managed, and did the price of freight 
 come more nearly to what it is really worth. 
 
 The price which it is fixed the private traders are to pay for 
 the freight they occupy in the Company's ships is 5/. per ton out 
 and 15/. per ton home, which is liable to an addition in time of 
 war. The Company aver, and it is believed, with some truth, 
 that their freight costs them more ; but what article, besides the 
 expense of insurance, can repay that price? It is certain that 
 the Company have monopolized the exportation of the most 
 valuable articles ; but still they are losers ; and how much greater 
 must be the loss of the private traders to whom is left the trade 
 in gross produce, and the raw r materials of manufacture alone ! 
 A considerable trade has long been carried on with Europe from 
 Bengal by American and foreign vessels, and some clandestine 
 trade. 
 
 The majority of these American and foreign vessels have 
 belonged to British subjects resident in India, who thus supply 
 Europe with the produce of Bengal without submitting them- 
 selves to the control of the Company, and without paying any 
 duties in London. The amount of this trade is supposed to be 
 one million four hundred thousand pounds \ 
 
 In order that Government might obtain a control over this 
 trade, that London might become its emporium, and that Great 
 Britain might have the advantage of levying a duty upon the 
 consumption of Europe of Indian articles, the Company were 
 obliged to give 3000 tons, to be increased, when necessary, 
 to the private trade ; but the price fixed for that tonnage 
 is very high, because the Company have retained the monopoly 
 of those articles which by their value were most likely to pay 
 the tonnage ; and as shipping could be procured at a rate in- 
 finitely lower, the foreign or clandestine trade exists to as great 
 a degree at present as it did at the time when the regulation 
 was adopted that the Company should furnish a proportion of 
 tonnage to private traders. These insist that tonnage might be 
 
 1 Number of ships, about ... 30 
 
 Tonnage 13,000
 
 ITS COST INJURES BOTH BENGAL AND GREA T BRITAIN. 495 
 
 procured at 3/. per ton out, and 3/. per ton home. However, it 
 seems certain that tonnage can be procured at a much cheaper 
 rate than that at which the Company supply it ; and although it 
 may still be necessary that the trade with Bengal should be 
 carried on through the medium of an exclusive Company, there 
 is no good reason why the people of Great Britain should pay 
 the extravagant price of this tonnage for the Indian goods they 
 consume, in addition to the price they pay for the mismanage- 
 ment natural to an exclusive Company in all its commercial 
 concerns. 
 
 Bengal and Great Britain both suffer from the high price of 
 this freight : Bengal, as it is deprived of the British market for 
 much of its produce ; and Great Britain, as it pays a high price 
 for all the Indian commodities which it consumes, and as it is 
 deprived of much of the Bengal produce which would be useful 
 in its manufactures, but which, on account of the high price of 
 freight, cannot be transported with any reasonable prospect of 
 profit. Therefore, as far as this high price of freight tends to 
 deprive Bengal of a market for its produce, the inhabitants have 
 reason to complain of want of encouragement in their agricul- 
 ture ; but they have not more reason to complain than the people 
 of Great Britain, who, from the same arrangements, suffer both 
 as consumers and as merchants and manufacturers. 
 
 Without at present entering into the question whether it 
 would be advisable or otherwise to lay open the trade entirely, 
 or whether it would be advisable to suffer an unrestrained inter- 
 course between Great Britain and India, it may be said that 
 policy as well as justice requires that shipping should be found 
 at the lowest rate, in order that due encouragement may be 
 given to the agriculture and commerce of Bengal, and that the 
 private trade should be left as free as the nature of the Com- 
 pany's government at home and abroad will permit it. If 
 measures are not adopted having these objects in view, it is not 
 to be expected that the clandestine and the foreign trade will 
 not increase ; and thus Great Britain will lose not only the ad- 
 vantage of being the carriers of Indian produce for all Europe, 
 but likewise the duties which she would be enabled to levy upon 
 the consumption of Europe upon Indian articles in their transit. 
 
 Measures having lowness of freight and freedom of trade in 
 view may be adopted upon two principles : either the commerce 
 with India may be laid open to all England from the port of 
 London, and every man who pleases may adventure thither, or
 
 49<5 LOSS OF THE COMPANY 3 S TRADE NOT MATERIAL. 
 
 the Company may be the medium of export as well as import. 
 If the former be adopted, the unrestrained resort of British sub- 
 jects to India must be the consequence, which in another part of 
 this paper I have objected to, and therefore that measure ought 
 to be laid aside ; if the latter be adopted, the Company ought to 
 be obliged to find freight at the lowest rate to as great an extent 
 as private merchants might think fit to call for it. These ought 
 to be confined as to the time of calling for it, and they ought to 
 pay for all they call for, even if it is not used. The exportation 
 of British manufactures, excepting of military stores, ought to 
 be free, and private merchants ought to have it in their option 
 to import whatever they might think fit (subject always to the 
 British revenue laws), and all merchandise ought, as at present, 
 to pay the Company's duty, and be exposed to sale at the India 
 House. These regulations would give perfect freedom to the 
 private trade, with cheapness of freight, at the same time that 
 the commerce of Great Britain and Bengal would be under the 
 control of Government. The consequence would probably be 
 the annihilation of the Company's commerce ; but as it has been 
 already said that the Company lose by their connection with 
 Bengal, considering it as a commercial concern, no great evil 
 will arise from that circumstance. The Company will be freed 
 from a considerable expense of establishments both at home and 
 abroad, which is incurred at present merely for their commercial 
 concerns ; but when the commerce falls into the hands of indi- 
 viduals, and nothing remains to the Company excepting the 
 government, the expenses of the former will be separate from 
 those of the latter, and both will be better and more cheaply 
 carried on. 
 
 It has been already said that the Company neither receive 
 more rent from the lands of Bengal, nor do the occupiers pay 
 more under the Company's Government, than the old Govern- 
 ments received, or than the occupiers then paid ; but the Com- 
 pany's Government, by taking into their own hands the monopolies 
 of salt and of opium, have raised the revenues upwards of a 
 million sterling, and out of that arises the surplus by means of 
 which the Government are enabled to bring anything home to 
 Europe. 
 
 In order to ascertain whether the natives of Bengal have any 
 reason to complain that the surplus of the revenues over the 
 expense is carried to a distant country, it is first necessary to 
 ascertain what proportion is applied to purposes in India, in
 
 GROSS AND NETT REVENUE DRAWN FROM BENGAL. 497 
 
 which Bengal has an immediate concern, and next what propor- 
 tion goes home ; and then the question will arise whether the 
 withdrawing these sums from Bengal through the medium of 
 commerce is unfavourable to that country. 
 
 The amount of the revenue received under all heads is £5,033,000 
 The charges in Bengal amount to . . . . 3,127,000 
 
 Surplus . £1,906,000 
 
 It cannot be contested but that the establishments at Madras 
 and Bombay, Bencoolen and Prince of Wales Island, are 
 essentially necessary to Bengal ; and even if there were no 
 connection between Great Britain and that country, they ought 
 to be supported. The interest of the debts contracted at Madras 
 and Bombay, as they must be supposed to have been contracted 
 in wars in support of the chief establishment, it ought likewise 
 to pay ; and therefore the supplies to those settlements, and 
 the interest of their debts, may be fairly chargeable to Bengal 
 itself, and not to its connection with Great Britain. 
 
 The surplus, as already stated, is . . . . £1,906,000 
 Deduct supplies to Madras and Bombay £350,000 
 
 „ Prince of Wales Island and 
 
 Bencoolen . . . 50.000 
 Interest of debts in India .... 561,923 
 
 961,923 
 
 The surplus will then be reduced to . . . . £944,077 
 
 But it appears that the gross amount of the revenue is made 
 up of sums received upon bills and certificates, and of sums 
 received for sales of goods in Bengal, in addition to the land 
 revenue, the customs, the opium, and salt monopolies. The 
 former, as they may be fairly stated to be received for a value 
 given, ought to be deducted from the amount of the claim, and 
 the account will stand as follows : 
 
 Surplus as above ..... £944,077 
 
 Amount of sales . . . £350,000 
 
 Bills and certificates . . 126,461 
 
 476,461 
 
 Remaining surplus . . £467,616 
 K k
 
 498 RAISED WITH MINIMUM OF INJURY TO NATIVES. 
 
 The amount of sales ought not to be deducted, as it is not 
 included in the gross amount of the revenue : 
 
 Surplus as stated ..... £467,616 
 Add amount of sales .... 350,000 
 
 Actual surplus . . . . . £817,616 
 
 Thus then the sum which Great Britain draws from Bengal 
 is 817,616/., and this is drawn away in trade. 
 
 If the question were, whether the people of Bengal would 
 not be more happy and comfortable if they did not pay more 
 revenue than is necessary to defray the expenses of their esta- 
 blishments, there could be no doubt upon the subject ; and if 
 their own comfort were alone to be considered, the surplus 
 revenue ought to be remitted to them as soon as possible. But, 
 as I shall show hereafter, Great Britain has a right to expect 
 this tribute from them, it is impossible to devise means by which 
 a revenue can be drawn from a people so little to their injury, 
 as that which Great Britain draws is injurious to the natives of 
 Bengal. 
 
 If specie were not essentially necessary for all the purposes 
 of commerce, and if a drain to the amount of the surplus above 
 stated would not be felt severely in all transactions of barter and 
 exchange in the country, there would be no harm in sending 
 this revenue home in money. The amount of the demand in 
 Europe of Indian articles remaining the same, the exports from 
 Bengal, the quantity of surplus produce for export, would be 
 precisely equal to what they are at present ; with this difference, 
 that they would be paid for in the manufactures or money of 
 Great Britain, instead of in the money raised from the country. 
 As the case stands at present, there is a large revenue raised 
 from this people : it is spent in the first instance in defending 
 them, and in paying the usual expenses of government ; in the 
 next, in paying the expenses of their dependencies, which may 
 be called their defence ; in the third, in paying the interest of 
 debts contracted for their defence and security ; and in the 
 fourth, in a tribute to Great Britain. The three last may be 
 stated to be laid out in the country in encouragement of agri- 
 culture and manufactures. Supposing the sums laid out for the 
 support of Madras, Bombay, &c, for the interest of debts, or for 
 the tribute, were remitted in the revenue, and that the tenantry 
 still continue to pay the same sums as at present, which is more
 
 GREAT BRITAIN ENTITLED TO TRIBUTE FROM BENGAL. 499 
 
 than probable, it is doubted whether the proprietors of land, into 
 whose hands they would go, would encourage the agriculture and 
 manufactures of the country to the degree that they are at pre- 
 sent encouraged by the present application of the revenue ; and 
 in that case if the demand for the produce of Bengal, upon the 
 coast, &c, and in England were to cease, the country would 
 indeed be in a ruinous condition. 
 
 Therefore, upon the whole, although the peasants may com- 
 plain of the amount of what they pay, and that so little is left to 
 them, they have no reason to complain of the manner in which 
 what is taken from them is applied. There is another question 
 upon this part of the subject which has been treated with a con- 
 siderable degree of asperity in the ' Remarks ; ' it is whether it 
 is just or right for Great Britain to take any tribute whatever 
 from Bengal? The first question ought to be, whether it is 
 just or right for one country to conquer another? and when the 
 circumstances under which the conquest of Bengal was made 
 are considered, the rights of Great Britain to have made that 
 conquest are very apparent. After a conquest has been made, 
 and the Government is in the possession of the conqueror, it is 
 said in the ' Remarks ' he has no right to any advantage but 
 the Government. That would be true in some instances, but 
 otherwise in many others. 
 
 Some nations when they have made a conquest gain a barrier 
 to their former dominions, as the French did in their conquests 
 of Alsace, &c, towards the Rhine, and there they have no right 
 to claim any further advantages. Others gain a monopoly of 
 commerce, as all nations in Europe do in the conquest of West 
 India islands, and there likewise they have no right to tribute : 
 others, again, gain the advantage of men and provisions for their 
 armies and fleets, the advantage that the country in question is 
 not connected with another power, such as Great Britain enjoys 
 in her connection with Ireland, from which country, although 
 she defends it, she has no claim to tribute : others get corn at a 
 cheap rate, as Rome did from Egypt, from which country she 
 received no other tribute. But I cannot perceive either a barrier, 
 a useful or necessary monopoly in trade, a connection which 
 gives Great Britain men or provisions for her fleets and armies, 
 or grain at a cheap rate, in Bengal ; and therefore I conclude 
 that in return for the protection which that country undoubtedly 
 receives, Great Britain has some right to expect remuneration. 
 In fact, all conquered countries give the conquerors an advan- 
 
 k k a
 
 500 WEST INDIAN SUGARS FA VOURED AT EXPENSE OF BENGAL. 
 
 tage in some point of view ; and Bengal gives none to Great 
 Britain, excepting in tribute, which therefore the latter ought 
 to take. 
 
 In the 'Remarks' much is said upon the subject of sugars; 
 great complaints are made that Great Britain, by the high 
 duties she lays upon the importation of sugars from the East 
 Indies, gives an undue preference to the West Indies, to the 
 injury of the former. If the question were abstractedly whether 
 it is proper to pay dearer for a certain commodity when you 
 can get it cheaper, there would be no doubt upon this subject ; 
 and there is no doubt but that the preference given to the West 
 India sugars raises a great tax upon the people of Great Britain, 
 and is highly injurious to the natives of Bengal, who undoubtedly 
 deserve every encouragement that can be given to them. But 
 the subject involves questions of greater magnitude than the 
 authors of the ' Remarks ' are aware of, and requires the cool 
 and candid judgment of an unbiassed mind to decide upon it, 
 instead of that of persons who may be fairly stated to be 
 interested in the event. 
 
 One leading fact is stated, upon which the whole question turns. 
 It is this : that if the East Indian sugars were admitted at the 
 same rate of duty as the West Indian, even at the present high 
 rate of freight, they would undersell them ; nay, it may be 
 stated that, owing to the disastrous war which has desolated the 
 West India Islands for the last years, the price of sugars 
 
 has been raised so considerably, that the Company have found it 
 expedient to import sugars from Bengal, paying the advanced 
 duty and the high freight. 
 
 These circumstances being considered, the avowed conse- 
 quence of admitting Bengal sugars at an equal duty must be 
 the annihilation of the West India Islands. 
 
 Before any measures are taken which can have that effect, 
 it will be wise to ascertain the nature and the quantity of pro- 
 perty there is in those islands belonging to British subjects 
 there residing, as well as to those who reside in England, all of 
 whom or whose ancestors have purchased, or otherwise obtained 
 and hold them, under the implied faith of the nation that they 
 were to be supported in them at all times during war, and that 
 the commercial policy of the nation in peace was likewise to be 
 directed towards their support. 
 
 It will likewise be wise to ascertain what quantity of pro- 
 perty and what quantity of shipping are embarked in this trade
 
 GROUNDS ON WHICH THIS PREFERENCE JUSTIFIABLE. 50T 
 
 under the same faith ; and after these circumstances will have 
 been nicely ascertained, and that the nation has determined to 
 make good all reasonable losses which individuals may sustain 
 by this change of its commercial policy, it may deliberate upon 
 this question, whether it be more for the advantage of Great 
 Britain to pay this advanced price for the sugars it consumes, 
 and that the natives of Bengal should wait their market for that 
 article ; or that it should make compensation to all individuals 
 concerned in the West Indies or in the trade to the islands, for 
 their losses. 
 
 Combined with this question there will be others which will 
 claim the consideration of those who are to decide upon the 
 subject. Their attention will be claimed by the importance of 
 the islands in the hands of other powers of Europe at enmity 
 with Great Britain, the importance of the trade to them as a 
 nursery for seamen, and a certain resource to the nation at the 
 commencement of a war. In those points of view, even supposing 
 that the pecuniary considerations were out of the question, they 
 are of the utmost consequence. I have not materials to form a 
 judgment of their political importance to Great Britain supposing 
 them in the hands of other European powers, but as a nursery for 
 seamen, a few facts will show their consequence. 
 
 It has been said that the climate of the West Indies is so 
 unwholesome that a residence in it is fatal to most of those who 
 go there. 
 
 Without disputing that fact, I may safely assert that it is not 
 more unwholesome or unfavourable to European constitutions 
 than the climate of Bengal. Generally speaking all tropical 
 climates are equally so, and that alone which makes one prefer- 
 able to another is the difference of the conveniences and luxuries 
 which are in use by the inhabitants to render the climate more 
 bearable. Bengal is more favourable to the higher class of 
 Europeans than other climates, because it is the custom and 
 the fashion there for them to take more care of themselves ; 
 but it is not more so to the lower orders of people than other 
 places situated in the tropics, as they have not more means of 
 taking care of themselves, more luxuries and conveniences there, 
 than they have elsewhere. Therefore upon the whole it may be 
 safely said that Great Britain does not lose more seamen in the 
 one country than in the other, considering the proportion of the 
 numbers employed in each. 
 
 But the advantage which the West India trade has over
 
 502 HIGH DUTIES ON OTHER GOODS SIMILARLY JUSTIFIABLE. 
 
 that of the East is, that the seamen are a shorter time absent 
 from their own country in the former than they are in the latter. 
 A voyage to the West Indies may be stated at six months, 
 during half of which time only can it be stated that the men are 
 in a bad climate ; whereas a voyage to the East Indies always 
 lasts eighteen months, generally two'years, and four-fifths of that 
 time are spent in a climate avowedly unfavourable to European 
 constitutions. Therefore supposing the numbers employed in 
 each were the same, it may be concluded that the loss of lives 
 would be greatest in that in which they remained longest. But 
 there is another reason why the West India trade is a preferable 
 employment for seamen. The voyage is so quickly performed 
 that the nation has them always in her power ; the fleets can be 
 manned from them in a short space of time : whereas if the 
 seamen from the East India fleet were the only or principal 
 dependence for manning the navy, weeks and months might elapse 
 after a declaration of war before the fleets could put to sea, and 
 the disadvantages thereof might have the most fatal conse- 
 quences. The seamen employed in the West India trade are 
 generally more expert than those employed in the trade to the 
 East Indies. They navigate seas in which there is a greater 
 diversity of weather than there is in a voyage to the East Indies, 
 during which, if it is commenced at the proper season, there will 
 probably be no occasion to alter the sails once, however long it 
 may be. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, the West India trade may be 
 stated to be the best school for seamen, and their importance to 
 the welfare, even to the existence of Great Britain, should induce 
 the Legislature to adopt with great caution any measure which 
 can diminish the West India trade in order to give a preference 
 to that with the East. 
 
 It is to be observed upon this part of the subject, that it has 
 no relation to the existence of the Company's exclusive privi- 
 leges of commerce. It is a subject for the consideration of Par- 
 liament, entirely distinct from that of their monopoly. The other 
 articles which are stated in the ' Remarks ' to labour under 
 the same inconveniences, such as silk, tobacco, &c, as being 
 loaded with high duties on their importation from India, in 
 order that they may not come in competition with similar articles 
 the produce of foreign European nations or of America, must 
 likewise be considered in the same point of view. The necessity 
 of a naval defence for Great Britain causes the necessity of
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS IN ANSWER TO 'REMARKS.' 503 
 
 encouraging commerce with all parts of the globe, particularly 
 with those parts which are most contiguous to it. If the 
 commerce of Great Britain were confined to one quarter alone, 
 its sources of wealth might be stopped ; the efforts of its enemies, 
 by being directed against that quarter, might at all events do 
 the country the greatest injury in time of war, and in the event 
 of success the country would be entirely ruined. As long as its 
 commerce is directed to all quarters, it must flourish ; one source 
 may be cut off, but others will be found. 
 
 Having considered the whole of this subject, I conclude, first, 
 that agriculture is considerably encouraged under the adminis- 
 tration of the British government in Bengal ; that the measures 
 recommended in the ' Remarks,' viz. to allow Europeans to 
 become purchasers, are impolitic, and ought not to be adopted ; 
 but that other measures might be adopted which would give to 
 agriculture all the encouragement it could require. 
 
 2. I conclude that it is not advisable to throw open the trade, 
 but that the Company ought to be obliged to furnish private 
 traders with the quantity of tonnage they might require at the 
 lowest rate at which it could be got. That the import of Bengal 
 articles ought to be as free for private traders as for the Company, 
 and the export of British produce (military stores excepted) 
 ought to be the same. 
 
 3. That the tribute is not so prejudicial to Bengal as it is 
 stated, and that it is a matter of right, founded upon the policy 
 usually adopted by modern and ancient nations in regard to 
 conquered countries. 
 
 4. I conclude that the protection given to West India sugars, 
 and to other articles the produce of Europe and America, to the 
 prejudice of the same produced in Bengal, is necessary on account 
 of the want of seamen for the British navy. 
 
 Arthur Wesley. 
 
 276. On Dearth in India. 1 
 
 Occasion of the discussion. Personal experience of the calamity 
 •which suggested it. The discussion falls under three heads. 
 t . Different modes of cultivation ; and effect upon them of 
 deficient rainfall. Area watered by the two monsoons re- 
 spectively. Speaking generally, the natives avail themselves 
 of one monsoon oirfy, in each place. The cultivation is either 
 
 1 Written on the voyage home from India. — Ed.
 
 504 CAN FAMINE BE PREVENTED IN INDIA f 
 
 of wet or of dry lands ; the former mostly producing rice. 
 Rice lands are zvatercd by either (1) rain, (2) canals from 
 rivers, (3) tanks filled directly by rain, or by canals supplied 
 from monsoon floods, or (4) by wells, filled by rain. Hotv 
 these methods of irrigation are carried out ; and their com- 
 parative dependence upon the monsoons. Limited extent of the 
 rice-producing country. The dry lands are watered by the 
 western rains. The produce throughout, of both kinds of 
 lands, ultimately depends mainly on the timely arrival and 
 extent of the periodical rains. To improve the cultivation of 
 either kind of lands, so as to supersede this dependence, seems 
 not very feasible^. 
 
 I read lately in a Bombay newspaper a statement of a speech 
 made by Sir James Macintosh, the Recorder of Bombay, to the 
 Grand Jury of that settlement, in the course of which, after 
 having adverted to the charitable disposition manifested by its 
 inhabitants to the famished Natives of the neighbouring conti- 
 nent, and the efforts made by the government of Bombay to 
 provide for the relief of those who had come to that island, in 
 search of food, he observes upon the frequent occurrence of dearth 
 in India, and upon the more fatal effects produced by it in that 
 part of the world, in comparison with those produced by the 
 occurrence of a similar calamity in other regions. He particu- 
 larly points out these two evils as subjects deserving investigation, 
 into which he proposes to inquire, and to which he will draw the 
 attention of his hearers at a future period. 
 
 I happened to be in the Deccan in the years 1803 and 1804, 
 during the time this dearth existed, and the calamities occurred 
 which have drawn the attention of Sir James Macintosh, and 
 have excited the charitable feelings of all the inhabitants of Bom- 
 bay ; and as I have had opportunities which few others have, of 
 viewing the Natives of India in their various relations with each 
 other, when concerned with Europeans, as I particularly saw the 
 cause and progress of the evil which every man must lament, 
 and had occasion to advert to the modes which were practic- 
 able of alleviating it, I will enter into a consideration of the 
 general subject, which, I hope, will not be deemed entirely useless. 
 
 1 The paper appears to be unfinished, the second and third heads 
 being omitted. But see, in the Appendix, an extract from Dr. Hunter's 
 Annals of Rural Bengal. — Ed.
 
 RANGE AND APPLICATION OF THE MONSOON RAINS. 505 
 
 The dearth and consequent famine which occurred in the Dec- 
 can in 1803 and 1804, was to be attributed principally to the dry 
 season of 1803. Those who are not acquainted with the systems 
 of government and the customs of the inhabitants of India, 
 or with the nature of the climate, will be of opinion that the 
 recurrence of the dearth might be prevented by a better sys- 
 tem of cultivation, or that the pernicious effects of the dearth 
 of the grain in any particular part, viz. famine, and the mor- 
 tality of its inhabitants, might be prevented by measures of the 
 government. 
 
 In order to clear the subject of all difficulty, it is necessary, 1st, 
 to consider generally the different modes of cultivating the land 
 in practice throughout India, and in what manner these modes 
 are affected by a wet or a dry season ; 2ndly, to consider in what 
 manner the deficiency produced by the seasons in any particular 
 part could be remedied by the government in that part ; and, 
 3rdly, what are the physical or moral causes which prevent the 
 application of those remedies. 
 
 It is well known that the rains in India, which are the great 
 source of all the cultivation, are periodical ; and that the whole 
 of the continent does not enjoy the benefit of them at the same 
 time of the year. The western rains, or those which set in in 
 the month of June, with what is called the S.W. monsoon, have 
 by far the greatest influence. They prevail in the whole of Hin- 
 dustan, including the provinces of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and 
 Orissa. all along the western coast of the peninsula, from Surat 
 to Cape Comorin, and across the peninsula, as far as the eastern 
 mountains, commonly called the range of Eastern ghauts. Even 
 the countries to the eastward of this eastern range, the Carnatic 
 and the Northern Circars, are not entirely exempt from their in- 
 fluence, as the rain falls heavily at times in those countries in the 
 months of June, July, and August, the season of the westerly 
 rains ; but not in sufficient quantities, in those parts of India, to 
 induce the inhabitants to take advantage of it for the purposes of 
 cultivation. 
 
 The countries on the eastern coast of the peninsula, extending 
 from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, and inland as far as the eastern 
 mountains, have the advantage of the eastern rains for the 
 cultivation of their lands ; and these begin generally in October, 
 with the N.E. monsoon, and last till towards the end of 
 December. 
 
 The rain which falls at this season reaches the other parts of
 
 506 PADDY FIELDS IRRIGATED IN FOUR WAYS. 
 
 India, as well as the provinces situated on the Bay of Bengal ; 
 but it is very partial, and very much in proportion to their neigh- 
 bourhood to the eastern mountains ; and it does not appear that 
 the inhabitants of any of the countries to the west of those moun- 
 tains take advantage of the easterly rains for the purposes of 
 cultivation, excepting in Mysore. 
 
 It follows, then, from this account, that, although the whole of 
 India may be watered in some degree by rains which fall at two 
 different seasons, in June and in October, the inhabitants of 
 Hindustan, of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa ; of the coast of 
 Malabar, from Surat to Cape Comorin ; and of the whole penin- 
 sula of India, from the Western sea to the Eastern ghauts, take 
 advantage of the western rains only for the cultivation of their 
 lands ; and that the inhabitants of the countries situated on the 
 Bay of Bengal, as far as the eastern range of mountains, take ad- 
 vantage of the eastern rains for the same purposes. 
 
 To this statement the Mysore country is an exception. The 
 eastern rains fall heavily, particularly in the eastern parts of that 
 country, and advantage is taken of them in cultivation ; and it 
 will appear presently, when I come to consider the different 
 species of cultivation, that the inhabitants of some countries in 
 the Carnatic, through which rivers run which rise in the Western 
 ghauts, and empty themselves in the Bay of Bengal, have likewise 
 the advantage of the western rains in their cultivation ; as the 
 rivers which supply them with water are filled by the western rains. 
 
 It is well known that the cultivation in India is either of wet 
 land or of dry. The great produce of what is called wet 
 land is rice, excepting in some very particular spots, on which 
 the produce is occasionally wheat, sugar, or Indian corn. But 
 these three last ought more properly to be termed exceptions 
 from the general rule, and do not deserve consideration in a 
 discussion respecting the causes or the consequences of dearth. 
 
 In the cultivation of rice the land is watered either, ist, directly 
 by the fall of the rain ; or, 2ndly, by artificial canals made by 
 the embankments of rivers ; or, 3rdly, by tanks filled by the 
 rains, or by the overflow of rivers, or torrents, the water run- 
 ning into them by canals ; or, 4thly, by wells filled by the rain, 
 from which the water is drawn by manual labour or that of cattle. 
 
 The greatest part of the cultivation of the wet lands in the 
 province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, 
 is carried on by the first mode ; and, of course, the produce must 
 depend entirely upon the critical arrival of the rains, and upon
 
 BUT ALL THESE DEPEND OX THE MQXSOONS. ^CJ 
 
 the quantity of the rain that falls. This quantity generally over- 
 flows the whole country ; and in Bengal, particularly, the crop is 
 reaped in boats. 
 
 The fall of the water in many of the rivers in India is very 
 great, so much so as to render the rivers torrents in the season 
 of the rains ; and the banks of some of these are low. In these 
 cases dams are thrown across the rivers ; by which means the 
 water is diverted from the principal channel into others for the 
 purposes of cultivation. It frequently happens that the fall of 
 the principal river is so great, and the dam is so well constructed, 
 as to throw water into the inferior channels for the purposes of 
 cultivation, even at the season in which the river is not full. The 
 produce of the lands through which these rivers run, particularly 
 those from which water can be drawn when the river is not quite 
 full, is far less precarious than of those lands which depend solely 
 upon the rains. Of this description are all the lands upon the 
 river Cauvery, from its rise in the western mountains, in all its 
 progress through Mysore, and the countries of Trichinopoly 
 and Tanjore, till it falls into the sea. Innumerable canals are 
 cut from it ; and these happy countries are certain of a crop, 
 whether the rains are abundant or otherwise. In some instances 
 these canals, after watering a great extent of country, fall again 
 into the river ; in others they are led to great tanks, which afford 
 a constant supply of water for the cultivation of the land in the 
 neighbourhood ; and in every case the cultivation of the country 
 is independent of the rains. 
 
 I did not see any river in India of which so much advantage 
 was taken in this way as of the Cauvery ; as none that I saw had 
 such a fall, or banks equally low. 
 
 The greatest part of Mysore and nearly the whole of the Car- 
 natic, excepting the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, 
 receive the water for the purposes of the cultivation of their wet 
 lands from tanks. These are filled either by the periodical rains, 
 the water which falls in their neighbourhood running into them 
 and being retained by their banks, or by the overflow of some of 
 the rivers, or rather torrents, which are filled by the eastern 
 rains. Canals are cut from these, which conduct the waters into 
 the tanks. 
 
 The beds of these torrents are dry during the whole year, ex- 
 cepting in the season of the rains, and in some instances banks 
 have been built across them at different distances to retain the 
 water. In this manner a river will appear to be a chain of tanks.
 
 508 DRY CULTURE MOSTLY DEPENDS ON THE MONSOONS. 
 
 Although the countries watered by these tanks, whether filled by 
 the rains, or by the overflow of the torrents, are more certain of a 
 crop than those which depend solely upon the fall of the rain in 
 their field, they are not in so good a situation as those watered 
 by such a river as the Cauvery. I know of no tanks or 
 canals in any part of India excepting in the Company's ter- 
 ritories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore and in 
 the Carnatic. 
 
 Wells for the purposes of cultivation are filled either by the 
 fall of the rain into them, or by a canal cut from a river. The 
 water is drawn from them by manual labour ; but they are little 
 used for the purposes of wet cultivation, excepting in parts of 
 the Northern Circars, and in the Company's territories in Benares 
 and Oude, and generally throughout India, for watering wheat 
 fields, sugar cane, Indian corn, and gardens. I am informed that 
 the whole country of Benares is watered by wells ; but those 
 which I have seen in other parts have done little more than afford 
 water to the garden grounds or sugar cane. 
 
 A country watered by wells is less dependent for its crop upon 
 the periodical rains than one which receives the water immedi- 
 ately from the heavens into its fields ; but such a country is less 
 certain of a sufficient supply of water than one which receives 
 what it requires from tanks or canals. 
 
 \\ hat I have above written applies solely to the cultivation of 
 wet lands, the produce of which is properly rice. But rice, as the 
 produce of wet lands, is the food of but a very small proportion 
 of the inhabitants of India. This grain is eaten generally in the 
 province of Bengal, along the coasts of India from Orissa anc 
 Cape Comorin, and from Cape Comorin to Surat ; but it is not 
 the food of the people of the upper countries, that is, of those 
 who inhabit the countries between the eastern and western range 
 of mountains in the peninsula, of the inhabitants of Hindustan 
 those of Oude, Benares, or Bahar. In the greatest part of this 
 immense tract of country the soil is of a black garden mould 
 which would not produce rice ; and in Mysore, parts of which dc 
 produce great quantities of that grain, it is not the food of the 
 common people, but is used as an article of commerce with the 
 coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. The inhabitants of all these 
 countries subsist upon what are called dry grains, or the produce 
 of the dry lands ; and the nature of the cultivation of these land- 
 of course requires the attention of the person who considers this 
 subject. As the countries which are watered by the eastern
 
 WHEN THE RAINS FAIL, DEARTH SEEMS INEVITABLE. 509 
 
 rains produce rice, and that is the common food of their people, 
 those who depend upon the produce of the dry lands for their 
 food are the inhabitants of the countries which are watered by the 
 western rains. 
 
 They depend for their crop greatly upon the rain which falls on 
 the land which they cultivate ; they plough the land and sow the 
 seed with the first rains, and they reap it in the months 
 of December and January. If the rain fails they lose it en- 
 tirely. 
 
 In some parts of India they have small spots of ground watered 
 by wells, which are ploughed early in the season, and produce an 
 early crop. But these appear to be cultivated principally for 
 fodder for the cattle ; and at all events, whatever may be the 
 intention, the produce from these small spots of ground must be 
 so small, as to afford subsistence to their cultivators for a very 
 short space of time. 
 
 The produce of the land, therefore, and the subsistence of the 
 people throughout India, depend entirely upon the critical arrival 
 and the quantity of the periodical rains ; and if these should fail 
 in any particular part of the country, the people of that part must 
 want subsistence. 
 
 It does not appear that it would be very possible to improve 
 this system of cultivation either of wet or of dry lands. The 
 rains which fall in the province of Bengal, and in the countries 
 on the coast of Malabar, are generally so heavy, and the countries 
 are so fiat and so completely overflowed, as to preclude the pos- 
 sibility of constructing the works, and canals and tanks, which 
 insure the rice crop in parts of Mysore and the Carnatic, and ren- 
 der it less uncertain in others. 
 
 The cultivation of dry lands appears equally incapable of im- 
 provement. If more wells were dug, the dependence upon the 
 rain would not be quite so absolute ; but the number to be dug, 
 in order to produce any effect upon the cultivation and produce 
 of the land, must be very great, and the work would be exceed- 
 ingly expensive. In a year of famine, the grain produced by the 
 land watered by a well would pay the expense of constructing it ; 
 but in the years in which the fall of rain would be plentiful, the 
 well would not be used. 
 
 It remains, then, to be considered whether any means can be 
 adopted, either to make the superfluity of one year supply the 
 want of another, or the superfluity of one country provide for 
 the wants of that not so well provided.
 
 510 COLONEL WELLESLEV INDOCTRINATES LORD CLIVE. 
 
 VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY, 
 
 i. Lord Clive. 
 
 277. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Colonel We lies ley explains the Governor-General's policy and 
 proposed measures. Lord Clive" s character and bearing. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, 15th Sept., 1798. 
 
 I have had a long conversation with General Harris. He has 
 kept me in Fort St. George in order, as he says, to co-operate 
 with him in keeping Lord Clive in the right road. I think that 
 we shall succeed in that object. He has already stated his deter- 
 mination to enter into no discussions with your Government. 
 
 I was with him for five hours this morning. We read over 
 first your private letter to General Harris, and I explained all 
 those parts which had any reference to your plans at Hyderabad 
 and Poonah, and those which you have for the defence of the 
 Carnatic in future. We then read over those parts of the in- 
 structions to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah which 
 explain the connection between the negotiations there and the 
 offers from Tippoo ; and I took much pains to make him under- 
 stand the reasons why it was necessary that the negotiation 
 at the one Court should be known by, approved of, and go 
 hand in hand with, that at the other. When I left him he was 
 strongly impressed, first, with the necessity which existed of 
 taking the steps which have been taken to drive the French 
 party out of the Deccan ; secondly, equally so of that of forcing 
 Scindiah back into Hindustan; and thirdly, he is perfectly recon- 
 ciled to the measure of weakening the army in the centre 
 div : sion, in order to insure the first, and to enable the Resident 
 at Poonah to proceed with the second. He is convinced that 
 these measures could not have been taken without assembling 
 an army in the Carnatic ; and he sees clearly that it is not your 
 intention to precipitate the country into a war ; but that even 
 after you will have obtained the objects at Hyderabad and 
 Poonah, the question of war or peace with Tippoo will depend 
 upon your state of preparation, his state of preparation, the
 
 LORD OLIVE'S CHARACTER AND POLITICAL TEMPER. 511 
 
 state of your finances, and the other considerations which must 
 ever have weight in such decisions. He was very anxious to 
 know what your plan of operation for the Bombay army was ; 
 what for that in the Carnatic ; the strength of the detachment 
 you intended to send from Bengal ; when it was to march, and 
 when likely to arrive ; what money he was to expect. I could 
 give him no certain information upon any of these points. I 
 told him generally that your idea was, that the Bombay army 
 should begin by an attack upon Mangalore, and afterwards 
 proceed up the Ghauts ; that for the present the operations of 
 the army in the Carnatic were to be merely defensive, and as 
 such must depend upon the nature of the attack ; that I believed 
 you intended two regiments of infantry for the service of this 
 Government, and that they were to march through Berar from 
 the north-west frontier towards November, and that it was sup- 
 posed they might arrive here by the end of January. I told 
 him that you intended to send him money as soon as you knew 
 what were his monthly expenses. I have requested him to send 
 you a copy of a memorandum he has received from Colonel 
 Close upon these subjects, upon which I shall make no remark, 
 excepting that you will perceive it is written upon a very 
 erroneous notion, as he presumes that the necessity of chastising 
 Tippoo is more urgent than that which exists of sending the 
 detachment to the Nizam. In some other points it is remark- 
 ably well done, and worthy of your attention. 
 
 I think that some pains had been taken to mislead Lord 
 Clive and to frighten him. He is a mild, moderate man, re- 
 markably reserved, having a bad delivery, and apparently a 
 heavy understanding. He certainly has been unaccustomed to 
 consider questions of the magnitude of that now before him, 
 but I doubt whether he is so dull as he appears, or as people 
 here imagine he is. He communicated with me very freely 
 upon all these points, but he did not say one word about any of 
 the persons who are about him. I can see plainly that they 
 have magnified the difficulties of the undertaking to him, and 
 so I told him. As he is convinced of the necessity of the 
 measures in which you are embarked, and as he will soon be so 
 of the exaggerated style in which everything has been stated to 
 him, I shall have an advantage over them of which I shall not 
 fail to profit ; at all events, you may be convinced that he will 
 give you no trouble. I encouraged him to open his mind to you 
 without reserve.
 
 512 HOW TO AVOID POLITICAL FRICTION. 
 
 278. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 Lord dive's disposition. The Governor-General should treat 
 him iv it Ji forbearance and confidence. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, 19th Oct., 1798. 
 
 Lord C. opens his mind to me very freely upon all subjects. 
 I give him my opinion, and talk as I would to M. The truth 
 is, he does not want talents, but he is very diffident of himself; 
 and now that he has begun to find out that there is no conjuration 
 in transacting the business of Government, he improves daily, 
 takes more upon himself, and will very shortly have less con- 
 fidence and reliance than he must have at present upon the 
 opinions and abilities of those who have long done the business 
 of the country. A violent or harsh letter from Fort William 
 would spoil all. The conduct which I recommend is, perfect 
 confidence with him upon all subjects, and I would extend it 
 even to his government when it is safe to do so. There should be 
 no jealousy, as there is really no danger, of an interference in 
 the duties or prerogatives of the Supreme Government ; and if 
 by chance either should be assumed by this Government, upon 
 an occasion not very material, it would be better to pass it over, 
 and not to notice any excepting upon an occasion when the 
 invasion of either may prove detrimental to the service. My 
 idea in this is to avoid disputes upon petty subjects, which have 
 
 one effect only, that of erecting little men, such as , who 
 
 are to manage them, into great ones. Small faults and omissions 
 in the obedience to the orders of the Supreme Government, pro- 
 vided they do not lead to bad consequences, ought, for the same 
 reason, to be passed over. It may be depended upon that per- 
 fect confidence, refraining from noticing faults such as I have 
 mentioned, and from naming or alluding to the persons whom 
 M. thinks adverse to him, will have the best effects. 
 
 279. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 Lord Clive is only unfamiliar with official routine, not hostile 
 to the Governor-General. A private letter from Lord Morn- 
 ington would set him right. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1798. 
 
 I hope that this letter will arrive before Mornington will have 
 written to Lord Clive, after the perusal of the general letter which
 
 POURING OIL ON THE TROUBLED WATERS. 513 
 
 you mention. It is of the utmost consequence to the success of 
 all his measures that they should remain upon good terms, and 
 that Mornington, in conformity to his own determination, should 
 refrain from all discussions with this Government : those alone 
 can occasion any unpleasant difference, the inevitable conse- 
 quence of which must be to bring into notice and increase the 
 
 influence of and others, who must manage the discussion 
 
 on this side ; as, whatever I may think of Lord Clive's abilities, 
 I don't deem him equal to cope with Mornington. He will, 
 therefore, call in the assistance of those who[m] he thinks most 
 able, and thus will his dependence upon and confidence in them 
 be increased. 
 
 My opinion is, that when Lord Clive was signing the general 
 letter, he did not know whether everything was put into its 
 proper department ; nor did he know that it was not his duty 
 to sign to every part of the letter. This is to be attributed 
 to his inexperience in business, and not to opinions which he 
 may be supposed to have formed inimical to the measures of 
 the Supreme Government ; as, notwithstanding his extreme 
 reserve and caution in delivering his opinions, I have got out of 
 him what he thinks of the measures of that Government, and he 
 has unequivocally stated it as his opinion that Mornington could 
 not do otherwise than he has done, both with respect to the 
 Allies and to the enemy. Indeed this opinion is very general in 
 the settlement. If he has done an improper thing in writing in 
 the public department upon a subject which had been before 
 the Council in the secret department ; if, contrary to the usual 
 forms of office, business which ought to have remained for some 
 time longer in the latter was improperly removed to the former, 
 I think that it would be advisable that Mornington should 
 write him a private letter about it, and warn him of the bad 
 consequences of such a departure from the rules of office. 
 
 280. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. 
 
 Corrupt and mischievous interference of the Directors in the 
 patronage of the Madras Government. 
 
 Seringapatam, 21st Oct., 1801. 
 
 I had heard a report of the circumstance which you have 
 
 communicated to me, but I had not an idea of the extent of the 
 
 intended changes, and I could not believe, till I received your 
 
 letter, that it was really intended to remove you from yourcffice. 
 
 Ll
 
 514 THE DIRECTORS THREATEN TO RUIN THE SERVICE. 
 
 I agree entirely in opinion with you regarding the effects which, 
 it is pretty clear, it is meant should be produced by the proposed 
 alterations. There is another effect to which you have not ad- 
 verted, and that is, that they will infallibly drive out of the 
 country every man who wishes well to the public cause, and who 
 prizes his character. As soon as the old system of rapacity in 
 the provinces is revived, and not only countenanced, but en- 
 couraged by the government, which will be the consequence of 
 these changes, the greediness of the public servants will be as 
 odious to the government as their dishonesty is at this moment ; 
 and those who have always resisted rapacity, and who do not feel 
 inclined to be rapacious, will become the objects of public cen- 
 sure. As for my part, I have determined that as soon as these 
 changes take place, and that I find that it is intended to intro- 
 duce the new system of dubashery and rapacity into this country, 
 I shall withdraw, and I believe every honest man who is not 
 obliged to stay will do the same. 
 
 I cannot conceive what can have produced these changes in 
 England. Surely Lord Wellesley's friends and Lord Hobart could 
 have prevented the effects of any violent calumny against your 
 character. It cannot be possible that the new Board of Control 
 have thrown themselves into the hands of the Directors, and all 
 the jobbers that have gone from this country from time to time ; 
 but certainly these last arrangements have all the appearance of 
 the neglect of Indian affairs by those who wish well to the public 
 cause, and of the triumph of those of a different description. At 
 all events I think that you cannot stay if you lose your office ; 
 and Lord Clive cannot stay if a secretary is to be forced upon 
 him with a view to an alteration in the system of his govern- 
 ment against his inclination. I don't know in what manner 
 Lord Wellesley could interfere to stop these arrangements : his 
 presence at Madras would probably prevent the consequences to 
 be apprehended from a change of men for a time ; but as soon 
 as he would return to his own government, or as he should go 
 to England, Lord Clive, supposing him to remain, would not 
 have strength to stem the system of rapacity ; and, supposing 
 that he should be withdrawn, it becomes established at once. 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I see no remedy for the evils which 
 will be the undoubted consequence of this change of men. 
 
 I wish now for your own sake that you had gone to Poonah. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 THEIR ACTION WILL COMPEL LORD CLIVE TO RESIGN. 515 
 
 281. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 The same subject. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1801. 
 
 You will have heard of the late dismissals and changes at 
 Madras. All of them are known to be extremely disagreeable 
 to the Governor-General, and many of them are, I believe, in 
 direct contradiction to his express recommendation. The case 
 of Mr. Oakes is a very strong one ; he had been appointed first 
 member of the Board of Revenue by the Court of Directors, but 
 went home upon finding that he had no chance of getting the 
 appointment, as government were determined not to make a 
 vacancy. Immediately after his departure a vacancy was made, 
 and Lord Wellesley appointed Mr. Cockburn to fill it ; since 
 that period I am informed that Lord W. has repeatedly re- 
 commended that Mr. Oakes should not be sent out at least to 
 that situation, and he has lately taken a very strong measure in 
 favour of Mr. Cockburn, in order to induce him to remain in 
 India to carry into execution the plans in contemplation for 
 establishing the judicial system in the territories under the 
 government of Fort St. George. All these arrangements, &c, 
 are at an end by the fresh appointment by the Court of Directors 
 of Mr. Oakes to be first member of the Board of Revenue. This 
 is a subject which it is impossible for any man with any feeling 
 to pass over. 
 
 The dismissal of Webbe and the disapprobation expressed of 
 almost all the measures of this government, which I believe 
 have been approved of by Lord Wellesley, are still more un- 
 pleasant, and render it more impossible for Lord Wellesley to 
 carry on his government, although, probably, it might not be so 
 necessary to notice these acts as it is to notice those regarding 
 Mr. Cockburn and Mr. Oakes. You are, of course, acquainted 
 with Lord Clive's character, and the dependence which Lord 
 Wellesley has placed in Mr. Webbe to carry on this govern- 
 ment, and you will conceive in what manner he will feel what 
 has been done regarding this gentleman. As for Lord Clive, I 
 don't see how it is possible for him to remain one hour after he 
 will have an opportunity of going away ; and of this I am very 
 certain, that after what has passed, if he does manifest so little 
 feeling as to stay in India, he will be turned out as soon as this 
 
 L 1 2,
 
 516 IT IS ILLEGAL, AS WELL AS UNJUST AND IMPOLITIC. 
 
 his intention shall be known in London. So that I think there 
 is some reason to believe that the Governor-General is not very 
 popular at the India House. 
 
 282. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 The same subject. Members of Council incited to oppose their 
 
 Governors. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 4th June, 1802. 
 
 We hear nothing yet of a successor to Lord Clive. His Lord- 
 ship certainly informed the Court of Directors that he would not 
 hold the government longer than January, 1803 ; and not even 
 so long, unless certain points were explained to his satisfaction. 
 The points on which he and the Court are at issue are the 
 interference of the Court in the appointments to offices under 
 this government, the sending back to India persons sent home 
 for their crimes, and the encouragement given by the Court 
 of Directors to a spirit of controversy and opposition in the 
 Councils. The Court of Directors have appointed persons to 
 the office of Chief Secretary of Government, to situations in 
 the Boards of Revenue and Trade, and to the principal com- 
 mercial residencies under this government. The selections for 
 these offices have not only been made without the consent or 
 recommendation of Lord Clive, but have been from persons of 
 whose conduct his Lordship has disapproved publicly, and from 
 others whom he or his predecessors have sent home for their 
 misdemeanours. 
 
 They have sent back to India with appointments to offices, 
 or with strong recommendations, many persons who have been 
 sent home ; among others, one young gentleman who was con- 
 victed, and did not even deny that he had taken a bribe to 
 make a judicial decision. 
 
 They have in a manner ordered their councillors to oppose 
 their Governors ; and the consequence is, that the greatest part 
 of the time of the Governor is now employed in answering the 
 opposition of the members of his Council. In my opinion, the 
 interference of the government at home in the disposal of the 
 patronage of the governments abroad, and the encouragement 
 given to controversy and opposition in the Councils, are directly 
 contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the Act of Parlia- 
 ment. At all events, these acts are in direct contradiction to
 
 IF CONTINUED, IT WILL RUIN OUR INDIAN EMPIRE. 517 
 
 the principles upon which we are taught to believe the Act of 
 Parliament was framed, and it is very obvious that a continu- 
 ance of them will soon settle all questions of British power 
 in India. 
 
 We are well aware of the manner in which persons sent home 
 for their crimes obtain the consent of the Court of Directors to 
 come out again, and others obtain their orders to the govern- 
 ments abroad to appoint them to offices for which they may 
 have been deemed entirely unfit. These modes of obtaining 
 the favour and recommendation of the government at home may 
 be highly profitable to those who are concerned in them ; but 
 they won't answer for a foreign and distant government, par- 
 ticularly not for the British government in India. Upon the 
 whole, I cannot but applaud Lord Clive's determination to 
 bring these subjects before the public if such an explanation be 
 not given of them as will enable him or any person of character 
 to hold the government hereafter. 
 
 2. Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 283. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 The Madras permanent settlement well carried out by Malcolm. 
 Corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenliall Street in the 
 operations of Lord Wellesley 's government^ incompatible with 
 his retention of office ; and ruinous in tendency to British 
 power in India. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 20th April, 1802. 
 
 The arrangements made by you at Madras must have been 
 very satisfactory to Lord Wellesley. They have secured the 
 accomplishment of an important measure, the permanent settle- 
 ment of the revenue in the territories under the government of 
 Fort St. George, and the cordiality and co-operation of that 
 government with the Supreme government at the present crisis. 
 If the permanent settlement of the revenue had been left to the 
 present board of Revenue, that measure would never have been 
 effected ; and if Lord Clive had gone to England, the govern- 
 ment which would have succeeded to him would have quarrelled 
 with the Supreme government, and, under the spurious names of 
 reform of military expenditure and increase of investment, would 
 have been guilty of every enormity that has lately met with the
 
 518 ' THESE MEASURES AIMED DIRECTLY AT LORD WELLESLEY.'' 
 
 approbation and patronage of the Court of Directors. The merit 
 of the arrangements which have prevented these evils depends 
 upon the characters of the individuals affected by them ; and the 
 degree of approbation which will be given to them at home will 
 be in proportion to the knowledge which people have of the 
 characters of the leading men in India, particularly of those of 
 the favourites of the Court of Directors. I hope, therefore, that 
 Lord W. has taken care in his despatches to bring a few facts to 
 the knowledge of his friends in England. I rejoice to hear that 
 he intends to go home, if justice is not done to him by the Court 
 of Directors ; and if the ministers do not give him security that 
 he shall not be again liable to the corrupt and vulgar interference 
 of Leadenhall street in the operations of his government. Their 
 appointment to all the principal offices at Fort St. George, and 
 the encouragement which I understand they have given to their 
 councils to oppose the acts of their governors, are inconsistent 
 with the spirit of, if not directly contrary to, the law ; and their 
 sending out to India all those who have been sent home for mis- 
 behaviour must, if not prevented in future, end in the annihilation 
 of all British power in India. All these measures are aimed 
 directly at Lord Wellesley, and he cannot remain in the govern- 
 ment, and no gentleman can succeed to him, if means are not 
 taken to prevent them in future. 
 
 284. To Major Malcolm. 
 
 Lord Wellesley justified in suspending the execution of the Court's 
 orders for abolishing the College. The question of his re- 
 signation not affected by those orders. 
 
 Seringapatam, 12th July, 1802. 
 
 I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th 
 June, which, with its enclosure, fully explains the College 
 question, and the conduct of the Governor-General in regard to 
 the orders which he has received. It appears that he has taken 
 the only ground that it was possible for him to take ; and he is 
 fully justified in the delay to abolish the institution, by the 
 approbation which the Court of Directors have given to it, 
 which would have induced them to continue it, if the Company 
 had not laboured, as they imagined, under financial embarrass- 
 ments ; by the fact that those embarrassments no longer exist ; 
 and by the circumstances of the persons belonging to the in-
 
 PERSONAL BEARINGS OF THE COLLEGE QUESTION. 519 
 
 stitution, who, if it was suddenly abolished, would be deprived 
 of bread. 
 
 I think that the question, whether Lord Wellesley should go 
 home or not, now stands precisely where it did before he re- 
 ceived these orders. He had no reason to expect any thing but 
 injury from the Court of Directors, till his appeal to the King's 
 ministers should have been received, and till they could have 
 acted in consequence. If the grounds were good on which he 
 determined to remain in India another year, and if the Court of 
 Directors should desire it, and recall some of their offensive 
 orders, and should promise support in future, and if the ministers 
 should engage for that support, — they are equally good at 
 present. He expected injury when he was induced to come to 
 this determination ; and, now that it has been received, he ought 
 not to alter it. In fact, if the Court of Directors and the 
 ministers should act as Lord Wellesley has required, the College 
 question, as well as all others, will be given up to him ; the 
 government at home will approve of the delay in the execution 
 of the orders recently received, and finally, of that institution. 
 
 In what I have above written, I have not considered whether 
 the Indian ministers have the power, the ability, or the inclina- 
 tion, to force the Court of Directors to act as Lord Wellesley 
 requires ; or whether, if they have, the Court of Directors will 
 be sincere and cordial in the support which they may engage 
 to give. These questions, I conclude, were maturely considered 
 when Lord Wellesley determined to remain in India another 
 year, on certain conditions ; and they are not affected by the 
 orders to abolish the College, and ought not now to be taken 
 into consideration. 
 
 I think that affairs in Europe are in a curious state. I wish 
 that you would send me one set of newspapers from the 1st 
 Jan. last. 
 
 285. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 The Ministers have broken faith with, and are not prepared to 
 support, you ; nor are they properly alive to the value of your 
 services. You are in danger of being dismissed ; which 
 would be a great evil on public grounds, as well as injurious 
 to your character. You should therefore fix, and announce 
 to the Directors, the earliest convenient time for your depar- 
 ture, i.e. the 1st of October. Were the war not at an end, I
 
 520 YOU CANNOT RELY ON MINISTERIAL SUPPORT. 
 
 should have recommended an earlier time. For yon conld not 
 then have wound tip affairs, as you may now do by October. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 31st Jan., 1804. 
 
 I received last night the duplicate of your letter of the 6th, 
 and your letter of the 9th instant, and I am rejoiced to find that 
 you approve of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar. 
 
 I have considered Henry's letter of the 31st August with all 
 the attention which the subject deserves, and I shall now give 
 you my unreserved opinion upon it. It appears that the King's 
 Ministers say that they are fully aware of the magnitude of your 
 services in this country, and are sensible of the necessity that 
 Great Britain should continue to enjoy the advantage of them ; 
 but they are not sufficiently strong, or they do not choose to 
 incur the risk of supporting you against the attacks of the Court 
 of Directors: that is to say, in other words, 'we enjoy a great 
 benefit, and we wish to continue to enjoy it, but we won't pay the 
 price which it must cost us ; a price which, by the by, common 
 justice to a man whom we have placed, and upon whom we have 
 prevailed to remain, in an arduous situation, ought to induce us 
 to pay at any rate.' In addition to this, the Prime Minister, 
 the man who ought to be most anxious to secure these services 
 for the nation, says that, as your private friend, he cannot 
 advise you to remain in India beyond the last year ; and he says 
 this almost in the same breath with a declaration of the magni- 
 tude and importance of the continuance of your services, and a 
 dissertation upon certain circumstances respecting your successor, 
 which render him not so fit a person for the office of Governor- 
 General as might be wished. 
 
 The first observation that occurs upon this subject is, that 
 the Ministers are guilty of a breach of faith. They promised 
 you their support, and now they refuse to give it. Another 
 observation is, that they are not so sensible of the magnitude 
 and importance of your services as they tell you and your friends 
 they are ; and that in fact they are indifferent whether the nation 
 continues to have the benefit of them, and that they prefer 
 losing them to taking the trouble of giving you the support 
 which is necessary in order that you may continue in your office ; 
 in other words, the vote of Mr. Tierney or of Mr. Fonblanque 
 is of greater importance than the continuance of your services 
 as Governor- General. 
 
 On this ground I have not the smallest hesitation in saying
 
 YOU SHOULD RESIGN, AS SOON AS YOU WELL CAN. 521 
 
 that you should not delay your departure from India one moment 
 beyond that on which you will have completely executed all the 
 measures which are in course at this moment. When I say 
 completely executed, I don't mean that you should stay till all 
 your views and plans for the peace and prosperity of India will 
 have been carried into effect, because that may yet take time, 
 possibly more than the Court of Directors or the King's Ministers 
 will allow you to hold your office. But I would recommend 
 that you should fix a time in which you might possibly complete 
 every thing, and on no account whatever ought you to stay 
 beyond that time. 
 
 There is no doubt that you cannot go in March. It is probable 
 that you will not have received the treaty of peace with Scindiah 
 till late in this month, and one month will not be sufficient for 
 executing all the arrangements connected with and depending 
 on that treaty; but the beginning of October is a good season 
 for sailing to England, particularly from Bengal, and in my 
 opinion you ought to go then, whatever may be the state of our 
 affairs. 
 
 You ought to take the earliest opportunity of apprising the 
 Court of Directors of this your determination ; and if the King's 
 Ministers should make you acquainted with this new intention 
 not to support you, or if you should think the report made by 
 Henry of his conversation with Mr. Addington sufficient authority, 
 you ought to inform the Ministers of the reasons for which you 
 had come to this determination, and that you would have de- 
 parted at an earlier period if the season had permitted it. 
 
 It may be said that there is but little difference between the 
 beginning of October and the month of December, and that you 
 will have more time for your business, and a better season for 
 your voyage, if you should sail in December : in fact there is 
 but little difference ; but in my opinion there is great danger of 
 your being dismissed from your office, and I need not point out 
 the bad effects which that will have in this country. It is probable 
 that the Ministers might be induced to resist this measure, if 
 they saw that you had determined to go home upon the first 
 opportunity that the season would afford ; but they would not 
 do so if they should find that you delayed your departure 
 beyond the first opportunity after you received the intimation of 
 their determination not to give you the support which you have 
 required. 
 
 I therefore most anxiously recommend you to fix the 1st of
 
 522 STATE FOUR INTENTION; OR YOU WILL BE DISMISSED. 
 
 October for the period of your departure, and to take the earliest 
 opportunity of informing the Court of Directors thereof. 
 
 You will observe that the opinion I have given you answers 
 your four questions. I am convinced that you will receive 
 orders to resign the government to Sir George Barlow, if you 
 don't announce your determination to go away when the season 
 will permit. These orders will, in my opinion, be more fatal to 
 the public interests in this country, to your character, and to the 
 power which you now possess of forwarding the interests of this 
 empire in England, than the failure of all the plans which you 
 have in contemplation for the public benefit by your leaving the 
 execution of them to Sir George Barlow, even supposing that 
 failure to be certain. 
 
 But much time remains between this and the month of Octo- 
 ber, and much may be done ; and it is more than probable that 
 Sir George Barlow will be inclined to adhere to your principles, 
 and to carry your plans strictly into execution. I declare that, 
 if the war still existed, I should have recommended you to go 
 away in March, for the same reason that I now recommend you 
 to go in October. You could not foresee the conclusion of the 
 war, and you would have every reason to expect a recall, which 
 would be more fatal to the public interests than the failure of all 
 your plans for carrying on the war, or for the re-establishment 
 of peace. Besides, in that case your remaining in India after 
 being informed that you were not to receive the support which 
 you had always declared to be necessary to induce you to remain, 
 would have appeared like an adhesion to the office. 
 
 Under present circumstances you remain for a certain time, 
 in order, as far as is possible in that time, to conclude certain 
 arrangements, the issue of which is not so uncertain as the 
 operations of a war must be, and at the expiration of that time 
 you announce your determination to go, whether those arrange- 
 ments are concluded or not.
 
 SIGNIFICANCE OF CORNWALLIS'S REAPPOINTMENT. 523 
 
 286. To Colonel Malcolm. 
 
 Is not the appointment of Lord Comwallis intended as a mark 
 of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley? 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805. 
 
 You will have been astonished to hear of Lord Cornwallis's 
 appointment to succeed to Lord Wellesley. There are letters here 
 for the latter from Lady Wellesley, which I believe were dis- 
 patched from England in November, from which circumstance 
 I judge that he was expected to return before it was determined 
 to appoint Lord Cornwallis. But you know well that I expected 
 that some measures would be adopted to force Lord Wellesley 
 to quit his situation, if he delayed to resign it ; and that I in- 
 formed him of this opinion and the grounds on which I had 
 formed it. Mr. Pitt's appointment to office made some alteration 
 in these grounds, but not a very essential one. I believe that 
 Mr. Pitt has been known to interfere but little in the departments 
 of government, of which he trusts the management to others, and 
 that he refrains particularly from all interference in the affairs 
 of India. If this should be the case, the administration of India 
 is the same now as it was in the time of Mr. Addington ; and 
 the only difference in respect to Lord Wellesley is the greater 
 degree of intimacy subsisting between him and Mr. Pitt, and 
 
 the greater degree of reluctance which would feel 
 
 in proposing his removal to Mr. Pitt than to Mr. Addington. 
 
 I acknowledge that I am of opinion that this arrangement 
 is intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley, 
 which opinion is founded upon a variety of circumstances which 
 came to my knowledge before I quitted India, with which you 
 are well acquainted. I can see nothing in the papers to the 
 end of February to lead my judgment on this subject ; and 
 there is, against the opinion that I have formed, a report in 
 circulation here that Lord Wellesley is to be appointed Secretary 
 
 of State for Foreign Affairs, upon his arrival in England, 
 
 holding the office only during his absence.
 
 524 a brotherly promise; amply redeemed. 
 
 3. Sir Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 287. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Relations of Colonel Wellesley to the Governor- General. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Fort William, 27th July, 1797. 
 
 I shall be happy to be of service to you in your Government ; 
 but such are the rules respecting the disposal of all patronage in 
 this country, that I can't expect to derive any advantage from it 
 which I should not obtain if any other person were Governor- 
 General. You may nevertheless be certain that I shall do 
 everything in my power to serve you. I have written you 
 several letters, in all of which I have delivered opinions upon 
 military and political subjects as they occurred to me : probably 
 upon reconsidering some of them I should not think them well 
 founded, but in general I believe they are so. As I am going 
 to Manilla, I probably shall not hear of your appointment as 
 Governor-General as soon as it takes place ; but as soon as I do 
 hear of it I will write you a letter, which will be delivered to you 
 upon your arrival, in which you shall have my opinion of the 
 principal men in this country, as far as from the short acquaint- 
 ance with them I have been able to form it. At present, to leave 
 it here would betray your secret, which I shall take care to 
 avoid ; and to write you a letter upon that subject to England 
 would be useless, as probably you will sail before it would reach 
 you. If you should not have sailed before this reaches you, 
 I shall have returned from the expedition before your arrival, 
 in which case I shall be able to give you opinions in person 
 better founded of course than those I have now upon the different 
 subjects which you have desired me to consider. 
 
 288. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 The circumstances connected with Colonel Wellesley' 1 s supersession 
 
 contribute to make that step an injustice, and a slur on his 
 
 military character. 
 
 Bombay, 16th April, 1801. 
 
 The letters which I have written to you lately will have shown 
 you that nothing could be more agreeable to me than the 
 permission which I received yesterday to return to the Mysore
 
 TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT. 525 
 
 country. But the first paragraph of the letter contains a reason 
 for my original removal from thence, and my appointment to the 
 chief command of the troops assembled at Ceylon, which indeed 
 I read once before in the despatch to Sir Ralph Abercromby, 
 and I wish to trouble you with a few lines upon it. 
 
 To avail yourself of my knowledge and experience in the 
 equipment of the expedition to be employed on the shores of 
 the Red Sea, is said to have been your inducement to call me 
 away from Mysore ; but, if this were the case, it was never so 
 stated to me, and, if it had been, I should have requested you 
 to employ in the drudgery that person who it was intended 
 should reap all the honour of the service ; and at least I should 
 have refrained from incurring expense, and from taking officers 
 from their situations to put them under the command of a man 
 they all dislike. 
 
 The fact was, that in the month of October you were carried 
 away, by some fortunate circumstances that had occurred, and 
 by your partiality for me, to appoint me to the chief command 
 of the troops to be employed at the Mauritius, in the Red Sea, 
 or, eventually, in India, and the governments were ordered to 
 furnish me with any additional troops that I might require. 
 On the 2 J st December you first announce your intention to 
 appoint Sir James Craig or General Baird to the command. 
 I don't deny that I conceive that they had reason to complain 
 when I was appointed to this command, and I believe they did 
 complain ; but, in order to do justice to them, why should a 
 greater injury and injustice than they complained of be done to 
 me, and why should reasons for my appointment be publicly 
 given to the whole world, which at least tend to show that you 
 conceived I was fit for the equipment of the expedition, but not 
 to conduct it after it was equipped ? 
 
 You have repeatedly stated to me an opinion directly the 
 contrary. But the reason of the change stands now publicly 
 unexplained, excepting in the manner above mentioned (I don't 
 know what is the reason of it, excepting it be that you thought 
 you had done an injustice to General Baird, and were desirous 
 to repair it) ; and as your success in this country, and your 
 character, must give to your opinions the fullest weight, I stand 
 publicly convicted of incapacity to conduct more of a service 
 than its equipment. I need not represent how injurious that 
 opinion must be to my future prospects ; particularly so as the 
 public in general, and those who are to judge of my conduct,
 
 526 WHY SHOULD I BE DECLARED INCAPABLE? 
 
 know well that your partiality to me would have induced you 
 to refrain from delivering it, if the incapacity had not been 
 manifest upon experiment. 
 
 If the change in the command were made only because I had 
 not sufficient rank, and because others had the rank required, 
 and complained of the preference shown to me at that time, it 
 would have been fair towards me to state it (although, by the 
 bye, I don't conceive those to be any good reasons for super- 
 seding a man when he has been appointed to a command). 
 The next best thing would have been to give no reason at all 
 for my appointment or my supersession. In either of these cases 
 I should have lamented only that the impropriety of the appoint- 
 ment had not been found out before it was made, the expense 
 which I had unnecessarily incurred, and that I had been induced 
 to remove officers from a situation which they did like to one 
 they do not. But I have a right to complain when I am super- 
 seded, and the reason stated for the supersession amounts to a 
 charge of incapacity. 
 
 I don't want to trouble you with my private feelings or con- 
 cerns, when I know that you have enough to think of ; and, 
 whatever I might have felt, I should never have said or written 
 another word upon the subject if I had not received yesterday 
 your letter of the 28th March. 
 
 The supersession has astonished, and is the conversation of, 
 the whole army and of all India, and numbers of my friends 
 have urged and written to me to request that I would have it 
 explained. Let Henry ask any indifferent man what is his 
 opinion of it. 1 After all this, if the same circumstances could 
 have happened under any other government, although I am fully 
 aware of the right of government to change officers as they may 
 think proper, I should certainly have asked whether any mis- 
 conduct or incapacity of mine had occasioned my supersession. 
 
 1 In a letter to his brother, dated Fort William, 22nd April, 1801, Mr. 
 Henry Wellesley says, ' I cannot think, my dear Arthur, that you have 
 suffered in the slightest degree in your reputation in consequence of 
 your being superseded in this command. You are still at the top of the 
 tree as to character, and I declare to you (and I can have no wish to 
 flatter you) that I never heard any man so highly spoken of, nor do I 
 know any person so generally looked up to. Your campaign against 
 Dhoondiah is surely sufficient to establish your character as a soldier 
 beyond the reach of malice or detraction of any kind.' — Ed.
 
 A MOMENTOUS REQUEST; AND ITS OUTCOME. 527 
 
 The admiral arrived yesterday, and I shall take an opportunity 
 of talking to him respecting your views upon the Mauritius and 
 Batavia. 
 
 I had two fits of fever upon the return of the spring-tides, and 
 I therefore propose to quit this place as soon as I can. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 289. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Desire to serve tender General Stuart in the Mahratta War ; or 
 to command, if General Stuart does not take the field. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803. 
 
 If you should take the command of it yourself, I hope you 
 will do me the favour to allow me to accompany you in any 
 capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its 
 inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was 
 in it ; and I shall do every thing in my power to make myself 
 useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the 
 command of this detachment yourself, and, in consideration of 
 the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that 
 country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I 
 have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to 
 intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every 
 thing in my power to forward your views. 
 
 290. Reply of Major-G-eneral Wellesley to the Address of the 
 British Inhabitants of Bombay. 
 
 [March, 1804.] 
 
 The approbation of this Settlement is a distinction which will 
 afford a permanent source of gratification to my mind ; and 
 I receive, with a high sense of respect, the honour conveyed to 
 me by your Address. 
 
 The events which preceded the war are of a nature to demon- 
 strate the justice of our cause ; while the forbearance with which 
 the British government refrained from the contest is calculated 
 to manifest that the efficient state of our military equipment was 
 directed to the preservation of peace, and consistent with the 
 principles of our defensive policy. The comprehensive plan of
 
 528 FAVOURABLE ASPECTS OF THE MAHRATTA WAR. 
 
 operations for the conduct of the war was equalled by the extent 
 of our resources, and supported by the concentrated power of 
 the empire. The conflict in which the British armies were in 
 consequence engaged presented a theatre capable of displaying 
 at once the most splendid objects of military glory, and sub- 
 stantial proofs of the pervading wisdom of the British councils. 
 To be engaged in such a scene was an object worthy of the 
 highest ambition ; and the contingencies which placed a division 
 of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the 
 permanent causes of our success and power, in the established 
 discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the 
 public interests, in the uniform effects of our consolidated 
 strength, and in the commanding influence of our national 
 reputation in India. 
 
 Under the effects of those certain causes, the troops under 
 my command were enabled to give that support which they were 
 destined by the Governor-General to afford to the operations 
 of the Commander-in-Chief. And, while the grand army, under 
 his Excellency's immediate command, decided the war in 
 Hindustan, by the most rapid career of brilliant victories, the 
 army of the Deccan, emulating that noble example, contributed 
 to elevate the fame and power of Great Britain in India, to a 
 height unrivalled in the annals of Asia. 
 
 In concluding the peace (a duty imposed on me by the local 
 situation of the respective armies) I was enabled, under the 
 immediate orders and instructions of the Governor-General, to 
 manifest a practical example of the moderation of the British 
 councils, which arrested the progress of our arms in the hour of 
 victory ; to fix the tranquillity of India on the foundations of 
 that enlarged policy ; and to receive the best assurances of the 
 continuance of peace from the confidence reposed by the states 
 lately confederated against us, in the generosity, honour, and 
 justice of the British government. 
 
 In reviewing the consequences of our success, it is with 
 unfeigned satisfaction that I perceive the increasing channels of 
 wealth which have been opened to this opulent settlement ; and 
 it is peculiarly gratifying to my feelings, that I should have been 
 instrumental in renewing the benefits of peace to a settlement, 
 from the resources and public spirit of which, the detachments 
 under my command have derived the most essential aids during 
 the prosecution of the war. 
 
 The occasion which it has pleased you to choose of uniting
 
 CORDIAL SENTIMENTS TOWARDS GENERAL STUART. 529 
 
 my name with that of the Governor-General has excited the 
 warmest affections of my heart, together with the highest 
 sentiments of public respect; at the same time, therefore, that 
 I receive, with peculiar gratitude, this mark of your kindness, 
 I cannot discharge the obligations you have imposed on me, in 
 a manner more conformable to my sense of the honour and 
 welfare of this settlement, or of the reputation and interests of 
 the empire, than by expressing my confidence of your cherishing 
 those principles of loyalty, subordination, and government, which 
 have raised and finally established the British Empire in India 
 on the extensive foundations of its present security, prosperity, 
 dignity, and renown. 
 
 291. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Testimony to Lient.-General Stuart's merits, as Sir Arthur's 
 {Presidential) Commander-in-Chief. 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 7th April, 1804. 
 
 In the course of the operations intrusted to me, I certainly 
 had difficulties to encounter which are inseparable from all 
 military service in this country, but I enjoyed an advantage 
 which but few have had in a similar situation. I served under 
 the immediate orders of an officer, who was fully aware of the 
 nature of the operations to be performed ; and who, after 
 considering all that was to be done, gave me his full confidence 
 and support in carrying into execution the measures which 
 the exigency of the service might require. Under these cir- 
 cumstances I was enabled to undertake every thing with 
 confidence ; and if I failed, I was certain it would be considered 
 with indulgence. I declare that I cannot reflect upon the events 
 of the last year without feeling for you the strongest sentiments 
 of gratitude, respect, and attachment ; and to have received these 
 marks of approbation has given me more real satisfaction than 
 all that I have received from other quarters. 
 
 292. To Lieutenant- General Lake. 
 
 Equivocal treatment at Head Quarters ; and application 
 for leave to go home. 
 
 Bombay, 23rd April, 1804. 
 
 It is with great reluctance that, at a time like the present, I 
 trouble you upon a subject relating only to myself; but I hope 
 
 M m
 
 530 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO RETURN TO EUROPE. 
 
 that tlie extraordinary circumstances which have induced me to 
 trouble you will be my excuse. 
 
 Above a year and a half have now elapsed since my promotion 
 to the rank of Major-General was announced in India, and since 
 Lieut.-Gen. Stuart, unsolicited by me, in a manner most grati- 
 fying to my feelings, recommended to the government of Fort 
 St. George, that I should be appointed to the staff of that Presi- 
 dency. Since that period accounts have reached England that 
 I had been appointed to the staff in the manner to which I have 
 above alluded, and that I had the command of a body of troops 
 employed in this country. From recent appointments made, 
 I judge that the staff in India must have been under discussion 
 lately, and that my appointment must have drawn the attention 
 of H. R. H. the Commander-in-Chief, and of His Majesty; but 
 I find that no confirmation has been made or notice taken of 
 this appointment. 
 
 Under these circumstances, however flattering in other respects, 
 it has become of an ambiguous nature ; there is reason to doubt 
 whether it meets with the approbation of H.R. H. the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief; and it is not impossible but that his Royal 
 Highness may appoint another officer to the situation which I 
 fill ; and, at all events, I do not conceive it to be creditable, and 
 I am not desirous, to remain in a military situation in His 
 Majesty's service, my appointment to which has not been ap- 
 proved by his Royal Highness and by His Majesty. I am 
 therefore upon the whole very anxious to return to Europe ; 
 and I have to request your Excellency's permission to do so. 
 If I should obtain it, I propose to resign the appointments 
 which I hold under the Government of Fort St. George, when an 
 opportunity shall offer for my return. 
 
 Upon the occasion of making this request, I beg to assure 
 your Excellency that, in case you should grant it, I do not intend 
 to avail myself of your leave as long as I can be of the smallest 
 service to your Excellency's operations, or as I can forward the 
 objects of the Governor-General's policy in this country; unless 
 I shall find an officer has actually been appointed to fill the 
 situation which I hold upon the staff.
 
 REASONS FOR MAKING THIS APPLICATION. 53 1 
 
 293. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Additional reasons for wishing to return to England, subject to 
 the Governor-General ''s pleasure and need of his services. 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804. 
 
 I wish you to take an opportunity of mentioning to the 
 Governor-General, that, having a very strong desire to return to 
 Europe, I applied lately to the Commander-in-Chief for leave to 
 quit this country when circumstances will permit it ; and Gen. 
 Lake has given me his permission to go whenever I may think 
 proper. 
 
 My principal reason for wishing to go is, that I think I have 
 served as long in India as any man ought, who can serve any 
 where else ; and I think that there appears a prospect of service 
 in Europe, in which I should be more likely to get forward. 
 Another reason is, that I have been a good deal annoyed by the 
 rheumatism in my back, for which living in a tent during another 
 monsoon is not a very good remedy ; and a third is, that I 
 do not think I have been very well treated by the King's govern 
 ment. 
 
 It is now about 3 years since I have been a Major-General, 
 and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort 
 St. George, by Gen. Stuart. Since that time, it has been per- 
 fectly well known that I have led a body of British troops into 
 the Mahratta territories ; and supposing that I had no other 
 pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected 
 a confirmation of Gen. Stuart's act, under those circumstances. 
 The staff in India had been under consideration, and another 
 officer had been appointed to it. This last reason for wishing to 
 go to Europe is the only one which I have stated to Gen. Lake, 
 although it is the least strong ; as I am very certain that I shall 
 have been appointed to the staff, as soon as it was known in 
 England that I had reached Poonah with the army ; and Gen. 
 Lake has consented to my departure. 
 
 If the war with Holkar had not broken out, there would have 
 been no difficulty in the business ; and I should have been able 
 to go in October, being the first period at which I could sail. 
 As affairs are situated, I think it probable that the Governor- 
 General will have no objection to my departure, and this is the 
 principal reason for which I trouble you. In the present state 
 of affairs, I can do but little in the Deccan, and that little may 
 
 M m 2
 
 $$2 HIS PRESENCE IN THE DECCAN NOT INDISPENSABLE. 
 
 as well be done by any body else. The siege of Chandore, when 
 it can be undertaken, is a military operation of but little impor- 
 tance ; and the operations of the troops from Guzerat are already 
 beyond my guidance. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I wish that the Governor-General 
 would allow me to relinquish the command in the Deccan. If I 
 should be able to go to England in October, it must be supposed 
 that I have money matters to arrange in Mysore, and at Madras; 
 particularly at the latter. My accounts of the late war, although 
 sent up regularly every month, have not yet been passed. I am, 
 therefore, very anxious to receive your answer to this letter, at 
 an early period, in order that I may arrive at Madras, if possible, 
 early in September. I need scarcely add, that, if the Governor- 
 General should have any desire that I should remain in this 
 country, or should think that I can be of the smallest use to his 
 plans, I shall remain with pleasure. 
 
 294. To Major Shawe. 
 
 Public reasons do not require his remaining in India. On private 
 grounds he wishes to go home. His treatment by the Direc- 
 tors, in spite of unique services, and by the King's Ministers, 
 is discouraging. The public interest claims his presence in 
 England. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 4th Jan., 1805. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I conceive that I am justified in 
 not going into the Deccan, by the accomplishment of one object 
 in view in sending me there ; by a concurrence of circumstances, 
 which render another impracticable, useless, and dangerous ; 
 and by the sentiments of the Governor- General. I acknow- 
 ledge, however, that I have determined not to go into the 
 Deccan not without a considerable degree of doubt and 
 hesitation. I know that all classes of the people look up to 
 me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. 
 I also know that my presence there would be useful in the 
 settlement of many points which remain unsettled, and which 
 probably will require time and peace to bring to a conclusion. 
 But these circumstances are not momentary ; whenever I should 
 depart, the same inconveniences would be felt even in an 
 increased degree, and very possibly the same state of affairs 
 which now renders my presence in the Deccan desirable, will
 
 HE IS NOT BOUND TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY. 533 
 
 exist for the next seven years. I certainly do not propose to 
 spend my life in the Deccan ; and I should not think it 
 necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than 
 the Governor-General should stay in India. I conclude that he 
 intends to go in February, as he proposed when I left Calcutta, 
 in case Holkar should be defeated, and the peace should be 
 certain ; and upon this point, having considered whether my 
 presence in the Deccan for 1, 2, or 3 months would answer any 
 purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not. 
 
 In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether 
 the Court of Directors or the King's ministers have any claim 
 upon me, strong enough to induce me to do any thing so 
 disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) 
 as to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have 
 served the Company in important situations for many years, 
 and have never received any thing but injury from the Court of 
 Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who 
 has served under all the governments, and in communication 
 with all the Political Residents, and many civil authorities ; 
 and there is not an instance on record, or in any private 
 correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a 
 single complaint, or even a symptom of ill temper from any one 
 of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom 
 I have acted. 
 
 The King's ministers have as little claim upon me as the 
 Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious ; and I acknow- 
 ledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations 
 that military services in India would be considered in the scale 
 in which are considered similar services in other parts of the 
 world. But I might have expected to be placed on the Staff 
 in India ; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death 
 of Gen. Fraser, Gen. Smith's arrival would have made me 
 supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and 
 is the subject of a good deal of conversation. 
 
 If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of 
 the British Empire, or to insure its peace, I should not hesitate 
 a moment about staying, even for years ; but these men or the 
 public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because 
 my presence, in a particular quarter, may be attended with 
 convenience. But this is not the only point in which this 
 question ought to be viewed. I have considered whether, in 
 the situation of affairs in India at present, my arrival in
 
 534 HE MAY ELUCIDATE INDIAN QUESTIONS AT HOME. 
 
 England is not a desirable object? Is it not necessary to take 
 some steps to explain the causes of the late increase of the 
 military establishments, and to endeavour to explode some 
 erroneous notions which have been entertained and circulated 
 upon this subject ? Are there not now a variety of subjects in 
 discussion, relating to this country, upon which some verbal 
 explanation is absolutely necessary ? I conceive, therefore, that 
 in determining not to go into the Deccan, and to sail by the first 
 opportunity for England, I consult the public interest not less 
 than I do my own private convenience anr 1 wishes.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. GENERAL. 
 
 295. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Severe estimate of native character. Two circumstances which tend 
 to degrade it. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort William, 12th July, 1797. 
 
 The natives, as far as I have observed, are much misrepresented. 
 They are the most mischievous, deceitful race of people I have seen 
 or read of. I have not yet met with a Hindoo who had one good 
 quality, even for the state of society in his own country ; and the 
 Mussulmans are worse than they are. Their meekness and mildness 
 do not exist. It is true that the feats which have been performed by 
 Europeans have made them objects of fear; but wherever the dispro- 
 portion of numbers is greater than usual, they uniformly destroy them 
 if they can, and in their dealings and conduct among themselves they 
 are the most atrociously cruel people I ever heard of. There are two 
 circumstances in this country which must occasion cruelty, and deceit, 
 and falsehood wherever they exist. First, there is a contempt of death 
 in the natives, high and low, occasioned by some of the tenets of the 
 religion of both sects, which makes that punishment a joke, and I may 
 say an honour, instead of what it is in our country. All our punish- 
 ments almost are the same, excepting imprisonment and whipping, 
 which occasion loss of caste, and are, therefore, reckoned too severe for 
 the common crimes for which we inflict them at home. The punishments 
 of the Mussulman Governments are precisely in the same state. The 
 Hindoos don't care for them, excepting they occasion loss of caste; and the 
 Mussulmans are now so nearly Hindoos, that they have not a better 
 effect upon them. Secondly, there is no punishment for perjury either in 
 the Hindoo or Mussulman law. Their learned say that God punishes 
 that crime, and therefore man ought not ; and as oaths are notwith- 
 standing administered and believed in evidence, no man is safe in his 
 person or property, let the Government be ever so good. The con-
 
 53*5 POSITION OF GRAIN DEPOTS IN THE BARAMAHAL. 
 
 sequence of all is, that there is more perjury in the town of Calcutta 
 alone than there is in all Europe taken together, and in every other great 
 town it is the same. 
 
 296. Transmitted to the Governor- General. 1 
 
 Grain depots for the army in the Baramahal should be placed near the 
 
 frontier. 
 (Extract.) 1 8th July, 1798. 
 
 The principles which apply to the equipments, and which induce me 
 to recommend that they should be placed in Arnee, do not apply 
 equally to grain. The advantage of placing the grain near the frontier 
 is certain, and I shall endeavour to show that the inconvenience which 
 might result from it would not be very great. 
 
 If the enemy should, by a rapid movement, place himself between 
 the army and its grain, or if the operations should be towards a quarter 
 different from that in which the grain is stored, there will not be much 
 difficulty nor fatal delay in drawing a fresh supply from the rear, either 
 from the Carnatic, from Tanjore, or the seacoast. Waiting till it arrives 
 cannot be so fatal as being deprived of your equipments. On the other 
 hand, if the grain is not placed very forward, as an establishment of 
 carriage-bullocks cannot be kept up, and these must be provided at the 
 commencement of a war, which will always create a certain delay, but 
 little advantage will be derived either from the establishment of the depot 
 or from storing the grain at all. If the grain is stored at Arnee, the 
 advantage gained will be just the difference of time between that which 
 is necessary for procuring draught-bullocks and carriage-bullocks and 
 grain, and that for procuring carriage-bullocks only ; and as I believe 
 that the three operations might be performed at the same time, the 
 advantage in point of time would be very small. 
 
 297. To Major-General Baird. 
 
 Personal explanation to General Baird a propos of the Red Sea 
 
 Expedition. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 9th April, 1801. 
 
 I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from 
 
 accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and 
 
 handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me ; and I will 
 
 confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that 
 
 my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were 
 
 directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter 
 
 further upon this subject, than to entreat you will not attribute my 
 
 1 Accidentally omitted in No. 2, p. 43. — Ed.
 
 WHY WELLESLEY DID NOT GO WITH BAIRD TO EGYPT. 537 
 
 stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it ; 
 and to inform you, that, as I know what has been said and expected 
 by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for 
 yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the dis- 
 tinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes 
 which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every 
 assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct. I shall stay 
 here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round 
 to Madras ; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate. 
 
 298. Memorandum on the operations in the Red Sea. 
 
 [Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major-Gen. Baird.] 
 
 Proposed objects of the expedition. Cosseir should be gained. Morad Bey, 
 apparently, the head of the Mamelukes, and formerly reputed to have 
 been friendly to us. He has made peace with the French, who have 
 ceded to him Upper Egypt. But neither party trusts the other ; and 
 Sir R. Abercrombys operations will leave him free to consult his own 
 interest. He will probably be induced to join us for the expulsion of his 
 present allies. This he ought to be promptly urged to do, by a full 
 explanation of their critical position, a?id by an offer of arms, ammu- 
 nition, and an auxiliary force. Our possession of Cosseir will tell 
 strongly to the same effect. Neither the expeditionary force, nor a de- 
 tachment of it, ought to cross the Desert {though that, however difficult, 
 is feasible) unless assured of being joined by a body of natives at the 
 Nile. For otheruiise, the army will starve, as efficient means of trans- 
 port for adequate supplies cannot be provided. And to cross the Desert 
 without them will only expose our weakness, and incline the natives to 
 side with the enemy. Arrangements recommended, in case the Mamelukes 
 are heartily with us. The French may annoy us in the passage of the 
 Desert. Arms, eye, should be promised, not given, till native co-operation 
 is certain ; then furnished liberally. 
 The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor-General, 
 in the expedition to the Red sea, are : 
 
 1 st. To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may 
 have on its shores. 
 
 2ndly. To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mame- 
 lukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them. 
 
 31'dly. To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms 
 and ammunition ; or by a junction with them, either of a part, or of 
 the whole, of the force. 
 
 The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will 
 be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is 
 possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last.
 
 53 8 WE MAY GAIN OVER THE MAMELUKES THRO* MORAD BEY. 
 
 under the orders of Adm. Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the 
 objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cosseir 
 will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army 
 ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place. 
 
 The General is already acquainted with the measures which have 
 been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate 
 them here ; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the ex- 
 pedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the 
 French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is 
 evident, will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir R. Abercromby, and it 
 appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition. 
 
 From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced 
 to believe that, after the Turkish army was beaten by Gen. Kleber, in 
 March last, and after Col. Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made 
 peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper 
 Egypt. He is now stationed there, and, from the accounts and dis- 
 tribution of the French force in Egypt which I have occasionally seen, 
 I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, 
 excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are 
 encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the com- 
 munication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable that, when Sir 
 R. Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower 
 Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper 
 Egypt ; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as 
 his sense of his own interests may point out. 
 
 I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes ; 
 and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed 
 to be a friend of the English ; and showed his power of doing injury to 
 the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their 
 army, under Gen. Dessaix, in pursuit of him. 
 
 It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt 
 very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet 
 possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their 
 engagement with him ; and, from his own experience of their fidelity in 
 adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his 
 disadvantage. Indeed, the fact, that the French have found it necessary 
 to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is 
 a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must 
 know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to 
 expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail 
 to exert it, to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so 
 little confidence. 
 
 Without being too sanguine, we may expect, then, that, as soon as 
 Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt,
 
 OTHERWISE, TO CROSS THE DESERT WOULD BE USELESS. 539 
 
 he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this 
 reason, the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a com- 
 munication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French 
 should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him ; and he 
 ought to be urged, in the strongest manner, to exert himself to shake 
 off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower 
 Egypt ought to be made known to him ; their prospects of success, 
 founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the 
 French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him ; and, finally, 
 an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and 
 even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red sea, 
 in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as 
 the English, must have in view. 
 
 The possession of the port of Cosseir, and of the navigation of the 
 Red sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of 
 Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English. 
 
 The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia ; and 
 this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to 
 Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of 
 Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so 
 much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons 
 which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head 
 of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the 
 consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the 
 natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part 
 or the whole of the army. 
 
 The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the 
 grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it 
 would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cosseir 
 at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with 
 a body of the natives posted upon the Nile. 
 
 It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be appre- 
 hended in crossing the Desert : they are certainly great, but I imagine 
 not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment 
 which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the 
 Nile, when they reach them ; if they should be certain of having water 
 only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I appre- 
 hend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought 
 not to be attempted. 
 
 . It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in 
 the contest in contemplation : they must take part with the French or 
 with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the 
 situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage 
 from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and pro-
 
 540 FOR THE ARMY WOULD BE STARVED IN EGYPT. 
 
 bably no forage ; and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is 
 to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to 
 send, with the body of troops which may cross, a very large proportion 
 of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the 
 operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the 
 country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. 
 It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle ; a number 
 much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise 
 of their power and means, can supply ; but there is another consideration 
 connected with this subject, besides the supply of cattle ; and that is, the 
 means of feeding them when landed from the ships. 
 
 Upon this point, I need only call to the General's recollection the 
 difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of 
 stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, 
 plentifully supplied with well water, and every other advantage of 
 arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle ; 
 and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be 
 expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is 
 to be apprehended : the cattle will, of course, land in weak condition, 
 in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the 
 voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state, before they commence 
 their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their 
 loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion 
 that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be 
 made to cross the Desert. 
 
 This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the 
 impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it 
 can be done : but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will 
 starve, if they do not return immediately ; and upon the inutility of the 
 measure, if they do. 
 
 It may be imagined, that, supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if 
 an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their 
 co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge 
 of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward ; 
 and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned 
 by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce 
 them to take advantage of it, and to join the French. 
 
 But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible 
 that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment ; and this their history 
 from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will 
 show to be impossible. 
 
 I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the 
 Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off 
 the French yoke, and to co-operate with us.
 
 PRECAUTIONS TO FACILITATE THE OPERATION. 54 1 
 
 The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the 
 cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As 
 soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should 
 make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that 
 part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply 
 of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his 
 army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should 
 be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the 
 Desert, between that place and Cosseir, in order to ensure his com- 
 munication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make 
 the depot of his stores, &c, which might be brought across the Desert by 
 degrees ; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy. 
 
 On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the 
 Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given 
 to that operation by the enemy ; because it is entirely distinct from the 
 difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, 
 however, that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should 
 not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to 
 be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however 
 small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may 
 cross the Desert. 
 
 I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be 
 given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these 
 supplies ought to be withheld, but promised ; when they have shown their 
 sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent. 
 
 299. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 Prosperi/j' 0/ Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 26th May, 1801. 
 
 The Rajah's government is in the most prosperous state : the country 
 is become a garden where it is inhabited, and the inhabitants are re- 
 turning fast to those parts which the last savage had forced them to 
 quit. The family have moved into old Mysore, where their ancient 
 palace has been rebuilt in the same form in which it was formerly, and, 
 I believe, on the old foundations. The whole family appear as happy as 
 we wished they should be when this government was established. Mysore 
 is become a large and handsome Native town, full of inhabitants : the 
 whole country is settled and in perfect tranquillity. I believe the Rajah's 
 treasury is rich, as he pays his kists with regularity ; but Purneah, who 
 has an eye to the future prosperity and revenue of the country, has 
 repaired numberless tanks, particularly that large one near Milcottah; 
 has rebuilt many towns and forts ; and, I understand, encourages the
 
 54^ MYSORE THRI VI NG . PL A N TO DES TROY B OMB A Y GO VERNMENT. 
 
 inhabitants of the country in all parts by advances of money and re- 
 missions whenever they require them. 
 
 Thus this establishment has succeeded in a manner equal to our most 
 sanguine expectations ; and there is every prospect that its prosperity 
 will be permanent. 
 
 300. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley. 
 
 A receipt for health in India. Good te??iper rare there. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 8th July, 1801. 
 
 I know but one receipt for good health in this country, and that is 
 to live moderately, to drink little or no wine, to use exercise, to keep the 
 mind employed, and, if possible, to keep in good humour with the world. 
 The last is the most difficult, for, as you have often observed, there is 
 scarcely a good tempered man in India. 
 
 301. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. 
 
 Projected abolition of the Government of Bombay. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 24th Aug., 1801. 
 
 If I could give you any certain information upon the subject of 
 Bombay, I would do so with the greatest pleasure. The Governor- 
 General's first notion was, I believe, to abolish the government of 
 Bombay, to place the territories which had been under its manage- 
 ment under that of the government of Madras, and that the settlement 
 itself, the arsenal, Surat, and the inferior residencies should come under 
 the government of Bengal, and be governed as Prince of Wales's Island 
 and Bencoolen are. It appears that the Court of Directors have 
 adopted only half the plan. 
 
 The principle of the Governor-General's plan was economy as well as 
 the supposed expediency of submitting to the government of Fort 
 St. George the territories in the Peninsula, which joined so well with 
 those already under its government or influence. The economical part 
 of the plan has not been adopted, and it is not improbable but that 
 the Governor-General may have urged it again, and pressed it parti- 
 cularly in that point of view on the attention of the Court of Directors, 
 and that eventually it may be adopted. I know that the whole of the 
 Governor-General's first plan had been approved of by the King's 
 ministers, and that everything had been settled to bring it before 
 Parliament; and it was not brought forward because the Court of 
 Directors objected to it, and probably would have opposed it in the 
 House of Commons. As the expenses in India have lately grown to a 
 great degree, and as there has been a general distress for money in all
 
 THE CAPTAIN OF THE HOST BOWS IN RIMMON's HOUSE. 543 
 
 the settlements, it is not improbable but that the Directors may have 
 been shaken in their first opinion ; or that even if they should still retain 
 it, the King's ministers may be determined to carry this plan through 
 notwithstanding their opposition. 
 
 I don't think there is any reason to believe that the Governor-General 
 has altered his notions, although I have more than once stated to him 
 my sense of the inconveniences which would be the result of the abolition 
 of the government of Bombay ; and if he still retains his opinions, it is 
 almost certain that he will have pressed them again upon the Court of 
 Directors. 
 
 302. To His Highness the Nizam. 1 
 
 Courtly letter to the Nizam. 
 
 21st Sept., 1802. 
 
 After the assurance of devoted submission, the representative of the 
 sincere well wisher, Colonel Wellesley, has the honour to state to the 
 attendants on the Presence, the treasury of bounty, of the unsullied 
 Nabob of exalted titles, whose turrets are the heavens, and whose origin 
 is celestial, (be his dignified shade extended !) that two purses, contain- 
 ing the illustrious enayetnamahs, replete with kindness, the one vouch- 
 safing the acknowledgment of the Maumyah trees, and the other 
 communicating the extensive benefit which had been effected by it, with 
 an order for the transmission of some bark from the trunks of both the 
 trees, sealed, and under the charge of the camel hircarrah of the pros- 
 perous Sircar, honoured and elevated me by the grandeur of their 
 approach and the dignity of their arrival. 
 
 On learning the circumstances of the benefit which had been ex- 
 perienced by the brilliant constitution, from the attendants on the 
 Presence, from the application of the aforesaid bark, I derived the 
 utmost happiness. 
 
 In compliance with the exalted order, two bundles of the desired 
 bark, the one from the trunk of the tree at Chinroypatam, and the other 
 from the trunk of that at the village of Kope, have been delivered, 
 sealed, to the camel hircarrahs of the Sircar, abounding in kindness, and 
 are despatched to the exalted Presence. They will pass, no doubt, under 
 the noble inspection. 
 
 In consequence of the length of the journey from Seringapatam to the 
 village of Kope, which is situated at the distance of 400 miles, and of the 
 incessant rain in the vicinity of Nuggur, the passing and repassing on 
 the road is very dilatory and difficult, and the procrastination and delay 
 of some days have, therefore, occurred in obeying the orders of the 
 unsullied Presence. I hope that the medicine which is transmitted, 
 
 1 Translated from a letter in Persian, on the records of the Residency at Hyderabad.
 
 544 HAVE I RECEIVED ANY BRIBE TO BLIND MINE EVES? 
 
 having attained the honour of application, may be beneficial in its effects 
 on the constitution, replete with purity. 
 
 The desire of my heart, the seat of constancy, is that the exalted 
 attendant will confidently regard and esteem the aforesaid bark as 
 a memorable instance of the loyalty of the well wisher, and as a testi- 
 mony of the anxiety of British officers to effect all arrangements which 
 may be desired by, or beneficial to, the noble Presence. 
 
 May the God of his slaves grant that the orb of your Prosperity 
 may shine and glitter from the eternal horizon, like the sun in the 
 zenith ! 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 303. To 
 
 Diagnosis of corrupt overtures, and of their reception. 
 
 Seringapatam, 20th Jan, 1803. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 15th this day, 
 and I lose no time in replying to that part of it, in which you inform 
 me that the Rajah, or Dessaye, of Kittoor has expressed a wish to be 
 taken under the protection of the British government, and has offered 
 to pay a tribute to the Company, and to give you a bribe of 4000 pago- 
 das, and me one of 10,000 pagodas, provided this point is arranged 
 according to his wishes. I cannot conceive what could have induced 
 the Rajah of Kittoor to imagine that I was capable of receiving that, 
 or any other sum of money, as an inducement to do that which he must 
 think improper, or he would not have offered it. But I shall advert to 
 that point more particularly presently. 
 
 The Rajah of Kittoor is a tributary of the Mahratta government, the 
 head of which is an ally, by treaty, of the Honourable Company. It would 
 be, therefore, to the full as proper that any officer in command of a post 
 within the Company's territories should listen to, and enter into, a plan for 
 seizing part of the Mahratta territories, as it is for you to listen to, and en- 
 courage, an offer from the Rajah of Kittoor to accept the protection of, and 
 transfer his allegiance and tribute to, the Honourable Company's govern- 
 ment. In case you should hear any thing further upon this subject from 
 the Rajah of Kittoor, or in future from any of the chiefs of the Mahrattas 
 on the frontier, I desire that you will tell them, what is the fact, that you 
 have no authority whatever to listen to such proposals ; that you have 
 orders only to keep up with them the usual intercourse of civility and 
 friendship ; and that, if they have any proposals of that kind to make, 
 they must be made in a proper manner to our superiors. You may, at 
 the same time, inform them that you have my authority to say that the 
 British government is very little likely to take advantage of the mis-
 
 WE NEED NOT SEEK OCCASION AGAINST HOLKAR. 545 
 
 fortunes of its ally, to deprive him either of his territories, or of the 
 allegiance or tribute due to him by his tributaries. 
 
 In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that 
 any man, in the character of a British officer, should not have given the 
 Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult ; and 
 that he should not rather have forbidden its renewal than that he should 
 have encouraged it, and even have offered to receive a quarter of the sum 
 proposed to be given to him for prompt payment. I can attribute your 
 conduct upon this occasion to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate 
 indiscretion, and to a wish to benefit yourself, which got the better of 
 your prudence. I desire, however, that you will refrain from a renewal 
 of the subject with the Rajah of Kittoor at all ; and that, if he should 
 renew it, you will inform him that I and all British officers consider such 
 offers as insults on the part of those by whom they are made. You shall 
 hear from me to-morrow regarding the Store establishment of Hullihall. 
 The battalion under your command is not destined for field service at 
 present. 
 
 304. To the Governor-General. 
 
 Holkar 1 s plunder of Aurungabad to be condoned. 
 (Extract.) Poonah, 27th May, 1803. 
 
 In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, 
 his conduct at Aurungabad affords ample ground for hostilities against 
 him : but upon the whole, considering that the Mahrattas have long been 
 in the habit of plundering the Nizam's territories; that his Highness' 
 government omit to take any measures for their defence ; arid that, in 
 this particular instance, they were aware of the combination between their 
 own servant and a Mahratta chief, and they were afraid to take the most 
 obvious steps to frustrate their designs, I think that, if all parties acquiesce 
 peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be 
 worth while to commence a chase after Holkar to recover the plunder of 
 Aurungabad. 
 
 305. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Why Residents at Native Courts should have authority over the 
 military force. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct., 1803. 
 
 It is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the Native 
 Princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. 
 In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the 
 sword ; and it follows, that if these political agents have no authority 
 over the military, they have no power whatever. The Natives would 
 soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their 
 
 N n
 
 54<5 MILITARY A UTHORITY OFRESIDENTS. ELPHINSTONE'S MERITS'. 
 
 influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the 
 military Commanding officer ought to be the Resident, or political 
 agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning 
 applies to every part of the executive government ; and that, upon this 
 ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, 
 the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning 
 upon this subject is, that the British government in India is a pheno- 
 menon ; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, 
 either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon 
 which these rules are founded. 
 
 306. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Mr. Elphimtone s experience, acquirements, and services. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec, 1803. 
 
 Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice 
 to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the 
 greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well 
 versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests 
 of the Mahratta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the 
 British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions 
 which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the 
 sieges ; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and 
 with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of 
 recommending him to your Excellency. 
 
 307. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar. 
 
 Pacificatory letter after the conquest of the Confederates. 
 
 5th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I wrote you a letter on the 16th July last, which I hope you have 
 received ; but lest you should not, I now send a duplicate of it. 
 
 I have the pleasure to inform you that I have concluded treaties of 
 peace between the Hon. Company and their allies, and Dowlut Rao 
 Scindiah and Rajah Senah Saheb Ragojee Bhoonslah respectively ; and 
 I take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the restoration of 
 peace in Hindustan and in the Deccan. During the existence of the late 
 war, your conduct has been most wise and politic, and has been perfectly 
 satisfactory to me ; and I repeat to you, upon this occasion, the as- 
 surance which I have frequently given you, that so long as you refrain 
 from attacking the Hon. Company and their allies, the British government 
 will not interfere with you. 
 
 This will be forwarded to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman who is 
 going to reside with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the part of the British
 
 LETTER TO HOLKAR. 'RISU SOLVUNTUR TABUL.E.' 547 
 
 government. He will receive from you any communication you may be 
 desirous of making to the British government or to me, and will commu- 
 nicate with you on any point that you may consider likely to forward 
 your interests, or to promote the friendship between the Hon. Company 
 and you. 
 
 308. To Marquess Wellesley. 
 
 Why General Wellesley writes to Major Shawe. Ludicrous scene at 
 Scindiah's Durbar. 
 (Extract.) Camp, 21st Jan. 1804. 
 
 I have generally written to Major Shawe for two reasons 1 : 1st; because 
 it was probable I should get an answer from him : 2ndly; it was probable 
 that this answer would contain intelligence of matters in Bengal which it 
 was desirable that I should have. 
 
 P. S. Malcolm writes from Scindiah's Camp, that at the first meeting 
 Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to pre- 
 serve throughout the visit. It rained violently ; and an officer of the 
 escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman, (a nephew of old Bective's by-the-by,) 
 sat under a flat part of the tent which received a great part of the rain 
 that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. 
 Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, and was discovered 
 after some time by an ' Oh Jasus ! ' and an hideous yell. Scindiah 
 laughed violently, as did all the others present; and the gravity and 
 dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot ; after which they 
 all parted upon the best terms. 
 
 309. To the Governor-General. 
 
 Forced march, and summary chastisement of Marauders. 
 
 Camp at Munkaiseer, 5th Feb. 1804. 
 After I had crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches to 
 the southward, I agreed to give cowle to the chiefs who commanded the 
 bands of freebooters who had carried on the operations on the western 
 frontier of the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the condition 
 of their dismissing their troops, and coming into my camp within 5 days, 
 and I had some reason to believe that they would act as I had desired ; 
 but, upon the expiration of the term fixed for their arrival in my camp, viz. 
 the 2nd inst, finding that they had not come in, and that their troops 
 were still assembled in the Soubah's territories, between Perinda and 
 Toljapoor, I determined to endeavour to cut them off. They were at the 
 
 1 P.S. of the Governor General's letter, 23rd Dec. 1803 : 'I do not know why you 
 address your private letters to the private secretary, and not to me ; consult, however, 
 your private convenience. W.' 
 
 N n %
 
 548 SHARP AND DECISIVE DASH AT LOOTIES. 
 
 distance of 80 miles from my camp, and there was some reason to hope 
 that I might surprise them by making forced marches. 
 
 I began my march on the 4th, in the morning, with the British cavalry, 
 the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 500 men belonging to the other 
 Native corps in my camp, and the Mysore and Mahratta cavalry. On my 
 arrival at Sailgaon, near Perinda, after a march of 20 miles, I learnt that 
 the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and were come 
 nearer Perinda, and that at that time they were not farther from me than 
 24 miles. I therefore marched again last night with an intention to 
 attack their camp at daylight this morning. 
 
 Unfortunately, the road was very bad, and we did not arrive here till 
 9 in the morning. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach, 
 and I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe that they 
 received it from persons in my own camp : their camp was struck, and 
 they had begun their march to their rear when I arrived. I followed 
 them, however, with the British cavalry, in one column, acting upon the 
 right of their rear, while the Mysore and Mahratta cavalry under Bist- 
 napah Pundit, Goklah, and Appah Dessaye, pursued the centre and left. 
 The enemy formed a large body of cavalry, apparently with an intention 
 to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, which were falling into 
 our hands, and I formed the British cavalry into two lines to attack them. 
 I followed them in this order from height to height, as long as I could 
 see any of them collected. In this advance, some horse and infantry 
 were cut up, and the whole of the enemy's guns, ammunition, bazaars, 
 and baggage, fell into our hands. 
 
 The Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, and the Mahratta cavalry 
 under Goklah, were engaged with the enemy on the right of the British 
 cavalry, and killed great numbers of them, and these troops also followed 
 them as long as they could see any collected. Upon the whole, although 
 I have reason to believe that the chiefs have escaped, the result of this 
 day is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of free- 
 booters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in 
 numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and 
 had taken from them the guns which I have retaken. I do not think 
 that they will venture, or indeed that they can collect again, as they have 
 lost every thing which could enable them to subsist when collected. 
 The troops bear with the utmost cheerfulness the extraordinary fatigue 
 of this short, but active expedition 1 . The infantry under Major Swinton, 
 of the 74th regt., arrived at the point of attack at the same time with the 
 cavalry ; but from the nature of the action, they could not co-operate 
 further in it than by moving into the enemy's former camp, which they 
 did with great regularity. 
 
 1 This expedition has often been remarked by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest 
 march he ever made. — Col. GurwoocVs note.
 
 HOW TO RELIEVE A FAMINE-STRICKEN PEOPLE. 549 
 
 The advance of the British cavalry, when formed, was in the best order, 
 and very rapid, notwithstanding the fatigue to which both men and horses 
 had been exposed for the last 24 hours. Our loss, of which I enclose a 
 return, is but small. I have given the 4 guns which we have taken to 
 the killadar of Perinda, who lost them about 6 weeks ago. 
 
 Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the troops under the command of Major 
 Gen. the Hon. A. 'Wellesley, in the action near Munkaiseer, on the 5th Feb. 1804. 
 
 Jemidar. R. and F. Horses. 
 H. M.'s 19th It. dragoons wounded — 23 
 
 4 th regt. Native cavalry wounded. 1 — 1 
 
 5th do. killed — 1 — 
 
 7th do. killed — _ 1 
 
 Total 1 3 5 
 
 310. To Major Graham. 
 Measures for providing agai?ist the effects of famine. 
 
 (Extract.) Bombay, nth April, 1804. 
 
 The delivery of the provisions gratis is, in my opinion, a very defective 
 mode of providing against the effects of famine. It is liable to abuses in 
 all parts of the world, but particularly in India ; and at Ahmednuggur, 
 the consequence of its adoption would be, that crowds of people would 
 be drawn there from other parts of the country, in which the distress is 
 equally felt ; and they would increase the distress at Ahmednuggur to 
 such a degree as to render all the efforts to remove it from its immediate 
 inhabitants entirely fruitless ; and it might at last reach our own troops 
 and establishments. The principle, therefore, of the mode in which 
 I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants is not to give grain 
 or money in charity. 
 
 Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two 
 classes ; those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter 
 class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women ; who, 
 from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labour, and 
 are weakened by the effects of famine. 
 
 The former, viz. those of both sexes who can work, ought to be em- 
 ployed by the public ; and in the course of this letter I shall point out 
 the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in 
 what manner paid. The latter, viz. those who cannot work, ought to be 
 taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at 
 the expense of the public. According to this mode of proceeding, sub- 
 sistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit 
 from the expense which will be incurred ; and above all it will be certain, 
 that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be
 
 550 MADRAS CANNOT, NOR SHOULD, RAISE MONEY AT P00NAH. 
 
 willing to work for his subsistence ; that none will apply, who are able to 
 work, and who are not real objects of charity ; and that none will come 
 to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be 
 procured by their labour, or to obtain which they must submit to the 
 restraint of an hospital. 
 
 311. To Lord W. Bentinck, Governor of Port St. George. 
 
 The project of raising money at Poonah, for the service of the Madras 
 government, inexpedient, because (i) it is not likely to succeed at pre- 
 sent ; (2) it will embarrass the Bombay government. The inadequate 
 resources of Bombay are eked out by bills on Bengal, negotiated largely, 
 through the soucars, at Poonah. The exchange on Bengal has lately 
 fallen very low. Causes of the fall. This has led me to refrain from 
 drawing on Calcutta, (ivhile I depe?id much on Bombay); as the com- 
 petition of my bills and those of the Bombay governme?it would tend to 
 depreciate the value of both. Why the plan is not likely to produce much 
 money. Publication of the tenders of the Fort St. George government, 
 therefore, suspended. Why I have been unable to avoid charging that 
 government with the payment of the subsidiary force. 
 
 Chowke, 1 8th May, 1804. 
 
 The Accountant Gen. at Fort St. George has lately forwarded to the 
 Resident at Poonah a plan, according to which he is desirous that money 
 should be raised at Poonah for the service of your Lordship's govern- 
 ment, upon which I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship. 
 
 Since I have conducted a service on the western side of India, I have 
 been obliged to depend, in a great measure, upon the resources of the 
 government of Bombay for the extraordinary supplies required to carry 
 on that service. The nature of those resources has become an object of 
 my particular attention; and it occurs to me that the plan of the 
 Accountant Gen., as detailed in his letter to the Resident at Poonah, of 
 the 28th April, will not raise any money at Poonah at the present 
 moment ; at the same time that the introduction of the bills drawn by 
 your Lordship on Bengal and England, and the loans of the government 
 of Fort St. George, at Poonah, will materially impede the financial 
 operations of the government of Bombay. 
 
 The expenses of the government of Bombay far exceed the means 
 afforded by their revenue of defraying it ; and the deficiency is made up 
 principally by money procured by bills drawn upon Bengal. It does not 
 appear that the trade, by means of which these bills are negotiated, is 
 carried on by sea, from port to port ; on the contrary, as the money 
 received by the government of Bombay for bills comes from the soucars, 
 and the bills are negotiated through the means of their connexions with 
 Poonah, Nagpoor, and other great cities in Hindustan, Benares, Luck :
 
 TAKE EXAMPLE BY MY CONDUCT. 55 [ 
 
 now and Calcutta, it is to be supposed that these operations are supported 
 by the inland trade. But if this were not sufficient to prove that the 
 inland trade was the support of these operations, it might be proved by 
 the state of the trade of the port of Calcutta with the ports of Bombay, 
 Surat, &c, on the western coast. 
 
 Till within little more than a year, the government of Bombay drew 
 upon Bengal to great advantage. They generally received 107 and 108 
 Bombay rupees at Bombay for a bill for 100 sicca rupees. Since the 
 last year, from a variety of causes, the exchange has fallen. One of 
 these causes has been the increasing disturbances in the Mahratta 
 Empire ; another was the great fire at Bombay ; a third was the late war, 
 which for a moment interrupted the commercial intercourse between the 
 provinces under the government of Fort William, and the great cities in 
 the Mahratta Empire; and a fourth was, that in consequence of the 
 authority which I received from the Governor-General, I drew bills upon 
 Bengal which were negotiated at Poonah ; and although endeavours were 
 made to draw those bills at the same rate of exchange with the bills 
 drawn by the government of Bombay, the fact that bills of exchange 
 were to be procured from two quarters, instead of from one, had a 
 tendency to depreciate the value of the bills of both, and to expose the 
 drawers to the effects of a combination among the soucars, all of whom 
 are connected by caste, if not in trade, and thus, to lower the rate of 
 exchange. The knowledge, that by drawing bills at Poonah, notwith- 
 standing the utmost care of the Resident, by whom the transaction was 
 managed, we should always be liable to these evils, had induced me to 
 determine to grant no more bills upon the government of Bengal till 
 I should be obliged by necessity to adopt this measure. Notwithstanding 
 these causes tending to produce a depreciation of the value of bills by 
 exchange drawn by the government of Bombay, they have not yet fallen 
 below par; and there was reason to hope that, as soon as the drain of 
 money to Guzerat for the purposes of the cotton trade should have 
 ceased, and the soucars should have seen that they had no chance of 
 procuring bills at Poonah, the exchange would have risen. 
 
 Upon a calculation made of the value of Arcot rupees, in respect to 
 Chandore rupees, the currency at Poonah, and the rate at which the latter 
 are issued to the troops, it appears that the terms upon which your Lord- 
 ship proposes to draw upon Calcutta are less favourable to the money 
 holders by one per cent, than the bills now granted by the government 
 of Bombay. It is therefore probable that your Lordship's bills would 
 not be taken, particularly as the holder of the money must wait about a 
 month after he shall have paid his money into the Poonah treasury, 
 before he will receive his bills from Madras. If, however, we should be 
 able to raise the value of the bills drawn by the government of Bombay 
 one per cent, above par, those drawn by your Lordship will immediately
 
 $$2 YOU WILL INJURE BOMBAY; NOT HELP YOURSELVES. 
 
 come in competition with them. The difference between the two will be 
 in favour of the Bombay bills, from the disadvantage of waiting for a 
 month for those drawn by your Lordship, which may be reckoned at 
 about one per cent. ; so that if your Lordship's bills on Calcutta should 
 be introduced into the market at Poonah, the utmost advantage that can 
 be expected at Bombay in the drawing of bills upon Bengal will be one 
 per cent., instead of 7 or 8 per cent., as it was 2 years ago. 
 
 Besides this inconvenience at Poonah, the negotiation of your Lord- 
 ship's bills upon Calcutta may affect the state of the exchange between 
 Bombay and Poonah, which is now at par, and will possibly rise in favour 
 of Bombay. 
 
 Your Lordship's bills upon the Court of Directors are upon more 
 favourable terms to the money holders than those granted by the govern- 
 ment of Bombay, but it is not probable that they will produce any money. 
 First, because a month must elapse after the money is paid at Poonah 
 before the bill can be returned from Madras; and next, because the 
 gentlemen at Bombay who might have money to dispose of in that 
 manner must employ agents both at Poonah and at Madras: at the 
 former, to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah ; at the latter, to 
 produce that certificate of the payment of the money, and receive the bill 
 at the office of the Accountant Gen. of Fort St. George. The loan will 
 not, in my opinion, produce any money from the settlement of Bombay, 
 because the government paper of Bombay can be purchased at a cheaper 
 rate. To allow money to be received by the Resident at Poonah, on 
 account of bills upon the Court of Directors, or of this loan, may be 
 advantageous to those of the officers of the army serving in this country 
 who may have any money to dispose of in such a manner ; but this 
 advantage must be deemed only a private one at best: it is very im- 
 probable that it will be enjoyed by many, and will bring but a small sum 
 of money into the treasury; and will not compensate for the evil of 
 introducing the financial plans of the government of Fort St. George, in 
 places in which those of the government of Bombay alone have been 
 hitherto in operation. 
 
 From what I have above stated, it will appear to your Lordship that 
 the plan, however well intended, is likely to create competition between 
 the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to be attended by 
 all the effects of competition between borrowers, viz. to increase the 
 demand of those who have any thing to lend. It will not affect your 
 Lordship's financial arrangements, as those are founded upon large 
 revenues and resources, and framed upon principles entirely different 
 from those of the government of Bombay; and they are independent of 
 the expected supplies of money at Poonah ; but it will affect the financial 
 arrangements of the government of Bombay, and, through them, those of 
 the Indian empire ; and therefore I conclude the plan ought to be
 
 WHY MADRAS HAS PAID FOR THE SUBSIDIARY FORCE. $$3 
 
 relinquished. Under these circumstances, I have taken the liberty of 
 requesting the Resident at Poonah to suspend the publication of the 
 advertisements forwarded to him by Mr. Smith till he shall have received 
 your Lordship's further orders. 
 
 When at Bombay, I gave much attention to the mode of supplying the 
 subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah with money hereafter, in con- 
 sequence of orders which I received from Lieut. Gen. Stuart ; and I had 
 much conversation upon the subject with the mercantile gentlemen there, 
 particularly with Mr. Forbes, a gentleman of great respectability, who is 
 at the head of one of the principal houses, and who has frequently come 
 forward in aid of government when his assistance has been required. 
 I should have been able to arrange the supply of the funds for the 
 support of the subsidiary force, so as to have precluded the necessity of 
 sending money from the territories under your Lordship's government, if 
 I could have stated precisely the monthly demand of cash at Poonah for 
 the public service ; but, in the present state of affairs, the demand is very 
 uncertain, and no private merchant could have ventured to contract to 
 supply an uncertain amount. On the other hand, no merchant would 
 undertake to supply a part of the funds required at Poonah. He must 
 supply the whole sum required at that place, or he is liable to a com- 
 petition with government in procuring the funds, in which competition 
 he must be a loser. However, I have no doubt whatever but that, when 
 affairs shall become more settled, and the amount of the demand upon 
 the British government, payable at Poonah, shall have been defined, the 
 government of Bombay will experience no difficulty in arranging with the 
 merchants there a mode of defraying the expense more consistent with 
 the general advantage than to draw the specie from the provinces under 
 your Lordship's government. 
 
 312. G-. O. 
 
 Farewell address to the Deccan army. 
 
 Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24th June, 1804. 
 The following corps, &c, are to compose the subsidiary force serving 
 with His Highness the Peshwah, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Wallace : 
 
 5th and 7th regts. Native cavalry. 
 
 Detachments of Madias and Bombay artillery. 
 
 H. M. 74th and 78th regts. 
 
 1st batt. 2nd regt. Madras N. I. 
 
 2nd batt. 3rd do do. 
 
 1st batt. 8th do do. 
 
 2nd batt. 18th do. do. 
 
 Lieutenant -Colonel Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force
 
 554 FAREWELL G. 0. TO THE DECCAN ARMY. 
 
 serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, 
 will each place themselves under the authority of the Resident at the 
 durbar of the powers in whose service the troops under their command 
 are employed, according to the orders and regulations of government 
 upon this subject. Colonel Murray and the troops in Malwa will receive 
 further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay. 
 
 Upon the occasion of quitting the army, in consequence of the orders 
 of the Governor-General, Major-General Wellesley once more returns his 
 thanks to the officers and troops for their uniform good conduct since he 
 has had the honour of commanding them. In the space of little more 
 than a year, those in this quarter in particular, now composing the 
 subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubahdar of the 
 Deccan, and those which are under orders to march to the southward, 
 have been tried in every mode in which it is possible to try troops, and 
 have uniformly manifested that patience under fatigues and severity of 
 climate, that activity and perseverance in labour, and bravery and dis- 
 cipline in action, which are the characteristic qualities of the best soldiers : 
 their success, and the honour which the troops have acquired, are pro- 
 portionate to the good qualities which they have displayed : on which 
 qualities Major- General Wellesley has always had the fullest reliance in 
 every emergency of the service. He now recommends to them an 
 adherence to the principles which have brought them with honour 
 through so many difficulties, as the certain pledge of future success. 
 
 Major-General Wellesley has frequently reported the good conduct of 
 the troops to the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor- General, and 
 has recommended them to the notice of their Excellencies. He will not 
 fail to recommend individuals who have had opportunities of distinguish- 
 ing themselves, whenever an occasion may offer ; and he assures all that 
 he shall ever remember and reflect with satisfaction on their conduct and 
 services, and that in every situation in which he may be placed he will be 
 happy to forward their views. 
 
 Major-General Wellesley has delayed to give orders for the division of 
 the property captured during the war, according to the instructions of the 
 Governor-General, only till he receives all the prize rolls : he expects 
 those of the nth regiment from Berar in the course of a few days, when 
 orders will be sent on that subject and regarding the batta for the 
 officers. 
 
 Major-General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his 
 approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the government 
 of Bombay in Guzerat during the late war. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE RAJAH 3 S CAVALRY. foj 
 
 313. To the Governor- General. 
 
 Present amount and proposed reduction of the Rajah's cavalry. His 
 
 gross revenue ; the result of Poorneah's good management. Expenses 
 
 regulated by the fixed condition of laying by an annual surplus 
 
 to provide a fund for meeting extraordinary calls by the British 
 
 government, for military assistance. Detail of peace establishment. 
 
 Composition, pay, and service, of the Candachar peons. Co7nposilion, 
 
 pay, armament, command, and discipline, of the regular infantry. The 
 
 Dewan' s zeal and efficiency in supplying the Deccan army, daring tlie 
 
 Mahratta war ; and in maintaining troops for the dfence of the 
 
 Mysore frontier. General success of the plan for settling the Rajah's 
 
 governnwit. 
 
 Seringapatam, iSth July, 1804. 
 
 i. On my journey from Poonah, in obedience to your Excellency's 
 orders, I have passed by this place, in order that I might have a personal 
 communication with the Dewan and the acting Resident, regarding the 
 distribution of the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, which have 
 been serving under my command. 
 
 2. The total number of cavalry in the service of the Rajah is now 
 4000, of which 3000 have been with me ; the original number of 2000 
 having been reinforced at the commencement of the late war. The 
 result of long discussions regarding the disposal of this body of troops 
 has at last been, that their number shall be gradually reduced to 2000 ; 
 and that one year shall elapse before those to be discharged shall be 
 dismissed from the service. 
 
 3. As I had experienced the benefits to be derived from these troops 
 in the service of the Rajah, I was desirous that some mode should be 
 adopted of retaining the whole ; I found that the Rajah could not 
 maintain a greater number than 2000, without breaking through the rules 
 of economy, which have been laid down by the Dewan, with a view to 
 enable the Rajah's government to afford the assistance which the British 
 government may demand from the Rajah in time of war, under the 3rd 
 article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, or without applying to the pay- 
 ment of the troops those funds which have hitherto been employed by the 
 Dewan, in the construction and repair of tanks, water courses, roads, 
 bridges, and other works, which will tend to the improvement and in- 
 crease of the agriculture and resources of the country. 
 
 4. The number of 4000 horse will therefore be reduced to 2000 in the 
 course of one year ; and this number is 500 more than the ordinary peace 
 establishment of the Rajah's government. 
 
 5. As your Excellency will probably be desirous to take into your con- 
 sideration the situation of the Rajah's government, and to ascertain how 
 far that government has performed the stipulations of the 3rd article of
 
 $$6 REVENUE AND PEACE ESTABLISHMENT OF MYSORE. 
 
 the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, I proceed to give your Excellency an 
 account of the ordinary resources and expenses of that government, 
 and the extraordinary expenses it incurred during the war ; with such 
 other information regarding it, as may be useful to enable your Ex- 
 cellency to review its situation. I have had a full communication upon 
 the whole of this subject with the Dewan and the acting Resident, and 
 I write from authentic documents. 
 
 6. It appears the Rajah's gross revenue is about 24 lacs of canterai 
 pagodas. It has been raised to this sum by the superior management of 
 the Dewan, by his attention to the repair of tanks and water courses, and 
 the construction of roads and bridges ; by the encouragement which he 
 has given to strangers to resort to and settle in Mysore ; and by his 
 general endeavours to improve the agriculture of the country, and the 
 situation of the people under the government of the Rajah. 
 
 7. The expenses for the repairs of tanks and water courses, and the 
 construction of roads and bridges; for the public buildings for the 
 Rajah's accommodation, and other public works; the remissions for 
 unfavourable seasons, and the military and civil expenses of the govern- 
 ment, are liable to fluctuation. But the Dewan, at an early period of his 
 administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rajah's 
 government to comply with any requisition which the British govern- 
 ment might make for assistance in war, under the 3rd article of the 
 subsidiary treaty of Mysore ; and he has saved annually a sum of money 
 amounting to one lac of star pagodas. He has made this saving the 
 criterion, by which he has endeavoured to regulate his disbursements, and he 
 has considered the sum resulting from that saving to constitute the fund 
 for answering any eventual demand under the 3rd article of the treaty. 
 
 8. The peace establishment of Mysore, at the end of 1802, consisted 
 of 1500 cavalry, 3000 regular infantry, in battalions, (to which number 
 1000 were added during the war,) 2500 peons in constant pay, at 2 canterai 
 pagodas each, per month, (to which number 400 were added during the 
 war,) and 12,000 Candachar peons, liable to do duty at their respective 
 villages (to which number 1000 were added and called out during the war). 
 
 9. The Candachar peons constituted the ancient military force of the 
 country; and the necessity of providing against their becoming the 
 instruments of commotion compelled the Dewan, in the first year of his 
 government, to entertain so large a number as 20,000, which has been 
 gradually reduced on better information and improved arrangement. 
 
 10. They receive a village pay of from 2 to 3 rupees per month, 
 according to local circumstances, half in money, and half in lands ; and 
 3^ rupees in addition, when called out from their respective villages 
 within the limits of Mysore ; with batta when sent on foreign service. 
 
 1 1. The present establishment is fixed on the principle of having, at least, 
 one individual of every family of the ancient military class in the pay of
 
 THE CANDACHAR PEONS, AND REGULAR INFANTRY. $$>] 
 
 the state ; and the family is permitted to relieve this individual according 
 to its convenience. This arrangement appears well calculated to insure 
 the allegiance of the whole ; and in case of emergency, 20,000 men of this 
 irregular description of force might be assembled at a few day's notice. 
 
 1 2. As every Candachar peon is a cultivator, the Dewan is anxious to 
 limit their services to local duty ; which consists in being ready to obey 
 the call of the officers of police, and take their tour of duty in the village 
 fort to which they are attached. 
 
 13. The 2500 peons, kept in constant pay, do duty with the regular 
 infantry in the more important forts and stations, or in the personal guard 
 of the Rajah, the Dewan, or the principal officers of the government ; they 
 are select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are 
 considered to be entirely trustworthy. They also are occasionally indulged 
 with the privilege of relief, according to their domestic convenience. 
 
 14. The regular infantry are composed of the sepoys, who were 
 formerly in the service of Tippoo Sultaun ; they are paid at the same 
 rates, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the Company's 
 Native infantry ; they are commanded by the sirdars of the state, and are 
 a regular, orderly, and obedient body, and their discipline of a description 
 to render them useful on service, in aid of the Company's troops. 
 
 15. I have the honour to enclose a detailed account of the extraordinary 
 war. This account, together with the preceding detail of the Rajah's 
 expenses : incurred by the government of Mysore, occasioned by the late 
 resources, and his ordinary expenses, will enable your Excellency to form 
 a judgment, whether the government of the Rajah of Mysore has 
 complied with the stipulation of the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty 
 of Mysore. 
 
 16. Till the late treaties of peace shall have had their full effect, and 
 the Mahratta Empire shall have recovered its tranquillity, after the long 
 and violent convulsions by which it has been disturbed, particularly until 
 the Deccan shall have recovered in some degree from the effect of the 
 existing famine, the Dewan proposes that the peace establishment of 
 Mysore shall be 2000 horse, 4000 regular infantry in battalions, 2500 
 peons in constant pay, and 12,000 Candachar peons; being an increase, 
 beyond the peace establishment of 1802, of 500 horse, and 1000 regular 
 infantry. 
 
 17. Upon the occasion of bringing under your Excellency's review 
 the state of the Mysore government, and of the expenses it incurred in 
 the late war, I cannot avoid adverting to the material assistance it 
 afforded upon that occasion. In consequence of the regularity of the 
 system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements 
 
 1 This account was afterwards corrected by Major Wilks, the acting Resident, and 
 transmitted, together with his report. — Note in Colonel Gurwood's Edition. Ed.
 
 $$$ EFFECTIVE MILITARY AID; AND GOOD GOVERNMENT. 
 
 of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to 
 provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the 
 corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its 
 march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines 
 formed in Mysore, and of the department of the army, or for the large 
 quantities of grain required by the cavalry and by the brinjarries, &c. 
 All these supplies, which amounted to about 60,000 bullock loads of 
 grain, principally rice, 60,000 head of sheep, &c, were furnished with a 
 facility hitherto unknown in this part of India. The Dewan has since 
 continued to forward supplies to the army under my command as fast as 
 the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides con- 
 tributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major Gen. Campbell, he 
 has lately forwarded large quantities of grain into Canara, in order to 
 enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the 
 supply of Bombay and Poonah. 
 
 18. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have 
 frequently drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan had a respectable 
 corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier, from the time I marched from 
 the Toombuddra till I returned, which he commanded in person as long 
 as the war lasted ; and a detachment of those troops, under Khan Jehan 
 Khan, distinguished themselves in the destruction of a band of free- 
 booters, who had assembled in Savanore, and threatened Mysore. 
 
 1 9. I now take the liberty of congratulating your Excellency upon the 
 success of all your measures respecting the government of Mysore, and 
 upon the practical benefits which the British government has derived 
 from its establishments. I cannot avoid, at the same time, expressing an 
 anxious hope, that the principles on which that government was established, 
 and has been conducted and supported, will be strengthened and rendered 
 permanent. 
 
 314. General Orders by the Governor in Council at Madras. 
 
 Official recognition of General Wellesley 1 s services. 
 
 28th July, 1804. 
 
 The government of Fort St. George have repeatedly had occasion to 
 express their high approbation of the distinguished services performed by 
 Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 The conduct of Major-General Wellesley during the campaign against 
 Seringapatam, in the operations against Dhoondiah Waugh, and in the 
 expeditions necessary to establish the tranquillity of Mysore, afforded the 
 most honourable and decisive testimonies of his talents, energy, and zeal; 
 but a wider field was furnished for the exercise of those eminent qualifica- 
 tions by the subsequent events in the Mahratta empire.
 
 GEN. WELLESLEY' S SERVICES. PROVISION FOR HIS PROTEGE. 559 
 
 The rapid and judicious movements of Major-General Wellesley which 
 produced the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preserved the capital of the 
 Mahratta empire, and restored the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah ; 
 his success in securing the means of subsistence and movement for the 
 army under his command in countries remote from the sources of supply, 
 and exhausted by the depredations of the Mahratta troops ; the victories 
 which he achieved at Assye and Argaum over the combined armies of 
 Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; the conquest of the 
 fortresses of Ahmednughur, Asseerghur, and Gawilghur; the general 
 conduct of the war, and the conditions of the treaties of peace arranged 
 by him with the confederate Mahratta chiefs, entitle Major-General 
 Wellesley to be classed with the most illustrious British commanders, and 
 to receive the approbation and gratitude of his country. 
 
 These services have already been appreciated and acknowledged by 
 the highest authority in India ; but the Right Honourable the Governor 
 in Council cannot deny himself the gratification of publishing to this 
 army, on the occasion of Major-General Wellesley's departure for 
 Bengal, the high sense entertained by his Lordship of the extensive 
 ability, military science, and political knowledge manifested by Major- 
 General Wellesley during the period while he commanded in the Deccan, 
 and of the eminent services which he has rendered to the interests of 
 this government, of the empire in India, and the British nation. 
 
 315. To the Magistrate at Seringapatam. 
 
 Provision for Dhoondiah Waugh's son. 
 
 Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805. 
 Sir, 
 
 I herewith enclose a bond, No. 2713, of 1804-5, for the amount of 
 one thousand star pagodas. 
 
 I wish to place this sum of money in the charge of the Court of 
 Seringapatam for the benefit of Salabut Khan, the son, or the adopted 
 son, of the late Dhoondiah Waugh. 
 
 I am desirous that the Court should be his guardian, and should 
 superintend his education, the expense of which will be defrayed out 
 of the interest of this sum, and a sum of two hundred pagodas already 
 in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Symons, and allotted by me for his 
 support, which Lieutenant-Colonel Symons has been requested to pay 
 into the Court. 
 
 I am desirous that, if not absolutely necessary for his advancement, 
 the principal of one thousand star pagodas should never be given to 
 Salabut Khan ; but the interest is to be applied to pay the expense of his 
 education, and to be given to himself when he will arrive at years of 
 discretion, and will be no longer under the guardianship of the Court.
 
 $6o COYNESS OF THE LADY IN LEADENHALL STREET. 
 
 This money is to revert to me in case Salabut Khan should die 
 without heirs. 
 
 I have, &c., 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 316. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley proposes to wait upon the Directors. 
 
 19th Sept., 1805. 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley presents his compliments to the Chairman of 
 the Court of Directors. He has had the honour of serving the East 
 India Company for many years, but has never had an opportunity of 
 paying his respects to the Court of Directors; and he will be much 
 obliged to the Chairman if he will make known to the Honourable 
 Court Sir Arthur Wellesley' s anxious wish to have the honour of waiting 
 upon them at any time the Court may think proper to appoint. 
 
 317. [The Chairman to Sir Arthur Wellesley.] 
 
 A diplomatic answer. 
 
 India House, 23rd Sept., 1805. 
 The Chairman has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note 
 addressed to him by General Wellesley under date the 19th instant, and 
 it is his intention to lay it before the Court of Directors. He would be 
 glad, however, if he could previously be favoured with a short interview 
 with General Wellesley, and regrets he was not so fortunate as to find 
 him at home when he went to pay his respects to him on the morning of 
 the 19th, before he knew of the note in question, as he probably would 
 then have heard of the intention of writing it, and might have made the 
 observation which it is still his wish to offer. 
 
 318. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley will ivait on the Chairman. 
 S IR No. 18, Conduit Street, 24th Sept., 1805. 
 
 I had the honour of receiving last night on my return to town your 
 note of the 23rd. As my only object in expressing a wish to wait 
 upon the Court of Directors was to mark my respect for the East 
 India Company, whom I have served for some years, I beg that you 
 will not communicate it to the Court if you should see any reason for 
 which it should be withheld, until I can have the honour of seeing you. 
 
 I propose to wait upon you this day before twelve o'clock ; but if it 
 should be inconvenient to you to see me at that hour, I will call upon you 
 at any hour in the course of to-morrow that you may appoint. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 A FREE CONFERENCE WITH LORD CASTLEREAGH. 56 1 
 
 319. To the Earl of Mornington. 
 
 Report of communications with Pitt, Casilereagh, a?id other statesmen as to 
 Lord Wellesleys administration, and political course on his return to 
 England. Sir Arthur's view on the latter subject. His own treat- 
 ment by the Co7mnander-in-Chief and the Directors. 
 
 My dear Mornington, Deal, 21st Dec, 1805. 
 
 I am just about to make a second attempt to reach the river Weser 
 with a body of troops, to which I am attached as a Major-General ; 
 but before I depart I wish to make you acquainted with all that has 
 passed between your friends and the ministers and me respecting your- 
 self, as far as I may be able in a letter. 
 
 I arrived in England about the 10th of September, and I was received 
 by Lord Castlereagh with great kindness and cordiality. I had several 
 different discussions with him on the subject of recent transactions in 
 India, in all of which he appeared to maintain the opinions given in the 
 ' Observations on Mahratta Affairs.' * He admitted, however, that you 
 had done as you ought in not carrying into execution the orders which 
 had been sent to you founded upon the principles laid down in that 
 paper, as the war and the treaties of peace had entirely altered the 
 circumstances which, it was supposed here, existed, or might exist 
 when those orders should reach India. As I found that Lord Castle- 
 reagh still adhered to the notions which he had formed when he wrote 
 the ' Observations,' which were certainly erroneous, I thought it best to 
 communicate to him the memorandum which I had written upon those 
 Observations, of which you had approved. After he had read this paper 
 I had another opportunity of discussing the subject with him. His 
 objections to the treaty of Bassein upon that occasion were confined to 
 one specific point, viz. that it had been framed too much in imitation of 
 the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam. To this I answered that it certainly 
 would have been possible to frame a treaty with the Peshwah in different 
 words, which should have bound both parties to the same specific 
 stipulations ; but I said that I was entitled by experience to assert that 
 nothing short of the treaty of Bassein would have answered at all. 
 I then recapitulated the arguments upon this part of the subject contained 
 in my memorandum. 
 
 Lord Castlereagh in answer said that what he would have wished 
 would have been some middle line between that of leaving the Peshwah 
 entirely at the mercy of the Mahrattas and taking him out of their hands 
 and into ours, from which supposed project I could never drive him. 
 When I pressed him by a detail of the situation of the different parties in 
 the empire, and their different political objects, and urged the impossi- 
 
 1 See the Editor's Selections from Marquess Wellesley's Despatches, page 249. 
 
 o o
 
 5^2 THE DIRECTORS' GRIEVANCES AGAINST LORD WELLESLEY. 
 
 bility of reconciling those objects either with our interests or any pacific 
 system, he either gave me no answer or flew off to some other part of the 
 subject or to one entirely unconnected with it. 
 
 One of these was the great extension of our political system as laid 
 down in your instructions to General Lake and myself of June, 1803, 
 which was carried into execution by the treaties of peace ; upon which 
 he urged all the topics which have repeatedly been brought forward 
 upon the same subject. In answer I told him that when you found that 
 your system was not likely to meet with the approbation and support at 
 home which you had thought it deserved, and, above all, when you had 
 experience of the treachery of the Rajpoots and others in their conduct 
 towards Monson's detachment, and upon other occasions, you had deter- 
 mined to narrow the system in such a manner as I thought would be 
 satisfactory to him. I then explained the nature of the arrangement 
 which you had proposed to make with a view to the settlement of 
 Scindiah's government, by which I pointed out to him that we should 
 have nothing beyond the Jumna excepting what was absolutely 
 necessary to secure the navigation of that river, and our possessions in 
 Bundelcund. 
 
 In all our discussions upon this subject Lord Casllereagh always spoke 
 with the greatest deference and respect for you. He lamented that he 
 had differed in opinion with you, and particularly that you should have 
 imagined, as he supposed you did, that he had altered his opinion of the 
 treaty of Bassein as soon as he found that it was likely to be followed by 
 war. He told me that he had written you a letter upon that subject, 
 which he intended to send to St. Helena to meet you, and which he said 
 he would show me ; but I have never seen it. 
 
 He lamented in strong terms your differences with the Court of 
 Directors, and entered with some detail upon the causes of them. 
 These were principally the old story, disobedience of their orders, 
 contempt of their authority, neglect to write to them to inform them of 
 the most important events, and declared dislike of their persons ; add to 
 all this a confirmed belief in the Court, founded upon the indiscretion of 
 some persons who had returned from India and were attached to you, 
 that it was your fixed resolution to exert all the means in your power to 
 overturn the authority of the Company upon your return to England. 
 
 Shortly after my arrival in England I went to Cheltenham, and Lord 
 Casllereagh sent after me a very long despatch, No. 128, which had 
 been sent up from the Court of Directors to the Board of Control. 
 I never saw such a paper in my life. In this the Court entered into 
 a discussion of all the measures of your government since the settle- 
 ment of Mysore, excepting the treaty of Arcot, each of which they 
 censured in the grossest and the least candid terms. I wrote to Lord 
 Castlereagh upon the subject of this despatch a letter, of which I enclose
 
 CASTLEREAGH SUPERSEDES THEIR GENERAL INDICTMENT. $6$ 
 
 you a copy, and the consequence was that he refused to allow the 
 despatch to be sent out to India, as it contained reflections which were 
 unjust and injurious upon the governments abroad ; and he ordered 
 that they should write another upon the points which were called con- 
 stitutional, of which he transmitted them a draft. In this draft he has 
 discussed and disapproved of three practices of the Supreme govern- 
 ment in the conduct of the public business : first, the separate 
 correspondence; secondly, the practice of issuing orders in the name 
 and by the authority of the Governor-General alone when he is at 
 Calcutta; and, thirdly, the practice of recording minutes at councils at 
 which the Governor- General does not preside, and at periods subsequent 
 to the arrangement of the transactions to which they relate. This letter 
 does not contain any injurious or disrespectful reflections, but positive 
 orders to discontinue the practices which it decidedly disapproves. 
 You will observe in my letter that I had urged Lord C. not to send any 
 orders upon these subjects to India till he should have seen and con- 
 versed with you ; and I urged the same again in conversation. 
 
 At the same time that this draft was sent down to the Court, another 
 was sent to the Secret Committee, in which the Governor-General is 
 ordered to narrow his system in India nearly according to the plan which 
 you had proposed when you had in contemplation the arrangements for 
 Scindiah's government. It is written in general terms, and contains an 
 approbation of the conduct of the Governor-General in delaying to carry 
 into execution the orders which he received at the same time with the 
 anonymous ' Observations.' 
 
 Lord C. lately took an opportunity of showing the Chairman that para- 
 graph of one of your late letters to him in which you disclaim all plans 
 to overturn the Company's authority. The Chairman said that he was 
 glad to see it, but that you must have altered.your mind upon that subject, 
 as he had reason to believe that you had entertained such a project. 
 
 Pitt was at Weymouth when I arrived in England, and I did not see 
 him till the day before I left town to go to Cheltenham. I had met 
 Lord Camden at East Sheen a day or two before, and had some con- 
 versation with him respecting you. I told him that you were but little 
 annoyed by the insolence and vulgarity of the Court of Directors, but 
 you felt extremely the neglect of your friends, and that you had had 
 reason to apprehend till very lately that Pitt had not approved of any part 
 of your administration. That the ground of that apprehension was that 
 he had never said a word in parliament upon the subject till upon a late 
 occasion, but that I was convinced you would feel more satisfied when 
 you would hear of the handsome manner in which he had spoken of 
 your administration, when he had defended you from the attacks made 
 upon you by Francis and some of the Directors, than you could be by 
 any event that could occur. In answer, Lord Camden told me that Pitt 
 
 2
 
 564 PITT AND SIR ARTHUR TALK BUSINESS ON HORSEBACK. 
 
 certainly felt towards you as warmly as ever, and that he was determined 
 to support you. He said that, in fact, no serious attack had ever been made 
 upon your administration, or was likely to be made ; but in order to prove 
 to me how much in earnest Pitt was in his determination to give you all 
 the support which he was capable of giving, he mentioned in confidence 
 that upon one occasion, when there was a probability that a serious attack 
 would be made upon you, Pitt had determined to send to Lord Grenville 
 to consult with him regarding the mode in which each should defend you 
 in the Houses of Lords and Commons, although he had not had any 
 communication with Lord Grenville for several months before. 
 
 I desired Lord Camden to tell Pitt what I had said, which I believe 
 he did, as on the next day I received a message from him to desire that 
 I would call upon him. Instead of calling upon him, I rode with him 
 from Wimbledon Common to London. We rode very slowly, and I had 
 a full opportunity of discussing with him and explaining all the points in 
 our late system in India, to which objections had been made, which 
 were likely to make any impression upon him. These were principally 
 the probability of future wars arising out of that system, in which we 
 should be obliged to interfere; the increased demand for European 
 troops ; the increased expenses, which would swallow up our increased 
 resources. Upon all these his mind appeared to be satisfied. I ex- 
 plained to him, as I had done to Lord Camden, how much you had 
 felt his silence upon all the events of your administration, and your 
 apprehension that its general tenor had not been approved by him ; 
 and I told him that I was convinced that you would receive the greatest 
 satisfaction when you would read the account of the handsome manner 
 in which he had spoken of you in a late debate. He then spoke of you 
 in the strongest and handsomest terms, and said that till the late oppor- 
 tunity, of which he had availed himself, none had offered in which he 
 could have spoken. 
 
 I told him that you were naturally most anxious that a parliamentary 
 decision should be given upon the war ; upon which he said that upon 
 his first coming into office he had not been able to turn his mind to the 
 subject as he had wished ; that afterwards, when he had been able to 
 read the papers, he had been so much pressed by different questions in 
 parliament that he could not bring it forward, more particularly as he 
 would not conceal from me that many of his friends entertained doubts 
 upon that subject, which it was not very easy to remove. He said, how- 
 ever, that he wished you might arrive before the parliament should meet, 
 in order that he might have an opportunity of talking over with you the 
 whole subject, and of arranging in what manner it should be brought 
 forward. I have seen Pitt several times since ; he has always been 
 very civil to me, and has mentioned you in the most affectionate terms. 
 
 Lord Grenville has been out of town ever since I arrived in England ;
 
 GENERAL INDIFFERENCE ON INDIAN SUBJECTS. $6$ 
 
 but I went to Stowe on my way to Cheltenham, where I underwent a bore 
 for two days. Bucky is very anxious that you should belong to the 
 opposition. He urged every argument to induce me to inflame your 
 mind against Pitt, particularly that he had not given you the Garter. He 
 told me that you might depend upon the cordial and active support of 
 himself, his brothers, his son, and all his friends ; that they had stipulated 
 with Fox that they were to give you this support in any question that 
 might arise on your administration ; but he expressed a hope that you 
 would not at once throw yourself into the arms of Pitt, forgetting your 
 old friends and connexions. I told him that I was convinced you would 
 follow the wise advice given to you by Lord Grenville, which was to 
 come home and look about you, and settle all the questions relating to 
 your Indian government before you should take any part in politics or 
 belong to any party. He then pointed out the inducements which Pitt 
 would hold out to you, all of them in his opinion strong ; but they were 
 office, power, and the means of revenging the injuries you have received 
 from the Court of Directors, about which body I suppose you will never 
 think after you will arrive in England. On the other hand, he urged 
 that to join the opposition was the best political game of the day ; and 
 this notion was founded upon the difference of the age of the King and 
 the Prince of Wales. 
 
 I was with Lord Bathurst at Cirencester, and had some conversation 
 with him respecting you. He said that although, of course, he was 
 desirous of renewing his old habits with you, and that you should be 
 with Pitt, it was his opinion that you ought not to take a"}' decided 
 part in party politics immediately upon your arrival, or till your Indian 
 questions should have been settled. Lord Buckinghamshire, with whom 
 also I had a conversation very lately upon the same subject, is of the 
 same opinion. 
 
 As for my part, I have no doubt upon the subject ; and I strongly 
 recommend it to you to remain neutral for some time, and observe the 
 course of events. The Court of Directors by their conduct have left you 
 in an awkward predicament regarding several acts of your administration ; 
 but, excepting the Mahratta war, upon which I am inclined to believe 
 that there must be a parliamentary decision, I rather think that the re- 
 mainder may as well he left alone. The real truth is that the public 
 mind cannot be brought to attend to an Indian subject. It appears to 
 me that people in general were much prejudiced against the whole 
 system of Mahratta politics, because it was necessary to attack Holkar, 
 because Monson was defeated, and because Lord Lake failed before 
 Bhurtpoor; and you cannot bring their attention to the subject suffi- 
 ciently to enable them to understand you, and to prove to them that 
 those events which all must lament had nothing to do with the system of 
 Mahratta politics which occasioned the treaty of Bassein.
 
 $66 THE MARQUESS SHOULD STAND ON THE DEFENSIVE. 
 
 In the same way the treaty of Oude and other measures are equally 
 misunderstood, and it is equally difficult to make people sufficiently 
 attentive to be able to understand them. For this reason I would stand 
 upon the defensive : keep Pitt well charged with information, and pre- 
 pared in the House of Commons, and yourself in the House of Lords ; 
 and whenever an attack is made, lay forth all your strength upon the 
 particular point to which it may be directed. Henry and William are 
 both of the same opinion. 
 
 In regard to myself, I have to tell you that I have seen the Duke of 
 York but once, upon my arrival in England. He was very civil, and 
 said he should be happy to avail himself of an opportunity to employ me. 
 I rather think that upon the whole they have not treated me very well in 
 not giving me a regiment. Bucky tried to inflame me upon this point ; 
 but of course I have said, and shall say, nothing upon the subject. 
 
 The Court of Directors invited me to one of their Wednesday dinners, 
 at which they were personally civil to me ; and I believe that I stand 
 well with that august body. But upon my arrival I proposed to wait 
 upon them by desire of Lord Castlereagh, and the Chairman recom- 
 mended that I should withdraw my proposition because it had no 
 precedent. The real reason, however, for which they refused to receive 
 me was, that they were apprehensive lest by any mark of personal 
 attention to me they should afford ground for a belief that they approved 
 of any of the measures in the transaction of which I had been concerned. 
 Lord Castlereagh told me this, but I don't wish that it should be 
 mentioned to him again. 
 
 By-the-bye, now that I think of it, I mention that I don't believe that 
 Lord C. knows that it was Pitt's intention to consult with Lord Grenville 
 about the mode of defending you in parliament. 
 
 I will not enter into the particulars of our late unfortunate attempt to 
 reach the Weser: you will see it all in the papers; and I only hope the 
 next attempt will be more fortunate, but it does not now promise very 
 well. I will write to you from the Continent when I shall hear of your 
 arrival in England. 
 
 I cannot conclude this letter without congratulating you upon the state 
 in which you will find your children. I saw Richard in London before 
 I went to Cheltenham, and I think him one of the finest young men 
 I ever met with. I called upon him afterwards at Oxford upon my 
 return from Cheltenham, but he was with his mother at Brighton; and 
 he afterwards went to Oxford, where he has remained ever since. The 
 two other boys are also very fine fellows, and the girls (particularly the 
 youngest) are very handsome and accomplished. This is some con- 
 solation, even if your services should not have been considered and 
 treated as they deserve. But you have this additional consolation in the 
 reflection that by your firmness and decision you have not only saved but
 
 THE CIVIL RULER MUST BEAR THE SWORD. $6j 
 
 enlarged and secured the invaluable empire intrusted to your government 
 at a time when everything else was a wreck, and the existence even of 
 Great Britain was problematical. 
 
 320. To Viscount Melville, President of the Board of Control. 
 
 European troops in India should be the King's ; native troops the Com- 
 pany's ; so long as the Company exercises sovereign rights. The 
 Presidential armies should be distinct. Suggestions for subordinating 
 the military to the civil power. Discipline should be i?i the hands of 
 the Commander-in-Chief. Hoiv military patronage should be adjusted 
 between the Governor and him. 
 
 Elvas, 1 2th March, 1812. 
 
 I received only the day before yesterday your letter of the 10th Feb., 
 and head quarters have been marching ever since, and I shall not have 
 time to peruse Gen. Maitland's paper before the post will go out. 
 
 As, however, it is probable that you will decide upon your measure 
 before the next mail shall reach England, I will not miss this opportunity 
 of stating to you my opinion : 
 
 1 st ; That the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King's. 
 
 2dly; That the 3 armies ought to continue separate and distinct. 
 
 3dly ; That the Native army ought to be the Company's if the Com- 
 pany should continue to be the sovereign of the territory. It would be 
 impossible to separate this army from the sovereignty; and indeed the 
 great difficulty of transferring the Native army to the Crown, and that 
 the Crown would find in keeping it officered, as it must be, by persons 
 exclusively belonging to the Native service, have always appeared to me 
 the greatest in the way of the transfer of the sovereignty, or, more pro- 
 perly speaking, of the exercise of the sovereignty, to the Crown. 
 
 4thly ; It is my opinion that the Crown should name both the Governors 
 and Commanders in Chief at all the settlements, and should have a very 
 efficient control over the nomination of members of Council. If the 
 Crown do not appoint the Governor, the Crown should not appoint the 
 Commander in Chief. I have not time now to enter into a detail of all 
 my reasons for entertaining this opinion. They are referable principally 
 to the experience I acquired in witnessing, and sometimes being the me- 
 diator and reconciler of disputes between the Governor and Commander 
 in Chief. If the latter were appointed by the Crown and the former by 
 the Company, the Commander in Chief would be too strong for the 
 Governor. 
 
 5thly ; It is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be 
 vested by the law in the Governor in Council. The law must recognise 
 no oiher authority in the state. The Company may and ought to instruct
 
 568 DISCIPLINE TO BE IN HANDS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 
 
 the Governor in Council, ist ; to leave all matters of discipline solely and 
 exclusively to the Commander in Chief, and to interfere in them in no 
 manner, excepting when the safety of the state should require it. 2dly ; 
 that all recommendations to military appointments, such as the staff 
 officers of the army to commissions, promotions in the army of persons, 
 civil or military, to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior 
 commands, should be made by the Commander in Chief to the Governor 
 in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his 
 reasons for dissent. 3rdly ; the recommendations to superior commands, 
 such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander in Chief, 
 when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or poli- 
 tical function ; and that in the case of a nomination to a higher command 
 being vested exclusively in the Governor in Council, without the recom- 
 mendation of the Commander in Chief, the Governor should be directed 
 to consult with the Commander in Chief in making the selection. 
 
 It would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor 
 in Council to promote officers for meritorious services, at the recommend- 
 ation of the Commander in Chief, out of the usual and regular routine, 
 as well as to pass over officers guilty of misconduct. This might be done 
 by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers, 
 by brevet, in the first instance, who should succeed to the first vacancies 
 in the rank to which they should have been promoted in the regiment to 
 which they should belong. 
 
 In regard to other points, I concur entirely with you. The Court of 
 Directors must be prevented from meddling with or peddling in the dis- 
 cipline of the army. It is a matter of too serious consequence to be 
 allowed to be jobbed at the India House. You will be the best judge 
 whether this can be effected by the authority of the control of the Crown, 
 or whether the authority of Parliament is necessary. 
 
 P.S. I have omitted to mention that in whatever way the Commander 
 in Chief is appointed a member of Council, he should have the same 
 power of voting, &c, as other members of Council on all questions. 
 
 321. To the Right Hon. George Canning. 
 
 The Subsidiary System, as distinct from looser alliances, should not be 
 extended to other Powers than the Peshwah and the Nizam. And 
 they should be urged to maintain efficient cavalry, according to their 
 Treaties with us. 
 
 My DEAR Sir, London, nth Aug., 181 6. 
 
 Upon passing over in my mind the conversation I had with you the 
 
 other day, it occurs to me that I may have stated my opinion against 
 
 further alliances in India too strongly. I object to the extension of the 
 
 subsidiary system further than to the great Powers, that is to say, the
 
 THE SUBSIDIARY SYSTEM NOT TO BE EXTENDED. 569 
 
 Peshwah and the Nizam. I think it very possible, however, that in 
 order to form an efficient system against Meer Khan and his Pindarries, 
 it may be necessary to form alliances with others, either temporary or 
 permanent, or applicable to that object, or for general objects, accord- 
 ing to circumstances, to which you could not have an objection. But 
 it is very desirable that we should not take upon ourselves the defence 
 of any more Powers in India, and that we should endeavour to prevail 
 upon the governments of the Peshwah and of the Nizam to maintain at 
 all times such a body of horse as they are respectively bound to maintain 
 by their treaties with us. 
 
 322. Memorandum on the Deccan Prize Money. 
 
 In preferring an exclusive claim to prize taken at Poonah, Nagpour, and 
 Mahidpour, Sir T. His lop and the Deccan Army were wrong both in 
 their main fact, and their reasonings. They urge that (1) There was 
 no previous concert or association between them and Lord Hastings and 
 the Grand Army, in the operations against the Mahratta Powers. 
 But Lord Hastings did anticipate the fact, though not the circum- 
 stances, of the Mahratta rising ; and his appointment of Sir T.Hislop, 
 with special powers in the Deccan, proved this, and met the occasion. 
 
 (2) There was no actual co-operation on the pari of the Grand Army. 
 But it kept Scindiah and Meer Khan from interposing in the Deccan. 
 Thus it co-operated politically at Poonah ; and in a military way at 
 Nagpour ; and more completely and extensively at Mahidpour. 
 
 (3) Sir T Hislop's was a separate command. It was, in no sense, 
 intended to be so, after he should have crossed the Nerbuddah. And, 
 throughout, Lord Hastings did not, and could not, renounce his 
 authority as Cojnmander-in- Chief ; though he might issue his orders 
 through Sir T. Hislop. His ivords prove that he deemed the Deccan 
 army part of his own. (4) He commanded Sir T. Hislop only as 
 Governor-General, in a political, not military, manner. This is 
 untrue ; though, combining the two functions, he exercised also the 
 political authority, which all Governors-General have over the army. 
 As to the original fact : — the spoils of Poonah, Nagpour, and 
 Mahidpour, had been already handed over to the prize agents. The 
 sum in question was a later acquisition, the result of the general war, 
 and of the exertions of the united armies. 
 
 10th Sept., 1825. 
 
 When the Deccan Prize Case was under the consideration of the 
 Lords of the Treasury in the year 1823, it was stated by one party and 
 not disputed by the other, and understood by their Lordships, that
 
 570 GROUNDS OF THE CLAIM OF THE DECCAN ARMY. 
 
 there was a very large booty at the disposition of his Majesty, taken 
 by the troops at Poonah, at Nagpour, and Mahidpour. 
 
 The one party before their Lordships, Sir Thomas Hislop and the 
 Army of the Deccan, claimed the exclusive right to have this booty 
 distributed among them ; the other party, Lord Hastings and the Grand 
 Army, claimed to participate in this advantage. 
 
 The first mentioned party contended that there was no previous 
 concert or legal association in the operations by which the booty in 
 question was acquired and placed at the disposition of his Majesty; nor 
 any co-operation in those operations on the part of Lord Hastings, or 
 of the Grand Army, such as it is understood the law requires, in order 
 to give a party a right to share which claims on the score of co- 
 operation. That the Army of the Deccan was a separate army, ex- 
 clusively under the military command in chief of Sir Thomas Hislop. 
 That he alone and exclusively ordered the operations of that army. 
 That Lord Hastings, in his capacity of Commander-in Chief, had never 
 given any command to Sir Thomas Hislop, and that all the orders 
 conveyed to Sir Thomas Hislop by his Lordship were given in the 
 exercise of his political powers as Governor-General. 
 
 It is not necessary to examine on which of these grounds the decision 
 of the Treasury x 1823, was founded. It might have been founded upon 
 none of them. It is quite clear, however, that the parties were mistaken ; 
 the one in their statements, and the other in their admissions of the 
 existence of this booty, and of the sources from which, and the mode 
 in which such booty had been captured. 
 
 It will be stated in this paper what booty really does exist at the dis- 
 position of the Crown in consequence of the operations of the war in 
 India in 18 17 and 18 18; but in the mean time it is desirable to consider 
 of the statements and arguments above referred to, in order to apply 
 them to the booty which is really at the disposition of the Crown at the 
 present moment. 
 
 The first point is, that there was no previous concert or association in 
 the operations against the Mahratla Powers, as distinguished from the 
 Pindarries. 
 
 It is asserted that Lord Hastings did not expect the hostilities which 
 subsequently took place on the part of the Peshwah, the Rajah of 
 Nagpour, or of Holkar, and this assertion is founded not upon Lord 
 Hastings' acts, or upon his omissions, or upon the general tenour of 
 what he wrote upon this subject, but upon a few selected phrases found 
 in different parts of his correspondence, expressing his surprise rather at 
 the mode in which the treachery had been carried into execution than 
 that it existed. 
 
 Lord Hastings was aware in what light the Pindarries had been con- 
 sidered, and to what degree they had been encouraged by all the
 
 LORD HASTINGS FORESAW THE MAHRATTA CRISIS. 57 1 
 
 Mahratta powers to undertake their operations in preceding years in 
 the Company's territories, and he could not believe that he could 
 effectually put down the predatory system without exciting the jealousy, 
 the animosity, and eventually the hostility of these powers, if they should 
 consider it possible to manifest such hostility with advantage or without 
 danger to themselves. Lord Hastings did not, nor could not, foresee 
 in what manner, at what time, or under what circumstances this hostility 
 would be manifested, and he adopted every measure in his power to 
 frustrate and render such hostility harmless by the display and employ- 
 ment of the largest and most efficient force which the resources of his 
 government would supply. 
 
 But there is one measure adopted by Lord Hastings which manifests 
 in the clearest manner that he did expect these hostilities on the part 
 of the Mahratta powers, and that was the nomination of Sir Thomas 
 Hislop to command the troops in the Deccan. Those troops consisted 
 of as follows : — the Nagpour subsidiary force under Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Adams ; the Hydrabad subsidiary force under Colonel Doveton ; the 
 Poonah subsidiary force, under Colonel Smith ; the Mysore Horse ; the 
 Hydrabad and Poonah Infantry and other irregular troops ; all of them 
 doing duty, or they might have been appointed to do duty, with one 
 or other of the subsidised corps of regular troops ; and, lastly, a body 
 of troops of the army of Fort St. George, detached from the territories 
 under the government of Fort St. George. 
 
 These last might have been organised under the command of any 
 officer whom his Lordship might have selected for such command, and 
 the whole of the troops above mentioned might have moved to the 
 Nerbuddah in separate bodies under the command of their several com- 
 manders acting under instructions from Lord Hastings, with equal, if 
 not with greater facility than they did move by the intervention of the 
 command of Sir Thomas Hislop in his capacity newly conferred upon 
 him by the Governor-General in Council, of Commander-in-Chief of 
 the Army of the Deccan. 
 
 But Lord Hastings saw that possibly, nay probably, it would be 
 necessary to carry on operations with those troops previously to their 
 arrival upon the Nerbuddah, and to the period at which they should be 
 in immediate and direct communication with himself, and with the 
 divisions of the Grand Army. He could not foresee what would be the 
 nature or the period of those operations, and he therefore did that 
 which, as a statesman and a general, he ought to have done; he 
 appointed an officer to command the whole, and endowed him with 
 full military and political powers, and instructions to act as circum- 
 stances might require. His Lordship manifested his foresight as well as 
 his wisdom in this arrangement, and, in point of fact, it occurred that 
 Sir Thomas Hislop was under the necessity of using his military as well
 
 $7% POLITICAL DIFFERS FROM MILITARY CO-OPERATION. 
 
 as his political powers in the three only instances in which they could 
 by possibility be used in the interval between his march from the 
 Company's territories and his communication with Lord Hastings after 
 his arrival at the rendezvous upon the Nerbuddah. It is to be hoped 
 then that we shall hear no more of the want of foresight, and of previous 
 concert and association. The fact is that everything was foreseen, and 
 we enjoy the fruits of this foresight, as the only measures which could 
 be an adequate remedy for the evils which might occur in the execution 
 if this great and necessary enterprise were adopted. Secondly, in respect 
 to co-operation. I am one of those too much accustomed to estimate 
 the value of real military co-operation to allow any exaggeration upon 
 this subject to enter my mind. I besides draw a distinction between 
 political and military co-operation, and, as I understand the law, which, 
 however, I apprehend has been laid down only in reference to naval 
 operations, it is military co-operation alone which can give a party a 
 claim to be considered as a joint captor. I object to military co- 
 operation being admitted only in cases in which the claimant has been 
 in sight, as in cases of naval co-operation, but I assert that there must 
 be an actual co-operation in the action. 
 
 The existence of previous concert and association, provided nothing 
 intervened to prevent the co-operation, would render the proof of such 
 co-operation unnecessary, and it is quite obvious from what has been 
 above stated that previous concert and association existed in the operations 
 at Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour. 
 
 But if that principle should be denied, or the fact denied, we must 
 then consider the cases. 
 
 The position of the Grand Army undoubted)' prevented Scindiah and 
 Meer Khan from moving; and it is certain that the movement of either 
 of these chiefs would have had great influence over the result of affairs 
 in the Deccan. But there was no military co-operation in the action at 
 Poonah, and this co-operation would be merely political. 
 
 In the case of Nagpour there was positive military co-operation by 
 the troops of the Grand Army under Brigadier-General Hardyman. 
 
 The case of Mahidpour was the strongest of all. The march of the 
 first and third divisions of the army had been delayed by the illness of 
 Sir Thomas Hislop, and by the badness of the weather. 
 
 What was the meaning of the delay of the operations against the 
 Pindarries till these troops should arrive at the rendezvous upon the 
 Nerbuddah ? 
 
 Was it for the purpose of inquiry after the General's health, or any 
 other act of courtesy ? 
 
 It was solely for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan laid , 
 down according to previous concert and association. 
 
 Accordingly from the moment of the passage of the Nerbuddah,
 
 THE GRAND ARMY CO-OPERATED IN BOTH WATS. 573 
 
 Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams with 
 the third and fifth divisions of the Army of the Deccan, were in daily 
 and hourly communication with General Marshall's division of the Grand 
 Army, and of course with the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hastings. 
 
 In the course of these operations it was found that Holkar acted 
 exactly as had been foreseen by Lord Hastings ; and Lieutenant- 
 General Sir Thomas Hislop, according to the instructions which he had 
 received from his Lordship, declared Holkar in a state of war with the 
 British Government, and attacked his army as he would have done a 
 Pindarry force. Not only was General Marshall's division co-operating 
 upon this occasion, but likewise General Donkin's, and General Brown's 
 and Sir W. Keir's. 
 
 It was no trifling act of co-operation to have enabled Lieutenant- 
 General Sir Thomas Hislop to force Holkar to an action. 
 
 An attentive perusal of the papers and a knowledge of the parties will 
 show that this was effected by two modes. First, by the movement of 
 General Malcolm to form a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop ; and 
 secondly, by the position of the divisions of Sir W. Keir, General Donkin, 
 General Brown, General Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams in 
 different parts of the country which rendered the retreat of Holkar im- 
 possible. Here was no chance, but clear previous concert and military 
 co-operation, not for the purpose of obtaining booty, but for a better 
 purpose, that of attaining a great and glorious public advantage. 
 
 It is not disputed that there was distinct military co-operation among 
 all the troops on the right of the Nerbuddah acting against the 
 Pindarries ; but it is disputed that in the war with Holkar, an event 
 foreseen and clearly provided for in the instructions to Sir Thomas 
 Hislop as likely to be the consequence of the operations against the 
 Pindarries, there was the same co-operation, the different divisions of 
 both armies being in fact in the same scene of action, and in the same 
 relative position towards each other, and in the same habits of com- 
 munication. 
 
 The next assertion is, that the Army of the Deccan was a separate 
 army exclusively under the command-in-chief of Sir Thomas Hislop; 
 that he exclusively ordered its operations ; that Lord Hastings as Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in India had never given any orders to Sir Thomas 
 Hislop or the troops under his command, and that the military orders 
 given by his Lordship to Sir Thomas Hislop, although military in 
 themselves, were given in the exercise of his Lordship's political power 
 as Governor-General. 
 
 The most extensive powers, political as well as military, were confided 
 to Sir Thomas Hislop, of which the only limit was to be found in his 
 instructions, and that he was to obey the orders of the Governor- 
 General, or of the Governor-General in Council; and that he was to
 
 574 SIR T - HISLOP'S NEVER A SEPARATE COMMAND. 
 
 be ' subject to the control eventually in the conduct of operations in 
 the field to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord 
 Hastings.' 
 
 For the purpose of this cause then it is to be supposed that Lord 
 Hastings, a military officer of high rank and great reputation, having 
 Sir Thomas Hislop undoubtedly under the control of his authority as 
 Commander-in-Chief, abandoned his duty as an officer, for it was his 
 duty as an officer to command Sir Thomas Hislop, and that he pre- 
 ferred to send him military orders in virtue of the political superiority 
 vested in his Lordship, instead of in the exercise of the military command 
 and control which he undoubtedly had on this service. 
 
 The words above recited conveying the authority conferred upon Sir 
 Thomas Hislop, and stating its limitations will show how little there is 
 in all the arguments to prove that he was a commander-in-chief of a 
 separate independent army, and that in that capacity he could be under 
 no control. He was under the control specifically of the commander- 
 in-chief eventually, and the event in contemplation occurred as soon as 
 he came within reach of his Lordship, and was in communication with 
 his Lordship ; that is, as soon as one of the divisions of the Army of 
 the Deccan crossed the Nerbuddah. 
 
 This is the difference between Sir Thomas Hislop's case and mine. 
 I never was in communication or co-operated with Lord Lake. Sir 
 Thomas Hislop was in communication with Lord Hastings from the 
 moment his troops crossed the Nerbuddah. From that moment a union 
 of operation was necessary, and a unity of command alone could 
 insure it. 
 
 Lord Hastings, in whom the chief command of the operations was 
 vested, could not do otherwise than exercise that command. His Lord- 
 ship might choose, as he did choose generally but not invariably, to 
 issue his orders to the divisions of the army of the Deccan through their 
 Commander-in-Chief Sir Thomas Hislop, and he might choose to write 
 them himself in official or in private letters, either upon the military 
 subject alone, or mixed up with other matter, or he might issue them if 
 he should think proper through his adjutant-general, or his quarter- 
 master-general, or his secretary, or his aide-de-camp. They were 
 equally his orders, and Sir Thomas Hislop was responsible as a military 
 officer to obey these orders. 
 
 I assert this principle : no officer in command of an army is bound 
 to issue his orders in any particular mode or channel. Provided those 
 who receive those orders are certain that they proceed from him, they 
 are bound to obey them ; and these very papers afford an instance of 
 two different modes of issuing orders to armies upon the same subjects. 
 
 Lord Hastings issued his orders regarding the movements of the 
 troops sometimes through his adjutant-general, Lieutenant-Colonel
 
 LORD HASTINGS' ORDERS MILITARY, NOT POLITICAL. 575 
 
 Nicoll, sometimes by his own letters official or private. Sir Thomas 
 Hislop issued his orders upon the same subject through Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Blacker, the quartermaster-general, and there are not two 
 commanders-in-chief of British armies who have issued such orders in 
 the same precise channel. 
 
 But it is stated that these orders, though undeniably issued by Lord 
 Hastings the Commander-in-Chief, and having for their objects detailed 
 movements and manoeuvres, were issued in the exercise of his political 
 power as Governor-General. 
 
 I will just inquire what Lord Hastings meant by the words my army, 
 frequently used in the letters conveying these orders. Did he mean that 
 he was the sovereign whose army it was, or was he the Governor-General 
 commanding the army, or the Commander-in-Chief commanding the 
 army ? Upon that point there can be no doubt ; and these very words 
 are sufficient to fix the real character of the letters in question. 
 
 It is true that Sir Thomas Hislop refers himself to Lord Hastings as 
 Governor-General, on some points which are considered elsewhere as 
 military, but which in India are exclusively civil. One of these is the 
 appointment of Colonel Walker, and afterwards that of Colonel Scott 
 to be a brigadier-general. But it must be observed that each of these 
 appointments was an augmentation of the staff of his army ; and the 
 officer of the pay-department of the army must have declined to pay the 
 brigadier unless the appointment were sanctioned by the Governor- 
 General, or by the Governor-General in Council. 
 
 Lord Hastings filled two offices, that of Governor-General and that 
 of Commander-in-Chief, both of them having distinct duties to perform 
 in the government of the affairs of the Presidency of Fort William. 
 
 All the acts of that government are done by law in the name and by 
 the authority of the Governor-General in Council. 
 
 But there are several acts which must be recommended to the 
 Governor-General in Council by the Commander-in-Chief under different 
 orders and instructions from the Court of Directors. 
 
 The distinct duties of the two offices are clear enough when they are 
 filled by different persons, but they require in their management the 
 official machinery which may be observed in these papers when both are 
 filled by one person, in order to keep the military business in its proper 
 channel. 
 
 But it is quite clear that Lord Hastings was the Commander-in-Chief 
 on this service, and that he acted as the Commander-in-Chief in reference 
 to the military body called the Army of the Deccan, by giving to the 
 officer immediately in command orders for its movements, which nobody 
 on the spot was authorised to issue excepting his Lordship, after the 
 event occurred which rendered an exact unity of operations necessary 
 between the two armies.
 
 57 6 THE PRIZE IN QUESTION ACCRUED AT END OF WAR; 
 
 I will now consider the nature of the booty realised and at the dis- 
 position of his Majesty, and will apply the facts and reasoning in this 
 paper to the consideration of the question, to what parts of the army 
 ought that booty to be distributed ? 
 
 In the letter from the Trustees to the Treasury of 22nd June, 1825, 
 an opinion is stated that the order of their Lordships in their minute of 
 the ' February, 1823, could not be carried into execution; and it is 
 recommended that the booty realised should be divided among the 
 commander-in-chief, officers, and troops of the Army of the Deccan. 
 When that letter was written the proceedings before their Lordships and 
 the arguments of counsel had not been brought under the view of the 
 Trustees. If they had been such an opinion could not have been formed. 
 
 It now appears that there was no prize or booty taken at Poonah, 
 Nagpour, or Mahidpour, which is not included in the sum of about 
 £150,000 sterling in the whole, realised by the officers appointed to 
 appraise and sell booty captured, and that the remainder of the sum at 
 his Majesty's disposition consists in the value of jewels abandoned by 
 the Peshwah, but concealed at Nassuck in his flight through that town in 
 February and March, 18 18, and found in Nassuck in May, 1818, above 
 a month after the Army of the Deccan had been broken up ; of deposits 
 made by the Peshwah in the hands of certain individuals for services, 
 which services were never performed, and the individuals in question 
 had been called upon in July, 18 18, to refund the sums deposited, 
 and had since refunded ; of debts due to the Peshwah, whether on 
 account of tribute, of arrears of revenue, &c, &c. ; all discovered 
 since the Army of the Deccan was broken up in March, 18 18, and 
 generally since the Peshwah delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm 
 in June, 1818. 
 
 These sums have been claimed on the part of the Crown as booty 
 obtained by the East India Company's officers in consequence of the 
 operations of the war, and have been delivered over as such by the 
 East India Company. But it is obvious from the nature of the sources 
 from which they came, and the period at which possession of them was 
 obtained, that their realisation has been the consequence of all the 
 operations, and not of any part, however important. 
 
 Whatever may be deemed to be the state of the case regarding 
 previous concert and association or of actual co-operation on the part of the 
 troops of the Grand Army, or even of those of the first, second, third, 
 and fifth, and reserve divisions of the Army of the Deccan, with the 
 fourth division in the capture of Poonah, it is quite clear that if the 
 Pindarries, and Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpour had not been de- 
 stroyed we should never have heard of the Nassuck jewels, nor of 
 deposits made by, nor of debts due to the Peshwah. 
 
 1 Blank in M.S.
 
 AND WAS WON JOINTLY BY BOTH ARMIES. $JJ 
 
 Indeed we did not hear of the two latter till after the Peshwah had 
 delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm. 
 
 But let us trace the operations which ended in that event, and we 
 shall see how the whole were linked together. 
 
 The Peshwah early in the year 1818 was driven from the neighbour- 
 hood of the River Kistna by the fourth and reserve divisions under 
 Generals Smith, Munro, and Pritzler. He passed through Nassuck into 
 Candeish, from whence he was driven in February by the troops which 
 had been sent across the Nerbuddah and Taptee under Sir Thomas 
 Hislop by Lord Hastings, and by those of the second division of the 
 Army of the Deccan under General Doveton. He then turned to the 
 south-west, towards the head of the Wurda River, into the territories of 
 the Rajah of Nagpour, and those of the Nizam, where he was met again 
 by the troops of the fifth division under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, and 
 defeated by them in April. The second division under General Doveton 
 was again co-operating. 
 
 The Peshwah then fled to the neighbourhood of Asseergur, between 
 the Taptee and the Nerbuddah, where on the 3rd of June, 18 18, he 
 delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm, who had put in movement 
 all the troops, even to Delhi, to stop the Peshwah in case he should pass 
 the Nerbuddah. All those in the Rajah of Nagpour's territories, Bopaul, 
 Bundlecund, &c, had been put in movement in April, to stop the 
 Peshwah when he was endeavouring to pass through the Nagpour 
 territories. 
 
 For all these troops there is a clear case of concert and association, and 
 for most, of direct military co-operation. 
 
 They would include nearly the whole of both armies, even if it could 
 be doubted that, as the war with the Peshwah was occasioned by the 
 just and necessary design to put down the Pindarries, so the surrender 
 of the Peshwah was the consequence of the previous operations against 
 those freebooters, and could not have occurred if these, in which all 
 without exception were engaged, had not been successful. 
 
 Wellington. 
 
 323. Memorandum on Mutiny at Barrackpoor. 
 
 Summary of the conduct of the mutineers. The Commander-in-Chief did 
 his duty in compelling them to lay down their arms, before he would 
 consider their demands. The Committee find that the mutiny arose 
 from: — (1) antipathy to the scene — and (2) to the character — of the 
 war. This is true. But government could not yield to such antipathy. 
 (3) Dislike to serving on board ship. This {they had reason to k?tozv) 
 was an ungrounded fear . (4) Want of baggage cattle. Why the sepojs 
 require this. The government, and the commanding officer, did their 
 
 P p
 
 $j8 SUMMARY NARRATIVE OF THE MUTINEERS' CONDUCT. 
 
 best to supply the want. (5) The exactions of those engaged in this 
 service. But the service was occasional, as contrasted with (6) The 
 alleged inadequate pay of the sepoys. Besides permanent employment, 
 they have batta, pensions, §c. It is not unjust to exact a premium, 
 when they are paid in Sicca rupees. Nor is their pay, judged by the 
 price of food, really inadequate. if) The want of knapsacks, for which 
 they were charged. No fair cause, though the charge should have been 
 postponed. (8) The undue iiifluence of two native officers. Their 
 influence was for good, not harm. 
 The indiscipline and bad feeling of the Bengal army are naturally account- 
 able for by the detachment, from regimental duty, of a large, and the 
 better, part of the European officers ; and by the little interest taken by 
 those who remain {including, on this occasion, the staff officers, adjutant, 
 and quartermaster) in the wants and proceedings of the sepoys. 
 General conclusion : — The government not to blame. Real rationale of 
 the mutiny. Its vigorous suppression was salutary, not censurable. 
 
 10th Oct., 1825. 
 I have perused with great attention the proceedings of the committee 
 of officers in Bengal on the mutiny at Barrackpoor in October and 
 November last ; their general observations, and the letter from the 
 Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors of the 30th of 
 March last. 
 
 These proceedings refer only to the transactions up to the 1st of 
 November. 
 
 It appears from them, however, that the 47th Native Regiment, after 
 various acts of insubordination on preceding days, refused to march on 
 the 1st of November; that a considerable body of that corps drove from 
 the parade on that morning 180 men there assembled with the Euro- 
 pean and Native officers for the purpose of commencing the march, and 
 seized the colours of the regiment; and remained throughout that day 
 in a state of mutiny in their lines in the cantonment at Barrackpoor; 
 the European and Native officers, and non-comissioned officers having 
 been obliged to withdraw themselves from the men of the regiment. 
 
 It appears that meetings had been held near a tank in front of the 
 cantonments on different nights previous to the 1st of November, 
 between the men of the 47th Regiment and those of the 26th and 62nd, 
 two other Native regiments ordered likewise to march, and to follow the 
 47th Regiment; and it is a fact that considerable bodies of both these 
 regiments joined the 47 th in the night of the 1st November with their 
 colours, which they had seized. 
 
 It likewise appears by the proceedings of the committee, that Major- 
 General Dalzell, commanding in the cantonment at Barrackpoor, had on 
 the 1st of November, after the mutiny of the 47 th Regiment, ordered
 
 THE COMMITTEE'S VIEW OF THE CAUSES EXAMINED. 579 
 
 a Court of Enquiry to assemble to investigate the alleged grievances and 
 claims of the sepoys, and the causes for which they had refused to 
 march. The mutineers were informed of the assembly of this Court by 
 Lieut. -Colonel Cartwright, their commanding officer, and were desired 
 to send two sepoys at a time of each company to attend the Court to 
 state their complaints. The mutineers refused, as they said that these 
 sepoys would not be allowed to return to them in safety. Upon this 
 statement, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright made the offer to remain upon the 
 parade with the mutineers as hostage, till all the separate detachments 
 of sepoys sent to attend the Court should return. 
 
 The mutineers refused to accept this offer ; and, in fact, the Court of 
 Enquiry was under the necessity of adjourning without proceeding on 
 the intended enquiry. 
 
 From these facts it is obvious that the mutineers of the 47th Regiment 
 felt considerable confidence in their security from their numbers, the 
 connivance of their Native officers, and the promised support of other 
 corps; and it was not without reason that his Excellency the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief required on the following morning that the mutineers 
 of the three corps assembled should lay down their arms, before his 
 Excellency should proceed to take into consideration the demands con- 
 tained in a petition in the Persian language, which they had conveyed 
 to his Excellency. 
 
 If his Excellency had adopted any other course, he would have been 
 guilty of a gross violation of his duty to the government and to his 
 employers. 
 
 The supposed causes of this mutiny are stated in the observations of 
 the committee to have been, first, ' The general dislike to proceeding to the 
 unhealthy country into which our military operations were to be carried.' 
 
 Secondly, ' The state of public feeling as to the nature and character 
 of the war ; and the difficulties they expected to meet in its progress.' 
 
 These were indeed the real causes of the mutiny. The sepoys serving 
 under the presidency of Fort William are in general levied in Benares 
 and Oude ; and they dislike at all times to serve in the lower provinces, 
 particularly in that of Bengal, on account of the nature of the climate, 
 the food, and the supposed difference of pay, which will be discussed 
 presently. They dislike still more to serve on the eastern frontier ; and 
 above all to pass that frontier into Assam. 
 
 But it is obvious that such objections could not induce the govern- 
 ment to countermand the march of these corps. The State was at war, 
 and required all its troops ; and it would not do to excuse any on 
 account of their dislike of the particular service ; provided that to employ 
 them in such service was not inconsistent with the engagement under 
 which the troops had enlisted, or the customs which had usually pre- 
 vailed in employing them. 
 
 P p 2,
 
 $8o WHY THE SEPOYS REQUIRE BAGGAGE CATTLE. 
 
 The third cause of the mutiny stated is, ' The aversion to being em- 
 ployed on board ship.' If such an intention on the part of the govern- 
 ment existed, it would have been a breach of engagement, and of the 
 practice of the service. 
 
 But all these troops were repeatedly assured by General Dalzell, by 
 Colonel Cartwright, by those of their European officers in whom they 
 felt confidence, and by their Native officers, that there was no such 
 intention ; and they must have known from experience that no native 
 troops had ever been embarked, excepting as volunteers, and by their 
 own consent. The suspicion of such an intention on the part of the 
 government must have been excited by those who fomented this 
 mutiny. 
 
 The fourth cause stated for this mutiny is, ' The want of a proper pro- 
 vision of cattle for the conveyance of the baggage of the sepoys.' 
 
 The sepoys in the service of the government of Bengal are nearly all 
 men of .the highest caste of Hindoos; and the ceremonies of their 
 religion and the duties of their caste require that each of them should 
 possess for his own use certain cooking utensils and other conveniences 
 in camp and on service, which are of a bulk and weight to render it 
 impossible for him to carry them on his back in the same manner as 
 other soldiers do those applied to a similar purpose. 
 
 For this reason, the sepoys are allowed to hire at their own expense 
 cattle to carry these articles ; which cattle are usually hired for them by 
 the interference of the magistrates in the different parts of the country. 
 
 It appears that notwithstanding that the commanding officer of the 
 47th, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, applied to the magistrate as early as 
 July to have the bullocks for the service of his corps hired, and repeated 
 his application again on the 13th of October, the magistrate could find 
 no bullocks for hire in the country, on account of the want of these 
 animals for the general service of the army, and of the unwillingness of 
 those who usually hired bullocks to proceed on service to that part of 
 the country. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright urged the sepoys to buy bullocks to carry 
 their baggage, and actually advanced money to the non-commissioned 
 officers to make the necessary purchases ; but the sepoys refused to 
 purchase, and insisted upon having them for hire as usual. The com- 
 manding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, then advanced three thousand 
 rupees (about four hundred pounds) out of his own pocket to purchase 
 bullocks for the sepoys; and the government, upon the representation 
 of the Commander-in-Chief, directed that 4000 rupees, or about five 
 hundred pounds, should be advanced to the commanding officer of each 
 of the corps going upon the service, to purchase bullocks to carry the 
 baggage of the sepoys. 
 
 I certainly think that the sepoys in the service of Bengal, having been
 
 THEY WERE NOT ILL-TREATED IN THIS RESPECT. 58 1 
 
 in the habit of hiring bullocks to carry their baggage, and this accommoda- 
 tion being necessary for the particular description of men of whom those 
 regiments were composed, and the assistance of the civil magistrates to 
 obtain what they required having been usually given, and being necessary, 
 it was the duty of the government to adopt measures to give them the 
 accommodation of the necessary number of bullocks in some other 
 manner, when it was found that they could not be obtained in the 
 country for hire. Accordingly, it appears that the government and the 
 commanding officer of the regiment, Lieut. -Colonel Cartwright, per- 
 formed this duty by the 47 th, and ten bullocks for each company were 
 in camp on the night of the 31st October, the night before the mutiny. 
 
 There is a difference of opinion respecting the quality of these 
 bullocks, whether they were sufficient in number, &c. But it must be 
 observed that the sepoys had been desired to leave behind them, or to 
 dispose of everything which it was not necessary for them to take with 
 them, which order was not only reasonable, but under the circumstances 
 a proper order to give out. 
 
 It likewise appears that a building in the cantonment had been 
 allotted to receive the baggage which the sepoys should leave behind. 
 
 But no imputation can be cast upon the government whether the 
 bullocks were or not sufficient in number, or their quality good. They 
 manifested their desire to provide for this service by the advance of the 
 money ; and it was the duty of others to superintend and take care of 
 all the details of the execution of the intentions of the government, 
 whether in regard to the carriage of the baggage of the sepoys, the care 
 of their baggage if left behind, and all other details. 
 
 The fifth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, ' The effect 
 produced by the enormous wages extorted from the public, and from 
 individuals, by all classes of persons whose services were wanted on this 
 occasion.' 
 
 This cause of discontent was made known to Lieut.-Colonel Cart- 
 wright, who very properly explained to the sepoys the difference between 
 their situation and that of the persons referred to. 
 
 They, the sepoys, were permanently in the service, and enjoyed many 
 advantages, besides their monthly pay, such as their batta on a march, 
 their pensions when unable to serve any longer, &c. ; whereas the 
 persons in question were hired only for the occasion, and when the 
 occasion should no longer exist, their pay would cease. This want of 
 an increase of pay, however, it appears was stated by the sepoys as one 
 of the causes of the mutiny to the last moment, and they peremptorily 
 demanded an addition of half the pay they already received as a con- 
 dition of their return to their duty. 
 
 This whole question of pay deserves consideration, as it is a point upon 
 which the committee have gone much at length in their observations.
 
 582 THE SEPOYS ARE NOT UNDERPAID IN BENGAL. 
 
 The first complaint is that the pay of the sepoys is calculated in 
 Sonat rupees, in which coin they are paid in Benares and Oude, but that 
 they are paid in Sicca rupees in Bahar and Bengal, upon which coin a 
 premium is taken from them of about \\ per cent. Sonat rupees are 
 the coin in general currency throughout Hindostan. Having been 
 coined in all parts of the country, they are very old, much worn, and 
 defaced ; and one hundred, upon an average, are calculated not to be 
 worth more than 95 or 95^ of the standard Sicca rupees. The standard 
 Sicca- rupees are coined by the Company in their mint ; and when the 
 troops are paid in this coin it is the common practice to deduct the 
 overplus of the value compared with Sonat rupees, in which the pay of 
 all ranks is calculated. 
 
 In stating the complaints of this arrangement, the committee do not 
 mention that the sepoys do not change a single Sonat rupee in the 
 bazaars of Hindostan, without paying something to the Shroff, or money 
 changer. The Sicca rupee will invariably change for its standard value 
 in other coins. What is the remedy for the evil stated by the com- 
 mittee ? Is it to pay the troops in Bahar and Bengal without deducting 
 the difference of value in Sicca rupees, continuing to pay those in 
 Benares and Oude their old pay in Sonat rupees? This arrangement 
 would be neither more nor less than to increase the pay of the troops in 
 Bahar and Bengal; and I beg to observe that the troops in those 
 provinces have always been supposed to be in peace cantonments, 
 whereas those in Benares and Oude are in camp or in war cantonments. 
 
 The next claim would be to add to the pay of the troops employed in 
 Benares and Oude \\ or 5 per cent, to make their pay equal in reality to 
 that of the troops employed in Bahar and Bengal. 
 
 It would be impossible to pay all the troops in Sicca rupees, on 
 account of the difficulty, expense, and delay of transporting those rupees 
 from the mint to the stations in Benares and Oude ; and equally im- 
 possible to pay all the troops in Bahar and Bengal in Sonat rupees 
 without giving circulation within the Company's territories to a base and 
 depreciated currency. It is clear, then, that there is no remedy for this 
 inconvenience, which in some shape or other must exist, and which, 
 after all, is exaggerated by the committee, as well as by the sepoys. 
 
 But there is still behind a question connected with this subject, and 
 that is, the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the pay of the sepoys in 
 Bengal. 
 
 The pay of a sepoy is seven rupees a month, or seventeen shillings 
 and sixpence, deducting therefrom 5 per cent., or say ninepence. Let 
 that sum be compared with the price of labour and of food in the 
 country, and with the pay of soldiers, the price of labour and of food in 
 any part of the world, and it will be found ample, even after making 
 allowance for all the deductions stated in the observations.
 
 THE TWO LAST ALLEGED GRIEVANCES FUTILE. 583 
 
 Suppose a sepoy eats one seer, or two pounds, of rice in a day ; and 
 I have known thousands of them live and serve upon half a seer, or a 
 pound a day, and the Bengal sepoys never have more than two pounds 
 when on service ; the average price of rice being about twenty seers for 
 a rupee, the sepoy would have 5^ rupees of his seven in every month for 
 his other expenses. 
 
 But besides this pay, the sepoy has at all times when in Oude, and 
 when he marches or is on service elsewhere, an allowance called batta of 
 about twopence a day, which, in fact, is intended to defray, and doe's 
 defray, the expense of his food. Seven rupees a month, then, is a fair 
 allowance of pay ; and in Bengal it is known that they are satisfied 
 with that amount, and so well satisfied as that the ranks are always 
 complete with men of the highest caste. When not in Bengal, the 
 sepoys eat wheaten flour, which is cheaper food than rice is. But the 
 price of rice is lower in Bengal than that above stated. 
 
 The seventh cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, ' The 
 want of knapsacks, for which the sepoys had been put under stoppages.' 
 
 This cannot fairly be deemed a cause for mutiny. Indeed, it was 
 scarcely stated by the troops; and those who did state the grievance, 
 were satisfied with the answer that the knapsacks had been embarked in 
 boats on the river at Futty Ghur, and were expected from thence. How- 
 ever, there is no doubt that it would have been better if the charge had not 
 been made for the knapsacks till the troops should have received them. 
 
 The eighth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, ' The 
 undue influence of the Subadar Major and Havildar Major of the 47th 
 Regiment.' These men appear to have conducted themselves meri- 
 toriously, particularly during these discontents, and therefore they are 
 complained of. They rendered themselves very useful to the command- 
 ing officer, Colonel Cartwright, who "attended to them accordingly. But 
 it does not appear in any part of the proceedings that injustice was 
 done to anybody in consequence of their influence. As connected with 
 this part of the subject, I will now advert to the observations of the 
 committee upon the native troops in Bengal. I have known these 
 troops long enough to have heard many similar complaints of their 
 having fallen oft" in discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service ; 
 but I have seen these troops perform the best service at the moment 
 when these complaints have been loudest. 
 
 About thirty years ago, that is in the year 1796, a great change was 
 made in the Company's service in India, particularly in the Native 
 service, which I don't think was fully considered at the time; and it 
 certainly has not tended to improve the qualities of the Native troops. 
 But whether that alteration was right or wrong, no change can now be 
 made ; and we must endeavour to rectify the defects which are apparent 
 upon the proceedings of this committee.
 
 5' 9 4 FEWNESS AND TEMPER OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS, MAIN EVIL. 
 
 Of all the armies in the world, the Native army in India is that one 
 of which the Staff officers should not be effective in its ranks. But on 
 the contrary, the European officers with the Native troops should always 
 be kept effective. Yet in this army, it appears that by far the majority 
 of the officers of the regiments, and of course the best officers, those 
 who best understand the language, manners, and customs of the natives, 
 those most capable of preventing such a catastrophe as happened at 
 Barrackpoor, are employed in civil and diplomatic situations on the 
 Staff of the army, in the Commissariat, in command, or to officer pro- 
 visional and local, or irregular corps of cavalry and infantry; some even 
 in the service of the allies of the British government. This being the 
 case, it cannot be matter of surprise to find it recorded on these pro- 
 ceedings, not only that the European officers of the 47th Regiment had 
 no influence in preventing this mutiny, but that they had no knowledge, 
 some till the 31st October, others not till the 1st November, of the dis- 
 contents which existed, and irregularities committed by the sepoys in 
 their companies many days previous to the mutiny, or till long after 
 those discontents and irregularities were known to the General Officer 
 commanding in the cantonments, and even to the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 It appears that these European officers never attended the roll-calls 
 of their companies, and but seldom the regimental parades. That they 
 were not acquainted with the sepoys of their companies, did not know 
 their names, and never spoke to them or communicated with them, ex- 
 cepting through the Native officers, or non-commissioned officers, nearly 
 all of whom, it appears, encouraged the sepoys to mutiny. 
 
 The European officers knew nothing of the orders issued by the 
 commanding officer, did not take measures to see them executed, or 
 take any part in the command or discipline of the corps. 
 
 It appears that the European Staff officers did not know of the 
 irregularities of which the sepoys were guilty till the morning of the 31st 
 October, although they were days before known to the commanding 
 officer, and to the General, and Commander-in-Chief, and did not know 
 or perform more of their duty than the officers in command of and 
 attached to the companies. 
 
 It appears that the adjutant, when he gave out the orders of the com- 
 manding officer, did not consider it his duty to see them carried into 
 execution ; and as for the quartermaster, he knew nothing, and did not 
 consider it his duty to know anything about the clothing or equipment 
 of the troops ; and when the government had taken the trouble, and had 
 incurred the expense of 4000 rupees to purchase bullocks to carry the 
 baggage of the sepoys of this corps, and the quartermaster might have 
 known how important it was that this supply should not be lost or 
 rendered useless for want of care, he did not consider it his duty to take 
 any steps whatever to have care taken of these animals.
 
 GOVERNMENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF NOT TO BLAME. 585 
 
 It is not necessary to seek for curious reasons for the falling off in the 
 discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service of the Native army 
 in Bengal, when such a state of things exists among the European 
 officers in one of the favourite corps of the service, the 47th Regiment. 
 
 I have come from the perusal of these proceedings with a firm con- 
 viction upon my mind that neither the acts nor the omissions of the 
 government caused the discontent, much less the mutiny. The dis- 
 content was caused by the necessity of employing the sepoys on the 
 Eastern frontier instead of in their own country, Oude ; and the mutiny 
 because the Native officers connived at the conduct of the mutineers, 
 and the European officers knew nothing about that, or anything else 
 which it was their duty to know, excepting the commanding officer, 
 Colonel Cartwright, who appears to me to have done everything in his 
 power, as well to allay the discontents, as to prevent the mutiny, and 
 afterwards to get the better of it ; excepting that he did not force the 
 European officers to perform their duty, or bring them to trial for a 
 neglect of it. The sepoys, then, finding that their conduct was thus 
 connived at, or not checked by those who ought to have controlled it, 
 and feeling themselves strong in numbers, and supported by other regi- 
 ments in the same cantonments, broke out into open mutiny. 
 
 It is a curious fact that the committee have taken no notice of and 
 made no observation upon their declining to attend the committee ordered 
 on the 1 st November to hear and investigate their complaints. But 
 having so declined, the Commander-in-Chief had but one line to follow, 
 and that was to force them to lay down their arms before he should 
 consider of their complaints. 
 
 I entreat my colleagues, before they decide upon these questions, to 
 consider well what would have been the consequences of any weakness 
 or want of decision in the settlement of this question upon the spot, or 
 in the punishment of those since tried by a court-martial composed of 
 Native officers, and condemned to work upon the roads for this crime. 
 
 Let them recollect the impressions upon their own minds when they 
 first heard of this mutiny ; and I beg them when the danger is over not to 
 judge too severely the conduct of those who got the better of it, probably 
 by the promptitude and vigour of the very measures upon which it is 
 now attempted to cast blame. 
 
 Wellington. 
 
 323. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. 
 Terms of peace to be concluded with Ava. 
 My DEAR Wtmn Stratfield Saye, 18th January, 1826. 
 
 I return the box with the papers on the negotiations for the peace, 
 which are become much more difficult in consequence of the duration of
 
 qS6 terms of peace to be exacted from ava. 
 
 the war. It will not answer now to make peace without requiring some 
 sacrifices on the part of the enemy, whether to inspire a salutary terror 
 in Ava, to serve as an example to the Native Powers in India, or 
 to prevent them from entertaining the notion that we have not been so 
 successful in this war as we have represented, and that this war has been 
 excessively troublesome and expensive to us. We may rely upon it 
 that if these notions should be entertained, and the Burmese should not 
 be made to feel permanently the effects of their hostility, the King of 
 Ava will become a part of the political system of India ; and probably 
 to us the most troublesome and inconvenient part. 
 
 I conceive, then, that you must take something from him. I would 
 take as much money as I could get. Those upon the spot would be 
 the best judges of the sum which the King could pay in a reasonably 
 short space of time ; say two years. I would then take the whole of 
 Arracan, and the Islands of Ramre, &c, upon that coast; more par- 
 ticularly if it should be found that there is a tolerable communication by 
 land or water from Arracan or the Islands, which I suspect there is, with 
 the valley of the Irrawaddy. I suspect that the islands of Ramre have 
 been formed by the river flowing from the mountains which divide the 
 valley of the Irrawaddy from the sea. 
 
 If this be true, Arracan will possess the following military advantages. 
 It will protect your position in Chittagong. It will give you the facility 
 of attacking the King of Ava in the heart of his dominions whenever you 
 think proper. It can with ease be relieved and supported by sea. From 
 the accounts which I have seen of the country, I believe it is not 
 unhealthy; and at all events the most healthy part of the coast. Arracan 
 should be kept by the British government at all events, whatever 
 might be the disposition made of the territory. But I must observe to 
 you, that however low the King of Ava and his Burmese are in our 
 estimation as a military power, they have raised themselves vastly in the 
 estimation of the natives of that part of the world by their contest with 
 us. We can dispose of territory then (which it is important to us to 
 keep out of the hands of the Burmese) to other Powers, such as Mughs, 
 Siamese, and Peguers, only by guaranteeing to them the possession, and 
 protecting them in it. I should think then that we ought to keep 
 Arracan to ourselves. I would give as much more as could be got to 
 the Mughs, the Siamese, the Peguers, the Rajahs of Munneepoor, 
 Cachar, &c, but upon the clear understanding that they were not to 
 expect our protection in the maintenance of their possession. 
 
 In respect to the stipulation that there is to be no communication with 
 European or American Powers, it has been common in all treaties with the 
 Native Powers in India ; and, considering the character and the physical 
 powers of the Burmese, I should consider it more important to prevent 
 the communication * between them and European Powers than any
 
 LORD COMBERMERE HAS DONE GOOD SERVICE. 587 
 
 Natives in India. I suspect that if they had been well armed and well 
 supplied with ammunition and stores the contest with them would have 
 been much more difficult and disastrous ; and the object of this stipula- 
 tion is to prevent the importation into Ava of arms and ammunition, 
 with which our good friends in Europe and America, and even in 
 London, will certainly supply them if the treaty of peace should not 
 contain such a stipulation, whether patent or secret. But it may be a 
 question whether in time of peace we can propose such a stipulation 
 consistently with all that we are doing elsewhere. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Wellington. 
 
 324. To the Duke of Newcastle. 
 
 Lord Combermere's capture of Bhurtpoor. The Duke declines to put 
 himself in a false position. 
 
 (Extract.) Stratfield Saye, 5th Nov., 1826. 
 
 In respect to the service performed by Lord Combermere, I must beg 
 leave to recommend to you to leave out of the consideration of that 
 point all reference to or comparison with the services of others. I 
 could easily show your Grace the difference between this service and 
 those of Lord Lake, and the difference between this particular siege 
 and the attacks made by Lord Lake upon the same fort. But there is 
 nothing so invidious as such comparisons ; and they answer no purpose 
 excepting to irritate the friends of both the parties whose services are 
 compared. 
 
 Having said thus much respecting the service comparatively with those 
 performed by Lord Lake or others, I must add this, that I conceive 
 Lord Combermere to have acted as became his character in going up 
 the country by dawk and alone, immediately upon his arrival, to take 
 the command of the army then about to take the field upon this service ; 
 that he conducted this service with all the promptitude, vigour, prudence, 
 and ability that any officer could have applied to it; that it was a service 
 in which success, and that not procrastinated or doubtful, was of the 
 utmost importance to the peace of India and to the political situation of 
 the British government, on account of the former failures of Lord Lake 
 in his attempts to take this fort by storm and not by regular siege, and 
 of the hopes of some and apprehensions of other of the natives of India 
 that we had at last found a fort which was impregnable by our arms ; 
 rather than on account of the political command of the fort or of the 
 persons, political or military, who held it, or of the strength of the 
 position itself. The proof of the truth of these opinions is to be found 
 in the facts that the fall of this fortress gave peace to India ; that after 
 this siege there was an end to the campaign ; and that Lord Combermere
 
 588 THE FOUNTAIN OF HONOUR SHOULD FLOW FREELY. 
 
 did not find it necessary to occupy and strengthen this position ; but he 
 destroyed all vestige of the fort. 
 
 I have nothing, and have never had anything, to say to the distribution 
 of the rewards of government to his Majesty's officers ; nor do I know 
 in which way those view this service whose duty it is to advise his 
 Majesty upon these points. But this I must say, that if I were Lord 
 Combermere I should never forgive the person who should interfere to 
 obtain for me a reward which, on account of that very interference, 
 would be no longer the spontaneous act of his Majesty advised by his 
 servants on a fair and impartial view of the nature and importance of the 
 service performed. In giving this opinion I can only assure your Grace 
 that it is in exact conformity with my own conduct. I have received 
 more rewards for military services than any man that serves, or than any 
 who ever served this country. But I never solicited one ; and if any 
 man had ever interfered between the government and me by such 
 solicitation, or even suggestion, I should not have considered that man 
 my friend. 
 
 325. To the Right Hon. Charles "Wynn. 
 
 Importance of retaining Arracan and Tenasserim ; and 0/ dis- 
 couraging European colonization. 
 My DEAR Wynn London, nth November, 1826. 
 
 I have perused with attention the papers in the box which will carry 
 this letter to you. 
 
 In respect to the provinces of Arracan, I entertain no doubt that you 
 ought to retain them, more particularly as it appears that there is a 
 practicable road from the city of Arracan into the valley of the Irrawaddy, 
 or the heart of the Burmese territories. Upon this point I will com- 
 municate to you a military principle, which is I believe admitted now by 
 the best authorities. 
 
 There is no really good defensive position which does not afford 
 the means of making an attack upon its assailants. This principle is 
 equally applicable to a fortress, to a military position for an army, and 
 to a frontier. The Bengal frontier towards Ava, as I understand it, is 
 excellent ; but it becomes improved, for it cannot be attacked with any 
 security if you keep in your hands the means of entering the valley of 
 the Irrawaddy with an army. This advantage, together with that of the 
 power of attacking Rangoon with your naval force, which operation you 
 must observe will not only be facilitated but rendered efficient at small 
 expense and in a short space of time by your possession of the provinces 
 of Arracan, will really give you a decided influence over the future 
 conduct of the Burmese government.
 
 ARRACAN, ETC. TO BE KEPT ; COLONISTS DANGEROUS. 589 
 
 I have no maps and but little information on the other cessions made 
 by the Burmese, and I don't like to give an opinion when not sufficiently 
 informed. It appears, however, that Martaban particularly would be an 
 useful settlement in reference to military and political objects in relation 
 to Ava and Siam ; and Mergui in respect to naval and European 
 warfare. All these settlements are situated in important points in the 
 view of commerce — I mean of the good old regular sort which enriched 
 men and States in time, and which was supported by intelligence, 
 industry, and honesty ! I do not counsel the cession ; but I am very well 
 convinced that the cession of these points to several of certain States in 
 Europe would be considered as making their commercial fortune ! and 
 I cannot consider that that which it would be good for such States to 
 obtain is not or may not be good for us to keep. 
 
 I would therefore recommend you to keep them as we have got them, 
 and to keep them upon the lowest possible scale of civil and military 
 expense till you can see what their real capacity and worth is. I 
 entertain no doubt that, under the British government, they will increase 
 in population and revenue so as very shortly to pay the expense of 
 keeping them, if they should not do so by good management immedi- 
 ately. 
 
 I believe that all these should be put under the government of Fort 
 George or of Prince of Wales's Island ; the former preferably. Arracan 
 should be under the government of Bengal, and a good paved road 
 broad enough for two cannon should be made from Chittagong to 
 Arracan. 
 
 There is one point adverted to in Mr. Bayley's minute and Dr. 
 Phillimore's memorandum, upon which I cannot avoid saying one word, 
 and that is, the colonization of these settlements by Europeans. 
 
 I am not astonished that the latter should have recommended this 
 scheme ; but I am that it should ever have occurred to a man who, like 
 Mr. Bayley, must have resided for some years in India. 
 
 You are not aware here of the inferiority of the European (particularly 
 British) character and of its consequences in all the relations of life. Look 
 at the accounts of the manners and conduct of those British subjects, 
 not Company's servants, who some time ago carried on indigo planta- 
 tions and manufactories. Yet observe, these men were not colonists. 
 They had no right to reside in the country, which I may say was the 
 scene of their depredations and plunder, excepting under the Company's 
 licence, which might have been withdrawn at any time. 
 
 Observe that when you send a man to colonize in one of these 
 settlements, you do not send him to a desert, as in Africa, America, or 
 Australasia, but you must send him to a country peopled more or less, 
 and more or less civilized. He goes there enriched with the character 
 of his country, of which advantage he soon becomes aware; and he
 
 590 DISCRETION IS THE BETTER PART OF VALOUR. 
 
 uses it and all the other advantages which the absence of law would give 
 him for the basest of purposes, the gratification of all his own base 
 passions. All respect for the character of the country would become 
 lost, and with its character we should lose our settlements. Rely upon 
 it that with all our civilization and advantages, we are the nation in 
 Europe the least disciplined and the least to be trusted in a situation in 
 which we are not controlled by the strong arm of authority and law. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Wellington. 
 
 You will have seen that throughout this contest Munro's opinion and 
 mine have not been far different. I enclose you a letter which I received 
 from him some time ago, from which you may conclude what his opinion 
 is upon this subject. 
 
 Pray return Munro's letter, which you will see is for yourself alone. 
 
 326. To Lord Combermere. 
 
 Danger of disputes between the Commander-in-Chief and the 
 Governor- General. 
 
 (Extract.) Sudbourne, 22nd December, 1826. 
 
 I have had a good deal of experience in Indian governments and in 
 the mode of conducting public affairs in that country, and I confess I 
 was concerned to peruse more than one Minute of yours, differing with 
 the Governor-General upon points purely political, and those most of 
 them bygone transactions. I will not write much upon this subject, nor 
 enter into a discussion whether you or the Governor-General were right. 
 But of this I am certain that any public and continued difference of 
 opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief is 
 prejudicial to the public interests, and cannot be allowed to exist. It is 
 prejudicial for this reason. It shakes the authority of government to its 
 very foundations, and while such difference continues, every little man 
 who takes part with either one or the other becomes of importance. 
 The interests of the party are the great object. Those of the public 
 are laid aside and forgotten, and even injured with impunity. 
 
 God forbid that I should desire you to approve of measures of which 
 you disapprove, or withhold from the Governor- General your real 
 opinions. But let them be your own opinions. Discuss them with him 
 in private fairly and candidly before you do so upon record, and avoid 
 to record your difference of opinion by Minute if it should be possible. 
 The Commander-in-Chief is the first executive servant of the govern- 
 ment. He is the right hand of the Governor-General, and he must be 
 his friend and support his authority, or one or both must be recalled.
 
 WE MAY TRAIN THE TROOPS OF PERSIA AND BAGDAD. 59 1 
 
 Rely upon it that in this country of law and civil government the military 
 authority, in such a contest, will go to the wall. I entreat you to attend 
 to this letter, and let no man persuade you that your honour or interest 
 is involved in a contest by Minute with the Governor-General. 
 
 327. To Lord Ellenborough. 
 
 How we viay help the Shah and Pacha of Bagdad. 
 
 (Extract.) Middleton, 9th October, 1828. 
 
 It is very desirable to encourage both the King of Persia and the Pacha 
 of Bagdad to improve their military resources ; and this not so much 
 with a view to the employment of these establishments, which we should 
 form for those governments against the Emperor of Russia, as for the 
 settlement and security of their own authority. A very small body of 
 well disciplined and obedient troops will keep in order a very extensive 
 country at a very little expense, comparatively. The government enjoys 
 its resources, and commands its military means ; and can employ them 
 against the enemy. 
 
 Without such aid, the first sound of foreign war occasions insurrection 
 and disorder, and expense everywhere. The resources of the country 
 are cut off from the government ; and it is deprived of the service of the 
 armies which such countries would furnish against the foreign enemy if 
 a better order of things existed. Then it must be reckoned upon that 
 insurrection always follows foreign war, if it does not precede and ac- 
 company it ; and the government, after having made peace with the 
 foreign enemy, is obliged to reconquer its own territories. 
 
 We ought to encourage and assist these governments, then, in forming 
 an efficient and obedient force. But they should pay the whole expense. 
 
 You will observe that every officer lent to these Powers is taken away 
 from the service of the army ; and aggravates the inconvenience of the 
 Staff in the regiments. 
 
 If this is to be, as it must be, an additional expense to the East 
 India Company, it is quite right that it should be defrayed by those for 
 whose benefit it is incurred. 
 
 I should likewise say that we must take care that, in aiding to form 
 military establishments of this description, it is done in situations in which 
 they cannot be used against ourselves. 
 
 The King of Persia and the Pacha of Bagdad cannot come into 
 contest with us. But I do not see for what the latter can want armed 
 ships in the Persian gulf, excepting for the attainment of objects in that 
 gulf or the Indian seas.
 
 593 ' I WAS THE FIT PERSON TO BE SELECTED. 
 
 328. To the Right Hon. J. W. Croker. 
 
 Why Col. Wellesley was preferred to General Baird as commandant 
 of Seringapalam. 
 My DEAR CROKER, London, 24th January, 1831. 
 
 I have received your note, and shall be happy to see you on the day 
 that you have fixed. 
 
 I have often heard of Sir D. Baird's dissatisfaction on my appoint- 
 ment to take the command at Seringapatam when he had commanded 
 the successful storm of the town, on which I was not even employed, 
 having been appointed to command the reserve in the trenches. Of 
 course I had nothing, I could have nothing to say to the selection of 
 myself, as I was in the trenches, or rather in the town, when I received 
 the order to take the command of it, and instructions to endeavour to 
 restore order. 
 
 Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion-hearted officer, but he had no 
 talent, no tact; had strong prejudices against the natives; and he was 
 peculiarly disqualified from his manners, habits, &c, and it was supposed 
 his temper, for the management of them. He had been Tippoo's 
 prisoner for years. He had a strong feeling of the bad usage which he 
 had received during his captivity, and it is not impossible that the know- 
 ledge of this feeling might have induced Lord Harris, and those who 
 advised his Lordship, to lay him aside. 
 
 However, of course I never inquired the reason of my appointment, 
 or of Baird being laid aside. There were many other candidates besides 
 Baird and myself, all senior to me, some to Baird. But I must say that 
 I was the fit person to be selected. I had commanded the Nizam's army 
 during the campaign, and had given universal satisfaction. I was liked 
 by the natives. 
 
 It is certainly true - that this command afforded me the opportunities 
 for distinction, and thus opened the road to fame, which poor Baird 
 always thought was, by the same act, closed upon him. Notwith- 
 standing this, he and I were always on the best terms, and I don't 
 believe that there was any man who rejoiced more sincerely than he did 
 in my success. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Wellington.
 
 WE HAVE SUFFERED FROM WANT OF LIGHT GUNS. 593 
 
 II. MILITARY. 
 1. Organization. 
 
 329. To Major- General St. Leger. 
 
 Suggestions on the proposed introduction of 1 galloper guns. 1 
 
 (Extracts.) Fort William, nth April, 1797. 
 
 There are certain principles in artillery, the truth of which is undeniable 
 in all countries, and which the light artillery would bring into effect in 
 this. One of these is, that the more speedily and the greater ease with 
 which the gun is transported the better, provided there is equal weight of 
 metal and equal strength of carriage. 
 
 The want of speed in the artillery of this country has been the cause 
 that many advantages have been missed, many opportunities of bringing 
 the enemy to action have not been taken because the artillery could not 
 be brought up in time ; and, for some unaccountable reason, the Native 
 armies, having had better draught-bullocks and larger establishments, 
 have been able to draw off their artillery when that of the British army 
 could not be moved. The only objection to light artillery is the scarcity 
 of horses in India. I put the expense out of the question, as, if the 
 establishment is necessary, the expense of it is not to be considered. 
 I am afraid that searcity will be fatal to what is proposed in the 
 memorial, although I think that an establishment adopting some of its 
 great principles may be had without difficulty and at a trifling expense, 
 and that it will render as effectual service in this country as that 
 proposed, which, I think, must be rejected on account of the want of 
 the necessary supply of horses. 
 
 Everybody is aware of the difficulty which attends the movement of 
 artillery by means of horses even in Europe, where the roads are 
 comparatively excellent, where forage is comparatively plentiful, and the 
 climate so favourable to them. The largest establishment of horses 
 that can be supposed necessary for a park of artillery is never equal 
 to transporting it for any length of time or distance, and the only 
 method of supply that can be adopted is that of pressing horses from 
 the country in proportion as it is found that those belonging to the 
 artillery are knocked up. 
 
 That is the universal practice in all the armies in Europe, and, 
 however improper, it cannot be dispensed with. 
 
 [During the Mysore war, I am informed that Lord Cornwallis had 
 
 Qq
 
 594 
 
 SUGGESTIONS ON HORSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 some light guns drawn by horses ; but I believe before — I am sure very 
 shortly after he ascended the Ghauts— long before he was near the 
 enemy, the horses were knocked up and the guns were drawn by 
 bullocks.] 
 
 Recourse cannot be had to such a measure in India ; and, therefore, 
 supposing that it was possible to establish a train of light artillery drawn 
 by horses, which would be attended with some difficulty, the want of the 
 supply of horses in the countries in which it is intended it would be 
 used is an objection to the establishment which must be fatal. 
 
 However, to have some artillery which can be moved with celerity 
 will be attended with such advantages, that I cannot readily give up 
 the idea merely because there is a difficulty attending the original 
 purchase of horses, and because their future supply would be im- 
 practicable. I should therefore propose that there should be an 
 establishment of horses for eight guns and four howitzers, with 
 harness, &c, at all times ready at the Park, in addition to their usual 
 establishment of bullocks, &c. &c. It is unnecessary at present to 
 enter into a detail of all that would be necessary for such an establish- 
 ment ; but my idea is that the horses should never be used excepting 
 when it is desirable, on account of being near an enemy, to move the 
 artillery at a quick rate ; and that all the ordinary duties of transport 
 should be done as usual by the bullocks. 
 
 I likewise think that the artillerymen might ride upon the horses and 
 upon the carriage of the guns. I am aware that the latter is liable 
 to objections, but, in my opinion, not to those to which it is liable in 
 Europe, as it is not intended that the artillerymen should be upon the 
 carriage for a greater length of time than during that which the horses 
 are drawing it, and it cannot therefore be supposed that they will strain 
 it to the same degree as it is strained in Europe, where the horses being 
 at all times to the gun, and generally going at an advanced rate, the 
 artillerymen are obliged to sit upon them and upon the carriage, which 
 
 by constant use becomes strained. 
 
 ******** 
 
 I should propose to attach to these guns, when they are in use, a party 
 of light dragoons ; these would answer the double purpose of escort, 
 and they could assist in holding the horses when the guns were un- 
 limbered. 
 
 Parties of the 15th Dragoons and of Rohan's hussars attended some 
 British light artillery for a length of time, and did besides the patrol duty 
 of the posts to which it was attached. 
 
 I think that if more is attempted at present, all will fail ; and, as 
 I stated above, I really think that it is utterly impracticable to find horses 
 in India to supply the loss and waste of them which would be occasioned 
 by an establishment of light artillery.
 
 PROMOTION, IN COMPANY'S ARMY, AT FIRST GENERAL 595 
 
 330. Regimental Rank in the Army of the East-India 
 
 Company. 
 
 Why promotion was originally general. Early system of officering Sepoy 
 
 corps. King's commissions given to Company's officers. Promotion 
 
 still general, in each Presidency. Lord Cornwallis' plan imperfectly 
 
 carried out. Present system of organizing Sepoy regiments, with 
 
 European and native officers. Promotion is still not regimental. This 
 
 circumstance ttiakes the discontent at the slowness of promotion, and at 
 
 the loss of old perquisites, a general grievance throughout the service. 
 
 In Bengal, it also seriously impairs discipline, by the removal of officers 
 
 from corps to corps : less so in Madras, where such removal is rare. 
 
 And it greatly increases the cost of the Bengal army. 
 
 [1798.] 
 
 The Company's army was formerly but small ; it consisted of but few 
 corps, and it was therefore perhaps necessary that all the officers belong- 
 ing to it should be liable to be removed from one to the other as the 
 service might require ; and that the promotion of each should not be 
 confined to one corps only, but be general throughout the whole of their 
 service. This was perhaps the more necessary, as the establishments at the 
 different Presidencies were subject to great variations at different times ; 
 and, if the promotion of the officers upon each establishment had not 
 been general, individuals would have suffered considerably. 
 
 In the process of time, and in consequence of the acquisition of 
 extensive dominions by the Company, and of the improvements in 
 the discipline of the armies of the Native powers, larger establishments 
 have become necessary, and there is at present at each of the three 
 settlements a very large army. These have required a different organiz- 
 ation. At first, the European battalions only were organized as the 
 King's regiments are : the Native corps were commanded by captains or 
 by majors, assisted by an adjutant and about ten subalterns ; and several 
 (five or six) of these corps were put in a brigade commanded by a 
 colonel and other field-officers. Still, the promotion of these officers 
 continued to be general. 
 
 In consequence of the representations made by several officers of the 
 Company's army, subsequent to the peace of '83, of the grievances 
 under which they laboured from serving with the King's regiments in 
 India, such as, that the Company's officers of each rank were com- 
 manded by those in the King's service of the corresponding rank, 
 notwithstanding that the dates of the commissions of the latter might be 
 subsequent to those of the former, it was agreed to give to every officer 
 holding a commission under the Company on the day of the cessation of 
 hostilities at Cuddalore, a similar commission from the King, dated on 
 that day ; and upon the promotion or appointment of any officer in future,
 
 596 REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN IJ96. 
 
 a commission from the King of the same date as that which he received 
 from the Company. It was likewise promised to them that the King 
 would not grant to any officer in his army brevet commissions/or India 
 only; and that such officers who then held them, and who should refuse 
 to give them up, should be ordered home. The army still remained 
 organized as before, and the promotion general instead of regimental. 
 
 The last war with Tippoo Sahib proved, that notwithstanding what 
 had been done for the army at different times by the Company, and 
 immediately previous to it by the King, the officers in the Company's 
 service, in proportion to the length of time they had served, were, com- 
 paratively with those in the King's service, in a very inferior situation ; 
 and the justice of Lord Cornwallis induced him to form a plan for their 
 relief, and to take the opinion of different officers at the head of the 
 Madras and of the Bengal armies respecting its efficacy and propriety. 
 
 It is needless to enter into a statement of what that plan was, or to 
 notice all the improper and unnecessary violence to which it gave rise. 
 In my opinion it would have been more advantageous to the Company's 
 army than the present arrangement, which, after the discussion of two 
 years, has been adopted. The Company's infantry are now organized 
 as the King's are, with this difference only: that a Native regiment, 
 consisting of two battalions (2000 men), has the same number of 
 European officers only that one battalion of Europeans has; but the 
 former has, in addition thereto, its Native officers. 
 
 This has occasioned a considerable promotion to the higher ranks, 
 and to that of captain. Besides this promotion, the officers of the 
 Company's army are included in the brevets which are granted to 
 those in the King's. The rank of captain has likewise been given 
 to all those who were in the army previous to January '81, who have 
 not been promoted in consequence of the new regulations. The most 
 essential part, however, of those arrangements, that in which, in my 
 opinion, the public as well as the officers are most interested, has not 
 been adopted, as Sir Robert Abercromby gave his opinion in a minute 
 against it : this part is, the promotion of officers in regiments as far as 
 the rank of Major, instead of by seniority throughout the whole of each 
 establishment. 
 
 Notwithstanding the liberality with which the regulations have been 
 framed, the extensive promotion which has been given, and the great 
 expense which has been incurred, it has been impossible to place every 
 individual in a situation as high as from the length of his services he 
 deserves. In all the armies several officers, with the brevet of captain, 
 are still subalterns. In the Bengal army there are 140 or 150 sub- 
 alterns of fourteen or fifteen years' standing in the service, whose 
 prospect of promotion is very distant. This must create a certain 
 discontent, and, in the course of a few years (particularly if the pro-
 
 DEFECTS AND MISCHIEF OF THE NEW SFSTEM. 597 
 
 motion in the King's army should ever again be as rapid as it has 
 been lately), it may be expected that it will again break out in the same 
 dangerous manner that it did upon the late occasion. If the promotion 
 by regiments were adopted, it might be expected that, as these officers 
 would be placed as the senior subalterns of each corps, in a short time 
 they would be promoted ; but even if they were not promoted so soon 
 as I expect, if some were unfortunately superseded by officers junior to 
 themselves with better fortune in other corps, and that they should still 
 remain subalterns after a length of time, the grievance would be that of 
 an individual instead of that of a whole army : if there were more of these 
 instances than is by any means probable, they would be of individual 
 grievances, which would be felt by those alone whom they affected at the 
 moment, and would not interest the army. 
 
 The fact is, that the arrangements have not given satisfaction, in 
 Bengal particularly, and among the lower and more numerous ranks. 
 Under the former system, the captain or major of a battalion of sepoys, 
 by defrauding his men, and by keeping his corps incomplete, made a 
 fortune in a few years. Every officer who was detached, in proportion 
 to the size of his detachment made a sum of money; and these ad- 
 vantages, together with others which they received from the public, they 
 have necessarily lost. The number of old officers was so great that it was 
 impossible they should all get rank ; and even those who have got rank, 
 have lost very considerable emoluments. This must in the end create 
 great discontent. The army at present act as one body ; the benefits and 
 grievances of one are the same to the whole, and they are irresistible : 
 their discontents, therefore, are more dangerous than those of other 
 armies. If they were permanently placed in regiments, every individual, 
 instead of feeling the grievances of the whole body, would feel those only 
 which affected his own corps, or perhaps his own person : besides that, 
 from the size and extent of the army and of the country in which it 
 is placed, it is reasonable to expect that, however extensive any particular 
 grievance (such as that of want of promotion) might be, some corps 
 would not feel it, or would enjoy other advantages to compensate for it : 
 and even one such would be sufficient to prevent the bad effects of 
 any discontent. 
 
 Besides this benefit, it is certain that if the officers, when once posted 
 to regiments, knew that they were not to expect to be moved from them, 
 the army would be better disciplined. An officer never takes pains 
 with a corps from which he knows that he can be removed when he 
 pleases; his credit does not depend upon the state in which it is 
 found. The difference in the state of discipline of the army upon the 
 coast and in that of Bengal is a strong confirmation of this fact. At 
 Madras it is not the practice to remove officers from one corps to 
 another, excepting when absolutely necessary, and the army is in very
 
 598 how, and why, it should be further modified. 
 
 high order ; in Bengal, from circumstances which I shall mention here- 
 after, they are moved when and where they please, and there is no army 
 that lays claim to the title of disciplined that is in such a bad state. 
 
 The conduct of the Coast army will illustrate another part of this 
 subject. Although their rise is not regimental, the officers are per- 
 manently posted to corps; and notwithstanding that their grievances 
 were heavier than those suffered by the officers in Bengal, there was 
 not the same violence of complaint, nor any reason to fear for the 
 consequences of discontent. The grievances were not less felt than in 
 Bengal ; but as they were regularly organized, and each corps com- 
 manded by an officer whose credit depended upon its state of discipline, 
 and who was responsible for its allegiance, the complaints were never 
 so loud : the army never acted as one body, as in Bengal. To then- 
 credit it may be said, that if it had been necessary, they would have gone 
 to Bengal and quelled a mutiny for the redress of grievances, in the 
 success of which they were more interested than those who mutinied. 
 
 From the promotion being general throughout the line in Bengal, and 
 from the consequent practice of removing officers from one corps to 
 another whenever they please, not only the army is not disciplined, but 
 it is much more expensive than it would be otherwise. The infantry 
 there consists of three regiments of Europeans, and, at present, fourteen 
 regiments of sepoys. These are distributed almost equally in six 
 stations ; whereby three are in Bengal and Bahar, where the troops get 
 half batta ; one in Benares where they get full batta ; and two in Oude, 
 where they get double full batta. The stations in Bengal and Bahar 
 make detachments to different places where full batta is likewise given. 
 The staff of every army is taken indiscriminately from its line, and every 
 corps gives a part of it. In every army each corps has a number of 
 officers absent from ill health or on furlough, or for other causes. In the 
 Bengal army, from the practice of removing officers from their corps 
 when they desire it, the regiments in Bengal and Bahar have all the 
 staff posted to them ; all the sick, and all those on furlough. Those in 
 Benares and in Oude have nearly all the effective officers of the army ; 
 even those who remain posted to a regiment within the provinces are 
 detached ; and it is not uncommon to see a regiment at one of the lower 
 stations without an officer excepting the commanding officer, who always 
 receives full batta, and the adjutant and quartermaster, who receive very 
 large allowances : so that, upon the whole, it may be said, with but few 
 exceptions, that every officer in the Company's service present in Bengal 
 receives either full or double full batta, or is upon the staff. The expense, 
 therefore, is enormous. If they were permanently posted to their regi- 
 ments, and if the promotion were regimental, the staff, the sick, and the 
 furlough would fall equally, or nearly so, among them all ; there would 
 be a certain number of officers present with the corps stationed within, as
 
 THE CORPS OF BULLOCK-DRIVERS TO BE KEPT UP. 599 
 
 well as with those stationed without the provinces ; and thus not only 
 would the army be better disciplined, but nearly one-third of the expense 
 of batta would be saved. Two of the regiments of sepoys were detached 
 to the Northern Circars, where they receive full batta ; I believe they are 
 lately returned. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 331. To Major-General Sydenham. 
 
 In future Indian wars, celerity of movement will be a primary requisite. 
 He?ice the whole corps of bullock-drivers ought to be retained. Pur- 
 poses to which the permanent bullock-train should be applied. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 16th Jan., 1800. 
 
 In the wars which we may expect in India in future, we must look to 
 light and quick movements ; and we ought always to be in that state to 
 be able to strike a blow as soon as a war might become evidently neces- 
 sary. There would be no difficulty in hiring bullocks (and even good 
 ones) to draw our guns, in the same manner as was done in the com- 
 mencement of last war, during the time that the other preparations might 
 be making ; but for these, as heretofore, there would be no drivers ; and 
 by the time that the army would be collected and prepared to move, the 
 bullocks, as usual, would be either dead or unfit for service. Therefore, 
 I insist upon it that, whether the bullocks are kept or not, the corps of 
 bullock-drivers ought to be retained in the service in the present situa- 
 tion of affairs, even if to pay the expense it should be necessary to send 
 away a regiment of Europeans or to disband one of sepoys. But the 
 bullock-drivers make nearly the whole expense of the establishment, and, 
 therefore, considering the small expense attending, and the great ad- 
 vantage of having 3500 trained cattle in good order when the army 
 is to take the field, I would not recommend that their numbers should be 
 at all diminished. 
 
 This number will give a sufficiency for a field train of 50 pieces of 
 cannon, with all their stores, and will leave a large number for your 
 provision department. It would be useless and ridiculous to think 
 of providing for a heavy train, and it would be improper, in my 
 opinion, to apply those bullocks to the draught of it, should one be ever 
 necessary. 
 
 It is first to be recollected that a road must be made wherever a heavy 
 gun goes, and that, when that is done, the number of bullocks allowed 
 by the Company's regulations, be they ever so bad, are fully equal to 
 drawing it as fast as it ought to go. Of this I have only to refer to the 
 experience of the last war. It was certainly impossible to find worse 
 bullocks than the army had, and yet there was no difficulty in getting on 
 the guns, excepting where the road was bad. In these situations, the
 
 6oo SUPPLIES NOT TO DEPEND ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 best bullocks, even those we have now, would not have enabled us to 
 make longer marches, or to move more quickly. Good and strong 
 bullocks are essentially necessary to field-pieces, because these are 
 always liable to be moved across the country where there is no road, and 
 because, in fact, they can be of no use to the troops excepting they can 
 be so moved. Therefore it is that I would have this establishment kept 
 and applied solely to the drawing of a field-train and its stores, and of a 
 provision department, and, perhaps, of treasure. 
 
 332. To Colonel Pater. 
 
 Dealers not to be constrained by the civil government to supply the troops on 
 march. If you pay what they ask, self-interest will induce the?n to 
 sell ; and competition will lower the price. 
 
 Camp 2 miles south of Cullumbella, 
 (Extract.) ist June, 1800. 
 
 Most certainly orders have been given to permit the people of the 
 country to sell you every thing that you may want, and that they may 
 have, but orders have not been given to the aumildars to interfere to 
 procure anything for you ; because I am exceedingly anxious that the 
 troops should be independent of the civil Government, from which I 
 desire nothing more than that they will remain neuter, and I am willing 
 and desirous that we should depend for our supplies on what alone can 
 make them plentiful, viz. our own money and the interest which the 
 people of the country have to dispose of the articles in their possession 
 of which we are in want. This interest they will steadily pursue if the 
 Government remain neuter, and that is all I desire from them ; and it is all 
 the assistance which I receive or ever have received in probably the most 
 plentiful camps that have ever been known in this country. Under these 
 circumstances I have to recommend to you to order the gram agents to 
 purchase gram at any rate, and immediately to complete their bullocks, 
 and to keep them so. You should have no nerrick for rice in your bazaar ; 
 let the bazaar people purchase it and sell it for what they can : it will be 
 dear probably just at first, as gram will be likewise, but the high price 
 given will occasion a desire to sell, a consequent competition among the 
 sellers, and will lower the price. 
 
 What I have above written is the dictate of common sense proved to 
 be true by experience, and you may depend upon it that the interests of 
 the people are a better foundation for supplies than the exertions of any 
 aumildar or civil Government, provided they will remain neuter. 
 
 You may ask, if the people feel this interest, and are allowed to act as 
 it dictates, why do they refuse to sell their goods, and ask so enormous a 
 price for them, and one so much above that which is common and 
 natural? I answer because it is their interest. They know perfectly
 
 WHY THE BULLOCK-SYSTEM IS INEFFICIENT. 6oi 
 
 well what is likely to happen, and from experience they know what they 
 are likely to get for their goods when what they expect will happen. 
 They therefore now ask a larger price for them than they are worth, and 
 keep them up to get it ; but give that price and you will immediately 
 create a competition which will reduce it as low as it probably ought 
 to be. 
 
 I have in my camp at this moment all the Company's bullocks, and 
 my consumption of gram is probably greater than that of all the regi- 
 ments of cavalry put together. I have never had any assistance what- 
 ever from any aumildar, and I have not yet heard that there has been 
 any difficulty in procuring that or anything else, and the price is low. 
 If it were ten times higher it must be given, and as long as the Govern- 
 ment will not interfere I shall be well supplied. 
 
 333. To the Secretary of Government, Madras. 
 
 Inefficiency of the bullock system, from the absence of the real owners of the 
 cattle. Officers ought to be responsible for the transport of their tents ; 
 and be put on le?it allowance. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp at Luckmaisir, 24th July, 1800. 
 
 The bad weather, mentioned in my letter of the 20th, continued to 
 the night of the 21st, and destroyed at that time nearly one-half of the 
 public hired carriage cattle of the detachment. 
 
 ******** 
 
 It is evident that upon the present bullock system a similar incon- 
 venience is always to be expected. The detachment left Mysore with 
 the finest bullocks that I have yet seen with troops. There has been at 
 no time a want of forage, and the few bullocks and the cattle in the ser- 
 vice of individuals are in high condition ; but there is a want among the 
 public hired cattle of the presence of the real owners, those who might 
 feel for their loss, and who would take pains for their preservation. The 
 real owners are dubashes at Seringapatam or at Madras, who employ 
 servants as fictitious owners in camp ; and it is often necessary to force 
 them out to bring forage for the cattle to eat. The consequence is they 
 are starved, and hard work or bad weather (of the former of which, it is 
 to be observed, upon this occasion they have had none, and of the latter 
 only two days) destroys them all, reduces the best troops to a critical 
 situation, and puts an end to every intended operation. 
 
 It is impossible to alter the system at present, or probably at any time ; 
 but it would be a considerable relief to it if the tents of the officers were 
 carried by themselves. Whenever there is a difficulty the camp equipage 
 department suffers most, and to relieve it is attended with most incon- 
 venience. In fact, a bullock which is not taken care of is very unequal
 
 602 TENT ALLOWANCE FOR OFFICERS. MILITARY CORVjSES. 
 
 to carry an officer's tent, which at this season of the year is generally 
 wet. Besides, although under the regulations a larger hire is paid for 
 bullocks which carry tents than for others, it is by no means so profitable 
 an employment for cattle as if they were in any other department. When 
 cattle carry tents, it is necessary that they should all be produced every 
 day, and that the drivers should be complete, or the officers complain. 
 When they are employed in the carriage of grain or of stores, all, or, at 
 least, a large proportion of the spare bullocks are employed in carrying 
 goods for the bazaar people or individuals, from which a profit is 
 derived. The number of drivers for these bullocks is not necessary, and 
 is never complete. Thus, then, the employment of cattle in the camp 
 equipage department, although highest paid by the public, is not the 
 most lucrative to the bullock owners ; and in consequence the camp 
 equipage, instead of having the best, generally has the worst bullocks, 
 and is most difficult to move. If the public bullocks of other depart- 
 ments should fail, it is always possible to find other means of carriage in 
 an army ; but tents require the cattle in the service of the public ; and if 
 these fail, it is not at all times possible to replace them. For all these 
 reasons I take the liberty of again recommending that the officers may 
 be put on tent allowance. 
 
 334. To Lieutenant- Colonel Macalister. 
 
 Military corve'es forbidden. 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 21st May, 1801. 
 
 The Resident has mentioned to me that the ryots have been forced to 
 bring straw and gram to your camp for sale, of which they complain as 
 an inconvenience, as it takes up much of the time of those who would 
 otherwise be employed in the cultivation of the country. I beg leave to 
 recal to your recollection that the Honourable Company has allowed a 
 bullock for each horse to carry his gram, and a grass-cutter for each 
 horse to bring in his forage, and therefore there is no reason why the 
 ryots who have gram and straw for sale should be obliged to bring those 
 articles to your camp. However, as there is now a larger number of 
 horses in camp than followers and bullocks are provided for, it may be 
 supposed that there are some grounds for requiring that gram and forage 
 should be brought in by the ryots. But I beg to observe upon that point, 
 that a grass-cutter can with ease bring more than one horse can consume, 
 if straw is to be given to the horses, and the same may be said of gram 
 in the plentiful country in which you are stationed. I therefore request 
 that the practice of requiring that gram and straw may be brought into 
 your camp for sale by the ryots may be discontinued entirely.
 
 THE REGULATION OF MILITARY BAZAARS. 603 
 
 335. To Major Paterson. 
 
 Military bazaars ; and discourage?nent of a disputatious spirit. 
 
 (Extracts.) Seringapatam, 31st July, 1801. 
 
 Government has never given any orders regarding the conduct of 
 bazaars, but has left them entirely under the direction of the officers 
 commanding different bodies of troops at different times, and they hold 
 these officers responsible that their regulations shall be such as to insure 
 to the troops a plentiful, regular, and cheap supply of provisions. 
 
 Upon the different occasions that I have had under my immediate 
 command bodies of troops, I have always regulated the bazaars upon the 
 principles adopted by Lord Cornwallis and General Harris. No duties 
 have been collected excepting upon intoxicating drugs and liquors ; the 
 sale of everything else has been free. The cutwals of the regimental 
 bazaars have been ordered to obey the commanding officers of the 
 regiments to which they were attached, at the same time that they were 
 under the direction of the head cutwal in camp and the officer super- 
 intending the bazaar. 
 
 This is the system which I prefer, and shall always adopt ; but I don't 
 think it proper that I should interfere so far in a business for which 
 Lieutenant- Colonel Macalister only is responsible, as to desire that he 
 should adopt the system which I prefer, even although that system has 
 the sanction of Lord Cornwallis and General Harris. Under these 
 circumstances, and as I don't see anything in the order by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Macalister which can tend to distress the troops for provisions, 
 I must forbear to interfere upon this occasion. 
 
 ******** 
 
 Having thus given an answer to the reference made by you, I have to 
 request that if my answer be not satisfactory, you will be so kind as to 
 refer the matter to the Commander-in-Chief; at the same time I recom- 
 mend a system of conciliation rather than any further reference upon 
 the subject from either side. 
 
 336. To Lieutenant-Colonel Shee. 
 
 Eurasians in European regiments. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 2nd Oct., 1801. 
 
 I wish to have your opinion upon the subject of two officers in the 
 33rd regiment, Lieutenants Hook and Stewart, who, I understand, are 
 as black as my hat ; at least I am told so by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, 
 in whose garrison of Poonamallee they were quartered for some time. 
 I am also informed that one of them, Lieutenant Hook, says that he con-
 
 604 HALF-CASTE OFFICERS IN EUROPEAN REGIMENTS. 
 
 trived to avoid showing himself at the War Office or to the Duke of York ; 
 and I am sure he must have equally avoided Lord Cornwallis. Without 
 having any prejudice against half-caste men, who, I dare say, may be intrin- 
 sically as good as others, I have a strong objection to a black face in an 
 European corps in this country ; and I think that, if these gentry are of the 
 colour that I hear they are, it is not proper that they should be allowed to 
 remain in the 33rd regiment, at least without the particular orders of the 
 Commander-in-Chief upon the subject. My present opinion is, that they 
 ought to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief, and that they ought to 
 be made to show themselves at the Adjutant-General's office ; and after 
 this inspection, if the Commander-in-Chief thinks it proper that they 
 should continue to be officers, it is his affair, and not ours. 
 
 337. To Captain Wilks. 
 Retiring pensions of officers in the Company s army. 
 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, 16th Aug., 1802. 
 
 I am still of opinion that it cannot be intended to deprive the officers 
 of the army of the pensions upon retirement. The inconveniences 
 attending them are obvious ; but every man who considers at all must 
 see that they must be continued, or the old abuses abolished by the 
 regulations of 1796 must be revived, or there can be no longer a local 
 army in India. I believe the Court of Directors prefer keeping their 
 army, even with this expense, to giving it up or to rendering it worse than 
 useless by a revival of the old abuses. 
 
 Since the establishment of the pensions, the Court of Directors have 
 been uncommonly liberal upon this subject. They have taken off many 
 restrictions upon retirement, and they have given pensions to officers 
 retiring at different periods of service on account of bad health. By 
 these regulations they have undoubtedly added to the expense of the 
 pension establishment. If they were a body capable of acting upon any 
 systematic plan, either with a good or bad object in view, I should 
 agree that the increase of the expense of the pension establishment 
 has been made in order to render it more odious to the King's ministers 
 and the public, and in order to render it more certain that it would be 
 abolished ; but we all know, both from the constitution of the Court of 
 Directors and from the mode in which they do business, that they are 
 not capable of forming a systematic plan of that kind, and of waiting 
 quietly its result. If they wanted to destroy the pension establishment, 
 they would have dashed at it at once rather than have increased its 
 expense as the most certain mode of increasing the number of its 
 enemies, and of finally obtaining its abolition. I am induced, therefore, 
 to attribute the liberal arrangements above alluded to to a spirit friendly
 
 company's officers' pensions, elephant keepers. 605 
 
 to the institution, founded upon a sense of its benefits to the military 
 service, and, of course, to the power of the Company. 
 
 In all great bodies there are many who see only the inconveniences 
 of an institution, particularly if it be attended with expense ; but I can 
 hardly believe that the Court of Directors in general are blind to the 
 benefits of this institution, or that the King's ministers would allow 
 them to abolish it as long as it is the policy of Great Britain to govern 
 India through the Company, to have there a local army, and to keep the 
 patronage out of the hands of the Crown. 
 
 338. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Native elephant-keepers require European superintendence. 
 
 (Extract.) Walwajee, 17th Sept., 1802. 
 
 I send this day to the Adjutant-General a letter from Captain Mackay 
 upon the subject of the gun-bullocks, &c. In drawing your attention to 
 this subject, I take the liberty of mentioning one connected therewith, 
 for which I have to apologize, as the elephants to which it relates are no 
 longer under my superintendence. By the tent regulations, I observe 
 that they are attached to the European regiments, and the Military Board 
 have lately ordered that they should be detached to the places in which 
 the regiments are stationed. 
 
 I know the people who have charge of them perfectly well, and I 
 assure you that they are not to be trusted in the care of these valuable 
 animals without European superintendence. I have worked them more 
 probably than any officer in the army, and I never saw them out of 
 condition when they were under the eye of the agent ; but whenever 
 they have been detached they have fallen off in condition, and some 
 have died, and frequent instances of frauds and thefts in feeding them 
 have been discovered. 
 
 I therefore take the liberty of recommending to you that they should 
 be placed under the immediate care of the quartermasters of the regi- 
 ments, and that the attention of the commanding-officers should be 
 called to the state of their condition. It will in some cases perhaps be 
 impossible that they should be kept in the place with the regiment to 
 which they are attached; but it will scarcely be necessary that they 
 should be detached to a greater distance than twenty miles, and the 
 quartermaster ought to see them constantly.
 
 606 MONEY ADVANCES TO BRINJARRIES. 
 
 339. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 To what extent, and on what conditions, advances should be made 
 to the brinjarries. 
 
 (Extract.) 24th Jan., 1803. 
 
 I think that Major Munro is mistaken regarding the necessity of 
 giving advances to the brinjarries, and that to give these advances, ex- 
 cepting in the manner I shall point out, would be more prejudicial than 
 beneficial to the service. The brinjarries are merchants who trade in 
 grain and attend armies in time of war, and trade in salt between the sea 
 coast and the inland countries of the peninsula and carry on a small 
 trade in time of peace. The trade which they carry on in grain in time 
 of peace is of no great extent, because there are few species of grain 
 which will pay the expense of a long land carriage, loaded as all grain is 
 with duties ; and the trade which they carry on in salt does not give em- 
 ployment to the number of cattle which they can employ in time of war. 
 They keep these cattle, however, in time of peace, although they have 
 no employment for them, and the whole are ready to attend armies in 
 the field when their services are called for. As merchants, it is obvious 
 that the brinjarries must have at all times a sufficiency of capital to pro- 
 vide loads for the bullocks employed in carrying on their trade in peace ; 
 indeed they must have more, as the contents of their loads being salt, 
 are more valuable than any load of grain. The necessity of giving them 
 advances of cash to provide loads for the cattle, therefore, if it exist at 
 all, exists only in respect to that proportion for which they have not em- 
 ployment in peace. Upon this statement the first object should be to 
 ascertain what number of their cattle have usually been employed in 
 peace, and in what manner, and then the number of cattle belonging to 
 each tandah for which there has been no employment. An advance 
 might be made for each head of these last (provided it should appear 
 that the tandah had not capital) sufficient to purchase a load for each 
 bullock, and an engagement ought to be taken from the owner of the 
 cattle to whom the advance should be made, to produce at a certain 
 period for the service of the army the whole number of bullocks loaded 
 which it might have been ascertained he had in his possession. The 
 consequence of adopting a different line of conduct, and of giving 
 advances (either of cash or loads of grain, which is the same thing) 
 generally without such previous inquiry, is that the brinjarries lay out the 
 money given to them and purchase new cattle instead of loads for those 
 they have long had ; they then find more difficulty in procuring the 
 number of loads- they require ; and as they are always unwilling to move 
 till every bullock is loaded, there is an additional delay, and the service 
 suffers greater inconvenience.
 
 WHY DIFFICULTY OCCURS IN PURCHASING FORAGE. 6oj 
 
 340. Memorandum upon Forage \ 
 
 The first object to be attained is, that this necessary article should be 
 got for the troops ; the next, that the inhabitants should receive a fair 
 value for it. Indeed the first depends much upon the last ; as it is 
 certain that unless the value is given for any article that is required for 
 the armies, it will not long be obtained without the use of force and more 
 trouble than it is worth. 
 
 With a view to the first object, the Rajah's government have been 
 prevailed upon to give orders in all parts of the country through which 
 the troops were to pass, that straw might be sold to whoever should 
 require it. There is a portion of the straw, however, which the in- 
 habitants will never sell, viz., that which they require for the food of 
 their own cattle during a certain period of the year. Nothing will 
 tempt them to part with this portion; and when they have but little 
 more than this, they become unwilling to sell any. When the troops 
 arrive at any camp, all their followers commonly go to the nearest village 
 for forage ; the people find difficulty in supplying all the demands with 
 the necessary celerity, they become frightened, they fear that if they 
 supply all the demands they will not have the quantity necessary for 
 themselves, and they end in refusing to sell any, if they are protected 
 by a safeguard, which it is impossible to refuse them. 
 
 It is apparent, therefore, that in order that the troops may get a suffi- 
 ciency of forage, it is necessary that the villagers should not have reason 
 to fear that they will be deprived of that which is absolutely requisite 
 for the subsistence of their own cattle, and that with this view measures 
 should be taken to prevent them from foraging all in the same village. 
 
 In order to effect this the Sircar has been called upon to furnish an 
 account of the number of villages in the neighbourhood of each ground 
 of encampment, the distance and bearing of each from the place which 
 gives the name to the camp, and the number of bullock loads of forage 
 which each can afford to sell. This return is translated and, put into a 
 form a copy of which accompanies this memorandum, is given to the 
 quartermaster's department the day before the march, who allots to the 
 corps and departments the different villages for forage according to their 
 several wants. 
 
 The corps, &c, are then ordered in the General Orders to forage in 
 certain villages by name, of which the direction from the place which 
 gives the name of the camp is inserted. My orders of this day will 
 show the mode in which this is arranged. 
 
 The quartermaster ascertains the wants of each corps or department 
 called for from heads of corps or departments, and from individuals 
 
 1 Enclosed in a Despatch to Lieutenant-General Stuart, dated, Camp at Benkypoor, 
 2 ist Feb., 1803. — Ed.
 
 608 PLAN FOR OBVIATING THIS DIFFICULTY. 
 
 attached to head-quarters, of the number of cattle belonging to all 
 descriptions of people attached to each. He then calculates the 
 number of bullock loads of straw required by each corps, &c, at the 
 rate of one bullock load for fifteen bullocks for one day. This is a 
 large proportion ; but as the people are obliged to pay for what they 
 get, they will not take more than they want, and by this calculation there 
 can be no disappointment. 
 
 The regiments of cavalry are not allowed to have straw for their 
 horses, excepting for the number for which there are no grass-cutters. 
 No country can afford to supply forage for our armies if the means 
 allowed by the Company to supply the regiments of cavalry with green 
 forage are not faithfully applied to that purpose. They get straw, 
 however, for all the bullocks attached to them, of which there are 
 considerable numbers, and for the horses for which there are no grass- 
 cutters. The place which gives the name to the camp is never allotted 
 to any corps, as the Sircar have always prepared and allotted the straw 
 at that place to the Company's gun bullocks. 
 
 According to this mode above 20,000 head of cattle have been foraged 
 in this division plentifully and without trouble ; besides Purneah's army, 
 in which there are doubtless 5000 more, and above 1500 horse, all of 
 which get straw. 
 
 When a camp is likely to remain in one place for a few days, the 
 foraging can easily be managed by an extension of the same system. 
 It is only to allot to corps, &c. villages at the distance of four and five 
 coss instead of under one. Accordingly a detail will be forwarded to 
 head-quarters of the quantity of straw in every village as far as five and 
 six coss from Mayaconda. 
 
 In regard to the second object, it was some years ago settled that the 
 price of straw in Mysore should be one bullock load for three silver 
 fanams, if sent for to a village ; if brought to the camp, the price of this 
 article, like every other, ought to be allowed to find its own level ; and 
 accordingly in this camp there are people who go out to the villages, 
 where they buy it at the regulated price, and bring it into the bazaar, 
 where they sell it to the bazaar people whose bullocks may be more 
 profitably employed, or to others at an advance. 
 
 This settled price, I am informed by the Dewan, is a fair equivalent 
 for the straw. Measures ought to be taken to insure its payment. 
 When the straw is in the neighbourhood of the camp, it is probable that 
 nobody will venture to plunder it ; but when the forage is brought from a 
 distance, some faults of this kind may be expected. It is to be observed, 
 however, that every village will be allotted to a particular corps ; and if 
 the criminal should escape from the villagers, it will not be difficult to find 
 out to whom he belonged. If any one is caught, he ought to be severely 
 punished, and one or two examples will stop this crime entirely.
 
 VIGILANT ECONOMY IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE. 609 
 
 341. To Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas. 
 
 Unnecessary expense for forage disallowed. 
 SlR, Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803. 
 
 In answer to your letter of the 23rd, I have to inform you that I am 
 perfectly aware of the necessity that the public should pay for the forage 
 which the horses received on the 20th and 21st instant. It was neces- 
 sary for the service that the cavalry should make an extraordinary forced 
 march, on which it was not possible for their grass-cutters to follow them 
 or to join them till late on the next day. On their arrival at Poonah 
 forage was to be procured only by purchase ; and as there is no regu- 
 lated allowance for providing it, it must be an extraordinary charge 
 of this detachment. I shall accordingly direct that this expense may be 
 defrayed. 
 
 In respect to the expense incurred on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, I 
 have to observe that it stands on grounds entirely different. The grass- 
 cutters were then arrived, and the question is whether the want of grass 
 has been such as that they have not been able to do their duty, and that 
 it became necessary to incur an additional expense for the horses. The 
 object of all the regulations of government for years past has been to 
 bring all expenses under certain heads, and to preclude the necessity of 
 incurring extra expenses by the means of officers of the junior ranks of 
 the army. This object is one of great importance, not only to the public, 
 but to the officers, as every additional expense of this nature must in- 
 crease their responsibility, and render them more liable to the checks of 
 the auditor's office. Under these circumstances it is proper that I should 
 proceed with caution in sanctioning or recommending even a momentary 
 deviation from the established practice. 
 
 I observe that in the returns forwarded by you, the officers command- 
 ing regiments have not stated the quantity of grass brought in by the 
 grass-cutters, excepting the officer commanding the 4th regiment ; nor 
 has any one of them declared that upon an examination of the banks of 
 the rivers and nullahs in the neighbourhood of this camp the grass usually 
 brought in by the grass-cutters cannot be mowed. I have reason to 
 believe that it can. 
 
 I have also to inform you that, since I had a conversation with you 
 upon this subject, I have made inquiries regarding it, and I find that the 
 whole expense of forage for the horses of the country cavalry, which 
 their chiefs also pay for, does not amount to more than about a quarter 
 of a rupee for each horse. The average expense of forage for our troops 
 amounts to more than that sum, even with the addition of the assistance 
 of the grass-cutters. Upon the whole, particularly as I propose to march 
 towards the hills on the day after to-morrow, in which plenty of grass 
 will be procured, I am desirous to avoid introducing into the service a 
 
 R r
 
 6lO BRINJARRIES PLUNDERERS. READY MONEY FOR GRAIN. 
 
 deviation from the established practice, which may be attended by many 
 public and private inconveniences ; but if the officers commanding regi- 
 ments should be desirous that the question should be referred to the 
 Commander-in-Chief, I will with pleasure transmit all the papers to be 
 laid before him. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 342. To Lieutenant- General Stuart. 
 
 Predatory tendencies of the brinjarries. We ought not to depend on 
 them far from their homes. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Poonah, 27th May, 1803. 
 
 I find the brinjarries, and indeed all the people of the Mysore country 
 and the Carnatic, very averse to staying in this country. It is true that 
 forage, and all kinds of provisions, are uncommonly dear : I therefore 
 take the liberty of recommending to you to bring forward as many hired 
 bullocks as possible, and to depend less upon the brinjarries for supply- 
 ing your troops than I have. The more I see of them, the more I am 
 convinced that we have entirely mistaken the character of these people ; 
 and that, unless they are permitted to plunder the country through which 
 they pass, or to have profits such as the Native armies are able to give 
 them from plunder, they will not follow the troops to any distance from 
 the place at which they usually reside. I have had the greatest difficul- 
 ties with them, and they have deceived me, and broken their engage- 
 ments, upon every occasion. Col. Stevenson, who has another set, has 
 been obliged to punish, and even to put some to death, for plunder in 
 the Peshwah's country. 
 
 343. G. O. 
 
 Grain to be paid for before removal. 
 
 Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21st Nov., 1803. 
 
 Repeated orders having been given to the agent for cavalry supplies 
 to cause payment to be made on the spot for grain taken by his servants 
 in the villages, and complaints having been made to-day that grain so 
 taken has not been paid for, Major- General Wellesley is pleased to pub- 
 lish in General Orders a general regulation, that grain taken or bargained 
 for, in the villages, by any department belonging to the army, shall be 
 paid for on the spot before the grain is removed ; and he warns all 
 persons concerned that any deviations from this rule will be submitted 
 to a public inquiry. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 COMPENSATION FOR SILL AD AR CASUALTIES. 6 11 
 
 344. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 
 
 .Expediency of a provision for wounded silladars, and for the families of 
 those killed ; and of a compensation for horses killed or wounded. 
 
 Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804. 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 1 8th inst., upon 
 the subject of an application from Col. Murray, that provision might 
 be made for the silladar horse who might be wounded in the service ; and 
 for the families of those who might be killed. It is not reasonable to 
 expect that persons of this description, who have no means of sub- 
 sistence, excepting those afforded by military service, will risk their lives, 
 or being disabled, unless made certain of a provision hereafter. The 
 want of this provision is the great defect of all the Native military 
 services; and is the cause of the frequent instances of misbehaviour 
 before an enemy of the country troops. The truth of this observation is 
 proved by the fact, that the troops in the service of Hyder Aly, and his 
 son Tippoo, and those now in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, 
 for whom provision is made, in case they should receive wounds, and for 
 their families, in case they should be killed, have uniformly behaved 
 better in battle than any other Native troops of whom we have a know- 
 ledge. I therefore strongly recommend to government, that the measures 
 proposed by Col. Murray may be adopted. It would be necessary, 
 however, in the first instance, to submit the claims of those disabled by 
 wounds, and of the families of the horsemen who may be killed in the 
 service, to the decision of a committee of officers, in the same manner 
 as the claims of persons actually in the military service of the Hon. 
 Company. 
 
 With the same view of rendering more efficient this body of cavalry 
 attached to Col. Murray's corps, I beg leave to suggest to the Governor 
 in Council the expediency of paying for the horses which may be killed, 
 or rendered unfit for service by wounds received in action. This is 
 another measure which has been practised by Hyder and Tippoo, and 
 the present Mysore government, and with the best effects. There are 
 two modes of paying for these horses. One, which has always been 
 practised by the Mussulmann and Hindu government of Mysore, is to 
 pay the horsemen 200 rupees for every horse killed or disabled, whatever 
 may be his value : the other is, to register a description and value of the 
 horse when the horseman is entertained ; and when the horse is killed or 
 disabled, to pay for him at the rate at which he shall be valued in the 
 register. I rather believe that the horsemen would prefer the latter 
 mode, and it will, probably, prove equally cheap to the Hon. Company, 
 as but few of their horses can be valued at a higher rate than 200 rupees. 
 
 R r 2
 
 6l2 INFANTRY TO LEARN ARTILLERY PRACTICE. 
 
 If this measure should be adopted, a committee ought to be assembled 
 to ascertain the claims of the horsemen. When all these measures shall 
 be adopted, the silladar horse with Col. Murray ought to be a most 
 efficient body. 
 
 345. To Sir William Clarke, Bart. 
 
 Expediency of training infantry to work guns. 
 
 (Extract.) Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805. 
 
 The government of Bombay might, I should think, afford to complete 
 your artillery at Goa ; but it is certain that the corps of artillery in all 
 parts of India are very weak, and it is not improbable but that the 
 authorities at Bombay may think it more important to preserve their 
 strength entire there than to make you as strong as you wish. I therefore 
 recommend you to have some of your infantry trained to the gun ex- 
 ercise, a practice which, in my opinion, ought to be adopted in all parts 
 of India. 
 
 I don't mean to say that I prefer artillery to infantry ; on the contrary, 
 my opinion is that the main strength of our armies consists in British 
 infantry. But I think that a soldier cannot know too much, and in a 
 garrison one who understands the duty of an artilleryman may be so far 
 more useful than one who knows only the duty of an infantry soldier. 
 
 The same reasoning applies to the Native infantry, and it is my 
 opinion that some of these ought to be taught the great gun exercise ; 
 but care should be taken to select for this purpose those men who are 
 known and distinguished for their attachment to the service. 
 
 346. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn. 
 
 Reasons against amalgamating the Presidential armies ; and equalizing 
 
 their pay. 
 My DEAR Wynn, London, 6th August, 1826. 
 
 I have received your letter and the abstract of the correspondence 
 upon the equalization of the Indian pay. 
 
 I differ from those who originally recommended the equalization of the 
 pay. I served in the largest armies ever collected in India, composed of 
 troops of the three Presidencies, receiving all sorts of different allowances, 
 some of them even the famous and much envied double full batta, and 
 these armies were placed in the most difficult circumstances, such as were 
 calculated to aggravate all discontents, &c. But I declare I recollect 
 having heard many more jokes than I ever did expressions of discontent 
 respecting one set of officers and soldiers receiving more than others. 
 The truth is, that all received more than enough for their wants ; and
 
 DISTINCT ARMIES STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT. 613 
 
 the envied double full batta gentlemen were only more loaded with 
 equipages, baggage, &c., than their comrades who were less paid ; and 
 the former were supposed to be less active and energetic in the per- 
 formance of their duty. 
 
 I don't believe the junction or neighbourhood of the armies of the 
 three Presidencies in their cantonments in the countries of the sovereigns 
 paying subsidies, or on the neighbouring frontiers of the Company's 
 extended territories, could have made any difference. 
 
 The truth is, that in modern times we have a morbid inclination to 
 seek out grievances, and even to suppose their existence, when we do 
 not readily discover them. The natural remedy for this grievance of 
 inequality of pay would have been to raise the pay and allowances of those 
 who received least to the standard of the pay and allowances of those 
 who received most ; and this remedy would have been adopted, if those 
 who discovered the grievance could have found some source from which 
 to draw the money, excepting the Treasury, for the expenditure of which 
 they were themselves responsible. Then came the notable resource of 
 lowering the pay of some in order to find the means to be able to raise 
 the pay of others ; and as soon as the difficulty, of this resource (and 
 by-the-by of another, that of increasing the pay of the whole under 
 a new name, house rent,) has been discovered, then comes a new 
 projector D., with a grand sweeping scheme for augmenting the pay of 
 the whole ! 
 
 Now, in my opinion, the principle of the whole system is wrong. I 
 declare it to be my opinion that it is not desirable to form into one army 
 or to amalgamate the three armies in India, notwithstanding that the 
 frontiers of the three Presidencies touch each other, or that the troops 
 of the three Presidencies join in the camps or cantonments of the 
 subsidised forces. Many events have occurred in India, and many more 
 may occur, in which the safety of the country and its dependency on the 
 British empire have rested ultimately upon this separation of the armies, 
 and the effect of this separation of the armies upon the difference of 
 the pay of the officers, as I believe there is but little in that of the 
 soldiers. 
 
 This difference of pay creates a distinction of interest in all questions 
 between government and army, or rather the European officers of the 
 army, and enables the government to deal very differently with such 
 questions than they would if they were conscious they had not such 
 distinction of interest operating in their favour. 
 
 I admit that the difference of pay may be very troublesome to officers 
 at the head of armies composed of detachments from the three 
 Presidencies, who do not know how to command their armies. But 
 these difficulties are trifles; and if my opinion had been asked at the 
 time these changes were made I would have earnestly recommended to
 
 614 EQUALIZATION OF PAY NOT DESIRABLE. 
 
 government not to enter upon the subject at all. The fact is, that the 
 pay and allowances of the officers of the army at each Presidency have 
 been formed upon a consideration not of the wants only, but of the 
 mode of life and its expenses of those officers ; and when you give an 
 officer of the Bombay establishment, for instance, what an officer receives 
 in Bengal, you give him more than is necessary ; and you enable him 
 to accumulate money faster than his comrades of the Bengal or Madras 
 army. 
 
 The only officers who have a right to complain on this subject are 
 those of the King's troops, from whom a word has never been heard. 
 Because they are moved from Presidency to Presidency, and having 
 received for five years the best allowances in Bengal, are sent to Bombay 
 to receive the worst. As for my part, I travelled through the three 
 Presidencies. 
 
 However, the equalization having been ordered and so far carried into 
 effect, I would recommend you to leave it where it is. 
 
 I would recommend you to give the full tent allowance to all the 
 officers of the European troops. What Munro says is very true. This 
 economy falls principally upon the officers of the King's regiments ; and 
 although it is very safe to trench upon them, it is not very generous, as 
 it is they in fact who carry the armies through all their difficulties. 
 
 The full batta at Dinapoor, Burhampoor, and Barrackpoor, originated 
 in an economical arrangement by which the Bengal army in the provinces 
 of Oude and Hindustan was deprived of double full batta. 
 
 This arrangement is something of the nature of a bargain, which is a 
 very bad thing with an army ; but if once made it must be adhered to. 
 
 Although I started at first, therefore, at the notion of introducing the 
 reduction for those who should enter the service from this date, I believe 
 it is usual, considering the arrangement of 1801 in the nature of a 
 bargain ; and if the reduction is to be made, it must be in that manner. 
 
 But for the reasons which I have above stated I would not make the 
 reduction at all. I would keep the Bengal Army as an army receiving 
 full batta, while the others should only receive half batta ; and I would 
 introduce no new allowance of house rent ; and my opinion upon this 
 subject is strengthened by the necessity of making the alteration to take 
 place only for those who should enter the service from this date. 
 
 I believe I have gone through all the points, and beg you, &c, 
 
 Wellington.
 
 BREVET PROMOTION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICES. 615 
 
 347. Memorandum. — East India Company's Army. 
 
 Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field. Rank of colonel 
 to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions 
 of artillery. Officers in the service of the E. I. C. in civil employments, 
 or on the Staff, not properly attached to the army} 
 
 31st July, 1828. 
 
 Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field. — There can be no 
 objection to the grant of brevet promotion for distinguished services in 
 the field against the enemy, to the officers of the army of the East India 
 Company, in the same manner as to the officers of the King's army. 
 
 But great care must be taken in the grant of this promotion that it 
 is not applied to gratify favourites rather than to reward real services. 
 
 The rule which I adopted was to allow General officers to recommend 
 officers who had distinguished themselves ; and I selected from the list 
 those whom I might think proper to recommend for brevet promotion. 
 
 There was a rule that the aides-de-camp and Staff belonging or 
 attached to General officers should not be recommended for promotion 
 by brevet, for the reasons which are obvious ; as well as because they 
 have great advantages over the officers of the Line. But I made many 
 exceptions to this rule. 
 
 I should say likewise that the Commander-in-Chief if not himself in 
 the field, or the Governor-General in Council if the Commander-in- 
 Chief should be in the field, ought, after the report of an important 
 service in the field against the enemy, to designate the number of 
 officers to be recommended for this brevet promotion. A larger number 
 should be named by the Commander of the force in the field, from which 
 number the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General in Council 
 should select the names of the number designated. 
 
 It is very necessary to check this description of promotion. Other- 
 wise it will go very far indeed. The Company's army ought to have 
 this promotion for the siege of Bhurtpoor. 
 
 Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, 
 and of battalions of artillery. — There is a great mistake in the reasoning 
 upon this subject. First, the relation between the British artillery and 
 engineers and the British cavalry and infantry is not the same as that 
 between the Company's army and the King's army in the East Indies. 
 
 The officers of the rank of colonel of the former seldom come in 
 competition with the cavalry and infantry. Those of the latter are in 
 daily competition with the officers of the same rank in the King's army. 
 
 It is not true likewise that the departure from the regulation of 1796 
 was to be attributed to the interference of the officers of the King's army 
 in India. 
 
 1 This summary is the Duke's own, in the body of the Memorandum. Ed.
 
 616 RANK OF COLONEL TO COMMANDANTS OF REGIMENTS, ETC. 
 
 The dispute originated in the East India Company's army of Fort 
 St. George, and from thence went to the King's army. 
 
 However, it is not reasonable that the public service should suffer 
 inconvenience on account of the private interest of individuals ; and it 
 appears quite right and proper that without retrospect the rank of 
 colonel should now be given to every lieutenant-colonel commandant 
 of a regiment of cavalry or infantry, or battalion of artillery, in the East 
 India Company's service ; and that in future an officer promoted to be 
 commandant of a regiment should have the rank of colonel. 
 
 I am perfectly ready to admit that the King's army is auxiliary in the 
 East Indies. But although it is auxiliary the King must take care that 
 his officers are not ill-treated ; and that their fair claims are not passed 
 over in consequence of the existence of any particular circumstances 
 attending the promotion of the army of the East India Company. 
 
 It is my opinion that whenever one of his Majesty's regiments is 
 serving in the army of Fort William, for instance, and the lieutenant- 
 colonel of such regiment is superseded by the promotion to the rank of 
 colonel of a regiment of a lieutenant-colonel of the army of that Presi- 
 dency, junior as a lieutenant-colonel to the lieutenant-colonel of his 
 Majesty's regiment, his Majesty should grant to the lieutenant-colonel 
 of his regiment a brevet of colonel in that army of the same date as that 
 of the colonel of the army of Fort William ; thus leaving both in their 
 same relative position. 
 
 If the King's regiment should be removed to the army of any other 
 Presidency, of course that commission will be no longer valid. But 
 another may be granted to the colonel of his Majesty's regiment, to put 
 him on a par, in respect to rank, with the officers of the service of the 
 East India Company's service, referring always to the date of their re- 
 spective ranks as lieutenant-colonel. 
 
 Officers in the service of the East India Company in civil employments, or 
 on the Staff, not properly attached to the army. — The uniform representa- 
 tions from India manifest the necessity of making some improvement in 
 the regimental system in India, so as to obtain a more constant residence 
 with their regiment of the officers of the army, and more assiduous 
 attention to their duty. I think, however, that those who make these 
 complaints do not always consider that these officers are usefully 
 employed for the service of the public, although not with their regiments ; 
 and possibly in some instances more usefully than if with their regiments. 
 It cannot be doubted, however, that the number of European officers 
 with several of the Native regiments is too small; that the discipline of 
 the army has suffered by the European officers looking to these Staff 
 employments rather than to their duty with their regiments, and by the 
 absence of so many on these Staff employments. It is likewise true that 
 officers who have passed much of their time in these employments are
 
 OFFICERS IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT, & ON THE STAFF. 6lJ 
 
 not the most fit for regimental duty, when they think proper themselves 
 to return to the performance of such service after passing a great portion 
 of their lives and service in the performance of more agreeable and 
 better paid duties. 
 
 It is my opinion, therefore, that when an officer is required from the 
 Line to perform the duty of a civil Staff office, he should be struck off the 
 strength of his regiment ; and that from that period he should receive 
 no regimental pay; and an officer should be promoted in his stead. 
 
 From that period for five years such officer so employed on the Staff 
 should have the option of returning to his regiment ; and upon his return 
 he should resume his station in the regiment, preceding the officer next 
 in succession to him when he was ordered for employment on the Staff. 
 
 He should likewise be promoted to every step of rank at the same 
 time with the officer next to him in his regiment, at the time he should 
 have been removed from it to the Staff, till he should reach the rank of 
 lieutenant-colonel. 
 
 Beyond that rank an officer employed on this civil Staff of the army 
 ought not to rise. 
 
 He should be allowed to retire according to the usual military regula- 
 tions. 
 
 If such officer should, within five years, desire to return to his regi- 
 mental duty in the service, he should be permitted to do so, taking rank 
 in the regiment in the place from which he should have been removed to 
 the civil Staff of the army. 
 
 The regiment will then have a supernumerary officer till there will be 
 a vacancy, which of course must not be filled up. 
 
 Wellington. 
 
 2. Operations. 
 
 348. G. M. O. 
 
 Instructions for troops crossing rivers. 
 
 Camp at Hurryhur, Monday, 16th June, 1800. 
 
 Major Desse will send a return to Captain Mackay stating the number 
 of bullock loads of tents he has to send over the river, and Captain 
 Mackay will furnish elephants to carry them. 
 
 It is very desirable that some arrangement should be made, and as 
 much regularity as is possible should be observed in 'the passage of 
 the river. The commanding officers of corps should settle the order 
 in which the sepoys and their baggage should pass, whether the bat- 
 talion should go over first and then be followed by its baggage and 
 stores, or that the baggage of each company should follow the company 
 to which it belongs : but, at all events, it is desirable that the baggage
 
 618 TROOPS CROSSING RIVERS. BASKET BOATS. 
 
 and sepoys should not be passed over at the same time. It is also 
 desirable that a particular spot should be appointed at which the boats 
 should be landed, and an officer of the corps which, or whose baggage, 
 they may be employed in crossing, ought to be at that spot to see that 
 they are not overloaded, and that everything is conducted with as much 
 regularity as is practicable. 
 
 As the boats are forced by the current to a considerable distance 
 below the place at which it may be expedient to load them, it will be 
 necessary that a party on fatigue should be employed to draw them 
 up the stream along shore to the spot at which they are to receive 
 their loads. An officer ought also to be appointed to superintend the 
 unloading of the boats on the other side of the river; and a party 
 on fatigue ought to be employed for that purpose, as well as to draw 
 the boats up the stream as high as possible before they are sent back 
 to this side. 
 
 When an officer commanding a corps shall have nearly got his whole 
 corps and his baggage over the river, and that it is probable that he will 
 have no further occasion for the boats, he will give notice thereof to 
 Colonel Wellesley, in order that another corps or department may 
 receive timely orders to prepare to pass. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 349. Memorandum respecting Basket Boats. 
 
 Camp, 27th March, 1803. 
 i. The size best calculated for strength and use is 10 feet diameter in 
 the clear, and 2 feet 3 inches high. 
 
 2. It is indispensable that the covering of leather should come over 
 the gunwale of the boat, to be lashed to the framework within : most 
 accidents that happen to this kind of boats arise from a neglect of this 
 precaution. There ought to be a double covering of leather, to add to 
 their security and strength ; but this is of less importance than that any 
 part of the gunwale should be left uncovered. It may be useful to 
 notice that the hides should be sewed with leather. 
 
 3. The materials that are required for basket boats are bamboo lath ; 
 jungle wood (the best is called souri, a tough thorn) ; country rope ; 
 leather. 
 
 4. A framework should be made of three of these laths together, and 
 worked with others, about 4 inches apart, in a succession of triangles, 
 until it allows the diameter required, 10 feet. In this state it is fixed in 
 uprights driven in a circle of 10 feet diameter, the ends bent upwards 
 and worked close with single lath for 2 feet 3 inches, which forms the 
 sides of the boat ; the remaining ends are then twisted in with the small 
 parts of souri, or pliable jungle wood, and this forms the gunwale, which
 
 HOW TO LAY A BOAT-BRIDGE ACROSS A RIVER. 6 1 9 
 
 should be well lashed with country rope. This is the mode of making 
 the boats, with which the Natives are as well acquainted as we are. 
 
 5. In this state it is taken from the uprights, and the centre of the 
 boat fixed in a little mound of earth (say 6 inches), when it is lined with 
 the toughest jungle wood that can be procured, and lashed to the frame 
 within it ; these should cross each other, so that the pressure may be 
 equal on every part of the boat. Eight pieces are sufficient, about the 
 thickness of 2 J or 3 inch rope, made long enough, with the ends pointed, 
 to run into the bottom of the gunwale, and secured with country rope. 
 
 6. It is absolutely necessary that a frame to fit, made exactly as the 
 bottom of the boat, should be then fixed within it, the smooth part of the 
 bamboo uppermost. This is laid over the lining of the jungle, to which 
 it is lashed by the same wood within to the sides of the boat. 
 
 7. This is the general mode of making boats: the great error is in 
 preparing the lath too thick, whereas it can scarcely be made too thin. 
 The strength of the boat depends upon the goodness of the jungle wood 
 for lining, and its being equally crossed, in order that it may sustain an 
 equal pressure in all its parts. 
 
 8. It is desirable that there should be a second frame, worked close in 
 a circular manner, and lashed within ; for, on the transporting of baggage, 
 it prevents a pressure on the leather from bamboos, feet of cots, and 
 tables, that pass through the triangle bamboo work of the boat. It pre- 
 serves the leather, and adds but little to the weight. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 350. Memorandum on the manner of laying a bridge of 
 boats across a river. 1 
 
 The bank on each side, where the ends of the bridge are to be, 
 must be made solid and firm by means of fascines, or otherwise. One 
 end of the cable must be carried across the river, and, being fixed to a 
 picket, or to any thing firm, must be drawn tight across where the heads 
 of the boats are to be ranged. 
 
 The boats are to be then launched, having on board each 2 men, with 
 the necessary ropes, &c. ; and are floated down the stream, under the 
 cable to which they are lashed endwise, by the rings and small ropes at 
 equal distances, and about their own breadth asunder, more or less, 
 according to the strength required. 
 
 If the river be very rapid, a second cable must be stretched across it, 
 parallel to the first, and at the distance of the length of the boats, and to 
 which the other ends of the boats must be lashed. The spring lines are 
 then lashed diagonally from one boat to the other, to brace them tight ; 
 
 1 Enclosed in a Despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Close, dated Camp at Kowaspoor. 
 nth April, 1803. Ed.
 
 620 INSTRUCTIONS ON CAVALRY MOVEMENTS. 
 
 and the anchors, if necessary, carried out up the stream, and fixed to the 
 cable, or sheer line, across the river. One of the chesses, or planks, is 
 then laid on the edge of the bank, at each end of the bridge, bottom up, 
 which serves to lay the ends of the baulks or beams upon ; (it appears 
 that the beams ought to lay (sic) in lines across the boats, from one end of 
 the bridge to the other, and must be bolted together in such manner as to 
 allow of fixing them in that mode ;) and as a direction for placing them 
 at the proper distances, to fit the chesses or planks that cover the bridge. 
 The baulks should be then laid across the boats, and keyed together, 
 their numbers proportioned to the strength required in the bridge. If the 
 gang boards are laid across the heads and sterns of the boats, from one 
 side of the river to the other, they will give the men a footing for doing 
 the rest of the work. Across the baulks are laid the chesses, one after 
 another, the edges to meet, (the chesses, or planks, must have laths nailed 
 upon them, in such manner as to form 4 grooves, to receive the 4 beams 
 on which the planks are to be laid,) and baulks running between the cross 
 pieces on the under side of the chesses. The gang boards are then laid 
 across the ends of the chesses, on each edge of the bridge. 
 
 351. G. O. 
 
 Memoranda on cavalry manoeuvres. 
 
 Poonah, 23rd May, 1803. 
 Major-General Wellesley requests the commanding officers of the regi- 
 ments of cavalry to peruse the following memoranda, and to communicate 
 them to their adjutants and such other officers as they may think proper. 
 
 1. When corps of cavalry act together, one corps is generally appointed 
 the leading corps, and all are to conform to the movements of that corps, 
 unless otherwise ordered. The leading corps may be altered, and all 
 corps are to attend and follow the movements of that newly ordered as 
 the leading corps. The rule applies equally whether they are in line or 
 otherwise formed ; but it is not intended that when a line is to be formed 
 from column, or to change its front, all corps are to perform that opera- 
 tion in the same mode ; each is to perform it in that mode in which it can 
 be done with the greatest celerity combined with the greatest accuracy. 
 
 2. When a number of regiments are in column, either with the right 
 or left in front, the formation into line may be either to the front or rear 
 of the column, to its proper or reverse flank, or oblique to the line of 
 march. 
 
 3. If the column be one with the right in front, and its formation is to 
 be made to the front, each corps disengages from the general column as 
 soon as the nature of the ground will admit, and goes to the left of the 
 leading corps ; the same mode is practised if the line is to be formed 
 oblique to the line of march : in both these cases the adjutants of different
 
 INSTRUCTIONS ON CAVALRY MOVEMENTS. 6ll 
 
 regiments move out quickly as soon as they learn that the line is to be 
 formed, and mark the ground on which the left of their corps is to stand ; 
 vice versa if the column be one with the left in front. 
 
 4. If the formation from a column with the right in front is to be made 
 to the rear, all the corps in rear of that in which the line is to be formed 
 are to lead out from the general column to their right ; all the corps in 
 front of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the 
 general column to their left. The adjutants of the corps in the rear are 
 to take up the ground on which their left is to stand ; those of corps in 
 front are to take up the ground on which their right is to stand ; vice versd 
 if the column has its left in front. 
 
 5. If the line is to be formed from an open column with the right 
 in front to the reverse flank, the corps follow their leaders, each 
 wheeling up successively as it reaches its ground, and the adjutants are 
 to mark the ground on which their left is to stand : vice versd if the 
 column is with the left in front. 
 
 6. When a column is marching upon an alignement, an object is 
 generally given in front, on which the column is to march ; the adjutants 
 of corps are to assist in keeping the column in its true direction, by placing 
 themselves in the line and each waiting there, till the corps to which he 
 belongs shall have passed him. The officers leading divisions in an open 
 column, marching on an alignement on which the line is to be formed, 
 are to go close to the horse's head of the adjutant who is marking the 
 ground : a regiment is not to deviate partially from the alignement 
 marked by its adjutant because the rear division of that in front of it 
 may have done so. 
 
 7. When the line is to change its front and a new formation is to be 
 made, all corps are to break towards that on which the new formation is 
 to be made : if the corps be on the right, all the corps on the left break 
 into an open column, with the right in front, and the adjutants are to 
 mark the ground on which the left is to stand in the new line ; if the 
 corps be on the left, all the corps on the right are to break into a column 
 with the left in front, and the adjutant is to mark the ground on which 
 the right is to stand. 
 
 8. The general rule is, that the corps, whether in forming line from 
 column or in changing front from line, are to enter on the new line at 
 the point marked for them by their adjutants, which is always where 
 their rear will stand ; but as that is the mode of forming which takes 
 most time, the practice is for each corps to enter the new line, either 
 where its head is to stand, or in a central spot. The commanding 
 officers must, in that case, take care to send forward a person to mark 
 a true point in the line, at which he will enter, and to bring up the head 
 of his regiment square to the proposed formation. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 62% WHEN AN OFFICER MAY IGNORE AN ORDER. 
 
 352. G. O. 
 
 Discretion of officers as to the execution of orders. 
 
 Camp at Jaum, Friday, nth Nov., 1803. 
 
 On publishing the sentence of the general court martial on the trial 
 
 of Captain , Major-General Wellesley thinks it proper to explain to 
 
 the troops that there is much difference in the situations and cases in 
 which an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion. 
 
 It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer, 
 which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at 
 the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty 
 or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a 
 moral impossibility. 
 
 In a case of this kind, Major-General Wellesley is by no means 
 disposed to check officers detached in the exercise of their discretion, 
 
 but Captain 's case is not of this description : he could have, and 
 
 had, no information which the officer had not who gave him orders, and 
 it was his duty to obey. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 353. G. O. 
 
 Instructions for the combined march in line of infantry battalions . 
 
 Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 16th June, 1804. 
 Major-General Wellesley requests the attention of officers commanding 
 corps of infantry to the following instructions, when several battalions 
 are required to march in line : 
 
 1. When the battalion is in line, the post of the commanding officer 
 is in the rear of the centre. 
 
 2. When the line is ordered to advance, each battalion is to march by 
 its own centre, in the same manner as if it were alone. The com- 
 manding officer of each battalion is to fix upon an object perpendicular 
 to the centre of his own battalion, upon which the officer who leads the 
 battalion is to march. 
 
 3. The havildar or Serjeant in the centre of the battalion between 
 the colours is to follow exactly the steps of the officer or non-com- 
 missioned officer who leads the battalion. 
 
 4. After the battalion shall have advanced a certain distance, the 
 commanding officer will be able to see whether it approaches, or 
 recedes from, the battalion which will have been named as that 
 which leads the line. If he should find that the due distance is not 
 preserved, he is to alter the direction of his march, and point out 
 another object to the officer or non-commissioned officer who shall
 
 MARCH IN LINE OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS. 623 
 
 lead the battalion, to which the leader will gradually alter his direction, 
 and his steps will be strictly followed by the non-commissioned officers 
 placed between the colours. 
 
 5. All changes of direction of a battalion marching in line, par- 
 ticularly if they are great changes, are equivalent to a wheel of the 
 battalion on its centre, a movement of a very complicated nature, which 
 requires time and great accuracy. 
 
 6. It follows, therefore, that in no case whatever must the pace of 
 the battalion be hurried whilst the alteration of the direction is making ; 
 or that, when it becomes necessary to alter the direction to any great 
 degree, it would be best to mark the time till the alteration is completed, 
 and then to bring up the battalion to its place. 
 
 7. It must sometimes happen that the alteration of the direction of the 
 march of the other battalions is so great as that it cannot be made by the 
 wheel of the battalion each upon its centre ; when the alteration of the 
 direction of a battalion is from any cause of this magnitude, it ought to 
 be made by the echelon march of divisions. 
 
 8. When the commanding officer of a battalion in line finds it necessary 
 to alter the direction of its march, he should apprise thereof the com- 
 manding officer of the next battalion on the flank most distant from the 
 leading battalion. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 3. Discipline. 
 
 354. To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny. 
 
 Embezzleynent of Stores, and manifold rascality. 
 My DEAR COLONEL, Seringapatam, 2nd July, 1 So I. 
 
 I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th June. 
 
 The curiosity of the whole army must naturally be excited by what has 
 been passing here lately, and I have no objection to gratify your curiosity, 
 provided that what I write is between ourselves, and not communicated 
 to any but those who you think can be trusted. It is not because anything 
 that has passed is a secret, but because it might not be deemed proper 
 that I should write upon this subject, that I am induced to caution you 
 not to make it public. 
 
 While I was absent in the month of January last (I believe), the 
 lascars, &c, of the store department of Seringapatam wrote a petition 
 to the Military Board and a letter to General Brathwaite, both without 
 signature, in which they represented the existence of all kinds of 
 enormities and bad practices in the store department, such as false
 
 624 HERAKLES CLEANSES THE STABLE OF AUGEAS. 
 
 musters, stealing of stores, cheating, &c. &c. Captain was at 
 
 Madras at the time these papers were received, and they were com- 
 municated to him ; whereupon he went off in a great hurry to stop some 
 bandies, loaded with gun-metal, which General Brathwaite was informed 
 were coming from Seringapatam. He did stop these bandies at Vellore, 
 and it was found that the gun-metal belonged to General Smith ; at least 
 it was said so. 
 
 However, the Military Board and government determined to defer the 
 inquiry till I should return, and then to order that the whole matter of the 
 petition and letter above mentioned should be inquired into. Accord- 
 ingly I received orders to institute an inquiry shortly after my return, 
 and, of course, I determined that it should be an inquiry in earnest. 
 I first gave orders to the Commissary to turn off his dubash, and then 
 I assembled a large Committee, consisting of myself, all the staff of the 
 army and garrison, and all the most respectable officers not employed 
 upon any other duty ; and indeed they were mostly the friends of the 
 Commissary. 
 
 On the first day we went to the arsenal to inquire into the grounds of 
 the complaints, the petition was explained to all the lascars and artificers, 
 and they were asked particularly whether they had any grounds of 
 complaint on the subject of each allegation. They all declared not, 
 and appeared anxious to come forward to vindicate the Commissary and 
 his dubash from any imputation that might have been laid upon them by 
 the petition and letter. 
 
 However, I was not satisfied with this proceeding, and on that evening 
 I issued a proclamation, in which I called upon the inhabitants to state 
 who had purchased stores, and threatened punishment to those who had 
 purchased them and concealed it. 
 
 Then came out a scene of villainy and peculation which has never 
 been surpassed, and seldom equalled, in this country. It was proved 
 
 before the Committee that Colonel — ■ had sold large quantities of 
 
 saltpetre, which he had stolen from the stores while he was a member 
 of the Committee for the valuation of captured property, and that 
 the arsenal was a public sale-shop for all kinds of military stores and 
 ordnance, the principal agent in which transactions was the Commis- 
 sary's dubash. 
 
 The artificers and lascars who had at first declared that they had no 
 reason to complain, and knew nothing of the petition and letter to the 
 Military Board, then came forward to testify the truth of everything, 
 and proved particularly that false musters had been taken and sent to 
 Madras; and that, in fact, half the people for whom pay was drawn 
 were not employed. 
 
 When the dubash was called ' upon to make his defence, to the 
 surprise of everybody, he said that he was determined to tell the truth
 
 TROPICAL GROWTH OF MORAL WEEDS. 62$ 
 
 and to conceal nothing ; and he declared that he had orders for every- 
 thing that he had ever done, either from Colonel or Captain 
 
 , and that he had papers in the arsenal which would prove the 
 
 truth of what he then asserted. 
 
 On account of what appeared against Captain on that day, 
 
 I determined to turn him out, and I did dismiss him that evening ; but 
 he went to the arsenal before he was dismissed and broke open the 
 desk, and, as the dubash says, destroyed some of the papers which he 
 had heard him promise to produce to the Committee. 
 
 However, he did not destroy all, and particularly not those relating to 
 himself, which I forced him to produce ; and the dubash, by means of 
 
 them, has been able to prove clearly that Captain had a large 
 
 share of the profits resulting from the sale of ordnance and stores. 
 
 In regard to Colonel , the proof against him was not equally clear, 
 
 for want of the papers which were destroyed ; but it is clearly proved 
 against him that he sold copper bands taken from the pillars of the 
 Mysore palace, contrary to the orders of the Military Board ; that he 
 never gave General Smith credit for above an eighth part of the money 
 produced by the sale of guns, which he avows, and which he says be- 
 longed to General Smith, until, by the proceedings of the Committee, it 
 appeared that he had sold guns to that amount, and there are papers 
 still forthcoming which will prove that he had his share of the profits 
 arising from the false musters. 
 
 Besides this, Captain sent gun-locks, &c, to Madras for sale, 
 
 and he knew of Colonel 's robbery of the saltpetre, and was 
 
 concerned with him in cheating the captors and the public out of a 
 large part of it. 
 
 All this can be proved by writings and accounts, besides by the 
 evidence of a host of dubashes and conicopolies. 
 
 I have thus given you the outline of what has passed; but the 
 intervals have been filled by details of scenes of villainy which would 
 disgrace the Newgate Calendar. 
 
 Government are now deliberating upon all this, and I expect shortly 
 to have orders which will let me know whether these gentry are to 
 be brought to a court martial, or to be dismissed the service, or to be 
 hanged. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Welleslev. 
 
 S s
 
 626 DIVINE ASPECTS OF HUMAN JUSTICE. 
 
 355. To the Right Hon. Lord Clive. 
 
 Mercy seasons justice. 
 My Lord. Seringa patam, 23rd Oct., 1801. 
 
 I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship in favour of an old 
 
 man, (the late) Lieutenant-Colonel , whom I have lately been the 
 
 means of convicting of very serious crimes before a general court- 
 martial ; and I do so, not from any doubt that I entertain of the reality 
 of his guilt, but from a conviction of his former good conduct as an 
 officer, and of the extreme poverty and distress to which he has been 
 reduced in consequence of the sentence of the general court-martial. 
 I understand that when he will have paid the Company the sums 
 Avhich are due to them in consequence of that sentence, he will be 
 left entirely destitute ; and, without attempting to justify any part of his 
 conduct, I may safely say that he becomes an object of charity. 
 
 Allow me, therefore, to entreat your Lordship to give him some small 
 pension to enable him to support himself, or that you will recommend 
 him for some provision to the Court of Directors on account of his long 
 services and his present reduced situation. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 356. To Major-General Baird. 
 
 Wellington s abhorrence of corrupt practices. 
 
 (Extract.) Bangalore, 24th Nov., 1801. 
 Since I wrote to you last, my time has been most disagreeably em- 
 ployed in prosecuting at a general court-martial , , and , for 
 
 embezzling stores at Seringapatam upon the different occasions on which 
 I was absent from that garrison in the field. The result of their trials is 
 that they are all broke, and I believe there appeared before the general 
 court-martial a scene of dirt and villany such as never before disgraced 
 the character of an officer, or shocked the feelings of those who were 
 obliged to investigate it. I have never performed so unpleasant a duty, 
 or one which gave me so much concern and trouble ; and I neither wish 
 to do such a one again myself, nor to see it devolve upon any friend of 
 mine. 
 
 357. To the Commander-in-Chief, Fort St. George. 
 
 A low official estimate of professional character reprobated. 
 
 (Extracts.) Seringapatam, 12th June, 1801. 
 
 In regard to the 3rd article of the 1st charge, of which the Court 
 Martial have found Mr. to be guilty, but which they are of
 
 MANNERS MAKYTH MAN. 627 
 
 opinion does not constitute ungentlemanlike behaviour, I must observe 
 
 that Mr. himself gives as a reason for beating and tying up 
 
 the inhabitant, that he wanted thereby to oblige him and others to 
 deliver straw for his horses, having already received provision for 
 himself, his servants and his horses ; for which straw and provision for 
 himself, his servants, and his horses, thus forced from the inhabitants 
 by tying up and beating one of them, it appears by the evidence he did 
 not pay. 
 
 I never can agree in opinion with the Court Martial that this scan- 
 dalous conduct is not unbecoming the character of a British officer 
 and a gentleman; and I never can approve a sentence which describes 
 it in other terms than those of the strongest reprobation. 
 
 ******** 
 
 The prosecution against Mr. was instituted upon the complaint 
 
 of the Rajah's government, in consequence of the injury received by. 
 and oppression upon, the inhabitants by him, on his journey from Sera 
 to Seringapatam. Having proved before a competent Court the truth 
 of their charges against him, they will surely expect that he will be 
 punished. What will be the opinion of British justice, honour, and 
 protection, if a gentleman who has been guilty, almost under the guns 
 
 of this fort, of such acts of oppression as Mr. has himself 
 
 acknowledged, is suffered to go unpunished ? 
 
 358. Or. O. 
 
 The savie subject. 
 
 Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801. 
 
 Although the sentence of the court-martial is confirmed, Colonel 
 Wellesley is concerned that he cannot approve of it. In his opinion 
 
 the evidence went to convict of all the articles of the charges 
 
 brought against him; and that, the court-martial having found him 
 guilty of the 3rd article of the 1st charge, viz. having caused to be 
 tied Chinbeswah Chitty, an inhabitant of Chutter, and having flogged 
 him, they ought to have held out that scandalous conduct to the exe- 
 cration of the army, by pronouncing it unbecoming the character of a 
 British officer and a gentleman. 
 
 This sentence would have been the more proper, as avows 
 
 that the inhabitant was tied, and he beat him, with a view to force 
 from the village forage for his horses ; and it appears by the evidence 
 that he had already received forage for his horses, and provisions for 
 himself and his servants, for which, any more than for the forage thus 
 forced from the inhabitants by tying up and beating one of them, it 
 also appears by the evidence that they received no payment. 
 
 The court-martial, however, having pronounced that conduct only a 
 
 S s 2
 
 628 TAMPERING WITH WITNESSES AT COURTS MARTIAL. 
 
 disobedience of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and having 
 
 delivered a sentence that for that crime ought to be repre- 
 
 manded, it becomes Colonel Wellesley's duty to reprimand him. 
 
 has been found guilty, by a general court-martial, of which 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Saxon is president, of a disobedience of the orders 
 of the Commander-in-Chief in tying up and beating an inhabitant of 
 the village of Chutter, as he himself says, in order to force from the 
 village forage for his horses. He ought to have known that he is a part 
 of a body of troops placed in this country to protect the inhabitants, 
 and not to oppress them : having, however, forgotten his duty in that 
 respect, and having been found guilty of conduct very improper in a 
 British officer, a repetition of which would be highly prejudicial to the 
 British interests and character in this country, he is hereby publicly 
 reprimanded. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 359. To the President of the G-eneral Court Martial. 
 
 Witnesses before Courts Martial not to be drilled by the accused or his 
 
 agents. 
 SlR, Seringapatam, 21st Sept., 1801. 
 
 In consequence of what passed at the court martial on Thursday 
 the 17th instant, of the system which was then developed by Serjeant 
 Halpine, of the mode of drilling witnesses which had been in use, of 
 which system the court martial had experienced the effects in the pre- 
 ceding trial of Lieutenant-Colonel , I am induced to request 
 
 you to urge the court martial to take some steps to prevent a continuance 
 of this same evil. 
 
 I have frequently stated to the court martial that I had intelligence of 
 the improper practices of those to be tried in regard to the witnesses ; 
 at last those practices have come regularly before them, and have been 
 proved by the oath of a man on whom they have been attempted. 
 Although it is true that the person of whom the complaint was made 
 on the 17 th instant is no longer under trial, there is nothing to prevent 
 him from assisting the other officers to be tried, and from following 
 the same system in regard to the witnesses to be produced at their 
 trials to which it appears he adhered at his own. Under these circum- 
 stances I cannot but look to the probable event of those trials with an 
 anxiety proportionate to the trust which has been placed in me to bring 
 forward the evidence on the part of the prosecution, and to the risk 
 which I feel conscious, and which it has been proved the prosecution on 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel 's trial incurred, in consequence of the system 
 
 of which I am complaining. In fact, as long as this system exists it 
 is impossible to be certain of the event of any trial, whatever may be the
 
 DIONYSUS A BAD DISCIPLINARIAN. 629 
 
 evidence to be produced at it, or that any court, however good its 
 intentions, can administer strict justice. 
 
 I understand the administration of justice to be the decision of a 
 competent tribunal upon any question, after a complete knowledge of its 
 merits, by an examination of witnesses upon oath in order to come at 
 the truth. Truth then is the foundation upon which the whole super- 
 structure is built; but if, by the introduction of such a system as that of 
 which I complain, the truth cannot be attained, it is obvious that the 
 administration of justice becomes impracticable, and is at an end. 
 
 I am aware how delicate the situation of the court martial is, and how 
 anxious its members must be to avoid doing anything which can appear 
 like harshness ; but when the fundamentals of justice are attacked (as 
 I believe no man will now deny), something more than appearance must 
 be consulted ; and it becomes necessary that the court martial should 
 either put a stop to this system, or make up their minds to incur the 
 risk of the evil to which I have above alluded. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 360. a. o. 
 
 Intoxication most degrading to the character, and ruinous to the efficiency, 
 
 of an officer. 
 
 Seringapatam, 17 th July, 1802. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley was concerned to learn that any officer under his 
 command had been put in arrest for ' coming to the parade of his 
 regiment in a state of intoxication;' and although it appears, by the 
 evidence which has been brought before the general court martial of 
 which Lieutenant- Colonel Mackay was president, that Major Bell, the 
 
 commanding officer of , may have been mistaken on this 
 
 occasion, Colonel Wellesley is concerned to be under the necessity of 
 observing that, if there had not been good reason to believe that 
 
 was in the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors at undue 
 
 hours, Major Bell would not have attributed his staggering upon the 
 parade to intoxication, but would have supposed that it was occasioned 
 by other causes. It is not to be imagined that any officer would cast 
 such an imputation upon another upon the first symptom of his 
 
 deserving it ; and the observations made by in his defence, 
 
 that his staggering ought to be imputed to indisposition, would be 
 correct, if circumstances had not given too strong reason to believe 
 that intoxication alone was the cause of it. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley therefore, in reprimanding for the crimes 
 
 of which he has been found guilty, cannot avoid calling his attention, and 
 that of the troops under his command in general, to the other crime of
 
 630 VIVA VOCE, IN GARRISON, BETTER THAN PAPER-WORK. 
 
 which he has been acquitted. It is one of the most degrading to the 
 character of an officer, which renders him unfit for any part of his 
 duty; and by the practice of it he fails in that most essential point, 
 the setting an example to the soldiers under his command. Colonel 
 Wellesley, however, has the pleasure of reflecting that this failing is 
 rare among the officers under his command, in proportion as it is 
 great; but he warns all against even the suspicion of it. 
 
 is hereby publicly reprimanded. He is released from arrest 
 
 and directed to return to his duty. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 361. The D. A. G. to Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage. 
 
 Commanding officers to communicate personally with their subordinates in 
 garrison — not write to them. 
 (Extract.) 10th Aug., 1802. 
 
 Col. Wellesley has observed that much inconvenience arises from 
 commanding officers communicating in writing with officers under their 
 orders, when living in the same garrison with them; and he recommends 
 that, when you have any thing to say to officers under those circum- 
 stances, you will order them to attend you, and deliver your sentiments 
 to them ; and also that you hear their representations in the same 
 
 manner, verbally ; and he particularly desires that Capt. may have 
 
 a perusal of this letter, in your presence, and that nothing further may be 
 written upon the subject. 
 
 362. To Mr. . 
 
 A sharp stimulant to a malingerer. 
 Dear Sir, Seringapatam, 23th Aug., 1802. 
 
 Since I had the pleasure of hearing from you, I have made inquiries 
 respecting you with a view to obtaining your appointment to a corps ; 
 and I am concerned to find that the commanding officer of Chingleput 
 has thought it necessary again to report that you are unfit for the 
 service, although he has very lately reported a number of gentlemen to 
 be fit for it who have not been so long at Chingleput as you have. 
 
 I have not the pleasure of being acquainted with Captain Bosc, but he 
 is well spoken of in the army ; and it is not to be supposed, and will 
 never be believed, that a person who could be capable of doing a 
 gentleman the injustice to keep him at Chingleput under instruction, 
 and from the service, for no reason whatever, would have been appointed 
 by the Commander-in-Chief to the situation which he fills. It is much more 
 consistent with probability that he detains you at that place, and does
 
 NIL SALIT ARC AD ICO JUVENI. 63 1 
 
 not make a report in your favour, because you don't deserve it; and 
 under these circumstances I shall take the liberty of writing you a few lines 
 by way of advice. You will impute it to my respect for your father and 
 your relations, and for the recommendation of my brother, and my sincere 
 desire to render you service. 
 
 By coming to India as a cadet you have entered into a profession in 
 which obedience to your superiors is essentially necessary. I am not 
 acquainted with the system of education for the military profession 
 adopted at Chingleput, but as I observe that gentlemen are reported to be 
 qualified for the service in a very short time after their arrival in India, 
 it must be confined to learning the common duties of a soldier, and 
 the principles of subordination and obedience : these are not very 
 difficult, and every gentleman who goes to Chingleput soon learns 
 them, excepting yourself. Surely there must be some cause for your 
 backwardness besides your inexperience, which I observe must operate 
 nearly in an equal proportion against every gentleman who goes there. 
 
 I most earnestly entreat you to be obedient to the officer placed over 
 you, attentive to the instructions which he will give you, and to con- 
 ciliate him by the regularity of your conduct. Consider the impression 
 which will be made of your character and capacity on those who are 
 not acquainted with you, arid of your want of diligence and attention 
 on your father and those who know you, when they hear that you 
 alone of so many have been twice reported unfit for military service in 
 this country, from having been incapable of learning even its rudiments 
 at Chingleput, of which all others have easily attained a competent 
 knowledge. 
 
 I have taken measures to have you recommended to Captain Bosc, 
 and I hope soon to hear an account of you far different from any that 
 have yet reached me. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 363. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Mouron Bul6t. 
 
 Abuse 0/ invaliding. The rules of the service do ?iot favour neat jobs. 
 § IR Seringapatam, 1st Sept., 1802. 
 
 I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 31st of August 
 and its enclosures. 
 
 Only two days ago you transmitted a certificate of the bad state of the 
 health of Lieutenant Baron de Miiller, which I desired might accompany 
 the general return to head-quarters of the regiment under your command. 
 You have now thought proper, notwithstanding the certificate that Lieu- 
 tenant Baron de Miiller is unfit for his duty on account of bad health, to 
 desire that he may have an unlimited leave to remain at Madras in charge
 
 632 A JOB STOPPED. NATIVES NOT TO BE BEATEN. 
 
 of the regimental stores of the regiment de Meuron. I have to observe — 
 1 St. That it is not usual to employ officers to take charge of stores at 
 Madras, that duty being always performed by non-commissioned officers ; 
 2ndly. That it is not usual to give officers unlimited leave of absence ; 
 3rdly. That it is not usual to employ upon any duty an officer whose 
 health is certified to be in such a state that he is unable to do duty. 
 For all these reasons I decline to forward your application ; and I beg 
 that, if you should think proper to send it yourself, you will transmit with 
 it a copy of this letter. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 364. G. O. 
 
 Officers forbidden to beat natives. 
 
 Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1802. 
 Colonel Wellesley has heard with much concern that, in some instances, 
 the officers of the army in the provinces below the Ghauts, particularly 
 officers of the junior ranks, and who have been but a short time in the 
 country, have beaten the Natives of the country, whether in their service 
 or employed by them, or generally followers of the troops, or residents 
 of the place at which such officers are stationed. The practice is very 
 irregular and illegal, and, if not speedily put a stop to, will tend to the 
 material inconvenience and injury of the troops. In this country, any 
 more than in England, no man has a right to take the law into his own 
 hand, or to punish another for an offence or injury done to himself. 
 There are magistrates, who have full authority to decide in every case 
 which can occur, and to whom, if necessary, complaint ought to be made. 
 Colonel Wellesley therefore prohibits this practice entirely, and desires 
 that the officers commanding in Malabar and Canara, and those com- 
 manding stations and corps, will report to him any instances of the kind 
 that may occur in future. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 365. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles. 
 
 The paymaster not to live away from head-quarters. 
 (Extract.) Seringapatam, Sept, 1802. 
 
 I observe that Mr. Richardson resides at Tellicherry. In the constant 
 intercourse which ought to take place between the commanding officer 
 in Malabar and the paymaster, his residence at such a distance from 
 head-quarters, and at a place where there are no troops nor any garrison 
 stores, must be very inconvenient to you, to him, and to the army in 
 general. You will therefore recommend him to move to Cannanore,
 
 INSOLENCE TO INFERIORS, AND TO SUPERIORS, AKIN. 6$$ 
 
 where the largest body of the troops and the head-quarters are stationed, 
 and you will request him to make his arrangements for that purpose 
 without loss of time. 
 
 366. G. O. 
 
 Military insolence tested by the rides of the service. 
 
 Seringapatam, ioth Sept., 1802. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley has received a report from Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Brown, commanding at Hullihall, dated the 5th instant, upon the subject 
 
 of the conduct of certain officers of the 1st battalion Bombay 
 
 regiment, regarding a baker at Hullihall, which appears to him so 
 extraordinary as to require this public mode of expressing his sentiments 
 upon it. 
 
 It appears that Ensign , of the 1st battalion regiment, 
 
 beat the baker of the place, in consequence of which Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Brown issued an order to prohibit all officers and soldiers under his 
 command from molesting the inhabitants of Hullihall in any manner. 
 Colonel Wellesley entirely approves of that order issued by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Brown, and desires that he will see it carried into execution, 
 and put in arrest and report to him the name of any officer who 
 disobeys it. 
 
 In consequence of the beating given to this baker, or for some other 
 reason, it appears that he does not choose to bake any longer at Hulli- 
 hall, and that he quits the place and proceeds to Goa. Some of the 
 officers of the 1st battalion regiment then write letters to Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Brown to complain that they have not bread for their breakfasts, 
 and others wait upon him to make similar complaints, having omitted to 
 put on their side arms. 
 
 The officers of the 1st battalion regiment must be informed, 1st, 
 
 that Lieutenant-Colonel Brown is by no means obliged to find a baker 
 to bake bread for them; 2ndly, that, living in the same fort with 
 their commanding officer, it is their duty to wait upon him, to make their 
 complaints known to him, and not to write to him upon all these trifling 
 occasions ; and 3rdly, that, if they should find it necessary to wait 
 upon him, or even to quit their quarters at all, the standing orders of 
 this army, and the customs of every military service, require that they 
 should wear their side arms. 
 
 Colonel Wellesley likewise calls the attention of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Brown to these orders; and he is astonished that Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Brown should have passed unnoticed so extraordinary an instance of 
 the disobedience of them as that which he reports in his letter of the 
 5th instant. 
 
 By the papers transmitted with Lieutenant-Colonel Brown's letter of
 
 634 THE SOPHISTRY OF EXTORTION EXPOSED AND BRANDED. 
 
 the 5th instant, Colonel Wellesley observes that Lieutenant and 
 
 Ensign , being officers of the day, reported that the ' garrison is 
 
 distressed,' and ' in great distress,' for want of bread. Colonel Wellesley 
 desires that Lieutenant-Colonel Brown will make him acquainted with the 
 orders for the duty of the officer of the day at Hullihall, particularly 
 mentioning whether the state of the provisions in the bazaar of Hullihall 
 comes under the cognizance of that officer. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 367. The D. A. G. to Major * * * *, commanding a 
 detachment of H. M. — regt. 
 
 Exposition of the futility of excuses pleaded for levying purveyance in the 
 Mysore country. Restitution required. 
 
 7 th Dec, 1802. 
 
 I have laid your letter of this date before Major Gen. the Hon. 
 A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, who desires me to inform you 
 
 that he consents to your joining the part of the regt. stationed at 
 
 Vellore ; but previous to your departure the General thinks it necessary 
 to advert to your conduct, since you came last into the Mysore country. 
 Complaints have come from every place at which the detachment of 
 those under your command halted on its march to Seringapatam, of im- 
 proprieties committed by you : such as your obliging the bazaar people 
 of the villages, near which you halted, to pay you certain duties and 
 customs ; and the amildars to furnish for your use certain articles, for 
 which you never paid. These complaints having been referred to you, 
 you have stated, in reply to them, that you were informed by persons, to 
 whose advice you acknowledge that you would not have trusted in any 
 other case, that you had a right to the duties, customs, and presents 
 which you claimed; and that you never forced any thing from the 
 amildars, or inhabitants of the villages through which you passed, but 
 that every thing was given to you without trouble, upon your simply 
 asking what was your right; and that your servant had orders to pay 
 for every thing received for your use. Upon this subject Major Gen. 
 Wellesley directs me to recall to your recollection that an officer of 
 your rank should, in a case of this kind, refer for information upon a 
 doubtful point, not to a person whose advice he would not take upon any 
 other occasion, but to the Articles of War, or to his superior officers, 
 from either of which authorities you would have found that conviction of 
 the practices of which you have been accused costs an officer only his 
 commission. But although you have acknowledged that you did follow 
 bad advice upon this occasion, you also declare that you did nothing 
 blamable ; and that every thing was given to you without violence, and 
 upon your asking simply what was your right. The General observes
 
 RESTITUTION ORDERED. SUBALTERN OFFICIOUSNESS. 6$$ 
 
 upon this statement, in the first place, that the amildars of the Mysore 
 country knew, as well as the collectors in the Company's territory, that 
 those demands are not the right of the commanding officers of detach- 
 ments, and they are full as likely to refuse to admit them : secondly, that, 
 if they could have imagined that you had such rights, they would not have 
 complained when you exercised them. The General rather supposes 
 that your advisers thought it probable that the amildars in this country 
 would so far forget their duty as to admit those demands without 
 complaint, and therefore they were made, although no officer would 
 have ventured to make such within the Company's territories. It may 
 be perfectly true that the persons on whom you levied those duties and 
 customs were no losers, because you permitted them, and they did 
 charge prices in proportion on the goods which they sold; but you 
 forget the officers and men under your command, and those who follow 
 them, who were made to pay double the price of every thing they 
 consumed, in order that a few fanams might be put into your pocket. 
 This conduct the General considers, upon the whole, so repugnant to 
 every military principle, and to the customs of the service, so far as he is 
 acquainted with them, and to the Rules and Articles of War, that he 
 would have deemed it his duty to bring it before a General Court Martial, 
 only that he perceives, by the G. O. 22nd Sept. 1802, the Rt. Hon. the 
 Governor in Council has taken measures to prevent the recurrence of 
 such practices. He cannot, however, deliver his sentiments upon the 
 subject without expressing his abhorrence of them, and his concern that 
 
 an officer, particularly a field officer of the regt., should have been 
 
 accused of them. Major Gen. Wellesley further directs me to subjoin an 
 abstract of the value of the articles received by you, and not paid for, at 
 the several stages ; and of the taxes levied by you on the shops, including 
 the money stopped by your servant out of the price of sheep, for whose 
 conduct, in such cases, you are answerable ; and to inform you that the 
 amount must be returned by you to the Mysore Circar, for the use of the 
 inhabitants. 
 
 368. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor. 
 
 Subalterns not to put each other in arrest, except in case of absolute 
 necessity. 
 (Extract.) Camp, 3rd July, 1803. 
 
 I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the practice which 
 prevails among subaltern officers of putting each other in arrest. It 
 originates in an indifference regarding the necessity of appearing 
 before a court martial which prevails in all parts of the country ; indeed 
 this feeling ought not to be called indifference, because I rather imagine 
 that the majority of the army would prefer to appear before a court
 
 636 TECHNICAL ACQUITTAL NO HONOUR. PEST OF SCRIBBLING. 
 
 martial, as they deem it a stage on which they can show their abilities. 
 In my opinion it will be proper to issue a General Order to prohibit the 
 practice of which you disapprove, and to desire that when an officer has 
 cause to complain of the conduct of another, he shall complain to their 
 mutual superior, if there should be one within reach, and that he shall not 
 proceed to put another officer in arrest excepting in a case of absolute 
 necessity, of which the proof will be required of him. 
 
 369. To Lieutenant- Colonel Boles, President of a General 
 Court Martial. 
 
 Courts Martial ought not to give sentence of honourable acquittal ' merely 
 where there is a defect of the proof of guilt! 
 (Extract.) Camp, iSth July, 1803. 
 
 A sentence of honourable acquittal by a general court martial may 
 justly be deemed by an officer to be the very best testimonial of 
 character that it is possible for him to receive in relation to the subject 
 which has been the object of their inquiry; but in proportion as this 
 sentence is prized by the officers of the army ought those whose duty it 
 may be to be members of a court martial to be cautious not to pass it 
 excepting in cases in which the innocence of the accused may be clear 
 to the whole world. If sentences of honourable acquittal are passed 
 merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt, it is obvious that they 
 must lose their force in the eyes of the world, an officer on whom such 
 a one may be passed will still be an object of suspicion, and such 
 sentences will lose their value. 
 
 370. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor. 
 
 Scribendi KaKor^Bes among officers to be checked. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp, 30th July, 1803. 
 
 I wish that you would give a hint to Major that there is no 
 
 occasion for so much correspondence among officers in the same 
 cantonment, and that I desire that he will communicate verbally with 
 those under his command instead of in writing, excepting on occasions 
 in which writing is absolutely necessary. These disputes in that corps 
 would not have occurred if the art of writing had never been invented, 
 and Captain and the doctor had not imagined that they pos- 
 sessed it.
 
 PRIVATE QUARRELS INJURE THE PUBLIC SERVICE. 637 
 
 371. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay. 
 
 The same subject. 
 (Extract.) Camp, nth Nov., 1803, 
 
 I take the liberty * * to recommend as a general rule, that 
 between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally, 
 correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to 
 prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public 
 officers who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to 
 copy, those voluminous documents about nothing. 
 
 372. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 The service not to suffer through the private quarrels of officers. 
 
 (Extracts.) Camp, 14th Sept., 1803. 
 
 I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the 
 consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general 
 referrible to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have 
 no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is 
 undoubtedly a public concern ; but, in many instances, it would be 
 much more proper, and more creditable for both parties, to settle these 
 differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public, 
 by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court 
 Martial. This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable 
 that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be 
 required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country ; 
 and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the 
 attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects 
 which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon, by a 
 General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique. 
 
 I therefore most anxiously deprecate this trial; and I beg you to 
 
 inform Capt. H , that I recommend him to withdraw his letters 
 
 and his charges against Lieut. Col. W , and make that officer such 
 
 an apology as will induce him to consent to his being released from 
 
 arrest. I enclose you all the papers which I received upon this subject. 
 
 ******** 
 
 If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will 
 be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and 
 from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable 
 to be attacked by the enemy ; and they are to remain at the place at 
 which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to 
 assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.
 
 638 A PUBLIC INSULT SHOULD BE PUBLICLY PUNISHED. 
 
 373. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General 
 Court Martial. 
 
 A private reprimand an inadequate punishment for insulting a ?nagislrale 
 in consequence of his acts as such. 
 
 Sir, Camp, 5th Oct., 1803. 
 
 I had yesterday the honour of receiving the duplicate proceedings of 
 the general court martial on the trial of Lieutenant . 
 
 There does not appear to be the smallest doubt that that officer 
 applied to Mr. Drummond for his interference as a magistrate, and that he 
 wrote him the letter No. 3 in the proceedings because the result of that 
 magisterial interference was not such as he wished it to be. It is not even 
 
 denied by Lieutenant that that letter is a very improper one, and, 
 
 as expressed in the charge, it is certainly ' couched in intemperate and 
 
 indecorous terms.' Lieutenant , therefore, is guilty of having 
 
 written that letter to Mr. Drummond in consequence of his act as a 
 magistrate. 
 
 It is immaterial whether the letter is private or public ; indeed, it is 
 difficult to draw the distinction between them. If the letter were 
 intended to be the ground of a private quarrel and its consequences, 
 it is still more reprehensible than if it were intended as a public offence 
 to a public officer, as it is well known that no public officer whatever 
 can do his duty, particularly one in a judicial capacity, if he be not 
 protected from the insults of those who may apply to him for redress, 
 
 as Lieutenant did in this instance, or who may be brought 
 
 before him. 
 
 I beg that the members of the general court martial will individually 
 and collectively consider their own situation, and whether it is consistent 
 with propriety or the common rules of justice that those who are em- 
 ployed to sit in judgment on the conduct of others should be liable to 
 insult (the intention of which is in this instance avowed) for their acts;, 
 and after that I beg them to decide whether a private reprimand, which, 
 at all events, is an improper punishment, is adequate to the offence of 
 which Lieutenant has been guilty. 
 
 I request that the sentence of this court martial may be revised. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesi.ey.
 
 PERILOUS TENDENCY OF REGIMENTAL DISPUTES. 639 
 
 374. To Major Doolan. 
 
 Frivolous and factious regimental quarrels highly dangerous to the public 
 interests, especially in lime of war ; and to the European officers engaged 
 in them. 
 
 (Extracts.) Cam P< 6th 0ct - l8o 3- 
 
 I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th September, 
 and it is with concern that I observe the existence of fresh disputes and 
 divisions in the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, under your command. 
 I was in hopes that, after what passed upon a former similar occasion, 
 the officers of that corps would have stifled their animosities; and, at 
 all events, I expected that they would have been suspended in a time of 
 war, and that their attention would have been directed to the security 
 of the important post under their charge. Instead of that, instead of 
 receiving from them or from you reports of their observations on the 
 situation and designs of the Mahrattas in their neighbourhood, my 
 attention is claimed at this interesting moment by paltry disputes about 
 nothing, the only effect of which must be to prove the entire absence 
 and annihilation of discipline and subordination in the 1st battalion 
 5th Bombay regiment. So trifling are these disputes, that I would not 
 even take the trouble of writing upon the subject, did I not observe 
 from them that the adjutant is at the head of a party in the corps 
 formed against you, and that the influence of the European officers has 
 been exerted in order to introduce the Native officers into the party. 
 
 This appears in the clearest manner from the sentence of the 
 garrison court martial on the writer, John Rodriguez. The slightest 
 knowledge of the Native character, particularly of that of the Native 
 officers of the army, will make it clear that those who tried John 
 Rodriguez would not have acquitted him when such evidence appeared 
 against him, and particularly would not have used offensive terms in 
 their sentence of acquittal when the commanding officer of their battalion 
 and of the garrison was his prosecutor, if they had not been abetted and 
 encouraged by the adjutant and the European officers. 
 
 This conduct is highly dangerous to the public interests, as well as to 
 the European officers in question. They are mistaken if they suppose 
 that they can uphold discipline and subordination among the Native 
 troops under their command (which, in a moment of difficulty, may be 
 essential to the safety not only of the important post of which they have 
 charge, but of their own persons), if they don't support the authority of, 
 and oblige the Native officers to respect, their commanding officer. 
 * #■# * * * * * 
 
 In respect to Lieutenant 's charges against you, some of them 
 
 are of a serious nature, and others are frivolous, and are to be attributed
 
 640 OFFICERS NOT TO TAKE GOODS ON CREDIT. 
 
 to the dispute respecting the writer, in which Lieutenant was 
 
 wrong. It is probable also that those of a serious nature, and which 
 alone concern the public, viz., the 3rd and 5th charges, would not have 
 been brought forward if it had not been for the existence of this dispute ; 
 and the whole, therefore, may be referred to private motives. 
 
 At any time I should hesitate before I should put an officer in arrest 
 and upon his trial for the gratification of private revenge; but at the 
 present moment, when the exertions and attention of every officer ought 
 to be turned to the defence and protection of the rights and interests 
 of his country, I shall certainly neither deprive your country of your 
 services by putting you in arrest, nor take up the time and attention of 
 other officers in trying you upon these charges. 
 
 I beg that this letter may be entered in the regimental book of the 
 1 st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, and that you will assemble the 
 officers under your command and read it to them; and at the same 
 time communicate to them my anxious desire that their animosities 
 may be buried in oblivion, and that they will direct their attention to the 
 discipline and subordination of the troops under their command, and to 
 the security of the important post of which they have charge. 
 
 375. G. A. O. 
 
 Officers to pay ready money for shop goods. 
 
 Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec, 1803. 
 The Parsee merchant has represented that Native servants come to 
 his shop and take away goods without paying for them or giving a 
 receipt, and sometimes without leaving their master's name, by which 
 conduct he is in danger of being ruined. As the credit of the army, 
 as well as its future convenience, is interested in preventing this, Major- 
 General Wellesley requests that, when gentlemen send their servants to 
 the Parsee's shop for goods, they will send ready money to pay for what 
 they want, as the man has resolved not to allow any thing to be carried 
 away by servants until paid for. 
 
 The 5th brigade to furnish a havildar's guard immediately, for the care 
 of the Parsee merchant's property. It is to be relieved daily. 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 376. To Colonel Murray. 
 
 Military inefficiency, from improper use of men or equipments, worse than 
 
 indiscipline. 
 (Extract.) Camp, 26th Jan., 1804. 
 
 I have to observe, that there is a tendency in the service in this 
 country to admit abuses beyond any other that I have met with.
 
 PRIVATE DIVERSION OF MILITARY MEANS, RUINOUS. 641 
 
 I cannot say whether this is to be attributed to former habits and 
 example, or to the laxity which must attend all distant establishments. 
 But of this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a commanding 
 officer to resist every thing of the kind in a most determined manner. 
 The want of discipline among troops is very bad, and renders them 
 useless ; but the want of efficiency, which is the result of the application to 
 private purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as troops, 
 or as the necessary attendants or equipments of these troops, is worse, 
 as it may exist with a certain degree and appearance of discipline, and 
 government may be misled by the notion that they have an army, 
 whereas they have nothing but paper. 
 
 The troops under your command are in a distant country, and they 
 can come but seldom under the view or inspection of the government ; 
 it is therefore particularly incumbent on you to take care that no practice 
 or custom shall exist which may destroy their discipline or lessen their 
 efficiency ; and I beg leave to assure you, that without the most constant 
 vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert these evils. 
 
 377. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron, commanding at 
 Seringapatam. 
 
 Strong obligation of British officers to support the authority of the civil 
 
 magistrate. 
 
 (Extract.) Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804. 
 
 As a British officer I have always considered it to be my duty, nay 
 more, an honourable distinction to the character of a British officer, 
 to support the laws and the authority of the magistrates who administer 
 them. In this country in particular, in which His Majesty's European 
 subjects are not liable to the jurisdiction of the courts of justice 
 established by the laws of our country for the government of the 
 Natives of India, it is more particularly incumbent on those British 
 officers, who have a due sense of the honour of their profession and 
 situation, to support the authority of the magistrates appointed by 
 government to preside in those courts. 
 
 378. To Major Symons. 
 
 The same subject. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804. 
 
 In the event of the use of improper language or of improper and 
 contemptuous behaviour towards you by any Native officer or soldier, 
 
 T t
 
 642 SOLDIERS SHOULD SUPPORT THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE. 
 
 or any Native of any description, you have in your hands the power of 
 supporting and vindicating your own authority, and I desire that you 
 will use it. It is not to be supposed that any European officer will 
 behave improperly to a magistrate ; but if there should be such a one, 
 the principles and inclinations of my mind as a British subject, and my 
 sense of my duty as a British officer, will induce me to take the 
 measures which I have in my power to bring to trial and to punish- 
 ment the officer who may be guilty of a contempt of the laws or the 
 person of one of the magistrates. 
 
 379. To Lord Ellenborough. 
 
 How the officers of the East India Company's army are excited 
 
 to mutiny. 
 
 (Extract.) Stratfield Saye, 7th Sept., 1829. 
 
 Mutiny in the East India Company's army is not a novelty. In my 
 time there have been three, of which two were of the European officers. 
 There was another in the time of Lord Clive. There are some pecu- 
 liarities in the situation of these officers, of which we must never lose 
 sight in all discussions affecting their interests. The native army in 
 India is and must always be, under all circumstances, a local army ; and 
 the officers belonging to it must be during their service local as well as 
 the army to which they belong. This must be the case whatever may 
 be the future constitution of the government, and whether the army be 
 the King's or the Company's. 
 
 The officers of that local army are not and cannot be of the same 
 description of men as those of the properly called British army. These 
 are composed of all classes of the higher ranks of society, and they 
 cannot long pursue a course that is not consistent with the public 
 interests. 
 
 There are many excellent men among the officers of the East India 
 Company's army. But they are all originally men without fortune. 
 They go to India solely and exclusively that they may subsist as 
 gentlemen ; they are in general totally disconnected from any interest 
 in their country, and their feeling for it is a desire and hope to find in 
 it a healthy spot in which to pass the end of their lives at their ease and 
 in comfort. They toil through the active part of their lives with no 
 other object in view than that, and of course they become discontented 
 and disposed to mutiny if that object is removed to a greater distance 
 from them, or rendered more difficult to be attained. 
 
 I don't mean to assert that they are all disposed to mutiny, but among 
 such men many so disposed will be found, and these the most active 
 and energetic of the whole ; and but little experience is required to show
 
 WHY ARE COMPANY'S OFFICERS TEMPTED TO MUTINY? 643 
 
 that when men of this description are found to take the lead in such 
 acts, others, however unwillingly and however lamenting every step they 
 take, are too ready to follow the example. T 1 ^re are some circum- 
 stances in the times which are peculiarly calculated to excite the dis- 
 position of these officers to mutiny, and to render their perseverance in 
 the mutiny more constant, and to increase the difficulty of overcoming it. 
 One of these is the hopelessness of promotion. The truth is that 
 men live for many years after they are no longer capable of rendering 
 service to the State, and such as these enjoy the honours and emoluments 
 of the military profession in India as well as elsewhere, to enjoy which 
 their juniors are eagerly and impatiently looking forward. These juniors 
 do not reflect that their turn will eventually come. What they want, and 
 want exclusively, is to possess riches and to enjoy honours. 
 
 Another excitement to mutiny among these officers is the absolute 
 impossibility of their living in their own country at their ease, and in the 
 respectable society in which they have been accustomed to live in India, 
 upon the income which they can hope to possess upon their return to 
 England. The increased expense of living and luxury in England is the 
 cause of this circumstance. 
 
 Another excitement to mutiny, and I beg you to attend to it, will cer- 
 tainly be the colonization of India even to a moderate degree. That which 
 brings these officers to England at the close of their service is that they 
 cannot hope to retain their health and to educate their families in India. 
 But if the country is colonised ; if hundreds of European families estab- 
 lished within it, exist with better or worse health as in the West Indies, 
 rear and educate families better or worse, is it to be believed that the 
 example will not have an effect upon the disposition of the European 
 officers of the Native army ? 
 
 Then there is another excitement to mutiny in the increasing dis- 
 position in this country to emigrate to the United States, occasioned by 
 the glowing descriptions of that country, and of its influence and power, 
 by all writers upon it, even our own. 
 
 The officers would naturally look to retire to the United States if their 
 disputes with their own country should he irreconcilable, and at all 
 events to support and assistance from the United States during their 
 mutinous struggle with their own country. I have written thus much 
 just to show you that we must not look lightly at a question of mutiny in 
 the East Indies. 
 
 T t 2
 
 $44 the service— first claim on all public means. 
 
 4. Miscellaneous. 
 
 380. To the Adjutant-General, Bombay. 
 
 All the public means ought to be applied to the public service when 
 necessary. 
 
 g IR Sep'n^apatam, 23rd April, 1800. 
 
 I have to inform you that when I was in the province of Malabar 
 I was desirous on many accounts that the flank companies of the 
 84th Regiment, which had been brought from Goa for the proposed 
 service in Malabar, should be sent back to that place when it was 
 determined that that service should not take place. At the request of 
 Colonel Sartorius, part of them were taken in the Fly, commanded by 
 Captain Hayes, and in a vessel belonging to Cannanore which went 
 with her; and a letter was written to Captain Hall of the Intrepid, 
 which vessel was lying at Calicui, to request that he would take to Goa 
 those men who still remained at Cannanore. To this letter an answer 
 was received stating that Captain Hall had no room in his ship for the 
 men ; but as I had heard that she was not so full as it would appear by 
 this answer, I wrote to the President of the Commission, who was then 
 at Mahd, to request that the Inlrepid might be sent to Cannanore in 
 order that it might be ascertained whether she could receive the men 
 or not. The Centurion was at Cannanore when the Intrepid arrived on 
 the 15th instant, and I hear from Colonel Sartorius that Captain Rainier 
 having sent an officer to examine whether she was capable of receiving 
 men, had stated that she could take some. In the mean time, however, 
 a letter came from Admiral Rainier in which he desired that the Centurion 
 might take the men, in answer to an application from Colonel Sartorius 
 and myself; and I must also state that Captain Rainier had consented 
 to take them before this letter arrived. The Inlrepid in consequence 
 received none. 
 
 As the public service has not been put to any inconvenience by this 
 refusal by Captain Hall to give the public means under his charge to 
 forward it, it may not appear absolutely necessary to bring this matter 
 forward to a public investigation. I make it known to the Commander- 
 in-Chief and to Government only to show the necessity of some reform 
 in this branch of their service. They have a right to require from those 
 in whose hands they place the command of their troops the most prompt 
 and ready execution of their orders, and of those measures which the public 
 service may require, and an attention to economy in carrying their measures 
 forward ; but I beg to observe that if all the public means are not to 
 be applied to the public service when necessary, if they can be kept 
 back with impunity and applied to private ends at the will of any
 
 21/05 T OF THE HILL FORTS SHOULD BE DEMOLISHED. 645 
 
 individual, the responsibility attending delay and expense ought not to 
 be laid upon the commanding officers of the troops. 
 
 I have been further induced to bring this subject under the view of 
 the Commander-in-Chief, as I have been informed by Colonel Sarlorius 
 that it is not uncommon for the gentlemen in command of the Company's 
 cruisers to recuse iheir assistance when it is required for the public 
 service on the Malabar coast ; and that one of them did refuse it upon 
 a late occasion, when Colonel Sarlorius was desirous of availing himself 
 of it to remove part of the detachment intended for field-service from 
 Cannanore to Calicut. 
 
 In writing upon this subject, it is but justice to Captain Hayes to 
 inform you that I found in him the greatest readiness to forward the 
 public service, and that Colonel Sartorius speaks highly of the assistance 
 which he has received from him. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 381. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick. 
 
 The hill /oris ought to be destroyed. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Chittledroog, nth June, 1800. 
 
 Our hill forts in general are worse than useless. They are so 
 unhealthy that it is not possible to leave a large body of people or 
 an European officer on the hill: he consequently resides below, and 
 sends a small guard to the top of the hill ; and the whole party are at 
 all times liable to be surprised and cut off. Under these circumstances 
 it would appear that it would be better to withdraw our garrisons from 
 all these places ; but then they would be occupied by the Polygars by 
 whom they were originally built, they would instantly rebel and oppose 
 the authority of government, and it would require almost an army to 
 retake each hill fort. If they are abandoned they must at the same 
 time be entirely destroyed, and particularly all the means which they have 
 of affording a supply of water must be totally destroyed. 
 
 In fact the hill forts in general are bad posts for us, and the sooner 
 they are destroyed the better. 
 
 382. To Lieutenant-Colonel Spry. 
 
 Officers who build houses on cantonment ground are entitled, strictly 
 speaking, on selling them, to receive the price of the materials only. 
 My DEAR Sir, Seringapatam, 5th June, 1802. 
 
 I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 30th May, 
 and have taken into consideration the subject to which it relates.
 
 646 TEMERE JEDIFICAVIT IN ALIENO SOLO. 
 
 My opinion is, that, when the commanding officer in Canara pointed 
 out a piece of ground for a cantonment for the 75th regiment, he 
 intended that it should be the spot for a cantonment for the corps which 
 should relieve the 75th ; and it stands to reason that the ground allotted 
 to the officers was not excepted from the general rule. Accordingly, 
 I conclude that the officers of the 75th regiment have no grant of the 
 ground on which they built their houses, and that their right to it must 
 have depended upon their being officers belonging to the corps which 
 occupied the cantonment. If this be true, they can have no possible 
 right to sell any more of their houses than the materials ; indeed, a 
 purchaser of more would throw away his money, as it would be in the 
 power of the commanding officer in the cantonment alloUed by govern- 
 ment to his regiment to prevent any person, excepting one belonging to 
 the regiment, from residing within his lines. 
 
 I am very far from being of opinion that an officer who succeeds to 
 another in a cantonment ought to insist upon his selling his house for 
 the value of the materials. In many cases the house must be worth a 
 larger sum, and it would be for the convenience and benefit of the 
 supposed purchaser that the materials should be allowed to stand in the 
 shape of a house, for which benefit it is but fair that the purchaser 
 should pay something; but, although the purchaser ought to pay some 
 advance on the value of the materials, I am far from thinking the seller 
 entitled to the whole sum which he would get for the house from any 
 man in the bazaar. In short, this question, like most others, depends 
 much upon the disposition of both parties to accommodate each other. 
 On the one hand, the purchaser ought to give a fair price for the house, 
 being rather more than the value of the materials, to which alone the 
 seller can have any right; and on the other, the seller ought not to 
 attempt to ask for it the full sum which he would get for it if he should 
 have the power of selling it in the bazaar. 
 
 This is my private opinion upon the question which you have put to 
 me. I observe, however, that it is one of general importance, the decision 
 upon which may affect more corps than the 75th and 77th regiments, 
 and I am rather desirous that it should be decided by the Commander- 
 in-Chief. I beg, therefore, that you will write me a public letter upon 
 the subject, which I can refer to him. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley.
 
 QUJERENDA ON FORTS : — STATE OF WORKS; ORDNANCE; 647 
 
 383. To the Officers commanding Chittledroog, Paughur, Nun- 
 dydroog; to be communicated to those commanding Mud- 
 gherry, Mergasie, and G-oorybunda. 
 
 Detailed information to be supplied by the commandants of forts, on occasion 
 
 of their inspection by Major- General Welles ley. 
 Sir 2Ist Aug., 1802. 
 
 The Deputy-Adjutant-General will already have acquainted you with 
 my intention to visit the station under your command in a short time, and 
 he will hereafter make you acquainted with the exact period of my arrival. 
 In the mean time there are certain points which I am about to detail 
 regarding the situation of the fortress under your command, into which 
 I propose to inspect minutely, and I have to request you to be prepared 
 with all the information in your power. 
 
 First. Regarding the works of the fort, you will be prepared — 
 
 1 st. With a report upon the exact state of the works of the fort under 
 your command ; distinguishing those of the upper from those of the lower 
 fort, with a statement of the materials of which those works are con- 
 structed. To this report you will add your remarks upon the advantage 
 or the disadvantage of the present works for the defence of the fort. 
 
 2nd. I should wish to have your opinion regarding the most prac- 
 ticable mode of improving the defences of the fort under your command. 
 In giving this opinion you will attend as much as may be practicable 
 to the following points: — 1st. To reduce the works as much as possible 
 without weakening the defences of the fort; 2ndly. To the improvement 
 of the communication for troops, the transportation of ordnance and 
 stores and provisions not only from one part of each line to another, 
 but from one line to the others; 3rdly. To the remedying of such 
 glaring defects in the fortifications, the existence of which may be 
 dangerous to the fort ; to supply the deficiencies of the means of giving 
 flanking fire, and to obtain the necessary degree of strength and security. 
 4thly. I wish you to examine particularly those parts of the upper fort 
 which are deemed inaccessible, and therefore but slenderly or not at all 
 fortified. You will report your opinion regarding the fact whether the 
 fort is or is not accessible at such points. 
 
 Secondly. Regarding the ordnance on the works in the fort under 
 your command, you will be prepared — 
 
 1 st. With a return stating the number, description, and state of such 
 ordnance, and a detail stating in what places it is situated. 
 
 2ndly. I should wish to have your opinion regarding the sufficiency of 
 that ordnance for the defence of the fort, and of its deficiency. In giving 
 this opinion I request you to consider whether light guns may not be 
 preferable to heavy in many situations ; and you will be so kind as to
 
 648 USE AS DEPOT; GARRISON; STORES; BUILDING MATERIALS; 
 
 report particularly in what situations, on account of the abrupt steepness 
 of the rock, the aid of depressing carriages would be desirable. 
 
 Thirdly. Regarding the possibility of using the fort under your 
 command as a depot of military stores and provisions, I request you to 
 be prepared — 
 
 1 st. With a report stating the number, size, description, and state of 
 repair of the buildings in the fort under your command applicable to 
 containing ordnance, military stores, powder, grain, and provisions 
 respectively. In this report you will specify whether such buildings are 
 in the upper or the lower fort ; and if in the upper, you will state your 
 opinion regarding the mode of communicating with them ; whether 
 it would be practicable to make a road to them for the use of bullocks 
 or coolies, without injuring the strength of the work ; and if that should 
 not be practicable, whether it would be so to construct a simple 
 machinery by means of which it would be possible to lodge and draw 
 from such buildings the grain or stores as might be necessary. 2ndly. 
 You will report the repairs necessary to these buildings, applicable to 
 containing ordnance and military stores, grain, and provisions. 
 
 Fourthly. Regarding the garrison, you will be prepared with a report, 
 stating, 1 st. Your opinion regarding the number of troops necessary for 
 the defence of the fort in case it should be attacked ; 2ndly. You will 
 report the description, state of repair, size, and number of the buildings 
 in the fort applicable to the convenience of the troops, whether as 
 barracks or hospital for Europeans ; barracks, hospital, or place of arms 
 for natives, garrison guard rooms, &c. &c. In this report you will specify 
 where each building is situated. 3rdly. You will report your opinion of 
 the repairs necessary to the buildings detailed in the second article of this 
 fourth head. 
 
 Fifthly. Regarding the stores at present in the fort, you will be 
 prepared — ■ 
 
 1 st. With an accurate return of the description, number, state of the 
 ordnance, and military stores in the fort under your command on the 
 1 st of the month in which you will give in these reports. 
 
 2ndly. With an accurate return of the grain and provisions, dry and 
 wet, on the same day. 
 
 Sixthly. Regarding the materials for building, and those for the 
 construction of ordnance and military stores, you will be prepared with 
 a report — 
 
 1 st. Stating the quantities of store materials in store in the fort under 
 your command applicable to store purposes respectively. 
 
 2ndly. The nature and quantities of materials for buildings found in 
 the neighbourhood of the fort, in old or useless buildings. 
 
 3rdly. The price of materials for the construction of buildings, 
 ordnance and military stores at the place under your command.
 
 WORKMEN; WATER SUPPLY; NAMES OF WORKS. 649 
 
 4thly. The distance from the fort under your command of the place 
 or places at which such materials are found. The mode in which they 
 are brought from such place, and the expense attending their trans- 
 portation. 
 
 Seventhly. Regarding the workmen to be procured at the place under 
 your command. You will be so kind as to report whether workmen can 
 be procured there in any large numbers, the prices of their labour, dis- 
 tinguishing them as artificers and coolies. 
 
 Eighthly. You will be prepared with a report of the mode in 
 which the fort is supplied with water, the number of reservoirs, where 
 situated, and in what manner constructed, and if they contain water at 
 all seasons. 
 
 You will be so kind as to ascertain whether all the different works in the 
 fort under your command, such as bastions, redoubts, batteries, cavaliers, 
 &c. &c. have names or numbers ; and if they have, you will announce 
 such names in the garrison orderly book as being the invariable names or 
 numbers of such works. You will be so kind as to number such works 
 as have not at present any name or number, and you will announce such 
 number in the garrison orderly book, and you will have it marked in 
 conspicuous figures on the work to which it will be assigned. 
 
 The magazines, the grain and provision and ordnance store-rooms, 
 if not already named or numbered, should be numbered in like 
 manner. 
 
 In the examination of the works, buildings, ordnance and stores, 
 &c. &c, upon which I have above informed you that I shall require 
 reports, I leave it to your discretion either to assemble committees to 
 make this examination and to frame the reports, or to do it alone. 
 
 I have, &c, 
 
 Arthur Wellesley. 
 
 384. k To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 
 
 Martial law indispensable in a lawless land. 
 (Extract.) Bombay, 27th March, 1804. 
 
 The patel of Batculgaum, in the usual style of a Marhatta patel, keeps 
 a band of plunderers for his own profit and advantage. You will inform 
 him that if he does not pay for the horses, bullocks, and articles plundered, 
 he shall be hanged also. You will make him acquaint his village with 
 this determination, and allow time for the answer to return ; and you will 
 hang him if he does not pay the money at the time fixed upon. It is 
 impossible to get on without these punishments in the Marhatta country. 
 The Peshwah has no authority ; and if he had, he would not exert it for 
 the advantage of our troops.
 
 650 LET NOT THY LEFT HAND KNO W WHA T THY RIGHT DOETH. 
 
 385. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace. 
 
 Importance to a commanding officer of habitual secrecy on public matters. 
 (Extract.) Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804. 
 
 I believe that in my public despatches I have alluded to every point to 
 which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will 
 mention to you, that is the secrecy of all your proceedings. 
 
 There is nothing more certain than that, of 100 affairs, 99 might be 
 posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests ; but 
 the misfortune is that, where the public business is the subject of general 
 conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon every 
 occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which 
 it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables dis- 
 cerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) 
 invariably to find it out ; and it may be depended upon that, whenever 
 the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is 
 exposed to public view. For this reason secrecy is always best, and 
 those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs 
 are in the habit of never making known public business of any des- 
 cription, that it is not necessary that the public should know. The 
 consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a 
 habit as it is to others to talk of public matters ; and they have it in 
 their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper. 
 
 I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have been the means 
 of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you 
 should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never 
 occur to you, but it is essentially necessary. Remember, that what I re- 
 commend to you is far removed from mystery : in fact, I recommend 
 silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid 
 the necessity of mystery upon any. 
 
 386. To Lord Bathurst. 
 
 Position of officers of Kings troops in India. 
 
 (Extract.) London, 26th Jan., 1824. 
 
 I cannot but agree * * that the situation of the officers of the 
 King's troops in India is very painful. The gallant and brilliant parts 
 of the service are performed by them. The rewards, in that country 
 at least, are given to the officers of the local army. The King's army 
 in the East Indies is the finest and best in the world, and I must observe 
 that it owes part of its excellence to some of the circumstances attending 
 their situation, of which the writer complains. It is true that they are
 
 MATURE MEN FITTEST FOR SOLDIERS IN INDIA. 65 1 
 
 cut off from all social intercourse with natives or others ; but the con- 
 sequence of that circumstance is that they have nothing to attend to 
 but their discipline, and they acquire military habits and a character 
 peculiar to themselves which have enabled them to perform some glorious 
 services. 
 
 387. To the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn. 
 
 At what age European soldiers may most safely be sent to India. 
 My DEAR Wynn, London, 25th July, 1826. 
 
 I return Sir Herbert Taylor's letter and the Memorandum enclosed. 
 
 I have always considered that men from thirty to forty years of age, 
 particularly if they have been soldiers till that age, are the most efficient 
 for soldiers, particularly in warm climates. As well as I recollect, we 
 thought them so when I served in the East Indies ; and I understand 
 that they are still thought so serviceable, as that men of the age of thirty- 
 five are received from the King's service into that of the East India 
 Company when the King's regiments are ordered home from India. 
 
 If I am not mistaken, you would find at the end of five years' service 
 in the East Indies, or of ten years' service, more men alive who should 
 commence their service at thirty or thirty-five years of age than you 
 would of the same numbers who should have commenced their service 
 at the ordinary age of recruits, viz., from eighteen to twenty-two or 
 twenty-three. If I am right, it would be cheaper for the East India 
 Company to send out the former. 
 
 Believe me, &c, 
 
 Wellington.
 
 6$2 ORIGIN OF THE MADRAS AND BENGAL ARMIES. 
 
 III. ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTATIONS. 
 
 388. Rise and Development of the Indian Army 1 . 
 
 Company's forces first raised in Madras. 
 
 The first establishment of the Company's Indian Army may be 
 considered to date from the year 1748, when a small body of • Sepoys 
 was raised at Madras, after the example set by the French, for the 
 defence of that settlement, during the course of the war which had 
 broken out, four years previously, between France and England. At the 
 same time a small European force was raised, formed of such sailors as 
 could be spared from the ships on the coast, and of men smuggled on 
 board the Company's vessels in England by the crimps. An officer, 
 Major Lawrence, was appointed by a commission from the Company to 
 command their forces in India. 
 
 Hostilities between the English and French were terminated in the 
 following year (1749), on the receipt of news of the Treaty of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle ; but, about the same time, the settlements of both nations 
 began to take an active part in the politics of the peninsula, and the 
 engagements into which the English entered with the parties whose 
 cause they supported, led to a rapid increase of the Madras native 
 army, stimulated further by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War 
 in 1756. 
 
 Rise of Bengal Army. 
 
 During this time, Calcutta remained a purely commercial settlement, 
 and the military force with which Clive retook that place, in 1757, 
 from the Nawab of Bengal, and won the Battle of Plassey, was 
 principally composed of Madras troops, native and European, with 
 part of a royal regiment of foot. On the English becoming virtual 
 masters of Bengal, Clive proceeded to raise a Sepoy force after the 
 Madras pattern, commanded by English officers, and supplemented by a 
 force of local European infantry and artillery. The complications 
 which soon followed in Bengal politics, arising out of the deposition of 
 successive Nawabs by their new masters, and the efforts of the party of 
 
 1 Indian Polity, by Major George Chesney, 1868, pp. 275-284, 1st edition.
 
 GROWTH AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BENGAL ARMF. 6$$ 
 
 the Emperor to recover that country, led to a rapid augmentation of 
 the Bengal Army, which, in 1772, consisted of 21 native battalions, 
 3 battalions of Europeans, and 4 companies of artillery. The native 
 battalions were about 800 strong, and were commanded each by a 
 captain, with a few subalterns attached; the European battalions and 
 the artillery companies were more fully officered, but were usually very 
 weak in men. In all, there was a nominal strength of about 3,500 
 Europeans and 24,000 natives, with more than 600 officers. The army 
 was divided into seven brigades, the battalions of which remained 
 always together. Each brigade was commanded by a field-officer, the 
 whole army by a general officer commissioned by the Company, a 
 charter of 1753 vesting them with authority to raise troops and appoint 
 officers. It was with an army so constituted that the campaigns were 
 fought which terminated in the final subjugation of Behar, and placed 
 the Emperor and Nawab-Vizier of Oudh at the mercy of Clive, on his 
 second return to India in 1765. The Bengal Army had previously 
 supplied a considerable detachment to the east coast, which afforded 
 material aid in the struggle between the French and English in the 
 South of India, ending in the final overthrow of the former, and the 
 capture of Pondicherry, in 1761. 
 
 With the grant of the dewanee or treasurership of Bengal, and the 
 fall of the French power in India, all contests for the possession of that 
 province ceased ; but the English almost immediately afterwards entered 
 into more extensive engagements. In 1773 their troops occupied 
 Allahabad, in view to hold that place on behalf of the Emperor against 
 the Mahrattas; in 1774 they undertook the defence of the Nawab of 
 Oudh's dominions, and their garrisons were moved up to Cawnpore and 
 Futtehghur; and in 1778 the Bengal Government joined in the ope- 
 rations then being undertaken from Bombay against the Mahrattas, and 
 a Bengal column was despatched across India to aid the western 
 presidency. These measures involved a considerable augmentation 
 to the Bengal Army, which in 1786, at the time when Lord Cornwallis 
 assumed charge of the government, consisted of 36 battalions of Sepoys, 
 which had been formed into 18 regiments of 2 battalions each, and 
 6 weak battalions of Europeans; the whole organised in 6 brigades. 
 The latter battalions were strongly officered ; the native battalions were 
 commanded by a captain, with a subaltern to each company. The 
 organisation followed, up to this time, had thus been of the kind now 
 popularly known as the ' irregular ' system, in contradistinction to that 
 based on the English regimental plan, the promotion of the officers 
 running in one list for the whole army, from which they were posted to 
 the various battalions. In all matters connected with pay, equipment, 
 and the audit of accounts, the army administration partook of the general 
 laxity and disorder which up to that time had pervaded every branch
 
 654 CHARACTER OF COMPANY'S TROOPS IN EARLY DAYS. 
 
 of the Company's Government in India, the major part of the officers' 
 emoluments being derived from irregular perquisites ; while, as to the 
 supposed superior morale and discipline of the early Company's army, 
 the history of those days records a succession of mutinies, in which the 
 black and white troops were alternately employed to coerce each other. 
 The latter were composed of the scouring of almost every European 
 nation, kidnapped or wheedled on board-ship by crimps; for the 
 Company's recruiting depot was not established until 1781. The class 
 from which the Sepoys were obtained was familiar with the scenes of 
 turbulent violence which at that time were being enacted at every court 
 in India. These conditions were quite incompatible with the formation 
 of a well-disciplined or well-organised army, such as has been sometimes 
 represented to have existed at this time. Discipline and morality were 
 the products of a later date. The redeeming feature of the troops of all 
 classes was the gallantry and endurance exhibited in the numerous 
 campaigns and protracted expeditions on which they were engaged. 
 
 Development of Madras Army. 
 
 While the Bengal Army was thus in course of gradual development, 
 the Madras Army also underwent a rapid augmentation. The overthrow 
 of the French power, in 1761, left it indeed for a time without a rival; 
 but the Madras Government had now undertaken the defence of the 
 Carnatic on behalf of its ruler, whom it was rapidly supplanting from all 
 but the nominal sovereignty, and the engagement involved the mainten- 
 ance of a considerable garrison. In the year 1772 the Madras Army 
 contained about 3,000 European infantry and 1 6,000 Sepoys, with a staff 
 of more than 600 officers, the greater part of the cost being defrayed by 
 the Nawab of the Carnatic. This force was shortly afterwards further 
 augmented in consequence of the war with the Mahrattas and with 
 Hyder Ali. The first contest with the latter, as is well known, involved 
 a struggle for the very existence of the English settlement, Hyder 
 extorting a peace (in 1769) from the Madras Government under the 
 walls of Fort St. George; in the second war with him and his son 
 Tippoo, which terminated in 1784, neither side manifested any decided 
 superiority. 
 
 Bombay Army. 
 
 The Bombay Presidency during this period, and for many years 
 afterwards, comprised no territory on the mainland of India. But a 
 military force was maintained for its protection, which was considerably 
 developed during the Mahratta wars. In 1772 it consisted of about 
 2,500 Europeans and 3,500 Sepoys, with nearly 200 officers. The 
 expense of this army, as of the Bombay civil establishments, then and
 
 ROYAL TROOPS. LORD CORNWALLIS'S REFORM. 6$$ 
 
 afterwards, was defrayed from the revenues of Bengal, or by the produce 
 of loans. 
 
 In 1773, when the first Governor-General was appointed, under the 
 Act passed in that year, and the Crown interposed to nominate the 
 members of the Government, the Company's army consisted nominally 
 of about 9,000 Europeans and 45,000 natives. 
 
 Royal troops in India. 
 
 The first regiment of the British Army sent to India was the 39th 
 Foot, which arrived at Madras in the year 1754. This regiment formed 
 part of the force which went with Clive to the relief of Calcutta in 1756, 
 and it was present at the Battle of Plassey in the following year. In 
 1758, it was nominally sent home, but in effect was broken up, the men 
 being invited to volunteer into the local force, and the officers offered 
 commissions in the Company's army. The English garrison in Bengal 
 then consisted for a time wholly of the Company's forces. Madras 
 remained without royal troops until 1758, when, in pursuance of the 
 elder Pitt's vigorous plans for pressing the war against the French in 
 every quarter of the globe, a newly-raised regiment of the line, the 79th, 
 was sent out, followed by the 84th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Eyre Coote, and the 96th. In 1759, Coote's regiment was transferred to 
 Bengal, and he was appointed by the Company Commander-in-Chief of 
 their forces in that presidency. On the peace of 1763, the British line was 
 again reduced to 70 regiments, and India remained without any royal 
 troops until 1779, when the 71st [then numbered 73rd] Foot was raised 
 and despatched to Madras. Four other new regiments followed, to aid 
 in the war against Hyder Ali. 
 
 Lord Cornwallis, who was appointed the first Governor-General in 
 India, after the passing of the Act of 1784, which gave that personage 
 authority over the three presidencies, was also appointed Commander- 
 in-Chief, and was thus vested with supreme authority over both civil and 
 military affairs throughout India. Up to this time it had been usual 
 to confer a step of local brevet rank on all lieutenant-colonels of the 
 royal service, an arrangement which naturally caused great dissatisfaction 
 among the Company's officers, whose own commissions were, moreover, 
 often not recognised by the former as giving valid rank. The high 
 authority conferred by the rank and military reputation of Lord Corn- 
 wallis, enabled him to procure the repeal of a regulation which was 
 repugnant to his sense of justice. Through his representations the local 
 brevet promotions were withdrawn in 1788, and brevet commissions in 
 the royal service were granted by him as Commander-in-Chief to all the 
 Company's officers, with corresponding dates to those of their sub- 
 stantive ones. This arrangement was continued until the abolition of 
 the Company's government in 1858.
 
 6$6 THE INDIAN ARMY REORGANIZED IN 1 796. 
 
 Gradual augmentation of native armies. 
 
 From 1772 until 1796, the strength of the Indian Army underwent a 
 gradual increase, occasioned by the Mahratta waT of 1778, and that in 
 the Carnatic with Hyder Ali and Tippoo. These wars were, however, 
 undertaken rather for defensive than aggressive purposes ; and until the 
 accession of Lord Mornington to the government, the policy of the 
 English, although at times marked by great oscillation of purpose, was 
 on the whole based on the principle of recognising the political equality 
 with themselves of the principal native states, and maintaining the 
 balance of power throughout India. Lord Cornwallis, indeed, when 
 forced into hostilities with Tippoo, the ruler of Mysore, displayed a 
 degree of decision and vigour at that time quite unusual in the conduct 
 of the English military operations. The burden of that war, which 
 ended in the complete humiliation of Tippoo, and the annexation of 
 a large part of his territory, was borne principally by the Madras and 
 Bombay Armies, which received the largest share of the augmentation 
 rendered necessary of the aggregate military establishment. 
 
 At the commencement of Lord Cornwallis's government, the establish- 
 ment of royal troops consisted of one regiment of dragoons and five 
 battalions of foot. In 1788, four regiments of the line were raised for 
 service in India, and thus brought up the complement to nine battalions, 
 which remained unaltered until 1797. Of these nine battalions, only one 
 was stationed in Bengal ; two belonged to the Bombay Presidency, the 
 remaining six, with the regiment of dragoons, to Madras. In the year 
 1794, the total strength of the Indian armies, including royal troops, 
 was 70,000, of which 13,500 were Europeans. The Madras and Bengal 
 establishments of native troops were each about 24,000 strong, the 
 Bombay establishment about 9,000. 
 
 Reorganisation of 1796. 
 
 In 1796, the organisation of the Indian Army was entirely recast. 
 Heretofore, the officers belonging to the establishment of each presidency 
 had been borne on one seniority list, from which they had been dis- 
 tributed among the different regiments; and the proportion of junior to 
 senior grades was exceedingly unfavourable for promotion, there being 
 about eight subalterns to every captain. They were now divided into 
 separate cadres, one for each native regiment of two battalions, to which 
 henceforward the respective officers were permanently attached, their 
 promotion up to the rank of major running in the order of regimental 
 seniority. The lieutenant-colonels and colonels remained on separate 
 lists for each branch of the service, to which the regimental majors were 
 promoted in order of seniority, on succession to vacancies. The
 
 INCREASE OF THE ARMY FROM WELLESLEY 3 S POLICY. 657 
 
 establishment of each regiment was fixed at 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant- 
 colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 22 lieutenants, and 10 ensigns, and the 
 result was a great advancement in rank throughout the army. This 
 system of promotion was maintained until the reorganisation of 1861. 
 The regiments of artillery and engineers were at the same time organised 
 on a similar footing to that of the infantry. An establishment of generals 
 was also formed for the Company's army, the officers of which, from the 
 power previously conferred on the Company to grant generals' com- 
 missions having been withdrawn, were not at this time eligible for 
 promotion beyond the rank of colonel. It was also provided that a 
 specified number of the divisional commands should be held by major- 
 generals of the royal army. The staff was fixed at two for Bengal, and 
 one each for Madras and Bombay ; and until lately these, with a limited 
 number of brigade commands, were the only appointments on the staff 
 of the Indian Army which could be held by officers of the royal service. 
 
 The year 1796 was further marked by the introduction of furlough 
 regulations, which entitled officers to visit England without quitting the 
 army, and also to quit India on sick leave, retaining their Indian 
 allowances and appointments during absence. The privileges conferred 
 by these regulations were, however, partly withdrawn in 1854, and they 
 were still further curtailed, virtually, by the operation of the amalgamation 
 measure of 1861. 
 
 Subsequent increase of forces. 
 
 The Marquis Wellesley arrived in India in 1798, and immediately 
 entered on a new line of policy, the object of which was to sweep away 
 the appearance of equality of power between the English and the 
 principal native states, and to establish the undisputed supremacy of the 
 former throughout the country. The era of war and conquest which 
 marked his tenure of office, and resulted in the advance of the British 
 cantonments beyond Delhi in the north, and over the whole of the Deccan 
 and the Mahratta territories, involved of course a large increase to the army. 
 The Bengal infantry was raised from 28 1 to 54 battalions, that of Madras 
 from 30 to 50 battalions, and that of Bombay from 12 to 18 battalions. 
 A considerable augmentation was also made to the native cavalry and 
 the Company's artillery of all kinds. The British troops in India were 
 also largely increased ; but the Company's European infantry, which had 
 always been far below its nominal strength, was reduced to one regiment 
 per presidency. 
 
 1 The number of battalions had been reduced in 1796 from 36 to 24, and again 
 raised in 1797 to 28 battalions. 
 
 U U
 
 6 5 8 
 
 SUBSEQUENT PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
 Indian Army in 1808. 
 
 In 1808, after the great Mahratta war had been finally brought to an 
 end, and the military forces reduced to a permanent peace-footing, the 
 Indian establishment was constituted as follows: — 
 
 
 British Troops. 
 
 Company's Troops. 
 
 Bengal . . . 
 Madras . . 
 Bombay . . 
 
 Regiments, 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Battalions, 
 Infantry. 
 
 Battalions, 
 European 
 Infantry. 
 
 Battalions, 
 Artillery. 
 
 Regiments, 
 
 Native 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Battalions, 
 Native 
 Infantry. 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 8 
 
 7 
 
 I 
 I 
 I 
 
 3 
 2 
 1 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 54 
 46 
 18 
 
 Total . . . 
 
 4 
 
 20 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 118 
 
 The strength of the three armies being, in round numbers — 
 
 Europeans. Natives. Total. 
 
 Bengal .... 7,000 57,ooo 64,000 
 
 Madras .... 11,000 53>ooo 64,000 
 
 Bombay .... 6,500 20,000 26,500 
 
 Total 
 
 24,500 130,000 1545°° 
 
 At this period, it will be noticed, the Bengal and Madras armies were 
 nearly of equal strength, but the latter had the larger proportion of 
 European troops. The cavalry and artillery were on a small scale in 
 proportion to the rest of the army ; but this was in accordance with the 
 organisation adopted for the British Army at home. 
 
 In 1823 the two-battalion regiments of native infantry were divided 
 into regiments of one battalion each. The officers of a regiment under 
 the new organisation consisted of — 
 
 1 Colonel 
 
 1 Lieutenant-Colonel 
 1 Major 
 5 Captains 
 10 Lieutenants 
 5 Ensigns 
 
 Total 
 
 23
 
 CIVILIZATION COUNTERACTS NATURAL SCARCITY. 659 
 
 389. Preventives of Famine 1 . 
 
 Before quitting the subject of dearths I wish to explain the two 
 circumstances which regulate their intensity, and the method by which 
 they may be counteracted. Famine in India is caused by natural 
 scarcity, resulting from the deficiency of the crops, and more or less 
 severe in proportion as the crops have been more or less completely 
 destroyed. Inundations may cause temporary scarcity, but the losses of 
 low-lying localities are usually made up by the subsequent abundance on 
 the high grounds. On the other hand, drought, when sufficiently intense 
 to destroy the December harvest, results in famine. The practical effects 
 of famine depend, however, on its actual pressure as indicated by the rise 
 in prices. Under native government and in 1770 under the Company's 
 first attempt at administration, the actual pressure of a famine held a 
 direct ratio to the natural scarcity. If the crops perished the people 
 died : the actual pressure was in proportion to the natural scarcity, and 
 the natural scarcity to the actual pressure. But the whole tendency of 
 modern civilisation is to raise up intervening influences which render the 
 relation of actual pressure to natural scarcity less certain and less direct, 
 until the two terms which were once convertible come to have very little 
 connection with each other. This is what has taken place in India 
 during the last fifty years, as the two following examples show. 
 
 The north-western provinces of Bengal have twice been visited during 
 that period by a season of terrible drought. On both occasions the 
 proportion of the crops destroyed appears to have been the same, and 
 the official estimate reports the natural scarcity as nearly equal. The 
 first took place in 1837, the second in 1860-61. In 1837, India was on 
 the point of being thrown unreservedly open to European enterprise, but 
 the change had not taken place. Railways were not ; roads and water- 
 courses were scarcely more numerous than in the time of Aurungzebe ; 
 non-official English influence, and the facilities for transport that such 
 influence everywhere procures, were confined to the immediate vicinity 
 of the great towns ; nor had that vast store of surplus capital, ever keenly 
 on the look-out for investment, been developed, which forms so striking 
 a feature in the mercantile economy of Bengal at the present day. 
 In short, the breakwaters which modern civilisation raises up between 
 natural scarcity and its actual pressure had not yet been constructed and 
 the ancient monotonous story of starvation was repeated. Notwith- 
 standing the efforts of the Government, then presided over by a noble- 
 man of remarkable private humanity, the deaths rose to twelve hundred 
 per diem in two of the principal towns ; in the open country the people 
 perished by villages, and nine months of famine left the whole rural 
 
 1 The Annals 0/ Rural Bengal, by W. W. Hunter, 1868, pp. 50-56. 
 U U 2
 
 660 THE ORISSA FAMINE NO EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE. 
 
 system disorganized. But during the next quarter of a century India 
 advanced towards civilisation by forced marches, and the drought of i860 
 found its effects checked by a hundred counteracting influences unknown 
 in 1837. The natural scarcity was the same, but abundance of capital 
 existed to buy food from other provinces, and the newly constructed 
 railways with their network of roads cheaply and rapidly effected its 
 distribution. The Grand Trunk Road, a work of Roman solidity, is 
 officially reported to have been worn out in fifteen days ; ' every cart, 
 bullock, camel, donkey, in short, every means of conveyance available in 
 the country ' was pressed into the service, and the principal railway stations 
 were at length blocked-up with grain. While private enterprise thus in- 
 tervened between the natural scarcity and the actual pressure, private 
 charity provided for that section of the people whose earnings just suffice 
 to keep them alive in seasons of ordinary fertility ; a section which will 
 always be thrown upon the public benevolence during a scarcity, as 
 long as the present relations of labour and capital continue in Bengal. 
 
 The second example is derived from the two famines that have visited 
 the lower provinces in 1770 and 1866. In this instance very little 
 evidence exists for comparing the natural scarcity. But we know that 
 in 1866 one corner of Bengal — Orissa — was, so far as the intervening 
 influences which prevent natural scarcity passing into actual pressure, 
 exactly in the position of the whole province in 1770. In these similarly 
 situated parts the actual pressure, as indicated by the price of rice, was 
 precisely the same in both famines, the maximum being fourpence and 
 the average over twopence a pound. It should be remembered, however, 
 that silver was dearer then than now. The proportion of the crops lost 
 seems also to have been equal. In the districts of Orissa which suffered 
 most in 1866 and in Rajmahal, one of the districts which suffered most 
 in 1770, the preceding harvests were officially estimated to have yielded 
 less than one-half their average produce, and any superiority of the 
 early Orissa harvests in 1865 to those of Rajmahal in 1769 was more 
 than counterbalanced by subsequent exportations from the Orissa sea- 
 board. It may be inferred, therefore, that the natural scarcity was the 
 same. The actual pressure happily proved very different. In 1770 the 
 natural scarcity passed in a direct and unmitigated form into actual 
 pressure. Before the middle of the year ten millions of the general 
 population had perished ; at the end of it, an official reports that of a 
 certain poor class — the lime-workers — only five out of one hundred and 
 fifty were living, and one-third of the country had returned to jungle. 
 In 1866, roads, railways, canals, toiled day and night in bringing grain 
 from other provinces, till at length the port at which the railway taps the 
 river system of Lower Bengal became unable to afford accommodation 
 for landing the unprecedented cargoes, and the Railway Company had 
 to seek the assistance of the authorities to prevent native shipmasters
 
 NATURE AND OPERATION OF SPECIFICS FOR FAMINE. 66 1 
 
 from unlading on its lines and sidings. One corner of Lower Bengal, 
 however, continued in the same isolated state in 1866 in which the whole 
 province found itself in 1770, and it was reserved for the unhappy people 
 of Orissa to experience what happens when the actual pressure of a 
 dearth is equal to the natural scarcity, and to illustrate to modern times 
 the meaning of the ancient word famine. 
 
 The preventives of famine belong to two distinct classes ; those that 
 tend to avert natural scarcity, and those that are directed towards the 
 development of intervening influences between natural scarcity and actual 
 pressure. Natural scarcity may be averted either by Government under- 
 taking works of irrigation and drainage at its own expense, or by giving 
 the landed classes a permanent title to the soil, — thus inducing them to 
 enter on such works by securing to them the profits. Orissa in 1866 
 was in this respect in the position of the whole of the province in 1770 : 
 it had neither a permanent settlement nor any adequate irrigation works 
 maintained by the State, and it was the only part of Lower Bengal in 
 which the scenes of 1770 were re-enacted. 
 
 The second set of preventives, those that tend to raise up break- 
 waters between natural scarcity and actual pressure, is a very large one. 
 Every measure that helps towards the extension of commerce and the 
 growth of capital, every measure that increases the facilities of transport 
 and distribution, comes under this class. Whatever tends to develop the 
 natural resources of a country, to call forth a spirit of enterprise among 
 its inhabitants, to render each part less dependent on itself, and to bind 
 up the commonwealth by the ties of mutual assistance and common 
 interest, tends to mitigate the actual pressure of a famine. The whole 
 list may be expressed by four words — enlightened government and 
 modern civilisation. These are the specifics for famine. Where they 
 exist, scarcity will never result in depopulation ; where they do not, the 
 utmost endeavours of Government may mitigate but they cannot avert. 
 Nevertheless, the two formal specifics may be assisted by subsidiary 
 relief efforts, such as public works and organized public charity. 
 
 Where natural scarcity passes directly into actual pressure, two ex- 
 ceptional measures have been employed, with various degrees of success, 
 to take the extreme edge off famine. The one is an embargo on 
 exportation, the other is importation at the State expense. Both are 
 dangerous expedients, and their success (when successful) implies that 
 the ordinary laws of political economy cannot be applied to the case ; 
 in other words, that modern civilisation and enlightened government 
 have yet to begin their work. This was the condition of Lower Bengal 
 in 1770 and of Orissa, its south-western corner, in 1866.
 
 66% EAST INDIAN SUGAR DUTIES UNJUST AND IMPOLITIC. 
 
 390. Indian Sugar 1 . 
 
 [Written in 1823.] 
 
 It is maintained: 
 
 1 st. That it is inconsistent with the principles of sound policy to 
 exclude by prohibitory or exorbitant duties, the importation into this 
 country of raw sugars, the produce of any part of the British dominions, 
 whether such sugars be required to supply the consumption of our own 
 population, or to furnish our refiners with the raw material to enable them 
 to supply the foreign market with the article in its manufactured state. 
 
 2nd. That the duty of thirty-seven shillings per cwt. on East India 
 sugars, being equal to a tax of about 200 per cent, on the prime cost of 
 the article in India, is manifestly of this description, and has not only 
 checked the importation of the finer sugars, the produce of British India, 
 by subjecting the importing merchant in many recent instances to a heavy 
 loss, but has actually, in the case of the coarser sugars, operated as a prohi- 
 bition, and has excluded those sugars altogether from the British market. 
 
 3rd. That it is not only inconsistent with the dictates of a wise policy 
 to check the trade in this article from any part of the British dominions ; 
 but that to exclude the produce of a particular dependency, by the 
 imposition of partial and unequal duties, for the sole purpose of favoring 
 the importation of the article from some other quarter, is a manifest 
 departure from those principles of equal justice, to the benefit of which 
 the subjects of these realms have all an equal claim. 
 
 4th. That the additional duty of ten shillings per cwt. imposed upon 
 East India sugars, which is further aggravated by levying upon those 
 sugars almost indiscriminately the duty of five shillings per cwt., payable 
 upon cloyed sugars (although it is well known that the finest sugars from 
 British India are very inferior both in quality and value to the cloyed 
 sugars of the West Indies), is a partial and unequal tax, intended to favor 
 a particular interest at the expense of other important interests, and is 
 not sanctioned by any principle of justice. 
 
 5th. That, although the British Legislature should succeed in excluding 
 East India sugars from the British market by prohibitory duties, this ex- 
 clusion would but little avail the parties whom it is intended to favor, 
 while those sugars can find their way into the markets of Europe ; since 
 it is perfectly certain that the price of the commodity in our own market, 
 which contains a large surplus for exportation, must be regulated, or be 
 materially affected, by the price which the article bears in the general 
 market of Europe ; and that, consequently, while this attempt to confer a 
 benefit on the West India interest seems little calculated to accomplish 
 the end proposed, it is evidently calculated to alienate a valuable branch of 
 
 1 Memorials of Indian Government. Being a Selection from the Papers of H. St. G. 
 Tucker, edited by J. W. Kaye, 1853, pp. 178-190.
 
 VESTED INTEREST PLEA FOR W. INDIAN SUGAR UNTENABLE. 66$ 
 
 trade — to give employment to foreign in preference to British shipping — 
 and to enable the foreign refiner, by supplying him with the raw material 
 at a lower rate, to compete successfully with the British manufacturer. 
 
 6th. That, whether it be justifiable or not, in regulating our system of 
 commercial policy, to make a distinction between European British 
 subjects and the natives of India, who, by the dispensation of Providence, 
 have been placed for more than half a century under the dominion of 
 Great Britain, — this partial and unequal tax does unquestionably injure 
 the property, and affect the interests of large numbers of British-born 
 subjects, who have claims to legislative protection, upon grounds as 
 strong and incontestible as those which have been urged, or can be 
 urged, by the proprietors or mortgagees of estates in the West Indies, or 
 by any other class of British subjects. 
 
 7th. That European British subjects who have invested their capital in 
 houses, factories, and other buildings — in docks, machinery, and other 
 immoveable property, and who can draw to this country the income of 
 such property, and ultimately the principal itself, in no other way than by 
 means of the produce of India, are placed in a situation perfectly analo- 
 gous to that in which the proprietors and mortgagees of estates in the 
 West Indies describe themselves ; and have just ground to complain of 
 those legislative enactments which, excluding the produce of India from 
 the British market, virtually deprive them of the means of removing their 
 capital to the mother country. 
 
 8th. That the income of British-born subjects from capital in India, 
 with the annual savings of the public servants and others from profes- 
 sional allowances and other sources, for which a remittance to this 
 country is required, has been estimated at the sum of three millions 
 sterling per annum ; and that, assuming this fact, which is strongly 
 corroborated by the difference which has long existed, and which still 
 exists, between the amount of imports and exports in the trade of India 
 and China with Great Britain, it would appear that the value of property, 
 and extent of interest, held by European British subjects in India, is not 
 inferior to that held by their fellow-subjects in the West Indies. 
 
 1820. 
 
 Imports into Great Britain . . £7,537,000 
 
 Exports from ditto . . . 1,998,000 
 
 Excess of imports . . . £5,539,000 
 
 1821. 
 Imports into Great Britain . . £7,562,000 
 
 Exports from ditto . . . 2,978,000 
 
 Excess of imports . . . £4,584,000 
 
 9th. That the protecting duty of ten shillings per cwt., which was
 
 66+ INJURY TO BRITISH INTERESTS; AND TO THE COMPANY. 
 
 imposed for the first time in the year 1813, to favor the trade of the 
 West Indies at the expense of British India, has necessarily the effect of 
 enhancing generally the price of all sugars in the home market ; and 
 that, consequently, as far as West India produce is in question, it 
 imposes upon the British consumer a tax, the produce of which does 
 not find its way to the public exchequer, but which is levied, without 
 discrimination, not merely for the benefit of the proprietors of estates 
 in the old colonies, who are known to be in a state of distress, but 
 also for the benefit of Demerara, and the other newly-acquired colonies, 
 which can neither advance the same plea of distress, nor pretend that 
 they have acquired any peculiar rights on the ground of long possession. 
 
 10th. That this forced enhancement of price in the home market 
 is injurious to the British refiner, and tends to prevent his obtaining 
 the supply of the foreign market, while the drawback which is granied 
 to compensate this disadvantage can be supplied only by means of direct 
 contributions from the British public. 
 
 nth. That the partial and unequal tax already described, although 
 more obviously affecting the British consumer and the capitalist who 
 has occasion to draw his funds from India, is not less injurious to the 
 interests of the British manufacturer, who sees within his reach an ex- 
 tensive market ready to receive his cottons, woollens, hardware, and 
 other articles, but who finds it impossible to extend, or to continue, 
 his exportation in consequence of not being permitted to import, at a 
 fair rate of duty, the raw produce of India in return. 
 
 1 2th. That, all commerce resolving itself ultimately into a barter of 
 commodities, an import duty may, and in certain cases must, have the 
 effect of checking and altogether preventing exportation ; and that the 
 enormous and unequal duty imposed upon East India sugars, does 
 notoriously tend to prevent that free interchange of the manufactures 
 of Great Britain for the raw produce of her Eastern possessions, which 
 is calculated to secure great and reciprocal advantages to the two 
 countries. 
 
 13th. That even the agricultural interests of these islands are exposed 
 to injury by those injudicious enactments, which tend to check the ex- 
 portation of British commodities ; since every measure which depresses 
 the condition of the manufacturer, diminishes his means of consuming, 
 and circumscribes his demand for the produce of the land. 
 
 14th. That the East India Company, who are under an obligation 
 to furnish a remittance for a portion of the interest of the territorial 
 debt, are liable to incur, and have actually sustained, a heavy loss in 
 consequence of the high protecting duties levied upon East India sugars ; 
 and that this loss, which might have been avoided under a more equitable 
 system of commercial regulation, has actually trenched upon a capital 
 which may be regarded as national property.
 
 INJURY TO THE REVENUE ; AND TO NATIVES OF INDIA. 665 
 
 15th. That the East India Company, precluded as they have lately been 
 from the importation of sugars to any extent, by reason of the excessive 
 duties, have found themselves compelled to have recourse to the im- 
 portation of specie and bullion from their Eastern possessions, as the only 
 channel of remittance which was open to them. That upon this remit- 
 tance, amounting in the last year to the sum of about two millions 
 sterling, a loss must be sustained of not less than twenty or twenty-five 
 per cent., — and that, if it should be found necessary to continue the 
 importation of specie in future years, either for the purpose of enabling 
 them to fulfil their engagements to the public creditors, or for the 
 purpose of defraying the territorial charge incurred in this country to the 
 amount of about one million and a half sterling per annum, the loss must 
 become of such magnitude as to affect the profits, or dividends, of the nu- 
 merous body of individuals who hold an interest in the Company's stock. 
 
 1 6th. That the exportation of specie from British India, a country 
 which is not known to possess any mines of the precious metals, must, 
 if continued upon a large scale, soon produce a scarcity of the circulating 
 medium ; and that such a scarcity, by lowering, as it probably would do, 
 the price of all consumable articles, the produce of the soil, must tend to 
 create a difficulty in the realisation of the territorial revenue, and ulti- 
 mately to reduce that revenue in proportion to the diminution in the 
 value of the produce of the land. 
 
 17th. That the probability of such a result can scarcely be doubted by 
 those who are aware that the land constitutes the chief source of revenue 
 in India; and that, adverting to the fact of the gross revenue of our 
 Eastern possessions being now supposed to exceed twenty millions 
 sterling per annum, and to have yielded in the last year, 1821-22, a net 
 surplus of not less than two millions, it is manifestly an object of such 
 vast national importance as to demand that it should not be placed at 
 hazard by commercial enactments, originating in a desire to protect and 
 favor a particular interest. 
 
 1 8th. That it is a solecism in political reasoning, and a proposition 
 perfectly monstrous in a moral point of view, to maintain the right to 
 exact the payment of a large annual tribute from a dependent territory, 
 at the same moment that its produce and manufactures, from which alone 
 such a tribute can be paid, are peremptorily excluded from the mother 
 country by the imposition of prohibitory duties. 
 
 19th. That even admitting that the Government, as lords paramount 
 of the soil, should succeed in realising the same revenue from the 
 country, notwithstanding the fall of prices, the landholders and peasantry 
 of our possessions in the East, who are under engagements to pay a 
 fixed money-rent, .must suffer from a diminution in the value of their raw 
 produce ; and especially in the instance of sugar, which is represented to 
 be one of the most profitable articles of cultivation.
 
 666 POLITICAL PLEA FOR W. INDIAN PREFERENCE UNTENABLE. 
 
 20th. That admitting further, that a scarcity of the circulating medium 
 should not take place so as to occasion a sensible fall of prices, the 
 persons engaged in the cultivation and manufacture of sugar, and other 
 classes of industrious individuals, must suffer from the exclusion of that 
 article from the home market ; for, although it is quite true that sugar 
 will be grown in India while there is a demand for it in the general 
 market of the world, it is by no means a slight injury to shut it out 
 from that market to which it would be sent in the natural course of 
 trade, and in which a rapid increase of consumption may be expected 
 to take place under the influence of moderate prices. 
 
 21st. That the prosperity of the trade from India generally depends 
 in a great degree upon the admission of sugar, since it is matter of 
 notoriety that cotton-wool, raw silk, indigo, and other articles, con- 
 stituting, as they do, a very light cargo, cannot safely be transported by 
 sea without a certain proportion of dead weight ; and that, if sugar be 
 excluded, a portion of the tonnage of every ship carrying these light 
 goods must either be occupied with ballast, yielding no freight, or with 
 saltpetre, an article which cannot be imported at present without a heavy 
 loss. 
 
 22nd. That the exclusion of East India sugars from the British 
 market has consequently a tendency not only to divert the trade in 
 that valuable article into a foreign channel, but also to force with it 
 into foreign ports a portion of the cotton-wool, which forms the raw 
 material of our most valuable manufacture. 
 
 23rd. That those deductions, which reason and theory long since 
 suggested, have lately been made manifest by actual experience; and 
 in no instance more remarkable than in that of coffee : — namely, that 
 high taxes dry up the very sources of revenue, and that moderate im- 
 positions upon commerce are often more productive than the highest 
 duties ; and that, applying these premises to the case of sugar, it may 
 fairly be pronounced that the apprehensions inculcated of a decrease 
 of revenue being the inevitable consequence of an equalisation of the 
 duties, are as little reconcileable with the deductions of sound reason- 
 ing, as they are with the results of actual experience. 
 
 24th. That the argument founded upon the comparative security and 
 permanency of our possessions in the West Indies, is not entitled to 
 more weight or attention, since it might easily be made to appear that 
 our insular possessions in the West, situated as they are in the immediate 
 neighbourhood of an aspiring and powerful state, are much more exposed 
 to the attacks of a foreign enemy than our extensive continental posses- 
 sions in the East ; while the slave population of the former, having almost 
 before their eyes the example of St. Domingo, are less to be depended 
 upon, and are more likely to break out into dangerous insurrections 
 than the free native subjects of our Indian Empire, who enjoy the in-
 
 POLITICAL PERIL OF UNJUST TAXATION IN INDIA. 667 
 
 estimable advantages of freedom, and who have hitherto been protected 
 in their rights (with, perhaps, the single exception of commercial 
 restriction), with a degree of care and solicitude characteristic of a 
 benevolent and paternal Government. 
 
 25th. That while a well-founded reliance may be placed in the 
 stability and security of our Indian Empire so long as that vast territory 
 shall be administered by a wise, just, and energetic Government, it is not 
 intended, or wished, to conceal that it may be exposed to danger : that 
 we may forfeit the attachment of the people upon which the very found- 
 ations of our empire rest : that they may be goaded by oppression, and 
 irritated by injustice ; and that it ought, consequently, to be a primary 
 object of the British Legislature to remove all those commercial re- 
 strictions and prohibitions which are calculated to excite in the minds 
 of our Asiatic subjects a sense of injustice — which may alienate their 
 affections, and cause them to regard the domination of Great Britain as 
 a calamity rather than a blessing to their country. 
 
 26th. That the East Indian interest, far from wishing to extend to their 
 fellow-subjects those oppressive restrictions on commerce of which they 
 themselves have so much reason to complain, are ready and willing to 
 co-operate with the West Indian interest in soliciting from the Legis- 
 lature relief from any remaining restrictions and disabilities under which 
 they may still suffer, and which can be removed without compromising 
 the general interests of the empire. 
 
 27 th. That the East Indian interest would most cordially and zealously 
 concur with the West Indian interest in urging upon the British Legis- 
 lature the expediency, and still more the moral obligation they are under, 
 of endeavouring, by all justifiable means, to put an end as soon as 
 possible to that unhallowed and execrable traffic in human beings, which 
 is still carried on by some of the nations of Europe, and which constitutes 
 the foulest blot in the history of the civilised world. 
 
 28th. That while the East Indian interest are prepared to deny and to 
 disprove the claims to a protecting duty set up by the West Indian 
 interest on the ground of prescription, they are ready and willing to 
 co-operate cordially with their fellow-subjects in petitioning the Legis- 
 lature either to substitute a moderate ad valorem duty on the impor- 
 tation of sugar, or to reduce the duties on East and West India 
 sugars respectively to the rates 1 at which they stood in the year 1803 ; 
 satisfied as they feel that these duties were then regulated on juster 
 principles, and that a recurrence to them would, without involving a sa- 
 crifice of the public revenue, afford essential relief to those who are 
 
 Viz. — On Muscovado ... 20 shillings per cwt. 
 E. I. white sugars ... 22 „ „ 
 
 W. I. cloyed . . . 23-4 „ „
 
 668 SUMMARY OF OBJECTIONS TO E. INDIAN SUGAR DUTIES. 
 
 interested in the manufacture and trade in sugar, both in the West and 
 East Indies. 
 
 29th. Finally. That with a view to these several considerations, it being 
 apparent that the high and unequal duties at present levied on East India 
 sugars do, in a greater or less degree, affect the interests of the British 
 consumer — of the British manufacturer — of the agriculturist — of all those 
 engaged in the trade and transportation of sugar, cotton, and other 
 articles from British India — of the British capitalist who has invested his 
 funds in India — of the land-owners and peasantry of our Eastern posses- 
 sions — of the manufacturers and merchants employed in carrying on the 
 internal trade of those provinces — of the British and Indian ship- 
 owners — and, lastly, of the East India Company themselves, both from 
 the large interest which they hold in the produce of the soil, and from 
 the obligation they are under to continue the great organ of remittance 
 from India — it is the bounden duty of the Honorable Court of Directors, 
 of the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock, and of all others con- 
 nected with, or taking an interest in, the welfare and prosperity of British 
 India, to endeavour, by all lawful and justifiable means, to obtain the 
 repeal of an arbitrary and oppressive tax, which is not reconcileable 
 either with the views of an enlightened policy, or with the dictates of 
 impartial justice. 
 
 391. Memorandum by the Prince Consort '. 
 
 Reorganisation of the Indian Army. 
 
 'Balmoral, 16th October, 1858. 
 
 The appeal in favour of " long-established rules " would have come 
 with more effect if the years 1857 and 1858 had not given us melancholy 
 proof of the result of the system on which the local Indian army had 
 been governed by the East India Company. 
 
 Instead of the proper " chain of responsibility " which is claimed for 
 the system, it would seem more correct to characterize the system as one 
 of perpetual counteraction and conflicting authorities. 
 
 Can anything be more monstrous, for instance, in a military point of 
 view, than the relative positions of the Commander-in-Chief for India, 
 the Commanders-in-Chief for Madras and Bombay ; that the latter 
 should be perfectly independent of the former in their respective 
 Presidencies as regards the Company's, or local, forces, but subordinate 
 to him as regards those of Her Majesty ? And that the former, in the 
 event of military operations near the frontiers of the different Presi- 
 
 1 The Life of H. R. H. the Prince Consort by Theodore Martin, Vol. IV, p. 310-31 2.
 
 REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY. 669 
 
 dencies, should be absolutely powerless to combine his operations, as far 
 as the co-operation of local troops is concerned, beyond the limits of 
 Bengal, without the concurence, previously obtained, of the Governor in 
 Council and Commanders-in-Chief of the subordinate Presidency ? Such 
 an arrangement seems only to equal, in injury to the public service, those 
 under which rates of pay, conditions of service, respect to caste, and the 
 military system generally, as regards the Native troops, have varied in the 
 different Presidencies. 
 
 The great principles on which the efficiency of the military force in 
 any country, and under any circumstances, must depend, are, simplicity, 
 unity, and steadiness of system, and unity of command. 
 
 We have hitherto had in India, not only a different system for each 
 Presidency, and independent, or nearly independent command in each, 
 but in each of these three independent armies, four independent kinds of 
 force — the Queen's European, the Company's European, the regular 
 Native, and the irregular Native armies ! Under this state of things the 
 result has been the mutiny of the whole of the Native army in one 
 Presidency, and a state of discipline in the local European troops char- 
 acterized as disgraceful by some of the most competent judges on the 
 spot, and nothing but jealousy and animosity between the different 
 services. 
 
 The Queen's troops have alone, after being some years in the 
 country, preserved an efficient discipline — and over them the authority of 
 the Commander-in-Chief extended throughout India — while he was 
 controlled by the Commander-in-Chief at home, acting under the 
 immediate authority of the Crown. 
 
 Here is the true " chain of responsibility," and it has to be shown 
 that inconvenience has arisen to the service in India from that chain of 
 responsibility, as regards the discipline and efficiency of the troops, 
 being thus preserved in the legitimate and constitutional line, traced back 
 to the Sovereign. Has the Governor-General or Indian Commander-in- 
 Chief been less free to move and employ Her Majesty's troops, as the 
 exigencies of the Indian service required, than those of the East India 
 Company? — or have they been found wanting at any time when the 
 others have broken down ? The events of the last two years, during 
 which the sole dependence has been upon Her Majesty's troops, is the 
 answer to these questions. 
 
 The course, then, prescribed by common sense, in considering the 
 future organisation of an army in India, would appear to be : To abandon 
 " the long-established rules," which, in the case of the Native troops, have 
 resulted in universal mutiny throughout Bengal, and, in that of the Com- 
 pany's European troops, in indiscipline and shortness of numbers (for
 
 670 REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY. 
 
 amongst other faults of the old system is that of never having been able 
 to keep the European forces of the Company nearly up to their establish- 
 ment), and to adopt that system which has been most successful hitherto 
 in maintaining an efficient force, that, namely, under which Her Majesty's 
 regular forces have been governed.
 
 %. MALLAVELLY, 27 th March. 1799 
 
 
 
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