•NRLF 
 
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 B. H. LANE. 
 
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 D0NCA8TER- 
 
 ESSAYS AND LECTURES 
 
 INDIAN HISTORICAL SUBJECTS. 
 
ESSAYS AND LECTURES 
 
 ON 
 
 INDIAN HISTORICAL SUBJECTS, 
 
 By colonel G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I, 
 
 I' 
 
 GUARDIAN TO HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJAH OF MYSORE ; AUTHOR OF 
 "history of the FRENCH IN INIIIA." 
 
 "To believe in the heroic makes heroes." — Disraeli. 
 
 " I am convinced it was the force of will, the sense of duty, 
 and the determination not to give in, that enabled him to 
 make himself a model for all ofus who yet remain to follow 
 him with feeble and unequal steps in the performance of 
 some of the duties which it fell to his lot to discharge."— 
 Gl-adstone, on " Lord Palmerston." 
 
 SECOND ISSUE. 
 
 LONDON: 
 TRtlBNER & CO, 57 and 59, LUDGATE HILL; 
 
 AND 
 
 W. NEWMAN & CO, CALCUTTA. 
 1876. 
 
M3 
 
 LONDON; 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, 
 
 STAMFOKU STRliET AND CHARING CKOSS. 
 
 HfiNRY MORSE STEPHENS 
 
B. H. LANE. 
 
 OSOWLE, 
 DONGA8TER. 
 
 TO 
 THE RIGHT HONORABLE 
 
 SIR BARTLE EDWARD FRERE,K.C.B.,G.C.S.T., 
 
 NOT LESS IN TESTIMONY OF ADMIRATION FOR 
 
 HIS PUBLIC CHARACTER AND OF REGARD FOR HIS PRIVATE VIRTUES, 
 
 THAN IN HUMBLE APPRECIATION OF 
 
 THE GENEROUS SYMPATHIES, THE EARNEST ENDEAVOURS 
 
 TO OBLITERATE ALL DISTINCTIONS OP RACE 
 
 WHICH HAVE MARKED HIS CAREER. 
 
 513777 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 Lkotuee on a Native State and its Kulbbs 
 
 Lord Lake 
 
 Lecture on the Career op Count Lallt 
 
 Sm Henry Havelook .. 
 
 A Lecture on Hyder Ali's Last War 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose 
 
 124 
 166 
 247 
 279 
 
Digitized by tine Internet Archive 
 
 •in 2007 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/essayslecturesonOO.mallrich 
 
ESSAYS AND LECTURES 
 
 ON 
 
 INDIAN HISTORICAL SUBJECTS. 
 
 LECTURE ON A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS." 
 
 [Delivered in the Dalhousie Institute, Calcutta, 
 20th February, 1865.] 
 
 The impression, I believe, very generally prevails, 
 that a Native State, that is, a State administered and 
 governed solely by Natives, must necessarily be ill 
 governed ; that the vices of lying, of corruption, and 
 of venality, must flourish in it to a considerable, even 
 to an alarming, extent. Whether such a state of things 
 actually exist or not, it is nevertheless certain that 
 its existence is taken for granted. The mis-govern- 
 ment and corruption of Native States, the effeminacy, 
 the sloth, the immorality, the untrustworthiness of 
 their rulers, have formed the text for many a homily, 
 and the pretext for a great deal of " sanctimonious 
 rhetoric." The indignation roused by some well authen- 
 ticated instances of mal-administration and oppression, 
 
 * That portion of this Lecture, commencing with the rise of the 
 Affghan family, and ending with the death of Nuzzer Mahomed Khan, 
 has been taken chiefly from Sir John Malcolm's narrative of Bhopal. 
 The remainder has been compiled from documents in the Calcutta 
 Foreign Office, for liberty to examine which the writer was indebted to 
 the courtesy of the then Secretary, Colonel Durand, C.B. 
 
 / 
 
2 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 has, too often, found its vent in the denunciation of 
 an entire community ; and in contemplating the vices 
 of a Sooraja Dowlah and a Sambajee, the energy and 
 the talents of a Baber and an Akbar have been often 
 forgotten. In fact, the truth of the old proverb, has, in 
 their case, also been attested : — 
 
 Men's evil manners live in brass ; their virtues 
 We write in water. 
 
 And yet, it is impossible for any man to study the 
 history of India, without being struck by the many 
 instances of the attainment of power, of prosperity, 
 and of influence, by Native States under the rule of 
 their own Chiefs. This power, this prosperity, and this 
 influence, have been acquired, too, by the display and 
 exercise of those qualities and those virtues, which 
 specially commend themselves to a manly mind, — 
 by valour in the field, as well as by prudence in 
 the cabinet, — by a strict and impartial administration 
 of justice, — by a wise foresight in the direction of 
 foreign afiairs, — and, above all, by a resolute good 
 faith in all things. I have said that many instances 
 have occurred of such results having been achieved, 
 but, perhaps, of all that are upon record, there is not 
 one case more striking, certainly not one, — regard 
 being had to the very circumstances of its existence, — 
 more interesting, than that of the State, which will 
 form the subject of my lecture this evening ; and that 
 State is— Bhopal. 
 
 That a small Mahomedan Principality surrounded by 
 powerful Hindoo Sovereigns, should simply exist for 
 one hundred and seventy years, would be deemed, 
 under any circumstances, no small marvel; but the 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS ETJLERS. 3 
 
 marvel increases almost to the proportion of a miracle 
 when we recollect, that those hundred and seventy- 
 years comprehend the most stirring periods of modern 
 Indian History — that in the interval, the Mahratta 
 power attained and fell from its greatest height — the 
 Pindarrees exercised and lost a dominion, which if 
 predatory, yet caused itself to be felt — that Scindia 
 and Holkar reached the very zenith of their renown ; 
 and, finally, that a foreign power, beginning with small 
 things, gradually spread itself over Hindustan ; striking 
 down, disabling, and always partially, if not entirely, 
 absorbing those who ventured to oppose its resistless 
 course. There must have been something remarkable 
 in the Kulers of that small Mahomedan State; there 
 must have been a consistency and an honesty in the 
 course of conduct, by which the country they governed 
 emerged from the chaos and conflagration of the eight- 
 eenth century, and of the first twenty years of its 
 successor, not only uninjured but even consolidated; 
 by which, whilst it saw the Mahrattas broken, Scindia 
 struck down, Holkar all but annihilated, it was itself 
 enabled to remain intact. Yes, there was something 
 indeed ! Not long since, one of the greatest of living 
 orators and statesmen, speaking of our own country, 
 made use of these remarkable words : — " Our Empire is 
 now unrivalled in its extent; but the material basis 
 of that Emi)ire is by no means equal to its colossal 
 superstructure. It is not our iron ships, it is not our 
 celebrated regiments, it is not these that have created, 
 or indeed really maintained our Empire. It is the 
 character of the people." Now, I think that this 
 remark is extremely applicable, in principle, to the 
 Kulers of Bhopal. The safety of that State, during 
 
 B 2 
 
4 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 
 
 the last hundred and seventy years, did not consist 
 in its army, for that was small ; it did not depend upon 
 the square miles of its territory, for they were few ; but 
 it did depend upon the character of its rulers ; upon 
 the character of those, who, whether as Nawabs, or 
 Dewans, or Begums, — and not least as Begums, — 
 guided its destinies : and I think I shall be able to 
 shew you this night, that it was because the character 
 of the great majority of those to whom authority was 
 intrusted had been moulded by a sense of what was 
 right and just, that Bhopal itself has been able to 
 defy the march of time, and to survive the changes 
 by which almost all the neighbouring States have been 
 more or less injuriously affected. 
 
 The principality of Bhopal was founded at the close 
 of the seventeenth century by Dost Mahomed Khan, an 
 Affghan nobleman, who had taken service under the 
 Emperor xlurungzebe. In the last decade of the ad- 
 ministration of that great prince, Dost Mahomed Khan 
 was detached at the head of a body of his countrymen 
 into Malwa, on the service of his Sovereign. It was 
 just at the period when the overgrown empire of the 
 Moguls had begun to shew the first symptoms of decay, 
 —when the eye of the great Emperor himself had 
 rrown too dim, and his hand too feeble, to observe 
 and to repress all the commotions and self-seekings 
 which had arisen in some of the more remote provinces 
 of his dominions. It was just the occasion, in fact, 
 which an adventurer of noble birth, more able, more 
 ambitious, more daring, and not more scrupulous than 
 his neighbours, might use to his own advantage. And 
 thus Dost Mahomed Khan did use that occasion. Partly 
 by forcQ, partly as a reward for services rendered, partly 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 5 
 
 by stratagem, and partly also, it is asserted, by treachery, 
 Dost Mahomed Khan gradually gained possession of a 
 territory, some 4,000 square miles in extent, containing 
 five or six large towns, and nearly three thousand 
 villages ; and inhabited by a population of about half a 
 million. This territory he formed into a principality 
 which he named Bhopal, after the chief town within 
 its limits. But this principality lay in a very dangerous 
 neighbourhood. On the north, west, and south, it was 
 hemmed in by the great Mahratta powers, then rising 
 into reputation, of Scindia and Holkar; whilst, on the 
 east and south-east, Bundelkund and Berar were under 
 the sway of princes who sympathised with the Affghan 
 neither in policy nor in faith. But Dost Mahomed 
 Khan had all the large views of a founder of a dynasty 
 that was to endure. Like other rulers of our own days, 
 he considered that the principality would survive, if 
 only the capital could be kept sacred from an enemy. 
 With this view he erected a fort, which he called 
 Futtehgurh, within the limits of the town of Bhopal, 
 and surrounded both with a strong wall. He was 
 prescient even in this undertaking, for the time did 
 come when these fortifications proved the safety of his 
 descendants. 
 
 Dost Mahomed Khan had commenced his career 
 of conquest and acquisitions at the close of the 17th 
 century, but it was not till after the death of the 
 Emperor Aurungzebe (on the 22nd February, 1707) 
 that he ventured to consolidate them into one prin- 
 cipality, and to assume the title of Nawab. And he not 
 only assumed, but held that title, and held it till his 
 death. He died in 1723, leaving the government of 
 the principality he had acquired secure in his own 
 
6 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 family, — ^leaTiug too behind him a reputation, which, if 
 not immaculate, may fairly challenge comparison with 
 the reputation of most conquerors and foimders of 
 dynasties. "Whatever may have been his defects," 
 writes Sir John Malcolm, "there can be no doubt of 
 his talents. He was deemed, even in a tribe where 
 valour is a common quality, a man of remarkable 
 courage. His life was for more than thirty years one 
 scene of warfare ; he had received in action about thirty 
 wounds; and his memory, as a soldier, is still fondly 
 cherished by the family of which he was the founder." 
 
 The death of Dost Mahomed was the signal for a 
 struggle between two parties who claimed to succeed 
 him. One of these was headed by his elder though 
 illegitimate son, Yar Mahomed ; the other by the 
 partisans of his younger but legitimate son, Sooltan 
 Mahomed. The elder son triumphed, and Sooltan was 
 compelled to renounce his pretensions for a time. He 
 renewed them on the death of Yar Mahomed, but having 
 been defeated in a pitched battle, he finally withdrew his 
 claims, on the condition of receiving, in a free grant, the 
 hill-fort of Kathgurh and its dependencies. It is neces- 
 sary that I should thus allude to the fate of this claim- 
 ant to the succession, for two reasons. The first is, that 
 the decision by which Sooltan Mahomed acquired Eath- 
 gurh was mainly caused by the interference of Mahjee 
 Sahibah, the widow of Yah Mahomed, and in that in- 
 terference we have the first glimpse of the pressure 
 exercised by the delicate hand of Woman, almost always 
 for good, on the affairs at Bhopal ; and the second, that, 
 some years later, one of this man's descendants came 
 from Eathgurh to play an important, though not a very 
 honourable, part in the history of Bhopal. 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EIJLERS. 7 
 
 The immecliate descendants of the founder of the 
 Affghan dynasty in Bhopal foimed no exception to 
 the idea prevailing regarding men bom in the purple. 
 Yar Mahomed the son, and Feyz Mahomed and Yassein 
 Mahomed, the grandsons, were men in no way dis- 
 tinguished by ability of any sort. Feyz Mahomed, 
 indeed, was a man of singularly weak intellect, and, 
 during the thirty-eight years he reigned as Nawab of 
 Bhopal, he acted the part more of a religious reclase 
 than of a sovereign prince. Yet, even duiing his reign, 
 Bhopal attained a very high degree of prosperity. And 
 this was owing to a very simple cause. 
 
 Probably there is no nation in the world that carries 
 pride to a higher extent than the Affghans. They are, 
 as a rule, proud of their descent, proud of their daring 
 courage, proud of their independence, proud also of — 
 whilst strongly, perhaps even fanatically, attached to — 
 their religion. Now, though some people may adopt 
 the arguments of the Puritans, and may condemn all 
 pride in the abstract, yet I cannot but regard the pride 
 of which I have spoken as not only a very wholesome, 
 but as a very noble and a very stimulating quality, in 
 the heart of the uncultivated man. If these Affghan 
 nobles gloried in their descent, it was because they 
 gloried in ancestors who never knew what it was to 
 turn their backs before numbers ; if they were proud 
 of their valour, they at least felt that " what men dared 
 they would dare ; " if they were proud of their inde- 
 pendence, they had at least achieved it; and, as for 
 theii* religion, — the religion which made them go forth 
 with sword on their thigh, and to smite the infidel, — 
 why, at all events, they would die for it. There was 
 thus something that was very sincere, and honest, and 
 
8 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 noble in this pride. It was a pride which, at least, they 
 could justify. It was a pride in what they could do, 
 and not in what they could not do. It was a pride, 
 which, whilst it stimulated them to excellence in the 
 performance of those deeds which they felt they could 
 perform, yet held them back from rushing on those 
 paths which, distrusting their windings, " they feared 
 to tread." Thus it was, that, whilst exclusive in many 
 matters, they kept the government in their own family, 
 they did not think that it trenched upon their pre- 
 rogative, or detracted from their influence, to commit 
 those offices of State, for which they felt they had 
 neither leaning nor capacity, to men, not only of 
 another family, but of another creed. Proud though 
 they were of being Affghans, they were ready enough to 
 acknowledge that they had not been endowed, solely in 
 virtue of their Affghan birth, with every talent, every 
 virtue, and every acquirement. Many offices, therefore, 
 they made over to Hindoos. And if there were one 
 department of which, more than another, they carefully 
 avoided the handling, it was that of Finance. This 
 they willingly yielded to trained financiers of Hindoo 
 origin. Capacity, talent, and honesty, were the three 
 chief requisites for this office ; and any individual, gifted 
 with these qualities, might have fairly aspired to a 
 financial career. 
 
 The financial ministers in the reigns of Yar and Feyz 
 Mahomed were Byjeeram, Gassyram, and Eaja Keesoree, 
 and it was owing to their able administration that Bho- 
 pal, though forced for a moment to affect submission 
 to the Mahrattas under Bajee Eow, and even to yield 
 a portion of its territory, preserved the independent 
 position that had been acquired for it by its founder. 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 9 
 
 Their financial administration, or, to speak more cor- 
 rectly, the balance sheet between the Nawab and his 
 ministers, was conducted, in those days, on a very simple 
 plan. The annual revenue was estimated at about two 
 hundred thousand pounds ; of this a portion, equal to fifty 
 thousand pounds' value in land, was set apart for the 
 Nawab, under his sole control; the remaining three- 
 fourths were administered by the Dewan, and from 
 this latter sum alone were the expenses of the State 
 defrayed. 
 
 The last-mentioned Dewan of Nawab, Feyz Mahomed 
 Khan, — the Kajah Kessoree, — lost his life in conse- 
 quence of a Court scandal with which he was concerned, 
 and was succeeded, for the moment, by the brother 
 of the Nawab, Mahomed Yassein. The death of the 
 Nawab elevated this brother to the sovereignty ; but he, 
 in his turn, died, before any permanent arrangements 
 for the office of Dewan could be made. His death made 
 w^ay for his brother, Nawab Hyat Mahomed Khan. 
 
 This prince was about forty-four years old when he 
 ascended the throne, and he sat upon it twenty-nine 
 years, — twenty-nine years of most stirring events. He 
 himself took but little part in affairs, devoting himself 
 almost entirely to religious exercises. There was one 
 in the family, however, who was well able to supply 
 his place. This was the Mahjee Sahibah, or Lady 
 Mother, the widow or principal lady of the deceased 
 Nawab Yar Mahomed. This lady had long exercised 
 a silent though powerful influence in the Councils of 
 Bhopal, and, on the accession of Hyat Mahomed, she 
 came forward even more prominently to lighten .the toils 
 with which his feeble nature was unequal to grapple. 
 Her first care was to provide him with a Dewan or chief 
 
10 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 
 
 minister. It so happened that, prior to his accession to 
 the throne, Hyat Mahomed, having at the time no 
 children of his own, had adopted four Hindoos, two of 
 them Brahmins, and had converted them to the Maho- 
 medan faith. The eldest of these, under the name of 
 Fowlad Khan, was alone of a fit age to be appointed 
 minister, when Nawab Mahomed Yassein died. He was 
 accordingly nominated. But with a careful prescience, 
 and with a view to be prepared for any events that 
 might happen, the Lady Mother selected the most 
 promising of the remaining three adopted children of 
 the Nawab, and gave him, under the name of Chutta 
 Khan, the very best education it was in her power 
 to bestow. 
 
 I would pause for an instant to dwell upon the 
 character of this Princess. She was born in Upper 
 Hindustan, of obscure parentage. Her name was Mu- 
 muUah. She had been united, at an early age, to 
 Nawab Yar Mahomed, son of the founder of the family, 
 by the tie of Nikah.* She had no children of her own, 
 but the best proof of the estimation in which she was 
 held may be derived from the fact that all members of 
 the family addressed her as Mahjee Sahibah (Lady 
 Mother). Sir John Malcolm tells us, that "from the 
 account given of her conduct, under the most trying 
 circumstances, it seems difficult to pronounce whether 
 she was most remarkable for the humanity of her dis- 
 position or the excellence of her judgment. She was 
 beloved and respected by all. Her memory is still 
 cherished by the natives, both Hindoo and Mahomme- 
 
 * This engagement, though inferior to marriage, is still respectable. 
 It is common where the condition of the parties is too unequal to admit 
 of one more legitimate. — Sir John Malcolm. 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULEES. H 
 
 dan, of Bhopal ; and it is consoling to see, in the example 
 of her life, that, even amid scenes of violence and crime, 
 goodness and virtue, when combined with spirit and 
 sense, maintain that superiority which belongs alone 
 to the higher qualities of our nature, and which, without 
 these, can be permanently conferred by neither title 
 nor station." 
 
 The Lady Mother must have been upwards of sixty 
 years old when Fowlad Khan, the adopted convert to 
 Mahommedanism, entered upon his ofBce as chief 
 minister at Bhopal. It was during the administration 
 of this man — memorable for little else — that an event 
 occurred, slight perhaps in itself, but which proved in 
 reality the foundation-stone of a new era in the fortunes 
 of Bhopal. This event was the first contact of the 
 Affghan principality with the British. The occasion of 
 this contact I will now proceed to relate. 
 
 The shameful convention of Wurgaum, entered into 
 between Colonels Egerton and Carnac on one side, and 
 Scindia and Nana Furnuvese on the other, in the month 
 of January, 1778, had so much endangered the English 
 settlements at Bombay, that the very safety of the Pre- 
 sidency seemed to depend upon the opportune arrival of 
 a force of between 4000 and 6000 men which Warren 
 Hastings, with the wonderful prevision for which he was 
 distinguished, had despatched, in anticipation of dis- 
 turbances on the coast, from Bengal. This force had 
 originally been placed under the orders of Colonel Leslie, 
 but, on Leslie's death in May of that year, the command 
 devolved upon Colonel Goddard. As this officer ad- 
 vanced from the Jumma the obstacles thrown in his way 
 were literally all but insurmountable. The various 
 powers of Central India, accustomed to regard the 
 
12 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 Malirattas as their most dreaded enemies, and being 
 most obnoxious to their blows, were fearful of provoking, 
 by favours to the English, the certain vengeance of the 
 nearer foe. To advance further, under such circum- 
 stances, would have seemed madness to most com- 
 manders. But Goddard persevered, and in this case, 
 also, perseverance and determination were synonymous 
 with safety and success. When everything seemed at 
 its worst, one independent Power stood forward to 
 offer a friendly hand to the stranger. Not only did this 
 Power afford the English a passage through its territory, 
 but it furnished them abundantly with supplies. It did 
 this too in defiance of threats freely lavished upon it by 
 the Mahrattas. Its nobles and people seemed to vie 
 with one another in ministering to the wants of the 
 warriors of the West. This Power was Bhopal. 
 
 The friendly feeKngs engendered on this occasion were 
 never forgotten by either party ; indeed, it was to the 
 recollection of them, many years later, that Bhopal 
 owed its first connection by treaty with the Government 
 of India. 
 
 The death of Fowlad Khan, who had rebelled against 
 the authority of the Lady Mother, not long after these 
 events, gave. the latter the wished-for opportunity of ele- 
 vating her protege, Chutta Khan, the convert from 
 Brahminism, to the vacant post of Minister. This man 
 did full justice to the education he had received. He 
 curbed the poWer of the nobles, suppressed numerous 
 plots to subvert his authority, established an efficient 
 police, maintained internal quiet, and by his tact and 
 decided measures, cleared Bhopal of freebooters. His 
 ministry was eminently advantageous to the Princi- 
 pality, for it secured for it peace and good govern- 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 13 
 
 ment at an epoch when both those commodities were 
 rare. 
 
 But death too soon put a stop to the career of this 
 able administrator. The Lady Mother had gone before 
 him, and it seemed as though the power, but lately so 
 well exercised, was now to be scrambled for. Intrigue 
 succeeded intrigue, each one using the State for his own 
 purpose, until Bhopal, bled from within and threatened 
 from without, appeared likely to fall a prey to the first 
 powerful enemy that should march against it. 
 
 But the hereditary qualities of their race had not been 
 extinguished in every member of this Affghan family. 
 When, after a series of internal disorders, the authority 
 of the State had again centred in the grasp of a woman, 
 — though that woman, the favourite lady of the reigning 
 Nawab, wanted strength and purpose for her task ; — 
 when she, the real ruler, to save the State from one 
 enemy, committed the fatal error of calling in another 
 power, likely at any moment to become an enemy, to 
 assist her; when it seemed only a question to which 
 of the two great predatory powers of Central India 
 Bhopal should fall a prey, — there suddenly appeared 
 upon the stage a youth, lineally descended from the 
 founder of the dynasty, who, by his strong character, his 
 daring courage, and by the possession of some of the 
 greatest qualities that have been allotted to man, suc- 
 ceeded not only in saving his country from the destruc- 
 tion that threatened it, but in indicating a line of poKcy, 
 by a strict adherence to which Bhopal has been placed 
 behind a barrier, secure for ever against the storms of 
 Fortune. He became, in fact, the second founder 
 of the Principality. 
 
 This youth was Wuzeer Mahomed, son of Sheriff 
 
14 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 Mahomed, cousin of the Nawab. During the administra- 
 tion of Chutta Khan, Sheriff Mahomed and his son 
 had rebelled against the Nawab ; but Sheriff Mahomed 
 had been slain, and his son had taken refuge in flight. 
 That son now came, habited as a soldier of fortune, and 
 attended by a few well-mounted adherents, to the gate 
 of the city. When stopped by the guards, he proclaimed 
 himself to be Wuzeer Mahomed, son of Sheriff Mahomed, 
 the cousin of the Nawab, with whom lie demanded an 
 interview. The interview was granted. In the course 
 of it, Wuzeer Mahomed admitted that, having been 
 banished from his country by Chutta Khan, he had been 
 \ compelled to earn his livelihood by serving a neigh- 
 \ bouring predatory Rajpoot chief. He had learned, he 
 said, the profession of a soldier, and the reports he had 
 received as to the dangers which threatened his native 
 land, had made him determine, at all hazards, to offer 
 his services, and to give his life (it was all he had), for 
 his country. The old Prince was roused from his usual 
 state of abstraction by the frank honesty of this offer, 
 and by the noble bearing of the youth who made it. He 
 gave to the youthful stranger the endearing title of son, 
 and hailed him as the future saviour of the country. 
 Wuzeer Mahomed was at once placed at the head of the 
 forces of Bhopal, and, in this capacity, showed himself, 
 in a very short time, worthy of the trust that had been 
 reposed in him. In less than eight months the depre- 
 dations of the Pindarees had been repressed, whilst the 
 Rajah of Berar had been compelled to relinquish the 
 siege of Hoshungabad. His praises were in every 
 one's mouth; he extorted commendation even from 
 his enemies ; and he was universally looked upon 
 as the fittest man, in that time of war and tumult, 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EIJLERS. 15 
 
 to fill the office of Dewan, then recently become 
 vacant. 
 
 But in those days, as in the present, praise, too loudly 
 and too generally administered, was the reverse of bene- 
 ficial to its object. It is impossible to praise any one 
 man to a very great extent, without indirectly reflecting 
 upon those to whom the same opportunities had been 
 vouchsafed, but who had neglected to use them. In 
 this instance, the universal expression of admiration of 
 Wuzeer Mahomed grated rather too harshly on the ear 
 of Ghous Mahomed, son of the reigning Nawab. To the 
 small mind of this man, who, in virtue of his position, 
 might have led the army of Bhopal to battle, — though 
 scarcely perhaps to victory, — this excessive laudation of 
 one who had been so successful, appeared positively 
 dangerous. One thing he was determined upon, and 
 that was that Wuzeer Mahomed should never become 
 Dewan. 
 
 To accomplish this resolve, it was necessary that he 
 should be able to produce a candidate of his own, 
 whose pretensions should, in some respects, equal the 
 claims of Wuzeer Mahomed. No mere Hindoo would 
 be considered fit for such a purpose. But there was a 
 man, — a man of high birth, great pretensions, unlimited 
 professions of obedience, and a lineal descendant too 
 of the founder of the house. This man was Mooreed 
 Mahomed Khan, hereditary Lord of Kathgurh, and a 
 descendant of that Sooltan Mahomed, whom we found in 
 rebellion against the two first successors of the first 
 Nawab of Bhopal. 
 
 And now the two candidates stood together, waiting 
 for the decision of the Nawab. There could not have been 
 a greater contrast. The one, in the flush of manly 
 
16 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 youth, noble and handsome in appearance, possessing 
 an open, generous, trustful nature, and master of the 
 divine art of managing his fellow-men. He made no 
 great professions, no splendid promises. This one thing 
 alone he said, — that he was ready to fight, and work, 
 and die, for his sovereign and his country. 
 
 But the other. More like a Hindoo merchant than 
 an Affghan Chief, he creeps submissively into the 
 presence of the Nawab. He addresses him in language 
 as humble as fulsome ; calls him his more than father ; 
 on the heir apparent, Ghous Mahomed, he lavishes the 
 most exaggerated praise, praise of his accomplishments 
 of mind and body, of his abilities, his courage, his 
 acquirements ; to the Beebee, or Lady Mother, whom 
 he next visits, and who, by her influence with the 
 Nawab, is the real dispenser of gifts, he is equally sub- 
 missive. He calls her his aunt, declares to her that he 
 will hear, with her ears, and see with her eyes ; that 
 her opinions shall be his opinions, her enemies his 
 enemies. 
 
 The next day he acts even a more extraordinary part 
 When waited upon by the Hindoo merchants and 
 bankers of the city, he refuses their usual offerings of 
 money, makes them presents of clothes, and calls them 
 his cousins. To the poor everywhere he distributes 
 considerable sums in charity. 
 
 The commonalty are delighted. Such a man, so 
 meek, so humble, so charitable, so religious, — for he 
 had sighed away one whole day at the tomb of his 
 ancestor, — such a man was a marvel in that rude age, 
 — so beneficent a mortal had never been seen. 
 
 The Court were equally pleased. His promises, his 
 professions were still ringing in their ears. This man 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 17 
 
 was to be their apt tool, their willing instrument, their 
 slave in all things — a better substitute for the popular 
 soldier. Mooreed Mahomed Khan was accordingly- 
 appointed minister. 
 
 I need scarcely add that he was a miserable hypo- 
 crite, " a mean, base, fawning, parasite." Let us con- 
 demn him for that by all means, but before we include 
 his nation in the condemnation, let us ask ourselves if 
 we have never witnessed similar conduct amongst our 
 own people ; if we have never known or heard of men 
 giving up their own convictions, merely to curry favour 
 with their superior; advising him, not according as 
 he ought to be advised, but according as they knew he 
 would like to be advised, — doing tliis too without even 
 the aim, which this man had, to become minister, but 
 simply with a view to stand high in the graces of a 
 great man. If we have heard of such amongst our 
 people, we ought not surely to charge the vice on any 
 nation in particular, though we may well regard the 
 perpetrators of it as the offscourings of their kind, — as 
 the Pariahs of the human race. 
 
 Deceit and hypocrisy gained for Mooreed Mahomed 
 the ofiice of minister : the same qualities led likewise to 
 his destruction. He soon shewed his true character. 
 In less than a month, the man who, when bidding for 
 office, had refused the customary presents from those 
 who visited him, had commenced a system of extortion, 
 unprecedented in Indian history. No class escaped his 
 avarice. The relations of former ministers were openly 
 fleeced : contributions were forced from the inhabitants 
 in proportion to their supposed wealth : no pleas of 
 poverty were accepted. Commencing, with the mean- 
 ness common to his class, with those who were powerless 
 
 c 
 
18 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 
 
 to protect themselves, he enlarged by degrees the circle 
 of his exactions ; till at last, grown bold with success, 
 he demanded money from the Beebee. This was the 
 woman of whom he had promised to be the slave, whose 
 opinion and wishes he had declared he w^ould accept 
 as his own ; and she, weak woman, on the strength of 
 these flattering promises, had raised him to power. But 
 no deceiver can be regarded as having accomplished 
 his destiny, until he have smitten the hand that ex- 
 tended to him its bounty. Mooreed Mahomed was no 
 exception to the rule. The Beebee refused to disgorge. 
 The minister therefore caused her to be assassinated, 
 and at once enriched himself by the plunder of the pro- 
 perty she had amassed. The Nawab and his wretched 
 son were completely in his power, and dared not even 
 remonstrate against his authority. One man alone he 
 feared, and him he was determined to destroy. This 
 was Wuzeer Mahomed, " the saviour of Bhopal," who 
 had been his rival candidate for the office of Dewan. 
 
 His rejection for that office had caused no change in 
 the conduct of Wuzeer Mahomed. He had accepted 
 the decision of the Nawab without a murmur, and, with 
 the innate loyalty of his nature, had striven ever since 
 to serve the State in the manner he was best able to 
 serve it. And in every undertaking he had added 
 to liis reputation. Sent with inadequate means against 
 the Pindarrees, his valour and judgment had supplied 
 the place of numbers, and he had everywhere triumphed. 
 His appearance was often sufficient to put his enemies 
 to flight. In one of his expeditions the tail of his horse 
 had been cut off, and thenceforth, horse and rider were 
 associated together. It is asserted that the cry of 
 Banda ghora ha Sowar (Cavalier with the cut-tail 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 19 
 
 horse) was always certain to cause a panic in the ranks 
 of tlie Pindarrees. Finding his rival's reputation thus 
 increasing, whilst his own had sunk to the lowest ebb, 
 Mooreed Mahomed attempted to cut him off by- 
 treachery. His letter, however, was intercepted, and 
 his plans defeated. The minister then threw off the 
 mask, and had the incredible baseness to invite the 
 Mahrattas to aid him in the destruction of the best 
 general of his sovereign. Hearing that tlie Mahrattas 
 were in Bhopal, Wuzeer Mahomed advanced, though 
 with a very disproportionate force, to oppose them. In 
 several skirmishes his valour gave him the advantage ; 
 but he would not have been able long to avert the 
 downfall of his country, if a disturbance in Scindia's 
 own dominions had not caused the recall of the Mahratta 
 force. It was then that deceit and treachery met with a 
 righteous retribution. The Mahrattas, forced to leave, 
 were yet unwilling to depart empty-handed. They, 
 therefore, compelled Mooreed Mahomed, whose imi^fiense 
 wealth was notorious, to accompany them to the last 
 town in the frontier. Here charges were trumped up 
 against liim, and he was threatened with torture unless 
 he should give up his treasures. The fear of being 
 himself treated as he had treated so many others 
 brought on an illness which terminated in his death. 
 Yet so entirely had he acquired the reputation of being 
 a ^' Living Lie," that even his death was supposed to be 
 counterfeited, and it was not till decomposition had set 
 « in, that the Mahratta chief allowed the body to be 
 buried. But though he died, his reputation still sur- 
 vives him, and, we are told, "that w^hen a Patau of 
 Bhopal visits Seronge to pay his devotion at a shrine 
 sacred to Murtiza Ali, it is deemed an essential part of 
 
 c 2 
 
20 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULEES. 
 
 the pilgrimage to bestow five blows with a slipper on the 
 tomb of Mooreed Mahomed Khan, to mark at once the 
 contempt and indignation which his memory excites." 
 
 The death of Mooreed Mahomed made way for the 
 youthful hero whom he had in vain endeavoured to 
 destroy. But though he had become minister, Wuzeer 
 Mahomed found that the office was no bed of roses. 
 The treasury was empty, the revenue, formerly 200,000?., 
 had declined under Mooreed's administration to 5000?., 
 and enemies were on every side of him. But by his 
 valour in the field, and his administrative abilities, 
 Wuzeer Mahomed soon repaired the losses the State 
 had sustained, and Bhopal would then have been placed 
 upon a permanent basis of prosperity, had not the 
 imbecile Ghous Mahomed, the heir apparent, jealous of 
 AVuzeer's reputation, intrigued with the Pindarrees to 
 supplant him. The attempt failed, but another, aided 
 by the whole power of Scindia, was more successful; 
 and Wuzeer was, for the moment, powerless to offer 
 any successful opposition. 
 
 Just at this crisis the Nawab died, and was succeeded 
 by Ghous Mahomed. The first act of this imbecile was 
 to invite Sadick Ali, the general of Kagojee Bhonsla, 
 Kajah of Berar, one of the most persistant enemies of 
 the country, to the capital, to secure his authority. 
 Seeing this, and powerless to prevent it, Wuzeer Maho- 
 med withdrew to the fortress of Gunnour. But it was 
 only the one step backwards which so often precedes 
 a resolute advance. Watching his opportunity, he 
 marched, after the departure of Sadick Ali, upon 
 Bhopal, expelled the Mahrattas, reproached the imbe- 
 cile Nawab for his perfidy, and reassumed the reins 
 of power. From that moment Ghous Mahomed was 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 21 
 
 but a cypher in the State ; all the real power was in 
 the hands of Wuzeer Mahomed, and even the title 
 of Nawab was transmitted by him to his descendants. 
 
 The nine years that elapsed from this period to his 
 death in 1816 were years of constant warfare, but it 
 was a warfare of the noblest kind. Twice, however, in 
 that interval Bhopal was in imminent peril. In the 
 year 1809, a British force had been sent under Sir 
 Barry Close to operate with the Eajah of Nagpore 
 against the Pindarrees, and as Wuzeer Mahomed had 
 been compelled, in self-defence, to ally himself with 
 these depredators, and even to give them an asylum, he 
 had thus drawn upon himself the hostility of the 
 British power. But Wuzeer Mahomed was far too 
 acute to commit himself to a contest which must be 
 hopeless. He therefore endeavoured by all the means 
 in his power to avert hostilities : he sent an agent to 
 Sir Barry Close to describe the necessity under which 
 he had acted in allying himself with the Pindarrees; 
 to urge the claims of the family of Bhopal on the 
 British nation for the aid formerly given to Colonel 
 Goddard; to state that the feeling of confidence with 
 which Bhopal regarded the British Power was an heri- 
 ditary feeling, a feeling incapable of being turned into 
 hostility, and he finally professed himself ready to 
 enter into any arrangement the British general might 
 dictate. 
 
 The difficulties under which Wuzeer Mahomed had 
 laboured were but little known to Sir Barry Close, and 
 the fact of his alliance with the Pindarrees, pressed 
 into service on every occasion by the emissaries in the 
 British camp of Holkar, Scindia, and the Rajah of Berar, 
 might have led to his destruction, but for the discovery 
 
22 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 
 
 by the English commander of the little dependence to 
 be placed on the active co-operation of his professed 
 allies. The British force did not therefore attack 
 Ehopal, but, still uncertain of the real character of its 
 ruler, the British Government then and afterwards 
 declined to enter into any engagement of protection 
 or alliance. Wuzeer Mahomed, however, to the end of 
 his career lived in hope of effecting this great object, 
 and shaped all his policy with that end in view. 
 
 The second peril to which Wuzeer Mahomed was 
 exposed was far more direct, and he was enabled to 
 Avard it off only by the display of courage and endurance 
 and high purpose, such as could have only emanated 
 from a man moulded and born a hero. In 1813, four 
 years after his negociations with Sir Barry Close, one of 
 Scihdia's armies of 40,000 men combined with the 
 army of the Eajah of Berar, 30,000 strong, to besiege 
 Wuzeer Mohamed in Bhopal. This city was defended 
 on three sides by a wall, and on the south side by the 
 citadel of Futtehgurh, but it had no ditch or other 
 fortifications. The forces by which it was garrisoned 
 consisted altogether of 11,000 men, of whom 5000 were 
 Pindarrees and levies of neighbouring zemindars. 
 These, however, being unable long to support the hard- 
 ships of the defence, and the deficiencies of food and 
 forage, Wuzeer Mahomed was left with his own army 
 of 6000 men. This disproportion in numbers was, how- 
 ever, amply compensated for by the fact that Wuzeer 
 Mahomed, and his gallant son, Nuzzer Mahomed, father 
 of Her Highness the present Begum, were within the 
 walls. The description of this siege has been written 
 by a merchant who was on the spot at the time ; and 
 the detail he gives of the gallantry, readiness, fertility 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS KULEES. 23 
 
 of resource, and immense energy of the two leaders are 
 most interesting. Time will, only allow me to give the 
 result. 
 
 The siege lasted from October, 1813, to May, 1814. 
 On the latter date, the numbers of the besieged had 
 diminished, by casualties and desertions, to 200 fighting 
 men. They had been for some time forced to live on 
 pounded tamarind- stones and carrion, and these were at 
 famine prices. Still, however, in this case as in so many 
 others, perseverance gained her end. It so happened that 
 in one great attack, the enemy, through the treachery 
 of one of Wuzeer Mahomed's officers, had penetrated 
 within the walls, and it was owing only to the daring 
 valour of Wuzeer Mahomed and his son, and to the 
 spirit with which they inspired their followers, that he 
 was finally driven back. But the repulse of this attack 
 had such an effect upon Sadick Ally, leader of the Nag- 
 pore forces, that he withdrew his army from Bhopal, 
 under the pretext that he had heard a voice in a dream 
 uttering against him maledictions for allying himself 
 with infidels against a true believer. Scindia, dispirited 
 by this example, broke up likewise a fortnight later, 
 and thus, this peril, the last that really threatened the 
 existence of Bhopal, happily passed away. It is true 
 that at the close of the year Scindia's troops, reinforced 
 by eight battalions under Jean Baptiste Filoze, threat- 
 ened to renew the siege, but the allied commanders 
 quarrelled, and at the same time the British agent 
 called upon Scindia to refrain from prosecuting hostilities 
 against Bhopal. 
 
 Eighteen months later, Wuzeer Mahomed died. He 
 was then only fifty-one, but he had spent his whole life 
 in a turmoil of activity. He left behind him the repu- 
 
24 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 tation of being the greatest warrior, the most skilful 
 and dashing leader, and the wisest politician of that 
 part of India. He had amply justiiied the title with 
 which old Hiyut Mahomed had saluted him on his first 
 entrance into Bhopal, of, " Saviour of his country." He 
 alone could have saved it. A great French writer has 
 remarked that " where nothing great is to be done, the 
 existence of a great man becomes impossible," but 
 Wuzeer Mahomed's career is but one example, out of 
 many, of the truth of the converse proposition, viz., that 
 where great things are to be achieved, the existence of 
 a great man is assured. Of his exploits I have been 
 able to give in this place but a very faint outline. 
 Those, however, who would care to read what one man, 
 a native of this country, having had no European 
 education, but wholly self-taught, may be capable of 
 accomplishing, will find Sir John Malcolm's account of 
 the career of Wuzeer Mahomed as interesting as it is 
 instructive. To many it will doubtless convey some 
 new ideas. 
 
 The son, Nuzzer Mahomed, who succeeded him as 
 Dewan, was worthy of his father. Though he filled the 
 office less than four years, his administration had lasting 
 consequences for Bhopal. He succeeded, the year 
 after his accession, in concluding an engagement with 
 the British, whereby Bhopal was guaranteed to himself, 
 on condition of his aiding the British army with a con- 
 tingent, and co-operating with it against the Pindarrees, 
 — a condition which was faithfully observed. He was 
 thus recognized as ruler of Bhopal, though Ghous 
 Mahomed remained for his lifetime nominal Nawab. 
 The finances, too, met with his earnest attention, and 
 the revenue, under the influence of his benign rule, 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULEES. 25 
 
 soon recovered its elasticity. The districts likewise 
 which had been lost in former wars were re-united to 
 Bhopal. In fact, a new era of prosperity had com- 
 menced for the principality, when the accidental discharge 
 of a pistol in his harem, by his nephew Foujdar Maho- 
 med, a boy of eight years old, deprived the State of the 
 skilful ruler who was so well guiding its destinies. 
 
 By that shot Nuzzer Mahomed lost his life. Though 
 he had reigned only three years and a half, he had 
 given proofs of great ability, tempered by a sound 
 discretion, and guided by a mature wisdom. He was 
 one of the most virtuous and enlightened men of his 
 time. Though a Mahomedan he had but one wife, and 
 his favourite companion and minister was a Christian. 
 His merits were so acknowledged, that the elder branch 
 of the family of Bhopal and his own elder brother 
 acquiesced in his elevation, and it has been said of 
 him — what can be recorded of so few in his position — 
 that "his memory is unstained by the reproach of a 
 single act of tyranny." 
 
 Nuzzer Mahomed left behind him but one child, a 
 daughter. Her Highness Secunder Begum, the present 
 Kuler of Bhopal. This lady was then but an infant, 
 and it was therefore arranged that she should be be- 
 trothed at the proper age to her cousin Mooneer Ma- 
 homed Khan, the son of the elder brother of Nuzzer 
 Mahomed, and that meanwhile the regency should 
 be confided to his widow, Koodsia Begum. 
 
 This lady, who is still alive, was only seventeen years 
 old when she assumed the office of Begent. She com- 
 menced her reign by continuing in office the ministers 
 of her husband, and by guiding herself by their advice. 
 The possession of power has its effect, however, even 
 
26 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 upon ladies, and very often develops instincts and 
 passions which, otherwise, might have lain dormant. 
 Koodsia Begum was no exception to this rule. Her 
 character, scarcely formed when she assumed the re- 
 gency, soon shewed a power of will and a consistency, 
 for which, up to that time, few had given her credit. 
 This was first displayed by her firm persistent support 
 of Balthazar Bourbon, the Christian minister who had 
 possessed the confidence of her husband, notwithstanding 
 many intrigues against him, both inside and outside the 
 circle of her own family. But six years later a circum- 
 stance occurred, which shewed her character in a still 
 stronger light. 
 
 In 1827, Mooneer Mahomed, having attained an age 
 when he thought he might exert his authority, claimed 
 the hand of his promised bride, Secunder Begum, and 
 demanded that he should be invested with the sovereign 
 authority. But Koodsia Begum, not wishing to give 
 up the power she had wielded for nine years, and 
 distrusting the character of tlie youth, refused to accede 
 to the request; and, urging the unfitness of Mooneer 
 Mahomed for the position to which he aspired, declared 
 the engagement cancelled. Mooneer at once took up 
 arms to support his rights, but the Begum was firm. 
 The case was finally referred to the Council of Nobles, 
 and by them it was decided, that Koodsia Begum 
 should be considered as absolute Kuler in her own right, 
 with succession to her daughter; and that Mooneer 
 Mahomed should resign his title to that daughter's 
 hand in favour of his younger brother, Jehangir, on re- 
 ceiving immediate possession of a jaghire of Es. 40,000, 
 guaranteed to him by the British Government. 
 
 Mooneer having thus been got rid of, Koodsia Begum 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS EULERS. 27 
 
 began to intrigue to defer, if not to prevent, tlie mar- 
 riage of Jehangir with her daughter. She feared that 
 this union would be the term of her power, and power 
 was too sweet to be lightly given up. She was so far 
 successful, that the celebration of the marriage was 
 deferred, in spite of all the efforts of Jehangir, for 
 seven years. It was then only brought about, partly by 
 the interference of the British agent, and partly by the 
 arts of the young princess, Secunder Begum, herself. 
 It would seem that the spark of ambition had been 
 already lighted in her bosom. Hence she bound herself 
 to consent to the immediate solemnization of the cere- 
 mony, if the prince would sign a paper binding himself 
 to certain conditions. Of these, the principal were : — 
 the acknowledgment on his part that he derived his 
 rights solely from her; his engagement to obey her 
 in all things; never to marry another woman; — and 
 to allow her free liberty to remain outside the Purdah. 
 Anxious for the marriage, he signed the paper, though 
 with a mental reservation, and the ceremony was solem- 
 nized on the 28th April, 1835. 
 
 It could not be expected that engagements so hollow 
 would last long. There were now three parties in tlie 
 State, intriguing for supreme power. There was Koodsia 
 Begum, the Kegent, striving openly to prolong her 
 tenure of office ; Jehangir Mahomed, now titular Nawab, 
 struggling also openly to gain the power as well as the 
 title; and Secunder Begum, his wife, secretly deter- 
 mined to become herself the ruler. It so happened 
 that, at this period, Koodsia Begum had disgusted 
 many even of her own party by her caprices, and the 
 nobles of Bhopal had become weary of the domination 
 of a woman. The British agent also had expressed 
 
28 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 himself in favour of the claims of the Nawab. Jehangir 
 Mahomed had therefore only to wait. Power was fast 
 coming to him, if he had only stood still to take it. 
 Every day augmented his chances, and it was only 
 requisite for him to maintain a cautious silence. This 
 seemed the more easy, as it was certainly the natural 
 course for a man to take in a contest with the more 
 impulsive sex. But Jehangir was not more than half a 
 man. He did not possess the divine faculty of knowing 
 when to speak and when to be silent. He could not 
 restrain the ambitious longings of his soul. Thirsting. 
 for power, and despairing of obtaining it by other 
 means, he resolved therefore upon a coup d'etat. 
 
 It was the month of August, 1836, when the Nawab 
 Jehangir and his wife Secunder Begum gave a grand 
 entertainment to Koodsia Begum, her brothers, and all 
 the nobility of Bhopal. Suspicion was asleep, and the 
 utmost cordiality and good humour prevailed amongst 
 the guests. Yet it was this evening, and this occasion, 
 that Jehangir had chosen, with a view to carry out his 
 purpose of seizing Koodsia Begum. The troops in the 
 fort of Futtehgurh and in Bhopal itself were at his 
 disposal, and he had only to give the word to ensure 
 success. Yet, though the matter had been well thought 
 over, — though Sadoolla Khan — his St. Arnaud — had 
 been summoned, and was actually present with his 
 troops in the palace, yet, the signal to act was not 
 given. Jehangir was barely nineteen ; his heart was 
 not yet hardened ; he had never yet committed himself 
 to actual bloodshedding ; and, as he surveyed that 
 banqueting room, crowded with the nobility of Bhopal, 
 some of them his kinsfolk, many of them his friends, 
 and the others, though devoted to the Begum, not 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 29 
 
 personally hostile to himself, the thought could not 
 but strike him that the attempt to seize the Begum 
 in such an assembly would change the sounds of cheer- 
 fulness into shouts of anger, and could be accomplished 
 only at the cost of the best blood in Bhopal. This 
 idea paralysed and unnerved him. He ordered back 
 his troops, and left the deed undone. Meanwhile the 
 secret had transpired. One of the Nawab's chief instru- 
 ments, furious at his master's weakness, had divulged 
 it to save himself. The Begum and her daughter at 
 once retired; and next morning, the Nawab was be- 
 sieged in his own house by the very troops who, the 
 evening before, had been devoted to his person. " Men 
 and soldiers," says Carlyle, " love intrepidity and swift 
 inflexible decision, even when they suffer by it." In- 
 firmity of purpose is the one crime they cannot pardon. 
 Time will not allow me to do more than give an 
 outline of the events that followed this unlucky attempt. 
 The Nawab was for a time blocked up in his house, 
 but escaping from it, he raised a force, and took pos- 
 session, through the treachery of the commandant, of 
 the fort of Ashta. Furious at this, the Begum sent 
 her troops against him. The two armies met in June, 
 1837, and, after a desperate encounter, the Nawab was 
 defeated, and driven within the fort. Here he was 
 besieged for two months, and at the end of that period, 
 both parties, weary of the contest, consented to accept 
 the mediation of the British Government. It was 
 finally arranged that the executive power should be 
 made over to the Nawab, — a jagheer, of the value 
 of three lakhs, being assigned to Koodsia Begum. The 
 Nawab was accordingly formally invested on 29th No- 
 vember, 1837, Koodsia Begum assisting. 
 
30 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 From this moment, we hear no more of Koodsia 
 Begum as a candidate for power, but her retirement 
 only brought into greater prominence the efforts of 
 Secunder Begum to take part in affairs. Her quarrels 
 with her husband were incessant, and reached at last 
 such a pitch, that at the end of 1838 she retired with 
 her mother to the fortress of Islamnugger, having 
 previously, in Jnlj, given birtli to a daughter, the 
 Princess Shahjehan. From this place she watched, 
 without attempting to disturb, the weak rule of the 
 Nawab. Her ambition to rule was great, but her 
 patience and self-restraint were greater. She knew the 
 character of the Nawab, and she knew herself, and she 
 felt that in the end she must win the game. Her 
 calculations were correct. After six years of inglorious 
 rule, the Nawab Jehangir died, expressing in his last 
 moments his dislike to his wife by a will in which he 
 attempted to deprive his daughter by her of her succes- 
 sion to the throne. 
 
 The character of Secunder Begum is well illustrated 
 by an incident which followed this event. Ignorant of 
 her talents, the British agent, not quite in the spirit of 
 the orders he had received, intimated that her mother's 
 brother, Foujdar Mahomed, was to be sole regent, 
 whilst Secunder Begum Avas to be intrusted with the 
 education of her daughter, the future ruler. This 
 arrangement was not at all consonant to the wishes of 
 that lady, and when the agent, in a bland manner, 
 attempted to explain to her the important nature of her 
 duties as guardian to her daughter, she turned furiously 
 to him, and exclaimed : — " Am I then a Dhaee (wet- 
 nurse) ? " 
 
 Notwithstanding her opposition, the arrangement was, 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 31 
 
 with some slight modifications, persisted in. It proved, 
 however, a faikire. Foujdar Mahomed had neither 
 strength of will, force of character, nor any just idea of 
 the principles of administration. The British agent 
 found that the Begum possessed all three. Foujdar 
 himself, sensible of his unfitness for the position, became 
 nervous and despondent, and fiually resigned the re- 
 gency at the beginning of 1847. Secunder Begum was 
 at once appointed sole regent in his place. 
 
 In that capacity, she had a large field for her talents, 
 and she fully justified all the expectations that had been 
 formed regarding lier. Her administration was remark- 
 able for vigour and ability. In six years she was able 
 to report to the British Government that she had paid 
 off the entire public debt of the State ; that she had 
 abolished the system of farming the revenue, and 
 had made her own engagements with the heads of 
 villages ; that monopolies of trades and handicrafts had 
 ceased ; that she had re-organized the police ; brought the 
 mint under her own management, and effected many 
 other improvements. She had displayed, in fact, in all 
 departments of the State, an energy, an assiduity, and 
 an administrative ability, such as would have done 
 credit to a trained statesman. 
 
 She had originally been appointed regent till her 
 daughter should attain the age of eighteen, but on the 
 occasion of Shahjehan*s marriage to the commander of 
 her forces, Bukshee Bakee Mahomed Khan, tlie period 
 was extended for three years. It was the desire of 
 Secunder Begum, however, that she should be regarded 
 as ruler in her own right, and though this request was 
 not complied with at that time, events soon after 
 
32 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 occurred, which gave her a real claim on the British 
 Government. 
 
 The storm of the mutiny in 1857 did not leave 
 Bhopal uninjured. So early in that year as April, 
 hundreds of copies of a lithographed proclamation 
 urging the overthrow and destruction of the English, 
 sent from Delhi, had been circulated throughout the 
 principality. As soon as this fact became known to the 
 Begum, she communicated it to the political agent, and 
 issued orders to search for and apprehend those who 
 were circulating the document. 
 
 In the month of June she expelled from the city a 
 jemadar whom she had caught in the act of raising 
 troops for some unavowed piu'pose. In July she afforded 
 shelter to the British officers who had been driven from 
 Indore by the mutinous troops of Holkar. She did this 
 too, in spite of a strong opposition on the part of her 
 own subjects, and under a sense of her inability to 
 render aught but a passive aid to her allies. Even the 
 contingent had mutinied, and some of her own relatives 
 had proclaimed a religious war. Yet under all these 
 circumstances, Secunder Begum, though standing almost 
 alone, never swerved from the traditional policy of 
 Bhopal. Her mother was a bigot, her uncles were 
 weak-minded men, yet she never faltered. She caused 
 the British officers to be safely escorted to Hoshun- 
 gabad ; then, with infinite tact, allayed the excitement 
 in her capital ; put down the mutinous contingent with 
 a strong hand ; and finally restored order in every part 
 of the Bhopal territory. In consequence of these 
 measures, there was little for the British authorities to 
 do, when, at the close of the year, British supremacy 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 33 
 
 was restored in that part of Central India. Kewards 
 were dealt out by the Begum with a liberal hand to 
 those ministers who had so efficiently supported her in 
 her measures, whilst condign punishment was inflicted 
 on her rebel relatives and 149 men of the contingent. 
 
 In the campaign of the following year, the Begum 
 assisted the army which, under tlie personal command 
 of Sir Hugh Kose, re-conquered Central India; not 
 only by amply supplying it with provisions, but by 
 furnishing a contingent of 800 men. 
 
 As an acknowledgment of her great services at this 
 crisis, the British Government, with the full consent of 
 her daughter, recognized her, in December, 1859, as 
 ruler in her own right of the State of Bhopal, with 
 succession to her daughter ; in May, 1860, four guns 
 were presented to her ; the Pergunnah of Bairseea, 
 which had been taken from the Dhar State, was, in 
 December, 1860, added to Bhopal ; in March 1862, the 
 right of succession according to Mahomedan Law was 
 conceded to her ; and on the 1st September, 1863, Her 
 Highness was invested, in the Viceroy's public Durbar 
 at Allahabad, with the Exalted Order of the Star 
 of India. 
 
 Subsequently, in November 1863, Her Highness left 
 Bhopal with her suite on a pilgrimage to Mecca. It 
 had been at one time her intention to proceed to 
 Medina, and thence to England, but the annoyances to 
 which she was subjected in Arabia induced her to return 
 at once to her dominions, after an absence of about a 
 year. Before she left Bhopal, she wrote a letter to 
 Colonel Durand, whom she had known both as agent at 
 her Court and a-gent for Central India, which shews at 
 least that she is not deficient in warmth of feeling and 
 
 D 
 
34 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 gratitude. After commending her daughter to his care, 
 she added — "It is a custom of long standing, for an 
 individual of the Mahomedan faith, when on the eve of 
 proceeding on a pilgrimage, to solicit forgiveness at the 
 hands of their former acquaintances. For five or six 
 years you were in Bhopal, and a partaker of my happi- 
 ness and grief. As mortals are prone to err, I beg that, 
 if I have ever done anything which was not agreeable, 
 you will pardon such acts. As far as I could help, I 
 wish to undertake this sacred mission with as much 
 purity as possible, because life is uncertain, and this 
 world without stability." 
 
 On the occasion of her being invested with the order 
 of the Star of India, after having been led up by the 
 most lately created knight — H. E. Sir Hugh Kose, 
 — and by Colonel Durand, she turned to the Viceroy, 
 and expressed her gratification at the honour done her 
 by the investiture, — an honour the greater, as no Lady 
 but Her Majesty possessed the Order. She then added : 
 " Otlier Governments can praise and reward men, but 
 the British Government stands alone in thinking of 
 awarding praise, honour, and distinction to a woman 
 like myself for any humble services she may have 
 rendered." 
 
 And thus I conclude this slight sketch of a Native 
 State and its Rulers. Yet, slight though it be, I would 
 fain hope that it may suggest some truths which we 
 may ponder over, and some conclusions which we may 
 not entirely ignore. I would first call attention to the 
 remarkable assimilation in the feelings and policy of 
 tlie rulers of Bhopal to English feelings and English 
 policy, as evidenced by the resolute good faith with 
 which they adhered to their early alliance with our 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 35 
 
 own nation, and to the high place and free action they 
 accorded to women. This course of conduct would seem 
 to be the development of a national character, which, 
 not born of the civilization which we acknowledge, has 
 yet been strong enough to overcome the prejudices of 
 custom, and to recognise the power and virtue inherent 
 in truth and justice. 
 
 Then again, with respect to individual character : — we 
 notice not only the workings, always interesting, always 
 instructive, of its various phases, but we are brought face 
 to face with the consequences which, sooner or later, 
 must follow the adherence to, or the departure from, 
 certain fixed principles. Thus, in Moreed Mahomed, we 
 see the type of the fawning yet designing hypocrite, of 
 the man who is willing to undergo any humiliation to 
 obtain power and place, and whose guile, nevertheless, 
 not only involves himself in destruction, but recoils upon 
 those who trusted him. There may be different develop- 
 ments of this species: one may be sneaking, complaisant, 
 timorous; another cruel and malignant; yet the con- 
 sequences of their conduct are almost always the same, 
 and, as a race, they are abhorrent alike to gods and men. 
 In Wuzeer Mahomed, again, we see the gallant warrior, 
 the undaunted defender of his country, the man who 
 was ready to die, — for men can die but once, — rather 
 than surrender, and whose energy and perseverance 
 triumphed — as energy and perseverance, directed to 
 a right end, always will triumph — over myriads of 
 obstacles. In Nuzzer Mahomed we have an example of 
 the wise and virtuous ruler, of the autocrat whose admin- 
 istration was " unstained by a single act of tyranny." 
 In many of the others we see the various forms of 
 irresolution and firmness, loyalty and disloyalty, petty 
 
36 A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 
 
 motives and mean actions, common in the world, and 
 therefore, not inviting on this occasion, special attention. 
 But soQiething must be said regarding Her Highness, 
 the reigning Begum. In her we see the type not only 
 of a very remarkable woman, but of a woman who joins 
 to the strong constancy and deep feeling of woman's 
 character, th^e energy, the daring, the longsighted per- 
 severance, which are generally supposed to be more 
 peculiarly the property of the rougher sex. Her career 
 has proved many things ; but to my mind, it has brought 
 into strongest light, this old truth, — not less true because 
 it is as old almost as the world, — that, all other circum- 
 stances being equal, no man, and no body of men, can 
 hope to contend successfully with a woman who is at 
 once clever and ambitious, strong-willed and daring. 
 It may be said of her that she never propounded a 
 scheme, never aimed at an object, but that whatever 
 were the obstacles, she ultimately succeeded in carrying 
 them out. 
 
 One word more. Let me ask now, taking a retro- 
 spective glance at this Native State during the hundred 
 and seventy years of its existence, what is the conclusion 
 that must be drawn? As we notice the working of 
 the springs which set its rulers in action, do we not 
 instinctively feel that we, — we Englishmen, — are liable 
 to be acted upon by the same causes, that we are subject 
 to the same impulses, — that we, according to our different 
 natures, are to be equally moved by the passions of 
 ambition, of avarice, of love, of hatred, of revenge ? Do 
 we not feel, in fact, that we and they are shaped in the 
 same mould and formed of the same clay ? Kecollect, 
 for a moment, that civihzation, as we know it, was 
 unknown to those men ; that education, as we regard it, 
 
A NATIVE STATE AND ITS RULERS. 37 
 
 was, to them, as thougli it had never existed. Keeping 
 sight of this fact, dare any of us who are here this 
 evening, and who may have the boldness to examine 
 himself,— to delve into his own heart, — dare any of us 
 say, that he would have been braver and more politic 
 than Wuzeer Mahomed, more virtuous than his suc- 
 cessor, more loyal and resolute than the present able 
 ruler, more prescient than the series of men who adhered, 
 through good and evil report, to the wise policy which 
 Bhopal has followed? Dare any even stand up and 
 declare that he would not have succumbed like some 
 of the others ? I, for one, having known and felt how 
 true is the saying of one of our greatest statesman, that 
 " not to aspire is to grovel," I, for one, feel confident, 
 that there are few indeed who know themselves, who, 
 recollecting all the circumstances of their position, would 
 dare to stoop down deliberately in order to cast a stone 
 at this Native State and its Kulers. 
 
LORD LAKE. 
 
 [From the 'Calcutta Eeview,' May, 1866.] 
 
 Of all. the great warriors who contributed to establish 
 British supremacy in India, not one earned a higher 
 reputation for chivalry and daring than did Lord Lake ; 
 not one ever combined, to a higher extent, the most 
 undaunted courage with that clear-headedness and pre- 
 sence of mind, which in him were never so remarkable 
 as amid the roar of artillery and the whistling of bullets. 
 He was not much of a tactician. Indeed, for manoeuvring, 
 as such, he had always a sort of lofty contempt. His 
 principle of war was to ascertain where the enemy was, 
 then to close with him quickly and rapidly, never to let 
 go his hold till he had beaten him. He had all the 
 natural qualifications for a general of this class. It has 
 been recorded of him, that to judgment and quickness 
 of perception he united courage, decision, and a remark- 
 able capability of bearing fatigue. He possessed, in an 
 eminent degree, the art of conciliating the confidence 
 and attachment of those under his command. In all his 
 great Indian battles the mutual confidence felt by the 
 soldiers in his leadership, and by himself in his soldiers, 
 is clearly visible, and to this feeling, and to his wonder- 
 ful presence of mind under all circumstances, may be 
 attributed his success against numbers greatly superior. 
 And this indicates another peculiarity in his mode of 
 
LORD LAKE. 39 
 
 warfare. Although general of the army, he always led 
 on his men in person. The greater the danger, and the 
 more difficult the position, the more surely was he to be 
 seen at the head of his troops, whether cavalry or 
 infantry, leading them to the charge or to the assault. 
 Whatever may be thought of such conduct in the 
 abstract, it is certain that its effect on his soldiers was 
 electric, and, considering the circumstances in which he 
 was placed, fighting at the head of an extremely small 
 force against an enemy strong in prestige and in num- 
 bers, it may be doubted whether any other tactics would 
 have been equally successful. « 
 
 The adoption by Lord Lake of this daring, dashing, 
 system of warfare may be attributed not less to his early 
 education than to his natural character. Both as a very 
 young and as a middle-aged man, he had enjoyed pecu- 
 liar opportunities of observing that the very fact of 
 moving on to an attack imbued the advancing troops 
 with a moral power which gave them a great supe- 
 riority over a standing enemy, and that, although a 
 larger immediate loss of life might sometimes result 
 from such tactics, it often had the effect of putting an 
 end to the war. Thus, in his first campaign, as an 
 ensign in the Foot Guards, during the seven years' war 
 in Germany, he had become familiar with the tactics of 
 the great Frederick, and had noticed how he, by acting 
 up to this dashing principle, succeeded in confounding 
 his numerous enemies. He himself was serving in that 
 war, with the rest of the English contingent, under 
 Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and it was in the year 
 after he joined * that he gave the first indication of the 
 
 * It may be necessary to state here that Lord Lake was born on the 
 27th July, 1744, at Ashton Clinton, in the county of Buckingham, that 
 
*0 LORD LAKE. 
 
 possession of that spirit and presence of mind to which 
 we have alluded. It was at the combat of Williamstadt 
 near Cassel. The French army was already almost 
 beaten and was retiring, when a portion of their cavalry, 
 making a detour, came upon the right of the allied 
 army, and caused a sudden panic amongst the troops 
 stationed there. Of these young Lake's regiment 
 formed a part, and the men composing it, with the 
 exception of a very few, joined in the flight. No sooner 
 did Lake see this than he waved the colours, which he 
 was carrying that day, and, forming up the few men 
 who remained with him, shewed a bold front to the 
 enemy. This conduct had such an effect upon the fugi- 
 tives, that they at once rallied to his support, and the 
 French were beaten off. 
 
 The experience he gained in the next war in which 
 he took a part, — the war caused by the revolt of the 
 American colonies, — only confirmed his early impres- 
 sions. It is true that he joined the army under Lord 
 Cornwallis but a short time before its humiliation at 
 York Town, yet, before the surrender, he seized the 
 opportunity of particularly distinguishing himself by 
 attacking and storming one of the enemy's batteries, in 
 such a manner as to obtain the warmest thanks of the 
 Commander-in-chief. From the spectacle here afforded 
 him of this army compelled to capitulate, he drew a 
 very practical deduction regarding the loss of moral 
 spirit and physical power almost inevitably produced by 
 inaction. 
 
 But his third campaign, against revolutionary France, 
 
 he joined the army as an ensign in the 1st Eegiment, Foot Guards, 
 in 1758, and the English contingent under the Marquess of Granby in 
 Germany in 1760. 
 
: LORD LAKE. 41 
 
 in 1793, probably bad tbe greatest effect in forming bis 
 cbaracter as a_general. He was then nearly fifty years 
 old, and was serving as Brigadier-General in command 
 of tbe brigade of Guards, tbe entire army being under 
 tbe direction of tbe Duke of York. Altbougb tbis cam- 
 paign opened witb some success for tbe allies, yet its 
 conclusion was disastrous. Tbe allies took Valenciennes, 
 and Brigadier-General Lake bimself contributed to tbe 
 success of tbe battle in wbich Dampierre was killed, and 
 afterwards beat tbe Frencb at Lincelles. Tbis action 
 may be regarded as a type of tbe battles be was about 
 to figbt in India, and be displayed in it tbe same tactics. 
 Tlie enemy were superior in numbers, were very strongly 
 posted, — but tbey were stationary. Tbougb tbe position 
 was extremely strong, General Lake resolved to storm 
 it. Se accordingly formed bis men up, and led tbem 
 himself against tbe enemy under a heavy fire. The 
 French fought well, but tbe impetus of the attack was 
 too much for tbem. They were completely dislodged, 
 with tbe loss of their guns. 
 
 Such victories, however, were exceptional. In that 
 war tbe French were generally tbe attacking, and, 
 therefore, tbe victorious party ; and it concluded, so far 
 as the Duke of York's army was concerned, by a retreat 
 from tbe Waal to tbe mouth of the Elbe, which, in the 
 intensity of suffering from cold, and, in its disastrous 
 results to tbe soldiers engaged, has been surpassed only 
 by tbe terrible retreat of the Frencb from Moscow in 
 1812. It deserves to be recorded, however, that through- 
 out that retreat the rear-guard of tbe British army per- 
 formed wonders, and that General Lake made himself 
 conspicuous on several occasions. At Bois d'Alkmaer 
 
42 LORD LAKE. 
 
 liis personal exertions contributed materially to the 
 safety of his brigade. 
 
 From the close of that campaign, in 1794, to the 
 date of his appointment as Commander-in-chief in India, 
 in 1800, General Lake saw no foreign service. He 
 was employed, however, in 1798, in crushing the re- 
 bellion in Ireland, — a service he performed most effec- 
 tively, by the exercise of his favourite tactics, first at 
 Vinegar Hill, and afterwards at Ballinamuck, where the 
 French general, Humbert, surrendered to him with the 
 eleven hundred men at whose head he had too rashly 
 invaded the country. 
 
 We have thus briefly referred to the services of Lord 
 Lake in Europe, under the idea that his character can 
 be better appreciated by a glance at the schools in which 
 he served his apprenticeship. There can be little doubt, 
 we think, that the contemplation of the daring cam- 
 paigns of the great Frederick, who won battles with his 
 soldiers' legs, and for whom no position was too strong 
 to assault, — in the first place, — and the experience of 
 the triumph of revolutionary onward-moving France 
 against her methodic and stationary enemies, — in the 
 second, — contributed not a little to influence his after 
 career. Considering the country he was coming out to, 
 and the enemies he was to encounter, he could scarcely 
 have had a better training. 
 
 It was in the year 1801, he being then fifty-six years 
 of age, that General Lake came out to India as Com- 
 mander-in-chief. He proceeded almost immediately to 
 Cawnpore, which was then our frontier station, and 
 busied himself there with a constant exercise of his 
 men. To the tactics of the cavalry especially he paid 
 
LORD LAKE. 43 
 
 very great attention. The great use that might be 
 made of this arm, especially by combining its move- 
 ments with the movements of artillery, in a flat country 
 like India, did not escape him. It was during the 
 exercise-months that followed his arrival that, on the 
 plains about Kanouge to the north of Cawnpore, he 
 devised and put into execution a scheme, which he after- 
 wards found of incalculable use, viz., that of attaching 
 to each regiment of cavalry two light six-pounder guns, 
 splendidly horsed. These guns, which were called 
 " galloper guns," formed, in fact, a part of each cavalry 
 regiment, and the combined movements of the two arms 
 were conducted with the most perfect exactness, and 
 the most wonderful effect. It was during these exer- 
 cises that General Lake had the first opportunity of 
 displaying in India that courage and coolness which 
 were afterwards so conspicuous in the field. An officer 
 of his staff, Major Nairne, had speared a tiger, when 
 riding out with the Commander-in-chief in the jungle. 
 The infuriated animal at once turned upon him, and 
 was in the act of making a spring, when General Lake, 
 with imperturbable presence of mind, coolly drew a 
 pistol from his belt, and shot the tiger dead upon the 
 spot. 
 
 For about a year after the arrival of the new Com- 
 mander-in-chief, nothing occurred to demand his pre- 
 sence in the field. In the beginning of 1802, however, 
 he was]called upon to chastise the rebellious spirit of some 
 zamindars, whose territories, in virtue of an agreement 
 made with the Nawab Wuzer of Oudh, had been made 
 over to us, but who had refused to submit. Against 
 these General Lake marched with a small force. The 
 resistance he experienced was very obstinate, and it was 
 
44 LORD LAKE. 
 
 not until after he had lost many lives that their strong- 
 holds were carried. 
 
 Peace had scarcely been restored in these districts, 
 when rumours of a contest with the Mahrattas began to 
 circulate very freely in the camp. We will not enter 
 here into the causes which had tended to raise that 
 power into the formidable position it occupied after the 
 downfall of Tippoo Sultan. Fortunately the Mahratta 
 power was not directed by one ruling mind : it was a 
 confederacy, divided into five heads, all jealous of one 
 another ; and of these five heads, the wise policy of the 
 Governor-General of India, the illustrious Marquess 
 Wellesley, had succeeded in the interval between the 
 fall of Tippoo and the time of which we are writing, in 
 reducing two, — the Peshwa and the Guikwar, — into a 
 state of dependence on the British. The three that 
 remained, Scindia, Holkar, and the Bhonsla, viewed 
 with a jealous dread the gradual progress of the British 
 arms. They accordingly banded together to overthrow 
 us. But when all their preparations had been com- 
 pleted, Holkar stood hesitatingly aloof, leaving his two 
 allies to bear the brunt of the contest which their pre- 
 parations had made unavoidable, waiting apparently the 
 first results of the campaign to determine in what man- 
 ner he should act. But Scindia and the Bhonsla alone 
 were most formidable enemies. Between them they 
 possessed actually, if not nominally, the whole of Berar 
 and Bundlecund, a portion of Malwa and Kajpootana, 
 the imperial cities of Delhi and Agra, and the country 
 known as tlie Doab, north of the town of Coel, — the 
 fortress of Allygurh, two miles from that town, consti- 
 tuting the frontier fortification. 
 
 The Mahrattas were very famous warriors. Originally 
 
LORD LAKE. 45 
 
 their great strength consisted in their numerous cavalry, 
 capable of any amount of endurance, able to subsist 
 without a commissariat, without tents, without organisa- 
 tion. Taking with them but sufficient for the provision 
 of the day, a spare blanket and a spare horse,* they 
 subsisted on the country through which they passed, 
 until a great victory or some unlooked for prize gave 
 them the opportunity of loading themselves with plun- 
 der. With the advance of time they had submitted to 
 a rude sort of discipline, without in any way impairing 
 their hardihood or their efficiency. They possessed, 
 too, numerous guns, the use and value of which they 
 had learned from the French. Their valour had been 
 proved on many a field and over many a foe. Though 
 almost annihilated by Ahmed Shah Abdallee at Paniput 
 in 1761, they had gradually recovered their strength, 
 until, under the greatest prince of the House of Scindia, 
 Madhajee, they had gained possession of the whole of 
 Central India, and, at the period to which we refer, 
 were using the authority of the Emperor Shah Alum, 
 who was a State prisoner in their hands, still further to 
 cement their power. 
 
 But to bring about this order of things the Mahratta 
 chieftains had not depended upon their swarms of cavalry 
 and their splendid artillery alone. Madhajee Scindia 
 had noted that the battles which the French and English 
 had gained against their native enemies, had been won 
 chiefly by the infantry. To discipline this arm, there- 
 fore, his greatest efforts had been directed. He had 
 invited adventurers from all parts of the world. One of 
 these, a Savoyard, named De Boigne, a man of superior 
 attainments, rose gradually to the command of the 
 
 * Grant Duff. 
 
46 LORD LAKE. 
 
 troops, which he himself had disciplined after the Euro- 
 pean fashion, and when, in 1797, he resigned his com- 
 mand into the hands of his master, Dowlut Kao, the 
 successor of Madhajee, he left him thirty-two disciplined 
 battalions, many of them commanded by Frenchmen, 
 and all imbued by a confidence in themselves, and in 
 the discipline they had acquired, such as was possessed 
 by no other soldiers in the country, except the British 
 and Anglo-Indian. 
 
 In the command of these troops De Boigne was suc- 
 ceeded by Perron, a Frenchman, who had come out to 
 India, nearly fifty years before, as a common sailor. 
 Perron was in many respects a superior man. He was 
 indefatigable, energetic, attentive to his duties, brave, 
 and a first-rate organiser. At the time to which we 
 are referring, he commanded the troops on the frontier, 
 having his head-quarters at Allygurh. But his master 
 Scindia, probably distrusting him, had, on the outbreak 
 of hostilities, appointed a Mahratta, Ambajee Inglia, to 
 take his place. The supersession, however, had not 
 taken effect, when, on the 28th August, 1803, General 
 Lake, at the head of an army numbering 5000 infantry, 
 2500 cavalry, with the usual proportion of artillery, 
 crossed the frontier, about four miles to the south of 
 Coel. 
 
 The plan adopted by Lord Wellesley, when the out- 
 break of hostilities could be no longer doubtful, had 
 been worthy of his coniprehensive mind and strong prac- 
 tical intellect. To strike and strike at the heart, with 
 a force that would be irresistible ; to break for ever the 
 power of the Mahratta confederacy ; to deprive Scindia^ 
 on the one side, of all prospects of extending his posses- 
 sions towards the south, and to rescue from his grasp. 
 
LORD LAKE. 47 
 
 on the other,^ not only the imperial cities of Delhi and 
 Agra, but the person of the captive emperor, — were the 
 great objects he proposed to himself. The iirst of these 
 movements he entrusted to the vigorous arm of his 
 brother, General Wellesley ; the second was confided to 
 the tried experience of the Commander-in-chief. 
 
 It was then, in pursuance of instructions received 
 from the Governor General, that General Lake orga- 
 nised a force at Cawnpore, in July, moved from that 
 station with it on the 5th August, and crossed the fron- 
 tier on the 28th, to attack the enemy at Coel. 
 
 Though General Perron commanded at Coel, he had 
 there a very small portion of his infantry. These, to 
 the number of 2000, he had thrown into the fort of 
 AUygurh, which place he considered capable of sustaining 
 a protracted siege. His plan was to attack the Englisli 
 force as it was moving upon AUygurh, with 8000 Mah- 
 ratta horse, and, should he fail to beat them, to move 
 rapidly upon Delhi, collect his infantry there, and march 
 upon the English whilst they should be yet engaged in 
 the siege of AUygurh. It was a bold and well-conceived 
 plan, but, in drawing it up, he had not made sufficient 
 allowance for the fact, that the troops to whom he was 
 opposed were either English, or officered by Englishmen, 
 and that the name of their general was Lake. 
 
 At four o'clock in the morning, the English left their 
 camping ground, and at seven o'clock they came in sight 
 of the Mahratta cavalry, drawn up in the plain in a 
 strong position, their right resting on the fort of AUy- 
 gurh, their front protected by a deep morass, and their 
 left by two detached villages, in which they had placed 
 some matchlock-men. General Lake at once carefully 
 examined the position, and determined to attack the 
 
48 LORD LAKE. 
 
 enemy on their weakest point — their left flank. He 
 accordingly formed his cavahy in columns of regiments, 
 and placing, himself at their head, moved off to the 
 right, supported by the infantry. On taking up a posi- 
 tion on the enemy's left flank, the general formed his 
 cavalry into two lines, and moved on to the two villages, 
 behind which the Mahratta cavalry slowly retired. The 
 matchlock-men in these villages, however, poured in so 
 annoying a fire that General Lake halted the cavalry, 
 andjsent a battalion of sepoys to drive them out. This 
 was effected in gallant style, and the cavalry again ad- 
 vanced. But they had scarcely cleared the villages, 
 when the Mahratta horse was seen coming up in two 
 lines, prepared to charge. But before they could carry 
 out this intention, the galloper guns, attached to our 
 cavalry, opened upon them. This fire was evidently a 
 surprise ; yet had Perron at that moment continued his 
 movement, and ordered a charge, he might have taken 
 the English cavalry, separated as they were from the 
 infantry, at great disadvantage. But the artillery fire 
 so confounded him, that he was incapable of giving any 
 definite orders. The natural result followed. Indecision 
 spread through the ranks, and, in a moment, the Mah- 
 ratta horse fled in all directions. They were followed 
 by our cavalry close to the walls of the fort, under the 
 fire of which Perron withdrew them from the field. 
 
 He had still, however, left 2000 men in Allygurh, 
 under the command of Colonel Pedron, a brave and 
 resolute ofiicer. It had been calculated that this place 
 could hold out for six weeks at least. The importance 
 with which it was regarded by the French commander 
 may be estimated by the letter which he wrote on the 
 occasion to Colonel Pedron, and which ran thus: — 
 
LORD LAKE. 49 
 
 " You will have received the answer you are to make to 
 the propositions of General Lake. I never could have 
 believed for an instant you could have thought of a 
 capitulation. Kemember, you are a Frenchman ; and 
 let no action of yours tarnish the glory of your nation. 
 I hope in a few days to send back the English general 
 as fast as, or faster than he came. Make yourself per- 
 fectly easy on this subject. Either the Emperor's army 
 or that of General Lake shall find a grave before the 
 fort of Allygurh." 
 
 The first act of the British general was to summon 
 the fort to surrender, but Colonel Pedron gave him the 
 answer that became a brave man ; General Lake, there- 
 fore^ resolved to lose no time in attacking it. 
 
 To attack it, however, by regular approaches, would, 
 he soon saw, occupy suflScient time to enable the enemy 
 to assemble in such force as seriously to compromise 
 his army. Yet it was equally impossible for him to 
 march to Delhi, leaving Allygurh in the hands of the 
 Mahrattas. There was one other chance, — a desperate 
 one, — and that was to attempt it by a coup-de-main. 
 
 The defences of Allygurh were particularly strong; 
 and not only that, but the country had been levelled for 
 a mile round it, and the fire of the fort guns covered 
 the entire intermediate space. There was but one pas- 
 sage across the ditch into the fort, and at the entrance 
 to this was a strong gateway. Three other gateways 
 had also to be forced before the body of the place could 
 be entered. 
 
 It was, nevertheless, that passage, strengthened as it 
 had been to meet such an attempt, which the British 
 general resolved to force. At three o'clock on the 
 morning of the 4th September, therefore, he detached, 
 
 E 
 
50 LORD LAKE. 
 
 under the command of Colonel Monson, a storming 
 party, consisting of four companies of the 76th Regi- 
 ment, the 1st battalion 4th Native Infantry, and four 
 companies of the 17th Native Infantry. These were 
 afterwards reinforced by the 2nd battalion 4th Native 
 Infantry. This party moved at once to within 600 
 yards of the gateway, and then halted. On the booming 
 of the morning gun, — the signal previously agreed upon, 
 — two batteries of four 18-pounders each, which had 
 been erected for the purpose the previous evening, 
 opened fire on the defences, and under cover of their 
 fire, the storming party advanced to within a hundred 
 yards of the gate before they were perceived. On 
 recognising the advancing line, the enemy hastily aban- 
 doned a traverse that had been thrown up in front of 
 the first gateway, and retired within the fort. Noting 
 their retreat. Colonel Monson hastened to follow them 
 with two companies of the 76th, hoping to enter with 
 them, but he was too late. The gate was shut, and the 
 entrance to it defended by a tremendous cross-fire. Nor 
 was an attempt at escalading made by Major McLeod 
 and some grenadiers of the 76th more successful, for the 
 enemy's pikemen crowded the walls in such numbers, 
 that success was impossible. A 6-pounder gun was then 
 brought up to force open the gate, but as it did not 
 succeed, it was followed by a 12-pounder, and from this 
 four or five rounds were ineffectually fired. All this 
 time, a period of twenty minutes, our troops were ex- 
 posed to a tremendous fire of grape and musketry, and, 
 not content with that, some of the enemy clambered 
 down the scaling-ladders, and attacked our men with their 
 pikes. By one of these Colonel Monson Avas wounded, 
 and here six officers and several men were killed. Just, 
 
LORD LAKE. 51 
 
 however, as matters were getting very critical, the first 
 gateway was forced open, and our troops, pouring through 
 it along a narrow causeway, quickly mastered the 
 second gate,* then advancing with a rush, passed through 
 the third simultaneously with the enemy's fugitives. 
 There remained yet one more, the gateway leading into 
 the body of the place. The artillery officer having 
 been killed, some delay occurred in bringing up the 
 12-pounder, and when it came, the gate had been too 
 strongly secured to be forced. Major McLeod, of the 
 76th, however, succeeded in opening the wicket, and 
 dashing through it, followed by his men, he ascended 
 the ramparts, and drove the enemy from the place, or 
 forced them to surrender. Our loss in killed and wounded 
 was 260 ; that of the enemy much greater. 
 
 The capture of AUygurh, — an event which elicited the 
 strongest eulogiums from Marquis Wellesley, and which, 
 by the panic it struck into the minds of the natives, 
 gave them an overwhelming idea of European daring, 
 and contributed probably to the inaction of Holkar, — 
 enabled General Lake to attempt the other object he 
 had in view, viz,, to pursue and to encounter the main 
 body of the enemy's forces, before they could receive 
 any reinforcement from Scindia. Accordingly, having 
 detached a party of cavalry to look after a French 
 partisan of the name of Fleury, who had attacked Eta- 
 wah, and having restored and improved the fortifications 
 of Allygurh, the general marched on the 7th September 
 towards Delhi, and encamped that same evening at 
 
 * The advance of our troops was much facilitated by the guidance 
 of an adventurer, Lieutenant Lucan, who had quitted the service of 
 Scindia on the declaration of war. He was killed on the first day of 
 Colonel Monson's retreat, noticed further on. 
 
 e2 
 
52 LORD LAKE. 
 
 Soomna. Here he received a letter from Perron, inti- 
 mating that he had resigned the service of Scindia, and 
 soliciting safe conducts for himself and two of his officers 
 into British territory. These were readily granted, and 
 overjoyed at this signal proof of the injured morale of 
 the enemy, the Commander-in-Chief pushed forward on 
 the following morning to meet their new general, also a 
 Frenchman, M. Louis Bourquin. On the night of the 
 11th September, Bourquin, at the head of twelve batta- 
 lions of infantry, five thousand cavalry, and seventy guns, 
 crossed the Jumna, with the express purpose of attacking 
 tlie English force. Our army, much fatigued after a 
 long march, had but just reached at eleven o'clock in 
 the morning the banks of the Jehna Nullah, six miles 
 from Delhi, when Bourquin with his whole force was 
 upon them. The British troops, 4500 strong, had already 
 grounded their arms, many were undressed, and all 
 scattered, General Lake, however, with his usual alacrity, 
 hastily collected the 27th Light Dragoons, and the 2nd 
 and 3rd Eegiments of Native Cavalry, and pushed on 
 within cannon-shot of the enemy, to reconnoitre. He 
 found them halted in a position which had been pre- 
 viously selected with great care, each flank being 
 covered by a swamp, their front by a line of intrench- 
 ments, and their numerous guns almost hidden from 
 view by a high grass jungle. The fire of the enemy 
 was instantly directed upon this large body of cavalry, 
 which, however, continued stationary, in order to give 
 time to the infantry to come up and attack the intrench- 
 ments. It was more than an hour before this could be 
 done, and in the interval, the enemy's fire caused us 
 great loss in men and horses, the Commander-in-Chief 
 himself having a horse shot under him. 
 
LORD LAKE. 53 
 
 At length, perceiving that the infantry had begun to 
 move to the front, and having had time to notice how 
 very strong was the position of the enemy, General 
 Lake resolved upon a movement, which should at the 
 same time entice them from their strong position, and 
 cover the advance of his infan.try. Accordingly, he gave 
 orders to his cavalry to retire slowly from the front of 
 the enemy's position, and to move in the direction of the 
 infantry. No sooner had they begun this movement, 
 than the enemy, conceiving them to be beaten, advanced 
 with loud shouts from their intrenchments, — their artil- 
 lery in the front, — to convert the retreat into a rout. 
 Still the cavalry continued their retrograde movement, 
 until they found themselves on the infantry. The 
 cavalry then opened from the centre, and the infantry 
 marching through, advanced steadily with sloped arms 
 towards the enemy, led by the Commander-in-Chief in 
 person. On arriving within eighty yards of their guns, 
 which all this time were pouring upon them showers of 
 grape and round shot, the line halted to give one volley ; 
 then, bringing their muskets to the charge, they rushed 
 forward with such impetuosity, General Lake leading 
 them, that the enemy gave way, and fled precipitately. 
 On this taking place, the line halted, and formed into 
 column of companies, upon which, as had been before 
 arranged, the cavalry, and the galloper guns rushed 
 through the intervals, and rendered the victory com- 
 plete. The enemy were pursued to the Jumna, in 
 which many of them perished. Their loss was enor- 
 mous ; ours amounted to 486 killed and wounded. All 
 their artillery and stores fell into our hands, and, what 
 was of a moral importance still stronger, the imperial 
 city of Delhi, within sight of which the battle had been 
 
54 LORD LAKE. 
 
 fought, was occupied two days later by the conqueror. 
 It deserves to be recorded that Bourquin and the French 
 officers were the first to quit the field, and Bourquin 
 himself, and four others, surrendered the day after the 
 action to the English general. 
 
 The battle of Delhi may justly be regarded as one of 
 the most brilliant feats of arms ever performed by a 
 British general and an Anglo-Indian army. The skill, 
 the daring, the intrepidity of the Commander-in-Chief 
 were not more worthy of notice than the discipline and 
 gallantry of the soldiers, European and native. From 
 Marquess Wellesley all the actors in it received well- 
 earned eulogiums. " The decisive victory gained in the 
 battle of Delhi, on the 11th September," he wrote in his 
 general order, "justified the firm confidence reposed by 
 the Governor-General in Council, in the bravery, perse- 
 verance, and discipline of the army, and in the skill, 
 judgment, active spirit, and invincible intrepidity of 
 their illustrious commander. The glory of that day is 
 not surpassed by any recorded triumph of the British 
 arms in India, and is attended by every circumstance 
 calculated to elevate the fame of British valour, to illus- 
 trate the character of British humanity, and to secure 
 the stability of the British empire in the East." 
 
 On the 14th September, General Lake entered Delhi, 
 and liberated from confinement the unhappy blind old 
 king. Shah Alum, who had been so long, not only a 
 state prisoner, but subjected to tyranny and insult. By 
 him, and by all the inhabitants of Delhi, the English 
 army were hailed as deliverers, and they showed their 
 title to that designation, by observing the strictest dis- 
 cipline during their occupation of the imperial city. 
 Having made the necessary arrangements for the secu- 
 
LORD LAKE. 55 
 
 rity of the capital and the tranquillity of the surrounding 
 country, as well as for the peaceful enjoyment by the 
 Emperor Shah Alum of his freedom and dignities, 
 General Lake left Delhi with his army, on the 24th 
 September, for Agra, which place it was his intention 
 to besiege. He arrived there on the 4th October, and 
 encamped within long cannon-shot of the fort. The 
 garrison of Agra consisted of 4500 fighting men, under 
 the nominal command of an English adventurer. Co- 
 lonel George Hessing; but, distrusting him and their 
 other English officers, six in number, the troops had 
 mutinied and made them prisoners. Besides these 
 troops, there were encamped under the walls of the 
 fort, tlu^ee battalions of the army that had been defeated 
 at Delhi, and four battalions of Perron's fifth brigade, 
 just arrived from the Dekkan, under the command of 
 Major Brownrigg, with twenty-six pieces of cannon. 
 The garrison had refused to admit these troops into the 
 fort, because there were within its walls twenty-five 
 lacs of rupees, their share of which, they feared, would 
 be lessened by a further accession of troops. They, 
 therefore, occupied the city and glacis. In addition to 
 these, twelve battalions of regular troops had taken up 
 a position in the rear of the besieging army, on the 
 Delhi road, with the view, should the siege be protracted, 
 of attempting to recover the imperial city. The Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, having noted this state of things,, 
 resolved, with his accustomed skill and energy, to dis- 
 lodge those battalions on the glacis and in the city before 
 commencing the siege. Accordingly, on the morning 
 of the 10th October, he detached two battalions of 
 sepoys, under Brigadier General Clarke, to attack the 
 city ; one battalion, under Colonel M'CoUough, to attack 
 
56 LORD LAKE. 
 
 the enemy on the western face of the fort ; and a fourth 
 battahon, under Captain Worsley, to attack them on the 
 southern face. These three attacks completely suc- 
 ceeded, though not till after a long and severe resistance, 
 costing us 213 men killed and wounded. The loss of 
 the enemy was computed at 600, besides which, all 
 their guns, twenty-six in number, were captured, and 
 they were so dispirited by the defeat, that two days 
 after, 2500 of them surrendered in a body to the English 
 general, the conditions being that they should be taken 
 into the Company's service, on the same pay they re- 
 ceived from Scindia. 
 
 . This difficulty being removed, the general prepared 
 in earnest for the siege, and on the 16th opened his 
 batteries. The next day, however, the garrison de- 
 manded terms of capitulation. These were, after some 
 discussion, agreed to, and the fort was evacuated on the 
 18th. By this surrender, 25 lakhs of rupees and 162 
 pieces of cannon fell into our hands. But, what was of 
 infinitely more importance, a line of defence along the 
 left bank of the Jumna was secured, and the British 
 were left at liberty to pursue Scindia's brigades into 
 his own territory. 
 
 It has been mentioned, that whilst the army was 
 encamped before Agra, twelve of Scindia's battalions, 
 with some cavalry and guns, had taken up a position on 
 the Delhi road in their rear. These consisted of seven 
 battalions, which had come up from the Dekkan, styled 
 the Dekkan Invincibles, reinforced by five others which 
 had escaped from Delhi, of 1500 cavalry and 74 guns, 
 about 9000 men in all. This force was commanded 
 by Abajee, a Mahratta, and was officered entirely by 
 natives. To pursue and destroy this, representing as 
 
LORD LAKE. 57 
 
 it did the last remnant of the force disciplined by 
 De Boigne, was the object General Lake proposed to 
 himself after the fall of Agra. Accordingly, after 
 making the necessary preparations for its defence, and 
 for the care of the wounded, he started on the 27th 
 October at the head of three regiments of dragoons, five 
 of native cavalry, one European regiment of infantry 
 (the 76th), and four battalions of Sepoys, in pursuit. 
 He soon ascertained that the Mahrattas had moved off 
 in the direction of the Jyepore country. Thither, ac- 
 cordingly, he followed them. The heavy state of the 
 soil, saturated with rain, having compelled him to leave 
 the greater part of his artillery behind him, he pressed 
 on by forced marches, and arrived, on the night of the 
 81st, on the ground which the enemy had only quitted 
 that morning. As this ground was but thirty-three 
 miles from the hilly country of Mewat, the only pass 
 into which could have been easily made almost impreg- 
 nable, the general resolved to push on with his three 
 cavalry brigades, and try the effect upon the enemy 
 with that arm alone. 
 
 Accordingly, at twelve o'clock that same night, he 
 set off, leaving the infantry to follow. At sunrise, next 
 morning, he came up with the enemy at the village 
 of Laswarrie. Here they were very strongly posted, 
 their right thrown back on a rivulet, "the banks of 
 which were extremely difficult of access ; their left 
 rested on the village of Laswarrie, whilst their entire 
 front, which lay concealed from view by long grass, was 
 defended by a most formidable line of artillery."* 
 Owing partly to the long grass, and partly to the clouds 
 of dust which were blown from the enemy, the strength 
 
 * Thorn. 
 
58 LORD LAKE. 
 
 of their position was not at once apparent to Gren^ral 
 Lake ; and as it appeared to him that their movements 
 indicated an intention to retreat to the Mewatee hills, 
 from which they were then but eight miles distant, he 
 resolved to attack them without waiting for the infantry. 
 Accordingly, he formed up his cavalry, and, as usual, 
 placing himself at their head, ordered successive charges 
 to be made by the advanced guard and the first and 
 second brigades on the left of their position, whilst the 
 third should turn their right. The charges on the left 
 were most gallantly executed ; the enemy were driven 
 back into the village, several guns were taken, and 
 their line in some instances penetrated, but owing to 
 the attack being unsupported by the infantry, the guns 
 could not be carried off, and, on the cavalry retiring, 
 they were recovered by the enemy. In this attack our 
 loss was heavy. Colonel Vandeleur, commanding the 
 brigade, received a mortal wound. But the charge of 
 the third brigade was even more desperate, and, if 
 possible, more daring. This brigade, consisting of the 
 29th dragoons and the 4th Native Cavalry had been 
 directed to turn the right of the enemy's line. To 
 obtain a position from which to effect this, they moved 
 along the front of that line, exposed to the fire of seventy- 
 four guns, which lay concealed by the long grass. Heed- 
 less of this fire, however, they moved on to the position 
 that had been marked out for them, formed up as 
 steadily as if on parade, and charged the hostile bat- 
 teries. Here, however, their success was but transient ; 
 for though they rode through the guns, they failed to 
 reach the infantry, who were posted behind an intrench- 
 ment, from which they poured in a musketry-fire most 
 galling to our men. In this unequal conflict they were 
 
LORD LAKE. 59 
 
 some time engaged, making heroic efforts to get at the 
 infantry. But it was in vain, the steady fire from the 
 enemy's line made terrible havoc amongst them ; and at 
 last the general, perceiving the inutility of farther per- 
 severing in a fruitless attack, drew off all his cavalry, 
 resolving to watch the enemy till the infantry should 
 arrive. 
 
 At noon the infantry came up, eager for the attack ; 
 but, having made a forced march of twenty-five miles, 
 the general ordered refreshments to be served out to 
 them before leading them into action. After an hour's 
 respite for this purpose, during which the enemy entered 
 into negotiations to surrender their guns, — but which 
 came to nothing, — he formed them into two columns, the 
 first of which was to turn the enemy's right, now con- 
 centrated round the village of Mohaulpore. The second 
 was to support it, whilst one portion of the cavalry 
 should draw off the enemy's attention by threatening 
 his left, and another should hold itself in readiness to 
 take advantage of any confusion in the hostile line. 
 
 These dispositions having been effected, the first 
 column moved on ; but their advance was no sooner 
 perceived by the enemy, than they threw back their 
 right, and concentrated on the advancing column the 
 whole fire of their artillery. So great was the slaughter, 
 especially in the leading regiment, the 76th, that the 
 general who was with them, resolved not to wait for his 
 supports, — the advance of which had been delayed, — 
 but to press on at once to the enemy's guns. But the 
 enemy's resistance was so determined, and the fire so 
 hot, that but little impression was made even by this 
 advance. At this moment, too, our advancing column 
 was charged by the enemy's cavalry. Although this 
 
60 LORD LAKE. 
 
 charge was repulsed, yet the position was altogether so 
 critical, that orders were sent to our cavalry to make a 
 counter attack. As they were forming up for this pur- 
 pose,* the horse of the Commander-in-Chief was shot 
 under him ; and his son,t whilst in the act of tendering 
 to him his own, was shot by his side and severely 
 wounded. This affecting incident was not lost upon the 
 troops ; it appeared to inspire them with enthusiasm. 
 Just at that moment the order to charge sounded, whilst 
 seventy pieces of canon opened on our line. The 
 advance of our men, however, was irresistible ; again 
 they drove back the gunners ; and the Commander-in- 
 chief, this time, having infantry with him, brought 
 them up at the right moment, and secured the greater 
 part of the guns. Both arms then pressed forward. 
 The enemy however, fought with the most determined 
 courage, and did not quit the field until they had been 
 driven from every position, and had lost every gun. 
 
 This was the most desperate and well fought battle 
 in which our force had yet been engaged. " From the 
 commencement of the conflict early in the morning," 
 says the historian J of that period, " to the close of the 
 general action in the evening, the enemy discovered a 
 firmness of resolution and contempt of death which 
 could not fail to command the admiration of their 
 
 * At this point of the action a matchlockman pointed his matchlock 
 close to the side of the general ; but just as the piece was discharged, 
 the Commander-in-Chief turned involuntarily, and the contents passed 
 under his arm, burning only his coat. — Ttiorn. 
 
 t This son, the Honourable G. A. F. Lake, became afterwards 
 Lieutenant-Colonel of the 29th Foot. He was killed at the battle of 
 Eoleia, on tlie 17th August, 1808, just when, at the head of his regi- 
 ment, he had forced the pass, the possession of which decided the 
 victory. 
 
 X Major Thorn. 
 
LOED LAKE. 61 
 
 opponents." Let it never be forgotten that those who 
 constituted that enemy were the warlike sons of Hin- 
 dostan. Here they were nnaided by the presence of 
 European officers, though trained in a European school ; 
 they were left solely to their own resources ; and though 
 superidr in numbers, the superiority was by no means 
 strongly marked. Yet here they fought with a gallantry, 
 a resolution, an energy, that would have done honour 
 to any troops in the world. 
 
 In this obstinately contested battle, it has been very 
 generally* conceded that the credit of the victory was 
 due not less to the unsurpassed valour of our troops 
 than to the character, the presence of mind, and the 
 personal exertions of the general himself. His influence 
 with the soldiers, their confidence in his generalship 
 and resources, his coolness in danger, the reliance he 
 had in himself, were never more conspicuous than on 
 
 * The following observations on this battle are from the pen of 
 Marquess Wellesley : — " The victory, however, must be principally attri- 
 buted to the admirable skill, judgment, heroic valom-, and activity, of 
 the Commander-in-Chief, General Lake, whose magnanimous example, 
 together with the recollection of his achievements at Coel, x\llygurh, 
 Delhi, and Agra, inspired general confidence and emulation. In the 
 mornhig General Lake led the charge of the cavalry, and, in the after- 
 noon, conducted in person, at the head of the 76th regiment, all the 
 different attacks on the enemy's line ; and on their reserve, posted in 
 and near the village of Mohaulpore. On this day two horses were 
 killed under the Commander-in-Chief. The shot sliowered around him 
 in every direction. In the midst of the danger and slaughter which 
 surrounded him, he displayed not only the most resolute fortitude 
 and ardent valour, but the utmost degree of professional ability and 
 knowledge, avaihng himself, with admirable promptitude, of every 
 advantage presented by the enemy, and frustrating every effort of the 
 enemy's obstinacy and boldness. His masterly plans of attack during 
 the action were carried into instantaneous execution by his unrivalled 
 personal activity ; and he appeared, with matchless courage and alacrity, 
 in front of every principal charge, which he had planned with eminent 
 judgment and skill." 
 
62 LORD LAKE. 
 
 this occasion. The imperturbable coolness with which, 
 after repulsing the enemy's cavalry, he halted his own 
 columns to allow the dragoons to come up to make a 
 way for the infantry, has never been surpassed on any 
 field ; whilst the touching incident by which it was 
 marked gave to it a romantic colouring by which its 
 effect on the troops was greatly heightened. 
 
 The victory was the most important of the war. The 
 last remnant of the disciplined battalions of Scindia, 
 raised with so much care by De Boigne, were in this 
 action destroyed; whilst seventy guns and numerous 
 stores of all sorts fell into our hands. Our loss was in 
 proportion, amounting to 823 killed and wounded, or 
 nearly one man out of every five engaged. The loss in 
 the 76th regiment was especially great ; and the general, 
 as he rode through their ranks after the battle, could not 
 refrain from dropping a tear at the terrible reduction in 
 their numbers. 
 
 On the 8th November the force left Laswarrie, and 
 on the 14th treaties were concluded with the Kajah 
 of Ulwar, as well as with the Kajas of Jyepore and 
 Joudhpore, the object being the exclusion of the Mah- 
 ratta power from their territories. A treaty was con- 
 cluded about the same time with Begum Sumroo ; and 
 her troops, 2000 strong, joined our army in December, 
 after a long and difficult march from the Dekkan. The 
 force then proceeded to Canoare,^where the Com- 
 mander-in-chief had an interview with Kunjeet Singh, 
 Eajah of Bhurtpore, — and thence by slow marches to 
 Biana, opposite the pass leading into the territories of 
 the Kajah of Jyepore, where it remained halted from the 
 27th December, 1803, to the 9th February following. 
 
 Meanwhile, whilst these events were progressing in 
 
LORD LAKE. ' 6S 
 
 the north-west, English arms had been no less successful 
 in the south. At Assaye, on the 24th September, and 
 at Argaum, on the 28th November, the combined armies 
 of Scindia and the Kaja of Berar had been signally 
 defeated. Such, indeed, was the consternation produced 
 by these defeats that, on the 7th December, the Eaja 
 of Berar withdrew from the confederacy ; and, on the 
 30th, Scindia, deserted by him, and abandoned before 
 the outset of hostilities by Holkar, signed a treaty of 
 peace * with General Wellesley. 
 
 This treaty put a stop to the further operations of 
 General Lake against Scindia. We have seen, in detail, 
 how completely successful he had been, how utterly he 
 had destroyed the ambitious projects formed by that 
 chieftain. With a force, at no time exceeding 5000 foot, 
 2500 horse, and a small proportion of artillery, he had, 
 between the 29th of August and the 1st November, — a 
 short period of little more than two months, — destroyed 
 the thirty-one battalions which the French adventurers 
 had disciplined with so much care for the service of 
 Scindia ; he had stormed the fort of Allygurh, captured 
 Agra, and entered as a conqueror the imperial city of 
 Delhi ; he had taken four hundred and twenty-six 
 pieces of cannon, — and, more than all, he had proved 
 the soundness of the theory, that a British general, pos- 
 sessing the confidence of his troops, may dare almost 
 anything in India. Thus Lake, at Allygurh, stormed 
 a fortress which was apparently as proof against the 
 chances of a coup-de-main as any fortress in the world ; 
 at Delhi, finding the position of the enemy so strong 
 that a direct attack upon him must be attended with 
 - enormous loss, he tried an experiment, which can only 
 
 * The treaty of Surjee Aijengamn. 
 
64 LOED LAKE. 
 
 be successful when troops have confidence in their com- 
 mander, and their commander in the troops, — that of 
 enticing him from his intrenchments by a feigned 
 defeat. At Agra again, deeming the possession of that 
 fortress of the last importance to the success of his ope- 
 rations, he deliberately sat down before it, although, in 
 addition to the garrison within its walls, a second hostile 
 force had possession of the city, and a third was march- 
 ing on his rear. Beating one force, frightening another 
 into quiescence by his fearless attitude, and compelling 
 the fort to surrender, he dashed then hastily in pursuit 
 of the last remnant of the enemy, making for the hilly 
 country of Mewat. These he encountered and brought 
 to bay only eight miles from their destination ; then, 
 with his cavalry alone, keeping them in position till his 
 infantry could come up, he launched upon them his 
 well-tried veterans, and after a conflict which, in the 
 desperate valour evinced by both sides, has never been 
 surpassed, destroyed or forced into surrender the entire 
 force. What a career! Wonderful not less in the 
 magnitude of the events, than in the rapidity, in the 
 completeness, with which they were executed, — a rapidity 
 and a completeness for the solution of which we must 
 look to the quick, decided, energetic character of General 
 Lake. 
 
 It was not considered improper or detrimental to 
 military discipline in those days for the oflScers of the 
 army to express publicly their sense of the high qualities 
 of the Commander-in-Chief, even during his tenm^e of 
 office. During the campaign we have described General 
 Lake had enjoyed very many opportunities of displaying 
 other qualities besides those of a daring and successful 
 general. His conciliatory and genial manners, his care 
 
LORD LAKE. 65 
 
 of the troops, and his attention to the comfort alike of 
 officers and soldiers, had, not less than his lofty con- 
 tempt of deatli, the dashing manner in which he had led 
 his troops into action, his imperturbable coolness under 
 fire, won for him the regard of all ranks. He had shown 
 himself essentially a fair man. In his treatment of the 
 officers in the immediate service of the King, and those in 
 the employ of the East India Company, he had made no 
 distinction. Those only had obtained his patronage who 
 had merited it by their character and their actions. At 
 the close of this campaign, therefore, and when it seemed, 
 for a moment, as though it only remained to guard the 
 conquests that had been won, the officers of both services 
 belonging to the army he commanded determined to 
 present to General Lake a testimonial of their attach- 
 ment and esteem. The sum of four thousand pounds 
 having been subscribed, a committee was appointed to 
 offer to the Commander-in-Chief a service of plate of 
 that value,* with an appropriate letter. This was ac- 
 cordingly done.t General Lake replied the same 
 
 * The inhabitants of Calcutta also presented General Lake with a 
 sword of the value of 1500?., and one to General Wellesley, valued at 
 lOOOZ. It was to commemorate these two campaigns, that the marble 
 statue of Marquess Wellesley, now in Government House, was subscribed 
 for. 
 
 t The following is the text of the letters referred to, dated 21st 
 December, 1803 : — " We, the officers of the British Indian army, who 
 have had the honour of serving under your Excellency's personal 
 command, during the present campaign, impressed with sentiments of 
 high respect towards your Excellency, and admiration of those exalted 
 talents by which we have been led to a series of brilliant victories, con- 
 firming the superiority of British arms in this remote quarter of the 
 globe, and yielding to us a soldier's best reward, the approbation of 
 Government, beg leave to request your Excellency's acceptance of a 
 service of plate of the value of four thousand pounds, in testimony 
 of our attachment and esteem. 
 
 " Zealously devoted to the service of our King, our country, and the 
 
 F 
 
66 LORD LAKE. 
 
 day, accepting the testimonial as coming from " officers 
 of an army whose meritorious services throughout this 
 campaign must ever entitle them to the highest respect 
 and honour." Although the practice of giving and 
 receiving testimonials whilst the recipient is in active 
 service would not be tolerated in the present day, it is 
 impossible not to respect the genuine feeling which 
 prompted the officers of that gallant force, thus at the 
 close of the campaign, to dedicate a large proportion of 
 their prize money to do honour to the general, to whose 
 daring leadership and never-failing self-reliance they 
 felt so greatly indebted for the success they had achieved. 
 Before proceeding to describe the coarse of action 
 which, after a very brief interval of rest, forced the 
 British general into warlike measures against another 
 
 Government under which we have the honour to serve, it only remains 
 for us to express our sincere and ardent hope, that we may long enjoy 
 the advantage of being placed under your Excellency's guidance and 
 command ; and that, wherever the interests of the State may require our 
 services, inspired by your animating example, and cherished by your 
 applause, we may continue to follow you to victory and renown." 
 
 General Lake replied thus : — *' I receive with sentiments of the most 
 hvely gratitude the valuable testimony of the esteem and attachment of 
 tlie army with which they have honoured me. 
 
 " This mark of regard is peculiarly flattering from the officers of an 
 army whose meritorious services throughout this campaign must ever 
 entitle them to the highest respect and honour. 
 
 " In the hour of severe trial, next to that Providence who protects us, 
 I have trusted to the invincible firmness, steady support, and unex- 
 ampled gallantry of my army ; and the distinguished success which has, 
 in every instance, crowned our exertions, has fully justified my entire 
 confidence and firm reliance. 
 
 " I shall with pride and pleasure reflect upon those situations in 
 which we have together maintained the honour of our King and the 
 glory of our country. 
 
 " The possession of this valuable testimony of your attachment will 
 serve to awaken those sentiments of esteem, gratitude, and affection, 
 which are already too deeply imprinted on my mind ever to be 
 forgotten." 
 
LORD LAKE. 67 
 
 Mahratta power, it may be convenient to refer very 
 briefly to the operations by which, at the time of the 
 campaign against Scindia, Bundelkund and the fortress 
 of Gwalior were brought under subjection to British 
 arms. The Peshwa had, in 1802, escaped from the state 
 of vassalage in which he had been held by Scindia and 
 Holkar, by throwing himself, as we have intimated, 
 under the protection of the British. By the treaty made 
 on that occasion,* certain territories south of the Taptee, 
 and between the Taptee and the Nerbudda, had been 
 ceded by the Peshwa to liis protectors. But it was 
 afterwards agreed that in lieu of a portion of this ceded 
 territory, the greater part of the province of Bundel- 
 kund, over which the Peshwa held a nominal sorve- 
 reignty, but which lay at an inconvenient distance from 
 Poena, should be made over to the British. It was to 
 carry out this arrangement that on the 6th September, 
 1803, a detachment of British troops under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Powell crossed the Jumna, and, on the 14th, 
 joined the native troops of Himmut Bahadoor, the chief 
 representative of tlie Peshwa's authority in the provinces 
 on the borders of Bundelkund. The cession of that ter- 
 ritory was, however, disputed by another chieftain, Shum- 
 sheer Bahadoor, and it w^as not until Colonel Powell and 
 his native allies had bombarded Calpee into surrender t 
 that Shumsheer realised the folly of further resistance. 
 He continued, however, to negotiate until the offer of 
 an annual pension of four lakhs to him and his family 
 induced him to submit entirely to the arrangem-ents 
 made with the Peshwa. About the same time the 
 
 * Treaty of Bassein, dated 31st December, 1802. 
 t 4th December, 1803. 
 
 f2 
 
68 LORD LAKE. 
 
 Siibadar of Jhansie entered into an alliance, offensive 
 and defensive, with the English. 
 
 There was one other chieftain upon whom the progress 
 of Biitish arms in Bundelkund had an important effect. 
 This was Ambajee Inglia, the Mahratta chieftain, who, 
 it will be recollected, had been selected by Scindia to 
 supplant the Frenchman Perron, in the governnient of 
 his dominions in the north-west, just previous to the 
 outbreak of hostilities. The English had not yet come 
 to an arrangement with Shurasheer Bahadoor when Am 
 bajee, noting their progress in Bundelkund, offered to 
 transfer his allegiance from 8cindia, in lieu of a guarantee 
 of the more important of his possessions. So long, how- 
 ever, as Shumsheer remained unsubdued, Ambajee care- 
 fully avoided entering into any positive engagement; 
 but when the fortunes of that chieftain had sunk to 
 their lowest ebb, Ambajee, bent on securing himself, 
 entered into conditions with the Commander-in-Chief, 
 whereby he abandoned all his territory north of Grwalior, 
 and that fortress itself, to the British, on condition of 
 being assured independent possession of the remainder.* 
 
 But although he had agreed to these terms, Ambajee 
 sent private instructions to the commandant of the 
 fortress to refuse to surrender it. Standing on the sum- 
 mit of a very steep hill, about a mile and a half in 
 length, with a width of 800 yards in its broadest part, 
 well-fortified, abundantly supplied with stores, and re- 
 garded by tlie natives as impregnable, Gwalior, he pro- 
 bably thought, would successfully defy the small force 
 of native troops that had been detached by the Com- 
 
 * There were some trifling exceptions for which, however, Amhnjee 
 was to receive indemnification. 
 
LORD LAKE. ' 69 
 
 mander-in-Chief under the orders of Colonel White to 
 take possession of it. 
 
 But he had not sufficiently considered the character 
 of the English commander. No sooner did General 
 Lake hear of the unexpected resistance than he detached 
 reinforcements of Europeans to Colonel White, and 
 gave him authority to call up the contingent employed 
 in Bundelkund. Colonel White, thus strengthened, 
 opened fire on the fortress, effected a practicable breach 
 on the 4th February, and, on the 5tli, accepted the 
 offer of the garrison to surrender on the condition that 
 the value of certain stores were made over to them. 
 
 The capture of Gwalior and of some intermediate 
 forts of secondary impoi-tance completed the line of 
 defence against the Mahrattas, and assured the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief against the chances of an invasion of 
 the country lying to the north or north-east of the line 
 he had obtained. The possession of a great part of 
 Bundelkund secured the country between Mirzapore 
 and Midnapore. No enemy could even threaten that 
 line without exposing his left flank in such a manner 
 as to court destruction. Calpee on the right, and Etawah 
 on the left, of the Jumna, secured the country between 
 Allahabad and Agra, whilst the possession of Gwalior 
 and Dutteeah,* and the alliance with Jhansie, rendered 
 any direct attack from the south-west impossible. Never 
 had British India occupied a position at once so safe and 
 so commanding. 
 
 We must now turn for a brief interval to those pro- 
 ceedings of the Mahratta powers, especially of Holkar, 
 which led to the renewal of hostihties. By the treaty t 
 
 * One of the forts of secondary importance referred to. 
 t The treaty of Suijee Arjengaum, 30th December, 1803. 
 
70 LORD LAKE. 
 
 concluded with Dowlut Kao Scindia, that prince had 
 ceded to the British all his positions in the provinces of 
 the north-west, and all the territories he had held south 
 of the Ajunta hills, with the exception of a few here- 
 ditary villages ; and he had besides resigned his claims 
 on his former feudatory rajahs, with whom the British 
 Government had made treaties. Subsequently to the 
 signing of that treaty, alarmed at some hostile demon- 
 strations made by Jeswunt Eao Holkar, Scindia had 
 agreed to become a p^rty to the defensive alliance sub- 
 sisting between the British Government, the Peshw^a, 
 and the Nizam, on condition that the British should 
 maintain a subsidiary force of six battalions, to be paid 
 for out of the revenues of the ceded territories, for his 
 defence. This arrangement was ratified in a fresh treaty 
 signed on the 27th February, 1804, and in this it was 
 agi-eed that the six battalions should be stationed near 
 Scindia's boundary but within British territory.* 
 
 It has already been stated that when the movements 
 of Scindia, in the early part of 1803, left to Marquess 
 Wellesley no alternative between an ignominious admis- 
 sion of Mahratta supremacy and war, that chieftain had 
 entered into an offensive alliance with the Bajah of 
 Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, but that after hostilities 
 had been actually entered upon Jeswunt Rao had held 
 aloof and had watched with complaisance the overthrow 
 of his two confederates. This conduct on the part of 
 Jeswunt Rao is susceptible of easy explanation. Himself 
 an illegitimate son, having seen one legitimate brother, 
 Mulhar Rao, massacred by Scindia, and the other, 
 Kashee Rao, a man of weak intellect, kept a prisoner 
 by that prince, and used as a puppet by whose means 
 
 * AitcMson. 
 
LORD LAKE. 71 
 
 his ancestral territories might be annexed, Jeswunt Eao 
 had early perceived that his sole chance of safety and 
 independence rested on the use he might make of the 
 talents and energies with which had been gifted. These 
 were neither few nor inconsiderable. High-spirited, of 
 daring courage, a splendid horseman, the leader in every 
 charge, a Mahratta of Mahrattas, Jeswunt Kao was 
 designed by nature to be a leader of men, a king amongst 
 nobles. Immediately after the murder of his brother, 
 therefore, he entered upon the one course which appeared 
 to present to him at once a chance of vengeance and a 
 prospect of sovereignty. Escaping the fury of his enemy, 
 he rallied round him the adherents of the house of 
 Holkar, and called upon them to acknowledge him as 
 their chief. Many responded to the call, and he soon 
 found himself at the head of a force which, if not equal 
 to the large armies of Scindia, was still respectable even 
 in numbers. The comparative deficiency in numbers, 
 too, was more than compensated for by the vigour, the 
 energy, and the skill of its leader. In the first encounter 
 between the two rivals all the advantages rested with 
 Holkar. Encouraged by this, he determined to contest 
 with Dowlut Eao the supremacy in the Mahratta con- 
 federacy — a post which, long held by the Peshwa, had 
 now come, by the gradual decline of the power of that 
 potentate, to be regarded as the property of the chieftain 
 who should exercise the greatest amount of influence at 
 Poena. Pursuing this course Jeswunt Eao marched at 
 once upon that city, defeated Scindia in a bloody battle 
 near it on the 29th October, 1802, and entered Poona * 
 a few days later. 
 
 * Sir John Malcolm relates that in this battle, Jeswunt Kao *' led the 
 charge on Scindia's guns, and being wounded, and pulled from his 
 
72 LOED LAKE. 
 
 It is unnecessary that we should refer at any length 
 to the course adopted by Marquess Wellesley at this 
 conjuncture. It was a course remarkable for the com- 
 bined daring and wisdom by which all the public acts 
 of that great statesman were characterised. Without 
 irritating Holkar into war, he not only restored the 
 Peshwa to his capital, but brought him, as well as the 
 Guikwar, into a state of dependence on the British. By 
 a masterly political stroke, in fact, supported by the 
 equally masterly military movement of his brother. 
 General Wellesley, the great Marquess cast off from 
 the Peshwa's neck the iron yoke which Scindia, Holkar, 
 and the Bhonsla, had each, as the power of each pre- 
 dominated, fixed upon him ; deprived those three powers 
 of the prestige attaching to intimate alliance with the 
 possessor of Poena, and then presented himself ready to 
 meet them, isolated as they were, on the field he had 
 chosen. 
 
 The first result of this policy we have already shown. 
 Scindia and the Bhonsla, shorn of a great portion of 
 their territories and a great portion of their power, had 
 been completely humiliated. But Holkar had been 
 untouched. It is probable, that having tested his 
 superiority over Scindia at Poena, he was not sorry to 
 see him weakened by the British, feeling that he would 
 thus become even an easier prey to his own arms. He 
 himself believed more in sweeping charges of Mahratta 
 cavalry than in the slower attacks of disciplined infantry. 
 But he showed by his subsequent acts that he felt at 
 this period master of the situation, and that he was 
 
 horse by an artillery soldier of great strength, he wrestled with his 
 enemy on foot, until one of his attendants came to his aid, and, after 
 slaying his antagonist, re-mounted him." 
 
LORD LAKE. 73 
 
 waiting only an indication of the result of the war to 
 declare himself. 
 
 He was, however, little prepared for the rapid move- 
 ments of the two English generals. Coel, Dellii, Agra, 
 and Laswarrie on the one side, and Assaye and Argaum 
 on the other, all fought within a period of little more 
 than two months, took him somewhat by surprise, and 
 for a moment he appeared undecided as to his action. 
 Even after peace had been signed with Scindia and the 
 Bhonsla at Surjee Arjengaum, he long hesitated as to 
 whether he should plunder the former, weakened by his 
 losses, or, cementing an alliance with him, turn his arms 
 against the British. 
 
 For a moment he seemed inclined to the former 
 course, and it was from a real apprehension of his aggres- 
 sions that Scindia made that application for the British 
 contingent, to which reference has been made. But 
 soon other counsels prevailed. Before proceeding against 
 Scindia he felt that he must either have a guarantee for 
 his own territories from the British, or he must show 
 himself their master. He tried for both ends about the 
 same time. Whilst the envoy whom he sent to Scindia 
 had instructions to induce that prince to enter into an 
 alliance for the destruction of the British, the agents he 
 accredited to these latter were commissioned to make 
 demands,* which, if acquiesced in, would have left him 
 free to rebuild the Mahratta power on a basis more 
 powerful than before. 
 
 But in both these attempts he over-reached himself. 
 
 * These were, — (1) leave to collect chout according to the custom of 
 his ancestors, to obtain possession of Etawah and other teiTitories in the 
 Doab, Bundelkund, and Hurriana, formerly possessed by his ancestors ; 
 the guarantee of the country he then possessed ; and a treaty similar to 
 that concluded with Scindia. — Thorn's War in India. 
 
74 LOED LAKE. 
 
 Scindia, smarting under the blows, the severity of which 
 he attributed mainly to the treachery of Holkar, in- 
 formed the British Government of the overtures thus 
 made to him, although, to maintain Jeswunt Eao in his 
 delusion, he sent a return embassy to his camp, charged 
 with professions of devotion. The letters* which, at 
 the same time, Holkar despatched by the hands of his 
 agents to the British generals, breathed a spirit so 
 haughty, and a confidence in his own power so resolute, 
 whilst, at the same time, his demands were so pre- 
 posterous, that little doubt was left on the minds of either 
 the Governor-General or the Commander-in-Chief that 
 he was really bent on war. 
 
 We left General Lake encamped at Biana, opposite 
 the pass leading into the dominions of the Rajah of 
 Jyepore. He had taken up this position because, ever 
 since the conclusion of the war with Scindia> the move- 
 ments of Holkar had indicated an intention to make an 
 incursion into those territories. Hence, before the 
 receipt of the communications above referred to, he 
 despatched a letter to Holkar warning him of the con- 
 sequences of making war on any ally of the British 
 nation, and advising him to remain within his own 
 frontier. But Holkar cared little for such advice. In- 
 deed, his first act after the receipt of this letter showed 
 but too clearly that he had resolved to break altogether 
 with the English. He at once sent for an English 
 adventurer in his service, named Vickers, informed him 
 
 * In his letter to General Wellesley, he intimated that a war with 
 him would not be without its perils, " that countries of many hundred 
 miles should be overrun and plundered. General Lake shall not have 
 leisure to breathe for a moment ; and calamities shall fall on thousands 
 of human beings by the attacks of my army which overwhelm like the 
 waves of the sea." 
 
LOED LAKE. 75 
 
 of his resolution to fight, and asked him as to his 
 willingness to join in a campaign against his own coun- 
 trymen. On receiving from Vickers a positive refusal, 
 he called up two others, Tod and Kyan, and put the 
 same question to them. They also having declined, 
 the three were simultaneously beheaded.* The heads 
 w^ere then fixed on lances in front of Jeswunt Kao's 
 camp, and a public crier proclaimed that such would be 
 the fate of every European who should fall into the 
 hands of Holkar. 
 
 This barbarous murder, — the discovery about the 
 same time of a correspondence with the Eohillas and 
 Sikhs, having for its object a combination against us, — 
 and the threatening position assumed by the forces of 
 Holkar against Jyepore, — determined General Lake to 
 break up from Biana, and advance into that territory. 
 This resolution he carried out on the 9th February, 
 after having sent 'back his heavy guns to Agra. He 
 marched thence leisurely to Hindown, and annoyed 
 only by the marauding propensities of the Mewatties, 
 who lost no opportunity of plundering the baggage-carts 
 and murdering all stragglers who fell in their way,t 
 arrived there on the 20th. Here he received reinforce- 
 ments, consisting of the two flank companies of the 
 22nd Eegiment, the flank companies of the 1st Euro- 
 peans, and five companies of the 16th Native Infantry. 
 Here, too, negotiations were re-opened with Jeswunt 
 
 * The excuse privately alleged by Holkar was that he had detected 
 these men in correspondence with the British general, and under Tod's 
 head, he affixed a letter which, he pretended, that officer had received 
 from General Lake. Vickers was one of his best officers, and had con- 
 tributed greatly to the defeat of Scindia at Poena. 
 
 t Amongst these was an officer of the 15th Native Infantry, Lieu- 
 tenant Tyson, murdered not far from the outposts. 
 
76 LORD LAKE. 
 
 Rao. No progress, however, having been made tend- 
 ing to a peaceful result, the army moved on the 8th 
 March from Hindown to Eamgurh. It was here that 
 the British Commander-in-Chief received the haughty 
 and defiant letters to which we have already alluded. 
 The agents, who were the bearers of these messages, 
 showed likewise, by their arrogant language, a spirit not 
 less haughty and self-confident. They openly avowed 
 the connection of their master with the Rohillas and the 
 Kajah of Bhurtpore ; they stated that a war with Holkar 
 could never be attended with any profit to his opponents, 
 since he was a marauder by profession, and disposed of 
 150,000 cavalry, at whose head he could inflict terrible 
 injury on our territories, whilst defeat in one place 
 would not prevent his re-appearance in another. They 
 also added that Scindia was with them, and that a 
 powerful French army had already landed on the coast, 
 and was marching to their aid. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief contented himself with the 
 dismissal of these envoys from the camp, with advice to 
 Holkar to be more moderate in his demands, and con- 
 tinued his advance. Arriving on the 23rd at Balla- 
 heera, he received a copy of the letter addressed by 
 Jeswunt Rao to General Wellesley.* No further doubt 
 remained on his mind as to the intentions of that chief- 
 tain, and learning a few days later that he had actually 
 plundered the territories of the Jyepore Rajah, he applied 
 for and obtained the orders of the Government to act 
 against him as an enemy. 
 
 On the 16th April, Marquess Wellesley issued instruc- 
 tions to the officers commanding in the Dekkan to 
 
 ♦ Vide note to page 74. 
 
LORD LAKE. 7y 
 
 eo-operate with the movement against Holkar, which 
 the Commander-in-Chief had been instructed to make 
 from the side of Hindostan. General Lake, meanwhile, 
 had marched from Ballaheera, and, on the 17th of 
 April, reached Dowsa, about fifty miles from Jyepore. 
 From this place he resolved to detach three native 
 regiments under the command of Colonel Monson to 
 protect that city, and to observe the movements of 
 Jeswunt Eao. 
 
 Colonel Monson was a very gallant soldier. He had 
 particularly distinguished himself at the capture of 
 xlllygurh, where he led the storming party, and received 
 a severe wound. This wound had not only caused him 
 much suffering, but it had prevented him from taking 
 part in the subsequent actions of the campaign. It 
 was, therefore, to compensate him for his enforced 
 absence from the fields of Delhi and Laswarrie, and to 
 give him a second opportunity of distinction, that the 
 Commander-in-Chief entrusted to him the command of 
 the detachment destined to bear the first brunt of the 
 encounter with Jeswunt Eao. 
 
 The force commanded by Colonel Monson consisted 
 of both battalions of the 12th Native Infantry, the 2nd 
 battalion 2nd Native Infantry, a detachment of European 
 artillery, and some native cavalry levies commanded by 
 Lieutenant Lucan and the Baraitch Nawab, with a 
 Mahratta contingent under Bapoojee Scindia, a relation 
 of Dowlut Eao. Pushing on towards Jyepore, Colonel 
 Monson encamped near the city on the 21st, and found 
 Holkar 's army occupying a threatening position to the 
 south of it. On the morning of the 23rd, however, 
 Holkar, without making any demonstration against the 
 city or the British force, broke up from his encamp- 
 
78 LORD LAKE. 
 
 ment and marclied to the south. But as it did not 
 appear to be his intention to evacuate the country north 
 of the Chumbul, the Commander-in-Chief directed 
 Colonel Monson to continue his advance, he himself fol- 
 lowing with the bulk of the army. As the British army 
 approached, Holkar still continued to retreat, but it was 
 not apparently until Kampoora, a strong fort in the dis- 
 trict of Tonk, had been gallantly stormed by Colonel Don, 
 at the head of a force * detached from the main army, 
 that he abandoned all hopes of maintaining himself on 
 the northern bank of the Chumbul. On the fall of that 
 place he retreated precipitately to the south. 
 
 Satisfied with the disappearance of the enemy to the 
 southward, and anxious to recruit the European portion 
 of his army, then suffering extremely from the heat, 
 General Lake resolved to postpone any serious opera- 
 tions until after the rainy season. He accordingly rein- 
 forced Colonel Monson with two native battalions under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Don, thus raising his numbers to 
 about 4000 men, and instructed him to cover the Jye- 
 pore country, whilst he should move with the main 
 body upon Agra and Cawnpore. There was not the 
 smallest idea that Colonel Monson's force would be 
 attacked. Hitherto Holkar had shown but one dis- 
 position, — to flee, — and it was believed that the move- 
 ment ordered by General Wellesley, and entrusted to 
 Colonel Murray, to march from Guzerat upon Indore, 
 would effectually prevent Holkar from attempting to 
 recover ground in the north. 
 
 To open communications with this force, Colonel 
 
 * This force consisted of five companies of the 8th Native Infantry, 
 tlie ilank companies of the 2nd battalion 21st Native Infantry, the 
 3rd reejiment Native Cavalry, and some guns. 
 
LORD LAKE. 79 
 
 Monson, after the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, 
 moved* on from Kotah, where it was previously en- 
 camped, through the Mokundra Pass to Sonara. Having 
 detached hence one regiment to take possession of the 
 small but strong fort of Hinglaizghur, he marched on, 
 notwithstanding bad roads and very rainy weather, to 
 the village of Peeplah. Here he received information 
 that Holkar had suddenly retraced his steps, and was 
 encamped with a strong force of all arms on the river 
 Chumbul, some five-and-twenty miles distant, covering 
 the town of Kampoora,t and guarding the only ford 
 across the river by which it could be approached. 
 . Colonel Monson had with him but three days' pro- 
 visions, and he had experienced the greatest difficulty 
 in obtaining supplies from the people of the country. 
 He might indeed expect, could he reach Kampoora, to 
 victual his camp, but between him and that place lay 
 the river Chumbul and the numerous army of Holkar. 
 To stay at Peeplah with but three days' supplies was 
 impossible. To retreat to Hinglaizghur or to the 
 Mokundra Pass before an enemy who had always liitherto 
 fled before him, was not to be thought of. Kumours, 
 too, reached him that the movement of Holkar indi- 
 cated great infirmity of purpose, inasmuch as he had 
 re-crossed the river, and appeared half-inclined once 
 more to retreat. Nothing seemed so likely, in the 
 judgment of Colonel Monson, to compel him to such a 
 movement, as a daring and resolute advance. Notwith- 
 standing, then, the heavy rain that fell all that night, 
 
 * This movement was made by Colonel Monson on his own authority, 
 and was rather opposed to the general instructions he received from 
 General Lake. The Commander-in-Chief, in fact, blamed him for having 
 made it. 
 
 t Not the fort Eampoora previously referred to. 
 
80 LORD LAKE. 
 
 Colonel Monson resolved to act as a soldier bred in the 
 school of Lake, and to move forward. 
 
 Onward, then, he marched, on the 7th July, to Gooree, 
 within six or eight miles of the enemy. But he had 
 not been long on this encamping ground when intelli- 
 gence reached him of a nature to shake his resolution. 
 First he learned that Holkar had crossed the Chumbul, 
 then that he had re-crossed ; but finally, at nine o'clock 
 in the evening, it was affirmed that he had passed the 
 river with his whole army, and was himself sitting on 
 the left bank, with two lakhs of rupees before him, from 
 which he was distributing largesses to his army. This 
 at least seemed to indicate action. Orders were there- 
 fore issued to the troops to remain under arms all night, 
 ready for any contingency that might occur. 
 
 But if Colonel Monson, in his advance from Peeplah 
 to Gooree had been mindful of the example of his great 
 leader, now, when difficulties increased upon him, he 
 showed that he did not possess that deliberate coolness, 
 that imperturbable presence of mind under all circum- 
 stances, which constituted one of the secrets of the success 
 of General Lake. Instead of taking counsel only from 
 his own brave heart, and making that forward move- 
 ment which, in all probability, would have induced 
 Holkar to retreat without an action, he took the advice 
 tendered to him by Bapoojee Scindia, who was in secret 
 correspondence with Jeswunt Kao, and resolved to 
 retreat. He was confirmed in this view by a rumour 
 which reached him about the same time, and which 
 was probably invented by the enemy, that Colonel 
 Murray had found the difficulties to Ins advance too 
 great to be surmounted, and had resolved to fall back 
 on the river Mhve. In vain did his best officers entreat 
 
LORD LAKE. 81 
 
 him to advance. In vain did Lieutenant Lucan beg 
 him, on his knees, to attack Holkar, offering himself to 
 encounter that chief with his own few levies. Colonel 
 Monson had made up his mind. Telling Lieutenant 
 Lucan that he, if he chose, might stay to encounter the 
 whole Mahratta army, he gave orders for a retrograde 
 movement. Holding his ground only during the night, 
 he despatched at four o'clock in the morning his bag- 
 gage and camp equipage in the direction of Sonara, 
 following at 9 a.m. with the infantry and guns, leaving 
 the cavalry under Lucan to cover the retreat. His 
 hope was to reach the Mokundra Pass before the enemy 
 could overtake him. Once there, he calculated on 
 being able to obtain supplies from his rear, and to 
 defend the pass against all the force that Holkar could 
 bring against it. 
 
 We have been careful to detail the movements of 
 Colonel Monson up to the moment when he decided 
 upon this retrograde movement in front of a barbarian 
 enemy, because it affords an illustration of the great 
 difference between the action of a master and that of a 
 pupil, who, though trained in that master's school, lacks 
 the qualities which, in him, makes boldness almost 
 synonymous witn safety. The world's history abounds 
 with such instances. The pupils and successors of that 
 Frederick, who for seven years had made head against 
 combined Europe, were crushed in a single campaign 
 by only one of the powers which, when united with 
 others, he had loQg baffled. The troops were the same, 
 the principles of warfare he adopted were well known, 
 the difference was simply that he possessed the power 
 of knowing how to apply those principles, and they did 
 not. It was the difference of the organization of one 
 
 G 
 
82 LORD LAKE. 
 
 man's brain. So it was with Monson and Lake. Trained 
 in the school of the latter, having seen what wonderful 
 successes had attended him from merely advancing, 
 Monson resolved to follow out that principle himself. 
 When, therefore, he heard that the enemy were but 
 twenty miles distant from him on the Chumbul, he 
 advanced to within eight. Then, according to his cal- 
 culations, the enemy ought to have retreated. But as 
 they did not retreat, as they even showed a disposition 
 to advance, Monson, possessing no creative power of his 
 own, no innate evidence to force upon himself convic- 
 tion, being but a copier without the talent to originate, 
 became helpless as a babe. He had pursued Lake's 
 system up to a certain point, then dropped it at the 
 very moment when not to pursue it to the end was to 
 court failure and destruction. If Lake had advanced 
 so far he would have advanced further. He would, in 
 such a difficulty, — and, no doubt, it was a great difficulty, 
 — have made up for the superior numbers of the enemy 
 by the superior morale which the act of advancing would 
 have given to his troops. His forward movement 
 would have inspired confidence in his own men, have 
 diminished it in the soldiers of Holkar, already distrust- 
 ful of themselves, and half-demoralised by repeated 
 retreats. The difference between the two men was 
 simply this, that the greater the danger, the more cool, 
 the more self-possessed, the more daring, was General 
 Lake ; Colonel Monson, on the contrary, though pos- 
 sessing equal courage, could not see that in war, as in 
 most other contingencies, when circumstances are more 
 than usually threatening, boldness is prudence. 
 
 Into the full details of the unfortunate retreat it is 
 unnecessary that we should enter. The outline we give 
 
LORD LAKE. 83 
 
 will be sufficient to show the infinitely greater dangers 
 likely to be encountered by the general who retreats 
 from, than by him who advances to attack, a barbarian 
 enemy. The infantry had not left their ground three 
 hours, before the Mahratta cavalry, 20,000 in number, 
 flushed with the sense of superiority, and inspirited by 
 the thought that they were the attacking party, dashed 
 upon the Anglo-Indian horse. In the short but despe- 
 rate contest that followed Lieutenant Lucan * and the 
 Baraitch Nawab were completely overpowered. After 
 fighting with all the energy of despair, they were both 
 wounded and taken prisoners. Their combined squad- 
 rons were cut up, the galloper guns were taken, whilst 
 the traitor Bapoojee Scindia went over to the enemy. 
 Meanwhile, the infantry and guns retreated, the first 
 day, 29 miles, to Soonara, the second day, nearly 20 
 miles, to the entrance of the Mokundra Pass. Here 
 Monson was attacked, after having refused a summons 
 to surrender, by the whole force of the enemy, but after 
 a contest which lasted from eleven o'clock in the morning 
 to six o'clock in the evening, he succeeded in driving 
 them back in confusion. 
 
 It had been Colonel Monson's intention to hold the 
 Mokundra Pass, the entrance to which was strongly 
 fortified, and to wait there provisions and reinforcements. 
 But fearing, on his arrival, that the enemy might cut 
 him off from Kotah, he resolved to retreat at once to 
 that place, leaving Colonel Don, with one battalion, to de- 
 fend the pass till the morning. 
 
 Three days of heavy marching brought the force, 
 re-united by the junction of Colonel Don, who had suc- 
 
 * He died soon afterwards at Kotah. 
 
 g2 
 
84 LORD LAKE. 
 
 cessfully performed the part allotted to him, to Kotah ; 
 but as the Rajah of that place showed himself hostile, 
 refusing provisions, and even retaining some stores that 
 had been left in his charge, it moved, at 9 p.m. of the 
 12th, to Gunneas Ghat on the Chumbul. This place 
 was reached, after a most fatiguing march, on the 13th, 
 and the river crossed with much diflSculty on the 14th. 
 in the midst of pouring rain. On the 15th the retreat 
 was continued, the men marching through a very heavy 
 country, the black soil of which was sticky with rain, 
 from 10 A.M. to 7 P.M., taking refuge then, without order, 
 discipline, or regard for rank, but crowding promis- 
 cuously together, in the huts of a deserted village. On 
 the 16th, the ground becoming from incessant rain 
 even heavier, the guns were spiked and left ; our troops, 
 notwithstanding, though marching eight hours, only 
 accomplished as many miles. On the 17th, the force 
 reached the ChumbuUee Nullah, near the entrance of 
 the Lackerie Pass. Here, in consequence of the swollen 
 state of the nullah, it was compelled to halt till the 
 26th, in great distress from want of food, and harassed 
 by attacks from the'enemy's parties. On the evening of 
 that day the troops commenced crossing, but during the 
 operation a great portion of their baggage-cattle were 
 carried off by the enemy's horse. However, on the 
 morning of the 27th, the entire force had crossed over, 
 and had begun its march towards the Lackerie Pass, 
 Colonel Don bringing up the rear. In this difficult 
 march, the rear-guard suffered much from the attacks of 
 the Menahs, and the entire remnant of the baggage had 
 to be abandoned. On joining the main body that even- 
 ing Colonel Don found a letter from Colonel Monson, 
 
LORD LAKE. 85 
 
 announcing that he had resolved to precede the force 
 to Eampoora.* The command, therefore, temporarily- 
 devolved upon Colonel Don. 
 
 On the 30th, after two dreadful marches, with but 
 little food available, the force reached Kampoora. Here, 
 after many orders and counter-orders, Colonel Monson, 
 who re-assumed command, resolved to halt until he 
 should receive the reinforcements which his urgent 
 requisitions to the Commander-in-Chief had led him to 
 expect. 
 
 These reinforcements, consisting of the 2nd battalion 
 9th Native Infantry, and the 1st battalion 14th Native 
 Infantry, with six guns and a corps of irregular cavalry, 
 arrived on the 14th, but brought with them no supplies. 
 Between this date and the 21st August, the force halted 
 at Kampoora, threatened by Holkar on the one side, and 
 by Bapoojee Scindia on the other. There can be little 
 doubt that Colonel Monson might have made a successful 
 stand at this place, as the fort of Kampoora was very 
 strong, and the Tonk country favourable for the supply 
 of his army. He had, too, received letters from General 
 Lake, informing him of his having ordered, on the first 
 news of his retreat, all the infantry in Agra to march to 
 his assistance. But, to use his own expression, "his 
 mind was so distracted," he could not think coolly upon 
 any point. Instead, therefore, of remaining halted at 
 Kampoora, he resolved to retreat to Kooshalgurh, where 
 he expected he might be joined by a considerable de- 
 tachment of Scindia's troops. Before doing this, he 
 informed the commanding officers of his intention, adding 
 that it would be for them to make their way to Agra as 
 best they could. 
 
 * The fort in the Tonk district. 
 
86 LORD LAKE. 
 
 To retreat to Kooshalgiirli Colonel Monson had to 
 cross the river Bunass, and, in attempting this on the 
 24th, after having left one battalion in garrison at Ram- 
 poora, he was attacked in force by Holkar, and was most 
 severely handled. Colonel Monson himself behaved with 
 conspicuous bravery, but the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment 
 was almost annihilated, several of his best officers were 
 killed or wounded, one howitzer was lost, and the spirits 
 of native officers and men received a terrible shock. He 
 succeeded, however, in reaching Kooshalgurh on the 
 night of the 25th, after marching 36 miles, during which 
 he was exposed to the repeated attacks of the enemy's 
 horse. At this place he was fortunate enough to meet 
 a thousand Brinjarrie bullocks, which had been sent from 
 Agra with grain for the use of his detachment, and which, 
 fortunately, Holkar had just missed. Scindia's detach- 
 ment, however, which he expected would aid him, showed 
 a decidedly hostile disposition. Great as had been 
 Colonel Monson's troubles up to this period, they now 
 became infinitely greater. During that night and the 
 following day, the enemy came up in large numbers and 
 surrounded the town, our troops retiring within it, and 
 manning the walls to keep off attack. As the place, 
 however, was not at all capable of defence. Colonel 
 Monson determined to avail himself of the darkness to 
 retire, — whither he scarcely knew. At 8 p.m. of the 26th 
 the attempt was made, our troops forming a square, and 
 moving off in that formation. The retreat, however, 
 was soon discovered, and 20,000 cavalry were immedi- 
 ately on their track. But the steadiness of the 2nd bat- 
 talion 21st regiment, who formed the rear-face of the 
 square, caused all their attacks, though they continued 
 up to noon of the following day, to fail. The last 
 
LORD LAKE. 87 
 
 remaining gun of the force, a howitzer, was, however, 
 spiked and abandoned. 
 
 Th^ attacks of the enemy ceasing about noon of the 
 next day, our troops hurried on, living on the hard grain 
 which they had no time to cook, and came about sunset 
 within sight of Hindown. But, to their disappointment, 
 they found it partly occupied by the enemy. Unwilling 
 to risk a contest for its possession with a demoralised 
 army, and an enemy following in his rear. Colonel 
 Monson moved to the ruins of an old fort in the neigh- 
 bourhood, and gave his men a few hours of repose. They 
 were but a few, however. At one o'clock in the morning, 
 silently and stealthily, they marched on again in the 
 same formation, this time without attracting much 
 attention from the enemy. At daylight, however, the 
 Mahratta horse was seen swarming in their track, accom- 
 panied by camels carrying small guns, which, together 
 with rockets, they occasionally discharged. At seven 
 o'clock the force, on emerging from some intricate ravines 
 in very straggling order, perceived that the enemy had 
 formed up in front and on either side of them. Almost 
 before they could realise their position the famed 
 Mahratta cavalry was upon them. But in this terrible 
 extremity, the sepoys showed themselves worthy of their 
 training. Forgetting their long marches, the harassing 
 disquietudes of the previous two months, they formed 
 up steadily, reserved their fire till the enemy were 
 within fifty yards, and then poured in a continuous file- 
 firing. First on the right, then, in lesser numbers, on 
 the front and left faces, did the daring horsemen of 
 Jeswunt Eao make charge after charge. In vain, how- 
 ever. They were as powerless against those brave sepoys 
 
88 * LORD LAKE. 
 
 as were the chivalry of France against the solid squares 
 of British infantry at AVaterloo. 
 
 Finding all their attempts to break the square by 
 means of cavalry ineffectual, the enemy commenced the 
 more sure method of pouring in a steady fire from their 
 matchlockmen and camel pieces. In this our troops 
 suffered terribly. Colonel Monson, therefore, moved on, 
 still in square, the enemy hovering about him, and 
 keeping up a desultory fire. Our troops experienced 
 great difficulty in crossing a nullah in their way, and 
 having halted in the ravines beyond it, they again 
 suffered terribly from the matchlock fire which was 
 poured on them from the high banks of the nullah. 
 Many of their wounded fell during the day into the 
 enemy's hands. 
 
 Under such circumstances, to halt was certain destruc- 
 tion. Although night was fast coming on, it was, there- 
 fore, determined still to move forward. Exposed to a 
 fire from the enemy in the rear, and from the Menahs 
 who lined the high grounds on their left, they straggled 
 into the Biana Pass, one of the most difficult, from its 
 narrowness and steep ravines, in the country. Here the 
 semblance of discipline almost entirely ceased.* Detach- 
 ments, even individuals, separated from one another. 
 It was impossible to keep any order. Sauve qui pent 
 was all that remained for the boldest to dream of One 
 officer,! who had been overcome by sleep, awoke only to 
 find himself alone. Nor was his a solitary exception. 
 The force which four months before had marched through 
 
 * The one corps, however, that did keep some kind of formation to 
 the very last, was the 1st battalion lith Native Infantry, commanded 
 by Colonel Ashe. 
 
 t Colonel Don. 
 
LOUD LAKE. 89 
 
 this very pass, full of the highest hopes, had become a 
 disorganised rabble, without discipline or power of 
 cohesion. 
 
 No further attempt was made to rally. The next 
 day some stragglers found themselves at Futtehpore 
 Sikree ; but even here there was no rest for them, the 
 very townspeople treating them as outcasts, and firing 
 upon them. It only remained for them, as best they 
 could, to push on to Agra. With the poor remnant of 
 strength yet remaining to them, this was attempted by 
 all who possessed the power of motion, and that day and 
 the following the ingress of wretched, 'footsore, half- 
 starved fugitives, dispirited in mind as much as battered 
 in body, conveyed to the garrison of Agra some idea of 
 the humiliation that is ever in store for the general who 
 retreats before a barbarian enemy.* Would the effect 
 have been worse, would it have been half so bad, if 
 Colonel Monson had attacked Holkar at Kampoora, and 
 been destroyed ? 
 
 It is easy to imagine the impression which these 
 straggling messengers of defeat produced on the mind 
 of General Lake. For his brilliant achievements in the 
 campaign against Scindia he had received the thanks of 
 Parliament, and had been created, on the Ist of Sep- 
 tember, Baron Lake of Delhi and Laswarrie, and of 
 Ashton Clinton, in the county of Buckingham. Although 
 he did not receive intimation of these honours till after 
 the siege of Bhurtpore, yet the consciousness of having 
 deserved, the knowledge of the reputation he had ac- 
 
 * Our loss in officers during this retreat was fturteen killed ; three 
 taken prisoners (of whom one was murdered and one died); one 
 drowned ; nine wounded : total, twenty-seven. The loss of the men 
 was never accm-ately ascertained. 
 
90 LOED LAKE. 
 
 quired, constituted inducements, which, had his own 
 inclinations been wanting, — a contingency of all others 
 most unlikely, — would have impelled him to the same 
 prompt action which formed the foundation of his fame. 
 
 Colonel Monson's misfortune had been in no respect 
 owing to Lord Lake. That officer had, in the first place, 
 advanced considerably beyond the limit which the 
 Commander-in-Chief had considered necessary or safe. 
 Having, in the second place, moved on from Peeplah 
 with the declared intention of attacking Holkar on the 
 Chumbul, — an attack in which success would not have 
 been at all improbable, — he had first hesitated, and then 
 retreated, drawing the enemy after him. Thirdly, he 
 had abandoned the pass of Mokundra, — the one place 
 where he might have made a successful stand before 
 his army had become disorganised. And fourthly, after 
 reaching Jonk Kampoora, he had first resolved to halt 
 and defend it, but after five days' hesitation had aban- 
 doned it in despair, telling his army to make the best 
 of their way to Agra. For none of these vacillations, 
 of these erratic movements, had the Commander-in-Chief 
 been responsible. None wondered at them more than 
 he, and in his despatch to Marquess Wellesley he had 
 expressed his surprise that a man, "brave as a lion, 
 should have no judgment or reflection." 
 
 But Colonel Monson was wanting in something besides 
 judgment and reflection. He himself alleged that he 
 decided to retreat, because he had no experience of, and 
 no confidence in, the native soldiers.* In this respect 
 
 * In noticing this, avowal on the part of Colonel Monson, and the 
 consequences resulting from it, the Court of Directors issued an order 
 that no purely native force should ever again be placed under the 
 command of an officer of the Eoyal Army. This order was never 
 deviated from until the period of the Affghanistan war, and then with 
 
LORD LAKE. 91 
 
 he again contrasts unfavourably with Lord Lake, who, 
 by showing confidence in those native soldiers, made 
 them accomplish seeming impossibilities. But if Colonel 
 Monson possessed not sufficient confidence in his men to 
 lead them on to an attack, they at least showed by their 
 courage, their fortitude, their constancy, their wonderful 
 endurance, during the retreat in which his incapacity 
 involved them, some of the best qualities of disciplined 
 soldiers. These " military proletarians," fighting for an 
 alien flag, and an alien people, for a nation differing from 
 them in manners and professing a proselytising faith, 
 displayed from the first to the last hour of that terrible 
 trial, a fidelity to their engagements that has been never 
 surpassed, a devotion to duty which might serve as an 
 example to many Western armies. Though exposed to 
 munificent offers from the emissaries of Holkar, they 
 remained true to their colours, and the scattered remains 
 of that retreating army, though severed for a moment 
 from the main force, hastened to rally under the walls 
 of Agra. 
 
 But great as was the misfortune, and though it was 
 in no way attributable to him. Lord Lake did not the 
 less display a resolution to repair it with alacrity. He 
 was not the man, indeed, to whine over disasters, how- 
 ever severe, after they had been accomplished. If his 
 lieutenant had failed, it was for him to obliterate the 
 effects of that lieutenant's error. Upon this principle he 
 acted with the promptitude natural to him. He sent 
 instructions to all the troops he could spare from the 
 
 results which were not very favourable. We have not space to refer 
 here, as we could have wished, to the magnanimity shown by Marquess 
 Wellesley towards Colonel Monson. It is paralleled by the generous 
 conduct of Napoleon to Marmont after Salamanca. 
 
92 LORD LAKE. 
 
 several stations under his command to concentrate at 
 Agra, and he himself, hastily fitting out the force im- 
 mediately about him, marched with it, on the 3rd 
 September, for that place. 
 
 Meanwhile, Jeswunt Kao Holkar had not been idle. 
 His pursuit of Colonel Monson's force had not, indeed, 
 been conducted with all the vigour and energy that 
 might have been expected from a man of his undaunted 
 and enterprising character, for, even in defeat, the 
 prestige gained at Coel, at Delhi, and at Laswarrie, was, 
 to a certain point, a safeguard. In the novel position 
 in which he found himself, Jeswunt Kao, after one or 
 two vain attempts, had abstained from coming to too 
 close quarters even with a retreating and disorganised 
 sepoy army, led by European officers. He pursued them 
 incessantly, as we have seen, from the banks of the 
 Chumbul to the Biana Pass, and even to Futtehpore 
 Sikri. Hence he advanced on the 16th September to 
 Muttra, of which, as it had been evacuated by our troops 
 on the 15th, he took possession, together with much grain 
 and baggage that had been stored there. Bat though 
 at the head of 60,000 horse and 15,000 infantry, he did 
 not venture to move upon Agra, contenting himself with 
 sending flying parties into the Doab, which were easily 
 repulsed. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs when Lord Lake, at the 
 head of the 8th, 27th, and 29th regiments of dragoons, 
 the flank companies 22nd regiment, the 76th regiment, 
 with some artillery, reached Agra on the 27th of the 
 month. He moved at once to Secundra, joined the 
 native troops already arrived there, and, on the 1st 
 October, marched in the direction of Muttra. On the 
 3rd he arrived close to this place. Holkar, however, 
 
LOED LAKE. ^B 
 
 had no wish to risk an action. His plans were con- 
 ceived in a far abler spirit. He wished to delay as 
 much as possible the advance of Lord Lake, by means 
 of his numerous cavalry, whilst his infantry, hurrying 
 on to Delhi, should endeavour to take that place and 
 gain possession of the person of the emperor, by a coup- 
 de-main. He had already despatched his infantry for 
 that purpose, whilst with his cavalry he took up a posi- 
 tion at the village of Aurung, four miles from Muttra. 
 
 Unsuspicious of this device on the part of Holkar, 
 Lord Lake moved from Muttra early on the morning 
 of the 7th to attack him at Aurung. Holkar, however, 
 was true to his tactics. He at once evacuated his 
 position without an action, and retreated more quickly 
 than he could be pursued. On the 10th, a second 
 attempt ended in a similar manner.* On the following 
 evening, Lord Lake received intelligence of the move- 
 ment of the enemy's infantry upon Delhi. Early on 
 the morning of the 12th, therefore, he took the road to 
 that place, the enemy giving way before him. 
 
 Meanwhile, in pursuauce of his plan, Holkar's in- 
 fantry and some cavalry appeared before Delhi on the 
 7th. The defences of that city were in a very dilapi- 
 dated condition. The walls were shattered, the ram- 
 
 * T]ie Maliratta tactics on these occasions are thus described by 
 Major Thorn : — " Our cavalry, formed in two lines, moved in columns 
 of half regiments at regular intervals. In this order, we swept clear 
 the whole plain where the enemy were encamped at full gallop ; but 
 could not succeed in our endeavours to charge them, for they 
 scampered off in all directions, dispersing as usual. When we halted, 
 they did the same, rallied and stood gazing at us ; and when wo turned 
 our backs to return home, they daslied on, attacking our rear and 
 flanks, firing long shots with their matchlocks, while those who were 
 armed with spears and tulwars, flourished their weapons, making at 
 the same time, a noise like jackals by way of bravado." 
 
94 LOED LAKE. 
 
 parts mostly fallen in, and the bastions in a state of 
 decay. The garrison consisted of two regular native 
 regiments, the 2nd battalion 4th, 2nd battalion 14th 
 Native Infantry, four companies of the 17th Native 
 Infantry, and about 1100 matchlockmen. The de- 
 ficiency of the troops and the weak state of the defences 
 were, however, more than compensated for by the fact 
 that he who wielded the authority of the Governor- 
 General within those walls, was no other than Colonel 
 David Ochterlony. Under this distinguished officer, as 
 military commandant, was Lieutenant-Colonel William 
 Burn, 
 
 It is impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to enter in 
 this place into the history of the gallant defence of that 
 important city. For seven days the forces of Holkar, 
 consisting of 10,000 infantry, 8000 cavalry, 160 guns, 
 commanded by Bapoojee Scindia, used all the means in 
 their power to master the place. They hazarded several 
 assaults, but in all they were repulsed. On the 14th 
 they made a grand attempt to escalade it at various 
 points, but not in one single quarter did they make any 
 impression. The vigilance of Colonel Ochterlony, and 
 the gallant conduct of Colonel Burn and his native 
 troops, completely baffled the besiegers. They re- 
 treated that night, leaving the scaling-ladders standing. 
 
 On the 18th Lord Lake arrived. He had pushed on 
 with all practicable speed from Muttra, leaving on the 
 route, unattacked and even unmasked, three or four 
 strong places which defied his authority. In thus 
 acting, he showed that disregard of rule, the correct 
 application of which is the best test of a true general. 
 He would neither be put off his main object of relieving 
 Delhi, nor weaken the force by which that relief was 
 
LORD LAKE. 95 
 
 to be effected. The intelligence of his rapid approach 
 materially influenced the enemy in their retreat on the 
 14th. Anxious as he was to improve that occasion by 
 an immediate pursuit of the baffled battalions of 
 Jeswunt Kao, he was yet forced to a few days' inaction 
 by that most urgent of all necessities, — the necessity of 
 providing food for his troops. On the 25th he was 
 able to despatch a small force, under Colonel Burn, to 
 relieve a Mr. Guthrie, who was besieged by the Sikhs 
 at Saharunpore, and on the 30th, having meanwhile 
 received intelligence that Holkar had crossed the Jumna 
 at Paniput, and had poured with his whole force into 
 the Doab, he started himself in pursuit at the head of 
 three regiments of dragoons, three of native cavalry, a 
 troop of horse artillery, and Colonel Don's reserve 
 brigade of infantry. The main body of infantry and 
 two regiments of native cavalry he left at Delhi, under 
 the command of Major-General Fraser, with instruc- 
 tions to observe the movements of the enemy in that 
 quarter, and, under certain conditions, to attack him. 
 
 Meanwhile Holkar, whose army had been reinforced 
 by levies from Scindia's territory, and by the troops of 
 the Kajah of Bhurtpore, having crossed the Jumna, pro- 
 ceeded in the direction of Saharunpore, hoping to 
 overtake and destroy the detachment w^hich, under 
 the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, had been 
 sent to that place. His advanced parties came up with 
 our sepoys on the afternoon of the 28th at Bagonrah, 
 and succeeded in carrying off some camels. Alarmed 
 at their increasing numbers, Colonel Burn moved off 
 the same afternoon, and marching all night, reached 
 Shamlie at sunrise, having been harassed all the way 
 by the enemy. He intended thence to advance to 
 
yo LOED LAKE. 
 
 Saharunpore, but whilst his men were taking some 
 slight refreshment, Jeswunt Kao came up with his 
 whole force, and took possession of the only road by 
 which an advance was possible. Colonel Burn, there- 
 fore, had no resource but to stay where he was, to await 
 the assistance he had asked from Lord Lake. He 
 moved his men, therefore, on the 30th into a small 
 mud fort, and in that, though with but a small stock of 
 provisions, took his stand. 
 
 Here, for three days, he was attacked by the whole 
 force of Holkar. At the end of that time the consump- 
 tion of his provisions, and the impossibility of procuring 
 fresh supplies, caused matters to look serious, and he 
 was seriously debating the expediency of attempting to 
 cut his way back to Delhi, when the retreat of the 
 Mahrattas announced the approach of the Commander- 
 in-Chief. 
 
 It was true. On the 3rd Lord Lake's army arrived, 
 having marched eleven and a half hours the previous 
 day, and at once Jeswunt Eao was in retreat. He 
 retired through the Doab, pillaging the villages in his 
 route. Lord Lake halted on the 4th, and resumed the 
 pursuit on the 5th. He followed the enemy by forced 
 marches to Meerut, where he left Colonel Burn and a 
 detachment, thence through Haupper, Mallargurh, and 
 Sheerpore to Allygunje, which village he found burning 
 on his arrival.* Here he learnt that Jeswunt Eao was 
 at Furruckabad, thirty-six miles ahead. He resolved 
 on pursuit that very night with the cavalry. At 9 p.m., 
 the troopers were mounting for the purpose, when he 
 received intelligence of a great victory gained over the 
 main body of the enemy's infantry by General Fraser 
 
 * Thorn. 
 
LORD LAKE. 97 
 
 at Deeg, not far from the scene of his own triumph at 
 Lasvvarrie. To the movements that brought about that 
 action we must now revert. 
 
 General Fraser had been left at Delhi, with a force 
 consisting of the 76th regiment, the Company's Euro- 
 pean regiment, and six native battalions. Knowing 
 that his infantry and heavy artillery had not accom- 
 panied Holkar in his raid into the Doab, General 
 Fraser, in pursuance of instructions received from Lord 
 Lake, left Delhi in search of them on the 6th, and 
 sighted them at a distance of six miles, from the heights 
 of Goverdon, on the 12th November. They had chosen 
 a very strong position. Their left flank was resting on 
 the fort of Deeg, bristling with cannon ; their left and 
 centre were covered by a morass ; and their right by a 
 village which they had carefully fortified. General 
 Fraser 's plan was soon made. He resolved to turn the 
 morass, and penetrating between it and a large tank 
 that lay behind it, either to destroy the enemy or drive 
 them within the fort. Leaving two native battalions 
 to protect the baggage, he moved with the remainder of 
 his force along the face of the morass, and, passing the 
 village on which the enemy's right rested, formed up 
 his troops at right angles to their line. Having effected 
 this movement without opposition, he directed the 76th 
 to take the village. This they easily did, then charging 
 down the declivity they attacked, and with the aid of 
 the European and native regiments by whom they were 
 supported, carried the first range of guns. Here, how- 
 ever, they were exposed to a tremendous fire from the 
 second range, a shot from which took off the General's 
 leg. The command then devolved upon Colonel Monson. 
 He instantly ordered a fresh advance upon the guns, 
 
 H 
 
98 LORD LAKE. 
 
 and, under his gallant direction, battery after battery 
 was abandoned, and the enemy forced to take refuge 
 under the guns of the fort.* But whilst engaged in 
 this advance, the enemy's horse, making a detour, came 
 upon the rear of our army, re-took the first range, and 
 turned the guns against our men. But Captain Norford, 
 of the 76th, taking with him only twenty-eight men 
 of that regiment, drove off this new enemy, though he 
 lost his life in accomplishing the feat. There still 
 remained a body of the enemy who had been posted at 
 the lower end of the morass, watched by the native 
 infantry under Captain Hammond. Upon these Colonel 
 Monson now moved, and taking them in flank with 
 some six-pounder guns, drove those who escaped that 
 fire into the morass. Colonel Monson then encamped 
 on the field of battle, advancing his pickets just beyond 
 cannon-shot of the fort, to watch the enemy's gar- 
 rison.t 
 
 This was the intelligence brought to Lord Lake at 
 nine o'clock on the evening of the 15th November, two 
 days after the battle, just as he was starting to surprise 
 Holkar at Furruckabad. Inspirited by the news, which 
 was at once communicated to them, the troopers moved 
 on, eagerly desirous to emulate the deeds of their com- 
 rades. Marching all night, lighted up by the soft rays 
 
 * The fort of Deeg belonged to the Eajah of Bhurtpore, who was 
 nominally our ally; but from the time of Monson' s retreat or even 
 earlier, he had been in secret communication with Holkar. 
 
 t The loss of the Anglo-Indian army in this action amounted to 
 5 officers killed, and 17 wounded ; 621 men were killed and wounded. 
 The loss of the enemy was computed at nearly 2000, General Fraser died 
 a few days after the action from his wound. Amongst the 87 pieces 
 of ordnance captured by Colonel Monson, were eleven 6-pounder8, 
 two 12-pounders, and one howitzer taken from Colonel Monson in his 
 retreat.— T/iorn. 
 
LORD LAKE. 99 
 
 of the moon, the advanced guard of the force reached at 
 daybreak the enemy's encampment. Holkar was en- 
 tirely unsuspicious of their vicinity. He had been 
 enjoying a nautch the night before,* when in the midst 
 of it he too received intimation of the disaster at Deeg. 
 Troubled in spirit, he quitted the entertainment without 
 communicating with his chiefs. Nor was he the more 
 re-assured when the fire of artillery convinced him that 
 the adversary he most dreaded in the world was upon 
 him. Forgetting in a moment the fame he had ac- 
 quired, the boasts he had indulged in, his visions of 
 empire and dominion, taking counsel only from his own 
 fears, he mounted his steed, and followed by those 
 horsemen who were ready, fled with all speed towards 
 Mainpore, not drawing rein till he had placed eighteen 
 miles of road and the river Kalini between himself and 
 the battle-field. It was just as well that he did flee. 
 On reaching the Mahratta camp at daybreak. Lord Lake 
 had found a grave-like quiescence, the very sentries 
 asleep at their post. Instantly he brought up his horse 
 artillery, and awoke the startled Mahrattas with the 
 roar of his cannon. Then, as they rose up in their 
 hurry and confusion, he dashed amongst them with 
 his cavalry, sabring them in numbers. Those that 
 had the opportunity fled, and for ten miles these 
 were followed up with all the energy that success 
 inspires.! 
 
 The vigour of the pursuit which thus met its crown- 
 ing fortune at Furruckabad, has never been surpassed 
 in military history. The force which left Delhi on the 
 
 * Thorn, 
 
 t Our loss amounted to 2 men killed, 20 wounded ; that of the enemy 
 was computed at 3000. The desertions from Holkar after the action 
 were very numerous. — Thorn. 
 
 H 2 
 
100 LORD LAKE. 
 
 31st October Lad, in the interval between that and the 
 morning of the 17th November, marched 350 miles, 
 rescuing in its course a beleaguered garrison from the 
 clutches of the enemy. In the twenty-four hours imme- 
 diately preceding the battle, it had marched upwards of 
 seventy miles. It added not a little to the powers of 
 endurance of both officers and men to see that every 
 fatigTie, every hardship, were cheerfully shared by their 
 revered chief; to behold him ever prompt to lead them 
 on, ever foremost in the battle or the charge, anxious 
 only to get at the enemy, to bring him to close quarters. 
 What could they not have done, in any part of the 
 world, against any enemy in the world, those troops, 
 under that leader ? 
 
 Those who have followed the career of Lord Lake 
 thus far, will have noticed how much an essential part 
 of his military system it was to follow up a victory. A 
 victory, in fact, he regarded as nothing without results- 
 Although, therefore, he had driven Holkar with great 
 loss from Furruckabad, he regarded him as not the less 
 an enemy to be pursued and annihilated. He pushed 
 on, therefore, rapidly in pursuit, and finding that he 
 had made for the fort of Deeg, he moved in the direc- 
 tion of that place, and joined the infantry under Colonel 
 Monson on the 28th November, encamped between 
 Muttra and Deeg. Waiting some days for a siege-train 
 from Agra, the army, after moving to within sight of 
 Deeg, took up, on the 13th, a position before that 
 fortress, and opened fire on the following morning. On 
 the 22nd, a practicable breach was effected in one of 
 the outworks, at one of the angles of the city, and a 
 storming party was detached to assault in the dark 
 hours just preceding midnight. 
 
LOED LAKE. 3 01 
 
 This storming party consisted of three columns,* 
 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Macrae. 
 These reached the points of attack indicated a little 
 before twelve o'clock, and at that hour made the assault. 
 The night was extremely dark, and the enemy were 
 taken by surprise. Their resistance, nevertlieless, was 
 of a very obstinate nature, as theit guns had been laid 
 to sweep the ground immediately in front of their 
 defences. They could not, however, resist the deter- 
 mined valour of our troops, and though their artillery- 
 men stood to be bayonetted at their guns, and their 
 infantry, under cover of the darkness, even attempted 
 to re-take them, it was in vain. By two o'clock in the 
 morning our troops were in possession of the outwork. f 
 This capture so dispirited the enemy that they aban- 
 doned the citadel and town on the following day, leav- 
 ing all their guns behind them, and retiring to Bhurt- 
 pore. Our troops entered the citadel on Christmas 
 morning, 1804. 
 
 But satisfactory as was the capture of this strong 
 fortress, Lord Lake felt strongly that his work would 
 be incomplete so long as its late master, Kunjeet Singh, 
 Eajah of Bhurtpore, was enabled to bid defiance to us 
 from, and to afford protection to the troops of the 
 
 ♦ The right column composed of four companies 1st Europeans, and 
 five companies 1st battalion 12th Native Infantry, under Captain Kelly ; 
 the left of four companies 1st Europeans, and five 1st battalion 12th 
 Native Infantry, under Major RadclilfeJ; and the centre, of the flank 
 companies 22nd, 76th, and 1st Europeans, and 1st battalion 8th Native 
 Infantry, under Colonel Macrea. 
 
 t In this attack we lost 43 men killed, and 184 wounded. Among the 
 former were two officers, and among the latter thirteen. One of these, 
 Lieutenant Forrest, received upwards of twenty wounds, and was left for 
 dead upon the field ; however, he ultimately recovered. One hundred 
 guns were-taken. — Thorn. 
 
102 LOED LAKE. 
 
 Holkar within the walls of his capital. Accordingly, 
 after repairing the defences of Deeg, he moved on the 
 28th December to meet the 75th regiment, which was 
 bringing up stores for the army. This done, he 
 marched on the 1st, and on the 2nd took up his ground 
 in front of Bhurtpore. 
 
 The fortress of Blnfrtpore was strong, not only in its 
 bastions and artillery, but in the numerous garrison, 
 formed of the debris of the Mahratta infantry and of 
 the hitherto unsubdued Jats, by which it was defended. 
 It stood in a plain covered with jungle, and abounding 
 with several pieces of water. The town itself was eight 
 miles in circumference, having thick mud walls, and a 
 wide and deep ditch, capable of being rendered uflford- 
 able. In addition to the garrison within its walls, a 
 considerable body of infantry had intrenched themselves 
 outside and close to them, whilst the still numerous 
 cavalry of Jeswunt Eao and his associate Ameer Khan 
 moved about the neighbourhood, ready to take advan- 
 tage of any favourable conjuncture. 
 
 Lord Lake, on the contrary, though at the head of 
 an infantry and cavalry tried in many a battle, was but 
 ill supplied with the artillery requisite for the attack of 
 such a place. He had not, at the opening of the siege, 
 more than three or four mortars of a useful calibre, and 
 eight or ten battering-guns. When these, as was the 
 case with some of them, became inefficient from ex- 
 cessive firing, he had none others to supply their place, 
 but was compelled to use guns captured from Holkar, 
 hurriedly furnished with benches at Muttra. Knowing 
 this deficiency, he had been strongly in favour of 
 repeating the course followed at Allygurh, but had 
 allowed himself to be persuaded, against his better 
 
LORD LAKE. 103 
 
 judgment, to try the effect of a siege. He accordingly, 
 though labouring under the disadvantages we have 
 noticed, opened his attack with his wonted energy on 
 the 7th January, dislodged with great slaughter the 
 infantry intrenched beneath the walls, effected a breach 
 on the 9th, and ordered a storming party for the same 
 evening. This party,* headed by Colonel Maitland, 
 moved out of camp at 8 o'clock in the evening, its 
 advance being covered by a tremendous fire from the 
 trenches. But the ground was so broken and swampy 
 that it was found impossible to keep much order, and 
 the party arrived at the ditch in some disarray. 
 Twenty-three men of the 22nd, who were the first to 
 arrive there, waded through it breast high, and even 
 mounted the breach ; but being unsupported they could 
 effect nothing. The delay in bringing up supports was 
 fatal. Losing two officers, and the third having left to 
 bring up reinforcements, the few men of the 22nd fell 
 back, and before the assault could be renewed, the 
 enemy had concentrated a tremendous fire upon the 
 approaches to it. The progress of the right and left 
 columns to support the centre was also checked by 
 defences which had not been foreseen. At length the 
 centre column, having, after much difficulty found its 
 way across the ditch, dashed at the breach led on by 
 Colonel Maitland. But all the efforts of that gallant 
 officer were vain. When near the summit of the 
 
 * It consisted of three columns ; the. left composed of 150 of the 
 1st Europeans, and a battalion of sepoys, under Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Kyan ; the right, of two companies of the 75th, and a battalion of 
 sepoys, under Major Hawkes ; and the centre, of the flank companies 
 of the 22nd, 75th, 76th, and 1st Europeans, and a battalion of sepoys 
 under Colonel Maitland. — Thorn, 
 
104 LORD LAKE. 
 
 breach he was shot dead. Other officers followed him, 
 but to no purpose. The slaughter amongst them was 
 terrible. At last, baffled but not humiliated, they were 
 forced to retreat to the trenches, exposed, as they 
 retired, to a tremendous fire from the enemy.* 
 
 Undaunted by this failure, which he justly attributed 
 to the accident of the second column losing its way, 
 Lord Lake at once re-commenced his fire on the place, 
 and, on the 21st, had succeeded in effecting another 
 breach a little to the right of the former one. This 
 time it was determined to attempt the assault in the 
 daytime, and having accurately ascertained the length 
 and breadth of the ditch opposite the breach, little 
 doubt was felt as to the result. At 3 o'clock in the 
 afternoon the storming-party,t having been supplied 
 with portable bridges J for surmounting the ditch, 
 advanced to the assault. On reaching the ditch, which 
 had been described the previous day as neither very 
 broad nor deep in that particular part, it was found 
 that the enemy had dammed it up below, and so that 
 the water had accumulated to such a degree as to make 
 even the ladders useless. Some of the men, however, 
 headed by Lieutenant Morris, swam across and clam- 
 bered up the breach. But the enemy had taken the 
 precaution to withdraw the guns behind the parapet 
 pointing them at the breach, and these opened a 
 
 * In this attempt we lost five officers and eighty-five men killed ; 
 twenty-four officers aad three hundred and seventy-one wounded. 
 
 t Consisting of 150 men of the 76th ; 120 of the 75tli ; 50 of the 
 22nd, supported by the remainder of tliose regiments, and the 2nd 
 battalions of the 9th, 15th, and 22nd Native Infantry, the whole com- 
 manded by Colonel Macrae. — Thorn. 
 
 X These were three broad ladders covered with latlis, and easily raised 
 and depressed by levers at the bank of the ditch. — Thorn. 
 
LORD LAKE. 105 
 
 tremendous fire on the daring leaders of the assault. 
 Seeing them thus exposed to certain death if they 
 remained, and being unable to convey to them any 
 aid, Colonel Macrae wisely sounded the recall, and 
 hastened back to the trenches, not, however, without 
 the very considerable loss of eighteen officers, and five 
 hundred and seventy-three men, killed and wounded. 
 
 The failure of this second attack only rendered the 
 Commander-in-Chief more resolute to persevere. In 
 the spirit which animated the Eoman senate when 
 they thanked Terentius Yarro after the loss of the 
 battle of Cannae, he issued to his troops a general order, 
 acknowledging the gallantry and steadiness they had 
 displayed in the attack, and expressing a confident 
 hope that in a very few days the obstacles which had 
 till then rendered all attempts fruitless would be sur- 
 mounted. This order produced the very best effect, — 
 an effect which was heightened by the repulse and 
 subsequent pursuit of Ameer Khan after an attempt to 
 intercept one of our convoys. That chieftain was him- 
 self intercepted, just as his attack on the convoy had 
 failed, by Colonel Need and the 27th Dragoons, and in 
 his bitter extremity only saved his life by stripping 
 himself of his gaudy apparel, and fleeing with his own 
 troopers. A second attempt made in greater force 
 three days later, upon another detachment coming from 
 Agra, was frustrated by the Commander-in-Chief in 
 person, numbers of the enemy's infantry being cut up 
 on the occasion. 
 
 From this date there was a lull in the siege opera- 
 tions, reinforcements being expected from Bombay. 
 The interval, however, was employed in the preparation 
 of fascines, pontoons, and rafts. On the 10th February, 
 
J 06 LORD LAKE. 
 
 the reinforcements arrived.* Measures were at once 
 taken more in unison with the scientific character of 
 siege operations, and regular approaches were made, 
 bringing our batteries much nearer to the walls of 
 the city. These having been carried to the brink of the 
 ditch, and a mine having been laid for the purpose of 
 blowing up the counterscarp, it was determined to give 
 the assault at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th 
 February. This time the storming party t was en- 
 trusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Don, a 'very gallant 
 ojBficer, who had particularly distinguished himself at 
 the capture of Eampoora, in command of the rear 
 guard during Monson's retreat, and during the pursuit 
 of Holkar in the Doab. The night before the assault 
 was ordered the enemy made a sally which was for a 
 time successful, and was only repulsed with loss. The 
 sally was repeated in the morning, but the besieged 
 were driven in, though not until they had cut up 
 several of our men. The storming party then, at 
 3 P.M., started on its perilous errand, preceded by fifty 
 men carrying fascines which were to be thrown into 
 the ditch. 
 
 Again, however, a fatality attended the attack. 
 Whether they were disheartened by previous failures, 
 or were dispirited by the sight of the bodies of their 
 comrades killed in the sally of the morning, or feared 
 that the approach was mined, it is certain that the men 
 
 * Under Major-General Jones, consisting of the 86th regiment, eight 
 companies 65th regiment, four battalions of sepoys, and 500 irregular 
 horse.— Thorn. 
 
 t Consisting of one column composed of 200 of the 86th regiment, 
 and the first battalion, 8 th Native Infantry, under Captain Grant ; of 
 a second of 300 of the 65th regiment, and two battalions of Bombay 
 sepoys, under Colonel Taylor, the centre column of details from the 75th 
 and 76th regiments and 1st Europeans, and three battalions of sepoys. 
 
LORD LAKE. 107 
 
 composing the storming party stood hesitating at the 
 exit of the approach unwilling to go on. In vain did 
 Colonel Don entreat and exhort, they would not move. 
 That officer, then, turning from the Europeans in front, 
 called upon the men in rear to advance through them. 
 Instantly there came forward a few men constituting 
 the remnant of the detail of the 22nd Foot, and the 
 12th Native Infantry, supported by two guns. One 
 sepoy at once ran at the breach, but it was impassable ; 
 the regiment then attempted a bastion on the right, 
 which many of them succeeded in climbing, and on the 
 top of which the colours of the 12th Native Infantry 
 were planted. Just at this moment the enemy sprung 
 their mine, without injury to our troops, and had the 
 Europeans then taken advantage of the confusion, 
 the place would assuredly have been stormed. But no 
 exertion of the officers could rouse the men to action, 
 and though fourteen of the former dashed to the front 
 to encourage them, they were not followed, and Colonel 
 Don had no resource but to draw off his men. Captain 
 Grant's column succeeded in capturing and carrying off 
 eleven guns, but owing to the failure of the centre 
 column their success could not be followed up.* 
 
 Attributing this repulse to exceptional causes. Lord 
 Lake resolved to renew the attack on the following 
 day, prefacing it by a very heavy fire. In selecting the 
 storming party, he thought it right, however, to address 
 himself to the Europeans whose backwardness on the 
 preceding day had led to the disaster. He spoke to 
 them, however, in terms savouring more of regret than 
 
 * Our loss in this attack amounted to three oflBcers and one hundred 
 and sixty-two men killed ; and twenty-five officers and 732 wounded. — 
 Thorn. 
 
103 yLORD LAKE. 
 
 of anger, at the same time oifering as many of them as 
 should be willing, an opportunity of retrieving their 
 laurels by volunteering. They at once came forward to 
 a man, and Lieutenant Templeton, of the 76th regi- 
 ment, offered to lead the forlorn hope. 
 
 At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, therefore, the storming 
 party,* under the leadership of Brigadier Monson, 
 moved on to the assault. Again was the bastion 
 selected as the point of attack, again were the British 
 colours planted on its summit, though the action was 
 fatal to Lieutenant Templeton who bore them. But 
 few, however, could climb that rugged surface, the 
 approaches to which, moreover, were commanded by a 
 tremendous cross fire. In vain was every opening tried, 
 were every means resorted to, to effect an entrance, for, 
 after two hours' fruitless but heroic efforts. Brigadier 
 Monson was compelled to give the order to retire.f 
 
 These four assaults had thus cost our army 103 
 officers and 3100 men in killed and wounded, and at 
 the conclusion of the last failure, Lord Lake was in a 
 worse position than when he commenced the siege. 
 Not, indeed, that he had lost one iota of his indomitable 
 resolution, but his siege-guns had become useless, his 
 supply of ammunition had diminished, and whilst the 
 confidence of the enemy had increased, that of his own 
 men had been considerably shaken. He determined, 
 therefore, to convert the siege into a blockade. 
 
 Those critics who judge by results have been very 
 
 * It consisted of the 1st Europeans, two battalions Bengal Native 
 Infantry, the greater part of the 65th and 86th regiments, the grenadier 
 battalion, and the flank companies of the 3rd Bengal Native Infantry. — 
 Thorn. 
 
 t We lost on this occasion six officers and 125 men killed ; twenty- 
 eight officers and 862 womided. 
 
LORD LAKE. 109 
 
 free in casting upon Lord Lake the entire blame of the 
 enormous loss of life which occurred at the siege of 
 Bhurtpore. We are willing to admit that the system 
 of Lord Lake's warfare was adapted for anything rather 
 than the slow process of a siege. And it is, we think, 
 under those circumstances, to be regretted that he did 
 not obey the prompting of his own inclinations, and 
 attempt to follow the capture of Deeg by a coup-de-main 
 on Bhurtpore. Such an attack, in the panic-stricken 
 state of the enemy, would have, in all probability, been 
 successful. It was the confidence gained by the be- 
 siegers from our first abortive efforts that contributed 
 to the success of their defence. Once, however, having 
 decided upon a siege, the Commander-in-Chief fell 
 naturally into the hands of his engineers. It was for 
 them to conduct those operations which form the pre- 
 liminary to the final attack of the infantry on a place. 
 Now nothing is clearer than that up to the time of the 
 last assault, the engineers were utterly ignorant of 
 the defences of Bhurtpore, or of the peculiarities of the 
 ground immediately under its walls. To their in- 
 capacity in this respect Lord Lake frequently refers in 
 his dispatches, and there can be little doubt that, no 
 engineer himself, and depending much on his com- 
 munications with officers of that service for his deci- 
 sions, he felt, and felt deeply, that he had been led 
 more than once to hazard the lives of his soldiers on 
 impossible enterprises. 
 
 Inapplicable then to his case is that criticism which 
 would transfer to Lord Lake the entire- blame of these 
 failures. It may be a question, indeed, whether with 
 ihe inadequate means at his disposal he was justified in 
 undertaking the siege of such a place. But here again 
 
110 LORD LAKE. 
 
 experience was in favour of prompt action. Allygurh 
 and Deeg had fallen without difficulty, and Bhurtpore 
 had not, at the moment he sat down before it, any 
 extraordinary means of defence. But for the accident 
 occurring at the first assault, it would assuredly have 
 fallen. But, even as it was, he did not fail in the main 
 result he proposed to himself. It is true he did not 
 take Bhurtpore by assault, but he compelled its Eajah 
 to humble himself before the British power, to recede 
 from the alliance with Holkar, to indemnify the Com- 
 pany for their expenses. Though he was repulsed, his 
 policy was not the less successful. Those terrible 
 assaults, though they resulted immediately in the 
 retreat of our storming parties, led with no less cer- 
 tainty to the accomplishment of the object of the 
 campaign. Had Lord Lake, on the other hand, hesi- 
 tated to attack Bhurtpore, he would have been unable, 
 having that strong position within thirty miles of our 
 frontier, to venture far in pursuit of the indefatigable 
 Holkar. 
 
 We cannot, then, altogether sympathize with these 
 critics after the event. In the siege of Bhurtpore, 
 fortune was against Lord Lake, and he failed. But at 
 the commencement of it nine chances out of ten were 
 in his favour, and his failure is more fairly attributable 
 to the accident which caused the first repulse, than to 
 any defect in his own arrangements. But though the 
 fickle goddess for the moment abandoned him, he 
 possessed, as we shall see, the iron will to force her to 
 become again, as she had been before, his submissive 
 and willing votary. 
 
 It will be recollected that after the second failure at 
 the assault, Ameer Khan, a famous partisan Eohilla, 
 
LORD LAKE. Ill 
 
 had attempted to cut off our convoys, but had been 
 signally repulsed. He had then left Bhurtpore, and 
 made an incursion into Kohilcund. Thither, however, 
 he had been followed by a portion of our cavalry under 
 General Smith, who reached Moradabad just in time to 
 save it from the clutches of Ameer Khan. That chief- 
 tain then attempted to return, but on his way was 
 attacked and defeated at Afzulgurh on the 2nd March. 
 He, however, contrived to escape with a few followers 
 and rejoined Holkar at Bhurtpore on the 23rd, having 
 in the interim received some accessions to his party. 
 His arrival so increased the forces at the disposal of 
 Jeswunt Kao, that Lord Lake considered the moment 
 opportune for endeavouring to bring the enemy to action 
 in the open plain, or at all events to drive them from the 
 vicinity of Bhurtpore. At two o'clock in the morning 
 of the 29th March therefore, taking with him the whole 
 of his cavalry, and sending Colonel Don with some 
 infantry to attack his right. Lord Lake moved upon the 
 position occupied by the allies. But though he came in 
 sight of it- at daybreak, the enemy had had notice of 
 his approach, for he found them in readiness to run 
 away. They moved off at once, and though pursued 
 for several miles, they lost only two hundred men and 
 some cattle. On the 1st April, the attempt was re- 
 newed with more success, our troops coming upon the 
 enemy before they had time to mount their horses, 
 sabring numbers of them, and pursuing the remainder 
 for fifty miles. This successful affair completed the dis- 
 comiiture of Jeswunt Kao. But before this occurred, 
 the Kajah of Bhurtpore had opened out negotiations 
 for peace. Weary of his allies, disliking the enormous 
 expenses imposed upon him, and above all, having a 
 
112 LOED LAKE. 
 
 just dread of the pertinacity of the English general, he 
 had taken advantage of the intimation he had received 
 of the elevation of Lord Lake to the peerage to offer 
 him his congratulations, accompanying it by a profession 
 of his desire for peace, and of his readiness to proceed 
 in person to the English camp. This frank offer met 
 with a corresponding return on the part of Lord Lake. 
 Formal negociations were opened on the 10th March, 
 the conclusion of which was rather hastened by the 
 defeat of Holkar, on the first April, and by the over- 
 throw of the last remnant of his infantry by Captain 
 Eoyal on the 7th April, at Ahmednuggur. On the 10th 
 of that month, the army having meanwhile taken up a 
 position with a view to renew the siege, the conditions 
 of a treaty were agreed to. The Kajah bound himself to 
 renounce his alliances with the Mahratta chieftains, 
 to restore the territory which we had made over to him 
 from that yielded to us by Scindia, and to pay a sum 
 of twenty lakhs ^f rupees towards the expenses of the 
 war. We should scarcely have demanded more, had 
 the place been taken by assault. 
 
 Free now to follow up Holkar, who had thrown 
 himself on the protection of Scindia, Lord Lake broke 
 up from Bhurtpore on the 21st. The doubtful conduct 
 of the latter chieftain made it more especially necessary 
 that the movements of his army should have no un- 
 certain character. He, accordingly, marched to Dhol- 
 pore on the Chumbul, threatening the territories of both 
 Mahratta rulers. Alarmed at this, Scindia, detaining 
 Mr. Jenkins, the English resident, precipitately retreated 
 in conjunction with Jeswunt Eao in the direction of 
 Kotah. This conduct on the part of Scindia led to 
 negotiations being entered into with the Supreme 
 
LOED LAKE. 113 
 
 Government, pending the issue of wliich Lord Lake, 
 with the bulk of his force, returned to Agra for the 
 rainy season, keeping it, however, in a state ready to 
 move at a moment's warning. 
 
 Whilst the negotiations we have referred to were still 
 going on, and the army was in daily expectation of a 
 declaration of a war against Soindia, the great ruler who 
 had so long and so successfully directed the fortunes of 
 his countrymen in India, and who, if Clive deserves to 
 be styled the first, is as surely entitled to the desig- 
 nation of the second founder of the Anglo-Indian empire, 
 — the illustrious Marquis Wellesley, — ceased to govern. 
 His successor, the Marquess Cornwallis, had arrived with 
 peaceful instructions, and with a pre-conceived determi- 
 nation to undo as far as possible the policy of his pre- 
 decessor. He resolved, therefore, not only to overlook 
 the conduct of Scindia as evinced in his detention of the 
 resident, but to restore to him the fortress of Gwalior, 
 and the province of Gohud, which had been taken from 
 him in the last war. With reference to Holkar, the 
 Governor General announced his intention to restore to 
 him all the possessions which he had held at the com- 
 mencement of the war. 
 
 It can easily be believed that such resolutions would 
 be regarded by Lord Lake as extremely detrimental 
 to British interests, — even fraught with danger to the 
 security of our possessions. To throw away the ad- 
 vantages which we had gained with so much glory, and 
 at the cost of so many lives, — to replace in their former 
 position men who had shown themselves the determined 
 and formidable enemies of the British, appeared to him 
 to indicate a feebleness little short of insanity. He 
 accordingly, took upon himself to detain the letter 
 
 I 
 
114 LOED LAKE. 
 
 containing the offers alluded to, until he could receive 
 a reply to a remonstrance he at once addressed on the 
 subject to the Governor General. 
 
 But before Lord Cornwallis received that remon- 
 strance, the stroke of death was upon him. On the 
 5th October he died, and the Government devolved ad 
 interim upon the senior member of Council, Sir George 
 Barlow. 
 
 It has been well observed* that the sole object by 
 which this gentleman appeared to be animated in his 
 administration, " was to get quit of present difficulties 
 at any cost, even at the sacrifice of the national power 
 and credit. This was cutting, not disentangling the 
 Gordian knot, and evinced little prudence or judgment 
 in the operators." Sir George Barlow not only*con- 
 firmed the arrangements entered into by Lord Cornwallis, 
 even adding a pension to Scindia of four lakhs annually, 
 but, agreeing on his part not to enter into separate 
 treaties with any of the independent chiefs, styled by 
 Scindia his tributaries, in Meywar or Malwa, he went 
 so far as deliberately to sacrifice to the vengeance of 
 the Mahratta chieftains, the Kajas of Boondee and Jye- 
 pore, whose stedfast alliance throughout the war, more 
 especially at the time of Monson's retreat, had been of 
 incalculable service to us. The earnest and repeated 
 remonstrances of Lord Lake on this point, he treated 
 with utter disregard. It is scarcely to be wondered at 
 that it should have become necessary before many years 
 to pour out blood and treasure again to reduce these 
 puffed up chieftains to the position in which Lord 
 Lake had brought, but was not allowed to keep, them, 
 nor that the task should have devolved upon another 
 
 * Professor H. H. Wilson. 
 
LOUD LAKE. 115 
 
 Governor General, the most brilliant successor* of 
 Marquess Wellesley, to place the most powerful of them 
 in a position in which it should become his interest 
 to support the predominance of the British power in 
 India. 
 
 Meanwhile, Lord Lake, disgusted at the too self- 
 denying policy of the acting Governor General, was not 
 the less determined to perform the part of Commander- 
 in-chief so long as the war continued. By a threaten- 
 ing letter to Scindia he procured, in July, the release of 
 the British resident, and as soon as the season permitted, 
 having learned that Holkar had eluded all the columns 
 sent to intercept him, and was moving on the Panjab at 
 the head of a numerous rabble and sixty guns, he set 
 out in pursuit. Marching to Delhi, thence, via Paniput 
 and Pattealah, he arrived on the 2nd December at 
 Loodhiana, the first British general, and leading the 
 first British array, that had ever beheld the waters of 
 the Sutlej. They crossed this river on the 5th, and 
 marching througli the country without meeting any 
 opposition from the people, — the supplies being carefully 
 paid for, — reached, after passing through Jullunder, the 
 banks of the Beas on the 9tli. Here intelligence was 
 received that Jeswunt Rao was at Umritsur, in very 
 great straits, the chiefs of the Sikh nation, alarmed by 
 the prompt pursuit of Lord Lake, having resolved to 
 withhold from him all material aid. Thus abandoned, 
 Jeswunt Eao, hopeless of aught but his life, threw himself 
 on the mercy of the conqueror, admitting that his whole 
 country lay upon his saddle's bow. To his surprise this 
 chieftain, who had waged war with us with an unrivalled 
 animosity, who had murdered in cold blood the Eng- 
 
 * We need scarcely say that we allude to Lord Ellenborough. 
 
 i2 
 
116 LORD LAKE. 
 
 lishmen in his employ, because they refused to fight 
 against their countrymen, who had treated the prisoners 
 he had taken with unparalleled atrocity, found himself, 
 according to the instructions of the Supreme Government 
 "reinstated in dominions to which he never had any 
 right, and which, even if he had, he deserved to have 
 forfeited."* 
 
 This treaty being concluded. Lord Lake after review- 
 ing his army for the benefit of the Sikh chieftains, began, 
 on the 9th January, to return to our own provinces. 
 He had previously transmitted a proposal to make the 
 Sutlej the boundary of British India, but such a plan 
 was not at all consonant to the ideas then prevailing in 
 high places.-f- He accordingly moved on leisurely to 
 Delhi, where he halted for two months to make the 
 necessary arrangements for the occupation of the country. 
 He then proceeded to Cawnpore, thence at the end of 
 the year to Calcutta, and there, in February, 1807, 
 amid addresses from all classes, from natives and from 
 Europeans, from soldiers and from civilians, he embarked 
 for Europe. Never before had such a general ovation 
 been given to any public man on his departure from the 
 country, and never has that ovation been repeated. It 
 was as true and genuine from all classes, as was the 
 testimonial offered in 1844 to Lord Ellenborough by 
 the army alone. 
 
 Had he deserved it? Was he, in sober truth, the 
 great general his soldiers believed him ? Did he, in 
 reality, possess those great military qualities for which 
 the enemies he defeated gave him credit? We at least, 
 
 * Major Thorn. 
 
 t It was nevertheless carried out four years later, under the adminis- 
 tration of Lord Minto. 
 
LORD LAKE. 117 
 
 do not doubt it. We believe that he, had completely 
 mastered, before he had fired a shot in this country, the 
 one principle which in India, at all events, makes victory 
 to an English army a matter of certainty. That prin- 
 ciple is never to fear moving forward, never to care for 
 strong positions or numerical superiority, but to dash 
 onwards to the attack. This is the rule that has been 
 adopted, and adopted successfully, by all our great 
 Indian commanders. It was the rule of Kobert Clive 
 and of John Adams ; of Forde and of Coote ; of Goddard ; 
 of Wellesley ; of Hastings ; of Napier and of Gough ; of 
 Havelock ; of Rose ; and of Nicholson. It was because 
 we had men possessing the spirit and sagacity to carry 
 out this rule, who did not wait to count the numbers or 
 to reconnoitre too closely the position of the enemy, that 
 we won India. " Show me where the enemy are," said 
 the greatest of Eussian generals, Suwaroff, " and I will 
 attack them ; I want no reconnoitring." Suwaroff drove 
 the French out of Italy. It is not, it is true, every man 
 who is capable of attacking. To attack with effect 
 requires the possession of a cool head, a brain that 
 becomes more energetic, more compressed, under the 
 influence of fire, a resolute and imperturbable nature. 
 Success in attack depends mainly on the capacity of 
 being able to see as clearly amid the whistling of bullets 
 as when sitting at a chess-board. It requires a man to 
 possess the faculties attributed by Napoleon to Massena, 
 of whom he said that he was dull in conversation, but 
 that when under fire his mental energy redoubled and 
 his thoughts were then clear and forcible. It was because 
 Lord Lake possessed this faculty to an eminent degree, 
 accompanying it by unlimited confidence in his men and 
 the power of winning their affections, that he was right 
 
118 LOED LAKE. 
 
 to attack under all- circumstances, and that he always 
 was successful when attacking in the field. 
 
 But he possessed in addition another great quality, 
 scarcely if at all less important for a general. It was a 
 quality he possessed in common with Napoleon, and 
 may, therefore, be described in the same language. 
 " The battle of Napoleon," writes Sir William Napier, 
 " was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which 
 the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured 
 onwards covering all things." That, too, was tlie battle 
 of Lord Lake. He was never content with merely 
 beating an enemy in the field ; with the possession of 
 the field of battle; he was not satisfied till he had 
 utterly annihilated and destroyed him. Thus, in the 
 war with Scindia, he was not content even with the 
 capture of two fortresses and one imperial city ; he 
 hastened from them in pursuit of the broken remnants 
 of the enemy, and was only satisfied when he had 
 annihilated their last disciplined battalion at Laswarrie. 
 Again, in the contest with Holkar, he pursued that 
 chieftain from Muttra to Delhi ; from Delhi to Fur- 
 ruckabad ; then, surprising him and beating him there, 
 drove him to take refuge under the walls of Bhurtpore ; 
 assaulting that city, and though repulsed four times, yet 
 gaining it over from Holkar at the last, he followed him 
 through regions untrodden by a British army ; crossed 
 the Sutlej in such array, as to prevent the fugitive 
 chieftain from finding new alliances among a warlike 
 people ; and finally forced him to surrender himself and 
 the " kingdom on his saddle's bow," at Umritsur. Who 
 will deny that in this instance *' the roaring flood poured 
 onwards, covering all things " ? 
 
 There is yet a third point of view in which the 
 
LORD LAKE. 119 
 
 arrangements of Lord Lake as a general were admirable, 
 worthy even of imitation in the present day. We 
 allude to the facility which he so happily exercised of 
 moving his troops and their baggage. ''The march 
 of our army," writes Major Thorn, " had the appearance of 
 a moving town or citadel in the form of an oblong 
 square, whose sides were defended by ramparts of 
 glittering swords and bayonets. On the one side moved 
 the line of infantry, on the opposite that of the cavalry, 
 parallel to, and preserving its encamping distance as 
 near as possible from the infantry, and keeping the head 
 of the column in a line with the former. The front 
 face was protected by the advance guard, composed of 
 all the pickets coming on duty, and the rear by all the 
 pickets returning from duty, and then forming the rear 
 guard. The parks and columns of artillery moved 
 inside the square, always keeping tlie high road, and 
 next to the infantry, which moved at a short distance 
 from it. The remainder of the space within the square 
 was occupied by the baggage, cattle, and followers of 
 the camp. Notwithstanding the immense magnitude 
 of this moving mass, and the multifarious elements of 
 which it consisted, nothing could exceed the regu- 
 larity observed by the troops in maintaining their 
 respective distances, and adhering closely to the order 
 of formation on the march." This was the case in an 
 ordinary march against an enemy, but we find from the 
 same authority how advantage was always taken of local 
 circumstances to alter it. Thus, in advancing from 
 Muttra, in face of the entire cavalry of Holkar,— the 
 cavalry led, followed by the infantry; between them 
 and the river Jumna, the course of which was followed, 
 were placed the baggage and camp followers, — a mode 
 
120 LORD LAKE. 
 
 of advance which effectually prevented depredations, 
 and gave free scope to the action of the army. To 
 enable him to make those unsurpassed marches, the 
 rapidity of which contributed as much as any other 
 cause to the defeat of the enemy, it was the practice of 
 Lord Lake to serve out gratuitously to each fighting 
 man and public follower six pounds of flour. This 
 quantity lasted six days, and being carried by the men, 
 reduced the carriage. The diminution in that respect 
 more than defrayed its cost. 
 
 In other respects Lord Lake fulfilled all the require- 
 ments of a great general. A strict disciplinarian, he 
 carefully consulted the comforts of the soldier. Tlieir 
 toils, their privations, their fatigues, their exposure, he 
 shared with them. It needed only that an officer or 
 soldier should show himself zealous and active to ensure 
 notice from the Commander-in-Chief. He knew no dis- 
 tinction of service. That man was rewarded who best 
 knew, and who best did his duty. No man ever pos- 
 sessed a greater power of attaching others to himself. 
 In private life, he was equally to be> esteemed. Generous, 
 unselfish, and open-hearted, he was a favourite every- 
 where. If his temper was quick, he never hoarded up 
 an enmity. His anger often cooled down before the 
 cause of it had bee^n removed. No man had a larger or 
 more attached circle of friends. 
 
 He left India, as we have stated, in February, 1807, 
 and reached England in the following September. He 
 received the most flattering welcome from his country- 
 men, and, on the 31st October following, was created by 
 his sovereign a viscount, and was appointed governor of 
 Plymouth. He did not, however, live long to enjoy 
 these dignities and honours. In the month of February 
 
LOED LAKE. 121 
 
 following, he was attacked by an illness, which on the 
 21st terminated fetally. He died, as he had lived, 
 in the performance of his duty. 
 
 With no more appropriate sentence could we conclude 
 our necessarily imperfect outline of the life of this 
 famous warrior. It forms alike an epitome of his career, 
 and a justification to us for having undertaken it. It is 
 possible that to some this long record of battles fought 
 and won; of sieges undertaken; of pursuits followed 
 up ; of advances and pursuits ; coloured only by details 
 of slaughter, and an account of the sufferings of the 
 wounded, may appear tedious and purposeless. But we 
 do not hesitate to avow that to our minds there are few 
 stories more instructive, none more interesting, than 
 that of the career of a noble and successful soldier, 
 fighting the battles of his country. There is something 
 inspiriting even in the idea of men giving themselves 
 up to a career of this nature, — a career in which every- 
 thing is to be risked, and little that is material to be 
 gained, — a career promising great toil, exposure of the 
 most trying kind, and an ever recurring chance of loss 
 of life or limb. There must at least be much that 
 is unselfish in the yearning that prompts a young man 
 to undergo all this labour for so little profit. For, the 
 real soldier, be it always remembered, fights not that he 
 himself may gain, but that his country may benefit by 
 his exertions. To that country he gives the best years 
 of his life, his best energies of body and mind, often too 
 those prospects of a peaceful life which will not always 
 be banished even from his imagination. He gives all 
 these, careless of the consequences, not only careless of, 
 but rejoicing in, the fatigues, difficulties, and dangers he 
 may encounter ; doubly happy if fortune will but give 
 
122 LOUD LAKE. 
 
 him the chance that may connect his name with the 
 scene of the triumph of his country's arms. But 
 to the general reader the contemplation of the career 
 of a great soldier, such as Lord Lake was, presents a 
 lesson of a character more practical and instructive. 
 Does not tlie story of his constant advances, his eager- 
 ness to close wdth the enemy, his grappling with him 
 till he had overcome him, — does not that indicate a state 
 of things which comes within the life-experience of 
 most men ? Do we not realise the fact that the military 
 career of a soldier is but the type of the every-day life 
 of an ordinary man? If the soldier is cowardly, in- 
 different, and careless, he will assuredly be beaten by his 
 enemy, just in the same way as the man who is cowardly, 
 indifferent, and careless in every-day life, is overcome 
 by the temptations which are to him a formidable foe. 
 When, on the other hand, ^ve read of Lord Lake ever 
 advancing, caring for no obstacle, riding at the long 
 grass which he knew covered the guns behind them, do 
 we not at once recognise the type of the man of every-day 
 life, who, conscious of his own dignity, confident of the 
 rectitude of his motives, advances in the path marked 
 out to him, thrusting down every temptation, careless of 
 the sneers of the world, scorning to compromise with 
 evil, resisting the seductions which are disguised under 
 some plausible title? Well would it be for men in 
 general, if they would not disdain to take a lesson from 
 this simple-minded warrior, if they would treat the sins 
 that beset them as Lord Lake treated his enemies, 
 taking no breath until they were utterly and for ever 
 subdued. In that view of the question, the study of his 
 life may not be quite valueless to all. 
 
 We cannot conclude without expressing the opinion 
 
LORD LAKE. 123 
 
 we entertain of Major Thorn's contribution to the 
 military history of that period. It must ever be the 
 text book of the campaigns against Scindia and Holkar, 
 more especially of that portion of them conducted by 
 Lord Lake in person, throughout which the Major bore 
 a part. We have followed his account in all important 
 particulars, excepting, indeed, when he speaks of the 
 numbers of the Mahrattas. On that question Major L. 
 F. Smith, who was himself in the service of Dowlut Kao 
 Scindia, is a far more safe and trustworthy authority. 
 The exaggeration, however unintentional, of the number 
 of troops brought into the field by a defeated enemy, is 
 no compliment to the conquering army, for it induces 
 doubts as to the real merit of the victories achieved. 
 
( 124 ) 
 
 LECTUEE ON THE CAREER OF 
 
 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 [Delivered in the Dalhousie Institute, Calcutta, 
 16th January, 1865.] 
 
 The career of Count Lally must always have special 
 charms for the student of individual character. It 
 is a career bristling with incidents, and not only with 
 incidents of a private or ordinary nature, but with in- 
 cidents affecting some of the most important events 
 in European and Anglo-Indian history. It is a career 
 full of instruction, for it shows how varying circum- 
 stances, and varying scenes, may affect the conduct 
 of a man of great resources and real ability. It shows 
 us a human character in innumerable phases, now 
 buoyant under prosperity, now struggling wnth the 
 animosity of secret and avowed enemies; a character 
 single-minded yet passionate, resolute and self-reliant, 
 and whilst perhaps limited in the scope of its intel- 
 lectual vision, yet regarding difficulties as obstacles 
 to be overcome, as obstacles which every man was 
 bound, as part of his heritage from his Maker, to 
 grapple with and trample upon. Such a character has 
 ever appeared to me well worthy of study. 
 
 I have styled this lecture " The Career of Count 
 Lally ; " but it might, I think, somewhat more correctly 
 
COUNT LALLY. 125 
 
 be entitled the * Careers ' of that eminent man. For, 
 undoubtedly, — and herein lies the great interest of his 
 life, — Lally had two careers, — two careers so distinct 
 from one another that it would seem, to the casual 
 reader, quite impossible that the same man had been 
 the chief actor in both ; two careers, — the one eminently 
 successful, the second a crushing failure, — the one 
 in Europe, the other in Asia ; — both alike interesting, 
 both alike instructive, and containing, when fairly 
 looked at, a moral which we, to whom, in different 
 spheres and under different circumstances, careers in 
 Europe and Asia have also been assigned, cannot fail 
 to understand and to apply. 
 
 Lally was the son of a very distinguished Irish 
 Officer. His father. Sir Gerard O'Lally, descended 
 from a race of Chieftains, — whose lineage might be 
 traced back to the period when Ireland stood alone, 
 unconnected with the sister isle, — had inherited the 
 religion, and had remained loyal to the cause, of the 
 House of Stuart. When the events of 1690 and 91 had 
 shattered the fortunes of that house in Ireland, Sir 
 Gerard and twelve thousand of his countrymen still 
 faithful to it, took advantage of the clause in the 
 capitulation of Limerick which permitted the garrison 
 to march out with all the honours of war, and to take 
 service under the French King. Arriving in France, 
 Sir Gerard was made colonel of one of the regi- 
 ments of the new Irish Brigade — a Brigade that soon 
 gained for itself the reputation of being the flower 
 of the French army, — ever most forward in fight, 
 ever entrusted with duties that were considered of 
 all others most arduous. Some few years later. Sir 
 Gerard married a French lady of noble family, and to 
 
126 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 them, in tlie month of January, 1702, a son was bora. 
 This son was Thomas Arthur, Count de Lally, Baron 
 de Tallendal, the hero of this lecture. 
 
 Lally was literally a soldier from the hour of his 
 birth. According to the custom then prevalent in the 
 French army, he was entered, as soon as he was born, 
 as a private in his father's regiment. Nor did his 
 service continue long merely nominal. At a very early 
 age he began the practice of spending his holidays with 
 his father in the French camp. He was barely nine 
 years old when he was present at the siege and capture 
 of Gerona (25th January, 1711). Three years later, 
 he mounted his first guard in the trenches before 
 Barcelona. In such a school, and amid such scenes, 
 under the direct tutorage of his father, Lally continued 
 till he attained the age of fifteen years. His oppor- 
 tunities were great. His father's experience gave him 
 knowledge of his profession, whilst his mother's relation- 
 ship to some of the most illustrious families of -France 
 caused his introduction to the higher circles of society, 
 and imparted to his manners that tone and polish so 
 characteristic of the old French aristocracy. The 
 manners thus acquired were set off by a handsome 
 person. 
 
 Amongst other lessons impressed upon the mind of 
 Lally at this early and most impressive period of his 
 life, was a bitter and unrelenting hatred of the English, 
 — or rather of the family which then sat on the throne 
 of England. Sir Gerard O'Lally could never forget 
 that he was an exile, and, not content with hating with 
 all the bitterness of an exile's hatred, he imparted all 
 his feelings, with all their bitterness, to his son. He 
 trained that son, as Hamilcar trained Hannibal, to a 
 
COUNT LALLY. 127 
 
 fierce detestation of his great enemy. He taught him 
 to consider the humiliation of the House of Hanover, as 
 the one great end and object of his life. The young 
 Lally never forgot that teaching. By it every im- 
 portant event' in his career was influenced, and he 
 counted no toil too great, no sacrifice too heavy, if, by 
 making it, he could inflict injury on those whom lie 
 regarded alike as the enemies of his God, and rebels 
 against his King. 
 
 In consequence partly of his great attention to his 
 duties, and partly, perhaps, to the ij^fluence he had 
 acquired through his mother at the French Court, 
 Lally obtained, at the age of nineteen, the command 
 of a company in his father's regiment. Two years 
 later, his principal patron, the Kegent Orleans, died 
 (1723). Lally, however, was not the man to need the 
 services of a patron ; he required only the opportunity 
 to develope his abilities ; and like all sterling men so 
 situated, he felt that, sooner or later, that opportunity 
 would come ; that meanwhile, it was only necessary for 
 him to be patient, and to prepare himself for all 
 eventualities. This, at least, is a maxim that must 
 always commend itself to any man who is at once able 
 and ambitious, and to whom the immediate future may 
 appear overshadowed. The opportunity, we may depend 
 upon it, will come, and it is for the man, who is at 
 once strong-willed and daring, capable and resolute, to 
 seize it. 
 
 Certainly, Lally, when his opportunity came, showed 
 no lack of these qualities. When, twelve years after 
 his promotion to captain, war broke out, he was still 
 only aide-major in his regiment, a rank almost equiva- 
 lent to that of adjutant. But then his opportunity 
 
128 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 came. His regiment formed part of the French army- 
 sent to besiege Kehl, on the Khine. Kehl was reduced, 
 and PhiHpsburg, the strongest fortress on the Khine, 
 was invested and taken, in the face of an Imperial army 
 under the famous Prince Eugene. Kollin, the French 
 historian of ancient history, describes this capture as an 
 achievement worthy of the Koman legions in their 
 palmiest day. To us, it has this interest, that it gave 
 Lally his first opportunity of showing the stuff that was 
 in him. He not only greatly distinguished himself, but 
 he was fortunate enough to save the life of his father 
 by a deed of unsurpassed gallantry. For his conduct 
 in this campaign Lally was promoted to the rank of 
 major. ^ 
 
 The taking of Philipsburg was the last event of the 
 war, and further opportunities for promotion seemed 
 to have ceased with the peace (1735). But Lally was 
 a man who could not be idle. Shut out from military 
 employment, he devoted himself to the accomplishment, 
 by other means, of the great dream of his life. To this 
 end he made a journey to England, and sounded the 
 sentiments of the Jacobites in the soutliern portion 
 of the kingdom. Bat this convinced him that an in- 
 surrection in England could only be successful, if sup- 
 ported by the intervention of a foreign power. Hopeless 
 of France, he turned his thoughts to Kussia, and as that 
 country was then engaged in war with Turkey, he 
 applied to be permitted to serve with the Kussian army, 
 then commanded by his uncle. General Lascy, in that 
 war. His real object was to interest the Czarina, Anne 
 of Courland, in his projects against England. His 
 leave was granted, but before he could set out, the 
 French Minister, Cardinal Fleury, knowing his sym- 
 
COUNT LALLY. 129 
 
 pathies, conferred upon his mission an official character, 
 and directed him to use all his efforts to bring about 
 a coalition of France and the Northern powers against 
 England. Lally went direct to St. Petersburg, and by 
 his skill and address, found great favour at the Court of 
 the Czarina. But he had scarcely left France, when Car- 
 dinal Fleury, already frightened at the possible results 
 of his mission, resolved that it should have no im- 
 portant consequences. He therefore left Lally himself 
 without instructions, and his despatches without definite 
 reply. Lally, therefore, unable to come to any under- 
 standing with the Northern Courts, and feeling himself 
 compromised, resolved to quit St. Petersburg. He re- 
 turned, irritated to Paris, and vented his reproaches on 
 the Cardinal. "I entered Kussia," he said to him, 
 "like a lion, and thanks to you, I consider myself 
 fortunate to have quitted it like a fox." The Cardinal 
 was much disconcerted, but could give no satisfactory 
 reply. He promised, however, to examine two memo- 
 randa transmitted to him by Lally on the subject 
 of a concert of the northern powers and France against 
 England, but death struck him down before any notice 
 of the question had been taken (29 January, 1743). 
 
 But, though thus unsuccessful as a negotiator, the 
 attenapt had greatly increased Lally's reputation. He 
 had gained the admiration of the Czarina by his 
 address, and of the French Ministry by his loyalty. 
 He was thus regarded as something more than a mere 
 soldier, and, from the time of his return from the 
 Kussian mission, was looked upon as one of the most 
 rising characters at the French Court. Indeed, oppor- 
 tunity alone seemed wanting to enable him to rise 
 to the highest pinnacle of success. 
 
 K 
 
130 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 That opportunity soon came. The death of the 
 Emperor Charles VI. (1740) threw Europe in a blaze, 
 and the year 1741, Lally being then thirty-nine years 
 of age, saw France and Austria again in hostile array 
 against one another. 
 
 • Of the campaigns that followed it is impossible that 
 I should speak here in detail, or even give a cursory 
 outline. The occasion does not demand it, nor does 
 time admit of it. On the breaking out of the war, 
 Lally's regiment was sent into Ilanders under the 
 Marshal de Noailles. In this campaign Lally gave 
 so many instances of ability, that the French marshal 
 applied for his services as adjutant-general on his staff. 
 In this capacity he accompanied the French army into 
 Germany, in the famous march in which the French 
 general succeeded in cutting off the allied army, under 
 the personal command of King George II., from Frank- 
 fort on the Maine. The battle of Dettingen which 
 followed, terminated disastrously to the French arms, 
 although, had ordinary prudence been displayed by the 
 Due de Grammont, who had been left in command at 
 the village of Dettingen, the capture of the King of 
 England, and the defeat or capture of his entire army, 
 would have been assured. Lally took an active part in 
 this engagement, and in the subsequent movements 
 consequent upon it. In the following year (1744) he 
 was present at the capture of Menin (5 June), of Ypres 
 (25 June), and of Furnes (11 July). In this campaign, 
 the French army, 120,000 strong, was commanded by 
 Louis XV. in person, having under him the Marshals 
 de Saxe and de Noailles. It was under these two 
 generals, the most distinguished of that period, that 
 Lally enjoyed the opportunity of displaying his abilities. 
 
COUIs^T LALLY. 131 
 
 and so liigUy were those abilities estimated, and so 
 favourable was the impression he made, that after the 
 taking of Furnes, he was commissioned to raise a new 
 regiment of Irish, to be called by his name, and of 
 which he was to have the command. 
 
 Lally set about this task with his wonted energy. In 
 four months after the regiment had been raised, he had 
 brought it, by his own efforts, into a high state of dis- 
 cipline. So high indeed was the opinion formed of it, 
 that the most important position in the trenches before 
 Tournay, then besieged by the French army (1745) 
 under Marshal Saxe, was assigned to it. From this 
 position it was removed to one of even greater import- 
 ance in the field, on the receipt of intelligence that an 
 English army, commanded by the son of the King of 
 England, was marching to the relief of Tournay. 
 
 Then ensued the famous battle of Fontenoy, a battle 
 glorious alike to the vanquished and the victors ; — glo- 
 rious to that ever memorable column of stout English- 
 men which, uncovered by its allies, pierced the very 
 centre of the French army, threatening even its King 
 with capture ; — glorious to Marshal Saxe, who, though 
 carried on a litter, declared, when the battle to aU but 
 him appeared lost, that notwithstanding all unfavourable 
 appearances, the day was his own; — glorious to the 
 renowned chivalry of France, who refusing, in a spirit 
 of romantic courtesy to be the first to fire, then, after 
 their foremost ranks had fallen, repeated charge after 
 charge on that dense column that would not be broken ; 
 — glorious even, — perhaps his last deed of heroism, — to 
 the French King, who, though entreated by all his 
 entourage, when the day seemed absolutely lost, to quit 
 the field, declared he would remain to share the fortunes 
 
 k2 
 
132 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 of his army; — glorious, finally, to that famous Irish 
 Brigade, and especially to that Irish Kegiment de Lally, 
 whose last charge decided the victory, and drove back 
 that nearly victorious column, already shaken by the 
 artillery brought to bear on its front, reeling, though 
 not disordered to its reserves. Yes, reeling, though not 
 disordered, beaten back by those who may be termed 
 their countrymen, this renowned column, to use the 
 words of the French historian, "quitted the field of 
 battle without tumult, without confusion, and was covered 
 with honour." 
 
 Lally's conduct on this occasion may be estimated 
 by the fact that Louis XV. made him colonel on the 
 field of battle, and that he was personally thanked by 
 Marshal Saxe for the gallantry that had mainly contri- 
 buted to the victory. 
 
 The battle of Fontenoy decided that campaign. Not 
 only Tournay, but almost all the towns of the Nether- 
 lands fell into French hands, and Lally, finding further 
 opportunities of distinction disappearing from that scene, 
 transferred his services to another sphere. 
 
 The success of the French arms on the Continent had 
 again revived the idea of malting an armed intervention 
 in favour of the House of Stuart. The youthful heir of 
 that house had shown himself ready and able to seize 
 the opportunity, for, less than two months after Fonte- 
 noy had been fought, he liad made a descent with a 
 handful of followers on the coast of Scotland. Lally 
 was eager to support him, and he impressed his views 
 with so much force and energy on the French Court, 
 that all his plans were adopted. A force of ten thou- 
 sand men, under the Due de Kichelieu, with Lally him- 
 self as Quarter-Master-General, was organised. Eager 
 
COUNT LALLY. 133 
 
 for action, Lally set out himself, as soon as the orders 
 for the force had been issued, and, accompanied by a 
 few friends, joined Charles Edward during his retreat 
 from Derby. He was at once appointed aide-de-camp 
 to that prince, and served in that capacity at the battle 
 of Falkirk. After that battle he was sent to the south of 
 England to encourage a rising amongst the partisans 
 of the House of Stuart. 
 
 In one sense, Lally's journey into England had been 
 unfortunate. He had been the soul of the expedition 
 at that time being organised in France. Voltaire, who 
 knew him personally, says of his efforts at that period, 
 " He was the soul of the enterprise. I have never seen 
 a man more zealous ; it needed only that success should 
 be possible for him to succeed." Thus, when Lally left, 
 the soul indeed departed, and the bo^y languished and 
 died. The expedition never left the French shores. 
 The battle of Culloden added to his misfortunes, and 
 these seemed at their climax when the object of his 
 mission to London was discovered. The Duke of Cum- 
 berland, thirsty for the blood of the Jacobites, caused a 
 price to be put upon his head. But by means of some 
 influence Lally possessed with the Prince of Wales, he 
 was enabled to elude his pursuers, and, in the disguise 
 of a sailor, crossed the channel and landed in safety 
 at Dunkirk. He immediately rejoined the French army 
 under Marshal Saxe, and reached it in time to take part 
 in the conquest of the most important places in Flanders 
 in 1746. 
 
 The following year we find Lally still serving under 
 that great master of the art of war. He commanded his 
 regiment with great credit at the battle of Laffeldt 
 (2nd July), in which the Duke of Cumberland, at the 
 
134 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 liead of a combined army of English, Austrians, and 
 Dutch, was again beaten by Marshal Saxe. Louis XY., 
 who witnessed this battle, and who noticed the contrast 
 between the valour of the English and the apathy of 
 their allies, gave expression on this occasion to that 
 famous mot, destined to be verified • so often : " The 
 English fight for all and pay for all." At Laffeldt the 
 Irish Brigade again bore the brunt of the action, and 
 suffered terribly in men, — and irreparably, in the death 
 of its famous leader. Count Dillon, who had brought the 
 materials of it from Ireland, and who had shown him- 
 self one of the most distinguished soldiers even of that 
 eventful period. He was Daily's great uncle. 
 
 Whilst the French Marshal amused the Allies after 
 Laffeldt, he despatched General Lowendal to attack 
 Bergen-op-Zoom, ^a fortress commanding the navigation 
 of the Scheldt, and then reputed impregnable. But in 
 spite of its reputation, Lowendal assaulted it after three 
 weeks' open trenches, and to the surprise of Europe, and 
 to the dismay of England and Holland, he took it. Just 
 before the assault Lally had been taken prisoner in a 
 sortie. 
 
 He was, however, soon exchanged, and rejoined his 
 command. He was present with the army when, early 
 in the following year, Saxe invested Maestricht. In the 
 siege which followed he was severely wounded, and had 
 not recovered when the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle restored 
 peace to Europe, — Maestricht being surrendered to the 
 French as a matter of form. Lally, immediately after- 
 wards, in consideration of his services during this cam- 
 paign, received the rank of Major-General. 
 
 Thus had Lally fought his way up from the lowest 
 grade in the army to the rank of General Officer. We 
 
COFNT LALLY. 135 
 
 have followed him in every step of his career. We have 
 seen how his energy, his gallantry, and his abilities, con- 
 stantly called forth the special notice of those under whom 
 he served. We have seen this evidenced in the trenches 
 before Philipsburg, in the early campaigns in Flanders, 
 on tlie glorious field of Fontenoy, and in the final siege 
 of Maestricht. We have seen how he moulded his 
 soldiers, as one man, to his will. We have proof of this 
 in the ease with which, in four months, he organised the 
 regiment which bore his name, by the devotion shown 
 and the success achieved by that regiment at Fontenoy. 
 We have seen him, a trusted subaltern, knowing how to 
 obey ; an efficient staff-officer, knowing how to impress 
 his general's orders upon others ; an unsurpassed regi- 
 mental commander, receiving on two occasions his pro- 
 motion on the field of battle; a zealous and skilful 
 diplomatist, retaining the confidence of his own Sovereign 
 at the same time that he won the esteem of the Monarch 
 to whose court he was deputed. We have seen him 
 patient, though never idle, in times of inaction; and 
 while rather seeking than waiting for opportunities, 
 eager and prompt to seize those opportunities when they 
 came in his way, and not only to seize them, but to use 
 them, to press and squeeze out their very marrow, till 
 nought but the dry hide of them remained. We have 
 seen him, all this time, rising in the estimation of men, 
 gaining the goodwill of all, till, made a major-general 
 before Maestricht, he found himself, at the conclusion 
 of the war, universally regarded as the rising genius of 
 France, as the general who, to all appearance, would 
 have to occupy, in the next war, the places about to be 
 vacated by the Saxes and the Noailles, by the Belleisles 
 and the Lowendalls. Ah ! if such indeed had happened, 
 
136 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 how different miglit have been his destiny ! He knew 
 Europe, her statesmen, her soldiers, her modes of war- 
 fare, her habits of thought ; he had acquired his know- 
 ledge in an European school ; and in those days it was 
 seriously believed, as in these it is sometimes even seri- 
 ously argued, that knowledge thus acquired was certain 
 to command success in every part of the world. Let us 
 see how all his experience, all his knowledge of the men 
 and nations of Europe, availed Lally in the new and 
 distant land to which he was about to be transported. 
 
 For seven years after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 Europe remained at peace. In 1754, however, England 
 and France came in contact in Canada, and it was not 
 long before the animosities thus caused involved the 
 two nations in war. 
 
 Whilst, however, they were yet nominally at peace, 
 the news of the capture of two French men-of-war by 
 the English fleet, off Newfoundland, caused immense 
 excitement in France. Lally was at once summoned to 
 the ministerial counsels, and his advice was asked as 
 to the course the French Government might pursue in 
 the event of their determining to reply to this infraction 
 of the common right of nations by a declaration of war. 
 Lally suggested three courses, any one of which, he 
 insisted, might be advantageously followed. His first 
 plan, — in forming which he was doubtless influenced by 
 the leading idea of his life, — was to fit out a fleet and 
 army sufiicient for the purpose, and, taking Charles 
 Edward on board, to make a descent upon England ; his 
 second proposal was, to send a sufficient force to the 
 East Indies, to chase the English from all their posses- 
 sions in that country ; and the third, to drive them out 
 of America ; but, he added, " whatever course you adopt. 
 
. COUNT LALLY. 137 
 
 it is primarily necessary that you should think and act 
 at the same time." This prudent counsel, — prudent 
 because, at such a conjuncture, as in many that occur to 
 us in our lives, boldness was prudence, — was not accepted 
 by the French Ministry. Desirous to avoid war, they 
 mistook timidity for wisdom, and it was only a year after, 
 when three-fourths of their merchant marine had been 
 swept from the seas, that they could make up their minds 
 to act boldly. An alliance was then formed with Aus- 
 tria, Kussia, and Sweden, and it was resolved to act simul- 
 taneously in Germany, Canada, and in the East Indies. 
 On the 17th May, 1756, war was formally declared. 
 
 No sooner was it known that the French Government 
 had resolved to send a force to the East, than the East 
 India Company pressed upon them the nomination of 
 Lally to its command. His great reputation, his expe- 
 rience in war, his wonderful energy, seemed indeed to 
 point him out as the fittest man for the task. That task 
 was no light one. Not only were foreign enemies to be 
 subdued, but there was an administration to be purged. 
 At that time the reports of the corruption of the French 
 administrators in the East were universally rife, and were 
 all but universally believed. This was an additional 
 reason which influenced the Directors in their choice of 
 Lally. They felt sure, not only that his unsullied 
 honour would be proof against corruption, but that he 
 would scorn and loathe that vice in others, and would 
 spare no means to extirpate it. They felt confident, 
 likewise, that he, of all others, was a man to make him- 
 self obeyed, and obedience to their orders had been, up 
 to that time, a virtue "conspicuous by its absence." 
 They repeatedly, therefore, urged upon the Minister of 
 War the appointment of Lally. 
 
138 COUNT LALLY. . 
 
 The minister was not very willing. He liked Lally 
 personally, but he feared that his stern and unbending 
 character, made still more stern by a long course of 
 prosperity, was not exTactly suited to encounter such 
 a state of affairs as were believed to exist in Pondichery. 
 He dreaded lest such a nature, passionate and energetic, 
 would become unreasonably wild in the presence of 
 a resistance that did not openly resist, a corruption 
 which, though existing, might not be tangible. For 
 a long time, therefore, he opposed the nomination, 
 but the importunities of the Directors, backed by the 
 voice of public opinion, at length prevailed, and on the 
 19th November, 1756, Lally was appointed Lieutenant 
 General and Commander-in-Chief of the expedition to 
 the East. 
 
 Never did the Crown confer on any of its officers 
 a fuller commission than on this occasion. On the 
 31st December, Lally was appointed Commander-in- 
 Chief and Commissary of the King for the French 
 possessions in the East, including the Isles of France, 
 Bourbon and Madagascar : he was to preside in Council, 
 and to make all the inhabitants, the governors, and the 
 commanders of the land and sea forces of the Company 
 take the oath of obedience, " without any contravention 
 whatever." He was only not permitted to alter the 
 mode of collecting votes in Council, and he had no 
 absolute control over the movements of the ships of the 
 Eoyal Navy. 
 
 It was intended that the Military portion of the 
 expedition should consist of about 3000 men ; that 
 it should be supplied with specie to the amount of six 
 millions of livres ; and that it should leave France in 
 three detachments. The first of these, consisting of 
 
COUKT LALLY. 139 
 
 nearly one thousand men of the Kegiment de Lorraine, 
 fifty Artillerymen, with twenty siege guns, and its 
 proportion of treasure, under the orders of the Chevalier 
 de Soupire, second in command of the expedition, sailed 
 from the port of Lorient on the 30th December, 1756, 
 and reached Pondichery on the 9th September of the 
 following year. 
 
 The second detachment, consisting of the regiment 
 de Lally, with a due proportion of artillerymen and 
 guns, was to leave in the February following, escorted 
 by a squadron under Eear-Admiral Count d'Ache. A 
 superstitious man would have done well to mark the 
 hour on which Lally first met his naval colleague, 
 for most certainly the new Governor then came into 
 contact with his Evil Genius. It is a great, though 
 not an irreparable, misfortune for a man to be born 
 with barren brains. The absence of conceptive power 
 may be atoned for by the possession of a strong cha- 
 racter, a brave heart, a hand to carry out, in all their 
 fulness, the ideas of a master mind. But that man 
 is surely most miserable, who, to an unproductive brain 
 adds infirmity of purpose ; who, when the path he 
 cannot see is pointed out to him by others, has neither 
 the spirit nor the manliness to tread it ; to whom, 
 fear of responsibility and doubt, supplying the place 
 of the imagination in which he is deficient, double 
 difficulties and halve resources. Such a man is, of 
 all others, to be avoided as a colleague in an important 
 expedition, and yet such a man was d'Ache. 
 
 The effects of tliis man's nerveless vitality were soon 
 apparent. The fleet sailed on the 20th February, 
 but, in clearing Brest Harbour, two of the vessels be- 
 longing to it were slightly damaged. The injury was 
 
140 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 SO unimportant that all the principal naval officers 
 of the expedition were in favour of continuing the 
 voyage, and making the necessary repairs at sea. The 
 wind was favourable, and nothing imperatively de- 
 manded their return. But d'Ache doubted; the in- 
 evitable " if " paralysed the action of his shadow of a 
 heart, and he put back. 
 
 The squadron had scarcely re-anchored in Brest 
 Harbour, when one of the results of d'Ache's timidity 
 became manifest. An order arrived from the Court to 
 transfer two of his men of war to the squadron fitting 
 out for Canada, their places to be supplied by vessels 
 belonging to the Company. Lally was also informed 
 that the remaining third of the force originally destined 
 for him, could no longer be supplied. 
 
 In the face of these difficulties d'Ache remonstrated, 
 and resigned. Lally remonstrated, but expressed his 
 willingness to carry out his master's orders at all 
 hazards. The reply from the Court of Versailles was 
 an order to d'Ache to put to sea as soon as the ships 
 destined for him should arrive, and a promise to Lally 
 that the remaining third of his force should be sent 
 after him six months later. It never was sent. 
 
 More than two months were spent at Brest in idleness 
 waiting for the promised ships, and it was only on the 
 2nd May, 1757, that the squadron made its final start 
 for its Eastern destination. 
 
 How slowly it sailed ; how it pursued a coarse which, 
 the English historian states, ought to be known in 
 order to be avoided ; how two months were lost by 
 every night lying by a little merchant ship that d'Ache 
 had picked up ; how six weeks more were wasted in an 
 obscure port in trying to dispose of her cargo ; six 
 
COUNT LALLY. 141 
 
 weeks more, from tlie fear of rounding the Cape during 
 the Equinox; how the course was constantly altered 
 at night to avoid the sail descried in the day time ; 
 how a capful of wind was always a signal for taking 
 in the sails ; how all these things occurred, need not be 
 described. They did occur, however, and as we read 
 the heart-breaking account, we wonder, not that d'Ache 
 took twelve months to accomplish his voyage, but that 
 he ever accomplished it at all. Had he only continued 
 his voyage on the 20th February, and pursued it with 
 ordinary speed, he would have arrived in the Indian 
 seas five or six months before the English fleet ; or had 
 he sailed as the English did, he would still have been 
 three months before them, and three months at that 
 time might have been fatal to English domination in 
 India. As it was, the two fleets arrived about the same 
 time ; the French on the 28th April, 1758, the English 
 a day or two later. 
 
 But before describing the scenes that followed their 
 landing, it is necessary to take a short retrospect of 
 French policy in India. 
 
 The French settlement of Pondichery, established in 
 1674, attained, in the course of a few years, to a state 
 of great prosperity. The place itself was fortified, and 
 the surrounding country was by degrees brought into 
 subjection. Other factories, too, were established at 
 Mahe on the Malabar, at Karikal, on the Coromandel 
 coast, and at Chandernagore in Bengal, all subject to 
 the parent settlement. 
 
 Nothing occurred to interrupt the rising prosperity 
 of these settlements till the year 1744, when war broke 
 out between France and England. Even then, the 
 French, sensible of the advantage of peace for the 
 
142 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 consolidation of tlieir power, were anxious that India 
 should be regarded as a neutral ground, and they made 
 proposals to that effect. But the English had sent a 
 squadron to the Eastern seas, and they were unwilling 
 to forego the opportunities which seemed to present 
 themselves of destroying the commerce of their rivals. 
 War thus became inevitable. 
 
 At this juncture, La Bourdonnais, a self-made man, 
 one of the most energetic characters that ever lived, 
 and whose career well merits on every account a separate 
 notice, was Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon. 
 Eesolving to make a counter stroke against the English, 
 this man, full of energy and fertile in resources, fitted 
 out a fleet, trained the crews, and trampling over the 
 opposition of the Company, and the opposition of 
 those around him, brought his squadron in safety to 
 Pondichery. 
 
 The Governor of Pondichery at that time was Dupleix. 
 This extraordinary man had then perhaps only half 
 confessed even to himself the idea, which almost imme- 
 diately afterwards became the leading idea of his being 
 — the formation of a French Empire in India. He it 
 was, who, at the outbreak of the war, had proposed that 
 India should be neutral ground for both belligerents, 
 but on the rejection of this proposal he set to w^ork to 
 aid with all his energies the efforts of La Bourdonnais. 
 On the arrival of this latter at the head of a squadron 
 which, in its course, had beaten off the English squadron, 
 the soaring spirit of Dupleix aspired not only to the 
 rooting out of the English from the Coast of Coromandel, 
 but to their entire expulsion from Indian soil. He 
 hastened to endeavour to impress these ideas upon 
 La Bourdonnais, urging him, as the first step, to attack 
 
COUKT LALLY. 143 
 
 and destroy Madras. But, unhappily for French in- 
 terests, La Bourdonnais was not formed to act under 
 superior authority. Sailing, after some hesitation, to 
 Madras, and taking it without the loss of a man, he 
 professed to regard himself, in virtue of that conquest, 
 as independent of the controlling authority of the 
 Governor of Pondichery. F,ar, then, from carrying 
 out the views of Dupleix regarding the destruction 
 of Madras, he consented to ransom it on easy terms, 
 receiving from the English, as the price of his concur- 
 rence, a considerable present for himself. But the 
 capture of Madras had only rendered Dupleix more 
 fixed in his idea, more resolved to carry it out. The 
 insubordinate conduct of La Bourdonnais for a time, 
 indeed, paralysed him, and lost him moments which 
 no one better than La Bourdonnais himself could have 
 used to the advantage of France. But Dupleix was 
 well aware that on the setting in of the monsoon it 
 would be necessary for La Bourdonnais to return to 
 the Isle of France. He tlierefore refused to ratify 
 his convention with the English, and when La Bour- 
 donnais, forced to depart, made over to him his conquest, 
 he boldly kept possession of it, refusing to restore it to 
 the English. 
 
 Time will not allow me to do more than glance at 
 the system then put in force by the fertile genius 
 of Dupleix. The main principle of that system was 
 to make himseK and his French absolutely necessary 
 to the native rulers of India, — to make himself so 
 necessary, that the native princes should be ready, 
 not only to comply with his demands, but to offer 
 him such extension of territory as they thought he 
 would covet ; — to make himself so necessary, that he 
 
144 COUNT LALLT. 
 
 should really pull the wires which should move his 
 puppets into action ; and that thus, insensibly and 
 by degrees, by skill rather than by force, India would 
 become French, — French not only by inclination, and 
 by policy, but finally also in fact. But with this yiew 
 he regarded it of primary importance to rid himself 
 of the English. Free from their observation, he felt he 
 could carry out his scheme without hinderance or 
 control. So long as they remained on the coast, he 
 had to use all his resources in endeavouring to counter- 
 act their rivalry. He wished to be face to face with 
 the Native Powers, so as by balancing one against the 
 other, to use them for the purposes of France ; by 
 making himself essential to the strongest, to use the 
 power of the strongest to forward, gradually but surely, 
 the dream he had formed of a French Empire in 
 India. 
 
 To carry out this system, it was requisite that its 
 originator should possess a cool brain, a fertile imagina- 
 tion, an unscrupulous conscience, a readiness that never 
 was at fault, and resources in himself that were incapable 
 of exhaustion. And Dupleix was such a man. He was 
 a match for the natives at their own weapons. He 
 was, in fact, everything but a soldier. Had he been 
 that also, he would have realised all his visions. As it 
 was, his scheme failed ; but how near it was to success ! 
 When the year 1752 opened, the system of Dupleix 
 had been six years at work, and what was the result ? 
 Dupleix had made the Subadar of the Deccan ; he 
 had made the Nawab of the Carnatic ; the limits of 
 the French possessions had increased enormously; the 
 English candidate for the Nawabship of the Carnatic 
 had been driven to his last stronghold in Trichinoply, 
 
COUNT LALLT. . 145 
 
 and this lie was hopelessly defending. The English 
 themselves had little beyond Madras (restored to them 
 after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle) and Fort St. David, 
 and it appeared that the fall of Trichinopoly would be 
 the signal for their expulsion from India. Mahommed 
 Ali, whom they recognised as Nawab, had even offered 
 to make his submission to Chanda Sahib, the Nawab 
 appointed by the French. 
 
 But the scheme, when just on the point of accom- 
 plishment, tottered to its fall. Dupleix, no soldier 
 himself, had sent Bussy, the only general he possessed, 
 far away to the North ; and just at that moment, when 
 on the eve apparently of the accomplishment of all his 
 plans, the genius of Clive delivered at them a blow 
 which shook the very foundations of French dominion 
 in India. 
 
 But it was when reverses came that Dupleix showed 
 how boundless and inexhaustible were his resources. 
 The English Company received supplies of men and 
 money from England. Dupleix received nothing, or 
 next to nothing. Still for two years he maintained the 
 unequal struggle ; and when recalled, in 1754, he still 
 showed a bold front to his enemy, and had not even 
 then despaired of the realization of his dream. 
 
 Peace followed the departure of Dupleix only nomi- 
 nally. In reality hostilities continued with almost un- 
 abated rancour, and with varying fortune ; and when, 
 in 1756, war broke out again in Europe, it seemed that 
 that power would gain the supremacy in India which 
 should first send a well-appointed fleet and army 
 to the scene of action. It was a conviction of this 
 nature that had inspired Daily's advice to the French 
 Minister, "to think and act at the same time." So 
 
 L 
 
146 . COUNT LALLY. 
 
 fayourable an opportunity indeed had never before pre- 
 sented itself, for at that time the English could scarcely 
 bring 200 Europeans into the field. 
 
 It is now full time that we should return to the 
 movements of the force commanded by Lally. It has 
 been seen that the first detachment of that force, under 
 the Chevalier de Soupire, left France on the 31st De- 
 cember, 1756, and reached Pondichery on the 9th 
 September following. It had been intended that De 
 Soupire's force, and the squadron which escorted it, 
 should make a combined attack on Fort St. David, then 
 garrisoned by only sixty invalids ; but the accidental 
 interception of a letter from the Governor of Fort St. 
 David to the Admiral of the English squadron, expected 
 from Europe, affording as it did the first intimation of 
 the anticipated arrival of such a squadron, produced so 
 great an alarm amongst the French, that they hurried 
 back to the Isle of France, without even landing the 
 heavy artillery and ammunition they had brought with 
 them for the purpose. De Soupire, thus left alone, 
 allowed himself to be controlled by the Civil Governor 
 of Pondichery, M. de Leyrit. As the career of this 
 official is henceforth intimately connected with that of 
 Lally, it is fit that we should inquire who and what 
 manner of man he was. 
 
 Before Lally set sail from France, a description of 
 the members of the Council of Pondichery was given to 
 him by the Directors of the French Company. In this 
 De Leyrit is spoken of as a man "fit for trade, but 
 weak, phlegmatic, and silent ; one who suffered others 
 to get the start of him ; and who did not know how to 
 maintain proper subordination." But this was a very 
 loose and incomplete portraiture of the man. In reality, 
 
COUNT LALLY. 147 
 
 De Leyrit was one of that class of men, not very un- 
 common even now, wlio, placed in a position in which 
 they are called upon to act, are yet so afraid of acting 
 wrongly, that they prefer not to act at all ; who think 
 they have decided a question if only they can get the 
 consideration of it postponed ; who persuade themselves 
 that affairs left to themselves will surely right them- 
 selves in the end. He was the sort of man, in fact, who 
 in these days would have sent even the most urgent 
 and pressing question to a department " for report ; " 
 and who then, regarding that question as disposed of 
 because reported upon, would have consigned it, report 
 and all, to the Charybdis of the Kecord Eoom. If his 
 advice were asked, " the oracle was always dark." 
 
 It was characteristic of the man, therefore, that when 
 the Chevalier de Soupire, having landed with his 
 thousand men, and having found another thousand 
 ready to his hand in Pondichery, naturally wished to 
 do something with them ; that although Fort St. David, 
 not many miles distant, was garrisoned at that moment 
 by only sixty invalids, and might easily have been 
 taken ; De Leyrit, fearful of sanctioning an enterprise 
 that might fail, held him back from the enterprise, and 
 forced him to content himself with the capture of a few 
 forts in the vicinity of Arcot. On these slight expedi- 
 tions were wasted the eight months that intervened 
 between the landing in India of De Soupire and the 
 landing of Lally. 
 
 At last, on the 2nd May, 1758, Lally arrived. The 
 main portion of the squadron had anchored before Cud- 
 dalore, near Fort St. David, and LaUy had come on in 
 a 60-gun ship, attended by a frigate, to Pondichery. 
 He received an ominous greeting. The guns which fired 
 
 l2 
 
148 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 off a salute in his honour happened to be loaded, and 
 their fire took effect on the ship on board of which was 
 the new Governor, three shots hitting the sides, and two 
 going through the rigging. However, he landed. The 
 first news that greeted him was the loss of Chanderna- 
 gore and Mahe to the English. Nevertheless, prompt 
 as he ever had been in Europe, he ordered out 800 men, 
 and three hours after his landing, he marched to Cud- 
 dalore, fifteen miles distant. The place, invested by 
 sea and land, fell on the third day. He then marched 
 to Fort St. David ; and though the garrison had been 
 increased, and the place much strengthened since the 
 arrival of De Soupire, he took it after seventeen days' 
 open trenches : he then sent a detachment against 
 Devi-cottah, which was abandoned at its approach, and, 
 thus successful, returned, on the 10th June, in triumph 
 to Pondichery. 
 
 But in this first expedition, successful though it was,, 
 the seeds of subsequent failure had been plentifully 
 sown. Accustomed only to Europe and to European 
 habits, Lally was unable to comprehend the existence 
 of a state of things such as forced itself upon his atten- 
 tion immediately after he had landed in India. To his 
 mind he and the few thousand Europeans at Pondichery 
 represented the dominant race, and he was surprised 
 that the millions of native inhabitants objected to be 
 regarded as slaves. The institution of caste appeared 
 to him to be simply an excuse of which men availed 
 themselves to escape toilsome occupation. He regarded 
 it, and was resolved to regard it, in no other light. He 
 at once reversed the policy of Dupleix. That able 
 administrator had been careful to respect native preju- 
 dices ; his whole policy, in fact, had been a policy of 
 
COUNT LALLY. 149 
 
 conciliation. But Lally, confident in his strength, tried 
 to ignore the existence as a nation of the dusky millions 
 of Hindustan. In his eyes France and England were 
 fighting for the possession of India ; and his policy was 
 expressed in his own words, that he had come to drive 
 the English from India. He went directly, far too 
 directly, to this purpose. He acted as he would have 
 acted in Europe. When men, whose caste forbade 
 them to labour, refused to act as coolies, they were at 
 once impressed, and driven to their tasks. The native 
 inhabitants of Pondichery were in this way condemned 
 without distinction to all sorts of labour. Brahmins 
 were compelled to carry the loads their caste forbade 
 til em to touch, and were yoked with Pariahs and 
 Soodras to draw carts. The result was an universal 
 panic in Pondichery. When De Leyrit and the Council 
 remonstrated, they were treated as accomplices who 
 had been bribed. It was another mistake thus to insult 
 those whose co-operation was so necessary. Poor De 
 Leyrit was not corrupt, he was only incapable. But 
 Lally was inexorable. He redoubled his exactions, and 
 stormed at and derided the Indian experience of men 
 whose duty it was to advise him. The consequences 
 were fatal ; and when he returned from tke conquest of 
 Fort St. David, he returned to a city, the European 
 and Native inhabitants of which were alike struck by 
 a paralysis of terror, and imbued with a feeling of 
 savage hatred. Of these two feelings he himself was at 
 once the cause and the object. 
 
 It was Lally's intention, after his return to Pondi- 
 chery, to march upon Madras; but he had neither 
 money nor carriage ; he was at feud with his Council, 
 and had lost the confidence of the natives. In despair 
 
150 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 he determined to claim the payment of a bond given by 
 the Eajah of Tanjore for five crores and a half of rupees, 
 and then in the possession of the Government of Pondi- 
 chery. The Eajah refused, and the siege of Tanjore 
 was resolved upon. 
 
 Then were seen, in all their completeness, the diffi- 
 culties, the insuperable obstacles, which a man, — even a 
 man endowed with great abilities and immense energy, 
 — must face should he determine to run counter to 
 the cherished convictions of an entire nation. It was 
 a struggle between the determination and obstinacy of 
 the man on one side, and a feeling stronger than armies, 
 stronger than force, stronger than time, on the other ! 
 Can we doubt the result? Means of transport were 
 wanting, provisions even failed. When the army at 
 length reached Tanjore, it had neither money, nor food, 
 nor ammunition. A pagoda which, to the horror of the 
 natives, they attacked and plundered, was found to con- 
 tain only rice in the husk. At last the unfortunate 
 Lally was reduced to the device of selling the plunder 
 of the place for two hundred thousand rupees ; but the 
 place did not choose to be plundered. The resistance 
 was obstinate, — so much so that Lally, furious at the 
 idea of being* thus thwarted by one of the children of 
 the soil, sent to the Eajah and threatened that, unless 
 he chose to surrender, he would send him and all his 
 family as slaves to Bourbon ; but the spirit of the Tan- 
 jorean revolted at this indignity, and he resolved to 
 23erish rather than submit. Just then there came a 
 report of the defeat of the French fleet ; and this, com- 
 bined with the exhaustion of his ammunition, deter- 
 mined Lally to retreat. But that retreat was nearly 
 fatal. The French camp was attacked; and Lally 
 
COUNT LALLY. 151 
 
 himself, signalled out especially as an object of assault, 
 escaped death only by something short of a miracle. 
 The enemy were finally repulsed, but the retreat was 
 conducted in the midst of the most terrible embarrass- 
 ments of all sorts. (18 August, 1759.) 
 
 On his return to Pondichery, Lally, nothing daimted, 
 resolved to prepare to attack Madras. But here d'Ache 
 failed him. This officer had encountered the English 
 fleet on the 29th April, and had been worsted in an 
 indecisive combat; he had met the English a second 
 time on the 2nd August, and had again sheered off 
 after an hour's fighting. He now expressed his deter- 
 mination to proceed at once to the Isle of France ; and, 
 in spite of the earnest entreaties of Lally, he sailed on 
 the 2nd September. 
 
 Thus left to himself, Lally resolved, nevertheless, to 
 persevere in his designs against Madras. He was con- 
 firmed in this determination by the departure of the 
 English fleet for Bombay. For the immediate expenses 
 of the army he advanced from his own funds thirteen 
 thousand rupees, and induced some of his officers to 
 follow his example. He stayed only twenty-five days 
 at Pondichery, and then moved upon Arcot, with the 
 garrison of which place he had contrived to come to an 
 understanding. Arcot was entered in triumph the 4th 
 of October, 1758. 
 
 At Arcot Lally was joined by Bussy, whom he had 
 recalled from the Court of the Subadar, where Bussy had 
 succeeded, ever since the departure of Dupleix, in 
 maintaining with a handful of Europeans the power and 
 authority of the French name. Lally, who could not 
 understand Bussy's plans, who regarded the system of 
 native alliances with contempt, and who saw no enemy 
 
152 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 in India but the English, treated Bussy himself with 
 marked " hauteur," and his proceedings at the Court of 
 the Subadar as a means of personal aggrandisement 
 He looked upon him as a Company's oflSeer; a man 
 destitute of European, and therefore of useful expe- 
 rience; in a word, as a mere Indian general. But 
 Bussy, — a man who united to much of the political 
 subtlety of Dupleix the fighting power of Clive, — made 
 a far different impression upon the unprejudiced officers 
 of the French army. Six of them, — men bearing the 
 most illustrious names in France, — ^^joined in a request 
 that Bussy might be made brigadier-general over their 
 heads. To this request Lally had no course but to 
 accede. 
 
 He refused, however, to allow Bussy to return to the 
 Subadar, notwithstanding the most pressing letters on 
 the subject from that viceroy. He even regarded the 
 very idea of his return as something akin to madness. 
 
 Had Lally, instead of taking Arcot, marched directly 
 upon Chingleput, — whence the English drew their sup- 
 plies, — he would, probably, have been able not only to 
 provision his army, but to force Madras to surrender. 
 At Arcot he found nothing in the way of resources, and, 
 even before he could take it, the English had thrown a 
 garrison of 850 men into Chingleput. Lally, therefore, 
 returned full of anger to Pondichery, to seek there the 
 sinews of war. 
 
 He obtained but few, except those which he himself 
 and his officers advanced, amounting in all to 94,000 
 rupees, and with this sum he was forced to put his 
 army in motion, — an army of 2700 Europeans, 300 
 cavalry, and 5000 native infantry, against the strong- 
 hold of the English. He arrived before Madras on the 
 
COUNT LALLY. 153 
 
 14tli December, and at once occupied the Black Town 
 almost without striking a blow. 
 
 It is impossible to conceive a more heart-breaking 
 time than that spent by Lally before Madras. He had 
 supplies but for fifteen days when he sat before it, and, 
 on their consumption, he and his troops literally lived 
 from hand to mouth. Now they were supported by a 
 supply of rice captured from an English vessel, now by 
 some chance arrival from Pondichery. Meanwhile the 
 troops were not paid, the officers were discontented, and 
 worse than all, Lally, — this Lally whose personal influ- 
 ence used to carry all before it in Europe, — was here 
 regarded as the cause of every failure, and the originator 
 of all the privations. 
 
 There is no need to recount every particular of the sad 
 tale, to shew why this attack failed, and that sortie was 
 no tout off : — everything went wrong, — and everything 
 went wrong because the man at the head of the troops, 
 though a most gallant soldier, and distinguished for his 
 abilities as an officer, had destroyed confidence by 
 trampling on the cherished feelings of others. 
 
 There could be but one termination to a siege so 
 carried on. When, at last, a breach had been made, 
 the officers and men showed a disinclination to storm ; 
 and before the day arrived on which Lally had resolved 
 to attempt it at all hazards, the appearance of an 
 English fleet, with considerable reinforcements on board, 
 compelled him to forego his schemes, and to raise the 
 siege. He returned with rage in his heart to Pondi- 
 chery, 17th February, 1759. 
 
 Such was the hatred entertained against Lally in 
 Pondichery that the news of his failure before Madras 
 caused the greatest rejoicing in that town. It must 
 
154 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 have been a strong feeling that could make French 
 hearts rejoice at the uprising of the Star of England ; 
 that could inspire them with a sense of relief when they 
 heard that a French army was in full retreat from 
 before an English fortress. Yet such a feeling Lally 
 
 had caused. He was not sensible of it himself. He 
 
 * 
 
 knew that the feeling existed, but he persisted in 
 attributing it to the treachery, the corruption, the want 
 of patriotism of his enemies. Even in the trenches 
 before Madras he could not restrain his invectives 
 against the mode of managing matters in Pondichery. 
 He declared that " fire from Heaven, in default of the 
 fire of English, would, sooner or later, inevitably destroy 
 that new Sodom." 
 
 Time will not allow me to follow, step by step, the 
 proceedings of Lally after his retreat from Madras. 
 That retreat was a death-blow to his hopes of conquest. 
 The possibility of having to defend Pondichery seemed 
 rather now to loom in the future. It was, however, yet 
 in the power of d'Ache to avert this calamity. But 
 d'Ache was the reed that invariably pierced the hand 
 that leaned upon it. This officer had received a rein- 
 forcement of three ships, and had again sailed for the 
 Indian Seas. Here, on the 10th September, 1759, he 
 had again met the English squadron, again had fought 
 it, and had again been beaten, this time receiving a 
 severe wound in his thigh. He managed, however, to 
 reach Pondichery, and to land there a small amount of 
 treasure, and 180 troops. But, once at Pondichery, 
 nothing could induce him to remain. In vain did 
 Lally and the Council point out to him that Pondi- 
 chery, left by him, would be in imminent danger ; in 
 vain did they appeal to honour, to sense of duty, even 
 
COUNT LALLY. 155 
 
 to his interest; in vain did they protest against his 
 departure. D'Ache would not have been himself had he 
 listened to these appeals. The utmost that he could do 
 was to land 450 of his crews, and of these Lally writes, 
 in his memoirs, that they were " the scum of the 
 squadron ; that 200 deserted to the English ; many 
 ended their lives by the executioner; 50, who gar- 
 risoned Wandewash, let the enemy into it, and the rest 
 abandoned their post in front of the enemy at Pondi- 
 chery." Such was the characteristic termination to the 
 Indian career of Count d'Ache : — he abandoned his 
 countrymen to their fate. 
 
 But this was not the only blow to Lally's hopes. 
 Though he himself had, after his retreat from Madras, 
 maintained his army with fair fortune in the field, yet 
 the total defeat and capitulation of Conflans, the officer 
 by whom he had replaced Bussy in the north, had 
 caused even a greater injury to the French policy by 
 alienating the Subadar of the Deccan, and compelling 
 him to seek an English alliance. These losses forced 
 Lally at last to have recourse to the one general under 
 him on whose talents he could rely, and he resolved to 
 detach Bussy to the north. But Bussy had scarcely 
 left his camp, when the army, deprived of pay, clothing, 
 and provisions, and hearing reports of the large fortunes 
 made by private individuals, broke out into open 
 mutiny. The effect of this was to cause Bussy to return, 
 and the delay which thus ensued proved fatal to 
 the French cause in the north. The mutiny was 
 quelled by the payment of six months' arrears, and the 
 promise of an amnesty, and Lally prepared again to 
 take the field. 
 
 But whilst he himself, with one division of his army, 
 
156 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 had obtained some slight advantage in the neighbour- 
 hood of Trichinopoly, the other had allowed the English 
 to surprise Wandewash, and to threaten Arcot. To 
 recover the one and save the other Lally massed his 
 forces and marched against Wandewash, rejecting the 
 advice of Bussy to compel the retirement of the English 
 by acting with his superior number of cavalry on their 
 commimications. Eather than do this, Lally resolved 
 to have recourse to the dangerous expedient of fighting 
 a decisive battle, the result of which, if disastrous, would 
 be fatal. 
 
 He had attacked and carried, sword in hand, the 
 town of Wandewash, on the 10th of January, 1760, and 
 had sat down the day following before the fort, but his 
 chief engineer was so dilatory that it was not till the 
 20th that the fire opened upon it. On the 21st a 
 breach was reported practicable. Then it was that the 
 English, under Colonel Coote, advanced to its relief. 
 Lally went out to meet him. He had only 1350 
 Europeans, and 800 sepoys. The English had 1900 
 Europeans and 2100 sepoys. In the action that 
 follows, Lally himself behaved with his usual gallantly? 
 but his sepoys ran away at the first onset. The 
 Kegiment de Lorraine which then advanced, succeeded, 
 under a murderous fire, in breaking the English line, 
 but it was immediately taken in both flanks and beaten 
 back. It was then that Lally, eager to redeem the 
 fortunes of the day, put himself at the head of his 
 cavalry, and ordered them to charge. But scarcely a 
 man would follow him. Just about this time con- 
 siderable confusion had been caused in the left wing by 
 the explosion of a tumbril, and the English took advan- 
 tage of the opportunity to advance on that side. Bussy, 
 
COUNT LALLY. 157 
 
 who commanded here, brought up the Eegiment de 
 Lally to recover the day, but in leading them to the 
 charge his horse was shot under him, and he was taken 
 prisoner. The rout was now general, and would have 
 been fatal had not the European cavalry, recovering 
 from their panic, shewed a firm front to the enemy, and 
 prevented any pursuit. 
 
 Lally, after the battle, recalled the part of the army 
 he had left before Wandewash, and retreated on Chetta- 
 pet, and, gradually thence, step by step, on Pondichery, 
 the English occupying the fortified places from which 
 he was forced to retij-e. By the 1st May, 1760, the 
 French army was confined almost to the limits of 
 Pondichery, and the place was virtually invested by sea 
 and land. Even then, Lally never for a moment 
 shewed the slightest sign of despair. For the nine 
 months that followed, though thwarted by intrigues and 
 opposition within the walls, by the discontent of some 
 of his troops and the faithlessness of others, he still 
 maintained a lofty mind in difficult circumstances. 
 All that could be done to repel the attack he did. 
 But in everything a fatality attended him. No longer 
 despising native assistance, he entered into negotiations 
 with Hyder Ali, then rising into power, but that astute 
 chief, though promising much, declined to commit 
 himself to fortunes so absolutely desperate: he pro- 
 jected a night attack (2nd September) on the English, 
 but his left wing failed him at the critical moment. 
 All this time he was surrounded by those whom he had 
 made his enemies, he was ill, harassed, and opposed. 
 The Eegiment of Lorraine had been reduced to 327 
 men, that of Lally to 230 ; whilst the enemy had 
 received large reinforcements. Finally, all resources 
 
158 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 having been exhausted, and having but four ounces of 
 rice left for distribution to each soldier, he agreed on 
 the 14th January to capitulate ; but the English re- 
 fused to grant him terms, and he was compelled to 
 surrender at discretion (16th January, 1761). The 
 following extract from the letter of an English oflScer 
 who was present at the siege will shew the straits to 
 which Lally was reduced before he gave in. " Our 
 artillery," he says, " performed wonders, but the want 
 of every necessary within was what chiefly wrought in 
 our favour. The inhabitants had subsisted for a long 
 time upon their elephants, horses, camels, &c. I can 
 assure you for a truth that a dog sold for 24 rupees ; of 
 this miserable provision there did not remain enough 
 for one day longer when the English took possession of 
 the place." Again referring to Lally, he says : " It is 
 a convincing proof of his abihties, the managing so 
 long and vigorous a defence, in a place where he was 
 held in universal detestation." 
 
 This detestation indeed was so great that, as he 
 marched out of the citadel of Pondichery, he was 
 saluted with a loud and general hiss, and was loaded 
 with the most abusive and opprobrious epithets. The 
 Intendant of his army, who followed him, an old man 
 half blind, and upwards of seventy years old, was killed 
 on the spot. Lally himself would have shared the same 
 fate but for the opportune appearance of some English 
 hussars. 
 
 With the surrender of Pondichery closes the Indian 
 career of Count Lally. But little more remains to be 
 told, and that little is perhaps the saddest of all. He 
 was detained after his surrender for nearly two months 
 at Madras, and, he states, was treated in a most un- 
 
COUNT LALLY. 159 
 
 worthy manner by the English Governor and Council. 
 At last he was sent to England as prisoner of war in a 
 small merchant ship. Arriving in London, he learned 
 for the first time that his enemies had preceded him to 
 Paris, and that he had been charged with treason, in- 
 competency, correspondence with the English, pecula- 
 tion, and tyrannical administration. More jealous of 
 his honour than careful for his safety, he applied to be 
 allowed to return to France on his parole. The appli- 
 cation was granted, and he returned, "carrying with 
 him," he said, "his head and his innocence." But he 
 found that all France had been stirred to its very depths 
 by the news of the loss of the French Indies, and that 
 the ministry were determined to have a victim. Who 
 was this victim to be ? On the one side Lally stood 
 alone, without a friend, not desirous to have a friend, 
 himself accusing all ; on the other, were the Council of 
 India and their friends, and allied with them, because 
 equally accused by Lally, were two such opposite cha- 
 racters as d'Ache and Bussy. In vain did the two 
 latter offer him terms of accommodation. Lally scorned 
 and spumed them ; in vain did the minister, the Due 
 de Choiseul, advise him to save himself by flight, as the 
 tide was too strong: Lally rejected the advice with 
 disdain. He stood upon his innocence, the purity of his 
 motives, the justice of his cause, — strong supports in the 
 abstract, but utterly powerless to save, in the presence 
 of a despotic Government thirsting for a victim. 
 
 For twelve months Lally was engaged in soliciting an 
 enquiry into his own conduct, and that of his accusers, 
 but learning at the end of that time that he was to be 
 placed under arrest, he voluntarily surrendered himself, 
 and was confined in the Bastille. 
 
160 COUNT LALLT. 
 
 In the course of the long months that followed, a 
 circumstance occurred which proved decisive of his 
 fate. It so happened that amongst the many intriguers 
 in Pondichery, one Father Lavaur, a Jesuit Priest, had 
 made himself especially active. This man was one of 
 those plausible sycophants who are found occasionally 
 in all countries and in all societies : a man of that class 
 of which King Solomon wrote that " a whisperer sepa- 
 rateth very friends:" a man who paid his court 
 alternately to contending parties, according as the 
 barometer of their fortunes appeared to be rising; 
 who abused Lally to Bussy, and Bussy to Lally ; who 
 repeated remarks not intended to be told, and who 
 insinuated even more than he repeated. This man had 
 latterly rather inclined to the party against Lally, but 
 with the low cunning and habitual baseness of the 
 sycophant race, he had contrived a method by which he 
 might stand well with either party, whichever might 
 succeed. For this purpose he had prepared two 
 memoirs of the events in the East, in one of which he 
 had lauded the administration of Lally, and in the other 
 had condemned it. He kept these carefully by him, 
 waiting for some sign of the action of the ministry to 
 use one or other of them. But death struck him down 
 when still wallowing in his baseness. His papers were 
 then searched, and the two memoirs were found; but 
 they were found by the enemies of Lally. One of 
 them only was consequently given to the world. It 
 was that in which Lally was condemned. 
 
 This decided the fate of Lally. Proceedings against 
 him had been commenced at the Chatelet on the 16th 
 July, 1763, they were transferred to the Parlement of 
 Paris in January, 1764. Lally was not allowed an 
 
COUNT LALLY. 161 
 
 advocate. The trial lasted more than two years and a 
 half. At length on the 3rd May, 1766, a decision was 
 arrived at. On the following day Lally was removed 
 to the Conciergerie, and on the 5th at seven in the 
 morning he was brought before his judges. On appear- 
 ing before tliem he was required to give up his red 
 riband and cross, and was then placed in the dock in 
 order to be interrogated. On finding himself in this 
 situation, he clasped his hands and exclaimed, "Is this 
 then the reward of fifty-five years' service ?" He was 
 interrogated that day from seven o'clock to one, and 
 again from three to nine p.m., after which he was taken 
 back to the Bastille. The next day the Parliament 
 delivered judgment, and pronounced " Lally attainted 
 and convicted of having betrayed the interest of the 
 King and of the India Company, of abuse of authority 
 and exactions against the subjects of the King and the 
 foreign residents of Pondichery." For reparation of 
 this, it deprived him of all titles, honours, and dig- 
 nities, and condemned him to have his head severed 
 from his body, and declared his property confiscated. 
 
 When this sentence was read to Lally, he listened 
 very quietly as far as the expression that " he had 
 betrayed the interests of the King." The moment he 
 heard those words he exclaimed, "that is not true, 
 never, never ; " and snatching up a pair of compasses, 
 with which he had been tracing a chart of the coast of 
 Coromandel, he endeavoured to strike them into his 
 heart. But the wound, though severe, w^as not mortal. 
 His enemies, however, deeming that he might thus 
 escape the full measure of their vengeance, caused the 
 execution to be advanced six hours. His confessor had 
 promised him that he should go to the place of execu- 
 
1G2 COUNT LALLY. 
 
 tion in a carriage, followed by a hearse. But even this 
 slight favour was denied him. He was hurried into' a 
 dung-cart, which had been put into requisition for the 
 purpose ; a gag was thrust into his mouth by the execu- 
 tioner to prevent him from addressing the populace; 
 and thus ignominiously was the man who had fought 
 for France since his boyhood, who had given her his 
 best years, his best energies, the first-fruits of all he 
 had inherited, led to the scaffold. Yes, to the scaffold, 
 gagged, and in a dung-cart ; sent thither by his King : 
 — by that King who had witnessed his prowess at 
 Fontenoy and Laffeldt; who, when some germs of 
 grace yet remained to him, had named this same Lally 
 Colonel on the field of battle; but who now, sunk in 
 vice, wallowing in debauchery, the slave, and by his 
 being the slave, making France the slave, of the vilest 
 of women, could forget all past services, and when 
 Lally's pardon was solicited by the Marshal de Soitbise 
 in the name of the army, could only reply : " It is too 
 late, he is condemned." Yes, he was thus led to the 
 scaffold : — the gag was then taken from his mouth, and 
 he was blindfolded. During the operation he turned 
 to the Commissaries of the Parliament and said : " Tell 
 my judges that God has given me grace to pardon 
 them ; if I were to see them again, I might no longer 
 have the forbearance to do it." He then knelt down 
 and placed his head upon the block. The executioner 
 severed it from his body in two blows ; he then threw 
 them both into a common hackney coach, and buried 
 them in the churchyard nearest the place of execution. 
 Many years later repentant France annulled the 
 unjust sentence which had thus sent to his doom one of 
 the most gallant and devoted of her sons. 
 
COUNT LALLY. 163 
 
 I have now brought to a conclusion the two careers 
 of Count Lally. It has necessarily been only an out- 
 line, for time would not allow more, — and I have been 
 compelled to omit many details that would have been 
 interesting. I trust, however, I have succeeded in con- 
 veying to the minds of all who have heard me, a clear 
 conception of the object of this lecture. It was not 
 only that we might obtain a knowledge of Count Lally 's 
 career, but that we might derive from a glance at that 
 career some ideas that might be advantageous to our- 
 selves. I have shown him to you as a zealous, active, 
 energetic officer in Europe, working his own way up to 
 the top of his profession, till chosen by his sovereign to 
 command in India. But here we find him at once face 
 to face with a new set of difficulties, — difficulties which 
 had never occurred to him before, which, in fact, were 
 not incidental to European life. How did he meet 
 those difficulties ? Did he have recourse to those whose 
 experience might have pointed out a mode of surmount 
 ing them ? Did he even take them calmly into con 
 sideration ? He did neither. He acted as if he argued 
 that because there were no such obstacles in Europe, 
 therefore none should exist for him in Asia, and that 
 the plea of Indian experience was but an excuse for 
 the non-performance of duties. He paid no regard to 
 institutions which were stronger than time, or to the 
 experience of men who were as anxious to serve France 
 as himself, but he rode roughshod over all. The conse- 
 quence was he failed, as those who attempt to govern 
 by brute force must in the end always fail. The 
 absence from his composition of sympathy with his kind 
 was sufficient to neutralise his great talents, his daring 
 energy, his invincible perseverance. It is this sympathy 
 
 m2 
 
164 COUNT LALLY. ' 
 
 which in any undertaking involving association with 
 different classes of men, is one great element of success ; 
 its absence the certain prelude of failure. Unfortu- 
 nately, Lally had it not. 
 
 Then, again, to look at another feature of his conduct. 
 A military man himself, trained up in the army, he 
 cared only for the opinions of men who belonged to his 
 own profession. An English officer, writing of him at 
 the time he was a prisoner at Madras, says, " Monsieur 
 Lally is arrived amongst us ; notwithstanding his fallen 
 condition, he is now as proud and haughty as ever. A 
 great share of wit, sense, and martial abilities, obscured 
 by a savage ferocity, and an undisguised contempt 
 for every person that moves in a sphere below that of a 
 general, characterise this odd compound of a man." 
 It was probably' the demonstration of this contempt, 
 the undisguised intimation that he considered it impos- 
 sible that virtue, or public spirit, or talent, could exist 
 out of the pale of his own service, that made him so 
 many enemies at Pondichery. Men, even when undis- 
 tinguished by abilities, can feel little heart in a system 
 under which they are treated as inferior animals because 
 of the difference in the colour of the coat that they 
 wear ; still less will those submit to it who feel within 
 themselves the proud consciousness of deserving. 
 
 But if we admit his faults, we must not refrain from 
 doing justice to the many virtues of Count Lally. 
 Energy, perseverance, and determination, were concen- 
 trated in him to an extent never surpassed in man. 
 ' " It needed only," as Voltaire said, " that success should 
 be possible for him to succeed." Putting out of sight 
 the fact that he himself was the cause of many of the 
 obstacles against which he contended in India, it must 
 
♦ COUNT LALLY. 165 
 
 yet be admitted that it would have been impossible for 
 any one to have shown more firmness, more energy, 
 more resolution than Lally showed. His perseverance 
 was never more apparent than when all hope of success 
 seemed vanished. He knew not what it was to despair. 
 His mind rose buoyant from disasters which would have 
 overwhelmed any ordinary man. He acted ever in 
 accordance with the golden motto: "Whatsoever thy 
 hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might." He did 
 not succeed, simply because success under the circum- 
 stances was impossible. He was a gallant soldier, a 
 loyal subject, and was imbued with the loftiest sense of 
 honour. The eloquent language applied to an English 
 general may truly be used with reference to Lally, 
 that "he not only shunned, but scorned and spurned 
 the base." We at least must recognise and admire 
 these great qualities. If they had been united with 
 patience, forbearance, and sympathy, they would have 
 procured for him a place on the highest pedestal of 
 Fame, and in that case it is probable that neither would 
 I have been here to recount, nor you to listen to this 
 imperfect lecture on " the career of Count Lally." 
 
( 166 ) 
 
 SIE HENRY HAVELOCK. 
 
 [Feom the ' Calcutta Review,' November, I860.] 
 
 As, gliding down the stream of the tranquil present, we 
 ^ look back upon the tumultuous past ; as we recall the 
 excitements, ^le terrors, the atrocities of 1857, it is 
 impossible to feel insensible to that wonderful dispensa- 
 tion of Providence which, when the danger was highest, 
 when the career of triumphant rebellion was as yet un- 
 checked, at least in the central provinces, when our 
 own resources w^ere at the lowest, brought to the scene 
 of action from another and a distant part of Asia, a man 
 suited to the hour, whose strong character, pitted against 
 hordes of conscienceless traitors, sufficed to restore victory 
 to our standards, and to re-establish the prestige, not 
 lost in fair fight, but stolen after foul murder, of the 
 British arms. How this was accomplished, how by the 
 determined energy of this man the tide of rebellion was 
 first turned, must be fresh in the memory of all. If we 
 allude now to the subject, it is because we woidd wish to 
 dwell for a moment on the character of the chief actor 
 in that part of the great drama, and to ascertain by what 
 mental training, through what amount of practical ex- 
 perience his natural powers had been moulded to attain 
 so brilliant a development. 
 
 A shy, contemplative, but strong-willed boy, Henry 
 Havelock had been educated for the bar. Circumstances, 
 
HAVELOCK. 167 
 
 however, which he could not control, but which in their 
 immediate result were opposed to his wishes, changed 
 his destination, and at the age of twenty years he en- 
 tered the army. Re entered it at a period when England 
 had had but five years' experience of that peace which 
 was destined to remain unbroken till 1853. The signs 
 of its probable continuance, however, were even then 
 plenteous, and Havelock, dreading the career the most 
 fatal of all others to genuine aspirations, — that of being 
 a soldier merely in name, — turned his thoughts to a 
 country which held out certain promise of becoming at 
 no distant period the theatre of great events. Of all 
 the possessions and dependencies of England, India at 
 that time alone offered the inducement of a chance of 
 active service. To noble ambitions, to high hopes, to 
 lofty aspirations, she was the land of promise. What 
 wonder then that Havelock, who had mastered the the- 
 ories of his profession with all the ardour of an enthu- 
 siast, who had ^ even then brooded over the achievements 
 of the great captains of ancient and modern epochs, 
 what wonder that he, left free to choose for himself, 
 should have selected a career in a country in which, if 
 there were many candidates for honour, there appeared 
 to be at least many chances for the aspirant. The stu- 
 dies to which he had devoted the initiatory years of his 
 military life, the complete theoretical knowledge which 
 he had obtained regarding the actual science of war, 
 his perfect acquaintance with the details of all the 
 famous battles of history, had inspired him with a hope, 
 near akin to confidence, that he too would be able to 
 seize and employ rightly that golden moment, which 
 occurs once always in the lifetime of all who seek it, 
 but which, once missed, in most cases vanishes for ever. 
 
168 HAVELOCK. 
 
 To India then he made up his mind to proceed, and 
 having so resolved, with a just appreciation of the first 
 difficulties which M^ould meet him in that country, he 
 devoted himself, whilst yet in England, to the acquire- 
 ment of the native languages. To a mind organised as 
 was his, the sudden transition from Jomini to Gilchrist 
 presented no insurmountable obstacles. The ardour 
 which had prompted him to acquire a complete know- 
 ledge of the principles of the one, enabled him to master 
 the peculiarities set before him by the other. His pro- 
 gress, therefore, was rapid, and the gain real and solid. 
 So much in fact had he advanced in his Oriental studies 
 during the few months that preceded his embarkation, 
 that he was able during the voyage out to become a 
 teacher in his turn, and to impart to others some of the 
 advantages which he had acquired for himself. 
 
 Havelock embarked in the * General Kyd,' in January, 
 1823, a lieutenant in the 13th Light Infantry. The 
 country to which he was proceeding was at that time 
 under the temporary sway of Mr. John Adams, a gentle- 
 man who unconsciously, and in spite of himself, did 
 more to upset the monopoly of the East India Company 
 than any previous or subsequent ruler. The same 
 month that witnessed Havelock's embarkation, wit- 
 nessed also the departure from India of the great mar- 
 quess who, in the course of a domination extending 
 over nine years, had raised the glory of our arms to the 
 highest pitch, and had placed upon the firmest basis the 
 material prosperity of the empire. Like others who 
 succeeded him, he sailed from India in the full belief 
 that he had left to his successor a legacy of peace ; 
 unlike those others, he did leave to that successor an 
 elastic revenue, and a treasury full even to overflowing, 
 
HAVELOCK. 169 
 
 — a source of strengtli and power to the strong, — an irre- 
 sistible temptation to the weak. 
 
 Havelock reached Calcutta in May of the same year. 
 Within two months of his arrival Mr. Adams, whose 
 tenure of office had resulted from the purely accidental 
 circumstance of his being at the time of Lord Hastings' 
 departure senior member of Council, was succeeded by 
 Earl Amherst, — not however before the occurrence on 
 our eastern frontier of certain manifestations, which laid 
 the foundations of future warfare. 
 
 It is not necessary to refer here to the particular 
 causes which brought about actual hostilities with the 
 Burman empire. From the moment that barbarism, 
 till then victorious and uncontrolled, came into contact 
 with European civilisation, the result was inevitable. 
 Commencing in the first instance with an actual attack 
 on our possessions, the court of Ava regarded the gentle 
 remonstrances of the Indian Government as sure signs 
 of conscious weakness. To such an extent did their 
 conceit increase, that it became absolutely necessary for 
 the security of our own territories to give to their 
 monarch a convincing proof that, however great might 
 be his superiority to the rude tribes that surrounded 
 him, he was yet unequal to the task of dictating terms 
 to an English Government. In consequence of this 
 necessity, and in pursuance of that wise principle of 
 warfare, of which Hannibal may be considered the most 
 brilliant exemplar, Lord Amherst resolved, in the early 
 part of 1824, to transport a sufficient force under an 
 experienced general to a part of the enemy's coast, 
 which was at once the most vulnerable, and which at 
 the same time might possess the advantage of commu- 
 nicating most easily with the capital. It was confidently 
 
170 HAVELOCK. 
 
 believed that a inarch on Ava, entailing, as it necessarily 
 must, more than one encounter between the hostile 
 forces, would suffice to bring the enemy to reason, and 
 to lower the arrogant spirit which had tempted him to 
 invade our possessions. Two divisions from Madras and 
 Calcutta were accordingly organised, and these leaving 
 their presidencies in the months of April and May, 
 1824, united at the Andamans on the 5th of the last 
 named month, and proceeded at once under the com- 
 mand of Sir Archibald Campbell to Kangoon. 
 
 At the time that the Bengal division of this force 
 was organised, Havelock had not completed twelve 
 months' service in India. Occupying the position during 
 this period of a subaltern of the corps which garrisoned 
 Eort William, no w^ork beyond the mere routine of 
 regimental duty had been assigned him. He liad, how- 
 ever, distinguished himself in a manner which does not 
 always commend the performer to the favourable notice 
 of the authorities. With all the fervour of his nature 
 he had devoted himself to the study and practice of 
 religion, and not content with that, he had endeavoured 
 to extend among his own soldiers \he knowledge of the 
 truths which he had found so precious. He became 
 known in the regiment as a pious, earnest, and at the 
 same time a most zealous and devoted officer. Fortu- 
 nately for his worldly prospects this knowledge was not 
 confined to his regiment. Thus it happened that at 
 the time when the Burmese expedition was being orga- 
 nised, and when inquiries were being made regarding 
 smart, intelligent officers to fill the more subordinate 
 positions on the general staff, the name of Havelock 
 was brought to the notice of those in whose hands 
 lay the dispensation of patronage, and he was ap- 
 
HAVELOCK. 171 
 
 pointed Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General of the ex- 
 pedition. 
 
 The war which was at that period undertaken proved, 
 in a military and scientific point of view^ the least in- 
 teresting of all in which the Indian Government has 
 been engaged. Combating in swamps, opposed to an 
 enemy who never fought but behind stockades, and then 
 generally fought badly, a prey to the ravages of a pesti- 
 lential atmosphere, our troops were merely called upon 
 to display that courage and that endurance which are so 
 peculiarly their own. There Avas no call for the mani- 
 festation of the manoeuvring capabilities of our com- 
 manders. To move straight on, to attack the enemy 
 wherever he could be found, and to follow up with 
 promptitude every advantage gained in the field, — these 
 were the conditions on which to bring the war to a suc- 
 cessful issue. To a soldier, nevertheless, thoroughly 
 acquainted with the details of European conflicts, versed 
 in that strategic science which prompted the operations 
 of Marlborough and Eugene in their campaigns against 
 the tried Marshals of Louis XIV., of Gustavus against 
 Tilly and Wallenstein, of Frederic against Daun, and of 
 General Bonaparte in 1796, this expedition to Burmah 
 opened a new field. It was here that Havelock first 
 learned that the success of Europeans combating against 
 Asiatics must depend less upon science than upon dash ; 
 that with one good blow, dealt energetically and fol- 
 lowed up rapidly, the fate of an empire might be 
 decided. The Burmese campaign it was, that taught 
 him that no troops were more liable to depression, none 
 less inclined to struggle against hostile fortune, none 
 who possessed to an inferior degree the power of rallying 
 en masse than Asiatics. To him then, destined as he 
 
172 HAVELOCK. 
 
 was to an Indian career, the experience thus gained 
 was invaluable. Grafting it upon his theoretical know- 
 ledge, he was able thereafter to plan, devise and execute 
 schemes calculated for every emergency. The fact that 
 he himself had borne no light part in a campaign that 
 terminated only at the gates of the enemy's capital, 
 that he had been able thus practically to test his theore- 
 tical knowledge, and to compare it with the actual 
 measures of his own commander, gave him a confidence 
 in his own judgment, and a proud self-reliance that 
 never after deserted him. In Burmah were sown the 
 seeds of that strategy that afterwards triumphed at 
 Cawnpore. 
 
 The Burmese campaign lasted twenty-one months. 
 Havelock, who arrived just too late for the storming of 
 Rangoon, was yet able to take a prominent part in the 
 operations which succeeded the occupation of that im- 
 portant town. As the year advanced, however, it was 
 found that sickness was our most dangerous foe. By 
 the end of July more than half the force had become 
 non-effective. Havelock himself was amongst the latter, 
 and to save his life he was compelled to proceed to 
 Calcutta, and thence by the sea route to Bombay. 
 After an absence of eleven months, during which our 
 army had advanced no higher than Prome, Havelock 
 returned to his duty. He was in time to take a share 
 in the advance which resulted in the defeat of the 
 enemy in three pitched battles, and in the acceptance 
 by the King of the conditions of peace which our Com- 
 mander-in-Chief had imposed. In these actions his was 
 naturally a subordinate part ; but to a subordinate on 
 the staff, great opportunities of observation are often 
 granted, and Havelock showed, not very long after- 
 
HAVELOCK. 173 
 
 wards, that he had allowed none of these to pass 
 unnoticed. 
 
 For nearly thirteen years after the treaty of Yan- 
 daboo, India remained at peace, and not a single oppor- 
 tunity was afforded Havelock of practically testing his 
 acquirements in the field. With an ill-fortune, which in 
 the present days of high pressure and quick promotion 
 would be accounted marvellous, he was doomed through- 
 out this period to remain a lieutenant. He was not, 
 however, altogether unemployed. As interpreter to 
 Colonel, afterwards Sir Willoughby Cotton, one of the 
 brigadier-generals of the Burman expedition, and then 
 commanding at Cawnpore ; as adjutant of the depot of 
 royal troops at Chinsurah ; as interpreter to the 16th 
 Foot, and, finally, as adjutant of his own regiment, he 
 found ample opportunities for increasing his own expe- 
 rience, and perfecting himself in that knowledge, the 
 most valuable of all to the soldier and the statesman, — 
 the knowledge of human nature. In his two appoint- 
 ments as adjutant, first to the depot and afterwards to 
 his regiment, the moving springs of human action were 
 constantly open to his inspection. It was probably 
 during this period of probation that he acquired that 
 experience in the art of managing men's minds, of 
 appealing to their hearts, of directing their instincts to 
 a particular point, which he afterwards put in practice 
 with so much effect. Keligious as he was, and ever 
 anxious to increase the number of those who cared 
 for their eternal welfare, he could not but have per- 
 ceived, that even on the scoffer and the profane it was 
 possible to exercise a strong moral influence. There 
 is probably no class of men more quick-witted, more 
 imbued with a sense of their own rights, or more 
 
174 HAVELOCK. 
 
 jealous of maintaining them than the private soldiers : 
 no men, at the same time, oftener subject themselves 
 to the sway of passions incidental to fallen man. To 
 manage such men, to direct their energies to a useful 
 and a noble end, mere theories are valueless. It is neces- 
 sary that each move in the lower organisation should be 
 checked, and, if possible, exalted, by a corresponding and 
 answering movement on the part of a more commanding 
 mind. For this purpose, knowledge acquired by actual 
 experience, imbibed, as it were, by mixing heartily with 
 the men, by seeing their natures open before one, is the 
 first requisite. None are more sensitive on this point 
 than the men themselves. Their spirits spurn the con- 
 trol which is measured out by rule, and which, applied 
 therefore without any consideration of the varying 
 attributes of humanity, must often act unjustly. It 
 is when their natures are in the presence of another 
 nature, not only superior to theirs, but intimately ac- 
 quainted with its component parts, yet partaking of the 
 higher and the better portion of those parts, and, at 
 the same time, sympatliising with the whole, that their 
 minds swayed by the magnetic influence, yield them- 
 selves entirely to its control. That Hav clock penetrated 
 to the very depths of this great mystery may perhaps 
 be doubted. There have been warriors, famous in 
 history, who have acquired a greater insight into the 
 secret springs of human actions, and who have gained 
 consequently a greater influence and control over 
 their men. But his after career proved, nevertheless, 
 that his knowledge of mankind, and his power of 
 directing the instincts of the soldier, were very great 
 indeed. The manner in which he showed this know- 
 ledge will be spoken of in its proper place : it is alluded 
 
HAVELOCK. 175 
 
 to here, because it was at the period of which we are 
 now treating that that experience must have been 
 acquired. 
 
 But there were seasons during those thirteen years of 
 peace when Havelock was not brought into such close 
 contact with his men. There were years when he was 
 forced to be content with the mere performance of the 
 duties of a subaltern with his regiment. Then it 
 was that his active mind went in search of other occupa- 
 tions, and, searching earnestly, soon lighted upon a 
 congenial theme. We have before alluded to the 
 opportunities which presented themselves to him during 
 his campaign in Burmah of criticising the manoeuvres of 
 his commanders. These had appeared to him to be, in 
 many instances, opposed to those principles of war on 
 which the greatest generals of ancient and modern 
 times had invariably sought to act. Their erratic 
 courses, as he supposed them to be, he had noted down 
 at the time ; and it appeared to him, in his moments 
 of leisure, that it might be useful to his profession, and 
 profitable to himself, to give to the world a critical 
 history of the entire campaign. He had scarcely, how- 
 ever, entered upon his work when the idea occurred to 
 him that it might possibly be considered presumption, 
 and more than presumption on his part, thus to criticise 
 his superiors. Yet only a subaltern, his right to pass in 
 review, and to animadvert upon the movements of full- 
 blown generals, would almost certainly be called in 
 question. Writing at all, he would be compelled to write 
 the whole truth, and would that be palatable ? . These 
 were startling questions ; especially startling were they 
 to a soldier dependent on his profession for support, and 
 looking to it as the sole ladder by which he could 
 
176 HAVELOCK. 
 
 advance to distinction. We know, from the memoirs 
 published of him by his brother-in-law, that he debated 
 the matter long and carefully with himself. " I am half 
 afraid," he says in one of his letters to Serampore, "of 
 the storm of hostility which the free discussion of recent 
 events might draw upon a subordinate officer. Men of 
 years and rank are so unwilling ever to be proved in the 
 wrong ; and I cannot, in common honesty, attempt to 
 show that in 1824-25, and '26 they were always in the 
 right." Again, "were the manuscript carried in statu 
 quo to the press, it is not impossible that I might find 
 my name omitted in the army list of some subsequent 
 month for having presumed to think that a Brigadier- 
 General can do wrong." These extracts prove that even 
 when sending his manuscript to the press, Havelock was 
 not free from doubt as to the manner in which the pub- 
 lication might affect his own prospects. With the know- 
 ledge which we possess of his conscientiousness, of liis 
 rigid morality, of his strong views regarding right and 
 wrong, of the manner in which he would have clung to 
 the one and spurned the other, we have a right to 
 believe that in deciding to publisli, Havelock pursued 
 the course which after deep and earnest consideration 
 he felt himself called upon to undertake. Possessing 
 a knowledge not shared in by the world at large, 
 enabled by his reading, by his practical ability, to point 
 out errors, which to be avoided in future it was neces- 
 sary to illustrate with peculiar reference to this particular 
 expedition, was he, on account of purely personal con- 
 siderations, for fear of injuring his own prospects, to be 
 absolutely dumb ? To be silent, he must have felt, was 
 to be criminal. Balancing then the criminality of silence 
 against the " imprudence " of publication, Havelock felt 
 
HAVELOCK. 177 
 
 it impossible to falter. Not careless then of con- 
 sequences, but confident in the purity of his motives, 
 believing that his criticism was just, that his conclusions 
 would bear the strictest examination, he published. 
 Written in a manly and classical style, outspoken in its 
 remarks on the execution of the campaign, awarding 
 with an impartial hand blame and praise, the work 
 appeared at the Serampore press in 1828, two years 
 after the conclusion of the war of which it treated. 
 It was most unfortunate that it had not been published 
 in England. An Indian work never has a fair chance. 
 It may be a prejudice, but it is a fact, that even the 
 Indian public look upon the name of the English pub- 
 lisher as a guarantee, to a certain extent, of the value of 
 the work. They look forward also before they buy, 
 unless they are by chance acquainted with the author, 
 to the criticisms of the English press. Deprived of these 
 advantages, printed too on inferior paper, and with 
 inferior type, an Indian book scarcely makes a fair 
 start. It has happened that when subsequent events 
 have recalled public interest to the subject on which 
 it treated, a work originally published in India has 
 reappeared in an English dress. But this is a rare 
 occurrence ; it almost always happens that the work 
 published in India is discredited on account of its Indian 
 imprint, and enjoys consequently but a limited circu- 
 lation. 
 
 It is on no other grounds that we can account for the 
 failure, as a literary speculation, of Havel ock's * Cam- 
 paigns in Ava.' The style in which it was written, the 
 professional acumen displayed in the criticisms, and the 
 general interest of the narrative, were sufficient under 
 ordinary circumstances to attract to it a large amount of 
 
 N 
 
178 HAVELOCK. 
 
 public support. Published in England, it must have 
 commanded attention, but an offspring of Serampore it 
 never surmounted the ineradicable blot of its nativity. 
 In India, therefore, its circulation was limited, whilst in 
 England it became known to but a select few. It did 
 happen, however, to find its way to the Horse Guards, 
 and in that hallowed region its boldness, as might have 
 been expected, found no favour. "Is he tired of his 
 commission?" was the question asked of the elder 
 brother of the author, when he presented himself within 
 those sacred precincts. No active persecution, however, 
 followed this remark, although we are informed by 
 his brother-in-law that the book made him many 
 enemies. 
 
 We might pause here for an instant to enquire with 
 his biographer how it happened that with the evidence 
 of professional knowledge displayed in this work before 
 them, the Government of India left the subaltern 
 author to pine in neglect. Was it because they thought 
 that soldiers ought to remain mere instruments, without 
 feelings and without passions, debarred from the exercise 
 of every intellectual faculty, and that they regarded as 
 little less than a crime, this effort on the part of Have- 
 lock to vindicate his claim to a position in the world of 
 responsible humanity? Did they consider that the 
 duties of an officer should be confined to a punctual 
 attendance at drills and parades, and to the necessity 
 never to appear drunk on duty, and did they wish to 
 repress every effort on his part to exercise his brain for 
 the performance of the higher duties of his profession, — 
 an exercise which in times of peace can best be pro- 
 moted by a critical study of past campaigns? These 
 are no light questions, for they affect the present evea 
 
HAVELOCK. 170 
 
 more than the past. Let us examine for a moment t'.- 
 circumstances of Havelock's case. Here was a mfwi, 
 who had instructed himself thoroughly in the science of 
 war, who enjoyed the highest character as an officer, 
 and in whom there lay, dormant at that time, an«.l 
 waiting for an occasion, very high military powprjs. 
 Impelled by an imperative'sense of duty, by a conscien- 
 tious resolve to do what was right in spite of c<)ii- 
 sequonces, he publishes a work, to the excellence of 
 which, he subsequently recorded, three Commanders- in- 
 Chief bore their testimony. Yet although that book 
 was rich in military lore, although it contained instruc- 
 tion of the most valuable nature, because, in the course 
 of its truthful narrative, it trenched upon the vanity of 
 a few high officials, the writer was allowed to linger in 
 obscurity. The abilities which were conspicuous in 
 every page of the book, the talents which the Govern- 
 ment might themselves have directed to some gi-eat 
 purpose, were restricted to the performance of trifling 
 duties, and for nine years afterwards the Havelock of 
 1:828, who possessed within himself all the powers and 
 more than the vigour of the Havelock of 1857, was 
 deemed doubly rewarded in being allowed to remain, 
 unmolested on account of his opinions, a hardworking 
 subaltern. One of the most touching pictures in the 
 history of France immediately prior to the Revolution, 
 presents to our eyes Dumouriez pacing the streets of 
 Paris, conscious of his abilities for command, but 
 conscious also that his plebeian birth deprived hi] a of 
 every chance of the attainment of his desires, l>at 
 how infinitely more affecting were the circumstances of 
 Havelock's position ! He, too, was conscious of the 
 possession of great abilities, and yet he had the mortifi- 
 
 N 2 
 
180 HAVELOCK. 
 
 cation to find that he was restricted to the duties of 
 a subaltern, because, in the only manner in which as a 
 conscientious officer he could perform the task, he had 
 written a work in which those abilities were made known 
 to the Government he served. 
 
 After long delays, however, and three failures to 
 obtain his company by purchase, promotion came at 
 last. In 1838 Havelock was able to write Captain 
 before his name, and by a strange coincidence the same 
 year witnessed also the abandonment of that peaceful 
 policy which, without interruption, had been fostered by 
 the Indian Government ever since the peace of Yanda- 
 boo. It was in December of that year that the expedi- 
 tion to Affghanistan, which had formed the great theme 
 of discussion in every station in India for twelve months 
 preceding, was actually entered upon. On the 10th of 
 that month the Bengal division of the British forces, 
 under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton, com- 
 menced its march for an object, which, for disregard of 
 all moral obligation, as well as for political unsoundness, 
 is unequalled by any recorded in the history of the 
 British nation. Decided upon originally for the purpose 
 of compelling the Persian army to raise the siege of 
 Herat, it might have been supposed that with the 
 accomplishment of that design, all necessity for the 
 further progress of the expedition would have ceased. 
 The Persian army, thanks to the gallantry of an English 
 officer who accidentally found himself in the place, had 
 been forced to retire from before Herat on the 9th Sep- 
 tember, 1838, three months before a single British 
 soldier had left our territories. The original object of 
 the expedition had thus been accomplished, without the 
 expenditure of a single drop of English blood, or an 
 
HAVELOCK. 181 
 
 ounce of English treasure. Nevertheless, so bent were 
 those who directed the counsels of the Indian Govern- 
 ment on making a grand demonstration in Central 
 Asia, so terrified were they at the bugbear of Russian 
 aggrandisement, then distantly looming in the future, 
 that losing sight of those greater dangers nearer 
 their own possessions, — dangers which in a cooler 
 moment would have been obvious to none more than to 
 themselves, — they resolved, at the cost of an immense 
 expenditure of money, in defiance of right, and at great 
 military risk, still to send on an army for the purpose of 
 expelling the energetic sovereign who was all the time 
 well disposed to fall in with our views regarding Persia, 
 and to replace him by an imbecile faineant whose weak- 
 ness had rendered him contemptible in Affghan eyes. 
 So extraordinary was the excitement that reigned 
 amongst the governing classes at the time, that they 
 did not perceive either the foolishness or the immorality 
 of the course which they had resolved to pursue. The 
 advance into Affghanistan was heralded by those high- 
 sounding phrases and lofty professions which those who 
 have at their disposal numerous battalions know so well 
 how to employ. These phrases and these professions 
 produced an effect at which men of the present day, 
 with their experience of thirty subsequent years, may 
 well be surprised. In 1838, however, belief in the 
 character of public men was not wholly extinguished, 
 and certainly the greater number of those who started 
 from Ferozepore on that 10th December, started in the 
 belief that they were about to restore a legitimate 
 sovereign to liis throne, and to give an effectual check 
 to the ambition and to the encroachments of Russia. 
 It would appear that Havelock entertained some such 
 
'b2 HAVELOCK. 
 
 opinion at the outlet. Certain it is that lie hailed the 
 prospect of service which the offer of the appointment 
 of Aide-de-camp on Sir WiHoughby Cotton's staff opened 
 out to him. It was a position most favourable for one 
 whose active mind would not permit him to be a mere 
 instrument of authority, but who judged every move- 
 ment by the standard set up by those great captains, 
 the history of whose achievements was stored in his 
 mind. Throughout that long march from Ferozepore 
 through the Bolan Pass to Candahar, he must often 
 have mused on the fact that on the fidelity to his 
 engagements of the ruler of the Punjab, depended the 
 safety of our force. We had no base of operations; 
 our army was separated from its resources; on our 
 right and our right rear lay the army of Kunjeet Singh, 
 splendidly organised, flushed with victory over the 
 Affghans, and ready to obey his nod. The further we 
 proceeded, the more isolated, the more dangerous 
 became our position, and to the chancts arising from 
 that position were added the barren nature of the 
 country, and the necessity which existed of carrying our 
 supplies with us. As we read the account of that cam- 
 paign, every page increases our astonishment that a 
 British army should ever have been sent on such an 
 expedition, and for such a purpose. 
 
 It is not our design to follow the expedition step by 
 step on its onward course. Its details are well-known 
 to all readers of Indian history. The part played by 
 Havelock, as aide-de-camp on the ^taff of a general of 
 division, was necessarily limited. He was able never- 
 theless to improve his experience in matters which it is 
 beyond the power of mere book-learning to impart. 
 He it was who, after the jmiction at Candahar by the 
 
HAVELOCK. 183 
 
 Bombay division, and the assumption by Sir John Keane 
 of the chief command, strongly urged that the siege train, 
 which had been conveyed thus far at the cost of much 
 trouble, should be taken on to be used against Ghuznee. 
 His advice was, on the representations of the "politicals," 
 disregarded, and in consequence, the army found itself 
 some weeks later in front of a fortress, the defences of 
 which CO aid only be breached by heavy artillery. It is 
 true that the combined daring and ingenuity of Captains 
 Thomson and Durand of the Bengal Engineers rescued 
 Sir John Keane from his false position, but the circum- 
 stance made an ineradicable impression on the mind of 
 Havelock, and materially influenced his own operations 
 at a later period. Never to attack fortified places 
 without artillery, and to be himself "political" as well as 
 general, ranked thereafter amongst his best conned 
 maxims. It was in this campaign also that the im- 
 pressions which he had imbibed in Burmah, as to the 
 advisability of losing no opportunity of attacking an 
 Asiatic enemy in the field, with but small regard to his 
 superior numbers, and his convictions likewise as to. the 
 enormous advantages to be derived from following up 
 rapidly even the most trifling victory, received fresh 
 confirmation. Havelock accompanied the force in its 
 triumphant progress to Cabool, but finding, shortly after 
 his arrival there, that the puppet king whom we had 
 placed on the throne by our bayonets, could only be 
 supported by the same means, and that our occupation 
 of Aflghanistan might be prolonged indefinitely, he 
 resisted all the offers of Sir Willoughby Cotton, and 
 resolved to return speedily to India. He was prompted 
 to this determination chiefly by a wish to publish an 
 account of tlie campaign, before the interest excited by 
 
184 HAVELOCK. 
 
 it liad entirely evaporated. For a task of tliis nature 
 lie was peculiarly well qualified. He had not only taken 
 notes of his own, but he had possessed the entire confi- 
 dence of Sir Willoughby Cotton, and had obtained from 
 the Commander-in-Chief free access to all the records in 
 his office. He naturally imagined that a work at once 
 accurate, interesting, and professional, could not fail to 
 find many readers, and although he wrote at the time 
 that he considered himself " too old for fame," he might 
 nevertheless have pictured to himself that such a work, 
 if well performed, would convince those in whose hands 
 lay the power of advancing deserving officers, that he at 
 least had mastered the higher branches of his profession. 
 He was doomed however, on this occasion, as on the 
 former, to bitter disappointment. The work, although 
 lucid in arrangement, forcible in style, and vivid in de- 
 scription, although too it had the advantage of an English 
 publisher, fell still-born from the press. This result may 
 perhaps be partly attributable to the intense excitement 
 which prevailed in England at that time (1839-40), on 
 account of the movements of the Chartists. The " battle 
 of Newport," so fatal to the pretensions of Messrs. Frost, 
 Williams, and Jones, presented a problem of far deeper 
 moment to the politicians of England than the history 
 of the taking of Ghuznee. Then again the march to 
 Cabool, though teeming with hardships to the soldiers, 
 was, for a campaign, singularly barren of fighting results. 
 The successful assault on Ghuznee, was, in a military 
 point of view, its solitary triumph. It is probable there- 
 fore, that the general public, unacquainted with the 
 locality, ignorant of the dangers in posse and the priva- 
 tions in esse, saw only that we had reached Cabool 
 without a battle, and imagined that it was almost 
 
HAVELOCF- 185 
 
 unnecessary to acquaint themselves with the details of 
 such an expedition to a greater extent than could be 
 ascertained from the despatches. Had there been a few 
 more casualties, and a fair proportion of stirring ad- 
 ventures, the history would probably have been more 
 favourably received. 
 
 It may not be out of place here to state the matured 
 opinion of Havelock, written in after years, on the 
 subject of the publication by an officer of his own ex- 
 periences on service and elsewhere. Even in the year 
 1860 the opinion on this subject of one of the most real 
 and practical soldiers that ever lived, may not be 
 altogether unworthy of consideration. The passage, as 
 recorded by his biographer, is too long to be extracted in 
 its entirety. We cull, however, that portion of it which 
 may be considered general in its application. "Our 
 institutions and public opinion secure to us the liberty 
 of printing ; and comnion sense unawed by a few who 
 have not kept pace with their age, recognises in the 
 nineteenth century the perfect compatibility of the most 
 implicit obedience in the ranks and in the field, with 
 thorough independence of spirit in the republic of 
 letters. Contemporary memoirs are the means of which 
 the future historian gladly avails himself, or of which he 
 bitterly laments the want, when he comes to trace with 
 an impartial hand the picture of events which have 
 influenced the happiness of large portions of the human 
 race. " 
 
 Although Havelock was naturally mortified by the 
 ill-success of a work on which he hp5i bestowed no ordi- 
 nary labour, his was not a spirit to be cast down by any 
 disappointment. Its first result was to determine him 
 to bend his mind more closely to his profession. It 
 
186 (^HAVELOCK. 
 
 happened that, after he had rid himself of the labour of 
 revising and despatching his work, he was directed to 
 proceed to Cabool with recruits. Arriving in the course 
 of his journey at Ferozepore, he fell in with General 
 Elphinstone, then lately appointed to the command of 
 our troops in Affghanistan. By him he was offered 
 the post of Persian interpreter on his staff. This he 
 accepted, and it was in that capacity that in February, 
 1841, after an absence of fifteen months, he found him- 
 self once more- in Cabool. 
 
 It was on the occasion of this, his second residence in 
 Affghanistan, that the nature of Havelock's qualities 
 was destined to the severest trial. The weakness of our 
 political agent, and the incapacity of our military com- 
 mander, contributed even more than the treachery of the 
 oligarchy of Cabool, to bring about the greatest disaster 
 that has ever befallen British arms. It was not so much, 
 as Havelock remarked with astonishment on his arrival? 
 that the position which should have been occupied as a 
 fort had been given up to the purposes of a seraglio ; it 
 was a vicious but not a fatal arrangement that located 
 our soldiers in a cantonment commanded by neigh- 
 bouring heights, and that placed all the supplies of the 
 army in a detached fort. These evils, great as they 
 were, would have been remedied by the valour of our 
 troops, if they had had but a commander. But with an 
 old gentleman at th^ head of the army enfeebled by 
 disease, with an envoy who had trained his intellect to 
 believe that to be true which he wished to be true, and 
 who persisted, in sjjite of the most glaring evidence of 
 bad faith, in giving credence to the assurances of the 
 natives, — with division everywhere, and self-reliance 
 nowhere, it was impossible to effect anything great. 
 
HAVELOCK. 187 
 
 There was in fact no command. The measures that had 
 been resolved upon one moment, were cancelled an hour 
 later, and this indecision, commencing in the tent of the 
 general, could not but have a most lamentable effect 
 upon the army. As if, too, to add to the diflBculties of 
 our situation, the most open marks of hostility on the 
 part of the Affghans served but to induce our leaders to 
 pretend a greater confidence in their good faith. It 
 seems at this distant period almost incredible, that after 
 the slaughter of Sir Alexander Burnes, after the murder 
 of the envoy in cold blood, after manifestations of 
 hostility too striking to be misconceived, the leaders of 
 that force, — a force numbering 5000 men, — should still 
 have preferred to trust to Aflfghan honour rather than to 
 the bayonets of their soldiers. Once having resolved to 
 retire, they should have regarded every Affghan as an 
 enemy, and have trusted to their own energies alone. 
 Instead of this, to use the emphatic language of Have- 
 lock, "they credulously confided in Affghan faith, moved 
 in the power and at the dictation of Akbar Khan, took 
 up the positions which he pointed out, for1)ore to fire on 
 the partisans whom he had arrayed to destroy them ; and 
 as much to the last the dupes of intrigue and tieachery 
 as the victims of the sword, ccld, hunger and fatigue, 
 were engulfed in the eastern '"Tilzye mountains." Surely? 
 if history be indeed philosophy teaching by example, the 
 details of this terrible cUsaster ought to have served as a 
 warning to the men that were to come after. The tale 
 told by it, of the folly, the incredible folly, of trusting to 
 the oaths of Asiatics, of placing ourselves with respect 
 to them in a suppliant and inferior position, ought to have 
 rendered impossible any similar infatuation in future. 
 Yet only sixteen years later, the events of the mutiny too 
 
188 HAVELOCK. 
 
 clearly slievved, tliat in many instances the warning of 
 Asiatic duplicity had been vouchsafed in vain, though, 
 unfortunately for us, the recollections of European cre- 
 dulity had been eagerly treasured up and remembered. 
 
 In the movements of the Cabool force Haveloek was 
 not a sharer. Although on the staff of the general, he 
 had obtained permission to join his regiment, the 13th 
 Light Infantry. This regiment, under the command of the 
 gallant Sale, had been ordered in the month of October, 
 1841, to the assistance of the 35th Native Infantry, 
 upon which an attack had been made in the passes near 
 Cabool. The nature of the conflict in which the two 
 corps were engaged on the following day made it clear 
 to those who took part in it that the whole country was 
 in arms against the British. General Sale indeed found 
 that it would be impossible for him to move forward to 
 Gundamuck, — the destination assigned him by the gene- 
 ral in command, — unless reinforcements were promptly 
 furnished. He selected Haveloek to carry the despatches 
 in which he state(J his necessities on this head, and it 
 was probably owing in a great measure to his influence 
 that within a week not only were reinforcements pro- 
 vided, but plentiful supplies were sent with them. 
 Haveloek again obtained permission to rejoin General 
 Sale's brigade, which the authorities at Cabool, lulled by 
 their reliance on Affghan promises, considered at that 
 time the post of danger. 
 
 For the eighteen days that followed the force was in 
 continual conflict. Harassed on all sides, attacked some- 
 times in front, oftener on the flanks and rear, the bri- 
 gade, encumbered as it was with baggage, could only 
 with difficulty push forward. It had been Havelock's 
 wish after the second march, when it had been resolved, 
 
HAYELOCK. 189 
 
 in accordance with instructions from Cabool, to send 
 back one of the native regiments, to return with it in 
 order to resume his appointment on the staff of General 
 Elphinstone. This he considered to be his post of duty, 
 and he was, at the moment, the less tempted to swerve 
 from it, because the Gilzyes had but just before agreed 
 to an accommodation, for the due performance of which 
 they had furnished hostages. General Sale, however, 
 could not patiently endure the idea of allowing Havelock 
 to leave him. He had himself been wounded on the 
 previous day, and he felt, therefore, more than ever all 
 the responsibilities of his position. With Havelock he 
 had been associated for many years, and he had had 
 opportunities of witnessing how fitted he was to cope 
 with a crisis. He therefore pointed out to him that in 
 his opinion it was his duty to continue with the force, 
 and finally took all the responsibihty of his compliance 
 on his own shoulders. Havelock obeyed, and from that 
 moment became one of the most confidential advisers of 
 the general. He it w^as who, in conjunction with Cap- 
 tains Macgregor, Backhouse, Broadfoot, and Davies, — 
 four names famous in the history of that eventful period, 
 — persuaded the general to attack the fort of Mamook- 
 hail, the possession of which secured the safety of the 
 advance from Gundamuck to Jellalabad. He it was 
 who, when a council of war was held at Gundamuck to 
 debate as to the nature of the movements that ought 
 to follow the receipt of the first disastrous accounts from 
 Cabool, threw all the weight of his influence in sup- 
 port of the march on Jellalabad, on the solid ground, 
 that there, at all events, they would occupy a position 
 that could be held until reinforcements should reach them 
 
100 HAVELOCK. 
 
 from Tadia. ]Te it wa^ who, after the arrival of the force 
 {it that phic; ', resisted with all his energy the proposal 
 to give np the town and to retire within the citadel. 
 He it was who, by the influence inspired by his cha- 
 racter, by his sound judgment, far-seeing sagacity, and 
 knovvl«^dge of soldiers, contributed as "^uich ^.s any single 
 individual could contribute, to the successful defence of 
 tlie illustrious garrison. If h^'s labours were not so 
 "pronounced" as those of Georrre Broadfoot, it was 
 because he occupied a far less prominent position than 
 that most distinguished ofiicr^r. It is yet a striking fact 
 that it wrs to Hav clock that Broadfoot ever looked for 
 moral support during the sittings of those councils of 
 war, in which he advocated, often alone, a determined 
 ] (dicy, and it was owing to that support, always accorded, 
 ^ '-at the resolution to resist to the last was finally decided 
 upon. It was due to Ciese two men that when the hopes 
 of the garrison were mort gloomy, — when the govern- 
 ment of India expressed only a desire to withdraw as 
 much as possible from the affairs of Affghanistan, and 
 when the news of the destruction of the Cabool force hiA 
 caused unusual depression in the minds of all, — it was 
 due, we say, to these two men that another treaty was 
 not entered into with the Affghans, the expressed objeC: 
 of which ^vas the withdrav/al of the British troops icop. 
 Jellalabad. The council of war had, in fact, decided in 
 favour of the measure, and had noticed their acceptan(^e 
 of the propositions to the ruler of Cabool. Fortunately 
 for the garrison the Affghans would not credit their 
 good fortune, and i,ent to propose iresh &i;ipiUa"'.ions. 
 But before these could arri'vo the exertions of Broadfoot 
 t^^vl ITave]«:?k had worlsed an immense change in t]i.i 
 
HAVELOCK. 191 
 
 minds of tlie garrison, and it was then finally resolved to 
 dismiss diplomacy to the winds, aiiU if necessary to 
 perish where they stood. 
 
 It would be foreign to the purpose of this article to 
 enter into a detail of the daily events of that illustrious 
 defence. Entering Jellalabad on the 12th November, 
 the force under the command of General Sale, in spite 
 of tho original want of defences to the place, — in spite of 
 deficiencies of supplies, — in spite of enemies without and 
 traitors within its walls, — maintained their position until 
 the arrival of the relieving army of General Pollock 
 on the 13th April following. Throughout this period 
 Ilavelock served on the staff of the general in. command, 
 and he enjoyed, therefore, the peculiar advantage of 
 being acquainted with the reasons which guided the 
 decisions of his chief. Of the influence which he was 
 able to bring to bear on those decisions we have already 
 spoken. His views were directed not only to the main- 
 tenance of our position at Jellalabad to the last extremity, 
 but to impressing on the minds of others the vital im- 
 portance of seizing every opportunity to meet the enemy 
 in the field. His experience of men combined with his 
 knowledge of the art of war to make his opinion espe- 
 cially valuable on this point. It was not only that he 
 was animated by the conviction that under no circum- 
 stances could Asiatic troops resist a charge of Europeans 
 in the open field, but he was profoundly impressed with 
 a sense of the effect which constant inaction must pro- 
 duce on the minds of the garrison. These feelings 
 reached their full intensity when, on the final repulse 
 of the Affghan force under Akbar Khan from the walls 
 of Jellalabad on the 10th March, that prince took up a 
 position within two miles of the town, and commanding 
 
192 HAVELOCK 
 
 all the approaches to it. Then it was tjiat Havelock 
 scented the opporifanity of making an attempt warranted 
 by every rule of war, and conformable to sound policy. 
 The defeat of the Affghans, the benefit to the " morale " 
 of the soldier, and the raising of the blockade, — these 
 w^ere the points for which, the immediate prospect of 
 relief being even then uncertain, it was surely desirable 
 to strike a blow. When, after some discussion. General 
 Sale determined to make the attempt, with a confidence 
 which testified to his opinion he gave the command of 
 one of the divisions to his most importunate adviser. 
 On this the first occasion of his holding a responsible 
 command in the field, Havelock gave proof of the pos- 
 session of high military ability. The right wing .under 
 his orders had been directed to lead the attack, and 
 penetrating if possible between the enemy's advanced 
 position and the river on which it rested to drive away 
 his skirmishers, and then combining with the two other 
 divisions to pierce his centre. Havelock performed his 
 part to admiration ; seizing the line of the river, he 
 drove the enemy's skirmishers before him, and pushed 
 on in the preconcerted direction. All at once, however, 
 the centre column under Colonel Dennie was diverted 
 to another part of the field, and Havelock found him- 
 self exposed without warning to the brunt of the enemy's 
 attack. Having received instructions from the general at 
 the same time to halt, he drew up his men partly behind 
 a wall and partly in square, and awaited the attack of 
 the enemy's cavalry. These came on with great deter- 
 mination, and Haveloek's horse rearing at the moment, 
 he lost his seat and was only saved from death by a 
 sapper and two men of the 13th who rushed forward to 
 rescue him. The enemy in the interval failing to make 
 
HAVELOCK. 193 
 
 an impression on the square, and being exposed to a 
 galling fire from the men posted behind the wall, drew 
 off in some confusion, and Havelock, observing almost 
 immediately that the other columns were proceeding to 
 his support, gave the signal to advance. Scarcely, how- 
 ever, had his men got well away from the protection of 
 the wall, than the Aifghan horse wheeling round came 
 down upon them like an avalanche. Attacked this time 
 in the open, Havelock formed his men into a square, 
 and directing them to reserve their fire, he awaited the 
 charge. Made more feebly than on the first occasion, 
 it was even more unsuccessful, and Havelock instantly 
 re-forming his men, completed the confusion of the 
 enemy by pursuing him into his camp and capturing 
 two guns. At this point the other columns came up, 
 the camp was stormed on all sides, and the victory was 
 complete. 
 
 How, nine days after this well won fight, — a fight 
 which left the garrison of Jellalabad without an enemy 
 within their reach, — the avenging army of General 
 Pollock arrived ; how for four months longer the united 
 forces remained in the valley of Jellalabad, waiting for 
 the co-operation of General Nott on the other side of 
 Cabool, — how then, owing to the wise resolution of Lord 
 Ellenborough, the army advanced, and triumphing on 
 its route at Jugdulluk and Tezeen, entered Cabool 
 flushed with the glow of victory; how our country- 
 women w^ere rescued from captivity, how that portion of 
 Cabool which witnessed the treacherous murder of our 
 envoy was destroyed, and how the enemy were utterly 
 dispersed at Istaliff, — an action planned by Havelock in 
 the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General to General 
 McCaskill ; how fmally the united armies of Nott and 
 
 o 
 
194 HAVELOCK. 
 
 Pollock, satiated with victory and sustained by the 
 ennobling idea that they had restored the prestige of 
 England in those distant regions, returned in the 
 cold weather of 1842 to Hindoostan, and were met 
 at Ferozepore by the grandest of India's Governors- 
 General, — one who possessed in its greatest perfection 
 the power of influencing men's minds, — and how finally 
 the troops, — their leaders rewarded, — were dispersed to 
 their peaceful cantonments, are matters which history 
 has recorded. Hitherto however, history, in dealing 
 with one of the subjects above alluded to, — the rewards 
 dealt out to those who most gTcatly distinguished them- 
 selves, — has omitted all allusion to Havelock. Had she 
 spoken, it would have been but to record that he was 
 left unnoticed in the ruck. In the heat of popular 
 enthusiasm, the merit of the great deeds accomplished 
 was awarded to those under whose authority they had 
 been carried out. Thus it was that Havelock, conscious 
 of deserving, and yet too modest to claim that which 
 was his due, was allowed, as a reward for his meri- 
 torious services, to proceed once more to the dull 
 routine of regimental duty. He was informed confi- 
 dentially by a friend, — his tried comrade Major Broadfoot, 
 — that there existed 'prejudices against him. So true is 
 it that even in these more liberal days, a man of really 
 independent spirit finds in the very qualities which 
 constitute his greatness, the most stubborn obstacle to 
 his fortune ! 
 
 Such merits as his, however, could not long remain 
 unnoticed. In the course of time those who had been 
 prejudiced against him disappeared from the scene, and 
 in 1843 he found himself simultaneously major of his 
 regiment and Persian interpreter to the new Commander- 
 
HAVELOCK. 195 
 
 in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough. He did not long enjoy this 
 new appointment in peace. Recent and constantly 
 recurring emeutes in the Punjab had warned Lord 
 Ellenborough that the time was approaching, when he 
 would be compelled to gather together all the resources 
 of the empire over which he so wisely ruled, for an 
 encounter with the trained and disciplined soldiers of 
 Runjeet Singh. Whilst too he beheld the cloud, as yet 
 scarcely bigger than a man's hand, that was rising 
 steadily in tlie horizon before him, he was aware also 
 of another tempest, not so dangerous, though more 
 quick in its action, brewing within fifty miles of the 
 capital of the North- West Provinces. Both these de- 
 monstrations were met by that noble man with the 
 prescience and the spirit of a great statesman. Deeming 
 the Gwalior danger the more pressing, knowing that it 
 would be in the highest degree dangerous to march 
 towards the Sutlej, whilst the hosts of Scindia lay armed 
 and watchful on his flank and rear, he forced that 
 Durbar to an explanation. Finding this unsatisfactory, 
 and penetrating the hostile intentions of the Court, he 
 marched in his army under Sir Hugh Gough, defeated 
 the enemy in two pitched battles, and then, abstaining 
 with a rare magnanimity from annexation, restored the 
 country to its legitimate sovereign, having first reor- 
 ganized its government upon principles which, fifteen 
 years later, produced results which contributed greatly, 
 in the dark hour of our calamity, to the safety of the 
 Anglo-Indian Empire. 
 
 In the battle fought at Maharajpore, Havelock, as one 
 of Lord Gough's staff officers, bore a part as prominent 
 as one in such a position could hope for. In the heat 
 of the action he rallied and inspired with enthusiam a 
 
 o2 
 
196 HAVELOCK. 
 
 native regiment — the 56th — against which he was after- 
 Avards destined to combat at Cawnpore. He found then 
 that it was as feasible to inspire Asiatics to great deeds 
 of courage, as to induce them, as in Affghanistan, to 
 acts of rare and generous devotion. The appeal that he 
 made to them in the heat of the action, riding in their 
 front, and reminding them that they fought under the 
 eye of their Commander-in-Chief, carried all hearts 
 before it. He remarked afterwards that " whereas it 
 had been difficult to get them forward before, the diffi- 
 culty now was to restrain their impetuosity." It is an 
 occasion like this that marks the really great soldier, — 
 the man that to perfect acquaintance with his profession 
 adds that still more necessary knowledge, — the knowledge 
 how to exert a moving and animating influence over the 
 minds of others. 
 
 It is recorded that after the action, standing over the 
 grave of General Churchill, Havelock expressed his 
 regret to Lord Ellenborough that the war had not been 
 a w^ar of subjugation. The same opinion was expressed 
 pretty generally at the time, and the Governor-General 
 was blamed for maintaining a rallying point for disaf- 
 fected spirits. Subsequent events, however, showed 
 that had Havelock's ideas on this point been carried 
 out, his victorious career in 1857 would have been im- 
 possible, and in all probability the Central and Lower 
 Provinces of India would have been, during that year, 
 overrun by the mutineers. It was the inaction of the 
 troops stationed in Gwalior, that enabled Havelock at 
 a critical moment to maintain his position at Cawnpore ; 
 and that inaction, forced upon these troops by their 
 Maharaja, was the offspring of Lord Ellenborough's 
 policy. Two years after the Gwalior episode, the other 
 
HAVELOCK. 107 
 
 and greater storm foreseen by Lord Ellenborough, burst 
 with unprecedented fury upon the land. Unfortunately 
 when the crisis came, the steady hand of that great 
 nobleman no longer guided the helm of the state-vessel. 
 He was recalled by men to whom his prescience was a 
 reproach, in spite of the protests of the Duke of Well- 
 ington and Sir Robert Peel, — both of whom appreciated 
 to the highest degree the great qualities which had 
 been evinced throughout Lord Ellenborough's tenure 
 of power. Combined ignorance and nepotism, howevei-, 
 shrink from the service of unsullied genius ; they prefer 
 employing as their agents men whom they can use to 
 their own purposes. Thus it was that whei^ the Sikh 
 war broke out. Lord Ellenborough, who had foreseen it, 
 and who had busied himself in preparations to meet 
 it, was no longer Governor-General. One of the first 
 acts of his successor, Sir H. Hardinge, was to counter- 
 mand all his preparations, thereby committing the 
 error, then almost fatal, but which notwithstanding has 
 in later years been repeated, of endeavouring to disarm 
 Asiatics by showing them that we were disarming our- 
 selves. This conduct on our part naturally hurried on 
 the catastrophe it was intended to avert. Without note 
 or warning, taking advantage of our want of preparation, 
 an enormous Sikh army crossed the Sutlej in the early 
 part of December, 1845, and threatened to destroy our 
 troops in detail in their cantonments. 
 
 Fortunately for us, the Sikh army, vast as it was in 
 point of numbers and arrogant in its spirit, able too 
 from the perfection of its equipments and the strength 
 and valour of its soldiery to have carried all before it, 
 was yet a body without a head. There was not a man 
 amongst its commanders able to conceive or to appre- 
 
198 HAVELOCK. 
 
 ciate the immense advantages within its grasp. It is 
 possible that had the inroad of 1845 been made upon a 
 purely Asiatic power, the chiefs of the Sikh army- 
 would have acted with that confident boldness whicli 
 had distinguished them in their contests with the 
 Affghans. But this aggression was made upon British 
 territory, and the British arms had still a great reputa- 
 tion. It was this reputation that gave us breathing 
 time; which induced timidity into the Sikh councils, 
 and made them first hesitate and then decline to strike 
 that blow, which would have been of all others most 
 fatal to our prestige. This indecision was further con- 
 firmed by the resolute bearing and the heroic deter- 
 mination of the general who commanded at Ferozepore. 
 Although he had only five thousand troops under his 
 orders, of whom less than one-fourth were British, yet 
 no sooner had the Sikh army, 60,000 strong, crossed 
 the Sutlej and threatened Ferozepore, than Sir John 
 Littler, taking counsel only from his own brave heart, 
 marched out and offered them battle. It was a prudent, 
 wise, and heroic resolve. Ferozepore was not defensible, 
 it was crowded with women and children ; to remain 
 in it was to confess weakness, and at the same time to 
 invite attack ; to go forth and face the foe was, on the 
 other hand, to intimate to them that a British general 
 feared no odds, and considered himself with his handful 
 a match for the thousands opposed to him. It was a 
 movement, in fact, inspired by high military genius, and 
 by a consummate knowledge of the Asiatic character. It 
 was as successful as it deserved to be. The Sikh gene- 
 ral, scared by the boldness of the British, declined the 
 proffered combat and marched forward in the direction 
 of Delhi. Meanwhile the Commander-in-Chief had not 
 
HAVELOCK. 199 
 
 been idle. No sooner did he hear that the enemy had 
 crossed the Sutlej than from Umballa, from the hill 
 stations, from Meerut, and from the lower provinces 
 troops were summoned into the jfield. The first division 
 of these troops met the enemy, quite accidentally, on 
 the 18th December at Moodkee. A battle without plan 
 or arrangement of any sort ensued, which, without any 
 very decisive issue, resulted in the retirement of the 
 Sikhs to a strong position previously selected at Feroze- 
 shuhur. In this action, Havelock, who acted as a sort 
 of aide-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief, had two 
 horses shot under him. Two days after, both armies 
 having been reinforced, ensued the great battle of 
 Ferozeshuhur, remarkable for the courage of the British 
 troops, for the determination of the enemy, and for the 
 incapacity of his generals. To use the expression of 
 Havelock, who was by the side of his chief throughout the 
 two days' contest, " India was again saved by a miracle." 
 Six weeks later, a victory having been in the mean 
 time gained by Sir H. Smith at Alliwal, the crowning 
 battle of Sobraon gave the coup de grace to the Sikh 
 army. Then followed the march upon Lahore, and the 
 treaty which, with the loss of a portion of territory, 
 restored vitality and independence to the Sikh Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In an article devoted to Havelock it would have been 
 impossible to pass by without notice three battles in 
 which he was hotly engaged. So closely, nevertheless, 
 did these battles follow one another, and so devoid were 
 they of anything approaching to tactics or manoeuvres, 
 that it need but be recorded that Havelock was present 
 in them, and that he did his duty, as he ever did, most 
 nobly. His situation on Lord Cough's staff had, how- 
 
200 HAVELOCK. 
 
 ever, broiiglit him prominently to the notice of the 
 Governor-Greneral, and he was not suffered to waste his 
 great capacities in uncongenial appointments much 
 longer. In 1846, on the recommendation of Lord 
 Hardinge, he was appointed Deputy Adjutant-General 
 of the Queen's troops at Bombay. By this appoint- 
 ment the certainty of future promotion was secured, at 
 the same time that there was obtained an insight into 
 those paper duties, which are nowhere more onerous, 
 and which nowhere need more to be mastered, than in 
 India, 
 
 For nearly three years Havelock continued to per- 
 form the duties of the Adjutant-General's office at Bom- 
 bay. They were years of peace and tranquillity, pre- 
 shadowing the tempest that was to follow. In the third 
 year of his appointment that storm burst in the Punjab. 
 Commencing with the murder of Messrs. Agnew and 
 Anderson, it was followed almost instantaneously by the 
 revolt of the Dewan Moolraj, by the brilliant achieve- 
 ments of Herbert Edwardes, then more leisurely by the 
 siege of Mooltan, the defection of Shere Singh, the 
 actions at Kamnuggur and Sadoolapore, the day of 
 Chillian walla, and the '' crowning mercy " of Goojrat. 
 Havelock, finding that on the formation of Lord Gough's 
 army, the 53rd Foot, to which he had been removed, 
 had been ordered to the scene of action, obtained per- 
 mission from the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay to 
 join it. He had not reached Agra, however, en route 
 to the Punjab, when he received a peremptory order 
 from Lord Gough to return to Bombay. This disap- 
 pointment, bitter though it was, he bore with the forti- 
 tude and resignation of a true hero. Instead of finding 
 fault with the Commander-in-Chief, or railing at fortune, 
 
HAVELOCK. 201 
 
 he probed Lis own conduct, and concluded by condemn- 
 ing himself for having left Bombay without having pre- 
 viously obtained the sanction of Lord Gough. It was 
 this self-command, this freedom from passion, this 
 ability to judge his own conduct as though it were the 
 conduct of another man, that gave to the actions of 
 Havelock a real consistency, and confirmed in no slight 
 degree his influence over those with whom he was brought 
 into contact. 
 
 It was in the autumn of the same year that failing 
 health compelled Havelock to return after an absence 
 of twenty-six years to England. He remained there 
 two years, spending his furlough principally in renew- 
 ing his acquaintance with old schoolfellows and friends, 
 and subsequently in travelling for his health in Ger- 
 many. It is a curious fact, that at one period of his 
 leave he was actually contemplating selling out and 
 settling in that country. He dreaded the effect which 
 the Indian climate might have upon his constitution, 
 and he found that a very small income would enable him 
 to educate his family and live even comfortably at one of 
 the large German towns on the Ehine. There was, how- 
 ever, some difficulty about the income, and after reflec- 
 tion he resolved, fortunately for his fame, to return to 
 Bombay. He did so, and, leaving behind him his 
 wife and children, took up his old appointment in De- 
 cember, 1851. 
 
 In the course of the three years that followed nothing 
 interfered to mar tlie tranquillity of Havelock's exist- 
 ence. In the second Burmese war, which broke out in 
 1852, he was not destined to share, though eager him- 
 self to join in it. He felt indeed an uncontrollable 
 desire to revisit as a responsible commander the scenes 
 
202 HAVELOCK. 
 
 of his earliest campaigning, and he made application to 
 Lord Dalhousie to be employed. Before, however, his 
 letter could reach that nobleman, the preparations for 
 the campaign had been completed, and the appoint- 
 ments filled up. 
 
 Promotion, however, was near at hand to console him 
 for this disappointment. In 1854 he was made Quarter- 
 Master-General of the Queen's troops, and shortly after- 
 wards received the rank of Brevet Colonel. But he 
 was not to rest there : in 1855 General Markham was 
 summoned to the Crimea, and the post of Adjutant- 
 General of the Queen's troops was bestowed upon Have- 
 lock, and this appointment, though bestowed by the 
 Horse Guards, was ratified by the tacit approval of every 
 soldier in India. 
 
 The manner in which the duties of the Adjutant- 
 General's office were exercised by the new official was 
 eminently characteristic of the man. With all his sym- 
 pathy with weak and erring humanity, he was yet a 
 stern and strict disciplinarian. It was part of his creed 
 that the discipline of a regiment depended mainly upon 
 the example set by the officers, and that where these were 
 careless in the performance of their duties, the men would 
 be negligent also. Convinced likewise of the importance 
 of impressing a rigid sense of individual responsibility 
 upon all officers, it was his especial care to inform the 
 commandants of royal regiments that he held them per- 
 sonally and individually responsible for every breach of 
 discipline that might be committed under their orders. 
 On this point he insisted with a pertinacity that caused 
 him to be regarded in some quarters as a martinet. He 
 was nothing of the sort. Individual responsibility is the 
 soul of military discipline, and it was by insisting on 
 
HAVELOCK. 203 
 
 the carrying out of this principle, that the regiments 
 which were in India when the mutiny broke out, had 
 advanced to that high state of efficiency which enabled 
 them at that period to confront and beat down the 
 countless hosts opposed to them. 
 
 Havelock had held this appointment nearly two years 
 when, by direction of the Home Government, war was 
 declared against Persia. An expedition under the com- 
 mand of Sir James Outram was forthwith organized at 
 Bombay, with the design of steaming up the Persian 
 Gulf, occupying the island of Karrack and the town of 
 Busheer, and of carrying out such other ulterior mea- 
 sures as might be deemed necessary. Sir James Outram, 
 when consulted by Lord Elphinstone as to the nomina- 
 tion of his divisional commanders, at once expressed a 
 desire to secure the services of Havelock in that capacity. 
 A telegram was immediately despatched to General 
 Anson with the requisition, and six days later Havelock 
 started for Bombay. But two days before he reached 
 that island, Sir James Outram had embarked, and 
 Havelock did not reach the scene of action until after 
 the first blow had been struck, and the Persian army 
 had been hopelessly discouraged by the loss of their 
 camp at Burayjoon, and of the flower of their forces at 
 Kooshab. 
 
 Sir James Outram had conceived the idea of bring- 
 ing the war to a speedy termination by one of those 
 Napoleonic blows so successful in the Imperial wars — 
 viz. an advance on the enemy's capital. But the expe- 
 rience he had gained of the country, during the march 
 which led to the events just recorded, had demonstrated 
 to him the almost utter impracticability of such a 
 course by land. It appeared, however, quite feasible to 
 
204 HAVELOCK. 
 
 act upon the Euphrates, and seizing a stronghold which 
 commanded its communication with the gulf, to send up 
 his troops along its course to Ispahan. For this pur- 
 pose the strongly fortified town of Mohumra was fixed 
 upon, and a division of the army was despatched under 
 Havelock to take it. This service was performed with 
 equal ability and success. Embarking his force, which 
 consisted of nearly five thousand men, of whom one- 
 third were Europeans, upon steamers and flats, he took 
 up a position abreast the works, which each day was 
 making more formidable, and then poured in continual 
 broadsides from his ships of war. In three hours and a 
 half the defences were abandoned by the enemy, and 
 Havelock, instantly landing his troops, took possession 
 of the town. The enemy suffered considerably from 
 the cannonading, but he had so much the start of our 
 troops in his retreat that it was impossible to follow him 
 up with any effect. Our loss was insignificant. A suc- 
 cessful attempt was made three days later to beat up 
 the enemy's quarters at Ahwaz on the Karoon — a place 
 which he evacuated with precipitation on the approach 
 of our troops. All further operations, however, were 
 put a stop to by the intelligence which reached the 
 camp almost simultaneously with the account of that 
 success, that a treaty of peace between the two nations 
 had been signed at Paris on the 4th Marcli. 
 
 On the 15th of the same month, with the prospect 
 before him of resuming the peaceful duties of the Adju- 
 tant-General's office, Havelock sailed for Bombay. On 
 reaching that place on the 29th, however, he learned 
 what he calls *' the astounding intelligence '* of the first 
 overt act of the promoters of that great convulsion, 
 which, gathering fresh strength as it poured onwards in 
 
HAVELOCK. 205 
 
 its rapid course, went so near to overwhelm India. At 
 such a crisis Havelock's place as Adjutant-General of 
 the Army was with the Commander-in-Chief. General 
 Anson, however, was at the time marching on Delhi, 
 and a land journey to that place across Central India, 
 supposed also to be disaffected, was impossible without 
 such an escort as could not be spared. There remained 
 then but one course, and that was to proceed to Cal- 
 cutta by water, and to place his services at the disposal 
 of the Indian Government. This course Havelock 
 adopted. . He remained but two days in Bombay and 
 on the 1st June embarked on board a steamer, the 
 ' Erin,' bound for Calcutta. But he was nqt destined 
 to reach that city without adventure. On the night of 
 the 5th, when steaming at the rate of eleven knots, the 
 * Erin ' ran upon the rocks which girt the island of 
 Ceylon. It seemed at first as though all lives must be 
 lost: the forepart of the vessel filled with water, and 
 for four hours she continued to bump heavily on the 
 rocks : at last, however, she was driven right on to the 
 reef, and fortunately remained fast. With the dawn 
 of day assistance was available from the shore. The 
 European officials of Ceylon, ever prompt in deeds of 
 charity, had come down to the shore, and, under their 
 directions, a communication was established with the 
 vessel, which resulted in the safe landing of passengers 
 and crew. 
 
 From Caltura, the point on which the *Erin' was 
 wrecked, Havelock proceeded to Galle, and finding 
 there the steamer ' Fire Queen ' ready to start for Cal- 
 cutta, he hailed the opportunity thus presented of 
 prosecuting his journey. On reaching Madras, how- 
 ever, he learned that an unlooked-for occurrence had 
 
206 HAVELOCK. 
 
 made Bombay his head-quarters. General Anson had 
 died on the 26th May, and had been succeeded by the 
 Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, Sir Henry Somerset. 
 Thither it behoved Havelock to repair, and thither he 
 would have proceeded, but for the fact that Sir Patrick 
 Grant, the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, had been 
 summoned to Calcutta, and he, anxious to avail himself 
 of Havelock's experience and abilities, pressed him to 
 waive compliance with the letter of the regulations and 
 to accompany him to Calcutta. To this, after reflection, 
 Havelock acceded, and the two generals proceeding 
 together landed in Calcutta on the 17th June. Before 
 alluding to the important events which followed the 
 arrival of Havelock in Calcutta, it may not be unprofit- 
 able to take a retrospective glance at the occurrences 
 which preceded, and which, in the opinion of the 
 general himself, certainly nurtured the development of 
 the mutiny. We are fortunately able to present, not 
 our own view, but the view which Havelock himself 
 entertained on this important subject. Certainly if any 
 man in India were entitled to give a decisive and 
 categorical opinion on the point, that man was General 
 Havelock. He was in India when, in 1824, the very 
 first appearance of mutiny was evinced by the Native 
 army, on the occasion of the refusal by the 47th N. I. 
 to proceed to Burmah. The prompt and energetic 
 measures taken by Sir Edward Paget had on that 
 occasion entirely crushed out aU vitality from the 
 spark. It is true that after the event, when the 
 feelings which were then no doubt inherent and ready 
 to burst forth had subsided, feeble natures had de- 
 nounced the measure as one of unnecessary cruelty. 
 It did not appear so to one who was a real soldier, and 
 
HAVELOCK. 207 
 
 at the same time one of the most conscientious of men. 
 In military law, in the articles of war with which every 
 soldier, native or European, is acquainted, it is laid 
 down that the punishment for mutiny is Death. To 
 enforce that punishment with stern and rigid im- 
 partiality is not only a necessity, but a mercy. It 
 would be impossible to calculate the number of soldiers 
 who have been made helplessly vicious or incui-ably 
 bad, who have been led on from weakness to crime by 
 acts of constant and ill-timed lenity on the part of their 
 commanding officer. Among no classes does contagion 
 spread more rapidly. No men have keener instincts 
 regarding the practical ability of those who-, are placed 
 over them. One offence passed over with a light 
 punishment in a regiment is an absolute invitation to a 
 thousand men to commit crime. No men are better 
 aware as to the lengths to which they may go in this 
 respect. With a weak man at their head they quickly 
 degenerate into becoming an armed mob, but a strong 
 man is invariably their master. An officer who has 
 acquainted himself thoroughly with the workings of 
 human nature can do anything with them. And, if this 
 is the case with minor offences, what must it not be 
 with positive crime? If to condone small acts of 
 indiscipline injures the morale of a regiment, what will 
 be the effect, if the highest crimes of which a soldier 
 can be guilty, are suffered to pass by with but a light 
 and inadequate punishment? This was a subject upon 
 which Havelock held a very strong opinion. He felt 
 that in the face of mutinous disposition on the part of 
 soldiers, weakness was synonymous with cruelty. Such 
 a disposition must be crushed in the bud or not at all. 
 He regarded, therefore, the decimation of the 47th N. I. 
 
208 HAVELOCK. 
 
 in 1824, as a merciful and effectual, though a severe, 
 remedy for a crime which, if allowed to run out its 
 course, could only have been suppressed by the out- 
 pouring of torrents of human blood. In this view he 
 was confirmed by the events which took place on the 
 occasion of the next ebullition of a mutinous spirit, — in 
 1844. At that period the events of 1824 had been 
 forgotten, a new generation bore arms under the Com- 
 pany, puffed up with the trhimphs of Affghanistan, of 
 Gwalior, and of Sind. In the haughtiness of their 
 hearts, deeming themselves the real conquerors of those 
 before whom, if left to themselves, they could never 
 have stood one hour, some of these men refused to 
 proceed to Bukkur. In an evil hour a policy of 
 pseudo-mercy was resolved upon : the punishment for 
 mutiny, the punishment absolutely necessary to repress 
 mutiny, was sparingly inflicted, and it happened that, 
 whilst the rulers imbibed the notion that an outbreak 
 was amenable to a few fair words, the sepoys regarded 
 the mildness of the punishment inflicted as a confession 
 of their power. Subsequently, again under the govern- 
 ment of Lord Dalhousie, a similar spirit was mani- 
 fested, and, although the vigour and energy displayed 
 by the Commander-in-Chief of the day nipped rebellion 
 in the bud, the general measures of the Government 
 exhibited even a greater tendency to regard mutiny as 
 a crime not dangerous in itself, and reprehensible only 
 when it ran counter to any settled plan. 
 
 Havelock was not the man to allow occurrences of 
 the nature we have noticed to pass before his eyes 
 without the keenest scrutiny. Those who knew him 
 can well imagine how each in their turn confirmed 
 him in his original opinion as to the wisdom of the plan 
 
HAVELOCK. 209 
 
 adopted in the year 1824. During his voyage from 
 Bombay to Calcutta he had had time to take a dis- 
 passionate review of the events which had immediately 
 preceded the latest manifestation of sepoy loyalty. 
 These events had come upon him all in a lump. He 
 heard simultaneously of the simple disbandment of the 
 19th for mutiny, and of the capture of Delhi by the 
 insurgent sepoys. That he regarded the one event as a 
 necessary corollary of the other is evident from the 
 minute which he recorded upon the occasion. At that 
 dark moment he saw, though others could not, that no 
 native infantry regiment could be trusted, that all were 
 implicated in the treason in heart, if not in act. He 
 then recorded his opinion, as a policy for the future in 
 contradistinction to that which had been adopted in 
 the past : " There must be no more disbandments for 
 mutiny. Mutineers must be attacked and annihilated ; 
 and if they are few in any regiment, and not imme- 
 diately denounced to bo shot or hanged, the whole 
 regiment must be deemed guilty and given up to 
 prompt military execution." He added : " Much de- 
 pends upon prompt action. The time for threats and 
 promises is gone by ; the slightest overt act must be 
 followed by the same retribution which, in 1824, Sir 
 Edward Paget dealt out to the 47th N. I., thereby 
 putting back mutiny in Bengal eighteen years." 
 
 Such were the opinions formed by this great soldier 
 as to the best mode of dealing with the revolted sepoys. 
 That severity in the commencement was mercy in the 
 end was his conviction : a contrary system pursued for 
 years had, in 1857, reached its climax, and it became 
 necessary to sacrifice the lives of our troops, to spend 
 
 p 
 
210 HAVELOCK. 
 
 millions of money, and to entail misery upon thousands, 
 to bring afifairs back to the status quo ante rebellion. 
 
 The state of the Bengal Presidency when Havelock 
 arrived in Calcutta may be described briefly as follows. 
 Kept down by the vigour, no less than by the policy, of 
 Sir John Lawrence, and the able men whom he had 
 selected from the two services for employment under 
 him, the Punjab was not only quiet itself, but it had 
 sent the greater part of its European garrison to join 
 the army before Delhi : it was raising troops from its 
 own bosom to fight against the sepoys ; a moveable 
 column had been formed to put down the first appear- 
 ance of revolt amongst these latter ; whilst thanks to 
 the energy of Herbert Edwardes, and to the military 
 spirit which animated Sidney Cotton, Peshawur, till 
 then the most dangerous residence in India, had become 
 the safest ; the native allies of the ruler of the province 
 were arming on our behalf, whilst that ruler himself, 
 prescient as to the future, was in turn advising, ex- 
 horting, and imploring those whom he deemed to stand 
 in need of his counsel. The country between Feroze- 
 pore and Loodianah at one extremity, and Meerut and 
 Delhi on the other, was held by our troops. Below, 
 however, it was different. Central India was in revolt ; 
 the Gwalior Contingent in open mutiny, though kept 
 back from open action by the loyalty of the Maharaja. 
 The province of Kohilcund was entirely occupied by 
 insurgents. Oudh, with the exception of its capital 
 Lucknow, was in the same category. The country 
 from Meerut to Allahabad was lost to us for the time, 
 and Allahabad itself, the arsenal of the North- West, 
 had been preserved to us, more in consequence of the 
 
HAVELOCK. 211 
 
 incapacity of the enemy than of any forethought on our 
 part. Below Allahabad we had still undisputed posses- 
 sion of the country, although even there, the mainte- 
 nance of armed sepoy regiments, mutinous at heart, and 
 watching their opportunity, paralyzed the action of 
 those gallant English soldiers whose presence might 
 have averted the catastrophe from other districts. 
 
 Of fortified places in the North- West, we possessed 
 Agra, the Kesidency of Lucknow, two barracks at 
 Cawnpore and Allahabad. The great bulk of our 
 troops were employed in the siege of Delhi. There 
 were, however, a regiment at Agra, another at Luck- 
 now, two hundred men at Cawnpore, whilst the nucleus 
 of a moveable column destined to act in tne North- 
 West had just reached Allahabad under Lieut-Colonel 
 Neill of the Madras Fusiliers. It is to this officer that 
 the credit is due of having first rallied the energies of 
 the handful of men who were maintaining the British 
 authority in the districts that yet remained in our 
 possession. Leaving Calcutta in the month of May 
 with his own regiment, he had, by the influence inspired 
 by his energy, averted catastrophe from Benares, and 
 restored our prestige at Allahabad. At the moment of 
 Havelock's arrival in Calcutta he was making super- 
 human exertions to procure carriage and supplies, to 
 facilitate an advance on Cawnpore. In little more than 
 a week he had managed to evoke order out of disorder, 
 disciplined arrangements out of chaos, and stirred up 
 no less by the promptings of an heroic soul than by the 
 accounts which he received of the condition to which 
 the defenders of Cawnpore were being reduced, he 
 fondly hoped that to himself would be allotted the 
 privilege of completing the worl?: he had so well begun, 
 
 p2 
 
212 HAVELOCK. 
 
 and of planting the British standard on the battlements 
 of Bithoor. He was destined in this respect to be 
 disappointed. Sir P. Grant who had now assumed 
 temporary command of the Bengal army, had been 
 much struck by a proposition made by Havelock during 
 the passage from Madras to Calcutta to form a move- 
 able column at Allahabad, with which to act in the 
 Central Provinces or in Oudh. Finding then on his 
 arrival, that a nucleus of such a force had been esta- 
 blished at Allahabad, Sir Patrick, true to his purpose, 
 pushed up reinforcements to join it, and either ignorant 
 of Neill's merits, or, what is more probable, having 
 unlimited confidence in Havelock, he appointed him to 
 the command of the combined column. It was just the 
 command that Havelock had longed for. For the first 
 time he was entirely his own master, unfettered by 
 orders, and unperplexed by suggestions. He had but 
 one definite object before him, — to relieve the sorely- 
 pressed garrison of Cawnpore. To that object every 
 other consideration must necessarily be subordinated. 
 Promptitude, energy, determination, — these were to be 
 the watchwords of his undertaking, and certainly no 
 man ever entered upon a difficult enterprise more 
 firmly resolved to accomplish, at any cost, the end he 
 had marked out. 
 
 Havelock reached Allahabad on the 30th June. The 
 arrangements which Colonel Neill had carried out in 
 the mean time had very much cleared the difficulties in 
 the way of a general advance upon Cawnpore. A 
 column of 400 Europeans, 300 Sikhs, and 120 native 
 cavalry had been despatched under the command of 
 Major Kenaud along the grand trunk road towards that 
 station ; 100 men with two guns had been placed on 
 
HAVELOCK. 213 
 
 board a steamer with instructions to ascend the Ganges 
 and co-operate with the land force, and the country had 
 been heavily indented upon for carriage. These as 
 they came up were instantly pressed into service, 
 
 Havelock had, as has already been shewn, felt 
 assured in his own mind, ever since the first great blows 
 struck by the mutineers, that henceforth no reliance 
 could be placed upon native troops ; and as in the 
 difficult operations >vhich he felt to be before him, he 
 knew that it would be absolutely necessary to have at 
 his disposal a body of cavalry upon which he could 
 depend, he had, before his arrival at Allahabad, tele- 
 graphed to Government to be permitted to a-yail himself 
 of the services of unemployed officers and volunteers for 
 this duty. The application was acceded to, and his first 
 care after arrival was to provide horses and equipments 
 for the corps. So short a time intervened between the 
 announcement of its formation and his actual march, 
 that it did not at the latter period exceed twenty in 
 number. It received, nevertheless, considerable subse- 
 quent additions, and under the command of its gallant 
 leader. Major Barrow, performed the most splendid 
 service. His other preparations for an advance were, if 
 possible, hastened by the authentic intelligence which 
 reached him the third day after his arrival of the fate 
 of the Cawnpore garrison. His mind was instantly 
 made up. To retake Cawnpore and inflict signal 
 vengeance on the murderers was his settled determina- 
 tion. Believing at the same time that the enemy, in 
 the pride of their strength would endeavour to crush 
 Renaud's column, he sent orders to the latter, who was 
 already near Futtehpore, to halt, and to await his 
 arrival with the main body. 
 
214 HAVELOCK. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 7th July Havelock left 
 Allahabad. His force consisted of about a thousand 
 Europeans from the 64th and 84th Foot, the 78th High- 
 landers, Madras Fusiliers, Royal Artillery, and volun- 
 teer ca-valry, and nearly two hundred natives. For the 
 first three days he took the ordinary marches to inure 
 the troops gradually to fatigue. On the fourth day, the 
 evening of the 10th, he started from Synee and 
 marched fifteen miles to Khagu, within five miles of 
 Major Renaud's encampment. Though strongly urged 
 to halt here, the news of the advance of the enemy, and 
 the composition of Renaud's force, of whom nearly half 
 were Sikhs whose fidelity had not yet been tried in the 
 field, induced him to resume the advance the same 
 evening. Starting, therefore, at midnight, he reached 
 Renaud about 1 o'clock in the morning of the 12th, and 
 the combined force marched on fifteen miles to Belinda, 
 a small village only five miles distant from Futtehpore. 
 
 Meanwhile the enemy, elated with his victory over 
 women and unarmed men, was marching in force, in 
 full hope of overwhelming the small detachment under 
 the command of Renaud. On the morning of the 12th 
 he approached Futtehpore, and, ignorant of the advance 
 made by our troops during the night, came on in a 
 leisurely, disorderly manner, the infantry, artillery, and 
 cavalry being all mixed up together. Intelligence oi 
 their movements was quickly conveyed to Havelock, 
 who at once ordered his Quartermaster-General, Colonel 
 Tytler, to proceed to the front to reconnoitre. Colonel 
 Tytler, advancing about two miles with his escort, found 
 the enemy marching through Futtehpore, and preparing 
 to encamp on this side of it. No sooner was he per- 
 ceived than the enemy's cavalry, thinking they saw 
 
HAVELOCK. 215 
 
 Kenaud before them, dashed at him with their whole 
 force, the infantry and artillery following without any 
 Mtempt at order or method. Colonel Tytler galloped 
 back with the intelligence to the general ; but the guns 
 of the enemy, which had meanwhile been brought to 
 the front, gave the first intimation of his movements. 
 The first sound of the cannon served as a signal for our 
 troops to fall in. Though engaged in cooking their 
 breakfasts at the time, and though tired after a march 
 of eighteen miles, they did this with an alacrity which 
 could not be surpassed. The guns, eight in number, 
 were moved to the front, one hundred Enfield riflemen 
 being with them : the infantry were formed in quarter- 
 distance columns at deploying distance behind, whilst 
 the Volunteer Horse and Irregular Cavalry guarded the 
 flanks. 
 
 These dispositions were scarcely made before the 
 enemy, still advancing in a determined though dis- 
 orderly manner, came within range. Their guns had 
 already fired two or three ineffective rounds before the 
 fire on our side opened. No sooner, however, was the 
 order given to our men, than the rapid advance of 
 the enemy changed its character. The long range of 
 the rifles told with murderous effect on the head of their 
 columns ; and Captain Maude, enabled to advance his 
 guns under cover of this fire to point-blank range, 
 speedily gave them the cowp de grace. They broke at 
 once, and retreated to a position in front of the town, 
 abandoning the guns to our victorious troops. 
 
 Havelock w^as not slow to take advantage of this 
 success. Deploying his infantry, he drove the enemy 
 from his new position, and pursued him helter-skelter 
 through the town. Guns, ammunition, plunder, fell 
 
216 HAVELOCK. 
 
 into his possession. Everything was abandoned ; and 
 although a last stand was attempted on the other side 
 of the town, the guns and riflemen succeeded in forcing 
 him to take refuge in a flight, which our exhausted 
 troops were unable to follow up. Whilst this was going 
 on in the centre, however, the enemy had almost suc- 
 ceeded in turning our flanks. Their cavalry, outnum- 
 bering ours considerably, came down in great force on 
 our right. Our Irregulars justified Havelock's bad 
 opinion by a display which he characterised as " worse 
 than doubtful." But on this occasion the Europeans 
 were nof wanting to themselves. Captain Beatson, the 
 Assistant Adjutant-General, who was with the right 
 column of infantry, halted his men, and directing their 
 attention to the enemy's horse, poured in so murderous 
 a volley, that they too hastened to follow their comrades 
 in a precipitate flight. 
 
 It was one o'clock before the troops, wearied with 
 thirteen hours' combined marching and fighting, reached 
 their encamping-ground. They were encouraged, how- 
 ever, not alone by their victory, but by the spirit-stirring 
 congratulations which their general addressed to them 
 on the occasion. They recognised in those congratula- 
 tions a different spirit to that for which such documents 
 are usually celebrated. There was a direct appeal to 
 each man's individual exertions, an acknowledgment of 
 the obligation under which the general felt to all, which 
 went directly to their hearts. Those hearts were touched 
 because it was felt that the general spoke to them from 
 his own. From that moment his influence with them 
 was established. They felt they had one at their head 
 who knew how to lead them, and who thoroughly com- 
 prehended them. A mutual confidence became esta- 
 
HAVELOCK. 217 
 
 Wished, so absolutely without limit as to contribute more 
 than anything else to make them, as an army, invincible 
 in the field. 
 
 On the following day the troops halted. On the 14th 
 the irregular cavalry, on an alarm of the enemy's ap- 
 proach, made as thougb they would plunder our bag- 
 gage ; they were therefore disarmed and dismounted, 
 and their horses made over to the volunteer cavalry. 
 On the 15th, after marching six miles, the general 
 found a strong detachment of the enemy intrenched 
 in the village of Aoung. He at once directed Colonel 
 Tytler to move to the front with about six hundred 
 men and the guns to drive the enemy frona his position, 
 whilst he himself should protect the baggage against 
 the attacks of the large bodies of cavalry who were 
 threatening him. On this occasion the enemy fought 
 much better than at Futtehpore. He commenced by 
 opening fire upon Colonel Tytler with his guns ; and 
 finding that that officer did not at once reply, he moved 
 out of his position to attack him. The colonel, who had 
 been engaged in completing his dispositions, showed no 
 disinclination for the combat. Sending the Madras 
 Fusiliers to engage the infantry, he directed a heavy 
 fire upon the enemy's intrenchment, and in less than 
 two hours had put him completely to flight. The at- 
 tempts of the cavalry to turn our flanks were equally 
 abortive. On the same day, whilst the troops were 
 refreshing themselves after their encounter, intelligence 
 reached the general that the enemy had crossed the 
 little river Pandoo, and were preparing to blow up the 
 bridge. He at once felt that success in this point would 
 be fatal to the speedy prosecution of his designs, as, 
 with the entire country in the hands of the enemy, it 
 
218 HAVELOCK. 
 
 would not be possible for him, without immense difficulty 
 and delay, to achieve the passage of that river in the 
 face of a hostile force. Though the hour was midday, 
 and the month July, the men were summoned to fall 
 in. They showed their appreciation of their leader 
 by obeying with alacrity. After marching little more 
 than an hour they suddenly, by the bend of the road, 
 came in sight of the river, considerably swollen by the 
 rains, and still spanned by a narrow stone bridge. 
 Almost simultaneously the enemy's fire opened, sweep- 
 ing the road by which our troops must advance. Our 
 dispositions were soon made. The guns were moved to 
 the front, and so arranged as to bring a flanking as well 
 as a direct fire on the enemy's position. Aligned with 
 them again were the Enfield riflemen. Their fire proved 
 most effective. The first discharge from our guns broke 
 the sponge-staffs of their gunners, and, having none in 
 reserve, they could no longer load their pieces. Their 
 fire therefore ceased as if by magic; and the Madras 
 Fusiliers dashing forward with great gallantry, the 
 rebels, after attempting ineffectually to blow up the 
 bridge, gave way at all points, and fled with precipitation 
 towards Cawnpore. The general was unfortunately, 
 from want of cavalry, unable to pursue them. 
 
 Intelligence reached the general during the night 
 that the Nana had taken a strong position in front of 
 Cawnpore with his whole force, and he felt that he had 
 got his hardest battle before him. He well Imew, how- 
 ever, that, humanly speaking, the victory must be with 
 himself He had met these rebels flushed with their 
 bloody deeds, and deeming themselves the masters of 
 India: he had beaten them whilst indulging in their 
 boastful dreams of conquest, and he did not fear to beat 
 
HAVELOCK. 219 
 
 them in their new attitude of rallied fugitives, oppressed 
 with a sense of their own crimes. He sat down there- 
 fore that evening, and wrote instructions to General 
 Neill to send up reinforcements, as he intended to 
 advance to Lucknow from Cawnpore. This was no 
 boastful announcement ; it was the calm and deliberately 
 expressed intention of a man who had counted the cost 
 and weighed the consequences of the proceeding on 
 which he had determined, — who felt that he had a right 
 to look upon the possession of Cawnpore on the follow- 
 ing evening as a certainty, and who regarded that pos- 
 session but as the prelude to the performance of greater 
 things. With the foresight of a great master of his art, 
 he planned all his moves so that they should tend, 
 directly or indirectly, to the accomplishment of a great 
 though still distant end. 
 
 On the following morning he marched to fight that 
 which may be considered in every respect as his greatest 
 battle. He could not, from sickness, mortality, and 
 other causes, bring into the field more than thirteen 
 hundred men, of whom three hundred were Sikhs. The 
 English portion of the force was animated, however, by 
 the noblest spirit. Combined with the confidence of 
 victory, there was besides a hope that they might arrive 
 in sufficient time to save their countrywomen from 
 death. They had twenty-two miles to march, a great 
 battle to fight, the heat of a terrible sun to endure, yet 
 their cheerfulness was never more apparent. They felt 
 that they could accomplish anything that morning. 
 After marching fifteen miles, they reached Maharajpore, 
 seven miles distant from Cawnpore. Here they took a 
 breakfast of biscuit and porter, and here the general 
 fell in with two sepoys, faithful to their salt, who gave 
 
220 HAVELOCK 
 
 him important and accurate information regarding the 
 strength and position of the enemy. His artillery had 
 been so laid as to sweep the only road by which he 
 thought it possible we could advance ; his right rested 
 on the railway embankment ; his centre, which was 
 more retired than the flanks, was immensely strong ; 
 whilst his left was covered by the Ganges. His troops 
 were strongly intrenched, and were protected moreover 
 by the nature of the ground which was intersected by 
 numerous ravines. Havelock at once felt that to attack 
 in front a position so strong, defended by five thousand 
 men, Avith only thirteen hundred, would do no credit to 
 the school in which he had been trained to arms : he 
 thought it possible so to manoeuvre as to render the 
 defences which the enemy had prepared almost useless, 
 and at the same time to gain the day without any great 
 sacrifice of life. If he could only interpose between the 
 left flank of the enemy and the river, and seize the 
 high ground on the right bank of the Ganges, he would 
 take the enemy completely in flank, render useless his 
 preparations for a front attack, and compel him to fight, 
 on all points except as regarded mere numbers, on dis- 
 advantageous terms. On this flank movement, then, he 
 resolved. 
 
 It was now two o'clock : the sun glared fiercely over- 
 head, and they were still seven miles distant from Cawn- 
 pore, when the order to advance was given. For three 
 miles they moved steadily on, although many men 
 succumbed to the influence of the terrible sun, and fell 
 to rise no more. They marched in order of battle, the 
 volunteer cavalry in advance, the artillery behind them, 
 and the infantry in the rear. At the commencement 
 of the fourth mile, they came in view of the enemy's 
 
HAVELOCK. 221 
 
 position ; and tlie fire of their guns at once convinced 
 Havelock of the accuracy of the information on which 
 he had based his plan. Still the volunteer cavalry 
 moved on, drawing upon itself the whole fire, and at- 
 tracting the sole attention of the enemy. At the same 
 moment the artillery and infantry, under cover of a 
 thick grove of trees, diverged to the right. For about 
 half a mile their movement was unperceived. It could 
 not be so much longer. As the heads of the columns 
 emerged into the open, the enemy, discovering the 
 nature of the movement, endeavoured with all haste to 
 change the direction of his fire. Not a gun replied. 
 The point to be reached was the high ground on the 
 right bank of the Ganges, and to attain that every other 
 consideration was sacrificed. For a quarter of an hour, 
 with sloped arms, exposed to a fire which they did not 
 return, the men marched on till they gained the turning- 
 point of the movement : then wheeling them up into line, 
 with the artillery in the intervals, Havelock led them 
 on to the enemy. 
 
 To describe, as they deserve to be described, all the 
 details of the battle that followed would trespass too 
 much on the space allowed to a single article. We 
 must content ourselves by observing that, having such 
 soldiers under his command, the battle was really 
 gained when the flank-movement was accomplished. 
 It is true that even then they were little more than one 
 man to five ; but, considering the opponents, such odds 
 were not unfair. That which generalship had so suc- 
 cessfully commenced, the most determined courage as 
 successfully carried out. Vying with one another in 
 their eagerness to meet the enemy, the troops pressed 
 on with a fury which was not to be witlistood. Position 
 
222 HAVELOCK. 
 
 after position was taken, one gun after another was cap- 
 tured. The general, in the language of one of the 
 combatants, " seemed to be gifted with ubiquity ; " he 
 was seen everywhere animating and inspiring the 
 soldiers, whose last charge, performed under his eyes 
 and in obedience to orders issued by himself, was given 
 with an ardour and impetuosity which were irresistible. 
 Notwithstanding the great efforts of the enemy, -^and 
 they never fought better, — that night beheld the Nana 
 a fugitive from Cawnpore, and the army, which was to 
 have won for him empire, a defeated and disorganized 
 rabble. 
 
 The political results of the battle of Cawnpore were 
 immense. It gave the first intimation to the rebels of 
 the Central Provinces that the rebellion against the 
 British was not to have a successful termination. The 
 chief conspirator, who had proclaimed himself the legi- 
 timate inheritor of the dignities of the Peshwa, and who 
 had endeavoured to cement his installation by the indis- 
 criminate slaughter of women and children, had been 
 defeated on his chosen battle-field, and been driven by 
 his terror to take refuge in Oudh. On the spot where 
 the British standard had been treacherously struck 
 down, British troops had, in the short space of three 
 weeks, and in spite of unheard-of difficulties, triumph- 
 antly re-established it. Every sign of the reign of 
 the usurper, save that of the devastation which he caused, 
 disappeared as if by magic ; and Cawnpore, taken by 
 Havelock, and never afterwards lost, was destined to 
 prove the base of many of the most important under- 
 takings for the recovery of British authority. At the 
 moment, its position was strategically most important. 
 Secure of his communications by two routes, — tlie river 
 
HAVELOCK. 223 
 
 and the road, — with Allahabad, and not threatened from 
 the north, Havelock could operate in Oudh, undisturbed 
 as to Cawnpore, so long as the Gwalior Contingent, then 
 fortunately held in check by the Maharaja, should 
 abstain from any movement towards Kalpee. Against 
 isolated attacks he could provide ; this alone was like 
 to prove a serious danger. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th July he entered Cawn- 
 pore. On the 18th he was occupied in making arrange- 
 ments for the accommodation of the troops, and in 
 deciding the locality of an intrenchment on the Ganges, 
 and commanding the communication with Oudh, of 
 such a nature that a small number of troops might be 
 able to hold against any attack. In this way he pro- 
 posed to make of Cawnpore a secure base for his ope- 
 rations in Oudh. The plateau which he selected was 
 admirably adapted for the purpose. No time was lost 
 in tracing out the plan ; and such was the haste em- 
 ployed, that on the arrival of General Neill, on the 
 20th, with a reinforcement of upwards of 200 men, the 
 work was sufficiently advanced to be defensible, and 
 Havelock did not hesitate to send the first detachment 
 across the river. Previously to this, on the 19th, he 
 had beaten up Bithoor, and found it empty: the suc- 
 cessor of the Peshwas had fled across the river. Een- 
 dered more secure by the absence of any immediate 
 apprehension of attack, having, too, in Neill, a man 
 capable of coping with any difficulty, whom he could 
 leave in command of the new intrenchment, and urged 
 on by a consideration of the danger of the Lucknow 
 garrison, Havelock resolved to push on his new enter- 
 prise with all possible expedition. 
 
 Never perhaps before had it been attempted to 
 
224 HAVELOCK. 
 
 undertake an enterprise so vast, with means ^so dis- 
 proportionate. Not Hannibal when he crossed the 
 Alps, not Alexander when he forced the Granicus, not 
 Frederick when he battled against the combined powers 
 of the Continent, were so utterly overmatched in point 
 of numbers as was Havelock in his expedition into 
 Oudh. Hannibal found allies as well as enemies in 
 his path ; Alexander commanded nearly all the re- 
 sources of Greece, and was opposed by an effeminate 
 people; Frederick fought on the defensive, and won 
 battles with his soldiers' legs ; but Havelock, with only 
 1500 men, went to attack the most warlike people in 
 Hindostan, — a province teeming with soldiers, many of 
 them trained by our officers, acquainted with our 
 habits, and drilled after our fashion. He threw himself 
 upon this province relying upon the courage, the 
 discipline, and the powers of endurance of his soldiers ; 
 for they had neither tent nor covering, they were 
 exposed to the extremes of heat and wet, their supplies 
 were precarious, and their power of advancing depended 
 entirely upon their ability to cope with difficulties such 
 as seldom fall to the lot of British troops to encounter. 
 It was an enterprise from which, we think, most men 
 would have recoiled. Success could only be accom- 
 plished under a combination of circumstances such as no 
 skill could arrange. To advance at the head of fifteen 
 hundred men into a hostile province boasting of its tens 
 of thousands under arms, would seem to partake some- 
 what of rashness. And yet, though Havelock attempted 
 this very thing, there was no rashness in his enterprise. 
 His chances of success, it is true, were small, but so 
 complete was his knowledge of his soldiers, so perfect 
 was their confidence in him, so thoroughly acquainted 
 
HAVELOCK. ■ 225 
 
 was he with the principles of his art, and so well had 
 he calculated every contingency, that, while there re- 
 mained but one faint hope of ultimate victory opposed 
 to ninety-nine chances of failure, he felt that it was his 
 duty to persevere. 
 
 On the 25tli July the entire force with which 
 Havelock intended to operate in Oudh had crossed 
 over to the left bank of the Ganges. It consisted of 
 ten gmis, imperfectly equipped and manned, the Volun- 
 teer Horse reorganised and increased to sixty troopers, 
 and the remnants of the 64th and 84th Regiments, the 
 78th Highlanders, Madras Fusiliers, and Brasyer's Sikhs. 
 Few besides the sick and wounded wer« left in the 
 entrenchments, but General Neill was there, a host in 
 himself, and being able to avail himself of the reinforce- 
 ments which were expected to arrive from time to time 
 from Allahabad, this gallant officer gladly accepted the 
 responsibility placed upon him. No one indeed urged 
 more strongly than he upon Havelock the necessity of 
 taking with him every available man. The little steamer 
 which had been brought up by Lieutenant Spurgin 
 aided materially in the passage of the river, and in the 
 procuring of boats. But for her, the Ganges would have 
 presented very great difficulties at the very outset. The 
 force marched that day, the 25th, to the village of 
 Mungulwar, five miles on the Lucknow road. Here 
 the general halted in order to complete his dispositions 
 for carriage and supplies. These having been arranged, 
 imperfectly although as fully as was practicable under 
 the circumstances, he moved forward in earnest on the 
 morning of the 29th. After a march of three miles he 
 came in sight of the enemy strongly posted at Oonao. 
 The position he had taken up is thus described by the 
 
 Q 
 
226 HAVELOCK. 
 
 general in his despatcli : — " His right was protected by 
 a swamp which could neither be forced nor turned ; his 
 advance was drawn up in a garden enclosure, which 
 in this warlike district had purposely or accidentally 
 assumed the form of a bastion. The rest of his 
 (advance) force was posted in and behind a village, 
 the houses of which were loopholed. The passage 
 between the village and the town of Oonao is narrow. 
 The town itself extended three-quarters of a mile to our 
 riglit. The flooded state of the country precluded the 
 possibility of turning in this direction. The swamp shut 
 us in on the left" Precluded thus from manoeuvring, 
 the general could only attack in front. This he did in the 
 manner he had found so successful on the Cawnpore 
 road. Opening with a fire from the artillery and 
 Enfield riflemen in skirmishing order, he waited until 
 the enemy had been driven from his advanced position 
 and compelled to take refuge in the loopholed houses. 
 The infantry was then brought to the front, and, after a 
 desperate hand-to-hand conflict, the guns were captured 
 and the enemy driven headlong from . the village. The 
 town of Oonao, however, was still before him, and the 
 enemy was marching in dense columns to occupy it. 
 Havelock therefore drew ofi" his force in line on the 
 ground he had gained between the village and the town, 
 his guns pointing on the high road by which alone he 
 could be attacked, and waited for the enemy's move- 
 ment to develop itself. At length, formed in dense 
 masses, they debouched from the town and halted. 
 Havelock felt that he had them. A withering fire from 
 guns and riflemen fell amongst their serried ranks. 
 Unable to deploy they had no choice but to charge 
 home or to retire. The former course would have been 
 
HAVELOCK. 227 
 
 opposed to every principle of Asiatic warfare. Whilst, 
 however, they yet seemed in doubt, our skirmishers, 
 wading up to their waists in the marshes, made their 
 presence perceptible on their flanks, and Havelock, 
 pushing forward two guns at the same time, gave them 
 sufficient intimation that he was determined to move 
 the only obstacle from his path. They then gave way 
 almost immediately, and fled precipitately, leaving their 
 guns, fifteen in number, in our possession. 
 
 The same day, after a rest of three hours, during 
 which the men dined, Havelock resumed his advance, 
 and after a march of six miles came upon the enemy 
 strongly entrenched at Busseeruthgufige. This was 
 a walled town situated in the open, and intersected by 
 the high road to Lucknow. In front of it lay a large 
 pond, which, owing to the inundation, had all the 
 appearance of a rapid river. In its rear was a still 
 larger pond or lake, traversed by a narrow causeway. 
 It possessed in addition a wet- ditch, and the main gate 
 was defended by an earthwork and four guns, and 
 flanked on either side by loopholed turrets. It was just 
 the position which Havelock could have maintained 
 against the whole army of Oudh. Defended by Asiatics 
 it merely afforded to the English general an opportunity 
 of putting in practice the principles of his art. Having 
 reconnoitred, Havelock deemed it quite practicable to 
 cut off the enemy from the causeway in the rear, whilst 
 he should attack them in front. The 64th were detached 
 on this duty, and whilst wading often up to their arm- 
 pits in the swamp they made a flank movement to the 
 left of the town, Havelock advanced in his old order, 
 against the main gate. Fortunately, the fire of the 
 enemy was high, whilst every shot from ours told. 
 
 q2 
 
228 HAVELOCK. 
 
 Under its influence the efforts of the enemy gradually 
 slackened, and the Highlanders and Fusiliers rushing 
 forward, forced their way, after a sharp struggle at the 
 gateway, into the town. If the 64th had been able to 
 reach the position assigned them, the enemy would 
 have been entirely cut off from the causeway. As it 
 was, he was enabled to cross his shattered forces, 
 although not without losing a very large number of 
 men. 
 
 But these successes, signal as they were, served only 
 to convince the general that, vdth such a force as that 
 at his disposal, it would be impossible for him to accom- 
 plish the great object of his expedition. In three days, 
 what with fighting, sickness, and deaths from disease, 
 his force had been reduced to 1200 men; he had no 
 means for carrying his sick ; he was marching away 
 from his resources whilst the enemy was falling back on 
 his ; on his first march of nine miles he had had to fight 
 two pitched battles, and attack two fortified towns, and 
 he was aware that stronger places were before him. 
 On the other hand, he had received intimation from 
 Calcutta that the 5th Fusiliers and 90th Light Infantry 
 were on their way to reinforce him. Every considera- 
 tion impelled him to suspend any further attempt at 
 an advance which had become for the moment im- 
 practicable. His resolution on this point was confirmed 
 by intelligence which reached him during the night, 
 that the Nana had collected a considerable body of 
 troops and was preparing to act on his rear and cut off 
 his communication with Cawnpore. With a heavy heart 
 then, though convinced of the necessity for tlie move- 
 ment, he retired on the following morning to his strong 
 position Mungulwar. From thence he despatched his 
 
HAVELOCK. 229 
 
 sick and wounded to Cawnpore, and informed General 
 ^^eill that to enable him to reach Lucknow it was 
 necessary that he should receive reinforcements of a 
 thousand bayonets and another battery. He also urged 
 the speedy completion of the bridge to connect both 
 banks of the river, a work which he had planned before 
 he set out on his first attempt. Into the causes which 
 acted to delay tlie arrival of the reinforcements so 
 ardently expected by the general, it is not necessary 
 that we should enter. The disappointment, bitter as it 
 was, only confirmed Havelock in his determination to 
 dare everything for the relief of the Lucknow garrison. 
 And as the diversion of those two cbrps, the 5th and 
 90th, to other employment, seemed to intimate to him 
 that he was to be left to his own resources, he resolved 
 to make with those resources one more effort to rescue 
 his beleaguered countrywomen. On the evening of 4th 
 August, then, having about fourteen hundred effective 
 soldiers under his command, he marched for the second 
 time towards Lucknow. They passed through Oonao 
 without attack, but as they approached Busseeruthgunge 
 it became evident that the enemy lay there in force. 
 Unwilling to risk a night action, Havelock moved back 
 to Oonao, bivouacked there, and advanced again the 
 following morning. He found the enemy strongly 
 posted in the position previously described. He resolved 
 to adopt, on a more effective scale, the tactics that had 
 proved so successful before. Leaving the 64th, 84th, 
 the heavier guns and the cavalry in front, he took the 
 Highlanders, Fusiliers, Sikhs, and Captain Maude's 
 battery to cut off the enemy from the causeway. Before, 
 however, he could accomplish this, the enemy, seeing 
 his design and dreading to be entrapped, bewildered, 
 
230 HAVELOCK. 
 
 too, by the cannonade in their front, fled precipitately 
 across the causeway. In doing this they came under 
 the fire of the guns of Captain Maude's battery, and 
 were mown down in numbers. They were at the same 
 time vigorously pursued, driven from village to village, 
 until broken and disheartened they found safety in the 
 fatigue of our soldiers. 
 
 This victory, however, served to convince the general 
 that he was no more capable of pushing on to Lucknow 
 than he had been on the first occasion of his advance. 
 Besides the losses from actual fighting, the cholera had 
 broken out in his camp, and was hurrying off its victims 
 in constant succession. The Nana, too, was approach- 
 ing his flank, and threatened to interrupt his com- 
 munications. But perhaps the most decisive intelligence 
 of all was conveyed in the account that the Gwalior 
 Contingent had mutinied against their Maharaja, and 
 was moving on Kalpee. This was a position threaten- 
 ing to Cawnpore and menacing our communications with 
 Allahabad. His return became through that fact no 
 longer a matter of consideration ; it was a necessity. 
 The general felt that the maintenance of the British 
 prestige depended upon the preservation of his army, 
 and that its destruction would bring certain ruin on 
 Lucknow. Impelled by these considerations he once 
 more retraced his steps to Mungulwar. 
 
 Havelock lay at Mungulwar four or five days recruit- 
 ing his men, and pushing on the construction of the 
 bridge that was to unite both banks of the river. On 
 the 10th, this great work, carried on under many dis- 
 advantages, was completed, and the same day intelli- 
 gence was sent by General Neill that Bithoor had been 
 occupied in great force by the enemy. Unwilling as he 
 
HAVELOCK. 231 
 
 was to leave his position at Mungulwar, Havelock at 
 once recognised the necessity of inflicting a signal blow 
 upon the enemy who had dared to approach so nearly 
 to Cawnpore, and he prepared accordingly to recross 
 the river. Before, however, he could carry out his 
 resolution, he learned that the Oudli rebels had taken 
 up a strong position between Oonao and Busseeruth- 
 gunge. To dislodge them from a position from which 
 they could have attacked him whilst crossing, became an 
 object of imperious necessity. 
 
 For the third time, therefore, Havelock moved towards 
 Busseeruthgunge. He found the enemy very strongly 
 posted between that town and Oonao-, and sheltered by 
 earthworks and entrenchments. Covered as before by 
 his artillery and skirmishers, Havelock advanced in 
 echellon of battalions from his right. But little impres- 
 sion, however, was made on the earthen mounds which 
 protected their position. An infantry charge was there- 
 fore resolved upon. The 78th Highlanders were brought 
 on to the main road whilst the Fusiliers were moved to 
 the right. These dashing with characteristic ardour on 
 the enemy's left, broke it instantly, and captured all the 
 guns at that point. Our troops instantly turned them 
 on the main body of the enemy, who, surprised and 
 panic-stricken, made but little resistance, but fled head- 
 long through Busseeruthgunge, pursued with untiring 
 energy till beyond the causeway, thus for the third 
 time the scene of their discomfiture. 
 
 The effect of this victory was to leave Havelock free 
 to recross to Cawnpore, without any fear of being dis- 
 turbed during the operation. Accordingly, on the 13th, 
 he moved his force across the bridge to the point whence 
 he had started nineteen days before on his arduous cam- 
 
232 IIAYELOCK. 
 
 paign ; during tliat period he had fought eight combats, 
 in all of which he had been eminently successful. In 
 spite of his victories, however, he had never been able 
 to advance more than ten miles out of the fifty that lay 
 between him and Lucknow. The overpowering numbers 
 and immense resources of the enemy counterbalanced 
 all the efforts of his genius, and he was compelled to 
 feel, after each victory, that at the head of so small a 
 force Lucknow was as distant from him as ever. General 
 Neill, with whom he consulted on the practicability of 
 making any further attempt to reach the beleaguered 
 garrison, expressed his opinion at this time, that unless 
 reinforced it could only terminate in disaster, without 
 the possibility of relieving the garrison, and that it 
 would be injurious to our interests in that part of India. 
 The 14th and 15th were devoted to rest, and to prepara- 
 tions to check the ravages of the cholera which had 
 broken out with extraordinary fury. On the 16th 
 Havelock deemed it absolutely necessary to march 
 against Bithoor. The rebels here, about four thousand 
 in number, consisted of sepoys from the 34th, 42nd> 
 17th, 28th, and a few of the 31st N. I. with the 2nd 
 regular and 3rd irregular cavalry, and some of the 
 Nana's own retainers with two guns. They were drawn 
 up in front of the castle of Bithoor, their communication 
 with which was maintained by means of a bridge in 
 their rear. Their position was strong, being defended 
 by entrenched quadrangles filled with sepoys, and 
 sheltered by plantations of sugarcane rising high above 
 the head. Two villages, one on either flank, and con- 
 nected by an earthen entrenchment, formed the supports 
 of this position ; they were strongly occupied. On this 
 occasion, for the first time, Havelock had the advantage 
 
HAVELOCK. 233 
 
 of the enemy in artillery, and he resolved to endeavour 
 to make them feel his superiority. For twenty minutes 
 he poured in a tremendous fire from the guns and 
 Enfield rifles, our men meanwhile lying down. Finding, 
 however, that he was making but little impression on 
 the quadrangles, he ordered an advance of infantry 
 covered by the Fusiliers. After a short conflict, in 
 which the 42nd N. I. are said to have crossed bayonets 
 with our men, the enemy evacuated the quadrangles, 
 and retired to his main position between the two villages. 
 Upon this the artillery fire was concentrated, but as 
 here also little impression was made on the earthwork, 
 and the enemy still kept up a galling fire from behind 
 its shelter, recourse was again had to the bayonet. The 
 rebels awaited the onset of our men with seeming con- 
 fidence, but no sooner had these reached the parapet 
 than their hearts failed them, and they gave way in 
 confusion, abandoning Bithoor in their flight. Our men 
 were too exhausted to pursue them ; they bivouacked 
 on the ground they had won, and on the following 
 morning retraced their steps to Cawnpore. Intelligence 
 gi'eeted the general on his arrival at that station that 
 another ofiScer had been appointed to the command of 
 the column with which he had been so gloriously associ- 
 ated. He received indeed no written communication on 
 the subject. A copy of the Government Gazette con- 
 taining Sir James Outram's appointment announced the 
 bare fact ; the reasons he was left to imagine. After all 
 his exertions, his rapid advance from Cawnpore, the 
 heroic efforts to reach Lucknow, his brilliant victories, 
 the confidence with which he had inspired all wdth 
 whom he had come in contact, the deadly blows which 
 he had dealt the rebel cause, to be simply superseded 
 
234 HAVELOCK. 
 
 seemed hard indeed. But to be superseded without 
 a word, without an acknowledgment of any sort, the 
 announcement first made known by the Government 
 G-azette, was ungenerous and cruel. It was impossible 
 to avoid the inference that he was superseded because 
 he had not attained the result which was hoped for by 
 those in power. Whatever the reason might have been, 
 it has never yet been revealed or acknowledged. Mr. 
 Marshman, his biographer and brother-in-law, whilst 
 condemning it as an act inconsiderate, uncalled-for, and 
 unjust, propounds the idea that it was an accident, the 
 offspring of confusion and error. To the minds of others 
 who had marked how, in that summer and autumn of 
 1857, success had been made the sole standard of con- 
 fidence, how even General Lloyd had been maintained 
 and supported at Dinapore because, up to a certain point, 
 he had managed the sepoys without disarming them, 
 another and a different conclusion appeared only natural. 
 However that may have been, it cannot be doubted 
 that to the general the first announcement, no less than 
 the manner in which it was made known, was a bitter 
 disappointment. He was not wanting, nevertheless, on 
 this trying occasion, to the principles which had ever 
 guided his course. Havelock the superseded was as 
 active, as daring, as energetic, as full of vigour as when 
 he ruled, the unfettered commander of an independent 
 force. Never were his great qualities more urgently 
 required on behalf of the public service than after 
 his return from the battle of Bithoor. Out of 1700 
 Europeans whom he had had altogether from the time 
 of quitting Allahabad under his orders, but QSb remained 
 effective. Not only was he compelled to abandon all 
 idea of moving into Oudh, but the action of the Gwalior 
 
HAVELOCK 235 
 
 Contingent at Kalpee rendered it doubtful whether he 
 could even maintain Cawnpore. This force consisting 
 of 5,000 men with 30 guns, was already threatening 
 Futtehpore. To the north, the Nawab of Furruckabad 
 had 30,000 men under him in arms, ready to take 
 advantage of the difficulties which menaced Cawnpore. 
 It was, besides, in the power of the rebels in Oudh, freed 
 from the presence of Havelock's force in their own pro- 
 vince, to detach any number of men to operate with the 
 Gwalior Contingent, and to cut him off from Allahabad. 
 Of all these difficulties Havelock had the fullest cog- 
 nizance, yet not one of them disturbed his clear judg- 
 ment. To remain at Cawnpore was. a very great risk 
 undoubtedly, but to fall back on Allahabad unless in 
 case of the most absolute need, would have been a 
 calamity. Not only should we have lost the prestige 
 and the material advantages gained by Havelock's 
 victories, but it would have united the three then 
 divided bodies against us, and have placed them, with 
 more means at their disposal, in a far stronger position 
 than that from which he had dislodged the Nana. He 
 announced then to the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
 CoKn Campbell, that if he could hold out hopes of re- 
 inforcements, he would, in spite of the very threatening 
 aspect of affairs, continue to hold Cawnpore ; if not, he 
 must retire upon Allahabad. The reply of Sir Colin 
 entirely reassured him as to the intentions of the 
 Government, and he resolved at all risks to hold his 
 position at Cawnpore. He did so. 
 
 Just one month after the battle of Bithoor, the 15th 
 September, Sir James Outram arrived with his reinforce- 
 ments. With a magnanimity, for which history records 
 no precedent but which places the chief actor on a 
 
236 , HAVELOCK. 
 
 moral pre-eminence surpassing that even of the stern 
 warriors of republican Eome, Sir James Outram declined 
 to take the command from one who had made efforts so 
 noble and so strenuous to accomplish the end still re- 
 maining before them. Whilst Havelock then kept the 
 command of the force, now increased to 2500 men, Sir 
 James joined it as a volunteer, and in that capacity, 
 serving with the volunteer cavalry, performed deeds of 
 daring which, had he been a subaltern, would have 
 gained for him the Order of Valour, but which, achieved 
 by Sir James, were considered to partake too much of 
 the character of the man, and to be but a too necessary 
 corollary of past heroism, to need any peculiar distinc- 
 tion. 
 
 On the 20th September, Havelock for the last time 
 crossed the Ganges, meeting little more than nominal 
 opposition in the passage. He ascertained, however, 
 that the enemy held Mungulwar in strength. Thither 
 he marched the following morning, drove him out of it, 
 and pursuing him rapidly, not allowing him time to 
 rally, did not halt until he had gained Busseeruthgunge, 
 and had seen the enemy in hopeless confusion beyond 
 it. On the following morning, resuming the advance, 
 he passed the Sye without opposition, the enemy having 
 neglected to destroy the bridge. But sixteen miles now 
 lay between him and the residency. The rapidity of 
 the advance had disconcerted all the plans of the enemy, 
 and compelled him to concentrate his forces hastily on 
 Lucknow. But Havelock had still to push on : between 
 him and the garrison lay difficulties which might well have 
 seemed insurmountable, but which he at least had 
 determined to overcome. On the 23rd, a march of ten 
 miles brought the force to within sight of the Alumbagh, 
 
HAVELOCK. 237 
 
 covered by an army of 10,000 men. No time was lost 
 in attacking these. Turning their right flank, and 
 assisting the movement by a iire from a heavy battery 
 of 24-poimders, he quickly put them into confusion, 
 then launching his cavalry upon them he completed 
 their disorder, and drove them across the Charbagh 
 bridge. 
 
 The city alone now lay between him and the resi- 
 dency, and to determine the plan for surmounting this 
 difficulty, as well as to give rest to the troops, the force 
 halted at the Alumbagh on the 24th. After long con- 
 sideration it was resolved to cross the Charbagh bridge, 
 and force their way through the intricate streets to the 
 residency. On the morning of the 2oth the troops, full 
 of energy, marched to this desperate work. How this 
 was accomplished, how, by dint of the most daring 
 courage, the most splendid perseverance on the part of 
 the men, and the most indomitable resolution on tlie 
 part of the general, this, the most thickly peopled city 
 in Asia, crowded with armed men, guarded by its narrow 
 streets, was penetrated and forced by that small band of 
 heroes, we cannot stay to tell. That it was successfully 
 achieved stamps those who planned and who executed 
 the attack as men of no common order. The difficulties 
 to be encountered were even greater than those which 
 staggered for so long a time the French army before 
 Saragossa, and which the genius of the Duke of Mon- 
 tebello with much labour surmounted. When one 
 thinks how easily a few determined men might have 
 held that strong position, how a union of courage and 
 discipline would have sufficed under a skilful leader to 
 crush, to utterly overwhelm, the little band that dared 
 that terrible conflict, one feels how impossible it is to 
 
238 HAVELOCK. 
 
 admire sufficiently the courage that planned and the 
 resolution that carried to a successful issue, an enter- 
 prise in which, regarded simply as a military operation, 
 the unfavourable chances so largely predominated. It 
 was because Havelock was a complete master of the art 
 of war, because he knew so well that there are times 
 when great principles even may be safely set aside, 
 because he was capable of judging, and of shaping his 
 opinions accordingly, of the effect of morale upon 
 soldiers, that he determined upon, and succeeded in, an 
 enterprise, which, viewed by a distant spectator and 
 regarded only with reference to the disproportion of 
 means to the end, would have been pronounced an im- 
 possibility. It is on such an occasion that the true 
 soldier, the man who understands his profession and 
 comprehends the most trifling action even on the part 
 of his fellow men, stands out most brilliantly. Havelock 
 succeeded because he felt that with the force at his 
 disposal, he could accomplish against the force to which 
 he was opposed, any achievement which required but 
 the duration of four-and-twenty hours to perform. 
 Beyond that period, numbers might overwhelm, but 
 Avithin it, keeping his men in constant action, and not 
 necessitated to halt them for the purpose of food, every- 
 thing was possible. 
 
 At dusk on the 25th Havelock entered the residency, 
 so long the object of his hopes, at the head of the leading 
 portion of his force. On the following morning Sir James 
 Outram assumed the command, and he subsided into the 
 position of divisional commander. But it soon became 
 evident to himself as well as to Sir James Outram, that 
 although the relieving force had been able to force itself 
 into Lucknow, it was not strong enough to escort back 
 
HAVELOCK. 239 
 
 to Cawnpore the women and children who so long and 
 so nobly had borne the privations attendant upon the 
 siege. It became then necessary to await a further 
 movement from Cawnpore. This was delayed for some 
 weeks to the great detriment of the general's health. 
 So long as he was in the field he had been sustained by 
 the excitement, by the great hopes he cherished, by the 
 constant labour, mental, and bodily even, that devolved 
 upon him. But shut up in the residency, compelled to 
 pass the weary hours of every succeeding day within a 
 narrow limit, certain that relief though coming was yet 
 distant, unsustained by the hope of relieving his country- 
 men from danger, that reaction in -his health set in, 
 which in his tour in Germany he had looked forward to 
 as ultimately certain. As if, too, to take away the last 
 chance of preserving a life that England had only then 
 recognised as so precious, he was unable within the resi- 
 dency to procure food of the nutritious nature requisite 
 for the support of his system. " We eat," he wrote to 
 his wife, " a reduced ration of artillery bullock beef, 
 chupattees and rice ; but tea, coffee, sugar, soap, and 
 candles are unknown luxuries." Under such a regimen, 
 and no longer under the healthful influences to which 
 we have referred, he began gradually to lose his former 
 vigour. The change, however, was perceptible to few 
 besides himself, and when, after a blockade of two 
 months, on the second and final relief of the garrison by 
 Sir Colin Campbell on the 17th November, Havelock 
 went out to meet him at the Motee Muhal, he was 
 apparently in his accustomed health. Three days later 
 it was known that he was ill with diarrhoea, although 
 the disease had apparently yielded to the remedies 
 applied. On the 21st he became worse, and was moved 
 
240 HAVELOCX. 
 
 in a dooly to tlie Dilkoosha. On the 22nd there was 
 little change ; but he expressed a conviction that he 
 would not recover ; on that day the dooly being- within 
 the range of the enemy's bullets, he was removed in it to 
 a more sheltered position. On the 23rd he was worse. 
 The events of that day and the following are thus related 
 by Mr. Marshman : — " Havelock was evidently worse, 
 and he himself declared his case hopeless. His mind 
 was calm and serene, supported by the strength of that 
 Christian hope that had sustained him through life. 
 Belying firmly on the merits of the Eedeemer, in whom 
 he had trusted with unwavering confidence through life, 
 he was enabled to look forward to the hour of dissolution 
 with cheerfulness. Throughout the day he repeatedly 
 exclaimed, * I die happy and contented.' At one time 
 he called his son to him, and said — ' See how a Christian 
 can die.' In the afternoon. Sir James Outram came to 
 visit his dying comrade, when he said, ' I have for forty 
 years so ruled my life, that when death came I might 
 face it without fear ; ' he enjoyed little sleep during the 
 night of the 23rd. The next morning he appeared to 
 revive, but at eight there was a sudden and fatal change, 
 and at half-past nine on the 24th November he calmly 
 resigned his spirit into the hands of his Eedeemer, in 
 the blessed hope of immortality." 
 
 Thus had lived, thus died, Henry Havelock. At the 
 moment when his fame was at the highest, when a 
 grateful country was showering upon him rewards and 
 honours, w^hen in every circle, in every town, in every 
 hamlet of England his name was hailed with the deepest 
 enthusiasm, his pure spirit w^inged its flight from its 
 tenement of clay. He lived but just long enough to 
 hear that England had appreciated his great services : 
 
HAVELOCK. 241 
 
 the full measure of her gratitude he could imagine, but 
 was not destined to enjoy. We ought not, perhaps, to 
 lament his fate in that particular. He died in the city 
 which he had risked so much and dared so nobly to 
 gain, in the full knowledge that the great object for 
 which those unsurpassed perils had been encountered 
 had been fully achieved. He died in the full conscious- 
 ness that he had done his duty to his God, to his country, 
 and to himself. As that lono^ rear-sruard of tender 
 women and helpless children defiled out of the residency, 
 it was impossible that to some amongst them the thought 
 should not have occurred how different, but for Havelock, 
 would have been their destiny. We can see now, even 
 more clearly than they could then, Kow he had accom- 
 plished such great things. It was that successful advance 
 from Allahabad, those intrepid marches into Oudh, and 
 finally that noble stand at Cawnpore when he had but 
 600 men fit for duty, and was threatened on all sides, 
 that had contributed far more than any other movement 
 to that happy result. His bold attitude had paralysed 
 the action of the rebels and had given our Government 
 the time required to collect the resources of the nation. 
 The very daring of his movements caused their success. 
 It was not so much that he marched triumphantly to 
 Cawnpore, — although not every general would have 
 successfully accomplished that movement, — it was his 
 conduct after he arrived there, that showed the* real 
 grandeur of his character. His three attempts to pene- 
 trate into Oudh are, as military achievements, unequalled 
 in history : he was so overmatched in numbers, that to 
 find the semblance of a parallel the memory travels 
 back to the days of Thermopylae or to the expedition of 
 Clearchus. But that disparity was certainly not his 
 
 K 
 
242 HAVELOCK. 
 
 greatest difficulty. He could not fail to see tliat a blow 
 successfully executed against his force would be fraught 
 with terrible destruction to British interests. It would 
 involve far more than the loss of his own little army. 
 Cawnpore would in that event have formed the point of 
 junction for the Gwalior Contingent, the Nawab of 
 Furruckabad, and the Oudh insurgents. Their road to 
 Allahabad would have been open, and whether successful 
 or not against that fortress, they would have had it in 
 their power to accomphsh enormous mischief, and would 
 have certainly occupied our forces far beyond the time 
 up to which the Lucknow garrison would have been 
 able to hold out. This was a consideration which would 
 assuredly have scared a timid commander. Its effect 
 upon Havelock was to make him more daring, more 
 determined. His Indian experience had convinced him 
 that the true, the only effectual manner of coping with 
 an Asiatic enemy, was to throw away the scabbard, to 
 seek him out, to impress him with the moral conviction 
 that to beat him was the inevitable result of encountering 
 him in the field. His crossing the Ganges therefore, in 
 the face of a province armed and ready to oppose him, 
 though seemingly a rash act, was in reality tlie safest 
 and most prudent course that a general could adopt 
 Although he could not reach Lucknow, he was yet able 
 to strike such terrible blows on the rebel force as to 
 ensure himself absolutely against molestation on that 
 side. His profound knowledge of war, and his thorough 
 acquaintance with men, enabled him to do that with 
 safety, which an ordinary mortal would either have not 
 attempted at all, or would have nullified by doubt and 
 hesitation. Every movement of Havelock's was like the 
 well-pronounced incision of a sharp blade ; there was no 
 
HAVELOCK. 243 
 
 hesitation about him ; no hacking bit by bit ; but his 
 blow was well aimed, well considered, and executed 
 always with a vigour and skill not to be surpassed. 
 
 But certainly, as much to be admired, and in a mili- 
 tary point of view at least as meritorious as his advances 
 into Oudh, was his resolution, when reduced to 600 
 effective men, not to abandon Cawnpore. He came to 
 this determination when Cawnpore, as a military position, 
 was not tenable. Kalpee itself, and with it the com- 
 mand of the whole line of the Jumna thence to Alla- 
 habad, was held by the Gwalior Contingent, a compact 
 and well-disciplined force of 5000 men. It was in the 
 power of this Contingent at any time. to cut him off from 
 Allahabad, and thus in fact, to isolate him entirely. 
 He viewed the chance of any movement of this nature 
 with far more apprehension than he regarded an advance 
 into Oudh, and he seems to have felt strongly more than 
 once that every military reason bound him to retire. 
 His experience convinced him, nevertheless, that not- 
 withstanding his false military position, boldness was his 
 soundest policy ; and, once assured that reinforcements 
 were on their way, he clung to that policy with all the 
 tenacity of his strong character. In this resolution, and 
 his consequent dispositions, he displayed one of the 
 strongest attributes of a general. He showed how 
 capable he was of using the moral power which his vic- 
 tories had given him in such a manner as to paralyse, 
 with his reduced physical power, the action of three 
 armies, each of which would have attacked him had he 
 given the smallest sign that he feared the encounter. 
 
 His conduct in this campaign demonstrated very 
 clearly that he possessed all the higher qualities of a 
 great commander. A thorough knowledge of the prin- 
 
 ii2 
 
244 HAVELOCK. 
 
 ciples of war, improved no less by study in the closet 
 tlian by practice in Burmah, in Affgbanistan, in Persia, 
 and in India itself, combined with a profound acquaint- 
 ance with human nature, to place him in the very first 
 rank of generals. The one taught him what ought to be 
 done under all circumstances, the other how to make 
 men do it. Thus, though a stern disciplinarian, he could 
 at the same time inspire his soldiers with that devotion 
 for his person that knows no limit. He impressed them 
 with a confidence in his skill and a belief in his ultimate 
 fortune, that made them bear almost without a murmur 
 that terrible trial to a soldier's temper — a retreat from 
 a victorious field. As a tactician he followed in the 
 footsteps of the great masters of the art. He never 
 attacked in front, when it was possible to gain his end 
 by operating on the flanks. At the same time he would 
 not allow himself to be fettered by the chains of even 
 the soundest general principle. Although he knew well 
 that it was against every rule of warfare to fight a 
 general action with a river in his rear, he deliberately 
 took up that position when he fought the battle of 
 Cawnpore. The great secret, in fact, of all his move- 
 ments was his thorough appreciation of the character of 
 his own soldiers, and of the character of his enemy. 
 This knowledge he used alike to modify a general plan 
 of a campaign, or a disposition on the battle-field ; and it 
 was this that enabled him to attempt more and to accom- 
 plish more, than had ever before fallen to the lot of any 
 general, with numbers so disproportionate, to achieve. 
 
 If, then, he was a general of whom his country may 
 boast, still more may the school in which he was trained 
 be proud to place him on her loftiest pedestal. That 
 Indian school which produced a Lawrence, a Clive, and 
 
HAYELOCK. 245 
 
 a Coote; which taught even Wellington how to win 
 battles ; to which the names of Lake, of Hastings, of 
 Ochterlony, of Napier, of Pollock, of Nott have added 
 fresh lustre ; which has glorified in the triumphs of 
 Outran! and mourned the untimely death of Nicholson, 
 and which can still point to Chamberlain, to Herbert 
 Edwardes, to Vincent Eyre, and to Lumsden as its worthy 
 living representatives ; — that school, we say, is honoured 
 by counting Havelock as a pupil. He lived in it, and 
 he was of it. All his feats of war were performed under 
 its banners, and he had grafted its principles on those 
 general maxims which he had imbibed from a study 
 of European warfare. With India,- then and with her 
 school of warriors, his name must ever be inseparably 
 connected. With Clive and Wellesley, Napier and 
 Nicholson, he stands crowned with the brightest chaplet 
 with which fame can encircle the warrior's brow, whilst 
 from the homes of England cries and tears of gratitude 
 are poured out at the pedestal of the hero, who so 
 worthily maintained his country's honour in the hour of 
 her darkest trial. 
 
 More fortunate than most warriors, Havelock has 
 found a competent biographer. Mr. Marshman s nar- 
 rative, which we have followed in this article, is an 
 excellent specimen of what biography should be, and we 
 are not surprised to learn that it has met with so favour- 
 able a reception in England. To those who desire to 
 look into the inner life of the general, to notice how 
 truly, from his first arrival in the country to the dark 
 hour of his departure, he adhered, in spite of all diffi- 
 culties, to the role of the Christian soldier, we commend 
 a perusal of this work. To the military student it gives, 
 at greater length than we have been able to afford, a 
 
246 HAVELOCK. 
 
 succinct and stirring account of liis various campaigns ; 
 while, for the benefit of all, it points the moral, that 
 unswerving rectitude of character, though clouded for 
 years by the cold shade of neglect, will, if true to itself 
 and proof against all temptation, inevitably find its 
 reward. 
 
( 247 ) 
 
 'A LECTURE 
 
 ON 
 
 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR* 
 
 [Delivered to the Soldiers of the Garrison, Fort William, 
 8th April, 1865.J 
 
 Hyder Ali lias been styled by a French writer ''the 
 most famous conqueror India has beheld since the time 
 of Thamas Kouli Khan." It cannot certainly be denied 
 that he was a great and successful soldier. In that 
 character, addressing, as I am, English soldiers, I wish 
 to speak of him this evening. I would shew him 
 to you as a general, who, our enemy, was brave, un- 
 daunted, persevering, fertile in expedients, ready in 
 resources, and who never despaired ; as a soldier, who 
 though fighting against English soldiers, had the utmost 
 respect for their discipline and valour ; and finally, as 
 a man, who, though born with a swarthy skin, never 
 taught to read or write, is yet a striking example that 
 great natural gifts are not confined to one single section 
 of the human race, but are distributed in fair proportion 
 to all. I have chosen the last three years of his 
 
 * The principal authorities consulted by me for the purposes of this 
 Lecture are : — Wilks"s * Historical Sketches of the South of India ; ' 
 Stewart's ' Memoirs of Hyder Ali Khan ; ' ' Journal of a French OflScer ;' 
 ' East India Military Calendar ;' ' Life of Sir Hector Munro ;' ' The Annual 
 Kegister ; ' Edmund Burke's * Speeches ; ' and ' Inde, par M. Xavier 
 Raymond.' 
 
248 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 life, because, to us Englishmen, those three years are 
 the most interesting of his long career. They were 
 years of unremitting warfare with England, and some- 
 times, on his part, of successful warfare. To have 
 compressed all the events of his life within the limits 
 of a lecture could only have been accomplished by 
 bestowing but a cursory notice on some of his greatest 
 achievements, whereas, in dwelling merely upon the 
 last portion of it, those details may be entered into 
 which will bring, I hope, some of his deeds on the 
 battle field vividly before your eyes. I will, however, 
 first endeavour to set before you, in as few words as 
 possible, a sketch of his earlier career. 
 1 fHyder Ali was born in 1718. His father, a Naik or 
 Colonel of a thousand men, died in 1738, a period 
 when India was in the throes of that anarchy and 
 confusion which supervened between the death of the 
 Emperor Aurungzebe and the establishment of Britisli 
 supremacy. It was just the period in the history of 
 Hindustan, when to be an adventurer, was a profession ; 
 when, the power of the sword being supreme, he who 
 could wield it with the greatest dexterity, was certain 
 to rise ; — a time fatal to science, to civilization, to the 
 growth of social virtues, but well suited to the gambler,* 
 who, with earth for his table and human bones for his 
 dice, might hope at one throw to gain a kingdom. 
 
 It was for such a stake that Hyder Ali played. By 
 means which, however unscrupulous, were common 
 enough in those days, he managed in 1760, after many 
 fluctuations of fortune, to eject the reigning Hindoo 
 iamily of Mysore, and to constitute himself virtual 
 luler of that kingdom. But his ambition did not stop 
 
 * His table earth, his dice were human hones.— Byron. 
 
HYDEE ALPS LAST WAR. 249 
 
 there. After increasing his territory at the expense of 
 the Mahrattas, he joined with the Nizam in endeavouring 
 to drive the English from the Carnatic, — the territory- 
 lying between Mysore and the seacoast, — then governed 
 by a protege of the English, Mahomed Ali, whose 
 predilection for adroit baseness was ahvays prompting 
 him to betray his protectors. In the war which followed, 
 Hyder Ali completely outmanoeuvred the English, and 
 dictated a peace to the Governor, on the 4th April, 
 1769, under the walls of Madras. The chief articles of 
 this treaty were the restitution of mutual conquests, 
 and the assurance of mutual aid and alliance in defen- 
 sive wars. 
 
 In the following year, Hyder Ali was attacked by the 
 Mahrattas. He called upon the English to perform 
 their contract and assist him, but, far from doing this, 
 they lent a moral support to his enemies. Hyder was 
 consequently compelled to make peace at a considerable 
 sacrifice of territory. This territory, however, he re- 
 covered in subsequent campaigns. 
 
 Hyder never forgave the English for having failed to 
 perform their part of the treaty of 1769. He would 
 nevertheless, on political grounds, have preferred their 
 friendship to an alliance with the French, but he feared 
 to trust them. In this case, as so often happens in 
 private life, the misunderstanding was inflamed and 
 increased by the arts of interested " whisperers," amongst 
 whom the Nawab of the Carnatic was conspicuous. 
 
 When, therefore, ten years later, the English became 
 involved in a war with the French, and a war with the 
 Mahrattas, and proposed to attack the French settle- 
 ment of Mahe, Hyder sent to inform them that he 
 should consider such an attack tantamount to a declara- 
 
250 HYDER ALIS LAST WAE. 
 
 tion of war. The English paid no heed to his remon- 
 strances, but took Mahe. They sent, however, first, 
 Mr. Schwartz, and afterwards, in January, 1780, Mr. 
 Gray, as envoys to Hyder's Court at Seringapatam. 
 to soothe and pacify him. Mr. Gray was supplied 
 with a pigskin saddle, and a breech-loading rifle, which 
 it was vainly attempted to charge as a muzzle-loader, 
 as presents to this Mahomedan chief. These were con- 
 temptuously returned, and when, some days later, Mr. 
 Gray was admitted to an audience, he was addressed in 
 language which left no doubt of the intentions of the 
 speaker. "Formerly," said Hyder to him, ''I was 
 of opinion that the English excelled all other nations 
 in sincerity and good faith ; but from late experience 
 I am convinced they have no longer any pretensions 
 to those virtues." Then, dwelling with considerable 
 emphasis on -his grounds of complaint against the 
 English, and on the impossibility of amity between the 
 two nations, he bade Mr. Gray, " return to his employer, 
 and tell him not to trouble him with letters or messages 
 of any kind." 
 
 Hyder prepared to act in accordance with this lofty 
 language. He had arranged with his three allies, the 
 Peshwa, the Eajah of Berar, and the Nizam, that whilst 
 he should invade the Carnatic, the Nizam should burst 
 upon the Northern Circars, and that the two armies, 
 effecting a junction at a fixed point, should march upon 
 and lay siege to Madras, overthrowing any army that 
 might attempt to stay their progress ; that at the same 
 time the Peshwa should march upon Bombay, and 
 throw the English into the sea, and that preparations 
 should be made at Delhi, either to obtain the co- 
 operation of the Wuzeer of Oudh in the expulsion of 
 
HTDER ALI'S LAST WAE. 251 
 
 the English, or, in case of his refusal, to act vigorously 
 against him. 
 
 A plan so gigantic could scarcely have succeeded on 
 all its points, even had there been a Hyder Ali to direct 
 each attack. But, of all the allies, he was perhaps the 
 only one who was bent on prosecuting the war to its 
 avowed end. In this, certainly, he showed no slackness. 
 He moved from Seringapatam in the direction of Banga- 
 lore in the month of June, 1780, at the head of an 
 army of 28,000 horse, 15,000 regular infantry, drilled 
 according to the European fashion, 12,000 irregular in- 
 fantry, 28,000 local troops and tributaries, 400 Europeans 
 under M. de Lally, nephew of the famous French general 
 of that name, and a hundred guns, — in all, 85,000 
 men. Of these, the local troops and tributaries, 28,000 
 in number, were the least to be depended upon, but 
 the others constituted the most efficient army ever 
 assembled under the banners of an Asiatic leader. He 
 had an admirable commissariat, under the direction 
 of a Brahmin, named Poornea, one of his ministers 
 of finance, and no arrangements seemed wanting to 
 ensure success. Hyder commanded, in person, the 
 main body of this army ; the left wing, intended to 
 attack the Northern Circars, was under the orders 
 of his son, Tippoo Sahib ; whilst the right wing, under 
 one of his most trusted generals, was directed to pene- 
 trate to the south, in the direction of Madura. 
 
 In the second week of July, 1780, Hyder broke up 
 from Bangalore, and making his way through the Ghats, 
 burst upon the Carnatic. The fort of Chittore, on the 
 English side of the Palamnaire Pass, offered little 
 impediment to his progress, and on the 20th his right 
 wing had penetrated to Porto Novo, on the coast, 
 
252 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAE. 
 
 below Pondichery, whilst he himself had plundered 
 the considerable town of Conjeveram, forty-two miles 
 west of Madras. Meanwhile, the Government of ]\Iadras 
 had made no preparations to meet the danger. They 
 did not even believe in it, though two of their members 
 urgently pressed it upon them. Even on the 21st July, 
 when intelligence reached them that Hyder had forced 
 his way through the passes, they were not at all disturbed; 
 and it was not till the 24th, when they learned with 
 dismay that the Mysore chieftain was within forty-two 
 miles of Madras, that they made the smallest prepara- 
 tion for the defence of the territory confided to their 
 charge. 
 
 But on the 24th it was no longer possible to question 
 the imminence of the danger. At that time the forces 
 immediately available at Madras and its neighbourhood 
 for active operations, consisted of one regiment of 
 Highlanders, the 73rd; the 1st Madras Europeans; 
 the grenadiers of the European battalion; four native 
 regiments ; and a few artillerymen ; — in all 5209 men. 
 It was arranged, after much discussion, and in the face 
 of many protests, that this force should march under 
 the command of Sir Hector Munro, of Buxar celebrity, 
 to Conjeveram ; and .that it should be there joined 
 by a detachment, 2813 strong, of whom 207 were 
 Europeans, then stationed at Guntoor to protect the 
 Northern Circars, under the orders of Colonel Baillie. 
 That officer was at first instructed to move westward so 
 as to alarm the enemy about his communications, but 
 on his own representation, these orders were modified, 
 and he was directed to march upon Conjeveram, taking 
 such a route as would best enable him to intercept 
 the enemy's convoys. The policy of ordering a junction 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 253 
 
 at Conjeveram under the very eyes of Hyder Ali, when 
 it might more safely and more speedily have been 
 effected at Madras, was protested against at the time, 
 and there can be no doubt that it was unsound. 
 
 At the same time. Colonel Brathwaite, who com- 
 manded at Pondichery, was ordered to move with his 
 force of 1500 men to Chingleput, and thence to Madras ; 
 whilst Colonel Cosby, with 2000 native infantry, two 
 regiments of the Nawab's cavalry, and two guns, was 
 directed to move northwards from the banks of the 
 Coleroon, so as to act on the enemy's communications 
 in the passes, but he was afterwards compelled, as we 
 shall see, to join the main army. Meanwhile, Hyder 
 Ali, sensible that everything depended on the celerity 
 of his movements, pushed rapidly forwards. On the 
 10th of August, his advanced parties had reached 
 St. Thomas' Mount, and had driven the European 
 inhabitants within the fort. He deemed it necessary, 
 however, to undertake, in the first instance, the siege of 
 Arcot, a place regarded of great importance, as being 
 the seat of Government of the Nawab, and the posses- 
 sion of which could not fail to secure to him great 
 moral as well as material advantages. On the 21st 
 August, therefore, he invested Arcot. 
 
 Four days later. Sir Hector Munro, at the head of 
 the force of 5209 men, before alluded to, left Madras 
 for Conjeveram. Here he arrived on the 29th August, 
 and here finding himself now within twenty-seven miles 
 of his great antagonist, he determined to wait the 
 arrival of Colonel Baillie, expected on the following 
 day. It is time to turn, therefore, to the movements of 
 that officer. 
 
 Colonel Baillie had left Guntoor early in August^ 
 
254 HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 
 
 and marching southwards, had encamped, on the night 
 of the 25th of that month on the northern bank of the 
 river Cortelaur, then nearly dry. The floods, however, 
 descended that night, and caused the river to rise 
 to such an extent that Colonel Baillie was detained 
 on the north bank till the 4th September. On that 
 day he crossed, and reached Perambaucum on the 
 morning of the 6th. This was but fourteen miles from 
 Conjeveram, where Sir Hector, with the main body, 
 was expecting him. He had scarcely, however, reached 
 the encamping ground at Perambaucum, when he found 
 himself assailed by the enemy, in overwhelming force. 
 This enemy consisted of the left wing of Hyder All's 
 army, under the command of Tippoo Sahib. To his 
 movements I must now revert. 
 
 It will be recollected that on the 29 th x^ugust. Sir 
 H. Munro arrived at Conjeveram, twenty-seven miles 
 distant from Arcot, then besieged by Hyder Ali. The 
 same day Hyder received information of the departure 
 of Sir Hector from Madras, and of Baillie's halt on the 
 Cortelaur. His plans were rapidly formed. Breaking 
 up from Arcot, he moved with the main body of his 
 force on to Conjeveram, whilst he detached his left 
 wing, consisting of 5000 regular infantry, 6000 horse, 
 twelve light and six heavy guns, under the command 
 of his son Tippoo, in the direction which he knew 
 Colonel Baillie must take. On the 3rd September 
 he himself encamped within six miles of the English 
 army ; and, receiving intimation, two days later, of his 
 son Tippoo's intention to attack Colonel Baillie, he took 
 ground to the north on the morning of the 6th, as 
 though he intended to turn the right flank of the 
 English. Sir Hector, completely deceived, refused his 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 255 
 
 right wing, and Hyder, taking advantage of this move- 
 ment, continued his manoeuvre, and succeeded in inter- 
 posing his whole force between the English army and 
 the only road by which Colonel Baillie's detachment, 
 then, as he knew, about to be attacked by his son Tippoo, 
 could receive assistance. 
 
 Meanwhile, Tippoo, who had sighted Colonel Baillie's 
 force on the 4th and 5th, but who, from strategical 
 reasons, had then refrained from attacking them, re- 
 solved on the morning of the 6th, to deliver the well- 
 intended blow. It was 11 o'clock, when, at the head of 
 the force I have already mentioned, he came in sight 
 of the English detachment, just arrived at Perambaucum. 
 It was not his first encounter with the dreaded English, 
 and, though he had now made up his mind to attack 
 them, he feared to trust to the result of a hand-to-hand 
 contest. He accordingly opened upon them with his 
 artillery, and was at once replied to by the English 
 guns. From eleven o'clock to two this contest continued, 
 when Tippoo, having lost two or three hundred men, 
 discontinued the cannonade, and wrote to his father that 
 it would be impossible for him to make any impression 
 on the enemy without reinforcements. Baillie, on the 
 other hand, whose loss amounted to about a hundred 
 killed and wounded, felt himself utterly unable to move 
 in the face of the overwhelming cavalry force of Tippoo, 
 and he wrote in this sense to Sir Hector, urging him to 
 move with his whole army to his assistance. 
 
 But this was just what the British Commander-in- 
 Chief could not do without hazarding an engagement 
 with the immensely superior forces of Hyder, for, as we 
 have seen, Hyder had interposed the main body of his 
 army between the two divisions of the British Army. 
 
256 HYDER ALT'S LAST WAR. 
 
 He was, besides, unwilling to leave his heavy guns and 
 supplies, which had been stored in the pagoda at Con- 
 jereram, a building incapable of holding out even for a 
 day. Forced to act, however, he determined to despatch 
 the flank companies of the 73rd, commanded respectively 
 by the Honourable John Lindsay, and Sir David Baird, 
 — subsequently so distinguished for his services in India 
 and in Spain, — two companies of the European regi- 
 ment, and eleven companies of sepoys, — 1007 men in 
 all, — and the whole commanded by Colonel Fletcher, — 
 in the hope that this column might be enabled to elude 
 the vigilance of the enemy, and that the latter would 
 be deceived by the passive attitude maintained by the 
 main army in front of Conjeveram. 
 
 On the night of the 8th September, therefore, this 
 detachment marched, following a route recommended by 
 the guides, as leading them away from Hyder Ali's 
 encampment. But Hyder, who had watched the English 
 force as the hunter watches his prey, and who had perfect 
 intimation of all its movements, had only permitted 
 Colonel Fletcher to march out, that he might ensure 
 his destruction. He had suborned the guides, and these 
 were directed to lead the detachment through a defile 
 from which escape would have been impossible. Fortu- 
 nately, however. Colonel Fletcher, who was an able man 
 and a good soldier, doubted the fidelity of the guides; 
 he had accurately reconnoitred the position taken up by 
 Hyder's army, and it appeared to him that the road by 
 which they were advancing must inevitably lead him 
 into the heart of the enemy's position. Acting upon this 
 conviction, he suddenly changed his route, and making 
 a long detour to the eastward^ passed Hyder's army 
 unperceived, and joined Colonel Baillie early on the 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 257 
 
 morning of the 9tli. A dangerous and difficult ma- 
 noeuvre was never more skilfully performed. 
 
 This junction raised the force under Colonel Baillie 
 to 3720 men, of whom upwards 'of 500 were Europeans. 
 After resting all day, Colonel Baillie prepared in the 
 evening to move towards his chief, then distant from 
 him but fourteen miles. A corresponding movement 
 made by Sir Hector would have ensured the junction, 
 for Hyder AH had been much disturbed by the success 
 of Colonel Fletcher's march, and the French officers in 
 his service regarded it as part of a masterly manoeuvre 
 to place the Mysore army between two fires. He had 
 therefore, made every preparation, in case of any dis- 
 position to move being evinced by the main body of the 
 English army, to retreat with his whole force to the 
 westward. But during the whole of the 9th, Sir Hector's 
 force remained motionless, and Hyder, at ease regard- 
 ing the intentions of one English commander, and bent 
 on crushing the other, despatched the bulk of his infantry 
 and guns at nightfall on the 9th to join his son Tippoo, 
 and followed himself with his cavalry and light guns at 
 4 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Meanwhile, Tippoo, who, since the indecisive action 
 on the 6th, had contented himself with maintaining his 
 ground, was very soon aware of the march of Colonel 
 Baillie's force towards Conjeveram. He again, however, 
 confined himself, as on the former occasion, to maintain- 
 ing a distant and desultory fire, his object being to draw 
 his enemy into a position in which he could attack him 
 with advantage. He counted the more on this, as the route 
 by which the English were moving had been carefully 
 reconnoitred, and his troops and guns had been placed in 
 positions in which they could act with the greatest effect. 
 
258 HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 
 
 But the steadiness of the English force baffled for a 
 time all his hopes. Though considerably inconvenienced 
 by the constant attacks from the enemy, they pushed on 
 for five or six miles, halting occasionally to silence the 
 fire of the hostile guns, or else to take possession of some 
 advantageous position which commanded the ground by 
 which they must advance. But, after marching six miles, 
 and being then but eight miles distant from Sir Hector 
 Munro's camp. Colonel Baillie suddenly, and in oppo- 
 sition to the advice of his second in command, Colonel 
 Fletcher, resolved to halt for the night. This fatal halt 
 was the cause of their subsequent misfortunes, for it 
 gave to Hyder Ali, his son, and the French officers in 
 their service, time to concert measures for the destruc- 
 tion of their hated foe. 
 
 Two miles in front of the position where the English 
 had halted, and on the road by which they must pass, 
 was a small grove of trees, opening on to a plain, about 
 three-quarters of a mile distant from a village. This 
 was jhe position chosen by Hyder, who had been in 
 constant communication with his son during the night, 
 for the destruction of the English force. Three batteries, 
 armed with fifty-seven guns, were erected, one in front 
 of the grove, and the other two on either side of it, and 
 the infantry and cavalry were held in reserve to complete 
 the havoc which, it was hoped, the fire of the artillery 
 would ensure. Ignorant of these dispositions. Colonel 
 Baillie, who had waited till daylight of the morning of 
 the 1 0th to resume his march, experienced for the first 
 two miles but little opposition. But no sooner had 
 he entered the grove, than a tremendous fire from the 
 enemy's batteries opened upon him. Yet, even at that 
 terrible crisis, though taken by surprise, and for the 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 259 
 
 moment without orders, the English soldiers and their 
 sepoy comrades shewed themselves worthy of their high 
 reputation. Covered by their guns, which returned with 
 steady precision the enemy's fire, the force still advanced 
 though in crowded order, along the avenue. Suddenly 
 fi-om their midst, ten companies of sepoys advance at 
 the double, and charge tlie battery which is playing 
 upon their front. The battery is reached, three of the 
 guns are already disabled, when the clouds of dust and 
 th^ tramping of myriads of horsemen tell them, with a 
 startling certainty, that 20,000 of the famed troopers of 
 Mysore are charging to cut them off. The sepoys, 
 however, make good their retreat, though with some 
 loss, and again the column moves slowly on. In vain, 
 however. Covered by Hyder's cavalry, huge masses of 
 infantry now advance, fresh guns are pushed on, and 
 after a short interval, from three sides, — from the front 
 from the right, and from the rear, — from fifty different 
 points, — a deadly cross fire is poured in on the devoted 
 column. Still, however, the English ranks remain un- 
 broken ; still, moving slowly, in the form of a square, — 
 the sick, the baggage, the ammunition in the centre, 
 — they drive back every assault and continue to gain 
 ground. Their behaviour elicits the admiration even of 
 their enemies. "In the whole of this trying day," wrote 
 a French officer serving under Hyder, "the English 
 preserved a coolness of manoeuvre which would have 
 done honour to any troops in the world. Kaked by 
 the fire of an immense artillery, the greatest part of the 
 action within grape-shot distance, attacked on all sides 
 by not less than 25,000 horse and 30 battalions of 
 sepoys, besides Hyder's European troops, the English 
 column stood firm, and repulsed every attack with great 
 
 s2 
 
260 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 slaughter ; the horse driven back on the infantry, the 
 right of our line began to give way, though composed 
 of the best troops in the Mysore army." It was indeed 
 true. Daunted by the unshaken firmness of the English, 
 column, and alarmed by a movement to the right in the 
 direction of his guns which Colonel Baillie made at 
 the moment, Hyder, who was burdened with the con- 
 sciousness that Sir H. Munro could not be further off 
 than six miles, and was probably much nearer, and 
 might place him at any moment between two ^es 
 resolved, after a cannonade of three hours' duration, to 
 retreat. He sent orders to Colonel Lally to draw off 
 the infantry, and to the cavalry to cover the movement. 
 The heroic resistance of the English had indeed produced 
 its natural effect, when at the moment, two of their 
 tumbrils, in the centre of their square, exploded. The 
 effect was terrific. One entire face of the square was 
 laid open, the guns were dismounted and overturned, 
 their ammunition destroyed, and the entire force thrown 
 into irreparable confusion. Hyder himself noticed the 
 catastrophe, but before he could give orders to take 
 advantage of it, one of his lieutenants charged at the 
 head of a regiment of cavalry. The charge was re- 
 pulsed, but the example brought down the enemy's horse 
 in successive squadrons, whilst the infantry poured in 
 volleys of musketry, and a little later the guns reopened 
 at a closer range. Yet, for an hour and a half longer 
 the unequal conflict was maintained. Closing up as their 
 ranks were thinned, the British cohort long presented a 
 bold front to their countless foes. At last, finding his 
 force reduced to about 400 men, and hopeless of relief 
 from the main army, Colonel Baillie resolved to sur- 
 render. Even then the troops desired to be led on, and 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 261 
 
 to die sword in hand. Better had they done so, for no 
 sooner had they, under a promise of quarter, laid down 
 their arms, than Hy dor's young soldiers rushed upon 
 them, and fleshed their swords on the defenceless, the 
 wounded, the sick. The exertions of the French officers, 
 especially M. Pinorin and M. de Lally, put a stop to this 
 massacre, but of the entire force of Europeans, number- 
 ing that morning upwards of 500 men, but 200 remained 
 alive, and of these many were wounded. Of 86 officers, 
 36 .were killed, 34 wounded; 16 only were untouched- 
 Colonel Fletcher lay dying on the field. Colonel Baillie, 
 mortally wounded, was brought into Hyder's presence 
 and taunted with Ijiis defeat, but with the true spirit of 
 a British officer, he bade the Asiatic chief not to vaunt 
 too loudly over a victory, which, — he could appeal to 
 his French officers, — never would have been his, but for 
 an accident which no human foresight could prevent. 
 
 The fate of the two hundred prisoners deserves to be 
 recorded and remembered, as one example amongst a 
 thousand, of the folly of men with arms in their hands 
 trusting to the promises of a barbarian enemy. Most of 
 them were Highlanders, and of these, few could even 
 read or write. They had, however, imbibed in early 
 youth the faith which they had been taught by their 
 forefathers, and from this, no temptation, no cruelty, 
 could induce them to swerve. Fed sparingly upon un- 
 wholesome rice, exposed purposely and without covering 
 to the burning heat of the sun by day, and to the un- 
 wholesome dews by night, seeing their companions 
 dropping before their eyes, they were yet offered life, 
 and liberty, and wealth, on condition of their embracing 
 the Mahomed an faith. Yet not one of them would agree 
 to purchase life on such terms ; not one even hesitated, 
 
262 HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 
 
 even at the moment when his bodily powers were 
 weakest. They would not consent, defenceless as they 
 were, to abandon the God of their fathers, and we may 
 be sure that in their dying moments He did not forget 
 them. But few survived the terrible ordeal, and those 
 who did found in the prisons of Seringapatam a more 
 lingering death. Another instance of English fortitude 
 deserves to be mentioned. Among the prisoners taken 
 was a son of Colonel Lang, commanding at Vellore, who 
 had served with the army a volunteer. Hyder, learning 
 who he was, sent for him, and ordered him to write a 
 letter to his father, offering him a splendid establishment 
 if he would give up Vellore, and stating that his own 
 death would be the consequence of refusal. The boy at 
 first positively refused, but, pressed with threats, he 
 turned to Hyder, and said, in an indignant voice, in the 
 Mysore language : — " If you consider me. base enough 
 to write such a letter, on what ground can you think so 
 meanly of my father ? It is in your power to present 
 me before the ramparts of Vellore, and cut me in a 
 thousand pieces in my father's presence, but it is not 
 in your power to make him a traitor." The threats 
 were, however, renewed, but on their proving ineffec- 
 tual, the boy was consigned to the quarters of the other 
 prisoners. 
 
 To return, however, to the battle field. Where, it 
 may be asked, was Sir Hector Munro, whilst 60,000 
 choice Asiatic troops were overwhelming one of his 
 detachments within a few miles of him ? It is indeed 
 time that we should enquire. 
 
 Sir Hector, we have seen, remained quiet at Conje- 
 veram the whole of the 9th. At daylight on the 10th, 
 he moved in the direction of Perambaucum, from which 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 263 
 
 he was fourteen miles distant. After marching two or 
 three miles, he saw the smoke of the action, and moved 
 in that direction ; after marching about a mile further, 
 he saw a great smoke, — evidently the explosion of the 
 tumbrils. Almost immediately afterwards the artillery 
 fire ceased for a time, and a desultory fire of musketry 
 succeeded. At this moment, considering the distances 
 the two English detachments had marched towards one 
 another that morning. Sir Hector could not have been 
 more than two miles distant from Colonel Baillie. Had 
 he only advanced, the defeat must have been converted 
 into a great victory. This advance, in fact, was the 
 movement Hyder feared, and which his French officers 
 believed to be part of an intended plan. He had kept 
 open, therefore, his communications with the west, 
 ready to move in that direction on the first appearance 
 of Sir Hector's columns. He, in fact, shortly before the 
 explosion, had seen the heads of those columns, and had 
 ordered his cavalry to threaten it in masses, with a view 
 to cover his own withdrawal, when, to his satisfaction, 
 he noticed its movement, to the east and subsequently 
 to the south, back to Conjeveram. Sir Hector, on his 
 part, had jumped to the conclusion that the cessation of 
 firing intimated a victory gained by Colonel Baillie, 
 and it was only after moving in every direction except 
 that which might have altered the state of affairs, that 
 he learned the truth from a wounded sepoy. He, at 
 once, " for the security of his army," moved back to 
 Conjeveram, where he arrived at 6 p.m. Deeming him- 
 self still unsafe there, he threw his heavy guns and 
 stores into the tank, and moved early next morning to 
 Chingleput, where, however, he only arrived with the 
 loss of the greater part of his baggage, on the morning 
 
264 HYDERALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 of the 12tli. Here he was fortunate enough to meet 
 Colonel Cosby's division, which had encountered great 
 difficulties in its march from the south of the Coleroon, 
 and had been compelled to cut its way through the 
 enemy. This junction enabled Sir Hector to march 
 north-eastwards for the defence of Madras, then at the 
 mercy of Hyder's victorious army. He reached Thomas' 
 Mount on the 14th, and moving next day to Marmalong, 
 remained there with a river covering his front, till he 
 was relieved in the following November by Lieutenant- 
 General Sir Eyre Coote. 
 
 Meanwhile Hyder, flushed with victory, though it 
 was a victory which had cost him some of his best 
 troops, moved back into his former encampment in 
 front of Conjeveram, ready to act according to circum- 
 stances. The retreat of Sir Hector from that place had 
 left the direct road to Madras open to him, but, though 
 sound policy and sound military strategy combined to 
 induce him to make an attack upon the presidency, 
 before it had recovered from the panic caused by the 
 events at Perambaucum, he preferred the easier task of 
 resuming the investment of Arcot, the capture of which 
 in the crippled state of the English army, appeared to 
 him easy. On the 19th, therefore, he moved to that 
 place, and after six weeks' open trenches he assaulted it 
 in two columns, one under his son Tippoo, the other 
 commanded by Maha Mirza Khan. Tippoo's column 
 was at first driven back, but, Mirza Khan being success- 
 ful, Tippoo rallied his troops, and at a second attempt 
 effected an entrance. The English troops, 200 in 
 number, retired, with the 7000 men in the service of 
 the Nawab, within the citadel, but Hyder, it is said, 
 managed by means of the Governor, Kaja Birbir, whom 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 265 
 
 he had taken prisoner, to exercise such an influence on 
 the native troops within its walls, that this citadel, — 
 formerly so famous for its successful defence of 50 days' 
 duration with an inferior garrison under Lord Clive, — 
 now surrendered on the third day after the town itself 
 had fallen. The Europeans taken on this occasion were 
 sent to Seringapatam, where many of them were em- 
 ployed in drilling Hyder's new levies, formed for the 
 most part of the native prisoners he had made during 
 this campaign, and the Hindoo portion of whom he 
 forced to become Mahomedans. 
 
 After the capture of Arcot, Hyder, still avoiding 
 Madras, marched -westward, and laid siege to Vellore, 
 sending detachments at the same time to attack Amboor, 
 Wandewash, Permacoil and Chingleput. Amboor sur- 
 rendered on the 13th January, but on the 18th, certain 
 information reached Hyder that Sir Eyre Coote had 
 left Madras on the previous day, at the head of a con- 
 siderable force, with the intention of wresting from him 
 the mastery over the Carnatic. Hyder, on receipt of 
 this intelligence, raised the siege of the places he was 
 attacking, and massed his forces, apparetitly intending 
 to accept a general engagement. But, hearing a few 
 days later of the arrival of a French fleet off Madras, 
 and believing that this intelligence would force Sir 
 Eyre Coote to move to its defence, he moved rapidly on 
 Conjeveram in order to cut off his enemy from the pre- 
 sidency. But Sir Eyre Coote, after revictualling the 
 garrisons of the strong places held by the English in 
 the Carnatic, had moved towards Pondichery, whither 
 he learned, the French fleet had preceded him. He 
 was followed by Hyder, whose march indicated an in- 
 tention to move on Cuddalore. On the 8th both armies 
 
266 HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 
 
 were moving in parallel lines within cannon range. 
 On the 10th Sir Eyre Coote, pressed for supplies, which 
 were cut off from him on the side of the sea by the 
 French fleet, and on the landside by Hyder, offered 
 battle to his enemy. But Hyder knew too well the 
 advantage of his position to accept it. The situation of 
 the British general was now desperate; he had no 
 supplies, no means of procuring any, and he himself, — 
 a man not given to despair, — a man who, in the famous 
 council of war before Plassey, had given his voice with 
 the minority for the fight, — recorded his opinion, that in 
 all human probability the existence of that British army 
 must be brought to a fatal close. But here again was 
 shown the truth of that aphorism of Napoleon "that 
 success in war lies with him who makes the fewest 
 mistakes." Suddenly, under some inspiration of folly, 
 the French admiral weighed anchor, and stood out to 
 the eastward. Coote could not conceal his exultation. 
 He at once wrote to Madras for provisions, adding signi- 
 ficantly ; " those supplied, I will manage the rest." 
 
 Sir Eyre Coote remained at Cuddalore waiting for 
 supplies for nearly five months. Meanwhile, Hyder 
 contented himself with occupying the passes which 
 communicated with the interior ; then, sending his son 
 Tippoo at the head of 30,000 men to resume the siege 
 of Vellore, he marched with the bulk of his army south 
 of the Coleroon, and drew all his supplies of both men 
 and money from the Tanjore territory, realising in this 
 manner an enormous booty. His object was, if possible, 
 to draw the English general from Cuddalore, the place 
 that he had fixed upon as the dep6t of his French allies. 
 
 On the 16th June, Sir Eyre Coote, hearing that 
 Hyder had strongly fortified a pagoda called Chillum- 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 267 
 
 brum near Porto Novo, and twenty-six miles from 
 Cuddalore, and that he intended to use it as a depot for 
 the French, moved towards the place with his whole 
 force. He came before it on the 18th, and attempted 
 to carry it the same evening by a coup de main. But 
 misinformed as to its strength and the number of the 
 garrison, the small party he detached for that purpose 
 was repulsed with loss. Having reconnoitred it the 
 next day and finding it very strong, he drew off his 
 army, and, re-crossing the Yellore river, encamped near 
 Porto Novo. 
 
 The account of this repulse, greatly exaggerated to 
 Hyder, emboldened that leader to make a move which 
 he hoped would prove decisive. Quickly re-massing 
 his scattered forces, he crossed the Coleroon, moved 
 rapidly to the north, then making a sudden turn to the 
 eastward, he interposed his whole army between the 
 English and Cuddalore, having marched a hundred 
 miles in two days and a half. On the 27th June, when 
 Sir Eyre Coote had just made arrangements for the 
 attack by sea and land, of the pagoda, Chillumbrum, he 
 suddenly heard that Hyder, with his whole army, was 
 within three miles of him. 
 
 Coote called a council of war, and this time the 
 council resolved to fight. At 7 o'clock on the morning 
 of the 1st July, he moved out his army, consisting of 
 847t) men, of whom 2070 were Europeans. Arriving 
 in front of the enemy, computed to be about 40,000 of 
 all arms, inclusive of tributaries, he spent a long hour 
 in reconnoitring his position. He found him very 
 strongly posted, occupying three villages. The ground 
 on his front and on his flanks was intersected in every 
 direction by deep ditches and watercourses; his left 
 
268 HTDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 was covered by a range of sandhills which followed the 
 direction of the coast. Embrasures for his artillery 
 had been cut in mounds of earth, formed from the 
 hollowing of the ditches. Behind these lay, motionless, 
 the main body of the army. 
 
 The English general soon made up his mind. His 
 army was formed in two lines. The second line, under 
 General Stuart, was broken into column, and moved to 
 the right under cover of the first line, and afterwards of 
 the sandhills before mentioned. The columns advanced 
 in this direction, following the coast, and thus turning 
 the enemy's left, until they reached an opening in the 
 sandhills, which Hyder had delayed for a day to fortify, 
 in order that he might first make it stronger. General 
 Stuart at once formed his men up and led them to this 
 opening. Twice repulsed, he succeeded the third time, 
 though not till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, in driving 
 the enemy before him. The first line had meanwhile 
 contented itself with a strong demonstration against the 
 enemy's left front, but, no sooner were General Stuart's 
 guns heard, then the feigned attack was converted into 
 a real one, and this line also made good its position on 
 the plateau. 
 
 Meanwhile, Hyder, who was seated cross-legged on a 
 stool on an eminence behind the centre of his line, 
 witnessed with astonishment and dismay the success of 
 the advance. He instantly ordered a charge of cavalry 
 on both lines. That on the first line was repulsed only 
 after a most desperate encounter ; that on the second 
 was never made. Just as its commander, Meer Sahib, 
 was about to give the order to charge, he was struck 
 dead by a round shot, and almost immediately after- 
 wards, an unexpected broadside from an English 
 
HYDEB- ALI'S LAST WAR. 209 
 
 schooner making terrible havoc amongst the chiefless 
 squadrons, a panic ensued, and they retreated behind 
 the sandhills. Hyder, furious, refused to leave his 
 stool ; he would not believe that he was beaten, and 
 declared that the heads of his generals should suffer for 
 their failure. At last, a favourite groom, one of his 
 privileged servants, seized him by both legs, and 
 mounted him on his horse. Hyder then hastened from 
 the field, and set to work to rally his beaten army, of 
 whom 10,000 killed and wounded had fallen on this 
 fatal day. He did not, however, lose a single gun. 
 The English loss was 306. 
 
 Baffled, though not despairing, Hyder took a north- 
 westerly direction, sending instructions to his son Tippoo, 
 who was besieging Wandewash, to join him, but first to 
 attempt an escalade of the place at all possible points. 
 In this Tippoo was foiled by the rare sagacity of Captain 
 Flint, — one of the unrewarded heroes of Indian history, — 
 but he succeeded in joining his father at Arcot. Thence 
 the combined force moved on Perambaucum, — the 
 scene of Colonel Baillie's defeat of the previous year, — 
 and here, — as a place of good omen, — Hyder resolved 
 to do battle again with his old antagonist. Either from 
 this superstitious motive, or from want of heart on the 
 part of his troops, he neglected the opportunity of 
 harassing Sir Eyre Coote in his march along the coast, 
 and of hindering his junction with the reinforcements 
 expected from Bengal. The English general was thus 
 enabled to unite himself with these at Pulicat, adding 
 one-third to his strength, on the 2nd August. 
 
 On the i9th August Sir Eyre Coote moved with his 
 augmented force towards the fort of Tripasore, only a 
 few miles distant from Hyder's encampment at Peram- 
 
2B0 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 baucum. On the morning of the 22nd a practicable 
 breach was reported, and the English were just preparing 
 for the assault, when the entire army of Hyder was seen 
 advancing to relieve it. The general instantly gave 
 orders to storm, when, fortunately, the place surrendered 
 of its own accord. Hyder, furious at the display of such 
 pusillanimity in the presence of his army, sent to the 
 English general and urged him to put to death the 
 prisoners he had taken, and who had behaved as traitors 
 to their master. This of course was not done, and the 
 prisoners were released on parole. 
 
 Sir Eyre Coote, bent now, more than ever, on bringing 
 Hyder to action, lost no time in advancing towards 
 Perambaucum. He came in front of it on the 27th 
 August. He found him occupying a position, which, 
 strong by nature, had been fortified by art. His army 
 70,000 strong, was drawn up on the acclivities of a 
 range of hills, at the foot of which ran several deep 
 watercourses. On his flanks, and along his front, he 
 had erected tremendous batteries, commanded by other 
 batteries in the rear, and his pioneers had been employed 
 for two days in obstructing the only road by which the 
 English columns could advance. 
 
 This was the position which 8ir Eyre Coote, with an 
 army numbering little over 12,000 men, advanced to 
 attack. His army was formed in two lines ; the first 
 of which, under Sir Hector Munro, was directed to 
 advance, supported by the second, commanded by General 
 Stuart, against the centre of the enemy's position. But 
 the difficulties of the ground were so great, and the 
 position so well chosen, and so bravely defended, that 
 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the English had not 
 succeeded in making any visible impression upon it. 
 
HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 271 
 
 Their further advance was checked by a strong enfilading 
 fire from the village of Pollilore, on the left of the 
 enemy's position. A new disposition was accordingly 
 made. Under cover of a heavy fire from two brigades 
 of the first line, the third brigade of which it was 
 composed attacked and stormed the village of Pollilore, 
 whilst the second line made a similar attack on the 
 right of the enemy's position. At this point the battle 
 raged with great fury, and it was not before nightfall 
 that the English succeeded in driving their brave anta- 
 gonists from the elevated plateau, which formed the 
 key to that part of their position. During the night, 
 Hyder, covered by his cavalry, which he had not been 
 able to use in the action, and abandoning one gun, out 
 of the eighty he had brought into the field, marched 
 towards Conjeveram, thus leaving the field of battle 
 to the English. He nevertheless fired a salute in honour 
 of what he termed his victory, but which might more 
 fairly be called an indecisive action. The English 
 general, after remaining one day on the field to bury 
 his dead, retired to Tripasore. The loss of the English 
 is variously estimated from 421 to 600 men ; that of the 
 Mysoreans from 1500 to 2000. 
 
 After this action, Hyder, sending his cavalry under his 
 son Tippoo to watch and harass the English, marched 
 with the remainder of his force upon Vellore, and closely 
 invested it on every side. He also commenced to fortify 
 a position at Sholingur to prevent the advance of the 
 English to its relief. But on the 27th September he 
 was surprised by the sudden appearance of Sir Eyre 
 Coote and his army. Unprepared to deliver battle, and 
 yet wishing to save his guns, he hurled his cavalry 
 under .Tippoo, who had rejoined him, on the advancing 
 
272 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 
 
 English. This attack, made with all the energy of 
 despair, enabled him to draw off his infantry and heavy 
 guns, and he retreated to the westward with the loss 
 of 800 men. Sir Eyre Coote not only relieved Yellore, 
 but also re-took the fort of Chittore at the entrance of 
 the Palamnaire Pass. 
 
 Want of supplies, ho\^ever, soon compelled Sir Eyre 
 Coote to retire to the vicinity of Madras, and the 
 blockade of Vellore was resumed by Hyder, with more 
 strictness than ever. In the beginning of December, 
 indeed, the Madras Government received information 
 that with the utmost economy in the distribution of 
 provisions, the place could not hold out beyond the 
 beginning of January. 
 
 The shattered state of Sir Eyre Coote's health had 
 induced his medical advisers to order him to return 
 to Bengal, but, at the earnest solicitation of Govern- 
 ment, he rose from his sick bed, to make a final effort 
 for the provisioning Vellore. He joined the army on 
 the 2nd January, and though struck down by an attack 
 of apoplexy on the 5th, he rallied so far as to be carried 
 in a palanquin with the army on the 6th. Never did 
 he shew more skill and boldness than when he was 
 thus, as it were, in the very jaws of death. He crossed 
 a large convoy over the Palar river, on which Vellore is 
 situated, and over a swampy morass, in front of the 
 whole army of Hyder, on the 10th January, threw 
 three months' provisions into the town on the 11th, and 
 recrossed the same morass on the 13th, threatened all 
 the time by the numerous cavalry of Hyder, and under 
 a perpetual cannonade. On the 16th, Hyder appearing 
 again in fuU force, Sir Eyre endeavoured to bring him 
 to battle, but in vain. He therefore returned, leisurely. 
 
HYDER ALPS LAST WAR. 273 
 
 to Tripasore. Hyder instantly took advantage of his 
 absence. It will be recollected that in the original 
 plan of the campaign of 1780, Colonel Brathwaite, 
 at the head of 1500 men, afterwards reinforced to 
 about 2500, of whom 150 were Europeans, had been 
 directed to proceed to Chingleput, and subsequently 
 to Madras; but, after the battle of Porto Novo, and 
 Hyder's march to the north, he had been charged 
 with the defence of the country south of the Coleroon. 
 Learning that this officer lay unsupported in that posi- 
 tion, Hyder, the moment Sir Eyre Coote . had marched 
 towards Tripasore, despatched his son Tippoo, at the 
 head of 12,000 cayahy, 8000 regular infantry, 400 
 French, and twenty guns, with orders to proceed by 
 forced marches and to surprise him. On the IGtli 
 February, Colonel Brathwaite, who was encamped in 
 an open plain, and who had disbelieved all the announce- 
 ments made to him on the subject of the approach of an 
 enemy, suddenly found himself surrounded by this force. 
 Unable to retreat, he resolved on a vigorous resistance. 
 He formed his force into a hollow square, with the 
 artillery interspersed in the faces, and the cavalry in 
 the centre. Tippoo first played on them with his guns, 
 and, bringing up his infantry under the cover of that 
 fire, he poured in volley after volley of musketry. But 
 being met by a bold and steady resistance, he ordered 
 his cavalry to charge. On they came, the flower of the 
 Mysore horse, but they came only to be broken and 
 to fly. From the living sides of that square there 
 poured upon them showers of grape and musket shot, 
 such as even the swarthy troopers of Southern India 
 dared not face. They charged but to reform, in dimi- 
 nished numbers, behind their guns. 
 
 T 
 
274 HYDEE ALI'S LAST WAE. 
 
 For nearly three days this fierce contest continued, — 
 Tippoo changing constantly his mode of attack, but 
 changing it in vain. For nearly three days, without 
 food, without prospect of relief, tliat band of heroes 
 resisted him. At last, on the 18th, a final attempt was 
 made. M. de Lally formed his 400 Frenchmen into 
 close column, and supported on either flank by strong 
 columns of Mysore troops, covered by the fire of the 
 artillery, and with the cavalry handy, charged down 
 with the bayonet on the devoted band. Faint and 
 weary, they .could not resist this final elSbrt. They 
 sank from sheer exhaustion before it. Then, as at 
 Perambaucum, dashed in the fierce troopers to slaughter 
 the fallen ; and then, as on that occasion, did the 
 wounded, the sick, and the wearied, owe their lives 
 to the generous interposition of the French commander. 
 Again, however, were the survivors reserved to a fate 
 worse than death, being sent, loaded with irons, to the 
 prisons of Seringapatam. Colonel Brathwaite himself 
 was detained a prisoner in Hyder's camp. 
 
 Hyder who had been greatly depressed by the defeat 
 of one of his detachments under Sirdar Khan at Telli- 
 cherry during the previous month, was immensely 
 elated by this success of his son Tippoo, and learning 
 shortly after, the disembarkation of a French division 
 of 2000 nxen at Porto Novo, — being the first detachment 
 of a powerful force under M. de Bussy, — began to re- 
 entertain the hope of wresting the Carnatic from 
 ' English influence. He speedily effected a junction 
 with the French force, and, taking Cuddalore on the 
 8th Api'il, and Permacoil a few days later, invested 
 Wandewash. Sir Eyre Coote advanced at once to its 
 relief, and on the 24th May offered battle to the allied 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 275 
 
 armies; but these, prevented by the instructions of 
 M. de Bussy to his French division not to fight a battle 
 before his arrival, were unable to accept it. They 
 retired rather to the heights around Arnee. 
 
 The English commander, having ascertained that 
 the commandant of Arnee was prepared to give up 
 that fort, marched against it on the 2nd June ; but 
 Hyder, divining this movement, had despatched Tippoo 
 and M. de Lally to the defence of Arnee, whilst he 
 himself should operate on the rear of the English 
 army, though unsupported by his French allies. The 
 3rd of June both armies came in contact, but it was 
 rather a day of manoeuvring and skirmishing than 
 a pitched battle. If, by his manoeuvres, Hyder Ali 
 foiled the intentions of tlie Engh'sh general upon 
 Arnee, the latter had the gratification of mortifying 
 Hyder still more by the capture of one of his guns 
 and eleven tumbrils, which had stuck fast in the bed of 
 a river. Five days later, however, Hyder revenged 
 himself by inflicting a loss on the English of 166 
 men and two guns by tempting them, by the display of 
 a drove of cattle, into an ambuscade. 
 
 This was the last encounter of the two rival com- 
 manders. Sir Eyre Coote returned to Madras, and 
 sailed thence to Bengal, broken down by ill-health, and 
 leaving the presidency in a state which he considered 
 all but desperate. Hyder, on his part, after several 
 demonstrations, encamped with the main body of his 
 army, on the high ground near the river Poni, sixteen 
 miles north of Arcot, for the rainy season, sending his 
 son Tippoo, with a strong force to the western coast. 
 He had been long ailing, and on the 6th of December, 
 feeling death coming upon him, he moved into the 
 
 T 2 
 
276 HYDER ALI'S LAST WAE. 
 
 town of Arcot. Here, on the following day, full of 
 years, — lie was sixty-five, — and in the possession of vast 
 resources, he died. 
 
 This man, who commenced his life as an adventurer, 
 left behind him a territory, not including his conquests 
 in the Carnatic, of 80,000 square miles ; a revenue of 
 two millions sterling, a full treasury, an effective regular 
 army of 88,000 men, and the reputation of being the most 
 energetic, the most persevering, and the most formidable 
 enemy the English had ever encountered in India. His 
 death was concealed for some days from his attendants 
 by his faithful ministers, in order to give time to Tippoo 
 Sahib, who was on' the western coast, to join the army. 
 I may add, that the war continued with varying fortune 
 for fifteen months after the death of Hyder Ali, when 
 it was concluded by the treaty of Mangalore (11th 
 March, 1784), by which the restitution of all places 
 taken by either party during the war, and the libera- 
 tion of all prisoners, were stipulated. Tippoo, however, 
 having twice, subsequently, defied the English to war, 
 was finally slain when valiantly defending Seringapatam, 
 — the 4th May, 1799, — and the kingdom of Mysore was 
 restored to the family which Hyder Ali had displaced. 
 
 Time has restricted me to a bare outline of the 
 military achievements of Hyder All's last war, but even 
 these are not quite uninstructive. We have seen how, 
 for three years, — and they continued it much longer, — 
 the English soldiers of the last century endured without 
 a murmur the fatigues and the dangers consequent upon 
 incessant marches, constant exposure to the sun at the 
 most deadly seasons, deficient supplies, treacherous 
 allies, and an exhausted and partly hostile country; 
 how they endured all this in the face of an enemy five 
 
HYDER ALI'S LAST WAR. 277 
 
 times as numerous as they were, and whose great 
 superiority in cavahy always robbed them of the fruit 
 of their victories. We have seen them overwhelmed 
 by numbers, yet still bearing up with a noble spirit 
 against a countless host, animating by their example 
 their sepoy comrades, and standing in their ranks, 
 though without food, without water, and without hope 
 of relief, till overwhelmed by physical exhaustion, and 
 the weight of numbers. We have seen how cheerfully 
 they advanced to every attack; how every privation 
 was forgotten in the presence of an enemy ; how 
 neither superiority of force, nor strength of position, 
 nor moral obstacles perhaps greater than these, ever 
 damped their ardour, or rendered them less confident of 
 victory. Yes, indeed ! If England has reason to be 
 proud of her soldiers now, she must also honour these, 
 — she must honour the men, who, when her fame as a 
 military nation was questioned, when she was being 
 forced to quit her hold on those American colonies 
 which were regarded as the brightest jewels of the 
 Crown, fought for a new empire under overwhelming 
 disadvantages, and who fought to win. 
 
 One word with respect to Hyder Ali. The moral of 
 his career is indeed too significant to be passed over 
 without remark. He rose by the sword, and he was 
 compelled all his life-time to wield the sword. By the 
 sword, too, his family fell. Is not this sentence, ap- 
 plicable as it is to the general state of India during 
 the eighteenth century, a sufficient justification for the 
 predominance of a power, which has prevented this 
 incessant slaughter, which will have no military adven- 
 turers, which, though it permits to so-called independent 
 states free action in internal affairs, yet takes from them 
 
278 HYBER ALIS LAST WAR. 
 
 the right of drawing the sword, which would rather 
 inculcate on its subjects the old-fashioned principle of 
 striving to rise, by the exercise of an honest industry, 
 and by the orderly development of natural talents, to 
 the places in society for which they are most fitted? 
 Imagine what was then the fate of the Carnatic, ravaged 
 for years by hostile armies; what the condition of 
 Madras, with an enemy constantly at its gates, and de- 
 pendent even for its supplies on the uncertain arrival of 
 ships, liable at all times to be intercepted by a hostile 
 squadron ! Contrast the India of the last century, 
 drawn upon incessantly for the support of the number- 
 less armies which strove to subdue it, wdth the India of 
 to-day, calm, peaceful, and prosperous under the rule of 
 Queen Victoria, and we may then, perhaps, — Natives 
 as well as Europeans, — feel some portion of the debt 
 of gratitude which we really owe to those gallant 
 soldiers, who fought so nobly, under so many accumu- 
 lated disadvantages, in " Hyder All's last war." 
 
( 279 ) 
 
 SIR HUGH EOSE 
 
 [From the * Calcutta Review ' for May, 1865.] 
 
 We seldom realise, during our own lives, the extent to 
 which posterity will interest itself regarding the careers 
 of those who have contributed to render illustrious the 
 period through which we are passing. Notwithstanding 
 that this is essentially a scribbling age, we fail to per- 
 ceive that it is at all more fruitful tham its predecessors 
 in that careful biography, which lays before us, as they 
 actually were, as they really lived and moved, those 
 who have but lately occupied, or who are now occupying, 
 a prominent place in the historic scene. In fact, the 
 scribbling of the present day is of too desultory a cha- 
 racter to be of real or permanent use. Men write, not 
 with a view to enrich the national annals or to advance 
 the cause of historic truth, but, too generally, to gain 
 for themselves a fleeting renown, or to gratify a spurious 
 sort of vanity. Not only do our library tables groan 
 under the weight of three-volumed novels, — too numerous 
 to read, and most of them too heavy to digest, — but we 
 have likewise philosophical reflections and paradoxical 
 essays, — many of them displaying, no doubt, an immense 
 deal of ingenuity, — but wanting, almost always, in 
 soundness, in depth, and in common sense. As we ex- 
 amine the majority of these "brain-sick fancies," we try 
 in vain to realise to ourselves the cast of mind which 
 
280 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 could conceive that a man is sent into this world to act 
 the part of the casuist and the visionary, to spend his 
 entire life in a vain attempt to unravel problems, which 
 •it was never intended he should know, and which, if 
 unraveled, would benefit him neither in this world nor 
 the next. If indeed worldly wisdom be the only result 
 aimed at, and a man be self-opinionated enough to 
 attempt to acquire that wisdom from books, — why, a 
 single play of Shakspeare is worth more than all the 
 divinations of the modern school of philosophers. On 
 the other hand if the student, before entering the world 
 himself, should wish to see a distinguished man exactly 
 as he lived amongst his contemporaries, — he must seek 
 out a record of his acts, his conversation, his letters ; he 
 must pry, if possible, through his writings, into his very 
 thoughts. To do this is always difficult, often impos- 
 sible. The man himself has disappeared from the scene, 
 and his writings are too frequently so dispersed that 
 they can come under the cognizance of but a few. One 
 by one, his contemporaries, those who stood face to face 
 with him in life, follow him to the silent tomb, and the 
 traces of his inner life become more and more obliterated. 
 But it may be said, that at this point the biographer, — 
 the mole of literature, — steps in. His is no path 
 strewed with garlands. No easy honours are showered 
 upon his progress. No present triumph stimulates his 
 vanity or supports him under the long moments of 
 weary labour. He has to dig and delve into forgotten 
 documents ; to search out the links of some story, all 
 the particulars of which have ceased to be remembered ; 
 to reconcile the conflicting statements of men who are 
 no more ; to give to the dry bones of antiquated 
 memoirs a living vitality. It is too often, in fine, a 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 281 
 
 labour, whicli, like the wheel of Sysiphus, seems ever to 
 recur; — a work, which, always accumulating under 
 newly found materials, seems to defy industry, and to 
 impose a limit even upon perseverance. The result, too, 
 is seldom satisfactory. We have presented to us, an 
 image certainly, the form and fashion of a man who 
 might have lived, — but too often, the resemblance to 
 the actual sitter for the portrait is scarcely discernible, 
 and the peculiarities by which he was distinguished in 
 his lifetime, are not seldom, in the picture, " conspicuous 
 by their absence." — Not so, however, with the writer who 
 attempts to portray a living man. This is a real repre- 
 sentation. The artist and the sitter have lived in the 
 same age, have associated with the same people, have 
 taken parts, — though often very different parts, — in the 
 same drama. The atmosphere has been aUke to both, 
 and thus, if the portrait be drawn with spirit and truth, 
 wdth a sincere desire to show things as they were, it must 
 be invested with a reality, in which the portraits of 
 those who have lived in a distant age are necessarily 
 deficient. 
 
 There have been few more eventful periods of general 
 history, — none, certainly, of Indian history, — than that 
 through which we have passed during the last seven 
 years. In that interval many great and noble characters 
 have risen to the surface, but what do we know of them ? 
 It is true that we have been presented with a likeness of 
 Havelock, — that pioneer of victory. It is understood 
 also that a life of Sir Henry Lawrence is now being 
 undertaken by the eminent soldier-political who is best 
 qualified to write it. But what do we know of Nichol- 
 son, that real Genius of War ? So far as we are aware, 
 not even a magazine article has been devoted to his 
 
282 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 brilliant career. Is the story of that career to die ? 
 He had friends, admirers, relations. Is there no one to 
 come forward to give that heroic character to the world, 
 before the eyes of those who have seen him on the scene 
 of his exploits, and who could tell of his deeds, have 
 been closed by death ? Is the career of one who was 
 the greatest ornament, the proudest boast of the Indian 
 Army, — who was at once its hero and its model, — is 
 that career to be allowed to pass out of sight unrecorded ? 
 Cannot those who have given to the world the " copia 
 verborum " of their own exploits, cannot they spare a few 
 half hours to write their reminiscences of the man to 
 whom all are so much indebted ? We never met an 
 Indian Officer who had seen him who did not acknow- 
 ledge in Nicholson the foremost man of the Indian 
 Army. They owe it, then, to his memory, that his name 
 should not be left to wander up and down the dull 
 pages of some dogmatic history, but that a literary 
 habitation should be found for it, not unworthy of the 
 hero. 
 
 But, whilst according to Nicholson all the honour 
 which his character and his great achievements demand, 
 we must not forget that, in another part of this country, 
 there were occurring about the same time events of 
 equal moment, — events fraught with the fate of western 
 and central India, and upon the result of which, too, the 
 action to be taken by the princes of southern India, in 
 all probability, depended. We will not here anticipate 
 the story we propose to tell, in this article, of some of 
 those events. We will confine ourselves to the remark, 
 that there was a peculiarity in the character of the 
 general who reconquered central India, which asserted 
 itself on every occasion, and which materially influenced 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 283 
 
 the fortunes of the campaign. This peculiarity evinced 
 itself in a firm determination to succeed at all hazards ; 
 to recognise no such obstacle as " impossibility ; " to be 
 foiled neither by deficiencies in his own camp, nor by 
 superiority of numbers in the camp of the enemy ; to 
 regard even disease itself, though attacking his own 
 person, as something to be trampled upon and disre- 
 garded. It showed itself likewise in greater things than 
 these. The general who reconquered central India had 
 gained, either from reading, from experience, or from 
 intuitive perception, — or, perhaps, from a combination of 
 all tliree, — so complete a knowledge of the " morale " 
 of an Asiatic foe, that, at a time when the pre-revolution 
 tactics of the Austrian army were in fashion in this 
 country, he never lost an opportunity of seeking his 
 enemy where he was to be found, of beating him when 
 he found him, and of following him up to utter destruc- 
 tion when he had beaten him. More than any other 
 commander of modern days did this general realise the 
 eloquent description, given by Sir William Napier, of 
 the battle of Napoleon ; — that it was " the swell and dash 
 of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded, and 
 the roaring flood poured onwards, covering all things." 
 When we recall to mind that this is the general who 
 has commanded the Indian Army during the past five 
 years, — five years of such momentous changes that they 
 might correctly be termed years of silent revolution, — 
 we think we shall be performing a service, not only to 
 the military world of India, but to the military world of 
 Europe, if we lay before the readers of this Eeview, in 
 a rapid and continuous outline, the main facts of a 
 career which is not only full of interest, but which offers 
 
284 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 also so much that is worthy of study as does the career 
 of Sir Hugh Eose. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose entered the army in the year 1820, as 
 an ensign in the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. He 
 obtained his commission at a very early age, and, — his 
 father being at the time envoy at the Court of Berlin, — 
 leave was given to him to complete his military educa- 
 tion in, — as it was then considered, — that great military 
 capital of Europe. He here enjoyed the advantage of 
 the best instruction which that age was capable of 
 affording. He was subsequently appointed to the 19th 
 regiment, and, in consequence of the special recom- 
 mendation of its commanding officer, was given an unat- 
 tached majority by purchase after only a little more 
 than six years' service. Whilst still serving in the 19th, 
 Lieutenant Rose's name was mentioned in division 
 orders by the Major-General commanding the district 
 for the great gallantry he displayed in completely 
 beating off, with only eight men, overwhelming numbers 
 of the peasantry in the county of Leitrim, who endeav- 
 oured to take from him the ganger, still, and prisoners 
 whom he was escorting. 
 
 Soon after obtaining his majority, Major Rose was 
 appointed to the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, and served 
 with them eleven years. The regiment was much em- 
 ployed in Ireland, chiefly in suppressing disturbances 
 in that then distrusted country. On Major Rose de- 
 volved the duty of putting down tithe and monster 
 meetings in Tipperary and the adjacent counties. Such 
 was the opinion then entertained of the young field 
 officer by Lord Vivian, Commander of the Forces, that 
 he authorised him to collect troops from the several 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 285 
 
 stations, and gave him discretionary powers as to the 
 manner in which he should act so as to repress and put 
 down these illegal assemblages. Major Kose accom- 
 plished this very rapidly and very effectively. He acted 
 on this occasion, as in his after career, on the well 
 known, though practically little accepted, principle, that 
 he gives twice who gives quickly. He moved his troops 
 by long marches with such celerity from one meeting to 
 another, that the dispersion of the rioters was complete, 
 and a few weeks saw not only Tipperary, but the neigh- 
 bouring counties, freed from those vast gatherings, which 
 had caused so much alarm in England as well as in the 
 sister island. For his services on this occasion Major 
 Eose received flattering acknowledgments from the 
 Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Marquess of Anglesey ; 
 from the Commander of the Forces, Lord Vivian ; and 
 from Sir George Bingham, commanding the Cork district. 
 But his conduct received even a higher recognition. 
 The present Earl of Derby, then Mr. Stanley, and 
 Secretary for Ireland, addressed Major Kose a letter, 
 conveying entire approval of his conduct, and conferring 
 upon him the commission of the peace. This was not 
 only a compliment, but it served greatly to strengthen 
 Major Kose's hands in the difficult duties which devolved 
 upon him as commanding the detachments in the county 
 of Tipperary. 
 
 Nothing occurred to break the ordinary routine of 
 duty till the year 1840, when Her Majesty's Government 
 determined to detach several officers of the army to 
 Syria, to act, in conjunction with a naval force, in 
 assisting to restore that country, made over by French 
 influence to Egyptian rule under Mahomed Ali, to the 
 Porte.. Major Kose having applied to be employed on 
 
286 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 this service, was sent to Syria with the rank of Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel and Deputy Adjutant-General. Several 
 other officers accompanied him, — all being under the 
 supreme direction of Brigadier-General Michell, E.A., 
 C.B., an officer of considerable reputation. Soon after 
 their arrival in Syria, it happened that an Egyptian Bey 
 attempted, at the head of a well accoutred force of 
 cavalry, to surprise the camp of Omar Pasha at Mejdal 
 in Palestine. Colonel Rose, who had wandered acci- 
 dentally in the direction of the Egyptian outposts, 
 having noticed the movement, hastily collected a few 
 ill-armed Bedouins, who happened to be close by, and 
 charged down upon the Egyptian horse. In the hand- 
 to-hand encounter that followed Colonel Rose received 
 two or three slight wounds, but he succeeded in com- 
 pletely routing the enemy, killing several of them. He 
 himself, with his own hand, wounded and captured the 
 leader. For this " dashing and gallant conduct," as it 
 was described by Sir Robert Stopford and General 
 Michell, Colonel Rose was rewarded with the Turkish 
 order of the " Nishan Iftihar " in diamonds ; he received 
 also a sabre of honour from the Sultan ; and for this and 
 other services in Lebanon, his Sovereign bestowed 
 upon him the military companionship of the Bath. 
 
 But a time was fast approaching when an opportunity 
 would be afforded to Colonel Rose of showing that, 
 dashing and gallant though he was, he possessed other 
 qualifications for employment in the public service. 
 Not long after the termination of the war in the Levant, 
 General Michell died ; Colonel Bridgeman, the previous 
 second in command, had gone before him ; and upon 
 Colonel Rose devolved the command of the British staff 
 officers and detachments in Syria. Their presence in 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 287 
 
 that country however had long been looked upon with 
 disfavour by the foreign embassies at Constantinople, 
 and it had already been resolved that they should be 
 recalled. But the services of Colonel Kose had been so 
 valuable, and they had been so highly appreciated by 
 the then Secretary for foreign affairs. Viscount Pal- 
 merston, that it was resolved that he should be retained. 
 On the withdrawal of the other officers, therefore, 
 Colonel Eose received the special appointment of Consul- 
 General in Syria. This appointment conferred upon 
 him diplomatic powers of a very extensive nature. Its 
 duties were naturally new to him, but the qualities he 
 had already displayed had produced in the mind of Lord 
 Palmerston the conviction that Colonel Rose was ad- 
 mirably suited to the difficult task of upholding the 
 Turkish and British policy against that of the French 
 and Egyptian rulers in that quarter of the globe, and 
 the result proved that he judged correctly. 
 
 The situation was by no means an easy one. To 
 manage it, indeed, required essentially a light and 
 steady hand, a discriminating judgment, a quick eye 
 and an invincible firmness. The complications, foreign 
 as well as domestic, were endless. Neither the French 
 nor the Egyptians could forget that Syria was lost to 
 their policy. As little could the Roman Catholic 
 Maronites, and the half Pagan, half Mahomedan, Druses, 
 cease to remember their hereditary feuds. To maintain 
 an equal balance between these contending parties, to 
 preserve Syria to Turkey, to see through and baffle the 
 intrigues of the rival powers, were the duties that de- 
 volved upon the British Consul-General, and they were 
 duties which demanded the most incessant watchfulness. 
 No doubt, a well devised double-administration under 
 
288 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 the Suzerainty of the Porte would have preserved peace 
 between the Maronites and Druses, had it been possible 
 for France to have ceased her intrigues, and for Turkey, 
 on such a question, to have acted with good faith. But 
 that was not possible. Colonel Kose, however, succeeded 
 in confining within verbal limits the feuds between these 
 rival factions. He was particularly careful to impress 
 upon the Maronites, whose fanaticism had been raised 
 to a high pitch by the promise of support from France, 
 that though the whole moral influence of that great 
 Catholic power might be employed to better the position 
 of her co-religionists in the East, she would never, in 
 the face of defiant England, send a single soldier to 
 improve that position by force. It was fit, indeed, that 
 an ojfficial with a strong purpose should be on the spot, 
 for a storm was brewing, and the hopes of the contending 
 parties rose and fell with each point of the electric 
 needle. 
 
 Colonel Eose's exertions in this difficult position were 
 so well appreciated by the English Government, that 
 Lord Palmerston took the first opportunity of bringing 
 him into the regular diplomatic service, by appointing 
 him Secretary to the Embassy at the Porte. On the 
 ambassador, Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, going on leave, 
 Colonel Eose succeeded him as Charg^ -d'affaires of the 
 embassy at Constantinople. In this post, Colonel Eose 
 enjoyed many opportunities of acquainting himself with 
 those secret springs of action, which, far more than open 
 and avowed pressure, constitute the moving power in an 
 Eastern Government. His quick eye soon discerned 
 that Eussia was preparing a secret blow which should 
 render lier the real mistress of Constantinople. It was 
 by secret missions, covered though they might be by the 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 289 
 
 pomp and circumstance attending splendid embassies, 
 that Kussia had always worked her way at Constanti- 
 nople. During the period when Lord Ponsonby filled 
 the post of ambassador at the Sublime Porte, the con- 
 stant intrigues of Russia had demanded the incessant 
 vigilance of that nobleman, and had proved the most 
 powerful enemy of his repose. Yet, notwithstanding 
 his unremitting watchfulness, the treaty of Unkiar 
 Skelessi had been concluded without his privity. By 
 this treaty Constantinople had been placed in such a 
 position, that it seemed that Russia had but to give the 
 word to take formal possession of it. And in 1853-4 
 every indication was given that, in the opinion of the 
 Emperor Nicholas, the time for giving that word had 
 arrived. A great and special embassy was despatched 
 from St. Petersburg, headed by Prince Menschikoff, a 
 personal favourite of the Czar, and a man of an over- 
 bearing and even insolent demeanour. Such a man 
 was well calculated to overawe the ministers of the 
 Sultan and to carry out the real object of Russia's 
 secret policy, — her assumption of the protectorate of all 
 the subjects of the Porte of the Greek persuasion, — 
 constituting, in European Turkey, a great majority of 
 those who owed allegiance to the Sultan. Now, as, in 
 addition to their being the majority, these Greeks are 
 likewise the most intelligent and the most powerful of 
 the subjects of the Porte, the policy of Prince Menschi- 
 koff was simply the assertion of the supremacy of 
 Russia over the larger portion of the European subjects 
 of the Sultan, — the first and surest step to ultimate 
 sovereignty over the whole. 
 
 More like a sovereign prince than, the servant of an 
 ally, Prince Menschikoff commenced his mission by a 
 
 u 
 
290 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, — a minister 
 whom he regarded as belonging to the anti-Kussian 
 interest. This demand, insolently put forward, — made, 
 in fact, with the sole view of displaying the greatness of 
 Kussia to the startled people of Europe, — was at once 
 complied with. The obnoxious minister was dismissed, 
 and then, Prince Menschikoff, deeming the ball at his 
 foot, developed, perhaps rather too incautiously, the 
 secret object of his mission. We have used the term 
 '' rather too incautiously," because it is quite probable 
 that the Russian ambassador traded on the absence of 
 Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe from his post. He possibly 
 thought that the fact that this determined enemy ot 
 Russian aggression was in England, afforded him the 
 best opportunity of pressing his master's demands upon 
 the Turkish Government. But, if he argued in that 
 way, he deceived himself. Not even Lord Stratford 
 de EedcHffe, skilled as he was in foiling Russian 
 manoeuvres, — not even Lord Stratford could have 
 watched with a keener or more penetrating glance the 
 movements of Prince Menschikoff than did Colonel 
 Rose. So far as the manoeuvres of the insolent agent 
 of the Czar could be fairly met, he met them. In open 
 warfare, he was the undaunted representative of British 
 interests. In secret manoeuvring indeed, an English- 
 man always feels less at home than a semi-Asiatic ; but 
 in watchfulness, in promptitude, in decision, — in all the 
 requirements, in fact, which depend upon the action of 
 a manly mind. Colonel Rose could not have been sur- 
 passed. 
 
 But a crisis that would test all these qualities was 
 fast approaching. Prince Menschikoff, finding that 
 his previous demonstrations had not produced their 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 291 
 
 intended effect, and seeing that the time had arrived, 
 when, if he did not wish to be baffled, he must take a 
 decisive step, made those demands upon the Sultan, 
 which if complied with, would have rendered him ab- 
 solutely subservient to the Kussian power, and have 
 involved, in addition, a complete infraction of the 
 quadruple treaty of 1841, of which England was one 
 of the guarantees. In this difficulty, the ministers of 
 the Sultan, who had already had ample experience of the 
 firmness and good faith of the English Charge-d'affaires, 
 informed Colonel Eose, that they would be compelled 
 to give way to Prince Menschikoff, and that Eussian 
 policy must triumph, unless some positive and material 
 guarantee were givei them that England would support 
 them in opposing the Eussian demands. On Colonel 
 Eose endeavouring to ascertain more definitely the 
 nature of the guarantee they required, it came out, that 
 they would be satisfied with nothing short of a material 
 pledge, and they suggested that Colonel Eose should 
 call up the British fleet from Malta to the mouth of the 
 Dardanelles, or to the neighbouring waters. 
 
 This was surely a position to try a man, — to test the 
 stuff that was in him. It should be remembered that 
 Colonel Eose was not the appointed representative of 
 England at the Ottoman Porte ; he was acting in the 
 absence of his chief. That chief too was a man of 
 wide-spread European reputation, of great influence at 
 Constantinople, where for years he had succeeded in 
 making his will respected. The acting for such a man 
 doubled the responsibility of the acting officer, in that a 
 false step on his part, made during a few months' tenure 
 of office, would be more prominently noticed by the 
 public, when contrasted with a career that for seven 
 
 u 2 
 
292 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 years had been marked by uniform success. On the 
 decision arrived at in this crisis depended too the issues 
 of peace or war. Had Colonel Kose, for instance, in- 
 formed the ministers of the Sultan, that, with the best 
 will in the world, he could not take upon himself the 
 responsibility of ordering up the fleet from Malta, the 
 Porte would have succumbed, Kussian policy would 
 have triumphed, but there would have been no war. 
 To order up the fleet, was to pledge England to action. 
 It was to assure Turkey of material aid in resisting 
 Kussian aggression. For any official, especially for one 
 only acting as a deputy, this was a very grave con- 
 sideration, a very weighty responsibility, — a responsi- 
 bility which would certainly have made the nights of 
 many sleepless, and their very lives a burden. 
 
 Colonel Kose, however, never hesitated. The only 
 responsibility he regarded was the strict performance, 
 without fear of consequences, of that which he conceived 
 to be his duty. With the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 
 before his eyes, and knowing that Kussia was now de- 
 manding something more even than was conceded by 
 that fatal arrangement, he felt that the time had arrived 
 when, if ever, a check must be given to the encroach- 
 ments of that Power. He informed the Porte, therefore, 
 that if they would refuse to assent to the illegal demands 
 of the Kussian Ambassador, he would ask the British 
 Admiral to assume a position with regard to Constan- 
 tinople which would leave no doubt that Great Britain 
 would not consent to the enforcement of the ' Kussian 
 demands. This was sufficient. The Porte, appreciating 
 the advantage of the move, and seeing that it was a 
 checkmate to the Eussian Ambassador, delayed a reply 
 to his demands, but at the same time, made no secret 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 293 
 
 that they had asked for, and that the representative of 
 the British Grovernment had consented to, the appear- 
 ance of the British fleet somewhat nearer Constan- 
 tinople. 
 
 We may pause for a moment to consider all the 
 circumstances attending this line of action. The im- 
 portance of the crisis cannot be exaggerated. Prince 
 Menschikoff was at Constantinople, with his grasp on 
 the throat of the Sultan, and endeavouring to force 
 from him his consent to an arrangement which would 
 have been the death-warrant of the Turkish Empire. 
 The Sultan himself appeared inclined to yield. He did 
 not place much .dependence upon England. The 
 English ministry had, indeed, all along failed to perceive 
 the importance of the crisis, or the proper mode of 
 meeting it. They believed that the moral influence of 
 England, exerted on behalf of Turkey, would be suffi- 
 cient to induce the Czar to recede, and they feared that 
 the smallest physical demonstration on our part would 
 be regarded as an insult to the dignity, the honour, the 
 unblemished good faith, which they publicly attributed, 
 and privately denied, to the Kussian Emperor. They 
 dreaded, moreover, lest the Czar should seize upon any 
 display of force as a pretext for accomplishing the great 
 object of his ambition. It was fortunate that Colonel 
 Kose was quite free from the delusions which paralysed 
 the action of the British Ministry. The last movement 
 of Prince Menschikoff had convinced him that it was- 
 absolutely necessary to satisfy Turkey, by something 
 stronger than words, that England would not allow her 
 to fall undefended. He felt in fact, that it was neces- 
 sary not only to act, but to act on the moment, — to 
 strike a counter-blow to this stroke of Prince Menschi- 
 
294 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 koff, to commit England, as far as he could commit her, 
 to something more than a protest against this arbitrary 
 infraction of the common law of nations. He therefore 
 unhesitatingly sent a requisition to Admiral Deans 
 Dundas, then commanding the British fleet at Malta, 
 to proceed at once to Besika Bay. 
 
 Admiral Dundas, bound to comply with the requisi- 
 tion of an Ambassador but not of a Charge-d'affaires, 
 declined to leave Malta. His refusal, however, was of 
 no great consequence. It was the refusal of one of the 
 machines, and not of one of the motive powers, of the 
 English Government. The fact that Colonel Kose had 
 sent for the fleet gave to the Turkish Government a 
 feeling of confidence which enabled them to reply in no 
 submissive tone to the arrogant demand of Prince Men- 
 schikofif. The certainty they now possessed of the sup- 
 port of England inspired the Turkish Ministers with a 
 spirit to which they had long been strangers. None 
 knew better than they that there were ten divisions of 
 picked Kussian troops always ready at Sebastopol for 
 immediate operations, and they were well aware that 
 they had nothing to oppose the disembarkation of such 
 a force at the mouths of the Danube, or under the walls 
 of Constantinople. Their non-compliance with his de- 
 mands came, as a surprise, to Prince Menschikoff. It 
 announced to him not only the failure of his great coup, 
 — the certain success of which he had already heralded 
 to his master, — but it discovered to him also that his 
 attack had recoiled upon himself. This attack had 
 indeed provoked the assurance of that material support 
 from one at least of the great Western Powers, the 
 possibility of which Prince Menschikofl" had constantly 
 derided. Too careless in his arrogance to look closely 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 295 
 
 into matters, lie had believed that the English had 
 thrown away their last trump-card when they permitted 
 Lord Stratford to proceed to England. His mortifica- 
 tion, then, may be imagined, when, on leading the ace 
 of his strong suit, he found that it was trumped by 
 Colonel Eose. 
 
 We have stated that Admiral Deans Dundas declined 
 to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition. In this 
 conduct he was supported by the British ministry, but 
 not by the British public. With a true instinct, the 
 people of England discerned that Colonel Rose had 
 done the right thing at the right time, and it was 
 the common belief that the admiral's refusal to act 
 would only the more firmly rivet in the mind of the 
 Czar the conviction he had entertained from the outset, 
 that the English ministry were prepared to go to any 
 lengths to defend Turkey, except to commit England 
 to war. Whether, at that period, the Czar had pro- 
 ceeded too far in his violent courses to retreat with 
 dignity, may be doubtful ; but had his judgment been 
 sufficiently cool at that epoch to view matters in their 
 natural light, it cannot be doubted but that the prompt 
 carrying out by tlie British Government of the states- 
 manlike and decisive measure initiated by Colonel 
 Rose, would have contributed more than anything to 
 change his opinion. When, a little later, the continued 
 aggressive conduct of the Czar opened the eyes of the 
 members of the Aberdeen Cabinet to the policy and 
 wisdom of Colonel Rose's conduct, and they ordered 
 the fleet to the Turkish waters, the fatal "too late" 
 stepped in between th^ order and the result they hoped 
 for. The Czar had, in the meanwhile, pledged himself 
 too deeply to his ambitious projects in the face of 
 
296 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 Europe, and lie could no longer withdraw from them 
 without the loss of that prestige which he valued more 
 than power. 
 
 But we are not writing an account of the diplomatic 
 errors of that memorable period. Sir Hugh Kose, at 
 all events, can look back to the part he played in 
 those struggles with a pardonable pride. Soon after the 
 occurrence to which we have referred, Lord Stratford 
 returned to his post, and almost his first act, after 
 making himself master of the events which had occurred 
 during his absence, and after taking in the actual state 
 of affairs, \vas to stamp with the approval of his vigorous 
 intellect the conduct of his locum tenens. Every one 
 knows what followed his return. When at last the 
 scales dropped from the eyes of the Czar, and he 
 saw that the English were prepared to fight if he did 
 not yield; when he realised the fact that the astute 
 Emperor of the French, apparently, and onl}^ apparently, 
 following their lead, was resolved to support them, he 
 had committed himself too far to retreat, and war was 
 inevitable. 
 
 War followed. Colonel Kose, released from his purely 
 diplomatic functions, was appointed Queen's Commis- 
 sioner at the Head- Quarters of the French army. In 
 this capacity, he and two other officers appointed at the 
 same time, — Colonel Claremont, and Major the Hon. 
 St. Georgci Foley, — were the organs of communication 
 between the British and French Head-Quarters. They 
 were consulted by the French Generals in all matters 
 relating to Lord Eaglan's army, and were present in 
 all the battles and operations before the enemy, being 
 entrusted with the delicate, and often difficult and 
 dangerous, duty, of conveying the communications 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 297 
 
 between the French Marshal and the British Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. To narrate each individual action in 
 which Colonel Rose was engaged would be to narrate 
 the history of the Crimean war. It will be sufficient 
 to state that Colonel — then promoted to Brigadier- 
 General — Rose was recommended for the cross of the 
 Legion of Honour after the battle of the Alma ; that he 
 was constantly mentioned in the Despatches published 
 in the * London Gazette,' for distinguished conduct in 
 the French trenches and at the battle of Inkermann, 
 where he had two horses shot under him. It deserves 
 to be added, that Marshal Canrobert, then commanding 
 the French Army^ recommended General Rose for the 
 Victoria Cross for liis gallant conduct on three different 
 occasions, and that the claim was not preferred, solely 
 because general officers were expressly excluded from 
 this decoration. For his services in this war. General 
 Rose received the Turkish Order of the Medjidie, was 
 made a Knight Companion of the Bath, and was pro- 
 moted to the rank of Lieutenant- General, " for distin- 
 guished conduct in the field." 
 
 But a short time elapsed before the reputation gained 
 in the Crimea was tested in a far different field. The 
 Indian mutiny caused a demand upon England for 
 generals of the highest promise, and, amongst others, 
 Sir Hugh Rose was directed to repair to the scene 
 of warfare. He was sent to Bombay, and, very soon 
 after his arrival there, in the autumn of 1857, he 
 was ordered to proceed in the direction of Mhow, to 
 assume command of the force acting in Malwa, and 
 which was afterwards termed the Central India Field 
 force. One division of this force under General Wood- 
 burn had marched from Bombay in June in the direc- 
 
298 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 tion of Mhow. On arriving at Aurungabad, however, 
 its destination seemed so uncertain to Colonel Durand, 
 the Governor-General's Agent for Central India, and 
 who had been driven from Indore by the mutinous 
 troops of Holkar, that that able officer hastened to 
 the south, in order, by his personal influence, to direct 
 its movements. Colonel Durand met this force at 
 Asseergurh, and so impressed his strong character on 
 tlie direction of its movements, that not only was 
 the rebellions fort of Dhar taken, but Neemuch was 
 very seasonably relieved after two actions fought at 
 Mundisore. These victories not only broke the spirit 
 of Holkar's mutinous soldiers, but cowed them so com- 
 pletely, that at Indore they ignominiously laid down 
 their arms before the man whose life, only a few 
 weeks earlier, they had treacherously attempted. We 
 would willingly pause to dilate upon this little episode 
 of the mutiny. It is an episode which is but little 
 known, and which the unassuming reticence of the 
 chief actor in it has kept hidden from the outer world. 
 It is however foreign to our present subject. We wiU 
 only say of it here, that there are few passages in any 
 history which tell of more unselfish devotion, more firm 
 wrestling with adverse fortune, more prompt and ready 
 action in difficult circumstances, than were evinced, 
 from the time of the outbreak at Indore on the 1st July, 
 to that of the battle of Mundisore in the last w^eek of 
 November, 1857, by Colonel Durand. 
 
 It was after the battle of Mundisore and the relief of 
 Neemuch, which followed it immediately, that the force 
 proceeded to Indore, and here, on the 16th December, 
 it was joined by Sir Hugh Rose. The first instructions 
 which Sir Hugh had received were to detach one of his 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 299 
 
 brigades along the grand trunk road to Gwalior, whilst 
 he himself should march the other brigade into Bundle- 
 kund via Saugor, relieving that place on its way. 
 These two brigades were to unite at Calpee on the 
 Jumna. Subsequently, however, it was decided that a 
 Madras column under Sir George Whitelock should 
 march to tlie relief of Saugor and for the pacification 
 of Bundlekund, co-operating for that purpose with the 
 little army under Sir Hugh Eose. 
 
 The force under Sir Hugh's immediate orders at this 
 time consisted of one troop of horse artillery, one light 
 field battery, two eight-pounder guns, two eight-inch 
 mortars, two five and a half inch mortars, one eight-inch 
 howitzer: of cavalry, a squadron of the 14th Light 
 Dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, 
 and a troop of cavalry of the Hydrabad Contingent: 
 of infantry, one European regiment, one Bombay native 
 regiment ; one regiment of the Hydrabad Contingent. 
 The same Contingent also furnished two six-pounder 
 guns, and detachments from two other infantry regi- 
 ments. Attached to the force also were some Bombay 
 and Madras sappers and miners. 
 
 Sir Hugh stayed a short time at Indore to organise 
 his force, and to arrange so as to co-operate with Sir 
 George Whitelock, but, finding that this latter officer 
 could not be so early in the field as had been hoped, 
 and learning that the necessities of the invested officers 
 at Saugor were very great, he resolved to diverge from 
 the plan of the campaign, and march himself to the 
 relief of Saugor. On the 8th January therefore he 
 quitted Indore, and passing through Bhopal, where 
 he was warmly welcomed by the Begum and assisted by 
 
300 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 supplies and a contingent 800 strong, lie arrived before 
 Eathgurh on the morning of the 24th. 
 
 This fort "said to be larger and as strong as that 
 of Mooltan," and which had resisted a very large force 
 of Scindia for five months, is situated near the high 
 road from Indore to Saugor, and commands the neigh- 
 bouring country. It is distant but thirty miles from 
 Saugor, and it had been occupied in force by the rebels, 
 as the best mode of hindering the relief of that place. 
 It is described as being very strong, — ^'the east and 
 south faces almost perpendicular, — the rock scarped 
 and strengthened by a deep rapid river running close 
 beneath from east to west ; the north face looked along 
 the densely jungled hill, and was strengthened by a 
 deep ditch some twenty feet wide ; the west face over- 
 looked the town and Saugor road ; in this face was the 
 gateway flanked by several square and round bastions. 
 The wall to the north side was strengthened by an 
 outwork looking like a second wall. Along each face 
 were strong bastions commanding various points, and 
 also in the four angles. Approach from the east and 
 south was next to impossible ; approach from the west 
 or town side almost as difficult."* 
 
 Sir Hugh arrived before this place on the 24th 
 January, and found the enemy posted in some strength 
 on the banks of the river. Having attacked and dis- 
 persed these, he at once invested the fort, and selected 
 sites for his breaching batteries. These were ready for 
 opening fire on the night of the 26th, and all that night, 
 the whole of the following day, and on the 28th, a 
 brisk fire was kept up. On the 28th, however, the 
 Kajah of Banpore moved forward with a force of 
 
 * Dr. Lowe. 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 301 
 
 revolted sepoys and Villaities,* to relieve Katgurh. 
 He advanced on tlie rear of the investing force with 
 standards flying and witli an apparent confidence seldom 
 manifested by the rebels. The approach of this force 
 was seen by the garrison, and their fire on the investing 
 army redoubled. Sir Hugh, however, without for a 
 moment relaxing his fire on the fort, detached some 
 troops, consisting mainly of cavalry, to drive back this 
 new enemy. The appearance of these troopers was 
 sufficient ; the rebels did not wait to be charged, but, 
 throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off 
 into the jungles. The garrison of Katgurh, disheartened 
 by the ill success of their allies, silently evacuated the 
 fort during the night, escaping by a path, the preci- 
 pitous nature of which would ordinarily be considered 
 sufficient to deter men from using it. Their escape, 
 regrettable in one sense, was not perhaps on the whole 
 to be lamented, for the fort itself was so strong, that a 
 few resolute defenders could have held it for a long 
 time against very superior numbers. 
 
 After taking Katgurh, Sir Hugh marched with a 
 portion of his force to Barodia, fifteen miles distant, 
 to complete the discomfiture of the Kajah of Banpore. 
 He found the enemy posted on the banks of the river 
 Bina, determined to resist his passage. But Sir Hugh, 
 at once attacking him, drove him from all his positions, 
 and inflicted upon him a loss of four or five hundred 
 men. There was considerable bush-skirmishing, and 
 the enemy fought unusually well. We lost two officers 
 killed, and six wounded. The enemy's defeat, however, 
 was complete, and the Kajah, wounded, w^as compelled 
 to flee on foot through the jungles. The immediate 
 
 ♦ Foreign mercenaries. 
 
302 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 consequence of these operations was the relief of Saugor. 
 This was eifected on the 3rd February, after the place 
 had been invested nearly eight months. 
 
 Thus had the first object of the campaign been 
 effected. The next was the recapture of Jhansie, and 
 the infliction of punishment for the barbarous and cold- 
 blooded slaughter of our countrymen and countrywomen 
 in that place. 
 
 Jhansie lies about a hundred and twenty-five miles 
 north of Saugor. But before any movement could be 
 made in that direction, it was necessary to capture 
 Gurrakotta, a strong fort about fi ve-and-twenty miles to 
 the east of Saugor, garrisoned by the rebel sepoys of the 
 51st and 52nd native infantry, and amply stored with 
 provisions of all sorts. The fort itself stood upon *' an 
 elevated angle of ground, the wide river Sonar washing 
 the east face, — a tributary stream, — the Gidaree nullah 
 with precipitous banks, — flowing round the west and 
 north faces; to the soutli, a strong gateway flanked 
 by bastions, and a ditch about twenty feet deep, and 
 thirty wide. This ditch ran round the west face also." 
 So thick were its parapets, that, when the place was 
 attacked by Brigadier Watson in 1818 with a force 
 of 11,000 men, and twenty-eight siege guns, he was 
 unable, in three weeks, to make a breach in them, 
 and the garrison was allowed to evacuate the fort with 
 all the honours of war ! 
 
 Against this place Sir Hugh Kose marched, and, 
 surprising and cutting up a rebel picquet on his way, 
 came before it on the evening of the 11th February. 
 He found the enemy in some force in the village in 
 front of the fort. He therefore, late as it was, at 
 once took measures to dislodge them by a brisk fire 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 303 
 
 of artillery. The rebel sepoys immediately formed 
 up, and advanced at the double on our guns ; but they 
 were repulsed. Making a second attempt, however, 
 they came close up to the guns before they were 
 broken, but then their discomfiture was complete. 
 Next morning the breaching batteries were erected, 
 and a fire was kept up on the fort all day. That 
 evening it was evacuated. The enemy, however, were 
 pursued by the Hydrabad cavalry, and were cut up 
 in great numbers. 
 
 Gurrakotta taken, no obstacle remained to the march 
 upon Jhansie. About forty miles to the north of Saugor 
 was the strongly forted pass of Maltoun, and through 
 this it was suppdsed the British force must march. 
 But there was another pass, — that of Mudanpore, — 
 very strong and very narrow, — by which it was equally 
 possible for the troops to advance. Between these 
 passes and Saugor was a little hill-fort also called 
 Barodia, held by the rebels. 
 
 In this direction the Central India force marched 
 on the morning of the 27th. Barodia was taken on the 
 following day, and on the 3rd ^March, the little army 
 found itself in front of the passes. Finding that of 
 Maltoun very strongly fortified and guarded in force, 
 Sir Hugh resolved to make a feigned attack upon 
 it, whilst he should direct his real attack upon the less 
 strongly occupied pass of Mudanpore. v 
 
 Crowning the heights with the 3rd Europeans and 
 the Hydrabad infantry, and bringing the main body 
 along the road, the artillery in advance, Sir Hugh soon 
 felt the enemy in front. The skirmishers first engaged 
 on the heights and in the jungle, but as those of 
 the enemy were driven back, a strong fire of artillery 
 
304 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 opened from a commanding position at the other end of 
 the pass. Our advance was for the moment checked, so 
 hot was the fire ; Sir Hugh himself had a horse shot 
 under him, and the artillery-uien took shelter behind 
 their guns. The halt was, however, only temporary. 
 The guns of the Hydrabad Contingent opened upon the 
 enemy with shell, and, under cover of this fire, the 
 infantry, reforming, dashed at them. Asiatics can stand 
 everything but a charge of Europeans. They had here 
 a splendid position, and a large force to hold it; but 
 the sight, of the charging Ked-coats was too much for 
 them. Men, who were brave, who certainly did not 
 fear death, who hated us bitterly, shrunk from the hand- 
 to-hand encounter which our soldiers offered them. 
 They fled, and the pass was stormed. The effect of 
 this success was very great. It so daunted the enemy, 
 that they gave up, without a blow, the pass of Maltoun, 
 the fort of Narut in its rear, the little fort of Serai, the 
 strong fort of Marowra on the road to Jhansie, the 
 fortified castle of Banpore, the residence of the Eajah of 
 Banpore, the almost impregnable fort of Tal-Behul on 
 the heights over the lake of that name ; they abandoned 
 also the line of the Bina and Betwa, with the exception 
 of the fort of Chandaree on the left bank of the latter 
 river. 
 
 After this engagement, and the formal annexation of 
 the district, which, in consequence, came into the per- 
 manent possession of the British, Sir Hugh continued 
 his march towards Jhansie. To the fall of this place 
 great importance was attached by Lord Canning, Lord 
 Clyde, and Lord Elphinstone. It was regarded as the 
 stronghold of the rebel power in Central India, and as 
 a place the very holding of which by the Kanee was 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 305 
 
 not only a defiance to the British, but constituted the 
 main strength of the rebels on the right bank of Jumna. 
 It was a place, too, in which the slaughter of our 
 countrymen and countrywomen had been accompanied 
 by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where the 
 hate to the English name had been shown by acts of 
 the most wanton cruelty. Nevertheless, anxious as were 
 Lord Canning and the Commander-in-Chief that Jhansie 
 should fall and fall speedily, they were both so impressed 
 with its strength, and the inadequacy of the force at the 
 disposal of Sir Hugh, that they wrote to him, and offered 
 him the option of proceeding instead towards Banda. 
 The original strength of Sir Hugh Kose's force when 
 he joined it at Indore, we have already seen. His 
 first brigade commanded by Brigadier Stuart was of 
 about similiar strength. Jhansie on the other hand was 
 extremely capable of being defended. The city was 
 surrounded by a granite wall, twenty-five feet high, 
 loophooled and bastioned. On the wall large guns were 
 mounted, commanding every approach. But the fortress 
 w^as far stronger. On its south and east faces were 
 strong towers, the guns of which were so laid as to en- 
 filade one another, and batteries had been thrown up 
 outside the fort, commanding every approach to it. The 
 Sanger road had been especially cared for, and the 
 fortress, strong naturally, — built on a high granite rock, 
 — had been rendered to all appearances impregnable. 
 It was garrisoned by 11,000 men, composed of rebel 
 sepoys, Yalaitees, and Bundeelas, and governed by a 
 woman, w^ho wanted only a good cause to be a heroine. 
 
 As if to add to the difficulties of the situation. Sir 
 Hugh Eose learned that Tantia Topee had raised and 
 organised a considerable force, — which he had dignified 
 
306 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 with the title of the Army of the Peshwa ; that he had 
 taken the fort of Chirkaree in Bundelkund, and that 
 he was moving towards Jhansie with the intention of 
 driving the English force from its walls. 
 
 With all these difSculties in his path, Sir Hugh did 
 not hesitate for an instant. To many a man, the re- 
 sponsibility, kindly meant as it was, placed upon him ; 
 the offer to him to move elsewhere with his force, 
 because Jhansie was too strong for him; would have 
 caused terrible anxiety and hesitation. But superior 
 men revel in responsibility. They delight in being 
 allowed to play their own game. Far, then, from avail- 
 ing himself of the option of transferring his force to a 
 less dangerous scene, Sir Hugh prepared himself, with 
 the greater determination, to attack the rebels in their 
 own chosen and well-fortified position. On his march to 
 that place, and with a view to secure his left rear, Sir 
 Hugh despatclied General Stewart, commanding his first 
 brigade, to attack the fort of Chandaree on the river 
 Bettwa. This fort was stormed on the 17th March, 
 after a desperate resistance on the part of the garrison, 
 and with a loss on our side of five officers and twenty- 
 five men killed and wounded. 
 
 Meanwhile Sir Hugh himself marched on Jhansie, and 
 arriving before it on the 21st March, at once invested 
 it. To invest such a place as Jhansie, four and a half 
 miles in circumference, with the force at the disposal of 
 the English general, was certainly a very bold measure. 
 But boldness is often synonymous with prudence, and, 
 in determining to adopt this mode of attack. Sir Hugh 
 showed how well he had mastered the leading features 
 of the Asiatic character. Investment diminishes certainly 
 the numbers of the attacking force, but, on the other 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 307 
 
 hand, it diminisbes to a far greater extent, tlie confidence 
 of an impressionable enemy, for it displays to him your 
 own. It is a common remark tbat tbe Englisb do not, 
 and never will, understand tbe native character. This 
 may be true in some of its aspects. It is not less true, 
 however, that there are some points of the English 
 character which the Natives can never comprehend. 
 The Dantonic motto, Vaudace, Vaudace, toujours Vaudace, 
 contains within itself a principle which an English 
 general can always successfully employ against an 
 Asiatic foe ; — a principle which the natives of India have 
 never yet been able to understand. Nothing paralyzes 
 them so much as boldness. The smallest hesitation on 
 the other hand gives them courage. In the presence of 
 a native army, then, a general can always risk ma- 
 noeuvres which he would not dare to dream of before an 
 European enemy. 
 
 The complete investment of Jhansie, therefore, by 
 the small force under Sir Hugh Kose, was prudent, 
 because it was bold. The garrison within its walls read 
 in that act the determination of the English general 
 to take not only the place, but the garrison with it. 
 Nevertheless, they were resolved to sell their lives 
 dearly. The capabilities of defence were as great as 
 the difficulties of the attack were many ; and the Ranee 
 was at the same time aware that Tantia Topee, at the 
 head of 12,000 men with twenty guns, was marching to 
 her relief. 
 
 The difficulties of the attack were indeed many. The 
 fort of Jhansie, on the high granite rock, — with its three 
 lines of works, its flanking fire, and its walls of solid 
 masonry, presented a most formidable aspect. It was 
 soon ascertained too that it would be necessary to take 
 
 x2 
 
308 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 the city prior to attacking the fort, as the latter 
 could not be breached. This involved a double labour 
 and a double danger. 
 
 Jhansie was invested on the 22nd, and the same 
 evening the necessary operations were effected for 
 erecting batteries to breach the city wall. Four of 
 these were ready on the evening of the 24th, and opened 
 fire on the 25th. On that day, the first brigade, under 
 Brigadier Stuart, joined from Chandaree. It was at 
 once moved to the south of the fort, and constituted the 
 left attack. The siege was now begun in real earnest. 
 Our troops, however, were terribly overworked. For 
 seventeen days they never took off their clothes, nor 
 were the horses unbridled except to water. From 
 the two attacks shot and shell were continually poured 
 into the city, whilst from the whole line of wall the 
 enemy's guns never ceased to thunder a reply. Advanced 
 positions were taken up near the wall to enable our 
 riflemen to fire upon the enemy's gunners. On both 
 sides the exertions were unceasing. Women and 
 children were seen assisting in repairing the defences 
 of the walls, and carrying water and food to the troops 
 on duty, whilst the Eanee herself constantly visited the 
 troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence 
 and her words. 
 
 For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to 
 spare only two eighteen-pounder guns, the remainder 
 of the artillery being used so as to employ the enemy 
 incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the 
 walls. The progress made by these two guns was, 
 owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely 
 slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the fort bastion 
 were torn down from the left attack, and on the 30th 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 309 
 
 and 31st further damage was made on their defences. 
 Still, no breach had been effected ; the vigilance of 
 the enemy was unabated ; their determination to resist 
 as strong as ever; when, on the evening of the last 
 mentioned day intelligence reached the general that 
 a new enemy was advancing in great force from the 
 north. 
 
 This was the army of Tantia Topee, — an army, which, 
 collected from the materials of the force which had 
 attacked General Windham in his entrenchments at 
 Cawnpore, and was subsequently beaten by Sir Colin 
 Campbell, — had been re-organised under the title of 
 Army of the Peshwa by Tantia Topee at Nowgong, 
 and which, taking Chirkaree en route, was now marching 
 to the relief of Jhansie. This army crossed the Bettwa the 
 same night, and encamped close to the English force. 
 
 The position of Sir Hugh Kose was full of peril. 
 Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by 
 11,000 warriors ; behind him and close to him, an army 
 of 12,000 men headed by a sworn enemy of the British 
 name, — one who had revelled in the slaughters of 
 Cawnpore. It was thus a position which required in a 
 special degree a clear head, a cool judgment, and a firm 
 will, — a position in which a single false step would have 
 ruined us. But Sir Hugh was equal to the occasion. 
 Kightly judging that to withdraw the investing troops 
 for the purpose of meeting Tantia Topee would give to 
 the besieged a moral as well as a material advantage. 
 Sir Hugh determined to continue to press the siege with 
 energy and vigour, whilst he should march in person, at 
 the head of such troops as could be spared from the 
 actual duties of the siege, against the new enemy. His 
 plan was to attack the enemy at day-break with about 
 
310 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 1,000 men of the second brigade, and a less number 
 of the first. 
 
 Learning in the night, however, that Tantia had 
 detached a division of his army to relieve Jhansie on 
 the northern side. Sir Hugh directed the first brigade 
 to move against that body, whilst he himself should 
 attack the enemy at dawn. But Tantia Topee did not 
 wait for the dawn. Whilst it was yet dark, he moved 
 his first line towards the British encampment, and drove 
 in the vedettes. But, no sooner had the retreat of these 
 cleared the line, then the British guns commenced a 
 brisk fire on the advancing body. But the fire of a few 
 guns was powerless to stop the onward movement of a 
 line which extended considerably beyond the British on 
 both flanks. The enemy had only to move straight 
 on to come with their overlapping wings upon the 
 investing party, who would thus be placed, literally, 
 between two fires. Sir Hugh comprehended this in an 
 instant. Massing then his horse artillery on his left 
 and accompanying it with a squadron of cavalry, he 
 directed it against the right flank of the enemy. Simul- 
 taneously, another squadron under the general in person 
 charged his left flank. Terrified at being thus attacked 
 on both flanks, the enemy halted, and his troops became 
 huddled together in disordered masses. At this moment 
 our infantry received orders to advance. Pouring in a 
 volley, they dashed forward at the charge. The result 
 was magical. The enemy's line at once broke and fled, 
 in complete disorder, toward the second line, abandoning 
 several of their guns. 
 
 Meanwhile General Stuart had been equally successful 
 against the other division of the enemy. The two routed 
 parties were being thus simultaneously driven on the 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 311 
 
 tliird division, which, under the personal command of 
 Tantia Topee, still stood its ground. The line of pursuit, 
 however, led Sir Hugh Kose against the front of Tantia's 
 array, whilst it drew General Stuart on to his right flank. 
 Seeing himself thus in danger of being attacked simul- 
 taneously in front and flank, and encumbered by the 
 crowds of panic-stricken fugitives, the rebel commander 
 resolved to retreat across the Bettwa. To check the 
 advance of the English he caused the jungle in front 
 of him to be set on fire, and then, under cover of the 
 smoke and flame, moved rapidly towards the river. He 
 effected his passage under cover of his guns, which were 
 remarkably well served, but he did not find himself the 
 safer. He was closely followed by our horse artillery 
 and cavalry, which had dashed at a gallop through the 
 flaming jungle, and the pursuit was continued until 
 every gun in his possession had been captured. Tantia 
 himself fled to Calpee. He had lost, in this action, 
 fifteen hundred men, and his force had been completely 
 dispersed. Never was a victory more complete. 
 
 Fatigued and exhausted, but with their morale in- 
 creased as much as that of the enemy had been de- 
 pressed by the events of the day, the victorious little 
 army returned to their position before Jhansie, on the 
 evening of the 1st. Sir Hugh was determined to take 
 prompt advantage of the discouragement which the 
 defeat of the great army of the Peshwa had produced 
 among the garrison. He therefore continued to pour 
 in a heavy fire all that night and the day following, — 
 when, deeming the breach in the city wall just prac- 
 ticaole, though only just practicable, he resolved to 
 attempt the storm of the place tlie next morning. He 
 made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to 
 
312 SIR HFGH ROSE. 
 
 make a false attack on tlie west wall, with a small 
 detachment. On the sound of their guns being heard, 
 the main storming party was to issue forth and attack 
 the breach, whilst on the right and left attempts should 
 be made to enter the city by escalading. 
 
 At 3 A.M. on the morning of the 3rd April the 
 storming parties moved to the positions marked out for 
 them to wait for the signal from the western side. No 
 sooner was it given tjian the main storming party, 
 consisting of the 86th Foot and the 25th Bombay native 
 infantry, dashed at the breach, covered by a strong fire 
 from the artillery. The resistance here was but trifling 
 and the breach was entered with but small loss. The 
 right attack, however, was not so successful. Consisting 
 of the 3rd Europeans, some Hydrabad infantiy, and 
 Madras and Bombay sappers, — the ladders on the 
 shoulders of the last, — they marched forward at the 
 signal, but on debouching into the plain in front of 
 the city wall, they were met by a heavy fire from 
 artillery, and the discharge of rockets, stinkpots, stones, 
 blocks of wood, and other missiles. Moving straight on, 
 however, they planted their ladders against the wall, 
 but some of these were too short, some broke down 
 under the weight of the stormers, and the officers who 
 succeeded in gaining the wall on the others were cut to 
 pieces before they could receive assistance. Still our 
 men pushed on, and very opportunely, a shout from the. 
 main column, showing that the breach had been stormed 
 came to assist them. The opposition in their front then 
 slackened, and the rampart was gained. The attempt 
 at escalading on the left had been successful, and 
 the three columns, uniting, poured into the town. But 
 resistance was not yet over. Covered by the fire from 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 313 
 
 the fort, the enemy showed a determined front, and each 
 house and street were contested with a fierce obstinacy. 
 Colonel TurnbuU, commanding our artillery, was shot 
 in this street battle. 
 
 Nevertheless our troops pressing steadily onwards 
 made way, and drove the enemy into the palace, — the 
 place he had fixed upon for his most resolute resistance. 
 Here the conflict was - desperate. Every room was 
 defended with the most determined fury. But it was of 
 no avail. From chamber to chamber were the rebels 
 driven with great slaughter, until at last the palace was 
 our own. Even then the contest was not over. The 
 Ranee's Body. Guard, some fifty in number, still held 
 the stables. Rushing into the stable-yard to attack 
 them, exposed as it was to the fire of the fort guns, 
 several of our men were in the first instance cut down. 
 The rebel troopers, after firing their carbines from be- 
 hind their horses, mounted, and charged sword in hand. 
 Some of their comrades at the same time fired the 
 stables. A terrible confusion followed. The glare and 
 heat of the flames, the fury of the excited combatants, 
 the fire of the fort plunging amid friends and foes, the 
 small space for the contest, all combined to make a 
 scene such as has been seldom witnessed. It was not 
 till every man of that Body Guard had been cut down 
 that order was in some degree restored. 
 
 All that night, and throughout the following day, 
 desultory fighting continued, — the enemy being either 
 slaughtered, or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. 
 But on the night of the 4th, the Ranee, despairing of 
 further resistance, evacuated the fort with all her re- 
 maining followers. Sir Hugh occupied it early on the 
 following morning, and detached a party in pursuit of 
 
314 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 the enemy. Of these two hundred were cut up. Our 
 loss in the storminor of Jhansie and the action of the 
 Bettwa amounted to 343 killed and wounded, of whom 
 thirty-six were officers ; that of the enemy was about 
 5000. 
 
 Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Calpee. This 
 was the main arsenal of the rebels, and it was well pro- 
 vided with artillery and other warlike stores. Its 
 distance from Jhansie is one hundred and two miles 
 in a north-easterly direction. The capture of this place 
 would enable Sir Hugh to co-operate with the left rear 
 of Lord Clyde's army, and, coupled with the fall of 
 Jhansie, it would set the seal to the extinction of the 
 rebellion in Central India. 
 
 Having rested and re-organised the force, wearied 
 with seventeen days' incessant labour, during which few 
 of them were allowed the luxury of a change of clothes, 
 and having placed a sufficient garrison in Jhansie, Sir 
 Hugh prepared to carry out his plans on Calpee. The 
 appearance, however,. of the rebel garrison of Kotah in 
 the neighbourhood compelled him to send a detachment 
 after that enemy, and he awaited its return before he 
 moved. He had meanwhile been joined by a weak wing 
 of the 71st Foot, but this reinforcement did not fill up 
 the gaps which had been caused by casualties, and by 
 the necessity which existed for leaving a garrison in 
 Jhansie. At last, on the 25th April, having previously 
 detached a flying column under Colonel Orr, to clear 
 away the remnants of the rebels, who might otherwise 
 imperil the communications between his own force and 
 General Whitelock's, and then to co-operate with him 
 against Koonch, Sir Hugh marched in the direction of 
 Calpee. Meanwhile the Eanee of Jhansie, the dis- 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 315 
 
 possessed Eaja of Banpore, and Tantia Topee had united 
 their followers, and, impressed with the necessity of 
 saving Calpee, had resolved to do battle for that place 
 at Koonch, about forty miles south-west of Calpee on 
 the Jhansie road. The heat of the weather, unusually 
 great, had made them determine to harass the Europeans 
 as much as possible in the day time. Leaving then but 
 a few troops in Calpee, they marched with the remainder 
 to Koonch, where they drew up under cover of the fort, 
 and threw up entrenchments and cut ditches across the 
 road in their front. They also occupied the small fort 
 of Loharee, which, so long as they were allowed to hold 
 it, would play upon the flank of an advancing enemy. 
 
 Against this position. Sir Hugh Kose moved on 
 the 6th May. The heat was terrific, but the whole 
 district being studded with forts it was necessary to 
 advance with great caution. It was long past sunrise, 
 therefore, when Sir Hugh, having mastered the enemy's 
 position, arrived so near it as to be able to direct Major 
 Gall to proceed with a detachment to storm the fort of 
 Loharee. This service was gallantly executed with a 
 loss on our side of four officers and nineteen men ; on 
 that of the rebels, of all their number. This impediment 
 to an advance removed, Sir Hugh directed the 1st 
 brigade, — co-operating with Colonel Orr on the other 
 side of the Bettwa, — to make a feigned attack on the 
 enemy's position, whilst he himself, with the 2nd brigade, 
 should make a flank march round their left, and attack 
 them. The enemy did not wait for the full execution 
 of this manoeuvre. Alarmed by the presence of the 
 1st brigade in their front, and the movement of the 2nd 
 brigade round their flank, threatening to cut them off 
 from Calpee, they gave way, after firing a few rounds, 
 
316 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 and retreated. Koonch at once fell into our hands, and 
 troops were at once sent in pursuit of the enemy. They 
 were followed up for sixteen miles, and pursuit only 
 ceased where they had lost all their guns. 
 
 Although the resistance made by the rebels on this 
 occasion was feeble on the field of battle, — a result 
 owing probably to the fear entertained by their leaders 
 of being cut off from Calpee, — yet in the execution of 
 their retiring movement the gallant bearing of the 
 infantry, — consisting of some regiments of the Gwalior 
 Contingent, — called forth the admiration of the English 
 officers. This retreat was covered by a line of skir- 
 mishers two miles in length, resting upon supports of 
 masses of thirty or forty men at stated intervals. These 
 skirmishers retired for a long time in perfect order 
 keeping up a brisk fire, and it was only when they were 
 taken in flank by our cavalry and artillery that they 
 were compelled to double up and give way. 
 
 Our troops suffered on this occasion far more from 
 the sun than from the enemy. The thermometer 
 showed 120 ° in the shade. The force had been marching 
 from daybreak, and the pursuit was not over till nine 
 o'clock at night. Twelve men of the 71st Foot were 
 struck dead by the sun. Sir Hugh himself was struck 
 down three times, and. Dr. Lowe informs us, " while the 
 action was going on, dhooly after dhooly was brought 
 into the field hospital with officers and men suffering 
 from sunstroke, some dead, others prostrated, laughing 
 and sobbing in weak delirium." The sufferings from 
 fatigue, thirst, and exposure were terrible. To all, how- 
 ever, the general showed an example which inspired his 
 soldiers ; thrice struck down, he each time forced him- 
 self to rally ; he personally directed the attack and 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 317 
 
 pursuit; he exposed himself as much as the meanest 
 soldier ; and the privations he endured were not less 
 than those to which all ranks were subjected. 
 
 Pressing on, as soon as possible, after this successful 
 action. Sir Hugh established himself with the 2nd 
 brigade at Golowlee, on the right bank of the Jumna, 
 seven miles from Calpee, on the 15th. Golowlee is not 
 on the direct road from Koonch to Calpee, but Sir 
 Hugh, having been informed that that road had been 
 strongly fortified, made a flank march across country to 
 his right, leaving the 1st brigade to make a feint upon 
 the direct road. By this means Sir Hugh was able to 
 open communications with Colonel G. V. Maxwell, — 
 who, with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, and the Camel 
 Corps, was on the left bank of the Jumna, — and also to 
 threaten Calpee in an unexpected quarter. Unfortu- 
 nately the exposure suffered by the troops told upon 
 them with terrible effect, and the deaths and admissions 
 into hospital increased at an alarming rate. The con- 
 dition of our troops in this respect was well known to 
 the enemy. Indeed, a general order issued by the rebel 
 commander on the subject was, about this time, inter- 
 cepted. This order stated that "as the European 
 infidels either died or had to go into hospital from 
 fighting in the sun, they were never to be attacked 
 before ten o'clock in the day, in order that they might 
 feel its force." To add to his anxieties, information 
 reached Sir Hugh at this time that the Nawab of Banda, 
 who had recently been defeated by Sir George Whitelock, 
 had joined the rebels at Calpee with a large force of 
 very efficient cavalry, — the remnants of our mutinous 
 regiments, — and with some infantry and artillery as 
 well. 
 
318 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 On the 16th, 17th, and 18th May there was constant 
 skirmishing between the two armies, in which the enemy- 
 were invariably driven back. On the night of the 19th 
 Sir Hugh concentrated both brigades at Golowlee, and 
 receiving on the following day from Colonel G-. Y. Max- 
 well a reinforcement of two companies of the 88th, the 
 Camel Corps, and 120 Sikhs, he prepared for a general 
 attack upon Calpee. 
 
 The attack presented great difficulties. Calpee is 
 situated on a high rock rising from the Jumna, and is 
 surrounded by miles of deep ravines, — forming in them- 
 selves not only strong natural obstacles to an attacking 
 party, but offering to an enemy well acquainted with 
 the country means of making sudden attacks, and of 
 cutting off small detachments. These difficulties how- 
 ever only inspired the general with a determination to 
 overcome them. His plan was, that while Colonel 
 Maxwell should shell Calpee, in reverse, from the left 
 bank of the Jumna, he should clear the ravines him- 
 self, and then attack the left face of the fort. 
 
 In pursuance of their plan to attack our men in the 
 heat of the day only, the enemy had come down in force 
 on the 20th, and attacked our right flank. To save his 
 men for the grand assault he was meditating, Sir Hugh 
 had contented himself with merely repulsing this attack. 
 'Next day Colonel Maxwell opened on the town and fort, 
 and shelled them without intermission. On the following 
 morning, information was brought to Sir Hugh that the 
 rebels had resolved to attack him with all their force on 
 the 23rd ; that their plan was to make a feint on his 
 left, whilst, stealing up the ravines with their main 
 attack, they should suddenly burst upon his right, which 
 they calculated would be weakened to support the left. 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 319 
 
 The plan was a good one, and in a military point of 
 view, well deserved to succeed. 
 
 It will be understood that our force lay in the ground 
 between the road from Calpee to Banda and the Jumna, 
 — the left nearly touching the Banda road, and the right 
 resting on the ravines near the river. In pursuance of 
 their plan, then, to compel us to weaken our right, the 
 rebels marched out in masses about ten o'clock along 
 the Banda road, and commenced an attack upon our 
 left. This attack, headed by the Nawab of Banda, and 
 Kao Sahib, nephew of the Nana, though intended only 
 as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the left was heavily 
 engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident in his information 
 as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man 
 from his right. The attack on the left continued, the 
 feigned attack became a very real one, but Sir Hugh 
 still kept his right in position. It was well he did so. 
 Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines 
 became a mass of fire; guns opened, and the enemy's 
 infantry, climbing up from below, poured in a musketry 
 fire upon the right of our line. The suddenness of the 
 attack, the numbers of the enemy, and the terrible heat 
 of the day gave them a great advantage. Another 
 point, too, was in their favour. Many of our Enfield 
 rifles had become affected by constant use, and the 
 men, after the first discharge, found it impossible to 
 ram down their cartridges. Numbers of them likewise 
 were struck down by the sun, and many more were 
 disabled by its force. When, therefore, the rebels, 
 starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured 
 in volleys, which our men could but feebly reply to; 
 when they saw that each discharge from our line became 
 weaker than the former ; they began to gain confidence. 
 
320 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 Moving on with loud yells, and finding less and less 
 opposition as they advanced, seeing in fact that our men 
 rather gave way, they at last came on with great deter- 
 mination, and driving all before them, came charging 
 towards our guns. General Stuart, seeing the infantry 
 driven back, dismounted from his horse, and drawing his 
 sword bade the gunners defend their guns with their 
 lives. Still the rebels advanced with frantic cries, and 
 it seemed as though, from their very numbers, they 
 must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom information of 
 the desperate nature of affairs on his right had been 
 conveyed, brought up the Camel Corps at their best 
 pace, then, dismounting them and leading them forward 
 at the double, without a moment's hesitation, charged 
 the advancing foe, — who were then within thirty yards 
 of our guns, — his men cheering as they did so. For a 
 moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. To 
 waver, to turn, to flee back into the ravines, followed 
 almost naturally. Not only was the attack on the right 
 thus repulsed, but the victory was virtually gained. 
 For the left charged the enemy at the same time with 
 so much vigour and determination, that they broke and 
 fled with precipitation. Those readers who have fol- 
 lowed the career of Sir Hugh Kose thus far with atten- 
 tion will not have failed to notice that he was never 
 content with merely gaining a victory, but that he 
 always improved it so as to disperse and damage his 
 enemy to the utmost. So it was on this occasion. Not 
 satisfied with driving the rebels from the field, he 
 followed them up so closely, that he cut off a great 
 number of them from Cjflpee. The same night the 
 enemy evacuated that fort. They were pursued how- 
 ever by our horse artillery and cavalry, until they lost 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 321 
 
 their formation, and dispersed. All their guns, stores, 
 and baggage were taken from them. Even the Kanee 
 of Jhansie, who fled with them, was compelled, for want 
 of a tent, to sleep under trees. 
 
 Calpee was entered on the morning of the Queen's 
 birth-day. It was found to contain warlike stores in 
 great abundance ; cases of English rifles and swords 
 unopened; shot, shell, and every description of ord- 
 nance. 
 
 Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of some of the 
 heads of departments when they entered Calpee. From 
 it an idea may be formed of the manner in which the 
 officers and soldiers of the force generally were suffering : 
 " The General," he says, " was very ill : his chief of the 
 staff, Colonel Wetherall, c.b., was in a raging fever ; his 
 quartermaster-general. Captain Macdonald, worn out; 
 the chaplain of the force had lost his reason, and was 
 apparently sinking fast." Truly the men who composed 
 this force, who fought so nobly, and who suffered so 
 severely, deserved the best gratitude of their country ! 
 
 The taking of Calpee completed the plan of the cam- 
 paign which the Government of India had drawn out for 
 the Central Indian force. Marching from Mhow in 
 November, that force, in five months, had traversed 
 Central India; from the banks of the Seepree and 
 Kala Sind it had marched to the Jumna, and had there 
 effected a junction with the troops under the orders of 
 Lord Clyde. It had been conjpelled, it is true, to 
 contest the whole country which it traversed; it had 
 been its lot to encounter, on several occasions, armies 
 vastly superior in number, and led by men whose rancour 
 against the British name incited them to the most 
 determined efforts for our destruction ; it had undei'taken 
 
 Y 
 
322 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 sieges, the success of which alone would have made the 
 reputation of a general. These deeds had been accom- 
 plished, too, during a season, the terrible heat of which 
 far surpassed the heat of corresponding seasons, and 
 under a sun which proved more deadly even than the 
 enemy. Yet, moving steadily onwards, regarding diffi- 
 culties as "obstacles to be overcome," letting nothing 
 beat him, showing himself equal to every emergency, 
 Sir Hugh Kose had marched his force to the destined 
 goal. Every impediment to his advance had been 
 swept away or struck down. Careless of himself, knowing 
 that to him the representative of his Sovereign, and that 
 Sovereign herself, looked for the successful issue of the 
 campaign. Sir Hugh had shown himself foremost where- 
 ever there was danger, kind, sympathising, and attentive 
 wherever there was suffering. His care of his soldiers 
 has never been exceeded. To look after their comforts, 
 to see that, after a hard-fouglit action, the wounded were 
 attended to, and after a long and tedious march, that 
 provisions and water were abundant, was with him a 
 sacred duty. The kind word, the sympathising enquiry, 
 were never wanting to the weary, the wounded, the 
 suffering. If on the battle-field he demanded all their 
 energies, all their capabilities; if, for seventeen days 
 before Jhansie, he required them to give every faculty 
 of mind and body to the carrying out of a great end, 
 and even to forego every comfort, — at least, when the 
 necessity passed away, he did for them all that it was 
 in the power of a man in his situation to do. No man 
 could have done more. The same sun that struck down 
 the soldier did not spare the commander ; the same 
 dangers that they encountered he dared likewise ; if 
 they did not spare themselves, neither did he ; and yet 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 323 
 
 with all the cares of the command upon him, with des- 
 patches to write, reports to listen to, sketches of the 
 country to examine, he managed to find time to attend 
 to their concerns. The great interest taken in the 
 soldier during his tenure of the office of Commander-in- 
 Chief has not always been regarded in an appreciatory 
 spirit. Yet that interest will not be regarded as extra- 
 ordinary by those who have had practical experience of 
 the splendid fighting qualities of our men, and who have 
 learned from experience on the field and by the sick- 
 bed' that, however much it may suit the conscientious 
 Pharisaism of some writers to place them on a level with 
 the brute creation, it is yet possible by kind and judicious 
 treatment to kindle within their breasts a strong yearning 
 after that which is good and elevating and pure. With- 
 out sympathy on the part of a commander, soldiers may 
 indeed be led, but they will never show that enthusiasm 
 which is so great an incentive to gallant actions. It 
 was doubtless an element in the success of the Central 
 India force that this sympathy was evinced in an emi- 
 nent degree by Sir Hugh Eose. 
 
 The campaign was now virtually over. The junction 
 had been effected. Kajpootana, Bundelkund, Jhansie, 
 had been relieved from the presence of the rebels, and 
 Sir Hugh, Avorn out with fatigue, was preparing to 
 return to Bombay. He had issued a farewell order to 
 his troops, when suddenly the intelligence reached him 
 that the rebel army under Tantia Topee and other 
 chiefs, amongst whom was the Kanee of Jhansie, had 
 attacked Scindia at Bahadurpore, nine miles from 
 Gwalior ; that Scindia's whole army, with the exception 
 of his body guard, had deserted in mass to the enemy ; 
 that Scindia had fled to Agra ; and that the rebels had 
 
 y2 
 
324 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 instantly taken possession of the fort of Gwalior, con- 
 taining artillery and munitions of war in abundance. 
 
 Sir Hugh Kose had previously detached a portion 
 of his force under Brigadier Stuart in the direction of 
 Gwalior, with a view to overawe the rebels ; and, imme- 
 diately on the receipt of this intelligence hef followed 
 with the remainder. Setting out on the 6th June, 
 — the thermor%eter 130° in the shade, — he moved by 
 forced marches towards his destination, and, overtaking 
 Brigadier Stuart at Indoorkee, on the 16th reached 
 Bahadurpore, the scene of Scindia's defeat. The same 
 day having been reinforced by Brigadier-General Napier 
 and Brigadier Smith, he marched with General Napier's 
 brigade and some of his owni men upon the Morar can- 
 tonments, five miles distant, occupied in force by the 
 rebels, and drove them out after an action which lasted 
 two hours. As a part of the same movement Brigadier 
 Smith advanced from the east upon Kotah-ka-serai, 
 about seven miles from Gwalior, a point at which com- 
 munications could be opened with Sir Hugh Kose. The 
 brigadier succeeded in occupying that position, but as 
 the enemy threatened him in considerable force, he 
 deemed it right to attack them. An action ensued, 
 which resulted in the retirement of the enemy, and in 
 the taking up by the brigadier of a position not unas- 
 sailable by the enemy, but sufficiently strong. The 
 most important occurrence of the action, however, was 
 the death of the Kanee of Jhansie, who fell fighting at 
 the head of her troopers, whilst endeavouring to repel 
 a gallant charge of the 8th Hussars. "Although a 
 lady," writes Sir Hugh in his despatch, " she was the 
 bravest and best military leader of the rebels." At the 
 same time that these movements were taking place. 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 325 
 
 Major Orr advanced upon the Seepree road to the direct 
 south of Gwalior, whilst Colonel Kiddell was moved so 
 as to complete the investment on its west side. 
 
 Sir Hugh now prepared for the final stroke. His 
 plan was, having completed the investment, to attack 
 Gwalior on its weakest side, that by which Brigadier 
 Smith had advanced. Leaving therefore Major Orr 
 and Colonel Kiddell to guard the outlets on the south 
 and west, and directing General Napier to remain at 
 Morar, Sir Hugh himself marched with the bulk of his 
 forces, on the morning of the 18th June, to join Briga- 
 dier Smith at Kotah-ka-serai. The distance was twenty- 
 miles, and tlie march was extremely harassing. The 
 heat of the sun was intense. More than a hundred 
 men of the 86th alone were compelled to fall out, 
 although it may be added that these gallant soldiers 
 were not deterred by sickness from joining on the 
 following day in the assault. Sir Hugh found Briga- 
 dier Smith, who had advanced nearer Gwalior, in a 
 very cramped position, in a pass between two ridges 
 of hills, one of which, on the left of our force, had been 
 occupied by the enemy, another body of whom were 
 also in force in the gorge about two miles in rear of our 
 position. In front of him was a very deep canal cut out 
 of the rock. Sir Hugh conceived the idea of cutting off 
 both these bodies from Gwalior. The only obstacle to 
 such a manoeuvre lay in the difficulties presented by the 
 canal. These, however, could be overcome. By sunset 
 or a little later a bridge or dam could have been con- 
 structed, and over this Sir Hugh might have marched a 
 force which should interpose between Gwalior and the 
 rebels, whilst another brigade should occupy them in 
 front. The movements of the enemy, however, compelled 
 
326 sm HUGH llOSE. 
 
 Sir Hugh to abandon this project. Fresh troops poured 
 out of Gwalior and made a serious attack on our left 
 flank, resting on the canal, the point where we were 
 weakest. To meet this attack. Sir Hugh detached 
 Brigadier Stuart's brigade with orders to cross the canal, 
 and crowning the heights on the other side of it, to 
 attack the enemy on their left, whilst at the same time 
 Brigadier Smith should advance obliquely, under cover of 
 the ground, against their left front. This attack on their 
 left at once had the effect of making the enemy desist 
 on his right,. and no sooner did they find that their left 
 was turned by the movement, than they fell back in 
 haste, abandoning their guns. They were pressed hard 
 by our troops, and driven into the city, and our line 
 advancing at the same time took possession of the 
 highest range of heights above Gwalior. From these 
 heights "the slopes descended gradually towards the 
 town ; the lowest one commanding the grand parade of 
 the 'Lushker,' which was almost out of fire of the Fort 
 and afforded an entrance into the city." * 
 
 Gazing from this position on Gwalior, thus lying at 
 his feet, seeing the enemy's infantry and cavalry de- 
 bouching from the city, but apparently without the 
 resolution to attack him, Sir Hugh Kose resolved to 
 strike at the moment, and endeavour to gain possession 
 of the place that same day. Having formed his battle 
 array, accordingly, he gave the order to advance. The 
 1st Bombay Lancers, under Colonel Owen, had been 
 ordered to descend the hills and occupy the road which 
 led to the grand parade of the Lushker. This they did 
 in gallant style, not only clearing the parade but 
 pursuing the enemy into the very streets of Gwalior. 
 
 * Sir Hugh Base's Despatch. 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 327 
 
 They were then withdrawn, and the infantry, taking 
 their place, marched right up to Scindia's palace with- 
 out meeting much opposition, — the enemy retreating 
 through the town with great rapidity. Brigadier Smith, 
 who had been detached in pursuit, succeeded, however, 
 in cutting up great numbers of them, in the face of 
 a fierce resistance offered by their artillery. The re- 
 mainder fell into the hands of General Napier at 
 Morar, who killed between three and four hundred of 
 them. 
 
 The old and new cities thus fell into our hands ; but 
 the fort was still unsubdued ; indeed throughout these 
 operations it. had maintained a constant, though not 
 very effective, fire upon our troops. On the morning 
 of the 19th, however, at an early hour. Lieutenant Kose, 
 of the 25th Bombay native infantry, and Lieutenant 
 Waller, with a party of the 25th and some police, crept 
 up the rock, burst open the main gateway of the fort, 
 and, taking the enemy by surprise, forced an entrance 
 through an archway connected by a narrow street with 
 the interior defences. Here they had to maintain a 
 fierce hand-to-hand encounter with the garrison, urged 
 to desperation by the knowledge that they had no 
 retreat. The gallantry of Lieutenant Kose and his 
 companions prevailed, however, over the fury of these 
 desperate men; they were all either shot down or cut 
 to pieces, and the fort was ours, though in gaining it 
 Lieutenant Eose sacrificed his own life. 
 
 Thus ended the Gwalior episode of the Central Indian 
 campaign. Forming no part of the original project, it 
 was yet forced upon the general by the unexpected 
 rebellion of the troops of our ally. Taken by itself it 
 would have been regarded as a brilliant feat of arms, 
 
328 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 but looked upon as an unexpected call upon strength 
 and resources which had undergone no mean trial, it 
 may well be regarded as an achievement of no common 
 character. The service was one of the last importance. 
 The promptness, the suddenness of the blow, — a striking 
 characteristic of all Sir Hugh Kose's movements, — alone 
 prevented Gwalior from becoming a second Delhi, — a 
 rallying point for all the parties of rebels who were 
 scattered over India. Of the conduct of our soldiers 
 their commander was the best judge, and thus he speaks 
 of it. "As commander of the troops engaged," wrote 
 Sir Hugh in his despatch, "it is my duty to say, that 
 though a most arduous campaign had impaired the 
 health and strength of every man of my force, their 
 discipline, devotion, and strength remained unvarying 
 and unshaken, enabling them to make a very rapid 
 march in summer heat to Gwalior, fight and gain two 
 actions on the r6ad, one at Morar cantonments, the 
 other at Kotah-ka-serai ; arrive at their posts, from 
 great distances and by bad roads, before Gwalior before 
 the day appointed, the 19th June ; and, on that same 
 day, carry by assault all the enemy's positions on strong 
 heights and in most difficult ground, taking one battery 
 after another, twenty-seven pieces of artillery in the 
 action ; twenty-five in the pursuit ; besides the guns in 
 the fort; the old city; the new city; and finally the 
 rock of Gwalior, held to be one of the most important 
 and strongest fortresses in India." 
 
 Sir Hugh made over command of his force to General 
 Napier on the 29th June, and proceeded to Bombay. 
 
 We now approach that which may be termed the 
 third division of Sir Hugh Kose's career. Appointed 
 Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, he was transferred, on 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 329 
 
 the departure of Lord Clyde from India, to the higher 
 appointment in Bengal. This appointment he took up 
 in the month of June 1860, and he held it till the end 
 of March of the present year, — a period of nearly five 
 years. We do not propose to follow step by step each 
 act of Sir Hugh Kose as Commander-in-Chief. In such 
 an appointment the value of an officer's services is to be 
 tested, not by any one particular measure, but by the 
 tendency and result of the line of policy he may pursue. 
 If that Hne of policy be based upon sound principles, if 
 the measures he attempt to cany into effect be just and 
 fair to all whose interests are touched by them, then the 
 result must IfO advantageous. Yet it must by no means 
 be imagined that all that a Commander-in-Chief has to 
 do, is to wish to act well ; that he has only to carve out 
 a policy to himself, and adhere to it. On the contrary, 
 there is probably no appointment emanating from the 
 Crown of England, in which the hands of the holder are 
 so tightly bound as that of the Commander-in-Chief in 
 India. Nominally an independent appointment, it is 
 really an appointment the independent action of which 
 is jealously watched and carefully restricted. Formerly 
 indeed, the powers which might, under certain circum- 
 stances, devolve upon a Commander-in-Chief were not 
 very accurately defined: but from the day when the 
 Marquis of Dalhousie snubbed Sir Charles Napier into 
 the resignation of his command for presuming to crush 
 mutiny in the bud, without consulting the Marquis who 
 was at sea, or the Council which' was at Calcutta, the 
 relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the 
 Government have become, practically, somewhat clearer 
 than they were before. The decision of the Home 
 Government and of the Duke of Wellington upon that 
 
330 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 important question announced, not the predominance of 
 the Civil Power, — for not even Sir Charles Napier ever 
 questioned that, — but, that not so great a peril as the 
 prospect of a mutiny would justify even the temporary 
 assumption by the Commander-in-Chief of any portion 
 of that power which was vested in the Government 
 alone. From this some idea may be drawn of the very 
 delicate and difficult position which a Commander-in- 
 Chief would occupy, who, full of zeal and energy, re- 
 volving plans of reform and improvement, should find 
 himself in the presence of a superior power by whom all 
 his intentions might be frustrated and all his reforms 
 nipped in the bud. We do not intend to assert that a 
 dead-lock of this nature is even within the bounds of 
 probability. We only allude to the subject, in order to 
 show, that even should a long tenure of the office of 
 Commander-in-chief produce no results, it is not neces- 
 sarily to be attributed to indifference on the part of the 
 head of the army. 
 
 We have written to little purpose if we have failed 
 to impress upon the minds of our readers that Sir Hugh 
 Rose was a man of deep convictions, strong will, and 
 great tenacity of purpose. Yet in the diplomatic train- 
 ing he had enjoyed in Syria and in Constantinople, he 
 had had many opportunities of observing that the most 
 common solution of even the weightiest affairs was a 
 compromise. With all his strong convictions he was 
 far too clear-headed, he had mixed too much with the 
 world, to imagine, that he could expect every other man 
 to agree with him on every subject. He knew well that, 
 in his new position, he would have to encounter men of 
 different and differing schools, — men who looked at 
 affairs from a point of view widely diverse from his 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 331 
 
 own, — and he had associated too much with the world 
 to think that these men would give in to his opinions, 
 simply because he held them. Whilst therefore perhaps 
 no man ever occupied the office of Commander-in-Chief 
 more strongly satisfied of the soundness of his own ideas, 
 of the necessity for putting them in practice, and more 
 determined to hold to and carry out those views, if it 
 were possible to do so, no one perhaps was at the same 
 time more impressed with the sense of the delicate and 
 difficult nature of his position, and of the wisdom of 
 accepting a part, if he were unable to gain the whole. 
 
 The state of the army when Sir Hugh Kose assumed 
 command of -it was peculiar. The European portion of 
 it was just reposing after the triumphs of the mutiny. 
 They were reposing, however, in buildings which had 
 been intended for half their number, and the wretched 
 state of existence which had always made the life of a 
 soldier in India proverbial, had been rendered even 
 more wretched by the crowded state of the barracks 
 and the deficiencies of the hospital accommodation. 
 The men of a section of that European force too,— that 
 section which, formerly under the Company, had been 
 transferred to the Crown without being made over to 
 the Horse Guards, were known to consider themselves 
 aggrieved, because the option of bounty or discharge 
 had not been offered to them on the occasion of their 
 transfer. As for the native army it was in a state of 
 chaos. Of the seventy-four native regiments of which 
 the Bengal Army consisted before the mutiny, but eight 
 or ten existed. There were officers without regiments 
 scattered all over the country. There were police corps 
 irregular corps, local corps, doing military duty in 
 various districts and stations, raised no one knew how, 
 
332 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 and subject one scarcely knew to whom. There were 
 hosts of claimants for appointments, men who had lost all 
 in the mutiny, who had no regiment to go to, and who 
 were conversant only with the military duties to which 
 they had been brought up. The mutiny had annihilated 
 all the old regulations, and none had come to replace 
 them. The officers of the old Company's army, deprived 
 of their old employments, looked anxiously to the future. 
 Each man knew that something was coming, yet no one 
 knew what to expect. At this time the Home Govern- 
 ment, in opposition to the written opinions of Lord 
 Clyde, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir William Mansfield, and other 
 high authorities, had determined to maintain the Indian 
 Army as a separate army, subject to the Secretary of 
 State and not to the Horse Guards, but as to the 
 manner in which it would be reorganised or officered 
 not a syllable had transpired. 
 
 The objects, then, which Sir Hugh just proposed to 
 himself on taking the command of the Indian Army, 
 were these. He wished, first, to improve the condition 
 of the European soldier ; to see that he was not only 
 properly lodged, well tended in hospital, and well fed, 
 but likewise that he should be provided with that which 
 all previous reformers had failed to secure for him, — 
 occupation during the long and weary hours of the day. 
 Few men had had better opportunities than Sir Hugh 
 of seeing what the European soldier could do if he were 
 only, we will not say encouraged, but allowed, to do it. 
 In that terrible Jhansie campaign the soldier had always 
 been ready to do more than his mere duty ; he was not 
 then fanciful about his rations, nor did he disdain the 
 hard earth for his bed. The Commander-in-Chief had 
 witnessed his exertions, his privations, his devotion then, 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 333 
 
 and he was resolved that, now that the fight was over, 
 those comforts and those opportunities for profitable 
 employment should be given to the European soldier, 
 which no one more than he had nobly earned. 
 
 At the same time discipline was to be maintained, 
 and though discipline had not been openly violated, 
 there were symptoms even then that the pressure of 
 a firm hand might be required, and that a lesson might 
 be needed. To those signs of the times Sir Hugh was 
 fully alive ; though it was still hoped, that by a cautious 
 and prudent line of conduct, the danger might be 
 averted. 
 
 Then, again, there was the condition of the native 
 army. The question o# the reorganization of this army 
 generally was a matter for the consideration of the home 
 authorities, but there was a point connected with it 
 which did come within the jurisdiction of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, and that was, to raise the tone of those 
 numberless officers, who, having lost their regiments, 
 were either absolutely without employment, or were 
 reduced to that most painful of all positions to men 
 who once had a regiment and a home, — that of doing 
 general duty in some large station. 
 
 This last task was that first undertaken by the new 
 Commander-in-Chief. The course he adopted was some- 
 what carped at at the time, but expfiience has testified 
 to its wisdom. To ascertain among a crowd of applicants 
 who are the fittest for military employ inont is for a new 
 Commander-in-Chief a very difticult matter. It may be 
 said that he can trust to his staff. But that is the rock 
 upon which the reputation for fair and just dealing 
 of so many previous Commanders-in-Chief has been 
 \Yrecked. The statement made before the Committee 
 
334 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 of the House of Lords, by an Adjutant-General, whose 
 patronage had been extremely advantageous to his own 
 personal friends, to the effect that those oflScers whom 
 he had not selected for employment where the " refuse " 
 of the Army, has not yet been forgotten. In the dark 
 and weary days of the mutiny, those who composed this 
 "refuse" had fought at least as well as their more 
 favoured comrades. In some cases, indeed, the elite had 
 not altogether come up to public expectation. For a 
 new Commander-in-Chief, then, to go back to the old 
 ways, to rely for the selection of men on whose conduct 
 would mainly depend the efficient carrying out of his 
 own views, on the reports of the Adjutant-General, was 
 not a plan likely to find favour ^fith one whose views of 
 discipline were so rigid, and whose sense of responsibility 
 was so marked as was the case with Sir Hugh Rose. 
 To his mind it appeared that one great public test was 
 far better than all the private recommendations. And 
 though this test might not operate quite evenly, though 
 it might exclude deserving officers, yet, being open, it 
 was a test the fairness of which, all, he thought, would 
 be ready to acknowledge, and which even those who 
 suffered from, it would declare to be preferable to the 
 secret system which had, by its unjust action, soured 
 many a noble spirit. Acting upon this principle. Sir 
 Hugh Rose officially declared, as soon as possible after 
 his assumption of the office of Commander-in-Chief, that 
 the staff appointments in his gift would be bestowed, 
 without favour or affection, upon those officers whose 
 services in the field and whose general good conduct, 
 testified to by those under whom they had served, gave 
 them the greatest claim upon the country. This was a 
 test, open, clear, and incapable of being misunderstood. 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 335 
 
 • 
 
 It was liable certainly to act hardly upon officers who 
 had not seen service ; but it was nevertheless the best 
 test that could be devised. In all stations of life there 
 are inequahties. Fortune showers her favours with 
 bounteous hands on some; she withholds them, in a 
 niggard spirit, from others. To those who, perhaps, 
 hardly seek for them, she gives frequent opportunities ; 
 to those who would walk bare-footed from one end of 
 India to another for one single chance, she often rigidly 
 denies that chance. We see this in every career, in 
 every station of life. If, then, this rule bore hardly upon 
 those who, from no fault of their own, had not fleshed 
 their maiden swords, it was, after aU, one of the chances 
 of existence. It had upon them, besides, this other 
 eJBfect, that, shut out from military employment, these 
 men where induced to turn their energies to the per- 
 formance of those departmental duties under the 
 government of India for which military service was 
 never considered a necessary qualification. 
 
 We have said that this new test proposed by Sir Hugh 
 Eose was rather carped at when it appeared. But it 
 was carped at simply because very few believed that 
 it would be strictly and rigidly adhered to. Declara- 
 tions of the same sort had been made by others ; yet, 
 with the exception of Sir Charles Napier and General 
 Anson, they had seldom been acted up to. Practically 
 the officer who had no interest had had but a slender 
 chance. The Indian public therefore were slow to believe 
 that any change in the system which had effectually 
 provided for the relations and friends of the staif of the 
 army would follow even the emphatic declarations of 
 the new Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 Yet, at the close of a five years' tenure of office by 
 
336 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 Sir Hugli Eose, we find that he never swerved from 
 that declaration. It is now an admitted axiom, that 
 public service is the test for promotion. Sir Hugh has 
 impressed that principle on the military administration. 
 Loud, doubtless, have been the lamentations over " the 
 good old times." But what a few private individuals 
 have lost the public has gained. The tone of the 
 officers is far higher than it was before. Men have 
 ceased to care about letters of introduction or relation- 
 ship to officials. A system has been introduced which 
 has made every man who has done good service feel 
 that his claim upon his country will be satisfied. It is 
 our conviction that Sir Hugh never gave away an 
 appointment to any one who was not, in his opinion, 
 the best qualified amongst those unemployed, to fill it. 
 
 He, like his predecessors, has no doubt had his tempt- 
 ations. People, "with a certain influence," are always 
 upon the qui vive to obtain something good for Charlie 
 or Frank. Yet it was the great merit of Sir Hugh Eose, 
 and that which has stamped his administration, that if 
 Charlie and Frank had been his own sons, he would 
 have given them nothing, if he believed that other men 
 had a prior and a better claim. 
 
 The increase to the allowances of commandants, and 
 of seconds in command ; the appointment of wing officers 
 and of paid doing duty officers, — measures recommended 
 by the Government of India and sanctioned by the 
 Secretary of State, — .gave to Sir Hugh Eose many 
 opportunities of providing for deserving officers. It is 
 quite possible that the critic may point to this or that 
 officer, and say that the appointment was not a goo ■ 
 one ; that a better might have been made. Even, 
 admitting this for the sake of argument, it was at least 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 337 
 
 recognised that that man was appointed who, in the 
 opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, ' had, from public 
 services, the best claim. No one has ever dreamt of 
 asserting that private interest ever influenced the 
 decisions of Sir Hugh Kose in this respect. Conflicting 
 claims must be balanced by one man. The great thing 
 is, to feel confidence in the impartiality of the adjudica- 
 tor, and, though men may have differed from Sir Hugh 
 in his estimate of the value of services, every one will 
 admit that his decision invariably gave the actual con- 
 clusion at which his mind had arrived. 
 
 With respect to the European soldier. Sir Hugh had 
 a more diJBficult task. In a very few months after his 
 arrival in Calcutta, the discontent which was even then 
 lurking in the minds of the European soldiers of .the 
 Indian Army culminated in acts of open mutiny. In 
 dealing with this mutiny Sir Hugh displayed that tact 
 and decision which had characterised his campaigns. He 
 was prompt to strike, severe to punish the ringleaders, 
 but merciful to the many who had blindly followed 
 the few. This danger averted — the snake not only 
 "scotched" but killed — Sir Hugh was soon after sum- 
 moned to Calcutta to take part in introducing the great 
 measure which was the consequence of that mutiny, — 
 the amalgamation of the two armies. 
 
 It was whilst this measure was being discussed, that 
 Sir Hugh found time to introduce one of his great 
 remedial measures for the improvement of the condition 
 of the soldier, — the establishment of soldiers' workshops. 
 In these the soldier was encouraged to develop the 
 knowledge he had acquired in his early youth by 
 working at the trade to which he had been brought up. 
 Every facility was afforded him. A workshop, tools 
 
338 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 and materials were supplied, and the soldier was per- 
 mitted to dispose of the results of his industry. A 
 certain class of officers who believe only in the drinking 
 faculties of the European soldier, who regarded him as 
 a mere brute to be lashed into obedience, laughed at the 
 simplicity which could devise so inoperative a measure. 
 We are bound to add, however, that by the Indian Press, 
 it was warmly received and applauded. Its greatest 
 opponents were the officers of the old school, wedded to 
 the ideas of their boyhood. But Sir Hugh had great 
 confidence in the experiment. He put it in force, and 
 the result has been the redemption of the well-disposed 
 men in the barracks ; it has proved a death-blow to that 
 listless idleness which has been the greatest enemy of the 
 European soldier ; it has enablecl men to save money, 
 which they have invested not in " drink," but in the 
 education of their children ; and it has, in many places 
 given a stimulus to local trade such as its supporters 
 never anticipated. 
 
 Similarly with soldiers' gardens. These, nominally 
 existing before, have been improviBd and increased 
 during the last four years. The vegetables supplied 
 to regiments are in many cases grown by the soldiers 
 themselves, and the European residents in stations are 
 often indebted to those gardens for their supplies. 
 
 It was quite impossible that a man of Sir Hugh Kose's 
 strong convictions and determination to do what he 
 believed to be right • without respect of persons, could 
 avoid coming in contact with some of the many depart- 
 ments of army administration which abound in this 
 country. We cannot be surprised to find, therefore, 
 that his endeavours to improve the rations of the 
 soldier brought him into collision with the department 
 
SIR HUGH EOSE. 339 
 
 which is entrusted with the supply of food to the army. 
 It must be admitted that in the course of the corre- 
 spondence on this subject charges were brought against 
 the department, which could not afterwards be sustained 
 before the Commission appointed by Government to 
 enquire into the subject. It is always the fate, however, 
 of an ardent reformer, who occupies a high position, 
 to find his sentiments and opinions exaggerated by 
 some of those about him, and certainly many of the 
 charges against the commissariat were very extravagant. 
 That department has always been one of the best 
 arranged and best organised in the Indian service. And 
 if it may be, said that it is liable sometimes to become 
 too much of. a bureaucracy, — to be a service within 
 a service, — the appointment as its chief, of an officer 
 untrammelled by its traditions, and unfettered by its 
 precedents, — a course which has lately been adopted 
 by the Government, — will always tend to remedy that 
 evil. 
 
 It was the opinion of the late Commander-in-Chief 
 that the commissariat department should be placed 
 under his orders, instead of being a department under 
 the Government of India. But we think the Indian 
 Government acted veiy wisely in adhering to a system 
 which, under every exigency and under seemingly 
 insuperable difficulties, has always worked well. The 
 Government of India would be mad if it was not as 
 anxious as the Commander-in-Chief for the lives and 
 health of the European soldiers serving in India ; it 
 would be culpably negligent, if it were not to enforce 
 upon its agents, charged with the supply of food to 
 the soldier, the necessity of seeing that those supplies 
 were of the very best quality. We cannot refrain from 
 
 z2 
 
340 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 expressing our opinion tliat in this branch of com- 
 missariat arrangement the Government of India has 
 nobly done its duty. No reasonable expense is spared 
 to make the supplies for the European troops equal 
 to the best procurable in the market. The ofificers of 
 the commissariat department are equally interested in 
 seeing that the wishes of Government in this respect 
 are carried out. We believe that it happens far more 
 often that the men reject what is good from an over- 
 fastidiousness than that the commissariat officer sympa- 
 thises with the contractor in the tender of an inferior 
 article. A curious incident bearing upon this subject, 
 happened in the cold weather of 1856-7 in Lucknow 
 when that city was visited by General Anson. On the 
 morning of the general's arrival, the regiment quartered 
 there had rejected the bread tendered by the contractor. 
 The same bread was accepted, as usual, by the messes. 
 Dining at one of these the same evening General Anson 
 remarked on the excellence of the bread, and he then 
 learned to his surprise that it was the very bread which 
 the men of the regiment, and a committee of their 
 officers, had that morning rejected. 
 
 It is in our opinion a positive advantage that the 
 commissariat should be under the Civil Power. In the 
 first place, it assimilates in that respect to the English 
 system. Then again, as a disbursing department, it is 
 properly placed under the control of the Government. 
 But, we believe, it is advantageous in the mere executive 
 arrangement of the department, and in the interest of 
 the troops themselves. A Commander-in-Chief could 
 not get more out of the commissariat officers than 
 do the Government now. He could not hang them 
 by reason of the badness of the supplies, — though Sir 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 341 
 
 Harry Smith after Buddiwal, in buffoon-like parody- 
 on the Duke of Wellington, threatened to do so. He 
 could only turn them out of their appointments, and 
 he would find it then diflScult to supply their places 
 with superior men. But so long as the commissariat 
 is under the supreme Government, the Commander-in 
 Chief possesses a power in reality far greater and more 
 effectual. We allude to the power of reporting an 
 officer to the supreme Government. To be turned 
 out by the Commander-in-Chief would not be nearly 
 so great a punishment to an officer as to be turned 
 out by the supreme Government on the report of the 
 CommandePrin-Chief. In the one case the Commander- 
 in-Chief is the accuser and the judge, and the moral 
 effect of a sentence against the accused would, in that 
 case, be comparatively small. In the other, the tribunal 
 is absolutely unbiassed, and an adverse decision would 
 be disgrace or ruin. 
 
 Nevertheless, the course adopted in this respect by 
 Sir Hugh Kose was prompted by a pure and sincere 
 desire to benefit the soldier. He had no private interests 
 to serve. He sought solely that the men who had 
 fought for us might not only be well fed, but that they 
 might be fed as well as the country could feed them. 
 And he succeeded. It is true the Government did not 
 adopt his views, yet he did not the less, though by 
 other means, obtain the result at which he was aiming. 
 The constant stirring of this question called constant 
 attention to the subject. It became the first interest of 
 the commissariat officers that the supplies should be 
 of a character such as none could object to ; and though 
 objections were occasionally made, — for it is the nature 
 of Englishmen to grumble and object, — yet they were 
 
342 SIR HUGH ROSE. 
 
 generally pronounced frivolous. The main result how- 
 ever was, that during the command of Sir Hugh Eose, 
 the rations attained a variety and an excellence such as 
 had never been before equalled ; and this, as we under- 
 stand it, ' was the practical result at which he aimed, 
 when he first agitated the subject. 
 
 Similarly with respect to punkahs and tatties for 
 barracks, to soldiers' cots, and to every other article 
 on which the soldier's comfort depends. No toil was 
 too great, no hours were considered thrown away, which 
 were devoted to improvements on these matters. On 
 some of them, as on the question of soldiers' cots. Sir 
 Hugh showed himself far in advance of those even 
 who were considered specially qualified to report on 
 them. There was this also about Sir Hugh, that he 
 was by no means wedded to his own theories; he was 
 always ready to receive suggestions, no matter whence 
 they came. When satisfied that a man was in earnest, 
 he at once was attracted towards him. Confident in 
 the purity of his intentions, he cared as little for hollow- 
 hearted ridicule as for foolish applause. He worked 
 straight to an end, and allowed no considerations to 
 deter him from carrying out that end to the extent 
 of his power. His regulations for cholera camps, and 
 his rules for the efficient sanitary care of the various 
 cantonments were excellent. He was especially anxious 
 to see that officers attended to their men during 
 times of epidemic sickness. No remissness, in his 
 opinion, was equal to that which kept officers from 
 the hospital at a time when their men were struck 
 down by hundreds, from a mere fear of catching the 
 disorder. He would have disrated his own brother had 
 he found him guilty of a dereliction of duty of this 
 
SIE HUGH ROSE. 343 
 
 nature. Many officers, no doubt, needed no stimulus to 
 induce them to pay proper attention to their men at 
 such seasons. We believe, indeed, that sickness especially 
 calls into active operation the sympathies of brave men. 
 Yet it is equally possible that the knowledge, that the 
 Commander-in-Chief regarded backwardness on such 
 occasions as second only to backwardness on the field of 
 battle, was not without its effect on some. 
 ' We have now glanced hastily at the effect of Sir 
 Hugh Eose's administration on the position of two 
 classes, — the European officers and the European soldiers. 
 With respect to the native soldier little remained to be 
 done, except to regulate the conditions of good service 
 pay, and to invent for him a dress more suited to him, 
 and to the climate of the country of his birth, than that 
 worn by the old Pandy regiments. The first, in concert 
 with the supreme Government, was accomplished ; the 
 second Sir Hugh Kose attempted. We believe he had 
 a dress made up somewhat in the style of the dresses 
 worn by the Turcos and Zouaves, and submitted it 
 to the Government of India. Whether it was accepted 
 we are not informed. It certainly is not worn at the 
 present time. Those, however, who have seen the 
 Turcos on guard at the Tuileries, with their clean neat 
 cloth dresses, well adapted for any work, and who have 
 contrasted them with the ill-fitting, 'slovenly, dirty- 
 looking uniform worn by our Indian sepoys, will not 
 fail to hope that the suggestions of our late Commander- 
 in-Chief in this respect will yet be carried out. 
 
 It may not be out of place to allude here to those 
 other qualities by which the character of Sir Hugh 
 Kose was marked. We have spoken in the earlier part 
 of this article of his own personal bravery, and of his 
 conduct on the field of battle. It may be said that 
 
344 SIR HUGH EOSE. 
 
 on those occasions, it was necessary that he should not 
 spare himself. Yet, when the necessity did not abso- 
 lutely exist, he spared himself as little. To make 
 himself master of the topography of the Punjab frontier, 
 he rode sixty and seventy and eighty miles a day, 
 and thought nothing of it. To acquaint himself with 
 the nature of that frontier was, in his idea, as much 
 an act of duty, as it was to inspect the condition of 
 the troops, and he therefore did it. Small wits have 
 sneeringly alluded to his dandy-like appearance, — and 
 there can be no doubt but that Sir Hugh Kose felt 
 a pride in appearing on every occasion as a gentleman 
 and a soldier, — but those witlings would have felt 
 extremely uncomfortable if they had been challenged 
 to accompany the dandy Commander-in-Chief on one of 
 of his frontier rides. He possessed indeed an energy 
 and a pluck which enabled him to defy fatigue. 
 
 Sir Hugh Kose loved a brave man. Words cannot 
 describe the absolute contempt he felt for a coward. 
 His hospitality was unbounded. He was totally devoid 
 of pretentious vanity. He strove, as he said in his 
 farewell speech in Calcutta "to do his duty." His 
 manners were distinguished by a refined courtesy to all. 
 For real, earnest men, whatever their rank or station, 
 he always testified a special regard. That he had faults 
 is perfectly true. But they were faults, which, weighed 
 against his great qualities as a general, his earnest 
 persistence as a military reformer, his impartiality and 
 heartfelt desire to do what was right, w^ithout care for 
 the consequences, deserve but little consideration. 
 
 Our task is now finished. We have endeavoured 
 to place before our readers an impartial sketch of 
 the Commander-in-Chief who has just quitted us. 
 Such an attempt, at an earlier date, would have been 
 
SIE HUGH ROSE. 345 
 
 impossible. But if, whilst a great public character is in 
 India, his enemies and detractors may say their worst 
 of him, it is surely permissible to those who may 
 entertain for him a genuine admiration, to describe his 
 career, after his final departure for Europe, in language 
 which the incidents of it in their opinion demand. Sir 
 Hugh Eose has indeed played no ordinary part in the 
 world. We have seen him as a young soldier gaining 
 the approval of one, who, at the time a young statesman 
 himself, has twice been Prime Minister of England. 
 We meet him then, gaining on his first essay in arms in 
 a foreign country a sabre of honour and other marks of 
 distinction .from a foreign Sovereign, and the highest 
 approval from his own commander. Had the Order of 
 Valour then been instituted, there can be no doubt but 
 that the Victoria Cross would have been awarded to 
 Colonel Kose for his gallantry in Syria. We see him 
 again, transferred to the diplomatic line, earning 
 the warm approval of the greatest Foreign Minister 
 of the nineteenth century, — the present First Minister 
 of the Crown. Transferred to Constantinople, to give him 
 a wider scope for his abilities, we find him there, with a 
 fearlessness of responsibility which too many would have 
 shrunk from, deciding the policy of his country at a 
 critical period, and engaging her to set bounds to 
 Kussian ambition. A little later, attached in a semi- 
 military, semi-diplomatic capacity to the Marshal com- 
 manding the tVench Army in the Crimea, we hear of 
 him again in the front rank, doing deeds which, but for 
 his high rank, would have secured for him the coveted 
 Cross. There is then an interval of rest, and he comes 
 in the hour of danger to Hindostan. That romantic 
 campaign of Central India, — romantic from its many 
 
 2 A ^ 
 
346 SIR HFGH ROSE. 
 
 incidents, its constant marches and combats, its deeds 
 of glory, — for the double victory of Jhansie, and the 
 " crowning mercy " of Gwalior, showed clearly to all who 
 have studied war, that England yet possessed a general. 
 That determination, — so rare in the present day, — to 
 move forwards; that energy, — so uncommon in all 
 ages, — not * once witnessed in the five years' course of 
 the American War, — to turn a defeat into an utter, a 
 ruinous, rout; that seff-possession under all circum- 
 stances, — that noble self-confidence which hugs to itself 
 responsibility, that directness of mental vision which 
 keeps a man firm to his original object, — all combined 
 to show indeed that in Sir Hugh Kose England pos- 
 sessed a Captain of a very high order of military ability. 
 Then again, in his final career as Commander-in-Chief, 
 we see the same qualities developing themselves in 
 another form. The care for the men who had fought so 
 nobly under his eyes; the efforts to wean the officers 
 from looking to any other than a soldiers career; the 
 strong sense of discipline and regard for their men which 
 he impressed upon the generals and the colonels, the 
 captains and the subalterns of his army, were, through- 
 out that career, most strongly marked. His own careful 
 inspection of the troops, of the frontiers, his personal 
 examination of officers, convinced every one that the 
 Commander-in-Chief was in earnest ; that he only asked 
 from officers that which he had done and was ready to 
 do himself. At the same time his generous hospitality 
 and his courteous demeanour to all were worthy, — the 
 one of an officer occupying so high and distinguished a 
 position ; the other, of the Chief of an Army in which 
 
 * This was written before the result of the final battles before Peters- 
 burs was known. 
 
SIR HUGH ROSE. 347 
 
 chivalry, it has been well stated, "has found her last 
 refuge." To say that he had faults is only to say that 
 he was mortal. But whilst we admit those faults, we 
 would call attention to the higher virtues, the larger 
 qualities by which the smaller failings are almost 
 entirely overshadowed. We live, it is true, in a cavilling 
 age ; in an age when all the acts of a public man are 
 laid open to the public view, when much that is good is 
 lost sight of, w^hilst all that is bad is repeated and exag- 
 gerated ; yet, even in this age, we believe that there are 
 few who study the military character and achievements 
 of Sir Hugh Rose, and who examine his public acts as 
 Commander-in-Chief, but will join in the eloquent eulogy 
 pronounced by Mr. Seton-Karr, and endorsed by the 
 community of Calcutta, on the occasion of the farewell 
 entertainment on the evening before His Excellency 
 left Calcutta for the last time ; and will realise the con- 
 viction, that " in the long experience, tried sagacity, and 
 well known forethought" of our late Commander-in- 
 Chief, " our country possesses a solid and effectual gua- 
 rantee for the adequacy of our national defences, for 
 the inviolability of our coasts, for the protection of the 
 .fair homes of England, — for everything, in short, within 
 the scope of his command and the limit of his observa- 
 tion, that shall concern the peace of the subject or the 
 honour of the Crown." 
 
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