Pi 
 
 m 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 FROM THE LIBRARY 
 OF F. VON BOSCHAN
 
 0^-=> 
 
 ON THB 
 
 STATE OF EUROPE 
 
 BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
 
 FREJVCM MEFOLUTIOJV: 
 
 BEING 
 
 AN ANSWER 
 
 TO 
 
 VEtat de la France a la Fin de V An VIII. 
 
 BY FREDERICK GENTZ, 
 
 COUKSEJ-LOR AT Wi^R TO I^IS PRySSIAN MAJESTY, &C. &C. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN 
 
 By JOHN CHARI^ES HERIIJES, Esq. 
 
 JLonUon : 
 
 tRlMTKD FOR J. HATCHARD, BOOKSELLER TO HER MAJKSTT, 
 OPPOdTS YORK HOUSE, PICCADILLY. 
 
 1802.
 
 I.iitit Queen Street, Hrlb'r«v
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 BY THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
 L'ETAT de la France a la Fin dt VAn 8, was 
 an anonymous publication at Paris in the autumn 
 of 1800. The Author was pot long concealed, 
 and he was generally known to have written 
 under the aufpices and authority of the French 
 Government. 
 
 The work itfelf betrayed its origin throughout. 
 It was every where marked by the moft invete- 
 rate enmity to this country ; and was evidently 
 written with a view to convert the nations of 
 the continent to the fame fentiment. It an- 
 nounced and explained a variety of plans for the 
 gratification of the envy and hatred which it en- 
 deavoured to excite ; and it ought rather to have 
 been called A Diflertation on the Neccflity and 
 a 2 the
 
 ( !v ) 
 
 the Means of ruining England, than An Ext*^ 
 mination of the State of France. 
 
 At any other period, fuch a produ(5\ion, 
 though it might have been amufing to a very fu- 
 perficial poUtician, would hardly have excited 
 the attention, much lefs required the anfwer, of 
 a profound and enlightened writer. But it ap- 
 peared at a time \»hen certain unfortunate an4 
 unfounded prejudices againft this country were 
 at their higheft pitch ; and it was craftily de- 
 flgned to inflame that fpirit of animofity which 
 could alone give currency to its abfurdities. 
 Upon thefe grounds it acquired a degree of popu- 
 larity, fufficient to induce a Pruffian writer, 
 vvhofe talents have before been difplayed in fome 
 excellent political works, to undertake the refu- 
 tation of it. 
 
 The following is a tranflation of this reply 
 of Profeflbr Gentz to Citizen Hauterive : but had 
 the German been only valuable as an anfwer to, 
 \hc French publication, I certainly fhould have 
 fparcd myfclf the pains of preparing it for the 
 
 Englifh
 
 ( » ) 
 
 fenglifli prefs. tt would have been a very fuper- 
 fluous labour in a country where the pamphlet 
 that gave rife to it, had excited neither admira- 
 tion nor argument. 
 
 But the merits oF Mr. Gentz's work are not 
 confined to the controverfy before him. His 
 Statey)/ Europe is fomething more than an occa- 
 fional treatife : it has an independent and general 
 charadler. And though the arguments and affer- 
 tions of his adverfary are completely difpofed of, 
 yet the ordinary fpirit and defetfls of polemical 
 writings have been carefully and judicioully 
 avoided : a circumftance which does him the 
 more honour, as he had received what might hi 
 cfteemed juft provocation from the French writer, 
 who treated him without candour or refpedl in 
 his alluHons to fome of his former produdlions. 
 
 LEtat de la France is one continued attack, 
 diredl or indirect, upon the rights and interefts, 
 the credit and condudl, of Great Britain. No 
 argument, no femblance of an argument, has 
 been left untried to criminate her politics, and 
 a 3 to
 
 ( vi ) 
 
 to dctrad from her chara6lcr. It Is necdleffs to 
 anticipate Mr. Gentz's obfervations on this gene- 
 ral fcope of Hauterive*s work ; he has condefcend* 
 cd to analyze forae of the charges againrt a na- 
 tion to which he is himfelf a flranger ; and no-- 
 thing more is necefTary to confute them. 
 
 It was more immediately his province to vin* 
 dicate the lazv of nations againfl a writer who is 
 a principal (becaufe the organ of the French go- 
 vernment) in a confpiracy to fubvert by fraud, 
 what yet remains undemolifhed by force ; and- 
 upon the ruins cf the old to eftablifh a new fyf- 
 tem, in which an abfolute fupremacy is to be 
 conceded to France, while England is to be mad© 
 to ^^ refwne her fiat'wn among nations of the fecond 
 ^rder,^' This Mr. Genlz has completely done ; 
 and at the fame time repelled a lingular attempt 
 to afcribe the fins of France to the mifcondu(5l of 
 Europe, m a manner quite novel, and, I think^ 
 jpcculiar to this author of the eighth year. 
 
 From the moment when the prefent govern- 
 mfnt had eHabliflicd itfelf upon the ruins of tlie
 
 ( vli ) 
 
 laft Jacobinical authority, the principles and events 
 of the revolution were no longer themes of praiife 
 and admiration for the political writers of France. 
 Liberty and equaUly had retired before the bay- 
 onets of Bonaparte's grenadiers i democratic ty- 
 ranny had yielded to the genius and fortune of 
 an afpiring foldier; and the admirers of the 
 change could not celebrate the event without 
 condemning the conduct of the great 7iation 
 during the ten years that preceded it. Hauterive 
 does not defend the revolution ; on the contrary, 
 he confiders it as an evil of the firfl magnitude ; 
 but his obje6l is to prove that France is not re- 
 fponlible for the miferies thereby occalioned to 
 Europe, but that Europe, on the contrary, is 
 the guilty caufe of all that France herfelf has 
 fuffered ; and he labours to perfuade us that the 
 French revolution, with ail its difailrous confe- 
 quences, was the fruit of the mifcondudt and 
 corruption of the governments of other nations. 
 Whether he has fucceeded, as he himfelf af- 
 fumes, in bis attempt to prove this extraordinary 
 polition, will be feen by the following work, in 
 which Mr. Gentz has contradi(5ted it by a very 
 a 4 able
 
 ( ^iii ) 
 iblc and elaborate review of the State of Europe 
 before the Revolution, 
 
 It may here be proper to make a few obfcrva- 
 tions on a very principal part of Hauterive's book j 
 becaufe it involves a queftion of the higheil im- 
 port to this country, and becaufe it is not dif- 
 cuffed in the anfvver of Mr. Gentz, who has re- 
 fcrved it for a leparate publication, a fequel to- 
 the prefent. 
 
 When the Etat de Ja France wzs produced by 
 an Honourable and Learned Member of the Houle 
 of Commons in his feat *, it was rcprefented as 
 aiming at the deftru^lion of the exifiing rela- 
 tions of belligerent and neutral powers, and la- 
 bouring to edablifh a fyftem directly hoflile to 
 the intercfls of England, and contrary to the 
 prefent law of nations. 
 
 The conteft which has been terminated fo ho*- 
 nourably and fatisfadlorily for Great Britain, af- 
 ter aflruggle of near fifty years, will be a fub*- 
 . jecSt of admiration to future ages, when it Iball 
 
 * Dr. Lavrrence, on the 5th of Alarch. 
 
 have
 
 ( ix ) 
 
 hare been faithfully defcribed by the pen of fome 
 impartial hifiorian. 
 
 Europe has been long alarmed, and in one iii- 
 llance feverely affli(Sled, by a mofl unjuftifiable 
 confpiracy againft the rights of belligerent pow- 
 ers, againft the fpirit and the letter of the law of 
 nations, againft the ftipulations of the roofl (o- 
 lemn treaties, and againft the confecrated ufages 
 of all maritime ftatcs. We have feen the politics 
 of princes fiooping to ferve the avarice of fraudu- 
 lent traders, and arming themfelves againft the 
 law which forbids the nefarious fyftem of cover- 
 ing actual hoftility by profeffed neutrality. 
 
 Moderation and firmnefs have condu(51ed 
 Great Britain to a happy termination of the difti- 
 culties involving the maintenance of her juft 
 rights : and we may now look back with a mix- 
 ture of exultation and regret to the rife and pro- 
 grefs of the conteft. 
 
 Let us, in the fir ft place, inquire if there be any 
 thing more than mere declamation in Citizen Hau- 
 terive's chapter on this fubjc(5l ; if there be any 
 
 truth
 
 ( X ) 
 
 truth in his aflertions, or any reafon in his^ argu- 
 ments. In the courfe of this examination wc 
 fliall have an opportunity of adverting to the 
 character and principal circum fiances of the 
 league which attempted to reahze his projedts 
 and delires. 
 
 After fome general obfervations on the litua- 
 tion of neutral powers in time of war, which arc 
 neither very new, nor very perfpicuous, he pro- 
 ceeds thus : 
 
 " I have mentioned the maritime preponde- 
 ** ranee of England ; the confcioufnefs of her 
 " fuperiority has given rife to pretenlions which 
 *' the relative weaknefs of other powers has per- 
 *' mitted her to enforce as rights ; whence two 
 " diftindl maritime codes, the one acknowledged 
 ** by all Europe, the other inlifled on by Eng- 
 ** land alone *.'* 
 
 To impute confummate ignorance to the writer 
 of fuch a paffage, would be to carry lenity too 
 
 * Page X7S. 
 
 far.
 
 ( xi ) 
 
 /ar. He was writing for the French government, 
 and of courfe poflefled better information. 
 Though it be eafy to guefs the obje6V, it is very 
 difficult to conceive the affurance neceflary foF 
 aflerting *' that the mantime Jaw mfijled on hy 
 EtigJand, is one which JIte has fet up in confequence 
 of her naval fuperiority,^' 
 
 He mufl have trufled to two things : ifV, that 
 nobody would read the whole of his book, and 
 2dly, that all his readers would be utterly igno- 
 rant of hiflory ; for a knowledge of hiftory, or 
 a pcrufal of his work, are alike fufficient to re- 
 fute his aflertion. In another place he has taken 
 extraordinary pains to fhew that the Navigation 
 A£i is the original caufe of this fatal preponde- 
 rance of the Englifh marine. Now the Naviga- 
 tion A<51 took place in 1651. He muft therefore 
 renounce all confiflency, or aflert that the mari- 
 time law of England was unknown till near the 
 end of the feventeenth century. But the mari- 
 time law of England is the maritime law ex- 
 prefled and defined in the Conjolato dd Mare, a 
 work publifhed in the thirteenth century, and 
 
 even
 
 ( xii ) 
 
 even theft flated as ancient and eflabliHied ; eX* 
 plained and commented upon by Grotius (de 
 Jure Belli ^ Pads), by Voetius (de Jure militari), 
 and by many other celebrated jurifts who lived 
 before the eftablifhment of that very fuperiotity 
 which is faid to have produced their do6irrnes. 
 The eminent writers of France and Germany, 
 who have treated the fubjecSl in the lad century, 
 haveuniformly quoted the above-mentionedasthe 
 highefl: authorities. The pretended recent code 
 is almofl: univerfally referred to the eleventh cen" 
 fury : and its firft politive document is dated by 
 none later than the thirteenth ; fo that the mari- 
 time law of England was the law of Europe, 
 long before any fuch extenlion of her commerce, 
 or fuch naval fuperiority as could have given rife 
 to it in the manner here defcribed. 
 
 So much for this ill-digefied attempt io con- 
 nect the maritime law with the maritime power of 
 England. 
 
 The Author then expatiates on the advantages 
 of the " cade achwivhdged hy all Europe ;" the 
 
 entirt
 
 ( xili ) 
 
 entire freedom of neutral commerce in time of 'war \ 
 and we might infer from what he fays, that Eng- 
 land is guihy of the greateft folly for not adopt- 
 ing it, becaufe the would neceflarily be the great- 
 er gainer by it. He then proceeds to obferve, 
 " France has always given lefs diflurbance to th^ 
 commerce of neutrals than any other maritime 
 power." This is a round aflertion ; and I only 
 notice it, to obferve that it is contradi6ted by very 
 good French authority. Valin declares that the 
 ordinances of the French marine went at one 
 time beyond the praftice of every other nation, 
 except Spain *, in feverity ; for they condemned 
 Votli fhip and cargo, when either was the property 
 of an enemy : England can never be accufed of 
 fuch rigour. 
 
 ' " France has been the firft to propofe at home 
 " and abroad, that neutral commerce {hould 
 " be freed from all its fhackles ; that cruifing 
 *' fhould be abolifhed ; and that the commercial 
 " profeflTion, its agents, &c. fhould for ever be 
 ?* exempt from violence and hoftihty." France 
 
 * Spain only adopted this feverity in imitation of France. 
 
 had
 
 ( siv ) 
 
 has not deviated from her ordinary politics in 
 this refpecl r — (he has always diftinguifTied be- 
 tween the right and expedient ; and has never 
 failed to renounce the former where it could not 
 be combined v;ith the latter. She is perhaps 
 not lingular in this rcfpe6l ; but why talk of her 
 juflice and generolity ? 
 
 It cofl her nothing to make the legiflative and 
 diplomatic propofal alluded to in fuch terms of 
 praife by Citizen Hauterive. She proclaimed 
 and preached up the perfedl: freedom of neutral 
 commerce, at the commencement of the late 
 war, at a time when it was neceffary to herfelf, 
 and injurious to her rival. But in this fhc was 
 fo little ftudious of conlillency, that as early as 
 the 9th of May 1793, Ihe pafTed a decree more 
 fevere than had yet been fcen in Europe againft 
 the trade of neutrals ; and afterwards continued 
 to repeal and renew her maritime ftatutes day 
 after day, as occafion ferved for enforcing or 
 relaxing them* 
 
 But
 
 ( ^ ) 
 
 But let us go a little farther back in the hiRory 
 of Europe, and take a brief furvey (fuch as the 
 limits of a Preface will allow) of the principal 
 events connected with this important queftion* 
 If faithfully made, it will enable us to appreci- 
 ate the conduct of France as well as of every 
 other power concerned in the attempt to deprive 
 Great Britain of a right fhe has flrcnuoufly and 
 fuccefsfully maintained. 
 
 The proje<Sl of forcibly abolifhing a practice 
 founded on the cleareft principles, and confe- 
 crated by long and univerfal afTent, may be eafily 
 explained, though it never can be juftified. As 
 the private interefts of individuals are prone to 
 break throucrh the reg-ulations of .each well- 
 ordered community ; fo the private views of a 
 few Hates created the attempt to refift, and, if 
 poffible, to deftroy, the eftablifhed law of Eu- 
 ppe. In proportion as the nations of the North 
 adopted the habits, and afpired to the advan- 
 tages of commerce, they became impatient to 
 cultivate a wide field of gain difplayed to neutral 
 Aates, amidll the hodilities of the principal ma- 
 ritime
 
 (' xvi ) 
 ritimc powers. This they might have done with 
 confiderable profit to themfelves, and without 
 infringing the rights, or injuring the interefts, of 
 any of the belligerent nations. But the fpirit 
 of avarice knows no bounds ; and the juft re- 
 flraints, impofed by the law of nations, were 
 found too narrow for its fpeculations. The 
 neutrals were not fatisfied with that fair and 
 honourable extenfion of their commerce which 
 was opened to them as often as a flate of war- 
 fare reftridied the trade and diverted the navi- 
 gation of the countries engaged in it ; they re-r 
 quired more; they infifted on the liberty of 
 carrying their tranfaflions beyond the bounds of 
 neutrality ; of adding in concert with either party 
 without contravention from the other, by fup- 
 plying all the articles neceffary to the profecu-r 
 tion of the war ; and thus of becoming, as it 
 were, parties to it on either fide, according to 
 their immediate interefts, without being fubje(5l 
 to its dangers or difficulties. 
 
 It would be abfurd to enter into any difcuf- 
 
 fion of fuch pretenlions upon the principles of 
 
 3 natural
 
 { xvii ) 
 
 natural juftice, and they are completely con- 
 trary to eftablinied law. The thirft of gain, 
 however, excited very formidable attempts 
 againft both ; and it has devolved entirely upon 
 the nation immediately intcrefted in the main- 
 tenance of them to repel the aggreffion upon the 
 rights of all. The eighteenth century has feen 
 a confederacy calling itfelf the Armed Neu- 
 trality, the objecf of which was no other than 
 to enforce thefe innovations, and to introduce a 
 fyftem utterly incompatible with every principle 
 of jufiice. A brief review of the rife and pro- 
 grefs of this confederacy will throw fome ligHt 
 upon its character and motives. 
 
 The Pruffian flag was fcarcely known in the 
 commercial world, when it began (about the 
 year 1746) to be diflinguifhed by a moft fla- 
 grant proftitution of its neutral chara61er, being 
 almoft wholly engaged in the very profitable 
 pradice of covering the (hipping and goods of 
 the enemy then at war with Great Britain. 
 This was perhaps more lucrative than any other 
 branch of buHnefs at that time within the reach 
 
 b of
 
 ( xvlii ) 
 
 of the PrufTians : it certainly was more lucrative 
 than honourable. The vigilance of the Britifli 
 navy in fotne degree diminifhed the profits of 
 thefe fpeculators ; and in many inftances thej 
 were condemned by the tribunals of this coun- 
 try, which, according to the law of nations, 
 confifcated the velfels or cargoes of the enemy 
 wherever they were dete6led. It is needlefs to 
 add, that thefe profecutions were all carried on 
 with that flridl impartiality which fo peculiarly 
 diflinguifhes every court of juftice under the 
 Britifh conftitution. If either party had caufe 
 to complain, it was furely that which was com- 
 pelled to ufe fuch vigilance, and adopt fuch 
 profecutions, in defence of its rights and intc- 
 refl. In the year 1752, however, the Pruffiaa 
 minifter prefented a memorial from his court, 
 complaining of the injury fuftained by Pruffian 
 fubje(5ls from the condu<5l of our cruifers, and 
 the proceedings of our maritime tribunals ; 
 tranfmitting, at the fame time, the fentence of 
 a comraiflion appointed at Berlin for the invefti- 
 gation of thefe grievances ; and informing the 
 court of St. James, that if they were not other- 
 wife
 
 *( xix ) 
 
 wile redreffcd, his Priiffian Majefty would take 
 indemnity by the floppage of the debts due to 
 individuals in this country, and afligned upon 
 the dutchy of Silefia. This memorial is ren- 
 dered very remarkable by its being the firft pub- 
 lic profeffion of a principle, which has lince 
 been made the bafis of the hoftile league called 
 the Armed Neutrality : the Pruffian commif- 
 fioners afTume the proportion, that ^'- free Jh'ips 
 make free goodsy* as the groundwork of all 
 their proceedings. 
 
 This affair created confiderable alarm through- 
 out the nation. The memorial was anfwered by 
 the Britifli minlftry in a firm though moderate 
 tone, and in a very full and explicit manner. 
 The principles advanced were refuted by an 
 appeal to the higheft authorities and to numerous 
 treaties, which confirmed the very reverfe as an 
 cftablifiied rule, either by explanations of it, 
 or exceptions to it ; and the juftice and pro- 
 priety of the proceedings here were fo ably de- 
 monfirated as to leave no room for the fiighteft 
 
 b 2 doubt
 
 ( XX ^ 
 
 -doubt upon the fubjecH:. The King of Pruffia 
 renounced his preteniions. 
 
 This queftion appears to have remained at 
 reft from that time until the year 1780 ; at leaft 
 the uniform practice of the Englifh navy, and 
 Ithe decifions of our courts, were not publicly 
 obje6tcd to. At that period it was revived, and 
 a much more formidable attempt was made to 
 fubvert the exifting law of nations, and to af- 
 fert a principle dire6lly hoflile to the welfare of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 We have nothing here to do with the fecret 
 intrigues and cabals wihich preceded and deter- 
 mined the manifefto addrefied by Ruffia* to all 
 the maritime powers of Europe. Whatever 
 might be the immediate caufe of it, it would mofl 
 probably never have appeared, had not the litu- 
 ation of tlie feveral belligerent powers prefcnted 
 a very favourable opportunity for introducing 
 the new maritime code which it went to efta- 
 
 * March i;8o. 
 
 blifli.
 
 ( xxi ) 
 
 hVi(h. It announced a convention between the 
 Hates of Ruffia, Sweden, and Denmark (af- 
 terwards acceded to by Prullia), entered into for 
 the purpofe of maintaining w.hat was called the 
 rights of neutral powers. The rights thus 
 arrogated, amounted to nothing lefs than an 
 unlimited freedom of commerce; a liberty of 
 trading without any reftriclion whatever, with 
 and for any or all of the belligerent powers in 
 time of war ; of fupplying them wiih articles till 
 then forbidden by the maritime law of Europe ; 
 and, in thort, of adding to the diftrefles or faci- 
 lities of either of the contending parties at their 
 pleafurc : thus requiring that every nation 
 fhould confent to further their views of gain, 
 though ablblutely contrary to its own interefts, 
 and in utter defiance of every natural and poll- 
 live law of nations. 
 
 The manner in which this declaration was 
 received by the feveral courts to which it was 
 addreffed, was a new proof that policy has little 
 to do with juftice. The anfwer of the court of 
 Verfailles is the lirft infiance of what Citizen 
 b 3 Hauterive
 
 ( xxii ) 
 
 Hauterive extols as the efforts of France to pro- 
 mote a more equitable Jyjlem of maritime law in 
 Europe. The pradlice of France was as feverely 
 condemned, her rights were as unqueftionably 
 attacked in this communication, as were thofe of 
 England, Spain, and Holland. But the mi- 
 niflry of Spain, Holland, and France, received 
 and replied io it in a manner that fhewed how 
 little it was then their intereft to maintain thofe 
 rights. They were little lefs than afloniftied at 
 the amazing political wifdom of the court of 
 Peterfburgh ; and France in particular was 
 highly gratified to behold the congeniality of 
 fentiment, and \\\t fimilarity of opinion, which had 
 induced the Emprefs of Rullia to adopt views, 
 and profecute plans, which had fo long occupied 
 the French court, and were the only caufe of 
 its engaging in the prefent war! The plain 
 truth of the matter is, that the powers then at 
 war with England, were eager to feize an op- 
 portunity of adding to the diftrefles of their 
 enemy, by renouncing a fyltem, of which the 
 breach happened at that moment to be more ad- 
 vantageous to them than the obfervance. They 
 
 were
 
 ( xxiii ) 
 
 were well aware what would be the condu£^ of 
 Great Britain on the occafion ; and they hoped 
 to fee RiifTia added to the lift of our enemies. 
 It is evident that the meafure was, at that time, 
 injurious and hortlle to England alone. In the 
 inidll of her unfortunate diifenfions with her co- 
 lonies, fhe had been attacked by France and Spain ; 
 who, on an ocrafion fo favourable to their views, 
 hoped to degrade, if not to ruin her. She main- 
 tained the contefl with a dignity and force 
 which aftonifhed the world ; her energies in* 
 creafcd with her dangers and difficulties ; and 
 her navy, riling even beyond its former great- 
 nefs, baffled the military efforts, and diftrefled 
 the commercial navigation, of her enemies. No 
 wonder then that her opponents readily acceded 
 to A plan which was to wrefl from Britain one 
 of the principal means of annoying them ; 
 which was to facilitate their operations by pro- 
 curing them numerous fupplies cut off by the 
 vigilance of the Bntilh cruifers ; and which 
 was to check the fuperiority of Great Britain, 
 where alone fhe was fiiperior. Such were the 
 motives of a condu6l which is now impudently 
 b 4 nfcribed
 
 ( xxiv ) 
 
 afcrlbcd to a ienfe of juftice, and a love of 
 right. 
 
 The then embarrafled Htuation of this coun- 
 try prevented its government from refenting the 
 hoflile proceedings of the northern powers, as 
 they would otherwife have done : avoiding the 
 difcuffion of the novel principles of the confe- 
 deracy, they contented themfclves with referring 
 to the juflice and moderation hitherto manifefted 
 in the conduct of the Englifh nation, and their 
 firm refolution to maintain their rights with the 
 fame unalterable dilpofition ; reminding the 
 confederates of their refpettive alhances and 
 treaties with Great Britain, which no proceeding 
 on her part had given them the fmalleft reafon 
 to violate or annul. 
 
 This convention was, however, in reality, 
 only a temporary mcafure ; being profefTedly 
 concluded for the duration of the then exifiing 
 war. But it was declared at the fame time, " that 
 it ihould ferve as a balls for all engagements 
 which conjundlures might render it necelTary to 
 
 contra(5t
 
 ( XXV ) 
 
 contra(5l for the future, and on account of any 
 new maritime war ; and that it fliould be re- 
 garJed as a law in matters of commerce and 
 navigation whenever there fliould be a quedion 
 of appreciating the rights of neutral nations." 
 The King of Sweden was extremely defirous of 
 feeing thefe principles eftablilhed upon a more 
 permanent footing by the general confent of 
 Europe ; for which purpofe he urged the pro- 
 priety of a congrefs in which the feveral con- 
 cerns of the belligerent and neutral powers 
 might be examined and defined ; being foli- 
 citous that the war fhould not be terminated, 
 and with it the northern convention, without 
 the previous interference of the neutral powers 
 for the eftablifhment of a permanent maritime 
 code of laws. 
 
 Thus the armed neutrality was confidered, even 
 by thofe who were parties to it, as an innovation 
 in the law of nations ; and the rights they aiTumed 
 were conceived to require a higher fanction than 
 the ftipulations of a partial confederacy. To ob- 
 tain this, was the with and endeavour of the 
 
 King
 
 ( xxvi ) 
 
 King of Sweden ; but he was difappolnted. The 
 belligerent powers made feparale treaties of 
 peace, and the maritime convention was fufFered 
 to expire without further dilcuffion, and with- 
 out any meafure for perpetuating its provilions. 
 
 How far the pnrties to this league were aflu- 
 atedby that fenfe of juflice held forth in all their 
 public declarations on the fubjcdl, may be ealily 
 feen from the condudl of one of them in the very 
 firft inflanceof its becoming a belligerent power, 
 and, of courfe, entitled to excrcife the right 
 which it had oppofed when England was in that 
 lituation. This happened in 1790, when a war 
 broke out between Sweden and Ruflia. We 
 have feen that the former of thefe powers was 
 particulai'ly a6tive in the project for abolifhing 
 the practice of fearching neutral traders, and con- 
 creating the property of an enemy found on 
 board. But that was at a time when Sweden 
 was a neutral, and England a belligerent power. 
 The cafe was now reverltd ; England was at 
 peace, and Sweden was engaged in war. And 
 behold, the full value of the right which had 
 2 lately
 
 ( xxvii ) 
 
 lately been contefted, its juftice and validity, 
 were now acknowledged and maintained by Swe- 
 den. Englilh veflels navigating the Baltic, and 
 bound to the ports of Ruffia, were detained and 
 vilited by the Swedifh cruifers, whofe govern- 
 ment even increafed the lift of contraband, fo 
 lately and fo loudly complained of, by the addi- 
 tion of fome articles (money and proviftons, for 
 example) till then not included in it. 
 
 How were the enemies of England difap- 
 pointed in their hope of feeing the armed 
 neutrality revived at the commencement of the 
 following war ! The fir ft and moft powerful 
 fupporter of the principles upon which it was 
 founded, was compelled by the conduct of 
 France to abandon its neutrality. Ruffia, though 
 fecured by her fituation from the immediate ag- 
 greffion of the anarchifts, was forced by their in- 
 fults and provocations to partake of the indig- 
 nation, and in fome degree of the alarm, that 
 agitated the more neighbouring nations. She 
 acceded to an alliance for preferving the tranquil- 
 lity of Europe, and perhaps reftoring peace to 
 France ; and in the capacity of a belligerent 
 power, flie renounced the principles of the 
 
 armed
 
 ( xxvili ) 
 
 armed neutrality, and flood forward to pra^tife 
 and enforce a right againfl which (he had lately 
 contended. Her admirals were inilru6led to life 
 every means of obflruc^ing the cornmerce of the 
 common enemy, and to confifcate his property 
 wherever it might be found on the high feas, 
 without regard to the protection of a neutral 
 flag. Thus the new maritime code was fupplant- 
 ed by the law of nations, in the pra6tice of the 
 very power with whom the northern confederacy 
 had originated. 
 
 The rulers of France had now fucceeded by 
 their unremitted endeavours, their brutal infuliSj 
 and their unprovoked aggreffions, to involve their 
 country in war with every power in Europe that 
 pofleffed a territory worth plundering, or a con- 
 ftitution worth fubverting. England, with evi- 
 dent reludance on her part, had been added to 
 the number ; and, from her peculiar lituation and 
 refources, foon became a principal in the bloody 
 conteft which defolated Europe. But how was 
 England to be involved in the miferies infli<5l:ed 
 on the nations of the continent ? How was this 
 profperous ifiand, the abode of peace, tranquil - 
 ■ lity, and happinefs, to be converted into a wil- 
 
 dernefs
 
 ( xxix ) 
 
 dernefs of blood and ruin ? A happy conftitu- 
 tion, adminiftercd with vigilance and wifdom by 
 a limited authority, promifed no fuccefs to the 
 principles of France ; and Nature had oppofed 
 infurmountable obftacles to her arms. Republican 
 rapacity beheld with rage our fertile fields, our 
 rich and populous cities, our crowded ports, and 
 all the valuable produ6lioHS of our induftry, in- 
 acceflible to her infatiable thirft of blood and 
 plunder; revolutionary fury was raifed almoft 
 to madnefs by the afpe<5l of our fecurity and hap- 
 pinefs ; and the fpeeches and writings of the 
 Convention and its agents are replete with the 
 bittereft reproaches againfl England, as the mofl 
 formidable and hated opponent of one of its 
 " Juhlime vocations, the dtforgan'i%ation of Ru- 
 ro^e*," 
 
 The power and profperity of England were 
 therefore to be attacked in a more circuitous way 
 
 * Camille VefmouUns^ in reply to Briflbt. — And is this 
 what Hauterive alludes to when he fays '* that the conduct 
 of France at the time when (lie was incapable of framing her 
 mealures upon the principles of deliberate prudence, is a 
 proof that her politics are injlln^li'vely in unifon with the 
 interefts, the independence, and profperity of all nations r" 
 
 than
 
 ( XXX ) 
 
 than the pofTefHons of Spahty Aufiriay and Prujfia* 
 They were not expofed to the dlred invalions by 
 which Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, &c. 
 were to be defolated. Her navy and commerce 
 were to be humbled ; and for this purpofe the 
 principles of the armed neutrality were to be re- 
 vived, and a maritime coalition was to be formed 
 againft her. 
 
 Thefe obje6ls were purfued with indefatigable 
 zeal ; with an ardour, perfeverance, and unifor- 
 mity, which aftonifh when we confider the num- 
 ber and variety of the fa6lions that fucceffively 
 aflumed the reins of empire. Nothing was omit- 
 ted that negotiation or intrigue could effect, to 
 induce the neutral maritime flates to embrace 
 this fyftem of hoflility to England. They were 
 fucceffively exhorted, and cajoled, and threatened, 
 and at length perfecuted to favour the views of 
 France ; while at the fame time, numberlefs pub- 
 lications lefs celebrated than that now before us, 
 were executed in the fame fpirit, and diffeminated 
 with the fame intention. In Ihort, our Author 
 
 himfcif
 
 ( XXXI ) 
 
 hlmreir tells us, "what France has hitherto done, 
 is the maximum of what fhe has been able to do 
 for the ejflablifhment of a new code of maritime 
 law *." 
 
 Though we cannot but fmlle at the idle at- 
 tempt to afcribe this conduct and thefe efforts to 
 the prodigious impariiahly and benevolence of the 
 demagogues of France; yet I think no EngUlh 
 writer would depart fo far from fenfe and decency, 
 as to load them with as much inventive for endea- 
 vouring to fubvert the law of nations, as Citizen 
 Hauterive has la vi died ag.iinfl: this country for 
 flrcnuoufly maintaining it. Virulence and abufe 
 are often f) mptoms of weaknefs in matters of con- 
 troverfy ; an unneccflary difplay of words betrays 
 a want of argument : what then are we to infer 
 from the abufive verbiage of the prefent Author ? 
 At the end of his modefl propofal of a new ma- 
 
 * " Ce que la France a fait eft le maximum de ce qu'elle 
 a pu faire jufqu'^ ce jour pour retabliflemei;it du code 
 public maritime.'* 
 
 ritime
 
 ( xxxii ) 
 
 ritimc code, he adds, " I am aware of all the 
 obftacles that England would oppofetothe intro- 
 dudtion of fuch wife regulations : every thing 
 that is wife muft be contrary to the principles fhe 
 profelles ; every thing that is jufl: muft be in op- 
 pofition to the rights ihe infifts upon *.'* 
 
 Thcfe expreflions require neither refutation 
 nor comment ; they only ferve to fhew the tem- 
 per of the writer. A general and unqualified 
 cenfure is furely no argument ; a difputant cannot 
 advance his caufe by calling his adverfary fool or 
 villain. 
 
 To return to the intrigues of France : they 
 were not fuccefsful. The neutral powers of the 
 North were either unable or unwilling to fecond 
 her views. A ftri6l neutrality was the profefled 
 objedl of their defires ; and a treaty was concluded 
 in March 1794, between Denmark and Sweden, 
 
 * *' Je fais tout ce que des lois aiifli fages doivent rencon- 
 trer d'obftacles de la part d'Angleterre : tout ce qui eft fage 
 ert ctMitraire a ce qu'elle etablit en principe } tout ce qui eft 
 jufte eft en oppolition, ave&ce qu'elle erige en droit." 
 
 I by
 
 ( xxxiii ) 
 
 by no means favourable to the defigns of the re- 
 publicans. In this convention, all idea of inno- 
 vation was formally difclaimed ; and the two 
 powers declared their objedl to be the mainte- 
 nance of former treaties, and the exiHing law of 
 nations. All this was contrary to the views of 
 France ; but the condu6l of thofe powers did not 
 fo much concern her as that of the United States 
 of America. 
 
 In a plan for deftroying the commerce of this 
 country, and undermining the foundation of the 
 Britifh navy (the moil formidable bulwark of Eu- 
 rope againfl the hoftile attempts of France), the 
 co-operation of America was of the greatefl con- 
 fequence. As a commercial nation, America 
 flood next in importance to Great Britain, though 
 far behind her ; a very coniiderable part of her 
 Shipping was employed in the trade with Eng- 
 land ; Ihe poflefled a more extenfive commercial 
 marine, and more fkilful navigators, than any 
 other of the neutral powers ; her harbours were 
 numerous and excellent, and in the vicinity of 
 our Well Indian polTeffions. If, therefore, they 
 
 c could
 
 ( xxxiv ) 
 
 could have perfuaded the Americans to aflert the 
 new fyftem of maritime law, or, in other words, 
 to join in a confpiracy againft this country, they 
 expelled to have given a fcvere blow to the re- 
 fources of Great Britain ; and by converting the 
 commercial marine of their allies into a naval 
 force, they hoped to injure ordeftroy one of the 
 fources of our wealth, and to deprive our induflry 
 of one of the principal fields for the difplay 
 of its produ6^ive powers. It is eafy to perceive 
 that fuch a rupture would ,have been infinitely 
 more prejudicial to the United States ; and its pro- 
 moters could not but be aware of all its fatal con- 
 fequences to the power they were endeavouring 
 to impel headlong to its own ruin, in order to 
 ferve their purpofes. But fuch confiderations ap- 
 pear never to have had much weight with the 
 French government ; the tate of its allies has al- 
 ways been made fubfervient to its own interefts. 
 And yet we are told that the *' j)oIitics of France 
 are mJlinEtrcely in unifon iv'ilh the happ'inefs and in- 
 dependence of all nations^'' Twenty years ago 
 fuch an ailertion would have been termed extra- 
 vagant and ridiculous ; at the prefcnt time it 
 
 would
 
 ( XXXV ) 
 
 would be difficult to find a name for it. It has 
 been boldly made in the face of experience, and 
 in fhamelefs contradiction to the evidence of 
 fa6ls ; fa6ls of which the remembrance is yet 
 frelh, and of which the traces are, perhaps, for 
 ever indelible. A latire upon the judgment of 
 the world, it is a grofs and ungenerous infult to 
 the humbled nations, who, after having been plun- 
 dered under the mafk of friendfhip, are retained 
 in a flate of vafTalage, while they are mocked 
 with the title of allies* 
 
 Happily for America, her government proved 
 fuperior to all the artifices and intrigues of France ; 
 and her lituation protected her from the ufurpa- 
 tions which the republicans had every where elie 
 efFedled by force of arms. She wifely declined 
 all participation in the glories and felicity of Bel- 
 gium, Holland, Spain, Italy, &c. of whofe union, 
 or connexions with the Great Nation, Hauierive 
 fpeaks in fuch terms of rapturous admiration ; 
 and (he firmly refifted every attempt to force upon 
 her what flie had refufed to yield to folicitation. 
 On the other hand, no means were negledcd to 
 c 2 enfure
 
 ( xxxvi ) 
 
 cnfure her choice ot'Ohedience: the hiflory of 
 thofe proceedings is in the memory of every one ; 
 we have only here to do with them as far as they 
 form a part of the labours of France in the efta- 
 blilhmcnt of the new maritime code, concerning 
 which the Author before us has fpoken fo falfely, 
 and reafoned fo unwarrantably. The befl reply to 
 his flatements and declamations may be extradled 
 from the memorials prefented to the French go- 
 vernment by the American miniftry, and by the 
 elaborate account of his condu6l rendered by the 
 Prefident to Congrefs, when, after four years of 
 unfuccefsful negotiation and intrigue, Fra?2ce had 
 proceeded to open violence, and left no alterna- 
 tive to the United States, but that of war with 
 France or England. Thefe papers afford the befl 
 comment upon the conduct of the defenders and 
 oppofers of the law of nations. Proceeding from 
 a country whofe politics have always been fup- 
 pofed more favourable to France than England, 
 and who at that particular time had conceived 
 fome caufc of refentment again ft the latter, no 
 Frenchman can have rcafon to complain of their 
 partiaUty. They will fufficiently expofe the 
 ] falfehood
 
 ( xxxvil ) 
 
 falfehood of our Author's ilatements with regard 
 to the origin, as well as thejufticc, of the mari^ 
 time practice of England. 
 
 Firfl, . what does Citizen Hauterive fay of the 
 origin of this pra6lice ? Thefe are his words : 
 " I have called this law the maritime law of 
 England, becaufe it has originated in the mari- 
 time wars of the eighteenth century, and that 
 the maritime wars of the eighteenth century 
 have all been excited, protracted, and diredled 
 by England *." 
 
 The executive government of America, how- 
 ever, did not think fo : they declare, at the end 
 of their note to Citizen Adet, in November 1796, 
 " the captures made by the Britifli of American 
 veffels having French property on board, are 
 warranted by the law of nations. The force and 
 operation of this law was contemplated by 
 France and the United States, when they formed 
 
 * For the complete refutation of this account of the origin 
 of the wars of the laft century, fee any hiftorian, French, 
 German J or Ehglifli, 
 
 c ? their
 
 ( xxxviii ) 
 
 their treaty of commerce, and their fpeclal fiipur 
 lation on this point was meant as an exception to 
 an iiniverfal rule ; neither our isoeaknefs nor our 
 Jlrength have any choice when the queftion concerns 
 the ohfervance of a Jcnown rule of the law of 
 nations. 
 
 Hauterive does not fcruple to aflert, '" fuch is 
 the maritime law which the ftates of Europe (the 
 one by its perfeverance^ the reft by their pajjive- 
 ncfs) have, as it were, confecrated ; and to the 
 reform of which, France calls the attention of 
 all nations, and invokes the wifdom of all go- 
 vernments/* 
 
 Now in a note from the American envoy tp 
 the French government, iti^ iiated, " Vattel, b. 
 jii. 115. fays pofitively, ' that ef^'e^Is belonging tQ 
 
 * an enemy found on hoard a neutral fhip^ arefeizahl^ 
 
 * by the rights of war. ^ But it is deemed unnecef- 
 fary to multiply citations to this point, becaufe 
 France herfelf is fuppofed to have decided 
 it in her Maritime Ordonnance of the year
 
 ( xxxlx ) 
 
 1 744 *. Enemies goods, in netrtral bottoms, are 
 declared liable io feizure and confircation. it will 
 not be contended that France continued in a long 
 courfeof pracStice and legiflation, oppofed to her 
 own opinion of the laws of nations. It mufl. then 
 be conlidered as the opinion of France, that, under 
 the liiiv, neutral bottoms afford no protection to 
 the goods of an enemy, &c." Tlie following 
 remarkable palTage occurs in the fame memorial, 
 and prefents a flriking contrait to the declamation 
 of the French writer, againft what he calls the 
 maritime law of England : *' The defire of efta- 
 blifhing univerfally the principle, that neutral 
 bottoms fhall make neutral goods, is perhaps felt 
 by no nation on earth more ftrongly than by the 
 
 * Many more early ordonnances to the fame effecft might 
 have been quoted : particularly, the celebrated one in i6Sr, 
 which defines the principle, and allerts the pra£t;ce, faid by 
 Mr. Hauterive to have originated in the wars of the eighteenth 
 century, and the policy of England. This orcionnance of 
 France was copied by Spain in 1 7 18, and the one and the other 
 wereonly confiimations of the uniform practice of both pow- 
 ers from the earlieft times ; yet the whole lyflem is faid to iia- e 
 been produced by the maritime preponderance of England in lie 
 eighteenth century ! Hautcrive could not be ignorant of thefe 
 things. 
 
 c 4 United
 
 ( xl ) 
 
 United States. Perhaps no nation is more deeply 
 interefted in its eftablifhment. But the wifh to 
 eftablifh a principle is efTentially different from a 
 determination that is already eftablifhed. The 
 interefts of the United States could not fail to 
 produce the wifh ; their duty forbid them to in- 
 dulge it when deciding on a mere right. How- 
 ever folicitous America might be to purfue all pro- 
 per means tending to obtain for this principle 
 the aflent of all, or any of the maritime powers 
 of Europe, fhe never conceived the idea of ob- 
 taining that confent by force. The United States 
 will only arm to defend their own rights : neither 
 their policy nor their intereft permits them to 
 arm, in order to compel zftirrender of the rights 
 of others, ^^ 
 
 Thus did the Americans decline the invitations, 
 refift the threats, and refute the principles by 
 which the French government unremittingly la- 
 boured to draw them into a confpiracy againft the 
 commercial interefls of Great Britain, and of 
 courfe to produce a rupture between the two 
 powers. The magnanimous, difmterefled policy of 
 
 France
 
 ( xli ) 
 
 France was evinced in the mean time by her ail- 
 ing herfelf upon the very principle (he afFe6ted 
 to condemn, and fhe carried the exercife of a 
 right which Ihe beheld with jealoufy in others, To 
 far as to violate the folemn treaties by which fhc 
 had renounced the practice with refped to parti- 
 cular Hates, always proving, according to Mr. 
 Hauterive, *' that the politics of France arc 
 inftincSlively allied with the interefls of the inde- 
 pendence and profperity of all nations *." 
 
 But in order to illuftrate the truth of what I 
 have here faid, and to fhew what credit is due to 
 Hautcrive*s affertions about the injiin^he politics 
 of France, let us appeal to another French wri- 
 ter of the eighth year. The following paffage is 
 extradled from Rcederer's " Dix Huit Bru- 
 maire\^ and I avail myfelf the more readily of 
 this teftimony, becaufe the language isfo ftrong, 
 and the cenfure fo unreferved, that I fhould have 
 avoided faying fo much myfelf (though perfectly 
 
 * '* Que la politique Fran^aife fe He par fon inftinft ieul 
 aux interets de I'independance et de la profperite de tous les 
 peuples," 
 
 aware
 
 ( =fl"> ) 
 
 aware of the fafls, and convinced of the truth 
 of what he fays), left T might have been fufpedted 
 of invidious exaggeration under the influence of 
 national prejudice. This publication is likewife 
 confidered as official ; for the writer occupied a 
 diltinguilhed place in the French government. 
 Thefe are his expreffions : 
 
 *' ]Look at the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cifalpine 
 republics ! What has been the conduct of France 
 towards thofe countries ? What has fhe given 
 them, but anarchy, rapine, and devaftation ? 
 
 *' The various changes made in the governments 
 impofed upon them, and the troubles infeparablc 
 from fuch tranlitions, have difgufted them in a 
 great meafure with liberty itfelf ; and if we do 
 not haftcn, by a protedlion equally liberal 
 and judicious, to repair the wrongs inflidled 
 on them, the nations on which we have be- 
 llowed a reprefentative conftitution, may foon 
 learn to regret the fetters we have broken for 
 them. 
 
 It
 
 ( xllli ) 
 
 ^•* It is therefore beyond all doubt that thcfc 
 pountries have been rendered inimical to us by 
 the excelies of which we have been guilty tor. 
 \vard them : while on the other hand, the French 
 republic has committed a ft ill greater error in 
 her condudt toward the neutral flates. 
 
 " Nothing could be more conducive to excite 
 enemies againft us than our horrible fyflem of 
 legiflation fnofre Ugijlation horrible) with regard 
 to the navigation of neutral, and even of friendly 
 ^nd allied powers. It is the depredations com- 
 mitted by French privateers that have principally 
 contributed to produce the rupture between 
 f'rance and America. 
 
 ^' At the beginning of our revolution, the 
 United States were among the firmeft of our al- 
 lies, the moft faithful of our friends. As foon as 
 it was perceived that the Congrefs no longer in- 
 clined in favour of France, the uninformed 
 amongft us raifed a clamour againft the Ameri- 
 cans, accufing them of having ungratefully for- 
 gotten the blood we had fhed, and the treafure 
 
 wc
 
 ( xliv ) 
 
 we had fpent, to affert their independence : but 
 thefe perfons muA have been ignorant of the en- 
 thufiafm which our revolution at firfl produced 
 in America ; of the rejoicings which were made 
 to celebrate our triumphs over tyranny, and of 
 the tranfport with which the patriots of this coun- 
 try were received in thofe climates. It was not 
 till the rase for univerfal defolation became our 
 only fyftem, till we had conceived the projedl of 
 fowing divifion among the Anglo-Americans ; 
 till our privateers, inflead of refpeding their 
 commerce, had impudently plundered them of 
 their property ; it was not till then that thefe 
 friends, fo much difpofed to ferve us, were natu- 
 rally inclined to withdraw their afFedlions from 
 us. The robberies committed by our pirates, 
 deflroyed a predile6lion which we might eafily 
 have improved ; a harmony which would have 
 been fo advantageous to us, if we had known 
 how to preferve it. 
 
 " The Dan'ijh flag was fubjedled to perpetual 
 vexations and affronts ; and it is very remarkable, 
 that notwithftanding the intereft which prompted 
 
 us
 
 ( xlv ) 
 
 us to conciliate the King of Frujfuij the flag of 
 that monarch was as little alForded as the reft. 
 Had he been in want of a pretext for quarrelling 
 with us, our privateers would have furniflied him 
 a thoufand ; their depredations on the fubjecSls of 
 this flate were carried to fuch an excefs, that 
 Mr. Sandos, the Pruffian minider, was at length 
 obliged to renounce the bufinefs of negotiating 
 concerning prizes at fea, on account oi the little 
 fuccefs that attended his remonflrances. The 
 charge of fuch fruitlefs proceedings was tranf- 
 ferred to a perfon in an inferior capacity. 
 
 *' Such has been our condufV towards the neu- 
 tral powers ; but we did not flop there : \\c pro- 
 ceeded with fiill greater violence and rapacity 
 againfl our ally, o\iv friend, the Batavian republic. 
 It was not enough that fhe had herfelf facilitated 
 our invaflon of her territory ; it was not enough 
 that flie had received a form of government from 
 our hands j it was not enough that fliie had paid 
 us immenfe funis by way of indemnification for the 
 trouble of conquering her \ it was not enough that 
 Ihe had ceded to us a part of her pofleflTions, and 
 
 had
 
 ( iclvi ) 
 
 had enslao-ed to feed and clothe a confiderabte 
 French army ; it was not enough, in fhort, th^t 
 fhe had quarrelled with England on our account, 
 and that the rupture had led to the annihilation 
 of her commerce, without which Holland is afi 
 empty name ; it was not enough that her mifer- 
 ablc inhabitants, in order to furnifli the Batavian 
 refcriptions, granted for the fervice of the French 
 people, and the payment of its armies, had for 
 the two lafl: years been compelled to pay the "half 
 of their income, and the tenth fart of their property ; 
 in addition to all this, it was neceflary that the 
 cruifers of France fnould feize thefewfmall vef- 
 fcls they yet ventured to fend to fea, even in their 
 own roads, even under their own cannon. Did 
 they fend fupplies of grain to their colonies, in 
 order to vi6lual them, and to prevent their falling 
 into the hands of the Englifh through abfolute 
 want of provifions ; French privateers intercept- 
 ed thefe fuccours, and the veflels were declared 
 good prize, according to the vexatious laws en- 
 acted on this fubjc(5l, and of which the applica- 
 tion was often pronounced in the provincial tri- 
 bunals.
 
 ( xlvii ) 
 
 bunals, by judges immediately concerned in the 
 privateers themfelves." Page 164 — 170. 
 
 This pafiage, upon which we may now fairly 
 reafon, lince no man would attempt to obje6t to 
 the fentence which the French have officially pro- 
 nounced upon themfelves ; this pafTage fuggefts 
 two important obfervations immediately applica- 
 ble to our prefent fubjedl : ifl. That the cla- 
 mour of France againfl the maritime pradlice of 
 England, being mod loud at the very period 
 when fhe herfelf was guilty of the greateft enor- 
 mity and injuftice, not in the ufe, but the 
 abufe of the fame rights on which it was founded ; 
 there could not be the fmalleft reafon to fufpedl 
 that they proceeded fromjufl or honourable mo- 
 tives ; the powers to whom they were addrefTed, 
 muft have perceived that they were the offsprino- 
 of private hatred, and had nothing to do with 
 public good. 2dly, That if the oppofition which 
 was afterwards fet up to our rights by the north- 
 ern ftates, had really been founded upon the mo- 
 tives openly affigned to it, it is inconceivable 
 why they did not long before that time produce 
 
 a fimilar
 
 ( xlvili ) 
 
 a iTmllar confederacy againfl the infults and pi- 
 racies of France. How could they patiently fub- 
 mit to thefe illegal depredations during ten years, 
 without arming to repel them, and at the end of 
 that period announce a league for the purpofe of 
 forcibly oppoling the legal proceedings of Eng- 
 land ? It will furely be found impoflible to juf- 
 tify fuch condu6t. It can never be fhewn to be 
 conliflent. 
 
 At the time when Hauterive publiflied his work, 
 the hopes of France were revived by what was 
 paffing in the North : and the book itfelf is one 
 of the many means they had recourfe to in order 
 to improve the favourable opportunity, and to 
 kindle the fpark into a iiame. I think every 
 man who has read it, will allow, that, however 
 great the difficulty of recommending a bad caufe, 
 it might have been done more ingenioufly. That 
 fuch a medley of vague aflertion, and intempe- 
 rate declamation, fhould have been fo much read, 
 and in any degree admired, is a flrong proof of 
 the violence of thofe prejudices which the jealoufy 
 and envy of other nations, inflamed by the wri- 
 tings
 
 ( x^^ ) 
 
 4 
 
 tings and intrigues of our enemies, ha^ cxqhed 
 iagainft us. 
 
 Some circumftances perfe(^ly foreign to all ma- 
 ritime concerns, gave a very unexpe6led, and, it 
 may well be faid, a very unnatural turn to the 
 politics of a great northern power, after the con- 
 clulion of the campaign of 1799* in which its 
 troops had adted fo honourable a part, and ren- 
 dered fuch eflential fervice againft the common 
 enemy. 
 
 Upon the firft fufpiciori of a difagreement be- 
 tween England and Rufiia, every engine in the 
 hands of France was put in motion to inflame 
 the ontroverfy, and widen the breach. But it 
 would be frultlefs to endeavour to explain the 
 motives and trace the progrefs of a revolution 
 which depended on a mind fo Angularly con- 
 ftrudied as that of the late Emperor. The mod 
 intimate alliance was fuddenly fucceeded by the 
 moft furious hoftility. 
 
 He
 
 He looked around nim for the means of injur- 
 ing his former friends ; and the armed neutrality 
 was again announced to the world. 
 
 Some pretext, however, was neceflary to ferve 
 as a foundation for the new northern conven- 
 tion, whofe object was profefledly limilar to that 
 of the old. It was expedient to create fome 
 ground of complaint againft this country, to give 
 it a colour of jufiice and neceflity. 
 
 For this purpofe a Danish frigate was appointed 
 to convoy fome merchantmen of that nation, and 
 the Captain was inftrufled to refifl any attempt 
 of the Englifh cruifers to fcarch or interrupt the 
 veflels under his protedlion. He encountered fome 
 Britifh fhips of war at the entrance of the Channel, 
 who proceeded to exercife the law of nations in the 
 nfual manner: the Dane refified, according to 
 his orders; the Englifh employed force, and 
 brought him with his convoy into port. 
 
 In the year 1798, a limilar occurrence had 
 taken place : a Swcdifli veffel efcorting a fleet of 
 
 merchantmen^
 
 ( H ) 
 
 merchantmen, refufed to permit fome Britifh fri- 
 gates under Commodore La wford to fearch them: 
 and a demonftration was made of repelling the 
 attempt by force. The law and pra6tice of na- 
 tions has attached the penalty of confifcation to 
 refiftance of vifitation. The flatutes of France 
 are explicit on this head : the ordinance of 1681, 
 above referred to, expreflly declares, art. 12, 
 *' That every vej/el JhaJl he good prize in cafe of 
 refifiance and combat^'' 
 
 The Swedllh frigate, with her convoy, being 
 htought into Margate Roads, the vefTels and 
 cargoes we-e proceeded againft according to pub- 
 lic law and ordinary pradlice. 
 
 The cafe, however, was not a common one. 
 It was remonflrated on the part of Sweden, that 
 the prefence of a commiffioned fhip was a fuffi- 
 cient fecurity for the condudl of its convoy, and 
 the legality of their proceedings ; that the diredl 
 ^terpofition of the fovereign authority of a neu- 
 tral power, precluded the right and propriety of 
 (earch by a belligerent. Thefe pretcnfions, how- 
 
 d a ever.
 
 ( li: ) 
 
 ever, were not fupported by the law of nations j 
 and the prefent inftance was no proof of its fc" 
 verity in that refpecl ; for the veffels tnus ef- 
 corted, were many of them laden with naval 
 {lores and other contraband articles for the ports 
 of our enemies. 
 
 There is no reafon, however, to believe that 
 the Britifli government would not have affented 
 to any equitable regulations by which the law 
 might have been modified with regard to the 
 prefence of commiffioned fhips, had it been 
 properly propofed : but its mere expediency to 
 forae nations was not fufficient to juftify the in- 
 troducing it by force. 
 
 The convention concluded at St. Peterfburgh 
 in June lall, is a fufficient proof of the rcadi- 
 nefs of the Englifh government to adopt the 
 fyfiem moft agreeable to the wifhes and conve- 
 nience of other powers, provided it interferes 
 not with its own interefts. At that time, howr 
 ever, it could only be guided by the then eAa* 
 blifhed law, and general pradtice of xiations ; 
 
 And
 
 ( lii! ) 
 
 «nd furely no power on earth could undertake, 
 Vfiih any hope of fuccefs, to beat or bully Great 
 Britain out of her rights. The Swedifh mer- 
 chantmen were condemned by the Court of 
 Admiralty, fhip and cargo, for rcliftance of 
 inquiry and fe^rch. 
 
 The right of fearching veflels under convoy 
 of a commiffioned fhip, was therefore the raoft 
 convenient to obje<5l to at a time when Ruflia 
 was refolved to make a reafon for eftablifhing a 
 hoflile convention againft England. It was a 
 fubje6l which .had long lain dormant*, becauf« 
 neutral ftates had not been in the habit of fend- 
 ing armed veflTels to efcort their merchapitmen ; 
 zud it was not Specifically mentioned in the 
 treaty concluded between the two powers in 
 1797, in which the right of/earch is fully agreed 
 upon by both parties. 
 
 * The right of refifting fearch by the prote£tion of convoy, 
 was firft fct up by the Queen of Sweden in 1653, and after- 
 wards much infilled on by Holland in 1655, 1656, and 1657; 
 j^ut thefe dates carry us far beyond the period within which 
 Mr. Hauierive has fixed the origin of the prelent maritione 
 code. 
 
 d3 The
 
 ( liv ) 
 
 The ground of oppolition to It was the more 
 fpecious too, as it appeared to involve the honour 
 and dignity of the complaining ftates, who in- 
 fifted upon the refped due to their fovereigii 
 authority, and profefled to be alarmed by a vio-. 
 lation of it. No extraordinary pains were ne- 
 ceffary to reconcile the body of the people in the 
 North, to any meafures hoftile to Great Britain ; 
 envy and jealoufy, and diifappointed avarice, 
 had embittered the trading part of them, whofe 
 unjuft and illiberal complaints were made the 
 groundwork of a fyflem for exciting the ge- 
 neral hatred again ft this country, by diflemi- 
 nating the moft unfounded ideas of the nature 
 and confequence of its commercial and maritime 
 fuperiority. To propagate and enforce thefe 
 notions, and to foment thefe popular preju- 
 dices ; to defcribe the profperity of England, as 
 in contradiction to the intereft of all Europe; 
 thefe are the objc61s upon wliich Mr. Hauterive 
 has beftowed the pioft of his labour and inge« 
 nuity. The time, the fpirit, and the matter of 
 his work, Ihew clearly that his grand objeft 
 was to promote the difcontent, and encourage 
 
 the
 
 ( 1^ ) 
 
 the Ipirit of hoftility againft Englan<3. And 
 lince we are alTurcd that his book met con- 
 fiderablc fucceTs where its cffe<Sl was intended 
 to be produced, we may regard it as a part not 
 altogether infignificant of the northern con* 
 ipiracy. 
 
 The miniftry of England, in the mean time, 
 were not uninformed of what was going on, and 
 lefolve.d to ufe every endeavour to avert the 
 ilorm in fuch a period of extraordinary diiii- 
 /culty. Upon intelligence of the capture of the 
 Danifh frigate (whofe bulinels ^nd deftination 
 were too obvious to be miftaken), dire^iions 
 were fent |to Lord WhiKvorth to repair to Co- 
 penhagen to arrange ^n immediate agreement 
 concerning that affair, in order to prevent all 
 linpleafant confequences ; referving the general 
 .queftipn for future difcuflion. According to the 
 Stipulations of thi$ agreement, the Danilh fri- 
 gate with her convoy, ^ere immediately re- 
 ilored ; while, on the other hand, Denmark pn- 
 gaged to fufpend her convoys till a definitive 
 arrangement of the point in queftion. This 
 
 d A convention
 
 ( Ivi ) 
 
 convention was concluded on the i^ih Auguil 
 
 1800. 
 
 In the mean tirne (on the i6th Auguft) ap- 
 peared the declaration of the Emperor of Ruffia, 
 accompanied by the embargo upon the veffels qf 
 the Englifh in all his ports. 
 
 This declaration was the groundwork of the 
 fubfequent convention, to which it invited the 
 neutral powers ; calling upon them to renew the 
 confederacy which they had formed in the yeat 
 1780, for the» maintenance of the /acred prhi- 
 ciples of a wife and impartial neutrality. To fe€? 
 the manifeflo in its true light, it is only neccf- 
 fary to conlider the proceedings with which it 
 was coupled. The true charadler of the arm^d 
 neutrality is difplayed by the temper and occa- 
 iion that created it : produced at the iame birth 
 with a monftrous violation of juftice, and 
 equity, and folemn obligations, and recent trea- 
 ties* with this country, there could be no doubt 
 
 concerning 
 
 * *' At the commencement of the prefent war, the 
 court of Peterfburgh, which had taken the principal part in 
 
 the'
 
 ( Ivii ) 
 
 concerning its merits or intent. The fevcral 
 parties who acceded to it, muft have felt that 
 they were pledging themfelves to an a6l of 
 dire(5l hoftility to England ; and engaging in a 
 confpiracy againfl the private iqtcrefts of one 
 nation, vvhofe welfare flood connedled with the 
 public law of Europe. The convention was 
 firft concluded between Sweden and Ruffia, 
 and afterwards acceded to by Denmark, in di- 
 rect violation of the recent engagements into 
 ^vhich fhe had entered under the convention 
 with Lord VVhitworth. 
 
 But the charatfVer of this alliance is bell 
 elucidated by the palpable contradiction be- 
 tween the condu6l and profeffions of its authors. 
 It was faid to have no other views than the 
 maintenance of certain juft rights, the introduc- 
 
 the formation of the former league, entered with his Majefty 
 into ei _;ageaients not only inconfillent with the convention 
 of 1780, but of a dire^^ly oppofite nature; engagements 
 which are ftiil in force, and the execution of which his Ma- 
 jefty is at thij moment entitled to claim on every principle of 
 good faith."--Lord Grenville's Note to the Danifh and Swe- 
 iliifli Minifters, 1 rth Jan. 1801. 
 
 tioM
 
 ( IvHi ) 
 
 lion of certain equitable principles, and the 
 abolition of feme oppreiTive pra6\ices in man- 
 time affairs. How fhould fuch obje6\s have 
 been purfued, to be compatible with the peace 
 and tranquillity of Europe, and conliitent with 
 the pacific and upright intentions profeflTed by 
 the parties to this league ? Should not the pro- 
 pofed innovations have been candidly fubmitted, 
 in the way of negotiation, to every power with 
 whofe interefts they could interfere ? Should 
 not fome attempt have been made to convince 
 the world of their expediency, and to obtain the 
 peaceable confent of all the nations concerned 
 in them ? Can there in juflice be any reafon for 
 proceeding to hoftilities againft one nation for 
 pra(5lices authorized and enjoined by the ancient 
 laws of Europe, becaufe a few powers have re- 
 folved to promulgate new ones ? Could cer- 
 tain ilates, becaufe they agreed, under exifling 
 circumflances, to furrender certain rights (while 
 they had no opportunity for exerciling them), be 
 juftified in taking arms to compel the furrcndejr 
 of them by another power ? Or, fuppoling that 
 fuch furrender were expedient for the welfare 
 
 of
 
 C i« ) 
 
 of Europe, how could it be confident with 
 ^iiity to commence a moft violent attack upoi; 
 that power before even its confent bad been 
 fought for, or its inclination confulted ? No ; 
 the armed neutrality, though even its profeflions 
 were unjuftitiaole, was nothing of what it 
 prolefied to be : it was an offenfive alliance 
 again ft England. Nut only no attempt was 
 made on the part of the allies to negotiate the 
 points to be cflablilhed, but the mod pohtivc 
 refolution was evinced to avoid all difcuflion of 
 their merits. The Englifh miniitry omitted no 
 efforts to bring the matter into a channel of pa- 
 cific determination. Ere the Britiih thunder 
 was heard to -roll, the olive-branch had been 
 repeatedly proffered to thofe with whom we had 
 yet any means of communication left. 
 
 The moderation of Great Britain continued 
 to be manifefled, even when fhe was driven to 
 the laft extremity by the infatuated policy of the 
 northern courts. Although a fleet, equal to the 
 mofl vigorous and decilive operations, had been 
 equipped with a promptitude and expedition 
 
 which
 
 ( 1=^ ) 
 
 vi'hich furprifed even thofe who were beft ac- 
 quainted with the naval refources of the coun- 
 try, a laft effort for peace was made by an at- 
 tempt to come to an amicable explanation with 
 the only power among the confederates with 
 whom the ordinary channels of diplomatic in- 
 tercourfe were ftill open ; the Britifji minifiers 
 hafing been forced with infult from Pet erf- 
 burgh, and obliged to quit the co urtof Sweden. 
 A gentleman, recently appointed to a lituatioti 
 of great confidence, was joined in this import- 
 ant and delicate miflion with the relident mi- 
 pifter at Copenhagen. On his arrival at that 
 city, the Britifh minifters found all means of 
 conciliation barred by a pofitive refufal on the 
 part of the Danifh government to receive their 
 credentials, except on conditions by which the 
 objed^s in difpute would have been virtually 
 conceded. Even under thefe circumftances, 
 which left them no option confifient with the 
 honour of their country, but that of putting an 
 immediate end to their mifiion, one more op- 
 portunity was accidentally offiired of fhewing 
 with how much rel usance the Britifh government 
 
 aflerted
 
 ( l^i ) 
 
 aflerted their rights by force of arms. Before 
 the minifters found an opportunity of leaving 
 Copenhagen, an officer arrived with difpatches 
 from Sir Hyde Parker, announcing the arrival 
 of his fleet off the entrance of the Sound. In 
 this awful moment of crilis they once more 
 tendered their credentials for acceptance, which 
 were again refufed with circumflances of arro- 
 gance, petulance, and precipitation, which 
 fhewed the blind obedience of the Danifli go- 
 vernment at that time, to a power whofe favourite 
 policy was to excite an irreconcilable enmity 
 between Great Britain and the maritime powers 
 of the North. I need not detail the glorious 
 events by which this policy was completely 
 fruftrated. The rights which Britifh valour de- 
 fended, have been afcertained and fecured bv 
 Britifh wifdom and moderation. The fame 
 terms were accepted in the hour of vidlory, 
 which were claimed in the moment of an im- 
 pending conflict with the united maritime force 
 of Europe, and a league which was ^prefsly 
 formed for the purpofe of di<5lating, under the 
 influence of France, a new code of maritime 
 '-- law:
 
 ( Jxii ) 
 
 law to the world, has ended in the general a<r- 
 knowledgment and final recognition of the old, 
 under the aufpices of Great Britain. 
 
 In the mean time our enemies were flattered 
 with the profpedl Gi,an approximation to that 
 happy flate of things, that beautiful fyflem of 
 commercial peace, which Hauterive defcribes in 
 fuch glowing colours : to that emancipation of 
 Europe, that delivery from her political thral- 
 dom, by the annihilation of Britain, the never- 
 varying obje6l of the benevolence, Impartiality, 
 and wifdom of the rulers of the Gre^t Nation. 
 Alas ! that France fhoiild have been only a 
 fpe61ator in the accomplifhment of this fublime 
 revolution ; that the world Ihould be indebted 
 to the Barhares du Nord, for the ineftimable 
 benefit of England's degradation ; and that the 
 liberty of the feas fiiould have been afierted by 
 the pafiion or caprice of an eccentric defpot ! 
 France may, however, with jufiiccj claim the 
 merit of a very adive, though not the moil 
 fi:riking part of this extraordinary drama. She 
 never will be reproached with having omitted 
 3 any
 
 { Ixill ) 
 
 any rpecics of Intrigue, any fecret praiflices, any 
 propagation of falfehood, any incendiary pub- 
 lications, any grofs adulation, by which the 
 weaknefs of princes, and the ignorance or paf- 
 fion of their fubjeiSIs, could be turned to ad*- 
 vantage ; by which the powers of the North 
 could be provoked to raife the fabric which 
 (hould eclipfe the glory, and darken the pro- 
 fpecls of Great Britain. I think an attentive and 
 impartial perufal of the following work will 
 clearly fhew, that a confpiracy againft the 
 dcareft interefts of England, muft always prove 
 a confpiracy againft the interefts of all Europe. 
 Happily for us, and for the world, the fuccefs of 
 thcfe plans was only momentary. France did 
 not long enjoy the fpe^lacle of Britain's diffi- 
 culties. She beheld her undaunted courage, 
 her vigorous efforts, with difmay, and at length 
 faw all her hopes blafted by the good policy and 
 moderation which feized the firft opportunity 6f 
 reftorlng peace and juftice, and in the midft of 
 viiftory fubftituted a truly equitable treaty to the 
 hoftile convention, mifnaraed the armed neil- 
 trality. 
 
 Of
 
 ( Ix'iv ) 
 
 Of this {yCiem, the foundation and fuppoff 
 was finally proved to the world by the occafion 
 and manner of its dilfolution, and Europe be- 
 held how little it had to do with thofe immu- 
 table principles of juftice, thofe extenlive vicwj 
 of humanity, that liberal and enlightened policy 
 which are fet forth by Hauterive, with all hi» 
 eloquence, as the true grounds on which the pow- 
 ers of the North are bound to confpire againfl: 
 Great Britain, and to further the views and intc- 
 refts of France* It was grafted on the capricious 
 refentment of a prince, whofe condu6l has war- 
 ranted fufpicions of derangement, and whole po- 
 litics were at once the terror and laughter of Eu- 
 rope. With his life it ended : his fuccelTor, con- 
 vinced of the impolicy, as well as injullice of 
 his proceedings towards this country, commenced 
 his reign by undoing the extravagancies of bis 
 prcdccelTor. Superior to the intrigues of France, 
 he was infenfible to the immenfe advantages of 
 diftrefling, or, perhaps, humbling England. He 
 foon made known his inclination to renounce 
 the idle pretenfions of the northern league, and 
 to form v/Ith England fuch a convention as 
 
 might
 
 might Iccure the jiili^ rights of the belligerent and 
 neutral powers, according to the fpirit of the an^ 
 cient law of nations ; and at the fame time de- 
 fine thofe points on which its ftipulations were 
 not fufficiently explici'c, or of which the general 
 welfare of Europe did perhaps require fome mo- 
 dification. 
 
 This convention of the 17th June 1801*, is 
 certainly among the mofl important in the annals 
 of hiflory. It has not only put an end to the 
 dangers that threatened the fafety of England, and 
 the tranquillity of Europe, at theprefent moment ; 
 hut it has, in all human probability, precluded the 
 tecurrence of thofe dangers by its wife and liberal 
 ftipulations, equally juft and Satisfactory to all 
 the parties concerned in it. It feefns to have left 
 no dubious point in maritime law which might 
 ferve as a pretext for any future quarrel with 
 Great Britain, as a handle for any future in- 
 trigues of France. The powers of the North Hand 
 pledged to fupport the fyftem they were lately en- 
 gaged to oppofe ; and the equitable conceflions 
 we have confented to make, have added double 
 
 "* Vide Appendix, No, I. 
 
 e Itrengtk
 
 ( Ixvi ) 
 
 Arength to the rights we were bound to infifl 
 upon. We have lately received the concluding 
 piece of this important treaty ; the acceffion of 
 Sweden * has been notified by our minifter at St. 
 Peterfburgh, together with the folemn aflurancc, 
 that the northern powers have renounced not only 
 the fpecific alliance which occafioned their 
 rupture with us, but the principle upon which it 
 was founded, and the pretenfions it was intended 
 to fupport. 
 
 Such has been the conclufion of a conteft in 
 which our beft interefis were involved. The an- 
 cient maritime law of Europe has been fucceff- 
 fully maintained, in an age too favourable to 
 revolutions, and againft a mod formidable at- 
 tempt to fubvert it. The right of belligerent to- 
 wards neutral powers, has been confecrated by a 
 folemn treaty with all the fiates whofe interefts 
 and lituation might incline them to difputethofe 
 rights. It muft further be obferved, that there 
 was nothing compulfatory in this convention ; it 
 was not the efFe6l of neceffity on either fide. 
 The arms of Great Britain had not yet encoun- 
 
 * Vide Appendix, No. II. 
 
 tered
 
 ( litvil ) 
 
 tercd thoie of the firft and principal contra<SVing 
 party ; and the peace concluded was not in confe- 
 quence of the- fortune of war. This circumftance 
 affords a fufficient anfwerto what Hauterive ikyi 
 when fpea king of the law of nations now con- 
 firmed : " That it is a code only maintained by 
 the adlivity and perfeverance of one nation, and 
 the paffiyenefs of all the reft." 
 
 It is evident, indeed, that, as the object of this 
 part of his work has been completely fruftrated 
 by the above treaty ; fo the arguments and afler- 
 tions it contains, are completely refuted, if they 
 need any refutation ; at leaft it has involved the 
 matter in the following dilemma : either his rea- 
 foning is inaccurate, and his conclufion falfe ; or 
 the ftates of Ruflia, Sweden, and Denmark, are 
 governed by wicked or incapable minifters. He 
 has entered at great length into the merits of the 
 maiitime law as it now ftands, in order to prove 
 that it is a ** code of oppreflion and barbarifm,*' 
 fupporting and fupported by the tyranny of Eng- 
 land, to the naifery and ruin of the reft of Europe. 
 Ruflia, Sweden, and Denmark, have confer 
 e a crated
 
 ( Ixviii ) 
 
 crated this code of oppreffion, this monument 
 of barbarifm, though he had promifed them, 
 " that France would willingly join all her ftrength 
 with that of the powers difpofed to arm for the 
 purpofe of banifhing this monument of ignorance 
 and barbarifm for ever from the legiflation of an 
 enlightened age." Europe muft decide between 
 Hauterive and them. 
 
 From thefe obfervations I thint we may draw 
 the following conclulions ^ 
 
 That until the year 1780, France and England 
 aflerted the fame principles in the pradlice of ma- 
 ritime warfare ; and that if in their conduft to- 
 wards neutrals there was any difference, the 
 greater feverity was on the fide of France. 
 
 That at that period, England being engaged 
 in a conteft which threatened to exceed her 
 flrength, the powers of the North proclaimed 
 their determination to refifl a pradlice that de- 
 barred them from confiderable fources of gain ; 
 and France, eager to feize an opportunity to in- 
 jure
 
 ( Ixlx ) 
 
 jure her enemy and rival, and check the growing 
 fuperiority of the Britifh navy, immediately con- 
 curred in that enterprife to overturn the law of 
 nations ; making a merit of renouncing rights 
 which were no longer (b ufeful to her, as the re- 
 nunciation; loudly contrafting her compliance 
 with the tenacity of Great Britain, and even af- 
 fedling to be the iirft mover and prime fupporter 
 of this new fyftem, from motives of the jftric^eft 
 juftice and mofl: extentive benevolence. 
 
 That during the late war it became ftill more 
 the intereft of France to revive the principles of 
 the armed neutrality, becaufe her own navy was 
 reduced to infignificance, and her coinmercial 
 marine nearly annihilated. Accordingly, the hif- 
 tory of her tranfadlions with the neutral powers, 
 is one continued feries of varied attempts to ex- 
 cite a maritime coalition under that pretence, 
 againft England. The liberty of ihefeas was the 
 ipecious cry at home and abroad ; while her prac- 
 tice, as far as her reduced means would reach, 
 was a conftant tranfgrellion, not only of fuch 
 e 3 profeffions.
 
 ( Ixx ) 
 
 profeffion?, but even of the ancient law of nA* 
 tions which they were deligned to fupplant. 
 
 That her efforts in and out of Europe proved 
 unfuceefsful, till fome circumftances of a differ- 
 ent nature had difpofed a great potentate of the 
 North to fecond her plans of hoftility to Eng- 
 land ; that her labours redoubled with this dawn 
 of hope ; and that the official publication written 
 at this period by Mr. Hauterive, was a part of 
 them. 
 
 That this publication, addrefled not to France, 
 but to Europe, was an attempt to inflame the 
 minds of all nations and all princes, and to ex* 
 cite a general coalition againft this country. In 
 a chapter (a very principal part of the work) 
 appropriated to the rights and relations of 
 neutral powers, it is endeavoured fo to blend 
 and confound the commercial profper'tty and ma~ 
 rit'tme fraSf'ice of this country, as to render both 
 equally odious, wherever jealoufy or avarice has 
 created an averflon to either ; and thus to procure 
 the co-operation of all Europe in a plan, not 
 
 merdy
 
 ( Ixxi ) 
 
 merely to deprive us of the right of fearching 
 neutral traders, and capturing enemies property 
 in time of war, but to ruin the very foundation 
 of our happinefs, to attack all the fources of our 
 induftry, to aim at the annihilation of our com- 
 merce, and finally to feek the defiru6lion of 
 Great Britain, as of a mpnfler devouring the fub- 
 fiance, and trampling on the independence of 
 Europe. 
 
 That the aflertions in this part of the work 
 are generally falfe, and the arguments, for the 
 moft part, fallacious ; fo that a very flight 
 knowledge of hiltory is fufficient to refute many 
 of its leading points. Thefe aflertions and argu- 
 ments were, however, intended to fupport the 
 principles, and difplay the views of the men now 
 at the head of affairs in France ; and we muft not 
 fuppofe that they have renounced them becaufe 
 the fudden death of the Emperor Paul, and the 
 good fenfe of his fucceffor, defeated their plans. 
 England will ever be the objed of fuch plans, 
 while the continues to be the ftay and bulwark of 
 Europe, againft a power whole ambition knows 
 €4 no
 
 ( Ixxii ) 
 
 no bounds; and whofe thirft of aggrandizement 
 muft be afluaged by continual acquifitions, qvei^ 
 in the midft of peace. 
 
 Finally, that the tremendous ftorm which 
 threatened us from the North, having been partly 
 difpelled by the above unexpedled circumftance, 
 highly favourable to Great Britain, has been en- 
 tirely broken and averted by the vigour and 
 proniptitude of our arms, and the moderation 
 and vvifdom of our councils. That the treaty of 
 the 17th June does great credit to the miniftry by 
 whom it was concluded ; and that we may reft 
 aflured, that, under their guidance, the honour 
 of our country will be efFe6lual1y afferted, and 
 its interefls vigilantly guarded. We may confi- 
 dently hope that the plans announced by Haute- 
 rive for ruining this country, will prove abortive, 
 from the want of co-operation on the part of 
 thofe powers, without which they cannot be car- 
 ried into efFe<5l ; and that the nations of Europe 
 will long continue in thatfiateof infenfibility and 
 indolence (that is, of prudence and integrity) of 
 which they are accufed in this publication, where 
 
 it
 
 ( Ixxiii ) 
 
 it is fald that they have " ni Je difcernenmit necejjaif^ 
 pour/entir tout le prix de la Vtherte, ni ajfez de refolu- 
 fion four fecondre les efforts de leiirs liherateursi^ 
 which IS in Englifh, " that all the remonftrances, 
 threats, and folicitations of France, are unahle 
 to provoke them to enter into a confpiracy to an- 
 nihilate this country, and enflave themfelves*." 
 
 There 
 
 * The plan which Hauterive propofes to Europe, in the 
 name of the French government, is contained in the following 
 article : 
 
 ifl. Privateering is to be aboliflied ; and all the rights of 
 fovereignty are to accompany the flag of neutral powers in 
 time of war. 
 
 zd. In peace, the commercial iiUercourfe of nations is to 
 be exempted from every kind of prohibition ; except with 
 Xefpe£l to the trade between the different ports of the fame 
 country, and the navigation between the colonies and mother- 
 Country. 
 
 In order to compel England to fubmit to thefe regula- 
 tions, he propofes, with regard to the firft, that the powers 
 of Europe fliould join with France to aflert it, a ?nain armc'e ; 
 and that, to enforce the fecond, they ftiould agree to form one 
 general Navigation AH, or a fyftem of prohibitive laws 
 limilar to the Navigation A£t of Great Britain ; differing 
 from it, however, in this important refpeft, that its operation 
 ihould not affeft all nations alike, but that it fliould be ex- 
 clufively directed againft England, who is thus, by general 
 confent, to be forcibly fliut out from all the markets of Eu- 
 ifope. To put herfelf at the head of fuch a league, and to 
 
 aflift
 
 ( Ixxiv ) 
 
 There is another chapter of Mr. Hautcrive's 
 work, which did not come within the fphere of 
 
 Mr. 
 
 aflift the ftates of Europe with her arms, her counfels, and 
 by her example (all which he promifes in her name), is, as he 
 thinks, rhe utmoft that France can do for the happinefs and 
 liberty of Europe. In the prefent ftate of things, it would 
 be premature to aflert, that France has actually begun to aft 
 iipon the latter part of this fyflem ; and that Ihe is deter- 
 mined to refiife the admittance of every article of Britifh in- 
 duftry or fpeculation to her markets. We have been aflured, 
 from high authority, that (lie has not evinced any difinclina- 
 tion to a commercial treaty with this country ; and we can- 
 not therefore pronounce with certainty upon her prefent con- 
 duft. If, however, it fliould prove a fpecimen of her future 
 intentions (though we have lately had reafon to hope that 
 flie may not follow Hauterive's fyftem), I cannot think 
 that we have much to apprehend on that account. It is now 
 ten years fince we have been debarred from all authorized or 
 open intercourfe with France ; and amidft all the dangers and 
 difficulties of a ftate of warfare, we have done fo well without 
 her connexion, that our commerce has attained to a pitch of 
 greatnefs unexampled in the hiftory of nations. Can we then 
 for a moment fuppofe that the fame circumftances will be 
 more prejudicial to us with all the advantages of peace? 
 Were this fyftem to be afted on by France alone (and there 
 is not the fmalleft reafon to fuppofe that any other nation 
 would affift her in it), {be would herfelf be the only fuflferer 
 by an attempt to injure us. Her prohibitive ftatutes will only 
 ferve to opprefs her own fubjec^s, without preventing the entry 
 of thofe commodities of which they ftand in need, many of 
 which they can only get from hence, and none of them fo 
 cheap elfewhere. For, as Hauterive fays himfelf, " Les loix 
 
 prohibitives
 
 ( Ixxv ) 
 
 Mr. Gentz's obfervations, and on which I muft 
 be permitted to fay a very few words : I mean 
 that in which he compares the wealth and re- 
 fources of France, with thofe of England. The 
 theme of his reafoning is, that the fabric of Eng- 
 lanS s greatnefs is artificial and precarious, while the 
 riches and power of France refi upon a f olid and im- 
 ntovahle foundation. The arguments by which 
 this propolition, with all its confequences, is at- 
 tempted to be demonftratcd, form by far the moft 
 elaborate and ingenious part of his work : he 
 doubtlefs conlidered it the moft important. It 
 is, however, by no means neceflaryto follow him 
 through the long expolition of his principle, in 
 order to difprove the rcfult to which it leads. I 
 think we fhall be juftificd by his own argu- 
 ments for afluming opinions diredlly oppofite to 
 his. 
 
 prohibitives font des impots dont les etrangers font feulement 
 charges de faire Tavance et que les nationaux font forces 
 enfuitc de renibourf'^r a un tres-haut interct. 
 
 *' Les lois prohibitives n'attcignent que momentanement 
 le commerce general ; elles retombent et peient avec duree 
 fur le commerce national et fur la confommation locale.'' — 
 Page 194. 
 
 - ^ It
 
 ( Ixxvi )' 
 
 It is his opinion that the refearches hitherto 
 made in political economy, are all imperfedl, and 
 the concl ulions drawn from them erroneous : that 
 no method has been difcovered of efiimating 
 the real wealth of nations^ and that the only one 
 which would lead to a true refult, is impradica- 
 bie in the prefent flate of the fcience : that the 
 volumes which have been written on the finances 
 and refources of Great Britain, are not even ap-. 
 proximations to the truth ; that they are the ofF- 
 fpring of party, the labours of men who have 
 framed ingenious bypothefes to arrive at prede- 
 termined conclufions; a labyrinth of figures, 
 tablesj and comparative ftatements, with which 
 the partilans of England have the affurance to 
 affront the moft incontrovertible principles : " / 
 jirmly heVieve^^- fays he, *' that Mr. Gentzs hooh, 
 that the budgets of Mr, Pitt, that the calculations 
 of Miff. Rofey Middhton, Beeke, ^c. leave the 
 whole quefiion concerning the foreign and do- 
 meftic commerce of Great Britain, juft where 
 they found it.'* 
 
 Havinjf^
 
 ( Ixxvli ) 
 
 Having thus difpofed of all that flood in hii 
 way, in a very fummary manner, he proceeds to 
 cftabiifli conclufions, directly oppofite to Vv^liat 
 we learn from the communications of thofe gen- 
 tlemen ; direcSlly oppofite to the moft authentic 
 documents, and directly oppofite to the common 
 experience of every man who is capable of any 
 difcernment or difcrimination. By the applica- 
 tion of certain principles (which he explains at 
 much length, though without any regard to or- 
 der or confequence) to the focial, economical, 
 and political conflitution of Great Britain, he 
 proves, as he fays, that her commerce mufi have 
 declined, that her wealth mnjl have been dimi- 
 nifhed, and that a large portion of her inhabit- 
 ants mufi have been reduced to mifery and want 
 during the late w-ar : in fhort, that the has been 
 brought to the brink of ruin, while France re- 
 mains unfhaken aud entire. He afTumes that his 
 principle is fufficient to efiablifh the fa(5i, even if 
 there were no other proof of it ; but that the 
 proofs are numberlefs, and therefore the fa(5l con- 
 firms the principle. 
 
 If
 
 ( Ixxviil ) 
 
 If the refutation of the fadt or principle were 
 involved in any difficulty ; if it were neceffary 
 to bring forward many of thofe " labyr'mihs of 
 figures*'' which we call authentic documents ; if, 
 in fliort, he had not furnifhed ushimfelf with the 
 means of annihilating the whole fabric of his in- 
 genuity in an inftant, he would probably have 
 remained unanfwered. Who would have en- 
 countered difficulty or trouble in fuch a caufe \ 
 
 Among the truths which are fludioufly inter- 
 mixed with the fophifms in this diflertation on 
 the decline of England*s profperity and refourccs, 
 there is one which Hauterive advances with pe- 
 culiar emphafis, and exhibits in more than one 
 place : he cannot therefore refufe to be judged by 
 it ; and we require no more. Thefe are his words : 
 (page 263 :) "In the focial organization of mo- 
 dern times, the population of a country is the 
 mod infallible criterion of its profperity." And 
 again (page 264), " It is a truth beyond difpute, 
 that a nation cannot be impoverifhed without be- 
 ing depopulated, nor depopulated without being 
 impoverifhed. And whenever a flatc preferves its 
 
 population
 
 ( Ixxix ) 
 
 population in defiance of caufes that have tended 
 to diminifh it, we may reft afTured that it has 
 preferved all the fources of its real wealth." 
 This is clear and explicit ; there is not in the 
 whole of his work a point on which he is more 
 decided. We aflfent, without referve, to his 
 petition, and delire no better grounds for de- 
 monftrating the falfehood of his afTertions with 
 refpedl to this country : fas ejl et ah hojle doceri. 
 To the major which he has given us, we need 
 only apply the refult of the late population re- 
 turns * as a minor, and leave to him or any man 
 of common fenfe to draw the inference. 
 
 As for the ineftimable advantages, the im- 
 mcnfe refources, the happy conftitution, and 
 the limple organization of France, which he 
 contrafts with the artificial fyilem and exhaufted 
 flate of this country, we are not defirous of de- 
 tra(ftingfrom them. A few years will prove whe- 
 ther he has reafoned right ; and fhould the 
 refult exceed his moft fanguine expedations, 
 England will never have caufeto lament or dread 
 
 * Vide Appendix, No. III. 
 I the
 
 ( IxX3t ) 
 
 the profperity and fecurity of her neighbour t 
 we (land upon too broad a balls to envy the hap- 
 pirtefs of other nations ; the riches of France 
 can never make us poor. We cannot however but 
 obferve, that, if France be really fo prote(51:ed by 
 her lituation, fo fertile in her foil, fo rich in the 
 induftry, and fo fecure in the valour of her fons, 
 Europe has the greater reafon to complain of her 
 'condu6l, and to execrate -her politics. If rich^ 
 why did the go forth to rob and plunder others 
 lefs opulent ? If above want of every kind^ 
 what tempted her to feizcupon the property, and 
 trample on the liberties of her neighbours ? If 
 her pofition and refources render her independ- 
 ent of the friendfhip, and impenetrable to the 
 hoftility of all the world, why do we fee her 
 unprofitable ambition pulling down all the hum- 
 bler edifices around, to add unnecefTary but- 
 trefles to a fabric fo perfe6l and fo folid ? 
 
 In the commencement of the chapter of his 
 work now before us, Mr. Hauterivc lays down 
 as a general rule, that *' the population, induf- 
 try, riches, and power of a nation, are perpetu- 
 
 ally
 
 ( Ixxxi . ) 
 
 ally adling and re-a6ling on each other, fo that 
 the changes in any of thefe elements afFe(5l the 
 flate of the whole, and that they rife and fall, in* 
 creafe or diminifh, together. 
 
 But it became neceflary for him to fhevv how 
 England is an exception to this rule, when he 
 had proved (as he aflumes) that the commerce, in- 
 dujlry, and wealth of this kingdom, have been re- 
 duced to the lowefl ebb ; for he does not attempt 
 to depreciate the public fower of Great Britain. 
 The magnitude of our efforts by fea and land, 
 the achievements of our fleets and armies in all 
 parts of the world, the energy with which our 
 extenfive dominions were every where maintained, 
 and the aflillance liberally afforded to our lefs 
 fortunate allies : all thefe were proofs of power 
 too evident and too impreffive to be overturned, 
 like the conclufions of Melf. P///, Gentz, Rofe, 
 Middhten, and Beeh, with a lingle flroke of the 
 pen. He was the more willing to allow their 
 whole force, becaufe, in tracing the caufes of 
 what he calls this apparent inconfiftency, he 
 f found
 
 ( libcxii ) 
 
 foufid an opportunity of demonfirating, that the 
 return of peace would be as fatal to the pubUis 
 power, as the war had been difaftrous to the inter- 
 »1il ftrengtli of Great Britain. 
 
 The power of England, fays Hauterivc, has 
 been rendered independent of the three other 
 claffes of focial organization ; has even acquired 
 new vigour and extent, while they were perill- 
 ing or falling into decay, from the following rea- 
 fons: I ft, The wonderful proficiency oftheEng- 
 lifh minifter in the fcience of borrowing. 2d, 
 His dexterity, in the art of taxatiom 3d, His 
 alliance with the monied men. 4th, A credit ar- 
 tificially fupported ; and 5th (and principally). 
 The fiate of terror and alarm in which he has 
 kept the nation, by dwelling upon, and magni*- 
 fying, the dangers of a revolution-, whereby the 
 frightened people have been compelled to facrifice 
 their lives and fortunes to the chimeras of hi^ 
 exalted imagination, 
 
 Thefe
 
 ( txxxili ) 
 
 Thefe are, in fubftance*, the fet'feral fource» 
 from whence England is faid to have been en- 
 abled to make thofe efforts that have aftonifhed 
 the world, while they have exhaufled herfelf. 
 But as the chief of thefe were created by, and 
 only available in a period of extraordinary diffi- 
 culty and alarm ; as nothing but the urgency of 
 real or imaginary danger could call forth the im- 
 menfe fupplies which were the lever of this mo- 
 mentary power ; fo the termination of the war, it 
 was faid, would cut off thefe refources, and 
 with the cefTation of the caufe there would be 
 an end of the efre(5ls : at the peace, the paffions 
 of men would naturally fubfide ; credit would be 
 placed upon its former footing ; capital would 
 follow the fpirit of adventure into the ufual 
 
 * I fay in fubftance, becaufe they are not exprefled either 
 ID thefe words, or in this order. The Author has reafoned at 
 great length on each of them; but it would far exceed the 
 bounds of a Preface to follow his reafoning. The public may, 
 however, expecSt to fee them more fully and ably difcufled ; 
 for 1 have been informed, fince thefe flieets \vtre fent to the 
 prcfs, that Sir Francis d'lvernois has undertaken the refuta- 
 tion of that part of Mr. Hauterive's work whidi has not been 
 anfwered by Mr. Gentz, 
 
 f 2 channels j
 
 { Ixxxiv ) 
 
 chanftels ; and the Britifli government, aban- 
 doned by its late fupports, would be left poor, 
 dellitate, and impotent. 
 
 Once more ; had it required many words, or 
 any refearch, to difprove fuch arguments, they 
 would probably have been left for ever unan- 
 swered. But as we have now arrived at the period 
 to which his predications refer, we may pafs {cn- 
 tence in a few words upon the principles that gave 
 birth to them. 
 
 If Mr. Ilauterive be right in his conftru61ion 
 of the powerof the Englifh government, the peace 
 mull have put an end to the greater part of it ; 
 lince the credit of the Britilli miniiler nauH: have 
 expired on the ift of O61obcr 1801, with all the 
 caufes which till then fupported it. He has 
 explicitly declared, that it never could *• fur- 
 vive that day, which would difpel {\\q fafcinationf 
 produced hy the dangers and alarms of the iznir. 
 Then the fyilem of credit will nccellariiy be al- 
 tered ; the new balls upon which it will feek to- 
 ^ftablifh itfelf, will be more conducive to the ge- 
 neral
 
 ( Ixxxv ) 
 
 fleral welfare, but willceafe tQ,fnpport the p-il-lic 
 Ireafury.'* 
 
 Thus peace is the experiment which was to 
 Terify or difprove his hypothetis ; we have now 
 enjoyed that bleffing nearly eight months , and 
 his whole fyftem crumbles into atoms beneath 
 the evidence of experience. If the phenomena 
 which he has endeavoured to explain, have ex- 
 jfted, and continue to exift when the caufeshave 
 longceafed to which he refers them, we muft 
 conclude that he has not known, or has not dif- 
 clofed, the true fources and foundation of their 
 being. 
 
 It Is unneceflary to fay more on this fubjecfl ; 
 we have brought the qucftion to a point where 
 every man may immediately decide upon it. The 
 Britifh financial operations of the prefent year 
 muft be known to a writer accuftomed to watch 
 (the EnghJIi budgets* {o attentively ; and we might 
 therefore fairly leave it to himfelf to pronounce 
 
 * Vide Appendix, No. III. 
 
 f 3 between
 
 ( Ixxxvi ) 
 
 between us. The />«^/i^ j^o-ix'^r of Great Britain 
 15 not the artificial machine he has defcribed ; it 
 is folid and fecure beyond that of any nation io 
 the world, France, furely, not excepted t. 
 
 We 
 
 * It is fcarcely credible that Hauterive fliould have ven» 
 tured to compare the future profpeds of France with thofe of 
 England, on the gfound of public credit ; and that he ftiould 
 have given the preference to the former, becaufe, fays he» 
 *' her national debt is a burden of 3,000,000 fterling only, 
 and one half of that confifts of annuities." He fliould have 
 added : This is not what ftie owes^ but what flie has' agreed 
 t9 pay ; and the violation of public faith, which reduced her 
 annual charge to this fum of 3,Qoo,ooo fterling, added much 
 more to its real weight than it took from its nominail value. 
 It may appear paradoxical to affert, that tjie French national 
 debt, at the higheft pitch to which it ever attained, would be 
 a more eafy burden now, if it had been faithfully maintained, 
 than is the comparatively fmall fum which remains of it ; but 
 every perfon who confiders the nature of public credit will 
 allow it to be true. It is by the violation of its engagements, 
 by the breach of public faith, that a government contrafts the 
 moft intolerable burdens, and dries up the moft plentiful re-* 
 iburces ; and that of France might fupport and provide for a 
 debt five times as great as what flie now acknowledges, with 
 infinitely greater eafe, if fhe had nqt fported with the confi- 
 dence of her creditors. The annual charge of the national 
 debt of Great Britain is about 22,500,000/. ; and it will not 
 be denied, that fhe difcharges this with lefs difficulty and^ 
 preflure than the French do their 3,000,000/. ; but had flic 
 only violated her engagements in a fingle jnilance, had flie 
 
 def ramie d
 
 ( Ixxxvii ) 
 
 We have thus refuted two pofitions on which 
 our Author values himfelf very much, and to 
 eftablilh which, is among the primary obje«5ts of 
 his defign. We have extorted from himfelf tlie 
 proofs we wanted to {hew, that the commerce, re- 
 venues, 2Ln^ population of England^ have uot been 
 
 defrauded her moft infignificant creditor of the moft trifling 
 claims, fhe would now, perhaps, be labouring under all the 
 iiaancical diftrefTes of France. 
 
 I cannot help fubmitting the following (latement to my 
 rcAders : it is an cxa£t account of the liquidation of an ac- 
 knowledged claim uf)on the French government : 
 
 Suppofe the claim to be for /" 50,000 toumois, or French] 
 livres, whichj according to the jcale of deprfciation, mzy be 
 afcertained to be worth 9000. Of thefe 9000 livres one 
 third is paid in rentes prcJifoires^ a fund now worth about 48 
 per cent, and the remaining two thirds is paid in hons 
 deux tiers^ another fund, worth, according to the laft quota- 
 tions, 2^ per cent, or 50 fols for a hundred livres : the ac- 
 count will then ftand thus : 
 
 3000 livres, at 47I a 48 per cent. - 1440 livres. 
 
 6000 ditto, a^ per cerit. - - 1 50 ditto. 
 
 9000 1590 livres, 
 
 Thefe rentes proinfolres and hons deux tiers are to be funded 
 in the Tiers conjolidis (a 5 per cent, fund, now worth about 
 57 per cent.) one year after the peace. At this rate, liquidated 
 tl.ums on the French government are worth little more than 
 one Hxth of their nominal value. 
 
 The claims of foreigners^ of vfbattver nation^ on the Britijb 
 governments arf paid nuithout dedhfiion of a Jingle farthing. 
 
 f4 diminifhed
 
 ( Ixxxvili ) 
 
 diminlfhed by the war ; and that htr puhlh fyowe^ 
 has not been created apd fupported by it. 
 
 But when we fay that the war has not produced 
 the efFeds affigned to it by this writer, pither one 
 way or the othpr, we do not wifh to be fuppofed 
 among the number of thofe who conceive it to 
 have been a fource of profperity and gain iQ this 
 country. Becaufe England has flourithed during 
 (I fhould fay, notwithfianding) the war, the error 
 has fometimes obtained, that Iheaduallyprofpered 
 jy the war : an opinion which has been ftudioufly 
 circulated by our enemies in fupport of their at- 
 tempts to lay all the miferies and bloodfhed in 
 Europe to our charge, by perfuading the world 
 that we continued the war for our commercial in- 
 terefts. No : while the proofs are numberiefs, 
 that the wealth and commerce o?" Great Britain 
 Jiave rapidly increafed even in this period of dif- 
 aftrous hotlility ; the arguments are likewife irre- 
 iiftible by which it is maintained that it mufl: 
 have tended to diminifh them. That they have 
 not been diminiflied, that they have acSiually in- 
 creafed, is, becaufe the principle of their growth 
 
 has
 
 ( Ixxxix ) 
 
 has proved fuperior to the caufesthat counteraAed 
 it ; but thofe caufes have neverthelcls had their 
 icfFedi: ; and great as we now are, we muft have 
 )>een much greater if they had never exilled. 
 
 . Laetis hunc numina rebus, 
 
 Crefcendi pofuere modum. 
 
 But if any man be difpofed to lament this lofs- 
 pf the opportunity of gain, and to regret the part 
 we have taken in the war ; let him for a moment 
 confider the obje6ls we have fccared, and the 
 dangers we have avoided. Let him, while the 
 remembrance of what has pafTed is yet frefli in his 
 jnind, retrace the lafl ten years of the hi fl cries 
 pf France and England; let him contraft the 
 prefent lituatipn, and compare the future profpe^U 
 pf the two countries ; and he will hardly fail tp 
 fet a jufl value upon the vefTcl which has wea- 
 thered fuch a ftorm, and the wifdom which has 
 guided the helm. The alarm that has fo long 
 agitated every member of fociety, who could or 
 would appreciate the bleffings of law and order, 
 has now, in part, fubiided ; and we are left at 
 liberty to contemplate the awful effedVs of the 
 ie.mpcfi we have happily efcaped. Unwilling to 
 3 infult
 
 ( xc ) 
 
 infult our neighbours with our pity, we cannot, 
 however, fupprefs the llgh which the fpe6lacle of 
 their ruin muft draw from every philanthropic 
 breaft, whatever its poUtical affe6lions or opi- 
 nions. Whoever ferioufly conliders the prefent 
 ftate of France, the morals, the habits, the fociaj 
 and political exiflence of her altered fons, 
 
 Prseteritique mcmor fleb/t, metuenfque futuri, 
 
 May the efforts of her prefent government, if 
 its intentions be fuch as it profeffes. prove fuc- 
 ccfsful ! may it fucceed in re-eftablifhingall thofe 
 facred inflitutions which France fo wantonly (a- 
 crificed ; and which we have maintained at the 
 expenfe of fo much blood and treafure againfl. 
 her attempts to reduce us to the level of her own 
 mifery ! All this, however, muft be the work of 
 fome time ; at prefent we can only wifh for fuch 
 improvements. The boafted regeneration of 
 philofopbic France has produced a civil and po- 
 litical nondefcript, whofe infancy has been 
 marked by the extremes of external violence, 
 and internal corruption ; and we have yet to 
 learn if its progrefs and maturity will be more 
 
 compatibly
 
 C xci ) 
 
 CQtnpatible with the fafety and tranquillity pfthc 
 world, 
 
 I have endeavoured, in the preceding obferva- 
 tlons, to point out the inconfiflency and abfur- 
 ^ityof fome of Mr. Hauterive's principal attacks 
 upon this country. I muft now refign him to 
 ^bler hands. Mr. Gent?, in his Defence of 
 Europe, has undertaken a much more elaborate 
 refutation of his dovflrines ; and I truft it will be 
 i^wnedthat he has eftablifhed the rev^rfe of what 
 is fet forth iv\ the Efaf de la France. I need fay 
 nothing of the abilities of Mr. Gentz : they are 
 well known to the public in this country, by 
 his work on the finances and refources of Great 
 Britain ; a work whofe intriniic merit has con- 
 ferred on its author a very high rank among 
 vyriters on the fame fubjedl, but which excites our 
 admiration in a fuperior degree, when we con- 
 lider the circumftances under which it was pro- 
 duced. We are aflonifhed that a native of Ger- 
 inany, at a difl^ance from all the fources of in- 
 formation, and unaffifled by a fmgle work of any 
 yalue in his own language, fhould have colle^ed 
 3 ^o
 
 { xcii ) 
 
 io much knowledge, and have reafoned (o accu^- 
 rately, on the wealth andrefources of this country, 
 as to rival the very befl productions of our own 
 on a fubje^ immediately belonging to ourfelves. 
 
 Mr.Xjentzhas divided the folio wins work into 
 three Parts: the two firft will be found interefiing 
 to the general politician ; the laft is particularly 
 fo to the Englifh reader. The firft Part treats of 
 the ftate of Europe before the French revolu- 
 tion ; the fecond defcribes the eiFe(51:s of that 
 event, and the condition in which the continent 
 has been left by the war to which it gave rife $ 
 and the third is a dilTertation on the prefent rela- 
 tions of France to her friends and enemies. The 
 fourth chapter of this laft diviiion is an inquiry 
 into the complaints which have been fo generally 
 and fo loudly urged on the continent againft 
 what has been ftrangely called the *' commer- 
 cial tyranny of the Englifh.** Mr. Gentz has 
 here difplayed the falfehood of the opinions con- 
 cerning the nature and origin of our commercial 
 fuperiority, which have been induftrioufly circu- 
 lated by our rivals, and too eafily adopted by 
 
 ignorance
 
 ( xciii ) 
 
 ignorance or envy among the nations whom it 
 was intended to excite againft us. It will not be 
 denied, that a refutation of fuch opinions is highly 
 important to ourinterefls ; and it is obvious that 
 the arguments on our fide mufl in this cafe ac- 
 quire conlidcrable weight from the country and 
 character of the perfon who has undertaken the 
 caufc of truth and jultice. It muft be remem- 
 bered that it is a Prujfian writer, entirely uncon- 
 ne(5led with England, and unbiafTed by national 
 prejudice, or views of party, who vindicates the 
 charader of Great Britain, and expofes the folly 
 of regarding her wealth and power as detrimen- 
 tal to the profperity, and incompatible with the 
 fecurity of the reft of Europe. 
 
 With refpeci to the tranflationitfelf, the delire 
 of rendering my Author with fidelity mult be my 
 apology for many of the defects that will be 
 found in it. As Itrength of argument is more 
 looked for than elegance of (tyle in a work of this 
 nature, I may entreat pardon for the Germanifms 
 which, I fear, too frequently occur in this Eng- 
 lifh verfion of Mr. Gentz's work. 
 
 London, May z8o2.
 
 ■?■• v»'-^
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 No. I. 
 
 CONVENTION hefjjctn bis Britannic Majejly, md the 
 Emperor of Rujjla, Jlgned at St. Ptterjlurgh the 
 ■^jih June 1801. 
 
 In the Name of the Moll Holy and undivided Trinity. 
 
 A HE mutual defire of his Majefty the King of the 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of 
 his Majefty the Emperor of all the Ruilias, being not; 
 only to come to an underftanding between themfclves 
 •with refpedl to the differences which have latdy interrupt- 
 ed the good underftanding and friendly relations which 
 fubfifted between the two ftates ; but alfo to prevent, by 
 frank and precife explanations upon the navigation of 
 their refpedive fubjects, the renewal of fimilar alterca- 
 tions and troubles which might be the confequence of 
 them ; and the common object of the folicitude of their 
 faid Majefties being to fettle, as foon as can be done, an 
 equitable arrangement of thofe differences, and an inva- 
 riable determination of their principles upon the rights of 
 neutrality, in their application to their refpeitive mo» 
 narchies, in order to unite more clofefy the tics of friefvd* 
 (hip and good intercourfe, of which they acknowledge 
 the mrlity and the benefits ; have named and chofen for 
 
 th^ir
 
 ( xcvl ) 
 
 their plenipoteiuiaries, viz. iiis Majefty the King of th^ 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Alleyne 
 Lord Baron St. Helens, his faid Majefty's Privy Coun- 
 fcllor, and liis Ambairador Extraordinary and Plenipoten- 
 tiary to his Majefty the Ewiperor of all the RulTias ) 
 and his Majefty the Emperor of all the Ruflias^ Sieur 
 Nikita Count de Panin, his Privy Counfellor, Mi- 
 nifter of State for the department of foreign affairs, 
 prefetit Chamberlain, Knight Grand Crofs of the orders 
 of St. Alexander Newiky, and of St. Anne of the firfV 
 clafs, of that of St. Ferdinand, and of Merit, of the 
 Red Eagle, and of St. Lazarus ; who, after having 
 communicated their refpedlive full powers, and found 
 them in good and due form, have agreed upon the 
 following points and articles : 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 There fhall'- be hereafter between his Britannic Ma- 
 jefty and his Imperial Majefly of all the Ruftlas, their 
 fubjedls, the ftates and countries under their dominionj 
 good and unalterable friendship and underftanding ; and 
 all the political, commercial, and other relations of 
 common utility between the refpe<3;ive fubjeds, (hall 
 fubiift as formerly, without their being difturbed or 
 troubled in any manner whatever. 
 
 '- ARTICLE II. 
 
 HisBiitannic Majefty and theEmperor of allthcRuflias 
 declare, that they will watch over the moft rigorous ex- 
 ecution of the prohibitions againft the trade of contra-
 
 ( xcvii ) 
 
 band of their fubjedis with the enemies of either of the 
 high contra6ling parties. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 His Britannic Majefty and his Imperial MajeRy of all 
 the Ruflias having refolved to place under a fnfficient 
 fafeguard the freedom of commerce and navigation of 
 their fubjefts, in cafe one of them (hall be at war, 
 whilft the other (hall be neuter, have agreed : — 
 
 1. That the (hips of the neutral power may navigate 
 freely to the ports, and upon the coafts of the nations at 
 war. 
 
 2. That the effefts embarked on board neutral (hips 
 fhall be free, with the exception of contraband of war, 
 and of enemy's property ; and 't is agreed not to com- 
 prife under the denomination of the latter, the merchan- 
 dife of the produce, growlli, or mrrinfp£lure nt the 
 countries at war, which fhould have been acquired by 
 the fubje6\s of the neutral power, and ihould be tranf- 
 ported for their account, which merchandife cannot be 
 excepted in any eafe from the freedom granted to the 
 flag of the faid power. 
 
 3. That in order to avoid all equivocation and mif- 
 underftanding of what ought to be confidered as 
 contraband of war, his Britannic Majefly, and his Im- 
 perial Majefly of all the Rudias, declare, conform- 
 ably to the nth article of the treaty of commerce 
 concluded between the two crowns on the loth (21 ft) 
 
 g February
 
 ( xcviii ) 
 
 February 1797, that they acknowledge as fuch the 
 following articles only ; viz. — cannons, mortars, fire-^ 
 arms, piftols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, firelocks, 
 flints, matches, gunpcnvder, faltpetre, fuloliur, cui- 
 raflTes, pikes, fwords, fword-belts, knapfacks, faddles 
 and bridles ; excepting, however, the quantity of the 
 faid articles which may be necLllary for the defence of the 
 Ihip and of thofe who compofe the crew ; and all other 
 articles whatever not enumerated here fhall not be re- 
 puted warlike and naval ftores, nor be fnbjeil to con- 
 fifcation, and of courfe fhall pafs freely, without being 
 fubjeded to the fmalleft difficulty, unlefs they be con- 
 fldered enemy's property in the fenfe above fpecified. 
 It is alfo agreed, that that which is ftipulated in the 
 prefent article (hall not be prejudicial to the particular 
 ftipulations of one or the other crown with other powers, 
 by which articles of a fimilar kind Ihould be referved, 
 prohibited, or permitted. 
 
 4. That in order to determine what characterizes a 
 blockaded port, that denomination is given only to a 
 port where there is, by the difpofitions of the power 
 which attacks it with fhips ftationary, or fufficiently 
 near, an evident danger in entering. 
 
 5. That the (hips of the neutral power fliall not be 
 flopped but upon jufl caufes and evident fads : that they 
 be tried without delay, and that the proceeding be al- 
 ways uniform, prompt, and legal. 
 
 In order the better to enfure tlie refped due to thefe 
 ilipulations, didated by the fmcerc defire of conciliating 
 
 every
 
 ( xclx ) 
 
 every intereft, and to give a new proof of their up- 
 rightnefs and love of juflice, tiie high contrading par- 
 ties enter here into the mod formal engagement to re- 
 new the fevereft prohibitions to their captains, whether 
 of fhips of war or merchantmen, to take, keep, or 
 conceal on board their (hips, any of the articles which, 
 in the terms of the prefent convention, may be reputed 
 contraband, and refpeclively to take care of the execn- 
 tion of the orders which they fhall have publiihed in 
 their admiralties, and wherever it fhall be neceifary. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 The two high contracting parties, wifhing alfo to pre- 
 vent all fnbje£l of dilfenfion in future by limiting the 
 right of fearch of merchant (hips going under convoy to 
 thofe cafes only, in which the belligerent power might 
 experience a real prejudice by the abufe of the neutral 
 flag, have agreed, 
 
 1. That the right of fearching merchant fliips be- 
 longing to the fubjecls of one of the contrafling powers, 
 and navigated under convoy of a (hip of war of the faiJ 
 power, fhall only be exercifed by fhips of war of the 
 belligerent party, and fhall never extend to letters of 
 marque, privateers, or other velTels, which do not be- 
 long to the royal or imperial fleet of their Majefties, but 
 which their fubjedls fhall have fitted out for war. 
 
 2. That the proprietors of all merchant fhips be- 
 longing to the fubjeils of one of the contra£ling fuve- 
 rcigns, which fhall be deftined to fail under convoy of a 
 
 g 2 ftiip
 
 ( c ) 
 
 fliip of war, fhall be required, before they receive their 
 failing orders, to produce to the commander of the con- 
 voy, their pafTports and certificates, or fea letters, in the 
 form annexed to the prefent treaty. 
 
 3. That when fiich fhip of war, having under convoy 
 merchant fhips, {hall be met with by a fhip or ihips of 
 war of the other contra6ling party, who fliall then be in 
 a ftate of war, in order to avoid all diforder, they fiiall 
 keep out of cannon (hot, unlefs the ftate of the fea, or 
 the place of meeting, render a nearer approach necef- 
 fary ; and the commander of the (hip of the belligerent 
 power fhall fend a boat on board the convoy, where they 
 fhall proceed reciprocally to the verification of the papers 
 and certificates that are to prove on one part, that the 
 fhip of war is authorized to take under its efcort fuch or 
 fuch merchant fhips of its nation, laden with fuch a 
 cargo, and for fuch a port : on the other part, that the 
 Ihip of war of the belligerent party belongs to the royal 
 or imperial fleet of their Majefties. 
 
 4. This verification made, no fearch fhall take place, 
 if the papers are found in form, and if there exifts no 
 good motive for fufpicion. In the contrary cafe, the 
 commander of the neutral fhip of war (being duly re- 
 quired thereto by the commander of the (hip or fliips of 
 war of the belligerent power) is to bring to and detain his 
 convoy during the time necefTary for the fearch of the 
 fhips which compofe it, and he fliall have the faculty of 
 naming and delegating one or more officers to affift at 
 the fearch of the faid fhips, which fhall be done in his 
 prefence on board each merchant fliip, conjointly with 
 
 one
 
 ( cl ) 
 
 one or more officers appointed by the commander of the 
 fliip of the belligerent party. 
 
 5. If it happen that the commander of the fhip or 
 fliips of the power at war, having examined the papers 
 found on board, and having interrogated the mafter and 
 crew of the fhip, fhall fee juft and fufficient reafon to 
 detain the merchant fliip, in order to proceed to an ulte- 
 rior fearch, he fhall notify fuch intention to the com- 
 mander of the convoy, who fhall have the power to 
 order an officer to remain on board the fhip thus de- 
 tained, and to afTift at the examination of the caufe of 
 her detention. The merchant fhip fliall be carried im- 
 mediately to the neareft and mod convenient port be- 
 longing to the belligerent power, and the ulterior fearch 
 fliall be carried on with all poflible diligence. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 It is in like manner agreed, that if any merchant 
 fhip thus convoyed fhould be detained without juft and 
 fufficient caufe, the commander of the fhip or fhips of 
 war of the belligerent power fhall not only be bound to 
 make to the owners of the fhip and of the cargo, a full 
 and perfeft compenfation for all the lolTes, expenfes, 
 damages, and colls, occafioned by fuch a detention, but 
 (hall moreover undergo an ulterior punifhment for every 
 a£l of violence or other fault which he may have com- 
 mitted, according as the nature of the cafe may require. 
 On the other hand, the convoying fhip fhall not be per- 
 mitted, under any pretext whatfoever, to refill by force 
 the detention of the merchant fhip or fliips by the fliip 
 
 g 3 °^
 
 ( cli ) 
 
 or (hips of war of the belligerent power ; an obligation 
 which the cotninander of a fhip of war with convoy is 
 not bound to obfcrve towards letters of marque and pri- 
 vateers. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 The high contra£ling parties fhall give precife and 
 efficacious orders that the judgments upon prizes made 
 at fca Ihall be conformable with the rules of the moft 
 exad juftice and equity; that they fhall be given by 
 judges above fufpicion, and who fliall not be interefted 
 in the affair in queftion. The government of the refpec- 
 tive dates (hall take care that (he faid decifions ihall be 
 fpeedily and duly executed, according to the forms pre- 
 fcribed. And in cafe of an unfounded detention, or 
 other contravention to the regulations ftipulated by the 
 prefent article, the owners of fuch fhip ind cargo fhall 
 be allowed damages proportioned to the lofs occafioned 
 thereby. The rules to obferve for thefe damages, and 
 for the cafe of unfounded detention, as alfo the prin- 
 ciples to follow for the purpofe of accelerating the pro- 
 cefs, ihall be the matter of additional articles, which 
 the contrading parties agree to fettle between them, 
 and which ihall have the fame iforce and validity as if 
 they were inferted in the prefent a6l. For this effed, 
 their Britannic and Imperial Majeflies mutually engage 
 to put their h.and to the falutary work, which may fervc 
 for the completion of thefe flipulations, and to commu- 
 nicate to each other, without delay, the views which 
 may be fuggefted to them by their equal folicitude, to 
 prevent the lead grounds for difpute in future, 
 
 article;
 
 ( cili ) 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 To obviate all the inconveniencies which may ar fe 
 from the bad faith of thofe who avail themfelves of the 
 flag of a nation without belonging to it, it is agreed to 
 eftablifh for an inviolable rule, that any veflel whatever, 
 in order to be confidered as the property of the country, 
 the flag of which it carries, mud have on board the 
 captain of the Ihip, and one half of the crew of the 
 people of that country, and the papers and palfports in 
 due and perfect form ; but every vellcl which Ihall not 
 obferve this rule, and which fhail ijifringe the ordi- 
 nances publifhed on that head, (hall lofe all rights to the 
 protedtion of the contradling powers. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 The principles and meafures adopted by the prefent 
 aft fhall be alike applicable to all the maritime wars in 
 which one of the two powers may be engaged, wliilft 
 the other remains neutral. Thefe ftipulations Ihall in 
 confequence be regarded as permanent, and llial! ferve 
 for a condant rule to the contracting powers in matters 
 of commerce and navigation. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 His MajeRy the King of Denmark, and his Majefly 
 the King of Sweden, Ihall be immediately invited by 
 his Imperial Majefty, in the name of the two contra6l- 
 ing parties, to accede to the prelcnt convention, and at 
 the fame time to renew and confirm their rcfpcdive 
 |re{^ties of commerce with his Britannic Majefly ; and 
 
 g4 his
 
 ( civ ) 
 
 his faid Majefly engages, by ads which fhall have efta* 
 bliflied that agreement, to render and reftore to each of 
 thefe powers all the prizes that have been taken from 
 them, as well as the territories and countries under their 
 dominion, which have been conquered by the arms of 
 his Britannic Majefty fmce the rupture, in the ftate in 
 which thofe poire-dions were found at the period at which 
 the troops of his Britannic Majefty entered them. The 
 orders of his faid Majefty for the reftitution of thofe prizes 
 and conquefts fhall be immediately expedited after the ex- 
 change of the ratifications of the a£ls by which Sweden 
 and Denmark (hall accede to the prefent treaty. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 The prefent convention ihall be ratified by the two 
 contrading parties, and the ratifications exchanged at 
 St. Peterfburgh in the fpace of two months at furtheft, 
 from the day of the fignature. 
 
 In faith, of which the refpedive plenipotentiaries have 
 caufed to be made two copies thereof perfedly fimilar, 
 figned with their hands, and have caufed the feal of their 
 arms to be affixed thereto. 
 
 Done at St. Peterfburgh the iVh June, i8oi. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.} N. C^^ DE Panin, 
 
 Formula.
 
 ( cy ) 
 
 Formula of the Pajfports and Sea Letters which are to be 
 de.ivered in the reJj^eSlivc y^dmiralties of the States of 
 the two Hig':- Contratiing Parties, to the Ships and Vef- 
 fels wi.ic jhall fail from them^ conformable to Article IV. 
 cf the frejeni Treaty. 
 El ^ kr,ov\ n that we have given leave and permlflTon 
 
 toN , ot the city or place of N , mafter and 
 
 ^oiid'iclor .)f the ihip V , belonging to N , of the 
 
 port of \ , of tons or thereabouts, now lying in 
 
 the port or i.arbour of N , to fail from thence to 
 
 N , laden with N , on account of N , after 
 
 the faid Ihip (hall have been vifited before its departure in 
 the ufiial manner by \\;e officers appointed for that pur^- 
 
 pofe ; and the faid N , or fuch other as fhall be vefted 
 
 with powers to replace him, (hall be obliged to produce 
 in every port or-harbour which he fhall enter with the faid 
 vefTel to the officers of the place, the prefent licenfe, and 
 
 to carry the flag of N , during his voyage. 
 
 In faith of which, &c. 
 
 FIRST SEPARATE ARTICLE. 
 
 The pure and magnanimous intentions of his Majefty 
 the Emperor of all the Ruflias having already induced 
 him to reftore the vefTels and goods of Britifli fubje£ls» 
 which had been fequeftered in Ruflia, his faid Majefty 
 confirms that difpofition in its whole extent; and his Bri- 
 tannic Majefty engages himfelf alfo to give immediate 
 orders for taking off all fequeflration laid upon the RuiTian, 
 Danilh, and Swedifli properties, detained in Englifh 
 ports, and to prove (fill more his finccre defire to termi- 
 nate amicably the differences which have arifen between 
 iJ Great
 
 ( cvi ) 
 
 Great Britain and the northern Courts ; and in order that 
 no new incident may throw obftacles in the way of this 
 fahitary work, his Britannic Majefty binds himfelf to give 
 orders to the commanders of his forces by land and fea, 
 that the armiftice now fubfifting with the Courts of Den- 
 mark and Sweden fhall be prolonged for a term of three 
 months from the date of this day ; and his Majefty the 
 Emperor of all the Ruffias, guided by the fame motives, 
 undertakes, in the name of his allies, to have this armi- 
 flice maintained during the faid term, 
 
 This feparate article fhall have the fame force and va- 
 lidity as if it were inferted word for word in the Treaty 
 ligned this day ; and the ratifications thereof fhall be ex- 
 changed at the fame time. 
 
 In faith of which, the refpedlive plenipotentiaries have 
 caufed to be made two copies thereof perfectly fimilar, 
 figned with their hands, and have caufed the feal of their 
 arms to be aflBxed thereto. 
 
 Done at St. Peterfburgh, tt June 1801. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.j N. C'^ DE Panin. 
 
 SECOND SEPARATE ARTICLE. 
 
 The differences and mifunderftandings which fubfiftcd 
 between his Majefly the King of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Brirain and Ireland, and his Majefty the Emperor 
 of all the Ruftias, being thus terminated, and the precau- 
 tions taken by the prefcnt Convention not giving further 
 
 room
 
 ( evil ) 
 
 room to fe?r that they can in future dlfturb the harmony 
 ;4nGl goo(J uncleriianding v\hich the two high contra6ting 
 parties have at heart to confolidate, their laid Majelties 
 confirm anew, by the prcfent Convention, the treaty of 
 commerce of the loth February (21) 1797> of which 
 all the ftipulations are here cited, to be maiatained in their 
 whole extent. 
 
 This feparate article fhall have the fame force and vali- 
 dity as if it were inferted word for word in the Treaty 
 jfigned this day ; and the ratifications thereof Ihall be ex- 
 changed at the fame time. 
 
 Jn faith of which the refpecSive plenipotentiaries have 
 caufed to be made two copies thereof perfe6liy fimilar, 
 flgned wit!i their hands, and have caufed the feal of their 
 ji/ms to be affixed thereto. 
 
 Pone at St. Peterfburgh the -J^. June 1801. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.) N. C^ DE Panin. 
 
 DECLARATION. 
 
 Although the magnanimous intention of his Impe- 
 rial Majefty of all the Rufli.tst.. do fiill and tutirejnftice 
 tothofe Britifh fubjefls wh< have luffer'-d lolTes during the 
 troubles which have diilurbcd the good intelligence be- 
 tween his empire and G.eat Britain, be alieudy proved by 
 fails, his Imperial Majelly, confuhing folcly his good 
 faith, has moreover authorized the underfisined plenipo- 
 tentiary to declare, as he does declare by ihefc prefcnts : 
 
 " That
 
 ( cviii ) 
 
 " TTiat all the fliips, the merchandife, and the pro- 
 perty of Britifh fuhjeds, which had been fequeftrated du- 
 ring the laft reign in Rufiia, fliall not only be faithfully 
 rcHored to the faid Britiili fubjedls, or to their agents, but 
 alfo that for the effects which may have been alienated in 
 fuch a manner as to render it impoflibie for them to be re- 
 ftored in kind, a fuitable equivalent (hall be granted to 
 the proprietors, which equivalent fhall be hereafter deter- 
 mined according to the rules of equity." 
 
 In faith of which vi-e, plenipotentiary of his Imperial 
 Majefty of all the Ruflias, have figned the prefent decla- 
 ration, and have caufed the feal of our arms to be affixed 
 thereto. 
 
 Done at St. Peterfburgh, y^r June, 1801. 
 
 (L. S.) N. CK DE Panin. 
 
 No. II. 
 
 JDDITIONJL ARTICLES ftgned at Mo/cow the S^tb 
 O^ober 1801, to the Convention betvwcen his Afajejiy and 
 the Emperor of RiiJpUy concluded at St. Peterjhurgh 
 the ^^th June 1801. 
 
 VV HEREAS by the Vlth article of the Convention 
 concluded the Vth June 1801, between his Britannic 
 Majefty, and his Imperial Majefty of all the Ruflras, it 
 was flipiilated that the two high contra6ling parties 
 ihould mutuall}' agree on fome additional articles, which 
 
 (hould
 
 ( cix ) 
 
 fhould fix the regulations and principles to be obferved, 
 as well for accelerating the judicial proceedings upon 
 captures made at Tea, as for the damages which fliouid 
 be allowed to the owners of neutral fhips and cargoes, in 
 cafes of unfounded detention, their Lid Alajefiics have 
 named and authorized for this purpofe, viz. his Majefly 
 the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
 Ireland, AUcyne Lord Baron St. Helens, a Peer of the 
 faid United Kingdom, one of his faid Majefty's moli 
 honourable Privy Council, and his Ambairaiior Extraor- 
 dinary and Plenipotentiary to his IVIajerty the Emperor ot" 
 all the Rudias ; and his Majefty the Emperor of all the 
 RufTias, tlie Sieur Alexander Prince de Koiirakin, his 
 Vice Chancellor, Actual Privy Counfellor, Minifter 
 of the Council of State, A6liial Chamberlain, Grand 
 Chancellor of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerufa- 
 lem, and Knight of the Ruffian Orders of St. Andrew, 
 of St. Alexander Newfky, and of St. Anne of the Firft 
 Clafs ; of thofe of PrulTia, of the Black and Red Eagles - 
 of thofe of Denmark, of the Danebrog, and of the Per- 
 fe<5l Union ; and Grand Crofs of the Sovereign Order of 
 St. John of Jerufalem : and the Sieur Vidtor Count de 
 Kotfchoubey, his Adual Privy Counfellor, Minifter for 
 the Department for Foreign Affairs, Senator, A<^ual 
 Chamberlain, and Knight of the Orders of St. Alexan- 
 der Newfky, of St. Vladimir of the Second Clafs ; and 
 Commander of the Sovereign Order of St. John of feru- 
 falem ; who, in virtue of their refpective full powers, 
 have agreed upon the following articles : 
 
 ARTICLE r. 
 In cafe of unfounded detention, or other contravention 
 of the eftablifhed regulations, the owners of the vclfel and 
 
 cargo
 
 ( ex ) 
 
 cargo Co detained (hall be allowed compenfation for each 
 day's demurrage, proportionate to the lofs they fhall have 
 fuftained, according to the freight of the faid (hip, and 
 the nature of its cargo. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 If the minifters of one of the high contra£ling par- 
 ties, or any other perfons accredited by the fame to the 
 belligerent power, fhould remonftrate againft the fen- 
 tence which fhall have been paifed by the refpeftive 
 courts of admiralty upon the faid captures, appeal Ihall 
 be made in Ruilia, to the Direding Senate, and in Great 
 Britain, to his Majefty's Privy Council. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Care fliall be taken on both fides fcrupuloudy to ex- 
 amine whether the regulations and precautions agreed 
 upon in the prefent Convention have been obfervcd, 
 which (hall be done with all pofTible difpatch. The two 
 high contra6ling parties moreover mutually engage to 
 adopt the moft efficacious meafures, in order to prevent 
 the fentences of their feveral tribunals refpedling cap- 
 lures made at fea being fubjedl to any unnecelTary delay. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 The goods in litigation cannot be fold or unloaded be- 
 fore final judgment, without an urgent and real neceflity, 
 which (hall have been proved before the Court of Admi- 
 ralty, and by virtue of a commillion to this efFe£l ; and 
 the captors (hall by no means be permitted to remove 
 or take away on their own authority, either openly or 
 clandeftinely, any thing from a veflel fo detained. 
 
 Thefe
 
 ( cxi ) 
 
 Thefe additional articles, making part of the conven- 
 tion figned the yth June 1801, in the names of their 
 Britannic and Imperial Majefties, (hall have the fame 
 force and validity as if they were inferted word for w^ord 
 in the faid Convention. 
 
 In witnefs whereof, wetheunderfigned, furnifhed with 
 full powers of their faid Majefties, have figned, in their 
 names, the prefent additional articles, and have affixed 
 the feal of our arms thereto. 
 
 Done at Mofcow, the ^th October i8oi. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.) Le Prince de KouRAKlN. 
 
 (L. S.) Le Comte de Kotschoubey. 
 
 DECLARATION explanatory of the Second Se^'ion of the 
 Third Article of the Convention^ concluded at Peterjbu) gh 
 tJje ^-^th June i8oi, httivcen his Majcjly and the Em- 
 peror of Rujfia, Jigned at Mofcow the '■'ilh October 
 1801. 
 
 In order to prevent any doubt or mifunderflanding 
 with regard to the contents of the fecond feition of the 
 third article of the Convention concluded the xV^h June 
 1801, between his Britannic Majefly, and his Majefly 
 the Emperor of all the Ruflias, the faid high contradt- 
 ing parties have agreed and declare, that the freedom of 
 commerce and navigation granted by the faid article 
 
 to
 
 ( cxii ) 
 
 to the fubjefls of a neutral power, does not authorize 
 them to carry, in time ot war, the produce or merchan- 
 dife of the colonies of the belligerent power diredl to 
 the continental polfcflions, nor vice vetjuy from the 
 mother-country to the enemies' colonies ; but that the faid 
 fubjed>s are however to enjoy the fame advantages and 
 facilities in this commerce as are enjoyed by the moft 
 favoured nations, and efpecially by the United States of 
 America. 
 
 In witnefs whereof, we, plenipotentiaries of their 
 faid Majellies, have figned the prefent declaration, and 
 have affixed the fealsof our arms thereto. 
 
 At Mofcow, the j^th 0£lober 1801. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.) Le Prince de KouRAKlN. 
 
 (L. S.) LeCompte de KoTsCHOUBEY. 
 
 ACT of ACCESSION of his Majejly the King of Den^ 
 mark and Norway to the Convetitlon of the ^-^th fune 
 180T, and Acceptance of his Majefly the King of the 
 United Kingd(.m of Great Britain and Ireland^ 
 
 In the Name of the Moft Holy and Undivided Trinity. 
 
 His Majefly the King of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majefty the Emperor 
 of all the Ruffias, having, in purfuance of their mutual 
 defire to terminate, in the mofl equitable manner, the 
 differences which had arifen between them, as well as 
 betv\een Great Britain and the other maritime powers 
 
 of
 
 ( cxiii ) 
 
 of the North, refpecfling the navigation of tlieir refpe(51ivc 
 fubjedls, concluded a Convention, figned by their plenipo- 
 tentiaries at St. Peterfburgh, the V^h June of the prefent 
 year: and their common fuHcitude extending itfelf not 
 only to prevent fimilar altercarions in future, and the 
 troubles which might refult therefrom, by ertabliihing 
 and applying the principles and rights of neutrality in 
 the refpeclive monarchies, but alfo to render this fyftcm 
 common and equally advantageous to the maritime po'v- 
 ers of the North ; it was ftipulated by the ninth article 
 of the faid Convention, that his Danifli MajeRy ftiould 
 be invited by his Majelty the Emperor of all the Rullias, 
 in the name of the higli contradling parties, to accede 
 to the faid Convention ; and his Majefly the King of 
 Denmark and Norway, animated with the fame fenti- 
 ments of conciliation and peace, and defirous of re- 
 moving every thing which has interrupted, or might 
 hereafter interrupt, the good underftanding between their 
 Britannic and Danifh Majeftie*;, and to re-eftablilli fully 
 on its former footing the ancient harmony, and rtate of 
 things, fuch as they exifled by his Danifli MajeRy's 
 treaties, and conventions with Great Britain, his faid Ma- 
 jefty has not hefitated to liften to the invitation made to 
 him to accede to the faid Convention, figned at St. Peterf- 
 burgh the y June laft. 
 
 ToefFe£l this falutary purpofe, and to give to this aft 
 of acceflion, and to the acceptance of his Britannic Ma- 
 jelty, every poflible authenticity, and every accuftomed 
 folemnity, their faid Majeflies have named for their ple- 
 nipotentiaries, viz. his Majefly the King of the 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Alleyne 
 
 h Lord
 
 ( cxiv ) 
 
 Lord Baron St. Helens, a Peer of the faid Uniteci 
 Kingdom, one of his faid Majefty's moft Honourable 
 Privy Council, and his Ambaflador Extraordinary and 
 Plenipotentiary to his Majefty the Emperor of all the 
 RuHias ; and his Majefty the King of Denmark and 
 Norway, the Sieur Francis Xavier Jofeph, Count de 
 Danncfkiold Lovvendal, Count of the Holy Roman Em- 
 pire, Knight of the Order of St. John of Jerufalcm, 
 Major General in the fervice of his Danifh Majefty, 
 Commander of his Marine Forces, and his Envoy Ex- 
 traordinary and Minifter Plenipotentiary to his Majefty 
 the Emperor of all the Ruflias ; who, after having re- 
 ciprocally exchanged their full powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have concluded and agreed, that all 
 the articles of the Convention concluded between his 
 Majefty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
 Britain and Ireland, and his Majefty the Emperor of all 
 the Ruflias, the Vth June of the prefent year, as well as 
 the feparate articles annexed thereto, and the additional 
 ones concluded the Vth October 1801, by the pleni- 
 potentiaries of their faid Majefties, in all the caufes, 
 conditions, and obligations, are to be confidered as 
 having been agreed upon, done, and concluded, word 
 for word, by their Britannic and Danifh Majefties them- 
 felves, in quality of principal contrafling parties, fave 
 and except the differences which refult from the nature 
 of the treaties, and engagements amecedently fubfifling 
 between England and Denmark, of which the conti- 
 nuance and renewal are fecured by the aforefaid Conven- 
 tion ; and with the exprefs ftipulation on the part of the 
 high contra6ting and acceding parties, that the ftipula- 
 lion of the fecond article of the additional articles, figned 
 X at
 
 ( CX7 ) 
 
 at Mofcow the Vth October i8oi, by the plenipoten- 
 tiaries of their Britannic and Imperial Majefties, which 
 fixes that the adjudication of caufes in litigation (hall, in 
 the laft refort, be carried by appeal in Ruffia, before 
 the Direding Senate, and in Great Britain before his 
 Majefty's Privy Council, is to be underftood, as with 
 regard to Dennnark, that the faid adjudications (hall be 
 there carried by appeal before the Supreme Tribunal of 
 that kingdom. 
 
 In order to prevent any inaccuracy, it has been agreed 
 that the faid Convention, figned the ^-^ih June, the fe- 
 parate articles annexed thereto, and the additional ones 
 concluded the V*^ Odlober i8oi, ftiould be inferted 
 here, word for word. 
 
 [Fiat infertio.]) 
 
 In confequence of all which, hisMajefty the King of 
 Denmark accedes, by virtue of the prefcnt af^, to the 
 faid Convention, and to the faid feparate and additional 
 articles, fuch as they are herein-before tranfcribed, 
 without any exception or referve, declaring, and pro- 
 inifing to fulfil all the claufes, conditions, and obliga- 
 tions thereof, as far as regards himfelf ; and his Majefty 
 the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
 Ireland accepts the prefent acceffion of his Danilh Ma- 
 jpfty, and in like manner promifes, on his part, to ful- 
 fil all the articles, claufes, and conditions contained in 
 the faid Convention, an^ the feparate and additional ar- 
 ticles herein-before inferted, without any exception or 
 referve. 
 
 h a The
 
 ( cxvi ) 
 
 The ratifications of the prefent Act o{ Accefllon, and 
 Acceptance, ihall be exchanged in the fpace of two 
 months, or fooner if polTible ; and the ftipulations of 
 the faid Convention (hall, at the fame time, be carried 
 into execution as fpeedily as pollible, regard being had 
 to the full and entire re-eftabli(hment of the flate of 
 things, fuch as it was before the period of the mifun- 
 derftandings which are now fo happily terminated. 
 
 In witnefs whereof, we the underfigned, by virtue of 
 our full powers, have figned the prefent a£t, and have 
 thereunto affixed the feal of our arms. 
 
 Done at Mofcow the ^^th Oclober 1801. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.) F. X. J. C=. de Danneskiold-Lowendal. 
 
 JCT of JCCESSION of his Majejiy the King of Swe- 
 den y to the Convention of the V y^"*^ 1801, and 
 Acceptanct of his Ahijcfly the King of the United King- 
 _ do7n of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 
 In the Name of the Mod Holy and Undivided Trinity. 
 
 His Majefty the King of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majefty the Emperor 
 of all the RMilins, having terminated, by a Convention 
 concluded at St. Pcierfburgh the V June 1801, the dif- 
 ferences which had arifen between them refpeding the 
 
 rights
 
 ( cxvii ) 
 
 rights of neutral navigation in time of war, and his 
 Majefty the King of Sweden, equally induced by the 
 defire of removing and conciliating the difienfions which 
 exifted on the fame fubjeft between his Britannic Ma- 
 jefty and himfelf, having confented, in confequence of 
 the invitation that has been made to him, to accede to 
 the above-mentioned Convention ; their faid Majefties 
 have chofen and named as their plenipotentiaries to this 
 cffed, viz. — His Majefty the King of the United King- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland, Alleyne Lord Baron 
 St. Helens, Peer of the faid United Kingdom, one of 
 his Majefty 's moft Honourable Privy Council, and his 
 Ambaflador Extraordinary and Miniftcr Plenipotentiary 
 to his Majefty the Emperor of the Ruflias ; and his 
 Majefty the King of Sweden, the Sieur Baron Louis 
 Bogiflas Chriftopher Court de Stedingk, one of the 
 Lords of the Kingdom of Sweden, his Ambaifador 
 Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Imperial Ma- 
 jefty of all the Ruflias, Lieutenant General of his 
 Armies, Chamberlain, Knight and Commander of his 
 Orders, Knight of the Ruflian Order of St. Andrew, 
 Knight Grand Crofs of his Order of the Sword, Knight 
 of thofe of Ruffia, of St. Alexander Newfky, and of 
 St. Anne of the Firft Clafs, and Knight of the French 
 Order of Military Merit ; who, after having exchanged 
 their full powers, found to be in good and due form, 
 have concluded and agreed upon what follows : — 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 His Majefty the King of Sweden accedes by the pre- 
 fent tranfadion with his Majefty the King of the United 
 
 Kingdom
 
 ( cxviii ) 
 
 Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to the Conven- 
 tion which was concluded between his faid Majefty and 
 the Emperor of all the Riiflias, the V June 1801, as 
 well as to the firfl: feparate article annexed thereto, and to 
 the additional ones concluded on the V Odober 1801, 
 promifing and engaging to obferve and fulfil all the fti- 
 pulations, claufes, and articles therein contained, in 
 the fame manner as if his Majefty had been a principal 
 contra6ling party thereto, fave and except the differences 
 which refult from the tenour of the treaties and engage- 
 ments exifting between England and Sweden, and which 
 are to be renewed and confirmed in virtue of the afore- 
 faid Convention. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 His Majefty tlie King of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Britain and Ireland acknowledges on his fide, 
 his Majefty the King of Sweden as a contrafling 
 party in the Convention concluded at Peterfhurgh the 
 Y June 1 801, and binds himfelf in the moft formal 
 manner to obferve, execute, and fulfil, to their utmoft 
 extent, in whatever regards his faid Majefty, the ftipu- 
 lations, claufes, and articles of the faid Convention, and 
 of the faid firft feparate article, and of the additional 
 ones ; fave and except the differences which refult from 
 the tenour of the treaties and engagements exifting be- 
 tween England and Sweden, and •which are to be re- 
 newed and confirmed in virtue of the aforefuid Con- 
 vention. 
 
 ARTICJaE
 
 ( cxix ) 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Il is agreed that the adjudication, in the laft reforf, 
 of caijfes in litigation, •which, according to the fecond 
 article of the aforefaid additional articles, are to be 
 brought by appeal before his Majefly's Privy Council 
 in Great Britain, and before the Diredling Senate in 
 Ru/Iia, ftiall, in Sweden, be brought by appeal before 
 the Suprenie Tribunal, in Swedifh Hogfta Doraftolen. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 In order to prevent any inaccuracy, it has been agreed 
 that the faid Convention, as well as the faid feparate 
 and additional articles, fhould be inferted here word for 
 word, and as follows :— 
 
 [Fiat infertio.j 
 
 The prefent A&. of Acceffion fhall be ratified in good 
 and due form, and the ratifications exchanged at London 
 in the fpace of two months, or fooner if poflible, from 
 the day of its fignature. 
 
 In faith of which, we the underfigned, in virtue of 
 our full powers, have (igned the prefent A£t, and have 
 thereunto affixed the feal of our arms. 
 
 Done at St. Peterfburgh the If March 1802. 
 
 (L. S.) St. Helens. 
 
 (L. S.) Court Stedingk, 
 
 No.
 
 OWING to the d'\ftd and JVales returned to Parliament in 
 known that in many CO _^ _ 
 
 thty nre generally fo, i^I ^O- All. 
 
 account would faJl ver 
 
 were iupp'.ied : as it is, 
 thceftimation of any fc 
 aiiims of thofe perfon, 
 ing condition ; if ther< 
 view than to crinninate 
 In 1757, it was c.ilcula- 
 
 Perfons. 
 
 cd to about 7,200,000 
 the prefent tinae ; conca 
 place between the mia 
 amply counterafted by 
 there has been an incre- 
 years. This would b^ 
 regifters, which are r. 
 where divorces are fo r 
 increafe of population. 
 
 Uninhabited 
 
 S3»96S 
 
 57.476 
 
 Males. 
 
 3'9S7'935 
 
 257,178 
 
 469,188 
 
 1,410 
 
 4i7^S»7" 
 
 Females. 
 
 4»343'499 
 284,368 
 
 4,627,867 
 
 Total. 
 
 8.33i>434 
 
 541,546 
 
 469,188 
 
 1,410 
 
 9.343'S78 
 
 Averages of 8 Years, 
 
 •• 68,341 — Peace. 
 
 'England and Wales-, from 178c 
 But the immediate 
 mote an inveftigation//«/<t/^. 
 of this country has noi 
 at the table before us \ Years. 
 Hauterive. The ma 
 trailed for a period o£ 
 cept the year 1801 (t 
 fords an opportunity ^o — 
 of years of peace imin 
 fiderably in favour of 
 
 rapid increafe appears 
 
 of hoflility, which it isJ3 — 
 
 Britain. The averagi 
 
 is much greater than 
 
 have chofen ; and tl, ___ 
 
 woiiid have been ftiil ^ 
 
 and 1800, had not ve 
 We perceive a di 
 
 This muft be attribu 
 
 always tend to dimin i — 
 
 fervice, by which m 
 
 the fcarcity of graio, 
 
 * 70,158 — War,
 
 ( cxx ) 
 
 No. III. 
 
 OWING to the difficulry attending the execution of this a(^, it is well 
 known that in mnny counties the retuins are confiderably deficient, and that 
 they nre generally f", in a fmati <Iegree. There is icalonto believe that the 
 account would fail very little fliort of 10,000,000, if all thefe deficiencies 
 were lupp!icd : as it is, however, the nnnriber actually returned, far exceeds 
 thecftiination of any former period, and very much difappoints the expe^l- 
 atinns of ihofe perfons who have reprefented the country to be in a perifh- 
 infj condition ; if there be really any who have aflertcd that with any other 
 view than to criminate the minirters to whom its affairs have been entrufted. 
 In 1757, it was c.ilculaied from the militia lifts, that the population amount- 
 ed to about 7,200,000, and Hauterive fuppofes it to be nearly the fame at 
 the prefent time ; concluding, perhaps, that any augmentation that had taken 
 place between the middle and the end of the eighteenth century, had been 
 amply counterafted by the effeifls of the late war. It appears, however, that 
 there has been an increafeof between two and three milhons in the laft fifty 
 years. This would be more fully illuflmted by acomparifon of the marriage 
 regifters, which are moft authentic documents, and which in a country 
 where divorces are fo rare, afford an infallible criteriou of the diminution or 
 increafe of population. 
 
 Dot the immediate object of the prefent argument docs not lead to fo re- 
 mote an inveftigation. I have only undertaken to fhew that the population 
 of this country has not been diminiflied by the war ; and the fljghteft glance 
 at the table before us will be fufficient to refute all the u priori reafonmg of 
 Hauterive. The marriage regifters of England and Wales are here ex- 
 traded for a period of fixtcen years, in which the whole of the late war, ex- 
 cept the year iSoi (which could not be procured), is included. This af- 
 fords an opportunity of comparing the years of war, with an equal number 
 of years of peace immediately preceding; and we fee that the average is con- 
 fiderably in favour of the war. But what ftrikes us more, is, that the moft 
 rapid increafe appears to have taken place during the laft years of that period 
 of hoftihty, which it is contended muji have diminidicd the population of Great 
 Britain. The average number of marriages in the four years 1797 — 1800, 
 is much greater than that of any other four years in the whole period we 
 have cholen ; and there is every reafon to conclude that the difference 
 would have been Aid more remarkably in its favour, if the fcarcity in 1799 
 and 1800, had no[ very materially affci'^ed it in the laft year. 
 
 We perceive a diminution of the marriages in the firft years of the war. 
 Thismuftbe attributed to the circumftances of alarm and ditficulty, which 
 always tend to diminiflj or delay the number of marriages ; to the recruiting 
 fervice, by which many males were taken for the army and navyj and to 
 the fcarcity of graio, which likewife prevailed in the third year. 
 
 General Total of the Population of England and fVales returned to Parliament , 
 purfuance of an A£l 41 Geo. Ill, 
 
 
 Houfci. 
 
 Perfons. 
 
 
 Inhabited. 
 
 By how 
 ■,..,i,y Fa- 
 milies. 
 
 Uninhabited. 
 
 Males. 
 
 Fe.a3e.. 
 
 Tool. 
 
 
 
 1,778,430 
 ■■8,303 
 
 53,965 3,987,93s 
 
 3,5'^ »57.'78 
 
 — 469,188 
 
 — ■,4>o 
 
 4,343,499 
 184,368 
 
 8.33 ',434 
 
 541,546 
 
 469,188 
 
 1,410 
 
 Walej 
 
 Arrny^ Navy, &c. 
 Convifts on board the hulks 
 
 108,053 
 
 
 '.575.9»3 
 
 ■.896,7*3 
 
 57.476 4,7'S>7" 
 
 4.627.867 
 
 9,343-578 
 
 Extrad fn 
 
 I the Marriage ReglJIirs of England and fVaks, fn 
 to 1800, inelufive. 
 
 11785 
 
 Veir:. 
 
 Maniages. 
 
 Averages of 4 Years. 
 
 1785 
 
 68,li4-\ 
 
 
 1786 
 .787 
 
 65,77* I 
 65,934 (■ 
 
 - 66,630 - 
 
 1788 
 
 65,703-' 
 
 
 1789 
 
 67,303 
 
 
 ■79° 
 1791 
 
 71,270 1 
 
 69,259 r 
 
 — 70,053 - 
 
 1791 
 
 7*,3SJ 
 
 
 ■793 
 
 69,437 
 
 
 1794 
 
 68,457 
 
 — 68,285 - 
 
 •795 
 
 65,598 
 
 
 1796 
 
 69,648 J 
 
 
 ■797 
 
 7 1,440-4 
 
 
 ■798 
 
 75,86. 1 
 
 — 72,031 - 
 
 ■799 
 
 74,17*1 
 
 1800 
 
 66,6j»J 
 
 
 Averages trf 8 Years, 
 
 68,341 — Peace. 
 
 70,158 — War.
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Ir LAN of ihe work - • - 1/06 
 
 Part I. — Of the political Jiate of Europe , 
 before and at the breaking out of the French 
 Revolution « - _ _ - 6 
 
 Chap. I. — Hovj far did the Treaty of JVeJl- 
 phalia eftdhltjli a fyjiem of Public Law in 
 Europe!^ _ _ _ . . j 
 
 Chap. ir. — How far has the Treaty of JVeJi- 
 
 phalia beenfubverted by fubfequent eveyjfs ? 14 
 
 Civilization of RiiJJia - - - 15 
 
 Elevation of Prujfia - - - a i 
 
 Commercial and colonial fyjiem - - 38 
 
 Chap. III. — Did there exiji any Public Law 
 in Europe at the beginning of the French 
 revolution? - - - - - 62. 
 
 Fiew of the internal condition of the tuitions 
 of Europe before the Revolution - 67 
 Ditto of their political relations f ditto 89 
 France - _ - _ . (^ 
 
 Auflria - - - - - 119 
 
 Prujfhi - - - - - 127 
 
 Rufia
 
 ( cxxiv ) 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rujfta ----- 144 
 
 England - - - - - 152 
 
 General ohfervatioris - - - 178 
 
 Part II — Since the French Revohition 186 
 
 Part III. — Of the prtjl'nt 7 daiions hetiaeen 
 
 Fra7ice and the other /rates of Europe.. 
 Chap. I. — General ohjervatmir. - - 216 
 
 Chap. II. — France and her allies - - 266 
 
 Chap. III. — France and her enemies - 276 
 
 Chap. IV. — An inquiry into the principal 
 mujes of complaint againfl the commercial 
 tyranny of the Englijh - - - 293 
 p'Irft — The Navigation A^ - ' - 295 
 Second — The monopoly of Trans-Euro- 
 pean Dominions * - - - 308 
 Third. — The monopoly of Britijh Manu' 
 fa^KTcs - - - - - 336 
 
 ON
 
 ON TUB 
 
 STATE OF EUROPE 
 
 BEfORE AVO AFTER THE 
 
 FRENCH REVOLUTION, 
 
 A HE object of the work we are now about 
 to examine, is no other than to fhow, that 
 Europe is in future to be indebted to the be- 
 neficial influence of France for the maintenance 
 of all peace and fecurity, and for the prefer- 
 vation of its focial and political conftitution : 
 that, on account of her fituation, her relations 
 to other powers, and the principles of her prefent 
 government, Trance can delire and aim at no- 
 thing elfe than the common welfare of all na- 
 tions, the independence and ftability of all go- 
 Ternments; and that her political and military 
 greatnefs, her natural and acquired riches, her 
 
 B prefent
 
 ( ^ ) 
 
 prefent lyfiem of adminiftration, and the advan- 
 tages of a conflitution according with the man- 
 ners and incHnations of her inhabitants, furnifh 
 her abundapt means not only to maintain the 
 pofition Ihe now occupies, but to prote6l and re- 
 gulate the nations af:OUAd lier ; to eftabhfli and 
 preferve the equiUbrium among them ; and, in 
 ihoii^' .-to- hc^<^va/s^^r)A. continue the -common 
 centre of a fyftem compofed of all the flates of 
 Europe. 
 
 To arrive at this refult, the Author leads us 
 gradually through a feries of hiftorical and po- 
 litical reflections, the fubftance of which is con- 
 tained in the following propofitions ; fome of 
 them a6lually laid down by himfelf, and the 
 others immediately deducible from his reafon- 
 ing. 
 
 ifl, That, at the commencement of the French 
 revolution, there exifted no cfFe61ive law of na- 
 tions, and no good fyfiem of government ; that 
 authority was guided by no eflablifhed maxims ; 
 and that the true principles of the political and 
 federal conftitution were negledled or forgotten. 
 
 2d, That the war afterwards waged agalnft 
 the French revolution, was the neceflary confe- 
 quence of this univerfal internal and external 
 
 anarchy ;
 
 ( s ) 
 
 anarchy ; it was only the laft and open effort of 
 that deftrudlive malady which had long been 
 preying upon the vitals of every ftate, and de- 
 ftroying the frail fabric which fupported their 
 connexions with each other. 
 
 3d, That the event of this war has reftored 
 France to the place which fhe ought always to 
 occupy, not only for the fake of her owjijecu- 
 rity, bat for ih^fecuritj of all Europe. 
 
 France is now in a fituation io give Europe 
 a new federal conftitution, in which its proper 
 place may be afligncd and guaranteed to each 
 particular ftate. 
 
 A part of this new and happy fyftem has al- 
 ready been carried into elxecution, and fhe is 
 prepared to continue and complete it. She is 
 refolved to treat her allies with impartial bene- 
 volence, her enemies with equity and modera- 
 tion, and the neutral powers with a due refpedl 
 for their rights. She is prepared and determined 
 to ferve as a bulwark to Europe, againil that" 
 fingle flate, which, animated by private interefts, 
 is hoftile throughout to the interefts of the reft ; 
 which, determined by thofe interefts, is the mover 
 of all the diffenfions and wars of Europe, and 
 which, if it be not at length confined within 
 B 2 narrower
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 narrower limits, will not only continue to diC- 
 turb the peace of all other nations, but will 
 flifie the induflry of the reft of the world, and 
 trample on the liberties of every people. 
 
 4th, That the {lability of the prefent internal 
 conftitution of France (the neceflary foundation 
 of its future political influence) refts upon the 
 mofl extentive mafs of natural, artificial, com- 
 mercial, and military refources, of which any na- 
 tion can boaft ; upon a fyftem of adminiflra- 
 tion, fimple, regular, and wife ; upon a happy 
 equality between the income and expenditure of 
 the flate. It refts, moreover, upon a govern- 
 ment exactly adapted to the focial and moral 
 condition of the country, perfe611y fuited to the 
 wants and delires of its inhabitants ; and, laftly, 
 upon the talents and chavn^ier of thofe whom 
 this conftitution has placed at the bead of af- 
 fairs. 
 
 Such is the fplrit, fuch is the argumentation 
 which pervades the work t every one who has 
 read it with attention, will admit thejufticeof 
 this reprclentation ; and the Author himfclf would 
 hardly refufe to acknowledge It. A full exami- 
 nation of Its principles will be naturally divided 
 into four principal parts ; the firft of which will 
 be an Inquiry into the Stale of Europe before the 
 
 Jf'ar
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 iVar of the Revolution \ the fecond will treat of 
 the Situation of Eur of e during a^id after that War ; 
 the third will conlider the prefent Relations be- 
 tween France and the other European Powers ; 
 and the fourth will examine the internal Conftitu- 
 lion of the French Republic : taking them all, 
 however, in thofe points of view in which th« 
 Author has confidercd them. 
 
 B 3 PART
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Of ihe 'political Situatioji of Europe hefoix and at 
 
 tliQ breaking out of the French Revolution. 
 
 *■ 
 
 J- HE queflion. Is a fyjlem of piihJic law ne- 
 cejfary for Europe*? (that is, a conftitution 
 among nations, founded upon treaties, and as 
 much as poffible defined and fixed by mutual 
 compa(9;j) feems, in the prefent fi:ate of the 
 fcience of politics among all civilized nations, 
 to require no further difcufl^on. The very na- 
 ture of the focial confiitution ; the tendency of 
 the human mind towards law and order, in pre- 
 ference to anarchy and confufion ; the bare idea 
 of independent fiates bordering on each other, 
 fufficiently anfwer fuch a queftion. I may there- 
 fore, without any danger, pafs over what the 
 Author has faid upon this fubjedl ; to all which 
 I Ihall not hefitate to fubfcribe in common with 
 every civilized being. 
 
 The following will therefore be the only quef- 
 tions requiring our attention in proceeding to ex- 
 amine the fyftem of our Author. 
 
 * Vide Note A. 
 
 •ft,
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 I ft. How far did the treaty of Weftpnalia eftar 
 blifli, as he afTerts, a fyftera of public law ia 
 Europe ? .,jy,^I ij^ 
 
 . 2d, How far have any fubfequent events con- 
 tributed to difTolve the fyftem of public law, 
 founded by the treaty of Weftphalia ; particu- 
 larly thofe events in the eighteenth century, 
 to which the Author afcribes fuch pernicious 
 effeas ? 
 
 ^d, Did there exiit any fyflem of public law 
 in Europe, at the commencement of the French 
 revolution ? 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 liow far did the Treaty of Wefiphalia ejiahltfh a 
 Syflem of public Law in Etirope ? 
 
 A HE two following conditions are indifpen- 
 fably neceflary to any treaty intended to be the 
 bails of an univerfal and perpetual fyftem of pub- 
 lic law, even were it only to comprile the nations 
 lying whhin a certain large circle ; fuch, for ex- 
 ample, as the extent of Europe. In the firft 
 place, it mufl comprehend all the ftates of this 
 B 4 circle
 
 ( 8 ) 
 
 circle in all their feveral relations ; and, in the 
 next place, it muft contain provifions, whereby 
 all future revolutions in the internal lituatioq 
 and external connexions of thefe itates fhould be 
 forefeen, confidered, and taken into the account 
 of the whole political fyftem. 
 
 It is only neceflfary to ftate thefe two condi- 
 tions, to point out the impoffibility of fuliilling 
 them. The difficulty of defining to the fatif- 
 fa6lion of all, in one and the fame negotiation, 
 in one and the fame treaty, the various and intri- 
 cate relations, wants, and pretenfions of (o great 
 a number of independent nations as Europe 
 alone contains, is evident ; and even though this 
 difficulty fliould not be confidered abfolutely in- 
 furmountable, it will hardly be thought ex- 
 traordinary that no ferious attempt fhould yet 
 have been made to overcome it. The treaty of 
 Weftpbalia had only to encounter a part of it ; 
 yet, feven years were confumed in negotiation 
 before it was brought about ; and the formation 
 and conclufion of this treaty was, and is Hill, 
 eficemed a mafter-piece of diplomatic ability. 
 
 But even fuppofing that all the llates of Eu- 
 rope could enter into fuch a compav9., as would 
 fcrve for the bafis of a general federative confti- 
 tution ; would afccrtain all their rights, and de-r 
 
 fine
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 fine all their relations ; yet, there would ftill be 
 wanting the means of enfuring the everlafling du- 
 ration of fuch a compadt, or of providing with 
 any degree of certainty for its future exiftence. 
 The fate of empires is no lefs fubjecH: to viciffi- 
 lude than that of individuals : owing to the 
 inequality cf their refpedlive progrefs, to the un- 
 expe6led growth of new brandies of industry 
 and power, to the perfonal and family con- 
 nexions, and, fiill more, to the opinions, the 
 charadlers, and the paffions of their rulers, there 
 mufl: neceflarily happen many changes which no 
 human wifdom can forefee, much lefs provide 
 againfl. Each of thefe changes occafions new 
 wants, new plans, and new pretenfions ; endan- 
 gers or deftroys the former equilibrium ; pre- 
 fents frefli difficulties to the flatefman, and ren- 
 ders it neceffary to revife the fyftem, and define 
 the refpe6tive rights anew. Impoffible as it is 
 for the code of laws of any nation to provide for 
 every poffible future variation in the chara(5ler 
 and manners, the civil, moral, and domeftic con- 
 dition of its inhabitants ; even fo impoffible is it 
 to eflabliffi an eternal fyftem of public law, by 
 means of any general treaty, however numerous 
 the objedls which it may embrace, with whatever 
 care and ability it may have been combined. 
 
 The
 
 ( «o ) 
 
 The treaty of Weftphalia could not be ex- 
 pected to perform that which is beyond the 
 reach of any treaty. It was fo far from juftifying 
 fuch expeclationSj that it did not even fulfil the 
 £rft condition of a compact defigned to be the 
 bafis of a federative fyltem ; it did not include 
 all the nations even then important ; and ftill lefs 
 did it embrace all the relations of the ftates which 
 it did include. Indeed it was hardly poffible that 
 it fhould ; for at the time when this peace was 
 negotiated, the fcience of politics was a perfect 
 flranger to the greater part of thofe important 
 problems which prefented themfelves for folution 
 in the following century ; it was not then fuf- 
 pc6ted how fruitful a principle of fociai improve- 
 ment lay concealed in the darknefs and confufion 
 of thofe times; and the meritorious flatefmen 
 who immortalized their names by this treaty, hay- 
 ing only the experience of the age in which they 
 lived, contemplated the lituation and wants of 
 Europe in a comparatively confined and imper- 
 fed: point of view. It did not even come with- 
 in their intention, much lefs was it the object of 
 their pride, to lay a folid foundation for the pub- 
 lic law of Europe. 
 
 There can be no doubt but that the treaty of 
 Weftphalia has been mifconceived, as often as it 
 has been conlidered in this light. The peculiar 
 
 merit
 
 ( " ) 
 
 merit of this famous treaty, is, in fadl, entirely 
 confined to Germany. It was by fixing the un- 
 certain relations, between the Emperor and the 
 fiates of the Empire ; by determining the extent 
 and Hmits of the fovereign autliority of the Ger- 
 man princes ; by defining more accurately the 
 competency of the tribunals of the Empire ; and, 
 above all, by deciding, in a manner equally juft 
 and wife, the moft important queftion at that 
 period — the differences between the two religious 
 parties, and afTuring to each its rights, its freedom, 
 its pofTeffions, and its due fhare in the conllitu- 
 tion of the Empire, that this treaty became a 
 beneficial and fundamental law for Gernuviy ; 
 and fuch it has remained, notwithflanding the 
 viciflitude of events, even until the moment 
 when, according to the affertions of modern 
 politicians, " there no longer exified an^ futidameti- 
 lal law or law of nations.''^ 
 
 But if we proceed to confider the treaty of 
 Weftphalla as the bafis of a federal fyftem of 
 Europe, it will come before us in a far lefs per- 
 fect, and, to fay the truth, in a very imperfect 
 ihape. Of the nations at that time the mofl 
 powerful, there were only three, viz. PVance, 
 Auftria, and Sweden, which took, an immediate 
 part in that treaty. Spain refufed to accede to it. 
 pngland was not even taken into confideration : 
 J neither
 
 f 12 ) 
 
 neither Denmark, nor Poland, nor the flatcs of 
 Lower Italy, had any dire6l (hare in it. Some of 
 the moft important ftipulations of this treaty, the 
 independence of Switzerland, and that of the 
 United Provinces, were, in fadl, mere formali- 
 ties, lince the fate of the nations to which they 
 related, had long before that period been com- 
 pletely decided. Others, fach as the ceffion of 
 Ibme maritime diftridls to Sweden, had very little 
 influence on the great political fyftem, or on the 
 events of later times. In various treaties lefs ce- 
 lebrated than that of Weflphalia, more confider- 
 able changes of territory and dominion, more 
 important revolutions in the general ftate of po- 
 litics, have been either efFedted or fandtioned. 
 
 Of all the articles of this treaty, the moft im- 
 portant with refpe6l to the general law of na- 
 tions, was undoubtedly that which determined 
 the indemnification of France ; and if this ar- 
 ticle has ceafed to be a fundamental law, it has 
 certainly not been the fault of the Germans. 
 Upon the whole, it ftill remained entire at the 
 breakinjr out of the French revolution: but, 
 alas ! France had in the mean time given more 
 than one melancholy example of a truth, long 
 lince well known to every ftatefman, — that the 
 moft folemn treaties are vi^eak and ineffe6^ual 
 barriers to the paflions of princes and their mi- 
 
 niflers.
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 nlfiers. Twenty years had fcarcely elapfed after 
 the treaty of Weftphalia, when a new war was 
 kindled by the ambition of Lewis XIV". which 
 occupied nearly the whole theatre of the thirty 
 years war ; and the grand fundamental law of 
 1648, was infufficient to prevent a feries of vio- 
 lence and bloodfhed, which almofl every ten 
 years called for new negotiations, and new trea- 
 ties ; while, to preferve entire even a fragment of 
 the treaty of Weftphalia, it became necelTary to 
 fiipport the finking balance of Europe, by the 
 treaties of Nimeguen, of RyfTwick, and of Raf- 
 tadt : and it was France^ and France only, whote 
 condu(51: occafioned the neceffity of flich fup- 
 ports ! It was France alone that offered the firll 
 violation to this facred principle of the federal 
 confiitution of Europe 1 
 
 Whoever then expe(5led that the treaty of 
 Wefrphalia would be the foundation of an uni- 
 verfal political fyftem to lafl for ever, mufl have 
 expected more from it than any treaty ever could 
 fulfil. It has effedled all that it could or was in- 
 tended to perform : and, what is more, its fun- 
 damental principles have endured longer, and 
 with lefs alteration, than has, perhaps, been the 
 cafe with refpedl to any other treaty. Among 
 its fundamental principles, however, I only 
 Kckon thofe which immediately refer to the con* 
 
 flitutkn
 
 ( H ) 
 
 ^itution of the German Empire, and thofe which 
 regard the relations between France and Ger- 
 many. Before we can determine what fuble- 
 quent events have overturned or materially en- 
 dangered the treaty of Weflphalia, we muft 
 proceed to examine how far either of thefe fun- 
 damental articles have been afFecSled by them. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 How far has the Treaty of JVeJlphalia been 
 fuhverted by fiibfequent Events ? 
 
 jc\FTER having decided in the foregoing chap- 
 ter, in what fenfc the treaty of Weftphalia could 
 be called the foundation of a federal conftitu- 
 lion, and pointed out what was properly /«Wj- 
 mental in that celebrated compa6l ; we now come 
 to inquire, how far the changes which have 
 iince happened in Europe, have tended to wea- 
 ken or dcflroy it, and particularly thofe three 
 events to which the Author principally afcribes 
 fucheffedls. — ^Thefe are, ift. The formation (as 
 the Author calls it) of a new empire in the north 
 of Europe ; or, more properly, the intervention of 
 this northern empire i?i the intercourfe and relations 
 of the refl\ 2d, The elevation of Vrujfia to a ^ower 
 ■ of
 
 ( -5 ) 
 
 of the h'ighejl rank ; 3d, The rife and progrefs of 
 the commercial and colonial fyfl em. 
 
 The civilization of Ruffia, and the interven- 
 tion of this powerful empire in the federative 
 connexions of Europe, could not but produce 
 very great and important effects on the v/hole 
 political fyftem. Thefe effects, like moft of the 
 changes which happen on the great theatre of the 
 world, have been in fome relpedls beneficial^ in 
 others pernicious. 
 
 The progrefsof civilization among nationsbefore 
 immerfed in barbarifm, is obvioufly a very import- 
 ant advantage, not only to thofewhom it immedi- 
 ately affe(fls, but to the general mafs of civilized 
 mankind. It multiplies thepoints of conta^tamong 
 men ; it enlarges the fphere of their connexions, 
 their a6livity, and their knowledge ; opens a new- 
 field to induftry and commerce, and creates ad- 
 ditional opportunities of communicating ideas. 
 Taken in this point of view, the advantages are 
 incalculable which have arilcn to Europe from 
 the civilization of the Ruffian empire ; which is, 
 perhaps, the greateft event after the difcovery of 
 America, in the hlftory of modern times. This 
 empire has eflablifhed a new connexion between 
 the moft civilized, and fome of the moft uncul- 
 tivated, though in them'elves the rlcheft and 
 
 moft
 
 ( J6 ) 
 
 moii fertile parts of the world. The way has 
 been opened by Ruffia, which will in future lead 
 Europeans into the interior of Alia ; and we 
 have now the plealing profpecl of one day feeing 
 thofe happy regions (the cradle of all civiliza- 
 tion, perhaps in every fenfe of the word, the 
 cradle of the human race) returning to a par- 
 ticipation of all thofe truly valuable bleflings 
 which have fo long been withheld from them. 
 Laftly, the Ruffian empire has for ever removed 
 and placed in the remoteft degree of poffibility, 
 the danger of a future irruption of the barbarous 
 nations into Europe; which, not very long ago, 
 was a fubjedl of apprehenlion to many an en- 
 lightened friend of humanity. 
 
 On the other hand, it cannot be denied, that 
 the formation of this new empire has ferved to 
 render the political relations of flates more intri- 
 cate, and their combinations more difficult; to 
 multiply plans and counter plans, pretentions 
 and oppofitions ; wars offentive and defenfire ; 
 and to give a new impulfe to that rettlefs a6tivity 
 which fo particularly diftinguifhes the prefent 
 times. The defire of the Ruffian princes to ob- 
 tain an immediate influence in the federal ar- 
 rangement of Europe, incited them to many bold 
 mealures, which filled their neighbours with-' 
 anxiety and conflernation ; alarmed the more 
 
 powerful
 
 ( '7 ) 
 
 powerful for the balance of Europe, and made 
 the weaker nations tremble for their very exiit- 
 ence. The plans of conqueft and partition, of 
 which a great part muft be laid to the account of 
 this empire, were lefs hurtful in their immediate, 
 than in their remote confcquences. They at« 
 tacked the foundations of all political and focial 
 fccurity ; they loofened and invalidated all prin- 
 ciples ; they made it doubtful whether the law of 
 nations was not an empty name, invented as a 
 cloak for power, and fecretly defpifed by the 
 powerful : they were the model, the pretence, 
 and the excufe for all future ufurpations ; and 
 fo much did they corrupt the public opinion, that 
 the terms, found policy^ fyji^f^ of equilibrium^ main- 
 tenance or reftoration of the balance of poiver, were 
 too often applied, to what, in fa<51:, was only 
 an abule of power, or the exercife of arbitrary 
 will. 
 
 But none of the changes produced by Ruflia 
 in the political relations of Europe, were within 
 the fphere of the fyltem founded and eftablifhed 
 by the treaty of Weftphalia. They related al- 
 moft excluiively to the northern ftates, and to 
 the fate of Poland and Turkey. The two great 
 fundamental articles of that treaty, the internal 
 political organization of the German emfire^ and 
 
 c the
 
 ( '8 ) 
 
 the relations between France and Germany^ were 
 not in the leaft afFedled by them. 
 
 The Ruffian monarchs endeavoured, indeed, 
 on more than one occalion, to procure a certain 
 degree of influence in the domeftic affairs of the 
 German empire. But until the commencement 
 of the French revolution (and we muft not for- 
 get that hitherto we have only been fpeaking of 
 the time which elapfed between the treaty of 
 Wefrphalia, and that great event), their efforts 
 remained entirely without fuccefs. Thofe who 
 are acquainted with the hiftory of the prefent 
 times, will remember with what determined op- 
 pofition the greater part of the German ilates en- 
 countered the pretenfions of Ruffia to the title ot 
 guarantee of the treaty of IVeJiphaha, which flic 
 claimed by a forced interpretation of a paflage in 
 the treaty of Tcfchen ; and that too at a time 
 when the maintenance of the conftitution founded 
 on that treaty, was become extremely problema- 
 tical, and when it was well known that the inten-^ 
 tions of Ruffia were to preferve, and not to de- 
 fi;roy it. 
 
 The relations exifiing between France 3.x\di Ger- 
 many, fufFered no alteration whatever from the 
 aggrandizement of Ruffia. They rather re- 
 ceived
 
 ( 19 ) 
 
 ceived from this event, a greater degree of con- 
 fiftency than they had ever before pofleffed : for 
 as the attention and politics of the two great 
 fiates of Germany, cfpecially of Auftria, were 
 always principally, and often exclufively directed 
 towards the undertakings of Ruffia ; France had 
 on her part the lefs to dread from theirs. 
 
 It may on the whole be fafely aflerted, that, of 
 all the leading ftates of Europe, France was the 
 leaft endangered by the increaiing greatnefs of 
 Ruflia ; and that, under certain conditions, that 
 event would have been lefs prejudicial to her 
 than to any other. If we except the relations of 
 commerce (which the French government, if 
 it had known and attended to its own interettSj 
 might have cultivated as well as the Englifli*), 
 there was no immediate point of contadl between^ 
 France and Ruffia ; and fo far was the mere ex- 
 jdence of the latter power from diflurbing the po- 
 litical fyjftem of Europe to the difadvantage of 
 France, that, on the contrary, it ftrengthened in 
 a confiderable degree, the juit and beneficial in- 
 fluence of the cabinet of Verfailles, in the rela- 
 tions of all the weflern and Ibuthern ftates. Con- 
 fidered in this light, fhe was a tacit and uniform, 
 
 * The treaty concluded at Peterfburg in 1787, by an able 
 D?gociator on the part of France, is a fuflicient proof of this, 
 
 c a thoucrh
 
 ( 10 ) 
 
 though negative guarantee of the fyltem efla- 
 blifhed or confirmed by the treaty of VVeftpha- 
 lia, indead of contributing to its diflblution. 
 
 It mufl: be confefled that even tbofe diflant 
 revolutions which Ruffia projected in Turkey, 
 and actually accomphfhed in Poland, could not 
 be^indifFerent to France : but it was owing to ac- 
 cidental circumftances, and to the weaknefs and 
 miftakes of tbofe who then managed the affairs 
 of that country, that tbofe revolutions could be 
 attempted, and in a certain degree executed. 
 It is now well known and generally acknow- 
 ledged, that the partition of Poland might have 
 been prevented by the timely interference of 
 France; and that Aufiria herfelf would have op- 
 pofed that partition, if the French minirtry had 
 not exprefsly declared that they beheld it with in- 
 difference. It is no lefs certain, that France 
 might have prevented the breaking out of the 
 Jaft war with Turkey, or otherwife have power- 
 fully fupported the Ottoman Pprte, had not the 
 beginning of her internal diffenfions at that 
 time, weakened her efforts, and diminifhed her 
 influence. 
 
 The intervention of Ruffia in the political con- 
 stitution of Europe, is not, therefore, one of the 
 events which have weakened the principles of 
 
 that
 
 ( 21 ) 
 
 that conftitution, and undermined the ground- 
 work of the federal fyllem. The moft important 
 provilions of the treaty of Weftphalia remained 
 unahered ; France, in particular, continued ex- 
 actly in the lituation in which fhe had been 
 placed by that peace, and by the fubfequent trea- 
 ties which confirmed or modified it. The gene- 
 ral political relations were, indeed, rendered more 
 extenfive and more intricate, but were not irre- 
 parably overturned, or materially and neceffarily 
 diflurbed by the intervention of Ruflia : on the 
 contrary, it is certain, that if the advantages to be 
 derived from this new weight had been attended 
 to with wifdom, the law of nations, and the fe- 
 deral conftitution of Europe, would have received 
 from it an additional fupport, and the means of 
 bringing them nearer to perfedlion. 
 
 The elevailon of PniJJia from a fuh ordinate flate 
 to a power of the fir Jt rank and Influence in Europe, 
 is the fecond of thofe events to which the Author 
 afcrihesthe diflblution of the fyftcm founded on 
 the treaty of Weftphalia, with all the evil con- 
 fequcnces, in his opinion, rcfuhing therefrom. 
 This event has certainly produced a more mate- 
 rial and decilive effc6t upon the two principal 
 objeclsof the treaty of Weftphalia, than the ag- 
 grandizement of Ruflia. It has occalioned great 
 changes in the internal condition of Germany ; 
 c 3 and
 
 ( " ) 
 
 and likewile matenally altered the rdatiofis bfr- 
 tween France and the German empire. The 
 only remaining qiieftion is, whether, after hav- 
 ing candidly confidercd thefe changes in a pro- 
 per point of view, we fhall pronounce them pre- 
 judicial; and whether they can, with any ap- 
 pearance of truth, be reckoned among thoie 
 which have confounded, ditbrdered, and over- 
 turned the public law of Europe ; have converted 
 it into a chaos of contradid ion and anarchy, and 
 at length put an end to its exiflence. Before we 
 anfwer this queftion, we muft turn our attention 
 to thofe confequenccs which the Author derives 
 from the elevation of Pruflia ; partly with rcfpctSl 
 to the fate of Germany m particular, partly with 
 regard to the political ilatc of Europe In g€- 
 neraL 
 
 With rcfpecl to the affairs of the German em- 
 pire, the following are the cfFecls it is faid to 
 have produced. 
 
 ill. It is afierted that ** the difputes between 
 the Emperor and the ftates of the Empire, have 
 more frequently occafioned war.*' Tliis aliertion 
 is contradicted by hillory, provided we do not 
 confound ihc formation of thegreatncfs of Pfuilia, 
 with its conjeqiiences . The firft of thefe was cer- 
 tainly accompanied by one of the moll deflrudivc 
 iS wars
 
 ( 23 ) 
 
 Wars of the eighteenth century. But fince the 
 time when Pruffia rofc triumphant out of that 
 war, not only has Hie never once ditiurbed the 
 peace of Germany, but, on the contrary, has by 
 turns protedicd the rights, and reconciled the 
 diti"crences of the fmaller dates by her great pre- 
 ponderance in a confiderable part of the Empire. 
 If we except the fliort campaign of 1778 (in 
 which fhe was evidently engaged with views of 
 ■prtjcrvation, not of Jejlru5lwn)y Pruffia has not 
 once taken arms in any of the difputes between 
 the ftates of ihe Empire. From the year 1763, to 
 the prefent day, no diflenfions among the Ger- 
 man princes, or between the chief of the Em- 
 pire and its members, have terminated in open 
 war : and lb little has the power of Pruffia tended 
 to fow divifion in Germany, that, on the con- 
 trary, many domett ic quarrels have been ami- 
 cably concluded by its intervention. 
 
 2d. I'iiat " France has been etlranged from 
 (he inlercfts of the German empire, and the Ger- 
 vhin empire iVom thofe of France.''' This un- 
 doubtedly has been the confequence of the in- 
 c.reafed influence of Pruffia : but have its efTe^fs 
 in this inftance been prejudicial ? If France 
 was not ambitious of 7-urnig in Germany, there 
 were only two reafonableobjedls which fhe could 
 feck to obtain by her arms, or her treaties ; fecu- 
 c 4 rify
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 rily for her/cif, and prote3ion to the vjeaker princes 
 of the Empire^ (igainfi the attempts of the more 
 powerful^ particularly of the Emperor. That the 
 Tafety of the French frontiers has not been en- 
 dangered by the elevation of Pruffia, is a truth 
 fufficiently confirmed by experience ; and the 
 greatnefs of the Pruflian monarchy has even 
 proved an additional and very confiderable fecu- 
 rity to France, againft Auftria, the mod power- 
 ful flate of the Empire. But that with refpedl 
 to the protection to be given to the fmallcr ftates 
 of the Empire, the part fhould now be allotted 
 to PruJJia which had hitherto been a6\ed by 
 France^ was certainly a fortunate change for 
 thofe countries themfelves ; and if judged accord- 
 ing to the true principles of politics, by^no means 
 an unfavourable one for France. She was now 
 at liberty to devote to other undertakings, the 
 force which had formerly been employed in giv-* 
 ing this protedlion. She might now banifh for 
 ever from among the objecfls of her political at- 
 tention, all anxiety for the fate of Germany, and 
 every dread of the preponderance of Auftria ; 
 the only juftifiable motives for her interference 
 in the thirty years war. If France had nothing 
 more in view than her own fafety and the protec- 
 tion of Germany, in her endeavours to maintain 
 the treaty of Weflphalia ; if fhc did not feek 
 (in contradiction to all the principles of jufl: and 
 
 liberal
 
 ( ^5 ) 
 
 liberal politics) to make her influence in the 
 Empire a pretence and a cloak for ambitious 
 plans of ufurpation ; flie could not but conflder 
 the elevation of Pruffia as an event in every re- 
 fpe6l advantageous to her ; and as the fureft and 
 mofl natural guarantee of the treaty of Weft- 
 phalia : becaufe it created a power always ready 
 and able to relifl every attempt injurious to the 
 conftitution. 
 
 3d. That <* the difputes on the conjlitution of the 
 Empire being no longer adjujied hv a third party , 
 have been decided by force^ and by the agreements 
 or arbitrary will of the mofl powerful'* The in- 
 terference of a third party cannot furely l3e ad- 
 vantageous to any conflitution in the difputes 
 that may arife on the interpretation of its provi- 
 iions ; and hiftory rcifntes the afTertion, that 
 force alone has prevailed in tiie Empire lince 
 France ceafed to take a part in its internal af-. 
 fairs. The truth is, that the office of umpire, 
 which France fo often exercifed with partiality, 
 and io feldom for the advantage of the Vv-hole, 
 became fuperfluoas by the elevation of Pruffia; 
 and that lince that event an internal prote6lor of 
 the German conditution has taken the place of 
 a foreign one : but if ever the queftion ffiould 
 arife, whether France or Prussia be the mofl 
 proper guarantee of any great national intereji ?
 
 ( 26 ) 
 
 t\o true and well-informed friend of the Ger- 
 man conftitution could hefitate a moment to 
 whicli to give the preference. 
 
 But, even fappofing the great influence which 
 France pofleired in the affairs of Germany to 
 have been beneficial to the Empire, and agree- 
 able to the general fyftem of politics (which, 
 after the preceding obfervations, I never can af- 
 I'ent to), it muft not be forgotten that the lofs 
 of this influence to France was the effect of her 
 own choice. Jt was not when the King of Pruf- 
 lia role to be a formidable rival of tlie greatnefs 
 -of Auflria ; but from the moment when the 
 French miniftry formed a new alliance with the 
 Emperor, that the connexion between France 
 and the princes of Germany was difTolved for 
 ever. The treaty of 1756 has been often repre-^ 
 fcnted, even by enlightened flatefmen before the 
 revolution, and by a multitude of very violent, 
 and often very ignorant writers flnce that pe- 
 riod, as the firit caule of the weaknels and de- 
 cay of the French monarchy*. All that we can 
 fay of the judgments of thofe flatefmen, and of 
 the declamations of thefe authors, is, that their 
 ideas are highly exaggerated. Although true 
 policy may have much to urge againft the treaty 
 of i 756, and Itill more perhaps againft the time 
 
 * Vide note B. 
 
 at
 
 ( ^7 ) 
 
 :at which it was concluded ; it is, -neverthelefs, 
 •falfe (being in evident contradit'-tion to hiliory) 
 ithat tl-iis treaty was a pofitive evil for France. A 
 great part of the bad coiilequcnccs attributed to 
 it, muft be deduced from very different fources ; 
 .and thoie who blame the mcaluic, fcem quite to 
 l^ave forgotten the great advantages France de- 
 rivetl from it. However that may be, the treaty 
 «f 1 7 ;d was a formal renunciation on tiie part of 
 ihc French miniftry of the office of umpire in 
 the affairs of Germany ; the name at leall of 
 wliich it had till then endeavoured to fupport. 
 France could not pofiibly be at the fame time 
 •the confederate of the Emperor, and the ally of 
 ■the Empire againfi: an abufe of power on tkc 
 part of the Emperor. If, determined by motives 
 ■o{ political prudence, France chofe to prefer 
 the certain advantages of an alliance with Auf- 
 tria to the doubtful benefit of a protecting in- 
 fluence in the Empire, fhe furcly has no right 
 to complain of the lofs of it. It was her own 
 determination, her own policy, the immediate 
 •confequence of a change in her own fvftem^ 
 and not the elevation of Pruilia, or certainly not 
 that alone, which deprived France of the part 
 ihc once had in the internal affairs of Germany. 
 
 4th. That " the Protfstant league r;o 
 
 h ch^ 
 
 noted 
 
 longer reluiNS, us Jh^h, even the na-ine tvhlch ch
 
 ( 2S ) 
 
 noted a community of rights and interefts ; and 
 having ajfumed that of the power ivhofe influence 
 fupplanted France^ it is now only known by the 
 title of the Prussian party." Here the Author 
 evidently lays down, as the confequence of a 
 lingle event, what is in fad the refult of much 
 greater and more general changes. The Proteft- 
 ant party has certainly not fufFered in the leaft 
 in its rights and liberties, or loft any of its 
 weight in the general affairs of the Empire fince 
 Pruffia has been its patron. The diminution of 
 its natural weight by the aggrandizement of 
 that power, would be a very extraordinary and 
 incomprchenlible phenomenon. So far as there 
 ft ill exiils in Germany a diflindl Proteftant inte- 
 reft, that intereft muft necelTarily find itfelf 
 more fecure under the prote6lion of a powerful 
 Proteftant flate, intimately connected with it, 
 than under that of a foreign power, only occa- 
 ftonally adtive in its behalf; a power, which, 
 while defending this Proteftant party, was a61ing 
 in open contradiction to its own principles of 
 internal policy ; a power whofe fupport often 
 fecretly difgufted the moft determined ene- 
 mies of the Imperial court r as no one could 
 help obferving, that it perfecuted with fire and 
 fword at home the religion it protec^^ied in Ger- 
 many. The advantage to the Proteftant fiates 
 I of
 
 ( 29 ) 
 
 of exchanging the fupport of fuch a power for 
 that of Pruffia, was furely undeniable. 
 
 But it was not without reafon that I exprefled 
 myfelf doubtfully as to the exiflence of a dif- 
 tindl Proteftant intereft in Germany. If it 
 fhould be aiTerted that the Proteftant party 
 icarcely continues to exill even in name, the af- 
 fertion would be at variance with the hifiory of 
 the prefent times, with the adlual lituation of the 
 Empire and its prefent conftitution. But it is^ 
 certain, that much, very much, perhaps the 
 greater part of what formerly characterized its 
 exiflence, has been loft in the revolutions of fo- 
 ciety. It is the fpirit of the times alone which 
 has brought about thefe changes, and not the 
 elevation of Pruffia, which would rather have 
 had a contrary tendency. The differences of 
 religion have loft the importance which was 
 formerly attached to them : the deep fhades they 
 caft upon the face of Ibciety, a century ago, are 
 now foftened down. Opinions and articles of 
 faith, which in former times have armed one half 
 of Europe againft the other, are now looked 
 upon with coldnefs and indifference : the 
 llighteft political connexion binds men and 
 ftates more firmly now than all the profeffions 
 of religion in the world ; and without entering 
 here into any comparifon of the merits of what 
 
 now
 
 ( 30 ) 
 
 BOW intcrcub us, and of the objects that f'or- 
 iwerly iifed to agitate mankind, and occalion the 
 moft important events ; it is a truth eftablitlied 
 by hiftory, that the manners, intercfts, politics, 
 iiittions, and enthnlialm, the uilciom and folly 
 of theprelent, are not tbpie of former times. 
 
 I think I have proved that ths' confequenccs of 
 the aggrandizement of Prullia, yi'ith refpedt ta, 
 the internal relations of Gernuniy, and thofe 'Ujhich 
 formerly cx'ijied het'-ji:ee?i Frajice and- fhe Rinpirey 
 are either not facb as the Anthor dercribes. them, 
 or ought certainly not to be confidered io unfa- 
 vourable as he appears to- think tliem. I con- 
 ceive the conftitution eflahlifhed by the treaty of 
 VVefjphalia, as far as- it was in its nature capable 
 of it, to have derived additional confirmation and 
 fupport from the elevation of pFulfia ; and it 
 now rcmakis for mc to exaraii^, wl^ther the in- 
 fluence of that event upon the general fyftera of 
 Eurojie, has, i-n far3, been fo detrimental as the 
 Author's reprcfentation would incline us to be- 
 Ik've. 
 
 Beraufe Fruffia, in order to improve, and af- 
 terwards to maintain her lituatiou, had recourfe 
 to a new fyftem of war and government ; becaufe 
 flie invented new tactics, and had recourfe to 
 the art of accumulating trcafures; and becaule 
 
 fear
 
 ( 31 ) 
 
 fear or iealcufy induced the furrounding na- 
 tions to adopt, on their parts, the fame inftru- 
 inents of power ; therefore, it is faid, has Pruflia, 
 by her principles and example, been the caufc of 
 thofe unnatural efforts, and of that total enerva- 
 tion of all the European ftates which has been 
 the confequence thereof. To maintain great ar- 
 mies, and to fin their coffers, they opprcifed 
 their fubjecis fo much by levies of men and mo- 
 ney, excited fuch univerfal difcontent, and 
 {trained all the fprings of power fo immode- 
 rately, as to occafion the general diibrder which 
 enfued, and ** of which the war againjl the revo^ 
 liition was only the lajt refultJ' 
 
 Whether this Hatement of the cafe is really 
 true ; whether the general efforts were fo over- 
 itrained ; the oppreflion fo intolerable ; the de- 
 bility fo great and univerfal ; and whether the 
 revolution, with the war excited again ft it, was 
 really the confequence thereof, will be examined 
 in another place. The queftion here, is only, 
 whether, and how far all thefe effects, if they 
 do exift, and fo far as they are fuppofed to 
 exifl, have been occalioned by the elevation of 
 Pruffia. 
 
 It is evident thatPruflla, with a territory com- 
 paratively fmall, and interfc(5led on all fides, 
 
 could
 
 ( 3^ ) 
 
 could never have rifen to a flate of the hi'gbefl: 
 rank, and been able to maintain hcrfclf there, 
 without new and extraordinary reiburces. Whe- 
 ther the fyftem of amaffing treafure, and that of 
 military confcription, are the betl, according to 
 general fpeculative ideas, is a queftion I have no- 
 thing to do with. The iituation, the wants, and 
 the objedlsof Pniffia conlidered, they were wife 
 and ufefnl for her. For Fruffia they laid the 
 foundations of a power which flie could otherwife 
 never have attained ; of a greatnefs, not merely 
 dazzling and tranfitory, but folid and durable : 
 and, what i^ more, the example of Fruffia has 
 proved, that a truly good adminiftration, that a 
 high degree of induftry and wealth, that the 
 profperlty of the ftate, and the happinefs of indi- 
 viduals, are by no means incompatible with fuch 
 foundations of power. Prulha has really united 
 them all : a fad which muft put every theory to 
 iilence. At the breaking out of the French re- 
 volution (for that is ftill the period to which all 
 our conliderations are at prcfcnt diredled) there 
 cxiftcd no llate in Europe, at once fo powerful 
 and fo happy as that of PruHia ; governed with 
 fo much energy and wifdom ; fo prepared for 
 every foreign undertaking, and fo fafe from all 
 internal comm6tion ; fo capable of the greatetl 
 exertions, and fo guarded againft all diforga- 
 nization. If it be true that Fruffia pointed out to 
 
 all
 
 ( 33 ) 
 
 ail Europe the way to ruin, it mufl at lead be 
 confefTed, that it took great care not to be itfelf 
 the firfl to proceed upon it. 
 
 This ruin did not, however, originate in im- 
 prudent and untimely imitations of the Pruffian 
 lyrtem of adminiftration. Such an aflertion is 
 immediately refuted by hiftory. The firft and 
 principal part of that fyftem, the amajjing of trea- 
 fure, was not imitated by any one power of the 
 firft rank, — was not even attempted. And though 
 certain forms of military confcription, and parti- 
 cular principles of tadics, may in fome inftances 
 have found imitators, it is neverthclefs an unde- 
 niable fa(9:, that every thing which efTentially 
 charaderizes thefe methods, has remained exclu- 
 fively peculiar to Pruffia. The ftrength of the 
 Pruffian army was in due proportion to the rank 
 and influence univerfally conceded to that ftatc 
 fince the fevcn years war ; nor did it give occalion 
 to any unnatural efforts even among its imme- 
 diate neighbours, much lefs in countries at a dif- 
 tance from it. 
 
 If it be really true, that many governments in 
 the eighteenth century exceeded their ftrength in 
 the efforts they made, the caufe of this evil muft 
 be looked for in more early and lefs remarkable 
 revolutions. The origin of the extenfive mili- 
 
 D. tary
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 tary fyflem, and, of courfe, of all the confc- 
 quences refulting from it, is to be found iu 
 France. The mighty armies, the briUiant admi- 
 niflration, the fplendid enterprifes, the refources, 
 and the fyflem of finance of Louis XIV. were 
 models for all the flates of Europe. At the time 
 of the elevation of Prullia, the fyftem founded by 
 Louis XIV. had arrived at maturity ; the great 
 outlines were laid down which every nation was 
 obliged to fill, in order to' maintain its import- 
 ance in the general fyflem. It is the mofl re- 
 markable circumflance in the fateof Pruffia, that 
 (he was exalted by the fuperior genius of one man, 
 to a fltuation which feemed to have been origi- 
 nally denied to her. As foon as fhe had attained 
 this place, there no longer remained any choice 
 with refpect to her future conduct ; fhe was com- 
 pelled to find the means of maintaining it in a 
 laflingand honourable manner. 
 
 But if we take a more comprehenfive view of 
 this fubjecSt, we fhall find ourfelves much in- 
 clined to acquit even Louis XIV. of the greater 
 part of thofe reproaches which the fhortlighted- 
 nefs of the prefent age has fo abundantly heaped 
 upon him. It was not Louis XIV. but the natu- 
 ral courfe of things, that produced thofe great 
 armies — that enlarged fyflem of adminiflration— 
 thofe extenfive political plans. They were ne- 
 
 cefTary
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 ceiTary'dbnfequences of the progrefs of civil fo- 
 cietv- In proportion to the advancement of ci- 
 vilization of induftry and riches among nations^ 
 the meafure of their wants, their defires, their 
 expenfes, their domeftic and public exiftence, is 
 increafed ; the fphere of their activity, their pro- 
 penlity to extend their limits, the ambition and 
 the power of their governments, are enlarged- A 
 rich individual has more fervants, more houfes, 
 more horfes, more plans, and more caprices than 
 a poor one ; a rich and cultivated people have 
 more public inftitutions, more minifters of flate, 
 more loldiers, more luxury, and a greater fpirit 
 of entcrprife, than one which is poor and unci- 
 "vilized. This is all in the natural order of things. 
 There may, no doubt, exifl: in the mofl opulent 
 nation, a dangerous difproportion between the 
 means and the will ; between the flrength and 
 the defires of fuch a people ; and, efpecially, 
 the military force, that great inflrument of influ- 
 ence and dominion, may be out of all propor- 
 tion to its foundation — the population and reve- 
 nues of the country. But, whatever particular 
 infiances may be adduced of the tranfgreffion of 
 thefe rules of proportion, and of the errors of 
 fome governments ; there was, on the whole, no 
 fuch difproportion to be feen in general at the 
 commencement of the revolution. The military 
 force had advanced in a degree, and to a ftate, 
 D 2 coinciding
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 coinciding with the progrefs of fociety. The fud- 
 den aggrandizement, the influence, and the ex- 
 ample of the kingdom of PrufTia, did not pufh 
 them beyond their, juft and natural limits. In 
 all human probability, the armies of the remain- 
 ing nations would have been no fmaller, their 
 fyilems of finance no lefs complicated, the rela- 
 tions between their efforts and their firength no 
 other than they adually were, had this new me- 
 teor never rifen in the political firmament of 
 Europe. ■ 
 
 The elevation of Pruffia has therefore, in na 
 refpcdt, been productive of pernicious confe- 
 quences. It has in no fhape tended to fubvert 
 the fyftem eflablifhed by the treaty of Weftpha- 
 lia. As to the firft fundamental objedt of this 
 treaty, the internal conflitution of the empire, fo 
 far has it been from deflroying it, that it has, on 
 the contrary, more tlmn ever confirmed and fe- 
 cured it. With regard to the next principal ob- 
 je6l which it had in view, the relations between 
 France and Germany ; it has occafioned no olher 
 changes in thefe, than fuch as were generally be- 
 neficial, and not eflentially prejudicial to France ; 
 fuch as France herfelf delired, and contributed to 
 effect by her own political meafurcs. It is equally 
 untrue, that Pruflia has diflurbed the general ba- 
 lance of Europe : Ihc has only kept pace with 
 
 the
 
 (. 37 ) 
 
 the continual progrefs made by other nations, 
 without forcibly or unnaturally hafiening it ; 
 Ihe has only difplayed in a peculiar degree, the 
 art of making this progrefs with more regularity, 
 more order, and more firmncfs than others, per- 
 haps than any others engaged in the fame career. 
 
 If after all this we confider, that Pruffia, from 
 the moment when fhe was firmly eftabliflied, be- 
 came a bulwark to all the weft of Europe, again ft 
 the attempts of Ruflia, and a ncceflary counter- 
 balance to that empire, after its intervention in 
 the general affairs of Europe ; that a power fo 
 happily fituated in the centre of the reft, and in 
 ihc midft of their principal connexions, pre- 
 sented a conftant barrier to every violent ufurpa- 
 tion ; that if the fafety of France could require 
 any additional fupport, it received a new one 
 from the elevation of Pruffia ; that the powers 
 of Europe, if duly fenfible of their true and 
 common intcrefls, muft have found it neceffary 
 to create fuch a ftate, if fate or genius had not an- 
 ticipated them ; if we further conftder what exten- 
 five benefit has been produced during half a cen- 
 tury, by the influence of a nation governed 
 with fo much energy and wifdom, with refpecl to 
 the general cultivation of mankind, induftr}-, 
 literature, the art of government, and every thing 
 exalted and valuable among men ; and whatufe- 
 D 3 fill
 
 ( 3S ) 
 
 ful leflbns, what glorious examples, it has afforded 
 to its cotemporaries, and to pofterity : — it will 
 not be ealy to conceive how the elevation pf 
 Pruffia can ever be ranked among the immediate, 
 or even collateral caufes of the decay and difor- 
 ganization of Europe. 
 
 The third great event, which, according to the 
 Author, invaded the fyftem eftablifhed by the 
 treaty of Weftphalia, and at length totally fub- 
 verted it, was the prodigious increafe of the com- 
 mercial and colonial fyftem in all parts of the 
 world. 
 
 This event (if that may properly be called an 
 event, which is in reality no more than a gradual 
 and ftill progreliiveexpanfion of human activity) 
 has affected the interefts of fociety, more than 
 any other which has taken place in the political 
 world lince the treaty of Weftphalia. It has 
 opened an immenfe field to the induftry, the arts, 
 the ideas, the enjoyments, and the paflions of 
 mankind : it has multiplied the inftruments of 
 power, the combinations of politics, and the ob- 
 je6ls of defire ; and by adding to the charm and 
 fplendour of dominion, it has been the caufe of 
 jealoufies, difleniions, and, doubtlefs, of wars. 
 It has even been the groundwork in the interior 
 of flates, of a great revolution in all the relations 
 
 of
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 of foc'iety. The only queftion is, whether, con- 
 fidering all this in the moft comprehenfive point 
 of view, it will appear to be an evil ; and parti- 
 cularly, whether the maintenance of a political 
 balance in Europe, is abfolutely incompatible with 
 all thefe changes ; whether the exiting political 
 conftitution muft neceffarily have been fubvcrted 
 by the increafed commercial and colonial fyfiem ; 
 whether it really was fo, and whether the exten- 
 lion of European commerce, and the multiplica- 
 tion of trans -European connexions, led to the 
 decay and diforganization of all nations, and 
 finally paved the way for their future fubjec- 
 tion. 
 
 I fhall only here examine the general relations 
 of this queftion : the Author has entered upon it 
 with a view almoft exclulively to Efigland, which 
 has given him an opportunity of introducing at 
 the beginning of his book, in a very ingenious 
 and brilliant manner, his favourite theme : — 
 *' That during the laft 150 years, England has 
 " oppreffed the induflry of all other countries, 
 " has threatened their independence, and en- 
 " couraged their mutual diflenfions ; and that, 
 '* in facl, the only danger which menaces Eu- 
 *' rope, arifes from the tyrannical pretentions of 
 *' the commercial politics of Great Britain." 
 He has ufed this favourable opportunity in its 
 utmofl extent. I intend to follow a different me- 
 
 D 4 thod.
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 thod. — The queftlon. What has England hither- 
 to been in the general fyftem of Europe ? What 
 may, or fhould it continue to be ? or (as it has 
 been the cuftom to exprefs it of late) " the pro- 
 blem, How to render the exiflence of the Britifh 
 empire compatible with the interelts and exiitence 
 of the remaining flates?" is, without doubt, one 
 of the moft important which at the prcfent moment 
 can occupy the politician. It is on this account 
 that it appears moft advifable to me, to unite, as 
 much as poffible, under one head, all that relates 
 to this great quefiion, which I Ihall endeavour 
 to comprife and arrange in fome general points 
 of view, in a chapter devoted to the prefent rela- 
 tions of the leading powers. I promife, how- 
 ever, in the mean time, not to pafs over a iinglc 
 obfervation of any confequence made by the 
 Author; nor to leave unexamined any argu- 
 ment to be found in his work. 
 
 It is my opinion, that theextenlion of the com- 
 mercial and colonial fyftera cannot have been a 
 necejfary caufe of the fubverfion of the federal 
 conftiUition of Europe, and that it could only 
 have proved the accidental caufe of fuch a fub- 
 verfion, by means of accidental errors or mif- 
 fortunes, which might in any other circum- 
 ftances have been made or experienced. This 
 refts upon the following grounds : 
 
 I ft.
 
 ( 41 ) 
 
 I ft. The commercial and colonial fyftem has 
 not dilbrdered the fundamental articles of the 
 treaty of Weftphalia. This point, after what has 
 been faid in the preceding pages, will not re- 
 quire an elaborate inveitigation. The ground- 
 work of the German constitution was hardly in 
 any refpedl affected by the extenlion of the fyf- 
 tem of commerce ; neither did it occalion any 
 important alteration in the relations between 
 France and Germany. The new relations which 
 it created, were all of them fuch as had never 
 been thought of at the treaty of Weltphalia ; 
 fuch as were then neither forefeen nor conjec- 
 tured ; and fuch as in every refpedl were beyond 
 the fphereof the fyftem of public law, eflablifli- 
 ed by that treaty. Of thefe unavoidable cir- 
 cumftances, thofe only can complain who eon- 
 lider the treaty of Weftphalia as the foundation 
 of a general federal conftitution, which it never 
 was, nor ever could be. That which it did 
 really eftablifh, remained entire to the end of 
 the eighteenth century ; but it was not in hu- 
 man wifdom to make regulations for what did 
 pot exift at the time. 
 
 2d. The extenfion of the commercial and 
 colonial fyflem was not the immediate effed of 
 the avarice or ambition of any particular Eurov 
 pean ftatej it was a general, neceffary, and 
 
 unavoidable
 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 unavol'dable refult of the expanlian of the 
 human mind : and every event derived from 
 that iburce, muft be, in feme way, compatible 
 with the oljjecis of focial exiftence, and of 
 courfe with the maintenance and fecurity of a 
 federal coi^fiitution and a law of nations. 
 
 I am here engaged in the difcuffion of a 
 particular objecl, and not writing a general 
 hiflory of human nature. But whoever has 
 thoroughly inveftigated this fubje61, will readily 
 allow mc, that, in a flate of fociety, the 
 different branches of human adivity are gra- 
 dually and fucceffively developed, each at its 
 proper period ; that when agriculture and ma- 
 nufacSlures have arrived at a certain degree of 
 perfe61ion, the defire of foreign commerce is 
 naturally awakened ; that although the obje6l 
 of this propenfity may be retarded or accelerated 
 by adverfe or favourable circumflances, the 
 perfevering aflivity of mankind will fooner 
 or later accomplifh it ; that it will at length 
 gain accefs to diflant and unexplored regions, 
 and fucceed in its unremitted endeavours to 
 conne6l all the parts of the earth ; that the pro- 
 duce of remote countries becomes a new fpur to 
 induftry, and induftry, fo excited, explores and 
 cultivates thofe lands; fo that the productions of 
 new regions operate to incrcafc the ad^ivity and 
 
 to
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 to multiply the commercial relations of the old ; 
 that this gives new life even to the interior of the 
 more civilized countries, and multiplies the ob- 
 je(5ls of traffic ; that induftry produces riches, and 
 riches reproduce induftry ; and thus commerce 
 at length becomes the foundation and the ce- 
 ment of the whole fecial edifice. 
 
 This is not determined by the prefumption or 
 caprice of man ; it is founded on the eternal 
 order of human nature, and is the effedl of that 
 irreliflible impulfe, by which every great and 
 beneficial change, every truly univerfal and im- 
 portant event in the hiftory of mankind, is pro- 
 duced. To this principle we muft refer not 
 only the origin but the progrefs and extenfion of 
 commerce. Hence too the important difcovery 
 of America ; for we may confidently afTert, that 
 it could not ultimately have efcaped mankind, 
 had it not been accomplifhed fo early by the ad- 
 venturous fpirit of a few extraordinary and en- 
 terpriling men*. Hence the fyftem of com- 
 merce and colonization, with all its adlual and 
 pofiible ramifications and extent. Hence the 
 independence of remote climes, not created nor 
 cultivated for us only, and the new fources of 
 opulence to which Europe is invited by their 
 
 * Vide Note C. 
 
 freedom
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 freedom and independence. Hence too humanity 
 will hereafter derive many invaluable bleffings, 
 will behold many a Iplendid aera, if the free dif- 
 play of this adive principle be not checked by 
 blind authority, and if human ingenuity do not 
 afpire to be wifer than Divine Providence. 
 
 Tf we confider the fubjecf^ in this point of 
 view, which to me appears the only proper one, 
 we fhall not eafily be perfuaded to attribute the 
 origin or the extenfion of the fyftem of com- 
 merce to any particular law of any iingle ftate, 
 or to any individual, be it Cromwell or Colbert, 
 whom hatred or partiality fhall fix upon. Ad- 
 hering to the plan which I have propofed to 
 myfelf, it will be the province of a fubfequent 
 chapter to prove, and I hope there to prove 
 moll latisfadlorily, that<the Englifh Navigation 
 AcV is neither the only nor the principal caufe of 
 the commercial greatnefs of England ; that this 
 celebrated law is not rightly underflood, when 
 juppofed to be creative, fince its nature is, in fadV, 
 reftrictive ; that it is in no wife unjuft, tyran- 
 nical, or hoftilc towards other nations ; and 
 that, when judged upon the true principles of 
 commercial right and policy, it is nothing like 
 *' the foundation of a continued confpiracy, and 
 an eternal warfare a gain ft the induUry of all other 
 
 countries."
 
 ( 45 ) 
 
 countries." I will return at prefcnt to my gene* 
 ral reafoning. 
 
 If it be true that the fyfrem of commerce and 
 colonization was one of the fruits deflincd to 
 grow and ripen in the foil of fociety, the roots 
 of this fyftem ran ft be fomehow counecled 
 with thofe of the whole focial conftitution. 
 The natural propenlities of man, particularly 
 thofe of which the general and conftant influ- 
 ence determines the fate of fociety, are fcldom 
 tound in contradiction to each other. That 
 there fhould be any great fpring of human ac- 
 tion in its nature inimical to fociety; tending to 
 involve nations in endlefs hoftility ; to fubvert 
 the law of nations, and even render its exift- 
 ence irapoffible ; and finally to bring about the 
 decay and ruin of empires ; would be ex- 
 tremely unnatural, and is therefore very much 
 to be doubted. The fyfiem of commerce, with 
 all its errors, cocld not produce fuch efFedls, 
 and in fa61: never has : that in ibme inftances it 
 ]»as been the caulc of wars, is certain ; but what 
 lias not been the caufe of war ? That it has 
 fometrmes created difcord in the federal confti- 
 tution of Europe, will not be denied ; but can 
 ilich a conflitutron be cxpe61ed to exift without 
 periodical difturbances ? Upon the whole, the 
 fyllem of commerce, with all its confcquences, 
 
 the
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 the pre-eminent riches of Tome countries, their 
 naval power, their foreign poflTeflions, and their 
 new influence (difproportioned to the extent 
 of their European territory), had adapted 
 itlelf exceeding!}' weii to the former focial rela- 
 tions of Europe ; and if extraordinary and un- 
 expetHied convulfions had not, from the year 
 1789, fhaken tlie whole edifice to its foundations, 
 and loofened every part of it, the queftion, 
 Does there Itill exili a law of nations ? would pro- 
 bably, at this time, have been abfurd, notwith- 
 Itanding all the changes occationed or haftened 
 by that fyflem. This will, I hope, appear more 
 plainly from the obfervations that will follow in 
 the next Part of the work, in which the fituation 
 of Europe, at the commencement of the French 
 revolution, will be more particularly difcuffed. , 
 
 5dly. The influence of the commercial and 
 colonial fyftem was not confined to any particu- 
 lar countries ; all of them were more or lefs 
 engaged in it. 
 
 The European eflablifhments in all quarters 
 of the world, which neceflarily promoted the 
 extension of commerce and induftry, were very 
 far from being a monopoly in the hands of the 
 nations immediately interefted in them. They 
 were a general advantage, of which, by degrees, 
 2 every
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 every country in Europe received its fhare. 
 Thofe which, by their litLiation and habits, were 
 devoted to navigation, were the firft to enjoy 
 thefe advantages; but however deiirous they 
 might have been of preferving them exclulivcly, 
 the natural courfe of things prefenled infur- 
 mountable obilacles to the accomplifhment of 
 fuch vvifiies. The vent of their produce 
 awakened on every lide, and in the moH inland 
 parts of the continent, the fame activity, the 
 fame delires, and the fame arts as thofe which 
 flimulated, infpired, and affified the maritime 
 ftates in their undertakings. Thefe nations were 
 even fometimcs, as in the examples of Spain 
 and Portugal, only the channel, between whofe 
 uncultivated and unfruitful banks the enlivening 
 ftream of induilry and riches flowed to happier 
 regions. The condition of focicty was in 
 every refpecfl: advanced and refined. With the 
 wealth and improvement of individuals, the 
 fum of thofe means and refources which confti- 
 tute the ftrength of nations, was increafed. AU 
 countries were benefited ; but all nearly in the 
 fame proportion. The whole became more rich, 
 more powerful, and more civilized; but the 
 proportions between the component parts re- 
 mained the fame. 
 
 I do
 
 ( 4^ ) 
 
 1 do not mean to alfert, that this partlcipatldil 
 of advantages ariling from the fyflem of com- 
 merce and colonization, amounted to an abfo-' 
 lute equality among all the parties concerned. 
 The progrefs muft naturally have been greater 
 and more rapid in thofe countries where the new 
 feeds of induftry, commerce, and riches found 
 a foil prepared to receive them ; or, where a fa- 
 vourable iituation, the difpoiitions and capacities 
 of the inhabitants, or the peculiarities of their 
 civil and political conflitution, promoted theit 
 growth in a more remarkable degree. The con- 
 fequences of the general change were certainly 
 more perceptible in France than in Germany, in 
 England and Holland, than in Ruffia or Poland; 
 and the effects produced on the proportions of 
 their national ftrength, muft have operated 
 more rapidly and immediately in the former than 
 the latter. That thefe inequalities (hould diflurb 
 the general balance, is an effe^l which the fyflem 
 of commerce only has in common with every other 
 caufe of focial improvement. No federal con- 
 flitution on earth can preferve the ftates which 
 compofe it during centuries exa(5lly in their origi- 
 nal relative lituations. No federal conflitution 
 can enfure an unaltered continuance of the pre- 
 cife mafs of refpeclive flrength, which was the 
 groundwcrlc of its formation, or even the pre- 
 fervatior. of the fame proportions in the exteijr 
 3 iion
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 lion of that mafs* Even if the fyftem of com- 
 merce had never exifted, the varieties of na- 
 tional charader and indultry^ the different con- 
 llitutions of the llates of Europe, and many ac- 
 cidental circumftances, would have created a di- 
 ver/ity in their feveral attainments ; and accord- 
 ingly the machine of government, which always 
 follows the progrefs of individuals, would have 
 been more or lefs complete in each. Foreign 
 trade was only one of the many and various fprings 
 which fet this great machine in motion. If com- 
 merce, with all its attendant benefits, had remain- 
 ed the exclufive property of a few ftates ; and had 
 thefe favoured nations alone attained to a higher 
 degree of civilization and wealth, and acquired 
 defpotic influence in the fate of Europe, while 
 other countries continued in barbarifm, poverty, 
 and relative weaknefs ; it would then, perhaps, 
 have been allowable to fay, that the colonial 
 fyftem had fubrerted the federal conftitution of 
 Europe. But lince the cafe is otherwife ; lince, 
 in the extenfive fcene of a61ivil y, induflry, and 
 opulence, which the progrefs of commerce has 
 difplayed, no (tate v/hatever has remained an 
 idle fpecTtator ; fince all have taken a lively 
 part in it, and all have been in a great, 
 though, perhaps, not altogether equal meafure, 
 gainers by it ; it is not pofTible that this fvfrem 
 
 E fhould
 
 ( 5° ) 
 
 ihould have been a caufe of the general dtczy, 
 or total difTolution of the federative conftitu- 
 tion. 
 
 4thly. Even the fiipcrior advantage accruuig 
 from the immediate pofleffiou of commerce and 
 colonies, was divided among feveral nations, 
 and therefore efrablifhed in the general balance 
 of Europe, a new and diftindl balance of the 
 maritime and commercial flates. 
 
 Nations enabled to for.nd colonies, and mo- 
 nopolize their commerce ; to carry on an ex- 
 tenlive navigation, and to fupply the neigh- 
 bouring ftates with the productions of the re- 
 moteft parts of the earth, mutt have derived a 
 more direcSt, and of courfe a greater benefit 
 from the tVftem of commerce and colonization, 
 under circumttances othervvife equal, than thole 
 excluded bv the nature of their fituation from 
 luch undertakings. The fate of Spain and 
 Portugal fufficiently evinces that this rule is not 
 without exceptions ; for they poflefled the 
 fmeft colonies in the world, and yet fell into a 
 Itate of poverty and decay unknown to any 
 other continental power ; which fliows, that the 
 advantages of commerce and colonization are 
 only conditional, depending on the induftry, 
 morals, legillation, and polity of the mother- 
 country.
 
 ( 5- ) 
 
 country. But where it is eitabliilied under a 
 wholefome government, and fupported by the 
 native induftry, the characler, and civil con- 
 ftitution of the country ; there the fyftem of 
 commerce is foon produ6live of ftriking ad- 
 vantages. Had all thefe favourable circumftances 
 been united in a iingle nation, it would necef- 
 farily have attained an extraordinary, and per- 
 haps dangerous pre-eminence ; but they were 
 fortunately polTefled by feveral at once, and 
 particularly by three, France, England, and 
 Holland. 
 
 It is a circumftance fomewhat extraordinary, 
 that a French writer fliould fpeak. of the fyftem, 
 of commerce and colonization in terms as if it 
 had only benefited other nations, to the preju- 
 dice of France ; as if England alone had derived 
 advantages from it, to the detriment of the reft 
 of Europe ; and as if his own country had not 
 been one of the moft fuccefsful in the acquifition 
 of all thofe advantages. If the pofTeffion of 
 colonies, and the habits of commerce, have dis- 
 turbed the general balance of Europe, it can- 
 not have done this in a manner unfavourable to 
 France, who had a principal fhare in that com- 
 merce ; but, on the contrary, to her advan- 
 tage, and unfavourably for the remaining ftates 
 of the continent. I will fay oothing here of the 
 s 2 trade
 
 ( 5i ) 
 
 trade to the Levant, always (o large a fburce of iii- 
 duftry and riches to France ; bat France ruled in 
 the Eail Indies till the middle of the eighteenth 
 century, and even retained, wlien that domi- 
 rvion had ceafed, fome valua))le polTeffions- 
 there ; France pollefled the finelt and moll 
 fertile provinces on the continent of America ; 
 France is, even at this day, in the poflTeffion of 
 the bell: of all the iflands in the Weft Indies, 
 which, hi the year 1789, was equal in value to 
 the reft of the Antilles taken together. It is 
 indeed true, that the advantage derived from 
 thefe great poflcffions, was not always equal to 
 their importance, and that falfe principles and 
 errors of adminiftration, as well as unfortunate 
 wars, confiderably diminifhed their value. But 
 France, neverthelefs, long remained the firft, 
 and always continued to be the Iccond commer- 
 cial and maritime f^ate.in Europe : there was no 
 fca unfrequented by her velfcls ; no coaft unoc- 
 cupied by her fat'H.ories and efiablifhments ; no 
 branch of any contequence in the whole fpherc 
 of commerce, in which fhe did not vie with the 
 other maritime nations. Her navy was Ibme- 
 timcs reduced to a comparative infignificancy ; 
 but it always recovered itlclf again j and only 
 ten years before the revolution, had arrived at 
 fuch a pitch of grcatnefs as to be able to cop« 
 with that of England. Her commerce with all 
 'sm ■ ■ ^ J. parts
 
 ( 53 ) 
 
 parts of the world was lb fiourifliing, and the 
 profits of it fo great, that the quantity of fpecie 
 in circulation generally exceeded the wants of 
 the country ; and St. Domingo alone, upon the 
 refpedable authority of Mr. Neckar, did not 
 add lets than feventy millions per annum to the 
 balance in bullion. Surely a man has no juft 
 ground of complaint againft the lyftem of com- 
 merce and colonization, who belongs to a nation 
 deriving fuch extraordinary advantages from it. 
 
 It is not here worth while to inquire whether 
 the ignorance or the avarice of individuals in 
 other countries may have made them look with 
 an evil eye on this liate of things ; but it is cer- 
 tain, that no enlightened perfon in Europe 
 could have envied France the advantages fhe 
 enjoyed. That the commerce of the world 
 fhould be divided between three, nearly equally 
 favoured nations, was the moli: fortunate cir- 
 cumftance the others could have defircd : it 
 enfured to them an extcnfive competition ; it 
 occafioned variety and ad:ivity in the relations 
 of commerce ; it provided, in the molt natural 
 mariner, againft that abufe of power, which 
 might have been favoured by the undivided fway 
 of a fingle nation. No one will entertain a 
 doubt, but that, had it not been for the rcvolu- 
 tion^ this beneficial competition would not 
 
 E -2 cafilv
 
 < 54 ) 
 
 cafily have been deftroyed; it would have 
 lafled ; it would have been ftill luriher im- 
 proved ; and nothing but the fhocks which 
 France has experienced in the ruin of her mo- 
 rarchy, could have annihilated it, as they have 
 done for a time. 
 
 5thly. The ftrength which fome countries 
 derived from the fyftem cf commerce and colo- 
 nization, produced a new weight in the general 
 balance, to be occalionally oppofed with advan- 
 tage to the preponderance of any continental 
 nation. 
 
 The federal conftitution of nations can never 
 be fo completely organized, fo carefully and ex- 
 actly balanced, as to prevent every attempt to 
 deftroy the equilibrium and opprefs the reft, 
 on the part of powers invited by favourable 
 circumflances, or impelled by enterpriiing 
 princes. In thefe periods of danger, it is for- 
 tunate for the political fyllem, if there exifls a 
 counterbalance of a diftin<5l nature, which may 
 be ufed to counteract the dangers of the federal 
 conflitution, and which, by a proper application, 
 mav reiift the attempts of an ambitious power 
 \ipon the fecurity and independence of its neigh- 
 bours. 
 
 A couri'i
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 A counterbalance of tliis nature was formed 
 as early as the end of the feventeenth century by 
 England and Holland, in conlequence of the 
 progrefs of the commercial fyftcm. Tlieie two 
 nations, that could not then vie with any of the 
 principal flates of the continent, in extent of 
 territory, population, or military force, acquired 
 a degree of influence and importance by their 
 riches and naval ftrength, that enabled them to 
 make head againft the moft powerful. They 
 more than once defended and maintained the 
 balance, when Europe had rcafon to tremble for 
 its fafety. I fhall here only mention the reign 
 of Lewis XIV. and particularly the time which 
 elapfed between the treaties of Nimeguen and of 
 Ryflwick ; partly becaufe that period prcfents a 
 moil remarkable and inftru(5tive example, and 
 partly becaufe it has pleafed the Author to ad- 
 duce this very example in illuflration of his 
 opinions refpecfting the prejudicial influence of 
 the maritime ftates, 
 
 His reafoning on the fubjecl of the league of 
 Auglburg in 1686, would induce us to believe, 
 that the founder of that league only ibught, 
 wantonly, and without caufe, to diilurb the 
 peace of Europe ; to weaken the French mo- 
 narchy ; and, by uniting England and Holland, 
 to concentrate in his own hands, all the fprings 
 
 14 of
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 of that preponderating naval ftrength, which, as 
 the Author exprefles himfelf, " had rendered his 
 former country (o dangerous to Europe." 
 
 This reprefentation of the cafe appears to me 
 not lefs arbitrary than new : it is certainly at va- 
 riance with all former opinions concerning the 
 relations and events of that time. Whether the 
 Prince of Orange was influenced in fecret by in- 
 terefted views, when he brought about the coa- 
 lition of Augiburg ; whether the defire of af- 
 cending the throne of England, or perfonal en- 
 mity to the King of France, were the true mo- 
 tives of his conducl ; arequeftions not to be dif- 
 culTed in this place. We have nothing to do with 
 the raeafure of his private worth ; we are con- 
 fidering the public merit and political good ef- 
 fects of his actions. To affert that the tendency 
 and refult of his plans, the able and perfevering 
 oppofition which he made to Lewis XIV. under- 
 mined the fecurity of the federal fyftem, and 
 fowed the feeds of anarchy and diforder, is no 
 lefs paradoxical, than it is abfurd to fay, that the 
 maritime power of Holland was ever dangerous 
 to Europe. 
 
 We need only throw a ha fly glance upon the 
 circumfiances under whicli the league of Augf- 
 burg was formed, to difcover the object and 
 
 the
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 the nature of that league ; completely explained 
 by the hiltory of its origin. Lewis XIV. had not 
 only threatened, but adlually violated the inte- 
 grity of all his neighbours. He had invaded the 
 Netherlands, only eight years after the peace of 
 the Pyrenees, and fecured a contiderable part of 
 his conquefls by the treaty of Aix, which nothing 
 hut the fear of the triple alliance between Eng- 
 land, Holland, and Sweden, induced him to ac- 
 cede to. He had immediately after that, under 
 a pretext fiill more futile, commenced a war 
 againlt Holland, by which that flourifhing re- 
 public was reduced to the brink of ruin. The 
 treaty of Nimeguen increafed his dominions, 
 liis influence, and the terror of his name in 
 Europe : but this was not fufficient for his ambi- 
 tion ; he w as a conqueror in the midft of peace : 
 by judicial fentences he adjudged to himfelf lands, 
 cities, and the right of fovereignty ; explained 
 the treaty of Weftphalia according to his own 
 opinion, and forced the town of Strafburg to 
 capitulate. Such was his condu6l towards the 
 Emperor, the Empire, Spain, the Italian princes ; 
 and thus did he force all his neighbour?, what- 
 ever might otherwife be their principles or opi- 
 nions, to feik protedlion in common mealurcs, 
 againft a common enemy. 
 
 \ 
 
 By
 
 ( 58 ) 
 
 By proceedings of another, thongli not lefs 
 odious nature, he awakened the fpirit of rehgion, 
 ib powerful at that time in a conlidcrable part of 
 Europe. The revocation of the edi6l of Nantes, 
 and the cruel perfecution of the Proteftants, ex- 
 cited the greateft anger and abhorrence in all 
 Proteitant countries ; England and Holland, ef- 
 pccially, took the alarm ; they beheld the French 
 nionarch armed with double terrors ; one com- 
 mon ruin threatened their independence and their 
 religion ; and William of Orange became what 
 his anceftors had formerly been, the hero and 
 guardian angel of religious and political liberty. 
 
 Under thefe auipices the league of Augfburg 
 was formed ; and if ever the conducl, the plans, 
 and the progrcfs of any power, could juftify the 
 reft in making preparations in common for the 
 lafety of the whole, that league was juftified. 
 'I'he confederates, moreover, confined themlelves 
 |lri6lly to the real and juft objeA of their truly 
 defenfive alliance. The maintenance of the 
 treaty of Wefiphalia was the bafis of all their 
 conferences ; the only aim which they had in 
 view, was to compel France to be juft. 
 
 Tlic Emperor, many of the princes of the Em- 
 pire, the King of Spain, the Duke of Savoy, all 
 en2"a^cd in this confederacv. Thele, for the 
 
 moi\
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 mod part Catholic princes, were affembled under 
 the itandard of a Proteftant Stadt holder of Hol- 
 land ; of a prince who was on the point of driving 
 the Catholic line of the Houfe of Stuart from tlie 
 throne of England. Thel'e fa6ls are not a little 
 ftrange and furpriling, when we confider the 
 temper of thofe times : but the more the)' are 
 ftraiigeand wonderful, fo much the more Itrongly 
 do they exprefs the danger in which the balance 
 and independence of Europe appeared to tiic 
 allies of the Prince of Orange. It was a confe- 
 deracy dictated by necefiity, and not a matter of 
 choice or inclination. The allies beheld in the 
 perfon of the Stadtholder, the proteclor of their 
 common rights againtt the common enemy; they 
 faw in the Catholic poiTetror of theEnglilh throne, 
 an open or fecret ally of that common enemy. All 
 other confiderations yielded to this important one. 
 They declared themfelves againft the prince who 
 favoured the dilturber of the general balance; 
 they took part with him by whofe prudence and 
 activity they were alTured of its prefervation*. 
 
 That, at that time, ** France alone conduced 
 herfelf in conformity to the tiue principles of the 
 federal fyftem, and the univerfal maxims of the 
 political balance, while all other nations made no 
 fcruplc of violating them," is an airertion that 
 
 ^ Vide Note D. 
 
 requires
 
 ( 6o ) 
 
 requires no refutation ; becaufe, to point out its 
 falfehood in the cleareft manner, it is only necef- 
 fary to mention it ; and becaufe the hiilory of 
 thofe times confutes it in every point. If Lewis 
 XIV. had met with no oppoiition, the treaty of 
 Weftphalia would already have been an empty 
 name at the end of the fame century in which it 
 was formed. To fave the independence and fede- 
 ral conflitution of Europe from total ruin, to pre- 
 ferve and fecure the general balance, was the 
 work and the merit of the coalition of which the 
 Prince of Orange was the founder and director. 
 
 I think I have fufficiently proved that the ex- 
 tenfion of the commercial and colonial fyftem is 
 by no means incompatible with the principles of 
 the federal conftitution of Europe. The nature 
 and chara61er of that fyftem contained no eflen- 
 tial caufe of any dreadful revolution ; and we are 
 taught by experience, that, fo far from having oc- 
 cafioned fuch an one, it has, on the contrary, add- 
 ed fuch power to fome nations, as to form a be- 
 neficial counterpoife ; whereby the federal confti- 
 tution has more than once been defended againft 
 dangers that threatened its fecurity. 
 
 The influence of the fyftem of commerce and 
 colonization in the improvement and aggrandize- 
 ment of the maritime Hates, was not, therefore 
 
 (any
 
 ( 6I ) 
 
 (any more than the elevation of Ruilia and 
 Pruflia), a caufe of the diflblution of the federal 
 union, and of the fubverfion of pubUc law. Thefe 
 three great events of the eighteenth century have 
 had important confequences, but have no connec- 
 tion whatever with thofe affumed by the Author. 
 If the condition of Europe at the breaking out 
 of the French revolution, was really fo defperate 
 as he has painted it, we mult iearch elfcwlierc for 
 the caufe of that misfortune. 
 
 If I have been fuccefsful in attempting to fhow 
 that hiftory does not confirm the Author's alTer- 
 tion of the influence of thofe three events; and 
 that a due confideration of their immediate and 
 remote confequences, will even juftify conclufions 
 almolt dire6lly oppofite to his ; I conceive that I 
 have already made much progrefs againfl: the 
 groundwork of his fyftem : the alTertion, " that at 
 the time of the revolution there no longer ex- 
 iUed a vettige of the law of nations, and that 
 Europe was on es'ery fide in a fiate of the greateft 
 diforder." For if thofe events from which he en- 
 deavours to deduce and explain this iieneral di:or- 
 ganization, neither have had, nor in their nature 
 could have fuch an efibdl ; this erroneous induc- 
 tion gives a very fufplcious appearance to the 
 whole fabric of his reafonino; ; and the well- 
 founded fuppofition arifcs, that thefe facls may 
 
 probably
 
 ( 62 ) 
 
 probably never have exifled at all, which fuch 
 changes in the relations of the pohtical fyftem 
 were incapable of producing. 
 
 But it is now time to meet that firfi: aflertion 
 of his in a more direct manner; it is time to 
 attack it in its leading- points, and to pro- 
 ceed immediately to examine tlie queftion, " In 
 what ftate was the federal fyftem of Europe at 
 the commencement of the French revolution ?" 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Did titer e ex'iji at the Beginning of the French RevO' 
 lution any puhlic Law in Europe ? 
 
 .1 HE Author is not fatisfied with giving a de- 
 cided negative to this queftion. He goes farther, 
 and draws a gloomy and depreffing pidture of 
 the focial conftitution of Europe, in the laft 
 years which preceded the revolution. " It was 
 irapoflible not to obferve" (fuch are the ex- 
 preflions he makes ufe of), *' that there had 
 long fince ccafed to exift any maxims of govern- 
 ment, any federal union, any fixed political 
 principles in Europe ; that an imaginary princi- 
 ple of aggrandizement, in fa6l nothing more 
 
 than
 
 C 63 ) 
 
 than a forcible, unnatural, and deflruclive exer- 
 tion, had fafcinated all governments ; that tbc 
 powers of Europe were involved in general 
 mifery; that bankruptcy flood at the door of 
 every government ; and that a tingle nation, 
 grafping at the riches of all the reft, converted 
 the misfortune of the whole to its own exclufive 
 advantage : that the fame caufes which pro- 
 duced the diforganization of ibciety in France, 
 had fown the feeds of political anarchy through- 
 out the whole of Europe ; that the law of na- 
 tions no longer exifted, except in appearance ; 
 and that the revolution was only a loud and for- 
 mal annunciation of its long-determined diflb- 
 lution." 
 
 It is of the grcatcft Importance that we thould 
 examine carefully every feature of this pidure. 
 If the pencil has here been guided by truth, and 
 if the political liate of Europe, the internal and 
 external relations of all countries, were really 
 fuch ; then the French revolution will appear not 
 only completely explained, but jufti tied, and more 
 than juftified. It would, in that cafe, only be the 
 natural end of a long feriesof evil, thebreakin'^ 
 out, the decifive crifis of a difordcr which had 
 long preyed upon the conftitution offociety; a 
 violent but falutary fever in a body longdifeafed. 
 
 I ' We
 
 ( 64 ) 
 
 We fhould then ceafe altogether to deplore a ro- 
 volution, to which we are indebted for the only 
 chance of recovery remaining; which difcovered 
 to us the abyfs into which we were plunged, and 
 the means of extricating ourfelves ; which has 
 convinced us of the extreme dcfe6\ivenefs of all 
 our former principles of government and maxims 
 of policy ; of all former fyllems of adminiftration 
 and public law. This revolution, then, has been 
 a beneficial and active principle of general reno- 
 vation, " by putting to the proof the little 
 ftrength which yet remained to us." It has 
 fubverted every thing, that all might be ordered 
 anew ; by the fufFerings infli61ed, it has awa- 
 kened a fcntiment of defpair, which ought long 
 before to have exitted for our own fafety ; it has 
 made us acquainted with our fituation, our wants, 
 our dangers, our ftrength, and our means; it has 
 overwhelmed us, in order to rail'e us again to a 
 more exalted flate, and to fecure us for ever 
 againfl. all future errors. 
 
 Such is theafpci'T: of the revolution, as painted 
 bv the Author in the whole train of his reaionincr. 
 iJe has not cxprelTly defcribed it thus ; for it was 
 a part of his plan to pat's over as much as poffible 
 in lilence, the revolution itfelj\ and only to fpeak 
 of the zvar aga'inji the revolution as of a thing 
 altogether diilintSt from and independent of it. 
 
 But
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 But I am induced to conclude, that he conlldered 
 it only, or at leafl principally, in this point of view, 
 by the general courfe of his argument, and by a 
 number of occafional obfervations in different 
 parts of his work ; belides, any one who will 
 affirm that the war ao;ainft the revolution was a 
 neceflary confequence of the difordered ftate of 
 civil fociety, will not, and cannot indeed, with 
 any confiftency, forbear to afcribe the revolution 
 itfelf to the fame fource. 
 
 Of the whole of this account of the caufes and 
 confequences of the revolution, the two following 
 are the only points to which I can affent: ift, 
 there exifted in the internal, focial, and domeftic 
 ftate of moft European countries, and particu- 
 larly of the French monarchy, certain difcord- 
 ances, fuch as might lead to great convulfions, 
 and which, when thofe convulfions did take 
 place, might in general be looked upon, with 
 reafon, as the preparatory caufes of them ; and 
 fccondly, the revolution has had the accidental 
 good effe6\ of difcovering and pointing out, in 
 the cleared: and moft impreffive manner, to 
 all governments, the imperfedlions exifting in 
 their former conftitutions, or in the ancient fede- 
 ration of Europe. 
 
 On
 
 ( 66 ) 
 
 On the other hand, lam convinced, and I truft 
 that all enlightened peribns will now agree 
 with me, that the condition of Europe in the 
 latter times preceding the revolution, was not lb 
 defperate either in a fecial, a domeftic, or a 
 federative point of view, as to lead immediately 
 to violent convulfions, or to render fuch con- 
 vulfions defirable ; that the French revolution, 
 though facilitated, and in that fenfe prepared, 
 by many focial and political difcordances, was by 
 no means a necefTary or unavoidable confequence 
 of the fiate of France, much lefs of Europe ; that 
 this event, with all its dreadful confequences, was 
 occahoned by fome obvious errors of the former 
 French government — was continued and com- 
 pleted by the untimely zeal, the ill-advifed 
 a(5\ivity, the inability, the prefumption, or the 
 vvickednefs of thofe who, in confequence of thefc 
 error?, were intruded with the direcSlion of the 
 public atfairs — and was converted into a principle 
 of dertru6tion for all Europe by the improvident 
 meafures of the fnrrounding nations ; that, far 
 from furthering the improvement of the con- 
 dition of civil and political fociety, this revolu- 
 tion, on the contrary, has interrupted and arrefted 
 its progrels at a moment when it appeared par- 
 ticularly promifing: and that, when confidered in 
 a more extenlive point of view, the greatefl and 
 mo ft lamentable of the evils which accompanied 
 
 it,
 
 ( 6; ) 
 
 it, was this : before the revolution there only 
 needed a few wife reforms in tlie internal confti- 
 tutions of ftates, and fome happy combinations 
 for ameliorating and confirming the federal fyftem, 
 to have raifed Europe to a high degree of pro- 
 fperity and happinefs ; whereas now all the means 
 of attaining to this defired obje6l muft be fought 
 for amidft a heap of ruins, and drawn forth, as it 
 were, from chaos again. 
 
 In this feries of important truths, the principal 
 one is that to which thei^reafoning of our Author 
 immediately conducts us. That we may judge 
 with accuracy what Europe owes to the revolu- 
 tion, we muft, before all things, be acquainted 
 with its lituation when the revolution broke out ; 
 we muft have before our eyes the leading features, 
 at leaft, of the true picture of fociety, as well 
 with relpect to the internal condition of ftates, 
 as with regard to their external relations. 
 
 Very great improvements had been made by all 
 the governments of Europe, in every thing re- 
 lating to the management of public affairs, and 
 the principles of adminiitration, ftnce the middle 
 of the eighteenth century. As the laft remains of 
 the feudal fyftem were abolifhed, the fetters were 
 dcltroyed by which the hands of fovereigns had 
 long been confined and reftrained in the free 
 F 2 exercife
 
 ( 68 ) 
 
 cxerclfe of their authority. The increafing 
 wealth of their ftates prefented new objedls for 
 their adlivity, and frefh incitements to various 
 undertakings ; while, at the fame time, it afforded 
 the means of accomplifhing them. Theprogreffive 
 improvement of the minds of men contributed 
 likewife to the general advancement. It has been 
 afferted, that all the favourable changes brought 
 about in this period, were owing to the labours 
 of public writers. But thefe writers were them- 
 felves, in fadl, the creatures of the general im- 
 provement ; I mean the great mafs of them, thofe 
 who had a wide and extenfive influence on the 
 minds of their cotemporaries ; not thofe men of 
 extraordinary genius, who fometimes burfl, like 
 fplendid meteors, through the deep gloom of an 
 age of barbarifm. The produdlions of genius 
 only become the daily occupation of mankind, 
 and a powerful aid of fecial advancement, when 
 the increafe of wealth has promoted the progrefs 
 of civilization ; when the defire of more refined 
 enjoyments has been awakened ; and, above all, 
 when governments have attained a certain libe- 
 rality of principle, and have been enlightened 
 and improved. 
 
 Without inquiring, however, which was the 
 firfl, or the lafl, in the chain of caufes that pro- 
 duced thcfe great changes, the event is clear and 
 
 undeniable.
 
 ( 69 ) 
 
 iondeniaLlc. There arofe In all the principal {lates 
 without exception, and more or lefs in moil of 
 the fmaller ones, a fpirit of advancement and im- 
 provement, extending to every branch of the pub- 
 lic admin iftration, which the body of the people 
 communicated to the governors, and which tliefe 
 again re-imparted to their fubje61s. The neceffity 
 of a revifal of the exifiing laws, and particularly 
 of the criminal code, was every where felt. 
 Meafures were taken for encouraging induftry, 
 for promoting agriculture, for extending com- 
 merce : while high roads, and canals and 
 plantations, and public edifices of every kind, 
 began to enrich and embellirti all countries. 
 In the place of the ancient fyflem of taxation, 
 often oppreffive and unjuft, much pains 
 were every where beftowed to introduce a 
 more limple and equitable one, Ihowing a 
 better infight into the true fources of wealth 
 and the real fprings of induftry. The employ- 
 ments of civil fociety were every where freed 
 from a number of burdenfome conftraints ; and 
 the beneficial principle of general competition 
 fupplantcd a pernicious monopoly, looked 
 upon, in the infancy of fociety, as the only en- 
 couragement and reward of activity. Exclufive 
 privileges were diminiflied ; inequalities foftened 
 down ; and the advantages of individuals made 
 fubordinate to the good of the whole. The edu- 
 F 2 cation
 
 ( 7° ) 
 
 cation of youth began every whereto be attended 
 to as a great national concern ; to becoaiC an 
 objedl of the care and protedlion of government ; 
 and, by the adoption of more efFe6\ual methods, 
 to be brought nearer to thefphere of pradicallife. 
 
 I am far from intending to affert, that this 
 happy progrefs of fociely was any where as per- 
 fe6l and confiftent as I have here defcribed it. 
 There were flill many dark and uncouth parts 
 in the great pi6lure of the age, from which the 
 obferver turned away with forrow or difguft. 
 There flill appeared frequent traces of barbarifm 
 in the manners, laws, and governments of the 
 mofl: polifhed nations. The abilities and charac- 
 ters of the men in power, were not always pro- 
 portioned to the degree of maturity and refine- 
 ment which their fubjeds had attained, or to 
 which their hopes and endeavours were directed. 
 The impediments likewife arifing from particular 
 circumftances and local relations, which oppofcd 
 the execution of beneficial plans, mud naturally 
 have been more frequent and conliderable 
 in fome countries than in others : but the general 
 tendency of all nations and all governments was 
 directed to a progreffive, perfevering, and fyf- 
 tematic improvement of the ftate of mankind, 
 more than in any other period of ancient or 
 modern hiftory. The good aduallyaccomphfhed, 
 
 was
 
 ( 7- ) 
 
 was not brought about, as in former, even the 
 brighteft and happieU pLriods of antiquity, by ir- 
 regular, partial, infulated, and tranlient mea- 
 fures ; but with order, conliftency, and method ; 
 principles clearly underltood ; having a great and 
 lafting objedl in view ; and compreiiending the 
 interefts of all mankind. 
 
 , The mo A important of the caufes that prepared 
 the dreadful florms which doled the eighteenth 
 century, will be found in this tendency to a 
 general and always progreffive reform, which 
 confiitutes the prominent and diflinguifliing fea- 
 ture of the focial and political charader of the 
 age, efpecially in the laft twenty years before the 
 revolution. Theelements of the defolating tcm- 
 peft were foftered, as in the natural world, in 
 the fame fertilizing atmofphere that gave a rich 
 and wholelbme nourifhment, a rapid and luxu- 
 riant growth, to the nobleit plants in the foil of 
 foclety. The new opinions of the governed com- 
 bined with the altered difpoliiions of the go- 
 vernors, to bring on this dreadful phenotnenon. 
 On the one hand, the confcioufncfs of a higher 
 degree of happinefs and treedorn, ofincreafcd 
 ftrength,andofgreater individual importance, pro- 
 duced a number of wifhcs, defires, and pretentions, 
 hitherto unknown : with the increale of wcahh 
 arofe diicontent ; with freedom, arrogance ; 
 F 4 with
 
 C 7^ ) 
 
 with the progrefs of knowledge, the propenfity 
 to idle and extravagant fpecalations : a fpirit 
 of diforder, of uneafinefs, and cenforioufnefs, 
 was the prevailing temper of all the leading 
 ftates of Europe. On the other hand, thofe. 
 invefted with power, were not always fuffici*> 
 ently cautious and circumfpedt in the reforms 
 and alterations they wifhed to make. They 
 Were too hafty in the execution of their plans ; 
 they ftrained the fprings of power till they 
 rifked their breaking; they irritated the minds 
 of their fubje6ts by rafh and violent meafures ; 
 they increafed the dangerous fermentation of 
 the times, inftead of uling every endeavour t^ 
 appcafe it; they often gave ear to rafh, enthuli- 
 afiic, and even fufpicious counfellors, v^fho,- 
 under the feducSlive pretext of the general good, 
 and of immortal fame, led them by untimely, 
 ill-combined, chimerical proje61s, into a labyrinth 
 of errors and troubles, and brcught them to the 
 brink of ruin. 
 
 It may with truth be aflerted, that fo far as any 
 caufes of the revolutions we have feen, may be 
 afcribed to the condition of civil fociety, they will 
 be found in that very propenfity to improve- 
 ment, that very progrefs towards perfection, 
 which was the pride and merit of the laft cen- 
 tury. Our greatncfs occafioned our fall ; our 
 
 infatiable
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 infatiable defire of advancing was the caufe of 
 our enervation ; our meritorious ambition led to 
 our prefent humiliation. That there no longer ex- 
 ited any maxims of government, any principles 
 of politics in Europe, was not the root of the 
 evil ; no, it was the abufe of thofe maxims and 
 principles in meafures too confident, too rafh 
 and enterprifing, in reforms too fudden and too 
 general at once, in attempts to rife from the 
 fafer paths of experience into regions yet untried 
 of fpeculative politics. It was prefumption, not 
 indolence ; enthuliafm, not averlion to reform ; 
 that involved Europe in all the misfortunes it 
 has fince experienced ; and led to a total difor- 
 ganization, then and then only, when the real 
 authors of thofe calamities received from the 
 accidental errors of a feeble government, the 
 lignal for a general fubverfion. 
 
 This hafty Iketch of the internal ftate of 
 Europe before the revolution, is drawn with 
 more truth than that which the Author has pre- 
 fented us. Every attentive obferver of the pro- 
 grefs and condition of mankind, in the laft 
 twenty years preceding that event, will admit 
 the juilice of it. But, leaving this general rea- 
 foning, we mull now take a hafty view of the 
 map of Europe ; and conlider briefly, the in- 
 ternal ftate of each of its component parts 
 
 during
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 during that period ; in order to fnow, by hiftori- 
 cal fa6ls, that no nation was excluded from 
 this bright career of amelioration and advance—' 
 ment ; and that the fame fpirit, the fame pro- 
 penfity, were every where awakened and ma- 
 nifefted, though not always in the fame manner 
 and degree. 
 
 Russia experienced its fecond political and 
 moral regeneration, under the fceptre of an ex- 
 traordinary woman. The thirty-four years reign 
 of the Emprefs Catherine, was an almofi uninter-^ 
 rupted feries of great and important reforms in 
 the internal flate of her immenfe empire. It 
 requires no extraordinary talents, no extraordi- 
 nary pains, to difcover many unfavourable parts 
 in objedls of fuch ftupendous magnitude as that 
 empire and government ; and, like many mo- 
 dern writers, wholly regardlefs of the true point 
 of view, to reprefent, even now, in the darkeft 
 colours, and perhaps to turn into ridicule, a 
 nation which a hundred years ago was buried in 
 the deepeft barbarifm ; but every candid judge, 
 if he be capable of diltinguifhing how much 
 was attainable, and what means there exifted of 
 attaining it, will confefs that the ilate of Ruffia, 
 from 1780 to 1790, compared with the condi- 
 tion of that empire at the deceafe of Peter the 
 
 Great,
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 Great, prefents a difference truly afioniflilng. 
 The new lyftem of legiflation of the Emprefs, 
 her wife and humane regulations of police, her 
 endeavours to promote induftry, her new ar- 
 rangement of the Ruffian dominions, her mca- 
 fures for enfuring the public fafety, the educa- 
 tion, the improvement, and the health of her 
 fubjedls ; the hofpitals of different kinds which 
 ihe ef^ablifhed for the reception of the fick and 
 poor; the unwearied zeal which fhe difplayed in 
 the fervice of the arts and tciences ; the libera- 
 lity of opinion, the taftc, and refinement in 
 the habits of focial intercourfe diffufed around 
 her throne by the influence of her own accom- 
 plifhed mind: — thefe are not fymptoms of a go- 
 vernment without energy or principles ; are not 
 indications of the decay and fall of nations. 
 Even thofe reftlefs projects of aggrandizement, 
 which rendered the government of Catherine fo 
 dangerous to the rcpofe of Europe, arofe in a 
 great mcafure (though not indeed altogether) 
 from endeavours to carry her work to a degree 
 of perfection, for ^^tiicii the time was not yet 
 arrived. She attempted to fuperfcde the necef- 
 lity of a flow and gradual civilization of her im- 
 menfe empire, by bolder meafures ; Ihe wanted 
 to become a European power in the utmofi ex- 
 tent of the word, and in the fhortcfl way ; her 
 plans were greater than her means ; fhe endea- 
 voured
 
 f 76 ) 
 
 voured to redouble thofe means, that fhe might 
 accomplifh, in a few years, what would, per- 
 haps, in the common courie of things, require a 
 century. The reigning character of the age ap- 
 peared even in her ambition. 
 
 The Austrian monarchy, under the govern- 
 ment of Jofeph II. prefented the remarkable 
 fpe^lacle of a fevere and obftinate conteft be- 
 tween a monarch infpired even to enthufiafra 
 with the fpirit of reform, and nations who re- 
 warded his philanthropic zeal with ingratitude 
 and refinance. The idea of an uniform fyilem 
 of legiflation, of one common adminiftration, for 
 a fiate corapofed of fo many heterogeneous parts, 
 was indeed more like a philofophic dream, than 
 a rational and practicable fyftem of govern- 
 ment. But, however blameable, this evidently 
 proceeded from an excefs of praife worthy in- 
 tentions, and was no fign of indifference to good. 
 Thofe men whofe interefts were connedled 
 with the maintenance of ancient abufes, cried 
 down the fyftem of the Emperor ; but all en- 
 lightened perfons admired iti' Pofterity, more 
 juft, will at all events admire him. Many 
 errors and much harm refulted from the hafti- 
 nefs of his condu6t, which fometimes degene- 
 rated into violence and feverity. Many of the 
 complaints of his fubje^ts were well founded; 
 2 he
 
 ( 77 ) 
 
 he more than once facrificed to his fpeculatlve 
 ideas of reform, the refpev5l due to exifting 
 rights and confecrated prejudices, which fre- 
 quently border on the moft foHd truths, and 
 hold by the moft refpe6labie feehngs. But his 
 undertakings were often marked with the flamp 
 of true wiiciom, and fometimes produced noble 
 and lafting fruit. His name has been glorioiifly 
 immortalized by many very important reforms 
 in the religious, legiflative, and domestic con- 
 dition of his dominions, by many excellent ella- 
 blifhments for public education, for the inter- 
 nal police, for the fupport and care of the poor 
 and lick, and for the improvement of induftry 
 in the ftates he governed. It is a very remark- 
 able circumftance, that all difturbances which 
 arofe in different parts of this monarchy, and 
 efpecially the ferious events in Hungary and the 
 Netherlands, were excited by the too hafty exe- 
 cution of his benevolent intentions, by the im- 
 petuolity of a mind too ardent in the purluit 
 of the nobleft objects of humanity, by the 
 boldnefs of his proje6ts of reform. If fate had 
 permitted his fucceffor, whofe mild and peace- 
 able difpofition appealed every difturbancc, and 
 won the hearts of men at the very beHnnine; of 
 his reign, to finifh the work undertaken by his 
 brother; if he who exalted Tufcany to be the 
 feat of true political wifdom, had been allowed to 
 
 tranfport
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 tratiTport his excdlent adminlilration to a more 
 exteniive theatre ; if no French revolution had 
 arreited the progrets of improvement, and 
 blafted the bloflbms of fo many hopes, what 
 might not the Auitrian monarchy, under the 
 government of Leopold and his fuccelTor, have 
 attained to ? 
 
 The achievements of Frederick II. have been 
 too much the obje6ts of general obfervation, 
 too often the fubjed of the mofl admired au- 
 thors, not to render it unnecelTary for me to 
 dwell much upon them in this place. The 
 world, affli6ted and almoft exhaufted with con- 
 tinued wars, beheld the military talents of this 
 extraordinary genius with difmay. It was his 
 good fortune, by the fcrvice he rendered during 
 twenty-three years of peace, to efface that im- 
 prelllon. In that ever memorable period the 
 kingdom of Prussia became a noble example of 
 order, regularity, and energy ; of fruitful in- 
 duftry, admirable cultivation, and true civil 
 liberty*: nor was the edifying example of this 
 kingdom unprodu(5live of good effects to others. 
 More than one of the German princes imitated 
 the fyftem of government adopted by Frede- 
 rick. Germany, in general, made remarkable 
 
 * Vide Note E. 
 
 ' advances
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 advances in every branch of public v^eltare, be- 
 tween the end of the feven years war, and the 
 bc";innin£r of the French revolution. With the 
 
 C3 to 
 
 exception of a few ftates, kept back by the dif- 
 ficulties of a general reform, or by the indo- 
 lence of their rollers, the improvements in ad- 
 miniilration, held up by Pruflia in the north, 
 and by Aufiria in the fouth, to the imitation of 
 their neighbours, were every where viiible in 
 their effects. It is only neceflary to advert to the 
 prolperous ftate of Saxony, Brunfwick, Hano- 
 ver *, Holftein, Heffe, Baden, and many of the 
 fmaller principalities, and even fome of the ec- 
 clefiaftical flates, during the laft years of that 
 period. 
 
 The flightefl: glance at the affairs of the Bri- 
 tish EMPIRE, isfufticient to banifli every idea of 
 decay and dilbrganization. The condition of 
 that kingdom after the American war, was the 
 firft complete demon ftration of the true prin- 
 ciples of the wealth of nations, wliich had re- 
 mained fo long unknown. The lofs of her co- 
 lonies was the firft £era of the lafting and in- 
 dependent greatnefs of Britain. It was after the 
 
 * The adminiftration of this country has always been 
 exemplary, and has implicitiy followed the Pruffian model, 
 even in its military eftablifhment. — Trans, 
 
 year
 
 ( 8o ) 
 
 year 1783 that ihe became confcious of her 
 real ftrength, and clearly underftood the true 
 grounds upon which it relied. Until then fhc 
 had more or lefs partaken of the errors and mif- 
 condud of the reft of Europe, derived from an 
 imperfect knowledge of the fyflem of commerce. 
 She now took the lead of all, in a new career, 
 and upon better principles. The French revo- 
 lution, which interrupted the progrefs of all 
 Europe, undoubtedly confined and retarded the 
 completion of the maftcrly fyftem of adminiflra- 
 tion adopted in England. It is a phenomenon 
 fufficiently extraordinary, which can only be 
 explained by the hiftory of its government 
 during the preceding ten years, that Great Bri- 
 tain fhould have been able to maintain itfelf 
 entire and unthaken in the dreadful war excited 
 by that revolution*. What it might have attained 
 to in a continuance of peace, muft be a matter 
 of mere hypothefis ; but this hypothelis will 
 receive a place among the cleareft political 
 truths from thofe who have been accuftomed to 
 ftudy the true fources of the profperity and 
 flrength of nations. 
 
 * I mean to examine, and I hope completely to refute the 
 opinion, that England has profpered hy this war, in a fubfe- 
 quent chapter. 
 
 The
 
 ( 8i ) 
 
 The government of Denmark in the fame 
 period was charadterized by meafures which, 
 though lefs fplendid, were certainly not lefs 
 praifeworthy in their nature. It united, by a 
 policy equally wife and liberal, the two extremes 
 of all minifterial wifdom. It increafed the re- 
 venue of the flate, while it enriched its fubjecSls : 
 it confirmed its own power, while it gratified 
 a jufl. and reafonable love of liberty. The abo- 
 lition of the laft traces of villanage, the im- 
 proved cultivation of the country, the wife laws 
 enabled for fixing the relations between the pea- 
 fantry and the proprietors of land, the liberty of 
 the prefs, the harmony which reigned between 
 the different orders of the ftate, the reciprocal 
 confidence between the people and the throne : 
 all thefe internal improvements form one of the 
 moft pleafing pi6lurcs which the page of hiftory 
 "will have to hand down to pofterity. 
 
 Though fcantily endowed by nature, cx- 
 haufied by the extravagant undertakings of her 
 moil: celebrated princes, and fallen into decay 
 during the defiru6live anarchy which imme- 
 diately followed her unnatural greatncfs ; even 
 Sweden, under the reign of Guftavus III. made 
 evident progrefs towards a ftate of greater pro- 
 fperity and ftability. The reftlefs mind of that 
 prince embraced every branch of the public 
 
 G welfare ;
 
 ( 8i ) 
 
 vvelfafe ; introduced light, order, and activity 
 into the chaos of a difordered government ; and 
 in the midft of many dangers and adverfities, 
 laid the foundations of a new one, upon which 
 his fuccelfors, under more favourable circum- 
 ftanceSi may completely organize a better fyf- 
 tem. The accounts which Guftavus, from time 
 to time, laid before the diet, are noble proofs of 
 his vigilance, induftry, and acutenefs ; and 
 though his paffions fometimes counteracted the 
 good which was the obje6l of his zeal, 
 though the fpirit of party ran very high during 
 his life, and the political lituation of his 
 country was often very critical ; yet the benefit 
 he conferred upon Sweden will long continue to 
 be felt, and will be fully acknowledged by the 
 judgment of an impartial poflcrity, 
 
 It may, perhaps, at the firll glance, look 
 fomewhat like temerity, to mention the unfor- 
 tunate kingdom of Poland, in an account of the 
 progrefs and improvement of the different ftates 
 of Europe. But even in this retarded and neg- 
 lected country, the dawn of a brighter day had 
 begun, fliortly before its diflblution, to en- 
 lighten the horizon. No elTential improvement 
 was in this inllance practicable without a 
 thorough reform of the conflilution; for the 
 errors in the conftitution were the real caufes of 
 
 the
 
 ( 83 ) 
 
 ^he decay and weaknefs of the ftate. This fird: 
 objei5\ had, however, already occupied the at- 
 tention of all thinking perfons ; and the par- 
 tition of 1772, with all its evil confequences, 
 had one beneficial efFedl for Poland ; it pointed 
 out, in the cleareft and moft impreffive man- 
 ner, the neceffity of a great political regene- 
 ration. The patriotic zeal of the friends of a 
 radical reform, and the general convidlion of its 
 neceffity, firft brought it forward as an object 
 of public conlideration, at the diet in 1788. 
 The refult of this diet is well known : the con- 
 ftitution of 1791 was the prefage of a happier 
 fortune, the beginning of a new ftate of ex- 
 iftence, conformable to the fpirit of the times, 
 and the progrefs of civilization in the reft of 
 Europe. This is not the place to review the 
 feries of events, by which this conflitution was 
 deflroyed in the moment of its birth, and Po- 
 land for ever Itruck out of the lift of nations. 
 But there is one obfervation which applies im- 
 mediately to my argument, and will be fub- 
 fcribed to without difficulty by every impartial 
 reader acquainted with the hiftory of modern 
 times : had it not been for the French revolu- 
 tion, the conftitution of 1791 would not have 
 been deftroyed, nor the political independence of 
 Poland annihilated. 
 
 ^i Of
 
 ( 84 ) 
 
 Of all the nations of Europe, Spain and Por- 
 tugal were perhaps the farthefl behind in the 
 general flate of improvement. And 3'et the 
 irrefiftible ftrength cf that propenfity to reform, 
 * which adlaated the raoft indolent governments, 
 was not altogether without eiFe6l even in thefe. 
 Portugal had been awakened from her profound 
 Clumber by the adminiflration of Pombal ; ano- 
 ther minifler like him, one prince only of an ac- 
 tive difpolition, would have freed her altogether 
 from the fetters that encumbered her. Spain too 
 began to underfiand her true interefts ; and, 
 however great the difficulties fhe had to fur- 
 mount, the refolution of encountering them was 
 not wanting*. Much time, and many favourable 
 circum fiances, were requillte to ameliorate the 
 condition of a nation, whofe decay was the refult 
 of caufes fo ancient and fo deeply rooted ; but it 
 is enough that the delire of reformation was 
 awakened, and a refolution taken to efFedl it. 
 We are n'ot, at prefent, afferting the uniformity 
 of the refult, but the generality and uniformity 
 of the impulfe and exertions. 
 
 Even Italy, fo far behind all other civilized 
 nations, in proportion to her natural flrength and 
 
 * Bourgoing's inftruftive work on Spain fufficiently (hows 
 that the Spanifla government was not inaftive or fupine in the 
 above period, though it had almoft infurmountable difficul- 
 ties to encounter. 
 
 advantages
 
 ( 8j ) 
 
 advantages which feeraed to have dcflined her 
 to a place among the firft ; even Italy had made 
 fome advances towards an improved ilate. The 
 Grand Dutchy of Tufcany, transformed into a 
 paradife hy Leopold, afforded a furpriling ex* 
 ample to the world of what may be accompliih- 
 ed in the fhort fpace of twenty years, by a 
 prince endowed with wifdom, a6iivity, and per- 
 feverance. This example could not poflibly re- 
 main entirely ufelcfs to the neighbouring flates ; 
 even the feeble government of Rome conceived 
 the thought of rendering itfclf independent of 
 contributions from abroad, by adopting principles 
 of prudence and economy ; and the meafures of 
 Cardinal Ruffo during the time he managed the 
 finances of the Pope, were all founded upon that 
 idea. Naples, a country fallen into the deepefl 
 decay, by the total negle6l of every principle of 
 government, opprefled with barbarous abufes ; 
 and having fuch a conftitution as rendered it 
 almoft impoflible for the government to under- 
 take any good work ; Naples began to liften to 
 prudent counfels, employed the wifeft heads to 
 proje^l plans of a fyftematic reform, and was 
 preparing to put them in execution *. She would, 
 doubtlefs, have had to encounter the greateft 
 difficulties in accomplifliing this ; but it would 
 have been undertaken ; and no one can with cer- 
 
 * Vide Note F. 
 
 G 3 tainty
 
 ( 86 ) 
 
 tainty aflert, ^bat the attempt would have been 
 vinfuccefsful, had not the ftorra of the revolution 
 }.ere, as every where elfe, deflroyed good and 
 bad together, and renewed the chaos, out of 
 which a happier order of things was beginning 
 to unfold itfelf to our hopes. 
 
 In order to complete this review of the flatesi 
 of Europe, we muft, in the laft place, dire<St 
 our attention to the central point of the revo- 
 lution ; the country out of which its fplendi^ 
 promifes, and its dreadful devaftations, have im- 
 xnediately proceeded. That the former govern- 
 ment of France was fqch as ftood in need of 
 the greateft reforms ; that the errors in its legif- 
 lation, its adminiftration, and its domeftic con- 
 Hitution, were many and great, cannot for 4 
 moment be difputed. Nobody will attempt to 
 deny that the government of Lewis the XVth 
 laid the foundation of a dangerous diforgani- 
 zation. But was the reign of Lewis XVI. from 
 its commencement to its tragical end, a proof 
 of the affertion, that there no longer exifled any 
 proper principles of government in Europe ? 
 Was it not rather marked throughout by the 
 defire of beneficial reforms, the prevailing cha- 
 ra6ler of the times ? Was not its only misfor- 
 tune a mifconception of ils ilrength, which 
 fank under the weight of its own undertakings ? 
 1 W^a
 
 ( 87 ) 
 
 Was the monarch who placed Turcot and 
 Males HERB Es among the number of his mi- 
 nifiers, who twice intrufted the fate of his king- 
 dom to the hands of Necker, was he a pa- 
 tron of abufes, a bhnd follower of former fyf- 
 tems ? Was the convocation of the Notables, 
 and the plan for which they were convened, the 
 work of mean, contemptible, obfcure, and 
 common-place politics ? Was the facility, or 
 rather the levity with which this government 
 confented to the affembling of the States, a 
 proof of tenacious obftinacy, or of an impru- 
 dent fpirit of conceffion ? Was the edi6t of the 
 3th July 1788, which not only eftablillied the 
 freedom of the prefs, but called upon every hand 
 that could guide a pen to employ itfelf in pub- 
 lifhlng plans of general utility — was that edi6l 
 the meafure of a court that trembled at every 
 prorpe(51: of innovation ? Was the decree of the 
 council of Hate of the 27th December 1788, 
 and the fpeech of the minifter of finance of the 
 5th May 1789, and even the unfortunate de- 
 claration of the 23d May — were thefe the pro- 
 ductions of a government far behind the wifhes 
 and opinions of its enlightened fubjedls ? Is the 
 revolution, in fhort, to be attributed to the want 
 of fyftem and principles ; or, on the contrary, to 
 the fuperfluity and abufe of them ? 
 
 e 4 Thefe
 
 ( 88 ) 
 
 Thefe are queftions which require no anlwcrs. 
 In France, as in the reft of Europe, " that gene- 
 ral charader of impatience, reftleffnefs, and mu- 
 tability," which the Author with juftice defcribes 
 as the diftinguifhing feature of the age, was only 
 the necefTary confequence, the expreffion, as it 
 were, of a general fenfe of the progrefs already 
 made, and the defire of further improvement. 
 The events of the laft ten years were occalioned 
 by the too ardent and too hafty purfuit of good 
 intentions, not by the general prevalence of cor- 
 ruption ; and inflead of admitting, that the true 
 principles of adminiftration were never To ill 
 underftood, we may, on the contrary, aflert 
 with confidence, that they were never fo gene- 
 rally and extenfively known and pra6lifed in 
 any period of hiftory; that the condition of 
 mankind had never required fo little as it then 
 did, the violent revolution which France ex- 
 perienced, and of which all Europe has felt the 
 efTedls ; and that this revolution, inflead of 
 being the laft link of a long chain of diforgani- 
 zation and decay, was, on the contrary, the firfl: 
 link of a new chain of misfortune and dif- 
 order ; the fignal for a general paufe, perhaps 
 relapfe in the ftate of Europe, by a daring at- 
 tempt to leave the natural caufe of fecial im- 
 provement, and to bring it at once to perfec- 
 tion. 
 
 Such
 
 ( 89 ) 
 
 Such was the flate of Europe with refpe^l to 
 the internal condition of its feveral nations. 
 Let us now proceed to examine, whether, in their 
 pohtical relations toward^ each other, there is any 
 better foundation for the behef of that general 
 diforganization and total want of public law, 
 which are faid to have exilled at the time of the 
 French revolution. 
 
 That this examination may not degenerate 
 into empty fpeculation, we mult, in the firll 
 place, define with precifion, the meaning to be 
 properly attached to the term, pibVic law, or 
 Jaw of nations (droit 'public), 
 
 A law of nations, in the moft extentive fenfe 
 of the word, would be fuch a conllitutioa 
 as fhould eftablifh all their feveral relations by 
 immutable laws ; affign to each the place it 
 ought to hold in the general fyftem, fo as not 
 to interfere with the interefls of the reti- ; gua- 
 rantee the duration of this fyflcm by a perfedl: 
 et][uilibrium of power, and provide effedlual 
 means for preventing every undertaking of a 
 nature to deilroy that equilibrium. Such a con- 
 jftitution can only exift in idea, never in reality. 
 There never has been any law of nations in this 
 fenfe of the word ; and it would be in vain to 
 expedl it, until the project of perpetual peace b^ 
 likewife realized. 
 
 a To
 
 ( 90 )' 
 
 To convince ourfelves that the federal conftitu- 
 tron of nations can never be otherwife than im- 
 perfed, we need only conlider the imperfection 
 of all fyftems invented andeftablifhed by man ; 
 the imraenfity of the objecls to be embraced by a 
 code of laws, comprehending and regulating the 
 rights of all nations ; the impenetrability of the 
 future ; the mutability of the relations of fo- 
 ciety ; and the alterations that mufi; neceflarily 
 take place in the courfe of time, in the abfolute 
 and relative ilrcngth of different ftates, owing 
 to the diverlity of their fortunes, the inequality 
 of their progrefsj or the perfonal abilities of their 
 princes. The merits of fuch a conflitution mufl 
 always be merely relative, greater or Icfs ; and 
 the moft perfecl federal fyftem we can ever hope 
 for, will at beil only be tolerable. 
 
 Whoever takes upon him to aflert, that, at a 
 certain period, the political fyflem was utterly 
 corrupted, and the federal conflitution either 
 eminently defe6live or totally annihilated, muft 
 be able to fhow, that at that period there exifled 
 no guaranty of public fecurity ; that the balance 
 of power was entirely deftroyed ; that the 
 weaker fiates could no longer find refuge or 
 prote6\ion againfl the ufurpations of the 
 {Wronger ; that one or a few of the powerful en- 
 dangered the peace and fecurity of the refl, and 
 
 rendered
 
 ( 9' ) 
 
 rendered their exigence precarious ; that the 
 difputes of nations were no longer determinable 
 by negotiations or treaties ; and that war and 
 force were the only refource, the only policy, 
 the only umpire in all their differences. 
 
 Was this the ftate of the federative fyfiem of 
 Europe at the commencement of the French re- 
 volution ? I fhould contradi6l my own opinion 
 were I to hefitate a moment to confefs, that at 
 that time the political fyfiem laboured under 
 great defe6ts. and was pervaded by many errors ; 
 that it was far, very far, removed from that per^ 
 fe6l federal conflitution, which we contemplate in 
 idea ; that the balance between the principal 
 powers was by no means fecured ; and that the 
 Ixtuation of the fmaller ftates was in many refpecSts 
 dangerous and precarious. A great part of thefe 
 errors and defeats was the immediate confe- 
 quence of the rapid civilization of Europe, by 
 which the former proportions between the lead- 
 ing flates were altered, and the difproportion be- 
 tween four or five preponderant nations on the 
 one hand, and a great number of fmall, difperfed, 
 and infignificant ftates on the other, was confi- 
 derably augmented. This difproportion excited 
 and encouraged many and various plans of am- 
 bition and ufurpation ; and at length added to 
 th? numberlcfs combinations of modern politics, 
 
 the
 
 ( 90 
 
 the celebrated fyfiem of partition, which inflicted 
 fo deep and dangerous a wound on the federal 
 
 confritution*. 
 
 But I can never be perfuaded to believe that 
 " at the time of the French revolution, the poli- 
 tical fyilem of Europe had reached the laft ftage 
 of decay and diforganization ; that its every 
 prop and foundation was deitroyed^" and that 
 ** it prefented nothing but imbecility, anarchy, 
 and confulion." The hiflory of the twenty-five 
 years which elapfed between the peace of Hu- 
 bertfburg and Fontainebleau, and the beginning 
 of the diflurbances in France, contradidls this af- 
 fertion in every refpecSl ; the mod indifputable 
 fa^ls Hand in oppofition to it ; the llighteft" 
 glance at the fituation of Europe, during that 
 period, confirms the very reverfe. The federal 
 conftitution was at leaft as perfect as it ever had 
 been fince the thirty years war j nay, it was even 
 more efficient and entire. The changes which 
 Europe had experienced in the laft 150 years had 
 been as happily and wifely grafted on the former 
 political relations, as, from the joint operation of 
 accident and prudence (fuch is the nature of 
 every federative fyftem), could ever have been de- 
 lired or expe(5led ; the balance of power was ad- 
 jufted as eflfedlually and as favourably as a H- 
 
 * Vide Note G. 
 
 beral
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 beral and reafonable policy could delire ; and if 
 there were feme events which infringed the facred 
 principles of the federal conftitution, they were 
 at leafl avenged by the unanimous indignation, 
 and the marked difapprobation of all cotempora- 
 ries. Europe polTefTed, in every reafonable fenfe 
 of the word, a federative conftitution, a political 
 balance, and a law of nations. 
 
 To explain thefe truths, it will not be neceflary 
 to defcend to a minute and particular analyfis of 
 the political relations exifting at that period. It 
 is fufficient if we dwell upon the leading features 
 of the picture. The fate of Europe depends 
 upon the fortunes and political relations of the 
 powers which preponderate in the general fyftem. 
 If the balance be preferved among thefe ; if their 
 political exiftence and internal organization be 
 fafely eitablilhed ; if, by their mutual a6tion and 
 readion, they protedl and fecure the independ- 
 ence of the fmaller ftates (fo much, at leafl, as 
 the weak can be fecure in a community with the 
 itrong) ; if there is no dangerous preponderance 
 to be perceived, which threatens to opprefs the 
 reft, or to involve them in endlefs v/ar ; we may 
 reft latisfied with the federal conftitution which 
 fulfils thefe moft effential points, notwithftanding 
 many errors and defe6ls. And fuch was the fede- 
 ral conftitution of Europe before the French re- 
 volution. 
 
 The
 
 (94 ) 
 
 The five powers which fince the middle of the 
 eighteenth century have conftituted the principal 
 weight in the general political fyftem are, France, 
 Auftria, Pruffia, Ruffia, and England. In con- 
 fidering the federal relations of thefe Itates, we 
 Ihall have an opportunity of adverting to thofe 
 of a lecond and third order, as well as to fome 
 of a flill lower rank, fo far at leaft as they afFe<5l 
 the general furvey of Europe. 
 
 JFRANCE. 
 
 The external relations of a nation are agree- 
 able to the true principles of the federal conflitu- 
 tlon, when it is completely, or in a very great 
 degree, fecured againft every foreign aggreffion^ 
 by its natural polition, or its internal flrength 
 and means of defence, or its political connexions, 
 or all of thele combined. A large, and by its na- 
 ture preponderant ilate, mufl, moreover, pof- 
 fefs a certain degree of influence on the reft, and 
 on the political relations of Europe, to enable it 
 to maintain its due place in the general fyftem. 
 
 The latter of thefe requilites is, however, lefs 
 effential than the tirft ; the principle upon which 
 it is founded, is lefs defined, and therefore more 
 liable to be abufed by being carried to an undue 
 and dangerous extent. The vague and equivo- 
 cal
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 Cal terras mfiuence^ confi deration, credit, &c. 
 are too often made the cloak of ambitious, reft- 
 lefs, intriguing politics, which facrifice the wel- 
 fare of all nations, and even their own interefts, 
 to a chimera of imaginary fuperiority. But in this 
 a proper medium is to be obfervcd. No power 
 in Europe, and more efpecially none of the 
 leading powers, can or ought to be without 
 a conflant influence over the reft. Were it to 
 be entirely confined within itfelf, and its in- 
 terefts altogether diflin6l, it would be in con- 
 tinual danger of feeing its interefls and inde- 
 pendence fall a facrifice to dexterous combina- 
 tions. It would degenerate into an idle, and foon 
 contemptible fpcdlator of the changes condantly 
 happening in the relations of other fiates; it 
 would either endanger its own fecurity, the firfl 
 and principal obje(5l of all federative policy, or 
 be often obliged to defend in fanguinary wars, 
 what might have been more eafily and advanta- 
 geoufly maintained by timely vigilance, by pru- 
 dent negotiation, or even by that refpe<5l alone, 
 which it might have exadled from its neigh- 
 bours. 
 
 Let us now confider the political fituation of 
 France before the revolution, in both thefe points 
 of view. 
 
 The 
 
 L. . _.
 
 ( 96 ) 
 
 Thefecurlty of that nation againft every attack 
 from without, was founded partly on the internal 
 means of defence peculiar to it, and partly on 
 the nature of its political relations to all its 
 neighbours. 
 
 The military and geographical lituation of 
 France was more proper to enfure the permanent 
 fecurity of an extenlive kingdom, than any other 
 that can be conceived ; the moft advantageous 
 that any nation in Europe could boaft of; the 
 molt excellent that has ever exifted in the fphere 
 of the modern political fyflem. The greater 
 part of it was bounded by the fea ; and its conti- 
 nental frontiers were fo protedled by art or nature, 
 in every point, as to render them almoft impene- 
 trable to an enemy. On the lide of Spain, and 
 on that of Savoy, it was defended by the higheli 
 mountains in Europe ; and fuch was the difpro- 
 portion of its ftrength, to that of the nations be- 
 yond thofe mountains, fo evident was the impof- 
 libility of penetrating into the interior of France 
 by way of the Alps or Pyrenees, that any dan- 
 ger of an invafion on that lide mufl be totally 
 out of thequeftion. The eaftern, and flill more 
 a part of its northern confines, were lefs pro- 
 tected by nature ; and being contiguous to more 
 powerful nations, were more expofed to an at- 
 tack* But here a chain of fortified places unpa- 
 ralleled
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 ralleledin its kind, and admirably combined with 
 the natural means of defence, prefented an impe- 
 netrable bulwark, fufficient to deter the moll en- 
 terprifing enemy. The martial fpirit, the induf- 
 try, and riches of the nation ; their attainments 
 in the arts and fciences ; completed and crowned 
 the abundance of natural and artificial means of 
 defence. Experience had fufficiently proved that 
 nothing was wanting to render them complete ; 
 and the hope of conquering France had long 
 lincc been banifhed as an empty vifion*. 
 
 To thefe peculiar advantages that affured the 
 fafety of France, were added (particularly in 
 the latter part of the eighteenth century, and 
 in that period when the federal conftitutlon 
 is faid to have been at its laft gafp) ■ all thofe 
 which federative policy can combine, to give to 
 a nation the higheft pofiible degree of fecurity. 
 No power on the continent could, with any ap- 
 pearance of hope or reafon, conceive tlie project 
 of invading France : they mult all have been re- 
 trained either by the evident impoffibility of fuc- 
 cefs, or by the flighteft knowledge of their own 
 intcrefts. The diftance of Ruffia, and the policy 
 of the intermediate fiates, precluded any attack 
 from that quarter. A balance of power had 
 been formed in Germany by the elevation of Pruf- 
 
 * Vide Note H. 
 
 H fia,
 
 ( 98 ) 
 
 fia, from which France could not but derive the 
 moft eflential advantage in all poffible political 
 combinations. If Auftria had attemj>ted to ag- 
 grandize herfelf, Pruffia would have been ready 
 to oppofe her ; if Pruffia had threatened France 
 with hoftility, the afliftance of Auftria was at 
 hand. That power, moreover, which in the 
 German empire had moft frequently waged war 
 with France ; from which ibe had the greateft 
 reafon to expect: an attack ; and whofe fttuation, 
 above all others, gave her the means of making 
 it ; that very power had, during an uninter- 
 rupted period of thirty years, maintained an al- 
 ftiance with her. She was united to Spain, on the 
 other hand, by the clofeft bonds of amity. The 
 Kin"" of Sardinia was the natural ally of France 
 on account of his political fttuation, his dread 
 of the power of Auftria, and his deftre of aggran- 
 dizing himfelf in Italy ; even though the many 
 family connexions which united them, were to 
 be conftdered as nothing. Switzerland, in all 
 her alliances, had given a decided preference to 
 the kind's of France, and cultivated their friend- 
 Ihip above any other. "VVe may boldly aftert that 
 Ibere was not a ftngle flate on the continent of 
 Europe, which, in the fttuation of affairs at that 
 time, was not impelled by the ftrongeft motives, 
 by fome great and important interefl, to fcek the 
 favour and friendftiip of France. Every archive, 
 
 every
 
 ( S9 ) 
 
 every article of diplomatic correfpondence, and 
 every flate paper of all the cabinets of Europe, 
 from the time of Cardinal Fleury, to the year 
 1789, might be fubmitted to the penetrating eye 
 of the raoft expert politician, without his being 
 able to dilcover in them the flighteft trace of a 
 confpiracy againft the interefts of France, or any 
 plan inimical to the fecurity and independence 
 of that kingdom. 
 
 There was only one among the greater powers 
 whole interefts were contrary to thofe of France, 
 and who at the fame time poflTefTed the means of 
 injuring her; and that was England. Some 
 ftriking contrarieties in their national characters, 
 centuries of warfare, and a long rivalry in the 
 moft important obje6^3 of true or imaginary na- 
 tional ^reatnefs, had abundantly fown the feeds 
 of hatred and contention between thefe two na- 
 tions, at once fo near, and fo completely fepa- 
 rated. The fentimcnt of oticnded pride continued 
 to irritate a wound never healed. England alone 
 had, properly fpeaking, triumphed over France, 
 in thccourfe of the whole century, and flie had, 
 in lomc inftances, obliged her to fubmit to mor- 
 tifying humiliations. So numerous, moreover, 
 were the points of conta6l between them ; fo 
 many the objects common to the acflivity and am- 
 bition of both ; fo frequent the collilion of their 
 II 2 refpe6\ivs
 
 ( loo ) 
 
 refpective interefts, that a liate of perfect peace 
 between them could not be of long duration. 
 
 ' • But, uith rcfpedl to the danger refulting to 
 'France from this hoftile relation, it appears that 
 the true foundation of all political independence 
 and greatnefs, the fecurity and integrity of its 
 tcrritor}', was not invaded or materially endan- 
 gered in any war with England. Colonial and 
 commercial interefts, the conftant objects of con- 
 tention between them, though certainly great and 
 important, were only fecondary to the above con- 
 lideration ; and the danger that enfued, though 
 ferious and afflicting, was only fubordinate. The 
 true foundation of the power of France re 
 mained unfliaken and unhurt, amidit the greatefl 
 misfortunes which befel her commerce, her navy, 
 and her poiTeffions in the Eaft and Weft Indies. 
 We have, therefore, often feen her rife quickly 
 from the fevereft blows received from England, 
 and reclaim with fuccefsful energy what fhe had 
 for a moment been deprived of. 
 
 The hifiory of the naval wars of the eighteenth 
 century proves, befides, that the balance of power 
 between France and England was by no means 
 uniformly on the fame tide. The war which 
 finifhed in the year 1762, was the moft unfortu- 
 nate of all for France : the peace of Fontaine- 
 
 bleau
 
 C 101 ) 
 
 bleau was tlie epoch of ber deepeft humiliation. 
 But how was the iituation of the two rivals al- 
 tered in the fhort fpace of twenty years, wl\en 
 the French navy rofe with new fpicndour from its 
 ruins; when the empire of the feas was diiputed 
 with various faccefs by France and England ; 
 when victory more than once fettled upon the 
 French ; and when thele fucceeded, againft all 
 expeclation, in wrefting the mod important colo- 
 nies in the world, out of the hands of their ad- 
 verfaries ! It is evident, therefore, that the power 
 of Great Britain did prefent no fuch preponde- 
 rance before the revolution, as to be aconftant 
 fubjecl of dread and alarm to France. The fe- 
 curity of her territory, the principal objccl in the 
 relations of a fiate with its neighbours, w^s 
 never ferioufly endangered by England, however 
 formidable ; and in the proper fphere of tht^r 
 rivalry, their commerce, colonial intereits, and 
 naval power, the advantage was almcll: as often 
 on the fide of France as on that of England. 
 To this muft be added, that, in the year 1786, the 
 firft formal treaty of commerce was concluded 
 between the two rival ftates, and the idea of an 
 eternal enmity between them was gradually dy- 
 ing away. Since the commencement of the eigh- 
 teenth century, there was no period in which the 
 probability of a lafiing peace between France 
 and England was fo great ; in which tlie danger 
 H 3 of
 
 ( 102 ) 
 
 of the renewal of the war was lb remote, fo little 
 to be dreaded, as at the moment when the French 
 revolution broke out. 
 
 Such was the fituation of France with refpeB. 
 to her fecur'ity : let us now confider what j>oJi- 
 iical influence the enjoyed. 
 
 The influence of the cabinet of Verfailles upon 
 the affairs and fortunes of Europe, had attained 
 its meridian in the fplendid days of Lewis XIV, 
 It declined after the peace of Ryfiwick ; the war 
 for the Spanifh fucceffion had remarkably dimi- 
 nifhed it ; and though it afterwards rofe in fome 
 degree, yet it never regained the extent and great- 
 nefs it pofTefTed in more early periods. This was 
 partly, indeed, occafioned by changes in the re- 
 lative flrength of the European powers; but ftill 
 more, and in one fenfe exclufively, by the per- 
 fonai character of the prince who afcended the 
 throne after Lewis XIV. Had fuch changes not 
 happened in the flate of Europe, flill the influ- 
 ence of France muft have been confiderably lefs, 
 under the government of a peaceable and mode- 
 rate, or, ftill more, of a weak and indolent mo- 
 narch, than under the fccptre of a warlike, am- 
 bitious, a6tive, and enterpriling prince. Such is 
 the inevitable deftiny of all earthly greatnefs and 
 dominion ! The brevity of human life forbids 
 
 the
 
 ( 103 ) 
 
 the works of man to be eternal. The inherit- 
 ance of an x\lexander, a Caefar, a Gengis Khan, 
 a Guftavus x\dolphus, have all of them under- 
 gone revolutions much greater than thole of 
 Lewis XIV. in the hands of his defcendants. 
 
 But to determine upon principles of truth 
 andjuftice, how far France experienced a real 
 misfortune, andacaufeofjutl complaint, in the 
 diminution of her influence in the general fyftcm 
 under Lewis XV. we muft in the firfl place ex- 
 amine and determine what fhould be the proper 
 meafure of that influence ; the extent to which it 
 ought, upon grounds of equity and general utility, 
 to be carried. Wherever we fix the limit of 
 the extent we affign to it, it is clear and undeni- 
 able that Lewis XIV. had gone beyond it. His 
 arbitrary and unjull pretentions, the haughti- 
 nefs with which he announced them, the terror 
 he fpread anjonghis neighbours, the general mif- 
 trufl prevailing in Europe, the alliances and 
 coalitions lo often formed and renewed, as the 
 only recourfe againfi his plans; all thefe things 
 fufficiently fliow, that his views were incompa- 
 tible with the pcacp and fafety of the rcfl^and in 
 dire6l oppofition to the laws of the federal confti- 
 tution. The exhaufted flate in which he left his 
 Kingdom proved flill more : it proved that he had 
 pxceedcc^ his Rrcngth ; that he had lacriiiced the 
 
 ^ 4 true
 
 ( 104 ) 
 
 true intcrefts of his country to a chimera of great- 
 nefs, dominion, and fame ; that ne had been in 
 purfuit of objedls, in which a more eniigbtened 
 policy would have difcovered no real advantage 
 even to France. It was no misfortune for the 
 world, it was for the happinefs of France, that 
 his fucceffors renounced his coloiTal projects, his 
 extravagant efforts, his refllefs interference in 
 all the affairs of Europe. The dignity of a na- 
 tion is not lowered, nor its real importance dimi- 
 nifhed, by renouncing undue pretenfions to inor- 
 dinate influence. It often becomes flronger in re- 
 ality by what it lofes in appearance. France 
 made more important advances in ever) branch 
 of public welfare, under the peaceful adminiilra- 
 tion of Cardinal Fleury, than in the moft bril- 
 liant times of Lewis XIV. 
 
 It is true that the exceflive forbearance of the 
 French miniflry under Lewis XV. often degene- 
 rated, particularly in the latter part of his reign, 
 into dangerous careleffnefs, and fometimes into 
 total apathy ; and France permitted undertakings 
 which it could and ought to have oppofed. But 
 it muft not be faid, that her infinence, becaufe 
 neglected during this period of relaxation, was 
 therefore annihilated. The elements of that in- 
 fluence exified as formerly ; a more energetic 
 government would foon have re-eftablifhed it. 
 2 The
 
 ( 105 ) 
 
 llie part ac^ed by France under Lewis XVI. par- 
 ticularly from the beginning of the American 
 war, to the commencement of her internal dif- 
 fenfions, relcmbled in nothing the condudl: of a 
 nation *' funk into contempt and infignificancy, 
 deprived of its former character, and almolt for- 
 gotten in Europe." This proved that France 
 ilill poffefTed all that a nation of the firft rank 
 ought to poflefs and defire to preferve ; that fhe 
 ftill held the rank that belonged to her in the po- 
 litical fyftem, on account of her internal Itrengtk 
 and her external relations ; and that of the 
 changes in Europe, which had in the mean time 
 taken place, there were none of a nature to di- 
 minilli her legitimate influence. An impartial 
 furvey of her political lituation at that time, will 
 confirm thefe truths, and fupport them againft 
 all the fophiftical declamations of difcontent, or 
 the ungrateful difregard of former advantages. 
 
 The relations between France and Germany 
 iince the middle of the eighteenth century, had 
 been as favourable to the interefts of France, as 
 the moft ingenious federal policy could have 
 contrived to make them. PrufQa, from the mo- 
 ment of her elevation, became a counterpoife to 
 the Houfc of Auftria, incomparably more uleful 
 to France than that fhe was formerly obliged to 
 create by uncertain and imperfedl alliances with 
 
 the
 
 ( ic6 ) 
 
 the members of the Empire. From that time, 
 France, in every pofHble conjnn6lure, had the 
 choice of two allies, almoft equally powerful ; 
 fhe was always Jure of one of them. She fixed 
 on Aufiria ; and the confequence of that choice, 
 fo often blamed, was a peace of thirty years 
 with Germany ; thirty yeais of undifturbed tran- 
 quillity, on the only tide expofed to an attack. 
 We are not here to examine whether the miniftry 
 of Lewis XV. did not go too far in this new 
 connexion ; and whether its participation in the 
 feven years war was not an impolitic meafure. But 
 it ascertain, that even the alliance of the cabinet 
 of Verfailles with the Houfe of Auflria, did not 
 prevent France from offering protection to every 
 ftate threatened by the fuperior ftrcngth of that 
 power ; that notwitlifi anding, or rather on account 
 of that alliance, Ihe interfered as a mediatrix in the 
 war of the fucceffion in Bavaria, and in the con- 
 teft for the opening of the Scheldt ; and that till 
 the year 1789, there was no fovereign of any 
 confequence in Germany, not excepting the King 
 of Pruflia, who did not more or lefs endeavour 
 to gain her friendfhip ; to many of them an ob- 
 ject of the firft importance, As loiig as the al- 
 liance with Auftria interfered not with other ii:^- 
 terefts, France, with reafon, adhered to it: 
 \vhilo, on the other hand, it only depended upon 
 hcrfclf to return to her former fyflem, whenever 
 
 Auftria
 
 (' I07 ) 
 
 Auftria fhould betray intentions incompatible 
 with the tranquillity of Europe ; and that with 
 the fuperior advantage now arifing from the 
 power of Pruflia, and the influence of that ftate 
 on the north of Germany. Surely fuch a fitua- 
 tion was the very reverfc of dangerous and unfa- 
 vourable, and was fuch as France had never been 
 placed in either before or fince the treaty of Wcit- 
 phalia* 
 
 Since the year 1761, F' ranee had been clofely 
 connected with Spain. This connexion, founded 
 upon the celebrated Family Compact, fecurcd to 
 France the refources, by no means unimportant, 
 of a nation advantageoufly Situated in her vi- 
 cinity ; gave her the difpofal of a fleet of eighty 
 fhips of war, and part of the treafures of Mexico 
 and Peru. It was furely no weak, contemptible, 
 and miflaken politics on the part of France, that 
 procured fuch a powerful fupport at the time of 
 her greatefl adverfity. That Ihe was not obliged 
 to fubmit unconditionally to the terms which 
 England would have impofed ; that flie was en- 
 abled twenty years afterwards, with the afl^ilancc 
 of her ally, to drive her rival out of North Ame- 
 rica ; that the condu6l of Spain was, during 
 thirty years, implicitly fubmitted to her control ; 
 and that flie found the cabinet of Madrid difpofcd 
 to renew that fubmiflion, even amid the ftorms 
 
 of
 
 ( loS ) 
 
 of the revolution : all this fufficiently fhows the 
 immenfe advantages derived from the family com- 
 pa<^, which muft be looked upon as one of the 
 moft important vi6iories in the field of diplo- 
 
 inatic policy. 
 
 The fame alliance, moreover, fecured to her 
 an extenlive and lafting influence in Italy. 
 Naples and Parma grafted their interefts on thofe 
 of the more powerful branches of the Houfe of 
 Bourbon. The forces of thefe two allies would 
 have been at the entire difpofal of France, in cafe 
 the only power capable befide herfelf of difturbing 
 Italy, had agitated plans of conquefi: and aggran- 
 dizement, fuch as to threaten the independence 
 of that part of Europe. But we mufl not fuppofe 
 that in fuch a cafe fhe could only have reckoned 
 npon Naples and Parma ; fhe poflefled a decided 
 influence over the greater number, and the moft 
 important of the Italian flates. The King of 
 Sardinia, conneded with France by the clofeft 
 ties of amity, had been at peace with her during 
 half a century ; he was allied by blood to the 
 family of the Bourbons, and looked upon the 
 French monarchs as his natural proteclors againft 
 the power of Aullria, the continual objed: of 
 his fears. Such were likewife the relations be- 
 tween France and her ancient allies, the repub- • 
 lies of Genoa and Venice. The Pope, who 
 
 could
 
 ( iQ9 ) 
 
 could never be attached to the Emperor, was al- 
 ways more or lets devoted to the interefls of 
 France. An Auflrian prince was indeed upoa 
 the throne of Tufcany ; but the lituation of that 
 llate, its diftance from the centre of the Aul" 
 Irian monarchy, and the diftincl interelts of its 
 fovereigns, prefcribed a ftrid; neutrahty as its 
 only fafety in every war between the principal 
 powers, and obliged it even in peace to leek the 
 favour of France. In a word, from the Alps to 
 the ifland of Malta (for here likewife the politics 
 of France prevailed), there was no point in the 
 whole extent of Italy, except Auftrian Lombardy, 
 in which France did not alone, or more than any 
 other European cabinet, influence the relations, 
 and dire(5l the condu6l of all. 
 
 The authority it enjoyed during leveral centu- 
 ries at Constantinople, even till the beccinnino" 
 of the revolution, is well known. The fecurity of 
 the Turkifh frontiers againli the undertakings of 
 its enterpriling neighbours, the principal objecSt 
 of this ancient alliance, equally ufcfal to Fran:e 
 and the Porte, had indeed in a g-cdt mcafurc 
 ceafed to be fulfilled during the laft thirty years ; 
 but this was not To much owing to the weakneis 
 of the French cabinet, and the diminution of hs 
 influence in the affairs of Europe, as to the pe- 
 culiar fituation of the Porle itfelf. The decay of 
 
 the
 
 ( iio ) 
 
 the Tarkifh empire mud be attributed to the bad* 
 nefs of its conftltution, the errors of its adminif- 
 tration, the defects in every part of its mihtary 
 fyftem, and, above all, to the increafing difpro- 
 portion between the always improving govern- 
 ments of Europe, and the barbarous Atiatic 
 policy of the Ottoman court. While all other 
 nations were progrellively civilized, cultivated, 
 and enriched ; Turkey, ftill adhering to long- 
 exploded principles and fuperflitious cufloms, 
 made no advance whatever. The efforts of 
 France, and the mutual jealoufies of its neigh- 
 bours, long preferved it from total ruin ; but the 
 internal principle of dilfolution overpowered 
 thefe adventitious aids; the duration of this em- 
 pire became every day more problematic, and at 
 lall; its final ruin appeared to be at hand. The 
 miniftry of Lewis XV. ought certainly to have 
 thpported this important ally more effectually 
 againft the attempts of Rufiia ; and they added 
 to the error here committed, by abandoning the 
 Porte entirely at the peace of 1774. But this 
 fault is confidcrably letfcned, and in fome degree 
 excuied, by the difhculties involving a contrary 
 conduct. The bulinefs of defending an ally fa 
 deaf to the fuggefiions of Ibund politics ; fo care- 
 lefs of the means of its own fafety ; fo averfe from 
 and incapable of any joint undertaking, and op- 
 pofcd to a power fo diftant from France, fo near 
 
 to
 
 ( III ) 
 
 to itfelf; would have embarraffed the boldefi and 
 mod enterpriiing miniltry. Yet, notwithfland- 
 ing all the changes which happened in Europe, 
 the influence of the French court at Conftanti- 
 nople remained undirainifhed ; and had It not 
 been for the French revolution, it would have 
 continued entire until the total diflblution of the 
 Turkilh empire, an event which France would 
 certainly have ipared no efforts to retard. 
 
 Russia was the only leading Itate over which 
 France never enjoyed any permanent influence. 
 The reafon of this is evident : their general in- 
 (erefls in the balance of Europe, which they mu- 
 tually though lacitly concurred to fupport, was 
 the only important objecl common to tlie politics 
 of France and Ruflia. Their principal point 
 of conta(^, the intcrefts of Turkey, was necef- 
 farily a fourcc of con (t ant oppofition between 
 them. England, moreover, by her great com- 
 mercial connexions with Ruflia, had from tlie be- 
 ginning of the eighteenth century gradually 
 weakened, and at length almolt annihilated the 
 influence of tlie French court at St. Peterl- 
 buroh(, 
 
 't3 
 
 Notwithftanding this, however, it more than 
 once revived when a favourable opportunity oc- 
 curred ; and in the year 1787 produced an ad- 
 
 vantageous
 
 ( 112 ) 
 
 vantageous treaty of commerce between the two 
 cations. This treaty would indeed have been 
 dearly purchafed by France if the deftrudion of 
 the Turkifh empire had been the price of it. Bat 
 the general fyftcm of Europe was then fo happily 
 organized, that France might fafely regard that 
 cataftrophe as diftant and improbable. Two 
 powerful weights were oppofed to the preponde- 
 rance of Ruflia : Auftria, if divided from it, was 
 always ready to counteract its attempts upon 
 Turkey; if not, Prufha maintained the balance; 
 and the hiftory of the laft Turkifli war fufhciently 
 proves that Pruffia was equal to the talk. Thus 
 the greateft danger which France could ever 
 dread from Rufiia, was averted without any im- 
 mediate effort of its own. 
 
 There was another and a very iinportant point, 
 on which it ought to have oppolcd the plans of 
 Ruflia at an early period. So long as Poland ex- 
 ited, an extenfive influence in all the north of 
 Europe was fecured to France. The flrft par- 
 tition of that country paved the way for its fub- 
 fequent annihilation ; and France beheld that par- 
 tition with unexpe61ed indifference. This was a 
 great and unpaidonable fault; the greater too, 
 as France might probably have averted that blow 
 without recourfc to arms, by a decided inter- 
 ference only ; and perhaps by a Ample negotia- 
 tion
 
 ( "3 ) 
 
 lion with Auftria, who, of all the powers con- 
 cerned in the partition, had the fmallefl intereft 
 in it, and evidently the leafl inclination towards 
 the meafure. The fault was fo much the greater, 
 as the partition of Poland required the mod un- 
 ufual of all combinations, the mofl dangerous 
 to France, and at the fame time that which Ihe 
 might the mofl: eafily have prevented — the coin- 
 cidence of Ruflia, Pruflia, and Auftria. No 
 one will attempt to juftify or even excufe this 
 fault, which fufhciently proves the profound 
 lethargy of the French miniflry in the laft years of 
 Lewis XV, : but its confequences were in reality 
 Icfs prejudicial to France than is commonly fup- 
 pofed. The formation and execution of fuch a 
 plan in the very light of France, was for her 
 the moft unfavourable circumflance attending: it : 
 but the political difcredit of that condutl could 
 in fa6l only attach to the miniflry and govern- 
 ment guilty of fuch negUgence. In the place 
 where I fhall difcufs the relations of the powers 
 concerned in that partition, I fhall endeavour to 
 prove that the treaty of 1 772 neither deftroyed nor 
 materially injured the balance of Europe, fo as 
 to hurt the interefts of France ; that it was even 
 ufeful to her in fome rcfpedls ; that her influence 
 in Poland was ftill confiderable ; and that the 
 total diffolution of that kingdom, though un- 
 doubtedly prepared, was by no means decided, 
 by tlie firit partition. 
 
 I Though
 
 ^ ( ^14 ) 
 
 Though France was not fufficiently active in 
 oppoling the fubjedion of Poland, fhe was, on the 
 other hand, more fuccefsful in directing the affairs 
 of Sm-edenj according to her own interell:. An 
 unhappy conftitution, which, under the appear- 
 ance of fecuring the prerogatives of the ftates, 
 introduced fadlion and diforder, had, iince the 
 3'ear 1720, deprived that kingdom of all dignity 
 and confequence, and gradually converted it into 
 a province of Ruffia. By the fubverfion of this 
 conftitution, the deliverance of the King of 
 Sweden, and the reitoration of that independence 
 io the government, without which it was but a 
 povverlefs fa6lion ; it was evident that Ruffia 
 mufl be deprived of one of the chief inftruments 
 of its preponderance in the North. The French 
 miniflry accomplifhed this important revolution. 
 The plan was formed at Paris ; the King of 
 Sweden was from thence dirc6led and encouraged 
 to this great undertaking, and relying on the 
 friendfhip of France, he achieved it in a man- 
 ner equally fortunate and ludden. This event, 
 fo favourable to the influence of France in the 
 North, and fo contrary to the vvifhes of the court 
 of Pctcrfburg, was brought about in the year 
 1772 ; at a time when the miniflry of Verfailles 
 feemed to have reached the lafi: flage of indolence 
 and weaknefs : how can we then believe that 
 France had ceafed to hold an important place in 
 the general fyf^cm of Europe ? 
 
 )Vhat
 
 ( 115 ) 
 
 What happened in Holland in the year 1787, 
 can only be a proof of the momentary weaknefs, 
 by no means of the utter decay, of the political 
 influence of France. The changes Urought 
 about in that country by England and Pruffia 
 were certainly hoftile to the interefls of France. 
 They were indeed doubly prejudicial to her : they 
 ilrengthened the party which had aKyays been in 
 oppofition to France ; and they threw the go- 
 vernment of the United ProvinceSj probably for a 
 long time, into the arms of Great Britain. But 
 what, after all, was this mighty change, when 
 confidered in a proper light ? The momentary fub- 
 je6\ion of a party, which France had long fup- 
 ported ; which had often triumphed by heraflifl- 
 ance ; and was far from being fubdued for ever *. 
 This party, encouraged, and more than once 
 armed, by France, had, during more than a 
 century, made head againfl its rival. The latter 
 took advantage of the moment when the violence 
 and extravagance of its adverfaries induced two 
 great powers to offer protection to the Houfe of 
 Orange ; at which time the domeftic troubles of 
 France precluded the chance of any effecfual op- 
 pofition from her. The attempt was fuccefsful ; 
 but the feeds of divilion remained ; andafewyears 
 would have fhown that there ftill exifted an Anti- 
 prange fadion and French interefl in Holland^ 
 
 * Vide Note I, 
 
 1 2. even
 
 ( "6 ) 
 
 even if the ftorms of the revolution had not fo foon 
 difclofed the true ftate of parties there, and the 
 meafure of their refpedlive llrength. 
 
 The revolution which took place in Holland 
 in the year 1787, was the efFedl of a concurrence 
 of circumftances, which cannot with juftice bo 
 faid to have occafioned any permanent change in 
 the balance of Europe. It lowered, for a time, 
 the political credit of the French miniftry ; but 
 did not deftroy it. Befides which, it does not 
 properly belong to the period hitherto the fubjedl 
 of our reafoning. We are fpeaking of the litu- 
 ation of Europe before the French revolution, 
 which, with refpedl to France, though not to 
 Europe in general, had certainly commenced in 
 the year 1787; though the fcenes of that time 
 were only preparatory to the fubfequent import-^ 
 ant cataftrophes. 
 
 I think I have proved, 
 
 ifV, That, during the period we have been 
 fpeaking of, the political fecurity of France was 
 as great and as firmly cftabliflied in every cffen- 
 tial point, as could bedefired or imagined ; that 
 her geographical fituation, the nature of her 
 frontiers, the magnitude of her internal refources, 
 and even the general interefis of furrounding 
 
 nations,
 
 ( "7 ) 
 
 nations^ combined not only to fupport that 
 fecurity, but to enfure it in the completed 
 manner. 
 
 adly, That the influence of France in the fe- 
 deral lyftem of Europe was fully adequate to her 
 real, political importance ; that it was diminifh- 
 ed fince the time of Lewis XIV. by fo much 
 only as it had then been carried too far ; and 
 that it was owing to the temporary errors of a 
 weak adminiftration, not to any unfavourable 
 change in the balance of power, nor to a pofi- 
 tive decreafe of this influence itfelf, that it failed 
 in fome particular inflances to operate with 
 energy and efFedt. 
 
 3dly, That France, till the commencement 
 of the revolution, was feared by all the greater 
 powers ; while her friendfhip and favour were 
 fought and cultivated by mod of the fmaller ; 
 that her relations with Germany were more 
 flable and advantageous than in any other pe- 
 riod of modern hiftory ; that every apprehen- 
 fion Ruffia might occafion was fufficiently coun- 
 teracted by the fltuation of the other powers ; 
 that her alliances, her patronage, or her policy, 
 enabled her to govern, exclufively or princi- 
 pally, in all the fouthern flates of Europe ; in 
 Spain, in the greater part of Italy, in Switzer- 
 land; and in Conftantinople ; and that the lofs 
 
 1 3 of
 
 ( ii8 ) 
 
 of influence fuftained by the partition of Poland 
 in the year 1772,, was repaired by a more foHd 
 and efFedlive connexion with Sweden. 
 
 4thly and laftly, That France, conlidered as 
 a maritime ftate, was more than once the fuc- 
 cefsful rival of the only nation flie had caufe to 
 fear ; that her inferiority was never permanent ; 
 .and that the laft naval war in this period was the 
 moft lliccefsful and honourable Ihe had ever 
 waged againft England. 
 
 It is this period, the peace of 1783, and the 
 time between that and the beginning of the re- 
 volution, that we muft look to in order to judge 
 of the confequence of France in the general 
 fyftem of Europe. Let thofe who can perceive 
 nothirvg but decay and diforganization ; nothing 
 but unnatural alliances, contempt of all laws, 
 and negle6l of all federal principles, in the 
 latter years of the French monarchy : let them, 
 if they have the affurance to do it, in defiance 
 of hiftory, and in oppofition to undeniable 
 truths, aflert, that France was then degraded 
 to a fubordinate rank ; was incapable of main- 
 taining the balance ; was abandoned, perfecuted, 
 and defpifed by the reft of Europe : but they 
 iliould not merely aflert all this ; they Ihould 
 prove it *. 
 
 ••+ Vide Note K. 
 
 AUSTRIA;
 
 ( 119 ) 
 
 AUSTRIA. 
 
 That dread of a dangerous preponderance on 
 the part of this ftate, which from the beginning 
 of the fixteenth, to the end of the feventeenth 
 century, had principally influenced the politics 
 of Europe, has been confidcrably diminifhcd 
 lince the treaty of Weftphalia ; and efpecially 
 -lince the wars of Lewis XIV. ; from which time, 
 whatever may have been the fecret views and 
 wifhes of her fovereigns, Auftria has more fre- 
 quently been engaged in wars for her own pre- 
 fervation, and in defence of the balance of 
 Europe, than to aggrandize herlelf. The moft 
 brilliant epoch in the hiftory of this monarchy 
 was the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
 when the imraenfe inheritance of Charles V. 
 feemed about to be again united under the 
 fceptre of its fovereigns : but the principles of 
 the political balance prevailed againft the genius 
 of Auftria and the victories of Prince Eugene ; 
 and the treaty of Utrecht placed a Bourbon 
 on the throne of Spain*. After the death of 
 Charles VI. a dangerous ftorm gathered about 
 the Houfe of Auftria. It was to its own firm- 
 nefs in the firft place, and in the next to the 
 weight which England, at this crifts, threw 
 into the fcale of the Queen of Hungary (thereby 
 again defeating the plans of France), that Auf- 
 
 * Vide Not* L. 
 
 I 4 trla
 
 ( 126 ) 
 
 tria was indebted for its prefervation from that 
 danger, and for the maintenance of her rank in 
 Europe, with the greater part, though not the 
 whole of her poffeffions. The treaty of Aix- 
 la-Chapelle reftored the Imperial houfe to its 
 former place with refpe(?l to France and the 
 German empire; only what Pruflia had wrclled 
 from it, was irretrievably loft ; and the laft at- 
 tempt to recover it, terminated unfuccefsfully, 
 after feven years of unavailing bloodlhed. 
 
 Of the principal changes in the general poli- 
 tical fyftem, during the eighteenth century, 
 there have been two advantageous and two pre- 
 judicial to the power of Auftria. The favour- 
 able events were, — i. The gradual enervation of 
 the Turks, which from the time of the treaty of 
 Paflarowitz was continually progreffive ; and, 
 adly, the alliance with France in the year 1756. 
 The firft of thefe changes delivered Auftria from 
 her moft dangerous enemy; and thus left her 
 free to devote to other objeds, a coniiderablc 
 force, formerly kept in conflant readinefs to op- 
 pofe that hoftile power. The alliance with 
 France enabled her to maintain her influence in 
 Germany, where her authority would have been 
 very much weakened if that power had formed 
 a connexion with Pruflia. Tiiis alliance like- 
 wife fecured to Auftria the undifturbed pof- 
 feflion of a province, which, on account of its 
 ^ dillance
 
 ( 121 ) 
 
 diftance from the reft, muft always have been 
 defended with difficulty, and never without 
 great expenfe. 
 
 The changes prejudicial to the Houfe of Auf- 
 tria, were, on the one hand, the extraordinary 
 aggrandizement of Ruffia ; and, on the other, 
 the growth and confolidation of the power of 
 Pruffia. The aggrandizement of Ruffia di-^ 
 miniffied the beneficial effects which the decay 
 of the Ottoman empire would otherwife have 
 had for Auftria ; and this contemptible neighbour 
 was replaced by a power, whofe ftrength and 
 ambition, whofe a61ivity and enterprifing fpirit, 
 required the conftant vigilance of the Auftrian 
 government. The elevation of Pruffia was an 
 event of the greateft importance to the Imperial 
 houfe ; it deprived it of one of its moft valu- 
 able provinces, of half its influence in Germany, 
 and much of its weight in Europe. The treaty 
 of 1756 was not an adequate corapenfation for 
 this lofs ; and it muft, on the whole, be con- 
 fefled, that the unfavourable changes confider- 
 ably overbalanced the events that were fortu- 
 nate for Aufiria in the eighteenth century. Her 
 only important acquifttion, after the death of 
 -Charles VI. was that part of Poland affigncd to 
 her by the treaty of 1772 : but that was only an 
 equivalent for limilar augmentations to the ter- 
 ritories of Ruffia and Pruffia, concerted between 
 
 thofe
 
 ( 122 ) 
 
 thofe powers. The accefTion of Auftria to that 
 treaty was more a matter of neceffity than of 
 choice*. 
 
 AuHrla has therefore, in no inJftance, deftroy- 
 ed the balance of Europe for her own advan- 
 tage. Her relative importance in the general 
 fyRem has rather been diminifhed than aug- 
 mented in the laft century ; and becaufe fhe has 
 always been inferior to France in her geogra- 
 phical, political, and federal relations, as well 
 as in her means of defence, Ihe has fufFered 
 more from the changes that took place in the 
 laft century. Perhaps, indeed, when impar- 
 tially conlidered, fhe, of all the leading powers, 
 has the jufteft grounds of complaint. 
 
 The a6tive and enterpriling character of 
 Jofeph II. produced, indeed, many projedls of 
 extending his dominions, and of rounding their 
 limits, which alarmed his neighbours, and 
 were the fubje6ls of heavy complaints of ufurp- 
 ation and ambition. But the truth is, that 
 not one of thefe projedls was carried into exe- 
 cution-f' ; and inftead of demonftrating a total 
 
 * Vide Note M. 
 
 f «' Notwithftanding the ambitious charafter of Jofeph, he 
 continued, during his whole reign, to be more alarmed for 
 the„fafety, than gratified by the extenfion of his dominions." 
 — Segur. 
 
 I want
 
 ( 123 ) 
 
 want of all federative principles, and the de- 
 ftrudlion of all political equilibrium, their fate, 
 on the contrary, affords a Itriking proof of 
 the continued exiitence of a federal conftitution, 
 of a fyftcm neither weak nor contemptible. 
 The firft of the plans of Jofeph which at- 
 tained to any degree of maturity, was that 
 which had part of Bavaria for its objedl. He 
 fcized the opportunity to execute it when the 
 younger branch of the Houfe of Wittelfbach be- 
 came extincl by the death of the Elector Maxi- 
 milian Jofeph. The refult of that undertaking 
 is well known : the King of Pruffia oppofed it 
 with arms ; the courts of Pruffia and France 
 employed all the powers of negotiation to in- 
 duce Auftria to renounce pretenfions evidently 
 unfounded. Juliicc prevailed ; and Aultria, at 
 the treaty of Teschen, received fcarcely one 
 fifteenth of the country of which fhe had claim- 
 ed the half Even that trifling acquifition was 
 purchafed by confenting to wave all future ob- 
 jections to the fucceflion of the King of Pruflia 
 to the Franconian principalities. 
 
 The fecond undertaking of the fame nature 
 was directed againft Holland. The Emperor 
 took advantage of the troubles in which a war 
 with England had involved that republic, to fet 
 up a number of pretentions which had no found- 
 ation
 
 ( 124 ) 
 
 ation but his will or power. He declared the 
 barrier treaty of 1 7 1 5 to be null and void ; re- 
 quired the limits of the Netherlands to be re- 
 fiored to the flate in which they were before 
 the treaty of Nimeguen ; and laftly, inlifled upon 
 the opening of the Scheldt, which Holland was 
 accuftomed to confider as a death-blow to her 
 commerce, and which had been exprefsly for- 
 bidden by the treaty of Weftphalia. Here was 
 one of thofc cafes in which the weaker can only 
 feek refuge againfl the ufurpation of a llronger 
 power in the common interefls of the reft, in the 
 firmnefs of their oppofition, in the juftice and 
 efficacy of their meafures. Had there no longer 
 exiftedany law ot nations, no longer any federal 
 conftitution in Europe, Holland would only have 
 had to choofe between an expeniive, and pro- 
 bably unfuccefsful war, or an unconditional 
 furrender of what conftituted much of the fe- 
 curity of her frontiers ; of Maftricht, of the fo- 
 vereignty of the Scheldt, &c. Her lituation 
 was the more critical, as the very ftate from 
 which Holland was naturally to expecl the 
 greateft affiftance, was engaged with her anta- 
 gonift in one of thofe " monftrous alliances," 
 which are now faid *' to have defiroyed the 
 very foundations of the whole political fyftem," 
 and ** to have delivered up the fmaller ftates, 
 without refourcc, at the mercy of the greater.*' 
 
 Did
 
 Did the confequence really juftify thefc finifter 
 conclufions ? The very reverfe. Notwithiiandlng 
 the importance France attached to her con- 
 nexion with Auflria, and all the advantages fhe 
 had derived from it in the American war, then 
 jufl concluded ; notwithitanding the ties of 
 blood which united the Emperor and the Houfe 
 of Bourbon ; France ftepped forward as a medi- 
 atrix in behalf of Holland, and condu61ed the 
 affairs of that ftate with all the impartiality and 
 energy of the moft enlightened politics*. The 
 Emperor was compelled to forego all his pre- 
 tenfions ; the Dutch preferved their frontier 
 towns ; the Scheldt was not opened ; and the 
 whole danger ended with the republic being 
 obliged to pay a comparatively infignificant fum ; 
 ^nd even of that, France undertook to difchargc 
 a conliderable part, in order to bring the matter 
 more fpeedily to a conclufion. 
 
 The third great proje(5l of the Emperor was 
 that which impelled him, in the year 17S8, to 
 declare war againft the Ottoman empire. A dif- 
 cuflion of the origin and progrefs of this war 
 would be foreign to my purpofe, but the termi- 
 nation and refult of it afford the ftrongeft and 
 moft irrefragable arguments againft the aifcrtion 
 that, " at the commencement of the French re- 
 
 * Vide Note N. 
 
 volution.
 
 ( 1^6 ) 
 
 volution, the balance of power was an empty 
 term." When the Turkilh war broke out, the 
 internal diflenfions of France were fiich as to 
 prevent her taking any a(9:ive part in foreign po- 
 litical relations ; yet, notwithftanding this tem- 
 porary annihilation of fo important a counter- 
 poife, the plan concerted between the powers of 
 Auftria and Ruflia was defeated by a judicious 
 combination of the remaining members of the 
 federative fyftem. The efforts of Pruffia, Eng- 
 land, and Sweden, in behalf of the Porte, pre- 
 vailed to fave her ; and the two powerful allies 
 were flopped in the midfl of their brilliant vic- 
 tories by the a61ive and energetic politics of the 
 mediating flates. Aufl.ria* reftored all her con- 
 quefts at the peace of Sziftow. I cannot but 
 look upon this treaty as among the moft re- 
 markable events in modern hiflory. The utility 
 of a fyflem of equilibrium, the efficacy of fede- 
 rative principles, the triumph of negotiation 
 over arms, have been feldom fo confpicuoufly 
 and fo honourably difplayed ; and, what is flill 
 more important to our prefent inveftigation, the 
 date of this event is the very fame at which the 
 federative fyflem is faid to have reached the laft 
 flage of diforganization and decay — the year 
 1790. 
 
 PRUSSIA.
 
 ( 127 ) 
 
 PRUSSIA. 
 
 I have fpoken, in my firft chapter, of the po- 
 litical relations of this power, and its beneficial 
 influence on the general ij, item of Europe ; and 
 it is unneceflary to repeat what I there have faid. 
 There is, however, among the general obferva- 
 tions of the Author of VEtat de la France, upon 
 the changes which have happened in the eigh- 
 teenth century, one that applies more directly to 
 PrufHa than to Ruffia or England, and which 
 appears to require a nearer examination. 
 
 He afTures us, in the firfl place, that he is far 
 from intending to condemn the efforts and fuc- 
 ccfs of thofe princes, who, taking advantage of 
 favourable circumflances, have raifed the na- 
 tions under them to unexpe6\ed power and 
 greatnefs; but the fource of the evil (fo he 
 continues after this very equitable declaration), 
 " the fource of the evil is not in the change* 
 themfelves, or in the views that led to them* 
 It lay in the improvidence of other governments, 
 carelefs of adapting their own fituations to the 
 new flate of things produced by thefe events ; 
 and in the fhortlightednefs of flatefmen, un- 
 mindful that an eftabliflied federative fyllem af- 
 fords its members, if they know their own intc- 
 reil, ample means to prevent every mcreafe of 
 power tending to dejlroy the harmony of their 
 
 relations f
 
 ( 128 } 
 
 relations, or to make every fuch aggrandizement 
 contribute to the maintenance of thufe relations, 
 without recourfe to the violent meafures of de- 
 flrudive and uncertain war." 
 
 A moment will be fufficient to convince us, 
 that, if applied to the elevation of Pruffia, this 
 cenfure is utterly unfounded*. There was only 
 one power in Europe impelled by great and ob- 
 vious interefts to relift, in every poffible iuanner, 
 the aggrandizement of Pruffia ; and the hiltory 
 of the three Silefian wars will fhow whether that 
 power beheld it with indifference. All other na- 
 tions, without exception^ were more or lefs inte- 
 refted in its favour ; though fome may at firit have 
 been averfe to it. Every man fufficiently ac-? 
 quainted with the principles of political equili-s 
 brium to calculate its confequences, mufl furely 
 have de fired fuch a change. W • have already 
 feen what advantages rcfulted from it to Ger-i 
 many ; and I have on more than one occafior\ 
 pointed out wherein it has been favourable to 
 France. Had not Pruffia rifen to her prcfent 
 grcatnefs, the independence of the Empire mufl 
 have been continually expofed to the dangers of 
 
 * It mufl evidently be directed, principally, if not exclu- 
 fively, to that event. For how the aggrandizement of Ruflia, 
 a natural confequence of its civilization, or how the afcendant 
 of England, the effect of her commerce and colonial polTef- 
 fious, could in any way have been prevented, is not very eafily 
 imagined, 
 
 internal
 
 ( 1^9 ) 
 
 internal iifurpatioh or foreign cabal. The Em- 
 peror would have aimed at abfolute dominion on 
 the one hand ; or, on the other, the greater part of 
 Germany would have been a fcene of inteftine di- 
 vifion and confufion, or a prey to the fatal influ- 
 ence of a foreign power. This was fufficient to 
 dOfnvince every enlightened flatefman, whatever 
 his perfonal inclinations, or particular principles, 
 that the influence of Pruffia was not only ufeful, 
 but necefTary. There had only been one opi- 
 nion in Europe on this point for more than thirty 
 years. It was referved for our times to give addi- 
 tional confirmation, and even an unforefeen ex- 
 tent, to this opinion ; and to fhow that circura- 
 flances might exift in which the power of Pruf- 
 fia could be ufeful even to Auflria ; could in fome 
 refpc(51s contribute even to her fecurity and wel- 
 fare. This, in the year 1789, would have been 
 called a paradox : in the year 1802, it is a fimple, 
 evident, incontrovertible truth. 
 
 There appears, therefore, no fufficient reafon 
 to have induced the potentates of Europe to pre" 
 verity in time^ the extenfion and confolidation 
 of the power of Pruffia. They would have 
 a61ed very unreafonably, had they oppofed a 
 change fo favourable to their general interefls ; 
 and the only thing they can properly be re- 
 proached with, is, their having too long rcfufed 
 
 K to
 
 ( «30 ) 
 
 to acknowledge thofe interefls ; too long and too 
 obftinately combated the acceffion of a welj^ht {o 
 happily adapted to the federal relations of the ge- 
 neral fyftem. It would be no lefs unjuft to affert, 
 that the formation of this new power was not 
 " made to contribute to the maintenance of the 
 due harmony between the former members of 
 the federal conftitution ;" for Pruffia was as hap- 
 pily and wifely interwoven in the general inte- 
 rells, as any of its former component parts, and 
 perhaps more fo. 
 
 The aggrandizement of this kingdom has only 
 in one refpet^t been prejudicial to the tranquillity 
 and fecurity of the reft. It could not immedi- 
 ately acquire the extent and folidity neceflary to 
 enfure the permanence, and anfweu all the wants 
 of its new polition. Its territory, at the end of 
 the feven years war, was not fufficiently exten- 
 live for the part it had to a6l ; its revenues were 
 not adequate to the efforts required by its fitua- 
 tion ; its provinces were fo divided, as to increafe 
 the difHculty of defending its frontiers. This in- 
 duced a neceffity of extending its limits; and 
 ^rogrejjive aggrandizement becanne in a certain 
 degree the conflant political maxim of Pruffia^ 
 as the only means of maintaining her influence^ 
 and a rule of fclf-prefervation. This refllefs adli- 
 vity frequently rendered her a fubjecl of appre- 
 
 3 henlion
 
 ( 'S.' ) 
 
 hcnfion to her neighbours, until Ihe had firmly 
 efiabhrhcd hcrfelf: and the plans thereby pro- 
 duced, even divefted of all ambitious inotiyes, 
 were fuch as to render the Pruflian fyftem ex- 
 trcmel) inimical to the fpirit of the law of nations. 
 Hence the partition and lubfequent annihilation 
 of. Poland. Thefe events were occafioned no 
 lefs (perhaps more) by the wants of Pruffia 
 than the ambition of Rutlia : wherefore we fhall 
 here examine more particularly their connexion 
 with the general fyflem, their charaderand effects. 
 
 I have already, in the preceding part of this 
 work, expreffed my opinion concerning the juf- 
 tice and propriety of that raeafure. This I once 
 more repeat ; and will here diftindlly declare my 
 fentinients of that and every fimilar political pro- 
 ceeding : thele are, That the principles of the fe- 
 dwal conftitution ought to be as facred in the ge- 
 neral fyltem of nations, as the laws in the inte- 
 rior of every flate ; that no political confideration, 
 whatever its importance, or general utility, can 
 excufe an adtion manifcCtly unjuft; that juftice 
 ought to be the firfl and prevailing principle in 
 all views of policy, in every poffibleconjunclure ; 
 jiiat the violation of that principle, although it 
 may occalionally and partially, or in its remote 
 or accidental effeifls, be produdive of good, is 
 ncverthelefs always ruinous in the end ; and that 
 K 2 no
 
 ( >J1 ) 
 
 tjo fituafi6n,tib wants, no declared or fecret mo- 
 tives, 110 future hope, no pretext of private or 
 general interefls, can juftify fuch a violation. 
 
 This declaration will, I hope, lufHciently ex- 
 empt me from the imputation of becoming; the 
 defender of proceedings, which, by difguifing 
 ufurpation in the cloak of juftice, by trampling 
 under foot the moft lacred principles, and by un- 
 dermining the credit of all governments in the 
 minds of all people, have brought fo many mif- 
 fortunes upon Europe. But while I thus con- 
 demn \he principle of the Polifh partition, I may 
 be permitted to differ widely from thofe opinions 
 of it's confequences, that prevail among the poli- 
 tical writers of the prefent day, efpecially with 
 regard to its influence on the balance of power. 
 After attentively confidering the fubjedl, I am 
 pcifuadcd the partition of Poland was very far 
 from being prejudicial to that balance ; which, in 
 a certain point of view, it even contributed to 
 preferve ; and that it has rather been favourable, 
 than adverfe, to the maintenance of peace and 
 
 tranquillity, in Europe. 
 
 'itC3 si: 
 
 The following are the grounds of this opinion : 
 
 ifi:. The condition of Poland prefented fuch a 
 contraft to that of its three powerful neighbours, 
 
 as
 
 ( '33 ) 
 
 as was highly unfavourable as well to the foreiga 
 relations, as to the domeftic welfare of the for- 
 mer. Two of thofe powers had made very conr 
 liderable progrefs in every branch of national 
 wealth and civilization ; and the third, though 
 by no means fo far advanced (in forac refpecls 
 even behind Poland), was at leaft evidently in a 
 ftate of improvement. Poland, on ttie other 
 hand, was reftrained from any material advance- 
 ment by a conftitution which was a continual 
 fource of anarchy ; which indeed was nothing 
 more itfelf than conftituted anarchy. And though 
 the fpirit of reform had been powerfully excited 
 in this kingdom in the laft ten years, before its abo- 
 lition, though it at length produced the plan of a 
 more regular form of government, and had even 
 proceeded to put it in execution ; ftill it is evi- 
 dent the dilproportion between its ilrength and 
 that of the furrounding ftates would have con- 
 tinued ; and confidering the ftart thofe nations 
 had got before it, the lapfe of time would pro- 
 bably have ferved to increafe, rather than dimi- 
 nifh the difference. The neceffary confequence 
 of this difproportion was the continual depend- 
 ance of Poland upon one of its neighbours ; 
 and the confequence of that dependance was 
 the continuance of domeftic faction, foreign cabal, 
 and inteftine diffenlions. Such would have been 
 the fate of that unhappy country, whatever the 
 K 3 nature
 
 ( '34 ) 
 
 nature of its new conftitution. This focus of 
 diforder, formed in an adive, ingenious, ardent, 
 and not unwarlike nation, muft neceflarily have 
 kept the north of Europe in conllant unealinefs 
 and alarm, would have multiplied the plans and 
 counter-plans of cabinets, and have made it ab- 
 furd to reckon upon ten fucceffive years of 
 peace. This focns has vanifhed. The great mafs 
 of territory betxVeen the Oder and the Black Sea, 
 the Carpathian Mountains and the Frozen 
 Ocean, is now governed by three fovereigns, 
 who have at leaft no conftant principle of dif* 
 order, jealoufy, and divilion between them ; who 
 ate at liberty to devote themfelves, each accord- 
 ing to his means and penetration, to, the civiliza- 
 tion and improvement of their refpedtive coun- 
 tries ; and who need only fubdue their own am- 
 bition, in order to live in peace and amity with 
 each other. All this is indeed but a feeble and 
 melancholy confolation for the deeply wound- 
 ed fpirit, the too juft indignation and regret of a 
 Polish magnate: but the judgment of every 
 impartial politician will pronounce it a great and 
 important advantage ; an advantage which all the 
 north of Europe, and perhaps Poland itfelf, will in 
 lefs tha^i a century haVe felt and acknowledged, 
 
 2d. The partition of Poland has not deftroyed 
 the equilibriuqi between the powers concerned in 
 
 it :
 
 ( «35 ) 
 
 It .; their reciprocal relations have become by fo 
 much more ftable and fecure, as they have at leall 
 in one, and that a very important refpe<St, been 
 rendered more iimple and permanent. The fliare 
 allotted to each has been in due proportion to its 
 former relative flrength and extent of territory j 
 in their common plan of aggrandizement, they 
 provided againfl the preponderance of one over 
 the others. With refped to the maintenance of 
 peace among them, it appears to me rather a fa- 
 vourable circuraflance than otherwife, that the 
 points of contadl are now fo numerous between 
 their refpedlive territories. Thefe were formerly 
 divided by a country which none of them could 
 conlider a fafeguard, becaufe it was no where 
 fortified, and not cafily defended ; but which they 
 all occafionally ufed as a magazine or a place of 
 arms ; while, by making it the theatre of their mi- 
 litary operations, they at once economized and 
 multiplied their refpedliverefources. The flighteft 
 mifunderflanding now endangers the immediate 
 interefl of all the three ilates ; wherever the war 
 Ijreaks out, it mufl be carried on in their own 
 CQuntry ; and the fqfFeripg party bears all the mif- 
 chief and deflrudjon that attends it. In this 
 itate of things, the defire of remaining at peace 
 niuft furely be more ferious and effedlual than it 
 was before. 
 
 K 4 The
 
 ( '36 ) 
 
 The balance of power was not merely uninjured 
 by the Polifh partition ; that event even tended to 
 itrengthen and improve it. The equality of the 
 partition was only apparent ; for the weaker par- 
 ties were in fa6t much greater gainers by it than 
 the flronger. This circumftance, the moll im- 
 portant of all, deferves to be more attentively ex- 
 amined. 
 
 I argue from the two following principles: if 
 two or more nations of very unequal magnitude, 
 are increafed in an exad: numerical proportion 
 (that is, with refpecH: to their territorial extent, 
 their population, revenues, &c.), the ^oliiual re- 
 iblt will always be more advantageous than in 
 that proportion to the fmaller ftate ; and if two 
 flates, of which one has its territories fufficiently 
 rounded, while the other yet wants thatcompadt- 
 nefs, extend their territories in an equal degree, 
 the advantage of the latter is without compa- 
 rifon more confiderable than that of the former. 
 
 It will be eafy to decide upon the conlequences 
 of the above partition, if thefe principles be ad- 
 mitted, and I think the truth of them is evident 
 from the very nature of the things themfelves. 
 The advantage which Pruffia derived from the 
 meafure, exceeded what accrued to the others. 
 If PrufTia, for example, acquired as many hun- 
 dred fquare miles as Ruffia did thoufands, the 
 
 real
 
 ( 137 ) 
 
 real increafe of ftrcngth refulting from thefc re- 
 fpedlive additions, was the moft important for 
 Pruliia. Hitherto all the exertions of that ftate, 
 the ftrength of its armies, the number of its for- 
 trefles, its magazines, its accumulated treafures, 
 its preparations for defence, had either exceeded, 
 or dangeroufly encroached upon the true bafis of 
 its power. That Ruffia was enabled by this ac- 
 quifition to add 20 or 30,000 men to her armies, 
 was of far lefs conlequence to her, than it was to 
 Pruflia (without any confidcrable addition to 
 her military eftablifhment) to fecure new fources 
 of riches and revenue, and to ^ive new ftrength 
 to the overftrained fprings of her bold and artificial 
 machine. With rcfpecl to the rounding of her 
 territories, fhe was perhaps a ft ill greater gainer. 
 Auftria acquired no more by the province of Gal- 
 licia than its intrinlic value : for Auftria had lon^r 
 fince been a compact and rounded Itate. But 
 Pruflia only became fuch by her fhare of the par- 
 tition of Poland, which connected her provinces, 
 till then divided and difperfed. The boundaries 
 of her territory were now in one continued line, 
 and the detached parts of her dominions were now 
 blended into afolid mafs, more capable of uniform 
 a6livity and efFe6lual reliftance. If, while one Itate 
 is merely increafed, another is at once increafcd 
 and improved in its Situation, it certainly cannot be 
 doubtful which of the two is the greater gainer *. 
 
 ♦ Vide Note O. 
 
 Thefc
 
 ( IJS ) 
 
 Thefe obfer-.-ations are decilivc in tlie prcfcnt 
 argument : they recpncile Europe to the partition 
 of Polaqd ; fo tar at leaft, as it is poflible to ac- 
 quielce in an unjuft proceeding. Pruffia mnft be 
 provided with ftrength to enable her to cope with 
 any power in Europe, in order to eftabliih ^n ef- 
 feclive balance among tlie principal fiates, and tq 
 carry the general federative lyftem to that degree 
 of perfedlion at leaft, qf which its elements, as 
 they now exitt, are capable. This is the real and 
 general intereil of Europe ; this is a principle of 
 which no one any longer doubts, wl^o confiders; 
 it with candour and impartiality, and who under- 
 llands the nature of the political balance, and fe- 
 deral conititution. Pruflia was not fo circum- 
 itanced uatil the partition of Poland. The genius 
 and beroifm of an extraordinary prince upheld it 
 forae time at a degree of elevation, which its 
 flrength at that period feepied inadequate to main^.. 
 tain : but in order to fulfil her entire deftination, 
 ilie required that degree of aggrandizement fhe 
 has attained by the Polifn partition. In this im- 
 portant point, that event has proved an additional 
 fupport to the federal cpnftitution, and a general^ 
 advantage to Europe. 
 
 4lh. If, then, th? partition of Poland was in^ 
 tlitfe refpedls conformable to the interells of 
 Europe, we Ihall be able to judge definitively of 
 
 its
 
 ( 139 ) 
 
 its effed^s, when we have decided, whether, while 
 it confirmed the balance of power between the 
 nations concerned, it did not injure the general 
 equilibrium, or materially prejudice any of the 
 other fVates. 
 
 The greater part of the ftates of Europe had 
 only a diftant interefl in the partition of Poland ; 
 to mpft of them it might have been indifferent; 
 and if any of them were particularly injured in 
 lefs important refped^s, they were amply compen- 
 fated by the great general advantage produced by 
 the change. There were only two powers that 
 could be immediately affedledby it : the Otto- 
 ^ MAN Porte, and France. 
 
 The partition of Poland was prejudicial to the 
 Ottoman empire, becaufe it gave new ftrength 
 to the two powers capable of hurting it, and which 
 threatened it with ruin. No flatc in Europe, 
 therefore, was fo firongly urged by its interefts to 
 oppofe that partition, as the governmcLt of Tur- 
 key. But the ftupid indifference with which the 
 Divan beheld proceedings fo dangerous to its ex- 
 iflencc, was the ftrongc!! proof of a total want 
 of policy, as well as ftrength, in this degraded 
 empire ; fhowed that its vital principle was ex- 
 hanfted' ; that it ftood upon the verge of diffolu- 
 tion. No external combination could uphold 
 it ftate, whofe decline was the rcfult of caufes fo 
 
 deeply
 
 ( I40 } 
 
 deeply rooted. The partition of Poland may, 
 perhaps, have accelerated its ruin ; but even fup- 
 poling this to have been one of its confequences, 
 it will fiill be a queftion which future experience 
 can alone decide, whether it will in that refpe<3: 
 have been a fource of good or evil. 
 
 T'kANCE, by this partition, was deprived of her 
 former influence in Poland. In order to form a 
 proper judgment of the magnitude of this loft, 
 let us firft examine, upon juft principles, the trilie 
 nature of that influence. 
 
 France, as we have already ieen, enjoyed 
 the higheft degree of fecurity in her fituation, 
 ihe ftrength of her frontiers, and her internal 
 means of defence, that any nation could poflibly 
 attain. In this firfl: and moft important of all 
 political confiderations, Ihe v/as not merely fa- 
 voured above every other country : thefe ad- 
 vantages belonged exclufively to her ; there was 
 nothing wanting to render them complete, no- 
 thing that fhe could wifh for or deli re. INo power 
 in Europe could look with the fame indifl^erence 
 as France upon every change in the relative 
 ilrengths of the refl-. Her fecurity could not be 
 greater ; her independence could not be more 
 complete. The partition of Poland produced no 
 eiFedl upon the French monarchy with refpe6l to 
 
 thefe
 
 { I4t ) 
 
 thefe advantages ; and as to the additional labi- 
 lity accruing from the excellence of her federal 
 relations, nobody will aflert, or I am fure no- 
 body will prove, that it experienced any diminu- 
 tion by that partition. The relations of Auftria, 
 Ruffia, and Pruffia, and of France with all of 
 them, remained upon the whole unaltered ; nay 
 more, if in any refpe^l they were changed, the 
 alteration was in favour of France ; for the ag- 
 grandizement of Pruffia, whatever its effects 
 upon the politics of the moment, could not but 
 be ultimately falutary and beneficial to her. 
 
 It Is therefore evident that France could re- 
 ceive no real detriment from the partition in quef- 
 ticn. She loft her immediate influence in Poland, 
 that is, the right, or the power of fomenting, and, 
 perhaps, multiplying faction and cabal ; of add- 
 ing to the caufes or pretexts of commotion ; of 
 perpetuating confuflon and anarchy in that un- 
 fortunate kingdom *. A lofs of that nature wa3 
 furely not prejudicial to the federal fyftem of 
 Europe: no upright and enlightened ftatetman 
 would deplore fuch a lofs, even though his own 
 country were the lofer. 
 
 * Had France been able to introduce and maintain a good 
 conftitution in Poland, flie ought undoubtedly to have fpared 
 no effort to accoraplifli it. But as things flood at that time, 
 fueh an undertaking would have exceeded the powers even 
 of a Lewis XIV. 
 
 5th.
 
 ( H^ ) 
 
 5Jh. All thefe arguments will not only apply 
 
 to the firlt partition of Poland, but lilccwile ta 
 
 tbe lublequcnt partitions, and final abolition of 
 
 that kingdom *. The eventSj however, are per- 
 
 fc(5^1y diftind : the abolition was by no means a 
 
 necefifary confequence of the treaty of 1772. 
 
 Had Poland remained in the flate it .vas placed 
 
 in by that treaty, France would have been in 
 
 every reipe6t a gainer. She would then have 
 
 united the advantages accruing to the general 
 
 lyftem of Europe from the partition of 1772, 
 
 with the uninterrupted continuance of her influ- 
 
 ence in the remaining kingdom of Poland. That 
 
 kin<z;dom was ftill confiderable, and might, not- 
 
 withftanding its paft misfortunes, have played 
 
 an important part in the north of Europe, had 
 
 its means been more profitably and judicioufly 
 
 applied. From the year 1788 the true method 
 
 of accomplifhing this had been actually adopted ; 
 
 and it was only in the general confufion and dil- 
 
 order introduced by the French revolution into 
 
 all political relations, that the independence of 
 
 Poland could have been annihilated without op- 
 
 polition. All eyes were fixed on the bloody 
 
 fcenes created by the difturbances in France ; all 
 
 attention was engrofled by the war which thole 
 
 difturbances had produced. The diffolution of 
 
 Poland feemed only an unimportant epifode, 
 
 which did not even attradl the regard, much lef^ 
 
 * Vide Note P. 
 
 awaken
 
 ( H3 ) 
 
 awaken tlic aflivlty, or call forth llie effeclual 
 opposition of Europe in general. 
 
 The partition of Poland is one of the events 
 on which the enemies of the former fyltem of 
 Europe dwell with peculiar plcafurc; the fa- 
 vourite theme of the admirers of the French re- 
 volution ; of all thofe, who more or lefs endeavour 
 to juftify the violent proceedings, the ufurpations 
 and fubverfions, of the laft ten years. That no 
 precedent or example of one atSl of injuftice can 
 juftify or excufe the commiffion of another, and 
 that fuccefsful violations of right can never 
 eftablifli the legitimacy of fubfequent limilar 
 violations, is fufhciently obvious to thofe who 
 regard principles as fomething more than mere 
 forms of fophiftry. But, alas ! the immutable 
 principles of juftice prevail but little in the com- 
 merce of the world or the ordinary fphere of ftate 
 policy. They are fpeedily lilenccd, when any 
 great interefi: ftands, or appears to Hand, in op- 
 pofition to them. Thus ha^-c thofe perfons who 
 maintain the neceffity and utility of the late 
 changes in the federative iyftcm, reprcfcnted the 
 partition of Poland as an event not only 
 highly unjuft, but extremely prejudicial; as 
 having dellroyed the balance of power, and 
 at once prepared and juftiiied tlie total fub- 
 verfion of the ancient political cdilice. It ap- 
 peared
 
 ( 144 ) 
 
 peared to me of thegreateft confequence to refute 
 fuch arguments, and to fhow that the partition 
 of Poland, however unjuft in its principle, was 
 not in its coniequences fo detrimental as has 
 been reprefented ; that it has rather tended to 
 ftrengthen than undermine the political fyftem; 
 and has neither been an immediate nor collateral 
 caufe of new revolutions or ufurpations. I fhall 
 have fufficiently fulfilled this intention, if the 
 foregoing obfervations are not found deftitute of 
 foundation ; and at the fame time fhall have 
 combated and difarmed the feverefl cenfure upoa 
 the former political ftate of things in Europe ; 
 as far as it could be done without departing from 
 a ftridl adherence to facred principles. 
 
 RUSSIA. 
 
 The Ruffian empire, from the firft moment 
 of its elevation to a place among the principal 
 flates of Europe, polfeffed every foundation of 
 power requifite and dcfirable for a nation of the 
 firft rank ; fuch as many others had been unable 
 to acquire by centuries even of fuccefsful efforts. 
 Its immenfe extent, its remote fituation, its great 
 military refources, and the dread with which it 
 infpired its neighbours, aflbrcd to it a degree of 
 ftability and fecurlty, of which no other ftate in 
 Europe, except France, could boa ft. There 
 I was
 
 ( Hj ) 
 
 ^\■as none that To little required a continued In* 
 lluence in the relations and affairs of the reft ; 
 yet we fnould look in vain for a nation, whofe 
 territory is produ(5live of materials, fo numerous 
 and valuable, by which to eftablifh the mofi: 
 important connexions with all the nations of 
 Europe ; and, without any violent mealures, to 
 open a iburce of extcnfive, continual, and at 
 the fame time always peaceful influence. 
 
 The conftant reftleffnefs of this flrate, and the 
 plans of conquefl and aggrandizement which its 
 rulers inceifantly agitated, were partly owing to 
 the natural, though not laudable, propcnfity of 
 the human mind, to arrive by the ftiorteft vvay at 
 an objccSt in view. They attempted to fuperfede the 
 neccffity of gradual and peaceful cultivation (the 
 moll certain and honourable method according 
 to found policy, though fometimes flow and 
 troublefome), by hafty and violent meafures. 
 They originated likewife in the impatience and 
 ambition of princes, who overlooked the trea- 
 fures they polTelfed, and forgot their domeftic 
 concerns in the purluit of diitant obje6ls. If 
 the fovereigns of this immenfe empire had not 
 only devoted a part of their attention and their 
 means, as iorae of them have laudably done, but 
 had dire(5led their whole aiftivity inceflantly and 
 excluflvely to the cultivation of their fertile pro- 
 L vinces,
 
 ( I4<5 ) 
 
 vincfts, and the civil izatiotl of their Tabjecls j if* 
 they had made a proper ufe of their natural ad- 
 vantages ; Ruffia would have been one of the 
 moft fiourifhing monarchies in the world, with- 
 out any wars of aggrandizement ; and the reigns 
 of Peter I. and Catherine II» would have been 
 the adiuiration of Europe in a much more ex- 
 alted fenfe than they now are*. 
 
 The addition made tp this empire by Peter the 
 Gfeat, when he acquired the provinces on the 
 Baltic, was more juftifiable by the nature of his 
 internal wants, and confequently more confiflent 
 with the principles of found policy, than any of 
 the Ruffian conquefts in the eighteenth century. 
 But the plans of his fucceflbrs moftly originated 
 in unbounded thirll of fame and dominion, or 
 miftaken ideas of the true interefis and flrength 
 of nations ; and fome of them were excited by 
 cofmo-political dreams of the fplendour of pair 
 times. Thefe plans deferved the oppofition they 
 met with, and would have jultified a greater. 
 As extravagant as they were arbitrary, they 
 troubled the peace of Europe in the north and 
 qaft ; they excited wars, without even the flightell 
 pretext of juftice ; and were wanton invafions 
 of the balance of Europe abfolutely unneceilary 
 to the real interefts of Ruffia. While the cabi- 
 net of Peterlburgh agitated projcds of this na- 
 
 * Vide Note Q. 
 
 ture,
 
 ( 147 ) 
 
 turejRuffia was the conftantobjed of the vigilance 
 and anxiety, of the plans and counter-plans of 
 all the neighbouring powers, and of every itatef* 
 man in Europe. 
 
 Thefe are truths that cannot be difputed. But 
 have the numerous proje<5ls and refllefs a6tivity 
 of Ruflia, has the Tuccefs that crowned fome of 
 her enterpriles, materially alFcdled the political 
 fyftem, or deftroyed the balance of Europe ? 
 This is a queftion of a very different nature ; and 
 if the reverie of all this be fully eftablifhed by 
 an appeal to experience, the cololTal power, the 
 enormous ambition of Rulfia, will ferve to de- 
 monftrate the f^rength, not the weaknefs, of the 
 former federative fyftem ; will prove the wifdom 
 of a conftitution which all the efforts of a power 
 fo great, fo unruly, and fo ambitious of prepon- 
 derance, were unable to overwhelm. 
 
 If we confider the condition of the RufHan 
 empire at the death of Catherine II. we fhall 
 find its efFe61ive ftrength by no means adequate 
 to the extravagant ideas generally entertained by 
 her coteraporaries. Its population, riches, and 
 revenues, were not in proportion to its lize, 
 or to the extent and boldnefs of the projects of 
 its government. Its armies were not much fu- 
 perior, even in numbers, to thofe which Auftria, 
 L 2, France,
 
 ( 148 ) 
 
 France, or PralTia, could any of them fend inia 
 the fxcld ; and they were inferior in point of ef- 
 fe(5^ive firength, if we confider the territorial 
 magnitude of the Ruffian monarchy, and the 
 difiiince of its central point from the principal 
 "theatres of war. Ruffia, notwith (landing her 
 for-nidahle appearance, was not more povverfol 
 than France or Anflria, nor perhaps much more 
 powerful than even Pruffia : for we are to com- 
 pare not merely the mafs, but the nature of their 
 refpective forces, the facility of moving and ap- 
 plying them to difrerent points, and the policy 
 by wliich they were directed. There was al- 
 ways, therefore, more tlian one power lufficient 
 by itfelf to counterbalance the weight of Ruffia ; 
 and we are informed by hiftory that the ambi- 
 tion of the court of Peterfburgh has often l>een 
 effectually checked even in its molt favourite 
 undertakings. 
 
 The firft partition of Poland (for the others re- 
 fjlted from clreumftances quite unconnetled 
 with any combinations of federal politics) ap- 
 pears to ftand in contradiction to this affi^rtion, 
 Ruffia was then affifled in the execution of her 
 plans by the two dates whofe fcparate and con- 
 tJ-ary interells afford the mofl eiFe61ual barrier 
 to her undertakings, and on whom the northern 
 »nd eaflern powers rely for the maintenance af 
 
 their
 
 ( 149 ) 
 
 Ihcir independence. But this tranfient union of 
 Aiiltria, Pruflia, and Ruffia, was a fm^ular phe- 
 iionif aon, produced by a conjundtion ot extra- 
 ordinary circum fiances, ailifted by the genius o( 
 one of the grealefl: men of any age, and beyond 
 the Iphere of all tl:e calculations of ordinary 
 politics. Such phenomena miift always defeat 
 them ; they exceed the limits of the ic iencc, and 
 expofe its infuiiiciency. x\ fimilar combin-atioa 
 will, pcriiaps, not occur in the courlii of many 
 centuries ; it could never lall ^ its permanence 
 would be in contradiction to the nature of things, 
 and to the neceflary order of all political rela/- 
 tions. An intimate connexion between Ruflia 
 and Auftria, ncceflarily excites the jealouly of 
 PrufRa and her allies ; while fuch a connexion 
 between RulTia and Prullia muft awaken that of 
 Aufiria and the nations in aHiance with her*. 
 Thus was a conflant and neceflary counterba- 
 lance oppofed to every alliance between Ruffia 
 and either of thole powers ; and fhe has often 
 felt, but never more remarkably than in her la ft 
 war with Turkey, that this was fufficient to de- 
 firoy the effecls of all her dangerous proje.c^ts. 
 
 The views of the Emprels were on that oc- 
 cafion alfiited by Aufiria. In oppolltion to 
 every rule of found policy, Jofcph 11. engaged 
 In a war, which^ even if crowned with the moil 
 
 * Vide Note R. 
 
 L 3 complete
 
 ( 150 ) 
 
 complete fuccefs, could never have contributed 
 to his real interefls. Whatever he could expe6l 
 to gain by it, cannot, for a moment, be com- 
 pared with the danger of throwing the greateft 
 and moil valuable part of the Ottoman empire 
 into the hands of Ruffia. It is more than pro- 
 bable that the Emperor, in moments of calmer 
 reflection, became fenlible of his true lituation ; 
 more than probable that he would have re*- 
 nounced the undertaking before the total annihi- 
 lation of Turkey. He purfued it, however, with 
 extraordinary zeal fo long as the firfl enthufiafm 
 was unabated ; and it is not eafy to pronounce 
 what confequences thefe joint proceedings might 
 ■Jiave produced, if an alarm for the balance of 
 Europe had not excited an oppolition in another 
 quarter, which fpeedily put an end to the danger 
 of the Porte, 
 
 The hlftory of this war has convinced all 
 thofe who faw, in imagination, the giant ftrength 
 of Ruflia redoubled by a fecond throne in Con- 
 llantinople, that the fyftem of Europe is not 
 without refources even againft the menacing 
 preponderance of this formidable flate. Not only 
 Pruffia prepared to oppofe the defigns of Ruflia, 
 even Encrland became the foul of an Anti-ruffian 
 confederary ; England, who might perhaps have 
 beheld the aggrandizement of that empire with 
 
 lefs
 
 ( iSi ) 
 
 icfs cancern than any other power. All the 
 hopes of the two moft powerful and ambitious 
 monarchs in Europe were inftantly defeated. 
 The King of Sweden, though not fufficiently 
 fupported, Itept forward, unexpectedly, an 
 active and dangerous antagonift of Ruffia ; he 
 planned the Emprefs in the heart of her empire ; 
 he made her tremble for the fafety of her capital, 
 and proved that evep flates of the fecond order, 
 when favoured by political combinations, may 
 arrefl or rcftrain the undertakings of the molt 
 powerful by timely diverlions. On the other 
 hand, the Kin^ of Pruflia, after having feparated 
 Ruflia from her ally, by the treaty of Reichenr 
 bach, and thus deftroyed the itrength of the 
 alliance, menaced the frontier of her empire 
 with a numerous array. The treaty of Jaily 
 completed the prefervation of the Porte ; and the 
 city of Oczakow was the only conquefl retained 
 by RufHa, the folitary fruit of all licr bloody 
 viClories. 
 
 fhus did the federal confiitution of Europe 
 poffefs fufficient flrength and (lability to refift, 
 cffecftually, the preponderance even of Ruflia, 
 however irrefifiible it miglU appear ; and Ruflia 
 was compelled to move within the limits afligncd 
 io her by the principles of the political balance, 
 jiotwithfianding the many advantages of her fitu- 
 L 4 ation.
 
 ( '5^ ) 
 
 ation, her gigantic diraenfions, her apparently in- 
 exhauftible ftrength, and the enterprifing and 
 ambitious charaders of lier fovereigns. 
 
 ENGLAND. 
 
 I am, at prefent, only examining the political 
 ilate ot Europe before the French revolution. It 
 is, therefore, in her political relations alone, 
 Ihat England can here come under conlideration. 
 Her commercial conftitution, with its influence 
 upon the reft of Europe, will be the fubjed of a 
 feparate chapter. A fubjed fo extenfive artd im- 
 portant requires a difiincl and particular difcuf- 
 fion ; it will be as much for the advantage of the 
 reader, as it is the intereft of the writer, to keep 
 it entirely unmixed with every thing foreign to it. 
 
 I fhall prepare the way for fome obfervations 
 on the political fituation of England, by quoting 
 the author of the Etat de la France : the follow- 
 ing paffage is the fubfiance, the quinteflence of 
 the opinions of French politicians on this fubjed ; 
 and the writer himfclf calls it *'' An h'iftor'tcal 
 Kecaptulat'ton of tjm Offences committed ^y one 
 Nation, ayid of the Grievances of aJl tre rest." 
 
 " We have feen how the Englifh govern- 
 ment," fuch are the words of this remarkable 
 
 paflagCj
 
 ( 153 ) 
 
 paffagc, " (rufting to its lituation (beyond the 
 reach of all continental ambition), and rely- 
 ing on the refources derived from a fublidizing 
 commerce, adapted its political conduct to the 
 national views of commercial aggrandizement, 
 extenfion, and ufurpation ; how it encouraged 
 every principle of difcord among the powers of 
 ihe continent to divide and weaken them ; how 
 it every where afTumed commercial preferences; 
 how it formed engagements, of which the tcnour 
 and duration were determined by its own conve- 
 nience ; how it meddled in all political difputes 
 to embitter them, and infinuatcd itfclf iwto all 
 conventions to difTolve them ; how it opprefled 
 every country in Europe lucceffivcly with the 
 burden of its lliccours, inceflantly making 
 changes in the fyflem of exifting relations, pro- 
 ducing falfe combinations of intcrefl and power, 
 and creating a partial ephemeral balance in op- 
 polition to the principles of the general equili- 
 brium ; in fhort, how it fucceihvely turned to 
 account the weaknefs or the Itrength, (he ambi- 
 tion or the prudence, the harmony or difcord of 
 all nations, great or fmali, by carefully infiaraing 
 the pallions, and taking advantage of the wants, 
 the dangers, and the alarms of the moment; 
 profiling by the confufion of a multitude of 
 intcreffs, almoft all at variance with each other, 
 ib as tp eftablifh, by its owii pcrfeverance and 
 
 uniformity,
 
 ( »54 ) 
 
 uniformity, a diftlndt intercil:, the fole objed 
 of all its views — that of its power rivalling 
 every other power ; that of its commercial fyf- 
 tem rivalling and excluding the commerce of 
 every other country." — The author alTures us 
 that this pii^iure has been drawn without anger 
 or malice. Of this he would perhaps find it 
 difficult to convince even his ov.'n countrymen, 
 at leaft the enlightened part of them. But what- 
 ever may have been his intentions or his feelings 
 in this ftatcment, it is our duty to proceed with- 
 out anger or malice to examine it. 
 
 Whether the interefls of Great Britain, her 
 induftry and commerce, are indeed fo oppofite 
 to thofe of all other nations ; and whether her 
 government can find its real advantage, in the 
 conduS of which it here Hands accufed ; thefe 
 are queftions I cannot difcufs until I enter at 
 large upon the commercial relations of that 
 country. The prefent fubje<5l of our conlidera- 
 tion is, whether it has reallv fo adled in the 
 courfe of the eighteenth century ? and whether 
 that which the author denominates Jn h'ljlorical 
 Recapitulation of its offences, is fupportcd an(^ 
 confirmed by the evidence of hiflory? 
 
 This long firing of acculations, when properly 
 confidered, is reduced to a fingle charge ; the 
 
 ftatcd
 
 ( "55 ) 
 
 dated crimes of the Britifh government are no- 
 thing more than her offences againft France. Il 
 is evident that England, from the remoteft time, 
 but more cfpecially fince the decay of Spain, has 
 had but one perpetual enemy in the whole circle 
 of Europe. It requires no argument to prove 
 that the Britifh government muft deiire to be at 
 peace with all the world, except France * ; that 
 the weakeft and moft ignorant, the maddeft ad- 
 ininiftration (if fuch an one could ever be placed 
 at the head of affairs in England), would never 
 .wantonly abandon fo obvious a principle ; that 
 to foment or engage in continental wars, could 
 never be conducive even to the momentary in- 
 terefts of Great Britain ; that England poffeffes 
 not the means of invading the powers of the 
 continent, and can never become dangerous to 
 the independence of other nations by projects of 
 conquell or ambition ; and that, with refpect to 
 political relations, every idea of ufurpation, 
 dommion, or tyranny, on the part of the Britifli 
 government, muft not only be unfounded, but 
 in the higheft degree abfurd and ridiculous. 
 
 Thcfc indifpufable truths are confirmed by 
 the hiftory of a whole century. All the wars in 
 which England has been cnjra<red, were either 
 immediately and exclulively with France, or 
 occalioned by events in which France was prin- 
 
 * Vide Note S. 
 
 cipally
 
 ( '$6 ) 
 
 dpally concerned*. France was always the ob- 
 jed, and the only objed, Hie had in view in all 
 her alHances, her fubfidics, her efforts' by land 
 and Tea. This at length became the ible bafis 
 of Britifh pohtics ; lb that the naval ind -niii- 
 tary fyllem of Great Britain was ciiahliihed with 
 reference to France exclufively, and directed 
 entirely againft her. This obfcrvation jullilies, 
 in the firft place, the caution with which every 
 j-eafonable and impartial perfon in Europe 
 ought to receive accufations as^ainit England, 
 from the pen of a French writer -j- : it weakens, 
 befidcs, inafmuch as it liraplifies, the mafs of 
 \yhat is called the offences of or^E iJ ation, and 
 the grievances of all the rest. With reipedV 
 to political relations, England can never have 
 ilnncd againft ^11 other nations, but by injuries 
 done to France. The queftioq between EiUgland 
 and Europe is, in every pofiible cafe, reduced 
 to a quetVion between Englaqd and France; 
 and the refentment, hatred, and oppofition of 
 Europe can never be awakened b,y the conduct 
 of England, except where the intercfts of 
 France and thole of Europe are the fame. 
 
 ^ Vide Note T. 
 
 t On the other hand, the paflionate declamations of an Eng- 
 lifli writer againft France ^re to he received with the fame 
 caution. There are fome honourable exceptions on either 
 fide. But 1 leave to any man acquainted with the political 
 writings of both countries, to determine confcientiouily, in 
 which thefe exceptions are molt rare. 
 
 The
 
 ( >57 ) 
 
 The following clear and limple principle will 
 therefore guide an impartial and enlightened 
 public in its judgment on the conduct of Eng- 
 land in every war in which it has been, or may 
 hereafter be engaged. 
 
 ifl, In every war between France and Eng- 
 land, of which their rcfpe6live interelis are the 
 only motives, Europe may remain an uncon- 
 cerned fpec^ator, without interfering in their fe- 
 veral rights and prctcnfions. 
 
 2dly, In every difpute or war in which the 
 conducl of France endangers the fecurity and 
 independence of other nations, the oppofition 
 of England is confillent. with the interefis of 
 Europe. 
 
 3dlyj In every war or difpute in which France 
 is in danger of being opprefTcd, difmembered, 
 or deprived of lier jufl and falutary influence, 
 the co-operation of England is at variance with 
 the interefls of Europe. 
 
 Before we apply thefe principles to the wars 
 which took place between France and England, 
 before the revolution, it will be neccifarv to 
 premife a few general obfcrvations on the re- 
 rpe(5live fituations of thofe two nations. 
 
 Which
 
 ( 158 ) 
 
 Which ofthele two is moft likely to endanger 
 the balance of power, and to threaten the inde- 
 pendence of Europe ? This qneftion might be 
 anfwered in the fhorteft and moft decilive man- 
 ner, by the teftimony and authority of French 
 writers themfelves, if I were to employ, for that 
 purpofe, the arguments and declamations by 
 which they have, during the laft fifty years» 
 been endeavouring to prove, that the internal 
 national flrength of Great Britain cannot be 
 compared with the foundations of the power 
 and greatnefs of France. According to their af- 
 fertions, " the whole power of England is a 
 precarious fabric, upon a deceitful foundation, 
 which the firll fevere fhock. may convert into a 
 heap of ruins. The riches of England are not 
 real, folld, and lafling, but imaginary, artifi- 
 cial, and tranfient ; depending upon circum- 
 ftances of the moment, and to vanifh as fpeedily 
 as they arofe, whenever a change fhall happen 
 in thofe circumfiances : the influence of the 
 Britifh government in Europe is as unnatural, 
 and not lefs unflable than the bafis of its power ; 
 and will fink, together with that power, into 
 nothing, whenever Europe fhall underfiand its 
 true interefis." On the other hand, according to 
 thele politicians, " the power of France has <i 
 great and unalterable foundation ; ilic derives 
 incxhaufiible refources from a fruitful and ex- 
 tenfive territory ; her real and folid riches are 
 3 of
 
 ( '59 ) 
 
 of a nature very different from the precarious 
 fupplies of England's commercial induftry ; to 
 the momentary illulions operated by the gold of 
 her rival, France oppofes the neceffary, durable, 
 unalterable influence of a nation endowed with 
 endlefs refources ; and whofe geographical, mi- 
 litary, and political advantages render it at once 
 fecure and powerful." 
 
 It would be eafy to draw fuch conclufions 
 from thefe aflertions as Vv'ould at once anAver 
 and put an end to every idea of a dangerous 
 preponderance on the part of Great Britain. 
 But this, with, the opinions I hold, would be a 
 mere artifice, a lawyer's quibble, fuch as I 
 would not even ufe if the prefent work were 
 written with no other objed^ than the defence 
 and juftification of the Britifh government. 
 But the cafe is not as thofe writers have defcribed 
 it. The power, the riches, and the political 
 influence of England, are as well founded and 
 as real as thofe of France : England's 2;reatnefg 
 refis upon a bafis as firm as that of her rival ; 
 their refources and their means may be different, 
 but the refult is the fame In both. 
 
 It is neverthelefs true, that France is fuperlor 
 to England in power and influence, if we 
 merely compare the natural and pohtical rela- 
 tions, the geographical fituation, the ofFenfivc 
 
 and
 
 ( i6o ) 
 
 and defenfivc refources, the capability of cxfeN 
 iial efforts, of the two nations, without regard 
 to the efFe(5):s produced by the good or bad ufe 
 of fuch advantages. Whenever the balance of 
 power is deft roved, it is more probable that 
 England will fuffer by the change, than deferve 
 to be accufed as the caufe of it. 
 
 In fupport of this opinion the following ar- 
 guments appear to me incontrovertible : 
 
 I ft, England is a maritime power only : her 
 operations on the continent are feldom of im- 
 portance, and have never had any lulling efFed^s ; 
 whereas France is at once a maritime and mili- 
 tary nation. By a proper application of her 
 ftrength, France may effedlually refifl the pre- 
 ponderance of the Bntifh navy : this has more 
 than once been the cafe already, and is equally 
 likely to happen again. When, and as often as 
 it does happen, the advantage is not only de- 
 cidedly on the part of France, but her fupcri- 
 ority is immenfe. 
 
 2dly, The only points of conta6l between 
 England and the other European powers, are 
 her federal, mercantile, and pecuniary rela- 
 tions ; her military operations can eiFe61: them 
 V£ry little, if at all. Plans of conquefl and 
 
 aggran-
 
 ( i6i ) 
 
 aggrandizement are beyond her reach ; her ar- 
 mies can at the moft only ferve for occafional 
 expeditions, but never, any more than her fleets, 
 becx)me the inftruments of any permanent con- 
 tinental dominion. France, befides the federal, 
 commercial, and pecuniary relations which 
 Hie poflefles in common with England, has 
 exenfive military refources always ready to 
 execute any great continental undertaking. 
 She can threaten and promife, can acl and nego- 
 tiate : her limits are not, hke thofe of England, 
 unalterably fixed ; they are capable of being 
 continually extended ; they have been fo for 
 centuries back ; and if, before the revolution, 
 they had reached the point which ought to have 
 fatisfied a wife and peaceful policy, the events 
 of later times have Ihown, that moderation and 
 wifdom are not allied with anjbition. 
 
 3dly, France is, and has long been, com- 
 pletely protected againft every foreign attack ; 
 nor is the fubjugation or deftrucSlion of her mo- 
 narchy among the conceivable confequences 
 of any fuch attempt. England has not this 
 invaluable fecurity to boaft of; (he has, more 
 than once, been threatened with actual in- 
 vafion ; and, what is worfe, if fuch invalion 
 were attended with fuccefs, the confequences 
 would be, beyond all calculation, deftrudUve. 
 
 H The
 
 ( '62 ) 
 
 The practicability of a defcent in England, 
 has been the fubjedl of much difpute. I Ihall 
 not enter here into the merits of that queftion. 
 Certain it is, that the undertaking would be at- 
 tended with very great difficulty and rifk ; that 
 the reliftance in the interior of the country 
 would be extremely vigorous ; and perhaps, 
 fince the late organization of the militia, quite 
 infurmountable. But it is no lefs certain, that, 
 in the opinions of the beft judges, the invalion 
 of Etjcrland is by no means impoffible ; fhe has 
 been frequently threatened with it, and has 
 more than once been made to tremble with 
 alarm*. Such an attempt has always beeii 
 among the plans of the French miniftry, who 
 conlidered it far from chimerical 'J-. The lituation 
 of a flate expofed to the bare poflibility, the 
 reraoteft chance of fuch a fatal enterprife in the 
 courfe of its wars, mufl: neceffarily be fomewhat 
 more precarious, under circumftances otherwife 
 equal, than that of a nation entirely free front 
 every fuch apprehenfion. 
 
 4thly, An uninterrupted intercourfe witl^ 
 all parts of Europe is important and defi^ 
 rable for every commercial ftate. By the pro- 
 
 * We fiod a remarkable inftance of this in the year 1756, 
 when the nation was feized with fuch a panic, that the 
 threatened defcent of the French occafioned the lofa of Minorca. 
 
 f Vide Note U, 
 
 ducc
 
 ( i63 ) 
 
 dnce of her indufrry, and the policy of her go- 
 vernment, England can often exclude other 
 nations, and efpecially France, from many of 
 the markets of Europe ; but could never cflrcl 
 this by open force. F'rance has been, and is 
 ftill, able to exclude all other commercial 
 powers, and confcquently England, from fome 
 of the moft valuable provinces on the contU'^ 
 nent, by the fuperiority of her arms*. The 
 political bafis of commerce was therefore lets 
 favourable to Enjrland than to France : and Ens"- 
 land found herfelf, in every continental war, ex- 
 pofed to danger on a fide which affeded her very 
 exigence ; a danger unknown to her adverfary.J 
 
 Having premifed thefe obfervations, I fhall 
 now briefly review the wars between France and 
 England, fince the treaty of Wefrphalia, in 
 order to determine, by hiftoric tellimony, which- 
 of the two has ir general fupported the caufe in 
 which the interelb of Europe have been embarked. 
 
 We have more than once made mention of 
 the wars of Lewis XIV. There can Icarcely 
 remain a doubt with refpe6l to the condudl of 
 the nations engaged in them. The life of Wil- 
 
 * One of the chief motives of England in every continental 
 war, has always been the danger of feeing the Netherlands in 
 the hands of France, and thus loft to her commerce. France 
 Jiad never any apprehcnfions of the fame nature. 
 
 M 2 VlaUX
 
 ( x64 ) 
 
 Ham III. was one continued flrugglc for the 
 maintenance of the balance of power. The 
 war for the Spanifh fucceffion was the laft a6l of 
 that glorious drama. It is evident (and even the 
 French writers are unanimous in confeffing it), 
 that the equity and moderation of the Britifh cabi- 
 net alone, preferved France from much greater 
 humiliation than fhe adlually fuffered at the con- 
 clulion of that conteft : any perfon, though only 
 fuperficially inftru6ied in the hiftory of that pe- 
 riod, mufl be acquainted with the attempts of 
 Auftria and Holland fo obflrud the negotia- 
 tions ; and will admit the indifputable truth, 
 that the treaty of Utrecht was owing to the ex- 
 ertions and good offices of England alone. 
 
 From the treaty of Utrecht till the Auftrlan 
 fucceffion war, for a period of more than thirty 
 years, England and France remained in a fiate 
 of uninterrupted peace. During a confiderable 
 part of that time, the two rival powers were 
 even conne61ed by alliance ; and whatever may 
 be the opinions of enlightened Englilh flatef- 
 men, with refpec^l to the wifdom and utility of 
 fuch alliances, it is certain that France enjoyed 
 the benefit of them. England, ifideed, renewe4 
 her former connexion with Auftria by the treaty 
 of Vienna in 1731 ; but fo little did that affedl 
 the interefls of France, that in the year 1735 
 :fhe commenced and profccuted, without inter- 
 ruption^
 
 ( '6i ) 
 
 ruptlon, one of the moft fuccefsful wars (lie 
 ever waged againft Auftria; and by the treaty of 
 1738, fecured the important acquifition of Lor- 
 raine, not only without the oppofition, but even 
 by the mediation of England. The great aver- 
 fion to war that chara6lerized the twenty years 
 adminiftration of Sir Robert Walpole, was taken 
 advantage of by France more fuccefsfully than 
 fhe could have delired or expedled. 
 
 The part a6led by England in the war for the 
 Auftrian fucceflion, was not only juflified by 
 her own immediate interefls, but by the general 
 and manifeft want of a power to counteradl the 
 projects of France, and the neceflity of effedlually 
 fupporting the finking monarchy of Auflria *. 
 The plans which France had formed for weaken- 
 ing her continental rival for ever, are well 
 known ; and let every impartial judge determine 
 whether Europe would have caufe to rejoice at 
 the fucccfs of fuch plans. The afliftance which 
 Auflria, in that critical moment, received from 
 England, accorded with the true principles of 
 federal polic)', and the interefts of all Europe. 
 This truth was fully confirmed by the treaty of 
 Aix la Chapelle. It was a very remarkable 
 circumftance, that England, at that time, re- 
 nounced advantages belonging exclufively to 
 
 * Vide Note V. 
 
 M 3 her.
 
 ( i66 ) 
 
 htTj and more or lefs indifferent to the refl of 
 Europe, for the purpofe of depriving France of 
 advantages which only afFecled the interefls of 
 Great Britain, in common with thofe of all the 
 European powers. Great Britain renounced her 
 conquers in America, and gave back the im- 
 portant acquifition of Cape Breton, to compel 
 France to quit the Auftrian Netherlands. The 
 whole benefit which fhe derived from this war, 
 was the refloration, as far as poflible, of the 
 flatus qiio in Europe. 
 
 The war which defolated almoft every part of 
 the world from the year 1755 to 1763, originated 
 in two perfectly dillindt caufes : the one, the dif- 
 ference between France and En5!!;land concerninfr 
 their limits in North x\merica ; the other, the 
 coalition of the leading powers of the continent 
 againfl the King of Pruffia. I will not take upon 
 me to determine Vv^hether France or England v/as 
 the ajr^reffor in this long; and bloodv war*. I am 
 taking a general view of political events and their 
 confequences, altogether difiinct: from the merits 
 or demerits of particular ad^ions or individuals, 
 and confidering their influence on the general 
 fyflem — the federal interei^s of Europe. 
 
 In this point of view we muft allow, that, in 
 the fcven years war, the projed^s of France were 
 
 ' * Vide Note W. 
 
 as
 
 ( '6? ) 
 
 jfis Incompatible with the interefts, and even the 
 fecurity of Europe, as the conduct of England 
 was conliftent with the true principles of the 
 federal conftitution. In the war for the Auftrian 
 fucceffion, England had fupported the Auftrian 
 monarchy againft France and Pruflia ; fhe now 
 protecfled Pruflia againfi: France and Auftria. 
 Under the different circumllances of cither pe- 
 riod, her condu6l was equally wife and falutary 
 in both. The maintenance of Pruilia was not 
 lefs connected with tnc iii.;:;ic(ts of Europe, than 
 the prefervation of Auftria. The part which 
 England played in the feven years war, fully efia- 
 blifhcd her right to the title of preferver and de- 
 fender of the federal fyflem ; which flie fupported 
 againft every attempt to violate or difturb it, 
 whatever pretext or authority invaded it. 
 
 This war was indeed productive of events of 
 another kind. The power of France in North 
 America was nearly annihilated ; her navy was 
 reduced almoft to nothing; and England remain- 
 ed a confiderable time undlfputed miftrefs ot the 
 feas. But all thefe confequences (to be afcribed, 
 moreover, to the errors of France herfelf; were not 
 immediately connecled with the interefts of 
 Europe ; they did not counterbalance the bene- 
 ficial cffecltsof the interference of England in the 
 feven years war, and the advantage derived there- 
 from to the relations of the continental ftates ; 
 M 4 they
 
 ( i68 ) 
 
 tlicy rather affecTied France in her individual, 
 than federal capacity ; afFe(51ed her merely as the 
 rival of Great Britain, not as a component part 
 of the general political fyftem. It is not furprifing 
 that France fliouldefteem this war the moft un- 
 fortunate fhe ever waged; and that its refult 
 fhould have increafed in the highefi degree the 
 jealoufy, hatred, and enmity, which have at all 
 times inflamed the two nations. The peace of 
 1 762 is alone the great and never-to-be-forgotten 
 crime unpardonable in the eyes of every French 
 politician, the flrft caufe of all the declama- 
 tions againfl the infolence and tyranny of Eng- 
 land, the obje<5l of everlafting and implacable 
 revenge. Endlefs complaints followed the peace 
 of 1762, and, notwithdanding all the victories 
 lince obtained by France, have continued to be 
 repeated to the prefent day. Thefe are the la- 
 mentations of thofe who were weakened and 
 humbled by that event *. But what has the rcfl 
 of Europe to do with them ? Was France de- 
 prived of her rank and influence in the general 
 federative fyflem ? Was her fecurlty, was her 
 territory invaded ? Did fhe lofe any of her inter- 
 nal or external means of defence ? Did fhe even 
 ceafe to be a maritime power, to poflefs a navy, 
 commerce, or colonies ? Did England prefcribe 
 laws to Europe upon the ruins of her rival ? 
 
 * Vide Note X. 
 
 Did
 
 ( i69 ) 
 
 Did flie diflurb, or even threaten, the balance of 
 power ? Nothing of all this. At the conclufion 
 of the feven years war, the political equilibrium 
 was as complete, nay more fo than it ever had 
 been ; and France continued what flie always 
 was, one of the firft powers on the continent. 
 That ihe had even not ceafed to be one of the firft 
 maritime ftates, was fufficiently evinced at the 
 commencement of the following war with Eng- 
 land. 
 
 This war, the la ft before the revolution, raifed 
 the French navy almoft to an equality with that 
 of England, crowned it with feveral .brilliant 
 vidlories, and wrefted from Great Britain the 
 fovereignty of the moft valuable colonies in the 
 world. Never, indeed, was the little narrow 
 policy, whofe (hortfighted wifdom fancies its own 
 riches in the poverty of others, and builds its own 
 greatnefs upon the weaknefs of its neighbours ; 
 never was the mean policy which had fo long 
 governed and mifled the princes of Europe, more 
 feverely mortified than by the final refult of the 
 American war. It was intended to ruin England 
 forever, and it prepared the period of her folid, 
 unalterable, and independent greatnefs. It was 
 to have creeled a new edifice of French dominion 
 upon the ruins of Great Britain : it produced no- 
 thing more to France than a defolating revolu- 
 tion.
 
 C 170 ) 
 
 tioii. But whatever the remote and unforefeefi 
 confequences of that war, its immediate effeds 
 did not dilappoint the hopes of its authors. Ac- 
 cording to the common, that is, the prevaiUng 
 ideas of commercial and pohtical advantage, 
 France obtained as much as could poflibly be 
 gained by fuch a war : fhe was alfo a gainer in 
 fome more effential refpe6ts ; her navy was orga- 
 nized anew ; her fleets were made to rival thofe 
 of England ; the honour of her flag was re-efla- 
 blithed in every quarter of the globe. The 
 peace of 1783 made her great amends, if not 
 complete compenfation, for the injury occadoned 
 by that of 1762. 
 
 If we compare this hillorical fui'vey with the 
 above-flated fundamental principles, we fhall 
 find, 
 
 ift. That mofi of the wars in which England 
 and France have been engaged fince the begin- 
 ning of the eighteenth century, have not been im- 
 mediately connecflcd with the interefls of the 
 federal fyftem ; but that their objects have been 
 either entirely (as in 1 778), or partly (as in 1756), 
 within the fphere of the peculiar relations of the 
 two ftates, the extenfion or limitation of their 
 commercial and colonial fyflems. 
 
 adly.
 
 ( '7' ) 
 
 idly, That in feveral of thofe wars (in the 
 Spanifh and Aultrian fucceffions, and fcven years 
 wars, for example) the balance of Europe was 
 more orlefs threatened by France, was maintained 
 and defended by England. 
 
 3dly, That there exifted in none of them any 
 danger of the due influence of France being de- 
 flroyed, or eflentially diminiflied, fo as to injure 
 the general federative fyftem ; or of England's 
 acquiring an undue preponderance in that lyftem. 
 
 What now becomes of all thofe accufations 
 with which the fpirit of fadion has armed itfelf, 
 to decry the politics of England as a labyrinth of 
 intrigue and cabal ; of premeditated verfatility, 
 and fyltematic inconftancy ? Where then are the 
 *' wars that England has excited :** Where are 
 the connexions into which fhe has entered merely 
 ** to diflblve them ?" Where are the " falfe com- 
 binations" fhe has created ? the " fubordinate, 
 tranlient alliances formed by her, in contradiction 
 to the principles of the general fyftem of equili- 
 brium ?" The hiftory of the eighteenth century 
 mentions none of thefe ! The fame views have 
 uniformly directed the condu6l of the Britilli go- 
 vernment ; a vigilant and aclive oppolition to the 
 enterprifing ambition of France, has been its con- 
 
 fiant
 
 ( '72 ) 
 
 flant objc6l. The manner of purfuing Tt hai 
 been different, according as circumftances have 
 changed. When France was in alliance with 
 Pruffia, England took the part of Auflria ; when 
 France and Auftria were united, ihe declared in 
 favour of Pruffia. The federal relations of Eng- 
 land were always the antitype, and, as it were, 
 the echo of thofe of France ; the political motives 
 of the one were always regulated and influenced 
 by the conduct; of the other. In all the great 
 wars of this century, the conftant plan and en- 
 deavour of France was to effe6l a revolution in 
 the federal fyftem : in the war of the Spanifh fuc- 
 ceffion, to aggrandize the Houfe of Bourbon; 
 in the conteft for the Auftrian fucceffion, to de- 
 ftroy all the proportions of power in Germany ; 
 in the feven years war, to annihilate the King of 
 Pruffia. In each of thefe wars, it was the con- 
 ftant plan and endeavour of England, to prevent 
 any fuch revolution, to uphold exiting rela- 
 tions, and to throw her weight into the fcale 
 from which France had withdrawn her own. 
 It is quite indifferent to the prefent queflion, 
 whether this proceeded from a generous zeal for 
 the common welfare of Europe, or motives of 
 felf-intereft, or hatred and jealoufy of France. 
 The effect was in either way the fame ; and if it 
 could be a reproach to England to have been 
 guided by the motives which have always regu- 
 3 lated
 
 ( '73 ) 
 
 jated the political condu6l of every nation \n the 
 world ; if fhe really can be convi6led of the fia 
 of having " profecuted, with uniform perfeye- 
 rance, the interefis, always predominant, of her 
 power;" yet is it neverthelefs certain, that, on ac- 
 count of the particular political relations of Eng- 
 land, thefe her private interefts were at the fame 
 time the common interefts of Europe : the pre- 
 fervation, the fecurity, and the equilibrium of 
 the whole federal conititution. 
 
 There is one point in the a6l of accufation 
 againfl England, which, though it naturally falls 
 to the ground, when the whole is deprived of iu 
 foundation, yet requires a more particular exa- 
 mination, becaufe it is the moft frequently re- 
 peated, and moft ftrongly urged. It is what re- 
 lates to fubftdies : *' England has opprefTed all 
 the nations of Europe fucceffively with the l>ur~ 
 den of her fuccours." This ftrange cxpreflion 
 is cither entirely without meaning, or its mean- 
 ing is, that England has incited, or (to ule a 
 word appropriate to the " burden of thefe fuc- 
 cours") has forced the nations of Europe to en- 
 gage unwillingly in wars contrary to their intc- 
 fefis and their wifhes. 
 
 In the great mafs of idle, common-place de- 
 cjamations, which, in a fuperficial and credulous 
 
 age,
 
 ( ^74 ) 
 
 age, arehanded from one writer to another, and 
 (alas ! we muft add) from one generation to ano- 
 ther, there are fome fo remarkably contemptible, 
 as to render criticifm almoft atliamed to make 
 them the objedls of any fenous examination. 
 Of this nature is the whole of this miferable 
 iluff about the effect of fubfidies in creating and 
 protra6ling wars. That a little infignificant 
 prince, incapable himfelf of waging war, obliged 
 to regulate his meafures by the conduct of ihe 
 leading powers, and to fhape his motions accord- 
 ing to theirs ; pofTefling no fources of revenue, 
 and yet avaricious of money ; maintaining jufl 
 fo many troops as the fecurity of his perfon, or a 
 pitiful vanity, requires ; that fuch a prince ihould 
 fell the ftrength of his country for ready money, 
 and take part in proceedings indifferent or con- 
 trary to his real interefts, for paltry gold — is conr 
 ceivable, is poflible, is not without example. 
 But that any of the principal powers fhould en- 
 gage in war merely for the fake of foreign fubfi- 
 dies, mufl for ever remain incredible to every 
 man, who can form an idea of the burdens of 
 war for fuch a power, and who is acquainted 
 with the general outline only of the enormous ex- 
 penfes of a fingle campaign : I mean the ex- 
 penfes in the ftrictcfl fenfe of the word, the pe- 
 cuniary charges, altogether independent of the 
 numberlefs facriiices and dangers which outweigh
 
 ( '75 ) 
 
 all the money in the world. I fpeak entirely 
 within bounds, when I fay that no fublidy ever 
 fufficed to defray one half of the charges to be 
 encountered by a great nation in the profecution 
 of a war. No fubfidies could ever be the princi- 
 pal caufe of the commencement or prolongation 
 of a flate of warfare. Never was there any go- 
 vernment fo depraved, never policy fo weak and 
 fhortiighted, as to errfo extravagantly, fo madly, 
 in its calculations. However contemptible fomc 
 people may choofeto hold the principles and judg- 
 ments of princes and their counfellors, they muft 
 not impute meafures to them, fo obvioufly con- 
 trary to their immediate interefls, even thofe of 
 the moment. 
 
 The only cafe in which one power can offer 
 fubfidies to another with any profpe6t of advan- 
 tage, is when the mutual interefts of the two 
 nations are immediately conneded in fome great 
 and pre-exifling obje6t. Such has been the 
 hiftory of every treaty of fubfidy in the eighteenth 
 century. A common intereft, a common pur- 
 pofe, was the motive ; the connexion was formed 
 by the mutual wants of the contrafting parties, 
 fvubfidies did not create the plan, but facilitated 
 the execution of it. Men and money are re- 
 quired for making war. Nothing is more natural 
 tjian that the flate pollcffing an abundance of 
 
 men
 
 ( «76 ) 
 
 men fhould fiipply its ally with troops ; and that 
 money fhould be advanced by the power which has 
 great pecuniary means. Thefe reciprocal fuccours 
 are the refult of a well-concerted, and at the fame 
 time juft and honourable policy. Thefe are the 
 fruits of a good federal conftitution ; for every thing 
 that contributes to the maintenance of the equi- 
 librium, andincrcafes and improves the means of 
 relifting every proje6l of invading it, muftbe pro- 
 dudive of great ^nd manifefl advantage to the 
 whole, 
 
 Thefe complaints againfl the prejudicial ef- 
 fects of England's fublidies, muft therefore ftand 
 or fall with the reft of the accufations preferr«d 
 againft her. If the part which England adled in 
 the general political fyftem was condemnable, 
 and her interference in the affairs of the conti- 
 nent prejudicial ; if fhe overturned the balance of 
 Europe, or alarmed, oppreflfed, and enflaved 
 her neighbours ; then were her fublidies the mif- 
 fortune and the curfe of Europe. But if her 
 condu6l was the reverfe of all this; if fhe fup- 
 ported the oppreiTed and perfecuted againft the 
 ambition of the powerful ; if her efforts were in 
 conformity with the true interefts of the conti- 
 nent, the independence and fecurity of all na- 
 tions, and were of a nature to preferve and de- 
 
 fcn4
 
 ( 177 ) 
 
 fend the balance of Europe ; then were the fub- 
 fidies fhe afforded an advantage, not only for 
 thofe who received, but even for thofe who did 
 not immediately partake of them : and they alone 
 will give the name of burdens to thefe fuccours, 
 whofe inordinate power has been checked and 
 humbled by the influence of Great Britain. 
 
 I am far from having written this chapter with 
 the view of defending the policy and adminif- 
 tration of Great Britain, from the time of Wil- 
 liam III. until the year 1789; fhould anyone 
 fufpecft me of that, let him be candid enough to 
 conflder attentively the nature of my fubjedV. 
 While I combat the aflertions of a writer, who, 
 like all French politicians, pays little regard to 
 the principles of equity, and frequently forgets 
 his own when he fpeaksof England, the fimpleft 
 ilatement of the truth mull neceffarily fometimes 
 take the form and character of an apology. My 
 only objedt was, to dcfcribe the true ftate and po- 
 litical relations of Europe before the commence- 
 ment of the French revolution. For this purpofe 
 it was abfolutely ncceffary to make that country 
 the principal fubjedt of my confideration, which, 
 according to the aflertionsof French writers, has 
 been the fource of all the wars, convulfions, and 
 misfortunes that have defolated Europe. By a 
 complete analyfis of thefe fcvere and arbitrary 
 N charges,
 
 ( '78 ) 
 
 charges, fupported by the incontrovertible evi- 
 dence of hiftory, I have proved that, at the begin- 
 ning of the revolution, England was precifely fo 
 placed as her own fafety and the fecurity of 
 Europe required ; that her political influence 
 could not be dangerous to any nation, not even 
 to France, her conftant and only enemy ; that 
 neither delirous nor able to difturb the equili- 
 brium of the general fyflem, fhc was, on the con- 
 trary, the fhield and bulwark of that fyftem in 
 all the moft important tranfa61ions of the eigh* 
 teenth century. 
 
 Let me be permitted, at the clofe of this chapter, 
 once more to flate the obje<51: of all the preceding 
 obfervations. 
 
 T ventured to affert, that vv6 ought, upon the 
 whole, to be fatisfied with the federal conftitu- 
 tion, though defective in feveral important re- 
 fpecSts, " if between the principal ftates compo- 
 fing that conftttution there exifted a due balance 
 of power ; if their flability were Secured, their 
 progrefs and improvement unrefl rained ; if, in 
 the fyftem of their a6lion and rea6lion, the inde- 
 pendence of the fmaller ftates were protedled (fo 
 much at kaft, asyin a community with theftrong, 
 
 the
 
 ( »79 ) 
 
 fiig weak can be effedually prote6led) ; and if 
 there were nofuch preponderance on anyUde, as 
 to threaten the liberties of the neighbouring flates, 
 or endanger the peace of the whole." If the 
 preceding furvtey of the feveral relations of the 
 leading powers be fundamentally accurate, it will 
 not be difficult to form a fatisfaflory opinion of 
 that federative fyftem which the French revolu- 
 tion found arid dellrbyed.' Let any impartial ob- 
 ferver compare it with what has before been faid 
 of the internal conl^itution of each nation, and 
 then decide, whether, " before the French revolu- 
 tion, all the governments of Europe were in a 
 pofition falfe and unnatural with regard to each 
 other, oppreffive and ruinous with refpe(ft to their 
 fubjedls." 
 
 The federal fyftem of Europe, and the law of 
 nations, were yet capable of much improvement ; 
 left many rcafonable defires, many juft demands, 
 unfatisfied. There was more than one important 
 point relating both to peace and war, which had 
 never been fufficiently difcufled, and remained 
 to be regulated by general convention. The irre- 
 gular diftribution of the territories of feveral pow- 
 erful empires ; the uncertainty of their limits, the 
 remote fituation of their provinces (often entirely 
 furrounded by thofe of other powers) ; the great 
 number of fmall defencelefs ftates, whofe very in- 
 N ^ dependence
 
 ( i9p ) 
 
 dependence was fometimes a burden to them ; the; 
 numerous and various pretenfions of the different 
 fovereigns j and the want, fo often felt, of a ntore 
 comprehensive code of public law : all thefc were 
 evils of which no enlightened European could 
 remain inienlible. Perpetual peace, the ever 
 cherjfhed, ever difappointed hope of mankind, 
 feemed ftill beyond the reach of political wifdora ; 
 the wwld continued to be vexed with difputes 
 concerning thfe limits, the right of fucceffion, the 
 privileges of commerce and navigation of the 
 fcveral powers, and ftill oftener by the ambition 
 of princes, and the unruly paffions of their fub- 
 3e£ls. 
 
 But all thefe defeds would never have induced 
 an impartial judge to condemn the whole edifice as 
 ruinous and unferviceable. We might have ex- 
 pected from time, and the improved condition of 
 fociety, the remedies for thefe evils ; our confola- 
 lory hopes of the future were founded upon the fuc- 
 cefsful efforts of the paft. It became more and more 
 manifeft during the laft twenty years before the 
 revolution, that the principles of government, 
 and the law of nations, were advancing towards 
 perfection ; and that a period of peace, con- 
 cord, and univerfal amelioration, was fall ap- 
 proaching. 
 
 The
 
 C i8i ) 
 
 The following were the obvious fymptoras of 
 this approaching change : 
 
 I ft. The governments of Europe were at length 
 fufficiently convinced, that the internal cultiva- 
 tion of their refpeclive ftates was a fource of 
 riches, power, influence, real glory, and even 
 external fplendour, far more produclive than all 
 the conquefts and aggrandizements that war or 
 negotiation can accomplilh. This was indeed 
 po new-difcovered truth ; all ages have produced 
 wife men who have preached it to the ears of 
 princes, or handed it down in ihe'it immortal 
 writings to fuGceeding generations. But it was a 
 new circumftance, and pecuHarto our times, that 
 this blefled do(5lrine no longer remained a dead 
 letter ; that it pervaded the fphere of pra6lical 
 life ; penetrated into the cabinets of rainifters, and 
 mixed with the maxims of ftate. It may be faid 
 that princes did not conform to it in their adions ; 
 but it was furely a great and important advan- 
 tage, that they fully acknowledged the truth of 
 it ; that they openly and folemnly renounced 
 the barbarous principles of former times ; that 
 they regarded war, notrpcrely (like their fathers) 
 as a breach of God's commandment, but as a 
 pernicious folly, a miftaken policy, injurious and 
 deltruc^ive in itfelf ; that they condemned it as 
 a pbfitive evil, and that their underftanding was 
 K 3 convinced.
 
 ( i82 ) 
 
 convinced, although their pallions were yet un- 
 liibdued. Mankind had the greatefl rcafon to ex-» 
 ult when they perceived the true principles of 
 commercial policy prevailing over all bbfiacles, 
 and combating fuccelsfuUy the mofl deep-rooted 
 prejudices. Men recovered from the rage for 
 monopoly, as from a dream of the infancy of hu- 
 man indutlry ; their former ideas of the import- 
 ance of exclufive dominion in diftant regions, 
 were confiderably diminithed, and the value of" 
 colonial poffeffions began to be feen in its true 
 point of view. The fame rivalry indeed conti-^ 
 nued in full force between the commercial na- 
 tions ; but it exifted in a more reafonable man- 
 ner, and was no longer excited by vain phan-r 
 toms, but contended for: folid advantages. This 
 evidently led the way to pjeace among nations ; 
 mankind had already pafTed judgment upon wars 
 of conqueft : the moment was not far diftant when 
 they would have unanimoufly acknowledged the 
 folly of commercial wars, 
 
 2d. A more enlightened, liberal, and benevo- 
 lent way of thinking, had at the fame time fpread 
 through the great body of the people in almoft 
 every European country. Their eyes were opened 
 to their true interefts ; not only this or that par- 
 ticular war, but all wars were become in the 
 highefl degree unpopular *. The different rela-r 
 
 * Vide Note Y, 
 
 tions
 
 ( "83 ) 
 
 tions of nations to each other, tlieiv refpedlive 
 rights and obhgations/ the extent and condition 
 of their connexions, were every where more 
 clearly feen and better underftood. The ftudy of 
 the law of nations had advanced with every 
 other branch of knowledge. Men were more 
 generally agreed upon what was jufl: and lawful, 
 thotigh they did not always pradtife it. In vain 
 would the governments of Europe have attempted 
 to counteract the fpirit of the age; it was too 
 powerful for them to control ; and they were 
 befides invited by their own intereft to favour it. 
 Never was the force of public opinion fo great ; 
 never was the violation of juftice fo loudly, fo 
 energetically, and fo univerfally condemned, by 
 the difapprobation and abhorrence of mankind ; 
 and whatever might be the cafe with refpecft to 
 the purity of theirnntentions, or the internal mo- 
 rality of their a6\ions, the principles publicly 
 acknowledged, honoured, and profefled by men 
 in general, had never been more excellent and 
 praifeworthy. 
 
 nl 
 
 To felcdl this very hopeful period for the ob- 
 je<Sl of the bittereft accufations ; to reprefent it 
 as utterly defiitute of every true principle of go- 
 vernment, every veftige of the law of nations; 
 appears to me one of the boldeft undertakings a 
 political writer could ever have conceived. The 
 N 4 eloquence
 
 ( i84 ) 
 
 eloquence and logic of all ancient and modern 
 fbphifts combined, would be unequal to the 
 talk. All books, all treaties, the memories of 
 all men living, muft be annihilated before the 
 fancStion of incorruptible hiflory could be pro- 
 cured to fuch a llatement. No ! fhe will hand 
 a very different account, a diredtly contrary one, 
 down to pofterity ! Europe not only poffefled, 
 before the French revolution, all the elements of 
 a law of nations, and the eflential ground- 
 work of a focial conflitution ; an efficient gua- 
 ranty of the political relations of flates, a well- 
 organized federal fyftem, and a beneficial balance 
 of power : but the fpirit with which thefe ele- 
 ments Ihould be animated j an univcrfal reve-» 
 rence of law and juftice ; an earneft delire to 
 exclude all violence, oppreflion, and war; s^ 
 vifible and fenfible tendency to cultivate the ties 
 of federal union, and to eflabliih peace and 
 harmony among all nations : thefe likewife 
 had been awakened among us. A fingle glance 
 at the ftate of Europe at the conclufton of the 
 treaty of Weftphalia, and in the year 1786, 
 prefents fuch a contraft as mufl at once annihi- 
 late a world of unfounded and calumnious de-. 
 clamation. 
 
 If, in the year 1786, the queflion had been 
 put to any candid flatefman (for reafon has 
 
 nothing
 
 i 185 ) 
 
 nothing to do with the demands of extravagant 
 cnthufiafm) ; if any reafonable and enlightened 
 citizen of the world, neither blind nor indiffe- 
 rent to the a(5tual defe<^s of the federal fylkm^ 
 had been alked, " whether it were advifable to 
 improve the fecial conflitution by a general an4 
 fuddcndiflblution of all exifting relations ?" it is 
 probable that his only anfwer would luive been 
 a fmile of contempt^ or an exclamation of hor- 
 ror! This diflblution has aclually taken place j 
 and lamentations are now in vain. Nothing 
 more remains for political wifdom than to fcarch 
 among the ruins of the former edifice, the ma- 
 terials for a new one. But in order that the 
 piifchief may not be irreparable, we muft banifli 
 the fatal opinion, that it was unavoidable ; and 
 the ftili more fatal one, that it was iifcful and 
 beneficial. The difeafe is too manifell to be 
 denied ; but a falfe idea of its origin, conceived 
 by miftaken, and encouraged by crafty empirics, 
 has diffused the fpecious perfuafion that it was a 
 falutary crifis, a neceffary flep to improvement. 
 Till this delufion be dillipatcd, there are no hopes 
 of amendment. 
 
 PART
 
 ( i85 J 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Of the Situation of Europe after the French 
 Revolution, 
 
 I. ALSE premifes lead to falfc conclulions. 
 The author of the Etat de la France having dc- 
 fctibed Europe, before the revolution, as a 
 fcene of univerfal anarchy and ruin, it was na- 
 tural to expe6t he would ered a fuperftru6lure 
 of the lame kind on that foundation, which is 
 not merely exaggerated, but altogether arbitrary,- 
 and in defiance of hiftory and experience : this 
 was a matter of courfe. But however prepared 
 we might be for ftrange, unufual, and paradox- 
 ical conclufions, our Author has far exceeded 
 the moft extravagant expe6lations. 
 
 If it fhould happen that nothing more re-, 
 mained for the reader of fome future time, than 
 his dark pi6\ure of the former political fyftem of 
 Europe; if, from the principal features, the 
 tone and fpirit of that fragment, it were required 
 to guefs the remainder of his work ; I can 
 hardly conceive that any future commentator 
 would be found poffeffed of fufRcicnt penetra- 
 tion and afTurance to reflore the latter part in its 
 
 true
 
 < i87 ) 
 
 true fhape. The moft rational conje^lure would, 
 perhaps, fuppofc the following reafoning : " The 
 revolution found Europe weakened and dif- 
 traded on all fides ; deprived of every guaranty 
 of a due equihbrium, every pillar of its federal 
 conftitution, every maxim of flate 'adminiftra- 
 tion, and every principle of the law of nations. 
 It kindled a dreadful war ; and the convullions 
 that enfued, fubverted the few pillars of the fo- 
 cial conftitution that yet fupported the tottering 
 edifice. Deftru6tion advanced with giant ftrides ; 
 the whole building crumbled into atoms, and 
 Europe became a theatre of ruin and defolation. 
 But however melancholy the fate of the un- 
 happpy generation that furvived this catafirophe, 
 however pitiable their fituation, however criti- 
 cal and hopelefs the profpe(5l of their regenera- 
 tion, they had no right to complain of their 
 lot ; they had no real caufe to lament it. No 
 right, for their misfortune was their fault ; they 
 might have forefeen the approaching evil ; they 
 deferved it by their criminal indifference to the 
 obvious indications of an approaching ftorm, by 
 their guilty inactivity in the midft of the daily 
 more vifible decay of their vvhole focial fyfiem, 
 of their civil, political, and federal relations. 
 1 hey had no reafon to lament it ; for what they 
 lofl was in reality not worth regretting. Their 
 exiflence had long been divellcd of every thiog 
 5 that
 
 ( i88 ) 
 
 that could contribute to Its dignity, fafety, and 
 conliftency ; the anarchy was complete, how- 
 ever veiled by cuftom, indolence, and the 
 daily palliatives of a contemptible common- 
 place policy. The explolion was not to be 
 avoided ; the revolution, and the war it pro- 
 duced, were only the laft and decifive efforts of 
 the evil ; and whatever a fufFering world may 
 have endured under the joint fcourges of thefe 
 two dreadful plagues, yet it may, and it ought: 
 fincerely to rejoice, that the crilis is at lengtl> 
 furmounted, and the period arrived, when, riling 
 from the ruins of the pafl, it may erect a nevy 
 edifice with more folid materials, more deliberate 
 wifdom, and more accurate principles ; and 
 hand down to a grateful pollerity the bleflings 
 of a more perfe6l conflitution.'* 
 
 This reafoning, all built upon the aiTumption of 
 the total inefficacy of our former political and civil 
 organization, will of courfe have no weight wherp 
 the premifes are not admitted : and I think I have 
 fully proved, in a preceding chapter, that fuch 
 pofitions will not bear ftnct examination. The 
 writer, however, would have been juflified in 
 proceeding upon thefe grounds to the conle- 
 quences above ftated. Had he been fatisiied 
 with that, he would at Icaft have avoided the 
 reproach of doing violence to his own premifes, 
 
 2 of
 
 ( '89 ) 
 
 of abufing his principles by unwarranted conclu- 
 fions, and of having, by a lingular refinement of 
 Ibphiftry, deduced an arbitrary and falfe refult 
 from a falfe and arbitrary hypothecs. 
 
 The Author was not falisfied with painting 
 the revolution as a neceflary confequence of the 
 previous diforder of Europe, and the war of the 
 revolution, with all its new dilbrders, as its natu- 
 ral companion. Such a gradation was not bold 
 and flriking enough for him : he pafled over the 
 revolution, and deduced the general war be- 
 tween France and the powers of Europe, im- 
 mediately from the faultinefs of the former fe- 
 deral conftitutioH, the annihilation of all politi- 
 cal principle, the diflblution of the law of nations, 
 and the blindnefs and folly of all governments. 
 
 I fhould exhauft the patience of the reader 
 were 1 to recapitulate the ftring of accufation;^, 
 by which, in the firfl chapters of his work, he 
 fupports this lingular dedu6lion, and in which 
 he vents his fpleen under various colours and 
 pretences, and fometimes in the moll violent 
 terms. It will fuffice at prefent to bring forward 
 a lingle pafiage, which, though one of the molt 
 moderate, will throw much light upon the ge- 
 neral train of his ideas. On a nearer examina- 
 tion of this fyltem, we fhall have more than one 
 
 opportunity
 
 opportunity of followirig him in the re{\. of his 
 obfervations. 
 
 " The war of the revolution," fuch afe the 
 words of this pafTage, " was the laft fcene of a 
 hundred and fifty years of improvidence, bhnd- 
 nefs, and impolicy. After having firft dreaded 
 the afcendancy of France without caufe, or front 
 exaggerated motives, and afterwards long dif- 
 dained her beneficial influence, the powers of 
 Europe became accuftomed to difpenfe with her 
 tutelary preponderance, and made a fport of her 
 political degradation during thirty years ; and 
 when at length fome unexpeded circumflances 
 enabled a nation, whofe ambitious politics were 
 never effc6lually checked but by France, to de- 
 bate in the moft public manner, whether fhe 
 ought not to be extirpated — all Europe took 
 arms, and formed a confederacy as wicked as it 
 was fenlelefs ! from which moment every veftige 
 of the law of nations was abolifhed." — Thus 
 arofe, according to the Author's ideas, a war, 
 whofe dreadful eonlequences have fhaken the 
 federal fyftem to its foundations ; have rendered 
 the prefent ftate of Europe an enigma ; made its 
 future exifience problematical ; and deftroyed 
 more within the fliort fpace of ten years, than 
 many centuries had raifed, or perhaps than ages 
 will be able to reftore. This war was a wanton 
 
 attempt.
 
 ( 19. ) 
 
 attempt, by the moft unnatural of all alliances^ 
 to build a new political fyflem, and cftablilli a 
 new divifion of power upon the ruins of the 
 French monarchy ; and thus to rcftore the long- 
 loft balance of Europe, by for ever annihilating 
 the iirfl and moft important of its elements ! 
 
 If the events of this war were utterly effaced 
 from the memories of all who witnefTed them ; 
 if hiftory were fuddenly to itop, and the fpace 
 between 1789 and 1801 to remain a frightful 
 blank for pofterity ; ftill this reprefentation, or 
 rather mifreprefentation, of its origin, muft for 
 ever be incredible while a veftige yet remains 
 of the former fyflem of Europe, Such could not 
 poflibly be the caufes of that war ! would the 
 lateft pofterity exclaim ; and fhall we who have 
 feen and furvived it, be impofed upon by fables, 
 which have not even the merit of being inge- 
 nioufly fabricated ? 
 
 There certainly was a time when the moft 
 dangerous attempts were apprehended, not 
 *' without fufficient caufe," from the ambitious 
 politics of France; againft whom a general 
 league would then have been a very probable, 
 and at the fame time juftifiable and even necetrary 
 meafure. It would even then have been a vio- 
 lation of fenfe and juftice to proje<5l the total dc- 
 
 giadation
 
 C 192 ) 
 
 gradation of France, inftead qf defining her 
 proper limits ; or to look for the fecurity of Eu- 
 rope in the difmemberment, conqued, or anni- 
 lation of that nation. In a period, however, of 
 fuch general difcontent, the extravagant fears 
 of one prince, or reftlefs ambition of another, or 
 lecret enmity under colour of the public lafety, 
 might have conceived or favoured fo abfurd a 
 plan ; which under thole circumftances would not 
 be quite unaccountable, though neither laudable 
 nor wile. But what inducement, immediate or 
 remote, could incite the powers of Europe to 
 overwhelm France at the end of the eighteenth 
 century ? when at peace with all the world, fhe 
 was governed by a mild, jufl, and confcientious 
 monarch ; and when (he was lb far from alarm- 
 ing the whole fyftem by ambitious views of pre- 
 ponderance, that fhe gave not the flighted: um- 
 brage to her nearefl neighbours * ? None of the 
 continental f^ates could be profited by the ruin 
 of France ; not one of them could hope to rife 
 by her degradation. Among the very abundant 
 political combinations of the age, there is not 
 the fmalleit veftige of a confpiracy againft her. 
 The author of any fuch fcheme would have been 
 ridiculed as a vifionary proje61or at every court 
 fij Europe. What then could have united all 
 irr&tiuns in an enterprife for which no one had 
 
 *• Vide Note Z. 
 
 the
 
 ( 193 ) 
 
 the fmallcft motive or inclination, or any rca- 
 fonable hope of fuccefs ? 
 
 It is perfc<Slly natural, that a perfon defirous 
 of gaining credit for fo abfurd an opinion, lliould 
 recur for that purpofe to the all-explaining influ- 
 ence of England ; the only power that could be 
 conceived inimical to the fecurity and independ- 
 ence of France. But what childifh credulity 
 muft the man fuppofe in his readers, who ran 
 attempt to perfuade them that the powers of the 
 continent were all leagued againfl that nation, 
 merely to gratify England ! that thofe powers, 
 feized with one common mania, departed from 
 all policy, fenfe, and juftice ; that they facrificed 
 every interell and advantage on the lame pile 
 with the elaborate llru^lure of an admirable fe- 
 deral confiitution — to make Enf^lanclfolemiftrefs 
 of the feas ! To give the fmalleft colour of proba- 
 bility to fo extravagant a combination, lb mon- 
 ilrous an abfurdity, fome fa6ls, or ibmething at 
 leaft in tlie fhape of fads, ought to have been 
 appealed to. But where are they to be found .'' 
 Who has ever attempted to adduce the flighted 
 proof of all this ? And though amidlt the greateli 
 confufion, and in the darkeit periods of the revo- 
 lution, when the minds of men, inflamed by 
 the vvildefl: pafTions, and fmarting under the fe- 
 verefl fufterings, eagerly purfued every chimera, 
 
 o and
 
 ( 194 ) 
 
 and caught at every wonder to explain their in- 
 explicable fortunes ; though there were thca 
 fome impudent declaimers, who in fome degree 
 fuccefsfully reprefented the wickednefs of the 
 Britifh minifi:ry as the caufe of all the afflictions 
 of Europe ; yet how could a writer of the year S 
 affociate with luch incorrigible impoftors ? How 
 could a politician, profefTcdly calm and impartial, 
 give way to fuch grofs exceffes of revolutionary 
 violence ? How could he be fo ignorant or un- 
 mindful of hiflory, as to attribute to England 
 the origin of a war, that had lafled nearly eight 
 months, before it ceafed to be doubtful, whether 
 that nation would maintain the ftridlei: neutra- 
 lity amidft the dilTeuiians of the continent I 
 
 No ! If that accurfed war, which has over- 
 whelmed the federal fyfiem of Europe, was in- 
 deed the efFc(5l of a general, premeditated, lyf- 
 tematic confederacy againtt France, the objecl of 
 that confederacy was at leail very different from 
 what the author has aiTerted. If there ever was 
 a coalition, and if the plans of that coalition 
 did really produce the war, it was neither jealoufy 
 of France, nor a defire to weaken and degrade, 
 nor any ridiculous project of difmembering that 
 kingdom, that conflituted its origin and intent. 
 It was formed not againft France, but the revo- 
 lution ; it was not the afcendant of the French 
 
 nation.
 
 ( 195 ) 
 
 nation, (what ground of alarm could that afford in 
 the year 1791 ?) but its hopclefs dirtra6\ions, that 
 drew down the pnexpedted ftorm upon Europe. 
 
 It would be foreign to my purpofe to enter 
 into a particular difcuffion of the caufes of this 
 war*. Jt is an inexhaultible fubjed^, on which 
 politicians will be long divided ; and if liiniiarity 
 of views and uniformity of opinion are ever tp 
 be attained in this intricate queltion, it can only 
 be in other times, and among other men ; when 
 truth fhall have prevailed over all hypothefes. 
 At prefent I fliall merely lubmit my private opi- 
 nion ; and though none of my readers fhould 
 be inclined to follow it, I am firmly perfuaded I 
 Ihall be able to prove moft fatisfadtorily, that our 
 Author has eftablifhcd his upon a fyftem devoid 
 of all foundation. 
 
 It has always been my opinion (and I know 
 many enlightened fratcfmen think tlie fame), 
 that the war was not produced by a coalition 
 againft France ; that, in the ftrict fen^c of the 
 word, fuch a coalition never has exiited, and 
 would have remained an empty fpeculation, an 
 idle dream of a few miniliers, if France had not 
 compelled the powers of Europe^ in a ccrtairj 
 degree, to realizx it. Even after this, when th^ 
 
 *■ ^ Vide Note A A. 
 
 o a common
 
 ( '96 ) 
 
 common danger was at the liigliefl:, the coalition 
 was only a name without meaning. The war 
 was reforted to and commenced by France ber- 
 felf, that is, by the dreadful fucceffion of out- 
 rageous and barbarous fa^lions which enflaved, 
 diftracled, and tyrannized over her during ten 
 years. What rendered it inevitable, was the 
 wide difference between thole reigning fadVions 
 and the reft of Europe, in their fyftems of ad* 
 miniftration, and in all their principles of inter- 
 nal and external policy ; which created a dif- 
 cordance not to be remedied by any peaceful 
 meafures. The revolutionary chiefs, aware of all 
 this, and feeling the precarioufnefs of their own 
 fttuations, recurred to the war as the only means 
 of maintaining themfelves, or as the laft refuge 
 of their defpair ; and they would have contrived 
 to involve all Europe in this misfortune, even 
 though every government had been anxious to 
 avoid it, even had they coalefced to preferve 
 peace. Unlmpellcd by any coalition, at a time 
 when the very name did not yet exift, and not a 
 Teflige of it was perceptible, they challenged fuc- 
 ceflively every nation, near or remote, conti- 
 nental or maritime, and at length made one ge- 
 neral declaration of w^ar againft every ancient 
 eftablifliment. Thus Europe had no alternative 
 but the dangers of the conteft on the one hand, 
 and perhaps flill greater danger^ with which, on 
 
 the
 
 ( 197 ) 
 
 the other, tbofc demagogues threatened the very 
 elements of the focial conilitution. 
 
 Such appears to me to be the origin of the war 
 upon the French revolution : for either there 
 never has been a war againft France, or it has 
 only been a confequence of the other. In this 
 opinion I may be wrong : but the miftake is 
 certainly not owing to prejudice or want of re- 
 fle61ion. My judgment has been formed by a 
 iludious obfervatiori of the chnra6lers and ac- 
 tions of the two great parties in the awful contcft 
 which, during ten years, has defolated Europe. 
 On the one hand, I have inceflantly watched 
 the fate and progrefs of the revolution, the 
 fpeeches and writings of its chiefs, and the mani- 
 fold teftimonics they themfelves afford in the ac- 
 cufations and replies with which each declining 
 or fallen party threw the blame of the war on its 
 fuccefsful adverfaries. On the other hand, I 
 have carefully examined and compared every 
 document and correfpondence laid before the 
 public, and allthofc imaginary treaties fald to be 
 the bafis of the coalition ; I have collected 
 every authentic information concerning the opi- 
 nions, views, and condiicl of its pretended 
 founders and patrons. Laftly, my opinion is 
 fupported by the folemn, unanimous affurances 
 of many highly refpe6led ftatcfmcn ; to whofe 
 
 o 3 authority
 
 ( "98 ) 
 
 authority in a problem of this nature, I may 
 furely be permitted to refer. 
 
 Having thus declared my opinion, I will pufli 
 impartiality fo far as to fet it entirely alide, and 
 will endeavour, if pollible, to forget it. I intend r 
 to meet the author of the Etai de la France on 
 his own grounds, and will ibppofe the war to 
 have been produced by a coalition of the powers 
 of Europe. 
 
 The firfl, and I think the moit important, 
 queftion will then be, whether fuch a league, 
 when impartially conlidercd, would be fo con- 
 demnable, fo unjuftifiable, lb impolitic, fo mon- 
 ftrous as the Author aflerts ; whether it would 
 juftly incur the abufc he heaps upon it ? 
 
 I will here once again declare my own opi- 
 nion, without in lifting upon it as a demonftrable 
 truth. 
 
 I do not conceive it to l^e unlverfally true, 
 *' that a nation has no right to interfere in the 
 domeftic affairs of any other," and I truft I 
 ihall not be fmgular iii regarding it as liable to 
 great exceptions. There are cafes in which 
 found policy fuggefts, and the law of nations 
 permits, an active intervention in the internal 
 
 proceedings
 
 \ 
 
 ( 199 ) 
 
 proceedings of a foreign counfry. Such a cafe 
 arifes when there happens in any, efpecially if it 
 be a principal Itate of Europe, a diforder fo 
 great, general, and permanent (it muft have all 
 thefe qualities), as manifeftly to endanger the 
 neighbouring powers. Thofe powers are Hill 
 more juflified in not remaining inactive fpedators 
 of fuch dlforders, when there are feveral parties 
 contending for the government of the diftradled 
 country upon various pretences ; and the right 
 of legiflation is difputed by a variety of claimants. 
 I regard the French revolution as an event of 
 this kind, not merely permitting, but abfolutely 
 requiring the a6live interference of other nations. 
 The all-deflru61ive principles upon which it was 
 founded, the criminal excelTes and contempt of 
 every right that attended its progrefs, would have 
 juftified an early oppofition. The conftitution 
 of 1791, inftead of diminifhing, firengthened 
 and confirmed the right of interference ; for no 
 one, even in France, will now deny that it was 
 calculated to organize the anarchy, and of courfe 
 to prolong the miferies of the unhappy country, 
 and the dangers of its neighbours-. What com- 
 pleted, and gave, as it were, the ultimate fan6^ion 
 to this right, w^as the fccne that prcfented itfelf 
 i?nmediately after the introdud^ion of that con- 
 ftitution. The popular members of the National 
 AfTembly, and the favourite orators of the clubs 
 04 (the
 
 ( 200 ) 
 
 (the men who at that time governed the coun* 
 tfy), then poured forth the torrent of their abufe 
 and calumny againll: all the governments of Eu- 
 rope ; they commenced an inveterate perfecution 
 of every ancient eftablifliment, of every facred 
 principle that enfured the obedience of the citi- 
 zen, and the fafety of the throne ; they called 
 upon all people to throw off their allegiance ; 
 and their fpeeches and writings were a ieries of 
 reiterated infults that announced every day more 
 openly the hoftillties they were refolvedto realize 
 with other weapons. 
 
 Under thefe circumflances, a coalition againfl 
 the deftroyers of France^ not againft France her- 
 felf, would have been prudent, juft, and bene- 
 ficial ; in every thing the reverfe of a wicked 
 confpiracy. It would not however have deferved 
 this meritorious charaiSler, unlefs conceived and 
 projected upon principles pure and difinterefted, 
 with views liberal and enlightened. Every idea 
 of partition, difmemberment, or fubjei^ion, be- 
 ing inadmiflible, the complete independence of 
 France fhould have been the firfl article, the 
 moft facred and inviolable flipulation of the 
 league. Nor fhould any foreign power have af- 
 fumed the right of prefcribing a new confiitution; 
 for that would have been out of the province, 
 beyond the juft policy of its intervention. A 
 q Itranrrer
 
 ( 201 ) 
 
 fVranger in fuch a cafe has nothing more to do than 
 to remove every unnatural obilacle to a proper 
 conftitution, to facilitate tlie reftoration of law and 
 order, and to give freedom to the lawful depoli- 
 tary of fovereign authority. Here muft end all 
 foreign interference ; the refl is entirely a domef- 
 tic concern, to be left to the energy, fkill, and 
 wifdom of thofe intrutted with the bufinefs of 
 regenerating the diflracfted ftatc. 
 
 This I conceive to be the only tenable opinion 
 on a fubjecl which the Author of T Etat de la 
 France has fecn in a different light : for he has 
 put a very hateful, and I think very falfe con- 
 ftrudlion upon the plan of fuch a coalition. 
 Among other things, he fays, *' Can any man re- 
 concile an undertaking of this nature to the trues 
 principles of a federal fyflem ? Can it be affert- 
 ed that thofe who contrived that immenfe combi- 
 nation of offenlive relations, were actuated by 
 views of general intercft ? Can they be faid to 
 have intended to diftinguifh the rights of the 
 continental and maritime powers, to define the 
 juft limits, andfecure the independence of each ? 
 Couldthis engagement, fo haflily and unadvifedly 
 made, be of long duration ?" &c. Immediately 
 after this, he fays, <« A league of this nature is 
 neceffarily in oppolition to the principles which 
 Should be the groundwork of every alliance;'* 
 
 the
 
 ( 202 ) 
 
 " the nations fo leagued were never allies ;'* an(^, 
 " becaufe they found no word in the political 
 diiftionary, wliercby to denote their monflrous 
 convention, they were forced to invent a new 
 one ; and to give the terra coalition to that 
 which will be more properly denominated in fu- 
 ttire hiflories, a confpiracy againft the rights of 
 a lingle people, and a folemn, premeditated re- 
 nunciation of every principle of the law of na- 
 ions. 
 
 What can we expe6l to find but tionfenfe, con- 
 tradi6lion, and unnatural combinations, if we 
 attempt to apply the principles that fhould regu- 
 late every ordinary alliance, to a league quite ex- 
 traordinary in its nature ? A coalition neither isj 
 nor ever can be, an alHance. Whether in earlier 
 times the word coalition has been ufed in the 
 fenfc now givefi to it, is a queftion of little im- 
 port ; the thing itfelf has exiited at all times, or 
 might at Icafr have exified at any time. It is evi- 
 dent^ that amidfi: the great variety of focikl revo- 
 lutions, there niuft fometimes occur cafes, in 
 which a temporary, urgent, and truly common in- 
 teretl, may lufpend every ufual federative rela- 
 tion, and unite all nations in the profccution of 
 a common objcft, without regard to the fimih- 
 tude or diverfity of their permanent views. Such 
 an union miiA always be tranfient as the intereft 
 
 which
 
 ( 263 ) 
 
 which creates it ; but, while It does cxii>, \{ o^xi- 
 rates in a manner peculiar to ittelf. An alliance, 
 that is, a permanent lengue formed for the main- 
 t-enance of certain permanent interefts — an rrk 
 liance of all Europe agnind a (ingle power, is 
 utterly inconfiflent with any principles of ge- 
 nuine politics : a coalition, the effeci of extra- 
 ordinary circuraltances, may fometlmes he en- 
 joined by neceffity ; and will then be approved by 
 prudence, and ran6lioned by every principle of 
 jutlice. 
 
 This very important diftinc^lion takes all weight 
 from what the Author has faid about the " gi- 
 gantic and vifionary aflbciation of the European 
 powers ;" his fevere and angry animadverfions 
 have no longer an object or a meaning. What 
 have we to do with an alliance, a permanent ftini- 
 larity of interelts, the poflibility o( long dura- 
 tion ? What with the continental and maritime 
 nations, the diitindtion of their rights, and Iccu- 
 rity of their refpe*5iive limits ? Thefe, with every 
 thing elfe the Author has fuppofed, ibught, and 
 found wanting in this *' monfrrous confederacy,"" 
 are quite foreign to the fubjcdt. The whole buji- 
 nefs is fimply a temporary junflion of the 
 ftrength of all nations, in order to obviate a com- 
 mon danger : till that danger be averted, till tlic 
 all-threatening revolution bedivefled of its hollile 
 and formidable charadler, brought within bounds, 
 
 2 and
 
 ( i04 ) 
 
 and rendered incapable of mifchief ; till tlien, 
 but no longer, the private interells of Auftria, 
 Prullia, Spain, and England, mull all be con- 
 founded in a more important conlideration — the 
 maintenance of the focial conftitution. This be- 
 ing completely fecured, every thing would return 
 to its former ll:ate ; the ordinary federal principles 
 would again prevail, and Europe refu me her na- 
 tural chara6\er, and fubmit to her ancient laws. 
 It is not more coniiftent with true federal policy 
 to call fuch a corapa6l " a Iblemn abjuration 
 of all principle," than it is agreeable to the juft 
 notions of the law of nations to term it an 
 *' atrocious confpiraey," or '^ a wanton attempt 
 upon the liberties of France." 
 
 I am well aware that the right of one nation 
 to interfere in the domeflic affairs of another 
 (the iirft principle upon which the foregoing ar- 
 gument is founded), fo far from being univerfally 
 acknowledged, is, on the contrary, rejected un- 
 conditionally, and in every poffible cafe, by many 
 political writers. But however various the opi- 
 nions of men on this important point, there is 
 furely nobody fo intolerant as to admit of none 
 but his own. Let us then, in order to grant 
 every thing for the moment, fuppofe it doubtful 
 whether fuch a coalition were juiliiiable, even in 
 the very extraordinary and critical fituation of 
 
 Europe
 
 ( 205 ) 
 
 Europe after the year 1789 ; let us fuppofe all go- 
 vernments to have been feduced by views poli- 
 tively falfe, are they, on account of this error, to 
 be branded with the reproach of madncfs or 
 guilt ? If it really was an error (which lam very far 
 from thinking), it was at leafl a pardonable one ; 
 pardonable on account of the magnitude of the 
 danger ; and pardonable on account of the 
 obvious and immenfc advantage to be derived 
 from the fucccfs of a well-concerted plan. The 
 true object, whether jufl or unjuft, of this coali- 
 tion, and the motives afcribed to it by the un- 
 principled Ibphiftry of French politicians, are as 
 different from each other, as the accidental error 
 of a fkilful calculator, from the ignorance and 
 Hupidity of a perfect idiot. Suppofing the powers 
 of Europe to have coalefced imprudently againft 
 the French revolution, they have not thereby in- 
 curred the reproaches they would merit, had they 
 fenfelefsly made war upon France herfelf. 
 
 But the laft and apparently mod formidable 
 quefiion is, whether the common fafety, well or 
 ill underflood, was really the ground of this 
 general combination ? Whether do we not attri- 
 bute to its authors a degree of wifdom of which 
 their plans were in truth utterly deftitute ? And 
 whetlicr the idle hope of profiting by the diftrels 
 of France, ofweakcninjr her for ever, of difmem- 
 
 bering^
 
 ( £o6 ) 
 
 baring, and perhaps fubduing her, did not cori- 
 ftilute the t 
 undertakins: ? 
 
 ftilute the true though fecret aioiive of the 
 
 & 
 
 To this queftion I have only one anfwer, 
 which Is involved in the following dilemma : — ? 
 cither there never was a coalition, in the ordinary 
 fciife ot the v.'ord, tlu- war was the ible work of 
 revolutionary demagogues, and the confederacy in 
 qocftion was liridliy defenlivc ; or the common 
 fafetj of Europe was the only obje6\ of that coali- 
 tkiw. The Ir.tter part of the alternative is proved 
 in a few words ; ;/ coulci have no other Dtotive. 
 Whatever temerity, periidv, or folly, may be im- 
 poted \o, or imagined of this or tha-t govern- 
 ment, it is impofiible to fuppofe it ever could be 
 the v«'ifh, the intereft, or the aim of all Europe 
 i& difrnember or ruin France. Suppofe Auftria 
 to have projedtcd a coalition in order to defpoil 
 her of fome provinces ; kippofe England to 
 have done the fame with a view to extinguifh 
 the French navy ; \{ will firll remain incon- 
 ceivable how Pruina, Spain, Sardinia, Sweden, 
 Rwffijf, the Stales of Germany and Italy, and 
 fven the Ottoman Porte, were drawn into this 
 ienfelcfs league. I'he trite and trivial recourfe 
 to intrigue and bribery, and Heaven knows what 
 fecret and n"jagic arts, now meets with contempt
 
 ( 207 ) 
 
 ajid ridicule throughout Europe, as an exploded 
 fable. How carelefs of truth, how de:(icient in 
 argument the perfon who can mention a handful 
 pf guineas as the caufe of a coalition of Eu- 
 rope againft France ! as the origin of a league 
 in which the moll heterogeneous elements com- 
 bined ; in which the natural friends and natur^^ 
 enemies of France were ranged on the fame fide; 
 fjnd in which, according to the principles of or- 
 dinary politics, it is impoffible to imagine, much 
 more to afcertaln and detine, a common objedi ! 
 How far above all ordinary coniiderations muft 
 be the aim of a confederacy, which, inftead of af- 
 fording any profpedl of advantage to its members 
 in general, exadled many painful facriiices ; and 
 which expofed them to a multitude of dangers to 
 encounter a fingle evil ; an evil big indeed with 
 the greatefl of all dangers ! 
 
 This then is the only alternative : a coalition 
 on the mod jufiifiable grounds, or no coalition. 
 Every other view of the fubje6l muli be imagi- 
 nary or abfurd. To me the choice appears by no 
 means dubious. I believe it (o be the misfor- 
 tune of Europe, that there never has exifled a 
 coalition in the true fenfe of the word. There 
 was nothing at the beginning of the war in the 
 leaft refembling it. The loofe and undefined 
 
 league
 
 ( 208 ) 
 
 league to which we now give the appellation, 
 was produced by the urgency of a common 
 danger, and the immediate necefiity of defence r 
 it was not the rcfult of a regular^ preconcerted 
 fyflem of attack. But if ever this opinion fhall 
 be refuted, if fome archive, yet a fecret, feme 
 more authentic document than the treaties of 
 Pavia, Pilnitz, Mantua, &c. fliould afford the 
 future hiftorian of thefe melancholy times, indif- 
 putable proofs of a premeditated, fyftematic, and 
 offenfive coalition, though it were only of a few 
 leading ftates ; I here confidently alTert before- 
 hand, that it will not confirm one fyllable of 
 what the Author of TEtai de la France has im- 
 puted to fuch a league, and that the general 
 welfare of Europe will be found its only objedV. 
 If there ever has been a coalition, and in whatever 
 degree it may have exifted, this muft have heer^ 
 its only bafis : it could have no other *. 
 
 We cannot therefore afcribe the war to the 
 defe6^s of the federal conftitution, either before 
 or after tlie year 1789; for it was in every refpe6t 
 foreign to the good or bad maxims and combi- 
 nations, to the happy or unfuccefsful efforts of 
 ordinary politics. It was an unnatural and un- 
 forefeen event that confounded and defied all 
 human calculation ; it was the revolution pro- 
 
 * Vide Note B B. 
 
 duced
 
 ( 209 ) 
 
 duced this terrible war. The revolution, and 
 that alone, overturned the political fyftem by an 
 unfortunate attempt to fupport it ; dilTolved every 
 federal obligation, lubverted and demolilhed 
 every pillar of the balance of power, and con- 
 verted the federal conftitution of Europe into a 
 fcene of anarchy and confufion, whence no hu- 
 man fkill or wifdom will fpeedily deliver it with- 
 out the miraculous interference of Providence. 
 
 That Europe, in its prefent unnatural and 
 helplefs condition— the dreadful refult of ten 
 fucceffive years of convulfions and misfortune — 
 that Europe now poffelTes no federal conftitu- 
 tion, now fcarce retains any public law, is a 
 melancholy truth, in which all parties feem to 
 agree. The Author of the Etat de la France is far 
 from doubting it. The peculiarity of his arbi- 
 trary, fophiftical, and paradoxical reafoning 
 conftfts in his attempt to deduce from an earlier 
 period the fource of the general diforder ; to 
 withdraw the firft: and only caufe of it, by an 
 artful niifreprefentation, from the eyes of his 
 cotemporaries ; and thus, if fuccefsful, to ex- 
 empt and purify his country from the everlafting 
 reproach of having brought fo dreadful a mif- 
 fortune upon civil fociety. 
 
 But
 
 ( aro ) 
 
 But where the connexion between caufc and 
 «ffe6l is (6 obvious as to ftrike the meaneft un- 
 derftanding, and catch the moil inexperienced 
 eye, all the efforts of fophiftry muft neceffarily 
 be vain. The only diiference of opinion, the 
 only doubts that have hitherto prevailed, have 
 been concerning the authors of the war ; and we 
 may fafely predial, that even thefe will foon be 
 difpelled by the light of truth ; fo that France, 
 as well as every other nation, will point the 
 curfes of the prefent, and the abhorrence of 
 future ages where they are really due. But 
 fophiftry will now attempt in vain to difpel the 
 convidionj that Europe owes the dangers and 
 diftrefs of her prefent fituation entirely to the 
 revolution and its confequent war. 
 
 I fhall not minutely examine the caufes that 
 have rendered the prefent war fo deftrudlive in 
 its character, and fo unfortunate to moft of the 
 nations concerned in it ; of which the danger- 
 ous preponderance of France has been the lafl, 
 moft important, and permanent effe^l. I fhall con- 
 fine mvfelfto a few obfervations, of which thetruth 
 13 too evident to expofe me to contradiction. That 
 fcries of misfortunes was, not a limple phenome- 
 non ; it was the refult of circumflances ex- 
 ..tremely. com|4ex and intricate. On the one 
 
 hand
 
 ( 211 ) 
 
 hand genius and depravity, and on the other 
 inevitable inferiority, with deplorable, perhaps 
 condemnable weaknefs, affiled each other to 
 produce it. It is difficult to fay which was the 
 principal of ihefe co-operating caufes ; but each 
 muft be taken into the account ; each was at 
 once caufe and efFe6l, each at once an original 
 principle and complementary condition of the 
 other. Future ages will do ample juftice to the 
 extraordinary energy and fready perfeverance, 
 the unrtiaken intrepidity and military talents, 
 the daring enterprifes and inexhauflible re- 
 fources of war difplayed by France amidft the 
 ftorms of the revolution, to the wondering na- 
 tions of Europe in arms. But hiftory will re- 
 mind us, too, that this extraordinary vigour grew 
 from the fame root with a no lefs extraordinary 
 depravity ; and that the means of fuch unheard-of 
 efforts, fuch gigantic enterprifes, could only be 
 afforded by a revolution that trampled on all 
 rights, tore down every barrier of civil polity, 
 and gave a loofe to every irregular pafHon. 
 Moreover, this enormous military greatnefs is 
 lefs a fubjedl of wonder, when we refledt that 
 every fecial and civil confideration, the in- 
 terefts of juftice, and even of humanity, the 
 welfare, and in a certain degree the exigence of 
 a great nation, the rich harveft of the paft, and 
 
 J ^ tjic
 
 ( 212 ) 
 
 the feeds of the future, were facrliiced to that' 
 fplendid but unprofitable greatiiefs. 
 
 On the other hand it is evident that the 
 powers leagued againll the revolution could not 
 imitate the proceedings, adopt the meafures, and 
 ufe the means of the common enemy, without 
 rilliing all they were contending for, and intro- 
 ducing to their own countries the very evils 
 they were combating : the difference always ex- 
 ifting between the refources of a coalition and 
 thofe of a revolutionary government, produced 
 the ncceffary inferiority of the enemies o£ 
 France. But it is equally evident that this 
 unavoidable difproportion, this neceflary in- 
 feriority, are far from being fufficient to ex- 
 plain all the events of our times. Some evil 
 genius leems to have perplexed the councils 
 of every cabinet, and paralyzed their political and 
 military energies ; (or it has been their fate to meet 
 the moft trying difficulties with pitiful pro- 
 jects, half- meafures, weak and incapable inftru- 
 ments, and a deplorable deficiency of every thing 
 the magnitude of the occafion required. They 
 too late, if ever, learned the character of their 
 enemy, and how to combat revolutionary wea- 
 pons and refources. There was no plan, co- 
 herence, or unifoiinity in their proceedings ; no 
 , . two
 
 ( 213 ) 
 
 two of them were of one opinion. Their unfor- 
 tunate diflenlions, the fatal influence of their 
 private interefls, their want of unanimity and 
 concert, the tardinefs and indecifion of their 
 meafures, redoubled the ftrength and courage 
 of their enemy. Capable at moft of a weak 
 and partial defence, unequal to a vigorous and 
 uniform attack, they formed no efletlive coali- 
 tion, but were merely a reludlant aflfemblage of 
 ill- according parts. They were, in fhort, un- 
 fortunately for the interefts of Europe, any 
 thing imaginable, except what the fubtle decla- 
 mations of the enemy, and the eafy credulity of 
 the age, have reprefented and believed. 
 
 The iffue of a war fo conduced between 
 fuch parties, could not be doubtful, and, in 
 fa6l, was exadly liich as had been predicted by 
 all men of judgment and penetration. The 
 firft of its unfortunate refults was the entire 
 failure of the original and only object of the 
 coalefced powers. While they were all wafting 
 their flrength, and many of them haflening 
 to ruin, the revolution was triumphant ; the 
 moft fcandalous enormities remained unpunifhed; 
 the perpetrators of the moft atrocious crimes that 
 ever difgraced the earth, afcended the throne of 
 ]LewisXlV. afTumed a plenitude of authority to 
 which the power of that mighty defpot baars no 
 p 3 compaiifon^
 
 ( 2.4 ) 
 
 compariron, and drowned the monarchy of 
 France in the blood of its laft defenders. But 
 this was not all ; they overran the neighbour- 
 ing {lates ; they devoured the fubftance of the 
 richeft countries in Europe ; they carried the 
 fymbol of their tyranny under the name of the 
 Tree of Liberty, through an hundred pro- 
 vinces ; they extended their territory on all fides 
 by conquett, by forced alliances, or by conipul- 
 fatory treaties ; and when all this was accom- 
 plilTied, refinance no longer poffible, the domi- 
 nion of the revolutionary rulers eftablilhed, and 
 the balance of Europe irrecoverably lofl ; the 
 fingle hope that yet remained — that of feeing the 
 monflrous edifice fall to pieces of itfelf — fud- 
 denly vanifhed ; the fcene changed, and this 
 colofTal fabric, thefe new refources, thefe territo- 
 rial acquifitions, thefe forced connexions, this 
 injlitary power and terrible preponderance, were 
 all confolidated in the hands of a regular, Ikil- 
 ful, and comparatively popular government. 
 The old revolutionary fyfiem was demolifhed as 
 a ufelefs pile. No principle of rule was now 
 acknowledged but the will and ambition of the 
 reigning party, and the genius of its chief; and 
 this government, thus flrengthcned and confoli- 
 dated, gave laws to a great part of Europe. 
 
 Suck
 
 ( ^'5 ) 
 
 Such is the ftate of things at the prefent mo- 
 ment *. The poUtical fyflem which refifted the 
 violence of fo many itorms until the French 
 revolution, and whofe llrong foundations had 
 defied the viciffitudes of fortune, and the lapfe 
 of time, has been converted into a heap of ruins 
 by the revolution, and its neceflary companion 
 the war. Europe, fay the friends as well as 
 enemies of the preponderant power; Europe 
 has entirely loft its balance. Let us nov/ pro- 
 ceed to inquire if there be any hope of feeing it 
 re-eftablifhed. 
 
 * The autumn of 1801. Some important changes have fince 
 taken place, and, alas ! they do but confirm Mr. Genz's con- 
 elufions ; they caft a deeper (hade \^on his very gloomy pic* 
 ture. The preponderance he deprecates, has received addi- 
 tional extenfion. While politicians are complaining of the 
 finking balance, the Gallic Chief throws his fvvord into the 
 fcale ; and " va viBis' is the anfvver, if afflifted Europe 
 fhould venture to remonftrate. After what they have already 
 fuffered, the powers of th« continent may fubmit to this. 
 
 Tran9» 
 
 P 4 PART
 
 ( 2l6 ) 
 
 PART IIL 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the ^refent Relations between France and the 
 other European States. 
 
 xJeFORE I enter upon the thorny path that 
 now awaits me, I muft premife a few obferva- 
 tions to explain as much as poflible the point 
 from which I fet out ; and from which alone the 
 courfe of my reafoning can be fairly traced and 
 judged. I hope thereby not only to fecure my- 
 felf againft wilful mifreprefentation, but even to 
 difarm that lawful criticifm which does not ex- 
 ceed the limits of its province. 
 
 Politics, or, more properly, the diplomatic 
 branch of them, conlift of two elements of dif- 
 ferent natures : 
 
 I ft, An accurate knowledge of the peculiar 
 relations of every flate : 2dly, The talent of efti- 
 jnating the capacities and charaders of the prin- 
 
 ' cipal
 
 ( 217 ) 
 
 dpal acSlors on the great Itage of public af-r, 
 jEairs, fo as to form acorrcdt judgment of the nature 
 andobjedl: of their views, and of the influence and 
 probal:>le coqfequences of their condudl in ever}' 
 political tranfa(5tion. The rules by which a 
 ilatefman fhould on all occalions be guided, 
 ought to be founded upon a due combination of 
 theie two principles. 
 
 It is obvious, that politics, as far as it depends 
 upon perfonal characters and difpolitions, is only 
 an art, fince thcfe relations can never be the ob- 
 je(5l of a fcicnce. The opinions, inclinations, 
 and paffions, the talents and abihties of indivi- 
 duals cannot be reduced to general rules : they 
 are various and irregular as nature. Long ftudy, 
 much obfervation, a frequent intercourfe with 
 the world, and great natural penetration, im- 
 proved by habit and experience, into a talent of 
 divination, are the indifpenfable requifites to a 
 diplomatic flatefman. The deepeft refearches, 
 the moil extenfive knowledge, all the advantages 
 of an excellent undcrflanding improved by habits 
 of reflexion, will not fupply thefe qualities, or 
 compenfate the want of them. 
 
 Practical politics mufl necefTarily be iraperfed 
 as a fcicnce ; for a confidcrable part of it 
 depends upon thcfe perfonal conliderations, 
 
 anc^
 
 < 2iB ) 
 
 and the art of obferving and direding them. Its 
 moft elaborate and profound calculations are 
 conftantly baffled by the influence of human 
 opinions and actions ; its apparently moft infal- 
 lible conclufions are frequently difappointed by 
 a lingle change in the fate of one important per- 
 fonage ; by a ftriking thought, a moment of 
 weaknefs or paffion, by a whim, a capricious 
 iit of favour or difguft. Its moft fatal enemy is 
 death, which frequently defeats its fpeculations, 
 becaufe it feldom forms a part of them. The 
 deceafe of a lingle perfon has often deftroyed the 
 work and combinations of a century ; the ap- 
 pearance of one new a6lor on the great theatre 
 of the world has brought about events which the 
 boldeft and moft ingenious politicians could not 
 Jiave difcovered by an age of meditation. 
 
 But however neceflary, in all political calcu- 
 lations, to keep thofe circumftances conftantly 
 in mind, and not to carry the fcience beyond 
 its unalterable limits; it would on the other 
 hand be extremely improper to attach too little 
 importance to the elementary and effential part 
 of politics. I call that the eflential part which 
 relates to the abfolute and relative ftrength of 
 nations ; and requires a knowledge of all their 
 fundamental and permanent relations ; their 
 geographical fttuations, the political and military 
 
 I fecurity
 
 ( 219 ) 
 
 fccurlty of their frontiers, their wants, thelf 
 povvers, their means of invafion or retiftance, th^ 
 natural apd conftant objedh of their induftr)', 
 and their feveral predominant interefls. Thefc 
 are, perhaps, the moft important articles in the 
 vocabulary of politics ; becaufe they are the 
 moft permanent, and in fome meafure the only 
 permanent objedts. Whatever changes may 
 take place in the opinions and paffions, the dif- 
 politions and capacities of men, the inclinations 
 and averfions of princes; there will always be 
 certain fixed and immutable points in the 
 changeable fphere of politics ; always fome fun- 
 damental relations, fome principles of a(51ion, 
 which no accidental change can alter or deftroy. 
 A great and powerful country, advantageoufly 
 fttuated, will, even under a government compa- 
 ratively weak, always be capable of greater ef- 
 forts to relift or attack an enemy, than a fmall, 
 defencelefs, and divided ftate, though governed 
 by a prince of extraordinary abilities. A nation 
 whofe power is fupported by commerce and in- 
 duftry, will on all occafions a6l on other princi- 
 ples than a ftate whofe greatnefs refts principally 
 or entirely upon military flrength. Amidft the 
 combinations of private views and paffions, there 
 muft always exift fome natural alliances and rival- 
 Ihips" among nations. The true, that is, the per- 
 manent and fundamental, intercft of each, will, 
 
 foon
 
 ( 220 ) 
 
 foon or late, prevail, however perverted, dif^ 
 gaifed, or concealed, by the temper or the errors 
 of the moment. Political calculations, founded 
 upon thefe principles, will never be entirely dif- 
 appointed, never ultimately ufelefs, notwith- 
 itanding accidental changes and exceptions. 
 
 There are therefore two extremes to be avoided 
 with equal care in all political reckonings. On 
 <he one hand, the opinion that the permanent 
 relations of ftates are alone to beconfidered ; and 
 on the other, that they are entitled to no conli- 
 deration at all. With the iirfi: of thefe the art, 
 with the fecond the Jcience of politics muft fall. 
 To acquire true notions, whereby to regulate 
 our condu6l in politics, we muft iirft ftudy the 
 fundamental relations of every ftate in their whole 
 extent ; and then always be mindful of the 
 changes that may poflibly be occaiioned in thefe 
 by the perfonal circumftances, the principles, 
 the character, and private opinions of their 
 rulers. 
 
 I Ihall here confine myfelf to thefe permanent 
 relations, fetting afide all conlideration of per- 
 fons. I conlider any nation dangerous to the 
 tranquillity of others when it wants nothing to 
 injure them but the will ; whether it be governed 
 by virtuous or depraved charaders, guided by 
 
 true
 
 ( ^21 ) 
 
 true or falfe principles. On the other hand, 
 regard the lituation of a country as helplefs and 
 precarious, without adverting to the poffibihty 
 of its being exaUed above all its dangers by the 
 exertions of an extraordinary prince, and fo 
 raifed to a higher degree of power and independ- 
 ence : here again I judge without reference to 
 any thing perfonal, and conclude a nation to be 
 weak and defencelefs, when fome unufual oc- 
 currence (fuch as the birth of a pre-eminent ge- 
 nius) is necefTary to its prefervation and fecurity. 
 
 Many of my readers will perhaps think me 
 blameable for adhering flridtly to this rule, in a 
 picSlure where France is the principal figure. 
 But to this blame I muft fubmit ; becaufe the 
 method I have adopted appears to me the fafefl 
 as well as the mo ft equitable. It is true, indeed, 
 that the perfonal relations of men in power, can 
 never affe61: a political queftion in a higher de- 
 gree, than where the iubject is — a nation imme- 
 diately ilTuing from a great revolution. Much 
 more depends in fuch a cafe than in any other, 
 upon the character of the government, and the 
 probability of a change in its component parts. 
 But if 1 renounce many important arguments de- 
 rivable from thefe peculiar circumftances, I am the 
 more certain that even the friends of the French 
 government will not invalidate my rcafoning. 
 
 The
 
 ( 12% ) 
 
 The following obfcrvations on the political and 
 federal lituation of France, are therefore entirely 
 confined to her real and permanent relations. I 
 abftain from inquiring how far the perfonal cha- 
 racter and principles of her prefent government 
 deferve the confidence, or juftify the diflrufl of 
 other nations. Its partifans aflure us it has re- 
 nounced all revolutionary projects, and directs 
 its views to fafety, peace, and juftice only : 
 others aflfert, that its moderation is but a new- 
 cloak for old maxims, which conceals the fame 
 ambition and perfidy, the fame oppreffion and 
 fyflematic tyranny that charaderized the ruling 
 fadtion in every period of the revolution. Thefe 
 opinions I leave to the practical flatefman, whofe 
 condu6l mufl be materially influenced by them, 
 and to the future hiftorian, whofe province it 
 will be to relate and judge the proceedings of 
 this government hereafter. Neither ihall I ift- 
 quire whether the duration of the prefent confti- 
 tution of France be within the fphere of human 
 probability. I will fuppofe it durable ; could its 
 warmeft advocate require more ? What I am 
 now going to fay of France is entirely independ- 
 ent of any fuch inquiry, and mufl be equally 
 true, whether a Bonaparte, a Robf^fpierre, or a 
 Bourbon be at the head of the French govern- 
 ment. 
 
 We
 
 ( 223 ) 
 
 We have already examined the fiatc of France 
 before the revolution, her fecurity, her means of 
 defence, and the nature of her frontiers ; in all 
 of which fhe had nothing left to defire. She 
 was more happy in the firfl requifite to a good 
 federal poiition than any nation in Europe. Her 
 conquells, in the laft ten years, are a powerful 
 addition to her fecurity. She ftood in no need 
 of them whatever, and has thus acquired a fu- 
 perfluity of political and federal ftrength. She 
 was fecure again ft every attack with her ancient 
 frontiers ; with her newly-extended limits Ihe 
 may bid defiance to the plans and efforts of all 
 Europe. 
 
 But however fecure and powerful this kingdom 
 was in its ancient ftate, there were always feveral 
 powers in Europe capable of curbing its ambi- 
 tious views of inordinate aggrandizement, and 
 reftraining its attempts upon the peace and fafety 
 of others, as often as it betrayed fuch dangerous 
 defigns. It was conftantly counterpoifed by 
 Auftria, Pruffia, or England ; and if any of 
 thefe was not fingly ftrong enough to counteract 
 its efforts, it was then effe6ted by a well-diredled 
 combination of their means. France was, more- 
 over, furrounded by feveral independent flates, 
 which, though comparatively of little weight, 
 yet fcrved to break the force of the firfl attack ; 
 
 gave
 
 ( 224 ) 
 
 gave time to the leading powers to alTeaiblc and 
 prepare for defence ; and, united with them, con- 
 tributed to prelerve the balance at all times, 
 
 Thisjv/iem is entirely deflroyed. 
 
 The chief bulwark of the north of Germany, 
 and confequently of the north of Europe, was 
 the independence of Holland. This rich and 
 refpe6ted republic had, in former times, often 
 refitted the attempts of France, with her own 
 well-dire(^led {trencrth in the hands of fkilful and 
 intrepid leaders. She gradually declined from 
 her former greatnefs after the peace of Utrecht ; 
 but until the French revolution Ihe neither 
 wanted firength nor refources to make head 
 againft an enemy; and her political alliances 
 were fuch as to enfure the maintenance of her 
 rank and influence. The torrent of the revolu- 
 tion has irrecoverably overwhelmed her, and fhe 
 is now erafed from the lift of independent ftates. 
 Holland has been a province of France fince the 
 year 1795. And fuppofing any favourable 
 change to relieve her from her prefent abjccl de- 
 pendancc, it is not polTible to conceive how fhe 
 could recover any material part of her former 
 importance. Her fircngth is exhaufted, her frort- 
 tifT towns are loft ; and Belgium in the hands 
 of France, leaves not the fmalleft hope of better 
 times. Holland is therefore a part of the domi- 
 nions
 
 ( 225 ) 
 
 t5!ons of France, and will be confidered as fuch 
 in every future war. Her independence was 
 formerly a fafegaard to the north of Europe : 
 that fafeguard is now no more. 
 
 The Austrian Netherlands were the next 
 rampart between France and the north of Ger- 
 many. Thele provinces were, perhaps, more bur- 
 denfome than productive to Auftria ; they were 
 conftantly expofed to the arms of France, and 
 their diftancc from the main body of the Auftrian 
 dominions rendered it very difficult and expen- 
 live to defend them. It muft likewife be con- 
 fefled, that a more liberal view of the fubjedl 
 would lead to a wifh that thefe provinces, the 
 object and theatre of fo many wars, had long 
 been otherwife difpofed of*. But however that 
 may be, it is certain, that, fo long as France did 
 not poffefs them, the Aultrian Netherlands were 
 a great protection to the north of Germany. 
 That France fhouJd commence her operations 
 agalnil: Germany, on the Meufe, or at her former 
 frontiers, is a difference of no fmall importance ; 
 that fhe fhould be able to penetrate immediately 
 into the interior of Germany, inftead of con- 
 fuming one or more campaigns in the conqueft 
 of Flanders, is an immenfe advantage. 
 
 * Vide Not? g C. 
 
 a The
 
 ( 226 ) 
 
 The tliird bulwark of the Empire agalnft France 
 in the North, was that large portion of German 
 territory that lay between the Rhine and the 
 French dominions. This country, potrcffing two 
 of the ftrongeft fortrefles in Europe, and a num- 
 ber of excellent military pofitions, was well luited, 
 like the Netherlands, to break the force of a firft 
 attack. The paiTageof the Rhine (in many places 
 an entcrprife of little difficulty) is now the only 
 obftacle to prevent the French armies from over- 
 running all the northern circles of the Empire as 
 far as the Wefer or the Elbe. 
 
 ^ The three fafeguards thus loft to Germany, 
 Were the more important as they protecled the 
 provinces leaft defended by art or nature. The 
 hiftory of the laft war has indeed afforded more 
 than one fad example of the infufficlency of art 
 or nature to oppofe the progrefs of a vidlorious 
 army ; and has fhown that the fouth, as well as 
 the north of Germ.any, is not impregnable to an 
 enterpriling enemy ; but it mult be allowed that 
 the country between the Mayne and the Alps 
 prefents many more difficulties to an invafion, 
 than the diflri6t between the Mayne and the 
 North Sea. The laiV is every where open, con- 
 taining fcarccly a tenable place, hardly one forti- 
 fied or difficult pafs, as far as the frontiers of the 
 hereditary dominions of the Houle of Branden- 
 burg,
 
 ( 2^7 ) 
 
 burg. One or two pitched battles will Iways de- 
 cide the fate of this country, with which the for- 
 tunes of the north of Europe are neccflarily con- 
 ne6led. The extraordinary coincidence of cir- 
 cumftances that ihielded the north of Germany 
 from immediate danger at the moll alarming 
 period of the war, rendered her lefs fenfible of 
 the lots of her ancient ramparts, and lets anxious 
 about the confequences ; other wife, the cef- 
 lion of the Rhine diftridts to the mafiers of Flan- 
 ders and Holland, and the treaty by which the 
 Rhine was made the boundary of France and 
 Germany, would have been objetls of greater fo- 
 licitude, more earneft complaintsy and more ef- 
 fcdlual oppofition. 
 
 Neither is the fouth of Germany fo fecure as it 
 was before the revolution. There too the Em- 
 pire has been deprived of its mofl. important bul- 
 wark ; for fuch was Switzerland. The neutrality 
 of this fortrefs of nature, this impregnable pofi- 
 tion, this central point of all military operations, 
 a neutrahty confecrated by ages, is no more: let 
 us not indulge in groundlefs hopes, it is deltroyed 
 for ever. At prefent there is not the fmalicfl 
 profpedl of a favourable change ; for Switzerland 
 is a province, a place of arms, an intrenched 
 camp of France. Should any political revolu- 
 tion, Ihould the fpontaneous moderation of the 
 Q 2 French
 
 ( ^^8 ) 
 
 Frencii government reflore its liberty, it could 
 never refume its former independence. The tacit 
 agreement of the leading powers to fpare it in 
 their feveral undertakings ; the refped for its wife 
 and inflexible neutrality, rather the effe6l of an- 
 cient cuftom, than of policy or moderation : all 
 this is annihilated for ever. In every future war 
 Switzerland will be held by the boldeil and rea- 
 dieft competitor. France muft at all events main- 
 tain a great and permanent influence in its domef- 
 tic concerns, and will no doubt, at all times, and 
 under all circumftances, conflder and ufe it as 
 her property. Here then is an end of all fafety 
 for Swabia, Bavaria, and the foremoft provinces 
 of the Auftrian monarchy ! At the firft flgnal 
 for war, the troops of France will pour down 
 from the fummits of the Alps upon the fouth of 
 the Empire ; and as Switzerland forms a great 
 point of communication between Germany and 
 Italy, the operations of the French, planned and 
 executed upon the new fyftem of warfare, rauft 
 acquire an extent, continuity, and vigour, to 
 .which the neighbouring nations can oppofe no 
 adequate refiftance. 
 
 The ftatcs of the King of Sardinia were for- 
 merly a barrier between Italy and France. That 
 monarch was not improperly called the gt4arcihm 
 of the Alps, For though incapable of effe6lually 
 
 oppofing
 
 ( 229 ) 
 
 oppofing either of the powers that (6 often con- 
 teiled the polTeffion of Italy, and though by no 
 means fo powerful as the interefts of that coun- 
 try and of Europe required ; yet his geographical 
 fituation, and his many excellent fortrefieSj gave 
 him no fmall degree of importance, and conli- 
 dcrable means of defence. While Europe re- 
 tained its ancient conftitution, neither France 
 nor Auftria could indulge a hope of conquering 
 and fubjc(^ing Italy. The ruler of Piedmont 
 and Savoy was the natural ally of the opponent of 
 fuch projecfls. 
 
 This fyflem is now irrecoverably loft. Savoy 
 is for ever united to France ; and the fortified 
 places of Piedmont are all in the hands of the 
 French government. The future deltiny of this 
 country, and of the King of Sardinia, lies buried 
 in the obfcurity of the future ; but we may con- 
 fidently predid, that the moft favourable turn of 
 the prefent crifis can never reftore the former 
 ftate of thinirs. Should theKin<!;of Sardinia be 
 re-eftablifhcd in the ibvereignty of Piedmont, he 
 would hardly recover his frontier towns, the cf- 
 fence of his ftrength and the bulwark of Italy. 
 Even if thefe fhould be reftored, yet with France 
 on one fide, and the vaiTals of France on every 
 other, he would himfelf be nothing more than a 
 valTal, an impotent vaiial of the republican chief. 
 Q- 3 '^^^'^
 
 ( ^3° ) 
 
 The obedience of the Cifalpine republic is for 
 ever fecured to the power whence it derives itsex- 
 iilence : the fubmiflion of Genoa, Parma, Tut- 
 cany, are alike implicit and invariable. Before 
 the treaty of Luneville, the manifeftos of France 
 declared, '' The interefts of Europe require that 
 Aufiria do.not pafs the Adige." The meaning 
 of this maxim is no longer an enigma. The 
 Adige is the boundary of Auftria ; bat it is the 
 boundary of France alfo. The whole of Italy 
 is neither more nor lefs than a French province. 
 French generals, and French commiiraries, give 
 the law from the Alps to the Straits of Meflina ; 
 and if the confular authority fhould refolye to- 
 morrow to convert all Italy into one republic, 
 under the prote61ion of France, or to incorporate 
 its provinces with the great nation, the important 
 operation would cofi the Chief Conful nothing 
 more than an order to his military lieutenant, tq 
 promulgate his fovereign decree*. 
 
 An undifturbcd alliance had fubfiftcd between 
 France and Spain lince the year 1762; and as 
 France was greatly more powerful than her ally, 
 there was a difproportion in the connexion that 
 
 * The fd£t has proved the poflibilitymore fpeedily than even 
 ?.lr. Genz could have expefted. IJe would probably have de- 
 fcribed ihe very manner in which this event was to happen, had 
 it not been a part of his plan to avoid all alhifion to perfonai 
 chaia^er. — T r an s.
 
 ( ^31 ) 
 
 led to the dependance of Spain. The Spanifh 
 government, however, pret'ervcd a certain degree 
 of independence, until the commencement of the 
 revolution, and France did not enjoy an unli- 
 mited control of the councils and refources of 
 her ally. This is now entirely altered: Spain 
 has not preferved a remnant of freedom or inde- 
 pendence;, when FrancQ commands, fhe murt be 
 obeyed, though the utter ruin of the Spanifh mo- 
 narchy were the neceffary confequence. The 
 words of Lewis XIV. "There are no longer 
 any Pyrennees for France," have been more lite- 
 rally true lince the year 1795, than when he fpoke 
 them. The expenfes of a conqueft have been 
 fpared ; but the conqueft of Spain is neverthelels 
 connplete. That nation has vanifhed from the lift 
 of independent ftates, in every political and fe- 
 deral refpedl: ; and the power it may hereafter 
 poftefs, muft be looked upon merely as an addi- 
 tion to the refources of France, and be eftimated 
 as fuch in every political calculation. 
 
 It is not therefore enough to fay that France 
 -has extended her limits on all tides by conqueft ; 
 has added to the impregnability of her frontiers 
 by new ramparts, and increafed her inflnencc 
 over the neighbouring ftates in a formidable de- 
 gree : the truth is, that France, in her prefent 
 ftate, is contained by no limits ; every thing 
 round about her either is really, if nut nominally, 
 Q. 4 her
 
 ( 23* ) 
 
 her territory and property, or may be made a paft 
 of her poffeffions, at the firft convenient oppor- 
 tunity, by ihe nod of her foverei^n. Spain, Italy, 
 and Germany, without fortrelTes, without means 
 of defence, without fecurity political or military, 
 are open to the attacks of France : and it now 
 only depends upon the moderation and jufiice of 
 the French government (mere perfonal guaran- 
 tees, which every moment may alter or deftroyj, 
 whether France ftiall rule alone in the whole well 
 of Europe, whether any law fhall be obeyed but 
 hers. 
 
 The foundation upon which this enormous 
 power was firft raifed, and f?ill continues to reft, 
 is by no means frail or precarious. The military 
 greatnels of France, the joint rel'ult of the revo- 
 lution and the moft unfortunate of all wars, is 
 not, as many people hope, a tranfitory meteor. 
 It is thoroughly interwoven with the eflential 
 principles of the French republic; it is a funda- 
 mental part of its conilitution, its politics and 
 government ; andisfo infeparably connc^ed with 
 its charadlcr iiixl exiftence, tliat a cetiation of this 
 military preponderance, and the total diflolulion 
 of the republic, may be faid lo be fynonimous. 
 Amidlt the f.orms of the la A ten years, the 
 French nation has become entirely military ; it 
 has cultivated the art of war at the expenfe of 
 every other: accullomed to victory, the ambi- 
 tion
 
 ( ^^^ ) 
 
 (ion of fnilltary fame is now the cliatacHeriftic 
 feature, the ufe of arms the ordinary ocrupation, 
 and war the natural clement of the French. 
 Even the internal folidity of their prefent confii- 
 tution depends entirely upon the conftant predo- 
 minance of a military force : nothing but a mili- 
 tary government (which, however, need not be 
 tyrannical) can coerce and retrain a people wlio 
 have loft every element of polity, and every prin- 
 ciple of peaceful fubordination in the convulfions 
 of a ten years revolution ; among whom force is 
 become the only m^afure of authority, and anar- 
 chy the only fubfiitute of law and order. When 
 in fuch a ftate the fprings o( military power are 
 relaxed, the decline and ruin of the civil confti- 
 tution arc at hand. The ilighteft view of the fub- 
 je6l mull convince any man, whether friend or 
 enemy, that the capacities, inclinations, habits, 
 characters, and intercfts of her prefent rulers will 
 jufii fy no other conclufion. 
 
 If to this military power, this extenfivc ter- 
 ritory, this unlimited control of fo many na- 
 tions; if to all the former and prel'ent advan- 
 tages of France, we add the terror which fhe has 
 fpread around her, and which is now the predo- 
 jiiinant fentiment of Europe : is there in the 
 whole extent of the continent, a nation capable 
 of maintaining, alone, a contcft with fuch a 
 power ? I fliall fpare myfelf the melancholy talk 
 
 of
 
 ( 234 ) 
 
 of entering minutely into the difcuiTion of this 
 truth, and of developing all its painful confe- 
 quences. The difproportion is clear and evident 
 to every fpedator : the hiilory of the war of the 
 revolution, and particularly of the campaigns of i 
 1799 and 1800, is one continued and incontro- 
 vertible comment upon it. I fay nothing of ex- 
 traordinary conjuncSlures : I will not fay that 
 fome new power may not be formed, forae great 
 genius may not arife hereafter, to avenge afflidled 
 Europe of the mortifications, (he has received 
 from viiSlorious France ; but the prefent fiate of 
 affairs, the natural courfe of things, and the 
 ufual eflimation of flrength, encourage no fuch 
 profpedf. No nation on the continent, unlefs 
 compelled by the neceffity of felf-defcnce, would, 
 fingly hazard a war with France. If, therefore, 
 it be yet poffible to check her inordinate afcen- 
 dant, and recover the balance of Europe, there 
 muff be a counterpoife formed by a combination 
 of feveral powers. But fhould a nearer exami- 
 nation difplay infurmountable difficulties in the 
 way of fuch a confederacy ; fhould the poflibility 
 of its exigence or the efficacy of its operation be 
 higlily dubious ; the anfwer, though a very com- 
 fortlefs one, will then readily be found to the 
 queftion ; '* What guaranty does there now ex-, 
 ift of our federal conflitution ?" 
 
 lii
 
 ( ^35 ) 
 
 In the firii place, it can hardly be difpated that 
 Austria or Prussia muli be principally engaged 
 in every elfcdual coalition agaittft France. The 
 other powers of Europe can never combat her 
 afcendant, but in concert with one or both of 
 thele, by their means, and as their allies. Sup- 
 pofing Ruffia able to cope lingly with France, 
 yet they have no immediate point of conta(5l, and 
 the immenfe intervening fpace renders ail adtivc 
 operations between them impoflible, unlefs fomc 
 more neighbouring nation fhould fide with Ruf- 
 fia. Belides, however dangerous France may be- 
 come to the fafety and independence of her neigh- 
 bours, it never can be the interell of Ruffia to 
 iland up alone in oppolition to plans, of which 
 ihe muft neceflarily be the lafl to feel the efFeds. 
 The power of Ruffia, if ever again it be engaged 
 in a war with France, will act no other part 
 than that of an auxiliary. England, whenever it 
 interferes in the concerns of the continent, mufl 
 do the lame. If France were bent upon lubduinc 
 the whole continent, England alone could not 
 prevent it : England can only adV againlt her as 
 an auxiliary in a general vi^ar, in concert with 
 Aufiria or Pruflia, or both of them. 
 
 The whole queftion therefore, concerning the 
 ffability of the prefent federal fyftcm, is reduced 
 to tills : How far arc Auftria and PrufTia enabled 
 
 to
 
 ( 256 ) 
 
 to protect themfelves and the nations conne<5ted 
 with them, againft the power of France? Be- 
 fore the revolution. Inch a queftion would have 
 been cafily anfwered. The power of Auftria had 
 been a counterpoife to that of France lince the 
 beginning of the lixteenth century; fometlmes 
 alone, fometimcs in alliance with others, Auftria 
 had often countera(Sled the attempts of her ancient 
 rival in Germany and Italy. The ultimate refult 
 of all their wars, was indeed in favour of France ; 
 for if we contemplate the period that elapfed be- 
 tween that epoch and the year 1740, we find that 
 fhe had conliderably enlarged her poffeflions in 
 the Netherlands and on the banks of the Rhine, 
 and had feated princes of the Houleof Bourbon on 
 two Italian thrones. But the foundations of the 
 Auftrian monarchy bad never been ihaken by 
 France before the year 1740. All the plans of 
 Lewis XIV. were baffled by the great alliances 
 with England and Holland, which Auftria fuc- 
 eefsfully oppofed to them ; and at the treaty of 
 Utrecht the Imperial provinces remained entire ; 
 tbe Empire retainedall its ancient bulwarks from 
 the Alps to the North Sea. 
 
 An important change took place in the fitu- 
 ation of Auflria after the year 1740. The eleva- 
 tion of the Iloufe of Brandenburg gave a new 
 form to the Empire. Till then it had been di- 
 2 vidcd
 
 ( ^37 ) 
 
 vided into a number of great and fmall frates, 
 who took part with oragainft Auftria in her leve- 
 ral wars, according to the interelts or politics of 
 their foverei<!;ns. But when Pruffia became a 
 great and independent frate, the centre as it were 
 of a fyftem formed by its new powers of attrac- 
 tion in the north of Germany ; the intcrcfis of 
 the Empire began in many important rel"pc<5ts lo 
 be difiinjiuirhed — the north from the fouth. The 
 Empire was from that time divided into two parts, 
 ftrongly conneeled with each other by a muhipli- 
 cityof intereits, but entirely diltin(!^t in the motl 
 eflential points of their federal politics. 
 
 This new fyftem was far from agreeable to tlie 
 private interefts of Aufrria ; but confidered in an 
 enlarged point of view, it could not he but gene- 
 rally advantageous. There was only one cale 
 poflible in which fuch a fyll'em could be danger- 
 ous to Europe, and cfpecially to Germany ; and 
 of that cafe there was not tiie linalleft probability 
 till the French revolution. The fchifm in the 
 Empire could have no pernicious confequence, 
 unlefs the afcendant of PVancc were luch as to re- 
 quire its united forces to oppote her. So long as 
 France remained in her former Itale, to long as 
 either Aullria or Priiliia, with their occafional 
 allies, formed a fufficient counterpoife to her 
 power, the balance and fecurity of Europe were 
 
 unfhakcn ;
 
 ( 23S ) ^ 
 
 unfhaken ; and Germany and Europe enjoyed the 
 beneficial effects of the altered conftitution of the 
 Empire, without experiencing, or even appre- 
 hendinfj; that mifchief, which could only, under 
 the above circiimfiances, refuU from it. 
 
 Two crreat examples have demonftratcd the ef- 
 ficacy of that fyiiem : in the war for the luccef- 
 lion of CharlesVl. Auftria, abandoned by almoft 
 every other power, flood alone againfl France 
 and her numerous allies; and maintained the 
 contefl with dignity and vigour. Pruilia flood 
 engaged with one half of Europe, in the {even 
 years war, and fiipported her caufe with honour 
 and effect. Even tlie thirty years alliance between 
 France and Auftria, produced by the~treaty of 
 1756, was never fufhciently powerful to threaten 
 the independence of the norlh of Germany with 
 lerious danger. Had France Co far departed from 
 all the principles of rational policy, as to threaten 
 Pruffia Tud lur allies, by means of this connex- 
 ion, had Auftria been blind enough to affift, even 
 tacitly, in fuch an undertaking, the north of Ger- 
 many, in itlelf neither weak, nor delHtute of re- 
 fources, would have found fupport in the aflift- 
 ance of England and Ruffia. The profound 
 peace enjoyed by Germany, unbroken but by the 
 campaign of 1778, and even that campaign itfelf, 
 luiiiciently prove, that the conftitution of the 
 
 Empire
 
 ( ^39 ) 
 
 Empire contalnedcomplete provifion for the fafety 
 and integrity of the whole and every part, againft 
 all foreign or internal dangers. 
 
 But this fiafe of divifion neceffarily prcfented 
 the greatcfl advantages to France as the enemy of 
 Germany, when unforefcen, unnatural revolu- 
 tions had given her fuch a preponderance as to 
 require the united forces of the Empire to oppofe 
 her. Now that ihe has overthrown every bulwark, 
 of Germany, crufhed the independence of the 
 intermediate countries, efiablilhed her fway in 
 Holland, in the Netherlands, on the left bank 
 of the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Upper Italy ; 
 now that fhe has even razed the few fortreflls 
 that remained on the right bank of the Rhine ; 
 a campaign in Germany v/ill be an enterprife of 
 no hazard or difficulty for the French armies. 
 Within eight days from the commencement of 
 hoftilities, the theatre of tlie war will be in the 
 heart of the Empire. The immediate objecl of 
 the invalion will not, as formerly, be attacked on 
 this or that particular fide, but in every part at 
 once. If the reft of the Empire is neutral, It will 
 Ipeedlly be furrounded. The firll advantage of 
 the enemy then opens him a way into the Ur- 
 ritories of the principal ftates. A dellrudtive and 
 decifive contell is commenced in the very heart of 
 iheir dominions; the lofs of every battle is fol- 
 lowed
 
 ( 24© ) 
 
 lowed by fuch incalculable clanger, leads to Cuch 
 dreadiul conlequences, as take away all courage 
 to relilT ; (he Iciierevilis eagerly fubmitted to, in 
 order to efcape from a more terrible misfortune ; 
 and ruin, apparently inevitable, is averted by an 
 ignominious peace. Such will be the event of 
 every war in Germany, fo long as the prefent 
 fyftcm fhall endure. 
 
 If it be yet polTible to prcferve the independ- 
 ence and fecuritv of Germany (whofe frontiers 
 are now defcncelcfs and unprotected) againil 
 France, with all her late conquefts, her enor- 
 mous extent of territory, herconfolidated military 
 itrength, and her abfolute control of Holland, 
 Italy, and Switzerland ; it can only beeifected by 
 a juncflion of all the powers of the Empire* 
 Such an union cannot be produced without 3 
 good undcrftanding between the two principal 
 dates. Is that to be expected ? This queftion 
 -involves, to all appearance, the future fate of 
 Germany, and that of Europe alio, fince Europe 
 can only reiift the preponderance of France, by 
 •means of Germany. 
 
 Since Pruffia has ranked among the principal 
 powers of Europe ; fince more than half a cen- 
 tury, Auftria andPruflia have appeared two hoftile 
 ifiars that threaten the whole political fyfteni with 
 
 fubvciiion
 
 ( "41 ) 
 
 fubvcrfion and ruin, whenever their orbits inter- 
 fered. We have I'een them involved in bloody 
 wars, engaged inceffantly in plans for weaken- 
 ing each other ; ever vigilant, ever in alarm, 
 each jealous of the efforts or advancement of its 
 rival. They were allied during a fhort time 
 againft an evil of a moft extraordinary nature; 
 againft a moft formidable and univerfal danger: 
 but even this alliance fowed the feeds of frefh 
 difcord, and produced new and apparently jufti- 
 fiable grounds of perpetual divifton. The im- 
 poffibility of their a6ling in concert, even when 
 called upon by the greatefl and moft preffing dan- 
 ger, the ftrongeft and moft facred motives ; this 
 lamentable impoflibility, the fource of fuch de- 
 plorable misfortunes, has furnifhed the completcft 
 proof of an irreconcilable antipathy, and annihi- 
 lated, not only every hope of the prefent, but, 
 for thofe who fee deeply into things, every hope 
 of the future. 
 
 If this inveterate hatred were only the effeift o£ 
 paflion, opinion, and prejudice, an enlightened 
 ftatcfman would not conftder it infurmountable ; 
 and, fo far as it only refts upon fuch grounds, 
 we may always entertain a hope of feeing, if not 
 perfed harmony, at leaft a fufpenfion of difcord- 
 ant meafures between them ; a temporary agree- 
 ment for a commoA <^e<^, and confidence and 
 
 R unanimity
 
 ( 142 ) 
 
 unanimity in the purfuit of it. That the com- 
 mon notions concerning natural antipathies 
 between governments and nations, are by no 
 means unfounded, has been incontrovertibly 
 proved by many deplorable examples ; but that 
 thefe antipathies fhould have no bounds, is 
 reje(5\ed by found policy, becaufe condemned 
 by found reafon. Whenever a real interell 
 commands, every national antipathy, though 
 exiftirg from the earliefl times, if it only relts 
 upon prejudice, mull yield to more urgent 
 motives ; and fo it doubtlefs will, when the gui- 
 dance of nations is intrufted to the wife and 
 great ; to men who are above all narrow views, 
 and fuperior to all little paffions. The deliberate 
 and decided mcafures of a truly enlightened go- 
 Ternment, intent upon important objefts, break 
 through the fetters of popular opinion, are fup- 
 ported by the wife, and carry the weak irrefift- 
 ibly along • thus often extinguifhing, in one for- 
 tunate moment, whole ages of national pre- 
 judice. 
 
 But in the cafe before us, the evil is more deeply 
 rooted. The antipathy between Auflriaand Pruf- 
 fiais not founded upon a blind fentiment of aver- 
 lion, jealoufy, or miflrufl ; is not merely the effedl 
 of long habit, or the bitter remembrance of mu- 
 tual injuries. It is conneded with more deep 
 
 and
 
 ( 243 ) 
 
 and e/Tcntial caufes. It has hitherto been a fun- 
 damental principle of European politics, and, un- 
 der certain limitations, mud always continue fo. 
 Thefe two powers are evidently dcftined to balance 
 each other ; that is their political calling, the ne- 
 ceflary rule of their whole political condu6l. 
 Setting entirely alide all private hatred, all jea- 
 loufy and animofity (which fhould always be ex- 
 cluded from the higher views of politics and go- 
 vernment), there mud ever remain in their rela- 
 tions, in the nature and objedis of their activity, 
 and in the very principle of their exiftence, a 
 fixed and unalterable caufc, not of natural or 
 political enmity, but of natural and political op- 
 pofition. They are compelled to counteract each 
 other ; how could they then in the common courfe 
 of things be permanently allied ? This necef- 
 fary ftate of oppolition was evidently conducive 
 to the welfare of Europe, as long as its ancient 
 conflitutionand relations endurtd, without being 
 detrimental to thofe powers themfelves, provided 
 it was not fuffered to exceed the bounds of true 
 policy. Till France arrived at her prefent great- 
 nefs, the fyfiematic enmity of Auftria and Pruf- 
 lia rather added to the fecurity than to the dan- 
 gers of Europe; their condu6l was in unifon 
 with the principles of legitimate politics ; and if 
 we maturely weigh the effecSls of a clofc con- 
 nexion between them, we mufl confefs, that, had 
 R 2 it
 
 ( 244 ) 
 
 it been poffible, it would have been by no means 
 defirable. 
 
 But iince the total change which has taken 
 place ; fince the French revolution has fubverted 
 every foundation of the federal fyllem ; Iince 
 France has attained a preponderance againfl: 
 which every ancient guarantee of the equilibrium 
 is but as a rotten pillar to a fiilling building; from 
 that time, this once beneficial oppolition is con- 
 verted into a caufe of the general vveaknefs, and 
 (it cannot be concealed) of the general ruin. 
 Though an alliance between Auftria and Pruflia 
 continue to be as unnatural and impracticable as 
 heretofore, yet it affords the only means of protec- 
 tion and defence to Germany ; there is no other 
 chance of its prefervation in the general wreck of 
 Europe. This alone is a flrong proof of the 
 malignancy and danger of the prefent political 
 crilis, and of the magnitude of our misfortunes : 
 for as the means of preferving the lafl remains 
 of the political lyftem, are difficult, extraordi- 
 nary, and unnatural ; even fo fevere and extraor- 
 dinary muft be the fhock which has difordered it. 
 
 It is among the moft unfortunate peculiarities 
 of this cafe, that every confederacy of the lead- 
 ing powers of Germany, though called for and 
 cemented by the nrongeft neceflity, mufl necef- 
 I faril/
 
 ( 245 ) 
 
 iarlly be conceived and executed in the fpirit of & 
 coalition, and not of an alliance. The funda- 
 mental contrariety in the principles and objecls 
 of their pohtics, will continue the fame under any 
 circumftances ; and muft indeed return whenever 
 the general balance is re-eftablilhed, and the fe- 
 deral fyftem fecured upon its former bafis. This 
 union, therefore, can never be other than tran- 
 fient ; which is the whole fecret, the perpetual 
 and neceflary caufe of its weaknefs. Such would 
 be the uncertainty of a combination of thefe he- 
 terogeneous parts, thai the forced and unfteady 
 alliance mi-ht be diirdved, and all its operations 
 fufpended in the moft critical and decifive mo- 
 ment. It is a matter of doubt whether the fe- 
 parate refiftance of each flate, with all its ne- 
 ceflary difadvantages, would not be preferable to 
 fuch a coalition. 
 
 If, moreover, the inordinate afcendant of 
 France were to create an alliance between Auf- 
 tria and Pruffia, as the only means of refifling 
 it, a general coalition would, in all political pro- 
 bability, be the confequence. For England and 
 Ruffia would always take part with Auftria or 
 Pruflia ; and in the prefent flate of Europe, every 
 power of the fecond and third order would be 
 more or lefs concerned with them. Thus a league 
 between Auflria and Pruffia may always be con- 
 R 3 lidered
 
 C 246 ) 
 
 lideredas a coalition of Europe. The want of fuch 
 a one (all the politicians of Europe will not fup- 
 prefs this truth), the want of tlich a coalition 
 againft France will often be felt and acknow- 
 ledged : but the conviction of its necefTity will 
 be accompanied by the jufl apprehenlion of its 
 infufficiency. It would require a rare conjunc- 
 tion of great and extraordinary characters to or- 
 ganize, diredl, and contain fuch a coalition, 
 and to condu6l it fnccefsfully to the objedl of its 
 original deftination. Experience has taught us 
 this : the dreadful lefTon is yet frefti in the 
 memory of humbled Europe ; and who now 
 among the rulers of nations will venture to 
 encounter a fecond ? 
 
 Thus far is certain at all events : the political 
 fyftem cannot but be extremely defective, when 
 it contains fuch a difproportion of power as 
 nothing but a general league can rectify. And 
 when even that difficult, dangerous, and almofl 
 defperate remedy does not promife certain fuccefs, 
 does not afford even rational hopes of it, the ex- 
 if^ence of any thing like equilibrium muft be 
 quite out of the cjueftion. 
 
 I will here briefly recapitulate the foregoing 
 obfervatjons, and prefent the following refults of 
 this view of the prefent relations between Francp 
 
 and
 
 ( 247 ) 
 
 and Europe ; which, though indeed only my in- 
 dividual opinion, is founded throughout upon 
 fads. 
 
 I ft. France has extended her limits on all 
 Hdcs by military or revolutionary operations. 
 She has deltroyed the independence of the 
 neighbouring ftates, either by regular conqueft, 
 as in the cafe of Flanders, Savoy, the Rhine 
 lands, &c. or under colour of alliance, as with 
 Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and the Italian 
 republics ; or finally, by the right of power only, 
 as in the fubjedtion of all Italy as far as the Adige. 
 The ancient conftitutions of all thefe countries 
 have been demolifhed, and France has eflablifhed 
 an empire upon their ruins, which has no parallel 
 in Europe. 
 
 2dly. This total obliteration of her former li- 
 mits, this deftrucfiion of every fafeguard of her 
 neighbours ; this military force, alike extraordinary 
 in extent and efficacy, and far exceeding even her 
 territorial aggrandizement in proportion ; thefe 
 have given a preponderance to France, againft 
 which no continental power, not even the greateft, 
 can contend with any chance of fuccefs. 
 
 3dly. Were France to abufe this prodigious 
 
 preponderance, and, not content with her pre- 
 
 fent acquifuions, were fhe to prefcribe too hard 
 
 R 4 conditions
 
 ( n8 ) 
 
 conditions to tlfe reft of Europe, a general league 
 would be the only means of refifting the danger. 
 
 4thly. Such is the geographical, military, and 
 political lituation of France, that no leagueagainft 
 her could be in the leaft efFedlual, in which Auf- 
 tria or Prullia, or both, are not engaged. 
 
 5thly. In every future war of Auftria or Pruf- 
 fia feparately againft France, the probability of 
 vi6lory (to fay no more) is on the fide of the 
 latter : and even the alliance of either with a 
 third ftate, would not form a counterpoife tq 
 France, ifthe other remained neuter; they could, 
 at the moft, only lefTen the difproportion *. 
 
 (5thly. Auftria and Praffia muft therefore ad 
 in concert, to afford a hope ofefFedlual prote<5lion 
 to Germany in any future war. 
 
 7thly. But an intimate alliance between thofe 
 two powers, is the moft improbable, the moft 
 difficult of all political combinations. Thus va- 
 nilhes the bafis of every federative guarantee 
 againft France, as foon as we have difcovered it. 
 
 8thly. In the whole fphere of federal relations 
 there is no alliance (in the common acceptation 
 of the word) that can form a counterpoife to 
 
 * Vide Note D D. 
 
 France.
 
 ( 249 ) 
 
 France. This can only be accompli flied by the 
 means always dangerous and uncertain, of a coa- 
 lition, whenever the neceliity of an a6^ive relift- 
 ance fhall arife : and as every coalition againll 
 France muft be general (becaufe the whole of 
 Germany, and confequently all the allies of the 
 leading powers of the Empire muft neceflarily be 
 engaged in it) ; fo the only refuge that remains to 
 Europe againft France, is the moft dangerous, 
 the moft uncertain, the moft intricate and diifi- 
 cult of all political meafures. 
 
 I am aware of fome objections likely to be 
 made to this reafoningin general (whofe intrinfic 
 confiftency, I think, will hardly be impeached), 
 and will anfyver theoi beforehand. 
 
 On the one hand, it will be faid (fuch are the 
 topics of confolation moft frequently held forth), 
 *' To what purpofe are all thefe melancholy cal- 
 culations ? What is the ufe of thus reckoning and 
 balancing remote dangers againft hypothetical re- 
 medies ? Thefpeculations of politics are as hills 
 of fand, whofe fhape and figure vary every in- 
 flant with the winds of heaven. What afTurance 
 have we that a few years, nay, a few months, 
 may not put an end to this preponderance of 
 France, fo frightfully defcribed to us? The 
 genius of a few enterprifing minds, the genius of 
 
 one
 
 ( 2^0 ) 
 
 one man, raifed that nation from the depth of 
 Tuin to its prefent greatnefs and ilability. That 
 which depends upon an uncertain life, muft be 
 jtfelf uncertain. Even now, perhaps, while 
 you are bewailing her afcendancy, France is 
 finking once more into an abyfs of anarchy and 
 confufion, or loiing, in the hands of a weak 
 and incapable government, that bold and ener- 
 getic character, which has more contributed to 
 deftroy the balance of Europe than any eflential 
 advantages of her prefent geographical, mili- 
 tary, and federative pofition. Even if this 
 fhould not be the cafe, who will warrant that 
 the fprings of this coloffal machine may not re- 
 lax in confequence of their very nature ; and 
 even though managed by the moft fldlful ar- 
 tifls, wear out and become ufelefs in the courfe 
 of time ? Take from France her military fpirit, 
 difcipline, and enthufiafm, (and where is it writ-^ 
 ten that they mufl be eternal, becaufe created in 
 a moment by extraordinary circumfiances ?) and 
 what becomes of her power ? Her extent of 
 territory, her conquells, her tributary republics, 
 her immenfe population, will all be converted 
 into a weight to haften her downfall whenever 
 the vital principle in the centre fhall fail. And 
 is then the rcH: of Europe for ever deprived of 
 courage and genius, of gieat and energetic 
 plans, and of ability to execute them ? A iingle 
 
 extraordinary
 
 { ^5' ) 
 
 extraordinary genius, one great and decided dizi» 
 racier, might reverfethewhoiefyflem, and take froni 
 France the weight that now oppreflcs Europe, to 
 throw it into an oppolite fcale. Perhaps in the 
 midft of your complaints of its intolerable pre- 
 ponderance, the moment may unexpe(5iedly ar- 
 rivCj when the French nation will be deprived 
 of its juft and beneficial influence ; and you 
 will have to lament, that, by an exaggerated de- 
 fcription of the prefcnt danger, you have contri- 
 buted to a lofs lb great and detrimental to the 
 general interefts." 
 
 To this I anfwer : Politics, fpeculative as well 
 as pra6licable, have to do with no elements but 
 fuch as actually cxifl ; and when they look for- 
 ward to the future, their calculations mufl al- 
 ways refl: upon prefent realities, and not upon 
 accidental or perfonal circumflances, upon 
 empty hypothefes or mere poffibilities. The 
 probability of the long or fhort duration of the 
 prefent flate of France, her military and political 
 afcendant, is a fubjecl of fpeculation and reflec- 
 tion for the politician. But whalever the refult 
 (merely hypothetical and conditional) of his rc- 
 fearches, it cannot affe6b the indifputable truth, 
 that at prefcnt there is no profpe(9. but of power 
 fo France and danger to the reft of Europe. 
 
 Should
 
 ( ^5^ ) 
 
 Should France fuddenly fall, or gradually de- 
 cline, we would draw new conclufions from 
 new premlfes ; fhould fhe, however improbable 
 it may appear, deftend even beneath her juft 
 level, and lofe her proper aed necefTary fhare of 
 power — the principle of her prefervation ; fhould 
 the fafety of Europe be threatened from fome 
 other fide with dangers now hardly to be under- 
 ilood or imagined ; thofe who furvive fuch 
 changes would learn how to accommodate their 
 fyftems, principles, do6lrines, and, where it is 
 neceffary to a6l, their meafures accordingly. 
 But fo long as the prefent relations endure, all 
 fyfVems, principles, doclrines, and meafures muft 
 be built upon thefe ; and as long as Europe on 
 the one hand, and France on the other, continue 
 3S they now fiand, in this firft year of the nine- 
 teenth century, it muft be permitted to aflert, 
 (hat there exifts no federal conftitution, no ba- 
 lance of power, no folid and durable peace. 
 
 On the other hand, I fhall meet with objec- 
 tions of a different, and perhaps more Ipecious 
 nature. *' A revolution has been accomplifhed 
 in the political fyftem. This might have been 
 prevented, and the former fyflem preferved with 
 all its defec"^?, if the flrength of Europe, more 
 firmly united, had been more efRcacioufly di- 
 recled. But the pad cannot be undone ; the 
 
 prefent
 
 ( 253 ) 
 
 prefent and the future only fhould occupy the 
 faience of politics. Why arc they both repfe- 
 fented fo comfortlefs ? There never exifted a 
 balance of power in the ftri6t fenfe of the word ; 
 there always have been preponderating fiates : 
 the weak have always been obnoxious to dan- 
 ger; there always have been pretexts for op- 
 preffion, occafions for injuftice, and fubjedts of 
 war in Europe. Suppofing the afcendancy ac- 
 quired by France to be as you defcribe it, docs 
 it follow that all fecurity, liberty, independence, 
 and liability mufl be annihilated for ever in the 
 reft of Europe ? Will not France ceafe to be 
 dangerous to other nations from the very cir- 
 cumftance of her having; nothino; more to v/i(h 
 for, nothing more to undertake ? What is there 
 now to call forth her exertions ? Every new 
 conquefl would be a burden to the republic ; 
 every new conqueft would dirainidi her 
 ftrength. Will fhe go forth upon unprofitable 
 adventures beyond the Alps, the Rhine, and the 
 Pyrennees ? Or, will fhe exterminate kingdoms 
 which fhe cannot govern ? The mere poffibility 
 of an abufe of power, of a wanton exaggeration 
 of pretentions, will not juftify fuppofitions of fo 
 hateful a nature, fuch unfounded and chimeri- 
 cal apprehenfions. If the former revolutionary 
 governments were the terror of Europe by their 
 unprincipled ambition, their infatiable avarice, 
 
 thei?
 
 { ==54 ) 
 
 their unbounded immorality ; yet the prefcnt 
 government is formed, in every refpedl, to difli- 
 pate the itorm, to tranquillize all minds, and to 
 awaken fentiments of confidence and fecurity in 
 all other nations. It aims at no farther aggran- 
 dizement ; feeks only to maintain its poileffions 
 as it found them, and is defirous of living in 
 peace with its neighbours and the whole world ; 
 faithful to the principles of the law of nations, 
 a powerful protc6lor of its allies, and an ex- 
 ample of juftice, equity, and moderation to its 
 enemies. If it continues to adhere to fuch prin- 
 ciples, why fhould not Europe be happy and 
 fecure in her prefent fituation ? Let us forget 
 the pa ft ; let every ftate conform with prudent 
 refignation to its prefcnt circumftances ; let each 
 improve its prefent advantages, and renounce 
 all de(lru6live ambition, all unnatural and ex- 
 travagant fyflcms, all falfe and turbulent poli- 
 tics. The great powers of Europe, whofe 
 broad and folid foundations reiifled the torrent 
 of the revolution, are ftill powerful enough to 
 defy every wanton attack, to cultivate and im- 
 prove their Hates by peaceful economy, to 
 make their fubje6ls happy, and to maintain 
 their political dignity. The reft is all error and 
 illufion ; whether a certain number of little fo- 
 vereigns, or one great republican power, give 
 laws beyond the Rhine, the Meufe, and the 
 
 Adiee^
 
 ( ^55 ) 
 
 Adige, mud be matter of indifference to tlitf 
 reil of Europe, fince the ancient poflcffors are 
 expelled, and the former conflltulions abolifl-i- 
 ed. Auftria, PrufTia, Rufiia, England, and 
 the powers of a fecond and third order, and 
 every thing that yet remains of the foriner fyf- 
 tem, will not the lefs profper and endure on that 
 account : and if thefe changes have indeed ir- 
 reparably fubverted the ancient federal fyftcm, 
 what fhall prevent you from ereding a new 
 ediiice with new materials ?" 
 
 The fpllowing obfcrvations will anfwer thefe 
 arguments ; the ftrongeft which any advocate 
 for the prefent f^ate of Europe, any defender of 
 the afcendancy of France, can oppofe to the juft 
 apprehenlions of the world, and reafonablc 
 warnings of political fpeculation. 
 
 if^. Whether the prefent government of 
 France deferve the unlimited confidence re- 
 quired by its partifans, is not within the fphere 
 of my prefent inquiry. I once more folemnly 
 difclaim all regard to perfonal conlideration. I 
 even go farther, and willingly concede what- 
 ever is not immediately neceffary to my objedl, 
 that I may thereby tread firmer upon the 
 grounds where I mean to build convi«51ion. f 
 therefore entirely renounce all arguments de- 
 
 ducible
 
 ( is6 ) 
 
 ducible from the chara^ler of the prefent go- 
 vernment ; which Ihall be fiippofed in all its 
 principles, opinions, plans, and meafures, the 
 reverfe of that which it fucceeded. We will 
 confider it as only delirous of concord and 
 peace, of fecurity and juflice ; as hitherto 
 guiltlefs of any proceeding calculated to jufiify 
 our former apprehenfions, or to excite new 
 ones, to infpire miftruft, or to fupprefs re- 
 viving hopes : to grant this is furely the extreme 
 of moderation. 
 
 2dly. But the chara(n:er of the prefent French 
 government is no fecurity for the future. It is a 
 leading maxim in every rational lyftem of prac- 
 ticable politics, that every power is dangerous 
 to the reft, which pofTefTes the means of dif- 
 turbing the general peace, and wants nothing 
 but the will to ufe them. If we depart from 
 this maxim, we no longer find any fixed point 
 whatever in the whole fphere of politics ; there 
 remains nothing then but vague fuppolitions 
 and wavering hypothefes, uncertain opinions of 
 perfonal characters, and loofe probabilities, 
 which one moment prefents, and the following 
 dcflroys. 
 
 3dly. As the perfonal charader of the pre- 
 fent government of France, or indeed of any 
 
 government
 
 ( 257 ) 
 
 government whatever, cannot enfure the difpofi- 
 tions of its fucceflbrs ; as even the prefcnt wilhes, 
 a6ls, and declarations of a fovereign, are no 
 fecurity for his intentions and proceedings at 
 a future period ; even fo do the obvious inte- 
 refis of a power afford no perfe6l aflurance of 
 its views and condu6l. This obfervation mufl:, 
 however, only be taken in a Hmited fenfe. In 
 the ordinary courfe of things the true interefts 
 of a nation are no inadequate criterion of the 
 condu6l which in all reafonable probability we 
 are to expedl from it, while there is a due ba- 
 lance of power, or a conftitution in which it is 
 nearly balanced ; when there is no danger of an 
 immediate revolution, and no flate fufficiently 
 preponderant to effect a fudden fubverfion of the 
 whole fyftem. For it may always be fuppofed, 
 that in any given period, as of fifty or an hun- 
 dred years, the wife and imprudent counfels by 
 which it is dircdled, will at lead counterbalance 
 each other ; that the principles of its real wel- 
 fare, though for a time forgotten, will always 
 be recurred to ; and that, on the whole, its true 
 intereft will be the leading objed of the govern- 
 ment. The politician will therefore generally 
 be right in his conclufions, who makes the in- 
 tereft of each flate a principal ground of every 
 fpeculation concerning its future condu<5t *. But 
 
 * Vide Note E E. 
 
 s tbU
 
 (25^ ) 
 
 tbis maxim ceafes to be ufeful in times whetl 
 the ftate of Europe may be altered in a moment 
 by a fingle reiblution. When any power attains 
 fo great a degree of influence and preponde-. 
 ranee in the political iyflem, that the flighteft 
 deviations of its politics may endanger all ex- 
 i(ting relations, and threaten a general fubver- 
 iion ; it vvoald be madncfs to difmifs every ap- 
 prehenlion, and continue in perfc6l fecurity, 
 becaufe war and conquefl may be oppofite to 
 the permanent interefts of that nation. For 
 who will venture to aiTure us, that the men 
 intruded with this extraordinary power, will 
 never give way to the impulfe of ambition, 
 avarice, or refentment, and gratify the paffions 
 of the moment^ regardlefs of thofe permanent 
 interefts ? This would be fufficient, in the 
 prefent flate of Europe, to produce the moft 
 extenfive defolation. 
 
 4thly. When we confidcr the prefent flate of 
 Erance, and what Ihe has experienced during 
 the laft ten years, we fhall find it difficult, 
 perhaps impoflible, to determine what maxims 
 and conduct her intcrcfis will conrtantiy pre- 
 leribe to her. Self-prefcrvation is naturally the 
 firft object of every government. Where that 
 is beft fecured by pacific meafures, and an ad- 
 herence to the principles of moderation and 
 jaftice, there juftice and moderation will pre- 
 
 vaiL
 
 ( 259 ) 
 
 vail. But when circumftances require a con- 
 trary condu(?t, and a government feels itlelf 
 obliged to affume a lofty and decided tone, and 
 engage in great and fplendid undertakings, 
 to fupport its linking popularity, to counteradt 
 an afpiring faction, or to awe the turbulence of 
 A feditious people; then moderation is facrificed 
 to the interetis of the moment ; and who will be 
 found bold enough to deny that the French go- 
 vernment may potlibiy be thus circumftanced ? 
 Does not every thing about that government 
 indicate the probability of critical lituations^, 
 frequent changes, and a long ftate of uncer- 
 tainty ? 
 
 But fhould the prefent and every future go- 
 vernment of France invariably renounce all 
 views of ufurpation, and make moderation the 
 leading principle of its politics ; fnould its in- 
 teretis be conftantly averfe to wars of conqueft, 
 plunder, and opprellion ; and fhould thefe 
 doubtful politions be verified in the moft fatif- 
 fadlory manner ; yet the relations betweefl 
 France and the reft of Europe would not there- 
 fore be lefs unequal, conftrained, and dan- 
 gerous. For, betides the difputes arifmg from 
 ambition, avarice, or wanton provocations 
 among nations ; there are differences of another 
 nature, which originate in the doubtfulnefs of 
 s 2 theic
 
 C 26a ) 
 
 thcrr rights, the infufnciency of their treaties, 
 and the often unavoidable concurrence of their 
 feveral interefls. Thefe difpufes, and the wars, 
 which, in extreme cafes, are the only means of 
 deciding them, will never ceafe to occur, while 
 there arc feparate Itates, without a perfect fyftem 
 of public law among them. But thefe unavoid- 
 able wars muft, in the prefent fituation of Eu- 
 rope, be productive of the mofl dreadful mif- 
 fortunes. The flighteft mifundcrftanding about 
 an undefined boundary, a doubtful right of fove* 
 reignty or navigation (not to mention the greater 
 ones, that might in time arife by the deceafe of 
 princes about the right of fucceiiion), the flighteft 
 difference between France and any neighbour- 
 ing ftate, would, on account of the immenfe 
 preponderance of the French power, raife fuch 
 a fiorm as to threaten all Europe with deflruc- 
 tion. The di6tates of found policy prefcribc 
 the necefHty of a natural or artificial balance of 
 power ; not only to prevent the wanton and 
 dangerous abufe of it on the part of a preponde- 
 rating {late ; but even to maintain a due pro- 
 portion of ftrength in thofe ordinary wars, 
 which human wifdom is often unable to avert, 
 and to preferve the political fyflem from fhocks 
 that might prove fatal to its exiflence. When- 
 ever this balance is deflroyed, the fecurity of 
 the whole is immediately annihilated, whether 
 
 the
 
 ( 26I ) 
 
 the maxims that govern each particular (late be 
 juft or unjuft, warHk.e or pacific. 
 
 6thly. In the prefent flate of things, there is a 
 conftant Iburce of pohtical difturbance, a per- 
 petual caufe of war, in the neceflary difpolition of 
 the humbled and opprefled nations, in their unex- 
 tinguifhable refentmcnt towards their haughty 
 and oppreffive conqueror. It would betray the 
 grofTcA ignorance of human nature to cxpe6l 
 that nations, fabdued and trampled on by 
 France ; that princes Gripped of their provinces 
 and revenues, their rank, and fplendour, and 
 fubje6ied to the moft humiliating conditions ; 
 that fo many minds afflicted by the feverefl 
 lofles, and iritated by the moft contemptuous 
 intuits, fhould in a moment throw a veil of 
 oblivion upon the paft, forget their fufferings, 
 ditpel their forrovvs, and Ibbmit, with pa- 
 tient relignation, to the yoke of France.—^ 
 Every rational oblerver of the ordinary courfe 
 of human fentiments and paffions muft: expect 
 the very reverfe. Until the power of France 
 iliall again be reduced to its juft proportion in 
 the fyftem of Europe, the prevailing fentimcnt 
 in all other countries, or at leaft in the princi- 
 pal European ftates, will be a fecret defire of 
 thwarting her preponderance ; a fecret and in- 
 furmountable hatred of that monopoly of in-- 
 
 s 3 fiucnce
 
 ( 262 > 
 
 floeflce and dominion which France has fo 
 vidloiioiifly afferted. They will fufFcr in lilencc 
 fo long as ih&y continue to feel the impoffibility 
 of any effectual remedy. But new exertions 
 and attempts, new wars and coalitions, will be 
 formed upon the firft hope of a fuecefsful ifluCi 
 ■whether founded upon reviving courage and 
 the animating confcioufnefs of their own incrfeafed 
 il:rength,or upon fymptoras of diforder, diffen/ion, 
 and weaknefs in the interior of France. An 
 unnatural and oppreffive confiitution, incompa- 
 tible with the fafety and dignity of Europe in 
 general, can have no profpe6l of duration. The 
 indeflru6lible elaflicity of fprings too forcibly 
 comprefTed, will always tend to reftore their 
 natural iiate. All the treaties in the world 
 cannot confirm and preferve a flate of things 
 repugnant to every principle of freedom, to all 
 equality of power, to the fundamental laws of 
 the focial and federal conftitution, to the 
 wifhes, propenlities, and views of the great 
 majority of nations and individuals *. 
 
 7thly. Should any man deny the force or trutk 
 of all thefe arguments, and afTert, in contra- 
 diiSiion to experience, to the evidence of the 
 pad and prefent, and to the true principles 
 
 *. ViJe Note F F. 
 
 of
 
 ( 263 ) 
 
 of politics, that neither the mutability of the 
 views and characters of the rulers of France, 
 nor the uncertainty of their future difpoiitions, 
 nor the chance of their private interefls being 
 incompatible with the general interetl and peace 
 of Europe, nor the danger with which even an 
 ordinary war would threaten all Europe when 
 there is no balance of power, nor the natural 
 and infurraountable propenfity to diflblve unna- 
 tural obligations — fhould he affert, that none of 
 (hefe caufes of diffenlion, enmity, and war, ^are 
 fufficiently a6iive and important to juftify the 
 apprehenfions here entertained ; and that, not- 
 withl^anding all thefe obvious fources of perpe- 
 tual internal difcord, the conftitution efta- 
 blifhed by the French revolution, and the events 
 of its unhappy war, may endure in peace and 
 harmony, as well as the former or any other po- 
 litical combination ; he muft at leaft allow, 
 that fuch a confiitution does not deferve the ap- 
 pellation of a federative fyflem, either in the 
 former, or any other proper acceptation of the 
 words. He raufl be prepared to affert, that the 
 balance of power, as hitherto conceived, is 
 only an empty term ; that Europe can exift and 
 profper under circumftances different from thofe 
 formerly held necelTary and efTential to it ; and 
 that federative policy is in future to proceed 
 upon new and unheard-of principles, in utter 
 s 4 cQntradi<5\iou
 
 ( 264 ) 
 
 contradidlion to all which prevailed before, and 
 hitherto unconfirmed by any experience. Accord- 
 ing to all former grounds of judgment, all an- 
 cient rule of conduct in politics, the prefent fitu- 
 ation of Europe is a ftate of political anarchy, of 
 confiant and unextinguifhable war. Thofe who 
 maintain the contrary, muft either renounce all 
 confiftency, or difclaim every principle hitherto 
 received. 
 
 Thefe remarks on the prefent relations between 
 France and Europe, are totally uninfluenced by 
 hatred or prejudice againft the French republic. 
 They flow from a free and impartial confidera- 
 tion of the fubjedl, from the real fiate and natural 
 courfe of things, and from an unconft rained ap- 
 plication of the flmpleft rules of the fcience of 
 politics. Every enlightened friend of the French 
 nation mufl: as readily fubfcribe to them, as the 
 bitterefl; enemy of France, or the moft deter- 
 mined adverfary of her prefent conflitution; It 
 is a charadleriftic property of all great diforders 
 in the political fyftem, that they do as much in- 
 jury to the ftates apparently benefited by the de- 
 ftru6lion of the balance, as to the immediate lofers 
 by the difproportion introduced. It is the true 
 and permanent intereft of every nation without 
 exception, to preferve a due proportion between 
 its own llrengthj and that of its neighbours ; and 
 
 to
 
 ( 265 ) 
 
 to maintain a jull diftribution of power among 
 all the members of the federative lyftem. The 
 advantages of a dangerous afcendancy are aU 
 ways deceitful ; for the public vv'clfare of a na- 
 tion cannot be fecure, without the latisfa6l:ion of 
 its neighbours, and the confidence of the world. 
 An enlightened policy requires a due attention to 
 thefe important requifites of peace, on the part of 
 the greateft as well as the fraallefl Hates. Were 
 France to diftinguifh her true interefts ; were the 
 voice of reafon to prevail above the dictates of 
 ambition and avarice ; her Hatefmen would eafily 
 be convinced, that what now is called, by a fhame- 
 lefs abufe of words, the federative fyftem of 
 Europe, is nothing but a compound of Inordinate 
 power on the one hand, and impotence on the 
 other ; in which no real independence, no inabi- 
 lity or fecurity, and no permanent peace can 
 exifi ; and which is confcquently incompatible 
 with the general welfare. 
 
 I have freely declared my opinion of the pre- 
 fent flate of Europe. I have not fupprefled the 
 difficulties which I conceive infeparably connect- 
 ed with every attempt to eftablifli a better fyftem, 
 amidft our prefent difalters — the fortune of the 
 prefent, and perhaps the dowry of future gene- 
 rations. I have pourtrayed the evil at full length, 
 fuch as I beheld it. It is for the pradlical poli- 
 tician
 
 ( 166 ) 
 
 tician to find the moft cffecftual remedies for the 
 diforders of fociety ; the writer has done his duty 
 when he has fhown their exiftence and origin. 
 In one cafe, however, he may go farther : if ano- 
 ther writer, whether authorized or not, has made 
 propofals to the pubhc, he may inquire into and 
 examine them. In one of the principal chapters 
 of his work, the Author of VEtot de la France 
 has given us the balls of a new federal fyftcm ; 
 for he does not doubt the deft ruction of the old 
 one. This may therefore with propriety be made 
 ^ fubje61: of public difcuflion ; and I fhall now 
 proceed to examine it. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 ©/* ihe Relations between France and her Allies.* 
 
 XT is the opinion of our Author that in future 
 every political alliance fhould be founded on the 
 two following rules : 
 
 id, " In peace it fhould guarantee the conti- 
 nuance of fubfifiing relations, and in war it 
 fliould provide for the defence of thofe relations 
 againft the common enemy." 2dly, " It fhould 
 fccure the political interefts of the continent both 
 1 in
 
 ( 4^7 ) 
 
 in peace and war, againft the immoderate afcend- 
 antaf the maritime powers*." 
 
 Sad indeed is the profped for the federal fyftena 
 of Europe, if fuch principles are to be made the 
 foundations of all future alliances. How can 
 they anfwer that purpofe, when they do not de- 
 fine any, much lefs all the conditions of an ufe- 
 ful alliance ? The flightefi: glance will convince 
 us that thefe pretended general rules arc perfecSlly 
 futile either in pradlicahle or fpeculativc politics. 
 
 ift. " That every alliance fhould guarantee the 
 continuance of exifting relations in peace, and 
 provide for their defence in war," is (if it be not 
 mere tautology) nothing more than a verbal 
 enunciation of the general object of all alliances, 
 by no means a rule whereby the fcience of poli- 
 tics can form or approve any particular engage- 
 ment. Every alliance is doubtlefs intended fome- 
 how to maintain fublifting relations : but what 
 relations ought to be the obje6ls of fuch conveii • 
 tions ? that is the queftion. The vague and un- 
 defined pofitions of the Author are far from, 
 afcertaining this point ; and indeed only fervc to 
 divert our attention from every inquiry leading 
 to an explanation of it. His principles would 
 induce us to conclude that thenaturd of the rela- 
 
 * Vide Note G G. 
 
 tions
 
 ( ?68 ) 
 
 lions fubfifting, is a matter of no conilderation ; 
 that nothing more i^ requitite than to provide for 
 their duration. But found policy will not refort 
 to means of preferving and perpetuating them, 
 till it has firft examined if they be worth prefervT. 
 ing. It would indeed be a fit maxim fqr a 
 power giving laws to all Europe, that only fuch 
 alliances fhould be reckoned jufl and ufeful, as 
 afforded frefli guarantees and new inllruments of 
 its own tyranny. But when we fpeak of general 
 principles, we muft take a more liberal view of 
 the fubjedl ; which would lead to the conclufion, 
 that v/heq the exifling relations jire clearly detri- 
 mental to the welfare of Europe, or to the inde- 
 pendence and fecurity of any nation, the moft 
 wife and beneficial alliance would be that which 
 Jiadfor its objefk the gradual d'lJfolut'iQn of thof^ 
 relations, and not their prefervatior*. 
 
 2.dly. " The inordinate afcendancy of the iJiaritime 
 ^owersj'' is a form of words without mean- 
 ing; and fo little worthy to be made a leading 
 principle in politics, that it will not even fiand 
 the tcfi: of common logic. Kn idea merely rela- 
 tive, can never be the groundwork of an abfolute 
 rule. Every attempt tp lay down fuch a rule, 
 with fuch materials, mufi naturally induce the 
 fufpicion, that the x\uthor wants to ponceal un- 
 jufiifiable views beneath thefe vague exprefiions, 
 
 and
 
 ( 26? ) 
 
 atid to pafs his own will and pleafure for law. 
 It would, befides, be an extraordinary principle, 
 that every league of the continental powers 
 fhould be direv^ed againft the preponderance of 
 the maritime fiates. Before we fpeak of the ex- 
 aggerated afcendancy of thofe fiates, and of al- 
 liances to be formed to oppofe it, we ought to af- 
 certain exactly, how far their juft, and neceffary, 
 and beneficial influence in the affairs of the con- 
 tinent, and on the whole political fyfiem, fhould 
 extend. This is a queftion of confiderable im- 
 portance ; and, till this has been completely de- 
 termined, we cannot think of providing againft 
 the excefs of that, which nothing but the blind- 
 eft partiality could condemn as altogether preju- 
 dicial. 
 
 In the place of thefe arbitrary affumptions, 
 whofe abfurdity and infufficiency, when treated 
 as general rules, muft be obvious to the moft fu- 
 perficial examination, I think I may place the 
 following maxim, which is certainly more clear 
 and comprehenfive, even if it fhould not com- 
 pletely exhauft the fubjed. 
 
 A nation ought, in its alliances, to confider its 
 true and permanent interefts (difiinguifhed from 
 the mutable difpolitions, the temporary incHna- 
 tions and averfions of its rulers), and, at the 
 
 fame
 
 ( 27° ) 
 
 Tame time, to keep in view, as much as pbflible, 
 the maintenance of that general balance, which 
 will alwa}'S moft conduce to the true and perma- 
 nent interefl o£ each particular flate* It iis the 
 bufinefs of practical politics to determine how 
 thefe interefts may, at different periods, bebeftaf* 
 ferted, and what plans or combinations are beft 
 adapted to that end : no general principle can fur* 
 riifh the folution of fuch problems. 
 
 The above maxim, if it be not entirely defti- 
 tute of truth, will lead to the following import- 
 ant, though melancholy conclulion. Every 
 great dilbrder, introduced into the federal fyflem, 
 by the inordinate afcendant of one of its confti- 
 tuent parts, not only deftroys the balance of the 
 whole, but throws fuch difnculties in the way of 
 future ufeful alliances, as to render' the forrtia- 
 tion of fuch, next to impoffible. The connexion 
 between this politioti, and what I have laid down 
 as the leading principle of alliances, may, I 
 think, be fufficiently demonftrated. 
 
 ifl. Let us fuppofe fome nation to have ob- 
 tained an abfolute preponderance ; that nation 
 cannot enter into any alliance whatever, confifl- 
 ently either with the interefts of the remaining 
 powers, or its own. With regard to the interefts 
 
 of
 
 { ^71 ) 
 
 of* the reft : if it fhoukl engage In alliance with 
 one of the more powerful, the preponderance fa 
 much dreaded would be thereby increafcd; the in- 
 fecurity of the other nations would be rendered 
 greater, and the general diforder more dclperate ; 
 and even the lituation of its temporary ally would 
 neceflarily be more precarious than ever. But 
 were it to form a connexion with a feeble ftate, 
 then, in addition to the above evils, the en- 
 tire fubje(Slion of the pretended ally, and the 
 total annihilation of its independence, would be 
 the immediate confequences. With refpecSl to the. 
 interefts of the preponderating ftate itfelf, every 
 fuch alliance muft be prejudicial, becaufe it con- 
 tributes to fupport and preferve a fyftera, which 
 cannot, from its nature, be of long duration ; 
 and which, even while it lads, is productive of 
 no real and folid good, no true and eflential ad- 
 vantage to the very power whofe pride it grati- 
 fies. There is, moreover, fomething unnatural 
 and repugnant in the idea of an alliance of any 
 nation, great or fmall, with a power whofe pre- 
 ponderance is the perpetual obje6l of the folici- 
 tude, the plans, and vigilance of the reft ; whofe 
 afcendancy (were it governed by angels) muft: 
 render it the common enemy of all fecurity and 
 independence; and whofe friendfhip is often 
 more dangerous than even its enmity. 
 
 adl}-.
 
 ( ^n ) 
 
 adly. It isc<^uallydifficult to conceive how, when 
 one nation has acquired an exclufive preponde- 
 rance, any beneficial alliance can be formed among 
 the reft. This, though it may perhaps appear 
 paradoxical, may, I think, be explained in a very 
 latisfadlory manner. In fuch a flate of things as 
 I am here fuppofing, every alliance muft be di- 
 rectly or indire6lly oppofed to the preponderating 
 power ; for it would be no lefs impolitic than un- 
 generous, to adt againft any of the weaker nations. 
 Every fuch confederacy againft the predominant 
 f^atCj muft either be compofed of a part of the refl, 
 or by the whole. In the former cafe it is evident, 
 that thofe who are not included in it, will nccef- 
 farily be impelled to draw nearer to the common 
 enemy, either by avowed alliances, or by a fyf- 
 tem of neutrality not very different ; and thus 
 will a partial confederacy naturally tend to fender 
 things worfe. In the latter cafe (and it likewife 
 inight very probably happen in the former), the 
 alliance is converted into a coalition, with all the 
 attendant difficulties and dangerous peculiarities 
 of fuch a league; and the permanent interefts 
 of the fcvcral powers are facrificed to a tempo- 
 rary obje6l, of which, unfortunately, the attain- 
 ment is always extremely doubtful. 
 
 I might adduce a great number of examples 
 
 from paft times, and advance many conjedures 
 
 I with
 
 ( ^73 ) 
 
 with refpedl to the future, to render this reafon- 
 ing more clear and impreflive ; but I leave all that 
 to the judgment and penetration of the attentive 
 reader. There are certain political truths of To 
 comfortlcfs a nature, certain relations lb critical, 
 tliat they will not bear to be treated but in a very 
 general manner. 
 
 It will be eafy, after thefe obfervations, to ap- 
 preciate the nature of the prefent relations be- 
 tween France and her allies; and to judge how 
 far we may expe(5^ firom them the re-cfia* 
 blifhment of the fubvcrted fyftem of Europe. 
 The Author of the Etat de la France has digni- 
 fied the alliances of the French republic with 
 Spain, Holland, and Genoa, by calling them the 
 firfl foundations of a future federal edifice*. He 
 quotes them as honourable and irreliftible proofs 
 pf the generofity and dilintereftednefs of the 
 republic, as affurances of thcuprightnefsof her 
 principles, and as the productions of an almoft 
 wonderful political wifdom. 
 
 * Neither Switzerland nor the Gifalpinc republic are men- 
 tioned in this fcheme of the future federal lyftem of France 
 What can be the reafion of the omilfion ? They arc as much 
 the faithful allies of the French republic as thole the Author 
 has fpecified : they maintain French armies, fubmit to the 
 guardianftiip of the great nation, guaranty the fubfifting re- 
 lations, &c. 
 
 T I fhould
 
 ( 274 ) 
 
 I Hiould be very juftly cenfured, were I for- 
 mally to analyze thefe panegyrics. The Author 
 was no lefs acquainted than any of his readers, 
 with the real nature of the connexions of 
 France with Spain, Holland, &c. and if he 
 truly and confcientioufly confidered as alliances 
 the relations exifting between the French repub- 
 lic and the nations honoured with the vague and 
 equivocal title of her allies ; his conception of an 
 alliance mufl be very different from all hithertq 
 received notions. Such were the alliances (though 
 the terms were certainly more favourable) of 
 Sicily, Greece, Afia Minor, Egypt, &c. with the 
 Romans ! If the future alliances of France are 
 to be formed on thefe models ; if the prefent 
 condition of Switzerland and Holland, Italy 
 and Spain, awaits all thofe to be hereafter leagued 
 with the French government ; it may well in- 
 deed be afked, whether the friendfhip and pro- 
 tection of that power are lefs fatal than her de- 
 clared enmity. If thefe relations, formed and 
 maintained by force of arms, are to be the balis 
 of a new federal fyftcm, and a future law of na- 
 tions, Europe mufl ardently with that the fiiper- 
 flru6lure to be raifed upon fuch a foundation may 
 jiever be completed*. 
 
 This wifh becomes flill more earneft, when 
 we learn the principles on which this new fyftem 
 
 * Vide Note H H, 
 
 of
 
 ( ^75 ) 
 
 ©f French alliances is to be raifed and propa- 
 gated. The declaration of our Author on that 
 head (and his authority for the explanation and 
 defence of thofe principles is furely not to be 
 rejedled) is no lefs inflrudive than alarming. 
 ** If France," fays he, " cannot extend her fe- 
 deral fyftem on the continent in any other way, 
 ihe will employ the only means left her by the 
 blindnefsand obftinacy of nations which, refufing 
 her alliance, will perfift in the continuance of a 
 deltrudive war : for political conventions fhe will 
 fubftitute military treaties: and if princes con- 
 tinue deaf to the voice of their own interefts, 
 v.'hich require amity with France, Ihe will for- 
 cibly enter into alliance with the countries they 
 are unable to defend ; and, covering their territo- 
 ries with her armies, will ufe their refources as 
 her own." 
 
 This clear, undifguifed, and unequivocal de- 
 clarsition, is the bell comment on the theory of 
 French alliances. Thus have they hitherto been 
 formed, and thus will it be with all fucceeding 
 ones. Such muft and will continue to be the 
 fyflem of politics, when the afcendancy of one 
 nation has deftroyed the fecurity of all ; when, 
 deprived of every federative fafeguard, the weak 
 are reduced to utter helpleffnefs, and the law of 
 nations is fupplanted by the law of force. 
 
 T 1 Ere
 
 ( 276 ) 
 
 Ere we dlfcufs the political conduit of France 
 towards her allies, we mufl at leaft wait till flie 
 has allies. Thofe who are now honoured with 
 that appellation, are, at beft, only her clients. 
 It will be time to fpeak of the alliances of France 
 in the true fenfe of the word, when fhe fhall be 
 connedled upon free and equal terms, with one 
 of the greater powers of Europe ; one of thofe 
 which have hitherto maintained their independ- 
 ence. But m the prefent £late of things, may 
 the guardian angel of Europe avert fuch an 
 event ! An alliance of France, preponderant as 
 ihe now is, with any of the principal powers, 
 would lead to incalculable mifchief, would pro** 
 bably be the lignal for endkfs misfortunes. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of France and her Enemies, 
 
 JL HE Author of the Etat de la France opens the 
 conlideration of this fubje(n: witli a firing of in- 
 viting aflurances and brilliant promifes, refpe(51" 
 ing the principles, the fpirit, and the objedl: of 
 the prefent politics of France. *' France has 
 and knows no natural enemy. France never de- 
 lires the ruin of thofe fhe fights againit.'*—" France 
 
 onlv
 
 ( ^77 ) 
 
 only makes war to diflblve alliances incompatible 
 with the tranquillity of Europe. France requires 
 noextenfion of her federal relations to enfure her 
 own fecurity. She will be induced to form new 
 engagements by charity alone towards fuch as 
 want her affiftance. Any nation injured by an 
 alteration in the balance of Europe, threatened 
 by an ambitious neighbour, oppreffed by an in- 
 tolerable yoke, or in want of a powerful fup- 
 port, will find the French government ready to 
 adopt it among the obje^ls of its federative 
 policy." 
 
 I ihall adhere to my original plan, and omit 
 all animadverfions on thefe affurances, fo far as 
 they are conne6led with the perfonal characters 
 and opinions, the wifhes and principles of the 
 rulers of France. Whether thefe, totally unin- 
 fluenced by pafiion or intereft, employ all their 
 efforts, and diretl all their views to enlure the ge- 
 neral fecurity of all nations, and the common 
 welfare of Europe, 1 leave entirely unexamined. 
 I confine myfclf to the following obfervations, 
 which are founded on paft fa6ls, prefent undeni- 
 able truths, and views of the future, deduced from 
 pofitive relations, independent of perfonal opi- 
 nion and inclinations ; and which are agreeable 
 to the nature of things, the only fixed and certain 
 clue to rational politics. 
 
 T 5 I. " France
 
 ( ^78 ) 
 
 I. " France Jiasno natural enemy -, Jlie recognifes 
 none.^' — It is true indeed that the fcience of poli- 
 tics, in the fecial conflitution to be etlablifhed 
 among nations, admits not national antipathies 
 among the number of their relations. But the 
 application of this theory to the adlual flate of 
 fociety, is unfortunately as limited as that of 
 the pure moral law, to the a6lions of individuals. 
 Little as this laft is able to fupprefs all anti-focial 
 inclinations and propenfities in the mind of man, 
 fo little can the former maintain a fyftem perfectly 
 conformable to the law of nations, and adapted 
 to the general welfare: which often inevitably 
 encounters private interefls, national prejudices, 
 and national paflions. There do exifl natural 
 enmities between nations, though a more exalted 
 policy may refufe to acknowledge them. I fay 
 nothing here of mere popular antipathies; though 
 even thefe, if traced to their origin, will feldom 
 be found deftituteof Ibme reafonable foundation. 
 I mean by natural enmity, the relation between 
 two flates, whofc geographical, political, or mili- 
 tary lituations, or fome objc6l common to their 
 induftry or defires, though not equally attainable 
 to both, induce a flate of continual jcaloufy, and, 
 confequently, of continual, more or lefs adtiv^ 
 oppolition. 
 
 Such was the relation formerly fubfifting be- 
 tween Rome and Carthage ; two nations, whole 
 
 irrecoa*
 
 ( ^79 ) 
 
 irreconcilable enmity, lb confpicuous in hiOory, 
 prefents an inftrucSlive leflbn to mankind. In the 
 fame relation towards each other have France 
 and England ftood lince the beginning ot the 
 feventeenth century ; from the moment when a 
 large portion of the induflry, the power and the 
 glory of both, began to befoundednpon an exten- 
 live commerce ; when the policy and ambition of 
 both began to be principally directed towards 
 remote fettlements and colonial monopoly, and 
 to a powerful marine^ as the neceliary means of 
 fecuring thefe advantages ; and when each be- 
 came the centre of a diftinct federal combina- 
 tion, and firuggled with its rival for the lird 
 place in the general fyflem of Europe. All thefe 
 natural fources of perpetual oppolition have con- 
 tinued, under different appearances, and with va- 
 rious refults, until the prefcnt day; they will (till 
 continue to exifl, and to produce the fame effecl^s ; 
 and, though we may hope that wifdom and pru ■ 
 dence will moderate their fatal influence, and 
 avert from ourfclves and poHerity the ihocking 
 tragedy of an internecine war ; yet this deep- 
 rooted and extenfive rivalry muft be taken into 
 the account, in every political reafoning, as one 
 of its conftant and moil important elements. 
 
 While this is a truth which cannot be denied, 
 
 it is, on the other hand, equally certain, that 
 
 France, before the revolution, ftood towards no 
 
 T 4 conti-
 
 ( ^5o ) 
 
 continental power whatever, in thic unfortanate 
 relation of a natural enemy. I have endeavoured 
 above to explain the caufes of this. The revo- 
 lution had, indeed, powerfully and vifibly fuf- 
 pended the operation of thofe caufes j but they 
 would by no means have ceafed entirely, if the 
 new political fyftem of France had borne even 
 the fmalleft refemblance to the old. The revor 
 lufion could not but fill Europe with apprehen- 
 fions of the mofl alarming nature, and iniptre 
 all that furrounded France, whether friends or 
 enemies, with fear, refentment, or dii'guft. But 
 had the federal conftitution of Europe been re- 
 placed on its former footing, at the clofe of that 
 revolution ; had the French nation recurred to 
 its former limits ; and had the balance of political 
 and military power been reflored ; whatever might 
 have been the final relult of her internal convul- 
 lions, the relations of peace and amity, formerly 
 fubfifling between France and all the continen- 
 tal powers, would, in fome way or other, have 
 been re-eftablilhcd. Is that now to be hoped or 
 expe6led ? All Europe bleeds at the wounds 
 inflifted by the aggrandizement of France ; and 
 her dreadful preponderance flill threatens, like 
 an impending ftorm ready to burft over the heads 
 of a trembling world. Do we here find (let the 
 admirers of France anfwer the quellion), do we 
 here find the nvaterials for a fyflem of peace, of 
 3 mutual
 
 ( 28i ) 
 
 mutual confidence, and fecurity ? 13oes this con- 
 firained relation prefent the profpc(5l of a happy 
 renewal and confirmation of the bonds of federal 
 union ? Is not the whole fyfiem of Europe, fo 
 long as it may yet endure, forced, on the con- 
 trary, to maintain an armed and conftant oppo- 
 lition to France ? And does not fuch an armed 
 oppofltion, in many eflential refpec^s, refemblc 
 a flate of perpetual war ? 
 
 The truth therefore is, that France, who be- 
 fore the revolution had no natural and permanent 
 enemy on the continent, is now (in a certain 
 (enfe of the word) furrounded by nothing but ene- 
 mies. She may, relying on her great power, 
 continue to defpife thefe enemies ; Ihe may even, 
 by moderation and equity in her proceedings, 
 difarm their miflruft for a time; finall)% by the 
 coincidence of temporary interefis, (he may, per- 
 haps, obtain the alliance of one or other of them. 
 But all this does not invalidate the grounds of my 
 aflertion : I ftill hold by what is permanent and 
 eflential in the political fyfiem ; and to the afler- 
 tion that France can now acknowledge no natu- 
 ral enemy, I oppofe one, which is certainly more 
 conformable to reafon and experience ; that, in 
 the common courfe of things, a nation lituated 
 as France now is, ccuinot reckon upon any natural 
 friend. 
 
 2, " France
 
 ( 2S2 ) 
 
 2. ** France never defires the rum of thofe Jht 
 fights agahiji^* — What fhe now does, or may 
 hereafter defire, will only be fhown by future ex- 
 perience : a bare aliertion, whatever be its au- 
 thority, is no fufficient fecurity. But what fhe 
 hitherto has purfued and accompliflied, is open 
 to difcuffion ; for it has now become hiftorical 
 fadV, and, confequently, fubjedl for inveiiiga- 
 tion. The Author even calls upon his cotempo- 
 rarics to devote themfelves to this examination. 
 He afferts (and many of his readers have found 
 the afTertion no lefs true than ingenious) that it 
 is not theconquells of a nation, but the treaties 
 which fhe propofes, or to which fhe fubmits, that 
 difplay the views fhe entertains, and fhow the 
 meafure of her moderation and forbearance, or 
 of her infatiable avarice and injufiice - . I too w lU 
 allow the truth of this propolition, with fome 
 reftrictions ; but I really cannot conceive what 
 will be thereby gained for the friends of the 
 French government. For I think it will not be 
 very eafy to fhow, that France has hitherto mani- 
 fefted any extraordinary degree of magnanimity 
 in her treaties of peace. The Author of the 
 Utat de la France has unhappily adduced the 
 treaty of Campo Formio as an inftance of it. 
 He forgot that now, when a part of the veil 
 which covered the negotiations of Leoben and 
 
 * Vide Note 1 1. ' 
 
 Udinc,
 
 ( ^83 ) 
 
 Udine, on the one hand, and the proceeduigs 
 of the Diredlory on the other, has been with- 
 drawn, there is fcareely a diplomatic tyro In 
 Europe unacquainted with the true caufes of 
 the then pretended moderation of France. He 
 forgot, befides, that the ever memorable congrefs 
 of Rafiadt was the true commentary, the after- 
 piece, ihtjiriah of the treaty of Campo Formio ! 
 We may now apply his principle to another and 
 more recent example, an example, in many re- 
 fpedts, more interefting, decilive, and inltruc- 
 tive, than that treaty which now only exifts in 
 the page of hiftory : we have now got the treaty 
 
 of LUNEVILLE. 
 
 I am fartrom intending to cenfurethe French, 
 or any other government, for taking advantage 
 of its iTJccefles at the conclufion of a victorious 
 campaign, and regulating the conditions of peace 
 according to the events of the war. This can 
 never be a fubjecl of reproach to her. But if her 
 moderation is to be extolled, to be reprefcnted as 
 a fource of conlblation for the fuffering party, as 
 a happy counterbalance to her power, and, as 
 it were, an antidote to her fortune and viclories 
 (which in the public difculTions of the treaty of 
 Luneville has more than once been I'aid) ; it 
 fhould firft be fhown, that there is an obvious 
 difference between what fhe has, and what fhe 
 might have infiited upon ; what the could have 
 
 required
 
 ( 284 ) 
 
 required confiflently with her own intereHs : 
 but I look in vain for this in the hii^ory of the 
 treaty of Luneville. 
 
 it is thought furprifing, that in this treaty 
 France only made the Rhine the extent of her 
 h'mits. But is fhe then expe(5led to extend her 
 already immenfc territory beyond all poffibility 
 of governing it ? Is there not always a point 
 beyond which the aggrandizement of a nation 
 becomes an immediate caufe of its weaknefs ? 
 Had not France long lince attained that point ? 
 And when we fpeak of plans of conqueft and 
 dominion in Europe at the end of the eighteenth 
 century, are they to be fuppofed like thofe of an 
 Alexander or a Gengis Khan ? The idea of an 
 univerfal monarchy has loft its former meaning ; 
 the bulinefs of government is become fo much 
 more difficult and intricate, that the moft extra- 
 vagant ambition will limit what it defires to rule; 
 and when in our days a nation is faid to give 
 laws to Europe, it is underftood to do it indi- 
 rectly and not immediately. As foon as we 
 confider the treaty of Luneville in this light, we 
 fee that France obtained by it every thing that 
 any treaty of peace could have fecured \o her. 
 She fixed her own limits, that is, the limits of 
 her immediate a6live government ; not thofe of 
 her political, military, and (to apply an old 
 
 term
 
 ( 28j ) 
 
 term to a new relation) feudal feign'iory. The 
 treaty left Holland, and Switzerland, and Italy, 
 from the Alps to Malta> in the hands of the 
 French government ; it left her, tacitly or ex- 
 plicitly, the power of difpofmg ai her plea- 
 fure of the future fate of thofe countries. 
 It deftroyed the few fortified places which Ger- 
 many might yet confider a bulwark againfi; 
 France in any future war ; and once for all, laid 
 bare the richeft provinces of Germany to the 
 firit irruption of a French army. Even in the 
 internal diftribution of power, in the equaliza- 
 tion of the flates, in the new political organiza- 
 tion of the Empire, France rcfcrved to herfclf 
 the right of deciding, I cannot conceive any 
 effential advantage that France could have 
 fought for or defired in the prefcnt treaty more 
 than (he acquired ; and if any European power 
 at the clofe of the eighteenth century was de- 
 lirous of forming a rational and pradlicable plan 
 of univerfal dominion, there would hardly be 
 found a more fuitable foundation for it than this 
 treaty. 
 
 If by the ruin of a Hate Is to be underflood 
 the defirudlion of its independence, it woi.'ld be 
 mockery to affert, that France has Ibught the 
 prefervation of the nations with whom fhe has 
 been at war. For the rcfult, the final and unde- 
 niable
 
 ( *86 ) 
 
 Diablc refalt, of this unexampled war is, that at 
 the prcfeiit moment there no longer exiH any 
 independent nations, except fome of the principal 
 Hates. If then the moderation of France is to 
 be one of her merits, and an objecl; of praife and 
 admiration, it muft firft be proved that France 
 Lad it in her power to fubjedl thefe leading 
 powers to the fame fate that all the fmaller ones 
 experienced ; and this, happily, might not be 
 quite fo eafily proved, 
 
 3. " France makes zvar for the purpofe of dif^ 
 JbJving alliances hojiile to the peace of Eur ope y—- 
 That object has been completely attained. Every 
 alliance againfl France, with one exception only, 
 is now dedroyed. I will not here again inquire, 
 whether the peace of Europe would thereby 
 have fuifered if thefe alliances had been more 
 firmly cemented, and, confequently, more Iug- 
 ccfsful. Experience prefents a melancholy ac- 
 count of what the peace of Europe has hitherto 
 gained by their diffolution ; we wait with patient 
 relignation for the advantages henceforward to be 
 derived from it. The meaning of the French 
 maxim is at all events fufficiently evident : 
 " There ihall, in future, no league whatever be 
 formed, till France fhall have pronounced it 
 lawful and good." — This is the fundamental law 
 of the new federal conflitution of Europe. If 
 
 this
 
 ( 287 ) 
 
 this rule be adopted, there will no longer be 
 any oppolition to France : war is the punifhment 
 for thofe who tranfgrefs it ; and this melancholy 
 alternative clofes every profpc^l of the future. 
 
 After announcing thefe general principles, the 
 author of the Etat de la France proceeds to exa- 
 mine the federal relations between France and 
 the powers at war with her when his work was 
 publilbed. The number of thefc lias lince tlien 
 been confiderably diminifhed ; for England, fee- 
 bly fupported by the Porte, is now the only 
 power in arms again ft France. The other con- 
 federates in the laft European league have all of 
 them, either tacitly or formally, retired from a 
 fruitlefs conteft. 
 
 There was a period when Rullia, the late 
 moft decided enemy of France, fcemed difpoled 
 not only to be at peace with that triumphant 
 power, but even to form a clofe alliance, and acl 
 in concert with it. It was natural and confiflent 
 that the French government fhould ufe all its 
 efforts to accomplilTi this iingular metamor- 
 pholis ; and that the partifans of tluit govern- 
 ment lliould cxhauil their eloquence and irige- 
 niiity to prove to the Ruffian monarch how inti- 
 
 nite
 
 ( 288 ) 
 
 nitc the glory and advantage he was to derive 
 from bis new connexion. But that they ihould 
 cxpecl to gain the alTent of the reft of Europe 
 to their new dodrine, and to perfuade all other 
 nations that this monftrous alliance was to be a 
 iburcc of fecurity, liberty, and profperity to 
 them ; this required a degree of affurance on the 
 one hand, and of credulity on the other, almoll 
 furpaifing all conception, I will not here in- 
 quire, whether the true intereffs of RuHia can 
 ever induce its government to form an alliance 
 with France (which can hardly be conceived 
 poflible, unlefs its ancient relations with England 
 be entirely given up) ; I am fpeaking of the in- 
 terefts of Europe, and of the politics of each 
 nation with relpedl to the whole. Jn which view 
 of the fubjed^, I aflert, upon the firmeft convic- 
 tion, that an alliance between Rullia and France, 
 fuch as was fome months ago, and furely not 
 without reafon, apprehended, would be the moii 
 dangerous, the moft fatal of all political combi- 
 nations ; that if in the politics of Europe there yet 
 remained any fenfe of dignity, of intereft, and of 
 duty, every nerve would be ftrained, and every 
 power employed to counteract this laft and mo^ 
 formidable evil ; and that if ever it fliould be rea- 
 lized, the moment of its formation would be the 
 laft of all independence, all fecurity in Europe, all 
 peace but peace eternal ! Happily for the general 
 
 welfare.
 
 ( ^89 ) 
 
 Welfare, the idea of this unnatural alliance could 
 only be conceived in a very uncommon mind; 
 and whatever may be the future policy of the 
 prelent Ibvereign of Rullia, it is to be hoped all 
 danger of the renewal of that coloflal projc(ft 
 has for ever ceafed to be an obje(5t of political 
 fpeculation. 
 
 The Author fpeaks in vague and obfcure terms 
 of the relations between France and Turkey ; the 
 ambiguity of his exprefHons befpeaks the unde- 
 cided plans of his government with refpedl to the 
 affairs of the Porte. He is uncertain whether 
 the Ottoman Porte is to receive new life from the 
 patronage of the French republic, or whether it 
 is to be deftroyed for ever ; he prepares us for 
 either of thefe two events. We will examine 
 no farther into them at prefent. The important 
 changes which Europe may cxpe6l on that fide, 
 and which may perhaps once more (hake it to its 
 foundations, belong entirely to futurity; the 
 prefent moment is fo overloaded with prefent 
 misfortunes and prefling dangers, that it would 
 be unwife to anticipate thofe to come : let the 
 men who will fooner or later be called upon to 
 deprecate or to bear thofe new dorms, employ 
 their Ikill and efforts with zeal and fidelity when 
 ihe hour fhall arrive. 
 
 u I fhall
 
 ( 290 ) 
 
 I fliall equally avoid a minute analyfis of the 
 prefent relations between France and Auflria. 
 The treaty of Luneville has difplayed to the 
 world the final refult of the war between them. 
 I have already made fome obfervations in the pre- 
 ceding chapters, on the future policy of Aufiria, 
 as it ftands connecled with the federal conftitu- 
 tion of Europe ; every thing beyond that is out 
 of my fphere. 
 
 But the political and commercial fyftem of 
 England, and its relations with the other powers, 
 are necefTarily connected with the main objedl of 
 the prefent inveftigation. To any perfon who 
 has in the leall iludied the character of the book. 
 I am now anfwering ; to any one, even fuperfi- 
 cially, acquainted with the principles and views 
 of the Author, it muft have been obvious, that 
 as his firlt obje6k was to draw a flattering pidlurc 
 of the new political fyftem of France, his next 
 was to portray that of England in the raofl 
 odious colours. On more than one occafion, 
 indeed, he even gives reafon to fufpecl: that this 
 laft was the chief part of his defign. Thus we 
 find all his pretended general realbnings and 
 fpeculations on the interefis of Europe applying 
 at lafl exclufively to England. Even his vindi- 
 cation of the French government, and his enco- 
 miums on their principles and condu6l, are in the 
 
 fhape
 
 ( 29^ ) 
 
 fnape ofinveiSilvc and reproich againft the mi- 
 niflry of their rivals. And his brilliant pro- 
 mifesof all the blellings to be difFufed by France 
 over Europe, are confounded with his com- 
 plaints of the infufferable tyranny exercifed by 
 Great Britain. 
 
 In the examination of the Etat dc la France^ 
 it is therefore neceffary to enter as fully as pof- 
 fihle into the relations between England and the 
 reft of Europe. This inveitigation is of itfelf 
 one of the mofl important in the fphere of fpe-'^ 
 culative politics. The Author does not merely 
 fpealc his own opinion, even in his fevereil accu- 
 sations ; he Is the echo of the times. He repre- 
 fents the prevailing fentiments and opinions, the 
 uniform bias of a great multitude of politicians 
 in all countries; and though he may perhaps 
 have made fome peculiar additions to the fa- 
 vourite topic of \\\^ day ; though he may have 
 treated the fubjedl with more than common in- 
 genuity and more than common bitternefs ; yet 
 he has on the whole been faithful to the views, 
 the argumentation, and the fource whence almoil 
 all political wifdom and eloquence has, of late 
 years, been derived whenever England was the 
 fubje^l of difcuflion. 
 
 I have already conlidered, at fome length, 
 what England has hitherto been in a political 
 
 u 2 fenfe ;
 
 ( ^9* ) 
 
 fenfc ; and what flie muft ncceflarily continue to 
 be, on account of her lituation with regard to 
 Europe in general, and her relations to France 
 in particular. But we now come to another 
 altogether different point ol" view, the favourite 
 topic of many, whole honell belief, or pallion, 
 or intereft, are perpetually filling the world 
 with alarm and dread of the afcendancy of 
 England. This, incontradiftindlionto the other, 
 may be called the domejiic policy of Great 
 Britain ; which I am now going to examine, in 
 order to determine whether its effects, when im- 
 partially confidered, arc different from thofe of 
 her general politics. If the prevailing opinion 
 on this fubjedt be confonant with truth, the in- 
 duffry of Great Britain is for ever at variance 
 with the induftry of all Europe: England is 
 only enriched by impoverifbing other nations ; 
 and her amazing power is merely the confe- 
 quence of the utter helpleffnefs, or, as others 
 term it, the abfolute ilavery in which fhe 
 keeps them all. If this opinion is well founded, 
 the Britifh empire muft be fcen in a very pe- 
 culiar light. It would then neceffarijy be, even 
 in peace, a perpetual enemy to the inde- 
 pendence and happinefs of all countries ; and 
 in war, nothing fiiort of the tyrant and terror of 
 Europe. Then, indeed, whatever might other- 
 wife be truly faid of its political utility would 
 
 lofe
 
 ( 293 ) 
 
 lofe all weight. For thongh the peculiar re- 
 fources of England might be a fafeguard againrt 
 the dcftrii<5\ive attempts of other powers, luch 
 cafual benefit would be too dearly purchalcd by 
 a perpetuity of intolerable evil. Thcfe accufa- 
 tions muft therefore be completely invelligated 
 before we can pronounce definitively upon the 
 relations of England to the reft of Europe. 
 Till the falfehood of thcfe charges be demon- 
 ilrated, we cannot with confidence alTert, that 
 England has a jufl title to that place in the 
 political fyftem, which in many impprtant rc- 
 fpedls can never be denied to her. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 jin Inquiry inio the pr'mcipal Caiifes of Cojiiflahit 
 agahift ihe commerckil Tsnmny of the R?iglifl. 
 
 JL HE Author of the Etat de la France has 
 fpecified the following charges of acrufation 
 againft England, which coniprehend, if I mif- 
 take not, all that has been, or can hereafter be 
 faid, againfl the maritime and commercial fupe-r 
 riority of Groat Britain. 
 
 u 3 Jft.
 
 ( 294 ) 
 
 I ft. " The celebrated Navigation AS: laid 
 the firfl: foundation of the oppreffive prepon- 
 derance of the navy and commerce of the Eng- 
 lilli. This UDJuft and hofiile regulation in- 
 duced a ftate of perpetual warfare between the 
 indultry of the Britifh and that of every other 
 nation." 
 
 2dly. *' England has contended for colonies, 
 fadlories, commercial eftablifhments, or exclu- 
 live privileges in every part of the world ; and 
 has aclually acquired, to the prejudice of all 
 other nations, the unbounded and exclulive 
 enjoyment of every branch of indufiry, every 
 fource of riches, and every valuable poireflion^ 
 whether territorial or commercial, in the inha- 
 bited or uninhabited regions of the globe,'* 
 
 3dly. " By this activity, and the immenfe 
 monopoly of the fale of her produdlions, fhe 
 has fupprefftd or fettered the induflry of all the 
 countries in Europe ; ihe has retarded their pro- 
 grefs, impofed the moft oppretlive of all tributes 
 upon them, tyrannically deprived them of a 
 mofl: valuable right — the free excrcife of their 
 powers ; and at length eftablilbed a political ty- 
 ranny, as the natural confequence of her mercanr. 
 tile and pecuniary fway." 
 
 4thly.
 
 ( 295 ) 
 
 4thly. " She has framed a new code of mari- 
 time laws, peculiar to herfclf, and reje6\ed by 
 every other nation ; has introduced the ufe of it 
 by main force, on all feas ; and thus in all her 
 wars has pcrfecufed, impeded, or totally annihi- 
 lated the commerce of every power that refufed 
 to engage in it on her fide." 
 
 In the prefent]chapter, I have only to do with 
 the three firil of thefe charges ; the fourth will 
 find its proper place in the next Part of this work, 
 in which the relations of neutral powers will be 
 difcufled. 
 
 L The A^ of Navigation. 
 
 The Author of the Eiat de la France has ad- 
 vanced fuch obfervations on this A6t, as clearly 
 fhow how neceflary it is to explain its contents 
 and meaning before any attempt is made to rea- 
 fon upon its charafler and confequences. For, 
 if this ftatute, fo celebrated in the hiltory of 
 political economy, were as well known on the 
 continent as from its nature it ought to be, 
 furely no writer would have ventured to call it 
 " a permanent confpiracy againll the induftry of 
 all nations." 
 
 u 4 The
 
 ( 296 ) ^ 
 
 The principal provllions of this a,S. are as fol- 
 Jow : — I A. No ftiip, except it be Britiih property, 
 commanded by a Britifh captain, and having 
 at leaft three fourths of its crew Britilh, is per-^ 
 mitted to trade with the Britifh colonies or fet- 
 tlements, or on the coail of Great Britain.-— 
 2dly. No foreign vefTel is allowed to bring any 
 other goods to England, but fuch as are the pro- 
 duce of the country to which the owner, the 
 captain, and at leaft three fourths of the crew qf 
 fuch fhip fhall belong. — 3dly. The importation 
 of certain articles of foreign merch^ndife is 
 prohibited either in Britifh or foreign fhips. — 
 4thly. No fea-fifh, unlefs caught by Britifh 
 fifhermen, and freighted on board Britifh vef- 
 fek, are allowe(^ to be imported into England. 
 This a(Sl was made in the year 1651, in Crom- 
 well's Protedlor^te, and confirmed by Charles II. 
 in 1660. In order to conceal nothing relating 
 to the point in queftion, we ^luft direct the at- 
 tention of the enemies of this a6l to a circum- 
 fiance they take no notice of. The Ai5l of Navi- 
 gation does not comprehend a^l the prohibitive 
 laws of the Britifh cornmercial code. A num- 
 ber of later ftatuteshave, on the onp hand, indi- 
 redlly reltri^led the irn portal ion of many ar- 
 ticles by heavy impolitions ; and op the other, 
 have laid fuch duties on certain articles of cj;- 
 portation as to increafe the difliculty of a re- 
 turn
 
 C 297 ) 
 
 turn freight to the foreign mercliant, and thus 
 imaiediatcly impede his operations. 
 
 In the firft place, if we con lidcrtiiefe laws with 
 rerpe(5\ to the right of Great Britain to ena<5l them, 
 we furely fhall not meet with the fmalleit doubt 
 on that head ; there can be no rational objecSlioii 
 to it whatever. Every government has an indiA 
 putable right to promote the internal iriduflry of 
 its people in what appears to it the fafeft and 
 mofl effedlual way ; provided it does not abfo- 
 Intely violate the privileges of other countries. 
 No nation has a right to exa6l from another 
 the unreftricled admiffion, or any admiflion at all, 
 of her produce, fhips, and merchants. Thefc 
 undeniable principles have been the foundation 
 of all commercial regulations to the prefent day. 
 All nations, without exception, have endeavour- 
 ed to encourage or fecure the chief branches 
 of their indufiry by prohibitions, duties, im- 
 pofitions, and reftridlions of every kind ; and 
 although the moft eminent writers on political 
 economy and government have held different 
 opinions as to the wifdom and efficacy of thefe 
 reftriclions, yet they have in no inftance treated 
 them as violations of the law of nations, as 
 public offences, ufurpations, and crimes. Nay, 
 more ; the fyflem that occafioned the prohi- 
 bitive law, was not only adopted by every go- 
 vernment in Europe, but wa^ a(5\ed on, refined, 
 
 and
 
 ( 29S ) 
 
 and carried to the iitmofl extent that their re- 
 fpe6Hvc lituations, abilities, or neceflities would 
 allow. That they had not all of them their 
 navigation aSs^ was no proof of magnanimity, 
 or tender and confcientious regard for the inte- 
 re(l and welfare of their neighbours: it was 
 owing to circumflances, which rendered the 
 thing impra6licable for them ; and perhaps to 
 careleffnefs, weaknefs, and (in this inftance 
 fortunate) inconfiflency. Look at the various 
 prohibitive laws, by which foreign commerce is 
 reftri6\ed in other countries. It is impoffible not 
 to allow, that many of them are as oppreilive 
 in their eiFe^ls as the Englifh Navigation A(5l ; 
 and they are almoft all as harfh and felfilh, and 
 intolerant and unfriendly in their principles. 
 
 The indlfputable right of every nation to pro- 
 mote its domefiic induftry, by every method 
 which does not at^ually injure others, is, if 
 poffible, ftill further flrengthened and confirm- 
 ed, when the aids applied to its hidujlry are at 
 the fame time ufeful, or perhaps abfolutely ne- 
 ccfTary to its fecurity. A country whofe very 
 cxiftence requires the maintenance of a nume- 
 rous army, is fully authorized to prevent its 
 citizens, by fevere laws, from entering into 
 foreign fervice. A country that does not pro- 
 duce fufhcient grain to fecure its inhabitants 
 
 from
 
 ( 299 ) 
 
 from the dangers of famine, has an undeniable 
 right to forbid the exportation of all corn by penal 
 ftatutes. A country whofe independence and 
 ferurity refls entirely upon a powerful navy, 
 poflctfes the moft indilputable right to refiridt 
 its commercial relations with other powers by 
 fuch regulations as may be ncceflary to enfure 
 that firfl objedl of all government and legifla- 
 tion. This laft was the cafe of England : her 
 fecurity depends upon her navy : a powerful 
 navy cannot be formed without an exlenfive 
 navigation ; (o create an extenlive navigation 
 was therefore the firft and neceffary objed of the 
 Britifh legiflature. This is fufficient to fhow 
 that the Navigation A6i (a part of the domeftic 
 policy of Great Britain) cannot, upon any prin- 
 ciple of truth and juftice, be termed " a meafure 
 offentive to the interefts of other nations," much 
 lefs •' a continual confpiracy againft their 
 rights." 
 
 But is this reflriclive regulation altogether 
 confident with the principles of a wife, enhght- 
 ened, and liberal policy ? Were there not other 
 and Icfs odious methods of encouraging the in- 
 dufiry of the Englifh ? And is not the Naviga- 
 tion A6>, though perfedlly juftifiable in itfelf, 
 though highly conducive to the private interefts 
 of England, is it not afubjedt of perpetual urn- 
 2 bragc
 
 ( $00 ) 
 
 brage to other nations ? Thcfe queftions will 
 lead to a more accurate knowledge of the real 
 character of the Britilli Navigation AvS\. 
 
 It is, generally fpeaking, true, that laws arc 
 prejudicial when they impede or reftritl the na- 
 tural courfe and free expanlion of human in- 
 dufiry; when they forcibly impel it into new 
 channels, or diredl it where it would not natu- 
 rally have flowed ; when they urge its progrefs 
 at the expenfe of its freedom. The Navigation 
 Acl is a law of this nature. It compels the in- 
 habitant of Great Britain to fetch the produce 
 of foreign countries in his own veflels, or to 
 remain entirely, or in a great meafure, deprived 
 of them. It obliges him, therefore, to devote a 
 larger portion of labour and capital to foreign 
 trade than he would have done in the natural 
 courfe of things if other nations had participated 
 without reflriclion in the importation. It poii- 
 tively forbids him to employ the induftry of a 
 foreigner, even when it might fuit his intercll 
 better than his own. It prevents him from pur- 
 cha'nng certain articles abroad cheaper than he 
 can get them at home. It prevents hin^ from 
 making ul'e of foreign (hipping, even in thole 
 cafes where the freight is cheaper than that of 
 his countrymen, and where he would confe- 
 nuently import the goods at a lQ\ver price. 
 
 Confidercd
 
 ( 30I ) 
 
 Confidered upon the general principles of a:i 
 enlightened political economy, the Navigation 
 AS. is no Itrfs condemnable than all other pro- 
 hibitive fiatutes. 
 
 But circumftances fometimcs render it the 
 duly of a government to depart, in particular 
 cales, from general principles of fiate economy, 
 when a temporary, or perhaps a permanent in- 
 tereft, urges confiderations of more importance 
 than any of the common maxims of adminidra- 
 tion. It is to circumftances of' this imperious 
 nature that the Englirti Navigation Act owes ils 
 being *. In order to form a counterpoile to the 
 powerful ftates of the continent, to protect her 
 infular territory, and maintain her independence, 
 England was obliged to ufe every effort to raiie 
 and fupport a powerful marine. The import- 
 ance of the objecl: juftified even coercive laws : 
 The Navigation A6t is indire611y coercive in its 
 nature and operation. The Englilli were com- 
 pelled to cultivate, with their own vcftels, their 
 own Tailors, and their own capitals, manv 
 branches of foreign trade, which would other- 
 wife have remained, partly or entirely, in the 
 hands of itrangers. Tliis was a powerful fn- 
 mulus to the commercial marine of Great Bri- 
 tain, which was thereby rendered a nuriery for 
 
 • Vide Note K K. 
 
 the
 
 ( 302 ) 
 
 the navj'j and an important inftrument of the 
 greatncfs and fecurity of the ftate, more rapidly 
 and more ejfifedually, than if left to the natural 
 courfe of things. 
 
 But let us not forget, that, according to the ge- 
 nuine principles of political economy, the Navi- 
 gation A61, which fecured thefc important objedts, 
 was far from being advantageous to the iuduftry 
 of the nation ; was, on the contrary, a reftraint 
 upon it. It was a facrifice to which England 
 willingly fubmitted, the better to eflablifh her fe- 
 curity and independence. In affairs of commerce, 
 the true infereft of every nation requires an ex- 
 tenfive competition, and the unreftrained liberty 
 of buying and felling to the greateft advantage 
 afforded by its induftry andfituation. The Na- 
 vigation kS. infringed this liberty, and deftroyed, 
 or very much diminifhed, that competition. So 
 far from being diredly beneficial to the foreign 
 trade of Great Britain, this la\,v was, in fadf, in- 
 directly detrimental to it. 
 
 No perfon acquainted with the real principles 
 of national wealth and induftry, can ever regard 
 the Navigation Acl as the foundation of Eng- 
 land's commercial greatnefs*. It has been in fpite 
 of that a(ft, and not by means of it, that her 
 foreign commerce has acquired fuch a wonderful 
 extent. Its extraordinary progrefs and increafe 
 
 * Vide Kote L L. 
 
 mull
 
 ( 3^3 ) 
 
 iriLift be very differently accounted for : it is not 
 the creature of the Navigation AJl. If fuch a 
 law had been pafled in any other country, deui- 
 tute of the natural advantages, character, and rc- 
 fources of England, it would have been a iignal 
 for the immediate annihilation of commerce ; the 
 fuppreffion of all indullry ; the deltruction of 
 every incentive to enterprile and aclivity. 
 
 ' Now, fince the Navigation Acl has produced 
 none of the efFe^ls in England which have been 
 alcribed to it in the declamations of angry jea- 
 loufy, labouring to render odious the commercial 
 induftryof GreatBritain ; we have only toexamine 
 in what manner and how far it has been detrimen- 
 tal to other nations. For though it be impofhhle, 
 upon any ground, to difpute the right of tlie 
 Britifh government to enact inch a law ; it might, 
 neverthelefs, in its conlequences be opprefhvc 
 to other nations. Without being a pofitive aS: 
 of injuflice, it might delervc the appellation of 
 an unfair andhoftilerecrulation ; it misht be con- 
 ftantly inimical to the intcrefts of all Europe- 
 There is only one fpecles of commerce dlre(5lly 
 injured by the Engllfh Navigation Ac^l, viz. the 
 conveyance from one country to another of the 
 produce and manufatlures of different nations. 
 This may properly be termed the freight trade \ 
 
 n [;U
 
 ( 3»4 ) 
 
 and this was the great fource of the afionilliin^ 
 riches of Holland. Holland was, in hB, the 
 only nation immediately affe(5>ed and injured by 
 the Navigation A6\. The Dutch and the very 
 few other nations engaged in the carrying trade, 
 were for ever deprived of the Englilh market. 
 The diredt traffic between the different flates 
 of Europe, with the productions of their own 
 toil, or their own induftry, was not impeded by 
 it ; and whatever rellri(^ions even this may have 
 been fettered with by other laws in England, and 
 by the fyftem of duties eftablifhcd there, they 
 were only fuch as the fpirit of mercantile policy 
 had produced in every other country *. The car- 
 rying nations alone had realon to complain of the 
 Navigation Ad ; all others ought to have been in- 
 diiFercnt to it. But it was not in the nature of 
 things, that even the former fliould be ruined by 
 it : the ad only excluded them from one coun- 
 try ; and the markets of the reft of Europe con- 
 doled and indemnified them for the lofs. Ex- 
 perleiKC has fhwon, that neither Holland nor 
 Hamburgh, nor any of the flates engaged in the 
 fame trade, have been either ruined or materially 
 injured by it. 
 
 * If it fecured to England the exclufive commerce of her 
 own colonies, it did no more in that refpeft than the maritime 
 ftatutes of France, Spain, aad Holland, in favour of their re- 
 iptHvt colonial fyftems. 
 
 If
 
 ( 3^5 ) 
 
 - M" every government in Europe (fay the accu- 
 fers of the Navigation Ae^) had enacted fimilar 
 laws againft all other nations, the whole would, 
 have fuffered a fevere lofs in the tot^l annihila- 
 tion of the freight trade. This obfecyation is^ ex- 
 tremely juft'; but the evil which it points to, 
 could only be conceived and dreaded, upon one 
 fuppofition, and that a very improbable one. All 
 governments muft either have entirely miftakea 
 their obvious interefls, or wantonly have faprificcd 
 them to the mad de fire of injuring tbeir^ncigh- 
 hours. For every monopolizing flatute (this cati" 
 not be too often repeated) is in the firfl inftancei 
 and generally in the higheft degree, pernicious 
 to the country which has produced it. Such a 
 law muft alvy.ay? b^ improper, . muft ,be abfurd 
 and unjuftifiable, where reafons of th^ higheft 
 importance do not urge the dangerous exception ; 
 and where, betides, the nation that adopts the 
 meafure is not pofTcfled of fuch ftrength and re- 
 Iburces in itlelf as arc fufhcient to fupport it. 
 Thefe two conditions are united in the cafe of 
 England only* : all other ftates wanted cither fuf- 
 ficient reafon for introducing fuch a law, or the 
 means of putting it in execution ; molt of them 
 poireftcd neither the one nor the other. 
 
 /d ..ftoj^no to oitit 
 The refult of the foregoing examination is, 
 therefore, > _ a-' . . :m^i no' 
 
 * Vide Note MM. > ' *" 
 
 X '' I ft.
 
 ( 3°6 ) 
 
 I ft, That the Britiih Navigation A(9. repreffed 
 the induftry df other countries in one refped^ 
 only — that of excluding the carrying nations from 
 one of their principal markets ; in every other, 
 the commerce and induftry of Europe remained 
 tmmolelled by it. 
 
 idly, That this liw was no fource of the eoih- 
 inercial greatneft and riches of Englandi If ope- 
 rated, on the contrary, like all monopolizing 
 ftatutes, prejudicially to the induftry o( thd na- 
 tion ; and the extraordinary profperity at which 
 its commerce has arrived, muft be referred to 
 other eaufes. - 
 
 ■r 
 
 3dly, The Navigation A6t was -a wife regala- 
 ^on as far as it encouraged, though at the 'ex>- 
 penfe of the ordinary principles of political eco- 
 nomy, a branch of national induftry, which con- 
 tributed to the fecurity and independ'ence ©f 
 Great Britain. A good policy made it contribute 
 indiredlly to every f3urce of the welfare and 
 profperity of the ftate. 
 
 4thly, That fuppoflng the Navigation AS. to 
 have been unwife, it can never have delerved the 
 title of unjuft. For it is neither more nor lefs 
 than a regulation of domeftic policy, for which 
 a nation is not anfwerable to other powers. But 
 ^ fince
 
 . ( 3^7 ) 
 
 lince'the wlfdom of the a£t cannot, under the 
 circumftanccs of England's fituation, be called 
 inqueftion, every fhadow of an argument againil 
 its juflice, isj of courfe, .done away. 
 
 5thly, In as much as the Britifh legiflature 
 went even beyond the Navigation Act, in prohi- 
 bitive commercial ftatutes, the impofition of 
 heavy duties on foreign produce, and other 
 fcheraeis of mercantile policy ; and as far as it 
 fettered the induflry of its own and other coun- 
 tries, without being fufficiently juftiiied by more 
 important motives, it proceeded upon blame-, 
 worthy principles. But what government in Eu-. 
 rope can reproach the Britifh nation on that ac- 
 count ? The liime mercantile policy has prevailed 
 in every country, without exception, even to the 
 prefent day. But,, fince the principles of politi- 
 cal economy have no where been Co thoroughly 
 developed, and ib extenfively praftifed as in £ng« 
 land ; the prellimption is in favour of that coun- 
 try, that it has, more than any other*, abandoned 
 the confined maxims of narrow-minded trade ; a 
 prefumption which has been confirmed by more 
 than one example, cfpecially in the laft twenty 
 years. 
 
 England's commercial ftatutes do therefore 
 furnifh no caufe of complaint againfl the maritime 
 
 * Hay more than any other \ for it muft be confefled that 
 «f en England has not rifen altogether fuperior to them. 
 
 X 2 tyranny
 
 ( 3^S ) 
 
 tyranny of that nation : if thofe complaints have 
 any foundation, it muft be fought for elfewhere. 
 
 II. Of the Monopoly of trans European Dominion- 
 
 When tlie expanfion of the human faculties, 
 and the civil and fecial itTiprovement of man kind, 
 fhall have attained the point towards which Eu- 
 rope has been gradually fending during the three 
 kft centuries ; all civilized nations muft be im- 
 pelled by the delire of eftablifhing a permanent 
 fyflem of connexion with the remoteft parts of 
 the world. The love of luxury, and the thirft 
 of knowledge, new wants, and new powers of 
 induflry, the di61:ates of reafon, and the allure- 
 ments of paffion, combitie to give an irrefiftible 
 force to this propenfity. What was originally 
 only a fpirit of adventure, is gradually converted 
 into fyftematic activity ; what was at firft fuper- 
 fluity, becomes habitual, regular, and neceflary. 
 The produdions of the mod diftant regions be- 
 come articles of daily ncceffity ; the fea, as well 
 as the land, is covered by the human fpecies ; 
 and navigation, comtncrce, and colonization, are 
 ranked with the more ftmple occupations of agri- 
 culture and domeftic manufacture. 
 
 This unlimited progrefs of induftry, this un- 
 bounded multiplication of its materials, its in- 
 ilrumentSj and its objecis, is the deftination of 
 
 humanity^
 
 ( ^09 ) 
 
 humanity. Civilization is not to be the exclu- 
 five privilege of this or that favoured people ; it 
 will fpread over the whole habitable globe in the 
 courfe of time. If we confider thcin with refer- 
 ence to this ineltimable obje6l — the fettlements 
 of Europeans in other quarters of the globe, are 
 fortunate and glorious events, notwithflanding 
 all the evils that accompanied them ; and if we 
 lofe fight of thefe confequences, all is enigma^ 
 doubt, and darknefs. Why was every iiep of the 
 civilized, among favage nations, to be marked 
 by the moil atrocious cruelties ? Why were mil- 
 lions to be deflroyed, that a happier race might 
 be efiablifhed upon their graves ? Why were 
 dcfirucflive wars, and robbery, and opprefHon, 
 and intolerable flavcry, made the groundwork 
 and necefTary condition of the nobleft work of 
 man ? Human reafon is loft In thefe inexpli- 
 cable contradi6lions ; between the grandeur and 
 fublimity of the end, and the bafenefs and hor- 
 riblenefs of the means. 
 
 Force and injuftice were, however, with few 
 exceptions, the groundwork of all European 
 colonies and dominions in the refl of the world. 
 Portuguefe, Spaniards, Dutch, Englifh, and 
 French, are, in this refpedl, all alike condemn- 
 able ; no nation can reproach another. Nay, 
 X 2 more.
 
 ( 3i» ) 
 
 more, no European has a right to reproach the 
 commercial flares, witli the oppreffion of the ori- 
 ginal inhabitants of their foreign pofTeffions. For 
 everyone participates in the manifold advantages 
 thence derived to all JOlurope, which afFecl every 
 branch of induftry, and fpread through every rank 
 offociety. Noonewill renounce his fhareof thofe 
 advantages ; and we are therefore all of us 
 equally refponfible for the evils attendant upon 
 their cultivation, andj in a certain degree, for 
 the crimes which accompanied the original fcttle- 
 ments. 
 
 Thefe no longer exifi: but in the page of his- 
 tory ; the rapacious fpirit of the firft conquerors 
 has every where yielded to more mild and humane 
 difpofitions. There is but one opinion among 
 civilized nations concerning the neceflity of con- 
 tinuing the prefent fyltem, notwithftanding all 
 the lamentations of philanthropy. We can there- 
 fore only hope that the wifdom of an enlightened 
 age may gradually introduce among the nume- 
 rous Haves of our true and imaginary wants, of 
 our infatiable defires and reliefs activity, that 
 happy ftate of being, which is alone conliflent 
 with the intereft of all, and calculated to fecure 
 the reign of peace and juface upon earth. 
 
 If,
 
 ( 3" ) 
 
 If, then, the powers of Europe do continue to 
 bold trans-European dominions, with which they 
 cannot maintain a due communication but by 
 means of an extenfive commercial fyftem ; all 
 that we have now to confider is, how that domi- 
 nion and commercial fyftem may belt be moJiiied 
 according to the general intereits of Europe. 
 
 In the anfwer to this queftion, it is generally 
 taken for granted, that an equal participation by 
 all maritime tlates in the advantages of ccmmerce 
 and colonization, would be the moft beneiicial 
 conftitution. For it is conceived that a mono- 
 poly of colonial produce, highly injurious and 
 opprellive to the reft, muft accrue from the too 
 great afcendant, andftill more from the folefway 
 of any one nation in fuch an extenfive fphere of 
 induflry and dominion. 
 
 I will, in the firft place, admit the juftice of 
 this opinion, and proceed upon that fuppofitioa 
 (not forgetting the complaints againft England) 
 to examine the diflribution of the Ealt and VVefl 
 Indian polTeflions of Europeans, before the French 
 revolution, and at the prefcut time. 
 
 The Englifh were in pofTeflion of the largeft 
 
 and richeft part of the Ealt Indies. Thty h^d 
 
 thrre founded the greatelt empire known to thofe 
 
 X 4 fertile
 
 ( ^t^ ) 
 
 fertile regions iince the reign of the Moguls. 
 Their agents colle6led the richeft produdlions of 
 the land, and tlieir veflels tranfported them to 
 Europe. They had opened, befides, an exten- 
 live trade with the eailern coatls of Afia, and 
 particularly with China ; and the tranfportation 
 of fome articles from thence, which (as tea, for 
 example) had become of the firfi neccfliiy in 
 Europe, now formed one of the mofV important 
 branches of their induftry. Notwithftanding all 
 this, the Englifh were neither the exclulive do- 
 minators in the Eaft Indies, nor the only traders 
 in the Indian ocean. The French, the Dutch, 
 the Portuguefe, the Danes, had a confiderable 
 fhare of both. The veflels of thefe nations vi- 
 lited every coaft, ifland, harbour, and fettlement, 
 from the mouth of the Indus to Japan. They 
 poflefled fadlories, towns, and provinces, that 
 rivalled thofe of the Englifli. Till the end of the 
 war of 1756, it even remained doubtful whether 
 Hindoflan was to acknowledge the fovereignty of 
 the French or Britifh. The empire of the Dutch 
 in the Indian ocean, was no lefs important in its 
 kind than that of the Englifh on the continent ; 
 the exclulive pofleflion of the fpice iflands was 
 an inexhauflible fource of riches. England and 
 Holland divided the trade with China ; that of 
 Japan belonged to the Dutch alone. England 
 was undoubtedly the preponderating flate in the 
 
 EafI
 
 ( 3^3 ) 
 
 Eaft Indies at the commencement of the French 
 revolution ; but fhe was far from enjoying the 
 fole dominion or the exclulive commerce of that 
 part of the world. 
 
 In the Weft Indies the divifton was ftill more 
 equal ; and if there was any preponderance, it 
 was evidently on the fide of France. St. Do- 
 mingo alone outweighed all the reft of the An- 
 tilles ; and beftdcs that invaluable ifland, the 
 French pofTcfTcd the richeft and moft important 
 of the fmaller ones. In extent of poflefTions, 
 Spain was not inferior to Great Britain in the Bay 
 of Mexico ; for Cuba alone was three times as 
 valuable as the Englifh iflands : but the weak- 
 nefs and blind nefs of her government rendered 
 her lefs powerful. Holland, Denmark, and 
 Sweden too, had valuable fettlements in the An- 
 tilles : and who would think of aflerting that the 
 poffeflbrs of Jamaica were the fole rulers in this 
 immenfe archipelago, or monopolized the trade 
 between Europe and the Weft Indies ? 
 
 Was Itotherwife on the continent of America ? 
 No: England, ftnce the peace of 1783, had 
 been confined to the moft northern part of that 
 continent, to an uncultivated, and, compara- 
 tively, poor and barren territory. The immenfe 
 regions of South America, with their various trea- 
 
 fures
 
 ( 3«4 ) 
 
 fiires on the furfacc and in the bowels of the eartftj 
 belonged to Spain and Portugal. In Norih Aoie- 
 rica, all that did not belong to the United States on 
 this fide of the river St. Lawrence, was the property 
 of France or Spain. With regard to extent of 
 territory, and political weight and power, Eng- 
 land was now hlirdly a flate of the third order iti 
 America. 
 
 It therefore clearly appears, 
 
 ifl". That before the revolution, England was 
 not the fo'e poffeffor of European dominion in 
 other quarters of the globe. 
 
 sdly. That France, England, Holland, Spain, 
 Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden, enjoyed each 
 of them fome part ot the European cftablifh- 
 ments in the Eaft and Wed Indies ; and tiiat the 
 fhare poffcffed by England was far from being the 
 greateft, or even the moft important withrefpeft 
 to its intriufic value. 
 
 3dly, That the trade and produce, as well as the 
 government of thofe poffefTions, were divided 
 among all the maritime powers ; France, Eng- 
 land, and Holland, however, having a decided 
 fuperiority over the reil. 
 
 4thly, That if England, even before the revolu- 
 tion, poffefled an afcendant over her rivals in 
 
 het
 
 ( 3'i ) 
 
 the trade to the Eaft and Weft Indies (which with 
 refpeiSl to France is by no means certain), the 
 caulcs of that alcendant are not to be found in 
 an exclulive or even exceffive dominion on 
 iier part, but rnuit be derived frdtii other 
 Iburces *, 
 
 Before we inquire into thefe, we muft examine 
 the changes which have happened in thofe rela- 
 tions fince the French revolution. 
 
 On the continent of America, no alteration has 
 taken place. Excepting the fniall diiiri<^ of Suri- 
 nam, England has made no conquefts; and 
 France, Spain, Portugal, he, have loft none of 
 their former pofleflions. 
 
 In the Weft Indies, England has taken Mar- 
 tinique and fome fmaller iflands from the 
 French ; Trinidad from the Spaniards ; and 
 from the Dutch the whole of their polTefTions. 
 On the other hand, France has obtained the 
 whole of St. Domiogo, of which fhe before 
 only poffefled the fmaller, though the richeft 
 and beft cultivated part. It is eafy to forefee, 
 that at the enfuing peace, if France will confent 
 on her part to make fome facrifices, England 
 will have no great difficulty to give back the 
 whole or Iht greater part of thefe conquefis by 
 
 * Vide Note NN. 
 
 way
 
 ( 3'6 ) 
 
 Way of compenfatlon *. But even as the ca/*d 
 now fiands, the acquifitions of France, territory 
 for territory, and dominion for dominion, are 
 at leaft equal in importance to thofe of Eng- 
 land. 
 
 In the Eaft Indies, indeed, the territorial em- 
 pire of the Englilh has been aggrandized in a 
 great and important degree. On the one hand, 
 the moft valuable pofleflions of the Dutch, 
 Ceylon, and the fpice iflands, have fallen under 
 their dominion '\'; on the other hand, they have 
 concluded a war, which has accomplifhcd the 
 ruin of the only Mogul prince yet poffeffing a re- 
 gular power in the peninfula of Hindoftan. 
 
 The firft of thefe events has made England 
 the fole miflrefs of the eafrern feas : the laft has 
 eflablifhed her in the entire fovereignty of the 
 continent of India. 
 
 It is impoffible to forefee, at prefent, whether 
 thefe things will continue thus, or whether they 
 are to fufFer many important changes (particu- 
 
 * Vide Note O O. 
 
 f This is precifely what has happened. The reftoration of 
 thefe conquefts has been a fubjeft of complaint and outcry to 
 a few anti-pacific declaimers in this country ; but we here find 
 an enlightened, and furely an impartial politician, predicting 
 It as a matter of the greateft probability, without imputing 
 either folly or weaknefs to the Britilh miniftry.— Trans. 
 
 I larly
 
 ( 3^7 ) 
 
 larly with rcfpecSl to the Dutch pofTefilons) at 
 the future peace between France and England* 
 But however that may be, and whatever the 
 changes that may then be made, the only quefr 
 tion now before us is this : How far is the ge- 
 neral intereft of Europe connected with the 
 divifion of power and territory, with the af- 
 cendancy of this or that nation, in trans-EurpT- 
 pean poflefiions ? 
 
 If thefe pofTeffions were, or ever could be, 
 an immediate fource of riches and power to the 
 countries they belong to, their relations would 
 be a fubje(51: of no fmall importance to the fyf- 
 tem of Europe. For, being then the inftru- 
 ments of confiderable political influence, they, 
 might, according as they fhould be concentrated 
 or divided, immediately and eflentially afFc6t 
 the general relations, and confirm, alter, or 
 fubvert the federal conftitution. We Ihould 
 then have to confider them as provinces in the 
 flrl(5leil fenfe of the word, as real territorial 
 aggrandizement of the mother-country ; and the 
 balance of Europe would be affected by the 
 conqueft of the Myfore or St. Domingo, as it 
 now is by that of Holland or Italy. 
 
 Such, however, is not the nature of thofe 
 pofleffions. They never were an immediate 
 fource of revenue to any nation, and confe- 
 
 quently
 
 ( 3JS ) 
 
 quently never an immediate fource of greatnels 
 and power *. The expenles of their adminiflra-i'i 
 tion and defence, either conlume, or (which is* 
 more common) exceed what they proelur'!!. 
 It is a well-known fa6t, that sH EcU> a!v^ \^.^^Vt 
 India companies that have iproceeded'cm the 
 principle of territorial domsnTOf/, 'have Tpcedily 
 met, or with difficulty averted' ihdilr VMiH",.' llhe* 
 fruitful and extenfive territory \Vhich.ltdW>fotnr»Si 
 the United States of America, never pro- 
 duced fo much to the Britilh government as a 
 filigre fqiiare mile in Grdat Britain. A haily 
 ^litit^ ^t l^he 'EJtft ' ^ndia ■ Baf%et, laid^ 'Mfore 
 parliam'oht dvdry'year'by the Br^itlfh miniflry, is 
 fufficlent to iho^, •upon iTie l^ett authority, the 
 true value of India, coniidered as a tetYitorial^ 
 poflcffi'o'n. Thefe fo much envied conqueroris, 
 the heirs and fucceflbrs 'of the Mogufls, Ihe 
 rulers of thirty millions of men, and fovereigns 
 of theVicheft countries bn-'the gtobe, fhfree timeis 
 a:s extenfive as their own country, are obliged 
 to heap debt upon debt to coriiply with their 
 expenles; their yearly fatpl us is a deficiency \ 
 and their empire would be a dead weight upon 
 Great Britain, if it did not nourifli the vital 
 principle of her greatnefs— her exteniive com- 
 merce. This is not a place to enter into a dit- 
 cuffion of the caufes of this remarkable pheno- 
 menon ; they are not formed by particular rela- 
 
 * Vide Note P P. 
 
 tions.
 
 ( 3^9 ) 
 
 fions, but He deep in the nature of the thing 
 itfelf, and in the neceflary condition of every' 
 adminiftration of lands remote from the centre 
 of government ; they will, in all times, and 
 under all circumftandes, more' or Icfs, afFedt 
 every trans-European territorial dominion. 
 
 Snch dominion will not, therefore, of itfelf, 
 procure any coniiderable influence in the poli- 
 tical relations and affairs of Europe. As far as 
 relates to the fovereignty only, it is a matter of 
 little moment, whether the Englil^, the French, 
 or the Dutch, exclufively, or altogether, ot 
 none of them, govern in the Ealt and Weft 
 Indies, in Africa, America, and all the iflands 
 of the ocean. It only becomes important as it 
 ilands connected with an advantage of another 
 nature, which is that of commerce. It is com* 
 mcrce alone that can give futficient importance 
 to thefe pofleffions to intereft Europe. It is 
 only by an extenfion of the whole, or fomc 
 particular branches of its commerce, which it 
 could not have effected otherwife, that any Eu- 
 ropean nation can derive material power and 
 influence in the general fyftem, from its domi- 
 nions in diltant quarters of the globe. The 
 only cafe in which any flate can complain of 
 the foreign pofTeflions of another, is when the 
 commerce derived from thofe poffefTions only,
 
 ( 320 ) 
 
 is in fomc way injurioijis ox oppieflive to other 
 i^ations. Conildered in a liberal point of view, 
 all complaints againft trans-European dominion, 
 as fuch, are pothing more than empty and un- 
 founded declamations, fuited only to minds e»Q 
 tirely blinded by national prejudice. 
 
 ,i*Hov7 far the poffeflion of diflant colonies, 
 and the exclulive enjoyment of them, are even 
 favourable to the commerce of a nation ; whe- 
 ther it might not attain the fame greatnefs with- 
 out thofe excludve pofleffions, fuppofing the 
 exiflencje iii bther refpe(9:s of the materials and 
 opportunities neceffary to its rife and. progress ; 
 and whether in the cafes where it has fiourifhed 
 in conjundjon with them, 'that profperity has 
 been created by, or notwithftanding them : 
 thefeare important queftions which I fhall leave 
 unexamined at prefent. I fhall confine myfelf 
 to the common ideas of the influence of fo;- 
 teign poffe/iions upon the profperity and increafe 
 of foreign commerce. I alTi whether, even aq- 
 cording to tbefe received ideas, the f^refent 
 -greatnefs, or, ^« it is frequently called, the fole 
 preponderance of the Britifh commerce, can, 
 with any fl^iow of reafon. be attributed to the 
 increafe of its prefent foreign territory, derived 
 ;from the events of the prefent war ? ' 
 
 VVc
 
 ( 3^1 ) 
 
 We have already feen, that it is only in the 
 Eaft Indies, that the poflellions of the Englifh 
 have received any material augmentation. 
 Their conquelts in the Weft Indies have not 
 been fufficiently important to throw any percep- 
 tible weig-ht into the fcale of their external 
 commerce. If the prefent fuperiority of their 
 trad^ be founded upon the extent of their pof- 
 feffions, it muft be explained by their acqui- 
 litions in the Eaft. The conqueft of Tippoo 
 Saib, and the capture of the Dutch fettlements, 
 muft be made to account for the whole, or the 
 greater part of it. 
 
 But it is fcarcely poflible that the efFedls of 
 the conqueft of the My fore can yet be felt ; and 
 whoever is the leaft acquainted with the litu- 
 ation of the Englifh Eaft India Company, will 
 be far from believing that conqueft to have 
 made any material addition to its real wealth, or 
 to have given any new vigour to its commerce. 
 It was only in one refpecl valuable to the pof- 
 feflbrs of Bengal ; it added to the fecurity of 
 their poflefiion. Like the reft of her dominions 
 in the Eaft, it was not ufeful to Great Britaia 
 as an immediate fource of wealth, but as an 
 additional fecurity to that extenftve commerce, 
 which is one of the fprings of England's great- 
 nefs. That commerce might have exifted with- 
 out the polTeflion of thofe immenfc regions ; 
 
 Y
 
 C 322 ) 
 
 a pofTeffion only neccffary, becaufe a falfe and 
 barbarous policy has poifoned the relations be- 
 tween India and Europe ; becaufe the founders 
 of all European eftabliilimcnts there, of what- 
 ever nation, have followed no other maxims 
 than thofe of force and opprefHon ; and becaufe 
 an unnatural dominion can only be maintained 
 by unnatural means*. The conqueft of the 
 Myfore is therefore of little or no weight in 
 explanation of the commercial preponderance 
 in queftion. 
 
 The acquifition of Ceylon, the Moluccas, &c. 
 is more intimately connected with it. But, if 
 we coniider that this only increafed the Britifh 
 commerce in one refpec!^, which, though im- 
 portant in itfch*, is (compared with others) 
 only a fecondary branch of it, we fhall be eafily 
 convinced that it is like wife infufficient to folvc 
 the problem. 
 
 The prefent commercial fuperlority of the 
 Euglifli is the refult of two principles uncoa- 
 necl:ed with each other. The one of thefe ex- 
 ifted before the revolution; the other owes its 
 being to the effe^s of the revolution on all the 
 other commercial flates of Europe. 
 
 * Vide Note Q^Qt 
 
 The
 
 ( 3^i ) 
 
 The incomparable adivity of the Englifh na- 
 tion, the extent of its capital, its wonderful im- 
 provements in all kinds of machinery, the great 
 expertnefs of its navigators, the labours of a 
 government ftudious of its real interetls, the 
 excellence of its internal conflitution, its politi- 
 cal and individual charader ; all thefe conftitute 
 the firft and principal bafis of the afcendant of 
 its foreign commerce. This firll and chief caufe 
 is entirely independent of all changes or revolu- 
 tions in the refl. of the world. It was already 
 amply difplayed before the commencement of 
 the prefent war : a concatenation of circum- 
 ftances to be explained in another place, pre- 
 vented even the war from impeding its progrefs ; 
 which is one of the moft extraordinary pheno- 
 mena in the hiftory of the commerce and civili- 
 zation of nations. 
 
 To this firft conflituent principle of the 
 commercial fuperiority of Great Britain, a fe- 
 cond has been added in the courfe of the war ; 
 which, however, compared to the former, can 
 only be called a negative caufe. The nations 
 which formerly divided the commerce of the 
 world with England, were reduced to impo- 
 tence and ina(Stivity, by a feries of moJft de- 
 plorable misfortunes. The once fo profperous 
 France beheld the ruin of her capital, her ma- 
 y 2 nufadlories.
 
 ( 324 ) 
 
 ftufac^ories, her induflry, her commerce, and 
 her navigation, amidft the convuliions of a 
 Iruinous anarchy. Defolatlon was fpread through 
 her colonies ; St. Domingo, the queen of the 
 Antilles, was converted Into an abode of mifery, 
 a wildernefs of blood and ruin ! Holland was 
 plunged in tiie devouring abyfs of an infatiahle 
 revolution ; the fprings of her trade were dried 
 up ; many of her internal refources were anni- 
 hilated ; her colonies and fnipping were taken 
 from her. One of thofe unfortunate contradic- 
 tions, which nothing could have produced but 
 the war of the revolution^ compelled the moft 
 powerful ally of this nation to take an a6\ive 
 part in lis dcftrudlion, to pcrfccute its trade in 
 every fca, and to take pofleffion of its moft va- 
 luable poflcffions in the Eaft and Weft Indies. 
 Spain, to avoid a greater evil, was obliged to 
 throw hevfelf into the arms of France ; to en- 
 gage with her in the war againft England, to 
 participate the fufpenfton of her commerce, the 
 infecurity of her navigation, the cxhauftion of 
 her finances, and all the misfortunes by which 
 France was for a time ftruck out of the lift of 
 commercial nations. The maritime flates of the 
 fecond order, and above all, the United States of 
 America*, made up, in fome refpe6ls, for the 
 
 defedlion 
 
 * Th<i extenfive augmentation of the trade of America 
 during this war, is too often overlooked. In latter years, her 
 
 advancement
 
 ( 3^5 ) 
 
 deiecfllon of France, Holland, and Spain ; but 
 they could not altogether lupply their place ; 
 and by far the moll: conliderable part of all trans- 
 European commerce was concentrated in the 
 hands of the Englifh. 
 
 Thus gradually arofe what is now called the 
 monopoly of the colonial trade. The hitj'mjicy 
 peculiar, pofitive fuperiority of the Englifh, which 
 exiftcd before the revolution, and had already 
 then been the occafion of fome unjufl and mif- 
 taken complaints, was the iirft and chief fource 
 of this monopoly. Had it not been for that in- 
 trinfic fuperiority of England's induftry, all the 
 maritime ftates in Europe, their commerce, and 
 their colonies, might have been ruined, without 
 advancing her to herprefent commercial greatnefs : 
 but poflefTing thofe peculiar advantages, and, at 
 the fame time, the very extraordinary one of be- 
 ing able to preferve the Iburce and foundation of 
 them, even in the midtt of war, England remained 
 alone on the field when all her rivals had difap- 
 peared. The misfortunes of other nations were 
 the accidental occafion, not the caufe, of a greater, 
 
 advancement in general comrnerce has even been more re- 
 markable, than her great improvements in many other 
 branches of pubUc wealth. The trade of America to the 
 Eaft Indies has been carried to fuch an extent as to render 
 it probable that flie will foou be a forrnidable rival of England 
 in that career. 
 
 V 3 perhaps
 
 ( 3^-6 ) 
 
 perhaps only more evident, difplay of the prin- 
 ciples of her power. 
 
 Suppolingthat which is arbitrarily and abfurdly 
 termed monopoly and tyranny, to be a politive 
 evil for other nations (and we fhall foon inquire 
 whether it really is fo), it would nevertheless ftill 
 be inequitable, and ridiculous indeed, to treat 
 this monopoly as a crime of the Englifh people ; 
 as injuftice, treachery, and ufurpation on the part 
 of the Britifh government. 1 he firlt principle 
 of the Btitifh commercial afcendant, the true and 
 immediate caufe of it, will furely not be a fubjedt 
 of ferious reproach to the nation which thereby 
 acquired fuch advantages, or to the government 
 that cherifhed and encouraged it : and England 
 can never be made refponhble for the fecond, 
 which was only the accidental occafion of ex- 
 tending, or at leatt of manifefling that long de- 
 termined fuperiority. England neither defired 
 nor cffedted the French revolution, nor the hor- 
 rors of her internal convuilions, nor the ruin of 
 the French colonies, nor the fubveriion of the 
 late conftitution of Holland, nor the alliance be- 
 tweien Spain and France. To what is called the 
 monopoly of the commerce of the world, fhe 
 only contributed that part for which nobody can 
 reproach her; the reft was accomplifhed by cir- 
 cumftances which England could neither forefee, 
 nor diredl, nor avert. 
 
 But
 
 t Z'^1 ) 
 
 But in order to judge how far England's mono^ 
 poly of colonial produce is really r;£Judicial to 
 other nations, we mull carefully <''.'"fiaguifh its 
 efFcd^s on the commercial ftates, 1; om its conle- 
 quences to the confuming part of Europe only. 
 
 The nations acSlively engaged in the colonial 
 trade before the revolution, are neceffarily fuf- 
 ferers by the prefent fiate of thin ;s. One of the 
 moft important branches of theii iiiduftry, is en- 
 tirely cut off; and many others, more or lefs 
 connec^led with it, arc conlidcrably ftraitened. 
 The fuddcn deftrut9.ion of their colonial fyfieuis, 
 not only affe61ed their foreign commerce and na- 
 vigation, but was a levere check upon their inter- 
 nal manufadlures, and the circulation of money ; 
 it diminifhed all the fources of private wealth, 
 and many of the fprings of public power. To 
 them the prefent fiate of tilings is a ferious, im- 
 portant, and, in fome refpe6is, an irreparable 
 misfortune. To them the former competition 
 was not only advantageous, but neceflary, and 
 to them it may well be permitted to reprefent the 
 re-eftabllihment of that competition as an ob- 
 jed of the firit and greatetl importance. 
 
 But very different Is the cafe with rcfpc(51: to 
 
 that conliderable part of Europe — the coufumers 
 
 only of colonial produce. All that immediately 
 
 intercils thcfe nations, is the facility of pro- 
 
 Y 4 curing
 
 C 3*8 ^ 
 
 curing thofe produdions at the loweft price. 
 In itlelf, it is indifferent to therQ whether the 
 Eaft and Weft Indian fgttlemepts, and their com- 
 merce and produce, are divided among many, 
 or confined to one nation. The fixft is only ad^ 
 vantageous to them when it enfures a lower price 
 at the market ; and the latter is only prejudicial 
 when it occafions an arbitrary rife in the value of 
 the produce. 
 
 It is rather generally believed in Europe, that 
 thofe circumftances which in the courfe of the 
 war have put the Englifh in exclulive pofTeffion 
 of the colonial trade, have at the fame time em- 
 powered that nation to exercife an oppreilive 
 monopoly towards the reft of Europe in the fale 
 o( that produce. This opinion was probably 
 created by the declamations of thofe, who were 
 inftigated againft England by an intereft of a 
 different nature — the lots of their active part of 
 the trade. It was foftered by political animoft- 
 ties, by hoftile prejudices and hoftile artifices ; 
 by the evident and uniform bias of moft qf the 
 writers of thefe tiipes, and by the prevailing tem- 
 per of the public mind. This opinion, likewife, 
 received a tinge of probability from the extra- 
 ordinary rife in the price of coloni<\l produce, 
 which happened at the very time when that pre- 
 ponderance, or, as people choofe to call it, that 
 defpct'fni of the Englilh was efiablifhed ; and 
 \t received its final confirmation from the ap- 
 parently
 
 ( 329 ) 
 
 parently infallible conclufions, that, as in any 
 ^ngle market the competition of fellers is the 
 pecefTary caiife of cheapnefs, and the monopoly 
 of a few, the occalion of the reverfe ; fo likevvifp 
 in the general marl^et of Europe, the concurr 
 rence of felling nations mud diminifh the prices, 
 while an arbitrary incrcafe of them miift inevi- 
 tably enfue from a monopoly in the hands of ope 
 ftate *. 
 
 The following reafons induce me to regard this 
 opinion as fallacious, however generally it may 
 be received. 
 
 In the firfi: place, I conceive it to be impoffible, 
 that a whole people fhould form fuch an agreement 
 as would be abfolutely neceffary to enable them 
 to affix an arbitrary price to any object of their 
 trade, A commercial natior) is only a multitude 
 of trading individuals ; and each of thefe, in his 
 traffic with foreign or domeftic purchafers, obeys 
 the maxims fuggefted by his own immediate in- 
 tereft. Every individual is the natural competi- 
 tor of all the reft. If an hundred perfons in one 
 commercial ftate were actually to confpire toge- 
 ther to eflablifh an arbitrary and artificial price In 
 pvery market, there would always be found an 
 hundred others, who would be willing, fur the 
 fake of a more extenfive fale, to conliuc tbem- 
 felves to a fmaller profit ; and this would deftroy 
 
 * Vide Note R R, 
 
 the
 
 ( 330 ) 
 
 the efFe(^ of fuch monopolizing combinations, 
 and rellore to the article (o unreafonably raifed, 
 its fair price — the original value of the produce, 
 with the charge of conveyance, and the ufual pro- 
 fit of the trader. That any monopoly fhould 
 cr.able all the individuals of a commercial flate 
 to impofe arbitrary prices upon their purchafers 
 in every market of Europe, is a chimera that 
 will not bear a moment's examination. Even 
 fuppoling the government of a commercial na- 
 tion to be fo blind and fenfelefs, as to put every 
 branch of its external commerce into the hands 
 of exclufive, and really monopolizing com- 
 panies ; even in this, by no means probable cafe, 
 the favoured companies would, in the end, find 
 it impolTible to maintain an arbitrar)' price in 
 the objects of their monopoly *. In fuch a cafe, 
 the fyflem of fmuggling would foon be carried 
 to fuch an immenfe extent, as to compel the 
 monopolifts to lower their prices, or to forego 
 their advantages altogether. My own opinion, 
 fupported and confirmed by much refledtion on 
 the fubje6V, is, that in the intercourfe among 
 nations there can be no fuch thing as a mono- 
 poly, in the ftrid fenfe of the word. 
 
 adly. The great rife which has taken place in 
 the prices of all Eaft and Wefl Indian produce, 
 within the laft ten years, is fo fully and fatisfac- 
 
 * Vide Note S S. 
 
 torily
 
 ( 331 ) 
 
 torlly explained by a number of obvious caufes, 
 as to invalidate completely the affumption of its 
 having been elfecfled by a national monopoly. 
 If, beljdes the conftant and neceflary advance- 
 ment in the price of all articles of provilion (in- 
 cludmg, of courfe, trans-European produce) which 
 takes place in the ordinary courfe of things, we 
 conlider the exiraordinary circumftances which 
 have tended, lince the revolution and the war, to 
 increafe the value of colonial produce ; if wecon- 
 ^der the calamities which have befallen the 
 richefl: colonies ; the ruin of induftry, and the 
 »deftru(^ion of capital in fo many of the dates of 
 Europe, and tlie effect of thefe misfortunes upon 
 the productive power of all nations ; if we con- 
 liderthe dangers of navigation, which increafe the 
 price of infurance, and IcfTen the prufits of the 
 merchant, even in the molt powerful : .iritirae 
 countries ; and the great mats of real fubftantial 
 wealth diverted by the war from produdive ob- 
 jedls in England as well as in the reft of affli6led 
 Europe : all thefe circumftances will be fufficient 
 to account for the high prices of colonial produce 
 as their natural and neceflary confequence. The 
 prefent profit of the Englifh trader on the fale 
 of this produce, is certainly no greater than it 
 ufed it to be twenty years ago : there is even rea- 
 fon to believe that it is Icfs, The Weft India 
 merchants of London have twice been obliged, 
 ip the courfe of the prefent war, to apply for af- 
 
 I fiftance
 
 C 33^ ) 
 
 ilflance to their government, which advanced 
 conliderable fums, to relieve their preffing difficul- 
 ties. The Eaft India Company has rather added 
 to its debts than its riches. The two clafles, there- 
 fore, which muft alone, or above all others, 
 have profited by the high price of Eaft aad Weil 
 India produce, if that price had been dictated 
 by an arbitrary monopoly, have in reality derived 
 no fuch extraordinary advantages from it, and 
 have, perhaps, found it difficult even to fecure 
 their ordinary gains. 
 
 The only refpe<^ in which it is at all important 
 to the confumers, whether they be provided with 
 colonial produce by this or that European people, 
 is the degree of induftry and wealth of the nation 
 they have to deal with. Among nations equal in 
 other refpe^ls, the richeft and mofl induflrioqs 
 will always fell at the loweft price. For the 
 greater the capitals, the more ac5live the in- 
 duftry, the more perfect: the art and ability em- 
 ployed in ^ny bufinefs, fo much the more pro- 
 dudlive does it prove, fo much the more fpeedy 
 and certain the refult, fo much lefs exertion 
 proportionably devoted to it, and fo much lefs 
 the equivalent required from the confumer. 
 The produ6\ions of the Eaft and Weft Indies, 
 in the markets of Europe, are fruits of the na- 
 vigation, the capital, the labour, and ingenuity 
 of the nations which bring them thither. In all 
 thefe points the Britifh people ftands unrivalled. 
 
 No
 
 ( 33i ) 
 
 No nation can procure, tranfport, and, of courfe, 
 fell fo cheap as the Englifh. As far as others 
 poflefs not the fame advantages and refources to 
 enable them to fell at the fame prices, and as 
 long as they continue incapable of fo doing ; Co 
 far and fo long muft the commercial predomi- 
 nance of the Englifh, or what is improperly 
 termed their commercial monopoly, remain a 
 manifefl: advantage to the confumer, in every 
 part of Europe*. This appears to me fo clearly 
 founded upon the limplcft principles of political 
 economy, that I am at a lofs to guefs what the 
 mofl prejudiced fophiflry will he able to oppofe 
 to it. 
 
 Thus have we analyzed the fecond charge 
 againft England, the accufation of monopoly ; 
 and we find, 
 
 ift^. That before the French revolution, Eng- 
 land was fo far from pofTcffing exclufive domi- 
 nion in America or the Indies, that fhe did not 
 even preponderate in the Weft Indies or on the 
 adjoining continent ; while in the Eaft fhe was 
 nearly balanced by the Dutch, French, Portu- 
 guefe, Danes, &c. who all of them held more 
 or lefs confiderable pofleffions there. 
 
 • Vide Note T T. 
 
 2dlv,
 
 ( 334 ) 
 
 idly, Since the revolution irt France and 
 Holland, the territorial dominions of Great 
 Britain have been extended in every part of the 
 globe; in the Eaft Indies almoft to exclufive fo- 
 vereignty ; but, in the Weft Indies, not even 
 to preponderance. How many of thefe additions 
 will be permanent, remains yet to be decided by 
 the enfuing peace. 
 
 3dly, But neither the territorial poflcffions of 
 the Englifh before the revolution, nor their con- 
 quefts during the war, are fufficient to account 
 for the extent of their almoft excluftve commerce 
 in Eaft and Weft India produce. This muft be 
 referred to other caufes, among which fome are 
 peculiar advantages which no man has a right to 
 make a fubjedt of reproach to England; others 
 are diforders and calamities which England in 
 no wife occalioned, and from which fhe derived 
 an accidental benefit too dearly purchafed on 
 another fide. 
 
 4thly, Her monopoly of trans-European pro- 
 ductions, fo far as it exifts, is only immediately 
 prejudicial to thofc nations who formerly took 
 an a(ftive part in general commerce. To all the 
 reft, to the great mafs of mere confumers, it 
 could only be hurtful if the prices of thofe 
 producSlions were thereby confiderably raifed. 
 
 Since
 
 ( 335 ) 
 
 Since this neither is, nor can be the cafe ; fincc, 
 under the prefent circumftances, the EngUlh 
 are the people from whom the confumer may 
 expc6l the moft moderate price ; this fo much 
 decried monopoly of Eaft and Weft India com- 
 merce, which at all events would be a matter 
 of indifference, is now even an advantage to 
 him. 
 
 Far be it from me to aflert, that it \a unim- 
 portant to Europe whether France, Spain, Hol- 
 land, and every other ftate whofe induftry has 
 been fettered or impeded by the revolution or 
 the war, fhall recover the ule and poffeffion of 
 their former ftrength, or continue to languilh. 
 in that ina6livity to v/hich their prefent ftate 
 condemns them. The true intereft of Europe 
 conftfts in the greateft poffible profperity of 
 every one of its component parts, and the 
 higheft poffible degree of wealth in all agri- 
 cultural, manufaduring, and commercial na- 
 tions. It requires likevvife, and muft, under 
 every poffible circumftance, require that every 
 nation fhould poffefs that fhare (and, if poffible, 
 neither more nor lefs) of the mafs of general 
 wealth, including Eaft and Weft India com- 
 merce and produce, which belongs to its particu- 
 lar fttuation, the nature of its induftry, its dif- 
 pofition and capacity ; and which is neceflary for 
 
 the
 
 ( J36 ) 
 
 the developement of its various productive 
 powers. In this point of view, not only the 
 philanthropic cofraopolite, but the enlightened 
 ilatefman, if he be acquainted with the general 
 principles of political economy, will defire that 
 every country, qualified for maritime purfuils, 
 may enjoy its due proportion of trans-European 
 commerce and dominion. But we muft not 
 confound this jult and liberal policy with the 
 falfe though common views, which form the 
 groundwork of all the complaints againfi: the 
 commercial fuperiority of England. This en- 
 larged conlideration of the fubjedl: is unknown 
 to thofe who join in thofe complaints : were it 
 generally underflood, the declamations againft 
 England would long fmce have been filenced. 
 
 III. Of the Monopoly of Englifli Ma7iufa£lures» 1 
 
 The colonial trade of the Englifh, notwith- 
 flanding its magnitude, is only a fecondary ob- 
 je(5l in the general mafs of Britifli induflry. 
 Its own manufa(5lures are by far the mofl fruit- 
 ful fource of that part of the power and riches 
 of this nation which is derived from commerce. 
 
 After having endeavoured to point out the 
 real nature of the colonial monopoly of the 
 Englifli, and to fhow with how little jullice the 
 
 commercial
 
 ( 337 ) 
 
 commercial fuperiority of Great Britain can In 
 that refpe(5l be termed tyrannically oppreflive, 
 or even prejudicial to other nations: I have 
 only now to examine whether fuch complaints 
 are better founded when applied to the dealings 
 of the Englilli in their own manufactures. 
 
 The Author of the Etat de la France, and a 
 thoufand writers befides, have defcribed the 
 preference obtained by the Englifh manufa6iurcs 
 in every market of Europe, as an infupportable 
 yoke, a painful and humiliating fervitude to all 
 other naHons. It is only by the irapovcrilhment 
 of Europe, fay they, that England rifes to an 
 unnatural degree of wealth ; as this wealth in- 
 creafes, the power is likewife augmented of 
 flraitening, confirming, and perpetuating the 
 galling and opprobrious fetters in which all go- 
 vernments and countries languifh in helplefs 
 inactivity. The annihilation of independence 
 In induftry, leads to the deftruClion of all liberty : 
 the commercial fovereignty of the Englifli is 
 made the foundation of their political dcfpot- 
 ilm, and England becomes more and more the 
 lawgiver and tyrant of Europe. 
 
 A very flight examination of this unfavour- 
 able picture is fufficient to fhow, that the 
 grounds of complaint upon which it is founded, 
 
 z are
 
 ( 3^8 ) 
 
 ite in many refpe<5ls equivocal, arbitrary, atr 
 furd, and untenable. The decided and almoft 
 exclulire preference given to Englilh manufac- 
 tures in the markets of Europe, is not the efFe6t 
 of compulilon, but of choice ; it is a preference 
 freely given, continued, and confirmed ; for 
 England has no means of introducing her 
 produdlions, and putting them off by force in 
 any part of Europe. Were the fuccefs of thefe 
 produ(!^ions as deflru61ive to the induflry, and 
 as conducive to the degradation and depend- 
 ance of all other countries as it is here de- 
 fcribed, it would be impoflible to conceive why 
 fo many nations fubmitted to a yoke they might 
 at any time throw off. For, fuppollng obfti- 
 nate prejudices, or unaccountable fafcination, 
 to poflefs the people, would not their govern- 
 ments ufe every effort to bar the acccfs of this 
 confuming poifon to their dominions ? 
 
 The force of thefe arguments mufl flrike the 
 meanefl capacity, although it were unable to 
 difl:inguifh the relations of caufe and effedl In a 
 great regular phenomenon ; and it is not a little 
 furprifing that fuch obvious conliderations 
 fhould not long lince have deflroyed all the 
 flimfy tifTues of fophiflry. 
 
 Upon
 
 ( 339 ) 
 
 Upon thefe complaints of the tyrannous op* 
 |3refIion CGnne6ied with the induflry of the Bii- 
 tirti nation, it naturally occurs to vik^ how does 
 this induflry, fo detefled and abhorred, this 
 pretended caufe of fuch misfortunes, fuch mifery 
 and ruin to the reft of Europe, how does it 
 maintain fo peaceably its once acquired prero- 
 gative ? Why do not all governments and in- 
 dividuals combine to exclude the manufac- 
 tures of Great Britain from every market ; and 
 thus by one manly effort break through the 
 fetters that encumber them ? The anfwer is 
 obvious — their intereft forbids it ; for though 
 they have no diflindl conception of the nature 
 of that interefl, there is a vague fentiment of 
 advantage which impels them more powerfully 
 than the vilionary hypothefes of prejudice or 
 ignorance. Let us now endeavour to devLlope 
 this vague fentiment ; let us diveft it of the 
 obfcurity in which it is involved. 
 
 The fuperiorlty of Great Britain in European 
 manufa(5lure, like her afcendant in colonial 
 commerce, is founded upon two diftindl prin- 
 ciples, one pofitive and the other negative. 
 
 The firft is the intrinfic excellence of the pro- 
 du6\ions of her induftry ; in other words, the 
 refult of the peculiar advantages by which Eng- 
 
 z 2 land 
 
 z_.
 
 ( 340 ) 
 
 land Is enabled, with lefs effort than other na- 
 tions, io prepare manufactures of equal good- 
 neft, Of with the fame application of labour to 
 deliver them better, by which means {he brings 
 her articles to market at a lower price when 
 equally good, at the fame price when fuperior 
 in quality, and very often both more perfedl 
 and more cheap. The reafon of this intrinfic 
 and peculiar excellence of Britifh manufadlures 
 Is obvious ; it is owing to the progrefs of every 
 art among the Englifli, to the extenfive ufe and 
 improvement of machinery, to the largenefs of 
 thfeir capitals, to the ingenuity and enterpriling 
 ipirit of the people ; it is a confequence of the 
 character and habits, the polity and conflitution 
 of the nation, which all contribute to produce 
 and fecure thofe advantages. 
 
 The negative principle of this afcendant is the 
 comparative weaknefs and indolence of other 
 nations, their ignorance of political economy, 
 their negleCl of many branches of induilry, and 
 their neceflary dependance on the activity of 
 foreigners; all, more or lefs, confequences of 
 their own faults. 
 
 The demand for Britifh manufactures in the 
 moft cultivated countries of Europe, and among 
 liations which have likewife carried induilry to 
 
 great 
 
 X .
 
 ( 341 ) 
 
 ^reat per£e6lIo*n, is a confequence and proof 
 of the pofitive fuperiority of that of the Eng^ 
 li(h. It is by that alone they have acquired, 
 and do fiill retain, the markets of Germany, of 
 jnoft of the northern powers, and of France 
 before and fince the revolution. 
 
 Upon this, which I have called the negative 
 fuperiority of the Englifh, is founded the af- 
 cendant of their induflry in Portugal, and more 
 efpecially in Ruilia. It is not merely in the 
 Ihape of commercial intercourfc that it prevailg 
 in thofe countries ; it is there internally produc- 
 tive. There Britifh adventurers, with Britifli 
 capital and Britifh labour, engage in the domef- 
 tic trade, and develope the interior refources of 
 the country : there they eftablifh manufadtories 
 on their own account. Ruflia and Portugal 
 would not, however, exclude the Englifh froni 
 their markets by the mere improvement of their 
 native induftry : for were they as highly culti- 
 vated as France and Germany, they would flill, 
 like France and Germany, prefer the produce 
 of Britifh labour even to their own, on account 
 of its peculiar excellence. But the exclulive 
 prevalence of the manufa*Slures, and dire6l in- 
 terference of the merchants of England, in the 
 interior of thofe countries ; this multiplication 
 pf their natural advantages can only proceed 
 
 z 3 from
 
 ( 34a ) 
 
 from particular defedls of conflitution or errors 
 of government. 
 
 As far as the predominance of Britifli manu- 
 fa6lures is a confequence of real, intrinlic ex- 
 cellence and comparative cheapnefs, it is clearly 
 a pofitive advantage to every nation, and to civil 
 fociety in general, as well as to England. It is 
 the intereft of every individual in Europe to 
 procure the commodities he wants from the 
 quarter where they are to be found at once the 
 befl and the cheapefl. 
 
 It is every man*s intereft (which no one will 
 miftake if left to himfelf) to purchafe articles of 
 merchandife at a lower price in another country, 
 rather than pay dearer for the fame productions 
 at home ; and the advantage is immenfe when 
 he can procure them at once better and cheaper 
 from a foreigner than from his own countrymen. 
 The gains of all the individuals conftitute the 
 advantage of the whole community. The true 
 intereft of a nation is always to fupply its fcveral 
 wants by the fmalleft poffible expenfe of labour 
 and capital. The greater its economy in thefe 
 refpeds, the more wants will it be able to fa- 
 tisfy, and the greater will be the furplus to be 
 applied in augmentation of its pofttive wealth, 
 and towards the furtherance of its produdlivG 
 
 powers.
 
 ( 343 ) 
 
 powers. When the foreign commerce of a na- 
 tion is governed by thefc principles (and they 
 are its only groundwork in the natural courfe 
 of things), it is always beneficial and pro- 
 dudlive. The intereft of particular clafles 
 may fometimes be at variance with them ; but 
 the advantage of the whole (even of the indi- 
 viduals of thofe very clalTes, when confidered as 
 a part of the general mafs) is infeparably corj- 
 nedled with them. Manufadlurers and tradef- 
 men, and ftatefmen who believe them, may 
 continue to imagine that a nation is impo-- 
 veriflicd by receiving the manufactures of ano- 
 ther ; but unprejudiced fenfe will fufpedt (and a 
 true knowledge of the fources of general wealth 
 will confirm it), that every branch of trade, be 
 it where it will, if produced by an a6lual im- 
 provement of human induftry, is beneficial to 
 every nation concerned, as well to the pur- 
 chalers as the fellers. Manufacturers and 
 tradefmen, and fiatefmen influenced by them, 
 lirft raifed the prcfent clamour about the de- 
 pendance of Europe and the afcendant of Bri- 
 tifti induftry ; the political enemies of England 
 eagerly took advantage of a clamour fo wel- 
 come to them ; what thofe had only termed 
 dependance, thefe inveighed againfl as an into- 
 lerable yoke ; what thofe only deplored as a la- 
 mentable error, thefe writers defcribed as the 
 z 4 laft
 
 ( 344 ) 
 
 laft degree of vveaknefs and abafement. Igno- 
 rance produced thefe abfurdities ; prejudice and 
 fraud diffeminated them : and the fcarcity of 
 juft ideas concerning the true principles of po- 
 litical economy, has rendered ignorance and 
 paffion triumphant in an age fo enlightened in 
 other refpedts, and fo juflly proud of its at- 
 tainments. 
 
 As far as the fuperiorlty of Britifh induftry is 
 a^lually founded on the weaknefs or negligence 
 of other nations, on the errors of their political 
 or mercantile fyftem ; fo far does it reft upon a 
 caufe not only detrimental to the countries it 
 difgraces, but prejudicial in its effeds to every 
 nation, and to all civil fociety : for the interell 
 of the whole requires the utmoft poflible im- 
 provement of the powers and refources of every 
 nation. If Ruffia and Portugal employ Englifli 
 capitals and Englifh hands in their internal 
 nianufa6lures, it is a proof of fome great defect: 
 in the fyftem of their domeftic induftry, or an 
 abfolute faultinefs in their political conftitu- 
 tions. To fupply the one, or to amend the 
 other, would not only be beneficial to thofe im-r 
 mediately concerned ; but every nation in Eu- 
 rope would feel the advantage, in as much as 
 there is a general connexion between the pro- 
 
 du«5\ive powers of the whole. 
 
 But
 
 ( 345 ) 
 
 But until fuch radical amendments fhall take 
 place, it is a clear and undeniable advantage 
 not only to thofe countries that employ the 
 labour and capitals of ftrangers, but to the 
 whole fyftem of European induftry, that the 
 means and refources of JEngland Ihould fupply 
 the deficiency of others. It would be a much 
 greater misfortune if thofe fields of human in- 
 duftry which are now cultivated and enlivened 
 by Britilh Ikill and capital, were to remain wafle 
 and unprodu6live. That would be a pofitive, 
 the prefent is only a relative evil ; is only fuch 
 as far as it proceeds from a ftate of things that 
 is itfelf evil ; in every other fenfe it is an ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 This analyfis will enable us eafily to deter- 
 mine how far the complaints againfl the afcend- 
 ant of Britifh induftry are well or ill founded 
 on the one hand, and, on the other, how far 
 the means by which it appears poffible to con- 
 trovert this fuperiority, are falutary or perni- 
 cious. 
 
 Thefe complaints, as far as they relate to the 
 faulty inadivity, the weaknefs, and bad admi- 
 niftration of the countries which England has 
 made tributary to her induftry, are in a certain 
 degree well founded ; while on the other hand 
 
 they
 
 ( 34« ) 
 
 tliey are ill underflood in many" refpe^ls, and at 
 all events highly unjufl when made matter of 
 accufation againfc England. They are well 
 founded as far as that intrinfic inferiority which 
 prevents a people from cultivating its peculiar 
 refources, betrays a defedlive or mifguided na- 
 tional economy, which muft always be a real 
 misfortune : they are ill underflood, fo far as, in 
 fuch a flate of things, the acceffion of foreign 
 induftry is the only fuccedaneum, and of courfe 
 muft be an advantage even to the nation that 
 wants the affiftance ; they are unjuft as charges 
 againft England, becaufe England can never be 
 made refponllble for the barbarifm, the indo' 
 knee, the unfkilfulnefs, the natural difhcultieSj 
 or the bad adminiftration of other countries ; 
 becaufe England can never be blamed for pro- 
 fiting, to the utmoft, in every lawful manner, 
 by her arts, her induftry, and fpirit of enter- 
 prife, whenever Ihe finds a field for them ; and 
 becaufe this mode of fupplying the deficiency of 
 induftry in one country by its abundance in 
 another, is not only beneficial to the nations 
 receiving the affiftance, but evidently advant^, 
 geous to a]!. 
 
 But when thefe complaints are grounded 
 upon the intrinftc merits of England's fuperior 
 induftry, they are not only extremely unjuft, 
 
 but
 
 ( 347 ) 
 
 but in the Viighefl- degree abfurd. The peculiar 
 excellence )f Gicat Britain in this refpedl, is a 
 general advaiitage to all nations^ if meafured 
 by the true principles of political economy. 
 
 All Europe is extremely interefted in the ex- 
 iftence of a people among whom induflry and 
 ingenuity have been carried to fo wonderful an 
 extent ; by whom numerous objecfls of general 
 confumption are provided comparatively cheap 
 and of excellent quality ; and whofe aftonifhing 
 adlivity affords a llriking, and not always fruit- 
 lefs example to other countries. The commer- 
 cial greatnefs of England is, in all thefe im- 
 portant refpe61s, a manifeft advantage to Eu- 
 rope. How could it, on thefe very grounds, be 
 made a fubje6l of complaint ? By the fame 
 rules we may judge of the fitnefs or unvvorthi- 
 nefs of any method that could be adopted for 
 reducing the prefent fuperiority of Great Bri- 
 tain. 
 
 Every indire(!^ diminution of this fuperioritj", 
 by promoting induftry in thofe nations where it 
 bas hitherto been wanting, mull contribute, not 
 only to the profpcrity of the flates thus ani- 
 jnated, but to the welfare of all Europe. The 
 lots fuftained by England in confequence of 
 ituch a diminution of her commercial and arti- 
 ficial
 
 ( 348 ) 
 
 ficial fuperiority, would be only apparentf 
 while the benefit accruing to the reft would hq 
 real and efiential. 
 
 Every dire£l diminution of this afcendant of 
 Great Britain, by pofitively reducing her pro- 
 du6live ftrength, would be prejudicial, not only 
 to England, but to the general welfare of Eu- 
 rope. The advantage to other nations, of fuch 
 3 diminution, would be merely apparent, while 
 the lofs fuflained by England, and all countries 
 at once, would be real and eflential. 
 
 The utmoft poilible improvement of the pro- 
 du6live powers of every nation ; the utmoft 
 poflible cxtenfion of the riches, arts, and in- 
 duf^ry of each j is the real intereft of the whole 
 of Europe. If thofe who hitherto have em- 
 ployed the men and money of other countries tQ 
 cultivate their natural refources, would now 
 apply their own adiivity to the fame objeds, the 
 happy change would be the occalion of a pofi- 
 tive increafe of the general produce of labour. 
 For the fum of foreign induftry, formerly cm-^ 
 ployed on what they would now themfelves ac- 
 complifh, would not be loft becaufe deprived of 
 one field of a61ion ; it would explore a new one, 
 and there difcover other fources of wealth; it 
 would make fome further addition to the riches 
 3 of
 
 ( 349 ) ' 
 
 of the world. The lofs is therefore only appa- 
 rent, which any civilized and induftrious nation 
 fuRains by the elevation of others. It is the in- 
 tereft of England as well as of Europe in ge- 
 neral, that induftry and wealth fhould be in- 
 creafed in every corner of the globe in the 
 higheft poflible degree. It is not the barbarifm 
 and poverty of other nations, but their riches 
 and civilization, that can add to the wealth of 
 Britain. If England were a6lually to impede 
 the induflry of other countries by force or fraud, 
 fhe would defcrve every reproach that could be 
 heaped upon an opprefTor ; then, but only then, 
 would fhe (land in dire6l oppolition to the 
 wifhes, endeavours, rights, and interefts of all 
 other nations, the common enemy, the tyrant, 
 and the fcourge of Europe. 
 
 But may our better genius, may the dictates 
 of true political economy reflrain us from feek- 
 ing any general advantage in the immediate de- 
 gradation of England ; from fuch inverted policy, 
 conceived by many a narrow mind to be the 
 height of wifdom ! To weaken England would 
 be to weaken Europe. The riches and induftry 
 of that nation belong to all other countries. 
 The thirty millions of manufactures which 
 England yearly adds to the commercial llock of 
 Europe, form a great and important portion of 
 
 ^ the
 
 the wealth of nations. Were thefe even In part 
 to difappear, what would become of the very ad- 
 vantageous market which England prefents to all 
 the natural produ61ions, the grain, the wines, 
 the metals, the wood, &c. of the continent ? 
 There would be a lofs of labour, in as much as 
 a greater quantity mufl then be employed to pro- 
 duce the fame mafs of neceflaries, by a lefs per- 
 fe6t induftry. The activity and indu ft ry excited 
 by Britifh capital in every commercial fpot, and 
 thence difFufed over every fea, river, and province 
 of the remoteft regions of the world, would be 
 then no more. Hence a moft important lofs, 
 which it would be impoffible to prevent or re- 
 medy. The fhort-fighted jealoufy of a manufac- 
 turer, a merchant, or the flatefman who adopts 
 their narrow views, may graft the hope of its own 
 advantage upon the proje6l of humbling Eng- 
 land ; Europe would have no caufe to rejoice if 
 their chimerical hopes were even realized. That 
 change is reprefented as a neceflary ftep towards 
 a general emancipation, by the fophiftical ene- 
 mies of England, and awaited with impatience 
 by their ignorant and credulous followers : but a 
 due confideration of the true interefts of Europe 
 will fet it in a very different light. 
 
 The Author of the Etat de la Francs has laid 
 down five conditions, which, in his opinion, are 
 
 the
 
 ( 3Jt 5 ' 
 
 the necefiary bafis of the deUverance of all i^a-^ 
 tions from the hated fuperiority of Great Britain- 
 By attending to the principles above explained, 
 we Ihall be able to judge with fome confidence, 
 how far the meafures propofed are, in themfelves, 
 delirable, or adapted to their obje^l. He con- 
 ceives it to be necefiary, 
 
 ift. That the war be terminated. 
 
 2dly, That the commercial relations of the 
 European powers be regulated by better treaties. 
 
 3dly, That a better fyflem be founded on the 
 treaties, that fhall hereafter define their feveral 
 rights and obligations. 
 
 4thly, That the interior adminiflratlon of every 
 flate be regulated by wifer maxims, and upon 
 better principles. 
 
 5thly, That governments, always attentive to 
 theprogrefs and revolutions of general commerce, 
 fhould proceed accordingly in the improvement of 
 their political relations. 
 
 Thefe rules of reform are not laid down with 
 uncommon perfpicuity or precifion : but it is ne- 
 verthelefs eafy to guefs their meaning and 
 tendency. 
 
 With
 
 ( 35a ) 
 
 With refpe^l: to the reftoration of peace, it Is 
 certain beyond all doubt, that a true peace, that 
 is, a fecure and permanent one, if under the pre- 
 ient circum fiances it could be attained, would ef- 
 ientially ameliorate the condition of every nation. 
 But fliould this fo much delired peace lead to the 
 diminution of England's commercial fuperiority, 
 or, as it is fo often called, to the deliverance of 
 Europe from the yoke of Britain's tyranny ; fhould 
 fuch be the fpecific objetl of the new fyftem of 
 political and commercial relations to be efta- 
 blifhed by it ; then its efFedts muft either be pre- 
 judicial to England alone, and advantageous to 
 the reft of Europe only, or muft at leafl be bene- 
 ficial to England in a lefs degree than to other 
 countries. I know very well that it is the gene- 
 ral opinion that the prefent war has been a fource 
 of the greateft advantages to England ; that it is 
 almoft neceffary to her exiftence, and that the 
 moment of its termination will bring whh it the 
 inevitablefall'of her commercial greatnefs. But, 
 however general this opinion may be, it is a grofs 
 and unpardonable error*. I fhall have an oppor- 
 tunity in a fucceeding chapter, of expofing its 
 whole weaknefs : at prefent I will only afTert, as 
 «in incontrovertible truth, which I mean to prove 
 ». 
 
 * Vide Note UU. 
 
 hereafter,
 
 ( iS3 ) 
 
 hereafter, that England (excepting all unforefeen 
 misfortunes), far from being lowered by the peace, 
 mufl, in the moft cflential refpedls, be a greater 
 gainer by it than any other nation. The re-efla- 
 blifhment of peace will therefore either make no 
 alteration in the commercial relations between 
 England and the refl: of Europe, or certainly not 
 fuch as this author, who lb paffionately inveighs 
 again ft them, has promifed to himfelf and the 
 world. 
 
 An amendment of the interior adminiftratlon 
 of every ftate, a wife and liberal legiilation, an 
 increafed attention to the interefts of commerce 
 and induftry, and a ftudious improvement of the 
 true fources of the wealth of nations : thefe are 
 propofals of reform in the domeftic fyftem of 
 Europe, which undoubtedly delerve the approba- 
 tion of every refle6ling mind, and of every friend 
 to humanity. BlefTed be the government that 
 adopts them in their whole extent \ Honour and 
 praife to every writer whofe energetic eloquence 
 can roufe from their lethargic indifference, thofe 
 who have hitherto negle6ted or refufed to follow 
 them ! With fuch weapons, but with fuch only, 
 may Europe combat Great Britain ! The refult 
 of the conteft, however, v^'ill not fatisfy the de- 
 teftablc defires of envy ; nor the foolith and per- 
 
 A A verfe
 
 ( 354 ) 
 
 verfe expectations of an ignorant mercantile po- 
 licy — a felf-deftroying thirfl after unattainable en- 
 joyments. The rife of other nations to greater 
 perfection would not deflroy the commercial fu- 
 periority of England. Every country would then 
 feel its peculiar advantages : each would difplay 
 its powers by an independent, unreflrained, and 
 beneficial activity, in the order, manner, and de- 
 gree prefcribed by its nature and Htuation. The 
 greatnefs and power of each would reft upon its 
 own ftrength, and upon the ftrength and profpe- 
 rity of the whole. But the general rife of Europe 
 \Vould not occalion the fall of England. It would 
 then icarcely be conceived by enlightened men, 
 how it could ever have been thought that the 
 riches or poverty of one nation, could be founded 
 upon the poverty or riches of another. 
 
 Had the Author of the Etat de la France con- 
 fined himfelf to fuch propofals, there would hare 
 been no reafon to doubt the juftnefs, the purity, 
 the benevolence of his views. But adhering to his 
 falfe premifes, he has mixed thefe propofals with 
 others more doubtful and equivocal. " The 
 commercial connexions of nations are to be 
 founded upon better regulations ;" '' Their rights 
 and obligations are to be defined by better trea- 
 ties." Wherein thefe better treaties and wifer 
 
 combinations 
 3
 
 ( S5S ) 
 
 combinations are to conlift, remains totally un« 
 explained ; but the fecret aim and true charader 
 of his propofals are betrayed, not only by nume- 
 rous expreffiorts in various parts of his work, and 
 the general tendency of his politics, but by his 
 explanation of what he himfelf calls the moft im- 
 portant article, which is an undefined recom- 
 mendation of a new political fyflem of commercial 
 relations. He thinks nothing more is requifite than 
 a " lingle ray of light, to Ihow to a few princes 
 and their minifters, the real caufes of their poli- 
 tical and commercial dependance, and the true 
 principle of their deliverance ;" and he adds, 
 " The prefent ftate of things might be imme- 
 diately changed by the energy of one great power, 
 and that power is France." 
 
 From thefe declarations, it is evident he did 
 not expect the improvement of European induf- 
 Iry, the deliverance of commerce, the profperity 
 and independence of all nations/ either entirely 
 or principally from the reformation of interior ad- 
 miniftrations, the freedom of trade, the improve- 
 ment of domeftic polity, orthe v/ifdom of govern- 
 ments. Such truly beneficial caufes operate 
 flowly, and in regular progreflion. The mere re- 
 folution of a few princes, or the energy of a fin- 
 gle power, may inftantly alter the courfe of things, 
 A A z apd
 
 ( 3i6 ) 
 
 and change the nature of all relations. It is evi- 
 dent that he looks to limple, bold, and deciiive 
 political raeafures, for what he calls the deliver- 
 ance of Europe ; and that he feeks to exalt France, 
 and Europe eventually with France, by weaken- 
 ing or dellroying the foundation of Britain's great- 
 nefs, by means of certain combinations, which he 
 conceals for the prefent, though they are ealily 
 difcovered. His favourite objedt therefore is, the 
 immediate degradation of England ; which, ac- 
 cording to the principles above explained, is fuf- 
 ficient to warrant his condemnation. 
 
 I conceive that the foregoing obiervations have 
 nearly fulfilled the objedl I had in view. My de- 
 lign was to re6lify the prevailing opinion, with 
 refpe(St to the dangers and evils ariting from the 
 commercial fuperiority of England. I flatter my- 
 felf I have fufficiently proved that neither the ma- 
 ritime flatutes of Great Britain (I fpeak of her 
 domeftic regulations), nor what is called the Bri- 
 tifh monopoly of colonial produce, nor the indif- 
 putable fuperiority of her manufadlures, aflford any 
 real or juflcaufe of accufation or complaint. In 
 my inquiry into thefe complaints, I have uni- 
 formly adhered to thofc principles, which every 
 
 enlightened
 
 ( 357 ) 
 
 enlightened mind now reverences with unquali- 
 fied aflent ; which alone can lead to the perfec- 
 tion of political economy ; and from which Eu-^ 
 rope has to expect the moft important improve- 
 ments in every branch of general welfare. Oa 
 thefe indifputable principles, it is evident that 
 what the ignorant njultitude, inltigated by fophif- 
 tical declaimers, decry as the commercial tyranny 
 of the Englifh, is in reality a moft eflential part 
 of the wealth, an active principle of the induf- 
 try, and a fruitful fource of the prefent and fu- 
 ture riches of all nations ; that the only method 
 of diminifhing the fuperiority of Britifh induftry, 
 which can be recommended or admitted, is the 
 promotion and encouragement of the fame adli- 
 vity in other countries, which would benefit the 
 whole without injuring England ; and that every 
 proje6l for acSlually deftroying the foundations of 
 Britain's povv^er and commercial greatnefs, by di- 
 re6l and violent attempts upon it, muft ulti- 
 mately prove its author an enemy to the general 
 welfare of Europe. 
 
 There is therefore nothing in England's com- 
 mercial fyflem, and in the influence of that fyftcm 
 upon the welfare of other nations, w^hich can 
 fupport or juftify the heavy charges brought 
 againf\ her. In her peaceful relations, we fee 
 A A 3 her
 
 { 358 ) 
 
 her in conftant and perfect harmoriy with the do- 
 meftic interefls of the focial fyftem of Europe. 
 If {he have in any way deferved the reproaches 
 of her numerous adverfaries, the caufes muft be 
 fought in other relations ; they muft be founded 
 on her conduct in war, towards countries not 
 immediately engaged in it ; and on the abufe of 
 her well-earned fuperiority in her oppreffion of 
 the weak. How far they really are fo, will be 
 difcuffed in a fequel to the prefent work. 
 
 NOTES.
 
 NOTES. 
 
 NOTE A, p. 6. 
 
 AN tlie Language of the Germans, which is charafter- 
 ized by the fame fpirit of minute difcrimination and 
 elaborate analyfis that pervades their philofophy, the 
 term public law has a more general and abftraft fig- 
 nification than is here intended to be given to it. In 
 order to avoid all ambiguity, I will therefore define its 
 meaning in the prefent work. It is intended to repre- 
 fent the law of nations in its pradlical, and not in its 
 theoretical, or what is commonly called its natural 
 fenfe ; and the ^qx^% federal Jyjlem or conjiitution, political 
 f^i/ientj &c. are to be regarded as fignifying the fame 
 thing as often as they occur in the following fheets. — 
 ^yxHOR. 
 
 The above note is ftill more neceffary to an Englifli 
 than a German reader; for without it there would 
 be an obfcurity from the ufe of thofe phrafes pervad- 
 ing the whole work. The X.txm federal conjiiiutitin pro- 
 perly fignifies, and is commonly ufed to denote fuch a 
 league between independent ftates, as formed the Swifs 
 and Dutch republics ; it is here made to comprehend the 
 whole fyftem of political relations, and the ufages which 
 
 A A 4 regulate
 
 ( 3^0 ) 
 
 regulate the condu6l of ftates in their tranfadions with 
 foreign powers. 
 
 The jus gentium^ or law of nations, as it has hitherto 
 been received, is compofed of a traditional and cuftomary, 
 as well as a pofitive code. But the political writers on 
 the part of France, finding the dodrines of all the great 
 authors of the laft century, more favourable to the Bri- 
 tifh, than to their own fyftem, have lately been labour- 
 ing with cpnfummate art, to fet afide their authority, 
 and to perfuade mankind that there neither has been, nor 
 can be, any law of nations not exprefsly eftabliflied by 
 treaty. — Trans, 
 
 NOTE B, p. 26. 
 
 The treaty of 1756 has been a favourite topic of de- 
 clamation for all the decriers of the old political fyftem, 
 from Favier to the Author of a work, intitled, Coup d'CEil 
 politique fur P Europe (in 2 vols. 1800) ; and I muft con- 
 fefs it gave me a favourable opinion of the writer whofe 
 work is now before me, that, fo far from defcribing that 
 treaty as one of thecaufesof the revolution, he has not 
 even mentioned it in the courfeof his work. His filence 
 induces me to conclude that his opinion is the fame a: 
 mine on that head. 
 
 The above note was written before I had feen Segur's 
 edition of Favier, m which many valuable additions 
 have been made to the original work. I think this is the 
 firft French publication in which the treaty of 1756 has 
 been reprefented in its true light, fuch as it mull here- 
 after
 
 ■ ( 36' ) 
 
 after be confidered by impartial hiftory ; and it could 
 not but gratify me to find my own opinion confirmed by 
 the judgment of a ftatefman of fuch abilities and expe- 
 rience as Segur. 
 
 NOTE C, p. 43. 
 
 It has even been aflerted that the difcovery of Ame- 
 rica would have been more beneficial to Europe, had it 
 l?een deferred to a later period ; and I am not a little 
 inclined to aflent to that opinion. Had tiie greater part 
 of Europe been prepared for the difcovery of the New 
 World, by a high degree of civilization and induftry, 
 /he would neceflarily have derived more important ad- 
 vantages from the valuable connexions and extenfive 
 commerce to which that event gave rife. Thefe new 
 objeils of induftry would then have prefented themfelves 
 in their natural order, which has now been in a cer- 
 tain degree inverted. The difcovery of America was 
 the occafion of a revolution ; and every revolutionary 
 i,nnovation in the ftateand progrefs of humanity, is more 
 or lefs unfavourable in its effedls. We muft not, how- 
 ever, be fo unjuft as to deny that, even as it happened, 
 that great event was highly beneficial to the focial ex- 
 iftence, and materially contributed to the improvement 
 gnd welfare of Europe. 
 
 NOTE D, p. 59, 
 
 The Author is pleafed to draw acontraft between the 
 hiftory of thofe times and the prcTcnt ; which he makes 
 ^he foundation of a bitter cenfure on the political fyftem 
 
 of
 
 ( 3«i ) 
 
 of Europe. " The European powers then coalefced," 
 fays he, *' to fupport a revolution in England, to pre-» 
 ferve England from the dangers of Catholicifm, to add 
 the naval power of Holland and Portugal to that of 
 England. In our times we have feen a coalition of Eu- 
 rope to prevent a revolution in France, to maintain the 
 Catholic religion in France, and to cripple the French 
 navy, in order to render her incapable of coping with 
 England." But this apparent contradiction in their 
 maxims and^condu£l, is explained by the uniformity of 
 their motives, under circumftances of quite contrary 
 natures. The revolution of 1688 in England, was con- 
 f;ftent with the fecurity of Europe; fo that foreign 
 powers were impelled by the ftrongeft intereft to give it 
 every poflible furtherance, whatever might be their opi- 
 nions of its authors, and whatever their inclinations 
 or averfion to the vanquifhed or triumphant party. The 
 French revolution in the year 1789, or rather in 1791, 
 before which time there can he no queftion of a coali- 
 tion againft it, was inimical to the fecurity of Europe ; 
 and had there been no other motive for aflerting the caufc 
 of monarchy ; had moft of the parties to the coalition 
 been inclined by their ordinary interefts, rather to de- 
 fire the humiliation, than the profperity of the reigning 
 houfe ; yet the fame intereft which united the greater 
 part of Europe againft the Stuarts at the Englifli revo» 
 Jution, compelled the whole of them to take part with 
 the-BouRBONs againft the revolution in France. 
 
 notje;
 
 ( 363 ) 
 
 NOTEE, p.j8. 
 
 Foreigners muft be carefully admoniflied not to 
 rely with implicit confidence on the authority of Mira- 
 beau, in forming their ideas of the Prufllan monarchy 
 under Frederick II. The merit of his ingenious work, 
 which in many refpe£ts ftill deferves great praife, is much 
 diminifhed <)y three very important defers, ift, The 
 inaccuracy and incompletenefs of his information on 
 many heads ; principally owing to the hurry in which the 
 work was executed, and the levity of Mirabeau in truft- 
 ing tomany incompetent coadjutors, adiy, His blind at- 
 tachment to the phyfiocratic fyjiem, which has often in- 
 duced him to pronounce moft unjuftly upon eftablifh- 
 ments and inftitutions not according with that fyftem, 
 3dly, That it was written for the times ; that every 
 part of it was adapted to the circumftances of the mo- 
 ment; that it was made fubfervient to a favourite theory, 
 l^d publiihed with particular views. 
 
 NOTE F, p. 85. 
 
 Galanti's celebrated work (Dlfcrlzzlone geografica 
 4poliiica delle Siciliejj of which the firft part appealed in 
 1788, and which prefents an invaluable collection of 
 infl.ru6live obfervations and excellent principles, in 
 every branch of political economy, was written under 
 the aufpices of the Neapolitan government, who pro- 
 vided the Author with materials, and dedicated to the 
 King. Nor was Galanti the only writer who was openly 
 encouraged to aflert anddifFuic among his countrymen, 
 the true principles of government and legiflation. Ge- 
 
 novefi
 
 ( 3^4 ) 
 
 novefi (who may in fome refpedl be confidered as the 
 founder of a new fchool), Filangieri, Melchior Del- 
 phico, Grimaldi, and other philofophic writers at Na- 
 ples, were authors of fyftems and effays which might 
 have done honour to the moft ingenious of the French 
 Encyclopsdills. The literature of Italy, during twenty- 
 years before the revolution, wasafplendid commentary 
 on the extraordinary progrefs of the fcicnce of political 
 economy in moft of the Italian ftates. 
 
 NOTE G, p. 92. 
 
 Far be it from me to attempt to juftify Xhtfyjlem of 
 partition ; I regard it as one of the moft odious and per- 
 nicious events of the eighteenth century. It is never- 
 thelefs, in fome refpects, a proof of the exiftence of a 
 balance of power, and, I will venture to aflert, a proof 
 of a more benevolent and peaceable fplrit of politics In 
 Europe. 1 he fyftem of partition, when properly con- 
 ijdered, though it be more repugnant in appearance, is 
 not more unjuft in reality, than the numerous wars of 
 conqueft and aggrandizement, of which the three laft 
 centuries furnifli fuch a melancholy hiftory. The idea 
 of aggrandizement without conqueft, evidently origi- 
 nated from two chara<5\eriftic principles of modern ppli- 
 Lics. It ftiowed, ift. That no fmgle ftate could en- 
 gage in plans of conqueft, without the concurrence of 
 its neighbours; 2dly, That even when aggrandize- 
 ment was to be attempted by a violation of juftice, the, 
 wnv of negotiation was preferred to the deftru£live 
 .•'hance of war. If the difproportion between Poland 
 tod her neighbours had been as great in the fifteenth or. 
 
 fixtcenth.
 
 ( 365 ) 
 
 lixteenth, as it was in the eighteenth centuiT ; lier la- 
 dependence would have been equally annihilated. The 
 only diiFerence is, that fhe would then have been ex- 
 punged from the lift of nations by a dreadful war, and 
 would have probably been the prey of a fingle conque- 
 ror; whereas flie has now been divided by an arbitrary 
 but peaceful treaty, and a new balance of power has 
 been eftabliflied upon her ruins. 
 
 NOTE H, p. 97. 
 
 The Author of the Efat de la France lias ilated fomc 
 truths on this head, which are fo remarkable, and fo 
 conducive to my obje<£t, that I cannot refrain from 
 quoting them. ^' France has never been conquered 
 fmce the irruption of the Franks; flie has always been 
 governed by a common fyftem of legiflation, nearly the 
 fame in all her provinces. Her fovercigns have givea 
 laws to almofl: every civilized people ; and many of the 
 European thrones have been filled by French princes. 
 France, fince the adoption of her prefent name, has 
 never been occupied by hoflile armies but partially, and 
 for a Ihort time. Since the eftablifliment of the Franks, 
 fhe has never obeyed a foreign prince. It would be 
 difficult to cite a war in which France did not carry the 
 terror of her arms into the very heart of her enemy's 
 dominions : all the viiStoiies of France recorded by hif- 
 tory, are diftinguilhed by Spanilh, Italian, or German 
 names. Her armies returned at the end of every war to 
 maintain the uniformity of the national charader, ,the 
 integritv of her provinces, and the inefi:imab]e fyftem
 
 ( 366 ) 
 
 of her frontiers." — Such was France before the revolu-* 
 tion^ 
 
 NOTE I, p. 115. 
 
 I WILL not venture into the dark labyrinth of the 
 difturbances in Holland, or touch on the refpe6live^e- 
 tenfions and refpecftive errors of the feveral fadlions ; 
 but I have a general obfervation to make on thofe affairs* 
 which is too impartial not to be fubfcribed toby all par- 
 ties, whether of the pail, or prefent time. It was nei- 
 ther the reftlefs intrigues of the anti-Orange, nor the 
 ufurpations of the Orange party, that formed the chief 
 caufe of the irreconcilable difTenfions of the Dutch, the 
 weaknefs of their government, and the gradual decline 
 of their former greatnefs : they were owing to the fun- 
 damental, perhaps irremediable errors in the conftitu- 
 tion of the ftate. If the changes introduced by Pruffia 
 and England in 1787, could have effeded a permanent 
 reform of that conftitution (which the internal condi- 
 tion of the country at that time renders very doubtful), 
 they would have been highly beneficial to Holland, and 
 even France would perhaps have gained more by that re- 
 volution in the end, than by all her intrigues with the 
 factions fhe fupported. A powerful executive govern- 
 ment, an effedive Stadtholder, would certainly have ren- 
 dered more effential fervice to the ftate, than a prince con- 
 fined and impeded in all his movements, polTeffing one 
 day the authority of a king, and another, fcarcely that 
 of a burgomafter. If this would have been the realin- 
 tereft of Holland, it muft have been that of her allies 
 likewife^ for an influence that is only founded on a con- 
 tinuance'
 
 ( 367 ) 
 
 tinuance of the weaknefs and diftradions of the country 
 intended to be benefited, can never be for the advantage 
 of the power that feeksto eftablifli it. Such was always 
 the influence of France in Holland. Upon the prin- 
 ciples purfued by France, there was no chance of reco- 
 very from the anarchy in which the country was in- 
 volved ; hat! /he fucceeded in aboliftiing the Stadiholder- 
 fhip, that recovery would have been equally diftant. 
 The revolution of 1787 opened at lead a door to it; 
 and though in itfelf it were only the work of interefl or 
 paffion, yet a confiderate and comprehenfive policy 
 would, even in the fituation of France, have encou- 
 raged it. 
 
 NOTE K, p. 1 18. 
 
 One of the greateft authorities among the political 
 writers of France, has lately given a very decided opi- 
 nion againft fo much of the above reafoning as relates to 
 that country. Thefe are the remarkable words of Segur : 
 *' 1 am perfuaded there never was a period in which the 
 French monarchy enjoyed a higher degree of confider- 
 ation, than in the years between 1783 and 1787; that 
 isj from the peace which concluded the American war, 
 till the revolution in Holland." Politique de tous les Ca^ 
 hinets de ['Europe (par FavierJ^ augmentee de Notes^ l^c. 
 par L. P, Segurf vol. ii. p. 97. 
 
 NOTE L, p. 119: 
 
 The war for the fucceffion to the throne of Spain was 
 a ftriking proof that the true theorv of the federal con- 
 ftitution had already attained to great maturity. It was 
 
 nor
 
 ( 3^^ ) 
 
 not the trifling anecdote of the Dutchefs of Marlbd" 
 rough (which is even now treated by the Author of the 
 Etat de la France as a great political event), but the death 
 of the Emperor Jofeph I. that occafioned the alteration 
 of the fecret difpofitions of the allies. They firft formed 
 an alliance with Auftria to prevent the inordinate ag- 
 grandizement of France; but the predominance of Auf- 
 tria was no lefs an objeft of jealoufy to them. As foon as 
 they had reafon to fear that the powers of Auftria and 
 Spain might be united in the fame hands, they renounced 
 their former plans, and inclined to peace with France. 
 The condu£l of England throughout this war, and in the 
 negotiations at Utrecht, as well as in the feparate ne- 
 gotiations which preceded the congrefs at that place, 
 were, in every refpe6l, agreeable to the principles of a 
 wife and enlightened federal policy. 
 
 NOTE M, p. 122. 
 
 That this was the real fituation of Auftria, muft be 
 evident to every perfon acquainted with the memorable 
 negotiations concerning the firft partition of Poland. 
 Could any doubt remain on the fubjedt, it muft be com- 
 pletely difpelled by the moft incontrovertible teftimony 
 — the pofitive declaration of Frederick 11. In the 
 works left behind him, he has very candidly related the 
 difficulties which the fyftem of partition met with at the 
 court of Vienna ; he expreflly fays, that Auftria had no 
 alternative but to accede to that project, or to venture a 
 war with Ruffia and Pruffia ; and he gives us the fol- 
 lowing paflage from the anfwer of Prince Kaunitz to 
 the firft propofal of the meafure, as part of his reafons 
 
 for
 
 ( 3«9 ) 
 
 for objecting to it, *' That the execution of fuch a plan 
 would render the fituation of Europe more critical than 
 ever, and that he advifed his Majefty the King of Pruf- 
 fia not to engage in any fuch projetfts." Afemoires de- 
 puh i']6'^ jufqu'^ 1775, chap, \, (CEuvres psjlhumes de Fre* 
 Pencil, vol. v.j. 
 
 NOTE N, p. 125. 
 
 It even appears from a memorial of the Comte de 
 Vergenncs, which has fince come to light, that the ca- 
 binet of Verfailles was at that time ferioufly inclined to 
 renounce the alliance of Auftria, and to declare war 
 againft the Emperor, fhould there be no other means of 
 preferving Holland. This important paper (printed in 
 the laft edition of Favier's Memoirs; completely refutes, 
 in my opinion, all that the Author of the Etat de la 
 France has faid concerning the political fyftem of Eu- 
 jope before the revolution. 
 
 NOTE O, p. 137. 
 
 There is another point of view in this queflion which. 
 I (hall merely mention, withovit laying any ftrefs upon 
 it, becaufe it might very properly be obje£led, that the 
 advantages alluded to, are only of an accidental, and 
 not of a permanent nature. If two nations are in- 
 creafed in the fame proportion to their former extent, 
 the refult wou]d be mod advantageous to that which 
 beft knows how to cultivate and improve its acquifition, 
 to confolidate its new w ith its old pofleflions ; to that, in 
 Jhort, whofe fyftem of adminiftraticn is the moft wife 
 and regular. Without difparagement to any other go- 
 
 B B vernment
 
 ( 310 ) 
 
 vernment, it may be permitted to aflert, in conformity 
 to the opinions of the greateft ftatefmen in Europe, 
 that in this refpc6l likewife, the partition of Poland was 
 mole ufeful to Pruffia than any of the powers concerned 
 in it. 
 
 NOTE P, p. 142. 
 
 I MIGHT in ftriftnefs liave confined myfelf to the firfl 
 partition ; for that alone is within the fphere of my 
 prefent reafoning. It appeared to me, however, moft 
 advifable to confider the fubjeft in its whole extent, 
 in order not to be obliged to recnr to it. 
 
 At the fame time it mufl be confefTed, that neither all 
 the beneficial confequences of the final diflolution of 
 Poland, nor the whole of what I have above faid, can 
 be referred to the firft partition ; for it is not always 
 fair in politics, to reafon from the greater to the lefs. 
 It muft however appear to any one who has confidered 
 the above arguments, and does not entirely difapprove 
 them, that many of them, and principally perhaps the 
 moll imporraht, will ferve to explain tlie political bear- 
 ings of the partition of 1772, as well as the events of 
 1793 and 1795. 
 
 NOTE Q, p. 146. 
 
 Every refle(5ling perfon, and doubtleft every enlight- 
 pned Ruffian, will give his unqualified aflent to the opi- 
 nion of the Author of the Etat de la France^ exprefled in 
 the following words : " The Emperor of Ruffia would 
 be one of the greateft and moft powerful princes of his 
 
 time.
 
 ( 37' ) 
 
 lime, if for the pompous infcription placed by the flat* 
 terers of Catherine on the gates of Cherfon — < The road 
 ' to Conjianiinoplcy he would fubftitute this more wife 
 and glorious fentence: — * The Jirengih of this empire 
 
 * Jhall henceforth be employed to govern, and not to aggran» 
 
 * dize it\" 
 
 NOTE R, p. 149. 
 
 This argument is farther ftrengthened liy the reflec- 
 tion, that the agreement which led to the partition of 
 Poland, related to an objedt in the midft of the three 
 powers, and concerning which, their interefts may ea- 
 filv he conceived to have been the fame. But it would 
 be difficult to point out another objedl within the fphere 
 of their political exiftence, in which a fimilar relation 
 could induce them all three to unite in a commoa 
 proje<5l. 
 
 NOTE S, p. 155. 
 
 It is not my intention to aflert, that a truly wife 
 policy would not confider peace, even with France, as 
 a very defirable object for England. I am only fpeak- 
 ing of what is likely to happen, andefpecially of what 
 is, and always has been, the cafe. A war with France I 
 may, under certain circumftances, be unavoidable by- 
 England ; and it will always continue to be thus, until 
 at length the nations of the world fhall recognife their 
 true interefts, and for ever renounce war of every kind ; a 
 peiiod which is probably not very near, which is per- 
 haps never to be ranked among the realities of the world. 
 But with any other continental power, war is, wnder 
 BBS every
 
 ( 37i ) 
 
 every circumflance, contrary not only to the general 
 and permanent, but to the immediate and temporary in- 
 terefts of England. It is not indeed impoiEble to iroa- 
 gine conjundures, in which the Britifli miniftry may 
 be obliged to engage in a continental war, to which 
 France is not a party ; but thefe would always relult 
 from unnatural, conftrained, and momentary fituations : 
 fuch a war would always be a facrifice made by Eng- 
 land, would be regarded by her as a neceflary evil, and, 
 in the natural courfe of thing?, there would always be 
 found means of avoiding it. With France alone (ac- 
 cording to the prevailing ideas of the inter^fts of na- 
 tions) war might fometimes be more advantageous to 
 England than peace ; it is only by a war with France 
 that flie could have any profpedl of gain, though it were 
 but tranfient and relative, 
 
 NOTE T, p. 156. 
 
 The exceptions which miglit be argued againft me 
 are either of no importance, or under fucli circum- 
 ftances" as render them rather favourable, than contrary 
 to my aflumptions : for, 
 
 ift, The negotiations, alliances, and armaments 
 ngainft Spain, Auftria, &c. in the reign of George I. 
 were for the moft part occafioned by the interefts of 
 Hanover. Thefe, it is well known, have never been 
 confidered as the interefts of Great Britain ; to which, on 
 the contrary, they have frequently been very oppofite, 
 and with which they have only been occafionally com- 
 bined. A Britifli monarch could hardly a(5l in concert 
 with France as King of England; and nothing of what 
 X paiTed
 
 ( 373 ) 
 
 pafled between the treaty of Utrecht and the year 1740J 
 was immediately coiine6led with the national affairs of 
 Britain, The treaty of Hanover (1725), of Seville 
 (1729), and Vienna ( 1 731), were not Britifh treaties. 
 
 2dly, The rupture with Spain in the year 1739, is the 
 only inftance of a war commenced by Britain in the 
 eighteenth century, of which France was not the ob- 
 jedl- It is well known that the Britifh miniftry were 
 ;iverfeto it, that they yielded relu6lantly to the violence 
 of the popular opinion, and condudled it very remiflly. 
 It made no alteration in the general relations of Europe; 
 and foon after loft itfelf in the following war concerning 
 the Auftrian fucceflion, fo completely, that at the peace 
 of Aix la Chapelle the objetfls that occafioned it were 
 not even mentioned. 
 
 3dly, The Ruffian armam.ent in the year 1790, ap- 
 peared about to involve England, for the firfl time, in a 
 continental war, in which France was not dire£lly con- 
 cerned, and in which the interefts of France were evi- 
 dently embarked in the fame caufe. Theobje£l of that 
 armament was moft undoubtedly a wife one, and it cer- 
 tainly was advantageous to Europe : at the fame time 
 the averfion to any participation in it, was fo ftrong in 
 England, that the miniftry were compelled to relinquifti 
 their defigns, and to leave the care of maintaining the 
 talancc to the King of Pruffia alone. 
 
 NOTE U, p. 162. 
 
 The writers who may be regarded as the organs of 
 
 the French government, have not failed to boaft oi^ 
 
 B B 3 eveyy
 
 ( 374 ) 
 
 every occafion of the fuperiority which the confciouf- 
 ncfs of this danger on the part of England appears to 
 aiFord them. I will adduce an inftance from one of the 
 moft efteemed among them, and quote a paffage from 
 Favier, which is remarkable, not only becaufe the words 
 are fo explicit, but on account of the inference he draws, 
 from his pofition. After fpeaking of the projefted de- 
 fcent in 1756, he continues thus: <* In order to keep 
 Jiannihal from the gates, England muft and will occupy 
 the only avenue by which we can approach her : fhe 
 muft keep pofTeffion of the fea, whence every nation 
 will be excluded that does not pofTefs a powerful navy 
 as well as maritime coafts. In a word, it is fear alone 
 that renders England fo haughty, fo infolent, and fo 
 unjuft toward France : but it is that deliberate refle£ling 
 fear which infpires the weak to profit by all the advan- 
 tages afforded by the ncgledl or ignorance of the ftrong," 
 &c. Upon this paiTage there is the following note by 
 Segur, the laft editor of thefe Memoirs : " What Favier 
 has here faid of the Britifh miniftry, has been verified 
 by experience \ it is fear that renders them implacable. 
 They know that France, at peace with the continent, 
 and under the direftion of a prudent and adive govern- 
 ment, would foon attain the fuperiority to which Nature 
 has deftined her, and force England to take her ftation 
 among powers of the fecond order," 
 
 Thefe are undoubtedly extravagant exaggerations: 
 but when we find the very fame writers declaiming in- 
 ceflantly againft the defpotifm, the fupremacy, the all- 
 threatening tyranny of the Britiili government, and 
 
 advancing
 
 ( 375 ) 
 
 advancing fuch aflertions as thefe, we cannot but admire 
 the naivete of their inconfiftency. 
 
 NOTE V, p. 165. 
 
 Thjs war was at firft ftrongly oppofed in England, 
 and the adverfaries of the minifter heaped the fevereft 
 cenfures upon it. Since the Spanifli fuccefllon war, 
 there had always been a party that would liften to no- 
 thing of what they called Britifh continental politics ; 
 and defired to feparate England entirely from the affairs 
 of the continent. It was, however, remarkable, that 
 as foon as any member of this party received a place in 
 the mipiftry, he renounced his former principles. Lord 
 Carteret, one of Walpolc's moft formidable opponents, 
 and among the moft violent declaimers againfl all foreign 
 politics, changed his opinion when he becfii^e minifterj 
 and defended the condvift of England in the Auftrian 
 fycceflion war, upon grounds of which pofterity will 
 certainly admit the folidity : and even the great Chat-r 
 ham, who fo often had condemned and ridiculed the 
 balance of Europe, and all interference in continental 
 affairs, afterwards publicly confeffed in Parliament that 
 *' America had been concjuercd in Germany." 
 
 NOTE W, p. 166, 
 
 The true caufe of the war in America was the un- 
 certainty of the French and Englilh limits there ; and 
 the difpute arofe upon no trifling obje£l. The point to 
 be decided was, whether France fliouid completely en- 
 clofe the poflefTions cf England, within a flrajght line 
 
 B B 4 from
 
 ( 376 ) 
 
 frorA the river St. Lawrence to the Mifliflipi, and thus 
 for ever exclude the induflrious cultivators of the fineft 
 colonies in the world, from the fertile countries beyond 
 the weftern mountains. The right was alike on either 
 fide ; becaufe the matter had never been regulated by- 
 treaty. It is always difficult in fuch cafes to point out 
 the author of the war. 
 
 But with regard to Germany, there exifted no fuch un- 
 certainty. Whoever has considered with attention the 
 tranfadions of that time, will find no reafon to doubt 
 that England was involved, much againft her inclina- 
 tion, in the war on the continent. The treaty of 1756, 
 concluded with Pruffia by George II. was, in theftrideft 
 fenfe of the word, defenfive. The King of England 
 merely defired neutrality for his German dominions. If 
 France had not forgotten her own intereft, and attacked 
 Pruffia and Hanover ; England would have remained an 
 idle fpeftator of this theatre of hoftility. I only men* 
 tion this as a fa£l, for fuch a neutrality would undoubt- 
 edly have been contrary to the true intereft of England ; 
 and it was fortunate for Europe, that the bad policy of 
 France compelled Great Britain to adopt a better fyftem. 
 
 NOTE X, p. 168. 
 
 Even coming from them, thev appear unfair when we 
 confider that of all the wars waged between France and 
 England in the eighteenth century, that of 1756 is the 
 only one of which the rcfult was immediately prejudicial 
 to the former. For notwithftanding the victories of 
 Elenheim and Malplaquet, fo glorious to the allies, it 
 
 cannot
 
 ( 377 ) 
 
 cannot be afferted that the peace of Utrecht was difa4f 
 vantageous or humiliating to France. 
 
 NOTE Y, p. 182. 
 
 The declaration of the firft National Aflembly, "that 
 France for ever renounced all wars of conqueft," made 
 more profelytes to the revolution in every part of the 
 worW than any other, perhaps than all the reft of their 
 profefTions. But this, declaration, like every thing that 
 was praifeworthy at the beginning of the revolution, 
 (who would refufe to acknowledge fome good amidft 
 fuch an infinity of ill ?} was not produced by the revo- 
 lution, but was a confequence of the ideas and opinions 
 prevalent among all nations before that event. The 
 chiefs of the revolution did nothing but exprefs the fen^ 
 timents already generally entertained. That is the ex- 
 tent of their merit and glory : for they were fo far from 
 realizing the hopes of mankind, that they even deftroyed 
 in defperate experiments, all that had been accumulated 
 and attained in half a century ; while they held out the 
 golden promife of everlafting peace, they plunged the 
 world in endlefs war. 
 
 NOTE Z, p. 192. 
 
 The Author even fays, " In the lafl thirty years the 
 powers of Europe had enjoyed the fpedtacle of France's 
 degradation ;'* and was it at the end of that period, at 
 the very time when they had attained the obje6t of their 
 wifhcs, that thefc unwife flatefmen (if any fuch ever 
 cxiftedjj who rejoiced iu the humiliation of France, 
 j found
 
 ( 3/8 ) 
 
 fpund it necelHiry to embrue halt a world in blood, it\, 
 order to overwhelm degraded and ruined France with the 
 united forces of all Europe } 
 
 NOTE A A, p. 195. 
 
 I SHALL touch the more lightly upon it, as I have 
 treated the fubjedl at fome length in a late publication, 
 <« On the Origin and Charadter of the War againft the 
 French Revolution." I muft apologize to thofe who 
 Jiave honoured that work with their attention, for briefly 
 recapitulating in the prefent chapter, the arguments % 
 have there employed, which I am forced to do from the 
 nature pf my prefent reafoning. 
 
 NOTE B B, p. 208. 
 
 It will perhaps be objefted to me, that there is roottx 
 « to fufpedl fonie of the nations engaged in this unfortu- 
 nate war, of having been influenced during the courfe 
 of it, by views of gain or conquefl. Without inquiring 
 whether, and in what inftances, the fufpicion be well 
 pounded ; I only have to obferve, that it can in no re- 
 fpe«5l invalidate my prefent reafoning. My objedl is 
 only to prove that the war againft the French revolu- 
 tion did not and could not originate in a league produced 
 by motives of intereft. The caufe of the war has not 
 the fmalleft connexion with what may have been de- 
 lired, proje6led, or attempted aftervyards, when the coa- 
 leiccd powers, deftitute of all plan, were a prey to jea- 
 ioufy. diffenfions, and miftruft. So unfavourable, more- 
 pver, is my opinion (?s will be n:\ore fully fhown here- 
 
 afterj
 
 ( 379 ) 
 
 ;»ftcr) of the fyftem on which, and the means by which 
 the war was carried on by the allies, that I fhall not be 
 much difincHned to admit the poflibility and even the 
 probability of a temporary departure from its objecf':, and 
 an inconfidcrate adoption of meafurcs direftly contrary 
 tpitp 
 
 NOTE C C, p. 225. 
 
 The union of the Auftrian Netherlands with Holland 
 pnder a prince of the Houfe of Orange, would have 
 anfwered the purpofe more completely than any other 
 political combination. It is hardly poflible to enume- 
 rate the beneficial coafe<juences that Europe would have 
 derived from the execution of fuch a plan. The fame 
 idea may have fuggefted itfelf to many politicians, but 
 it has never been fo completely jirgued as by the Authop 
 of La P ruffe et fa Neutralite, 
 
 NOTE D D, p. 248. 
 
 That one of the two might be the ally of France 
 in a war againft the other (a cafe whiqh certainly cannot 
 be ranked among abfolute impoflibilities), is a fuppolition 
 I have taken no notice of: but in order to fet the contrail 
 between the prefent and the former ftate of Europe in 
 the ftrongeft light, \vc need only to confider this cafe 
 for a moment : before the revolution, an alliance be- 
 tween France and one of the great powers of Germany, 
 was among the ordinary combinations of politics ; where- 
 ^ at prefent it is fcarcely poflible to think on the con- 
 
 fequences
 
 ( 3So ) 
 
 fcquences of fuch an alliance lo the ftate againft wlacb 
 it would be direded in the event of a war. 
 
 NOTE E E, p. 257. 
 
 It is certain, however, that even in the ordinary 
 courfe of things, politics would be led into frequent 
 errors, were it to build too confidently on the prefump- 
 tion, that the intereft of every government is a crite- 
 rion of its condu6l. In the firft place, the true intereft 
 of a nation is a matter of much extent and uncertainty 5 
 the conception of which depends greatly upon the point 
 of view in which it is contemplated, and of courfe upon 
 fhe ability to choofe the proper one. 1 1 muft likewife be 
 confefTed, that even the immediate interefts of ftates 
 are oftener faerificed to private views and paffions, 
 than is generally imagined ; that many nations have 
 mifunderftood them during centuries, and fome perhaps 
 have never known them : we muft therefore go cau- 
 tioufly to work when we reafon on thefe grounds iri 
 politics. 
 
 NOTE F F, p. 262. 
 
 In this enumeration of the principles of perpetual 
 difcord between France and her neighbours, I have 
 pafTed over one of the moft a6Hve and important, on 
 which, however, I iliall not lay any ftrefs, becaufe 
 there prevails much difference of opinion with regard to 
 the extent of its influence; and becaufe it would really 
 be extremely difficult to calculate its future probable cf- 
 fc6ls with any certainty. Who will take upon him to 
 
 fay
 
 ( 38' ) 
 
 fay whether two fyftems fo thoroughly difiimilar lA 
 themfelves, and in their conftituent principles, as, oq 
 the one hand, that wherein every conjiitution like the 
 French mujl rejiy and on the other, that upon which 
 the ancient fyjlem of Europe is founded; who will 
 decide whether thefe fo oppofite fyftems can exift toge- 
 ther ? And who does not perceive that this eflential 
 contrariety in the hrft principles of public power, muft 
 lead to continual uneafinefs, miftruft, and difturbance ? 
 that it muft be an ever fruitful fource of open and fe» 
 crct oppofition, of concealed or declared enmity ? 
 
 NOTE GG, p. 267. 
 
 In plain language, thefe fundamental laws may be flate^ 
 thus t I ft, No alliance muft be formed but for the pur- 
 pofe of fecuring the continuance of the afcendant of 
 France, or of contributing to its farther extenfion in 
 peace ; and for organizing the means of oppofing every 
 attempt to diminifti it in war. 2dly, No alliance muft 
 be formed but for the purpofe of deftroying the influ- 
 ence of England both in peace and war, in order that 
 there be no longer any rival to the preponderance of 
 France. This is the true and only meaning of both the 
 tflential principles of our Author ; his whole work is a 
 continued commentary on this theme ; and he has not 
 even thought it worth while to leave any room for a dif- 
 ferent explanation. 
 
 NOTE H H, p. 274. 
 
 It is not a little remarkable, that the Author fhould 
 h»yc denned the chara6lerlftics of all conltrained and 
 
 unnatural
 
 ( 38i ) 
 
 unnatural alliances fo clearly and explicitly in the be- 
 ginning of his chapter on the new fyftem of French 
 alliances, as to render it inconceivable how he could, in 
 the next moment, fpeak of the prefent relations of Swit- 
 zerland, Holland, 8cc. in terms of praife, nay, of ad- 
 miration. After faying that fimilarity of intereft mufl 
 be the foundation of every true alliance, he adds, ** Be- 
 yond this principle there is nothing but compulfatory 
 ties, which the tyranny of a few nations endeavours in 
 vain to cover with the name of alliances; and to which 
 the weak only fubmit with the hope of finding in fome 
 favourable change, the means and opportunity of throw- 
 ing ofFthe yoke.'* Can any thing be more flriking than 
 this picture ? Any man who looks at the prefent ftate 
 of Europe may put the names to it. 
 
 NOTE I I, p. 282. 
 
 A TREATY of peace is naturally regulated by all the 
 circumftances of the refpedtive fituations of the bellige- 
 rent powers ; and in order to judge of it, we muft con- 
 fider it in more than one point of view. It would there- 
 fore ()e a great error to regard every renunciation of con- 
 quefts, as a dire6t proof of moderation and forbearance ; 
 for powerful motives of another kind might compel the 
 conqueror to make thefe conceflions. It would evi- 
 dently be ridiculous, for example, if it were to be ac- 
 counted a merit to the Directory, that it did not infift 
 at the treaty of Leoben, on the cefTion of the 
 German and Italian diftridls then occupied by its 
 armies. For it was obvious to all the world, that 
 France could not have maintained thofe acquifitions, 
 
 however
 
 ( jS3 ) 
 
 however great her inclination might have been to 
 do fo. 
 
 NOTE KK, p. 301. 
 
 This a6l was indeed created with the intention of in- 
 juring the Dutch ; but its fubfequent confirmation and 
 maintenance, has been the confequence of a judicious 
 policy. ** What though feveral of the provifions of 
 this celebrated a(fl," lays Adam Smith, " may have 
 been didlated by national antipathy ? they are never- 
 thelefs as wife as if tlicy had been produ<^ions of con- 
 fummate wifdom." 
 
 NOTE L L, p. 302. 
 
 Ixis only in one refpe£l that the Navigation Awl could 
 have promoted the commercial interefts of Great Bri- 
 tain : as there are few countries fo advantageoufly fitu- 
 ated for foreign trade, this law, which operated fo 
 forcibly to urge the progrcfs of a very important branch 
 of England's induftry, may have had an efte£l fomewhat 
 like the temporary monopoly by which the firfl. efta- 
 blifhment of an ufeful manufa6luring or commercial 
 undertaking is fometimes favoured. But fuppofing this 
 to have been the cafe, the Navigation Adl ought only to 
 have been a temporary, and not permanent flatute. 
 That it was not the cafe, is fufficiently evident, fince 
 the commerce of Great Britain did not acquire a decided 
 or perceptible preponderance till fifty years after the 
 pafling of the Navigation Ad. In the year 168S, the 
 foreign fhipping that frequented the ports of England, 
 
 was
 
 ( 3^4 ) 
 
 was half as gfeatasher own ; the former being 195,0001 
 and the latter 190,000 tons; which in the year 1696, 
 even fell to 91,000 tons, while the foreign fliipping ftill 
 maintained itfelf at 83,000, 
 
 NOTE M M, p, 305, 
 
 Holland was the only nation in Europe that could 
 have imitated the Englifh Navigation A6i without a de- 
 relidlion of true policy and found reafon. But although 
 «ne of the above-mentioned conditions, viz. the advan- 
 tage of extending her maritime fyftem, exifted almoft as 
 much in the cafe of Holland, as of England ; yet the 
 other was entirely wanting. Holland was not fufficient- 
 ly independent of other nations to adopt exclufive mea- 
 fures againft them ; ihe flood too much in need of their 
 aflxftartce to prefcrihe burdenfome reftritSlions to them. 
 Moreover^ the Englifh Navigation A61 wa confiderr 
 ably modified in favour of Holland, by fubfequent ftipu- 
 lations; for flie enjoyed the privilege of carrying to Eng- 
 land, as her own produce, all articles of aierchandife 
 brought from Germany down the Rhine, 
 
 NOTE NN, p. 315. 
 
 The Author of the Etat de la France even goes fo far 
 as to make it the objed of a diftinct charge againft the 
 Englifli, that they labour with unremitted afTiduity in 
 purfuit of eftablilhments in hitherto unexplored regions. 
 •' Countries hardly known to Europe," fays he, " havfr 
 Received Englifh names; and others yet undifcovered 
 await Englifh appellations."—*' In the eaflern parts of 
 Aiia, her difcoverers examine every coafl ; her agents 
 
 ftibje(5t
 
 ( 3S5 ) 
 
 fubje£l all the maritime diftrhfls to her commerce, and 
 propofe her friendfliip to the princes they belong to.'* 
 *< In Africa we behold a fmiilar fpedacle — travellers 
 inflamed with the thirft of difcovering countries yet 
 unknown to the traffic of Europeans, traverfe that con- 
 tinent in all directions, perilh there, and are followed 
 by fucceflbrs impatient to replace them; all of them 
 feeding their infatiable employers with the fplcndid hope 
 of procuring them the priority of commercial inter- 
 courfe with nations richer than the dominions of Mon- 
 tezuma, and cities more extenfive and populous than 
 London." 
 
 All this is perfefkly true ; but who would ever have 
 expedled that the enterprifing fpirit, the unremitted ex- 
 ertions, the fuccefsful labours of a great people in the 
 difcovery of unexplored regions : thefe belt titles to 
 fame and honour, thefe benefits conferred on ;»11 nations, 
 and on all poflerity : who would have fufpedted that 
 thefe, and with thefe the courage and devotion of in- 
 dividuals, would be made the fubjedts of accufation and 
 reproach ? 
 
 NOTE OO, p. 316. 
 
 It is conftantly afTerted in all French manifcftos and 
 publications, that the Englifh are indebted to treachery 
 for all the Eaft and Weft Indian pofleflions taken from 
 theDutch fince 1795; which trite accufation has lately 
 been made the fubje»5l of official articles in tiie Paris 
 papers. It is not worth the while to enter here into a 
 minute refutation of them. A judicious reader will 
 
 c c find
 
 ( 3S6 ) 
 
 finH the following brief obfervations fuffidicnt ; t{{. 
 When the eftabliflied conftitution of any country is 
 fubverted by a violent revolution, which expels its 
 former government ; and particularly when that revo- 
 lution is accomplifhed by a foreign power, it muft, upon 
 every principle of right, be permitted to fuch of its 
 fubjec5\s and officers, as find themfelves beyond the 
 reach of the new authority (as for example, the gover- 
 nors, &c. of the Dutch pofTeflions in India), to adhere to 
 their former government and conflitution. And fliould 
 there remain no profpe6l of their re-eftablifhment, thofe 
 officers, &c. (provided they have not voluntarily and 
 explicitly recognifed the new government) are fully .at 
 liberty to put themfelves under the prote6lion of a na- 
 tion that fupports their former fovereign, rather than 
 fubmit to the power that expelled him, or to the new 
 government which they confider as an ufurpation, 
 founded upon the authority of ftrangers. Such a conduit 
 is fo far from deferving the name of treachery, that it 
 js, on the contrary, the only one which is confonant 
 with integrity and principle. It is a confequence of 
 every violent revolution, that confcience is left the only 
 arbiter of right and wrong ; and there can be no trea- 
 chery where confcience is obeyed. 2d!y, It is no Icfs 
 unjuft to impute fuch acquilitions as a crime to a nation. 
 After the revolution in Holland, England had no alter- 
 native but either to leave the Dutch fettlements in the 
 hands of the French, or, what was the fame thing, of tha 
 Batavian government, or to take pofleffion of them her- 
 felf: flienaturally chofe the laft; and this proceeding 
 was not in any refpeft Icfs juflinable than a regular con- 
 queft in ajuftwar. The true authors of the injury 
 
 wjiich
 
 ( 3S7 ) 
 
 which Holland fuftained, were thofe who devoted that 
 country to a fatal revolution, and thereby condemned 
 England to treat it as an enemy. 
 
 It is not a little furprifing to find the accufation of 
 treachery advanced againfl the governors and ofEcers of 
 the Dutch fettlements, and the charge of perfidy ap- 
 plied to the Britifh miniftry, by the advocates of a go- 
 vernment, indebted for moft of its conquers to the co- 
 operation, to give it no har/lier name, to the co-opera- 
 tion of men who favoured and affifted the*plans and en- 
 terprifes of a foreign power againfl their lawful fove- 
 reign. Let every friend of juftice in or out of France, 
 aflign the proper term to fuel) co-operation, and give a 
 name to the condufl of thofe who made ufe of it. 
 
 NOTE PP, p. 318. 
 
 The only exception to this is, where gold and filver 
 mines conftitute the fole produ(5lions of foreign fettle- 
 ments. Spain and Portugal were the only powers who 
 derived a dire<5t revenue from their American provinces. 
 But even thefe extraordinary cafes are no exception to 
 the general principle ; for their revenues, inftead of add- 
 ing at all to the ftrength of their governments, were 
 the immediate caufcs of the decline and weaknefs of 
 both. 
 
 NOTE Q^Q^, p. 322. 
 
 In order to enfure the commerce of Europe with In- 
 dia and China, it is now become abfolutely neceflary, 
 
 c c 2 that
 
 ( 3^3 ) 
 
 that the pen 1.11 Tula of Hindoftan be governed by a great 
 military power capable of protefling it. Were this 
 power in any way annihilated, the whole connexion 
 muft neceffarily be loft for a long time. In the prcfent 
 llateof things, the dominion of the Englifh in the Eaft 
 Indies is not only the foundation of their own trade, but 
 fecures that of all other nations ; and as the commerce 
 of the Eaft Indies is become an objeft of the firft im- 
 portance to every people, the empire of the Britifti in 
 that part of the world ought and muft be confidered as 
 a general henelit ; and is in a certain fenfe to be regarded 
 as a common property. 
 
 NOTE R R, p. 329. 
 
 Besides thefe caufes of the general complaint againfl: 
 Englaiid on account of the monopoly of colonial pro- 
 duce imputed to her, there is another, which, on a clol'er 
 examination of the public opinion, will perhaps appear 
 to conftitLt-t a more important part of it. The con- 
 fumption of colonial produce has increafcd in a very 
 great degree throughout all Europe during the laft 
 twenty years ; a circumftance which the enlightened 
 ftatefman will find no difficulty to explain, nor any rea- 
 fon to deplore. The dependance of the confuming 
 nations on the induftry of the colonial traders, is there- 
 fore con fiderably increafed, and the drain of fpecie oc- 
 cafioned by the importation of that produce is every 
 where more fenfible. This is not the place to examine 
 liow far fuch increafed confumption, and the confe- 
 (jucnt lofs of fpecie, are pofitive evils ; and I fliall not 
 trouble the reader vrith the reafons which induce me to 
 
 believe,
 
 ( 389 ) 
 
 believe, that, according to the true principles of political 
 economy, they do not dcferve the appellation. But the 
 greater part of the fiatefmen and politicians of Europe 
 certainly do confider that increafed confumption, and 
 what they term the unfavourable balance rcfalting from 
 it, as a ferious evil which cannot be too ftrenuoufly com- 
 bated. At the fame time they daily perceive that all 
 their complaints, exhortations, and projeds; that even 
 their a6tive contraventions, their heavy duties, their 
 prohibitions, and their inceffant refearches after ima- 
 ginary fubilitutes; tliey behold ail thefe efforts not only 
 unfuccefsful, but even contributing to flrengthen the 
 propenfity they are fo defirous of counteradling. No- 
 thing therefore is more natural, than that a kind of re- 
 fentment, a kind of hatred, fhould arife againft thofe na- 
 tions which are engaged in the colonial trade, on account 
 of their fituation, their wealth, and their maritime 
 pofleffions ; becaufe they are confidered as the authors 
 of the (imaginary) impoverifhment of Europe, and as 
 enemies to the general welfare of all confuming coun- 
 tries. And fmce England has long pofTefled the largefl 
 fliare of that trade ; fmce England has, during the laft 
 five or fix years, attained to the almoft cxclufive enjoy- 
 ment of it; it is not fa rprifing that this iTiort-fighted 
 jealoufy, this blind and groundlefs hatred, fhould be con- 
 centrated entirely againfl England. This is the gene- 
 ral (late of reafoning on the fubjedt. 
 
 It is a great misfortune for mankind, that their ima- 
 ginary wants of fugar, coffee, tea, cotton, 6cc. have gra- 
 dually undermined the flrength of every nation not ad- 
 dicted to commerce ; but the Englifh nation fells more 
 
 of
 
 ( S90 ) 
 
 of thofc articles, than all the others taken together ; 
 therefore that nation is more rcfponfible than any other 
 for this always increafing misfortune. Ignorance of the 
 true principles and elements of national wealth, pro- 
 duced the major of this remarkable fyllogifm ; experience 
 lias afForded the minor, and the blindncfs of prejudice 
 has drawn the conclufion. 
 
 NOTE S S, p. 330. 
 
 When the Dutch Eaft India Company were in the 
 cxclufive and undifturbed pofTcflion of the fpice iflands, 
 it would have been perfedlly eafy for them, according to 
 the general opinion, to have maintained an arbitrary- 
 price of their produce, which had become abfolutely 
 neceffary to Europe. They neverthelefs confldered it a 
 thing fo impoffible, that, fearful of being beat out of all 
 the markets, notwitliflanding their great advantages, they 
 had reeourfe to the barbarous meafure of wantonly root- 
 ing out part of the plants, and deftroying part of the 
 produce ! Yet even thcfe barbarous meafures did not 
 prevent their gradual decline. 
 
 NOTE T T, p. 333. 
 
 I WILL even go fo far as to afTert, that in thofe very 
 nations which take an adive part in general commerce, 
 it is for the immediate advantafrc of the confumer, and 
 thus far for the immediate advantage of the community, 
 rather to pin chafe Eafl: and Weft: India produce at a low 
 pi ice from Englifli mercliants, than at a high one from 
 their own. But it mufl be confefred that in thofe coun- 
 tries, foreign commerce may liave become fuch an im- 
 portant
 
 ( 39' ) 
 
 portant branch of the general welfare, as to require the 
 immediate intereft of the confumer to be facrificed to its 
 maintenance and extcnfion. 
 
 NOTE U U, p. 352. 
 
 I SHALL take this opportunity of expofing one of the 
 moft ftriking contradi6tions of which the Author of the 
 £,'at de la France has been guilty. After hating ex- 
 haufted his ingenuity in the fird part of his work, to 
 flievv that England was the only nation ftrongly intereft- 
 ed in the beginning, continuance, and protradlion of 
 the prefcnt war; he proves in a following chapter, of 
 which the objedl is to reprefcnt the refources of Bri- 
 tain in the moft unfavourable light, that no nation is i# 
 great a lofer by the war, as the very one to which he 
 had before aflcrted that it was abfolutcly neceffary. 
 
 THE EiJt). 
 
 Printed by S. Gos.vem, 
 little Queeu Street, Holboiru
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 123, line i^., for Pruffia, naJ Ruffia. 
 
 316, the afterifit in t.he firft line refers to the /;<rc«</ note nt 
 
 /not ; and the mark f in the iith line, nkts to the Note 
 
 O O at the end. 
 345> — ~^)J^^ controvert, r^ai counteract.
 
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