Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation I http://www.archive.org/details/fieldofphilosophOOIeigrich THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY AN OUTLINE OF LECTURES ON INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY BY JOSEPH ALEXANDER LEIGHTON ProfeetOT of Philosophy in the Ohio Sute UniTenitj , * » * . • * »= Columbus, Ohio R. G. ADAMS & CO. 1918 AU Bighu Resenred i-4 COPYRIGHT, 1918 BY J. A. LEIGHTON Published March, 1918 ** it Printed by THE F. J. HEER PRINTING CO. Colwnbus, Ohio, U, S. A, PREFACE The following work has been prepared pri- marily for the use of classes in The Ohio State University. I hope it may be found of service else- where. For some years past I have experimented and pondered as to the best method of giving an intro- ductory course which might really introduce be- ginners to the basic problems and theories of philosophy and quicken them to some appreciation of the role played by philosophy in the whole move- ment of civilization, while, at the same time, giving them at least an inkling of the work of the greatest thinkers and arousing in them a desire to go to the sources. A course in the entire History of European Philosophy, if seriously given, is beyond the reach of many beginners in the subject. Only the ex- ceptional student can make much out of it. The others are bewildered by the rapid succession of theories not easily distinguishable and become con- fused as to the fundamental issues and standpoints. They are likely to carry away from the course the feeling that philosophy has no close relation to cul- ture and everyday experience and that it is a be- wildering mass of speculations "shot out of the blue". The History of Philosophy should be a second course. (v) 385101 VI PREFACE On the other hand a purely topical and system- atic introduction fails to bring the student in con- tact with the great historical doctrines in other than the scrappiest fashion. Moreover, the miscel- laneous and varied characters of the intellectual backgrounds of students who elect a first course in philosophy make it imperative to supply something in the way of a common background and also, at the risk of being dogmatic, to indicate the main directions in which solutions of the chief problems of philosophy may be sought. The present outline is thus a combination of the historical and the systematic methods of treat- ing the great problems and theories. Its plan is to discuss systematically the chief problems and standpoints of modern philosophy from the vantage point acquired by a rapid sketch of the most signifi- cant stages and types of philosophical thinking from the primitive world view up to the beginning of modern thought. My conception of the structure of an intro- ductory text is that it should be in the nature of a comprehensive outline — an extended syllabus — to be filled in by the teacher in his lectures and by the student in his collateral readings. Therefore, I have avoided discussing the more technical and finely-drawn distinctions within the main types of doctrine that would be dealt with in a more elabo- rate treatment. The teacher who uses this book can easily select and make omissions from the material presented, according to his tastes and the needs of his classes. PREFACE VH It would not have been possible for me to bring ouit this preliminary edition now, had not my colleague, Dr. R. D. Williams, generously volunteered to report my lectures. Mr. W. S. Gamertsfelder, Fellow in Philosophy, was good enough to type the reports, and I have revised them. Nearly two- thirds of the book is a transcript from lectures. Dr. Williams and Dr. A. E. Avey have rendered valuable assistance in proof reading. To them I am much indebted also for preparation of the index. Dr. Williams has also aided me in several places with illustrations and references. Some haste in preparation for the press was necessary, in order to have the book ready for the use of the classes in the present semester. I shall be grateful for any criticisms and suggestions that may help me in the preparation of a second and revised edition. Joseph Alexander Leighton. Columbus, Ohio, February 15, 1918. CONTENTS Chapter I. 1. 2. 3. 4. Chapter II. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Chapter III. 1. 2. Chapter IV. 1. 2. 3. Chapter V. 1. PAGE Philosophy, Its Meaning and Scope 1 Definition of Philosophy 1 The Relation of Philosophy to Practical Life, Especially to Conduct and Religion 4 Methods of Religion and Philosophy. ... 6 Poetry and Philosophy 7 Primitive Thought 9 The Primitive World- View 9 Primitive Idea of the Soul 9 Tabu 11 Magic 12 Mythology 17 The Differentiation of Philosophy and Science from Religion 22 The Rise of Philosophy to Independence 22 The Development of Early Greek Phil- osophy 31 The Personality, Mission and Influence of Socrates 43 The Personality of Socrates 43 The Method of Socrates 48 The Substance of Socrates' Teaching. . . 50 Plato 55 The Problem of Truth and Knowledge (Logic) 55 2. The Platonic Theory of Reality (Meta- physics) 61 3. Plato's Doctrine of the Soul (Psychol- ogy) 69 4. Plato's Theory of Human Good (Ethics and Social Philosophy) 70 (ix) X CONTENTS PAGE Chapter VI. Aristotle * 77 1. Aristotle's Theory of Reality 77 2 . Aristotle's Psychology 80 3 . Aristotle's Theory of Knowledge 82 4. Summary of Aristotle's Theory of Reality 85 5. Aristotle's Doctrine of the Good (Ethics) 87 Chapter VII . Atomistic Materialism 89 Chapter VIII . The Decline of Greek Speculation ... 95 Chapter IX . Skepticism 99 Chapter X . Stoic Pantheism 108 Chapter XI. Mysticism — Neo-Platonism 115 Chapter XII. Early Christian Philosophy 125 1. The Ethical Content of Christianity 127 2. The Doctrine of the Trinity 129 Chapter XIII. Mediaeval Philosophy 133 Chapter XIV. Realism, Nominalism and the Problem of Individuality 140 Chapter XV. Modern Philosophy: Its Spirit, Its Chief Problems and Its Standpoints 148 Chapter XVI. The Problem of Reality 155 Chapter XVII . Dualism 159 Chapter XVIII. The Scientific Notion of Material Substance 167 Chapter XIX. Materialism * 173 Chapter XX. Spiritualism or Idealism 178 1 . Berkeleyan Idealism 178 2 . Leibnitz' Monadology 182 3 . Hegelian Idealism 188 Chapter XXI. The Identity or Double Aspect Theory 191 Summary 192 Chapter XXII. Singularism and Pluralism (The One and the Many) 195 1. From Naive Pluralism to Singularism.. 195 2. The Spinozistic Conception of the Ab- solute 205 CONTENTS XI PAGE t 3 . The Hegelian Conception of the Absolute 210 ' 4. Further Implications of Singularism . . . 216 ^^ 5. Criticism of Singularism 219 f" 6. Pluralism 221 7. My Own Standpoint 223 Chapter XXIII. The Problem of Evolution and Tele- ology 230 , 1. The Rise of the Doctrine of Evolution. . 230 I 2. The Method of Evolution 235 ' 3. The Mechanical and the Teleological Aspects of Evolution 239 Chapter XXIV. The Self 252 Chapter XXV. The Fundamental Concepts of Meta- physics 270 ^l . Substance 272 2. Causality 273 - 3. Finality and Individuality 278 4. Order, Law, Relation and Individuality 280 5. Space and Time*-. 287 Chapter XXVI . Epistemology 293 1. The Problem of the Sources of Knowl- edge 294 2. Knowledge and Reality 305 3. Critical Realism or Teleological Idealism 308 I Chapter XXVII . The Criteria of Truth 314 3 1 . The Copy Theory of Truth 314 ^ K^.2 • Pragmatism 315 3. The Rationalistic Theory of Truth 325 Chapter XXVIII. The Special Philosophical Disci- plines — The System of Philosophy 330 1 . Psychology and Philosophy 331 2. Logic 334 3. Ethics and Social Philosophy 336 4 . Aesthetics 339 5 . The Philosophy of Religion 341 Chapter XXIX . The Status of Values 345 Chapter XXX. The Philosophy of History 364 II Xll CONTENTS PAGE Appendix — Current Issues in Regard to Conscious- ness, Intelligence and Reality 389 1. The New Realism 389 2. Neutral Monism 396 3. The Instrumentalist View of Intelligence 399 4. Irrationalistic Intuitionism 403 ERRATA On page 69 line 18 § 2, for "next lowest part" read "next lower part." On page 85 lines 3 and 4 for "The organization," etc., read "In the organization of sense experience the mind uses" etc. I i On page 103 line 1 for "Differences" read "Variations." i On page 105 line 8 for "cause" read "course." On page 214 line 24 for "purporsive" read "purposive." CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHY, ITS MEANING AND SCOPE 1. DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY The word "philosophy" is derived from the Greek words "philein" meaning to love iand "sophia" meaning wisdom. Hence the true philosopher is a lover of wisdom. The philosopher strives, as Plato so finely puts it, to attain a synoptic vision of things, to see things as a whole or together, that is, to see all the main features of experience, life and conduct in their inter-relationships. The philosopher strives to be "the spectator of all time and existence." This does not mean that the philosopher must compass in minute detail all knowledge and all experience. It means rather that, in trying to reach a unified and consistent view of things, the philosopher will not neglect to consider the general significance of any of the main fields of human experience, knowl- edge or conduct. Plato distinguished between Ignorance, Right Opinion, and Knowledge or Wisdom. Ignorance is not to know, nor to know why you do not know. Right Opinion is a belief which corresponds to the facts but is devoid of reasoned insight into its own foundations. Knowledge is belief with reasons. If one knows wherein his own ignorance lies or the limitations of the possibilities of the subject, he 2 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY may be rightly said to possess knowledge of the subject. Philosophy is more fundamental and compre- hensive than science, otherwise they are identical in their aims. Philosophical knowledge has these three characteristics : — 1. It is fundamental knowledge. 2. It is most comprehensive or general- ized knowledge 3. It is most unified and consistent knowledge. The aim of philosophy is to discover the full meanings and relations of Truth, Beauty, and Good- ness and to determine their places in the universe of reality. Philosophy is an attempt to interpret reflectively human life in all its relations. The philosopher aims to "see life steadily and to see it whole." Plato says "the unexamined life is not a truly human life." Philosophy is rational reflection upon experience, belief, and conduct. It is closely related to science, conduct and religion. Science is a careful scrutiny of the grounds of our common sense beliefs. It analyzes and de- scribes our common experiences. It is organized common sense. The special sciences are the chil- dren of philosophy, and can never replace phil- osophy. Among the Greeks philosophy included all science. In fact Aristotle was the first to map out the field of knowledge into distinct sciences. In the course of intellectual history the various sciences have gradually been split off from philosophy in the following order — ; mathematics, astronomy. PHILOSOPHY, ITS MEANING AND SCOPE 3 physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and so- ciology. 1. All sciences make assumptions. Phil- osophy examines these assumptions. 2. The mutual adjustment of the prin- ciples of the several sciences into a unified and coherent view of things is a philosophical task. 3. The adjustment of the principles of science and the principles and beliefs which underlie the practical conduct of life is a task of philosophy. The data of the sciences are really sense-data or perceived facts. In reducing these data to orderly and compact bodies of conceptual descrip- tion and explanation, science makes assumptions. These basic assumptions of the sciences, philosophy must critically examine; e. g., the uniformity of the causal order — like causes produce like effects. Moreover, it is generally assumed in the practical affairs of the common social life that each individual is responsible for his own acts. But if we are machines, as the physiologist might assume, this is not true. Philosophy is thus a clearing house for the sciences, adjusting their several conclusions to one another and to practical life. In brief, the assumptions and conclusions of the several sciences call for critical examination and co-ordination, and this is a principal part of the work of philosophy. For example, what are Matter, Life, Mind, Space, Time, Causality, Purpose? What are their interrelations? Is the living organism 4 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY merely a machine, or, is it something more? Wliat is the mind or soul, and what are its relations to life and matter? What are Space and Time? Is the world really boundless in space and endless in duration? What are the enduring realities? Or, does nothing really endure? What is the status of purpose in the universe? Does everything that hap- pens happen blindly and mechanically? Are our human beliefs in the permanent significance of the purposes and values achieved by the rational in- dividual illusions? What may we hope for in re- gard to the realization and conservation of the highest human values? Such are the exceedingly difficult and important questions to which phil- osophy seeks reasoned answers. Judgment should not be passed as to the mean- ing of human life and its status in the cosmos until all the evidence is in. The one fundamental faith or postulate in philosophy is that nobody can be too intelligent. Great evils have come in the past through lack of intelligence. 2. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICAL LIFE, ESPECIALLY TO CONDUCT AND RELIGION. Natural science is impersonal and indifferent to human weal or woe. It is not concerned with the values of life ; it is essentially non-human. Mate- rial progress does not necessarily mean improve- ment in human nature. There is, besides the physical realm, the human realm or the realm of human values. Two kinds of human values may be distinguished, viz. : — PHILOSOPHY, ITS MEANING AND SCOPE 5 1. Instrumental values, which are of use as means to realize ends ; 2. Intrinsic values realized within the self, experiences valued in themselves or for their own sakes. The good life is the life which contains great intrinsic or satisfying values. Ethics deals with intrinsic values or goods for selves. Ethics is thus the philosophy of intrinsic or immediate values. Aesthetics, dealing with the beauUfvl, is also a part of the philosophy of values. Religion claims to answer the question: How do values endure? The life that is best is the only one that endures, on account of its harmony with the supreme purpose of the universe, — such is the central tenet in religion. All religion is faith in the supremacy in the universe, and therefore the permanence, of the best life, the life having the most worth. Religion is close to conduct because it attempts to give firm foundation for the intrinsic values of life. The atheistic or materialistic view of the uni- verse is that blind physical forces will finally over- come human existence and effort, and engulf all human values. Philosophy is interested in what nature is, but also in what are the values of life, and what is the status of the highest human life, i. e., philosophy asks : What is the status of values in the real world? What are the highest values of life, is the problem of ethics, an important branch of philos- ophy. Religion affirms dogmatically that what a 6 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY society or individual members thereof regard as the highest values are promoted and conserved by a Higher Power. Religion pictures the highest values of life as incorporated in the Supreme Reality or Perfect Power who rules the Cosmos. 3. METHODS OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY. The procedure of philosophy is intellectual, finding reasons for our beliefs and rejecting beliefs that are inconsistent with facts or with well- grounded principles. Religion is not primarily in- tellectual. It is based chiefly upon tradition- and feeling. The factor of personal need may change one's religion. The influence of social tradition and the sentiments of the group together with personal feeling chiefly determine a man's religion. Seldom does the individual break away from the religion of the group. The method of philosophy is sustained rational inquiry. Philosophy originates and flour- ishes in the rational activity of the individual mind. The group-mind is seldom guided by reason. The scope of philosophy is wider than that of religion. Philosophy must determine not only the nature and meaning of religion, but also its relation to the principles of the sciences and to life. Philosophy has two main problems, viz. : — 1. The interpretation of nature, and, 2. The interpretation of human values. Why the conflict between religion and philos- ophy? Religion is conservative and philosophy is not conservative but radical and constructive. Since PHILOSOPHY, ITS MEANING AND SCOPE 7 religion is based largely on social customs and per- sonal feeling it is not always very careful as to whether there is consistency in its beliefs or not. Philosophy seeks consistency above all things else. Does philosophy make assumptions? No. — But it has progressively realized that there is some kind of intelligibility in the world, that the world can, in part, be understood, and that we have experiences which, if properly interrogated, will yield answers to our questions. 4. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY The more serious poetry of the race has a philosophical structure of thought. It contains beliefs and conceptions in regard to the nature of man and the universe, God and the soul, fate and providence, suffering, evil and destiny. Great poetry always has, like the higher religion, a metaphysical content. It deals with the same august issues, ex- periences and conceptions as metaphysics or first philosophy. For example, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, Lucretius, Omar Khayyam, Dante, Milton, Shakespeare, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold, Browning, Tennyson, Goethe, Schiller, Moliere, are philosophical poets. Poetry is more concrete, vivid and dramatic in its treatment of these high themes; it is more intuitive in its thought processes and expressions than philosophy; hence it makes a more direct appeal to the emotions than philosophy. A philosophical poet is a meta- physician who does not think in a predominantly conceptional and ratiocinative manner. A meta- 8 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY physician is a poet who cannot think in concrete pictures, or, if he can, is unable to express himself in rhythm, color and swift movement of speech as does the poet, and, at the same time, has a genius for analysis and ratiocination. Sometimes, as in Plato, a genius is supreme in both orders of spiritual creativeness and then we get the absolute best in the spiritual realm, the profoundest thought wedded to the noblest expression. REFERENCES F. Paulsen, "Introduction to Philosophy", Introduction. J. Royce, "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy", Intro- duction. W. James, "Some Problems of Philosophy", Chapter I. O. Kiilpe, "Introduction to Philosophy", Chapters I and IV. B. Russell, "The Problems of Philosophy", Chapter XV. R. B. Perry, Approach to Philosophy, Chapters I-V. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, article, Phil- osophy. Plato, "Symposium" and "Phaedo". Other introductions to philosophy by Fletcher, Fuller- ton, Jerusalem; Calkins, "Persistent Problems of Phil- osophy"; Perry, "Approach to Philosophy"; Watson, "Out- line of Philosophy"; Sellars, "Essentials of Philosophy". CHAPTER II PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 1. THE PRIMITIVE WORLD-VIEW. Although prehistoric man has left no records of his inner life, the earliest literature throws light on primitive views and the facts entitle one to as- sume that savage belief and thought today is very like primitive belief and thought. This assumption is supported by the study of the earliest literature of civilized peoples, of savage lore, and of the theory of evolution. Primitive man believed that everywhere in the world everything was alive, — there was a uni- versally diffused energy. The world was not orderly to him, it was only alive. Man had not yet arrived at the distinction between animate and inanimate things. Moreover, he had no conception of per- sonality. Wherever anything was done, there was life. This theory may be called pan-biotism or ani- matism (a better term than "animism" which seems to imply the idea of a soul differing in kind from the body) . 2. PRIMITIVE IDEA OF THE SOUL Primitive men do not think of the soul as im- material. The soul has no specific mass or weight. It is of much more tenuous material than the body. It is an active principle. But it is not different in (9) 10 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY kind from the physical objects with which it is asso- ciated. It differs only in degree. It is elusive. It can leave the body and enter into other bodies. It hovers around after death; so food and drink are given for it. Many primitive peoples do not regard the soul as being generated with the body. The Australian savages, it is said, (according to Spencer and Gillen, "Northern Tribes of Central Australia",) do not regard generation and birth as a result of the sex relation. They think the child is the result of a pre-existing soul — a reincarnation. Many consider the soul as a manikin, like an image or a shadow of the body. Mysterious powers are at- tributed to a person's shadow. Savages are often afraid to have their pictures taken because their souls might be harmed by exposure on the photo- graph. The soul is sometimes conceived as like a bird, also as air, e. g., by the ancient Hebrews and Romans. Nervous affections, they believe, are caused by strange spirits. The causes for making a distinction between and a separation of body and soul were reflection upon dreams and visions of terror and delight, the mysteriousness of death, disease and misfortune, and the feeling of being environed by mysterious forces potent for good and evil. The third conception is that of spirits. The great spirits were believed to be free from the hampering influence of ordinary physical events. A striking phenomenon will cause the supposition of spirits. Some spiritual agencies are beneficent and others are maleficent. The high spirits would be PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 11 called the high gods. Most savage tribes believe in a creator god, remote and inaccessible. Primitive man draws no clear distinction be- tween man and animals. Totemism considers some animals sacred. The totem is an animal having a mysterious connection with the origin and well-being of the clan or tribe. Members of a totem clan do not kill the animal of their totem except under special circumstances. They must marry out of their totem. Plants, too, are supposed to be con- trolled by the spirits. Moreover the spirit of an- cestors may or may not be deified.^ 3. TABU This is an important item in primitive beliefs. Anything which is tabu must not be touched. It is set apart — sacred. A prohibition of any kind of food is tabu, e. g., with the Jews, pork, and with the Hindus, the cow. To violate tabu would bring injury to the clan. A woman after childbirth is tabu, also a dead body. At puberty, boys and girls are tabu. The person of the king, and even words, may be tabu. ^ The distinction between soul and spirit is not sharply drawn in primitive thought. The distinction between body, on the one hand, and mana soul or spirit on the other hand, is made in terms of behavior. Anj^hing that behaves in an unusual or unexpected manner has mana soul or spirit in it. The arrow, fishing spear or canoe that behaves queerly is possessed by mana or spirit. The body is that which be- haves in the ordinary fashion. At the points where social groups behave or need to behave in an unusual way the great spirits or gods are conceived and invoked. 12 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Why are things tabu? Because there is be- lieved to be some mysterious power (in Polynesia called mana, among the North American Indians, wakanda, orenda, manitou), resident in them or associated with them in some way, which, if the tabu is violated, will work injury to the violator or his tribal associates. Anthropologists employ the word "mana" to designate the mysterious force or influence which primitive man believes to be widely distributed through nature and which operates through all sorts of objects. 4. MAGIC One of the most striking features of primitive conduct is the belief in and use of magic. Magic consists of various special devices and procedures through which control of the mysterious powers which surround man is obtained for the advantage or the group or the individual. Out of the technique of primitive magic has arisen two very different types of technique. One is the technique of science which aims, by the use of delicate and standardised instruments of observa- tion, measurement and calculation, such as fine balances, micrometers, microscopes, microtomes, dividing engines, statistical tables and algebraic formulas, at acquiring an accurate and economic in- tellectual control or shorthand formulation of the order of nature. The other is religious technique, which aims, by its symbols, rites, prayers, et cetera, at bringing into right relation with one another the human group and individual on the one hand, and PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 13 the Supreme Power, who is the custodian and dis- penser of the values on participation in which depend individual and social well-being, on the other hand. In brief, religious technique aims at vital, moral and spiritual control. Both these techniques have grown out of primitive magic which was primitive science and religion in one. Religion and magic became differentiated as religion came to embody more clearly and rationally the organization of human values into a coherent and socialized whole, and thus to furnish explicitly the motives and sanctions for a higher social-moral order ; while magic, incapable of development into an agency of social moralization and rational spiritualization, re- mained merely a technique for the satisfaction of isolated interests and irrational passions. The Hebrew-Christian and the Greek lines of develop- ment are most instructive and significant in this regard. Magic is the ancestor of technology, the an- cestor of what we call applied science. Medicine springs from it. The individual medicine man or Big Medicine among the aboriginal inhabitants of this continent was a man who, by reason of special ability and training, was able to do things that the ordinary individual could not do in the way of controlling mysterious forces of nature. The word "medicine" was applied not merely to what we call medicine, but to rain making, cloud making, wind making, getting strength into the war party, harming their enemies, etc. When we want any- thing done in what we call the arts of technology, 14 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY we go to a special individual, e. g., physician, engineer, carpenter, plumber, who has a special training. The medicine man was a man technically trained and able to control mysterious forces. Of course, the ordinary member of the tribe as a hunter, fisher, etc., had his training, and he could do the ordinary things in the ordinary way. But if he wanted anything special done, he went to the medi- cine man — the Shaman. Two kinds of magic are found, i. e., two kinds of magical control, viz. : — 1. Contagious 2. Homeopathic. The basis of the belief in contagious magic is that power is transmitted by contagion, by contact with some being in whom this power resides. That belief is the source of one of the most wide-spread and solemn ceremonies in religion, the partaking of the god in the sacred meal — the banquet with the gods. Where totemism exists, we find that, whereas ordinarily the individual would not kill the animal, a certain part of that animal is eaten in the sacred meal and strength is derived therefrom. Can- nibalism is partly due to this. The savages did not always eat the bodies of their enemies because they were hungry. Possibly they had plenty. But if the enemy were particularly strong, they would get some of the strength by eating their bodies. And similarly, if the individual or the tribe, not being able to get hold of the whole persons of their enemies, could get hold of some parts of them, they PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 15 could do them deadly injury. If you have the hair, clothes, scalp-lock, et cetera, you have the enemy in your power. The magical power of names of birds was due to the supposition that power resided in the names. The other form of magic is homeopathic. Not only like cures like but like causally affects like. The original dogma of homeopathy is found deeply im- bedded in primitive thought. So, if you could not get hold of anything belonging to your enemy, you might make an effigy and vent your anger on it. This practice has come down to modem times. Primitive man believed that he was hurting the original by injuring the image. Rain making, wind making, cloud making, the dance, imitating the com planting, imitating the activities of war and the chase, — these procedures were means of tapping mana, the mysterious force pervading nature. As a familiar instance of homeopathic magic, I would cite the story of the brazen serpent. The Israelites on the way through the wilderness were attacked by a plague of serpents, and the brazen serpent was the means of curing that plague by homeopathic magic. There is a tendency to believe, and there are people who still believe, in the efficacy of the bones of the saints, even the very small bones and frag- ments of their garments, to cure diseases. People still believe that by a few words a priest actually transforms bread and wine into body and blood. Some people, especially the peasantry of Europe, have recourse to love charms and to injurious magic. 16 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY In the course of the development of civilized society, a differentiation took place in the magic, between black and white magic. The rulers and the people of Israel were forbidden to have re- course to soothsayers. We find in the Middle Ages in Europe a belief in black art, black magic, evil eye, and various forms of witchcraft, a belief which is still in existence in the minds of a good many people who still live in the Dark Ages. Many students of that subject have argued that from the first there was a fundamental difference between magic and religion. I believe they have one origin — the belief that superhuman agencies may be employed for either human ill or weal. The differentiation into magic and religion takes place gradually. Those special and mysterious methods, through which the mysterious powers which environ man are controlled, are placed in some person or group of persons. Of course, whatever ceremony or deed is for the welfare of the group is good. But now the individuals who want to satisfy their desires, their loves and hates as individuals, will have re- course to magic to gratify a passion which may dis- turb the order of the group. An individual, for example, falls in love and has recourse to a magician to get another person as a husband or wife, which may be bad for the social order. One has a grudge against an individual and tries to bring him to de- struction. There thus arises a difference between anti-social magic and religion. Magic in general is a specialized kind of method for obtaining control over these mysterious forces that surround and in- vade the life of man. PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 17 5. MYTHOLOGY Among all primitive peoples and in the early- literature of civilized peoples we find a great variety of stories to account for the origin of the various things in the world and to account for how things took place. Man asks from the beginning, why and how? Why and how, are the questions which we try to answer by science and philosophy. Myth is the lineal ancestor of science and philosophy. Myths are stories invented to account for that which exists, to account for the world, for man, and for his various customs and beliefs — in short, to explain why and how. We have, for example, cosmogonic myths, stories to account for the origin of the world, and anthropogenic myths, to account for the origin of man. Then we have stories to account for the origin of culture. We have culture heroes. Death is not regarded as a natural affair by primitive man. Death is believed to be due to the intervention of some malevolent or at least not well disposed power. Normally it should not take place. So we have all through history crude explanations of death, as e. g., the influence of the serpent, the devil, sin. Now the fact that many of the stories seem very childish should not blind us to their pur- pose. St. Paul said : "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child ; now that I am become a man, I have put away childish things". At the time of the origin of these myths, mankind was in a state of intellectual childhood. The savage gave free play to his imagination and was not checked by any acquired body of scien- 18 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY tific principles and of scientific methods of pro- cedure. Nor was he checked by the evidence of the validity of these principles. Consequently he thinks in pictures, and just as he interprets the phenomena of nature in the way we have seen, so he must make use of his own crude, disjointed picture-thinking to account for the origin of things. For instance, today, if anybody asks a scientist how man came on this earth, the scientist will say that he descended from an ape-like ancestor who lived in trees and later developed language, invented fire and tools, and organized societies. That is the evolutionary ex- planation of the how of things. We say that the earth was formed through the condensation of a nebula, or through the aggregation of meteoric star dust on the little core of the planet. Development or evolution by natural processes extending through immense periods of time and proceeding from the simple to the more complex — such is our evolu- tionary doctrine of the origins of the earth, animals and man. When we come to the higher types of myth as to the origin of things, we find two main kinds or types, — though not all, perhaps, can be thus classi- fied. One type of explanation of the origin of things is that they are due to a male and female principle. It is very obvious why man would explain things in terms of his own experience, as due to male and female powers. Another type is the notion that from the beginning there were two opposing natures in things. The whole process of creation is due to the conflict of these principles. This notion em- PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 19 bodies on a cosmical scale that conflict which is so universal a feature of common life. The Chinese, for example, have two principles, Yang and Yin — light and darkness. And I do not think that they regard these principles as male and female. They are opposed principles, positive and negative. All things have sprung into being from them. The ancient Persians have two conflicting principles. Sometimes in Persian literature we find the view that these two principles sprang from the same original source; but on the whole the Persian thought is that two opposing principles worked, viz., Ahura Mazda and Ahrimanes. We find, among other peoples, various con- ceptions confusedly intermingled. For example, one myth is that the sky is the female principle and the earth the male principle, and from these all things came, from a primeval chaos. Without any consistency, the ancient Egyptians believed the separation of earth and sky was due to the sun. They forgot their own myths of the genesis of the sun by the earth and that the sun was formed from chaos. Another conception was that the sun god is the father of gods and men. The Hebrew and Babylonian myths have a fun- damental similarity. They both presuppose a pri- meval chaos. Tiamat is the primeval chaos. The Babylonians conceived it as water. And the origin of things was due to Marduk. In the book of Genesis it is stated that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth", the meaning be- ing, not out of nothing, but out of chaos. And the 20 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY word that occurs for this primeval chaos is Tehom — "the abyss". There is no question but that the story of genesis in the book of Genesis is an elevated form of the Babylonian story. It is of special interest to note briefly the features of some of the main Greek cosmogonies because mankind emancipates itself first from this confusion we are dealing with among the Greeks. Homer does not represent a very religious point of view. Some of the actions of the gods as depicted by Homer aroused the ire of Plato and other philosophers. Of course, we are not to take these seriously. The book was compiled in the present shape in a very sophisticated civilization tinged with skepticism and irony. The original beings in Homer are Oceanus — heaven, and Tethys — earth. But behind both stands the goddess Night. The Orphic cosmogony is similar. Water and land are the offspring of earth and heaven. Two other stories are worth noting. Hesiod says that all things sprang from chaos, which meant space. From space first came Gaia, the earthly mass and Eros — love or desire. Then sprang Erebus and Night, then Ether — day. Pherecydes brings in a trinity the first member of which is an eternal spiritual principle. The first and mightiest is Zeus ; then comes Chronos — time. From Chronos sprang fire, air, and water. The third principle is Chthonia, Earth-Spirit. These three seem to be alike eternal, although Zeus is the most powerful and, as Zeus-Eros, is the principle agent in creation. PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 21 REFERENCES ON GREEK AND HEBREW RELIGION Ency. Britannica, 11th ed., Articles Greek Religion and Hebrew Religion. Murray, G., Four Stages of Greek Religion. Adam, J., The Religious Teachers of Greece. Cornford, F. M., From Religion to Philosophy, pp. 73-122. Kautsch, Religion of Israel, in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible. Article Israel by Kennett in Encylopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites. Fowler, H. T., History of Hebrew Religion. REFERENCES ON THE PRIMITIVE WORLD-VIEW Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Articles on Cos- mogony and Cosmology, Mana and Magic. Carpenter, J. E., Comparative Religion, Chapters III and IV. Coe, G. A., The Psychology of Religion, Chapters V, VIII, IX. Clodd, E., Animism, sections 1-9. Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough, Vol. I, Chapters I-III. Haddon, A. C, Magic and Fetishism. Kingsley, M. H., West African Studies, Chapters V-VIII. Thomas, W. I., Source Book for Social Origins, 651- 735. Reinach, S., Orpheus, Chapters I-IV. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Articles on An- imism^ Magic and Mythology. l/jevons, F. B., Introduction to the History of Religion. Marett, R. R., The Threshold of Religion. Brinton, D. G., The Religions of Primitive Peoples. Tylor, E. B., Primitive Culture. Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms of the Re- ligious Life. Crawley, E., The Idea of the Soul. CHAPTER III THE DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE FROM RELIGION 1. THE RISE OF PHILOSOPHY TO INDEPENDENCE The first influence that made for independent intellectual inquiry into things was the break-down of the primitive world view. In order that man may understand and control the forces operative in the world, it is necessary that he discover the sequences among phenomena. Now when man discovers that there is regularity of sequential relations among phenomena, that is a discovery of what we call the causal relation, that is to say, one thing is invariably dependent for its appearance on other things. The regular antecedent is cause and the regular conse- quent is effect. From the beginning man must have tried, in so far as he exercised his intelligence, to discover causal relations, and, as I have pointed out, the primitive world view is a theory of the causal de- pendencies, of the regular sequences of events. And from that theory there follows certain practices. Magic and religion aim at methods of control over the causes of things. Surrounded by mysterious forces that affected him, that operated on him for weal or woe, early man formulated a theory of the characters of these forces from his experience. He regarded things that affected him as expressions of (22) DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 23 forces, spirits, gods, as mysterious or supernatural operations, and devised means to control them. Science today is concerned with the same problem. But between our science and practice and the beliefs and practices of primitive man lies the whole his- tory of science and philosophy as independent enter- prises. There are three fallacies to which the primitive man was prone. There are many fallacies, but these are the three most prevalent and persistent. The modern man is still a prey to them. A train- ing in scientific habits of investigation and of per- sistency in analyzing things into their elements, is to get rid of the influences of these fallacies. These are: 1. "Post hoc ergo propter hoc". 2. The neglect of negative instances. 3. Classification by means of superficial resemblances. The fallacy of "post hoc ergo propter hoc" in English means this : That because we once or twice observe one thing to follow another, therefore that which follows is the effect of that which it follows upon. Conversely, that which we have occasionally observed to immediately precede an event is the cause. Because of man's native propensity to jump to conclusions, a single instance of a sequence will be taken as evidence of a causal dependence. His primitive and persistent credulity makes such a belief, once formed, very difficult to dislodge. The superstitions that still prevail among human beings, especially feminine beings, are due to the persistence 24 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY of primitive causal theories and beliefs that owe their rise to this fallacy. For example, that it is unlucky to take journeys on Friday; certain things bring bad luck; thirteen is an unlucky number, be- cause disasters have occurred when something was done on the 13th, or thirteen were at the table, — these are instances of primitive causal theories. Now, suppose the members of a tribe were starting on a hunting expedition and something unusual happened, as e. g., there was a great clap of thunder, a brilliant flash of lightning, or strange birds flew across the sky. Anything strange arrested attention. To primitive man, anjrthing that is mysterious has supernatural significance. They started out with that in their minds. They went on and were defeated, or did not get game, or the game turned on them and some of them were killed. Immediately the conclusion followed naturally that there was a causal connec- tion, that they should not have started, or that they should have propitiated the spirits who sent the birds or the lightning. We only are able to eliminate these fallacies by a thoroughly exact analysis which leads us to determine that there is some constant relation. Now as to the fallacy of making further obser- vation suit one's already formed belief and neglect- ing the negative instances, having observed that once or twice A follows B, the conclusion that A always follows B is made, and men never look for the instances in which A occurs and there is no B ; and they never try to analyze A and B to separate DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 25 relevant from irrelevant factors. The tendency to neglect negative instances is a consequence of that primitive tendency to believe what one sees in the lump, without further inquiry. Suppose, for ex- ample, you believe in the prophetic significance of dreams. Whenever a dream occurs that turns out to be even vaguely anticipatory of a later occurrence, you will chalk it down and other dreams will be over- looked. This is often the sole source of belief in the efficacy of certain therapeutic methods. You take some medicine and get well. The medicine may have had nothing to do with it. Nature cures ninety per cent of ills. So the doctor, no matter what the trouble is, has a tremendous advantage over the credulous patient, because when a person is in dis- tress, physical or mental, and looks for some remedy, and is told by someone else that something is good, whether faith healing or medicine, immediately, if he gets well, the patient concludes that it was the consequence of the advised remedy. The following is a story from the ancient Greeks. A certain Greek was skeptical as to the power of Neptune — in Greek Poseidon — to really control the waves. A friend took him into the temple and showed him a large number of votive offerings that had been put into the temple by sailors and fishermen who had called upon Neptune and the sea had become calm. This proved the case to the pious believer. But the skeptic said, "Before I make up my mind I would like to hear from those who were drowned", that is, to hear the negative in- stances of those who had called upon Neptune in 26 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY vain. It is very hard for humankind not to make up its mind until it hears from the drowned. Most people tend to jump to conclusions. The third persistent fallacy is classification by means of superficial resemblances. Identity of nature and operation is attributed to things that look alike in outline or behavior. A stick, a stone or a cloud looks or moves as an animal or man might, therefore it is animated by similar motives. The trees in the forest or the wind at sundown or dawn make sounds like the voices of men or animals, therefore they are alive. Animatism has one of its most powerful supports in this mode of reasoning which is, of course, the primitive form of the argu- ment from analogy. Resemblance or analogy fur- nishes one of the permanent modes of arranging facts in order, but we must weigh as well as count the points of likeness and balance them, as to both weight and number, against the differences. This precaution the primitive mind commonly fails to observe. What leads to the break-down of faith in the primitive world view? The development of civiliza- tion; the growth of social organization; the establishment of stable, well ordered states; the development in the arts of life ; agriculture and the industrial arts. When civilization develops so that it includes a large number of families with stable civic organization and advance is made in agricul- ture, works of architecture, engineering and the household arts, and especially when one people comes into contact with other peoples and observes dif- DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 27 ferences in customs and arts, keen minded in- dividuals make discoveries. They discover that the primitive theory does not work ; that good crops do not always follow on the propitiation of the gods; that success in war does not always follow upon the propitiation of the deities and supernatural powers. They discover that beliefs running back to im- memorial antiquity are often a hindrance to the welfare and progress of the individual and the group. In other words, a question arises as to the validity of these beliefs, because they do not pro- duce the results expected. In fact they may produce bad results. By familiarity with the qualities of natural objects gained through manual work, men dis- covered that there is a regularity of sequence and a constancy of behavior in things and that you can get certain results by taking account of certain qualities. It is discovered that by rubbing amber you can get sparks and if you do not rub, no incan- tation will bring forth the sparks. The development of political life through the organization of strong and stable states leads to higher moral conceptions. Some of the old customs are seen to be hindrances to the proper conduct of business, industry, and to proper administration and the progress of the social order. The develop- ment of social life in stability, the growth of justice, the definition of property rights, rights of contract, the growth of man's whole moral and social life as a member of society, brings to pass an increasing recognition of the significance of the personality of 28 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY the individual. There is more leisure, more oppor- tunity, more scope for exceptional individuals, for inventors and critics of the established beliefs and customs. The discoveries of new ways of thinking are always made by individuals. Masses of men never discover anything, never invent anything. It is always the exceptional individual who creates new ideas and values. The crowd is irrational, imitative and subject to the influence of suggestion. There- fore, the type of society in which there is develop- ment, scope and stimulation for the exceptional in- dividual, is the type of society which progresses most rapidly in the arts and sciences, which pro- gresses intellectually and spiritually. So far as we are concerned, we belong to the European culture system. Our culture is a con- tinuation of the European culture, and what I have to say about the genesis of philosophy and science will have no reference to the history of India or China. Up to the present time China has had no influence on the development of our culture, and India has had hardly any. So it is the development of European science and philosophy, of which we are the heirs, that I am concerned with. The earliest important civilizations were along the rivers — in the fertile river valleys. Babylonia and Assyria attained a high degree of development in written language, social organization, agriculture, and the mechanical arts. Some of their archi- tectural achievements are still sources of wonder, and their social and religious ideas were the ances- tors of some of the most fundamental ideas of the Hebrews and even of the Greeks. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 29 The next period of civilization after the river period was the Mediterranean. The shores of the Mediterranean were naturally favorable environs for the development of civilization. It is not very large, the shores are near enough together to pro- mote traffic, the climate is good, there are clear skies, varied rocky shores, fertile plains and pic- turesque river valleys. Apparently in the island of Crete there developed a high degree of civilization, the Minoan civilization. Crete was one center of advancement, but it was not confined to Crete. Asia Minor, the Hellespont, and other contiguous regions had their share in it. This civilization spread over the whole region and probably over a large part of the Mediterranean. There came down upon this early civilization and conquered the representatives of it, a people whom we call the Greeks and who call themselves Hellenes. They were in many respects less highly civilized than the people they conquered. They were Aryans, the race which we belong to. The Greeks had certain common features in their physi- cal build, the shape of the head, et cetera, which characterized them.^ A great advance in civiliza- tion, I think, has always involved intimate contact of two peoples. An isolated people does not ad- vance. And the contact of the Hellenes with the other peoples stimulated the Hellenes. It gave them ^ Perhaps the invaders were of the same racial stock as the more civilized people whom they conquered. This is an unsettled question. 30 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY material to work on, and they worked in a favor- able environment. The geography of the eastern Mediterranean is favorable to the development of human culture. There were beautiful promontories, inland mountains and valleys, good climate and plenty of sunshine, which afford favorable condi- tions to stimulate humankind. The economic con- ditions were also good, material wants were easily provided for in a genial clime and with slave labor. This is where we find the origins of science. Why were the Greeks so keen and creative? Originally, why did they possess such eager curiosity, such fertility of thought? They must have had them from the first, to some extent. Some- how, in their racial characteristics, there was a capacity for more advanced civilization. They inter-married with the aboriginal inhabitants. The most progressive races are always mixed races. The parents of science and philosophy are the Greeks. Science and philosophy's first independent disciples appeared about 600 B. C. The Greeks were traders, industrialists, trav- elers. One of the richest Greek cities of that time was Miletus, the birthplace of science and phil- osophy. Thales of Miletus, who flourished about 585 B. C., was the first philosopher and physicist. His school was called the Milesian School. Of his school were Anaximenes, who flourished about 540 B. C., and Anaximander, who flourished about 570 B.C. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 31 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. Thales said that the first principle of things, the substance or stuff of all things, was water. This does not seem like a very significant statement. The cosmogonies had already said that Oceanus was first. We have traditions that Thales did various things. He was a mathematician and astronomer and foretold an eclipse. He cornered all the oil presses, showing his business shrewdness. But for our purpose, the important point is, what is the significance of the theory that the substance of things is water? Thales held that every finite thing that comes into existence is a modification of water. He held the view that by condensation and rarefac- tion of water all things rise, and he actually at- tempted an evolutionary account of the genesis of man, and plants and animals. Thales regarded the substance, water, as having in it life. None of these early thinkers recognized any distinction between living and non-living, or mental and non-mental. They believed that every particle of the substance of things had the germ of life in it. They were all Hylozoists. They were all, in a broad sense. Evolu- tionists. Anaximenes said air or the ether is the sub- stance of things. Anaximander said that the un- limited (to apeiron), a boundless animated mass, is the substance of things. Why does Thales' theory constitute the birth of independent philosophy and science? First, it is a natural principle, one natural substance or principle, and not a multitude of mysterious spirits ; 32 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY an empirical substance is made the stuff and cause of all things. Second, Thales, I think, was un- doubtedly led to his view by observation and reflec- tion upon the mutations that water undergoes, its rarefaction and condensation. It solidifies into ice and rarefies into vapor. It enters into so many things; into rocks and breaks them. Things die without water, with enough water they flourish. Thales lived on an island in the ^gean Sea off the coast of Asia Minor, and his situation possibly sug- gested his hypothesis that water was the basic and all-inclusive substance of things. Herein lay the signiflcance of the first theories advanced by the lonians, Thales and his disciples; these theories all have this in common, however otherwise they may conceive the one substance, that they consist in the notion that there is one natural substance, stuff, material, out of which all things are fashioned, and that the whole variety of par- ticular things which exist, animals, plants, men, as well as rocks, air, ocean, the whole variety and the endless succession of actual beings, are fashioned out of the one natural substance, the primeval stuff which is not conceived as merely material. Its material characteristics are most obvious, but it is dynamic and living, and is distributed throughout the entire world, and all things arise from it through the operation of natural causes. So this one substance is living matter (Hylozoism). Now once a conception of this sort has been definitely formulated and shaped, there are several questions which logically arise. And the first ques- DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 33 tion which arises is this: What is permanent amidst or through all the ceaseless changes in particular beings? If the primeval stuff is con- stantly undergoing modification, then it never exists as such in the form in which it is conceived. What is it that is permanent? That is the first question. The second question is : What is the cause, or the causes, of the ceaseless flux, the endless modification of things, things arising, changing, passing away, and new ones arising? The clearness and con- sistency ^vith which various Greek thinkers raised and tried to answer these questions, once they hit upon the trail, is a mark of their genius. One of the greatest thinkers, Heraclitus of Ephesus (538-475 B. C), a city of Asia Minor, on the coast, answered the question by saying that nothing is permanent, all is change, ceaseless flux is the nature of things. There is no substance that retains the same characteristics and qualities. The world of nature is the theater of incessant mutation, "panta rei", -n-avTa >«", all things flow. But all change takes place in an orderly fashion, according to the eternally fixed law or decree — Logos, which in Greek means both word and reason, or thought expressed. This conception of Heraclitus is the ancestor of our doctrine of natural law. So far as the actual course of particular things is concerned, their un- ending fate is ceaselessly to arise and to pass away, but this fate is not the expression of the wills of animated beings or spirits, nor is it the result of 34 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY chance. It is the expression of rational order in the universe, and that rational order Heraclitus identified with God — Zeus. Now as to the causes of change, the doctrine of Logos or Reason or Universal Law means that there is no disorder. There is nothing that happens without reason or cause. As to the question, what is the ultimate cause, what in the last analysis is it that keeps things going, why this constant cyclical process of generation and decease, Heraclitus says strife is the father of all things finite. Struggle or conflict is an inexpugnable feature of reality. This old Greek thinker anticipated by many cen- turies the Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence, as well as HegePs doctrine of the develop- ment of reality through conflict. "War is the father and king of all things". The world is the theater of the ceaseless conflict, with ever varying results, of two opposing tendencies, the tendency toward discord, and the tendency toward harmony. But whichever may be in the ascendency at a par- ticular time in a particular region of the universe, whichever may have the upper hand, whether it be peace or war, all takes place according to law, ac- cording to reason, according to the eternal divine order. As to the stuff, the substance of things, Her- aclitus regarded fire as the best symbol, the nearest approximation that we have in experience. That may be conceived as the primary stuff. This is one radical solution of the problems of the relations of change and permanence, multiplicity and unity. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 35 But another equally radical solution and way to get rid of the problem of the opposition between the ceaseless changes that the world shows and the permanence of the primary stuff, is to say that there is no such thing as change. And this is the way that Parmenides of Elea, who flourished about 475 B. C, solved the question. For him the substance of things is one and unchangeable. Consequently, all the changes which we see are illusory, and all the multiplicity that we see in things is illusion. There is no motion or change in reality, that too is an illusion of our senses. There is no growth and decay in reality, and there is no plurality of beings, there is one and only one substance — "hen kai pan", ev Kal iravy the One and All. Parmenides was probably stimulated by Xe- nophanes who was a religious poet. He was especially interested in the religious aspect of philosophy and insisted that there was but one supreme and divine being. He criticised the popular doctrine of the gods, saying that the Ethiopian's gods were Ethiopians in color and made in the image of the worshipper himself, and that an ox's god would be like an ox. He criticised the attribu- tion of human qualities to the gods. Parmenides solves the problem of the contrast between perma- nence and change, unity and plurality, by saying that wnat we call change, growth and decay, birth and death, are illusions. What we apparently see through our senses, that there exist a multitude of beings, the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands, all these perceptions are illusions. There 36 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY is only one being. He conceived the One as like a material sphere, because the sphere was round and complete. And he defended his theory by argu- ments, showing the irrationality of belief in change and multiplicity. Zeno, his disciple, with great acuteness, developed a series of contradictions in- volved in the assumption that motion is real (the Achilles, the flying arrow) ; that there exists a plurality of beings (the infinite divisibility and the infinite extensibility paradoxes). These contradic- tions, he says, show the utter untrustworthiness of the senses. Now, of course, Parmenides and Zeno did not have to solve the problem, what is the cause of change? There is no need for a cause if there is no change or plurality. But they escaped that prob- lem to face another, viz., what is the cause of the illusion that we are all under? What is the cause of the universal belief that there is change and multi- plicity? They failed to explain this satisfactorily, and that failure is an immediate factor in develop- ing a consciousness of a new problem, viz., that of knowledge and error. The very diflftcult and im- portant question arises as to why we should err and how we can know anything, if our senses are wholly untrustworthy. The Eleatics solved the problem of permanence and change by eliminating change. Heraclitus solved it by making change universal and by affirm- ing that the only thing which is permanent is the law and order of change. Another series of thinkers tried in various ways to combine the two DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 37 notions. Empedocles of Agrigentum (495-435 B. C.) advanced the theory that there are four elements. These are permanent : — earth, air, fire and water. He took these from the myth-makers, his predecessors. These are the permanent and original things. The succession of particular beings that constitute our world is due to the inter- mixture of these elements in various proportions. They are always being mixed and separated, com- bined, dissolved and recombined. And he conceived every particular thing as a mechanical mixture of the four elements. As to the cause of this intermix- ture, he says there are two forces that exist through all time, they are eternal — Love and Hate. This is a more pictorial form of Heraclitus' doctrine of harmony and discord. And because love and hate are always striving against one another, is the reason why we have in nature the ceaseless succes- sion of all sorts of things and events. It is worth noting that Heraclitus, Empedocles and others be- lieved that the course of the universe runs in cycles. Leucippus was the founder of the atomic school. The mere fact that Leucippus first formu- lated the theory of atoms marks him as one of the most important thinkers that the world has ever seen. Leucippus' theory, more fully developed later by Democritus, was that that which is per- manent is an indefinite number of indivisible par- ticles of matter, the atoms. These are inde- structible, they never came into being and never can pass out of being. They exist in space. Why do they exist? There is no why. Space and 38 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY atoms are the original and indestructible con- stituents of being. The atoms differed in size and shape, and consequently in weight and mass. In tumbling about in space, they jostle one another and become compacted in various ways. The whole course of things is due to the ceaseless blind dance of atoms in space. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 B. C.) was another early Greek thinker who formulated an original theory of permanence and change, or unity and multiplicity. Like Empedocles and Leucippus, his idea was that the substance of things consists of indestructible elements. His elements he calls seeds, spermata. Aristotle calls them homoiomeries — like parts. Anaxagoras says that, when we analyze our perceptions, we find a very con- siderable variety of distinct qualities. We have, of course, to begin with, the qualities perceived through the senses; colors, shapes, sounds, tactual perceptions, temperature sensations, etc. Besides that, when we dissect a living being, we find dif- ferent kinds of stuff or structure, bones, nerves, blood-vessels, muscles. That is the starting point of the doctrine. Corresponding to every quality that we find, there is an indefinite number of minute parts or elements which havo the same qualities. Bone is made up of bone parts, nerve of nerve parts, muscle of muscle parts, heat of heat parts. We can smile at Anaxagoras because he did not have behind him the history of scientific analysis, of the minute analysis of things by use of the microscope, test tube, et cetera, which we have. But DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 89 Anaxagoras' doctrine of the elements is the ancestor of the modem chemical doctrine. The chemist, as a chemist, does not say that he can reduce all the elements to the same kinds of atoms. The physicist says that all the chemical substances may be composed of the same primary stuff, and if he is a metaphysical physicist, he is now apt to say that they are constellations of electrons. But the chemist simply reduces the physical world to things that cannot be further analyzed by chemical methods. The elements of Anaxagoras represent the not further analyzable qualities of the world, and he re- gards these qualities as due to the presence of a large number of minute particles which have the same qualities. That is, the substance of things, and all the ceaseless variety of beings which exist in our world are due to the intermixture and separation of these elements. As to the cause of these ceaseless processes of inter-mixture and separation, Anaxagoras is quite original. He says that these things cannot move of themselves. There must be something which moves them. He says we know that, when our bodies undergo a change, when we move our bodies, it is because there is a mind causing the body to move. As to the cause of movement, therefore, he argues that, just as you and I intentionally move our bodies, and through moving our bodies move other things to a limited extent, so there is a univer- sal mind which is the cause of movement. He calls this Noils — Universal Intelligence, He does not 40 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY conceive this mind in a strictly immaterial way, and he does not, so far as the preserved fragments of his teaching show, work out the difficulties and problems of how mind can act on matter. He does not even apply his theory of mind as the prime mover, except when he can find no other explana- tion. Mind imparts only the original rotatory movement to things. You may ask for the difference between Anaxagoras' view and the primitive animistic view. We may say, on the one hand, that Anaxagoras has a clearly defined doctrine of material elements, and, on the other hand, he conceived the universe as a unity, with one universal mind as the first cause of all the motion in the world. Neither of these views, in a clearly defined form, were present in the primi- tive animistic view of the world. All of these conflicting theories, in more elaborated form, have engaged men's attention throughout the centuries, since the doctrines of one or more natural substance and cause are attempts to account for the mutation, and multiplicity of things in various ways. We have the doctrine of the universal law acording to which all change takes place. We have a doctrine of a multitude of elemen- tary substances in place of the homogeneous sub- stance. We have various theories as to the causes of change: the love and hate of Empedocles, the harmony and strife of Heraclitus, and the elements and Nous of Anaxagoras. We have also the very radical doctrine that the whole world of sense per- ception is an illusion. DIFFERENTIATION OF PHILOSOPHY, ETC. 41 The conflict of these various theories brings into the foreground new problems, problems of which man had not hitherto been conscious. The first, was the problem of knowledge. The debate be- tween the representatives of these theories begets the critical spirit and man begins to ask himself, what is the relation between my thought and the things I think about, between my senses and the physical world, between my intelligence and the world? The development of the critical spirit means further that the spirit of inquiry does not stop with theoretical questions ; more particularly, it takes hold of the questions of belief and conduct. The critical views of the ancestral mores and religion of the Greeks resulted in the dissolution of the authority of the mores and traditional beliefs. So the problem of conduct becomes a central prob- lem. The critical spirit directs the light of intelli- gence upon the inherited customs and beliefs in matters of conduct, statecraft and religion. So we have the nature and authority of the good, the rules of conduct, and the rites and beliefs of religion, be- coming problems of critical study. When man becomes conscious of the fact that there are prob- lems of knowledge, conduct and religion, and sets about to deal with these problems systematically, then he has become conscious of the central position which his own mind occupies in relation to things. Out of these problems of knowledge, the good and religion arises the consciousness of the problem of spirit, of the meaning and nature of spirit or mind itself. All these problems come to a focus in Plato. 42 THE FIELD OP PHILOSOPHY REFERENCES Cornford, F. M., From Religion to Philosophy. Benn, A. W., Early Greek Philosophy. Burnett, J., Early Greek Philosophy. Rogers, History of Philosophy, pp. 8-48. Thilly, History of Philosophy, 7-50. Zeller, Outlines of Greek Philosophy, pp. 35-101. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy, pp. 16- 151. Zeller, E., The Pre-Socratics. Gomperz, Th., Greek Thinkers. Grote, G., History of Greece, Vol. VIII. CHAPTER IV THE PERSONALITY, MISSION, AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 1. THE PERSONALITY OF SOCRATES It is impossible to separate the teaching of Socrates from that of Plato. Plato makes Socrates his mouthpiece. It is a difficult and perhaps in- soluble problem as to where to draw the line of separation between their doctrines. Xenophon, who wrote, in his Memorabilia of his revered master, an account of the personality and teaching of Socrates, was an upright soldier, but was incapable of conveying an adequate account of the philosophical teachings of Socrates. He con- veys only the reverence of an honest soldier for the greatest man he ever knew. In Aristotle also, we have some condensed information as to Socrates. Here we are told that Socrates was the first phil- osopher to develop deduction and induction as a means of definition; and further, that he was the first to develop the process of division or classifica- tion of concepts. There is but little information further than this concerning Socrates in Aristotle. Socrates was born in B. C. 469, at a time when Athens was passing through the most brilliant period of her history. From 479 to 431 Athens was the most brilliant of all city states. Socrates (43) 44 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY died in B. C. 399 by drinking hemlock poison in ful- fillment of the sentence of death imposed upon him by the Athenian jury. Athens had entered upon the greatest period of her history, upon her age of supreme sacrifice and effort; and it was in just such an age that she de- veloped her greatest glory. (The age of Shakes- peare, and the present situation in America afford epochs that are quite similar to this). Socrates' work was carried on (as he prophesied it would be) by Plato, the greatest of all prose writers. He in turn was followed by Aristotle, "the master of those who know". The age of Socrates was one of enlightenment, criticism, an age of keen intellectual activity. This is evidenced by the great activity of the Sophists. This age of inquiry and criticism was succeeded by an age of creativeness. Athens was not only the center of politics and patriotism; it was also an intellectual center. This age in Athens was, in view of its brevity and the comparatively small size of the Athenian state, the greatest intellectual period in the history of the world. The Sophists, sarcastically so-called by Plato who did not like them, are contrasted with the philosophers as lovers of wisdom, who do not pretend to be wise. The Sophists arose in response to a definite social situation. They were profes- sional teachers in a time when there were no col- leges and universities. Plato's Academy was founded and directed by Plato, and it is here that we first find the true features of a university, viz. : PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 45 1. Research into all fields of knowledge, 2. The training of men for public service. Plato carried on his work in the belief that the state could not prosper without using the best trained men that were available. This was the high standard of Plato's Academy. As contrasted with this, in our state life, men of the highest training are often not wanted in public life. The spirit of critical inquiry was rife in Athens as it was in France before the French Revolution, and as it is in America today. It was an inevitable consequence that in such a situation hoary customs and time-honored traditions and beliefs would be called into question. Students in the colleges and universities of America today, coming into touch with the sciences and philosophy, may be similarly disturbed in their views. But this questioning atti- tude must be aroused if there is to be personal de- velopment and progress. The same is true in the life of a state. Traditions and customs must be critically analyzed and subjected to rational treat- ment. The Sophists made many claims, one being that they were able to make the worse cause appear the better. Some of them, notably Protagoras, held the view that man is the measure of all things. There are, indeed, two ways of taking this attitude of the Sophists: First, the individual with all his limitations, i. e., the particular, changeable in- dividual, may be taken as the measure of all things ; second, human nature in general, i. e., the immutable and necessary rational and moral element common 46 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY to all mankind, may be taken as the measure of all things. If the first view be accepted, then there is nothing objective in our moral distinctions and rules for conduct, and it may even seem that there are no means by which objective truth and good can be ascertained. It was in this attitude that some of the Sophists pandered to the gilded youth of their day and taught them that whatever one may want to do is right. Conservatism took alarm at this teaching. The standpatters of the day maintained that Athens was going to ruin, and that all civic foundations were being undermined.* The solu- tion offered by the standpatters of the day was that this procedure must be stamped out and that the cus- toms of the city state must be blindly and unques- tionably accepted and obeyed. "The old is the best", this is the constant attitude of the standpat- ter. Socrates saw the danger that would result to the individual and to the state from both of these attitudes. He seeks to use rhetoric and argumenta- tion for other purposes than to justify the momen- tary whims and opinions of the individual. While men were openly preaching that "might is right" and declaring that the only test of conduct is "does it pay in financial or political success", Socrates saw another way out of the dangers of the situation, viz., not by the cessation of thought, not by a dumb and blind adherence to tradition, but through earnest and persistent thoughtfulness. The way of reason * See the plays of Aristophanes. PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 47 was the only way out for Socrates. The cure for the ills of the day as proposed by Socrates was not the suspense of reason, but the systematic and per- sistent exercise of reason. Socrates felt that the Sophists were not in earnest and not intellectually equipped for the work to which they set themselves. He looked upon them as pretenders, fakers, (a goodly number of such Sophists are at large in our country today), men who said one thing to one crowd and something else to another crowd. Their own interest was their constant aim. The trouble with Athens, Socrates saw, was that the leaders had not made a deep inquiry into the principles of conduct and the social order. The way of salvation for the state and the individual, Socrates said, is to think out earnestly the problems of conduct. It was the prob- lem of conduct and not the problems of the early cosmologists that engaged Socrates' attention. He cared only for social and ethical inquiries. Socrates was a man of powerful frame and of great endurance. He was abstemious in his habits, but not ascetic, and was not given to eating or drinking to excess even though his companions all did so. He was kindly and good-humored, but unflinching in his devotion to the right, noble and magnanimous in temper. He devoted himself whole-heartedly to his mission, and carefully avoided mixing in politics, believing that if he did his life would be shortened. Three times he had the deciding vote on public questions, and at these times he braved the clamor of the multitude and 48 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY the voice of authority. He faced death without a tremor. His passions and his body were the com- plete servants of his rational will. He always re- garded himself as entrusted with a mission from on high and as being always under divine guidance. He repeatedly spoke of his "dsemon" or spirit, the supernatural, inner voice, which gave him warning at all the crises of life. Socrates was accused of the following three charges : — 1. Corrupting the youth, 2. Teaching atheism, 3. Introducing false divinities. The real causes of the accusation, however, were : — 1. Desire for revenge on the part of the exposed humbugs of the day, 2. The democratic reaction against the tyrants with some of whom Socrates had been closely associated, notably Alcibiades. Socrates, of all those in Athens interested in the problem of knowledge, knew that he was ignorant. The first step in the acquisition of true knowledge is the consciousness of ignorance. 2. THE METHOD OF SOCRATES. Socrates* method was directed towards eluci- dating or educing from the ordinary opinions of men in regard to virtue, the good, temperance, jus- tice, et cetera, consistent and adequate conceptions. PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 49 He believed that there is latent or implicit in moral common sense — (in the opinion of the average decent citizen) — sound conceptions in regard to conduct, but that these conceptions are implicit, i. e., not yet thought about. The ordinary man dealt with particular cases as they arose and had not thought things out. Socrates refers to his art as that of an intellectual midwife. He helped men bring forth conceptions that were latent or im- plicit in their ordinary opinions. The following will illustrate his method of pro- cedure: Suppose the question to be, "What is jus- tice"? The ready answer came: "Justice is an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, good for good, and evil for evil". Socrates would ask: "Is the man who returns good for evil an unjust man"? His answer was : "No ; one sees that such a man is just in a much higher degree". Thus by questions and answers he sought to elucidate universal ideas, aim- ing to get definitions that were applicable to every concrete case. Instead of the current sophistical view that the thing to do is simply to do what you feel like doing, Socrates maintained that we must reflect, think, and form rational notions of conduct. We must carry rational thinking through to the bitter end. In doing this Socrates took the definitions given off the bat, as it were, by those who knew (thought they knew) , and showed that such defini- tions did not square with the moral common sense of man. Socrates took a definition, set it up as an hypothesis, and then examined it to see if it stood 50 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY the test at the hands of particular cases. He re- flected upon facts and the foundations of hypotheses, and sought to test them by concrete cases. Such was the nature of the Socratic method. 3. THE SUBSTANCE OF SOCRATES* TEACHING. The substance of Socrates* teaching may be ex- pressed thus: "Virtue is knowledge; vice is ignorance. No man willingly does evil ; every man seeks the good." This seems to be an extraordinary statement. Offhand we would say it is false. "I see and approve the better, but I do the worse"; this statement we would approve. There is a wide gap, we think, between knowing and doing. We ordinarily believe we know what is right. We often say, "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise". We often think that knowledge produces corruption, and that it is wrong to think upon certain sacred matters and other matters that are evil. Socrates held that there could be no permanently good and useful conduct that is not guided by sustained thoughtf ulness and that knowledge earnestly sought and used would never lead to evil. If Socrates were here today, he would doubt- less say that what we call knowledge he would call degraded knowledge, or even not knowledge at all. Our handing out of cold storage pabulum to blindly accepting pupils is not the true way of im- parting and acquiring knowledge. Knowledge for Socrates was personal insight which men acquire by their own persistent activity. No one has any genuine knowledge which he has not discovered for PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 51 himself. We find no peptonized, predigested, after- breakfast knowledge- tablets in Socrates. Belief must cost the sweat of the intellectual brow, or it is not knowledge. It was knowing that had reference to conduct that chiefly interested Socrates. If one persistently endeavors to find out what is right or wrong, one will do so, for he has put his whole per- sonality into the quest. Knowledge that has to do with conduct is only attainable through an active quest ; it is the result of a voyage of self-discovery. This voyage of self-discovery must be made by each individual for himself. Only such knowledge is knowledge at all in Socrates' view. In literature we have some magnificent presen- tations of persons like Milton's Satan, who knew the difference between good and evil and deliberately chose the evil. Satan says: "Evil, be thou my good". Such an attitude Socrates would regard as impossible. He would say that Satan must have mistakenly regarded ruling at any cost as the highest good. In short Satan's choice Socrates would regard as based on a lack of true insight into the good. And indeed, the prevalent notion is that goodness requires little or no reflection. This is the very opposite of Socrates' view. This view is only the exaggeration of a great truth. Enduring good must be built on knowledge. There has been more evil wrought in this world by ignorant fanatics than by all the wise devils. This conception is strictly in line with Socrates' teaching. There is urgent necessity for the application of knowledge to the conduct of daily life, and it is the little attention 52 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY that has been paid to the theoretical problems of conduct and social organization that is perhaps responsible for our present international situation. This generation needs to be reminded that Socrates has lived. We are puffed up with knowledge about everything, but we have gained but little knowledge about the social and political conditions of good con- duct, and as a consequence of this we are using knowledge in that most stupid business of blowing each other to pieces. By our industrial processes we have increased a thousand-fold productivity in material things, but we have not learned how to distribute these goods equitably so as to increase the common weal. Socrates' conception of goodness was this: Goodness consists in the health or harmony of the soul ; it is the subordination and organization of the appetites and impulses under the guidance of reason and the good. This, said Socrates, is the truly use- ful. There is nothing of use that is comparable to the welfare of the soul. There is a view current that philosophy is use- less, since it does not tell us how to pile up riches, win law cases, achieve political preferment and operate machines. Socrates would doubtless ask us today : "Of what use are your machines, your vast riches, your thousands of pairs of shoes made over a similar pattern, your fast trains, your telegraph lines, your telephones, and motors"? We might reply: "See how luxuriously we live, how sumptu- ously we fare, how fast we ride, and how readily we communicate with each other"! But Socrates PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES 53 would reply : "Does all this contribute to the health and harmony of the individual ? Does it add to the poise and harmony of the people" ? The health and harmony of the soul are the only ends that are supremely worth seeking, and thus the good alone is truly useful. In matters of religion Socrates never spoke dis- respectfully or lightly of the finer aspects of the traditional forms of Greek religious life. Evidently his own belief was that there is but one divine being or principle — the guardian of righteousness — the moral governor of the universe. The deepest article in his own faith was this — "No evil can happen to a good man either in this life or in any to come." A supreme righteous order rules in the universe, and ultimately no harm can happen to a good man. It is, indeed, far better to suffer than to do an injustice. To return evil for evil is to in- jure one's own self. Such were the moral intuitions of Socrates. Coupled with these he had also a strong hope of immortality. REFERENCES Britannica, 11th ed., art's Sophists and Socrates. Thilly, History of Philosophy, 40-58. Benn, The Greek Philosophers. Zeller, Greek Philosophy, 103-118. Burnett, History of Greek Philosophy. Grote, History of Greece, Vol. VII. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol. I. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools. 54 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Xenophon, Memorabilia. Plato's Dialogues, transl. by Jowett; especially Pro- tagoras, Apology, Phaedo, Symposium, Theaetetus. Aristotle, Metaphysics (I, 6; XIII, 4), transl. by W. D. Ross. CHAPTER V PLATO — 427-347 B. C. HIS METHOD Plato extends the Socratic method of enquiry to other spheres such as mathematics and the physical sciences. There were four great problems which Plato attempted to solve, viz. : — 1. The problem of truth and of knowl- edge (Logic and Epistemology) . 2. The problem of the nature of ultimate reality. (Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion) . 3. The problem of the soul. This is the problem of philosophical psychology. 4. The problem of values, i. e., what is the good for men in society, and by '' what kind of conduct and social or- ganization can the good be attained? (Ethics and Politics). 1. THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE (LOGIC) In the skeptical theory of the Sophists, knowl- edge was derived from sense perception. Truth is therefore simply what you taste, touch, smell, feel, see. This theory Plato criticised. If this is the nature of truth, he argues, then there is no truth. The pig or dog-faced baboon is a measure of truth (65) 56 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY equally with the wisest man. Indeed "wisest" has then no meaning. This view denies that there is any test or standard of truth. Thus these skeptics, by saying that there are no standards of truth, re- fute themselves. If there is no truth this statement itself is not true. Plato does not deny that sensation is a factor in our knowing. Sensations furnish the stimuli by which we are led to think. True knowledge, however, is the soul's conversation with itself. By this Plato meant that knowledge is arrived at through the activity of reason or of thought, and not through the senses alone. The senses furnish the stimuli and the material for knowledge, but this material must be reflected upon before we can have knowledge. Plato insisted that knowledge is reminiscence. Inasmuch as we are unable to account for knowl- edge in terms of the senses and inasmuch as we have knowledge, the soul must have been bom with an inherent capacity for it and only gradually does the soul awaken to a consciousness of the knowl- edge that is implicit in its own being. Plato is here formulating the view that true thinking is not something derived from, but applied to, sense per- ception. True knowledge is not to be explained as the result of sensation or sense perception. We do not apprehend the contents of true knowledge through the senses alone; there must therefore be an inborn capacity in the soul which comes to con- sciousness through the stimulation of sense per- ception. Sense perception is merely the occasion PLATO 57 for getting knowledge, but there is no possibility of deriving knowledge from the qualities of sense per- ception alone. This position of Plato is expressed in Wordsworth's "Intimations of Immortality" when he says: "The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star, Hath had elsewhere its setting. And Cometh from afar: Not in entire fotgetfulness. And not in utter nakedness, But trailing clouds of glory do we come From Grod, who is our home:" Consider some of the kinds of knowledge that Plato has in mind. Knowledge of relationships is one kind or type. Relationships are not proved through the senses. Suppose that we deal with the properties of a triangle. We say that the three in- terior angles are equal to 180 degrees. Draw as many triangles as one chooses; they all differ in size, shape, et cetera, and of them all we say that the three interior angles of any triangle equals 180 degrees. But it is not true of these particular triangles as we measure them, for we cannot measure them absolutely. All actually figured triangles are more or less than we define them to be. We cannot draw a line having no breadth. Thus all the way through the complete body of mathe- matical relations, there is something absolute about these relations that is not perceived by the senses. Note briefly the relations : equals, greater than, and less than. Suppose I say that John Smith equals in height John Brown. He may also be 58 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY shorter than X and taller than Y. Therefore John Brown is at the same time equal to, shorter than, and taller than. Columbus is north of Circleville and south of Delaware. Columbus is also east of Dayton and west of Zanesville. Columbus is there- fore both north, south, east and west. We do not apprehend the relation of direction through sense perception alone. We do not perceive north and south. We cannot say where north begins and south ends. It is only by the mind that these rela- tions are apprehended. In knowledge we further classify data. There is no knowledge without the systematic ordering of things we have knowledge about. We order things in groups, series, classes. I refer to Teddy (my dog). There are dogs and men with this name. What do I mean by dog, man, bear. By man I mean a specific type of being who belongs to a certain class distinct from dogs, and that this class is dis- tinguished by certain characteristics. The empiri- cist claims that we perceive or "sense" those charac- teristics. Suppose that we had seen a bear that walked like a man ; would it be necessary to inter- pret and to classify that bear as a man? There must be a body of typical ways of behavior present before we classify the object as a man. As every triangle is a particular case of triangularity, so every man is a particular case of humanity. He shares in the attributes of humanity which make him such. No single man, however, embodies absolutely the attributes of humanity. Each in- dividual is only a partial embodiment of these PLATO 59 attributes, and as this is the case we do not per- ceive the attributes of humanity by the senses. We perceive through the senses only the particular in- dividuals, and no individual incorporates all the attributes of a class; no individual is the universal man. No man is humanity; no dog is caninity; no horse is equinity. One perceives this man, this dog, this horse, and that exhausts the range of percep- tion. Justice, injustice, temperance, and intem- perance, — what about these moral attributes ? We never say of any particular act that it is the com- plete embodiment of self-control. We never think that any act embodies all of justice. Each act is an embodiment of some universal quality or quali- ties. Every one of our experiences implies that there is a universal, and the universal is thought, not perceived; apprehended by the reason, and not through the senses. Mathematical relations, logical relations, class terms or class concepts such as humanity, caninity; ideas of value, (good, evil, beau- tiful), these are universals known only through the intellect, and only through these is knowledge possible. Without reasoning there would be only a disconnected riot — no sequence — of perceptions. That is what our experience would be without thought. But the fact that our experience is not such a riot — the fact that we order and classify and serialize all the facts of nature and the moral life implies that the soul is born with the capacity to think universals. The main types of these universals are : — 60 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY 1. Relationships. 2. Values. 3. Class concepts. What we grasp with our senses alone is with- out thought: Sense material is mutable, it ever fluctuates. Long since Heraclitus said that the world is in constant flux. -These universals, how- ever, are not in the flux; they are changeless and eternal. The propositions of geometry are eternally true; they do not depend upon someone seeing or smelling them. And we indicate this fact by saying that truth is discovered and not made or invented. The same consideration is true in regard to all relationships. Relationships never fluctuate. Equality remains equality, no matter what the em- pirical conditions of any particular object may be. The relationship **greater than" is always "greater than". Particular things become equal to, greater than, less than other particular things ; but univer- sals remain eternally the same. The fact that we judge acts as just and unjust means that there is a universal, unchanging justice. There is a universal of temperance or self-control. There is also a uni- versal of beauty. Men may come and men may go, but "humanity" remains forever the same. The type remains constant, and it is only on the basis of this permanence of type that all our forms of classi- fication are possible. Suppose that some explorer discovered a new type of animal life in some distant country and that the scientists were not sure whether this newly discovered creature is an anthropoid ape or a man. PLATO 61 How would this new specimen be classified? The scientist seeks to know whether it has tools, whether it speaks, whether it has society, art, etc., i. e., the scientist applies the universal idea of humanity and only on this basis can the new instance be ma- nipulated. The means by which we acquire or develop knowledge is through the possession by the soul of this capacity for grasping universals. True knowl- edge comes only from the activity of the soul in the acts of ordering and classifying the particular data in terms of the universals. 2. THE PLATONIC THEORY OF REALITY (Metaphysics) These universals through which we know, Plato calls ideas, — eidos, — idea, — form, — kind, type, — universal. These words all mean the same in Plato. In the Platonic theory there are two realms. The one is the realm of the forms, which is the realm of the eternal. The other is the realm of sense perception. This is the region of the mutable. It is important to guard from the beginning against a confusion which prevails even in the camps of philosophers themselves as to the use of the Platonic term idea. The ordinary man takes ideas to be something in someone's mind. This is the psychological sense of the term idea, and this use we have inherited from Locke, Berkeley and other British empiricists. These men declare that we know only what is in the mind, therefore we cannot know an objective physical world. Plato is 62 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY not a subjective idealist. To damn a dog we need only call him a bad name — this has been done in the case of Plato, but the Platonic idea is never in- tended to be something in our mind. The Platonic idea is a form, a pattern, a universal type, and exists whether any human mind apprehends it or not. These ideas exist eternally in the realm of ideas. Thus we see that Plato does not mean what we usually mean by ideas — they are patterns, forms, of which the things of sense are merely bad copies or imitations. Or again, a Platonic idea is an eternally existing type seeking embodiment in par- ticular contents, and because of the obstructing character of the material, no single particular is an adequate embodiment of the idea. This brings us to Plato's conception of matter. He called it non-being (to fxrj 6v) . Matter in Plato is the primitive, formless stuff out of which individual specimens or beings are formed through the in- fluence of ideas or universal types. He does not mean, however, that matter does not exist; he means to suggest that it is not a specific type of being. He means to imply that there is indefinite potentiality. Matter is nothing in itself, but it is that out of which all particular things are made. What then is the Platonic conception of the mode of operation of universals on matter. At this point Plato has a variety of answers. Things of sense and also our particular acts get their specific characteristics by participation in or imita- tion of the ideas. Every just act shares in the idea of justice; every man shares in the idea of PLATO 63 humanity. The realm of matter exists as the pos- sibility of both particular beings and particular acts. There are therefore three logically distinct realms in the Platonic doctrine : — 1. Realm of ideas, the perfect realities. 2. Realm of particular things and acts, which actually exist. 3. Realm of pure matter or non-being. This is an abstraction and does not exist as sicch. The ideas are dynamic ; they are causes. They effect the work of molding matter into the form of particular things that exist in the world of our ex- perience. Our world is therefore the product of the causal action of ideas on matter. If the ideas are eternal and thus have causal efficacy, why do they not produce perfect particulars? Why does not the kingdom of God immediately emerge? Why does not perfection in our ethical experience mani- fest itself? Here in our world there are no perfect dogs, no perfect justice, no perfect wisdom. Why not? The source of all particular things is perfect. The reason why no particular instance is perfect is that matter offers obstruction. It is recalcitrant to the operation of the ideas. Matter is mulish. There is a brute, irrational necessity in matter that obstructs the realization of ideas in matter. The Platonic view, therefore, is a teleological idealism involving a dualistic element. It is teleological in that it interprets the world in terms of purpose or final cause. It is dualistic in its conception of the two kinds of existence, matter and ideas. 64 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Aristotle holds that Plato severed the realm of ideas from the world of sense. Whether or not Aristotle's criticism be just, at any rate we are justi- fied in saying that there is a dualistic tinge in Platonism. There are two clearly distinct realms of being : — a) Realm of ideas, b) Realm of perceptual existence. The realm of ideas is above, but it enters into and shapes the realm of matter into perceptual existence. The realm of ideas is thus both trav^ scendent and immanent. The ideas of Plato are transcendent in that they go beyond actual experi- ence, and are immanent in that they are indwelling and operative in experience. Plato's theory of reality is also pluralistic to this extent, viz., that there is an indefinitely large number of universals, each of which really exists. The essence of pluralism is that there are many existents — many beings that exist. But Platonic philosophy is not a chaotic pluralism. The ideas constitute a system, the copestone of which system is the supreme, unitary idea — The Good, the many in one or the one in many. There is a doubt if Plato meant that the three logically distinct spheres — matter, perceptual exist- ence and the ideas — should be regarded as three worlds. The probability is that he regarded them simply as logically distinct levels of existence. It is not easy, however, to say what Plato's view was. He examines the difficulties in the way of his own theories and repeatedly revises them. His mind , PLATO 65 did not crystallize into an unyielding structure. In this respect Plato is the paragon of scholars. The constant prayer of the scholar should be this : "God deliver me from having a crystallized mind, from having a shut up mind." There is nothing so im- penetrable as such a mind. It is more impenetrable than steel. There are minds into which no novel idea can penetrate. The lowest level of existence is that of brute matter — mere matter which, in itself, is non-being. The precise meaning of this concept in Plato's system is not clear. Some authorities say that by mere matter he meant space. At any rate it is the formless stuff about which nothing more could be said, because it is formless. The second level is the realm of sense experience, and in this realm we can distinguish a number of stages. As an illustra- tion, one may take a tree. The tree embodies more universals than its seed. Imagine this tree sawed into planks. The planks mean more than the log. These planks may be further utilized and elaborate pieces of furniture made out of them. The fur- niture embodies more universals than the planks. An amoeba is not a very highly organized being, but man is highly organized, and thus he expresses more and higher universals. The scholar is much higher than the ditch digger because he also embodies a greater diversity of universals. You may take two volumes, both made out of wood-pulp. Suppose that one of these is the latest, best seller, and the other a volume of Plato or Bergson. The difference between these two is tremendous. The Plato or 66 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Bergson is vastly richer in meanings, i. e., universals, than the best seller. The third level is the realm of ideas or universals. Whether this is for Plato an entirely separate realm that communicates itself to the lower stages is not clear. At any rate, this much is clear, that it is the rational control of the lower levels. All meanings are from this realm. However small and ephemeral; however great and permanent; all order and value is derived from the realm of universals. The particular thing participates in many ideas or universals. Plato does not mean, e. g., that man participates in nothing but humanity, or that dog participates only in caninity. A particular is a meeting-point for many universals. If this were not the case one could never predicate any attribute of any subject. The only possibility would be to say, man is man and dog is dog, et cetera. But we say, f good, \ I wise, Socrates is : ^ older than, I shorter than, \^ etc. Good, however, is not tall, or young, or old. Good is good. But unless the particular does par- ticipate in a multiplicity of universals, it would be contradictory to make any judgments. Only on this basis is predication possible. The empirical world, therefore, is seen to be a system, not a chaos. For the universals constitute the network that binds particulars together. Anything may have anything in common with something else. A bottle of wine PLATO 67 on the table and the symbol, square root of two, on the blackboard, have the common character of being in the same spatial whole. It is a fact, therefore, that every individual is a meeting-point of ideas, and thus is the sense world constituted a system. Particulars of sense perception never ad- equately embody universals, and it is for this reason that sense particulars are always imperfect. In- asmuch as particulars are a system through sharing in the universals, the universals themselves con- stitute a system. All the ideas, forms (of which the particulars are the imperfect embodiments), constitute a system. The forms are all inter- related, and, though we may not see how all the universals are related, we can see how some are, e. g., ideas of justice and wisdom. We see that we cannot be truly brave without being just. We can see how moral qualities are interrelated. We can also see how certain metaphysical universals, as one and many, sameness and difference, are related. Sameness has no meaning apart from the idea of difference, and vice versa. If the world were a blank identity — as Hegel said, a dark night in which all cows are black — then our judgments involving predications of differences in all their forms would be impossible. It is the fundamental contention of Plato that universals are interrelated. The work of knowledge is to discover what are the universals, and how they are related. The idea of the good is the copestone of the Platonic system. This is the supreme idea. There is an absolute beauty, truth, justice, courage. But 68 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY the principle which unifies them all is the concep- tion of the good. Our imperfect and growing ideas of truth are only imperfect approximations to the realm of these eternal ideas. We make this ap- proximation through right thinking and conduct. It is by these two devices that we get a more systematic grouping of this ideal realm. This realm is a realm of eternal, perfect bliss, and its controll- ing idea is that of the good. Plato perhaps means by this doctrine of the good — God. All the order and intelligibility, all the meaningf ulness, in our world is an expression of the divine and absolute reality. In so far as we understand and feel and act wisely, just so far we grow in character and intellect into the likeness of the absolute and divine reality. The Final Cause of the world is the Idea of the Good. The world exists in order that the good may be expressed in a multitude of beings. Plato says that God, being animated by love and having no jealousy, desires that there should be as many beings like him as possible. As to the details of creation, it is impossible to give any exact scientific account. The doctrine of the ideas, however, Plato holds is scientific. It is not a myth, although he invents many myths, and many of these have entered deeply into the texture of Christian theology. Before creation there was this primeval potentiality of things (matter), and out of this God fashions the world. In doing this God first creates the demiurge. This is the divine, creative principle in making the world. Its functions are like those of the Logos in the New PLATO 69 Testament. This demiurge is the energy of God at work. The demiurge then fashioned a world soul, and then fashioned souls for each planet and star, after which he fashioned souls for human beings. Thus we have : — 1. World soul, 2. Planetary souls, 3. Human souls. All this process is effected that there may be as many souls as possible in the likeness of the divine. 3. PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL (Psychology) The soul means for Plato the principle of life and consciousness. We are here interested in his doctrine of the nature of the human soul. The human soul is tri-partite: 1. Highest part (noetic part), "vov^ edge are found in experience, and no reasonable ^vX^ rationalist will deny that postulate, but he insists ^ that the data do not fashion the tools by which knowledge is made. Indeed, Kant emphatically as- serted that there could be no knowledge without empirical data and became agnostic only at the points where such empirical data are not present. Empiricism has a tendency to confine experience to what we perceive through the outer senses, but in doing so it overlooks the fact that we have a large framework of affectional, moral, social and logical 300 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY context. It is this that empiricism seems peren- nially to overlook. The position that I take is called teleological idealism. Such a point of view makes an organic synthesis of the valid claims of both rationalism and empiricism. From this standpoint we explicity hold that the materials of knowledge come to us in experience, but the materials thus given are or- ganized by the activity of reason into the texture of our sciences. This native capacity of the reason is not to be interpreted, as many interpret Plato and other historic rationalists, as being a body of categories which have come into existence independ- ently of the creative or synthetic processes of ex- perience. The universal principles of knowledge are the mind's fundamental ways of working as these develop in and through the organization of experience. Thoroughgoing empiricism is nominalistic. Concepts and universals, which are the chief tools of science, are from this standpoint nothing but signs or symbols, and it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy what the relation is that subsists between the symbols and the thing symbolized. The thing signified or symbolized is not a matter of experience, consequently our con- cepts and universals are subjective formations; they are names for relations which arise in the mind be- tween ideas. Hume, who is one of the most instruc- tive figures in the history of philosophy because he worked out the logical consequences of empiricism, argued that the only kind of knowledge that has EPISTEMOLOGY 801 any certainty is mathematics. Now this certainty is due to the fact that mathematics deals only with relations between ideas. Such relations as these of identity, difference, magnitude and degree have to do only with the comparison of ideas with one an- other. Yet Hume is constrained to say that even in mathematics the oftener we run over a proof the more certain of it do we become. Repetition of similar experiences is the test of truth. Thus em- piricism is not just to the character of mathematics. Mathematics does not deal with existence theorems. It is not concerned with the existence of points, lines, circles, et cetera, in nature. Indeed it abstracts even from the relation of mathematical space to the space of perception. Pure mathematics deals with ideal constructions. Thus far Hume is cor- rect, but the validity of a mathematical theorem is in no wise dependent on the frequency of our running over the proof. In the last generation the science of mathematics has been very largely recon- structed by the discovery and the elaboration of more rigorous methods of proof. Keen, critical minds equipped with a passion for certitude have discovered flaws even in Euclid. Minds, in the highest degree equipped with the rational structure of which I spoke above, have criticised and dis- covered flaws in certain mathematical demonstra- tions which had been supposed to be irrefutable. But these more rigorous methods of proof have not in- creased in rigor merely by being repeated many times by many persons. 302 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY There is another difficulty with the empirical attitude. Granted that mathematics deals, not with existence, but with relations of ideas connected by- reason, we are justified in saying that mathematics is an invention. We must say that it is a product not of the senses but of the reason. But mathe- matics applies to the world in which we live. The triumph of the modern mechanical theory of nature is due to the faith its authors had that nature is a kind of crystallized mathematics. It is small wonder that Galileo and others called mathematics divine — "What we can measure we can know." Mathematics works. It works in its application to past experience, to present experience and further, to possible experience. The predictive power of mathematical science is great. Take this illustra- tion. In 1843 two astronomers made a calcula- tion, based upon the deviation of the observed path of the planet Uranus from the path it should de- scribe in view of the relations, the relative points and motions of the planets known by observation to exist. The path of Uranus as calculated from the observed relations of the recorded planets should have been of a certain character. The observed path, however, was aberrant. In view of this, what did the mathematical astronomers do? The astron- omer said, "there must be an hitherto unobserved planet" and he calculated the locus of this planet. At Berlin the royal astronomer heeded the order of the astronomers in question and looked as he was told for the planet and lo, it was there. This is only one of the evident cases of prediction. The EPISTEMOLOGY 303 more science develops by so much the more do we have cases of this kind. Let me note as a curious fact that Hume, who says that the whole idea of causation is a mere result of habit, presupposes the very idea he seeks to explain, inasmuch as he is already seeking a cause for the origin of our belief in causation. Rationalism is realistic. It is realistic in that it regards universals and other relations as facts that the mind discovers by the use of its funda- mental ways of working. Reality has rational order, texture, coherence ; it is not chaotic, and it is because of this doctrine as to the texture of reality that rationalistic realism finds a place for science, whereas for nominalism science is but a set of sub- jective symbols of an unknown reality. Science is objective in its application. Rant, though he answered Hume, never freed himself completely from the influence of empiricism. He said that the materials of knowledge come into the mind as a chaotic manifold and that mind, through its synthetic organizing power, arranges this chaotic mass into the ordered whole which we call the world. The mind puts the relations into nature. This view is an inconsistent one, for, if mind puts the relations into nature, then the world is the fabrication of our own powers and we are not delivered from subjectivity. Later idealists start from Kant's view that mind is an organizing principle, and they hold that the successful working of the mind in the world shows that the environment has an intelligible 304 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY texture. This is what objective idealism teaches. It is not that we know only ideas as Berkeley argued, but it is the fact that we are analyzing the nature of mind and finding that it has this structure, which also has its correlate in nature, that gives efficacy to mind. Mind is an effective part of the world. In short, mind is at home in the world. Wm. James, who partially misunderstood rationalism, and was at the same time rightly dis- satisfied with empiricism, called his view radical empiricism. It is pure mythology, he says, to argue that all that comes to the mind is mere disjecta membra. We cannot put our finger on any dis- connected item of experience. Every item is re- lated. The minimum of experience at least involves the relating implied in the answer to such a question as, "what is that?" The mind starts out with its classificatory tentacles, its incipient universals. We are everlastingly propounding the question "what does this fact mean?"; and thus we start on the end- less process of relating data. There is no such thing as an unrelated datum of sense. Psychologists are now agreed that there are no such things as pure sensations. James misunderstood rationalism in so far as he thought that it is one of the cardinal doctrines of this view to suppose that mind comes down from above, as it were, and puts relations into the data in an external fashion. James, in his doctrine of a "pure experience" free from the dis- tinctions and relations which thought makes, over- looked the fact that it is impossible for us to have mere sensations, although, in other passages, he EPISTEMOLOGY 805 recognizes that there are no pure sensations. He seems to have held that this so-called pure experience is the reality which thought distorts and disfigures. The truth is the mind is always active and all that comes to mind is related. The meaning of this is that our world has an intelligible, rational, texture or structure. 2. KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY We have already discussed incidentally the place of knowing in reality. It now remains to gather up briefly these suggestions into a systematic view. The simplest answer to the query, what is the relation of cognition to reality? is called naive or presentational realism. This is the view of the com- mon man (that horrible example) , the person who has not thought of this problem. He is naive; for him there is no distinction between mind and the object of mind. For him mind is at one with its object. The object known and the knowing process are numerically and qualitatively identical. This position is untenable. No two of us in this classroom see this table before me in the same way. Your perception is a function of your posi- tion, of light, shade, of movements and of infinite other variations. In fact your perception is a function of your sense organs, of your perceptors as these are determined by your mental habits and interests. From Zeno down the skeptics have been pointing out arguments that show the duality of the knowing mind and the known objects. 306 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY One remove from naive is representationcd realism. The stock example of this point of view is John Locke. This views admits the validity of the criticism just made of naive realism, and so this view starts from the existence of images and mental conceptions and says that we know only our ideas. Our ideas are representations, copies, symbols, of the real things. It is quite true that representation does play a considerable part in our knowledge. In response to my request, you describe the State House. In doing so you call up images of the State House. Your idea is a kind of representation, replica or copy ; but how do we settle whether the description you give is a copy? We appeal to the fact. The fact confirms or rejects the copy. If we take, how- ever, the copy view on all fours, we never get any- thing but ideas. Then how can we settle, how can we ever agree? Representational realism is only a half-way mansion ; we cannot stay at this place. Any man that thinks must pack up his tent and move on to some more substantial city. One more remove is the position known as phenomenalistic realism or idealism,^ Ernst Mach, Karl Pearson and in part Immanuel Kant are representatives of this position. These men assert that we do not know reality. We cannot tell to what extent, if indeed to any at all, our ideas truly represent reality. The really real things forever retreat up the spiral stairway of ^ Improperly so-called. It should be called phenomenal- istic psychologism or ideaism. This is Hume's position. EPISTEMOLOGY 307 reality. We reach out our conceptual tentacles to make a seizure into reality, but we remain in the veil. Between us and reality there is a wall of partition which not even the Allies can demolish. We do not know reality. Herbert Spencer too has contributed to the teaching of phenomenalism. He calls his position transfigured realism. In our knowing reality, he says, we transfigure it ; it becomes in the knowledge context something quite different from what it is outside the knowledge relation. The knowledge relation does not bring us into touch with reality as it is. Yet Herbert Spencer is convinced that there is a reality, and that this reality is an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed. Let me briefly indicate two diflficulties in this view: (a) Knowledge works in the world. In the only world with which we have anything to do, we find that knowledge does function effectively, and we further find that the increasing success of knowledge is due to the fact that we have analyzed and systematized our experiences. Errors are half truths. Illusions are experiences wrongly inter- preted, set in the wrong relations, in the wrong context, and the distinction between the knowledge of phenomena and the knowledge of reality is only a distinction of degree, (b) Phenomenalistic ideal- ism is inconsistent in the very distinction which serves as its starting point. How do we know that we know only phenomena, if we do not know the real? The lapidarist says of a certain specimen handed to him, "this is a sham diamond." Such 308 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY pronouncement is impossible unless there be a knowledge of the real diamond. Phenomenalism assumes that there is a veil between us and reality. How do we know it is a veil if we have never been through the veil and looked upon the holy of holies ? Our world of experience is the only world with which we have to deal. The phenomenalist makes a distinction which involves him in a contradiction. By what sources does he know that we do not know real things ? There is no meaning in the distinction between the sham and the real, unless we know enough about the real to be able to compare it with the sham. 3. CRITICAL REALISM OR TELEOLOGICAL IDEALISM. We know reality in part and are capable of knowing it more fully. This is the basic thesis of our position. It is also our contention that the progress of knowledge shows an increasing corre- spondence between mind or the knower and the world. There is a growth in the agreement be- tween thought and things, and this evolution is manifested in the progress of pure science and in its successful applications. Many of our ideas do seem to consist of mental representations of actual past or possible future experiences. Considered as ideas, these representations vary in concreteness and pictorialness from images to the symbolic formulas of mathematics and logic. But these representative ideas contain truth, because the representative experiences that human beings have EPISTEMOLOGY 309 had, stand for further experiences which may be had under definite and assignable conditions. The standpoint of teleological idealism is that mind is a live focus of reality, that there is an active correspondence of mind and reality, in short, it is that mind is a true part of reality. Minds are centers in which the nature of reality becomes con- scious of itself, and in this way mind is seen to be something very different from the old soul prin- ciple which was shut off by unscalable walls from the world. Reality is not something impenetrably hidden behind a veil. Reality is what is or may be experienced, and what may be inferred from ex- perience. The other side of the moon, the center of the earth and the polar ice-cap of the Antarctic region are items of rational belief which we infer from our experiences. By saying that there is ether or that there are electrons, what does one mean? I take it that we can only mean that these are logical constructions inferred from experiences. These constructions however, are based on experience, and if there are electrons, then under certain assignable conditions they should be perceptible. Otherwise the electron theory is a useless hypothesis. Reality is experience as actual or possible or both. Our minds and sense organs are genuine functioning parts of the real world. There is this active and effective corre- spondence between thought and reality and, since we make our concepts, our formulas and sjnnbols of things by thinking about sense data and since, furthermore, these formulas work in experience, it 310 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY follows that reality has an orderly or structural character. In short, we agree with Hegel in saying that reality is rational. What then shall we say of illusions and the so-called errors of the senses? In reality they are errors of judgment and not of the senses. The error is a function of the judgment which I make. The man in delirium tremens has a real experience, so also the one who sees ghosts, but it is only in his interpretation of his experience that he errs. He does not set his sensory data in their right relations. In epistemology one of the most hackneyed illustra- tions is the case of the straight stick that is bent in the water. In the water it looks bent, but we say it is really straight. The bentness of the stick is due to the different refractive power of air and water. The visual stick is really bent, but the tactual stick is not bent and further, the visual stick out of the water is not bent. Which is the real stick? We live most of our time on land, and we have learned that the properties or qualities which are practically important for us are those an object has when close to us. So we agree to make cer- tain sets of conditions define the standard for us and we all agree to that. The "real" stick is the result of the tacit agreement among us socially as to what aspects of the whole series of sensory qualities called "stick" are most important. Our standards of measurement are all of them postulates of the social will. They are a matter of social con- vention. So then, to return to the stick in the EPISTEMOLOGY 311 water, suppose that we were like seals, living in the water and were without hands, the type of im- portant qualities would doubtless vary greatly from what it now is. Or suppose that we lived on the surface of a sphere and were unable to lift our- selves up. Here also we would have a very dif- ferent set of standardized qualities and relations. It may be objected to this view that what we mean by a real thing is the thing as it exists independently of our perceptions. To this I reply, yes and no! Independent of my perceiving it, yes ! But no mean- ing can be attached to the idea of an object existing independently of anybody's perceiving it. The inde- pendent reality of an object is the reality of some- thing that can be perceived under definite assignable conditions by any percipient organism like our own. Who cares about a real object which is apart from and indifferent to any percipient organism ? The real world is the world of social per- ceivahles. It is the world of things which under definite conditions can, by anyone equipped with the proper mental and sensory equipment, be ex- perienced. Some say that the real object is what God or the Absolute perceives — I don't know what he perceives. When we take into account the specific char- acteristics of the percipient, his place, his relations to objects, his history and interests, we can recog- nize that what he perceives is relative to him and yet real. Teleological Idealism or, as it might be called. Critical Realism, is the view that we know reality, not uncritically, however. It is a fact that we do 312 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY perceive, and it is further a fact that we can im- prove our perceptions by means of the organizing activity of thought. This circumstance indicates, it seems to me, that the world is in agreement with mind. Many critics of objective or teleological ideal- ism shoot wide of the mark, because they insist on identifying all idealistic standpoints with either phenomenalistic "ideaism" or Berkeleyan idealism. Modem or teleological idealism from Hegel down to the present is realistic in its epistemology, as in- deed so were Plato and Aristotle. It insists that the human mind knows reality, through experience, as the resultant of the active intercourse of the knower with his world. Knowing may be described, on the one hand, as the process by which the real world becomes conscious of itself in human minds ; or, on the other hand, as the process by which minds transcend their merely "given*' or biological indi- viduality by becoming aware of the qualities- in-organic-relation which constitute the world. In short, the organization of experience is the or- ganization of selfhood, through the increasing dis- covery of the nature of reality. The knower, in his perceptual reactions, apprehends in some degree and manner the actual qualities of the real. The knower in thinking, and thus organizing perceptual experience, is discovering the systematic and intel- ligible character of reality as an ordered whole of things-in-relation. The very realistic character and practical success of human knowledge indicates that reality is a purposive and intelligible order. To EPISTEMOLOGY 818 hold this is the essence of teleological idealism which is thus, a metaphysical theory of reality. Reality as a whole has a significant structure. But such a view is built on an essentially realistic conception of the function of knowing. We know reality in perception and thought, and we know reality thus because it is responsive to the aims and activities of minds and, therefore, is the expression of intel- ligence or reason. REFERENCES Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, especially Chapters 7 and 8, Philosophical Essays, and Our Knowledge of the External World. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, Book II, Chap- ter II. Des Cartes, Meditations; Locke, Essay Concerning Hu- man Understanding; Berkeley, Three Dialogues, and Prin- ciples of Human Knowledge; Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sects. II to VII, and Treatise, Of the Understanding, Parts I and III. Kant, Prolegomena, and Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel, Logic, and Phenomenology of Mind. Mill, J. S., Logic, Book II, Chapters III and IV. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Chapters XV and XXIX. Joachim, H. H., The Nature of Truth. James, Essays on Radical Empiricism, II, III and IV, and Some Problems of Philosophy, III and IV. The New Realism, Essays by Perry and others. CHAPTER XXVII THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH The problem of this chapter is the fundamental problem of Logic. Inasmuch as philosophy is the application of logic to the systematic interpretation of the most general features of experience, we have been compelled to use the logical criteria of truth all along the line in this course. It now remains to state systematically what these criteria are and to examine them critically. There are three chief doc- trines on this matter — (1) the Copy Theory, (2) the Pragmatic Theory and (3) the Rationalistic Theory. 1. THE COPY THEORY OF TRUTH According to this theory ideas (including in the term "idea," images, concepts and propositions) are true if they are good copies of reality. Ideas are mental representations of realit ies. Some of theriTTtEat'ts, imagesT are p ictures of realities. Some of them, ab stract c oncepts and propositions, and in general the conventionalized formulas of mathematics and science are linguistic symbols of realities. It is not necessary to spend much time now ex- amining this theory. A g reat many of ou r_ideas, namely all those which r efer to objec ts not present to sense, are either_j::ejireafintatives or syinl)oIs~of (314) THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 315 realities. But the test of the validity or truth of these ideas is whether theycorresjioiid with, and will lead us, under the appropriate conditions, to an adequate experimental acquaintance with, the things which they represent or symbolize. The test of their truth fulness is their agreement with ex - perience. The knowledge about things which they appear to bear is true knowledge only in so far as they can be c ashed in in direct experience b v per- ceiving, handling, working with the things repre- sented by them. If I have an idea of a certain office building and the distance to it, my idea is true if it will guide me there. If I have a scientific formula, it is true if it will enable me to solve a c hemica lor an engmeermg problem . tJut when it is maintained that all ideas are copies of realities, we answer that if there are two worlds, the mental world of ideas and the real world outside, which are shut out from direct contact with one another, then we are landed in phenomenalism; and finally, when we think this doctrine through to the end, in an inconsistent subjectivism and skepticism. For, u nless we have direct acquaJ Tifanpp af anTvio pninfo with realitv. we can never know whether wp know a nything truly atiH wp r^n j\c\i. Avplaiii ^j^y ^yo shnnlH ^yiakp any HistinpfinTi af all bpt ween ide as and reality, between p henom ena and t hingsj n them- selves. 2. PRAGMATISM Pragmatism is the name that has been made fashionable by William James and others for a 316 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY theory of truth which is offered as a correction of the copy theory. I think the novelty and importance of the prag- matic theory of truth has been over-emphasized, probably because its progenitors, who were psychol- ogists, were overjoyed at finding a way out of the subjective world of the copy-theory into which the undue subjectivism of Locke, Descartes, Hume and even Kant had kept them imprisoned so long. If they had kept company more faithfully with Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, they would not have been im- mured in the prison house of subjectivism. The pragmatist insists, with justice, on the purposive or instrumental character of ideas. Ideas, he insists, are not eternal copies of external realities, but working plans of action, devised and invented by man to remove pains and discomforts, escape dangers, promote his affectional and prac- tical interests, maintain and enhance his own well being. The pragmatist is an evolutionist. He looks upon mind and all its products as biological instru- ments — like sharp fangs and strong jaws and swift feet, only much more powerful and supple weapons in the struggle for existence. Indeed, he admits that mind has the strange power of creating a cul- tural environment by which human life is lifted far above that of the brutes. Still he insists that re- flective thinking would, in all probability, never have arisen, and certainly would never have thriven, if the affectional life of the genu^ homo had always been serene and blissful without alloy, if his desires had always been satisfied the instant they made THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 317 themselves felt and if the satisfactions had never left him with a bad taste in the mouth, if promise had always led straight to fulfillment. Because of discordances, discomforts, pains, because of discrepancies between belief and experi- ence, expectation and fulfillment, thought arises and continues to work until the jarring discords are removed. "Thought is the means by which the consciously effected evolution of reality goes forward" (Dewey). The only part of reality which we know and are concerned with is in evolution. "Realit y is still in the making and awaits a part of itg'^m plexion froirrt he futur e" (William James). In fact, for the'pfagmatist, reality is jicst the process of experi- ence itself and experience is the result of the con- tinuous and active commerce of man with his natural and social environment, in which commerce, in saecula saeculorum, he remakes both environ- ments and remakes them again and again, even though only in small degree. Thics reality is the joint product of man's intelligent will and the en- vironing nature. There is no eternal nature of things which the mind has to copy or gaze at; or if there is, it is ultra vires, beyond the jurisdiction of the court of human intellect. The world that thought lives and works in is a humanistically colored world, a world that has engendered minds just as it has engendered stomachs and hands. But, of course, the pragmatist would not assert that the intellect has no larger or more varied uses than the stomach, although he would doubtless say that with- 318 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY out a stomach the mind could not do much in this world. But the pragmatist is not a materialist. In fact he is a kind of teleological idealist. For he holds that the mind is a very important kind of organic behavior. It is active and experimental. It not only reacts to stimuli in its own ways, but is a selective and successfully purposive agent. Ideas are not inherently true. They are not eternal verities. They are made true, become true by lead- ing to all sorts of satisfactory results. An idea of the way to a certain place to which you want to go becomes true by leading you there. An idea of a certain ethical or chemical process becomes true by leading to the promised land of results. An idea in education or social reconstruction is made true by being put to work and "delivering the goods." "The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."^ If you can cash in on the amount indicated by the idea, in the currency that the idea promises, the idea is made true. Ideas are checks drawn on the bank of experience. If they are returned marked "no funds," they are false. If the money is counted out to you in the shape of concrete satisfactions, they are true. The satisfactions may be paid in terms of worldly success, honor, fame, wealth, power; in terms of the gratification of personal affections, love, friendship, comradeship ; in terms of social welfare, * James, Pragmatism, p. 222. THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 819 in terms of aesthetic gratification, in terms of the mind's craving for intellectual satisfaction ; even in terms of the soul's craving for a God to lean on and commune with. The pragmatic method means "the attitvde of looking away from first things, principles, 'cate- gories', supposed necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts,*'^ "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assign- able reasons/'^ "True ideas are those that we can as- similate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideals are those that we can not,"^ "Truth is made just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience."* For thought to be true it must "agree" or correspond with reality. "To agree in the widest sense with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its sur- roundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something con- nected with it better than if we disagreed."^ "The essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belong- ings, * * * that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting^ will agree sufficiently ^ James, Pragmatism, pp. 54-55. 'Ibid., p. 76. "Ibid., p. 201. *Ibid., p. 218. ■^ James' Pragmatism, pp. 212-213. 320 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY to meet the requirements. It will hold true of that reality." ^ "This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification." ^ Truth is made largely out of previous truths. "Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's funding opera- tions. So far as reality means experienceable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in process of mutation — mutation towards a definite goal, it may be — but still muta- tion." ^ In short, reality is mutable and so is truth. These quotations require no comment on my part. They are so clear as to be wholly self-ex- planatory. Any idea that is useful in enriching and harmonizing experience, in satisfying the in- terests of the individual or society, by performing that function as a good instrument, becomes thus far true. An idea that cannot be put to work is meaningless. An idea that will not yield satisfac- tion when put to work is false. The pragmatist can even find some uses for the Absolute All-inclu- sive Knower or Experiencer of a Hegel, a Bradley or a Royce, although James did not think that the moral and religious uses of the Absolute counter- Mbid., p. 213. ' James' Pragmatism, p. 202. ' Ibid., pp. 224-225. THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 321 balanced its practical, moral and scientific useless- ness and so rejected it.^ Pragmatism is right in insisting on the instru- mental value of ideas, on their purposive character, and in demanding that ideas should be put to work in the life of concrete experience. It is right in insisting that the fact that an idea works in experi- ence and conduct is a test of its truth. Pragmatism accounts for the origin, utility and truth-value of many of our ideas. A good deal, perhaps the greater part, of knowledge arises and is validated precisely in the ways which the pragmatist describes. He propounds a sound although not novel method of testing the truth of ideas — ^the scientific method of taking ideas as hypotheses, deducing conclusions from them and testing these deductions by putting them to work and finding whether they lead to the promised concrete results in experience. If a con- cept, a judgment, a belief works well in practice, there must be something true in it. James* own statement of pragmatism was too individualistic. Ideas may work well for individuals in terms of satisfaction, but their so working may be harmful to society in the long run. A conscience- less profiteer may make millions from the nation's patriotism in time of war and die rich, working untold injury to society. John Dewey emphasizes the social test of working and thus corrects James* view. And, of course, the social and long-run satis- ^ James, Pragmatism, pp. 291 ff., and A Pluralistic Universe, Lecture VIII. 21 322 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY factions as tests are logically compatible with the pragmatist position. But even the later pragmatists have not made it clear as to how, pragmatically, the conflicts between individuals, or between an in- dividual and a social group, as to the respective claims for satisfaction of their interests are to be adjudicated. Pragmatism talks much about good fruits and good consequences, but it has failed hitherto to formulate any comprehensive theory of how rela- tive goodnesses in fruits or consequences are to be judged. It seems to me that the pragmatist must admit that the ability of the stronger or of the majority to dragoon the recalcitrant individual or minority is the final social test. If expediency is to rule both in practice and in theory, I can see no other argument. Expediency thus becomes an euphonious name for brute power, analogous to the "survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence." Perhaps this is the ultimate test, but the choicest spirits of the race have not hitherto thought so and I for one cannot think so. I am unable to admit that the Right is always on the side of the biggest bat- talions. Belgium may be blotted from the map but the wrong remains eternally a wrong. Hence I agreevdthRo^e^ that the re are^ absolute truths in Idjic, ma^ematics, ethifis^ history and experience; §in^ the truths j}f logiCr m^fh^jn^fic*^ a,yid ethifi3 im- ply that there is an absolute cr eative, rati onal will ^ "The Problem of Truth in the Light of Recent Dis- cussion" in William James and other Essays. THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 323 which is their ground and source. " Absolute'' prag- matism is the only fom o f_tV iP. Hnp±riTiP tha t, is in ha rmony ^^th the nature of logical an d ethical truth, as at once vol itiona l or p urposiv e and draw- ing its character and meaning and its inherent au- thority from the determinate structure of the abso- lute, rational and ethical will or purpose involved in the teleological or worthful and meaningful order of reality. Pragmatism takes too narrow, too provincial a view of the criteria of truth. In the long run ideas work and yield good results because they are in harmony with the actual structure of reality. And there is useless — ^that is, useless from any pres- ent view of individual or social utilities — ^knowledge. The story is told of - a great mathematician that, having worked out a new theorem, he said "thank God, there is a truth that no one can make any use of." In higher mathematics, in history, arch- aeology and science, yes even in perceptual experi- ence, there are many things recognized as true that men have not found any use for beyond the satis- faction of knowing them, which means the satisfac- tion the mind has in being in conscious and loyal harmony with the intelligible order of reality. How are these propositions known to be true? Either because men cannot help perceiving them, as I can- not help perceiving the hideous and useless things that deface the landscape in my town, or because they express the intuitively recognized objective structure of the rational will in man, or because their truth follo ws by the laws of logical^oi^isitency 324 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY fro m some other propositio n, definition or axiom Which expresses some fact of the objective rational order. It may be that use will be found for every truth ultimately. Let us hope so. If the world is rational and just, it must be so. The re are disa greeable truths which we must face^. — When my lbaincef~ informs me that my ac- count is already overdrawn and I have no money to put in, or if I am wholly bankrupt, I have yet to find the person to whom the knowledge of that truth is agreeable. At the present juncture, we must face as a nation discomforts, sacrifice and death of many of our choicest sons in loyalty to a cause. The pragmatist says tha t^what proves satis£ fa^^o ry, when the returns are all in. will be true. BuCSjthe matter of moral principles, ofttimes the returns are never all in, in this world. How do I know that more satisfaction will ensue to anybody if I go to the war and sacrifice myself for my country or if I send my son? How do I know that my family or even the third generation to come will be happier? I do not. I only know that if it is clearly my duty — I ought to go, I ought to send my son. How do I know that by conscripting the youth of this land to fight in Europe the world will be made safe for democracy and this will be a better world? I do not know. I only hope so. But in loyalty to the cause, I know that we must not shirk the issue. I only know that, since we are convinced of the justice of our cause, and that if a brutal militaristic autocracy triumphs the world will not be a fit place for our children and our children's children to live THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 325 in, therefore, we ought to do whatever is necessary to defend that cause. 3. THE RATIONALISTIC THEORY OF TRUTH^ Knowledge comes from several sources. What one perceives or feels, one perceives or feels just as brute fact. We may recognize, examine and analyze experience very rigorously but, finally, we get down to data that are not further analyzable. I see the light and feel the heat and cold, whether these be agreeable or disagreeable. I apprehend impacts and motions as brute facts. Any idea in regard to ex- pe rimental facts is true only it it is m agreemen t with the determinate experience or experienceable facts. The facts may be unsatisfactory to you or me, but there they are. I a lso intuitively recn g-rnVp, hy vny rpagnTi^ Pf^r. tai n truths of logic and ethics. J The elementary propositions and axioms or postulates of mathe- matics and logic, on careful reflection, appear to me true whether you or I care for them or not. They express the intellect's native ways of working. Th ey reflect the rational st mrti^^^ ^^ ^^alj^'y The statement that two contradictory propositions can- -rmfr-hfi t.nTp"'Rvfnn1f.flr>pons1y atiH ij] the same situa- ti on appears to me self-evident. I cannot conceive a world in which it should be false. In such a world "true" and "false" would have no meaning, and it would not even be a world. ^ Perhaps a better name for this theory would be either 'rationalistic experientialism", or "rationalistic realism". 326 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Thus th ere are ideas that are true because th ey are in agreement with the given nr finite farfs, ^nd there are ideas that are trueHbecause they express the meanings of the mind's own reflective intuitions, of its own rational procedure in thinking about its world. So jfar as these truths go they are absolut e. Further than this,_s ome m inds have a passionate h unger for puttinjTtruths togetheTln to a coliHrtr nlr \^^ole, for ^organizing ideas into a sys tem. This ideaiof truth-seeking is the philosophical ideal. It is the harmonious organization of all separate truths into a coherent whole. James really ad- mitted these criticisms when he said that we are CQerce(Lby-jthe-4ete^^nmate^ord er of fac t and of in- tuitively recognized truths of abstract relationships, and when he^said-that intellectuaL-Co nsistency is_ :^.e-most imperlnus claimant of all for satisf action. The fact is that our purposes and our interests do not always get or deserve satisfaction. Sometimes they are shattered into fragments and remade by the logic of events, into larger purposes and mean- ings. Reality is in mutation, but there is a logic of events, a determinate order of mutation. The process of reality has a specific structure, and part of our truth consists in apprehending and sym- bolizing that structure as it is. Mind in us has a logical and ethical structure. Our images, concepts, theories and assumptions change, to fit enlarged and finer apprehensions of the factual order and to meet the mutations in that order. But through all the changes and chances in the mental life of ideas, through all the scrapping of old ones and the making THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 327 of new ones to fit the facts, there run certain funda- mental ways of thinking and acting ; the elementary- principles and postulates of knowledge and conduct. It would belong to a treatise on logic and epis- temology to discuss these theoretical principles fully, but we may state the principal ones briefly — the logical identity of objects of thought with themselves or the invariant character of these ob- jects, the impossibility of admitting the truth of two contradictory propositions, the self-evidencing qvMity of the elementary propositions of logic and mathematics, the rationally evident character of our most universal and fundamental moral judgments, the demand of the mind for the organization of knowledge into a coherent whole which gives us the logically self -consistent systems of mathematics and which, in the form of the principle of sufficient rea- son or ground, appears in our insistent need in science to discover the relevancy of facts to one an- other, to classify facts and connect them in a system of causally related or reciprocally interdependent elements. One could sum up this matter as follows — the absolute postulates of knowledge are the loqic ajridentity of every object o f t/iougtit with it- self, and the har monious organization or reievanci i of oil tru^'JuxTgrnent s to one avnther j 'n- n sysfp/ryinfir. whole . And there are ethical principles which are valid whether you and I obey them or not, whether we find that they satisfy our concrete interests or not. We may as individuals or social groups be loyal or disloyal to honesty, justice, love, fellow- ship, loyalty itself, but our actions do not make these 328 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY qualities right if expedient, and wrong if inex- pedient. If expediency be the highest good, there is no highest good. Plato was right in holding that there are values and relationships, principles of moral and rational order, that give meaning and status to, and that endure through, the temporal flux of human experience. This generation has been permeated and cap- tivated in its thinking by the thought of evolution, ceaseless flux and relativity in all things. Let me remind you that there is no meaning in evolution, or even in flux and relativity, unless there be an enduring teleological order of meanings, by refer- ence to which we measure and judge the dates and relations and meanings and values of the tides and times of human circumstance and deed and of physical circumstance as well. The fullest criteria of truth are the coherence Qf ideas^ith ex nerien ces andjgie coh erenc e of ide as , as interpretations of experiences, with one another. The ideal of knowledge is the harmonious organiza- tion of thinking and experience, in which thinking appears as the instrument for the organization or interpretation of experience, by which experience becomes conscious of its own meanings and by which its own enrichment and more harmonious ful- fillment are furthered. This ideal, although never fully realized, is the animating motive of the thinker at his best. ^^plify ifl a. tp1po|ogieal_an d self-or ganizing__sys- tem, and thinking is th e chief es t instim meg^- -f^r fhp THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH 329 i function of thought is both to discover the existing relations or relevancies of things to one another and to promote the increase of these relationships. Thinki ng is the chief instrument of organizatio n in a purposively ordered w orld, a world controlled by a rational and ethical order, as I believe. REFERENCES Carr, H. W., The Problem of Truth. (An excellent, brief discussion.) James, William, Pragmatism (especially Lectures II, III, V, and VI) and The Meaning of Truth. Royce, Josiah, The Problem of Truth in William James and other Essays. Dewey, John, Studies in Logical Theory, and the articles Beliefs and Realities and The Experimental Theory of Knowledge in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, Chap- ters 10, 11, 12 and 13. Hegel, Logic trans. Wallace. Joachim, H. H., The Nature of Truth. Bradley, F. H., Appearance and Reality. Marvin, W. T., A First Book in Metaphysics. Schiller, F. C. S., Humanism and Studies in Humanism. Santayana, G., Reason in Science. CHAPTER XXVIII THE SPECIAL PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY The central and fundamental philosophical dis- cipline, metaphysics, is the theory of the nature or structure and meaning of reality as a whole. While writers may show philosophical insights in various special fields and, to the extent of these insights, deserve the name philosophers, a system of thought can be properly called a philosophy only when its various aspects are built upon and articulated with a metaphysics or doctrine of reality. Metaphysics includes, as special divisions : — cosmology or philos- ophy of nature, whose chief problems are the nature or meaning of space, time, matter, motion and evolution; meta^psychology or philosophy of selves and society; epistemology or philosophy of knowl- edge; and axiology or philosophy of values. These special divisions of metaphysics cannot, however, be pursued successfully in isolation from one another. The subject matter of the present work has con- sisted: — (1) in tracing the emergence and develop- ment of the fundamental problems and theories of metaphysics; and (2) in discussing the present status of these problems and theories. It now re- mains for us to consider briefly the respective fields, and relations to general philosophy or metaphysics, (330) DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 331 of the special philosophical disciplines. These are: Logic, Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of History. Before proceeding with this matter, it is desirable that an indication be given as to the relation between philosophy and psychology. 1. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY There is no unanimity of opinion among the psychologists as to the proper fields and methods of psychology. The point on which there is nearest approach to agreement is that psychology is not the science of the soul, that it has no concern with the question whether man is a soul or permanently unified self. It is also pretty generally agreed that psychology is as much an independent science as, say, chemistry, and therefore, like any other special science, is independent of philosophy. Still there must be some good reason, other than the slow de- velopment of the science itself, why psychology has remained so long in closer association with philos- ophy than the other sciences. Before we can dis- cover this reason, we must essay a statement as to the province of psychology. It used to be said that the business of psychology is to analyze, describe and correlate the elementary constituents and processes of conscious- ness, or to determine in detail the structure of coiv- sciou^ness in all its forms and stages. This, the standpoint of strv/^turalism, was the classical stand- point until after the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury, when evolutionary biology began more and 332 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY more to hold sway over men's thinking about human nature. Of course it had been already recognized that psychology is concerned, too, with the relation between consciousness and the nervous system, or, in general terms, between mind and body. The rapid development of the evolution hypo- thesis led to a change of emphasis in psychology. Mental processes began to be viewed as instru- ments of adaptation to the environment, as tools for the more successful adjustment of the relationships between man and nature, and the individual man and society. This is the standpoint of functionalism, which does not deny all value to structural analysis of mind but makes such analysis subservient to the determination of the biological or life-serving func- tions of the mind. The mind in all its phases, whether clearly conscious, subconscious and per- haps unconscious, consists of special types of func- tional adjustments of the organism. William James' great work, The Principles of Psychology, was the first and most influential in making this change of emphasis. Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology is written chiefly from the same stand- point. Lately a third standpoint has arisen — be- haviorism. The ultra-radical behaviorist denies that consciousness is a fruitful or even legitimate subject of study. He proposes to consider only the objective or physical side of behavior. The mod- erate behaviorist admits that the most important data for psychology are those obtained from the study of conscious thinking organisms, but he in- sists that psychology is primarily the science of DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 333 human behavior. I am of the opinion that the psychologist cannot afford to neglect permanently any one of these standpoints. Psychology, as I understand it, has for its central domain the sys- tematic investigation of the conscious and intel- ligent behavior of human individuals. To success- fully carry on this work it cannot afford to leave out of account, either the purposive adaptation- functions which the mind of the individual per- forms, or the structural analysis of mental com- plexes, such as perceptions, memories, images, judg- ments, conceptions, instincts, emotions and senti- ments, into their elementary features. What, then, is the right relation between psychology and philosophy ? Psychology is a special science, inasmuch as it studies the behavior of the conscious individual in relation to the physical order and the social order, without raising the metaphys- ical questions as to how one is to conceive, ulti- mately, the nature of the self in relation to the body and the relation of the psycho-physical individual or group of individuals to the world as a whole; in so far as it describes the process of thinking, with- out attempting to determine what are the final norms or critera of knowledge; in so far as it de- scribes the processes of volition, without attempting to determine the valid norms or standards of con- duct; and in so far as it describes the processes of aesthetic feeling, without raising the question as to the place of beauty in reality. But when psychology does attempt to deal with the ultimate problems of the relation of mind and body, of self and world, 334 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY of the criteria of truth and goodness and beauty in the universe, then it passes into philosophy; it passes into metaphysics, ethics, logic, epistemology and aesthetics. Moreover, it is not easy for the psychologist to avoid raising the philosophical issues. Inasmuch as the problems of philosophy all center in the questions as to the place of the self and society in the universe of reality, it is quite evident why psychology has always lived, and should continue to live, in intimate association with philos- ophy. It is not for the permanent good of either discipline that they should be kept asunder. With- out philosophy psychology's work becomes a blind trafficking with physical instruments and physiol- ogical measurements. Without empirical psycholog- ical foundations philosophy becomes a dialectical exercise in spinning logical cobwebs. 2. LOGIC Logic is the systematic investigation of the fundamental processes or methods by which thought arrives at truth, or the right methods of making judgments and inferences. Psychology likewise studies the processes of knowing, but from a dif- ferent standpoint. Psychology is concerned to analyze and describe the cognitive processes simply as mental events which occur in individual minds along with other kinds of mental events. It is not the aim of psychology either to formulate the most general canons or norms of correct thinking or to formulate all the various methods by which these canons are applied in the actual work of science. DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 335 But this is just what logic aims to do. It is true that logic studies actual processes of thinking and therefore makes use of psychology, but Logic finds its material chiefly in the analysis of typical cases of correct thinking as exemplifying the norms of knowledge. Hence fair samples of correct thinking in the practical affairs of life and in all the sciences furnish the materials of Logic. It studies analy- tically such cases in order to determine the funda- mental procedures, in judgment and inference, that are involved in them. It is evident that right judgment and inference, as exemplified in concrete cases, presuppose and imply certain most fundamental principles of knowl- edge. These are the laws or principles of all sound thinking. Such principles are: — ^the principle of coherence or freedom from contradiction (two con- tradictory propositions cannot both be true) ; the principle of identity (a logical subject of thought must be identical with itself) ; the principle of suf- ficient ground or causation (there must be a suf- ficient ground for every event) ; the principle of uniformity (the same conditions or causes will have the same effects) . Since this is but a brief indica- tion of the province of Logic, I shall not discuss whether the above named are the only ultimate fundamental principles of Logic. It will be obvious to the thoughtful reader that the above principles are presupposed in all genuinely scientific or sys- tematically thoughtful procedure of the mind and that, therefore, a sound logical theory is not only implied in every kind of scientific procedure, but 336 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY as well that it is the primal condition of sound philosophy. Every true judgment and inference in practical affairs, as well as in science, is a bit of applied Logic; and metaphysics is an applied Logic of the whole universe of reality or experience. Logic is frequently divided, in elementary text- books, into two parts — Deductive and Inductive Logic. Such a division, while it may have practical pedagogical justification, overlooks the fact that in the actual work of science, deduction and induction are both involved and, while some sciences are more inductive or deductive than others, no science is purely either the one or the other. 3. ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY The central problem of Ethics is the determina- tion of a standard of the good or a rationally de- finable criterion of intrinsic values, a standard for voluntary conduct. Is there any common measure for those ends that are intrinsically good or have value in themselves for the human agent? If so, what is it? Is it a maximum of agreeable feeling? Or obedience to rules of reason ? Or is it something richer, more complex and concrete than either pleasurable feeling or the service of reason? The Hedonist holds that the ethical standard is the maxi- mum of agreeable feeling for the individual agent and his fellows. The Rationalist holds that right conduct consists in the subordination of feeling to reason. The Energist or Self-Realizationalist holds that the standard of value is the organization and DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 337 actuation of the fundamental interests of the self as a rational and social agent. Another important problem for Ethics is the question of the right relation between the moral consciousness or conscience of the individual and the established social code of conduct in the group or groups of which the individual is a member. This is an extremely important and' difficult question which involves two other problems, namely: — (1) to what extent is the individual's conscience actually, and to what extent should it be ideally, the echo of the social or group-code; and (2) what are the right relations between the individual and various social groups? To what extent and in what directions should the individual sacrifice his private interests to group interests, or the interests of narrower and more deep going groups, such as the family or the trade or professional group, to wider group in- terests such as the nation ? Moral conduct is conduct that has social refer- ence, so that Ethics and Social Philosophy cannot be sharply distinguished. Social and Political Philosophy, in distinction from Sociology and Politics which are sciences de- scriptive of actual social and political institutions in the present and in history, is concerned with the ethical ends or values that are involved in social institutions and activities. It studies the facts of social and political life from the standpoint of a systematic doctrine of the ethical values or ends that should be realized by social institutions, by family, school, industry, the state. Social Philosophy ass THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY is thus really Applied Ethics — the system of moral valuations applied to the judgment of existing in- stitutions such as school organization, economic or- ganization and political organization, in the light of the intrinsic human values or human interests which these organizations exist to further. Thus, Ethics is inseparable from Social Philosophy, as Plato and Aristotle long ago soundly taught. Ethics is the philosophical doctrine of human values, of the various inherently worthful interests or ends which mankind has the right and duty to aim to attain and conserve. The investigation of the problems of Ethics and Social Philosophy involves psychology, since their subject matter is man as a feeling, thinking and striving agent. A sound ethical and social doc- trine of ends and values can be built up only upon an adequate psychology — one which makes a care- ful inventory of man's original nature, his inherit- ance of instincts, impulses and more general ca- pacities such as reason or intelligence. But man's original nature is profoundly modified by his social nurture, including the social and spiritual patterns and ideals of conduct which are held up to him for admiration and imitation in his plastic period of youth. A sound theory of ethical and social values can be formulated only when the various cultural or spiritual-historical strains which shape and stimulate the individual in society have been ex- amined and evaluated. Ethics and Social Philosophy must, therefore, be based on an extensive and intensive apprecia- DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 339 tion of the historical development of the whole spiritual heritage of man. 4. AESTHETICS Aesthetics is the philosophy of aesthetic feel- ing and judgment. Since Kant's Critique of Judg- ment was written it has been recognized as a di- vision of philosophy. We may investigate the psychological and physiological conditions of aes- thetic feeling and, thus far, Aesthetics is a branch of psychology and physiology. We may consider the history of aesthetic appreciation in relation to the history of art and, in this regard. Aesthetics is a branch of the history of culture. But we may also ask, what is the significance of aesthetic feel- ing and judgment with reference to man's place in the universe? Does the fact that the sounding cataract haunts one like a passion, that one feels oneself to be a part of the mountains, seas and sky ; in short, does the whole human reaction in which we feel beauty, sublimity, picturesqueness in nature, in which perhaps, we feel with Wordsworth "a presence far more deeply interfused, a motion and a spirit which impels all thinking things, all objects of all thoughts," does this aesthetic reaction to nature mean perhaps that nature is the expression of a life, of whose rich and harmonious meanings these sympathetic feelings of ours for nature are the echoes or adumbrations? Is Beauty an avenue to the vision of reality ? Does it unlock gates other- wise closed, by which, even though intermittently, we are permitted to enter into contact with reality 340 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY in some of its glory? Or are all our feelings for nature, our sense of a divine mystery half revealed, half concealed in the sunset, the mountains, the forest brook, the quiet lake and the majestic sea, merely subjective reverberations in our organisms of a world that in itself is but the stony and in- sensate realm of mass particles in motion or the dead and unfeeling completeness of some static Absolute? These questions are hints as to the meta- physical problem suggested by man's aesthetic rela- tion to nature; and similar questions arise from a consideration of the ceaseless striving of man to express and satisfy his emotions in art-forms of beauty, sublimity and terror, and from the con- sideration of the refining, purifying, healing and refreshing influences which have come to men through converse with nature and art. It is beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss these ques- tions. I must leave the matter with the suggestion that, perhaps, the painters, the sculptors, the mu- sicians and the poets, apprehend an aspect of reality that is hidden from the eyes of the dry-as-dust scientist or arid dialectician. It is my own convic- tion, one that has grown upon me with the years, that the aesthetic experiences are more than sub- jective solaces or illusory refuges from the "fret- ful stir unprofitable and the fever of this world;" that the beauty and the grandeur as felt in nature, in human life and art, are forefelt apprehensions, though intermittent and fragmentary, of an order, a harmony, a concrete and meaningful life that be- longs somehow to the heart of things. The true DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 341 greatness of poets such as Wordsworth, Shelley and Whitman, and prose writers such as Ruskin and Thoreau, resides in the fact that they have been prophets of the aesthetic vision of a higher reality beyond and yet interwoven with the dumb shows of sense. The same fundamental notion of living order or a harmonious organization of experience is the basic motif of science and logic which aim, not at reducing individual centers of activity and experi- ence to illusions, but at finding the world to be an ordered or organized realm of individuals. And the practical, moral and social activities of man have the same aim — to construct a harmonious, well organized whole of living centers of experience and deed — ^the ideal society — in which the law of each member's being is fulfilled by expansion into harmonious action and feeling with the whole, as the fulfillment of the law of the whole through the individuality of each. Thus aesthetic experience in- terprets and fulfills, from the standpoint of feeling, the vocation of man which, more abstractly, or in more formal shape, urges on his theoretical and his practical life activities. At this point the transition to the consideration of the place of religion in phil- osophical system is readily suggested. 5. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Religion in its most significant forms is the affirmation of the supremacy in the order of reality of all the organized and coherent values pertaining to the life of man in society. Religion idealizes man's values as a socialized individual, or as a 342 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY society of individuals regenerated and redeemed through participation in the common life. Religion affirms that the system of ideal values not -only must be the paramount goal of human life, but as well that these values, in their organic wholeness as ful- filled in the socialized individual, are securely seated at the heart of reality and control the process of things. God is the incarnation of the system of ideal values. Therefore God is essentially the per- fect social self — ^the Supreme Self — who lives and fulfills himself in and through the regeneration or development of the spiritual man in and through the ideal society. God is the ideal embodiment of the values which are realized by the moral and rational self as a member of a social order which functions to serve these values. Religion affirms the ideal unity and ground of value to be the most real being. The business of the Philosophy of Religion is to determine what religion means and aims at, in the successive and varied phases of its development in history and in its operations in the individual's ex- perience and the social order. Religion is thus both social and individual, both historical and personal, and the Philosophy of Religion should evaluate the history of religion or interpret the movement of re- ligious evolution, the religious experience of the individual, and the religious attitude of the social group. From this standpoint, too, it should deter- mine the function and meaning of the God-idea, of salvation, regeneration, redemption, atonement, the freedom and vocation of man. DISCIPLINES — THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 343 In short, the Philosophy of Religion is the metaphysics of selves, society and values, applied to the constructive interpretation of the religious experience of the race in the light of the history of culture and psychology. So large and deep going an area of human social life and individual experience as religion represents must be taken account of by the philosopher; and, if he cannot find room for it in his rubrics, then it is more likely that his rubrics are too small and rigid than that the whole religious history of the race is an illusion. REFERENCES Psychologies by Angell, Stout, Titchener, Calkins, Pillsbury, Kuelpe, James (Principles), Wundt (Physiolog- ical Psychology). Logic : Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic, and Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge; Introductory Logics by Creigh- ton, Joseph, Aikins; J. S. Mill, Logic; B. Russell, Principles of Mathematics; Essays by Royce and others in Windelband and Ruge, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Vol. I, Logic. Ethics: Introductory works by Mackenzie, Fite, Seth, Wright and Drake. Paulsen, Ethics; Moore, Principia Ethica; Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism; Alexander, Moral Order and Progress; Hob- house, Morals in Evolution. Social Philosophy: Bosanquet, The Philosophical The- ory of the State; Hegel, Philosophy of Right; Mill, On Lib- erty; Santayana, Reason in Society; Graham Wallas, The Great Society; McDougall, Social Psychology. Aesthetics: Carritt, The Theory of Beauty; Santay- ana, The Sense of Beauty, and Reason in Art; Croce, Aesthetics; Plato Republic Book X, and Phaedrus; Aris- totle, Poetics, trans. Butcher; Introduction to Hegel's Philos- 344 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY ophy of Fine Art, trans. Bosanquet; Kant, Critique of Judg ment; Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Bk. 3; Ruskin, Modern Painters, etc.; Wordsworth and Shelley, Poems; Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, etc. Philosophy of Religion; Hoeffding, Galloway; Caird, The Evolution of Religion; Balfour, Theism and Humanism; Santayana, Reason in Religion; Boutroux, Science and Re- ligion in Contemporary Philosophy; James, Varieties of Religious Experience; Ward, J., The Realm of Ends; Hock- ing, The Meaning of God in Human Experience. CHAPTER XXIX THE STATUS OF VALUES Knowing is a human affair. The objects of knowledge may be physical things, complexes of sense-qualities, that is groupings of the qualities apprehended through man's perceptive mechanism ; or relations between physical objects and events, that is, laws of nature generalized by the mind from the analysis and comparison of sense-perceptions; or selves and their actual relations to the physical order and to one another; or, finally, the objects of knowledge may be the appreciations or valuations with which man stamps the objects known, and the aims and ideals by which he determines his active relations to physical nature and to other selves. Since man is not a colorless and passive knower, who might reflect the characteristics of his surround- ings as a good mirror reflects things or as a glassy water surface reflects its bank, but a knower who feels and acts, he judges the objects he knows to have various degrees and kinds of worth and un- worth; and he strives to so alter or maintain the interaction of his surroundings and himself as to remove the experiences that have unworth for him and to maintain and increase these experiences that have worth. There are some things in the world of my daily round of experiences that have little or no plus or (346) 346 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY minus value for me. To meet and apprehend them has little or no bearing on my weal or woe. Such are most of the buildings and many of the people I pass in the streets. Ordinarily, I ignore them. I am scarcely aware of their existence. On the other hand, the buildings in which I live and work, the members of my family and my professional asso- ciates, and even the weather have worth for me. I apprehend them with interest and I react to them with approval and disapproval. I exercise prefer- ences in regard to the actual and possible objects of experience. In short, man appreciates, enjoys, loves, ad- mires, and therefore seeks, or he dislikes, fears, hates, and therefore avoids certain objects and situa- tions. Valuation is the most persistent and char- acteristic attitude in human nature. Man seeks to acquire and retain knowledge, power, wealth, com- fort, fame, love and friendship, because he values these things as experiences. The systematic study of the main types of human valuation and the rela- tions between them is an important part of phil- osophy. As we have seen in the previous chapter, ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of religion, are sciences of human values or axiological sciences. The word "axiology" means science of values. It is de- rived from the Greek alto? (worth) and Aoyo? (rea- son). All these divisions of philosophy are con- cerned primarily with the central fact that man, in the various aspects of his cognitive and active rela- tions to his world, is a being guided by selective preferences or interests. These preferences, in the THE STATUS OF VALUES 347 last analysis, are derived from feelings, from the emotions and sentiments which constitute the affec- tive complex which is the self considered as a center of feeling and source of valuation, choice and volition. Here we are concerned only with making dis- tinctions and definitions with sufficient sharpness to see what is the problem of the status of human values in reality. And, first, we note that there is an important distinction in human values between instrumental or mediate values and intrinsic or im- mediate values. Wealth, position, manual skill, tools, knowledge of foreign languages, are usually means to ends. My pen, for instance, has only an instrumental value. It mediates my getting my thoughts on paper, and this achievement, in turn, is a means to getting them noticed and accepted by my fellows. On the other hand, to love and be loved, to have friends, to be esteemed by one's fellows, are values in themselves. These latter are intrinsic values. To live in these experiences is to enjoy im- mediate values. Even to know the facts and laws of nature, historical facts and relations, or philos- ophical principles, has, for some people, intrinsic value. One may take satisfaction in knowing things, regardless of whether anyone else knows that one knows, or esteems or rewards one for knowing, re- gardless of whether knowing makes one healthier or wealthier, or physically more comfortable. One values knowledge for its own sake because one feels that an essential demand of one's life is being satisfied by knowing. Moreover, certain kinds of 348 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY knowledge give aesthetic satisfaction. We speak rightly of the beauty of a piece of deductive reason- ing, the grandeur or sublimity of a scientific prin- ciple such as that of gravitation or evolution. Aesthetic experiences gained through poetry, the drama, fine prose, music, painting, or the enjoy- ment of nature, are to many people intrinsically worthf ul. "Beauty is its own excuse for being.'* While many persons have no joy in knowledge for its own sake and, hence, knowledge has for them no immediate worth ; or, have no keen joy in beauty for its own sake which, hence, for them has no im- mediate worth, there is one type of values which is universal in its appeal. The individual who has no preferences in this type is an idiot or a monster. This type consists of the fundamental valuations or preferences of human persons as individuals and as social beings. Every normal human being desires the companionship, esteem, friendship or love of some other human beings. Every human being who has any self-respect desires the respect of others. Every human being desires to satisfy the funda- mental interests of his being, desires to feel and act in the ways that express and realize what he esteems his true selfhood. Now, ethics is the scien- tific or systematic study of these fundamental types of human value and of the principles of social or- ganization by which the achievement and perma- nence of these values are furthered. Honesty, in- tegrity, justice, fair-mindedness, active sympathy, conscientiousness, kindness, the spirit of service — these terms connote qualities of selves which con- THE STATUS OF VALUES 849 stitute fundamental ethical values ; because they are not merely indispensable means to the maintenance of a social order in which selves can be truly selves, but, moreover, they are intrinsically worthful qual- ities of human nature. If "love is the fulfilling of the law", that is because love is taken to include all the other qualities in the presence of which man's higher selfhood can come to its full expression. And all the movements which have aimed at social justice, at the bettering of the economic, in- dustrial, educational and political conditions of man's social life are to be judged by their service- ableness in promoting the realization of the funda- mental human values. It follows that all intrinsic values are located in the conscioits lives of selves or persons. It is nonsense to talk about values that no self feels or seeks, about preferences that no self prefers. The statics of values in the universe of reality is the status of selves. For selves alone feel, enjoy, suffer, strive for and win values. If selves, with all their strivings, sufferings and en- joyments, with all their poignant feelings and unre- mitting efforts, are but evanescent spume cast up by the waves of the blind and chartless ocean of being, then certainly love and justice, integrity and loyalty, and the other ethical qualities which lend dignity and worth to human life are equally tran- sient. The world is not just and not rational, much less kind, if the whole sequence of human life, in which alone, so far as we know experimentally, justice, reasonableness, kindness, are to be found in finite and imperfect but ever present and ever 350 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY growing forms of realization, is doomed to extinc- tion. Indeed, if the life of selfhood, the life which is now throbbing in humanity, does not endure and grow permanently the very norms of thought, the logical values themselves, are homeless in the uni- verse and there is no universe, only a hideous bedlam. Science and logic postulate the rationality, in a broad sense the justice, of the universal order. Science and logic presuppose the validity of the fundamental intellectual values, presuppose the obligation to observe carefully, to think clearly, dis- interestedly and persistently about whatever sub- ject matter we may be concerned with. In the last analysis science, logic and ethics rest upon the same postulate — ^the rationality and justice of things, the permanence of fundamental values in the order of reality. But to talk about reason, much less justice and love ruling the universe, if all selves or souls are ephemeral phenomena, is, I repeat, to talk non- sense. To talk of eternal values which rule serenely in a timeless world of being, if the life of humanity does not endure somehow as an essential and worth- ful constituent in the universe of reality, is to talk "transcendental moonshine". Science, a better social order, a freer, fuller life for human personality, beauty, philosophy it- self, are all vain dreams which man conjures up to hide from his gaze the reeking shambles of reality which he fears to face, unless the fundamental human values endure through the permanence of rational and ethical spirit. THE STATUS OF VALUES 351 The last and deepest problem of philosophy which is, I remind you, the reflective study of life and experience in their wholeness, is the problem of religion. And religion, as I have already pointed out, is always at its best an affirmative answer to the final question of humanity — do our highest values endure and if so, under what conditions? The true meaning of postulating a God, the animating principle of faith in God and the higher order of which he is the guardian and sustainer, is this affirmative response to the cry of mankind for the assurance or promise of the permanence of the life of most worth. Religion is the yea-sayer to all the higher values. If it denies some values dear to the hearts of some persons, if it calls to renunciation and sacrifice of the lower self, it does this in the interest of higher values. As to the questions, how fundamental values come to appear in the life of humanity, and whence they derive their authority, three chief answers have been given — (a) Dualistic Supematuralism, (b) Agnostic Relativism or Subjectivistic Human- ism, (c) Teleological Idealism. The dualistic supematuralist avers that the source and authority of all supreme values is the descent into human life, at special times and at special crises, of heaven-sent messengers authen- ticated with supernatural power. The "Thus saith the Lord" has its seal in miracle working and mystery mongering. Jahweh thunders from Mount Sinai. God speaks through a divine revealer and validates his utterances with physical portents, or 352 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY he leaves, through the divinely appointed succession of a hierarchical order, continuous special au- thorities in an ecclesia or church. (b) The agnostic relativist points to the fact that the language and the very contents and mean- ings of the speech of revealers are conditioned, in- deed, determined by the whole social culture of their times. He points, with the eye of the critical his- torian, to the way in which fundamental values have changed and evolved under the influences of industrial, political and scientific changes. He points out, for example, that the values authorized by Mosaic religion differed from those of later Hebrew prophetism ; the latter from those of prim- itive Christianity. He triumphantly shows, by his- torical analysis, that the social values of the prim- itive Christian community differed greatly from those of a present day Christian state. He shows that the change is due to a mass of economic, political and intellectual changes. Finally, he calls attention to the significant fact that dualistic super- naturalism rests upon a cosmology that is incon- sistent with modern science. The latter has built up, step by step, a conception of the infinite extent, complexity, duration and orderly character of a world in which there is no place for the eruption now and then of miraculous portents. The agnostic relativist concludes that the human values are the products solely of the social workmanship of man, a creature weak and ephemeral but gifted with an indomitable will and a strange capacity for planting and training up, THE STATUS OF VALUES 353 amidst the savage wastes of the blind farces which alone operate in nature, a cultivated plot of the finer humanity. Man, he says, is engaged in an incessant struggle with the savage and relentless forces of nature. He will ultimately go down to defeat and extinction, but in the meantime the only life of effort that gives at least a transitory, though pathetic, gleam of grace and sweetness to life is the ceaseless endeavor to improve his little garden of the spirit, to tend and nurture in it the fruits and flowers of honesty, integrity, loyalty, justice, truthfulness, comradeship and sympathy. These values are all doomed to ultimate extinction but, in the meantime, let us nobly strive and nobly help one another. The agnostic relativist fails to solve one riddle. How, if nature or reality be as he conceives it, could it ever have given birth to man, its insurgent son? If man, too, be but the blind offspring of savage and insensate forces, surely it makes an even greater draft on one's credulity to say that from the blind welter of mass particles in endless whirl- ing motion there could have sprung the tender- nesses, the heroisms, the noble friendships, the undying devotions to human kind, the willing self- sacrifices for those illusions of great causes and high enterprises, which the better part of mankind displays? How could even such illusions as justice, integrity, sympathy, love, loyalty and self-sacri- fice have come into being? Agnostic relativism, which holds that values have no status except in the better members of the living generation, hence 354 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY is a subjectivism, in which the present living gen- eration of the race, not the individual self, is re- garded as the subject who creates values out of nothing. This view is, of course, materialism, and the single criticism in which all criticisms of mate- rialisms concenter is that it makes all human values illusions, mysteriously and episodically engendered by the operation of blind physical forces. (c) Teleological or Axiological Idealism. This view accepts the criticisms of dualistic super- naturalism and holds, too, that values are wrought out by man in history and, hence, are subject to fluctuation, to change and evolution, as man^s social life develops from simpler to more complex forms, as his tools for intellectual analysis and economic and social organization improve. But the teleolog- ical idealist holds that the persistance and evolu- tion of values, the change which involves continuity of growth in the process of discovering values and means to realize them, logically implies that human values, and the selves which realize and enjoy them, are not mere ephemeral by-products of nature. Man is a true and effective part of reality. He is a legitimate offspring of the universe. He must be heir then to a part of the universal heritage. The values he creates he does not create out of nothing. Values are not vain imaginings. It is the same being who perceives and knows who likewise values, prefers, chooses and acts. It is the same homo- geneous world in which he grows in knowledge and power, and in the consciousness of values and the ability to realize them. Man and his valuations are THE STATUS OF VALUES 355 somehow at home in the universe. Man is quite as able to cash in on his preferences, his valuations, as he is on his knowledge or his industrial activity. The universe which, in part, we know, is a universe which answers questions that are rightly put and to which answers are persistently sought. It is the same teleological order which sustains and honors human values. Values are neither mysterious visitants from an alien sphere nor phantoms of human imagination. Values are the ways in which the ruling purport, the ineluctable life and feeling of the universe, are expressed in a multitude of finite centers of feeling and action — in the life of humanity. In almost all the great historic systems of phil- osophy, the author's concept of value determines the character of his fundamental standpoint.^ The Ideas that play the chief part in Plato's interpretation of reality are Ideas of Values — logical relations, beauty, justice, wisdom; and the supreme and ruling Idea is the Good. The same is true with regard to Aristotle. God, the pure form, is the ground of all forms, and the finite forms or entelechies are the ordering principles in nature. The highest value for Aristotle is the aesthetic-intellectual concept of the pure self-activity of Reason. Plotinus' concep- tion of reality is controlled by the ideal of mystic union of the finite selfhood with the Absolute Spirit. Despite his show of geometrical demonstration. ^ Even in systems of materialism it is the apparent clearness, simplicity, self-evidence and cogency of the priri' ciples that determines the standpoint taken. 356 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Spinoza's world view is determined chiefly by his vision of finite selfhood as finding its fulfillment and euthanasia in a blessed absorption in the divine Substance. For Leibnitz the supreme values are the infinitely diversified individuality of the monads and the continuity and organization of the universe into a harmonious whole. Kant's system is controlled by his concept of the moral dignity and freedom of the human per- sonality ; of the tremendous seriousness and infinite significance of man's moral vocation. The same motives determined the fundamental outlines of Fichte's philosophy. For Hegel the supreme value is the spectacle of the self-realizing march of Spirit through history, having as its goal the harmonious organization of finite selfhood into conscious union with the Infinite Idea. For Schopenhauer the peace which comes from the cessation of all desire and the ending of all inner discord is the highest value. For Berkeley the vision of God, the great other spirit, is the highest value. For Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill the highest value lies in the recon- ciliation of the social and political freedom of the individual with the needs of a social order and au- thority. How to ensure to the human individual the liberty to develop and lead his own life as a member of the social order, without which the development and exercise of individuality is impos- sible — such has been the dominant problem of Eng- lish philosophy from Hobbes to John Stuart Mill. Mill expressly states that he was led to his logical THE STATUS OF VALUES 357 investigations in order to lay secure foundations for a science of society. It is in this British feeling for the worth and rights of human individuality that we find the key- note of William James' philosophy. For the school of objective idealism, (Bradley, Bosanquet and others), the supreme criterion of value is the har- monious organization of experience into a sys- tematic whole, the fusion or union of all aspects of experience into a living totality, in which all differ- ences are unified, all conflicts are healed, all dis- cords are harmonized. In this harmonious totality the contrast between reflective thinking and its objects passes away into a perfect intuition or state of feeling in which knower and known are wholly one; the conflict between the "is'' and the "ought- to-be", between desired ideal and achieved fact is laid at rest. In it all pain and discord are contribut- ing elements in the harmonious feeling which per- vades the whole. The whole is the all-inclusive indi- vidual experience in which all imperfect individuals are elements. Thus the highest value is the highest reality. The same standard obtains for truth as for other aspects of value. For the measure of truth in any system of judgments is the internal coher- ence of the system. Royce's conception of value does not greatly differ from the one just stated. Absolute reality is the fulfillment of all values, for it is the complete fulfillment of the meaning of all finite ideas, the complete satisfaction of all finite purposes. 358 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY The chief objections raised to the idealistic theory of value are: (1) in its eagerness to identify the absolute value of harmony, internal coherence, perfection of organization in experience, with reality, it overlooks the fact that, for human beings, value is an ideal aim only gradually and partially achieved in time, and thus it seems to deprive the human process of striving for and achieving har- monious organization, the whole temporal life of effort and progress towards higher values, of any final value. For, identifying absolute value and absolute reality, this doctrine assumes the timeless reality of the ideal values; (2) consequently, it is objected, eternalistic idealism cannot find any last- ing significance in the deeds and experiences of the imperfect and striving human individual. The pragmatists and personal idealists have, while admitting that the ideal of value is har- monious experience or harmony of life and feeling, protested against the assumption that all value is eternally or timelessly real. This protest, on behalf of the human person's life as a process in time, is the chief motive of the tendency known as tem- poralism, which insists that all reality must traffic in time, that value must inhere in the temporal activities of selves and the historical order, if there be any value in reality. Windelband, Rickert and other representatives of the Philosophy of Values in Germany, have in- sisted that the validity of the norms of logical think- ing, the very basic principles of knowledge, no less than the acceptance of moral ideals and canons of THE STATUS OF VALUES 359 aesthetic judgment, rest on the act of the thinker in accepting the conditions under which alone the purpose and will to know the truth, to will the good, and to accept the beautiful, can be fulfilled. In other words, if you seek truth you ought to and must accept the rules of the thinking game, just as if you seek the good you must accept the norms of goodness. This attitude of the self in acknowl- edging the values of truth, goodness and beauty is an act of faith in universal purposes which rule the time order. From our standpoint the only sense in which we can speak of eternal values is that there are universal purposes and meanings which maintain themselves and prevail in the temporal flux. In other words the eternity of values means their active perduration through the endless process of change and evolution and their continuing victory, won in part through the service by human selves of the Universal Purpose or Universal Value. This standpoint I call teleological idealism. It accepts, as the ideal or criterion of value, the har- monious organization of experience in persons. It finds such harmony fulfilled in the development of truth through increasing coherence, in the develop- ment of the good through the organization of human interests, in the development of feeling through the fulfillment of aesthetic ideals and personal affec- tions. But it does not admit that the ideal of value is in all its fullness timelessly fulfilled in the shape of a completed reality. It does not admit that the present order of facts is transparently and com- 360 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY pletely the fulfillment or expression of value. It finds that the conflict between actual existence, and ideals, between finite fact and value, is real and it is led to suppose that only through continuous activity by selves can this conflict be overcome. Thus teleological idealism admits the necessity of postulating a ruling principle or ground of values in the universe. It can believe in progress and admit retrogression in the values of life. It knows no absolute but the absolute need that man, if he is to be true to his vocation as a spiritual agent, shall loyally cleave to the service of the ideal values, to the loyal service of truth, integrity, justice, fel- lowship, the furtherance of beauty and harmony in the world of society and in the inner man. For we know only in part and prophesy in part, and we prophesy in faith according to the measure and urgency of our spiritual needs and cravings. Teleological idealism does not deny that in special individuals, and at significant junctures in man's history, old values are transformed and new ones created. In fact teleological idealism sees in the religious genius, the moral genius, the artistic and scientific geniuses, in the creative poet, musician, artist, discoverer, organizer and pro- tagonist of higher ideals, special organs through which the common life of man is transformed by the breaking forth, into a new power of creative utterance, of the Universal Spiritual Order, the Ever Energizing Cosmic Meaning of Life. The problem of the status of value in the uni- verse is the problem of the status of humanity or THE STATUS OF VALUES 361 selfhood. The idea of God is that of a Supreme Reality or Spiritual Order, in and through which human personality and its values are sustained. God is the cosmical ground of values, the ground of human personality, the Overself which is the source and goal of all selfhood. The evil is that which thwarts values, which impedes and destroys them. I cannot here enter upon a consideration of the problem of evil. Let me point out that, from the present standpoint, namely that God means the Supreme Principle or Ground of Values and of Personality, the question of the origin of evil ceases to be a question of vital interest. The world is as it is, no matter what were the conditions of its origin. There is no point in crying over the irrevocable past. It could not have been otherwise, either from the point of view of materialism or of teleological idealism. The appar- ent wastefulness and cruelty of the natural order is to be faced as a fact. These things can be, and are being controlled. Man's inhumanity to man is capable of being remedied. Nature's inhumanity to man has been in part overcome and may be still more successfully lessened, when man's social capacities are better organized and more fully brought into play. From our standpoint we are to regard the defects of nature and the defects of man as challenges to concerted human effort, by which the human values already visioned and acknowl- edged shall be enhanced and conserved and, in the process, new and richer human values shall be engendered. 362 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Teleological idealism does not imply that there are no forces in the universe hostile to the achieve- ment or conservation of values. It does mean that humanity and its values, being essential features of a universe, which, thus far, is humanistic in char- acter, may endure and win the victory. Thus it is a rational faith in human values; rational, because values and selves are the offspring of the very uni- verse in which reason lives and works, faith, be- cause admittedly we can see but a little way and that not very clearly, along the pathway of humanity in its course through time. In conclusion it may not be amiss to note the bearing of this position on the traditional argu- ments for the existence of God. The ontological argument — the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being ; the idea of a perfect being involves the exist- ence of such a being ; therefore God exists — is nothing more than the putting into the form of a syllogism of the postulate of a Supreme Principle or Ground of Values — the Perfect Being. The cosmological argument — that the existence of the world implies the existence of a unitary Cause — has no religious value, except in sq far as it is assumed that the world is good and, therefore, its values must have a single source. The physico- teleological argument or argument from the evi- dence of design or purpose in the structure and process of nature is but a clumsy and round about way of stating the fundamental postulate of life, morality, science and religion, namely that values THE STATUS OF VALUES 863 are operative and controlling principles in the universal order. REFERENCES Works on Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion, previously cited. Huxley, T. H., Evolution and Ethics. Mill, J. S., Three Essays on Religion. HofFding, The Problems of Philosophy. James, The Will to Believe, and A Pluralistic Universe. Miinsterberg, The Eternal Values. Bosanquet, The Value and Destiny of the Individual. Windelband, W., Einleitung in die Philosophie, Pt. II, and History of Philosophy, pp. 518-528 and pp. 648-659. Rickert, H., Vom System der Werte, Logos, Bd. IV, 1913, pp. 295-327. Leighton, Personality and a Metaphysics of Value, In- ternational Journal of Ethics, 1910. Nietzsche, F., Works trans. A. Tille, especially Thus Spake Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Bad and Genealogy of Morals. Leighton, Temporalism and the Christian Idea of God, The Chronicle, Vol. XVIII (1918) Nos. 6 and 7, pp. 283-288 and 339-344. CHAPTER XXX THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY The philosophy of history must be distin- guished from the philosophical study of history. The latter consists of reflection upon and generaliza- tion from the study, either of special periods of his- tory, or in its widest form, of universal history. Excellent examples of philosophical historians are Ranke, Taine, Lecky and Burckhardt. The phil- osophy of history is the quest for a determination of the right standpoint from which to view the whole activity of man as an historical and social being. What does the life of man, as an historical being, mean? What ends or values does the his- torical life aim at and achieve? What is the worth, the purpose, the promise of man's life in time on the earth? Is human history, as the successive generations run their courses, a meaningless and futile tale? Or does man lay foundations, build up values, partially see and achieve ends that are in- herently worthful, however fragmentary and im- perfect their fulfillment at any given time may be? Does the historical life of man imply the further progress and fruition of human values? Are justice, rationality, liberty, humanity, the achievement of fuller individuality and a finer social order, mere dreams and illusions of a being who is inexorably and unconsciously driven on by physical and (364) THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 365 economic forces alone? Or does history show, on large scale patterns, the working out of ethical and rational ends? To raise such questions is to in- dicate that the philosophy of history is the applica- tion of metaphysics and ethics to the spectacle of man's temporal life. On the other hand, meta- physics and ethics are enriched, given content, en- dowed with body and blood, only by bringing their categories down into, and putting them to work in, the concrete life of man. Metaphysics and ethics must draw, from the contemplation, on a wide scale and in sympathetic manner, of the march of man and civilization through time, fruitful suggestions, materials and points of view. The germs of a philosophy of history are to be found in the writings of Hebrew prophecy (in Isaiah, Amos, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and others) in which the course of nations is for the first time con- ceived and depicted as controlled by the one divine governing purpose. Jehovah is the ruler of all the nations and he judges them and determines their fates in accordance with the eternal principles of social righteousness and mercy, which are the ex- pression in human society of his holy will. Special privileges entail special obligations and Jehovah judges and allots to Israel its historical destiny in accordance with the measure of its loyalty to the laws of social justice and loving kindness, which he enunciates through the mouths of his prophets. In this connection see especially Isaiah 40 : 12 ff., 42 : 5 ff., 45 : 21-23, Amos 9 : 7, and the whole treatment of the relations of the various peoples in Isaiah, 366 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Amos, Micah and Jonah. Israel and Judah must not look for special favors at the hands of Jehovah. He is not their God alone but the God of the whole earth and, indeed, of the whole universe. This prophetic conception of the moral order of history, that is, of the course of historical change as the working out of cosmically effective principles of social or ethical value, was their solution of the ethico-religious problem which confronted a group of great thinkers who started from the fundamental postulate of an ethical and social religion. Jehovah was believed to stand in a peculiar relation to the people to whom he had made known his true char- acter and who had accepted him by an act of will (the covenant relationship) . Now political disaster, conquest and suffering confronts the chosen people. If Jehovah be, indeed, the ethical will who rules the world, these disasters must be the consequence of Israel's disloyalty. The prophets have no dif- ficulty in pointing to the social corruption, the luxury, sensuous indulgence, dishonesty and oppres- sion, that are rife in a luxurious state, as the sins of disloyalty, the continuance in which brings dis- aster because the Judge of all the earth is holy. This new view of the nation's relation to Jehovah carries with it the ethical universalism which sees in the vicissitudes of all the nations the work of Jehovah's will. Assyria is for the time the rod of his anger. Cyrus, the Persian, is his instrument. The prophetic doctrine of a providential moral order, ruling the course of history and having its consummation in the full establishment of the King- THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 367 dom of God, is taken over and further developed, in the light of the belief in Christ as the fulfiller of the prophetic teaching, by the fathers of the Christian Church. It furnishes the means by which the civilization of Greece and Rome are set in their relations to the Hebrew-Christian process of revela- tion and redemption. St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews philosophize on the rela- tion of Hebraism and Gentilism to Christianity. See, in this connection, St. Paul's Epistles to the Romans, passim, and Galatians, Chapters 3 and 5, and Hebrews, especially Chapter 11. Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and espe- cially Augustine, carry on the work of setting the history of the world in the framework of the Chris- tian religion as the final revelation of God's pur- pose. Augustine, in his City of God, formulates, in comprehensive fashion, for mediaeval Christianity the whole providential order of history. The goal of history is the parousia or second coming of Christ, which will mean the complete establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. The Christian eschatology or doctrine of last things thus supplies the norm for the judgment of historical progress. The Manicheans and Gnostics, heretical sects in the early Christian centuries, conceived the his- torical process in thoroughly dualistic fashion as a battle of the Gods, a conflict between the cosmic powers of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, Spirit and Flesh. This dualistic interpretation of history has its roots in the dualism of the Persian religion and in the metaphysical and ethical dual- 368 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY ism of spirit and matter which is so prominent a feature of the later Greek and Hellenistic-Roman speculation, especially in the Neo-Platonic school. Augustine was profoundly influenced by it. From Augustine to Herder one does not find any original contribution to a philosophy of his- tory, except the isolated and unfruitful attempt of G. B. Vico to establish a science of history (La Scienza Nuova). Vico struck out the idea of the unity of history and conceived of all history as con- sisting of series of cycles which, although differing from one another, are all expressions of the ''eternal idea of history". The burden of history is the realization of justice. The philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not in- terested in history, with the exception of that uni- versal genius, Leibnitz, who in this respect, as in others, is beyond his time. For Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza and their followers the norms of all knowledge are mathematics and mechanics, the mathematics of the physical order. For Locke and Hume the chief interest lay in the psychological and epistemological analysis of knowledge. For them, too, mathematics was the highest and exactest kind of knowledge, since it dealt only with the relations of ideas. The notion of the gradual growth or evolution of hum.an institutions was foreign to their thinking. Everything social and human was con- ceived to be a deliberate invention of reason or the result of a voluntary convention or conscious con- tract. This attitude is not entirely true of Hume. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 369 Kant in his Ideas Towards a Universal His- tory does not break away from this type of unhistorical rationalism. He did, however, formu- late the idea of progress toward rationality; as did also Lessing (1729-1781), who conceived the historical process of humanity to be a gradual progress in God's education of the race up to the goal, which is full recognition of the religion of the spirit and love, first enunciated in the Gospel of St. John. Herder (1744-1803) in his Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind has a much broader conception. He attempts to bring the whole course of man's development in time under the con- ception of a law of progress, whose goal is the rule of reason and love in human society. Herder takes account of the influence of geographical and climatic conditions in the historical developments of peoples and gives a place to the operation of the more or less unconscious spirit or soul of a people. The goal of history is the fulfillment of the ideal of humanity; that is, the harmonious development of all the capacities of man into rationality, aesthetic harmony, social freedom and love. This was the ideal of Goethe and Schiller, too. Fichte and Hegel agree with Lessing and Herder in conceiving the course of history to be the progressive realization in human society of rational freedom and love. The goal of man's earthly life, says Fichte, is that humanity, in all its relationships, shall direct its life with freedom and in accordance with reason. Fichte too regards the Johannine Gospel as the first clear enunciation of the spiritual end and meaning 370 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY of history. Reason, he says, works first uncon- sciously as instinct, then externally as the authority of custom and law, and finally, inwardly in the com- plete insight of conscious and rational freedom. Fichte's doctrine is a metaphysics of history read in terms of his theory of ethical values. Hegel's Philosophy of History is the most elaborately worked out metaphysics of history pro- duced by the school of absolute idealism. In a broad sense, Hegel's whole philosophy is historical, an evolutionary idealism. The dialectic process or de- velopment of the full truth and meanings of things through the "might of the negative", that is, the impulse resident in every finite thing and event to pass over into its opposite, and for the opposites to be absorbed into a higher unity in which opposi- tion again breaks forth, this logic of passion, is ex- emplified on the grand scale in the history of human culture. The whole history of humanity is the de- velopment of spirit to fully conscious and rational freedom, through the incessant breaking forth, and reconciliation on a higher level, of the oppositions inherent in the movement of spirit through the finite forms of reality. Art, politics and religion, all pass through this dialectic growth, and Hegel threads the whole history of the religious and polit- ical institutions of the world on his dialectic frame- work. The meaning of human history is the pro- gressive realization of the consciousness of rational freedom on the part of man. Rational freedom is attained when there is a recognition of the complete harmony of the will of the individual with the uni- THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 371 versal will embodied in the state. It is identical with true morality, for this consists precisely in the conscious and complete acceptance by the indi- vidual self of the rights and duties which are pre- scribed to him by the whole spirit of the state. So freedom is fully realized where custom, law and morality are wholly harmonious. It is in the state that the individual life, family life and the life of civil society, find their fulfillment. History, there- fore, begins and ends with the state. The dialectic of history is the struggle of the succession of state Ideas. "The state is the march of God in history". "The state is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth." In it are found the union of morality and religion. God is the Absolute Rea- son who governs the world, and the working out of this government is the history of the world. God is the world-spirit who realizes his Idea or Pur- pose in time. In each successive great epoch of history, one state represents the aspect of the Divine Idea which is then being realized. The struggle between states is the struggle between stages of the Idea. The victorious state represents a higher phase of the Divine Idea than the conquered state. For example, in the ancient oriental empires of China and India but one man is free — ^the ruler — and he is capricious and despotic. The subjects do not know that they are free subjects and therefore are only unconscious subjects. The religions of the Orient, especially Brahmanism, make the Infinite all and man, the finite individual, nothing. Thus 372 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY they correspond with the despotic state idea. Greece conquers the oriental world because Greece, par- ticularly Athens, represents a higher stage in the consciousness of freedom and individuality. Some men, that is the citizens, are free. Greece gives free play to individuality, and her religion is the religion of the finite, of free and beautiful indi- vidualities who express the Greek ideal of humanity. But Greece succumbs because she does not attain the full consciousness of the identity of man as man with the universal, of the finite with the Infinite, of the identity of the individual spirit with the spirit of the social order. In order that this conscious- ness of the universality of freedom may be achieved, it must appear in the form of abstract universality, the abstract power of the universal state. This is the Roman Empire. Christianity infuses into the Roman world the consciousness of the identity of the Divine and the Human, the Infinite and the Finite, in its doctrine of the God-Man. Politically, this consciousness is realized in the modern Ger- manic world, in which all men are free as rational beings who find the substance of their wills in the complete but free and rational identification of their subjective or personal wills with the universal will embodied in the organization of the state, in which they co-operate as rational members. Thus the goal of history is reached. What remains to be achieved in future time, Hegel does not indicate. The great personalities, world-historical indi-' viduals, statesmen, conquerors and rulers are the chief organs of the universal will, instruments of THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 373 the Idea, of the World-Spirit. They pursue their own aims, but the Idea in its cunning uses them as its tools to further its unhasting and unresting movement. Hegel's conception of history thus differs from the traditional Christian conception in that his Providence is a World Purpose or a World-Idea that is the wholly immanent driving force that operates according to the dialectic or logic of his- tory, using the passions and wills of men, the vicis- situdes of empires and rulers, to achieve full con- sciousness of itself, by an immanent necessity that admits nothing contingent, nothing that can arrest its resistless progress. Hence, the course of history is the majestic progress of the true and the good in and through all the error and the sin, the pas- sion and pathos, the tragedy and comedy of man's political and social life. The Christian view, on the other hand, regards man as a free and responsible agent who may contravene, although he cannot finally thwart, God's purposes in history. Hegel's Philosophy of History is a combination of philosophical history, in which the facts are often badly distorted to fit his scheme, and metaphysics of history. For Hegel history is the resistless and inevitable march of the Absolute Idea through time, until it becomes fully conscious of itself in the culture of the modem Germanic world and dis- covers, in the Hegelian philosophy, what it has all meant. This victorious march of the Absolute through time is the metaphysical ground of all culture. It is the progressive realization by the 374 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY human spirit of its identity with the Absolute Spirit, which consciousness of itself through the human spirit by the Absolute Spirit is the full and true meaning of freedom. Karl Marx, the author of Das Kapital, the socialistic Bible, stood the Hegelian philosophy on its head when he proclaimed that the march of the Absolute through time is the march of economic necessity and every culture factor, every ideological motive in history, is but a sublimation of economic forces. Marx in a one-sided fashion thus called attention to a very important considera- tion neglected by Hegel, namely the influence of economic factors in determining the course of man's historical evolution. The economic or materialistic interpretation of history has become almost a com- monplace since then; but to assert that economic motives are the only ones that rule in history is to take a distorted view of human nature. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) regards historical progress as due primarily to intellectual causes. There are, he says, three stages in man's intellectual history. In the earliest or theological stage, man ex- plains events by recourse to spirits (animism) ; in the second or metaphysical stage, explanation is given in terms of abstract metaphysical entities (for example, to explain the effects of opiates as due to a "dormific" capacity) ; in the third or posi- tivistic stage, of which Comte was the herald, man concerns himself only with formulating the cor- relations between phenomena, to the end that he may establish social harmony and well being. Comte formulated a polity for the positivistic THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 375 society, his social ideal, in which altruism as the supreme motive and the detailed regulation of social life are to be the chief factors. The goal of history is the perfection of man in society, motivated by altruism and directed by positivistic science. Buckle, the English historian, was a pioneer in showing the influence of physical conditions in de- termining the course of history. He did not, how- ever, deny the influence of mental causes. Nearly all modern systems of sociology include theories of historical progress. Herbert Spencer, for instance, elaborates at great length the view that society has progressed, and is still progress- ing, from militarism with centralized organization towards industrialism with political decentraliza- tion. Some sociologists, such as Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, emphasize the struggles of races and groups for political domination as the chief cause of historical change. Much use has been made of the evolutionary doctrines of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest as ruling forces in his- torical changes. Social psychologists or psychological sociol- ogists, of whom there are many today, following Wundt, emphasize the central place of psychical forces, feelings and volitions, in historical change. Wundt holds that the philosophy of history is ap- plied psychology. There are social psychological laws or principles which are illustrated by the facts of history. The sociologists in general hold that there are laws of historical change. Thus they are determinists. But many of them would agree with 376 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY Wundt that the laws of historical causality are psychological and thus differ from physical laws. In a physical process there is quantitative equiv- alence between cause and effect. This is not the case in the psychical sphere. Here the effects differ quantitatively as well as qualitatively from the causes (Wundt's Law of the Increase of Psychical Energy). A considerable and influential number of writers on the Logic of History, chief among whom may be mentioned Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Troeltsch and Croce, deny that there are historical laws even remotely analogous to physical laws. They hold the function of history to be the description and interpretation of unique, non-re- peatable occurrences. The subject matter of his- tory is the irreversible series of unique non-repeat- able events that constitute the historical develop- ment of human culture. History does not repeat itself and the historian deals with individualities, chiefly the individualities of culture groups, epochs and movements. The historian employs general concepts and makes generalizations. But these arc teleological concepts or concepts of value. In th selection and interpretation of historical occur rences, it is not merely legitimate but inevitabl that the unique members of historical series o events should be related or connected into a sys tematic interpretation, and this relating takes plac in terms of values or teleological principles action. For historical events are the expressioi of the clashing and co-operating wills of men. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 377 In conclusion I will briefly indicate the prob- lems of the Philosophy of History. This discipline has no concern with the determination of the facts of history or their empirical relationships. That is the province of the historian. The considera- tion of the logical processes or methods and prin- ciples of historical investigation and interpretation, and comparison of them with the methods and prin- ciples of natural science constitutes the Logic of History, an important division of logical enquiry. Inasmuch as the principles of logic have the closest connection with metaphysics, the logic of history is intimately associated with the Metaphysics of History, In the latter field, the chief questions are the following : — First, the determination of the sys- tem of human values or standards of judgment, in the light of which philosophy can intelligently weigh the questions as to the fact and character of human progress, the growth of culture or civiliza- tion. The general problem of progress falls into several divisions — ^the problem of the nature and fact of moral progress, political progress, economic progress, intellectual progress, religious progress, and their interrelationships. In the consideration of the problem of progress there are two chief factors to be taken into account ; first, the original or biological nature of man. Is human nature modifiable through the inheritance of acquired characteristics? Man's inherited nature is an original datum for all theories of progress and practical efforts towards progress. The changes in the way of improvement and decline in the char- 378 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY acter of the social inheritance or cultural complexes, into which the generations are born and by which they are nurtured, is the second factor in estimating progress. The formulation of the system of values is the critical problem of ethics. Thus the philosophy of history must rest on ethics. On the other hand, the study of history furnishes material for ethics. There is here a logical circle. History is interpreted and judged in terms of a system of ethical values which, in turn, are derived from history. There is no escape from the circle. The philosopher must simply do his best to attain the fullest possible objectivity by the fairest, widest and most penetrat- ing survey of the facts of cultural evolution. In the past those who have speculated on the meaning of history have usually judged the facts from the standpoint of a standard of valuation arbitrarily assumed or deduced from some theolog- ical or metaphysical belief in regard to the abso- lute or supreme values to be served or won by man. Now, a candid or searching examination of the types of judgment, the conceptions of the good, or the values to be pursued by civilized man, as these are revealed in man's social, political and religious deeds and aspirations and are expressed in his literatures and philosophies, will show that there has been change, growth with improvement in cer- tain directions, perhaps retrogression in others. The ideals of a Greek gentleman, as reflected in Plato and Aristotle, differ quite markedly from those of the best Hebrews of Isaiah's day or of a Greek THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 379 Christian or a mediaeval Christian. The ideals or values of life for a mediaeval Christian are quite different from those of an eighteenth century phil- ospher and of a twentieth century American. The ideals and values of the latter differ from those of a good Chinaman or Burmese. A doctrine of ethical and social values or norms of conduct and social organization, which shall be clear sighted and well rounded, must be based on a critical and sympathetic examination of the ideals of life in their historical evolution. The doctrine of ethical values or goods is really a distillation or sublimation of the dynamic trend, the driving pur- port of the history of man's inner or spiritual civilization. The attempt to construct such a sys- tem by abstract rationalizing or even psychologizing can only result in a distorted skeleton. Ethics cannot be based simply on psychology. For the norms of conduct, which issue demands to the will of the individual and which shape his con- genital tendencies, are the products of the evolu- tion of social culture. These norms live and operate, without systematic self-consciousness, in the social atmosphere in which the individual lives. The task of ethics is, by historical and sociological analysis and philosophical construction, to disengage them from the mass of tradition and custom and to or- ganize them into a coherent whole. Only when this has been done have we a clear and self-conscious standpoint from which to judge the facts of history. Without a systematic theory of moral values educed, J)y constructive analysis. 380 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY from the systematic study of the moral history of humanity, judgments in regard to the fact and meaning of progress, in other words, in regard to the purport of history, can be nothing better than the expression of inherited beliefs, personal prej- udices and subjective emotional reactions. Inasmuch as the historically grounded and systematically organized doctrine of ethical value- judgments remains as yet largely unachieved for contemporary society, a society in transition, it can- not be said that we have the instruments ready at hand for formulating a philosophy of history. And yet, if man is to guide his further efforts towards a better social order and greater individual well- being in the clear daylight of an enlightened and instructed intelligence, a philosophy of history is much to be desired. Certainly the struggles and confusions of the present, the cataclysmic upheavals in the whole social and political fabric of western civilization, constitute an urgent call to scholars and philosophers to devote themselves to the task of clarifying and organizing human convictions on the true ends of human life, the true values to be aimed at and achieved by our social order. We must not go it blindly. We must seek with all our power, and with all the light available, to formulate an ethics of social progress, and that means to formu- late an ethical philosophy of history. Statecraft, education, industrial society, stand in urgent need of just this guidance. In this sense philosophy is called upon to be an interpreter of history and a guide to the life of man in society. The need of a THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 381 broader-based and more profoundly conceived social ethics is clamant. In the second place, assuming that we have attained a system of ethical values, a normative standpoint from which to estimate the relative worths of the various stages and factors of his- torical change ; in other words, that we have arrived at clearly defined standards of progress and apply our standards to the factual order of history; a candid examination of the latter order up to the present moment will compel the admission that there is but scant evidence that mankind, taken as a whole, is surely moving towards one universal goal or end. The course of historical change is exceedingly complex and confusing. Certain peoples are stationary for long periods. Others, such as the extreme Orient and the Occident, lived for many centuries without influencing one another. Now that the oriental and the occidental civilizations are in closer contact, it is not clear what the issue of this meeting will be. Even Occidental civilization does not show steady progress in all directions. It halts and even retrogrades. Who would assert that the present world war is not being accompanied by profound ethical retrogression? The occidental man does not seem to have mastered the vast in- dustrial mechanism which he has evoked from the forces of nature to do his bidding. The monster he has created threatens to engulf the finer spirit of life. Moreover, were it clear that moral and humane progress goes on even through the welter of indus- 382 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY trialism, commercialism and war, who are to enjoy the final fruits of the movement? Is it the lot of the living members of each generation simply to toil and suffer and achieve somewhat, in order to hand on to the following generation a heritage of instruments and a nest of problems, with and at which that generation, in turn, will labor, to pass to the grave and be forgotten after a brief toil at an endless task; one which is never done, but con- tinues and changes throughout the centuries and the aeons without final goal, without enduring re- sults in human values? Either humanity, as it toils in history, is engaged in an endless and goal- less task and then progress is a self-contradictory notion; or the goal is to be reached by some far off generation, and then all the preceding genera- tions will have been mere hewers of wood and drawers of water to serve the welfare of the final happy one; or there is, in the lives of each genera- tion, as it toils and suffers and aspires in the living present, an inherent value and then, since this value is only in part achieved by it, must we not postulate, if our ethical and humane values are to retain their validity and dignity, a continuous existence and progressive fulfillment of value for the life of man beyond the visible bournes of the present time and space? Does not the supremacy of ethical values imply the immortality of the generations ? Furthermore, while the individual lives a worthy life only in so far as he co-operates man- fully in the social work of his own day and place as a member of the community, the nation, the THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 383 group in which his calling and election give him membership and, in the widest sense, in the work of humanity, the individual life which alone feels, thinks and wills, alone knows the bitterness of defeat, the joy of achievement, alone feels the sor- row and the happiness of the common human lot, is the actual agent and embodiment of ethical values. How, then, can ethical values endure and grow if individual souls are, in the final outcome, but dust and ashes thrown on the cosmical scrap-heap by the winds and tides of the blind cosmical weather? Thus, the final issues raised by ethics and the philosophy of history are the issues that lie, and have always lain, at the heart of man's whole prac- tical and affective life. These are the issues out of which arise the cry for a religious world view, and assuring answers to which the genius of religion does and has always aimed to give. For religion, at its best, is the consecration of the highest human values; it is the affirmation in faith and deed that these values are integral constituents in, or essential qualities of, the universal and enduring order; that the higher meanings and purposes of the human spirit are blood kin to the supreme meaning and Purpose of Reality. An interesting and important application of these problems arises in connection with the ethics of the state, the most comprehensive and powerful form of social organization. What ends does and should the state exist to serve ? Is there discernible, in the light of ethical values, any line of political progress in history? Should the state be ordered 384 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY SO as to promote primarily the universal self-realiza- tion of the mass of mankind, to enable all indi- viduals to attain and enjoy a fair measure of physical and mental well being? If so, what is a fair measure of well being? Should the means to develop and exercise exceptional abilities and achieve distinguished results be denied the compara- tively few in the interest of a moderate average of well being for all? Or are both aims possible of realization? In short, can the democratic and the aristocratic ideals of social order be reconciled? If so, how? Which is more nearly in accord with the highest ethical values, well being and enjoyment made cheap and accessible to every one, or a polit- ical and industrial organization that aims primarily at producing the highest results in art, science, literature? Or can these two ideals be realized simultaneously in the same social order? To seek an answer to these questions is to formulate a sys- tem of ethical values by which history and the present social and political orders are judged. Or are, perhaps, the Buddhist, the Neo- Platonist, the quietist, the contemplative mystic, right in holding that the only permanent peace, the only lasting values, are to be attained by escaping from the roaring loom of time to the calm haven of unruffled contemplation and mystic union with the One Changeless Absolute in whose presence all the fretful stir unprofitable and the fever of this jarring world are seen to be illusion? THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 385 REFERENCES Troeltsch, art. Historiography in Encyc. of Religion and Ethics. Windelband, History of Philosophy, pp. 255-262 and pp. 648-659. Eucken, Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, The Problem of Human Life, and Art. Geschichtsphilosophie in System- atische Philosophie (in series Die Kultur der Gegenwart). Hegel, Philosophy of History. Comte, Positive Philosophy, trans, by Martineau. Lotze, Microcosmus. Xenopol, A. D., Les principes fondementaux de Vhistoire. Bagehot, Physics and Politics. Flint, R., History of The Philosophy of History. Kidd, B., Principles of Western Civilization. Spencer, H., Principles of Sociology, and Principles of Ethics. Ward, L. F., Dynamic Sociology. Giddings, F. H., Principles of Sociology. Matthews, Shailer, The Spiritual Interpretation of History. Barth, P., Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, lite Auflage. Rickert, H., Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, lite Auflage, and Art. Geschichtsphilosophie in Die Philosophie im Beginn des Zwansizsten Jahrhunderts. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenchaften. Grotenfelt, Geschichtliche Wertmassstabe in der Ges- chichtsphilosophie. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode. APPENDIX (387) APPENDIX CURRENT ISSUES IN REGARD TO CONSCIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY. Among current philosophical tendencies, of those lay- ing claim to novelty the most significant are: The New Realism, which is an epistemological reaction against idealism; Neutral Monism, which is a metaphysical theory fathered in part by representatives of the new realism and which claims to circumvent the time-honored standpoint of dualism by recourse to a new theory of identity or qualita- tive monism of being; Instrumentalism, a further develop- ment of pragmatism, which, while stressing the practical and empirical function of the intellect, emphasizes its active and creative character and would have us forego the quest for an ultimate reality, insisting that the only useful func- tion of thinking is the organization of the empirical flux; and finally Irrationalism, which, in Bradley and James and still more emphatically in Bergson, proclaims the power- lessness of intellect or reason to apprehend the true char- acter of reality and offers in its place a doctrine of feeling or intuition as the way to direct contact with the essence of reality. We shall now discuss briefly these movements. 1. The New Realism. This term includes a variety of standpoints. For instance S. Alexander's statement of it is one that seems to differ chiefly in terminology from the standpoint of such objective idealists as Bosanquet. B. Russell states a type of new realism which finds a place for the idealistic con- tention that what we know immediately are sense data and that the objective world of matter of the physicist is really an intellectual construction. Russell recognizes fully that (389) 390 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY the activity of the Ego or knowing subject is a non- eliminable factor in knowledge of the world of sense and that the world of physics is an intellectual construction. Thus Russell is a dualistic so-called neo-realist. Some of the American neo-realists approach closely to the standpoint of naive common sense in their assertion of the complete independence of the objects of knowledge over against the subject or knower (e. g., R. B. Perry). Others hold, ap- parently, that reality is energy (Montague) or a strange world of logical entities (e. g.. Holt). It is not possible to discuss here all the variants of this doctrine, some of which have not much in common except the name. I shall, there- fore, confine myself to a brief consideration of the more salient and significant features of the movement. The New Realism involves two positions (a), the ob- jects known are independent of their being known; (b) logical and metaphysical pluralism, i. e., reality is not a system or whole of interrelated entities, but a mere aggre- gate of many entities some of which are interdependently related to some but not each to all the others. With regard to the first position, the new realist argues that the idealist is guilty of equivocation in his use of the term "experience". Because what I experience seems to me real and I am the experient the idealist argues, says the new realist, that all reality is experience and therefore dependent on an Ego. Because everything known is thus far related, by the act of knowing, to an Ego, therefore the being of everything known is only being for an Ego. The idealist thus begs the question and calmly assumes that, since a thing known is in the knowledge relation, therefore that thing's being is dependent on a knower. This criticism is doubtless valid against some forms of idealism, but not against the spiritualism or idealism of Leibnitz, Hegel, Green, E. Caird or Bosanquet. For these men do not argue that, since perception or experience is the state or act of an Ego, therefore all being is the state or act of an Ego or experient. The gist of their argument rather is that, since the organization of experience involves relations and CURRENT ISSUES 391 since all that reality can mean for us men is a system of progressively organized experience, reality must have a ra- tional structure or texture and therefore is to that extent related to mind or thought. Certainly in the very act of knowing an object (whether that object be a physical thing or a scientific principle), it is implied that the object known is distinct from the act of knowing. Even in knowing my own psychical processes /, as knower, am distinct from me, as known. Furthermore, by the reality of a physical thing or the truth of a scientific law as recognized by me, I do not mean that I have made the thing or even the law that I now know out of whole cloth or out of nothing. A physical object, if real, must have being independent of its being known by you or me. A scientific law is not a law if it be valid only for my mind, not even though I am its discoverer. But do we not mean by an objectively real physical object one that is accessible to all normal percipients under standardized conditions of perception? And do we not mean by a scien- tific law a principle that would be recognized as true by all normal minds working under the same conditions? That there are real physical energies which operate when no finite knower is perceiving them I do not question. It seems to me in the highest degree improbable that any finite knower is now perceiving what is going on in the center of the earth or of the sun. These regions exist as inferred and real objects of possible experience. And when we ask what these energies or objects are, when we attempt to determine their natures, we can only do so by a logical and imagina- tive construction based upon experience. It is impossible to say anything significant about any part of reality with- out direct or indirect reference to reality as experienced or a8 constructed from experience. Therefore the attempt to know or define any aspect or region of reality involves reference to experience. Further, the attempt to conceive the most remote region or recondite and microscopic quality of the real involves the assumption that it is intelligibly continuous with experienced reality, that the non-experience- 392 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY able and imaged reality is an element in the whole system of reality. Thus any meaningful assertion or speculation about any bit of reality implies its possible presence to some experient or thinker and its actual membership in the in- telligible or rational and coherent structure of reality. The other chief tenet of new realism is logical and metaphysical pluralism — reality is an aggregate of entities many of which may be in no relation to many others. This doctrine is a reaction from the misuse made of the so-called doctrine of the internality of relations, namely, the doctrine that since all relations are internal to the terms related (otherwise it is claimed the terms would not be really re- lated), therefore all finite beings are really parts of one all-inclusive being. We can think of many entities that have no relevant interrelations so far as we can see. For instance, I see no relevant relation between the flavor of the apple I have just eaten, the beard of Hammurabi and Fuchsian functions in mathematics. So far as I am con- cerned the interrelations of these three entities are so negligible as to make the terms external to one another. Still these three entities are all parts of the same universe and must have some sort of spatial, temporal or logical con- nections. If I were an omniscient being doubtless I should see those connections. One's recognition of relevancy of spatial, temporal, causal, quantitative, qualitative or tele- ological relations between entities is relative, not merely to the limitations of one's actual knowledge but relative also to the character of one's purposes. An abstract logical or mathematical relation may be very significant to Mr. Russell and meaningless to Von Hindenburg. There must be an indefinitely numerous variety of degrees in the relevancy of relations and there certainly are many varia- tions in the relevancy of relations to the purposes of human knowing. Moreover, since reality is dynamic, is process, relations change. Old ones disappear and new ones arise. Nevertheless, in so far as it is a universe or cosmos in which we live, even the rises and disappearances of relations must be themselves cases of relations that are somehow. CURRENT ISSUES 393 somewhere, sometime, relevant to other terms and rela- tions. If we take literally the doctrine of the pure ex- ternality or pluralism of relations, we have not even "a world of tiny absolutes" as Bosanquet puts it, but a chaos of tiny absolutes and, since each of us is either a part or whole of one such absolute, we could not even know that there is a chaotic plurality of absolutes. We are elements in a uni-verse no matter how little we may know about our places and destinies therein. Relations do not make the entities which are related mere parts of one inclusive entity, but relations are relevant to the natures of the terms related and the natures of the terms are relevant to the relations. For example, the character of a man is relevant to the societies he belongs to and, vice versa, the character of the social relations are affected by the natures of individuals in those relations. Marvin (History of European Philosophy, pp. 413-421) gives a quite different statement of the neo-realistic stand- point. He asserts that neo-realism discards entirely the traditional notions of substance and cause. It substitutes for the concepts of physical and mental substances or stuffs the concepts of concrete realities as having determinable structures, and by structure it means relations between parts or organization. Different entities have different types of structure or systems of relation. The human mind has a definite and discoverable structure and the body has a dif- ferent structure. The difference between the physical and the mental is a difference solely of relations and not a dif- ference of stuff or entity. And, in place of asking how mind and body interact causally, neo-realism asks, what are the functional relations between the two structural systems? Certainly, the business of science and philosophy is to deter- mine and formulate the chief types of structure, organiza- tion or systematic relationships in things, and the relations of these types to one another. If this be neo-realism we must all be neo-realists. In so far as one means by sub- stance a homogeneous and unchanging stuff, he is employ- ing a notion that belongs to the childhood of thought. But 894 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY are not parts, relations, structures, organizations or sys- tematic connections, entities or realities? Have they not being and, in many cases, dynamic being? They are as they do and they do as they are. Certainly, too, the relation of mind and body is a case of functional interdependence. Knowing and willing are functions of two variables — two systems in one system? But what sort of function? Surely there is a profound difference between a purely logical func- tion of timeless implication, as when we say, for example, that the area of a circle is a function of its radius, and an efficient physical or teleological function ! When one says that the distance the water from a garden hose will carry is a function of the angle at which the nozzle is held, that is only a part of the truth. The distance is also a function of the water-pressure and this is a dynamic factor. When one says that the amount of patriotic service that a citizen will render is a function of his intelligence and character as affected by the social spirit of his community and nation one is dealing with dynamic and teleological factors, with tem- porally operative energies and agencies; in short, with causes in distinction from logical and timeless systems of implications. This brand of neo-realism is not realistic enough. It has a tendency to evaporate the dynamic and temporal reality into a timeless system of logical and mathe- matical implications. It runs into a pure logicism. It sup- plies one more instance of that confusion between actual causation, as a dynamic and temporal process of interaction or relevant and efficient interrelation between individual elements, and the notion of a timeless system of logical im- plications, which one finds in Spinoza and which recurs even in Bradley and Bosanquet. Thus absolute idealism and neo- realism join hands in the same error. The ever-recurring controversies and misconceptions which arise from the equivocal meanings of the terms "ideal- ism" and "realism" suggest that it might be better to discard their use altogether, and to call our standpoint "rational- istic" or "organizational experientialism". Briefly, this standpoint involves the following propositions: — (a) Things CURRENT ISSUES 395 perceived are selected and organized groupings of sense- qualities in relations; such relations as spatial, temporal, numerical, qualitative (degrees of likeness and unlikeness), quantitative (equality greater, less, etc.), dynamical (phys- ical, purposive), (b) In knowing, true relations are dis- covered, not made by the mind; in willing, man does, to a limited extent, make new relations, (c) The known world, as a complex of things and events in relation, involves three factors: (1) the mind, with its definitive structure history and interests; (2) the physical or "objective" grounds of perception; these I conceive to be energy-complexes; (3) the central nervous system and the sense-organs, which are at once parts of the physical order and the immediate basis of the mental processes of perception, etc., and hence are the intermediating links between the mind and the rest of the physical world, (d) Percepts are not copies of things but partial and fragmentary aspects or "views" of the real external world selected by the mind and the sensory system, (e) The mind is the "ultimate" active selective and analytic- synthetic principle which discovers and takes note of quali- ties-in-relation, and which constructs and organizes a larger context of reality, in which it sets and interprets the imme- diate data of experience. The relation of a perceived thing or event or even a scientific law to reality is that of a partial selected and interpreted aspect or fragment of an indefinitely complex totality of things, processes, qualities and relations. Reality involves much more than any experience, but that "more" is a construction by the human mind from the struc- ture of actual experience and the nature of the construction is determined by the joint natures of the experienced reality and of the mind's own structure, (f) In error and illusion the mind misinterprets or places in its wrong setting some bit of experience or generalization from experience. It may either fail to determine and analyze the data correctly or it may fail to set the data in the right connections with other items of reality. There can be no unreal experiences, only untrue, i. e., wrongly related, experiences. 396 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY 2. Neutral Monism. This doctrine owes its recent developments to the es- says of William James: Does Consciousness Exist? A World of Pure Experience, etc., collected together in his Essays in Radical Empiricism. Intermarried with neo- realistic logical pluralism it has given birth to some mar- velous neutral progeny, especially the monism of Holt in the Concept of Consciousness. It has affinities with Avenarius' concept of Pure Experience and with the sensa- tionalistic phenomenalism of Ernest Mach. James proposed to get rid of the duality of conscious- ness and its objects by taking a radical step and thus rightly called his doctrine "radical empiricism'". He says there is no such entity as consciousness. The standing assumption of common sense is that there is a duplicity in experience — knower and known, thought and things. James says "Experience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity;"' "thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are*'^. "The instant field of the present is at all times what I call *pure' experience"*. The sum total of all ex- perence "is a that, an absolute, a *pure' experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing""; "experience as a whole is self-con- taining and leans on nothing."'. It is "the selfsame piece of pure experience, taken twice over, that serves now as thought and now as thing.'" I am writing at a desk. The paper, the desk and the pencil are bits of pure experience. If they are taken in their spatial relations in the house, they thus become physical things ; but, if they are taken as items in my personal biography, they thus become thoughts. As virginal experiences they are neither thoughts nor things, 1 See especially Essays in Radical Empiricism. ^Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 9. »Ibid, p. 37. * Ibid, p. 23. ojbid, p. 134. " Ibid, p. 193. ' Ibid, p. 27. CURRENT ISSUES 397 and their being taken as either the one or the other is an addition to their original natures as just pure experiences. As for the relations which seem to do the taking and thus the dualizing or dichotomizing of the world of pure ex- perience, they too are experiences of transition which no Ego has or makes. They just happen. The relations are empirical data like the substantive bits of pure experience between which they are transitions or passages. This seems a beautifully simple way of circumventing all the difficulties which arise from the duality of Ego know- ing and object known. It solves the problem of the self by saying it consists of certain transitional experiences. Con- sciousness becomes a clumsy and misleading name for cer- tain empirical groupings. There is no longer any problem of mind and body on our hands, since mind and body are merely the same pure experiences connected by other pure experiences of relation or transition. Knowing, affection and willing consist of certain transitional feelings and ma- terial movements consist of other transitional feelings. No Ego feels the feelings or knows the knowledges. All things flow and all things, including the rates and kinds of flowing, are simply experiences. A personal history is simply an experience of continuous transition. James' doctrine has been taken up by certain American neo-realists, especially by Perry and Holt. According to the latter, the world consists of neutral elements, i. e., ele- ments that are neither physical or psychical. These elements are numerically many but qualitatively of the same sub- stance. They are logical "terms" and "propositions", but active and generative of more complex entities. These ele- ments constitute an indefinite variety of complexes, since they may enter an indefinite variety of group or class rela- tions. They are the foundation stones of the universe. Mind is a class or group of neutral entities, as a physical object is another class or group. A mind makes a cross section of the world which is always a group of the neutral com- ponents of the object and its immediate relations. Con- sciousness is any part of the field of neutral entities that is 398 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY illuminated. Mere illumination makes no change in the na- tures of the entities. They may exist the same in relation and out of relation to consciousness. Consciousness is like a searchlight that plays over the entities^ The work of selection and illumination, which results in consciousness, is done by the central nervous system'. The processes of the nervous system are of a mathematical and neutral structure^", like all physical processes. Holt would even de- fine a collision between two railroad engines as a contradic- tion between two groups of logical entities. In short, reality is resolved into an unearthly ballet of bloodless terms and propositions. Neutral monistic realism thus turns around into a pluralistic logicism. Neutral monism seems to be but a philosophical aberra- tion for the following reasons: (1) It can offer no explanation of why we should make a distinction between consciousness and its objects, between knowing and the thing known, without invoking the nervous system as the real agent. Much less can it account for the fact of self-consciousness. Can a searchlight search for its own searching^? (2) It cannot account for the felt difference between perception of objects as present to the percipient and imag- ination of objects not so present. (3) It cannot account for memory since the latter involves the conscious continuity of the self. (4) It cannot account for error. If consciousness be but the passively illuminated field of objects selected by the central nervous system, how can there be wrong judg- ments? The theory of error requires the assumption of an active thinker. (5) Since consciousness is the illuminated field of the present, how can one believe in non-temporal proposi- tions such as those of logic, mathematics and natural science? 8 Holt in The New Realism, p. 362 ff. » Holt in The New Realism, p. 352 ff., and Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 299 etc. " Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p. 255, etc. CURRENT ISSUES 399 (6) Neutral monism involves psychological atomism. The self is resolved into an ever shifting phantasmagoria of neutral entities selected by the brain. (7) Since the brain is the real selective and attentive agency, the searchlight that makes the illumination which is consciousness, neutral monism is but a new and specious name for materialism. It has no right to be called neutral monism. James' standpoint of radical empiricism is simpler and not open to all the above objections, because it evades all troublesome problems as to how the "inner duplicity" arises in experience and would make philosophy a mere descrip- tion, without analysis and reconstructive interpretation, of the flux of experience. James fails to offer any account as to why or how it happens that identically the same bits of experience get taken, respectively, in physical and personal contexts of relations. Personal biographies, appreciations, judgments, feelings, volitions just appear and disappear mysteriously, hither and yon in the flux of experience. It is simpler and more reasonable to admit that experience involves an experiencer, and, hence, a self, especially in view of the fact that one is not only conscious but may be conscious of one's being conscious, i. e., be selfconscious. 3. The Instrumentalist View of Intelligence. In the latest development of pragmatism in the hands of John Dewey and his school, and to which the name in- strumentalism is frequently given, the Jamesian conception of the flux of experience is a characteristic feature. Dewey insists that we should abandon the old problems of the rela- tion of knower and known, the self and nature, mind and body, freedom and determination, the one and the many, the problem of evil, etc., and turn philosophy into an instrument for the better organization of human experience and activity by making it a tool for solving practical, social, educational, political and personal problems. The time honored problems and theories of metaphysics he thinks are evaporating. The 400 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY truly useful and creative function of intelligence is the en- richment and harmonization of man's individual and social life, and we are to take experience at its face value. Every- thing is what it is experienced as. But Dewey lays great stress on the active organizing function of intelligence in enhancing the values of experience. He seems to regard it as the chief instrument of human progress and individual as well as social welfare. Thus, while James seeks prag- matic justification for the contemplative side of life as found in religion, especially in mysticism, Dewey's standpoint is more that of a crusader on behalf of the practical, and especially the social, efficacy of intelligence. Bergson re- duces intelligence to the level of a mere tool for action on matter and has recourse to intuition to satisfy man's passion to experience reality. Dewey elevates intelligence to the place of the supreme instrument which will enrich the whole of human life, while he seems to deny the value for life of the investigation of the classical problems and theories of philosophy in the past. In short, while for James, Bergson and Dewey, reality is flux and intelligence is a biological instrument to improve human behavior and the behavior of non-human nature, James and especially Bergson offer, in immediate experience, feeling or intuition, a way of escape for the romantic long- ing of man, his metaphysical craving for the experience of union with the universe; whereas Dewey apparently would have man give all the energies of his intellect to control and adjust himself to the flux of experience in which he lives and of which he is a part, thus relegating the problems of ultimate reality and man's place in it to the position of adolescent dreams left behind by the mind that has attained intellectual maturity. The conception of intelligence as an active organizing principle is the last remaining legacy of the objective idealists, from Plato to Hegel, which our newest instru- mentalists have preserved. But surely the successful opera- tion of intelligence as an instrument of control or success- ful behavior in a world implies that the world is, at least CURRENT ISSUES 401 to a predominating degree, of similar structure. Mind can make itself at homei in a universe only if the latter be in some sense a rational order. Moreover, it is a narrow and unjustifiable limitation of the function of human intelligence to say that it exists only to exercise practical, technical, social and volitional controls andi invent make-shift adjust- ments between human emotional and biological needs and the daily and hourly flux of experience. The functions of consciousness and reason are not exhausted in meeting novel situations and controlling behavior by a reference to the future. When I am engaged in aesthetic contemplation of nature or art, when I am enjoying the companionship of a friend, when I am contemplating the logical symmetry, beauty and impersonal grandeur of some scientific or mathe- matical construction, when I am living in some significant period of the past, for example Elizabethan England or the Athens of Pericles, when I am following the career and feeling myself into the life of some one of the race's worldly or spiritual heroes, my consciousness, keen, vivid and ex- panding, may have no reference to my own future behavior or that of anyone else. The human spirit lives not by deeds of adjustment to external and future situations alone. It lives deeply in pure contemplation and free imagination. The instrumentalist errs by taking one important function of conscious intelligence and making it the sole function. Disinterested contemplation and enjoyment of the beauty, grandeur, meaning and order of things for their own sakes are for some human beings inherently worthful functions of consciousness. The philosopher, like Kipling's world- wanderer, is moved by the passion "For to see and for to admire" the universe. To become, in however modest degree, the spectator of time and existence is a native human long- ing which philosophy exists to satisfy. Nothing is more truly a mark of the distinctively human life, nothing in human life gives more worth and poise, more inner strength and unshaken fortitude to life than the attainment of a con- templative insight in which the intellect's thirst for a re- flective vision of reality is slaked, in which the thinker becomes, in however imperfect measure, consciously at one 402 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY with the order of the universe. The truest mainspring of science and philosophy is not the discovery of "get-rich- quick" methods in either industry or social organization. Philosophy is more than a good economic, political, social or even pedagogical tool. Even to make the economic and social needs of the proletariat the chief guide to its ruling aims and methods will be to ruin philosophy. The theoretic or contemplative life is the crown and guide of the truly human life. The rational life is the coherent and harmoni- ous life, in contrast with the random and disjointed life of blind feeling and impulse. Universality of meaning, har- mony, organization into a coherent system — these are alike notes of the most true in science and of the highest type of social order and individual life. The mainspring of science and philosophy is the quest for a coherent and harmonious life, including a coherent insight into the mean- ing of life and the nature of things. Reality is more than reason, but without reason, without disinterested contempla- tion, without a life that seeks the reflective insight into the ordered totality, the coherent organization of the real, the deepest meanings and values of reality do not come into the possession of man. The truly human part of man is the rational and spiritual power in him which has fashioned and is ever fashioning, out of the materials supplied by nature, an objective rational order of social, moral and spiritual life; and which creates science, art, religion and philosophy, not for the satisfaction of man's belly needs but in order that reason and the creative imagination may find themselves at home in the spiritual universe. The danger of over stressing the instrumental char- acter of intelligence lies in covertly assuming that, since intelligence or reason is a practical instrument of behavior, it is nothing more. The instrumentalist a outrance con- demns all pure speculation and contemplation, all imagina- tive musings over the problems of metaphysics and theology. He demands that philosophy come down into the market place, roll up its sleeves and go to work to prove its utility like the farm tractor or any other piece of human invention. He voices the severe utilitarianism of the practical Amer- ican, especially the Middle- Westerner. Well, I will risk the CURRENT ISSUES 403 prophecy that, when our boasted nineteenth century in- dustrialism and scientific and materialistic commercialism have tumbled down about our ears, we shall have to turn, from cunningly devised empirical and mechanical panaceas for social, educational and political reconstruction, to seek the guidance of an idealistic philosophy and the inspiration of a simpler type of ethical and rational religion. Only the acceptance of universal and ideal values will save oc- cidental civilization from ruin. 4. IRRATIONALISTIC InTUITIONISM. Bergson conceives of the power of intelligence as rigidly limited to dealing with inorganic solids, with mere matter. Intelligence is able only to comprehend and formulate abstract geometrised equations of identity. It turns the mobility, warmth, manifold heterogeneity, in- dividuality, creativity and freedom of the life-force into frozen concepts, into inert, motionless and skeletal travesties of the rich and ever moving reality. Life for him is ever active and creative, reason is static and uncreative. Thus life, which is reality, transcends thought. The vital impetus, creative, mysterious, unpredictable and uncontrollable, is the power which moves the world. Reality as life is not only incalculable and inconceivable in its secret tendencies, move- ments and results; its secret essence can not be communi- cated, for language, an instrument of intelligence fashioned to meet the exigencies of social intercourse, is utterly power- less to express the multitudinous variety and novelty of life's manifestations. Words are pale and colorless abstractions, little more than geometrical marionettes. Thus intelligence trails along helplessly in the wake of life, picking up super- ficial uniformities and overlooking the spontaneous diversi- ties and novelties with which life teems. But Bergson recognizes that the metaphysical thirst of man for contact with reality must be slaked. Intuition or the immediate feeling of, the direct listening to, the face-to-face vision of, our inner selfhood is the key to reality. In the supreme moments of life, in great passional and volitional crises, when man feels his whole personality surg- 404 THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY ing up from the deeps or feels that he is putting his whole self into ian act: "Intuition is there however vague and above all discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. But it glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and perhaps on our destiny, it throws a light however feeble and vacillating, but which none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us". The function of Philosophy is to unite, to deepen and dilate these evanescent intuitions and thus to enable man to lay direct hold on reality. Thus Bergson is a reviver of romanticism and mysticism. Reality must be directly perceived or felt, by an immediate contact or union of the contemplating soul with the reality contemplated. If Bergson means that there must be immediate data of experience at the basis of all grninine knowledge, thus far he is right. He is right, too, in holding that the data for the understanding of the nature of the self and of all psychical and spiritual life must be found in the living contemplation of the Ego's own life. I can, only understand and appreciate another Ego by recreat- ing his experiences and attitudes within myself. The key to the meaning of life is to be found in the experience of living. But Bergson's conception of intelligence is altogether too narrow. Intelligence is not tied-up to abstract spatial forms. It does not traffic alone in barren identities, static formulas and concepts. It has other modes of operation than geometry. The business of intellect is to interpret and organize the data of experience. These data have connec- tions, relations, meanings, and, thus, are intelligible. If diversity, novelty, dynamic change, increasing individuality and freedom are facts, the intellect does not commit suicide in recognizing them nor does it try to reduce them to a dead monotony and colorless sameness. The intellect operates in this variegated moving world. Science is organized com- mon-sense and philosophy is common-sense and science CURRENT ISSUES 406 organized and interpreted as completely as possible. The intelligence is the power of reflectively organizing the per- ceptions, the impulsions, the deeds, the feelings, the valua- tions of the self and of so interpreting and interrelating the whole life of the self in its organic interplay with nature and humanity; so that thereby our impulses become dynamic elements in a harmonious personality, so that thereby our deeds take on a social and universal significance, so that thereby our dumb and blind feelings learn to speak the language of reason and become refined and transformed into the higher sentiments of a well articulated personality, and so that thereby, too, our valuations as the guides to our deeds and the finest fruits of our experiences become the universalized and harmonious instruments by which the in- dividual self ^t once comes into fuller self-possession as a richer and more significant personal unity and comes into fuller union with man, with nature and with the universal order. Perhaps this is what Bergson means; but it is un- fortunate that he plays into the hands of irresponsible ir- rationalism and emotionalistic mysticism by offering us, as a foundation for his metaphysics, such an erroneous, ridiculous, wooden-image travesty of intelligence or reason. By all means we must seek reality first-hand in living, in acting, in feeling. But by all means, if the universe be not a crazy patchwork, or a madhouse, we shall find our true selves, we shall understand and control nature and we shall organize our lives into richer and more meaningful internal and social harmony and attain union with the universal meaning of things, only by the unremitting exercise of the analytic-synthetic, organizing and interpreting activity of intelligence. REFERENCES. Thilly, History of Philosophy, pp. 666-591. Marvin, History of European Philosophy, Ckapter XXVIII. Works by Russell, James, Perry, Marvin, Holt, Dewey and Bergson previously cited. Dewey and Others, Creative Intelligence. Leighton, A Defence of Reason, Hobart College Bulletins, Vol. XI, No. i. INDEX Abelard, 137. Absolute, The, 119 ff., Hegelian conception of, 210, 212 flf., 253. Academy, 44 ff. Achilles, 36, 102. Acosmic, 207. Adaptation, 244. Aesthetics, 5, 339 ff. Alexander the Great, and Aristotle, 77. Alexandria, 118. Alexandrian Schools, 96. Amos, 365, ff. Analogy, argument from, 26. Anaxagoras, 38, ff.; on multiplicity, 38; on substance, 39; relation to animism, 40. Anaximander, 30 ff, Anaximenes, 272. Anselm, 136. Apologists, 126. Aquinas, 137; 138, 140, 144. Archimedes, 183. Arguments of Zeno, 101; for skep- ticism, 102 ff. Aristophanes, 46. Aristotle, on science, 2; criticism of Plato, 64; theory of knowledge, 77 ff; on universals, 77; on de- velopment, 79; on efficient cause, 80; on soul, 80; psychology of, 80; on soul and body, 80 ff; theory of knowledge, 82; on sense perception, 83; definitions, 83; theory of reality, 85; 138, 152, 185, 186, 249; on categories, 270, 272 ff, 316, 338, 355, 378. Arian heresy, 129. Arrow, 36. Assumptions, 104. Athanasian doctrine, 129. Athens, 44, 118. Atomism, 37, 87; in science, 91; its fruitfulness, 95. Augustine, Saint, 131, 134, 367 ff. Aurelius, Marcus, 109. Avenarius, 396. Axiology, 330, 346. Bacon, Francis, 294. Bacon, Roger, 138, 148. Beginnings, 290, Berkeley, on idea, 61; 149, 156, 169, 178 ff., 253, 272, 356. Bergson, 66, 156, 158, 228, 242, 245, 249, 389, 400, 403 f, Boethius, 136, Bosanquet, 156, 157, 188, 210, 253, 357, 389, 394. Bradley, 156, 157, 188, 204, 210, 215, 219, 320, 357, 389, 394. Brotherhood, universal. 111; Pytha- gorean, 116. Browning, 148. Bruno, 149, 119. Bruhl, 119. Buddha, 122, Burckhardt, 364. Buchner, 156. Byron, 186. Caird, E., 188. Calkins, 219, 254. Carneades, 99, 100. Causation, 296. Cause, final, 68; efiicient (Aristotle), 80. Causality, original form of, 22; its relation to magic, 22; of ideas, 63; 201, 273 ff. Certitude, 100. Chalcedon, 130. Change, Heraclitus on, S3 ff,; self initiated, 265. (407) 408 INDEX ChaoB, 79. Christ, 143. Christianity, 124; ethical content of, 126, 127; its origin, 127; 249, 252. Chrysippus, 109. Church, Jewish, 125. City, of God, 367. Civilization, Mediterranean, Greek, 29. Cleanthes, 109. Clearness, 105. Classification, in Plato, 58. Community, the Beloved, 204. Communion, 110. Communism, in Plato, 73. Comte, Auguste, 374 ff. Conduct, problem of, 41. Conservation, of Value, 246. Conservatism, in Athens, 46. Contemplation, 88, 401 ff. Concept, 145. Continuum, 200. Contradiction, 36. Copernicus, 152. Cosmogonies, Greek, 20. Cosmology, 330. Cosmic soul, 120. Cosmos, 284. Cratylus, 105. Creation, Plato's theory of, 68. Creativity, of reason, 81, 245. Criteria of truth, 314. Croce, 376. Culture, Mediaeval, 135. Culture system, European, our re- lation to it, 28. Cusa, Nicholas of, 148. Cycles, 37. Cyclic process, 246. Dante, 143. Darwin, 34, 230, 234 ff. Death, 17. Demiurge, 68. Democracy, 75. Democritus, 87, 90, 272. Descartes, 113, 149, 151, 156, 160, 169, 171, 252, 261, 294 ff., 316, 368. Determinatio, 209. Determinism, 263 ff. Development, 79, 85; of civilization, 26. Dewey, 317, 321, 399 ff. Dialogues, 121. Dilthey, 376. Ditheletism, 131. Divisibility, 36. Docetic, 130. Doctrine, chemical anticipated by Anaxagoras, 39. Double aspect theory, 191 ff. Driesch, 241 ff. Dualism, 156 ff., 261. Duality, in unity, 130. Duns Scotus, 136. Durkheim, 287. Duty, Stoic conception of. 111. Eclectics, 117. Education, 70. Effulgence, 120. Ego, 253. Elea, 35. Elements, the four, 37; Anaxagoras on, 38. Emerson, 175. Empedocles, 37. Energy, conservation of, 160 ff., 176. Entelechy, 78, 252. Epictetus, 109. Epicureanism, an atomism, 90, 109. Epistemology, its problems, 293 ff.; 330. Erigena, John Scotus, 136. Error, problem of, 36. Ethics, nature of, 5; in Plato, 70; 336 ff. Eugenics, in Plato, 75. Euthanasia, 356. Evidence, self, 105. Evolution, problem of, 230; defii- nition of, 231; aspects of, 239, 245 ff, goal of, 249. INDEX 409 Existence, levels of, 65; eternal 85. Experience, Absolute, 220, 390, 396 f. Experientialism, organic, 194. Ezekiel, 365. Fallacies, 23. Fechner, 191 f. Feudalism, 150. Fichte, 156, 188, 193, 219, 253, 262, 356, 369. Final, cause, 68. Finality, 278 flf. Forces, love and hate, 37. Form, in Plato, 61; 78; in Aristotle, 86 flf. Foundations, of Christian philos- ophy, 129. Freedom, 198, 249. Galileo, 152, 153, 188, 186, 302. Gassendi, 90. Genesis, 20. Geometry, 289. Gnostics, 367. Goal of evolution, 249. God, 67; the one pure form, 78; first cause, 86; epistemologcal de- vice, 172, 181 ff.; Olympian, 286; meaning of, 342; 855; 371. Godhead, 115, 123, 130. Goethe, 369, Good, the, 64; idea of, 67, 361; in Aristotle, 87; in Plato, 87; Demo- critus' theory of, 93. Gospel, 125. Graeco-Roman, 128. Green, 156, 188. Gumplowicz, 375. Haeckel, 156, 191. Haldane, 241. Hamiltonian, 200. Hate and love, 37. Hegel, 34, 156, 157, 188, 203, 204, 210 ff., 253, 261, 271, 286, 294 ff, 816, 820, 856, 860 ff, 400. Hegelian, doctrine, 205; conception of Absolute, 210. Heraclitus, 33; on strife, 34, 40; 230. Herder, 233, 368 ff. Hesiod ,20. Heymans, 191. History, philosophy of, 364 ff.; logic of, 377; metaphysics of, 377. Hobbes, 90, 156, 233, 294, 356, 368. Holbach, 156. Holt, 390, 397. Holy Spirit, 128. Homer, 20. Hume, 151, 254, 271, 275, 294 ff., 316, 356, 368. Huxley, 99, 230, 234 ff. Huyghens, 183, 186. Hylozoism, 32. Hymn to Zeus, 113. Hypotheses, working, 106. Idealism, types of, 178; Hegelian, 188; Berkeleyan, 178; teleological, 194; 300, 808, 354, 359 ff; objec- tive, 304, 890 ff. Ideas, in Plato, 61; Locke and Berkeley, 61; transcendence of, 64; immanence of, 64; of values, 65. Identity theory, 156 ff., 191 ff. Ignorance, nature of, 1. Illusions, 35. Image, divine, 110. Imagination, in primitive thinking, 17 ff. Immanence, of formative principles, 78; of God, 109 ff.; see Singu- larism. Immortality, in the Phaedo, 70. Incarnation, 130. Individual, 78, 85. Individualism, 197. Individuality, 140, 245, 278 ff. Infinite, 101. Inge, 116. Inquiry, 106. 410 INDEX Instrumentalism, on intelligence, 399 ff. Intelligence, 39. Intent, 127. Intuition, 119. Intuitionism, 403 ff. Invention, 368. lonians 30 ff. Irtnaeus, 367. Irreversibility, 248. J.cpiah, 200, 365, 378. Jakweh, 286, 351. James, Saint, 169. James, William, 119, 151, 157, 158, 182, 201, 254, 304, 315, 317; quoted, 319 ff.; 232, 357, 389, 396 ff. Jehovah, 200, 365 ff. Jeremiah, 365. Jesus, 127. Job, 218. Johnson, Doctor, 181. Jonah, 366. Justice, 248. Justin Martyr, 126. Kant, 151, 156, 211, 225, 253, 262; on categories, 271; 275, 290, 294 ff, 316, 339, 356, 369. Kepler, 152, 186. Knowledge, problem of, 41; Aris- totle's theory of, 77 ff; Plato's theory of, 55; and reality, 305; ideal of, 328; objects of, 345. Laissez Faire, 197. Lamarck, 230, 235. La Mettrie, 156. Law, natural, 83; of thought, 106; 298 ff.; Roman, 112. Lecky, 364. Leibnitz, 113, 149, 151, 156, 158, 182, 191, 192, 222, 272, 294 ff., 356, Lessing, 369. Leucippus, 37. Liebmann, 186. Locke, on idea, 61; 149, 151, 156, 158, 169, 171, 253, 271, 294 ff., 316, 356, 368. Logic, 344 ff. Logos, 33; New Testament, doctrine of, 68; 110, 117, 125, 128; and Father, 129. Lotze, 156, 161." Love, and hate, 37; Platonic, 122; intellectual, 123. Lucretius, 90. Luther, 136. Lyceum, 77. Mack, 157, 254, 306, 396. Magic, 12; and science, 12 ff. ; and religion, 13; kinds, 14; black and white, 16. Man, his good, 87; the measure of things. Manichaean, 134, 367. Mars' Hill, 113. Martyr, Justin, 367. Marvin, 393 ff. Marx, Karl, 374. Materialism, 89, 156, 173 ff. Mathematics, pure, 301. Matter, 37, Plato on, 62; 78, 79; contingent, 86; 168. McDougall, William, 156. McTaggart, 221. Mechanism, 89, 152, 244, 247. Metaphysics, 270 ff., task of, 285; its nature, 330. Meta-psychology, 330. Micah, 366. Middle Ages, 131. Might, is right, 46. Miletus, school of, 30. Mill, J. S., 294, 356. Mind, and matter, 40; and body, 393. Modalists, 131. Monad, 183. Monadology, Leibnitzian, 182 ff. Monism, epistemological in Aris- totle, 82; neutral, 156, 396 ff. INDEX 411 Monisms, qualitative, 157; neutral, 396 flf.; objections to neutral, 398 f. Monophysite, 130. Monotkelitism, 131. Montague, 390. Morality, 253. Moses, 126, Motion, Zeno on, 36; paradox of, 101. Motive, 127. Mover, God as universal, 86. Multiplicity, 34. Mutation, 326 ff. Mysteries, Orphic, 116. Mystic way, 115, Mysticism, 115. Myth, types of, 18; Persian, 19. Mythology, 17 S. Nature, philosophy of in Aristotle, 80. Natures in Christ, the two, 131. Necessitarianism, 198, Negatio, 209. Negative, 370, Neo-Platonism, 115; its failure, 123. Neo-Pythagoreans, 117, New Realism, 389 ff, Newton, 152, 186, Nicaea, Council of, 129. Nietzsche, 239. Nopiinalism, 140. Non-Euclidian, 289. Notions, general, 110, 178. Nous, of Anaxagoras, 39; in Plato's theory, 70. Novalis, 207. Occam, William, 138, 142, 145, 148, One, the, 35; and all, 35; 120, the eternal, 204 ff. Origen, 118, 129. Opposites, unity of, 149. Order, 280 ff. Organization, 246. Orphic, cosmogony, 20; mysteries, 120, Ortkodox, 131. Othering, process of, 211. Pantheism, Stoic, 108; definition of, 109. Paracelsus, 148. Paradox, 102, Parallelism, psycho-physical, 191. Parmenides, the One, 31; 35, Particulars, relation to universals, 60; definition of, 66 ff. Patripassionism, 130, Paul, Saint, 113, 282, 367. Paulsen, 191, Pawlow, 241, Pearson, 254, 306, Perception, Plato on, 56; 93, un- trustworthiness of, 102; act of, 110, Perception petite, 185. Perry, R, B., 390, 397. Personality, 193 ff. Phaedo, 231. Phenomenalism, 82, Philo, 117, 125, 126. Philosopher, his activity, 1. Philosophy, defined, 1; and science, 2 ff.; aim of, 2; and practical life, 4 ff.; and religion, 6; main problems of, 6; and poetry, 7; rise to independence, 22 ff.; de- velopment of, 31 ff.; defined, 108; early Christian, 125; Me- diaeval, 133; modern, 148; and psychology, 331 ff.; social, 336 ff. Plato, on the philosopher, 1 ff., 74 ff.; on knowledge, 1; on Homer, 20; relation to Socrates, 43; and Academy, 44; method of, 55; theory of knowledge, 55; problems of, 55; versus Sophists, 55; reminiscence, 56; on percep- tion, 56; criticised by Aristotle, 64; on creation, 68; on the soul, 69; ethics, 70; communism, 6S; on the state, 73; eugenics, 75; 126, 128, 186, 227, 228, 230, 249, 256, 272, 316, 328, 338, 355, 378, 400. 412 INDEX Platonism, 117. Plotinus, 115, 118 f., 123, 355. Pluralism, 64; and singularism, 195, ff. Pluralist, 195. Plurality, 36. Plutarch, 117. Pneuma, 110. Poetry, and philosophy, 7. Politics, and ethics, 87. Possibility, 164. Postulates of Greek thought, the two, 109; of knowledge, 327. Potentiality, in Aristotle, 78; 118. Pragmatism, 315; on ideas, 316; absolute, 323. Priestley, 156. Primitive world view, 9; breakdown of, 22, 26, Principle, vital, 241. Principles of truth, 106. Probability, degrees of, 100. Problem, of conduct, 41; of knowl- edge, 41; of religion, 41. Process, cyclic, 246. Protagoras, homo mensura, 45. Psalmist, 105. Psyche, 119. Psychology, 331 ff.; and philosophy, 333 ff. Purification, 122. Purpose, 244; universal, 359; world, 373. Pyrrho, 99. Pyrrhonic skepticism, 100. Pythagorean, brotherhood, 116. Quadrivium, 136. Qualities, secondary, 93, 104, 169 ff. Quantities, 104. Ranke, 364. Rationalism, 84. Ratzenhofer, 375. Realism, 140; types of, 141 ff.; naive, 305; representational, 306; trans- figured, 307; critical, 308. Realists, new, 157; extreme, 227. Reality, Aristotle on, 85; problem of, 155; 247, 305 ff.; absolute, 357; purpose of, 383, 391. Reason, 70; creativity of, 81; 110; divine, 125. Redemption, social, 248. Reformation, 150. Relativity, 104. Relations, 57, 392 ff. Relativism, agnostic, 351. Religion, nature of, 5; relation to philosophy, 6; philosophy of, 341. Reminiscence, Plato on, 56. Renaissance, 150. Revolution, French, 124, 150. Renouvier, 271. Ribot, 199. Rickert, 358, 276. Roman, Empire, 108; law, 112. Romans, 96. Rome, Bishop of, 135. Roscellinus, 142. Rousseau, 233. Royce, 156, 157, 186 ff., 188, 204, 210, 215, 219, 253, 254, 320, 322, 357. Ruskin, 341. Russell, B., 156, 390. Sabellians, 131. Same, 130. Salvation, 129. Sarx, 119. Savior, 125. Schopenhauer, 156, 356. Schelling, 157, 191. Schiller, 369. Science, and philosophy, 3; problem of, 23; origins in Greece, 30; experimental in Greece, 96. Scotus, Duns, 136, 138, 144, 148. Selection, natural, 236. Self, 252 ff.; Hume on, 254; Calkins on, 254; Plato on, 256 ff. Self determination, 246. Seneca, 109. INDEX 413 Sense perception, untrustworthlness of, 102. Senses, Parmenides and Zeno on tke, 36. Shelley, 186, 196, 341. Simmel, 376. Sin, 129, 249. Sinai, Mount, 351. Singularism, and pluralism, 195 ft., 205. Singularist, 196. Skepticism, Pyrrhonic, 100; reply to, 106; 99. Social Philosophy, 336 ff. Socrates, 43 fF. ; relation to Plato, 43; charges against, 48; method of, 48 ff. ; theory of conduct, 49; on definitions, 49; conception of goodness, 52; attitude toward re- ligion, 63; 126, 231. Solidarity, 248. Sonship, divine, 127. Space, 37, 287 ff. Sopkists, 44. Soul, primitive idea of, 9 ff. ; and body, 10; Plato on, 69; and body, 80 ff.; atomistic conception of, 92; cosmic, 120, 246. Spencer, H., 157, 191, 212, 239, 307. 332, 375. Spinoza, 113, 149, 157, 191, 198, 203 ff., 214, 216, 261, 272, 356, 368, 394. Spirit, 10; pure, 105; universal, 122; Holy, 128. Spiritualism, 156, 178. Standards, 106. State, 70. Stoic pantheism, 108. Strife, Heraclitus on, 40. Substance, 31, 155, 167; definition of, 208; 272 ff. Suffering, 348. Summa Theologia, 37. Supernaturalism, 351. Superstition, 23 ff. Sympathy, 127. System of universals, 67. Tabu, 11 ff., 14. Taine, 364. Talleyrand, 124. Teleology, of Plato, 63; in nature, 78; 85; problem of, 230, 244. Tennyson, quoted, 201 ff. Tertullian, 367. Testament, New, 113. Thales, 30 ff., 199, 272. Theism, 109. Thermo-dynamics, 162. Thomson, J. A., 241. Thoreau, 341. Thought, laws of, 298. Timaeus, 136. Time, 85, 225, 285 ff. Topsy, 234. Totemism, 11. Transcendence, of ideas, 64; 78. Trinity, doctrine of, 129. Trivium, 136. Troeltsch, 376. Truth, determination of, 106; cri- teria of, 314 ff.; theories of 314 ff. Truths ,the four noble, 122. Unconscious adaptation, 244. Underbill, Miss, 116. Unio Mystica, 218. Union, with God, 122. Units, 101, 196. Unity, 120. Universal, in Plato, 58 ff.; relation to particulars, 60; system of, 67; abstract, 372. Upanishads, 203. Uranus, 302. Valuation, 346 ff. Values, the fundamental, 5; 246; status of, 345; types of, 346 ff.; Schopenhauer on, 356. Vico, 368. View, Athanasian, 180. Virtues, cardinal, 71; practical and theoretical, 87. Voltaire, 219. 414 INDEX Von Hartmann, 271. Von Huegel, 116. Wallace, 230. Ward, James, 158. Whitman, 341. Will, primacy of, 145; to live, 262; to power, 262. Wilson, President, 161. Windelband, 868, 376. Word, 128. Wordsworth, quoted, 57, 186, S39, 341. World history, 246. World, Stoic conception of, 109. Wundt, 262, 375 ff. Xenophanes, 35. Zeno, puzzles of, 36, 305. Zeno, the Stoic, 101. THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. *Wf iPj 1984 ! i nCT 24 193 \ ^^1 4 W35 DEC 17193f> B DEC 281936 ' ««^« 2 ;^,, ''oy 29 1^^^' /^/3/pf tg ( ' 1 DEC 1 1930 VB 23517 U ! V ""^ ^^ - 385101 ■>'. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA UBRARY