n F I43S .C343 3 > 3 p c 5 %^^^r:.SX ^»^ ^% 'w^«^^^#^^ TME AMEILIGAN REVIEW OF REVI EWS ^ £>Gceinber :IQ22 MAW Cents POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY; THE TURKISH CRISIS; GERMANY'S FINAN- CIAL FUTURE; COUE AND HIS DOC- TRINE; TREATING MENTAL DISORDERS Subsidies for American ShipSy and many other topics in editorials, leading articles, pictures, and cartoons r ro5*>CK>o^^"2^sC^::::^«~^;^:^6^?^?c^>c>^ J\^ :|M^^ l^'- -' if ./' -bi m ^ '/ V- U Christmas morning — and in come the greatest artists ! The surprise and delight of a Victrola for Christmas! Music appropriate to Christinas; music for every day in the year; music so lifelike that the greatest artists select the Victrola as the one instru- ment to carry their art into the home. Buy a Victrola this Christmas — but be sure it is a Victrola. $25 to $1500. V -HIS MASTERS VOICE" This iridemirk and Ihr Indcniatktd •ord "Victrola" identify all our Drodurli. Look under the lid! Look on tnv label! Victor Talking MacKine Company, Camden, N. «J. The American Review of Reviews EDITED BY ALBERT SHAW CONTENTS FOR DECEMBER, 1922 Greeks in. Flight from Thrace .... Frontispiece The Progress of the World — The Christmas Spirit Survives 563 Childhood as the Central Interest 563 A Fairly Normal November 564 The Great Game of Politics 564 American Political Stability 564 Party Changes of a Decade 565 A Review of Election Statistics 565 Democrats Fighting Uphill 566 Weakness of the New Democracy 566 '■Reversion to Type"' in 1920 566 Republicans on "Safe and Sane" Ground. . . 567 The Sweeping \'erdict Two Years Ago 567 The Next Congress also Republican ;68 The "Ins" Met the Shock Fairly Well 568 Public ;Men Come and Go 568 Senate Elections in the East 569 Four New Democratic Senators 569 Some Southern Results 570 Ohio, Indiana and Michigan 570 Beveridge's Defeat 571 Ferris Wins in Michigan 571 The "Agrarian" Victories 571 Senators from the Farther West 572 New Governors in Many States 572 Issues and Results 573 The "Wets" and Their Agitation 574 A One-Sided Battle 574 Law-breaking and Its Consequences 574 Private Conduct Always the Basis 575 "Dry" or "Wet" Ships? 575 The Plight of Foreign Ships 576 A High Tide of Smuggling 576 Laws, and Social Standards 576 Massachusetts Rejects "Movie" Censorship 576 New York to Abolish the Censors 577 The Bonus Leaders Are Encouraged 577 America Is Harmonious in Contrast 577 English Parties and Their Leaders 577 The Fascisti Success in Italy 578 The Turkish Menace 579 The Refugees and Their Flight 579 A Question of Allied Unity 579 The Coal Commission at Work 580 .\ Permanent Coal Commission? 5S0 Germany's Coal Council 580 Too Many Men Employed 581 A Program for Saving Germany 581 With portraits, cartoons, and other ilhis:rations ;82 ecord of Current Events American and British Politics in Cartoons 5S6 Investment Questions and Answers. Political Revolutions at London and Rome 592 By Frank H. Simonds Leaders and Parties in Great Britain. . . 603 By p. W. Wilson With portraits The Administration and the Merchant Marine 609 By Edward Nelson Dingley Failure of the Central American Union . 613 By Ch.\rles I'l Chapman With map --. The German Financial Future 618 By J. Laurence Laughlin Coue: An Estimate and a Comparison . 622 By Lyman P. Powell With portrait Physical Treatment for Mental Dis- orders 625 By Albert Shaw A School for Public Service for Women. 6j7 By Marjorie Shulkr A Hole in the Hill in France 640 By Marcus M. Marks With illustrations Secretary Lane's Letters 641 With portrait Leading Articles of the Month — Should the Allied Debts Be Collected? 643 Lyman Abbott 645 Steeds for Santa Claus 646 Rent Law and Housing Problem in Spain. . 648 Italy's New Leader 649 Does the Mocker Mock? 650 Vv hy the Little Entente? 651 The Work of the Agricultural P^xplorer 652 J'ortugal's Losses in the World War 653 Technique of the Safe-Breaker 654 Influence of Ultra- Violet Rays on Eyes 655 Perfecting of International Organizations. . . 657 Soviet Russia and the Mohammedan World. 658 The French in Tunis 659 The French Occupation on the Rhine and in the Saar Valley 661 Behind the Scenes of Life and Politics. ... 663 Modern Journey from Capetown to Cairo . 664 News of Nature's World 66b With portraits, cartoons, and other illiistraiions The New Books 668 With portraits Page 6, advertising section TERMS:-!„,.ed monthly. 35 cen.s . „„n,be,. »j,oo • year » "<1'™"J" !\» 'i™"'i|i''f „Sti?T& pSf oS THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS CO., 30 Irving Place, New York Pacific Coast Office, 327 Van Nuys Bldg.. Los Angeles, Calif. Albert Shaw, Pres. Chas. D. Lanier. Sec. and Treas. 561 562 I 303I THE FAILURE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNION BY CHARLES E. CHAPMAN (Associate Professor of Hispanic American History in the University of California) RUNNING from north to south, between . Mexico and Panama, are the five republics of Guatemala, Salvador, Hon- duras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. All but Salvador, which occupies a strip of the Pacific coast, stretch from one ocean to the other. Guatemala is the biggest, richest, and most populous of the five, with about 2,000,000 of the 5,000,000 inhabitants of Central America; but is a land made up largely of Indians living in a condition of peonage on the vast estates of the coffee planters. Costa Rica is at the opposite extreme, with a white population of small proprietors. In all, there are about 400,000 people in this republic. The other three Central American republics are for the most part mestizo (mixed Indian and white), dominated socially, politically, and eco- nomically by a white aristocracy. Along the Atlantic coast the population is negro or negroid, and the language is more often English than Spanish. Salvador is much the smallest of these states, but ranks close to Guate- mala in population (about a million and a half) and wealth. Nicaragua and Honduras have each per- haps a little more than half a million people. Cof- fee is the principal product of the countries on the Pacific slope, and bananas on the Atlantic, but they are enormously wealthy in other resources as well. Six Attempts at Federation Almost a hundred years before the Pilgrim Fathers landed in New England, the Spanish conquerors had ranged this territory and founded permanent settlements. They were grouped together in a single gov- ernment, presided over by the /ludiencia (a civil and judicial court) of Guatemala and a captain-general. In 18 10 the Span- ish American Wars of Independence be- gan. There was little fighting in Central America, but on September 15, 182 1, the independence of the whole region from Spain was declared. In the following year Central America joined with the Mexican Empire of Iturbide. On the dissolution of that empire in 1823, Central America cast about for a new modus viveitdi, and in 1824 the first Federation of Central America was formed. This lasted in name until 1840. In 1838 Nicaragua withdrew, followed presently by the other countries. Since 1840 there have been at least six attempts to revive the union, all resulting in failure. The most recent of these has just come to the usual end. Considered as an ideal there can be no objection to the unification of the five ^^A. OCi THE FIVE REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL AMERICA- FROM MEXICO TO PANAMA -EXTENDING 613 6i4 THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF REVIEWS republics of Central America into one. Tradition favors it. An overwhelming majority opinion in Central America, irre- spective of party, in a general way desires it. As one country, Central America could attain to a position in world affairs that no one of the five can ever have. Then why not unite? Or why didn't they stay united on some one of the various occasions when they have joined together? Attitude of the United States There are certain radical-minded Central Americans who cast the blame upon the United States, holding that our Govern- ment keeps them divided in order to manage them the more easily. This view, which flies directly in the face of history, was recently advanced to the writer by a young man who had spent the past five years as a student in California. "You have been in the United States a long time," I said to him. "Do you seri- ously believe that the United States would have any trouble in dominating the whole of a united Central America if she wanted to?" He thought a moment, and then an- swered frankly: "You are right! Cali- fornia could do it alone." It is time to lay this silly ghost of an eighteenth century "divide and rule" policy of the United States in Central America. Nothing but good for this coun- try could come from a successful union of the five states. Without exception, our Government has always expressed its readi- ness to see the union consummated, when- ever the Central Americans could accom- plish it among themselves. When the recent federation was broached, Dr. Leo S. Rowe, Director of the Pan-American Union, said: "It would be indefensible for the United States to oppose such a union." Secretary of State Hughes put our Govern- ment definitely on record when he stated to Doctor Zepeda (Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs) on June 2, 1921, that the United States approved the formation of a Central American Union, provided it were in accordance with the spontaneous wish and desire of the different countries and their citizens. Mr. Hughes added that recognition would depend upon the pros- pects of success the union should have, after it had been formed. These remarks of Mr. Rowe and Mr. Hughes should be taken as indicative of the general policy of the United States. The successful attain- ment of a Union of Central America is a matter that is wholly in the hands of the Central Americans themselves. Arguments, For and Against Tradition is perhaps the strongest factor in the desire of the Central American coun- tries for a union. In addition, they have similar problems as respects their resources and need for development; their leading political parties are usually "Liberals" and "Conservatives," \vith similar (if some- what shadowy) principles in each country; frequency of revolutions (organized usually across the borders of a neighboring state) and of exile has made the leading families acquainted with one another, and has brought about much intermarriage; and there is also the (at least theoretical) possi- bility of a saving in administrative and miUtary expenses through the substitution of one government for live. But there are also arguments against forming a union which at present far out- weigh those in its favor. They may be summed up as follows: real patriotism, of the sort that puts country above self, is rare in Central America. A saving in jobs and expenditures is not desired by the unduly large official class, which has hard enough time as it is to eke out an existence; indeed, lack of jobs is an all too prolific cause of revolution. The different coun- tries, different parties, and different indi- viduals within the same country, party, and town are filled either with jealousy or mis- trust of one another. Political morality and political methods have not yet reached a stage where the inhabitants are willing to abide by a decision that is adverse to them. And communications are so scantily de- veloped and the resources of governments so slight that revolution, even when unsuc- cessful, is easy and fairly safe. For these reasons it is always necessary to investigate the specific problems of each attempt at union, looking behind high-sounding pro- grams. It will be found that Costa Rica has been the most persistently opposed to a union, in which it could have slight weigljt owing to its comparatively small popula- tion. Furthermore, with a population that is largely white and with a record for good government and freedom from revolu- tion that ranks with the best in Hispanic America, Costa Rica is somewhat skeptical of becoming involved in the maelstrom of THE FAILURE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNION 615 Central American politics. Guatemala has usually opposed the union, but for an opposite reason, being unwilling to accept an equal ranking with the other less wealthy and less populous states. And yet it was Rufino Barrios, a Guatemalan, who stood forth as the great apostle of the union in recent times. In 1885 he tried to establish it by force, but met with defeat and death at the hands of a Salvadorean army. The iniquitous Nicaraguan dictator, Zelaya, also tried to bring about union by force, in 1907, dreaming even of a vast empire under his rule that should stretch into South America; but he was unable to accomplish his design. Opposition to Our Treaty with Nicaragua With the approach of the one-hundredth anniversary of Central American inde- pendence (September 15, 1921), a number of ardent pro-unionists began to suggest the idea of a revival of the federation. An invitation to the other Governments was formally issued by the Republic of Salvador in December, 1920, and delegates from all five states met at San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica. By that time the forces of particularism had gotten in their work, and the specific issue of the conference at once manifested itself. This was the op- position of the other four republics to the relations of Nicaragua with the United States, and especially to the Chamorro- Bryan Treaty of 1914. In that treaty the United States acquired an option, for ninety-nine years, to build a canal through Nicaragua, receiving also rights to estab- lish naval bases on Great Corn Island off the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua and in the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific, in case the canal should be built. The consideration paid was $3,000,000. The Central American countries, other than Nicaragua, have bitterly opposed this treaty, despite the assurance of the United States Government that it did not propose to take any action that should violate the sovereignty of the four complaining states. The most vociferously announced objection is that the treaty does infringe the specific rights of three of the four republics and the general rights of all. Costa Rica claims that Nicaragua went back on a promise to share with her the benefits that might come from the building of a canal. Furthermore, though it would be possible to have it en- tirely in Nicaragua, the San Juan River (which it is proposed to utilize) has changed its course so that its principal mouth is now in Costa Rican territory. Salvador and Honduras claim that the Gulf of Fon- seca belongs jointly to them and Nicaragua. And Guatemala gets in, because the idea of the union has never died, even though the states have separated; therefore, any spe- cial advantage accruing to one, it is claimed, ought to be shared by aU. Back of these openly announced argu- ments there were almost certainly the more sordid motives of jealousy over the profit Nicaragua had made out of the canal treaty, desire to share in that and in any- thing else Nicaragua might get out of the construction of a canal, and anti-Ameri- canism. There seems to be no doubt but that the union movement was due in part to Mexican propaganda, started in Car- ranza's time, against the United States. One gets this information on all sides. The motive in this Mexican activity seems to have been a belief that the union would be a valuable ally of Mexico against the United States. Nicaragua's Side of the Controversy Nicaragua has been blamed by the other countries for the failure of the union, on the ground that she would not consent to a denunciation of the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty, or at least to a fresh negotiation with the United States with a view to its derogation. It is therefore no more than just to set forth Nicaragua's defense, in some detail. In the early discussions of the congress it was agreed that the new state of Central America should fulfil the treaties made with foreign powers by each one of the five. Thereupon, Manuel Pasos, one of the two Nicaraguan delegates, asked that special mention be made of the Chamorro- Bryan Treaty, Despite pleasant-sounding speeches, it was clear that the other dele- gates would not consent, and presently they reached the point of denying the validity of the treaty. Senor Pasos, by this time the only remaining delegate from Nicaragua, was willing to stand upon it merely as a reservation of Nicaragua, with- out binding the other states to recognize it. This was acceptable to them in so far as it did not infringe "existing rights" of other states — which it was perfectly clear that the majority of the delegates interpreted to mean that the treaty was not, and never 6i6 THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF REVIEWS had been, valid because it did infringe "existing rights," basing their view on two decisions of the now defunct Central Ameri- can Court of Justice, decisions against which Nicaragua protested at the time and ever since. Senor Pasos then tried to have the sessions suspended, to be resumed later at Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, but nothing came of the suggestion. The situation had now reached a deadlock; so Senor Pasos left the conference, early in January, 192 1. The remaining delegates proceeded to sign a pact of union for sub- mission to their respective governments. It was not until later in the year 192 1 that the project received much attention in Washington. A meeting of a "Nicaragua Group Committee" was held on June 13, 1921, at the suggestion of Dr. Leo S. Rowe, which developed opinions that were pres- ently embodied in a formal report, dated June 28. Referring to the advantages of Nicaragua's association since 191 2 with the United States Government and the Ameri- can bankers, the report went on to say: The Government of Nicaragua feels it would be disloyal to the people of Nicaragua if it were to sacrifice those advantages by joining unconditionally any union with other states less fortunately situated. It recognizes nevertheless that there are certain important factors which lead it to the conclusion that if the interest of Nicaragua can be fully guarded, it might well be found advisable to enter such a union. ... In consequence, it will doubtless be very glad to take up for serious consideration the question of its entrance into the union, provided it can receive assurance that the other members of the federation will be able and willing to put themselves politically and financially into the con- dition, either before entering the union or through pUns adopted in the formation of the union, which will enable all parties to enter the union on such terms that the interests of each shall be carefully guarded and there shall be no undue sacrifice re- quired of any one member. After making a specific recital of the achievements of Nicaragua since 191 2 — substantially as set forth by the present writer in his article published in the October number of the Review of Reviews — the report concluded with a statement of re- sults to which the other four countries should attain, before Nicaragua could con- sent to enter a union. In the words of the report, these results should be the following: (a) A sound monetary system for the union or such a reorganization of the monetary system of the republics that they will work harmoniously with that of Nicaragua. (b) A satisfactory arrangement of their foreign debts. (c) A consolidation of their internal debts. (d) A standardization of customs tariffs, internal revenue fiscal systems, means of communication (post-offices and telegraphs), harbors and ports, coastwise steamship service, and such changes in their political government as may be necessary to make a homogeneous governmental entity. It should also be clearly understood, of course, that the present contracts entered into by the Republic, either in the form of treaties or contracts with private indi\aduals, should be religiously and scrupulously carried out, backed by the whole confederation, but with Nicaragua primarily re- sponsible. Still more representative of the official opinion of Nicaragua are the words of President Diego Chamorro. In his inaugural address of January i, 1921, he referred to the conference which was then going on at San Jose, saying: "From the beginning there has been observed the well-defined tendency among certain political elements to take the idea of union as a weapon of local partisanship." He then alluded to the attempts to invalidate Nicaragua's treaty with the United States, and concluded, saying that his Government would still put forth its efiforts "so that the centenary of our independence may find us reunited under a single flag and forming a single political entity." A year later, in December, 192 1, President Chamorro issued his first annual message, nearly half of which was devoted to a recital of Nicaragua's relation to the project of union. His account of the proceedings at San Jose agreed with that of the official volume of the conference, which has been followed in the summary given here, but went on to tell of the " repeated attempts at subversion of the public order" since the refusal of the Nicaraguan delegates to sign the pact, all done "in the name of and under the pretext of the federation." The Latest Attempt at Union Throughout the other countries of Cen- tral America the press openly advocated employment of force to overthrow the ex- isting government of Nicaragua, in order to bring that state into the union, and many Nicaraguan Liberals did all they could to stir up a revolution. Meanwhile the three northern states had accepted the compact ' of union, and had arranged for a meeting at Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, of a Constituting Assembly, to put the new union on a working basis. Forming them- selves into a so-called " Federalist League," certain Nicaraguan Liberals selected dele- gates to attend the meeting in Honduras, THE FAILURE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN UNION 617 which began on July 20, 192 1. The pro- posal was made to receive them as the for- mally constituted representatives of Nica- ragua, and this was done by the Assembly, although the Federal Council had pre- viously refused to acknowledge them. The president of the Assembly went so far as to say that negotiations might be opened with the United States to bring Nicaragua into the union, but it would not be necessary to treat with the government of Nicaragua. Outside of the sessions of the Assembly, the advisability of stirring up a revolution in Nicaragua was freely discussed, and news- papers in the different states quite as freely predicted civil war and the overthrow of the government in Nicaragua. Finally, on August 2 1 , a body of men crossed over from Honduras into Nicaragua, and raised the standard of revolt. They were easily driven out, but later there were other similar invasions. No further attempts were made after October, 192 1, but the air has been filled with tales of plotting ever since. During the conference of San Jose the Costa Rican delegates and press had been enthusiastic for union. The Minister of Foreign Relations, as president of the con- ference, even went so far as to denounce Nicaragua for putting ahead of the union " the faith of its plighted word, as the party which is at present in power understands it." And yet, on June 22, 1921, the Costa Rican Congress rejected the pact of union. Many reasons have been assigned for this action, but the one which underUes them all was the failure of Nicaragua to come in. With Nicaragua in the union, Costa Rica might hope to force her own interpretation of the canal treaties upon her northern neighbor; without Nicaragua, the tradi- tional objections of Costa Rica to the union far outweighed all other considerations. Guatemala, Salvador, and Honduras ratified the pact, but it was evident from the first that the failure to get Nicaragua in had killed the union. Late in 192 1 there was a successful revolution in Guatemala. The new government of President Orellana favored the union in principle, but not the one that had been worked out. So it for- mally withdrew. In Salvador, enthusiasm for the union was decidedly on the wane from the moment it was clear that Nicaragua could not be brought in. The position of Salvador somewhat resembled that of Costa Rica; no formal action was taken, but the union now ceased to function as respects Salvador. Left alone, Honduras — which some say was the only sincere proponent of union — could do nothing. Secretary Hughes Calls a Meeting at Washington As this article goes to press, arrange- ments are being made for a meeting of delegates from the Central American coun- tries to be held in Washington. As an- nounced in the newspapers, a discussion of the various problems of the five republics is contemplated, with the proviso that the consent of each delegation must be ob- tained before any specific matter may be considered. Almost certainly a revival of the project of union will be suggested, but assuredly Nicaragua will interpose a veto unless the questions her delegates raised at San Jose are first settled to her satisfaction. But if it were conceivable that such a result might be attained, then it would be more than probable that some of the other republics would veto the issue of union. In any event, whatever pro- nouncements may be made at Washington in favor of union, it is better to reserve judg- ment until the events of the next few years shall provide an answer. Will there ever be a Union of Central America? Possibly — but there are a number of "conditions precedent." There must be a considerable betterment in the means of communication. The finances of the other four republics must be put upon something approaching the soundness of the Nicara- guan system. These matters might profit- ably be taken up at Washington. And, most important of all, there must be an inculcation of real patriotism, over and above local and individual aspirations c#*Jealousies, such that one President, one Congress, one capital, one army, and, in fine, a single government will be accepted by all. Even the recent union did not attempt to go as far as that. Instead of having one Presi- dent, replacing five, it was proposed to have an executive of ten persons — a representative and substitute from each of the states. Sal- vador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have the best chance of forming a union that will last, as racially and geographically they are most nearly alike. Guatemala might remain in, but there is some question in her case. Costa Rica is not likely to be appealed to by the idea of union in itself. Only if it is distinctly and continuously to her advan- tage will she enter a union and stay. THE GERMAN FINANCIAL FUTURE BY J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN GERMANY has followed the mad course of so many other countries in excessive issues of inconvertible paper money that we are not without evidence in abundance on which to base reasonable estimates as to what must inevitably follow the break-down of her monetary' system. The strange thing is that the disasters into which unrestrained leaders have precip- itated their peoples by monetary errors and whose records have been writ large in financial history, should not have served as warnings to prevent Germany from stupidly copying the same futile policies. She has always prided herself on gathering facts in recondite fields of knowledge, even though her scholarship has often been vitiated and lost effectiveness by a too common disposition to speculate and offer visionar}' theories which have the attrac- tion of novelty or audacity. It is accordingly difficult to believe that Germany did not know better. If so, she has been consciously dishonest for a po- litical purpose; if not, then her leaders have been inconceivably incompetent. If she expected disasters to follow her mad mone- tary policy, then it was stupid in her to think that by such serious, self-inflicted wounds she could so excite compassionTTs to bring about a reduction in the burden of reparations. The Allies, and the rest of the world, were not likely to be so simple- minded as to be thus deceived. ^ II A distinction should be made between a financial and a monetary collapse. The former has to do with income and outgo in a fiscal sense; while the latter concerns the means of payment, the standard in which all prices, quotations of securities, wages, freights, rents and contracts are made. The latter, of course, must react on the former, and make all matters of value and 6i8 exchange variable, difficult and confusing! The immediate question in Germany ha{ to do with the monetary fiasco. The error| which have brought the mark to practicaj worthlessness are based upon hoary ok fallacies, always known to work distress. The pivotal folly, of course, is the mental confusion between the fiscal and the monel tary functions of the treasury", (i) On thi one hand, the state by taxation or loanj engages to provide the means for covering the normal budget of peace or the extraorl dinary expenditures of war; (2) on th( other hand, the state b)- a duly considerec monetary and credit system aims to pro! vide an effective means by which goods of income and outgo can be priced in a stabU standard and readily exchanged by formj of money, bills, notes and credit to th< greater convenience of production and trade and payment of taxes. Germany has com] mitted the one fatal error of disregarding all experience and borrowing for fiscal purj poses through the issue of irredeemable paper money. The plea of necessity is quite aside froi the point. To create a forced loan by demand debt is itself an acknowledgment of financial distress and immediately lowers the credit of the state. The display 01 financial incompetence, by which 7000 o^ the paper marks can now be bought for one dollar, can have no other effect than to damage her credit as to make it practicall) impossible for her to float a foreign, if no^ also a domestic, loan. By hopelesslj mixing up fiscal with monetary operation^ Germany through repeated issues of billion^ of paper every week has advertised to tht world that she is unable to raise funds foil fiscal purposes in legitimate ways. For an\j passable financial existence in the futurej Germany's policy must be founded on aij unalterable determination to separate enn tirely her monetary from her fiscal dealings] Such are the principles to which her financetj must sooner or later conform, whatever heij political struggles. Lithomount Pamphlet Bindef Gaylord Bros. Makers Stockton, Calif. PAT. IAN 21, 1908 •J-.*.- ■ * HA.,, -b M<..j. { ^ ^-\