.-. .--r. '... -^ -'- . II UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS INSTRUCTION PAPER PREPARED BT HENRY BILLINGS BROWN, LL.D. FORMER JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CORRESPONDENCE CHICAGO ILLINOIS U.S.A. T COPYRIGHT 1912 BY AMERICAN SCHOOL OP CORRESPONDENCE Entered at Stationers' Hall, London All Rights Reserved {44*4 CONTENTS CHAPTER I Scope of Federal Jurisprudence PAQ1 1. Articles of confederation 1 2. The constitution 2 3. Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court 2 4. Distinction between confederation and constitution 4 5. Extent of federal judicial power 6 CHAPTER II Criminal Jurisdiction 6. Power of Congress to enact criminal laws 21 7. Division of criminal cases 21 8. Summary 32 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS CHAPTER I SCOPE OF FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE 1. Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confed- eration of 1778 were the genesis, but not the foundation of the Federal Government. These Articles did not contem- plate a government in the ordinary sense, but were a mere league between the States "for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare." As little power as possible was given to the Union; as much as possible was reserved to the States. There was no provision for an executive head, but during a recess of Congress, a Committee of the States was given very limited executive powers. Congress could borrow money, but could not repay it, except by requisitions often disregarded upon the States. Congress had no power to levy taxes for any purpose, but might order the States to levy them. It had no power to raise an army except by requisition upon the States, which reserved to themselves the right to appoint all officers below the rank of Colonel. They made no provision for the organization of courts excepting in admiralty, though Congress was made a court for the trial of territorial disputes between the States ; but had no power to enforce its decrees. Lack- ing courts, Congress had no power to punish offenses against its own laws. No important step could be taken without the assent of nine States. Underlying the entire scheme was a jealousy of the States toward each other, but little less intense than the hostility they exhibited toward Copyright, 1912, ~by the American School of Correspondence. 1 2 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS the mother country. Under these Articles the Revo- lutionary War was carried to a successful conclusion; but their impotence became so clearly manifest that it was uni- versally felt that the bonds of the union must be strength- ened, or the Confederacy must be dissolved into its original States. The spectre of arbitrary power seemed to be con- stantly hovering over the deliberations of the Convention, and the fear that the central government might be made too strong resulted in a denial of authority absolutely indispensable to its existence. 2. The Constitution. Of all the causes which con- tributed to the adoption of the Constitution the most im- portant was the necessity felt for a court representative of all the States, with power to reconcile or decide between the conflicting opinions of the courts of different States, to enforce obedience to the laws of Congress, to aid in the collection of a national revenue, and to afford to foreigners and citizens of different States an impartial tribunal for the adjustment of their differences, uninfluenced by local feeling or prejudice. The Convention voted unanimously for the establishment of a Supreme Court ; but it was only after a prolonged contest and a strong protest from the minority, that authority was given to Congress to estab- lish inferior courts with a jurisdiction strictly limited to cases within the purview of the Constitution. The outcome of this controversy was that original jurisdiction was given to the Supreme Court in but two classes of cases. 1 3. Original Jurisdiction of Supreme Court. Cases Affecting Foreign Representatives. First, cases "affecting ambassadors or other public ministers or consuls." This concession appears to be an offshoot of the general exclu- sive authority vested in the Federal Government of con- trolling our relations with foreign states, whose representa- tives are thus accorded the extraordinary privilege of suing directly in the highest court of the country. This power has been rarely, if ever exercised, as Congress gave the same jurisdiction to the inferior courts of the United i Const. Act. III. 2. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 3 States, though it is denied to the courts of the several States. This jurisdiction is principally of value when the foreign representative sues as plaintiff, as no principle of international law is better settled than that the person and property of a foreign ambassador or minister, (though not a consul) are exempt from the process, both civil and criminal, of the nation to which he is accredited. He cannot be sued for a debt or a tort, and is not even amenable to its criminal laws. A violation, however atrocious, of its criminal laws, can only be punished by demanding his recall or sending him his passport. The object of all this is to prevent any fear that representatives of a foreign power will be harassed by litigation here. A foreign min- ister owes no allegiance to the country to which he is sent, and his house is not only his castle, but to all intents and purposes, a piece of foreign territory. Cases in Which a State Shall Be a Party. Second, the Supreme Court also has jurisdiction of "cases in which a State shall be a party." Actions between two different States, usually turning upon the location of a boundary line, or upon riparian or water rights, are not of infrequent occurrence. It was at first held that this jurisdiction ex- tended to suits against a state by citizens of other States or by foreigners. 2 But this assertion of jurisdiction evoked such a storm of protest that it was taken away by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Appellate Jurisdiction. In all but the above two classes of cases, the Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdic- tion. But, in addition to this, a further provision of the same Article of the Constitution defines and limits the judi- cial power of the Federal Government, by whichever of the Federal courts this power is exercised. The limit of this jurisdiction may be said to be determined by the nature of the concessions made by the States to the Federal Govern- ment in adopting the Constitution, and by the legislative power vested in Congress. As already observed, the old Confederation was a mere league between the States, by sChisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 4 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS which certain rights were surrendered to the Federal Gov- ernment, but each State was left to determine the extent of its obligations and its ability and willingness to carry them out. Their views might be as numerous as the States. Massachusetts might take one view; New York another; Virginia a third, and Georgia a fourth. No pro- vision was made for securing unity of sentiment, or con- solidation of action. There was absolutely nothing upon which Congress or foreign powers could rely but the good faith and ability of the States. .4. Distinction between Confederation and Constitu- tion. The Constitution was also a league of the States but it was much more than that. By this instrument the States surrendered to the general government not only the powers already vested in the Confederation, but what was of no less importance, the authority to make these powers effective and compel not only the obedience of the States, but the obedience of each individual citizen through- out the Union. For this purpose it erected a separate and independent government, with an executive head called a President; a legislative body consisting of two chambers, one representative of the States, the other of the people of the States; a Supreme Court with jurisdiction over the courts of all the States, and its own inferior courts, or courts of first instance, with jurisdiction to enforce the laws of Congress, to punish their violation, and to take cognizance of certain interstate and international con- troversies. The distinction between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution was akin to that between a partner- ship and a corporation. To an ordinary partnership each partner makes a contribution, with the understanding that he may participate in its business and its profits, or may withdraw his share and compel a dissolution. Upon the other hand, to a corporation a stockholder makes a contri- bution, but with the understanding that its management shall be entrusted to a board of directors, of which he may or may not be a member, with power to compel his ac- FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 5 quiescence, or conduct the business regardless of his wishes. It is immaterial in this connection that the Thirteenth Article of the Confederation provided that "the Union shall be perpetual," since Congress having no army or navy of its own was powerless to enforce this agreement, or coerce a State, at least without the consent of nine others. But it must not be supposed that the consent of the States to subordinate their views to the Federal Govern- ment in the particulars covered by the Constitution was accomplished without a struggle. The State legislatures not only protested against the encroachments of the gen- eral Government, but one of them went so far as to de- nounce the penalty of death against anyone who should attempt to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court in a certain case which happened to be very unpopular. 3 The courts of the several States which had been accus- tomed to interpret their own Constitutions as well as those of their sister States, were loth to surrender the power to construe the Constitution of the United States, or to recog- nize the superior authority of the court which Congress had established for that very purpose. In an early case coming up from Virginia, the Court of Appeals of that State having unanimously held that the Act of Congress allow- ing appeals from the Supreme Court of the States to the Supreme Court of the United States was unconstitutional, its judgment was unanimously reversed. 4 The effect of the decision of the Virginia court would have been to leave the courts of each State to construe the Consti- tution to suit themselves, without the right to appeal to the higher court, which it was the very object of the Con- stitution to secure. It can now be seen that the affirm- ance of the Virginia judgment would have nullified the Constitution in a very important particular, and probably wrecked the whole structure of the Government. Different phases of the same general question have since been pre- sented, but always with the expression of an opinion, that s Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515. * Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304 ; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 26i G FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS it was essential to the perpetuity of the government that the interpretation of the Constitution must finally rest with the supreme tribunal of the Federal Government. The rights of the States are perfectly protected and strengthened by the limitations placed upon the Federal judicial power, which still leaves in the hands of the State courts nineteen-twentieth s of the litigation of the country. All the controversies, which are constantly arising between citizens of the same State, are justiciable in the local courts, without appeal to, or possibility of interference by the Fed- eral courts. It is only when some claim is made under the Constitution of the United States or a law of Congress, that the interposition of the Federal courts becomes possible. It is true that these cases are often of great importance and command a corresponding attention in the newspapers, but in number and in their influence upon the daily life of the people, they bear a very small proportion to the immense business of the local courts. 5. Extent of Federal Judicial Power. It is necessary to consider in some detail the extent and limits of the judicial power of the Federal courts. It may be said in general that this power is commensurate with the legisla- tive power of Congress. Ifpon whatever subject Congress has the power to legislate under the Constitution, the Federal courts have the power to interpret such legis- lation, and to adjudicate all questions arising in direct connection with it. Not that the State courts may not pass upon these so-called Federal questions, as they are constantly doing, but there is a reserved right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States as the final arbiter. The cases to which the judicial power is limited are in the language of the Constitution, Article III, Sec- tion 2: Cases Arising Under Constitution and Laws. "All cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." As these laws and treaties are of general application over the entire country, it is FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 7 essential that the settlement of such questions should finally rest with a court whose jurisdiction is correspondingly extensive, and a conflict among the State courts be thus averted. This jurisdiction exists quite irrespective of the citizenship of the parties, and may be invoked, though they be inhabitants of the same State or town. Diversity of citizenship is itself a separate and independent source of jurisdiction, but it has no relation to this class of cases. It is difficult to define exactly what are cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; but it may be said in general that wherever the plaintiff, in making out his case, or the defendant, in establishing his defense, relies upon the Constitution, or upon a statute or treaty of the United States, the case may be said to "arise" under it. It is only putting it in different form to say, as has been said in some cases, that if it appears that some right, title, privilege, or immunity on which a recovery depends will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by an opposite construction of the Constitution or a law of the United States, a case may be said to " arise" under such Constitu- tion or law. Instances of this kind scattered through the reports are so numerous that any citation or attempt to classify them would tend rather to confuse than to eluci- date the subject. Perhaps the most frequent illustration of this class of cases grows out of the power given to Congress by the Constitution to establish bankrupt laws, and to promote the progress of science by issuing patents and copyrights. Suits for the relief of poor debtors through the operation of the bankrupt act, and suits for the infringement of pat- ents of inventors, and the copyrights of authors are so frequent and so distinctive as almost to constitute a sepa- rate branch of jurisprudence, and the establishment of a separate court of patent appeals is already a matter of serious contemplation. The original jurisdiction under this clause is not exclu- sive in the Federal courts, since cases are frequently begun in a State court without suspicion of a Federal question 8 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS being involved. Such a question may first arise when the. defense is put in, but the jurisdiction of the court is not thereby ousted, and the case may proceed to judgment, saving to the parties an ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Such jurisdiction might doubt- less have been made exclusive in the Federal courts, but Congress wisely omitted to do so. If the action be orig- inally begun in the Federal court, the existence of a Federal question must be raised by the plaintiff in his declaration or bill, but if begun in a State court, it may be raised on an application for a removal of the case to the Federal court, as may be done, if a Federal question be really involved; or it may be raised after judgment in the State court, upon a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the highest court of the State, to which the parties must resort before appealing to the Supreme Court. Cases Affecting Foreign Representatives. The inclusion within the judicial power of the United States of "all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers or con- suls," has been already considered in connection with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This jurisdic- tion is exclusive of the State courts, which cannot take cog- nizance of such cases. 5 It has been made a question whether this jurisdiction was not intended to be exclusive in the Supreme Court, but in apportioning the jurisdiction of the several courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress pro- vided, Section 13, that the Supreme Court should have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits against ambassadors, etc., but that such jurisdiction should be original but not exclusive in actions brought by them. This is carried into Section 233 of the New Judicial Code passed by the 62d Congress, which provides explicitly for actions by and against them. Admiralty Cases. "All cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" are also included within the Federal judicial power, and constitute one of the most important sources of Federal jurisdiction. As the Constitution extends this s Judicial Code of March 3, 1911; see 256, sub. 8. power to "all cases" of this description, it is not only exclusive of the State courts, but it is at least doubtful whether Congress has any power to extend or limit it. As Congress has never exercised such power if it possesses it it becomes important to determine what are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction within the meaning of the Constitution. This has been an extremely fertile source of controversy ever since the organization of the Federal courts, and can hardly yet be said to be definitely settled. It depends first, upon the character of the waters upon which the controversy arises, and second, the nature of the action. To What Waters Applicable. It may be said that all the courts, including even the Supreme Court itself, have been divided upon the question whether it was limited to such cases as were within the cognizance of the English court of Admiralty, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, or was an expansive power depending upon the character of the waters of this country and the necessi- ties of its commerce. As was natural, the courts at first adhered to the English precedents, and held that jurisdic- tion could only be exercised in cases arising upon the high seas, or waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. So far as England was concerned, this was a sensible conclusion, since all the important commerce and the ports of that country were upon tidal waters. But when it is considered that practically all the vast internal commerce of this country is upon waters unaffected by the ebb and flow of the tide, it is evident that the English criterion is utterly inapplicable to the great rivers and lakes of the American continent. It was an inevitable result of this physical dif- ference between the two countries, that the cases to which was applied the English test, should be solemnly overruled by the Supreme Court, as to cases arising upon the Great Lakes, and the modern doctrine firmly established, that the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all navigable waters of the United States, 6 and that waters should be considered The Genesse Chief, 12 How. 443 ; The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15. 10 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS navigable in law which are navigable in fact. This decision was one of the most important ever pronounced by the Supreme Court, and at once doubled the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. While such jurisdiction had there- tofore been limited to the comparatively few ports upon the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts, it marched at once into the interior, and took possession of every port upon the Great Lakes and the rivers of the country. Attempts were at first made to limit it to the Lakes, but they were ineffectual. With each successive case the jurisdiction was widened to take it in, until finally the doctrine became so popular that it swept everything before it, and was applied to every sea or stream susceptible of navigation as a high- way of commerce, except such lakes as were solely within the boundaries of a single State, such as those of New York, Maine, and Wisconsin, and a few other States. It was even applied to rivers solely within the limits of a single State, provided they were used in connection with other waters as highways of commerce between different States. 7 A resolute effort was made to limit the application of the rule to natural as distinguished from artificial waters, but the distinction was rejected in a case where it was held that a navigable canal used as a highway for commerce between different States was a public water of the United States, and within its admiralty jurisdiction. This ruling was subsequently applied to the Erie Canal. 8 Character of Vessels. The vessels to which the admir- alty jurisdiction attaches embrace every species of craft engaged in commerce or navigation, whatever be its size, form, or method of propulsion, provided it be constructed and used for the purposes of commerce. It does not attach, however, to row boats, a floating dock or wharf, a ferry bridge hinged to a wharf, a sailor's bethel, or any floating structure permanently moored to a wharf, or other- wise attached to the land, since none of these structures is used for the purpose of commerce or navigation. The 7 The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17. 8 Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 11 use to which it is put thus becomes the determining factor upon the question of jurisdiction. Character of Cases. Coming now to the character of cases cognizable in admiralty, we are confronted with the same differences of opinion to which allusion has already been made in connection with the waters upon which these cases arise. In ancient times the Lord High Admiral of England assumed a very extensive jurisdiction not only over contracts of a maritime nature, but over ordinary commercial contracts, parties to which were haled into the Admiralty court to answer for debts contracted, or inju- lies suffered upon land, or upon creeks, bays or arms of the sea, and not of a maritime nature. Before the adoption of the Constitution, however, this jurisdiction had been limited by prohibitions from the common-law courts between which and the court of admir- alty great jealousy existed until little of its ancient juris- diction remained but suits for seamen's wages, bottomry or money lent upon the credit of the ship, salvage where the property was not cast ashore, cases between part owners regarding the employment of the ship, and colli- sions and injuries to property or person on the high seas. The Supreme Court was at first inclined to take the more limited view, but all the important recent cases have fully established the doctrine that the jurisdiction extends to all contracts of a maritime nature and relating to vessels, their masters and crews as the agents of commerce, includ- ing not only those above specified, but cases of maritime insurance, bills of lading, or other contracts for the car- riage of goods or passengers; charter parties, supplies, labor, and materials furnished for the equipment or repairs of vessels, cases of general average, contribution, wharfage, dockage, and preparing cargoes for shipment. Indeed, cases of this kind are so numerous that their character can be arrived at better by considering the exceptions to the gen- eral rule that every contract which concerns a vessel or its crew is within the admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, con- tracts for the original construction of a vessel or for mate- 12 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS rials furnished before she is launched are not by our law considered as maritime, for the simple reason that the structure is not considered as a ship until she is launched or takes the water, and that up to this time the work is done upon land, and her creditors are protected by the mechanics* lien laws of the several States. 9 This exception to the general rule of liability is also an exception to the law of continental Europe, and to the early English law, both of which treated as maritime contracts for the build- ing of vessels. In deference also to the English precedents another ex- ception was made of necessaries furnished to the vessel at the home port, or ports of the State in which she is owned, upon the presumption that the articles were furnished upon the personal credit of the owner, and, therefore, that no lien was contempfated. This rule was declared at an early date (1819), but was, after a strenuous effort to reverse it, solemnly reaffirmed fifty years thereafter. At the last session of Congress, however, it was abolished by an act giv- ing the same lien upon domestic as upon foreign vessels, and declaring the question of credit to the ship to be imma- terial. But the exception was really of little practical value, as liens are given by the laws of most of the States, which are enforced in the admiralty courts. It is incorrect to say that the court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of neces- saries furnished a domestic ship, since it has always been held that a suit in personam in the admiralty will lie against the owner, and if a lien is given by the local law, a suit in rem will lie to enforce it. The distinction between maritime and non-maritime contracts is sometimes a little obscure, but it may be said generally that contracts which do not directly concern the business of navigation, as for example, contracts preliminary to a maritime contract, or for services performed, or articles furnished on land though incidentally connected with shipping do not give rise to a lien enforcible in the admiralty. Cases of Tort. In cases of tort, the jurisdiction of the eBoach T. Chapman, 22 How. 129. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 13 admiralty is complete where the damage is done, or the injuries received upon navigable waters, or, to put it in the familiar words of the admiralty bar, "locality is the test of jurisdiction." In England this jurisdiction was limited to torts not occurring within the body of a county, which includes all navigable waters "where one may see what is done on the one part of the water, and on the other, as to see from one land to another." This distinction, however, has been repudiated in this country and abrogated by Act of Parliament in England. The most common cases of maritime torts are collisions, damages to ships by neg- ligence of various kinds, and assaults by officers upon sea- men and passengers. Whether the word "tort" as thus used includes every act within the common-law definition of the word, or is confined to such as are in some way con- nected with the equipment, navigation, or discipline of the ship, has not been judicially decided. The former definition would cover every wrongful act done upon navigable waters, such as an assault by one passenger upon another; or an injury suffered by one through the negligence of another, and make locality the sole test of jurisdiction. The latter would limit it to torts committed by the officers or crew in conducting the navigation or enforcing the dis- cipline of the ship. The broader view is within the letter of the definition, but it may well be doubted whether, for example, a libel or slander put in circulation on board a ship could be made the basis of a suit in admiralty. Such cases are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the common- law courts and a trial by jury. This is the .view taken by Mr. Benedict in his work upon Admiralty. The sugges- tion, however, is rather academic than practical, as in- stances of this kind must be exceedingly rare, while assaults by officers upon seamen are unfortunately frequent and often attended by the grossest brutality. A much more serious question, however, arises in cases which, for want of a better word, may be designated as amphibious torts, by which we understand an injury done upon one element, and damage suffered upon the other. 14 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS Cases of this kind are by no means of infrequent occur- rence, and usually concern damages suffered by ships by coming in contact with objects affixed to the land, or dam- ages done by ships to bridges, piers, derricks and like fix- tures. With regard to this, the rule in England is settled by the Admiralty Court Act in favor of the jurisdiction, while in America the rule was supposed, until recently, to be as firmly settled the other way. I have already stated that this reservation to the Federal courts is of "all cases'* of admiralty and maritime juris- diction. Placing its own construction upon this clause, Congress has declared that this provision shall be exclu- sive of the State courts. This at one time became of great importance, as many of the State legislatures had enacted laws giving liens upon vessels for causes of action unques- tionably maritime in their nature, and also authorizing the enforcement of such liens by proceedings in the State courts analogous to those given for the enforcement of a mechan- ic 's lien. But in a case arising in 1866, the Supreme Court held that these proceedings were an exercise of admiralty jurisdiction inhibited to the State courts by the act of Congress, and that their proceedings were wholly void. 10 In view of the control by Congress of all commerce between the States and with foreign nations, and of our diplomatic relations with such nations, and the use of our ports and harbors by the vessels of other powers, there is a peculiar appropriateness in assuming this jurisdiction, and thus preventing foreign vessels being annoyed by suits brought in the State courts under the varying laws of the different States. The exclusive character of this jurisdiction has been recently settled by Congress in the Judicial Code, Sec. 256, Sub. 33. This rule, however, does not interfere with the ordinary law and equity jurisdiction which remains unimpaired as against the owners and officers of foreign vessels, who are liable to suit upon the same terms as our own citizens, subject in cases of large amount to a removal to the Federal court. The distinguishing feature of an 10 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 15 admiralty suit is the power to proceed against a ship, or other thing itself for the collection of a demand or redress of a grievance, and the sale of such ship or thing divested of all prior liens, to satisfy the judgment of the court. The State court may proceed against the person of the ship owner, and may even attach and sell the ship as his prop- erty, but such sale would convey only his interest, subject to all prior liens. Cases to Which the U. S. Are a Party. The Federal judi- cial power also extends "to controversies to which the United States shall be a party. " This concession extends to all suits, both civil and criminal, for the punishment of crimes against the Federal laws, for the collection of Fed- eral revenue, to enforce its bonds and other obligations, and to suits against States as well as against individuals. As a sovereign cannot be sued except by his own permission, a suit will not lie against the United States except in certain cases, provided for in the Court of Claims Act, but the tend- ency is rather to increase than to restrict this power, and the laws in this connection are becoming more liberal. It may be said in general that any person having a claim against the United States, founded upon an act of Con- gress, regulation of an executive department, or a contract, may sue the Government as if it were a private individual, but that claims for injuries or torts can only be allowed by the action of Congress. 11 Cases between States. The fifth division of the judicial power embraces " controversies between two or more States." Allusion has already been made to a similar clause in speaking of the original jurisdiction of tile Supreme Court, where the language used is "cases to which a State shall be a party." But a declaration that the Supreme Court may assume jurisdiction of cases in which a State shall be a party is not intended to confer a new jurisdiction, but merely to say that, if the jurisdic- tion exists at all in the Federal courts, it may be exercised by the Supreme Court. The clause above quoted confers 11 Judicial Code, 145. 16 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS the jurisdiction upon the Federal courts in controversies between two or more States. These controversies have been a fertile source of litigation ever since the original Articles of Confederation were adopted, and a year rarely passes that the Supreme Court is not called upon to adjust a State boundary or settle some other question in dispute. While the boundary cases constitute the most numerous class, they are by no means the only source of litigation between the States. Ordinary causes of contention between indi- viduals occasionally arise between the States and are pro- ductive of litigation. Actions to determine water rights upon rivers flowing through different States, are of not infrequent occurrence, and occasionally a case arises where a State has assumed ownership of bonds issued by another State, and has brought suit in the Supreme Court for the enforcement of this obligation. Between a State and Citizens of Another State. The judicial power also extends to "controversies between a State and citizens of another State." This is now of little consequence, as it applies only where a State sues as plain- tiff. It was originally held in the celebrated Chisholm case that a State could be sued by a citizen of another State, but the decision created such a ferment that an amendment to the Constitution was hurried through prohibiting such suits. This renders the above clause of little practical value. 12 Between Citizens of Different States. The clause imme- diately following conferring jurisdiction of "cases between citizens of different States" is the foundation of the juris- diction of at least four-fifths of the law and equity cases in the courts of the United States. Its origin is found in the not unnatural fear that a citizen of another State, prose- cuting a large claim in the local courts, would have to encounter a certain local prejudice of which a popular citi- zen would not hesitate to avail himself as against a stranger or perhaps a foreigner. It was thought best by the framers 12 Chisholra v. Georgia, 2 Ball. 419. FEDERAL LAW AXD FEDERAL COURTS 17 of the Constitution to establish a court for the adjudication of claims by citizens of other States, which should be held in the largest town of the District, which was usually co-extensive with the State itself, by a judge of exceptional ability, and the jurors of which should be selected from the whole district, and not from the immediate locality. The wisdom of this provision is shown by its history, and by the fact that a plaintiff citizen of another State, having his choice of jurisdictions, almost invariably elects to sue in a Federal court, while if sued by a resident plaintiff in a State court, he usually removes it to a Federal court, as he is authorized to do by statute. The jurisdiction exists, whatever be the cause of action, and is dependent alone upon diversity of citizenship and the amount involved. It was not intended that actions for small amounts should be brought in the Federal courts, as the arguments in favor of this jurisdiction do not apply to cases of small magni- tude, and are offset by the greater expense of carrying on litigation in a distant town. This amount was fixed at first at $500, but this was subsequently raised by the Judicial Code, Sec. 24, to $3,000. If the plaintiff recovers less than this amount, he gets no costs, but in the discretion of the court, may be required to pay them. It will be noticed that this clause is limited to suits " between citizens of different States." Two important questions arise in connection with this language. In the first place, can a corporation be a citizen independent of the citizenship of its stockholders f It was at first thought that it could not, and hence, that the corporation could not sue unless the incorporators could sue. This was decided in 1809, when corporations other than banks and insurance companies were scarcely known, but in view of their enor- mous increase in number and importance, particularly after the introduction of railways and steamboats, this rule was found so inconvenient, and, in fact, so impossible, that the early cases were overruled, and the modern doctrine estab- lished, that a corporation is conclusively presumed to be a citizen of the State by which it is incorporated and from 18 FEDERAL LAW AXD FEDERAL COURTS which it receives its charter, even though its stockholders be citizens of the same State as the opposite party. 13 The substance of this is that a corporation has an independent citizenship of its own, regardless of that of its stockholders. The result has been an enormous increase in the business of the Federal courts, and the assumption of jurisdiction by those courts of the great constitutional cases to which the existence and operation of these corporations have given birth. It is not too much to say that half the cases in number before the Supreme Court, and much more than half in importance, are corporation cases. In connection with this same clause it was decided at an early day that the words "citizens of different States" excluded citizens of the Territories and of the District of Columbia; and this rule has been adhered to, notwith- standing that every argument in favor of the jurisdiction between citizens of States applies with equal force to citi- zens of the Territories and of the District. 14 It is a some- what curious reversal of the maxim that "The letter kHleth but the spirit giveth life. ' ' Claimants of Lands under Conflicting Grants. Another class of cases justiciable in the Federal courts are those "between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States." In the early days of the Re- public there were conflicting titles in the northwest territory, in Kentucky, in the western reserve in Ohio of which Con- necticut claimed to be the owner as well as to the Wyo- ming Valley in Pennsylvania, also claimed by Connecticut. A few cases under this clause are reported in the Supreme Court, but with the more careful delimitation of State lines, they have almost disappeared, and are rarely called to the attention of the courts. Suits by and against Aliens. The final clause of the first paragraph of section 2 gives jurisdiction of "cases between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." But little need be said concerning is Louisville tc. K. R. Co. v. Setson, 2 How. 497. Barney v . .Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 19 this clause. It is a mere extension to aliens of the privi- lege accorded to citizens of other States of the Union, to prosecute their cases in the Federal courts. It is given for the same reasons, and is subject to the same limitations as to amount, as the jurisdiction previously given to citizens of different States. An alien is one who at the time of bringing suit is a subject or citizen of a foreign prince or State. If, though born abroad, he has been naturalized as an American citizen, he cannot sue as an alien under this clause, although if he has merely taken out his first papers he is still regarded as an alien and may sue. In all cases mentioned in this section, excepting those affecting ambassadors and ministers, those of admiralty jurisdiction, and patent, copyright, or bankruptcy cases, there is a concurrent jurisdiction in the State courts, and the power of bringing suits in or removing them to the Federal courts is a privilege, but not a necessity. CHAPTER H CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 6. Power of Congress to Enact Criminal Laws. So much for the civil jurisdiction of the Federal courts. The Constitution contains no such express grant of criminal jurisdiction as is given in the section already analyzed with respect to civil jurisdiction, except the power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and cur- rent coin of the United States, to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations. There is, however, a recog- nition of the power of Congress to enact criminal laws, defining expressly the crime of treason, and in various amendments to the Constitution, the right to an indictment and a trial by jury is guaranteed, as well as immunities against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. The power to make criminal laws may also be properly included in the express power granted by the last para- graph of Article 1, Section 8: "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or any Department or officer thereof. ' ' The power of Congress to punish is incident to the power of Congress to legislate upon a particular subject. Given the power to legislate, the power to punish interference with such legislation follows as a matter of course. Thus, the power to establish post offices and post roads, carries with it the power to protect them and carry mails over them, as well as to punish the theft of letters or interfer- ence with the carriers of the mail. The great mass of criminal jurisdiction, including nearly all offenses against persons or property, and aggregating nineteen-twentieths 20 21 of the entire criminal business of the country, still remains in the State courts. It is only where Congress has seen fit to act and to prescribe penalties, that the case is drawn into the courts of the United States. In comparison with the amount of business done in the State courts, the number of cases is very small, and the amount of public attention drawn to them by their peculiarities is out of all propor- tion to the magnitude of the business. These laws have been recently collected in what is known as the " Federal Penal Code," which is really a codification of all the penal stat- utes previously enacted. 7. Division of Criminal Cases. The criminal cases cognizable in the courts of the United States are divisible into two general and distinct classes of crimes, dependent upon the consideration, first, of the locality of the offense, and, second, of its nature. Dependent upon Locality. First, certain offenses, if punishable at all, must from the necessities of the case, bo punished by the courts of the United States, since they are not cognizable by the State courts, by reason of the fact that they are committed outside of the local jurisdiction. It is a principle of common law that criminal cases must be tried within the jurisdiction where the crime was com- mitted. The Constitution itself requires that all criminal trials shall be held in the State where the crime was com- mitted, but if not committed within any State, Congress may provide for the place of trial. High Seas. Prominent in this class of cases are crimes committed upon an American vessel while upon the high seas, or other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdic- tion of any particular State. It is a cardinal principle of international law that the high seas belong to nobody, and are the common property of the entire world, although each nation may punish crimes committed upon its own vessels, or crimes such as piracy, which are against the laws of all nations. Hence, a pirate may be punished under whatever flag he sails, or to whatever country he belongs. 22 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS The same rule also applies to slave traders, but with the exception that the offense must have been committed upon an American vessel to give the courts of this country juris- diction. These offenses include most of what are known as common-law crimes, such as murder, manslaughter, as- saults of various kinds and degrees of enormity, rape or seduction, robbery and larceny. In addition to these, there are certain offenses peculiar to the navigation and man- agement of vessels which are deemed worthy of special provision, such as the loss of life through the negligence of officers, and the seduction of female passengers, whose helplessness renders them an easy prey to unscrupulous seamen. The laws applicable to the high seas are also ex- tended to crimes upon American vessels navigating the Great Lakes and their connecting waters. While these lakes are within the boundaries of the States and counties border- ing upon them, it is often impossible by reason of their width, to locate a crime within a particular county or State, or even to determine whether it was committed on the Amer- ican or Canadian side of the line which runs through the center. Hence, it was deemed necessary to provide a court with jurisdiction co-extensive with the lakes themselves, re- gardless of international and State boundary lines. This jurisdiction, like that upon the high seas, is confined to crimes upon American vessels. Reserved Lands. The criminal jurisdiction of the Fed- eral courts also extends to crimes committed upon lands reserved for the exclusive use of the United States, usually by purchase for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other building. Purchases of this kind are very frequent, and are usually made by consent of the legis- lature and with cession of jurisdiction to the Federal courts of crimes committed within their limits, though occasion- ally jurisdiction is reserved to the State. Jurisdiction is also given over islands, rocks, and keys containing depos- its of guano, which may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appurtenant to the United States. This last is an anomalous jurisdiction, and rests upon the propo- FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 23 sition that a private citizen may take possession of an un- claimed island rich in guano, and may, with the approval of the President, practically annex it to the United States, at least for jurisdictional purposes. The validity of the annexation of Navassa Island in the Caribbean Sea was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The criminal jurisdiction over government reservations extends not only to crimes which are punishable when com- mitted at sea, but to arson, robbery, receiving stolen goods, and others of what may be called land offenses. Where a State makes a cession of jurisdiction, the reservation ceases to belong to the State and practically becomes foreign ter- ritory, though the State usually reserves the privilege of serving its own process upon such reservation. The Nature of the Offense. The second grand division of the criminal power of the Federal courts depends upon the nature of the offense. This jurisdiction is quite inde- pendent of that of the State courts, and necessarily, to a large extent, exclusive of it, though there are cases, such as the passing of counterfeit money, robbery of mail car- riers, etc., wherein the State courts have a concurrent juris- diction, and the offender may be punished under the laws of the State or nation. 1 The extent of this jurisdiction is commensurate with the power of Congress. Wherever Congress has the power to legislate, it has a corresponding authority to make this legislation effectual by punishing infractions of its laws ; in neither case can it invade the local and domestic affairs of the State. Treason. The most prominent, and in some -of their aspects, the most serious of these crimes are those aimed at the existence and structure of the Government. The best known of these is treason, which consists in levying war against the United States, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies. Under the law of England, as defined by a statute of Edward III., treason also consisted of various other of- fenses against the life or person of the king, queen, or imme- i Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13. 24 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS diate members of the royal family, counterfeiting the king's seals, or the current coin of the realm, or slandering the great officers of state or justices of the royal courts. But all these were swept away by the Revolution, and all other crimes except that of levying war directly or indirectly, are now covered by separate statutes. While treason has been generally spoken of as the most atrocious crime of which a citizen can be guilty, and in some of its aspects is still so regarded, it must be admitted that the denuncia- tion has proceeded as much from loyalty to the existing state of things and to the person of the sovereign, as from any general consideration of the enormity of the offense. There are treasons which proceed from the vilest and most detestable motives. There are offenders equally guilty in the eye of the law, who may have been animated by the purest patriotism, and devotion to the interests of an op- pressed people. There are anarchists who plot the over- throw of all governments, both good and bad, and slay a President chosen by popular vote as readily as they do a tyrant who has gained his throne, perhaps by the assassina- tion of a rival, and used his power to enslave his subjects. The traitor who, like Benedict Arnold, deserts his flag, takes refuge with the enemy and carries on a campaign against his own country, is deserving of all the odium which from time immemorial has been heaped upon him. Upon the other hand, the man who has stood for the rights of the people in a war for independence, or the overthrow of a hated despotism, has been among the noblest figures in history. A term which would include within its definition every soldier who fought for his native land in the war of the Revolution, every Frenchman who stormed the Bastile in 1789, every soldier who took up arms for the South in the Civil War, must be received with some modification, in the light of attending circumstances. Those who conscientiously believed that they were right, and were acting in defense of their liberties and the interests of their fellow men, while legally classed as traitors, have been held worthy of the respect of mankind. Nor is success the FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 25 sole criterion, but much depends upon the number and character of those who are engaged. A single man may be a traitor, a body of men may be guilty of treason. But an army of a hundred thousand men cannot be amenabie to the laws applicable to a few individuals, though the casu- ist may make no distinction between them. The wholesale condemnation of a hundred and thirty-four participants in the Monmouth rebellion, in 1865, by Jeffreys in the ''Bloody Assizes" has ever since shocked the conscience of the whole English speaking world. While in this country the definition of treason has never changed, and probably never will be changed, I am not aware of any one having actually suffered the penalty of the law for this crime, although there have been one or two convictions. We can only say that while the statute against treason is not obsolete, the state of the country and the general respect for the law has fortunately been such as to have afforded very few occasions for its practical enforcement. Analogous Offenses. There are a few other analogous crimes intended to cover cases where the proof of actual treason is incomplete, but the act is such as threatens the subversion of the government or the disturbance of public order. These are misprison or concealment of the treason of others; inciting or setting on foot insurrections against the authority of the United States ; carrying on correspond- ence with foreign governments with the intent of influenc- ing the conduct of such governments in relation to contro- versies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the Government; sedition, conspiracy with intent to overthrow the Government, opposing its authority or de- feating the execution of its laws; or recruiting sailors or soldiers to engage in armed hostility against the United States. But no separate discussion of these is necessary, as prosecutions under them are exceedingly rare. Neutrality Laws. Next to the obligation of every govern- ment to protect its own existence is the analogous duty of avoiding complications with foreign nations and refus- 26 FEDERAL LAW AXD FEDERAL COURTS ing to intermeddle in wars in which it has no concern. To permit men to be enlisted, munitions of wars to be furnished, or ships to be engaged in the service of either power at war with another, is not only a breach of good faith and a destruction of international relations, but a positive dan- ger, which has more than once brought us to the verge of war with European powers. Hence, Congress under the name of neutrality laws, has provided for the punishment of a large number of offenses, such as accepting commis- sions from foreign nations in time of war, enlisting in the service of a belligerent State, fitting out or arming vessels of war for the purpose of engaging in a foreign naval serv- ice, augmenting the force of foreign armed vessels, or organizing military expeditions against foreign States with which we are at peace. Not only is power given to the courts to enforce these laws by the arrest of persons and the seizure of any property concerned in these unlawful enterprises, but the President is authorized to compel the departure of foreign vessels, or their owners to give bond that they will not engage in hostilities against a friendly power. These neutrality laws are not intended, however, as a suspension of intercourse or commerce with belligerent States. Our people may still furnish them money, pro- visions or other supplies not contraband of war, though with knowledge that they are to be used for military pur- poses. Our ships of war may give asylum to foreign refu- gees, though belligerent a privilege frequently accorded to the turbulent peoples of South America. Foreign bellig- erent vessels may resort to our ports for repairs, but may be required to leave as soon as the repairs are finished. Our vessels may even carry to a belligerent country articles contraband of war, provided their officers have no knowl- edge they are to be used for a hostile purpose. In most of these cases the question of intent is a material element. Frauds. The scope of governmental functions, and the attempts to thwart legislation intended for the public good in the interest of a few individuals, have led to a large FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 27 number of acts to circumvent and punish these illegal de- signs. These include the forgery of public records, such as patents, deeds, and powers of attorneys, false persona- tions of officers and individuals, embezzling of public prop- erty, presenting fraudulent claims for allowance, conspir- acies, briberies, enticing soldiers or workmen to desert the service of the Government; injuries to fortifications or other property, depredations upon timber lands or setting them on fire; fraudulent naturalization papers, in short, the general principle is as true here as elsewhere, that wher- ever Congress legislates, it exercises the commensurate power of making such legislation effectual by providing punishment for those who seek to defeat its purposes. It is a melancholy commentary upon human nature that wher- ever important legislation is enacted there are always in- dividuals standing ready to evade it, if it be penal, or if it be remedial, to extend its operation to cases never con- templated by Congress. Interference with Officers. Connected with this same general subject are criminal attempts to take an illegal ad- vantage of their positions, by officers of the Government, such as extortion under color of office, giving receipts for larger amounts than paid an offense frequently commit- ted by agents of the Government hiring clerks at a lower salary than that receipted for, the unlawful use or keep- ing of public moneys, or failure to render accounts for the same, soliciting or accepting bribes or collecting ille- gal fees, as well as several other offenses applicable espe- cially to members of Congress, who do not always observe the distinction between their public duties and their professional labors, by acting as agents for private claim- ants and receiving pay for their services in prosecuting such claims against the Government; soliciting political contributions or financial aid from candidates for office, offenses formerly supposed to be inseparably connected with hot campaigns. Interference with Public Justice. Another class of of- fenses is connected with the administration of public jus- 8 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS tice in the courts of the United States, the most conspicu- ous of these being perjury or false swearing, whether before officers of the United States or of the State, in support of claims against the Government, subornation of perjury, stealing or destroying public records, bribing judicial offi- cers, witnesses or jurors, obstructing process, assaulting officers of courts, rescuing prisoners, and extorting money under threats of giving information. Counterfeiting. Among the powers vested in Congress none is more important than that of coining money, regu- lating its value and providing for the punishment of coun- terfeiting, which under the old English law was treated as treason. Crimes against the currency have always been a fertile source of criminal business in courts of the United States. Included in this prohibition of counterfeiting are not only the coin of the United States, but every paper security in the form of bonds, notes, certificates, bills, checks, national bank notes, revenue or postage stamps, in short, every form which those securities may take in the transactions of the Government, and issued under its authority. The prohibition extends not only to forging or counterfeiting of such securities, but to the uttering or passing of the same, or to the bare possession of counter- feited securities, if such possession be with intent to put them in circulation; to the use or possession of plates or dies for manufacturing the same; or to the unauthorized use of genuine plates. It is a crime even to photograph them with the purpose of using them as genuine. These provisions are also made applicable to securities issued under authority of a foreign government or a foreign bank. An analogous offense is that of clipping, defacing, lighten- ing, debasing coin by alloy, or the imitation of bank notes or securities by advertising cards. In the enforcement of these provisions ample authority is given to the courts to issue search warrants for the entry of suspected dens of counterfeiters, and to seize and take possession of any property found there and apparently intended for illegal use. A competent force of detectives FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 29 is constantly kept in the service of the Treasury Depart- ment, to be despatched to parts of the country where an unusual amount of counterfeited money is being put in cir- culation. The importance of preserving the currency of the country from alloy or forgery is best appreciated by those who have traveled in Southern Europe and the Orient, where constant efforts are made to put off on the unsus- pecting stranger debased coins or counterfeited money. It is one of the principal duties of a sovereign State to pro- vide its citizens with a safe and convenient currency, and to protect its monopoly in that particular against unau- thorized interference. Postal Crimes. Under the constitutional authority of Congress "to establish post offices and post roads," it has inaugurated a vast system for the transmission of letters and other mail matter, opened post offices in every city and village, set up letter boxes upon the principal streets, made contracts with railways, steamboats, and private individuals for the carriage of mails, established offices for the regis- tering of letters and money orders, and, as the last expres- sion of its will to popularize this branch of public service, has opened banks at the leading post offices for the deposit of the people's savings. It is needless to say that the success of this system requires elaborate penal provisions for the security of mail matter and of every person engaged in its transmission. So careful is this oversight that it may be said that every step in the route of a letter, from the box at the corner of the street where it is deposited to the moment of its delivery by the postman at its destination, is subject to the scrutiny, supervision and protection of the Government. It is made a crime not only to assault or hinder a carrier in his duties, to open or rob a post office or letter box, to steal or counterfeit its stamps ; but penalties are denounced upon employes for embezzling or even opening letters entrusted to their care, even though nothing more was contemplated than the gratification of a curiosity to pry into another's business or secrets. SO FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS The carriage of the mails is a Government monopoly which is preserved by penalties inflicted upon those who set up private post offices, or carry mails without the author- ity of law. A person cannot legally wear the uniform or badge of a letter carrier, or paint the words "U. S. Mail" upon any vehicle without authority. Penalties are also provided for injuring or stealing from mail bags, forcing locks or keys, as well as for those who make use of the mails for the transmission of illegal or obscene matter, or for the concoction and circulation of schemes to defraud; and the Postmaster General is given authority to exclude from the mails prospectuses or advertisements, whenever he is satisfied from evidence and enquiry that they are intended to cover devices for obtaining money without any reasonable prospect of return. Included in this category are all lotteries or gift enterprises. Interstate Commerce. The constitutional power of Con- gress "to regulate commerce between the several States and with foreign nations" has been expanded in recent years to assume largely the control of commerce to an extent probably not originally contemplated by the f ramers of the Constitution, but which has become imperative by reason of the fact that railways and other transportation companies are each year extending their routes through dif- ferent States, where the jurisdiction of the State legisla- tures and courts is, of course, limited in each case by its State lines. An important step in this direction was taken in 1887 by the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, by which authority was given to the Commission to regu- late commerce between the States, make certain restrictions upon prices and discriminations, and to suppress the system of rebates, which was threatening to throw the whole busi- ness of the country into the hands of a few corporations. Supplemental to this, there were punishments provided for carrying explosives, except under stringent regulations of the Commission to avoid danger; importing from abroad or carrying lottery tickets between the States; placing re- FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 31< strictions upon the transmission of intoxicating liquors, obscene books or pictures, or importing objectionable birds or other animals, or game killed in violation of State laws. Illegal Combination. Closely connected with this general subject are statutes to penalize contracts or combinations in restraint of trade, or to monopolize trade between the several States by the creation of trusts. During the past twenty years these have proved a fruitful source of litiga- tion, not only by bills filed with a view of dissolving the illegal corporations, but in several instances by criminal prosecutions against parties charged with the formation of monopolies. This class of legislation, however, is lim- ited by the authority given by the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations and between the several States, and has no application to commerce wholly within the boundaries of a particular State. In the early days of the Eepublic, commerce was limited largely to places within the same State. But with the development of rail- ways, the telegraph and steam vessels, it has of late years assumed a far wider scope, and the bulk of modern com- merce is rather interstate than intrastate. Slave Trade and Peonage. Another class of cases cog- nizable by the Federal courts is aimed at those engaged in slave trade, or in the establishment of peonage. Slave trade on a large scale has practically ceased since eman- cipation of slaves in this country, and indeed, has ceased to exist all over the world, except to a limited extent in Africa and the Orient. But attempts are constantly made, even in this country to reestablish it under the name of peonage, which is defined to be holding a person in servi- tude for the payment of a debt. This is ordinarily car- ried out by advancing a small sum of money to a proposed laborer, usually a negro, taking him into service and com- pelling him to serve until the debt is paid. As the laborer is ordinarily of the most ignorant class, a skillful manipu- lation of his accounts will keep him always in debt, and become an excuse for a perpetual servitude. This, Con- gress has declared to be illegal under the power given it 32 FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS by the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude. Elective Franchise. Somewhat analogous to these are crimes in connection with the exercise of the elective fran- chise and the civil rights of citizens. This legislation be- came necessary to give full force and effect to the Four- teenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution en- franchising the negro. By virtue of it Congress has pro- vided for the punishment of those who conspire to injure him in the enjoyment of his civil rights, or to set up State laws as an excuse therefor; or to prevent any officer by force or threat from accepting an office or discharging its duties. The intimidation of voters by the presence of armed men at election polls, or any interference with elec- tion officers by Army or Navy officials of the United States is subject to a like punishment. It may be said that these statutes have proved ineffective to preserve to the negro his right to vote in the Southern States, where popular opinion has proved to be even more potent than the Con- stitution and laws of the United States. It is a lesson which has been often repeated, that no law can be enforced against the opposition of a large majority of the people affected by it. 8. Summary. These are a summary of the principal criminal laws of the United States, but in addition thereto there is a vast number of penal provisions, contained in subordinate clauses of the administrative laws, notably those for the collection and disbursement of the public revenues and the protection of public lands, and other prop- erty. These, however, are quite too numerous for sepa- rate mention. Taken in connection with the criminal code, the whole constitutes an immense mass of legislation nec- essary to the adequate protection of the citizen, but with which the great body of the people rarely, if ever, come in actual contact. EXAfllNATION PAPER. FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS Read Carefully: Place your name and full address at the head of the paper. Any cheap, light paper like the sample previously sent you may be used. Do not crowd your work, but arrange it neatly and legibly. Do not copy the answers from the Instruction Paper; use your own words, to that we may be sure you understand the subject. 1. What were the main defects of the Articles of Confedera- tion of 1778? 2. What cause contributed principally to the adoption of the Constitution? 3. In what cases has the Supreme Court original and appellate jurisdiction? 4. What is the distinction between the Articles of Confedera- tion and the Constitution? 5. State the extent of the Federal Judicial Power. 6. What are cases arising under the Constitution and Laws of the United States? 7. What are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: (a) as affected by the character of the waters; (b) as affected by the character of the vessels; (c) as affected by the character of the case? 8. What are maritime torts? 9. What are cases to which the United States are a party? 10. What are cases between the States? 11. What are cases between citizens of different States? Who are citizens? Who constitute corporations? 12. What are cases by and against aliens? Who are aliens? 13. From what clauses of the Constitution does the power of Congress to enact criminal laws arise? 14. How are criminal cases divisible? 15. What localities give the Federal courts exclusive juris- diction therein of high seas and reserved lands? FEDERAL LAW AND FEDERAL COURTS 16. What is the general nature of the offenses of which the Federal courts have jurisdiction? 17. What are the crimes against the existence and structure of the Government? 18. State crimes against the Neutrality Laws. 19. State generally what are frauds against the Government. 20. Define interference with officers. 21. Define crimes of interference with public justice. 22. Define crimes against the currency. 23. Define crimes against the postal service. 24. Define crimes against interstate commerce. 25. What are illegal combinations in restraint of trade? 26. Define slavery and peonage. 27. Define crimes against the Elective Franchise. After completing the work, add and sign the following statement: I hereby certify that the above work is entirely my own. (Signed) UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 682 575 6