LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ELOQUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMPILED BY E. B. WILLISTON. IN FIVE VOLUMES, VOL. I. MIDDLETOWN, CONN, PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY F.. & H. CLARK 1827. LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR3MIA DAVIS \ DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, SS. BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the seventeenth day of July, in the fifty-se ond year of the Independence of the United States of America, E. B. WILLISTOK, of the said District, hath deposited in this Office, the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as Author and Proprietor, in the words following to wit: " Eloquence of the United States : compiled by E. B. Willision, in Jive volumes." In conformity to the Act of Congress of the United States, entitled, " An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." And also to the Act, entitled, " An Act supplementary to an Act, entitled 4 An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of Maps, Charts and Books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,' and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and other prints." CHA'S A. INGERSOLL, Clerk of the District of Connecticut. A true copy of Record, examined and sealed by me, CHA'S A. INGERSOLL, Clerk of the District of Connecticut. PREFACE. THE Compiler of these volumes was induced to engage in the undertaking, from the conviction that a collection of the kind would be of great public utili ty and meet with liberal encouragement. He now offers them to the public with much diffidence, aris ing from an apprehension that he may have been in judicious in his choice of materials, and that the ex pectations of his patrons will be disappointed. The work consists of selections from the Delibe rative, Forensic and Miscellaneous Eloquence of the United States. A copious selection has been made from the de bates in the several State Conventions on the expe diency of adopting the Federal Constitution, which, it is believed, will be found highly interesting at the pre sent time, when so much difference of opinion exists relative to the true meaning and intent of some parts of that instrument. The Congressional Eloquence of the most inter esting period of our history, (during the Revolution,) is irrevocably lost; and such was the condition of the PREFACE. art of reporting for several years subsequent, that sketches only of the debates were preserved by the reporters. In the selection of the Speeches -in Congress, two objects have directed the Compiler in his choice the eloquence of the productions, and the importance of the subjects of discussion ; and as far as practica ble, he has given preference to those which unite both these qualities. He has endeavored, without regard to the political parties which have existed, to make the selection in such manner as to furnish a view of the most important subjects which have engaged the deliberations of Congress. Several speeches, originally reported in the third person, have been changed to the first with as little altera tion in the phraseology as possible. In Forensic Eloquence, great excellence has been attained in this country; but most of the efforts in this department have passed away with the occasions which gave them birth, or exist only in the recollec tions of those who heard them. In the prosecution of his undertaking, the Compi ler has applied to every source from which he could expect to derive aid ; and takes this opportunity to acknowledge his great obligations to numerous gen tlemen, from whom he has received valuable assist ance. He still is sensible that, notwithstanding his exertions to render the collection as perfect as possi- PREFACE. ble, it is not improbable that the * sin of omission' may be justly laid to his charge. But when it is considered how various and exten sive are the materials from which the compilation has been made, he feels confident that due allowance will be made for any errors of this kind into which he may have fallen. MlDDLETOWN, CONNECTICUT, ) Nov. 13, 1827. S I CONTENTS OF VOLUME FIRST. Mr. WILSON'S Speech on the expediency of adopting the Federal Constitution, in the Convention of Pennsylvania, November 26, 1787, 1 Mr. HAMILTON'S Speech on the same subject, in the Convention of New York, June 20, 1788, ... 22 Mr. HAMILTON'S second Speech on the same subject, in the Convention of New York, June 24, 1788, . 45 Mr. HAMILTON'S third Speech on the same subject, in the Convention of New York, June 27, 1788, . 61 Mr. HENRY'S Speech on the same subject, in the Con vention of Virginia, June 4, 1788, 73 Mr. RANDOLPH'S Speech on the same subject, in the /^ Convention of Virginia, June 6, 1788, .... 102 Mr. MADISON'S Speech on the same subject, in the Con vention of Virginia, June, 1788, 128 Mr. HENRY'S second Speech on the same subject, in the Convention of Virginia, June 7, 1788, .... 178 Mr. MARSHALL'S Speech on the same subject, in the Convention of Virginia, June 20, 1788, .... 226 Mr. HENRY'S third Speech on the same subject, in the ( Convention of Virginia, June, 24, 1788, .... 240 President WASHINGTON'S Inaugural Address, April 30, 1789, 252 Mr. SMITH'S Speech on Mr. Madison's Resolutions, in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 13, 1794, 257 Mr. NICHOLAS' Speech on the same subject, in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 16, 1794, 286 Mr. AMES' Speech on the same subject, in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 27, 1794, 29S Mr. MADISON'S Speech on the British Treaty, in the Vlll CONTENTS. House of Representatives of the United States, April 15, 1796, 332 Mr. GILES' Speech on the same subject, in the House of Representatives of the United States, April 18, 1796, 352 Mr. GALLATIN'S Speech on the same subject, in the House of Representatives of the United States, April 26, 1796, 396 Mr. AMES' Speech on the same subject, in the House of Representatives of the United States, April 28, 1796, 425 President J. ADAMS' Inaugural Address, March 4, 1797, 464 Mr. HARPER'S Speech on the necessity of resisting the Aggressions and Encroachments of France ; in the House of Representatives of the United States, May 29,- 1797, 471 SPEECH OF JAMES WILSON. ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, NOVEMBER 26lh, 1787.* THE system proposed, by the late convention, for the government of the United States, is now before you. Of that convention I had the honor to be a member. As I am the only member of that body, who has the honor to be also a member of this, it may be * Soon after the termination of the war of the revolution, it be came apparent that the powers vested in the General Government* by the articles of Confederation, were inadequate, and that the unity which had existed among the states during the war, had resulted rather from the pressure of circumstances, than from any authority of the General Government. So universal was the conviction that the public welfare required a Government of more extensive powers, that in May, 1787, a con vention, composed of delegates from all the states in the union, with the exception of Rhode Island, assembled at Philadelphia, to take the subject into consideration. It continued its deliberations with closed doors until the 17th of the following September, when thf Federal Constitution was promulgated. The convention resolved. " That the constitution be laid before the United States, in Con gress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this convention that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates, cho sen in each state by the people thereof, for their assent and ratifica tion." In conformity to the recommendation of the convention, Con gress, on the 28th of the same month, passed a resolution directing that the constitution be submitted to conventions to be assembled in the several states. In the conventions subsequently assembled, the expediency of adopt ing the constitution was discussed wfth great ability and eloquence. The wisdom, genius and patriotism of the nation, were here called into action, and their concentrated rays threw over the subject a flood of light which left none of its intricacies unrevealed. COMPILED. VOL. T. I 2 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON" expected that I should prepare the way for the delibe rations of this assembly, by unfolding the difficulties which the late convention were obliged to encounter ; by pointing out the end which they proposed to ac complish ; and by tracing the general principles which they have adopted for the accomplishment of that end. To form a good system of government for a single city or state, however limited as to territory, or incon siderable as to numbers, has been thought to require the strongest efforts of human genius. With what conscious diffidence, then, must the members of the convention have revolved in their minds the immense undertaking which was before them. Their views could not be confined to a small or a single community, but were expanded to a great number of states ; seve ral of which contain an extent of territory, and re sources of population, equal to those of some of the most respectable kingdoms on the other side of the Atlantic. Nor were even these the only objects to be comprehended within their deliberations. Numer ous states yet unformed, myriads of the human race, who will inhabit regions hitherto uncultivated, were to be affected by the result of their proceedings. It Avas necessary, therefore, to form their calculations on a scale commensurate to a large portion of the globe. For my own part, I have been often lost in astonish ment at the vastness of the prospect before us. To open the navigation of a single river was lately thought, in Europe, an enterprise adequate to imperial glory. But could the commercial scenes of the Scheldt be compared with those that, under a good government, will be exhibited on the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac, and the numerous other rivers, that water and are intended to enrich the dominions of the United States? The difficulty of the business was equal to its mag nitude. No small share of wisdom and address is re quisite to combine and reconcile the jarring interests, that prevail, or seem to prevail, in a single community. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ;{ The United States contain already thirteen govern ments mutually independent. Those governments present to the Atlantic a front of fifteen hundred miles in extent. Their soil, their climates, their produc tions, their dimensions, their numbers, are different. In many instances, a difference and even an opposi tion subsists among their interests ; and a difference and even an opposition is imagined to subsist in many more. An apparent interest produces the same attach ment as a real one ; and is often pursued with no less perseverance and vigor. When all these circumstances are seen and attentively considered, will any mem ber of this honorable body be surprised, that such a diversity of things produced a proportioned diversity of sentiment ? Will he be surprised that such a diversi ty of sentiment rendered a spirit of mutual forbearance and conciliation indispensably necessary to the success of the great work ? And will he be surprised that mu tual concessions and sacrifices were the consequences of mutual forbearance and conciliation ? When the springs of opposition were so numerous and strong, and poured forth their waters in courses so varying, need we be surprised that the stream formed by then- conjunction was impelled in a direction somewhat different from that, which each of them would have taken separately ? I have reason to think that a difficulty arose in the minds of some members of the convention from another consideration their ideas of the temper and disposi tion of the people, for whom the constitution is propos ed. The citizens of the United States, however differ^ ent in some other respects, are well known to agree in one strongly marked feature of their character a warm and keen sense of freedom and independence. This sense has been heightened by the glorious result of their late struggle against all the efforts of one of the most powerful nations of Europe. It was appre hended, I believe, by some, that a people so high spirit ed would ill brook the restraints of an efficient govern- i MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON rnent. I confess that this consideration did not influ ence my conduct. I knew my constituents to be high spirited; but I knew them also to possess sound sense. I knew that, in the event, they would be best pleased with that system of government, which would best promote their freedom and happiness. I have often revolved this subject in my mind. I have sup posed one of my constituents to ask me, why I gave such a vote on a particular question ? I have always thought it would be a satisfactory answer to say because I judged, upon the best consideration I could give, that such a vote was right. I have thought that it would be but a very poor compliment to my con stituents to say, that in my opinion, such a vote would have been proper, but that I supposed a contrary one would be more agreeable to those who sent me to the convention. I could not, even in idea, expose myself to such a retort as, upon the last answer, might have been justly made to me. Pray, sir, what reasons have you for supposing that a right vote would displease your constituents ? Is this the proper return for the high confidence they have placed in you? If they have given cause for such a surmise, it was by choosing a representative, who could entertain such an opinion of them. I was under no apprehension, that the good people of this state would behold with displeasure the brightness of the rays of delegated power, when it only proved the superior splendor of the luminary, of which those rays were only the reflection. A very important difficulty arose from comparing the extent of the country to be governed, with the kind of government which it would be proper to establish in it. It has been an opinion, countenanced by high authority, " that the natural property of small states is to be governed as a republic ; of middling ones, to be subject to a monarch; and of large empires, to be swayed by a despotic prince; and that the conse quence is, that, in order to preserve the principles of the established government, the state must be support- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ed in the extent it has acquired ; and that the spirit of the state will alter in proportion as it extends ^or con tracts its limits."* This opinion seems to be support ed, rather than contradicted, by the history of the gov ernments in the old world. Here then the difficulty appeared in full view. On one hand, the United States contain an immense extent of territory, and, according to the foregoing opinion, a despotic government is best adapted to that extent. On the other hand, it was well known, that, however the citizens of the United States might, with pleasure, submit to the legitimate restraints of a republican constitution, they would reject, with indignation, the fetters of despotism. What then was to be done ? The idea of a confede rate republic presented itself. This kind of constitu tion has been thought to have " all the internal ad vantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government."! Its description is, " a convention, by which several states agree to be come members of a larger one, which they intend to establish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of farther association."! The expanding quality of I such a government is peculiarly fitted for the United States, the greatest part of whose territory is yet un- f cultivated. But while this form of government enabled us to surmount the difficulty last mentioned, it conducted us to another, of which I am now to take notice. It left us almost without precedent or guide ; and, con sequently, without the benefit of that instruction, which, in many cases, may be derived from the con stitution, and history, and experience of other nations. Several associations have frequently been called by the name of confederate states, which have not, in * Mont. Sp. L. b. 8. c. 20. t Id. b. 9. c. 1. 1 Paley, 199202. 1 Mont. Sp. L. b. 9. c. 1. () MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON propriety of language, deserved it. The Swiss Can tons are connected only by alliances. The United Netherlands are indeed an assemblage of societies but this assemblage constitutes no new one ; and, there fore, it does not correspond with the full definition of a confederate republic. The Germanic body is com posed of such disproportioned and discordant mate rials, and its structure is so intricate and complex, that little useful knowledge can be drawn from it. Ancient history discloses, and barely discloses to our view, some confederate republics the Achgean league, the Lycian confederacy, and the Amphictyonic coun cil. But the facts recorded concerning their consti tutions are so few and general, and their histories are so unmarked and defective, that no satisfactory infor mation can be collected from them concerning many particular circumstances, from an accurate discern ment and comparison of which alone, legitimate and practical inferences can be made from one constitu tion to another. Besides, the situation and dimensions of those confederacies, and the state of society, man ners, and habits in them, were so different from those of the United States, that the most correct descrip tions could have supplied but a very small fund of ap plicable remark. Thus, in forming this system, we were deprived of many advantages, which the history and experience of other ages and other countries would, in other cases, have afforded us. Permit me to add, in this place, that the science even of government itself, seems yet to be almost in its state of infancy. Governments, in general, have been the result of force, of fraud, and of accident. After a period of six thousand years has elapsed since the creation, the United States exhibit to the world the first instance, as far as we can learn, of a nation, unattacked by external force, unconvulsed by domes tic insurrections, assembling voluntarily, deliberating fully, and deciding calmly, concerning that system of government under which they would wish that they THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 7 and their posterity should live. The ancients, so en lightened on other subjects, were very uninformed with regard to this. They seem scarcely to have had any idea of any other kinds of government, than the three simple forms designated by the epithets, monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical. I know that much and pleasing ingenuity has been exerted, in modem times, in drawing entertaining parallels between some of the ancient constitutions, and some of the mixed governments that have since existed in Europe. But I much suspect that, on strict examination, the instances of resemblance will be found to be few and weak ; to be suggested by the improvements, which, in subse quent ages, have been made in government, and not to be drawn immediately from the ancient constitu tions themselves, as they were intended and under stood by those who framed them. To illustrate this, a similar observation may be made on another subject. Admiring critics have fancied, that they have discover ed in their favorite Homer the seeds of all the improve ments in philosophy, and in the sciences, made since his time. What induces me to be of this opinion, is, that Tacitus, the profound politician Tacitus, who lived towards the latter end of those ages which are now denominated ancient, who undoubtedly had stu died the constitutions of all the states and kingdoms known before and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each of them, considers, after all he had known and read, a mixed government, composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather to be wished than expected : and he thinks, that if such a government could even be instituted, its dura tion could not be long. One thing is very certain, that, the doctrine of representation in government was al together unknown to the ancients. Now the know ledge and practice of this doctrine is, in my opinion, essential to every system, that can possess the quali ties of freedom, wisdom, and energy. tf MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite some surprise, that representation of the people is not, even at this day, the sole principle of any gov ernment in Europe. Great Britain boasts, and she may well boast, of the improvement she has made in politics, by the admission of representation: for the improvement is important as far as it goes ; but it by no means goes far enough. Is the executive power of Great Britain founded on representation? This is not pretended. Before the revolution, many of the kings claimed to reign by divine right, and others by hereditary right ; and even at the revolution, nothing farther was effected or attempted, than the recogni tion of certain parts of an original contract,* supposed at some remote period to have been made between the king and the people. A contract seems to ex clude, rather than to imply, delegated power. The judges of Great Britain are appointed by the crown. The judicial authority, therefore, does not depend upon representation, even in its most remote degree. Does representation prevail in the legislative department of the British government ? Even here it does not pre dominate ; though it may serve as a check. The le gislature consists of three branches, the king, the lords, and the commons. Of these, only the latter are supposed by the constitution to represent the authority of the people. This short analysis clearly shows, to what a narrow corner of the British constitution the principle of representation is confined. I believe it does not extend farther, if so far, in any other govern ment in Europe. For the American States were re served the glory and the happiness of diffusing this vital principle through all the constituent parts of gov ernment. Representation is the chain of communi cation between the people, and those to whom they have committed the exercise of the powers of govern ment. This chain may consist of one or more links ; * I Bl. Com. 233. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 9 but in all cases it should be sufficiently strong and discernible. To be left without guide or precedent was not the only difficulty, in which the convention were involved, by proposing to their constituents a plan of a confede rate republic. They found themselves embarrassed with another of peculiar delicacy and importance ; I mean that of drawing a proper line between the nation al government and the governments of the several states. It was easy to discover a proper and satisfac tory principle on the subject. Whatever object of gov ernment is confined in its operation and effects within the bounds of a particular state, should be con sidered as belonging to the government of that state ; whatever object of government extends in its operation or effects beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the govern ment of the United States. But though this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much difficulty; because, in its application, room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particular instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in mathematical science, that aline can be describ ed with mathematical precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable ; and ac curate too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a subject of this nature. Particulars under this head will be more properly explained, when we descend to the minute view of the enumeration which is made in the proposed constitution. After all, it will be necessary, that, on a subject so peculiarly delicate as this, much prudence, much can dor, much moderation, and much liberality should be 10 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH O>s exercised and displayed, both by the federal govern ment and by the governments of the several states. It is to be hoped, that those virtues in government will be exercised and displayed, when we consider, that the powers of the federal government, and those of the state governments, are drawn from sources equally pure. If a difference can be discovered between them, it is in favor of the federal government; because that government is founded on a representation of the whole union ; whereas the government of any particular state is founded only on the representation of a part, incon siderable when compared with the whole. It is not more reasonable to suppose, that the counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole. I intend not, sir, by this description of the difficulties with which the convention were surrounded, to magnify their skill or their merit in surmounting them, or to insinuate that any predicament, in which the conven tion stood, should prevent the closest and most cautious scrutiny into the performance, which they have exhibit ed to their constituents and to the world. My inten tion is of far other and higher aim to evince by the conflicts and difficulties which must arise from the many and powerful causes which I have enumerated, that it is hopeless and impracticable to form a constitu tion, which will, in every part, be acceptable to every citizen, or even to every government in the United States ; and that all which can be expected is, to form such a constitution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be obtained. Man and perfection ! a state and perfection ! -an assemblage of states and perfection ! Can we reasonably expect, however ardently we may wish, to behold the glorious union ? I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to others, the impression, which, on many occasions, was made by the difficulties which surrounded and pressed the convention. The great undertaking, at THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. H some times, seemed to be at a stand ; at other times, its motions seemed to be retrograde. At the conclu sion, however, of our work, many of the members ex pressed their astonishment at the success with which it terminated. Having enumerated some of the difficulties which the convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I shall next point out the end which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we were made for a state of society. But a state of so ciety could not be supported long or happily without some civil restraint. It is true that, in a state of na ture, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others; but it is equally true, that, in such a state, every other individual may act uncontrolled by him. Amidst this universal independence, the dissensions and animosi ties between interfering members of the society would be numerous and ungovernable. The consequence would be, that each member, in such a natural state, would enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption, than he would in a regulated society. Hence the uni versal introduction of governments of some kind or other into the social state. The liberty of every member is increased by this introduction ; for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other member, than he loses by the limitation of his own. The result is, that civil government is ne cessary to the perfection and happiness of man. In forming this government, and carrying it into execution, it is essential that the interest and authority of the whole community should be binding on every part of it. The foregoing principles and conclusions are gene rally admitted to be just and sound with regard to the nature and formation of single governments, and the duty of submission to them. In some cases they will apply, with much propriety and force, to states already formed. The advantages and necessity of civil gov ernment among individuals in society are not greater jo ;MJ{. WILSON'S SPEECH o\ or stronger than, in some situations and circumstances, are the advantages and necessity of a federal government among states. A natural and a very important question now presents itself. Is such the situation are such the circumstances of the United States ? A proper answer to this question will unfold some very interesting truths. The United States may adopt any one of four differ ent systems. They may become consolidated into one government, in which the separate existence of the states shall be entirely absorbed. They may re ject any plan of union or association, and act as separate and unconnected states. They may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one federal republic. Which of these systems ought to have been proposed by the convention ? To support with vigor, a single government over the whole ex tent of the United States, would demand a system of the most unqualified and the most unremitted despot ism. Such a number of separate states, contiguous in situation, unconnected and disunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, and foreign intrigue ; at another, the victim of mutual rage, rancor, and revenge. Neither of these systems found advocates in the late convention : I presume they will not find advocates in this. Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies ? It will not be unadvisable to take a more minute survey of this subject. Some aspects, under which it may be viewed, are far from being, at first sight, uninviting. Two or more confede racies would be each more compact and more manageable, than a single one extending over the same territory. By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, ithe great collision of in terests, apparently or really different and contrary, in the whole extent of their dominion, would be broken, and in a great measure disappear in the several parts. But these advantages, which are discovered from THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 13 certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination. Animosities, and perhaps wars, would arise from assigning the extent, the limits, and the rights of the different confederacies. The expenses of governing would be multiplied by the number of federal governments. The danger resulting from for eign influence and mutual dissensions would not, per haps, be less great and alarming in the instance of different confederacies, than in .the instance of dif ferent, though more numerous unassociated states. These observations, and many others that might be made on the subject, will be sufficient to evince, that a division of the United States into a number of sepa rate confederacies, would probably be an unsatis factory and an unsuccessful experiment. The re maining system, which the American States may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate republic. It will not be necessary to employ much time or many arguments to show, that this is the most eligible system that can be proposed. By adopting this system, the vigor and decision of a wide spreading monarchy may be joined to the free dom and beneficence of a contracted republic. The extent of territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number, and greatness, and connexion of lakes and rivers, with which the United States are intersected and almost surrounded, all indicate an enlarged gov ernment to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and dispositions of their citizens indicate, that. in this government liberty shall reign triumphant. Such indeed have been the general opinions and wishes entertained since the era of our independence. If those opinions and wishes are as well founded as they have been general, the late convention were justified in proposing to their constituents one confederate re public, as the best system of a national government for the United States. In forming this system, it was proper to give minute 14 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH O\ attention to the interests of all the parts ; but there was a duty of still higher import to feel and to show a predominating regard to the superior interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its ap pearance. The same principle that was so necessary in forming it, is equally necessary in our deliberations, whether we should reject or ratify it. I make these observations with a design to prove and illustrate this gr.eat and important truth that in our decisions on the work of the late convention, we should not limit our views and regards to the state of Pennsylvania. The aim of the convention was, to form a system of good and efficient government on the more extensive scale of the United States. In this, as in every other instance, the work should be judged with the same spirit with which it was performed. A principle of duty as well as of candor demands this. We have remarked, that civil government is neces sary to the perfection of society : we now remark, that civil liberty is necessary to the perfection of civil gov ernment. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divest ed only of that part, which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community, than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows, that civil liberty, while it resigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the human faculties, so far as it is compatible with the public welfare. In considering and . developing the nature and end of the system before us, it is necessary to mention another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the appellation of federal liberty. When a single govern ment is instituted, the individuals, of which it is com posed, surrender to it a part of their natural independ ence, which they before enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities, of THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 15 which it is composed, surrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as states. The principles which directed, in the former case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give similar directions in the latter case. The states should resign to the national government that part, and that part only, of their political liberty, which, placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole, than if it had remained in the several states. While they resign this part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous exercise of all their other faculties as states, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending confederacy. Since states as well as citizens are represented in the constitution before us, and form the objects on which that constitution is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and define federal as well as civil liberty. These general reflections have been made in order to introduce? with more propriety and advantage, a practical illustration of the end proposed to be accom plished by the late convention. It has been too well known it has been too severely felt that the present confederation is inadequate to the government and to the exigencies of the United States. The great struggle for liberty in this country, should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which she will have for her existence and prosperity, in any part of the globe. And it must be confessed, that this struggle has, in some of the stages of its pro gress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded no fortunate issue. To the iron hand of tyranny, which was lifted up against her, she manifested, indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the fet ters which were forged for her, and showed that she was unassailable by force. But she was environed by dangers of another kind, and springing from a very 16 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON different source. While she kept her eye steadily fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was secretly undermining the rock on which she stood. Need I call to your remembrance the contrasted scenes, of which we have been witnesses ? On the glorious conclusion of our conflict with Britain, what high expectations were formed concerning us by others ! What high expectations did we form con cerning ourselves! Have those expectations been realized ? No. What has been the cause? Did our citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity ? No. Did they become insensible of resentment and indignation at any high handed attempt, that might have been made to injure or enslave them? No. What then has been the cause ? The truth is, we dreaded danger only on one side : this we manfully repelled. But on another side, danger, not less formi dable, but more insidious, stole in upon us ; and our unsuspicious tempers were not sufficiently attentive, either to its approach or to its operations. Those, whom foreign strength could not overpower, have well nigh become the victims of internal anarchy. If we become a little more particular, we shall find that the foregoing representation is by no means exag gerated. When we had baffled all the menaces of foreign power, we neglected to establish among our selves a government, that would ensure domestic vigor and stability. What was the consequence? The commencement of peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress, that could befall a people in a peaceful state. Devoid of national power, we could not prohibit the extravagance of our importa tions, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess. Devoid of national importance, we could not procure for our exports a tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national credit, we saw our public securities melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before the sun. Devoid of national dignity, we could not, in some instances, perform our treaties on our part : THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 17 <> and, in other instances, we could neither obtain nor compel the performance of them on the part of others. Devoid of national energy, we could not carry into execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws. Shall I become more particular still ? The tedious detail would disgust me: nor is it now necessary. The years of languor are past. We have felt the dis honor, with which we have been covered : we have seen the destruction with which we have been threat ened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and when we have once discovered them, we have begun to search for the means of removing them. For the confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal to an enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and of the several states, are replete with them. They all point out the weakness and insufficiency of the present confederation as the cause, and an efficient general government as the only cure of our political distempers. Under these impressions, and with these views, was the late convention appointed; and under these im pressions, and with these views, the late convention met. We now see the great end which they proposed to accomplish. It was to frame, for the consideration of their constituents, one federal and national constitu tion a constitution that would produce the advan tages of good, and prevent the inconveniences of bad government a constitution, whose beneficence and energy would pervade the whole union, and bind and embrace the interests of every part a constitution that would ensure peace, freedom, and happiness, to the states and people of America. We are now naturally led to examine the means, by which they proposed to accomplish this end. This opens more particularly to our view the important dis cussion before us. But previously to our entering upon it, it will not be improper to state some general and leading principles of government, which will receive VOL. i. 3 18 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON particular applications in the course of our investi gations. There necessarily exists in every government a power, from which there is no appeal; and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable. Where does this power reside ? To this question, writers on different governments will give different answers. Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain, the power is lodged in the British parliament ; that the parliament may alter the form of the government ; and that its power is abso lute and without control. The idea of a constitution, limiting and superintending the operations of legisla tive authority, seems not to have been accurately un derstood in Britain. There are, at least, no traces of practice, conformable to such a principle. The British constitution is just what the British parliament pleases. When the parliament transferred legislative authority to Henry the eighth, the act transferring it could not, in the strict acceptation of the term, be called uncon stitutional. To control the power and conduct of the legisla ture by an overruling constitution, was an improve ment in the science and practice of government re served to the American States. Perhaps some politician, who has not considered, with sufficient accuracy, our political systems, would answer, that, in our governments, the supreme power is vested in the constitutions. This opinion ap proaches a step nearer to the truth, but doe snot reach it. The truth is, that, in our governments, the su preme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures; so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last in stance, is much greater ; for the people possess, over our constitutions, control in act, as well as in right. The consequence is, that the people may change the constitutions, whenever and however they please- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 19 This is a right, of which no positive institution can ever deprive them. These important truths, sir, are far from being merely speculative : we, at this moment, speak and deliberate under their immediate and benign influence. To the operation of these truths, we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world a gentle, a peaceful, a volunta ry, and a deliberate transition from one constitution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in government is, by a mourn ful and indissoluble association, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such revolu tions in a very different light to consider them only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and increasing the happiness of society and mankind. Oft have I viewed with silent pleasure and admira tion, the force and prevalence, through the United States, of this principle that the supreme power re sides in the people ; and that they never part with it. It may be called the panacea in politics. There can be no disorder in the community but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution ; if in the con stitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy, therefore, for every distemper in govern ment, if the people are not wanting to themselves. For a people wanting to themselves, there is no reme dy : from their power, as we have seen, there is no ap peal: to their error, there is no superior principle of correction. There are three simple species of government monarchy, where the supreme power is in a single person aristocracy, where the supreme power is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the vacancies in their own body, or suc ceed to their places in it by inheritance, property, or in 20 MR. WILSON'S SPEECH ON respect of some personal right or qualification a re public or democracy, where the people at large retain the supreme power, and act either collectively or by representation. Each of these species of government has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of a monarchy are, strength, des patch, secrecy, unity of counsel. Its disadvantages are, tyranny, expense, ignorance of the situation and wants of the people, insecurity, unnecessary wars, evils attending elections or successions. The advantage of aristocracy is, wisdom, arising from experience and education. Its disadvantages are, dissensions among themselves, oppression to the lower orders. The advantages of democracy are, liberty, equal, cau tious and salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of exciting and producing the abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages are, dissensions, the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the imbe cility of public measures retarded by the necessity of a numerous consent. A government may be composed of two or more of the simple forms above mentioned. Such is the British government. It would be an improper government for the United States; because it is inadequate to such an extent of territory ; and because it is suited to an es tablishment of different orders of men. A more mi nute comparison between some parts of the British constitution, and some parts of the plan before us, may, perhaps, find a proper place in a subsequent period of our business. What is the nature and kind of that government, which has been proposed for the United States, by the late convention ? In its principle, it is purely de- mocratical : but that principle is applied in different forms, in order to obtain the advantages, and exclude the inconveniences of the simple modes of government. If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we shall find the streams of power running in different THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 21 directions, in different dimensions, and at different heights, watering, adorning, and fertilizing the fields and meadows, through which their courses are led; but if we trace them, we shall discover, that they all originally flow from one abundant fountain. In this constitution, all authority is derived from THE PEOPLE. Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular re marks on the different parts of the plan. I have now to ask pardon of the house for detaining them so long. SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 20, 1788. The second section of the first article of the constitution having heen read, the following amendment was proposed : " Resolved, That it is proper that the number of representatives be fixed at the rate of one for every twenty thousand inhabitants, to be ascertained on the principles mentioned in the second section of the first article of the constitution, until they amount to three hundred ; after which, they shall be apportioned among the states, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of the states re spectively : and that before the first enumeration shall be made, the several states shall be entitled to choose double the number of representatives for that purpose, mentioned in the constitution ;" when Mr. Hamilton addressed the convention as follows. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE honorable member, who spoke yesterday, went into an explanation of a variety of circumstances to prove the expediency of a change in our national government, and the necessity of a firm union : at the same time, he described the great advantages which this state, in particular, receives frem the confederacy, and its peculiar weaknesses when abstracted from the union. In doing this, he advanced a variety of argu ments, which deserve serious consideration. Gentle men have this day come forward to answer him. He MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c. 23 has been treated as having wandered in the flowery fields of fancy ; and attempts have been made, to take off from the minds of the committee, that sober im pression, which might be expected from his arguments. I trust, sir, that observations of this kind are not thrown out to cast a light air on this important subject; or to give any personal bias, on the great question before us. I will not agree with gentlemen, who trifle with the weaknesses of our country ; and suppose, that they are enumerated to answer a party purpose, and to terrify with ideal dangers. No ; I believe these weak nesses to be real, and pregnant with destruction. Yet, however weak our country may be, I hope we shall never sacrifice our liberties. If, therefore, on a full and candid discussion, the proposed system shall appear to have that tendency, for God's sake, let us reject it. But, let us not mistake words for things, nor accept doubtful surmises as the evidence of truth. Let us consider the constitution calmly and dispas sionately, and attend to those things only which merit consideration. No arguments drawn from embarrassment or incon venience ought to prevail upon us to adopt a system of government radically bad; yet it is proper that these arguments, among others, should be brought into view. In doing this, yesterday, it was necessary to reflect upon our situation ; to dwell upon the imbe cility of our union ; and to consider whether we, as a state, could stand alone. Although I am persuaded this convention will be resolved to adopt nothing that is bad; yet I think every prudent man will consider the merits of the plan in connexion with the circum stances of our country ; and that a rejection of the constitution may involve most fatal consequences. I make these remarks to show, that though we ought not to be actuated by unreasonable fear, yet we ought to be prudent. This day, sir, one gentleman has attempted to an swer the arguments advanced by my honorable friend ; 24 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON another has treated him as having wandered from the subject : this being the case, I trust I shall be equally indulged in reviewing the remarks which have been made. Sir, it appears to me extraordinary, that while gen tlemen in one breath acknowledge, that the old con federation requires many material amendments, they should in the next deny, that its defects have been the cause of our political weakness, and the consequent calamities of our country. I cannot but infer from this, that there is still some lurking, favorite imagination, that this system, with corrections, might become a safe and permanent one. It is proper that we should examine this matter. We contend that the radical vice in the old confederation is, that the laws of the union apply only to states in their corporate capacity. Has not every man, who has been in our legislature, experienced the truth of this position ? It is insepara ble from the disposition of bodies, who have a constitu tional power of resistance, to examine the merits of a law. This has ever been the case with the federal re quisitions. In this examination, not being furnished with those lights, which directed the deliberations of the general government, and incapable of embracing the general interests of the union, the states have al most uniformly weighed the requisitions by their own local interests, and have only executed them so far as answered their particular convenience or advantage. Hence there have ever been thirteen different bodies to judge of the measures of Congress and the opera tions of government have been distracted by their taking different courses : those, which were to be benefitted, have complied with the requisitions ; others have totally disregarded them. Have not all of us been witnesses to the unhappy embarrassments which resulted from these proceedings? Even during the late war, while the pressure of common danger con nected strongly the bond of our union, and incited to vigorous exertions, we have felt many distressing ef- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 25 fects of the impotent system. How have we seen this state, though most exposed to the calamities of the war, complying, in an unexampled manner, with the federal requisitions, and compelled by the delinquency of others, to bear most unusual burdens. Of this truth, we have the most solemn proof on our records. In 1779 and 1780, when the state, from the ravages of war, and from her great exertions to resist them, be came weak, distressed, and forlorn, every man avowed the principle which we now contend for ; that our mis fortunes, in a great degree, proceeded from the want of vigor in the continental government. These were our sentiments when we did not speculate, but feel We saw our weakness, and found ourselves its victims. Let us reflect that this may again, in all probability, be our situation. This is a weak state ; and its rela tive station is dangerous. Your capital is accessible by land, and by sea is exposed to every daring invader; and on the north-west, you are open to the inroads of a powerful foreign nation. Indeed, this state, from its situation, will, in time of war, probably be the theatre of its operations. Gentlemen have said that the non-compliance of the states has been occasioned by their sufferings. This may in part be true. But has this state been delinquent ? Amidst all our distresses, we have fully complied. If New York could comply wholly with the requisitions, is it not to be supposed, that the other states could in part comply ? Certainly every state in the union might have executed them in some degree. But New Hampshire, who has not suffered at all, is totally delinquent: North Carolina is totally delin quent : many others have contributed in a very small proportion ; and Pennsylvania and New York are the only states, which have perfectly discharged their federal duty. From the delinquency of those states who have suf fered little by the war, we naturally conclude, that they have made no efforts; and a knowledge of human VOL. i. 4 2$ MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON nature will teach us, that their ease and security have been a principal cause of their want of exertion. While danger is distant, its impression is weak, and while it affects only our neighbors, we have few mo tives to provide against it. Sir, if we have national objects to pursue, we must have national revenues. If you make requisitions arid they are not complied with, what is to be done ? It has been well observed, that to coerce the states is one of the maddest pro jects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single state : this being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war ? Suppose Massachusetts, or any large state, should re fuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them; would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those states who are in the same situation as themselves ? What picture does this idea present to our view ? A complying state at war with a non-complying state : Congress marching the troops of one state into the bosom of another : this state col lecting auxiliaries and forming perhaps a majority against its federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed towards a government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself a government that can exist only by the sword ? Every such war must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose every peaceable citizen against such a government. But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument of coercion ? The thing is a dream it is impossible then we are brought to this dilemma: either a federal standing army is to enforce the requisitions, or the federal trea sury is left without supplies, and the government with out support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil ? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the states do This is the true reasoning upon the subject, sir. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 27 The gentlemen appear to acknowledge its force ; and yet while they yield to the principle, they seem to fear its application to the government. What then shall we do ? Shall we take the old con federation, as the basis of a new system ? Can this be the object of the gentlemen ? Certainly not. Will any man who entertains a wish for the safety of his country, trust the sword and the purse with a single assembly organized on principles so defective so rotten ? Though we might give to such a government certain powers, with safety, yet to give them the full and unlimited powers of taxation and the national forces, would be to establish a despotism ; the defini tion of which is, a government in which all power is concentred in a single body. To take the old confederation, and fashion it upon these principles, would be establishing a power which would destroy the liberties of the people. These considerations show clearly, that a government totally different must be instituted. They had weight in the convention which formed the new system. It was seen, that the ne cessary powers were too great to be trusted to a single body : they therefore formed two branches, and divided the powers, that each might be a check upon the other. This was the result of their wisdom ; and I presume that every reasonable man will agree to it. The more this subject is explained, the more clear and convinc ing it will appear to every member of this body. The fundamental principle of the old confederation is de fective we must totally eradicate and discard this principle before we can expect an efficient go vernment. The gentlemen who have spoken to-day, have taken up the subject of the ancient confederacies : but their view of them has been extremely partial and erroneous. The fact is, the same false and impracticable principle ran through most of the ancient governments. The first of these governments that we read of, was the Amphictyonic confederacy. The council which managed the affairs of this league, possessed powers 28 MR- HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON of a similar complexion to those of our present Con gress. The same feeble mode of legislation in the head, and the same power of resistance in the mem bers, prevailed. When a requisition was made, it rarely met a compliance ; and a civil war was the con sequence. Those which were attacked, called in foreign aid to protect them ; and the ambitious Philip, under the mask of an ally to one, invaded the liberties of each, and finally subverted the whole. The operation of this principle appears in the same light in the Dutch Republics. They have been oblig ed to levy taxes by an armed force. In this confedera cy, one large province, by its superior wealth and in fluence, is commonly a match for all the rest ; and when they do not comply, the province of Holland is obliged to compel them. It is observed, that the United Provinces have existed a long time ; but they have been constantly the sport of their neighbors, and have been supported only by the external pressure of the surrounding powers. The policy of Europe, not the policy of their government, has saved them from dissolution. Besides, the powers of the Stadtholder have served to give an energy to the operations of this government, which is not to be found in ours. This prince has a vast personal influence : he has independent revenues : he commands an army of forty thousand men. The German confederacy has also been a perpetual source of wars. They have a diet, like our Congress, who have authority to call for supplies : these calls are never obeyed; and in time of war, the imperial army never takes the field till the enemy are returning from it. The emperor's Austrian dominions, in which he is an absolute prince, alone enable him to make head against the common foe. The members of this con federacy are ever divided and opposed to each other. The king of Prussia is a member ; yet he has been constantly in opposition to the emperor. Is this a de sirable government ? THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 29 i might go more particularly into the discussion of examples and show, that wherever this fatal principle has prevailed, even as far back as the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as well as the Amphictyonic con federacy; it has proved the destruction of the govern ment. But I think observations of this kind might have been spared. Had they not been entered into by others, I should not have taken up so much of the time of the committee. No inference can be drawn from these examples, that republics cannot exist : we only contend that they have hitherto been founded on false principles. We have shown how they have been conducted, and how they have been destroyed. Weakness in the head has produced resistance in the members : this has been the immediate parent of civil war: auxiliary force has been invited; and a foreign power has annihilated their liberties and their name. Thus Philip subverted the Amphictyonic, and Rome the Achaean Republic. We shall do well, sir, not to deceive ourselves with the favorable events of the late war. Common danger prevented the operation of the ruinous principle, in its full extent : but, since the peace, we have experienced the evils ; we have felt the poison of the system in its unmingled purity. Without dwelling any longer on this subject, I shall proceed to the question immediately before the com mittee. In order that the committee may understand clearly the principles on which the general convention acted, I think it necessary to explain some preliminary cir cumstances. Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-navigating states the northern are properly the navigating states : the southern ap pear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of na vigation. This difference of situation naturally pro duces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting 30 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON foreign commerce. It was the interest of the northern states, that there should be no restraints on their navigation, and that they should have full power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation of foreigners. The southern states wished to impose a restraint on the northern, by requiring that two-thirds in Congress, should be requisite to pass an act in re gulation of commerce : they were apprehensive that the restraints of a navigation law would discourage foreigners, and by obliging them to employ the ship ping of the northern states, would probably enhance their freight. This being the case, they insisted strenuously on having this provision engrafted in the constitution ; and the northern states were as anxious in opposing it. On the other hand, the small states seeing themselves embraced by the confederation upon equal terms, wished to retain the advantages which they already possessed : the large states, on the con trary, thought it improper that Rhode Island and De laware should enjoy an equal suffrage with themselves: from these sources a delicate and difficult contest arose. It became necessary, therefore, to compro mise ; or the convention must have dissolved without effecting any thing. Would it have been wise and prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have deserted their country ? No. Every man who hears me every wise man in the United States, would have condemned them. The convention were obliged to appoint a committee for accommodation. In this committee the arrangement was formed as it now stands ; and their report was accepted. It was a deli cate point; and it was necessary that all parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will see, that if there had not been unanimity, nothing could have been done : for the convention had no power to establish, but only to recommend a government. Any other sys tem would have been impracticable. Let a convention be called to-morrow let them meet twenty times; THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 31 nay, twenty thousand times ; they will have the same difficulties to encounter ; the same clashing interests to reconcile. But, dismissing these reflections, let us consider how far the arrangement is in itself entitled to the approba tion of this body. We will examine it upon its own merits. The first thing objected to, is that clause which al lows a representation for three-fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of the impropriety of represent ing men, who have no will of their own. Whether this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume to say. It is the unfortunate situation of the southern states, to have a great part of their population, as well as property, in blacks. The regulation complained of, was one result of the spirit of accommodation, which governed the convention ; and without this indulgence, no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir, considering some peculiar advantages which we de rive from them, it is entirely just that they should be gratified. The southern states possess certain staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c. which must be capital ob jects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations ; and the advantage which they necessarily procure in these treaties, will be felt throughout all the states. But the justice of this plan will appear in another view. The best writers on government have held, that representation should be compounded of persons and property. This rule has been adopted, as far as it could be, in the constitution of New York. It will, however, by no means be admitted, that the slaves are considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of the states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of nature. But representation and taxation go together and one uniform rule ought to apply to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the as sessment of taxes* and discard them from the estimate 32 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON in the apportionment of representatives ? Would it be just to impose a singular burden, without conferring some adequate advantage ? Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule we have been speaking of, is a general rule, and applies to all the states. Now, you have a great number of people in your state, which are not repre sented at all ; and have no voice in your government : these will be included in the enumeration not two- fifths nor three-fifths, but the whole. This proves that the advantages of the plan are not confined to the southern states, but extend to other parts of the Union. I now proceed to consider the objection with regard to the number of representatives, as it now stands ; I am persuaded the system, in this respect, stands on a better footing than the gentlemen imagine. It has been asserted, that it will be in the power of Congress to reduce the number. I acknowledge, that there are no direct words of prohibition. But I con tend, that the true and genuine construction of the clause, gives Congress no power whatever to reduce the representation below the number, as it now stands. Although they may limit, they can never diminish the number. One representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants is fixed as the standard of increase ; till, by the natural course of population, it shall become necessary to limit the ratio. Probably, at present, were this standard to be immediately applied, the rep resentation would considerably exceed sixty-five. In three years it would exceed one hundred. If I under stand the gentlemen, they contend that the number may be enlarged or may not. I admit that this is in the discretion of Congress ; and I submit to the com mittee, whether it be not necessary and proper. Still, I insist, that an immediate limitation is not proba ble, nor was it in the contemplation of the convention. But, sir, who will presume to say, to what precise point the representation ought to be increased ? This is a THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 33 matter of opinion; and opinions are vastly different upon the subject. A proof of this is drawn from the representations in the state legislatures. In Massa chusetts, the assembly consists of about three hundred in South Carolina, of nearly one hundred in New York there are sixty-five. It is observed generally, that the number ought to be large ; let the gentlemen produce their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me to say what number may be said to be sufficiently large. On one hand, it ought to be considered, that a small number will act with more facility, system and decision : on the other, that a large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to con sist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a rea sonable man, may appear to be as near the proper medium as any number whatever ; at least, for the present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon any constructions of the consti tution; it is the creation of new states. Vermont, Kentucky and Franklin, will probably become inde pendent ; new members of the union will also be form ed from the unsettled tracts of western territory. These must be represented, and will all contribute to swell the federal legislature. If the whole number in the United States be, at present, three millions, as is commonly supposed, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have on the first census, a hundred representatives. In ten years, thirty more will be added ; and in twenty-five years, the number will double : then, sir, we shall have two hundred, if the increase goes on in the same proportion. The convention of Massachusetts, who made the same objection, have fixed upon this number as the point at which they chose to limit the representation. But can we pronounce with certainty, that it will not be expe dient to go beyond this number ? We cannot. Ex perience alone must determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left to the discretion of the le gislature, as it will be the interest of the large and in- VOL. i. 5 34 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON creasing states, of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl vania, &c. to augment the representation. Only Con necticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely calculate upon a growing representation, according to the advance of population, and the circumstances of the country. The state governments possess inherent advantages, which will ever give them an influence and ascendency over the national government ; and will for ever pre clude the possibility of federal encroachments. That their liberties indeed can be subverted by the federal head, is repugnant to every rule of political calcula tion. Is not this arrangement then, sir, a most wise and prudent one ? Is not the present representation fully adequate to our present exigencies; and suf ficient to answer all the purposes of the union ? I am persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal government will afford a conclusive answer. Many other observations might be made on this subject, but I cannot now pursue them ; for I feel my self not a little exhausted : I beg leave, therefore, to waive for the present the further discussion of the question. On the 21st, Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks as follows : When I had the honor to address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances which attended the convention, when forming the plan before you. I endeavored to point out to you the principles of accommodation, on which this ar rangement was made, and to show that the contend ing interests of the states led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the second place, I attempted to prove, that, in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 35 that there should be a broad democratic branch in the national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is impossible, in the first instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my rea sonings on the subject of government, I rely more on the interests and opinions of men, than on any specu lative parchment provisions whatever. I have found, that constitutions are more or less excellent, as they are more or less agreeable to the natural operation of things. I am therefore disposed not to dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and forms ; but to adopt a system, whose prin ciples have been sanctioned by experience, adapt it to the real state of our country, and depend on pro bable reasonings for its operation and result. I con tend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies, af ford perfect security, in the present state of things; and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the general convention, will not leave an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large states to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the members of Congress will be interested not to increase the number, as it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reason ing upon the subject, there seems to be this fallacy : they suppose that the representative will have no motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of duty ; or on the other, but corruption. They do not reflect, that he is to return to the community ; that he is de pendent on the will of the people, and that it cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their re presentatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this rule there are certain conjunctures, when it may be 36 MR- HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the people have formed. But in the general course of things, the popular views, and even prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers. All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case. In these, the will of the people makes the essential principle of the govern ment; and the laws which control the community, re ceive their tone and spirit from the public wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined. Here then we may expect the laws to be propor- tionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy; and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate conformity between the views of the re presentative and his constituent. If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives ; and the state legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them. Sir, if I believed that the number would remain at sixty- five, I confess I should give my vote for an amend ment; though in a different form from the one proposed. The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twen ty thousand. I would ask, by what rule or reasoning it is determined, that one man is a better representa tive for twenty than thirty thousand ? At present we have three millions of people ; in twenty-five years, we shall have six millions; and in forty years, nine millions : and this is a short period, as it relates to the existence of states. Here then, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have, in forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be true, and if this be a safe representation, why be dis satisfied? Why embarrass the constitution with amendments, that are merely speculative and useless ? I affree with the gentleman, that a very small number THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 37 might give some color for suspicion : I acknowledge, that ten would be unsafe ; on the other hand, a thou sand would be too numerous. But I ask him, why will not ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation? This at present appears to be the proper medium. Besides, the president of the United States will be him self the representative of the people. From the com petition that ever subsists between the branches of gov ernment, the President will be induced to protect their rights, whenever they are invaded by either branch. On whatever side we view this subject, we discover various and powerful checks to the encroach ments of Congress. The true and permanent inter ests of the members are opposed to corruption: their number is vastly too large for easy combina tion : the rivalship between the houses will for ever prove an insuperable obstacle : the people have an obvious and powerful protection in their state govern ments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual observation, will be capable of forming and conducting plans of regular opposition. Can we suppose the people's love of liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused into resistance, and the madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow ? Sir, the danger is too dis tant ; it is beyond all rational calculation. It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved, that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyran ny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. In these assemblies, the enemies of the people brought forward their plans of ambition sys tematically. They were opposed by their enemies, of 38 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON another party ; and it became a matter of contingency, whether the people subjected themselves to be led blindly by one tyrant or by another. It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous repre sentation was necessary to obtain the confidence of the people. This is not generally true. The confi dence of the people will easily be gained by a good ad ministration. This is the true touchstone. I could illustrate the position, by a variety of historical exam ples, both ancient and modern. In Sparta, the Ephori were a body of magistrates, instituted as a check upon the senate, and representing the people. They consisted of only five men ; but they were able to pro tect their rights, and therefore enjoyed their confidence and attachment. In Rome, the people were repre sented by three Tribunes, who were afterwards in creased to ten. Every one acquainted with the histo ry of that republic, will recollect how powerful a check to the senatorial encroachments, this small body prov ed ; how unlimited a confidence was placed in them by the people whose guardians they were ; and to what a conspicuous station in the government their influence at length elevated the plebeians. Massachusetts has three hundred representatives ; New York has sixty- five. Have the people in this state less confidence in their representation than the people of that ? Dela ware has twenty-one : do the inhabitants of New York feel a higher confidence than those of Delaware ? I have stated these examples, to prove that the gentle man's principle is not just. The popular confidence depends on circumstances very distinct from conside rations of number. Probably the public attachment is more strongly secured by a train of prosperous events, which are the result of wise deliberation and vigorous execution, and to which large bodies are much less competent than small ones. If the repre sentative conducts with propriety, he will necessarily enjoy the good will of the constituent. It appears then, if my reasoning be just, that the clause is perfect- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 39 ly proper, upon the principles of the gentleman who contends for the amendment ; as there is in it the great est degree of present security, and a moral certainty of an increase equal to our utmost wishes. It has been further, by the gentlemen in opposition, observed, that a large representation is necessary to understand the interests of the people. This princi ple is by no means true, in the extent to which the gentlemen seem to carry it. I would ask, why may not a man understand the interests of thirty as well as of twenty ? The position appears to be made upon the unfounded presumption, that all the interests of all parts of the community must be represented. No idea is more erroneous than this. Only such interests are proper to be represented, as' are involved in the powers of the general government. These interests come completely under the observation of one, or a few men ; and the requisite information is by no means augmented in proportion to the increase of number. What are the objects of the government ? Commerce, taxation, &c. In order to comprehend the interests of commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat is rais ed, and in what proportion it is produced in one dis trict and in another ? By no means. Neither is this species of knowledge necessary in general calculations upon the subject of taxation. The information neces sary for these purposes, is that which is open to every intelligent inquirer ; and of which, five men may be as perfectly possessed as fifty. In royal governments, there are usually particular men to whom the business of taxation is committed. These men have the form ing of systems of finance ; and the regulation of the revenue. I do not mean to commend this practice. It proves, however, this point; that a few individuals may be competent to these objects ; arid that large numbers are not necessary to perfection in the science of taxation. But granting for a moment, that this minute and local knowledge, the gentlemen contend for, is necessary, let us see, if under the new constitu- 40 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON tion, it will not probably be found in the representa tion. The natural and proper mode of holding elec tions, will be to divide the state into districts, in pro portion to the number to be elected. This state will consequently be divided, at first, into six. One man from each district will probably possess all the know ledge gentlemen can desire. Are the senators of this state more ignorant of the interests of the people, than the assembly ? Have they not ever enjoyed their con fidence as much ? Yet, instead of six districts, they are elected in four ; and the chance of their being col lected from the smaller divisions of the state conse quently diminished. Their number is but twenty-four ; and their powers are co-extensive with those of the assembly, and reach objects, which are most dear to the people life, liberty and property. Sir, we hear constantly a great deal, which is rather calculated to awake our passions, and create preju dices, than to conduct us to the truth, and teach us our real interests. I do not suppose this to be the design of the gentlemen. Why then are we told so often of an aristocracy ? For my part, I hardly know the meaning of this word as it is applied. If all we hear be true, this government is really a very bad one. But who are the aristocracy among us ? Where do we find men, elevated to a perpetual rank above their fellow-citizens ; and possessing powers entirely inde pendent of them ? The arguments of the gentlemen only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men who are poor ; some who are wise, and others who are not. That indeed every distinguished man is an aris tocrat. This reminds me of a description of the aris tocrats, I have seen in a late publication, styled the Federal Farmer. The author reckons in the aris tocracy, all governors of states, members of con gress, chief magistrates, and all officers of the mili tia. This description, I presume to say, is ridicu lous. The image is a phantom. Does the new gov ernment render a rich man more eligible than a poor THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 4! one ? No. It requires no such qualification. It is bottomed on the broad and equal principle of your state constitution. Sir, if the people have it in their option, to elect their most meritorious men, is this to be considered as an objection ? Shall the constitution oppose their wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege ? While property continues to be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of information pervades the community, the tendency of the people's suffrages, will be to elevate merit even from obscurity. As riches increase and accumulate in few hands; as luxury prevails in society, virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature : it is what neither the honorable mem ber nor myself can correct ; it is a common misfortune, that awaits our state constitution, as well as all others. There is an advantage incident to large districts of election, which perhaps the gentlemen, amidst all their apprehensions of influence and bribery, have not adverted to. In large districts, the corruption of the electors is much more difficult. Combinations for the purposes of intrigue are less easily formed : factions and cabals are little known. In a small district, wealth will have a more complete influence ; because the people in the vicinity of a great man, are more im mediately his dependants, and because this influence has fewer objects to act upon. It has been remarked, that it would be disagreeable to the middle class of men to go to the seat of the new government. If this be so, the difficulty will be enhanced by the gentle man's proposal. If his argument be true, it proves, that the larger the representation is, the less will ba your choice of having it filled. But, it appears to me frivolous to bring forward such arguments as these. It has answered no other purpose, than to induce me, VOT,. f. f> 42 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON by way of reply, to enter into discussions, which I con sider as useless, and not applicable to our subject. It is a harsh doctrine, that men grow wicked in proportion as they improve and enlighten their minds. Experience has by no means justified us in the suppo sition, that there is more virtue in one class of men than in another. Look through the rich and the poor of the community ; the learned and the ignorant. Where does virtue predominate ? The difference in deed consists, not in the quantity but kind of vices, which are incident to various classes ; and here the advantage of character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the pros perity of the state, than those of the indigent, and partake less of moral depravity, After all, sir, we must submit to this idea, that the true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Represen tation is imperfect, in proportion as the current of po pular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is adhered to ; where, in the organization of the government, the legislative, executive and judicial branches are rendered distinct ; where again the le gislative is divided into separate houses, and the ope rations of each are controlled by various checks and balances, and above all, by the vigilance and weight of the state governments ; to talk of tyranny, and the sub version of our liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm. This balance between the national and state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from over passing their constitutional limits, by a certain rival- ship, which will ever subsist between them. I am per suaded, that a firm union is as necessary to perpetuate THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 43 our liberties, as it is to make us respectable ; and ex perience will probably prove, that the national govern ment will be as natural a guardian of our freedom, as the state legislatures themselves. Suggestions, sir, of an extraordinary nature, have been frequently thrown out in the course of the present political controversy. It gives me pain to dwell ou topics of this kind; and I wish they might be dismiss ed. We have been told, that the old confederation has proved inefficacious, only because intriguing and powerful men, aiming at a revolution, have been for ever instigating the people, and rendering them disaf fected with it. This, sir, is a false insinuation. The thing is impossible. I will venture to assert, that no combination of designing men under Heaven, will be capable of making a government unpopular, which is in its principles a wise arid good one, and vigorous in its operations. The confederation was framed amidst the agitation and tumult of society. It was composed of unsound materials put together in haste. Men of intelligence discovered the feebleness of the structure, in the first stages of its existence; but the great body of the peo ple, too much engrossed with their distresses, to con template any but the immediate causes of them, were ignorant of the defects of their constitution. But when the dangers of war were removed, they saw clearly what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suf fer, from a feeble form of government. There was no need of discerning men to convince the people of their unhappy situation; the complaint was co-extensive with the evil, and both were common to all classes of the community. We have been told, that the spirit of patriotism, and love of liberty, are almost extinguished among the people; and that it has become a prevail ing doctrine, that republican principles ought to be hooted out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such remarks as these are rather occasioned by the heat of argument, than by a cool conviction of their truth and 44 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c. justice. As far as my experience has extended, I have heard no such doctrine, nor have I discovered any di minution of regard for those rights arid liberties, in de fence of which, the people have fought and suffered. There have been, undoubtedly, some men who have had speculative doubts on the subject of government ; but the principles of republicanism are founded on too firm a basis to be shaken by a few speculative and sceptical reasoners. Our error has been of a very dif ferent kind. We have erred through excess of caution, and a zeal false and impracticable. Our counsels have been destitute of consistency and stability. I am flattered with a hope, sir, that we have now found a cure for the evils under which we have so long labor ed. I trust, that the proposed constitution affords a genuine specimen of representative and republican government, and that it will answer, in an eminent de gree, all the beneficial purposes of society. SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING TBE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 24th, 1788, The following speech was made in opposition to a resolution brought forward by Mr. G. Livingston, as an amendment to the constitution, which proposed ; That no person should be eligible as a senator for more than six years, in any term of twelve years, and that the le gislatures of the several states should have power to recall their senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for the remainder of the time for which such senator, or senators, so recalled, were appointed. I AM persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn shall be indulged, in addressing the committee. We all, in equal sincerity, profess to be anxious for the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the United States, and I presume I shall not be disbelieved, when I declare, that it is an object of all others, the nearest and most dear to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose, become the most important study which can interest mankind. It is our duty to examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from 46 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECtf ON nature, from reason, from examples, the best princi ples of policy, and to pursue arid apply them in the formation of our government. We should contem plate and compare the systems, which, in this examina tion, come under our view ; distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each, and discard ing the former, incorporate the latter, as far as circum stances will admit, into our constitution. If we pursue a different course and neglect this duty, we shall pro bably disappoint the expectations of our country and of the world. In the commencement of a revolution, which receiv ed its birth from the usurpations of tyranny, nothing was more natural, than that the public mind should be influenced by an extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these encroachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the great object of all our public and private institutions. The zeal for liberty became predominant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention. But, sir, there is another object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little capable of regarding : I mean a principle of strength and stability in the or ganization of our government, and vigor in its opera tions. This purpose can never be accomplished but by the establishment of some select body, formed peculiarly upon this principle. There are few posi tions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic, some permanent body to correct the pre judices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. It is evident, that a body instituted for these purposes, must be so formed as to exclude as much as possible from its own character, those infirmities, and that mutability which it is designed to remedy. It is therefore necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its autho- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 47 rity during a considerable period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its pow ers, as will divest it as much as possible of local preju dices. It should be so formed as to be the centre of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system. Without this establishment, we may make ex periments without end, but shall never have an efficient government. It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity : but it is equally unquestionable, that they do not pos sess the discernment and stability necessary for sys tematic government. To deny that they are frequently led into the grossest- errors by misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of administration especially, which involves our political relations with foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths are not often held up in public assemblies ; but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me. From these principles it follows, that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our government; one, which shall be immediately constituted by and pecu liarly represent the people, and possess all the popular features ; another, formed upon the principle, and for the purposes before explained. Such considerations as these induced the. convention who formed your state constitution, to institute a senate upon the pre sent plan. The history of ancient and modern repub lics had taught them, that many of the evils which these republics suffered, arose from the want of a cer tain balance and mutual control indispensable to a wise administration ; they were convinced that popu lar assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden impulses and the intrigues of ambitious men ; and that some firm barrier against these opera tions was necessary : they, therefore, instituted your 48 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON senate, and the benefits we have experienced, have fully justified their conceptions. Now, sir, what is the tendency of the proposed amendment ? To take away the stability of govern ment by depriving the senate of its permanency ; to make this body subject to the same weakness and pre judices, which are incident to popular assemblies, and which it was instituted to correct ; and by thus assimi lating the complexion of the two branches, destroy the balance between them. The amendment will render the senator a slave to all the capricious humors among the people. It will probably be here suggested, that the legislatures, not the people, are to have the power of recall. Without attempting to prove that the le gislatures must be, in a great degree, the image of the multitude, in respect to federal affairs, and that the same prejudices and factions will prevail ; I insist, that in whatever body the power of recall is vested, the se nator will perpetually feel himself in such a state of vassalage and dependence, that he never can possess that firmness which is necessary to the discharge of his great duty to the union. Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the inter ests of the several states, and those of the United States in contrast ; this is not a fair view of the sub ject ; they must necessarily be involved in each other. What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence of these is as power ful as the most permanent conviction of the public good ; and against this influence we ought to provide. The local interests of a state ought in every case to give way to the interests of the union : for when a sa crifice of one or the other is necessary, the former be comes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one. When you assemble from your several counties in the legislature, were every THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 49 member to be guided only by the apparent interest of his county, government would be impracticable. There must be a perpetual accommodation and sa crifice of local advantage to general expediency ; but the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by this important principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the senate should be so form ed, as to be unbiassed by false conceptions of the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their several states. Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable appre hensions of danger to the state governments; they seem to suppose, that the moment you put men into u national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all their affection for their fellow-citizens. But can we imagine that the senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents ? The state governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the general system. As long, therefore, as Congress have a full conviction of this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This conviction can never leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues to be read, and its principles known, the states must, by eve ry rational man, be considered as essential, component parts of the union; and therefore the idea of sacrific ing the former to the latter is wholly inadmissible. The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of state governments, which will ever give them an important superiority over the general government. If we compare the nature of their differ ent powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall find the advantage entirely on the side of the states. This consideration, impor tant as it is, seems to have been little attended to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout the states may be two thousand. Their personal in- VOL. i. 7 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON fluence will, therefore, be proportionably more exten sive than that of one or two hundred men in Congress. The state establishments of civil and military officers of every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible correspondent establishments in the ge neral government, will create such an extent and com plication of attachments, as will ever secure the predi lection and support of the people. Whenever, there fore, Congress shall meditate any infringement of the state constitutions, the great body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic representatives. Can the general government withstand such an united opposition ? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their privileges ? Will they suffer their legislatures^) be reduced to a shadow and a name ? The idea is shocking to common sense. From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be mentioned, results a complicated, irresistible check, which must ever sup port the existence and importance of the state gov ernments. The danger, if any exists, flows from an opposite source. The probable evil is, that the ge neral government will be too dependent on the state legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious to their humors ; that the states, with every power in their hands, will make encroach ments on the national authority, till the union is weak ened and dissolved. Every member must have been struck with an ob servation of a gentleman from Albany. Do what you will, says he, local prejudices and opinions will go into the government. What ! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these pre judices ? Shall we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it ? It is undeniable that there must be a control somewhere. Either the general interest is to control the particular interests, or the contrary. If the former, then certainly the government ' ought to be so framed, as to render the power of control effi- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 5] cient to all intents and purposes ; if the latter, a strik ing absurdity follows : the controlling powers must be as numerous as the varying interests, and the opera tions of government must therefore cease: for the moment you accommodate these different interests, which is the only way to set the government in mo tion, you establish a general controlling power. Thus, whatever constitutional provisions are made to the contrary, every government will be at last driven to the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their rea soning, to distinguish between the real, genuine good of a state, and the opinions and prejudices which may prevail respecting it : the latter may be opposed to the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrificed ; the former is so involved in it, that it ne ver can be sacrificed. Sir, the main design of the con vention, in forming the senate, was to prevent fluc tuations and cabals. With this view, they made that body small, and to exist for a considerable period. Have they executed this design too far ? The sena tors are to serve six years. This is only two years longer than the senators of this state hold their places. One third of the members are to go out every two years ; and in six, the whole body may be changed. Prior to the revolution, the representatives in the se veral colonies were elected for different periods ; for three years, for seven years, &c. Were those bodies ever considered as incapable of representing the peo ple, or as too independent of them ? There is one circumstance which will have a tendency to increase the dependence of the senators on the states, in pro portion to the duration of their appointments. As the state legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the senator will have more attachments to form, and con sequently a greater difficulty of maintaining his place, than one of shorter duration. He will therefore be more cautious and industrious to suit his conduct to the wishes of his constituents. * p . r )2 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON Sir, when you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you will certainly see, that the senators will constantly look up to the state gov ernments, with an eye of dependence and affection/ If they are ambitious to continue in office, they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose, and, whatever may be their private sentiments of po litics, they will be convinced, that the surest means of obtaining a re-election, will be an uniform attachment to the interests of their several states. The gentlemen, to support their amendment, have observed, that the power of recall, under the old gov ernment, has never been exercised. There is no rea soning from this. The experience of a few years, under peculiar circumstances, can afford no probable security that it never will be carried into execution with unhappy effects. A seat in Congress has been less an object of ambition ; and the arts of intrigue, consequently, have been less practised. Indeed, it has been difficult to find men, who were willing to suffer the mortifications, to which so feeble a govern ment, and so dependent a station, exposed them. Sir, if you consider but a moment, the purposes for which the senate was instituted, and the nature of the business which they are to transact, you will see the necessity of giving them duration. They, together with the president, are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations ; they must understand all their interests, and their political systems. This knowledge is not soon acquired but a very small part is gained in the closet. Is it desirable then that new and un qualified members should be continually thrown into that body ? When public bodies are engaged in the exercise of general powers, you cannot judge of the propriety of their conduct, but from the result of their systems. They may be forming plans, which require time and diligence to bring to maturity. It is neces sary, therefore, that they should have a considerable and fixed duration, that they may make their calcula- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 53 lions accordingly. If they are to be perpetually fluc tuating, they can never have that responsibility which is so important in republican governments. In bodies subject to frequent changes, great political plans must be conducted by members in succession : a single as sembly can have but a partial agency in them, and consequently cannot properly be answerable for the final event. Considering the senate, therefore, with a view to responsibility, duration is a very interesting and essential quality. There is another view, in which duration in the senate appears necessary. A gov ernment, changeable in its policy, must soon lose its sense of national character, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators will not be solicitous for the reputation of public measures, in which they have had but a temporary concern, and will feel lightly the bur den of public disapprobation, in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure. Our political rivals will ever consider our mutable counsels as evidence of deficient wisdom, and will be little ap prehensive of our arriving at any exalted station in the scale of power. Such are the internal and external disadvantages which would result from the principle contended for. Were it admitted, I am fully persuad ed, sir, that prejudices would govern the public delibe rations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union. If it were necessary, I could illustrate my subject by historical facts : I could travel through an extensive field of detail, and demonstrate, that wherever the fa tal principle of the head suffering the control of the members, has operated, it has proved a fruitful source of commotions and disorder. This, sir, is the first fair opportunity that has been offered, of deliberately correcting the errors in gov.- ernment. Instability has been a prominent and very defective feature in most republican systems. It is the first to be seen, and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most bane- fully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we ,j4 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poi sonous principle from our government. If this be not done, sir, we shall feel, and posterity will be convuls ed by a painful malady. On the 25th, Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks upon the same subject. MR. CHAIRMAN, In debates of this kind, it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged, that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situa tion, it is the province of judgment and good sense, to determine their force and application, and how far the arguments advanced on one side, are balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress in which both may appear, renders it a difficult task to make this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some of the principles on each side are admitted, and the conclusions drawn from them denied, while other prin ciples, with their inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument. There are two objects in forming systems of gov ernment safety for the people, and energy in the ad ministration. When these objects are united, the cer tain tendency of the system will be to the public wel fare. If the latter object be neglected, the people's security will be as certainly sacrificed, as by disregard ing the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual, with the strength of government : if the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensi bility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach, in its operations, the perfect THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 55 balance between liberty and power. The arguments of the gentlemen chiefly apply to the former branch the house of representatives. If they will calmly con sider the different nature of the two branches, they will see that the reasoning which justly applies to the representative house, will go to destroy the essential qualities of the senate. If the former is calculated per fectly upon the principles of caution, why should you impose the same principles upon the latter, which is designed fpr a different operation? Gentlemen, while they discover a laudable anxiety for the safety of the people, do not attend to the important distinction I have drawn. We have it constantly held up to us, that, as it is our chief duty to guard against tyranny, it is our policy to form all the branches of government for this purpose. Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illus trated by experience, that when the people act by their representatives, they are commonly irresistible. The gentleman admits the position, that stability is essen tial to the government, and yet enforces principles, which, if true, ought to banish stability from the sys tem. The gentleman observes, that there is a fallacy in my reasoning, arid informs us, that the legislatures of the states not the people, are to appoint the senators. Does he reflect, that they are the immedi ate agents of the people ; that they are so constituted as to. feel all their prejudices and passions, and to be governed, in a great degree, by their misapprehen sions? Experience must have taught him the truth of this. Look through their history : what factions have arisen from the most trifling causes what in trigues have been practised for the most illiberal pur poses ! Is not the state of Rhode Island, at this mo ment, struggling under difficulties and distresses, for having been led blindly by the spirit of the multitude ? What is her legislature but the picture of a mob ? In this state we have a senate, possessed of the proper qualities of a permanent body : Virginia, Maryland, and a few other states, are in the same situation : the 56 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON rest are either governed by a single democratic as sembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon de mocratic principles. These have been, more or less, embroiled in factions, and have generally been the image and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to reason on this point, without touching on certain deli cate chords. I could refer you to periods and con junctures, when the people have been governed by improper passions, and led by factious and designing men. I could show, that the same passions have in fected their representatives. Let us beware that we do not make the state legislatures a vehicle, hi which the evi) humors may be conveyed into the national sys tem. To prevent this, it is necessary that the senate should be so formed, as, in some measure, to check the state governments, and preclude the communication of the false impressions which they receive from the people. It has been often repeated, that the legisla tures of the states can have only a partial and confin ed view of national affairs ; that they can form no pro per estimate of great objects which are not in the sphere of their interests. The observation of the gen tleman, therefore, cannot take off the force of my ar gument. Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a reflection,* that their future existence is absolutely in the power of the states. Will not this form a power ful check ? It is a reflection which applies closely to their feelings and interests ; and no candid man, who thinks deliberately, will deny that it would be alone a sufficient check. The legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great influence over the electors. Indeed, they convey their influence through a thousand channels, into the gene ral government. Gentlemen have endeavored to show that there will be no clashing of local and gene ra 1 interests: they do not seem to have sufficiently considered the subject. We have in this state a duty of six pence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 57 and with advantage : but such a duty would be very burdensome to some of the states. If Congress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt tax, would it not be opposed by the eastern states ? Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure, they could only feel its apparent injus tice. Would it be wise to give the New England states a power to defeat this measure, by recalling their senators who may be engaged for it ? I beg the gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction be tween the real and apparent interests of the states. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the government ; yet every state is not the government : every petty district is not the government. Sir, in our state legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessa ry between the interests of counties : the same must happen in the general government between states. In this, the few must yield to the many: or, in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members of Congress are too depend ent on the state legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from local views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their in terest is interwoven with their dependence, and they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situa tion. Those who have been in Congress, have seen these operations. The first question has been how will such a measure affect my constituents, and conse quently, how will the part I take affect my re-election ? This consideration may be, in some degree, proper; but to be dependent from day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present, would be the source of innu merable evils. Six years, sir, is a period short enough for a proper degree of dependence. Let us consider the peculiar state of this body, and see under what impressions they will act. One third of them are to go out at the end of two years ; two thirds in four years, and the whole in six years. When one year is elapsed, there will be a number who are to hold their VOL. i. 8 58 M R - HAMILTON'S SPEECH OK places for one year, others for three, and others for five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant and frequent change of members, but there will be some whose office is near the point of expiration, and who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of their dependence. The biennial change of mem bers is an excellent invention for increasing the diffi culty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advo cates, and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating and virtuous men. When two principles are equally important, we ought if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither. We think that safety and permanency in this govern ment are completely reconcileable. The state gov ernments will have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence over the senate, without the check for which the gentlemen contend. It has been remarked, that there is an inconsistency in our admitting, that the equal votes in the senate were given to secure the rights of the states ; and, at the same time, holding up the idea, that their interests should be sacrificed to those of the union. But the committee certainly perceive the distinction between the rights of the state and its interests. The rights of a state are defined by the constitution, and cannot be invaded without a violation of it ; but the interests of a state have no connexion with the constitution, and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally sacrificed. An uniform tax is perfectly constitutional ; and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain members of the union. The gentlemen are afraid that the state governments will be abolished. But, sir, their existence does jiot depend upon the laws of the United States. Congress can no more abolish the state governments, than they can dissolve the union. The whole constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentlemen would introduce an additional, useless pro vision against it. It is proper that the influence of the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 59 states should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual states be the judges how far ? Shall an unlimited power be left them to determine in their own favor ? The gentlemen go into the extreme : in stead of a wise government, they would form a fantas tical Utopia. But, sir, while they give it a plausible, popular shape, they would render it impracticable. Much has been said about factions. As far as my ob servation has extended, factions in Congress have arisen from attachment to state prejudices. We are attempting by this constitution to abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare. That a man should have the power in private life, of recalling his agent, is proper ; because in the business in which he is engaged, he has no other object but to gain the approbation of his principal. Is this the case with the senator ? Is he simply the agent of the state ? No he is an agent for the union, and he is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the whole, though his state should condemn them. Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen car ry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am con vinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe also, that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other states have; and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the states to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument : nay, he will feel temp tations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetu ate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change hu man nature, as to oppose the strong current of the sel- 60 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH, &c. fish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good. It has been observed, that it is not possible there should be, in a state, only two men qualified for sena tors. But, sir, the question is not, whether there may be no more than two men; but whether, in certain emergencies, you could find two equal to those whom the amendment would discard. Important negotia tions, or other business to which they shall be most competent, may employ them, at the moment of their removal. These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men, capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine. As to corruption, sir, admitting in the president a disposition to corrupt, what are the instruments of bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a great number of offices. But how many offices are there, for which a man would relinquish the senato rial dignity ? There may be some in the judicial, and some in other principal departments. But there are few, whose respectability can in any measure balance that of the office of senator. Men who have been in the senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of a re-election, will not be easily bought by offices. This reasoning shows that a rotation would be pro ductive of many disadvantages under particular cir cumstances, it might be extremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our country. SPEECH OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF NEW YORK, JUNE 27, 1788. A proposition to amend the constitution was brought before the conven tion, the object of which was, to materially abridge the power pro posed to be conferred upon Congress, relative to imposing excise and laying direct taxes, in opposition to which, Mr. Hamilton de livered the following speech. THIS is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise, and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its first impressions create a prejudice, before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils, than the advantages of a measure ; and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger, than to see the ne cessity, of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may justly expect, that those who hear me, will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in those which favor, their prepossessions. After all our doubts, our suspicions and specula tions, on the subject of government, we must return, at last, to this important truth that when we have form ed a constitution upon free principles ; when we have given a proper balance to the different branches of ad ministration, and fixed representation upon pure and equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish it with 02 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample manner, the purposes of government. The great de siderata are a free representation, and mutual checks. When these are obtained, all our apprehensions of the extent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What then is the structure of this constitution ? One branch of the legislature is to be elected by the people by the same people, who choose your state representa tives. Its members are to hold their office two years, and then return to their constituents. Here, sir, the people govern: here they act by their immediate representatives. You have also a senate, constituted by your state legislatures by men, in whom you place the highest confidence, and forming another represen tative branch. Then, again, you have an executive magistrate, created by a form of election, which me rits universal admiration. In the form of this govern ment, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the best writers, have ever conceived. What more can rea sonable men desire? Is there any one branch, in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged ? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced : the execu tive authority is divided between two branches ; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their offices during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the great scrutiny with success. Now, what do gentlemen mean, by coming forward and declaiming against this government ? Why do they say we ought to limit its powers, to disable it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing the people ? Has philosophy suggested has experience taught, that such a government ought not to be trusted with every thing necessary for the good of society ? Sir, when you have divided and nicely balanced the de partments of government ; when you have strongly THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 3 connected the virtue of your rulers with their interest; when, in short, you have rendered your system as per fect as human forms can be you must place con fidence ; you must give power. We have heard a great deal of the sword and the purse: it is said, our liberties are in danger, if both are possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used, and so little understood. It is, that you shall not place these powers in either the legislative or execu tive singly : neither one nor the other shall have both ; because this would destroy that division of powers, on which political liberty is founded ; and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny. But, where the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another, there can be no danger. All governments have possessed these powers : they would be monsters without them, and incapable of exertion. What is your state government? Does not your legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without restraint ? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches. Sir, when we reason about the great in terests of a great people, it is high time that we dis miss our prejudices and banish declamation. In order to induce us to consider the powers, given by this constitution, as dangerous in order to render plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit of the most important power in government, the gen tleman complains that we shall not have a true and safe representation* I asked him what a safe repre sentation was, and he has given no satisfactory aiv swer. The assembly of New York has been mention ed as a proper standard ; but, if we apply this stan dard to the general government, our Congress will be come a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse, and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system afford security ? Can you have confidence in 64 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON such a body ? The idea of taking the ratio of repre sentation, in a small society, for the ratio of a great one, is a fallacy which ought to be exposed. It is im possible to ascertain to what point our representation will increase : it may vary from one, to two, three, or four hundred , it depends upon the progress of popu lation. Suppose it to rest at two hundred ; is not this number sufficient to secure it against corruption ? Human nature must be a much more weak and despi cable thing, than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred of our fellow-citizens can be corrupted in two years. But, suppose they are corrupted; can they, in tvo years, accomplish their designs ? Can they form a combination, and even lay a foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period ? It is far from my inten tion to wound the feelings of any gentleman ; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of things as they are ; and hold up opinions in the light in which they ought to appear : and I maintain, that all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle or fact : that it is mere verbiage, and idle declamation. The true principle of govern ment is this : make the system complete in its struc ture; give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts ; and the powers you give it will never affect your security. The question, then, of the division of powers between the general and state governments, is a question of convenience : it becomes a prudential inquiry, what powers are proper to be reserved to the latter ; and this immediately involves another inquiry into the proper objects of the two governments. This is the criterion by which we shall determine the just distribution of powers. The great leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domes tic peace, and provide for the common defence. In these are comprehended the regulation of commerce, that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse ; the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. (J5 support of armies and navies, and of the civil adminis-* tration. It is useless to go into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general government are numerous, extensive and important. Every one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all re spects, and in every degree, equal to these objects. This principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of the state governments. Have they to pro vide against foreign invasion? Have they to maintain fleets and armies ? Have they any concern in the re gulation of commerce, the procuring alliances, or form ing treaties of peace? No. Their objects are merely civil and domestic; to support the legislative esta blishment, and to provide for the administration of the laws. Let any one compare the expense of support ing the civil list in a state, with the expense of provid ing for the defence of the union. The difference is almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that kingdom, the ordinary expenses of peace to those of war, are as one to fourteen: but there they have a monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous ci vil establishment, with which we have nothing in this country to compare. If, in Great Britain, the expenses of war and peace are so disproportioned, how wide will be their disparity in the United States ; how infi nitely wider between the general government and each individual state ! Now, sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every rational man will give an immediate answer. To what extent shall these resources be possessed ? Reason says, as far as possible exigencies can require ; that is, without limita tion. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants ; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its re sources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the country. Shall not your government have power to call these abilities into action ? The contingencies of society are not reduceable to calculations. They VOL. r. 66 MR. HAMILTON'S SPEECH ON cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination. Will you limit the means of your defence, when you cannot ascertain the force or extent of the invasion ? Even in ordinary wars, a government is frequently obliged to call for supplies, to the temporary oppres sion of the people. Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we shall be obliged to fix some distinguished line, which neither government shall overpass. The inconven iences of this measure must appear evident, on the slightest examination.' The resources appropriated to one, may diminish or fail, while those of the other may increase, beyond the wants of government. One may be destitute of revenues, while the other shall possess an unnecessary abundance, and the constitution will be an eternal barrier to a mutual intercourse and re lief. In this case, will the individual states stand on so good a ground, as if the objects of taxation were left free and open to the embrace of both the govern ments ? Possibly, in the advancement of commerce, the imposts may increase to such a degree, as to ren der direct taxes unnecessary. These resources, then, as the constitution stands, may be occasionally relin quished to the states ; but on the gentleman's idea of prescribing exclusive limits, and precluding all recip rocal communication, this would be entirely improper. The laws of the states must not touch the appropriat ed resources of the United States, whatever may be their wants. Would it not be of more advantage to the states, to have a concurrent jurisdiction extending to all the sources of revenue, than to be confined to such a small resource, as, on calculation of the objects of the two governments, should appear to be their due proportion? Certainly you cannot hesitate on this question. The gentleman's plan would have a further ill effect; it would tend to dissolve the con nexion and correspondence of the two governments, to estrange them from each other, and to destroy that mutual dependence, which forms the essence of union. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. rm you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security. Go to every other member of the society, you will find the same tranquil ease and con tent ; you will find no alarms or disturbances ! Why then tell us of dangers, to terrify us into an adoption of this new form of government ? And yet who knows the dangers that this new system may produce ? They are out of the sight of the common people : they cannot foresee latent consequences. I dread the operation of it on the middling and lower classes of people : it is for them I fear the adoption of this system. I fear I tire the patience of the committee, but I beg to be in dulged with a few more observations. When I thus profess myself an advocate for the liberty of the people, I shall be told, I am a designing man, that I am to be a great man, that I am to be a demagogue; and many similar illiberal insinuations will be thrown out ; but, sir, conscious rectitude out weighs these things with me. I see great jeopardy in this new government: I see none from our present one. I hope some gentleman or other will bring forth, in full array, those dangers, if there be any, that we may see and touch them ; I have said that I thought this a consolidated government : I will now prove it. Will the great rights of the people be secured by this government? Suppose it should prove oppressive, how can it be altered ? Our bill of rights declares, " That a majority of the community hath an indubita ble, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter. VOL. i. 12 90 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." I have just proved, that one tenth, or less, of the people of America a most despicable minority, may prevent this reform, or alteration. Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their government, can a majority of them do it ? No, because they are connected with other men; or, in other words, consolidated with other states. When the people of Virginia, at a future day, shall wish to alter their government, though they should be unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United States. The founders of your own constitu tion made your government changeable : but the power of changing it is gone from you ! Whither is it gone ? It is placed in the same hands that hold the rights of twelve other states ; and those, who hold those rights, have right and power to keep them. It is not the par ticular government of Virginia : one of the leading features of that government is, that a majority can alter it, when necessary for the public good. This government is not a Virginian, but an American gov ernment. Is it not therefore a consolidated govern ment ? The sixth clause of your bill of rights tells you, " That elections of members to serve as representa tives of the people in assembly, ought to be free, and that all men, having sufficient evidence of perma nent, common interest with, and attachment to the com munity, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property, for public uses, without then- own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good." But what does this constitution say ? The clause under considera tion gives an unlimited and unbounded power of taxa tion. Suppose every delegate from Virginia opposes a law laying a tax, what will it avail ? They are op posed by a majority ; 'eleven members can destroy their efforts : those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 91 most oppressive tax-law. So that in direct opposition to the spirit and express language of your declaration of rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but by people who have no connexion with you. The next clause of the bill of rights tells you, "That all power of suspending law, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the representa tives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised." This tells us that there can be no suspension of government, or laws, without our own consent ; yet this constitution can counteract and suspend any of our laws, that contravene its op pressive operation ; for they have the power of direct taxation, which suspends our bill of rights ; and it is expressly provided, that they can make all laws neces sary for carrying their powers into execution ; and it is declared paramount to the laws and constitutions of the states. Consider how the only remaining defence, we have left, is destroyed in this manner. Besides the expenses of maintaining the senate and other house in as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great and mighty president, with very extensive powers the powers of a king. He is to be supported in extra vagant magnificence : so that the whole of our proper ty may be taken by this American government, by lay ing what taxes they please, giving themselves what salaries they please, and suspending our laws at their pleasure. I might be thought too inquisitive, but I believe I should take up but very little of your time in enumerating the little power that is left to the govern ment of Virginia; for this power is reduced to little or nothing. Their garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situated in the strongest places within the states their ten miles square, with all the fine ornaments of human life, added to their powers, and taken from the states, will reduce the power of the latter to nothing. The voice of tradition, I trust, will inform posterity of our struggles for freedom. If our descendants be worthy the name of Americans, they <);> mi. HENRY'S SPEECH ON will preserve, and hand down to their latest posterity, the transactions of the present times ; and though, I confess, my exclamations are not worthy the hearing, they will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty : for I never will give up the power of di rect taxation, but for a scourge. I am. willing to give it conditionally; that is, after non-compliance with requisitions : I will do more, sir, and what I hope will convince the most sceptical man, that I am a lover of the American union ; that in case Virginia shall not make punctual payment, the control of our custom houses, and the whole regulation of trade, shall be given to Congress ; and that Virginia shall depend on Congress even for passports, till Virginia shall have paid the last farthing, and furnished the last soldier. Nay, sir, there is another alternative to which I would consent ; even that they should strike us out of the union, and take away from us all federal privileges, till we comply with federal requisitions ; but let it de pend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the most easy manner for our people. Were all the states, more terrible than the mother country, to join against us, I hope Virginia could defend herself; but, sir, the dissolution of the union is most abhorrent to my mind. The first thing I have at heart is American liberty ; the second thing is American union ; and I hope the peo ple of Virginia will endeavor to preserve that union. The increasing population of the southern states, is far greater than that of New England; consequently, in a short time, they will be far more numerous than the peo ple of that country. Consider this, and you will find this state more particularly interested to support American liberty, and not bind our posterity by an improvident relinquishment of our rights. I would give the best security for a punctual compli ance with requisitions ; but I beseech gentlemen, at all hazards, not to grant this unlimited power of taxation. The honorable gentleman has told us that these THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 93 powers given to Congress, are accompanied by a judi ciary which will correct all. On examination, you will find this very judiciary oppressively constructed, your jury-trial destroyed, and the judges dependent on Congress. In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find two sets of tax gatherers the state and the federal sheriffs. This, it seems to me, will produce such dreadful oppression, as the people cannot possibly bear. The federal sheriff may com mit what oppression, make what distresses, he pleases, and ruin you with impunity : for how are you to tie his hands ? Have you any sufficient, decided means of preventing him from sucking your blood by specula tions, commissions and fees? Thus thousands of your people will be most shamefully robbed. Our state sheriffs, those unfeeling blood-suckers, have, un der the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people. It has required the most constant vigilance of the le gislature to keep them from totally ruining the people. A repeated succession of laws has been made, to sup press their iniquitous speculations and cruel extor tions ; and as often has their nefarious ingenuity de vised methods of evading the force of those laws : in the struggle, they have generally triumphed over* the legislature. It is a fact, that lands have sold for five shillings, which were worth one hundred pounds. If sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye of our state legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not have done if their mas ters had been at Philadelphia or New York ? If they perpetrate the most unwarrantable outrage, on your persons or property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or New York: and how can you get it there ? If your domestic avocations could per mit you to go thither, there you must appeal to judges sworn to support this Constitution in opposition to that of any state, and who may also be inclined to fa vor their own officers. When these harpies are aid- 94 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON ed by excisemen, who may search, at any time, your houses and most secret recesses, will the people bear it ? If you think so, you differ from me. Where I thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand ; and here there is a strong probability that these oppressions shall actually happen. I may be told, that it is safe to err on that side ; because such regulations may be made by Congress, as shall restrain these officers, and because laws are made by our representatives, and judged by righteous judges : but, sir, as these regula tions may be made, so they may not ; and many rea sons there are to induce a belief, that they will not : I shall therefore be an infidel on that point till the day of my death. This constitution is said to have beautiful features ; but when I come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly frightful. Among other defor mities, it has an awful squinting; it squints towards monarchy : and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American ? Your president may easily become king. Your senate is so imperfectly constructed, that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority : and a very small minority may continue forever unchangeably this gov ernment, although horridly defective. Where are your checks in this government ? Your strong holds will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on a sup position that your American governors shall be ho nest, that all the good qualities of this government are founded ; but its defective and imperfect construction, puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mis chiefs, should they be bad men. And, sir, would not all the world, from the eastern to the western hemis phere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad ? Show me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 95 loss of liberty. I say that the loss of that dearest privilege has ever followed, with absolute certainty, every such mad attempt. If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy will it be for him to render himself absolute ! The army is in his hands, and, if he be a man of address, it will be at tached to him ; and it will be the subject of long me ditation with him to seize the first auspicious mo ment to accomplish his design. And, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens ? I would rather infinitely, and I am sure most of this convention are of the same opinion, have a king, lords and commons, than a government, so replete with such insupportable evils. If we make a king, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them : but the president in the field, at the head of his army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any Ame rican ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I cannot, with patience, think of this idea. If ever he violates the laws, one of two things will happen : he will come at the head of his army to carry every thing before him; or, he will give bail, or do what Mr. Chief Justice will order him. If he be guilty, will not the recollection of his crimes teach him to make one bold push for the American throne ? Will not the im mense difference between being master of every thing, and being ignominiously tried and punished, power fully excite him to make this bold push ? But, sir, where is the existing force to punish him ? Can he not, at the head of his army, beat down every opposi tion? Away with your president, we shall have a king : the army will salute him monarch ; your militia will leave you, and assist in making him king, and fight against you : and what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and your rights ? Will not absolute despotism ensue ? [Here Mr. Henry strongly and pathetically expatiated on the 96 MR- HENRI'S SPEECH OK probability of the president's enslaving America, and the horrid consequences that must result.] What can be more defective than the clause con cerning the elections ? The control given to Con gress, over the time, place and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the end of suffrage. The elections may be held at one place, and the most inconvenient in the state ; or they may be at remote distances from those who have a right of suffrage : hence, nine out of ten must either not vote at all, or vote for strangers : for the most influential characters will be applied to, to know who are the most proper to be chosen. I repeat, that the control of Congress over the manner, &c. of electing, well warrants this idea. The natural consequence will be, that this de mocratic branch will possess none of the public con fidence : the people will be prejudiced against repre sentatives chosen in such an injudicious manner. The proceedings in the northern conclave, will be hid den from the yeomanry of this country. We are told, that the yeas and nays shall be taken and entered on the journals : this, sir, will avail nothing : it may be locked up in their chests, and concealed forever from the people ; for they are not to publish what parts they think require secrecy ; they may think, and will think, the whole requires it. Another beautiful feature of this constitution, is the publication, from time to time, of the receipts and ex penditures of the public money. This expression, from time to time, is very indefinite and indeterminate : it may extend to a century. Grant that any of them are wicked, they may squander the public money so as to ruin you, and yet this expression will give you no re dress. I say, they may ruin you ; for where, sir, is the responsibility ? The yeas and nays will show you nothing, unless they be fools as well as knaves : for, after having wickedly trampled on the rights of the people, they would act like fools indeed, were they to publish and divulge their iniquity, when they have it THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. q~ t equally in their power to suppress and conceal it. Where is the responsibility that leading principle in the British government? In that government, a pun ishment, certain and inevitable, is provided: but in this, there is no real, actual punishment for the gross est mal-administration. They may go without pun ishment, though they commit the most outrageous violation on our immunities. That paper may tell me they will be punished. I ask, by what law ? They must make the laAV, for there is no existing law to do it. What will they make a law to punish them selves ? This, sir> is my great objection to the con stitution, that there is no true responsibility, and that the preservation of our liberty depends on the single chance of men being virtuous enough to make laws to punish themselves. In the country from which we are descended, they have real, and not imaginary re sponsibility ; for there, mal-administration has cost their heads to some of the most saucy geniuses that ever were. The senate, by making treaties, may de stroy your liberty and laws, for want of responsibility. Two thirds of those that shall happen to be present, can, with the president, make treaties, that shall be the supreme law of the land : they may make the most ruinous treaties, and yet there is no punishment for them. Whoever shows me a punishment provided for them, will oblige me. So, sir, notwithstanding there are eight pillars, they want another. Where will they make another ? I trust, sir, the exclusion of the evils wherewith this system is replete, in its present form, will be made a condition precedent to its adoption, by this or any other state. The transition from a general, unqualified admission to offices, to a consolidation of government, seems easy; for, though the American states are dissimilar in their structure, this will assimi late them: this, sir, is itself a strong consolidating feature, and is not one of the least dangerous in that system. Nine states are sufficient to establish this government over those nine. Imagine that nine have VOL. I. 13 $tt MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON come into it. Virginia has certain scruples. Suppose she will consequently refuse to join with those states : may not they still continue in friendship and union with her? If she sends her annual requisitions in dollars, do you think their stomachs will be so squeam ish as to refuse her dollars ? Will they not accept her regiments ? They would intimidate you into an in considerate adoption, and frighten you with ideal evils, and that the union shall be dissolved. 'Tis a bugbear, sir : the fact is, sir, that the eight adopting states can hardly stand on their own legs. Public fame tells us, that the adopting states have already heart-burnings and animosity, and repent their precipitate hurry : this, sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief. When I reflect on these, and many other circumstances, 1 must think those states will be fond to be in confederacy with us. If we pay our quota of money annually, and furnish our rateable number of men, when necessary, I can see no danger from a rejection. The history of Switzerland clearly proves, that w^e might be in amica ble alliance \vith those states, without adopting this constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy, consisting of dissimilar governments. This is an example, which proves that governments, of dissimilar structures, may be confederated. That confederate republic has stood upwards of four hundred years ; and, although several of the individual republics are democratic, and the rest aristocratic, no evil has resulted from this dis similarity, for they have braved all the power of France and Germany, during that long period. The Swiss spirit, sir, has kept them together : they have encoun tered and overcome immense difficulties, with patience and fortitude. In the vicinity of powerful and ambi tious monarchs, they have retained their independence, republican simplicity and valor. [Here Mr. Henry drew a comparison between the people of that country and those of France, and made a quotation from Ad- dison, illustrating the subject.] Look at the peasants of that country, and of France, and mark the dif- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 99 ference. You will find the condition of the former far more desirable and comfortable. No matter whether a people be great, splendid and powerful, if they enjoy freedom. The Turkish Grand Seignior, along side of our president, would put us to disgrace : but we should be abundantly consoled for this disgrace, should our citizen be put in contrast with the Turkish slave. The most valuable end of government, is the liber ty of the inhabitants. No possible advantages can compensate for the loss of this privilege. Show me the reason why the American union is to be dissolved. Who are those eight adopting states? Are they averse to give us a little time to consider, before we conclude ? Would such a disposition render a junc tion with them eligible : or, is it the genius of that kind of government, to precipitate people hastily into mea sures of the utmost importance, and grant no indul gence ? If it be, sir, is it for us to accede to such a government ? We have a right to have time to con sider we shall therefore insist upon it. Unless the government be amended, we can never accept it. The adopting states will doubtless accept our money and our regiments ; and what is to be the consequence* if we are disunited ? I believe that it is yet doubtful, whether it is not proper to stand by a while, and sec the effect of its adoption in other states. In forming a government, the utmost care should be taken, to prevent its becoming oppressive ; and this government is of such an intricate and complicated nature, that no man on this earth, can know its real operation. The other states have no reason to think, from the antecedent conduct of Virginia, that she has any in tention of seceding from the union, or of being less active to support the general welfare. Would they not, therefore, acquiesce in our taking time to delibe rate deliberate whether the measure be not peri lous, not only for us, but the adopting states. Permit me, sir, to say, that 'a great majority of the people, even in the adopting states, arc averse to this government, 100 iMR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON I believe I would be right to say, that they have been egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has, perhaps, been tricked into it. If the other states, who have adopted it, have not been tricked, still they were too much hur ried into its adoption. There were very respectable minorities in several of them ; and, if reports be true, a clear majority of the people are averse to it. If we also accede, and it should prove grievous, the peace and prosperity of our country, which we all love, will be destroyed. This government has not the affection of the people, at present. Should it be oppressive, their affection will be totally estranged from it and, sir, you know, that a government without their affec tions, can neither be durable nor happy. I speak as one poor individual but, when I speak, I speak the language of thousands. But, sir, I mean not to breathe the spirit, nor utter the language of secession. I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am really concerned that I have something yet to say. The honorable member has said that we shall be properly represented : remember, sir, that the num ber of our representatives is but ten, whereof six are a majority. Will those men be possessed of sufficient information? A particular knowledge of particular districts, will not suffice. They must be well acquaint ed with agriculture, commerce, and a great variety of other matters throughout the continent; they must know not only the actual state of nations in Europe and America, the situation of their farmers, cottagers and mechanics, but also the relative situation and in tercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as England. Our proportion of representatives is but ten men. In England they have five hundred and thirty. The house of commons in England, numerous as they are, we are told, is bribed, and have bartered away the rights of their constituents : what then shall become of us ? Will these few protect our rights ? Will they be incorruptible ? You say they will be bet ter men than the English commoners. I say they THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be chosen blindfolded : their election, (the term, as ap plied to their appointment, is inaccurate,) will be an. involuntary nomination, and not a choice. I have, I fear, fatigued the committee, yet I have not said the one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my mind, and wish to impart. On this occasion, I con ceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interest of the state ; and I thought her dearest rights at stake : having lived so long been so much honored my ef forts, though small, are due to my country. I have found my mind hurried on from subject to subject, on this very great occasion. We have all been out of or der, from the gentleman who opened to day, to myself. I did not come prepared to speak on so multifarious a subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will in dulge me another time. Before you abandon the pre sent system, I hope you will consider not only its de fects, most maturely, but likewise those of that which you are to substitute for it. May you be fully appris ed of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience, but by some abler advocate than I. SPEECH OF EDMUND RANDOLPH, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OP ADOPTING THK FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 6th, 1788. 1 ' The first and second sections of the first article of the constitution being under consideration, Mr. Randolph addressed the con vention as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM a child of the revolution. My country, very early indeed, took me under her protection, at a time when I most wanted it; and by a succession of favors and honors, prevented even my most ardent wishes. I feel the highest gratitude and attachment to my country ; her felicity is the most fervent prayer of my heart. Conscious of having exerted my faculties to the ut most in her behalf, if I have not succeeded in securing the esteem of my countrymen, I shall reap abundant consolation from the rectitude of my intentions : ho nors, when compared to the satisfaction accruing from a conscious independence and rectitude of ccfhduct, are no equivalent. The unwearied study of nty life, shall be to promote her happiness. As a citizen, ambi tion and popularity are no objects with me. I expect, in the course of a year, to retire to that private station which I most sincerely and cordially prefer to all others.* The security of public justice, sir, is what I Mr. Randolph was at this time Governor of Virginia. MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH, &c. ]Q3 most fervently wish as I consider that object to be the primary step to the attainment of public happiness. I can declare to the whole world, that in the part I take in this very important question, I am actuated by a re gard for what 1 conceive to be our true interest. I can also, with equal sincerity, declare that I would join heart and hand in rejecting this system, did I conceive it would promote our happiness : but having a strong conviction on my mind, at this time, that, by a disunion, we shall throw away all those blessings we have so earnestly fought for, and that a rejection of the consti tution will operate disunion pardon me if 1 discharge the obligation I owe to my country by voting for its adoption. We are told that the report of dangers is false. The cry of peace, sir, is false: say peace, when there is peace : it is but a sudden calm. The tempest growls over you look around wheresoever you look, you see danger. When there are so many witnesses, in many parts of America, that justice is suf focated, shall peace and happiness still be said to reign? Candor, sir, requires an undisguised repre sentation of our situation. Candor, sir, demands a faithful exposition of facts. Many citizens have found justice strangled and trampled under foot, through the course of jurisprudence in this country. Are those, who have debts due them, satisfied with your govern ment? Are not creditors wearied with the tedious procrastination of your legal process a process ob scured by legislative mists ? Cast your eyes to your sea-ports, see how commerce languishes : this country, so blessed by nature, with every advantage that can render commerce profitable, through defective legisla tion, is deprived of all the benefits and emoluments she might otherwise reap from it. We hear many com plaints on the subject of located lands a variety of competitors claiming the same lands under legislative acts public faith prostrated, and private confidence destroyed. I ask you if your laws are reverenced? In every well regulated community, the laws command 104 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON respect. Are yours entitled to reverence ? We not only see violations of the constitution, but of national principles in repeated instances. How is the fact ? The history of the violations of the constitution, extends from the year 1776, to this present time violations made by formal acts of the legislature; every thing has been drawn within the legislative vortex. There is one example of this violation in Virginia, of a most striking and shocking nature ; an example, so horrid, that if I conceived my country would passively permit a repetition of it, dear as it is to me, I would seek means of expatriating myself from it. A man, who was then a citizen, was deprived of his life, thus : from a mere reliance on general reports, a gentleman in the house of delegates informed the house, that a certain man (Josiah Phillips) had committed several crimes, and was running at large, perpetrating other crimes ; he therefore moved for leave to attaint him. He ob tained that leave instantly. No sooner did he obtain it, than he drew from his pocket a bill already written for that effect ; it was read three times in one day, and carri ed to the senate : I will not say that it passed the same day through the senate ; but he was attainted very speedily and precipitately, without any proof better than vague reports ! Without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses ; without the privilege of call ing for evidence in his behalf, he was sentenced to death, and was afterwards actually executed. Was this arbitrary deprivation of life, the dearest gift of God to man, consistent with the genius of a republican gov ernment ? Is this compatible with the spirit of free dom ? This, sir, has made the deepest impression on my heart, and I cannot contemplate it without horror. There are still a multiplicity of complaints of the debility of the laws. Justice, in jpany instances, is so unattainable, that commerce may pin fact, be said to be stopped entirely. There is no peace, sir, in this land : can peace exist with injustice, licentiousness, insecu- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. rity and oppression ? These considerations, indepen dent of many others which I have not yet enumerated, would be a sufficient reason for the adoption of this constitution, because it secures the liberty of the citi zen, his person and property, and will invigorate and restore commerce and industry. An additional reason to induce us to adopt it, is that excessive licentiousness which has resulted from the relaxation of our laws, and which will be checked by this government. Let us judge from the fate of more ancient nations. Licentiousness has produced tyran ny among many of them : it has contributed as much, (if not more,) as any other cause whatsoever, to the loss of their liberties. I have respect for the integrity of our legislators ; I believe them to be virtuous: but as long as the defects of the constitution exist, so long will laws be imperfect. The honorable gentleman went on further, and said, that the accession of eight states is not a reason for our adoption. Many other things have been alledged out of order instead of discussing the system regularly, a variety of points are promiscuously debated, in order to make temporary impressions on the members. Sir, were I convinced of the validity of their arguments, I would join them heart and hand. Were I convinced that the accesions of eight states, did not render our accession also ne cessary to preserve the union, I would not accede to it till it should be previously amended: but, sir, I am convinced that the union will be lost by our rejection. Massachusetts has adopted it ; she has recommended subsequent amendments ; her influence must be very considerable to obtain them: I trust my countrymen have sufficient wisdom and virtue to entitle them to equal respect. Is it urged, that being wiser, we ought to prescribe amendments to the other states ? I have considered this subject deliberately ; wearied myself in endeavor ing to find a possibility of preserving the union, with out our unconditional ratification : but. sir, in vain ; I VOL. i. 14 J06 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON find no other means. I ask myself a variety of ques tions applicable to the adopting states, and I conclude, will they repent of whaj; they have done ? Will they acknowledge themselves in an error ? Or, will they recede to gratify Virginia? My prediction is, that they will not. Shall we stand by ourselves, and be se vered from the union if amendments cannot be had ? I have every reason for determining within myself, that our rejection must dissolve the union ; and that that dissolution will destroy our political happiness. The honorable gentleman was pleased to draw out several other arguments, out of order : that this government would destroy the state governments, the trial by jury, &c. &c. and concluded, by an illustration of his opinion, by a reference to the confederacy of the Swiss. Let us argue with unprejudiced minds : he says, that the trial by jury is gone is this so ? Although I have de clared my determination to give my vote for it, yet I shall freely censure those parts which appear to me reprehensible. The trial by jury, in criminal cases, is secured ; in civil cases, it is not so expressly secured, as I could wish it ; but it does not follow, that Con gress has the power of taking away this privilege, which is secured by the constitution of each state, and not given away by this constitution. I have no fear on this subject Congress must regulate it so as to suit every state. I will risk my property on the certainty, that they will institute the trial by jury in such manner as shall accommodate the conveniences of the inhabi tants in every state : the difficulty of ascertaining this accommodation, was the principal cause of its not being provided for. It will be the interest of the indi viduals composing Congress, to put it on this conven ient footing. Shall we not choose men respectable for their good qualities ? Or can we suppose that men, tainted with the worst vices, will get into Con gress ? I beg leave to differ from the honorable gen tleman, in another point. He dreads that great in conveniences will ensue from the federal court ; that THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 1Q7 our citizens will be harrassed by being carried thither. I cannot think that this power of the federal judiciary, will necessarily be abused. The inconvenience here suggested, being of a general nature, affecting most of the states, will, by general consent of the states, be removed ; and, I trust, such regulations shall be made, in this case, as will accommodate the people in eve ry state. The honorable gentleman instanced the Swiss cantons, as an example, to show us the possibili ty, if not expediency, of being in amicable alliance with the other states, without adopting this system. Sir, references to history will be fatal in political rea soning, unless well guarded. Our mental ability is often eo contracted, and powers of investigation so limited, that sometimes we adduce as an example in our fa vor, what in fact militates against us. Examine the situation of that country comparatively to us. Its ex tent and situation are totally different from ours ; it is surrounded by powerful, ambitious, and reciprocally jealous nations : its territory small and the soil not very fertile. The peculiarity, sir, of their situation, has kept these cantons together, and not that system of alliance, to which the gentleman seems to attribute the durability, and felicity of their connexion. [Here- Mr. Randolph quoted some passages from Stanyard, illustrating his argument, and largely com mented upon them. The effect of- which was, that the narrow confines of that country rendered it very possible for a system of confederacy to accommo date those cantons, that would not suit the United States : that it was the fear of the ambitious and war like nations that surrounded them, and the reciprocal jealousy of the other European powers that rendered their union so durable; and that notwithstanding these circumstances, and their being a hardy race of people, yet such was the injudicious construction of their confederacy, that very considerable broils some times interrupted their harmony.] He then continued I have produced this example 108 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON to show, that we ought not to be amused with histori cal references, which have no kind of analogy to the points under our consideration. We ought to confine ourselves to those points solely, which have an imme diate and strict similitude, to the subject of our dis cussion. The reference made by the honorable gentleman over the way, is extremely inapplicable to us. Are the Swiss cantons circumstanced as we are ? Are we surrounded by formidable nations or are we situated in any manner like them ? We are not, sir. Then it naturally results, that no such friendly intercourse as he flattered himself with, could take place, in case of a dissolution of our union. We are remotely situated from powerful nations, the dread of whose attack might impel us to unite firmly with one another ; we are not situated in an inaccessible, strong position : we have to fear much from one another : we must soon feel the fatal eifects of an imperfect sys tem of union. The honorable gentleman attacks the constitution, as he thinks it contrary to our bill of rights. Do we not appeal to the people, by whose authority all gov ernment is made ? That bill of rights is of no validity, because, I conceive, it is not formed on due authority. It is not a part of our constitution : it has never se cured us against any danger : it has been repeatedly disregarded and ' violated. But we must not discard the confederation, for the remembrance of its past services. I am attached to old servants. I have re gard and tenderness for this old servant : but when reason tells us, that it can no longer be retained with out throwing away all it has gained us, and running the risk of losing every thing dear to us, must we still continue our attachment ? Reason and my duty tell me not. Other gentlemen may think otherwise. But, sir, is it not possible that men may differ in sentiments, and still be honest ? We have an inquisition within ourselves, that leads us not to offend so much against charity. The gentleman expresses a necessity of be- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 1Q9 ing suspicious of those who govern. I will agree with him in the necessity of political jealousy to a certain extent : but we ought to examine, how far this political jealousy ought to be carried. I confess that a certain degree of it, is highly necessary to the preservation of liberty ; but it ought not to be extended to a degree which is degrading and humiliating to human nature ; to a degree of restlessness and active disquietude, suf ficient to disturb a community, or preclude the possi bility of political happiness and contentment. Confi dence ought also to be equally limited. Wisdom shrinks from extremes, and fixes on a medium as her choice. Experience and history, the least fallible judges, teach us that in forming a government, the powers to be given must be commensurate to the ob ject. A less degree will defeat the intention, and a greater will subject the people to the depravity of rulers, who, though they are but the agents of the people, pervert their powers to their own emolument, and ambitious views. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be obliged to detain the house, but the relation of a variety of matters, renders it now unavoidable. I informed the house yesterday, before rising, that I intended to show the necessity of having a national government, in prefer ence to the confederation ; also, to show the necessi ty of conceding the power of taxation, and of distin guishing between its objects ; and I am the more hap py, that I possess materials of information for that purpose. My intention then is, to satisfy the gentle men of this committee, that a national government is absolutely indispensable, and that a confederacy is not eligible, in our present situation. The introductory step to this will be, to endeavor to convince the house of the necessity of the union, and that the present con federation is actually inadequate and unamendable. The extent of the country is objected to, by the gentle man over the way, as an insurmountable obstacle to the establishing a national government in the United 110 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON States. It is a very strange and inconsistent doctrine, to admit the necessity of the union, and yet urge this last objection, which I think goes radically to the exis tence of the union itself. If the extent of the country be a conclusive argument against a national govern ment, it is equally so, against an union with the other states. Instead of entering largely into a discussion of the nature and effect of the different kinds of govern ment, or into an inquiry into the particular extent of country, that may suit the genius of this or that gov ernment, I ask this question is this government ne cessary for the safety of Virginia ? Is the union indis pensable for our happiness ? I confess it is impru dent for any nation to form alliance with another, whose situation and construction of government are dissimilar with its own. It is impolitic and improper for men of opulence to join their interest with men of indigence and chance. But we are now inquiring, particularly, whether Virginia, as contradistinguished from the other states, can exist without the union a hard question, perhaps, after what has been said. I will venture, however, to say, she cannot. I shall not rest contented with asserting, I shall endeavor to prove. Look at the most powerful nations on earth. England and France have had recourse to this expe dient. Those countries found it necessary to unite with their immediate neighbors, and this union has prevented the most lamentable mischiefs. What di vine pre-eminence is Virginia possessed of, above other states ? Can Virginia send her navy and thun der, to bid defiance to foreign nations ? And can she exist without an union with her neighbors, when the most potent nations have found such an union neces sary, not only to their political felicity, but their nation al existence ? Let us examine her ability. Although it be impossible to determine, with accuracy, what de gree of internal strength a nation ought to possess, to enable it to stand by itself; yet there are certain sure facts and circumstances, which demonstrate, that a THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. particular nation cannot stand singly. I have spoken with freedom, and, I trust, I have done it with decency ; but I must also speak with truth. If Virginia can exist without the union, she must derive that ability from one or other of these sources, viz : from her natural situation, or because she has no reason to fear from other nations. What is her situation ? She is not in accessible. She is not a petty republic, like that of St, Marino, surrounded with rocks and mountains, with a soil not very fertile, nor worthy the envy of surrounding nations. Were this, sir, her situation, she might, like that petty state, subsist, separated from all the world. On the contrary, she is very accessible : the large, ca pacious bay of Chesapeake, which is but too excel lently adapted for the admission of enemies, renders her very vulnerable. I am informed, and I believe rightly, because I derive my information from those whose knowledge is most respectable, that Virginia is in a very unhappy position, with respect to the access of foes by sea, though happily situated for commerce. This being her situation by sea, let us look at land. She has frontiers adjoining the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina. Two of those states have declared themselves members of the union. Will she be inaccessible to the inhabitants of those states ? Cast your eyes to the western country, that is inhabit ed by cruel savages, your natural enemies. Besides their natural propensity to barbarity, they may be ex cited, by the gold of foreign enemies, to commit the most horrid ravages on your people. Our great, in creasing population, is one remedy to this evil ; but. being scattered thinly over so extensive a country, how difficult it is to collect their strength, or defend the country. This is one point of weakness. I wish, for the honor of my countrymen, that it was the only one. There is another circumstance which renders us more vulnerable. Are we not weakened by the population of those whom we hold in slavery ? The day may come, when they may make an impression upon us. Gentle- 112 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON men, who have been long accustomed to the contem plation of the subject, think there is a cause of alarm in this case. The number of those people, compared to that of the whites, is in an immense proportion : their number amounts to two hundred and thirty-six thousand, that of the whites only to three hundred and fifty-two thousand. Will the American spirit, so much spoken of, repel an invading enemy, or enable you to obtain an advantageous peace? Manufactures and military stores, may afford relief to a country exposed : have we these at present ? Attempts have been made to have these here. If we shall be separated from the union, shall our chance of having these be greater ? Or, will not the want of these be more deplorable ? We shall be told of the exertions of Virginia, under the confederation her achievements, when she had no commerce. These, sir, were necessary for her imme diate safety, nor would these have availed, without the aid of the other states. Those states, then our friends, brothers and supporters, will, if disunited from us, be our bitterest ^enemies. If then, sir, Virginia, from her situation, is not inac cessible, or invulnerable ; let us consider if she be pro tected, by having no cause to fear from other nations : has she no cause to fear ? You will have cause to fear, as a nation, if disunited ; you will not only have this cause to fear from yourselves, from that species of population I before mentioned, and your once sister states, but from the arms of other nations. Have you no cause of fear from Spain, whose dominions border on your country ? Every nation, every people, in our circumstances, have always had abundant cause to fear. Let us see the danger to be apprehended from France : let us suppose Virginia separated from the other states: as part of the former confederated states, she will owe France a very considerable sum France will be as magnanimous as ever. France, by the law of nations, will have a right to demand the whole of her, or of the others. If France were to demand it, what THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. U$ would become of the property of America? Could she not destroy what little commerce we have ? Could she not seize our ships, and carry havoc and destruction before her on our shores ? The most la mentable desolation would take place. We owe a debt to Spain also ; do we expect indulgence from that quarter ? That nation has a right to demand the debt due to it, and power to enforce that right. Will the Dutch be silent about the debt due to them ? Is there any one pretension, that any of these nations will be patient ? The debts due the British are also very con siderable : these debts have been withheld contrary to treaty : if Great Britain will demand the payment of these debts, peremptorily, what will be the conse quence ? Can we pay them if demanded ? Will no danger result from a refusal ? Will the British na tion suffer their subjects to be stripped of their proper ty ? Is not that nation amply able to do its subjects justice ? Will the resentment of that powerful and supercilious nation sleep forever ? If we become one* sole nation, uniting with our sister states, our means of defence will be greater ; the indulgence, for the payment of those debts, will be greater, and the danger of an attack less probable. Moreover, vast quantities of lands have been sold, by citizens of this country, to Europeans, and these lands cannot be found. Will this fraud be countenanced or endured ? Among so many causes of danger, shall we be secure, separated from our sister states ? Weakness itself, sir, will in vite some attack upon your country. Contemplate our situation deliberately, and consult history : it will inform you, that people, in our circumstances, have ever been attacked, and successfully : open any page, and you will there find our danger truly depicted. If such a people had any thing, was it not taken ? The fate which will befall us, I fear, sir, will be, that we shall be made a partition of. How will these, our troubles, be removed ? Can we have any dependence on commerce ? Can we make any computation on VOL. i. 1/5 , 114 Mil. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON this subject ? Where will our flag appear ? So high is the spirit of commercial nations, that they will spend five times the value of the object, to exclude their ri vals from a participation in commercial profits: they seldom regard any expenses. If we should be divided from the rest of the states, upon what footing would our navigation in the Mississippi be ? What would be the probable conduct of France and Spain? Every gentleman may imagine, in his own mind, the natural consequences. To these considerations, I might add many others of a similar nature. Were I to say, that the boundary, between us and North Carolina, is not yet settled, I should be told, that Virginia and that state go together. But what, sir, will be the consequence of the dispute that may arise between us and Mary land, on the subject of Potomac river ? It is thought, Virginia has a right to an equal navigation with them in that river. If ever it should be decided on grounds of prior right, their charter will inevitably determine it in their favor. The country called the Northern Neck, will probably be severed from Virginia. There is not a doubt, but the inhabitants of that part will annex themselves to Maryland, if Virginia refuse to accede to the union. The recent example of those regulations, lately made respecting that territory, will illustrate that probability. Virginia will also be in danger of a conflict with Pennsylvania, on the subject of bounda ries. I know that some gentlemen are thoroughly per suaded, that we have a right to those disputed boun daries : if we have such a right, I know not where it is to be found. Are we not borderers on states that will be separat ed from us ? Call to mind the history of every part of the world, where nations have bordered on one another, and consider the consequences of our separation from the union. Peruse those histories, and you find such countries to have ever been almost a perpetual scene of bloodshed and slaughter. The inhabitants of one, escaping from punishment into the other protection * THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 115 given them consequent pursuit, robbery, cruelty and murder. A numerous standing army, that dangerous expedient, would be necessary, but not sufficient, for the defence of such borders. Every gentleman will amplify the scene in his own mind. If you wish to know the extent of such a scene, look at the histo ry of England and Scotland before- the union; you will see their borderers continually committing depre dations and cruelties, of the most calamitous and de plorable nature, on one another. Mr. Chairman, were we struck off from the union, and disputes of the back lands should be renewed, which are of the most alarming nature, and which must produce uncommon mischiefs, can you inform me how this great subject would be settled ? Vir ginia has a large unsettled country : she has, at last, quieted it : but there are great doubts whether she has taken the best way to effect it. If she has not, disa greeable consequences may ensue. I have before hinted at some other causes of quarrel between the other states and us : particularly the hatred that would be generated by commercial competition. I will only add, on that subject, that controversies may arise concerning the fisheries, which must terminate in wars. Paper money may also be an additional source of disputes. Rhode Island has been in one continued train of opposition to national duties and integrity : they have defrauded their creditors by their paper mo ney. Other states have also had emissions of paper money, to the ruin of credit and commerce. May not Virginia, at a future day, also recur to the same expedient ? Has Virginia no affection for paper mo ney, or disposition to violate contracts ? I fear she is as fond of these measures as most other states in the union. The inhabitants of the adjacent states, would be affected by the depreciation of paper money, which would assuredly produce a dispute with those states. This danger is taken away by the present constitu tion, as it provides, " That no state shall emit bills of 1T6 MR. KANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON credit" Maryland has counteracted the policy of this state frequently, and may be meditating examples of this kind again. Before the revolution, there was a contest about those back lands, in which even gov ernment was a party : it was put an end to by the war. Pennsylvania was ready to enter into a war with us for the disputed lands near the boundaries, and no thing but the superior prudence of the man, who was at the head of affairs in Virginia, could have prevent ed it. I beg leave to remind you of the strength of Massa chusetts, and other states to the north, and what would their conduct be to us if disunited from them. In case of a conflict between us and Maryland or Penn sylvania, they would be aided by the whole strength of the more northern states ; in short, by that of all the adopting states. For these reasons, I conceive, that if Virginia supposes she has no cause of apprehen sion, she will find herself in a fatal error. Suppose the American spirit in the fullest vigor in Virginia, what military preparations and exertions is she capa ble of making? The other states have upwards of three hundred and thirty thousand men capable of bearing arms : this will be a good army, or they can very easily raise a good army out of so great a num ber. Our militia amounts to fifty thousand; even stretching it to the improbable amount (urged by some,) of sixty thousand in case of an attack, what defence can we make ? Who are militia ? Can we depend solely upon these? I will pay the last tribute of gratitude to the militia of my country : they per formed some of the most gallant feats during the last war, and acted as nobly as men, inured to other avo cations, could be expected to do : but, sir, it is danger ous to look to them as our sole protectors. Did ever militia defend a country? Those of Pennsylvania were said to differ very little from regulars, yet these, sir, were insufficient for the defence of that state. The militia of our country will be wanted for agricul- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. H7 ture : on this noblest of arts, depends the virtue and the very existence of a country : if it be neglected, every thing else must be in a state of ruin and decay. It must be neglected if those hands, which ought to attend to it, are occasionally called forth on military expeditions. Some, also, will be necessary for manu factures, and those mechanic arts which are necessa ry for the aid of the farmer and planter. If we had men, sufficient in number to defend ourselves, it could not avail without other requisites. We must have a navy, to be supported in time of peace as well as war, to guard our coasts and defend us against invasions. The impossibility of building and equipping a fleet, in a short time, constitutes the necessity of having a cer tain number of ships of war always ready in time of peace. The maintaining a navy will require money and where, sir, can we get money for this and other purposes ? How shall we raise it ? Review the enor mity of the debts due by this country : the amount of the debt we owe to the continent, for bills of credit, rating at forty for one, will amount to between six and seven hundred thousand pounds. There is also due the continent, the balance of requisitions due by us, and, in addition to this proportion of the old conti nental debt, there are the foreign, domestic, state mili tary, and loan-office debts, to which, when you add the British debt, where is the possibility of finding money to raise an army or navy ? Review then your real abili ty. Shall we recur to loans ? Nothing can be more impolitic : they impoverish a nation : we, sir, have nothing to repay them ; nor, sir, can we procure them. Our numbers are daily increasing by emigration ; but this, sir, will not relieve us, when our credit is gone, and it is impossible to borrow money. If the imposts and duties in Virginia, even on the present footing, be very unproductive, and not equal to our necessities, what would they be if we were separated from the union? From the first of September, to the first of June, the amount, put into the treasury, is only fifty nine 118 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON thousand pounds, or a little more. But, sir, if smug gling be introduced in consequence of high duties, or otherwise, and the Potomac should be lost> what hope is there of getting money from these ? Shall we be asked if the impost would be bettered by the union ? I answer that it will, sir. Credit being restored and confidence diffused in the country, mer chants and men of wealth will be induced to come among us ; emigration will increase, and commerce will flourish : the impost will therefore be more sure and productive. Under these circumstances, can you find men to defend you ? If not men, where can you have a navy ? It is an old observation, that he, who commands at sea, will command the land ; and it is justified by modern experience in war. The sea can only be commanded by commercial nations. The United States have every means, by nature, to enable them to distribute supplies mutually among one an other, to supply other nations with many articles, and to carry for other nations. Our commerce would not be kindly received by foreigners, if transacted solely by our selves ; as it is the spirit of commercial nations to en gross as much as possible, the carrying trade : this makes it necessary to defend our commerce : but how shall we encompass this end? England has arisen to the greatest height, in modern times, by her navigation act and other excellent regulations. The same means would produce the same effects. We have inland navigation. Our last exports did not exceed one million of pounds. Our export trade is en tirely in the hands of foreigners. We have no manufac tures depend for supplies on other nations, and so far are we from having any carrying trade, that, as I have already said, our exports are in the hands of foreigners. Besides the profit that might be made by our natural materials, much greater gains would ac crue from their being first wrought before they were exported. England has reaped immense profits by this, nay, even by purchasing and working up those THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 119 materials which their country did not afford : her suc cess in commerce is generally ascribed to her naviga tion act. Virginia would not, incumbered as she is, agree to have such an act. Thus, for the want of a navy, are we deprived of the multifarious advantages of our natural situation ; nor is it possible, that if the union is dissolved, we ever should have a navy suffi cient either for our defence or the extension of our trade. I beg gentlemen to consider these two things our inability to raise and man a navy, and the dread ful consequences of the dissolution of the union. I will close this catalogue of the evils of the dissolu tion of the union, by recalling to your mind what pass ed in the year 1781. Such was the situation of our af fairs then, that the powers of a dictator were given to the commander in chief to save us from destruction. This shows the situation of the country to have been such, as made it ready to embrace an actual dictator. At some future period, will not our distresses impel us to do what the Dutch have done throw all power into the hands of a stadtholder ? How infinitely more wise and eligible, than this desperate alternative, is an union with our American brethren ? I feel myself so abhorrent to any thing that will dissolve our union, that I cannot prevail with myself to assent to it directly or indirectly. If the union is to be dissolved, what step is to be taken ? Shall we form a partial confederacy ; or, is it expected that we shall successfully apply to foreign alliance for military aid ? This last measure, sir, has ruined almost every nation that has used it ; so dreadful an example ought to be most cautiously avoid ed ; for seldom has a nation recurred to the expedient of foreign succor, without being ultimately crushed by that succor. We may lose our liberty and inde pendence by this injudicious scheme of policy. Admit ting it to be a scheme replete with safety, what nation shall we solicit France ? She will disdain a connex ion with a people in our predicament. I would trust every thing to the magnanimity of that nation, but she 120 MR. RANDOLPH'S' SPEECH OK would despise a people who had, like us, so imprudently separated from their brethren ; and, sir, were she to accede to our proposal, with what facility could she be come mistress of our country. To what nation then, shall we apply to Great Britain ? Nobody has as yet trusted that idea. An application to any other y must be either fruitless or dangerous ; to those who advocate local confederacies, and at the same time preach up for republican liberty, I answer, that their conduct is inconsistent ; the defence of such partial confederacies will require such a degree of force arid expense, as will destroy every feature of republicanism. Give me leave to say, that 1 see nought but destruc tion in a local confederacy. With what state can we confederate but North Carolina North Carolina, situ ated worse than ourselves ? Consult your own rea son : I beseech gentlemen most seriously to reflect on the consequences of such a confederacy : I beseech them to consider, whether Virginia and North Caroli na, both oppressed with debts and slaves, can defend themselves externally, or make their people happy in ternally. North Carolina having no strength but mili tia, and Virginia in the same situation, will make, I fear, but a despicable figure in history. Thus, sir, I hope that I have satisfied you, that we are unsafe with out an union, and that in union alone safety con sists. I come now, sir, to the great inquiry, whether the confederation be such a government as we ought to continue under ; whether it be such a government, as can secure the felicity of any free people. Did I be lieve the confederation was a good thread, which might be broken without destroying its utility entirely, I might be induced to concur in putting it together ; but I am so thoroughly convinced of its incapacity to be mended or spliced, that I would sooner recur to any other expedient. When I spoke last, I endeavored to express my sentiments concerning that system, and to apologize THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. J21 (if an apology was necessary,) for the conduct of its trainers that it was hastily devised, to enable us to repel a powerful enemy that the subject was novel and that its inefficacy was not discovered, till requisi tions came to be made by Congress. In the then situa tion of America, a speedy remedy was necessary to ward off the danger, and this sufficiently answered that purpose : but so universally is its imbecility now known, that it is almost useless for me to exhibit it at this time. Has not Virginia, as well .as every other state, acknowledged its debility, by sending delegates to the general convention ? The confederation is, of all things, the most unsafe, not only to trust to, in its present form, but even to amend. The object of a federal government, is to remedy and strengthen the weakness of its individual branches; whether that weakness arises from situation, or any other external cause. With respect to the first, is it not a miracle that the confederation carried us through the last war ? It was our unanimity, sir, that carried us through it. That system was not ultimately concluded till the year 1781 although the greatest exertions were made before that time. Then came requisitions of men and money : its defects then were immediately discovered : the quotas of men were readily sent not so those of money. One state feigned inability, another would not comply till the rest did ; and various excuses were of fered ; so that no money was sent into the treasury not a requisition was fully complied with. Loans were the next measure fallen upon : upwards of eighty millions of dollars were wanting, beside the emissions of dol lars, forty for one. These things show the impossibili ty of relying on requisitions. [Here Mr. Randolph enumerated the different delinquencies of different states, and the consequent distresses of Congress.] If the American spirit is to be depended upon, I call him to awake, to see how his Americans have been disgraced: but I have no hopes that things will be VOT,. F 1(> 1-22 MK. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH OX better hereafter. I fully expect things will be as they have been, and that the same derangements will pro duce similar miscarriages. Will the American spirit produce money or credit, unless we alter our system? Are we not in a contemptible situation are we not the jest of other nations ? But it is insinuated, by the honorable gentleman, that we want to be a grand, splendid and magnificent people : we wish not to become so : the magnificence of a royal court is not our object. We want govern ment, sir a government that will have stability, and give us security : for our present government is desti tute of the one, and incapable of producing the other. It cannot perhaps, with propriety, be denominated a government being void of that energy requisite to enforce its sanctions. I wish my country not to be contemptible in the eye's of foreign nations. A well regulated community is always respected. It is the internal situation, the defects of government, that at tract foreign contempt that contempt, sir, is too often followed by subjugation. Advert to the con temptuous manner, in which a shrewd politician speaks of our government. [Here Mr. Randolph quoted a passage from Lord Sheffield, the purport of which was, that Great Britain might engross our trade on her own terms : that the imbecility and inefficacy of our gene ral government were such, that it was impossible we could counteract her policy, however rigid or illiberal towards us, her commercial regulations might be.] Re flect but a moment on our situation. Does it not in vite real hostility ? The conduct of the British minis try to us, is the natural effect of our unnerved govern ment. Consider the commercial regulations between us and Maryland. Is it not known to gentlemen, that this state and that have been making reprisals 'on each other, to obviate a repetition of which, in some degree, these regulations have been made ? Can we not see from this circumstance, the jealousy, rivalship and hatred, that would subsist between them, in case THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ]23 this state was out of the union ? They are importing states, arid importing states will ever be competitors and rivals. Rhode Island and Connecticut have been on the point of war, on the subject of their paper mo ney Congress did not attempt to interpose. When Massachusetts was distressed by the late insurrection, Congress could not relieve her. Who headed that insurrection ? Recollect the facility with which it was raised, and the very little ability of the ring-leader, and you cannot but deplore the extreme debility of our merely nominal government; we are too despicable to be regarded by foreign nations. The defects of the confederation consisted principally in the want of pow er. It had nominally powers powers on paper, which it could not use. The power of making peace and war is expressly delegated to Congress ; yet the power of granting passports, though within that of making peace and war, was considered by Virginia as belong ing to herself. Without adequate powers, vested in Congress, America cannot be respectable in the eyes of other nations. Congress, sir, ought to be fully vest ed with power to support the union, protect the inter est of the United States, maintain their commerce, and defend them from external invasions arid insults, and internal insurrections ; to maintain justice, and pro mote harmony and public tranquillity among the states. A government, not vested with these powers, will ever be found unable to make us happy or respectable : how far the confederation is different from such a gov ernment, is known to all America. Instead of being able to cherish and protect the states, it has been unable to defend itself against the encroachments made upon it by the states : everyone of them has conspired against it Virginia as much as any. This fact could be proved by reference to actual history. I might quote the observations of an able modern author, (not because he is decorated with the name of author, but because his sentiments are drawn from human nature,) to prove the dangerous impolicy of withholding neces- 124 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON sary powers from Congress; but I shall at this time, fatigue the house, as little as possible. What are the powers of Congress ? They have full authori ty to recommend what they please : this recommenda tory power reduces them to the condition of poor supplicants. Consider the dignified language of the members of the American Congress May it please your high mightinesses, of Virginia, to pay your just, proportionate quota of our national debt : we humbly supplicate, that it may please you to comply with your federal duties ! We implore, we beg your obedience ! Js not this, sir, a fair representation of the powers of Congress ? Their operations are of no validity, when counteracted by the states. Their authority to re commend is a mere mockery of government. But the amendability of the confederation seems to have great weight on the minds of some gentlemen. To what point will the amendments go ? What part makes the most important figure? What part de serves to be retained ? In it, one body has the legisla tive, executive and judicial powers : but the want of efficient powers has prevented the dangers naturally consequent on the union of these. Is this union con sistent with an augmentation of their power ? Will you then amend it, by taking away one of these three powers? Suppose, for instance, you only vested it with the legislative and executive powers, without any control on the judiciary, what must be the result ? Are we not taught by reason, experience and govern mental history, that tyranny is the natural and certain consequence of uniting these two powers, or the le gislative and judicial powers, exclusively, in the same body ? If any one denies it, I shall pass by him, as an infidel not to be reclaimed. Wherever any two of these three powers, are vested in one single body, they must, at one time or other, terminate in the destruc tion of liberty. In the most important cases, the as sent of nine states is necessary to pass a law : this is too great a restriction, and whatever good conse- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. quences it may, in some cases, produce, yet it will prevent energy in many other cases ; it will prevent energy, which is most necessary on some emergencies, even in cases wherein the existence of the community depends on vigor and expedition. It is incompatible with that secrecy, which is the life of execution and dispatch. Did ever thirty or forty men retain a se cret? Without secrecy, no government can carry on its operations, on great occasions : this is what gives that superiority in action to the government of one. If any thing were wanting to complete this farce, it would be, that a resolution of the assembly of Vir ginia, and the other legislatures, should be necessary to confirm and render of any validity, the congression al acts : this would openly discover the debility of the general government to all the world. But, in fact, its imbecility is now nearly the same, as if such acts were formally requisite. An act of the assembly of Vir ginia, controverting a resolution of Congress, would certainly prevail. 1 therefore conclude, that the con federation is too defective to deserve correction. Let us take farewell of it, with reverential respect, as an old benefactor. It is gone, whether this house says so, or not. It is gone, sir, by its own weakness. I am afraid I have tired the patience of this house ; but I trust you will pardon me, as I was urged by the importunity of the gentleman, in calling for the reasons of laying the ground work of this plan. It is objected by the honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr. George Mason,) that a republican government is im practicable in an extensive territory, and the extent of the United States is urged, as a reason, for the rejec tion of this constitution. Let us consider the defini tion of a republican government, as laid down by a man who is highly esteemed. Montesquieu, so cele brated among politicians, says, " that a republican government is that, in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power ; a monarchical, that in which a single person governs, 126 MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH ON by fixed and established laws ; a despotic government, that in which a single person, without law, and with out rule, directs every thing, by his own will arid ca price." This author has not distinguished a republi can government from a monarchy, by the extent of its boundaries, but by the nature of its principles. He, in another place, contradistinguishes it, as a government of laws, in opposition to others, which he denominates a government of men. The empire, or government of laws, according to that phrase, is that, in which the laws are made with the free will of the people; hence then, if laws be made by the assent of the people, the government may be deemed free. When laws are made with integrity, and executed with wisdom, the question is, whether a great extent of country will tend to abridge the liberty of the people. If defensive force be necessary, in proportion to the extent of country, I conceive that, in a judiciously constructed government, be the country ever so extensive, its inhabitants will be proportionably numerous, and able to defend it. Ex tent of country, in my conception, ought to be no bar to the adoption of a good government. No extent on earth seems to me too great, provided the laws be wisely made and executed. The principles of repre sentation and responsibility, may pervade a large, as well as a small territory : and tyranny is as easily in troduced into a small, as into a large district. If it be answered, that some of the most illustrious and dis tinguished authors, are of a contrary opinion, I reply, that authority has no weight with me, till I am con vinced that not the dignity of names, but the force of reasoning, gains my assent. I intended to have shown the nature of the powers which ought to have been given to the general gov ernment, and the reason of investing it with the pow er of taxation, but this would require more time than my strength, or the patience of the committee, would now admit of. I shall conclude with a few observa tions, which come from my heart. I have labored for THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. J27 the continuance of the union the rock of our salva tion. I believe, that as sure as there is a God in Heaven, our safety, our political happiness and ex istence, depend on the union of the states ; and, that without this union, the people of this and the other states, will undergo the unspeakable calamities, which discord, faction, turbulence, war and bloodshed, have produced in other countries. The American spirit ought to be mixed with American pride pride to see the union magnificently triumph. Let that glorious pride, which once defied the British thunder, reani mate you again. Let it not be recorded of Ameri cans, that, after having performed the most gallant ex ploits, after having overcome the most astonishing dif ficulties, and after having gained the admiration of the world by their incomparable valor and policy, they lost their acquired reputation, their national con sequence and happiness, by their own indiscretion. Let no future historian inform posterity, that they wanted wisdom and virtue, to concur in any regular, efficient government. Should any writer, doomed to so disagreeable a task, feel the indignation of an honest historian, he would reprehend and recriminate our fol ly, with equal severity and justice. Catch the pre sent moment, seize it with avidity and eagerness, for it may be lost, never to be regained. If the union be n ow lost. I fear it will remain so forever. I believe gen tlemen are sine ere in their opposition, and actuated by pure motives : but when I maturely weigh the advan tages of theun'on, and dreadful consequences of its dissolution ; when I see safety on my right, and de struction on my left ; when I behold respectability and happiness acquired by the one, but annihilated by the other, I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of the for mer. I hope my weakness, from speaking .so long, will. apologize for my leaving this subject in so mutilat ed a condition. If a further explanation be desired, I shall take the liberty to enter into it more fully another time. SPEECH OF JAMES MADISON, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OP ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE, MR. CHAIRMAN, IN what I am about to otter to this assembly, 1 shall not attempt to make impressions by any ardent pro fessions of zeal for the public welfare : we know that the principles of every man will be, and ought to be judged, not by his professions and declarations, but by his conduct. By that criterion, I wish, in common with every other member, to be judged; and even though it should prove unfavorable to my reputation, yet it is a criterion from which I by no means would depart, nor could if I would. Comparisons have been made between the friends of this constitution, and those who oppose it. Although I disapprove of such comparisons, I trust, that in every thing that regards truth, honor, candor and rectitude of motives, the friends of this system, here, and in other states, are not inferior to its opponents. But professions of at tachment to the public good, and comparisons of par ties, at all times invidious, ought not to govern or in fluence us now. We ought, sir, to examine the con stitution exclusively on its own merits. We ought to inquire whether it will promote the public happiness : and its aptitude to produce that desirable object, ought to be the exclusive subject of our researches. MR. MADISON'S SPEECH, &c. In this pursuit, we ought to address our arguments not to the feelings and passions, but to those understand ings and judgments which have been selected, by the people of this country, to decide that great question, by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that gentlemen, in displaying their abilities on this occa sion, will, instead of giving opinions and making as sertions, condescend to prove and demonstrate, by fair and regular discussion. It gives me pain to hear gentlemen continually distorting the natural construc tion of language. Assuredly, it is sufficient if any hu man production can stand a fair discussion. Before I proceed to make some additions to the reasons which have been adduced by my honorable friend over the way, I must take the liberty to make some observa tions on what was said by another gentleman, (Mr. Henry.) He told us, that this constitution ought to be rejected, because, in his opinion, it endangered the public liberty, in many instances. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation let the dangers with which this system is supposed to be replete, be clearly pointed out. If any dangerous and unnecessa ry powers be given to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without proof without examination. If powers be necessary, appa rent danger is not a sufficient reason against conced ing them. He has suggested, that licentiousness has seldom produced the loss of liberty ; but that the ty ranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpa tions : but on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbulence, violence and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions, which, in republics, have more frequently than any other cause. VOL. i. 17 130 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON produced despotism. If we go over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and go to the sources of that diversity of sentiment which pervades its inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear, that the same causes may terminate here, in the same fatal effects, which they produced in those republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. In the progress of this discussion, it will perhaps appear, ihat the only pos sible remedy for those evils, and the only certain means of preserving and protecting the principles of republicanism, will be found in that very system which is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression. I must confess, that I have not been able to find his usual consistency, in the gentleman's arguments on this occasion. He informs us that the people of this country are at perfect repose ; that every man enjoys the fruits of his labor, peaceably and securely, and that every thing is in perfect tranquillity and safety. I wish sincerely, sir, this were true. But if this be real ly their situation, why has every state acknowledged the contrary? Why were deputies from all the states sent to the general convention? Why have com plaints of national and individual distresses been e.cho- ed and re-echoed throughout the continent ? Why has our general government been so shamefully dis graced, and our constitution violated? Wherefore have laws been made to authorize a change, and wherefore are we now assembled here ? A federal government is formed for the protection of its indivi dual members. Ours was itself attacked with impu nity. Its authority has been boldly disobeyed and openly despised. I think I perceive a glaring incon sistency in another of his arguments. He complains of this constitution, because it requires the con sent of at least three fourths of the states to intro duce amendments, which shall be necessarv for the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. happiness of the people. The assent of so many, he considers as too great an obstacle to the admission of salutary amendments, which he strongly insists, ought to be at the will of a bare majority, and we hear this argument, at the very moment we are called upon to assign reasons for proposing a constitution, which puts it in the power of nine states to abolish the pre sent inadequate, unsafe and pernicious confederation ! In the first case, he asserts, that a majority ought to have the power of altering the government, when found to be inadequate to the security of public happiness. In the last case, he affirms, that even three fourths of the community have not a right to alter a government, which experience has proved to be subversive of na tional felicity ; nay, that the most necessary and ur gent alterations cannot be made without the absolute unanimity of all the states. Does not the thirteenth article of the confederation expressly require, that no alteration shall be made without the unanimous con sent of all the states ? Can any thing in theory be more perniciously improvident and injudicious than this sub mission of the will of the majority to the most trifling minority ? Have not experience and practice actual ly manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be ex tremely impolitic ? Let me mention one fact, which I conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any one the smallest state in the union has obstructed every attempt to reform the government; that little member has repeatedly disobeyed and counteracted the general authority ; nay, has even supplied the ene mies of its country with provisions. Twelve states had agreed to certain improvements which were proposed, being thought absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of the general government ; but as these im provements, though really indispensable, could not, by the confederation, be introduced into it without the con sent of every state, the refractory dissent of that little state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concur- J32 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON rence in alterations of the confederation, must be known to every member in this convention ; it is therefore needless to remind them of them. Is it not self-evident, that a trifling minority ought riot to bind the majority ? Would not foreign influence be exert ed with facility over a small minority ? Would the ho norable gentleman agree to continue the most radi cal defects in the old system, because the petty state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them ? He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district where the seat of the government may be fixed. Would he submit that the representatives of this state should carry on their deliberations under the control of any one member of the union ? If any state had the power of legislation over the place where Congress should fix the general government, it would impair the dignity, and hazard the safety of Congress. If the safe ty of the union were under the control of any particu lar state, would not foreign corruption probably prevail in such a state, to induce it to exert its controlling in fluence over the members of the general government ? Gentlemen cannot have forgotten the disgraceful insult which Congress received some years ago. And, sir, when we also reflect, that the previous cession of par ticular states is necessary, before Congress can legis late exclusively any where, we must, instead of being alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it. But the honorable member sees great danger in the provision concerning the militia. Now, sir, this I conceive to be an additional security to our liberties, without diminishing the power of the states, in any considerable degree ; it appears to me so highly ex pedient, that I should imagine it would have found ad vocates even in the warmest friends of the present system. The authority of training the militia, and appointing the officers, is reserved to the states. But Congress ought to have the power of establishing a uniform system of discipline throughout the states; and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 133 insurrections, and repel invasions. These are the only cases wherein they can interfere with the militia ; and the obvious necessity of their having power over them in these cases, must flash conviction on any reflecting mind. Without uniformity of discipline, military bodies would be incapable of action : without a general con trolling power to call forth the strength of the union, for the purpose of repelling invasions, the country might be overrun, and conquered by foreign ene mies. Without such a power to suppress insurrec tions, our liberties might be destroyed by intestine faction, and domestic tyranny be established. The honorable member then told us, that there was no instance of power once transferred, being voluntarily renounced. Not to produce European ex amples, which may probably be done before the rising of this convention, have we not seen already, in seven states, (and probably in an eighth state,) legislatures surrendering some of the most important powers they possessed ? But, sir, by this government, powers are not given to any particular set of men they are in the hands of the people delegated to their representa tives chosen for short terms ; to representatives at all times responsible to the people, and whose situa tion is perfectly similar to their own : as long as this is the case, we have no danger to apprehend. W T hen the gentleman called to our recollection the usual effects of the concession of powers, and imputed the loss of liberty generally to open tyranny, I wish he had gone something further. Upon a review of history, he would have found, that the loss of liberty very often resulted from factions and divisions ; from local consi derations, which eternally lead to quarrels : he would have found internal dissensions to have more frequently demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition in rulers to retain any stipulated powers. [Here Mr. Madison enumerated the various means whereby nations had lost their liberties.] The power of raising and supporting armies is ex- 134 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON claimed against, as dangerous and unnecessary. I sincerely wish, sir, that there were no necessity for vesting this power in the general government. But suppose a foreign nation should declare war against the United States, must not the general legislature have the power of defending the United States ? Ought it to be known to foreign nations, that the general government of the United States of America has no pow er to raise or support an army, even in the utmost dan ger, when attacked by external enemies? Would not their knowledge of such a circumstance stimulate them to fall upon us ? If, sir, Congress be not invested with this power, any great nation, prompted by ambi tion or avarice, will be invited by our weakness to at tack us ; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans, would certainly be attended with success, when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar situation of this country, the multiplicity of its excellent inlets and harbors, and the uncommon facility of attacking it, however much he may regret the necessity of such a power, cannot hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may eluci date this argument. In the course of the late war, when the weak parts of the union were exposed, and many states were placed in the most deplorable situa tion by the enemy's ravages, the assistance of foreign nations was thought so urgently necessary for our protection, that the relinquishment of territorial advan tages was not deemed too great a sacrifice for the acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted with great reluctance even by those states who ex pected most advantages from it. The crisis, how ever, at length arrived, when it was judged necessary for the salvation of this country, to make certain ces sions to Spain ; whether wisely, or otherwise, is not for me to say ; but the fact was, that instructions were sent to our representative at the court of Spain, to em- Swer him to enter into negotiations for that purpose. >w it terminated is well known. This fact shows '; ; THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 135 the extremities to which nations will recur in cases of imminent danger, and demonstrates the necessity of making ourselves more respectable. The necessity of making dangerous cessions, and of applying to for eign aid, ought to be provided against. The honorable member then told us, that there are heart-burnings in the states that have assented to the new constitution, and that Virginia may, if she does not come into the measure, continue in amicable con federacy with those adopting states. I wish, as seldom as possible, to contradict the assertions of gentlemen ; but I can venture to affirm, without danger of being detected in an error, that there is the most conclusive evidence of the satisfaction of those states being every day augmented, and that, in that state where it was adopted only by a majority of nineteen, there is not, at this time, one fifth of the people dissatisfied. There are some reasons which induce us to conclude, that the grounds of proselytism extend every where ; its principles begin to be better understood ; and the in flammatory violence wherewith it was opposed by de signing, illiberal and unthinking minds, begins to sub side. I will not enumerate the causes from which, in my conception, the heart-burnings of a majority of its opposers have originated. Suffice it to say, that in all cases, they were founded on a misconception of the nature and tendency of the new government. Had it been candidly examined and fairly discussed, I believe, sir, that but a very inconsiderable minority of the peo ple of the United States would at any time have op posed it. With respect to the Swiss confederacy, which the honorable gentleman has proposed for our example, as far as historical authority may be relied upon, we shall find their government quite unworthy of our imitation. I am sure if the honorable member had sufficiently considered their history and govern ment, he never would have quoted their example in this place. He would have found, that instead of re specting the rights of mankind, their government, (at 136 MR. MADISON- S SPEECH ON ^ least that of several of their cantons,) is one of the vilest aristocracies that ever was instituted. The peasants of some of their cantons are more oppressed and degraded than the subjects of any monarch of Europe ; nay, almost as much so, as those of any eastern despot. It is a novelty in politics, that from the worst of systems, the happiest consequences should arise. For it is their aristocratical rigor, and the pe culiarity of their situation, that have so long supported their union. Without the closest compressment, dis memberment would unquestionably ensue, arid their powerful, ambitious neighbors, would immediately avail themselves of their least jarrings. As we are not circumstanced like them, however, no conclusive precedent can be drawn from their situation. I trust, the gentleman does not carry his idea so far as to re commend a separation from the adopting states. This government may secure our happiness ; this is at least as probable as that it shall be oppressive. If eight states have, from a persuasion of its policy and utility, adopted it, shall Virginia shrink from it, without a full conviction of its danger and inutility ? I hope she will never shrink from any duty : I trust she will not determine without the most serious reflection and de liberation. I confess to you, sir, that were uniformity of religion to be introduced by this system, it would, in my opin ion, be ineligible ; but I have no reason to conclude, that uniformity of government will produce that of re ligion. To the great honor of America, that right is perfectly free and unshackled among us. The gov ernment has no jurisdiction over it ; the least reflec tion will convince us, there is no danger to be feared on that ground. But we are flattered with the probability of obtain ing previous amendments. This point calls for the most serious care of the convention. If amendments are to be proposed by one state, other states have the same right, and will also propose alterations* These v -I' THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. cannot but be dissimilar, and opposite in their nature. I beg leave to remark, that the governments of the different states are in many respects dissimilar in their structure ; their legislative bodies are not similar ; their executives are still more different. In several of the states, the first magistrate is elected by the people at large ; in others, by joint ballot of the members of both branches of the legislature ; and in others again, in other different manners. This dissimilarity has oc casioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of gov ernment, which will, without many reciprocal conces sions, render a concurrence impossible. Although the appointment of an executive magistrate has not been thought destructive to the principles of democra cy, in any of the states, yet, in the course of the de bate, we find objections made to the federal execu tive : it is urged that the president will degenerate into a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of the honorable member, to explain the reasons of pro posing this constitution, and develope its principles ; but I shall postpone my remarks, till we hear the sup plement which he has informed us, he means to add to what he has already offered. Give me leave to say something of the nature of the government, and to show that it is perfectly safe and just, to vest it with the power of taxation. There are a number of opinions ; but the principal question is, whether it be a federal or a consolidated government. In order to judge properly of the question before us, we must consider it minutely, in its principal parts. I myself conceive, that it is of a mixed nature: it is, in a manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one ex press prototype in the experience of the world: it stands by itself. In some respects, it is a government of a federal nature : in others, it is of a consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the constitution is investigated, ratified and made the act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstand ing what the honorable gentleman has alledged, that VOL. i. 18 .J38 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON - this government is not completely consolidated ; nor is it entirely federal. Who are the parties to it ? The people not the people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereign ties. Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consoli dated government, the assent of a majority of the peo ple would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining states would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it. Were it such a govern ment as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this state, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it ; but, sir, no state is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the states adopt it, it will be then a government establish ed by the thirteen states of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed governments, is very mate rial. The existing system has been derived from the dependant, derivative authority of the legislatures of the states ; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a majority of the states cannot introduce amendments ; nor are all the states required for that purpose ; three fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The mem bers to the national house of representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the senate, its members are elected by the states in their equal and political capacity ; but had the gov ernment been completely consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by the people, in their indi vidual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated na ture, and this complication, I trust, will be found to THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS . j 39 exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere confederacy. If Virginia were separated from all the states, her power and authority would extend to all cases ; in like manner, were all powers vested in the general government, it would be a con solidated government : but the powers of the federal government are enumerated ; it can only operate iu certain cases : it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its ju risdiction. But the honorable member has satirized, with pe culiar acrimony, the powers given to the general gov ernment by this constitution. I conceive that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be necessary ; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the union. Let us consider the most important of these reprobated powers ; that of direct taxation is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode of. providing for them will be adopted. When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary, they will not be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those in power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult the conveniences of the peo ple, will cost them nothing, and in many respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor ? Not the expenses of their governments, but war. If this country should be engaged in war, (and I conceive we ought to provide for the possibility of such a case,) how would it be carried on ? By the usual means provided from year to year ? As our imports will be necessary for the ex penses of government, and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the means of defence ? How is it possible a war could be supported without money or credit ? And would, it be possible for government | 140 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON to have credit, without having the power of raising money ? No, it would be impossible for any govern ment, in such a case, to defend itself. Then, I say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordi nary exigencies, and give this power to the general government ; for the utter inutility of previous requisi tions on the states is too well known. Would it be possible for those countries, whose finances and reve nues are carried to the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an uncon trolled power of raising money ? Has it not been ne cessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of pro curing money? Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was known that her power to raise money was limited ? Has not France been obliged, on great occasions, to recur to unusual means, in or der to raise funds ? It has been the case in many countries, and no government can exist, unless its powers extend to make provisions for every contingen cy. If we were actually attacked by a powerful na tion, and our general government had not the power of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable : if the reve nues of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations. This must be obvious to every member here : I think, therefore, that it is ne cessary for the preservation of the union, that this power should be given to the general government. But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the power of direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy all subordinate authority ; that its increas ing influence will speedily enable it to absorb the state governments. I cannot bring myself to think that this will be the case. If the general government were wholly independent of the governments of the particu- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. lar states, then indeed, usurpation might be expected to the fullest extent : but. sir, on whom does this gene ral government depend ? It derives its authority from these governments, and from the same sources from which their authority is derived. The members of the federal government are taken from the same men from whom those of the state legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the federal represen tatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the general will never destroy the individual governments ; and this conviction must be strengthened by an atten tion to the construction of the senate. The represen tatives will be chosen, probably under the influence of the members of the state legislatures : but there is not the least probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the former. One hundred and sixty members representing this commonwealth in one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to the general legislature. Those who wish to become federal representatives, must de pend on their credit with that class of men who will be the most popular in their counties, who generally rep resent the people in the state governments : they can, therefore, never succeed in any measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend. So that on the whole, it is almost certain, that the deliberations of the members of the federal house of representatives, will be directed to the interests of the people of Ame rica. As to the other branch, the senators will be ap pointed by the legislatures, and though elected for six years, I do not conceive they will so soon forget the source from whence they derive their political exist ence. This election of one branch of the federal, by the state legislatures, secures an absolute dependence of the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one third, will lessen the facility of a combination, and preclude all likelihood of intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will attend to the inter- 142 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON csts of their constituent states. Have not those gen tlemen who have been honored with seats in Con gress, often signalized themselves by their attachment to their states ? Sir, I pledge myself that this gov ernment will answer the expectations of its friends, and foil the apprehensions of its enemies. I am persuaded that the patriotism of the people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties, and that the ten dency of the constitution will be, that the state gov ernments will counteract the general interest, and ul timately prevail. The number of the representatives is yet sufficient for our safety, and will gradually in crease ; and if we consider their different sources of information, the number will not appear too small. Sir, that part of the proposed constitution, which gives the general government the power of laying and collecting taxes, is indispensable and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well organized system of government : if we consult reason, and be ruled by its dictates, we shall find its justification there : if we re view the experience we have had, or contemplate the history of nations, there too we shall find ample rea sons to prove its expediency. It would be preposterous to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is fully possessed of the power of withholding them. If a government depends on other governments for its revenues ; if it must depend on the voluntary contribu tions of its members, its existence must be precarious. A government that relies on thirteen independent sovereignties, for the means of its existence, is a solecism in theory, and a mere nullity in practice. Is it con sistent with reason, that such a government can pro mote the happiness of any people ? It is subversive of every principle of sound policy, to trust the safety of a community with a government, totally destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members. Can Con gress, after the repeated, unequivocal proofs it has ex perienced of the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisi tions, reasonably expect, that they would be hereafter THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 143 effectual or productive ? Will not the same local in terests, and other causes, militate against a compli ance ? Whoever hopes the contrary must forever be disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause. Let each county in this commonwealth be supposed free and independent : let your revenues depend on requisitions of propor tionate quotas from them : let application be made to them repeatedly, and then ask yourself, is it to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate collection could be made from partial compliances ? It is now difficult to collect the taxes from them : how much would that difficulty be enhanced, were you to depend solely on their generosity ? I appeal to the reason of every gentleman here, and to his candor to say whether he is not persuaded, that the present con federation is as feeble as the government of Virginia would be in that case : to the same reason I appeal, whether it be compatible with prudence to continue a government of such manifest and palpable weakness and inefficiency. If we recur to history, and review the annals of man kind, I undertake to say, that no instance can be pro duced by the most learned man, of any confederate government, that will justify a continuation of the pre sent system ; or that will not, on the contrary, demon strate the necessity of this change, and of substituting to the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system now under consideration, or one equally energetic. The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of an cient and modern confederacies, is, that instead of pro moting the public happiness, or securing public tran quillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion ineffectual for the preserva tion of harmony, and a prey to their own dissensions and foreign invasions. The Amphictyonic league resembled our confedera tion in its nominal powers : it was possessed of rather more efficiency. The component states retained their 144 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON sovereignty, arid enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our pre sent system, yet it had the same radical defect. Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders, and final destruction. It was com pelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to foreign assist ance : by complying with that application, and employ ing his wiles and intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired sufficient influence to become a member of the league; and that artful and insidious prince soon after became master of their liberties. The Achaean league, though better constructed than the Amphictyonic, in material respects, was continu ally agitated with domestic dissensions, and driven to the necessity of calling in foreign aid ; this also event uated in the demolition of their confederacy. Had they been more closely united, their people would have been happier; and their united wisdom and strength would not only have rendered unnecessary all foreign interpositions in their affairs, but would have enabled them to repel the attack of any enemy. If we descend to more modern examples, we shall find the same evils resulting from the same sources. The Germanic system is neither adequate to the external defence, or internal felicity of the people ; the doctrine of quotas and requisitions flourishes here. Without energy without stability the empire is a nerveless body. The most furious conflicts, and the most implacable animosities between its members, strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and co-ope ration are incompatible with such an injudiciously constructed system. The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced for its stability ; but even there, dissensions and wars of THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 14;, a bloody nature, have been frequently seen between the cantons. A peculiar coincidence of circumstances contributes to the continuance of their political con* nexion. Their feeble association owes its existence to their singular situation. There is a schism this mo ment in their confederacy, which, without the necessity of uniting for their external defence, would immediately produce its dissolution. The confederate government of Holland is a further confirmation of the characteristic imbecility of such governments. From the history of this government we might derive lessons of the most important utility. [Here Mr. Madison quoted sundry passages from De Witt, respecting the people of Holland, and the war which they had so long supported against the Spanish monarch ; showing the impolitic and injudicious struc ture of their confederacy; that it was entirely desti tute of energy, because their revenues depended chief ly on requisitions ; that during that long war, the pro vinces of Guelderland and Overyssel had not paid their respective quotas, but had evaded altogether their payments ; in consequence of which, two sevenths of the resources of the community had never been brought into action; nor contributed in the least to wards the prosecution of the war : that the fear of pressing danger stimulated Holland and the other pro vinces to pay all the charges of the war : that those two provinces had continued their delinquencies ; that the province of Holland alone paid more than all the rest; still those provinces which paid up their propor tional shares, claimed from the failing states the amounts of their arrearages ; that the most fatal con sequences had nearly resulted from the difficulty of adjusting those claims, and from the extreme aver sion of the delinquent states to discharge even their most solemn engagements: that there are existing controversies between the provinces on this account at present ; and to add to the evils consequent upon requisitions, that unanimity and the revision and sane- VOL. i. 19 31 It. MADISON'S SPEECH O,\ tion of their constituents, were necessary to give va lidity to the decisions of the states general. He then proceeded,] Sir, these radical defects in their confe deracy must have dissolved their association long ago, were it not for their peculiar position circumscribed in a narrow territory ; surrounded by the most power ful nations in the world ; possessing peculiar advan tages from their situation; an extensive navigation and a powerful navy advantages which it was clear ly the interest of those nations to diminish or deprive them of. Their late unhappy dissensions were mani festly produced by the vices of their system. We may derive much benefit from the experience of that unhappy country. Governments, destitute of energy, will always produce anarchy. These facts are worthy the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. ^Poes not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lessons drawn from our own expe rience ? I most earnestly pray that America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instruc tive information she may derive from a contemplation of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a similar fate, by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprung. If the general govern ment is to depend on the voluntary contributions of the states for its support, dismemberment of the Unit ed States may be the consequence. In cases of immi nent danger, those states alone, more immediately ex posed to it, would exert themselves ; those remote from it, would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive. The general government ought therefore to be armed with power to defend the whole union. Must we not suppose, that those parts of America which are most exposed, will first be the scenes of war ? Those nations, whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power, and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and wealthy. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 147 must naturally be inclined to exert every means to prevent our becoming formidable. Will they not be impelled to attack the most exposed parts of the un ion ? Will not their knowledge of the weakness of our government stimulate them the more readily to such an attack ? Those parts to which relief can be afford ed with most difficulty, are the extremities of the coun try, and will be the first objects of our enemies. The general government, having no resources beyond what, are adequate to its existing necessities, will not be able to afford any effectual succor to those parts which may be invaded. In such a case, America must perceive the danger and folly of withholding from the union, a power suf ficient to protect the whole territory of the United States. Such an attack is far from improbable, and if it be actually made, it is difficult to conceive a possi bility of escaping the catastrophe of a dismember ment. On this subject we may receive an estimable and instructive lesson, from an American confedera cy; from an example which has happened in our country, and which applies to us with peculiar force, being most analogous to our situation. I mean that species of association or union which subsisted in New England. The colonies of Massachusetts, Bris tol, Connecticut and New Hampshire, were confede rated together. The object of that confederacy was primarily to de* fend themselves against the inroads and depredation? of the Indians. They had a common council, consist ing of deputies from each party, with an equality of suffrage in their deliberations. The general expendi tures and charges were to be adequately defrayed. Its powers were very similar to those of the confedera tion. Its history proves clearly, that a government, founded on such principles, must ever disappoint the hopes of those who expect its operations to be condu cive to public happiness. There are facts on record to prove, that instead of 148 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON answering the end of its institution, or the expectation of its framers, it was violated with impunity ; and only regarded when it coincided perfectly with the views and immediate interests of the respective parties. The strongest member of the union availed itself of its circumstances to infringe their confederacy. Mas sachusetts refused to pay its quotas. In the war be tween England and Holland, it was found particularly necessary to make more exertions for the protection of that country. Massachusetts being then more powerful and less exposed than the other colonies, refused its contribu tions to the general defence. In consequence of this, the common council remonstrated against the council of Massachusetts. This altercation terminated in the dissolution of their union. From this brief account of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a longer adherence to the latter. [Mr. Madison then recapitulated many instances of the prevalent persuasion of the wisest patriots of the states, that the safety of all America depended on union ; and that the government of the United States must be possessed of an adequate degree of energy, or that otherwise their connexion could not be justly denominated an union. He likewise enumerated the expedients that had been attempted by the people of America to form an intimate association, from the meeting at New York in the year 1754, downwards : that their sentiments on this subject had been uniform, both in their colonial and independent conditions ; and that a variety of causes had hitherto prevented the adoption of an adequate system. He then continued thus,] If we take experience for our guide, we shall find still more instructive direction on this subject. The weak ness of the existing articles of the union, showed itself during the war. It has manifested itself since the peace, f o such a degree as can leave no doubt in any rational. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 149 intelligent and unbiassed mind, of the necessity of an alteration : nay, this necessity is obvious to all America ; it has forced itself on the minds of the people. The com mittee has been informed, that the confederation was not completed till the year 1781, when a great portion of the war was ended ; consequently no part of the merit of the antecedent operations of the war could justly be attributed to that system. Its debility was perceived almost as soon as it was put in operation. A recapitulation of the proofs which have been expe rienced of its inefficacy, is unnecessary. It is most notorious, that feebleness universally marked its cha racter. Shall we be safe in another war in the same situation? That instrument required the voluntary contributions of the states, and thereby sacrificed some of our best privileges. The most intolerable and un warrantable oppressions were committed on the people during the late war. The gross enormity of those oppressions might have produced the most serious consequences, were it not for the spirit of liberty, which preponderated against every consideration. A scene of injustice, partiality and oppression, may bring heavenly vengeance on any people. We are now by our sufferings, expiating the crimes of the otherwise glorious revolution. Is it not known to every member of this committee, that the great princi ples of a free government were reversed through the whole progress of that scene? Was not every state harassed ? Was not every individual oppressed and subjected to repeated distresses ? Was this right ? Was it a proper form of government, that warranted, authorized, or overlooked, the most wanton violations of property ? Had the government been vested with complete power to procure a regular and adequate supply of revenue, those oppressive measures would have been unnecessary. But, sir, can it be supposed that a repetition of such measures would ever be ac quiesced in ? Can a government, that stands in need of such measures, secure the liberty, or promote the happi- J50 MK. MADISON'S SPEECH OK ness or glory of any country ? If we do not change this system, consequences must ensue that gentlemen do not now apprehend. If other testimony were neces sary, I might appeal to that which I am sure is very weighty, but which I mention with reluctance. At the conclusion of the war, that man who had the most ex tensive acquaintance with the nature of the country, who well understood its interests, and who had given the most unequivocal and most brilliant proofs of his attachment to its welfare when he laid down his arms, wherewith he had so nobly and successfully de fended his country, publicly testified his disapprobation of the present system, and suggested that some altera tion was necessary to render it adequate to the securi ty of our happiness. I did not introduce that great name to bias any gentleman here. Much as I admire and revere the man, I consider these members as not to be actuated by the influence of any man ; but I in troduced him as a respectable witness to prove that the articles of the confederation were inadequate, and that we must resort to something else. His modesty did not point out what ought to be done, but said, that some great change was necessary. But, sir, testimony, if wished for, may be found in abundance, and numer ous conclusive reasons may be urged for this change. Experience daily produced such irresistible proofs of the defects of that system, that this commonwealth was induced to exert her influence to meliorate it : she began that noble work, in which I hope she will per sist : she proposed to revise it ; her proposition met with the concurrence, which that of a respectable party will always meet. I am sure if demonstration were ne cessary on the part of this commonwealth, reasons have been abundantly heard in the course of this debate, manifold and cogent enough, not only to operate con viction, but to disgust an attentive hearer. Recollect the resolution of the year 1784. It was then found that the whole burden of the union was sustained by a few states. This state was likely to be saddled with I'HK FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. a very disproportionate share. That expedient was proposed to ohviate this inconvenience, which has been placed in its true light. It has been painted in sufficient horrors by the honorable gentleman who spoke last. I agree with the honorable gentleman, (Mr. Henry,) that national splendor and glory are not our objects : but does he distinguish between what will render us secure and happy at home, and what will render us re spectable abroad ? If we be free and happy at home, we cannot fail to be respectable abroad. The confederation is so notoriously feeble, that for eign nations are unwilling to form any treaties with us ; they are apprized that our general government cannot perform any of its engagements : but, that they may be violated, at pleasure, by any of the states. Our violation of treaties already entered into, proves this truth unequivocally. No nation will therefore make any stipulations with Congress, conceding any advan tages of importance to us ; they will be the more averse to entering into engagements with us, as the im becility of our government enables them to derive many advantages from our trade, without granting us any return. Were this country united by proper bands, in addition to other great advantages, we could form very beneficial treaties with foreign states. But this can never happen without a change in our system. Were we not laughed at by the minister of that nation, from which we may be able yet to extort some of the most salutary measures for this country ? Were we not told that it was necessary to temporize till our government acquired consistency ? Will any nation relinquish national advantages to us ? You will be greatly disappointed, if you expect any such good effects from this contemptible system. Let us recollect our conduct to that country from which we have re ceived the most friendly aid. How have we dealt with that benevolent ally France ? Have we complied with our most sacred obligations to that nation ? Have we 152 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON paid the interest punctually from year to year ? Is not the interest accumulating, while not a shilling is dis charged of the principal ? The magnanimity and forbearance of that friendly monarch are so great, that he has called upon us for his claims, even in his own distress and necessity. This, sir, is an additional mo tive to increase our exertions. At this moment of time, a very considerable amount is due from us to that country and to others. [Here Mr. Madison mentioned the amount of the debts due to different foreign na tions.] We have been obliged to borrow money, even to pay the interest of our debts. This is a ruinous and most disgraceful expedient. Is this a situation on which America can rely for security and happiness? How are we to extricate ourselves? The honorable mem ber tells us, we might rely on the punctuality and friend ship of the states, and that they will discharge their quotas for the future ; but, sir, the contributions of the states have been found inadequate from the beginning, and are every day diminishing instead of increasing. From the month of June, 1787, till June, 1788, they have only paid two hundred seventy six thousand six hundred and forty one dollars into the federal treasury for the purposes of supporting the national government, and discharging the interest of the national debts : a sum so very insufficient, that it must greatly alarm the friends of their country. Suggestions and strong as sertions dissipate before these facts. Sir, the subject of direct taxation is perhaps one of the most important that can engage our attention, or that can be involved in the discussion of this great and momentous question. If it be to be judged by the comments made upon it, by the opposers and favorers of the proposed system, it requires a most clear and critical investigation. The objections against the ex ercise of this power by the general government, as far as I am able to comprehend them, are founded upon the supposition of its being unnecessary, impracticable, unsafe and accumulative of expense. I shall therefore THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 153 consider, first, how far it may be necessary ; secondly, how far it may be practicable ; thirdly, how far it may be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at large, as to the state legislatures ; and fourthly, with respect to economy. First then, is it necessary ? I must acknowledge that 1 concur in opinion with those gentlemen who told you, that this branch of revenue was essential to the salvation of the union. It appears to me necessa ry, in order to secure that punctuality which is requi site in revenue matters. Without punctuality indi viduals will refuse it that confidence, without which it cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to consider the situation of this country, if unhappily the govern ment were to be deprived of this power. Let us sup pose for a moment that one of those great nations that may be unfriendly to us, should take advantage of our weakness, which they will be more ready to do when they know the want of this resource in our gov ernment, and should attack us, what forces could we oppose tcT.it ? Could we find safety in such forces as we could call out ? Could we call forth a sufficient number, either by drafts, or in any other way, to repel a powerful enemy ? The inability of the gov ernment to raise and support regular troops, would compel us to depend on militia. It would then be ne cessary to give this power to the government, or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief, that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the United States, it would at once flash conviction on the minds of the citizens, and show them, to their deep regret, the necessity of vesting the govern ment with this power, which alone can enable it to protect the community. I do not wish to frighten the members of this convention into a concession of this power, but to bring to their minds those conside rations which demonstrate its necessity. If we were secured from the possibility, or the probability of dan ger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that VOL. i 20 154 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON concourse of dangers which may probably arise at re mote periods of futurity, nor all those which we have immediately to apprehend ; for this would lead me be yond the bounds which I have prescribed to myself, feut I will mention one single consideration, drawn from fact itself. I hope to have your attention. By the treaty between the United States and his most Christian majesty, among other things it is stipu lated, that the great principle on which the armed neutrality in Europe was founded, should prevail in case of future wars. The principle is this, that free ships shall make free goods, and that vessels and goods shall be both free from condemnation. Great Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was against her, she held out without acceding to it. It has been considered for some time past, that the flames of war, already kindled, would spread, and that France and England were likely to draw those swords which were so recently put up. This is judged probable. We should not be surprised, in a short time, if we found ourselves as a neutral nation France being on one side, and Great Britain on the other. Then, what would be the situation of America ? She is remote from Europe, and ought not to engage in her politics or wars. The American vessels, if they can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the contending nations. It is a source of wealth which we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, sir, is there not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution, we shall be drawn into the war ? If American vessels have French property on board, Great Britain will seize them. By this means, we shall be obliged to re linquish the advantage of a neutral nation, or be en gaged in a war. A neutral nation ought to be respec table, or else it will be insulted and attacked. Ame rica, in her present impotent situation, would run the risk of being drawn in, as a party in the war, and lose the advantage of being neutral. Should it happen, that the British fleet should be superior, have we not THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 155 reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that nation to us and to all the world, that we should be in sulted in our own ports, and our vessels seized ? But if we be in a respectable situation ; if it be known that our government can command the whole resources of the union, we shall be suffered to enjoy the great ad vantages of carrying on the commerce of the nations at war ; for none of them would be willing to add us to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more on this point, there being others which merit your con sideration. The expedient, proposed by the gentlemen opposed to this clause, is, that requisitions shall be made, and if not complied with, in a certain time, that then taxa tion shall be recurred to. I am clearly convinced, that whenever requisitions shall be made, they will disappoint those who put their trust in them. One reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of delinquency in others. States will be governed by the motives that actuate individuals. When a tax law is in operation, in a particular state, every citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to enforce payment, and that every other citizen is per forming his duty, will cheerfully discharge his duty; but were it known, that the citizens of one district were not performing their duty, and that it was left to the policy of the government to make them come up with it, the citizens of the other districts would be very supine and careless in making provisions for pay ment. Our own experience makes the illustration more natural. If requisitions be made on thirteen dif ferent states, when one deliberates on the subject, she will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it also. This, sir, has been a principal cause of the inefficacy of requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce the same evil. If the legislatures are to deliberate on this subject, (and the honorable gentleman opposed to this clause, thinks their deliberation necessary,) is it not J56 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON presumable, that they will consider peculiar local cir cumstances ? In the general council, on the contrary, the sense of all America will be drawn to a single point. The collective interest of the union at large, will be known and pursued. No local views will be permitted to operate against the general welfare. But when propositions should come before a particu lar state, there is every reason to believe, that qualifica tions of the requisitions would be proposed; compli ance might be promised, and some instant remittances might be made. This will cause delays, which, in the first instance, will produce disappointment, and pro duce failures every where else. This, I hope, will be considered with the attention it deserves. The public creditors will be disappointed, and of course, become more pressing. Requisitions will be made for purposes equally pervading all America ; but the ex ertions to make compliances, will probably not be uni form in the states. If requisitions be made for future occasions for putting the states in a condition of military defence, or to repel an invasion, will the exertions be uniform and equal in all the states ? Some parts of the United States are more exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert themselves equally? We know that the most exposed will be more immedi ately interested, and will incur less sacrifices in making exertions. I beg gentlemen to consider, that this ar gument will apply with most effect to the states which are most defenceless and exposed. The southern states are most exposed, whether we consider their situation, or the smallness of their population. And there are other circumstances which render them still more vulnerable, which do not apply to the northern states. They are therefore more interested in giving the government a power to command the whole strength of the union in cases of emergency. Do not gentlemen conceive that this mode of obtaining sup plies from the states, will keep alive animosities be tween the general government and particular states ? THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 157 Where the chances of failures are so numerous as thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment, in the first place, and consequent animosity, must inevitably take place. Let us consider the alternatives, proposed by gen tlemen, instead of the power of laying direct taxes. After the states shall have refused to comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by Con gress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamors will be raised among the people against the government ; hatred will be excited against it. It will be regarded as an ignominious stigma on the state. It will be considered at least in this light by the state where the failure is made, and these senti ments will, no doubt, be diffused through the other states. Now let us consider the effect, if collectors are sent where the state governments refuse to com ply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition of mankind not to stop at one violation of duty. I conceive that every requisition that will be made on any part of America, will kindle a contention between the delinquent member, and the general government. Is there no reason to suppose divisions in the govern ment (for seldom does any thing pass with unanimity,) on the subject of requisitions ? The parts least ex posed will oppose those measures which may be adopted for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to presume, that the representatives from the delinquent states will be more likely to foster diso bedience to the requisitions of the government, than to endeavor to recommend a compliance with them to the public ? There is, in my opinion, another point of view in which this alternative will produce great evil. I will suppose a case that is very probable, namely, that par tial compliances will be made. A difficulty here arises, which fully demonstrates its impolicy. If a part be paid, and the rest be withheld, how is the ge neral government to proceed ? They are to impose a 158 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON tax, but how shall it be done in this case ? Are they to impose it by way of punishment, on those who have paid, as well as those who have not ? All these con siderations taken into view, (for they are not visionary or fanciful speculations,) will certainly produce this consequence. The general government, to avoid those disappointments first described, and to avoid the contentions and embarrassments which I have last described, will, in all probability, throw the public burdens on those branches of revenue that will be more in their power. They will be continually ne cessitated to augment the imposts. If we throw a dis proportion of the burdens on that side, shall we not discourage commerce, and suffer many political evils ? Shall we not increase that disproportion on the south ern states, which for some time will operate against us ? The southern states, from having fewer manu factures, will import and consume more. They will therefore pay more of the imposts. The more com merce is burdened, the more the disproportion will operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the power of the general government to lessen that inequality. But this in equality will be increased to the utmost extent, if the general government have not this power. There is another point of view in which this subject affords us instruction. The imports will decrease in time of war. An honorable gentleman has said, that the im posts would be so productive that there would be no occasion for laying taxes. I will submit two observa tions to him and to the committee. First, in time of war the imposts will be less ; and, as I hope we are considering a government for a perpetual duration, we ought to provide for every future contingency. At present, our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our sales, and to the number of our in habitants ; but when we have inhabitants enough, our imports will decrease ; and as the national demands will increase with our population, our resources will THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 159 increase as our wants increase. The other conside ration, which I will submit on this part of the subject, is this. I believe it will be found in practice, that those who fix the public burdens, will feel a greater degree of responsibility when they are to impose them on the citizens immediately, than if "they were to say what sum should be paid by the states. If they ex ceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and clamor will arise. Let us suppose they were to col lect the taxes from the citizens of America ; would they not consider their circumstances ? Would they not attentively weigh what could be done by the citi zens at large ? Were they to exceed in their demands, what were reasonable burdens, the people would im pute it to the right source, and look on the imposefs as odious. When I consider the nature of the various objections brought against this clause, I should be led to think, that the difficulties were such that gentlemen would not be able to get over them, and that the power, as defined in the plan of the convention, was impractica ble. I shall trouble them with a few observations on that point. It has been said, that ten men deputed from this state, and others in proportion from other states, will not be able to adjust direct taxes so as to accommo date the various citizens in thirteen states. I confess I do not see the force of this observation. Could not ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts from this state, lay direct taxes on a few objects in the most judicious manner ? It is easily to be con ceived, that they would be acquainted with the situa tion of the different citizens of this country. Can any one divide this state into any ten districts so as not to contain men of sufficient information ? Could not one man of knowledge be found in a district ? When thus selected, will they not be able to carry their know ledge into the general council ? I may say with great propriety, that the experience of our own legislature 160 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON demonstrates the competency of Congress to lay taxes wisely. Our assembly consists of considerably more than a hundred, yet from the nature of the business, it devolves on a much smaller number. It is through their sanction, approved of by all the others. It will be found that there are seldom more than ten men who rise to high information on this subject. Our fe deral representatives, as has been said by an honora ble member, who has entered into the subject with a great deal of ability, will get information from the state governments. They will be perfectly well in formed of the circumstances of the people of the dif ferent states, and the mode of taxation that would be most convenient for them, from the laws of the states. In laying taxes, they may even refer to the state sys tems of taxation. Let it not be forgotten, that there is a probability, that that ignorance, which is com plained of in some parts of America, will be continu ally diminishing. Let us compare the degree of knowledge which the people had in time past, to their present information. Does not our own experience teach us, that the people are better informed than they were a few years ago? The citizen of Georgia knows more now of the affairs of New Hampshire, than he did, before the revolution, of those of South Carolina. When the representatives from the differ ent states are collected together, to consider this sub ject, they will interchange their knowledge with one another, and will have the laws of each state on the table. Besides this, the intercourse of the states will be continually increasing. It is now much greater than before the revolution. An honorable friend of mine seems to conceive, as an insuperable objection, that if land' were made the particular object of taxa tion, it would be unjust, as it would exonerate the commercial part of the community ; that if it were laid on trade, it would be unjust in discharging the landholders ; and that any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair. If the general government. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. were tied down to one object, I confess the objection would have some force in it. But if this be not the case, it can have no weight. If it should have a gene ral power of taxation, they could select the most pro per objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner, as that they should fall in a due degree on every mem ber of the community. They will be limited to fix the proportion of each state, and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner to the public. The honorable member considered it as another insuperable objection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen states, and that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression. Perhaps it may not be found on due inquiry, to be so impractica ble as he supposes. But were it so, where is the evil of different laws operating in different states, to raise money for the general government ? Where is the evil of such laws ? There are instances in other coun tries, of different laws operating in different parts of the country, without producing any kind of oppres sion. The revenue laws are different in England and Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to custom, excises and trade, are similar ; but those re specting direct taxation are dissimilar. There is a land tax in England, and a land tax in Scotland, but the laws concerning them are not the same. It is much heavier in proportion in the former than in the latter. The mode of collection is different ; yet this is not productive of any national inconvenience. Were we to argue from the objections against the proposed plan, we must conclude that this dissimilarity would, in that point alone, have involved those kingdoms in difficulties. In England itself, there is a variety of different laws operating differently in different places. I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that concurrent collections under different authorities, were VOL. r. 21 162 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON not reducible to practice. I agree that were they in dependent of the people, the argument would be good. But they must serve one common master. They must act in concert, or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the people. If the general government be so constructed, that it will not dare to impose such burdens as will distress the people, where is the evil of its having a power of taxa tion concurrent with the states ? The people would not support it, were it to impose oppressive burdens. Let me make one more comparison of the state gov ernments to this plan. Do not the states impose taxes for local purposes ? Does the concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general pur poses, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial and county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression ? The collection of these taxes is perfect ly practicable, and consistent with the views of both parties. The people at large are the common superior of the state governments, and the general government. It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid interferences for two causes to avoid public oppres sion, and to render the collections more productive. I conceive they will be more likely to produce disputes, in rendering it convenient for the people, than to run into interfering regulations. In the third place, I shall consider, whether the pow er of taxation to be given to the general government be safe : and first, whether it be safe as to the public liber ty in general. It would be sufficient to remark, that it is, because, I conceive, the point has been clearly estab lished by more than one gentleman who have 'already spoken on the same side with me. In the decision of this question, it is of importance to examine, whether elections of representatives by great dis tricts of freeholders, be favorable to the fidelity of representatives. The greatest degree of treachery in representatives, is to be apprehended where they are chosen by the least number of electors : because there THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 163 is a greater facility of using undue influence, and be cause the electors must be less independent. This position is verified in the most unanswerable manner, in that country to which appeals are so often made, and sometimes instructively. Who are the most cor rupt members of Parliament ? Are they not the in habitants of small towns and districts ? The sup porters of liberty are from the great counties. Have we not seen that the representatives of the city of Lon don, who are chosen by such thousands of voters, have continually studied and supported the liberties of the people, and opposed the corruption of the crown ? We have seen continually, that most of the members in the ministerial majority are drawn from small cir cumscribed districts. We may therefore conclude, that our representatives being chosen by such ex tensive districts, will be upright and independent. In proportion as we have security against corrup tion in representatives, we have security against cor ruption from every other quarter whatsoever. I shall take a view of certain subjects which will lead to some reflections, to quiet the minds of those gen tlemen who think that the individual governments will be swallowed up by the general government. In order to effect this, it is proper to compare the state govern ments to the general government with respect to re ciprocal dependence, and with respect to the means they have of supporting themselves, or of encroaching upon one another. At the first comparison, we must be struck with these remarkable facts. The general government has not the appointment of a single branch of the individual governments, or of any officers within the states, to execute their laws. Are not the states integral parts of the general government ? Is not the president chosen under the influence of the state legis latures? May we not suppose that he will be com plaisant to those from whom he has his appointment, and from whom he must have his reappointment ? The senators are appointed altogether by the legisla tures. 164 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON The honorable gentleman apprehends a coalition between the president, senate and house of represen tatives, against the states. This could be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts. A coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their nature. The house of representatives is not chosen by the state governments, but under the influence of those, who compose the state legislature. Let us suppose ten men appointed to carry the government into ef fect ; there is every degree of certainty, that they would be indebted, for their re-election, to the members of the legislatures. If they derive their appointment from them, will they not execute their duty to them ? Be sides this, will not the people, (whose predominant interest will ultimately prevail,) feel great attachment to the state legislatures? They have the care of all local interests those familiar, domestic objects, for which men have the strongest predilection. The general government, on the contrary, has the preser vation of the aggregate interests of the union; ob jects, which being less familiar, and more remote from men's notice, have a less powerful influence on their minds. Do we not see great and natural attachments arising from local considerations ? This will be the case, in a much stronger degree, in the state govern ments, than in the general government. The people will be attached to their state legislatures from a thou sand causes : and into whatever scale the people at large will throw themselves, that scale will prepon derate. Did we not perceive, in the early stages of the war, when Congress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the object most dear to America, that they were attached to their states ? Afterwards, the whole current of their affection was to the states, and it would be still the case, were it not for the alarm ing situation of America. At one period of the congressional history, they had power to trample on the states. When they had that THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. fund of paper money in their hands, and could carry on all their measures without any dependence on the states, was there any disposition to debase the state governments ? All that municipal authority which was necessary to carry on the administration of the government, they still retained unimpaired. There was no attempt to diminish it. I am led, by what has fallen from gentlemen, to take this supposed combination in another view. Is it sup posed, that the influence of the general government will facilitate a combination between the members ? Is it supposed, that it will preponderate against that of the state governments ? The means of influence consist in having the disposal of gifts and emoluments, and in the number of persons employed by, and depen dent upon a government. Will any gentleman com pare the number of persons who will be employed in the general government, with the number of those that will be in the state governments? The number of dependants upon the state governments will be in finitely greater than those on the general government. I may say with truth, that there never was a more eco nomical government in any age or country ; nor which will require fewer agents, or give less influence. Let us compare the members composing the legis lative, executive and judicial powers in the general government, with those in the states, and let us take into view the vast number of persons employed in the states ; from the chief officers to the lowest, we shall find the scale preponderating so much in favor of the states, that while so many persons are attached to them, it will be impossible to turn the balance against them. There will be an irresistible bias towards the state governments. Consider the number of militia officers, the number of justices of the peace, the num ber of the members of the legislatures, and all the va rious officers for districts, towns and corporations, all intermixing with, and residing among the people at large. While this part of the community retaias its 166 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON affection to the state governments, I conceive the fact to be, that the state governments, and not the general government, will preponderate. It cannot be contra dicted, that they have more extensive means of influ ence. I have my fears, as well as the honorable gen tleman ; but my fears are on the other side. Expe rience, I think, wjdl prove, (though there be no infalli ble proof of it here,) that the powerful and prevailing influence of the states, will produce such attention to local considerations, as will be inconsistent with the advancement of the interests of the union. But I choose rather to indulge my hopes than fears, because I flatter myself, if inconveniences should result from it, that the clause which provides amendments will re medy them. The combination of powers vested in those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of the states. The powers of the general government relate to ex ternal objects, and are but few. But the powers in the states relate to those great objects which immediate ly concern the prosperity of the people. Let us ob serve also, that the powers in the general government are those which will be exercised mostly in time of war, while those of the state governments will be ex ercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of war will be little, compared to that of peace. I could not complete the view which ought to be taken of this sub ject, without making this additional remark, that the powers vested in the proposed government, are not so much an augmentation of authority in the general gov ernment, as a change rendered necessary, for the pur pose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it before. It cannot escape any gentleman, that this power in theory, exists in the confederation as fully as in this constitution. The only difference is this, that v now they tax states, and by this plan, they will tax in dividuals. There is no theoretic difference between the two. But in practice there will be an infinite dif ference between them. The one is an ineffectual THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 167 power : the other is adequate to the purpose for which it is given. This change was necessary for the pub- Jic safety. Let us suppose, for a moment, that the acts of Con gress, requiring money from the states, had been as ef fectual as the paper on the table : suppose all the laws of Congress had had complete compliance, will any gentleman say, that as far as we can judge from past experience, the state governments would have been debased, and all consolidated and incorporated in one system? My imagination cannot reach it. I con ceive, that had those acts the effect which all laws ought to have, the states would have retained their sovereignty. It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new expenses and burdens on the people. I believe it is not necessary here to make a comparison between the expenses of the present and of the proposed gov ernment. All agree that the general government ought to have power for the regulation of commerce. I will venture to say, that very great improvements, and very economical regulations will be made. It will be a principal object to guard against smuggling, and such other attacks on the revenue as other nations are subject to. We are now obliged to defend against those lawless attempts ; but from the interfering regu lations of different states, with very little success. There are regulations in different states which are un favorable to the inhabitants of other states, and which militate against the revenue. New York levies mo ney from New Jersey by her imposts. In New Jersey, instead of co-operating with New York, the legisla ture favors encroachments on her regulations. This will not be the case when uniform arrangements shall be made. Requisitions, though ineffectual, are unfriendly to economy. When requisitions are submitted to the states, there are near two thousand five hundred per sons deliberating on the mode of payment. All these, 168 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great proportion of every session, in every state, is employ ed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode. Let us suppose fifteen hundred persons de liberating on this subject. Let any one make a calcu lation ; and it will be found that a very few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public money, than one year of that of the general legisla ture. This is not all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers shall be vested in the general government, there will be less of that mutability which is seen in the legislation of the states. The consequence will be a great saving of expense and time. There is an other great advantage which I will but barely mention. The greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject, is a vicissitude of laws, and a continual shifting and changing from one object to another, that must expose the people to various inconveniences. This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men al ways have, and always will make an advantage. From whom is advantage made ? From the industrious far mers and tradesmen, who are ignorant of the means of making such advantages. The people will not be ex posed to these inconveniences under a uniform and steady course of legislation. But they have been so heretofore. Sir, it has been said, that by giving up the power of taxation, we should give up every thing ; that requisi tions ought to be made on the states, and that then, if they be not complied with, Congress should lay direct taxes by way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma which arises from this doctrine. Either requisitions will be efficacious or they will not. If they be effica cious, then I say, sir, we give up every thing as much as by direct taxation. The same amount will be paid by the people as by direct taxes. If they be not effica cious, where is the advantage of this plan ? In what respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences which we have experienced from requisitions ? The power THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 169 of laying direct taxes by the general government, is supposed by the honorable gentleman, to be chimeri cal and impracticable. What is the consequence of the alternative he proposes ? We are to rely upon this power to be ultimately used, as a penalty to com pel the states to comply. If it be chimerical and im practicable in the first instance, it will be equally so* when it will be exercised as a penalty. A reference has been made to concurrent executions, as an instance of the possibility of interference between the two gov ernments. But it may be answered, that under the state governments, concurrent executions cannot pro duce the inconvenience here dreaded, because they are executed by the same officer. Is it not in the power of the general government to employ the state officers ? Is nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every thing be immutably fixed in the constitution ? Where exclusive power is given to the union, there can be no interference. Where the general and state legislatures have concurrent power, such regulations will be made, as may be found necessary to exclude interferences and other inconveniences. It will be their interest to make such regulations. It has been said, that there is no similarity between petty corporations and independent states. I admit that, in many points of view, there is a great dissimilari ty, but in others, there is a striking similarity between them, which illustrates what is before us. Have we not seen in our own country (as has been already sug gested in the course of the debates,) concurrent collec tions of taxes going on at once, without producing any inconvenience ? We have seen three distinct collec tions of taxes for three distinct purposes. Has it not been found practicable and easy for collections of taxes, for parochial, county and state purposes, to go on at the same time ? Every gentleman must know, that this is now the case, and though there be a subordination in these cases which will not be in the general govern ment, yet in practice it has been found, that these differ- VOL. i. 22 170 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON ent collections have been concurrently carried on, with convenience to the people, without clashing with one another, and without deriving their harmony from the circumstance of being subordinate to one legislative body. The taxes will be laid for different purposes. The members of the one government, as well as of the other, are the agents of, and subordinate to, the people. I conceive that the collections of the taxes of the one will not impede those of the other, and that there can be no interference. This concurrent collection ap pears to me neither chimerical nor impracticable. Gentlemen compare resistance of the people to col lectors, to refusal of requisitions. This goes against all government. It is as much as to urge that there should be no legislature. The gentlemen who favored us with their observations on this subject, seemed to have reasoned on a supposition, that the general gov ernment was confined, by the paper on your table, to lay general uniform taxes. Is it necessary that there should be a tax on any given article throughout the United States ? It is represented to be oppressive, that the states who have slaves and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, who have them not, would escape. But does the con stitution on the table admit of this ? On the contrary, there is a proportion to be laid on each state, accord ing to its population. The most proper articles will be selected in each state. If one article in any state should be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate to its population. This is a con stitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds. If the taxes be not uniform, and the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal ? Does not the same principle hold in our state government in some degree ? It has been found inconvenient to fix on uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. parts are not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In both cases, the reciprocity of the prin ciple will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress the other. An honorable gentleman seems to suppose that Congress, by the possession of this ultimate power as a penalty, will have as much credit, and will be as able to procure any sums, on any emergency, as if they were possessed of it in the first instance ; and that the votes of Congress will be as competent to procure loans, as the votes of the British commons. Would the votes of the British house of commons have that credit, which they now have, if they were liable to be retarded in their operation, and perhaps rendered ultimately nu gatory as those of Congress must be by the proposed alternative ? When their vote passes, it usually re ceives the concurrence of the other branch, and it is known that there is sufficient energy in the government* to carry it into effect. But here,.the votes of Congress are, in the first place, dependent on the compliance of thirteen different bodies, and after non-compliance, are liable to be opposed and defeated, by the jealousy of the states against the exercise of this power, and by the opposition of the people, which may be expected, if this power be exercised by Congress after partial compliances. These circumstances being known. Congress could not command one shilling. He seems to think that we ought to spare the present generation, and throw our burdens upon posterity. I will not contest the equity of this reasoning, but 1 must say that good policy, as well as views of economy, strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply with our most solemn engagements. W r e must make effectual pro vision for the payment of the interest of our public debts. In order to do justice to our creditors, and sup port our credit and reputation, we must lodge power somewhere or other for this purpose. As yet the United States have not been able, by any energy contained in the old system, to accomplish this end. Our creditors have a right to demand the principal, but would be satisfied with a punctual payment of the interest If 172 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON we have been unable to pay the interest, much less shall we be able to discharge the principal. It ap pears to me, that the whole reasoning used on this occa sion shows, that we ought to adopt this system, in order to enable us to throw our burdens on posterity. The honorable member spoke of the decemviri at Rome, as having some similitude to the ten representatives who are to be appointed by this state. I can see no point of similitude here, to enable us to draw any conclusion. For what purpose were the decem viri appointed ? They were invested with a plenary commission to make a code of laws. By whom were they appointed by the people at large ? No ; my memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were ap pointed by the senate and composed of the most influ ential characters among the nobles. Can any thing be inferred from that against our federal representatives ? Who made a discrimination between the nobles and the people ? the senate. Those men totally pervert ed the powers, which were given them for the purpose above specified, to the subversion of the public liberty. Can we suppose that a similar usurpation might be made, by men appointed in a totally different manner ? As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I con ceive that no arguments drawn from that source, can apply to this government. I do not thoroughly com prehend the reasoning of the honorable gentleman, when he tells us, that the federal government will predo minate, and that the state interests will be lost ; when, at the same time, he tells us, that it will be a faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail as states, I conceive that state influence will prevail. If state in fluence under the present feeble government has pre vailed, I think that a remedy ought to be introduced by giving the general government power to sup press it. He supposes that any argument with respect to a future war between Great Britain and France is falla cious. The other nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality, while Great Britain opposed it. We THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 173 need not expect, in case of such a war, that we should be suffered to participate of the profitable emoluments of the carrying trade, unless we were in a respectable situation. Recollect the last war. Was there ever a war in which the British nation stood opposed to so many nations ? All the belligerent powers in Europe, with nearly one half of the British empire, were united against it. Yet that nation, though defeated, and humbled beyond any previous example, stood out against this. From her firmness and spirit in such des perate circumstances, we may divine what her future conduct may be. I did not contend, that it was neces sary for the United States to establish a navy for that sole purpose, but instanced it as one reason out of se veral, for rendering ourselves respectable. I am no friend to naval or land armaments in time of peace, but if they be necessary, the calamity must be submitted to. Weakness will invite insults. A respectable govern ment will not only entitle us to a participation of the ad vantages which are enjoyed by other nations, but will be a security against attacks and insults. It is to avoid the calamity of being obliged to have large ar maments, that we should establish this government. The best way to avoid danger, is to be in a capacity to withstand it. The imposts, we are told, will not diminish, because the emigrations to the westward will prevent the in crease of population. Gentlemen have reasoned on this subject justly, to a certain degree. I admit, that the imposts will increase till population becomes so great as to compel us to recur to manufactures. The period cannot be very far distant, when the unsettled parts of America will be inhabited. At the expiration of twenty-five years hence, I conceive, that in every part of the United States, there will be as great a popu lation as there is now in the settled parts. We see al ready, that in the most populous parts of the union, and where there is but a medium, manufactures are beginning to be established. Where this is the case. 174 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON the amount of importations will begin to diminish. Although the imposts may even increase during the term of twenty-five years, yet when we are preparing a government for perpetuity, we ought to found it on permanent principles, and not on those of a temporary nature. Holland is a favorite quotation with honorable mem bers on the other side of the question. Had not their sentiments been discovered by other circumstances, I should have concluded from their reasonings on this occasion, that they were friends to the constitution. I should suppose, that they had forgotten which side of the question they were defending. Holland has been called a republic, and a government friendly to liberty. Though it may be greatly superior to some other gov ernments in Europe, still it is not a republic, nor a de mocracy. Their legislature consists, in some degree, of men who legislate for life. Their councils consist of men who hold their offices for life, and who fill up offices and appoint their salaries themselves. The people have no agency, mediate or immediate, in the government. If we look at their history, we shall find, that every mischief which has befallen them, has re sulted from the existing confederacy. If the stadthold- er has been productive of mischief if we ought to guard against such a magistrate more than any evil, let me beseech the honorable gentleman to take no tice of what produced that, and of those troubles which interrupted their tranquillity from time to time. The weakness of their confederacy produced both. When the French arms were ready to overpower their repub lic, and the Hollanders were feeble in the means of de fence, which was principally owing to the violence of parties, they then appointed a stadtholder, who sus tained them. If we look at more recent events, we shall have a more pointed demonstration, that their po litical infelicity arose from the imbecility of their gov ernment. In the late disorders, the states were almost equally divided, three provinces on one side, three on THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 175 the other , and the other divided: one party inclined to the Prussians, and the other to the French. The situation of France did not admit of their interposing immediately in their disputes by an army ; that of the Prussians did. A powerful and large army marched into Holland and compelled the other party to surren der. We know the distressing consequences to the people. What produced those disputes and the ne cessity of foreign interference but the debility of their confederacy ? We may be warned by their example, and shun their fate, by removing the causes which pro duced their misfortunes. My honorable friend has referred to the transactions of the federal council with respect to the navigation of the Mississippi. I wish it was consistent with delica cy and prudence to lay a complete view of the whole matter before this committee. The history of it is singular and curious, and perhaps its origin ought to be taken into consideration. I will touch on some circumstances, and introduce nearly the substance of most of the facts relative to it, that I may not seem to shrink from explanation. It was soon perceived, sir, after the commencement of the war with Britain, that among the various objects that would aifect the happi ness of the people of America, the navigation of the Mississippi was one. Throughout the whole history of foreign negotiation, great stress was laid on its pre servation. In the time of our greatest distresses, and particularly when the southern states were the scene of war, the southern states cast their eyes around to be relieved from their misfortunes. It was supposed that assistance might be obtained for the relinquishment of that navigation. It was thought that for so sub stantial a consideration, Spain might be induced to af ford decisive succor. It was opposed by the northern and eastern states. They were sensible that it might be dangerous to surrender this important right, parti cularly to the inhabitants of the western country. But so it was, that the southern states were for it. and the 176 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON eastern states opposed it. Since obtaining that happy peace, which secures to us all our claims, this subject has been taken again into consideration, and delibe rated upon in the federal government. A temporary relinquishment has been agitated. Several members from the different states, but particularly from the northern, were for a temporary surrender, because it would terminate disputes, and at the end of the short period for which it was to be given, the right would re vert, of course, to those who had given it up. And for this temporary surrender some commercial advan tages were offered. For my part, I considered that this measure, though founded on considerations plau sible and honorable, was yet not justifiable but on grounds of inevitable necessity. I must declare, in jus tice to many characters who were in Congress, that they declared they never would agree to the measure, unless the situation of the United States was such as could not prevent it. On the whole, I am persuaded that the adoption of this government will be favorable to the preservation of the right to that navigation. Emigrations will be made from those parts of the United States which are settled, to those which are unsettled. If we afford pro tection to the western country, we shall see it rapidly peopled. Emigrations from some of the northern states have lately increased. We may conclude, that those who emigrate to that country, will leave behind them all their friends and connexions as advocates for this right. What was the cause of those states being the cham pions of this right, when the southern states were dis posed to surrender it ? The preservation of this right will be for the general interest of the union. The western country will be settled from the north as well as from the south, and its prosperity will add to the strength and security of the nation. I am not able to recollect all those circumstances which would be ne cessary to give gentlemen a full view of the subject. I THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION'. 177 can only add, that I consider the establishment of the new government to be the best possible means of se curing our rights as well in the western parts as else where. I will not sit down till I make one more observation on what fell from an honorable member. He said, that the true difference between the states, lies in this circumstance that some are carrying states, and others productive, and that the operation of the new gov ernment will be, that there will be a plurality of the former to combine against the interest of the latter* and that consequently it will be dangerous to put it in their power to do so. I would join with him in senti ment, if this were the case. Were this within the bounds of probability, I should be equally alarmed ; but I think that those states which are contradistin guished as carrying states, from the non-importing states, will be but few. I suppose the southern states will be considered by all, as under the latter descrip tion. Some other states have been mentioned by an honorable member on the same side, which are not considered as carrying states. New Jersey and Con necticut can by no means be enumerated among the carrying states. They receive their supplies through New York. Here then is a plurality of non-importing states. I could add another, if necessary. Delaware, though situated upon the water, is upon the list of non-carrying states. I might say that a great part of New Hampshire is so. I believe a majority of the people of that state receive their supplies from Massa chusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Might I not add all those states which will be admitted hereafter into the union ? These will be non-carrying states, and will support Virginia in case the carrying states should attempt to combine against the rest. This objection must therefore fall to the ground.* : The preceding speech is composed of several delivered by Mr. Madison during the session of the convention. COMPILER. VOL. I. 23 SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 7, 1788. MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE thought, and still think, that a full investiga tion of the actual situation of America, ought to pre cede any decision on this great and important ques tion. That government is no more than a choice among evils, is acknowledged by the most intelligent among mankind, and has been a standing maxim for ages. If it be demonstrated, that the adoption of the new plan is a little or a trifling evil, then, sir, I acknow ledge that adoption ought to follow : but, sir, if this be a truth, that its adoption may entail misery on the free people of this country, I then insist, that rejection ought to follow. Gentlemen strongly urge that its adoption will be a mighty benefit to us : but, sir, I am made of such incredulous materials, that assertions and declarations do not satisfy me. I must be con vinced, sir. I shall retain my infidelity on that subject till I see our liberties secured in a manner perfectly satisfactory to my understanding. There are certain maxims, by which every wise and enlightened people will regulate their conduct. There are certain political maxims, which no free people ought ever to abandon : maxims, of which the observ ance is essential to the security of happiness. It is Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH, &< ,-. 179 impiously irritating the avenging hand of heaven, when a people, who are in the full enjoyment of freedom, launch out into the wide ocean of human affairs, and desert those maxims which alone can preserve liberty. Such maxims, humble as they are, are those only which can render a nation safe or formidable. Poor little humble republican maxims have attracted the admi ration and engaged the attention of the virtuous and wise in all nations, and have stood the shock of ages. We do not now admit the validity of maxims, which we once delighted in. We have since adopted maxims of a different, but more refined nature ; new maxims, which tend to the prostration of republicanism. We have one, sir, that all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity. We have a set of maxims of the same spirit, which must be beloved by every friend to liberty, to virtue, to man kind our bill of rights contains those admirable maxims. Now, sir, I say, let us consider, whether the picture given of American affairs ought to drive us from those beloved maxims. The honorable gentleman, (Mr. Randolph,) has said, that it is too late in the day for us to reject this new plan. That system which was once execrated by the honorable member, must now be adopted, let its defects be ever so glaring. That honorable member will not accuse me of want of candor, when I cast in my mind what he has given the public,* and compare it to what has happened since. It seems to me very strange and unaccountable, that what was the object of his exe cration should now receive his encomiums. Some thing extraordinary must have operated so great a change in his opinion. It is too late in the day ! Gen- * Alluding to Mr. Randolph's letter on that subject, to the speaker of the house of delegate?. I BO MK. HENRY'S SPEECH ON tlemen must excuse me, if they should declare again and again, that it is too late, and I should think dif ferently. I never can believe, sir, that it is too late to save all that is precious. If it be proper, and, indepen dently of every external consideration, wisely construct ed, let us receive it : but, sir, shall its adoption, by eight states, induce us to receive it, if it be replete with the most dangerous defects ? They urge, that subsequent amendments are safer than previous amendments, and that they will answer the same ends. At present, we have our liberties and privileges in our awn hands. Let us not relinquish them. Let us not adopt this system till we see them secured. There is some small possibility, that should we follow the con duct of Massachusetts, amendments might be obtain ed. There is a small possibility of amending any government ; but, sir, shall we abandon our inesti mable rights, and rest their security on a mere possi bility ? The gentleman fears the loss of the union. If eight states have ratified it unamended, and we should rashly imitate their precipitate example, do we not thereby disunite from several other states ? Shall those who have risked their lives for the sake of union, be at once thrown out of it? If it be amended, every state will accede to it ; but by an imprudent adoption in its defective and dangerous state, a schism must inevitably be the consequence; I can never, therefore, consent to hazard our unalienable rights on an absolute uncertainty. You are told there is no peace, although you fondly flatter yourselves that all is peace no peace ; a general cry and alarm in the country ; commerce, riches and wealth vanished ; citizens going to seek comforts in other parts of the world; laws insulted; many instances of tyrannical legislation. These things, sir, are new to me. He has made the discovery. As to the administration of jus tice, I believe that failures in commerce, &c. cannot be attributed to it. My age enables me to recollect its progress under the old government. I can justify it by THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. saying, that it continues in the same manner in this state, as it did under the former government. As to other parts of the continent, I refer that to other gen tlemen. As to the ability of those who administer it, I believe they would not suffer by a comparison with those who administered it under the royal authority. Where is the cause of complaint if the wealthy go away ? Is this, added to the other circumstances, of such enormity, and does it bring such danger over this commonwealth, as to warrant so important, and so awful a change, in so precipitate a manner ? As to insults offered to the laws, I know of none. In this re spect, I believe this commonwealth would not suffer by a comparison with the former government. The laws are as well executed, and as patiently acquiesced in, as they were under the royal administration. Com pare the situation of the country; compare that of our citizens to what they were then, and decide whether persons and property are not as safe and secure as they were at that time. Is there a man in this com monwealth, whose person can be insulted with impuni ty ? Cannot redress be had here for personal insults or injuries, as well as in any part of the world; as well as in those countries where aristocrats and monarchs triumph and reign ? Is not the protection of property in full operation here ? The contrary cannot, with truth, be charged on this commonwealth. Those se vere charges which are exhibited against it, appear to me totally groundless. On a fair investigation, we shall be found to be surrounded by no real dangers. We have the animating fortitude and persevering alacrity of republican men, to carry us through misfor tunes and calamities. 'Tis the fortune of a republic to be able to withstand the stormy ocean of human vicis situdes. I know of no danger awaiting us. Public and private security are to be found here in the highest degree. Sir, it is the fortune of a free people, not to be intimidated by imaginary dangers. Fear is the passion of slaves. Our political and natural hemis- 182 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON pheres are now equally tranquil. Let us recollect the awful magnitude of the subject of our deliberation. Let us consider the latent consequences of an errone ous decision, and let not our minds be led away by unfair misrepresentations and uncandid suggestions. There have been many instances of uncommon lenity and temperance used in the exercise of power in this commonwealth. I could call your recollection to many that happened during the war and since, but every gentleman here must be apprised of them. The honorable member has given you an elaborate account of what he judges tyrannical legislation, and an ex post facto law in the case of Josiah Phillips. He has misrepresented the facts. That man was not executed by a tyrannical stroke of power; nor was he a Socrates. He was a fugitive murderer and an outlaw ; a man who commanded an infamous bandit ti, at a time when the war was at the most perilous stage. He committed the most cruel and shocking barbarities. He was an enemy to the human name. Those, who declare war against the human race, may be struck out of existence as soon as they are appre hended. He was not executed according to those beautiful legal ceremonies which are pointed out by the laws, in criminal cases. The enormity of his crimes did not entitle him to it. I am truly a friend to legal forms and methods ; but, sir, the occasion war ranted the measure. A pirate, an outlaw, or a com mon enemy to all mankind, may be put to death at any time. It is justified by the laws of nature and nations. The honorable member tells us then, that there are burnings and discontents in the hearts of our citizens in general, and that they are dissatisfied with their government. I have no doubt the honorable member believes this to be the case, because he says so. But I have the comfortable assurance, that it is a certain fact, that it is not so. The middle and lower ranks of people have not those illumined ideas, which the well- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 133 born are so happily possessed of; they cannot so rea dily perceive latent objects. The microscopic eyes of modern statesmen, can see abundance of defects in old systems; and their illumined imaginations discover the necessity of a change. They are captivated by the parade of the number ten ; the charms of the ten miles square. Sir, I fear this change will ultimately lead to our ruin. My fears are not the force of ima gination ; they are but too well founded. I tremble for my country : but, sir, I trust, I rely, and I am confi dent, that this political speculation has not taken so strong a hold of men's minds, as some would make us believe. The dangers which may arise from our geographi cal situation, will be more properly considered a while hence. At present, what may be surmised on the subject, with respect to the adjacent states, is merely visionary. Strength, sir, is a relative term. When I reflect on the natural force of those nations that might be induced to attack us, and consider the difficulty of the attempt and uncertainty of the success, and com pare thereto the relative strength of our country, I say that we are strong. We have no cause to fear from that quarter; we have nothing to dread from our neighboring states. The superiority of our cause would give us an advantage over them, were they so unfriendly or rash as to attack us. As to that part of the community, which the honorable gentleman spoke of as in danger of being separated from us, what in citement or inducement could its inhabitants have to wish such an event ? It is a matter of doubt whether they would derive any advantage to themselves, or be any loss to us by such a separation. Time has been, and may yet come, when they will find it their advan tage and true interest to be united with us. There is no danger of a dismemberment of our country, unless a constitution be adopted which will enable the gov ernment to plant enemies on our backs. By the con federation, the rights of territory are secured. No 184 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OX treaty can be made without the consent of nine states While the consent of nine states is necessary to the cession of territory, you are safe. If it be put in the power of a less number, you will most infallibly lose the Mississippi. As long as we can preserve our unaliena- ble rights, we are in safety. This new constitution will involve in its operation the loss of the navigation of that valuable river. The honorable gentleman can not be ignorant of the Spanish transactions. A treaty had been nearly entered into with Spain, to relinquish that navigation, and that relinquishment would abso lutely have taken place, had the consent of seven states been sufficient. The honorable gentleman told us then, that eight states having adopted this system, we cannot suppose they will recede on our account. 1 know not what they may do ; but this I know, that a people of infinitely less importance than those of Vir ginia, stood the terror of war. Vermont, sir,' withstood the terror of thirteen states. Maryland did not accede to the confederation till the year 1781. These two states, feeble as they are, comparatively to us, were not afraid of the whole union. Did either of these states perish ? No, sir, they were admitted freely into the union. Will not Virginia then be admitted ? I flatter myself that those states who have ratified the new plan of government will open their arms and cheerfully receive us, although we should propose certain amendments as the conditions on which we would ratify it. During the late war, all the states were in pursuit of the same object. To obtain that object, they made the most strenuous exertions. They did not suffer trivial considerations to impede its ac quisition. Give me leave to say, that if the smallest states in the union were admitted into it, after having unreasonably procrastinated their accession, the greatest and most mighty state in the union, will be easily admitted, when her reluctance to an immediate accession to this system is founded on the most rea sonable grounds. When I call this the most mighty THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 185 .state in the union, do I not speak the truth ? Does not Virginia surpass every state in the union, in number of inhabitants, extent of territory, felicity of position, and affluence and wealth ? Some infatuation hangs over men's minds, that they will inconsiderately precipitate into measures the most important, and give not a mo ment's deliberation to others, nor pay any respect to their opinions. Is this federalism ? Are these the be loved effects of the federal spirit, that its votaries will never accede to the just propositions of others ? Sir, were there nothing objectionable in it but that, I would vote against it. I desire to have nothing to do with such men as will obstinately refuse to change their opinions. Are our opinions not to be regarded ? I hope that you will recollect, that you are going to join with men who will pay no respect even to this state. Switzerland consists of thirteen cantons expressly confederated for national defence. They have stood the shock of four hundred years : that country has en joyed internal tranquillity most of that long period. Their dissensions have been, comparatively to those of other countries, very few. What has passed in the neighboring countries? wars, dissensions and in trigues Germany involved in the most deplorable civil war thirty years successively, continually con vulsed with intestine divisions, and harassed by for eign wars France with her mighty monarchy per petually at war. Compare the peasants of Switzer land with those of any other mighty nation : you will find them far more happy ; for one civil war among them, there have been five or six among other na tions : their attachment to their country, and to free dom, their resolute intrepidity in their defence, the consequent security and happiness which they have enjoyed, and the respect and awe which these things produced in their bordering nations, have signalized those republicans. Their valor, sir, has been active ; everything that sets in motion the springs of the hu man heart, engaged them to the protection of their in- VOL. T. 24 186 MH. HENRY'S SPEECH ON estimable privileges. They have not only secured their own liberty, but have been the arbiters of the fate of other people. Here, sir, contemplate the tri umph of republican governments over the pride of monarchy. I acknowledge, sir, that the necessity of national defence has prevailed in invigorating their councils and arms, and has been, in a considerable de- gree,*the means of keeping these honest people to gether. But, sir, they have had wisdom enough to keep together and render" themselves formidable. Their heroism is proverbial. They would heroically fight for their government, and their laws. One of the illumined sons of these times would not fight for those objects. Those virtuous and simple people have not a mighty and splendid president, nor enor mously expensive navies and armies to support. No, sir, those brave republicans have acquired their repu tation no less by their undaunted intrepidity, than by the wisdom of their frugal and economical policy? Let us follow their example, and be equally happy. The honorable member advises us to adopt a measure which will 4 es troy our bill of rights : for, after hear ing his picture of nations, and his reasons for aban doning all the powers retained to the states by the confederation, I am more firmly persuaded of the im propriety of adopting this * new plan in its present shape. I had doubts of the power of those who went to the convention ; but now we are possessed of it, let us exa mine it. When we trusted the great object of revising the confederation to the greatest, the best and most enlightened of our citizens, we thought their delibera tions would have been solely confined to that revision. Instead of this, a new system, totally different in its nature, and vesting the most extensive powers in Con gress, is presented. Will the ten men you are to send to Congress, be more worthy than those seven were ? If power grew so rapidly in their hands, what may it not do in the hands of others ? If those who go from THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 187 this state will find power accompanied with temptation, our situation must be truly critical. When about form ing a government, if we mistake the principles, or com mit any other error, the very circumstance promises that power will be abused. The greatest caution and circumspection are therefore necessary : nor does this proposed system in its investigation here, deserve the least charity. The honorable . member says, that the national government is without energy. I perfectly agree with him : and when he cried out union, I agreed with him : but I tell him not to mistake the end for the means. The end is union ; the most capital means, I suppose, are an army and navy : on a supposition I will ac knowledge this ; still the bare act of agreeing to that paper, though it may have an amazing influence, will not pay our millions. There must be things to pay debts. What these things are, or how they are to be produced, must be determined by our political wisdom and economy. The honorable gentleman alledges, that previous amendments will prevent the junction of our riches from producing great profits and emoluments, (which would enable us to pay our public debts,) by exclud ing us from the union. I believe, sir, that a previous ratification of a system notoriously and confessedly de fective, will endanger our riches ; our liberty; our all. Its defects are acknowledged ; they cannot be denied. The reason offered' by the honorable gentleman for adopting this defective system, is the adoption by eight states. I say, sir, that, if we present nothing but what is reasonable in the shape of amendments, they will re ceive us. Union is as necessary for them as for us. Will they then be so unreasonable as not to join us ? If such be their disposition, I am happy to know it in time. The honorable member then observed, that nations will expend millions for commercial advantages : that is, they will deprive you of every advantage if they can. 188 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON Apply this another way. Their cheaper way, instead of laying out millions in making war upon you. will be to corrupt your senators. I know that if they be not above all price, they may make a sacrifice of our commercial interests. They may advise your president to make a treaty that will not only sacrifice all your commercial interests, but throw prostrate your bill of rights. Does he fear that their ships will outnumber ours on the ocean, or that nations, whose interests come in contrast with ours, in the progress of their guilt, will perpetrate the vilest expedients to exclude us from a participation in commercial advantages ? Does he advise us, in order to avoid this evil, to adopt a constitution, which will enable such nations to obtain their ends by the more easy mode of contaminating the principles of our senators ? Sir, if our senators will not be corrupted, it will be because they will be good men; and not because the constitution provides against corruption; for there is no real check secured in it, and the most abandoned and profligate acts may with impunity be committed by them. With respect to Maryland, what danger from thence ? I know none. I have not heard of any hos tility premeditated or committed. Nine tenths of the people have not heard of it. Those who are so happy as to be illumined, have not informed their fellow-citi zens of it. I am so valiant as to say, that no danger can come from that source, sufficient to make me abandon my republican principles. The honorable gentleman ought to have recollected, that there were no tyrants in America, as there are in Europe : the citizens of republican borders are only terrible to ty rants : instead of being dangerous to one another, they mutually support one another's liberties. We might be confederated with the adopting states, with out ratifying this system. No form of government renders a people more formidable. A confederacy of states joined together, becomes strong as the United Netherlands. The government of Holland, (execrated THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. as it is,) proves that the present confederation is ade quate to every purpose of human association. There are seven provinces confederated together for a long time, containing numerous opulent cities and many of the finest ports in the world. The recollection of the situation of that country, would make me execrate monarchy. The singular felicity and success of that people, are unparalleled ; freedom has done miracles there in reclaiming land from the ocean. It is the richest spot on the face of the globe. Have they no men or money ? Have they no fleets or armies ? Have they no arts or sciences among them ? How did they repel the attacks of the greatest nations in the world ? How have they acquired their amazing in fluence and power ? Did they consolidate govern ment, to effect these purposes as we do ? No, sir, they have triumphed over every obstacle and difficulty, and have arrived at the summit of political felicity, and of uncommon opulence, by means of a confede racy ; that very government which gentlemen affect to despise. They have, sir, avoided a consolidation as the greatest of evils. They have lately, it is true, made one advance to that fatal progression. This misfortune burst on them by iniquity and artifice. That stadtholder, that executive magistrate, contriv ed it, in conjunction with other European nations. It was not the choice of the people. Was it owing to his energy that this happened ? If two provinces have paid nothing, what have not the rest done ? And have not these two provinces made other exertions ? Ought they to avoid this inconvenience, to have consolidated their different states, and have a ten miles square ? Compare that little spot, nurtured by liberty, with the fairest country in the world. Does not Holland pos- vsess a powerful navy and army, and a full treasury ? They did not acquire these by debasing the principles and trampling on the rights of their citizens. Sir, they acquired these by their industry, economy, and by the freedom of their government. Their commerce is the 190 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON most extensive in Europe : their credit is unequalled : their felicity will be an eternal monument of the bless ings of liberty ; every nation in Europe is taught by them what they are, and what they ought to be. The contrast between those nations and this happy people, is the most splendid spectacle for republicans: the greatest cause of exultation and triumph to the sons of freedom. While other nations, precipitated by the rage of ambition or folly, have, in the pursuit of the most magnificent projects, rivetted the fetters of bond age on themselves and their descendants, these repub licans have secured their political happiness and free dom. Where is there a nation to be compared to them ? Where is there now, or where was there ever a nation, of so small a territory, and so few in number, so powerful, so wealthy, so happy ? What is the cause of this superiority? Liberty, sir, the freedom of their government. Though they are now unhap pily in some degree consolidated, yet they have my acclamations, when put in contrast with those millions of their fellow-men who lived and died slaves. The dangers of a consolidation ought to be guarded against in this country. I shall exert my poor talents to ward them off. Dangers are to be apprehended in whatever manner we proceed : but those of a consoli dation are the most destructive. Let us leave no ex pedient untried to secure happiness ; but whatever be our decision, I am consoled, if American liberty will re main entire, only for half a century ; and I trust that mankind in general, and our posterity in particular, will be compensated for every anxiety we now feel. Another gentleman tells us, that no inconvenience will result from the exercise of the power of taxation by the general government ; that two shillings out of ten may be saved by the impost ; and that four shillings may be paid to the federal collector, and four to the state collector. A change of government will not pay money. If from the probable amount of the impost, you take the enormous and extravagant expenses, which TH FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 191 will certainly attend the support of this great con solidated government, I believe you will find no reduc tion of the public burdens by this new system. The splendid maintenance of the president and of the members of both houses ; and the salaries and fees of the swarm of officers and dependants on the gov ernment, will cost this continent immense sums. Double sets of collectors will double the expense. To these are to be added oppressive excise-men and custom house officers. Sir, the people have an hereditary ha tred to custom-house officers. The experience of the mother country leads me to detest them. They have introduced their baneful influence into the administra tion, and destroyed one of the, most beautiful systems that ever the world saw. Our forefathers enjoyed liberty there, while that system was in its purity, but it is now contaminated by influence of every kind. The style of the government, (we the people,) was introduced, perhaps, to recommend it to the people at large ; to those citizens who are to be levelled and de graded to the lowest degree, who are likened to a herd, and who, by the operation of this blessed sys tem, are to be transformed from respectable, indepen dent citizens, to abject, dependent subjects or slaves. The honorable gentleman has anticipated what we arc to be reduced to, by degradingly assimilating our citi zens to a herd. [Here Mr. Randolph rose, and declared that he did not use that word to excite any odium, but merely to convey the idea of a multitude.] Mr. Henry replied, that it made a deep impression on his mind, and that he verily believed, that system would operate as he had said. [He then continued] I will exchange that abominable word for requisitions ; requisitions which gentlemen affect to despise, have nothing degrading in them. On this depends our po litical prosperity. I never will give up that darling word, requisitions ; my country may give it up ; a ma jority may wrest it from me, but I will never give it up 192 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON till my grave. Requisitions are attended with one sin gular advantage. They are attended by deliberation. They secure to the states the benefit of correcting op pressive errors. If our assembly thought requisitions erroneous, if they thought the demand was too great, they might at least supplicate Congress to re consider, that it was a little too much. The power of direct taxation was called by the honorable gentleman the soul of the government : another gentleman called it the lungs of the government. We all agree, that it is the most important part of the body politic. If the power of raising money be necessary for the general government, it is no less so for the states. If money be the vitals of Congress, is it not precious for those individuals from whom it is to be taken ? Must I give my soul, my lungs, to Congress ? Congress must have our souls ; the state must have our souls. This is dis honorable and disgraceful. These two co-ordinate, interfering, unlimited powers of harassing the com munity, are unexampled unprecedented in history: they are the visionary projects of modern politicians : tell me not of imaginary means, but of reality : this po litical solecism will never tend to the benefit of the community. It will be as oppressive in practice as it is absurd in theory. If you part from this, which the honorable gentleman tells you is the soul of Congress, you will be inevitably ruined. I tell you, they shall not have the soul of Virginia. They tell us, that one col lector may collect the federal and state taxes. The general government being paramount to the state le gislatures, if the sheriff is to collect for both his right hand for the Congress, his left for the state his right hand being paramount over the left, his collections will go to Congress. We will have the rest. Deficiences in collections will always operate against the states. Congress being the paramount, supreme power, must not be disappointed. Thus Congress will have an un limited, unbounded command over the soul of this commonwealth. After satisfying their uncontrolled THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 193 demands, what can be left for the states ? Not a suf ficiency even to defray the expense of their internal administration. They must therefore glide impercep tibly and gradually out of existence. This, sir, must naturally terminate in a consolidation. If this will do for other people, it never will do for me. If we are to have one representative for every thirty thousand souls, it must be by implication. The con stitution does not positively secure it. Even say it is a natural implication, why not give us a right to that, proportion in express terms, in language that could not admit of evasions or subterfuges ? If they can use implication for us, they can also use implication against us. We are giving power ; they are getting power : judge then, on which side the implication will be used. When we once put it in their option to assume con structive power, danger will follow. Trial by jury, and liberty of the press, are also on this foundation of im plication. If they encroach on these rights, and you give your implication for a plea, you are cast ; for they will be justified by the last part of it, which gives them full power " To make all laws which shall be necessa ry and proper to carry their powers into execution." Implication is dangerous, because it is unbounded : it' it be admitted at all, and no limits be prescribed, it admits of the utmost extension. They say, that every thing that is not given is retained. The reverse of the proposition is true by implication. They do not carry their implication so far when they speak of the gene ral welfare. No implication when the sweeping clause comes. Implication is only necessary when the ex istence of privileges is in dispute. The existence of powers is sufficiently established. If we trust our dear est rights to implication, we shall be in a very unhap py situation. Implication in England has been a source of dissen sion. There has been a war of implication between the king and people. For one hundred years did the mother country struggle under the uncertainty of im- VOL, i 25 194 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON plication. The people insisted that their rights were implied: the monarch denied the doctrine. Their bill of rights in some degree terminated the dispute. By a bold implication, they said they had a right to bind us in all cases whatsoever. This constructive power we opposed, and successfully. Thirteen or fourteen years ago, the most important thing that eould be thought of, was to exclude the possibility of construction and implication. These, sir, were then deemed perilous. The first thing that was thought of, was a bill of rights. We were not satisfied with your constructive argumentative rights. Mr. Henry then declared, a bill of rights indispensa bly necessary ; that a general positive provision should be inserted in the new system, securing to the states and the people, every right which was not conceded to the general government ; and that every implica tion should be done away. It being now late, he con cluded by observing, that he would resume the sub ject another time. On the 9th, Mr. Henry continued his remarks as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, I find myself again constrained to trespass on the patience of this committee. I wish there was a pros pect of union in our sentiments ; so much time would not then be taken up. But when I review the magni tude of the subject under consideration, and of the dangers which appear to me in this new plan of gov ernment, and compare thereto my poor abilities to secure our rights, it will take much more time, in my poor unconnected way, to traverse the objectionable parts of it ; there are friends here who will be abler than myself, to make good these objections which to us appear well founded. If we recollect, on last Sa turday, I made some observations on some of those dangers, which these gentlemen would fain persuade us hang over the citizens of this commonwealth, to induce us to change the government, and adopt the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 195 new plan. Unless there be great and awful dangers, the change is dangerous, and the experiment ought not to be made. In estimating the magnitude of these dangers, we are obliged to take a most serious view of them, to feel them, to handle them, and to be fami liar with them. It is not sufficient to feign mere ima ginary dangers: there must be a dreadful reality. The great question between us is, does that reality exist ? These dangers are partially attributed to bad laws, execrated by the community at large. It is said the people wish to change the government. I should be happy to meet them on that ground. Should the people wish to change it, we should be innocent of the dangers. It is a fact, that the people do not wish to change their government. How am I to prove it? It will rest on my bare assertion, unless supported by an internal conviction in men's breasts. My poor say- so is a mere non-entity. But, sir. I am persuaded that four fifths of the people of Virginia must have amend ments to the new plan, to reconcile them to a change of their government. Our assertions form but a slip pery foundation for the people to rest their political salvation on. No government can flourish unless it be founded on the affection of the people. Unless gentle men can be sure, that this new system is founded on that ground, they ought to stop their career. I will not repeat what the gentlemen say, but will mention one thing. There is a dispute between us and the Spaniards, about the right of navigating the Mississippi. This dispute has sprung from the fede ral government. I wish a great deal to be said on thi? subject. I wish to know the origin and progress of the business, as it would probably unfold great dan gers. In my opinion, the preservation of that river calls for our most serious consideration. It has been agitated in Congress. Seven states have voted so as that it is known to the Spaniards, that under our ex isting system, the Mississippi shall be taken from them. Seven states wished to relinquish this river to then* J96 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON The six southern states opposed it. Seven states not being sufficient to convey it away, it remains now ours. If I am wrong, there are a number on this floor, who can contradict the facts ; I will readily retract. This new government, I conceive, will enable those states, who have already discovered their inclination that way, to give away this river. Will the honorable gentleman advise us to relinquish this inestimable na vigation, and place formidable enemies to our backs ? This weak, this poor confederation cannot secure us. We are resolved to take shelter under the shield of federal authority in America. The southern parts of America have been protected by that weakness so much execrated. I hope this will be explained. I was not in Congress when these transactions took place, I may not have stated every fact. I may have mis represented matters. I hope to be fully acquainted with every thing relative to the subject. Let us hear how the great and important right of navigating that river has been attended to ; and whether I am mistak en in my opinion, that federal measures will lose it to us forever. If a bare majority of Congress can make laws, the situation of our western citizens is dreadful. We are threatened with danger for the non-pay ment of the debt due to France. We have informa tion from an illustrious citizen of Virginia, who is now in Paris, which disproves the suggestions of such dan ger. This citizen has not been in the airy regions of theoretic speculation ; our ambassador is this worthy citizen. The ambassador of the United States of America, is not so despised as the honorable gentle man would make us believe. A servant of a republic is as much respected as that of a monarch. The ho norable gentleman tells us, that hostile fleets are to be sent to make reprisals upon us ; our ambassador tells you, that the king of France has taken into considera tion, to enter into commercial regulations on recipro cal terms with us, which will be of peculiar advantage to ns. Does this look like hostility ? I might go fur- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 197 fher; I might say, not from public authority, but good information, that his opinion is, that you reject this government. His character and abilities are in the highest estimation ; he is well acquainted, in every re spect, with this country ; equally so with the policy of the European nations. This illustrious citizen advises you to reject this government, till it be amended. His sentiments coincide entirely with ours. His attach ment to, and services done for this country, are well known. At a great distance from us, he remembers and studies our happiness. Living amidst splendor and dissipation, he thinks yet of bills of rights thinks of those little despised things called maxims. Let us follow the sage advice of this common friend of our happiness. It is little usual for nations to send armies to collect debts. The house of Bourbon, that great friend of America, will never attack her for the unwilling delay of payment. Give me leave to say, that Europe is too much engaged about objects of greater impor tance to attend to us. On that great theatre of the world, the little American matters vanish. Do you believe, that the mighty monarch of France, beholding the greatest scenes that ever engaged the attention of a prince of that country, will divert himself from those important objects, and now call for a settlement of ac counts with America ? This proceeding is not war ranted by good sense. The friendly disposition to us, and the actual situation of France, render the idea of danger from that quarter absurd. Would this coun tryman of ours be fond of advising us to a measure which he knew to be dangerous and can it be rea sonably supposed, that he can be ignorant of any pre meditated hostility against this country ? The honor able gentleman may suspect the account, but I will do our friend the justice to say that he would warn us of any danger from France. Do you suppose the Spanish monarch will risk a contest with the United States, when his feeble colo nies are exposed to them ? Every advance the people I J98 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON here make to the westward, makes him tremble for Mexico and Peru. Despised as we are among our selves under our present government, we are terrible to that monarchy. If this be not a fact, it is general ly said so. We are in the next place frightened by dangers from Holland. We must change our government to escape the wrath of that republic. Holland groans under a government like this new one. A stadtholder, sir, a Dutch president has brought on that country, miseries which will not permit them to collect debts with fleets or armies. The wife of a Dutch stadtholder brought one hundred thousand men against that republic, and prostrated all opposition. This president will bring miseries on us like those of Holland. Such is the con dition of European affairs, that it would be unsafe for them to send fleets or armies to collect debts. But here, sir, they make a transition to objects of another kind. We are presented with dangers of a very un common nature. I am not acquainted with the arts of painting. Some gentlemen have a peculiar talent for them. They are practised with great ingenuity on this occasion. As a counterpart to what we have already been intimidated with, we are told, that some lands have been sold which cannot be found ; and that this will bring war on this country. Here the picture will not stand examination. Can it be supposed, that if a few land speculators and jobbers have violated the principles of probity, that it will involve this country in war ? Is there no redress to be otherwise obtained, even admitting the delinquents and sufferers to be nu merous ? When gentlemen are thus driven to produce imaginary dangers, to induce this convention to assent to this change, I am sure it will not be uncandid to say, that the change itself is really dangerous. Then the Maryland compact is broken, and will produce peril ous consequences. I see nothing very terrible in this. The adoption of the new system will not remove the evil Will they forfeit good neighborhood with us, be- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 199 cause the compact is broken ? Then the disputes con cerning the Carolina line are to involve us in dangers. A strip of land running from the westward of the Allegany to the Mississippi, is the subject of this pretended dispute. I do not know the length or breadth of this disputed spot. Have they not regularly con firmed our right to it and relinquished all claims to it ? I can venture to pledge, that the people of Carolina will never disturb us. The strength of this despised country has settled an immense tract of country to the westward. Give me leave to remark, that the honorable gentleman's observations on our frontiers, north and south, east and west, are all inaccurate. Will Maryland fight against this country for seeking amendments ? Were there not sixty members in that state who went in quest of amendments ? Sixty against eight or ten were in favor of pursuing amendments. Shall they fight us for doing what they themselves have done ? They have sought amendments, but dif ferently from the manner in which I wish amendments to be got. The honorable gentleman may plume him self on this difference. Will they fight us for this dis similarity ? Will they fight us for seeking the object they seek themselves ? When they do, it will be time for me to hold my peace. Then, sir, comes Pennsylva nia, in terrible array. Pennsylvania is to go in conflict with Virginia. Pennsylvania has been a good neigh bor heretofore. She is federal something terrible : Virginia cannot look her in the face. If we sufficiently attend to the actual situation of things, we will con clude, that Pennsylvania will do what we do. A num ber of that country are strongly opposed to it. Many of them have lately been convinced of its fatal ten dency. They are disgorged of their federalism. I beseech you to bring this matter home to yourselves. Was there a possibility for the people of that state to know the reasons of adopting that system or under stand its principles, in so very short a period after its formation? This is the middle of June. Those 200 M&. HENRY'S SPEECH ON transactions happened last August. The matter was circulated by every effort of industry, and the most precipitate measures taken to hurry the people into an adoption. Yet now, after having had several months since to investigate it, a very large part of this commu nity -a very great majority of this community, do not understand it. I have heard gentlemen of re spectable abilities declare they did not understand it. If after great pains, men of high learning, who have received the aid of a regular education, do not understand it ; if the people of Pennsylvania under stood it in so short a time, it must have been from in tuitive understandings, and uncommon acuteness of perception. Place yourselves in their situation ; would you fight your neighbors for considering this great and awful matter ? If you wish for real amendments, such as the security of the trial by jury, it will reach the hearts of the people of that state. Whatever may be the disposition of the aristocratical politicians of that country, I know there are friends of human na ture in that state. If so, they will never make war on those who make professions of what they are attached to themselves. As to the danger arising from borderers, it is mutual and reciprocal. If it be dangerous for Virginia, it is equally so for them. It will be their true interest to be united with us. The danger of our being their ene mies, will be a prevailing argument in our favor. It will be as powerful to admit us into the union, as a vote of adoption without previous amendments could pos sibly be. Then the savage Indians are to destroy us. We cannot look them in the face. The danger is here di vided ; they are as terrible to the other states as to us : but, sir, it is well known that we have nothing to fear from them. Our back settlers are considerably stronger than they, and their superiority increases daily. Suppose the states to be confederated all around us, what we want in number, we shall make up THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 201 otherwise. Our compact situation and natural strength will secure us. But to avoid all dangers, we must take shelter under the federal government. Nothing gives a decided importance but this federal government. You will sip sorrow, according to the vulgar phrase, if you want any other security than the laws of Virginia. A number of characters of the greatest eminence in this country, object to this government, for its conso lidating tendency. This is not imaginary. It is a formidable reality. If consolidation proves to be as mischievous to this country, as it has been to other countries, what will the poor inhabitants of this country do ? This government will operate like an ambus- ca.de. It will destroy the state governments, and swal low up the liberties of the people, without giving them previous notice. If gentlemen are willing to run the hazard, let them run it ; but I shall exculpate myself by my opposition, and monitory warnings within these walls. But then comes paper money. We are at peace on this subject. Though this is a thing which that mighty federal convention had no business with, yet I acknowledge that paper money would be the bane of this country. I detest it. Nothing can justify a people in resorting to it, but extreme necessity. It is at rest, however, in this commonwealth. It is no longer solicited or advocated. Sir, I ask you, and every other gentleman who hears me, if he can restrain his indignation at a system, which takes from the state legislatures the care and preservation of the interests of the people ; one hun dred and eighty representatives^ the choice of the peo ple of Virginia, cannot be trusted with their interests. They are a mobbish, suspected herd. This country has not virtue enough to manage its own internal inter ests. These must be referred to the chosen ten. If we cannot be trusted with the private contracts of the citizens, we* must be depraved indeed. If he can prove, that, by one uniform system of abandoned princi ples, the legislature has betrayed the rights of the peo VOL. i. 26 202 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH Oft pie, then let us seek another shelter. So degrading an indignity so flagrant an outrage on the states so vile a suspicion is humiliating to my mind, and many others. Will the adoption of this new plan pay our debts ? This, sir, is a plain question. It is inferred, that our grievances are to be redressed, and the evils of the existing system to be removed by the new constitution. Let me inform the honorable gentleman, that no nation ever paid its debts by a change of government, with out the aid of industry. You never will pay your debts but by a radical change of domestic economy. At present, you buy too much, and make too little to pay. Will this new system promote manufactures, industry and frugality ? If, instead of this, your hopes and de signs will be disappointed, you relinquish a great deal, and hazard infinitely more for nothing. Will it enhance the value of your lands ? Will it lessen your burdens ? Will your looms and wheels go to work by the act of adoption ? If it will in its consequences produce these things, it will consequently produce a reform, and enable you to pay your debts. Gentlemen must prove it. I am a sceptic an infidel on this point. I cannot conceive that it will have these happy consequences. I cannot confide in assertions and al legations. The evils that attend us, lie in extrava gance and want of industry, and can only be removed by assiduity and economy. Perhaps we shall be told by gentlemen, that these things will happen, because the administration is to be taken from us, and placed in the hands of the luminous few, who will pay differ ent attention, and be more studiously careful than we can be supposed to be. With respect to the economical operation of the new government, I will only remark, that the national expenses will be increased if not doubled, it will ap proach it very near. I might, without incurring the imputation of illiberality or extravagance, say, that the expense will be multiplied tenfold. I might tell you THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 203 of a numerous standing army; a great, powerful navy ; a long and rapacious train of officers and de pendents, independent of the president, senators and representatives, whose compensations are without limitation. How are our debts to be discharged un less the taxes are increased, when the expenses of government are so greatly augmented ? The defects of this system are so numerous and palpable, and so many states object to it, that no union can be expected, unless it be amended. Let us take a review of the facts. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have re jected it. They have refused to become federal. New York and North Carolina are reported to be strongly against it. From high authority, give me leave to tell, that New York is in high opposition. Will any gentleman say that North Carolina is not against it ? They may say so, but I say that the adop tion of it, in those two states, amounts to entire un certainty. The system must be amended before these four states will accede to it. Besides, there are seve ral other states who are dissatisfied, and wish altera tions. Massachusetts has, in decided terms, proposed amendments ; but by her previous ratification, has put the cart before the horse. Maryland instituted a com mittee to propose amendments. It then appears, that two states have actually refused to adopt two of those who have adopted, have a desire of amending. And there is a probability of its being rejected by New York and North Carolina. The other states have acceded without proposing amendments. With re spect to them, local circumstances have, in my judg ment, operated to produce its unconditional, instantane ous adoption. The locality of the seat of government, ten miles square, and the seat of justice, with all their concomitant emoluments, operated so powerfully with the first adopting state, that it was adopted without taking time to reflect. We are told that numerous ad vantages will result from the concentration of the wealth and grandeur of the United States in one happy 204 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH OK spot, to those who will reside in or near it. Prospects of profit and emoluments have a powerful influence on the human mind. We, sir, have no such projects as that of a grand seat of government for thirteen states, and perhaps for one hundred states hereafter. Con necticut and New Jersey have their localities also. New York lies between them. They have no ports, and are not importing states. New York is an im porting state, and taking advantage of its situation, makes them pay duties for all the articles of their con sumption : thus, these two states being obliged to im port all they want, through the medium of New York, pay the particular taxes of that state. 1 know the force and effect of reasoning- of this sort, by experience. When the impost was proposed some years ago, those states which were not importing states, readily agreed to concede to Congress, the power of laying an impost on all goods imported for the use of the continental treasury. Connecticut and New Jersey therefore, are influenced by advantages of trade in their adoption. The amounts of all imposts are to go into one common treasury. This favors adoption by the non-importing states ; as they participate in the profits which were before exclusively enjoyed by the importing states. Notwithstanding this obvious advantage to Connecti cut, there is a formidable minority there against it. After taking this general review of American affairs, as respecting federalism, will the honorable gentleman tell me, that he can expect union in America ? When so many states are pointedly against it; when two adopting states have pointed out, in express terms, their dissatisfaction as it stands ; and when there is so respectable a body of men discontented in every state, can the honorable gentleman promise himself harmony, of which he is so fond ? If he can, I cannot. To me it appears unequivocally clear, that we shall not have that harmony. If it appears to the other states, that our aversion is founded on just grounds, will they not be willing to indulge us ? If disunion will really result THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 205 from Virginia's proposing amendments, will they not wish the re-establishment of the union, and admit us. if not on such terms as we prescribe, yet on advanta geous terms ? Is not union as essential to their happiness, as to ours ? Sir, without a radical altera tion, the states will never be embraced in one fe deral pale. If you attempt to force it down men's throats and call it union, dreadful consequences must follow. He has said a great deal about disunion and the dangers that are to arise from it. When we are on the subject of union and dangers, let me ask, how will his present doctrine hold with what has happened ? Is it consistent with that noble and disinterested conduct, which he displayed on a former occasion ? Did he not tell us that he withheld his signature ? Where then were the dangers which now appear to him so formi dable ? He saw all America eagerly confiding that the result of their deliberations would remove their distresses. He saw all America acting under the im pulses of hope, expectation and anxiety, arising from their situation and their partiality for the members of that convention: yet his enlightened mind, knowing that system to be defective, magnanimously and nobly refused its approbation. He was not led by the il lumined the illustrious few. He was actuated by the dictates of his own judgment ; and a better judgment than I can form. He did not stand out of the way of information. He must have been possessed of every intelligence. What alteration have a few months brought about ? The internal difference between right and wrong does not fluctuate. It is immutable. I ask this question as a public man, and out of no par ticular view. I wish, as such, to consult every source of information, to form my judgment on so awful a question. I had the highest respect for the honorable gentleman's abilities. I considered his opinion as a great authority. He taught me, sir, in despite of the approbation of that great federal convention, to doubt 206 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON of the propriety of that system. When I found my honorable friend in the number of those who doubted, I began to doubt also. I coincided with him in opinion. I shall be a staunch and faithful disciple of his. I ap plaud that magnanimity which led him to withhold his signature. If he thinks now differently, he is as free as I am. Such is my situation, that as a poor individu al, I look for information every where. This government is so new, it wants a name. I wish its other novelties were as harmless as this. He told us, we had an American dictator in the year 1781. We never had an American President. In making a dic tator, we follow the example of the most glorious, mag nanimous and skilful nations. In great dangers this power has been given. Rome had furnished us with an illustrious example. America found a person wor thy of that trust : she looked to Virginia for him. We gave a dictatorial power to hands that used it gloriously ; and which were rendered more glorious by surrendering it up. Where is there a breed of such dictators ? Shall we find a set of American presidents of such a breed ? Will the American President come and lay prostrate at the feet of Congress his laurels ? I fear there are few men who can be trusted on that head. The glorious republic of Holland has erected monuments to her warlike intrepidity and valor : yet she is now totally ruined by a stadtholder ; a Dutch president. The destructive wars into which that na tion has been plunged, has since involved her in ambi tion. The glorious triumphs of Blenheim and Ra- millies were not so conformable to the genius, nor so much to the true interest of the republic, as those nu merous and useful canals and dykes, and other objects at which ambition spurns. That republic has, however, by the industry of its inhabitants, and policy of its ma gistrates, suppressed the ill effects of ambition. Not withstanding two of their provinces have paid nothing, yet I hope the example of Holland will tell us, that we can live happily without changing our present despis- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 207 ed government. Cannot people be as happy under a mild, as under an energetic government ? Cannot content and felicity be enjoyed in a republic, as well as in a monarchy, because there are whips, chains and scourges used in the latter ? If I am not as rich as my neighbor, if I give my mite, my all, republican forbear ance will say, that it is sufficient. So said the honest confederates of Holland : " You are poor ; we are rich. We will go on and do better, far better, than be under an oppressive government." Far better will it be for us to continue as we are, than go under that tight, energetic government. I am persuaded of what the honorable gentleman says, that separate confede racies will ruin us. In my judgment, they are evils never to be thought of till a people are driven by neces sity. When he asks my opinion of consolidation, of one power to reign over America, with a strong hand, I will tell him, I am persuaded of the rectitude of my honorable friend's opinion, (Mr. Mason,) that one gov ernment cannot reign over so extensive a country as this is, without absolute despotism. Compared to such a consolidation, small confederacies are little evils, though they ought to be rucurred to, but in case of necessity. Virginia and North Carolina are despis ed. They could exist separated from the rest of Ame rica. Maryland and Vermont were not overrun when out of the confederacy. Though it is not a desirable object, yet, I trust, that on examination it will be found, that Virginia and North Carolina would not be swal lowed up in case it was necessary for them to be join ed together. When we come to the spirit of domestic peace, the humble genius of Virginia has formed a government, suitable to the genius of her people. I believe the hands, that formed the American constitution, triumph in the experiment. It proves, that the man who form ed it, and perhaps by accident, did what design could not do in other parts of the world. After all your reforms in government, unless you consult the genius of the 208 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON inhabitants, you will never succeed ; your system can have no duration. Let me appeal to the candor of the committee, if the want of money be not the source of all our misfortunes. We cannot be blamed for not making dollars. This want of money cannot be sup plied by changes in government. The only possible remedy, as I have before asserted, is industry aided by economy. Compare the genius of the people with the government of this country. Let me remark, that it stood the severest conflict, during the war, to which human virtue has ever been called. I call upon every gentleman here to declare, whether the king of England had any subjects so attached to his family and gov ernment so loyal as we were. But the genius of Virginia called us for liberty ; called us from those beloved endearments, which, from long habits, we were taught to love and revere. We entertained from our earliest infancy, the most sincere regard and reve rence for the mother country. Our partiality extend ed to a predilection for her customs, habits, manners and laws. Thus inclined, when the deprivation of our liberty was attempted, what did we do ? What did the genius of Virginia tell us ? " Sell all and purchase li berty." This was a severe conflict. Republican maxims were then esteemed. Those maxims, and the genius of Virginia, landed you safe on the shore of freedom. On this awful occasion, did you want a fe deral government? Did federal ideas possess your minds ? Did federal ideas lead you to the most splen did victories ? I must again repeat the favorite idea, that the genius of Virginia did, and will again lead us to happiness. To obtain the most splendid prize, you did not consolidate. You accomplished the most glo rious ends, by the assistance of the genius of your coun try. Men were then taught by that genius, that they were fighting for what was most dear to them. View the most affectionate father, the most tender mother, operated on by liberty, nobly stimulating their sons, their dearest sons, sometimes their only son, to ad- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 2 09 vunce to the defence of his country. We have seen sons of Cincinnatus, without splendid magnificence or parade, going, with the genius of their great progeni tor Cincinnatus, to the plough men who served their country without ruining it ; men who had served it to the destruction of their private patrimonies ; their country owing them amazing amounts, for the pay ment of which no adequate provision was then made. We have seen such men throw prostrate their arms at your feet. They did not call for those emoluments, which ambition presents to some imaginations. The soldiers, who were able to command every thing, in stead of trampling on those laws, which they were in stituted to defend, most strictly obeyed them. The hands of justice have not been laid on a single Ameri can soldier. Bring them into contrast with European veterans you will see an astonishing superiority over the latter. There has been a strict subordination to the laws. The honorable gentleman's office gave him an opportunity of viewing if the laws were administer ed so as to prevent riots, routs and unlawful assemblies. From his then situation, he could have furnished UF with the instances in which licentiousness trampled on the laws. Among all our troubles, we have paid almost to the last shilling, for the sake of justice : we have paid as well as any state ; I will not say better. To sup port the general government and our own legislature ; to pay the interest of the public debts, and defray con tingencies, we have been heavily taxed. To add to these things, the distresses produced by paper money, and by tobacco contracts, were sufficient to render any people discontented. These, sir, were great temptations ; but in the most severe conflict of misfor tunes, this code of laws this genius of Virginia, call it what you will, triumphed over every thing. Why did it please the gentleman, (Mr. Corbin,) to bestow such epithets on our country ? Have the worms taken possession of the wood, that our strong vessel our political vessel, has sprung a leak ? He VOL. i. 27 Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH ON may know better than I, but I consider such epithets to be the most illiberal and unwarrantable aspersions on our laws. The system of laws under which we have lived, has been tried and found to suit our genius. I trust we shall not change this happy system. I can not so easily take leave of an old friend. Till I see him following after and pursuing other objects, which can pervert the great objects of human legislation, pardon me if I withhold my assent. Some here speak of the difficulty in forming a new code of laws. Young as we were, it was not wonder ful if there was a difficulty in forming and assimilating one system of laws. I shall be obliged to the gentle man, if he would point out those glaring, those great faults. The efforts of assimilating our laws to our genius have not been found altogether vain. I shall pass over some other circumstances which I intended to mention, and endeavor to come to the capital objec tion, which my honorable friend made. My worthy friend said, that a republican form of government would not suit a very extensive country ; but that if a government were judiciously organized and limits pre scribed to it; an attention to these principles might render it possible for it to exist in an extensive territo ry. Whoever will be bold to say, that a continent can be governed by that system, contradicts all the expe rience of the world. It is a work too great for human wisdom. Let me call for an example. Experience has been called the best teacher. I call for an exam ple of a great extent of country, governed by one gov ernment, or Congress, call it what you will. I tell him that a government may be trimmed up according to gentlemen's fancy, but it never can operate ; it will be but very short-lived. However disagreeable it may be to lengthen my objections, I cannot help taking no tice of what the honorable gentleman said. To me it appears that there is no check in that government. The president, senators and representatives all imme diately, or mediately, are the choice of the people. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. Tell me not of checks on paper ; but tell me of checks founded on self-love. The English government is founded on self-love. This powerful, irresistible stimu lus of self-love has saved that government. It has interposed that hereditary nobility between the king and commons. If the house of lords assists or per mits the king to overturn the liberties of the people, the same tyranny will destroy them ; they will there fore keep the balance in the democratic branch. Sup pose they see the commons encroach upon the king ; self-love, that great, energetic check, will call upon them to interpose ; for, if the king be destroyed, their destruction must speedily follow. Here is a conside ration which prevails in my mind, to pronounce the British government superior, in this respect, to any government that ever was in any country. Compare this with your congressional checks. I beseech gen tlemen to consider whether they can say, when trust ing power, that a mere patriotic profession will be equally operative and efficacious, as the check of self- love. In considering the experience of ages, is it not seen that fair, disinterested patriotism and professions of attachment to rectitude, have never been solely trusted to by an enlightened, free people. If you de pend on your president's and senators' patriotism, you are gone. Have you a resting place like the British government ? Where is the rock of your salvation ? The real rock of political salvation is self-love, per petuated from age to age in every human breast, and manifested in every action. If they can stand the temptations of human nature, you are safe. If you have a good president, senators and representatives, there is no danger. But can this be expected from human nature ? Without real checks, it will not suf fice that some of them are good. A good president, or senator, or representative will have a natural weak ness. Virtue will slumber : the wicked will be con tinually watching : consequently you will be undone. Where are your checks ? You have no hereditary no- 212 MR - HENRY'S SPEECH ON bility an order of men, to whom human eyes can be cast up for relief: for, says the constitution, there is no title of nobility to be granted ; which, by the by, would not have been so dangerous, as the perilous cession of powers contained in that paper : because, as Montes quieu says, when you give titles of nobility, you know what you give ; but when you give power, you know not what you give. If you say, that out of this deprav ed mass, you can collect luminous characters, it will not avail, unless this luminous breed will be propagat ed from generation to generation ; and even then, if the number of vicious characters will preponderate, you are undone. And that this will certainly be the case, is, to my mind, perfectly clear. In the British gov ernment, there are real balances and checks ; in this system, there are only ideal balances. Till I am con vinced that there are actual, efficient checks, I will not give my assent to its establishment. The president and senators have nothing to lose. They have not that interest in the preservation of the government, that the king and lords have in England. They will therefore be regardless of the interests of the people. The constitution will be as safe with one body, as with two. It will answer every purpose of human legisla tion. How was the constitution of England when only the commons had the power ? I need only remark, that it was the most unfortunate era when the country returned to king, lords and commons, without sufficient responsibility in the king. When the commons of England, in the manly language which became free men, said to their king, you are our servant, then the temple of liberty was complete. From that noble source have we derived our liberty : that spirit of pa triotic attachment to one's country, that zeal for liber ty, and that enmity to tyranny, which signalized the then champions of liberty, we inherit from our British ancestors. And I am free to own, that if you cannot love a republican government, you may love the Bri tish monarchy : for, although the king is not sufficient- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 213 ly responsible, the responsibility of his agents, and the efficient checks interposed by the British constitution, render it less dangerous than other monarchies, or op pressive tyrannical aristocracies. What are their checks of exposing accounts? Their checks upon paper are inefficient and nugatory. Can you search your president's closet ? Is this a real check ? We ought to be exceedingly cautious in giving up this life, this soul our money this power of taxation to Congress. What powerful check is there here to prevent the most extravagant and profligate squandering of the public money? What security have .we in money matters? Inquiry is precluded by this constitution. I never wish to see Congress supplicate the states. But it is more abhorrent to my mind to give them an unlimited and unbounded command over our souls, our lives, our purses, without any check or restraint. How are you to keep inquiry alive ? How discover their conduct ? We are told by that paper, that a re gular statement and account of the receipts and ex penditures of all public money, shall be published from time to time. Here is a beautiful check ! What time ? Here is the utmost latitude left. If those who are in Congress please to put that construction upon it, the words of the constitution will be satisfied by pub lishing those accounts once in one hundred years. They may publish or not, as they please. Is this like the present despised system, whereby the accounts are to be published monthly ? I come now to speak something of requisitions, which the honorable gentleman thought so truly con temptible and disgraceful. That honorable gentleman being a child of the revolution, must recollect with gra titude the glorious effects of requisitions. It is an idea that must be grateful to every American. An English army was sent to compel us to pay money contrary to our consent. To force us by arbitrary and tyrannical coercion to satisfy their unbounded de mands. We wished to pay with our own consent. 1>14 MR. HENRVS SPEECH ON Rather than pay against our consent, we engaged in that bloody contest, which terminated so gloriously. By requisitions we pay with our own consent ; by their means we have triumphed in the most arduous strug gle that ever tried the virtue of man. We fought then, for what we are contending now to prevent an ar bitrary deprivation of our property, contrary to our consent and inclination. I shall be told in this place, that those who are to tax us are our representatives. To this I answer, that there is no real check to prevent their ruining us. There is no actual responsibility. The only semblance of a check is the negative power of not re-electing them. This, sir, is but a feeble bar rier, when their personal interest, their ambition and avarice come to be put in contrast with the happiness of the people. All checks founded on any thing but self-love, will not avail. This constitution reflects, in the most degrading and mortifying manner, on the vir tue, integrity and wisdom of the state legislatures : it presupposes that the chosen few who go to Congress, will have more upright hearts, and more enlightened minds, than those who are members of the individual legislatures. To suppose that ten gentlemen shall have more real substantial merit, than one hundred and seventy, is humiliating to the last degree. If, sir, the diminution of numbers be an augmentation of me rit, perfection must centre in one. If you have the fa culty of discerning spirits, it is better to point out at once the man who has the most illumined qualities. If ten men be better than one hundred and seventy, it follows of necessity that one is better than ten the choice is more refined. Such is the danger of the abuse of implied power, that it would be safer at once to have seven representa tives, the number to which we are now entitled, than depend on the uncertain and ambiguous language of that paper. The number may be lessened instead of being increased ; and yet by argumentative, construc tive, implied power, the proportion of taxes may con- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 215 tinue the same or be increased. Nothing is more perilous than constructive power, which gentlemen are so willing to trust their happiness to. If sheriffs prove now an over-match for our legisla ture ; if their ingenuity has eluded the vigilance of our laws, how will the matter be amended when they come clothed with federal authority? A strenu ous argument offered by gentlemen is, that the same sheriffs may collect for the continental and state treasu ries. I have before shown, that this must have an inevitable tendency to give a decided preference to the federal treasury in the actual collections, and to throw all deficiencies on the state. This imaginary remedy for the evil of congressional taxation, will have another oppressive operation. The sheriff comes to-day as a state collector next day he is federal how are you to fix him? How will it be possible to discriminate op pressions committed in one capacity, from those per petrated in the other ? Will not his ingenuity perplex the simple, honest planter ? This will at least involve in difficulties, those who are unacquainted with legal ingenuity. When you fix him, where are you to punish him ? For, I suppose, they will not stay in our courts : they must go to the federal court ; for, if I understand that paper right, all controversies arising under that constitution, or under the laws made in pursuance thereof, are to be tried in that court. When gentle men told us, that this part deserved the least excep tion, I was in hopes, they would prove that there was plausibility in their suggestions, and that oppres sion would probably not follow. Are we not told, that it shall be treason to levy war against the United States ? Suppose an insult offered to the federal laws at an immense distance from Philadelphia, will this be deemed treason ? And shall a man be dragged many hundred miles to be tried as a criminal, for hav ing, perhaps justifiably, resisted an unwarrantable attack upon his person or property? I am not well acquainted with federal jurisprudence ; but it ap- 216 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON pears to me that these oppressions must result from this part of the plan. It is at least doubtful, and where there is even a possibility of such evils, they ought to be guarded against. There are to be a number of places fitted out for arsenals and dock-yards in the different states. Unless you sell to Congress such places as are proper for these, within your state, you will not be consistent after adop tion; it results therefore clearly that you are to give into their hands, all such places as are fit for strong holds. When you have these fortifications and garri sons within your state, your legislature will have no power over them, though they see the most dangerous insults offered to the people daily. They are also to have magazines in each state ; these depositories for arms, though within the state, will be free from the con trol of its legislature. Are we at last brought to such a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we can not be trusted with arms for our own defence ? There is a wide difference between having our arms in our own possession and under our own direction, and having them under the management of Congress ? If our de fence be the real object of having those arms, in whose hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or equal safety to us, as in our own ? If our legis lature be unworthy of legislating for every foot in this state, they are unworthy of saying another word. The clause which says that Congress shall " pro vide for arming, organizing arid disciplining the mili tia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserv ing to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers," seemed to put the states in the power of Congress. I wished to be informed, if Congress neg lected to discipline them, whether the states were not precluded from doing it. Not being favored with a particular answer, I am confirmed in my opinion, that the states have not the power of disciplining them, without recurring to the doctrine of constructive, im- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 217 plied powers. If by implication the states may disci pline them, by implication also Congress may officer them ; because, in a partition of power, each has a right to come in for part; and because implication is to operate in favor of Congress on all occasions, where their object is the extension of power, as well as in fa vor of the states. We have not one fourth of the arms that would be sufficient to defend ourselves. The power of arming the militia, and the means of pur chasing arms, are taken from the states by the para- " mount powers of Congress. If Congress will not arm them, they will not be armed at all. There have been no instances shown of a voluntary cession of power, sufficient to induce me to grant the most dangerous powers : a possibility of their future relinquishment will not persuade me to yield such powers. Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of rais ing an army, and by their control over the militia, have the sword in one hand and the purse in the other. Shall we be safe without either ? Congress have an unlimited power over both : they are entirely given up by us. Let him candidly tell me, where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up by the people ? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and purse. Can you prove by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without retaining one of these ? If you give them up, you are gone. Give us at least a plausible apology why Con gress should keep their proceedings in secret. They have the power of keeping them secret as long as they please ; for the provision for a periodical publication is too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail any thing. The expression, from time to time, as I have more than once observed, admits of any extension. They may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were nor ever will be secure, when the transoc- VOL. i. 28 218 Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH ON tions of their rulers may be concealed from them. The most iniquitous plots may be carried on against their liberty and happiness. 1 am not an advocate for di vulging indiscriminately all the operations of govern ment, though the practice of our ancestors in some de gree justifies it. Such transactions as relate to milita ry operations, or affairs of great consequence, the im mediate promulgation of which might defeat the inter ests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end which required their secrecy should have been effected. But to cover, with the veil of secrecy, the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man, and every friend to his country. [Mr. Henry then, in a very animated manner, expati ated on the evil and pernicious tendency of keeping secret the common proceedings of government, and said, that it was contrary to the practice of other free nations. The people of England, he asserted, had gained immortal honor, by the manly boldness where with they divulged to all the world their political dis quisitions and operations ; and that such a conduct inspired other nations with respect. He illustrated his arguments by several quotations.] He then con tinued : I appeal to this convention, if it would not be better for America to take off the veil of secrecy. Look at us hear our transactions. If this had been the lan guage of the federal convention, what would have been the result ? Such a constitution would not have come out to your utter astonishment, conceding such dan gerous powers, and recommending secrecy in the fu ture transactions of government. I believe it would have given more general satisfaction, if the proceed ings of that convention had not been concealed from the public eye. This constitution authorizes the same conduct. There is not an English feature in it. The transactions of Congress may be concealed a century from the public consistently with the constitution. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. This, sir, is a laudable imitation of the transactions of the Spanish treaty. We have not forgotten with what a thick veil of secrecy those transactions were co vered. We are told that this government, collectively taken, is without an example ; that it is national in this part, and federal in that part, &c. We may be amused, if we please, by a treatise of political anatomy. In the brain it is national: the stamina are federal some limbs are federal, others national. The senators are voted for by the state legislatures ; so far it is federal. Individuals choose the members of the first branch ; here it is national. It is federal in conferring general powers, but national in retaining them. It is not to be supported by the states the pockets of individuals are to be searched for its maintenance. What signi fies it to me, that you have the most curious anatomi cal description of it in its creation ? To all the com mon purposes of legislation it is a great consolidation of government. You are not to have the right to legislate in any but trivial cases : you are not to touch private contracts : you are not to have the right of having arms in your own defence: you cannot be trusted with dealing out justice between man and man. What shall the states have to do ? Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so on and so on. Abolish the state legislatures at once. What purposes should they be continued for ? Our legislature will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle one hundred and eighty men marching in solemn, farcical procession, exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost li berty of their country, without the power of restoring it. But, sir, we have the consolation, that it is a mixed government ; that is, it may work sorely on your neck, but you will have some comfort by saying, that it was a federal government in its origin. I beg gentlemen to consider; lay aside your preju dices is this a federal government ? Is it not a con solidated government for every purpose almost ? Is 2'2(1 31K. IIKNKY'S SPEECH ON the government of Virginia a state government, alter this government is adopted ? I grant that it is a repub lican government ; but for what purposes ? For such trivial, domestic considerations, as render it unworthy the name of a legislature. I shall take leave of this political anatomy by observing, that it is the most ex traordinary that ever entered into the imagination of man. If our political diseases demand a cure, this is an unheard of medicine. The honorable member, I am convinced, wanted a name for it. Were your health in danger, would you take new medicine ? I need not make use of these exclamations ; for every member in this committee must be alarmed at making new and unusual experiments in government. Let us have national credit and a national treasury in case of war. You never can want national resources in time of war, if the war be a national one, if it be necessary, and this necessity be obvious to the meanest capacity. The utmost exertions will be used by the people of America in that case. A republic has this advantage over a monarchy, that its wars are generally founded on more just grounds. A republic can never enter into a war, unless it be a national war, unless it be approv ed of, or desired by the whole community. Did ever a republic fail to use the utmost resources of the com munity when a war was necessary ? I call for an ex ample. I call also for an example, when a republic has been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of its people. There are thousands of examples where the ambition of its prince has precipitated a nation into the most destructive war. No nation ever withheld power when its object was just and right. I will ha zard an observation ; I find fault with the paper before you, because the same power that declares war, has the ability to carry it on. Is it so in England ? The king declares war : the house of commons gives the means of carrying it on. This is a strong check on the king. He will enter into no war that is unnecessa ry ; for the commons, having the power of withholding THK FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 221 the moans, will exercise that power, unless the object of the war be for the interest of the nation. How is it here ? The Congress can both declare war and carry it on, and levy your money as long as you have a shilling to pay. I shall now speak a little of the colonial confedera cy which was proposed at Albany. Massachusetts did not give her consent to the project at Albany so as to consolidate with the other colonies. Had there been a consolidation at Albany, where would have been their charter ? Would that confederacy have preserved their charter from Britain ? The strength and energy of the then designed government would have crushed American opposition. The American revolution took its origin from the comparative weakness of the British government not being concentred in one point. A concentration of the strength and interest of the British government in one point, would have rendered opposition to its ty rannies fruitless. For want of that consolidation do we now enjoy liberty, and the privilege of debating at this moment. I am pleased with the colonial establish ment. The example, which the honorable member has produced to persuade us to depart from our pre sent confederacy, rivets me to my former opinion, and convinces me that consolidation must end in the de struction of our liberties. The honorable gentleman has told us of our ingrati tude to France. She does not intend to take payment by force. Ingratitude shall not be laid to my charge. I wish to see the friendship between this country and that magnanimous ally perpetuated. Requisitions will enable us to pay the debts we owe to France and other countries. She does not desire us to go from our be loved republican government. The change is incon sistent with our engagements with those nations. It is cried out, that those in opposition wish disunion. This is not true. They are the most strenuous friends to it. This government will clearly operate disunion. 222 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON If it be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, that you are going to disunite and dissolve the confederacy, what says France ? Will she be indifferent to an event that will so radically affect her treaties with us ? Our treaty with her is founded on the confederation we are bound to her as thirteen states confederated. What will become of the treaty? It is said that trea ties will be on a better footing. How so ? Will the president, senate and house of representatives be par ties to them ? I cannot conceive how the treaties can be as binding, if the confederacy is dissolved, as they are now. Those nations will not continue their friend ship then ; they will become our enemies. I look on the treaties as the greatest pillars of safety. If the house of Bourbon keeps us, we are safe. Dissolve that confederacy who has you ? The British. Federalism will not protect you from the British. Is a connexion with that country more desirable ? I was amazed when gentlemen forgot the friends of America. I hope that this dangerous change will not be effected. It is safe for the French and Spaniards, that we should continue to be thirteen states ; but it is not so, that we should be consolidated into one government. They have settlements in America ; will they like schemes of popular ambition ? Will they not have some seri ous reflections ? You may tell them you have not changed your situation ; but they will not believe you. If there be a real check intended to be left on Con gress, it must be left in the state governments. There will be some check, as long as the judges are incor rupt. As long as they are upright, you may preserve your liberty. But what will the judges determine when the state and federal authority come to be con trasted ? Will your liberty then be secure, when the congressional laws are declared paramount to the laws of your state, and the judges are sworn to support them ? I am constrained to make a few remarks on the ab surdity of adopting this system, and relying on the THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 23 chance of getting it amended afterwards. When it is confessed to be replete with defects, is it not offering to insult your understandings, to attempt to reason you out of the propriety of rejecting it, till it be amended ? Does it not insult your judgments to tell you adopt first, and then amend ? Is your rage for novelty so great, that you are first to sign and seal, and then to retract ? Is it possible to conceive a greater solecism ? I am at a loss what to say. You agree to bind your selves hand and foot for the sake of what ? Of being unbound. You go into a dungeon for what ? To get out. Is there no danger when you go in, that the bolts of federal authority shall shut you in ? Human nature never will part from power. Look for an exam ple of a voluntary relinquishment of power, from one end of the globe to another you will find none. Nine tenths of our fellow-men have been, and are now, de pressed by the most intolerable slavery, in the different parts of the world ; because the strong hand of power has bolted them in the dungeon of despotism. Review the present situation of the nations of Europe, which is pre.tended to be the freest quarter of the globe. Cast your eyes on the countries called free there. Look at the country from which we are descended, I beseech you ; and although we are separated by everlasting, insuperable partitions, yet there are some virtuous people there who are friends to human nature and liberty. Look at Britain ; see there the bolts and bars of power; see bribery and corruption defiling the fairest fabric that ever human nature reared. Can a gentleman, who is an Englishman, or who is acquaint ed with the English history, desire to prove these evils ? See the efforts of a man descended from a friend of America ; see the efforts of that man, assisted even by the king, to make reforms. But you find the faults too strong to be amended. Nothing but bloody war can alter them. See Ireland : that country groaned from century to century, without getting their government amended. Previous adoption was the fashion there. They sent for amendments from time to time, but 224 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON never obtained them, though pressed by the severest oppression, till eighty thousand volunteers demanded them sword in hand till the power of Britain was prostrate ; when the American resistance was crowned with success. Shall we do so ? If you judge by the experience of Ireland, you must obtain the amendments as early as possible. But, I ask you again, where is the example that a government was amended by those who instituted it ? Where is the instance of the errors of a government rectified by those who adopted them ? I shall make a few observations to prove, that the power over elections, which is given to Congress, is contrived by the federal government; that the people may be deprived of their proper influence in the government, by destroying the force and effect of their suffrages. Congress is to have a discretiona ry control over the time, place and manner of elections. The representatives are to be elected con sequently when and where they please. As to the time and place gentlemen have attempted to obvi ate the objection by saying, that the time js to happen once in two years, and that the place is to be within a particular district, or in the respect- tive counties. But how will they obviate the danger of referring the manner of election to Con gress ? Those illumined genii may see that this may not endanger the rights of the people ; but to my un enlightened understanding, it appears plain and clear, that it will impair the popular weight in the gov ernment. Look at the Roman history. They had two ways of voting: the one by tribes, and the other by centuries. By the former, numbers prevailed : in the latter, riches preponderated. According to the mode prescribed, Congress may tell you, that they have a right to make the vote of one gentleman go as far as the votes of one hundred poor men. The Eower over the manner admits of the most dangerous ititude. They may modify it as they please. They may regulate the number of votes by the quantity of THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 225 property, without involving any repugnancy to the constitution. I should not have thought of this trick or contrivance, had I not seen how the public liberty of Rome was trifled with by the mode of voting by centuries, whereby one rich man had as many votes as a multitude of poor men. The plebeians were trampled on till they resisted. The patricians trampled on the liberties of the plebeians, till the latter had spirit to assert their right to freedom and equality. The result of the American mode of election may be similar. Perhaps I shall be told, that I have gone through the regions of fancy; that I deal in noisy exclamations, and mighty pro fessions of patriotism. Gentlemen may retain their opinions; but I look on that paper as the most fatal plan, that could possibly be conceived to en slave a free people. If such be your rage for novelty, take it and welcome, but you never shall have my consent. My sentiments may appear extravagant^ but 1 can tell you, that a number of my fellow-citizens have kindred sentiments ; arid I am anxious, if my country should come into the hands of tyranny, to ex culpate myself from being in any degree the cause ; and to exert my faculties to the utmost to extricate her. Whether I am gratified or not in my beloved form of government, I consider that the more she is plunged into distress, the more it is my duty to relieve her. Whatever may be the result, I shall wait with patience till the day may come, when an opportunity shall offer to exert myself in her cause. But I should be led to take that man for a lunatic, who should tell me to run into the adoption of a gov ernment avowedly defective, in hopes of having it amended afterwards. Were I about to give away the meanest particle of my own property, I should act with more prudence and discretion. My anxiety and fears are great, lest America, by the adoption of this system, should be cast into a fathomless abyss. 29 SPEECH OF JOHN MARSHALL. ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 20th, 178C The first and Second sections of the third article of the constitution being under consideration, Mr. Marshall addressed the conven tion as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS part of the plan before us, is a great improve ment on that system from which we are now departing. Here are tribunals appointed for the decision of con troversies, which were before, either not at all, or im properly provided for. That many benefits will result from this to the members of the collective society, every one confesses. Unless its organization be de fective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of ac commodating the convenience of the people, it merits our approbation. After such a candid and fair dis cussion by those gentlemen who support it, after the very able manner in which they have investigated and examined it, I conceived it would be no longer consi dered as so very defective, and that those, who oppos ed it, would be convinced of the impropriety of some of their objections. But I perceive they still continue the same opposition. Gentlemen have gone on an idea, that the federal courts will not determine the causes, which may come before them, with the same fairness and impartiality, with which other courts decide. MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH, &c. 227 What are the reasons of this supposition ? Do they draw them from the manner in which the judges are chosen, or the tenure of their office ? What is it that makes us trust our judges ? Their independence in office and manner of appointment. Are not the judges of the federal court chosen with as much wis dom, as the judges of the state governments ? Are they not equally, if not more independent ? If so, shall we not conclude that they will decide with equal im partiality and candor ? If there be as much wisdom and knowledge in the United States, as in a particular state, shall we conclude that that wisdom and know ledge will not be equally exercised in the selection of the judges ? The principle on which they object to the federal jurisdiction, seems to me to be founded on a belief, that a fair trial will not be had in those courts. If this committee will consider it fully, they will find it has no foundation, and that we are as secure there as any where else. What mischief results from some causes being tried there ? Is there not the utmost reason to conclude, that judges wisely appointed, and independent in their office, will never countenance any unfair trial ? What are the subjects of its jurisdiction ? Let us examine them with an expectation that causes will be as candidly tried there, as elsewhere, and then determine. The objection, which was made by the honorable member who was first up yesterday, (Mr. Mason,) has been so fully refuted, that it is not worth while to notice it. He objected to Congress having power to create a number of inferior courts according to the necessity of public circumstances. I had an apprehension that those gentlemen, who placed no confidence in Congress, would object that there might be no inferior courts. I own that I thought, that those gentlemen would think there would be no inferior courts, as it depended on the will of Congress, but that we should be dragged to the centre of the union. But I did not conceive, that the power of increasing the 228 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON number of courts could be objected to by any gentle man, as it would remove the inconvenience of being dragged to the centre of the United States. I own that the power of creating a number of courts is, in my estimation, so far from being a defect, that it seems necessary to the perfection of this system. Af ter having objected to the number and mode, he ob jected to the subject matter of their cognizance. [Here Mr. Marshall read the 2d section.] These, sir, are the points of federal jurisdiction to which he ob jects, with a few exceptions. Let us examine each of them with a supposition that the same impartiality will be observed there, as in other courts, and then see if any mischief will result from them. With re spect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the constitution and the laws of the United States, he says, that the laws of the United States being paramount to the laws of the particular states, there is no case but what this will extend to. Has the government of the United States power to make laws on every subject ? Does he understand it so ? Can they make laws af fecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims between citizens of the same state ? Can they go beyond the delegated powers ? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as com ing under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void. It will annihilate the state courts, says the ho norable gentleman. Does not every gentleman here know, that the causes in our courts are more numer ous than they can decide, according to their present construction? Look at the dockets; you will find them crowded with suits, which the life of man will not see determined. If some of these suits be carried to other courts, will it be wrong ? They will still have business enough. Then there is no danger that par ticular subjects, small in proportion, being taken out THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 229 of the jurisdiction of the state judiciaries, will render them useless and of no effect. Does the gentleman think that the state courts will have no cognizance of cases not mentioned here ? Are there any words in this constitution, which exclude the courts of the states from those cases which they now possess? Does the gentleman imagine this to be the case? Will any gentleman believe it ? Are not controver sies respecting lands, claimed under the grants of dif ferent states, the only controversies between citizens of the same state, which the federal judiciary can take cognizance of? The case is so clear, that to prove it would be an useless waste of time. The state courts will not lose the jurisdiction of the causes they now de cide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the federal courts in those cases, in which the latter have cognizance. How disgraceful is it that the state courts cannot be trusted, says the honorable gentleman. What is the language of the constitution ? Does it take away their jurisdiction ? Is it not necessary that -the federal courts should have cognizance of cases arising under the constitution and the laws of the United States ? What is the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable, orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or avail ing yourselves of force ? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here ? To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary ? There is no other body that can afford such a protection. But the honora ble member objects to it, because, says he, the of ficers of the government will be screened from merited punishment by the federal judiciary. The federal she riff, says he, will go into a poor man's house and beat him, or abuse his family, and the federal court will pro tect him. Does any gentleman believe this ? Is it necessary that the officers shall commit a trespass on 230 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON the property or persons of those with whom they are to transact business ? Will such great insults on the people of this country be allowable? Were a law made to authorize them, it would be void. The injur ed man would trust to a tribunal in his neighborhood. To such a tribunal he would apply for redress, and get it. There is no reason to fear that he would not meet that justice there, which his country will be ever will ing to maintain. But on appeal, says the honorable gentleman, what chance is there to obtain justice ? This is founded on an idea', that they will not be im partial. There is no clause in the constitution, which bars the individual member injured, from applying to the state courts to give him redress. He says, that there is no instance of appeals as to fact in common law cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr. Chairman, to be the case in this commonwealth. With respect to mills, roads and other cases, appeals lie from the inferior to the superior court, as to fact as well as law. Is it clear, that there can be no case in common law, in which an appeal as to fact might be proper and necessary ? Can you not con ceive a case where it would be productive of advan tages to the people at large, to submit to that tribunal the final determination, involving facts as well as law? Suppose it should be deemed for the convenience of the citizens, that those things which concerned foreign ministers, should be tried in the inferior courts : if jus tice should be done, the decision would satisfy all. But if an appeal in matters of fact could not be carried to the superior court, then it would result, that such cases could not be tried before the inferior courts, for fear of injurious and partial decisions. But, sir, where is the necessity of discriminating be tween the three cases of chancery, admiralty and com mon law ? Why not leave it to Congress ? Will it enlarge their powers ? Is it necessary for them wan tonly to infringe your rights ? Have you any thing to apprehend, when they can, in no case, abuse their THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 231 power without rendering themselves hateful to the peo ple at large ? When this is the case, something may be left to the legislature, freely chosen by ourselves^ from among ourselves, who are to share the burdens imposed upon the community, and who can be chang ed at our pleasure. Where power may be trusted, and there is no motive to abuse it, it seems to me to be as well to leave it undetermined, as to fix it in the con stitution. With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has been de cried with unusual vehemence. I hope no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present ? Are there not many cases in which the legislature of Vir ginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued ? It is not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be partiality in it, if a state cannot be defendant if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on that account ? If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to be pre sumed, that on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction ? But how could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, without the establishment of these tribunals ? The honorable member objects to suits being insti tuted in the federal courts by the citizens of one state against the citizens of another state. Were I to con tend, that this was necessary in all cases, and that the government without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment. But are not the objections to 232 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON it carried too far ? Though it may not, in general, be absolutely necessary, a case may happen, as has been observed, in which a citizen of one state ought to be able to recur to this tribunal, to recover a claim from the citizen of another state. What is the evil which this can produce? Will he get more than justice there ? The independence of the judges forbids it. What has he to get? Justice. Shall we object to this, because the citizen of another state can obtain justice without applying to our state courts ? It may be necessary with respect to the laws and regulations of commerce, which Congress may make. It may be ne cessary in cases of debt, and some other controversies. In claims for land it is not necessary, but it is not danger ous. In the court of which state will it be instituted said the honorable gentleman. It will be instituted in the court of the state where the defendant resides, where the law can come at him, and nowhere else. By the laws of which state will it be determined said he. By the laws of the state where the contract was made. According to those laws, and those only, can it be de cided. Is this a novelty ? No, it is a principle in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth. If a man con tracted a debt in the East Indies, and it was sued for here, the decision must be consonant to the laws of that country. Suppose a contract made in Maryland, where the annual interest is at six per centum, and a suit instituted for it in Virginia, what interest would be given now, without any federal aid ? The interest of Maryland most certainly, and if the contract had been made in Virginia, and suit brought in Maryland, the interest of Virginia must be given without doubt. It is now to be governed by the laws of that state where the contract was made. The laws which gov erned the contract at its formation, govern it in its decision. To preserve the peace of the union only, its jurisdiction in this case ought to be recurred to. Let us consider, that when citizens of one state carry on trade in another state, much must be due to the one from THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 233 the other, as the case between North Carolina and Virginia. Would not the refusal of justice to our citi zens, from the courts of North Carolina, produce dis putes between the states ? Would the federal judicia ry swerve from their duty, in order to give partial and unjust decisions ? The objection respecting the assignment of a bond to a citizen of another state, has been fully answered. But suppose it were to be tried as he says, what would be given more than was actually due in the case he mentioned ? It is possible, in our courts as they now stand, to obtain a judgment for more than justice. But the court of chancery grants relief. Would it not be so in the federal court ? Would not depositions be taken to prove the payments, and if proved, would not the decision of the court be accordingly ? He objects, in the next place, to its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and a foreign state. Suppose, says he, in such a suit, a foreign state is cast, will she be bound by the decision ? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not be barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust ? The previous consent of the parties is necessary ; and, as the federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce. It will be the means of preventing disputes with foreign nations. On an attentive consideration of these courts, I trust every part will appear satisfactory to the committee. The exclusion of trial by jury in this case, he urged, would prostrate our rights. Does the word court only mean the judges ? Does not the determination of a jury, necessarily lead to the judgment of the court ? Is there any thing here which gives the judges exclu sive jurisdiction of matters of fact ? What is the ob ject of a jury trial ? To inform the court of the facts. When a court has cognizance of facts, does it not fol low, that they can make inquiry by a jury ? It is im possible to be otherwise. I hope that in this country, where impartiality is so much admired, the laws will di- VOL. r. 30 234 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON rect facts to be ascertained by a jury. But, says the honorable gentleman, the juries in the ten miles square will be mere tools of parties, with which he would not trust his person or property ; which, he says, he would rather leave to the court. Because the government may have a district ten miles square, will no man stay there but the tools and officers of the government ? Will nobody else be found there ? Is it so in any other part of the world, where a government has legis lative power ? Are there none but officers and tools of the government of Virginia in Richmond ? Will there not be independent merchants, and respectable gentlemen of fortune, within the ten miles square ? Will there not be worthy farmers and mechanics ? Will not a good jury be found there as well as any where else ? Will the officers of the government be come improper to be on a jury ? What is it to the government, whether this man or that man succeeds ? It is all one thing. Does the constitution say, that juries shall consist of officers, or that the su preme court shall be held in the ten miles square ? It was acknowledged by the honorable member, that it was secure in England. What makes it secure there ? Is it their constitution ? What part of their constitution is there, that the parliament cannot change ? As the preservation of this right is in the hands of parliament, and it has ever been held sacred by them, will the government of America be less honest than that of Great Britain ? Here a restriction is to be found. The jury is not to be brought out of the state. There is no such restriction in that govern ment ; for the laws of parliament decide every thing respecting it. Yet gentlemen tell us, that there is safety there, and nothing here but danger. It seems to me, that the laws of the United States will general ly secure trials by a jury of the vicinage, or in such manner as will be most safe and convenient for the people. But it seems that the right of challenging the jurors. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 235 is not secured in this constitution. Is this done by our own constitution, or by any provision of the English government ? Is it done by their magna charta, or bill of rights ? This privilege is founded on their laws. If so, why should it be objected to the Ameri can constitution, that it is not inserted in it ? If we are secure in Virginia, without mentioning it in our constitution, why should not this security be found in the federal court ? The honorable gentleman said much about the quit rents in the Northern Neck. I will refer it to the honorable gentleman himself. Has he not acknow ledged that there was no complete title ? Was he not satisfied, that the right of the legal representative of the proprietor did not exist at the time he mentioned ? If so, it cannot exist now. I will leave it to those gentlemen who come from that quarter. I trust they will not be intimidated on this account, in voting on this question. A law passed in 1782, which secures this. He says that many poor men may be harassed and injured by the representative of lord Fairfax. If he has no right, this cannot be done. If he has this right and comes to Virginia, what laws will his claims be determined by ? By those of this state. By what tribunals will they be determined? By our state courts. Would not the poor man, who was oppressed by an unjust prosecution, be abundantly protected and satis fied by the temper of his neighbors, and would he not find ample justice ? \Vhat reason has the honorable member to apprehend partiality or injustice? He supposes, that if the judges be judges of both the fede ral and state courts, they will incline in favor of one government. If such contests should arise, who could more properly decide them, than those who are to swear to do justice ? If we can expect a fair decision any where, may we not expect justice to be done by the judges of both the federal and state governments? But, says the honorable member, laws mav be executed 236 MR. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON tyrannically. Where is the independency of your judges ? If a law be executed tyrannically in Virginia, to what can you trust ? To your judiciary. What security have you for justice ? Their independence. Will it not be so in the federal court? Gentlemen ask what is meant by law cases, and if they be not distinct from facts. Is there no law aris ing on cases in equity and admiralty ? Look at the acts of assembly ; have you not many cases, where law and fact are blended ? Does not the jurisdiction in point of law as well as fact, find itself completely satisfied in law and fact ? The honorable gentleman says, that no law of Congress can make any exception to the federal, appellate jurisdiction of fact as well as law. He has frequently spoken of technical terms, and the meaning of them. What is the meaning of the term exception ? Does it not mean an alteration and diminution? Congress is empowered to make ex ceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the supreme court. These exceptions certain ly go as far as the legislature may think proper, for the interest and liberty of the people. Who can under stand this word, exception, to extend to one case as well as the other ? I am persuaded, that a reconsidera tion of this case will convince the gentleman, that he was mistaken. This may go to the cure of the mischief apprehended. Gentlemen must be satisfied, that this power will not be so much abused as they have said. The honorable member says, that he derives no consolation from the wisdom and integrity of the le gislature, because we call them to rectify defects which it is our duty to remove. We ought well to weigh the good and evil before we determine. We ought to be well convinced, that the evil will be really produced before we decide against it. If we be con vinced that the good greatly preponderates, though there be small defects in it, shall we give up that which THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 237 is really good, when we can remove the little mischief it may contain, in the plain, easy method pointed out in the system itself? I was astonished when I heard the honorable gentle man say, that he wished the trial by jury to be struck out entirely. Is there no justice to be expected by a jury of our fellow-citizens ? Will any man prefer to be tried by a court, when the jury is to be of his country men, and probably of his vicinage ? We have reason to believe the regulations with respect to juries will be such as shall be satisfactory. Because it does not con tain all, does it contain nothing ? But I conceive that this committee will see there is safety in the case, and that there is no mischief to be apprehended. He states a case, that a man may be carried from a federal to an anti-federal corner, (and vice versa) where men are ready to destroy him. Is this probable ? Is it presumable that they will make a law to punish men who are of different opinions in politics from them selves ? Is it presumable, that they will do it in one single case, unless it be such a case as must satisfy the people at large ? The good opinion of the people at large must be consulted by their repre sentatives; otherwise mischiefs would be produced, which would shake the government to its foundation. As it is late, I shall not mention all the gentleman's argument ; but some parts of it are so glaring, that I cannot pass them over in silence, He says that the establishment of these tribunals, and more particularly in their jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of these states and foreign citizens and subjects, is like a retrospective law. Is there no difference between a tribunal which shall give justice and effect to an exist ing right, and creating a right that did not exist before ? The debt or claim is created by the individual; he has bound himself to comply with it; does the crea tion of a new court amount to a retrospective law ? We are satisfied with the provision made in this country on the subject of trial by jury. Does our con- . 238 MK. MARSHALL'S SPEECH ON stitution direct trials to be by jury ? It is required in our bill of rights, which is not a part of the constitution. Does any security arise from hence ? Have you a jury when a judgment is obtained on a replevin bond, or by default ? Have you a jury when a motion is made for the commonwealth against an individual ; or when a motion is made by one joint obligor against another, to recover sums paid as security ? Our courts decide in all these cases, without the intervention of a jury ; yet they are all civil cases. The bill of rights is merely recommendatory. Were it otherwise, the consequence would be, that many laws which are found convenient, would be unconstitutional. What does the govern ment before you say ? Does it exclude the legislature from giving a trial by jury in civil cases ? If it does not forbid its exclusion, it is on the same footing on which your state government stands now. The legislature of Virginia does not give a trial by jury where it is not necessary. But gives it wherever it is thought expedi ent. The federal legislature will do so too, as it is formed on the same principles. The honorable gentleman says, that unjust claims will be made, and the defendant had better pay them than go to the supreme court. Can you suppose such a disposition in one of your citizens, as that to op press another man, he will incur great expenses ? What will he gain by an unjust demand ? Does a claim establish a right ? He must bring his witnesses to prove his claim. If he does not bring his witnesses, the expenses must fall upon him. Will he go on a cal culation that the defendant will not defend it, or can not produce a witness ? Will he incur a great deal of expense, from a dependence on such a chance ? Those who know human nature, black as it is, must know that mankind are too well attached to their interest to run such a risk. I conceive that this power is abso lutely necessary, and not dangerous ; that should it be attended by little inconveniences, they will be altered, and that they can have no interest in not altering them. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 239 Is there any real danger ? When I compare it to the exercise of the same power in the government of Virginia, I am persuaded there is not. The fede ral government has no other motive, and has every reason of doing right, which the members of our state legislature have. Will a man on the Eastern Shore, be sent to be tried in Kentucky ; or a man from Kentucky be brought to the Eastern Shore to have his trial ? A government by doing this would destroy itself. I am convinced, the trial by jury will be regulated in the man ner most advantageous to the community. SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY, ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, JUNE 24th, 1788. The resolution of Mr. Wythe being under consideration, which proposed, " That the committee should ratify the constitution, and that whatsoever amendments might be deemed necessary should be recommended to the consideration of the Congress, which should first assemble under the constitution, to be acted upon according to the mode prescribed therein ;" Mr. Henry thus addressed the convention. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE proposal of ratification is premature. The im portance of the subject requires the most mature de liberation. The honorable member must forgive me for declaring my dissent from it, because, if I understand it rightly, it admits that the new system is defective arid most capitally: for immediately after the proposed ratification, there comes a declaration, that the paper before you is not intended to violate any of these three great rights the liberty of religion, liberty of the press, and the trial by jury. What is the inference, when you enumerate the rights which you are to en joy? That those not enumerated are relinquished. There are only three things to be retained : religion, freedom of the press, and jury trial. Will not the ratifi cation carry every thing, without excepting these three things ? Will not all the world pronounce, that we 3111. HENRY'S SPEECH, &c. 241 intended to give up all the rest? Every thing it speaks of, by way of rights, is comprised in these three things. Your subsequent amendments, only go to these three amendments. I feel myself distressed, be cause the necessity of securing our personal rights, seems not to have pervaded the minds of men : for many other valuable things are omitted. For in stance: general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the com mission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are ad mitted, any man may be seized ; any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evi dence or reason. Every thing the most sacred, may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We have infinitely more reason to dread ge neral warrants here, than they have in England ; be cause there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But here, a man living many hundred miles from the judges, may rot in prison before he can get that writ. Another most fatal omission is, with respect to standing armies. In your bill of rights of Virginia, they are said to be dangerous to liberty, and it tells you, that the proper defence of a free state consists in militia; and so I might go on to ten or eleven things of immense consequence secured in your bill of rights, concerning which that proposal is silent. Is that the language of the bill of rights in England ? Is it the language of the American bill of rights, that these three rights, and these only, are valuable ? Is it the language of men going into a new government ? Is it not necessary to speak of those things before you go into a compact ? How do these three things stand ? As one of the parties, we declare we do not mean to give them up. This is very dictatorial ; much more so, than the conduct which proposes alterations as the condition of adoption. In a compact, there are two parties one accepting, and another proposing. As VOL. i. 31 242 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON a party, we propose that we shall secure these three things ; and before we have the assent of the other contracting party, we go into the compact, and leave these things at their mercy. What will be the conse quence ? Suppose the other states will call this dic tatorial : they will say, Virginia has gone into the government, and carried with her certain propositions, which she says, ought to be concurred in by the other states. They will declare, that she has no right to dictate to other states the conditions on which they shall come into the union. According to the honora ble member's proposal, the ratification will cease to be obligatory unless they accede to these amendments. We have ratified it. You have committed a violation, they will say. They have not violated it. We say we will go out of it. You are then reduced to a sad di lemma ; to give up these three rights, or leave the government. This is worse than our present confede ration, to which we have hitherto adhered honestly and faithfully. We shall be told we have violated it, because we have left it for the infringement and vio lation of conditions, which they never agreed to be a part of the ratification. The ratification will be com plete. The proposal is made by one party. We, as the other, accede to it, and propose the security of these three great rights ; for it is only a proposal. In order to secure them, you are left in that state of fatal hostility, which I shall as much deplore as the honora ble gentleman. I exhort gentlemen to think seriously, before they ratify this constitution, and persuade them selves that they will succeed in making a feeble effort to get amendments after adoption. With respect to that part of the proposal, which says, that every power not granted, remains with the people ; it must be pre vious to adoption, or it will involve this country in in evitable destruction. To talk of it, as a thing subse quent, not as one of your unalienable rights, is leaving it to the casual opinion of the Congress who shall take up the consideration of that matter. They will not THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. i>43 reason with you about the effect of this constitution. They will not take the opinion of this committee con cerning its operation. They will construe it as they please. If you place it subsequently, let me ask the consequences ? Among ten thousand implied powers which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your slaves, if they please. And this must and will be done by men, a majority of whom have not a common interest with you. They will, therefore, have no feeling for your interests. It has been repeatedly said here, that the great ob ject of a national government, is national defence. That power, which is said to be intended for security and safety, may be rendered detestable and oppressive. If you give power to the general government to pro vide for the general defence, the means must be com mensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people, must be given to the government which is entrusted with the public defence. In this state there are two hundred and thirty six thousand blacks, and there are many in several other states : but there are few or none in the northern states, and yet, if the north ern states shall be of opinion that our numbers are numberless, they may call forth every national re source. May Congress not say, that every black man must fight ? Did we not see a little of this in the last war? We were not so hard pushed, as to make emancipation general : but acts of assembly passed, that every slave who would go to the army should be free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event about ; slavery is detested ; we feel its fatal effects ; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity. Let all these considerations, at some future period, press with full force on the minds of Congress. Let that urbanity, which I trust will distinguish America, and the necessity of national defence let all these things operate on their minds, and they will search that pa per, and see if they have power of manumission. And have they not, sir ? Have they not power to provide 244 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON for the general defence and welfare ? May they not think that these call for the abolition of slavery ? May they not pronounce all slaves free, and will they not be warranted by that power ? There is no ambiguous implication, or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the point. They have the power in clear unequivo cal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it. As much as I deplore slavery, I see that prudence for bids its abolition. I deny that the general govern ment ought to set them free, because a decided majo rity of the states have not the ties of sympathy and fellow-feeling for those whose interest would be affect ed by their emancipation. The majority of Congress is to the north, and the slaves are to the south. In this situation, I see a great deal of the property of the people of Virginia in jeopardy, and their peace and tranquillity gone away. I repeat it again, that it would rejoice my very soul, that every one of my fellow-be ings was emancipated. As we ought with gratitude to admire that decree of heaven, which has numbered us among the free, we ought to lament and deplore the necessity of holding our fellow-men in bondage. But is it practicable, by any human means, to liberate them, without producing the most dreadful and ruinous consequences? We ought to possess them in the manner we have inherited them from our ancestors, as their manumission is incompatible with the felicity of the country. But we ought to soften, as much as possible, the rigor of their unhappy fate. I know that in a variety of particular instances, the legislature, lis tening to complaints, have admitted their emancipa tion. Let me not dwell on this subject. I will only add, that this, as well as every other property of the people of Virginia, is in jeopardy, and put in the hands of those who have no similarity of situation with us. This is a local matter, and I can see no propriety in subjecting it to Congress. With respect to subsequent amendments, proposed by the worthy member. I am distressed when I hear THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 24/> the expression. It is a new one altogether, and such an one as stands against every idea of fortitude and manliness, in the states, or any one else. Evils admit ted, in order to be removed subsequently, and tyranny submitted to, in order to be excluded by a subsequent alteration, are things totally new to me. But I am sure he meant nothing but to amuse the committee. I know his candor. His proposal is an idea dreadful to me. I ask does experience warrant such a thing from the beginning of the world to this day ? Do you enter into a compact of government first, and after wards settle the terms of the government ? It is ad mitted by every one, that this is a compact. Although the confederation be lost, it is a compact constitution, or something of that nature. I confess I never heard of such an idea before. It is most abhorrent to my mind. You endanger the tranquillity of your country, you stab its repose, if you accept this government un altered. How are you to allay animosities ? For such there are, great and fatal. He flatters me and tells me, that I could influence the people, and re concile them to it. Sir, their sentiments are as firm and steady, as they are patriotic. Were I to ask them to apostatize from their native religion, they would despise me. They are not to be shaken in their opinions with respect to the propriety of preserving their rights. You never can persuade them, that it is necessary to relinquish them. Were I to attempt to persuade them to abandon their patriotic sentiments, I should look on myself as the most infamous of men. I believe it to be a fact, that the great body of yeo manry are in decided opposition to it. I may say with confidence, that for nineteen counties adjacent to each other, nine tenths of the people are consci entiously opposed to it. I may be mistaken, but I give you it as my opinion, and my opinion is founded on personal knowledge in some measure, and other good authority. I have not hunted popularity by declaim ing to injure this government. Though public fame 246 MK. HENRY'S SPEECH ON might say so, it was not owing to me that this flame of opposition has been kindled and spread. These men never will part with their political opinions. If they should see their political happiness secured to the latest posterity, then indeed they might agree to it. Subsequent amendments will not do for men of this cast. Do you consult the union in proposing them ? You may amuse them as long as you please, but they will never like it. You have not solid reality the hearts and hands of the men who are to be governed. Have gentlemen no respect to the actual dispositions of the people in the adopting states ? Look at Penn sylvania and Massachusetts. These two great states have raised as great objections to that government as we do. There was a majority of only nineteen in Massachusetts. We are told, that only ten thousand were represented in Pennsylvania, although seventy thousand had a right to be represented. Is not this a serious thing ? Is it not worth while to turn your eyes for a moment from subsequent amendments, to the situation of your country ? Can you have a lasting union in these circumstances ? It will be in vain to expect it. But if you agree to previous amendments, you shall have union, firm and solid. I cannot con clude without saying, that I shall have nothing to do with it, if subsequent amendments be determined upon. Oppressions will be carried on as radically by the ma jority, when adjustments and accommodations will be held up. I say, I conceive it my duty, if this govern ment is adopted before it is amended, to go home. I shall act as I think my duty requires. Every other gen tleman will do the same. Previous amendments, in my opinion, are necessary to procure peace and tran quillity. I fear, if they be not agreed to, every move ment and operation of government will cease, and how long that baneful thing, civil discord, will stay from this country, God only knows. When men are free from restraint, how long will you suspend their fury ? The interval between this and bloodshed, is but a moment. ' .:-> : THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 247 The licentious and wicked of the community, will seize with avidity every thing you hold. In this un happy situation, what is to be done ? It surpasses my stock of wisdom. If you will, in the language of free men, stipulate that there are rights which no -man un der heaven can take from you, you shall have me going along with you, and not otherwise. [Here Mr. Henry informed the committee, that he had a resolution pre pared, to refer a declaration of rights, with certain amendments to the most exceptionable parts of the constitution, to the other states in the confederacy, for their consideration, previous to its ratification. The clerk then read the resolution, the declaration of rights, and amendments, which were nearly the same as those ultimately proposed by the convention, for the consi deration of Congress. He then resumed the subject] I have thus candidly submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee, what occurred to me as proper amendments to the constitution, and a declaration of rights containing those fundamental, unalienable pri vileges, which I conceive to be essential to liberty and happiness. I believe, that on a review of these amend ments it will still be found, that the arm of power will be sufficiently strong for national purposes, when these restrictions shall be a part of the government. I be lieve no gentleman, who opposes me in sentiments, will be able to discover that any one feature of a strong government is altered; and at the same time your unalienable rights are secured by them. The government unaltered may be terrible to America, but can never be loved, till it be amended. You find all the resources of the continent may be drawn to a point. In danger, the president may concentre to a point every effort of the continent. If the govern ment be constructed to satisfy the people and remove their apprehensions, the wealth and strength of the continent will go where public utility shall direct, This government, with these restrictions, will be a strong government united with the privileges of the 248 Mil. HENRY'S SPEECH OX people. In my weak judgment, a government i^ strong, when it applies to the most important end of all governments the rights and privileges of the peo ple. In the honorable member's proposal, jury trial, the press, and religion, and other essential rights, are not to be given up. Other essential rights what are they ? The world will say, that you intended to give them up. When you go into an enumeration of your rights, and stop that enumeration, the inevitable con clusion is, that what is omitted is intended to be sur rendered. Anxious as I am to be as little troublesome as pos sible, I cannot leave this part of the subject, without adverting to one remark of the honorable gentle man. He says, that rather than bring the union into danger, he will adopt it with its imperfections. A great deal is said about disunion, and consequent dan gers. I have no claim to a greater share of fortitude than others, but I can see no kind of danger. I form my judgment on a single fact alone, that we are at peace with all the world, nor is there any apparent cause of a rupture with any nation in the world. Is it among the American states that the cause of disunion is to be feared ? Are not the states using all their efforts for the promotion of union ? New England sacrifices local prejudices for the purposes of union. We hear the necessity of the union, and predilection for the union, re-echoed from all parts of the continent : and all at once disunion is to follow ! If gentlemen dread dis union, the very thing they advocate will inevitably produce it. A previous ratification will raise insur mountable obstacles to union. New York is an insur mountable obstacle to it, and North Carolina also. They will never accede to it, till it be amended. A great part of Virginia is opposed most decidedly to it, as it stands. This very spirit which will govern us in these three states, will find a kindred spirit in the adopting states. Give me leave to say, that it is very problema tical whether the adopting states can stand on their THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 240 own legs. I hear only on one side, but as far as my information goes, there are heart-burnings and animosi ties among them. Will these animosities be cured by subsequent amendments ? Turn away from America, and consider European politics. The nations there, which can trouble us are France, England and Spain. But at present we know for a certainty, that those nations are engaged in very different pursuits from American conquests. We are told by our intelligent ambassador, that there is no such danger as has been apprehended. Give me leave then to say, that dangers from beyond the Atlantic are imagina ry. From these premises then, it may be concluded, that from the creation of the world, to this time, there never was a more fair and proper opportunity than we have at this day to establish such a government as will permanently establish the most transcendent political fe licity. Since the revolution there has not been so much experience. Since then, the general inte rests of A meri- ca have not been better understood, nor the union more ardently loved, than at this present moment. 1 acknowledge the weakness of the old confederation. Every man says, that something must be done, Where is the moment more favorable than this ? During the war, when ten thousand dangers surrounded us, Ameri ca was magnanimous. What was the language of the little state of Maryland ? " I will have time to consi der. I will hold out three years. Let what may come, I will have time to reflect." Magnanimity appeared every where. What was the upshot ? America tri umphed. Is there any thing to forbid us to offer these amendments to the other states ? If this moment goes away unimproved, we shall never see its return. We now act under a happy system, which says, that a ma jority may alter the government when necessary. But by the paper proposed, a majority will forever endea vor in vain to alter it. Three fourths may. Is not this the most promising time for securing the necessary al- L 32 250 MR. HENRY'S SPEECH ON terations ? Will you go into that government, where it is a principle, that a contemptible minority may pre vent an alteration? What will be the language of the majority ? Change the government. Nay, seven eighths of the people of America may wish the change; but the minority may come with a Roman Veto, and object to the alteration. The lan guage of a magnanimous country and of freemen is. till you remove the defects we will not accede. It would be in vain for me to show, that there is no dan ger to prevent our obtaining those amendments, if you are not convinced already. If the other states will not agree to them, it is not an inducement to union. The language of this paper is not dictatorial, but merely a proposition for amendments. The proposition of Virginia met with a favorable reception before. We proposed that convention which met at Annapolis. It was not called dictatorial. We proposed that at Philadelphia. Was Virginia thought dictatorial ? But Virginia is now to lose her pre-eminence. Those rights of equality, to which the meanest in dividual in the community is entitled, are to bring us down infinitely below the Delaware people. Have we not a right to say, hear our propositions? Why, sir, your slaves have a right to make their humble requests. Those, who are in the meanest occupations of human life, have a right to com plain. What do we require ? Not pre-eminence, but safety ; that our citizens may be able to sit down in peace and security under their own fig-trees. I am confident that sentiments like these will meet with unison in every state ; for they will wish to banish discord from the American soil. I am certain that the warmest friend of the constitution, wishes to have fewer enemies fewer of those who pester and plague him with opposition. I could not with hold from my fellow-citizens any thing so reason able. I fear you will have no union, unless you re- THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 251 move the cause of opposition. Will you sit down contented with the name of union without any solid foundation ? Mr. Henry then concluded, by expressing his hope, that his resolution would be adopted, and added, that if the committee should disapprove of any of his amendments, others might be substituted. INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DELIVERED APRIL 30th, 1789. Fellow-citizens of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives, AMONG the vicissitudes incident to life, no event could have filled me with greater anxieties, than that of which the notification was transmitted by your or der, and received on the fourteenth day of the present month. On the one hand, I was summoned by my country, whose voice I can never hear but with vene ration and love, from a retreat which I had chosen with the fondest predilection, and in my flattering hopes with an immutable decision as the asylum of my declining years ; a retreat which was rendered eve ry day more necessary, as well as more dear to me, by the addition of habit to inclination, and of frequent interruptions in my health to the gradual waste com mitted on it by time. On the other hand, the magni tude and difficulty of the trust, to which the voice of my country called me, being sufficient to awaken in the wisest and most experienced of her citizens a distrust ful scrutiny into his qualifications, could not but over whelm with despondence one, who inheriting inferior endowments from nature, and unpractised in the du ties of civil administration, ought to be peculiarly con* scious of his own deficiencies. In this conflict of emo tions, all I dare aver, is, that it has been my faithful INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 253 study to collect my duty from a just appreciation of every circumstance by which it might be affected. All I dare hope is, that if in executing this task, I have been too much swayed by a grateful remembrance of former instances, or by an affectionate sensibility to this transcendent proof of the confidence of my fellow- citizens, and have thence too little consulted my inca pacity as well as disinclination for the weighty and un tried cares before me, my error will be palliated by the motives which misled me, and its consequences be judged by my country, with some share of the partiali ty in which they originated. Such being the impressions under which I have, in obedience to the public summons, repaired to the pre sent station, it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act, my fervent supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe who presides in the councils of nations and whose provi dential aids can supply every human defect, that his benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happi ness of the people of the United States, a government instituted by themselves for these essential purposes ; and may enable every instrument, employed in its ad ministration, to execute with success, the functions al lotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the great author of every public and private good, I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not less than my own, nor those of my fellow-citizens at large, less than either. No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the af fairs of men, more than the people of the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the cha racter of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency : and in the important revolution just accomplished in the system of their united government, the tranquil de liberations and voluntary consent of so many distinct communities, from which the event has resulted, can not be compared with the means, by which most gov- 254 PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S ernments have been established, without some return of pious gratitude along with a humble anticipation of the future blessings which the past seem to presage. These reflections, arising out of the present crisis, have forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be sup pressed. You will join with me, I trust, in thinking that there are none under the influence of which, the proceedings of a new and free government can more auspiciously commence. By the article establishing the executive depart ment, it is made the duty of the President, " to recom mend to your consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." The circum stances under which I now meet you, will acquit me from entering into that subject, farther than to refer to the great constitutional charter under which you are assembled ; and which, in defining your powers, desig nates the objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more consistent with those circumstances, and far more congenial with the feelings which actu ate me, to substitute, in place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due to the ta lents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters selected to devise and adopt them. In these honorable qualifications, I behold the surest pledges, that as, on one side, no local prejudices or attach ments, no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage of commu nities and interests ; so on another, that the founda tions of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality ; and the pre eminence of free government, be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its citizens, and command the respect of the world. I dwell on this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent love for my country can inspire: since there is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there ex ists in the economy and course of nature, an indissolu- INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 255 ble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity : since we ought to be no less persuaded, that the propitious smiles of heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which heaven itself has ordained : and since the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican model of government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people. Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with your judgment to decide, how far an exercise of the occasional power delegated by the fifth article of the constitution is rendered expedient at the present juncture by the nature of objections which have been urged against the system, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them. Instead of undertaking particular recommendations on this subject, in which I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of the public good ; for I assure myself that whilst you carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger the benefits of an united and effective government, or which ought to await the future les sons of experience; a reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for the public harmo ny, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question how far the former can be more impregna- bly fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously promoted. To the preceding observations I have one to add, which will be most properly addressed to the House of Representatives. It concerns myself, and will there fore be as brief as possible. When I was first honor ed with a call into the service of my country, then on the eve of an arduous struggle for its liberties, the 256 PRESIDENT WASHINGTON'S, &c. light in which I contemplated my duty required that 1 should renounce every pecuniary compensation. From this resolution I have in no instance departed. And being still under the impressions which produced it, I must decline, as inapplicable to myself, any share in the personal emoluments, which may be indispensa bly included in a permanent provision for the execu tive department; and must accordingly pray that the pecuniary estimates for the station in which I am plac ed, may, during my continuance in it, be limited to such actual expenditures as the public good may be thought to require. Having thus imparted to you my sentiments, as they have been awakened by the occasion which brings us together, I shall take my present leave ; but not with out resorting once more to the benign Parent of the human race, in humble supplication, that since he has been pleased to favor the American people, with op portunities for deliberating in perfect tranquillity, and dispositions for deciding with unparalleled unanimity on a form of government, for the security of their un ion, and the advancement of their happiness ; so his divine blessing may be equally conspicuous in the en larged views, the temperate consultations, and the wise measures on which the success of this govern ment must depend. SPEECH OF WILLIAM L. SMITH. MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES. Oil the 3d of January, 1794, the house of representatives resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on the report of Mr. Jeffer son, Secretary of State, " On the nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the measures which he thought proper to be adopted for the improvement of the commerce and naviga tion of the same," when Mr. Madison introduced a series of reso lutions, proposing to impose " further restrictions and higher duties, in certain cases, on the manufactures and navigation of foreign nations, employed in the commerce of the United States, than those now imposed." On the 13th, Mr. Smith addressed the committee as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, AMONG the various duties which are assigned by the constitution to the legislature of the United States, there is perhaps none of a more important nature than the regulation of commerce, none more generally in teresting to our fellow-citizens, none which more seri ously claims our diligent and accurate investigation. It so essentially involves our navigating, agricultu ral, commercial and manufacturing interests, that an apology for the prolixity of the observations which I am about to submit to the committee, will scarcely be requisite. VOL. i. 33, 258 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON In the view which I shall take of the question, dis engaging the inquiry from all topics of a political na ture, I shall strictly confine myself to those which are commercial, and which alone are, in my judgment, pro perly connected with the subject. Called upon to decide on propositions, merely com mercial, and springing from a report, in its nature limited to commercial regulations, it would be as ill- timed, as it would be irregular, to mingle with the dis cussion considerations of a political nature. I shall accordingly reject from the inquiry every idea which has reference to the Indians, the Algerines, or the Western Posts. Whenever those subjects require our deliberations, I shall not yield to any member in readiness to vindicate the honor of our country and to concur in such measures as our best interests may demand. This line of procedure will, I trust, be deemed by those gentlemen who follow me the only proper one, and that the debate will be altogether confined to commercial views ; these will of themselves open a field of discussion sufficiently spacious, without the intervention of arguments derived from other sources. It would indeed argue a weakness of ground in the friends of the propositions, and imply a distrust of the merits of their cause, were they compelled to bolster it up with such auxiliaries, and to resort for support to arguments, not resulting from the nature of the subject, but from irrelative and extraneous conside rations. The propositions, as well as the report, being pre dicated upon facts and principles having relation to our commerce and navigation with foreign countries, by those facts and principles, and those alone, ought the propositions to stand or fall. It will not be denied, that this country is at present in a very delicate crisis, and one requiring dispassion ate reflection, cool and mature deliberation. It will be much to be regretted then, if passion should usurp MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 259 the place of reason; if superficial, narrow and preju diced views should mislead the public councils from the true path of national interest. The report of the secretary of state, on the privi leges and restrictions on the commerce of the United States in foreign countries, is now before the commit tee. The tendency of that report, (whatever may have been the design of the reporter,) appears to be, to induce a false estimate of the comparative condition of our commerce with certain foreign nations, and to urge the legislature to adopt a scheme of retaliating regulations, restrictions and exclusions. The most striking contrast, which the performance evidently aims at, is between Great Britain and France. For this reason, and as these are the two powers with whom we have the most extensive relations in trade, I shall, by a particular investigation of the subject, en deavor to lay before the committee an accurate and an impartial comparison of the commercial systems of the two countries in reference to the United States, as a test of the solidity of the inferences which are at tempted to be established by the report. A fair com parison can only be made with an eye to what may be deemed the permanent system of the countries in ques tion. The proper epoch for it, therefore, will precede the commencement of the pending French revolution. The commercial regulations of France, during the period of the revolution, have been too fluctuating, too much influenced by momentary impulses, and, as tar as they have looked towards this country with a favora ble eye, too much manifesting an object of the mo ment, which cannot be mistaken, to consider them as a part of a system. But though the comparison will be made with principal reference to the condition of our trade with France and Great Britain antecedent to the existing revolution, the regulations of the sub sequent period will perhaps not be passed over alto gether unnoticed. The table which I have before me, comprises the 2150 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH CIS principal features of the subject within a short com pass. It is the work of a gentleman of considerable commercial knowledge, and I believe may be relied on for its correctness. An attentive reference to it will, with some supplementary remarks, convey a just con ception of the object. A view to conciseness and sim plicity has excluded from it all articles (the produc tion and manufactures of the United States,) which are not of considerable importance. Accustomed as our ears have been to a constant panegyric on the generous policy of France towards this country in commercial relations, and to as con stant a philippic on the unfriendly, illiberal and perse cuting policy of Great Britain towards us in the same relations, we naturally expect to find, in a table which exhibits their respective systems, numerous discrimina tions in that of France in our favor, and many valuable privileges granted to us, which are refused to other foreign countries ; in that of Great Britain, frequent discriminations to our prejudice, and a variety of pri vileges refused to us, which are granted to other foreign nations. But an inspection of the table will satisfy every candid mind that the reverse of what has been supposed is truly the case ; that neither in France nor the French West Indies is there more than one solitary and unimportant distinction in our favor, (I mean the article of fish oil,) either with regard to our exports thither, our imports from thence, or our shipping ; that both in Great Britain and the British West Indies, there are several material distinctions in our favor, with regard both to our exports thither and to our im ports from thence, and, as it respects Great Britain, with regard also to our shipping ; that in the market of Great Britain a preference is secured to six of our most valuable staples, by considerably higher duties on the rival articles of other foreign countries ; that our navigation thither is favored by our ships, when carry ing our own productions, being put upon as good a footing as their own ships, and by the exemption of se- MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 261 veral of our productions, when carried in our ships, from duties which are paid on the like articles of other foreign countries carried in the ships of those coun tries; that several of our productions may be car ried from the United States to the British West Indies, while the like productions cannot be carried thither from any other foreign country ; and that several of the productions of those countries may be brought from thence to the United States, which cannot be car ried from thence to any other foreign country. These important differences in the systems of the two countries will appear more fully by passing in re view each article, and presenting, at the same time, the remarks which it will suggest. [Here Mr. Smith entered into a critical examina tion of our export trade with France and Great Bri tain, from which he drew an inference, that Great Bri tain and her dominions consumed annually a much greater amount of our commodities than France and her dominions, and consequently, that Great Britain was a much better customer, as a consumer, than France. He then proceeded to take a view of our import trade with those countries, from which he drew the conclusion, that Great Britain was our best furnish er as well as our best customer. Mr. Smith next advert ed to our navigation with France and England. After going into a detail of facts upon this subject, he pro ceeded thus] We find then, upon a comprehensive and particular investigation of the system of Great Britain, that in stead of its wearing an aspect particularly unfriendly towards us, it has in fact a contrary aspect ; that com pared with other foreign nations, it makes numerous and substantial discriminations in our favor ; that it secures by means, which operate as bounties upon our commodities, a preference in her markets to the greatest number of our principal productions, and thereby materially promotes our agriculture and com merce ; that in the system of France there is but a 262 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON single and not very important instance of a similar kind ; that if France allows us some advantages of navigation in her islands, she allows the same advan tages to all other foreign nations, while Great Britain allows advantages to our navigation with herself di rectly which she does not allow to other foreign na tions ; that if France admits our salted fish into her West India islands, she does it under such duties upon ours and such premiums upon her own as would ex clude us from them, if she had capacity to supply herself, while she formally prohibits our flour ; that if Great Britain excludes our fish from her islands, she freely admits our flour ; that while France, as far as we are permitted to trade with her islands, lets in other foreign nations to a competition with us on equal terms, Great Britain excludes from a competition with most of the articles of the United States, which she admits into the islands, the like articles of other for eign countries ; that while France permits us to be supplied directly from her islands with nothing more than she permits to other nations, and with only the two articles of molasses and rum, Great Britain allows us to be supplied directly from her islands with a con siderable number of essential articles, and refuses a direct supply of those articles to other foreign coun tries ; that if the system of France is somewhat more favorable to our navigation, that of Great Britain is far more favorable to our agriculture, our commerce, and to the due and comfortable supply of our wants ; that Great Britain is a better furnisher than France of the articles we want, from other foreign countries, and a better customer for what we have to sell ; and that the actual relations of commerce between the United States and Great Britain are more extensive and im portant than between the United States and France, and it may be added, or any other country in the world, for our trade with France is no doubt second in impor tance. Where then is the ground for extolling the liberal MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 263 policy of France, the superior importance of our com mercial connexion with her, and for exclaiming against the illiberal and oppressive policy of Great Britain, and for representing our intercourse with her as secon dary in consequence and utility? There is none. 'Tis altogether a deception which has been long successfully practised upon the people of the Unit ed States, and which it is high time we should unmask. If we pass from the fact of the footing of our com merce with France and Great Britain to the principles and motives of . their respective systems, we shall find as little room for eulogium on the one as censure on the other. Candor will assign to both the same station in our good or bad opinion. Both (like other nations) have aimed at securing the greatest possible portion of benefit to themselves, with no greater concession to our interests than was supposed to coincide with their own. The colonial system of France is the great theme of the plaudits of her partizans.. The detail, already entered into respecting it, will now be further elucidat ed by a concise view of its general principles and pro gress. An ordinance of the year 1 727, like the British navi gation act, had given to the mother country a monopo ly of the trade of the colonies, and had entirely exclud ed foreigners from it. Experience having shown, as we learn from an ordi nance of 30th August, 1784, that it was necessary to moderate the rigor of that system, small relaxations from time to time accordingly took place, and by the ordinance just mentioned, more important alterations were made. That ordinance establishes several free ports in the French islands, one at St. Lucie, one at Martinique, one at Guadaloupe, one at Tobago, and three at St. Domingo, and grants permission, " till the king should please otherwise to ordain," to foreign vessels of at 264 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON least sixty tons burthen to carry to those free ports wood of all kinds, pit coal, live animals, salted beef, but not pork, salted cod and fish, rice, Indian corn, ve getables, green hides in the hair or tanned, peltry, tur pentine and tar, and to take from the same ports, mo lasses, rum and merchandizes which had been imported from France, charging the articles which are per mitted to be imported, with the duties stated in the table. The steps which succeeded that ordinance, calculat ed to narrow its operation in regard to the article of fish, have been already noted so particularly as to render a recapitulation unnecessary. It is sufficient to repeat that they manifested on this point a decided disposition to exclude as far as pos sible foreign fish, from a competition with their own. It appears then that the general principle of the co lony system of France, like that of Great Britain, was a system of monopoly, and that some temporary devia tions from it were, from time to time, made from ne cessity or the force of .circumstances. In like manner, the navigation act of Great Britain gives the mother country a monopoly of the trade of her colonies, not only as to navigation, but as to sup ply ; but the force of circumstances has led to some de viations. The deviations of France have extended partially to navigation, as well as to supply. Those of Great Britain have extended further than those of France, as to supply, but have been narrower as to navigation. Neither however has deviated further than particular situation dictated. Great Britain has been less re laxed on the article of navigation than France, be cause the means of navigation possessed by the for mer were more adequate than those possessed by the latter. France has been more restrictive on the article of exports than Great Britain, because her home mar ket was more adequate to the consumption of the pro ductions of her islands than that of Great Britain to MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. those of her islands, and because the latter found ad vantages in allowing a freer export to the United States as an article of exchange. France permitted the introduction of salted beef and fish into her islands, because she could not sufficiently furnish those arti cles herself: she prohibited flour and pork, because she thought herself competent to the supply of them : Great Britain prohibited fish, because she knew her self able to furnish it, and like France, was jealous of an interference with her fisheries, as a main support of her navigation. She permitted flour, because she knew herself unable to supply it. As far as the mea sures of France may have had a conciliatory aspect towards this country, she was influenced by the desire of sharing more largely in our trade, and diverting it more from her ancient rival. As far as the measures of Great Britain may have made any concession to us, they have proceeded from a sense of our importance to her as a customer, from the utility of our supplies to her, from a conviction that it was necessary to fa cilitate to us the means of re-exchange, that it was better to take our commodities, which were paid for in commodities, than those of other countries, which she might have to pay for in specie, that it was good policy to give us some douceur^ as well to hinder our commerce from running into another channel, as to prevent collisions which might be mutually injurious. These are the true features of the systems of both countries, as to motives. If we are unprejudiced, we shall see in neither of them either enmity or particular friendship; but we shall see* in both a predominant principle of self-interest, the universal rule of national conduct. Having completed my comparison of the two sys tems of France and Great Britain towards this coun try, I shall now extend it to those of other countries, in order to mark the principal differences. [Here Mr. Smith described the situation of our com mercial relations with the United Netherlands. Sweden. VOL. i. 31 266 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON Spain, Portugal and Denmark, and drew the conclu sion that the system of Great Britain, not only as compared with that of France, was entitled to our preference, but that it was also greatly to be prefer red to that of all the beforementioned nations, except perhaps the United Netherlands. He then continued his speech as follows :] From the view which has been taken, this general reflection results, that the system of every country is selfish according to its circumstances, and contains all those restrictions and exclusions which it deems useful to its own interests. Besides this, a desire to secure to the mother country a monopoly of the trade of its colonies, is a predominant feature in the system of al most every country in Europe. Nor is it without foundation in reason. Colonies, especially small isl ands, are usually maintained and defended at the expense of the mother country, and it seems a natural recompense for that service, that the mother country should enjoy, exclusively of other nations, the benefit of trade with its colonies. This was thought reasona ble by the United States, while colonies, even after their disputes on the point of taxation had begun : and however the question may stand between the mother country and its colonies, between the former and foreign nations, it is not easy to see how the equity of the exclusion can be contested. At any rate, its be ing the most prevailing system of nations having colo nies, there is 110 room for acrimony against a particu lar one that pursues it. This ought not to dissuade the United States from availing itself of every just and proper influence to gain admission into the colony trade of the nations concerned ; but this object ought to be pursued with moderation, not under the instiga tion of a sense of injury, but on the ground of temperate negotiation and reasonable equivalent. These observations ought to produce two effects, to moderate our resentments against particular nations and our partialities for others, and to evince the im- MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 2t)7 practicability and Quixotism of an attempt by violence, on the part of this young country, to break through the fetters which the universal policy of nations imposes on their intercourse with each other. Our moderation in this respect ought to be excited by another reflection does not our own system pre sent a number of exclusions and restrictions similar to those of which we complain ? Let us look into our impost and tonnage acts ; do they not exhibit a num ber of instances of duties prohibitory in their principle and extent? Do they not by additional duties on foreign vessels and on goods brought in foreign ves sels, secure a decided superiority to our ships in the navigation between this country and all those to which they are permitted to go ? If duties on goods of one country, imported into another, are oppressions and grievances, (as the Secretary of State seems frequent ly to suppose,) how few are the foreign articles brought into the United States, on which considerable duties are not laid. The Secretary of State, after pointing out the exclu sions, restrictions and burdens which prevent our en joying all the advantages which we could desire in the trade with foreign countries, proceeds to indicate the remedies ; these are counter-exclusions, restrictions and burdens. The reason of the thing and the general observa tions of the Secretary of State', would extend the regu lations to be adopted to all the nations with whom we have connexions in trade ; but his conclusion would seem to confine them to Great Britain, on the sugges tion that she alone has declined friendly arrangements by treaty, and that there is no reason to conclude, that friendly arrangements would be declined by other nations. The suggestion with regard to Great Britain, ap pears not to be well founded, if we are to judge from the correspondence with the British minister, Mr. Hammond, communicated by the president to tht> 31K. SMITH'S SPEECH ON house. Mr. Jefferson asks him, if he is empowered to treat on the subject of commerce j he replies, that he is fully authorized to enter into a negotiation for that purpose, though not as yet empowered to conclude. Upon further difficulty and objection on the part of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Hammond renews his assurance of his competency to enter on a negotiation, which he rests on his commission, as minister plenipotentiary, and his instructions ; Mr. Jefferson requires a commu nication of his full powers for that purpose, and de clines the negotiation. This was by no construction a declining on the part of the British minister. Forms were the obstacle with the Secretary of State, whose zeal, at best, was not greater than Mr. Hammond's. But with regard to Spain, these observations occur. A secret article with France, stipulated for Spain a right to become a party to our commercial treaty with France, on the same terms. She has never availed herself of the right. Do we not know, that measures have been since pursued towards forming a treaty of commerce with her ? Do we not know that none has been formed ? Have we not reason to suspect, that such a treaty, on eligible terms, could not be obtained but at a price which we should be unwilling to pay for it ? Have no measures been pursued towards effect ing a commercial treaty with a power so interesting to us as Portugal ? What was the object of sending a minister there ? How happens it, that there is no re turn ? Is not there reason to conclude, from the long delay, that there are serious obstacles to the forming a proper treaty of commerce with that nation ? Why then is Great Britain selected, but that it is most in unison with our passions to enter into collisions with her ? If retaliations for restrictions, exclusions and bur dens, are to take place, they ought to be dealt out, with a proportional hand, to all those from whom they are experienced. This, justice and an inoffensive conduct require. If, suffering equal impediments to our trade 31K. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 269 from one power as another, we retaliate on one and not on another, we manifest that we are governed by a spirit of hostility towards the power against whom our retaliation is directed, and we ought to count upon a reciprocation of that spirit. If, suffering fewer from one than from another, we retaliate only on that party from whom we suffer least, the spirit of enmity, by which we were actuated, becomes more unequivocal. If, receiving a positively better treatment from one than another, we deal most harshly towards that pow er which treats us best, will it be an evidence either of justice or moderation? Will it not be a proof either of caprice, or of a hatred and aversion, of a na ture to overrule the considerations both of equity and prudence. Whatever questions may be raised about the pre ference due to the British commercial system, as com pared with that of France, there can be none, compar ing it either with that of Spain or Portugal. Where then is the justification of the attempt to S'oduce a war of commercial regulations with Great ritain, passing over greater objections to the policy observed toward us by other nations ? Commercial regulations ought to be bottomed on commercial motives : but if political grievances are to be implicated, is there no power proposed to be ex empted, of whom we have cause to complain? The propositions, (which may be considered as a commentary on the report,) do every thing but name Great Britain. Professedly confined to the powers with whom we have no treaties of commerce, the ar ticles selected, as the objects of regulation, have scarcely any application but to Great Britain. This is but a flimsy cover ; the design will be mistaken by no one, and there would have been much more dignity in naming the party with whom it was meant to con tend. The idea of an apportionment of retaliation to grievance is rendered impossible by our treaties. 270 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON These contain precise stipulations of mutual privileges, and in each case the general principle of the party being on the footing of the most favored nation. But at least it might be done with regard to the pow ers with whom we have no treaties, and the not propo sing it will be considered as a clear proof that the ostensible object is one thing, the real object another. Will it be believed out of doors, that all this pro ceeds from a pure zeal for the advancement of com merce and navigation ? Have the views of our public councils been uniform on this point ? Have they never contributed to lose favorable opportunities for making such a treaty, by recalling powers for that purpose once given, by defeating efforts made to send them when they might have been useful ? Whatever may be the motive, the operation may clearly be pronounced to be a phenomenon in political history a government, attempting to aid commerce by throwing it into confusion ; by obstructing the most precious channels in which it flows, under the pretence of making it flow more freely ; by damming up the best outlet for the surplus commodities of the country, and the best inlet for the supplies, of which it stands in need ; by disturbing without temptation, a beneficial course of things, in an experiment precarious, if not desperate ; by arresting the current of a prosperous and progressive navigation, to transfer it to other coun tries, and by making all this wild work in the blamea- ble, but feeble attempt to build up the manufactures and trade of another country at the expense of the United States. Let us take a closer view of the project. It has been proved that it does not rest on a basis of distribu tive justice, and observations have been made to evince its impolicy. But this demands a more critical exa mination. Let it be premised, that it is a project calculated to disturb the existing course of three fourths of our im port trade, two fifths of our export trade, and the MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 271 means on which depend two thirds, at least, of our revenues. To be politic, therefore, it ought to unite these dif ferent ingredients : 1. An object of adequate utility to the country. 2. A moral certainty at least of success. 3. An assurance that the advantage likely to be ob tained, is not overbalanced by the inconveniences likely to be incurred, and as an equivalent for the jeopardy to which advantages in our possession are exposed. 1. The direct object professed to be aimed at, is a freer trade with Great Britain, and access to her West India islands, in our own ships. A collateral one, the success of which seems most relied on, is to transfer a part of our too great trade with Great Britain to other nations, particularly France. The first is no doubt an object of real magnitude, worthy of every reasonable and promising exertion. The second, in the single light of obviating a too great dependence for supply on one nation, is not unworthy of attention, but, as before observed, it ought only to be aimed at by expedients neither embarrassing nor ex pensive ; it is a very insufficient object to be pursued either at hazard or expense to the people of the United States. It has been already shown, that to pursue it, either by prohibitions or partial increase of duties, would be a costly undertaking to this country. 2. The second ingredient is, " a moral certainty of success." The argument used to prove the proba bility, nay, the certainty of success, is this ; the United States are a most important customer to Great Bri tain ; they now take off near three millions in her manufactures, and by the progress of their population, which is likely to exceed that of their manufactures, the probability is, that their importance as a customer will increase every year ; their importance to Great Britain, as a source of supply, is not less than as a customer for her manufactures; the articles with which they furnish her, are those of prime necessity, 272 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON consisting of the means of subsistence, and the mate rials for ship-building and manufactures, while the articles we derive from her, are mostly those of con venience and luxury ; her supplies to us are therefore less useful than ours to her ; that it would be contrary to all good policy in Great Britain, to hazard the turn ing of a commerce so beneficial, into other channels ; beside all this, Great Britain is immersed in debt, and in a state of decripitude ; the derangement of our commerce with her, would endanger a shock to the whole fabric of her credit, and by affecting injuriously the interests of a great portion of her mercantile body, and by throwing out of employ a large number of her manufacturers, would raise a clamor against the mi nistry too loud and too extensive to be resisted ; and that they would consequently be compelled by the weight of these considerations to yield to our wishes. It is as great an error in the councils of a country to over-rate as to under-rate its importance. The foregoing argument does this, and it does it in defiance of experience. Similar arguments were formerly used in favor of a non-importation scheme ; the same conse quences now foretold, were then predicted in the most sanguine manner ; but the prediction was not fulfilled. This it would seem, ought to be a caution to us now. and ought to warn us against relying upon the like ef fects, promised from a measure of much less force, namely, an increase of duties. If our calculations are made on the ordinary course of the human passions, or on a just estimate of relative advantages for the contest proposed, we shall not be sanguine in expecting that the victory will be readily yielded to us, or that it will be easily obtained. The navigation act of Great Britain, the principles of which exclude us from the advantages we wish to en joy, is deemed by English politicians, as the palladium of her riches, greatness and security. After having cherished it for such a long succession of years, after having repeatedly hazarded much for MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 273 the maintenance of it, with so strong a conviction of its immense importance, is it at all probable that she would surrender it to us without a struggle that she would permit us to extort the abandonment of it from her without a serious trial of strength ? Prejudices riveted by time and habit, opinions fixed by long experience of advantages, a sense of interest, irritated pride, a spirit of resentment at the attempt, all these strong circumstances would undoubtedly prompt to resistance. It would be felt, that if a concession were made to us upon the strength of endeavors to ex tort it, the whole system must be renounced ; it would be perceived, that the way having been once successful ly pointed out to other nations, would not fail to be fol lowed, and that a surrender to one would be a surren der to all. Resistance therefore would certainly follow in one or other mode, a war of arms or of commercial re gulations. If the first should be determined upon, it would not be difficult for Great Britain to persuade the other pow ers, with whom she is united, that they ought to make common cause with her. She would represent that our regulations were in fact only a covert method of taking part in the war by embarrassing her, and that it was the interest of the cause, in which they were combined, to frustrate our attempts. If war could be foreseen as the certain conse quence of the experiment proposed to be made, no arguments would be necessary to dissuade from it. Every body would be sensible that more was to be lost than gained, and that so great a hazard ought not to be run. But we are assured that there is no danger of this con sequence, that no nation would have a right to take umbrage at any regulations we should adopt with re gard to our own trade, and that Great Britain would take care how she put to risk so much as she would hazard by a quarrel with us. VOL* i- 35 274 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH Oi\ All this is far more plausible than solid. Experience has proved to us that the councils of that country are influenced by passion as well as our own. If we should seize the present moment to attack her in a point where she is peculiarly susceptible, she would be apt to re gard it as a mark of determined hostility. This would naturally tend to kindle those sparks of enmity which are alledged to exist on her side. War is as often the result of resentment as of calculation. A direct and immediate war between us would not be surprising ; but if this should not take place, mutual ill offices and irritations, which naturally grow out of such a state of things, would be apt quickly to lead to it. Insults and aggressions might become so multiplied and open as riot to permit forbearance on either side. It would be a calculation with Great Britain whether she could best oppose us by retaliating regulations, or by arms. As circumstances at the moment of deliberation should point, according to the then view of probabilities, would be the result. The decision may be in favor of war, under the idea that its distresses might induce us to enter into a commercial treaty upon her own terms ; who can pronounce that this would not be the result, when it is considered that she is likely to be aided by so many other maritime powers now in her connexion ? Let us however take it for granted that she would prefer the other course, that of retaliating regulations ; how will the contest stand ? The proportion of the whole exports of Great Britain, which comes to the United States, is about one fifth ; the proportion of our exports, which goes to Great Britain, is about one eighth of the whole amount of her imports. Taking the mean of these proportions of imports and ex ports, the proportion which our trade with Great Bri tain bears to the totality of her trade is about one sixth. The proportion of imports from the dominions of Great Britain into the United States, may be stated at three fourths of our whole importation ; the proportion MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 275 which our exports to the same dominions bears to our total exportation may be stated at two fifths ; taking the mean of these two, the proportion which our trade with Great Britain bears to our whole trade is some thing more than one half. It follows then, that while a commercial warfare with Great Britain would disturb the course of about one sixth of her trade, it would disturb the course of more than one half of ours. This much greater proportional derangement of our trade than of hers by a contest, is a mathematical demonstration that the contest would be unequal on our part, that we should put more to hazard than Great Britain would do, should be likely to suffer greater in convenience than her, and consequently, (the resolu tion and perseverance of the two parties being sup posed equal,) would be soonest induced to abandon the contest. The inequality of the contest is evinced by these fur ther considerations. The capital of Great Britain is greater in proportion to numbers than ours. A manu facturing as well as an agricultural nation, the objects of her industry and the materials of her trade are as much diversified as can well be conceived, while ours are few and simple. The habits of her people admit of her bringing into action every source of revenue which she possesses, while those of ours embarrass the government at every step, and would render substitutes for the existing ones extremely difficult. The govern ment of Great Britain has all the energy, which can be derived either from the nature of a government, or from long habits of obedience in the people, while ours is in its infancy, neither confirmed by age nor habit, and with many circumstances to lessen its force. No one can but be sensible, that in proportion to the capital of a merchant or a nation, is the faculty to en dure partial derangements to the trade carried on by the one or the other ; that in proportion to the diversi ty of objects which a merchant or a nation can bring 276 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON to market, is the faculty to find new resources of trade, and to bear the temporary suspension of existing ones ; that in proportion to the habitude of a nation to en dure taxation, is the facility of a government to find substitutes for revenues lost ; that in proportion to the energy of a government and the habits of obedience of a people, is the chance of perseverance on the part of such government, in measures producing inconven iences to the community. Great Britain then would have less to resist and more means of resistance than the United States; the United States more to resist and less means of re sistance than Great Britain. Which party are the chances against in such a contest ? Can any one say that the United States ought, in such a compara tive situation, to count on success in an experiment like that proposed, with sufficient assurance to be jus tified in hazarding upon it so great a derangement of its affairs, as may result from the measure ? The main argument for the chance of success, is, that our supplies to Great Britain are more necessary to her than hers to us. But this is a position which our self-love gives more credit to than facts will alto gether authorize. Well informed men in other coun tries, (whose opportunities of information are at least as good as ours,) affirm, that great Britain can obtain a supply of most of the articles she obtains from us, as cheap and of as good .a quality elsewhere, with only two exceptions, namely, tobacco and grain, and the latter is only occasionally wanted : a considerable sub stitute for our tobacco, though not of equal quality, may be had elsewhere : and even admitting this posi tion to be too strongly stated, yet there is no good reason to doubt that it is in a great degree true. The colonies of the different European powers on this con tinent, some countries on the Mediterranean, and the northern countries of Europe, are in situations adapted to becoming our competitors. On the other hand, the manufactured articles which MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 277 we do npt make ourselves, (the greatest part of which are, in civilized countries, necessaries,) are as impor tant to us, as our materials for manufacture (the only articles for which her demand is constant,) are to Great Britain. The position is as true, that no other nation can supply us as well as that country, with seve ral essential articles which we want, as that no nation can supply her equally well with certain articles which she takes from us ; and as to other articles of subsis tence, it is certain that our demand for manufactured supplies is more constantly urgent than her demand for those articles. Where indeed shall we find a sub stitute for the vast supply of manufactures which we get from that country ? No gentleman will say that we can suddenly replace them by our manufactures, or that this, if practicable, could be done without a vio lent distortion of the natural course of our industry. A substitute of our own , being out of the question, where else shall we find one ? France was the power which could best have filled any chasm that might have been created. But this is no longer the case. 'Tis undeniable that the money capitals of that country have been essentially destroy ed ; that manufacturing establishments, except those for war, have been essentially deranged. The destruc tion to which Lyons appears to be doomed, is a severe blow to the manufactures of France ; that city, se cond in importance in all respects, was perhaps the first in manufacturing importance. It is more than probable that France, for years to come, will herself want a foreign supply of manufactured articles. At a moment then, when the manufactures of Great Britain have become more necessary than ever to us, can we expect to succeed in a contest, which supposes that we can dispense with them ? It may be said that the resolutions proposed do not suppose this ; but they do suppose it, for they ought to proceed upon the possibility, nay, probability, that a system of commercial retaliation will be adopted by 278 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON Great Britain, in which case we must inevitably sus tain a defeat, if we cannot dispense both with her sup plies and with her market for our supplies. Will it be answered that her manufactures will find their way to us circuitously, and our supplies to her in like manner ? If so, what are our regulations to pro duce but distress and loss to us ? The manufactures of Great Britain will still be consumed, and our ma terials will still nourish those manufactures. The manufactures we take from her being less bulky than the supplies we send her, the charges of a circuitous transportation would be less than those of a like transportation of our commodities. In all the cases therefore, in which those charges fall upon her, they would be lighter than in the cases in which the latter charges fell upon us. Moreover, as the articles of Great Britain would meet less competition in our markets than ours in hers, the increased charges on her manufactures would much oftener fall upon us than those upon our materials would fall upon her. So that both ways we should sustain loss. But, it may be asked, what are the regulations Great Britain could adopt to counteract ours ? I answer, she could, (among other conceivable things,) prohibit or lay prohibitory duties on her com modities to this country, and on ours to her, in our bottoms ; and she might in addition, temporarily grant the same privileges to Dutch or other friendly bottoms which are now granted to those of the United States in the trade between us and herself; or she might go no further in this particular than to permit the impor tation of our commodities in some of those bottoms. This, it is true, would be a departure from the system of her navigation act; but when the question was, whether she should surrender it permanently to us by extortion, or temporarily to a power more friendly to her, till the issue of the experiment could be decided, who can doubt what would be the course which in terest and resentment would dictate ? MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 276 But there are numerous other regulations which could be adopted, and which equally with the forego ing would have the effect of transferring the trade be tween the two countries to the management of some third party ; for after all, it is not improbable this will be the result of the contest, that instead of the United States and Great Britain carrying on jointly as they now do the trade between the two countries, it will be carried on either directly or circuitously by some third power, more to our detriment than to that of Great Britain. The manufactures of that country will get to us nearly in the same quantities they now do, with the disadvantage of additional charges ; such of our com modities, as she cannot have of equal quality elsewhere, will get to her also : the rest will be supplanted by the like commodities of other nations, and we shall lose the best market we have for them. Those who advocate the system of contention, should tell us where a substitute will be found. The merchants, who know that it is now difficult enough to find markets for our surplus commodities that France, in ordinary times, affords a very contracted one, and that the French West Indies are not likely, in settled times, to be as good customers as they have been for some time past, cannot desire to see the sphere abridg ed, and our landholders will quickly reprobate the plan. Thus it appears, that the contest would be likely to issue against us, and to end in defeat and disgrace. What would be our situation if we should make an attempt of the kind and fail in it ? Our trade would then truly be in the power and at the disposal of Great Britain. 3. The third ingredient stated, as necessary to justi fy the proposed attempt, is this ; that the prospect of advantages should be at least an equivalent for those in possession, which would be put in jeopardy by the experiment. ft has been shown, that in fact there is no real pros- 280 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON pect of advantage, but a considerable one of incon venience and loss. This puts an end to comparison. But it may be added, that our situation is precisely such an one as to forbid experiments. It is so, from the stage at which we are, as a people, too little ad vanced, too little matured for hazardous experiments of any sort. This is not all : our general situation at this time is an eligible one ; we are making as rapid a progress in most of the great branches of political prosperity as we can reasonably desire, and it would be imprudent to hazard such a situation, upon precarious speculations of greater advantage. The prosperity of a nation is not a plant to thrive in a hotbed ; moderation in this respect is the truest wisdom ; it is so plain a path, that it requires a peculiar sublimation of ideas to deviate from it. It is agreed on all hands, that all our great national interests, our population, agriculture, manufactures, commerce and our navigation, are in a thriving and progressive state, advancing, faster than was to have been expected, and as fast as can reasonably be de sired. Our navigation, in the short space of three years, ending the 31st of December, 179., has increased in the ratio of nearly one fifth. The proportions of our tonnage have been as fol lows : In 1790 tons 479091 ) 1791 - - 501790 ) showing an increase of 89192 tons. 1792 - 568283) The proportion of foreign tonnage during the same years, has been In 1790 tons 258919) 1791 - - 240799 > showing a decrease of 14656 tons. 1792 - - 244263) This proves that our present system is highly fa vorable to the increase of our navigation, and that we are gradually supplanting foreigners. MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 281 The truth is, that the difference in the tonnage duty, and the addition of one tenth upon the duties on goods imported in foreign bottoms, is a powerful encourage ment to our shipping, and as it has not been of a mag nitude to excite retaliation, it is much more likely to promote the interests of. our navigation, than violent measures, v/hich would compel to retaliation; pru dence admonishes us to stop where we are, for the pre sent, rather than risk the advantages we possess, in trials of strength, that never fail to injure more or less both parties. If we turn from our shipping to our agriculture, we shall find no reason to be dissatisfied. The amount of our exports for the year, ending 30th September, 1792, as appears by the last return of ex ports to this house, exceeded the two preceding years by five hundred eighty-nine thousand, six hundred and one dollars and sixteen cents. It exceeded the mean of the two preceding years, by one million, five hundred ninety-seven thousand, nine hundred and eighty-three dollars and thirty-six cents. Our reve nues are unquestionably more productive than was looked for. Those from imports have exceeded, in a year, four millions, six hundred thousand dollars. Of the increase of our manufactures we have no precise standard, but those, who attend most to the subject, en tertain no doubt that they are progressive. This certainly is not a state of things that invites to hazardous experiments. These are perhaps never justifiable, but when the affairs of a nation are in an unprosperous train. We experience, indeed, some embarrassments from the effects of the European war, but these are tempo rary, and will cease with that war, which of itself of- iers us some indemnifications, I mean a freer trade to the West Indies. I am greatly mistaken if the considerations, which have been suggested, do not conclusively prove the impolicy of the plan which is now recommended for VOL. i. 36 282 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON our adoption. So strong and decided is my own con viction, that I cannot but persuade myself, that of the committee will lead to its rejection. A few miscellaneous observations will conclude what I have to offer on this very interesting subject. 1. It has been made an objection to the present foot ing on which our trade is with Great Britain, that it is regulated by annual proclamation of the executive, in stead of a permanent law. This was at first laid down by the secretary of state in terms so general as to in clude the West Indies ; but he has since corrected the error, and told us that our trade with the British West Indies is regulated by a standing law. The fact itself, nevertheless, is of no real importance. The actual footing, on which we are placed, is the only material point; the mode of doing it is of little consequence. The annual proclamation of the British executive is equivalent to the decree, revocable at pleasure, of any single legislator, of the monarch of Spain or Portugal, and it may be added, of the French convention, which, though a numerous body, yet forming only one assem bly, without checks, is as liable to fluctuation as a sin gle legislator ; and in fact, its resolutions have been tound as fickle and variable, as it was possible for the resolutions of any single person to be. To prove this, if proof were required, it would be only necessary to refer to the frequent changes in the regulations they have made with regard to the trade of this country to-day one thing, to-morrow another. Instability is more applicable to no political institution than to a legislature, consisting of a single popular assembly. 2. The additional duties proposed, are objectiona ble, because the existing duties are already, generally speaking, high enough for the state of our mercantile capital and the safety of collection. They are near twenty per centum on an average, upon the value of the objects on which they are laid ; higher than the du ties of several countries, and high enough for our pre sent condition. To augment the rates materially will MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 283 be in the abstract to oppress trade ; for we must have for our consumption the manufactures of the country on which they are proposed to be laid. 3. To serve as a contrast to the conduct of Great Britain, we are told of the liberal overtures for a com mercial treaty lately made by France. It has been already remarked, that the conduct of France towards us since the commencement of the re volution, is no basis of reasoning : it has undergone as many revolutions as their political systems : their mea sures at one period, with respect to our tobacco, were of a complexion peculiarly hostile to us. The duty of twenty-five livres per kentle on that article, carried in our bottoms to France, and of only eighteen livres fifteen sous on the same article, carried in French bot toms, amounted to a complete prohibition to carry our tobacco in our own bottoms. The duty of twenty livres per kentle on foreign fish is another important instance of severity of regulations, a duty admitted by the secretary of state to be pro hibitory. If there have been regulations and propositions of a more favorable nature, they are to be ascribed to causes of the moment. During the continuance of the revolution, it is of necessity that we have carte blanche in the French West Indies. We know that we are getting admission into the British and Spanish Islands also. And as to the overtures for a permanent system, Mr. Genet's instructions published by him explain the object. Privileges of trade in the West India Islands are to be the price of our becoming a party in the war. The declamations against the liberticide maxims of the ancient government and in favor of free principles of commerce, resolve themselves into this. This is a bar gain which I trust a majority of this house will not be willing to make ; I am sure our constituents would not thank us for it. But it may be asked, are we to sit with folded arms and tamely submit to all the oppressions, restrictions 2#4 MR. SMITH'S SPEECH ON and exclusions to which our trade is subject if not, what are we to do ? I answer, nothing certainly at the present juncture. If the foundation of the question were more solid than I believe it to be, candidly and dispassionately considered, this is of all moments the most unfavorable for an experiment. Any move ment of the kind would, as before observed, be constru ed into a political manoeuvre and an attempt to embar rass one of the belligerent powers, and would interest the feelings of all those united with her, producing consequently either war or additional trammels in every quarter upon our trade ; besides the weighty argument, that the great source of subsidiary supply to which we might have heretofore looked has been obstructed. But I answer further, that we ought with great cau tion to attempt any thing at a future day, till we have acquired a maturity which will enable us to act with greater effect, and to brave the consequences, even if they should amount to war, and till we have secured more adequate means of internal supply ; to which point we should bend our efforts, as the only rational and safe expedient, in our present circumstances, for counteract ing the effects of the spirit of monopoly, which more or less tinctures not the system of Great Britain merely, but that of all Europe. But this it seems is not the favor ite course, it is not high seasoned enough for our politi cal palate ; we not only turn aside from it with neglect, but we object away the plainest provisions of the con stitution to disable ourselves from pursuing it. Every year, for years to come, will make us a more important customer to Great Britain, and a more im portant furnisher of what she wants. If this does not lead to such a treaty of commerce as we desire, the period is not very distant when we may insist with much better effect on what we desire, without any thing like the same degree of hazard. This last ob servation is not meant to be confined to Great Britain, but to extend to any other power, as far as the stipula tions of treaty may permit. MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 285 Wisdom admonishes us to be patient, "to make haste slowly." Our progress is and will be rapid enough, if we do not throw away our advantages. Why should we be more susceptible than all the world ? Why should this young country throw down the gaunt let in favor of free trade against the world ? There may be spirit in it, but there will certainly not be prudence. But again it may be asked, shall we put nations, dis posed to a more liberal system, upon the same footing with those differently disposed ? Will not this tend to produce an unfriendly treatment from all ? I answer first, that I think it has been proved, that the nation against which we have been invited prin cipally to aim our artillery, treats us with at least as much liberality as other nations, I mean in a commer cial sense. I answer secondly, that if there be nations, who are seriously disposed to establish with us more free and beneficial principles of trade, the path is plain ; let treaties be formed, fixing upon a solid basis the privileges which we are to enjoy, and the equivalent. I have no objection to granting greater privileges to one power than to another, if it can be put on the stable foundation of contract, ascertaining the boon and the equivalent. But I think it folly to be granting volun tarily boons at the expense of the United States with out equivalent. The mode of treaty secures the ground ; it is inoffensive to any third power. Our re ply to objections would in that case be, " here is the price to us clearly defined and fixed by treaty, for which we grant the greater advantages of which you complain : give us the price, and the like advantages are yours." But capriciously to grant greater privi leges by law to one nation than to another, when, upon a fair comparison, we are not better treated by one than by another, is neither equitable, politic, nor safe. Let us then leave changes for the present to the course of national treaties, and continue to proceed in the path in which we have hitherto found prosperity and safetv. SPEECH OF JOHN NICHOLAS, ON MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 16, 1794. In the committee of the whole, Mr. Nicholas spoke as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, I FEEL a great embarrassment, in speaking on this subject, from a distrust of my ability to treat properly its acknowledged importance, and from the apparent expectation of the audience. I feel too, as the mem ber from Maryland who spoke yesterday did, from the imputation of motives, well knowing that the Repre sentatives of my country are industriously reported to be enemies of the government, and promoters of anarchy, and that the present measure is imputed to these principles. It is somewhat remarkable, that farther North we are charged with selfishness and want of attachment to the general welfare, for a supposed opposition to measures of the import of the present. I mention this contradictory inference, to show that the shameful designs, charged upon us, are not proved by the fact, and to place the guilt where it only exists, in the malignity of the accuser. It is a commonly received opinion, that trade should be entrusted to the direction of those immediately in terested in it, and that the actual course of it, is the best which it could take ; this principle is by no means MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH, &c. 287 a safe one, and as applied to the trade of America, is extremely fallacious. It can never be just, where the beginning and growth of commerce have not been free from all possible constraint as to its direction, as that can never be called a business of election, which has been created under foreign influence. The man ner in which America was first peopled, and the nurture she received from Great Britain, afford the most strik ing contrast to the requisite beforementioned. The first inhabitants of America were educated in Great Britain, and brought with them all the wants of their own country ; to be gratified chiefly by the productions of that country, aided by British capital in the settle ment of the wilderness ; and depending on the same means for the conveyance of its produce to a place of consumption, it was inevitable that the demand for British commodities should keep pace with the im provement of the country. In the commencement of American population and during its early stages, there does not appear to have been a chance of comparing the advantages of commercial connexion with different countries, and it will be found, that in its progress it was still more restrained. In the last years of the de pendence of America on Great Britain, the principal part of America was occupied by large trading com panies, composed of people in Great Britain, and con ducted by factors, who sunk large sums in the hands of the farmers to attach them to their respective stores, by which means, competition was precluded, and a dependence on the supplies of those stores completely established. Since the revolution, the business has been conducted by persons in the habit of dependence on Great Britain, and who had no other capital than the manufactures of that country, furnished on credit. The business is still almost wholly conducted by the same means. In no stage of its growth then, does there appear to have been a power in the consumer to have compared the productions of Great Britain, with those of any other country, as to their quality or 288 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON price, and therefore there is no propriety in calling the course of trade, the course of its choice. The subject before the committee, naturally divides itself into navigation and manufactures, in speaking of which^ I shall offer some other considerations, to show that the same effects are by no means to be expected from the greatest commercial wisdom in individuals, which are in the power of the general concert of the community; the one having in view profit on each sepa rate transaction, the other promoting an advantageous result to the whole commerce of the country. In considering the importance of navigation to all countries, but especially to such as have so extensive a production of bulky articles, as America, I think I shall show that the last observation is accurately right, and that the interest of the whole community, not those only who are the carriers, but those also who furnish the object of carriage, positively demands a domestic marine, equal to its whole business, and that, even if it is to exist under rates higher than those of foreign navigation, it is to be preferred. In circum stances of tolerable equality, that can never however entirely be the case ; for in the carriage of the produce of one country, by the shipping of another, to any other place than the country to which the shipping belongs, there is considerably more labor employed, than would have been by domestic shipping, as the return to their own country, is to be included. On this ground, it may be confidently asserted, that where the materials of navigation are equally attainable, they will always be more advantageously employed by the country for whose use they are intended, and that if under such circumstances, another country is employed as the carrier, it must be under the influence of some other cause than interest, as it respects that particular busi ness. A dependence on the shipping of another coun try, tends to establish a place of deposit in that coun try, of those exports which are for the use of others, if it is at a convenient distance from them. The super- MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 289 intendence of property, makes short voyages desirable for the owner, and the connexion, that soon takes place, between the money capital of a country and its ship ping interests, greatly strengthens the vortex. The attainment of wealth beyond the demands of naviga tion, leads to an interest in the cargo itself, and then the agency in selling to the consumer, becomes im portant. It is apparent, that as the final sale depends on the wants of the purchaser, all intermediate expenses of care and agency, must be taken from the price to which the maker would be entitled. Our own com merce has involved this loss in a remarkable degree, and it has gone to an enormous extent, from a necessi ty of submitting to the perfidy of agents, arising from a dependence established by means of the so much boasted credit. That there is this tendency in the employment of foreign shipping, is not only proved by the commercial importance of Holland, which became thus from her naval resources, the store-house of Europe, without furnishing any thing from her own productions, but also from the varied experience of America. Before the revolution, every thing for European consumption was carried to Great Britain ; but since America has possessed shipping of her own, and in the northern states, there has been an accession of capital, the ex port to England is reduced one half. It is true indeed, that there is still nearly one half of what she receives, that is re-exported ; but it will be found, that she still retains a proportionate share of those influences, which formerly carried the whole. Great Britain, under all the discouragements of our laws, which we are told by the mercantile members of the committee, amount to a prohibition where they have any rivals, did, until the European war, possess one third of the foreign tonnage employed in America. This has been sup ported by the dependence into which the southern states were placed by credit, and here, as in every other step of the connexion, this engine extorts ad- VOL. T. 37 290 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON vantages from us, beyond the compensation which is always secured in the first advance. If there is wanted other proof of the British interest in the American navigation, being supported in direct opposition to our interests, it may be found in the comparative state of the tonnage employed, where it appears that, after the protecting duties once had their effect, the additional tonnage, to a considerable amount, has been entirely American, and that the British tonnage has remained very nearly stationary, and in proportion to their undue influence. In time of war, in addition to the inconveniences before stated, which are enhanced by throwing the trade from its accustomed channel, there are great and important losses brought on a country by this kind of dependence. If your carriers are parties to the war, you are subjected to war freight and war in surance on your cargo, and you are cut off from all the markets to which they are hostile ; and indeed, from our experience in the present war, I may say you are cut off from the market of your carriers them selves, as it would have been impossible for British vessels to have escaped in our seas last summer. To what extent this loss goes, may be seen from a calcula tion in the secretary of state's report on the fisheries, making the proportion of war to that of peace in the last one hundred years, as forty-two to one hundred ; and on that calculation there can be no hesitation in determining that the interest of the farmers requires that this foreign dependence should end here. But the European war, by making a temporary exclusion of British shipping, has already brought on us the great est mischief of such a regulation, and by the encour agement it has afforded to our shipping, almost com pleted the remedy ; so that we have reason to consi der this as a fortunate period. But it is not merely the advancement of our marine that is contemplated by the present resolutions ; the security of that which we have, is also dependent on them. The danger MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 291 from the Algerines has been estimated in this house at five per centum on the vessel and cargo, but the whole encouragement to our own shipping in our existing laws, consists in the one tenth additional duty on goods imported in foreign vessels. Whenever there shall be an European peace, which cannot be far distant, the whole difference between the two sums will be a direct encouragement on British ships, and will probably be equal to two freights. Do gentlemen rely on the pre carious prospect of building frigates, and the more precarious service to be rendered by them when built, so much as to neglect any other regulations for the safety of our shipping, when they are so much in their power ? Having shown, that the actual state of our com merce is by no means the most beneficial, as far as navigation is concerned, I will proceed to consider the benefits derived from the consumption of those Euro pean manufactures, which form the principal part of the stores of America: and here it may safely be said, that national policy by no means justifies the almost exclusive preference, given to those of Great Britain. It is not always true, that the commodity which is bought for least money is the best bargain ; for the means of payment form an important considera tion in all traffic, and accommodations in it, may more than counterbalance an inequality of price. If one man will receive an article in exchange, which you can sell to no other, it will certainly be a saving to deal with him, at a high advance on his property. If there are countries which would become great consumers of American produce, on the terms of reciprocal con sumption, arid we find a difficulty, as is often the case, in vending that produce, is it not of great national importance to excite those acts, which are to become the foundation of the connexion, even if in the first instance, it is to be attended with inconvenience and loss ? France may be made a connexion of this sort ; she is at this time, almost, if not quite on a footing 292 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON with Great Britain in the consumption of American products, and every hand which shall receive employ ment from us, will add to her wants. We are told, that it is of no less importance to us to find a country which can supply us advantageously, than one which will consume our productions, and that, as commerce is no longer carried on by barter, it is no less beneficial to sell in one country and buy in another, than if we could complete the exchange in the same country. This might be true, if your production was limited, and the demand for it certain ; but with a greatly im proving agriculture, and some risk in our markets, the object is important. Great Britain being the fac tory of those things, which would make her most de pendent on the agricultural interest, and her national wealth being probably at the greatest height, there is no expectation that her consumption will increase. On the other hand, as labor is now to receive its direc tion in France to the manufacturing arts, so far as con cerns America you will take from the agricultural strength a large class of people, and by that means create a dependence on you, at least to the amount of their own consumption, and the wealth you will diffuse, will give ability to thousands who are now too poor to bid for your commodities. Nor is it probable that you will purchase this important benefit, on very disadvan tageous terms ; for it is agreed on all hands, that many important arts are well understood there, and that labor, which forms the principal part of the cost of most articles, is considerably cheaper in France, than in England. Another very important operation of a discrimina tion in favor of France, will be, that by encouraging liberal industry, you may put an end to some practices, which, in the existing state of consumption, greatly de preciate our commodities; I mean the public provi sion made in granaries, and the supply from them in times of scarcity, which destroy the competition that raises every thing to its just value. Different conse- MR, MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. quences have been foretold, as likely to result from those measures, to which I shall give a short examina tion. We are told, that the preference, long since given by our laws, has been equal to a prohibition of British vessels, and that to the extent to which it has gone, the best effects have been produced. To secure this operation from a recent attack, and at the same time to extend it to some branches of trade, to which its prin ciple would equally extend, is the object of the marine resolutions. We have no reason to apprehend bad effects from an action, which has hitherto had good consequences. As to the increased duties on manu factures, I think the prospect in no way threatening, for if there should be found no country to supply our wants on better terms, the diminution of consumption will be only in proportion to the duty. This can be by no means alarming, considered as the worst conse quence of the measure to men, with whom the impost is the favorite mode of collecting the revenue, at a time when the public wants are equal to any possible produce. If there shall be found a competitor with Great Britain for our consumption, the great object will be attained, as it must be accompanied by a cor responding consumption of American productions. But we are told, that there will be a conflict of commer cial regulations between this country and Great Bri tain, and that the consequence will be the loss of the market she affords us. The probable consequences of such a conflict, will best determine whether it is to be expected ; as it will commence on her part as well as ours, with a view to consequences. The danger, which she can alone apprehend, is the loss of the market for her manufactures, and to obviate this, it would be ab surd to widen the breach between us, as that would tend, in a direct proportion, to the establishment of un friendly habits, and manufactures, either here or in other countries, which would rival her own. If, however, the ultimate advantage would justify such measures, the immediate distress of her people would forbid it 294 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON The American trade must be the means of distributing bread to several hundred thousand persons, whose oc cupation would be wholly ended with the trade, and the government is by no means in a situation to bear their discontent. Their navigation and manufactures draw many im portant ingredients from America, which would be lost to them. The creditors of the people of America to an immense amount, would be deprived of the remit tances which depend on a friendly intercourse. On the whole, it would add to the disorders of the govern ment among those, who perhaps have heretofore contri buted to its support, without gratifying any thing but an arrogant resentment. But we are told, that our own citizens would be equal sufferers, and are more to be injured by being stopped in a career of rapid improve ment : it will be hard to anticipate any real misfortune to America, in such a contest, unless the temporary loss of indulgences, which are by no means necessary, can be so called. The consumption of Great Britain is, according to the most friendly calculation, not more than one third of our purchases from her, and therefore the national wealth, independent of the gratification of our appetites, will receive an immense addition, and a vast fund will be procured to make lasting and valua ble improvements, which would be degraded by com parison with the gewgaws of a day. It is to be remark ed, that the diminution of our exports would be divided among large classes of people, and in all cases rather form a deduction from the annual income, than a total loss : this will result from the various objects of American industry and the division of the markets of its produce. This forms an important difference between America and Great Britain, in an estimate of the effects of a rupture between the two countries. In my opinion, the habits of the southern states are such as to require the control, which is said to be the consequence of these measures. Under the facility offered by the modes of trade before spoken of, and the credit which is said to MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 295 be so beneficial, they have not only involved them selves in debt, but have contracted habits, which, with the power of gratification, must always keep them so. We did hope that the administration of justice would have corrected the evil, but we now find that it cannot be corrected but by entire changes. It is founded in the policy of the merchant himself, and this circum stance is enough to present to the minds of the com mittee a long train of dependent mischiefs ; it is a fact, supported by the best evidence, that our merchants who get their goods from the manufacturer, pay as much for them as the shopkeeper, who buys at Balti more or Philadelphia. This is one of the conse quences of the want of credit, which always will fol low a reliance on collection from farmers ; and there can be no doubt, that the merchant is indemnified for his disgrace, as well as his advance. The result of the whole train of indulgence is, that our goods are bought at an advance from a half to one fourth of what they could be afforded for in cash sales ; nor does the mischief stop here ; it brings a subjection which materially affects the sale of our produce. I believe myself, that the war with Great Britain did not bring half the mischief on us that their credit has, and I very much suspect that a credit for consumption will always be found equally mischievous. It by no means resembles money loans, as is insinuated by the gentle man from South Carolina, by freeing a man's own re sources for any other use. It is certain, that there is no other safe regulation of a farmer's expenses, than his income and experience every day proves that when so regulated they always fall short of the income, and that when they depend on credit they always exceed it, and thereby subject future revenue. Lessening the importation of foreign manufactures will increase our household fabrics, which experience has proved to be highly profitable, as the labor is done by a part of the community of little power in any other application. Regular efforts in this way have been, in my country, certainly productive of independence. 296 MR. NICHOLAS' SPEECH ON It is acknowledged, that we may derive great advan* tages from France in our commerce ; but it is said they should be secured by treaty, and we should not pay beforehand for them. If advantages are to be drawn by treaty from foreign nations, to enable the executive to procure them we must advance the impost beyond the revenue standard, or they will have nothing to give in exchange. Will gentlemen agree to involve France in this measure indiscriminately, when we have al ready a commercial treaty with her, which was con comitant with that treaty which gave us independence? Will they, under such proofs of friendliness, and while they are laboring under a revolution that must strength en our connexion, show distrust of their justice, when the distinction now proposed may give them a know ledge of those advantages they may derive from our trade, and thereby make them more eager for a per manent contract ? It will be always in our power, when we find ourselves deceived, to restore the equali ty with Great Britain. We are asked, what will be come of our revenue under such an establishment ? The answer is obvious from my former observations. If the consumption is reduced only by means of reve nue, the revenue will increase ; if it is lessened by com petition, it will not be diminished, for the present rates will continue on all foreign goods, and we shall be bet ter able to pay from the improvement of our foreign markets. But if there should be a diminution without lessening the power of the people to pay, what mis chief will there be ? Every body understands that the people pay the revenue, although it is collected by custom-house officers ; and there is reason to believe, that the expense of collection is greater in that way than any other, as there is not only the apparent ex pense, but a secret compensation to the merchants for advancing it. But we are told, that we are including countries, in the general description, which are our best customers Spain, Portugal, the Hanse Towns and Denmark. It MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 297 will be found, that they are little within the reach of the propositions, not being carriers and in a small de gree manufacturers of the articles to be taxed. It will be in the power of the legislature to save them, in filling up the blanks ; but this is not intended to shut out any nation, which chooses to trade with us on liberal terms, and if we are satisfied with our footing in their trade, there is no doubt but we can secure it by treaty : they will not complain of our taking away benefits, which they may resume at any time. We are told, that this business is merely commercial, and that we should not think of our political relations to Great Britain ; hut in my opinion, most of our grievances have commer cial objects, and therefore are to be remedied by com mercial resistance ; if you take away what is contended for, contest must end. The Indian war and the Alge- rine attack, have both commercial views, or Great Bri tain must stand without excuse for instigating the most horrid cruelties. I consider, however, the pro positions before you, as the strongest weapon America possesses, and the most likely to restore her to all her rights, political and commercial and I trust I have shown, that the means will have a beneficial effect, if they should fail as a remedy with respect to Great Britain. VOL. i. 38 SPEECH OF FISHER AMES, ON MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 27, 1794. In the committee oi'the whole, Mr. Ames spoke as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, THE question lies within this compass : is there any measure proper to be adopted by Congress, which will have the effect to put our trade and navigation on a better footing ? If there is, it is our undoubted right to adopt it, (if by right is understood the power of self-government, which every independent nation possesses,) and our own as completely as any other ; it is our duty also, for we are the depositaries and the guardians of the interests of our constituents, which, on every consideration, ought to be dear to us. I make no doubt they are so, and that there is a dispo sition sufficiently ardent existing in this body, to co operate in any measures for the advancement of the common good. Indeed, so far as I can judge from any knowledge I have of human nature, or of the pre vailing spirit of public transactions, that sort of patri otism, which makes us wish the general prosperity, when our private interest does not happen to stand in the way, is no uncommon sentiment. In truth, it is very like self-love, and not much less prevalent. There is little occasion to excite and inflame it. It is, like self-love, more apt to want intelligence than zeal. MR. AMES' SPEECH, &c. 29U The danger is always, that it will rush blindly into em barrassments, which a prudent spirit of inquiry might have prevented, but from which it will scarcely find means to extricate us. While therefore the right, the duty, and the inclination to advance the trade and na vigation of the United States, are acknowledged and felt by us all, the choice of the proper means to that end is a matter requiring the most circumspect inqui ry, and the most dispassionate judgment. After a debate has continued a long time, the sub ject very frequently becomes tiresome before it is ex hausted. Arguments, however solid, urged by differ ent speakers, can scarcely fail to render the discussion both complex and diffusive. Without pretending to give to my arguments any other merit, I shall aim at simplicity. We hear it declared, that the design of the resolu tions, is to place our trade and navigation on a better footing. By better footing, we are to understand a more profitable one. Profit is a plain word, that can not be misunderstood. We have, to speak in round numbers, twenty mil lion dollars of exports annually. To have the trade of exports on a good footing, means nothing more than to sell them dear ; and consequently, the trade of import on a good footing, is to buy cheap. To put them both on a better footing, is to sell dearer and to buy cheap er than we do at present. If the effect of the resolu tions will be, to cause our exports to be sold cheaper, and our imports to be bought dearer, our trade will suffer an injury. It is hard to compute how great the injury would prove ; for the first loss of value in the buying dear, and selling cheap, is only the symptom and beginning of the evil, but by no means the measure of it; it will withdraw a great part of the nourishment, that now supplies the wonderful growth of our industry and opulence. The difference may not amount to a great proportion of the price of the articles, but it may reach 300 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON the greater part of the profit of the producer ; it may have effects in this way which will be of the worst kind, by discouraging the products of our land and in dustry. It is to this test I propose to bring the reso lutions on the table ; and if it shall clearly appear, that they tend to cause our exports to be sold cheaper, and our imports to be bought dearer, they cannot escape condemnation. Whatever specious show of advan tage may be given them, they deserve to be called ag gravations of any real or supposed evils in our com mercial system, and not remedies. I have framed this statement of the question so as to comprehend the whole subject of debate, and at the same time, I confess it was my design to exclude from consideration a number of topics, which appear to me totally irrelative to it. The best answer to many assertions we have heard is, to admit them without proof. We are exhorted to assert our natural rights ; to put trade on a respecta ble footing ; to dictate terms of trade to other nations ; to engage in a contest of self-denial, and by that, and by shifting our commerce from one country to another, to make our enemies feel the extent of our power. This language, as it respects the proper subject of discus sion, means nothing, or what is worse. If our trade is already on a profitable footing, it is on a respectable one. Unless war be our object, it is useless to inquire, what are the dispositions of any government, with whose subjects our merchants deal to the best advan tage. While they will smoke our tobacco, and eat our provisions, it is very immaterial, both to the con sumer and the producer, what are the politics of the two countries, excepting so far as their quarrels may disturb the benefits of their mutual intercourse. So far, therefore, as commerce is concerned, the in quiry is, have we a good market ? The good or bad state of our actual market is the question. The actual market is every where more or less a restricted one, and the natural order of things is MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 301 displaced by the artificial. Most nations, for reasons of which they alone are the rightful judges, have regu lated and restricted their intercourse, according to their views of safety and profit. We claim for our selves the same right, as the acts in our statute book, and the resolutions on the table evince, without hold ing ourselves accountable to any other nation what ever. The right, which we properly claim, and which we properly exercise, when we do it prudently and usefully for our nation, is as well established, and has been longer in use in the countries of which we com plain, than in our own. If their right is as good as that of Congress, to regulate and restrict, why do we talk of a strenuous exertion of our force, and by dic tating terms to nations, who are fancied to be physi cally dependent on America, to change the policy of nations ? It may be very true, that their policy is very wise and good for themselves, but not as favorable for us as we could make it, if we could legislate for both sides of the Atlantic. The extravagant despotism of this language accords very ill with our power to give it effect, or with the af fectation of zeal for an unlimited freedom of com merce. Such a state of absolute freedom of com merce never did exist, and it is very much to be doubt ed whether it ever will. Were 1 invested with the trust to legislate for mankind, it is very probable the first act of my authority would be to throw all the re strictive and prohibitory laws of trade into the fire : the resolutions on the table would not be spared. But if 1 were to do so, it is probable I should have a quarrel on my hands with every civilized nation. The Dutch would claim the monopoly of the spice trade, for which their ancestors passed their whole lives in warfare. The Spaniards and Portuguese would be no less obstinate. If we calculate what colony monopo lies have cost in wealth, in suffering, and in crimes, we shall say they were dearly purchased. The Eng lish would plead for their navigation act, not as a 303 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON source of gain, but as an essential means of securing their independence. So many interests would be dis turbed, and so many lost, by a violent change from the existing to an unknown order of things ; and the mutu al relations of nations, in respect to their power and wealth, would suffer such a shock, that the idea must be allowed to be perfectly Utopian and wild. But for this country to form the project of changing the policy of nations, and to begin the abolition of restrictions by restrictions of its own, is equally ridiculous and incon sistent. Let every nation that is really disposed to extend the liberty of commerce, beware of rash and hasty schemes of prohibition. In the affairs of trade, as in most others, we make too many laws. We follow experi ence too little, and the visions of theorists a great deal too much. Instead of listening to discourses on what the market ought to be, and what the schemes, which always promise much on paper, pretend to make it, let us see what is the actual market for our exports and imports. This will bring vague assertions and san guine opinions to the test of experience. That rage for theory and system, . which would entangle even practical truth in the web of the brain, is the poison of public discussion. One fact is better than two systems. The terms, on which our exports are received in the British market, have been accurately examined by a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Wm. L. Smith.) Before his statement of facts was made to the com mittee, it was urged, and with no little warmth, that the system of England indicated her inveteracy to wards this country, while that of France, springing from disinterested affection, constituted a claim for gratitude and self-denying measures of retribution. Since that statement, however, that romantic style, which is so ill adapted to the subject, has been chang ed. We hear it insinuated, that the comparison of the footing of our exports, in the markets of France and England, is of no importance ; that it is chiefly Mil. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 393 our object to see how we may assist and extend our commerce. This evasion of the force of the state ment, or rather this indirect admission of its authori ty, establishes it. It will not be pretended, that it has been shaken during the debate. It has been made to appear, beyond contradiction, that the British market for our exports, taken in the aggregate, is a good one ; that it is better than the French, and better than any we have, and for many of our products the only one. The whole amount of our exports to the British do minions, in the year ending the 30th September, 1790, was nine million, two hundred and forty-six thousand, six hundred and six dollars. But it will be more simple and satisfactory to confine the inquiry to the articles following : bread stuff, tobacco, rice, wood, the produce of the fisheries, fish oil, pot and pearl ash, salted meats, indigo, live animals, flax seed, naval stores and iron. The amount of the beforementioned articles, export ed in that same year to the British dominions, was eight million, four hundred and fifty-seven thousand, one hundred and seventy-three dollars. We have heard so much of restriction of inimical and jealous prohibitions to cramp our trade, it is na tural to scrutinize the British system, with the expecta tion of finding little besides the effects of her selfish and angry policy. Yet of the great sum of nearly eight millions and a half, the amount of the products beforementioned sold in her markets, two articles only are dutied by way of restriction. Bread stuff is dutied so high in the mar ket of Great Britain as, in times of plenty, to exclude it, and this is done from the desire to favor her own farmers. The mover of the resolutions justified the exclusion of our bread stuff from the French West In dies by their permanent regulations, because, he said, they were bound to prefer their own products to those even of the United States. It would seem that the 304 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON same apology would do for England, in her home mar ket. But what will do for the vindication of one na tion becomes invective against another. The criminal nation, however, receives our bread stuff in the West Indies free, and excludes other foreign, so as to give our producers the monopoly of the supply. This is no merit in the judgment of the mover of the resolu tions, because it is a fragment of her old colony system. Notwithstanding the nature of the duties on bread stuff in Great Britain, it has been clearly shown, that she is a better customer for that article, in Europe, than her neighbor, France. The latter, in ordinary times, is a poor customer for bread stuff, for the same reason that our own country is, because she produces it her self, and therefore France permits it to be imported, and the United States do the like. Great Britain of ten wants the article, and then she receives it; no country can be expected to buy what it does not want. The bread stuff sold in the European dominions of Britain, in the year 1790, amounted to one million, eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred and forty dollars. Whale oil pays the heavy duty of eighteen pounds three shillings sterling per ton; yet spermaceti oil found a market there to the value of eighty-one thou sand and forty-eight dollars. Thus it appears, that of eight millions and a half, sold to Great Britain and her dominions, only the value of one million, one hundred and sixty-eight thou sand dollars was under duty of a restrictive nature. The bread stuff is hardly to be considered as within the description ; yet, to give the argument its full force, what is it ? about one eighth part is restricted, To proceed with the residue : Indigo to the amount of $473,830 Live animals to the West Indies - 62,415 Flax-seed to Great Britain 219,924 Total, $756,169 MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTIONS. 305 These articles are received, duty free, which is a good foot to the trade. Yet we find, good as it is, the bulk of our exports is received on even better terms : Flour to the British West Indies $858,00 portant staples of this country, have, without even a pretext of reciprocity, been subjected to confiscation* No nation, which produces these articles, has, I believe, any treaties at present, making the same sacrifice, with the exception of Denmark, who, in the year 1780, by what means I know not, was induced to agree to an explanation of the treaty of 1670, by which these articles are declared to be contraband. Now, sir, it appears to me, that this same supplementary and ex planatory agreement between Great Britain and Den mark, has been the model selected for the contraband list of the treaty, at present in question ; the enumera tion in the latter being transcribed, word for word, from the former, with a single exception, which, not only is in itself, but renders the whole transaction extremely remarkable. The article " HORSES," which stands as one part of the original, is entirely omitted in the copy; and what renders the omission more worthy of scruti ny, is, that though the treaty, in general, seems to have availed itself, wherever it readily could, of the authori ty of Vattel, the omission of horses is no less a departure from him, than from the original, from which that part of the treaty was copied. Indeed, the whole of this particular transaction seems fraught with singularity and just liability to suspicion ; for, strange as it may appear, it is certainly true, that the copy proceeded exactly from the original, till it got as far as the purposes of Great Britain required, and at that point stopped short. I entreat the committee to pay attention to this fact. After enumerating the articles that are to be deemed contraband, the Danish article goes on in the words following, viz. " But it is ex pressly declared, that among contraband merchandizes, shall not be comprehended, fish and meats, whether fresh or salted; wheat, flour, corn, or other grain; 342 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON beans, oil, wines, and generally whatever serves for the nourishment and support of life ; all of which may at all times be sold and transported, like any other mer chandizes, even to places held by an enemy of the two crowns, provided they be not besieged or blockaded." This view of the subject naturally leads me to make some observations on that clause of the treaty which relates to provisions, and which, to say the least of it, wears a very ambiguous and disagreeable counte nance ; or, to speak more precisely, seems to carry with it a necessary implication that provisions, though not bound to besieged or blockaded places, may ac cording to the law of nations, as it now exists, be re garded and treated as contraband. According to the genuine law of nations, no articles, which are not ex pressly and generally contraband, are so, in any particu lar instance, except in the single case of their going to a place besieged; yet it is recognized by this treaty, that there are other cases in which provisions may be deemed contraband, from which recognition, implica tion fairly results, that one of those cases may be that which has been assumed and put in force by Great Britain, in relation to the United States. Such trivial cases, as might be devised by way of appurtenances to the law, that condemns what is bound to blockaded places, can by no means satisfy the import of the stipu lation ; because such cases cannot be presumed to have been in contemplation of the parties. And if the particular case, of provisions bound to a country at war, although not to a besieged place, was not meant to be one of the cases of contraband according to the exist ing law of nations, how necessary was it to have said so ; and how easy and natural would that course have been, with the Danish example on the subject before their eyes. On the supposition that provisions, in our own ves sels, bound to* countries at war with Great Britain, can be now seized by her for her own use, on the con dition stipulated, this feature of the treaty, sir, pre- THE BRITISH TREATY. 343 seats itself in a very serious light indeed ; especially if the doctrine be resorted to, that has been laid down by the executive in the letter of Mr. Jefferson, then se cretary of state, to Mr. Pinckney, on the 7th of Sep tember, 1793. This letter is a comment on the Bri tish instructions of June the 8th, 1793, for seizing neu tral provisions. After stating the measure as a fla grant breach of the law of nations, and as ruinous to our commerce and agriculture, it has the following paragraph. " This act too, tends to draw us from that state of peace in which we are willing to remain. It is an essential character of neutrality to furnish no aids not stipulated by treaty" that is, sir, by a trea ty made prior to the war " to one party, which we are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound to permit it to be sent to France. To restrain it would be a partiality that must lead to war ; and between restraining it ourselves, and permit- ing her enemies to restrain it unrightfully, there is no difference. She would consider it as a mere pretext, of which she certainly would not agree to be the dupe ; and on what honorable ground could we otherwise explain it ? Thus we should see ourselves plunged, by this unauthorized act of Great Britain into a war, with which we meddle not. and which we wish to avoid, if justice to all parties, and from all parties, will enable us to avoid it." Sir, I entreat the committee to give this very interesting executive document all the atten tion which it demands, and which they have in their power to bestow. I am now, sir, come to that article of the treaty by which the sequestration of British property is prohi bited ; upon which I must say, that though I should, in all probability, be one of the last men existing, to have recourse to such an expedient for redress, I cannot ap prove of a perpetual and irrevocable abandonment of a defensive weapon, the existence of which may ren der t^ie use of it unnecessary. Sir, there is an extra- 344 MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON ordinary peculiarity in the situation of this country, as it stands in its relations to Great Britain. As we have no fleets or armies, to command a respect for our rights, we ought to keep in our own hands all such means as our situation gives us. This article, sir, is another instance of the very little regard that has been paid to reciprocity. It is well known, that British sub jects now have, and are likely always to have in this country, a vast quantity of property of the kind made sacred. American citizens, it is known, have little, and are likely to have little of the kind in Great Bri tain. If a real reciprocity was intended, why ara not other kinds of private property, such as ves sels and their cargoes, equally protected against vio lation? These, even within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, are left open to seizure and sequestration, if Great Britain shall find it expedient ; and why is not property on the high seas, under the protection of the law of nations, which is said to be a part of the law of the land, made secure by a like stipulation? This would have given a face of equality and reciprocity to the bargain. But nothing of the sort makes a part of it. Where Great Britain has a particular interest at stake, the treaty watchfully provides for it; when the United States have an equal interest at stake, and equally entitled to protection, it is abandoned to all the dangers which it has experienced. Having taken this brief review of the positive evils in this part of the treaty, I might add the various omis sions, which are chargeable upon it : but, as I shall not pretend to exhaust the subject, I will mention only one, and that is, the utterly neglecting to provide for the ex hibition of sea papers ; and, I cannot help regarding this omission as truly extraordinary, when I observe that in almost every modern treaty, and particularly in all our other treaties, an article on this subject has been regularly inserted. Indeed it has become almost an article of course in the treaties of the present centurv. THE BRITISH TREATY. 345 I shall now, sir, consider the aspect in which the commercial articles of this treaty present themselves for consideration. In the free intercourse stipulated between the United States and Great Britain, it can not be pretended that any advantage is gained by the former. A treaty is surely not necessary to induce Great Britain to receive our raw materials and to sell us her manufactures. Let us, on the other hand, con sider what is given up by the United States. It is well known that when our government came into operation, the tonnage of America, employed in the British trade, bore a very inconsiderable proportion to the British tonnage. There being nothing on our side to counteract the influence of capital and other circumstances on the British side, that disproportion was the natural state of things. As some small ba lance to the British advantages, and particularly that of her capital, our laws have made several regulations in favor of our shipping, among which is the impor tant encouragement resulting from the difference of ten per centum in the duties paid by American and for eign vessels. Under this encouragement, the Ameri can tonnage has increased in a very respectable degree of proportion to the British tonnage. Great Britain has never deemed it prudent to frustrate or diminish the effects of this, by attempting any countervailing measures for her shipping ; being aware, no doubt, that we could easily preserve the difference by further measures on our side : but by this treaty, she has re served to herself the right to take such countervailing measures against our existing regulations, arid we have surrendered our right to pursue further defensive measures against the influence of her capital. It is justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such a restoration of things to their former state, the Ame rican tonnage will relapse into its former disproportion to the British tonnage. Sir, when I turn my attention to that branch of the subject which relates to the West Indies, I see still VOL. i. 44 346 MR, MADISON'S SPEECH ON greater cause for astonishment and dissatisfaction. As the treaty now stands, Great Britain is left as free, as she ever has been, to continue to herself and her shipping, the entire monopoly of the intercourse. Re collecting, as I do, and as every member of the com mittee must do, the whole history of this subject, from the peace of 1783, through every subsequent stage of our independence, down to the mission of the late envoy, I find it impossible, adequately to express my astonish ment, that any treaty of commerce should ever have been acceded to, that so entirely abandoned the very object for which alone such a treaty could have been contemplated; I never could have believed that the time was so near, when all the principles, claims and calculations, which have heretofore prevailed among all classes of people, in every part of the union, on this interesting point, were to be so completely re nounced. A treaty of commerce with Great Britain, excluding a reciprocity for our vessels in the West In dia trade, is a phenomenon which fills me with more surprise than I know how to express. I may be told, perhaps, that in the first place, Great Britain grants to no other nation the privilege granted to the United States of trading at all with her West Indies, and that, in the second place, this is an important relaxation of the colonial system establish ed among the nations of Europe. To the first of these observations, I reply, that no other nation bears the same relation to the West Indies as the United States ; that the supplies of the United States are es sential to those islands ; and that the trade with them has been permitted purely on that account, and not as a beneficial privilege to the United States. To the second, I reply, that it is not true, that the colony system requires an exclusion of foreign vessels from the carrying trade between the colonies and foreign countries. On the contrary, the principle and practice of the colony system are, to prohibit, as much as may be convenient, all trade between the colonies THE BRITISH TREATY. 347 and foreign countries ; but when such a trade is per mitted at all, as necessary for the colonies, then to al low the vessels of such foreign countries a reciprocal right of being employed in the trade. Great Britain has accordingly restrained the trade of her islands with this country, as far as her interest in them will permit. But, has she allowed our vessels the reciprocal right to carry on the trade so far as it is not restrained ? No such thing. Here she enforces a monopoly in her own favor, contrary to justice, and contrary to the colo nial system of every European nation that possesses any colonies ; none of whom, without a single exception, ever open a trade between their colonies and other countries, without opening it equally to vessels on both sides. This is evidently nothing more than strict jus tice. A colony is a part of an empire. If a nation choose, she may prohibit all trade between a colony and a foreign country, as she may between any other part of her dominions and a foreign country ; but if she permit such a trade at all, it must be free to vessels on both sides, as well in the case of colonies as of any other part of her dominions. Great Britain has the same right to prohibit foreign trade between London and the United States, as between Jamaica and the United States ; but if no such prohibition be made with respect to either, she is equally bound to allow foreign vessels a common right with her own in both. If Great Britain were to say, that . no trade whatever should be carried on between London and the United States, she would exercise a right of which we could not reasonably complain. If she were to say, that no American vessels should be employed in the trade, it would produce just complaints, and justify a recipro cal regulation as to her vessels. The case of the trade from a port in the West Indies is precisely similar. In order that the omission of the treaty to provide a reciprocity for our vessels in the West India trade, may be placed in its true light, it will be proper to at tend to another part of the treaty, which ties up the MR. MADISON'S SPEECH ON hands of this country against every effort for making it the interest of Great Britain to yield to our reasona ble claims. For this end I beg leave to point out to the committee the clause, which restrains the United States from imposing prohibitions or duties on Great Britain, in any case, which shall not extend to all other nations, and to observe, that the clause makes it impos sible to operate on the unreasonable policy of that nation, without suspending our commerce at the same time with all other nations, whose regulations, with re spect to us, may be ever so favorable and satisfactory. The fifteenth article, Mr. Chairman, has another extraordinary feature, which I should imagine must strike every observer. In other treaties, which profess to put the parties on the footing of the most favored nation, it is stipulated that where new favors are grant ed to a particular nation in return for favors received, the party claiming the new favor shall pay the price of it. This is just and proper where the footing of the most favored nation is established at all. But this ar ticle gives to Great Britain the full benefit of all privi leges that may be granted to any other nation, without requiring from her the same or equivalent privileges, with those granted by such nation. Hence it will happen, that if Spain, Portugal or France shall open their colonial ports to the United States, in considera tion of certain privileges in our trade, the same privi leges will result gratis and ipso facto to Great Bri tain. This stipulation, sir, I consider as peculiarly im politic, and such an one as cannot fail to form, in the view of the committee, a very solid and weighty ob jection to the treaty. I dare say, sir, that by the advocates of the treaty great stress will be laid on the article relating to the East Indies. To those who are better acquainted with the subject than I can pretend to be, I shall resign the task of examining and explaining that part of the subject. With two observations, however, I must trouble the committee, before I drop the subject of this THE BRITISH TREATY. 349 article ; one is, that some gentlemen, as judicious and well informed, as any, who can be consulted, declare that they consider this article as affording not a sha dow of advantage to the United States. The other is, that no privilege is stipulated in it, which has not heretofore been uniformly granted without stipulation ; and as the grant can have proceeded from no motive but a pure regard to the British interest in that coun try, there was every reasonable security that the trade would continue open as it had been, under the same consideration. Such, Mr. Chairman, being the character of this treaty, with respect to the execution of the treaty of peace, the great principles of the law of nations, and the regulations of commerce, it never can be viewed as having any claim to be carried into effect on its own account. Is there then any consideration, extraneous to the treaty, that can furnish the requisite motives ? On this part of the subject the house is wholly without information. For myself, I am ready to declare, that I have neither seen, nor known, nor heard, of any cir cumstances in the general posture of affairs, or in the particular relations of this country to them, that can account for the unequal and injurious arrangements, which we are now called upon for laws to execute. But there is something further to be taken into ac count. The continuance of the spoliations on our trade, and the impressment of our seamen, whether to be understood as practical comments on the treaty, or as infractions of it, cannot but enforce on the minds of the committee the most serious reflections. And here, sir, I beg leave to refer once more to the passage I have already read, extracted from the letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Pinckney, and to ask if, as there stat ed by the executive, our neutrality and peace are to be exposed, by permitting practices of that kind, what must be thought of our giving effect, in the midst of such practices, to a treaty from which a countenance may be derived by that nation for going on further with them? 350 MR, MADISON'S SPEECH OK I am aware that the executive, notwithstanding the doctrine and policy laid down as above, has finally con curred in the treaty under all these circumstances. But I do not consider that as invalidating the reason ing drawn from the present state of things. I may be treading on delicate ground, but I cannot think it im proper to remark, because it is a known fact, that the executive paused for some weeks after the concur rence of the senate, before he ratified the treaty with his signature ; and I think it may fairly be presumed, that the true grounds of that pause were the renewal of spoliation, and a recollection of the light in which they had been represented ; that, on that supposition, he was probably influenced in signing the treaty when he did, by an expectation that such a mark of confi dence in the British government would produce an abolition of the unlawful proceeding, and consequent ly, if it were foreseen that the spoliations would have been continued, as we find them to be, the treaty would not have been then signed, or if it had not been then signed, it would not be signed under the circum stances of the moment, when it falls under our con sideration. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman, with taking notice of two considerations, which have been made great use of by way of inducing Congress to carry the treaty into effect. In the first place, it has been said, that the greater part of the treaty is to continue in force for no longer time than two years after the termination of the present war in Europe ; arid that no very great evils can grow out of it in that short period. To this I reply, that ten of the articles, containing very objec tionable stipulations, are perpetual ; and that, in the next place, it will be in the power of Great Britain, at the expiration of the other articles, to produce the same causes for the renewal of them, as are now urg ed in their support. If we are now to enforce the treaty, lest Great Britain should stir up the Indians, and refuse to pay our merchants for the property of which she has plundered them, can she not, at the end of two THE BRITISH TREATY. 351 or three years, plunder them again, to the same or a greater amount ? Cannot the same apprehensions be revived with respect to the Indians, and will not the ar guments then be as strong as they are now, for renew ing the same treaty, or for making any other equal sacrifices that her purposes may dictate ? It has been asked what will be the consequences of refusing to carry the treaty into effect ? I answer, that the only supposable consequence is, that the ex ecutive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism, which I do not doubt will govern that department, will of course pursue the measures most likely to obtain a reconsideration and remodification of the offensive parts of the treaty. The idea of war as a consequence of refusing to give effect to the treaty, is too visionary and incredible to be admitted into the question. No man will say that the United States, if they be really an independent people, have not a right to judge of their own interests, and to decline any treaty that does riot duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such cases, can afford no cause, nor pretext, nor provoca tion for war, or for any just resentment. But, apart from this, is it conceivable that Great Britain, with all the dangers and embarrassments that are thickening on her, will wantonly make war on a country, which is the best market she has in the world for her manufac tures, which pays her an annual balance, in specie, of ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies, moreover, are essential to an important part of her dominions ? Such a degree of infatuation ought not to be ascribed to any country. And, at the present crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war from Great Britain, on this country, would argue a degree of madness, greater than any other circumstances that can well be imagined. With all the objections, therefore, to the treaty, which I have stated, I hope it will not now be carried into effect, and that an opportunity will take place for reconsidering the subject, on principles more just and favorable to the United States. '- : SPEECH OF WILLIAM B. GILES. ON THE BRITISH TREATY, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES OP THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 18, 1796. In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain : Mr. Giles spoke as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, IT is much to be regretted that all the information xvhich could throw light upon the subject of discussion, should not be before the committee. A sense of re sponsibility arising from the peculiarly delicate nature of the question, has induced the House to take every step with more than a common degree of caution. Before we proceeded to deliberate upon the expedi ency or inexpediency of providing for carrying the treaty into effect, we made a request to the Presi dent for the papers which attended the negociation. This request has been refused ; not because the call itself contained any thing unconstitutional; not be cause the contents of the papers called for are of such a nature as to render the disclosure thereof at this time improper neither of these causes being inti mated in the message but because, principles were advocated by individual gentlemen in the course of THE BRITISH TREATY. the argument inducing the call, which the President thought not warranted by the constitution. I do not propose to animadvert upon the conduct of the Execu tive, in departing from the resolution itself, and in notic ing the arguments of individual members ; nor upon any other part of the proceedings of the Executive rela tive to the call of the House and his refusal. I only mean to remark, that being perfectly convinced of the propriety of the call itself, of the utility of the informa tion embraced by it ; and not being satisfied, by the arguments of the President, of the propriety of with holding the papers called for, I should myself have been willing to have suspended all further proceedings re specting the provision for the treaty, until the papers should be laid before the House. I would have firmly placed myself on that ground ; and in that position hazarded my responsibility. The extreme sensibility excited on the public mind by the agitation of the treaty question, I had supposed, would have furnished an irresistible argument in favor of complying with the request of the House; provided no inconvenience would have attended the disclosure ; and in my opin ion, under all the circumstances of the case, the House would have been completely justified in suspending all further proceedings upon the question of providing for the treaty, until they received that information which they deemed necessary, to guide their deliberations. But as the House has thought proper to take a differ ent course, and has proceeded to the consideration of the question, with such lights as they possess, I will explain the motives which will probably finally influence my vote. I shall discuss the subject in two points of view. I will first examine the contents of the treaty itself, and then the probable consequences of refusing, or of giv ing it efficacy. In examining the contents of the instrument itself, I propose to go through it, article by article, unless the task prescribed to myself should exceed the bounds VOL. i. 45 354 MR- GILES' SPEECH ON usually allowed to members for the delivery of their sentiments. 1 shall do this, because I wish to treat the subject with the utmost candor, and to avoid any possible imputation of intending to exhibit the bad, and avoid the good parts of the treaty, if any such there are. I mean, however, to state merely the pur port of many of the articles, without any animadver sion, and to dwell only upon such as appear to me to be the most material. The first object of the negociation respects the in- cxecution of the treaty of peace. The preamble professes to wave the respective com plaints and pretensions of the parties, as to the inexe- cution of the former treaty, and of course establishes a principle, as the basis of the present treaty, that either both parties Avere equally culpable or equally blameless, in respect to the inexecution of the treaty of peace. I do not mean to remark upon the propriety or impropriety of this admission on the part of the United States. I will observe, however, and I think with great force, that the stipulations in the present treaty do not correspond with the principle professed as its basis. On the part of Great Britain, two articles have been unexecuted the restoration of certain property in pos session of the British at the close of the war, and the surrender of the Western posts. On the part of the United States, one article is said to remain unfulfilled ; it respects the promise, that no legal impediments should be thrown in the way of the recovery of debts due to British subjects. The claim of compensation for the property carried away in contravention of the treaty of peace, is wholly abandoned, and the value of the surrender of the posts very much lessened, by the annexation of condi tions which made no part of the stipulations of surren der in the treaty of peace. The United States are more than bound to fulfil the article heretofore unfulfill ed by them; for, instead of continuing the courts open for the recoverv of debts in the usual wav. as was the THE BRITISH TKEATV. promise in the treaty of peace, they are made to as sume the payment of all debts, interests and damages in cases of insolvencies, and a mode of adjustment is proposed for ascertaining the amount, which furnishes the greatest latitude for frauds against the United States which could be devised. This will appear in the further examination of the subject. Hence it is obvious, that the stipulations of the treaty abandon the very principle of adjustment assumed by a gentle man from Connecticut, (Mr. Swift,) in replying to a. remark to this effect, made by a gentleman from Vir ginia : he observed, that he believed if an inquiry were to be made into the first breach of the treaty of peace, it would not issue favorably to the United States ; and he proceeded to argue upon the presump tion, that the first breach was properly imputable to the United States. I think it requires very strong as surances to justify an imputation of this sort against the United States, such as I believe the present occasion does not afford. In the first place, the treaty itself disavows the imputation ; all claims and pretensions arising from the first breach are disclaimed ; of course it is unnecessary, if not improper, to defend the treaty on a ground disclaimed by itself. But upon what ground does the gentleman place his admission of the first breach of the treaty of peace upon the United States ? The gentleman denies the uniform construction, put upon the article for the re storation of certain property which was carried away from the United States at the close of the war, and asserts, that the article never was intended to bear that construction. If the gentleman can establish his assertion, and extend it to the other article, unfulfilled by Great Britain, he may probably establish his po sition. I will first premise, that if the article does not in tend the restoration of property mentioned in it, the insertion of it in the treaty is not only unnecessary, 356 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON but mischievous ; as it will necessarily produce em barrassment to the parties to the instrument. The British army, at the termination of the war, was at New- York ; the negroes, which constitute the species of property in question, are in the southern states, so that if the article does not include that spe cies of property taken in the course of the war, and in the possession of the British at the close of it, it is worse than nonsense. It never could have been sup posed, that upon the first dawn of peace, the British would have left New York and invaded the southern country, for the purpose of plundering the inhabitants of their negroes. The peace article itself was a suffi cient security against this conduct, and of course no specific provision could have been necessary for that purpose. This is not only the uniform construction of the article by the United States, but, as I always have understood and believed, Great Britain has acquiesced in the construction, until the negociation of the pre sent treaty. As an evidence of these facts, I will ob serve, that American commissioners were permitted to make a list of the negroes in the possession of the British at the close of the war, by the British com mander ; that the list was entered upon the files of Congress; that there are resolutions of Congress claiming compensation for the property carried away in contravention of that article in the treaty of peace, perhaps without even the intimation of a doubt as to the construction: that during the administration of lord Carmarthen, I have always understood, that the claim of compensation for property carried away, was admitted, whenever British subjects were indemni fied for the debts due to them from citizens of the United States. But here I have to regret the want of the papers called for by this House, as they contain all the evidence upon which this important fact depends. Hence it appears that Great Britain herself yield ed her assent to this construction, and ought not to THE BRITISH TREATY. 357 have been permitted to withdraw it afterwards. These circumstances seem to me to be conclusive, and ingenuity itself would pause for arguments against facts so stubborn and irresistible. The gentleman from Connecticut, has said, that he thinks the present treaty as good an one, as the United States had any right to expect. If the United States were as flagitious with respect to the inexecution of the treaty of peace, as the gentleman supposes, and Great Britain as blameless, I would acknowledge that the mode of adjustment has inflicted upon them a just punishment for their criminal conduct. This, howev er, is but a negative compliment to the treaty, and can be gratifying only to those who concur with the gen tleman in the imputation thrown upon the United States. But it can afford no consolation to those, who contend, that Great Britain has been at least as culpable as the United States, and particularly when they reflect that the present treaty itself professes to disavow the imputation. But even if the imputation is conceded, it would have been but reasonable, to have confined the pun ishment to the new adjustment of the articles unfulfill ed, without extending it to a train of humiliating and imperious commercial concessions, which are alto gether unconnected with the subject, and not war ranted by necessity. The first article of the treaty, is declaratory of peace, &c. between the two countries, which is a very desira ble thing, provided it can be established upon princi ples compatible with the national honor and the na tional interests. The second and third articles con tain the stipulations for the surrender of the western posts, and the conditions accompanying the surrender. The surrender of the western posts, would be an extremely desirable object, if conformably with the treaty of peace, it were unattended with any conditions. I am desirous of giving credit to every part of the instrument which will admit of it, and am not dispos- 358 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON ed to exaggerate its imperfections. I am willing to admit, that the surrender of the posts, even with the conditions annexed, is of some importance ; but I will assert, that the surrender loses a great portion of its value to the United States, in consequence of the con ditions attached to it. Two objects of primary impor tance were to be effected by the unqualified surrender of the posts. The one was to obtain the influence over the Indians in their neighborhood, which the Bri tish now possess. The other, the participation, at least, in the fur trade carried on with those Indians. The conditions accompanying the surrender, will, in my opinion, very much impede the one, and complete ly defeat the other object. The stipulation in the second article, which autho rizes British subjects, now living within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts, still to continue to reside there, with the free use of their property, and to elect either to remain British subjects, or become American citizens at pleasure, will, in my opinion, very much im pede, if not wholly obstruct, the salutary influence of the United States, over the numerous tribes of Indians in that quarter ; which is one great object hoped for from the possession of those posts. The effects of this stipulation will appear more obvious, when it is com pared with the stipulations in the next article, by which the trade with the Indians is regulated. The second object, to wit, the participation in the fur trade, I be lieve will be completely defeated by the regulation of that trade in the third article. That article stipulates an equality of duties between American citizens and British subjects, a free communication through that country, upon an equality of portages and ferriages. These conditions, in my opinion, will secure a com plete monopoly of the fur trade to Great Britain ; be cause the superiority of the British capital employed in that trade, and the inferiority of duties, paid upon goods imported for that trade into Canada, will, in my judgment, wholly exclude American citizens from a THE BRITISH TREAT!', 359 participation in that trade through any channel in the United States. The United States have no mode left to counteract this monopoly, but by a system of draw backs, which appear to me, from the nature of the trade and country, to be almost impracticable ; or if not absolutely impracticable, it will compel us to pur chase the trade at a price greater than it is worth. It appears to me, that Great Britain foresaw these con sequences, and that these articles are as well calculat ed to produce them, and to obstruct the views of the United States, as sagacity itself could have devised. Hence it appears to me, that the value of an unquali fied surrender of the posts, is very much lessened by the accompanying conditions. The gentleman from Connecticut, observed, that tho surrender of the posts was absolute, and that no conditions were annexed to it. It is a sufficient answer to say, that his observa tion is a mere criticism upon terms. If they be not conditions of the surrender, they are accompanying engagements, and are to be executed, with good faith, by the United States. The fourth and fifth articles relate merely to the as certainment of the boundary line, and therefore I shall pass over them without comment. The sixth article is, in my judgment, highly objec tionable. This article assumes the payment of all debts, interests and damages, due from American citi zens to British subjects, previous to the revolution, in all cases where insolvencies have ensued, and where legal impediments to the recovery of the debts have existed. I will remark, that this is an assumption of debt by the public, which they do not owe, and never promised to pay, and that it is bettering the condition of the British creditor under the treaty of peace, with out any obligation on the United States to do so. As amongst the fashionable calumnies of the day, this article has been a fertile source of misrepresenta tion against the state I have the honor to represent, J am anxious to place this subject in its true light : 360 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON and as I profess to be well acquainted with it, I hope to be indulged with some minutice of explanation. This subject presents two aspects to the public ; the one, as it respects states, the other, as it respects the individuals of the United States. As to the first, 1 ad mit, that if a greater proportion of debts of this de scription are due from Virginia than from other states, (which has not, however, been ascertained, and which, I doubt,) in the same proportion as a state, Virginia would receive an advantage over the rest of the states, by a common assumption of the debts ; but as it re spects the individuals of that state, who are not debt ors, they stand precisely upon the same footing with individuals in the other states, because they are, in common with others, to contribute to the payment of debts which they never owed. It is of very little con solation to them, that they live in the neighborhood of those, whose debts they are to contribute to pay ; for propinquity or distance can make no difference in the state of interest between the individuals, who do not owe, but who are to contribute to pay. As a very small proportion of the inhabitants of Virginia come under this description of debtors, the phenomenon of an opposition of that state to this particular article, is thus explained. It is to be remarked, that this article contains no limits as to the amount of debts assumed by it, nor are there any precise data furnished for calculation. But it has been said, that if the debts be due, they ought to be paid, be the amount what it may. Gen tlemen should reflect, that the amount will depend very much upon the mode of adjustment, and that the mode adopted by the treaty, is the most objectionable that can be devised. The principle established for the adjustment of the debts, instead of preserving the conflicting interests of debtor and creditor, will produce a complete union of interests; and of course, will furnish the greatest temptations to frauds against the United States from THE BRITISH TREATY. 361 both debtor and creditor. Hence the amount of debts assumed by the United States, will probably be great ly increased beyond what would be the amount, if the debtor and creditor were left to the ordinary course of judicial proceedings to adjust their own differences under the principle of opposing interests. To entitle the creditor to a claim upon the United States, it is ne cessary for him first to establish his demand against his debtor, and then to show that his debtor was sol vent at the commencement of the late war, has since become insolvent, and that some legal impediment has intervened to prevent the recovery of the debt. Hence it becomes the interest of both debtor and creditor, to establish these facts ; because the debtor will be reliev ed from his debt, by the assumption of the United States, and the claim of the creditor will be transferred from the individual to the United States, which he will in all cases prefer, particularly as the assistance of the debtor will often become necessary to facilitate the establishment of the debt. This is the natural operation of the union of interest, produced by the as sumption of the debts by the United States, and there is more danger to be apprehended from it, from the impossibility of checking it by any vigilance on the part of the United States, and from the peculiar cir cumstances attending these debts. The greatest proportion of debts remaining unpaid* I believe, stand upon open accounts. In many cases, when the debts were evidenced by specialties, pay ments have been obtained, either by the usual course of judicial process, or by compromise between the par ties. There are two circumstances, attending the open accounts, which will give great scope to frau dulent combinations between the debtor and creditor. The one respects the evidence, the other the substan tial causes of difference in the accounts of the creditor and debtor. In the reign of George the II., an act was passed for the more easy recovery of debts due to his majesty's subjects, from his majesty's plantations VOL. i, 46 362 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON in America. This act authorized the merchant, resid ing in Great Britain, to establish his debt against a co lonist, by affidavits, taken before the commencement of the suit, and authenticated in the usual mode. This deprived the defendant of all opportunity of cross exa mination, so essential to the discovery of truth, and the jury of all knowledge of the character and credibili ty of the deponent. In Virginia, the affidavits, taken in pursuance of this act, have been deemed incompetent to the establish ment of the debt, because the act itself destroys the very nature and properties of evidence. Hence, in all disputed claims, founded upon this act, judgments have been rendered for the defendants. If this should be deemed a legal impediment to the recovery, this whole description of debts will probably come under the description of debts assumed. The words used in the treaty were calculated, in my opinion, with a view to this construction, and must have been dictated by persons, better informed of the nature of this business than I presume the envoy extraordinary of the United States could have been. The words alluded to are the following : " The said commissioners, in examining the complaints and applications so preferred to them, are empowered and required, in pursuance of the true intent and meaning of this article, to take into their consideration all claims, whether of principal or in terest, or balance of principal and interest, and to determine the same respectively, according to the merits of the several cases, due regard being had to all the circumstances thereof, and as equity and justice shall appear to them to require. And the said commissioners shall have power to examine all such persons, as shall come before them, on oath or af firmation, touching the premises ; and also to receive in evidence, according as they may think most consis tent with equity and justice, all written depositions, or books, or papers, or copies, or extracts thereof, every such deposition, book, or paper, or copy, or extract. THE BRITISH TREATY. 3(33 being duly authenticated, either according to the legal forms now respectively existing in the two countries, or in such other manner as the said commissioners shall see cause to require or allow." The other circumstances arise from the nature of the remittances. These are generally made in tobac co. The sales of this article are entrusted solely to the merchant, residing in Great Britain ; and the Ame rican shipper has no check whatever upon the mer chant, making the sale. Upon rendering these ac counts, the tobacco is often set down at a price very inferior to the average price of that article in Europe, at the time of making the sale. A great number of con troversies have taken place upon this ground, which remain unsettled ; but, if the United States shall as sume the debts of the individuals thus circumstanced, they will have no inducement to contest these ac counts in a course of judicial proceedings, and the pro mise of exoneration from the creditor, will often in duce the debtor to facilitate the establishment of the claims against the United States. I have not overlook ed the clause in this article of the treaty, which compels an assignment of the claim from the creditor to the United States ; but that will have little or no operation to check the practice invited by this article, because, the debtor is presumed to be insolvent before the as signment is to be made, and I believe the United States will be but unsuccessful collectors from insol vent debtors. From these circumstances I conclude, that this as sumption of debt, without any obligation for so doing, is extremely improper, particularly when it is recol lected, that this article sweeps away all acts of limita tion, and relates to the whole extensive scene of busi ness, carried on in the United States, from the ex tremes of New Hampshire to the extremes of Georgia, for an unlimited time before the revolution. If I were to make a conjecture as to the amount, it would be a loose one, but if I were to choose between indemnifica- 364 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON tion to the American merchants for recent spoliations, committed upon their commerce, or the payment of these debts, I should not hesitate to prefer the first alternative ; because, to that there are known limits ; to the other, there are not, nor any data for calculation under the mode of adjustment prescribed by the treaty. I therefore caution gentlemen against the assumption of this unascertained debt ; for I believe it will be at tended with a responsibility, which they cannot answer to their constituents, nor will the responsibility be al leviated by the recollection of the merits of the indi viduals for whose benefit it is made. The increase of the debt of the United States, by these artificial means, without any obligation to do so, I think highly ob jectionable. The seventh article of the treaty promises compen sation for the spoliations, committed upon American commerce, in the course of the present war. This would be a very desirable object, if it could be obtain ed ; but, when I observe, that before compensation is to be obtained, a process is to be had in the admiralty courts of Great Britain, and that the amount will de pend very much upon the temper of those courts, I doubt whether this boasted article will not dwindle down into very little importance. I shall only observe further, that the merchants, for whose benefit this ar ticle was more immediately intended, and who have petitioned Congress to make provision for carrying the treaty into effect, seem not to rely implicitly upon the provision upon this subject ; because, in every me morial, they have held up the expectation of ultimate indemnification from the United States. The eighth article points out the mode of paying the commissioners, to be appointed under the treaty to which I have no objection. The phraseology of the ninth article is somewhat curious, and the object I cannot perfectly understand. It is in the following words : " It is agreed, that British subjects, who now hold ; THE BRITISH TREATY. 365 lands in the territories of the United States, and Ameri can citizens, who now hold lands in the dominions of his majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles therein ; and may grant, sell, or devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if they were na tives ; and that neither they nor their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect the said lands and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens." If it be the object of this article to vary the existing laws upon the subject of landed estates, it is wholly improper. If not, it is wholly unnecessary. I do not know how far this article may affect the proprietory estates. If it be intended to give any new impulse to those estates, it may be attended with serious effects. Pennsylvania is the only state which has regularly ex tinguished the proprietory claim. If a latitude of con struction should be given to this article, it might ma terially affect the states of Delaware, North Carolina and Virginia. I will not pretend to say, that it will bear the interpretation I have hinted at, but, as an in dividual,! would rather it had been omitted. There is a semblance of reciprocity assumed by this article ; but no reciprocity in fact. The tenth article is of a very extraordinary complex ion. It is remarkable, both as to the matter it con tains, and the manner in which it is expressed. It is in the following words : " Neither the debts, due from individuals of the one nation to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor monies, which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war or national differences, be sequestered or confiscat ed, it being unjust and impolitic, that debts and engage ments, contracted and made by individuals having con fidence in each other, and in their respective govern ments, should ever be destroyed or impaired by na tional authority, on account of national differences and discontents." 366 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON This article also assumes the semblance of recipro city ; but no reciprocity in fact. British subjects have great sums, both in public and Erivate funds, in the United States ; American citizens ave little or no property in public or private funds in Great Britain. Hence the evident and substantial inequality of this reciprocal stipulation. On the other hand, American citizens have a great share of proper ty on the water, with very little naval protection, and of course subject to the naval superiority of Great Britain. If, therefore, Great Britain had stipulated, in case of war, that in consideration of a refusal, on the part of the United States, to sequestrate property of British sub jects upon land, she would not molest the property of American citizens upon water, there would then have been a substantial, instead of a nominal reciprocity : as the article now stands, there is an important right conceded, and no compensation obtained. This article, however, has been highly applauded, by a particular description of persons interested in it, in consequence of the affectation of morality professed by it. It has been said to be dishonest and immoral, to take the property of individuals for the purpose of compen sating national wrongs. I can see no difference be tween the morality of taking the property of individuals upon water, and the property of individuals upon land. The difference of the element can make no difference in the morality of the act. However strongly, there fore, this moral impulse was operating upon the Ame rican envoy, whilst engaged in the construction of this article, it had entirely dissipated before he arrived at the twenty-fifth article : for, in that article, the princi ple of privateering is not only admitted, but its opera tion facilitated ; so that, unless the interest of Great Britain is to be the criterion of the envoy's morality, what he has gained by the morality of the tenth ar- THE BRITISH TREATY. 367 ticle, must be at least balanced by the immorality of the twenty-fifth. Sequestration is always admitted as part of the law of nations, and hence I presume it is not immoral, under certain circumstances. It appears to be the opinion of some, that where the property of an individual has been sequestered on account of the act of his nation, the individual is to sustain the loss ; but this is not the case. The sequestration itself im poses upon the government, to which the individual belongs, an obligation of reimbursement. Hence the sequestration does not ultimately rest upon the indi vidual, but upon the government for whose wrong the property was taken. This is also conformable to the laws of nations. It is the course pursued by Great Britain for all sequestrations made during the Ameri can war, and is the course which will be pursued by all nations. War itself is immoral in most cases ; and justifiable, in my opinion, only in the case of self-defence ; but, if a stipulation had been inserted in this treaty which prohibited the United States from declaring war, it would have been justly and universally reprobated. The present article prohibits the United States from resorting to the best means, not only of preventing war y but the most efficacious means of supporting it. Hence the surrender of the right is a most impolitic con cession, and is infinitely aggravated by its being a voluntary concession ; no equivalent being received in return. It is dishonorable to the United States, be cause it evidences a want of confidence in the discretion of the constituted authorities. The right of sequestra tion is admitted to be essential to national sovereign ty; but lest it should be indiscreetly used by the United States, its guardianship is transferred to Great Britain. I view sequestration as an extraordinary re medy, to be resorted to only on extraordinary occa sions. And although I admit that but few cases will justify a resort to it, yet it is one of our best instru ments of defence, considering our relationship to I 368 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON Great Britain, and ought not, therefore, to have been surrendered. This restraint is imposed upon the United States for an unlimited time, and is the more objectionable, as it is a species of legislation against the discretion of legislation. But, whatever may be the difference of opinion as to the matter of this article, the most partial admirer of this treaty must be unwilling to defend the very extra ordinary envoy of the United States for the manner of expression. This measure was proposed in the House of Representatives, as one of the means of self- protection against British depredations. This cir cumstance was known to the envoy, yet he not only bar tered away the measure, but, in doing so, branded the proposition, then depending before the House of Re presentatives, with the terms "impolitic and unjust." This was an unnecessary imputation, which no minis ter could have been justifiable in applying to his gov ernment. Suppose our envoy had insisted, and the British minister had agreed, that the order of the 6th of November, for taking neutral vessels for adjudication, was piratical, and ought not to be renewed : I will not pretend to say how far the order would justify the epi thet ; but what would have been the fate of a British minister under such circumstances ? Utter disgrace would have been one inevitable consequence ; but, an American minister is not only tolerated for a similar conduct, but by some, who even affect to be Ameri cans, applauded. In the present agitation of the pub lic mind, truth seems to be obscured by party irrita tions, and personal partialities ; but I am convinced, that whenever it may be so far collected as to take a calm review of this transaction, there will exist one universal voice of condemnation. The eleventh article contains a general stipulation for the liberty of navigation and commerce between the two countries. The twelfth article is the first of the commercial articles. This article is suspended ; but the want of THE BRITISH TREATY. ;j(jij a substitute will justify a few remarks. 1 am not practically acquainted with commercial detail, and of course shall not go much into detail upon the com mercial articles ; there are, however, some grand principles which apply to commerce, as well as to every other business or science, which will guide me in a few remarks upon this subject. The twelfth arti cle is intended to regulate the trade between the United States and the British West India Islands; so far, therefore, as it permits that trade to be carried on. it is intended as a concession to the United States ; the rigid restrictions accompanying the concession, however, render it so paltry, that the Senate rejected the concession, although the envoy had accepted it. But, in what situation has the rejection left the United States ? They are now engaged in a commercial treaty with Great Britain, in which they have surren dered almost every commercial advantage they had to bestow, and are still wholly excluded from the West India trade. I have always understood that the West India trade was the great object of commercial nego- ciation with Great Britain, but now that is formally relin quished. It may be said, that further negociations upon this subject are promised ; but what inducement will Great Britain have to relax her colonial regulations, provided this treaty should be carried into effect? She has already, without this relaxation, placed the commerce between the two countries precisely upon the footing she wished; and the United States have yielded every commercial advantage which might nave been exchanged for that relaxation ; of course. Great Britain will have no inducement to make, as the United States have nothing to offer for, the re laxation. The gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. Swift,) justi fied the conduct of Great Britain with respect to the West Indies, upon the ground of her colonial rights. He observed that Great Britain had a right to prevent, the trade to the West Indies altogether. This is true : VOL. i. 4.7 370 -MR. GILES' SPEECH ON and she has a right to prevent the trade to London, and the United States have a right to interdict her trade to this country. But I would ask, if there be no relaxa tion of these rights, of what advantage is the treaty ? The very object of a commercial treaty is a reciprocal indulgence in the exercise of these rights ; and the pecu liar dependence of those islands upon the United States for their very subsistence, would command a participa tion in that trade, if properly used. The resort to the United States for supplies to facili tate the present operations in the West Indies, is a striking evidence of the importance of the United States to their existence. It has been observed, that the Spanish treaty has not opened the Spanish islands to the United States. This is true, and it would have been a desirable thing if it had effected this object. But it should be recol lected, that the United States have made no commer cial concessions to Spain, and that the treaty does not profess to contain any material commercial regula tions. The thirteenth article contains regulations for the East India trade. This article has been held up as an apology for all the commercial defects of the treaty. I do not pretend to be perfectly acquainted with the nature of this trade ; but as far as I understand the ex planation of the advantages of this article, I cannot concur in the result. The common remark is, that this article secures to the United States a right which be fore was a courtesy. This remark possesses some plausibility, but no substance ; what is called courtesy, is a trade founded upon the interest of the parties. I believe that a courtesy in trade, the basis of which is the interest of the party granting it, is a better securi ty than forced regulations by treaty, without the basis of interest for their support. It is admitted, that the trade to the East Indies, before this treaty, was ex tremely lucrative, and of course cannot be the effect of the treaty. But the restrictive and monopolizing THE BRITISH TKEATV. 371 hand of Great Britain, is seen to extend itself even to this branch of commerce, in the prohibition of the ex portation of East India articles to an European market in American bottoms ; which is a restriction that does not now exist, and is another restriction upon the citizens of the United States trading thence, which, in my opinion, will lessen very much the boasted security of right under this article, whenever the interest of the East India company will justify the prohibition of that trade. The restrictions alluded to are in the fol lowing words. " Neither is this article to be construed to allow the citizens of the said States to settle or re side within the said territories, or to go into the interi or parts thereof, without the permission of the British government established there ; and if any transgression should be attempted against the regulations of the British government in this respect, the observance of the same shall and may be enforced against the citi zens of America in the same manner as against British subjects or others transgressing the same rule. And the citizens of the United States, whenever they arrive in any port or harbor in the said territories, or if they should be permitted in manner aforesaid, to go to any other place therein, shall always be subject to the laws, government and jurisdiction, of whatever nature estab lished, in such harbor, port or place, according as the same may be. The citizens of the United States, may also touch for refreshment at the island of St. Helena, but subject in all respects to such regulations, as the British government may from time to time establish there." The fourteenth article relates to the commerce and navigation of the two countries generally, and will be passed over without remark. The fifteenth article is, in my judgment, highly ob jectionable. This article restrains the United States from impos ing upon British goods higher duties, &c. than upon those of other foreign nations. It authorizes Great 3*72 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON Britain to equalize the existing unequal duties, between the American and British bottoms, and restrains the United States from reviving the existing inequality. One objection to this article is, that it abandons, without an equivalent, the advantages resulting from the peculiar nature of the trade carried on between the United States and Great Britain. This trade consists, on the part of the United States, mostly of raw mate rials, which employ the artizans of Britain, and on the part of Great Britain, of the manufactures of artizans in the most finished state ; and in addition, there is always a large specie balance against the United States and in favor of Great Britain. It is calculated, that the United States furnish a market for at least one third of the whole surplus manufactures of Great Britain, and for this the most suitable returns for the British market are made. The loss of so valuable a market could not be supplied in any part of the world. It would naturally be supposed, that a trade so favora ble would be entitled to some indulgence on the part of the nation receiving the favor, and would command some respect to the nation affording it ; provided it had energy enough to avail itself of the advantage ; but by this article it is abandoned with a nominal, but no real equivalent. This consideration is greatly strengthened by extending it to the peculiar nature of the trade be tween the United States and the West Indies, which has been already remarked upon. Upon this ground the discrimination in favor of American over British bottoms, has been built ; and the growth of American shipping has very considera bly increased, in consequence of this policy. Our ex perience, therefore, is bartered away without even the probable calculation of a countervailing advantage. The apology, made for this article, that the United States have granted no right to Britain, which she did not possess before, is entirely delusive. It may be true, that no new right of sovereignty is granted to Great Britain ; but she is now left at liberty to exercise a THE BRITISH TREATY. 373 right, without hazard, by a restriction imposed upon the United States ; and which she had failed to exercise until this restriction was imposed. It is remarkable, from the whole complexion of the treaty, that the ad vantages, gained by Great Britain, consist in restric tions imposed upon the United States, as if her object was to restrain the United States in the exercise of their rights of sovereignty. The sixteenth article relates only to the appointment of consuls, and does not require notice. The seventeenth article is, in my opinion, objec tionable in many respects. It yields a formal assent to the seizure and condemnation of an enemy's property on board of American vessels. I expected to have heard this article apologized for and not justified. But I was surprised to hear it asserted, that it was pro blematical, whether the admission of this principle would be for the advantage or disadvantage of the United States. This is throwing the article into a problem, without attempting to solve it. It is discard ing the exercise of the reasoning faculty. From the peculiar situation of the United States in their rela tions to the rest of the world, the establishment of the principle, that neutral vessels shall give freedom to their cargoes, is to them of primary importance ; of course the United States have sedulously exerted themselves, in all their foreign negociations, to have that principle formally admitted as the law of nations. In every other treaty, entered into by the United States, this principle has been carefully inserted. A formal assent to the contrary doctrine, will probably produce a retrograde effort upon all former exertions, which will require a great length of time to counteract. In the relations between the United States and Great Britain, the principle is peculiarly important. Great Britain possesses the most formidable fleet in exist ence, and is at least one half her time at war. The United States have an extended commerce without the protection of a fleet, and from her remote situa- 374 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON tion from Europe, the great scene of war, as well as from the genius of the American people, are not like ly to be involved in European contests. Hence the disadvantage to the United States from this stipula tion, will be in proportion to the greater probability of their remaining free from war, than Great Britain, and in proportion to their more defenceless state of com merce. There exists another forcible reason, which ought to have prevented this stipulation its necessa ry operation upon the present belligerent powers. Under this article, French goods, in American bot toms, are made subject to British seizure and con demnation ; but British goods, in American bottoms, are free from French seizure and condemnation. This is an evident partiality in favor of Britain against France, which, in my opinion, can hardly be warrant ed by the species of neutrality, proclaimed by the Ex ecutive as the existing state of the nation. It is not only a neutrality, but an impartial neutrality. If a de viation from the strict line of impartial neutrality can be in one case justifiable, I think every American feel ing will incline to favor the cause of liberty, and not the cause of despotism. It is no apology for this article, to say that an arti cle upon the opposite principle could not be obtained : then let none be obtained. It is the assent to the prin ciple, which constitutes the disgrace and the injury to the United States. If other terms could not have been procured, French property, in American bottoms, might have been left to the ordinary operation of the laws of nations, without an explicit and invidious stipu lation for its seizure and condemnation. The eighteenth article defines contraband goods : there is a common, but just objection, made to this article, to wit, that the contraband list is extended, and that several articles are added, which were never before admitted to be contraband. It is to be observ ed, that all these additional articles are amongst the exports of the United States, whilst most, or perhaps THE BRITISH TREATY. 375 all of them, are amongst the imports of Great Britain. This circumstance proves, that the reciprocity, assum ed by this article, is delusive, and that the advantage is wholly in favor of Great Britain. This article con tains also some regulations, respecting the seizure of provisions in American vessels under certain circum stances, which are extremely equivocal and suspicious. I presume this article furnished the pretext to Great Britain, for issuing the late order for seizing American vessels, bound with provisions to France. I will not pretend to say. that the article justifies a construction which might give rise to the order ; but the existence of such an order since the signing of the treaty, is universally admitted : but I will assert, that whether the order is to be considered as the practical construc tion of this article, or an infraction of it, or an infrac tion of the neutrality of the United States in any re spect, it may be attended with the most serious con sequences. If this invasion of neutral rights is to be the first fruits of the treaty, the most alarming results may be expected from its further operation. The ex ecutive of the United States has declared, that even the permission of this conduct, by one of the bellige rent powers, is a breach of neutrality against the other ; and, of course, a just cause of war from the injur ed nation. This doctrine is so clearly established in a letter from Mr. Jefferson, written by order of the Pre sident to Mr. Pinckney, dated 7th September, 1793, that I beg the indulgence of the committee in reading two or three paragraphs from the letter : it is in the fol lowing words : " This act, too, tends directly to draw us from that state of peace in which we are wishing to remain. It is an essential character of neutrality, to furnish no aids, (not stipulated by treaty,) to one party, which we are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we permit corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound to permit it to France. To restrain it would be a partiality, which might lead 376 MR. GILES* SPEECH ON to war with France ; and, between restraining it our selves, and permitting her enemies to restrain it un rightfully, there is no difference. She would consider this as a mere pretext, of which she would not be the dupe, and on what honorable ground could we otherwise ex plain it ? Thus we should see ourselves plunged, by this unauthorized act of Great Britain, into a war, with which we meddle not, and which we wish to avoid, if justice to all parties, and from all parties will enable us to avoid it. In the case, where we found ourselves obliged by treaty, to withhold from the ene mies of France, the right of arming in our ports, we thought ourselves in justice bound to withhold the same right from France also ; and we did it. Were we to withhold from her supplies of provisions, we should, in like manner, be bound to withhold them from her enemies also ; and thus shut against ourselves all the ports of Europe, where corn is in demand, or make ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma, which Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and for which no pretext can be found in any part of our conduct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of starving an enemy nation ; but she can give no right of doing it at our loss, nor of making us the instrument of it." After this unequivocal declaration, made by the Ex ecutive of the United States, what plea can be made to the French government, to justify an acquiescence in this conduct of Great Britain ? Whether it be the result of the construction of the treaty, or an infraction of it, what apology can this house make for giving ef ficacy to the treaty before some satisfactory explana tion is made upon this subject ? Suppose the republic of France were to approach the Executive of the Unit ed States with this letter in their hand, and sav, " Here is your own declaration of your own principles of neu trality ! You have unkindly departed from the princi ples avowed by yourself, in favor of my enemy. You seem to have concurred in a scheme of distressing a whole nation by withholding supplies of provisions, I THE BRITISH TREATY. 377 when a better office might have been expected from the United States." Suppose a similar appeal were to be made to this House, whilst deliberating upon the expediency or inexpediency of giving efficacy to the very treaty which is used by Great Britain to sanctify her conduct ; what reply could be made in either case ? Is any gentleman, who is disposed to carry the treaty into effect, prepared to give a satisfactory answer to so just and so interesting a complaint ? According to the very principles avowed by the Executive, rather than give no cause of umbrage to Great Britain, we give just cause of war to France. Yet it has been said, that it would be disgraceful to the nation not to give efficacy to an instrument containing this disgrace ful concession. It is not sufficient to say, that the re public of France will not avail herself of this breach of neutrality, and enter into hostilities against the United States. It is sufficient to show that the United States, by the execution of this treaty, under this construc tion, will furnish just cause for such a conduct ; and. if this be not the just interpretation of the instrument, no disgrace can be greater than to execute a treaty with a nation at the very moment she is engaged in its infraction. The nineteenth article contains some regulations respecting privateers, which require no comment. The twentieth article respects the punishment of pirates, which is not material. The twenty-first article prohibits American citizens from entering into any foreign service against Great Britain, and defines piracies. There is an existing law in the United States upon this subject, which ope rates equally towards all the belligerent powers. This act extends no farther than to prohibit American citi zens from entering into foreign service within the Unit ed States, and applies equally to all foreign powers. But Great Britain, not content with this fair and just regulation, has extended this provision, so far as re gards herself, beyond the limits or jurisdiction of tin* VOL, i. 48 378 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON United States, and entirely destroys the impartiality and neutrality of the existing legal provision. What is the operation of this article upon the belligerent powers ? It is this. An American citizen entering into the French service against Great Britain, out of the limits or jurisdiction of the United States is punishable. An American citizen entering into the British service under the same circumstances, is not punishable. Besides, it is a prohibition upon Ameri can citizens, which has never been imposed upon the subjects or citizens of any nation, as far as I can recol lect. But the practice of entering into foreign service has, at all times, been resorted to as affording the best military education. When it is recollected, that this article is to continue in force for only two years after the termination of the present European war ; that there is no probability of the United States being, dur ing that time, engaged in an European war ; and that this article is, in no respect, connected with the pro fessed objects of negociation has not the stipulation too much the appearance, as well as the effect, of in terfering in the present European quarrel, and evincing a partiality for the interests of Great Britain, in viola tion of our professions of an impartial neutrality? And can this conduct be justified, either from the na ture of the cause in which France is engaged, or from the good offices rendered by that great nation to the United States? The twenty-second article stipulates, that notice shall be given before acts of reprisal, &c. shall be au thorized by either of the contracting parties, which is very proper. The twenty-third article is that, in which I expected to have found some provisions for the protection of American seamen against British impressments: in stead of this humane and salutary provision, I found that the officers and crews of those very ships of war, &c. engaged in the unauthorized impressments, are to J>e hospitably received in the ports of the United States, I THE BRITISH TREATY. 3f 9 and a proper respect to be paid to those officers, ac cording to their respective ranks. Strange substitute this for the protection of American seamen ! This ar ticle is rendered more aggravating by the practice of the British in impressing American seamen since the signing this very treaty. Whilst the table of the House is almost laboring with evidence of this fact whilst the fact is riot denied by any gentleman on this floor in the very same breath in which a bill has been passed for the protection and relief of this valuable class of citizens, is the House called upon to make provision for effectuating a treaty of amity, &c. with a nation committing these wrongs with a nation refusing to respect any evidence of protection which can be af forded to this description of citizens by the govern ment of the United States ; and an alarm and wonder is excited, because the House, under these circum stances, should deliberate upon making the provision. The twenty-fourth article prohibits the arming of ships, by other foreign nations, in the ports of the United States, and selling their prizes ; and restrains the United States from selling them more provisions than may be necessary to carry them to the next port of the nation to which they belong. Although I can see no propriety in these stipulations, particularly at this time, I will pass them over without remark. The twenty-fifth article deserves two remarks the first is, that it accommodates Great Britain in her scheme of privateering against France, and evidences the same temper with several other articles towards the belligerent powers, which has been remarked upon. The other grows out of the general clause of reserva tion which it contains. The clause I allude to is in the following words : " Nothing in this treaty contained, shall, however, be construed or operate contrary to former and exist ing public treaties with other sovereigns or states. But the two parties agree, that while they continue i amity, neither of them will in future make any treaty 380 3111. GILES' SPEECH ON that shall be inconsistent with this or the preceding article." From this reservation it is evident, that all the arti cles, which affect the present belligerent powers, are intended as constructive of the treaty between the United States and France ; and the construction is so made, as to operate most injuriously to France, and most advantageously to Great Britain. Indeed, this construction seems to have bound so hard upon the French treaty, in the opinion of both negociators, that they, probably apprehending that it might, in some respect, be deemed by the United States a positive in fraction of that treaty, thought it necessary to insert this sovereign clause. The whole of the stipulations, which affect the present belligerent powers, are the most reprehensible interferences in the European quar rel, for the following reasons : first, they are wholly unnecessary, because they are totally disconnected with the objects of negociation between the two coun tries, and with the usual and natural order of com merce ; and of course, must be deemed voluntary on the part of the United States. Second, the interest of the United States could not have been contemplated, because, there is no probability of their being engaged in a naval war in two years after the termination of the present war ; at which time these stipulations are to cease; of course the accommodation was intended for the present war, in which the United States are not en gaged, and not for a future war, in which they may be engaged. Third, because it is a dishonorable devia tion from that impartial neutrality, professed by the United States in favor of a nation the least of all others entitled to the accommodations of the United States, and against a nation the most of all others entitled to them. Fourth, it voluntarily hazards the resentment and hostility of a nation, which, if exerted, might pro duce to the United States the most serious calamities. The twenty-sixth article provides, that in case of war between the two countries, the merchants and others THE BRITISH TREATY. 381 of each of the two countries, residing in the other, shall have time to remove with their effects, &c. which is in every respect proper. The twenty-seventh article provides for reciprocal ly giving up certain fugitives from justice, which is not objectionable. The twenty-eighth article respects the time of the duration of the treaty. Having examined the treaty at large, with candor, and with the best judgment I possess, I find in it so much to condemn, and so little to applaud, and some of the objectionable parts are so formidable in them selves, that it is wonderful to me, that the treaty should have found an advocate upon its merits, in the United States. Viewing the subject as I do, and be lieving it my duty to exercise my discretion upon it, nothing, contained in it, can justify me in giving my vote for the necessary provisions to give it efficacy. [Mr. Giles, after apologizing for the time he had al ready consumed, proceeded to consider the probable consequences of refusing, or giving efficacy to the treaty.] Gentlemen in favor of making the provision have sug gested two consequences resulting from a refusal, of a very serious nature. The one, what is termed by them the hostility of departments of government, which would necessarily eventuate in a total dissolution of the government itself. The other, a war with Great Britain. If either of these consequences would result, I would vote for the necessary provisions, although the vote would be more against my feelings than any vote I ever before gave. Whether either of these consequences will result, cannot be positively ascer tained, but by experiment. The subject, however, like all others, is susceptible of a certain degree of reasoning and calculation. It should be recollected, that the House is now en gaged in the exercise of its constitutional rights. It is called upon to make provision for carrying into ef- 382 MR. GILES' SPEECH ' ON feet the British treaty. Two things naturally present themselves to its consideration. The one, the expe diency of the object of expenditure itself, for which the appropriation is required ; the second, the ways and means of raising the money. It has been settled by the House, that both are within the constitutional dis cretion of the House. The President would deprive the House of the right of judging of the expediency of the expenditure, and limit its discretion to the ways and means of furnishing the supplies. This point be ing previously settled, I shall not enlarge upon it. I pro pose to give the history of the rise and progress of the treaty. I will be correct as to facts, and precise as to dates. Very shortly after Great Britain became a party to the war against France, the President pro claimed the United States to be in a state of impartial neutrality. The proclamation was dated 22d of April, 1793. An attempt had been made, and was at that time continued, to terminate the differences, which subsisted between the United States and Great Bri tain, growing out of the inexecution of the treaty of peace. This attempt proved unsuccessful. On the 1 6th of June, 1793, Great Britain issued an order, which affected the rights of neutral vessels. This or der, and the acts committed under it, served to in crease the causes of dispute between the two countries. On the meeting of Congress, in the succeeding fall, the President communicated to them all the negocia- tions which had taken place between the two coun tries, intimated, that negociation did not promise a favorable issue, and that it was left with Congress to say, what further was to be done. In this critical situa tion of affairs, Congress took the subject into conside ration. Great Britain was, at that time at least, consi dered as the aggressing nation. The first measure of self-protection proposed, was a restriction of the com merce of Great Britain with the United States : this measure was objected to, as being too strong as a commercial measure, and too weak as a political one. THE BRITISH TREATY. 3g3 As far, however, as a vote was taken upon it, a majori ty of the house appeared in favor of that proceeding. On the 6th of November, 1793, an additional order was issued, the purport of which was, to take and bring to legal adjudication all neutral vessels bound to French ports. This additional evidence of hostility gave rise to three other measures ; the one was an embargo for a limited time, which was effected; the second was the suspension of commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain; the third, a sequestration, or rather the arrestation of debts due to British subjects. The proposition for the ar restation of debts, was moved the 27th of March : the proposition for the suspension of intercourse, 7th of April, 1794. On the 4th of April, 1794, the Presi dent laid before the House a communication from Mr. Pinckney, minister from the United States to Great Britain, containing a conversation between Mr. Pinck ney and Lord Grenville, of a very extraordinary nature, which always appeared to me to be the ground work of the change, which shortly afterwards took place in the conduct of the Executive of the United States to wards the House of Representatives. The part of the communication alluded to, is in the following words. Extract of a letter from Mr. Pinck ney to the secretary of state, dated 9th of January, 1794. " Lord Grenville answered, that the only reason for renewing them was, lest the present instruction, being a revocation of that of the 6th of November, might also be deemed to revoke the articles which were connected with it. His lordship then explained the motives which had induced this government to issue the present instruction. The first, he said was the sincere desire of administration to maintain the best understanding and harmony with the United States. The second was, what he could not mention to me officially, but what he still thought it right, I should be apprized of, that no misconception of their motives might be entertained: that he was aware of the delica- 384 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON cy of speaking to a foreign minister concerning the in ternal state of his country, neither could he expect an answer from me on the subject ; but that their second reason was, by this conduct, to take away every pre text, from evil disposed persons among us, who accord ing to the intelligence he had received, were endeavor ing to irritate our people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, and, in short, to reduce us to the present situation of France ; a misfortune, which they deprecated, as well for our sakes, as for the common welfare and tranquilli ty of mankind. He further took occasion to observe, with respect to the conduct of our government, in maintaining our neutrality, that although there were some matters, with which this government was not perfectly satisfied, (and to which, for the same reason, they refrained from giving that opposition they thought they would be justified in doing,) yet, from the general tenor of the conduct of our government, they were con vinced, it was their desire to maintain a full neutrality, which was an additional motive for their present con duct." It is to be remarked, that on the 8th of January, the revocation of the hostile order of the 6th of No vember took place, and on the next day, after an apolo gy for the acknowledged indelicacy of interfering in the internal affairs of a foreign government, Lord Grenville modestly undertakes to intermeddle with the affairs of the United States. It has always been mat ter of surprise to me, that the American minister should have listened to such a communication, and still more surprising, that it should have met with a favorable re ception in the United States. But the fact is, that on the 19th of April, 1794, the chief justice was taken from the exercise of his judicial duties, and nominated envoy extraordinary to Great Britain, during the pen dency of two of the beforementioned propositions in the House of Representatives. The House of Repre sentatives proceeded to pass the bill for the suspension THE BRITISH TKEATV. 385 of commercial intercourse on the 25th of April, by an uncommonly large majority, and on the 27th of April, the bill was negatived by the senate % upon the casting vote of the vice-president. The effect of this vote was a discontinuance of the embargo, and an abandonment of all the other measures proposed for self-protectioo. In these acts will be seen, the commencement of what gentlemen call the hostility of departments ; but what I shall term the due exercise of the checks, provided by the constitution. And, if it is to be traced to this source, the House of Representatives will evidently appear not to be the aggressor. The House, viewing their mea sures defeated by the constitutional check, acquiesced in the decision without a murmur. Now we are told* if the House should exercise its constitutional check, a dissolution of the government would necessarily ensue. This conclusion seems to me without foundation, and ought not to be brought into calculation, in estimating the present question. The treaty itself was concluded on the 28th of Octo ber, 1794. It was communicated to this House, the 1st of March, 1796, having on the same day been pro mulgated by proclamation declaring it to be obligatory. The treaty originated from an intimation of lord Grenville, which has always excited my appre hension ; it was commenced against the known sense of the House of Representatives, and every step of its progression seems to have been marked with peculiar coercion. When a British minister undertakes to declare, that the motive for the revocation of a hostile order was, to take away every pretext from evil disposed persons among us, who, according to the intelligence he had re ceived, were endeavoring to irritate our own people against Griat Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, &c., and to assign the same reason, for refraining from giving that opposition to some exceptionable measures of our government, which he otherwise might have done; and when the VOL, i. 49 386 MK. GILES' SPEECH ON United States so far listen to this language, as immediately to enter into negociation upon the sub ject, my apprehensions of British interference, of British influence, are strongly excited, particularly when the British minister seems to make a common cause between the two governments against what he is pleased to call evil disposed persons. I will here incidentally remark, that as far as these " evil disposed persons" have produced the revocation of the hostile order of November, and a relaxation of British hostili ty in other respects, they are certainly entitled to ap plause from the United States, whatever epithets may have been bestowed upon them by a British minister. The contents of the treaty have very much confirm ed my original apprehensions. Gentlemen have often said, show us the danger of British interference, of British influence. To my mind, the treaty itself con tains the evidence. The treaty itself corresponds with what I consider as the object of the British mi nister in giving the invitation to it. I find it in the following particular instances. Be fore the treaty, the right of laying a special, as well as a general embargo existed in the United States : the right of laying a special embargo upon British vessels, is surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of seques tration existed, and the exercise of it was proposed. This right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is for ever surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of dis criminating against British goods, in favor of those of other nations, existed, and the exercise of it was pro posed. This right is surrendered. Before the treaty, the right of suspending commercial intercourse with Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exer cised ; the exercise of that right is stipulated against for a limited time, &c. All these are restrictions of the exercise of the rights of national sovereignty, and seem to me complete evidence of British interference. These circumstances furnish two reflections. The one is. that the British cabinet deem the measures THE BRITISH TREATY. 387 proposed, to be more efficacious, than they have ge nerally been represented to be in the United States ; and hence, the extreme caution to stipulate against the future exercise of them. The other is, that party sen sations must have had great influence upon the extra ordinary envoy of the United States, to induce his consent to these great abridgments of the rights of national sovereignty. The treaty not only contains abridgments of the national rights, but changes the municipal regulations of the United States : and how have these things been effected ? By the substi tution of a foreign power in the place of the House of Representatives. If the treaty-making power be thus extensive, and if it be so absolutely obligatory, as. to deprive the House of Representatives of the right of judging as to the expediency of making the provisions for its complete effectuation, of what use is the House of Representatives as a distinct branch of the government ? Will it not be a mere formal, and not an efficient branch of the government ? An entire new system of jurisprudence may thus be introduced by treaty, and become obligatory upon the House of Representatives obligatory upon the nation. Whenever the question, which necessarily results from the unlimited scope given to the treaty-making power, shall be presented to the people of the United States, to wit : Shall the House of Representatives become a formal, or remain an efficient, branch of the government; they will pause, before they will decide upon its annihilation. Their love of liberty, their love of their own interests, will check, for a moment, per sonal affections, or antipathies : party sensations, state jealousies will be disarmed, and the people will be found right in their decision. Even in the midst of the clamor of war and disunion, which has been momentarily excited for a particular object, the people cannot be led to such fatal extremi ties, as the doctrine contended for would necessarily produce. Much less will this be the case after they M*R. GILES' SPEECH ON 7 shall have been relieved from these causeless appre hensions. If therefore, the House should exercise a constitu tional right of judging of the propriety of the object of expenditure, and a refusal should be the result of their judgment, I do not believe that it will produce that fatal hostility of departments which would eventuate in a total dissolution of the government ; but will be an exercise of one of the salutary checks, provided in the constitution, which, in my opinion, constitute its merit, and not its reproach. I shall now proceed to consider, whether a war with Great Britain will be the probable consequence of a refusal to make the necessary provision for carrying the British treaty into effect. To my mind, there does not appear to be the least ground for the clamor, which has been excited from this suggestion. I believe that Great Britain will make war upon the United States whenever she deems it her interest to do so ; and that the treaty would impose no restraint upon her, if she thought her interest would justify the conduct. I also believe, that if there should be no treaty with Great Britain, she would not go to war with the United States, unless her interest should dictate the measure. In short, I believe, that Great Britain, like all other nations, will make her interest the criterion of her conduct in every question of peace or war. If this opinion be well formed, the probability of war may be tested by this question. Is it the interest of Great Britain to make war upon the United States in the relative situation of the two countries ? Great Britain is now engaged in a war in which the govern ment hazards every thing. She is at this moment en gaged in an important enterprize against the French West Indies. She is under the necessity of resorting to the United States for sundry supplies for facilitating the enterprize. The United States are the best com mercial customer she has in the world. Under these circumstances, what would be her inducement for THE BRITISH TREATY, 3(J9 war ? What would be her inducements to avoid it ? These questions furnish their own answers. The argu ment of war is an argument of dependence. It is also an argument which will last forever. If the fear of war is now to influence our conduct against our judgments, will not the same argument apply with double force two years after the expiration of the present war, to in duce a continuance of the treaty upon its present inju rious conditions ? As the argument of war is the chief instrument, by which the treaty is pressed upon the people of the United States, 1 beg the indulgence of the committee in taking a retrospective view of this subject, and in examining it with some minuteness. Whatever may have been my opinion at the time of receiving the in formation of the hostile order of the 6th of November, I am now of opinion, that at that time, Great Britain did meditate war against the United States, although I believe there is no danger of it at present. I believe too, that the neutrality, proclaimed by the United States, does not in the smallest degree, influ ence the conduct or disposition of Great Britain to wards the United States in regard to war or peace, but that the true explanation of her disposition will be found in the course of events in Europe. On the 1st of February, 1793, France declared war against the king of England, and the stadtholder of Holland, and on the 7th of the same month against Spain. France was then at war with the emperor of Germany, and the king of Prussia, &c. A combination of most of the despots of Europe had previously been formed, (it is generally believed on the 21st July, 1791, at Pilnitz,) for the purpose of crushing the revolutionary spirit, which had appeared in France. The accession of Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Portugal and some of the Italian States to the combination already form ed, made it the most formidable which has ever ap peared in the history of modern times. The most desperate and bloody war. of course, ensued, and im- 390 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON mediately succeeded the declaration of war against Great Britain ; a series of successes took place, which threatened the absolute subjugation of France. On the 1st of March, the French sustained a consi derable loss by the surprise of the vanguard of their army, on the river Roer ; on the 13th, the rebellion of La Vendee commenced; on the 18th, Dumourier was defeated ; on the 20th, he abandoned his army ; on the 3d of April, his army retreated into France ; on the 4th, Dumourier himself was outlawed; on the 13th, France made a declaration against all interference with for eign governments ; on the 22d of April, the President issued the proclamation of neutrality; on the 3d of May, the rebellion of Corsica commenced ; 29th, the rebellion of the department of Loire ; 30th, the rebel lion of the city of Lyons ; June 2d, thirty-two deputies of the convention, generally called the Brissotines, were arrested. About the same time, a rebellion com menced in the departments ofBouches du Rhone, Cal vados and Eure ; June the 8th, the first order by Great Britain for seizure of neutral vessels bound to France, with provisions, was issued. It is here to be remark ed, that the impartial state of neutrality proclaimed by the President of the United States, on the 22d of the preceding April, was probably known to the British cabinet; but, whilst flushed with these successes in her crusade against liberty, the neutrality of the United States could not protect them from the inva sion of their neutral rights. On the 10th of July, Con- de surrendered to the Combined Armies ; on the 27th, Mayence, &c. ; on the 28th, Valenciennes ; at the end of July, the Spaniards were in possession of Bellegrade, Collioure, St. Elme, &c. and of the whole department of the eastern Pyrenees, and part of the lower Pyre nees. The Prussians and Austrians were possessed of the lines of Weisemburg, Fort Vauban, c. and had blockaded Landau. The Piedmontese and Ha noverians had made successful inroads into other parts of France ; the royalists of La Vendee were in possession of four departments. THE BRITISH TREATY. 391 The royalists of the fourth were in possession of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and the departments of Vaucluse and Rhone. On the 28th of August, all Frenchmen were put in requisition ; on the 28th, Tou lon surrendered to lord Hood, by the royalists ; on the 9th of September, the duke of York was defeated ; on the llth, Lyons was subdued; on the 30th of October, the Brissotines were executed. This was nearly the state of the war upon the European continent, at the time of issuing the hostile order of the 6th of November. In this chronological statement of facts, may be found the hostile disposition of Great Britain, widened by that order against the United States. France, convuls ed with intestine divisions, which extended to the very heart of the convention, laboring under the most for midable external pressure, was supposed to be an easy prey to this terrible combination of despots : the com bination having in view, as I believe, the total de struction of liberty. Great Britain, possessed of the most triumphant and formidable fleet, and guiding al most implicitly the movements of this great combina- nation, already anticipated the destruction of liberty in France, and began to turn her attention towards the same object in the United States. Hence, the order of the 6th of November ; hence, the truce between Portu gal and Algiers ; hence, the talk between lord Dor chester and the Indians. These were all acts of hos tility, and evidently produced by the state of things be fore described. But what events followed these acts of hostility ? A complete reverse of fortune immediately succeed ed. The duke of York had been already defeated. On the 17th of December, Toulon was retaken by the French ; on the 22d, the Austrian fortified camp near Werth, was attacked and carried ; on the 24th and 25th, the army under the command of the duke of Brunswick was defeated at Kellsburg, and the Austrian army at Geisberg ; on the 26th, the lines of Weisem- burg were forced, and the Austrian army defeated, 392 MR. GILES' SPEECH ON On the 8th of January, the hostile order for seizing neutral vessels was revoked, and on the 9th, lord Grenville informed the American minister, that the revocation of the order was to take away all pretext from evil disposed persons amongst us, for indulging their resentment against Great Britain. But, however strongly this motive may have operated on the British cabinet, it certainly was very strongly enforced by the state of things upon the European continent, which was not only changed, but completely reversed be tween the 6th of November, 1793, and the 8th of Janua ry, 1794. It is remarkable, that notwithstanding the several changes in the conduct of Great Britain, to wards the United States, they have been uniform in their impartial neutrality towards Great Britain; of course, the uniform disposition of the United States towards Great Britain, could not have produced the fluctuating disposition of Great Britain towards the United States. Great Britain, in all probability, supposed, that, in the intoxication of the combined powers, from their early successes, her influence might unite them in a war against the United States, and perhaps, in the height of her presumption, she might even have indulged the impious hope of regain ing her dominion over them : but this sudden reverse of fortune checked her ambitious enterprize. Proba bly anticipating a speedy dissolution of the combina tion, and having abandoned all prospects of engaging them in her iniquitous project, and being unwilling to add a new and formidable enemy to the one she al ready had encountered, and even fearing the effects of her previous hostilities, a sudden revolution is produc ed in her conduct towards the United States: it is then she is desirous of taking away all pretext from " evil disposed persons," to indulge their resentment against her: it is then the order of revocation is seen. If, then, Great Britain was unwilling to encounter a new enemy, in her then situation, will any change of circumstances justify, at this time, the supposition of a THE BRITISH TREATY. 393 change of disposition in Great Britain, respecting war with the United States ? I believe not. Peace seems to be more important to Great Britain, at this moment, than at any time previously, during the whole period of the war. The nation is desirous of peace, and dis tressed for provisions. The combination, which in dulged her presumptuous hopes, crumbled into dust. Prussia is at peace with France, and almost at war with Great Britain. Spain is at peace with France, and hardly at peace with Great Britain. Holland is at peace and in alliance with France, and at war with Great Britain. Austria herself is almost exhausted, and desirous of peace ; and the continuation of French exertions and successes has excited the admi ration and astonishment of the world. Are these the circumstances which would justify apprehensions of war from Great Britain ? And are the United States to tremble at the sound of war from a nation thus cir cumstanced ? I trust not. And for what cause is this war to be produced ? Because the House of Repre sentatives may deem it inexpedient to become the in strument of giving efficacy to a bad bargain. I verily believe, that the alarm of war is not serious. I verily believe it is resorted to as an artificial instru ment to effect a favorite object. For my part, I be lieve the hazard so small, as not to constitute an item in estimating the present question. I believe, that Great Britain considers the United States as a more important commercial connexion, (particularly as it respects her views in the West In- aies,) than some gentlemen seem to admit ; and I be lieve also, that she views the United States more for midable as an enemy. I infer these opinions from the avidity with which this treaty seems to have been received in that country, and particularly from an ex pression in the speech of the king at the late meeting of parliament. Two reflections were strongly im pressed upon my mind from that speech. The one, that the treaty is deemed a very advantageous one to 1. 50 394 MR, GILES' SPEECH ON Great Britain, the other, that Great Britain has no ap petite for war against the United States, in her present situation. Hence, I cannot believe, that there is the least pos sible foundation for the suggestion of the fatal hostili ty of departments of government, or of war with Great Britain, as amongst the consequences resulting from a refusal to make the necessary provisions for giving ef ficacy to the treaty. As the present treaty is incomplete, and as further negociations are stipulated in the treaty itself, and in the event of a decision either way, are expected ; I think the most important consequences of the vote will be these. If the House should refuse to make the provisions for carrying the treaty into effect, the new negociations will commence without the concessions contained in the present treaty. If the provisions are made, the further negociations will proceed under the weight of the concessions already made, arid very little melioration of the present conditions can be expect ed, as the United States will have very little left to in duce the melioration. And if no final adjustment of differences ensues, the United States will at least con tinue to possess all the rights attached to national sovereignty. Much has been said, and much unnecessarily said, about intemperance and heats. I will appeal to the recollection of the committee, whether there ever was a more harmonious session than the present, until this treaty was introduced into the House ; and, then, whether its opponents have not discovered at least as much coolness and deliberation as its advocates. The treaty itself is the torch of discord, which has been unfortunately thrown into the United States, and it is extraordinary to observe, that those who have been most instrumental in introducing it, impute intemper ance to others for a firm and decisive opposition to it. It is too much to suppose that the absolute sacrifice of opinion is an obligation due to the embarrassments, into which this treaty has thrown the United States. THE BRITISH TREATY. 395 Upon the whole, I conscientiously believe the treaty to be a bad one. I believe it contains the completes! evidence of British interference in our internal affairs, and has laid the foundation for the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has not afforded protection to our neutral rights, which is amongst its great objects ; and, in the adjustment of the differences resulting from the inexecution of the treaty of peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these im portant circumstances considered, and when it is also considered, that the British persevere in impressing our seamen and seizing our vessels in violation of the clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing 'of the treaty, I cannot consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. I believe, that it is one of those ex traordinary cases, which justify strong and extraordina ry resistance. SPEECH OF ALBERT GALLATIN, ON THE BRITISH TREATY, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 26, 1796. In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved) as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain : Mr. Gallatin spoke as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL not follow some of the gentlemen, who have preceded me, by dwelling upon the discretion of the legislature; a question which has already been the subject of our deliberations, and been decided by a so lemn vote. Gentlemen, who were in the minority on that question, may give any construction they please to the declaratory resolution of the House ; they may again repeat, that to refuse to carry the treaty into ef fect, is a breach of the public faith, which they con ceive as being pledged by the President and senate. This has been the ground on which a difference of opinion has existed since the beginning of the discus sion. It is because the House thinks that the faith of the nation cannot, on those subjects submitted to the power of Congress, be pledged by any constituted au thority other than the legislature, that they resolved, that, in all such cases, it is their right and duty to con- MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH, &c. 397 aider the expediency of carrying a treaty into effect. If the House think the faith of the nation already pledg ed, they cannot claim any discretion ; there is no room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing. The resolution now under consideration, is merely " that it is expedient to carry the British treaty into effect," and not whether we are bound by nation- al faith to do it. I will, therefore, consider the question of expediency alone ; and thinking, as I do, that the House has full discretion on this subject, I conceive that there is as much responsibility in deciding in the affirmative, as in rejecting the resolution, and that we shall be equally answerable for the consequences that may follow from either. It is, however, true, that there was a great differ ence between the situation of this country, in the year 1794, when a negociator was appointed, and that ia which we are at present ; and that consequences will follow the refusal to carry into effect the treaty in its present stage, which would not have attended a refu sal to negociate, and to enter - into such a treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumes before us a different and more complex shape, than when be fore the negociator,tfre senate, or the President. The treaty, in itself and abstractedly considered, may be injurious; it may be such an instrument as, in the opinion of the House, ought not to have been adopted by the Executive ; and yet, such as it is, we may think it expedient, under the present circumstances, to car ry it into effect. I will, therefore, first take a view of the provisions of the treaty itself, and in the next place, supposing it is injurious, consider, in case it is not car^ ried into effect, what will be the natural consequence of such refusal. The provisions of the treaty relate either to the ad justment of past differences, or to the future inter course of the two nations. The differences, now ex isting between Great Britain and this country, arose either from non-execution of some articles qf the tyea- 398 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON ty of peace, or from the effects of the present Europe an war. The complaints of Great Britain, in relation to the treaty of 1783, were confined to the legal impe diments, thrown by the several states in the way of the recovery of British debts. The late treaty provides adequate remedy on that subject ; the United States are bound to make full and complete compensation for any losses arising from that source, and every ground of complaint on the part of Great Britain is removed. Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America has a right to expect that equal attention shall be paid to her claims arising from infractions of the treaty of peace, viz. compensation for the negroes carried away by the British ; restoration of the western posts, and indemnification for their detention. On the subject of the first claim which has been ob jected to as groundless, I will observe, that I am not satis fied that the construction given by the British govern ment to that article of the treaty, is justified even by the letter of the article. That construction rests on the supposition that slaves come under the general denomination of booty, and are alienated the moment they fall into the possession of ah. enemy, so that all those who were in the hands of the British when the treaty of peace was signed, must be considered as British, and not as American property, and are not in cluded in the article. It will, however, appear, by re curring to Vattel when speaking of the right of Postli- minium, that slaves cannot be considered as part of the booty which is alienated by the act of capture, and that they are to be ranked rather with real pro perty, to the profits of which only the captors are en titled. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the construction given by America, is that which was un derstood by the parties at the time of making the trea ty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentle man from Connecticut, (Mr. Coit,) prove this fully ; for when he says, that the insertion of this article was THE BRITISH TREATY. 399 alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens from London, can it be supposed that he would have laid so much stress on a clause, which, according to the new con struction, now attempted to be given, means only that the British would commit no new act of hostility would not carry away slaves, at that time in posses sion of Americans ? Congress recognized that con struction by adopting the resolution which has been already quoted, and which was introduced upon the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it has not been denied that the British ministry, during Mr. Adams' embassy, also agreed to it. But when our negociator had, for the sake of peace, waved that claim ; when he had also abandoned the right which America had to demand an indemnifica tion for the detention of the posts, although he had conceded the right of a similar nature, which Great Britain had for the detention of debts ; when he had thus given up every thing which might be supposed to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that our last claim a claim on which there was not, and there never had been any dispute the western posts should have been restored according to the terms of the treaty of peace. Upon what ground the British insisted, and our negociator conceded, that this late restitution should be saddled with new conditions, which made no part of the original contract, 1 am at a loss to know. British traders are allowed, by the new treaty, to remain within the posts, without becom ing citizens of the United States; and to carry on trade and commerce with the Indians living within our boundaries, without being subject to any control from our government. In vain is it said, that if that clause had not been inserted, we would have found it our in terest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we are alone competent judges ; if that condition is harmless at present, it is not possible to foresee whether, under future circumstances, it will not prove highly injurious ; and whether harmless or not, it is not less a perma- 400 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON nent and new condition imposed upon us. But the fact is, that by the introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our jurisdiction, as British subjects, the very men, who have been the instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our frontiers ; by obliging us to suffer those men to con tinue their commerce with the Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those regulations, which we have thought necessary in order to restrain our own citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain has preserved her full influence with the Indian nations. By a restoration of the posts under that con dition, we have lost the greatest advantage that was expected from their possession, viz. future security against the Indians. In the same manner have the British preserved the commercial advantages, which result from the occupancy of those posts, by stipulat ing as a permanent condition, a free passage for their goods across our portages, without paying any duty. Another article of the new treaty, which is connect ed with the provisions of the treaty of 1783, deserves consideration ; I mean what relates to the Mississippi, At the time when the navigation of that river to its mouth, was, by the treaty of peace, declared to be common to both nations, Great Britain communicated to America a right, which she held by virtue of the treaty of 1763, and as owner of the Floridas ; but since that cession to the United States, England has ceded to Spain her claim on the Floridas, and does not own, at the present time, an inch of ground, either on the mouth or on any part of that river. Spain now stands in the place of Great Britain, and by virtue of the treaty of 1783, it is to Spain and America, and not to England and America that the navigation of the Mis sissippi is at present to be common. Yet, notwith standing this change of circumstances, we have re peated that article of the former treaty in the late one, and have granted to Great Britain the additional privi lege of using our ports on the eastern side of the river. THE BRITISH TREATY. 40i without which, as they own no land thereon, they could not have navigated it. Nor is this all. Upon a supposition that the Mississippi does not extend so far northward as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Wood, or, in other words, upon a supposition that Great Britain has not a claim even to touch the Mississippi, we have agreed, not upon what will be the boundary line, but that we will hereafter negociate to settle that line. Thus leaving to future negociation what should have been finally settled by the treaty itself, in the same manner as all other differences were, is calculated for the sole pur pose, either of laying the foundation of future disputes, or of recognizing a claim in Great Britain on the waters of the Mississippi, even if their boundary line leaves to the southward the sources of that river. Had not that been the intention of Great Britain, the line would have been settled at once by the treaty, according to either of the two only rational ways of doing it in conformity to the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by agreeing that the line should run from the northernmost sources of the Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of the Lake of the Wood, or northwardly till it intersect ed the line to be drawn due west from that lake. But, by repeating the article of the treaty of 1783 ; by conced ing the free use of our ports on the river, and by the insertion of the fourth article, we have admitted, that Great Britain, in all possible events, has still a right to navigate that river from its source to its mouth. What may be the future effects of these provisions, especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it is impossible at present to say ; but although they can bring us no advantage, they may embroil us with that nation ; and we have already felt the effect of it in our late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged, on ac count of that clause of the British treaty, to accept as a gift and a favor the navigation of that river whieh we had till then claimed as a right. The seventh article of the treaty is intended to ad- VOL. i. 51 402 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON just those differences which arose from the effects of the present European war. On that article it may also be observed, that whilst it provides a full compensation for the claims of the British, it is worded in such a manner, when speaking of the indemnification for spoliations committed on .the American commerce, as will render it liable to a construction very unfavorable to our just claims on that ground. The commissioners, to be appointed by virtue of that article, are to take cognizance and to grant redress only in those cases where, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or con demnations, made under color of authority or commis sions from the king of Great Britain, losses have been incurred, and where adequate compensation cannot now be actually obtained by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If Great Britain should insist that, since the signing of the treaty, they had, by ad mitting appeals to their superior courts, afforded a redress by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; if those courts were to declare, that the captures, complained of, were neither illegal, nor made under color, but by virtue of authority or commissions from the king, and if that construction should prevail with the commissioners ; the indemnification which our plundered merchants would actually receive, in conse quence of the provisions of this article, w r ould fall very short of their expectations and of their just claims. Yet this article, considering the relative situation of the two countries, at the time when the negociation took place, is as much as could reasonably have been expected by America. When a weak nation has to contend with a powerful one, it is gaining a great deal, if the national honor is saved even by the shadow of an indemnification, and by an apparent concession on the part of the aggressor ; and however objectiona ble the article might appear at first view, I am, on the whole, satisfied with it. The remaining provisions of the treaty have no con nexion with past differences ; they make no part of THE BRITISH TREATY. the convention which was the avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission: they apply solely to the future inter course of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation ; and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been nevertheless adjusted. It is agreed on all hands, that, so far as relates to our commerce with Great Britain, we want no treaty. The intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, is more immediately necessary to England, and her own interest is a sufficient pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her Europe an ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in our navigation. The twelfth and thirteenth articles were obtained by our negociator with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which relates to our inter course with the West Indies, is found, upon examina tion, to be accompanied by a restriction of such na ture, that what was granted by Great Britain as a fa vor, has been rejected by the senate as highly injuri ous. The thirteenth article, which relates to the East Indies, and remains a part of the treaty, is, like the twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and so far as I can depend on the opinion of the best inform ed judges on this subject, these restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was before the treaty. As the West India article declares, that w r e shall not re-export any produce of those isl ands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same time that it grants us the privilege, which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the in terest of the East India company to grant it to us that of being admitted into the British sea-ports there prohibits our carrying any articles from thence to any place except to America ; which regulation amounts to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China, or to obtain freights back to Europe ; and upon the whole, I cannot help thinking, from what has fallen 404 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON on this floor, and what I have heard elsewhere, from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same fate in the senate with the twelfth article. But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek in the treaty for some provisions securing to us the free navigation of the ocean against any future ag- fressions on our trade, where are they to be found ? can add nothing to what has been said on the sub ject of contraband articles : it is, indeed, self-evident, that, connecting our treaty with England on that sub ject with those we have made with other nations, it amounts to a positive compact to supply that nation, exclusively, with naval stores, whenever they may be at war. Had the list of contraband articles been re duced had naval stores and provisions, our two great staple commodities, been declared not to be contraband, security would have been given to the free exportation of our produce ; but instead of any provision being made on that head, an article of a most doubtful nature, and on which I will remark here after, has been introduced. But I mean, for the pre sent, to confine my observations to the important ques tion of free bottoms making free goods. It was with the utmost astonishment that I heard the doctrine ad vanced on this floor, that such a provision, if admitted, would prove injurious to America, inasmuch as, in case of war between this country and any other na tion, the goods of that nation might be protected by the English flag. It is not to a state of war that the bene fits of this provision would extend ; but it is the only security which neutral nations can have against the legal plundering on the high seas, so often committed by belligerent powers. It is not for the sake of pro tecting an enemy's property; it is not for the sake of securing an advantageous carrying trade ; but it is in order effectually to secure ourselves against sea ag- THE BRITISH TREATY. gressions, that this provision is necessary. Spolia tions may arise from unjust orders, given by the gov ernment of a belligerent nation to their officers and cruizers, and these may be redressed by application to, and negociation with, that order. But no com plaints, no negociations, no orders of government it self, can give redress, when those spoliations are grounded on a supposition, that the vessels of the neutral nation have an enemy's property on board, as long as such property is not protected by the flag of the neutral nation ; as long as it is liable to be cap tured, it is not sufficient, in order to avoid detention and capture, to have no such property on board. Every privateer, under pretence that he suspects an enemy's goods to be part of a cargo, may search, vex arid capture a vessel ; and if in any corner of the do minions of the belligerent power, a single judge can be found inclined, if riot determined, to condemn, at all events, before his tribunal ; all vessels so captured will be brought there, arid the same pretence which caused the capture will justify a condemnation. The only nation who persists in the support of this doctrine, as making part of the law of nations, is the first mari time power of Europe, whom their interest, as they are the strongest, and as there is hardly a maritime war in which they are not involved, leads to wish for a con tinuation of a custom, which gives additional strength to their overbearing dominion over the seas. All the other nations have different sentiments and a different interest. During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the neutral nations, of the ne cessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottoms making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portu gal, who was in a state of vassallage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, united in order to es tablish the principle, and formed for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the armed neutrality. All the belligerent powers, except England, recognized and agreed to the doctrine. England itselfl was 406 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH OK obliged, in some measure, to give for a while, a tacit acquiescence. America, at the time, fully admitted the principle, although then at war. (Mr. Gallatin quoted, on this subject, the journals of Congress of the year 1780, page 210, and of the year 1781, page 80,) It has been introduced into every other treaty we have concluded since our existence as a nation. Since the year 1780, every nation, so far as my knowledge goes, has refused to enter into a treaty of commerce with England, unless that provision was inserted. Russia, for that reason, would not renew their treaty, which had expired in 1786 ; although I believe, that during the present war, and in order to answer the ends of the war, they formed a temporary convention, which I have not seen, but which, perhaps, does not include that provision. England consented to it, in her trea ty with France, in 1788, and we are the first neutral nation who has abandoned the common cause, given up the claim, and by a positive declaration, inserted in our treaty, recognized the contrary doctrine. It has been said, that under the present circumstances, it could not be expected that Great Britain would give up the point; perhaps so ; but the objection is not, that our negociator has not been able to obtain that prin ciple, but that he has consented to enter into a treaty of commerce, (which we do not want, and which has no connexion with an adjustment of our differences with Great Britain,) without the principle contended for, making part of that treaty. Unless we can obtain security for our navigation, we want no treaty ; and the only provision which can give us that security, should have been the sine qua non of a treaty. On the contrary, we have disgusted all the other neutral na tions of Europe, without whose concert arid assistance there is but little hope that we shall ever obtain that point ; and we have taught Great Britain, that we are disposed to form the most intimate connexions with her, even at the expense of recognizing a principle the most fatal to the liberty of commerce, and to the secu rity of our navigation. THE BRITISH TREATY, 407 But, if we could not obtain any thing which might secure us against future aggressions, should we have parted, without receiving any equivalent, with those weapons of self-defence, which, although they could not repel, might, in some degree, prevent any gross at tacks upon our trade any gross violation of our rights as a neutral nation? We have no fleet to oppose or to punish the insults of Great Britain ; but, from our commercial relative situation, we have it in our power to restrain her aggressions, by restrictions on her trade, by a total prohibition of her manufactures, or by a sequestration of the debts due to her. By the treaty, not satisfied with receiving nothing, not satis fied with obtaining no security for the future, we have, of our own accord, surrendered those defensive arms, for fear they might be abused by ourselves. We have given up the two first, for the whole time during which we might want them most, the period of the present war; and the last, the power of sequestration, we have abandoned forever : every other article of the treaty of commerce is temporary ; this perpetual. I shall not enter into a discussion of the immorality of sequestering private property. What can be more immoral than war ; or plundering on the high seas, legalized under the name of privateering ? Yet self- defence justifies the first, and the necessity of the case may, at least, in some instances, and where it is the only practicable mode of warfare left to a nation, apo logize even for the last. In the same manner, the power of sequestration may be resorted to, as the last weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by an appeal to arms. It is the last peace measure that can be taken by a nation ; but the treaty, by declaring, that in case of national differences it shall not be re sorted to, has deprived us of the power of judging of its propriety, has rendered it an act of hostility, and has effectually taken off that restraint, which a fear of its exercise laid upon Great Britain. Thus it appears, that, by the treaty, we have promis- 408 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON ed full compensation to England for every possible claim they may have against us, that we have aban doned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we have consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and re strictions never before contemplated that after having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment of past differences, we have entered into a new agree ment, unconnected with those objects, which have heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations ; and that, by this treaty of commerce and na vigation, we have obtained no commercial advantage, which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we have parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of self- defence which is calculated to give us any security. There is yet another article which stands by itself, unconnected either with adjustment of past disputes, or with commercial regulations ; I mean the ninth ar ticle, which provides that British subjects now holding lands in the United States, shall continue to hold them, and may sell or devise the same ; and that neither they, nor their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens. I am not a lawyer, and, in expressing an opinion, I mean nothing more than to communicate my doubts, and ask for an explanation. There would be no difficulty in finding the meaning of the article, did it apply only to those British subjects, who have acquired lands under the laws of the states ; but the former connexion of this country with England, renders the subject difficult to be explained, even by men of legal abilities ; for its explanation must depend on the consequences of a principle unknown to the laws of England. The principle of the English law is, that no subject can shake his allegiance, that is to say, that no man who was once a citizen, can become THE BRITISH TREATY. 409 an alien. Yet, by the effect of the revolution, British subjects, who, before 1776, had a right to hold lands in America, as part of the British empire, have become aliens in the United States, and the effect of that alien age upon their titles to such lands, and how far that, effect is changed by the operation of the treaty, seem to me to be questions of a very nice nature. I will, however, beg leave to suggest what to me appears to be the effect of the treaty. So far as lands have been confiscated by the laws of any state, and those laws carried into effect, and so far as such lands having been considered as escheated, an office has been found, and the escheat been completed, I conceive the treaty will create no alteration; but where the lands have not been confiscated, either because no laws had been passed for that purpose, or because they had not been carried into effect before the trea ty of 1783, and where the legal formalities of finding an office, &c. necessary to complete an escheat have been neglected, it seems to me the treaty may operate in three ways. Firstly, it will prevent any state from completing an escheat by finding an office, &c. when they have neglected doing it. Secondly, it will ena ble the British subjects to sell or devise, and therefore to convert their life estate into a fee-simple for ever. And thirdly, it will enable those subjects to institute suits in courts for the recovery of those lands, provid ing them with a legal remedy, they had not before, since their alienage would have been a sufficient bar against bringing real actions. If the treaty may be supposed to have that effect, its tendency so far as re lates, not to private estates, but to the former pro prietary estates, may prove vexatious and injurious to several of the states. It will strengthen the proprie tary claims of the Penn family, not in Pennsylvania, but in the state of Delaware. It may have some ef fect on the decision of the Fairfax claim in Virginia, and even on such parts of the lands of Maryland, VOL. i. 52 410 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON which have been sold, although formerly the property of the Baltimore family, as vacant lands and not as confiscated lands. In North Carolina, the proprieta ry claim of the Grandville family, which includes the best half of that state and of the southwestern territo ry, may be revived by the treaty ; for although a law has passed in that state to confiscate the lands of all the British subjects who should be absent on a certain day, yet the proprietary lands were not meant to be comprehended within that provision ; the commission ers, who were to sell the confiscated property, never disposed of a single acre of the lands, which were granted by another law of the state as vacant and not as confiscated lands, without having been actually es cheated to the state by an office being found or any other formality whatever ; and they are even express ly distinguished from land to be confiscated by the very act passed for the purpose of confiscating. (Mr. Gallatin here read the clause of the act he alluded to.) Supposing, however, every thing I have said on this subject as very doubtful, it is not less true that this article, under an appearance of reciprocity, grants a positive advantage to Great Britain without any equivalent being given is, if not an infraction, at least a restriction over the legislative powers, and an excep tion to the laws of the different states on a subject of a delicate nature may involve not only some of our citizens, but even several of the states in complex law suits and serious embarrassment, and although it may thus create much mischief, can give us no possible benefit. From the review I have taken of the treaty, and the opinions I have expressed, it is hardly necessary for me to add, that I look upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and that I earnestly wish it never had been made ; but whether in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to car ry it into effect, and what will be the probable conse- THE BRITISH TREATY. 411 quences of a refusal, is a question which requires the most serious attention, and which I will now attempt to investigate. Should the treaty be finally defeated, either new ne- gociations will be more successful, or Great Britain will refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they now are, or war will be the consequence. I will, in the course of my observations, make some remarks on the last suppo sition. I do not think that the first will be very pro bable at present, and I am of opinion, that under the present circumstances, and until some change takes place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it is to be apprehended, that, in such a case, new negociations will either be reject ed, or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have perhaps followed a rejection of the treaty even by the senate or by the President. After the negociator, em ployed by the United States, had once affixed his sig nature, it must have become very problematical, un less he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made, would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new treaty. I conceive that the hopes of obtaining better conditions, by a new negociation, are much less in the present stage of the business than they were, when the treaty was in its inchoate form before the Executive ; and in order to form a just idea of the consequences of a rejection at present, I will contem plate them upon this supposition, which appears to me most probable, to wit, that no new treaty will take place for a certain period of time. In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I have already stated the advantages which, in my opin ion, would result to the United States from the non- existence of that instrument ; I will not repeat ; but proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue, that can be set off against those advantages. As I am not sensible that a single commercial ad- 412 MR. GALLATiiVS SPEECH ON vantage has been obtained by the treaty, I cannot mention the loss of any, as a mischief that may at tend its rejection. If, however, the East India article is supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other hand, be conceded, that we have enjoyed every bene fit arising from it for a number of years, without trea ty, and consequently because it was the interest of the East India company that we should enjoy them, and that it is not probable, that circumstances will so far change there, during the short period to which this ar ticle is limited, as to induce that company to adopt a different policy towards us. The indemnification, to be obtained from Great Bri tain for spoliations on our trade, if considered as a national reparation for a national aggression, is cer tainly, as I have already stated it, an important object gained by the treaty. But, if it is to be viewed as a money transaction, and its loss as a national loss of money, it will be well to examine, whether in this point of view, viz. of money, we should not be gainers, on the whole, by not carrying the treaty into effect. I have made no objections to that article of the treaty which relates to British debts. Whatever the amount may be, if it is just that we should pay them, it must be just to pay that amount ; but when we are examin ing the situation in which we should be, if we had no treaty, when we are calculating the losses we are to experience by obtaining no compensation for our claims, it is right to consider the amount of those claims, and to compare it with the probable amount of the claims of the other party, and of the sums of money which a non-execution of the treaty, and a re fusal on the part of Great Britain to do us justice, to indemnify us for our own losses and to enter into new negociations, would justify us in withholding. That subject has already undergone a full discussion, and I will recall the attention of the committee only to the demand of Great Britain for interest on the British debts. It is well known that our courts have uniformly THE BRITISH TREATY. 413 refused to allow to the British creditors the interest which has accrued on their demands during the late war, that is to say, during eight years. Although we have contended that those decisions cannot be con sidered as legal impediments, yet it has been insisted by Great Britain that they are. The two govern ments have come to issue on this point, as may be seen by recurring to the printed correspondence of Mr. Jefferson. It is one of the points to which the juris diction of the commissioners must extend, since, on ac count of the decisions of our courts, it is one of the cases where compensation could not be obtained, and has been refused by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings ; and for greater security, the commission ers are, by the treaty, empowered to take into their consideration all claims, whether of principal or inter est, or balances of principal or interest. These com missioners must be considered less as judges, than as political agents, who will come with a determination to support the claims, contended for by their respective nations. They will, therefore, disagree on the subject of war interest, and it will be left solely to the fifth commissioner, that is to say, to lot, to decide whether that interest shall be paid by the United States, or not. Eight years interest amounts to one half of the whole amount of debts due by America to Great Britain at the beginning of the war ; for it must be remarked, that this claim extends to all debts whether good or bad, because it has been refused on all, and can be recovered, by the ordinary course of judicial proceed ings, on none. What those debts amount to, is very uncertain. I have seen a variety of calculations on this subject. If they are estimated, as they have been by some, at five millions sterling, one half of them will amount to more than twelve millions of dollars ; and when we take into consideration the amount of princi pal we shall have to pay, on the principles stated by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) his calcula tion of near fifteen millions of dollars in the whole. - 1J4 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON will not seem exaggerated. But even taking the amount of those debts at the lowest estimate, the amount of war interest, and of the principal we shall have to pay, far exceeds the amount, which the most sanguine among us expected to recover from the gov ernment of Great Britain, by virtue of the treaty, on account of the spoliations committed on our trade. The only positive loss, therefore, which, in my opin ion, will arise from our having no treaty, is that of the western posts. I have already stated, that, surrendered in the manner settled by the treaty, I conceive them to be of very insignificant value in a commercial point of view, and of very little use, if any, as a security against the Indians ; for it must be remembered, that our own laws, for the purpose of preserving peace with those tribes, have enacted, under severe penalties, that our own citizens shall, on no account whatever, cross over the boundary line between them and ourselves, although within the territory ceded to us by Great Britain, unless they have special licenses from our government. It is, therefore, our own opinion, that peace cannot be pre served with the Indians, if ever our own citizens have a free and uncontrolled intercourse with them. And yet it is a positive condition of the treaty, that the British traders, settled at Detroit and in the other posts men, who from habit, are attached to Great Bri tain, and inimical to the United States ; who have given repeated proofs of that enmity ; who possess an un bounded influence amongst the Indians, and have been the chief promoters of the Indian war that these men may remain there as British subjects, and that they and all other British subjects may have the privilege for ever to pass over that line, which we have forbidden our citizens to cross, and may continue to carry on with the Indians living within our territory, a free trade and commerce uncontrolled by our laws and by those re gulations, which we have imposed, or may impose on our citizens ; in other words, we have agreed that these men may preserve their baneful influence over the Indi- THE BRITISH TREATY, ans, and their allegiance to Great Britain; and we may, therefore, expect that influence to be exerted which suits the interest, and will be in conformity to the directions of their sovereign. I must, therefore, repeat, that as I think that at any time since 1789, we might have had the posts without these conditions, provided we had then agreed, as we have by the late treaty, to make a compensation for the British debts, I had much rather that we could again be placed in the situation in which we were two years ago ; and I will not hesitate to declare that, in my opinion, our claim to the posts, and the chance we had to obtain them, by negociation, in the year 1793, was better than their possession upon the terms of the treaty. But as the question now is not what would be best to be done, if no treaty had been made ; as the negociator has put us in a worse situation than we were before that treaty ; as the subject of the present examination is the con sequences that will follow, if no treaty at all* is made ; and as one of those consequences will undoubtedly be a further detention of the posts, and less hope to obtain them in future, I will certainly agree that it is better to have them, even encumbered with these conditions, than not to have them at all. For although they may not be of an immediate advantage, either as a com mercial object or as giving security against the Indi ans, their possession will enable us to prevent a further extension of the British settlements within our terri tory, and by forming settlements of our own, to acquire by degrees sufficient strength in that quarter, to have nothing to fear either from the British or from the Indians. The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the treaty ; and when to those considera tions I add that of the present situation of this country. 416 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advan tages that will arise from union of sentiments, however injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, how ever repugnant it may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will imply its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain, since the treaty was signed, the impressment of our seamen, and their uninterrupted spoliations on our trade, espe cially by seizing our vessels laden with provisions, a proceeding which they may, perhaps, justify by one of the articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause a while, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolu tion on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect. The eighteenth article of the treaty, the provision article, as it is called, has already been fully investi gated by a gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) and I have been astonished, that those gentlemen who have spoken in favor of the treaty, have given no di rect answer to his remarks on that point. The second clause of that article declares, that, " whenever pro visions, becoming contraband according to the exist ing laws of nations, shall for that reason be seized ; the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners in demnified." This clause of the article does not con template provisions, or other articles not generally contraband, when attempted to be carried to a besieg ed place ; for the third clause of the same article pro vides for the last mentioned case, and declares, " that a vessel thus laden and sailing for a besieged place shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, con fiscated, unless after notice she shall again attempt to enter;" which implies, that, in case of notice thus given, provisions may be confiscated, whilst the pro visions contemplated in the second clause are not to be confiscated. It is, therefore, admitted by that arti- THE BRITISH TREAT k". JIT cle, that there are cases, other than that of provisions and other articles not generally contraband, carried to a besieged place, in which those provisions and ar ticles may be regarded as contraband. It is admitting a principle unknown to the laws of nations, infringing our neutrality, destructive of our trade, and liable to every misconstruction. The British have shown, what they meant by provisions becoming contraband ac cording to the existing laws of nations, when they have taken our vessels laden with provisions, and given us an indemnification of tender centum. So immediately connected is that proceeding of the British, with this article, that even the gentleman from, Connecticut, (Mr. Hillhouse,) could not separate them in his own mind ; and wherl speaking of the indemnification, we are to obtain in such cases, as are contemplated by the article, he repeatedly called it " ten per centum ;" thinking only of the compensation, given by the British in the case beforementioned, as one contemplated in the article, since the words ten per centum are not to be found in the clause itself. It is not, however, mate rial at present to decide, whether a fair construction of the article justifies the conduct of the British or not. The fact is uncontroverted ; they still continue to im press our seamen and to capture our vessels. If they pretend to justify this conduct by the treaty, it becomes necessary to obtain an explanation of the doubtful ar ticles ; if there is nothing in the treaty to justify it, their acts are acts of hostility, and an infraction of the treaty ; and, even according to the doctrine of those gentlemen, who think, that, in common cases, the House has no discretion, the treaty once broken by one party, is no longer binding on the other ; and it is the right as well as the duty of this House, not to pro ceed to pass the laws necessary to carry it into effect, until satisfactory assurances are obtained, that these acts shall cease, arid until Great Britain has evinced a friendly disposition towards us. Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, VOL. r. 53 418 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON they will not attend a postponement. To suspend our proceedings, will not throw us into a situation, which will require new negociations, new arrangements on the points already settled and well understood by both par ties. It will be merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British towards us may be ob tained, or until that conduct may be altered. If, on the contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under the present circumstances, what will be our situation in future ? It is by committing the most wanton and the most unprovoked aggressions on our trade ; it is, by sei zing a large amount of our property as a pledge for our good behaviour, that Great Britain has forced the nation into the present treaty. If by threatening new hostili ties, or rather by continuing her aggressions, even after the treaty is made, she can force us also, to carry it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to a declaration, that we mean to submit in proportion to the insults that are offered to us ; and this disposition being once known, what security have we against new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which probably will lay the foundation of some additional de mands on the part of the aggressor, and of some ad ditional sacrifices on ours? It has been said, and said with truth, that to put up with the indignities we have received, without obtaining any reparation, which will probably be the effect of defeating the trea ty, is highly dishonorable to the nation. In my opin ion, it is still more so, not only tamely to submit to a continuation of these national insults, but while they thus continue uninterrupted, to carry into effect the instrument we have consented to accept as a repara tion for former ones. When the general conduct of Great Britain towards us, from the beginning of the present war, is considered; when the means, by which she has produced the treaty, are reflected on ; a final compliance on our part, while she still persists in that conduct, whilst the chastening rod of that nation is still held over us, is. in my opinion, a dereliction of na- THE BRITISH TREATY. 419 lional interest, of national honor, of national inde pendence. But it is said, that war must be the consequence of our delaying to carry the treaty into effect. Do the gentlemen mean, that if we reject the treaty, if we do not accept the reparation there given to us, in order to obtain redress, we have no alternative left but war ? If we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present treaty into effect; for this treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions com mitted since it was ratified, has not produced a dis continuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that they shall be discontinued. But the ar guments of those gentlemen, who suppose that America must go to war, apply to a final rejection of the treaty, and not to a delay. I do not propose to refuse the re paration offered by the treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; I have agreed, that that repa ration, such as it is, is a valuable article of the treaty ; I have agreed, that, under the present circumstances, a greater evil will follow a total rejection of, than an ac quiescence in the treaty. The only measure, which has been mentioned, in preference of the one now un der discussion, is a suspension, a postponement whilst the present spoliations continue, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they shall cease. But is it meant to insinuate that it is the final inten tion of those, who pretend to wish only for a postpone ment, to involve this country in a war ? There has been no period during the present European war, at which it would not have been equally weak and wicked to adopt such measures, as must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence ; but, at this time, to think of it would fall but little short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to the idea ; and it might, at least have been recollected, that war cannot be declared, except 120 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH OS by Congress, and that two of the branches of govern ment are sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of this kind. If there is no necessity imposed upon America to go to war, if there is no apprehension she will, by her own conduct, involve herself in one, the danger must arise from Great Britain, and the threat is, that she will make war against us if we do not comply. Gentlemen first tell us that we have made the best possible bargain with that nation ; that she has conceded every thing, without receiving a single iota in return, and yet they would persuade us, that she will make war against us in order to force us to accept that contract so advanta geous to us, and so injurious to herself. It will not be contended, that a delay, until an amicable explanation is obtained, could afford even a pretence to Great Bri tain for going to war ; and we all know that her own interest would prevent her. If another campaign takes place, it is acknowledged, that all her efforts are to be exerted against the West Indies. She has proclaimed her own scarcity of provisions at home, and she must depend on our supplies to support her armament. It depends upon us to defeat her whole scheme, and this is a sufficient pledge against open hostility, if the Eu ropean war continues. If peace takes place, there will not be even the appearance of danger ; the mo ment, when a nation is happy enough to emerge from one of the most expensive, bloody and dangerous wars, in which she ever has been involved, will be the last, she would choose to plunge afresh into a similar calamity. But to the cry of war, the alarmists do not fail to add that of confusion ; and they have declared, even on this floor, that if the resolution is not adopted, gov ernment will be dissolved. Government dissolved in case a postponement takes place ! The idea is too absurd to deserve a direct answer. But I will ask those gentlemen, by whom government is to be dis solved ? Certainly not by those who may vote against THE BRITISH TREATY, 421 the resolution; for although they are not perhaps for tunate enough to have obtained the confidence of the gentlemen who voted against them, still it must be agreed, that those who succeed in their wishes, who defeat a measure they dislike, will not wish to destroy that government, which they hold so far in their hands, as to be able to carry their own measures. For them to dissolve government, would be to dissolve their own power. By whom, then, I again ask, is the govern ment to be dissolved ? The gentlemen must answer by themselves or they must declare, that they mean nothing but to alarm. Is it really the language of those men, who profess to be, who distinguish them selves by the self-assumed appellation of friends to order, that if they do not succeed in all their mea sures, they will overset government and have all their professions been only a veil to hide their love of pow er, a pretence to cover their ambition? Do they mean, that the first event, which shall put an end to their own authority, shall be the last act of govern ment ? As to myself, I do not believe that they have such intentions; I have too good an opinion of their patriotism to allow myself to admit such an idea a single moment ; but I think myself justifiable in enter taining a belief, that some amongst them, in order to carry a favorite, and what they think to be an advan tageous measure, mean to spread an alarm which they do not feel; and I have no doubt, that many have con tracted such a habit of carrying every measure of gov ernment as they please, that they really think that eve ry thing must be thrown into confusion, the moment they are thwarted in a matter of importance. I hope, that experience will in future cure their fears. But, at all events, be the wishes and intentions of the members of this House what they may, it is not in their power to dissolve the government. The people of the -United States, from one end of the continent to the other, are strongly attached to their constitution; they would restrain and punish the excesses of any party, of any 422 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH ON set of men in government, who would be guilty of the attempt; and on them I will rest as a full security against every endeavor to destroy our union, our con stitution, or our government. But although I am not afraid of a dissolution, I feel how highly desirable is a more general union of senti ment ; I feel the importance of an agreement of opin ion between the different branches of government, and even between the members of the same branch. I would sacrifice much to obtain that object ; it has been one of the most urging motives with me to be in favor, not of a rejection, but only of a suspension, of a delay. But even, as a matter of opinion, it is difficult to say, which mode of proceeding in this House, will best accord with the general sentiments of the people. So far as relates to the petitions before us, the number of signatures against the treaty, exceeds, at the mo ment I am speaking, the number of those in favor of the treaty. Amongst the last, some have come from one part of the union, where, it seems, both from the expressions in the petition itself, and from the proceed ings there, that a great inducement in the petitioners to sign, was a wish to carry the treaty with Spain into ef fect, as they appear to suppose that its fate depends upon that of the British treaty. How they would act upon the British treaty alone, and unconnected with the other, I do not know, nor have I any evidence which enables me to form an opinion thereon. All I know is, that, until the Spanish treaty was made, they were perfectly silent on the subject of the other treaty, and never expressed an opinion upon it alone. True it is, that an alarm, which has produced a com bination, has lately taken place amongst the merchants of this and some other sea-ports. What effect it will have, and how successful they will eventually be, in spreading this alarm amongst the people at large, I cannot tell ; but there are circumstances accompany ing their petition, which, in my opinion, much diminish the weight they otherwise might have had. They THE BRITISH TREATY. 423 have undoubtedly a right to petition upon every public measure, where they think themselves interested, and their petitions deserve equal regard with those of their fellow-citizens, throughout the United States. But, on this occasion, in order to create an alarm, in order to induce the people to join them, in order to force the House to pass the laws relative to the treaty, they have formed a dangerous combination, and affected to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, and transacting any business. A gentleman from New York, (Mr. Williams,) has been so much alarmed himself, that he has predicted a fall in the price of eve ry kind of produce, and seems indeed to have supposed that the clamors of a few individuals here, would ei ther put an end to, or satisfy the wants of those na tions, which depend on us for supplies of provisions. Yet, it has so happened, and it is a complete proof that the whole is only an alarm, that whilst we have been debating, the price of flour, which was of very dull sale two weeks ago, has risen in equal proportion with the supposed fears of the purchasers. I cannot help considering the cry of war, the threats of a disso lution of government, and the present alarm, as design ed for the same purpose, that of making an impression on the fears of this House. It was through the fear of being involved in a war, that the negociation with Great Britain originated; under the impression of fear, the treaty has been negociated and signed ; a fear of the same danger, that of war, has promoted its ratification ; and now, every imaginary mischief, which can alarm our fears, is conjured up, in order to de prive us of that discretion, which this House thinks they have a right to exercise, and in order to force us to carry the treaty into effect. If the people of the United States wish this House to carry the treaty into effect immediately, and notwith standing the continued aggressions of the British, if their will was fairly and fully expressed, I would imme diately acquiesce; but since an appeal has been made 424 MR. GALLATIN'S SPEECH, &c. to them, it is reasonable to suspend a decision until their sentiments are known. Till then I must follow my own judgment ; and as I cannot see that any pos sible evils will follow a delay, I shall vote against the resolution before the committee, in order to make room, either for that proposed by my colleague, (Mr. M'Clay,) or for any other, expressed in any manner whatever, provided it embraces the object I have in view, to wit, the suspension of the final vote a post ponement of the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect, until satisfactory assurances are obtained, that Great Britain means, in future, to show us that friendly disposition, which it is my earnest wish, may at all times, be cultivated by America towards all other nations. SPEECH OF FISHER AMES, ON THE BRITISH TREATY, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 28, 1796. In committee of the whole on the following Resolution, Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty with Great Britain ; Mr. Ames spoke as follows : MR. CHAIRMAN, I ENTERTAIN the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes. In my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and manner, with which we may prevail upon ourselves to contemplate the subject, than upon the developement of any profound political principles, or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If we could succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less difficulty than we have to apprehend in surmounting all our objections. The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to ourselves, and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we ought to anticipate the VOL, i. 54 ,> 426 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON circumstance as a probability, and when we are ad monished by the evidence of our senses that it is the fact. How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the House, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears. Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and effect ; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left unexplored ? It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and, when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling has been summoned to listen to some peculiar style of address : and yet we seem to believe, and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that of unbiassed reason. It would be strange, that a subject, which has roused in turn all the passions of the country, should be dis cussed without the interference of any of our own. We are men, and therefore not exempt from those passions : as citizens and representatives, we feel the interests that must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions. We are not disinterested; it is impossible we should be dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may be cloud the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the under standing. But the public sensibility, and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation to the debate. The public attention has been quick ened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impres sions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and more mature, as well as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents in political af fairs are the passions of men. Shall we complain of our nature shall we say that man ought to have been I THE BRITISH TREATY. 427 made otherwise ? It is right already, because HE, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so ; and be cause thus made and thus acting, the cause of truth and the public good is the more surely promoted. But an attempt has been made to produce an influ ence of a nature more stubborn, and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly pretended, that the con stitutional right of this House is at stake, and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said, that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the design to nullify this as sembly, and to make it a cypher in the government : that the President and senate, the numerous meet ings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terror, to force the treaty down our throats, though we loathe it, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience. It is necessary to pause here and inquire, whether suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and pernicious in all their in fluences. They oppose an obstacle in the path of in quiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insur mountable. They will not yield to argument ; for as they were not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are indestruc tible. While this remains, it is vain to argue ; it is vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea. For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead, that should hope to prevail in an argument, whose scope and object is to mortify the self-love of the expected prose lyte ? I ask further, when such attempts have been made, have they not failed of success ? The indig nant heart repels a conviction that is believed to de base it. The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, nor more constant in its action, than what is 420 3IR. AMES' SPEECH ON called in French, V esprit du corps, or the self-love of an assembly ; that jealous affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its own pre rogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be aban doned, because men in a public assembly are still men, and feel that esprit du corps which is one of the laws of their nature ? Still less should we despond or complain, if we reflect, that this very spirit is a guar dian instinct, that watches over the life of this assem bly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation, and without its existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the representatives of the people, and mediately the liber ties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage. If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a re proach to be found even moderate in my zeal, to as sert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and whenever they shall be in real danger, the present oc casion affords proof, that there will be no want of ad vocates and champions. Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when once roused, so difficult to pacify, that if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure, which was lately believed by our selves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of the House. Princi ples that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a post, where it is possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault. THE BRITISH TREATY. 429 While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless. It may be heard with the ceremony of at tention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience it wearies to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and eve ry pass to the understanding guarded. Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing. I cannot press this topic too far ; I cannot address myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here, to suspect their own feelings, and, while they do, to examine the grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our per suasion, that this body has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from inclination than evi dence. Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition, and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House ; that the addresses, which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and decep tion, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity. It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortations to reject the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surren der them forever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the House will not concur in the measure to execute the treaty, what other course shall we take ? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us ? 130 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON In the nature of things there are but three ; we are either to make the treaty, to observe it, or break it. It would be absurd to say we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase already so much abused, we are under coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the conse quences of a choice. By refusing to act, we choose. The treaty will be broken and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness then, of replying to those who urge upon the House the topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to force the treaty down, and to compel this assembly to re nounce its discretion and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the treaty-making power ? In case we reject the appropria tion, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we gain no safer shelter than before from the conse quences of the decision. Indeed they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain that the treaty-making power has produced this coercion to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that pow er, it is the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the blind instruments of pow er, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture ? Yet that word, that empty word, coer cion, has given scope to an eloquence, that, one would imagine, could not be tired, and did not choose to be quieted. Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before us, and we shall scarcely fail to see, in still stronger lights, the futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the House. If, as some have suggested, the thing called a treaty, is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obliga tion, the first question is, will this House complete the instrument, and, by concurring, impart to it that force which it wants. The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty, though formally ratified by the executive power of both THE BRITISH TREATY. 431 nations, though published as a law for our own by the President's proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable in point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many, precisely for the reason, that in the con tention for power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms as well as the fair interpre tation of our own resolutions (Mr. Blount's.) We declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the President and senate, and not in this House. Need I say, that we fly in the face of that resolution, when we pretend, that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in them? It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a power, which we at the same time disclaim as exclusive ly vested in other departments. What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the President and senate with foreign nations are treaties, without our agency, and yet those compacts want all power and obligation, until they are sanctioned by our concurrence ? It is not my design in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted, that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation. But, say those, who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous phrases ; have we no discretion? and if we have, are we not to make use of it in judg ing of the expediency or inexpediency of the treaty ? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty. If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making the appropriations for the treaty, but in the resolution itself (Mr. Blount's.) Let us examine it 432 MH. AMES' SPEECH ON more nearly. A treaty is a bargain between nations, binding in good faith ; and what makes a bargain ? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the treaty power is not in this House; this House has no share in contracting, and is not a party : of con sequence, the President and senate alone, may make a treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, how ever, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expedi ency of treaties ; that is the constitutional province of our discretion. Be it so. What follows ? Treaties, when adjudged by us to be inexpedient, fall to the ground, and the public faith is not hurt. This, incredi ble and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount of it, in plainer language, is this the Presi dent and senate are to make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making them. But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend upon the making, but upon our opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our legislative capacity, the treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in sus pense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratifica tion by the treaty-making power, but from our appro bation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend that we have no share, according to the argument, in the. treaty-making power ? These opinions, neverthe less, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perse verance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them, and their ridiculous conse quences ? Let me hasten to suppose the treaty is considered as already made, and then the alternative is fairly pre- THE BRITISH TREATY, 433 settled to the mind, whether we will observe the treaty or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question. If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of con duct for the legislative as for the courts of law. I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, ap pears at length to be no more than the authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen com plain we are forced to act in this way, we are forced to swallow the treaty. It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not. There is but one right way open for us, the laws of morality and good faith have fenced up every other. What sort of liberty is that, which we presume to exer cise against the authority of those laws ? It is for tyrants to complain, that principles are restraints, and that they have no liberty, so long as their despotism has limits. These principles will be unfolded by examining the remaining question : SHALL WE BREAK THE TREATY? The treaty is bad, fatally bad, is the cry. It sacri fices the interest, the honor, the independence of the United States, and the faith of our engagements to France. If we listen to the clamor of party intemper ance, the evils are of a number not to be counted, and of a nature not to be borne, even in idea. The lan guage of passion and exaggeration may silence that of sober reason in other places, it has not done it here. The question here is, whether the treaty be re ally so very fatal as to oblige the nation to break its faith. I admit that such a treaty ought not to be exe cuted. I admit that self-preservation is the first law of society, as well as of individuals. It would, perhaps, be deemed an abuse of terms to call that a treaty, which violates such a principle. I wave also, for the VOL. i. 55 434 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON present, any inquiry, what departments shall represent the nation, and annul the stipulations of a treaty. I content myself with pursuing the inquiry, whether the nature of this compact be such as to justify our refusal to carry it into effect. A treaty is the promise of a nation. Now, promises do not always bind him that makes them. But I lay down two rules, which ought to guide us in this case. The treaty must appear to be bad, not merely in the petty details, but in its character, princi ple and mass. And in the next place, this ought to be ascertained by the decided and general concurrence of the enlightened public. I confess there seems to me something very like ridicule thrown over the debate by the discussion of the articles in detail. The undecided point is, shall we break our faith ? And while our country and enlightened Europe, await the issue with more than curiosity, we are employed to gather piecemeal, and article by article, from the instrument, a justification for the deed by trivial calcu lations of commercial profit and loss. This is little worthy of the subject, of this body, or of the nation. If the treaty is bad, it will appear to be so in its mass. Evil to a fatal extreme, if that be its tendency, requires no proof; it brings it. Extremes speak for themselves arid make their own law. What if the direct voyage of American ships to Jamaica with horses or lumber, might net one or two per centum more than the present trade to Surinam ; would the proof of the fact avail any thing in so grave a question as the violation of the public engagements? It is in vain to allege, that our faith, plighted to France, is violated by this new treaty. Our prior trea ties are expressly saved from the operation of the Bri tish treaty. And what do those mean who say, that our honor was forfeited by treating at all, and especial ly by such a treaty ? Justice, the laws and practice of nations, a just regard for peace as a duty to man kind, and the known wish of our citizens, as well as that THE BRITISH TREATY. 435 self-respect which required it of the nation to act with dignity and moderation, all these forbade an appeal to arms, before we had tried the effect of negociation. The honor of the United States was saved, not forfeit ed, by treating. The treaty itself, by its stipulations for the posts, for indemnity, and for a due observation of our neutral rights, has justly raised the character of the nation. Never did the name of America appear in Europe with more lustre than upon the event of ratify ing this instrument. The fact is of a nature to over come all contradiction. But the independence of the country we are co lonists again. This is the cry of the very men who tell us, that France will resent our exercise of the rights of an independent nation to adjust our wrongs with an aggressor, without giving her the opportunity to say, those wrongs shall subsist and shall not be adjusted. This is an admirable specimen of the spirit of inde pendence. The treaty with Great Britain, it cannoi be denied, is unfavorable to this strange sort of in dependence. Few men of any reputation for sense, among those who say the treaty is bad, will put that reputation so much at hazard as to pretend that it is so extremely bad as to warrant and require a violation of the public faith. The proper ground of the controversy, there fore, is really unoccupied by the opposers of the trea ty ; as the very hinge of the debate is on the point, not of its being good or otherwise, but whether it is intole rably and fatally pernicious. If loose and ignorant declaimers have any where asserted the latter idea, it is too extravagant, and too solidly refuted, to be re peated here. Instead of any attempt to expose it still further, I will say, and I appeal with confidence to the candor of many opposers of the treaty to acknow ledge, that if it had been permitted to go into opera tion silently, like our other treaties, so little alteration of any sort would be made by it in the great mass of our commercial and agricultural concerns, that it 436 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON would not be generally discovered by its effects to be in force, during the term for which it was contracted. I place considerable reliance on the weight men of candor will give to this remark, because I believe it to be true, and little short of undeniable. When the panic dread of the treaty shall cease, as it certainly must, it will be seen through another medium. Those, who shall make search into the articles for the cause of their alarms, will be so far from finding stipulations that will operate fatally, they will discover few of them that will have- any lasting operation at all. Those, which relate to the disputes between the two coun tries, will spend their force upon the subjects in dispute, and extinguish them. The commercial articles are more of a nature to confirm the existing state of things, than to change it. The treaty alarm was purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less formida ble. Objections that proceed upon error, in fact or calculation, may be traced arid exposed ; but such as are drawn from the imagination or addressed to it, elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind, after having been banished from it by truth. I will not so far abuse the momentary strength that is lent to me by the zeal of the occasion, as to enlarge upon the commercial operation of the treaty. I pro ceed to the second proposition, which I have stated as indispensably requisite to a refusal of the performance of a treaty will the state of public opinion justify the deed ? No government, not even a despotism, will break its faith without some pretext, and it must be plausible, it must be such as will carry the public opinion along with it. Reasons of policy, if not of morality, dissuade even Turkey and Algiers from breaches of treaty in mere wantonness of perfidy, in open contempt of the reproaches of their subjects. Surely, a popular gov ernment will not proceed more arbitrarily, as it is more free ; nor with less shame or scruple in proportion as it THE BRITISH TREATY. 437 has better morals. It will not proceed against the faith of treaties at all, unless the strong and decided sense of the nation shall pronounce, not simply that the treaty is not advantageous, but that it ought to be broken and annulled. Such a plain manifestation of the sense of the citizens is indispensably requisite ; first, because if the popular apprehensions be not an infallible crite rion of the disadvantages of the instrument, their ac quiescence in the operation of it is an irrefragable proof, that the extreme case does not exist, which alone could justify our setting it aside. In the next place, this approving opinion of the citi zens is requisite, as the best preventive of the ill conse quences of a measure always so delicate, and often so hazardous. Individuals would, in that case at least, attempt to repel the opprobrium that would be thrown upon Congress by those who will charge it with per fidy. They would give weight to the testimony of facts, and the authority of principles, on which the government would rest its vindication. And if war should ensue upon the violation, our citizens would not be divided from their government, nor the ardor of their courage be chilled by the consciousness of injus tice, and the sense of humiliation, that sense which makes those despicable who know they are despised. I add a third reason, and with me it has a force that no words of mine can augment, that a government, wantonly refusing to fulfil its engagements, is the cor- rupter of its citizens. Will the laws continue to pre vail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators ? How shall we punish vice while we practise it ? We have not force, and vain will be our reliance, when we have forfeited the resources of opinion. To weaken government and to corrupt morals are effects of a breach of faith not to be prevented ; and from effects they become causes, producing, with augmented ac tivity, more disorder and more corruption ; order will be disturbed and the life of the public liberty shortened. 438 MR. AMES* SPEECH ON And who, I would inquire, is hardy enough to pre tend, that the public voice demands the violation of the treaty ? The evidence of the sense of the great mass of the nation is often equivocal ; but when was it ever manifested with more energy and precision than at the present moment ? The voice of the peo ple is raised against the measure of refusing the ap propriations. If gentlemen should urge, nevertheless, that all this sound of alarm is a counterfeit expression of the sense of the public, I will proceed to other proofs. If the treaty is ruinous to our commerce, what has blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders ? Surely they are not enemies to trade, or ignorant of their own interests. Their sense is not so liable to be mistaken as .that of a nation, and they are almost unanimous. The articles, stipulating the redress of our injuries by captures on the sea, are said to be de lusive. By whom is this said ? The very men, whose fortunes are staked upon the competency of that redress, say no such thing. They wait with anxious fear lest you should annul that compact on which all their hopes are rested. Thus we offer proof, little short of absolute demon stration, that the voice of our country is raised not to sanction, but to deprecate the non-performance of our engagements. It is not the nation, it is one, and but one branch of the government that proposes to reject them. With this aspect of things, to reject is an act of desperation. I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some ar ticles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition ; and how the clamors against it from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted for ? The apprehensions so extensively diffused, on its first publication, will be vouched as proof, that the treaty is bad, and that the people hold it in abhorrence. I am not embarrassed to find the answer to this in sinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious ope ration? could not have created all the fears that were THE BRITISH TREATY. 439 felt or affected. The alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty. There were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding. We are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling. The fervor of the revolution war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensi bilities of our citizens were quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irrita tion. One of the two great nations of Europe under went a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathies. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impressions met with much to in flame, and nothing to restrain them. In our newspa pers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusi asm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism, and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow that passions so impe tuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our coun try. They were hazarded. I will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs ? They are here, they are every where. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794. No one has for gotten the captures of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted not merely for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment with 440 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON its seals prevail at once to tranquillize the people ? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke re sentment, but not satisfy it. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations as to disarm extravagant passions. Of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes. They, who are animated by the spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit. Why do they complain, that the West Indies are not laid open ? Why do they lament, that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies ? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished ? Let us be explicit more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would riot a treaty of amity with Great Britain, still be obnoxious ? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain ? A treaty of amity is con demned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. No treaty, ex claim others, should be made with a monarch or a despot : there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers domineer on the ocean : their den must be destroyed : that nation must be extirpated. I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these, we do not pant for treaties. Such pas sions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left king George his island, it would not answer ; not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Britain was sunk in the sea ; if where there are now men and wealth and laws and liberty, there was no more than a sand bank for the sea-monsters to fatten on ; a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict. THE BRITISH TREATY. 441 1 object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point, that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will, but it is no indication that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms ; it is to re- strain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party. Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am, not unwilling to explain myself; I affect no conceal ment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally desire, arid with any chance of success, equally endeavor to create an influence in America. Each will exert all its arts to range our strength on its own side. How is this to be effected ? Our government is a democratical republic. It will not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in sub servience to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens : and, if Congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pur sued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is the instrument of for eign influence. Without it, all is labor and disap pointment. With that mighty auxiliary, foreign in trigue finds agents, not only volunteers, but competi tors for employment, and any thing like reluctance is understood to be a crime. Has Britain this means of influence ? Certainly not. If her gold could buy ad herents, their becoming such would deprive them of all political power and importance. They would not wield popularity as a 'weapon, but would fall under it. Britain has no influence, and for the reasons just given can have none. She has enough ; and God forbid she ever should have more. France, possessed of popular enthusiasm, of party attachments, has had, and still has too much influence on our politics any foreign influence is too much, and ought to be destroyed. I detest the man and disdain the spirit, that can bend to VOL. i. 56 442 MK. AMES' SPEECH O!s a mean subserviency to the views of any nation. It is enough to be Americans. That character compre hends our duties, and ought to engross our attach ments. But I would not be misunderstood. I would not break the alliance with France ; I would not have the connexion between the two countries even a cold one. It should be cordial and sincere ; but I would banish that influence, which, by acting on the passions of the citizens, may acquire a power over the govern ment. It is no bad proof of the merit of the treaty, that, un der all these unfavorable circumstances, it should be so well approved. In spite of first impressions, in spite of misrepresentation and party clamor, inquiry has multiplied its advocates ; and at last the public senti ment appears to me clearly preponderating to its side. On the most careful review of the several branches of the treaty, those which respect political arrange ments, the spoliations on our trade, and the regula tion of commerce, there is little to be apprehended. The evil, aggravated as it is by party, is little in de gree, and short in duration ; two years from the end of the European war. I ask, and I would ask the question significantly, what are the inducements to reject the treaty ? What great object is to be gained, and fairly gained by it ? If, however, as to the merits of the treaty, candor should suspend its approbation, what is there to hold patriotism a moment in balance, as to the violation of it ? Nothing ; I repeat confident ly, nothing. There is nothing before us in that event but confusion and dishonor. But before I attempt to develope those conse quences, I must put myself at ease by some explanation. Nothing is worse received among men than the confutation of their opinions ; and, of these, none are more dear or more vulnerable than their political opin ions. To say that a proposition leads to shame and ruin, is almost equivalent to a charge that the support- THE BRITISH TREAT*. U'J ers of it intend to produce them. I throw myself upon the -magnanimity and candor of those who hear me. I cannot do justice to my subject without exposing, as forcibly as I can, all the evils in prospect. I readily admit, that in every science, and most of all in politics, error springs from other sources than the want of sense or integrity. I despise indiscriminate professions of candor and respect. There are individuals opposed to me of whom I am not bound to say any thing. But of many, perhaps of a majority of the opposers of the appro priations, it gives me pleasure to declare, they possess my confidence and regard. There are among them individuals for whom I entertain a cordial affection. The consequences of refusing to make provision for the treaty are not all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast interests are committed to the sport of the winds. Chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is forbidden to human foresight to count their number, or measure their extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss, so dark and so profound, it becomes us to pause and re flect upon such of the dangers as are obvious and inevi table. If this assembly should be wrought into a tem per to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is decep tive, to pretend that we can escape them. It is worse than weakness to say, that as to public faith our vote has already settled the question. Another tribunal than our own is already erected. The public opinion, not merely of our own country, but of the enlightened world, will pronounce a judgment that we cannot resist, that we dare not even affect to despise. Well may I urge it to men, who know the worth of character, that it is no trivial calamity to have it con tested. Refusing to do what the treaty stipulates shall be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should stand justified at last, a character, that is vindicated, is something worse than it stood before, unquestioned and unquestionable. Like the plaintiff in an action of slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by invective, and even tarnished by too much handling. In the J4i JJR. AMES' SPEECH O\ combat tor the honor of the nation, it may receive some wounds, which, though they should heal, will leave scars. I need not say, for surely the feelings of every bosom have anticipated, that we cannot guard this sense of national honor, this everlasting fire which alone keeps patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too vigilant and jealous. If, by executing the treaty, there is no possibility of dishonor, and if, by rejecting, there is some foundation for doubt, and for reproach, it is not for me to measure, it is for your own feelings to estimate the vast distance, that divides the one side of the alternative from the other. If therefore, we should enter on the examination of the question of duty and obligation with some feelings of prepossession, 1 do not hesitate to say, they are such as we ought to have : it is an after inquiry to determine whether they are such as ought finally to be resisted. The resolution (Mr. Blount's) is less explicit than (he constitution. Its patrons should have made it more so, if possible, if they had any doubts, or meant the public should entertain none. Is it the sense of that vote, as some have insinuated, that we claim a right, for any cause or no cause at all but our own sovereign will and pleasure, to refuse to execute, and thereby to annul the stipulations of a treaty that we have nothing to regard but the expediency or inex pediency of the measure, being absolutely free from all obligation by compact to give it our sanction ? A doctrine so monstrous, so shameless, is refuted by being avowed. There are no words, you could express it in, that would not convey both confutation and re proach. It would outrage the ignorance of the tenth century to believe, it would baffle the casuistry of a papal council to vindicate. I venture to say it is im possible : no less impossible than that we should desire to assert the scandalous privilege of being free after we have pledged our honor. THE BRITISH TREATY. .j 1;, It is doing injustice to the resolution of the House, (which I dislike on many accounts) to strain the in terpretation of it to this extravagance. The treaty- making power is declared by it to be vested exclusive ly in the President and senate. Will any man in his senses affirm, that it can be a treaty before it has any binding force or obligation ? If it has no binding force upon us, it has none upon Great Britain. Let candor answer, is Great Britain free from any obligation to de liver the posts in June, and are we willing to signify to her that we think so ? Is it with that nation a question of mere expediency or inexpediency to do it, and that too, even after we have done all that depends upon us to give the treaty effect ? No sober man believes this. No one, who would not join in condemning the faithless proceedings of that nation, if such a doctrine should be avowed and carried into practice and why com plain, if Great Britain is not bound? There can be no breach of faith where none is plighted. I shall be told that she is bound. Surely it follows, that if she is bound to performance, our nation is under a similar obligation ; if both parties be not obliged, neither is obliged, it is no compact, no treaty. This is a dictate of law and common sense, and every jury in the coun try has sanctioned it on oath. It cannot be a treaty and yet no treaty, a bargain yet no promise ; if it is a promise, I am not to read a lecture to show why an honest man will keep his pro mise. The reason of the thing, and the words of the reso lution of the House, imply, that the United States en gage their good faith in a treaty. We disclaim, say the majority, the treaty-making power ; we of course disclaim (they ought to say,) every doctrine, that would put a negative upon the doings of that power. It is the prerogative of folly alone to maintain both sides of a proposition. Will any man affirm, the American nation is engag ed by good faith to the British nation ; but that en- MR. AMES' SPEECH ON gagement is nothing to this House ? Such a man is not to be reasoned with. Such a doctrine is a coat of mail, that would turn the edge of all the weapons of argument, if they were sharper than a sword. Will it be imagined, the king of Great Britain and the Presi dent are mutually bound by the treaty, but the two na tions are free ? It is one thing for this House to stand in a position that presents an opportunity to break the faith of America, and another to establish a principle that will justify the deed. We feel less repugnance to believe that any other body is bound by obligation than our own. There is not a man here who does riot say that Great Britain is bound by treaty. Bring it nearer home. Is the se nate bound ? Just as much as the House and no more. Suppose the senate, as part of the treaty power, by ratifying a treaty on Monday, pledges the public faith to do a certain act. Then, in their ordinary capacity as a branch of the legislature, the senate is called upon on Tuesday to perform that act, for example, an appropriation of money is the senate, (so lately un der obligation,) now free to agree or disagree to the act ? If the twenty ratifying senators should rise up and avow this principle, saying, we struggle for liberty, we will not be cyphers, mere puppets, and give their votes accordingly, would not shame blister their tongues, would not infamy tingle in their ears would not their country, which they had insulted and dis honored, though it should be silent and forgiving, be a revolutionary tribunal, a rack on which their own re flections would stretch them ? This, sir, is a cause that would be dishonored and betrayed, if I contented myself with appealing only to the understanding. It is too cold, and its processes are too slow for the occasion. I desire to thank God, that since he has given me an intellect so fallible, he has impressed upon me an instinct that is sure. On a question of shame and honor, reasoning is sometimes THE BRITISH TREATY, 447 useless, and worse. I feel the decision in my pulse if it throws no light upon the brain, it kindles a fire at the heart. It is not easy to deny, it is impossible to doubt, that a treaty imposes an obligation on the American na tion. It would be childish to consider the President and senate obliged, and the nation and the House free. What is the obligationperfect or imperfect ? If perfect, the debate is brought to a conclusion. If im perfect, how large a part of our faith is pawned ? Is half our honor put at risk, and is that half too cheap to be redeemed? How long has this hair-splitting subdivision of good faith been discovered, and why has it escaped the researches of the writers on the law of nations ? Shall we add a new chapter to that law, or insert this doctrine as a supplement to, or more pro perly a repeal of the ten commandments ? The principles and the example of the British par liament have been alleged to coincide with the doc trine of those who deny the obligation of the treaty. 1 have not had the health to make very laborious re searches into this subject. I will, however, sketch my view of it. Several instances have been noticed, but the treaty of Utrecht is the only one that seems to be at all applicable. It has been answered, that the con duct of parliament in that celebrated example, affords no sanction to our refusal to carry the treaty into ef fect. The obligation of the treaty of Utrecht has been understood to depend on the concurrence of parlia ment, as a condition to its becoming of force. If that opinion should, however, appear incorrect, still the precedent proves, not that the treaty of Utrecht want ed obligation, but that parliament disregarded it ; a proof, not of the construction of the treaty-making power, but of the violation of a national engagement. Admitting still further, that the parliament claimed and exercised its power, not as a breach of faith, but as a matter of constitutional right, I reply, that the analogy between parliament and Congress totally fails. The 448 MR. AMES J SPEECH ON nature of the British government may require and justify a course of proceeding in respect to treaties, that is unwarrantable here. The British government is a mixed one. The king, at the head of the army, of the hierarchy, with an am ple civil list, hereditary, unresponsible, and possessing the prerogative of peace and war, may be properly ob served with some jealousy in respect to the exercise of the treaty-making power. It seems, and perhaps from a spirit of caution on this account, to be their doctrine, that treaties bind the nation, but are not to be regard ed by the courts of law, until laws have been passed conformably to them. Our concurrence has expressly regulated the matter differently. The concurrence of parliament is necessary to treaties becoming laws in England, gentlemen say ; and here the senate, repre senting the states, must concur in treaties. The con stitution and the reason of the case, make the concur rence of the senate as effectual as the sanction of par liament, and why not? The senate is an elective body, and the approbation of a majority of the states affords the nation as ample security against the abuse of the treaty-making power, as the British nation can enjoy in the control of parliament. Whatever doubt there may be as to the parliamenta ry doctrine of the obligation of treaties in Great Bri tain, (and perhaps there is some,) there is none in their books, or their modern practice. Blackstone represents treaties as of the highest obligation, when ratified by the king ; and for almost a century, there has been no instance of opposition by parliament to this doctrine. Their treaties have been uniformly carried into effect, although many have been ratified, of a nature most obnoxious to party, and have produc ed louder clamor than we have lately witnessed. The example of England, therefore, fairly examined, does not warrant, it dissuades us from a negative vote. Gentlemen have said, with spirit, whatever the true doctrine of our constitution may be. Great Britain has no THE BRITISH TREATY. 449 right to complain or to dictate an interpretation. The sense of the American nation as to the treaty power, is to be received by all foreign nations. This is very true as a maxim ; but the fact is against those who vouch it. The sense of the American nation is not as the vote of the House has declared it. Our claim to some agency in giving force and obligation to treaties, is beyond all kind of controversy novel. The sense of the nation is probably against it. The sense of the government certainly is. The President denies it on constitutional grounds, and therefore cannot ever accede to our interpretation. The senate ratified the treaty, and cannot without dishonor adopt it, as I have attempted to show. Where then do they find the proof, that this is the American sense of the treaty-making power, which is to silence the murmurs of Great Bri tain ? Is it because a majority of two or three, or at most of four or five of this House, will reject the treaty ? Is it thus, the sense of our nation is to be recognized ? Our government may thus be stopped in its move ments a struggle for power may thus commence, and the event of the conflict may decide who is the victor, and the quiet possessor of the treaty power. But, at present, it is beyond all credibility, that our vote, by a bare majority, should be believed to do any thing better than to embitter our divisions, and to tear up the settled foundations of our departments. If the obligation of a treaty be complete, I am aware that cases sometimes exist which will justify a nation in refusing a compliance. Are our liberties, gentle men demand, to be bartered away by a treaty, and is there no remedy ? There is. Extremes are not to be supposed, but when they happen, they make the law for themselves. No such extreme can be pretended in this instance, and if it existed, the authority it would confer to throw off the obligation, would rest where the obligation itself resides in the nation. This House is not the nation it is not the whole delegated authority of the nation. Being only a part of that au- VOL. i. 57 450 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON thority, its right to act for the whole society obviously depends on the concurrence of the other two branches. If they refuse to concur, a treaty, once made, remains in full force, although a breach on the part of a foreign nation would confer upon our own, a right to forbear the execution. I repeat it, even in that case the act of this House cannot be admitted as the act of the nation, and if the President and senate should not concur, the treaty would be obligatory. I put a case that will not fail to produce conviction. Our treaty with France engages that free bottoms shall make free goods, and how has it been kept ? As such engagements will ever be in time of war. France has set it aside, and pleads imperious necessity. We have no navy to enforce the observance of such arti cles, and paper barriers are weak against the violence of those, who are on the scramble for enemies' goods on the high seas. The breach of any article of a treaty by one nation gives an undoubted right to the other to renounce the whole treaty. But has one branch of the government that right, or must it reside with the whole authority of the nation ? What if the senate should resolve, that the French treaty is broken, and there fore null and of no effect. The answer is obvious, you would deny their sole authority. That branch of the legislature has equal power in this regard with the House of Representatives. One branch alone cannot express the will of the nation. A right to annul a treaty, because a foreign nation has broken its articles, is only like the case of a suffi cient cause to repeal a law. In both cases the branches of our government must concur in the orderly way, or the law and the treaty will remain. The very cases, supposed by my adversaries in this argument, conclude against themselves. They will persist in confounding ideas that should be kept dis tinct, they will suppose that the House of Representa tives has no power unless it has all power. The House is nothing if it be not the whole government the na tion, THE BRITISH TREATY. 451 On every hypothesis, therefore, the conclusion is not to be resisted ; we are either to execute this treaty, or break our faith. To expatiate on the value of public faith may pass with some men for declamation to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge can any cir cumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement ? Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue, and their standard of action ? It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to break all the ligaments of society, to dissolve that mys terious charm which attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense of shame and disgust. What is patriotism ? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man was born ? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent preference be cause they are greener ? No, sir, this is not the cha racter of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoy ments of life, and twisting itself with the minutest fila ments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of so ciety, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see, not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious, but as sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defence, and is conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For, what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a state re nounces the principles that constitute their security ? Or if his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country odious in the eyes of stran gers and dishonored in his own ? Could he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent ? The sense of having one would die within him ; he would blush for his patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He would be a banished man in his native land. 452 3IR. AMES" SPEECH ON I see ncTexception to the respect, that is paid among nations to the law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period, when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of politics, the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string of beads, gives not merely binding force, but sanctity to treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise, or too just, to disown and annul its obligation. Thus we see, neither the ignorance of savages, nor the prin ciples of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection from the foot of the gallows, if the vic tims of justice could live again, collect together and form a society, they would, however loath, soon find themselves obliged to make justice, that justice under which they fell, the fundamental law of their state. They would perceive, it was their interest to make others respect, and they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good faith. It is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even the supposition, that America should furnish the occa sion of this opprobrium. No, let me not even ima gine, that a republican government, sprung, as our own is, from a people enlightened and uncorrupted, a gov ernment whose origin is right, and whose daily disci pline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option to be faithless can dare to act what despots dare not avow, what our own example evinces, the states of Bar- bary are unsuspected of. No, let me rather make the supposition, that Great Britain refuses to execute the treaty, after we have done every thing to carry it into effect. Is there any language of reproach pun gent enough to express your commentary on the fact ? What would you say, or rather what would you not say ? Would you not tell them, wherever an English man might travel, shame would stick to him he would THE BRITISH TREATY. 453 disown his country. You would exclaim, England, proud of your wealth, and arrogant in the possession of power blush for these distinctions, which become the vehicles of your dishonor. Such a nation might truly say to corruption, thou art my father, and to the worm, thou art my mother and my sister. We should say of such a race of men, their name is a heavier bur den than their debt. I can scarcely persuade myself to believe, that the consideration I have suggested requires the aid of any auxiliary. But, unfortunately, auxiliary arguments are at hand. Five millions of dollars, and probably more, on the score of spoliations committed on our commerce, depend upon the treaty. The treaty offers the only prospect of indemnity. Such redress is pro mised as the merchants place some confidence in. Will you interpose and frustrate that hope ; leaving to many families nothing but beggary and despair ? It is a smooth proceeding to take a vote in this body : it takes less than half an hour to call the yeas and nays and reject the treaty. But what is the effect of it ? What, but this ; the very men, formerly so loud for redress ; such fierce champions, that even to ask for justice was too mean and too slow, now turn their capricious fury upon the sufferers, and say, by their vote, to them and their families, no longer eat bread ; petitioners go home and starve, we cannot satisfy your wrongs and our resentments. Will you pay the sufferers out of the treasury ? No. The answer was given two years ago, and appears on our journals. Will you give them letters of marque and reprisal to pay themselves by force ? No, that is war. Besides, it would be an opportunity for those who have already lost much to lose more. Will you go to war to avenge their injury ? If you do, the war will leave you no money to indemnify them. If it should be unsuccessful, you will aggravate existing evils ; if successful, your enemy will have no treasure left to give our merchants ; the first losses -will be con- 454 MK. AMES' SPEECH ON founded with much greater and be forgotten. At the end of a war there must be a negociation, which is the very point we have already gained ; and why relinquish it ? And who will be confident that the terms of the negociation, after a desolating war, would be more acceptable to another House of Representa tives, than the treaty before us. Members and opin ions may be so changed, that the treaty would then be rejected for being what the present majority say it should be. Whether we shall go on making treaties and refusing to execute them, I know not. Of this I am certain, it will be very difficult to exercise the treaty-making power on the new principles, with much reputation or advantage to the country. The refusal of the posts, (inevitable if we reject the treaty,) is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. A plain arid obvious one will be, the price of the western lands will fall. Set tlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so much of the interest of the United States, should calculate how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the treaty ; how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund expressly de voted to sink the national debt. What then are we called upon to do ? However the form of the vote and the protestations of many may disguise the pro ceeding, our resolution is in substance, and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution to prevent the sale of the western lands and the discharge of the public debt. Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contested by any one ? Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war till the negociation with great Britain was far advanced, and then the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not, however, to ex pect that neighboring nations, highly irritated against THE BRITISH TREATY. 455 each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages ; the traders will gain an influence and will abuse it ; and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised, and hardly restrained from violence ? Their situation will oblige them to choose between this country and Great Britain, in case the treaty should be rejected. They will not be pur friends, and at the same time the friends of our enemies. But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point ? Certainly the very men who charged the In dian war on the detention of the posts, will call for no other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It is remembered with what emphasis, with what acrimo ny, they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and treasure into the western country, in consequence of Britain's holding the posts. Until the posts are restored, they exclaimed, the treasury and the frontiers must bleed. If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that the peace with the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will urge another reply. From argu ments calculated to produce conviction, I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask, whether it is not already planted there ? I resort especial ly to the convictions of the western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no treaty, the settlers will remain in security ? Can they take it upon them to say, that an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove firm ? No, sir, it will not be peace, but a sword : it will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the tomahawk. On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for them, if my powers bore any pro portion to my zeal, I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, wake from your false security : your cruel dangers, your more cruel apprehensions are soon to be renew ed: the wounds, yet. unhealed, are to be torn open 456 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON again : in the day time, your path through the woods will be ambushed : the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father the blood of your sons shall fatten your corn field : you are a mother the war-whoop shall wake the sleep of the cradle. On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror, which cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, it will speak a language, compared with which all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid. Will it be whispered that the treaty has made me a new champion for the protection of the frontiers ? It is known that my voice as well as vote have been uni formly given in conformity with the ideas I have ex pressed. Protection is the right of the frontiers ; it is our duty to give it. Who will accuse me of wandering out of the sub ject ? Who will say that I exaggerate the tendencies of our measures ? Will any one answer by a sneer, that all this is idle preaching ? Will any one deny, that we are bound, and I would hope to good purpose, by the most solemn sanctions of duty for the vote we give ? Are despots alone to be reproached for un feeling indifference to the tears and blood of their subjects ? Are republicans unresponsible ? Have the principles, on which you ground the reproach upon cabinets and kings, no practical influence, no binding force ? Are they merely themes of idle declamation, introduced to decorate the morality of & newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topics of harangue from the windows of that state-house ? I trust it is neither too presumptuous nor too late to ask ; can you put the dearest interest of society at risk without guilt, and without remorse ? It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are not to be reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their measures. This is very true, where they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have de- jj THE BRITISH TREATY. 457 picted are not unforeseen ; they are so far from inevi table, we are going to bring them into being by our vote. We choose the consequences, and become as justly answerable for them as for the measure that we know will produce them. By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires, we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom our deci sion will make, to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake, to our country, and I do not deem it too se rious to say, to conscience and to God. We are an swerable, and if duty be any thing more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are pre paring to make ourselves as wretched as our country. There is no mistake in this case, there can be none. Experience has already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future victims have already reached us. The western inhabitants are not a silent and un complaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of their wilderness. It exclaims, that while one hand is held up to reject this treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of the imagination to conceive, that events so near are already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage vengeance, and the shrieks. of torture. Alrea dy they seem to sigh in the west wind already they mingle with every echo from the mountains. It is not the part of prudence to be inattentive to the tendencies of measures. Where there is any ground to fear that these will be pernicious, wisdom and duty forbid that we should underrate them. If we reject the treaty, will our peace be as safe as if we executed it with good faith ? I do honor to the intre pid spirit of those who say it will. It was formerly un derstood to constitute the excellence of a man's faith to believe without evidence and against it. But as opinions on this article are changed, and We are called to act for our country, it becomes us to VOL. i. 58 458 MR. AMES' SPEECH ON explore the dangers that will attend its peace, and to avoid them if we can. Few of us here, and fewer still in proportion of our constituents, will doubt, that, by rejecting, all those dangers will be aggravated. The idea of war is treated as a bugbear. This levity is at least unseasonable, and most of all unbe coming some who resort to it. Who has forgotten the philippics of 1794? The cry then was reparation no envoy no treaty no te dious delays. Now, it seems, the passion subsides, or at least the hurry to satisfy it. Great Britain, say they, will not wage war upon us. In 1794, it was urged by those, who now say, no war, that if we built frigates, or resisted the piracies of Al giers, we could not expect peace. Now they give ex cellent comfort truly. Great Britain has seized our ves sels and cargoes to the amount of millions ; she holds the posts ; she interrupts our trade, say they, as a neutral nation ; and these gentlemen, formerly so fierce for redress, assure us, in terms of the sweetest consola tion, Great Britain will bear all this patiently. But let me ask the late champions of our rights, will our nation bear it ? Let others exult because the aggressor will let our wrongs sleep forever. Will it add, it is my duty to ask, to the patience and quiet of our citizens to see their rights abandoned ? Will not the disap pointment of their hopes, so long patronized by the government, now in the crisis of their being realized, convert all their passions into fury and despair ? Are the posts to remain forever in the possession of Great Britain ? Let those who reject them, when the treaty offers them to our hands, say, if they choose, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take them by force ? The argument I am urging, would then come to a point. To use force is war. To talk of treaty again is too absurd. Posts and redress must come from voluntary good will, treaty or war. The conclusion is plain, if the state of peace shall continue, so will the British possession of the posts. THE BRITISH TREATY. 459 Look again at this state of things. On the sea- coast, vast losses uncompensated : on the frontier, Indian war, actual encroachment on our territory: every where discontent resentments tenfold more fierce because they will be impotent and humbled : national scorn and abasement. The disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosi ties of that period. Wars, in all countries, and most of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of the public feelings. The despotism of Turkey is of ten obliged by clamor, to unsheath the sword. War might perhaps be delayed, but could not be prevented. The causes of it would remain, would be aggravated, would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable. More captures, more impressments would swell the list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. I make no calculation of the arts of those, whose employment it has been, on former occasions, to fan the fire. I say nothing of the foreign money and emissaries that might foment the spirit of hostility, because the state of things will naturally run to violence. With less than their former exertion, they would be successful. Will our government be able to temper and restrain the turbulence of such a crisis ? The government, alas, will be in no capacity to govern. A divided peo ple and divided councils ! Shall we cherish the spirit of peace or show the energies of war ? Shall we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dis pose him, by the measures of resentment and broken faith, to respect our rights ? Do gentlemen rely on the state of peace because both nations will be worse dis posed to keep it; because injuries, and insults still harder to endure, will be mutually offered ? Such a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will be worse than war. Peace without security, accumulation of injury without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor, con tempt for ourselves, intestine discord and anarchy. 460 MK. AIDES' SPEECH ON Worse than this need not be apprehended, for if worse could happen, anarchy would bring it. Is this the peace, gentlemen undertake with such fearless confi dence to maintain ? Is this the station of American dignity, which the high-spirited champions of our na tional independence and honor could endure nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the country ? What is there in the treaty, that could humble us so low? Are they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choaking with them. If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do not hesitate to declare it ought not M be peace. Is there any thing in the prospect of the interior state of the country, to encourage us to aggravate the dangers of a war ? Would not the shock of that evil produce another, and shake down the feeble and then unbraced structure of our government? Is this a chimera ? Is it going off the ground of matter of fact to say, the rejection of the appropriation proceeds upon the doctrine of a civil war of the departments ? Two branches have ratified a treaty, and we are going to set it aside. How is this disorder in the machine to be rectified ? While it exists, its movements must stop, and when we talk of a remedy, is that any other than the formidable one of a revolutionary interposi tion of the people ? And is this, in the judgment even of my opposers, to execute, to preserve the constitu tion and the public order ? Is this the state of ha zard, if not of convulsion, which they can have the courage to contemplate and to brave, or beyond which their penetration can reach and see the issue ? They seem to believe, arid they act as if they believed, that our union, our peace, our liberty are invulnerable and immortal as if our happy state was not to be disturb ed by our dissensions, and that we are not capable of falling from it by our unworthiness. Some of them have no doubt better nerves and better discernment than mine. They can see the bright aspects and hap- THE BRITISH TREATY. 461 py consequences of all this array of horrors. They can see intestine discords, our government disorganiz ed, our wrongs aggravated, multiplied and unredress- ed, peace with dishonor, or war without justice, union or resources, in " the calm lights of mild philosophy." But whatever they may anticipate as the next mea sure of prudence and safety, they have explained no thing to the House. After rejecting the treaty, what is to be the next step ? They must have foreseen what ought to be done, they have doubtless resolved what to propose. Why then are they silent ? Dare they not avow their plan of conduct, or do they wait till our progress towards confusion shall guide them in form ing it ? Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to despond on this prospect, by presenting another, which it is yet in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, with out some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it ? Will he not feel some dread, that a change of system will reverse the scene ? The well grounded fears of our citizens in 1794, were removed by the treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly in evitable, and would not this adjustment have been con sidered, at that day, as a happy escape from the cala mity ? The great interest and the general desire of our people, was to enjoy the advantages of neutrali ty. This instrument, however misrepresented, af fords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or re ferred to a new negociation after the end of the Euro pean war. This was gaining every thing, because it confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing. This alone would justify the en gagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our hori zon, all our wishes were concentred in this one, that 462 fift. AMES' SPEECH ON we might escape the desolation of the storm. This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, mark ed to our eyes the space where it was raging, and af forded, at the same time, the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colors will grow pale, it will be a baleful meteor portending tempest and war. Let us not hesitate then, to agree to the appropria tion to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and dif fuse the spirit of confidence and enterprize, that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast, and if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to aug ment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed-wheat, and is sown again to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity. And in this progress, what seems to be fiction is found to fall short of ex perience. I rose to speak under impressions, that I would have resisted if I could. Those who see me will believe, that the reduced state of my health has unfitted me. almost equally, for much exertion of body or mind. Unprepared for debate, by careful reflection in my re tirement, or by long attention here, I thought the reso lution I had taken to sit silent, was imposed by necessi ty, and would cost me no effort to maintain. With a mind thus vacant of ideas, and sinking, as I really am, under a sense of weakness, I imagined the very desire of speaking was extinguished by the persuasion that I had nothing to say. Yet when I come to the moment of deciding the vote, I start back with dread from the edge of the pit into which we are plunging. In my view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation, THE BRITISH TREATY. 463 have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it. I have thus been led, by my feelings, to speak more at length than I had intended. Yet I have, perhaps, as little personal interest in the event as anyone here. There is, I believe, no member who will not think his chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public dis orders, to make confusion worse 'confounded, even I ? slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may autlive the government and constitution of my country. INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF JOHN ADAMS, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DELIVERED MARCH 4, J 797. WHEN it was first- perceived, in early times, that no middle course for America remained, between unlimit ed submission to a foreign legislature and a total in dependence of its claims ; men of reflection were less apprehensive of danger from the formidable power of fleets and armies they must determine to resist, than from those contests and dissensions, which would certainly arise, concerning the forms of government to be instituted over the whole, and over the parts of this extensive country. Relying, however, on the purity of their intentions, the justice of their cause, and the in tegrity and intelligence of the people, under an over ruling Providence, which had so signally protected this country from the first ; the representatives of this nation, then consisting of little more than half its pre sent numbers, not only broke to pieces the chains which were forging, and the rod of iron that was lifted up, and frankly cut asunder the ties which had bound them, and launched into an ocean of uncertainty. The zeal and ardor of the people during the revolution ary war, supplying the place of government, command ed a degree of order, sufficient at least for the tempo rary preservation of society. The confederation, which was early felt to be necessary, was prepared from the models of the Batavian and Helvetic confede racies, the only examples which remain, with any de tail and precision, in history, and certainly the only ones, which the people at large had ever considered. But, reflecting on the striking difference, in so many particulars, between this country and those, where a TNAUGURAL ADDRESS. 465 courier may go from the seat of government to the frontier in a single day, it was then certainly foreseen by some, who assisted in Congress at the formation of it, that it could not be durable. Negligence of its regulations, inattention to its re commendations, if not disobedience to its authority, not only in individuals, but in states, soon appeared with their melancholy consequences; universal lan guor, jealousies, rivalries of states ; decline of navi gation and commerce ; discouragement of necessary manufactures ; universal fall in the value of lands and their produce ; contempt of public and private faith : loss of consideration and credit with foreign nations ; and, at length, in discontents, animosities, combina tions, partial conventions, and insurrection, threat ening some great national calamity. In this dangerous crisis, the people of America were not abandoned by their usual good sense, presence of mind, resolution, or integrity. Measures were pursu ed to concert a plan, to form a more perfect union, es tablish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. The public dis quisition, discussions, and deliberations issued in the present happy constitution of government. Employed in the service of my country abroad dur ing the whole course of these transactions, I first saw the constitution of the United States in a foreign country. Irritated by no literary altercation, animated by no public debate, heated by no party animosity, I read it with great satisfaction, as the result of good heads, prompted by good hearts ; as an experiment, better adapted to the genius, character, situation, and relations of this nation and country, than any, which had ever been proposed or suggested. In its general principles and great outlines, it was conformable to such a system of government as I had ever most es teemed ; and in some states, my own native state in particular, had contributed to establish^ Claiming a right of suffrage in common with my fellow-citizens VOL. i. 59 466 PRESIDENT J. ADAMS r in the adoption or rejection of a constitution, which was to rule me and my posterity, as well as them and theirs, I did not hesitate to express my approbation of it on all occasions, in public and in private. It was not then nor has been since any objection to it, in my mind, that the executive and senate were not more permanent. Nor have I entertained a thought of pro moting any alteration in it, but such as the people themselves, in the course of their experience, should see and feel to be necessary or expedient, and by their representatives in Congress and the state legislatures, according to the constitution itself, adopt and ordain. Returning to the bosom of my country, after a pain ful separation from it for ten years, I had the honor to be elected to a station under the new order of things, and I have repeatedly laid myself under the most seri ous obligations to support the constitution. The ope ration of it has equalled the most sanguine expecta tions of its friends ; and from an habitual attention to it, satisfaction in its administration, and delight in its effects upon the peace, order, prosperity and happi ness of the nation, I have acquired an habitual attach ment to it, and veneration for it. What other form of government, indeed, can so well deserve our esteem and love ? There may be little solidity in an ancient idea, that congregations of men into cities and nations are the most pleasing objects in the sight of superior intelli- gencies : but this is very certain, that to a benevolent human mind there can be no spectacle presented by any nation, more pleasing, more noble, majestic, or august, than an assembly like that, which has so often been seen in this and the other chamber of Congress of a government, in which the executive authority, as well as that of all the branches of the legislature, are exercised by citizens selected at regular periods by their neighbors, to make and execute laws for the general good. Can any thing essential, any thing more than mere ornament and decoration, be added to fhis by robes or diamonds ? Can authority be more . . INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 467 amiable or respectable, when it descends from acci dents or institutions established in remote antiquity, than when it springs fresh from the hearts and judg ments of an honest and enlightened people ? For, it is the people only that are represented : it is their pow er and majesty that is reflected, and only for their good, in every legitimate government, under whatever form it may appear. The existence of such a govern ment as ours for any length of time, is a full proof of a general dissemination of knowledge and virtue throughout the whole body of the people. And what object of consideration, more pleasing than this, can be presented to the human mind ? If national pride is ever justifiable or excusable, it is when it springs, not from power or riches, grandeur or glory, but from conviction of national innocence, information and benevolence. In the midst of these pleasing ideas, we should be unfaithful to ourselves, if we should ever lose sight of the danger to our liberties, if any thing partial or ex traneous should infect the purity of our free, fair, virtu ous and independent elections. If an election is to be determined by a majority of a single vote, and that can be procured by a party through artifice, or corruption, the government may be the choice of a party, for its own ends, not of the nation for the national good. If that solitary suffrage can be obtained by foreign na tions, by flattery or menaces, by fraud or violence, by terror, intrigue, or venality ; the government may not be the choice of the American people, but of foreign nations. It may be foreign nations who govern us, and not we, the people, who govern ourselves : and candid men will acknowledge, that in such cases choice would have little advantage to boast of, over lot or chance. Such is the amiable and interesting system of gov ernment, (and such are some of the abuses to which it may be exposed,) which the people of America have exhibited to the admiration and anxiety of the wise and virtuous of all nations for eight years 5 under the 468 PRESIDENT J. ADAMS' administration of a citizen, who, by a long course of great actions, regulated by prudence, justice, temper ance, and fortitude, conducting a people, inspired with the same virtues, and animated with the same ardent patriotism and love of liberty, to independence and peace, to increasing wealth and unexampled prosperi ty, has merited the gratitude of his fellow-citizens, commanded the highest praises of foreign nations, and secured immortal glory with posterity. In that retirement, which is his voluntary choice, may he long live to enjoy the delicious recollection of his services, the gratitude of mankind; the happy fruits of them to himself and the world, which are daily increas ing, and that splendid prospect of the future fortunes of his country, which is opening from year to year. His name may be still a rampart, and the knowledge that he lives, a bulwark against all open or secret enemies of his country's peace. This example has been recommended to the imita tion of his successors, by both Houses of Congress, and by the voice of the legislatures and the people, throughout the nation. On this subject it might become me better to be silent, or to speak with diffidence; but, as something may be expected, the occasion, I hope, will be admit ted as an apology, if I venture to say, that if a pre ference, upon principle, of a free republican govern ment, formed upon long and serious reflection, after a diligent and impartial inquiry after truth ; if an attach ment to the constitution of the United States, and a conscientious determination to support it, until it shall be altered by the judgments and wishes of the people, expressed in the mode prescribed in it ; if a respectful attention to the constitutions of the individual states, and a constant caution and delicacy towards the state governments ; if an equal and impartial regard to the rights, interests, honor, and happiness of all the states in the union, without preference or regard to a nor thern or southern, eastern or western position, their various political opinions on essential points, or their INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 469 personal attachments ; if a love of virtuous men of all parties and denominations ; if a love of science and letters, and a wish to patronize every rational effort to encourage schools, colleges, universities, academies, and every institution for propagating knowledge, vir tue and religion among all classes of the people, not only for their benign influence on the happiness of life, in all its stages and classes, and of society in all its forms, but, as the only means of preserving our consti tution from its natural enemies, the spirit of sophistry, the spirit of party, the spirit of intrigue, profligacy, and corruption, and the pestilence of foreign influence, which is the angel of destruction to elective govern ments ; if a love of equal laws, of justice and humani ty, in the interior administration ; if an inclination to improve agriculture, commerce, and manufactures for necessity, convenience, and defence ; if a spirit of equi ty and humanity towards the aboriginal nations of America, and a disposition to meliorate their condi tion, by inclining them to be more friendly to us, and our citizens to be more friendly to them : if an inflexi ble determination to maintain peace and inviolable faith with all nations, and that system of neutrality and impartiality among the belligerent powers of Europe, which has been adopted by the government, and so solemnly sanctioned by both Houses of Congress, and applauded by the legislatures of the states and the public opinion, until it shall be otherwise ordained by Congress; if a personal esteem for the French nation, formed in a residence of seven years chiefly among them, and a sincere desire to preserve the friendship, which has been so much for the honor and interest of both nations; if, while the conscious honor and integrity of the people of America, and the internal sentiment of their own power and energies must be preserved, an earnest endeavor to investigate every just cause, and remove every colorable pretence, of complaint ; if an intention to pursue, by amicable negociation, a repara tion for the injuries, that have been committed on W I 470 ^PRESIDENT J. ADAMS', &c7 the commerce of our fellow-citizens by whatever na tion ; arid if success cannot be obtained, to lay the facts before the legislature, that they may consider, what further measures the honor and interest of the government and its constituents demand; if a resolu tion to do justice, as far as may depend upon me, at all times, and to all nations, and maintain peace, friendship and benevolence with all the world ; if an unshaken confidence in the honor, spirit, and resources of the American people, on which I have so often ha zarded my all, and never been deceived ; if elevated ideas of the high destinies of this country, and of my own duties towards it, founded on a knowledge of the moral principles and intellectual improvements of the people, deeply engraven on my mind in early life, and not ob scured but exalted by experience and age, and with humble reverence I feel it my duty to add if a venera tion for the religion of a people, who profess and call themselves Christians, and a fixed resolution to consi der a decent respect for Christianity among the best recommendations for the public service, can enable me, in any degree, to comply with your wishes, it shall be my strenuous endeavor, that this sagacious injunction of the two Houses shall not be without effect. With this great example before me ; with the sense and spirit, the faith and honor, the duty and interest of the same American people, pledged to support the constitution of the United States, I entertain no doubt of its continuance in all its energy ; and my mind is prepared without hesitation, to lay myself under the most solemn obligations to support it, to the utmost of my power. And may that Being, who is supreme over all, the patron of order, the fountain of justice, and the protec tor, in all ages of the world, of virtuous liberty, con tinue his blessing upon this nation and its government, and give it all possible success and duration, consistent with the ends of his providence. SPEECH OF ROBERT G. HARPER, *> ON THE NECESSITY OF RESISTING THE AGGRESSIONS AND ENCROACHMENTS OF FRANCE, t DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OP THE UNITED STATES, MAY 29, 1797. In 1797, the French Directory refused to receive Mr. Pinckney, the minister of the United States, under such circumstances that the President deemed it advisable to call a special session of Con gress to take the subject into consideration. He accordingly issu ed a proclamation convoking Congress ; and in his message, com municated at the opening of the session, he expressed, in strong terms of disapprobation, his sense of the indignity offered to the United States by the Directory. An address was moved in the House of Representatives, responding the sentiments of the President. An amendment, however, was proposed, expressive of an opinion that the House viewed the conduct of the Directory as less reprehensible than it had been represented by the Presi dent, and recommending conciliatory measures as the basis of the negociations about to be entered into with France. The amendment being under consideration in committee of the whole, Mr. Harper delivered the following speech : MR. CHAIRMAN, AT the time the interruption took place on Satur day, by the unfortunate indisposition of the speaker, I had drawn near to the close of those observations, with which at that time, I intended to trouble the com mittee. I shall now resume, as nearly as possible, the same train of remarks, and bring them to a conclusion as speedily as possible. As more time, however, is now afforded to me, I will take a range somewhat more extensive than I had prescribed to myself on the 472 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING former day, endeavoring, at the same time, to avoid every thing, not strictly relative to the question on the amendment, now under consideration. [Mr. Harper here observed, that he should go a lit tle out of his way, in order to notice and refute some positions laid down by gentlemen in favor of the amendment, which, though wholly irrelevant to the present question, would have a tendency, if allowed to pass uncontradicted, to render the people discontent ed with the government. Having concluded his re marks upon this subject, he proceeded thus :] The scope and object of this amendment is to re commend it to the President, to offer certain conces sions to France, in the negociations which he has de clared it his intention to commence. These conces sions, are understood to relate to the list of contra band, which is more extensive, as stated by the British treaty, than in that with France ; and to the right of taking enemies' goods out of neutral ships, which Bri tain enjoys, and France by her treaty with us has given up. In these two points it is the scope and object of the amendment to recommend, that the two nations should be placed on the same footing. Hence the amendment is to be considered under two points of view ; first, the recommendation itself; and secondly, the thing recommended. As to the recommendation itself, I ask, is it consti tutional is it useful is it politic ? With respect to its constitutionality, every body knows, that the power of negociation is given wholly to the President by the constitution, and that of mak ing treaties to the President and senate. Can the House of Representatives control or direct that pow er ? Can it instruct the President in matters, which the constitution has entrusted solely and exclusively to his judgment ? Shall it undertake to instruct him will he be bound to obey those instructions ? Should he think fit to pursue a different course, will the House be justified by the constitution and their duty in with- THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 473 holding supplies, and in leaving the country without defence ? Do gentlemen foresee the dilemma, which they are preparing for themselves and for the House ; a dilemma in which they must choose between pride and duty, between supporting the executive in mea sures adopted against their advice, and leaving the country defenceless, at the mercy of all who may choose to assail it? What possible effect can this interference have, but to lay the foundations of a schism between the different departments of government ? But admitting such a recommendation to be con formable to the constitution, in what is it useful ? Is it to dispose the executive to treat ? If so, it is use less, for he already has that disposition, and has strong ly declared it in his speech to both Houses. He has declared it as his resolution " to institute a fresh at tempt at negociatiori, and to promote and accelerate an accommodation, provided one can be made on terms compatible with the rights, duties, interests and honor of the nation." He has declared, that if we have committed " errors, and these can be demonstrat ed, we shall be willing to correct them. If we have done injuries, we shall be willing, on conviction, to re dress them." Can there be a spirit more conciliato ry or would gentlemen wish to see the negociations conducted on other principles ? Is it to give information to the executive, to point out the course which the public good requires to be taken? But do gentlemen imagine that the executive is ignorant of the public interest, or less acquainted with it than the House? Is it not notorious that bodies of this kind are always unfit for negociation ? Have not the people declared it, by placing that pow er in the hands of the President ? Can gentlemen suppose, that the House possesses, or can possess, all the information necessary, in forming an opinion about what ought to be given, and what ought to be requir ed, in a negociation with another nation ? Can the house foresee all that may happen, to render this of- VOL. i. 60 474 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING fer inexpedient, or useless, or unnecessary to justify other offers, or to make demands necessary, instead of offers of any kind ? What will become of the power of negociation in the executive, if the House is first to instruct him, and afterwards to censure him ? Some gentlemen have seemed to think, that this amendment would give weight to the negociation abroad ; would strengthen the hands of the executive, and place him on higher ground. But how is this ef fect to be produced ? By showing, it is answered, that, in making this offer, all the branches of govern ment are united, and that the ground thus taken will be firmly supported. But must it not be perfectly evident, that the best way of giving this impression is, to pursue a conduct and hold a language, which will evince a perfect confidence in the executive, and a determination to support him with the whole force and resources of the country ? Then it is, that the offers of the executive will come with weight, when they come with evidence of union in the government, and of mutual confidence among the various departments. Some gentlemen have supported this amendment on the ground, that it will give confidence to the people of this country in the executive; arid one gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) has gone so far as to say, that the people of this country will not support the government, unless its measures are right. Admitting this opinion to be true, (and I am inclined to think it may be,) still it will remain to be inquired, by what means and on what standard the people would form their opinion of the propriety and wisdom of the mea sures, pursued by their government. Not certainly from the declarations of that gentleman or his friends; because there has not been one measure adopted by the government, since its formation, which they have not opposed in the House and out of it, on which they have not set the stamp of their most decided censure ; and yet, sir, we have seen all these measures support ed and approved of by the people. We have seen the THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 475 late President, who was in a peculiar manner the au thor of them, under whose auspices they were adopt ed and established, in spite of the most violent and persevering opposition from these very gentlemen we have seen him surrounded with applauses, with gratitude and with thanks, from every quarter of the union ; we have seen the wisdom and firmness of his administration made one very principal ground of these thanks arid applauses ; and even in a former House of Representatives, where the principles of these gentlemen did so greatly preponderate, when they moved to strike out of an address to this great man a clause expressly approving his administration, as wise, firm and greatly beneficial to his country, the motion was overruled by a very large majority ; and when the address itself, containing this obnoxious clause, was put to the vote, it passed with only twelve nays. Yet gentlemen talk to us, as if they were the standard, by which the people would measure the con duct of government ! Sir, the people are not truly es timated by those gentlemen. They are not the blind, ignorant herd which those gentlemen take them to be. They will do in future what they have always done heretofore they will judge of the measures of govern ment by the measures themselves, and by the just con fidence which they have long placed in those whom they have appointed to administer it ; not by the opin ions or invectives of this or that set of men, either on this floor or out of doors. Gentlemen ought to be ad monished, by the frequent and always unsuccessful ap peals, which they have made to the people, to give up at length this vain chimera of being able to rule public opinion, with which they have so long suffered them selves to be deluded. I hold, sir, in my hand a paper, from that very quar ter where gentlemen probably suppose, and not with out appearance of reason, that their labors in the vine yard of opposition have been crowned with most suc cess. It is an add*9ss from Mecklenburg county, in 476 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING Virginia, to their representative on this floor, and con tains sentiments so just, so truly patriotic, and so ap plicable to the point of confidence in government, that I cannot help reading it to the committee, though I am sensible it must have already attracted the notice of every individual. [Mr. Harper then read the address.] This paper, sir, affords a most consoling and hon orable contrast to the speeches, which have lately been heard on this floor. It contains sentiments, which I have no doubt are reverberated from the hearts of every American in every part of the union, and which prove how far the people, even that part of them on which these gentlemen have most particular ly relied, are from sharing with them in their want of affection for the government, and of confidence in its measures. There is nothing in this address to prove, that the people in that part of the union will refuse to support the government, unless those gentlemen should inform them that its measures were right. I also consider the recommendation, contained in this amendment, as extremely impolitic. Is it good policy to show the enemy your eagerness to treat, your eagerness to make concessions ? Is it good po licy to show to France, that you have no confidence in the executive, in his wisdom, his information, his pa triotic intentions ; that you think it necessary to in struct and direct him ? Is it good policy to send the executive trammelled to France ; to send him in a situation, where he must either yield to a part of her demands, or go against the recommendations of this House ? Is this the way to give weight to his nego- ciations, or to lessen her demands ? Is it true, thai there is in this House a majority, who do not confide in the executive ? I repeat the question, and I ad dress it not to those gentlemen whose constant em ployment it has been, for eight years past, in the House and out of it, to oppose the executive and every measure which he was understood to favor, to declare their distrust of him. and endeavpr to weaken thai THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 477 confidence so justly reposed in him by the people. I address not myself to these : I address myself to those gentlemen, and some such there no doubt are, who, entertaining just ideas of the constitution, and repos ing full confidence in the executive, may nevertheless be inclined to favor this recommendation, because they think it a harmless thing. I could ask these gen tlemen, whether there is a majority in this House, who do not think the executive worthy of confidence in the performance of his constitutional functions ? I could ask them whether they are willing to make this decla ration, if they do not believe it ? I could ask them whether, admitting it to be true, it would be prudent to tell France so ? I would ask them what, beside such a declaration, France can see in this amend ment ? I answer, and they must, I think, join me in the answer, that she can see nothing else. She will see in it a proof and confirmation of her present opin ion, that we are a divided people; that the people are divided from the government, and the government di vided within itself This will encourage her to press and heighten her demands ; for, seeing us. as she will think, divided, she will remember one part of the scripture, while she forgets all the rest, that " a house divided against itself cannot stand." As I believe this recommendation to be unconstitu tional, useless and highly impolitic, I can never give my vote in its favor. I will now ask gentlemen, who may think the recom mendation not improper, whether the measure recom mended is entitled to their support ? Why should it be entitled to support ? Either because it is necessa ry, or because it is useful ; because it is demanded by justice, or recommended by good policy. If the measure were really necessary, or useful, sure ly the executive is as well apprized of that necessity and utility, as well qualified to judge about it, as the House of Representatives : and the thing will be as well done by him alone, and will have as much effect, 478 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING as if the House were to join in it : the claims of justice can be as completely satisfied in one case as in the other; the ends of policy as completely attained. Though I myself have very little reliance on the use fulness of the measure, and no conviction of its neces sity, still I, for one, am perfectly willing that it should be tried by the executive, and perfectly willing that it should be effected, if the executive think fit. Neither have I any doubt that it will be tried. The very de bate in this House will inform the executive of the pro priety of trying it; and I have no doubt, moreover, that the executive is disposed to make the attempt, to offer these advantages to France. I know nothing di rectly of the opinion of the executive, but I know, that those who are about the executive have this opinion, and are disposed to make this offer to France, not per haps in the unqualified and unconditional manner re commended by some gentlemen, but on terms con sistent with the honor and interests of this country, and with which the public, when it comes to be informed of them, will be satisfied. I, therefore, even if I thought this measure not only useful but necessary, should still leave it most willingly to the President. But as there are gentlemen in the House, who may be inclin ed to favor the recommendation from an opinion, that the measure recommended is necessary or useful, F will address some considerations to them, by which they may, perhaps, be induced to doubt whether it is either the one or the other. First, I ask them, how this measure, this concession to France, can be necessary ? Do gentlemen contend. that this country is too weak to defend her rights ; that it must yield to the demands of a foreign power, merely because those demands are made ? I have not so understood them. Supple as their language has been, and submissive as their course of policy seems calculated to become, they have not yet bent thus low. But they have contended, that this conces sion is necessary, because it is right ; because justice THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 479 requires it. And how does justice require it ? Be cause, according to them, having yielded these rights to England by our treaty with her, impartial justice re quires, that we should yield them also to France. This argument rests^on the ground that Britain does not possess these rights by the law of nations, which point gentlemen have taken much pains, and made many elaborate dissertations, to establish. I shall not follow them through this long diplomatic discussion, which is much better suited to the department of state, and has there been handled in a very mas terly and satisfactory manner. I believe, that when the official paper on this subject, lately published from the department of state, shall be read and compared with the speeches of gentlemen, very little doubt will remain on the point. I have an other reason too for avoiding a dispute on the law of nations. Gentlemen seem disposed to treat the law, and the writers on it, with as little respect as the one and the other have received from the nation whose cause they advocate. One minister of that na tion, in this country, has declared those writers to be no better than worm-eaten volumes, whose contents he was happy to have forgotten. Another, at Genoa, declared, that the French had taken up arms for the express purpose of subverting the law of nations. After this I should be almost afraid to cite writers on the law of nations, lest I should be told, " that they are worm-eaten volumes." There is, however, one au thority on this point, which perhaps may be acknow ledged, and which I will therefore adduce. It is the marine code of France herself; from which it ap pears, that by the law of nations, and her own laws founded upon it, enemies' goods are liable to capture, in neutral ships. Sir, it appears from Valin, vol. ii. page 250, that, on the 21st of October, 1744, the king of France published & regulation, " concerning prizes made at sea, and the navigation of- neutral vessels in time of war." 480 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING first, second, third and fourth articles specify all the cases in which neutral ships in time of war may sail, free from molestation. Then comes the fifth article, which is in these words : " If in any of the cases specified in the first, second, third and fourth articles of this regu lation, there shall be found on board of the said neutral ships, to whatsoever nation they may belong, merchan dizes or effects, the property of his majesty's enemies, such merchandize or effects shall be good prize, even though they be not the production of the enemies' country: but the ships shall be released." This regulation continued in force till the 26th of July, 1778, when the king of France, having engaged in the Ameri can war, (for the treaty of alliance was early in Februa ry, 1778,) found it his interest to relax from the princi ple in hopes of prevailing on England to do so too. Accordingly on that day he published a regulation, by the first article of which, enemies' property, on board of neutral ships, is declared to be safe from capture by French armed vessels. The article, however, contains the following clause : " But his majesty retains to him self a right to revoke the permission contained in the present article, should the enemy powers fail to grant a similar permission within six months from the date hereof." Hence it is clear, that France not only has asserted and long exercised this right, which she charges us with having conceded to England, but even possesses it at the present moment, and may exercise it, if she thinks fit, without violating the law of nations; she being only restrained in those cases, in which, as in ours, she has renounced it by treaties. All this ap pears from her own laws and public acts; for her re- linquishment of this right in July, 1778, having been merely conditional and dependent on a similar relin- quishment by England, which has never taken place, may be at any moment revoked, and indeed has been; for, notwithstanding all her clamors against the Eng lish for exercising this right, it is very well known, that THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. she has constantly exercised it herself from the begin ning of the present war. It may therefore be expected, that we shall not here after be told by either France or her advocates, that the right to take enemies' goods in neutral vessels, is not a right given by the law of nations. It has, however, been contended, that the law of na tions in this respect has been altered by the conven tion of the armed neutrality. I will not stop to refute this position, which has been so often and so complete ly exposed ; still less will I undertake to prove what is in itself so perfectly obvious, that the convention of the armed neutrality, being no more than a treaty, is confined, like all other treaties, to the parties who agree to it, and can in no manner affect the general rights of other states, under the general law of nations : but I will remark, that this objection about the armed neutrality, comes with a very bad grace from France ; because France, when requested to accede to this con vention of the armed neutrality, expressly declined it. She declined it indeed under pretence, that its principles were already established by her regulation of July, 1778. This regulation, however, as has been seen, was temporary and conditional, and left France at full liberty to adhere to the law of nations, or adopt the principles of the armed neutrality, as she might after wards find convenient. She afterwards did refuse to accede, as appears by the authority of Mr. Gibbon ; in one of whose letters to lord Sheffield, dated Sep tember llth, 1785, and published in the first volume of his miscellaneous works, page 06, there is found this passage : " The other day the French ambassador mentioned, that the empress of Russia had proposed to ratify the principles of the armed neutrality by a defini tive treaty ; but that the French had declared, that they would neither propose nor accept an article, so disagreeable to England." This, sir, is a good comment on their former pro ceedings with respect to this right ; and proves, that VOL. i; 61 482 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING they never meant to renounce it, though they were willing, for a short time and for a particular purpose, to suspend its exercise. It is true that France after wards, in the years 1786 and 1787, made a treaty with Russia, in which this right was finally relinquished. The same thing is done in her treaty with England in 1786. But her having so long retained it, and her very agreement at last to give it up, proves most incon- testably that she believes herself to possess it, under the general law of nations. A dispute has arisen, whether the convention of the armed neutrality is permanent in its nature, or merely confined to the duration of the American war. I have been of the latter opinion myself, on the construction of the instrument itself, and of the acts which have grown out of it ; and I shall not enter again into the discussion, which I believe to be wholly immaterial. Because, whether this convention be permanent or temporary, still it is no more than a treaty, and can have no effect on the general law of nations. I will, however, correct a mistake into which a gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) has fallen on this subject. In order to prove that the convention of the armed neutrality was permanent in its nature, that gen tleman has asserted that Portugal acceded to it after the war. But the gentleman has forgot the dates. The accession of Portugal was signed at Petersburg. July, 1782, and ratified at Lisbon, September, 1782. The ratifications were exchanged on the 21st of January, 1783. Whereas the provisional articles of peace were not signed till November 30th, 1782. The armistice for suspending hostilities took place on the 20th of January, 1783, and the definitive treaty, by which the war was really ended, was not signed till September, 1783, many months after the accession of Portugal. That accession even preceded the provi sional articles by some months ; and yet the gentle man from Pennsylvania has told the committee that Portugal acceded after the war. THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 483 The gentleman, however, has given up the point, so strongly contended for by others on the same side of the House. He has admitted that we did not, by the treaty with England, concede to her the right respect ing neutral bottoms ; but he contends that we should have made no commercial treaty with her, till she had relinquished that right. I will, however, ask that gen tleman and the committee, whether it is not wise to obtain the modification of a right which operates un favorably to us, when we cannot obtain its relinquish- ment? Is it not wise and lawful, since we cannot prevent this operation, to render it as little injurious as possible to lessen its inconveniencies when we cannot quite remove them ? This is what the treaty has done ; and surely we may do this without asking the permission of France, or giving her cause of offence. From all this it must evidently appear, that we have not conceded this right to England, since she possess ed it by the law of nations ; and that we have done France no injury. Consequently, justice does not re quire us to concede it to her. The argument of ne cessity, of course, falls to the ground. Will the argument of utility avail gentlemen any bet ter ? They contend, that if not necessary, it would at; least be useful to make this concession to France : that if not demanded by justice, it is at least recom mended by policy. If so, it may be done by the Pre sident without our assistance or advice, and the same good effects will still result from it. But why will it be useful ? Will it be valuable to France ? Does she want it ? Will this concession satisfy her ? These are questions which, in my opinion, deserve particular and serious consideration. In the first place, I would ask how this right can be valuable to France ? We are not carriers for Britain. For many nations, indeed, we are carriers, but not for Britain ; which, on the contrary, is very considerably a carrier for us. Our produce is often found in her ships her goods very seldom in ours. Consequently. 484 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING the right to take British property on board of our ships, is a right of no value to France. Her interest, and a very powerful one it is, consists not in using the right herself, but in taking it away from England. It is not to seize English property in our ships that she is so anxious, but to make French property safe from being seized in them by the English. Could she once accomplish this point, her commerce would float safe ly in our ships, and England, being prohibited to touch it, would become infinitely less formidable to her. The navy of England would, in fact, become in a great degree useless to her, in a war against France ; since it could not touch her commerce secured under our neutral flag, while France, having her commerce thus carried on for her, would be able to employ every ship and every sailor she possessed, in attacking and destroying the commerce and the navy of England. Thus that naval superiority which she so much dreads, and which enables England to counterbalance her power in Europe, would be stripped of all its effects and all its terrors. It is not, therefore, wonderful, that France should be so extremely anxious to deprive Eng land of this right, or so ready to renounce it herself. It is of no use to her, and of infinite use, perhaps ne cessity, to England. Accordingly it has been seen, that France, while perpetually urging us to resist the exercise of this right by England, and even quarrelling with us for not doing so, has never hinted the least desire to have it herself. She has not been slow or diffident, every body knows, in demanding what she thinks useful to herself; and it may, therefore, be most safely concluded, that since she has not demanded this, she thinks it of no use to her, and does not want it. To show us, indeed, how little she cares about it, she has taken it lately by a for mal decree, and yet still continues to quarrel with us, and plunder us. What reason, then, I would ask, is there for suppos ing, that France will be satisfied by this concession ? THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 485 Does she limit her claims to this ? Some gentlemen, particularly one from Maryland, (Mr. S. Smith,) has said so : but does she say so ? Is that gentleman in the secret of her councils, or authorized to explain her pretensions ? If so, let him show his credentials. If not, the House must take the liberty of judging, not from his assertions, but from the acts of France her self; from the official papers presented by her minis ters. Let the gentleman from Maryland read these papers. He will find in them a great many preten sions to which he will never submit, but not one word of this. That gentleman has said, that her decree of March 2d, wherein she takes these rights, which gen tlemen are so anxious to have conceded to her, ought to overrule all her former acts, to be considered as her ultimatum, as the final declaration of her wishes, her claims, and her pretensions. If so, why continue to plunder and maltreat us since that decree? Why send away our minister ? Why refuse to receive an other, unless all the grievances of which she has com plained, and to the redress of which she thinks herself entitled, shall first be removed ? Gentlemen have found in that phrase, " to the redress of which she is entitled," a wonderful restriction of all her demands, and a very conciliatory disposition. But who is to de clare which are the complaints, to the redress of which she is entitled ? Certainly she herself. And where is this country to look for the declaration ? Certainly in the official acts of her government directed to ours, and not in decrees passed long after, nor in the speeches of members on this floor. The first of these acts is M. de la Croix's summary, delivered to our ministers at Paris, March 9th, 1796, and containing complaints against the whole British treaty, against the interference of our courts with French prizes, and against the construction, put by our government on the laws of neutrality, and on some articles of the trea ty with France. Next comes the decree of July 4th, 1796. for enforcing these complaints. After that is 486 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESIST!^, M. Adet's fifth note of October 27th, 1796, communi cating this decree ; and last of all comes his manifesto, November 15th, 1796, in which all the former com plaints made by himself, his predecessors and M. de la Croix, are enlarged upon and enforced. On the 12th of December following, the directory refused to re ceive our minister, and declared that they would in fu ture, receive no minister plenipotentiary from us, till all the injuries, of which they had complained, were redressed. What are the complaints here referred to ? Certainly those contained in the manifesto of M. Adet : for as the directory had no doubt given him instruc tions, as to the manifesto and the time of publishing it, they must have known that it had been published, when they gave this answer to Gen. Pinckney ; and to that manifesto, and the complaints contained in it, the answer no doubt refers. As to the decree of March 2d, which gentlemen say, ought to be considered as the ultimatum of France, it did not take place till two months afterwards : and to suppose that the directory, in refusing to receive a minister on account of griev ances complained of, had reference to a complaint made two months after, would certainly be to charge them with a very singular absurdity. I cannot, therefore, be persuaded that these conces sions, so much relied on by gentlemen, will satisfy France, since it is certain that they form no part of her present demands, that she never has asked for them, and that they would be of little value to her, if she had them. This conclusion is greatly strengthen ed by the consideration, that although she had pos sessed herself of these rights by the decree of July 4th, 1796, and still more formally and expressly by that of March 2d, 1797, she still continued to pillage and mal treat this country, under the pretext of other com plaints ; whereas, had these rights now proposed to be ceded to her, been the sole or chief object of her de sires, she would have ceased to complain and plunder, as soon as she had seized them t THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 487 I should be glad to hear what use is to be made of this conclusion. Is it to dissuade our government from making the offer to France ? No ; I, for one, wish the offer to be made, and I have no doubt, that it will be made, whether recommended by the House or not : but to dissuade the House from relying too much on the efficacy of this offer ; to dissuade them from regarding this offer as in any degree an effectual mean of satisfying the demands of France, of checking her insolence, or of restraining her aggressions. To prevent them, if possible, from being led, by confidence so false, into a neglect of these decided and energetic measures of defence, on which the success of the ne- gociation must entirely depend. This idea, I believe, cannot be too much pressed upon the House. I con ceive it to be of infinite importance in the present situa tion of our affairs. I am persuaded, that our only hope of avoiding war or disgrace, lies in a strict and practical attention to it. In order to enforce the more effectually its importance, I conceive, that it will be highly useful to inquire what the real wishes and ob jects of France are, as well as what they are not. In order to find out this, it will be proper to ask, what has been the scope of her policy in this country ? And what is the ground of her anger at the British treaty ? For my part, I have no doubt that the whole scope of the French policy towards this country, has been to draw it into the war against England, and the tenden cy of the British treaty to defeat this project, the whole ground of their animosity against that instrument. It is, in my opinion, a vain delusion, to suppose that France has conceived this mighty resentment, and is committing these unheard of outrages, on account of this or that article of a treaty, this or that advantage given to another nation, and withheld from her. It is the treaty itself, which has given her offence ; and its tendency to preserve peace between this country and Britain, is the ground of that offence. If it should be asked, how this appears to have been the drift of 488 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING France ? I answer, that it appears, in the first place, by the instructions to Genet. These instructions have been given to the public by M. Genet himself, in order to justify his conduct in this country. They must still be fresh in the recollection of most persons ; but as there may be some, who have not particularly attend ed to them, or have forgotten their tenor, it will not be improper to cite some of the most remarkable pas sages. " The executive council, (says M. Genet,) are disposed to set on foot a negociation on these founda tions, (the overtures made by general Washington and Mr. Jefferson for a new treaty,) and they do not know but that such a treaty admits a latitude still more ex tensive, in becoming a national agreement, in which two great nations shall suspend" (this, sir, should have been translated unite,) " their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding, to be friend the empire of liberty wherever it can be embrac ed, and punish those powers who still keep up an ex clusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring, that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties." Thus it appears, that this treaty is not only to be a commercial, but also a politi cal union : that we are to assist in extending French principles and French influence, under the name of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the people, and be friending the empire of liberty ; and that, in order to accomplish this end, we are to shut our ports against all the powers who maintain an exclusive commercial and colonial system; that is, against the English, Spaniards, Danes and Dutch. This amounts in sub stance, and almost in name, to an alliance offensive and defensive with France. Lest, however, her views should be misunderstood, she has gone on, in the instructions, to explain them in a manner still more clear and explicit. " As it is pos sible, however, (continues M. Genet,) that the false representations, which have been made to Congress of the state of our internal affairs, of the situation of THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE, 489 our maritime force, of our finances, and especially of the storms with which we are threatened, may make her ministers, in the negociations which citizen Genet is instructed to open, adopt a timid and wavering con duct, the executive council charges him, in expecta tion that the American government will finally deter mine to make a common cause with us, to take such steps as it will appear to him exigencies may require* to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the, people." This passage, sir, assuredly can require no comment. In the supplementary instructions, the sys tem is more fully developed. And indeed, the passage relative to the point under consideration is so conclu sive, that I will cite it entire. These are the words : " The reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the two nations, stipulated in the eleventh article of the treaty of 1778, can be established upon generous prin ciples, which have been already pointed out, and shall equally be an essential clause in the new treaty, which is to be proposed." In order to understand this, it will be necessary to recollect, that the treaty of 1778, was purely defensive ; so that France could not claim the guarantee in a war, in which she should be the aggres sor. As she was then preparing to attack England, against which she declared war within less than a month after these instructions were signed, this defen sive guarantee would not answer her purpose. She therefore evidently wished to make it offensive and de fensive. For had she meant to remain on the defen sive herself, the defensive guarantee would have been sufficient, and she would have wanted no other. The instructions then proceed thus : " The executive coun cil, in consequence, recommend it especially to citi zen Genet, to sound early the disposition of the Ame rican government, and to make it, (the guarantee,) a condition sine qua non of their commerce with the West Indies, so essential to the United States. It nearly con cerns the peace and prosperity of the French nation, that a people, whose resources increase beyond all VOL. i. 62 490 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING calculation, and whom nature has placed so near our rich colonies, should become interested by their own engagements, in the preservation of these islands. Citizen Genet will find the less difficulty in making the proposition relished in the United States, as the great trade which will be the reward of it will indemnify them in the end for the sacrifices which they may make in the outset ; and the Americans cannot be ig norant of the great disproportion between their re sources and those of the French republic, and that for a long period the guarantee asked from them will be little more than nominal for them, while on our part it will be real, and we shall immediately put ourselves in a condition to fulfil it, by sending to the American ports a sufficient force to put them beyond insult, and to facilitate their communication with the islands and with France." Thus it manifestly appears, that an alliance, offensive and defensive in the war, which she meditated against England, was to be formed with France ; that the object of this alliance was to be the preservation of her islands, and commercial privileges its reward ; that we were to make sacrifices in the outset, and be reimbursed by these privileges ; and that a French fleet was to be sent to our coast, for our protection. In other words, we were to become the carriers and servants of France, and she was to defend us against England. This point indeed is so clear, that it has been ad mitted by the greater part of those, who possess any information on the subject. Many gentlemen, how ever, are of opinion, that when Genet was recalled, this system was given up by France. But I ask these gen tlemen, what was the real motive of Genet's recal ? Was it to disavow his plans, or to satisfy our com plaints ? Certainly not. His violent and foolish pro ceedings, which counteracted the plan instead of pro moting it, were no doubt intended to be censured, and there probably was a disposition to coax and flatter oiil government* by the recal of this minister, in order THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. to prepare it better for that insidious policy, which was to be adopted by his successors. The true cause, however, of Genet's removal was the fall of the Brisso- tine party, to which he had belonged; and every person connected with or employed by which, Robespierre had removed. Hence the consuls in America, against whom we never had complained, were removed, as well as the minister. But did the French government disavow the instructions or the proceedings of M. Genet ? Did his successors relinquish his claims and preten sions ? Certainly not. On the contrary, they were all renewed and perpetually urged by those gentlemen, who never ceased to talk to us about efficacious measures against England, about a vigorous reaction. And in the manifesto published by one of them (M. Adet,) the whole of Genet's measures were expressly revived, and all his complaints renewed and enforced. Even that appeal to the people, which he was dis graced for threatening, was actually made by this manifesto. The policy of France to draw this country into the war, appears also, from the clamor, raised by her and her partizans against the proclamation of neutrality. This clamor is fresh in the recollection of us all. Genet cried out against this proclamation ; Fouchet indirect ly complained of it, and Adet stigmatized it as insidi ous, perfidious and " a cloak under which this country presented England with a poniard, to cut the throat of our ally." Societies passed resolutions against it ; orators declaimed, and newspapers teemed with abuse. Whence all this, if the object had not been to engage us in the war ? Had France, as she pretended, been de sirous of our remaining in peace, whence all this rage at the measure, the only possible object of which was to preserve peace ? That such was her object is more over manifest from the measures themselves which she wished us to adopt; for it is impossible to suppose her government ignorant of the direct and necessary ten dency of these measures to bring us into a quarrel with England. .192 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING Tn the first place, she wished us to resist and repel the right, .claimed and exercised by the British govern ment under the law of nations, of taking the property of their enemies, on board of our ships. She constant ly urged us, not only to deny this right, but to resist its exercise in an efficacious manner. But could she have imagined that England would yield this right to us ? She knew that the English, when France, Spain, Holland and the United States, were in arms against them alone, had refused to yield it, though pressed by the formidable combination of all the neutral powers, with the empress of Russia at their head: a combina tion, supported too by the united maritime strength of Prussia, Sweden and Denmark. She knew that after the American war, Russia, whose treaty with England expired in 1786, and who, as a power desirous of ex tending its navigation, was extremely desirous of this concession, had never been able to obtain it from Eng land. Sir, England has constantly refused it to the formida ble fleet, the immense strength, the overbearing influ ence, and the wise and vigorous government of the empress of Russia. She has constantly refused it to the united solicitations of Sweden and Denmark and the Hanse towns ; though she has carried on a very extensive and important commerce with all these na tions. She has constantly refused it, in time of peace, to all of them. To France, indeed, she conceded it in 1780, because she gained great equivalents, and had no interest in withholding it from her ; as she could never expect to be engaged in a war without having France for her enemy ; and in that case the stipulation could not operate. But what did she say to those nations who might remain at peace, while she and France should be at war such as the Russians, Swedes, Danes, and Hanse towns ? She said, " I will never J relinquish this right to you ; because it would enable you to become the carriers of France, whenever is at war with me; and she will thereby be ena- J HE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 493 bled, in her turn, to employ all her ships and sailors in attacking my commerce, while hers will be safe under a neutral flag." In the year 1793, indeed, when Rus sia entered into the coalition against France, Britain made a temporary cession to her of this right, because the reason, for which it had been withheld, could not operate, while Russia as well as England was at war with France : but even then she would not entirely re linquish it. All this France perfectly well knew ; and knowing it, could she suppose, that England, would relinquish this right to us, who had not a single ship of war, when she had refused it to the vast force of the armed neutrality that what she had refused to so many powerful nations she would yield to a people, who, though possessing vast resources, could not call them into action without great injury to themselves, and much delay that what she had refused in time of peace, she wouLd surrender in a war, where not only her suc cess, but her very existence, depended on the support of her naval power ; and surrender it too to that very na tion, which possessing the greatest number of ships and sailors, was most capable of exercising the right to her injury and destruction ? No, France expected no such thing. She knew, that England would not sur render the right ; and when she so warmly and pertina ciously urged us to resist the exercise of it, she could have had no other view than to set the two countries to quarrelling. England, she well knew, would not yield, Should we persist, a war must immediately take place. The same, sir, will apply to the measures she wished us to adopt, respecting the impressment of seamen in our ships. It is well known, that England insists on a principle, by which all persons once her subjects al ways remain so, unless the right to their allegiance has been given up by the government itself. This is the case with all persons born in the United States, or settled in them at the treaty of peace. From these she claims no allegiance. But such as have come here t since the treaty, she still considers as her subjects, and 494 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING claims the right of treating them as such, whenever she finds them on her own territory, or on the high seas, the common territory of nations. Of this description there are numbers of sailors on board of our ships, and she claims a right to impress them. This right I do not mean to defend ; I know that in its exercise it is liable to great abuse, and is particularly inconvenient to this country ; but it is claimed and exercised by France herself, and by every other nation, as well as England. Yet France has constantly urged us to resist the exer cise of it by England. We have done every thing in our power to induce England to renounce it, and not succeeding in that, we have taken all proper steps to remedy and prevent its abuse. But this does not satisfy France ; she urges us to resist the right itself. Why ? Because she supposes that England will yield it? No, sir, no such thing. She well knows that England will not arid cannot yield it with any regard to her own safety: it being of the last importance to her in a war like the present, where she has every thing staked on her maritime exertions, to prevent her seamen from passing from hers into neutral ships, where they get better wages, lighter duty, and are free from danger. France well knows, therefore, that England will not yield this right, and this is precisely the reason why she urges us to resist it : because such a resistance must immediately produce a quarrel be tween Great Britain and the United States. The same spirit is visible in her other demands ; all of which tend to the same point. She wished us to adopt a construction of the treaty, that would have given her complete possession of our ports, and shut them to England. She would have armed vessels, and enlisted crews, in our country ; she would have sold her prizes here ; she would have taken the merchant ships of England on our shores, and in our very rivers ; arid our courts must not have interfered. No English ship of war could have entered our harbors, which she would not have expelled, by simply affirming, that it THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 495 had made prize on her citizens, no matter whether lately or four years ago, whether in the East Indies, the West Indies, Africa or Europe. Could she have imagined, that England would see all this partiality, all these favors to its enemy, without anger and jealousy ? Could she have imagined, that bitter complaints or ir ritating remonstrances on the part of that country, would not take place ? Certainly she could not. She knew, that anger, jealousy and irritation would ne cessarily be excited : she knew, that a system, which, under the name of neutrality, would have all the effect of an alliance with her, must produce resentment and remonstrance on the part of England, and that these, added to the ancient animosities not yet extinguished, but heightened on the contrary by recent injuries, must speedily end in hostility. Sir, the plan of ambition and aggrandizement, pur sued by France in Europe, affords additional proofs of her policy respecting this country. I have no doubt, that any gentleman, who will carefully examine the subject, will be convinced, that France deliberately at tacked Austria as well as England, and of her own accord, and, in pursuance of a regular system of poli cy, lighted up the flames of the present war. I shall not, however, stop to examine that question, which would require a minute and tedious detail of facts, and is by no means, essentially necessary in the pre sent deliberation. Whether France began the war from projects of dominion, or was driven into it for the defence of her independence, is, in some degree, unimportant at present ; since it is perfectly evident, and has indeed been admitted on all sides, that with whatever motives the war began, it has long since been a mere contest for power. In this contest, France, having detached Prussia from the alliance, enslaved Belgium, subjugated Holland, and obtained an absolute control over the government and forces of Spain, found her progress resisted by nothing but the firm persevering courage of Austria on one side, 496 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING and the vast maritime power of England on the other. Accordingly, she bent all her efforts to weaken and destroy these two powers, and left nothing un attempt ed to divide them* She made continual efforts to in duce the Turks to fall on the house of Austria on one side, and to arm Prussia against it on the other. She offered to divide its spoils with Prussia, in order to engage the avarice and ambition of that rival power, by whose assistance she might break the strength of Austria, arid then rule both, with the rest of Germany. As the fear of Russia has kept the king of Prussia in awe, and restrained his enterprises, she has left no stone unturned, to lull the new emperor of Russia into security, and obtain his acquiescence. By thus rais ing up enemies against Austria on every side, and pressing upon it at the same time with her whole mili tary force, she is attempting to compel it to relinquish a large part of its territories, and make a peace sepa rate from England. But she constantly refuses either to give up her own conquests, or to make a peace in which both England and Austria should be included. The policy of this is obvious and important. Could she, after having stripped and weakened Austria, suc ceed in detaching it from England, she would be left free to turn her whole undivided force against that ri val nation, so long the great object of her jealousy and hatred, and whose maritime superiority, it has been her policy, for a century, to reduce. In the meantime, she leaves nothing unattempted to accomplish this purpose ; and knowing that the naval strength and pe cuniary resources of the English depend on their trade, she resolves to assail their trade in all possible ways. Hence her former and recent attempts to exclude English vessels from every port. Hence her instruc tions to Genet to draw us into an alliance, one condi tion of which is to be the exclusion of English vessels from our ports. Hence her threats to Portugal of an invasion by Spain, unless English vessels are excluded from the Portuguese ports. Hence her recent at- THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 497 tempts of the same kind on Denmark and the Hanse towns. To the success of this project against the com merce and navy of England, the aid of the United States is of the highest importance,* and is so consi dered by France. I have it from the highest authori ty, that the plan of a maritime coalition against Eng land, was early formed by France ; that to the comple tion of it the accession of the United States was alone wanting ; and that that accession was requested and refused. The pretence of this coalition, was to reduce the exorbitant maritime power of England, and pre vent her tyranny over the other commercial states. The object of it was, and the certain effect of it if suc cessful would have been, to break down England ; by which means France, who came next to her in naval power, would have been left to reign unrivalled and uncontrolled in her stead. The United States would have been the most important member of this coali tion. The great number of their ships and sailors would have enabled them to become the carriers of France, while she should employ all her maritime re sources in attacking England. Their privateers also would have struck a deadly blow at the English com merce ; and the use of their resources and their ports to France would have given her a decided superiority in the West Indies, and obliged the English to send so great a force there, as greatly to weaken their ope rations every where else. Hence it is evident that France could have no ally so important to her, in the naval war against England, as the United States. In deed, without their assistance, she could have no hopes of success in the West Indies. Accordingly she took steps to secure this assistance, as soon as she be gan to form her project against England, and has pur sued them ever since with the most unwearied perse verance, and by every expedient of threats, promise?, flatteries, fraud and intrigue. VOL. i. 63 49,8 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING It being, as I conceive, perfectly manifest from all these considerations, that the plan of France has al ways been to draw us into the war ; the house is fur nished with a ready solution of her anger against the British treaty, and a clue to all her present measures. It is evident, that her anger at the treaty has arisen entirely, from its having defeated her plan of drawing us into the war ; and it will readily appear, that the whole aim and object of her present measures are to compel us to renounce it ; to drive us into that quarrel with England, into which she has failed in her attempts to entice us. She must either mean this, or she must mean seriously to attack us, and drive us into a war against herself. To discover which of these is her real object, what is the true motive of her present measures, is of the utmost importance ; because till that is done, it will be difficult to determine, in what manner those measures ought to be counteracted, which is the point immediately under consideration. I can never believe, that it is the intention of France seriously to attack this country, or to drive it into a war against herself. She has too much to lose and too little to gain by such a contest, to have seriously resolved on it, or even to wish it. In her counsels, I have observed great wickedness, but no folly ; and it would be the extreme of folly in her to compel this country to become her enemy; especially in the pre sent war, when we can throw so formidable a weight into the opposite scale. France well knows our pow er in that respect, and will not compel us to exert it. She well knows, that we possess more ships and more seamen than any country upon earth except England alone. She well knows, that our sailors are the most brave, skilful and enterprizing in the world, and, that by arming our vessels, our commerce would soon be made to float safe from privateers; while her fleets and large ships would be kept in awe by those of England. She knows that in the late war, the state of Massa chusetts alone, with its privateers, took one third of all THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 499 the merchant ships of Great Britain ; and that, though she had no commerce to be attacked, these maritime materials, greatly increased since that time, would ena ble us, if driven to the necessity, to create speedily a formidable marine, with which we could, not only de fend ourselves, but attack her possessions. She knows, that we have a population not far short of six millions, and that the martial spirit, which conducted us glori ously through the trying scenes of the late war, though dormant indeed, could not have been extinguished. She knows, that by co-operating with the English, (a co-operation which must result naturally from our be ing driven into the war.) by opening our harbors to their ships, permitting them to arm, refit and victual in our ports, to recruit among our seamen, and to em ploy our vessels as transports, we could give them a most decided preponderance in the American seas, under which her own colonies, and those of Spain arid Holland, which she most justly considers as her own, must speedily fall. She knows, that in case of a war with us, Spain and Holland, who must be her allies, would be within our grasp. She knows that the Americans could and would lay hold of New Orleans and the Floridas, and that they are well acquainted with the road to Mexico ; and she would dread that enterprizing valor, which formerly led them through barren wilds and frozen mountains, to the walls of Quebec. She knows, in fine, that to drive this country into a war with her at the present juncture, would bring about that co-operation of means, and that union of interests and views be tween us and the English, which it has been the great object of her policy to prevent, and which she had un dertaken two wars, in the course of half a century, for the sole and express purpose of breaking. It is, there fore, I think, impossible to conceive, that France means to drive or provoke us into war. Her object, in my opinion, must be altogether different. It must 500 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING be to compel us to renounce the British treaty, and renew all our differences with that nation, under cir cumstances of irritation which must speedily end in a rupture. What has led her to form this project? From whence could she derive hopes of success ? She has been led to form it, in my opinion, from a per suasion, erroneous indeed, but favored by many ap pearances, that we are a weak, pusillanimous people, too much devoted to gain to regard our honor, too careful about our property to risk it in support of our rights, too much divided to exert our strength, too dis trustful of our own government to defend it, too much devoted to her to repel her aggressions at the risk of a quarrel, too much exasperated against England to consent to that co-operation, which must of necessity grow out of resistance to France. Various occur rences have combined to produce and confirm this persuasion, and the forbearance, which our govern ment has exercised towards herself, is not the least of them. She has seen us submit, with patience, to the insults and outrages of three successive ministers, for the very least of which, she would have sent the minis ter of any nation out of her country, if not to the guil lotine. The minister of the grand duke of Tuscany, with whom France had recently concluded a treaty, learning that the daughter of Louis the Sixteenth was to be sent out of the country, requested permission to pay her a visit. This request to visit an unfortu nate young lady, the near relation of his sovereign, and whose tender age no less than her sex, her vir tues and her calamities, entitled her to respect, was answered by an order from the directory, to quit the territories of the republic. His expression of a wish to show one mark of regard to virtuous misfortune and suffering innocence, was considered as an affront by the government of France, and punished by the in stant dismissal of the minister. Accustomed to act thus herself, how can she impute our long suffering and THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 501 forbearance, under the perpetual insolence and insults of her ministers, to any thing but weakness, pusilla nimity, or a blind devotedness to herself? The con duct of gentlemen on this floor too has more and more confirmed her in this injurious opinion of us ; has confirmed her in the erroneous persuasion, that there is a party in the very bosom of the government, devot ed to her interests. I do not mean to charge gentle men with acting under French influence. I am per suaded that, in the course they have taken, they be lieved themselves to be aiming at the good of their country, which they supposed might best be promoted in the manner recommended by them. But I would ask those gentlemen, and I solemnly call on them to lay their hands on their hearts and answer me I would ask them whether the course of conduct, which they have pursued, is not calculated to impress France with a belief, that they are devoted to her interests and not to those of their own country ? Whether the man ner, in which they have always connected the interests and wishes of France with their opposition to the measures of this government, does not necessarily tend to create and confirm this belief? When she saw them constantly making it a ground of opposi tion to measures, that they would be hurtful or dis pleasing to her; constantly supporting those plans which she was desirous of seeing adopted; constantly opposing all that she opposed ; what could she infer, but that they were a party devoted to her views ? As she knows their numbers and importance, and has these apparently strong reasons for relying on their attachment, what can she conclude, but that however unable they may be to direct the government accord ing to her wishes, they will be ready and able so to clog its operations, as to prevent it from adopting or pursuing vigorous measures against her? She no doubt does believe, and there is evidence of the fact from the most respectable quarter, our minister in o02 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING that country, that she has nothing to do but press hard on the government, in order to lay it, bound hand and foot, at the feet of this party, by means of which, she might then govern the country. She is further confirmed in this belief by the conduct of the people of this country, by their warm partiality for her cause and her nation, by their enthusiastic exultation in her victories, and the fond, sympathizing sorrow with which they mourn her disasters. Mistaking the source of these generous emotions, she has seen in them no thing but the proof of a slavish devotedness to herself, which would render this people incapable of asserting their own rights, when it must be done at the risk of her displeasure. She does not know, nor can she be made to understand, that it is the cause of liberty in which she is thought to be struggling, that inspires this enthusiasm, and that, should she change her conduct, and abandon the principles which she professes, these generous well-wishers would be found among the firm est of her opposers. A similar mistake she commit ted with respect to England, and that mistake further confirmed her original error. She saw much resent ment excited by the attacks and outrages of England, and she supposed that resentment to be deep-rooted and durable. She did not know, and could not con ceive, that, when England had given up her injurious pretensions for the future, and agreed to make a fair and just compensation for the past, we should forget our resentments, and cherish sentiments of mutual and friendly intercourse. She supposed these resent ments to be far more deeply rooted, more universal, and more permanent, than they really are, and relies on them as a certain means of preventing any union of interests and operations between us and England, however recommended by policy or even required by necessity. In all these delusions she is confirmed by the con duct* the speeches, and the writings, of persons in this THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 503 country, both our own citizens and hers ; by the infor mation and opinions of some of her citizens, who, hav ing resided here, have carried home with them those erroneous opinions, which foreigners generally form about countries they visit ; and it is to be feared by the behaviour too of some of our citizens in her own country, who, forgetting the trust reposed in them, and the situations in which they were placed, allowed them selves to pursue a course of conduct and conversation, calculated to confirm France in all her unfounded and injurious opinions, respecting this country. Suppos ing, therefore, that the people of this country are un willing to oppose her, arid the government unable; that we should prefer peace with submission, to the risk of war ; that a strong party devoted to her will hang on the government, and impede all its measures of reaction ; and that, if she should place us by her aggressions in a situation, where the choice should seem to lie between a war with England and a war with her, our hatred to England, joined to those other causes, would force us to take the former part of the alternative; she has resolved on the measures which she is now pursuing, and the object of which is to make us renounce the treaty with England, and enter into a quarrel with that nation : in fine, to effect by force and aggressions, that which she had attempted in vain by four years of intriguing and insidious policy. If such are her objects, how was she to be induced to renounce them? By trifling concessions of this, that, or the other article of a treaty ; this, that or the other advantage in trade ? No. It seems to me a de lusion equally fatal and unaccountable, to suppose that she is to be thus satisfied : to suppose that, by these inconsiderable favors which she has not even asked for, she is to be bought off from a plan so great and important. It seems to me the most fatal and unaccountable delusion, that can make gentlemen shut their eyes to this testimony of every nation, to 504 MR. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING this glare of light bursting in from every side ; that can render them blind to the projects of France, to the Herculean strides of her overtowering ambition, which so evidently aims at nothing less than the establish ment of universal empire, or universal influence, and has fixed on this country as one of the instruments for accomplishing her plan. It is against this dangerous delusion that I wish to warn the House and the country. I wish to warn them not to deceive themselves with the vain and fal lacious expectation, that the concessions proposed by this amendment will satisfy the wishes or arrest the measures of France. Do I dissuade you from these concessions ? Far from it, I wish them to be offered, and in the way the most likely to give weight to the offer. It is a bridge which I am willing to build, for the pride of France to retreat over ; but what I wish to warn the House against, is the resting satisfied with building the bridge, to the neglect of those measures by which France may be induced to march over it, after it shall be built. I wish to negociate, and I even rely much on success ; but the success of the negocia- tion must be secured on this floor. It must be secur ed by adopting firm language and energetic measures ; measures which will convince France, that those opin ions respecting this country, on which her system is founded, are wholly erroneous ; that we are neither a weak, a pusillanimous or a divided people ; that we are not disposed to barter honor for quiet, nor to save our money at the expense of our rights : which will convince her, that we understood her projects, and are determined to oppose them, with all our resources, and at the hazard of all our possessions. This, I believe, is the way to insure success to the negociation ; and without this I shall consider it as a measure equally vain, weak and delusive. When France shall at length be convinced, that we are firmly resolved to call forth all our resources, and THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 505 exert all our strength to resist her encroachments and aggressions, she will soon desist from them. She need not be told what these resources are; she well knows their greatness and extent ; she well knows that this country, if driven into a war, could soon become invulnerable to her attacks, and could throw a most formidable and preponderating weight into the scale of her adversary. She will not, therefore, drive us to this extremity, but will desist as soon as she finds us determined. I have already touch ed on our means of injuring France, and of repelling her attacks; and if those means were less than they are, still they might be rendered all-sufficient, by resolu tion and courage. It is in these that the strength of nations consists, and not in fleets, nor armies, nor popu lation, nor money: in the "unconquerable will the courage never to submit or yield." These are the true sources of national greatness ; aud to use the words of a celebrated writer, " where these means are not wanting, all others will be found or created." It was by these means that Holland, in the days of her glory, triumphed over the mighty power of Spain. It is by these, that in latter times, and in the course of the present war, the Swiss, a people, not half so numerous as we, and possessing few of our advantages, have honorably maintained their neutrality amid the shock of surrounding states, and against the haughty ag gressions of France herself. The Swiss have not been without their trials. They had given refuge to many French emigrants, whom their vengeful and implacable country had driven and pursued from state to state, and whom it wished to deprive of their last asylum in the mountains of Switzerland. The Swiss were required to drive them away, under the pretence that to afford them a retreat was contrary to the laws of neutrality. They at first temporized and evaded the demand: France insisted ; and finding at length that evasion was useless, they assumed a firm attitude, and declared that VOL. i. 64 506 Mfc. HARPER'S SPEECH ON RESISTING having afforded an asylum to those unfortunate exiles, which no law of neutrality forbade, they would protect them in it at every hazard. France, finding them thus re solved, gave up the attempt. This was effected by that determined courage, which alone can make a na tion great or respectable : and this effect has invariably been produced by the same cause, in every age and every clime. It was this that made Rome the mistress of the world, and Athens the protectress of Greece. When was it that Rome attracted most strongly the admiration of mankind, and impressed the deepest sentiment of fear on the hearts of her enemies ? It was when seventy thousand of her sons lay bleeding at Cannae, and Hannibal, victorious over three Roman armies and twenty nations, was thundering at her gates. It was then that the young and heroic Scipio, having sworn on his sword in the presence of the fathers of the country, not to despair of the republic, marched forth at the head of a people, firmly resolved to con quer or die : and that resolution insured them the victo ry. When did Athens appear the greatest and the most formidable ? It was when giving up their houses and possessions to the flames of the enemy, and having transferred their wives, their children, their aged pa rents, and the symbols of their religion on board of their fleet, they resolved to consider themselves as the republic, and their ships as their country. It was then they struck that terrible blow, under which the great ness of Persia sunk and expired. These means, sir, and many others are in our power. Let us resolve to use them, and act so as to convince France that we have taken the resolution, and there is nothing to fear. This conviction will be to us in stead of fleets and armies, and even more effectual. Seeing us thus prepared she will not attack us. Then will she listen to our peaceable proposals ; then will she accept the concessions we mean to offer. But should this offer not be thus supported, should it be at- THE AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 507 tended by any circumstances from which she can dis cover weakness, distrust or division, then will she re ject it with derision and scorn. I view in the proposed amendment circumstances of this kind; and for that, among other reasons shall vote against it. I shall vote against it not because I am for war, but because I am for peace ; and because I see in this amendment itself, and more especially in the course to which it points, the means of impeding, instead of promoting our pacific endeavors. And let it be remembered, that when we give this vote, we vote not only on the peace of our country, but on what is far more important, its rights and its honor. END OF VOL. I. * THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW RENEWED BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE RECALL DUE l^ LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS Book Slip-35m-7,'62(D296s4)458 282^62 Iwilliston, E.B. Eloquence of the [I United States, Wi HTst OX] E302.1 W73 v.l 302. h/73 v.\ 282562