THE SIX SYSTEMS 
 
 OF 
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
 
 OF 
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 THE RIGHT HON. F. MAX MULLER, K.M. 
 
 FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 LONDON AND BOMBAY 
 
 1899
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IT is not without serious misgivings that I venture 
 at this late hour of life to place before my fellow- 
 workers and all who are interested in the growth 
 of philosophical thought throughout the world, some 
 of the notes on the Six Systems of Indian Philo- 
 sophy which have accumulated in my note-books 
 for many years. It was as early as 1852 that I 
 published my first contributions to the study of 
 Indian philosophy in the Zeitsckrift der Deutschen 
 Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. My other occupa- 
 tions, however, and, more particularly, my prepara- 
 tions for a complete edition of the Rig- Veda, and 
 its voluminous commentary, did not allow me at 
 that time to continue these contributions, though 
 my interest in Indian philosophy, as a most im- 
 portant part of the literature of India and of 
 Universal Philosophy, has always remained the 
 same. This interest was kindled afresh when 
 I had to finish for the Sacred Books of the East 
 (vols. I and XV) my translation of the Upanishads. 
 the remote sources of Indian philosophy, and 
 especially of the Vedanta-philosophy, a system in 
 which human speculation seems to me to have 
 reached its very acme. Some of the other systems 
 of Indian philosophy also have from time to time
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 roused the curiosity of scholars and philosophers in 
 Europe and America, and in India itself a revival 
 of philosophic and theosophic studies, though not 
 always well directed, has taken place, which, if it 
 leads to a more active co-operation between Euro- 
 pean and Indian thinkers, may be productive in the 
 rnture of most important results. Under these cir- 
 cumstances a general desire has arisen, and has 
 repeatedly been expressed, for the publication of 
 a more general and comprehensive account of the 
 six systems in which the philosophical thought of 
 India has found its full realisation. 
 
 More recentlv the excellent publications of Pro- 
 fessors Deussen and Garbe in Germany, and of Dr. 
 G. Thibaut in India, have given a new impulse to 
 these important studies, important not only in the 
 eyes of Sanskrit scholars by profession, but of all 
 who wish to become acquainted with all the solutions 
 which the most highly gifted races of mankind have 
 proposed for the eternal riddles of the world. These 
 studies, to quote the words of a high authority, 
 have indeed ceased to be the hobby of a few indi- 
 viduals, and have become a subject of interest to 
 the whole nation '. Professor Deussen's work on 
 the Vedanta-philosophy (1883) an( l nis translation 
 of the Vedanta-Sutras (1887), Professor Garbe's 
 translation of the Samkhya-Sutras (1889) followed 
 by his work on the Su^khya-philosophy (1894), 
 and, last not least,, Dr. G. Thibaut's careful and 
 most useful translation of the Vedanta-Sutras in 
 vols. XXXIV and XXXVIII of the Sacred Books 
 of the East (1890 and 1896), mark a new era in the 
 
 Words of the Viceroy of India, see Times, Nov. 8, 1898.
 
 PREFACE. vii 
 
 study of the two most important philosophical 
 systems of ancient India, and have deservedly 
 placed the names of their authors in the front rank 
 of Sanskrit scholars in Europe. 
 
 My object in publishing the results of my own 
 studies in Indian philosophy was not so much to re- 
 state the mere tenets of each system, so deliberately 
 and so clearly put forward by the reputed authors 
 of the principal philosophies of India, as to give 
 a more comprehensive account of the philosophical 
 activity of the Indian nation from the earliest times, 
 and to show how intimately not only their religion, 
 but their philosophy also, was connected with the 
 national character of the inhabitants of India, 
 a point of view which has of late been so ably 
 maintained by Professor Knight of St. Andrews 
 
 University *. 
 
 */ 
 
 It was only in. a country like India, with all 
 its physical advantages and disadvantages, that 
 such a rich development of philosophical thought 
 as 'we can watch in the six systems of philosophy, 
 could have taken place. In ancient India there 
 could hardly have been a very severe struggle for life. 
 The necessaries of life were abundantly provided by 
 nature, and people with few tastes could live there 
 like the birds in a forest, and soar like birds 
 towards the fresh air of heaven and the eternal 
 sources of light and truth. What was there to do 
 for those who, in order to escape from the heat of the 
 tropical sun, had taken their abode in the shade of 
 groves or in the caves of mountainous valleys except 
 to meditate on the world in which they found them- 
 
 See 'Mind,' vol. v. no. 17.
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 selves placed, they did not know how or why ? 
 There was hardly any political life in ancient India, 
 such as we know it from the Vedas, and in con- 
 sequence neither political strife nor municipal ambi- 
 tion. Neither art nor science existed as yet, to 
 call forth the energies of this highly gifted race. 
 While we, overwhelmed with newspapers, with 
 parliamentary reports, with daily discoveries and 
 discussions, with new novels and time-killing social 
 functions, have hardly any leisure left to dwell on 
 metaphysical and religious problems, these problems 
 formed almost the only subject on which the old 
 inhabitants of India could spend their intellectual 
 energies. Life in a forest was no impossibility in 
 the Avarm climate of India, and in the absence of 
 the most ordinary means of communication, what 
 was there to do for the members of the small 
 settlements dotted over the country, but to give 
 expression to that wonder at the world which is 
 the beginning of all philosophy ? Literary ambition 
 could hardly exist during a period when even tli^ 
 art of writing was not yet known, and when there 
 was no literature except what could be spread and 
 handed down by memory, developed to an extra- 
 ordinary and almost incredible extent under a care- 
 fully elaborated discipline. But at a time when 
 people could not yet think of public applause or 
 private gain, they thought till the more of truth ; 
 and hence the perfectly independent and honest 
 character of most of their philosophy. 
 
 It has long been my wish to bring the results 
 of this national Indian philosophy nearer to us. 
 and, if possible, to rouse our sympathies for their 
 honest efforts to throw some rays of li<rht on
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 the dark problems of existence, whether of the ob- 
 jective world at large, or of the subjective spirits, 
 whose knowledge of the world constitutes, after all, 
 the only proof of the existence of an objective world. 
 The mere tenets of each of the six systems of Indian 
 philosophy are by this time well known, or easily 
 accessible, more accessible, I should say, than even 
 those of the leading philosophers of Greece or of 
 modern Europe. Every one of the opinions at 
 which the originators of the six principal schools of 
 Indian philosophy arrived, has been handed down 
 to us in the form of short aphorisms or Sutras, so 
 as to leave but little room for uncertainty as to 
 the exact position which each of these philosophers 
 occupied on the great battlefield of thought. We 
 know what an enormous amount of labour had 
 to be spent and is still being spent in order to 
 ascertain the exact views of Plato and Aristotle, 
 nay, even of Kant and Hegel, on some of the most 
 important questions of their systems of philosophy. 
 There are even living philosophers whose words 
 often leave us in doubt as to what they mean, 
 whether they are materialists or idealists, monists 
 or dualists, theists or atheists. Hindu philosophers 
 seldom leave us in doubt on such important points, 
 and they certainly never shrink from the conse- 
 quences of their theories. They never equivo- 
 cate or try to hide their opinions where they are 
 likely to be unpopular. Kapila, for instance, the 
 author or hero eponymus of the Samkhya-philosophy, 
 confesses openly that his system is atheistic, an- 
 i.svara, without an active Lord or God, but in spite of 
 that, his system was treated as legitimate by his con- 
 temporaries, because it was reasoned out consistently,
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 and admitted, nay, required some transcendent and 
 invisible power, the so-called Purushas. Without 
 them there would be no evolution of Praknti, 
 original matter, no objective world, nor any reality 
 in the lookers-on themselves, the Purushas or spirits. 
 Mere names have acquired with us such a power 
 that the authors of systems in which there is 
 clearly no room for an active God, nevertheless 
 shrink from calling themselves atheists, nay, try 
 even by any means to foist an active God into 
 their philosophies, in order to escape the damaging 
 charge of atheism. This leads to philosophical am- 
 biguity, if not dishonesty, and has often delayed 
 the recognition of a Godhead, free from all the 
 trammels of human activity and personality, but 
 yet endowed with wisdom, power, and will. From 
 a philosophical point of view, no theory of evolution? 
 whether ancient or modern (in Sanskrit Parmama), 
 can provide any room for a creator or governor of 
 the world, and hence the Sa?/zkhya-philosophy de- 
 clares itself fearlessly as an-i.svara, Lord-less, leaving 
 it to another philosophy, the Yoga, to find in the 
 old Sa?/ikhya system some place for an Isvara or 
 a personal God. What is most curious is that 
 a philosopher, such as *Sa/kara, the most decided 
 monist, and the upholder of Brahman, as a neuter, 
 as the cause of all things, is reported to have been 
 a worshipper of idols and to have seen in them, 
 despite of all their hideousness, symbols of the 
 Deity, useful, as he thought, for the ignorant, even 
 though they have no eyes as yet to see what is 
 hidden behind the idols, and what was the true 
 meaning of them. 
 
 What I admire in Indian philosophers is that
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 they never try to deceive us as to their principles 
 and the consequences of their theories. If they are 
 idealists, even to the verge of nihilism, they say so, 
 and if they hold that the objective world requires 
 a real, though not necessarily a visible or tangible 
 substratum, they are never afraid to speak out. They 
 are bona Jide idealists or materialists, monists or 
 dualists, theists or atheists, because their reverence 
 for truth is stronger than their reverence for anything 
 else. The Vedantist, for instance, is a fearless idealist, 
 and, as a monist, denies the reality of anything but 
 the One Brahman, the Universal Spirit, which is 
 to account for the whole of the phenomenal world. 
 The followers of the Samkhya, on the contrary, 
 though likewise idealists and believers in an unseen 
 Purusha (subject), and an unseen Prakriti (objective 
 substance), leave us in no doubt that they are and 
 mean to be atheists, so far as the existence of an 
 active God, a maker and ruler of the world, is 
 concerned. They do not allow themselves to be 
 driven one inch beyond their self-chosen position. 
 They first examine the instruments of knowledge 
 which man possesses. These are sensuous percep- 
 tion, inference, and verbal authority, and as none of 
 these can supply us with the knowledge of a Supreme 
 Being, as a personal creator and ruler of the world, 
 Kapila never refers to Him in his Sutras. As a 
 careful reason er, however, he does not go so far as 
 to say that he can prove the non-existence of such 
 a Being, but he is satisfied with stating, like 
 Kant, that he cannot establish His existence by the 
 ordinary channels of evidential knowledge. In 
 neither of these statements can I discover, as others 
 have done, any trace of intellectual cowardice, but
 
 Xll PREFACE. 
 
 simply a desire to abide within the strict limits of 
 knowledge, such as is granted to human beings. 
 He does not argue against the possibility even of 
 the gods of the vulgar, such as >Siva, Visrmu, and 
 all the rest, he simply treats them as 6ranyesvaras 
 or Karyesvaras, produced and temporal gods (Sutras 
 III, 57, comm.), and he does not allow, even to the 
 Supreme Isvara, the Lord, the creator and ruler 
 of the world, as postulated by other systems of 
 philosophy or religion, more than a phenomenal 
 existence, though we should always remember that 
 with him there is nothing phenomenal, nothing con- 
 fined in space and time, that does not in the end 
 rest on something real and eternal. 
 
 We must distinguish however. Kapila, though he 
 boldly confessed himself an atheist, was by no means 
 a nihilist or Nastika. He recognised in every man 
 a soul which he called Purusha, literally man, or 
 spirit, or subject, because without such a power, 
 without such endless Purushas, he held that Prakriti, 
 or primordial matter with its infinite potentialities, 
 would for ever have remained dead, motionless, 
 and thoughtless. Only through the presence of this 
 Purusha and through his temporary interest in 
 Prakriti could her movements, her evolution, her 
 changes and variety be accounted for, just as the 
 movements of iron have to be accounted for by the 
 presence of a magnet. All this movement, however, 
 is temporary only, and the highest object of Kapila's 
 philosophy is to make Purusha turn his eyes away 
 from Prakr/ti, so as to stop her acting and to regain 
 for himself his oneness, his aloneness, his indepen- 
 dence, and his perfect bliss. 
 
 Whatever we may think of such views of the
 
 PREFACE. Xlii 
 
 world as are put forward by the Sa?7ikhya, the 
 Vedanta, and other systems of Indian philo- 
 sophy, there is one thing which we cannot help 
 admiring, and that is the straightforwardness and 
 perfect freedom with which they are elaborated. 
 However imperfect the style in which their theories 
 have been clothed may appear from a literary point 
 of view, it seems to me the very perfection for the 
 treatment of philosophy. It never leaves us in any 
 doubt as to the exact opinions held by each philo- 
 sopher. We may miss the development and the 
 dialectic eloquence with which Plato and Hegel 
 propound their thoughts, but we can always appre- 
 ciate the perfect freedom, freshness, and downright- 
 ness with which each searcher after truth follows 
 his track without ever looking right or left. 
 
 It is in the nature of philosophy that every 
 philosopher must be a heretic, in the etymological 
 sense of the word, that is, a free chooser, even if, 
 like the Vedantists, he, for some reason or other, 
 bows before his self-chosen Veda as the seat of 
 a revealed authority. 
 
 It has sometimes been said that Hindu philosophy 
 asserts, but does not prove, that it is positive 
 throughout, but not argumentative. This may be 
 true to a certain extent and particularly with regard 
 to the Vedanta-philosophy, but we must remember 
 that almost the first question which every one of 
 the Hindu systems of philosophy tries to settle 
 is, How do we know ? In thus giving the Noetics 
 the first place, the thinkers of the East seem to me 
 again superior to most of the philosophers of the 
 West. Generally speaking, they admitted three 
 legitimate channels by which knowledge can reach
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 us, perception, inference, and authority, but authority 
 freely chosen or freely rejected. In some systems 
 that authority is revelation, >Sruti, $abda, or the 
 Veda, in others it is the word of any recognised 
 authority, Apta-va&ana. Thus it happens that the 
 S&mkhya philosophers, who profess themselves en- 
 tirely dependent on reasoning (Manana), may never- 
 theless accept some of the utterances of the Veda 
 as they w r ould accept the opinions of eminent men or 
 <Sishfas, though always with the proviso that even 
 the Veda could never make a false opinion true. 
 The same relative authority is granted to Smrtti 
 or tradition, but there with the proviso that it must 
 not be in contradiction with ^Sruti or revelation. 
 
 Such an examination of the authorities of human 
 knowledge (Pramanas) ought, of course, to form the 
 introduction to every system of philosophy, and to 
 have clearly seen this is, as it seems to me, a very 
 high distinction of Indian philosophy. How much 
 useless controversy would have been avoided, par- 
 ticularly among Jewish, Mohammedan, and Christian 
 philosophers, if a proper place had been assigned in 
 limine to the question of what constitutes our legiti- 
 mate or our only possible channels of knowledge, 
 whether perception, inference, revelation, or any- 
 thing else ! 
 
 Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of 
 truth, Hindu philosophers have built up their various 
 systems of philosophy, or their various conceptions 
 of the world, telling us clearly what they take for 
 granted, and then advancing step by step from the 
 foundations to the highest pinnacles of their systems. 
 The Vedantist, after giving us his reasons why reve- 
 lation or the Veda stands higher with him than
 
 PREFACE. XV 
 
 sensuous perception and inference, at least for the 
 discovery of the highest truth (Paramartha), actually 
 puts $ruti in the place of sensuous perception, and 
 allows to perception and inference no more than an 
 authority restricted to the phenomenal (Vyavaharika) 
 world. The conception of the world as deduced 
 from the Veda, and chiefly from the Upanishads, 
 is indeed astounding. It could hardly have been 
 arrived at by a sudden intuition or inspiration, but 
 presupposes a long preparation of metaphysical 
 thought, undisturbed by any foreign influences. All 
 that exists is taken as One, because if the existence 
 of anything besides the absolute One or the Supreme 
 Being were admitted, whatever the Second by the 
 side of the One might be, it would constitute a limit 
 to what was postulated as limitless, and would have 
 made the concept of the One self-contradictory. But 
 then came the question for Indian philosophers to 
 solve, how it was possible, if there was but the One, 
 that there should be multiplicity in the world, and 
 that there should be constant change in our experi- 
 ence. They knew that the one absolute and unde- 
 termined essence, what they called Brahman, could 
 have received no impulse to change, either from 
 itself, for it was perfect, nor from others, for it was 
 Second-less. 
 
 Then what is the philosopher to say to this mani- 
 fold and ever-changing world ? There is one thing 
 only that he can say, namely, that it is not and 
 cannot be real, but must be accepted as the result 
 of nescience or Avidya, not only of individual 
 ignorance, but of ignorance as inseparable from 
 human nature. That ignorance, though unreal in 
 the highest sense, exists, but it can be destroyed
 
 XVI PREFACE. 
 
 by Vidya, knowledge, i. e. the knowledge conveyed 
 by the Vedanta, and as nothing that can at any 
 time be annihilated has a right to be considered 
 as real, it follows that this cosmic ignorance also 
 must be looked upon as not real, but temporary 
 only. It cannot be said to exist, nor can it be said 
 not to exist, just as our own ordinary ignorance, 
 though we suffer from it for a time, can never claim 
 absolute reality and perpetuity. It is impossible to 
 define Avidya, as little as it is possible to define 
 Brahman, with this difference, however, that the 
 former can be annihilated, the latter never. The 
 phenomenal world which, according to the Vedanta, 
 is called forth, like the mirage in a desert, has its 
 reality in Brahman alone. Only it must be remem- 
 bered that what we perceive can never be the 
 absolute Brahman, but a perverted picture only, just 
 as the moon which we see manifold and tremulous in 
 its ever changing reflections on the waving surface 
 of the ocean, is not the real moon, though deriving 
 its phenomenal character from the real moon which 
 remains unaffected in its unapproachable remote- 
 ness. Whatever we may think of such a view of 
 the cosmos, a cosmos which, it should be remem- 
 bered, includes ourselves quite as much as what we 
 call the objective world, it is clear that our name of 
 nihilism would be by no means applicable to it. 
 
 The One Real Being is there, the Brahman, only 
 it is not visible, nor perceptible in its true character 
 by any of the senses ; but without it, nothing that 
 exists in our knowledge could exist, neither our 
 Self nor what in our knowledge is not our Self. 
 
 This is one view of the world, the Vedanta view; 
 another is that of the Sa?khya, which looks upon
 
 PREFACE. XV11 
 
 our perceptions as perceptions of a substantial some- 
 thing, of Prakrtti, the potentiality of all things, 
 and treats the individual perceiver as eternally 
 individual, admitting nothing besides these two 
 powers, which by their union or identification cause 
 what we call the world, and by their discrimination 
 or separation produce final bliss or absoluteness. 
 
 These two, with some other less important views 
 of the world, as put forward by the other systems 
 of Indian philosophy, constitute the real object of 
 what was originally meant by philosophy, that is 
 an explanation of the world. This determining idea 
 has secured even to the guesses of Thales and 
 Heraclitus their permanent place among the historical 
 representatives of the development of philosophical 
 thought by the side of Plato and Aristotle, of Des 
 Cartes and Spinoza. It is in that Walhalla of real 
 philosophers that I claim a place of honour for the 
 representatives of the Vedanta and Samkhya. Of 
 course, it is possible so to define the meaning of 
 philosophy as to exclude men such as even Plato and 
 Spinoza altogether, and to include on the contrary 
 every botanist, entomologist, or bacteriologist. The 
 name itself is of no consequence, but its definition 
 is. And if hitherto no one would have called him- 
 self a philosopher who had not read and studied the 
 works of Plato and Aristotle, of Des Cartes and 
 Spinoza, of Locke, Hume, and Kant in the original, 
 I hope that the time will come when no one will 
 claim that name who is not acquainted at least with 
 the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philo- 
 sophy, the Vedanta and the Samkhya. A President, 
 however powerful, does not call himself His Majesty, 
 why should an observer, a collector and analyser, 
 
 b
 
 XVlil PREFACE. 
 
 however full of information, claim the name of 
 philosopher ? 
 
 As a rule, I believe that no one knows so well the 
 defects of his book as the author himself, and I can 
 truly say in my own case that few people can be so 
 conscious of the defects of this History of Indian 
 Philosophy as I myself. It cannot be called a 
 history, because the chronological framework is, as 
 yet, almost entirely absent. It professes to be no 
 more than a description of some of the salient points 
 of each of the six recognised systems of Indian philo- 
 sophy. It does not claim to be complete ; on the 
 contrary, if I can claim any thanks, it is for having 
 endeavoured to omit whatever seemed, to me less 
 important and not calculated to appeal to European 
 sympathies. If we want our friends to love our 
 friends, we do not give a full account of every one 
 of their good qualities, but we dwell on one or two 
 of the strong points of their character. This is what 
 I have tried to do for my old friends, Badarayana, 
 Kapila, and all the rest. Even thus it could not well 
 be avoided that in giving an account of each of the 
 six systems, there should be much repetition, for they 
 all share so much in common, with but slight modifi- 
 cations ; and the longer I have studied the various 
 systems, the more have I become impressed with the 
 truth of the view taken by Vigwana-Bhikshu and 
 others that there is behind the variety of the six- 
 systems a common fund of what may be called 
 national or popular philosophy, a large Manasa lake of 
 philosophical thought and language, far away in the 
 distant North, and in the distant Past, from which 
 each thinker was allowed to draw for his own pur- 
 poses. Thus, while I should not be surprised, if
 
 PEEFACE. XIX 
 
 Sanskrit scholars were to blame me for having left 
 out too much, students of philosophy may think that 
 there is really too much of the same subject, dis- 
 cussed again and again in the six different schools. 
 I have done my best, little as it may be, and my best 
 reward will be if a new interest shall spring up 
 for a long neglected mine of philosophical thought, 
 and if my own book were soon to be superseded by 
 a more complete and more comprehensive examina- 
 tion of Indian philosophy. 
 
 A friend of mine, a native of India, whom I con- 
 sulted about the various degrees of popularity enjoyed 
 at the present day by different systems of philosophy 
 in his own country, informs me that the only system 
 that can now be said to be living in India is the 
 Vedanta with its branches, the Advaitis, the Madh- 
 vas, the Ramanu^as, and the Vallabhas. The Ve- 
 danta, being mixed with religion, he writes, has 
 become a living faith, and numerous Pandits can 
 be found to-day in all these sects who have learnt 
 at least the principal works by heart and can 
 expound them, such as the Upanishads, the Brahma- 
 Sutras, the great Commentaries of the A&aryas and 
 the Bhagavad-gita. Some of the less important 
 treatises also are studied, such as the Paw&adasl 
 and Yoga-Vasish^Aa. The Purva-Mlma / msa is still 
 studied in Southern India, but not much in other 
 parts, although expensive sacrifices are occasionally 
 performed. The Agnishfoma was performed last 
 year at Benares. 
 
 Of the other systems, the Nyaya only finds 
 devotees, especially in Bengal, but the works studied 
 are generally the later controversial treatises, not 
 the earlier ones. 
 
 b2
 
 XX PREFACE. 
 
 The Vaiseshika is neglected and so is the Yoga, 
 except in its purely practical and most degenerate 
 form. 
 
 It is feared, however, that even this small remnant 
 of philosophical learning will vanish in one or two 
 generations, as the youths of the present day, even 
 if belonging to orthodox Brahmanic families, do not 
 take to these studies, as there is no encouragement. 
 
 But though we may regret that the ancient 
 method of philosophical study is dying out in India, 
 we should welcome all the more a new class of 
 native students who, after studying the history of 
 European philosophy, have devoted themselves to 
 the honorable task of making their own national 
 philosophy better known to the world at large. 
 I hope that my book may prove useful to them by 
 showing them in what direction they may best assist 
 us in our attempts to secure a place to thinkers 
 such as Kapila and Badarayana by the side of 
 the leading philosophers of Greece, Rome, Germany, 
 France, Italy, and England. In some cases the 
 enthusiasm of native students may seem to have 
 carried them too far, and a mixing up of philosophical 
 with religious and theosophic propaganda, inevitable 
 as it is said to be in India, is always dangerous. 
 But such journals as the Pandit, the Brahmavddin, 
 the Liyht of Truth, and lately the Journal of the 
 Buddhist Text Society, have been doing most valu- 
 able service. What we want are texts and transla- 
 tions, and any information that can throw light on 
 the chronology of Indian philosophy. Nor should 
 their labour be restricted to Sanskrit texts. In the 
 South of India there exists a philosophical literature 
 which, though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit
 
 PREFACE. XXi 
 
 influence, contains also original indigenous elements 
 of great beauty and of great importance for historical 
 purposes. Unfortunately few scholars only have 
 taken up, as yet, the study of the Dravidian 
 languages and literature, but young students who 
 complain that there is nothing left to do in Sanskrit 
 literature, would, I believe, find their labours amply 
 rewarded in that field. How much may be done in 
 another direction by students of Tibetan literature 
 in furthering a study of Indian philosophy has lately 
 been proved by the publications of Sarat Chandra 
 Das, C.I.E., and Satis Chandra Achaiya Vidya- 
 bhushana, M.A., and their friends. 
 
 In conclusion I have to thank Mr. A. E. Gough, 
 the translator of the Vaiseshika-Sutras, and the 
 author of the 'Philosophy of the Upanishads,' for his 
 extreme kindness in reading a revise of my proof- 
 sheets. A man of seventy-six has neither the eyes 
 nor the memory which he had at twenty-six, and he 
 may be allowed to appeal to younger men for such 
 help as he himself in his younger days has often and 
 gladly lent to his Gurus and fellow-labourers. 
 
 F. M. M. 
 
 OXFORD, 
 May i, 1899.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 INTEODUCTOEY CHAPTEE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Philosophy and Philosophers ..... i 
 
 Sruti and Smnti ........ 3 
 
 Upanishad-period, from about 700 B. c. . . 6 
 
 Period antecedent to the Upanishads .... 6 
 
 Intellectual Life in ancient India ..... 9 
 
 Kshatriyas and Brahmawas . . . . . . 1 1 
 
 The Evidence of the Upanishads, kanaka, A^atasatru . 14 
 
 A^atasatru . . . . . . . . . 18 
 
 Buddhist Period . . . . . . . . 19 
 
 Prasena^it and Bimbisara . . . . . . 21 
 
 Brahma-^ala-sutta . . . . . . . 21 
 
 Mahabharata ........ 28 
 
 Buddha ......... 30 
 
 Greek Accounts . . . . . . . . 34 
 
 Buddhist Pilgrims, Hiouen-thsang .... 36 
 
 King Harsha ... ... 39 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 THE VEDAS. 
 
 TheVedas 43 
 
 The Philosophical Basis of the Vedic Gods . 46 
 
 Three Classes of Vedic Gods .... 48 
 
 Other Classifications of Gods ... 49 
 
 The Visve or All-gods . . . . . . 5 1
 
 XXIV CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Tendencies towards Unity among the Gods . . . 52 
 
 Henotheism ......... 53 
 
 Monotheism and Monism . . . . . . 53 
 
 Pra^apati . 55 
 
 Visvakarman ........ 57 
 
 Tvashfri . . ....... 57 
 
 Search for a Supreme Deity ...... 59 
 
 Hymn to the Unknown God ..... 60 
 
 Brahman, Atman, Tad Ekam . . . . . 63 
 
 Nasadiya Hymn . . . . . . . . 64 
 
 Brahman, its various Meanings ..... 68 
 
 Br?h and Brahman, Word . . . . . . 72 
 
 East and West 77 
 
 Mind and Speech ........ 88 
 
 Atman .......... 93 
 
 Pra^apati, Brahman, Atman . . . . . 95 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Growth of Philosophical Ideas . . . . . 97 
 
 Prasthana Bheda . . . . . . . . 98 
 
 Literary References in the Upanishads . . . . 1 1 1 
 
 The Six Systems of Philosophy . . . . 1 1 1 
 
 Bnhaspati-Sutras . . . . . . . .113 
 
 Books of Reference . . . . . . .114 
 
 Dates of the Philosophical Sutras . . . . .116 
 
 Sawkhya-Sutras . . . . . . . .118 
 
 Vedanta-Sutras . . . . . . . .119 
 
 Mnemonic Literature . . . . . . .121 
 
 The Brihaspati- Philosophy . . . . . .123 
 
 Common Philosophical Ideas . . . . 137 
 
 1. Metempsychosis Sawisara . . . . .137 
 
 2. Immortality of the Soul . . . . . .138 
 
 3. Pessimism . . . . . . . .139 
 
 4. Karman . . . . . . . . .143 
 
 5. Infallibility of the Veda . . . . . .146 
 
 6. Three Guwas . . . . . . . .146
 
 CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAA/SA. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa . . . . .148 
 
 Badarayawa . . . . . . . . X 53 
 
 Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta . . . 159 
 
 Translation of the Upanishads . . . . .179 
 
 Character of the Upanishads . . . . .182 
 
 Vedanta-Sutras . . . . . . . .184 
 
 Appeals to the Veda . . . . . . .186 
 
 Pramawas . . . . . . . . .187 
 
 Pramawas according to the Samkhya . . . .188 
 
 Pratyaksha 188 
 
 Anumana . . . . . . . . .189 
 
 Sabda . . . . . . . . . .190 
 
 Authority of the Vedas . . . . . . .195 
 
 The Meaning of Veda 195 
 
 Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda . . . 198 
 Vidya and Avidya . . . . . . 199 
 
 Subject and Object . . . . . . 199 
 
 The Phenomenal Keality of the World . . . . 202 
 
 Creation or Causation ....... 203 
 
 Cause and Effect ........ 204 
 
 Dreaming and Waking ....... 209 
 
 The Higher and the Lower Knowledge . . . . 215 
 
 Is Virtue Essential to Moksha ? . . . .217 
 
 The Two Brahmans . . . . . . .220 
 
 Philosophy and Religion . . . . . .224 
 
 Karman ..... . . . . 224 
 
 Brahman is Everything . . . . . .226 
 
 The Sthula- and Sukshma-sarira . . . . .227 
 
 The Four States 229 
 
 Eschatology . . . . . . . . .229 
 
 Freedom in this Life . . . . . . .236 
 
 Different Ways of Studying Philosophy . . . 239 
 Ramanuf/a ......... 243 
 
 Metaphors ......... 255
 
 XXVI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PURVA-M!MAM8A. 
 
 PAGH 
 
 Purva-Mimawsa 258 
 
 Contents of the Purva-Mimamsa 263 
 
 Pramawas of (?aimini . . . . . . .265 
 
 Sutra-style . . . . . . . . .266 
 
 Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin ? .... 270 
 
 Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mimamsa . . . . 275 
 
 Is the Purva-Mimamsa a system of Philosophy? . . 279 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SAMKHYA-PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Samkhya-Philosophy . . . . . . .281 
 
 Later Vedanta mixed with Samkhya . . . . 281 
 
 Relative Age of Philosophies and Sutras . . .286 
 Age of the Kapila-Sutras ...... 288 
 
 Samkhya-karikas . . . . . . . .290 
 
 Date of Gaudapada . . . . . . .292 
 
 Tattva-samasa . . . . . . . .294 
 
 Anteriority of Vedanta or Samkhya .... ,-500 
 
 Atheism and Orthodoxy ...... 303 
 
 Authority of the Veda ....... 305 
 
 Samkhya hostile to Priesthood ..... 306 
 
 Parallel development of Philosophical Systems . . 307 
 Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads .... 309 
 
 Lalita-vistara . . . . . . . .310 
 
 Asvaghosha's Buddha-ftarita . . . . . .311 
 
 Buddhist Suttas . . . . . . . .312 
 
 Asvalayana's Gr/'hya-Sutras . . . . . 313 
 
 Did Buddha borrow from Kapila? . . . . 314 
 
 Bana's Harsha/oirita . . . . . . .316 
 
 The Tattva-samasa . . . . . . .318 
 
 List of Twenty-five Tattvas . . . . . .320 
 
 The Avyakta . . . . . . . .321 
 
 Buddhi. . . . . . . . . .322 
 
 Ahamkara ......... 326 
 
 Five Tanmatras .... . . 328
 
 CONTENTS. XXV11 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sixteen Vikaras . . . . . . . -33 
 
 Five Buddhindriyas . . . . . . -33 
 
 Five Karmendriyas . . . . . . .330 
 
 Manas .......... 330 
 
 Five Mahabhutas . . . . . . 331 
 
 Purusha . . . . . . . . .331 
 
 Is Purusha an Agent ? . . . . . . . 334 
 
 Three Guwas ......... 335 
 
 Is Purusha one or many ? . . . . . -335 
 
 Vedanta Sayings . . . . . . . -33^ 
 
 Early Eelation between Vedanta and Sawkhya . . 338 
 Traiguwya . . -343 
 
 San&ara and Pratisaw&ara . . . . . -345 
 
 Adhyatma, Adhibhuta, Adhidaivata . . . . 346 
 
 Abhibuddhis (5) ........ 348 
 
 Karmayonis (5) ........ 348 
 
 Vayus (5) -35 
 
 Karmatmans (5) ........ 350 
 
 Avidya, Nescience (5) . . . . . . 35 1 
 
 Asakti, Weakness (28) ....... 351 
 
 Atushti and Tushft . . . . . . -352 
 
 Asiddhis and Siddhis ....... 352 
 
 Tushfts and Siddhis 353 
 
 Mulikarthas 354 
 
 ShasbJi-tantra . . . . . . . -355 
 
 Anugraha-sarga . . . . . . . .356 
 
 Bhuta-sarga . . . . . . . . 356 
 
 Bandha, Bondage ........ 357 
 
 Dakshiwa-bondage, Gifts to Priests . . . . 35? 
 
 Moksha 358 
 
 Pramawas ......... 358 
 
 Du/ikha 359 
 
 The True Meaning of the Sawkhya . . . .360 
 
 Nature of Pain . . . . . . . .361 
 
 Vedanta and Samkhya . . . . . . .366 
 
 Vedanta, Avidya, and Aviveka . . . . .367 
 
 Sawkhya, Aviveka . . . . . . .369 
 
 Atman and Purusha . . . . . . -374 
 
 Origin of Avidya ........ 37^ 
 
 The Sastra . 379
 
 XXViu CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Development of Prakn'ti, Cosmic ..... 380 
 
 Retrospect . . . . . . . . .381 
 
 Is Sawkhya Idealism ? . . . . . . . 384 
 
 Purusha and Prakriti 386 
 
 State of Purusha, when Free ..... 387 
 
 Meaning of Pain 389 
 
 Purusha ......... 390 
 
 Prakriti an Automaton ? . . . . . .391 
 
 Prakr/ti's Unselfishness . . . . . .392 
 
 Gross and Subtle Body ....... 393 
 
 The Atheism of Kapila 395 
 
 Immorality of the Samkhya . . . . . -398 
 Sawkhya Parables . . . . . . . -399 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Yoga and Sawkhya . . . . . . .402 
 
 Meanings of the word Yoga ...... 404 
 
 Yoga, not Union, but Disunion 405 
 
 Yoga as Viveka ........ 407 
 
 Pata%ali, Vyasa . . . . . . . .410 
 
 Second Century B.C. . . . . . .411 
 
 Chronology of Thought . . . . . .412 
 
 The Yoga- Philosophy 415 
 
 Misconception of the Objects of Yoga . . . .416 
 
 Devotion to Jsvara, Misconceptions . . . .418 
 
 What is Isvara ?. . . . . . . .421 
 
 Kapila's Real Argument . . . . . .429 
 
 The Theory of Karman . . . . . . .432 
 
 The Four Books of Yoga-Sutras 438 
 
 True Object of Yoga . . . . . . .440 
 
 Jfitta .......... 440 
 
 Functions of the Mind . . . . . . .442 
 
 Exercises . . . . . . . . .443 
 
 Dispassion, Vairagya . . . . . . .444 
 
 Meditation With or Without an Object. . . . 447 
 
 U'vara once more . . . . . . . .450 
 
 Other Means of obtaining Samadhi . . . .4^1 
 
 Samadhi Apnu//Vitii . . . . . .454
 
 CONTENTS. XXIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Kaivalya, Freedom . . . . . . -455 
 
 Yogangas, Helps to Yoga . . . . . .456 
 
 Vibhutis, Powers . . . . . . . .458 
 
 Sawyama and Siddhis . . . . . . .459 
 
 Miracles ......... 462 
 
 True Yoga ......... 466 
 
 The Three Gunas 468 
 
 Samskaras and Vasanas . . . . . . .469 
 
 Kaivalya . . . . . . . . .471 
 
 Is Yoga Nihilism ? . . . . . . .471 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. 
 
 Eelation between Nyaya and Vaiseshika . . . 474 
 Dignaga ......... 476 
 
 Bibliography . . . . . . . .481 
 
 Nyaya-Philosophy ....... 484 
 
 Summum Bonum . . . . . . .485 
 
 Means of Salvation ....... 489 
 
 The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas . . . . .489 
 
 Means of Knowledge . . . . . . .490 
 
 Objects of Knowledge . . . . . . .491 
 
 Padartha, Object . . . . . . . .492 
 
 Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika . . . . . .493 
 
 Madhava's Account of Nyaya ..... 493 
 
 I. Pramawa ......... 496 
 
 Perception or Pratyaksha . . . . . .496 
 
 Inference or Anumana . . . . . . .496 
 
 Comparison or Anumana . . . . . .500 
 
 Word or abda 500 
 
 II. Prameya . . . . . . . .501 
 
 III. Samsaya ........ 504 
 
 IV. Prayof/ana. V. Dn'shfanta. VI. Siddhanta . . 504 
 
 VII. The Avayavas, or Members of a Syllogism . . 504 
 Indian and Greek Logic ...... 505 
 
 VIII. Tarka 508 
 
 IX. Nimaya ........ 509 
 
 X-XVI. Vada, 6ralpa, Vitawc?a, Hetvabhasa, Gati, 
 
 ,, Nigrahasthana ...... 509
 
 XXX CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 Judgments on Indian Logic . . . . . .510 
 
 The Later Books of the Nyaya 513 
 
 Time Present, Past, Future 515 
 
 Upamana, Comparison . . . . . .516 
 
 abda, the Word 516 
 
 The Eight Pramawas 518 
 
 Thoughts on Language . ...... 520 
 
 Sphofa 527 
 
 Words express the Summum Genus .... 530 
 Words expressive of Genera or Individuals? . . 532 
 All Words mean TO ov . . . . . . . 532 
 
 Vedanta on Sphofa 536 
 
 Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofo 539 
 
 Nyaya on Sphoa ... ..... 542 
 
 Vaiseshika on Sphofa 543 
 
 Prameyas, Objects of Knowledge . . . . .544 
 Indriyas. Senses . . . . . . . -545 
 
 arira, Body 545 
 
 Manas, Mind. . . . . . . . . 546 
 
 Atman .......... 549 
 
 Memory ......... 549 
 
 Knowledge not Eternal . . . . . . -552 
 
 More Prameyas ........ 552 
 
 Life after Death 553 
 
 Existence of Deity . . . . . . -553 
 
 Cause and Effect ........ 555 
 
 Phala, Rewards . . . . . . . -556 
 
 Emancipation . . . . . . . -557 
 
 Knowledge of Ideas, not of Things .... 559 
 
 Syllogism ......... 560 
 
 Pramawas in different Philosophical Schools . . . 562 
 Anumana for Others . . . . . . -565 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 VAI.VESIIIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Date of Sutras ........ 574 
 
 Dates from Tibetan Sources . . . . . -576 
 
 Kawada 577
 
 CONTENTS. XXxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Substances ......... 578 
 
 Qualities 578 
 
 Actions ......... 579 
 
 Cause .......... 580 
 
 Qualities Examined . . . . . . .581 
 
 Time 582 
 
 Space ......... . 582 
 
 Manas .......... 583 
 
 Amis or Atoms ........ 584 
 
 Samanya 586 
 
 "Vlsesha 586 
 
 Sama>vaya 586 
 
 Abhava ......... 587 
 
 The Six Systems ........ 589
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
 
 Philosophy and Philosophers. 
 
 WHILE in most countries a history of philosophy 
 is inseparable from a history of philosophers, in 
 India we have indeed ample materials for watching 
 the origin and growth of philosophical ideas, but 
 hardly any for studying the lives or characters 
 of those who founded or supported the philosophical 
 systems of that country. Their work has remained 
 and continues to live to the present day, but of the 
 philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to 
 us beyond their names. Not even their dates can 
 be ascertained with any amount of certainty. In 
 Greece, from the earliest times, the simplest views 
 of the world and of the destinies of man, nay even 
 popular sayings, maxims of morality and worldly 
 wisdom, and wise saws of every kind, even though 
 they contained nothing very original or personal, 
 were generally quoted as the utterances of certain 
 persons or at least ascribed to certain names, such 
 as the Seven Sages, so as to have something like 
 a historical background. We have some idea of who 
 
 B
 
 2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Thales was, and who was Plato, where and when 
 they lived, and what they did ; but of Kapila, 
 the supposed founder of the S&mkhya philosophy, 
 of Pata/l^ali, the founder of the Yoga, of Gotama 
 and Ka?iada, of Badarayawa and 6raimini, we 
 know next to nothing, and what we know hardly 
 ever rests on contemporary and trustworthy evi- 
 dence. Whether any of these Indian philosophers 
 lived at the same time and in the same place, 
 whether they were friends or enemies, whether 
 some were the pupils and others the teachers, 
 all this is unknown to us, nor do I see any 
 chance of our ever knowing more about them 
 than we do at present. We read that Thales 
 warned King Croesus, we are told that Empedocles 
 finished his days by throwing himself into the flames 
 of Aetna, we know that Socrates drank poison, and 
 that Anaxagoras was the friend of Pericles, but 
 there is nothing to connect the names of the ancient 
 Indian philosophers with any historical events, with 
 any political characters, or with dates before the 
 time of Buddha. 
 
 It is quite true that every literary composition, 
 whether in prose or in poetry, presupposes an 
 individual author, that no poem makes itself, and 
 no philosophical system is elaborated by the people 
 at large. But on the other hand, no poet makes 
 himself, no philosopher owes everything to himself. 
 He grows from a soil that is ready made for him, 
 and he breathes an intellectual atmosphere which is 
 not of his own making. The Hindus seem to have 
 felt this indebtedness of the individuals to those 
 before and around them far more strongly than 
 the Greeks, who, if they cannot find a human
 
 SRUTAM AND SMfl/TAM. 3 
 
 author, have recourse even to mythological arid 
 divine personages in order to have a pedestal, 
 a name, and an authority for every great thought 
 and every great invention of antiquity. The 
 Hindus are satisfied with giving us the thoughts, 
 and leave us to find out their antecedents as best 
 we can. 
 
 $rutam and Smntam. 
 
 The Hindus have divided the whole of their 
 ancient literature into two parts, which really mean 
 two periods, $rutam, what was heard, and was 
 not the work of men or any personal being, human 
 or divine, and Smr^tam, what was remembered, 
 and has always been treated as the work of an 
 individual, whether man or god. $rutam or 
 /Sruti came afterwards to mean what has been 
 revealed, exactly as we understand that word, 
 while Srmntam or Smriti comprised all that was 
 recognized as possessing human authority only, so 
 that if there ever was a conflict between the two, 
 Snmti or tradition might at once be overruled by 
 what was called $ruti or revelation. 
 
 It is curious, however, to observe how the 
 revealed literature of the Hindus, such as the 
 hymns of the Rig-veda, have in later times been 
 ascribed to certain families, nay even to individual 
 poets, though many of the names of these poets are 
 clearly fictitious. Nor are even these fictitious 
 poets supposed to have created or composed their 
 poems, but only to have seen them as they were 
 revealed to them by a higher power, commonly 
 called Brahman, or the Word. What we call philo- 
 sophy in its systematic form, is, from an Indian 
 
 B 2
 
 4 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 point of view, not revealed, /Srutam, but belongs 
 to Smriti or tradition. We possess it in carefully 
 composed and systematically elaborated manuals, in 
 short aphorisms or Sutras or in metrical Karikas, 
 ascribed to authors of whom we hardly know 
 anything, and followed by large commentaries or 
 independent treatises which are supposed to contain 
 the outcome of a continuous tradition going back 
 to very ancient times, to the Sutra, nay even to the 
 Brahmana period, though in their present form they 
 are confessedly the work of medieval or modern 
 writers. In the Sutras each system of philosophy 
 is complete, and elaborated in its minutest details. 
 There is no topic within the sphere of philosophy 
 which does not find a clear or straightforward treat- 
 ment in these short Sutras. The Sutra style, im- 
 perfect as it is from a literary point of view, would 
 be invaluable to us in other systems of philosophy, 
 such as Hegel's or Plato's. We should always know 
 where we are, and we should never hear of a philoso- 
 pher who declared on his deathbed that no one had 
 understood him, nor of antagonistic schools, diverg- 
 ing from and appealing to the same teacher. One 
 thing must be quite clear to every attentive reader 
 of these Sutras, namely, that they represent the last 
 result of a long continued study of philosophy, 
 carried on for centuries in the forests and hermitages 
 of India. The ideas which are shared by all the 
 systems of Indian philosophy, the large number of 
 technical terms possessed by them in common or 
 peculiar to each system, can leave no doubt on 
 this subject. Nor can we doubt that for a long 
 time the philosophical thoughts of India were 
 embodied in what I call a Mnemonic Literature.
 
 MNEMONIC LITERATURE. 5 
 
 Writing for literary purposes was unknown in India 
 before the rise of Buddhism, and even at the Bud- 
 dhist Councils when their Sacred Canon, the Tripkaka, 
 was settled, we hear nothing as yet of paper, ink, and 
 reeds, but only of oral and even musical repetition. 
 The very name of a Council was Samgiti or Maha- 
 sawgiti, i. e. singing together, and the different parts 
 of the Canon were not consigned to writing, but 
 rehearsed by certain individuals. Whenever there 
 arose a dispute as to the true teaching of Buddha, 
 it was not settled by an appeal to any MS., but an 
 invitation was addressed to a member of the Samgha 
 who knew the text by heart. It is actually men- 
 tioned that the Southern Canon was not reduced to 
 writing till the first century B.C., under King Va^a- 
 gamani, about 80 B. c. Nothing can be more explicit 
 than the statement in the chronicles of Ceylon on 
 that point : ' Before this time the wise monks had 
 handed down the texts of the Tipkaka orally; and 
 also the A^Aakatha (commentary). At this time 
 the monks, perceiving the decay of beings (not 
 MSS.), assembled, and in order that the Law might 
 endure for a long time, they caused it to be written 
 down in books.' Such a state of things is difficult 
 for us to imagine, still if we wish to form a true 
 idea of the intellectual state of India in pre-Bud- 
 dhistic times, we must accustom ourselves to the 
 idea that all that could be called literature then was 
 mnemonic only, carefully guarded by a peculiar and 
 very strict educational discipline, but of course 
 exposed to all the inevitable chances of oral tradi- 
 tion. That Mnemonic Period existed for philosophy 
 as well as for everything else, and if we have to 
 begin our study of Indian philosophy with the
 
 6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sutras, these Sutras themselves must be considered 
 as the last outcome of a long continued philosophical 
 activity carried on by memory only. 
 
 TJpanishad-period, from about 700 B.C. 
 
 But while the Sutras give us abstracts of the 
 various systems of philosophy, ready made, there 
 must have been, nay there was, one period, previous 
 to the Sutras, during which we can watch something 
 like growth, like life and strife, in Indian philosophy, 
 and that is the last stage of the Vedic period, as 
 represented to us in the Upanishads. 
 
 For gaining an insight into the early growth of 
 Indian philosophic thought, this period is in fact the 
 most valuable ; though of systematised philosophy, 
 in our sense of the word, it contains, as yet, little or 
 nothing. As we can feel that there is electricity in 
 the air, and that there will be a storm, we feel, on 
 reading the Upanishads, that there is philosophy in 
 the Indian mind, and that there will be thunder 
 and lightning to follow soon. Nay, I should even go 
 a step further. In order to be able to account for what 
 seem to us mere sparks of thought, mere guesses at 
 truth, we are driven to admit a long familiarity 
 with philosophic problems before the time that gave 
 birth to the Upanishads which we possess. 
 
 Period antecedent to the Upanishads. 
 
 The Upanishads contain too many technical 
 terms, such as Brahman, Atman, Dharma, Yrata, 
 Yoga, Mimjimsa, and many more, to allow us to sup- 
 pose that they were the products of one day or of one 
 generation. Even if the later systems of philosophy 
 did not so often appeal themselves to the Upanishads
 
 UPANISHAD-PERIOD. J 
 
 as their authorities, we could easily see for ourselves 
 that, though flowing in very different directions, 
 like the Ganges and the Indus, these systems of 
 philosophy can all be traced back to the same distant 
 heights from which they took their rise. And as 
 India was fertilised, not only by the Ganges and 
 Indus, but by ever so many rivers and rivulets, all 
 pointing to the Snowy Mountains in the North, we 
 can see the Indian mind also being nourished through 
 ever so many channels, all starting from a vast 
 accumulation of religious and philosophic thought of 
 which we seem to see the last remnants only in our 
 Upanishads, while the original springs are lost to us 
 for ever. 
 
 If some of the seeds and germs of philosophy could 
 be discovered, as has been hastily thought, among the 
 savage tribes of to-day, nothing would be more wel- 
 come to the historian of philosophy, but until these 
 tribes have been classified according to language, we 
 must leave these dangerous enterprises to others. For 
 the present we must be satisfied with the germs of 
 thought such as we find them in the Upanishads, 
 and in the archives of language which reach back far 
 beyond the Upanishads and even beyond the folklore 
 of Khonds, Bhils, and Koles. 
 
 It is true that during that distant period which 
 we can watch in the Upanishads, philosophy was 
 not yet separated from religion ; but the earliest 
 religion, at least among the speakers of Aryan 
 languages, seems always to have been not only the 
 first religion, but the first philosophy also, of the 
 races that had taken possession of India, as well as 
 of the best soil of Asia and Europe. If it is the object 
 of philosophy to discover the causes of things, rerum
 
 8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cognoscere causas, what was the creation of the 
 earliest mythological gods but an attempt to ex- 
 plain the causes of light, of fire, of dawn, of day and 
 night, of rain and thunder, by postulating agents for 
 every one of them, and calling them Dyaus or 
 Agni, light or fire, Ushas, dawn, the Asvins, day 
 and night, Indra, the sky-god, and calling all of 
 them Devas, the Bright, or dii, the gods ? Here are 
 the first feeders of the idea of the Godhead, what- 
 ever tributaries it may have received afterwards. 
 Of course, that distant period to which we have to 
 assign this earliest growth of language, thought, 
 religion, law, morals, and philosophy, has left us no 
 literary monuments. Here and there we can dis- 
 cover faint traces in language, indicating the foot- 
 prints left by the strides of former giants. But in 
 India, where we have so little to guide us in our 
 historical researches, it is of great importance to 
 remember that there was such a distant period of 
 nascent thought ; and that, if at a later time we 
 meet with the same ideas and words turning up in 
 different systems, whether of religion or philosophy, 
 we should be careful not to conclude at once that 
 they must have been borrowed by one system from 
 the other, forgetting that there was an ancient re- 
 servoir of thought from which all could have drawn 
 and drunk. 
 
 Considering how small our historical information 
 is as to the intellectual and social life of India at 
 different times of its history, it is essential that we 
 should carefully gather whatever there is, before^we 
 attempt to study Indian philosophy in its differen- 
 tiated and systematised systems. Much of our in- 
 formation may represent a chaos only, but we w r ant
 
 INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT INDIA. 9 
 
 such a chaos in order to understand the kosmos 
 that followed. 
 
 Intellectual Life in ancient India. 
 
 In certain chapters of the Brahmanas and in 
 the Upanishads we see a picture of the social and 
 intellectual life of India at that early time, which 
 seems fully to justify the saying that India has 
 always been a nation of philosophers. The picture 
 which these sacred books give us of the seething 
 thoughts of that country may at first sight seem 
 fanciful and almost incredible ; but because the men 
 of ancient India, as they are there represented to 
 us, if by tradition only, are different from Greeks 
 and Romans and from ourselves, it does not follow 
 that we have not before us a faithful account of 
 what really existed at one time in the land of the 
 Five or Seven Rivers. Why should these accounts 
 have been invented, unless they contained a certain 
 verisimilitude in the eyes of the people ? It is 
 quite clear that they were not composed, as some 
 people seem to imagine, in order to impose after 
 two thousands of years on us, the scholars of 
 Europe, or on anybody else. The idea that the 
 ancient nations of the world wished to impose on 
 us, that they wished to appear more ancient than 
 they were, more heroic, more marvellous, more 
 enlightened, is an absurd fancy. They did not 
 even think of us, and had no word as yet for 
 posterity. Such thoughts belong to much later 
 times, and even then we wonder rather how a local, 
 not to say, provincial poet like Horace should have 
 thought so much of ages to come. We must not 
 allow such ideas of fraud and forgery to spoil our
 
 10 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 faith and our interest in ancient history. The 
 ancients thought much more of themselves than 
 of the nations of the distant future. If, however, 
 what the ancients tell us about their own times, 
 or about the past which could never have extended 
 very far back, seems incredible to us, we should 
 always try first of all to understand it as possible, 
 before we reject it as impossible and as an inten- 
 tional fraud. That in very early times kings and 
 nobles and sages in India should have been absorbed 
 in philosophical questions seems no doubt strange 
 to us, because the energies of the people of Europe, 
 as far back as we know anything about them, have 
 always been divided between practical and intel- 
 lectual pursuits, the former, in ancient times, con- 
 siderably preponderating over the latter. But why 
 should not a different kind of life have been possible 
 in a country which, without much effort on the part 
 of its cultivators, yielded in abundance all that was 
 necessary for the support of life, which was pro- 
 tected on three sides by the silver streaks of the 
 ocean, and on the fourth by almost impassable 
 mountain barriers, a country which for thousands 
 of years was free from w r ar except the war of ex- 
 termination directed against barbarous tribes, the 
 so-called sons of the soil ? After all, to thoughtful 
 people, finding themselves placed on this planet, they 
 did not know how or why, it was not so very far- 
 fetched a problem, particularly while there was as yet 
 no struggle for life, to ask who they were, whence 
 they came, and what they were intended for here 
 on earth. Thus we read at the beginning of the 
 iS'veta.s'vatara-upanishad : ' Whence are we born ? 
 Whereby do we live, and whither do we go ? O ye
 
 KSHATRIYAS AND BRAHMANS. II 
 
 who know Brahman, (tell us) at whose command we 
 abide here, whether in pain or in pleasure ? Should 
 time or nature, or necessity, or chance, or the ele- 
 ments be considered as the cause, or He who is called 
 Purusha, the man, that is, the Supreme Spirit l ? ' 
 
 Kshatriyas and Brahmans. 
 
 It might be thought that all this was due to the 
 elevating influence of an intellectual aristocracy, 
 such as we find from very early times to the pre- 
 sent day in India, the Brahmans. But this is by 
 no means the case. The so-called Kshatriyas or 
 military nobility take nearly as active a part in the 
 intellectual life of the country as the Brahmans 
 themselves. The fact is that we have to deal in 
 the earlier period of ancient India with two rather 
 than with four castes and their numerous sub- 
 divisions. 
 
 This term caste has proved most mischievous and . 
 misleading, and the less we avail ourselves of it 
 the better we shall be able to understand the true ! 
 state of society in the ancient times of India. 
 Caste is, of course, a Portuguese word, and was 
 applied from about the middle of the sixteenth 
 century by rough Portuguese sailors to certain 
 divisions of Indian society which had struck their 
 fancy. It had before been used in the sense of 
 breed or stock, originally in the sense of a pure or 
 unmixed breed. In 1613 Purchas speaks of the 
 thirty and odd several castes of the Banians (Vani</). 
 To ask what caste means in India would be like 
 asking what caste means in England, or what fetish 
 
 1 See also Anugita, chap. XX ; S. B. E., VIII, p. 311.
 
 12 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (feiti9o) means in Portugal. What we really want 
 to know is what was implied by such Indian words as 
 Varaa (colour), 6rati (kith), to say nothing of $&pind- 
 atya or Samanodakatva, Kula (family), Gotra (race), 
 Pravara (lineage) ; otherwise we shall have once more 
 the same confusion about the social organisation of 
 ancient India as about African fetishism or North 
 American totemism ! Each foreign word should 
 always be kept to its own native meaning, or, if 
 generalised for scientific purposes, it should be most 
 carefully defined afresh. Otherwise every social 
 distinction will be called caste, every stick a totem, 
 every idol a fetish. 
 
 We have in India the Aryan settlers on one side, 
 and the native inhabitants on the other. The 
 former are named Aryas or Aryas, that is, culti- 
 vators of the soil which they had conquered ; the 
 latter, if submissive to their conquerors, are the 
 >Sudras ] or Dasas, slaves, while the races of indi- 
 genous origin who remained hostile to the end, were 
 classed as altogether outside the pale of political 
 society. The Aryas in India were naturally 
 differentiated like other people into an intellectual 
 or priestly aristocracy, the Brahmans, and a fighting 
 or ruling aristocracy, the Kshatriyas, while the 
 great bulk remained simply Vis or VaLvyas, that is, 
 householders and cultivators of the soil, and after- 
 wards merchants and mechanics also. To the very 
 last the three great divisions, Brahmans, Kshatriyas, 
 
 1 Thus we read as early as the Mahabhanita ' The three 
 qualities abide in the three castes thus : darkness in the S'udra. 
 passion in the Kshatriya, and the highest, goodness, in the 
 Brahmami.' (Anugita, S. B. E.,VIII, p. 329.)
 
 CASTES. 13 
 
 and Vaisyas, shared certain privileges and duties 
 in common. Originally they were all of them called 
 twice-born, and not only allowed, but obliged to be 
 educated in Vedic knowledge and to pass through the 
 three or four Asramas or stages of life. Thus we read 
 in the Mahabharata : ' The order of Vanaprasthas, 
 of sages who dwell in forests and live 011 fruits, 
 roots, and air is prescribed for the three twice-born 
 (classes) ; the order of householders is prescribed 
 for all.' (Anugita, S. B.E.,VIII, p. 316.) While the 
 division into Aryas and Dasas was due to descent, 
 that into Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas seems ^i I ^ 
 originally to have been due to occupation only, 
 though it may soon have acquired an hereditary 
 character. The Brahmans had to look after the 
 welfare of souls, the Kshatriyas after the welfare 
 of the body politic, and the Vaisyas represented 
 originally the undifterentiated mass of the people, 
 engaged in the ordinary occupations of an incipient 
 civilisation. The later subdivision of Indian 
 society, as described by Manu, and as preserved 
 under different forms to the present day, does not 
 concern us for our present purpose. The lessons 
 which the names of Varwa (colour) and G&ti (genus) 
 teach us had long been forgotten even in Manu's 
 time, and are buried at present under a heavy heap 
 of rubbish. Still even that rubbish heap deserves to 
 be sifted, as I believe it is now being sifted by 
 scholars like Mr. Bisley and others. 
 
 In ancient times neither Kshatriyas nor Vaisyas 
 were excluded from taking part in those religious 
 and philosophical struggles, which seem to have 
 occupied India far more than wars of defence or 
 conquest. Nay women also claimed a right to be
 
 14 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 heard in their philosophical assemblies. The Ksha- 
 triyas never surrendered their right to take part 
 in the discussions of the great problems of life and 
 death, and they occasionally asserted it with great 
 force and dignity. Besides, the strong reaction 
 against priestly supremacy came at last from them, 
 for we must not forget that Buddha also was a 
 Kshatriya, a prince of Kapilavastu, and that his 
 chief opposition, from a social and political point 
 of view, was against the privileges of teaching 
 and sacrificing, claimed by the Brahmans as their 
 exclusive property, and against the infallible and 
 divine character ascribed by them to their Vedas. 
 
 The Evidence of the Upanishads, Ganaka, A^atasatru. 
 
 If we look back once more to the intellectual life 
 of India in the ancient Vedic times, or at least in 
 the times represented to us in the Upanishads, 
 we read there of an ancient King kanaka, whose 
 fame at the time when the Upanishads were 
 composed had already spread far and wide (Kaush. 
 Up. IV, i ; Brih. Ar. Up. II, i , i ). He was a king 
 of the Videhas, his capital was Mithila, and his 
 daughter, Sita, is represented to us in later times as 
 the famous wife of Rama (Ramapurvatap. Up.). But 
 in the Upanishads he is represented, not as a 
 successful general or conqueror, not so much as 
 a brave knight, victorious in chivalrous tournaments. 
 We read of him as taking part in metaphysical 
 discussions, as presiding over philosophical councils, 
 as bestowing his patronage on the most eminent 
 sages of his kingdom, as the friend of Yagwavalkya, 
 one of the most famous philosophical teachers of
 
 KING GANAKA. 15 
 
 the Upanishad period. When performing 1 a great 
 sacrifice, this king sets apart a day for a Brah- 
 modyam, a disputation in which philosophers, such 
 as Yagwavalkya, Asvala, Artabhaga, and even 
 women, such as Gargi, the daughter of VMaknu 
 (Brih. Ar. Up. Ill, i, 5), take an active part. To 
 the victor in these disputations the king promised 
 a reward of a thousand cows with ten padas of 
 gold fixed to their horns. As Yagwavalkya claimed 
 these cows on account of his superior knowledge, 
 the other Brahmans present propounded a number 
 of questions which he was expected to answer in 
 order to prove his superiority. And so he does. 
 The first question is how a man who offers a sacrifice 
 can be freed thereby from the fetters of death. 
 Then follow questions such as, While death swallows 
 the whole world, who is the deity that shall swallow 
 death ? What becomes of the vital spirits when 
 a man dies ? What is it that does not forsake 
 man in the hour of death ? What becomes of 
 man after his speech at death has entered the 
 fire, his breath the wind, his eye the sun, his 
 mind the moon, his ear space, his body the earth, 
 his Atman the ether, the hairs of his body the 
 herbs, the hair of his head the trees, his blood and 
 seed the waters ? Whither did the descendants of 
 King Parikshit go ? What is the soul ? What 
 contains the worlds 1 Who rules everything and 
 yet is different from everything ? Far be it from 
 me to say that these and other questions were 
 answered by Yagwavalkya in a manner that would 
 seem satisfactory to ourselves. What is important 
 
 1 Kaushitaki Up. IV, i ; Bhh. Ar. Up. Ill, i.
 
 l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to us is that such questions should have been asked 
 at all, that they should have formed the staple of 
 public discussion at that early time, a time previous 
 to the establishment of Buddha's religion in India, 
 in the fifth century B.C., and that his answers should 
 have satisfied his contemporaries. There is no other 
 country in the world where in such ancient times 
 such disputations would have been thought of, 
 unless it were in Egypt. Neither Menelaos nor 
 Priam would have presided over them, neither 
 Achilles nor Ulysses would have shone in them. 
 That these disputations took place in public and 
 in the presence of the king we have no reason to 
 doubt. Besides, there is one passage (Brih. Ar. 
 Up. Ill, 2, 13) where we are told expressly that 
 the two disputants, Ya^/navalkya and Artabhaga, 
 retired into a private place in order to come to 
 an understanding about one question which, as 
 they thought, did not admit of being discussed 
 in public. 
 
 Do we know of any other country where at that 
 early time such religious congresses would have 
 been thought of, and royal rewards bestowed on 
 those who were victorious in these philosophical 
 tournaments ? 
 
 One of the sayings of kanaka has remained 
 famous in Indian literature for ever, and deserves 
 to remain so. When his capital, Mithila, was de- 
 stroyed by a conflagration, he turned round and 
 said, ' While Mithila is burning, nothing that is mine 
 is burnt.' 
 
 Very curious is another feature, that, namely, in 
 these public assemblies not only was a royal reward 
 bestowed on the victor, but the vanquished was
 
 KING KANAKA. 17 
 
 sometimes threatened with losing his head l . Nor 
 was this a threat only, but it actually happened, we 
 are told, in the case of $akalya (Brih. Ar. Up. 
 
 III, 9, 26). Must we withhold our belief from such 
 statements, because we have learnt to doubt the 
 burnt hand of Mucius Scaevola and the suicide of 
 Lucretia ? I believe not, for the cases are not quite 
 parallel. 
 
 Besides these public disputations, we also read of 
 private conferences in which Ya^/lavalkya enlightens 
 his royal patron 6ranaka, and after receiving every 
 kind of present from him is told at last that the 
 king gives him the whole of his kingdom, nay 
 surrenders himself to him as his slave. We may 
 call all this exaggerated, but we have no right to 
 call it mere invention, for such stories would hardly 
 have been invented, if they had sounded as in- 
 credible in India itself as they sound to us. (Brih. 
 
 IV, 4; 2 3 .) 
 
 It is true we meet in the Upanishads with philo- 
 sophical dialogues between gods and men also, such 
 as Kaush. Up. Ill, i, between Indra and Pratar- 
 dana, between Sanatkumara, the typical warrior 
 deity, and Narada, the representative of the Brah- 
 mans, between Pra.f/apati, Indra, and Viro&ana, 
 between Yama, the god of death, and Na&iketas. 
 But though these are naturally mere inventions, 
 such as we find everywhere in ancient times, it does 
 not follow that the great gatherings of Indian sages 
 presided over by their kings should be equally 
 
 1 I translate vipat by 'to fall off/ not by 'to burst/ and 
 the causative by 'to make fall off/ i.e. to cut off. Would not 
 'to burst' have been vipaf? 
 
 C
 
 l8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 imaginary. Even imagination requires a certain 
 foundation in fact. 
 
 We have a record of another disputation between 
 a King Af/atasatru and the Brahman Balaki, and 
 here again it is the king who has to teach the 
 Brahman, not vice versa. 
 
 Ar/atasatru was king of Kasi (Benares), and must 
 have been later than kanaka, as he appeals to his 
 fame as widely established. When he has con- 
 vinced Balaki of the insufficiency of the information 
 which this learned Brahman had volunteered to 
 impart to him, the proud Brahman actually declares 
 himself the pupil of the king 2 . 
 
 I do not mean, however, to deny that originally the 
 relation between the kings and the sages of ancient 
 India was that which we see represented, for in- 
 stance, in the case of King 6r4nasruti and the 
 Brahman Raikva, who contemptuously rejects all 
 offers of friendship from the king, till at last the 
 king has to offer him not only gold and land (the 
 Raikvapama villages in the country of the Mahav?^'- 
 shas) but his own daughter, in order to secure his 
 amity and his instruction. But though this may 
 have been the original relation between Brahmans 
 and Kshatriyas, and remained so to the time re- 
 presented by Manu's Law-book, the warrior class 
 had evidently from a very early time produced a 
 number of independent thinkers who were able to 
 
 1 Kaushitaki Up. IV, 2 ; Brfli. Ar. Up. II, i. 
 
 2 See also the dialogue between Sanatkumara and Narada 
 (/tfmnd. Up. VII, 2, i).
 
 BUDDHIST PERIOD. 19 
 
 grapple with and to hold their own against the 
 priests, nay, who were superior to them particularly 
 in one subject, as we are told, namely, in their 
 knowledge of the Atman, the Self. In the Maitra- 
 yawa-upanishad we read of King Br^hadratha who 
 gives up his kingdom, retires into the forest, and 
 is instructed by the sage >Sakayanya, whose name 
 may contain the first allusion to $akas and their 
 descendants in India. Such a royal pupil would 
 naturally in the course of his studies become a sage 
 and teacher himself. 
 
 Again, in the TTAand. Up. V, 1 1 we see a number 
 of eminent Brahmans approaching King Asvapati 
 Kaikeya. and making themselves his pupils. The 
 question which they discuss is, What is our Self 
 and what is Brahman (V, 1 1 , i ) ? and this question 
 the king was supposed to be able to answer better 
 than any of the Brahmans. 
 
 Buddhist Period. 
 
 When we leave the period represented by the 
 Upanishads, and turn our eyes to that which follows 
 and which is marked by the rise and growth of 
 Buddhism, we find no very sudden change in the 
 intellectual life of the country, as represented to us 
 in the Sacred writings of the Buddhists. Though 
 there is every reason to suppose that their sacred 
 code, the original text of the Tripifaka, belongs 
 to the third century B.C., and was settled and re- 
 cited, though not written down, during the reign of 
 Asoka, we know at all events that it was reduced 
 to writing in the first century before our era, and 
 we may therefore safely accept its descriptions as 
 giving us a true picture of what took place in India 
 
 c 2
 
 20 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 while Buddhism was slowly but surely supplanting 
 the religion of the Veda, even in its latest offshoots, 
 the Upanishads. It seems to me a fact of the 
 highest importance that the Buddhists at the time 
 when their Suttas were composed, were acquainted 
 with the Upanishads and the Sutras, at all events 
 with the very peculiar names of these literary com- 
 positions. We must not, however, suppose that as 
 soon as Buddhism arose Vedism disappeared from 
 the soil of India. India is a large country, and 
 Vedism may have continued to flourish in the West 
 while Buddhism was gaining its wonderful triumphs 
 in the East and the South. We have no reason to 
 doubt that some of the later Upanishads were com- 
 posed long after King A.soka had extended his 
 patronage to the Buddhist fraternity. Nay, if we 
 consider that Buddha died about 477 B.C., we are 
 probably not far wrong if we look upon the doctrines 
 to which he gave form and life, as represented 
 originally by one of the many schools of thought 
 which were springing up in India during the period 
 of the Upanishads, and which became later on the 
 feeders of what are called in India the six great 
 systems of philosophy. Buddha, however, if we 
 may retain that name for the young prince of 
 Kapilavastu, who actually gave up his palace and 
 made himself a beggar, was not satisfied with 
 teaching a philosophy, his ambition was to found 
 a new society. His object was to induce people 
 to withdraw from the world and to live a life of 
 abstinence and meditation in hermitages or mon- 
 asteries. The description of the daily life of these 
 Buddhist monks, and even of the Buddhist laity, 
 including kings and nobles, may seem to us at first
 
 BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. 21 
 
 sight as incredible as what we saw before in the 
 Upanishads. 
 
 Prasena#it and Bimbisara. 
 
 We read in the Tripkaka, the sacred code of 
 the Buddhists, of King Prasenagdt, of Kosala, 
 drawing near to Buddha and sitting down respect- 
 fully 'at one side before venturing to ask him a 
 question (Samyutta Nikaya III, i, 4). We read 
 likewise of King Bimbisara, of Magadha, showing 
 the same respect and veneration to this poor monk 
 before asking him any questions or making any 
 suggestions to him. Bante or Lord is the title by 
 which the paramount sovereigns of India address 
 these mendicants, the followers of Buddha. 
 
 Brahma-<7ala-sutta. 
 
 If we want to get an idea of the immense wealth 
 and variety of philosophic thought by which Buddha 
 found himself surrounded on every side, we cannot 
 do better than consult one of the many Suttas or 
 sermons, supposed to have been preached by Buddha 
 himself, and now forming part of the Buddhist 
 canon, such as, for instance, the Brahma-^ala-sutta l . 
 
 We are too apt to imagine that both the believers 
 in the Veda and the followers of Buddha formed 
 compact bodies, each being held together by gener- 
 ally recognised articles of faith. But this can 
 hardly have been so, as we read in the Brahma- 
 (/ala-sutta that even among the disciples who 
 
 1 We possess now an excellent translation of this Sutta by 
 Ehys Davids. The earlier translations by Gogerly, by Grim- 
 blot (Sept Suttas Palis, 1876), were very creditable for the 
 time when they were made, but have now been superseded.
 
 22 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 followed Buddha, some, such as Brahmadatta, spoke 
 in support of Buddha, in support of his doctrines 
 and his disciples, while others, such as Suppiya, 
 spoke openly against all the three. Though there 
 was a clear line of demarcation between Brahmans 
 and Samanas or Buddhists, as far as their daily 
 life and outward ceremonial were concerned, the 
 two are constantly addressed together by Buddha, 
 particularly when philosophical questions are dis- 
 cussed. Brahmawa is often used by him as a mere 
 expression of high social rank, and he who is most 
 eminent in knowledge and virtue is even by Buddha 
 himself called ' a true Brahma?*a.' Brahman with us 
 is often used in two senses which should be kept dis- 
 tinct, meaning either a member of the first caste, orone 
 belonging to the three castes of the twice-born Aryas, 
 who are under the spiritual sway of the Brahmans. 
 
 We must try to get rid of the idea that Brahmans 
 and Buddhists were always at daggers drawn, and 
 divided the whole of India between themselves. 
 Their relation was not originally very different from 
 that between different systems of philosophy, such 
 as the Vedanta and Samkhya, which, though they 
 differed, were but seldom inflamed against each 
 other by religious hatred. 
 
 In the Brahma-iyala-sutta, i. e. the net of Brahma, 
 in which all philosophical theories are supposed to 
 have been caught like so many fishes, we can dis- 
 cover the faint traces of some of the schools of 
 philosophy which we shall have to examine here- 
 after. Buddha mentions no less than sixty-two 
 of them, with many subdivisions, and claims to be 
 acquainted with every one of them, though standing 
 himself above them all.
 
 BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. 23 
 
 There are some Samanas and Brahmans, we are 
 told 1 , who are eternalists, and who proclaim that 
 both the soul and the world are eternal 2 . They 
 profess to be able to remember an endless succession 
 of former births, including their names, their lineage, 
 and their former dwelling-places. The soul, they 
 declare, is eternal, and the world, giving birth to 
 nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain peak. Living 
 creatures transmigrate, but they are for ever and 
 ever. 
 
 There are some Samanas and Brahmans who are 
 eternalists with regard to some things, but not with 
 regard to others. They hold that the soul and the 
 world are partly eternal, and partly not. According 
 to them this world-system will pass away, and there 
 will then be beings reborn in the World of Light 
 (Abhassara), made of mind only, feeding on joy, 
 radiating light, traversing the air and continuing in 
 glory for a long time. Here follows a most peculiar 
 account of how people began to believe in one 
 personal Supreme Being, or in the ordinary God. 
 When the world-system began to re-evolve, there 
 appeared (they say) the palace of Brahma, but it was 
 empty. Then a certain being fell from the World 
 of Light and came to life in the palace of Brahma. 
 After remaining there in perfect joy for a long- 
 period, he became dissatisfied and longed for other 
 beings. And just then other beings fell from the 
 World of Light, in all respects like him. But he 
 who had come first began to think that he was 
 Brahma, the Supreme, the Ruler, the Lord of all, 
 
 1 Brahma-#ala-sutta, translated by Khys Davids, p. 26 seq. 
 
 2 This would be like the asvata-vada.
 
 24 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Maker and Creator, the Ancient of days, the 
 Father of all that are and are to be. The other 
 beings he looked upon as created by himself, because 
 as soon as he had wished for them, they had come. 
 Nay, these beings themselves also thought that he 
 must be the Supreme Brahma, because he was there 
 first and they came after him, and it was thought 
 that this Brahmcl must be eternal and remain for 
 ever, while those who came after him were imper- 
 manent, mutable, and limited in duration of life. 
 
 This Brahma reminds one of the Isvara of the 
 Samkhya and other philosophies, which as Brahma, 
 masc., must be distinguished from Brahma, neuter. 
 Then we are told that there are some gods who 
 spend their lives in sexual pleasures and then fall 
 from their divine state, while others who abstain 
 from such indulgences remain steadfast, immutable, 
 and eternal. Again, that there are certain gods so 
 full of envy that their bodies become feeble and their 
 mind imbecile. These fall from their divine state, 
 while others who are free from such failings remain 
 steadfast, immutable, and eternal. 
 
 Lastly, some Sam anas and Brahmans are led to 
 the conclusion that eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body 
 form an impermanent Self, while heart or mind or 
 consciousness form a permanent Self, and therefore 
 will remain for ever steadfast, immutable, and eternal. 
 
 Next follows another class of speculators who 
 are called Antanantikas, and who set forth the 
 infinity and finiteness of the world. They maintain 
 either that the world is finite or that it is infinite, 
 or that it is infinite in height and depth, but finite 
 in lateral extension, or lastly, that it is neither finite 
 nor infinite.
 
 BRAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. 25 
 
 The next description of the various theories held 
 by either Samanas or Brahmanas seems to refer to 
 what is known as the Sy4dv t ada, the theory that 
 everything may be or may not be. Those who hold 
 to this are called wriggling eels. They will not admit 
 any difference between good and bad, and they will 
 not commit themselves to saying that there is 
 another world or that there is not, that there is 
 chance in the world or that there is not, that any- 
 thing has a result or reward or that it has not, that 
 man continues after death or that he does not. 
 
 It would seem, according to some of the Suttas, 
 that Buddha himself was often disinclined to commit 
 himself on some of the great questions of philosophy 
 and religion. He was often in fact an agnostic 
 on points which he considered beyond the grasp 
 of the human mind, and Mahavira, the founder of 
 (rainism, took the same view, often taking refuge 
 in Agnosticism or the Ae/mlnavada 1 . 
 
 Next, there are Samanas and Brahmans who hold 
 that everything, the soul and the world, are acci- 
 dental and without a cause, because they can 
 remember that formerly they were not and now 
 they are, or because they prove by means of logic 
 that the soul and the whole world arose without 
 a cause. 
 
 Furthermore, there are Samanas and Brahmans 
 who hold and defend the doctrine of a conscious 
 existence after death, but they differ on several 
 points regarding this conscious existence. 
 
 Some maintain that the conscious soul after death 
 has form, others that it has no form, others again 
 
 ] M. M., Natural Keligion, p. 105.
 
 26 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that it has and has not, and others that it neither 
 has nor has not form. Some say it is finite, others 
 that it is infinite, that it is both and that it is 
 neither. Some say that it has one mode of con- 
 sciousness, others that it has various modes of 
 consciousness, others that it has limited, others that 
 it has unlimited consciousness. Lastly, it is held 
 that the soul after death is happy, is miserable, is 
 both or is neither. 
 
 There are, however, others who say that the soul 
 after death is unconscious, and while in that state 
 has either form, or no form, has and has not, or neither 
 has nor has not form ; that it is finite, infinite, both 
 or neither. 
 
 Again, there are some Samanas and Brahmans 
 who teach the entire annihilation of all living beings. 
 Their arguments are various, and have in their 
 general outlines been traced back to some of the 
 teachers of Buddha, such as Alara Kalama, Udda- 
 laka and others l . They uphold the doctrine of 
 happiness in this life, and maintain that complete 
 salvation is possible here on earth. Thus when the 
 soul is in perfect enjoyment of the five pleasures of 
 the senses, they call that the highest Nirvana. 
 Against this view, however, it is said that sensuous 
 delights are transitory and always involve pain, 
 and that therefore the highest Nirvana consists in 
 putting away all sensuous delights and entering 
 into the first (VMna, i. e. Dhyana, that is, a state of 
 joy born of seclusion and followed by reflection and 
 meditation. Against this view, again, it is asserted 
 that such happiness involves reasoning, and is there- 
 
 Khys Davids, 1. c., p. 48.
 
 BKAHMA-GALA-SUTTA. 27 
 
 fore gross, while the highest Nirvana can only arise 
 when all reasoning has been conquered and the soul 
 has entered the second 6rAana, a state of joy, born of 
 serenity without reasoning, a state of elevation and 
 internal calm. But even this does not satisfy the 
 true Buddhist, because any sense of joy must be gross, 
 and true Nirvana can only consist in total absence 
 of all longing after joy and thus entering into the 
 third 6rMna, serene and thoughtful. Lastly, even 
 this is outbidden. The very dwelling of the mind 
 on care and joy is declared to be gross, and the final 
 Nirvana is said to be reached in the fourth 6rMna only, 
 a state of self-possession and complete equanimity. 
 
 This abstract may give an idea of the variety of 
 philosophical opinions which were held in India at 
 or even before the time of Buddha. The Brahma- 
 (/ala-sutta professes that all speculations about the 
 past and the future are included in this Sutta of the 
 net of Brahma. By division and subdivision there 
 are said to be sixty-two theories, arranged into two 
 classes so far as they are concerned either with the 
 past or with the future of the soul ; the soul, as it 
 seems, being always taken for granted. 
 
 The extraordinary part is that in the end all these 
 theories, though well known by Buddha, are con- 
 demned by him as arising from the deceptive per- 
 ceptions of the senses, which produce desire, attach- 
 ment, and therefore, reproduction, existence, birth, 
 disease, death, sorrow, weeping, pain, grief, and 
 misery, while Buddha alone is able to cut off the 
 root of all error and all misery, and to impart the 
 truth that leads to true Nirvana. 
 
 It does not seem, indeed, as if the philosophical 
 teaching of Buddha himself was so very different at
 
 28 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 first from that of other schools which had flourished 
 before and during his lifetime in India ; nay, we can 
 often perceive clear traces of a distant relationship 
 between Buddhism and the six orthodox systems of 
 philosophy. Like streams, all springing from the 
 same summit, they run on irrigating the same 
 expanse of country without proving in the least 
 that one channel of thought was derived from 
 another, as has been so often supposed in the case 
 particularly of Buddhism in its relation to the 
 Sa??ikhya philosophy, as known to us from the 
 Karikas and Sutras. 
 
 Though the Brahma-^ala-sutta does not enter 
 into full details, which may be gathered from other 
 Suttas, it shows at all events how large a number 
 of philosophical schools was in existence then, and 
 how they differed from each other on some very 
 essential points. 
 
 Mahabharata. 
 
 If now we compare one of the numerous passages 
 in the Mahabharata, containing descriptions of the 
 philosophical sects then flourishing in India, we 
 shall be struck by the great, almost verbal, similarity 
 between their statements and those which we have 
 just read in the Buddhist Brahma-r/ala-sutta. Thus 
 we read in the Anugita, chap. XXIV : ' We observe 
 the various forms of piety to be as it were contra- 
 dictory. Some say piety remains after the body 
 is destroyed ; some say that it is not so. Some 
 say everything is doubtful ; and others that there 
 is no doubt. Some say the permanent principle is 
 impermanent, and others, too, that it exists, and 
 others that it exists and does not exist. Some
 
 MAHABHARATA. 29 
 
 say it is of one form or twofold, and others that 
 it is mixed. Some Brahmawas, too, who know 
 Brahman and perceive the truth, believe that it is 
 one ; others that it is distinct ; and others again that 
 it is manifold. Some say both time and space exist, 
 and others that it is not so. Some have matted 
 hair and skins ; and some are clean-shaven and 
 without any covering.' This last can only refer to 
 the followers of Buddha, whatever the date of our 
 Mahabharata may be. ' Some people are for bathing ; 
 some for the omission of bathing. Some are for taking 
 food ; others are intent on fasting. Some people 
 extol actions, and others tranquillity. Some extol 
 final emancipation and various kinds of enjoyments ; 
 some wish for riches, and others for indigence.' 
 
 The commentator Nilakan^Aa refers all these 
 remarks to certain sects known to us from other 
 sources. ' Some hold,' he says, ' that the Self exists 
 after the body is lost ; others, that is, the Lokayatas 
 or .TTarvakas, hold the contrary. Everything is 
 doubtful, is the view of the Satyavadins (Syadva- 
 dins r (] ; nothing is doubtful, that of the Tairthikas, 
 the great teachers. Everything is impermanent, 
 thus say the Tarkikas ; it is permanent, say the 
 Mimamsakas ; nothing exists, say the /Simyavadins ; 
 something exists, but only momentarily, say the 
 Saugatas or Buddhists. Knowledge is one, but 
 the ego and non-ego are two different principles, 
 thus say the YogaMras ; they are mixed, say the 
 Uc/ulomas ; they are one, such is the view of the 
 worshippers of the Brahman as possessed of quali- 
 ties ; they are distinct, say other Mimamsakas, who 
 hold that special acts are the cause (of everything) ; 
 manifold they are, say the atomists ; time and space
 
 30 IXDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 they are, say the astrologers. Those who say that it 
 is not so, that is to say, that what we see has no 
 real existence at all, are the ancient philosophers ; 
 omission to bathe 1 is the rule of the Naish^Aika 
 BrahmaMrins ; bathing that of the householders.' 
 
 Thus both from Buddhistic and Bran manic sources 
 we learn the same fact, the existence of a large 
 number of religious and philosophical sects in the 
 ancient days of India. 
 
 Buddha. 
 
 Out of the midst of this whirlpool of philosophical 
 opinions there rises the form of Buddha, calling for 
 a hearing, at first, not as the herald of any brand 
 new philosophy, which he has to teach, but rather 
 as preaching a new gospel to the poor. I cannot 
 help thinking that it was Buddha's marked person- 
 ality, far more than his doctrine, that gave him the 
 great influence on his contemporaries and on so 
 many generations after his death. 
 
 Whether he existed or not, such as he is de- 
 scribed to us in the Suttas, there must have been 
 some one, not a mere name, but a real power in the 
 history of India, a man who made a new epoch in 
 the growth of Indian philosophy, and still more of 
 Indian religion and ethics. His teaching must have 
 acted like a weir across a swollen river. And no 
 wonder, if we consider that Buddha was a prince or 
 nobleman who gave up whatever there w r as of out- 
 ward splendour pertaining to his rank. He need not 
 have been a powerful prince, as some have imagined, 
 
 1 Does not this refer to the solemn bathing which is the first 
 step towards the stage of u Gr/hastha or independent house- 
 holder ?
 
 BUDDHA. 31 
 
 but he belonged to the royal class, and it does not 
 appear that he and his house had any suzerain 
 over them. Like several of the philosophers in the 
 Upanishads, he was a Kshatriya, and the very fact 
 of his making himself a popular teacher and religious 
 reformer attracted attention as a social anomaly in 
 the eyes of the people. We see in fact that one of 
 the principal accusations brought against him, at a 
 later time, was that he had arrogated to himself the 
 privilege of being a teacher, a privilege that had 
 always been recognised as belonging to those only 
 who were Brahmans by birth. And as these Brah- 
 mans had always been not only the teachers of the 
 people, but likewise the counsellors of princes, we 
 find Buddha also not only patronised, but consulted 
 by the kings of his own time. Curiously enough 
 one of these kings has the name of A(/atasatru, a 
 name well known to us from the Upanishads. He, 
 the son of Vaidehi, a Videha princess, sends two of 
 his ministers, who were Brahmans by birth, to 
 Buddha in order to consult him on what he ought 
 to do. It has been supposed by some scholars that 
 this is the same Agdtasatru, king of Kasi (or 
 Benares), who, as we saw in the Upanishads, silenced 
 the Brahman Balaki (Kaush. Up. IV, 2, i). But, 
 according to others, A(/ata,s'atru, i. e. ' without an 
 enemy,' should be taken, like Devanam priya, as 
 a general title of royalty, not as a proper name ' . 
 However that may be, the coincidence is cer- 
 tainly striking, and requires further explanation. 
 At all events, we see that, as in the Upanishads, 
 so in the Tripkaka also, kings appear as friends and 
 
 1 S. B. E., XI, p. i, note.
 
 32 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 patrons of a philosopher, such as Buddha, long before 
 he had become recognised as the founder of a new 
 religion, that they take a prominent part in public 
 assemblies, convened for discussing the great problems 
 of religion and philosophy, or afterwards for settling 
 the canon of their religious texts. The best known 
 are Bimbisara, king of Magadha, and Prasena^it, 
 king of Kosala. 
 
 There is in this respect a clear continuity be- 
 tween the Upanishads and the earliest appearance 
 of Buddhism ; and if some of the tenets and technical 
 terms of the Buddhists also are the same as those of 
 the Hindu schools of philosophy, there would be as 
 little difficulty in accounting for this as for the con- 
 tinuity between Sanskrit and Pali. The Buddhist 
 monk was clearly prefigured in the Parivra//aka or 
 itinerant mendicant of the Upanishads (B?~ih. Ill, 
 5). The name of Buddha, as the awakened and 
 enlightened, could hardly be understood without the 
 previous employments of the root Budh in the Veda ; 
 nor Bhikshu, beggar, without Bhiksh, to beg, in the 
 Upanishads. Nirvana, it is true, occurs in later 
 Upanishads only, but if this shows that they are 
 post-Buddhistic, it suggests at the same time that 
 the old Upanishads must have been pre-Buddhistic. 
 Para gati, the highest goal, is taken from the dic- 
 tionary of the Upanishads, and possibly 7\akrapra- 
 vartana, the turning of the wheel l , also is taken 
 from the same source. 
 
 But though Buddhism and the Upanishads share 
 
 1 Cf. Anugita, chap. XVII : 'You arc the one person to turn 
 this wheel, the nave of which is the Brahman, the spoke the 
 understanding, and which does not turn hack, and which is 
 checked by the quality of goodness as its circumference.'
 
 BUDDHA. 33 
 
 many things in common which point back to the 
 same distant antiquity, Buddhism in its practical 
 working produced a complete social revolution in 
 India. Though it did not abolish caste, as has 
 sometimes been supposed, it led to a mixture of 
 classes which had formerly been kept more carefully 
 distinct. Anybody, without reference to his birth, 
 could jt>in the Buddhist fraternity, if only he was 
 of good report and free from certain civil disabilities. 
 He could then become an itinerant (Parivra^aka) 
 friar, without any of that previous discipline which 
 was required from a Brahman. Once a member of 
 the Samgha, he was free from all family ties and 
 allowed to support himself by charitable gifts 
 (Bhiksha). Though kings and noblemen who had 
 embraced the doctrines of Buddha were not obliged 
 to become actual mendicants and join the fraternity, 
 they could become patrons and lay sympathisers 
 (Upasakas), as we see in the case of the kings already 
 mentioned, and of wealthy persons such as Anatha- 
 pmcftka. Whenever the Buddhist friars appeared 
 in villages or towns, they seem to have been re- 
 ceived with splendid hospitality, and the arrival of 
 Buddha himself with his six hundred or more dis- 
 ciples was generally made the occasion of great 
 rejoicings, including a public sermon, a public dis- 
 cussion, and other entertainments of a less spiritual 
 character. 
 
 In fact, if we may judge from the Tripifcika, the 
 whole of India at the time of Buddha would seem 
 once more to have been absorbed in religion and 
 philosophy ; nay, the old saying that the Indians 
 are a nation of philosophers would seem to have 
 never been so true as at the time of the great 
 
 D
 
 34 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Buddhist Councils, held, we are told, at 
 
 at Vaisali, and later on at the new residence of 
 
 Asoka, Pateliputra. 
 
 This Asoka, like kanaka of old, took the warmest 
 interest in the proceedings of that Council. It is 
 perhaps too much to say that he made Buddhism 
 the state-religion of India. There never was such 
 a thing as a state-religion in India. Asoka cer- 
 tainly extended his patronage, formerly confined to 
 Brahman s only, to the new brotherhood founded 
 by Buddha, but there was nothing in India corre- 
 sponding to a Defender of the Faith. 
 
 It might be objected, no doubt, that the authori- 
 ties on which we have to rely for a description of 
 the intellectual state of India at the time of these 
 Councils, even that of Asoka, 242 B.C., are one- 
 sided and exaggerated ; but when we consult the 
 Mahabharata which, in its earlier elements, at all 
 events, may be assigned to the same Buddhistic 
 period, we get just the same picture. We meet 
 among the Brahmans as among the Buddhists with 
 an immense variety of philosophical and religious 
 thought, represented by schools and sects striving 
 against each other, not yet by persecution, but by 
 serious argumentation. 
 
 Greek Accounts. 
 
 Nor are the scant accounts which the Greeks 
 have left us of what they saw during and after 
 the invasion of India by Alexander the Great at 
 variance with what we learn from these native 
 authorities. Nothing struck the Greeks so much 
 as the philosophical spirit which seemed to pervade
 
 GREEK ACCOUNTS. 35 
 
 that mysterious country. When Megasthenes 1 , the 
 ambassador of Seleucus Nicator at the court of 
 ./Tandragupta (Sandrocottus), describes what he 
 saw in India in the third century B.C., he speaks 
 of gymnosophists living on mountains or in the 
 plains, having their abode in groves in front of 
 cities within moderate- sized enclosures. ' They 
 live,' he writes, 'in a simple style, and lie on beds 
 of rushes or skins. They abstain from animal food 
 and sexual pleasures, and spend their time in 
 listening to serious discourse and in imparting 
 their knowledge to such as will listen to them.' 
 The so-called $armanas mentioned by Megasthenes, 
 have generally been accepted as representing the 
 /Sramanas or Samanas, the members of the Buddhist 
 brotherhood who then seemed to have lived most 
 amicably with the Brahmans. Nothing at least is 
 said of any personal enmity between them, however 
 much they may have differed in their philosophical 
 and religious opinions. His Hylobioi or forest- 
 dwellers are probably meant for the Brah manic 
 Vanaprasthas, the members of the third Asrama who 
 had to live in the forest, at a certain distance from 
 their villages, and give themselves up to asceticism 
 and meditation, such as we see described in the Upani- 
 shads. Even if their name did not tell us, we are 
 distinctly informed that they lived in the forest, sub- 
 sisting on leaves and wild fruits, and wore garments 
 made of the bark of trees (Valkala) -. They com- 
 municated, we are told, with kings, who, like 6ranaka 
 and A(/atas'atru, Prasena^/it and Bimbisara, or in later 
 
 1 Ancient India, by J. W. M c Crindle, 1877, p. 97 seq. 
 
 2 Clement Alex., Strom, i. p. 305, adds that they neither live 
 in cities nor even in houses. 
 
 D 2
 
 36 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 times King Harsha, consulted them by messengers 
 regarding the causes of things, and who through them 
 worshipped and supplicated their gods. Clement of 
 Alexandria, after repeating all this, adds at the end 
 that there are also philosophers in India who follow 
 the precepts of Butta, whom they honour as a god 
 on account of his extraordinary holiness. This is 
 the first Greek mention of Buddha, for no one else 
 can have been meant by Clement. The name was 
 never mentioned by Alexander's companions, though 
 there are early coins, which point to Greek influence, 
 with the figure and name of Boddo. We are also 
 told that these philosophers practised fortitude, both 
 by undergoing active toil, and by enduring pain, 
 remaining for whole days motionless in a fixed 
 attitude. 
 
 Buddhist Pilgrims, Hiouen-thsang. 
 
 Some centuries later we have another and inde- 
 pendent source of information on the intellectual 
 state of India, and this also is in perfect accordance 
 with what we have hitherto learnt about India 
 as the home of philosophers. Beginning with the 
 fourth century of our era, that is, at the time when 
 what I call the Renaissance of Sanskrit literature 
 and national independence began, Chinese Buddhists 
 who made their pilgrimages to India, as to their 
 Holy Land, described to us the state of the country 
 such as they saw it. Those who came early, such 
 as Fa-hian, saw Buddhism flourishing in the fifth 
 century, those who came later in the sixth and 
 seventh centuries, witnessed alreadv the evident simis 
 
 / c? 
 
 of its decline. The most important among them 
 was Hiouen-thsang who visited India from 629 to
 
 CHINESE ACCOUNTS. 37 
 
 645, and whose travels have been translated by my 
 late friend, Stanislas Julien. No one can doubt the 
 trustworthiness of this witness, though he may have 
 been deceived in some of his observations. He de- 
 scribes the Buddhist monasteries scattered all over 
 the country, the schools of the most illustrious 
 teachers whose lectures he attended, and their 
 public assemblies, particularly those that took place 
 at the court of /S'iladitya Harshavardhana 610-650, 
 commonly called $ri-Harsha of Kanyakub^a. This 
 king, who is described as having conquered the five 
 Indias, seems to have been in his heart a Buddhist, 
 though he bestowed his patronage and protection 
 on all sects alike, whether followers of the Vedas or 
 of Buddha. No one, we are told, was allowed to 
 eat flesh in his dominions, and whoever had killed 
 a living thing was himself put to death '. He built 
 many hospitals and monasteries, and entertained many 
 Buddhist friars at his own expense. Every year he 
 assembled the >Srama^as from different kingdoms, 
 and made them discuss in his presence the most im- 
 portant points of Buddha's doctrine. Each disputant 
 had his chair, and the king himself was present to 
 judge of their learning and their good behaviour. 
 Hiouen-thsang, who by this time had made himself 
 a proficient Sanskrit scholar and Buddhist theolo- 
 gian, having studied the Buddhist writings under 
 some of the most illustrious teachers of the time, 
 was invited by the king to be present at one of 
 these great assemblies, on the southern bank of the 
 Ganges. Twenty kings were gathered there, each 
 bringing with him both $ramanas and Brahmanas. 
 
 1 Memoires sur les Contrees Occidentales, Julien, i. p. 251 seq.
 
 38 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A large camp was constructed, and every day rich 
 alms were bestowed on the $ramanas. This, as it 
 would seem, excited the anger of some Brahmans 
 who were present. They tried to set fire to the 
 camp and the magnificent buildings erected by the 
 king. And when they failed in this, they actually 
 hired an assassin to kill the monarch. The king, 
 however, escaped, and forgave the would-be assassin, 
 but exiled a large number of Brahmans from his 
 kingdom. This gives us the first idea of what 
 at that time religious persecution meant on the 
 part of Buddhists as well as of Brahmans. These 
 persecutions may have been exaggerated, but they 
 cannot be altogether denied. Hiouen-thsang him- 
 self seems to have taken an active part in this 
 Congress of Religion, and I still believe it was he 
 who is mentioned by his Sanskrit name as ' Moksha- 
 deva ' or as the ' Master of the Tripiteka.' After 
 making all reasonable deductions, such as we should 
 make in the case of the descriptions of any enthu- 
 siastic witness, enough seems to me to remain to 
 show that from the time of the Upanishads to the 
 time of Hiouen-thsang's sojourn in India, one domi- 
 nant interest pervaded the whole country, the interest 
 in the great problems of humanity here on earth. 
 While in other countries the people at large cared 
 more for their national heroes, as celebrated in their 
 epic poetry on account of their acts of bravery or 
 cunning, India under the sway of its Vedic poets, 
 most of them of a priestly rather than a warrior 
 origin, remained true to its character. Its kings 
 surrounded themselves witli a court of sages 
 rather than of warriors, and the people at large 
 developed and strengthened their old taste for
 
 KING HARSHA. 39 
 
 religious and philosophical problems that has en- 
 dured for centuries, and is not extinct even at the 
 present day. Of course, if we call the people of 
 India a nation of philosophers, this is not meant 
 to deny that the warrior class also had their 
 popular heroes, and that their achievements also 
 excited the interest of the people. India is large 
 enough for many phases of thought. We must not 
 forget that even in the Vedic hymns Indra, the 
 most popular of their gods, was a warrior. The 
 two great epic poems are there to testify that hero- 
 worship is innate in the human heart, and that in 
 early days men and even women will place muscle 
 higher than brain. But many even of these epic 
 heroes have a tinge of philosophical sadness about 
 them, and Argoma, the greatest among them, is at 
 the same time the recipient of the highest wisdom 
 communicated to him by KHshna, as described in the 
 Bhagavad-gita. 
 
 KHstma himself, the hero of the Bhagavad-gita, 
 was of Kshatriya origin, and was looked upon as 
 the very incarnation of the Deity. It is curious 
 that the Sanskrit language has no w r ord for epic 
 poetry. Itihasa refers to the matter rather than to 
 the poetical form of what we should call epic poems, 
 and the Hindus, strange to say, speak of their 
 Mahabharata as a Law-book, Dharmasastra l , and to 
 a certain extent it may have fulfilled that purpose. 
 
 King Harsha. 
 
 If the account given by Hiouen-thsang of the 
 spiritual state of India at the time of his visit 
 
 1 See Dahlmann, Das Mahabharata.
 
 40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and of his stay at the court of Harsha should seem 
 to be tinged too much by the sentiments of the 
 Buddhist priest, we have only to consult the 
 history of Harsha as written in Sanskrit by Ba/ia, 
 to feel convinced of the faithfulness of his account. 
 No doubt Hiouen-thsang looked at India with the 
 eyes of a follower of Buddha, but Bai^a also, though 
 not a Buddhist, represents to us the different schools 
 and teachers, whether followers of Buddha or of 
 the Veda, as living together apparently in perfect 
 peace, and obeying the orders of the same king. 
 They would naturally discuss their differences and 
 exchange opinions on points on which they were 
 agreed or opposed to each other, but of violent 
 persecutions by one side or the other, or of excom- 
 munications and massacres, we hear very little or 
 nothing. The king himself, the friend and patron 
 of Hiouen-thsang, tolerated both Buddhism and 
 Brahmanism in his realm, and we feel doubtful 
 sometimes which of the two he favoured most in 
 his own mind. We see him, for instance, pay his 
 respects to a sage of the name of Divakara, who 
 had been by birth and education a Brahman, but 
 had been converted to Buddha's doctrine, without, 
 as it would seem, incurring thereby the displeasure 
 of the king or of his friends. In the Harsha-/rarita' 
 the king is represented to us as entering a large 
 forest, surrounded by his retinue. When approach- 
 ing the abode of the sage, the king leaves his 
 suite behind arid proceeds on foot, attended by only 
 a few of his vassals. While still at a distance from 
 the holy man's abode, the king perceived a large 
 
 Harsha-frarita, translated by Cowull and Thomas, p. 235.
 
 KING HARSH A. 4! 
 
 number of 'Buddhists from various provinces, perched 
 on pillows, seated on rocks, dwelling in bowers of 
 creepers, lying in thickets or in the shadow of 
 branches, or squatting on the roots of trees, de- 
 votees dead to all passions, 6rainas in white robes 
 ($vetambaras),with mendicants (Bhikshus orParivra- 
 #akas), followers of Krishna (Bhagavatas), religious 
 students (Brahma/iarins), ascetics who pulled out 
 their hair, followers of Kapila (Samkhyas), 6rainas, 
 Lokayatikas (atheists), followers of Kamda (Vaise- 
 shikas), followers of the Upanishads (Vedantins), 
 believers in God as a creator (Naiyayikas), assayers 
 of metals (?), students of legal institutes, students 
 of the Purcbias, adepts in sacrifices requiring seven 
 priests, adepts in grammar, followers of the Pa/l/ta- 
 ratras, and others beside, all diligently following 
 their own tenets, pondering, urging objections, 
 raising doubts, resolving them, giving etymologies, 
 and disputing, discussing and explaining moot points 
 of doctrine,' and all this, it would seem, in perfect 
 peace and harmony. 
 
 Now I ask once more, is there any other country 
 in the world of which a similar account could be given, 
 always the same from century to century ? Such 
 a life as here described may seem very strange to 
 us, nay, even incredible, but that is our fault, because 
 we forget the totally different conditions of in- 
 tellectual life in India and elsewhere. We cannot 
 dissociate intellectual life from cities, from palaces, 
 schools, universities, museums, and all the rest. 
 However, the real life of India was not lived in 
 towns, but in villages and forests. Even at present 
 it should be remembered that towns are the ex- 
 ception in India, and that the vast majority of
 
 42 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 people live in the country, in villages, and their 
 adjoining groves. Here the old sages were free to 
 meditate on the problems of life and on all that 
 is nearest to the heart of man. If they were not 
 
 ; philosophers, let them be called dreamers, but 
 dreamers of dreams without which life would hardly 
 
 / be worth living. 
 
 An insight into this state of things seemed 
 to me necessary as a preliminary to a study of 
 Indian philosophy as being throughout the work 
 of the people rather than that of a few gifted in- 
 dividuals. As far back as we can trace the history 
 of thought in India, from the time of King Harsha 
 and the Buddhist pilgrims back to the descriptions 
 found in the Mahabharata, the testimonies of the 
 Greek invaders, the minute accounts of the Bud- 
 dhists in their Tripi^aka, and in the end the 
 Upanishads themselves, and the hymns of the Veda, 
 \ve are met everywhere by the same picture, a 
 society in which spiritual interests predominate and 
 throw all material interests into the shade, a world 
 of thinkers, a nation of philosophers.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Vedas. 
 
 IF after these preliminary remarks we look for 
 the real beginnings of philosophy on the soil of 
 India, we shall find them in a stratum where 
 philosophy is hardly differentiated as yet from 
 religion, and long before the fatal divorce between 
 religion and philosophy had been finally accomplished, 
 that is in the Vedas. 
 
 There have been curious misunderstandings about 
 this newly-discovered relic of ancient literature, if 
 literature it may be called, having nothing what- 
 ever to do in its origin with any litera scripta. No 
 one has ever doubted that in the Veda we have the 
 earliest monument of Aryan language and thought, 
 and, in a certain sense, of Aryan literature which, 
 in an almost miraculous way, has been preserved to 
 us, during the long night of centuries, chiefly by 
 means of oral tradition. But seeing that the Veda 
 was certainly more ancient than anything we pos- 
 sess of Aryan literature elsewhere, people jumped 
 at the conclusion that it would bring us near to the 
 very beginning of all things, and that we should 
 find in the hymns of the Rig-veda the ' very songs 
 of the morning stars and the shouts of the sons of 
 God.' When these expectations were disappointed, 
 many of these ancient hymns, turning out to be
 
 44 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 very simple, nay sometimes very commonplace, and 
 with little of positive beauty, or novel truth, a re- 
 action set in, as it always does after an excessive 
 enthusiasm. The Vedic hymns were looked on ask- 
 ance, and it was even hinted that they might be but 
 forgeries of those very suspicious individuals, the 
 Brahmans or Pandits of India. In the end, however, 
 the historical school has prevailed, and the historian 
 now sees that in the Vedas we have to deal, not with 
 what European philosophers thought ought to have 
 been, but with what is and has been ; not with what 
 I is beautiful, but with what is true and historically 
 real. If the Vedic hymns are simple, natural, and 
 often commonplace, they teach us that very useful 
 lesson that the earliest religious aspirations of the 
 Aryan conquerors of India were simple and natural, 
 and often, from our point of view, very commonplace. 
 This 'too is a lesson worth learning. Whatever the 
 Vedas may be called, they are to us unique and 
 priceless guides in opening before our eyes tombs 
 of thought richer in relics than the royal tombs of 
 Egypt, and more ancient and primitive in thought 
 than the oldest hymns of Babylonian or Accadian 
 poets. If we grant that they belonged to the second 
 millennium before our era, we are probably on safe 
 ground, though we should not forget that this is a 
 constructive date only, and that such a date does 
 not become positive by mere repetition. It may be 
 very brave to postulate 2000 B.C. or even 5000 B.C. 
 as a minimum date for the Vedic hymns, but what 
 is gained by such bravery ? Such assertions are 
 safe so far as they cannot be refuted, but neither 
 can they be proved, considering that we have no 
 contemporaneous dates to attach them to. And
 
 THE VEDAS. 45 
 
 when I say that the Vedic hymns are more ancient 
 and primitive than the oldest Babylonian and Acca- 
 dian hymns, all that I mean and could mean is that 
 they contain fewer traces of an advanced civilisa- 
 tion than the hymns deciphered from cuneiform 
 tablets, in which we find mention of such things as 
 temples in stone and idols of gold, of altars, sceptres 
 and crowns, cities and libraries, and public squares. 
 There are thoughts in those ancient Mesopotamian 
 hymns which would have staggered the poets of 
 the Veda, such as their chief god being called the 
 king of blessedness, the light of mankind, &c. We 
 should look in vain in the Veda for such advanced 
 ideas as ' the holy writing of the mouth of the 
 deep/ ' the god of the pure incantation,' ' thy will 
 is made known in heaven and the angels bow their 
 faces,' ' I fill my hand with a mountain of diamonds, 
 of turquoises and of crystal,' ' thou art as strong 
 bronze,' ' of bronze and lead thou art the mingler,' 
 or ' the wide heaven is the habitation of thy liver.' 
 All this may be very old as far as the progression 
 of the equinoxes is concerned, but in the progress 
 of human thought these ideas mark a point, not 
 yet reached by the poets of the Veda. In that 
 sense, whatever their age, these Babylonian hymns 
 are more modern in thought than the very latest 
 hymns of the Rig-veda, though I confess that it 
 is that very fact, the advanced civilisation at that 
 early time which they reflect, that makes the Baby- 
 lonian hymns so interesting in the eyes of the 
 historian. I do not speak here of philosophical 
 ideas, for we have learnt by this time that they are 
 of no age and of any age. 
 
 Whatever may be the date of the Vedic hymns,
 
 46 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 whether 1500 or 15000 B.C., they have their own 
 unique place and stand by themselves in the litera- 
 ture of the world. They tell us something of the 
 early growth of the human mind of which we find 
 no trace anywhere else. Whatever aesthetic judge- 
 ments may be pronounced on them, and there is 
 certainly little of poetical beauty in them, in the 
 eyes of the historian and the psychologist they will 
 always retain their peculiar value, far superior to 
 the oldest chronicles, far superior to the most an- 
 cient inscriptions, for every verse, nay every word 
 in them, is an authentic document in the history 
 of the greatest empire, the empire of the human 
 mind, as established in India in the second mil- 
 lennium B.C. 
 
 The Philosophical Basis of the Vedic Gods. 
 
 Let us begin with the simplest beginnings. What 
 can be simpler than the simple conviction that the 
 regularly recurring events of nature require certain 
 agents ? Animated by this conviction the Vedic 
 poets spoke not only of rain (Indu), but of a rainer 
 (Indra), not only of fire and light as a fact, but of 
 a lighter and burner, an agent of fire and light, a 
 Dyaus (Zevs) and an Agni (ignis). It seemed im- 
 possible to them that sun and moon should rise 
 every day, should grow strong and weak again 
 every month or every year, unless there was an 
 agent behind who controlled them. We may smile 
 at such thoughts, but they were natural thoughts, 
 nor would it be easy even now to prove a negative 
 to this view of the world. One of these agents 
 they called Savitar ('^L^TT/P, or vtnos), the enlivener, 
 as distinguished yet inseparable from Surya, the
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF VEDIC GODS. 47 
 
 heavenly, the sun, Greek Helios. Soma, from the 
 same root Su, was likewise at first what enlivens, 
 i. e. the rain, then the moon which was supposed 
 to send dew and rain, and lastly the enlivening 
 draught, used for sacrificial purposes and prepared 
 from a plant called Sorna or the enlivener, a plant 
 known to Brahmans and Zoroastrians before the 
 separation of the two. In this way both the re- 
 ligion and the mythology of the Vedic sages have 
 a philosophical basis, and deserve our attention, if 
 we wish to understand the beginnings not only of 
 Indian mythology and religion, but of Indian philo- 
 sophy also. ' No one,' as Deussen truly says, ' can 
 or should in future talk about these things who 
 does not know the liig-veda 1 .' The process on 
 which originally all gods depended for their very 
 existence, the personification of, or the activity attri- 
 buted to the great natural phenomena, while more 
 or less obscured in all other religions, takes place 
 in the Big-veda as it were in the full light of day. 
 The gods of the Vedic, and indirectly of all the 
 Aryan people, were the agents postulated behind 
 the great phenomena of nature. This was the be- 
 ginning of philosophy, the first application of the 
 law of causality, and in it we have to recognise 
 the only true solution of Indo-European mythology, 
 and likewise of Aryan philosophy. Whatever may 
 have existed before these gods, we can only guess at, 
 we cannot watch it with our own eyes, while the 
 creation of Dyaus, light and sky, of Prithivi, earth, of 
 Vanma, dark sky, of Agni, fire, and other such Vedic 
 deities, requires neither hypothesis nor induction. 
 
 1 Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic, p. 83.
 
 40 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There was the sky, Dyaus, apparently active, hence 
 there must be an agent, called Dyaus. To say that 
 this Aryan Theogony was preceded by a period of 
 fetishism or totemism, is simply gratuitous. At all 
 events, it need not be refuted before it has been 
 proved. Possibly the naming of the sky as an 
 agent and as a masculine noun came first, that of 
 the mere objective sky, as a feminine, second. 
 
 Three Classes of Vedic Gods. 
 
 We know now by what very simple process the 
 Vedic Aryas satisfied their earliest craving for 
 causes, how they created their gods, and divided 
 the whole drama of nature into three acts and the 
 actors into three classes, those of the sky, those of 
 mid-air, and those of the earth. To the first belong 
 Dyaus, the agent of the sky ; Mitra, the agent of 
 the bright sky and day ; Varu??a, the agent of the 
 dark sky and evening ; Surya, the agent of the sun ; 
 Savitn', the agent of the enlivening or morning sun ; 
 Asvinau, the twin agents of morning and evening ; 
 Ushas, the maiden of the dawn. 
 
 To mid-air belong Indra, the agent of the atmo- 
 sphere in its change between light and darkness, 
 the giver of rain ; the Marutas, the agents of 
 the storm-clouds ; Vayu and Vata, the agents of the 
 air ; Parr/anya, the agent of the rain-cloud ; Iludra, 
 the agent of storm and lightning, and several others 
 connected with meteoric phenomena. 
 
 To the earth belong Prithivi herself, the earth 
 as active ; Agui, the agent of fire ; Saras vat i and 
 other rivers; sometimes the Dawn also, as rising 
 from the earth as well as from the sky. These 
 gods were the first philosophy, the first attempt at
 
 OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS OF GODS. 49 
 
 explaining the wonders of nature. It is curious to 
 observe the absence of anything like star-worship in 
 India among the Aryan nations in general. A few 
 of the stars only, such as were connected with human 
 affairs, determining certain seasons, and marking 
 the time of rain (Hyades), the return of calmer 
 weather (Pleiades), or the time for mowing (Krit- 
 tikas), were noticed and named, but they never 
 rose to the rank of the high gods. They were less 
 interesting to the dwellers in India, because they 
 did not exercise the same influence on their daily life 
 as they do in Europe. There was of course no settled 
 system in this pantheon, the same phenomena being 
 often represented by different agents, and different 
 phenomena by the same agents. The gods, how- 
 ever, had evidently been known before they were 
 distributed into three classes, as gods of the sky, 
 of the earth, and of the clouds l . 
 
 Other Classifications of Gods. 
 
 If we call this creation and likewise classification 
 of the Devas or gods, the first philosophy of the 
 human race, we can clearly see that it was not 
 artificial or the work of one individual only, but 
 was suggested by nature herself. Earth, air, and 
 sky, or again, morning, noon, and night, spring, 
 summer, and winter, are triads clearly visible in 
 nature, and therefore, under different names and 
 forms, mirrored in ancient mythology in every part 
 of the world. These triads are very different from 
 the later number assigned to the gods. Though 
 the Devas are known in the Kig-veda and the 
 
 1 M. M., Contributions to the Science of Mythology, p. 475. 
 
 E
 
 50 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Avesta as thirty-three, I doubt whether there is 
 any physical necessity for this number '. It seems 
 rather due to a taste very common among un- 
 civilised tribes of playing with numbers and multi- 
 plying them to any extent 2 . We see the difficulty 
 experienced by the Brahmans themselves when they 
 had to fill the number of thirty-three and give their 
 names. Sometimes they are called three times 
 eleven ; but when we ask who these three times 
 eleven are, we find no real tradition, but only more 
 or less systematising theories. We are told that 
 they were the gods in the sky, on earth, and in the 
 clouds (I, 139, 1 1), or again that they w r ere Vasus, 
 Rudras, Adityas, Visve Devas, and Maruts 3 , but the 
 number of each of these classes of gods seems to have 
 been originally seven rather than eleven. Even 
 this number of seven is taken by some scholars in 
 the general sense of many, like devanam bhuyish- 
 thsih ', but it is at all events recognised in the Hig- 
 veda VIII, 28, 5, though possibly in a late verse. 
 What we look for in vain in the Veda are the names 
 of seven Maruts or seven Hudras. We can perhaps 
 make out seven Vasus, if, as we are told, they are 
 meant for Agni, the Adityas, the Marutas, Indra, 
 Ushas, the Asvins and Iludra. The seven Adityas, 
 too, may possibly be counted as Vanma, Mitra, 
 Aryaman, Bhaga, Daksha, A??isa, and Tvash^rt, but 
 all this is very uncertain. We see in fact the three 
 times eleven replaced by the eight Vasus, the eleven 
 Maruts, and the twelve Adityas, to which two other 
 
 1 Satap. Br. XII, 6, i, p. 205. 
 
 2 Contributions, p. 475. 
 
 3 Vedanta-Sutras I, 3, 28; and Kig-veda X, 122, i.
 
 THE VISVE OR ALL-GODS. 51 
 
 gods are added as leaders, to bring their number 
 up to the required thirty-three. 
 
 In still later times the number of the Adityas, 
 having been taken for the solar light in each suc- 
 cessive month, was raised to twelve. I look upon 
 all these attempts at a classification of the Vedic 
 gods as due once more to the working of a philo- 
 sophical or systematising spirit. It is not so much 
 the exact number or names of these gods, as the 
 fact that attempts had been made at so early a time 
 to comprehend certain gods under the same name, 
 that interests the philosophical observer. 
 
 The Visve or All-gods. 
 
 The first step in this direction seems to be repre- 
 sented by the Visve or the Visve Devas. Visva is 
 different from Sarva, all. It means the gods to- 
 gether, Gesammtgotter (cuncti), not simply all the 
 gods (omnes). Sometimes, therefore, the two words 
 can be used together, as Taitt. Br. Ill, i, i, Visva 
 bhuvanani sarva, 'all beings together.' The Maruts 
 are called Visve Mariita/^, in the sense of all the 
 Maruts together. These Visve, though they belong 
 to the class-gods (Gawas), are different from other 
 class-gods inasmuch as their number is hardly 
 fixed. It would be endless to give the names of 
 all the gods who are praised in the hymns addressed 
 to the Visve Devas. Indra often stands at their 
 head (Indra^yesh^aA), but there is hardly one of 
 the Vedic gods who does not at times appear as one 
 of them. What is really important in these Visve is 
 that they represent the first attempt at comprehend- 
 ing the various gods as forming a class, so that even 
 the other classes (Ganas), such as Adityas, Vasus, 
 
 E 2
 
 52 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or Rudras may be comprehended under the wider 
 concept of Visve. It is all the more curious that 
 this important class, important not only for mytho- 
 logical but for philosophical and religious purposes 
 also, should have attracted so little attention hither- 
 to. They are passed over, as a class, even in that rich 
 treasure-house of Vedic Mythology, the fifth volume 
 of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts, but they ought 
 not to be ignored by those who are interested in the 
 progress of the ancient mythological religions from 
 given multiplicity to postulated unity, as an essential 
 character of the godhead. 
 
 Tendencies towards Unity among the Gods. 
 
 But while this conception of Visve Devas marks 
 the first important approach from the many inco- 
 herent gods scattered through nature to a gradually 
 more and more monotheistic phase of thought in the 
 Veda, other movements also tended in the same 
 direction. Several gods, owing to their position in 
 nature, were seen to perform the same acts, and 
 hence a poet might well take upon himself to say 
 that Agni not only acted with Indra or Savitn', but 
 that in certain of his duties Agni was Indra and was 
 Savit?^'. Hence arose a number of dual gods, such 
 as Indra-Agni, Mitra-Varunau, Agiii-Shomau, also 
 the two Asvins. On other occasions three gods were 
 praised as working together, such as Aryaman, Mitra 
 and Varu?za, or Agni, Soma and Gandharva, while 
 from another point of view, Vishnu with his three 
 strides represented originally the same heavenly 
 being, as rising in the morning, culminating at noon, 
 and setting in the evening. Another god or goddess, 
 Aditi, was identified with the sky and the air, was
 
 HENOTHEISM, MONOTHEISM AND MONISM. 53 
 
 called 'mother, father, and son, was called all the 
 gods and the five races of men, was called the past 
 and the future. Professor Weber has strangely 
 misunderstood me if he imagines that I designated 
 this phase of religious thought as Henotheism. 
 
 Henotheism. 
 
 To identify Indra, Agni, and Vanma is one thing, 
 it is syncretism ; to address either Indra or Agni or 
 Vanma, as for the time being the only god in 
 existence with an entire forge tfulness of all other 
 gods, is quite another ; and it was this phase, so 
 fully developed in the hymns of the Yeda, which 
 I wished to mark definitely by a name of its own, 
 calling it Henotheism l . 
 
 Monotheism and Monism. 
 
 All these tendencies worked together in one 
 direction, and made some of the Vedic poets see 
 more or less distinctly that the idea of god, if once 
 clearly conceived, included the ideas of being one 
 and without an equal. They thus arrived at the 
 conviction that above the great multitude of gods 
 there must be one supreme personality, and, after 
 a time, they declared that there was behind all the 
 gods that one (Tad Ekam) of which the gods were 
 but various names. 
 
 Rv. I, 164, 46. Ekam sat vipra/i bahudha vadanti, Agnim, 
 Yamam, Matarisvanam ahuh. 
 
 The sages call that One in many ways, they call it Agni, 
 Yama, Matarisvan. 
 
 1 This phase of religious thought has been well described in 
 the same fifth volume of Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts, p. 352 ; 
 see ,also Deussen, Geschichte der Philosophie, I, p. 104.
 
 54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Kv. X, 129, 2. Anit avatam svadhaya tat ekam, tasmat ha 
 anyat na para/j kirn fcana asa. 
 
 That One breathed breathlessly by itself, other than it there 
 nothing since has been. 
 
 Tlie former thought led by itself to a monotheistic 
 religion, the latter, as ive shall see, to a monistic 
 philosophy. 
 
 In trying to trace the onward movement of 
 religious and philosophical thought in the Veda, 
 we should recognise once for all the great difficulties 
 with which we have to contend. Speaking as yet 
 of the hymns only, we have in the Rig-veda a 
 collection of i ,o 1 7 hymns, each on an average con- 
 taining about ten verses. But this collection was 
 made at different times and in different places, 
 systematically in some respects, but in others, more 
 or less at random. We have no right to suppose 
 that we have even a hundredth part of the religious 
 and popular poetry that existed during the Vedic 
 age. We must therefore carefully guard against 
 such conclusions as that, because we possess in 
 our Rig-veda-samhita but one hymn addressed to 
 a certain deity, therefore that god was considered 
 as less important or was less widely worshipped 
 than other gods. This has been a very common 
 mistake, and I confess that there is some excuse for 
 it, just as there was for looking upon Homer as the 
 sole representative of the whole epic poetry of Greece, 
 and upon his mythology as the mythology of the 
 whole of Greece. But we must never forget that 
 the Ilig-veda is but a fragment, and represents the 
 whole of Vedic mythology and religion even less 
 than Homer represents the whole of Greek mytho- 
 logy and religion. It is wonderful enough that
 
 PRAAPATI. 55 
 
 such a collection should have escaped destruction 
 or forgetfulness, when we keep in mind that the 
 ancient literature of India was purely mnemonic, 
 writing being perfectly unknown, but the art of 
 mnemonics being studied all the more as a discipline 
 essential to intellectual life. What has come down 
 to us of Vedic hymns, by an almost incredible, yet 
 well attested process, is to us a fragment only, and 
 we must be on our guard not to go beyond the 
 limits assigned to us by the facts of the case. Nor 
 can the hymns which have come down to us have 
 been composed by one man or by members of one 
 family or one community only ; they reach us in the 
 form of ten collections (Manc?alas) composed, we are 
 told, by different men, and very likely at different 
 periods. Though there is great similarity, nay even 
 monotony running through them, there are differ- 
 ences also that cannot fail to strike the attentive 
 reader. In all such matters, however, we must be 
 careful not to go beyond the evidence before us, 
 and abstain as much as possible from attempting 
 to systematise and generalise what comes to us in 
 an unsystematised, nay often chaotic form. 
 
 Pra#apati. 
 
 Distinguishing therefore, as much as possible, 
 between what has been called tentative monotheism, 
 which is religion, and tentative monism, which is 
 philosophy, we can discover traces of the former in 
 the famous hymn X, 121, which, years ago, I called 
 the hymn to the Unknown God. Here the poet 
 asks in every verse to whom, to what Deva, he 
 should offer his sacrifice, and says towards the end 
 whether it should be, ya/i deveshu adhi devaA eka/i
 
 56 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 &sit, ' he who alone was god above gods/ Many of 
 the ordinary gods are constantly represented as 
 supreme, with an entire forgetfulness that one only 
 can be so ; but this is very different from the distinct 
 demand here made by the poet for a god that should 
 be above all other gods. It is much more like the 
 Semitic demand for a god above all gods (Exod. xviii. 
 n), or for a father of gods and men, as in Greece 
 (narrjp av8pS>v re 6t5>v re). Aristotle already remarked 
 that, as men have one king, they imagined that the 
 gods also must be governed by one king 1 . I believe, 
 however, that the ground for this lies deeper, and 
 that the idea of oneness is really involved in the 
 idea of God as a supreme and unlimited being. 
 But Aristotle might no doubt have strengthened his 
 argument by appealing to India where ever so many 
 clans and tribes had each their own king, whether 
 Rar/ah or Maharajah, and where it might seem natural 
 to imagine a number of supreme gods, each with 
 their own limited supremacy. Still all this would 
 have satisfied the monistic craving for a time only. 
 Here too, in the demand for and in the supply of 
 a supreme deity, we can watch a slow and natural 
 progress. At first, for instance, when (Rv. VIII, 89) 
 Indra was to be praised for his marvellous deeds, it 
 was he \vho had made the sun to shine. He was called 
 iS'atakratu, the all-powerful and all-wise, or Abhibhu, 
 the conqueror. At the end the poet sums up by 
 saying : Visva-karma visvd-deva/i maha'n asi, ' thou 
 art the maker of all things, thou art the great 
 Visvadeva (all-god).' The last word is difficult to 
 translate, but its real purport becomes clear, if we 
 
 1 Arist. Politics, i, 2, 7 ; Muir, O. S. T., V, p. 5.
 
 VISVAKARMAN. TVASHTRI. 57 
 
 remember what we saw before with reference to the 
 origin of the Visve Devas. 
 
 Visvakarman. 
 
 In such adjectives as $atakratu, and still more in 
 Visvakarman, the maker of all things, we see the 
 clear germs that were to grow into the one supreme 
 deity. As soon as Visvakarman was used as a sub- 
 stantive, the Brahmans had what they wanted, they 
 had their All-maker, their god above all gods, the 
 god whose friendship the other gods were eager to 
 secure (VIII, 89, 3). 
 
 Tvashtfn. 
 
 The maker or creator of all things is the nearest 
 approach to the one and only god of later times. It 
 should not be forgotten, however, that there was 
 already another maker, called Tvashfrn, i.e. re/crew, only 
 that he did not rise to the position of a real creator 
 of all things. He seems to have been too old, too 
 mythological a character for philosophical purposes. 
 He remained the workman, the Hephaestos, of the 
 Vedic gods, well known as the father of Saranyu 
 and Visvarupa. He had all the requisites for be- 
 coming a supreme deity, in fact, he is so here and 
 there, as when he is addressed as having formed 
 heaven and earth (X, 1 10, 9), nay, as having begotten 
 everything (visvam bhuvanam </a(/ana). He is in 
 fact all that a Creator can be required to be, being 
 supposed to have created even some of the gods, 
 such as Agni, Indra, and Brahmaviaspati (Rv. X, 2, 
 7 ; II, 23, 17). If Agni himself is called Tvash^H 
 (Rv. II, i, 5), this is merely in consequence of that 
 syncretism which identified Agni with ever so many
 
 58 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gods, but more particularly with Tvash^ri', the simper 
 of all things. 
 
 When Tvash^ri is called Savitrz, this does not 
 necessarily imply his identity with the god SavitH, 
 but the word should in that case be taken as a pre- 
 dicate, meaning the enlivener, just as in other places 
 he is praised as the nourisher or preserver of all 
 creatures, as the sun (Rv. Ill, 55, 19). One of the 
 causes why he did not, like Prar/apati or Visvakarman, 
 become a supreme god and creator was his having 
 belonged to a more ancient pre-Vedic stratum of 
 gods. This might also account for Indra's hostility to 
 Tvashf?^', considering that he (Indra), as a new god, 
 had himself supplanted the older gods, such as Dyaus. 
 We must be prepared for many such possibilities, 
 though I give them here as guesses only. It is possible 
 also that the name of Asura, given to Tvash^ri and 
 to his son Visvarupa, points in the same direction, 
 and that we should take it, not in the sense of an 
 evil spirit, but in the sense of an ancient daimon in 
 which it is applied in other hymns to Varmza, and 
 other ancient Devas. Tvash^ri is best known as the 
 father of Sara?iyu and the grandfather therefore of 
 the Asvins (day and night), but it is a mistake to 
 suppose that as father of Yama and Yami he was ever 
 conceived as the progenitor of the whole human race. 
 Those who so confidently identify Yama and Yami 
 with Adam and Eve seem to have entirely forgotten 
 that Yama never had any children of Yami. In 
 his mythological character, Tvash^r/ is sometimes 
 identical with Dyaus (Zeus) 1 , but he never becomes, 
 as has sometimes been supposed, a purely abstract 
 
 1 Contributions, II, p. 560.
 
 SEARCH FOR A SUPREME DEITY. 59 
 
 deity ; and in this we see the real difference between 
 Tvash^H and Visvakarman. Visvakarman, originally 
 a mere predicate, has no antecedents, no parents, 
 and no offspring, like Tvashiri (Rv. X, 81, 4). The 
 work of Visvakarman is described in the following 
 words, which have a slight mythological colouring : 
 ' What was the stand, the support, what and how 
 was it, from whence the all-seeing Visvakarman 
 produced by his might the earth and stretched out 
 the sky ? The one god who on every side has 
 eyes, mouths, arms and feet, blows (forges) with his 
 two arms and with wings, while producing heaven 
 and earth l .' 
 
 How vague and uncertain the personal character 
 of Visvakarman was in Vedic times, we can see 
 from the fact that the Taittiriya Brtihmana ascribes 
 the very acts here ascribed to Visvakarman to 
 Brahman 2 . At a later time, Visvakarman, the 
 All-maker, became with the Buddhists, as Visva- 
 kamma, a merely subordinate spirit, who is sent to 
 act as hairdresser to Buddha. The gods also have 
 their fates ! 
 
 Search for a Supreme Deity. 
 
 The same human yearning for one supreme deity 
 which led the Vedic priests to address their hymns 
 to the Visve Devas or to Visvakarman as the maker 
 of all things, induced them likewise to give a more 
 personal character to Pra^/apati. This name, meaning 
 
 1 This blowing has reference to the forge on which the 
 smith does his work. Wings were used instead of bellows, 
 and we must take care not to ascribe angels' wings to Tvash/rt 
 or to any god of Vedic times, unless he is conceived as a bird, 
 and not as a man. 
 
 2 Taitt. Br. II, 8, 9, 6 ; Muir, O.S.T., V, p. 355.
 
 60 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lord of creatures, is used in the Rig-veda as a pre- 
 dicate of several gods, such as Soma, Savitri, and 
 others. His later origin has been inferred from the 
 fact that his name occurs but three times in the 
 Rig-veda *. These arithmetical statistics should, how- 
 ever, be used with great caution. First of all my 
 index verborum is by no means infallible, and secondly 
 our Samhita of the Rig-veda is but a segment, pro- 
 bably a very small segment, of the mass of religious 
 poetry that once existed. In the case of Pra^apati 
 I had left out in my Index one passage, X, 121, i o, 
 and though, for very good reasons, I considered and 
 still consider this verse as a later addition, this was 
 probably no excuse for omitting it, like all that is 
 omitted in the Pada-text of the Rig-veda. The whole 
 hymn must have been, as I thought, the expression of 
 a yearning after one supreme deity, who had made 
 heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is. 
 But many scholars take it as intended from the 
 very first verse for the individualised god, Pra</apati. 
 I doubt this still, and I give therefore the translation 
 of the hymn as I gave it in 1 860, in my ' History of 
 Ancient Sanskrit Literature ' (p. 568). It has been 
 translated many times since, but it will be seen that 
 I have had but little to alter. 
 
 Hymn to the Unknown God. 
 
 1. In the beginning there arose the germ of golden light, 
 Hirawyagarbha ; he was the one born lord of all that is. He 
 stablished the earth and this sky Who is the god to whom 
 we should offer our sacrifice? 
 
 2. He who gives life, lie who gives strength ; whose com- 
 mand all the bright gods revere ; whose shadow is immortality 
 
 1 Muir, O.S.T., V, 390.
 
 HYMN TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. 6l 
 
 and mortality (gods and men) Who is the god to whom we 
 should offer our sacrifice ? 
 
 3. He who through his power became the sole king of this 
 breathing and slumbering world he who governs all, man 
 and beast Who is the god to whom we should offer our 
 sacrifice ? 
 
 4. He through whose greatness these snowy mountains are, 
 and the sea, they say, with the Kasa, the distant river, he 
 whose two arms these regions are Who is the god to whom 
 we should offer our sacrifice ? 
 
 5. He through whom the sky is strong, and the earth firm, 
 he through whom the heaven was established, nay the highest 
 heaven, he who measured the light in the air Who is the god 
 to whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 
 
 6. He to whom heaven and earth (or, the two armies) 
 standing firm by his help, look up, trembling in their minds, 
 he over whom the rising sun shines forth Who is the god to 
 whom we should offer our sacrifice ? 
 
 7. When the great waters went everywhere, holding the 
 germ and generating fire, thence he arose who is the sole life 
 of the bright gods Who is the god to whom we should offer 
 our sacrifice ? 
 
 8. He who by his might looked even over the waters, which 
 gave strength and produced the sacrifice, he who alone is god 
 above all gods Who is the god to whom we should offer our 
 sacrifice ? 
 
 9. May he not destroy us, he, the creator of the earth, or he, 
 the righteous, who created the heaven, he who also created the 
 bright and mighty waters Who is the god to whom we should 
 offer our sacrifice ? 
 
 Then follows the verse which I treated as a later 
 addition, because it seemed to me that, if Pra^apati 
 had been known by the poet as the god who did 
 all this, he would not have asked, at the end of every 
 verse, who the god was to whom sacrifice should be 
 offered. However, poets have their own ways. 
 But the strongest argument against the final verse, 
 which my critics have evidently overlooked, is the
 
 62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fact that this verse has not been divided by the 
 Padakara. I still hold, therefore, that it was a later 
 addition, that it is lame and weak, and spoils the 
 character of the hymn. It runs as follows : 
 
 10. '0 Pra^apati, no other but thou has held together all 
 these things ; whatever we desire in sacrificing to thee, may 
 that be ours, may we be the lords of wealth.' 
 
 With this conception of Pra</apati as the lord of 
 all created things and as the supreme deity, the 
 monotheistic yearning was satisfied, even though 
 the existence of other gods was not denied. And 
 what is curious is that we see the same attempt l 
 repeated again and again. Like Visvakarman and 
 Prar/apati we find such names as Purusha, man ; 
 Hira?iyagarbha, golden germ ; Pnma, breath, spirit ; 
 Skambha, support (X, 81,7); DhatH, maker ; VidhatH, 
 arranger ; Namadha, name-giver of the gods, ovo^a- 
 ToOerrjs and others, all names for the Eka Deva, the 
 one god, though not, like Pra^/apati, developed into 
 fullgrown divine personalities. These names have 
 had different fates in later times. Some meet us 
 again during the Brahmana period and in the Athar- 
 vawa hymns, or rise to the surface in the more 
 modern pantheon of India ; others have disappeared 
 altogether after a short existence, or have resumed 
 their purely predicative character. But the deep 
 groove which they made in the Indian mind has 
 remained, and to the present day the religious wants 
 of the great mass of the people in India seem satisfied 
 through the idea of the one supreme god, exalted 
 above all other gods, whatever names may have 
 been given to him. Even the gods of modern times 
 
 1 M. M., Theosophy, pp. 244 seq.
 
 BRAHMAN, ATMAN, TAD EKAM. 63 
 
 such as /Siva and Vistmu, nay goddesses even, such 
 as Kali, Parvati, Durga, are but new names for what 
 was originally embodied in the lord of created things 
 (Prae/apati) and the maker of all things (Vi.s-va- 
 karman). In spite of their mythological disguises, 
 these modern gods have always retained in the eyes 
 of the more enlightened of their worshippers traces 
 of the character of omnipotence that was assigned 
 even in Vedic times to the one supreme god, the 
 god above all gods. 
 
 Brahman, Atman, Tad Ekam. 
 
 We have now to take another step in advance. 
 By the side of the stream of thought which we 
 have hitherto followed, we see in India another 
 powerful movement which postulated from the first 
 more than a god above, yet among, other gods. In 
 the eyes of more thoughtful men every one of the 
 gods, called by a personal and proper name, was 
 limited ipso facto, and therefore not fit to fill the 
 place which was to be filled by an unlimited and 
 absolute power, as the primary cause of all created 
 things. No name that expressed ideas connected 
 with the male or female sex, not even Pra^apati or 
 Visvakarman, was considered as fit for such a being, 
 and thus we see that as early as the Yedic hymns 
 it was spoken of as Tad Ekam, that One, as neither 
 male nor female, that is, as neuter. We come across 
 it in the hymn of Dirghatamas (I, 164, 6 x ), where, 
 
 1 This hymn, the author of which is called Dirghatamas. i.e. 
 Long Darkness, is indeed full of obscure passages. It has 
 been explained by Haug (Vedische Rathselfragen und Riithsel- 
 spriiche, 1875) and more successfully by Deussen, in his Allge- 
 meine Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 108, but it still contains 
 much that has to be cleared up.
 
 64 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 after asking who he was that established these six 
 spaces of the world, the poet asks, ' Was it perhaps 
 the One (neuter), in the shape of the Unborn 
 (masc.)?' This should be read in connection with 
 the famous forty-sixth verse : 
 
 ' They call (it) Indra, Mitra and Varuwa, Agni : 
 then (comes) the heavenly bird Garutman ; that 
 which is the One, the poets call in many ways, they 
 call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan.' 
 
 Here we see the clear distinction between the 
 One that is named and the names, that is, the 
 various gods, and again between the One without 
 form or the unborn, that is, the unmanifested, and 
 those who established the whole world. This One, 
 or the Unborn, is mentioned also in X, 82, 6, 
 where we read ' The One is placed in the nave 
 of the unborn where all beings rested/ Again in 
 a hymn to the Visve Devas, III, 54, 8, the poet, 
 when speaking of heaven and earth, says : 
 
 ' They keep apart all created things, and tremble 
 not, though bearing the great gods ; the One rules 
 over all that is unmoving and that moves, that walks 
 or flies, being differently born.' 
 
 The same postulated Being is most fully de- 
 scribed in hymn X, 129, i, of which I likewise gave 
 a translation in my ' History of Ancient Sanskrit 
 Literature' (1859), p. 569. It has been frequently 
 translated since, but the meaning has on the whole 
 remained much the same. 
 
 Nasadiya Hymn. 
 
 i. There was then neither what is nor what is not, there 
 was no sky, nor the heaven which is beyond. What covered ? 
 Where was it, and in whose shelter ? Was the water the deep 
 abyss (in which it lay)?
 
 NASADIYA HYMN. 65 
 
 2. There was no death, hence was there nothing immortal. 
 There was no light (distinction) between night and day. That 
 One breathed by itself without breath, other than it there has 
 been nothing. 
 
 3. Darkness there was, in the beginning all this was a sea 
 without light ; the germ that lay covered by the husk, that 
 One was born by the power of heat (Tapas). 
 
 4. Love overcame it in the beginning, which was the seed 
 springing from mind ; poets having searched in their heart 
 found by wisdom the bond of what is in what is not. 
 
 5. Their ray which was stretched across, was it below or was 
 it above? There were seed-bearers, there were powers, self- 
 power below, and will above. 
 
 6. Who then knows, who has declared it here, from whence 
 was born this creation ? The gods came later than this creation, 
 who then knows whence it arose ? 
 
 7. He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it 
 or did not make it, the Highest Seer in the highest heaven, he 
 forsooth knows ; or does even he not know ? 
 
 There are several passages in this hymn which, 
 in spite of much labour spent on them by eminent 
 scholars, remain as obscure now as they were to me 
 in 1859. The poet himself is evidently not quite clear 
 in his own mind, and he is constantly oscillating 
 between a personal and impersonal or rather super- 
 personal cause from whence the universe emanated. 
 But the step from a sexual to a sexless god, from a 
 mythological Trpcoros to a metaphysical irpw-rov, had 
 evidently been made at that early time, and with it 
 the decisive step from mythology to philosophy had 
 been taken. It is strange to meet with this bold guess 
 in a collection of hymns the greater part of which 
 consists of what must seem to us childish petitions 
 addressed to the numerous Devas or gods of nature. 
 Even the question which in Europe was asked at 
 a much later date, where the Creator could have
 
 66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 found a TTOV o-rco for creating the world out of 
 matter or out of nothing, had evidently passed 
 through the minds of the Vedic seers when they 
 asked, Rv. X, 8 1 , 2 and 4 : 'What was the stand, what 
 was the support, what and how was it, from whence 
 the all-seeing Visvakarman produced by his might 
 the earth and stretched out the sky ?' These start- 
 ling outbursts of philosophic thought seem indeed 
 to require the admission of a long continued effort 
 of meditation and speculation before so complete 
 a rupture with the old conception of physical gods 
 could have become possible. We must not, how- 
 ever, measure every nation with the same measure. 
 It is not necessary that the historical progress of 
 thought, whether religious or philosophical, should 
 have been exactly the same in every country, nor 
 must we forget that there always have been pri- 
 vileged individuals whose mind was untrammelled 
 by the thoughts of the great mass of the people, and 
 who saw and proclaimed, as if inspired by a power 
 not themselves, truths far beyond the reach of their 
 fellow men. It must have required considerable 
 boldness, when surrounded by millions who never 
 got tired of celebrating the mighty deeds achieved 
 by such Devas as Agni, Indra, Soma, Savitr/, or 
 Varu/ja, to declare that these gods were nothing but 
 names of a higher power which was at first without 
 any name at all, called simply Tad Ekam, that One, 
 and afterwards addressed by such dark names as 
 Brahman and Atman. The poets who utter these 
 higher truths seem fully conscious of their own 
 weakness in grasping them. Thus, in I, 167, 5 and 
 6, the poet says : 
 
 'As a fool, ignorant in my own mind. I ask for the hidden
 
 NASADlYA HYMN. 67 
 
 places of the gods ; the sages, in order to weave, stretched the 
 seven strings over the newborn calf 1 .' 
 
 ' Not having discovered I ask the sages who may have dis- 
 covered, not knowing, in order to know : he who supported the 
 six skies in the form of the unborn was he perchance that 
 One?' 
 
 And again in ver. 4 of the same hymn : 
 
 ' Who has seen the firstborn, when he who had no bones 
 (no form) bears him that has bones (form)? Where is the 
 breath of the earth, the blood, the self? Who went to one 
 who knows, to ask this ? ' 
 
 In all this it is quite clear that the poets them- 
 selves who proclaimed the great truth of the One, 
 as the substance of all the gods, did not claim any 
 inspiration ab extra, but strove to rise by their own 
 exertions out of the clouds of their foolishness towards 
 the perception of a higher truth. The wise, as they 
 said, had perceived in their heart what was the 
 bond between what is and what is not, between the 
 visible and the invisible, between the phenomenal 
 and the real, and hence also between the individual 
 gods worshipped by the multitude, and that One 
 Being which was .free from the character of a mere 
 Deva, entirely free from mythology, from parentage 
 and sex, and, if endowed with personality at all, 
 then so far only as personality was necessary for will. 
 This was very different from the vulgar personality 
 ascribed by the Greeks to their Zeus or Aphro- 
 dite, nay even by many Jews and Christians to their 
 Jehovah or God. All this represented an enormous 
 progress, and it is certainly difficult to imagine how 
 
 1 This calf seems meant for the year, and in the seven 
 strings we might see a distant recollection of a year of seven 
 seasons ; see Galen, v. 347. Prar/apati is often identified with 
 the year. 
 
 F 2
 
 68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it could have been achieved at that early period and, 
 as it were, in the midst of prayers and sacrifices 
 addressed to a crowd of such decidedly personal and 
 mythological Devas as Indra and Agni and all the 
 rest. Still it was achieved ; and whatever is the 
 age when the collection of our Rig-veda-sawhita 
 was finished, it was before that age that the con- 
 viction had been formed that there is but One. One 
 Being, neither male nor female, a Being raised high 
 above all the conditions and limitations of per- 
 sonality and of human nature, and nevertheless the 
 Being that was really meant by all such names as 
 Indra, Agni, Matarisvan, nay even by the name of 
 Prar/apati, lord of creatures. In fact the Vedic 
 poets had arrived at a conception of the Godhead 
 which was reached once more by some of the Christian 
 philosophers of Alexandria, but which even at pre- 
 sent is beyond the reach of many who call them- 
 selves Christians. 
 
 Before that highest point of religious speculation 
 was reached, or, it may be, even at the same time, 
 for chronology is very difficult to apply to the 
 spontaneous intuitions of philosophical truths, many 
 efforts had been made in the same direction. Such 
 names as Brahman and Atman, which afterwards 
 became so important as the two main supports of 
 Vedanta-philosophy, or Purusha, the name of the 
 transcendent soul as used in the Sawkhya system, 
 do not spring into life without a long previous 
 incubation. 
 
 Brahman, its various Meanings. 
 
 If then we find Bnihman used as another name 
 of what before was called Tad Ekam, That One, 
 if later on we meet with such questions as
 
 BRAHMAN, ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. 69 
 
 ' Was Brahman the first cause ? Whence are we 
 born ? By what do we live ? Whither are we 
 hastening ? By whom constrained do we obtain 
 our lot in life whether of happiness or of misery, 
 
 ye knowers of Brahman ? Is time, is the nature 
 of things, is necessity, is accident, are the elements, 
 or is Purusha to be considered the source ?' 
 
 We naturally ask, first of all, whence came these 
 names ? What did Brdhman mean so as to become 
 fit to signify rb ovroos ov ? It is curious to observe 
 how lightly this question has been answered l . Brali- 
 man, it was said by Dr. Haug, means prayer, and 
 was derived from the root Barh or Bn'h, to swell 
 or to grow, so that originally it would have meant 
 what swells or grows. He then assigned to Brah- 
 man the more abstract meaning of growth and 
 welfare, and what causes growth and welfare, 
 namely sacred songs. Lastly, he assigned to Brah- 
 man the meaning of force as manifested in nature, 
 and that of universal force as the Supreme Being. 
 
 1 confess I can see no continuity in this string of 
 thought. Other scholars, however, have mostly 
 repeated the same view. Dr. Muir starts from Brah- 
 man in the sense of prayer, while with the ordinary 
 change of accent Brahman means he who prays. 
 
 Here the first question seems to be how Brdhman 
 could have come to mean prayer. Prof. Roth main- 
 tained that Brahman expressed the force of will 
 directed to the gods ; and he gave as the first mean- 
 ing of Brahman, ' Die als Drang und Fiille des 
 Gemiiths auftretende und den Goiter n zustrebende 
 Andacht,' words difficult to render into intelligible 
 
 1 M. M., Theosophy, p. 240.
 
 JO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 English. The second meaning, according to him, is 
 a sacred or magic formula ; then sacred and divine 
 words, opposed to ordinary language ; sacred wisdom, 
 holy life ; lastly, the absolute or impersonal god. 
 These are mighty strides of thought, but how are 
 they to be derived one from the other I 
 
 Prof. Deussen (p. i o) sees in Brahman ' prayer,' 
 the lifting up of the will above one's own in- 
 dividuality of which we become conscious in religious 
 meditation. I must confess that here too there 
 seem to be several missing links in the chain of 
 meanings. Though the idea of prayer as swelling 
 or exalted thought may be true with us, there is 
 little, if any, trace of such thoughts in the Veda. 
 Most of the prayers there are very matter-of-fact 
 petitions, and all that has been said of the swelling 
 of the heart, the elevation of the mind, the fervid 
 impulse of the will, as expressed by the word Brahman, 
 seems to me decidedly modern, and without any 
 analogies in the Veda itself. When it is said that the 
 hymns make the gods grow (Vndh),this is little more 
 than what we mean by saying that they magnify the 
 gods (Deussen, 1. c., p. 245). Even if a more pro- 
 found intention were supposed to be necessary for the 
 word Brahman in the sense of prayer, there would 
 be nothing to prevent its having originally grown 
 out of Brdhman in the sense of word. Of course 
 we cannot expect perfect certainty in a matter like 
 this, when we are trying to discover the almost 
 imperceptible transitions by which a root which 
 expresses the idea of growing forth (Vriddhau), 
 growing strong, bursting forth, increasing, came to 
 supply a name for prayer as well as for deity. This 
 evolution of thought must have taken place long
 
 BRAHMAN, ITS VARIOUS MEANINGS. 7! 
 
 before the Vedic period, long before the Aryan 
 Separation, long before the final constitution of the 
 Aryan language of India. We can but guess there- 
 fore, and we should never forget this in trying to 
 interpret the faint traces which the earliest steps 
 of the human mind have left on the half-petrified 
 sands of our language. That Brahman means prayer 
 is certain, and that the root BHh meant to grow, 
 to break forth, is equally certain, and admitted by 
 all. What is uncertain are the intermediate links 
 connecting the two. 
 
 I suppose, and I can say no more, that Vn'h or 
 BHh, which I take to be a parallel form of VHdh, 
 to grow, meant to grow, to come forth, to spread. 
 Hence Brihat means simply great (like great from 
 growing), broad, strong ; Barhish^a, strongest. We 
 should note, however, though we cannot attribute 
 much importance to the fact, that BHmhati and 
 BHmhayati also w r ere quoted by Indian gram- 
 marians in the sense of speaking and shining. 
 Here we can see that speaking could originally 
 have had the meaning of uttering, and that ' word ' 
 has been conceived as that which breaks forth, or 
 is uttered, an utterance (Ausdruck), as we say. 
 
 The next step to consider is the name Brihas- 
 pati. We must start from the fact that Brzhaspati 
 is synonymous with Ya/ias-pati, lord of speech. 
 Unless Brih had once meant speech, it would have 
 been impossible to form such a name as Br/has-pati, 
 as little as Brahma?^as-pati could have been possible 
 without Brahman 1 . 
 
 1 See /fAand. Up. I, 2, u, vag ghi br/hati, tasya esha patih ; 
 and VII, 2,2, yo va&am brahma * ity upasate. Cf. Br/h. I, 3, 20.
 
 72 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 From this point once gained I make the next 
 step and suppose that Brdh-nlan was formed to 
 express what was uttered, what broke forth, or 
 shone forth, that is, the word or speech. , If we 
 have arrived at this, we can easily understand how 
 the general concept of word was specialised in the 
 sense both of sacred utterance or formula and of 
 prayer ; without any idea of swelling meditation or 
 lifting up of hearts, so alien to Vedic poets, such as 
 they are known to us. But if I am right in seeing 
 in Brdhman the original meaning of what breaks 
 forth, of a force that manifests itself in audible 
 speech, it will become easy to understand how 
 Brahman could also, from the very beginning though 
 in a different direction, have been used as a name 
 of that universal force which manifests itself in 
 the creation of a visible universe. We need not 
 suppose that it had to ascend a scale first from 
 holy word, holy wisdom to the source of that wis- 
 dom, the absolute god. 
 
 Bnh and Brahman, Word. 
 
 We may suppose therefore I say no more that 
 Brdhman meant force or even germ, so far as it 
 bursts forth, whether in speech or in nature l . But 
 now comes a much more perplexing question. It 
 can hardly be doubted that Vrih or BHh is a parallel 
 form of VHdh ; and it is a well-known fact that both 
 the Latin vei'bum and the German Wort can be 
 regularly derived from the same root, corresponding 
 to a possible Sanskrit Vw'h-a or Widh-a. In that 
 
 1 Divyadasa Datta quotes a passage from the YogavasishMa : 
 ' Brahmavn'wihaiva hi ^agarj, ^/aga/c A'a brahmavnwhanam 
 (Vedantism, p. 28).
 
 Bfl/H AND BRAHMAN, WORD. 73 
 
 case Brd,h man also may be taken as a direct deri- 
 vation in the sense of the uttered word, and 
 brahman as the speaker, the utterer. So far we 
 are still on safe ground, and in the present state 
 of our knowledge I should not venture to go much 
 beyond. But Colebrooke and other Vedic scholars 
 have often pointed out the fact that in the Veda 
 already we find a goddess Va&, speech, which we 
 met in Va&as-pati and BHhas-pdti *, the lord of 
 speech. This Va&, as Colebrooke pointed out as 
 early as 1805, was 'the active power of Brahma, 
 proceeding from him 2 .' After reading Colebrooke's 
 remarks on it, few Sanskrit scholars could help 
 being reminded of the Logos or the Word that was 
 in the beginning, that was with God, and by whom 
 all things were made. The important question, 
 however, which, even after Colebrooke's remarks, 
 remained still undecided, was whether this idea of 
 the creative Word was borrowed by the Greeks from 
 India, or by the Indians from Greece, or whether 
 it was an idea that sprang up independently in 
 both countries. This is a question the answer of 
 which must lead to the most far-reaching con- 
 sequences. Professor Weber in his 'Indische Studien,' 
 IX, 473, published an article with the object of 
 showing that ' the Logos-idea had no antecedents 
 in Greece to account for it.' This was certainly 
 a startling assertion, but in the face of well-known 
 facts he added : ' Without wishing to give a de- 
 
 1 In the Rig-veda we have only va'/ca/i pate, X, 166, 3, as two 
 words; and again patiw vaA'a/i, IX, 26, 4. Brahma^as pati/i 
 occurs frequently in Eig-veda, as II, 23, i, gyeshtharag&m 
 brahnia^am. brahma^as pate, &c. 
 
 2 Miscellaneous Essays, I, p. 28.
 
 74 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cision on this question, the surmise is obvious, 
 considering the close relations at that time existing 
 between Alexandria and India, that the growth of 
 this Neoplatonic idea was influenced by the like 
 views of the philosophical systems of India.' He 
 says again, ' that it may have been simply on 
 account of the invigorating influence which the gods 
 were believed to derive from the hymns, that the 
 goddess of Speech was conceived as furnishing to 
 Pra^/apati the strength of creation, though at last, 
 particularly in the shape of Om, she obtained the 
 highest position, being identified with the absolute 
 Brahman.' 
 
 I hope I have thus given a correct account of 
 Professor Weber's somewhat vague yet startling 
 assertion, that the Alexandrian Logos idea had no 
 antecedents in Greek philosophy, but was influenced 
 by the Vedic VaA;. There are, no doubt, similarities, 
 but there are dissimilarities also which ought not 
 to be ignored. To say nothing else, VaA' is a 
 feminine, Logos a masculine, and that involves more 
 than a difference of grammatical gender. 
 
 I have tried to show in my ' Lectures on Theo- 
 sophy,' that the facts of the case lead us to a very 
 different, nay to the very opposite opinion. If I 
 did not enter on a discussion of the arguments 
 which were intended to prove the absence of 
 antecedents of the Alexandrian Logos idea in Greek 
 philosophy, it was because I thought it better to 
 state the facts as they really are, without entering 
 on any useless controversy, leaving classical and 
 Sanskrit scholars to form their own conclusions. 
 While Professor Weber had asserted that the Logos 
 appears in Alexandria without any preparatory steps,
 
 BtfTH AND BRAHMAN, WORD. 75 
 
 I did my best to point out these very steps leading 
 up to the Logos, which are very well known to every 
 student of the early history of Greek philosophy 1 . 
 If I have succeeded in this, the presumption in 
 favour of any Indian influence having been exercised 
 on the philosophers of Alexandria, would fall to the 
 ground of itself, and the claims of India and 
 Greece would be equal so far as the original idea 
 of the Word, as a potentia of the absolute Being, 
 was concerned. ' Real Indian philosophy,' I had 
 said before, ' even in that embryonic form in which 
 we find it in the Upanishads, stands completely 
 by itself. We cannot claim for it any historical 
 relationship with the earliest Greek philosophy. 
 The two are as independent of each other as the 
 Greek Charis, when she has become the wife of 
 Hephaestos, is of the Haritas, the red horses 
 of the Vedic Dawn' (p. 79). 
 
 Then the question arose, was there at least a 
 distant relationship, such as exists between Charis 
 and the Haritas, between Zeus and Dyaus, between 
 VaA; and the Logos also ? As there were no lin- 
 guistic indications whatever in support of such a 
 view, I arrived in the end at the conclusion, that 
 striking as are the coincidences between the Vedic 
 Va& and the Greek Logos, we must here also admit 
 that what was possible in India was possible in Greece 
 likewise, and that we have no evidence to support us 
 in any further conclusions. In all this I thought 
 that facts would speak far better than words. It is 
 quite true that Professor Weber was careful to add 
 
 1 Theosophy, p. 384, The Historical Antecedents of the 
 Logos.
 
 76 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the clause ' that he did not intend to give any 
 opinion on this question/ hut after such a confession 
 it is hardly becoming to hint that those who have 
 given an opinion on this question, had derived their 
 information from him. It is easy to state the pros 
 and cons, the Purvapaksha and the Uttarapaksha, 
 but both are meant in the end to lead on to 
 the Siddhanta, the conclusion. Even stronger 
 coincidences between VaA; and the Sophia of the 
 Old Testament 1 might have been adduced, for as 
 we read of Va& as the companion of Pra(/apati 2 , 
 Wisdom, in Prov. viii. 30, is made to say, ' I was by 
 him, as one brought up with him ; and I was daily 
 his delight, rejoicing always before him.' 
 
 While in the Kanaka we read of VaX* being 
 impregnated by Pra</apati, we read in Prov. viii. 22, 
 ' The Eternal possessed me in the beginning of his 
 way, before his works of old.' 
 
 But with all this I cannot admit that there is 
 any evidence of borrowing or of any kind of in- 
 teraction between Indian and Greek philosophy, 
 and I should have thought that after the historical 
 antecedents of the Logos and the Logoi in Greece 
 had been clearly laid open, the idea of the Greeks 
 having borrowed their Logos from Vedic VaA- or 
 from the 0. T. Sophia, would not have been re- 
 vived. The historical consequences of such an 
 admission would carry us very far indeed, and it 
 would require a far stronger lever to lift and to 
 remove the weight of evidence on the other side . 
 than the arguments hitherto brought forward. If 
 
 1 M. M., Theosophy, p. 381. 
 
 2 KAMaka 12, 5 (27, i).
 
 EAST AND WEST. 77 
 
 the Greeks had really borrowed their idea of the 
 Logos from India, why should they not have adopted 
 any of the consequences that followed from it ? 
 
 East and West. 
 
 This requires some fuller consideration. Every 
 indication of a possible intellectual intercourse 
 between Greeks and Hindus in ancient as well as 
 in more modern times, has been carefully noted and 
 strongly urged of late, but I feel bound to say that, 
 particularly for ancient times, nothing beyond mere 
 possibilities of an exchange of religious or philoso- 
 phical ideas between Greece and India has as yet 
 been established. It seems not to have been perceived 
 that an exchange of philosophical thought is very 
 different from an adoption of useful arts, such as 
 alphabetic writing, astronomical observations, coined 
 money, or articles of trade whether jewels, wood, or 
 clothing materials. It is only a philosopher that 
 can teach or influence a philosopher, and even in 
 the cases of two such men meeting, the difficulties of 
 an interchange of thought, without a perfect know- 
 ledge of the languages, are far greater than we 
 imagine. We have an instance of a foreign philoso- 
 pher becoming a proficient in the philosophical 
 language of India in the case of Hiouen-thsang. Has 
 he left any trace of Chinese thought, whether de- 
 rived from Confucius or Lao-tze, in India ? Modern 
 missionaries, if unsuccessful in conversions, may, no 
 doubt, have left some imprint of Christianity and 
 European philosophy on the native mind, but the 
 position of the Christian missionary in India, ac- 
 credited by membership in the ruling race, is very 
 different from what the position of a few Buddhist
 
 78 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 monks could possibly have been in ancient times, even 
 if they had reached Alexandria, and learnt to speak 
 and converse on certain subjects in Greek or Egyptian. 
 A courier may be very conversant with French or 
 Italian, but let him try to discuss metaphysical 
 questions, or even to translate a book of Vico's into 
 English, and it will be perceived what difference 
 there is between an interpreter and a philosopher 
 capable of discussing religious and metaphysical 
 problems. 
 
 That there was a time when the ancestors of the 
 Aryan speakers had the same language and held 
 many of their mythological and religious names and 
 ideas in common, is no longer doubted, though, even 
 here, we must be satisfied with names, and could not 
 expect common mythological speculations. Later 
 contact between Indians and Greeks, whether in 
 Persia, Asia Minor or Greece, assumed no importance 
 till we come to the invasion of Asia Minor, Persia, and 
 India by Alexander the Great. But long before that 
 time both Greeks and Hindus had invented many 
 tilings, such as kings, priests, numbers, and seasons, 
 marriages and funerals, without our having to imagine 
 that there was at that time any exchange of ideas 
 between the two countries on such points. If then 
 we meet in India as well as in Greece with similar 
 philosophic ideas, as, for instance, with a name 
 meaning atom and with the atomic theory, should 
 we suggest at once that Epicurus must have borrowed 
 his atoms from Kanada, or Kanada his Anus from 
 Epicurus ? It is interesting, no doubt, to point out 
 coincidences between Kapila and Zenon. Pythagoras, 
 Plato and Aristotle, but it is even more interesting 
 to point out the shades of difference in cases where
 
 EAST AND WEST. 79 
 
 they seem most to agree. If the Vedanta could 
 elaborate an ideal Monism, why not the Eleatics as 
 well ? And yet where is there a trace of such a 
 philosophical theory as the absolute identity of 
 Atman (the Self), and Brahman (the absolute being), 
 to be found in Greek philosophy ? Who would see 
 more than a very natural coincidence between the 
 Sanskrit triad of Dharma, virtue, Artha, wealth, 
 Kama, love, and the Platonic TO, KaXd, what is good, TO, 
 o0eAi/ia 3 what is useful, and TO, -fjSea what is pleasant ? 
 How widely the triad of thought, word, and deed 
 is spread has been shown very clearly by my old 
 friend Professor Co well and others, but no one 
 would venture to accuse either Greeks or Indians of 
 borrowing or of theft on such evidence. 
 
 The real character of most of these coincidences 
 between Greek and Hindu philosophy, is best 
 exhibited by the often attempted identification of 
 the names of Pythagoras and Buddha-guru. At 
 first sight it is certainly startling, but if traced back 
 to its origin, it evaporates completely. First of all, 
 Buddha-guru does not occur, least of all as a name 
 of the teacher Buddha, and whether as a common 
 Aryan name or as borrowed, Pytha could never be 
 the same as Buddha, or Goras as Guru. The belief 
 in transmigration among the Buddhists, besides 
 being borrowed from the Veda, is very different from 
 that of Pythagoras and other philosophers, both 
 civilised and uncivilised, while ascetic practices were 
 certainly not confined to either India or Greece. 
 
 It is quite true that after Alexander's conquests, 
 and after the establishment of a Bactrian kingdom, 
 in the North of India, there was a more real intercourse 
 even between philosophers of Greek and Indian origin,
 
 8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and many of the facts bearing on this subject have 
 been very carefully put together by Count Goblet 
 d'Alviella in his Ce que I'lnde doit a la Grece, 1897. 
 But even he brings forward coincidences, which 
 require more convincing proofs. With regard to 
 Indian coinage, it should be observed that the three 
 gods mentioned by Patafkjrali as used for commerce, 
 i.e. on coins, are the very gods found on the earliest 
 Mauryan coins, >Siva, Skanda, and Visakha, cf. Psm. 
 V, 3 5 99 > provided that Visakha can refer to Kama 
 shooting his arrows ? 
 
 It cannot be doubted that the art of coining money 
 was introduced into India by the Greeks, and if the 
 images of Indian gods and even of Buddha on ancient 
 coins, may be supposed to have favoured idolatry in 
 India, that too may be admitted. Indian gods, how- 
 ever, were anthropomorphic, had legs and arms, heads, 
 noses and eyes, as early as the Veda, and the absence 
 of workable stone in many parts of India would 
 naturally have been unfavourable to a development 
 of sculptured idols. The Hindus had a god of love in 
 the Veda, but he was very different from the Kama, 
 imaged on more modern coins as an archer sitting 
 on the back of a parrot. 
 
 We are now in possession of specimens of much 
 earlier Greek workmanship in India, than this Kama 
 on the back of a parrot, nor is there any reason to 
 doubt that the idea of temples or monasteries or 
 monuments, built and carved in stone, came from 
 Greece, while some of the Indian architecture, even 
 when in stone, shows as clear surviving traces of 
 a native wood-architecture as, for instance, the 
 Lycian tombs. 
 
 The later influence which Christianity is supposed
 
 EAST AND WEST. 8 1 
 
 to have exercised in originating or in powerfully 
 influencing the sectarian worship of K?'istma does not 
 concern us here, for, if it should be admitted at all, 
 it would have to be referred to a much later period 
 than that which gave rise to the six systems of 
 philosophy. Ever since the beginning of Sanskrit 
 studies, nay even before, these startling similarities 
 between Krishna and Christos have been pointed '^ 
 out again and again. But iteration yields no strength 
 to argument, and we are as far as ever from being 
 able to point to any historical channel through 
 which the legends of Christ or Kn'srma could have 
 travelled. No one can deny the similarities, such 
 as they are, but no one, I believe, can account for 
 them. Some of those who have been most anxious to 
 gather coincidences between the Bhagavad-gitsi and 
 the New Testament, have been rightly warned by 
 native scholars themselves, that they should learn 
 to translate both Sanskrit and Greek before they 
 venture to compare. It should not be forgotten j 
 that as the Bhagavad-gita bears the title of Upani- 
 shad, it may belong to the end of the Upanishad- 
 period, and may, as the late Professor Telang 
 maintained, be older even than the New Testament. 
 If Damascius tells us that there were Brahmans 
 living at Alexandria l , we must not forget that this 
 refers to the end of the fifth century A. D., and 
 does not help us much even as indicating the way 
 by which the idea of the Creative Word could 
 have reached Clement of Alexandria or Origen. 
 That Clement of Alexandria knew the name of 
 Butta is well known, he even knew that he had 
 
 1 See Goblet d'Alviella, I.e., p. 167. 
 G
 
 82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 been taken for a god. Nor should it be forgotten, 
 that Pantaenus who, according to Eusebius, had 
 preached the Gospel in India, was one of the teachers 
 of Clement. But all this is far from proving that 
 Clement or Origen was able to study the Vedanta- 
 Sutras or the Buddhist Abhidharmas, or that their 
 opinions were influenced by a few Indian travellers 
 staying at Alexandria who cared for none of these 
 things. 
 
 Some of the coincidences between Buddhism and 
 Christianity are certainly startling, particularly by 
 their number, but in several cases they exist on 
 the surface only and are not calculated to carry 
 conviction on one side or the other. I have treated 
 of them on several occasions, for the last time in my 
 paper on ' Coincidences,' but the same coincidences, 
 which have been proved to be anything but real 
 coincidences, are repeated again and again. The 
 story of Buddha sitting under an Indian fig-tree 
 (faux religiosa) has nothing whatever in common 
 with Nathaniel sitting under a Palestinian fig-tree, 
 and the parable of the Prodigal Son in the Buddhist 
 scriptures is surely very different in spirit from that 
 in the New Testament. There remain quite sufficient 
 similarities to startle and perplex us, without our 
 dragging in what has no power of proving anything-. 
 No critical historian would listen for one moment to 
 such arguments as have been used to establish a real 
 exchange of thought between India and Europe in 
 ancient times. On this point we owe a great deal 
 to students of ethnology, who have pointed out 
 coincidences quite as startling between the religious 
 and philosophical folklore of uncivilised and civilised 
 faces, without venturing to suggest any borrowing
 
 EAST AND WEST. 83 
 
 or any historical community of origin. The 
 bridge, for instance, which seems so peculiar to the 
 Persians, had its antecedents as far back as the 
 Veda, and is matched by a similar bridge among 
 the North American Indians 2 . I say, a similar 
 bridge, for it differs also, as I pointed out, very 
 characteristically from the Persian bridge. Again, 
 it is well known that the creation of the world by 
 the Word has been discovered among so low a race 
 as the Klamaths 3 , but no one has ventured to say 
 that the two accounts had a common origin or were 
 borrowed one from the other. This should serve as 
 a useful warning to those who are so fond of suggest- 
 ing channels through which Indian thought might 
 have influenced Palestine or Greece, and vice versa. 
 No doubt, such channels were there ; neither 
 mountains nor seas would have formed impassable 
 barriers. Besides, Buddhism, as early as the third 
 century B.C., was certainly a missionary religion 
 quite as much as Christianity was at a later time. 
 Alexandria was known by name, as Alasando, to 
 the author of the Mahavamsa 4 . On the other hand, 
 the name of King Gondaphoros, who is mentioned 
 in the legend of St. Thomas' travels to India, has 
 been authenticated on Indo-Parthian coins as Gondo- 
 phares, likewise the name of his nephew Abdayases, 
 and possibly, according to M. S. Levi, that of 
 Vasu Deva as Misdeos. All this is true, and shows 
 that the way between Alexandria and Benares was 
 wide open in the first century A. D. Nor should 
 
 1 Contributions to the Science of Mythology. 
 
 2 Theosophy, p. 168. 3 Theosophy, p. 383. 
 4 Le Comte d'Alviella. I.e., p. 177. 
 
 G 2
 
 84 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between 
 Milinda and Nagasena we have a well authenticated 
 case of a Greek king (Menandros), and of a Buddhist 
 philosopher, discussing together some of the highest 
 problems of philosophy and religion. All this is true, 
 and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered 
 a Greek or Indian go-between in flagrante delicto. 
 We have before us ever so many possibilities, nay 
 even probabilities, but we could not expect any 
 bond jide historian to accept any one of them as 
 a proof of a real influence having been exercised 
 by Greece on India or by India on Greece, at 
 a time when Greek philosophy and religion might 
 still have been amenable to Eastern guides, or 
 Indian schools of thought might have gratefully 
 received fresh impulses from the West. Though the 
 literature of India has no trustworthy chronology, 
 still, unless the whole structure of the literary develop- 
 ment of India is once more to be revolutionised, 
 we can hardly imagine that the occurrence of such 
 names as Bodda and Zarades (Zoroaster) among 
 the followers of Mani, or that of Terebinthos the 
 pupil of Scythianos l , the very founder of the 
 Manichaean sect in Babylon, would help us to 
 discover the secret springs of the wisdom of Kapila 
 or Buddha /SVikya Muni. They may point out 
 whence these heresiarchs derived their wisdom, but 
 they leave the question which concerns us here 
 totally untouched. Gorres, in spite of all his mysti- 
 cism, was right when he looked for a similarity 
 
 1 It has been suggested that Scythianos may have been an 
 adaptation of .S'akya the Scythian, a name of Buddha, and 
 Terebinthos may contain traces of Thera (elder). All this is 
 possible, but no more.
 
 EAST AND WEST. 85 
 
 in technical terms in order to establish an Indian 
 influence on Greek or a Greek influence on Indian 
 philosophy. His principle was right, though he 
 applied it wrongly. It is the same as in Com- 
 parative Mythology. There may be ever so many 
 similarities between two mythologies, such as changes 
 of men and women into animals or plants, worship 
 of trees and ancestors, belief in spirits and visions 
 in sleep or dreams, but one such equation as Dyaus = 
 Zeus, is more convincing than all of them taken 
 together. If people ask why, they might as well 
 ask why the discovery of one coin with the name 
 of Augustus on it is a more convincing proof of 
 Roman influence in India than the discovery of 
 ever so many pieces of uncoined gold. 
 
 To return to the origin of the word Brahman. 
 Tempting l as the distant relationship between Bra'h- 
 man and ~Brih, in the sense of speech, with verbum 
 and Word may be, we could not admit it without 
 admitting at the same time a community of thought, 
 and of deep philosophical thought, at a period 
 
 1 There is a curious passage in Bhartnhari's BrahmakawcZa 
 which seems to identify Speech and Brahman. See Sarva- 
 darsana-sangraha, Bibl. Ind., p. 140: 
 
 Anadinidhanam Ibrahma sabdatattvam yad aksharam, 
 
 Vivartate*rthabhavena prakriya gag&to yatha. 
 
 Brahman without beginning or end, which is the eternal 
 
 essence of speech, 
 Is changed into the form of things, like the evolution 
 
 of the world. 
 
 Equally strong is the statement of Madhava himself, Sphote- 
 khyo niravayavo nitya/i sabdo brahmaiveti, ' The eternal word 
 which is called Spho^a and does not consist of parts, is indeed 
 Brahman.'
 
 86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 previous to the Aryan Separation ; and we certainly 
 have no evidence sufficiently strong to support so 
 bold a hypothesis. What we may carry away 
 from a consideration of the facts hitherto examined 
 is that in India itself Brahman, as a name of the 
 TrpvTov KIVOVV, need not have passed through a stage 
 when Brdhman meant prayer only, and that Brah- 
 man, prayer, could not have assumed the meaning of 
 the object of prayers, that is, the Universal Spirit, 
 who never required any prayers at all. 
 
 In order to show what direction the thoughts 
 connected with Va& took in the Veda, I shall first 
 of all subjoin here a few passages from the hymns, 
 the Brahma?ias and Upanishads : 
 
 Va, speech, speaking in her own name, is intro- 
 duced in hymn X, 125, also in Atharva-veda IV, 30, 
 as saying : 
 
 ' i. I wander with the Vasus and the Kudras, 
 I wander with the Adityas and the Visve Devas, 
 I support Mitra and Varima both, I support Agni 
 and the two Asvins ; 
 
 2. I support the swelling (?) Soma, I support 
 Tvashfr't and Pushan and Bhaga. I bestow wealth on 
 the zealous offerer, on the sacrificer who presses Soma. 
 
 3. I am the queen, the gatherer of riches, the 
 knowing, first of those who merit worship ; the 
 gods have thus established me in many places, 
 staying with many, entering into many. 
 
 4. By me it is that he who sees, he who breathes, 
 lie who hears what is spoken, eats food ; without 
 knowing it, they rest on me. Hear, one and all ! 
 1 tell thee what I believe. (?) 
 
 5. I, even I myself, say this, what is good for 
 gods, and also for men ; whomsoever I love, him
 
 EAST AND WEST. 87 
 
 I make formidable, him I make a Brahman, him 
 a Rishi, him a sage. 
 
 6. I bend the bow for Rudra (the storm-god) that 
 his arrow may strike the hater of Brahman ; I make 
 war for the people, I have entered both heaven 
 and earth. 
 
 7. I bring forth the (my ?) father (Dyaus) on the 
 summit of this world, my origin is in the waters, 
 in the sea ; from thence I spread over all beings, 
 and touch yonder heaven with my height. 
 
 8. I indeed spread forth like the wind, to lay 
 hold 011 all things, beyond the sky, beyond the 
 earth ; such have I become through my greatness.' 
 
 I ask is there any trace in these utterances of the 
 thoughts that led in the end to the conception of 
 the Greek Logos? There is another hymn (X, 71) 
 which is very obscure and has for the first time 
 been rendered more intelligible by Professor Deussen 
 (A. G. P., p. 148), where we meet with some im- 
 portant remarks showing that language formed an 
 object of thought even at that early time. But 
 here also there is nothing, as yet, approaching to 
 the conception of the Word as a creative power. 
 We meet with such observations as that words 
 were made in the beginning in order to reveal what 
 before had been hidden. This is, no doubt, an 
 important thought, showing that those who uttered 
 it had not yet ceased, like ourselves, to wonder at 
 the existence of such a thing as language. The 
 struggle for life that is going on among words is 
 alluded to by saying that the wise made speech by 
 mind (Manas), sifting as by a sieve the coarsely 
 ground flour. The power of speech is greatly ex- 
 tolled, and eloquence is celebrated as a precious
 
 88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gift. All men shout when the eloquent man ap- 
 pears, holding the assembly subdued or spellbound 
 by his words (Sabhasaha), nay he is supposed to 
 remove all sin and to procure sustenance for his 
 friends. The knowledge of all things or, as Deussen 
 says, the knowledge of the origin of things, is 
 taught by the Brahman. 
 
 We meet with passages of a very similar character, 
 in various parts of the Brahmanas. One of the most 
 startling is found in a verse inserted in the Purusha- 
 hymn,as given in the Taittiriya-aranyaka (III, 12,17), 
 ' I know that great sun -coloured Punish a, when on 
 the verge of darkness, he, the wise, rests, addressing 
 them, after having thought all forms, and having 
 made their names.' Here we have only to translate 
 forms by e'i'Sr), and names by Aoyof, and we shall 
 not be very far from the world of thought in which 
 Plato and Aristotle 1 moved. 
 
 But although we can discover in this hymn an 
 appreciation of the mysterious nature of speech, we 
 look in vain for the clear and definite idea that 
 language and thought are one, which can be so 
 clearly read in the Greek word Logos, both word 
 and thought, nor do we find more than slight 
 anticipations of the Neo-platonist dogma that the 
 creation of the universe was in reality an utter- 
 ance of the hidden thoughts and words of the 
 Deity. 
 
 Mind and Speech. 
 
 The following passages will give some idea of 
 what was thought in India about mind and lan- 
 guage and their mutual relation. They may be 
 
 Sec Deussen, I.e., p. 290.
 
 MIND AND SPEECH. 89 
 
 vague and mystical, but they show at all events that 
 a good deal of thought must have been expended 
 by the early thinkers of India on this problem, the 
 nature of speech and the relation between speech and 
 thought. 
 
 $atap. Brahmana VI, i, i : 'Pra^apati, after having 
 created the Veda (Brahman, neut.), created the 
 waters out of Va& (speech), for Va& was his. That 
 was created (sent forth). He then entered the 
 waters with Brahman, i.e. the threefold Veda, and 
 there arose from the water an egg which he touched 
 and commanded to multiply. Then from the egg 
 there arose first Brahman, neut., that is, the three- 
 fold Veda.' 
 
 Paft&avimsa Brahmana XX, 14, 2 : ' Pra(/apati 
 alone was this, and Va& was his own, Va& as the 
 second. He thought, Let me create (send forth) 
 this Va&, for she will go and become all this.' 
 
 $atap. Brahm. VII, 5, 2, 21 : ' The unborn is Va/j, 
 and from Va& Visvakarman (the all-maker) begat 
 living beings.' 
 
 Bn'h. Ar. Up. I, 5, 3 : 'The Atman consists of 
 speech, mind, and breath. There are also the three 
 worlds ; speech is this world, mind the air, breath 
 the sky. The same are the three Vedas, speech 
 the Eig-veda, mind the Ya^/ur-veda, breath the 
 Sama-veda. The same are gods, ancestors, and 
 men, speech the gods, mind the ancestors, breath 
 men, &c.' 
 
 ~Brih. Ar. Up. I, i, 24 : 'He desired, let a second 
 body be born of me, and he (death or hunger) em- 
 braced speech with his mind.' 
 
 And ibid. I, 4, 17 : 'This world in the beginning 
 was Atman (Self), alone and lonely. He desired,
 
 90 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 May I have a wife . . . Manas (mind) is the Self, 
 speech the wife, breath the child.' 
 
 The same or very similar and often contradictory 
 ideas occur in later works also. Thus we read in 
 Manu I, 2 1 : 'In the beginning he (Brahma) 
 fashioned from the words of the Veda, the several 
 names, works, and conditions of all things.' 
 
 And to quote but one passage from the Maha- 
 bharata, /Santi-parva, 8533 : 'In the beginning 
 Vidya (knowledge, Sophia) without beginning or 
 end, the divine Va& (speech) of the Vedas, w r as sent 
 forth by Svayambhu, the self-existent.' 
 
 >Sa??ikara, when treating of Sphofa 1 (word), of which 
 we shall have to treat further on, quotes from the 
 Br/h. Ar. Up. 1, 2, 4 : ' He with his mind united himself 
 with speech,' and he adds an important verse from 
 some Snu'iti : ' In the beginning divine Va&, Speech, 
 eternal, without beginning or end, consisting of 
 Veda, was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all 
 activities proceeded ' ; 
 
 And again : ' In the beginning Mahe,svara shaped 
 from the words of the Veda the names and forms 
 of all beings and the procedure of all acti\'ties.' 
 
 The Laws of Manu, or, more correctly, of the 
 Manavas, the clan of Manu, are no doubt later than 
 the Brahma?(as, but they often contain old thoughts. 
 
 These utterances, to which many more might be 
 added, are certainly vague, and chaotic, and often 
 contradictory, because they sprang from different 
 minds without any prearranged system ; but tbey 
 seem to me to show at all events that thought and 
 language must have occupied the philosophers of 
 
 1 Vod. Sutras I, 3, 28.
 
 MIND AND SPEECH. 9! 
 
 India far more than they did the philosophers of 
 Greece, and even in later times those of modern 
 Europe. And if some of them assigned the first 
 place to thought and others to speech, this also 
 serves to show that at all events these early guessers 
 did not accept language simply as a matter of 
 course, as most of our modern philosophers are so 
 apt to do, but tried hard to discover whence it came 
 and what was its true relation to thought. Thus 
 we read in the /S'atap. Br. I, 4, 5, 8 : 'A dispute once 
 took place between Mind and Speech as to which was 
 the better of the two. Both said, "I am excellent." 
 Mind said : " Surely I am better than thou, for thou 
 dost not speak anything that is not understood by 
 me, and since thou art only an imitator of what 
 is done by me and a follower in my wake, I am 
 surely better than thou." Speech said : " Surely 
 I am better than thou, for what thou knowest 
 I make known, I communicate." 
 
 ' They went to appeal to Pra^apati for his decision, 
 and Pra</apati decided in favour of Mind, &c.' 
 
 In the Anugita (p. 262) we read on the con- 
 trary : ' ihen the lord of speech was produced, that 
 lord of speech looks up to the mind. First, verily, 
 are words produced, and the mind runs after them.' 
 
 Some of the Brahmanic thinkers say in so many 
 words that Speech is Brahman ($atap. Br. II, i, 4, 
 10, Vag vai Brahma), and the co-existence of Brthas- 
 pati and Brahma/zas-pati could hardly have failed 
 to suggest to them the identity of Brahman and 
 BHh in the sense of speech, just as every thought- 
 ful Greek must have known that there was a reason 
 why Logos meant both word and thought. But 
 that ancient chapter of thought which lies beyond
 
 Q2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the childhood of all philosophy is for ever lost to 
 us and can be reconstructed by conjectures only, 
 which, though they produce conviction in some 
 minds, cannot be expected to produce the same 
 in all. 
 
 Taking into account all these scattered indica- 
 tions, I cannot bring myself to accept the evolution 
 of the various meanings of the word Brahman as 
 elaborated by former scholars. I am particularly 
 reluctant to differ on such a point from Professor 
 Deussen. Professor Deussen holds that Brahman 
 had a ritualistic origin (p. 239), and from prayer 
 came to mean he who is prayed to, the Urgrund der 
 Welt, He calls it der zum Heiligen, Gottlichen 
 emporstrebende Wille des Menschen, which is much 
 the same idea to which Roth and others have 
 given currency, but which certainly requires a fuller 
 justification. Instead of beginning with the spe- 
 cialised meaning of prayer, whether ritualistic or un- 
 premeditated, and then rising to the object of prayer, 
 I prefer to begin with Brahman as a synonym of 
 B?vh in Br/haspdti, meaning word or speech, and to 
 admit by the side of it another Brahman, meaning 
 that which utters or drives forth (Pra/t-yavayati) or 
 manifests or creates, that which is the universal 
 support (Skambha) or force (Daksha), in fact the 
 Brdhman, such as we find it afterwards, whether as 
 a neuter, Brahman, or, for more popular purposes, 
 as a masculine, Brahma \ No doubt in those dark 
 passages through which words passed silently be- 
 fore they emerged into the full light of literature, we 
 may often fail to discover the right footsteps of 
 
 1 Tuitt. Br. II, 7, 17, i.
 
 ATMAN. 
 
 93 
 
 their progress, and we must be prepared for differ- 
 ences of opinion. But the really important point is 
 that on which all scholars agree, by assigning to 
 Bnihman the final meaning of TO 6V, TO 6Vro>y 6V, 
 rb TrpcoTov KLVOVV, though, even of those terms, as 
 we shall see, not one corresponds fully and exactly 
 to the character of Brahman as developed in the 
 history of the Indian mind. 
 
 Atman. 
 
 The next word we have to examine is Atman. 
 It is next in importance to Brahman only, and 
 the two together may be called the two pillars on 
 which rests nearly the whole of the edifice of Indian 
 philosophy, more particularly of the Vedanta and 
 Samkhya systems. 
 
 As early as the time of the Apastamba-S&tras, 
 that is, at the end of the Vedic period, we read, I, 8, 
 
 23, i : 
 
 ' The Brahmam who is wise and recognises all 
 things to be in the Atman, who does not become 
 bewildered when pondering (on it), and who recog- 
 nises the Atman in every (created) thing, he shines 
 indeed in heaven . . .' 
 
 And in the same Sutras, I, 8, 23, 2, we find a 
 definition of Brahman, as the cause of the world, 
 which presupposes, as clearly as possible, the preva- 
 lence of Vedantic ideas l at the time of the author 
 of this Sutra : 
 
 ' He who is intelligence itself and subtler than 
 the thread of the lotus-fibre, He who pervades the 
 
 1 Yoga and Mimamsa also are mentioned by name in the 
 Apastamba-Sutras, bnt not yet as definite systems of philo- 
 sophy. Cf. I, 8, 23, 5 ; II, 4, 8, 13.
 
 94 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 universe and who, unchangeable and larger than the 
 earth, contains this universe ; He who is different 
 from the knowledge of this world which is obtained 
 by the senses and is identical with its objects, pos- 
 sesses the highest (form of absolute knowledge). 
 From him who divides himself, spring all (objective) 
 bodies. He is the primary cause, eternal and un- 
 changeable.' 
 
 The etymology of At man is again extremely ob- 
 scure, probably because it belongs to a pre-Sanskritic, 
 though Aryan stratum of Indian speech. However, 
 there can be little doubt that in the Veda Atman, 
 in several places, still means breath, as in Rv. X, 
 1 6, 3, su'ryam MkshuA gaMatu, va'tam atma, words 
 addressed to a dead person, ' May the eye go to the 
 sun, the breath (Atma) to the wind.' It then came 
 to mean vital breath, life, and, like the spirit or 
 breath, was frequently used in the sense of what 
 we call soul. In some passages it is difficult to say 
 whether we should translate it by life or by spirit. 
 From soul there is but a small step to Self, and that 
 step is often grammatical rather than real. If in 
 the Atharva-veda IX, 5, 30 we read : 
 
 Atmanam pitiiram put ram paiitram pitamahiim, 
 G'ayam r/iinitrim miitaram ye priyas tan upa hvaye, 
 
 we have to translate in English, ' Myself, father, 
 son, grandson, grandfather, wife, mother, whoever 
 are dear, I call upon them.' But Self may here be 
 translated by soul or person also, just as we may 
 say, ' My soul doth magnify the Lord,' instead of 
 'I magnify the Lord.' Again we read, Kv. IX, i 13, 
 i, bahim dddhana/i atnuini, 'putting strength into 
 oneself.' In the end Atman became the regular
 
 PRA0APATI, BRAHMAN, ATMAN. 95 
 
 pronoun self. I need not go through all the 
 evidence which may be seen in any Sanskrit dic- 
 tionary 1 , but we have still to see at what stage in 
 its development Atman became the definite name of 
 the soul or Self within. This transition of meaning 
 in Atman offers a curious parallel to that of As, in 
 Asu and Asti, which we examined before. There 
 are passages such as Rv. I, 164, 4, bhumyaA asu/< 
 asn'k a'tma kva svit, 'Where was the breath, the 
 blood, the spirit of the world ? ' Here Atm may be 
 rendered by spirit or life. But in other passages 
 Atman signifies simply the inmost nature of any- 
 thing, and more particularly of man, so that in the 
 end it means much the same as what medieval 
 philosophers would have called the quiddity, or 
 Indian philosophers the Idant& of things. Thus we 
 read at first atmanam atmana pasya, ' see thy Self by 
 thy Self;' atmaiva hy atmana/i sakshi, 'Self is the 
 witness of Self.' In this sense Atman is afterwards 
 used as the name of the highest person, the soul 
 of the world (Paramatman), and we read (/S'atap. Br. 
 XIV, 5,5,15)^ sa va ayam atma sarvesham bhutanam 
 adhipatiA, sarvesham bhutanam rac/a, 'That Atman is 
 the sovereign of all beings, he is the king of all 
 beings.' 
 
 Pra^apati, Brahman, Atman. 
 
 We have thus seen three words growing up in 
 the hymns and Brahmanas of the Yeda, Prar/apati, 
 Brahman, and Atman, each of which by itself repre- 
 sents in nuce a whole philosophy or a view of the world. 
 
 1 See Anthropological Keligion, pp. 200 seq. ; Theosophy, 
 pp. 247 seq., or more recentl}-, Deusseii's Gescliichte der 
 Philosophic, pp. 324 seq.
 
 96 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In Pragdpati we have the admission of a personal 
 and supreme being, a god above all gods, a creator 
 and ruler of the world. He created the primeval 
 waters and rose from them as Hiranyagarbha, in 
 order to send forth, to animate, and to rule all 
 things. Whether this Pra^rapati was himself the 
 material cause of the world may seem doubtful. 
 Many times it is said that he was everything and 
 that he desired to become many, and thus created 
 the world, in which case matter also \vould have 
 come out of him. In other places, however, the 
 primeval waters seem to have been admitted as 
 existing by themselves and apart from Prat/apati 
 (Rv. X, 121, 7). We also read that in the beginning 
 there was water over which Pra^apati breathed as 
 wind and produced the earth, or that the waters 
 themselves produced a golden egg from whence 
 arose Pra^/apati, the creator of gods and men. There 
 occur even in the Brahmanas allusions to the legend 
 well known from the Puranas, that a boar brought 
 forth (Udbabarha or Udvavarha from V?^h) the 
 earth, or that a tortoise supported it l . 
 
 A belief in that Pra(/apati, as a personal god, 
 was the beginning of monotheistic religion in India, 
 while the recognition of Brahman and Atman, as 
 one, constituted the foundation of all the monistic 
 philosophy of that country. 
 
 1 M.M., India, pp. 134, 287.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Growth of Philosophical Ideas. 
 
 WE have thus learnt the important lesson that 
 all these ideas, metaphysical, cosmological, and 
 otherwise, burst forth in India in great profusion 
 and confusion, and without any preconceived system. 
 
 We must not suppose that these ideas follow each 
 other in chronological succession. Here once more 
 the Nebeneinander gives us the true key, much more 
 than the Nacheinander. We must remember that 
 this earliest philosophy existed for a long time 
 without being fixed by writing, that there was 
 neither control, authority, nor public opinion to 
 protect it. Every Asrama or settlement was a 
 world by itself, even the simplest means of com- 
 munication, such as high-roads or rivers, being often 
 wanting. The wonder is that, in spite of all this, 
 we should find so much unity in the numerous 
 guesses at truth preserved to us among these 
 Vedic ruins. This was due, we are told, to the 
 Parampara, i.e. to those who handed down the 
 tradition and at last collected whatever could be 
 saved of it. It would be a mistake to imagine that 
 there was a continuous development in the various 
 meanings assumed by or assigned to such pregnant 
 terms as Praf/apati, Brahman, or even Atman. It 
 
 H
 
 98 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is much more in accordance with what we learn 
 from the Brahmawas and Upanishads of the intel- 
 lectual life of India, to admit an infinite number of 
 intellectual centres of thought, scattered all over the 
 country, in which either the one or the other view 
 found influential advocates. We should then under- 
 stand better how Brahman, while meaning what 
 bursts or drives forth, came to signify speech and 
 prayer, as well as creative power and creator, and 
 why Atman meant not only breath, but life, spirit, 
 soul, essence, or what I have ventured to render by 
 the Self, das Selbst, of all things. 
 
 But if in the period of the BrahmaTias and 
 Upanishads we have to find our way through 
 religious and philosophical thoughts, as through 
 clusters of thickly tangled creepers, the outlook 
 becomes brighter as soon as we approach the next 
 period, which is characterised by persistent attempts 
 at clear and systematic thought. We must not 
 imagine that even then we can always discover in 
 the various systems of philosophy a regular his- 
 torical growth. The Sutras or aphorisms which we 
 possess of the six systems of philosophy, each distinct 
 from the other, cannot possibly claim to represent 
 the very first attempts at a systematic treatment ; 
 they are rather the last summing up of what had 
 been growing up during many generations of isolated 
 thinkers. 
 
 Prasth&na Bheda. 
 
 What the Brahmans themselves thought of their 
 philosophical literature we may learn even from such 
 modern treatises as the Prasthana-bheda, from which 
 I gave some extracts by way of introduction to some 
 papers of mine on one of the systems of Indian
 
 PRASTHANA BHEDA. 99 
 
 philosophy, published as long ago as 1852 in the 
 Journal of the German Oriental Society. It is but 
 fair to state that the credit of having discovered 
 that tract of Madhusudana Sarasvati, and perceived 
 its importance, belonged really to Colebrooke. I my- 
 self came to be acquainted with it through my old 
 friend, Dr. Trithen, who had prepared a critical 
 edition of it, but was prevented by illness and death 
 from publishing it. It was published in the mean- 
 time by Professor Weber in his Indische Studien, 
 1849, and I think it may be useful to give once 
 more some extracts from it ] . 
 
 'Nyaya 2 ,' he writes, 'is logic 3 , as promulgated by 
 Gotama 4 in five Adhyayas (lessons). Its object is 
 knowledge of the nature of the sixteen Padarthas by 
 means of name, definition, and examination/ These 
 Padarthas are the important or essential topics of the 
 Nyaya philosophy ; but it has proved very misleading 
 to see Padartha here translated by categories. No one 
 could understand why such things as doubt, example, 
 wrangling, &c., could possibly be called categories or 
 praedicabilia, and it is no wonder that Ritter and 
 others should have spoken of the Nyaya with open 
 
 1 A new translation of the Prasthana-bheda has been pub- 
 lished by Prof. Deussen as an Introduction to his Allgemeine 
 Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i, p. 44, 1894. 
 
 2 Nyaya is derived from ni 'into, 'and i 'to go.' The fourth 
 member of a syllogism is called Upanaya, ' leading towards ' or 
 'induction.' Ballantyne translates Nyaya by yu,e$o8os. 
 
 3 Anvikshikl as an old name of philosophy, more particularly 
 of logic, occurs also in Gautama's Dharmasastra II. 3. It is 
 used sometimes as synonymous with Mimawsa, and is more 
 comprehensive than logic. 
 
 4 As the MSS. vary between Gotama and Gautama, I have kept 
 the former for the Nyaya, 'philosopher,' the latter for Buddha. 
 
 H 2
 
 100 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 contempt, as they have done, if such things were repre- 
 sented to them as the categories of Indian logic. 
 
 'There is also the Vaiseshika philosophy in ten 
 lessons, promulgated by Kawada. Its object is to 
 establish by their similarities and dissimilarities * 
 the six Padarthas, viz. : 
 
 1. Dravya, substance. 
 
 2. Guwa, quality. 
 
 3. Karman, activity. 
 
 4. Samanya, what is general and found in more than one 
 object. The highest Samanya is Satta or being. 
 
 5. Visesha, the differentia or what is special, residing in 
 eternal atoms, &c. 
 
 6. Samavaya, inseparable inherence, as between cause and 
 effect, parts and the whole, &c. 
 
 To which may be added 
 
 7. Abhava, negation. 
 
 This philosophy also is called Nyaya.' 
 These Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas, at least 1-5, 
 may indeed be called categories, for they represent 
 what can be predicated, in general, of the objects 
 of our experience, or, from an Indian point of 
 view, what is predicated by, or what is the highest 
 sense (Artha) of words (Pada). Thus it has come to 
 pass that Padartha, literally the meaning of a word, 
 was used in Sanskrit in the sense of things in 
 general, or objects. It is rightly translated by 
 category when applied to the five Padarthas of 
 Ka/tada, but such a translation, doubtful even in 
 
 1 Bartliolemy St. Hilaire, in his work on Indian Logic, 
 p. 356, remarks, 'Mais le philosophe Vaiseshika n'a point 
 cherche a distinguer les categories entre elles, en 6mnnerant 
 leurs propriety's, comine 1'a fait le Stagirite. II n'a point 
 montro, coinme Aristote, leurs rapports et leurs differences.' 
 But this is exactly what he has done, cf. Sutras I, 8 seq.
 
 PRASTHANA BHEDA. IOI 
 
 the case of the sixth or seventh Padartha of the 
 Vaiseshikas, would of course be quite misleading 
 when applied to the Padarthas of Gotama. The real 
 categories would, in Gotama's system, find their place 
 mostly under Prameya, meaning not so much what 
 has to be proved or established, as what forms the 
 object of our knowledge. 
 
 Madhusudana continues : ' The Mimamsa also is 
 twofold, viz. the Karma-Mimawsa (work-philosophy) 
 and the $ariraka-Mima???sa (philosophy of the em- 
 bodied spirit). TheKarma-Mima??isa has been brought 
 out by the venerable (raimini in twelve chapters.' 
 
 The objects of these twelve chapters are then indi- 
 cated very shortly, and so as to be hardly intelligible 
 without a reference to the original Sutras. Dharma, 
 the object of this philosophy, is explained as con- 
 sisting of acts of duty, chiefly sacrificial. The second, 
 third, and fourth chapters treat 1 of the differences 
 and varieties of Dharma, its parts (or appendent 
 members, contrasted with the main act), and the 
 principal purpose of each sacrificial performance. The 
 fifth chapter tries to settle the order of all sacrificial 
 performances, and the sixth the qualifications of its 
 performers. The subject of indirect precepts is 
 opened in the seventh chapter and carried on more 
 fully in the eighth. Inferrible changes, adapting to 
 any variation or copy of certain sacrificial acts what 
 was designed for the types or models of them, are 
 discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in 
 the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the 
 eleventh chapter, and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth ; 
 that is, the co-operation of several acts for a single 
 
 1 I give this more intelligible description from Colebrooke, 
 Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i, p. 330 seq.
 
 102 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 result is the subject of the one, and the incidental effect 
 of an act, of which the chief purpose is different, is 
 discussed in the other l . 
 
 ' There is also the Samkarsha^a-kcuicZa, consisting 
 of four chapters, composed by (raimini, and this, 
 which is known by the name of Devata-kanc/a, 
 belongs to the Karma-Mima??isa, because it teaches 
 the act called Upasana or worship. 
 
 ' Next follows the $ariraka-Mima??isa, consisting 
 of four chapters. Its object is to make clear the one- 
 ness of Brahman and Atman (Self), and to exhibit 
 the rules which teach the investigation (of it) by 
 means of Vedic study, &c.' It is in fact much more 
 what we call a system of philosophy than the Purva- 
 Mlmamsa, and it is quoted by different names, such 
 as Uttara-Mimamsij Brahma-Mima/Jisa, Vedanta, &c. - 
 
 ' In the first lecture is shown the agreement 
 with which all Vedanta passages refer, directly 
 or indirectly, to the inward, undivided, second-less 
 Brahman. In the first section are considered Vedic 
 passages which have clear indications of Brahman ; 
 in the second, passages which have obscure indica- 
 tions of Brahman, and refer to Brahman so far as he 
 is an object of worship; in the third, passages which 
 have obscure indications of Brahman, and mostly 
 refer to Brahman, so far as he or it is an object of 
 knowledge. Thus the consideration of the Vedanta 
 
 1 Professor Deussen has given a, somewhat different version 
 of these titles. He gives, for instance, as the subject of the 
 fiftli chapter the successive order of recitation, as enjoined by 
 S'ruti, but to judge from Mini. Sutras V, i, i, the right meaning 
 seems to be the ' settling of the order of performance, according 
 to .S'ruti, subject-matter, recitation, &c.' 
 
 Read Adya for Akhya in the Prasthana bheda.
 
 PKASTHANA BHEDA. 103 
 
 texts has been finished, and in the fourth section 
 such words as Avyakta, Agd, &c., are considered, of 
 which it can be doubtful whether they may not refer 
 to ideas, adapted and formulated by the Samkhya 
 philosophers, such as Pradhana, PrakHti, which is 
 generally, though quite wrongly, translated by nature, 
 as independent of Brahman or Purusha. 
 
 ' The convergence of all Vedanta texts on the 
 second-less Brahman having thus been established, 
 Vyasa or Badarayawa, fearing an opposition by 
 means of arguments such as have been produced 
 by acknowledged Smntis and various other systems, 
 undertakes their refutation, and tries to establish 
 the incontrovertible validity of his own arguments 
 in the second lecture. Here, in the first section, 
 the objections to the convergence of the Vedanta 
 passages on Brahman, as stated by the Snmtis 
 of the Samkhya-yoga, the Kanadas, and by the 
 arguments employed by the Samkhyas, are disposed 
 of. In the second section is shown the faultiness 
 of the views of the followers of the Samkhya, 
 because every examination should consist of tw T o 
 parts, the establishment of our own doctrine and 
 the refutation of the doctrine of our opponents. 
 In the third section the contradictions between 
 the passages of the Veda, referring to the creation 
 of the elements and other subjects, are removed in 
 the first part, and in the second those referring to 
 individual souls. In the fourth section are considered 
 all apparent contradictions between Vedic passages 
 referring to the senses and their objects. 
 
 ' In the third chapter follows the examination of 
 the means (of salvation). Here in the first section, 
 while considering the going to and returning from
 
 104 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 another world (transmigration), dispassionateness 
 has to be examined. In the second section the 
 meaning of the word Thou is made clear, and after- 
 wards the meaning of the word That. In the third 
 section there is a collection of words, if not purely 
 tautological, all referring to the unqualified Brahman, 
 as recorded in different $akhas or branches of the 
 Veda ; and at the same time the question is discussed 
 whether certain attributes recorded by other $akhas 
 in teaching a qualified or unqualified Brahman, may 
 be taken together or not. In the fourth section the 
 means of obtaining a knowledge of the unqualified 
 Brahman, both the external, such as sacrifices and 
 observing the four stations in life, and the internal, 
 such as quietness, control, and meditation, are in- 
 vestigated. 
 
 ' In the fourth chapter follows an inquiry into the 
 special rewards or fruits of a knowledge of the 
 qualified and unqualified Brahman. In the first 
 section is described salvation of a man even in this 
 life, when free from the influence of good or bad 
 acts, after he has realised the unqualified Brahman 
 by means of repeated study of the Veda, &c. In the 
 second section the mode of departure of a dying man 
 is considered. In the third, the further (northern) 
 road of a man who died with a full knowledge of 
 the unqualified Brahman is explained. In the fourth 
 section the obtainment of disembodied aloneness by 
 a man who knows the unqualified Brahman is first 
 described, and afterwards the abode in the world of 
 Brahman, promised to all who know the qualified 
 (or lower) Brahman. 
 
 'This, the Vedanta, is indeed the principal of all 
 doctrines, any other doctrine is but a complement
 
 PRASTHANA BHEDA. 105 
 
 of it, and therefore it alone is to be reverenced by 
 all who wish for liberation, and this according to 
 the interpretation of the venerable $amkara this 
 is the secret ! ' 
 
 Here we see clearly that Madhusudana considered 
 the Vedanta-philosophy as interpreted by Sawikara, 
 if not as the only true one, still as the best of all 
 philosophies. He made an important distinction also 
 between the four, the Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Purva, 
 and Uttara- Mimamsa on one side, and the remain- 
 ing two, the Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies on 
 the other. It is curious indeed that this distinction 
 has been hitherto so little remarked. According 
 to Madhusudana, the philosophies of Gotama and 
 Kanada are treated simply as Smritis or Dharma- 
 sastras, like the Laws of Manu, nay like the Mah&- 
 bharata l of Vyasa, and the Ramayana of Yalmiki. 
 Of course these systems of philosophy cannot be 
 called Smriti in the ordinary sense of Dharmasastra ; 
 but, as they are Snm'ti or tradition, and not >Stuti 
 or revelation, they may be said to teach Dharma, if 
 not in the legal, at least in the moral sense of that 
 word. Anyhow it is clear that Samkhya and Yoga 
 were looked upon as belonging to a class different 
 from that to which the two Mimamsas, nay even 
 Nyaya and Vaiseshika, and the other recognised 
 branches of knowledge belonged, which together 
 are represented as the eighteen branches of the 
 Trayi (the Veda). Though it may be difficult to 
 understand the exact reason of this distinction, the 
 distinction itself should not be passed over. 
 
 1 See Dahlmann, Das Mahabharata als Epos und Eechts- 
 buch, 1896.
 
 106 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ' The Samkhya,' Madhusudana continues, ' was 
 brought out by the venerable Kapila in six Adhyayas. 
 In the first Adhyaya the objects for discussion are 
 considered ; in the second the effects or products of 
 Pradhana, or original matter ; in the third aloofness 
 from sensuous objects ; in the fourth stories about 
 dispassionate persons, such as Pingal (IV, 1 1), the 
 ttetcher (IV, 1 8), &c. ; in the fifth there is refutation 
 of opposite opinions ; in the sixth a resume of the 
 whole. The chief object of the Sa??ikhya-philosophy 
 is to teach the difference between Praknti and the 
 Purushas. 
 
 ' Then follows the Yoga-philosophy as taught by 
 the venerable Pata%yali, consisting of four parts. 
 Here in the first part meditation, which stops the 
 activity and distraction of the mind, and, as a means 
 towards it, repeated practice and dispassionateness 
 are discussed ; in the second the eight accessories 
 which serve to produce deep meditation even in one 
 whose thoughts are distracted, such as (II, 29) 
 restraint, observances, posture, regulation of breath, 
 devotion, contemplation, and meditation ; in the 
 third, the supernatural powers ; in the fourth alone- 
 ness. The chief object of this philosophy is to achieve 
 concentration by means of stopping all wandering 
 thoughts.' 
 
 After this follows a short account of the Pa.supata 
 and Pii/V.'aratra-systems, and then a recapitulation 
 which is of interest. Here Madhusudana says, 'that 
 after the various systems have been explained, it 
 should be clear that there are after all but three 
 roads. 
 
 i. The Arambha-vada, the theory of atomic 
 agglomeration.
 
 PKASTHANA BHEDA. IOJ 
 
 2. The Parmama-vada, the theory of evolution. 
 13. The Vivarta-vada, the theory of illusion. 
 
 The first theory holds that the four kinds of 
 atoms (A.nu), those of earth, water, fire, and air, by 
 becoming successively double atoms, &c., begin the 
 world which culminates in the egg of Brahman. 
 
 This first theory, that of the Tarkikas (Nyaya 
 and Vaiseshika) and the Mimamsakas, teaches that 
 an effect which was not (the world), is produced 
 through the activity of causes which are. 
 
 The second theory, that of the Samkhyas, Yoga- 
 patan^alas, and Pasupatas, says that Pradhana alone, 
 sometimes called Prakriti or original matter, com- 
 posed, as it is, of the Gunas of Sattva (good), llamas 
 (moderate), and Tamas (bad), is evolved through 
 the stages of Mahat (perceiving) and Ahamkara 
 (subjectivity) into the shape of the (subjective and 
 objective) world. From this point of view the 
 effected world existed before as real, though in a 
 subtile (invisible) form, and was rendered manifest 
 through the activity of a cause. 
 
 The third theory, that of the BrahmavMins 
 (Vedanta), says that the self-luminous and perfectly 
 blissful Brahman which has no second, appears by 
 mistake, through its own power of Maya, as the 
 world, while the Vaishnavas (Ramanu^a, &c.) hold 
 that the world is an actual and true evolution of 
 Brahman. 
 
 But in reality all the Munis who have put 
 forward these theories agree in wishing to prove 
 the existence of the one Supreme Lord without 
 a second, ending in the theory of illusion (Vivarta). 
 These Munis cannot be in error, considering that 
 they are omniscient ; and these different views have
 
 I08 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 only been propounded by them, in order to keep off 
 all nihilistic theories, and because they were afraid 
 that human beings, with their inclinations towards 
 the objects of the world, could not be expected at 
 once to know the true goal of man. But all comes 
 right when we understand that men, from not 
 understanding their true object, imagined that 
 these Munis would have propounded what is con- 
 trary to the Veda, and thus, accepting their opinions, 
 have become followers of various paths.' 
 
 Much of what has here been translated from 
 Madhusudana's Prasthana-bheda, though it gives a 
 general survey, is obscure, but will become more in- 
 telligible hereafter when we come to examine each of 
 the six philosophies by itself; nor is it at all certain 
 that his view of the development of Indian philo- 
 sophy is historically tenable. But it shows at all 
 events a certain freedom of thought, which we see 
 now and then in other writers also, such as Vi<7/iana- 
 bhikshu, who are bent on showing that there is 
 behind the diversity of Vedanta, Sa??ikhya, and 
 Nyaya one and the same truth, though differently 
 expressed ; that philosophies, in fact, may be many, 
 but truth is one. 
 
 But however we may admire this insight on the 
 part of Madhusudana and others, it is our duty, a>s 
 historians of philosophy, to study the different paths 
 by which different philosophers, whether by the 
 light of revelation or by that of their own unfettered 
 reason, have striven to discover the truth. It is the 
 very multiplicity and variety of these paths that form 
 the chief interest of the history of philosophy, and 
 the fact that to the present day these six different 
 systems of philosophy have held their own in the
 
 PEASTHANA BHEDA. 109 
 
 midst of a great multitude of philosophic theories, 
 propounded by the thinkers of India, shows that we 
 must first of all try to appreciate their characteristic 
 peculiarities, before attempting with Madhusudana 
 to eliminate their distinctive features. 
 These philosophers are 
 
 1. Badarayawa, called also Vyasa Dvaipayana or 
 Krishna Dvaipayana, the reputed author of the 
 Brahma-Sutras, called also Uttara-Mimamsa-Sutras, 
 or Vyasa-Sutras. 
 
 2. 6raimini, the author of the Purva-Mimamsa- 
 Sutras. 
 
 3. Kapila, the author of the Samkhya-Sutras. 
 
 4. Pataw/ali, also called /Stesha or Phamn, the 
 author of the Yoga-Sutras. 
 
 5. Kanada, also called Ka7iabhu<7, Kanabhakshaka, 
 or UMka, the author of the Vaiseshika-Sutras. 
 
 6. Gotama, also called Akshapada, the author of 
 the Nyaya-Sutras. 
 
 It is easy to see that the philosophers to whom 
 our Sutras are ascribed, cannot be considered as the 
 first originators of Indian philosophy. These Sutras 
 often refer to other philosophers, who therefore 
 must have existed before the time when the Sutras 
 received their final form. Nor could the fact that 
 some of the Sutras quote and refute the opinions of 
 other Sutras, be accounted for without admitting 
 a growing up of different philosophical schools side 
 by side during a period which preceded their last 
 arrangement. Unfortunately such references hardly 
 ever give us the title of a book, or its author, still 
 less the ipsissima verla. When they refer to such 
 topics as Purusha and Prakn'ti we know that they 
 refer to the Samkhya, if they speak of Arms or
 
 110 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 atoms, we know that their remarks are pointed at the 
 Vaiseshikas. But it by no means follows that they 
 refer to the Sawkhya or Vaiseshika-Sutras exactly 
 as we now possess them. Some of these, as has been 
 proved, are so modern that they could not possibly 
 be quoted by ancient philosophers. Our Sawkhya- 
 Sutras, for instance, have been proved by Dr. F. Hall 
 to be not earlier than about 1380 A. D., and they 
 may be even later. Startling as this discovery 
 was, there is certainly nothing to be said against 
 the arguments of Dr. Hall or against those by which 
 Professor Garbe l has supported Dr. Hall's dis- 
 covery. In this case, therefore, these Sutras should 
 be looked upon as a mere rifaccimento, to take 
 the place of earlier Sutras, which as early as the 
 sixth cent. A. D. had probably been already super- 
 seded by the popular Sawkhya-karikas and then for- 
 gotten. This late date of our Sawkhya-Sutras may 
 seem incredible, but though I still hold that the 
 Sutra-style arose in a period when writing for 
 literary purposes was still in its tentative stage, we 
 know that even in our time there are learned 
 Pandits who find no difficulty in imitating this 
 ancient Sutra-style. The Sutra-period, reaching 
 down as far as Asoka's reign in the third century, 
 and his Council in 242 B.C., claims not only the 
 famous Sutras of Pamni, but has also been fixed 
 upon as the period of the greatest philosophical 
 activity in India, an activity called forth, it would 
 seem, by the strong commotion roused by the rise 
 of the Buddhist school of philosophy, and afterwards 
 of religion. 
 
 ' Curbo, Die Suwkhya- Philosophic, p. 71.
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. Ill 
 
 Literary References in the TTpanishads. 
 It is of considerable importance to remember that 
 of the technical names of the six systems of phi- 
 losophy, two only occur in the classical Upanishads, 
 namely Samkhya and Yoga or Samkhya-yoga. Ve- 
 danta does not occur, except in the $vetasvatara, 
 Munc/aka and some of the later Upanishads 1 . Mi- 
 ma?ftsa occurs in the general sense of investigation, 
 Nyaya and Vaiseshika are altogether absent, nor 
 do we meet with such words as Hetuvidya, or 
 Anvikshiki, nor with the names of the reputed 
 founders of the six systems, except those of the two 
 Mimamsas, Badarayana and 6raimini. The names 
 of Pata/lr/ali, or Ka7^ada, are absent altogether, while 
 the names of Kapila and Gotama, when they 
 occur, refer, it would seem, to quite different per- 
 sonalities. 
 
 The Six Systems of Philosophy. 
 
 No one can suppose that those whose names are 
 mentioned as the authors of these six philosophical 
 systems, were more than the final editors or re- 
 dactors of the Sutras as we now possess them. If 
 the third century B.C. should seem too late a date 
 for the introduction of writing for literary purposes 
 in India, we should remember that even inscriptions 
 have not yet been found more ancient than those 
 of Asoka, and there is a wide difference between 
 inscriptions and literary compositions. The Southern 
 Buddhists do not claim to have reduced their 
 
 1 A curious distinction is made in a commentary on the 
 Gautama- Sutras XIX, 12, where it is said that 'those parts of 
 the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads are called Vedantas.'
 
 112 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sacred Canon to writing before the first century B. c., 
 though it is well known that they kept up close 
 relations with their Northern co-religionists who 
 were acquainted with writing 1 . During all that 
 time, therefore, between 477 and 77 B.C., ever so 
 many theories of the world, partaking of a Vedanta, 
 Sawkhya or Yoga, nay even of a Buddhist cha- 
 racter, could have sprung up and have been reduced 
 to a mnemonic form in various Asramas. We need 
 not wonder that much of that literature, considering 
 that it could be mnemonic only, should have been 
 irretrievably lost, and we must take care also not 
 to look upon what has been left to us in the old 
 Dar^anas, as representing the whole outcome of the 
 philosophical activity of the whole of India through 
 so many generations. All we can say is that phi- 
 losophy began to ferment in India during the period 
 tilled by Brahmanas and Upanishads, nay even in 
 some of the Vedic hymns, that the existence of 
 Upanishads, though not necessarily our own, is 
 recognised in the Buddhist Canon, and lastly that 
 the name of Suttas, as a component part of the 
 Buddhist Canon, must be later than that of the 
 earliest Brahmanic Sutras, because in the mean- 
 time the meaning of the word had been changed 
 from short mnemonic sentences to fully developed 
 discourses. Possibly Sutra was originally meant 
 for the text to be elucidated in a sermon, so that 
 the long Buddhistic sermons came to be called 
 Suttas in consequence. 
 
 1 The sac rod Bo-tree in the city of Anuradhapura in Ceylon 
 was grown, we are told, from a branch of the tree at Buddha 
 Gay a.
 
 Btf/HASPATI-SUTRAS. 113 
 
 Brihaspati-Stitras. 
 
 That some of the earlier philosophical Sutras were 
 lost, is shown in the case of the B?^'haspati-Sutras. 
 These are said to have contained the doctrines of the 
 out and out materialists, or sensualists, the Lauka- 
 yatikas or /farvakas, who deny the existence of 
 everything beyond what is given by the senses. 
 They are referred to by BhaskaraMrya at Brahma- 
 Sutras III, 3, 53 \ and as he gives an extract, it is 
 likely that they still existed in his time, though 
 no MS. of them has been found as yet in India. 
 The same applies to such Sutras as the Vaikhanasa- 
 Sutras, possibly intended for the Vanaprasthas, and 
 the Bhikshu-Sutras 2 , quoted by Panini, IV, 3, no, 
 and intended, it would seem, for Brahmanic, and not 
 yet for Buddhistic mendicants. It is a sad truth 
 which we have to learn more and more, that of 
 the old pre-Buddhistic literature we have but scanty 
 fragments, and that even these may be, in some 
 cases, mere reproductions of lost originals, as in 
 the case of the Sa?^khya-Sutras. We know now 
 that such Sutras could have been produced at any 
 time, and we should not forget that even at present, 
 in the general decay of Sanskrit scholarship, India 
 still possesses scholars who can imitate Kalidasa, 
 to say nothing of such poems as the Mahabharata 
 and Ramayawa, and so successfully that few 
 scholars could tell the difference. It is not long 
 ago that I received a Sanskrit treatise written in 
 Sutras with a commentary, the work of a living 
 
 1 Colebrooke, Misc. Essays' 2 , I, 429. 
 
 2 They were identified by Taranatha TarkavJi/aispati with the 
 Vedanta-Siitras ; see Siddhanta Kaumudi, vol. i, p. 592. 
 
 I
 
 114 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 scholar in India, which might have deceived many 
 a European scholar of Sanskrit literature \ If that 
 is possible now, if, as in the case of the Kapila- 
 Sutras, it was possible in the fourteenth century, 
 why should not the same have taken place during 
 the period of the Renaissance in India, nay even 
 at an earlier time ? At all events, though grateful 
 for what has been preserved, and preserved in what 
 may seem to us an almost miraculous manner, we 
 should not imagine that we possess all, or that 
 we possess what we possess in its original form. 
 
 Books of Reference. 
 
 I shall mention here some of the most important 
 works only, from which students of philosophy, 
 particularly those ignorant of Sanskrit, may gain 
 by themselves a knowledge of the six recognised 
 svstems of Indian Philosophy. The titles of the 
 more important of the original Sanskrit texts may 
 be found in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essavs, vol. 
 ii, p. 259 seq., and in the Catalogues, published 
 since his time, of the various collections of Sanskrit 
 MSS. in Europe and India. 
 
 For the Vedanta-philosophy of Badarayawa the 
 most useful book is Thibaut's English translation of 
 
 the text of the Sutras and /Sa?kara's commentary in 
 
 j 
 
 the S. B. E. , vols. xxxiv and xxxviii. 
 
 Of books written in German, Deussen's translation 
 of the same work, 1887, preceded as it was by his 
 
 ' It is called Katantra/,7,7mnda//prakriva by -A'andrakanta 
 Tarkalarikara, 1896, and gives additional Sutras to the Ka- 
 tantra on Vedic Grammar. He makes no secret that Sutraw 
 vrittis /robhayam api mayaiva vyaraA'i, 'the Sutra and the 
 commentary, both were composed by me.'
 
 BOOKS OF REFERENCE. 115 
 
 'System des Vedanta/ 1883, can be thoroughly 
 recommended. 
 
 Of the Samkhya-system we have the Sutras trans- 
 lated by Ballantyne in 1882-1885, the Aphorisms 
 of the Samkhya Philosophy of Kapila, with illustra- 
 tive extracts from the Commentaries, 1852, 1865, 
 1885. 
 
 In German we have the Samkhya-Prava&ana- 
 Bhashya, Vigwana-bhikshu's Commentar zu den 
 Samkhya-Sutras, iibersetzt von K. Garbe, 1889. 
 Also Aniruddha's Commentary and the original 
 parts of Vedcantin Mahadeva's commentary on the 
 Samkhya-Sutras, by Richard Garbe, 1892. 
 
 Der Mondschein der Samkhya Wahrheit, Va&a- 
 spatimis'ra's Sa7?ikhya-tattva-kaumudi, iibersetzt von ' 
 II. Garbe, 1892, is also a very useful work. 
 
 The Samkhya Karika by Iswarakrishna, translated 
 from the Sanscrit by H. T. Colebrooke, also the 
 Bhashya or commentary by Gaurapada ; translated 
 and illustrated by an original comment by H. H. 
 Wilson, Oxford, 1837, may still be consulted with 
 advantage. 
 
 Other useful w^orks are : 
 
 John Davies, Hindu Philosophy. The Sankhya . 
 Karika of Iswarakrishna, London, 1881. 
 
 Die Samkhya-Philosophie, nach den Quellen, von 
 H. Garbe, 1894. 
 
 Of the Purva-Mimamsa or simply Mimamsa, which 
 deals chiefly with the nature and authority of the 
 Veda with special reference to sacrificial and other 
 duties, we have the Sutras with $abarasvamin's 
 commentary published in the original ; but there is 
 as yet no book in English in which that system may 
 be studied, except Professor Thibaut's translation of 
 
 I 2
 
 Il6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Laugakshi Bhaskara's Arthasawgraha, a short ab- 
 stract of that philosophy, published in the Benares 
 Sanskrit Series, No. 4. 
 
 The Vaiseshika system of philosophy may be 
 studied in an English translation of its Sutras by 
 A. E. Gough, Benares, 1873 ; also in a Gertnan trans- 
 lation by Roer, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgen- 
 liindischen Gesellschaft, vols. 21 and 22, and in some 
 articles of mine in the same Journal of the German 
 Oriental Society, 1849. 
 
 The Nyaya-Sutras of Gotama have been translated, 
 with the exception of the last book, by Ballantyne, 
 Allahabad, 1850-57. 
 
 The Yoga-Sutras are accessible in an English 
 translation by Rajendraldla Mitra, in the Bibliotheca 
 Indica, Nos. 462, 478, 482, 491, and 492. 
 
 Dates of the Philosophical Sfttras. 
 If we consider the state of philosophical thought 
 in India such as it is represented to us in the 
 Brahma^as and Upanishads, and afterwards in the 
 canonical books of the Buddhists, we cannot wonder 
 that all attempts at fixing the dates of the six 
 recognised systems of philosophy, nay even their 
 mutual relationship, should hitherto have failed. It 
 is true that Buddhism and (-rainism were likewise 
 but two philosophical systems out of many, and that 
 it has been possible to fix their dates. But if in 
 their case we know something about their dates and 
 
 O 
 
 their historical development, this is chiefly due to the 
 social and political importance which they acquired 
 during the fifth, the fourth, and the third centuries 
 B.C., and not simply to their philosophical tenets. 
 We know also that there were many teachers, con-
 
 DATES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS. 117 
 
 temporaries of Buddha, but they have left no traces 
 in the literary history of India. 
 
 Nor should we forget that, though the date of the 
 Buddhist Canon may be fixed, the date of many of 
 the texts which we now possess and accept as 
 canonical is by no means beyond the reach of doubt. 
 
 In the Buddhist annals themselves other teachers 
 such as 6rfiatiputra, the Nirgrantha, the founder of 
 6rainism, Purana Kasyapa, Kakuda Katyayana, 
 Agita Kesakambali, Sam^aya Vaira^i-putra, Gosali- 
 putra, the Maskarin, are mentioned by the side of 
 Gautama, the prince of the clan of the Sakyas. One 
 of these only became known in history, 6r7iatiputra, 
 the Nirgrantha or gymnosophist, because the society 
 founded by him, like the brotherhood founded by 
 Buddha, developed into a powerful sect, the (rainas. 
 Another, Gosali with the bamboo stick, originally 
 an A^ivaka, then a follower of Mahavira, became 
 likewise the founder of a sect of his own, which, 
 however, has now disappeared l . 6r/mtiputra or 
 Nataputta was actually the senior of Buddha. 
 
 Though it seems likely that the founders of the 
 six systems of philosophy, though not the authors of 
 the Sutras which we possess, belonged to the same 
 period of philosophical and religious fermentation 
 which gave rise to the first spreading of Buddha's 
 doctrines in India, it is by no means clear that any 
 of these systems, in their literary form, are pre- 
 supposed by Buddhism. This is owing to the vague- 
 ness of the quotations which are hardly ever given 
 verbatim. In India, during the mnemonic period of 
 literature, the contents of a book may have become 
 
 1 Kern, Bucldhismus, I, p. 182.
 
 Il8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 considerably modified, while the title remained the 
 same. Even at a much later time, when we see 
 Bharb'/hari (died 650 A. D.) referring to the Mima?/i- 
 saka, Sawkhya, and Vaiseshika Darsanas, we have 
 no right to conclude that he knew these Darsanas 
 exactly as we know them, though he may well have 
 known these philosophies after they had assumed 
 their systematic form. Again, when he quotes 
 Naiyayikas, it by no means follows that he knew 
 our Gotama-Sutras, nor have we any right to say 
 that our Gotama-Sutras existed in his time. It 
 is .possible, it is probable, but it is not certain. 
 We must therefore be very careful not to rely too 
 much on quotations from, or rather allusions to, 
 other systems of philosophy. 
 
 Sawzkhya-Stltras. 
 
 The Sa??ikhya-Sutras, as we possess them, are very 
 chary of references. They clearly refer to Vaiseshika 
 and Nyaya, when they examine the six categories 
 of the former (V, 85) and the sixteen Padarthas of 
 the latter (V, 86). Whenever they refer to the Anus 
 or atoms, we know that they have the Vai.veshika- 
 philosophy in their minds ; and once the Vaiseshikas 
 are actually mentioned by name (I, 25). /SYuti, which 
 the Sa?/<khyas were supposed to disregard, is very 
 frequently appealed to, Sm/'/ti once (V, 123), and Va- 
 madeva, whose name occurs in both iSVuti and Snm'ti, 
 is mentioned as one who had obtained spiritual 
 freedom. But of individual philosophers we meet 
 only with Sanandana A/.-firya (VI, 69) andPawX.-a.vikha 
 (V, 32; VI, 68), while the teachers, the A&aryas, 
 when mentioned in general, are explained as com- 
 prehending Kapila himself, as well as others.
 
 VEDANTA-SUTRAS. 1 19 
 
 Vedanta-Stltras. 
 
 The Vedanta-Sutras contain more frequent refer- 
 ences, but they too do not help us much for chrono- 
 logical purposes. 
 
 Badarayana refers more or less clearly to the 
 Buddhists, the 6rainas, Pasupatas, and Pa/iAaratras, 
 all of whom he is endeavouring to refute. He never 
 refers, however, to any literary work, and even when 
 he refers to other philosophical systems, he seems to 
 avoid almost intentionally the recognised names of 
 their authors, nay even their technical terms. Still 
 it is clear that the systems of the Purva-Mlmamsa, 
 the Yoga, Samkhya, and Vaiseshika were in his mind 
 when he composed his Sutras, and among Mimamsic 
 authorities he refers by name to (raimini, Badari, 
 Audfalomi, Asmarathya, Kasakn/tsna, Karslmagdni, 
 and Atreya, nay to a Badaraya>ia also. We cannot be 
 far wrong therefore if we assign the gradual forma- 
 tion of the six systems of philosophy to the period 
 from Buddha (fifth century) to Asoka (third century), 
 though we have to admit, particularly in the cases 
 of Vedaiita, Samkhya, and Yoga a long previous 
 development reaching back through Upanishads 
 and BrahmaTias to the very hymns of the Kig-veda. 
 It is equally difficult to fix the relative position *- 
 of the great systems of philosophy, because, as 
 I explained before, they quote each other mutually. 
 With regard to the relation of Buddhism to the six 
 orthodox systems it seems to me that all we can 
 honestly say is that schools of philosophy handing 
 down doctrines very similar to those of our six 
 classical or orthodox systems, are presupposed by 
 
 1 Bhandarkar, Samkhya Philosophy (1871), p. 3.
 
 120 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Buddhist Suttas. But this is very different from 
 the opinion held by certain scholars that Buddha 
 or his disciples actually borrowed from our Sutras. 
 We know nothing of Samkhya-literature before the 
 Sca??ikhya-karikas, which belong to the sixth century 
 after Christ. Even if we admit that the Tattva- 
 samasa was an earlier work, how could we, without 
 parallel dates, prove any actual borrowing on the 
 part of Buddha or his disciples at that early time ? 
 
 In the Upanishads and Brahma?? as, though there 
 is a common note running through them all, there 
 is as yet great latitude and want of system, and 
 a variety of opinions supported by different teachers 
 and different schools. Even in the hymns we meet 
 with great independence and individuality of thought, 
 which occasionally seems to amount* to downright 
 scepticism and atheism. 
 
 We must keep all this in mind if we wish to gain 
 a correct idea of the historical origin and growth of 
 what we are accustomed to call the six philosophical 
 systems of India. We have seen already that philo- 
 sophical discussions were not confined to the Brah- 
 mans, but that the Kshatriyas also took a very active 
 and prominent part in the elaboration of such funda- 
 mental philosophical concepts as that of Atman or 
 Self. 
 
 It is out of this floating mass of philosophical 
 and religious opinion, which was common property 
 in India, that the regular systems slowly emerged. 
 Though we do not know in what form this took 
 place, it is quite clear that what we now possess of 
 philosophical manuals, in the form of Sutras, could 
 not have been written down during the time when 
 writing for any practical purposes except inscrip-
 
 MNEMONIC LITERATURE. 121 
 
 tions on monuments and coins was still unknown in 
 India, or at all events had not yet been employed 
 for literary purposes, so far as we know. 
 
 Mnemonic Literature. 
 
 It has now been generally admitted, I believe, 
 that whenever writing has once become popular, 
 it is next to impossible that there should be no 
 allusion to it in the poetical or prose compositions of 
 the people. Even as late as the time of $amkara, 
 the written letters are still called unreal (AnHta) in 
 comparison with the audible sounds, as classified in 
 the Pratisakhyas, which are represented by them 
 (Ved. Sutras II, I, 14, p. 451). There is no allusion 
 to writing in the hymns, the Brahmanas and Upani- 
 shads ; very few, if any, in the Sutras. The historical 
 value of these allusions to writing which occur in the 
 literature of the Buddhists depends, of course, on 
 the date which we can assign, not to the original 
 authors, but to the writers of our texts. We must 
 never forget that there was in India during many 
 centuries a purely mnemonic literature, which con- 
 tinued down to the Sutra-period, and which was 
 handed down from generation to generation accord- 
 ing to a system which is fully described in the 
 Pratisakhyas. What would have been the use of 
 that elaborate system, if there had been manuscripts 
 in existence at the same time ? 
 
 When that mnemonic literature, that Smr/ti, 
 came for the first time to be reduced to writing, 
 this probably took place in something like the form 
 of Sutras. The very helplessness of the Sutra-style 
 would thus become intelligible. Letters at that 
 time were as yet monumental only, for in India also
 
 122 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 monumental writing is anterior to literary writing, 
 and to the adoption of a cursive alphabet. Writing 
 material was scarce in India, and the number of 
 those who could read must have been very small. 
 At the same time there existed the old mnemonic 
 literature, invested with a kind of sacred character, 
 part and parcel of the ancient system of education, 
 which had so far answered all purposes and was not 
 easy to supplant. Much of that mnemonic literature 
 has naturally been lost, unless it was reduced to 
 writing at the proper time. Often the name may 
 have survived, while the body of a work was en- 
 tirely changed. Hence when we see the Sa?nkhya 
 mentioned by name in the Buddhist texts, such as 
 the Visuddhi-magga (chap. XVII), it is impossible to 
 tell whether even at that time there existed a work 
 on the Sawkhya-philosophy in the form of Sutras. 
 It is clear at all events that it could not have been 
 our Sa//<khya-Sutras, nor even the Samkhya-karikas 
 which seem to have superseded the ancient Sutras 
 early in the sixth century, while our present Sutras 
 date from the fourteenth. 
 
 It might be possible, if not to prove, at all events 
 to render probable the position assigned here to 
 Buddha's teaching as subsequent to the early growth 
 of philosophical ideas in their systematic and more 
 or less technical form, by a reference to the name 
 assigned to his mother, whether it was her real 
 name or a name assigned to her by tradition. She 
 was called Maya or Mayadevi. Considering that in 
 Buddha's eyes the world was Maya or illusion, it 
 seems more likely that the name was given to his 
 mother by early tradition, and that it was given 
 not without a purpose. And if so this could only
 
 THE BB7HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 123 
 
 have been after the name of Avidya (nescience) in 
 the Vedanta, and of PrakHti in the Samkhya-philo- 
 sophy had been replaced by the technical term of 
 Maya. It is well known that, in the old classical 
 Upanishads, the name of May& never occurs ; and it 
 is equally significant that it does occur in the later 
 and more or less apocryphal Upanishads. In the 
 /SVetasvatara, for instance, I, 10, we read, Maya?)i tu 
 Prakntim vidyat, ' Let him know that Prakrit i is 
 Maya or May4 PrakHt i.' This refers, it would seem, 
 to the Samkhya system in which Prakriti acts the 
 part of Maya and fascinates the Purusha, till he 
 turns away from her and she ceases to exist, at all 
 events as far as he is concerned. But whether in 
 Samkhya or Vedanta, Maya in its technical meaning 
 belongs certainly to a secondary period, and it might 
 therefore be argued that May&, as the name of 
 Buddha's mother, is not likely to have found a place 
 in the Buddhistic legend during the early period 
 of Indian philosophy, as represented in the early 
 Upanishads, and even in the Sutras of these two 
 prominent schools. 
 
 There was, no doubt, a certain amount of philo- 
 sophical mnemonic composition after the period 
 represented by the old Upanishads, and before the 
 systematic arrangement of the philosophical Sutras, 
 but whatever may have existed in it, is for ever lost 
 to us. We can see this clearly in the case of the 
 Bn'haspati-philosophy. 
 
 The Bnhaspati-Philosophy. 
 
 Brihaspati is no doubt a very perplexing character. 
 His name is given as that of the author of two Vedic 
 hymns, X, 71, X, 72, a distinction being made
 
 124 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 between a Bn'haspati Angirasa and a Brihaspati 
 Laukya (Laukayatika ?). His name is well known 
 also as one of the Vedic deities. In Rv. VIII, 96, 
 15, we read that Indra, with B?*?'haspati as his ally, 
 overcame the godless people (adevi/i vis&h). He is 
 afterwards quoted as the author of a law-book, 
 decidedly modern, which we still possess. B?^'has- 
 pati is besides the name of the planet Jupiter, and 
 of the preceptor or Purohita of the gods, so that 
 Brihaspati-purohita has become a recognised name 
 of Indra, as having BHhaspati for his Purohita or 
 chief priest and helper. It seems strange, therefore, 
 that the same name, that of the preceptor of the 
 gods, should have been chosen as the name of the 
 representative of the most unorthodox, atheistical, 
 and sensualistic system of philosophy in India. 
 We may possibly account for this by referring to 
 the Brahma?ias and Upanishads, in which Bn'has- 
 pati is represented as teaching the demons his 
 pernicious doctrines, not for their benefit, but for 
 their own destruction. Thus we read, Maitrdyami 
 Up. 7, 9 : 
 
 ' Bn'haspati, having become or having assumed 
 the shape of ukra, brought forth that false know- 
 ledge, for the safety of Indra and for the destruction 
 of the Asuras (demons). By it they show that 
 good is evil and that evil is good, and they say 
 that this new law, which upsets the Veda and the 
 other sacred books, should be studied (by the 
 Asuras, the demons). That being so, it is said, 
 Let no man (but the demons only) study that false 
 knowledge, for it is wrong ; it is, as it were, barren. 
 Its reward lasts only as long ;>s the pleasure lasts, 
 as with one who has fallen from his station (caste).
 
 THE B#/ HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. 125 
 
 Let that false doctrine not be attempted, for thus 
 it is said 1 : 
 
 1. Widely divergent and opposed are these two, 
 the one known as false knowledge, the other as 
 knowledge. I (Yama) believe Na&iketas to be 
 possessed of a desire for knowledge ; even many 
 pleasures do not tempt him away. 
 
 2. He who knows at the same time both the 
 imperfect knowledge (of ritual) and the perfect 
 knowledge (of Self), crosses death by means of the 
 imperfect, and obtains immortality by means of the 
 perfect knowledge 2 . 
 
 3. Those who are wrapt up in imperfect know- 
 ledge fancy themselves alone wise and learned, 
 they wander about floundering and deceived, like 
 the blind led by a man who is himself blind V 
 
 And again : 
 
 ' The gods and the demons, wishing to know 
 the Self, went once into the presence of Brahman 
 (their father Pra^apati 4 ). Having bowed before 
 him, they said : "0 blessed one, we wish to know 
 the Self, do thou tell us ! " Thus, after considering, 
 he thought, these demons believe in a difference of 
 the Atman (from themselves), and therefore a very 
 different Self was taught to them. On that Self 
 these deluded demons take their stand, clinging 
 to it, destroying the true boat of salvation, and 
 praising untruth. What is untrue they see as 
 true, like jugglery. But in reality, what is said 
 in the Vedas, that is true. What is said in the 
 Vedas, on that the wise take their stand. There- 
 
 Kai/?a Upanishad II, 4. : Va#. Up. II. 
 
 KaM. Up. II, 5. 4 A7;and. Up. VIII, 8.
 
 126 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fore let no Brahman study what is not in the 
 Vedas, or this will be the result (as in the case 
 of the demons).' 
 
 This passage is curious in several respects. First 
 of all it is a clear reference of one Upanishad to 
 another, namely to the ./TMndogya, in which this 
 episode of Bn'haspati giving false instruction to 
 the demons is more fully detailed. Secondly w r e 
 see an alteration which was evidently made in- 
 tentionally. In the A'Mndogya Upanishad it is 
 Pra^tipati himself who imparts false knowledge of 
 the Atman to the Asuras, while in the Maitrayana 
 Upanishad Bn'haspati takes his place. It is not 
 unlikely that Brihaspati was introduced in the later 
 Upanishad in order to take the place of Pra^apati, 
 because it w r as felt to be wrong that this highest 
 deity should ever have misled anybody, even the 
 demons. In the A7mndogya the demons who be- 
 lieved in the Anyata (otherness) of the Atman, that 
 is to sav, in the possibility that the Atman could 
 
 i/ / 
 
 be in some place different from themselves, were 
 told to look for it in the person seen in the pupil 
 of the eye, or in the image in a looking-glass, or 
 in the shadow in the water. All this would, how- 
 ever, refer to a visible body only. Then Prar/apati 
 goes on to say that the Atman is what moves 
 about full of pleasures in a dream, and as this 
 would still be the individual man, he declares at 
 last that Atman is what remains in deep sleep, 
 without however losing its own identity. 
 
 If thon in the Upanishads already Bn'haspati was 
 introduced for the purpose of teaching wrong and 
 unorthodox opinions, we may possibly be able to under- 
 stand how his name came to cling to sensualistic
 
 THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 127 
 
 opinions, and how at last, however unfairly, he was 
 held responsible for them. That such opinions 
 existed even at an earlier time, we can see in 
 some of the hymns in which many years ago I 
 pointed out these curious traces of an incipient 
 scepticism. In later Sanskrit, a Barhaspatya, or a 
 follower of BHhaspati, has come to mean an infidel 
 in general. Among the works mentioned in the 
 Lalita-vistara as studied by Buddha a Barhas- 
 patyam is mentioned, but whether composed in 
 Sutras or in metre does not appear. Besides, it 
 is well known that the Lalita-vistara is rather a 
 broken reed to rest upon for chronological purposes. 
 If we may trust, however, to a scholion of Bhas- 
 kara on the Brahma-Sutras, he seems to have known, 
 even at that late time, some Sutras ascribed to 
 BHhaspati 1 , in which the doctrines of the ^arvakas 
 i. e. unbelievers, were contained. But although such 
 Sutras may have existed, we have no means of 
 fixing their date as either anterior or posterior to 
 the other philosophic Sutras. Pamni knew of Sutras 
 which are lost to us, and some of them may be 
 safely referred to the time of Buddha. He also 
 in quoting Bhikshu-Sutras and Na^a-Sutras, men- 
 tions (IV, 3, no) the author of the former as 
 Parasarya, of the latter as /Silalin. As Parasarya 
 is a name of Vyasa, the son of Parasara, it has been 
 supposed that Pamni meant by Bhikshu- Sutras, the 
 Brahma - Sutras L ', sometimes ascribed to Vyasa, 
 which we still possess. That would fix their date 
 about the fifth century B.C., and has been readily 
 accepted therefore by all who wish to claim the 
 
 1 Colebrooke, II. 429. z See before, p. 113.
 
 128 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 greatest possible antiquity for the philosophical 
 literature of India. But Parasarya would hardly 
 have been chosen as the titular name of Vyasa ; and 
 though we should not hesitate to assign to the 
 doctrines of the Vedanta a place in the fifth century 
 B.C., nay even earlier, we cannot on such slender 
 authority do the same for the Sutras themselves. 
 
 When we meet elsewhere w T ith the heterodox 
 doctrines of Bri'haspati, they are expressed in verse, 
 as if taken from a Karika rather than from Sutras. 
 They possess a peculiar interest to us, because they 
 would show us that India, which is generally con- 
 sidered as the home of all that is most spiritual 
 and idealistic, was by no means devoid of sensual- 
 istic philosophers. But though it is difficult to say 
 how old such theories may have been in India it 
 is certain that, as soon as we get any coherent 
 treatises on philosophy, sensualistic opinions crop 
 up among them. 
 
 Of course the doctrines of Buddha would be called 
 sceptical and atheistic by the Brahmans, and /iar- 
 vaka as well as Nastika are names freely applied 
 to the Buddhists. But the doctrines of Brihaspati, 
 as far as we know them, go far beyond Buddhism, 
 and mav be said to be hostile to all religious feel- 
 
 / O 
 
 ings, while Buddha's teaching was both religious 
 and philosophical, though the lines that separate 
 philosophy and religion in India are very faint. 
 
 There are some tenets of the followers of Bn'has- 
 pati which seem to indicate the existence of other 
 schools of philosophy by their side. The Barhas- 
 patyas speak as if being inter jxtrcs, they differ from 
 others as others differed from them. Traces of an 
 opposition against the religion of the Vedas (Kautsa)
 
 THE B.K/HASP ATI-PHILOSOPHY. 129 
 
 appear in the hymns, the Brahmaftas, and the 
 Sutras, and to ignore them would give us an entirely 
 false idea of the religious and philosophical battles 
 and battle-fields of ancient India. As viewed from 
 a Brahmanic point of view, and we have no other, 
 the opposition represented by Bn'haspati and others 
 may seem insignificant, but the very name given 
 to these heretics would seem to imply that their 
 doctrines had met with a world-wide acceptance 
 (Lokayatikas). Another name, that of Nastika, 
 is given to them as saying No to everything ex- 
 cept the evidence of the senses, particularly to the 
 evidence of the Vedas, which, curiously enough, was 
 called by the Vedantists Pratyaksha, that is, self- 
 evident, like sense-perception. 
 
 These Nastikas, a name not applicable to mere 
 dissenters, but to out and out nihilists only, are 
 interesting to us from a historical point of view, 
 because in arguing against other philosophies, they 
 prove, ipso facto, the existence of orthodox philo- 
 sophical systems before their time. The recognised 
 schools of Indian philosophy could tolerate much ; 
 they were tolerant, as we shall see, even towards 
 a qualified atheism, like that of the Samkhya. But 
 they had nothing but hatred and contempt for the 
 Nastikas, and it is for that very reason, and on 
 account of the strong feelings of aversion which 
 they excited, that it seemed to me right that their 
 philosophy should not be entirely passed over by 
 the side of the six Vedic or orthodox systems. 
 
 Madhava, in his Sarvadarsana-samgraha or the 
 Epitome of all philosophical systems, begins with 
 an account of the Nastika or TTarvaka system. He 
 looks upon it as the lowest of all, but nevertheless, 
 
 K
 
 130 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as not to be ignored in a catalogue of the philo- 
 sophical forces of India. Aarvaka (not Aarvaka) 
 is given as the name of a Rakshasa, and he is 
 treated as a historical individual to whom Brt'has- 
 pati or ViU-aspati delivered his doctrines. The 
 name of Aarvaka is clearly connected with that of 
 Aarva, and this is given as a synonym of Buddha 
 by Bala.s'astrin in the Preface to his edition of the 
 Kasika (p. 2). He is represented as a teacher of 
 the Lokayata or world-wide system, if that is the 
 meaning originally intended by that word. A short 
 account of this system is given in the Prabodha- 
 fcandrodaya 27, 18, in the following words: 'The 
 Lokayata system in which the senses alone form 
 an authority, in which the elements are earth, 
 water, fire, and wind (not Akasa or ether), in which 
 wealth and enjoyment form the ideals of man, in 
 which the elements think, the other world is denied, 
 and death is the end of all things.' This name 
 Lokayata occurs already in Pamni's Ga>ia Ukthadi. 
 It should be noted however, that Hema&andra 
 distinguishes between Barhaspatya or Nastika, and 
 Aarvaka or Lokayatika, though he does not tell us 
 which he considers the exact points on which the 
 two are supposed to have differed. The Buddhists 
 use Lokayata for philosophy in general. The state- 
 ment that the Lokayatus admitted but one Pramana, 
 i. e. authority of knowledge, namely sensuous per- 
 ception, shows clearly that there must have been 
 other philosophical systems already in existence. 
 We shall see that the Vaiseshika acknowledged 
 two, perception (Pratyaksha) and inference (Anu- 
 mana) ; the Sa?/ikhya three, adding trustworthy 
 affirmation (Aptavakya) ; the Nyaya four, adding
 
 THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 131 
 
 comparison (Upamana) ; the two Mimamsas six, 
 adding presumption (Arthapatti) and privation 
 (Abhava). Of these and others we shall have to 
 speak hereafter. Even what seems to us so natural 
 an idea as that of the four or five elements, required 
 some time to develop, as we see in the history of the 
 Greek a-To^ia, and yet such an idea was evidently 
 quite familiar to the ./Tarvakas. While other systems 
 admitted five, i. e. earth, water, fire, air, and ether, 
 they admitted four only, excluding ether, probably 
 because it was invisible. In the Upanishads we 
 see traces of an even earlier triad of elements. All 
 this shows the philosophical activity of the Hindus 
 from the earliest times, and exhibits to us the K&x- 
 vakas as denying rather what had been more or less 
 settled before their time, than as adding any new 
 ideas of their own. 
 
 So it is again with regard to the soul. Not only 
 philosophers, but every Arya in India had a word 
 for soul, and never doubted that there was some- 
 thing in man different from the visible body. The 
 /Tarvakas only denied this. They held that what 
 was called soul was not a thing by itself, but was 
 simply the body over again. They held that it 
 was the body that felt, that saw and heard, that 
 remembered and thought, though they saw it every 
 day rotting away and decomposing, as if it never 
 had been. By such opinions they naturally came 
 in conflict with religion even more than with 
 philosophy. We do not know how they accounted 
 for the evolution of consciousness arid intellect 
 out of mere flesh, except that they took refuge 
 with a simile, appealing to the intoxicating power 
 that can be developed by mixing certain ingredi- 
 
 K 2
 
 132 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ents, which by themselves are not intoxicating, as 
 an analogy to the production of soul from body. 
 
 Thus we read : 
 
 ' There are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, 
 
 And from these four elements alone is intelligence 
 produced 
 
 Just like the intoxicating power from Kinwa, 
 &c., mixed together ; 
 
 Since in " I am fat," " I am lean," these attributes 
 abide in the same subject, 
 
 And since fatness, &c., resides only in the body, 
 it alone is the soul and no other, 
 
 And such phrases as " my body " are only signi- 
 ficant metaphorically.' 
 
 In this way the soul seems to have been to them 
 the body qualified by the attribute of intelligence, 
 and therefore supposed to perish with the body. 
 Holding this opinion, it is no wonder that they 
 should have considered the highest end of man 
 to consist in sensual enjoyment, and that they 
 .should have accepted pain simply as an inevitable 
 concomitant of pleasure. 
 
 A verse is quoted : 
 
 ' The pleasure which arises to men from contact 
 with sensible objects, 
 
 Is to l)e relinquished as accompanied by pain- 
 such is the warning of fools ; 
 
 The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white 
 grains, 
 
 What man, seeking his true interest, would fiing 
 them away, because covered with husks and dust ] '( ' 
 
 1 See for those vorsos Cowell and Gough's translation of the 
 Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 4.
 
 THE Bfl/HASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 133 
 
 From all this we see that, though fundamental 
 philosophical principles are involved, the chief 
 character of the j^arvaka system was practical, rather 
 than metaphysical, teaching utilitarianism and crude 
 hedonism in the most outspoken way. It is a pity 
 that all authoritative books of these materialistic 
 philosophers should be lost, as they would probably 
 have allowed us a deeper insight into the early 
 history of Indian philosophy than the ready-made 
 manuals of the six Darsanas on which we have 
 chiefly to rely. The following verses preserved by 
 Madhava in his Epitome are nearly all we possess 
 of the teaching of Brihaspati and his followers : 
 
 ' Fire is hot, water cold, and the air feels cool ; 
 
 By whom was this variety made ? (we do not 
 know), therefore it must have come from their own 
 nature (Svabhava).' 
 
 Bnhaspati himself is held responsible for the 
 following invective : 
 
 ' There is no paradise, no deliverance, and certainly 
 no Self in another world, 
 
 Nor are the acts of the Asramas (stations in life) 
 or the castes, productive of rewards. 
 
 The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the three staves 
 (carried by ascetics) and smearing oneself with ashes, 
 
 They are the mode of life made by their creator ' 
 for those who are devoid of sense and manliness. 
 
 If a victim slain at the 6ryotishoma will go to 
 heaven, 
 
 Why is not his own father killed there by the 
 sacrificer ? 
 
 1 Dhatri, creator, can here be used ironically only, instead of 
 Svabhava, or nature.
 
 134 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If the *Sraddha-offering gives pleasure to beings 
 that are dead, 
 
 Then to give a viaticum to people who travel 
 here on earth, would be useless. 
 
 If those who are in heaven derive pleasure from 
 offerings, 
 
 Then why not give food here to people while they 
 are standing on the roof? 
 
 As long as he lives let a man live happily ; after 
 borrowing money, let him drink Ghee, 
 
 How can there be a return of the body after it has 
 once been reduced to ashes ? 
 
 If he who has left the body goes to another world, 
 
 Why does he not come back again perturbed by 
 love of his relations ? 
 
 Therefore funeral ceremonies for the dead were 
 ordered by the Brahmans. 
 
 As a means of livelihood, nothing else is known 
 anywhere. 
 
 The three makers of the Vedas were buffoons, 
 knaves, and demons. 
 
 The speech of the Pandits is (unintelligible), like 
 ^r'arphari Turphari. 
 
 The obscene act there (at the horse sacrifice) to 
 be performed by the queen has been 
 
 Proclaimed by knaves, and likewise other things 
 to be taken in hand. 
 
 The eating of flesh was likewise ordered by 
 demons.' 
 
 Tliis is certainly very strong language, as strong 
 ;IK any that has ever been used by ancient or 
 modern materialists. It is well that we should 
 know how old and how widely spread this 
 materialism was, for without it we should hardly
 
 THE B5IHASPATI-PHILOSOPHY. 135 
 
 understand the efforts that were made on the 
 other side to counteract it by establishing the 
 true sources or measures of knowledge, the Pra- 
 manas, and other fundamental truths which were 
 considered essential both for religion and for 
 philosophy. The idea of orthodoxy, however, is 
 very different in India from what it has been 
 elsewhere. We shall find philosophers in India 
 who deny the existence of a personal god or 
 Isvara, and who, nevertheless, were tolerated as 
 orthodox as long as they recognised the authority 
 of the Veda, and tried to bring their doctrines 
 into harmony with Vedic texts. It is this denial 
 of the authority of the Veda which, in the eyes of 
 the Brahmans, stamped Buddha at once as a heretic, 
 arid drove him to found a new religion or brother- 
 hood, while those who followed the Sa??ikhya, and 
 who on many important points did not differ much 
 from him, remained secure within the pale of 
 orthodoxy. Some of the charges brought by the 
 Barhaspatyas against the Brahmans who followed 
 the Veda are the same which the followers of 
 Buddha brought against them. Considering there- 
 fore, that on the vital question of the authority 
 of the Veda the Sa??ikhya agrees, however incon- 
 sistently, with orthodox Brahmanism and differs 
 from the Buddhists, it would be far easier to prove 
 that Buddha derived his ideas from Brihaspati than 
 from Kapila, the reputed founder of the Samkhya. 
 If we are right in the description we have given 
 of the unrestrained and abundant growth of 
 philosophical ideas in ancient India, the idea of 
 borrowing, so natural to us, seems altogether out 
 of place in India. A wild mass of guesses at truth
 
 136 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 was floating in the air, and there was no controlling 
 authority whatever, not even, as far as we know, 
 any binding public opinion to produce anything like 
 order in it. Hence we have as little right to 
 maintain that Buddha borrowed from Kapila as 
 that Kapila borrowed from Buddha. No one would 
 say that the Hindus borrowed the idea of building 
 ships from the Phenicians, or that of building 
 Stupas from the Egyptians. In India we move 
 in a world different from that which we are accus- 
 tomed to in Greece, Rome, or Modern Europe, and 
 we need not rush at once to the conclusion that, 
 because similar opinions prevail in Buddhism and 
 in the Sawkhya-philosophy of Kapila, therefore 
 the former must have borrowed from the latter, 
 or, as some hold, the latter from the former. 
 
 Though we can well imagine what the spirit 
 of the philosophy of the ancient Indian heretics, 
 whether they are called TTarvakas or Barhaspatyas, 
 may have been, \ve know, unfortunately, much less 
 of their doctrines than of any other school of 
 philosophy. They are to us no more than names, 
 such as the names of Ya^Havalkya, Raikva, or any 
 other ancient leaders of Indian thought mentioned 
 in the Upanishads, and credited there with certain 
 utterances. We know a few of the conclusions at 
 which they arrived, but of the processes by which 
 they arrived at them we know next to nothing. 
 What we may learn from these utterances is that 
 a large mass of philosophical thought must have 
 existed in India long before there was any attempt 
 at dividing it into six well-defined channels of 
 systematic philosophy, or reducing it to writing. 
 Even when the names of certain individuals, such
 
 METEMPSYCHOSIS SAJJfSARA. 137 
 
 as 6raimini, Kapila, and others, are given us as the 
 authors of certain systems of philosophy, we must 
 not imagine that they were the original creators 
 of a philosophy in the sense in which Plato and 
 Aristotle seem to have been so. 
 
 Common Philosophical Ideas. 
 
 It cannot be urged too strongly that there 
 existed in India a large common fund of philo- 
 sophical thought which, like language, belonged to 
 no one in particular, but was like the air breathed 
 by every living and thinking man. Thus only can 
 it be explained that we find a number of ideas in 
 all, or nearly all, the systems of Indian philosophy 
 which all philosophers seem to take simply for 
 granted, and which belong to no one school in 
 particular. 
 
 1. Metempsychosis Sawsara. 
 
 The best known of these ideas, which belong to 
 India rather than to any individual philosopher, is 
 that which is known under the name of Metempsy- 
 chosis. This is a Greek word, like Metensomatosis, 
 but without any literary authority in Greek. It 
 corresponds in meaning to the Sanskrit Sa?7isara, 
 and is rendered in German by Seelenwanderung. 
 To a Hindu the idea that the souls of men migrated 
 after death into new bodies of living beings, of 
 animals, nay, even of plants, is so self-evident that 
 it was hardly ever questioned. We never meet 
 with any attempt at proving or disproving it among 
 the prominent writers of ancient or modern times. 
 As early as the period of the Upanishads we hear 
 of human souls being reborn both in animal and
 
 138 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in vegetable bodies. In Greece the same opinion 
 was held by Empedocles ; but whether he borrowed 
 this idea from the Egyptians, as is commonly 
 supposed to have been the case, or whether Pytha- 
 goras and his teacher Pherecydes learnt it in India, 
 is a question still hotly discussed. To me it seems 
 that such a theory was so natural that it might 
 perfectly well have arisen independently among dif- 
 ferent races. Among the Aryan races, Italian, Celtic, 
 and Scythic or Hyperborean tribes are mentioned 
 as having entertained a faith in Metempsychosis, 
 nay, traces of it have lately been discovered even 
 among the uncivilised inhabitants of America, 
 Africa, and Eastern Asia. And why not ? In 
 India certainly it developed spontaneously ; and if 
 this was so in India, why not in other countries, 
 particularly among races belonging to the same 
 linguistic stock ? It should be remembered, how- 
 ever, that some systems, particularly the Sa/wkhya- 
 philosophy, do not admit what we commonly 
 understand by Seeleuwanderung. If we translate 
 the Sawkhya Purusha by Soul instead of Self, it 
 is not the Purusha that migrates, but the Sukshma- 
 .sarira, the subtile body. The Self remains always 
 intact, a mere looker on, and its highest purpose 
 is this recognition that it is above and apart from 
 anything that has sprung from Prakr/ti or nature. 
 
 2. Immortality of the Soul. 
 
 The idea of the immortality of the soul also should 
 be included in what was the common property of all 
 Indian philosophers. This idea was so completely 
 taken for granted that we look in vain for any 
 elaborate arguments in support of it. Mortality
 
 PESSIMISM. 139 
 
 with the Hindus is so entirely restricted to the 
 body which decays and decomposes before our 
 very eyes, that such an expression as Atmano 
 *mHtatvam, immortality of the Self, sounds almost 
 tautological in Sanskrit. No doubt, the followers of 
 Bn'haspati would deny a future life, but all the other 
 schools rather fear than doubt a future life, a long- 
 continued metempsychosis ; and as to a final annihila- 
 tion of the true Self, that would sound to Indian ears 
 as a contradiction in itself. There are scholars so 
 surprised at this unwavering belief in a future and 
 an eternal life among the people of India, that they 
 have actually tried to trace it back to a belief sup- 
 posed to be universal among savages who thought 
 that man left a ghost behind who might assume the 
 body of an animal or even the shape of a tree. This 
 is a mere fancy, and though it cannot of course be 
 disproved, it does not thereby acquire any right to our 
 consideration. Besides, why should the Aryas have 
 had to learn lessons from savages, as they at one 
 time were no doubt savages themselves, and need not 
 have forgotten the so-called wisdom of savages as 
 little as the >Sudras themselves from whom they are 
 supposed to have learnt it ? 
 
 3. Pessimism. 
 
 All Indian philosophers have been charged with 
 pessimism, and in some cases such a charge may 
 seem well founded, but not in all. People who 
 derived their name for good from a word which 
 originally meant nothing but being or real, Sat, 
 are not likely to have looked upon what is as 
 what ought not to be. Indian philosophers are by 
 no means dwelling for ever on the miseries of life.
 
 140 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 They are not always whining and protesting that 
 life is not worth living. That is not their pessimism. 
 They simply state that they received the first im- 
 pulse to philosophical reflection from the fact that 
 there is suffering in the world. They evidently 
 thought that in a perfect world suffering had no 
 place, that it is something anomalous, something 
 that ought at all events to be accounted for, and, 
 if possible, overcome. Pain, certainly, seems to be 
 an imperfection, and, as such, may well have caused 
 the question why it existed, and how it could be 
 annihilated. But this is not the disposition which 
 we are accustomed to call pessimism. Indian philo- 
 sophy contains no outcry against divine injustice, 
 and in no way encourages suicidal expedients. They 
 would, in fact, be of no avail, because, according to 
 Indian views, the same troubles and the same 
 problems would have to be faced again and again in 
 another life. Considering that the aim of all Indian 
 philosophy was the removal of suffering, which was 
 caused by nescience, and the attainment of the 
 highest happiness, which was produced by knowledge, 
 we should have more right to call it eudsemonistic 
 than pessimistic. 
 
 It is interesting, however, to observe the unan- 
 imity with which the principal systems of philosophy 
 in India, nay some of their religious systems also, 
 start from the conviction that the world is full of 
 suffering, and that this suffering should be ac- 
 counted for and removed. This seems to have been 
 one of the principal impulses, if not the principal 
 impulse to philosophical thought in India. If we 
 begin with Cr'aimini, we cannot expect much real 
 philosophy from his Purva-MimamsA, which is chieHy
 
 PESSIMISM. 141 
 
 concerned with ceremonial questions, such as sacrifices, 
 &c. But though these sacrifices are represented as 
 being the means of a certain kind of beatitude, arid 
 so far as serving to diminish or extinguish the ordi- 
 nary afflictions of men, they were never supposed to 
 secure the highest beatitude for which all the other 
 philosophers were striving. The Uttara-Mima?nsa 
 and all the other philosophies take much higher 
 ground. Badarayana teaches that the cause of all 
 evil is Avidy4 or nescience, and that it is the object 
 of his philosophy to remove that nescience by means 
 of science (Vidya), and thus to bring about that true 
 knowledge of Brahman, which is also the highest 
 bliss (Taitt. Up. II, i). The Samkhya- philosophy, 
 at least such as we know it from the Karikas and 
 the Sutras, not however the Tattva-samasa, begins 
 at once with the recognition of the existence of the 
 three kinds of suffering, and proclaims as its highest 
 object the complete cessation of all pain ; while the 
 Yoga philosophers, after pointing out the way to 
 meditative absorption (Samadhi), declare that this 
 is the best means of escaping from all earthly 
 troubles (II, 2), and, in the end, of reaching Kai- 
 valya or perfect freedom. The Vaiseshika promises 
 to its followers knowledge of truth, and through it 
 final cessation of all pain ; and even Gotama's philo- 
 sophy of logic holds out in its first Sutra complete 
 blessedness (Apavarga) as its highest reward, which 
 is obtained by the complete destruction of all pain 
 by means of logic. That Buddha's religion had the 
 same origin, a clear perception of human suffering and 
 its causes, and had the same object, the annihilation 
 of DuAkha or suffering (Nirva/ia) is too well known to 
 require further elucidation, but it should be remeni-
 
 142 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bered that other systems also have one and the same 
 name for the state to which they aspire, whether 
 Nirvana or DuAkhanta, i. e. end of DuAkha, pain. 
 
 If therefore all Indian philosophy professes its 
 ability to remove pain, it can hardly be called pessi- 
 mistic in the ordinary sense of the word. Even 
 physical pain, though it cannot be removed from 
 the body, ceases to affect the soul, as soon as the 
 Self has fully realised its aloofness from the body, 
 while all mental pain, being traced back to our 
 worldly attachments, would vanish by freeing our- 
 selves from the desires which cause these attach- 
 ments. The cause of all suffering having been 
 discovered in ourselves, in our works and thoughts, 
 whether in this or in a previous existence, all 
 clamour against divine injustice is silenced at once. 
 We are what we have made ourselves, we suffer what 
 we have done, we reap what we have sown, and it 
 is the sowing of good seed, though without any 
 hope of a rich harvest, that is represented as the 
 chief purpose of a philosopher's life on earth. 
 
 Besides this conviction that all suffering can be 
 removed by an insight into its nature and origin, 
 there are some other ideas which must be traced back 
 to that rich treasury of thought which was open to 
 every thinking man in India. These common ideas 
 assumed, no doubt, different guises in different 
 systems, but this ought not to deceive us, and a 
 little reflection allows us to perceive their common 
 source. Thus, when the cause of suffering is in- 
 quired for, they all have but one answer to give, 
 though under different names. The Vedanta gives 
 Avidya, nescience, the Sar/vkhya, Aviveka, non-dis- 
 crimination, the Nyaya, Mithyiu/ftana, false know-
 
 K ARM AN. 143 
 
 ledge, and these various aberrations from knowledge 
 are generally represented as Bandha or bondage, to 
 be broken again by means of that true knowledge 
 which is supplied bythevarious systems of philosophy. 
 
 4. Karman. 
 
 The next idea that seems ingrained in the Indian 
 mind and therefore finds expression in all the 
 systems of philosophy is a belief in Karman, deed, 
 that is, the continuous working of every thought, 
 word, and deed through all ages. ' All works, good 
 or bad, all must bear and do bear fruit/ is a senti- 
 ment never doubted by any Hindu, whether to-day 
 or thousands of years ago l . 
 
 And the same eternity which is claimed for works 
 and their results is claimed for the soul also, only 
 with this difference, that while works will cease to 
 work when real freedom has been obtained, the 
 soul itself continues after the obtainment of freedom 
 or final beatitude. The idea of the soul ever 
 coming to an end is so strange to the Indian mind 
 that there seemed to be no necessity for anything 
 like proofs of immortality, so common in European 
 philosophy. Knowing what is meant by ' to be,' the 
 idea that 'to be ' could ever become ' not to be ' 
 seems to have been impossible to the mind of the 
 Hindus. If by 'to be' is meant Samsara or the world, 
 however long it may last, then Hindu philosophers 
 would never look upon it as real. It never was, 
 it never is, and never will be. Length of time, 
 however enormous, is nothing in the eyes of Hindu 
 
 5 Cf. The Mysteries of Karma, revealed by a Brahmin Yogee, 
 Allahabad, 1898.
 
 144 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophers. To reckon a thousand years as one 
 day would not satisfy them. They represent length 
 of time by much bolder similes, such as when a man 
 once in every thousand years passes his silken ker- 
 chief over the chain of the Himalayan mountains. 
 By the time he has completely wiped them out by 
 this process the world or Sawsara may indeed come 
 to an end, but even then eternity and reality lie 
 far beyond. In order to get an easier hold of this 
 eternity, the very popular idea of Pralayas, i.e. de- 
 structions or absorptions of the whole world, has 
 been invented. According to the Vedanta there 
 occurs at the end of each Kalpa a Pralaya or dis- 
 solution of the universe, and Brahman is then 
 reduced to its causal condition (Karariavastha), 
 containing both soul and matter in an Avyakta 
 (undeveloped) state \ At the end of this Pralaya, 
 however, Brahman creates or lets out of himself 
 a new world, matter becomes gross and visible once 
 more, and souls become active and re-embodied, 
 though with a higher enlightenment (Vikasa), and 
 all this according to their previous merits and de- 
 merits. Brahman has then assumed its new Karya- 
 vastha or effective state which lasts for another 
 Kalpa. But all this refers to the world of change 
 and unreality only. It is the world of Karman, the 
 temporary produce of Nescience, of Avidya, or 
 Maya, it is not yet real reality. In the Sa?>ikhya- 
 philosophy these Pralayas take place whenever the 
 three Gimas of Prakrit i recover their equipoise 2 , 
 while creation results from the upsetting of the equi- 
 poise between them. What is truly eternal, is not 
 
 1 Thibaut, V. S. I, p. xxviii. 2 Sawkhya-Sutras VI, 42.
 
 K ARM AN. 145 
 
 affected by the cosmic illusion, or at least is so for a 
 time only, and may recover at any moment its self- 
 knowledge, that is, its self-being, and its freedom 
 from all conditions and fetters. 
 
 According to the Vaiseshikas this process of 
 creation and dissolution depends on the atoms. If 
 they are separated, there ensues dissolution (Pralaya), 
 if motion springs up in them and they are united, 
 there follows what we call creation. 
 
 The idea of the reabsorption of the world at the 
 end of a Kalpa (aeon) and its emergence again in the 
 next Kalpa, does not occur as yet in the old Upani- 
 shads, nay even the name of Samsara is absent from 
 them ; and Professor Garbe is inclined therefore 
 to claim the idea of Pralaya as more recent, as 
 peculiar to the Samkhya-philosophy, and as adopted 
 from it by the other systems *. It may be so, but 
 in the Bhagavad-git& IX, 7, the idea of Pralayas, 
 absorptions, and of Kalpas or ages, of their end 
 and their beginning (Kalpakshaye and Kalpadau), 
 are already quite familiar to the poets. The exact 
 nature of the Pralayas differs so much, according to 
 different poets and philosophers, that it is far more 
 likely that they may all have borrowed it from a 
 common source, that is, from the popular belief of 
 those among whom they were brought up and from 
 whom they learnt their language and with it the 
 materials of their thoughts, than that they should 
 each have invented the same theory under slightly 
 varying aspects. 
 
 1 Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. 221.
 
 146 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 5. Infallibility of the Veda. 
 
 One more common element presupposed by Indian 
 philosophy might be pointed out in the recognition 
 of the supreme authority and the revealed char- 
 acter ascribed to the Veda. This, in ancient times, 
 is certainly a startling idea, familiar as it may 
 sound to us at present. The Sa?>ikhya-philosophy 
 is supposed to have been originally without a belief 
 in the revealed character of the Vedas, but it cer- 
 tainly speaks of /Sruti (Sutras I, 5). As long as we 
 know the Samkhya, it recognises the authority of 
 the Veda, calling it /Sabda, and appeals to it even 
 in matters of minor importance. It is important 
 to observe that the distinction between $ruti and 
 Smn'ti, revelation and tradition, so well known in 
 the later phases of philosophy, is not to be found 
 as yet in the old Upanishads. 
 
 6. Three Guwas. 
 
 The theory of the three Gunas also, which has 
 been claimed as originally peculiar to the Sawkhya- 
 philosophy, seems in its unscientific form to have 
 been quite familiar to most Hindu philosophers. 
 The impulse to everything in nature, the cause of 
 all life and variety, is ascribed to the three Gu^as. 
 Gunn means quality, but we are warned expressly 
 not to take it, when it occurs in philosophy, in the 
 ordinary sense.; of quality, but rather as something 
 substantial by itself, so that the Gumis become in 
 fact the component constituents of nature. In the 
 most general sense they represent no more than 
 thesis, antithesis, and something between the two, 
 such as cold, warm, and neither cold nor warm ; m>od, 
 
 ' O
 
 THREE GU7VAS. 147 
 
 bad, and neither good nor bad ; bright, dark, and 
 neither bright nor dark, and so on through every part 
 of physical and moral nature. Tension between these 
 qualities produces activity and struggle: equilibrium 
 leads to temporary or final rest. This mutual ten- 
 sion is sometimes represented as Vishamatvam, un- 
 evenness, caused by a preponderance of one of the 
 three, as we read, for instance, in the Maitrayana 
 Upanishad V, 2 : ' This world was in the beginning 
 Tamas (darkness) indeed. That Tamas stood in the 
 Highest. Moved by the Highest, it became uneven. 
 In that form it was Ra^as (obscurity). That llamas, 
 when moved, became uneven, and this is the form of 
 Sattva (goodness). That Sattva, when moved, ran 
 forth as essence (Rasa).' Here we have clearly the 
 recognised names of the three Gunas, but the Maitra- 
 yana Upanishad shows several Samkhya influences, 
 and it might therefore be argued that it does not 
 count for much, in order to establish the general 
 acceptance of the theory of the Gunas, not for more, 
 at all events, than the later Upanishads or the 
 Bhagavad-gita, in which the three Gunas are fully 
 recognised. 
 
 L 2
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Vedanta or Uttara-Mimawisa. 
 
 IF now we pass on to a consideration of the six 
 orthodox systems of philosophy, and begin with the 
 Vedanta, we have to take as our chief guides the 
 Sutras of Badarayana, and the commentary of 
 *Sa,mkara. We know little of Biidaraya?ia, the re- 
 puted author of our Sutras. Of course when we 
 possess commentaries on any Sutras, we know that 
 the Sutras must have existed before their com- 
 mentaries, that the Sutras of Badaraya?ia were 
 older therefore than Samkara, their commentator. 
 In India he has been identified with Vy;isa, the 
 collector of the Mahabharata, but without sufficient 
 evidence, nor should we gain much by that identifi- 
 cation, as Vyasa of the Mahabharata also is hardly 
 more than a name to us. This Vyasa is said by 
 /Samkara, III, 3, 32, to have lived at the end of the 
 Dvapara and the beginning of the Kali age, and to 
 have had intercourse with the gods, I.e., I, 3, 33. 
 But though he calls him the author of the Maha- 
 bharata, 1. c., II, 3, 47, *Samkara, in the whole of his 
 commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, never mentions 
 that the Vyasa of the epic was the author of the 
 book on which he is commenting, though he mentions 
 Badarayana as such. This convinced Windischmann 
 that ASamkara himself did not consider these two 
 Vyasas as one and the same person, and this judg-
 
 VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMA/VSA. 149 
 
 ment ought not to have been lightly disturbed. It 
 was excusable in Colebrooke, but not after what had 
 been said byWindischmann, particularly when no new 
 argument could be produced. All we can say is that, 
 whatever the date of the Bhagavad-git4 is, and it is 
 a part of the Mahabharata, the age of the Vedanta- 
 Stitras and of Badarayana must have been earlier. 
 
 We may also say that Badarayana himself never 
 refers to any work which could be assigned with 
 any amount of certainty to any time after our era. 
 Even when Badarayana quotes the Snm'ti, it does 
 not follow that /Samkara is always right when 
 suggesting passages from the Mahabharata (Bhaga- 
 vad-gita), or from Manu, for it is not too much to 
 say that similar passages may have occurred in other 
 and more ancient Srnnti works also. Badarayarai 
 is certainly most provoking in never quoting his 
 authorities by name. If we could follow $amkara. 
 Badaraya^ia would have referred in his Sutras to 
 Bauddhas, 6rainas, Pasupatas and Paft&aratras, to 
 Yogins, Vaiseshikas, though not to Naiyayikas, to 
 Sawkhyas, and to the doctrines of (j'aimini 1 . By the 
 name of Sruti Badarayana, according to $amkara, 
 meant the following Upanishads, BHhad-aranyaka, 
 /^Aandogya, Kanaka, Kaushitaki, Aitareya, Tait- 
 tiriya, Munc^aka, Prasna, /Svetasvatara, and 6rabala. 
 
 This must suffice to indicate the intellectual sphere 
 in which Badarayana moved, or was supposed to have 
 moved, and so far may be said to determine his 
 chronological position as far anterior to that of 
 another Vyasa, who was the father of $uka, the 
 teacher of Gauc?apada, the teacher of Govinda, the 
 
 1 Deussen, System des Vedanta, p. 24,
 
 150 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 teacher of $a?kara, and who, if $a?>ikara belonged 
 to the eighth century, might have lived in about 
 the sixth century of our era l . 
 
 The literary works to which >Sa??ikara refers in his 
 commentary are, according to Deussen (System, p. 34), 
 among the Sa??ihitas, that of the Big-veda, of the 
 Va^asaneyins, Maitrayamyas and Taittiriyas, and 
 Ka^as, (nothing from the Sama and Atharva- 
 samhitas) ; among the Brahmanas, the Aitareya, 
 Arsheya, Shac^viwisa, /S'atapatha, Taittiriya, Ta/^c/ya, 
 TTMndogya ; among the Arawyakas, Aitareya and 
 Taittiriya ; and among the Upanishads, Aitareya, 
 Br&had-ararayaka, L>a, Ka^Aa, Kaushitaki-brahmana, 
 Kena, jfiTAandogya, Maitrayaniya, Munc/aka, Prasna, 
 jSvetasvatara, Taittiriya. These are sometimes called 
 the old or classical Upanishads, as being quoted by 
 $a?>ikara, though Paiwgi, Agnirahasya, Narayawlya 
 and G'abala may have to be added. As belonging to 
 Smn'ti$amkara quotes Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita), 
 Ramayana, Marka/ic/eya-purana, Manu,Yaska, Pa?iini, 
 Paribhashas, Samkhya-karika, and he refers to Sa??i- 
 kliya-Sutras (though it is important to observe that he 
 gives no ipsissima verba from our Samkhya-Sutras), 
 to Yoga-Sutras, Nyaya-Sutras, Vai.veshika-Sutras, 
 and to Mlmamsa-Sfrfcras. When he alludes to Sugata 
 or Buddha he refers once to a passage which has been 
 traced in the Abhidharma-KosAa-vyakhya. He also 
 knew the Bhagavatas and the Svapiuidhyayavids. 
 
 Though the name of Vedanta does not occur in the 
 old Upanishads, we can hardly doubt that it was the 
 
 1 Another sternum of Vyasa, given by native writers, is 
 Naraya/w, VasishMa, (Padmabhava), *S'akti, Parasara, Vyasa, 
 .S'uka, Gauf/apacla, Hastamalaka (*S'ishya), Tro^aka, Varttika- 
 kara, &c.
 
 VEDANTA OR UTTARA-MIMAMSA. 151 
 
 Vedantic thoughts, contained in the Upanishads, 
 which gave the first impulse to more systematic 
 philosophical speculations in India. Several scholars 
 have tried to prove that Samkhya ideas prevailed 
 in India at an earlier time than, the Vedantic ideas. 
 But though there certainly are germs of Samkhya 
 theories in the Upanishads, they are but few and 
 far between, while the strictly Vedantic concepts 
 meet us at every step in the hymns, the Brahma/ias, 
 the Aranyakas, and in the Sutras. Vedanta is clearly 
 the native philosophy of India. It is true that this 
 philosophy is not yet treated systematically in the 
 Upanishads, but neither is the Samkhya. To us 
 who care only for the growth of philosophical 
 thought on the ancient soil of India, Vedanta is 
 clearly the first growth ; and the question whether 
 Kapila lived before Badarayana, or whether the 
 systematic treatment of the Samkhya took place 
 before that of the Vedanta, can hardly arise. 
 
 I only wonder that those who maintain the 
 priority of the Samkhya, have not appealed to 
 the Lalita-vistara, twelfth chapter, where, among 
 the subjects known to Buddha, are mentioned not 
 only Nirghar^u, X/^andas, Yagraakalpa, 6ryotisha, but 
 likewise Samkhya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, Vesika (Vaid- 
 yaka ?), Arthavidya, Barhaspatya, AsA'arya, Asura, 
 Mri'gapakshiruta, and Hetuvidya (Nyaya). There 
 are several names which are difficult to identify, but 
 there can be no doubt that the five philosophical 
 systems here mentioned were intended for Samkhya, 
 Yoga, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, and Barhaspatya. The 
 two Mimamsas are absent, but their absence does 
 not prove that they did not exist, but only that 
 they were considered too orthodox to form a proper
 
 152 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 subject of study for Buddha. This shows the real 
 character of the antagonism between Buddhism and 
 Brahmanism, now so often denied or minimised 1 , and 
 is confirmed by similar references, as when Hema- 
 &andra in his Abhidhana mentions indeed such names 
 as Arhatas or (9ainas, Saugatas or Buddhists, Naiya- 
 yikas, Yoga, Samkhya or Kapila, Vaiseshika, Barhas- 
 patya or Nastika, AUrvaka or Lokayatika, but 
 carefully omits the two really dangerous systems, 
 the Mimamsa of Badarayana and that of 6raimini. 
 
 It should also be remembered that considerable 
 doubt has recently been thrown on the age of the 
 Chinese translation of the Lalita-vistara, which 
 seemed to enable us to assign the original to a date 
 at all events anterior to 70 A. D. The case is not 
 quite clear yet, but we must learn to be more 
 cautious with Chinese dates. 
 
 It has been the custom to give the name of 
 Vedanta- philosophy to the Uttara-Mimams4 of 
 Badarayam, nor is there any reason why that name 
 should not be retained. If Vedanta is used as 
 synonymous with Upanishad, the Uttara-Mimawsa 
 is certainly the Vedanta-philosophy, or a systematic 
 treatment of the philosophical teaching of the 
 Upanishads. It is true, no doubt, that Vasish^a as 
 well as Gautama distinguishes between Upanishads 
 and Vedantas (XXII, 9), and the commentator to 
 Gautama XIX, 7 states distinctly that those parts 
 only of the Arawyakas which are not Upanishads 
 are to be called Vedantas. But there is no real harm 
 in the received name, and we see that the followers 
 of the Vedanta were often called Aupanislmdas. 
 
 1 See Brahmavadin, Feb., 1898, p. 454.
 
 V* BADARAYANA. V 153 
 
 Badarayawa. 
 
 As to Badarayana, the reputed author of the 
 Vedanta-Sutras, we had to confess before that 
 we know nothing about him. He is to us a name 
 and an intellectual power, but nothing else. We 
 know the date of his great commentator, /Samkara, 
 in the eighth century A.D., and we know that another 
 commentator, Bodhayana, was even earlier. We 
 also know that Bodhayana' s commentary was followed 
 by Kamanu^a. It is quite possible that Bodhayana, 
 like Ramanu^a, represented a more ancient and more 
 faithful interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and 
 that $amkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, 
 is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no MS. 
 of Bodhayana has yet been discovered. 
 
 A still more ancient commentator, Upavarsha by 
 name, is mentioned, and /S'amkara (III, 3, 53) calls 
 him Bhagavad or Saint. But it must remain doubt- 
 ful again whether he can be identified with the 
 Upavarsha, who, according to the Katha-sarit-sagara, 
 was the teacher of Panini. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that, according to Indian 
 tradition, Badarayana, as the author of the Vedanta- 
 Sutras, is called Vyasa or Vedavyasa, Dvaipayana 
 or Krishna Dvaipayana. Here we are once more 
 in a labyrinth from which it is difficult to find an 
 exit. Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name 
 given to the author of the Mahabharata, and no two 
 styles can well be more different than that of the 
 Vyasa of the Mahabharata and that of Vyasa, the 
 supposed author of the so-called Vyasa-Sutras. I 
 think we should remember that Vyasa, as a noun, 
 meant no more than compilation or arrangement,
 
 154 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as opposed to Samasa, conciseness or abbreviation ; 
 so that the same story might be recited Samasena, 
 in an abbreviated, and Vyasena, in a complete 
 form. 
 
 We should remember next that Vyasa is called 
 Parasarya, the son of Parasara and Satyavati 
 (truthful), and that Pawini mentions one Parasarya 
 as the author of the Bhikshu-Sutras, while Va/ras- 
 pati Misra declares that the Bhikshu-Sutras are 
 the same as the Vedanta-Sutras, and that the 
 followers of Parasarya were in consequence called 
 Parasarins. (Pan. IV, 3, no.) 
 
 This, if we could rely on it, would prove the 
 existence of our Sutras before the time of Pamni, 
 or in the fifth century B. c. This would be a most 
 important gain for the chronology of Indian philo- 
 sophy. But if, as we are told, Vyasa collected 
 (Vivyasa) not only the Vedas, the Mahabharata, 
 the Puranas, but also the Vyasa-Sutras, nay even 
 a prose commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras, 
 we can hardly doubt that the work ascribed to 
 him must be taken as the work of several people 
 or of a literary period rather than of one man. 
 I formerly thought that Vyasa might have repre- 
 sented the period in which the first attempts were 
 made to reduce the ancient mnemonic literature 
 of India to writing, but there is nothing in tradition 
 to support such a view, unless we thought that 
 Vyasa had some connection witli Nyasa (writing). 
 Indian tradition places the great Vyasa between 
 the third and fourth ages of the present world, 
 whatever that may mean, if translated into our 
 modern chronological language. If Vyasa had 
 really anything to do witli our Vedanta-Sutras, it
 
 BADARAYAJVA. 155 
 
 would hardly have been more than that he arranged 
 or edited them. His name does not occur in the 
 Sutras themselves, while that of Badarayawa does, 
 and likewise that of Badari, a name mentioned by 
 (raimini also in his Purva-Mimawisa l . In the Bhaga- 
 vad-gita, which might well be placed as contemporary 
 with the Vedanta-Sutras, or somewhat later, Vyasa 
 is mentioned as one of the Devarshis with Asita 
 and Devala (X, 13), and he is called the greatest 
 of Rishis (X, 37). But all becomes confusion again, 
 if we remember that tradition makes Vyasa the 
 author of the Mahabharata, and therefore of the 
 Bhagavad-gita itself, which is even called an Upani- 
 shad. 
 
 The only passage which seems to me to settle 
 the relative age of the Vedanta-Sutras and the 
 Bhagavad-gita is in XIII, 3 2 , 'Hear and learn from 
 me the Supreme Soul (Kshetrar/ria) that has been 
 celebrated in many ways by Rishis in various metres, 
 and by the words of the Brahma-Sutras, which are 
 definite and furnished with reasons.' Here the 
 words ' Brahma-sutra-padai/?,' ' the words of the 
 Brahma-Sutras,' seem to me to refer clearly to 
 the recognised title of the Vedanta or Brahma- 
 Sutras. Whatever native authorities may say to 
 the contrary, the words ' definite and argumenta- 
 tive ' can refer to Sutras only. And if it is said, on 
 the other side, that these Brahma-Sutras, when they 
 refer to Snm'ti, refer clearly to passages taken from 
 the Bhagavad-gita also, and must therefore be later, 
 I doubt it. They never mention the name of the 
 
 Colebrooke, M. E., II, p. 354. 
 
 Prof. T. E. Amalnerkar, Priority of the Vedanta-Sutras, 1895.
 
 156 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Bhagavad-gita, nor do they give any ipsissima verba 
 from it, and as every Smrzti presupposes a $ruti. 
 these references may have been meant for pas- 
 sages which the Bhagavad-gita had adapted, and 
 may have shared with other Snmtis. Brahma- 
 Sutra, on the contrary, is a distinct title, all the 
 more significant where it occurs, because neither 
 the word Sutra nor Brahma-Sutra occurs ao;ain in 
 
 ~ 
 
 any other passage of the Gita. However, even 
 admitting that the Brahma-Sutras quoted from the 
 Bhagavad-gita, as the Gita certainly appeals to 
 the Brahma-Sutras, this reciprocal quotation might 
 be accounted for by their being contemporaneous, 
 as in the case of other Sutras which, as there can 
 be no doubt, quote one from the other, and some- 
 times verbatim. 
 
 As to the commentary on Pataf^ali's Yoga-Sutras 
 being the work of the same Vyasa, this seems to 
 me altogether out of the question. There are 
 hundreds of people in India who have the name 
 of Vyasa. Nor has it ever been positively proved 
 that Pataf/r/ali, the reputed author of the Yoga- 
 Sutras, was the same person as Pata/l^ali, the author 
 of the Mahabhashya, the great commentary on 
 Pa?iini's grammar, and on Katyayana's Varttikas. 
 Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion, 
 chiefly in order to fix the date of the Yoga-Sutras, 
 but this also would force us to ascribe the most 
 heterogeneous works to one and the same author '. 
 
 Even the age of Pata^r/ali, the grammarian and 
 author of the Mahabhashya, seems to me by no 
 
 1 Botli Lassen and Garbe, Die Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. 46. 
 seem inclined to accept the identity of the two Puta%alis.
 
 BADARAYA.VA. 157 
 
 means positively settled. I gladly admit the plau- 
 sibility of Goldstiicker's arguments that if Pataft^ali 
 presupposed the existence of the Maurya-dynasty he 
 might be placed in the third century B.C. I look 
 upon the Ar&aA, which he mentions in the famous 
 Maurya-passage, as having been devised by the 
 Mauryas for the sake of trade, as the first coins with 
 images of the gods, introduced by the Maurya- 
 dynasty. Such coins, when they contain images 
 of the gods, should not, according to the gram- 
 marian, be called simply by the names of the gods, 
 but by a derivative name, not >Siva, but $ivaka, 
 just as we distinguish between an Angel and an 
 Angelot. And I pointed out before, the very gods 
 mentioned here by Pataf^/ali are the gods the 
 images of which do occur on the oldest Indian coins 
 which we possess, viz. Siva,, Skanda, and Visakha, 
 the last, if taken for Kama. As a constructive date 
 therefore, that assigned by Goldstlicker to Pata%ali 
 might stand, but that is very different from a posi- 
 tive date. Besides, the name of Maurya in the Maha- 
 bhashya is doubtful and does not occur again in it. 
 
 We saw before that Badarayana refers in his 
 Sutras to 6raimini, the author of the Purva-Mimamsa- 
 Sutras, and that (7aimini returns the compliment 
 by referring to Badarayawa by name. Badaraya?ia 
 is likewise acquainted with the atheistical doctrines 
 of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada, 
 and tries to refute them. But in India this is 
 far from proving the later date of Badarayawa. 
 We must learn to look on Badarayana, 6raimini, 
 Kapila, and similar names, as simply eponymous 
 heroes of different philosophies ; so that at what- 
 ever time these systems were reduced to the form
 
 158 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of Sutras, certain opinions could be called by their 
 names. Colebrooke states, on the authority of a 
 scholiast to Manu and Ya^fiavalkya, that the instruc- 
 tions of a teacher were often reduced to writing by his 
 pupils, and that this would account for the fact 
 that the author of a system is often quoted in the 
 third person in his own book. It would be interest- 
 ing if this could be established with reference to 
 ancient texts, but I remember nothing of the kind. 
 All this is very discouraging to students accustomed 
 to chronological accuracy, but it has always seemed 
 to me far better to acknowledge our poverty and the 
 utter absence of historical dates in the literary history 
 of India, than to build up systems after systems which 
 collapse at the first breath of criticism or scepticism. 
 When I speak of a chronology of thought, what 
 I mean is that there is a chronology which enables 
 us to distinguish a period of Yedic thought, sub- 
 divided into three periods of Mantras, Brahmanas, 
 and Upanishads. No one would doubt the succes- 
 sion of these three periods of language, but if some 
 scholars wish to extend each period to thousands of 
 years, I can only wish them success. I confess I do 
 not share the idea that we should claim for Indian 
 literature as remote an antiquity as possible. The 
 same attempts were made before, but nothing was 
 gained by them, and much was lost as soon as more 
 sober and critical ideas began to prevail. After the 
 Upanishad-period would follow that of Buddhism, 
 marked, on the Buddhist side, by the Suttas, on 
 the Brahmanic side, and possibly somewhat earlier, 
 by the large mass of Sutra literature. To that 
 period seem to me to belong, by similarity of thought, 
 if not of style, the six systems of philosophy. I
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 159 
 
 should have said by style also, because the earliest 
 form in which we possess these systems is that of 
 Sutras. Unfortunately we know now how easily even 
 that very peculiar style can be, and in case of the 
 Samkhya and some of the legal Smritis, has been 
 imitated. We must not therefore ascribe too much 
 weight to this. The next period would be what 
 I have called that of the Renaissance, beginning at 
 a time when Sanskrit had ceased to be the language 
 spoken by the people, though it continued, as it has 
 to the present day, to be cultivated by the learned. 
 Such are the difficulties that meet us when we 
 attempt to introduce anything like chronological 
 order into the literature of India, and it seems to 
 me far better to state them honestly than to disguise 
 them. After all, the importance of that literature, 
 and more particularly of its philosophical portion, 
 is quite independent of age. It has something to 
 teach us quite apart from the names and dates of its 
 authors ; and grateful as we should feel for any real 
 light that can be thrown on these chronological mazes, 
 we must not forget that the highest interest of the 
 Vedanta and the other philosophies is not their age, 
 but their truth. 
 
 Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedanta. 
 
 If we ask for the fundamental doctrines of the 
 Vedanta, the Hindus themselves have helped us 
 and given us in a few words what they themselves 
 consider as the quintessence of that system of 
 thought. I quoted these words at the end of my 
 ' Three Lectures on the Vedanta' (1894) : 
 
 ' In one half verse I shall tell you what has been 
 taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true,
 
 l6o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing 
 else 1 .' 
 
 And again : 
 
 ' There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing 
 worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but 
 Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, is 
 Brahman.' 
 
 This resume of the Vedanta is very true, and 
 very helpful as a resume of that system of philo- 
 sophy. After all we must distinguish in every 
 philosophy its fundamental doctrines and its minute 
 details. We can never carry all these details in 
 our memory, but we may always have present be- 
 fore our mind the general structure of a great system 
 of thought and its salient points, whether it be the 
 philosophy of Kant or of Plato or of Badaraya?ia. It 
 would be quite impossible in a historical sketch of 
 the six Indian philosophical systems to give all their 
 details. They are often unimportant, and may 
 easily be gathered from the texts themselves, such 
 as we have them in the original or in translations ; 
 but they must not be allowed to crowd and to 
 obscure that general view of the six systems which 
 alone is meant to be given in these pages. 
 
 We have another and still shorter abstract of the 
 Vedanta in the famous words addressed by Uddalaka 
 Arum to his son vetaketu (AMnd. Up. VI, 8), 
 namely, ' Tat tvam asi,' ' Thou art That.' These words, 
 however, convey little meaning without the context 
 in which they occur, that is to say, unless we know 
 what is meant by the Tat, that, and by the Tvam, 
 thou. The Tat is what we saw shadowed forth in 
 
 1 See also Theosophy, p. 3 1 7.
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. l6l 
 
 the Upanishads as the Brahman, as the cause of 
 the world, the Tvam is the Atman, the Self in 
 its various meanings, from the ordinary I to the 
 divine Soul or Self, recognised in man ; and it is 
 the highest aim of the Vedanta to show that these 
 two are in reality one 1 . This fearless synthesis, 
 embodied in the simple words Tat tvam asi, seems 
 to me the boldest and truest synthesis in the whole 
 history of philosophy. Even Kant, who clearly 
 recognised the Tat or it, that is the Ding an sich 
 behind the objective world, never went far enough 
 to recognise the identity of the Tat, the objective 
 Ding an sich, and the Tvam, the Ding an sich on 
 the subjective side of the world. Among ourselves 
 such a synthesis of the subjective with the objective 
 Self would even now rouse the strongest theological, 
 if not philosophical, protests, whereas the theologians 
 of India discuss it with perfect equanimity, and see 
 in it the truest solution of the riddle of the world. 
 In order fully to understand it, we must try to 
 place ourselves firmly on the standpoint of the 
 Vedanta philosophers, forgetting all our own in- 
 herited theological misgivings. Their idea of the 
 Supreme Cause of the universe went far beyond 
 what is meant by God, the creator and ruler of the 
 world (Prar/apati). That being was to them a mani- 
 festation only of the Supreme Cause or Brahman, it 
 was Brahman as phenomenal, and it followed that, 
 as Brahman, as they held, was indeed the cause of 
 everything, the All in All, man also could be nothing 
 but a phenomenon of Brahman. The idea therefore 
 that it would be blasphemy to make the creature 
 
 1 Mawdukya Up. II, Ayam Atma Brahma. 
 M
 
 1 62 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 equal to the creator so far as their substance was 
 concerned, never presented itself to their minds. 
 Their Tat was something behind or above the purely 
 personal creator, it was the absolute divine essence, 
 the Godhead, manifested in a subjective and personal 
 creator, and present likewise in all its phenomenal 
 manifestations, including gods and men. Even their 
 god beyond all gods (Deveshu adhi ekaA) did not 
 satisfy them any longer, as it did in the hymns of the 
 Rig-veda ; and though they might have shrunk from 
 identifying gods and men with that personal divine 
 being, Prar/cipati, the lord of all creatures, they saw 
 nothing but truth in the doctrine that man in his true 
 nature was the same with Brahman, that he shares in 
 the nature of Brahman, or in the spirit of God. They 
 saw, in fact, that God is hardly a name that can be 
 used for that Supreme Brahman, the absolute Cause 
 of the universe, and the absolute Cause of Pra<yapati 
 also, w r hen taken as the creative god. I say when 
 taken as such, for we ought never to forget that we 
 have always to be satisfied with what we take God 
 to be ( Vidyamatra), and that we can never go beyond. 
 Translated into the language of the early Christian 
 philosophers of Alexandria, this lifting up of the Tvam 
 into the Tat might prove the equivalent of the idea 
 of divine sonship, but from the Vedanta point of view 
 it means real identity, real recognition of the original 
 divine nature of man, however much hidden and dis- 
 figured for a time by Avidya, or ignorance, and all its 
 consequences. With us unfortunately such questions 
 can hardly be discussed in a calm philosophical spirit, 
 because theology steps in and protests against them 
 as irreligious and blasphemous, just as the Jews de- 
 clared it blasphemy in Christ to teach that He was
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 163 
 
 equal to God, nay that He and the Father were one, 
 Tat tvam asi. If properly understood, these Vedanta 
 teachings may, though under a strange form, bring 
 us very near to the earliest Christian philosophy, 
 and help us to understand it, as it was understood 
 by the great thinkers of Alexandria. To maintain 
 the eternal identity of the human and the divine is 
 very different from arrogating divinity for humanity ; 
 and on this point even our philosophy may have 
 something to learn which has often been forgotten 
 in modern Christianity, though it was recognised as 
 vital by the early fathers of the Church, the unity 
 I of the Father and the Son, nay, of the Father and 
 all His sons. 
 
 The teachers of the Vedanta, while striving to 
 resuscitate in man the consciousness of the identity 
 of the Tat and the Tvam, arid, though indirectly, 
 of man and God, seem to be moving in the most 
 serene atmosphere of thought, and in their stiff and 
 algebraic Sutras they were working out these mighty 
 problems with unfaltering love of truth, and in an 
 unimpassioned and truly philosophic spirit. 
 
 It is as difficult to give an idea of the form of 
 the Upanishads as of the spirit that pervades the 
 Upanishads. A few extracts, however, may help to 
 show us the early Vedantists as they were, groping 
 their way in the dark. We do not indeed get there 
 the pure wine of the Vedanta, but we get the grapes 
 from which the juice was extracted and made into 
 wine. The first is taken from the JTMndogya Upani- 
 shad w T hich belongs to the Sama-veda and is generally 
 regarded as one of the earlier Upanishads *. 
 
 1 Translated in S. B. E., I, p. 92 
 M 2
 
 164 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FIRST KHANDA. 
 
 1. /Svetaketu was the son of Arum, the grandson 
 of Arima. To him his father (Uddalaka, the son 
 of Arima) said : ' $vetaketu, go to school ; for there 
 is none belonging to our race, darling, who, not 
 having studied (the Veda), is, as it were, a Brahma- 
 bandhu, i.e. a Brahma?ia by birth only.' 
 
 2. Having begun his apprenticeship (with a 
 teacher) when he was twelve years of age, /Sveta- 
 ketu returned to his father, when he was twenty- 
 four, having then studied all the Vedas, conceited, 
 considering himself well-read, and stubborn. 
 
 3. His father said to him : ' $vetaketu, as you 
 are so conceited, considering yourself well-read, 
 and so stubborn, my dear son, have you ever asked 
 for that instruction by which we hear what is not 
 heard, by which we perceive what is not perceived, 
 by which we know what is not known ? ' 
 
 4. ' What is that instruction, Sir ? ' he asked. 
 The father replied : ' My dear son, as by one clod 
 
 of clay all that is made of clay is known, the differ- 
 ence being only the name, arising from speech, but 
 the truth being that all is clay ; 
 
 5. ' And as, my dear son, by one nugget of gold 
 all that is made of gold is known, the difference 
 being only the name, arising from speech, but the 
 truth being that all is gold ; 
 
 6. ' Arid as, my dear son, by one pair of nail-scissors 
 all that is made of steel (Karsrmayasam) is known, 
 the difference being only the name, arising from 
 speech, but the truth being that all is steel, thus, 
 rny dear son, is that instruction.' 
 
 7. The son said : ' Surely those venerable men
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 165 
 
 (my teachers) did not know that. For if they had 
 known it, why should they not have told it me ? 
 Do you, Sir, therefore tell me that.' ' Be it so,' 
 said the father. 
 
 SECOND 
 
 1. 'In the beginning, my dear son, there was 
 that only which is (TO 6V), one only, without a second. 
 Others say, in the beginning there was that only 
 which is not (TO ^ 6V), one only, without a second ; 
 and from that which is not, that which is, was 
 born. 
 
 2. ' But how could it be so, my dear son ? ' the 
 father continued. ' How could that which is, be 
 born of that which is not ? No, my dear son, only 
 that which is, was in the beginning, one only, without 
 a second. 
 
 3. 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow 
 forth. It sent forth fire. 
 
 ' That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow 
 forth. It sent forth water. 
 
 ' And therefore whenever anybody anywhere is 
 hot and perspires, water is produced on him from 
 fire alone. 
 
 4. ' Water thought, may I be many, may I grow 
 forth. It sent forth earth (food). 
 
 ' Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food 
 is then produced. From water alone is eatable 
 food produced. 
 
 SEVENTH KHAJVTDA. 
 
 i . ' Man (Purusha), my son, consists of sixteen 
 parts. Abstain from food for fifteen days, but 
 drink as much water as you like, for breath comes
 
 1 66 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from water, and will not be cut off, if you drink 
 water.' 
 
 2. /SVetaketu abstained from food for fifteen days. 
 Then he came to his father and said : ' What shall 
 I say ? ' The father said : ' Repeat the Rile, Ya^us, 
 and Saman verses.' He replied : ' They do not 
 occur to me, Sir.' 
 
 3. The father said to him : 'As of a great lighted 
 fire one coal only of the size of a firefly may be left, 
 which would not burn much more than this (i. e. very 
 little), thus, my dear son, one part only of the sixteen 
 parts (of you) is left, and therefore with that one part 
 you do not remember the Vedas. Go and eat ! 
 
 4. ' Then wilt thou understand me.' Then Sve- 
 taketu ate, and afterwards approached his father. 
 And whatever his father asked him, he knew it all 
 by heart. Then his father said to him : 
 
 5. ' As of a great lighted fire one coal of the size 
 of a firefly, if left, may be made to blaze up again 
 by putting grass upon it, and will thus burn more 
 than this, 
 
 6. ' Thus, my dear son, there was one part of the 
 sixteen parts left to you, and that, lighted up with 
 food, burnt up, and by it you remember now the 
 Vedas.' After that, he understood what his father 
 meant when he said : ' Mind, my son, comes from 
 food, breath from water, speech from fire.' He 
 understood what he said, yea, he understood it. 
 
 NINTH KB.ANDA. 
 
 1. 'As the bees, my son, make honey by col- 
 lecting the juices of distant trees, and reduce the 
 juice into one form, 
 
 2. ' And as these juices have no discrimination,
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 167 
 
 so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree 
 or that, in the same manner, my son, all these 
 creatures, when they have become merged in the 
 True (either in deep sleep or in death), know not 
 that they are merged in the True. 
 
 3. ' Whatever these creatures are here, whether 
 a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge. 
 or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again 
 and again. 
 
 4. ' Now that which is that subtile essence, in it 
 all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is 
 the Self, and thou, /SVetaketu, art it.' 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 ' Be it so, my child,' the father replied. 
 
 TENTH 
 
 1. ' These rivers, my son, run, the eastern (like the 
 Ganga) toward the east, the western (like the Sindhu) 
 toward the west. They go from sea to sea (i. e. the 
 clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky, and 
 send it back as rain to the sea). They become indeed 
 sea. And as those rivers, when they are in the sea, 
 do not know, I am this or that river, 
 
 2. ' In the same manner, my son, all these crea- 
 tures, when they have come back from the True, 
 know not that they have come back from the True. 
 Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or 
 a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, 
 or a musquito, that they become again and again. 
 
 3. ' That which is that subtile essence, in it all 
 that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the 
 Self, and thou, >Svetaketu, art it.' 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 ' Be it so, my child,' the father replied.
 
 1 68 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ELEVENTH 
 
 i . ' If one were to strike at the root of this large 
 tree here, it would bleed, but it would live. If he were 
 to strike at its stem, it would bleed, but it would live. 
 If he were to strike at its top, it would bleed, but it 
 would live. Pervaded by the living Self that tree 
 stands firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing ; 
 
 2. ' But if the life (the living Self) leaves one 
 of its branches, that branch withers ; if it leaves 
 a second, that branch withers ; if it leaves a third, 
 that branch withers. If it leaves the whole tree, the 
 whole tree withers. In exactly the same manner, 
 my son, know this.' Thus he spoke : 
 
 3. ' This (body) indeed withers and dies when the 
 living (Self) has left it ; the living (Self) dies not. 
 
 ' That which is that subtile essence, in it all that 
 exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, 
 and thou, $vetaketu, art it.' 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 
 ' Be it so, my child,' the father replied. 
 
 TWELFTH KHA#Z>A. 
 
 i . ' Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha 
 tree.' 
 
 ' Here is one, Sir.' 
 
 ' Break it.' 
 
 ' It is broken, Sir.' 
 
 ' What do you see there ? ' 
 
 'These seeds, almost infinitesimal.' 
 
 ' Break one of them.' 
 
 ' It is broken, Sir.' 
 
 ' What do you see there ? ' 
 
 ' Not anything, Sir.'
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 169 
 
 2. The father said: 'My son, that subtile essence 
 which you do not perceive there, of that very 
 essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists. 
 
 3. ' Believe it, my son. That which is the subtile 
 essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is 
 the True. It is the Self, and thou, O /Svetaketu, 
 art it/ 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more/ said the son. 
 ' Be it so, my child/ the father replied. 
 
 THIRTEENTH 
 
 1. ' Place this salt in water, and then wait on me 
 in the morning/ 
 
 The son did as he was commanded. 
 
 The father said to him ; ' Bring me the salt, which 
 you placed in the water last night/ 
 
 The son having looked for it, found it not, for, of 
 course, it was melted. 
 
 2. The father said : ' Taste it from the surface of 
 the water. How is it ? ' 
 
 The son replied : ' It is salt/ 
 
 ' Taste it from the middle. How is it ? ' 
 
 The son replied : ' It is salt/ 
 
 ' Taste it from the bottom. How is it ? ' 
 
 The son replied : ' It is salt/ 
 
 The father said : ' Throw it away and then wait 
 on me/ 
 
 He did so ; but the salt continued to exist. 
 
 Then the father said : ' Here also, in this body, 
 indeed, you do not perceive the True (Sat), my 
 son ; but there indeed it is. 
 
 3. ' That which is the subtile essence, in it all that 
 exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, 
 and thou, $vetaketu, art it/
 
 170 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 ' Be it so, my child/ the father replied. 
 
 FOURTEENTH KHA^Z>A. 
 
 1. 'As one might lead a person with his eyes 
 covered away from the Gandharas, and leave him 
 then in a place where there are no human beings ; 
 and as that person would turn towards the east, or 
 the north, or the west, and shout, " I have been 
 brought here with my eyes covered, I have been 
 left here with my eyes covered," 
 
 2. 'And as thereupon some one might loose his 
 bandage and say to him, " Go in that direction, it 
 is the Gandharas, go in that direction ; " and as 
 thereupon, having been informed and being able to 
 judge for himself, he would by asking his way from 
 village to village arrive at last at the Gandharas, 
 in exactly the same manner does a man, who meets 
 with a teacher to inform him, learn that there is 
 delay so long only as " I am not delivered (from this 
 body); and then I shall be perfect." 
 
 3. 'That which is the subtile essence, in it all 
 that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the 
 Self, and thou, O /Svetaketu, art it.' 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 ' Be it so, my child,' the father replied. 
 
 FIFTEENTH KHAA T /)A. 
 
 i . ' If a man is ill, his relatives assemble round 
 him and ask : " Dost thou know me ? Dost thou 
 know me ? " Then, as long as his speech is not 
 merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in 
 heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being (Devata), he 
 knows them.
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 171 
 
 2. ' But when his speech is merged in his mind, 
 his mind in breath, breath in heat (fire), heat in the 
 Highest Being, then he knows them not. 
 
 * That which is the subtile essence, in it all that 
 exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, 
 and thou, /Svetaketu, art it.' 
 
 ' Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son. 
 
 ' Be it so, my child,' the father replied. 
 
 The next extract is from the Ka^Aa Upanishad 
 of the Ya^ur-veda, and has by many scholars been 
 classed as of later date. 
 
 FIRST VALLI. 
 
 i. Va^asravasa, desirous (of heavenly rewards), 
 surrendered (at a sacrifice) all that he possessed. He 
 had a son of the name of Na&iketas. 
 
 4. He (knowing that his father had promised to 
 give up at a sacrifice all that he possessed, and 
 therefore his son also) said to his father : ' Dear 
 father, to whom wilt thou give me ? ' 
 
 He said it a second and a third time. Then the 
 father replied (angrily) : 
 
 ' I shall give thee unto Death.' 
 
 (The father, having once said so, though in haste, 
 had to be true to his word and to sacrifice his son.) 
 
 5. The son said : ' I go as the first, at the head 
 of many (who have still to die) ; I go in the midst 
 of many (who are now dying). What will be the 
 work of Yama (the ruler of the departed) which 
 to-day he has to do unto me ? 
 
 6. ' Look back how it was with those who came 
 before, look forward how it will be with those who 
 come hereafter. A mortal ripens like corn, like 
 corn he springs up again.'
 
 172 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (Na&iketas then enters into the abode of Yama 
 Vaivasvata, and there is no one to receive him. 
 Thereupon one of the attendants of Yama is sup- 
 posed to say :) 
 
 7. ' Fire enters into the houses, when a Brahmana 
 enters as a guest. That fire is quenched by this 
 peace-offering ; bring water, Vaivasvata ! 
 
 8. ' A Brahmana that dwells in the house of a 
 foolish man without receiving food to eat, destroys 
 his hopes and expectations, his possessions, his 
 righteousness, his sacred and his good deeds, and 
 all his sons and cattle/ 
 
 (Yama, returning to his house after an absence 
 of three nights, during which time Na&iketas had 
 received no hospitality from him, says :) 
 
 9. ' Brahma?ia, as thou, a venerable guest, hast 
 dwelt in my house three nights without eating, 
 therefore choose now three boons. Hail to thee ! 
 and welfare to me !' 
 
 10. Na&iketas said : ' Death, as the first of the 
 three boons I choose that Gautama, my father, be 
 pacified, kind, and free from anger towards me ; and 
 that he may know me and greet me, when I shall 
 have been dismissed by thee.' 
 
 1 1. Yama said : ' With my leave, Auddalaki Arum, 
 thy father, will know thee, and be again towards 
 thee as he was before. He shall sleep peacefully 
 through the night, and free from anger, after having 
 seen thee freed from the jaws of death.' 
 
 12. Naiketas said: 'In the heaven-world there 
 is no fear ; thou art not there, Death, and no one 
 is afraid on account of old age. Leaving behind 
 both hunger and thirst, and out of the reach of 
 sorrow, all rejoice in the world of heaven.'
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 173 
 
 IT,. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-sacrifice 
 which leads us to heaven ; tell it to me, for I am 
 full of faith. Those who live in the heaven-world 
 reach immortality, this I ask as my second boon/ 
 
 14. Yama said : ' I will tell it thee, learn it from 
 me, and when thou understandest that fire-sacrifice 
 which leads to heaven, know, Na&iketas, that it 
 is the attainment of the eternal worlds, and their 
 firm support, hidden in darkness.' 
 
 15. Yama then told him that fire-sacrifice, in the 
 beginning of the worlds, and what bricks are re- 
 quired for the altar, and how many, and how they 
 are to be placed. And Na&iketas repeated all as it 
 had been told to him. Then M?^'tyu, being pleased 
 with him, said again : 
 
 1 9. ' This, Na&iketas, is thy fire which leads to 
 heaven, and which thou hast chosen as thy second 
 boon. That fire all men will proclaim as thine. 
 Choose now, Na&iketas, thy third boon/ 
 
 20. Na&iketas said : ' There is that doubt, when a 
 man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not. 
 This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is 
 the third of my boons/ 
 
 2 1 . Death said : ' On this point even the gods 
 have been in doubt formerly ; it is not easy to 
 understand. That subject is subtle. Choose an- 
 other boon, O Na/dketas, do not press me, and let 
 me off that boon/ 
 
 22. NaAiketas said : ' On this point even the 
 gods have been in doubt indeed, and thou, Death, 
 hast declared it to be not easy to understand, and 
 another teacher like thee is not to be found : 
 surely no other boon is like unto this/ 
 
 23. Death said : 'Choose sons and grandsons who
 
 174 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 shall live a hundred years, herds of cattle, elephants, 
 gold, and horses. Choose the wide abode of the 
 earth, and live thyself as many harvests as thou 
 desirest.' 
 
 24. ' If thou canst think of any boon equal to that, 
 choose wealth, and long life. Be (king), Na&iketas, 
 on the wide earth. I make thee the enjoyer of all 
 desires.' 
 
 25. ' Whatever desires are difficult to attain among 
 mortals, ask for them according to thy wish ; these 
 fair maidens with their chariots and musical instru- 
 ments, such are indeed not to be obtained by 
 men, be waited on by them whom I give to thee, 
 but do not ask me about dying.' 
 
 26. NaMketas said: 'Thoughts of to-morrow, 
 Death, wear out the present vigour of all the 
 senses of man. Even the whole of life is short. 
 Keep thou thy horses, keep dance and song for 
 thyself/ 
 
 27. ' No man can be made happy through wealth. 
 Shall we have wealth, when we see thee 1 Let us 
 live, as long as thou rulest ? Only that boon 
 (which I have chosen) is to be chosen by me.' 
 
 28. ' What mortal, slowly decaying here below, 
 and knowing, after having approached them, the 
 freedom from decay enjoyed by the immortals, would 
 delight in a long life, after he has pondered on the 
 pleasures which arise from beauty and love?' 
 
 29. 'No, that on which there is this doubt, Death, 
 tell us what there is in that great Hereafter. Na&i- 
 ketas does not choose another boon but that which 
 enters into what is hidden.'
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OP THE VEDANTA. 175 
 
 SECOND VALLI. 
 
 1. Death said: 'The good is one thing, the pleasant 
 another ; these two, having different objects, chain 
 a man. It is well with him who clings to the good ; 
 he who chooses the pleasant, misses his end.' 
 
 2. ' The good and the pleasant approach man : 
 the wise goes round about them and distinguishes 
 them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the 
 pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through 
 greed and avarice.' 
 
 3. ' Thou, O Na&iketas, after pondering all plea- 
 sures that are or seem delightful, hast dismissed 
 them all. Thou hast not gone into the road that 
 leadeth to wealth, in which many men perish.' 
 
 4. 'Wide apart and leading to different points are 
 these two, ignorance, and what is known as wisdom. 
 I believe Na&iketas to be one who desires know- 
 ledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee 
 away.' 
 
 5. ' Fools dwelling in darkness, wise in their own 
 conceit, and puffed up with vain knowledge, go 
 round and round, staggering to and fro, like blind 
 men led by the blind.' 
 
 6. ' The Hereafter never rises before the eyes of 
 the careless child, deluded by the delusion of wealth. 
 "This is the world," he thinks, "there is no other;" 
 thus he falls again and again under my sway.' 
 
 7. ' He (the Self) of whom many are not even able 
 to hear, whom many, even when they hear of him, 
 do not comprehend ; wonderful is a man, when found, 
 who is able to teach this (the Self) ; wonderful is 
 he who comprehends this, when taught by an able 
 teacher.'
 
 176 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 9. ' That doctrine is not to be obtained by argu- 
 ment, but when it is declared by another, then, O 
 dearest, it is easy to understand. Thou hast obtained 
 it now ; thou art truly a man of true resolve. May 
 we have always an inquirer like thee ! ' 
 
 i o. Na&iketas said : ' I know that what is called 
 treasure is transient, for the eternal is not obtained 
 by things which are not eternal. Hence the Na&i- 
 keta fire-sacrifice has been laid by me first ; then, 
 by means of transient things, I have obtained what 
 is not transient (the teaching of Yama).' 
 
 1 1 . Yama said : ' Though thou hadst seen the 
 fulfilment of all desires, the foundation of the world, 
 the endless rewards of good deeds, the shore where 
 there is no fear, that which is magnified by praise, 
 the wide abode, the rest, yet being wise thou hast 
 with firm resolve dismissed it all.' 
 
 12. ' The wise who, by means of meditation on his 
 Self, recognises the Ancient, who is difficult to be 
 seen, who has entered into darkness, who is hidden 
 in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he 
 indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.' 
 
 13. 'A mortal who has heard this and embraced 
 it, who has removed from it all qualities, and has 
 thus reached that subtle Being, rejoices, because he 
 has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. The 
 house (of Brahman) is open, I believe, O Na/dketas.' 
 
 1 8. 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not; 
 it sprang from nothing, nothing sprang from it. The 
 Ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting ; he is not 
 killed, though the body is killed.' 
 
 19. ' If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed 
 thinks that he is killed, they do not understand ; for 
 this one does not kill, nor is that one killed.'
 
 FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE VEDANTA. 177 
 
 20. ' The Self, smaller than small, greater than 
 great, is hidden in the heart of the creature. A 
 man who is free from desires and free from grief, sees 
 the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator 
 (or through the serenity of the elements).' 
 
 21. ' Though sitting still, he walks far ; though 
 lying down, he goes everywhere. Who, save 
 myself, is able to know that God, who rejoices 
 and rejoices not ? ' 
 
 22. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless 
 within the bodies, as unchanging among changing 
 things, as great and omnipresent, he never grieves.' 
 
 23. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, 
 nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He 
 whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be 
 gained. The Self chooses him (his body) as his 
 own.' 
 
 24. ' But he who has not first turned away from 
 his wickedness, who is not tranquil, and subdued, 
 or whose mind is not at rest, he can never obtain 
 the Self (even) by knowledge.' 
 
 THIRD VALLI. 
 
 1 . ' There are the two, drinking their reward in 
 
 O 
 
 the world of their own works, entered into the cave 
 (of the heart), dwelling on the highest summit (the 
 ether in the heart). Those who know Brahman call 
 them shade and light ; likewise, those householders 
 who perform the Tri?ia/dketa sacrifice.' 
 
 2. 'May we be able to master that Na/t'iketa rite 
 which is a bridge for sacrificers ; which is the 
 highest, imperishable Brahman for those who wish 
 to cross over to the fearless shore.' 
 
 3. ' Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot. 
 
 x
 
 178 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) 
 the charioteer, and the mind the reins.' 
 
 4. ' The senses they call the horses, the objects of 
 the senses their roads. When he (the Highest Self) 
 is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, 
 then wise people call him the Enjoyer.' 
 
 5. ' He who has no understanding and whose mind 
 (the reins) is never firmly held, his senses (horses) are 
 unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer.' 
 
 O ' 
 
 6. 'But he who has understanding and whose mind 
 is always firmly held, his senses are under control, 
 like good horses of a charioteer.' 
 
 7. ' He who has no understanding, who is unmind- 
 ful and always impure, never reaches that place, but 
 enters into the round of births.' 
 
 8. ' But he who has understanding, who is mindful 
 and always pure, reaches indeed that place, from 
 whence he is not born again.' 
 
 9. ' But he who has understanding for his cha- 
 rioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he 
 reaches the end of his journey, and that is the 
 highest place (step) of Vishmi.' 
 
 10. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, 
 beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the 
 mind there is the intellect, the Great Self is beyond 
 the intellect.' 
 
 ii.' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, 
 beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person 
 (Purusha). Beyond the Person there is nothing 
 this is the goal, the furthest road.' 
 
 i 2. ' That Self is hidden in all beings and does not 
 shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through 
 their sharp and subtle; intellect.' 
 
 13. 'A wise man should keep down speech and
 
 TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. 179 
 
 mind ; he should keep them within the Self which 
 is knowledge ; he should keep knowledge within the 
 Self which is the Great ; and he should keep that 
 (the Great) within the Self w T hich is the Quiet/ 
 
 14. 'Rise, awake I having obtained your boons, 
 understand them ! The sharp edge of a razor is 
 difficult to pass over ; difficult is the path (to the 
 Self) ; the wise tell it.' 
 
 15. ' He who has perceived that which is without 
 sound, without touch, without form, without decay, 
 without taste, eternal, without smell, without begin- 
 ning, without end, beyond the Great, and unchange- 
 able, is freed from the jaws of death.' 
 
 Translation of the Upanishads. 
 
 May I be allowed to say here a few words with 
 regard to my translation. Those who know my trans- 
 lation of the Upanishads, published in 1879 and 1884, 
 will easily see that I have altered it in several places. 
 But I do not wish it to be understood that I consider 
 my translation even now as quite free from doubt. 
 Our best scholars know how far we are still 
 from a perfect understanding of the Upanishads. 
 When therefore, in 1879, I undertook a translation 
 of all the more important Upanishads, all I could 
 hope for was to give a better translation than what 
 we had before. Though I was well aware of the 
 difficulties of such an undertaking, I knew that I 
 could count on the same indulgence which is always 
 granted to a first attempt at translating, nay, often, 
 as in our case, at guessing and deciphering an ancient 
 text. Nor have I been at all convinced that I was 
 wrong in following a text, such as it is presupposed 
 by the commentaries of /Samkara, instead of intro- 
 
 N 2
 
 l8o INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ducing conjectural emendations, however obvious 
 they seem to be. Scholars should learn that the 
 more obvious their emendations are, the more 
 difficult it becomes to account for the introduction 
 of such palpable corruptions into an ancient text, 
 such as it was at the time of $a??ikara. My 
 determination also, whenever it was impossible to 
 discover a satisfactory meaning, to be satisfied 
 with /Sawkara's interpretations, who after all lived 
 a thousand years ago, may be criticised, and I never 
 represented it as more than a pis aller. Besides 
 that, all the translators of the S. B. E. had to make 
 a sacrifice in giving what they could give at the 
 time, without waiting for the ninth year. Though 
 I have hardly ever referred to the mistakes made 
 by earlier translators of the Upanishads, but have 
 simply corrected them, anybody who will take the 
 trouble to compare them with my own will find 
 a good harvest of them, as those who come after 
 me will no doubt glean many a stray ear even in 
 a field which so many mowers have mowed. But 
 the work of the children that glean some ears is very 
 different from that of the mower who has to mow 
 a whole field alone. Such a work as Colonel Jacob's 
 Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the 
 Bhagavad-gita, published in 1891, has placed at the 
 disposal of all Vedantic students what may almost 
 be called a mowing machine in place of a sickle ; and 
 the careful and brilliant translation of the Sixty 
 Upanishads published by Professor Deussen, in 1897, 
 shows what an immense advance has been made 
 with its help. I have adopted many emendations in 
 the extracts given above, from Professor Deussen's 
 work, and when my translations diller from his,
 
 TRANSLATION OF THE UPANISHADS. l8l 
 
 all I can say is that I always differ most reluctantly 
 from one who has devoted so many years to 
 Vedantic studies, and whose mind is so thoroughly 
 imbued with Vedantic ideas. If we could always 
 know at what time each Upanishad was finally 
 settled and reduced to writing, whether before or 
 after the time when the Vedarita and Samkhya- 
 philosophy assumed each its own independent and 
 systematic form, our task would be much lightened. 
 Whenever we come across such words as Atman and 
 Brahman we suspect Vedantic influences, whereas 
 Purusha and PrakHti at once remind us of Sawkhya 
 doctrines. But Atman is by no means unknown to 
 early Samkhya philosophers, nor is Purusha entirely 
 outside the Vedantic horizon. To say, therefore, 
 that Purusha must always be taken in the technical 
 Samkhya sense, and Atman in that of the Vedanta, 
 is going too far, at least at present. We go still 
 further out of our depth if we maintain, with regard 
 to the Ka^Aa Upanishad, for instance, that there 
 was a time when it consisted of one chapter and 
 three Vallis only. It may have been so, and who 
 shall prove that it was not so ? But on the other 
 hand, what do we know of the compilers of the 
 Upanishads to enable us to speak so positively 
 on such a subject ? Everybody can see that there 
 was a division at III, 13, or 16, or 17. The technical 
 repetition of certain words in IV, 1 7 might indicate 
 that the Upanishad originally ended there, and that 
 V, 1 8 is later. Anybody can see also that the 
 second Adhyaya differs in spirit from the first. 
 The name of Naiketas, for instance, is never 
 mentioned in the second chapter, except in the 
 last and probably spurious or additional verse,
 
 1 82 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and then it appears as NaAiketa, as derived from 
 Na&iketa, not from the old form NaHketas. We 
 may easily discover a different spirit in the third, 
 as compared with the first and second Valli. In 
 fact, there is still plenty of work left for those 
 who come, after us, for with all that has been 
 achieved we are on the threshold only of a truly 
 historical study of Indian philosophy and literature. 
 Here, also, we are still like children playing on 
 the sea-shore and finding now and then a pebble or 
 a shell, whilst the great ocean of that ancient litera- 
 ture lies before us undiscovered and unexplored. 
 
 Character of the Upanishads. 
 
 Such utterances as I have here quoted from the 
 Upanishads will hardly seem worthy of the name of 
 philosophy. It would have been almost impossible 
 to describe them so as to give a clear idea of what 
 the Upanishads really are. With us philosophy 
 always means something systematic, while what we 
 find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than 
 consecutive treatises. But that is the very reason 
 why the Upanishads are so interesting to the his- 
 torical student. Nowhere, except in India, can we 
 watch that period of chaotic thought, half poetical, 
 half religious, which preceded, in India at least, the 
 age of pbilosophy, properly so called. Possibly, if 
 we knew more of the utterances of such men as 
 Heraclitus or Epimenides in Greece, they might 
 show some likeness to the outpourings of the authors 
 of the Upanishads. What is quite clear, however, 
 is that the systematic philosophy of India would be 
 perfectly unintelligible without the previous chapter 
 of the Upanishads. And however unsystematic
 
 CHARACTER OF THE UPANISHADS. 183 
 
 these relics of the childhood of philosophy may 
 seem, there is really more system in them than 
 appears at first sight. They contain a number even 
 of technical terms which show that the Upanishads 
 did not spring up in one day, and that there must 
 have been a good deal of philosophical controversy 
 during the age that is recorded to us in the Upani- 
 shads. If /SVetaketu is represented as attending the 
 schools of famous teachers till he is twenty-four 
 years of age, and is then only learning from his 
 father the highest wisdom, we see that that highest 
 wisdom had already been fully elaborated in the 
 formula of ' Tattvam asi,' ' Thou art that,' that is, thou, 
 man, art not different from that divine nature which 
 pervades the whole world, as salt pervades the sea. 
 You cannot see it, you cannot handle it, but you can 
 taste it and know that, though invisible, it is there. 
 That divine essence, that which is alone true and real 
 in this unreal or phenomenal world, is present likewise, 
 though invisible, as the germ of life in the smallest 
 seed, and without it there would be no seed, no 
 fruit, no tree, as without God there would be no 
 world. That this ancient wisdom should be so 
 often mixed up with what seems to us childish and 
 absurd, is as true as it is difficult to explain, but 
 we must remember that a long continued oral 
 tradition must naturally leave a wide door open to 
 additions of every kind. 
 
 Whatever we may think of these Upanishads, 
 it cannot be doubted that they represent the soil 
 which contained the seeds of philosophy which 
 sprang up and had their full growth in the great 
 systems of philosophy of a later age.
 
 184 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Ve cUinta- S fttras . 
 
 If now we turn to these, and first of all, to the 
 philosophy elaborated by Badaraya/ia, we find no 
 longer rhapsodies, but a carefully reasoned system, 
 contained in 555 short paragraphs, the so-called 
 Vedanta-Sutras. We read there in the first Sutra 
 and as a kind of title, ' Now then a desire to know 
 Brahman,' or as Deussen translates Giyn&sh, 'Now 
 then research of Brahman.' The two words Atha and 
 AtaA which, I believe, were originally no more than 
 introductory, and which occur again and again at 
 the beginning of Sanskrit works, always give rise 
 to endless and most fanciful interpretations. If we 
 must assign to them any special meaning, it seems 
 to me best to take Atha in the sense of Now, and 
 Ata/z- in the sense of Then or Therefore, implying 
 thereby that the student has fulfilled certain pre- 
 liminary conditions, such as Upanayana, reception 
 by a teacher, Vedadhyayana, learning by heart the 
 text of the Veda, including the Upanishads, and 
 that he is therefore likely to feel a desire to under- 
 stand the Veda and to know Brahman. It may 
 be true also, as some commentators maintain, that 
 in real life the first step would have been to study 
 the Purva-Mimamsa, or what is called Dharma, law, 
 virtue, &c. ; and that only after having gained a 
 knowledge of Dharma, particularly of the sacrificial 
 Dharma, would there arise a desire to know Brah- 
 man. In that case the Mimamsd might be looked 
 upon as one body, the Purva-Mimawsa forming the 
 first, the Uttara-Miinib/isa the second part, and we 
 should have to consider the practice of virtue and 
 the performance of sacrificial acts as a necessary
 
 VEDANTA-S^TRAS. 185 
 
 preliminary to a study of the Vedanta-philosophy, 
 or, as it is generally expressed, we should have to 
 consider works as essential for producing that purity 
 and serenity of the mind without which a know- 
 ledge of Brahman is impossible. I confess I doubt 
 whether all this was present to the mind of Biida- 
 raya?ia. He may have used Gign&sa,, wish to know, 
 instead of ViMra, research or discussion, on purpose, 
 because in the true sense Brahman cannot be de- 
 fined or known. But although Brahman cannot 
 be known like all other things, by being defined 
 as So and So, it can be explained negatively as 
 Not so and Not so, and can thus be cleared from 
 many doubts which arise from the various utterances 
 about it in the Upanishads. When we read, how- 
 ever, that food is Brahman l , that Manas is Brah- 
 man -, that Vi^fiana is Brahman 3 , that the sun is 
 Brahman 4 , nay that Narayana is Brahman 5 , there 
 is surely room enough for trying to determine what 
 Brahman really is, or at least what he or it was 
 to Badarayana and his predecessors. 
 
 The best answer, however, to all these questions 
 is that given in the next Sutra, ' That from which 
 the origin &c. (origin, subsistence, and dissolution) 
 of this world proceed 6 .' The full sense of this 
 Sutra, according to the commentator, is : ' That 
 
 1 JDmnd. Up. VII, 7, 9, 2 ; Brih. Ar. V, 12, i. 
 
 2 Khaud. Up. Ill, 18, i ; VII, 3, 2 ; Brill. Ar. IV, i, 6. 
 
 3 JOand. Up. VII, 7, 2. 
 
 4 J^and. Up. Ill, 19, i ; Brill. Up. II, i, 2. 
 
 5 Mahanar. Up. XI, 4. 
 
 6 The words which actually occur in the Sutra are printed 
 in italics, to give an idea of the enigmatical style of the Sutras, 
 and their utter uselessness without a commentary.
 
 1 86 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 omniscient, omnipotent cause from which proceed 
 the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world, 
 which world is differentiated by names and forms, 
 contains many agents and enjoyers, and is the 
 abode of fruits or effects, caused by former actions, 
 these fruits having their definite places, times and 
 causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot 
 be conceived by the mind that cause is Brahman. 
 
 If it be asked, how this is known, the commen- 
 tator insists very strongly that such knowledge is 
 not to be gained by sense perception or by inference, 
 but simply by the Veda (Upanishads), passages of 
 which have been collected and properly arranged 
 in the Sutras. If in some places he admits as a 
 second source of knowledge Sakshatkara, or mani- 
 festation, that can only be meant for intuition, 
 but, strictly speaking, such intuition also presup- 
 poses a previous working of the organs of sensuous 
 perception, while the object of such Sakshatkara, 
 i. e. Brahman, can at first be supplied by the Veda 
 only. In support therefore of our Sutra which is 
 intended to give a general idea of Brahman, a 
 passage is quoted from the Taitt. Up. Ill, i, where 
 Varu^a explains to his son that ' that from which 
 these beings are born, that by which, when born, 
 they live, that into which at their death they 
 re-enter, try to know that, that is Brahman.' 
 
 Appeals to the Veda. 
 
 And here we should mark a curious feature of 
 orthodox Indian philosophy. Though the Vedanta 
 appeals to the Veda, it appeals to it, not as having 
 itself grown out of it or as belonging to it, but 
 rather as an independent witness, looking back to it
 
 PRAMAJVAS. 187 
 
 for sanction and confirmation. The same applies, 
 though in a less degree, to other systems also. 
 They all speak as if they had for several generations 
 elaborated their doctrines independently, and, after 
 they had done so, they seem to come back to get 
 the approval of the Veda, or to establish their 
 conformity with the Veda, as the recognised highest 
 authority. This shows that a certain time must 
 have elapsed after the final redaction of the Upani- 
 shads and the return, as it were, of their offspring, 
 the Sutras, to their original home. How this came 
 about, we cannot tell, because we have no historical 
 documents, but that there had been something very 
 important intervening between the old Upanishads 
 and the first attempts at systematising Vedanta 
 and Samkhya doctrines in the form of Sutras is 
 very clear by the manner in which the Sutras 
 appeal to the Veda. This constant appeal to the 
 Veda as the highest authority was justified by the 
 most elaborate arguments, as part of the question, 
 How do we know ? a question which forms an essen- 
 tial preliminary to all philosophy in India. 
 
 Pramawas. 
 
 We saw how the .Sfarvakas admitted but one 
 source of knowledge, the evidence of the senses, 
 excluding all others. How they defended that 
 sensuous knowledge against the uncertainties in- 
 herent in it, we do not know, because we do not 
 possess those Sutras. But it is characteristic of 
 the Vedanta-Sutras, that they pay much smaller 
 attention to the Prama/ias, the sources and autho- 
 rities of knowledge, than the other systems. These 
 questions of Pramawa are often referred to in the
 
 l88 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 commentaries, but not so much in the text. Pramaia 
 is originally the instrument of measuring, from Ma, 
 to measure, and Pra, forth. It may be translated 
 by measure, standard, authority, and survives in 
 the modern Persian Ferman, an authoritative 
 order. 
 
 Pramanas according to the Sawikhya. 
 
 The Pramana which serves as a means (Sadhana) 
 of determining, produces Pramiti, accurate know- 
 ledge, just as a Sadhana (means) produces Siddhi, 
 truth or certainty. When we come to the Sawikhya, 
 we shall find there a very full and perhaps the oldest 
 description of the three essential Pram&nas, viz. 
 Pratyaksha, Anumana, and /Sabda. The first Pra- 
 ma?ia, Pratyaksha, is what we mean by sensuous 
 perception, though it is also used in the sense of 
 what can be perceived by the senses, the Dn'shte, 
 i.e. what is seen. It is explained (Sawkhya-Sutra 
 I, 89) as cognition which arises from contact (with 
 objects) and represents their form. 
 
 Pratyaksha. 
 
 It is generally explained by Indriyartha-sa?mii- 
 karsha, contact of the senses and their respective 
 objects, and is said to involve really three stages, 
 contact of the sense-organ with its object, and at 
 the same time union of the sense with Manas, 
 mind, and union of Manas, mind, with Atman, Self. 
 There is a distinction made between two kinds of 
 Pratyaksha, called Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa, with 
 doubt and without doubt. The former seems to 
 consist in our seeing an object, and then declaring 
 that it is this or that ; the latter in simply accepting
 
 ANUMANA. 189 
 
 a thing such as it is, without any previous idea of 
 it, such as when we awake from sleep, see a tiger, 
 and at once run away. Each sense working by 
 itself, and on its own objects only, is the Asadha- 
 rawakararia, the special or exclusive instrument of 
 the knowledge conveyed by it. Sound, for instance, 
 is heard by the ear only, and is conveyed by Akasa 
 or ether. But not every sound is brought into 
 immediate contact with the ear ; it is transmitted 
 through the ether, as we are told, by means of 
 waves (ViAita), so that we may perceive the beating 
 of a distant drum, one wave propelling the other 
 across the vast ocean of ether, till it strikes the 
 shore, i. e. the ear. 
 
 Anumana. 
 
 The next Prama^a is Anumana or inference, which 
 is explained (1. c., I, 100) as knowledge of the con- 
 nected on the part of one who knows the connection, 
 or as knowledge of something that is not perceptible, 
 but is known as being invariably connected (Vyapya) 
 with something else that is perceived, as when 
 we perceive fire (Vyapaka) from perceiving smoke 
 (Vyapta). This is a very imperfect description of 
 Anumana, w T hich will be more fully explained here- 
 after, but it suffices for our present purpose. As 
 an illustration, we have the common illustration 
 that we know the presence of fire when we see 
 smoke, and that we know the absence of smoke 
 when we see no fire, always supposing that fire 
 has been proved to be the Vyapaka or the sine 
 qua non of smoke.
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sabda. 
 
 $abda (I, 101) or word, another Pramana, is ex- 
 plained to be instruction given by one that can be 
 trusted (Aptopadesa) ; this one that can be trusted 
 being for the Vedantists the Veda, but for the 
 Samkhya and other systems, any other person also 
 endowed with authority and therefore considered 
 as trustworthy. It might easily be shown that 
 these three Pramanas all go back to one, the 
 Pratyaksha, because the invariable concomitance 
 between smoke and fire and the like, on which the 
 Anumana rests, can have been established by sen- 
 suous experience only ; and the trustworthiness of 
 any knowledge conveyed by word must equally 
 depend on experience, or on acquaintance with 
 the person who is or is not to be trusted. 
 
 The question is, whether this $abda, word, was 
 originally taken to signify the Veda such as we 
 possess it T . I have elsewhere given my reasons 
 for believing that /S'abda had really a far more 
 general and more philosophical meaning, and that 
 it may have been intended at first for Brahman, 
 the Word, or for verbal knowledge as is conveyed 
 by a word. The Hindus knew quite well that 
 words such as greatness, goodness, nay, also such 
 as animal, plant, metal, nay, even dog or cow, 
 convey knowledge that cannot be gained either by 
 perception or by inference alone, but only by the 
 word. The same applies to Aptava&ana, another 
 
 1 Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 154, Anin. ,3. That the connec- 
 tion between sound and meaning, and therefore the authority 
 of words by themselves, occupied the Sawkhyas, we see from 
 Sutra V, 37.
 
 SABDA. 
 
 term for $abda, word, used in the Samkhya-philo- 
 sophy. Apta, which is explained by Yogya, can 
 hardly be translated by aptus. It means what 
 has been obtained or received, and Aptavakya or 
 Aptava&ana need originally have meant no more 
 than our traditional language such as it is, though 
 it was explained afterwards as meaning the word 
 of a person worthy of confidence, or even of a book 
 believed in by the world at large. However, we 
 must be satisfied with what the Sa?7ikhya philo- 
 sophers tell us ; and there can be no doubt that 
 the followers of the orthodox Samkhya understood 
 /Sabda in the sense of Veda ; though, considering 
 that they admitted a divine, not a human origin 
 of the Veda, it is difficult to understand how they 
 could afterwards take it in the general sense of the 
 word of one that can be trusted. The important 
 question for us to consider is what other systems 
 of philosophy have made of these three Pranuwas. 
 The Sutras of all the other systems of philosophy 
 are well acquainted with them, and they are even 
 referred to by the commentators of the Vedanta 
 also. It seems strange at first sight, considering 
 that the question of the possibility of knowing or 
 of the instruments of knowledge, forms the founda- 
 tion of every true system of philosophy, that the 
 Brahma-Sutras, though not the later Vedanta works, 
 should apparently have attached so little importance 
 to what may be called their Critique of Pure Reason. 
 This would seem indeed to lower the Vedanta-philo- 
 sophy to the level of all Pre-Kantian philosophy, 
 but a little reflection will show us that there was 
 in the Vedanta a sufficient excuse for this neglect. 
 What at first sight makes the case still worse is
 
 192 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that while Pratyaksha, perception, and Anumana, 
 inference, are ignored, the only evidence invoked by 
 Badarayafta is $ruti or revelation, which, as we saw, 
 was often invoked by the modern orthodox Samkhyas 
 under the name of $abda or word. To most philo- 
 sophers revelation would seem a very weak instru- 
 ment of knowledge, and one that could never claim 
 more than a subordinate place, even if treated as a 
 subdivision of Anumana or inference. But we 
 must remember that it is the highest object of the 
 Vedanta to prove that there is only one true reality, 
 namely Brahman, and that the manifoldness of the 
 visible world is but the result of that nescience 
 which the Vedanta is meant to destroy. It will 
 then become intelligible why an appeal to the evi- 
 dence of the senses or to inference would have been 
 out of place and almost self-contradictory in the 
 Vedanta. The commentator admits this when he 
 says, ' If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute 
 unity (Brahman), the ordinary means of right know- 
 ledge, perception, &c., become invalid, because the 
 absence of manifoldness deprives them of their 
 objects.' Hence, a doctrine which undertakes to 
 prove that the manifold world, presented to us by 
 the senses, is unreal, could not well appeal at the 
 same time to the evidence of the senses, nor to in- 
 ference which is founded on it, in support of truth 
 or right knowledge, though it may and does readily 
 acknowledge their importance for all the ordinary 
 transactions of life. Thus /Sawkara continues : 'So 
 long as a person has not reached the true knowledge 
 of the unity of the Self, it does not enter his mind 
 that the world bf effects, witli its instruments and 
 objects of right knowledge and its results of actions,
 
 SABDA. 193 
 
 is untrue ; and hence, as long as true knowledge 
 does not present itself, there is no reason why the 
 ordinary course of secular and religious activity 
 should not go on undisturbed.' 
 
 How well B4darayawa must have been acquainted 
 with the ordinary evidences of knowledge, both 
 Pratyaksha and Anumttna, is best shown by the new 
 meaning which he assigns to them, applying (I, 3, 28) 
 Pratyaksha to Srut'i (revelation) and Anumana to 
 Snm'ti (tradition), the Veda being to him self-evident, 
 while other works, such as the Law-books of Manu, 
 the Mahabharata (Bhagavad-gita), nay even the 
 Sawkhya and Yoga systems (IV, 2,21), being Snmti, 
 are true in so far only as they are not in opposition to 
 the Veda. But everything else, every kind of Tarka 
 or speculation, is excluded when the fundamental 
 truths of the Vedanta are at stake. Thus /Samkara, 
 II, i , n, says : ' In matters to be known from $ruti 
 mere reasoning 1 is not to be relied on. As the 
 
 o 
 
 thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning, 
 which disregards the holy texts and rests on in- 
 dividual opinion only, has no proper foundation. One 
 sees how arguments which some clever men had 
 excogitated with great pains, are shown by people 
 still more ingenious to be fallacious, and how the 
 arguments of the latter are refuted in their turn 
 by other men ; so that on account of the diversity of 
 men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reason- 
 ing as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get 
 over this difficulty by accepting as well founded the 
 reasoning of some person of recognised eminence, 
 whether Kapila or any one else, since we observe 
 that even men of the most undoubted intellectual 
 eminence, such as Kapila, Kamida, and other founders 
 
 o
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of philosophical schools, have contradicted each 
 other.' 
 
 This rejection of reason and reasoning, though not 
 unfamiliar to ourselves, seems certainly strange in a 
 philosopher ; and it is not unnatural that $amkara 
 should have been taunted by his adversaries with 
 using reason against reasoning. ' You cannot,' they 
 say, ' maintain that no reasoning whatever is well- 
 founded, for you yourself can found your assertion 
 that reasoning has no foundation, on reasoning only. 
 Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole 
 course of practical human life would have to come 
 to an end.' But even this does not frighten $amkara. 
 As all reasoning is admittedly founded on perception 
 and inference, he replies, ' that although with regard 
 to some things reasoning is known to be well founded, 
 with regard to the matter in hand there will be no 
 escape, i.e. reasoning cannot there escape from the 
 charge of being ill-founded. The true nature of the 
 cause of the world on which final emancipation de- 
 pends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruse- 
 ness, even be thought of without the help of the 
 holy texts ; for it cannot become the object of per- 
 ception because it does not possess qualities such as 
 form and the like, and, as it is devoid of characteristic 
 signs or qualities, it cannot lend itself to inference 
 and other means of right knowledge.' 
 
 Here we approach a very difficult question, and 
 have possibly to admit a weak link in the strong 
 chain armour of both Badardyana and awkara. 
 How is the supreme authority of the Veda to be 
 established against those who doubt it ? It may be 
 enough for the orthodox to say that the Veda is its 
 own proof, that it is self-luminous like the sun : but
 
 THE MEANING OF VEDA. 195 
 
 how are objections to be silenced ? The Vedanta 
 philosophers have no superstitions on any other 
 points, and are perfectly fearless in the treatment of 
 all other problems ; they can enter into the most 
 subtle controversies, and yet they are satisfied with 
 the mere assertion that the Veda wants no proof, 
 that its authority requires no support from elsewhere 
 (pram4?iyam. nirapeksham), that it is direct evidence 
 of truth, just as the light of the sun is its own evi- 
 dence of light, and at the same time the direct means 
 of our knowledge of form and colour (II, i, i). 
 
 Authority of the Vedas. 
 
 But who says so ? Who but a fallible mortal ? 
 It is hardly enough if we were to say that the Veda 
 was the oldest document which the Brahmans 
 possessed, that it may even have been brought 
 into India from another country, that its very 
 language required to be interpreted by competent 
 persons. All this might have helped to invest the 
 Veda with some kind of mysterious character ; but 
 my impression has always been that this would be 
 taking too low a view of the Indian intellect. Veda, 
 I hold, was not merely the name of a text or of texts, 
 but was originally conceived in a far deeper sense. 
 
 The Meaning of Veda. 
 
 We often read that Veda is Brahman, and 
 Brahman is Veda, and in such passages Brahman is 
 now generally taken in the sense of the Samhitas 
 and Brahmanas such as we possess them. But 
 might it not, like Aptava&ana, to which we referred 
 before, have meant originally knowledge or wisdom 
 
 o 2
 
 196 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or Sophia ; and as such a Sophia was impossible 
 without words, might we not here also have a 
 faint recollection of Brahman as the Word, the 
 first creation of divine thought. After all, Veda 
 means originally knowledge, and not hymns and 
 Brahma/ias, and as such would come very near 
 to Wisdom or Sophia. I do not venture to speak 
 positively on such a subject, because there is so 
 little of real evidence left to which we could appeal. 
 I give it simply as an idea that has presented itself 
 to my mind as a way out of many difficulties. To 
 prevent all misunderstandings I say at once that 
 I do not entertain the idea that such thoughts were 
 borrowed from Greece and Alexandria, or had been 
 matured during the as yet undivided Aryan period. 
 All I should venture to suggest is that the idea of 
 the Word or the Logos being the first revelation, 
 manifestation or creation of a Divine Power is by 
 no means so strange, even in a very early period of 
 thought, as it seems to us. People who have 
 thought at all about what a word is, not a mere 
 sign or a means of communication, but an act em- 
 bodying for the first time a definite idea which 
 came into existence by being uttered, and after- 
 wards thrown forth and realised in our objective 
 world, would naturally, whether in Greece or in 
 India, recognise in every word an act of a Divine 
 Thinker, just as in every species they have to recog- 
 nise the will of a Divine Creator. >Sawkara goes 
 so far as to declare that the Veda is the cause 
 of the distinction of all the different classes and 
 conditions (species) of gods, animals, and men ( [, i, 3, 
 and Bf'ih. Ar. Upari. II, 4, 10). Nay he speaks still 
 more distinctly in I, 3, 28 : ' We all know from
 
 THE MEANING OF VEDA. 197 
 
 observation,' he says, ' that any one, when setting 
 about something which he wishes to accomplish, 
 first remembers the word denoting the thing, and 
 after that sets to work.' What should he do when 
 there is as yet no word to remember, but the word, 
 that is, the idea, has first to be created ? We there- 
 fore conclude that, before the creation, the Vedic 
 words became manifest in the mind of Pragrapati 
 the creator, and that after that he created the things 
 corresponding to these words. The Sruti also, when 
 it says 'uttering Bhur He created the earth, 
 &c.,' shows that the worlds, such as the earth, &c., 
 became manifest, i. e. were created, from the word 
 Bhur, which had become manifest in the mind (of 
 Pra^apati). In that case the recognition by Indian 
 thinkers of Brahman as the Word or the Divine 
 Thought, or as Veda, would by no means be so 
 surprising as it sounds to us at first. It might then 
 be said quite truly that the $abda, sound, or Brah- 
 man or Va/v or *BHh = word, was eternal, absolute, 
 self-luminous, self-evident, in fact all that the Veda 
 is said to be. Two such words as Brahman and 
 Atman would by themselves convey that eternal 
 truth for which the Vedanta-philosophy is fighting, 
 and in support of which there is but one appeal, not 
 to sensuous experience nor to inference, but to the 
 Word itself, i. e. to Brahman, or the Veda. I know 
 full well how entirely hypothetical, if not mystical, 
 this may sound to many Sanskrit scholars, but 
 I could not entirely suppress these thoughts, as 
 they seem to me the only way in which we can free 
 our Vedanta philosophers from the charge of child- 
 ishness, for imagining that they could establish the 
 highest truths which are within the reach of the
 
 198 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 human mind, on such authorities as the hymns, the 
 Brahmanas and even some of the Upanishads, as we 
 possess them now. 
 
 Returning to the Vedanta, however, such as we 
 know it from the Sutras, we must be satisfied with 
 the expressed view of Badaraya?ia that the evidence 
 for what the Vedanta teaches is neither perception 
 nor inference, but the Word ($abda) alone, such as 
 we find it in our manuscripts, or rather in the 
 oral tradition of the Veda. 
 
 Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda. 
 
 Of course a distinction has to be made, and has 
 been made by Badarayawa between the Knowledge- 
 part, the 6r?lana-karica, chiefly the Upanishads, and 
 the Karma-kanc/a, the Work-part, the hymns and 
 Brahman as. Both are called Veda or /Stuti, revela- 
 tion, and yet the work-part does not exist for the 
 true philosopher, except in order to be discarded as 
 soon as he has understood the knowledge-part. Sam- 
 kara is bold enough to declare that the whole Veda 
 is useless to a man who has obtained knowledge, or 
 Mukti, or freedom. ' Not all the Vedas together,' 
 he says, ' are more useful to one who has obtained 
 true knowledge than is a small tank of water in 
 a country flooded with water/ A man who has 
 neglected the Vedas and disregarded the rules of 
 the four A.sramas, in fact, a man who has lost caste, 
 may still be allowed to study the Vedanta as the 
 fountain of all true knowledge, and thus become 
 liberated (III, 4, 36). The hymns and Bralmia/ias 
 refer in fact to the phenomenal world, they pre- 
 suppose the existence of a manifold creation, of an 
 enjoyer of what is to be enjoyed, of good works and
 
 SUBJECT AND OBJECT. 199 
 
 their fruit. But all this, as we shall see, is not real, 
 but phenomenal; it belongs to the realm of Avidya, 
 Nescience, and vanishes as soon as true wisdom or 
 Vidya has been obtained. It is to be observed in 
 the world, such as it is, as a lower stage, but as 
 essential in leading on to a higher stage. 
 
 and 
 
 If then the highest truth contained in the Veda 
 is the Tat Tvam Asi, that is, Thou, the 6rivatman, art 
 it (the Paramatman or Brahman), and if, as we are 
 told, there is but one Brahman and nothing beside 
 it, the Vedanta philosopher is at once met by the 
 question, How then are we to account for the 
 manifold Thou's, the many individuals, and the 
 immense variety of the objective world ? If the 
 Veda is true, our view of the world cannot be 
 true at the same time. It can therefore be due 
 only to what is called Avidya, Nescience, and it is 
 the very o.bject of the Vedanta-philosophy to expel 
 and annihilate this Avidya, and replace it by 
 VidyL 
 
 Subject and Object. 
 
 This Avidy^ is the next point that has to be 
 discussed. /Sawkara, in the introduction to his com- 
 mentary, has some important remarks on it ] . ' As it 
 is well known,' he says, ' that object and subject, 
 which fall under the concepts of We and You (or 
 as we should say, of the Ego and Non-Ego), are in 
 their very essence opposed to each other, like dark- 
 ness and light, and that the one can never therefore 
 take the place of the other, it follows further that 
 
 1 Three Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 62.
 
 200 INDIAN .PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 their attributes also can never be interchanged.' 
 This means that object and subject mutually 
 exclude each other, so that what is conceived as 
 object can never in the same act of thought be 
 conceived as subject, and vice versa. We can, for 
 instance, never say or think : We are you, or You 
 are we, nor ought we ever to substitute subjective 
 for objective qualities. ' Therefore,' he continues, 
 ' we may conclude that to transfer what is objective, 
 that is what is perceived as You or Non-ego with 
 its qualities, to what is subjective, that is what 
 perceives as We, the Ego, which consists of thought, 
 or vice ve*rsa to transfer what is subjective to 
 what is objective, must be altogether wrong.' A 
 subject can never be anything but a subject, the 
 object always remains the object. ' Nevertheless,' he 
 adds, ' it is a habit in human nature (a necessity of 
 thought, as we might call it), to say, combining what 
 is true and what is false, " I am this," " this is mine," 
 &c. This is a habit, caused by a false apprehension 
 of subject and predicate, and by not distinguishing 
 one from the other, but transferring the essence and 
 the qualities of the one upon the other.' 
 
 It is clear that $amkara here uses subject and 
 object not only in their simple logical sense, but 
 that by subject he means what is real and true, in 
 fact the Self, while object means with him what 
 is unreal and phenomenal, such as the body with its 
 organs, and the whole visible world. In ' I am,' the 
 verb has a totally different character from what it has 
 in ' thou art ' or ' he is.' Such statements therefore 
 as ' T am strong,' or ' I am blind,' arise from a false 
 apprehension which, though it is inseparable from 
 human thought, such as it is, has slowly to be over-
 
 SUBJECT AND OBJECT. 2O1 
 
 come and at last to be destroyed by the Vedanta- 
 philosophy. 
 
 This distinction between subject and object in 
 the sense of what is real and what is phenomenal 
 is very important, and stamps the whole of the 
 Vedanta-philosophy with its own peculiar character. 
 
 It follows in fact from this fundamental distinc- 
 tion that we should never predicate what is pheno- 
 menal or objective of what is real and subjective, or 
 what is real and subjective of what is phenomenal 
 and objective; and it is in causing this mistake that 
 the chief power of Avidy& or Nescience consists. 
 I should even go so far as to say that this warning 
 might be taken to heart by our own philosophers 
 also, for many of our own fallacies arise from the same 
 Avidya, and are due in the end to the attribution of 
 phenomenal and objective qualities to the subjective 
 realities which we should recognise in the Divine 
 only, and as underlying the Human Self and the 
 phenomenal world. 
 
 It must not be supposed, however, that the 
 Avidya or Nescience which makes the world what 
 we make it and take it to be, is simply our own 
 individual ignorance, our being unacquainted with 
 the truths of the Vedanta. It should rather be 
 looked upon as inborn in human nature, or, from an 
 Indian point of view, as the result of accumulated 
 thoughts and deeds before the mountains were 
 brought forth. It has truly been called a general 
 cosmical Nescience, inevitable for a time, as darkness 
 is with light. So far as in true reality we are 
 Brahman, our Nescience might indeed be called 
 the Nescience of Brahman, if for a time only ; and 
 if we remember that it can be annihilated, we can
 
 202 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 understand why it was said to be nought, for, 
 according to a general principle of the Vedanta, 
 nothing that is real can ever be annihilated, so 
 that nothing that is liable to annihilation has 
 a right to be called real. 
 
 The Phenomenal Reality of the World. 
 
 But it is very curious to find that though $a??ikara 
 looks upon the whole objective world as the result 
 of Nescience, he nevertheless allows it to be real for 
 all practical purposes (Vyavaharartham). Thus w r e 
 read (II, i, 14), 'The entire complex of phenomenal 
 existence is considered as true so long as the know- 
 ledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen, 
 just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to 
 l)e true until the sleeper wakes. . . .' Hence, as long 
 as true knowledge does not present itself, there is 
 no reason why the ordinary course of secular and 
 religious activity should not go on undisturbed, and 
 more particularly, why all the commands of the 
 Veda, even of the work-part, should not be obeyed. 
 
 But apart from this concession, the fundamental 
 doctrine of $amkara remains always the same. 
 There is Brahman and nothing else ; and to this 
 Brahman as the subject, nothing must be ascribed 
 that is peculiar to the individual living soul (I, 3, 
 19). The individual soul is, no doubt, Brahman, for 
 the simple reason that there is nothing but Brah- 
 man, but Brahman is not the individual soul, which 
 in its present state is personal, that is conditioned, 
 and phenomenal. All we may predicate of that 
 Highest Brahman is that it is one, never changing, 
 never in contact with anything, devoid of all form, 
 eternally pure, intelligent and free. To ascribe 
 anything phenomenal to that Brahman or Atman
 
 CREATION OR CAUSATION. 203 
 
 would be the same error as to ascribe blue colour to 
 the colourless ether of the sky. 
 
 Creation or Causation. 
 
 If with these ideas, taken as granted, we approach 
 the problem of what we call the creation or the making 
 of the world, it is clear that creation in our sense cannot 
 exist for the Vedantist. As long as creation is con- 
 ceived as a making or fashioning of matter, it does 
 not exist for Badaraya?ia ; only so far as it is a calling 
 forth out of nothing does it approach the ideas of 
 the Vedantist. Creation with Badaraya?^a would be 
 nothing but the result of Nescience, and yet Brah- 
 man is again and again represented as the cause of 
 the world, and not only as the efficient, but as the 
 material cause as well, so far as such foreign terms 
 can be applied to the reasoning of the Vedanta. 
 Here lies our great difficulty in rendering Hindu- 
 philosophy intelligible. The terms used by them 
 seem to be the same as those which we use our- 
 selves, and yet they are not. It is easy to say that 
 Karana is cause and Karya effect, that the created 
 world is the effect, and that Brahman is the cause. 
 But the Vedantists have elaborated their own 
 theory of cause and effect. According to them 
 cause and effect are really the same thing looked 
 at from two points of view, and the effect is always 
 supposed to be latent in the cause. Hence, if 
 Brahman is everything, and nothing exists besides 
 Brahman, the substance of the world can be nothing 
 but Brahman. Divyadasa, a living Vedantist, 
 seems therefore to draw a quite legitimate inference 
 when he says l that the universe with all its sins 
 
 1 Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 24.
 
 204 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and miseries mijst have existed latent in Brahman, 
 just as steam existed latent in water before it was 
 heated, though it does not become evident as 
 vapour till fire is brought near to- water. 
 
 Cause and Effect. 
 
 This question of cause and effect and their 
 mutual relation has occupied most of the philo- 
 sophical systems of India ; and when we remember 
 what different views of cause and effect have been 
 held by some of the most eminent philosophers of 
 Europe, it is not surprising that the Hindus also 
 should have arrived at very different results. The 
 Vedantists stand up for Karya-kara?iabheda, the 
 non-difference or substantial identity of cause and 
 effect, and the Sarakhya philosophers agree with 
 them up to a certain point. In the Vedanta, II, i, 
 14, we read in so many words, Tadananyatvam, that 
 is, ' they, cause and effect, are not other, are not 
 different from each other.' On this, as a general 
 principle, rests their dogma of the substantial 
 identity of Brahman and the phenomenal world. Nor 
 does /Sa?/ikara support this principle by passages 
 from the Veda only, but he appeals likewise to 
 observation. Thus he continues, II, i, 15, 'Only 
 when a cause exists is an effect observed to exist, 
 not when it does not exist. The non-difference of 
 the two (cause and effect) is perceived, for instance, 
 in an aggregate of threads, when we do not perceive 
 the thing which we call cloth in addition to the 
 threads, but merely threads running lengthways, 
 and crossways. In the threads again we perceive 
 finer threads, and in these again still finer threads, 
 and so on. On this ground we conclude that the
 
 CAUSE AND EFFECT. 205 
 
 very finest parts which we can perceive are ulti- 
 mately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, 
 and black, these again with air, the air with ether, 
 and, at last, the ether with Brahman which is with- 
 out a second and the ultimate cause of the whole 
 world.' Or again, when we look at a tree and ask 
 what it is, when we see through its leaves and 
 fruits, its bark and wood, and ask again what it is, 
 the answer comes that it would be nothing if it 
 were not Brahman, that it lives through Brahman, 
 that it exists through Brahman, that it would not 
 be at all but for Brahman. This is the real Pan- 
 theism of the Vedanta : and strange as it may sound 
 to us, it would not be difficult to match it whether 
 from our own philosophers or our poets. Even so 
 recent a poet as Tennyson is reported to have said, 
 ' Perhaps this earth and all that is in it storms, 
 mountains, cataracts, the sun and the skies, are the 
 Almighty : in fact, such is our petty nature, we 
 cannot see Him, but we see His shadow, as it were, 
 a distorted shadow.' Is not this pure Vedanta ? only 
 that the Vedantists hold that a cause, by its very 
 nature, can never become the object of perception, 
 while what Tennyson calls the distorted shadow 
 would come very near to the Avidya of $amkara. 
 The Veda has declared ' that what is posterior in 
 time, i. e. the effect, has its being, previous to its 
 actual beginning, in the nature of the cause.' And 
 A^amkara adds that, even in cases where the con- 
 tinued existence of the cause (in the effect) is not 
 perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of 
 the fig-tree from which spring sprouts and new 
 trees, the term birth, as applied to the sprout, 
 means only that the causal substance, viz. the seed,
 
 206 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the 
 continued accretion of similar particles, while the 
 term death means no more than that through the 
 secession of these particles, the cause passes again 
 beyond the sphere of visibility. 
 
 This problem of cause and effect in connection 
 with the problem of Brahman and the world was 
 no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the 
 Vedantists. If they turned to the Veda, particularly 
 to the Upanishads, there were ever so many passages 
 declaring that Brahman is one and unchangeable, 
 while in other passages the same Brahman is called 
 the Creator, and from him, and not, as the Samkhyas 
 hold, from a second non-intelligent power, called 
 Prak?*iti, the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption 
 of the world are said to proceed. If it be asked 
 how two such opinions can be reconciled, $amkara 
 answers : ' Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the 
 omniscient Lord, there are names and forms (Nama- 
 rupa).' These correspond very closely to the Logoi 
 of Greek philosophy, except that, instead of being 
 the ideas of a Divine Mind, they are the figments of 
 Nescience, not to be defined as either real (Brahman), 
 or as different from it. They are the germs of the 
 entire expanse of the phenomenal world, that is, of 
 what in >S'ruti and Smrzti is called illusion (Maya), 
 power (*S'akti), or nature (Prakrtti). Different, how- 
 ever, from all this is the Omniscient Lord, and in 
 support of this a number of Vedic passages may 
 be quoted, such as ' He who is called Ether is the 
 revealer of all forms and names ; that wherein these 
 forms and names are contained, that is Brahman' 
 ('A7*and. Up. VIII, 14, i) ; ' Let me evolve names and 
 forms' (AV/tind. Up. VI, 3, 2) ; ' lie, the wise one,
 
 CAUSE AND EFFECT. 207 
 
 having defined all forms and having made their 
 names, sits speaking/ i.e. creating (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 
 7) ; 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Svel. Up. 
 VI, 12). The Lord as creator, as Lord or Isvara, de- 
 pends upon the limiting conditions or the Upadhis 
 of name and form, and these, even in the Lord, are 
 represented as products of Nescience, not like the 
 Logoi, creations of a Divine Wisdom. The true 
 Self, according to the Vedanta, is all the time free 
 from all conditions, free from names and forms, and 
 for the truly informed or enlightened man the whole 
 phenomenal world is really non-existent. 
 
 To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. 
 Brahman, though called the material cause (Upadana) 
 of the world, is himself immaterial, nay the world, of 
 which he is the cause, is considered as unreal, while 
 at the same time cause and effect are held to be 
 identical in substance. 
 
 While the Vedantist is threatened by all these 
 breakers, the Samkhya philosopher is far less 
 imperilled. He starts with a PrakHti, a power 
 different from Brahman, generally, though very 
 imperfectly, translated by Nature, as the material 
 cause of the world. PrakHti exists, as far as man 
 is concerned, only so far as it is taken notice of by 
 man (Purusha) ; and he, the Purusha, on taking 
 notice, may therefore be called the efficient cause of 
 the world, PrakHti itself being its material cause. 
 Otherwise Kapila takes much the same view of the 
 relation between cause and effect as the Vedantist. 
 The Karya-kara?iabheda, the identity of cause and 
 effect, is valid as much for S&mkhya as for Vedanta. 
 According to both, no real effect would be possible 
 without the continuance of its cause. Though dif-
 
 208 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ferent in appearance or phenomenally, both are the 
 same substantially. An effect is not something 
 newly produced or created, it is a new manifestation 
 only, the cause being never destroyed, but rendered 
 invisible only. This is so characteristic a dogma of 
 the Sawkhya that this philosophy is often spoken of 
 as the Sat-karyavada, the doctrine that every effect 
 pre-exists, and is the effect of something real, while the 
 Asat-karyavada is peculiar to Nyaya and Vaiseshika, 
 and strongly supported by the Buddhists. Whether 
 this doctrine of the identity of cause and effect was 
 first proclaimed by Kapila or by Badarayana is 
 almost impossible to settle. Professor Garbe l , who 
 claims it for Kapila, may be right in supposing that 
 it would be a more natural theorem for a follower 
 of the Sawikhya than of the Vedtinta, but this could 
 never be used as an argument that the Sft???khya- 
 philosophy is older in its entirety than the Vedanta. 
 fSawkara himself certainly gives us the impression 
 that with him the recognition of the identity of cause 
 and effect came first, and afterwards its religious 
 application, the identity of Brahman and the world. 
 For he says (II, i, 20), 'Thus the non-difference of 
 the effect from the cause is to be conceived. And 
 therefore, as the whole world is an effect of Brahman, 
 and non-different from it, the promise is fulfilled.' 
 It is curious that Kapila seems, almost in so many 
 words, to guard against what is known to us as 
 Hume's view of causality. For in Sutra I, 4, i, lie 
 says, ' If it were only priority, there would be no 
 law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect.' 
 The Sat-karyavada, which might be compared with 
 
 1 Samkhya -Philosophic, p. 232.
 
 DREAMING AND WAKING. 209 
 
 Herbart's Selbsterhaltung des Realen, is often illus- 
 trated by the very popular simile of the rope which 
 is mistaken for a snake, but which, even in its mis- 
 taken character, has the very real effect of frightening 
 those who step on it. There is more in this often- 
 quoted simile than at first sight appears. It is 
 meant to show that as the rope is to the snake, so 
 Brahman is to the world. There is no idea of claim- 
 ing for the rope a real change into a snake, and in 
 the same way no real change can be claimed for 
 Brahman, when perceived as the world. Brahman 
 presents itself as the world, and apart from Brahman 
 the world would be simply nothing. If, therefore, 
 Brahman is called the material cause of the world, 
 this is not meant in the sense in which the clay is 
 the material cause of a jar. Even the apparent 
 and illusory existence of a material world requires 
 a real substratum, which is Brahman, just as the 
 appearance of the snake in the simile requires the 
 real substratum of a rope. If we once see this 
 clearly, we shall also see that Nescience may quite 
 as well be called the material cause of the world as 
 Brahman, the fact being that, strictly speaking, 
 there is with the Vedaiitists no matter at all, in 
 our sense of the word. 
 
 Dreaming and Waking. 
 
 There is, however, in the Vedanta, as well as in 
 many other systems of philosophy, a certain ambiguity 
 as to what is meant by material and real. One 
 would have thought that philosophers, who look 
 upon everything as the result of Avidy& or Nescience, 
 would have denied all reality in the highest sense 
 to everything except Brahman. And so in a certain 
 
 p
 
 210 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sense they do. But besides the concession to which 
 we alluded before, that for practical purposes (Vya- 
 vaharartham) things may be treated as real, what- 
 ever we may think of them in our heart of hearts, 
 a concession, by-the-by, which even Berkeley and 
 Kant would readily have allowed, there is another 
 important argument. It is clearly directed against 
 Buddhist philosophers who, carrying the Vedanta 
 principle to its extreme consequences, held that 
 everything is empty and unreal, and that all we 
 have and know are our perceptions only. This is 
 called the $ilnyavada (doctrine of emptiness or 
 vanity) or Vidyamatra (knowledge only). Although 
 some Vedantists have been credited with holding 
 the same opinion, and have actually been called 
 Cryptobuddhists in consequence, /Samkara himself 
 argues most strongly against this extreme idealism. 
 He not only allows the reality of the objective 
 world for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham), but 
 he enters on a full argument against the nihilism of 
 the Buddhists. These maintain that perception in 
 dreams is of the same kind as all other perception, 
 and that the admission of the existence of external 
 things is therefore unnecessary. No, says $a??ikara, 
 there is a difference between perceiving viands and 
 perceiving the satisfaction arising from eating them. 
 He holds, therefore, that in perceiving anything we 
 not only perceive our perceptions, but perceive some- 
 thing not ourselves, and not our perceptions. He 
 also points out that there is this difference between 
 dreaming and waking, that dreams on awaking are 
 found to be unreal. Dreams at night are contra- 
 dicted by full daylight, but perceptions in full day-* 
 light are not contradicted by dreams. When the
 
 DREAMING AND WAKING. 211 
 
 Buddhist replies that, in spite of that, we never can 
 be said to perceive anything but perceptions, the 
 Ved4ntist answers that, though we perceive percep- 
 tions only, these perceptions are always perceived 
 as perceptions of something. And if the Buddhists 
 answer that these perceptions are illusive only, that 
 they are perceptions of things as if they were with- 
 out us, the Vedantist asks What is meant by that 
 'without us,' to which all things perceived by us are 
 referred ? If our perceptions conform to anything 
 without us, the existence of such perceived objects 
 is ipso facto admitted. No one would say that per- 
 ception and what is perceived are identical ; they 
 stand to each other in the relation of instrument 
 and effect, just as when we speak of an impression, 
 we admit something that impresses as well as some- 
 thing that is impressed. 
 
 This must suffice to show what the Vedantists 
 thought of the difference between the real and 
 the phenomenal, and what was the meaning they 
 attached to Avidya by which not only the individual 
 Egos, but the whole phenomenal world exists or 
 seems to exist. Creation is not real in the highest 
 sense in which Brahman is real, but it is real in so 
 far as it is phenomenal, for nothing can be pheno- 
 menal except as the phenomenon of something that 
 is real. No wonder that, with all these ambiguities 
 about the phenomenally real and the really real, 
 different schools even in India should have differed 
 in their views about Avidya, and that European 
 scholars also should have failed to form a clear idea 
 of that creative Nescience of which we can neither 
 say that it is or that it is not. Avidya, like all 
 other words, has had a history. In the Upanishads 
 
 p 2
 
 212 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it is often used in the simple sense of ignorance, and 
 opposed to Vidya, knowledge. Both are in that 
 sense simply subjective. Thus we read, Kh&nd. 
 Up. I, i, 10: 'Both perform the sacrificial act, he 
 who knows and he who does not know. But there 
 is a difference between Vidy (knowledge) and 
 Avidy& (nescience). For what is performed with 
 Vidya, with faith, and with the Upanishad, that is 
 more efficacious.' Or again, Brz'h. Ar. Up. IV, 3, 
 20 : ' If he feels in a dream as if he were murdered, 
 then, in his ignorance, he takes that to be real 
 whatever he fears, when awake.' Here we see that 
 it is ignorance alone which imparts a false character 
 of reality to the visions of a dream. In the same 
 Upanishad, IV, 4, 3, a man, when dying, is said to 
 shake off his body and his Avidya. We are right 
 therefore, I believe, if historically we trace the con- 
 cept of Avidya back to the subjective ignorance 
 of the individual, just as we saw that the higher 
 concept of the Self, though in the end identical 
 with Brahman, arose from that of the individual 
 personal Self, when as yet not free from the limits 
 of the Ego. In some of the later Upanishads 
 this Nescience or Ignorance assumes a more inde- 
 pendent character and even a new name, viz. Maya. 
 It is then no longer the Nescience of the individual, 
 but the result of that universal Nescience, which is 
 the cause of what we should call the phenomenal 
 world. Thus we read in the /SVet. Up. IV, 10 : 
 ' Know Prakn'ti (nature) as Maya (magic), and the 
 great Lord as the Mayin (magician).' Though this 
 is not pure Vedanta, it shows us, at all events, 
 the way by which the ignorance of the individual 
 became the cause of what we call objective reality,
 
 DREAMING AND WAKING. 213 
 
 and led, at the same time, to the admission of an 
 active and creative Lord, the personal Brahm or 
 Isvara ; how Avidya in fact became a $akti or 
 potentia, somehow or other related to Brahman 
 itself. 
 
 But before there arises this May& of objective 
 nature, belonging as it were to Brahman himself, 
 there was the Maya of the internal or subjective 
 world. This was originally the only Maya, and, 
 deceived by that Maya or Avidya, the Atman, or 
 pure Self, was covered up (Upahita) or blinded, 
 or conditioned by the so-called Upadhis, the con- 
 ditions or impositions, if we may say so, in both 
 senses. There is here again a certain ambiguity, 
 the Upadhis being caused by primeval Avidya, and, 
 from another point of view, Avidy& being caused 
 in the individual soul ((rivatman) by the Upadhis. 
 These Upadhis are : 
 
 1. The Mukhyaprana, the vital spirit (uncon- 
 scious) ; 
 
 2. the Manas, the central organ of perception, 
 ready to receive what is conveyed to it by the 
 separate senses, and to react on them by will, 
 Manas being that which, as we say, perceives, feels, 
 thinks and wills ; 
 
 3. the Indriyas, the five senses, both afferent and 
 efferent. The five afferent (Upalabdhi) senses are 
 the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste, scent. The 
 five efferent or acting senses (Adhyavasaya l ) are 
 the senses of speaking, grasping, going, evacuating 
 and generating ; 
 
 4. the material organic body. 
 
 1 Adhyavasayo buddhi/A, Sawkhya-Sufcras II, 13.
 
 214 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 To these is sometimes added 
 
 5. The objective environment, or the objects or 
 meanings of the senses (Artha). 
 
 All these are not the Atman, and it is only 
 through Avidya that the Atman has become identi- 
 fied with them. 
 
 That there is in man something that can be called 
 Atman or Self requires no proof, but if a proof were 
 wanted it would be found in the fact that no one 
 can say, ' I am not ' (I being the disguised Atman), 
 for he who would say so, would himself be not, or 
 would not be. The question then is What is really 
 I or what is there real behind the I. It cannot be the 
 body as influenced by our objective environment, for 
 that body is perishable ; it cannot be the Indriyas or 
 the Manas or the Mukhyaprima, for all these have 
 a beginning, a growth, and therefore an end. All 
 these, called the Upadhis, conditions, are to be 
 treated as Not-self; arid if it be asked why they 
 should ever have been treated as Self, the only 
 possible answer is that it was through Nescience 
 or Avidya, but through a Nescience that is not 
 only casual or individual, but universal. What in 
 our common language we call the Ego or Aha?nkara 
 is but a product of the Manas and quite as un- 
 substantial in reality as the Manas itself, the senses 
 and the whole body. 
 
 We can understand how this startling idealism or 
 monism for it is not nihilism, though our philosophy 
 has no better name for it led to two distinct, yet 
 closely united views of the world. All that we should 
 call phenomenal, comprehending the phenomena of 
 our inward as well as of our outward experience, 
 was unreal ; but, as the phenomenal was considered
 
 THE HIGHER AND THE LOWER KNOWLEDGE. 215 
 
 impossible without the noumenal, that is, without 
 the real Brahman, it was in that sense real also, 
 that is, it exists, and can only exist, with Brahman 
 behind it. And this led to the admission by the 
 strict Advaitists or Monists of two kinds of know- 
 ledge, well known under the names of Apara-, the 
 lower, and Para, the higher knowledge. 
 
 The Higher and the Lower Knowledge. 
 
 The higher knowledge consists in the distinction 
 and thereby the freedom of the Self (Atman) from 
 all its Upadhis, and this not for this life only, 
 but for all eternity. This is the true Moksha or 
 freedom which implies knowledge of the identity 
 of the Atman with Brahman, and deliverance from 
 birth and rebirth in the constant evolution (Sa??isara) 
 of the world. The lower knowledge is likewise 
 founded on the Veda, but chiefly on its work-portion 
 (Karmakant/a), and teaches, not how Brahman is to 
 be known, but how it or he is to be worshipped in 
 its or his phenomenal state, that is, as a personal 
 Lord and Creator, or even under the name of any 
 individual deity. This worship (Upasana) being 
 enjoined in many parts of the Veda, is recognised 
 as obligatory on all who have not yet reached the 
 highest knowledge. These are even allowed the 
 comfort that, in worshipping a personal god, they 
 are really worshipping Brahman, the true Godhead, 
 though in its phenomenal aspect only, and they are 
 promised, as a reward of their worship, happiness 
 on earth and in heaven, nay by way of preparation, 
 a slow advance (Kramamukti) towards complete 
 Moksha or freedom. 
 
 In this sense it has been truly said that $a??ikara
 
 2l6 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 did not attack or destroy idolatry, though with him 
 it was always symbolism rather than idolatry. On 
 this point which has given rise to much controversy 
 among the Hindus themselves, some appealing to 
 $amkara's contempt of all ritualism and Karman, 
 others to his defence of a worship of the popular 
 gods, I may quote the words of a living Vedantist, 
 Divyadds Datta, in his Lecture on Vedantism, p. 12. 
 ' It is certain,' he says, ' that $a??ikara was opposed 
 to the abuse of ritualism, and though he did not 
 cut off all connection with idolatry, he tried to 
 introduce the right spirit of idolatry. Idolatry in 
 the sense of religious symbolism and I believe the 
 most orthodox Hindus would take no other view 
 cannot be open to objection. Symbolism there 
 must be, whether in words or things. Verbal 
 symbols appeal to the ear, and the symbols of 
 things to the eye, and that is all the difference 
 between them. Verbal symbolism is language. 
 Who would object to the use of language in 
 religion ? But if the one is allowed, why should 
 not also the other ? To my mind, idolatry, apart 
 from its attendant corruptions, is a religious algebra. 
 And if verbal symbols, without the spirit or in a 
 corrupted spirit, are not objectionable, [but are they 
 not ?] so, and to the same extent, formal symbols, or 
 stocks and stones also are unobjectionable. At one 
 stage of its growth, idolatry is a necessity of our 
 nature. The tender seed of a religious spirit requires 
 to be carefully preserved in a soft coating of symbols, 
 till it has acquired the strength to resist the nipping 
 frost of worldliness and scepticism. . . . When the 
 religious spirit is mature, symbols are either given 
 up, or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. . . .
 
 IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA ? 21 7 
 
 $amkara did bow to idols, sometimes as symbols of 
 the great Infinite, sometimes as symbols of lower 
 orders of beings in whom he believed. . . . These 
 lower orders of divine beings, Brahma, Vishmi, Indra, 
 Yama, &c., in whom he believed, are phenomenal, 
 and subject to creation and dissolution as much as 
 ourselves.' /Samkara himself expresses this opinion 
 very clearly when (I, 3, 28) he says: 'The gods 
 (or deities) must be admitted to be corporeal, and 
 though by their divine powers they can, at one 
 and the same time, partake of oblations offered at 
 numerous sacrifices, they are still, like ourselves, 
 subject to birth and death.' 
 
 If $amkara did not claim full freedom or Moksha 
 for himself, he did so, as he says, for the sake of 
 others. ' If I,' he says, ' had not walked without 
 remission in the path of works, others would not 
 have followed my steps, O Lord ! ' 
 
 Is Virtue Essential to Moksha? 
 
 Another question which has been hotly contested 
 both in India and in Europe is whether Moksha can 
 be the result of knowledge only, or whether it 
 requires a fulfilment of moral duties also l . Though, 
 as far as I understand $amkara, knowledge alone can 
 in the end lead to Moksha, virtue is certainly pre- 
 supposed. It is the same question which meets us 
 with regard to the Buddhist Nirva/ia. This also was 
 in the beginning the result and the reward of moral 
 virtue, of the restraint of passions and of perfect 
 tranquillity of soul, such as we find it described, for 
 
 1 See Moksha or the Vedantic Release, by Divyadas Datta, 
 Journal of the R. A. S., vol. xx, part 4.
 
 2l8 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 instance, in the Dhammapada ; but it soon assumed 
 a different character, as representing freedom from 
 all bondage and illusion, amounting to a denial 
 of all reality in the objective, and likewise in the 
 subjective world. There are a few traces left 
 in the Upanishads, showing that virtue was con- 
 sidered an essential preliminary of Moksha. In 
 the Ka#7ia Upanishad II, i, which is generally quoted 
 for that purpose, we read : ' The good is one thing, 
 the pleasant another ; these two having different 
 objects chain a man. It is well with him, if he 
 clings to the good ; but he who chooses the pleasant, 
 misses his end. The good and the pleasant approach 
 a man ; the wise goes round about them and distin- 
 guishes them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the 
 pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through 
 greed and avarice.' But even in this passage we 
 are not told that virtue or self-denial by itself could 
 secure Moksha or perfect freedom ; nay, if we only 
 read a few lines further, we see : ' Wide apart and 
 leading to different points are those two, ignorance 
 (Avidya) and what is known as wisdom (Vidya).' 
 And Na/tiketas is praised because he desires know- 
 ledge, and is not tempted away from it by pleasure. 
 Still less convincing are passages taken from the 
 Bhagavad-gita, a work which was meant to present 
 different views of Moksha. All of them, no doubt, 
 though they do not explicitly say so, presuppose 
 high morality on the part of the candidate, so that 
 Ar</una is made to say for himself: 
 
 G'uniimi dharmam, na //a me pravn'ttiA, 
 G'anamy adharmam, na /ra me mvritti/t, 
 
 \\lnc\i has been somewhat freely translated : ' For
 
 IS VIRTUE ESSENTIAL TO MOKSHA ? 2 19 
 
 what I would that I do not, but what I hate that 
 do I/ 
 
 That later treatises, such as the Pan/t-adasi, 
 should lay great stress on the religious and moral 
 side of Moksha is quite compatible with what has 
 been maintained before, that Moksha cannot be 
 achieved by sacrifices or by moral conduct, but in the 
 end by knowledge only. Hence a prayer such as, 
 
 ' May such unchanging love as foolish people feel 
 for earthly pleasures never cease in my heart when 
 I call upon Thee ! ' 
 
 may well be uttered by worshippers of Brahma 
 or Isvara, but not by the true Mumukshu, who 
 is yearning for Brahman and true Moksha. 
 
 Even the prayer from the BHhad-aranyaka (I, 3, 
 
 2 &)- 
 
 1 Lead me from the unreal to the real ! Lead 
 me from darkness to light ! Lead me from death to 
 immortality ! ' 
 
 refers to the lower knowledge only, and has for 
 its reward another world, that is, the heaven world, 
 which will also pass away. 
 
 It would not be difficult, no doubt, to produce 
 passages which declare that a sinful man cannot 
 obtain Moksha, but that is very different from 
 saying that Moksha can be obtained by mere 
 abstaining from sin. Good works, even merely 
 ceremonial works, if performed from pure motives 
 and without any hope of rewards, form an excellent 
 preparation for reaching that highest knowledge 
 which it is the final aim of the Vedanta to impart. 
 And thus we read : ' Brahmanas seek to know Him 
 by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by charitable 
 gifts' (Bnh. Up. IV, 4, 22).
 
 220 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But when the knowledge of the highest Brahman 
 has once been reached or is within reach, all works, 
 whether good or bad, fall away. ' The fetter of the 
 heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished 
 are all his works, w T hen He has been beheld who is 
 both high and low ' (Muwd Up. II, 2, 8). 
 
 Hence, to imagine that true Moksha can be ob- 
 tained by moral conduct alone is a mistake, while 
 there are passages in the Upanishads to show 
 that some Vedantists taught that a man who had 
 reached Brahman and the highest knowledge, was 
 even in this life above the distinction of good and 
 evil, that is, could do nothing that he considered 
 good and nothing that he considered evil. Danger- 
 ous as this principle seems to be, that whosoever 
 knows Brahman cannot sin, it is hardly more 
 dangerous, if properly understood, than the saying 
 of St. John (Ep. I, v. 68), that whosoever is born of 
 God, sinneth not. 
 
 The Two Brahmans. 
 
 It sometimes seems as if *S'a??ikara and Badarayawa 
 had actually admitted not only two kinds of know- 
 ledge, but two Brahmans also, Sagu/iam and Ni rgu n am, 
 with or without qualities, but this would again apply 
 to a state of Nescience or Avidya only ; and it is in 
 this sense alone that Brahman also may be said to be 
 affected by Avidya, nay to be produced by Avidya, not 
 by the Avidya of single individuals, but by an Avidya, 
 inherent in sentient nature. The true Brahman, 
 however, remains always Nirgunam or unqualified, 
 whatever we may think about him; and as, with 
 regard to Brahman, to be conceived and to be is the 
 same thing, so likewise, so far as we are concerned,
 
 THE TWO BRAHMANS. 221 
 
 Brahman is conceived by us and becomes to us quali- 
 fied, active, creative and personal through the decep- 
 tion of the same universal and inevitable Avidya. 
 In the same way the creation of the world and of 
 man is not the work of Brahman, but the result 
 of Avidya and of man while under her sway. This 
 ambiguity runs through the whole of the Vedanta, 
 at least according to the interpretation of /Samkara. 
 It will be seen how small a step it was from this 
 view to another which looked upon Brahman itself 
 as affected by Avidya, nay which changed this 
 Avidy& into a $akti or potentia of Brahman, thus 
 lowering him, not raising him, to the character of an 
 active creator. In full reality Brahman is as little 
 affected by qualities as our true Self is by Upadhis 
 (conditions), but the same Nescience which clouds us 
 for a time, clouds ipso facto Brahman also, Atman 
 (6rivatnian) and Brahman being substantially one. 
 If the qualified Brahman makes us, we, the qualified 
 Atman, make Brahman, as our maker. Only we must 
 never forget that all this is illusion, so that in truth 
 we can predicate nothing of Brahman but Na, na, 
 i. e. No, no ; he is not this, he is not that. He is, 
 that is all we can say, and is more than everything 
 else. In that sense Brahman may be called both 
 Sat and Asat, being and not being, being in the 
 highest sense, not being, as different from all that 
 the world calls being or true. If in the later Upani- 
 shads Brahman is called Sa-id-ananda, ' being, 
 perceiving, and blessed,' then these three predicates 
 are in reality but one, for he or it could not be 
 without perceiving itself (esse est percipere), and he 
 or it could not perceive himself or itself except as in- 
 dependent, perfect, unaffected and untrammelled by
 
 222 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 anything else (Advitiya). Having no qualities, this 
 highest Brahman cannot of course be known by pre- 
 dicates. It is subjective, and not liable to any objec- 
 tive attributes. If it knows, it can only know itself, 
 like the sun that is not lighted, but lights itself. Our 
 knowledge of Brahman also can only be consciousness 
 of Brahman as our own subjective Atman or Self. 
 
 It seems only a concession to the prejudices, or 
 let us say, the convictions of the people of India, 
 that an ecstatic perception of Brahman was allowed 
 as now and then possible in a state of trance, 
 such as the Yogins practised in ancient, and even 
 in modern times, though, strictly speaking, this 
 perception also could only be a perception of the 
 Atman as identical with Brahman. The fatal mis- 
 take which interpreters of the Vedanta-philosophy 
 both in India and Europe have made is to represent 
 this absorption or recovery (Samradhanam, accom- 
 plishment) as an approach of the individual soul 
 towards God. There can be no such approach 
 where there is identity, there can only be recovery 
 or restitution, a return, a becoming of the soul of 
 what it always has been, a revival of its true 
 nature. Even Yoga, as we shall see, did not mean 
 technically union, nor Yogin a man united with God, 
 but Yoga is effort towards Nirodha or suppression of 
 A'itta (the activity of thought) (see Yoga-Sutras I, 2). 
 
 We shall thus understand the distinction which 
 the Vedaritists and other Indian philosophers also 
 make between the Brahman, TO oWcoy 6V, ;uid the 
 Brahman as I.svara, the personal God, worshipped 
 under different names, as creator, preserver, and 
 dissolver of the universe. This Isvara exists, just 
 as everything else exists, as phenomenally only, not
 
 THE TWO BKAHMANS. 223 
 
 as absolutely real. Most important acts are ascribed 
 to him, and whatever he may appear to be, he is 
 always Brahman. When personified by the power 
 of Avidy& or Nescience, he rules the world, though 
 it is a phenomenal world, and determines, though he 
 does not cause, rewards and punishments. These 
 are produced directly by the acts themselves. But 
 it is He through whose grace deeds are followed by 
 rewards, and man at last obtains true knowledge and 
 Mukti, though this Mukti involves by necessity the 
 disappearance of Isvara as a merely phenomenal god. 
 It must be clear to any one who has once mastered 
 the framework of the true Vedanta-philosophy, as 
 I have here tried to explain it, that there is really 
 but little room in it for psychology or kosmology, 
 nay even for ethics. The soul and the world both 
 belong to the realm of things which are not real, and 
 have little if anything to do with the true Vedanta 
 in its highest and truest form. This consists in the 
 complete surrender of all we are and know. It 
 rests chiefly on the tremendous synthesis of subject 
 and object, the identification of cause and effect, of 
 the I and the It. This constitutes the unique 
 character of the Vedanta, unique as compared with 
 every other philosophy of the world which has not 
 been influenced by it, directly or indirectly. If we 
 have once grasped that synthesis, we know the 
 Vedanta. All its other teaching flows naturally 
 from this one fundamental doctrine ; and though its 
 carefully thought out and worked out details are 
 full of interest, they contain no thoughts, so entirely 
 new at the time when they were uttered, as this 
 identity of subject and object, or this complete 
 absorption of the object by this subject.
 
 224 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Philosophy and Religion. 
 
 It is interesting to see how this very bold philo- 
 sophy of the Vedanta was always not only tolerated, 
 but encouraged and patronised by religion and by 
 its recognised representatives. Nor did the Vedanta 
 as a philosophy interfere with popular religion ; on 
 the contrary, it accepted all that is taught about 
 the gods in the hymns and in the Brahma^as, and 
 recommended a number of sacrificial and ceremonial 
 acts as resting on the authority of these hymns and 
 Brahmawas. They were even considered as a neces- 
 sary preliminary to higher knowledge. The creation 
 of the world, though not the making of it, was ac- 
 cepted as an emanation from Brahman, to be followed 
 in great periods by a taking back of it into Brahman. 
 The individual souls also were supposed, at the end 
 of each Kalpa, to be drawn back into Brahman, but, 
 unless entirely liberated, to break forth again and 
 again at the beginning of every new Kalpa. 
 
 Karman. 
 
 The individual souls, so far as they can claim any 
 reality, date, we are told, from all eternity, and not 
 from the day of their birth on earth. They are clothed 
 in their Upadhis (conditions) according to the merit 
 or demerit which they have acquired by their former, 
 though long-forgotten, acts. Here we perceive the 
 principal moral element in the ancient Vedanta, so 
 far as it is meant for practical life ; and this doctrine 
 of Karman or deed, to which we alluded before, 
 has remained to the present day, and lias leavened 
 the whole of India, whether it was under the 
 sway of Brahmans or of Buddhists. The whole
 
 KARMAN. 225 
 
 world, such as it is, is the result of acts ; the 
 character and fate of each man are the result of his 
 acts in this or in a former life, possibly also of the 
 acts of others. This is with them the solution of 
 what we venture to call the injustice of God. It 
 is their Theodicee. A man who suffers and suffers, 
 as we say, unjustly, seems to them but paying off 
 a debt or laying up capital for another life. A man 
 who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that 
 he is spending more than he has earned, and that he 
 has therefore to make up his debt by new efforts. 
 It cannot be by a Divine caprice that one man is 
 born deaf or dumb or blind, another strong and 
 healthy. It can be the result of former acts only, 
 whether, in this life, the doer of them is aware 
 of them or not. It is not even necessarily a punish- 
 ment, it may be a reward in disguise. It might 
 seem sometimes as if Avidya too, which is answer- 
 able for the whole of this phenomenal world, had 
 to be taken as the result of acts far back before the 
 beginning of all things. But this is never clearly 
 stated. On the contrary, this primeval Avidy& is 
 left unexplained, it is not to be accounted for as 
 little as Brahman can be accounted for. Like 
 Brahman it has to be accepted as existent ; but it 
 differs from Brahman in so far as it can be destroyed 
 by Vidya, which is the eternal life-spring of Brahman. 
 The merit which can be acquired by man even in 
 this state of Avidya is such that he may rise even to 
 the status of a god, though for a time only, for at the 
 end of a Kalpa even gods like Indra and the rest 
 have to begin their career afresh. In fact it might 
 be said with some truth that Avidya is the cause of 
 everything, except of Brahman ; but that the cause 
 
 Q
 
 226 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of that primeval Avidy4 is beyond our powers of 
 conception. 
 
 Brahman is Everything. 
 
 These powers of conception are real indeed for all 
 practical purposes, but in the highest sense they too 
 are phenomenal only. They too are but Nama- 
 rupa, name and form ; and the reality that lies 
 behind them, the Atman that receives them, is 
 Brahman and nothing else. This might become 
 clearer if we took Brahman for the Kantian Ding 
 an sich, remembering only that, according to the 
 Kantian philosophy, the Rupa, the forms of intuition 
 and the categories of thought, though subjective, are 
 accepted as true, while the Vedanta treats them also 
 as the result of Nescience, though true for all prac- 
 tical purposes in this phenomenal life. In this sense 
 the Vedarita is more sceptical or critical than even 
 Kant's critical philosophy, though the two agree with 
 each other again when we remember that Kant also 
 denies the validity of these forms of perception and 
 thought when applied to transcendent subjects. 
 According to Kant it is man who creates the world r 
 as far as its form (Namarupa) is concerned ; ac- 
 cording to the Vedanta this kind of creation is due 
 to Avidya. And strange as it may sound to apply 
 that name of Avidya to Kant's intuitions of sense 
 and his categories of the understanding, there is 
 a common element in them, though hidden under 
 different names. It would be natural to suppose 
 that this Atman within had been taken as a 
 part of Brahman, or as a modification of Brahman : 
 but no. According to $a?/<kara the world is, as
 
 THE STHULA- AND SUKSHMA-SARIRA. 227 
 
 I tried to show l on a former occasion, the whole of 
 Brahman in all its integrity, and not a part only ; 
 only, owing to Avidya, wrongly conceived and in- 
 dividualised. Here we have in fact the Holenmerian 
 theory of Plotinus and of Dr. Henry More, antici- 
 pated in India. If the Atman within seems, limited 
 like the Brahman when seen in the objective world, 
 this is once more due to Avidya. Brahman ought 
 to be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent ; 
 though we know but too well that in ourselves it is 
 very far from all this. 
 
 The Sthftla- and Stikshma-sarlra. 
 
 These are the conditions or Upadhis which consist 
 of Manas, mind, Indriyas, senses, Pranas, vital spirits, 
 and the $arira, body, as determined by the outward 
 world. This Vedantic arrangement of our organic 
 structure and our mental organisation is curious, 
 but it seems to have been more or less the common 
 property of all Indian philosophers, and supplied by 
 the common language of the people. What is 
 peculiar in it is the admission of a central organ, 
 receiving and arranging what has been conveyed to 
 it by the separate organs of sense. We have no 
 word corresponding to it, though with proper limi- 
 tations we may continue to translate it by mens or 
 mind. It would represent perception as uniting 
 and arranging the great mass of sensations, but it 
 includes besides Upalabdhi, perception, Adhyavasaya, 
 determination, also, so far as it depends on a 
 previous interaction of percepts. Hence a man is 
 said to see by the mind (Manas, vovs), but he may 
 
 1 Theosophy, p. 280. 
 Q 2
 
 228 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 also be said to decide and act by the mind (Manas). 
 All this may seem very crude, leaving particularly 
 the question of the change of mere sensations into 
 percepts (Vorstellungeri), a subject so carefully elabo- 
 rated by modern philosophers, and of percepts into 
 concepts, unapproached and unexplained. Here the 
 philosophy of Herbart would supply what is wanted. 
 He too, being opposed to the admission of various 
 mental faculties, is satisfied with one, the Manas, and 
 tries to explain all psychical phenomena whatever 
 as the result of the action and interaction of elemen- 
 tary Vorstellungen (ideas or presentations). 
 
 By the side of the vital spirit, the Mukhya Prana, 
 we find a fivefold division into Pra/ia, Upana, Vyana, 
 Samana, and Udana, meaning originally forth-, off-, 
 through-, with-, and out-breathing, but afterwards 
 defined differently and without much reference to any 
 physiological data. This also is a doctrine common 
 to most systems of Indian philosophy, though it is 
 difficult to see by what physiological observations 
 it could have been suggested. 
 
 What is more interesting is the distinction between 
 the Sthula- and Sukshma-sarira, the coarse and the 
 fine body, the former the visible outward body ; the 
 latter invisible and consisting of Mukhya Prtuza, vital 
 spirit, Manas, mind, and> Indriyas, organs of sense. 
 This body is supposed to remain after death, while 
 the outer body is dissolved into its material elements. 
 The thin or subtle body, though transparent or 
 invisible, is nevertheless accepted as material ; and 
 it is this Sukshma-.sarira which is supposed to 
 migrate after death from world to world, but, for 
 the most part, in an unconscious state. It is not 
 like a human body with arms and legs.
 
 ESCHATOLOGY. 
 
 The Four States. 
 
 Here again we come across an original idea of 
 Indian philosophy, the doctrine of the four states, 
 the state of being awake, the state of dreaming, the 
 state of deep and dreamless sleep, to which is added 
 as the fourth, the state of death. In the first state 
 the Atman is supposed to be perceiving and acting 
 by means of the Manas and the Indriyas. In the 
 second the Indriyas cease to act, but the Manas 
 remains active, and the Atman, joined to the Manas, 
 moves through the veins of the body and sees 
 dreams made out of the remnants of former impres- 
 sions (Vasanas). The third state arises from a com- 
 plete separation of Atman from Manas and Indriyas. 
 While these are absorbed in the vital spirit, which 
 remains in full activity, the Atman in the heart is 
 supposed to have for a time become one with 
 Brahman, but to return unchanged at the time of 
 awakening. In the fourth or disembodied state 
 the Atman with the Sukshma-sarira is supposed to 
 escape from the heart through a vein in the head 
 or through the hundred veins of the body, and then 
 to take, according to merit and knowledge, different 
 paths into the next life. 
 
 Eschatology. 
 
 Such fancies seem strange in systems of philo- 
 sophy like the Vedanta ; and, with the full recog- 
 nition of the limits of human knowledge, we can 
 hardly understand how Vedantists accepted this 
 account of the Sukshma-sarira, the circumstances 
 attending the departure of the soul, in fact, a com- 
 plete Eschatology, simply on the authority of the 
 Veda. It is taken over from the Upanishads,
 
 230 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and that may be the excuse for it. Vedantists 
 had once for all bound themselves to accept the 
 Upanishads as revealed truth, and the usual result 
 followed. But we should see clearly that, while 
 much may be taken over from the Veda as due to 
 Avidya, we are here really moving in an Avidya 
 within that Avidya. For practical purposes Avidya 
 may often be called common sense, under its well- 
 understood limitations, or the wisdom of the world. 
 But these dreams about the details of a future life 
 are a mere phantasmagoria. They cannot even be 
 treated as Naisargika, or inevitable. They are simply 
 Mithyagwana, fanciful or false knowledge, if not 
 that which is commonly illustrated by the son of 
 a barren woman that is, a self-contradictory state- 
 ment that kind at least which is unsupported by 
 any evidence, such as the horn of a hare. This is 
 really a weakness that runs through the whole of 
 the Vedanta, and cannot be helped. After the 
 supreme and superhuman authority of the Word 
 or of the Veda had once been recognised, a great 
 portion of the sacred traditions of the Vedic age, 
 incorporated as they are in the hymns, the Brah- 
 manas, and the Upanishads, had to be accepted with 
 the rest, though accepted as part of the Apara Vidya, 
 the lower knowledge only. All the sacrificial rules, 
 nay the very conception of a sacrifice, had no place 
 in the Para Vidya, or the highest knowledge, because 
 they involved an actor and an enjoyer of the fruits 
 of such acts, and the truly enlightened man cannot 
 be either an actor or an enjoyer l . However, as 
 a preparation, as a means of subduing the passions 
 
 1 See (Sawkara's Introduction to the Aitareyu Upanishad.
 
 ESCHATOLOGY. 23! 
 
 and purifying the mind by drawing it away from 
 the low and vulgar interests of life, all such com- 
 mandments, together with the promises of rewards 
 vouchsafed to them, might perhaps have been toler- 
 ated. But when we come to a full description of 
 the stations on the road by which the subtle body 
 is supposed to travel from the veins of this body to 
 the very steps of the golden throne of the Lower 
 Brahman, we wonder at the long suffering of the 
 true philosopher who has learnt that the true and 
 highest knowledge of the Vedanta removes in the 
 twinkling of an eye (Apatata^) the veil that in this 
 life seems to separate Atman from Brahman. As 
 these eschatological dreams have been included in 
 the Vedanta system, they had to be mentioned 
 here, though they are better studied in the pages 
 of the Upanishads. 
 
 We are told there that, in the case of persons 
 who have fulfilled their religious or sacrificial duties 
 and have lived a good life, but have not yet reached 
 the highest knowledge, the subtle body in which 
 the Atman is clothed migrates, carried along by the 
 Udana through the Murdhanya Nac?i, the capital 
 vein, following either the path of the fathers 
 (PitHyana) or the path of the gods (Devayana). 
 The former is meant for good people, the latter for 
 those who are good and have already reached the 
 lower, if not the highest knowledge. The former 
 leads on to smoke, night, the waning moon, the 
 waning year, the world of the fathers, the ether, 
 and lastly the moon. In the moon the departed 
 souls remain for a time enjoying the rewards of 
 their good deeds, in company with the Pit?^'s, and 
 then descend again, supported by the remnant of
 
 232 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 unrewarded merit due to their good works, to the 
 ether, wind, smoke, cloud, rain, and plants. From 
 the plants springs seed which, when matured in the 
 womb, begins a new life on earth in such a station 
 as the rest of his former deeds (Anusaya), Anlage, 
 may warrant. As this is, as far as I know, the earliest 
 allusion to metempsychosis or Seelenwanderung, it 
 may be of interest to see in what sense $arakara 
 in his commentary on Sutra III, 1,22 took it * ; 
 
 ' It has been explained,' he says, ' that the souls 
 of those who perform sacrifices, &c., after having 
 reached the moon, dwell there as long as their 
 works last, and then redescend with a remainder of 
 their good works. We now have to inquire into 
 the mode of that descent. On this point the Veda 
 makes the following statement : " They return again 
 the way they came to the ether, from the ether to the 
 air (wind). Then the sacrificer having become air 
 becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes 
 mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, 
 having become a cloud he falls down as rain." 
 Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls 
 pass over into a state of identity (Sabhavyam) with 
 ether, &c., or into a state of similarity (Samyam) 
 only. The Purvapakshin (opponent) maintains that 
 the state is one of identity, because this is directly 
 stated by the text. Otherwise there would take 
 place what is called indication only (Lakshana, i. e. 
 secondary application of a word), and whenever the 
 doubt lies between a directly expressed and a merely 
 indicated meaning, the former is to be preferred. 
 Thus the following words also, "Having become air 
 
 ! S.B.E., vol. xxxvii, Thibuut's translation.
 
 ESCHATOLOGY. 233 
 
 he becomes smoke," &c. 5 are appropriate only if the 
 soul be understood to identify itself with them. 
 Hence it follows that the souls (of the departed) 
 become really identical with ether. To this we 
 ($awkara) reply that they only pass into a state 
 of similarity to ether, &c. When the body, con- 
 sisting of water which the soul had assumed in the 
 sphere of the moon for the purpose of enjoyment, 
 dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes 
 to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes 
 thereupon into the power of the air, and then gets 
 mixed with smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the 
 clauses, " They return as they came to the ether, 
 from the ether to the air," &c. How is this known 
 to be the meaning 1 Because thus only is it possible. 
 For it is not possible that one thing should become 
 another in the literal sense of the word. If, moreover, 
 the souls became identified with ether, they could 
 no longer descend through the air. And as con- 
 nection with the ether is, on account of its all- 
 pervadingness, eternal, no other connection (of the 
 souls) with it can here be meant, but their entering 
 into a state of similarity to it. In cases where it is 
 impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text, 
 it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is 
 merely indicated. For these reasons the souls' be- 
 coming ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary 
 sense of their passing into a state of similarity to 
 ether, and so on.' 
 
 We see from this that $amkara believed in a 
 similarity only, an outward and temporary similarity 
 between the departed (in its Sukshma-sarira) and 
 the ether, air, mist, cloud, and rain ; and it is im- 
 portant to observe how, in doing so, he violently
 
 234 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 twisted the natural meaning of Sabhavya, the word 
 used in the Sutras, rather than altering a word of 
 the Sutra, and replacing Sabhavyam by Samyara. 
 
 A similar difficulty arises again when it has to 
 be determined whether the departed, in his further 
 descent, actually becomes a plant, such as rice, corn, 
 sesamum, beans, &c., or becomes merely connected 
 with them. /Samkara decides strongly in favour of 
 the latter view, though here again the actual words 
 of the Sutra have certainly to be twisted by him ; 
 nay, though amkara himself has to admit that 
 other people may really, on account of their bad 
 deeds, sink so low as to become plants. He only 
 denies this with reference to the departed who, on 
 account of their pious works, have already reached 
 the moon, and are after that redescending upon 
 earth. 
 
 Lastly, if it is said that the plant, when eaten, be- 
 comes a progenitor, this also, according to $amkara, 
 can only mean that it is joined with a progenitor. 
 For the progenitor must exist long before he eats 
 the rice or the beans, and is able to beget a child. 
 Anyhow, the child when begotten is the soul that 
 had ascended to and descended from the moon, and 
 is born again according to his former works. 
 
 I must confess that, though the Vedantists may 
 be bound by *S'a?kara's interpretation, it seems to 
 me as if the author of the Sutras himself had taken 
 a different view, arid had looked throughout on ether, 
 air, mist, cloud, rain, plants as the habitat, though 
 the temporary habitat only, of the departed in their 
 subtle body 1 . 
 
 1 See Vishwu Dh. S. XLIII, 45.
 
 ESCHATOLOGY. 235 
 
 Little is said in the Upanishads of those who, 
 owing to their evil deeds, do not even rise to the 
 moon and descend again. But Badaraya?ia tries to 
 make it clear that the Upanishads know of a third 
 class of beings (III, i, 12) who reap the fruits of 
 their evil actions in Samyamana (abode of Yama) 
 and then ascend to earth again. Theirs is the third 
 place alluded to in the jKMnd. Upanishad V, 10, 8. 
 
 But while evil doers are thus punished in different 
 hells, as mentioned in the Puranas, and while pious 
 people are fully rewarded in the moon and then 
 return again to the earth, those who have been 
 pious and have also reached at least the lower 
 knowledge of Brahman follow a different road. 
 After leaving the body, they enter the flame, the 
 day, the waxing moon, the waxing year (northern pre- 
 cession), the year, the world of the Devas, the world 
 of Vayu, air, the sun, the moon, and then lightning ; 
 but all these, we are told, are not abodes for the soul, 
 but guides only who, when the departed has reached 
 the lightning, hand him over to a person who is 
 said to be not-a-man. This person conducts him 
 to the world of Varuna, then to that of Indra, and 
 lastly to that of Pra^apati or the qualified Brahma. 
 Here the souls are supposed to remain till they 
 realise true knowledge or the Samyagdarsana, which 
 does not mean universal, but thorough and com- 
 plete knowledge, that knowledge which, if obtained 
 on earth, at once frees a man from all illusion. 
 Finally the souls, when fully released, share in 
 all the powers of Brahman except those of creating 
 and ruling the universe. They are not supposed 
 ever to retura to t:ie world of Samsara (IV, 4, 17). 
 
 All this is hardly to be called philosophy, neither
 
 236 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 do the different descriptions of the road on which the 
 souls of the pious are supposed to wander towards 
 Brahma, and which naturally vary according to dif- 
 ferent schools, help us much towards a real insight 
 into the Vedanta. But it would have been unfair to 
 leave out what, though childish, is a characteristic 
 feature of the Vedanta-philosophy, and must be 
 judged from a purely historical point of view. 
 
 Freedom in this Life. 
 
 What is of importance to remember in these 
 ancient fancies is that the enlightened man may 
 become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (6rivan- 
 mukti 1 ). This is indeed the real object of the 
 Vedanta-philosophy, to overcome all Nescience, to 
 become once more what the Atman always has been, 
 namely Brahman, and then to wait till death removes 
 the last Upadhis or fetters, which, though they 
 fetter the mind no longer, remain like broken chains 
 hanging heavy on the mortal body. The Atman, 
 having recovered its Brahmahood, is even in this 
 life so free from the body that it feels no longer any 
 pain, and cannot do anything, whether good or bad. 
 This has been always laid hold of as the most 
 dangerous doctrine of Vedantism, and no doubt it 
 may be both misunderstood and misapplied. But 
 in the beginning it meant no more than that the 
 Atman, which is above the distinctions of subject 
 and object, of past and present, of cause and effect, 
 is also by necessity above the distinction of good 
 and evil. This never was intended as freedom in 
 the sense of licence, but as freedom that can 
 
 1 Vedanta-Sutras III, 3, 28.
 
 FREEDOM IN THIS LIFE. 237 
 
 neither lapse into sinful acts nor claim any merit 
 for good acts, being at rest and blessed in itself and 
 in Brahman. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to say or to prove that the 
 Vedtlnta-philosophy, even in its popular form, holds 
 out no encouragement to vice. Far from it. No 
 one can even approach it who has not previously 
 passed through a course of discipline, whether as 
 a student (Brahma&arin) or as a householder (Qri- 
 hastha). In order to make this quite clear, it may 
 be useful to add a few verses from one of the many 
 popular works intended to teach Vedanta to the 
 masses. It is called the Mohamudgara, the Hammer 
 of Folly, and is ascribed to $amkara. Though not 
 strictly philosophical, it may serve at least to show 
 the state of mind in which the true Vedantist is 
 meant to maintain himself. It was carefully edited 
 with Bengali, Hindi and English translations by 
 Durga Das Ray, and published at Darjeeling in 1888. 
 
 ' Fool ! give up thy thirst for wealth, banish all 
 desires from thy heart. Let thy mind be satisfied 
 with what is gained by thy Karman. 
 
 Who is thy wife and who is thy son ? Curious 
 are the ways of this world. " Who art thou ? 
 Whence didst thou come ? Ponder on this, O 
 Brother." 
 
 Do not be proud of wealth, of friends, or youth. 
 Time takes all away in a moment. Leaving all this 
 which is full of illusion, leave quickly and enter 
 into the place of Brahman. 
 
 Life is tremulous like a water-drop on a lotus-leaf. 
 The company of the good, though for a moment 
 only, is the only boat for crossing this ocean of the 
 world.
 
 238 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 As is birth so is death, and so is the dwelling 
 in the mother's womb. Thus is manifest the 
 misery of the world. How can there be satisfaction 
 here for thee, O Man ! 
 
 Day and night, morning and evening, winter 
 and spring come and go. Time is playing, life is 
 waning yet the breath of hope never ceases. 
 
 The body is wrinkled, the hair grey, the mouth 
 has become toothless, the stick in the hand shakes, 
 yet man leaves not the anchor of hope. 
 
 To live under a tree of the house of the gods, 
 to sleep on the earth, to put on a goat-skin, to 
 abandon all worldly enjoyment ; when does such 
 surrender not make happy ? 
 
 Do not trouble about enemy, friend, son, or rela- 
 tion, whether for war or peace. Preserve equanimity 
 always, if you desire soon to reach the place of 
 Vishnu (Vistmupada). 
 
 The eight great mountains, the seven oceans, 
 Brahma, Indra, the Sun and the Rudras, thou, I 
 and the whole world are nothing ; why then is there 
 any sorrow ? 
 
 In thee, in me, and in others there dwells Vishnu 
 alone, it is useless to be angry with me and im- 
 patient. See every self in Self, and give up all 
 thought of difference. 
 
 The child is given to play, the youth delights in 
 a beautiful damsel, an old man is absorbed in cares 
 no one clings to the Highest Brahman. 
 
 Consider wealth as useless, there is truly no particle 
 of happiness in it. The rich are afraid even of their 
 son, this is the rule established everywhere. 
 
 So long as a man can earn money, his family is 
 kind to him. But when his body becomes infirm
 
 DIFFERENT WAYS OF STUDYING PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 through old age, no man in the house asks after 
 him. 
 
 Having given up lust, anger, avarice, and dis- 
 traction, meditate on thyself, who thou art. Fools 
 without a knowledge of Self are hidden in hell and 
 boiled. 
 
 In these sixteen verses the whole teaching of 
 the disciples has been told. Those in whom this 
 does not produce understanding, who can do more 
 for them ? ' 
 
 Different Ways of Studying Philosophy. 
 
 This may not be exactly moral teaching as we 
 understand it. But there are two ways of studying 
 philosophy. We may study it in a critical or in 
 a historical spirit. The critic would no doubt fasten, 
 at once on the supersession of morality in the Vedanta 
 as an unpardonable flaw. One of the corner-stones, 
 without which the grandest pyramid of thought 
 must necessarily collapse, would seem to be missing 
 in it. The historian on the other hand will be 
 satisfied with simply measuring the pyramid or 
 trying to scale it step by step, as far as his 
 thoughts will carry him. He would thus understand 
 the labour it has required in building up, and 
 possibly discover some counteracting forces that 
 render the absence even of a corner-stone intelligible, 
 pardonable, and free from danger. It is surely as- 
 tounding that such a system as the Yed^nta should 
 have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and 
 intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a 
 system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in 
 mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an 
 ancient Gothic cathedral. None of our philosophers, 
 not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has
 
 240 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ventured to erect such a spire, never frightened by 
 storms or lightnings. Stone follows on stone in 
 regular succession after once the first step has 
 been made, after once it has been clearly seen that 
 in the beginning there can have been but One, as 
 there will be but One in the end, whether we 
 call it Atman or Brahman. We may prefer to 
 look upon the expansion of the world in names 
 and forms as the work of Sophia or as the realised 
 Logos, but we cannot but admire the boldness with 
 which the Hindu metaphysician, impressed with the 
 miseries and evanescence of this world, could bring 
 himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result 
 of Avidy:! or Nescience, so that in the destruction of 
 that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, 
 and the summum bonum (PurusMrtha) of man. We 
 need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but 
 if we have any heart for the builders of former days 
 we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and 
 stupendous effort. And this is the feeling which 
 I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedanta. 
 Other philosophers have denied the reality of the 
 world as perceived by us, but no one has ventured to 
 deny at the same time the reality of what we call 
 the Ego, the senses and the mind, and their inherent 
 forms. And yet after lifting the Self above body and 
 soul, after uniting heaven and earth, God and man, 
 Brahman and Atman, these Vedanta philosophers 
 have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal 
 beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in 
 this phenomenal world. On the contrary, they have 
 shown that there can be nothing phenomenal with- 
 out something that is real, and that goodness and 
 virtue, faith and works, are necessary as a prepara-
 
 DIFFERENT WAYS OF STUDYING PHILOSOPHY. 241 
 
 tion, nay as a sine qud non, for the attainment of 
 that highest knowledge which brings the soul back 
 to its source and to its home, and restores it to its 
 true nature, to its true Selfhood in Brahman. 
 
 And let us think how keenly and deeply Indian 
 thinkers must have felt the eternal riddles of this 
 world before they could propose so desperate a solu- 
 tion as that of the Vedanta; how desperate they must 
 have thought the malady of mankind to be before 
 they could think of so radical a cure. A student 
 of the history of philosophy must brace himself to 
 follow those whom he wants to reach and to under- 
 stand. He has to climb like a mountaineer, un- 
 dismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must 
 be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never dis- 
 couraged even if snow and ice bar his access to the 
 highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. 
 Even if he has sometimes to descend again, dis- 
 appointed, he has at all events strengthened his 
 lungs and his muscles for further work. He has 
 done his athletic exercise, and he has seen views 
 such as are never seen in the valleys below. I am 
 myself not a mountaineer, nor am I altogether a 
 Vedantist ; but if I can admire the bold climbers 
 scaling Mount Gauri-Samkar, I can also admire 
 the bold thinkers toiling up to heights of the 
 Vedanta where they seem lost to us in clouds 
 and sky. Do we imagine that these ascents were 
 undertaken from mere recklessness, from mere love 
 of danger? It is easy for us to call those ancient 
 explorers reckless adventurers, or dispose of them 
 with the help of other names, such as mystic or 
 pantheist, often but half understood by those who 
 employ them. The Vedaritists have often been 
 
 R,
 
 242 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 called Atheists, but as the gods which they denied 
 were only Devas, or what we call false gods, they 
 might thus far have been forgiven. They have been 
 called Pantheists, though their theos, or their theoi, 
 were not the Pan, but the Pan was their theos. 
 They have been called Nihilists, but they them- 
 selves have drawn a sharp line between the up- 
 holders of the $unya-vada l , the emptiness-doctrine, 
 and their own teaching, which, on the contrary, in- 
 sists throughout on the reality that underlies all 
 phenomenal things, namely Brahman, and inculcates 
 the duties which even this world of seeming imposes 
 on all who are not yet in possession of the highest 
 truth. That this phenomenal world has no exclusive 
 right to the name of real is surely implied by its 
 very name. Besides, whatever perishes can never 
 have been real. If heaven and earth shall pass 
 away ; if we see our body, our senses, and all that has 
 been built up on them, decaying and perishing every 
 day before our very eyes ; if the very Ego, the Aham, 
 is dissolved into the elements from which it sprang, 
 why should not the Vedantist also have held to his 
 belief that Brahman alone is really real, and every- 
 thing else a dream ; and that even the Nama-rupas, 
 the words and things, will vanish with each Kalpa? 
 To sum up, the Vedanta teaches that in the 
 highest sense Creation is but Self-forgetful ness, and 
 Eternal Life remembrance or Self-consciousness. 
 And while to us such high abstractions may seem 
 useless for the many, it is all the more surprising 
 that, with the Hindus, the fundamental ideas of the 
 
 1 An important distinction between Buddhists and Ve- 
 dantists is that the former hold the world to have arisen from 
 what is not, the latter from what is, the Sat or Brahman.
 
 RAMANUOA. 243 
 
 Vedanta have pervaded the whole of their literature, 
 have leavened the whole of their language, and form 
 to the present day the common property of the people 
 at large. No doubt these ideas assume in the streets 
 a different garment from what they wear among the 
 learned in the Asramas or the forests of the country. 
 K-Jffay even among the learned few stand up for the 
 complete Advajfca or Monism as represented by 
 jSamkara. 
 
 The danger with /Samkara's Vedantism was that 
 what to him was simply phenomenal, should be 
 taken for purely fictitious. There is, however, as 
 great a difference between the two as there is 
 between Avidy^ and Mithyagwana. May4 1 is the 
 cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious, world; 
 and if $amkara adopts the Vivarta (turning away) 
 instead of the Parinama (evolution) doctrine, there 
 is always something on which the Vivarta or illusion 
 is at work, and which cannot be deprived of its 
 reality. 
 
 There are schools of Vedantists who try to explain 
 the Sutras of Badarayana in a far more human spirit. 
 The best known is the school of Ramanur/a, who lived 
 in the twelfth century A. D. 2 If we place $a???kara's 
 literary activity about the eighth century 3 , the claim 
 of priority and of prior authority would belong to 
 iSamkara. But we must never forget that in India 
 more than anywhere else, philosophy was not the 
 
 1 In the only passage where the Sutras speak of Maya (III, 
 2, 3\ it need not mean more than a dream. 
 
 2 Wilson, Works, I, p. 35. 
 
 8 I-tsing, Introduction, p. xv, 788-820 A.D. ; Kumarila, 
 750 A.D. 
 
 R 2
 
 244 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 property of individuals, but that, as in the period of 
 the Upanishads, so in later times also, everybody 
 was free to contribute his share. As we find a 
 number of teachers mentioned in the Upanishads, 
 and as they give us long lists of names, pupil suc- 
 ceeding teacher through more than fifty spiritual 
 generations, the commentators also quote ever so 
 many authorities in support of the v^ews which they 
 either accept or reject. Hence we cannot accept 
 /Samkara as the only infallible interpreter of the 
 Vedanta-Sutras, but have to recognise in his com- 
 mentary one only of the many traditional interpreta- 
 tions of the Sutras which prevailed at different times 
 in different parts of India, and in different schools. 
 A most important passage in this respect is that in 
 which ASa??"tkara has to confess that others (apare tu 
 vadina//) differ from him, and some, as he adds, even 
 of our own (asmadiyas a ke&it) l . This allows us 
 a fresh insight into the philosophical life of India 
 which is worth a great deal, particularly as the 
 difference of opinion refers to a fundamental doctrine, 
 namely the absolute identity of the individual soul 
 with Brahman. iSamkara, as we saw, was uncom- 
 promising on that point. With him and, as he thinks, 
 with Badaraya?za also, no reality is allowed to the 
 soul (Atman) as an individual (Criva), or to the world 
 as presented to and by the senses. With him the 
 soul's reality is Brahman, and Brahman is one only. 
 But others, he adds, allow reality to the individual 
 souls also. Now this is the very opinion on which 
 another philosopher, Ilamfmur/a, has based his own 
 interpretation of Bddarayana's Sutras, and has 
 
 1 S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xx, Thibaut.
 
 RAMANU&A. 245 
 
 founded a large and influential sect. But it does 
 not follow that this, whether heretical or orthodox 
 opinion, was really first propounded by Ramanu^a, 
 for Ramanucfa declares himself dependent on former 
 teachers (Pur vaMry aA), and appeals particularly to 
 a somewhat prolix Sutra- vritti by Bodhayana as his 
 authority. Ramanu^a l himself quotes not only 
 Bodhayana, but after him Tanka, Dramic?a (or 
 Dravic/a), Guhadeva, Kapardin, BharuH. One of 
 them, Dravicfa, is expressly said to have been anterior 
 to $aikara, and so must Bodhayana have been, if 
 he is meant by the Vrittikara whom $amkara him- 
 self criticises -. 
 
 We ought, therefore, to look on Ramanu^a as a 
 perfect equal of /Samkara, so far as his right of in- 
 terpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own 
 opinion, is concerned. It is the same here as every- 
 where in Hindu philosophy. The individual philo- 
 sopher is but the mouthpiece of tradition, and that 
 tradition goes back further and further, the more 
 we try to fix it chronologically. While $a/?ikara's 
 system is Advaita, i.e. absolute Monism, that of 
 RamamK/a has been called Visish^a- Advaita, the 
 doctrine of unity with attributes or Monism with a 
 difference. Of course with Ramanur/a also Brahman 
 is the highest reality, omnipotent, omniscient, but 
 this Brahman is at the same time full of compassion 
 or love. This is a new and very important feature 
 in Ramanuir/a's Brahman, as compared with the icy 
 self-sufficiency ascribed to Brahman by $amkara. 
 Even more important and more humanising is the 
 
 3 S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xxi. 
 
 2 Deussen, The Vedanta-Philosophy, p. 31.
 
 246 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 recognition that souls as individuals possess reality, 
 that Kit and A/lit, what perceives and what does not 
 perceive, soul and matter, form, as it were, the body 
 of Brahman l , are in fact modes (Prakara) of Brahman. 
 Sometimes Kit is taken for the Supreme Spirit as 
 a conscious cause, AHt for the unconscious effect or 
 matter ; but there is always Isvara as a third, the 
 Lord ; and this, originally Brahma, is later on iden- 
 tified without much ado with Vislmu, so that 
 Raman w/a's sect is actually called $ri-Vaistmava. 
 It assumed no doubt the greatest importance as a 
 religious sect, as teaching people how to live rather 
 than how to think. But to us its chief interest is 
 its philosophical character, and more particularly its 
 relation to the Badarayana-Sutras and $arakara's 
 explanation of them. 
 
 Brahman, whether under the name of Isvara, 
 Vishnu or Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, is with Ramanuf/a 
 as with $a??ikara both the efficient and the material 
 cause of all that exists, and he is likewise the lord 
 and ruler of the world. But here mythology comes in 
 at once. From this Brahman, according to Ramanu^a, 
 spring Samkarshana, the individual soul ((7iva), from 
 Samkarshana Pradyumna, mind (Manas), and from 
 Pradyumna Aniruddha or the Ego (Aharikara). 
 Brahma, masc., here called Vasudeva, is not without 
 qualities, as >Samkara holds, but possesses (7/kina 
 (knowledge), $akti (energy), Bala (strength), Aisvarya 
 (supreme power), Virya (vigour), and Te^as (energy), 
 as his Gu?tas or qualities. Much more of the same 
 kind may be found in Colebrooke 2 . 
 
 1 Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, I, 439 n. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, p. 439.
 
 RAMANUGA. 247 
 
 The real philosophical character of Ramanw/a's 
 Vedantism has for the first time been placed in its 
 true light by Professor Thibaut, from whom we may 
 soon expect a complete translation of Ramanw/a's 
 own commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, the Sri- 
 bhashya. As, according to Ramanugra, Brahman is 
 not Nirguna, without qualities, such qualities as 
 intelligence, power, and mercy are ascribed to him, 
 while with /Samkara even intelligence was not a 
 quality of Brahman, but Brahman was intelligence, 
 pure thought, and pure being. Besides these 
 qualities, Brahman is supposed to possess, as con- 
 stituent elements, the material world and the indi- 
 vidual souls, and to act as the inward ruler (Antar- 
 yamin) of them. Hence, neither the world nor the 
 individual souls will ever cease to exist. All that 
 Ramanu</a admits is that they pass through different 
 stages as Avyakta and Vyakta. As Vyakta, de- 
 veloped, they are what we know them to be on 
 earth ; as Avyakta they are enveloped (SamkoHta). 
 This involution takes place at the end of each Kalpa, 
 when Brahman assumes its causal state (Karana- 
 vastha), and when individual souls and individual 
 things lose for a time their distinct and independent 
 character. Then follows, by the mere will of Brahma, 
 the evolution, or the new creation of gross and visible 
 matter, and an assumption by the individual souls 
 of new material bodies, according to the merit or 
 demerit of their former existence. The important 
 point is that the individual souls, according to 
 Ramanuf/a, retain their individuality even when they 
 have reached the blissful abode of Brahman. The 
 world is not considered by him as merely the result 
 of Avidya, but is real, while Brahman is to be looked
 
 248 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 upon and worshipped as a personal god, the creator 
 and ruler of a real world. Thus Isvara, the Lord, is 
 not to be taken as a phenomenal god ; and the differ- 
 ence between Brahman and Isvara vanishes, as much 
 as the difference between a qualified and an un- 
 qualified Brahman, between a higher and a lower 
 knowledge. Here we perceive the influence exercised 
 on philosophy by the common sense or the common 
 sentiment of the people. In other countries in which 
 philosophy is, as it were, the private property of 
 individual thinkers, that influence is far less per- 
 ceptible. But extreme views like those propounded 
 by /Samkara were, as might be expected, too much 
 for the great mass of the people, who might be will- 
 ing to accept the doctrines of the Upanishads in 
 their vagueness, but who would naturally shrink 
 from the conclusions drawn from them with in- 
 exorable consistency by >Sa??ikara. If it is impossible 
 to say, as >Samkara says, ' I am not,' it is difficult at 
 least to say, 'I am not I,' but 'I am Brahman.' It may 
 be possible to say that Isvara or the Lord is Brahman ; 
 but to worship Isvara, and to be told at the same 
 time that Isvara is but phenomenal, must be trying 
 even to the most ardent of worshippers. If there- 
 fore Ramanur/a, while professing his faith in the 
 Upanishads and his allegiance to Badaraya^a, could 
 give back to his followers not only their own souls, 
 but a] so a personal god, no wonder that his success 
 should have been so great as it was. 
 
 In the absence of any definite historical materials 
 it is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the 
 historical development of the Vedanta-philosophy 
 at the time of Badarayana and afterwards, it was 
 the absolute Monism as represented by /S'a??ikara
 
 RAMANUGA. 249 
 
 that took the lead, or whether the more temperate 
 Monism, as we see it in Ramanur/a's commentary, 
 exercised an earlier sway. There are certainly some 
 Sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend them- 
 selves far more readily to Ramanur/a's than to Ssun- 
 kara's interpretation. The question as to the nature 
 of individual souls seems decided by the author of 
 the Sutras in favour of Ramanw/a rather than of 
 $amkara. We read in Sutra II, 3, 43, ' The soul 
 is a part of Brahman.' Here the soul is clearly 
 declared to be a part of Brahman, and this is the 
 view of Ramanur/a ; but /Samkara explains it by ' a 
 part, as it were,' since Brahman, being not composed 
 of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense of 
 the word. 
 
 This seems a bold proceeding of /Samkara's ; and, 
 though he tries to justify it by very ingenious 
 arguments, Ramanu^a naturally takes his stand on 
 the very words of the Sutra. Similar cases have 
 been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut ; and this very 
 diversity of opinion confirms what I remarked before, 
 that the Vedanta philosophers of India, though they 
 look both on Upanishads and the Sutras as their 
 highest authorities, often present a body of doctrine 
 independent of them ; colonies, as it were, of thought 
 that had grown to be independent of the mother- 
 country, but are anxious nevertheless to prove that 
 their own doctrines can be reconciled with the old 
 authorities. This was the position assumed by 
 Badarayana towards the Upanishads, so much so 
 that nearly the whole of the first book of his Sutras 
 had to be devoted to showing that his own views 
 of Brahman were not in conflict with certain pas- 
 sages in the Upanishads. Some of them may refer
 
 250 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to the lower Brahman, some to the individual soul 
 as one with Brahman ; and it is on these points that, 
 at a later time, $amkara and Ramanuf/a would 
 naturally have differed. What was important for 
 Bcidarayawa to show was that no passages from the 
 Upanishads could fairly be quoted in support of 
 other philosophies, such as the Sa??ikhya, of which 
 both /Sawkara and RamanuT/a would disapprove. 
 In the same manner both /Samkara and Ramanuc/a 
 are anxious to show that they themselves are in 
 perfect agreement with Badarayana. Both, however, 
 approach the Sutras as if they had some opinions 
 of their own to defend and to bring into harmony 
 with the Sutras. We can only suppose that schools 
 in different parts of India had been growing up fast 
 in the hermitages of certain teachers and their 
 pupils, and that all were anxious to show that they 
 had not deviated from such paramount and infallible 
 authorities as the Sutras and the Upanishads. This 
 was done by means of what is called Mimawsa, or 
 a critical discussion of passages which seemed to be 
 ambiguous or had actually been twisted into an 
 unnatural meaning by important teachers. 
 
 Dr. Thibaut therefore seems to me quite right 
 when he says that both $amkara and Ramanm/a 
 pay often less regard to the literal sense of the 
 words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing 
 Badarayana to bear testimony to the truth of their 
 own philosophical theories. This only confirms what 
 I said before about the rich growth of philosophical 
 thought in India, independent of Sutras and Upani- 
 shads, though influenced by both. Even if we 
 
 1 S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xcvi.
 
 RAMANUtfA. 251 
 
 admit that Badarayam wished to teach in his Sutras 
 nothing but what he found in the Upariishads, it 
 must not be forgotten that the Upanishads contain 
 ever so many conflicting guesses at truth, freely 
 uttered by thinkers who had no personal relations 
 with each other, and had no idea of propounding 
 a uniform system of religious philosophy. If these 
 conflicting utterances of the Upanishads had to be 
 reduced to a system, we can hardly blame $amkara 
 for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and 
 a lower Brahman, the former being the Brahman of 
 philosophy, the other that of religion, and both, as 
 he thought, to be found in different parts of the Veda. 
 By doing that he avoided the necessity of arguing 
 away a number of purely anthropomorphic features, 
 incongruous, if applied to the highest Brahman, and 
 dragging down even the Brahman of the lower Vidya 
 to a lower stage than philosophers would approve 
 of. Ramanugra's Brahman is always one and the 
 same, and, according to him, the knowledge of 
 Brahman is likewise but one ; but his Brahman is 
 in consequence hardly more than an exalted Isvara. 
 He is able to perform the work of creation without 
 any help from Maya or Avidya ; and the souls of 
 the departed, if only their life has been pure and 
 holy, are able to approach this Brahma, sitting on 
 his throne, and to enjoy their rewards in a heavenly 
 paradise. The higher conception of Brahman ex- 
 cluded of course not only everything mythological, 
 but everything like activity or workmanship, so that 
 creation could only be conceived as caused by Maya l 
 
 1 Ved. Sutras II, 2, 2, sub fine: Avidyapratyupasthapita- 
 namarupamayavesavasena, ' Through being possessed of the 
 Maya of names and forms brought near by Avidya.'
 
 252 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or Avidya ; while the very idea of an approach of 
 the souls of the departed to the throne of Brahman, 
 or of their souls being merged in Brahman, was 
 incompatible with the fundamental tenet that the 
 two were, and always remain, one and the same, 
 never separated except by Nescience. The idea of 
 an approach of the soul to Brahman, nay, even of 
 the individual soul being a separate part of Brahman, 
 to be again joined to Brahman after death, runs 
 counter to the conception of Brahman, as explained 
 by $a?'/ikara, however prominent it may be in the 
 Upanishads and in the system of Ilamanur/a. It 
 must be admitted therefore that in India, instead of 
 one Vedanta-philosophy, we have really two, spring- 
 ing from the same root but extending its branches 
 in two very different directions, that of $awkara 
 being kept for unflinching reasoners who, supported 
 by an unwavering faith in Monism, do not shrink 
 from any of its consequences ; another, that of 
 RamanuT/a, trying hard to reconcile their Monism 
 with the demands of the human heart that re- 
 quired, and always will require, a personal god, as 
 the last cause of all that is, and an eternal soul 
 that yearns for an approach to or a reunion with 
 that Being. 
 
 I am well aware that the view of the world, of 
 God, and of the soul, as propounded by the Vedantists, 
 whether in the Upanishads or in the Sutras and 
 their commentaries, has often been declared strange 
 and fanciful, and unworthy of the name of philosophy, 
 at all events utterly unsuited to the West, whatever 
 may have been its value in the East. I have nothing 
 to say against this criticism, nor have I ever tried 
 to make propaganda for Vedantism, least of all in
 
 RAMANUffA. 253 
 
 England. But I maintain that it represents a phase 
 of philosophic thought which no student of philo- 
 sophy can afford to ignore, and which in no country 
 can be studied to greater advantage than in India. 
 And I go even a step further. I quite admit that, 
 as a popular philosophy, the Vedanta would have its 
 dangers, that it would fail to call out and strengthen 
 the manly qualities required for the practical side of 
 life, and that it might raise the human mind to a 
 height from which the most essential virtues of social 
 and political life might dwindle away into mere 
 phantoms. At the same time I make no secret that 
 all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta. 
 Nay, I can fully agree with Schopenhauer, and quite 
 understand what he meant when he said, ' In the 
 whole world there is no study, except that of the 
 original (of the Upanishads), so beneficial and so 
 elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian trans- 
 lation of the Upanishads). It has been the solace 
 of my life, it will be the solace of my death.' 
 
 Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random, 
 or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called 
 mystic and inarticulate thought. And I am neither 
 afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm 
 for the Vedanta, and feel indebted to it for much 
 that has been helpful to me in my passage through 
 life. After all it is not everybody who is called 
 upon to take an active part in life, whether in de- 
 fending or ruling a country, in amassing wealth, or 
 in breaking stones ; and for fitting men to lead 
 contemplative and quiet lives, I know 7 no better 
 preparation than the Vedanta. A man may be a 
 Platonist, and yet a good citizen and an honest 
 Christian, and I should say the same of a Vedantist.
 
 254 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 They may be called useless by the busy and toiling 
 portion of humanity; but if it is true that 'those 
 also serve who only stand and wait,' then may we 
 not hope that even the quiet in the land are not so 
 entirely useless as they appear to be ? 
 
 And while some of the most important doctrines 
 of the Vedanta, when placed before us in the plain 
 and direct language of the Vedanta-Sutras, may often 
 seem very startling to us, it is curious to observe 
 how, if clothed in softer language, they do not jar at 
 all on our ears, nay, are in full harmony with our 
 own most intimate convictions. Thus, while the 
 idea that our own self and the Divine Self are 
 identical in nature might seem irreverent, if not 
 blasphemous, one of our own favourite hymns 
 contains the prayer, 
 
 And that a higher gift than grace 
 
 Should flesh and blood refine, 
 God's Presence and His very Self, 
 
 And Essence all-divine ! 
 
 This is pure Vedanta. We also speak without 
 hesitation of our body as the temple of God, and of 
 the voice of God within us ; nay, we repeat with 
 St. Paul that we live, and move, and have our 
 being in God, yet we shrink from adopting the plain 
 and simple language of the Upanishads that the Self 
 of God and man is the same. 
 
 Again, the unreality of the material world, though 
 proved point by point by Berkeley, seems to many a 
 pure fancy ; and yet one of our most popular poets, 
 the very type of manliness and strength, both mental 
 and physical, speaks like a Vedantist of the shadows 
 among which we move :
 
 METAPHORS. 255 
 
 For more than once when I ' 
 Sat all alone, revolving in myself 
 The word that is the symbol of myself, 
 The mortal limit of the Self was loosed, 
 And passed into the Nameless, as a cloud 
 Melts into Heaven. I touched my limbs the limbs 
 Were strange, not mine and yet no shade of doubt, 
 But utter clearness, and thro' loss of Self 
 The gain of such large life as matched with ours 
 Were Sun to spark unshadowable in words, 
 Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world. 
 
 It would be easy to add similar passages from 
 Wordsworth, Goethe, and others, to show that after 
 all there is some of the Indian leaven left in us, 
 however unwilling we may be to confess it. Indian 
 thought will never quite square with English 
 thoughts, and the English words which we have to 
 adopt in rendering Indian ideas are never quite 
 adequate. All we can do is to strive to approximate 
 as near as possible, and not to allow these inevitable 
 differences to prejudice us against what, though 
 differently expressed, is often meant for the same. 
 
 There is one more point that requires a few 
 remarks. 
 
 Metaphors. 
 
 It has often been said that the Yedanta-philosophy 
 deals too much in metaphors, and that most of them, 
 though fascinating at first sight, leave us in the end 
 unsatisfied, because they can only illustrate, but 
 cannot prove. This is true, no doubt ; but in philo- 
 sophy illustration also by means of metaphors has 
 its value, and I doubt whether they were ever meant 
 for more than that. Thus, when the Vedarita has to 
 
 Tennyson, The Ancient Sage.
 
 256 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 explain how the Sat, the Real or Brahman, dwells 
 within us, though we cannot distinguish it, the author 
 of the jfTMndogya Up. VI, 13, introduces a father 
 telling his son to throw a lump of salt into water, and 
 after some time to take it out again. Of course he 
 cannot do it, but whenever he tastes the water it is 
 salt. In the same way, the father says, the Sat, the 
 Divine, is within us, though we cannot perceive it 
 by itself. 
 
 Another application of the same simile (Brihad. 
 Ar. Up. II, 4, 12) seems intended to show that the 
 Sat or Brahman, in permeating the whole elementary 
 world, vanishes, so that there is no distinction left 
 between the individual Self and the Highest Self 1 . 
 
 Again, when we read 2 that the manifold beings 
 are produced from the Eternal as sparks spring 
 from a burning fire, we should remember that this 
 metaphor illustrates the idea that all created beings 
 share in the substance of the Supreme Being, that 
 for a time they seem to be independent, but that 
 they vanish again without causing any diminution 
 in the Power from whence they sprang. 
 
 The idea of a creating as a making of the world 
 is most repugnant to the Vedantist, and he tries in 
 every way to find another simile by which to illus- 
 trate the springing of the world from Brahman as 
 seen in this world of Nescience. In order to avoid 
 the necessity of admitting something extraneous, 
 some kind of matter out of which the world was 
 shaped, the Upanishads point to the spider spinning 
 its web out of itself; and, in order to show that 
 things can spring into existence spontaneously, they 
 
 1 See Deussen, Upanishads, p. 416, fora different explanation. 
 
 2 Bnh. Ar. Up. II, i, 20.
 
 METAPHORS. 257 
 
 use the simile of the hairs springing from a man's 
 head without any special wish of the man himself. 
 
 Now it may be quite true that none of these 
 illustrations can be considered, nor were they in- 
 tended as arguments in support of the Upanishad- 
 philosophy, but they are at all events very useful in 
 reminding us by means of striking similes of certain 
 doctrines arrived at by the Vedanta philosophers 
 in their search after truth.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IT would be interesting to trace at once the same 
 or very similar tendencies as those of the Vedanta in 
 the development of other Indian philosophies, and 
 particularly of the Sarakhya and Yoga, and to see 
 what they have to say on the existence and the 
 true nature of a Supreme Being, and the relation 
 of human beings to that Divine Being, as shadowed 
 forth in certain passages of the Veda, though 
 differently interpreted by different schools of philo- 
 sophy. But it seems better on the whole to adhere 
 to the order adopted by the students of philosophy 
 in India, and treat of the other Mima?sa, the Purva- 
 Mima?HS'i, that is the Former Mimamsa, as it is 
 called, in connection with the one we have examined. 
 The Hindus admit a Purva-Mima?rtsa and an Uttara- 
 Mimawsa. They look upon the Vedanta as the 
 Uttara- or later Mima?^sa, and on that of G'aimini 
 as the Purva-, or prior. These names, however, were 
 not meant to imply, as Colebrooke l seems to have 
 supposed, that the Purva-Mimfvwsa was prior in 
 time, though it is true that it is sometimes called 
 Pra/,'i -, previous. It really meant no more than that 
 
 1 Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i, p. 239. Kilter, History 
 of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 376, in Morrison's translation. 
 
 2 Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 122, 1. 3.
 
 PURVA-MfMAA/SA. 259 
 
 the Purva-Mimamsa, having to do with the Karma- 
 kancZa, the first or work-part of the Veda, comes 
 first, and the Uttara-Mimarasa, being concerned with 
 the Grfl&nak&nda,, comes second, just as an orthodox 
 Hindu at one time was required to be a Grihastha or 
 householder first, and then only to retire into the 
 forest and lead the contemplative life of a Vana- 
 prastha or a Samnyasin. We shall see, however, 
 that this prior Mima??isa, if it can be called a philo- 
 sophy at all, is very inferior in interest to the 
 Vedanta, and could hardly be understood without 
 the previous existence of such a system as that of 
 Badarayana. I should not like, however, to commit 
 myself so far as to claim priority in time for the 
 Vedanta. It has a decided priority in importance, 
 and in its relation to the (r/lana- portion of the 
 Veda. We saw why the fact that Badaraya^a 
 quotes 6raimini cannot be used for chronological 
 purposes, for (7aimini returns the compliment and 
 quotes Badarayana. How this is to be accounted 
 for, I tried to explain before. It is clear that while 
 Badarayana endeavoured to introduce order into 
 the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses 
 to something like a system, 6raimini undertook to 
 do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called 
 Karmakaijc/a or work-portion, that is, all that had 
 regard to sacrifice, as described chiefly in the Brah- 
 manas. Sacrifice was so much the daily life of the 
 Brahmans that the recognised name for sacrifice 
 was simply Karman, i.e. work. That work grew 
 up in different parts of India, just as we saw philo- 
 sophy springing up, full of variety, not free even 
 from contradictions. Every day had its sacrifice, 
 and in some respects these regular sacrifices may be 
 
 s 2
 
 260 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 called the first calendar of India. They depended 
 on the seasons or regulated the seasons and marked 
 the different divisions of the year. There were 
 some rites that lasted the whole year or even several 
 years. And as philosophy existed, independent of 
 the Upanishads, and through BMarayana attempted 
 to make peace with the Upanishads, we must con- 
 sider that sacrifices also existed for a long time 
 without the Brahmar/.as, such as we possess them, 
 that they grew up without being restrained by 
 generally binding authorities of any kind, and 
 that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had 
 been composed and had acquired some kind of 
 authority, the necessity began to be felt of recon- 
 ciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied 
 in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as 
 well as special rules for the performance of every 
 kind of ceremony. We can hardly imagine that there 
 ever was a time in India when the so-called priests, 
 settled in distant localities, did not know how to 
 perform their own sacrificial duties, for who were 
 the authors of them, if not the priests? But when 
 the Brahmanas once existed, a new problem had to 
 be solved : how to bring the Brahmanas into har- 
 mony with themselves and with existing family and 
 local customs, and also how to discover in them a 
 meaning that should satisfy every new generation. 
 This was achieved by means of what is called 
 Mlm^msa, investigation, examination, consideration. 
 There is little room for real philosophy in all this, but 
 there are questions such as that of Dharma or duty, 
 including sacrificial duties, which offer an opportunity 
 for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its 
 rewards ; while in accounting for seeming contradic-
 
 PURVA-MfMAMSA. 261 
 
 tions, in arriving at general principles concerning 
 sacrificial acts, problems would naturally turn up 
 which, though often in themselves valueless, are 
 generally treated with considerable ingenuity. In 
 this way the work of 6raimini secured for itself 
 a place by the side of the works ascribed to 
 Badarayafta, Kapila and others, and was actually 
 raised to the rank of one of the six classical philo- 
 sophies of India. It cannot therefore be passed over 
 in a survey of Indian philosophy. 
 
 While Badaraya^a begins his Sutras with Athato 
 Brahmagdc/nasa, ' Now therefore the desire of know- 
 ing Brahman,' 6raimini, apparently in imitation of 
 it, begins with Athato Dharmaf/ig^asa, ' Now there- 
 fore the desire of knowing Dharma or duty.' The 
 two words ' Now therefore ' offer as usual a large 
 scope to a number of interpreters, but they mean 
 no more in the end than that now, after the Veda 
 has been read, and because it has been read, there 
 arises a desire for knowing the full meaning of 
 either Dharma, duty, or of Brahman, the Absolute ; 
 the former treated in the Uttara-, the latter in the 
 Purva-Mimamsa. In fact, whatever native commen- 
 tators may say to the contrary, this first Sutra is 
 not much more than a title, as if we were to say, 
 Now begins the philosophy of duty, or the philo- 
 sophy of (raimini. 
 
 Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts 
 of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices. It is 
 said to be a neuter, if used in the latter sense, 
 a very natural distinction, though there is little 
 evidence to that eifect in the Sutras or in the litera- 
 ture known to us. 
 
 This Dharma or duty is enjoined in the Brah-
 
 262 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and these together with the Mantras are 
 held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that 
 whatever is not Mantra is Brahmana, whatever is 
 not Brahma/ia is Mantra. The Brahmarias are said 
 to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and Arthavadas, 
 glosses. The injunctions are meant either to make 
 us do a thing that had not been done before, or to 
 make us know a thing that had not been known 
 before l . Subsequently the Vidhis 2 are divided 
 into Utpatti-vidhis, original or general injunctions, 
 such as Agnihotram guhoti, he performs the Agni- 
 hotra, and Viniyoga-vidhi, showing the manner in 
 which a sacrifice is to be performed. The latter 
 comprises injunctions as to the details, such as 
 Dadhn& (/uhoti, he performs the sacrifice with sour 
 milk, &c. Then follow the Prayoga-vidhis which 
 settle the exact order of sacrificial performances, 
 and there is lastly a class of injunctions which 
 determine who is fit to perform a sacrificial act. 
 They are called Adhikara-vidhis. 
 
 The hymns or formulas which are to be used at 
 a sacrifice, though they are held to possess also a 
 transcendental or mysterious effect, the Apurva, are 
 by 6raimini conceived as mainly intended to remind 
 the sacrificer of the gods who are to receive his 
 sacrificial gifts. 
 
 He likewise lays stress on what he calls Na- 
 madheya or the technical name of each sacrifice, 
 such as Agnihotra, Darsapurttamasa, Udbhid, &c. 
 These names are found in the Brahmawas and they 
 are considered important, as no doubt they are, in 
 defining the nature of a sacrifice. The Nishedhas 
 
 1 Rigvedabhashya, vol. i, p. 5. 
 
 2 Thibaut, Arthasawigraha, p. viii.
 
 CONTENTS OF THE PT>RVA-MIMAMSA. 263 
 
 or prohibitions require no explanation. They simply 
 state what ought not to be done at a sacrifice. 
 
 Lastly, the Arthavadas are passages in the Brah- 
 manas which explain certain things ; they vary in 
 character, being either glosses, comments, or ex- 
 planatory statements. 
 
 Contents of the Purva-Mlmaws.. 
 
 Perhaps I cannot do better than give the prin- 
 cipal contents of (raimini's Sutras, as detailed by 
 Madhava in his Nyaya-mala-vistara \ The Mi- 
 ma/wsa consists of twelve books. In the first book 
 is discussed the authoritativeness of those collec- 
 tions of words which are severally meant by the 
 terms injunction (Vidhi), explanatory passage (Artha- 
 vada), hymn (Mantra), tradition (Snm'ti), and name 
 (Namadheya). In the second we find certain sub- 
 sidiary discussions, as e. g. on Apurva, relative to 
 the difference of various rites, refutation of erro- 
 neously alleged proofs, and difference of perform- 
 ance, as in obligatory and voluntary offerings. In 
 the third are considered revelation ($ruti), ' sign ' or 
 sense of a passage (Linga), ' context ' ( Vakya), &c., 
 and their respective weight, when in apparent 
 opposition to one another ; then the cerarnonies 
 called Pratipathi-Karmam, things mentioned by the 
 way, Anarabhyadhita, things accessory to several 
 main objects, as Praya^as, &c., and the duties of 
 the sacrificer. In the fourth the chief subject is 
 the influence of the principal and subordinate rites 
 on other rites, the fruit produced by the (ruhA 
 
 1 See Cowell and Gough in their translation of the Sarvadar- 
 sana-samgraha, p. 178.
 
 264 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 when made of the Butea frondosa, &c., and the 
 dice-playing, &c., which forms part of the Ka^/asuya- 
 sacrifice. In the fifth the subjects are the relative 
 order of different passages of the /Sruti, &c., the order 
 of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen 
 animals at the Va(/apeya, the multiplication and 
 non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force 
 of the words of the /Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as 
 determining the order of performance. In the sixth 
 we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, 
 then: obligations, the substitutes for prescribed mate- 
 rials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory 
 rites, the Sattra-offerings, things proper to be given, 
 and the different sacrificial fines. In the seventh 
 is treated the mode of transference of the cere- 
 monies of one sacrifice to another by direct command 
 in the Vaidic text, others as inferred by ' name ' or 
 ' sign.' In the eighth, transference by virtue of the 
 clearly expressed or obscurely expressed ' sign ' or 
 by the predominant ' sign,' and cases also where no 
 transference takes place. In the ninth, the dis- 
 cussion begins with the adaptation (Uha) of hymns, 
 when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation 
 of Samans and Mantras, and collateral questions 
 connected therewith. In the tenth the occasions 
 are discussed where the non-performance of the 
 primary rite involves the ' preclusion ' and non- 
 performance of the dependent rites, and occasions 
 when rites are precluded, because other rites pro- 
 duce their special results, also Graha-offerings, 
 certain Samans, and various other things, as well 
 as different kinds of negation. In the eleventh we 
 find the incidental mention and subsequently the 
 fuller discussion of Tantra, where several acts are
 
 PRAMA^AS OF GAIMINI. 265 
 
 combined into one, and Avapa, or the performing 
 an act more than once. In the twelfth there is 
 the discussion on Prasaiiga, when the rite is per- 
 formed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental 
 further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concur- 
 rent rites (Samu&Maya), and option. 
 
 It is easy to see from this table of contents that 
 neither Plato nor Kant would have felt much the 
 wiser for them. But we must take philosophies as 
 they are given us ; and we should spoil the picture 
 of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of 
 consideration their speculations about sacrifice as con- 
 tained in the Purva-Mima/msa. There are passages, 
 however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, 
 for instance, the chapter on the Pramanas or the 
 authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation 
 between word and thought, and similar subjects. 
 It is true that most of these questions are treated 
 in the other philosophies also, but they have a 
 peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic Purva- 
 Mimamsa. 
 
 Pramawas of Craimini. 
 
 Thus if we turn our attention first to the Pra- 
 manas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities 
 to which we can appeal as the legitimate means 
 of knowledge, as explained by the Purva-Mlma??isa, 
 we saw before that the Vedantists did riot pay 
 much attention to them, though they were ac- 
 quainted with the three fundamental Pramawas 
 sense-perception, inference, and revelation. The 
 Purva-Mimamsa, on the contrary, devoted consider- 
 able attention to this subject, and admitted five, 
 (i) Sense-perception, Pratyaksha, when the organs
 
 266 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are actually in contiguity with an object ; (2) In- 
 ference (Anumana), i. e. the apprehension of an 
 unseen member of a known association (Vyapti) 
 by the perception of another seen member ; (3) 
 Comparison (Upamana), knowledge arising from 
 resemblance ; (4) Presumption (Arthapatti), such 
 knowledge as can be derived of a thing not itself 
 perceived, but implied by another ; (5) >S'abda, verbal 
 information derived from authoritative sources. One 
 sect of Mima?nsakas, those who follow Kumarila 
 Bha^a, admitted besides, (6) Abhava, not-being, 
 which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we 
 infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or 
 absence of clouds and rain. 
 
 All these sources of information are carefully 
 examined, but it is curious that Mimamsakas should 
 admit this large array of sources of valid cog- 
 nition, considering that for their own purposes, 
 for establishing the nature of Dharma or duty, 
 they practically admit but one, namely scripture 
 or /S'abda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human 
 authority, because the ' ought ' which underlies 
 all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that 
 is more than human or more than fallible, and such 
 an authority is nowhere to be found except in the 
 Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving 
 the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders 
 of 6 ? aimini ; and we shall see hereafter how he per- 
 forms it. 
 
 Stltra-style. 
 
 Before, however, we enter on a consideration of 
 any of the problems treated in the Purva-Mimamsa, 
 a few remarks have to be made on a peculiarity in
 
 SUTKA-STYLE. 267 
 
 the structure of the Sutras. In order to discuss a 
 subject fully, and to arrive in the end at a definite 
 opinion, the authors of the Sutras are encouraged 
 to begin with stating first every possible objection 
 that can reasonably be urged against what is their 
 own opinion. As long as the objections are not 
 perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, 
 and this is called the Purvapaksha, the first part. 
 Then follow answers to all these objections, and this 
 is called the Uttarapaksha, the latter part ; and 
 then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the 
 Siddhanta. This system is exhaustive and has many 
 advantages, but it has also the disadvantage, as far 
 as the reader is concerned, that, without a com- 
 mentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons 
 end and the pros begin. The commentators them- 
 selves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes 
 again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is 
 stated in five members, namely : 
 
 1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya). 
 
 2. The doubt (Samsaya). 
 
 3. The first side or prima facie view (Purvapaksha). 
 
 4. The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhanta) ; and 
 
 5. The connection (Samgati). 
 
 This is illustrated in the commentary on the first 
 and second Sutras of the Mimamsa l , which declare 
 that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and 
 then define duty (Dharma) as that which is to be 
 recognised by an instigatory passage, that is by a 
 passage from the Veda. Here the question to be 
 discussed (Vishaya) is, whether the study of Duty in 
 
 1 Sarvadarsana-sawgraha, p. 122; translation by Cowell and 
 Gough, p. 180; Siddhanta Dipika, 1898, p. 194.
 
 268 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (raimini's Mimams^ is really necessary to be under- 
 taken. The Purvapaksha says of course, No, for 
 when it is said that the Veda should be learnt (Vedo 
 *dhyetavyaA), that clearly means either that it should 
 be understood, like any other book which we read, or 
 that it should be learnt by heart without any attempt, 
 as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply 
 as a work good in itself, which has its reward in 
 heaven. This is a very common view among the 
 ancient Brahmans ; for, as they had no written books, 
 they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts 
 on the memory of young persons, by making them 
 learn every day a certain number of verses or lines 
 by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making 
 them understand what they learnt ; and afterwards 
 only supplying the key to the meaning. This acqui- 
 sition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered 
 highly meritorious ; nay, some held that the Veda 
 was more efficacious, if not understood than if 
 understood. This was in fact their printing or 
 rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic 
 literature would have been simply impossible. As 
 we warn our compositors against trying to under- 
 stand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cau- 
 tioned against the same danger ; and they succeeded 
 in learning the longest texts by heart, without even 
 attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us 
 such a system seems almost incredible, but no other 
 system was possible in ancient times, and there is 
 no excuse for being incredulous, for it may still be 
 witnessed in India to the present day. 
 
 Only after the text had thus been imprinted on 
 the memory, there came the necessity of inter- 
 pretation or understanding. And here the more
 
 SUTRA-STYLE. 269 
 
 enlightened of the Indian theologians argue that 
 the Vedic command ' Vedo-dhyetavyaA/ ' the Veda 
 is to be gone over, that is, is to be acquired, to be 
 learnt by heart,' implies that it is also to be under- 
 stood, and that this intelligible purpose is preferable 
 to the purely mechanical one, though miraculous 
 rewards may be held out for that. 
 
 But if so, it is asked, what can be the use of the 
 Mima?nsEi? The pupil learns the Veda by heart, 
 and learns to understand it in the house of his 
 teacher. After that he bathes, marries and sets up 
 his own house, so that it is argued there would 
 actually be no time for any intervening study of the 
 MimamsEi. Therefore the imaginary opponent, the 
 Purvapakshin, objects that the study of the Mimamsa 
 is not necessary at all, considering that it rests on no 
 definite sacred command. But here the Siddhantin 
 steps forward and says that the Snm'ti passage 
 enjoining a pupil's bathing (graduating) on returning 
 to his house is not violated by an intervening study 
 of the Mima??isa, because it is not said that, after 
 having finished his apprenticeship, he should imme- 
 diately bathe ; and because, though his learning of 
 the text of the Veda is useful in every respect, 
 a more minute study of the sacrificial precepts of 
 the Veda, such as is given in the Mima??isa, cannot 
 be considered superfluous, as a means towards the 
 highest object of the study of the Veda, viz. the 
 proper performance of its commands. 
 
 These considerations in support of the Siddhanta 
 or final conclusion would probably fall under the 
 name of Samgati, connection, though I must confess 
 that its meaning is not quite clear to me. There 
 are besides several points in the course of this dis-
 
 270 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cussion, such as, for instance, the so-called four 
 Kriyaphalas, on which more information is much 
 to be desired. 
 
 Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin? 
 
 This discussion leads on to another and more 
 important one, whether the Veda has supreme 
 authority, whether it is the work of man, or of some 
 inspired person, or whether it is what we should 
 call revealed. If it were the work of a person, then, 
 like any other work, it could not establish a duty, 
 nor could it promise any rewards as a motive for the 
 performance of any duty ; least of all, a reward in 
 heaven, such as the Yeda promises again and again 
 to those who perform Vedic* sacrifices. It follows 
 therefore either that the Veda has no binding 
 authority at all, or that it cannot be the work of 
 a personal or human author. This is a dilemma 
 arising from convictions firmly planted in the minds 
 of the ancient theologians of India, arid it is interest- 
 ing to see how they try to escape from all the diffi- 
 culties arising out of their postulate that the Veda 
 must be the work of a superhuman or divine author. 
 The subject is interesting even though the argu- 
 ments may not be convincing to us. It is clear that 
 
 */ O 
 
 even to start such a claim as being revealed for any 
 book requires a considerable advance in religious 
 and philosophical thought, and I doubt whether 
 such a problem could have arisen in the ancient 
 literature of any country besides India. The Jews, 
 no doubt, had their sacred books, but these books, 
 though sacred, were riot represented as having been 
 the work of Jehovah. They were acknowledged to
 
 HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? 27! 
 
 have been composed, if not written down, by his- 
 torical persons, even if, as in the case of Moses, they 
 actually related the death of their reputed author. 
 The Mimamsa philosopher would probably have 
 argued that as no writer could relate his own death, 
 therefore Deuteronomy must be considered the work 
 of a superhuman writer ; and some of our modern 
 theologians have not been very far from taking the 
 same view. To the Brahmans, any part of the 
 Veda, even if it bore a human or historical name, 
 was superhuman, eternal and infallible, much as 
 the Gospels are in the eyes of certain Christian 
 theologians, even though they maintain at the same 
 time that they are historical documents written down 
 by illiterate people, or by apostles such as St. Mark 
 or St. John. Let us see therefore how the Mimamsa 
 deals with this problem of the Apaurusheyatva, i. e. 
 the non-human origin of the Vedas. Inspiration in 
 the ordinary sense of the word would not have 
 satisfied these Indian orthodox philosophers, for, as 
 they truly remark, this would not exclude the 
 possibility of error, because, however true the mes- 
 sage might be, when given, the human recipient 
 would always be a possible source of error, as being 
 liable to misapprehend and misinterpret such a 
 message. Even the senses, as they point out, 
 can deceive us, so that we mistake mother-of-pearl 
 for silver ; how much more easily then may we 
 misapprehend the meaning of revealed words ! 
 
 However, the first thing is to see how the Brah- 
 mans, and particularly the Mimamsakas, tried to 
 maintain a superhuman authorship in favour of the 
 Veda. 
 
 1 quote from Madhava's introduction to his com-
 
 272 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mentary on the Rig-veda l . He is a great authority 
 in matters connected with the Purva-Mimarasa, 
 having written the Nyaya-mala-vistara, a very com- 
 prehensive treatise on the subject. In his intro- 
 duction he establishes first the authority of the 
 Mantras and of the Brahmanas, both Vidhis (rules) 
 and Arthavadas (glosses), by showing that they were 
 perfectly intelligible, which had been denied. He 
 then proceeds to establish the Apaurusheyatva, the 
 non-human authorship of the Veda, in accordance, 
 as he says, with 6raimini's Sutras. 
 
 'Some people,' he says, and he means of course 
 the Purvapakshins, the recognised objectors, ' up- 
 hold approximation towards the Vedas,' that is to 
 say, they hold that as the Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa 
 and other poems are recent, so also are the Yedas. 
 The Vedas, they continue, are not without a begin- 
 ning or eternal, and hence we find men quoted in 
 them as the authors of the Vedas. As in the 
 case of Vyasa's Mahabharata and Valraiki's Rama- 
 ya?ia, Vyasa, Valrniki, &c., are known to be their 
 human authors, thus in the case of the Kanaka, 
 Kauthuma, Taittiriya, and other sections of the 
 Veda, Ka^Aa, &c., are given us as the names of the 
 authors of these branches of the Veda ; and hence it 
 follows that the Vedas were the works of human 
 authors. 
 
 And if it were suggested that such names as 
 Ka^Aa, &c., were meant for men who did no more 
 than hand down the oral tradition, like teachers, 
 the Purvapakshin is ready witli a new objection, 
 namely, that the Vedas must be of human origin, 
 
 1 See my Second Edition, vol. i, p. 10.
 
 HAS THE VEDA A SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN? 273 
 
 because we see in the Vedas themselves the mention 
 of temporal matters. Thus we read of a Babara 
 Pravaham, of a Kusuruvinda Auddalaki, &c. The 
 Vedas, therefore, could not have existed in times 
 anterior to these persons mentioned in them, and 
 hence cannot be prehistoric, pre-temporal, or eternal. 
 It is seen from this that what is claimed for the 
 Veda is not only revelation, communicated to his- 
 torical persons, but existence from all eternity, and 
 before the beginning of all time. We can under- 
 stand therefore why in the next Sutra, which is the 
 Siddhanta or final conclusion, (raimini should appeal 
 to a former Sutra in which he established that even 
 the relation of words to their meanings is eternal. 
 This subject had been discussed before, in answer to 
 the inevitable Objector-general, the Purvapakshin, 
 who had maintained that the relation between words 
 and their meanings was conventional (6eo-ei), estab- 
 lished by men, and therefore liable to error quite as 
 much as the evidence of our senses. For as we may 
 mistake mother-of-pearl for silver, we may surely 
 mistake the meaning of words, and hence the mean- 
 ing of words of the Veda also. 6raimini, therefore, in 
 this place, wishes us first of all to keep in mind that 
 the words of the Vedas themselves are superhuman 
 or supernatural, nay, that sound itself is eternal, and 
 thus fortified he next proceeds to answer the objec- 
 tions derived from such names as Kanaka, or Babara 
 Pravaham. This is done by showing that Ka^/ia 
 did not compose, but only handed down a certain 
 portion of the Veda, and that Babara Pravcaham 
 was meant, not as the name of a man, but as a name 
 of the wind, Babara imitating the sound, and Prava- 
 hana meaning 'carrying along,' as it were pro-vehens. 
 
 T
 
 274 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Then follows a new objection taken from the fact 
 that impossible or even absurd things occur in the 
 Veda ; for instance, we read that trees or serpents 
 performed a sacrifice, or that an old ox sang foolish 1 
 songs fit for the Madras. Hence it is argued once 
 more that the Veda must have been made by human 
 beings. But the orthodox (raimini answers, No ; 
 for if it had been made by man, there could be no 
 injunction for the performance of sacrifices like the 
 (ryotish toma, as a means of attaining Svarga or para- 
 dise, because no man could possibly know either the 
 means, or their effect ; and yet there is this injunction 
 in the case of the 6ryotishoma, and other sacrifices 
 are not different from it. Such injunctions as ' Let a 
 man who desires paradise, sacrifice with the 6ryotish- 
 foma ' are not like a speech of a madman ; on the 
 contrary, they are most rational in pointing out the 
 object (paradise), in suggesting the means (Soma, c.), 
 and in mentioning all the necessary subsidiary acts 
 (Dikshamya, &c.). We see, therefore, that the com- 
 mands of the Veda are not unintelligible or absurd. 
 And if we meet with such passages as that the trees 
 and serpents performed certain sacrifices, we must 
 recognise in them Arthavadas or glosses, conveying 
 in our case indirect laudations of certain sacrifices, 
 as if to say, ' if even trees and serpents perform 
 them, how much more should intelligent beings do 
 the same ! ' 
 
 As, therefore, no flaws that might arise from 
 human workmanship can be detected in the Veda, 
 (raitnini concludes triumphantly that its superhuman 
 origin and its authority cannot be doubted. 
 
 On Miidruku, see Muir, Sansk. Texts, II, p. 482.
 
 SUPPOSED ATHEISM OF PURVA-MIMAJUSA. 275 
 
 This must suffice to give a general idea of the 
 character of the Purva-Mimamsa. We may wonder 
 why it should ever have been raised to the rank of 
 a philosophical system by the side of the Uttara- 
 Mim&msa or the Vedanta, but it is its method 
 rather than the matter to which it is applied, that 
 seems to have invested it with a certain importance. 
 This Mimamsa method of discussing questions has 
 been adopted in other branches of learning also, for 
 instance, by the highest legal authorities in trying 
 to settle contested questions of law. We meet with 
 it in other systems of philosophy also as the recog- 
 nised method of discussing various opinions before 
 arriving at a final conclusion. 
 
 There are some curious subjects discussed by 
 (raimini, such as what authority can be claimed for 
 tradition, as different from revelation, how far the 
 recognised customs of certain countries should be 
 followed or rejected, what words are to be con- 
 sidered as correct or incorrect ; or again, how a good 
 or bad act, after it has been performed can, in 
 spite of the lapse of time, produce good or bad 
 results for the performer. All this is certainly of 
 interest to the student of Indian literature, but 
 hardly to the student of philosophy, as such. 
 
 Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mim&wsa. 
 
 One more point seems to require our attention, 
 namely, the charge of atheism that has been brought 
 against (raimini's Mimamsa. This sounds a very 
 strange charge after what we have seen of the 
 character of this philosophy, of its regard for the 
 Veda, and the defence of its revealed character, 
 nay, its insistence on the conscientious observance 
 
 T 2
 
 276 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of all ceremonial injunctions. Still, it has been 
 brought both in ancient and in modern times. So 
 early a philosopher as Kumarila Bha^a tells us 
 that the Mima/nsa had been treated in the world 
 as a Lokayata l , i. e. an atheistic system, but that 
 he was anxious to re-establish it as orthodox. 
 Professor Banerjea- tells us that Prabhakara also, 
 the other commentator of the Mima/msa, had openly 
 treated this system as atheistic, and we shall meet 
 with a passage from the Padma-Pura?ia supporting 
 the same view. However, there seems to be a mis- 
 understanding here. Atheistic has always meant 
 a great many things, so much so that even the most 
 pantheistic system that could be imagined, the 
 Vedanta, has, like that of Spinoza, been accused of 
 atheism. The reason is this. The author of the 
 Vedanta-Sutras,Bcidaraya?ia, after having established 
 the omnipresence of Brahman (III, 2, 36-37) by 
 quoting a number of passages from the Veda, such 
 as 'Brahman is all this' (Mu^cZ. Up. II, 2, 1 1), 'the 
 Self is all this ' (A"Mnd. Up. VII, 25, 2), proceeds to 
 show (III, 2, 38) that the rewards also of all works 
 proceed directly or indirectly from Brahman. There 
 were, however, two opinions on this point, one, that 
 the works themselves produce their fruit without 
 any divine interference, and in cases where the fruit 
 does not appear at once, that there is a super- 
 eensuous principle, called Apiirva, which is the 
 direct result of a deed, and produces fruit at a later 
 time ; the other, that all actions are directly or 
 
 1 Lokayata is explained by Childers, s.v., as controversy on 
 fabulous or absurd points, but in the Amba/Ma-Suttu, I. ,3, it is 
 mentioned as forming part ot the studies proper for a Brahman. 
 
 2 Muir, III, 95.
 
 SUPPOSED ATHEISM OF PURVA-MIMAMSA. 277 
 
 indirectly requited by the Lord. The latter opinion, 
 which is adopted by Badarayana, is supported by a 
 quotation from Bn'h. Up. IV, 4, 24, ' This is indeed 
 the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of 
 wealth.' (jaimini, however, as we are informed by 
 Badaraya^a in the next Sutra, accepted the former 
 opinion. The command that ' he who is desirous of 
 the heavenly world should sacrifice,' implies, as he 
 holds, a reward of the sacrificer by means of the 
 sacrifice itself, and not by any other agent. But 
 how a sacrifice, when it had been performed and 
 was ended, could produce any reward, is difficult 
 to understand. In order to explain this, 6raimini 
 assumes that there was a result, viz. an invisible 
 something, a kind of after-state of a deed or an 
 invisible antecedent state of the result, something 
 Apurva or miraculous, which represented the re- 
 ward inherent in good works. And he adds, that if 
 we supposed that the Lord himself caused rewards 
 and punishments for the acts of men, we should 
 often have to accuse him of cruelty and partiality ; 
 and that it is better therefore to allow that all 
 works, good or bad, produce their own results, or, in 
 other words, that for the moral government of the 
 world no Lord is wanted. 
 
 Here, then, we see the real state of the case as 
 between (7aimini and Badarayana. Graimini would 
 not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that 
 seems to prevail in the world, and hence reduced 
 everything to cause and effect, and saw in the 
 inequalities of the world the natural result of the 
 continued action of good or evil acts. This surely 
 was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear 
 the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue
 
 278 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 partiality which have so often been brought against 
 him. It was but another attempt at justifying the 
 wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicee, that, what- 
 ever we may think of it, certainly did not deserve 
 the name of atheism. 
 
 Badarayana, however, thought otherwise, and 
 quoting himself, he says, ' Badarayana thinks the 
 Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action/ and 
 he adds that he is even the cause of these actions 
 themselves, as we may learn from a well-known 
 Vedic passage (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8) : ' He makes 
 whomsoever he wishes to lead up from these worlds, 
 do good deeds ; and makes him whom he wishes to 
 lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds.' 
 
 Atheism is a charge very freely brought against 
 those who deny certain characteristics predicated of 
 the Deity, but do not mean thereby to deny its 
 existence. If the Mimamsakas were called atheists, 
 it meant no more than that they tried to iustify the 
 
 / *J J 
 
 ways of God in their own way. But, once having 
 been called atheists, they were accused of ever so 
 many things. In a passage quoted by Professor 
 Banerjea from a modern work, the Vidvan-moda- 
 tararigmi, we read : ' They say there is no God, or 
 maker of the world ; nor has the world any sustainer 
 or destroyer ; for every man obtains a recompense in 
 conformity with his own works. Neither is there any 
 maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their 
 arrangement is eternal. Its authoritativeness is 
 self-demonstrated, for since it has been established 
 from all eternity how can it be dependent upon 
 anything but itself ? ' This shows how the Mimam- 
 sakas have been misunderstood by the Vedantists, 
 and how much $awkara is at cross-purposes with
 
 IS THE PURVA-MIMAMSA A PHILOSOPHY ? 279 
 
 (raimini. What has happened in this case in India 
 is what always happens when people resort to names 
 of abuse rather than to an exchange of ideas. Surely 
 a Deity, though it does not cause us to act, and 
 does not itself reward or punish us, is not thereby 
 a non-existent Deity. Modern Vedantists also are 
 so enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that 
 is, of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate, 
 like Vivekananda, for instance, in his recent address 
 on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who 
 differ from himself with atheism. ' He is the atheist,' 
 he writes, ' who does not believe in himself. Not 
 believing in the glory of your own soul is what the 
 Vedanta calls atheism.' 
 
 Is the Pftrva-Mimawsa a system of Philosophy? 
 
 Let me say once more that, in allowing a place to 
 the Purva-Mimamsa among the six systems of Indian 
 Philosophy, I was chiefly influenced by the fact that 
 from an Indian point of view it always held such 
 a place, and that by omitting it a gap would have 
 been left in the general outline of the philosophic 
 thought of India. Some native philosophers go so 
 far as not only to call both systems, that of (raimini 
 and Badarayana, by the same name of Mimamsa, 
 but to look upon them as forming one whole. They 
 actually take the words in the first Sutra of the 
 Vedanta-philosophy, ' Now then a desire to know 
 Brahman,' as pointing back to (raimini's Sutras and 
 as thereby implying that the Purva-Mimamsa should 
 be studied first, and should be followed by a study 
 of the Uttara-MimamsEi afterwards. Besides, the 
 authors of the other five systems frequently refer to 
 (raimini as an independent thinker, and though his
 
 280 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 treatment of the sacrificial system of the Veda would 
 hardly seem to us to deserve the name of a system 
 of philosophy, he has nevertheless touched on many 
 a problem which falls clearly within that sphere of 
 thought. Our idea of a system of philosophy is 
 different from the Indian conception of a Darsana. 
 In its original meaning philosophy, as a love of 
 wisdom, comes nearest to the Sanskrit 6ri(//iasa, 
 a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If 
 we take philosophy in the sense of an examination 
 of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with 
 Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human know- 
 ledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in 
 India. Even the Vedanta, so far as it is based, not 
 on independent reasoning, but on the authority of 
 the /Sruti, would lose \vith us its claim to the title 
 of philosophy. But we have only to waive the claim 
 of infallibility put forward by Badarayana in favour 
 of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads, 
 and treat them as simple human witnesses to the 
 truth, and we should then find in the systematic 
 arrangement of these utterances by Badarayarza, 
 a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in 
 which we live, like those that have been put forward 
 by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries 
 of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and 
 England.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Samkhya-Philosophy. 
 
 HAVING- explored two of the recognised systems 
 of Indian philosophy, so far as it seemed necessary 
 in a general survey of the work done by the ancient 
 thinkers of India, we must now return and enter 
 once more into the densely entangled and almost 
 impervious growth of thought from which all the 
 high roads leading towards real and definite systems 
 of philosophy have emerged, branching off in dif- 
 ferent directions. One of these and, as it seems 
 to me, by far the most important for the whole 
 intellectual development of India, the Vedanta, 
 has been mapped out by us at least in its broad 
 outlines. 
 
 It seemed to me undesirable to enter here on 
 an examination of what has been called the later 
 Vedanta which can be studied in such works as 
 the Pan&adasi or the Vedanta-Sara, and in many 
 popular treatises both in prose and in verse. 
 
 Later Vedanta mixed with Sawkhya. 
 
 It would be unfair and unhistorical, however, to 
 look upon this later development of the Vedanta as 
 simply a deterioration of the old philosophy. Though 
 it is certainly rather confused, if compared with the 
 system as laid down in the old Vedanta-Sfttras,
 
 282 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it represents to us what in the course of time 
 became of the Vedanta, when taught and discussed 
 in the different schools of philosophy in medieval 
 and modern India. What strikes us most in it is 
 the mixture of Vedanta ideas with ideas borrowed 
 chiefly, as it would seem, from Samkhya, but 
 also from Yoga, and Nyaya sources. But here 
 again it is difficult to decide whether such ideas 
 were actually borrowed from these systems in their 
 finished state, or whether they were originally com- 
 mon property which in later times only had become 
 restricted to one or the other of the six systems of 
 philosophy. In the Pa?U*adasi, for instance, we 
 meet with the idea of Praknti, nature, which we 
 are accustomed to consider as the peculiar property 
 of the Sa/mkhya-system. This Prakrit! is said there 
 to be the reflection, or, as we should say, the shadow 
 of Brahman, and to be possessed of the three Gunas 
 or elements of goodness, passion, and darkness, or, 
 as they are sometimes explained, of good, indifferent, 
 and bad. This theory of the three Gu?;as, however, 
 is altogether absent from the original Vedanta ; at 
 least, it is not to be met with in the purely Veduntic 
 Upanishads, occurring for the first time in the 
 /SVetasvatara Upanishad. Again in the later Vedanta 
 works Avidya and Maya are used synonymously, 
 or, if distinguished from one another, they are sup- 
 posed to arise respectively from the more or less 
 pure character of their substance 1 . The omniscient, 
 but personal tsvara is there explained as a reflection 
 of Maya, but as having subdued her, while the 
 
 1 I translate Sattva hero by substance, for the context 
 hardly allows that we should take it for the Guna of goodness.
 
 LATER VEDANTA MIXED WITH SAJIfKHYA. 283 
 
 individual soul, Pragma or 6riva, is represented as 
 having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multi- 
 form, owing to the variety of Avidya. The individual 
 soul, being endowed with a causal or subtle body, 
 believes that body to be its own, and hence error 
 and suffering in all their variety. As to the de- 
 velopment of the world, we are told that it was 
 by the command of Isvara that PrakHti, when 
 dominated by darkness, produced the elements of 
 ether, a,ir, fire, water and earth, all meant to be 
 enjoyed, that is, to be experienced by the individual 
 souls. 
 
 In all this we can hardly be mistaken if we 
 recognise the influence of Samkhya ideas, obscuring 
 and vitiating the monism of the Vedanta, pure and 
 simple. In that philosophy there is no room for a 
 Second, or for a Prakn'ti, nor for the three Gums, 
 nor for anything real by the side of Brahman. 
 
 How that influence was exercised we cannot 
 discover, and it is possible that in ancient times 
 already there existed this influence of one philo- 
 sophical system upon the other, for we see even 
 in some of the Upanishads a certain mixture of 
 what we should afterwards have to call the dis- 
 tinctive teaching of Vedanta, Samkhya, or Yoga- 
 philosophy. We must remember that in India the 
 idea of private property in any philosophic truth 
 did hardly exist. The individual, as we saw before, 
 was of little consequence, and could never exercise 
 the same influence which such thinkers as Socrates 
 or Plato exercised in Greece. If the descriptions of 
 Indian life emanating from the Indians themselves, 
 and from other nations they came in contact with, 
 whether Greek conquerors or Chinese pilgrims, can
 
 284 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be trusted, we may well understand that truth, 
 or what was taken to be truth, was treated not 
 as private, but as common property. If there was 
 an exchange of ideas among the Indian seekers 
 after truth, it was far more in the nature of co- 
 operation towards a common end, than in the 
 assertion of any claims of originality or priority 
 by individual teachers. That one man should write 
 and publish his philosophical views in a book ; and 
 that another should read and criticise that book 
 or carry on the work where it had been left, was 
 never thought of in India in ancient times. If 
 A. referred to B. often, as they say, from mere 
 civility, Pm/artham, B. would refer to A., but no 
 one would ever say, as so often happens with us, 
 that he had anticipated the discovery of another, 
 or that some one else had stolen his ideas. Truth 
 was not an article that, according to Hindu ideas, 
 could ever be stolen. All that could happen and 
 did happen was that certain opinions which had 
 been discussed, sifted, and generally received in 
 one Asrama, hermitage, Arama, garden, or Parishad, 
 religious settlement, would in time be collected 
 by its members and reduced to a more or less 
 systematic form. What that form was in early 
 times we may see from the Brahmanas, and more 
 particularly from the Upanishads, i. e. Seances, 
 gatherings of pupils round their teachers, or later on 
 from the Sutras. It cannot be doubted that these 
 Sutras presuppose, by their systematic form, a long 
 continued intellectual labour, nay it seems to me 
 difficult to account for their peculiar literary form 
 except on the ground that they were meant to be 
 learnt by heart and to be accompanied from the very
 
 LATER VEDANTA MIXED WITH SA3/KHYA. 285 
 
 beginning by a running commentary, without which 
 they would have been perfectly unintelligible. I sug- 
 gested once before that this very peculiar style of 
 the Sutras would receive the best historical expla- 
 nation, if it could be proved that they represent 
 the first attempts at writing for literary purposes 
 in India. Whatever the exact date may be of 
 the introduction of a sinistrorsum and dextrorsum 
 alphabet for epigraphic purposes in India (and in spite 
 of all efforts not a single inscription has as yet been 
 discovered that can be referred with certainty to the 
 period before Asoka, third century B. c.), every classical 
 scholar knows that there always is a long interval 
 between an epigraphic and a literary employment 
 of the alphabet. People forget that a period marked 
 by written literary compositions requires a public, 
 and a large public, which is able to read, for where 
 there is no demand there is no supply. Nor must 
 we forget that the old system of a mnemonic 
 literature, the Parampara, w r as invested with a kind 
 of sacred character, and would not have been easily 
 surrendered. The old mnemonic system was upheld 
 by a strict discipline which formed the principal 
 part of the established system of education in India, 
 as has been fully described in the Prati.sakhyas. 
 They explain to us by what process, whatever 
 existed at that time of literature, chiefly sacred, 
 was firmly imprinted on the memory of the young. 
 These young pupils were in fact the books, the 
 scribes were the Gurus, the tablet was the brain. 
 We can hardly imagine such a state of literature, 
 and the transition from it to a written literature 
 must have marked a new start in the intellectual 
 life of the people at large, or at least of the educated
 
 286 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 classes. Anybody who has come in contact with 
 the Pandits of India has been able to observe the 
 wonderful feats that can be achieved by that 
 mnemonic discipline even at present, though it is 
 dying out before our eyes at the approach of printed 
 books, nay of printed editions of their own sacred 
 texts. I need hardly say that even if Biihler's 
 . idea of the introduction of a Semitic alphabet into 
 India by means of commercial travellers about 800 
 or 1000 B.C. were more than a hypothesis, it would 
 not prove the existence of a written literature at 
 that time. The adaptation of a Semitic alphabet 
 to the phonetic system as elaborated in the Prati- 
 sakhyas may date from the third, possibly from 
 the fourth century B.C., but the use of that alphabet 
 for inscriptions begins in the middle of the third 
 century only ; and though we cannot deny the 
 possibility of its having been used for literary pur- 
 poses at the same time, such possibilities would 
 form very dangerous landmarks in the chronology 
 of Indian literature. 
 
 But whatever the origin of the peculiar Sutra- 
 literature may have been and I give my hypothesis 
 as a hypothesis only all scholars will probably 
 agree that these Sutras could not be the work of one 
 individual philosopher, but that we have in them the 
 last outcome of previous centuries of thought, and 
 the final result of the labours of numerous thinkers 
 whose names are forgotten and will never be 
 recovered. 
 
 Relative Age of Philosophies and Sfttras. 
 
 If we keep this in mind, we shall see that the 
 question whether any of the texts of the six philo-
 
 RELATIVE AGE OF PHILOSOPHIES AND SUTRAS. 287 
 
 sophies which we now possess should be considered 
 as older than any other, is really a question im- 
 possible to answer. The tests for settling the 
 relative ages of literary works, applicable to Euro- 
 pean literature, are not applicable to Indian litera- 
 ture. Thus, if one Greek author quotes another, 
 we feel justified in taking the one who is quoted 
 as the predecessor or contemporary of the one 
 who quotes. But because G'aimini quotes Bada- 
 rayawa and Badarayafta 6raimini, and because 
 their systems show an acquaintance with the other 
 five systems of philosophy, we have no right to 
 arrange them in chronological succession. Kanada, 
 who is acquainted with Kapila, is clearly criti- 
 cised by Kapila, at least in our Kapila-Sutras. 
 Kapila, to whom the S&mkhya-Sutras are ascribed, 
 actually adopts one of Badarayana's Sutras, IV, i , i , 
 and inserts it totidem verbis in his own work, IV, 3. 
 He does the same for the Yoga-Sutras I, 5 and II, 46, 
 which occur in II, 33, III, 34, and VI, 24 in the 
 Sawkhya-Sutras which we possess. Ka^ada was 
 clearly acquainted with Gotama, while Gotama 
 attacks in turn certain doctrines of Kapila and Bada- 
 rayana. It has been supposed, because Patan^ali 
 ignores all other systems, that therefore he was 
 anterior to all of them l . But all such conclusions, 
 which would be perfectly legitimate in Greek and 
 Latin literature, have no weight whatever in the 
 literary history of India, because during its mnemonic 
 period anything could be added and anything left 
 out, before each system reached the form in which 
 we possess it. 
 
 1 Kajendralal Mitra, I.e., p. xviii.
 
 288 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Age of Kapila-Sfttras. 
 
 The Sutras of Kapila, which have come down to 
 us, are so little the work of the founder of that 
 system, that it would be far safer to treat them as 
 the last arrangement of doctrines accumulated in one 
 philosophical school during centuries of Parampanl 
 or tradition. It is easy to see that the Yoga- 
 philosophy presupposes a Sa?7ikhya-philosophy, but 
 while Pata%ali, the reputed author of Yoga-Sutras 
 has been referred to the second century B.C., it is 
 now generally admitted that our Sawkhya- Sutras 
 cannot be earlier than the fourteenth century A.D. 
 It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the 
 six philosophies as so many channels of thought, 
 and the Sutras which embody their teachings and 
 have been handed down to us as the earliest docu- 
 ments within our reach. Yoga, as a technical 
 term, occurs earlier than the name of any other 
 system of philosophy. It occurs in the Taittiriya 
 and Ka^Aa Upanishads, and is mentioned in as 
 early an authority as the Asvalayana-Gn'hya- 
 Sutras. In the Maitray. Up. VI, 10 we meet even 
 with Yogins. But it by no means follows that the 
 Yoga, known in those early times, was the same 
 as what we possess in Pata/lr/ali's Sutras of the 
 Yoga-philosophy. We look in vain in the so-called 
 classical Upanishads for the names of either Samkhya 
 or Vedanta, but Sa/wkhya occurs in the compound 
 Samkhya-Yoga in the /SVetasvatara Up. VI, i 3 and 
 in several of the minor Upanishads. It should be 
 observed that Vedanta also occurs for the first time 
 in the same SVetasvatara VI, 22, and afterwards in 
 the smaller Upanishads. All such indications may
 
 AGE OF KAPILA-SUTKAS. 289 
 
 become valuable hereafter for chronological purposes. 
 In the Bhagavad-git IJ, 39 we meet with the Sam- 
 khya as the name of a system of philosophy and 
 likewise as a name of its adherents, V, 5. 
 
 As to our Samkhya-Sutras their antiquity was first 
 shaken by Dr. FitzEdward Hall. Va&aspati Misra, the 
 author of the Samkhya-tattva-Kaumudi, who, accord- 
 ing to Professor Garbe, can be safely referred to 
 about 1150 A. D., quotes not a single Sutra from our 
 Samkhya-Sutras, but appeals to older authorities 
 only, such as PaMasikha, Varshaganya, and the 
 Ra^avcartika. Even Madhava about 1350 A. D., who 
 evidently knew the Sutras of the other systems, 
 never quotes from our Samkhya-Sutras ; and why 
 not, if they had been in existence in his time ? 
 
 But we must not go too far. It by no means 
 follows that every one of the Sutras which we possess 
 in the body of the Samkhya-Sutras, and the com- 
 position of which is assigned by Balasastrin to so 
 late a period as the sixteenth century, is of that 
 modern date. He declares that they were all com- 
 posed by the well-known Vi^/nana-Bhikshu who, as 
 was then the fashion, wrote also a commentary on 
 them. It is quite possible that our Samkhya-Sutras 
 may only be what we should call the latest recension 
 of the old Sutras. We know that in India the oral 
 tradition of certain texts, as, for instance, the Sutras 
 of Panini, was interrupted for a time and then 
 restored again, whether from scattered MSS., or 
 from the recollection of less forgetful or forgotten 
 individuals. If that was the case, as we know, with 
 so voluminous a work as the Mahabhashya ; why 
 should not certain portions of the Samkhya-Sutras 
 have been preserved here and there, and have been 
 
 TJ
 
 290 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 added to or remodelled from time to time, till they 
 meet us at 'last in their final form, at so late a date 
 as the fourteenth or even the sixteenth century ? 
 It was no doubt a great shock to those who stood 
 up for the great antiquity of Indian philosophy, to 
 have to confess that a work for which a most remote 
 date had always been claimed, may not be older 
 than the time of Des Cartes, at least in that final 
 literary form in which it has reached us. But if we 
 consider the circumstances of the case, it .is more 
 than possible that our Sutras of the Samkhya- 
 philosophy contain some of the most ancient as 
 well as the most modern Sutras, the utterances of 
 Kapila, Asuri, PafU-asikha and Varshaga?iya, as well 
 as those of Lsvara-KHshfta and even of Vigwana- 
 Bhikshu. 
 
 Sawkhya-karikfts. 
 
 But if we must accept so very modern a date for 
 our Kapila-Sutras, we are fortunate in being able to 
 assign a much earlier and much more settled date 
 to another work which for centuries seems to have 
 formed the recognised authority for the followers 
 of the Sa?7ikhya in India, the so-called Sawkhya- 
 karikas or the sixty- nine or seventy Versus 
 memoriales of Isvara-Krtshna (with three supple- 
 mentary ones, equally ascribed to that author). 
 That these Karikas are older than our Sutras could 
 easily be proved by passages occurring among the 
 Sutras which are almost literally taken from the 
 Karikas 1 . 
 
 Alberuni, who wrote his account of India in the 
 
 1 See Hall, Samkhya-Sara, p. 12 ; Deusscn, Vedanta, p. 361.
 
 SAMKHYA-KARIKAS. 29! 
 
 first half of the eleventh century, was well ac- 
 quainted not only with Lsvara-K?^'shna's work, but 
 likewise, as has been shown, with Gauc/apada's 
 commentary on it 1 . Nay, we can even make 
 another step backward. For the Samkhya-karikas 
 exist in a Chinese translation also, made by .Kan-ti 
 (lit. true truth), possibly Paramartha, a Tripkaka 
 law-teacher of the Kh&\\ dynasty, A.D. 557 to 589 
 (not 583). Paramartha came to China in about 
 547 A.D. in the reign of the Emperor Wu-ti of the 
 Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 
 502 to 557 A.D. 2 , and was followed by the Kh&n 
 dynasty. He lived till 582 A.D. ; and there are no 
 less than twenty-eight of his translations now in 
 existence, that of the Suvama-Saptati-sastra being 
 the twenty-seventh (No. 1,300 in B. Nanjio's 
 Catalogue). The name given to it in Chinese, ' the 
 Golden Seventy Discourse,' is supposed to refer to 
 the number of verses in the Karika. TTan-ti was not 
 considered a good Chinese scholar, and his trans- 
 lation of the Abhidharma-Kosha-sastra, for instance, 
 had in consequence to be replaced by a new trans- 
 lation by Hiouen-thsang. 
 
 But though we are thus enabled to assign the 
 Samkhya-karika to the sixth century A.D., it by 
 no means follows that this work itself did not 
 exist before that time. Native tradition, we are 
 told, assigns his work to the first century B.C. 
 
 1 Garbe, Sawkhya und Yoga, p. 7. 
 
 2 See Mayer's Chinese Header's Manual, which gives the exact 
 dates. 
 
 U 2
 
 292 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Date of Gatif/apada. 
 
 But even here new difficulties arise with regard 
 to the age of Gauc?apada, the author of the com- 
 mentary on the Karikas. This commentary also, so 
 we were informed by Beal, had been translated into 
 Chinese before 582 A.D. ; but how is that possible 
 without upsetting the little we know of Gauc/apada's 
 date ? $a?7ikara is represented as the pupil of 
 Govinda who was the pupil of Gauc^apada. But 
 $arakara's literary career began, as is generally 
 supposed, about 788 A. D. How then could he have 
 been the literary grandson of Gauc/apada, and son 
 or pupil of Govinda ? As Mr. Beal could no longer be 
 consulted I asked one of my Chinese pupils, the late 
 Mr. Kasawara, to translate portions of the Chinese 
 commentary for me ; but the specimens he sent me 
 did not suffice to settle the question whether it was 
 really a translation of Gauc?apada's commentary. It 
 is but right to state here that Telang in the Indian 
 Antiquary, XIII, 95, places /Samkara much earlier, 
 in 590 A.D., and that Fleet, in the Indian Antiquary, 
 Jan., 1887, assigns 630 to 655 as the latest date to 
 King Vrishadeva of Nepal who is said to have re- 
 ceived $a7ftkara at his court, and actually to have 
 given the name of $a?ftkaradeva to his son in honour 
 of the philosopher. In order to escape from all these 
 uncertainties I wrote once more to Japan to another 
 pupil of mine, Dr. Takakusu, and he, after carefully 
 collating the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit 
 commentary of Gauc/apiida, informed me that the 
 Chinese translation of the commentary was not, and 
 could not in any sense be called, a translation of 
 Gauc/apada's commentary. So much trouble may
 
 DATE OF GAUDAPADA. 293 
 
 be caused by one unguarded expression ! Anyhow 
 this difficulty is now removed, and /Samkara's date 
 need not be disturbed. The author of the Karikas 
 informs us at the end of his work that this philo- 
 sophy, proclaimed by the greatest sage, i. e. Kapila, 
 had been communicated by him to Asuri, by Asuri 
 to Pa?iA;asikha, and, as the Tattva-samasa adds, from 
 Pan&asikha to Patan^ali l , and had been widely 
 taught until, by an uninterrupted series of teachers, 
 it reached even Isvara-Kri'shria 2 . He calls it the 
 Shashd-tantra, the Sixty-doctrine. A similar ac- 
 count is given by Paramartha in his comment on 
 the first verse, ' Kipila (Kapila)/ he says, ' was a jRishi 
 descended from the sky and was endowed with the 
 four virtues, dutifulness (Dharma), wisdom (Pragma), 
 separation from desires (Vairagya), and freedom 
 (Moksha). He saw a Brahman of the name of 
 O-shu-li (Asuri) who had been worshipping heaven 
 or the Devas for a thousand years, and said to him : 
 ' Asuri, art thou satisfied with the state of a 
 GHhastha or householder ? After a thousand years 
 he came again, and Asuri admitted that he was 
 satisfied with the state of a GHhastha. He then 
 came a third time to Asuri, whereupon Asuri quitted 
 the state of a householder and became a pupil of 
 Kapila.' These may be mere additions made by 
 Paramartha, but they show, at all events, that to 
 him also Kapila and Asuri were persons of a distant 
 past. 
 
 1 This would seem to place the Tattva-samasa later than 
 Pata%ali. 
 
 2 See Karika, vv. 70, 71.
 
 294 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Tattva-samasa. 
 
 But however far the Karikas of 
 may go back, they are what they are, a metrical 
 work in the style of a later age, an age that gave 
 rise to other Karikas like BhartHhari's (about 
 650 A. D.) Karikas on grammar. Everybody has 
 wondered, therefore, what could have become of the 
 real Samkhya-Sutras, if they ever existed ; or, if 
 they did not, why there should never have been 
 such Sutras for so important a system of philosophy 
 as the Samkhya. There is clearly a great gap between 
 the end of the Upanishad period and the literary 
 period that was able to give rise to the metrical 
 w.ork of Isvara-Kristma. In what form could the 
 Samkhya-philosophy have existed in that interval ? 
 
 To judge from analogy we should certainly say, 
 in the form of Sutras, such as were handed down 
 for other branches of learning by oral tradition. 
 The Karikas themselves presuppose such a tradition 
 quite as much as the much later Sutras which we 
 possess. They are both meant to recapitulate what 
 existed, never to originate what we should call new 
 and original thoughts. When we see the Karikas 
 declare that they leave out on purpose the Akhayikas, 
 the illustrative stories contained in the fourth book 
 of our Sutras, this cannot prove their posteriority 
 to the Sutras as we have them ; but it shows that 
 at Isvara-Knshna's time there existed a body of 
 Samkhya-philosophy which contained such stories 
 as we find in our modern Sutras, but neither in the 
 Karikas nor in the Tattva-samasa. Besides these 
 stories other things also were omitted by I.svara- 
 K/'i'shna, comprehended under the name of Para-
 
 TATTVA-SAMASA. 295 
 
 v4da, probably controversies, sucb as those on the 
 necessity of an Isvara. 
 
 Under these circumstances I venture to say that 
 such a work in Sutras not only existed, but that 
 we are in actual possession of it, namely in the 
 text of the much neglected Tattva-samasa. Because 
 it contains a number of new technical terms, it has 
 been put down at once as modern, as if what is new 
 to us must be new chronologically also. We know 
 far too little of the history of the Samkhya to justify 
 so confident a conclusion. Colebrooke l told us 
 long ago that, if the scholiast of Kapila 2 may be 
 trusted, and why should he not ? the Tattva-samasa 
 was the proper text-book of the Samkhya-philosophy. 
 It was a mere accident that he, Colebrooke, could 
 not find a copy of it. ' Whether that Tattva-samasa 
 of Kapila be extant,' he wrote, ' or whether the 
 Sutras of Paw&asikha be so, is not certain.' And 
 again he wrote : ' It appears from the Preface of 
 the Kapila-bhashya that a more compendious tract 
 in the form of Sutras or aphorisms, bears the title 
 of Tattva-samasa, and is ascribed to the same author, 
 i. e. to Kapila. 
 
 I admit that the introductory portion of this 
 tract sounds modern, and probably is so, but I find 
 no other marks of a modern date in the body of the 
 work. On the contrary there are several indications 
 in it of its being an earlier form of the Samkhya- 
 philosophy than what we possess in the Karikas or 
 in the Sutras. When it agrees with the Karikas, 
 sometimes almost verbatim, it is the metrical text 
 
 1 Essays, I, p. 244. 
 
 2 Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya, pp. 7, no.
 
 296 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that seems to me to presuppose the prose, not the 
 prose the metrical version. In the Sutras themselves 
 we find no allusion as yet to the atheistic or non- 
 theistic doctrines which distinguish the later texts 
 of the Samkhya, and which are still absent from the 
 Samkhya-karikas also. The so-called Aisvaryas or 
 superhuman powers, which are recognised in the 
 Tattva-samasa, might seem to presuppose the re- 
 cognition of an Isvara, though this is very doubtful ; 
 but the direct identification of Purusha with Brahman 
 in the Tattva-samasa points certainly to an earlier 
 and less pronounced Nirisvara or Lord-less character 
 of the ancient Samkhya. It should also be mentioned 
 that Vi^wana-Bhikshu, no mean authority on such 
 matters, and even supposed by some to have been 
 himself the author of our modern Samkhya-Sutras, 
 takes it for granted that the Tattva-samasa was 
 certainly prior to the Kapila-Sutras which we possess. 
 For why should he defend Kapila, and not the 
 author of the Tattva-samasa, against the charge of 
 Punarukti or giving us a mere useless repetition, 
 and why should he have found no excuse for the 
 existence of the Kapila-Sutras except that they are 
 short and complete, while the Tattva-samasa is short 
 and compact 1 ? 
 
 Not being able to find a MS. of the Tattva-samasa 
 Colebrooke decided to translate instead the Sa?khya- 
 karikas, and thus it came to pass that most scholars 
 have been under the impression that in India also 
 this metrical version was considered as the most 
 authoritative and most popular manual of the Sam- 
 khya-philosophy. This is the way in which certain 
 
 1 Sawkhya-prava&ana-bhashya, Introduction.
 
 TATTVA-SAMASA. 297 
 
 prepossessions arise. We have learnt since from 
 Ballantyne l that at Benares, where he resided, these 
 Karikas were hardly known at all except to those 
 who had seen Professor Wilson's English edition of 
 them, while the Tattva-samasa was well known to 
 all the native assistants whom he employed. Nor 
 can we doubt that in the part of India best known 
 to Ballantyne it was really an important and popular 
 work, if we consider the number of commentaries 
 written on it 2 , and the frequency of allusions to it 
 which occur in other commentaries. The com- 
 mentary published by Ballantyne is, if I understand 
 him rightly, anonymous. It gives first what it calls 
 the S&mkhya-Sutrara, and then the Samasakhya- 
 stitra-vritti/z.. Hall, I.e., p. 13, quotes one com- 
 mentary by Kshemananda, called Samkhya-krama- 
 dipika, but it is not quite clear to me whether this 
 is the same as the one published by Ballantyne, nor 
 have I had access to any other MSS. 
 
 We must not forget that in modern times the 
 Samkhya-philosophy has ceased to be popular in 
 several parts of India. Even in the sixteenth 
 century Vi^nana-Bhikshu, in his commentary on the 
 Samkhya-Sutras (v. 5), complains that it has been 
 swallowed up by the sun of the time, and that but 
 a small part of the moon of knowledge remained ; 
 while in the Bhagavata Purana I, 3, 10, the Samkhya 
 is spoken of as Kala-vipluta, destroyed by time. 
 Professor Wilson told me that, during the whole of 
 his intercourse with learned natives, he met with one 
 Brahman only who professed to be acquainted with the 
 
 1 Drift of the Sawkhya, p. i. 
 
 2 Five are mentioned by Hall in his Preface, p. 33.
 
 298 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 writings of this philosophical school, and Professor 
 Bhandarkar (1. c., p. 3) states that the very name of 
 Sawkhya-prava&ana was unknown on his side of 
 India. Hence we may well understand that Sawkhya 
 MSS. are scarce in India, and entirely absent in 
 certain localities. It is possible also that the very 
 smallness of the Tattva-samasa may have lowered 
 it in the eyes of native scholars, and that in time it 
 may have been eclipsed by its more voluminous 
 commentaries. But if we accept it as what it pro- 
 fesses to be, and what, up to the time of Vign&na.- 
 Bhikshu at least, it was considered to be in India, 
 it seems to me just the book that was wanted to 
 fill the gap to which I referred before. By itself it 
 would fill a few pages only. In fact it is a mere 
 enumeration of topics, and, as such, it would agree 
 very well with the somewhat puzzling name of 
 Samkhya, which means no more than enumeration. 
 All other derivations of this title seem far-fetched 1 
 as compared with this. According to Vi^/lana- 
 Bhikshu in his commentary on the Sutras (pp. 6, 1 10), 
 ed. Hall, both the Samkhya-Sutras and the Yoga- 
 Sutras are really mere developments of the Tattva- 
 samasa-Sutras. Both are called therefore Sa?>ikhya- 
 prava&ana, exposition of the Samkhya, the latter 
 adding the peculiar arguments in support of the 
 existence of an Lsvara or Supreme Lord, and there- 
 fore called Sesvara, in opposition to the Sawkhya, 
 which is called An-i.s-vara, or Lord-less. 
 
 And here it is important to remark also that 
 the name of Shashh-tantra, the Doctrine of the Sixty, 
 
 1 They are mentioned in the Preface to Hall's edition of tho 
 Samkhya-pravaA'ana-bhashya, 1856. Some of them are mere 
 definitions without any attempt at etymology.
 
 TATTVA-SAMASA. 299 
 
 which is given by Isvara-Krtstwa, or at all events 
 by the author of the 72nd of his Karikas, should 
 occur and be accounted for in the Tattva-samasa, 
 as containing the 17 (enumerated in 64 and 65), and 
 the 33, previously exhibited in 62 and 63, together 
 with the 10 Mulikarthas or fundamental facts which 
 together would make up the sixty topics of the 
 Shashri-tantra. At the end of the 25 great topics of 
 the Tattva-samasa we find the straightforward de- 
 claration : ' Iti tattva-samasakhya-samkhya-sutrani/ 
 Here end the Samkhya-Sutras called Tattva-samasa. 
 At first sight, no doubt, Samasa seems to mean 
 a mere abstract ; but Samasa may be used also in 
 opposition to BHhat, and there is no other work 
 in existence of which it could be called an abstract, 
 certainly not either of the Karikas or of the modern 
 Sutras, such as we possess them. The whole arrange- 
 ment is different from the other and more recent 
 treatments of Samkhya - philosophy. The three 
 kinds of pain, for instance, which generally form the 
 starting-point of the whole system, are relegated 
 to the very end as a separate topic. We meet 
 with technical subjects and technical terms which 
 are 'not to be found at all in other and, as it 
 would seem, more modern Samkhya works. The 
 smallness of the Tattva-samasa can hardly be used 
 as an argument against its ever having been an 
 important work, for we find similar short, yet old 
 Sutra-works, for instance, the Sarvanukrama and 
 other Anukramanis described in my History of 
 Ancient Sanskrit Literature 1 . However, in matters 
 
 1 These Anukramas have been very carefully published in 
 the Anecdota Oxoniensia by Professor Macdonell. to whom 
 I had handed over my materials.
 
 300 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of this kind we must avoid being too positive either 
 in denying or asserting the age and authenticity 
 of Sanskrit texts. All I can say is that there is 
 no mark of modern age in their language, though 
 the commentary is, no doubt, of a later date. What 
 weighs with me is the fact that Indian Pandits 
 evidently considered the Tattva-samasa-Sutras as 
 the original outlines of the Samkhya-philosophy, 
 while the idea that they are a later spurious pro- 
 duction rests, as far as I can see at present, on no 
 real argument whatever. 
 
 Anteriority of Vedanta or Sawkhya. 
 
 It must be clear from all this how useless it 
 would be, with the limited means at our disposal, 
 to attempt to prove the anteriority either of the 
 Vedanta or of the Samkhya, as systems of philo- 
 sophy, and as distinguished from the Sutras in which 
 we possess them. External or historical evidence 
 we have none, and internal evidence, though it may 
 support a suggestion, can but seldom amount to 
 positive proof. We can understand how, out 
 of the seeds scattered about in the Upanishads, 
 there could arise in time the systematic arrange- 
 ment and final representation of systems such as 
 have been handed down to us in the Sutras of 
 the Vedanta, the Satkhya, and the other schools. 
 It cannot be denied that in the Upanishad period 
 Vedantic ideas are certainly more prevalent than 
 those of the Sa/mkhya. I go even a step further 
 and admit that the Sawikhya-philosophy may have 
 been a kind of toning down of the extreme Monism 
 of the Advaita Vedanta. I think we can enter 
 into the misgivings and fears of those who felt
 
 ANTERIORITY OF VEDANTA OR SAMKHYA. 30! 
 
 startled by the unflinching Monism of the Vedanta, 
 at least as interpreted by the school which was 
 represented rather than founded by $amkara. 
 Now, the two points which are most likely to 
 have caused difficulty or given offence to ordinary 
 consciences, would seem to have been the total 
 denial of what is meant by the reality of the 
 objective world, and the required surrender of all 
 individuality on the part of the subject, that is, 
 of ourselves. These are the points which seem most 
 startling even to ourselves, and it is quite possible 
 that they may have given rise to another system 
 free from these startling doctrines, such as we find 
 in the Samkhya. They certainly formed the chief 
 stumbling-block to Ramanm/a and those who had 
 come before him, such as Bodhayana and other 
 Purv4Mryas, and led them to propound their own 
 more human interpretation of the Vedanta, though 
 sacrificing the Isvara in order to save the reality 
 of each Purusha. 
 
 These conflicting views of the world, of the soul, 
 and of God, emerge already in the Upanishads ; and 
 in a few of them, the $vetasvatara, Maitray, and 
 Ksithsi Upanishads, for instance, there are utterances 
 that come very near to what we know as Samkhya 
 rather than Vedanta doctrines. Vedanta ideas 
 preponderate, however, so decidedly in the Upani- 
 shad literature, that we can well understand that 
 in the oral tradition of the schools the Samkhya 
 doctrines should have exercised a limited influence 
 only, whatever favour they may have found with 
 those who were repelled by the extreme views of 
 the monistic Vedanta. The followers of Kapila 
 had an advantage over the Vedantists in admitting
 
 302 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a Prakriti, or a something objective, independent 
 of Brahman or Purusha, though called into life 
 and activity by the look of Purusha only, and dis- 
 appearing when that look ceased. They were also 
 less opposed to the common consciousness of man- 
 kind in admitting the reality of individual souls. 
 Dualism is always more popular than rigorous 
 Monism, and the Sa??ikhya was clearly dualistic 
 when it postulated nature, not only as the result 
 of Avidya or Maya, but as something real in the 
 ordinary sense of that word, and when it allowed 
 to the individual souls or (rivas also an independent 
 character. It should be remembered that the denial 
 of an Isvara or personal Lord did not probably 
 form part of the original Samkhya, as presented to 
 us in the Tattva-samasa. It would seem therefore 
 that on these very important points the Samkhya 
 was more conciliatory and less defiant to the common 
 sense of mankind than the Vedanta, and though 
 this is far from proving that it was therefore 
 posterior to the Vedanta in its severest form, it 
 might well be accepted as an indication that these 
 two streams of thought followed parallel courses, 
 starting from a common fund of ancient Vedic 
 thoughts, but diverging afterwards, the Vedanta un- 
 flinchingly following its straight course, the other, 
 the Sa/ttikhya, avoiding certain whirlpools of thought 
 which seemed dangerous to the ordinary swimmer. 
 To the people at large it would naturally seem as 
 if the Vedanta taught the oneness of all individual 
 souls or subjects in Brahman, and the illusory 
 character of all that is objective, while the Sawkhya 
 allowed at all events the temporary reality of the 
 objective world and the multiplicity of individual
 
 ATHEISM AND ORTHODOXY. 303 
 
 souls. Of course, we must leave it an open question 
 for the present whether the extreme monistic view 
 of the Veda was due to $amkara, or whether, like 
 Hamanu^a, he also could claim the authority of 
 PurvaMryas in his interpretation of Badarayana's 
 Sutras. If that were so, the difference between 
 the two systems would certainly seem to be irre- 
 concilable, while minor differences between them 
 would in India at least admit of a friendly adjust- 
 ment. 
 
 Atheism and Orthodoxy. 
 
 Even on what seems to' us so vital a point in every 
 philosophy as theism or atheism, Indian philosophers 
 seem to have been able to come to an understanding 
 and a compromise. We must remember that in the 
 eyes of the Brahmans the Samkhya is atheistic and 
 yet orthodox. This seems to us- impossible ; but the 
 fact is that orthodoxy has a very different meaning 
 in India from what it has with us. What we mean 
 by orthodoxy was with them not much more than 
 a recognition of the supreme authority of the Veda. 
 The Samkhya, whatever we may think of its Yedic 
 character, never denies the authority of the Veda in 
 so many words, though it may express a less decided 
 submission to it. Whether in its origin the Samkhya 
 was quite independent of the Veda, is difficult to 
 say. Some scholars think that the recognition of 
 the supreme authority of the $ruti was an after- 
 thought with Kapila, a mere stroke of theological 
 diplomacy. But if so, we should be forced to admit 
 that the Samkhya philosophers wished, by means of 
 this diplomacy, to be raised to the same position 
 which others, such as the Vedaiitists, had occupied 
 before them ; and so far it might seem to indicate
 
 304 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the posteriority of the Samkhya, as a system of 
 philosophy. 
 
 It is important here to remember that the Saw- 
 khya not only declared for the authority of the Veda, 
 but had never openly rejected it, like Bnhaspati or 
 Buddha. It is quite another question whether it 
 really carried out the spirit of the Veda, particularly 
 of the Upanishads. That *Sa??ikara, the great de- 
 fender of Vedantism, should deny the correctness of 
 the interpretation of the Veda, adopted by Kapila, 
 proves after all no more than that a difference of 
 opinion existed between the two, but it would show 
 at the same time that Kapila, as well as $awkara, 
 had tried to represent his philosophy as supported 
 by passages from the Veda. To judge from a passage 
 in the beginning of the Samkhya-karikas it might 
 seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy 
 above the Veda. But he really says no more there 
 than that certain remedies for the removal of pain, 
 enjoined by the Veda, are good, and that other 
 remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good ; 
 but that of the two the latter are better, that is, 
 more efficacious (Tattva Kaumudi, v. 2). This does 
 not affect the authority of the Veda as a whole, as 
 compared with philosophy or human knowledge. 
 We must not forget that after all it is >Sruti or 
 
 O 
 
 revelation itself which declares that all remedies are 
 palliative only, and that real freedom (Moksha) 
 from all suffering can be derived from philosophical 
 knowledge only, and that this is incomparably higher 
 than sacrifices or other meritorious acts (Sawkhya- 
 pravaana I, 5).
 
 AUTHORITY OP THE VEDA. 305 
 
 Authority of the Veda. 
 
 What authority Kapila assigns to the Veda may 
 be gathered from what he says about the three 
 possible sources of knowledge, perception, inference, 
 and Aptava&ana, that is the received, correct, or true 
 word, or, it may be, the word of a trustworthy 
 person. He explains Aptava&ana in v. 5 by Apta- 
 sruti, which clearly means received revelation or 
 revelation from a trustworthy source. However 
 the commentators may differ, $ruti can here mean 
 the Veda only, though, no doubt, the Veda as 
 interpreted by Kapila. And that the Veda is not 
 only considered as equal to sensuous perception 
 and inference, but is placed by him on an even 
 higher pedestal, is shown by the fact that Kapila 
 (Sutras V, 51) declares it to be self-evident, Svata^- 
 pramawam, while perception and inference are not, 
 but are admitted to be liable to error and to require 
 confirmation. 
 
 Though it is true, therefore, that with the true 
 Samkhya philosopher the Veda does not possess 
 that superhuman authority which is ascribed to it 
 by Badarayana, I cannot bring myself to believe 
 that this concession on the part of Kapila was 
 a mere artifice to escape the fate which, for in- 
 stance, befell Buddha. There are many passages 
 where Kapila appeals quite naturally to $ruti or 
 revelation. In I, 36 he appeals to both Sicuti and 
 Nyaya, reasoning, but in many places he appeals to 
 $ruti/ alone. That revelation is to be looked upon 
 as superior to experience or sensuous perception is 
 stated by him in so many words in I, 147, where 
 we read ' There is no denial of what is established 
 
 x
 
 306 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by $ruti.' Again, when the Nyaya philosophy 
 tries to establish by reasoning that the organs of 
 sense are formed of the elements, Kapila squashes 
 the whole argument by a simple appeal to $ruti. 
 ' They cannot be so formed,' he says, ' because 
 $ruti says that they are formed of Ahamkara, 
 self-consciousness (II, 20) V 
 
 Other passages where the authority of /Sruti is 
 invoked as paramount by Kapila, or supposed to be 
 so by the commentator, may be found in Samkhya- 
 Sutras I, 36; 77; 83; 147; 154; II, 20; 22; III, 
 15; 80; IV, 22; &c. 
 
 Sflwkhya hostile to Priesthood. 
 
 There is one passage only in which a decidedly 
 hostile feeling towards the Brahmanic priesthood 
 may be discovered in Kapila's Sutras, and it seems 
 full of meaning. Among the different kinds of 
 bondage to which men are liable, but ought not to 
 be, is one called Dakshma-bandha, bondage arising 
 from having to offer gifts to priests, which seems to 
 be condemned as superstitious and mischievous 2 . 
 
 As springing from the great mass of philosophic 
 thought accumulated in the Upanishads, the Sa??i- 
 khya, like the Vedanta-philosophy, was probably at 
 first considered as neither orthodox nor unorthodox. 
 It was simply one out of many attempts to solve 
 the riddle of the world, and even the fact that it 
 did not appeal to a personal Lord or creator, was 
 evidently at first riot considered sufficient to anathe- 
 matise it as unorthodox or un-Vedic. It was probably 
 
 1 But are not the elements mere Vikaras of Ahawkani? 
 
 2 See Tattva-samiisa 22 ; Sawjkliya-karikas 44.
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS. 307 
 
 at a much later time when the Vedanta and other 
 systems had already entrenched themselves behind 
 revelation, or the Veda, as the highest authority 
 even on philosophical questions, that other systems, 
 having been proved un-Vedic, came to be considered 
 as objectionable or unorthodox, while the Vedanta, 
 as its very name implied, was safe under the shadow 
 of the Veda. I know that other scholars maintain 
 that with the Samkhya any appeal to the Veda was 
 an afterthought only, and not an essential part of the 
 original system, nay, not even quite honest. We may 
 admit that the Samkhya has no need of the Veda, 
 but why should it appeal to it even on indifferent 
 questions, if the Veda had not been considered by it 
 as of supreme authority. It is possible that there 
 may have been originally a difference between $ruti, 
 revelation as not human, and Apta-va&ana, authori- 
 tative tradition as human, and that with Kapila the 
 Veda was treated at first as coming under Apta- 
 va&ana. But however this may be, unless our con- 
 ception of the development of Indian philosophy, as 
 we catch glimpses of it now and then in the course 
 of centuries, is entirely wrong, it must be clear that, 
 in the present state of our knowledge, to call one 
 channel of philosophic thought, whether Samkhya 
 or Vedanta, in the form in which it has reached us, 
 more ancient than the other, would be mere playing 
 with words. 
 
 Parallel development of Philosophical Systems. 
 
 The result of this desire to fix dates, where dates 
 are impossible, has often proved most mischievous. 
 Scholars of recognised authority have arrived at 
 and given expression to convictions, riot only widely 
 
 X 2
 
 308 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 different, but diametrically opposed to each other. 
 The chief cause of this confusion has been that, by 
 a very natural tendency, we always wish to arrange 
 things Nacheinander or in causal connection, instead 
 of being satisfied with taking things as Nebenein- 
 ander, parallel and formed under similar conditions, 
 springing from a common source and flowing on side 
 by side in the same direction. 
 
 A reference to the history of language may make 
 my meaning clearer. No one would say that Greek 
 was older than Latini Greek has some forms more 
 primitive than Latin, but Latin also has some forms 
 more primitive than Greek. It is true that we 
 know literary productions in Greek at a much 
 earlier time than literary productions in Latin, 
 nor would any Sanskrit scholar deny that the 
 Sutras of Badarayana are older than the Sa?nkhya- 
 Sutras, as we now possess the two. But for all 
 that, Greek, as a language, cannot be a day older 
 than Latin. Both branched off, slowly it may be 
 and almost imperceptibly at first, from the time 
 when the Aryan separation took place. In their 
 embryonic form they both go back to some indefinite 
 date, far beyond the limits of any chronology. In 
 India we may learn how, like language, religion, 
 and mythology, philosophy also formed at first 
 a kind of common property. We meet with 
 philosophical ideas of a Vedantic character, though 
 as yet in a very undecided form, as far back as the 
 hymns of the Ilig-veda ; they meet us again in 
 the Brahmawas and in some of the Upanishads, 
 while the Samkhya ideas stand out less prominently, 
 owing, it would seem, to the ascendency gained at 
 that early period already by the Vedanta. Instead
 
 BUDDHISM SUBSEQUENT TO UPANISHADS. 309 
 
 of supposing, however, that passages in support of 
 Sa/n-khya ideas occurring in certain of the older 
 Upanishads were foisted in at a later time, it seems 
 far more probable to me that they were survivals 
 of an earlier period of as yet undifferentiated philo- 
 sophical thought. 
 
 Buddhism subsequent to Upanishads. 
 
 What remains of the chronological framework 
 of Indian philosophy is in the end not much more 
 than that both Vedanta and S&mkhya ideas existed 
 before the rise of historical Buddhism. The very 
 name of Upanishad, for instance, is so peculiar that 
 its occurrence in ancient Buddhist texts proves once 
 for all the existence of some of these works before 
 the rise of Buddhism. 
 
 The recognition of mendicant friars also, as 
 a social institution, seems to me simply taken over 
 from the Brahmans. The very name of Bhikkhu, 
 applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity, 
 comes from the same source. It is true, no doubt, 
 that the name of Bhikshu does not occur in the 
 classical Upanishads, but the right of begging, 
 whether in the first or the third of the Asramas 
 (BrahmaMrin or Vanaprastha), is fully recognised, 
 only that the third and fourth Asramas are not 
 so clearly distinguished in early times as they are 
 in Manu and afterwards. In the Kaush. Up. 
 II, 2 we read of a man who has begged through 
 a village and got nothing (Bhikshitva) ; in the 
 JTMnd. Up. IV, 3, 5, a BrahmaA-arin is mentioned 
 who has begged. The technical term for this 
 begging is BhikshaMry in the B-rih. Ar. Up. Ill 
 (V), 5, i, and exactly the same compound, Bhikkha-
 
 310 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Mrya, occurs in the Dhammapada 392 ; Bhaiksha- 
 Hry occurs also in the Mwic/aka I, 2, n, so that 
 the fact that the substantive Bhikshu does not 
 occur in the classical Upanishads can hardly be 
 used as an argument to prove that the status of 
 the mendicant friar was not known before the spread- 
 ing of Buddhism. It is true that in its social mean- 
 ing Asrama, the name of the three or four stages, 
 does not occur in the classical Upanishads ; but, 
 as we find Asramin in the Maitray. Up. IV, 3, we 
 can hardly doubt that the three or four stages 
 (Brahma&ari, Gaha^Ao, Vanapa^Ao, Bhikkhu) were 
 known before the rise of Buddhism, and taken 
 over by the Buddhists from the Vedic Brahmans. 
 Socially, the only Asramas that remained among 
 the Buddhists were two, that of the Grihins and 
 that of the Bhikkhus. 
 
 That many of the technical terms of the Buddhists 
 (Uposhadha, &c.) could have come from the same 
 source only, has long been known, so much so that 
 it has been rightly said, Without Brahmanism no 
 Buddhism. 
 
 The institution of the Vasso l , for instance, the 
 retreat during the rainy season, is clearly taken over 
 from the Varshas, the rainy season, as kept by the 
 Brahmans, and so is the quinquennial celebration 
 of the Pan&avarsha-parishad, and many other cus- 
 toms adopted by the Buddhists. 
 
 Lalita-vistara. 
 
 I have explained before why at present I attribute 
 less importance than I did formerly to the occurrence 
 
 1 S. 13. E. VIII, p. 213.
 
 ASVAGHOSHAS BUDDHA- JTARITA. 31! 
 
 of a number of titles, including Samkhya, Yoga, 
 Vaiseshika, and possibly Nyaya, in the Lalita- 
 vistara. If the date assigned by Stanislas Julien 
 and others to certain Chinese translations of this 
 work could be re-established, the passage so often 
 quoted from the twelfth chapter would be of con- 
 siderable value to us in forming an idea of Indian 
 literature as it existed at the time when the 
 Lalita-vistara was originally composed. We find 
 here the names not only of the Vedic glossary 
 (Nigha^u ?) the Nigamas (part of Nirukta), Puranas, 
 Itihasas, Vedas, grammar, Nirukta, /Siksha, Khan- 
 das, ritual (Kalpa), astronomy (6ryotisha), but, 
 what would be most important for us, the names of 
 three systems of philosophy also, Samkhya, Yoga, 
 and Vaiseshika, while Hetuvidya can hardly be 
 meant for anything but Nyaya. But until the dates 
 of the various Chinese translations of the Life of 
 Buddha have been re-examined, we must abstain 
 from using them for assigning any dates to their 
 Sanskrit originals. 
 
 Asvaghosha's Buddha-&arita. 
 
 We may perhaps place more reliance on Asva- 
 ghosha's Buddha-A-arita, which, with great probability, 
 has been ascribed to the first century A.D. He men- 
 tions Vyasa, the son of Sarasvati, as the compiler 
 of the Veda, though not of the Vedanta-Sutras ; he 
 knows Valmiki, the author of the Ramayana, Atreya 
 as a teacher of medicine, and kanaka, the well- 
 known king, as a teacher of Yoga. By far the 
 most important passage in it for our present 
 purpose is the conversation between Arac/a and 
 the future Buddha, here already called Bodhisattva
 
 312 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the twelfth book. This Arac/a is clearly a teacher 
 of Samkhya-philosophy, it may be of Sa??ikhya in an 
 earlier state ; and, though the name of Samkhya does 
 not occur, the name of Kapila does (XII, 2 1 ), and 
 even a disciple of his is mentioned. Here then we 
 have in a poem, ascribed to the first century A. D., 
 a clear reference to that philosophical system which 
 is known to us under the name of Samkhya, and we 
 have actually the name of Kapila, the reputed 
 author of that system. The name of Kapila- vastu l 
 also occurs, as the birthplace of Buddha and as the 
 dwelling of the famous sage Kapila. No reference 
 to the Vedanta has been met with in Asvaghosha's 
 Buddha-arita, though the substitution of the Ve- 
 dantic name of Brahman for the Sawkhya name 
 of Purusha deserves attention. 
 
 Buddhist Suttas. 
 
 If we consult the Buddhist Suttas, which, what- 
 ever the date of their original composition may have 
 been, were at all events reduced to writing in the 
 first century B.C., and may be safely used therefore as 
 historical evidence for that time, we find there also 
 views ascribed to the Brahmans of Buddha's time 
 which clearly breathe the spirit of the Sa??ikhya- 
 philosophy. But it would be very unsafe to say 
 more, and to maintain that such passages prove in 
 any way the existence of fully developed systems of 
 philosophy, or of anything very different from what 
 we find already in certain Upanishads. All we can 
 
 1 I write Vastu, because that alone means dwelling-place, 
 while Vastu means thing. Vastu became Vattliu in Pali, and 
 was then probably retranslated into Sanskrit as Vastu.
 
 ASVALAYANA'S GS/HYA-S^TEAS. 313 
 
 say is that there are a number of terms in the 
 Suttas which are the very terms used in the Vedanta, 
 Samkhya and Yoga-philosophies, such as Atman, 
 /Sa-svata, Nitya (? Anitya), Akshobhya, Brahman, 
 tsvara, Dharma, Parmama, and many more ; but, so 
 far as I know, there is not one of which we could 
 say that it could have been taken from the Sutras 
 only, and from nowhere else. 
 
 We should remember that in the Buddhist Canon 
 we find constant mention of Titthiyas or Tirthakas 
 and their heretical systems of philosophy. Six con- 
 temporaries of Buddha are mentioned, one of them, 
 Nigan^o Nataputta, being the well-known founder 
 of (jrainism, Purana Kassapa, Makkhali, Agita, 
 Pakudha and Sa^k/aya 1 . Nor are the names of 
 the reputed authors of the six systems of Brahmanic- 
 philosophy absent from the Tripi^aka. But we hear 
 nothing of any literary compositions ascribed to 
 B4daraya?ia, (raimini, Kapila, Pataf^/ali, Gotama 
 or Kanada. Some of these names occur in the 
 Buddhist Sanskrit texts also, such as the Lanka- 
 vatara where the names of Kanada, Kapila, Aksha- 
 pada, Brthaspati are met with, but again not a 
 single specimen or extract from their compositions. 
 
 Asvalayana's Gnhya-Stltras. 
 
 Another help for determining the existence of 
 ancient Sutras and Bhashyas may be found in the 
 GHhya-Sutras of Asvalayana and /S'amkhayana, works 
 belonging to the age of Vedic literature, though it 
 may be to the very end of what I call the Sutra- 
 period. Here, as I pointed out in 1859 in my History 
 
 1 Samar5f?a-Phala-Sutta 3.
 
 314 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, we find not only 
 the Rig-veda with all its subdivisions, but such 
 names as Sumantu, (raimini, Vaisampayana, Paila, 
 Sutras, Bhashyas, Bharata 1 , Mahabharata, teachers 
 of the law, (ninanti, Bahavi, Gargya, Gautama, 
 ^Sakalya, Babhravya, Mancfavya, Manc/ukeya, Gargi 
 Va&aknavi, Vadav& Pratitheyi, Sulabh4 Maitreyi, 
 Kahola Kaushitaka, Mahakaushitaka, Paimgya, 
 Mahapai?gya, Suyagwa $a??ikhayana, Aitareya, 
 Mahaitareya, the Sakala (text), the Bashkala (text), 
 Su^atavaktra, Audavahi, Mahaudavahi, Sau^ami, 
 /Saunaka, Asvalayana. The ^S^ikhayana G?^'hya- 
 Siitras IV, 10, give the same list, though leaving 
 out a few names and adding others. The most 
 valuable part in both sets of Grihya-Sutras is their 
 testifying at that early and probably pre-Buddhistic 
 time, not only to the existence of Sutras, but of 
 Bhashyas or commentaries also, without which, as 
 I said before, neither the philosophical, nor the 
 grammatical, nor any other Sutras would ever have 
 been intelligible, or even possible. 
 
 Did Buddha borrow from Kapila ? 
 
 I may seem very sceptical in all this, but I cannot 
 even now bring myself to believe that the author of 
 Buddhism borrowed from the Samkhya or any other 
 definite system of philosophy, as known to us in its 
 final Sutra form, in the sense which we ourselves assign 
 to borrowing. Buddha, it seems to me, had as much 
 
 1 How careful we must be, we may learn from the fact 
 that instead of Bharata and Mahabharata, other MSS. read 
 Bharatadharma/raryas ; while in the Samkhayana Gn'hya-Sutras 
 IV, 10, 4, Bharata, Mahabharata and Dharmaftaryas are left 
 out altogether.
 
 DID BUDDHA BORROW FROM KAPILA ? 315 
 
 right to many of the so-called Sa?>ikhya or Yedanta 
 ideas as Kapila or anybody else. Who would say, 
 for instance, that his belief in Samsara or migration 
 of souls was borrowed from Badarayawa or Kapila ? 
 It belonged to everybody in India as much as 
 a belief in Karman or the continuous working of 
 deeds. In the great dearth of historical dates it 
 may no doubt be excusable, if we lay hold of any- 
 thing to save us from drowning while exploring the 
 chronology of Indian literature. Our difficulties are 
 very great, for .even when the names of the principal 
 systems of philosophy and the names of their reputed 
 authors are mentioned, how do we know that they 
 refer to anything written that we possess ? Unless 
 we meet with verbatim quotations, we can never 
 know whether a certain book of a certain author is 
 intended, or simply the general Parampara, that 
 is, the tradition, as handed down in various Asramas, 
 two things which should be carefully distinguished. 
 It is strange to see how often our hopes have 
 been roused and disappointed. We were told that 
 in Professor Hardy's most valuable translation of 
 the Anguttara a number of philosophical sects were 
 mentioned which existed at the time of Buddha's 
 appearance, such as (i) Agdvakos, (2) Nigan^Aos, 
 (3) Muw<iasavakos, (4) 6ratilakos, (5) Paribba^akos, 
 (6) Magandikos, (7) Tedancfrkos, (8) Aviruddhakos, 
 (9) Gotamakos, and (10) Devadhammikos. But not 
 one of these names helps us to a real chronological 
 date. Agdvakos and Nig&nthos are the names of 
 (7aina ascetics, the latter belonging to the Digambara 
 sects, which could hardly have been established long 
 before Buddha's appearance, while Munc/asavakos, 
 i.e. pupils of the shaveling, the Buddha, and Gota-
 
 316 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 makos would seem to be schools which owed their 
 existence to Buddha himself. The other names 
 (ratilakos, ascetics, Paribba^rakos, religious mendi- 
 cants, Teda>ic/ikos, i.e. Sawmyasins carrying the three 
 staves, would be applicable both to Brahmanic and 
 Buddhist sects. Magandikos, if meant for Maga- 
 dhikos, people of Magadha, would be Buddhists 
 again. Aviruddhakos, a name not clear to me, may 
 have been intended for ascetics no longer impeded 
 by any desires, while Devadhammikos are clearly 
 worshippers of the ancient national Devas, and 
 therefore Brahmanic, and possibly Vedic. We get 
 no historical dates from the names of any of these 
 schools, if schools they were. All they teach is that 
 at the time Brahmanic and Buddhist sects were 
 existing side by side in large numbers, but by no 
 means, as is commonly supposed, in constant con- 
 flict with each other 1 . Of the six recognised systems 
 of philosophy, of their eponymous heroes or their 
 written works, we do not hear a single word. 
 
 Buna's Harshafcarita. 
 
 Not even in later works, which have been referred 
 to the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries A.D., do 
 we meet with actual quotations from our Sutras of 
 the six Darsanas. Bana, in his Life of King Harslia, 
 knows indeed of Aupanishadas, Kapilas, Ka^adas ; 
 and if the Kapilas are the followers of the Sawkhya, 
 Ka^adas the followers of the Vaiseshika school, the 
 Aupanishadas can hardly be meant for anybody 
 but the Vedantins. Varaha-Mihira also, in the sixth 
 
 Cf. Ehys Davids, J. K. A. S., Jan., 1898, p. 197.
 
 BANAS HARSHAJTARITA. 317 
 
 century A. D., mentions Kapila and Kanabhu^ 
 (Vaiseshika), but even this does not help us to the 
 dates of any Sutras composed by them. 
 
 The Chinese translator of the Karikas, likewise in 
 the sixth century, informs us that these Karikas 
 contain the words of Kapila or of Pan&asikha, the 
 pupil of Asuri, who was the pupil of Kapila. We 
 are told even that there were originally 60,000 
 Gathas, and all that Is vara- Krishna did was to 
 select seventy of them for his seventy or seventy- 
 two Karikas. 
 
 That MMhava (1350 A. D.), while mentioning the 
 Sutras of the other systems, should not have men- 
 tioned those of the Samkhya, is no doubt, as I 
 pointed out before, a strong argument in support 
 of their non-existence in his time. But it is no 
 proof, as little as we may conclude from the fact 
 that Hiouen-thsang translated the Vaiseshika-nikaya- 
 dasapadartha-sastra by 6rrtana&andra, and not the 
 Vaiseshika-Sutras by Kanada, that therefore these 
 Sutras did not exist in his time. We cannot be too 
 careful in such matters, for the unreserved accept- 
 ance of a purely conjectural date is very apt to inter- 
 fere with the discovery of a real date. Hiouen-thsang 
 likewise mentions a number of Nyaya works, but 
 not Gotama's Nyaya-Sutras. Does that prove that 
 Gotama's Sutras were unknown in the seventh 
 century 1 It may or may not. He relates that 
 Gimamati defeated a famous Samkhya philosopher 
 of the name of Madhava, but again he tells us no 
 more. His own special study, as is well known, 
 was the Yoga-philosophy. And here again, though 
 he speaks of a number of Yoga works, he says 
 not a word of the most important of them all, the
 
 318 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sfttras of Pata/i^ali J . Yet I doubt whether we 
 may conclude from this that these Sutras did not 
 exist at his time. 
 
 The Tattva-samasa. 
 
 If then I venture to call the Tattva-samasa the 
 oldest record that has reached us of the Samkhya- 
 philosophy, and if I prefer to follow them in the ac- 
 count I give of that philosophy, I am quite aware 
 that many scholars will object, and will prefer the 
 description of the Samkhya as given in the Karikas 
 and in the Sutras. Both of them, particularly the 
 Karikas, give us certainly better arranged accounts 
 of that philosophy, as may be seen in the excellent 
 editions and translations which we owe to Professor 
 Garbe, and I may now add to Satish Chandra 
 Banerji, 1898. If, as I believe, the Tattva-samasa- 
 Sutras are older than our Samkhya-Sutras, their 
 account of the Samkhya-philosophy would always 
 possess its peculiar interest from a historical point 
 of view ; while even if their priority with regard to 
 the Karikas and Sutras be doubted, they would 
 always retain their value as showing us in how 
 great a variety the systems of philosophy really 
 existed in so large a country as India. 
 
 These Samasa-Sutras, it is true, are hardly more 
 than a table of contents, a mere S4mkhyam or Pari- 
 samkhya, but that would only show once more that 
 they presuppose the existence of a commentary from 
 the very first. What we possess in the shape of com- 
 mentaries may not be very old, for commentaries 
 may come and go in different schools, while the 
 
 1 M. M., India, p. 362.
 
 THE TATTVA-SAMASA. 319 
 
 Sutras which they intend to explain, would remain 
 unchanged, engraved on the memory of teachers 
 and pupils. How tenacious that philosophical 
 ParampaKi was we can see from the pregnant fact 
 that the Akhyayikas or stories, though left out in. 
 the Karikas, must surely have existed both before 
 and after the time of Isvara-Kn'srma, for though 
 absent in the Tattva-samasa and in the Karikas, 
 they reappear in our Samkhya-Sutras. Where were 
 they during the interval if not in Sutras or Karikas, 
 now lost to us ? 
 
 The commentary on the Tattva-samasa, the pub- 
 lication of which we owe to Ballantyne, begins witli 
 an introduction which sounds, no doubt, like a late 
 tradition, but reminds us in some respects of the 
 dialogue at the beginning of the Chinese translation 
 of the commentary on the Samkhya-karikas. But 
 though it may sound like a late tradition, it would 
 be very difficult to prove that it was so. Chronology 
 is not a matter of taste that can be settled by mere 
 impressions. 
 
 A certain Brahman, we are told, overcome by the 
 three kinds of pain, took refuge with the great 
 Tfo'shi Kapila, the teacher (not necessarily the origi- 
 nator) of the Samkhya l , and having declared his 
 family, his name, and his clan in order to become 
 his pupil, he said : ' Reverend Sir, What is here on 
 earth the highest (the summum bonum) ? What is 
 truth ? What must I do to be saved ? ' 
 
 Kapila said, 'I shall tell thee.' Then follow the 
 topics which are twenty-five in number : 
 
 1 In the Bhagavata-purawa I, 3, u, Kapila is said to have 
 revived the Sawkhya (Sawikhya-Sara, ed. Hall, p. 7, note).
 
 320 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 List of Twenty-five Tattvas. 
 
 I. The eight Prakritis (primary and produc- 
 tive elements), 
 
 1. The Prakriti as Avyakta (the non-dif- 
 
 ferentiated or undeveloped principle) ; 
 
 2. The Buddhi (intellect), of eight kinds ; 
 
 3. The Aha?nkara (the subject), of three 
 
 kinds (Vaikarika, Tai^asa, Bhutadi) ; 
 4-8. The five Tanmatras (essences) of sound, 
 touch, colour, savour, and odour. 
 
 II. The sixteen ViMras (modifications), / 
 9-13. The five Buddhindriyas (perceptive 
 
 organs) ; 
 
 14-18. The five Karmendriyas (active 
 organs) ; 
 
 19. Manas (central organ or mind) ; 
 
 20-24. The Mahabhutas (material ele- 
 ments) ; 
 
 III. 25. The Purusha (Spirit or Self). 
 
 { 
 
 a 
 
 0> 
 
 IV. The Traigunya (triad of forces). 
 
 V. The Sahara (evolution). 
 
 VI. The PratisafJiara (dissolution). 
 
 i referring to the thirteen 
 
 VII. The Adhyatma 
 
 / instruments, i.e. to bud- 
 
 VIII. The Adhibhtita \ ,. . A1 ,' 
 
 TV rin A 11-1 tlln, Ahamkara, Manas, 
 
 IX. Ihe Adhiuaivata , , , T i 
 
 v and the ten Indnyas. 
 
 X. The five Abhibuddhis (apprehensions), five acts 
 of Buddhi or the Indriyas. 
 
 XT. The five Karmayonis (sources of activity). 
 
 XII. The five Vilyus, winds or vital spirits. 
 
 XIII. The five Karmatmans, kinds of Ahamkara.
 
 THE AVYAKTA. 321 
 
 XIV. Avidya (Nescience), fivefold, with sixty-two 
 subdivisions. 
 
 XV. Asakti (weakness), twenty-eightfold (nine 
 Atushds and eight Asiddhis). 
 
 XVI. Tushd (contentment), ninefold. 
 
 XVII. Siddhi (perfection), eightfold. 
 
 XVIII. Mulikarthas (cardinal facts), eight. 
 
 XIX. Anugrahasarga (benevolent creation). 
 
 XX. Bhutasarga (creation of material elements), 
 fourteen. 
 
 XXI. Bandha (bondage), threefold. 
 
 XXII. Moksha (freedom), threefold. 
 
 XXIII. Pramana (authorities), threefold. 
 
 XXIV. Du/ikha (pain), threefold. 
 
 I have given these titles or headings in Sanskrit, 
 and shall often have to use these Sanskrit terms, 
 because their English equivalents, even when they 
 can be found, are too often unintelligible or mis- 
 leading without a commentary. This commentary 
 which follows immediately on the Sutra, is meant 
 to elucidate their meaning, and it does so on the 
 whole satisfactorily, but the English word seems 
 never to square the Sanskrit terms quite accurately. 
 
 The commentator begins by asking, ' Now what 
 are the eight PrakHtis V and he answers, again 
 in technical terms which will have to be explained : 
 I. ' i. The Avyakta (chaos), 2. Buddhi (light or per- 
 ception), 3. Ahamkara (subjectivity), and 4-8, the 
 five Tanmatras (transcendental elements).' 
 
 The Avyakta. 
 
 He then continues : i . ' Here then the Avyakta, 
 neuter (the undeveloped), is explained. As in the
 
 322 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 world various objects such as water-jars, cloth, vases, 
 beds, &c., are manifest, not so is the Avyakta 
 manifest. It is not apprehended by the senses, such 
 as the ear, &c. And why ? Because it has neither 
 beginning, middle, nor end, nor has it any parts. 
 It is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, 
 eternal, without savour and odour. The learned 
 declare it to be without beginning and middle, to 
 be beyond what is great *, unchanging, pre-eminent. 
 And again, this Avyakta is subtle, without attri- 
 butes, without beginning or end, producing (Prasuta), 
 but alone of all the eight PrakHtis unproduced 
 (Aprasuta), without parts, one only, but common to 
 all. And these are its synonyms, that is to say, 
 words applicable to the Avyakta, under certain 
 circumstances : Pradhana (principal), Brahman 2 , Pura 
 (abode), Dhruva (unchanging), Pradhanaka (chief), 
 Akshara (indestructible), Kshetra (field, object), Tamas 
 (darkness), Prasuta (productive).' 
 
 Buddhi. 
 
 2. ' And what is called Buddhi (intellect) ? Buddhi 
 is Adhyava'saya (ascertainment). It is that through 
 which there is in regard to a cow, &c., the conviction 
 (Pratipatti), " This is so and so, not otherwise, this 
 is a cow, not a horse ; this is a post, not a man." 
 
 1 Mahat in the sense of mind, and Pradhana in the sense of 
 nature, seem hardly to be appropriate here. 
 
 2 Brahman seems out of place here, and to be synonymous 
 with Purusha or Atman rather than with the Avyakta. It 
 is given as a synonym of Purusha further on, but strictly 
 speaking Prakn'ti also would, from a Vedantic point of view, 
 fall to Brahman as being what is called the substantial cause 
 of the world, but of an immaterial world, as it would seem.
 
 BUDDHI. 323 
 
 Such is Buddhi, the most wonderful phase of Pra- 
 kn'ti.' 
 
 Buddhi is generally taken here in its subjective or 
 psychological sense, but whatever native and Euro- 
 pean authorities may have to say, it is impossible that 
 this should have been its original meaning in the 
 mind of Kapila. If Buddhi meant only determi- 
 nation (Adhyavasaya), even in its widest sense, it 
 would clearly presuppose the later phases, not only 
 Ahamkara, Manas, Indriyas, as subjective, but like- 
 wise something that is knowable and determinable, 
 such as Mahabhutas, or at least Tanmatras. Though 
 this psychological acceptation is the common accep- 
 tation of Buddhi among native writers on Samkhya, 
 yet sense is more important than commentaries. 
 The Buddhi or the Mahat must here be a phase 
 in the cosmic growth of the universe, like Prakriti 
 in the beginning, and the senses and the other organs 
 of the soul; and however violent our proceeding may 
 seem, we can hardly help taking this Great Principle, 
 the Mahat, in a cosmic sense. Now the first step 
 after Avyakta, the undeveloped, dull, and as yet 
 senseless Prakriti, can only be PrakHti as lighted 
 up, as rendered capable of perception, and no longer 
 as dull matter. If taken in a psychological sense, 
 it supplies, no doubt, in a later stage, the possibility 
 of individual perception also, or of the determination 
 of this and that. But originally it must have been 
 meant as Prak?^'ti illuminated and intellectualised, 
 and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the 
 germ of Aha?7ikara (distinction of subject and object), 
 Manas, mind, and Indriyas, apprehensive senses. Only 
 after PrakHti has become lighted up or perceptive, 
 only after mere material contact has become conscious- 
 
 Y 2
 
 324 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ness, can we imagine the distinction, whether general 
 or individual, between subject and object (Aha??ikara), 
 and their new relation as perceiver and perceived, as 
 I ' on one side and ' this ' and ' that ' on the other. 
 
 This may seem a very bold interpretation, and 
 a complete forsaking of native guidance, but unless 
 a more reasonable and intelligible account can be 
 given of Buddhi, there seems no escape from it. 
 
 What native interpreters have made of Buddhi 
 may be seen in all their commentaries, for instance, 
 VaA'aspati - Misra's commentary on Karika 2 3 : 
 ' Every man uses first his external senses, then he 
 considers (with the Manas), then he refers the 
 various objects to his Ego (Aha?wkara), and lastly 
 he decides with his Buddhi what to do.' This may 
 be quite right in a later phase of the development 
 of PrakHti, it cannot possibly be right as representing 
 the first evolution of PrakHti from its chaotic state 
 towards light and the possibility of perception. It 
 could not be the antecedent of Ahamkara, Manas, 
 and even the Tanmatras, if it were no more than the 
 act of fixing this or that in thought. I am glad to 
 find that Mr. S. C. Banerji on p. 146 of his work 
 arrives at much the same conclusion. 
 
 There are eight manifestations of this Buddhi 
 (intellect), (i) Dharma, virtue, (2) 6r/lana, knowledge, 
 (3) Vairagya, dispassionateness, (4) Aisvarya, super- 
 human power. 
 
 As each of these requires explanation, he ex- 
 plains them by a very favourite process, namely, by 
 contrasting them with their opposites, and saying 
 that (i) Dharma, virtue, is the opposite of Adharma, 
 vice, and is enjoined by >S'ruti and Smn'ti, revelation 
 and tradition. It is not opposed to, nay, it is in
 
 BUDDHI. 325 
 
 harmony with, the practice of the best people, and 
 has happiness for its outward mark. 
 
 (2) 6r/iana or knowledge, the opposite of Agwana 
 or ignorance, is explained as the understanding of 
 the twenty-five subjects (Tattvas), the states of 
 thought (Bhava), and the elements (Bhuta). 
 
 (3) Vairagya, dispassionateness, is the opposite of 
 passion, and consists in not being dependent on or 
 influenced by external objects, such as sound, &c. 
 
 (4) Aisvarya, superhuman power, is the opposite 
 of powerlessness, and consists of the eight qualities 
 such as Amman, extreme minuteness, i. e. being able 
 to assume the smallest form and weight, &c. ' 
 
 These four kinds of intellect (Buddhi) are classed 
 as Sattvika. 
 
 Their opposites are classed as Tamasa, dark or 
 bad. 
 
 Through virtue, as a means, there takes place 
 going upward, through knowledge there arises 
 liberation, through dispassionateness men are ab- 
 sorbed in Praknti (Prakrit ilaya?), through super- 
 human power there comes unfettered movement. 
 
 Thus has Buddhi in its eight forms been de- 
 scribed. 
 
 Synonyms of Buddhi are, Manas, mind, Mati, 
 thought, Mahat, the great, Brahma 2 , masc., Khyati, 
 discrimination, Pragma, wisdom, $ruti, inspiration, 
 
 1 These Aisvaryas are believed in by Sawkhya and Yoga, 
 and are acquired by Yogins by means of long and painful 
 practices. 
 
 2 This also seems out of place here, unless the Sawkhyas 
 give their own meaning both to Brahman and Brahma. In 
 later times Buddhi, taken collectively, becomes the Upadhi or 
 mental limitation of Brahma or Hirawyagarbha.
 
 326 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Dhn'ti, firmness, Pragwanasantati, continuity of 
 thought, Srrm'ti, memory, and DM, meditation. 
 
 It is quite clear that in all these explanations 
 Buddhi is taken as intellect, and as personal 
 intellect, and that the idea of a cosmic stage of 
 intellectuality has been entirely forgotten. Thus 
 only can we account for the statement that this 
 Buddhi, if dominated by Sattva (Gu?za of purity), 
 is said to assume the form (Rupa) of virtue, know- 
 ledge, dispassionateness, and superhuman powers, 
 while, if dominated by Tamas (Gu?ia of darkness), it 
 takes the four opposite forms of vice, &c. How could 
 this be possible before the distinction between sub- 
 ject and object has been realised by Aha??ikara, and 
 before Buddhi has assumed the character of sense- 
 perception (Buddhindriya?ii) ? We have, in fact, to 
 read the Samkhya-philosophy in two texts, one, as it 
 were, in the old uncial writing that shows forth here 
 and there, giving the cosmic process, the other in the 
 minuscule letters of a much later age, interpreted in 
 a psychological or epistemological sense. 
 
 Ahamkara. 
 
 3. Now, he asks, What is called Aha??ikara ? 
 And he answers, ' It is Abhimana, assumption or 
 misconception, and this consists in the belief that 
 I am in the sound, i. e. I hear, I feel, I see, I taste, 
 and I smell, I am lord and rich, I am Isvara, I enjoy, 
 I am devoted to virtue, by me a man was slain, 
 I shall be slain by powerful enemies, &c.' 
 
 >S'a?yikara in his commentary on the Vedarita- 
 Sutras gives, though from a different point of view, 
 some more instances, as when a man, because his 
 wife and children are unhappy, imagines that he
 
 AHAMKARA. 327 
 
 is unhappy, or that he is stout, thin, or fair, that 
 he stands, walks, or jumps, that he is dumb, 
 impotent, deaf, blind, that he has desires, doubts, 
 or fears, whereas all these things do not pertain 
 to him at all, but to Prak?^'ti only. 
 
 ' Synonyms of Ahamkara, or rather modifications 
 of it, are Vaikarika, modifying, Tair/asa, luminous, 
 Bhutadi, the first of elements, Sanumana, dependent 
 on inference, Niranumana, not dependent on in- 
 ference.' 
 
 Here we must distinguish again between Aham- 
 kara, as a cosmic power, and Ahamkara as a 
 condition presupposed in any mental act of an 
 individual thinker. Ahamkara was so familiar in 
 the sense of Egoism that, like Buddhi, it was taken 
 in its ordinary rather than in its technical Samkhya 
 sense. I quite admit that this is a somewhat bold 
 proceeding, but how to get without it at a proper 
 understanding of the ancient Samkhya, the rival 
 of the Vedanta, I cannot see. We must remember 
 that Ahamkara, whatever it may mean in later 
 times, is in the Samkhya something developed out 
 of primordial matter, after that matter has passed 
 through Buddhi. Buddhi cannot really act without 
 a distinction of the universe into subject and object, 
 without the introduction of the Ego or I, which 
 again is impossible without a Non-Ego, or something 
 objective. After that only do we watch the develop- 
 ment of what is objective in general into what is 
 objectively this or that (the Tanmatras). But while 
 the creation of what is subjective and objective is 
 the only possible meaning of the cosmic Ahamkara, 
 its psychological interpretation is far more easy. 
 Thus we are told that there are three or four
 
 328 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 modifications of the Ahamk4ra, (i) the Vaikarika, 
 dominated by the Sattva-gu?ia, helps to do good 
 works ; (2) the Tai^asa, dominated by the Ra^as- 
 guwa, helps to do evil works ; (3) the Bhutadi, 
 dominated by the Tamas-gima, helps to do hidden 
 works ; (4) the Sanumana Ahamkara is responsible 
 for unintentional good ; (5) the Niranumana, for 
 unintentional evil works. This division, though 
 rather confused, shows at all events that the 
 Aha?nkara is here treated as simply a moral 
 agent, dominated by the Gunas, but no longer 
 as a cosmic potentia. These five modes of Aham- 
 kara are spoken of as Karmatmans also, i. e. the 
 very essence of our acts, while in another place 
 the Tattva-samasa itself explains that Ahamkara 
 should be taken as an act of Buddhi directed 
 towards the perception of the nature of what is 
 Self (subjective) or Not-Self (objective). Though 
 Ahamkara means only the production of Ego, yet 
 the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego, 
 and thus divides the whole world into what is sub- 
 jective and objective. 
 
 Five Tanmatras. 
 
 4-8. If it is asked, What are the five Tan- 
 matras (substances) ? he answers, The five sub- 
 stances or essences as emanating from Ahamkara, 
 the essence of sound, contact colour, savour, and 
 odour. 
 
 The essences of sound are perceived in sounds 
 only. Differences of sound, such as acute, grave, 
 circumfiexed, and the notes of the gamut, such as 
 Shac/r/a, C, /foshabha, 1), Gandhara, E, Madhyama, 
 F, Pa/U'ama, G, Dliaivata, A, Nishada, B, are
 
 FIVE TANMATRAS. 329 
 
 perceived ; but there is no difference in the essence 
 of sound. 
 
 The essences of touch are perceived in touch 
 only. Differences of touch, such as soft, hard, 
 rough, slippery, cold, and hot, are perceived, but 
 there is no difference in the essence of touch. 
 
 The essences of colour are perceived in colour- 
 only . Differences of colour, such as white, red, 
 black, green, yellow, purple, are perceived, but 
 there is no difference in the essence of colour. 
 
 The essences of savour are perceived in savour- 
 only. Differences of savour, such as pungent, 
 bitter, astringent, corrosive, sweet, acid, salt, are 
 perceived, but there is no difference in the essence 
 of savour. 
 
 The essences of odour are perceived in odour 
 only. Differences of odour, such as sweet and 
 offensive, are perceived, but there is no difference 
 in the essence of odour. 
 
 Thus have the essences been indicated ; and their 
 synonyms, though sometimes very inaccurate ones, 
 are said to be : Avisesha, not differentiated, and 
 therefore not perceptible, Mahabhutas (?), the great 
 elements ; PrakHtis, natures, Abhogya, not to be 
 experienced, Ami, atomic, Asanta, not-pleasurable, 
 Aghora, not-terrible, Amuc/Aa, riot-stupid ; the last 
 three being negations of the qualities of the 
 Mahabhutas, according to the three Gunas pre- 
 ponderating in each. And if it is asked why 
 these eight Prakritis only, from Avyakta to the 
 Tanmatras, are called Prakritis, the answer is 
 because they alone Prakurvanti, they alone bring 
 forth, or evolve.
 
 33 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sixteen Vikaras. 
 
 II. If it be asked ' Which are the sixteen Vikaras 
 or evolutions ? ' the answer is, ' the eleven sense 
 organs (including Manas), and the five elements.' 
 
 Five Buddhindriyas. 
 
 9-13. 'Now the organs are set forth; the ear, 
 the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose, con- 
 stitute the five Buddhindriyas, or perceptive organs. 
 
 The ear perceives as its object sound, the skin 
 touch, the eye colour, the tongue' savour, the nose 
 odour.' 
 
 Being produced from the Tanmatras, the senses, 
 as perceiving, are represented as being of the same 
 nature as the objects perceived, a view of consider- 
 able antiquity. 
 
 Five Karmendriyas. 
 
 14-18. 'The five Karmendriyas or organs of 
 action, voice, hands, feet, the organ of excretion, 
 and the organ of generation, perform each its own 
 work. The voice utters words, the hands work, 
 the feet perform movement, the organ of excretion 
 evacuation, the organ of generation pleasure.' 
 
 Manas. 
 
 1 9. ' Manas, mind, both perceptive and active, 
 performs its acts of doubting and ascertaining.' 
 
 Central organ of the senses or KOLVOV ala-OriTripiov 
 might be the nearest approach to the meaning of 
 Manas ; but mind may do, if we only remember its 
 Sa??ikhya definition, as perceptive, like the other 
 organs, and at the same time active like the 
 Karmendriyas. 
 
 ' Thus have the eleven organs been explained. 
 Their synonyms are, Kara/ta, instruments, Vaika-
 
 PURUSHA. 331 
 
 rika, changing, Niyata, special, Padani, appliances \ 
 AvadhHtani, kept under (?), Anu, atomic, Aksha 2 , 
 
 organ.' 
 
 Five Mahabhfttas. 
 
 20-24. 'The Mahabhutas, or gross elements, are 
 earth, water, light, air, and ether.' 
 
 Here the earth, we are told, helps the other four, 
 by being their support. Water helps the other 
 four by moistening. Light helps the other four by 
 ripening. Air helps the other four by drying. 
 Ether helps the other four by giving space. 
 
 ' Earth is possessed of five qualities, sound, touch, 
 colour, savour, and odour. Water is possessed of 
 four qualities, sound, touch, colour, and savour. 
 Light is possessed of three qualities, sound, touch, 
 and colour. Air is possessed of two qualities, sound 
 and touch. Ether has one quality, sound. Thus 
 are the five Mahabhutas explained. 
 
 Their synonyms are : Bhutas, elements, Bhuta- 
 viseshas, special elements, Vikaras, modifications, 
 Akritis, species, Tanu, skin (or body ?), Vigraha, 
 shapes, /Santa, pleasurable, Ghora, fearful, Muc/Aa, 
 stupid. Thus have the sixteen Vikaras been de- 
 scribed.' 
 
 Purusha. 
 
 III. 25. Now it is asked, 'What is the Purusha ? ' 
 and the answer is, ' Purusha is without beginning, it 
 is subtle, omnipresent, perceptive, without qualities, 
 eternal, seer, experiencer, not an agent, knower of 
 objects, spotless, not producing. Why is it called 
 Purusha I Because of its being old (Pura?iat), because 
 it rests in the body (Puri say ate), and because it serves 
 
 1 Garbe, Siunkhya-Philosophie, p. 257. 
 
 2 Or Akshara, imperishable ?
 
 332 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as Purohita (Director).' These are, of course, fanciful 
 etymologies ; and we can hardly doubt that we have, 
 in the name of Purusha, a recollection of the Vedic 
 Purusha, one of the many names of the supreme 
 deity, by the side of Visvakarman, Hira?iyagarbha, 
 Prat/apati, &c. Like Brahman when conceived as 
 Atman, Purusha also was probably used both for 
 the divine and for the human side of the same 
 power. It is the multiplicity only of the Purusha 
 which is peculiar to the Sa??ikhya-philosophy. 
 
 ' And why is the Purusha without beginning ? 
 Because there is no beginning, no middle, and no 
 end of it.' This is not a very satisfactory answer, 
 but it is probably meant for no more than that we 
 never perceive a beginning, middle, or end of it. 
 Why is it subtle ? Because it is without parts and 
 supersensuous. Why omnipresent ? Because, like 
 the sky, it reaches everything, and its extent is 
 endless. Why perceptive ? Because it perceives 
 (that is, for a time) pleasure, pain, and trouble. 
 Why without qualities ? Because the qualities of 
 good, indifferent, and bad are not found in it. 
 Why eternal ? Because it was not made, and 
 cannot be made. Why seer ? Because it perceives 
 the modifications of Prakrtti. Why enjoy er ? Be- 
 cause being perceptive it perceives (for awhile) 
 pleasure and pain. Why not an agent ? Because 
 it is indifferent and without the qualities (Gimas). 
 Why the knower of body or of objects ? Because it 
 knows the qualities of objective bodies. Why spot- 
 less ? Because neither good nor evil acts belong to 
 the Purusha. Why not-producing? Because it has 
 no seed, that is, it can produce nothing. Thus has 
 the Purusha of the Sawkhya been described.
 
 PURUSHA. 333 
 
 The synonyms of Purusha are, Atmari, Self, 
 Puman, male, Pumgu^a^antugivaA, a male living 
 creature, Kshetragwa, knower of objects or of the 
 body, Nara, man, Kavi, poet, Brahman, Akshara, 
 indestructible, Pi-ana, spirit, YaAkaA ] , anybody, 
 Sa, He. 
 
 Thus have the twenty-five substances been de- 
 scribed, viz. the eight Prakn'tis, the sixteen Vikaras, 
 and the Purusha. He who knows these twenty-five 
 substances, whatever stage of life he may be in, and 
 whether he wear matted hair, a topknot, or be shaven, 
 he is liberated, there is no doubt. This verse is 
 often quoted by Samkhya philosophers. Here, it 
 seems, the first part of the Tattva-samasa is ended, 
 containing a list of the twenty-five Tattvas, in the 
 three divisions of Prakn'tis, Vikaras, and Purusha. 
 
 Purusha (subject). 
 
 I 
 
 i. Prakrit! (object). 
 Avyakta 
 
 2. Mahat or Buddhi (light and intelligence as Samashii, not yet 
 
 | individualised). 
 
 3. Ahawzkara (subjectivation). 
 
 5 Tanmatras (Sattvika) 10 Indriyas, organs (Ragasa) + i Manas (mind) 
 
 (subtle elements). (5 Buddhindriyas, 5 Karmendriyas, and Manas). 
 
 Tanmatras. Buddhindriyas. Karmendriyas. 
 
 1. Sound, Sabda. i. Srotra, hearing in ear. r. Speaking in tongue. 
 
 2. Touch, Sparsa. 2. TvaA 1 , touch in skin. 2. Grasping in hands. 
 
 3. Colour, Rupa. 3. A'akshus, seeing in eye. 3. Moving in feet. 
 
 4. Savour, Rasa. 4. Gihva, tasting in tongue. 4. Evacuating in Payu. 
 
 5. Odour, Gandha. 5. Ghraxa, smelling in nose. 5. Generating in Upasth;i. 
 
 5 Mahabhutas (Tamasa). 
 
 1. Akasa, ether (sabda). 
 
 2. Vayu, air (sabda + sparsa). 
 
 3. Te</as, fire (sabda + sparsa + rupa). 
 
 4. Ap, water (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa). 
 
 5. Pn'thivi, earth (sabda + sparsa + rupa + rasa + gandha). 
 
 1 As ya/i, the relative pronoun could hardly be used as a 
 name, I supposed it might be meant for the indefinite pronoun 
 ya/ika/j, but this is doubtful.
 
 334 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Is Purusha an Agent? 
 
 Now follow a number of special questions, which 
 seemed to require fuller treatment. The first is, Is 
 the Purusha an agent, or is he not ? If Purusha were 
 an agent, he would do good actions only, and there 
 would not be the three different kinds of action. 
 The three kinds of action are (i) Good conduct, called 
 virtue (Dharma), which consists in kindness, control 
 and restraint (of the organs), freedom from hatred, 
 reflection, displaying of supernatural powers. 
 
 (2) But passion, anger, greed, fault-finding, violence, 
 discontent, rudeness, shown by change of coun- 
 tenance, these are called indifferent conduct. 
 
 (3) Madness, intoxication, lassitude, nihilism, de- 
 votion to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, 
 impurity, these are called bad conduct. 
 
 We see here once more that the three Gmias 
 must have had originally a much wider meaning 
 than is here described. They are here taken as 
 purely moral qualities, whereas originally they must 
 have had a much larger cosmic sense. They are not 
 qualities or mere attributes at all ; they are on the 
 contrary ingredients of Prakrit! in its differentiation 
 of good, indifferent, bad ; bright, dim and dark ; light, 
 mobile, heavy. We see here the same narrowing 
 of cosmical ideas which we had to point out before 
 in the case of Buddhi and Ahamkara, and which, 
 it seems to me, would render the original conception 
 of the Samkhya-philosophy quite unmeaning. We 
 must never forget that, even when the Suwkhya 
 speaks of moral qualities, these qualities belong to 
 nature as seen by the Purusha, never to Purusha 
 apart from Prakriti.
 
 IS PURUSHA ONE OR MANY? 335 
 
 Three Guwas. 
 
 Whenever this triad is perceived in the world it 
 is clear that agency belongs to the Gunas, and it 
 follows that Purusha is not the agent. 
 
 Deceived by passion and darkness, and taking 
 a wrong view of these Gimas which belong to 
 Prakriti, not to himself, a fool imagines that he 
 himself is the agent, though in reality he is unable 
 by himself to bend even a straw. Nay, he becomes 
 an agent, as it were, foolish and intoxicated by vain 
 imagination and saying, ' All this was made by me 
 and belongs to me.' 
 
 And then it is said (in the Bhagavad-gita III, 2 7) : 
 'Acts are effected by the qualities (Gunas) of PrakHti 
 in every way, but the Self (Atman), deluded by the 
 conceit of the I (Ahawikara), imagines that the I is 
 the agent.' 
 
 Ibid. XIII, 31:- 
 
 ' This imperishable supreme Self, from being with- 
 out beginning and devoid of qualities, neither acts 
 nor suffers, even while staying in the body.' 
 
 And XIII, 29 :- 
 
 ' He sees (aright) who looks upon actions as in 
 all respects performed by Prakn'ti alone, and upon 
 the Self as never an agent.' 
 
 Is Purusha one or many? 
 
 Now comes the important question, Is that 
 Purusha one or many? The answer to this question 
 divides the Samkhya from the Vedanta-philosophy. 
 The Sa?nkhya answer is that the Purusha is clearly 
 many, because of the variety in the acts of pleasure, 
 pain, trouble, confusion and purifying (of race), health,
 
 336 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 birth and death ; also on account of the stages in life 
 (Asrama) and the difference of caste ( Vama). If there 
 were but one Purusha, as the Vedantins hold, then 
 if one were happy, all would be happy ; if one were 
 unhappy, all would be unhappy, and so on in the 
 case of people affected by trouble, confusion of race, 
 purity of race, health, birth and death. Hence 
 there is not one Purusha, but many, on account of 
 the manifoldness indicated by form, birth, abode, 
 fortune, society or loneliness. Thus Kapila, Asuri, 
 Pan&asikha and Pata/l^ali, and all other Sawikhya 
 teachers describe Purusha as many. 
 
 Vedanta Sayings. 
 
 But teachers who follow the Vedanta, such as 
 Harihara, Hiranyagarbha, Vyasa and others, describe 
 Purusha as one. And why so ? Because (as the 
 Vedanta says), 
 
 1. ' Purusha is all this, what has been and what is 
 to be, he is lord of that immortality which springs 
 up by (sacrificial) food, that is, he is beyond the 
 immortality of the ordinary immortal gods l . 
 
 2. That is Agni, that is Vayu, that is Surya, that 
 is /ifandramas, that is pure, that is Brahman, that is 
 water and Prar/apati ~. 
 
 3. That is true, that is immortal, it is liberation, 
 
 1 These verses arc meant to represent the views of the 
 Vedanta, and they are mostly taken from the Upanishads. 
 The first from ,S'vet. Up. Ill, 15, occurs also Taitt. Ar. Ill, 
 12, i, and in the Eig-veda X, 90, 2, where we should read, Yat 
 annenadhirohati, see Deussen, Geschichte, I, p. 152. 
 
 2 Mahanar. Up. I, 7 ; cf. Va#. Sawih. 32, i.
 
 VEDANTA SAYINGS. 337 
 
 it is the highest point, it is indestructible, it is the 
 glory of the sun ; 
 
 4. Higher than which there is nothing else, 
 nothing smaller, and nothing greater, the One 
 stands like a tree planted in the sky ; by him 
 and by the Purusha, all this is filled ] . 
 
 5. Having hands and feet everywhere, having 
 mouth, head and eyes everywhere, hearing every- 
 where in this world, it stands covering everything ; 
 
 6. Shining 2 through the qualities (Guna) of all the 
 senses, and yet free from all the senses, the master 
 of all, the Lord, the great refuge of all ; 
 
 7. He is all substances everywhere, the Self of 
 all, the source of all ; that in which everything is 
 absorbed, that the sages know as Brahman. 
 
 8. For 3 there is but one Self of beings, settled in 
 everybody, it is seen as one and as many, like the 
 moon in the water. 
 
 9. For he alone, the great Self, dwells in all 
 beings, whether moving or motionless, he by whom 
 all this was spread out. 
 
 10. This Self of the world is one by whom was 
 it made manifold ? Some speak of the Self as 
 several, because of the existence of knowledge, &c. 
 (because knowledge is different in different people). 
 
 11. Wise 4 people see the same (Atman) in the 
 Brahman, in worms and insects, in the outcast, in 
 the dog and the elephant, in beasts, cows, gadflies, 
 and gnats. 
 
 12. 13. As one and the same string passes 
 
 1 vet. Up. Ill, 9 ; Mahanar. Up. X, 20. 
 
 2 Svet, Up. Ill, 17 ; cf. Bhag. Gita XIII, 14. 
 
 3 Brahmabindu Up. 12. 4 Cf. Bhag. Gita V, 18. 
 
 z
 
 338 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 through gold, and pearls, jewels, corals, porcelain, 
 and silver, thus is one and the same Self to be 
 known as dwelling everywhere in cows, men, and 
 in elephants, deer,' &c. 
 
 We see in these extracts a mixture of Vedanta 
 and Samkhya terms and ideas ; and in verse 10 the 
 two views of Brahman being one, and the Purusha 
 being many, are given in the same breath. 
 
 Early Relation between Vedanta and Samkhya. 
 
 The relation between Samkhya and Vedanta 
 during the Upanishad-period is by no means clear. 
 Most scholars seem to regard it as a kind of syn- 
 cretism, but it may also represent to us a period 
 of philosophic thought when these two views of the 
 world were not yet finally differentiated, and were 
 not felt to be altogether incompatible. Though 
 there is in the Upanishads which w r e possess a 
 decided preponderance of a Vedantic interpretation 
 of the world, the Samkhya philosophers are not 
 altogether wrong when they maintain that their 
 view also can be supported by Yedic authority. 
 All these views were at first no more than guesses 
 at truth, gropings in the dark ; but the idea that 
 if the one was right the other must be wrong, 
 belongs decidedly to a later period, to that of 
 systematised arid controversial philosophy. There 
 are certain technical terms, such as Purusha, Buddhi, 
 Gunas, &c., which are looked upon as the pecu- 
 liar property of the Samkhya, and others, such 
 as Atman, Brahman, Avidya, Maya, &c., which re- 
 mind us at once of the Vedanta-philosophy ; but 
 even these terms are used far more freely in the 
 Brahmawas and Upanishads than in the Darsanas,
 
 RELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAMKHYA. 339 
 
 nor are they always used in the same sense or in 
 the same order by earlier and later authorities. 
 Thus we read in the Kanaka Up. Ill, 10, 1 1 : 
 'Beyond the senses are the objects (Artha), 
 beyond the objects is the mind (Manas), beyond the 
 mind is intellect (Buddhi), the Great Self (Mahan 
 Atma) is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great 
 there is the Undeveloped (Avyakta), beyond the un- 
 developed there is the Purusha. Beyond the Purusha 
 there is nothing, that is the goal, the highest point.' 
 In the same Upanishad, VI, 7, 8, we read : 
 ' Beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind 
 the highest being (Sattvam Uttamam), higher than 
 that being is the great Self (Mahan Atma), beyond 
 this great (Self) is the highest, the Undeveloped. 
 
 Beyond the Undeveloped is the Purusha, the 
 all-pervading and imperceptible. Every creature 
 that knows him is liberated, and obtains immor- 
 tality.' 
 
 The successive development, as here described, 
 is not in strict accordance with the systematic 
 Samkhya, but still less does it represent to us 
 Vedantic ideas. Even the two accounts, as given 
 in the same Upanishad, vary slightly, showing to 
 us how little of technical accuracy there was as yet 
 during the Upanishad-period. We get 
 
 III, 10, ii. VI, 7, 8. 
 
 1. Indriyas. Indriyas. 
 
 2. Arthas. 
 
 3. Manas. Manas. 
 
 4. Buddhi. Sattvam Uttamam. 
 
 5. Mahan Atma. MaMn Atma. 
 
 6. Avyakta. Avyakta. 
 
 7. Purusha. Purusha. 
 
 Z 2
 
 340 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The omission of the Arthas as objects would not 
 signify, because, as Indriyarthas, they are implied 
 by the Indriyas or senses. But why should Buddhi, 
 generally the first emanation of PrakHti in its un- 
 developed (Avyakta) state, be replaced by Sattvam 
 Uttamam, the Highest Being ? The word may be 
 meant for Buddhi, for Buddhi is often called Mahat, 
 the Great, but why it should be called Great is 
 difficult to say. It is certainly not an equiva- 
 lent of the Phenician Mot, as Professor Wilson 
 conjectured many years ago l . Mahfm Atm& looks 
 like a Vedantic term, but even then it would only 
 occupy the place of (rivatma, the individualised 
 Self, and how could this be said to emanate from 
 the Avyakta ? 
 
 Another passage which reminds us of Sa?khya 
 rather than of Vedanta-philosophy occurs in the 
 Maitray. Up. II, 5, where we read : ' He who has the 
 name of Purusha, and is very small, intangible, 
 invisible, dwells of his own will 2 here in part 3 , as 
 a man who is fast asleep awakes of his own will. 
 And this part, which is entirely intelligent, present 
 in every single man, knowing the body, attested by 
 conceiving (Manas), willing (Buddhi), and belief in 
 subject and object (Ahawk;.ira) is Pra/yapati, called 
 
 1 See Samkhya-Sutras I, 61, 71 ; the Ekadasakam is Sattvi- 
 kam, cf. II, 1 8, that is the live Buddhindriyas, the five Kar- 
 mendriyas, and the Manas ; see Garbe, Sawkhya-pravafcana- 
 bhashya, p. i8H. 
 
 2 The Anubhuti-praka.s'a roads Buddhipurvam, Deussen 
 translates Abuddhipurvam. 
 
 3 As to the idea of parts (Awsa), see Vedanta-Sutras II, 
 3, 43, and Thibaut's remarks in his Introduction, p. xcvii.
 
 EELATION BETWEEN VEDANTA AND SAA/KHYA. 341 
 
 Visva. By him, the intelligent, is the body made 
 intelligent, and he is the driver thereof.' 
 
 This passage does not contain much of Samkhya 
 thought, yet the words Purusha and possibly 
 Buddhipiirvam seem to allude to Kapila's ideas 
 rather than to those of Badarayana. Other words 
 also, such as Samkalpa, Adhyavasaya and Abhimana, 
 in the sense of Aha?nkara, point to the same source. 
 The whole passage, however, is obscure, nor does 
 the commentator help us much, unless he is right 
 in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic 
 ideas of a Pra^/apati, called Visva or Vaisvanara 
 (Vedanta-sara, $ 138), Tau/asa and Pragma. 
 
 One more passage of the Maitray.Upanishad, III, 2, 
 may here be mentioned, as reminding us of S&mkhya 
 doctrines. There we read : ' There is indeed that 
 other different one, called the elemental Self (Bhut- 
 atma) who, overcome by the bright and dark fruits 
 of action, enters on a good or evil birth, so that his 
 course is upward or downward, and that over- 
 powered by the pairs (the opposites) he roams 
 about. And this is the explanation. The five 
 Tanmatras (of sound, touch, light, taste, and smell) 
 are called Bhuta (elements), and the five Maha- 
 bhutas (gross elements) also are called Bhuta. Then 
 the aggregate of all these is called /Sarira, body, and 
 he who dwells in that body is called Bhutatman (the 
 elementary Atman). True, his immortal Atman 
 (Self) remains untainted, like a drop of water on a 
 lotus-leaf; but he, the Bhutatman, is in the power of 
 the Gunas of Prakn'ti. Then, thus overpowered, he 
 becomes bewildered, and because thus bewildered, 
 he sees not the creator, i. e. the holy Lord, abiding 
 within him. Carried along by the Gimas, darkened,
 
 342 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 unstable, fickle, crippled, full of devices, vacillating, 
 he enters into Abhimana (conceit of subject and 
 object), believing "I am he, this is mine," &c. He 
 binds himself by himself, as a bird is bound by a net, 
 and, overcome afterwards by the fruits of what he has 
 done, he enters on a good or evil birth, downward 
 or upward in his course, and, overcome by the pairs, 
 he roams about.' 
 
 Here we see again a mixture of Samkhya and 
 Vedanta ideas, the Samkhya claiming such terms 
 as Prakriti and Gums, the Vedanta such terms as 
 Atman and possibly Bhutatman. This Bhutatman, 
 however, is by no means so clear as has sometimes 
 been imagined. It is a term peculiar to the Maitray. 
 Upanishad, and seems to have been borrowed from 
 it when it occurs in some of the later Upanishads. 
 If, like many other things in the Maitray. Upanishad, 
 it is to be looked upon as belonging to the Samkhya- 
 system, we must remember that Atman, though 
 quoted sometimes as a synonym of Purusha, cannot 
 be supposed to stand here for Purusha. A com- 
 pound such as Bhuta-Purusha would be impossible. 
 The Maitray. Up. Ill, i itself says that the Atman 
 of Bhutatman is another, though likewise called 
 Atman, and that he dwells in the body, $arira, 
 which is a compound of Tanmatras, Bhutas, and 
 Mahabhutas. It would therefore correspond to the 
 Vedaritic (rivatman. But if this Bhutatman is 
 said to spring from Prak? v iti, it could not possibly 
 stand for the Purusha of the Sawkhyas, because 
 their Purusha does not spring from Prak?v'ti, as 
 little as Prakriti springs from him. Nor could any 
 Atman be said to be purely objective. In fact, 
 strictly speaking, this Bhutatman fits neither into
 
 TRAIGU^YA. 343 
 
 the Vedanta, nor into the Samkhya-philosophy, and 
 would rather seem to belong to a philosophy in 
 which these two views of the world were not yet 
 finally separated. 
 
 Another difficult and rather obscure expression 
 in the Maitray. Upanishad is Niratman (selbstlos], an 
 expression which would be impossible in the Vedanta- 
 philosophy, and is certainly perplexing even in the 
 Samkhya. 
 
 A similar mixture of philosophical terms meets us 
 in the $vetasvatara Upanishad. In verse I, 10, for 
 instance, we have Pradhana, which is Samkhya, and 
 Maya, which is Vedanta, at least the later Vedanta, 
 while in IV, 10 Maya is directly identified with 
 Praknti. Purusha occurs in III, 12, where it 
 evidently stands for Brahman, IV, i. But though 
 in this Upanishad Samkhya ideas would seem to 
 prevail, Vedanta ideas are not excluded. The very 
 name of Samkhya 1 and Yoga occurs (VI, 13), but 
 the name of Vedanta also is not absent, VI, 22. In 
 all this we may possibly get a glimpse of a state of 
 Indian philosophy which was, as yet, neither pure 
 Samkhya nor pure Vedanta, unless we look on these 
 Upanishads as of a far more modern date, and on 
 their philosophy as the result of a later syncretism. 
 
 Traiguwya. 
 
 IV. If now we return to the Tattva-samasa, 
 we meet first of all with some more remarks 
 about the three Gunas, Sattva, explained as 
 
 1 Sawkhya should be here taken as the title of the two 
 systems, Samkhya and Yoga, or better still as one word, 
 Samkhyayoga. It cannot well mean Priifung,
 
 344 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 virtue, purity, goodness ; Ra^as, explained as dust, 
 mist, passion, movement, and Tamas, darkness, as 
 ignorance. Colebrooke had already warned us 
 against taking the Gunas of the Smkhya in the 
 sense of qualities. ' These three qualities,' he says, 
 ' are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its 
 essence, and enter into its composition like different 
 rivers forming one stream, though for a time retain- 
 ing their different colours.' Constituent ' parts ' 
 might be a better rendering, but for the present it 
 is best to retain Guna,, there being neither thought 
 nor word in English corresponding to Gu?ia, as 
 defined in the Samkhya. We ourselves have in- 
 herited our ideas of substance and quality from 
 Greek and medieval philosophers, but even with us 
 a definition of inherent qualities is by no means 
 easy, considering that our substances never exist 
 without qualities, nor our qualities without sub- 
 stances. Our commentary continues : 
 
 He now asks, What is the triad of Gu?ias ? and 
 the answer is, the triad consists of Goodness, Pas- 
 sion, and Darkness. The triad of Gu?^as means the 
 three Guwas. 
 
 Goodness (Sattva) is of endless variety, such as 
 calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of what 
 is wished for, contentment, patience, joy, &c. In 
 short it consists of happiness. 
 
 Passion is of endless variety, such as grief, dis- 
 tress, separation, excitement, attainment of what is 
 evil, itc. In short it consists of pain. 
 
 Darkness is of endless variety, such as covering, 
 ignorance, disgust, misery, heaviness, sloth, drowsi- 
 ness, intoxication, &c. In short it consists of trouble 
 or madness.
 
 SAjYA'ARA AND PEATISA^A'ARA. 345 
 
 Thus far has the triad of the Gunas been ex- 
 plained. Let it be known that goodness is all that 
 is bright, passion all that excites, and darkness all 
 that is not bright. This is what is named Trai- 
 gunya. 
 
 These Gimas have been again and again explained 
 as Dravyam, matter ; quality and what is qualified 
 being considered in the Samkhya as inseparable. 
 The four sides of a cube, for instance, would be 
 called its Gmias as much as the blue of the sky. 
 These Gunas act a very prominent part in Indian 
 philosophy, and have quite entered into the sphere 
 of popular thought. We can best explain them by 
 the general idea of two opposites and the middle 
 term between them, or as Hegel's thesis, anti- 
 thesis and synthesis, these being manifested in 
 nature by light, darkness, and mist ; in morals by 
 good, bad, and indifferent, with many applications 
 and modifications. If the Samkhyas look on cer- 
 tain objects as happy instead of happifying, &c., we 
 should remember that we also call sugar sweet, 
 meaning that it calls forth the sensation of sweet- 
 ness in us. The Hindus look upon the state of 
 equilibrium of the three Gmias as perfect, and they 
 see in the preponderance of any one of them the 
 first cause of movement and activity in Prakriti or 
 nature, in fact the beginning of creation. 
 
 Saw/iara and Pratisawytara. 
 
 V, VI. Then comes the question, What is 
 San&ara and what is Pratisa?I&ara ? The answer 
 is, San&ara is evolution, Pratisafl&ara dissolution or 
 re-involution. Evolution is as follows : From the 
 Avyakta (undeveloped Praknti) before explained,
 
 346 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 when superintended by the high and omnipresent 
 Purusha (Spirit), Buddhi (intellect) arises, and this 
 of eight kinds. From this Buddhi, the substance of 
 intellect, arises Aha??ikara (conceit of I, or sub- 
 jectivity). Ahawkara is of three kinds, Vaikarika, 
 modified, that is, modified of Sattva ' ; Tau/asa, 
 luminous, as under the influence of llamas producing 
 the Buddhindriyas ; and Bhutadi (first of elements). 
 From the modified or Vaikarika Aha??ikara, which 
 under the influence of Tamas produces the gross 
 material elements, spring the gods and the senses ; 
 from the first of elements, Bhutadi, the Tanmatras 
 (essences) ; from the luminous, Tair/asa, both. From 
 the Tanmatras, essences, are produced the material 
 elements. This is the development or Sa/U'ara. 
 Pratisa?7/:ara or dissolution is as follows : The 
 material elements are dissolved into the essences, 
 Tanmatras, the essences and senses into Aha?kara, 
 Aha??ikara into Buddhi (intellect), Buddhi into 
 Avyakta (the undeveloped), all being different forms 
 of Prak?'tti. The Undeveloped is nowhere dis- 
 solved, because it was never evolved out of any- 
 thing. Know both Prakrit! and Purusha as having 
 no beginning. Thus has dissolution been explained. 
 
 Adhyatma, Adhibhtlta, and Adhidaivata. 
 
 VII-IX. Now it is asked, What is meant by 
 Adhyatma (subjective), Adhibhuta (objective), and 
 Adhidaivata (pertaining to deity) ? To this it is 
 answered, Intellect is subjective, what is to be per- 
 ceived is objective, Brahma is deity. Ahamkara is 
 subjective, what is to be received and perceived by 
 
 1 Gurbe, Samkhya- Philosophic, p. 236.
 
 ADHYATMA, ADHIBHUTA, AND ADHIDAIVATA. 347 
 
 it is objective, Rudra is the deity. Manas, mind, 
 is subjective, what is to be conceived is objective, 
 -/Tandra, moon, is the deity. The ear is subjective, 
 what is to be heard is objective, Akasa, ether, is the 
 deity. The skin is subjective, what is to be touched 
 is objective, Vayu, wind, is the deity. The eye is 
 subjective, what is to be seen is objective, Aditya, 
 the sun, is the deity. The tongue is subjective, 
 what is to be tasted is objective, Varuna ! is the 
 deity. The nose is subjective, what is to be smelled 
 is objective, Earth is the deity. The voice is sub- 
 jective, what is to be uttered is objective, Agni, fire, 
 is the deity. The two hands are subjective, what 
 is to be grasped is objective, Indra is the deity. 
 The feet are subjective, what has to be gone over 
 is objective, Vishnu is the deity. The organ of 
 excretion is subjective, what is to be excreted is 
 objective, Mitra is the deity. The organ of genera- 
 tion is subjective, what is to be enjoyed is objective, 
 Pragdpati, lord of creatures, is the deity. Thus in 
 the case of each of the thirteen instruments is there 
 what is subjective, what is objective, and the deity. 
 Whoever has properly learnt the substances, the 
 forms of the qualities (Gu?^asvarupa^i), and the 
 deity (Adhidaivatam) is freed from evil and released 
 from all his sins ; he experiences the qualities 
 (Gu?ias), but is not united to them. Here ends 
 the discussion of the Tattvas (substances) 2 . 
 
 1 Evidently taken already as god of the waters. 
 
 2 I ought to say that in this and the subsequent paragraphs 
 I had often to be satisfied with giving the words such as they 
 stand, without being myself able to connect any definite ideas 
 with them. I did not like to leave them out altogether, but 
 while they may be safely passed over by philosophical readers,
 
 348 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Abhibuddhis (5). 
 
 X. Now what are the five Abhibuddhis (appre- 
 hensions) ? The answer is, They are Vyavasaya, 
 ascertainment, Abhimana, conceit, I/t&Aa, desire, 
 Kartavyata, determination to act or will, Kriya, 
 action. 
 
 The apprehension that this has to be done by me 
 is ascertainment ; an act of the intellect. Abhimana, 
 conceit, is directed towards the perception of the 
 nature of Self and not-Self, it is Ahamkara, an act 
 of the intellect. Lkkhh, desire, is wish, an idea of 
 the mind, an act of the intellect. Kartavyata, the 
 will of doing such acts as hearing, &c., performed 
 by the senses that have sound, &c., for their objects, 
 is an act of the intellect pertaining to the Bud- 
 dhindriyas. Kriya, the act of the intellect, such as 
 speaking, &c., pertaining to the Karmendriyas, is 
 action '. Thus have five Abhibuddhis (apprehen- 
 sions) been explained. 
 
 Karmayonis (5). 
 
 XL What are the five Karmayonis ? The answer 
 is that they are Dhr/ti, energy, /Sraddha, faith or 
 faithfulness, Sukha, bliss, Avividisha, carelessness, 
 Vividisha, desire of knowledge. 
 
 O 
 
 The character of Dhr/ti or energy is when a man 
 resolves and carries out his resolution. $raddha, faith 
 or faithfulness, is said to consist in study of the Veda 
 
 they may, I hope, elicit from Sanskrit scholars some better 
 elucidation than I am ablo to #ivo. At present most of them 
 seem to me to consist of useless distinctions and hair-splitting 
 definitions of words. 
 
 1 The text is somewhat doubtful.
 
 KARMAYONIS. 349 
 
 religious studentship, sacrificing and causing sacri- 
 fices to be performed, penance, giving and receiving- 
 proper gifts, and making Homa-oblations. 
 
 But Sukha or bliss arises when a man, in order 
 to obtain blessedness, devotes himself to knowledge, 
 sacrifices and penance, being always engaged in 
 penitential acts. 
 
 AvividisM or carelessness consists in the heart's 
 being absorbed in the sweetness of sensual pleasures. 
 
 Vividisha or desire of knowledge is the source of 
 knowledge of thoughtful people. What has to be 
 known is the oneness (belonging to Prakn'ti), the 
 separateness (ofPurushaandPraknti), &c., (Prakr/ti) 
 being eternal, and not-percipient, subtle, with real 
 products, and not to be disturbed ; and this is 
 Vividisha. ... It is a state belonging to Prakriti 
 destroying cause and effect. Thus have the five 
 Karmayonis been explained (?). 
 
 Some portions of these verses are obscure, and 
 the text is probably corrupt. I have taken Grneyft, 
 for 6rneyam, referring to each of the subjects with 
 which Vividisha, the desire of knowledge, is con- 
 cerned. The construction is very imperfect, but 
 may be excused in what is after all no more than 
 an index. I separate Sukshmam and take it in the 
 sense of Sukshmatvam. Satkaryam refers to the 
 Satkaryavada. The third line is quite unintelligible 
 to me, and Ballantyne has very properly left it 
 altogether untranslated. It may mean that Vivi- 
 dishti is a state belonging to Prakriti which helps 
 to destroy cause and effect by showing that they 
 are one and the same, but this is a mere guess.
 
 350 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Vayus (5). 
 
 XII. What are the Vayus (winds) ? They are 
 Prana, Apana, Samana, Udana, and Vyana, i.e. the 
 winds in the bodies of those who have bodies. The 
 wind called Prana is superintended by mouth and 
 nose, and is called Praa because it leads out or 
 moves out. The wind called Apana is superintended 
 by the navel, and is called Apana because it leads 
 away and moves downward. The wind called Samana 
 is superintended by the heart, and is called Samana 
 because it leads equally and moves equally. The 
 wind called Udana is superintended by the throat. 
 It is called Udana because it goes upward and 
 moves out. Vyana is the all-pervader. Thus have 
 the five w r inds been explained. 
 
 The real meaning of these winds has never been 
 discovered. If they are rendered by vital spirits, 
 nothing is gained except explaining obscurum per 
 obscurius. They may have been intended to 
 account for the vital processes which make the 
 action of the senses (Indriyas) and of other organs of 
 the body also, possible, but their original intention 
 escapes us altogether. They form a kind of physical 
 organism or AntaAkara^a, but their special functions 
 are often stated differently by different authors. 
 
 Karmatmans (5). 
 
 XIII. What are the five Karmatmans, the (Ego as 
 active) ? They are Vaikarika, Tair/asa, Bhutadi, Sanu- 
 mana, and Niranumana. The Vaikarika, modifying, 
 is the doer of good works. The Tauyasa, luminous, 
 is the doer of bad works. The Bhutadi ', first of 
 
 1 Bhutadi is used in the sense of Manas, because the Bhutas, 
 though springing from the Tanmatras, are due to it.
 
 ASAKTT, WEAKNESS. 351 
 
 elements, is the doer of hidden works. If associated 
 with inference (Sanumana), the Aha?ttkara is the doer 
 of what is good and reasonable ; if not associated 
 with inference (Niranumana) it is the doer of what 
 is not good and not reasonable. Thus have the 
 five Karmatmans been explained. 
 
 Avidya, Nescience (5). 
 
 XIV. What is the fivefold Avidya (Nescience) ? It 
 is Tamas, darkness, Moha, illusion, Mahamoha, great 
 illusion, Tamisra, gloom, Andhatamisra, utter gloom. 
 Here darkness and illusion are again each eightfold, 
 great illusion is tenfold, gloom and utter gloom are 
 eighteenfold. Tamas, darkness, is the misconception 
 that Self is identical with things which are not Self, 
 namely with PrakHti, Avyakta, Buddhi, Ahamkara, 
 and the five Tanmatras. Moha, illusion, is the miscon- 
 ception arising from the obtaimnent of supernatural 
 powers, such as minuteness and the rest. Mahamoha, 
 great illusion, is when one supposes oneself to be 
 liberated in the ten states with regard to the objects 
 of sound, colour, &c., whether heard or seen, &c. 
 Gloom is unrestrained hatred, directed against the 
 eightfold superhuman powers, such as minuteness. 
 &c., and against the tenfold w^orld of sense causing 
 threefold pain. Utter gloom is that distress which 
 arises at the time of death after the eightfold human 
 power has been acquired, and the tenfold world of 
 sense has been conquered. Thus has ignorance w r ith 
 sixty-two subdivisions been explained. 
 
 Asakti, Weakness (28). 
 
 XV. What is called the twenty-eightfold weakness ( 
 The faults of the eleven organs of sense and the 
 seventeen faults of the intellect. First, with regard
 
 352 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to the organs of sense, there is deafness in the ear, 
 dullness in the tongue, leprosy in the skin, blindness 
 in the eye, loss of smell in the nose, dumbness in 
 the voice, crippledness in the hands, lameness in the 
 feet, constipation in the organ of excretion, impotence 
 in the organ of generation, madness in the mind ; 
 these are defects of the eleven organs. The seventeen 
 defects of the intellect are the opposites of the Tushds, 
 contentments, and of the Siddhis, perfections. 
 
 Atushfa and Tushft. 
 
 XVI. First then the opposites of the Tushfis or 
 the contentments. They are Ananta, the conviction 
 that there is no Pradhana (Prakrit!) ; Tamasalina, 
 consisting in recognising the Atman in the Mahat 
 (Buddhi, intellect) ; Avidya, the non-recognition of 
 the Ego (Ahamkara) ; Avrish^i, the denial that the 
 Tanmatras, essences, are the causes of the elements ; 
 Asutara, occupation in acquiring the objects of the 
 senses ; Asupara, occupation in their preservation ; 
 Asunetra, occupation for wealth, without seeing that 
 it is liable to be lost ; AsumarUika, addiction to en- 
 joyment ; Anuttamambhasika, engaging in enjoyment 
 without seeing the evil of injury (to living beings). 
 Thus have the nine opposites of Tushd, contentment, 
 been explained. 
 
 Asiddhis and Siddhis. 
 
 XVII. Next follow the opposites of Siddhi, perfec- 
 tion, which are also called Asiddhis, non-perfections: 
 Atara, when diversity is mistaken for phenomenal 
 unity ; Sutara, when, after hearing words only, the 
 opposite is understood, as, for instance, when after 
 hearing that a man who knows the various principles
 
 TUSHTIS AND SIDDHIS. 353 
 
 (tattvas) is liberated, a man understands the op- 
 posite, that such a man is not liberated ; Ataratara, 
 ignorance, when a man, though devoted to hearing 
 and studying, does not succeed in knowing the 
 twenty-five principles, owing either to his obtuseness 
 or to his intellect being impaired by false doctrines. 
 If a man, though overcome by mental suffering, is not 
 anxious to know, being careless as to transmigration, 
 so that knowledge is no pleasure to him, this is 
 Apramoda. Thus the next pair also of Apramu- 
 dita (mutually not delighted) and Apramodamana 
 (mutually not delighting) should be considered. 
 Ignorance of a man of undecided mind even with 
 regard to what has been taught him by a friend is 
 Arasya. But failure of an unfortunate man in ob- 
 taining knowledge, either because of bad instruction 
 or disregard on the part of the teacher, is Asat- 
 pramuditam. Thus have the eight Asiddhis, the 
 opposite of the Siddhis or perfections, been ex- 
 plained, and the twenty-eightfold A^akti (weakness) 
 is finished. 
 
 Tushfts and Siddhis. 
 
 Xext follow the Tushris and Siddhis themselves, 
 but as their opposites have already been examined 
 we may dispense with their enumeration here. Some 
 of these technical terms vary in different texts, but 
 they are of very small importance l . I am afraid 
 that even what I have given of these long lists, 
 
 1 The names of the nine Tushfis or contentments are : 
 Ambhas. water. Salila, Ogha. Vr/shfi, Sutara, Supara. Su- 
 netra, SuniariAika. Uttama Sattviki. The names of the eight 
 Siddhis are : Tara, Sutara. Tarayanti. Prainoda, Pramudita. 
 Pramodarnana, Kainyaka, Satpramudita. 
 
 A a
 
 354 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which are so characteristic of the Sa??ikhya-philo- 
 sophy, may have proved very tedious, and not very 
 closely connected with the great problems of philo- 
 sophy. I confess that in several cases many of these 
 subdivisions seemed to me entirely meaningless, but 
 I thought that they were of some importance his- 
 torically, and for a right appreciation of the methods 
 of Indian philosophy. The long lists of the instru- 
 ments and the acts of intellect, of the sources of 
 activity, of Nescience with its sixty-two subdivi- 
 sions, &c., though certainly meaningless to my mind, 
 may possibly serve to show how long and how 
 minutely these philosophical questions must have 
 been discussed in order to leave such spoils behind. 
 This large number of technical terms is certainly 
 surprising. Some of them, as, for instance, SuA:i, 
 Pada, Avadharita, &c., are not mentioned either in 
 the Karikas or in the Sutras, and this, which has been 
 taken for a sign of their more recent date, seems to 
 me, on the contrary, to speak in favour of an early 
 and independent origin of the Tattva-samasa and its 
 commentary. If these technical terms were modern 
 inventions, they would occur more frequently in 
 modern works on the Sawkhya-philosophy, but as 
 far as I know, they do not. 
 
 Mftlikarthas. 
 
 XVIII. We have still to examine, though as briefly 
 as possible, the Mulikarthas or eight cardinal facts, 
 that is, the most important subjects established 
 by the Sa<khya '. They are with regard to 
 PrakHti or Pradhana, its reality (Astitva), its 
 oneness (Ekatva), its having an object or an 
 
 1 See Samkhya-tattva-kaumudl, p. 59.
 
 SHASim-TANTRA. 355 
 
 intention (Arthavattva), and its being intended for 
 some one else (Pararthya). They are with regard 
 to Purusha his being different from Prakn'ti (An- 
 yatva), his not being an agent (Akartritva), and his 
 being many (Bahutva). They are with regard to 
 both Prakriti and Purusha, their temporary union 
 and separation, while Sthiti, durability, is said to 
 refer to the Sukshma- and Sthula-sarira, the gross 
 and the subtle bodies. Astitva, reality, might seem 
 to belong to both PrakHti and Purusha, but it is 
 meant as the reality of PrakHti only, which the 
 Samkhya is chiefly concerned with establishing as 
 against the Vedantins who deny it with regard to 
 all that is objective, keeping it for the subject 
 only, whether he is called Purusha or Atman. The 
 commentator, however, and Prof. Garbe also, connect 
 Astitva with Purusha as well as with PrakHti. 
 The matter is of little consequence, unless Astitva 
 is taken in the sense of phenomenal or perceptible 
 reality. The highest reality of the Purusha or the 
 Atman has of course never been doubted by Sam- 
 khya or Vedanta philosophers, but that is more 
 than mere Astitva. 
 
 Shashft-tantra. 
 
 It should be added that the commentator in this 
 place accounts once more for the name of Shashd- 
 tantra, the Sixty-doctrine, but this time by adding 
 the 17 Tushes and Siddhis, the 33 (Avidya 5 + 
 Asakti 28) and 10, not 8, Mulikarthas, and thus 
 arriving at 60 topics. The Chinese name presup- 
 poses a Saptati-sastra, or Seventy-treatise, probably 
 with reference to the original number of verses in 
 the Karika. 
 
 A a 2
 
 356 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Anugraha-sarga. 
 
 XIX. But even here the Tattva-samasa is not yet 
 finished, for it goes on to explain the Anugraha- 
 sarga, lit. the creation of benevolence, which is 
 explained as the production of external objects from 
 the five Tanmatras or subtle essences for the sake 
 of the Purusha. Brahma, after seeing these (the 
 organs of sense ?) produced, but as yet without 
 a sphere in which their measuring or perceiving 
 power could find scope, created for them the 
 so-called benevolent creation, shaped from the 
 Tanmatras \ 
 
 Bhtita-sarga. 
 
 XX. After this follows the Bhuta-sarga in fourteen 
 divisions. The divine creation has eight divisions, 
 consisting of good and evil spirits and gods, such as 
 Pi.9aas, Rakshas, Yakshas, Gandharvas, Indra, Pra- 
 grapati, and Brahma. The animated creation con- 
 sists of domestic animals, birds, wild animals, reptiles, 
 and immovable things or plants. The human creation 
 consists of one, of man only, from Brahmans down to 
 K&ndiil&s. Domestic animals are from cows down 
 to mice ; birds from Garur/a down to gnats ; wild 
 animals from lions down to jackals ; reptiles from 
 Sesha (world-serpent) down to worms ; immovable 
 things from the Pari^ata-tree (in paradise) down to 
 grass. This is the threefold creation, consisting of 
 gods, men, and animals, the animals, i. e. living 
 beings, forming again five classes. 
 
 1 Tliis passage is very doubtful, unless we connect Man a 
 with Tanmatra, and take measuring in the sense of perceiving, 
 so that the creation would be represented as made for man.
 
 DAKSHItfA-BONDAGE, GIFTS TO PRIESTS. 357 
 
 Bandha, Bondage. 
 
 XXI. If it be asked what the threefold bondage 
 (Bandha) consists in, it is replied, In the eight Pra- 
 kritis,in the sixteen Vikaras, and in Dakshma (gifts to 
 priests). There are eight Prakritis, as often described 
 before (pp. 321, 329) ; and as long as a man considers 
 these as the highest, he is absorbed in PrakHti and 
 bound by Prakn'ti. The bondage of the sixteen 
 Vikaras applies both to ascetics and to men of the 
 world, if they are subdued by the senses, which are 
 Vikaras, if they are devoted to objects of sense, if 
 their organs of sense are not in subjection, if they 
 are ignorant and deluded by passions. 
 
 Dakshiwa-bondage, Gifts to Priests. 
 The priestly bondage applies to those, whether 
 householders, students, mendicants or anchorets, 
 whose minds are overcome by passions and delusions, 
 and who from misconception bestow sacrificial gifts 
 on priests. A verse is quoted here in support : 
 * Bondage is spoken of by the name of Prakriti- 
 bondage, Vikara-bondage, and thirdly bondage 
 through priestly gifts.' This last bondage seems 
 to me very important, and it is strange that it 
 should never have been pointed out as marking the 
 unecclesiastical and unorthodox character of the 
 Samkhya-philosophy l . What would have become 
 of the Brahmans without their Dakshmas or fees, 
 the very name of a Brahman being Dakshimya, one 
 to be fee'd ? In the Aitareya-Brahmana already we 
 readofYatis who condemned sacrifices, but they are 
 said to have been thrown to the jackals. That this 
 
 1 See, however, Karika 44.
 
 35^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 feeing of a priest should have been considered one 
 of the three bondages shows at all events that 
 the followers of Kapila were above superstition, and 
 looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances 
 rather than as helps to true freedom and Moksha of 
 the spirit. 
 
 Moksha. 
 
 XXII. This Moksha, the highest aim of Kapila's 
 philosophy, is again of three kinds, according as it 
 arises from increase of knowledge, from the quieting 
 of the passions of the senses, or lastly from the 
 destruction of the whole. From increase of know- 
 ledge and quieting of the passions of the senses 
 there arises the destruction of all that is commonly 
 considered as merit and demerit ; and from the 
 destruction of merit and demerit there arises final 
 beatitude consisting in complete detachment from 
 the world, and in concentration of the Purusha in 
 
 himself. 
 
 Pramawas. 
 
 XXIII. The three Pramanas which follow next 
 require little explanation here, as they have been 
 fully examined before. Still each system of philosophy 
 takes its own view of them, and the character of 
 each is more or less determined by the view taken 
 of the real nature of knowledge. What is most 
 creditable is that each system should have recog- 
 nised the importance of this question, as a pre- 
 liminary to every philosophy. This distinguishes 
 Indian philosophy very favourably from other philo- 
 sophies. All systems of philosophy in India admit 
 Pratyaksha or perception of the senses as the first 
 of Prama/^as. The Vedanta, however, looks upon 
 the Veda as the only source of true knowledge, and
 
 DUJ7KHA. 359 
 
 actually applies to it the name of Pratyaksha. The 
 ordinary three or six Pramanas of the Mimamsa 
 would apply to the world of Avidya or nescience 
 only, never to the true world of Brahman. See 
 Vedanta-Sutras II, i, 14. The names vary some- 
 times, but the meaning is the same. Sensuous 
 perception, if it is meant for what is perceived, 
 is sometimes called Drish^am, what is seen ; and 
 instead of Veda we meet with >Sabda, word, and 
 Apta-va&ana (Samkhya), right affirmation. Anu- 
 mana, inference, is illustrated by the usual examples, 
 such as, inference of rain from the rising of clouds, 
 inference of water from the appearance of cranes, 
 inference of fire from the rising of smoke. What- 
 ever cannot be proved by either sense or inference 
 has to be accepted as Apta-va&ana, as, for instance, 
 the existence of Iridra, the king of the gods, the 
 Northern Kurus, Meru, the golden mountain, the 
 Apsaras, or nymphs of Svarga, &c. For all these 
 things, Munis such as Vasish^a must be accepted 
 as authorities. Apta is explained as a name for a 
 man who is assiduous in his work, free from hatred 
 arid passion, learned, and endowed with all virtues, 
 and who can therefore be relied upon. These three 
 Prama?ias, or measures, are so called because in the 
 same way as in common life grains are measured by 
 measures such as a Prastha, and sandal wood, &c., 
 weighed by a balance, the Tattvas also, the principles, 
 the Bhavas (their modifications), and the Bhutas, 
 elemental substances, are measured or proved by the 
 Prama?ias. 
 
 DuAkha. 
 
 XXIV. The last paragraph in the Tattva-samasa 
 points back to the first. We saw in the beginning how
 
 360 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 a Brahman was introduced who, overcome by three- 
 fold pain, took refuge with the great Jfo'shi Kapila. 
 If we ask what was meant by that threefold pain, 
 the answer is that it is Adhyatmika, Adhibhautika, 
 and Adhidaivika. Adhyatmika is pain arising from 
 the body, whether produced by wind, bile, or 
 phlegm, &c., and from the mind (Manas), such as 
 is due to desire, anger, greed, folly, envy, separation 
 from what is liked, union with what is disliked, &c. 
 Adhibhautika is pain that arises from other living 
 beings, such as thieves, cattle, wild beasts, &c. 
 Adhidaivika is pain that is caused by divine agents, 
 as pain arising from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunder- 
 bolts, &c., all under the direction of the Vedic 
 Devas. If a Brahman is affected by this threefold 
 pain, a desire to know (the reason) arises in him, as 
 a desire for water arises in a thirsty man. Freedom 
 from pain, or final beatitude, is to be gained, as we 
 are told, from a study of the Tattva-samasa. 
 Whoever knows the philosophy which is contained 
 in the Tattva-samasa, is not born again. This is 
 the doctrine of the great sage Kapila, and thus 
 is finished the commentary on the Sutras of the 
 Tattva-samasa. 
 
 The True Meaning of the Sawkhya. 
 
 In giving an account of the Samkhya, I have 
 followed entirely the Tattva-samasa, without mixing 
 it up with the Karikas or Sutras. I was cpiite 
 aware that the Karikas or the Sutras might have 
 supplied us with a clearer and better -arranged 
 account of that philosophy. But if I am right, that 
 the Tattva-samasa is older than either, it seemed 
 to me more important that we should know what
 
 NATURE OF PAIN. 361 
 
 the Samkhya really was in its original form. By 
 comparing the Tattva-samasa with the Karikas and 
 Sutras, we can easily see how this dry system was 
 developed in later times. But though the Karikas 
 and Sutras give us a more systematic account of 
 the Sawkhya, all that is essential can be found 
 in the Samasa, if only we try to arrange the dry 
 facts for ourselves. It must be confessed, no doubt, 
 that neither in the Sutras, the Karikas, nor in the 
 Tattva-samasa, do we find what we most value in 
 every philosophy, an insight into the mind and 
 heart of the founder of that philosophical system. 
 If we were asked why such a system should ever 
 have been imagined and elaborated, or what kind 
 of comfort, whether intellectual or moral, it could 
 have afforded to any human being, we should in- 
 deed have little to answer. All we can learn is that 
 a man crushed by the burden of what is called the 
 threefold misery, and seeing no hope of relief either 
 by means of good actions or of sacrifices, which can 
 promise no more than a temporary happiness on 
 earth or in Heaven, should seek advice from a 
 philosopher, such as Kapila, believing that he 
 could procure for him entire freedom from all 
 his troubles. 
 
 Nature of Pain. 
 
 Here we come across something like a really 
 human sentiment. We can well understand why 
 pain, not only as actual suffering, but as an appa- 
 rent anomaly or imperfection in the universe, should 
 have opened man's eyes to the fact that there 
 was something wrong or limited in his nature, and 
 in the world in which he found himself; and it is
 
 362 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 quite intelligible that this consciousness of his 
 limitation should have acted as the first impulse to 
 an inquiry for the cause of it. This would naturally 
 lead on either to a religious or to a philosophical 
 solution, and it certainly did so in India. A religion 
 must have existed already before this question of the 
 origin of suffering could well have been mooted : but 
 religion seems rather to have increased the difficulty 
 of the questioner than solved it. The gods or god, 
 even in their imperfect conception, were generally 
 supposed to be good and just. How then could 
 they be the authors of human suffering, particularly 
 of that suffering, bodily or mental, for which the 
 individual was clearly not responsible, such as being 
 1 born blind, or deaf, or dumb, or mad.' This seems 
 to have been keenly felt by the ancient Indian 
 philosophers, who shrink from charging any divine 
 power with injustice or cruelty towards men, how- 
 ever low an opinion they may otherwise have formed 
 of Indra and Agni, nay even of Prar/apati, Visva- 
 karman or Brahma. 
 
 Here then it was that philosophy was called in, 
 nay was first brought to life, and the answer which 
 it gave as to the origin of suffering or, in a wider 
 sense, the origin of evil, was that all that seemed 
 wrong in the world must have been the effect of 
 causes, of deeds done, if not in this, then in a former 
 life. No deed (Karman) good or bad, small or 
 great, could ever be without its effect, its reward 
 or punishment. This was the fundamental principle 
 of their ethics, and an excellent principle it was. 
 Jt was but another version of what we mean by 
 eternal punishment, without which the world would 
 fall to pieces ; for it has rightly been observed that
 
 NATURE OF PAIN. 363 
 
 eternal punishment is in reality but another name 
 for eternal love. This idea of eternal love, however, 
 cannot hang in the air, it presupposes an eternal 
 lover, a personal God, a creator and ruler of the 
 world : but even this idea Indian philosophers would 
 not have taken for granted. In some cases, though 
 allowing deeds to have their effects, they went so 
 far as to admit at least the superintending care 
 of a Divine Being, just as the giver of rain enables 
 seeds to grow, though the seeds themselves were 
 the deeds performed by men, as independent actors, 
 and therefore liable to take all their consequences 
 upon themselves, whether good or evil. 
 
 But though this ought to have sufficed to convince 
 men that the world was exactly as it ought to be, 
 and could not have been otherwise, because man 
 himself had made it what it was, whether as an 
 individual or as a member of a class, there arose 
 a new question which could not well be suppressed, 
 namely, Whether it was beyond the power of man 
 ever to put an end to the unbroken and irresistible 
 sequence of the effects of the deeds of himself and 
 of his fellow creatures ; whether, in fact, the cycle of 
 life and death, or what was called Samsara, would 
 go on for ever. And here the bold answer was, 
 Yes, the Samsara can be stopped, man's former 
 acts can be shaken off and annihilated, but by one 
 means only, by means of knowledge or philosophy. 
 In order to achieve this deliverance from all suffering, 
 from all limitation, from all the bondage of the 
 world, man must learn what he really is. He must 
 learn that he is not the body, for the body decays and 
 dies, and with it all bodily sufferings might seem to 
 end. But this is again denied, because through an in-
 
 364 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 visible agency (Adnshtfa or Apurva) a new Ego would 
 spring up, liable to suffer for its former acts, just as 
 it was in this life. A man must learn therefore that 
 he is not even what is meant by the Ego, for the 
 Ego also has been formed by surroundings or cir- 
 cumstances, and will vanish again like everything 
 else. Then what remains ? There remains behind the 
 body, and behind the Ego, or the individual person, 
 what is called the Purusha or the Atman, the Self, 
 and that Self is to be recognised either as identical 
 with what was in earlier times conceived and called 
 the Divine, the Eternal, the Unconditioned, namely, 
 Brahman, or as Purusha, perfect, independent, and 
 absolute in itself, blissful in its independence and in 
 the complete aloofness from everything else. The 
 former was, as we saw, the view of the Vedanta, 
 the latter is the view of the Samkhya-philosophy. 
 Both may have had the same roots, but they differ 
 in their later growth. The view which the Vedanta 
 took of man has sometimes been mistaken for human 
 apotheosis. But people forget that for these philo- 
 sophers there were no theoi left whose company man 
 could have joined, and whose eminence they could 
 have reached. The Divine which they meant was 
 the Divine in man, and what they wanted was 
 reconciliation between the Divine within and the 
 Divine without. Their Moksha or Nirvana was not 
 meant for Vergotterung, not even for the Vergottung 
 of Eckhart ; it was meant for complete freedom, 
 freedom from all conditions and limitations, self- 
 clom, in fact, whether as recovery of the Divine as 
 Brahman, or as Atman, or as something beyond all 
 names that had ever been given to the Divine, as 
 the eternal Subject, undetermined by any qualities,
 
 NATUKE OF PAIN. 365 
 
 satisfied and blissful in his own being and in his 
 own thinking. 
 
 Whatever we may think of these two solutions 
 of the world's great riddle, we cannot but admire 
 their originality and their daring, particularly if we 
 compare them with the solutions proposed by other 
 philosophers, whether of ancient or modern times. 
 None of them seems to me to have so completely 
 realised what may be called the idea of the soul 
 as the Phoenix, consumed by the fire of thought 
 and rising from his own ashes, soaring towards 
 regions which are more real than anything that can 
 be called real in this life. Such views cannot be 
 criticised as we criticise ordinary systems of religion 
 or morality. They are visions, if you like, but they 
 are visions which, to have seen is like having 
 been admitted to the vision of another world ; of 
 a world that must exist, however different in its 
 eternal silence from what we and from what the 
 ancient seers of India imagined it to be. 
 
 The most curious thing is that such views could 
 be held by the philosophers of India without 
 bringing them into conflict with the representatives 
 of the ancient religion of the country. It is true 
 that the Samkhya-philosophy was accused of atheism, 
 but that atheism was very different from what we 
 mean by it. It was the negation of the necessity 
 of admitting an active or limited personal god, and 
 hence was carefully distinguished in India from the 
 atheism of the Nastikas or nihilists, who denied 
 the existence of anything transcendent, of anything 
 beyond our bodily senses, of anything divine. To 
 call the Samkhya atheistic, and the Vedanta not, 
 would be philosophically most unfair, and it does
 
 366 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Indian priesthood great credit that they treated 
 both systems as orthodox, or at all events as not 
 prohibited, provided always that the students had, 
 by a previous severe discipline, acquired the strength 
 and fitness necessary for so arduous a task. 
 
 How different the world of thought in India was 
 from our own, we may see by an extraordinary 
 defence set up for the so-called atheism of the 
 Samkhya-philosophy. It seems to us perfectly 
 absurd, but it was by no means so, if we consider 
 the popular superstitions of the Hindus at the time. 
 It was a common belief in India that man could, by 
 severe penance, raise himself to the status of a god, 
 or Deva. There are ever so many legends to that 
 effect. This might no doubt be called apotheosis ; 
 and it was expressly stated that it was in order 
 to put an end to such vain desires of becoming 
 personal gods that Kapila ignored or left out of 
 question the existence of such theomorphic or 
 anthropomorphic beings as could ever excite the 
 rivalry of men. We are hardly prepared for such 
 explanations, and yet in India they seem quite 
 'bond fide. 
 
 Vedanta and Samkhya. 
 
 We have thus finished our account of the Vedanta 
 and of the Sa?>ikhya-philosophy. At first sight no two 
 philosophies would seem to be so different from each 
 other, nay, to start from such opposite points of view 
 as the Vedanta and the Samkhya. The Vedantist of 
 the school of /Sa?>zkara looks upon the whole world, 
 including animate and inanimate nature, including 
 the small gods and the still smaller men, as a pheno- 
 menal manifestation of an unknown power which he 
 calls Brahman. There is nothing beside it, nothing
 
 VEDANTA, AVIDYA, AND AVIVEKA. 367 
 
 that can be called real except this one invisible 
 Brahman. Then came the question, But whence 
 this phenomenal world ? or rather, as he starts with 
 the idea of there being but one real being from 
 eternity to eternity, How could that eternal Brahman 
 ever give rise to the world, not only as its efficient, 
 but also as its material cause, if indeed there is any- 
 thing material in the objects known to the Vedantist? 
 Under the circumstances thus given, but one answer 
 is possible, That Brahman is the world, and that the 
 world, so far as it is Brahman, but so far only, is 
 real. The phenomenal world, such as we see it and 
 live in it, is changeful, ever passing away, and con- 
 sequently never, in the Vedantic sense of that word, 
 real. We never see it or know it, as it really is, until 
 we have become Ved^ntists. It is impossible to think 
 that this eternal Being, whatever name be given to 
 it, could ever change or be changed. This view of the 
 universe as a development of Brahman was possibly 
 the original view taken by Badaraya?ia, and it was 
 clearly that of Ramanu^a and his followers, who 
 explain the world as an evolution (Pari/iama). But 
 this was not $amkara's theory. He accepts the 
 two facts that the world is changing and unreal, 
 and yet that the real cause of it, that is, Brahman, 
 is incapable of change. 
 
 Vedanta, Avidya, and Aviveka. 
 
 Hence nothing remains but to ascribe the change- 
 ful phenomenal character of the world to something 
 else, and, according to the Vedanta, to ignorance, not. 
 however, to our individual ignorance, but to some 
 primeval ignorance directed towards Brahman as 
 manifested and seen. This ignorance or Avidya,
 
 368 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 again, is not to be called real, it is nothing by the 
 side of Brahman, nothing therefore that could ever 
 have dominion over Brahman. All such views are 
 excluded by the postulate that Brahman is free, is one 
 and all ; though here again, other Vedantists differ 
 from $a?kara, and represent Avidy& as an actual 
 power (/Siakti) of Brahman, or as Maya, i. e. illusive 
 power, which in fact performs, or is answerable for 
 what we call creation. We should of course ask at 
 once, Whence comes that Avidy& or that Maya, and 
 what is it ? How can it be anything, if not again 
 Brahman, the only thing that exists ? The answer 
 given by $amkara, which satisfied his mind, if not 
 the minds of other Vedantists, was that we know 
 as a fact that Avidy4 or Nescience is there, but 
 we also know that it is not there, as soon as we 
 see through it, in fact, as soon as we are able 
 to annihilate it by Vidya or knowledge, such as 
 is given to us by the Vedanta-philosophy. The 
 Vedantist holds that nothing that can be annihi- 
 lated can claim true reality for itself. Therefore 
 Avidya, though it is, must not be called something 
 real. The great difficulty how Brahman could 
 ever be affected by Avidya, which is a weakness or 
 a defect, is avoided by looking upon Brahman, while 
 affected by Avidya or seen through Avidya, as for 
 the time under a cloud or forgetful of itself, but 
 never really unreal. We ourselves also, that is the 
 individual souls, can be in full reality nothing but 
 Brahman, though for a while we are divided from 
 
 7 O 
 
 it, because forgetful of Brahman through Avidya. 
 While that state of Avidya lasts the true Brahman, 
 neuter, may become to us Brahma, masculine, may 
 become the creator and ruler of the world, and, as
 
 SAMKHYA, AVIVEKA. 369 
 
 such, receive worship from his creatures. But as 
 soon as the cloud of. Avidya is lifted, this creator 
 also recedes and is restored at once to his true state 
 and dignity. He, the so-called Isvara, or Lord, or 
 Creator, becomes what he is and always has been, 
 the whole Brahman ; and we ourselves also remember 
 and thereby recover our true Brahmahood, or Self- 
 hood, not as if we had ever been divided from it, but 
 only as having been blinded for a while by Avidy& 
 so as to forget ourselves, our true Self, that is 
 Brahman. 
 
 Sawkhya, Aviveka. 
 
 The Samkhya takes what seems a very different 
 attitude towards the problem of the world. These 
 attitudes towards the world form indeed the kernel 
 of every philosophy. If we call the Vedanta monistic, 
 the Samkhya is decidedly dualistic. It accepts the 
 whole objective universe as real, and calls it Pra- 
 knti, a word often translated by Nature, but in 
 reality untranslatable, because the idea which it 
 represents has never arisen in our philosophy. 
 PrakHti may be called the undeveloped matter 
 or Urstoff, containing in itself the possibilities of all 
 things. By itself it has no consciousness, it simply 
 grows or develops into consciousness when seen by 
 Purusha. And it develops not only into an objective 
 or material world, but at the same time, into what 
 we should call the subjective or intellectual world, 
 supplying the instruments of perception and thought, 
 both what perceives and what is perceived. The 
 question whence it came is never asked, as little as 
 we could ask that question with regard to Brahman. 
 It is, it has been, and it has had no beginning. But 
 in order to account for the world of experience, it 
 
 Bb
 
 370 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is supposed that this undeveloped PrakHti is always 
 operative, so long as it is noticed or perceived by a 
 Purusha (Self), and always passing through a pro- 
 cess of evolution. This is an important condition. 
 Praknti is at work so long only as it is perceived 
 by a Purusha or a true Self. This would come very 
 near to the recognition of the subjectivity of all 
 our knowledge, and to the recognition that the 
 world exists for us in the form of knowledge only. 
 If we call Prak?^'ti matter, the Samkhya philosopher 
 saw clearly enough that dead, dull, inert matter 
 alone would not account for the world. Therefore 
 he makes Prak?-iti, under the eye of a Purusha, 
 develop into Buddhi, commonly translated by per- 
 ception, but really a kind of perception that 
 involves something like what we should call in- 
 tellect (rouy). What, as far as I can see, is really 
 meant by Buddhi in this place, is the lighting 
 up of Praknti or dull matter by intelligence, so 
 as to render it perceptive, and also perceptible. 
 It is the Indian ' Let there be light.' In this 
 stage Praknti is called Mahat, the great, possibly 
 in order to indicate its importance in the great 
 development of the universe. It cannot be taken 
 here in an exclusively psychological sense, though 
 it supplies, no doubt, the possibility of the intelli- 
 gence of the individual also. In the cosmical sense 
 the development of the world is often spoken of as 
 Samashfi, in the psychological sense, and as applied 
 to each individual it goes by the name of Vyash^i. 
 Thus Vu//lfma-Bhikshu (Sa?>tkhya-Sutras I, 63) re- 
 marks : As, according to passages of Sruti and 
 Smriti, such as (/fAand. Up. VI, 2, 3) ' Let me 
 multiply myself, let me procreate,' the creation of
 
 SAA/KHYA, AVIVEKA. 371 
 
 the elements, &c., is preceded by Abhimana (i. e. 
 Ahamkara or subjectivity), it follows that this 
 Abhimana is really the cause of the creation of the 
 world, as preceded by an activity of Buddhi, i.e. 
 the cosmical Buddhi, and not simply the personal 
 organ of deciding, as Buddhi is generally explained 
 when part of the individual or psychological develop- 
 ment. For shortness sake, it is sometimes said that 
 Abhimana or Ahamkara is the cause of creation, for 
 in the end all the Vikaras or evolutes serve one and 
 the same purpose. Buddhi exists in human nature 
 as the power of perception, and it is then, though 
 not quite correctly, identified with Manas or Anta^- 
 karana, the mental activity going on within us, 
 which combines and regulates the impressions of the 
 senses, as we shall see hereafter. But as a cosmic 
 force, Buddhi is that which gives light as the 
 essential condition of all knowledge, and is after- 
 wards developed into the senses, the powers of light 
 and thought, two ideas often comprehended by the 
 root Budh, to awaken or to perceive. Budh means 
 literally to awake. And as a sleeping person is dull 
 and inert to the world, but begins to perceive as 
 soon as he is awake, Prakriti also is inert till it is 
 awakened (Pra-buddha), and thus becomes Buddhi, 
 perceiving or perception. 
 
 This Buddhi, however, which, as we must always 
 remember, is here conceived as a development of 
 Prakriti, and as, as yet, neither subjective nor objec- 
 tive, requires a new development before it can serve 
 for conscious intellectual work. Perception, according 
 to the S4mkhya, cannot work without Ahamkara, 
 literally I-making or Egoism, but philosophically 
 used with a much larger meaning, namely, if I am 
 
 B b 2
 
 372 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 right, as that which produces the sense of subject, 
 and in consequence of object also. Nature, in spite 
 of being lighted up or rendered capable of perceiving 
 and being perceived, requires, even after it has 
 reached the stage of Buddhi, the division of the 
 whole world, that is, of itself, into subject and object, 
 before any real perception can take place. Subjec- 
 tivation, therefore, would seem to be the nearest 
 approach, though naturally there can be no subjec- 
 tivation without simultaneous objectivation. 
 
 After this development of Prakrit! into Buddhi, 
 and its differentiation as subjective and objective, 
 the next step is that it produces the Tanmatras, the 
 elements of the senses as well as of the sense-objects, 
 such as sight and light, hearing and sound, smelling 
 and odour, tasting and savour, feeling and touch. All 
 these, the faculties as well as the corresponding 
 qualities of sense-perception, are modifications of the 
 same Prakrit!, and therefore in one sense the same 
 thing, only viewed from different points of view, 
 as we should say, as subjective and objective, and 
 as changed at last into the material reality of 
 the sentient powers on one side, and the objective 
 world on the other. Lastly, all this development 
 remains without real consciousness, till it attracts 
 the attention of some Purusha, Spirit or Self, 
 who by becoming conscious of Prakrit! and all its 
 works, produces what is the only reality of which 
 we have any conception, the phenomenal reality of 
 a self-conscious soul. ] hope I have understood this 
 train of thought rightly, but there is much that 
 requires fuller light. Does Kapila really look upon 
 perception and thought as an instrument, ready 
 made by Prakrit! for the use of the Purusha, but
 
 SAJfKHYA, AVIVEKA. 373 
 
 remaining inert, like a telescope, till it is looked 
 through by the Purusha, or is it the first glance of 
 Purusha at Prakn'ti in its state of Avyakta or chaos, 
 that gives the first impulse to the activity of PrakHti, 
 which impulse is generally ascribed to the working 
 of the Gunas ? Much may be said for either view. 
 I do not feel competent to pronounce so decided an 
 opinion as others have done on this subject. 
 
 If the Vedantist explains what we call Creation as 
 the result of Avidya or Nescience, the Samkhya ex- 
 plains it by the temporary union bet ween Purusha and 
 Prak?^'ti. This union is said to arise from a want of 
 discrimination (Aviveka), and it is not in the highest 
 sense a real union, because it vanishes again by dis- 
 criminating knowledge (Viveka), nay, it is actually 
 said to have the one object only of evoking at last in 
 the Purusha a revulsion, and in the end a clear recog- 
 nition of his complete independence, and his freedom 
 from PrakHti (Karika 66). Thus the creation of the 
 phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal 
 world are due to nescience (Avidya) with the Vedant- 
 ist, but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the 
 Samkhya philosopher (S. S. 1, 5 5), and this want of dis- 
 crimination is actually called by the Vedantic term 
 of Avidya in the Yoga-Sutras II, 24. Where then, we 
 may well ask, is the difference between the two views 
 of the universe ? There is a difference in the mode 
 of representation, no doubt, but in the end both 
 Vedanta and Sa?7ikhya look upon what we call reality 
 as the result of a temporary error, call it nescience, 
 illusion, want of discrimination, or anything else. If, 
 therefore, philosophers like Vi^wana-Bhikshu recog- 
 nised this original similarity in the tendencies both 
 of the Vedanta and the Samkhya, it is hardly fair to
 
 374 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 blame them as having mixed and confounded the 
 two. No doubt these two philosophies diverged in 
 their later development, but they started with the 
 same object in view, and they advanced for a time 
 in the same direction. If the Vedantists desired 
 to arrive at what is called Atma-anatma-viveka, 
 discrimination between Atman and Anatman, the 
 Sa??ikhyas looked forward to Prakr/ti-purusha-viveka, 
 discrimination between Purusha and Prak?'/ti. Where 
 then is the difference ? If their later defenders forgot 
 their common interest and laid greater stress on the 
 points of difference than on the points of similarity 
 between them, it was but right that those who could 
 see deeper, should bring to light whatever features 
 there were left of the original family likeness between 
 the two philosophies. 
 
 Atman and Purusha. 
 
 Greater, however, than the difference between 
 Nescience, Avidya, and want of discrimination, Avi- 
 veka, as the causes of the world, according to Vedanta 
 and Sa??ikhya, is that between the Brahman of the 
 Vedanta, and the many Purushas of the Sawkhya. 
 According to $awkara the individual souls are not, 
 according to Kapila they are. According to the 
 former there is in reality but one Atman or Self, as 
 it were, one sun reflected in the countless waves of 
 the world-ocean ; according to the latter there are 
 many Purushas, as many as there are divine, human, 
 animal, and vegetal souls, and their plurality is 
 conceived as eternal, not as phenomenal only. On 
 this point, therefore, there is a radical difference ; 
 and this is due, as it seems to me, to a want of 
 accurate reasoning on the part of the Sii^khyas. 
 Such a peculiarity must not be slurred over in an
 
 ATMAN AND PURUSHA. 375 
 
 account of the Samkhya-philosophy, but it is fair to 
 point out what the reason of this aberration may 
 have been. From a higher point of view the Purusha 
 of Kapila is really the same as the Brahman or the 
 Atman of the Vedanta, the absolute subject. It 
 differs only in that the Purusha was never conceived 
 as the material cause of the universe, while Brahman 
 was, though, of course, with the important proviso 
 that everything material was due to Nescience. 
 Apart from that, if the Purusha was meant as abso- 
 lute, as eternal, immortal, and unconditioned, it ought 
 to have been clear to Kapila that the plurality of such 
 a Purusha would involve its being limited, determined 
 or conditioned, and would render the character of it 
 self-contradictory. Kapila has certainly brought for- 
 ward every possible argument in support of the 
 plurality of individual Purushas, but he has forgotten 
 that every plurality presupposes an original unity, 
 and that as trees in the last resort presuppose the 
 tree, as men are descended from man, call him Adam 
 or Manu or any other name, many Purushas, from 
 a metaphysical point of view, necessitate the admis- 
 sion of one Purusha, just as the many gods had to be 
 recognised as in reality the One God without a second, 
 and at last as mere mistakes of Brahman. In this 
 way Vi^?7ana-Bhikshu was right that Kapila did not 
 differ so much from Badarayana as it would seem, 
 because, if the Purushas were supposed to be many, 
 they would not be Purushas, and being Purusha 
 they would by necessity cease to be many. It may 
 be said that this is going beyond Kapila, but surely 
 we have a right to do so. 
 
 It is necessary, at all events, that we should see 
 all this clearly, just as Vi^nana-Bhikshu and other
 
 376 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophers saw it clearly, in order to perceive the 
 unity that underlies the apparent diversity in the 
 philosophy of India. Nor should we ever forget that 
 our philosophical Sutras, whatever their age, whether 
 of the fourteenth century A. D. or the fifth century B. c., 
 are but the last outcome of the philosophical activity 
 of a whole country, and that we are entirely ignorant 
 of their historical antecedents. We should remember 
 that the grammatical Sutras of Pa?nni are contra- 
 dicted again and again by grammatical forms which 
 have fortunately been preserved to us in the earlier 
 Brahmarcas and Mantras of the Vedic period. We 
 have no such remnants of an earlier period of philo- 
 sophy anterior to the Sutras, with the exception of 
 the as yet unsystematised Upanishads, and possibly 
 of some of the more ancient parts of the Mahabharata ; 
 but in other respects we are left without any earlier 
 facts, though not without a firm conviction that such 
 perfect systems as we find in the Sutras cannot 
 have sprung up in a day, still less from one brain, 
 but that they must have passed through many 
 changes for better or for worse, before they could 
 assume that final and permanent form in which 
 they are now presented to us in literature. The 
 Sutras are, in fact, the final outcome of ages of 
 inquiry and discussion. 
 
 It would seem then to follow from Vi^nana- 
 Bhikshu's remarks that in India a philosopher might 
 at one and the same time have been a follower of 
 the Vedanta as well as of the Sa?>*khya, if he could 
 only see that, where the two follow different roads, 
 they started nevertheless from the same point and 
 were proceeding towards the same goal. If this is 
 seen and accepted in a historical spirit, it can do
 
 ATMAN AND PURUSHA. 377 
 
 no harm, though no doubt there is danger of the 
 distinctive features of each system becoming blurred, 
 if we dwell too much on what they share in common 
 or on what they may have shared in common at 
 an earlier period of their growth. In one respect 
 Vi</Mna-Bhikshu, to mention him only, has certainly 
 seen more rightly by not resorting at once to the 
 idea that actual borrowing must have taken place, 
 whenever Vedanta and Samkhya shared the same 
 ideas. We should always remember that there 
 must have been a period of unrestricted growth of 
 philosophical thought in ancient India, and that 
 during that period philosophical ideas, whether true 
 or false, were common property and could be freely 
 adopted by different schools of philosophy. It was 
 in the Sutras that these schools became sterilised 
 and petrified. 
 
 On one point Vi^nana-Bhikshu may have gone too 
 far, yielding to a temptation which does not exist 
 for us. To him not only Vedanta and Samkhya, but 
 all the six Darsanas or systems of philosophy were 
 orthodox, they were all Snm'ti, though not $ruti. 
 Hence his natural desire to show that they did not 
 on any essential points contradict each other. After 
 he had reconciled to his own satisfaction the con- 
 flicting tenets of Vedanta and Samkhya, and had 
 certainly, at least to my mind, succeeded in discover- 
 ing the common background of both of them, he 
 attempted to do the same for the Nyaya and Vaise- 
 shika. These two, as he says, as they represent the 
 Self as endowed with qualities, might seem to be 
 contradicted by the Vedanta and Samkhya which 
 show that the Self, or the Purusha, cannot be endowed 
 with qualities ; but this is not so. Nyaya and Vaise-
 
 378 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 shika are intended, as he thinks, as a first step only 
 towards the truth ; and though they admit the Self 
 to be qualified by pain and joy, they teach that the 
 Self is at all events different from the body. This is 
 what marks the first advance toward a right under- 
 standing of the Self, not only as different from the body, 
 but as unaffected by pain and joy, as neither suffer- 
 ing nor enjoying, as neither thinking nor acting in 
 any way. To the followers of the Nyaya-philosophy 
 also, Brahman, the Absolute, is AnirvaA'aniya, unde- 
 finable or inexpressible. The full light, however, of the 
 Sa?>ikhya-doctrine might dazzle the beginner, and 
 hence, according to Vi^ftana-Bhikshu, the usefulness 
 of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika, as slowly preparing him 
 for the acceptance of the highest truth. There does 
 not, however, seem to be any ancient evidence to 
 support this view of Vu/mma-Bhikshu's, that the 
 Nyaya and Vai.seshika were intended as a prepara- 
 tion only, still less that they existed as systems 
 before the doctrines of the Samkhya began to in- 
 fluence the thinkers of India. The Sawkhya is 
 indeed mentioned in the Mahabharata (XII, 1 1 1, 98) 
 as the highest truth, but the other systems are 
 never represented as merely preparations for it. They 
 present themselves as independent philosophies, quite 
 as much as the other Darxanas : nor do I remember 
 any passage where Gotama and Ka/<ada themselves 
 represent their teaching as a mere step leading to 
 the higher knowledge of Vedanta or Sawkhya, nor 
 any utterance of P>adarayaa or Kapila to the effect 
 that such preparation was required. 
 
 Origin of Avidyfi,. 
 
 The question which the Sawkhya may seem to 
 have left unanswered, but which is really unanswer-
 
 THE SASTRA. 379 
 
 able, is, How this Aviveka, this failure of Purusha to 
 recognise himself as distinct from PrakHti, could 
 ever have arisen, and how and by what stages the 
 development of Prakr&ti may be supposed to have 
 taken place which led in the end to the delusion 
 of Purusha and made him look on the senses, on the 
 Manas (central sense), on the Aham or ego, nay on 
 Buddhi or intellect, on everything, in fact, within 
 his experience, as belonging to him, as his own ? 
 What Kapila wishes to teach is that nothing is in 
 reality his own or belongs to him except his Self, or, 
 as he calls it, the Purusha. Here we can observe 
 a real difference between Sawkhya and Vedanta. 
 And while in all these discussions Badarayana had 
 only to appeal to the Veda in support of any one 
 of his statements, Kapila, with all his regard for 
 Aptava&ana, had evidently meant to reason out his 
 system by himself, though without any declared 
 antagonism to the Vedas. Hence the Sutras of 
 Kapila received the name of Manana-sastra, institute 
 of reasoned truth. 
 
 The Sastra. 
 
 If then it is asked how Kapila came to know 
 anything about Prakriti or Urstoff which, as super- 
 intended by Purusha, is said to stand for the whole 
 of creation, and how we ourselves can know any- 
 thing about its various developments, beginning 
 with Buddhi or intellect, and going on from Buddhi 
 to Ahamkara, the making of the I or Ego, or sub- 
 jectivity as inseparable from objectivity, and from 
 Ahamkara to the Tanmatras or subtle substances, 
 &c., we have to confess with the author of the 
 Samkhya-sara (p. 1 6) that there was nothing but the 
 $astra itself to depend on in support of what may
 
 380 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be felt to be very crude and startling assertions l . 
 $astra sometimes stands for Veda, but it cannot 
 well be taken in that sense here. It seems rather 
 to point to the existence of a treatise, such as 
 the Sa?ftkhya-karika or the original text of the 
 Samkhya- Sutras, or the whole body of Samkhya- 
 philosophy, as handed down from time immemorial 
 in various schools in India. At first sight, no doubt, 
 it seems strange to us to derive Buddhi or Intellect 
 from PrakHti, nature, or from Avyakta, the unde- 
 veloped. But we must remember that all these 
 English renderings are very imperfect. Prak?"iti is 
 very different from nature or 0i/o-i?, though there is 
 hardly a more convenient term to render it by. 
 In the Samkhya-philosophy Prakriti is a postulated 
 something that exists, and that produces every- 
 thing without being itself produced. When it is 
 called Avyakta, that means that it is, at first, 
 chaotic, undeveloped, and invisible. 
 
 Development of Prakriti, Cosmic. 
 In place of this one Prakriti we often read of 
 eight Prakrttis, those beginning with Buddhi or the 
 Mahat being distinguished as produced as well as 
 producing, while the first, the Avyakta, is producing 
 only, but not produced. This need not mean more 
 than that the seven modifications (Vikaras) and 
 
 1 For the actual succession in the evolution of AhawkAra 
 from the Mahat, and of the Mnh;it from Prakr/ti, &c., the 
 S'dstrn alone, we are told, can be our authority, and not infer- 
 ence, because inference can only lead us to the conclusion that 
 all effects must have a cause, while there is no inference to 
 prove either the succession beginning with the elements, or 
 that beginning with the mind in the way in which the Saw- 
 khya-philosophy teaches. Then what is meant by 6astra here ?
 
 BETEOSPECT. 381 
 
 forms of Prakn'ti are all effects, and serve again as 
 causes, while the Avyakta itself, the undeveloped 
 Prakriti, has no antecedent cause, but serves as cause 
 only for all the other forms of PrakHti. 
 
 Retrospect. 
 
 After going through the long list of topics which 
 form the elements of the Samkhya-philosophy, it 
 may be well to try to give a more general view 
 of Kapila's system. Whether we begin with the 
 beginning, the postulated PrakHti, or with the end, 
 the phenomenal world as reflected by the Indriyas 
 and the Manas, it is but natural that Kapila should 
 have asked himself the question how what was pos- 
 tulated as the beginning, the undeveloped PrakHti, 
 could account for all that was to follow, or how all 
 that did follow could be traced back to this postu- 
 lated Prakriti. Given the undeveloped PrakHti, he 
 imagined that it was due to the disturbance of the 
 equilibrium of its three constituents (Gunas) that it 
 was first awakened to life and light or thought, to 
 physical and intellectual activity. Some such impulse 
 is required by all metaphysicians, a ir^rov K.IVOVV. 
 This first step in the development of Prak?"iti, this 
 first awakening of the inert substance, is conceived 
 by Kapila as Buddhi, the lighting up, and hence, 
 so long as it is confined to PrakHti, described as 
 Prakasa, or light, the chief condition of all per- 
 ception. After Praknti has thus been lighted up 
 and become Buddhi, or potential perception, another 
 distinction was necessary in this luminous and per- 
 ceiving mass, in this so-called Mahat or Buddhi, 
 namely, the differentiation between perceiver and 
 what is perceived, between subject and object. This
 
 382 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 was the work assigned, I believe, to Aha?ttkara, which 
 I should prefer to translate by subjectivation (Snb- 
 jectivirung, Garbe) rather than by Ego or Egoism. 
 
 This step from Buddhi to Ahamkara has been 
 compared to Des Cartes' Cogito ergo sum\ but is it 
 not rather Sum, ergo cogito, as showing that being 
 itself would be impossible unless it were first lighted 
 up, and differentiated into subject and object, that 
 esse, in fact, is per dpi, or even percipere ? 
 
 When the evolution of the Avyakta has gone so 
 far, the question arises, how this process of perception 
 could take place, how perception is possible subjec- 
 tively, how it is possible objectively. If we begin 
 with the objective side, the answer of Kapila is that 
 there must be Tanmatras (This-only), potential per- 
 ceptilnlia, which are not the potentialities of every- 
 thing in general, but of this and this only(Tan-matra). 
 These five potentialities are Sound, Touch, Odour, 
 Light, and Taste. They are not yet what is actually 
 heard, seen, &c., nor what actually hears and sees, but 
 they contain the possibilities of both. As there is no 
 hearing without sound, the Sawkhyas seem to have 
 argued, neither is there any sound without hearing. 
 But there is in the Tanmatras the potentiality of 
 both. Hence, according to the division produced by 
 Ahamkara into subject and object, the five Tan- 
 matras are realised as the five subjective powers of 
 perception, the powers of hearing, touching, smelling, 
 seeing, and tasting, and corresponding to them as 
 the five objects of sense, the objects of sound, touch, 
 odour, sight, and taste. In their final form the 
 five potential Tanmatras stand before us in their 
 
 1 Duvies, Hindu Philosophy, p. 18.
 
 RETKOSPECT. 383 
 
 material shape, subjectively as ear, skin, nose, eyes, 
 and tongue, objectively as ether, air, light, water, 
 and earth (the five Mahabhutas). These five supply 
 all possible and real forms under which perception 
 can and does take place. 
 
 It should be remembered, however, that in order to 
 account for perception such as it really is, another, 
 a sixth sense, is necessary, in addition to the five, 
 which is called Manas, generally translated by mind, 
 but really a kind of central organ of perception, 
 acting as a door-keeper, meant to prevent the 
 crowding in of perceptions, to arrange them into 
 percepts, and, as we should say, into concepts also, 
 being in fact the conditio sine qud non of all well- 
 ordered and rational thought. One might feel in- 
 clined to translate Manas by brain, if brain had not 
 become so unscientific a term in our days. It might 
 also be called the point of attention and appercep- 
 tion, but even this would hardly help us to a clear 
 view of what Kapila really meant by Manas. Only 
 we must guard against taking this Manas, or mind, for 
 the true Self. Manas is as much a mere instrument 
 of knowledge and a product of PrakHti as the five 
 senses. They all are necessary for the work of 
 perception, conception, and all the rest, as a kind 
 of clockwork, quite different from the highest Self, 
 whether it is called Atman or Purusha. The Purusha 
 watches the clockwork, and is for a time misled into 
 believing in his identity with the workings of Prakriti. 
 
 This is but a poor attempt to make the Samkhya 
 view of being and knowing intelligible, and I am 
 far from maintaining that \ve have gained, as yet, 
 a full insight into the problems which troubled 
 Kapila, or into the solutions which he proposed.
 
 384 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 What I feel is, that it is not enough simply to 
 repeat the watchwords of any ancient philosophy, 
 which are easily accessible in the Sutras, but that 
 we must at least make an attempt to bring those 
 ancient problems near to us, to make them, our own, 
 and try to follow the ancient thinkers along the few 
 footsteps which they left behind. 
 
 There is an illustration in the Sawkhya-tattva- 
 Kaumudi 36, which suggests a very different view 
 of the process of knowing, and deserves to be taken 
 into consideration : 'As the seniors of a village,' they 
 say, ' collect taxes from the householders and hand 
 them over to the governor of the district, who 
 again remits them to the treasurer, and the trea- 
 surer to the king, thus do the outer senses, when 
 they have perceived anything, hand it on to the 
 inner sense, the Manas, the organ which determines 
 what there is and then hands it over to Aha??ikara, 
 and the Ahawkara, after appropriating it, to the 
 Buddhi, the supreme Lord.' Here Buddhi, though 
 supreme, is decidedly different from the cosmic 
 Buddhi that springs from the Avyakta and leads 
 to Ahawikara ; nor is it easy to see how these two 
 Buddhis, or rather that one Buddhi in its two func- 
 tions, could have been admitted by one and the 
 same philosopher. 
 
 Is Sa?nkhya Idealism ? 
 
 There is another point on which it is difficult to 
 come to a clear understanding. We are asked 
 whether the Hindus fully realised the fact that we 
 are conscious of our sensations only, and that all 
 we call bodies, or the outside or objective world, is 
 no more than the result of an irresistible inference 
 of our mind, which may be called Avidya. We are
 
 IS SAAfKHYA IDEALISM? 385 
 
 conscious, no doubt, that we are not ourselves the 
 cause of our sensations, that we do not make 
 the sky, but that it is given us. But beyond that, 
 our world is only an inductive world, it is, so to 
 say, our creation ; we make the sky concave or 
 blue, and all that remains, after deducting both 
 the primary and secondary qualities, is PrakHti 
 as looked at by Purusha, or, as we should say, das 
 Ding an sich, which we can never know directly. 
 It is within us, or under our sway, that this 
 PrakHti has grown to all that it is, not excluding 
 our own bodies, our senses, our Manas, our Tanmatras, 
 our Ahamkara, our Buddhi. Was this the view 
 taken by the Samkhyas ? Did they see that the 
 Saft&ara, the development of the world, takes place 
 within us, is our growth, though not our work, that 
 the light which, as Buddhi emerges from Prakriti, is 
 the light within us that has the power of perceiving 
 by its light ; that both the Aham, the Ego, and the 
 Tvam, the Non-Ego, determine not only ourselves, 
 but the whole world, and that what we call the real, 
 the sensuously perceiving and perceived world, is no 
 more than the development of thoughtless nature 
 as reflected through the senses on our enchanted 
 Self? The riddle of the world which the Samkhya- 
 philosophy has to solve would then be no more than 
 to account for the mistaken interest which the Self 
 takes in that reflex, the consciousness which he 
 assumes of it, the fundamental error by which, for 
 a time at least, he actually identifies himself with 
 those images. This identifying process would, from 
 this point of view, really take the place of what we 
 call creation. The closing of the mental eyelids 
 would be the dropping of the curtain and the close 
 
 c c
 
 386 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the drama of the world ; and this final recogni- 
 tion of our cosmic misconception would lead the 
 Self back from the stage of the world to himself, 
 would undo all creation, and put an end to that 
 suffering which is the result of bondage or finiteness. 
 It sometimes seems to me as if such views had been 
 at the bottom of all Hindu philosophy, though for- 
 gotten again or obscured by a belief in that reality 
 which determines our practical life (Vyavahara). By 
 admitting this blending of cosmic and psychological 
 views, much in the Sa??ikhya-philosophy would cease 
 to be obscure, the Buddhi of the world and the 
 Buddhi of ourselves would indeed become one, and 
 the belief in the reality of things, both objective 
 and subjective, might truly be explained as due to 
 Aviveka, the absence of discrimination between the 
 Self and the imagery of nature. It would become 
 intelligible why Prakn'ti should be supposed to play 
 her part so long only as it was noticed by Purusha ; 
 it would explain why Prakn'ti, by itself, was taken 
 as A&etana, objective, thoughtless, and the Purusha 
 only as subjective, conscious and thinking ; why in 
 its solitude Purusha was conceived as not active, 
 but Prakn'ti as always active ; why Purusha should 
 sometimes mean the eternal Self, and sometimes 
 man such as he is or imagines himself to be, w r hile 
 interested in the world, believing in the world, and 
 yet with a constant longing after a higher and truer 
 state, freedom from the world, freedom from pain, 
 freedom from all cosmic being, freedom as alone with 
 
 himself. 
 
 Purusha and Prakr/ti. 
 
 But if we may credit the founders of the Samkhya, 
 whether Kapila or Asuri or Parl/rasikha, with such
 
 STATE OF PURUSHA, WHEN FREE. 387 
 
 advanced views, if they really had made it quite 
 clear to themselves that human beings cannot have 
 anything but their own knowledge, we can under- 
 stand why they should have represented the whole 
 process of perception and combination, all joy and 
 pain, and, in consequence, all willing also, as belong- 
 ing, not to the Purusha or the Self, but to a stranger, 
 to the Manas, and indirectly to Prak?"iti, while 
 the Purusha, when he seems to see, to combine, to 
 rejoice, to suffer, and to will, does so by misappre- 
 hension only, like a spectator who is carried away 
 by his sympathies for Hecuba, but who in the end 
 dries his tears and stops his sighs, leaves the theatre 
 of the world, and breathes the fresh air of a bright 
 night. The Samkhya uses this very simile. The 
 whole development of PrakHti, it is said, takes 
 place only when Purusha is looking on the dancer, 
 that is, on Prakrfti, in all her disguises. If he does 
 not look, she does not dance for him, and as soon 
 as he turns his eyes entirely away from her, she 
 altogether ceases to try to please him. She may 
 please others who are still looking at her, and so far 
 it may be said that she is never annihilated, because 
 there will always be new Purushas to be enchanted 
 and enchained for awhile, but at last to be set 
 free by her. 
 
 State of Purusha, when Free. 
 
 Often has the question been asked, What then 
 becomes of the Purusha, after the spell of Prakriti 
 has been broken, and he has ceased to take any in- 
 terest in the phantasmagoria of the world, thrown 
 on him by the Manas and all the products of PrakHti 
 that support the Manas. But this is a question 
 
 c c 2
 
 388 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which no philosophy can be expected to answer. All 
 that can be said is that Purusha, freed from all 
 PrakHtic bonds, whether ignorance or knowledge, 
 joy or sorrow, would remain himself, would be what 
 he alone can be, unrestricted, not interfered with, 
 free and independent, and hence, in the highest 
 sense of the word, perfect and happy in himself. 
 This ineffable state of bliss has naturally shared the 
 fate of similar conceptions, such as the oneness with 
 Brahman, the NiAsreyasa or Non plus ultra, and 
 the Nirvana of the Buddhists. In the eyes of less 
 advanced thinkers, this unfathomable bliss assumed 
 naturally the character of paradisiacal happiness 
 painted in the most brilliant and even sensuous 
 colours, while to the truly enlightened it repre- 
 sented tranquillity (/Santi), perfect rest, and self- 
 satisfaction. While I agree with Dr. Dahlmann l 
 that the Buddhist idea of Nirvana was the same, 
 originally, as that of the higher bliss of the Vedanta 
 and Sar/ikhya-philosophy, I cannot believe that it 
 was borrowed by the Buddhists from either of those 
 systems. Nirvana was one of the ideas that were 
 in the air in India, and it was worked out by 
 Bud dim as well as by Kapila and Badaniyana, but by 
 each in his own fashion. The name itself, like many 
 technical terms of Buddha's teaching, was no doubt 
 Brahmanic. It occurs in the Vedanta, though it is 
 absent in the Sa?/ikhya-Sutras. We see in the 
 Buddhist Suttas how it was used by the Buddhists, 
 at first, in the simple sense of freedom from passion, 
 but was developed higher and higher, till in the 
 
 1 Nirvana, eine Studio zur Vorgeschichto dos Buddhismus 
 von Joseph Dahlmann, S.J. Berlin, 1896.
 
 MEANING OF PAIN. 389 
 
 end it became altogether negative. If it had been 
 simply taken over by Buddha from some individual 
 teacher of an established philosophy, it would betray 
 its origin, while we see it spring up as naturally in 
 Buddha's philosophy as in that of Badarayawa and 
 Kapila. They all took their materials from the 
 same stratum of thought, and elaborated them 
 into systems, probably about the same time. But in 
 spite of Dr. Dahlmann's very learned and very able 
 pleading, I must say once more that I cannot yet 
 see any evidence for supposing that either Buddha 
 borrowed direct from Kapila or that Kapila borrowed 
 from Buddha. 
 
 Kapila does not enter into a minute analysis of 
 his Nirvana, or, as he calls it, Kaivalya, aloneness. 
 His object was to show how pain arose and how pain 
 can be absolutely removed. If freedom from limita- 
 tion and pain is happiness, that happiness can be 
 secured by the Samkhya just as much as by the 
 Vedanta and the Buddhist-philosophy; but though 
 the Vedantist admits happiness (Ananda) by the 
 side of existence and perception (Sa&-/;it), as peculiar 
 to the highest Brahman, he does not attempt to 
 explain what kind of happiness he means ; and some 
 Vedanta philosophers have actually objected to 
 Ananda or happiness as a positive predicate of the 
 highest Brahman. Negatively, however, this happi- 
 ness may surely be defined as freedom from pain, free- 
 dom from all limits or fetters, and therefore perfect 
 bliss. 
 
 Meaning of Pain. 
 
 It would seem extraordinary, and wholly unworthy 
 of a great philosopher, if Kapila had had eyes for 
 the ordinary sufferings only which are entailed on
 
 390 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 all the sons of men. He must have known that there 
 is happiness also for them, and something between 
 suffering and happiness, the even tenour of a man's 
 life. Kapila meant something else by pain. He 
 seems to have felt what Schelling felt, that sadness 
 cleaves to all finite life, but that is very different 
 from always being intent on getting rid of the suffer- 
 ings inherent in life on earth. Kapila evidently meant 
 by Du/^kha or pain something more than physical 
 or even mental suffering, namely the consciousness 
 of being conditioned, limited, or fettered, which is 
 inseparable from this life. But whatever suffering 
 he may have meant, the method suggested by him 
 for its removal is certainly bold and decided. All 
 this suffering, he tells us, is not, as we imagine, our 
 suffering. Like the whole evolution of PrakHti, this 
 suffering also belongs to PrakHti and not to our- 
 selves, not to the Purushas. 
 
 Purusha. 
 
 In order to explain the world, we have to admit 
 not only Prakriti, rising in the form of Buddhi, 
 Ahawkara, and Manas to the height or the deptli 
 of individual existence, perception, and action, 
 but likewise another quite independent being, the 
 Purusha, the real or the better and truer Self, and 
 therefore very much the same as the Atman of the 
 Vedanta. Both Purusha and Atman, it should be 
 remembered, are absent in Buddha's teaching, and 
 by their removal the idea of Nirvana has become 
 almost meaningless. But on this point also we 
 must wait for further light. 
 
 With Kapila the Purusha or Self always remains, 
 after as well as before his release. It is true he is
 
 PRAK.R/TI AN AUTOMATON? 39! 
 
 only the looker on of all that takes place through 
 Prakrtti, looking as it were into a glass in which all 
 the doings of Prakn'ti are mirrored. For a time by 
 some strange want of discernment, this Purusha, 
 
 o 
 
 always one of many Purushas, forgets his true nature 
 and identifies himself with this image of PrakHti. 
 He imagines therefore that he himself sees and 
 hears, that he himself suffers and rejoices, that he 
 himself is an I, really possessing all that the world 
 offers to him, and unwilling to give it up again, 
 whether in life or in death. His very body, how- 
 ever, his organs of sense, nay his mind and his 
 individuality, are neither he, nor his ; and if he can 
 only learn the wisdom of Kapila, he is for ever above 
 the body, above all sensation, above all suffering. 
 Nay Prakriti even, which has no soul, but acts only 
 as impelled by her nature when looked at by Purusha, 
 ceases her jugglery as soon as Purusha turns away. 
 
 Prakrit! an Automaton? 
 
 It might possibly help us to understand the rela- 
 tion between Purusha and Praknti better, if we 
 saw in Prakriti an automaton, such as Des Cartes 
 described, performing all the functions which we 
 consider our own and which are common to man 
 and animals, as in fact a mere mechanism, and if we 
 took the rational soul, the Purusha, as the chose 
 pensante, superadded to the automaton. It was 
 Professor Huxley who showed that, as a consequence 
 of this assumption, all our mental conditions might 
 be regarded as simply the symbols (Pratibimba) in 
 consciousness of the changes which take place auto- 
 matically in the organism. In the same way all the 
 changes of PrakHti, from mere sensation to con-
 
 392 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ceptual thought, might be taken as including pain 
 and joy and consequent action, the working of 
 PrakHti, independent of the looker on, although 
 that looker on in his enchanted state imagines that 
 he is himself doing what in reality Prak?^'ti is doing 
 for him. This is beautifully illustrated by the simile 
 of the dancing-girl to which we referred before, but 
 who is here represented not only as intent on pleas- 
 ing and beguiling Purusha, but as trying herself to 
 open his eyes and make him free from her charms 
 and fetters. We thus get a new application of the 
 simile mentioned before. 
 
 Prakr/ti's Unselfishness. 
 
 We read in the Karikas 59-62 : ' As a dancer 
 having exhibited herself on the stage ceases to dance, 
 so does Nature (PrakHti) cease, when she has made 
 herself manifest to Purusha. 
 
 60. In many ways PrakHti serves Purusha, who 
 yet does nothing for her in return ; she is noble 
 minded and cares only for the welfare of him who 
 is so ungrateful to her. 
 
 6 1. There is nothing more modest, I think, than 
 Prakriti, who does not expose herself again to the 
 gaze of Purusha, after she knows that she has been 
 gazed at. 
 
 62. No Purusha is therefore really chained, nor 
 does lie become free, or wander ; Praknti alone, 
 dependent as she is on different Purushas, wanders 
 from birth to birth, is bound, and is freed/ 
 
 In fact it would seem that Praknti, in enchanting 
 or binding Purusha, has no object in view except that 
 Purusha should in the end perceive his fetters, and 
 by discrimination become free from them (Kurika 59).
 
 GROSS AND SUBTLE BODY. 393 
 
 Here is indeed the Gordian knot of the whole 
 Samkhya-philosophy. We believe for a time in our 
 own physical nature and in the nature by which we 
 are surrounded, and so long as we do this, we suffer. 
 We are exposed to all kinds of pain, till our eyes are 
 opened and we learn that it is Prak?^'ti that sees 
 and acts, that kills and is killed, that suffers, while 
 we imagine that we ourselves do and suffer all this. 
 As soon as this insight has been gained, as soon as 
 Purusha has distinguished between himself and what 
 is not himself, liberation is achieved at once, and the 
 dance of life is ended for ever, at least so far as the 
 liberated Self is concerned. Until that final liberation 
 has been accomplished and everything like body has 
 been completely removed, transmigration continues, 
 and the Purusha is supposed to be clothed in what 
 is called the Liriga-sarira, or subtle body. Whatever 
 we may think of the truth of such a system we can- 
 not help admiring its consistency throughout, and its 
 boldness and heroism in cutting the Gordian knot. 
 
 Gross and Subtle Body. 
 
 The idea of a subtle body by the side of our 
 gross body is very natural ; and we know that 
 among the Greeks also Pythagoras claimed a subtle 
 ethereal clothing for the soul apart from its grosser 
 clothing when united with the body. But the exact 
 nature of that subtle body and its relation to the 
 grosser body is by no means as clear as we could 
 wish it to be. 
 
 Both Samkhyas and Vedantists agreed in admit- 
 ting the necessity of a subtle body in order to make 
 the process of migration after death intelligible. 
 In the Vedanta the name of that body, or vehicle,
 
 394 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or Asraya for the journey of the soul from existence 
 to existence is Sukshma-sarira, the subtle body. 
 The Vedantists look upon this thin and transparent 
 vehicle of the soul as a seminal or potential (Vigra 
 or akti) body, which at death leaves the coarse 
 material body, without being injured itself. This 
 subtle body arises, according to the Vedanta, from 
 the so-called Upadhis (conditions), and consists of 
 the senses of the body (Dehendriyas), both percep- 
 tive (Buddhindriyas) and active (Karmendriyas), and 
 of Manas (mind), of Buddhi (intellect), Vedana (sensa- 
 tion), implying beyond itself the Vishayas, objects 
 required for sensation and presupposed already by 
 Manas. Its physical life is dependent on the Mukhya 
 Prana, the vital spirit, and on the five Pra/ias, the 
 specialised spirits. Its Indriyas or senses are not 
 to be taken as the external organs of sense, such as 
 ears, eyes, &c., but as their functions only (Vritti). 
 This subtle and invisible body or Suksh ma-sarira 
 remains, according to the Vedanta, till true know- 
 ledge arises, and the individual soul recovers its true 
 being in Brahman. The Vedantists are, however, 
 by no means consistent in their views on these two 
 bodies, the subtle and the coarse body (Sukshmaw 
 and Sthulam $ariraw), or on the process by which 
 the one affects or controls the other. At the final 
 dissolution of the coarse body we are told that the 
 Indriyas are absorbed in the Manas, the Manas In 
 the Mukhya Prami. this in the (7iva, the individual, 
 and this in the subtle body ; but neither the Upani- 
 shads nor the Vedanta-Sutras are always quite 
 consistent and clear in their views on the subject, 
 ;md it seems to me useless to attempt to reduce 
 their various guesses to one uniform theory.
 
 THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. 395 
 
 In the Samkhya-philosophy this Sukshma-sarira 
 appears as Linga-sarira, or the sign-body. The 
 Sthula-sarira or coarse material body consists, accord- 
 ing to some Samkhya teachers, of the five or four 
 coarse elements (Bhutas), according to others of the 
 element of the earth only, and is made up of six 
 coverings, hair, blood, flesh, sinews, bones and mar- 
 row. The subtle or inner body, sometimes called 
 the vehicle, or the Ativahika-sarira, is formed of 
 eighteen elements 1 , of (i) Buddhi, (2) Ahamkara, 
 (3) Manas, (4-8) the five Tanmatras or Sukshma- 
 bhutas, and (9-18) the ten senses. This body is of 
 course invisible, but without it the coarse body 
 would be useless. It forms what we should call our 
 personality, and causes the difference in the char- 
 acters of individuals, being itself what it has been 
 made to be by former works. All fitness for reward 
 and punishment attaches to it, not to the Purushas 
 who are all alike and unchanging, and it likewise 
 determines by means of its acquired dispositions the 
 gross bodies into which it has to enter from life to 
 life, till final freedom is obtained by the Purusha ; 
 and not only the gross body, but the subtle body 
 also is reabsorbed in Prakrit i. 
 
 The Atheism of Kapila. 
 
 We have still to say a few words about the 
 charge of atheism brought against the Samkhyas. 
 It seems certainly strange that at this early time 
 
 1 Karika 40, and Suwkhya-Sutras III, 9. Why the Linga- 
 sarira should be said to consist of seventeen and one (Sapta- 
 dasaikam) elements, is difficult to say, unless Eka is taken for 
 the Purusha who, for the time being, identifies himself with 
 the subtle body.
 
 396 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and surrounded as he no doubt was by sacrifices and 
 hymns addressed to the innumerable Vedic Devas, 
 nothing should have been said by Kapila either for 
 or against these beings. Most likely at his time and 
 before his time, the different Devas of the popular 
 religion had already been eclipsed in the minds of 
 thoughtful people by one Deity, whether Pra^apati, 
 Visvakarman, or Brahman. Both Pra^apati and 
 BrahmS, are mentioned in the Tattva-samasa- 
 bhashya. But even such a supreme Deva or Adhi- 
 deva is never asserted or denied by Kapila. There is 
 a place in his system for any number of subordinate 
 Devas, but there is none for God, whether as the 
 creator or as the ruler of all things. There is no 
 direct denial of such a being, no out-spoken atheism 
 in that sense, but there is simply no place left for 
 him in the system of the world, as elaborated by 
 the old philosopher. He had, in fact, put nearly 
 everything that belonged to God into Prakriti, 
 only that this Prakriti is taken as purely objective, 
 and as working without a conscious purpose, unless 
 when looked at by Purusha, and then working, as 
 we are told, for his benefit only. 
 
 This has sometimes been illustrated by what must 
 have been a very old fable, viz. that of a cripple 
 who could not walk, meeting another cripple who 
 could not see. As they could not live by them- 
 selves, they lived together, the lame one mounting 
 on the shoulders of the blind one. Prakriti, we 
 are told, was the blind, Purusha the lame traveller. 
 
 We must remember, however, that Prakr/ti, 
 though blind, is always conceived as real, because 
 the Sawkhya-philosophy looks upon every thing that 
 is, as proceeding out of something that is real (Sat-
 
 THE ATHEISM OF KAPILA. 397 
 
 karyavada). Arid here we see again, the fundamental 
 difference between the Sa?nkhya and the other philo- 
 sophies, as Va&aspati-Misra has pointed out in his 
 commentary on the Samkhya-karikd 9. The Buddhist 
 takes the real world as the result of nothing, the 
 Vedantist takes the unreal world as proceeding from 
 something real, Naiyayika and Vaiseshika derive 
 what does not yet exist from what does exist, while 
 the Samkhyas derive what is from what is l . 
 
 If it be asked how the unconscious Prakr&ti began 
 to work and attract the attention of Purusha, Kapila 
 has an answer ready. The Gu?ms, he says, are first 
 in a state of equipoise, but as soon as one of the 
 three preponderates, there is tension, and Prakrit! 
 enters on the course of her unceasing labours, be- 
 ginning with the emanation of Buddhi, and ending 
 with the last of the twenty-four Tattvas. 
 
 There is this difference also between the atheism of 
 Kapila and that of other atheistic systems of philo- 
 sophy, that Kapila nowhere puts himself into a hostile 
 attitude towards the Divine idea. He nowhere 
 denies distinctly the existence even of the purely 
 mythological gods, such as Indra, which is strange 
 indeed ; nor does he enter on any arguments to 
 disprove the existence of one only God. He simply 
 says and in that respect he does not differ much 
 from Kant that there are no logical proofs to estab- 
 lish that existence, but neither does he offer any 
 such proofs for denying it. We know that Kant, 
 honest thinker as he was, rejected all the logical 
 proofs of the existence of Deity as insufficient, and 
 based the arguments for his belief in God on purely 
 
 1 Garbe, Sawkhya-Philosophie, p. 202.
 
 398 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ethical grounds. Though we have no right to 
 assume anything of the kind with regard to Kapila, 
 when brought face to face with this great religious 
 and moral problem, the existence of a supreme God, 
 we ought to mark his impartiality and the entire 
 absence, in the whole of his philosophy, of anything 
 like animus against a belief in God. The Devas he 
 could hardly have seriously believed in, we should 
 say, and yet he spares them and allows them to 
 exist, possibly with the reservation that people, in 
 worshipping them, were unconsciously approaching 
 the true Purusha. We should not forget that with 
 many people atheism meant, and means, a denial of 
 Devas rather than the denial of the one, only God, 
 the First Cause of the world. This whole question, 
 however, will be better discussed when we reach the 
 Yoga-philosophy and have to examine the argu- 
 ments produced by Pata%ali against Kapila, and 
 in support of the admission of a Supreme Being, 
 generally called Isvara, the Lord. 
 
 Immorality of the Sawkhya. 
 
 It has also been said that Kapila's system is not 
 only without a God, but likewise without any 
 morality. But though it is quite true that, accord- 
 ing to Kapila, Purusha in his perfect state is non- 
 moral, neither merit nor demerit, virtue nor vice, 
 existing any longer for him, he is certainly not 
 allowed to be immoral. The Sawkhya, like the 
 Vedanta arid other systems of Indian philosophy, 
 implies strong moral sentiment in the belief in 
 Karman (deed) and transmigration. Kapila also 
 holds that deeds, when once done, can never cease, 
 except at the time of Moksha, but produce effect
 
 SAMKHYA PAKABLES. 399 
 
 after effect, both in this life and in the lives to come. 
 This is one of the unalterable convictions in the 
 Hindu mind. There is, besides the admission of virtue 
 and vice, the dispraise of passion and the praise of dis- 
 passion. These are represented as forms of Buddhi, 
 as Rupas or Bhavas, forms or states, inhering in 
 Buddhi, and therefore following the Liiiga-sarira 
 from birth to birth. Nay, it is distinctly added that 
 going upward is due to virtue, going downward to 
 vice, so that virtue, as a preliminary, is really in- 
 dispensable to final liberation. It may be true that 
 in this way morality is reduced to mere calculation 
 of consequences, but even such a calculation, which 
 is only another name for reasoning, would serve as 
 a strong incentive to morality. Anyhow there is 
 no ground for saying that Kapila's system ignores 
 ordinary morality, still less that it encourages vice. 
 
 Samkhya Parables. 
 
 There is one more feature of the Samkhya that 
 deserves to be mentioned, because it is not found in 
 the other Indian philosophies, but may be supposed 
 to have suggested to the Buddhists their method of 
 teaching by parables. A whole chapter of the 
 Sutras, the fourth, is assigned to a collection of 
 stories, each of which is meant to illustrate some 
 doctrine of Kapila's. Some are very much to the 
 point, and they can be appealed to by one word, so as 
 to recall the whole lesson which they were meant to 
 teach. The first is meant to illustrate the complete 
 change that comes over a man when he has been 
 taught his true nature by means of the Samkhya. 
 'As in the case of the son of a king.' The story 
 which follows is that a young prince who was born
 
 400 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 under an unlucky star, was taken out of his capital 
 and brought up by a $abara, a kind of wild man of 
 the woods. When he grew up he naturally thought 
 that he himself was a iSabara, and lived accordingly. 
 But a minister, who had found out that the prince 
 was alive, went to him secretly and told him that 
 he was the son of the king, and not a Sahara. 
 At once the prince gave up the idea that he was a 
 savage, believed that he was a prince, and assumed 
 a truly royal bearing. In the same manner a man 
 who has been told his true character by his teacher, 
 surrenders the idea that he is a material and mortal 
 being, and recovers his true nature, saying ' As a son 
 of Brahman I am nothing but Brahman, and not 
 a being different from him in this phenomenal 
 world.' 
 
 The commentator adds an extract from the 
 Garuc/a-Purana which must have been borrowed 
 from a Sa?7^khya source : 
 
 'As everything that is made of gold is known 
 as gold, if even from one small piece of gold one 
 has learnt to know what gold is, in the same way 
 from knowing God the whole world becomes known. 
 
 As a Brahman possessed by an evil spirit, imagines 
 that he is a /Sudra, but, when the possession is over, 
 knows that he is a Brahman, thus the soul, pos- 
 sessed by Maya, imagines that it is the body, but 
 after Maya has come to an end, it knows its own 
 true being again, and says, I am a Brahman.' 
 
 The seventh illustration is 'like a cut-off hand,' 
 and is meant to teach that, as no one takes his hand 
 a^ain after it has once been cut off, no one should 
 
 o 
 
 identify himself witli anything objective, after once 
 having surrendered the illusion of the objective. The
 
 SAMKHYA PARABLES. 4<DI 
 
 sixteenth, to which I called attention many years 
 ago as connected with old Aryan folklore, is meant 
 to teach that even an accidental negligence may 
 be fatal to our reaching the highest goal, as in the 
 case of the ' frog-wife.' 
 
 The story is that of a king who, while hunting, 
 had seen a beautiful girl in a forest. She became 
 his wife on condition that he should never let her 
 see water. He gave the promise, but once when 
 the queen, tired after playing, asked him for some 
 water, he forgot his promise, and brought her some, 
 whereupon the daughter of the frog-king became 
 a frog (Bheki), and disappeared in the lake. Neither 
 nets nor anything else was of any avail for bring- 
 ing her back, the king had lost her for ever. Thus 
 true knowledge also will disappear by one act of 
 negligence, and will never return. 
 
 This system of teaching by parables was very 
 popular with the Buddhists, and it is just possible 
 that the first impulse may have come from the fol- 
 lowers of Kapila, who are so often called Krypto- 
 buddhists or Pra&Manna-Bauddhas. 
 
 I have called attention already to the fact that 
 these illustrative parables, though they do not occur 
 in the Karikas and in the Tattva-samasa, must have 
 existed all the time in the Parampara of the Brah- 
 mans, because they appear in the modern Sutras, 
 that is in the sixteenth century. Like the Sutras 
 referring to these stories, other Sutras also may 
 occur in our modern collection of Samkhya-Siitras, 
 which existed for centuries, as handed down by 
 tradition, but were omitted in the Karikas and even 
 in the Tattva-samasa. 
 
 DC!
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Yoga and Sawkhya. 
 
 THE relation of the Yoga to theSam-khya-philosophy 
 is not easy to determine, but the Bhagavad-gita V, 4, 
 goes so far as to say that children only, not learned 
 people, distinguish between Samkhya and Yoga at 
 all, as it were between faith (knowledge) and works. 
 We find the S4mkhya and Yoga represented, each 
 in its own Sutras, which are ascribed to different 
 authors, Kapila and Pataf^ali 1 , and they are spoken 
 of in the dual as the two old systems (Mahabh. 
 XII. 104, 67) ; but we also find a philosophy called 
 Sa?>?khya-yoga (Svetasv. Up. II, 13), and this not 
 as a Dvandva, as it were, Sawkhya and Yoga, but as 
 one philosophy, as a neuter sing., representing Yoga 
 and Samkhya together as one, or possibly as Yoga 
 belonging to the Sa?nkhya. Thus we read again in 
 the Bhagavad-gita V, 5, that he who understands 
 Sa//<khya and Yoga to be one, understands aright. 
 Yoga, in the sense of ascetic practices and medita- 
 tions, may no doubt have existed in India in very 
 
 ' The identification of these two names with tho n;ime of 
 one person Kapya Fataf/A'ala, who is mentioned in the Siitn- 
 patha-brahmawa, once proposed by Professor Weber, lias prob- 
 ably long been given up by him. See also Garbe, Sawkhya- 
 Philosophie, p. 26.
 
 YOGA AND SAMKHYA. 403 
 
 ancient times. It is called Puratana (old), (B. G. 
 IV, 3), and this is probably what the author of 
 the Bhagavad-gita (IV, i) meant, when he made 
 the Bhagavat say to Ar^una : 
 
 ' I declared this imperishable Yoga to Vivasvat, 
 Vivasvat told it to Manu,, Manu to Ikshvaku. Thus 
 royal sages came to know it, having received it 
 through tradition ; but this Yoga was lost here by 
 long lapse of time.' 
 
 A similar oral tradition descending from Pra^apati 
 to Manu, and from Manu to the people (to Ikshvaku, 
 according to $awkara) is mentioned already in the 
 JjfMndogya Upam'shad (III, n ; VIII, 15). 
 
 It is much the same with the other philosophies, 
 and we are left in doubt as to whether the three 
 couples, Samkhya and Yoga, Nyaya and Vaiseshika, 
 nay even Purva- and Uttara-Mimamsa, were amal- 
 gamations of systems which had originally an inde- 
 pendent existence, or whether they were differentia- 
 tions of former systems. Samkhya and Yoga might 
 easily have formed one comprehensive system, 
 because their divergence with regard to the existence 
 of an Isvara, or Lord, was not so essential a point to 
 them as it seems to us. Those who wanted an Isvara 
 might have him as a first and super-eminent 
 Purusha ; while those who had gone beyond this 
 want, need not have quarrelled with those who still 
 felt it. The Nyaya and Vaiseshika show clear traces 
 of a common origin ; while the two Mimamsas, which 
 in character are more remote from one another than 
 the other systems, seem to sanction, by their names 
 at least, the suspicion of their former unity. But the 
 deplorable scarcity of any historical documents does 
 not enable us to go beyond mere conjectures ; and 
 
 D d 2
 
 404 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 though the names of Kapila, Vy.isa, and Gotama may 
 seem to have an older air than those of Pataftr/ali, 
 (raimini, and Kanada, we must not in such matters 
 allow ourselves to be guided by mere impressions. 
 The often-cited passage from the Vedanta-Sutras II, 
 i, 3, Etena YogaA pratyuktaA, 'By this the Yoga is 
 refuted/ proves of course no more than the existence 
 of a Yoga-philosophy at the time of Badarayana ; it 
 cannot be used to prove the existence of the Yoga- 
 Sutras, such as we possess them, as previous to the 
 composition of the Vedanta-Sutras. 
 
 Meanings of the word Yoga. 
 
 In the Bhagavad-gitft Yoga is defined as Samatva, 
 equability (II, 48). It has been repeated again and 
 again that Yoga, from Yu</, to join, meant originally 
 joining the deity, or union with it. Even native 
 authors occasionally favour that view. A moment's 
 consideration, however, would have shown that such 
 an idea could never have entered the mind of 
 a Sawkhya, for the simple reason that there was 
 nothing for him that he could have wished to join. 
 Even the Vedantist does not really join Brahman, 
 though this is a very common misconception ; nay, a 
 movement of the soul towards Brahman is distinctly 
 guarded against as impossible. The soul is always 
 Brahman, even though it does not know it, and it 
 only requires the removal of ignorance for the soul 
 to recover its Brahmahood, or to become what it 
 always has been. Yu^/, from meaning to join, came, 
 by means of a very old metaphor, to mean to join 
 oneself to something, to harness oneself for some 
 work. Thus Yu^/ assumed the sense of preparing 
 for hard work, whether preparing others or getting
 
 YOGA, NOT UNION, BUT DISUNION. 405 
 
 ready oneself. And as people with us use the 
 expression to go into harness, i. e. to prepare for 
 work, or to buckle-to, i. e. to get ready for hard work, 
 Yw/, particularly in the Atmanepada, came to mean 
 to exert oneself. Possibly the German Angespannt 
 and Anspannung may have been suggested by the 
 same metaphor, though the usual explanation is 
 that it was so by a metaphor taken from the 
 stretching of the bow. In Sanskrit this Yu# is 
 often used with such words as Manas, ./Tittam, 
 Atman, &c., in the sense of concentrating or exert- 
 ing one's mind ; and it is in this sense only that our 
 word Yoga could have sprung from it, meaning, as 
 the Yoga-Sutras tell us at the very beginning, I, 2, 
 the effort of restraining the activities or distractions 
 of our thoughts (TTitta-vHtti-nirodha), or the effort 
 of concentrating our thoughts on a definite object. 
 
 Yoga, not Union, but Disunion. 
 
 A false interpretation of the term Yoga as union 
 has led to a total misrepresentation of Patark/ali's 
 philosophy. Rajendralal Mitra, p. 208, was therefore 
 quite right when he wrote : ' Professor Weber, in his 
 History of Indian Literature (pp. 238-9), has entirely 
 misrepresented the case. He says, " One very peculiar- 
 side of the Yoga doctrine and one which was more 
 and more developed as time went on is the Yoga 
 practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, 
 mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption 
 into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained." 
 " The idea of absorption," he continues rightly, " into 
 the supreme Godhead forms no part of the Yoga 
 theory." " Pata%rali, like Kapila," he adds, " rests 
 satisfied with the isolation of the soul, and does not
 
 406 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pry into the how and where the soul abides after 
 separation." ' But when he charges the professor with 
 not having read the Yoga he goes a little too far, 
 and he ought to have known, from his own experi- 
 ence, that it is small blame to a man who writes 
 a complete history of Indian literature, if he has not 
 read every book on which he has to pronounce an 
 opinion. Even the best historian of German litera- 
 ture can hardly have read every German author 
 of any eminence, much less can the first historian of 
 Sanskrit literature. 
 
 Rajendralal Mitra, however, is quite right so far 
 that Yoga, in the philosophy of Pataf/ali and Kapila, 
 did not mean union with God, or anything but effort 
 (Udyoga, not Sa?nyoga), pulling oneself together, 
 exertion, concentration. Yoga might mean union, 
 but the proper term would have been Sa?/iyoga. 
 Thus we read in the Bhagavad-gita II, 50 : 
 Buddhiyukto (/ahatiha ubhe sukn'tadushkrite, 
 Tasmad yogiya yu(/yasva, yogaA karmasu kausalam. 
 ' He who is devoted to knowledge leaves behind both 
 good and evil deeds ; therefore devote yourself to 
 Yoga, Yoga is success in (all) actions.' 
 
 That native scholars were well aware of the double 
 meaning of Yoga, we may see from a verse in the 
 beginning of Bho<yadeva's commentary on the Yoga- 
 Sutras, where he states that, with a true Yogi n, Yoga, 
 joining, means really Viyoga, separation, or Viveka, 
 discrimination between PurushaandPrakr/ti, subject 
 and object, self and nature, such as it is taught in the 
 Samkhya : Pumprakr/tyor viyogo'pi yoga ityudito 
 vaya, ' By which (teaching of Pata/i^ali) Yoga (union) 
 is said to be Viyoga (separation) of Purusha and 
 Prakn'ti.'
 
 YOGA AS VIVEKA. 407 
 
 Yoga as Viveka. 
 
 We saw that this Viyoga or Viveka was indeed 
 the highest point to which the whole of the Samkhya- 
 philosophy leads up. But granted that this dis- 
 crimination, this subduing and drawing away of the 
 Self from all that is not Self, is the highest object of 
 philosophy, how is it to be reached, and even when 
 reached, how is it to be maintained ? By know- 
 ledge chiefly, would be the answer of Kapila (by 
 (rfianayoga) ; by ascetic exercises delivering the Self 
 from the fetters of the body and the bodily senses, 
 (by Karmayoga) adds Patawr/ali. Patan^ali by no 
 means ignores the (rftanayoga of Kapila. On the 
 contrary, he presupposes it ; he only adds, as a 
 useful support, a number of exercises, bodily as well 
 as mental, by which the senses should be kept in 
 subjection so as not to interfere again with the 
 concentration of all thoughts on the Self or the 
 Purusha l . In that sense he tells us in the second 
 Sutra that Yoga is the effort of restraining the 
 activity or distractions of our thoughts. Before we 
 begin to scoff at the Yoga and its minute treatment 
 of postures, breathings, and other means of mental 
 concentration, we ought first of all to try to under- 
 stand their original intention. Everything can 
 become absurd by exaggeration, and this has been, 
 no doubt, the case with the self-imposed discipline 
 and tortures of the Yogins. But originally their 
 
 1 I prefer, even in the Sawkhya-philosophy, to render 
 Purusha by Self rather than by man, because in English man 
 cannot be used in the sense of simply subject or soul. Besides, 
 Atman, Self, is often used by Pata%ali himself for Purusha, 
 cf. Yoga-Sutras III, 21 ; II, 41.
 
 408 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 object seems to have been no other than to counteract 
 the distractions of the senses. We all consider the 
 closing of the eyelids and the stopping of the ears 
 against disturbing noises useful for serious medita- 
 tion. This was the simple beginning of Yoga, and 
 in that sense it was meant to be a useful addition to 
 the Sa??ikhya, because even a convinced Samkhya 
 philosopher who had obtained 6rfianayoga or know- 
 ledge-yoga would inevitably suffer from the disturb- 
 ances caused by external circumstances and the 
 continual inroads of the outer world upon him, 
 i. e. upon his Manas, unless strengthened to resist 
 by Karmayoga or work-yoga the ever present enemy 
 of his peace of mind. More minute directions as to 
 how this desired concentration and abstraction could 
 be achieved and maintained, might at first have been 
 quite harmless, but if carried too far they would 
 inevitably produce those torturing exercises which 
 seemed to Buddha, as they do to most people, so 
 utterly foolish and useless. But if we ourselves must 
 admit that our senses and all that they imply are 
 real obstacles to quiet meditation, the attempts to 
 reduce these sensuous affections to some kind of 
 quietude or equability (Samatva) need not surprise 
 us, nor need we be altogether incredulous as to 
 the marvellous results obtained by means of ascetic 
 exercises by Yogins in India, as little as we should 
 treat the visions of St. Francis or St. Teresa as 
 downright impositions. The real relation of the 
 soul to the body and of the senses to the soul is still 
 as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient 
 Yogins of India, and their experiences, if only honestly 
 related, deserve certainly the same careful attention 
 as the stigmata of lloman Catholic saints. They
 
 YOGA AS VIVEKA. 409 
 
 may be or they may not be true, but there is no 
 reason why they should be treated as a priori untrue. 
 From this point of view it seems to me that the 
 Yoga-philosophy deserves some attention on the part 
 of philosophers, more particularly of the physical 
 school of psychologists, and I did not feel justified 
 therefore in passing over this system altogether, 
 though it may be quite true that, after we have once 
 understood the position of the Samkhya-philosophy 
 towards the great problem of the world, we shall 
 not glean many new metaphysical or psychological 
 ideas from a study of the Yoga. We must never 
 forget that, although our Samkhya-Sutras are very 
 modern, the Samkhya as such, is not, and is always 
 presupposed by the Yoga. It has its roots in a soil 
 carefully prepared by centuries of philosophical 
 cultivation, and has but little in common with the 
 orgiastic ecstasies which we see among savage tribes 
 of the present day. The Hindus also, before they 
 became civilised and philosophers, may or may not 
 have passed through such a phase. But how little 
 of true similarity there really exists between the 
 Yoga and Tapas of the Hindus, and the sweating 
 processes of the American Indians in their steam- 
 booths, may easily be seen from the excellent 
 Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology, by J. W. 
 Powell, 1892-3, p. 117 seq. ; p. 823 seq., to mention 
 no other and more painful reports. 
 
 Before we enter upon an examination of the 
 peculiar teaching of the Yoga-philosophy, a few 
 words with reference to the sources on which we 
 have to depend for our information may be 
 useful.
 
 410 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pata?I#ali, Vyasa. 
 
 The Sutras of the Yoga-philosophy are ascribed 
 to Patari^ali, who is also called Phamn or $esha, the 
 divine serpent. He may have been the author or the 
 representative of the Yoga-philosophy without being 
 necessarily the author of the Sutras. His date is of 
 course uncertain, though some scholars have, with 
 great assurance, assigned him to the second cen- 
 tury B.C. It may be so, but we should say no more. 
 Even the commonly received identification of the 
 philosopher Patan^ali with Pata/1(/ali, the gram- 
 marian and author of the Mahabhashya, should be 
 treated as yet as a hypothesis only. We know too 
 little about the history of Sanskrit proper names to 
 be able to say whether the same name implies the 
 same person. That is not the case in any other 
 country, and can hardly be true in India considering 
 how freely the names of the gods or of great Rishis 
 were taken, and are still taken, as proper names. 
 It has actually been asserted that Vyasa, the author 
 of a late commentary on Pata/l^ali's Yoga-Sutras, is 
 the same person as Vyasa, the collector of the Vedas, 
 the reputed author of the Mahabharata and of the 
 Vedanta-Sutras. But there are ever so many Vyasas 
 living even now, and no solid argument could pos- 
 sibly be derived from the mere recurrence of such 
 a name. There are works ascribed to Hira/jya- 
 garbha, Ilarihara, Vislmu, &c. ; then why not to 
 Pata/Vyali ? It is of course as impossible to prove 
 that Pata/V/ali the philosopher and Pata?Vyali the 
 grammarian were not the same person, as to prove 
 that they were ; but if style of language and style 
 of thought are any safe guides in such matters, we
 
 SECOND CENTURY B.C. 411 
 
 ought certainly to hesitate, and should do so in any 
 other literature, before taking the grammarian and 
 the philosopher Patafk/ali as one and the same per- 
 son. It would no doubt be a great help if we 
 could transfer the date of the grammarian, the 
 second century B.C., to the author of our Yoga- 
 Sutras, but on that point also it seems to me better 
 to wait till we get some more tangible proof. In 
 the present state of knowledge, or rather ignorance, 
 of all dates to be assigned to the philosophical 
 Sutras, it is the duty of every scholar to abstain 
 from premature assertions which only encumber and 
 obstruct the way to further discoveries. 
 
 Second Century B.C. 
 
 The second century would certainly be most 
 welcome as a date for any of our extant philoso- 
 phical Sutras, but that is no excuse for saying that 
 the Yoga-philosophy was reduced to the form of 
 Sutras in that century, because the grammarian 
 Patan^ali has been referred to it. Besides, even the 
 date assigned to the grammarian Patafk/ali is a con- 
 structive date only, and should not for the present 
 be considered as more than a working hypothesis. 
 The fact that these Yoga-Sutras do not enter on 
 any controversy might certainly seem to speak in 
 favour of their being anterior to the other Sutras ; 
 but we saw already why we could no more build 
 any chronological conclusions on this than we 
 should think of proving the anteriority of our 
 Sa?nkbya-Sutras by the attacks on its atheistical 
 doctrines which occur in the Sutras of the other 
 philosophical systems. I think we must be satis- 
 fied with the broad fact that Buddha was later
 
 412 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 than the classical Upanishads, and that our philo- 
 sophical Sutras are later than Buddha, because they 
 evidently refer to his doctrines,- though not to his 
 name. As to popular tradition, it is no doubt of little 
 value, particularly in India ; still I doubt whether 
 tradition could have gone so completely wrong as 
 to prophesy in the Saiikshepa-^amkara-Vir/aya * and 
 elsewhere that (raimini, Vyasa, Patan^ali, and S&m- 
 kara would appear on earth to uproot all heresies, 
 if they had lived before the great heresy of Buddha. 
 Pata7l(/ali is said to have been a portion of Sarikar- 
 sha?ia or Anarita, the hooded serpent /Sesha, encircling 
 the world, and it may be for the same reason that he 
 is sometimes called Pha?iin (Phambhartn). This 
 is the kind of useless information which tradition 
 gives us. 
 
 Chronology of Thought. 
 
 Iii India we must learn to be satisfied with the 
 little we know, not of the chronology of years, but of 
 the chronology of thought ; and taking the Yoga, 
 in its systematic form, i. e. in the Pataf^ali-Siitras, 
 as post-Buddhistic, we can best understand the 
 prominence which it gives both to the exercises 
 which are to help toward overcoming the distracting 
 influences of the outer world, and to the arguments 
 in support of the existence of an Ixvara or Divine 
 Lord. This marked opposition became intelligible 
 and necessary as directed against Kapila as well as 
 against Buddha ; and in reading the Yoga-Sutras it 
 is often difficult to say whether the author had his 
 eye on the one or the other. Jf we took away these 
 
 1 Yoga Aphorisms, p. Ixvi.
 
 CHRONOLOGY OF THOUGHT. 413 
 
 two characteristic features of the Yoga, the wish to 
 establish the existence of an Isvara against all 
 comers, and to teach the means of restraining the 
 affections and passions of the soul, as a preparation 
 for true knowledge, such as taught by the Sawikhya- 
 philosophy, little would seem to remain that is 
 peculiar to Patafw/ali. 
 
 But though the Sutras are post-Buddhistic, there 
 can be no doubt that not only the general outlines 
 of the Samkhya, but likewise all that belongs to 
 the Karmayoga or work-yoga was known before 
 the rise of Buddhism. Thus, if we turn to the 
 Mahabharata, we find that the twenty-four principia, 
 with Purusha as the twenty-fifth, are often men- 
 tioned, though arranged and described in different 
 ways. Then we read again (Anugita XXV) : ' That 
 which sages by their understanding meditate upon, 
 which is void of smell, of taste, of colour, touch or 
 sound, that is called Pradhana (Prak?Tti). That 
 Pradhana is unperceived ; a development of this un- 
 perceived power is the Mahat ; and a development of 
 the Pradhana (when it has) become Mahat, is Aham- 
 kara (egoism). From Ahamkara is produced the 
 development, namely, the great elements, and from 
 the elements respectively, the objects of sense are 
 stated to be a development.' 
 
 As to the Yoga-practices or tortures we know 
 that, after practising the most severe Tapas for a 
 time, Buddha himself declared against it, and rather 
 moderated than encouraged the extravagant exercises 
 of Brahmanic ascetics. His own experience at the 
 beginning of his career had convinced him of their 
 uselessness, nay, of their danger. But a moderately 
 ascetic life, a kind of via media, remained throughout
 
 414 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the ideal of Buddhism, and we can well understand 
 that the Brahmans, in trying to hold their own 
 against the Buddhists, should have tried to place 
 before the people an even more perfect system of 
 asceticism. And, lest it should be supposed that 
 the Sa??ikhya-philosophy, which was considered as 
 orthodox or Vedic, had given its sanction to Buddha's 
 denial of an Atman and Brahman, which was far more 
 serious than the denial of an Isvara, Lord, it would 
 have seemed all the more necessary to protest de- 
 cidedly against such denial, and thus to satisfy the 
 ingrained theistlc tendencies of the people at large, 
 by showing that the Samkhya,by admitting Purusha, 
 admitted a belief in something transcendent, and 
 did by no means, according to Patan^ali at least, 
 condemn a belief even in an Isvara, or Lord. In that 
 sense it might truly be said that the Yoga-philosophy 
 would have been timely and opportune, if it came 
 more boldly forward, after the rise of Buddhism, 
 not so much as a new system of thought, but as 
 a re-invigorated and determined assertion of ancient 
 Samkhya doctrines, which for a time had been 
 thrown into the shade by the Buddhist apostasy. 
 In this way it would become intelligible that 
 Buddhism, though sprung from a soil saturated 
 with Sfiwkhya ideas, should have been anterior to 
 that new and systematic development of Samkhya- 
 philosophy, which we know in the Sutras of Kapila 
 or in the Karikas or even in the Tattva-samasa ; 
 that in fact, in its elements, the Sa/mkhya should 
 be as decidedly pre- Buddhistic as in its final 
 systematic form it was post -Buddhistic. That 
 the existence side by side of two such systems 
 as those of Kapila and Buddha, the one deemed
 
 THE YOGA-PHILOSOPHY. 415 
 
 orthodox, the other unorthodox, gave matter for 
 reflection to the people in India we see best by 
 a well-known verse which I quoted many years 
 ago in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 
 (p. 102) : ' If Buddha knew the law and Kapila not, 
 what is truth ? If both were omniscient, how could 
 there be difference of opinion between the two ? ' 
 
 The Yoga-Philosophy. 
 
 The Yoga-Sutras, or the Yoganusasana 1 , called also 
 by the same name which was given to the Samkhya- 
 Sutras, viz. Samkhya-prava&ana, both being consi- 
 dered as expositions of the old Samkhya, may have 
 been contained originally in some such text-book 
 as the Tattva-samasa. The Sutras were published 
 and translated by Ballantyne, 1852, a translation 
 
 1 It is not much of an argument, but it may deserve to be 
 mentioned, that the title given by Pata%ali to the Yoga-Sutras. 
 Atha Yoganusasanam, 'Now begins the teaching of the Yoga.' 
 and not Atha Yogar/i<7asa, reminds us of the title which 
 the grammarian Pataf^ali gives to his Mahabhashya, Atha 
 $abdanusasanam, 'Now begins the teaching of Words or of 
 the Word.' This title does not belong to Pamni's Sutras, but 
 to the Mahabhashya ; and it is curious that such a compound 
 as /Sabdanusasanam would really offend against one of Panini's 
 rules (II, 2, 14). According to Pamni there ought to be no 
 such compound, and though he does not give us the reason 
 why he objects to this and other such-like compounds, we can 
 easily see that Sanskrit did not sanction compounds which 
 might be ambiguous, considering that Word-teaching might be 
 taken in the sense of teaching coming from words as well as 
 teaching having words for its object. It is true that this 
 apparent irregularity might be removed by a reference to 
 another rule of Pawini (II, 3, 66), yet it is curious that the 
 same, if only apparent, irregularity should occur both in the 
 Mahabhashya and in the Yoga-Sutras, both being ascribed to
 
 416 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 continued by Govindadeva-sastrin in the Pandit, 
 vol. Ill, Nos. 28-68. A more useful edition, but 
 not always quite correct translation, was given by 
 Rajendralal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica, 1883, 
 'Yoga Aphorisms of Patafk/ali, with the commen- 
 tary of Bho^a Ra(/a.' Vi^lana-Bhikshu, whose com- 
 mentary on Kapila's Sawkhya-Sutras was mentioned 
 before \ and who is chiefly known by his Yoga- 
 varttika, is the author also of the Yoga-sara-sam- 
 graha, an abstract of the Yoga, which has been 
 edited and translated by Ganganatha Jha, Bombay, 
 1894, and may be consulted with advantage by 
 students of philosophy. Colebrooke's essay on the 
 Yoga, like all his essays, is still most useful and 
 trustworthy ; and there are in German the excellent 
 papers on the Samkhya and Yoga by Professor 
 Garbe in Biihler's Grundriss. Garbe speaks well of 
 a dissertation by P. Markus, Die Yoga-philosophie 
 nacli clem Itdjamdrtanda daryestellt, which, how- 
 ever, I have not been able to obtain. 
 
 Misconception of the Objects of Yoga. 
 
 It was almost impossible that the Yoga-philosophy, 
 as represented by European scholars, should not 
 
 1 Other works ascribed to the same author are : 
 
 The Brahma-mimawsa-bhashya, called Vi</nananmta. 
 The Sawkhya-karika-bhashya, ascribed to him, but really 
 
 composed by GaueZapada (see Ganganatha, p. 2). 
 The Yoga-vfirttika. 
 
 The Isvara-gita-bhashya, from the Kurma-purawa. 
 The Prasnopanishad-aloka. 
 An explanation of Prasastapada's commentary on the 
 
 Vaiseshika-Sutras, called Vaiseshika-varttika. 
 There are printed editions of the Samkhya-prava&ana- 
 
 bhashya, the Yoga-varttika, and the Samkhya-sara.
 
 MISCONCEPTION OF THE OBJECTS OF YOGA. 417 
 
 have suffered from its close association with the 
 Samkhya, properly so called. All its metaphysical 
 antecedents were there. Yoga is indeed, as the 
 Brahmans say, Samkhya, only modified, particularly 
 in one point, namely, in its attempt to develop and 
 systematise an ascetic discipline by which con- 
 centration of thought could be attained, and by 
 admitting devotion to the Lord God as part of that 
 discipline. Whether this was done, as is generally 
 supposed, from mere theological diplomacy is a 
 question we should find difficult to answer, con- 
 sidering how little we know of the personal character 
 of Pata?k/ali or of the circumstances under which 
 he elaborated his theistic Samkbya-philosophy. 
 There is an entire absence of animosity on his part, 
 such as our own philosophers would certainly have 
 displayed in accusing another philosopher of atheism 
 and in trying to amend his system in a theistic 
 direction. No doubt there must always have been 
 a majority in favour of a theistic philosophy of 
 the universe as against an atheistic, but whether 
 Pata/l^ali may be fairly accused of having yielded 
 to the brutal force of numbers, and curried favour 
 with the many against the few is quite another 
 question. It is certainly extraordinary to see the 
 perfect calmness with which, with very few ex- 
 ceptions, Kapila's atheism is discussed, and how 
 little there is of the adpopulum advocacy in support 
 of a belief in God and a personal God. Nor does 
 Kapila, like other atheistic philosophers, display any 
 animosity against the Divine idea and its defenders. 
 He criticises indeed the usual arguments by which 
 theists make and unmake their God, if they represent 
 Him as the creator and ruler of the world, and 
 
 E e
 
 418 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 charge him at the same time with cruelty, by 
 making him responsible for the origin of evil also. 
 But all this is done by Kapila in a calm and what 
 one might almost call a businesslike manner ; and 
 in answering Kapila's arguments, Pata?l^ali also 
 preserves the same Samatva or even temper. He 
 imputes no motives to his antagonist, nor does 
 he anywhere defend himself against any possible 
 suspicion that in showing the necessity of a personal 
 God, an Isvara, he was defending the interests of 
 the Brahman priesthood. After all, Isvara was not 
 even a popular name for God, or the name of any 
 special god, though it occurs as a name of Rudra, 
 and in later times was applied even to such gods as 
 Vistmu and /Siva, after they had been divested of 
 much of their old mythological trappings. 
 
 Devotion to isvara, Misconceptions. 
 
 In this respect also we have something to learn 
 from Hindu philosophers. Considering the impor- 
 tance of the subject, it is useful to see how little 
 heat was expended on it either by Kapila or by 
 Pataw/ali. If we remember how the two philo- 
 sophies were in popular parlance distinguished from 
 each other as Sawikhya with and Sa?khya without 
 a Lord, we should have expected to see this ques- 
 tion treated in the most prominent place. Instead 
 of which we find Pataw/ali, at the end of the first 
 chapter, after having described the different prac- 
 tices by which a man may hope to become free from 
 all worldly fetters, mentioning simply as one of many 
 expedients, I, 23, 'Devotion to the Lord,' or, as it 
 is generally translated 'devotion to God.' Devotion 
 or Pranidhdna (lit. placing oneself forward and into)
 
 DEVOTION TO ISVARA, MISCONCEPTIONS. 419 
 
 is explained by Bho^a as one of the forms of 
 resignation, as worship of Him, and as the sur- 
 render of all one's actions to Him. If a man, without 
 wishing for any rewards consisting in worldly enjoy- 
 ments, makes over all his cares to Isvara as the 
 highest guide, that, we are told, is Pramdhana. 
 Pata>1<7ali then goes on, ' As it has been said that 
 Samadhi or complete absorption can be obtained 
 through devotion to the Lord, the next that has to 
 be explained in order, is the nature of that Lord, 
 the proof, the majesty, the name of Him, the order 
 of His worship, and the fruit thereof.' In I, 24 
 Patark/ali goes on to say : ' I-svara, the Lord, is a 
 Purusha (Self) that has never been touched by 
 sufferings, actions, rewards, or consequent disposi- 
 tions.' The commentary adds : ' Sufferings are such 
 as Nescience, Avidya, &c. ; actions are either enjoined, 
 forbidden, or mixed ; rewards are the ripened fruits 
 of actions manifested in birth (genus, caste) and 
 life, while dispositions (Asaya, Anlage) are so-called 
 because they lie in the soil of the mind till the fruit 
 has ripened, they are instincts (Samskara) or impres- 
 sions (Vasana). If the Lord is called a Purusha, 
 that means that He is different from all other 
 Purushas (Selves), and if He is called Lord, that 
 means that He is able by His work alone to liberate 
 the whole world. Such power is due to the con- 
 stant prevalence of goodness (a Guna) in Him, who 
 has no beginning, and this prevalence of goodness 
 arises from His eminent knowledge. But the two, 
 knowledge and power, are not dependent on each 
 other, for they are eternally abiding in the very 
 substance of Isvara. His very relation to that 
 goodness is without beginning, because the union 
 
 E e 2
 
 420 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of Prakrit! and Purusha, that is, the creation would, 
 from a Yoga point of view, have been impossible 
 without the will of such an Lsvara. While the 
 Altta or mind in ordinary Purushas or Selves 
 undergoes, while in the body, modifications tending 
 towards happiness, unhappiness, and delusion, and, 
 if remaining without blemish, good, and full of 
 virtue, becomes conscious of the incidence of the 
 pictures mirrored on the mind, it is not so with 
 Isvara. His highest modification is of goodness 
 alone, and he remains steadfast in enjoyment through 
 eternal union with it. Therefore he alone is Isvara, 
 eminent above all other Purushas. Again, even for 
 one who has gained freedom, a return of suffer- 
 ings, &c., is possible, and has to be guarded against 
 by such means as are inculcated in the Yoga ; but 
 he, the Isvara, as he is always such as he is, is not 
 like a man who has gained freedom, but he is by 
 nature free. Nor should one say that there may 
 be many such Isvaras. Though there be equality 
 of Purushas, qud Purushas, yet as their aims 
 are different, such a view would be impossible. 
 And though there be a possibility of more or less, 
 yet the most eminent would always be the Isvara 
 or the Lord, he alone having reached the final goal 
 of lordship.' 
 
 The Patafyyala-bhashya dwells very strongly on 
 this difference between the liberated soul and the 
 Lord ; for 'the liberated or isolated souls,' it says, 
 'attain their isolation by rending asunder the three 
 bonds, whereas in regard to Isvara there never was 
 and never can be such bondage. The emancipated 
 implies bondage, but this can never be predicated of 
 the Lord.'
 
 WHAT IS ISVARA? 42! 
 
 We need not point out here the weak points of 
 this argument, and the purely relative character 
 of the greatness and separateness claimed for the 
 Isvara, as compared with other Purushas, but it 
 may be well to try to compare our own ideas of 
 God, when put into clear and simple language, with 
 the ideas here propounded. Pataf^ali seems to me 
 to come very near to the Homoiousia of man with 
 God, though he does not go quite as far as the Ve- 
 dantin who claims for the Atman perfect Homoousia 
 with Brahman. His Isvara may be primus inter 
 pares, but as one of the Purushas, he is but one 
 among his peers. He is a little more than a god, 
 but he is certainly not what we mean by God. 
 
 What is Isvara? 
 
 As Kapila had declared that the existence of 
 such a being as Isvara did not admit of proof, 
 Pata?l^ali proceeds in the next SCitra to offer what 
 he calls his proofs, by saying : ' In Him the seed of 
 the omniscient (or omniscience) attains infinity.' 
 It would be difficult to discover in this anything 
 like a proof or a tenable appeal to any Prama/ia, 
 without the help of the commentary. But Bho^/a 
 explains that what is meant here is that there are 
 different degrees of all excellences, such as omnisci- 
 ence, greatness, smallness, and other Aisvaryas, and 
 that therefore there must be for all of them a point 
 beyond which it is impossible to go. This Niratisaya 
 point, this non plus ultra of excellence, is what is 
 claimed for Isvara or the Lord. 
 
 Though this could hardly be considered as a 
 convincing argument of the existence of a Being 
 endowed with all such transcendent excellences as
 
 422 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are here postulated, it shows at all events an honest 
 intention on the part of Patafi^ali. Patafw/ali's argu- 
 ment reminds us to a certain extent of the theistic 
 argument of Cleanthes and Boethius. What he means 
 is that where there is a great and greater, there 
 must also be a greatest, and this is Isvara, and that 
 where there is good and better, there must be best. 
 
 Nor does he flinch in trying to answer the 
 questions which follow. The question is supposed 
 to have been asked, how this Isvara, without any 
 inducement, could have caused that union and 
 separation of himself and Prakn'ti which, as we 
 saw, is only another name for creation. The answer 
 is that the inducement was his love of beings, 
 arising from his mercifulness, his determination 
 being to save all living beings at the time of the 
 Kalpapralayas and Mahapralayas, the great destruc- 
 tions and reconstructions of the world. This, of 
 course, would not have been admitted by Kapila. 
 
 Next Pata/lgrali proceeds to explain the majesty 
 of Isvara by saying, in I, 26, 
 
 ' He is the superior (Guru) even of the former 
 ones, being himself not limited by time.' 
 
 By the former ones are meant, as we are told, 
 the ancients, the first creators, such as Brahma 
 and others, and by superior is meant instructor and 
 guide, so that it would seem difficult to assign a 
 higher position to any divine being than by placing 
 him thus above Brahma and other accepted builders 
 of the world. Next follows his name, I, 27 : 
 
 ' His name is Pra?^ava.' 
 
 Pranava might etymologically mean breathing 
 forth or glory. It is assigned as a name to the 
 sacred syllable Cm, possibly a relic of a time beyond
 
 WHAT IS LS'VARA? 423 
 
 our reach. It is said to have been the name of 
 I9vara from all eternity, just as the name of father 
 or son. This may be true, but it does not satisfy 
 us. However old the name Pranava and the 
 syllable Om may have been, they must have had 
 a beginning, but in spite of all the theories of the 
 Brahmans, there is not one in the least satisfactory 
 to the scholar. Om is their sacred syllable, which 
 has to be repeated a hundred or a thousand times 
 in order to draw the mind away from all disturbing 
 impressions and to concentrate it on the Supreme 
 Being. But why it is so we cannot tell. It may be 
 a mere imitation of the involuntary outbreathing of 
 the deep vowel o, stopped by the labial nasal, and 
 then drawn in ; or it may be the contraction of a pro- 
 nominal stem Avam, ' that,' corresponding to Ayam, 
 ' this,' and it is certainly used in the sense of Yes, 
 much as hoc illud was used in French when con- 
 tracted to oui. But however that may be, it is 
 called PraTiava, praise or breathing forth, and cannot 
 be explained any further etymologically. It is a 
 name, as Bho^a says, riot made by anybody, and 
 if it has any historical or etymological justification, 
 this is at all events not known to us. Still we 
 cannot go quite so far as Rajendralal Mitra, who 
 sees in it an Indianised form of the Hebrew Amen ! 
 First of all, Amen does not mean God, and how 
 should such a word have reached India during the 
 Brahmana period ? 
 
 Pataw/ali continues by telling us in Sutra I, 38, 
 that repetition of the syllable Om and reflection 
 on its meaning are incumbent on the student of 
 Yoga. And this, as Bho^a adds, as a means to 
 concentrate our thoughts, and to attain to Samadhi,
 
 424 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the chief end of the whole Yoga-philosophy. In 
 that sense he adds, I, 29 : 
 
 'Thence also obtainment of inward-turned thought, 
 and absence of obstacles.' 
 
 Inward-turned thought (Pratyaketana) is ex- 
 plained as a turning away of our senses from all 
 outward objects, and turning them back upon the 
 mind. The obstacles to Samadhi are mentioned 
 in the next Sutra, I, 30, as 
 
 'Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, idleness, 
 worldliness, error, not having a settled standpoint, 
 and not keeping it ; these are the obstacles causing 
 unsteadiness of mind/ 
 
 I,3i. 'With them arise pain, distress, tremor 
 of limbs, and disturbance of the regular inbreathing 
 and outbreathing.' 
 
 I, 32. 'To prevent all this, there is constant 
 fixing of the mind on one subject (Tattva).' 
 
 I, 33. 'And likewise from a reviving friendliness, 
 pity, complacency, and indifference towards objects 
 of happiness, unhappiness, virtue and vice, there 
 arises serenity of mind.' 
 
 The commentator adds, ' If one sees happy people, 
 one should not envy them ; if one sees unhappiness, 
 one should think how it could be removed ; if one 
 sees virtuous people, one should rejoice and not say, 
 Are they really virtuous ? if one sees vicious people, 
 one should preserve indifference, and show neither 
 approval nor aversion. Thus does the mind become 
 serene and capable of Samadhi. But all these are 
 only outward helps towards fixing the mind on one 
 subject, and of thus in time obtaining Samadhi.' 
 
 I have given this extract in order to show how 
 subordinate a position is occupied in Patafi^ali's
 
 WHAT IS ISVARA? 425 
 
 mind by the devotion to Isvara. It is but one of 
 the many means for steadying the mind, and thus 
 realising that Viveka or discrimination between 
 the true man (Purusha) and the objective world 
 (Prakrit!). This remains in the Yoga as it was 
 in the Sa?nkhya, the summum bonum of mankind. 
 I do not think, therefore, that Rajendralal Mitra 
 was right when in his abstract of the Yoga (p. lii) 
 he represented this belief in one Supreme God as the 
 first and most important tenet of Pataf^ali's philo- 
 sophy. ' The leading tenets of the Yogins,' he says, 
 ' are first, that there is a Supreme Godhead who is 
 purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from 
 afflictions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol 
 is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently 
 devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment 
 of liberation ; but He does not directly grant it. 
 Nor is He the father, creator, or protector of the 
 universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected.' 
 
 Rajendralal Mitra does not stand alone in this 
 opinion, and the very name of Sesvara-Samkhya, 
 theistic Samkhya, given to the Yoga, would seem 
 to speak in his favour. But we have only to look 
 at the Sutras themselves to see that originally 
 this belief in a personal God was by no means 
 looked upon as the most characteristic feature of 
 Patafk/ali's system. 
 
 Rajendralal Mitra is right, however, in stating 
 the tenet, second in importance, to have been that 
 there are countless individual souls or Purushas 
 which animate living beings, and are eternal. They 
 are pure and immutable ; but by their association 
 with the universe they become indirectly the 
 experiencers of joys and sorrows, and assume
 
 426 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 innumerable embodied forms in the course of an 
 ever-recurring metempsychosis. 
 
 The Isvara, with the Yogins, was originally no 
 more than one of the many souls, or rather Selves or 
 Purushas, but one that has never been associated with 
 or implicated in metempsychosis, supreme in every 
 sense, yet of the same kind as all other Purushas. 
 The idea of other Purushas obtaining union with him 
 could therefore never have entered Pata?1(7ali's head. 
 According to him, the highest object of the Yogin 
 was freedom, aloneness, aloofness, or self-centred- 
 ness. As one of the useful means of obtaining 
 that freedom, or of quieting the mind previous to 
 liberating it altogether, devotion to the Isvara is 
 mentioned, but again as one only out of many means, 
 and not even as the most efficacious of all. In the 
 popular atmosphere of India this belief in one 
 Supreme Being may have been a strong point 
 in favour of Patavk/ali's system, but from a philo- 
 sophical point of view, Pataw/ali's so-called proofs 
 of the existence of God would hardly stand against 
 any criticism. They are mere vrapepya, or side 
 issues. We must remember that Kapila had 
 committed himself to no more than that it is im- 
 possible to prove the existence of Lvvara, this I-svara 
 not being synonymous with God, in the highest 
 sense of the word, but restricted to a personal 
 creator and ruler of the world. Such a confession 
 of an inability to prove the existence of an Isvara 
 does not amount to atheism, in the current sense 
 of that word, and thus only can we explain the fact 
 that Kapila himself was considered orthodox by 
 friends and foes. In the Vedanta-philosophy the 
 question of the real existence of a personal Isvara
 
 WHAT IS ISVAKA? 427 
 
 never arises, though we know how saturated that 
 philosophy is with a belief in the existence of 
 Brahman, the absolute Divine Essence of which 
 the active or personal Isvara or the Lord is but 
 a passing manifestation, presented by Brahma, 
 masc., a mere phase of Brahman, neuter. The 
 Samkhya, in attempting to explain the universe, 
 such as it is, both in its subjective and objective 
 character, has no need to call in the assistance of 
 a personal Lsvara. What we mean by the objective 
 world is, according to Kapila, the work or out- 
 come of Prakrit i, when animated by Purusha, not 
 of Brahman. His system is therefore without 
 a creator or personal maker of the world, but 
 if we called it therefore atheistic, we should have 
 to apply the same name to Newton's system of 
 the world and Darwin's theory of evolution, though 
 we know that both Newton and Darwin were 
 thoroughly religious men. Darwin himself went 
 so far as to maintain most distinctly that his 
 system of nature required a Creator who breathed 
 life into it in the beginning, and even those Dar- 
 winians who look upon this admission of Darwin's 
 as a mere weakness of the moment, would strongly 
 object to be called irreligious or atheists. Kapila 
 might easily have used the very words of Darwin, 
 and this is very much what Pataf^/ali actually did 
 in his Yoga-Sutras. His supreme Purusha, after- 
 wards raised into an Adi-Purusha, or First Being, 
 satisfied the human craving after a First Cause, 
 and, so far as I can see, it was this natural craving 
 rather than any vulgar wish to curry favour with 
 the orthodox party in India that led to Patan^ali's 
 partial separation from Kapila. We certainly need
 
 428 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not suppose that the recognition of Kapila's ortho- 
 doxy was a mere contrivance of theological diplo- 
 macy on the part of the Brahmans, and that these 
 defenders of the faith were satisfied with an in- 
 sincere recognition of the supreme authority of 
 the Vedas. I confess that with what we know 
 of the religious life of India and the character 
 of the Brahmans at all times, it seems to me very 
 difficult to admit the idea of such a compromise. 
 Besides, Kapila appeals, as we saw, to the Veda in 
 good earnest, particularly when it supports his own 
 views, as in V, 1 2, when he wants to prove 'that the 
 world arises from primitive matter/ and appeals to 
 the Veda, that is, to such passages as $vetasvatara 
 Upanishad IV, 5, and BHhad. Ar. Up. I, 4, 7, 
 that can be made to support his view. The two 
 oldest representatives of the Samkhya-philosophy, 
 the Tattva-samasa and the Karikas ', do not even 
 allude to the difficulty arising from the Isvara 
 question, which seems to me an important argu- 
 ment in favour of their antiquity. The charge 
 of atheism became more popular in later times, 
 so that in the Padma-purana the charge of atheism 
 is brought not against the Sa??ikhya only, but 
 against the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophies also, 
 nay even against the Purva-Mima??isa. Two systems 
 only escape this charge, the Uttara-Mimamsa and 
 the Yoga ; and in the case of the Uttara-Mimawzsa, 
 its explanation by $amkara is stigmatised as no 
 better than Buddhism, because it perverts the 
 meaning of passages of the Veda, which teach the 
 identity of the individual soul with the highest 
 
 1 Hall, Preface to Sawkhya-sara, p. 39, note, and Intro- 
 duction to Sawkhya-pravafcana.
 
 KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. 429 
 
 soul (Brahman without qualities), and recommends 
 the surrender of good works, and complete indiffer- 
 ence towards this world and the next. 
 
 Kapila's Heal Arguments. 
 
 But it is but fair that we should hear what 
 Kapila himself has to say. And here it is important 
 again to observe that Kapila does not make a point 
 of vehemently denying the existence of an Isvara, but 
 seems likewise to have been brought to discuss the 
 subject, as it were by the way only, while engaged 
 in discussing the nature of sensuous perception 
 (I, 89). He had been explaining perception as 
 cognition arising from actual contact between the 
 senses and their respective objects. And here he 
 is stopped by the inevitable opponent who demurs 
 to this definition of perception, because it would 
 not include, as he says, the perceptions of the 
 Yogins. Kapila replies that these visions of the 
 Yogins do not refer to external objects, and that, 
 without denying their reality, he is dealing with 
 the perceptions of ordinary mortals only. But the 
 controversy does not end here. Another opponent 
 starts up and maintains that Kapila's definition of 
 perception is faulty, or at all events not wide enough 
 because it does not include the perception of the 
 Isvara or Lord. It is then that Kapila turns round 
 on his opponent, and says that this Isvara, this, 
 as it is pretended, perceptible Isvara, has never 
 been proved to exist at all, has never been estab- 
 lished by any of the three legitimate instruments 
 of knowledge or Prama/ias. This may seem to us 
 to amount to a denial of an Isvara, but "V i(//iana- 
 Bhikshu remarks with a great deal of truth, that
 
 43 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 if Kapila had wished to deny the existence of God, 
 he would have said Isvarabhavat, and not Isvara- 
 siddheA, that is, because Isvara does not exist, and 
 not, as he says, because Isvara has not been proved 
 to exist. Anyhow this is not the tone of a philo- 
 sopher who wants to preach atheism, and in what 
 follows we shall see that it is the manner rather 
 than the matter of the proof of an Isvara which is 
 challenged by Kapila and defended by his antagonist. 
 Taking his stand on the ground that the highest 
 blessedness or freedom consists in having renounced 
 all activity, because every activity presupposes 
 some kind of desire, which is of evil, he says ' that 
 every proof in support of an Isvara as a maker 
 or Lord, a Sat-kara, would break down. For if he 
 were supposed to be above all variance and free, 
 he could not have willed to create the world ; if he 
 were not so, he would be distracted and deluded 
 and unfit for the supreme task of an fsvara.' Then 
 follows a more powerful objection, based on the 
 fact that the Veda speaks of an Isvara or Lord, 
 and therefore he must exist. Kapila does not 
 spurn that argument, but, as he has recognised 
 once for all the Veda as a legitimate source of 
 information, he endeavours to prove that the Vedic 
 passages relied on in support of the existence of a 
 maker of the world, have a different purpose, namely 
 the glorification of a liberated Self or Purusha, or of 
 one who by devotion has attained supernatural 
 power (I, 95). This is explained by Aniruddha as 
 referring either to a Self which is almost, though 
 not altogether, free, because if altogether free, it 
 could have no desire, nor even the desire of creation ; 
 or to a Yogin who by devotion has obtained super-
 
 KAPILAS REAL ARGUMENTS. 431 
 
 natural powers. Vigwana-Bhikshu goes a step further, 
 and declares that it refers either to a Self that has 
 obtained freedom from all variance and disturbance, 
 or to the Self that is and has remained free from 
 all eternity, that is, to the Adi-purusha, the First 
 Self, who in the theistic Yoga-philosophy takes the 
 place of the Creator, and who may, for all we know, 
 have been the origin of the later Purushottama. 
 
 Aniruddha thereupon continues that it might be 
 said that without the superintendence of some such 
 intelligent being, unintelligent Prakn'ti would never 
 have acted. But this also he rejects, if it is meant 
 to prove the existence of an active creator, because 
 the superintendence of the Purusha of the Samkhyas 
 over PrakHti is not an active one, but arises simply 
 from proximity, as in the case of a crystal (I, 96). 
 What he means is that in the Samkhya the Purusha 
 is never a real maker or an agent. He simply 
 reflects on Prakr^ti, or the products of PrakHti 
 are reflected on him ; and as anything reflected 
 in a crystal or a mirror seems to move when the 
 mirror is moved, though it remains all the time 
 quite unmoved, thus the Purusha also seems to 
 move and to be an agent, while what is really 
 moving, changing, or being created is PrakHti. The 
 Purusha therefore cannot be called superintendent, 
 as if exercising an active influence over PrakHti, 
 but Prakriti is evolved up to the point of Manas 
 under the eyes of Purusha, and the Purusha does 
 no more than witness all this, wrongly imagining 
 all the time that he is himself the creator or ruler 
 of the world. In support of this Aniruddha quotes 
 a passage from the Bhagavad-gita (III, 27): 'All 
 emanations of Prakriti are operated by the Gunas ;
 
 432 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but the Self deluded by Ahamkara imagines that he 
 is the operator/ 
 
 Another objection is urged against the Samkhya 
 view that the Purusha is not a doer or creator, 
 namely that, in that case, a dead body also might 
 be supposed to perform the act of eating. But 
 no, he says, such acts are performed not by a dead 
 or inactive Atman, as little as a dead body eats. 
 It is the individual Purusha (6riva) that performs 
 such acts, when under the influence of Prakn'ti 
 (Buddhi, Ahamkara, and Manas), while the Atman 
 or Purusha remains for ever unchanged. 
 
 A last attempt is made to disprove the neutrality 
 or non-activity of the Atman, that is, the impossi- 
 bility of his being a creator, namely the uselessness 
 of teaching anything, supposing the Self to be 
 altogether without cognition. To this the answer 
 is that though the Atman is not cognitive, yet the 
 Manas is. The Atman reflects on the Manas, and 
 hence the illusion that he himself cognises, while 
 in reality he does no more than witness the appre- 
 hension of the Manas. Thus when it is said, ' He is 
 omniscient and omnipotent,' he (in spite of the 
 gender) is meant for PrakHti, as developed into 
 Manas, and not for the Purusha who in reality is 
 a mere witness of such omniscience and omnipotence 
 (III, 56), deluded, for a time, by Prak?^ti. 
 
 The Theory of Karman. 
 
 In another place where the existence of an Ls-vara, 
 or active ruler of the world, is once more discussed 
 in the Sa??/khya-Sutras, the subject is again treated 
 not so much for its own sake, as in order to settle 
 the old question of the continuous effectiveness of
 
 THE THEORY OF KARMAN. 433 
 
 works (Karman). The reward of every work done, 
 according to Kapila, does not depend on any ruler 
 of the world ; the works themselves are working 
 on for evermore. If it were otherwise, we should 
 have to ascribe the creation of the world, with all 
 its suffering, to a Lord who is nevertheless supposed 
 to be loving and gracious. 
 
 Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha (trans- 
 lated by Cowell and Gough, p. 228) uses the same 
 argument, saying : ' As for the doctrine of " a 
 Supreme Being who acts from compassion," what has 
 been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of 
 His existence, this has wellnigh passed away out of 
 hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either 
 of the two alternatives. For does He act thus 
 before or after creation ? If you say before, we 
 reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of 
 bodies, &c., there will be no need, as long as there 
 is no creation, for any desire to free living beings 
 from pain (which is the main characteristic of com- 
 passion) ; and if you adopt the second alternative, 
 you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one 
 hand you will hold that God created the world 
 through compassion, and on the other hand that 
 He compassionated it after He had created it.' 
 
 And again, as every activity presupposes desire, 
 the Lord, whether working for Himself or for 
 others, would ipso facto cease to be free from de- 
 sires. This argument is examined from different 
 points of view, but always leads to the same result 
 in the end ; that is to say, to the conviction that 
 the highest state of perfection and freedom from all 
 conditions is really far higher than the ordinary con- 
 ception of the status of the popular Hindu deities, 
 
 pf
 
 434 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 higher even than that of an Isvara, if conceived as 
 a maker and ruler of the universe. This concept 
 of the liberated Purusha or Atman has in fact 
 superseded the concept of the Isvara, and to have 
 made this quite clear would have been, on the part 
 of Kapila, by far the most effective defence against 
 the charge of atheism. The conscience of Kapila 
 and of the ancient Samkhyas was evidently satisfied 
 with a belief in a Purusha in which the old concepts 
 of the divine and the human had been welded into 
 one, without claiming even the aid of an Adi-purusha, 
 a first Purusha, which was a later expedient. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that other philosophies 
 also besides the Sa?7ikhya have been suspected or 
 openly accused of atheism for the same reason. It 
 is easy to understand why almost every philosophy, 
 whether Indian or European, if it endeavours to 
 purify, to dehumanise, and to exalt the idea of the 
 Godhead, can hardly avoid the suspicion of denying 
 the old gods, or of being without a belief in the 
 God of the vulgar. It is well known that on that 
 ground even the early Christians did not escape the 
 suspicion of atheism. 
 
 Even 6raimini's Purva-Mima/msa, though based on 
 the belief that the Veda is of superhuman origin, 
 and though entirely devoted to the interpretation 
 of the Vedic sacrifice, has been charged with atheism, 
 because it admitted the independent evolution of 
 works, which was supposed to imply a denial of 
 God ; nor did the Nyaya and Vai.seshika systems, as 
 we saw, escape the same suspicion. It may be 
 that the recognition of the authority of the Veda 
 was considered sufficient to quiet the theological 
 conscience ; but there is certainly, so far as I can
 
 THE THEORY OF KARMAN. 435 
 
 see, no passage in the Nyaya and Vaiseshika- Sutras 
 where an tsvara is clearly denied or postulated, either 
 as the author or as the controller of the infinitesimally 
 small elements or atoms of which the world is by 
 them supposed to consist. There is one passage in 
 the Nyaya-Sutras in which the question of a divine 
 Lord is discussed in the usual way, namely Book V, 
 Sutras 19-21, but otherwise we hear nothing of 
 what the Isvara is meant to be or to do. 
 
 These attacks, as met by the Nyaya philoso- 
 phers, may be looked upon as purely academic, but 
 the tone in which they are met, for instance, by later 
 philosophers such as Madhava in his Sarva-darsana- 
 samgraha, shows that they at all events took them 
 seriously. As specimens of Indian casuistry some 
 extracts from Madhava's chapter on the Nyaya may 
 here be of interest. I quote from the translation by 
 Cowell and Gough (p. 171): 'It is quite true/ he 
 says, ' that none of the three Prama^as can prove 
 the existence of a Supreme Being. Perception 
 cannot, because the Deity, being devoid of form, 
 must be beyond the senses. Inference cannot, be- 
 cause there is no universal proposition or middle 
 term that could apply. The Veda cannot, because 
 we Naiyayikas have ourselves proved it to be non- 
 eternal. All this we admit to be quite true, that 
 is, we admit that a Supreme Isvara cannot be 
 established by proof. But is there not, on the other 
 side, the old argument that the mountains, seas, &c., 
 must have had a maker, because they possess the 
 nature of being effects, quite as much as a jar (or, as 
 we should say, a watch) "? And that they are effects 
 can easily be proved by the fact that they possess 
 parts, these parts existing in intimate relation, and 
 
 F f 2
 
 436 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 again by the fact that they possess a limited 
 magnitude half-way between what is infinitely great 
 and infinitesimally small. Nor has any proof ever 
 been produced on the opposite side to show that 
 the mountains had no maker. For if any one should 
 argue that the mountains cannot have had a maker 
 because they were not produced by a body, just as 
 the eternal ether this pretended inference would 
 no more stand examination than the young fawn 
 could stand the attack of the full-grown lion, for 
 you have not even shown that what you say about 
 the eternal ether is a real fact. We therefore abide 
 by our old argument that the mountains have the 
 nature of effects, and if they had no maker, they 
 could not be effects, that is, produced, not by them- 
 selves alone, but by concurrent causes, one of them 
 being a maker. A maker is a being possessed of a 
 combination of volition, desire to act, a knowledge of 
 proper means, setting in motion all other causes, but 
 itself moved by none (the Aristotelian KIVOVV CLKLV^TOV)' 
 But though yielding to this argument, the objector 
 asks next, what object this maker or Isvara could 
 have had in view in creating the world. A feeling 
 of compassion, if he had any, should surely have 
 induced him to create all living beings happy, 
 and not laden with misery, since this militates 
 against his compassion. Hence he concludes that 
 it would not be fitting to admit that God created 
 the world. Hereupon the Nyiiya philosopher be- 
 comes very wroth and exclaims : ' thou crest-jewel 
 of the atheistic school, be pleased to close for a 
 moment thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider 
 the following suggestions. His action in creating 
 is indeed caused by compassion only, but the idea
 
 THE THEOEY OF KAKMAN. 437 
 
 of a creation which shall consist of nothing but 
 happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, 
 since there cannot but arise eventual differences 
 from the different results which will ripen from the 
 good and evil actions (Karman) of the beings who 
 are to be created.' 
 
 In answer to this, the atheistic opponent returns 
 once more to the authority of the Veda and says : 
 ' But then, how will you remedy your deadly sick- 
 ness of reasoning in a circle [for you have to prove 
 the Veda by the authority of God, and then again 
 God's existence by the Veda].' 
 
 But the theistic interpreter and defender of the 
 Nyaya is not silenced so easily, and replies : ' We 
 defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in 
 our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal 
 dependence of each " which you call " reasoning in 
 a circle," in regard to their being produced or in 
 regard to their being known ? It cannot be the 
 former, for though the production of the Veda is 
 dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, 
 there is no possibility of His being produced ; nor 
 can it be in regard to their being known, for even 
 if our knowledge of God were dependent on the 
 Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other 
 source ; nor, again can it be in regard to the know- 
 ledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the 
 non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by 
 any Yogin endowed with transcendent faculties 
 (Tivra, &c.). 
 
 Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious 
 by the performance of duties which produce His 
 favour, the desired end, liberation, is obtained; thus 
 everything is clear.'
 
 438 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Everything may be clear to one accustomed to 
 the Indian way of arguing ; but from our point of 
 view it would certainly seem that, though the 
 Nyaya does not teach the non-existence of an 
 Isvara, it is not very successful in proving by its 
 logic the necessity of admitting a maker or ruler 
 of the world, that is, an Isvara. 
 
 The Four Books of Yoga-Stltras. 
 
 If now we turn to the Yoga-Sutras of Pataw/ali 
 we find that the first book, the Samadhi-pada, is 
 devoted to an explanation of the form and aim 
 of Yoga, and of Samadhi, meditation or absorption 
 of thought ; the second, the Sadhana-pada, explains 
 the means of arriving at this absorption ; the third, 
 Vibhuti-pada, gives an account of the supernatural 
 powers that can be obtained by absorption and 
 ascetic exercises ; while the fourth, the Kaivalya- 
 pada, explains Kaivalya to be the highest object 
 of all these exercises, of concentration of thought, 
 and of deep absorption and ecstasy. Kaivalya, from 
 Kevala, alone, means the isolation of the soul from 
 the universe and its return to itself, and not to any 
 other being, whether Isvara, Brahman, or any one 
 else. 
 
 That this is the riofht view of the case is confirmed 
 
 O 
 
 by the remarks made by Vi^nana-Bhikshu in his 
 Yoga-sara-sa?y/graha, p. 18. Here we are told that 
 even when there is some imperfection in the employ- 
 ment of the above means (faith, energy, memory, 
 absorbing meditation, and knowledge), the two 
 results (absorption and liberation) can be brought 
 very near by the grace of the Parama-Isvara, the 
 Highest Lord, and secured by devotion to Him.
 
 THE FOUR BOOKS OF YOGA-SUTRAS. 439 
 
 By Parama-lWara or the Highest Lord is here 
 meant that particular Purusha (Self) who was 
 never touched by the five troubles, nescience and 
 the rest, nor by virtue or vice and their various 
 developments, or by any residue (results of former 
 deeds) in general. Vi^nana-Bhikshu abstains from 
 saying much more on the Lord, because, as he says, 
 he has treated of this Being very fully in his 
 remarks on the Brahma-Sutras I, i. He probably 
 refers to his commentary on the Vedanta ; and he 
 is evidently quite convinced that, however different 
 the roads followed by the Vedantins and Samkhya- 
 yogins may be, the Divine idea of both schools is 
 much the same. He only adds that the powers and 
 omniscience of the Isvara are equalled or excelled 
 by none, that he is the spiritual chief and father 
 of all the gods, such as Brahma, Vishnu, and 
 Hara, that he imparts spiritual vision (6r/lana- 
 &akshus) through the Vedas, and that he is the 
 inner guide, and called Pranava. Devotion to Him 
 is said to consist in contemplation and to end in 
 direct perception. Steadfastness with regard to 
 Isvara is represented as the principal factor in 
 abstract meditation and in liberation, because it leads 
 to greater nearness to the final goal, steadiness 
 with regard to the human self being secondary 
 only. This devotion to Isvara is also declared to 
 put an end to all the impediments, such as illness, 
 &c. (I, 30) ; and a passage is quoted from the Smn'ti, 
 ' For one desiring liberation the most comfortable 
 path is clinging to or resting on Vishnu ; otherwise, 
 thinking only with the mind, a man is sure to be 
 deceived.'
 
 440 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 True Object of Yoga. 
 
 It is clear throughout the whole of this chapter on 
 Isvara that devotion to him is no more than one of 
 the means, though, it may he, a very important one, 
 for the attainment of liberation, the highest goal of 
 the Yoga. But it is not that highest goal itself, but 
 only a means towards it, nor could it be accepted 
 as the most important feature of the Yoga. The 
 really important character of the Yoga consists in 
 its teaching that, however true the Samkhya-philo- 
 sophy may be, it fails to accomplish its end without 
 those practical helps which the Yoga-philosophy 
 alone supplies. The human mind, though fully 
 enlightened as to its true nature, would soon be 
 carried away again by the torrent of life ; the 
 impressions of the senses and all the cares and 
 troubles of every-day life would return, if there 
 were no means of making the mind as firm as 
 a rock. Now this steadying of the mind, this 
 Yoga, is what Pata/^ali is chiefly concerned with. 
 
 7fltta. 
 
 We saw that in the second Sutra he explained 
 Yoga as Altta-vn'tti-nirodha, that is, restraining 
 or steadying the actions and distractions of thought. 
 Vritti, which I translate by action, has also been 
 rendered by movement or function ; while A"itta, 
 which T give as thought, has often been trans- 
 lated by mind or the thinking principle. It is 
 curious that the Yoga should have employed a 
 word which, as far as I know, was not a recog- 
 nised technical term of the Sawkhya. In the 
 Sa?ftkhya the term would be Manas, mind, but
 
 .OTTA. 441 
 
 Manas in a state of activity, and, of course, as 
 a development of Ahamkara and Buddhi. It has 
 to be taken here as a psychological term, as a name 
 for thought, as carried on in real life, and indirectly 
 only of the instrument of thought. As I had to 
 use mind for Manas in the Samkhya-philosophy, 
 it would be difficult to find a better rendering 
 of the word when used by Yoga philosophers. Of 
 course Manas is always different from Buddhi, in so 
 far as it is a modification of Buddhi, which itself has 
 passed through Ahamkara or the differentiation of 
 subjectivity and objectivity. But for practical pur- 
 poses, what is meant by Kitta, is simply our thought 
 or our thinking, and though mind, with us also, 
 has been defined very differently by different 
 philosophers, and is used most promiscuously in 
 common parlance, its etymological relationship with 
 Manas pointed it out as the most convenient 
 rendering of Manas, provided always that we 
 remember its being a technical term of the Yoga- 
 philosophy, as we have to do whenever we render 
 Prakrtti by nature. Nirodha, restraint, does not 
 mean entire suppression of all movements of thought, 
 but at first concentration only, though it leads in 
 the end to something like utter vacuity or self- 
 absorption. In all the functions of the Manas, it 
 must be remembered that the real self-conscious 
 seer or perceiver is, for the time being, the Purusha 
 or Self. It is he who is temporarily interested in 
 what is going on, though not absorbed in it except 
 by a delusion only. Like the moon reflected in the 
 ripples of the waters, the Self appears as moving 
 in the waves which break against it from the vast 
 
 O 
 
 ocean of Praknti, but in reality it is not moving.
 
 44 s INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We saw that the mind, when receiving impressions 
 from the outer world, was supposed in Hindu 
 philosophy to assume for the time being the actual 
 form of the object perceived, but, when once perfect 
 in Yoga, it perceives nothing but itself. 
 
 Functions of the Mind. 
 
 The principal acts and functions of the mind are 
 described as right notion, wrong notion, fancy, 
 sleep, and remembering, and they may be either 
 painful or not. 
 
 Right notions are brought about by the three Pra- 
 ma^as, so well known from different systems of 
 Indian philosophy, as sensuous perception, inference, 
 and testimony, Vedic or otherwise. It is significant 
 that Pata?l^ali should have used Agama instead of 
 the Aptava&ana of the S4??ikhya, for Agama means 
 distinctly the Veda, and thus would establish once 
 for all what is called the orthodox character of 
 the Yoga. 
 
 Wrong notions require no explanation. They 
 are illustrated by our mistaking mother-of-pearl 
 for silver, a rope for a snake, &c. A state of doubt 
 also when we are uncertain whether what we see 
 at a distance is a man or the trunk of tree, is classed 
 among wrong notions. 
 
 Fancy is explained as chiefly due to words ; and 
 a curious instance of fancy is given when we speak 
 of the intelligence of the Self or Purusha, or of the 
 head of llahu. the fact being 1 that there is no in- 
 
 o 
 
 telligence belonging to Self, but that the Self is 
 altogether intelligence, just as llahu, the monster 
 that is supposed to swallow the moon, is not a being 
 that has a head, but is a head and nothing else.
 
 EXERCISES. 443 
 
 Sleep is defined as that state (Vritti) of the mind 
 which has nothing for its object. The commentator, 
 however, explains that in sleep also a kind of per- 
 ception must take place, because, otherwise, we could 
 not say that we had slept well or badly. 
 
 Remembering is the not wiping out of an object 
 that has once been perceived. While true per- 
 ception, false perception, and fancy take place in 
 a waking state, a dream, which is a perception of 
 vivid impressions, takes place in sleep, while sleep 
 itself has no perceptible object. Remembering may 
 depend on true or false perceptions, on fancy, and 
 even on dreams. 
 
 Exercises. 
 
 Now all these actions or functions have to be 
 restrained, and in the end to be suppressed, and this 
 is said to be effected by exercises (Abhyasa) and 
 freedom from passions (Vairagya), I, 12. 
 
 Indian philosophers have the excellent habit of 
 always explaining the meaning of their technical 
 terms. Having introduced for the first time the 
 terms exercise and freedom from passion, Patafk/ali 
 asks at once : ' What is Abhyasa or exercise ? ' 
 Abhyasa is generally used in the sense of repetition, 
 but he answers that he means hereafter to use this 
 term in the sense of effort towards steadiness (Sthiti) 
 of thought. And if it be asked what is meant by 
 steadiness or Sthiti, he declares that it means that 
 state of the mind, when, free from all activity (V ritti), 
 it remains in its own character, that is, unchanged. 
 Such effort must be continuous or repeated, as 
 implied by the term Abhyasa (I, 13).
 
 444 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This Abhyasa is said to become firmly grounded, 
 if practised for a long time thoroughly and un- 
 intermittingly (I, 14). 
 
 Dispassion, Vairagya. 
 
 Next follows the definition of dispassion( Vairagya), 
 as the consciousness of having overcome (the world) 
 on the part of one who has no longer any desire for 
 any objects whatsoever, whether visible or revealed 
 
 a, is). 
 
 Here visible (DHshte) stands for perceptible or 
 sensuous objects, while Anusravika may be translated 
 by revealed, as it is derived from Anusrava, and 
 this is identical with /S'ruti or Veda. Perhaps Anu- 
 srava is more general than Veda, including all that 
 has been handed down, such as the stories about the 
 happiness of the gods in paradise (Devaloka). &c. 
 The consciousness of having subdued or overcome 
 all such desires and being no longer the slave of 
 them, that, we are told, is Vairagya or dispassionate- 
 ness, and that is the highest point which the student 
 of Yoga-philosophy hopes to reach. 
 
 It is interesting to see how deeply this idea of 
 Vairagya or dispassionateness must have entered 
 into the daily life of the Hindus. It is constantly 
 mentioned as the highest excellence not for ascetics 
 only, but for everybody. It sometimes does not 
 mean much more than what we mean by the even 
 and subdued temper of the true gentleman, but it 
 signifies also the highest unworldliness and a com- 
 plete surrender of all selfish desires. A very good 
 description of what Vairagya is or ought to be is 
 preserved to us in the hundred verses ascribed to 
 Bhartnhari (650 A. D.), which are preceded by two
 
 DISPASSION, VAIRAGYA. 445 
 
 other centuries of verses, one on worldly wisdom 
 and the other on love. Many of these verses occur 
 again and again in other works, and it is very 
 doubtful whether BhartHhari was really the original 
 author of them all, or whether he only collected 
 them as Subhashitas \ Anyhow they show how the 
 philosophy of Vairagya had leavened the popular 
 mind of India at that distant time, nor has it ceased 
 to do so to the present day. It was perhaps bold, 
 after Bhartn'hari, to undertake a similar collection 
 of verses on the same subject. But as the Vairagya- 
 sataka of (rainaMrya seems in more recent times 
 to have acquired considerable popularity in India, 
 a few extracts from it may serve to show that the 
 old teaching of Pataw/ali and Bhartn'hari has not 
 yet been forgotten in their native country. 
 
 ' Death follows man like a shadow, and pursues 
 him like an enemy ; perform, therefore, good deeds, 
 so that you may reap a blessing hereafter.' 
 
 ' Frequent enjoyment of earthly prosperity has 
 led to your sufferings. Pity it is that you have not 
 tried the " Know Yourself." ' 
 
 ' Live in the world but be not of it, is the precept 
 taught by our old Bishis, and it is the only means 
 of liberating yourself from the world.' 
 
 ' The body is perishable and transitory, while the 
 Self is imperishable and everlasting ; it is connected 
 with the body only by the link of Karman ; it 
 should not be subservient to it.' 
 
 ' If, through sheer negligence, you do nothing good 
 
 1 His work is actually called Subhashita-trisati, see 
 Eeport of Sanskrit and Tamil MSS., 1896-97, by Seshagiri 
 astri, p. 7.
 
 44^ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for your fellow creatures, you will be your own enemy, 
 and become a victim to the miseries of this world.' 
 
 ' Better to do less good, with purity of heart, than 
 to do more with jealousy, pride, malice, or fraud. 
 Little, but good and loving work, is always valuable, 
 like a pure gem, the essence of a drug, or pithy 
 advice.' 
 
 ' If you are unable to subject yourself physically 
 to penances, to undergo austerities, and engage in 
 deep contemplation, the proper course to liberate 
 your soul from the hard fetters of Karman would 
 be to keep the passions of your heart under control, 
 to check your desires, to carry out your secular affairs 
 with calmness, to devote yourself to the worship of 
 God, and to realise in yourself the " Permanent 
 Truth," bearing in mind the transitory nature of the 
 universe.' 
 
 'To control your mind, speech, and body, does 
 not mean to be thoughtless, silent or inactive, like 
 beasts or trees; but, instead of thinking what is 
 evil, speaking untruth, and doing harm to others, 
 mind, speech, and body should be applied to good 
 thoughts, good words, and good deeds.' 
 
 Dispassionateness, as here taught for practical 
 purposes chiefly, reaches its highest point in the 
 eyes of the Yoga-philosopher, when a man, after he 
 has attained to the knowledge of Purusha, has freed 
 himself entirely from all desire for the three Gimas 
 (or their products). This is at least what Patu/i/yali 
 says in a somewhat obscure Sutra (I, ii) 1 . This 
 Sutra seems intended to describe the highest 
 
 c"> 
 
 state within reach of the true VairiUnn, involving 1 
 
 O c* 
 
 1 Garbe, Grundriss, p. 49.
 
 MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. 447 
 
 indifference not only to visible and revealed objects, 
 but likewise towards the Gimas, that is, if I am 
 not mistaken, the twenty-four Tattvas, here called 
 Guwas J , because determined by them. The know- 
 ledge of the Purusha implies the distinction between 
 what is Purusha, the Self, and what is not, and there- 
 fore also between Purusha and the Gunas of Prakr^ti. 
 Vigrnana-Bhikshu explains it by Atmanatmavive- 
 kasakshatkarat, i. e. from realising the difference 
 between what is Self and what is not Self, and 
 not as a possessive compound : the sense, however, 
 remaining much the same. It is curious that 
 Rajendralal Mitra should have rendered Purusha- 
 khyate^ by ' conducive to a knowledge of God.' 
 From a purely philosophical point of view Purusha 
 may be translated by God, but such a translation 
 would be misleading here, particularly as the 
 Sutra 23, on the devotion to the Lord, follows so 
 soon after. It would have been better also to 
 translate ' arising from,' than ' conducive to.' 
 
 Meditation With or Without an Object. 
 
 Pataw/ali next proceeds (1, 1 7) to explain an impor- 
 tant distinction between the two kinds of meditative 
 absorption (Samadhi), which he calls Sampra^nata 
 
 1 These Guwas are more fully described in II, 19, where we 
 read that the four Guwas or Guwaparvam are meant for (i) 
 Visesha, i.e. the gross elements and the organs ; (2) Avisesha. 
 i.e. the subtle elements and the mind; (3) the Liwgamatra, i.e. 
 Buddhi ; (4) the Aliwga, i.e. Praknti as Avyakta, In the com- 
 mentary to I, 45, the same classes of Gvmas are described as 
 Aliwga, a name of Pradhana, Visishfaliwga, the gross elements 
 (Bhutani) ; AvisisbJalimga, the subtle essences and the senses : 
 Liwgamatra, i. e. Buddhi, and Aliwga, that is, the Pradhana.
 
 448 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and Asampra<7?iata. This seems to mean that there 
 is one kind of meditation when our thoughts are 
 directed and fixed on a definite object, and another 
 when there is no definite object of meditation left. 
 Here the spirit of minute distinction shows itself 
 once more, for though these two kinds of meditation 
 may well be kept apart, and the former be considered 
 as preliminary to the latter, the numerous sub- 
 divisions of each hardly deserve our notice. We are 
 told that what is called conscious meditation may 
 have for its object either one or the other of the 
 twenty-four Tattvas or the Isvara, looked upon as 
 one of the Purushas. The twenty-four Tattvas are 
 called unconscious, the twenty-fifth or Purusha is 
 conscious. When meditation (Bhavana) has something 
 definite for its object it is called not only Pra^/iata, 
 known, or, as referred to the subject, knowing, but 
 also Savi^a, literally with a seed, which I am inclined 
 to take in the sense of having some seed on which 
 it can fix, and from which it can develop. The 
 Asampra^rtata-samadhi, or meditation without a 
 known object, is called Avi(/a, not having a seed 
 from which to spring or to expand. Native com- 
 mentators, however, take a different view. 
 
 Those who in their Samadhi do not go beyond 
 the twenty-four Tattvas, without seeing the twenty- 
 fifth, the Purusha, but at all events identify them- 
 selves no longer with the body, are called Videhas, 
 bodyless ; others who do not see the Purusha 
 yet, but only existence, are called Prakwtilayas, 
 absorbed in Prakf'iti. 
 
 This again is not quite clear to me, but it is 
 hardly necessary that we should enter into all the 
 intricate subdivisions of the two kinds of meditation,
 
 MEDITATION WITH OR WITHOUT AN OBJECT. 449 
 
 such as Savitarka, argumentative, Savi&ara, delibera- 
 tive, Sananda, joyous, and Sasmitil l , with false con- 
 ceit. They may become important in a more minute 
 study of the Yoga, but they can hardly be of 
 interest to speculative philosophers except so far 
 as they furnish another proof of a long continued 
 study of the Yoga-philosophy in India before the 
 actual composition of the Sutras. 
 
 The Asamprae^ata-samadhi, or meditation with- 
 out a known object, or, it may be, unconscious 
 meditation, is explained as being preceded by a 
 repetition of negative perception, and as the end 
 of all previous impressions. I, 18. 
 
 This Sutra has been differently explained by 
 different European and native commentators. It 
 may mean that there is a residue of previous 
 impressions, or that there is not. The Sawskaras, 
 which I have rendered by previous impressions, 
 are everything that has given to the mind its 
 peculiar character, its flavour, so to say, or its 
 general disposition, 
 
 'Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem 
 Testa diu.' 
 
 It may be intended that these Sawiskaras are either 
 all wiped out, or that there is but a small residue of 
 them, manifested in the final act of the stopping all 
 functions of the mind. 
 
 In summing up what has been said about the 
 different kinds of Samadhi, Pata?"k/ali says (I, 1 9) once 
 more that in the case of the Videhas and Prakviti- 
 
 3 Asmita is different from Ahawkara, and means the mis- 
 conception that I am (Asmi) what I am not, such as Prakn'ti, 
 Buddhi, Ahamkara, Manas, &c. 
 
 Gg
 
 45 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 layas (as explained before, p. 448) the object or, if 
 you like, the cause of Samadhi is the real world 
 (Bhava), but that for other Yogins there are pre- 
 liminary conditions or steps to Samadhi, namely, 
 faith, energy, memory, concentration, and know- 
 ledge succeeding each other. Every one of these 
 Samadhis is again carefully defined, and some more 
 helps are mentioned in the next Sutra (I, 21), 
 where we read that Samadhi may be said to 
 be near or within reach when the zeal or the will is 
 strong. These strong-willed or determined aspirants 
 are again divided (I, 22) according as the means 
 employed by them are mild, moderate, or excessive. 
 Thus we get nine classes of Yogins, those who 
 employ mild means, with mild, with moderate, or with 
 excessive zeal ; those who employ moderate means, 
 with mild, with moderate, or with excessive zeal ; and 
 those who employ excessive means with mild, with 
 moderate, or with excessive zeal. 
 
 Such divisions and subdivisions which fully justify 
 the name of Samkhya, enumeration, make both the 
 Samkhya- and Yoga-philosophies extremely tedious, 
 and I shall in future dispense with them, though 
 they may contain now and then some interesting 
 observations. 
 
 tsvara Once More. 
 
 After an enumeration of all these means of Yoga 
 to be employed by the student, follows at last the 
 famous Sutra I, 23, which has always been supposed 
 to contain, in answer to Kapila, the proof of the 
 existence of a Deity, and which I translated before 
 by ' Devotion to the Lord.' The commentator calls 
 it simply an easy expedient, an alternative. Nor is 
 it right, with liajendralal Mitra, to translate this
 
 OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. 451 
 
 Sutra at once by ' Devotion to God.' Isvara, as we 
 saw, is not God in the sense in which Brahm^ might 
 be called so. He is a God, the highest God, but 
 always one of many Purushas ; and though he was 
 looked upon as holy (I, 25) and omniscient, he never 
 seems to have risen to the rank of a Creator, for 
 which there is really no room in the Samkhya 
 system. Though it is true, no doubt, that the 
 orthodox Yogins derived great comfort from this 
 Sutra as shielding Patan^ali against the charge of 
 atheism, it would be impossible to look upon it as 
 a real proof in support of the existence of God, or 
 as more than a somewhat forced confession of faith. 
 
 Other Means of Obtaining Samadhi. 
 
 The benefits arising from this devotion to the 
 Lord are not essentially different from those that 
 are to be obtained from other Upayas or means of 
 attaining Samadhi, as may be seen from Sutras I, 29 
 to I, 33 translated before. Nor is this devotion 
 even the last or the highest Upaya, for Patark/ali 
 goes on immediately after to mention other means 
 equally conducive to concentrated meditation or 
 absorption in the thought of one object. Expedients, 
 such as the expulsion and retention of the breath, 
 follow next, the so-called Pranayamas, which we 
 can well believe, may have been really useful as 
 contrivances to draw away the thoughts from all 
 subjects except the one chosen for meditation, 
 generally one of the Tattvas. But this opens far 
 too large a subject for our purpose in this place. 
 We approach here to the pathological portion of 
 the Yoga, the so-called Ha^a or Kriya-yoga, a sub- 
 ject certainly far more important than has generally 
 
 Gg 2
 
 452 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 been supposed, but a subject for students of path- 
 ology rather than of philosophy, unless, as is now 
 the fashion, we include the so-called physico-psycho- 
 logical experiments under the name of philosophy. 
 One thing may certainly be claimed for our Sutras ; 
 they are honest in their statements as to the 
 discipline that can be applied to the mind through 
 the body, and even if they could be proved to have 
 been mistaken in their observations, their illusions 
 do not seem to me to have been mere frauds, at 
 least in the days of Pata?l(/ali, though it is far from 
 my purpose to undertake a defence of all the doings 
 and sayings of modern Yogins or Mahatmans. 
 
 Next to the moderation or restraint of the breath- 
 ing, follow descriptions of how the mind, by being 
 directed to the tip of the nose, cognises a heavenly 
 odour, and the same with all the other senses, which 
 therefore are supposed to have no longer any inclina- 
 tion towards outward objects, having everything 
 they want in themselves. We are next told of the 
 perception of an inward luminous and blessed state, 
 which produces a steadiness and contentedness of 
 the mind when directed towards objects which no 
 longer appeal to the passions (I, 37). No wonder 
 that even objects seen in dreams or in sleep are 
 supposed to answer the same purpose, that is, to fix 
 the attention. In fact any object may be chosen for 
 steady meditation, such as the moon without, or our 
 heart within, provided always that these objects do 
 not appeal to our passions. 
 
 All these are means towards an end, and there 
 can be no doubt that they have proved efficacious ; 
 only, as so often happens, the means have evidently 
 encroached in this case also, on the aims, and to such
 
 OTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING SAMADHI. 453 
 
 an extent that Yoga has often been understood to 
 consist in these outward efforts rather than in that 
 concentration of thought which they were meant 
 to produce, and which was to lead on to Kaivalya 
 or spiritual separateness and freedom. This true 
 Yoga is often distinguished as Ra^a-yoga or royal 
 Yoga from the other called Kriya-yoga or work- 
 ing Yoga, which is sometimes called HaAa-yoga, 
 though it is not clear why. Though some of these 
 bodily exercises are represented as serving as a kind 
 of staircase on which the mind ascends step by step, 
 we are told at other times that any step may be 
 useful, and that some may be skipped or taken for 
 passed. 
 
 Now, if we ask what is the result of all this, we 
 are told in Sutra 41 that a man who has put an 
 end to all the motions and emotions of his mind, 
 obtains with regard to all objects of his senses con- 
 formation grounded in them (sic), or steadiness and 
 consubstantiation, the idea being that the mind is 
 actually modified or changed by the objects per- 
 ceived (I, 41). As a crystal, when placed near a 
 red flower, becomes really red to our eyes, in the 
 same way the mind is supposed to become tinged 
 by the objects perceived. This impression remains 
 true as grounded in the object, and our mind should 
 always be centred on one object of meditation. 
 
 Having mentioned in a former Sutra that Samadhi 
 (here called Samapatti) may be either Savitarka or 
 SaviMra, he now explains (I, 42) that when medita- 
 tion is mixed with uncertainties as to word, meaning, 
 or knowledge, it is called Savitarka. Thus, supposing 
 that our meditation was centred on a cow, the question 
 would be whether we should meditate on the sound
 
 454 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cow, Sk. Go, or on the meaning of it (Begriff), that 
 is the genus cow, or the idea or picture (Vorstellung) 
 conveyed by it. Such a meditation would be called 
 Savitarka. Its opposite is Nirvitarka when all 
 memory vanishes and the meaning alone, without 
 any form, remains, or, as the commentator puts it, 
 though not much more clearly, when the knowing 
 mind (Pragma), tinged with the form of its object, 
 forgets its own subjective form of knowing, and 
 becomes, as it were, one in form with the object. 
 
 After Samadhi, both Savitarka and Nirvitarka, 
 has been described, the next division is into Savi&ara 
 and NirviMra. They are defined as having reference 
 to subtle objects (I, 44), that is, to the Tanmatras, 
 essences, and the senses, and thus we learn that the 
 former, the Savitarka Samadhi, had to deal with 
 material objects only. Subtle objects include Pra- 
 k-riti also, and there is nothing subtle beyond it, for 
 the Purusha is neither subtle nor non- subtle. 
 
 If we look upon the NirviMra Samadhi as the 
 highest of the Samadhis, then there would follow 
 on the completion of that meditation contentment or 
 peace of the Self (Atman). Knowledge in this state 
 is called Tfo'tambhara, right or truth-bearing, quite 
 different from the knowledge which is acquired by 
 inference or by revelation. And from this know- 
 ledge springs a disposition which overcomes all 
 former dispositions and renders them superfluous. 
 
 Samadhi Aprar/uatft. 
 
 This knowledge therefore would seem to be the 
 highest goal of the true Yogin ; but no, there is 
 still something beyond knowledge, and that is what 
 was called before Apragr/iat& Samadhi, meditation
 
 KAIVALYA, FREEDOM. 455 
 
 without any object, or pure ecstasy. This restores 
 the Purusha to his own nature, after he has been 
 delivered from all the outside disturbances of life, 
 and particularly from the ignorance that caused him 
 to identify himself for awhile with any of the works 
 of Prakrit i (Asmita). 
 
 Kaivalya, Freedom. 
 
 This short account of what is contained in the 
 first chapter of the Yoga-Sutras contains almost 
 all that can be of interest to European philosophers 
 in the system of Patan^ali, and it is not impossible 
 that it may have originally formed a book complete 
 in itself. It shows us the whole drift of the Yoga 
 in its simplest form, beginning with the means of 
 steadying and concentrating the mind on certain 
 things, and more particularly on the twenty-four 
 Tattvas, as taken over from the Samkhya, and 
 leading on to a description of meditation, no longer 
 restricted to any of the Tattvas, which is tantamount 
 to a meditation which does not dwell on anything 
 that can be offered by an ideal representation of what 
 is called the real world. It is really meditation of 
 each Purusha on himself only, as distinct from all the 
 Tattvas of Praknti. This is Kaivalya or the highest 
 bliss in the eyes of the true Yogin, and it may well 
 be called the highest achievement of 6rfiana-yoga, 
 i. e. Yoga carried on by thought or by the will alone. 
 Outward helps, such as the Pranayama, the in- and 
 out-breathing, are just alluded to, but that is almost 
 the only allusion to what in later times came to be 
 the most prominent part of the practical or Kriya- 
 yoga, namely, the postures and other ascetic per- 
 formances (Yogahgas), supposed to prepare the mind
 
 456 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for its own higher efforts. The above-mentioned 
 Isvara-pramdh4na, ' Devotion to the Lord/ is classed 
 here as simply one of the Yogangas or accessories 
 of Yoga, together with purification, contentment, 
 penance, and mumbling of prayers (II, 32), showing 
 how little of real philosophical importance was 
 ascribed to it by Patafk/ali. It helps towards Sa- 
 madhi, meditation, it is a kind of worship (Bhakti- 
 visesha) addressed to Bhagavat ; but that is all the 
 commentator has to say in recommendation of it. 
 There is nothing to show that Patafi^/ali imagined 
 he had thereby given a full and satisfactory answer 
 to the most momentous of all questions, the exist- 
 ence or non-existence of an individual Creator or 
 Ruler of the world. 
 
 It is quite possible that some of my readers will, 
 be disappointed by my having suppressed fuller 
 details about these matters, but it seems to me 
 that they really have nothing to do with philosophy 
 in the true sense of the word ; and those who take 
 an interest in them may easily consult texts of 
 which there exist English translations, such as the 
 second and third books of the Yoga-Sutras, and 
 better still the Ha^aprayoga, translated by Shrinivas 
 Jyangar, Bombay, 1893 ; On the Vedantic Haj-Yoga, 
 by Sabhapati Svami, edited by Siris Chandra Basu, 
 Lahore, 1880; the Ghera/<c/a-samhita, Bombay, 1895, 
 and several more. There is also a very useful German 
 translation by H. Walter, ' Svatmarama's Ha^Aa- 
 yoga-pradipika, Mimchen, 1893. 
 
 Yogangas, Helps to Yoga. 
 
 It is true that considerable antiquity is claimed 
 for some of these Yogangas, or members of Yoga.
 
 YOGANGAS, HELPS TO YOGA. 457 
 
 Siva, himself is reported to have been their author, 
 and names such as Vasish^Aa and Ya^navalkya are 
 quoted as having described and sanctioned eighty- 
 four postures, while Gorakshanatha reckoned their 
 true number as 8,400,000 J . I take a few specimens 
 from Eajendralal Mitra's Yoga Aphorisms, p. 103 : 
 ' i . Padmasana. The right foot should be placed 
 on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right 
 thigh ; the hands should be crossed, and the two 
 great toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin 
 should be bent down on the chest, and in this 
 posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of 
 the nose. It is called Padmasana, lotus-seat, and 
 is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases. 
 
 2. Virasana. Place each foot under the thigh 
 of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture 
 Virasana. 
 
 3. Bhadrasana. Place the hands in the form of 
 a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the 
 feet, and there is Bhadrasana, fortunate-seat. 
 
 4. Svastikasana. Sitting straight with the feet 
 placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastika- 
 sana, cross-seat. 
 
 5. Danc/asana. Seated with the fingers grasping 
 the ankles brought together and with feet placed 
 extended on the legs, stick-seat.' 
 
 This will, I believe, be considered enough and 
 more than enough, and I shall abstain from giving 
 descriptions of the Mudras (dispositions of upper 
 limbs), of the Bandhas or bindings, and of the rules 
 regarding the age, sex, caste, food and dwelling 
 of the performer of Yoga. To most people these 
 
 1 See Eajendralal Mitra, Yoga Aphorisms, p. 102.
 
 458 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 minute regulations will seem utterly absurd. I do 
 not go quite so far, for some of these facts have, in 
 a general way, been recorded and verified so often 
 that we can hardly doubt that these postures and 
 restraints of breathing, if properly practised, are 
 helpful in producing complete abstraction (Pratya- 
 hara) of the senses from their objects, and a com- 
 plete indifference of the Yogin towards pain and 
 pleasure, cold and heat, hunger and thirst ] . This 
 is what is meant by the complete subjugation of 
 the senses (Param& vasyatS, indriy4?^im, II, 55) 
 which it is the highest desire of the Yogin to realise, 
 and this not for its own sake, but as an essential 
 condition of perceiving the difference between the 
 Purusha, the seer, and PrakHti, the spectacle, pre- 
 sented to Purusha through the agency of the Manas 
 as developed from Prakriti. Professional students 
 of hypnotism would probably be able to account for 
 many statements of the followers of Kriya-yoga, 
 which to a reader without physiological knowledge 
 seem simply absurd and incredible. 
 
 Vibhdtis, Powers. 
 
 The third chapter of Pata/lr/ali's Yoga-Sutras is 
 devoted to a description of certain powers which 
 were supposed to be obtainable by the Yogin. 
 They are called Vibhutis, or simply Bhutis, Maha- 
 siddhis, Jfo'ddhis, or Aisvaryas. Here also we are 
 able to watch the transition from rational begin- 
 nings to irrational exaggerations, the same tendency 
 which led from intellectual to practical Yoga. That 
 transition is clearly indicated in the Yogangas or 
 
 Cf. N. C. Paul, Yoga-Philosophy.
 
 SAM YAM A AND SIDDHIS. 459 
 
 accessories of Yoga. In II, 29 we find eight of 
 these accessories mentioned, viz. restraints (Yama), 
 subduing (Niyama), postures (Asana), regulation of 
 breathing (Pranayama), abstraction (Praty4hara), 
 firmness (Dharana), contemplation (Dhyana), and 
 absorption (Samadhi), but in III, 4 three only are 
 chosen as constituting Samyama, firmness, namely 
 DharaTia, Dhyana, arid Samadhi, the other five 
 being treated as merely outward helps. Dharawa, 
 firmness in holding, is explained (III, i) as the 
 confinement of the Manas to one place, and this 
 place is said to be the tip of the nose, the navel, 
 the ether, the sky or some other place. By this all 
 other VHttis or motions of the Manas are stopped, 
 and the mind can be kept fixed on one object. The 
 next, Dhyana, is contemplation of the one object to 
 the exclusion of all others ; while the third, real 
 Samadhi, absorption, arises when the mind, lost in 
 its work, illuminates one object only. This Sa- 
 madhi, of which absorption or meditation is a very 
 poor rendering, is explained etymologically as that 
 by which the mind, Samyag adhiyate, is thoroughly 
 collected and fixed on one point without any dis- 
 turbing causes (III, 3). 
 
 Sawyama and Siddhis. 
 
 The Samyama, which comprises the three highest 
 helps to Yoga, is called internal (III, 7) in contra- 
 distinction from the other helps, but, in itself, it is 
 still but an outside help of the so-called objectless 
 (Nirvi^a) state (III, 8). It is difficult to find a 
 word for Samyama, firm grasp being no more than 
 an approximative rendering. It is this Sawiyama, 
 however, which leads on to the Siddhis, or perfections.
 
 460 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 These are at first by no means miraculous, though 
 they become so afterwards, nor are they the last and 
 highest goal of Yoga-philosophy, as has often been 
 supposed both by Indian and by European scholars. 
 Patafw/ali, before explaining these Siddhis, endeavours 
 to show that every thing exists in three forms, as 
 not yet, as now, and as no more, and that it is 
 possible from knowing one to know the other states. 
 Thus a jar is not yet, when it exists only as clay ; 
 it is now, when it is the visible jar, and it is no 
 more, when it has been broken up and reduced to 
 dust again. So in all things, it is said, the future 
 may be known from the present and the present 
 accounted for by the past. This is expressed by 
 Pataf^ali in Sutra III, 16. So far all is clear ; but 
 it is difficult to see why Samyama is required for 
 this, and how it is to be applied to what is called 
 the threefold modification. Knowledge of the past 
 from the present, or of the future from the present, 
 is hardly miraculous yet ; though, when we are told 
 that a Yogin by means of Sa??iyama knows what is 
 to come and what is past, it sounds very much like 
 a claim of the gift of prophecy, and certainly became 
 so in time. The same applies in a still higher 
 degree to the achievements by means of Sawyama 
 claimed by the Yogins in the following Svltras. Here 
 (III, i 7) because a man has learned to understand 
 the meanings and percepts indicated by words, a 
 Yogin by applying Sawyama to this gift, is supposed 
 to be able to understand the language of birds and 
 other animals. In fact we get more and more into 
 superstitions, by no means without parallels in other 
 countries, but for all that, superstitions which have 
 little claim on the attention of the philosopher, how-
 
 SAMYAMA AND SIDDHIS. 461 
 
 ever interesting they may appear to the pathologist. 
 Then follow other miraculous gifts all ascribed to 
 Samyama, such as a knowledge of former existences, 
 a knowledge of another's mind, or thought-reading, 
 though not of the merely casual objects of his thoughts, 
 a power of making oneself invisible, a fore-knowledge 
 of one's death, sometimes indicated by portents. 
 By Samyama with respect to kindness, a man may 
 make himself beloved by everybody. This is again 
 natural, but soon after we are landed once more in 
 the supernatural, when we are told that he may 
 acquire the strength of an elephant, may see things 
 invisible to ordinary eyes, may, by meditating on the 
 sun, acquire a knowledge of geography, by meditating 
 on the moon, a knowledge of astronomy, by medi- 
 tating on the Polar star, a knowledge of the move- 
 ments of the heavenly bodies, and by meditating 
 on the navel, a knowledge of anatomy. He may 
 actually suppress the feelings of hunger and thirst, 
 he may acquire firmness, see heavenly visions, in fact 
 know everything, if only he can bring his will or his 
 Sawyama to bear on the things which produce such 
 effects. More of these Siddhis are mentioned from 
 IV, 38 to 49, such as the soul entering another 
 body, ascension to the sky, effulgence, unlimited 
 hearing, lightness like that of cotton, conquest of 
 all elements, conquest of the organs, conquest of 
 time, omniscience, &c. These matters, though 
 trivial, could not be passed over, whether we accept 
 them as mere hallucinations to which, as we know, 
 our senses and our thinking organ are liable, or 
 whether we try to account for them in any other 
 way. They form an essential part of the Yoga-philo- 
 sophy, and it is certainly noteworthy, even from a
 
 462 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophical point of view, that we find such vague 
 and incredible statements side by side with specimens 
 of the most exact reasoning and careful observation. 
 
 Miracles. 
 
 In reading the accounts of the miracles performed 
 by Yogins in India we have in fact the same feeling 
 of wonderment which we have in reading of the 
 miracles performed by the Neo-platonists in Alex- 
 andria. The same writer who can enter into the 
 most abstruse questions of philosophy 1 will tell us 
 with perfect good faith how he saw his master 
 sitting in the air so many feet above the ground. 
 One instance of the miracles supposed to have been 
 wrought by a Yogin in India must suffice. A 
 writer with whom I have been in correspondence, 
 the author of a short life of his teacher, Sabhapati 
 Svamy, born in Madras in 1840, relates not only 
 visions which the young student had these might 
 be accounted for like other visions but miracles 
 which he performed in the presence of many people. 
 We are told that it was in the twenty-ninth year 
 of his age that Sabhapati, thirsting for Brahma^/Mna 
 or knowledge of Brahman, had a vision of the 
 Infinite Spirit, who said to him : ' Know, Sabha- 
 pati, that I the Infinite Spirit am in all creations, 
 and all the creations are in me. You are not 
 separate from me, neither is any soul distinct from 
 me : I reveal this directly to you, because I see that 
 you are holy and sincere. I accept you as my dis- 
 ciple, and bid you rise and go to the Agastya A.sTama, 
 where you will find me in the shape of Rishis and 
 
 1 M. M., Theosophy, Lcct. xiii.
 
 MIRACLES. 463 
 
 Yogins.' After that, in the dead of the night, for 
 it was one o'clock in the morning when he saw the 
 divine vision, Sabhapati left his wife and two sons, 
 went out of his house and travelled all the night 
 till he reached the temple of Mahadeva, also called 
 Vedasrem-Svayambhu-sthalam, seven miles from 
 Madras. There he sat for three days and three 
 nights immured in deep contemplation, and was again 
 commanded in a vision to proceed to the Agastya 
 Asrama. After many perils he at last reached that 
 Asrama and found there, in a large cave, a great 
 Yogin, two hundred years old, his face benign and 
 shining with divinity. The Yogin had been expect- 
 ing him ever since Mahadeva had commanded him 
 to proceed to the Agastya Asrama. He became his 
 pupil, acquired Brahmagwana and practised Samadhi 
 till he could sit several days without any food. 
 After seven years his Guru dismissed him with 
 words that sound strange in the mouth of a miracle- 
 monger : ' Go my son, and try to do good to the 
 world by revealing the truths which thou hast 
 learned from me. Be liberal in imparting the truths 
 that should benefit the GHhasthas (householders). 
 But beware lest thy vanity or the importunity of 
 the world lead thee to perform miracles and show 
 wonders to the profane.' Sabhapati seems after- 
 wards to have taught in some of the principal cities 
 and to have published several books, declining, how- 
 ever, to perform any miracles. In 1880 he was 
 still living at Lahore. But though he himself 
 declined to perform any of the ordinary miracles, he 
 has left us an account of a miracle performed by one 
 of the former members of his own Asrama. About i So 
 years ago a Yogin passed through Mysore and visited
 
 464 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Rj ah who received him with great reverence 
 and hospitality. Meanwhile the Nabob of Arcot 
 paid a visit to Mysore, and they all went with the 
 Yogin to his Asrama. The Nabob, being a Mussul- 
 man, asked : ' What power have you that you 
 arrogate to yourself divine honour, and what have 
 you that you call yourselves divine persons ? ' A 
 Yogin answered, 'Yes, we possess the full divine 
 power to do all that God can do ; ' and the Yogin 
 took a stick, gave divine power to it, and threw 
 it in the sky. The stick was transformed into 
 millions of arrows, and cut down the branches of 
 the fruit trees to pieces, thunder began to roar in 
 the air, and lightning began to flash, a deep dark- 
 ness spread over the land, clouds overcast the sky, 
 and rain began to fall in torrents. Destruction was 
 impending ; and in the midst of this conflict of the 
 elements, the voice of the Yogin was heard to say : 
 ' If I give more power, the world will be in ruins.' 
 The people implored the Yogin to calm this universal 
 havoc. He willed, and the tempest and the thunder, 
 and the rain and the wind, and the fire and all were 
 stopped, and the sky was as serene and calm as 
 ever V 
 
 I do not say that the evidence here adduced would 
 pass muster in a Court of Law. All that strikes 
 me in it is the simplicity with which everything is 
 told, and the unhesitating conviction on the part of 
 those who relate all this. Of course, we know that 
 such things as the miracle here related are impos- 
 
 1 Om, a treatise on Vedantic Raj Yoga Philosophy, by the 
 Mahatma Giana Guroo Yogi Sabhapati Sovarni, edited by Siris 
 Chandra Basu, Student, Government College, Lahore, 1880.
 
 MIRACLES. 465 
 
 sible, but it seems almost as great a miracle in 
 human nature that such things should ever have 
 been believed, and should still continue to be be- 
 lieved. This belief in miracles evidently began with 
 small beginnings, with what Pata^ali describes as 
 a foretelling of the future by a knowledge of the 
 present or the past. What could be foretold might 
 soon be accepted as the work of the prophet who 
 foretold it, and from prophecy even of recurrent 
 events, there is but a step to prophesying other 
 events also, whether wished for, feared, or expected. 
 Prophets would soon begin to outbid prophets, and 
 the small ball of superstition would roll on rapidly 
 till it became the avalanche which we know it to be, 
 and to have been at all times and in all countries. 
 
 Apart from that, however, we must also remember 
 that the influence of the mind on the body and of 
 the body on the mind is as yet but half explored ; 
 and in India and among the Yogins we certainly 
 meet, particularly in more modern times, with many 
 indications that hypnotic states are produced by 
 artificial means and interpreted as due to an inter- 
 ference of supernatural powers in the events of 
 ordinary life. But all this is beyond our province, 
 however interesting it may be to modern psycho- 
 logists, and it was only in order to guard against 
 being supposed to be unwilling even to listen to 
 the statements of those who believe in Kriyayoga 
 that I have given so much space to what I cannot 
 help considering as self-deception, leading in many 
 cases to a systematic deception of others. 
 
 Yoga, in its early stages, knew little or nothing 
 of all this. It was truly philosophical, and the 
 chief object it had in view was to realise the dis- 
 
 Hh
 
 466 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tinction between the experiencer and the experienced, 
 or as we should call it, between subject and object. 
 We are told again and again that our ordinary, 
 though false, experience arises from our not dis- 
 tinguishing between these two heterogeneous factors 
 of our consciousness, and Yoga, when perfect, repre- 
 sented the achievement of this distinction, the sepa- 
 ration or deliverance of the subject from all that is 
 or ever was objective in him ; the truth being that 
 the Purusha never can be the immediate experiencer 
 or perceiver of pain or pleasure, but can only see 
 them as being reflected on the Manas or mind, this 
 mind not being, in truth, his, the Purusha's, but 
 simply the working of Prakn'ti, the ever objective. 
 In enumerating the means by which this distinction 
 can be realised, Patafw/ali always gives the prefer- 
 ence to efforts of thought over those of the flesh. 
 If he does not discard the latter altogether, 
 we ought to remember that only by practical 
 experiments could we possibly gain the right to 
 reject them altogether. 
 
 True Yoga. 
 
 But though Patam/ali allows all these postures 
 and tortures as steps towards reaching complete 
 abstraction and concentration of thought, he never 
 forgets his highest object, nay he allows that all 
 the Siddhis, or miraculous powers, claimed by the 
 Yogins, are useless and may even become hindrances 
 (III, 37) in the career of the true aspirant after 
 Viveka, distinction, Moksha, freedom, and Kaivalya, 
 aloneness. One sometimes doubts whether all the 
 Sutras can really be the work of one and the same 
 mind. Thus while in the course of Patangrali's
 
 TRUE YOGA. 467 
 
 speculations, we could not but give him credit for 
 never trying to locate the mind or the act of per- 
 ceiving and conceiving in the brain, or in some- 
 thing like the pineal gland, we find him suddenly 
 in III, 34, claiming the muscle of the heart as 
 the seat of the consciousness of thought (HHdaye 
 7ifittasa?nvit). While the human body as such is 
 always regarded as dark and as unclean, so that 
 the Yogin shrinks from contact with his own, much 
 more from contact with other bodies, we are sud- 
 denly told (III, 46) that by Samyama or restraint, 
 colour, loveliness, strength and adamantine firm- 
 ness may be gained for the body. 
 
 However, the general drift of the Yoga remains 
 always the same, it is to serve as a Taraka (III, 54), 
 as a ferry, across the ocean of the world, as a light 
 by which to recognise the true independence of the 
 subject from any object ; and as a preparation for 
 this, it is to serve as a discipline for subduing all the 
 passions arising from worldly surroundings. In the 
 last Sutra of the third book, Patan^ali sums up 
 what he has said by a pregnant sentence (III, 55) : 
 ' Kaivalya (aloneness) is achieved when both the 
 mind and the Self have obtained the same purity.' 
 This requires some explanation. Instead of Mind, 
 Pata%/ali says simply Sattva, which the commen- 
 tator renders by A'ittasattva, and defines as the 
 entering of thought (Jiitta) into its own causal 
 form, after the removal of the misconception of 
 activity. This seems not quite exact, for if we 
 took Sattva as the Guna, Sattva, we should be told 
 that a Guna cannot have a cause, while the Manas 
 has a cause, and is to be reabsorbed into its cause 
 or causes (Ahamkara, Bnddhi, Prakrit!) , as soon as 
 
 H h 2
 
 468 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 its Guna, here the Sattva, has become perfectly 
 *Santa or quieted. 
 
 The Three Gums. 
 
 I have tried to explain the meaning of the three 
 Gu?ias before, but I am bound to confess that their 
 nature is by no means clear to me, while, unfor- 
 tunately, to Indian philosophers they seem to be so 
 clear as to require no explanation at all. We are 
 always told that the three Guas are not qualities, 
 but something substantial (Dravyam). In every- 
 thing that springs from nature, and therefore in the 
 Manas also, there are these three Gu?ias (IV, 15) 
 striving for mastery l . Sattva of the mind is good- 
 ness, light, joy, and its purification means its not 
 being overcome by the other two Gu^as of Ra^as, 
 passion, or Tamas, darkness (II, 47). From this 
 purification springs first Saumanasya, serenity, from 
 this Ekagrata, concentration, from this Indriya- 
 r/aya, subjugation of the organs of sense, and from 
 this at last Atmadar-sanayogyata, fitness for be- 
 holding the Self, or in the case of the Purusha, fit- 
 ness for beholding himself, which is the same as 
 Kaivalya, aloneness. 
 
 In the fourth and last chapter Patafw/ali recurs 
 once more to the Siddhis, perfections, natural or 
 miraculous, and tells us that they may be due not 
 only to Samadhi, meditation in its various forms, but 
 also to birth, to drugs, to incantations, and to heat 
 
 1 Yatharthas trigunas tatha A'ittam api triguwam, 'As the 
 object is threefold, the thought also is threefold.' The mind in 
 fact is doubly affected by the Gimas, first as having thorn or 
 being them, then as being tinged once more by the Gunas of 
 the objects perceived (IV, 16).
 
 SAMSKARAS AND VASANAS. 469 
 
 (Tapas) or ardour of asceticism, &c. By birth is 
 meant not only birth in this or in a future life, as 
 a Brahman or /Sudra, but also rebirth, such as when 
 Nandisvara, a Brahman, became a Deva, or when 
 Visvamitra, from being a Kshatriya, became by 
 penance a Brahman. This is accounted for as being 
 simply a removal of hindrances, as when a husband- 
 man, wishing to irrigate his field, pierces the balk of 
 earth that kept the water from flowing in. 
 
 Sawskaras and Vasanas. 
 
 Though, as a rule, whatever a man does has its 
 results, whether good or bad, the act of a Yogin, we 
 are told, is neither black nor white, it produces no 
 fruit, because it is performed without any desire. 
 
 As the results of actions we have Vasanas, im- 
 pressions, or Samskaras, dispositions. They show 
 themselves either in what remains, often dormant, 
 and is then called memory l , or in the peculiar genus, 
 of man, bird, cow, Brahman or /Sudra, in the locality 
 and in the time when a man is born. These re- 
 mainders never cease, so that the animal pro- 
 pensities may lie dormant for a time in a Brahman, 
 but break out again when he enters on a canine 
 birth. They are not said to be without beginning, 
 because desires and fears can only arise when there 
 are objects to be feared or desired (IV, 10). Impres- 
 sions are caused by perceptions, perceptions spring 
 from desire, desire from nescience. The result of 
 them all is the body with its instincts, their habitat 
 the mind, their support, or that on which they lean, 
 
 1 This kind of memory comes very near to what we call 
 instinct, propensity, or untaught ability.
 
 470 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the same as the support of perception, i. e. the 
 objective world. Hence it is said that they sprout, 
 like seeds, but that by Knowledge and Yoga they 
 can be annihilated also like seeds, when roasted. In 
 connexion with this the question is discussed, how 
 anything can ever be completely destroyed, how 
 what exists can be made not to exist, and how what 
 does not exist can be made to exist. I doubt, how- 
 ever, whether Rajendralal Mitra can be right (III, 
 9, IV, 12) when he discovers here something like 
 the theory of ideas or logoi in the mind of Patafi<?ali, 
 and holds that the three ways or Adhvans in which 
 objects present themselves to the mind, or affect the 
 mind, as past, present and future, correspond to the 
 admission ofuniversalia ante rem, the ideas or types, 
 the universalia in re, the essence, and the univer- 
 salia post rem, the concepts in our minds. I confess 
 I hardly understand his meaning. It should never 
 be forgotten that the mind is taken by Patafl(/ali as 
 by itself unconscious (not as Svilbhasa, self-illumi- 
 nated, IV, 1 8) and as becoming conscious and intelli- 
 gent for a time only by the union between it and 
 the Purusha, who is pure intelligence. The Manas 
 only receives the consciousness of perception which 
 conies in reality from the Purusha, so that here we 
 should have the etymological, though somewhat fanci- 
 ful, definition of consciousness (con-scientia) as well 
 as of the Sanskrit Saw-vid, i. e. knowing along with 
 the mind, i.e. apprehending the impressions of the 
 mind (Svabuddhi-Sawvedanam). But though Altta 
 is the work of the Manas, not directly of the Buddhi, 
 this A'itta, when seen by the seer (Purusha) on one 
 side and tinged with what is seen on the other, may 
 be spoken of as the thought of the Purusha, though
 
 IS YOGA NIHILISM ? 47! 
 
 it is so by a temporary misconception only. This 
 ./Litta again is coloured by many former impressions 
 (Vasana). It may be called the highest form of 
 PrakHti, and as such it serves no purpose of its 
 own, but works really for another, the Purusha, 
 whom it binds and fascinates for a time with the 
 sole purpose, we are told, of bringing him back to 
 a final recognition of his true Self (IV, 24). 
 
 Kaivalya. 
 
 If that is once achieved, the Purusha knows that 
 he himself is not experiencer, neither knower nor 
 actor ; and the Manas or active mind, when beginning 
 to feel the approach of Kaivalya, turns more and 
 more inward and away from the world, so as not to 
 interfere with the obtainment of the highest bliss of 
 the Purusha. Yet there is always danger of a relapse 
 in unguarded moments or in the intervals of medita- 
 tion. Old impressions may reassert themselves, and 
 the mind may lose its steadiness, unless the old 
 Yoga-remedies are used again and again to remove 
 all impediments. Then at last, perfect discrimina- 
 tion is rewarded by what is called by a strange 
 term, Dharmamegha, the cloud of virtue, knowledge 
 and virtue being inseparable like cause and effect. 
 All works and all sufferings have now ceased, even 
 what is to be known becomes smaller and smaller, 
 the very Gunas, i.e. Prakriti, having done their 
 work, cease troubling ; Purusha becomes himself, is 
 independent, undisturbed, free, and blessed. 
 
 Is Yoga Nihilism? 
 
 This is the end of the Yoga-philosophy, and no 
 wonder that it should have been mistaken for
 
 472 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 complete nihilism by Cousin and others. But first 
 of all, the play of Prak?^'ti, though it has ceased for 
 our Purusha, who has gained true knowledge, is 
 supposed to be going on for ever for the benefit of 
 other innumerable Purushas ; and as long as there 
 are any spectators, the spectacle of Prakrit! will 
 never cease. Secondly, the Purusha, though freed 
 from illusion, is not thereby annihilated. He is 
 himself, apart from nature, and it is possible, though 
 it is not distinctly stated, that the Purusha in his 
 aloneness may continue his life, like the 6rivan- 
 nmkta of the Vedanta, maintaining his freedom 
 among a crowd of slaves, without any fear or hope 
 of another life, unchanged himself in this ever- 
 changing Samsara. However, we need not attempt 
 to supply what Pata?~^ali himself has passed over in 
 silence. The final goal whether of the Yoga, or of the 
 Samkhya, nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism, 
 always defies description. Nirvana in its highest 
 sense is a name and a thought, but nothing can be 
 predicated of it. It is ' what no eye has seen and 
 what has not entered into the mind of man.' We 
 know that it is ; but no one can say what it is, and 
 those who attempt to do so are apt to reduce it to 
 a mere phantasmagoria or to a nothing. 
 
 Though I hope that the foregoing sketch may 
 give a correct idea of the general tendency of the 
 Yoga-philosophy, I know but too well that there are 
 several points which require further elucidation, and 
 on which even native expositors hold different 
 opinions. What w r e must guard against in all these 
 studies is rejecting as absurd whatever we cannot 
 understand at once, or what to us seems fanciful or 
 irrational. I know from my own experience how
 
 IS YOGA NIHILISM? 473 
 
 often what seemed to me for a long time unmeaning, 
 nay absurd, disclosed after a time a far deeper 
 meaning than I should ever have expected. 
 
 The great multitude of technical terms, though 
 it may be bewildering to us, could not be entirely 
 suppressed, because it helps to show through how 
 long and continuous a development these Indian 
 systems of thought must have passed, before any 
 attempt was made, as it was by Patafw/ali and 
 others, to reduce them to systematic order. There 
 remains with me a strong conviction that Indian 
 philosophers are honest in their reasonings, and 
 never use empty words. But there remains much 
 to be done, and I can only hope that if others 
 follow in my footsteps, they will in time make these 
 old bones to live again. These ancient sages should 
 become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with our- 
 selves in unknown continents of thought, and we 
 ought not to be afraid to follow in their track. 
 They always have the courage of their convictions, 
 they shrink from no consequences if they follow 
 inevitably from their own premisses. This is the 
 reason why I doubt whether the admission of an 
 Isvara or lord by Pataf^ali, in contradistinction to 
 Kapila who denies that there are any arguments in 
 support of such a being, should be put down as 
 a mere economy or as an accommodation to popular 
 opinion. Indian philosophers are truthful, and 
 Patark/ali (II, 36) says in so many words that truth 
 is letter than sacrifice l . They may err, as Plato 
 has erred and even Kant, but they are not decepti 
 deceptores, they do not deceive or persuade them- 
 selves, nor do they try to deceive others. 
 
 1 Satyapratish^ayam kriyaphalasrayatvat.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 NYAYA AND VALSESHIKA. 
 
 Eelation between Nyaya and Vaiseshika. 
 
 WHILE in the systems hitherto examined, par- 
 ticularly in the Vedanta, Samkhya, and Yoga, there 
 runs a strong religious and even poetical vein, we 
 now come to two systems, Nyaya and Vaiseshika, 
 which are very dry and unimaginative, and much 
 more like what we mean by scholastic systems of 
 philosophy, businesslike expositions of what can be 
 known, either of the world which surrounds us or of 
 the world within, that is, of our faculties or powers of 
 perceiving, conceiving, or reasoning on one side, and 
 the objects which they present to us, on the other. 
 
 It should be remembered that, like the Samkhya 
 and Yoga, and to a certain extent like the Purva and 
 Uttara-Mimawisa, the Nyaya and Vaiseshika also have 
 by the Hindus themselves been treated as forming 
 but one discipline. We possess indeed a separate body 
 of Nyaya-Sutras and another of Vai.veshika-Sutras, 
 and these with their reputed authors, Gotama and 
 Kanada, have long been accepted as the original 
 sources whence these two streams of the ancient 
 philosophy of India proceeded. But we know now 
 that the literary style which sprang up naturally in 
 what I called the Sutra-period, the period to which 
 the first attempts at a written in place of a purely
 
 RELATION BETWEEN NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA. 475 
 
 mnemonic literature may have to be ascribed, was 
 by no means restricted to that ancient period, but 
 continued to be so well imitated in later times that 
 we find it used with great success not only in the 
 Samkhya-Sutras, which are later than Madhava 
 (1350 A.D.), but in more modern compositions also. 
 It should always be borne in mind that the Sutras 
 ascribed to Gotama and Ka^ada presuppose a long 
 previous development of philosophical thought, and 
 instead of regarding the two as two independent 
 streams, it seems far more likely that there existed at 
 first an as yet undifferentiated body of half philosophi- 
 cal half popular thought, bearing on things that can 
 be known, the Padarthas, i.e. omne scibile, and on the 
 means of acquiring such knowledge, from which at a 
 later time, according to the preponderance of either 
 the one or the other subject, the two systems of Vaise- 
 shika and Nyaya branched off. These two systems 
 shared of course many things in common, and hence 
 we can well understand that at a later time they 
 should have been drawn together again and treated 
 as one, as we see in >Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi 
 (about 1400 A.D.), in the Bhasha-PariM'Aeda, with its 
 commentary the Muktavali, in the Tarkasamgraha, 
 the Tarkakaumudi, the TarkamHta, &c. For practi- 
 cal purposes it is certainly preferable that we should 
 follow their example and thus avoid the necessity 
 of discussing the same subjects twice over. There 
 may have been an old Tarka, very like our Tar- 
 kasamgraha, the one before the bifurcation of the 
 old system of Anvikshikl, the other after the con- 
 fluence of the two. But these are as yet conjectures 
 only, and may have to remain mere conjectures 
 always, so that, in the present state of our know-
 
 476 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ledge, and depending, as we have to do, chiefly on 
 the existing Sutras as the authorities recognised 
 in India itself, we must not attempt a historical 
 treatment, but treat each system by itself in spite 
 of unavoidable repetitions. 
 
 A very zealous native scholar, Mahadeo Rajaram 
 Bodas, in the Introduction to his edition of the 
 Tarkasa??igraha, has indeed promised to give us 
 some kind of history of the Nyaya-philosophy in 
 India. But unfortunately that period in the his- 
 torical development of the Nyaya which is of greatest 
 interest to ourselves, namely that which preceded 
 the composition of the Nyaya-Sutras, had by him 
 also to be left a blank, for the simple reason that 
 nothing is known of Nyaya before Gotama. The 
 later periods, however, have been extremely well 
 treated by Mr. Bodas, and I may refer my readers 
 to him for the best information on the subject. 
 Mr. Bodas places the Sutras of Gotama and Kanada 
 in the fifth or fourth cent. B.C. ; and he expresses a 
 belief that the Vaiseshika, nay even the Samkhya, 
 as systems of thought, were anterior to Buddha, 
 without however adducing any new or certain 
 
 proofs. 
 
 Dignaga. 
 
 Dates are the weak points in the literary history 
 of India, and, in the present state of our studies, 
 any date, however late, should be welcome. In 
 former years to assign the Kapila-Sutras to the 
 fourteenth or even fifteenth century A. D., would have 
 seemed downright heresy. Was not Kalidasa himself 
 assigned to a period long before the beginning of our 
 era ? It seems now generally accepted that Kalidasa 
 really belonged to the sixth century A. D., and this
 
 DIGNAGA. 477 
 
 date of Kalidasa may help us to a date for the 
 Sutras of Gotama, valuable to us, though it may 
 be despised by those who imagine that the value 
 of Sanskrit literature depends chiefly on its sup- 
 posed remote antiquity. I have pointed out l that, 
 according to native interpreters, Kalidasa alluded to 
 the logician Dignaga in a verse of his Meghaduta 2 . 
 We may suppose therefore that Dignaga was con- 
 sidered a contemporary of Kalidasa. Now Dignaga 
 is said by Ya&aspati Misra, in his Nyaya-varttika- 
 tatparya-ika, to have interpreted the Nyaya aphor- 
 isms of Gotama in a heterodox or Buddhist sense, 
 while Uddyotakara wrote his commentary to refute 
 his interpretation and to restore that of Pakshila- 
 svamin. If Va&aspati Misra is right, we should be 
 allowed to place Dignaga in the sixth century, and 
 assign the same or rather an earlier date to the 
 Sutras of Gotama, as explained by him and other 
 Nyaya philosophers. So late a date may not seem 
 to be worth much, still I think it is worth having. 
 Several other dates may be fixed by means of that 
 of Dignaga as I tried to show in the passage quoted 
 above (India, pp. 307 seq.). 
 
 A more comprehensive study of Buddhist litera- 
 ture may possibly shed some more light on the 
 chronology of the later literature of the Brahmans, 
 if I am right in supposing that in the beginning the 
 followers of Buddha broke by no means so entirely, 
 as has generally been supposed, with the literary 
 traditions of the Brahmans. It is quite intelligible 
 
 1 India, p. 307. 
 
 2 See also Prof. Satis Chandra Vidyablmshana in Journal 
 of Buddhist Text Society, IV, parts iii, and iv, p. 16.
 
 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 why among the various systems of Hindu philosophy 
 the Buddhists should have paid little attention to 
 the two Mimawsas, concerned as they both were 
 with the Veda, an authority which the Buddhists 
 had rejected. But there was no reason why the 
 Buddhists should forswear the study of either the 
 Nyaya or Vaiseshika systems, or even the Sawkhya 
 system, though making their reserves on certain 
 points, such as the existence of an Lsvara, which 
 was admitted by the Nyayas, but denied by Buddha. 
 We know that at the court of Harsha, Brahmans, 
 Bauddhas, and 6rainas were equally welcome (India, 
 pp. 307 seq.). We know from Chinese travellers such 
 as Hiouen-thsang that Vasubandha, for instance, 
 before he became a Buddhist, had read with his 
 master, Vinayabhadra or Samghabhadra 1 , not only 
 the books of the eighteen schools which were Bud- 
 dhist, but also the six Tirthya philosophies, clearly 
 meant for the six Brahmanic systems of philosophy. 
 This Yasubaridha, as a very old man, was actuallv 
 the teacher of Hiouen-thsang, who travelled in India 
 from 629 to 648 A. D. Therefore in Vasubandha's 
 time all the six systems of Indian philosophy must 
 have been in existence, in the form of Sutras or 
 Karikas. For we possess, in one case at least, 
 a commentary by Pakshila-svamin or Vatsyayana 
 on the Nyaya-Sfitras, the same as those which we 
 possess, and we know that the same Sutras were ex- 
 plained afterwards by Dignaga, the Buddhist. This 
 Buddhist commentary was attacked by Uddyota- 
 kara, a Brahman, of the sixth century, while in the 
 beginning of the seventh century Dharmakirtti, 
 
 1 See also Journal of Buddhist Text Society, 1896, p. 16.
 
 DIGNAGA. 479 
 
 a Buddhist, is said to have defended Dignaga l and 
 to have criticised Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika. 
 In the ninth century Dharmottara, a Buddhist, 
 defended Dharmakirtti's and indirectly Dignaga's 
 interpretation of the Nyaya-Sutras, and it was not 
 till the tenth century that Va&aspati Misra finally 
 re-established the Brahmanic view of the Nyaya 
 in his Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ika. This would 
 coincide with the period of the Brahmanic reaction 
 and the general collapse of Buddhism in India, and 
 thus place before us an intelligible progress in the 
 study of the Nyaya both by Brahmans and Buddhists 
 from the sixth to the tenth century, while the re- 
 vival of the Nyaya dates from Gamgesa Upadhyaya 
 who lived in the fourteenth century at Mithila. 
 
 Thanks to the labours of Sarat Chandra Das 
 and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusharta, we have lately 
 gained access to some of the Sutras of the Buddhist 
 schools of philosophy, which are full of interest. 
 Of the four great schools of the Buddhists, the 
 Madhyamika, Yogalura, Sautrantika, and Vaibha- 
 shika, the first or Madhyamika now lies before us 
 in the Madhyamika 'Vritti by A^andra-Kirtti, and 
 there is every hope that other philosophical treatises 
 also, for instance, the Nyaya-samuM'aya, may be 
 made accessible to us by the labours of these inde- 
 fatigable scholars. 
 
 The Sutras or rather Karikas of the Madhyamika 
 school must, of course, be distinguished from the 
 system of thought which they are meant to explain. 
 
 3 Though none of Dignaga's writings have as yet been dis- 
 covered, Sri Sarat Chandra states that there is in the library of 
 the Grand Lama a Tibetan translation of his Nyaya-samuft&aya 
 (Journal of Buddhist Text Society, part iii, 1896, p. 17).
 
 480 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The characteristic feature of that system is the 
 unya-vada, or nihilism, pure and simple. As such 
 it is referred to and refuted in Gotama's Nyaya- 
 Sutras IV, 37 to 40, in Kapila's Samkhya-Sutras I, 
 43, 44, in Badarayana's Yedanta-Sutras II, 2, 28, 
 where $a??ikara distinctly refers the doctrine that 
 we know no objects, but only our perceptions of them, 
 to Sugata or Buddha. The author of the Parl&adasi 
 quotes the Madhyamikas by name as the teachers of 
 universal nihilism (Sarvam iSunyam). 
 
 If Nagar^una was really the author of the 
 Madhyamika-Sutras, as we now possess them, they 
 would carry us back to about the first century A. D. , 
 and we should have in his Karikcas, as explained by 
 A'andra-Kirtti, the oldest document of systematic 
 philosophy in India, which will require very careful 
 examination. Though it is different, no doubt, from 
 all the six systems, it nevertheless shares in common 
 with them many of the ideas and even technical 
 terms. If it teaches the /Sunyatva or emptiness of 
 the world, this after all is not very different from 
 the Vedantic Avidya, and the Sa?>ikhya Aviveka, 
 and if it teaches the Pratityatva of everything, that 
 need be no more than the dependence of everything 
 on something else 1 . The distinction made by the 
 Madhyamikas between what is Paramarthika, real 
 in the highest sense, and Samvntika, veiled, is 
 much the same as the distinction of the later 
 Vedanta between what is really real (Paramartha- 
 
 1 Pratitya in Pratitya-samutpada and similar words may best 
 he rendered by dependent or conditioned. A son, for instance, 
 is a son, Pitaram Pratitya, dependent on a father, and a father 
 is impossible without a son. In the same way everything is 
 dependent on something else.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 481 
 
 ta/i), and what is Vyavaharika, phenomenal or the 
 result of Maya, sometimes called Samvn'ti, the veil 
 that covers the Nirgwia Brahman or the Tad, which 
 again is not very different from what the Buddhists 
 meant originally by /Sunya, empty, for they hold that 
 even the $unya is not altogether nothing. Many of 
 the technical terms used by the Madhyamikas are the 
 same as those with which we are acquainted in 
 the other systems. Du/ikha, pain, for instance, is 
 divided into Adhyatmika, intrinsic, Adhibhautika, 
 extrinsic, and Adhidaivika, divine or supernatural. 
 We meet with the five perceptions of colour, taste, 
 smell, touch, and sound, and with their five causes, 
 light, water, earth, air, and ether, and we also have 
 the well-known idea that Manas, mind, forms the 
 sixth sense. What is peculiar to the Buddhists is 
 that to them neither the objects of sense nor the sen- 
 sations point to an underlying substance or reality. 
 
 We owe a great debt of gratitude to both Sarat 
 Chandra Das and Sri Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana 
 for their labours in Tibet, and we look forward to 
 many valuable contributions from their pen, more 
 particularly for retranslations from Tibetan. 
 
 Whether Buddhist philosophy shares more in 
 common with the Samkhya than with the Nyaya and 
 Vaiseshika seems to me as doubtful as ever. The 
 fundamental position of the Samkhya, as Satkarya- 
 vada, is the very opposite of the Buddhist view of 
 the world. 
 
 Bibliography. 
 
 It was in 1852 that published my first contri- 
 butions to a study of Indian philosophy in the 
 Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandisclien Ge- 
 sellschaft. These papers did not extend, however, 
 
 i i
 
 482 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 beyond the Vaiseshika and Nyaya-philosophy as 
 treated in the Tarkasa?ttgraha, and more urgent 
 occupations connected with the edition of the Rig- 
 veda prevented me at the time from finishing what 
 I had prepared for publication on the other systems 
 of Indian philosophy. Though, of course, much new 
 and important material has come to light in the 
 meantime, particularly through the publications of 
 the Vaiseshika-Sutras in the Bibliotlieca Indica, 
 through the complete translation of them by A. E. 
 Gough, 1873, and through the comprehensive re- 
 searches of European scholars, such as Professors 
 Deussen and Garbe, I found that there was not 
 much to alter in my old account of Gotama's and 
 Kanada's philosophies, as given in the German 
 Oriental Journal, and in my paper on Indian Logic 
 contributed to the late Archbishop Thomson's Laws 
 of Thought. Indian philosophy has this great ad- 
 vantage that each tenet is laid down in the Sutras 
 with the utmost precision, so that there can be 
 little doubt as to what Ka?iada or Gotama thought 
 about the nature of the soul, the reality of human 
 knowledge, the relation between cause and effect, 
 the meaning of creation, and the relation between 
 God or the Supreme Being and man. Thus it may 
 be understood why even papers published so long ago 
 as 1824, such as J. Colebrooke's papers on the Nyaya 
 and Vai.veshika and the other systems of Indian 
 philosophy, may still be recommended to all who 
 want trustworthy information on Indian philosophy. 
 These essays have sometimes been called antiquated, 
 but there is a great difference between what is old 
 and what is antiquated. The difficulty in giving an 
 account of these systems for the benefit of European
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 483 
 
 readers consists far more in deciding what may be 
 safely omitted, so as to bring out the salient points of 
 each system, than in recapitulating all their tenets. 
 
 Books in which the Nyaya and Vaiseshika-systems 
 may be studied by those who are unacquainted with 
 Sanskrit are, besides the papers of Colebrooke : 
 
 Ballantyne, The Aphorisms of the Nyaya-Philo- 
 sophy by Gautama, Sanskrit and English, Allahabad, 
 1850. (Gautama is the same as Gotama, only that 
 by a tacit agreement Gotama has generally been 
 used as the name of the philosopher, Gautama as 
 that of Buddha, both belonging, it would seem, 
 to the family of the Gautamas or Gotamas, the 
 MSS. varying with regard to the vowel.) 
 
 A. E. Gough, The Vaiseshika Aphorisms of Kanada, 
 translated, Benares, 1873. 
 
 Manilal Nabubhai Dvivedi, The Tarka-Kaumudi, 
 being an introduction to the principles of the 
 Yaiseshika arid Nyaya-philosophies by Laugakshi 
 Bhaskara, Bombay, 1886. This is the same author 
 to whom we owe a valuable edition of the Yogasara- 
 sawgraha. 
 
 Windisch, Uber das Nyaya-bhashya, Leipzig, s. a. 
 
 Kesava $astri, The Nyaya-darsana with the com- 
 mentary of Vatsyayana, in the Pundit, 1877, pp. 60, 
 1 09, 311,363 (incomplete) ; see also Bibliotheca Indica. 
 
 Mahadeo Kajaram Bodas, The Tarkasamgraha of 
 Annambha^a, with the author's Dipika and 
 Govardhana's Nyaya-bodhini, prepared by the late 
 Kao Bahadur Yasavanta Vasadeo Athalya, and pub- 
 lished with critical and explanatory notes, Bombay, 
 1897. This book reached me after these chapters 
 on the Nyaya and Vaiseshika were written, but 
 not too late to enable me to profit by several of 
 
 I i 2
 
 484 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his explanations and criticisms, before they were 
 
 printed. 
 
 Ny ay a-P hilosophy . 
 
 Though Nyaya has always been translated by 
 logic, we must not imagine that the Nyaya-Sutras 
 are anything like our treatises on formal logic. There 
 is, no doubt, a greater amount of space allowed to 
 logical questions in these than in any of the other 
 systems of Indian philosophy ; but originally the 
 name of Nyaya would have been quite as applicable 
 to the Purva-Mimamsa, which is actually called 
 Nyaya in such works, for instance, as Sayana's 
 Nyaya-mala-vistara, published by Goldstlicker. Nor 
 is logic the sole or chief end of Gotama's philosophy. 
 Its chief end, like that of the other Darsanas, is 
 salvation, the summum bonum which is promised to 
 all. This summum bonum is called by Gotama 
 Ni/zsreyasa, literally that which has nothing better, 
 the non plus ultra of blessedness. This blessedness, 
 according to the ancient commentator Vatsyayana, 
 is described as consisting in renunciation with re- 
 gard to all the pleasures of this life, and in the non- 
 acceptance of, or indifference to any rewards in the 
 life to come ; as being in fact what Brahman is, 
 without fear, without desire, without decay, and 
 without death. Even this Brahmahood must not be 
 an object of desire, for such desire would at once 
 produce a kind of bondage, and prevent that perfect 
 freedom from all fear or hope, which is to follow by 
 itself, but should never be yearned for. Thin perfect 
 state of freedom, or resignation, can, according to 
 Gotama, be realised in one way only, namely, by 
 knowledge, and in this case, by a knowledge of the 
 sixteen great topics of the Nyaya-philosophy.
 
 SUMMUM BONUM. 485 
 
 Summum Bonum. 
 
 In this respect all the six systems of philosophy 
 are alike, they always promise to their followers or 
 their believers the attainment of the highest bliss 
 that can be obtained by man. The approaches lead- 
 ing to that bliss vary, and the character also of the 
 promised bliss is not always the same ; yet in each 
 of the six systems philosophy is recommended not, 
 as with us, for the sake of knowledge, but for the 
 highest purpose that man can strive after in this 
 life, that is, his own salvation. 
 
 We saw that the Vedanta recognised true salva- 
 tion or Moksha in the knowledge of Brahman, which 
 knowledge is tantamount to identity with Brahman. 
 This Brahman or God is, as the Upanishads already 
 declare, invisible, and far beyond the reach of the 
 ordinary faculties of our mind. But he can be 
 learnt from revelation as contained in the Veda, and 
 as $vetaketu was taught ' Tat tvam asi/ ' Thou art 
 it,' every Vedantist is to learn in the end the same 
 lesson, and to realise his identity with Brahman, as 
 the fulfilment of all desires, and the surcease of all 
 suffering (Du^khanta). 
 
 The end of all suffering is likewise the object of 
 the Samkhya-philosophy, though it is to be reached 
 by a different road. Kapila, being a dualist, admits 
 an objective substratum by the side of a subjective 
 spirit or rather spirits, and he sees the cause of all 
 suffering in the spirits' identifying themselves with 
 what is purely objective or material. He therefore 
 recognises the true means of destroying all bondage 
 and regaining perfect freedom of the spirit in our 
 distinguishing clearly between spirit and matter,
 
 486 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 between subject and object, between Purusha and 
 Prak?-iti. Kaivalya, or aloneness, is the right name 
 for that highest state of bliss which is promised to 
 us by the Samkhya-philosophy. 
 
 The Yoga-philosophy holds much the same view 
 of the soul recovering its freedom, but it insists 
 strongly on certain spiritual exercises by which the 
 soul may best obtain and maintain peace and quiet- 
 ness, and thus free itself effectually from the illusions 
 and sufferings of life. It also lays great stress on 
 devotion to a Spirit, supreme among all the other 
 spirits, whose very existence, according to Kapila, 
 cannot be established by any of the recognised 
 means of real knowledge, the Pramawas. 
 
 Of the two Mima??isas we have seen already that 
 the Brahma-Mimawsa or the Vedanta recognises sal- 
 vation as due to knowledge of the Brahman, which 
 knowledge produces at once the recognition of one- 
 self as in reality Brahman (Brahmavid Brahma 
 eva bhavati, ' He who knows Brahman is Brahman 
 indeed '). It is curious to observe that, while the 
 Sa?7ikhya insists on a distinction between Purushas, 
 the subjects, and Prakriti, all that is objective, as 
 the only means of final beatitude, the Vedanta on 
 the contrary postulates the surrendering of all 
 distinction between the Self and the world, and 
 between the Self and Brahman as the right means 
 of Moksha. The roads are different, but the point 
 reached at last is much the same. 
 
 The other Mima?usa, that of (7aimini, diverges 
 widely from that of Badarayami. It lays its chief 
 stress on works (Karman) and their right perform- 
 ance, and holds that salvation may be obtained 
 through the performance of such works, if only
 
 SUMMUM BONUM. 487 
 
 they are performed without any desire of rewards, 
 whether on earth or in heaven. 
 
 Lastly, the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, 
 though they also aim at salvation, are satisfied with 
 pointing out the means of it as consisting in correct 
 knowledge, such as can only be obtained from a 
 clear apprehension of the sixteen topics treated by 
 Gotama, or the six or seven categories put forward 
 by Kar^ada. These two philosophies, agreeing as 
 they do among themselves, seem to me to differ 
 very characteristically from all the others in so far 
 as they admit of nothing invisible or transcendent 
 (Avyakta), whether corresponding to Brahman or 
 to Prak?^'ti. They are satisfied with teaching that 
 the soul is different from the body, and they think 
 that, if this belief in the body as our own is once 
 surrendered, our sufferings, which always reach us 
 through the body, will cease by themselves. 
 
 But while we can understand that each of the 
 six systems of Indian philosophy may succeed in 
 removing pain, it is very difficult to see in what 
 that actual happiness was supposed to consist which 
 remained after that removal. 
 
 The Vedanta speaks of Ananda, or bliss, that 
 resides in the highest Brahman ; but the happiness 
 to be enjoyed by the souls near the throne of 
 Brahman, and in a kind of paradise, is not considered 
 as final, but is assigned to a lower class only. That 
 paradise has no attraction, and would give no real 
 satisfaction to those who have reached the know- 
 ledge of the Highest Brahman. Their blissful know- 
 ledge is described as oneness with Brahman, but 
 no details are added. The bliss held out by the 
 Samkhyas also is very vague and indefinite. It
 
 488 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 can arise only from the Purusha himself, if left 
 entirely to himself, far from all the illusions and 
 disturbances arising from objective nature, or the 
 works of Pralm'ti. 
 
 Lastly, the Apavarga (bliss) of the Nyaya and 
 Vaiseshika systems seems entirely negative, and 
 produced simply by the removal of false knowledge. 
 Even the different names given to the supreme 
 bliss promised by each system of philosophy tell 
 us very little. Mukti and Moksha mean deliver- 
 ance, Kaivalya, isolation or detachment, NiAsreyasa, 
 7io?i plus ultra, Amrita, immortality, Apavarga, 
 delivery. Nor does the well-known Buddhist term 
 Nirvana help us much. We know indeed from 
 Pa?iini (VIII, 2, 50) that the word was pre-Bud- 
 dhistic and existed in his time. He tells us that, 
 if used in the sense of ' blown out,' the right form 
 would be Nirvata/^, such as Nirvat'o vata/i, 'the wind 
 has ceased to blow,' but Nirvano *ghih, ' the fire is 
 gone out.' We cannot prove, however, that Nir- 
 vana was used as the technical term for the summum 
 bonum in Pa?dni's time, and it does not seem to 
 occur in the classical Upanishads. Its occurring as 
 the title of one of the modern Upanishads makes it 
 all the more likely that it was borrowed there from 
 Buddhistic sources. There is one passage only, in 
 the shorter text of the Maitreya l Upanishad where 
 Nirvanam anusasanam occurs, possibly meant for 
 Nirvananu.sasanam, the teaching of Nirvana. What 
 should be clearly understood is that in the early 
 Buddhistic writings also, Nirvfwa does not yet 
 mean a complete blowing out of the individual soul, 
 
 1 Sacred Books of the East, XV, p. 61.
 
 THE SIXTEEN TOPICS OR PADARTHAS. 489 
 
 but rather the blowing out and subsiding of all 
 human passions and the peace and quietness which 
 result from it. The meaning of complete annihila- 
 tion was a later and purely philosophical meaning 
 attached to Nirvana, and no one certainly could 
 form an idea of what that Nirvana was meant to 
 be in the Buddhist Nihilistic or >Sunyata-philosophy. 
 I doubt even whether the Upanishads could have 
 given us a description of what they conceived their 
 highest Mukti or perfect freedom to be. In fact 
 they confess themselves (Taitt. Up. II, 4, i) that 
 ' all speech turns away from the bliss of Brahman, 
 unable to reach it V an d when language fails, thought 
 is not likely to fare better. 
 
 Means of Salvation. 
 
 Turning now to the means by which the Nyaya- 
 philosophy undertakes to secure the attainment of 
 the summum bonum or Apavarga, we find them 
 enumerated in the following list : 
 
 The Sixteen Topics or Padarthas. 
 
 (i) Pramana, means of knowledge ; (2) Prameya, 
 objects of knowledge ; (3) Samsaya, doubt ; (4) 
 Prayo^ana, purpose ; (5) DHsh^anta, instance ; 
 (6) Siddhanta, established truth ; (7) Avayava, 
 premisses ; (8) Tarka, reasoning ; (9) Nirnaya, con- 
 clusion ; (10) Vada, argumentation; (n) 6ralpa, 
 sophistry; (12) Vitanc/a, wrangling, cavilling; (13) 
 Hetvabhasa, fallacies; (14) /f/^ala, quibbles; (15) 
 
 1 See a very learned article on Nirvawa by Professor Satis 
 Chandra Vidyabhushawa, in the Journal of the Buddhist Text 
 Society, VI, part i, p. 22.
 
 49 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ^rati, false analogies; (16) Nigrahasthana, unfitness 
 for arguing. 
 
 This may seem a very strange list of the topics 
 to be treated by any philosophy, particularly by one 
 that claims the title of Nyaya or logic. It is clear 
 that in reality the chapters on Prama?ia or means of 
 knowledge, and Prameya, objects of knowledge, 
 comprehend the whole of philosophy. 
 
 Means of Knowledge. 
 
 The four Pramanas, according to Gotama, are 
 Pratyaksha, sensuous perception, Anumana, infer- 
 ence, Upamana, comparison, and >Sabda, word. 
 
 Perception comes first, because inference can only 
 begin to do its work after perception has prepared 
 the way, and has supplied the material to which 
 inference can be applied. Comparison is no more 
 than a subordinate kind of inference, while the 
 $abda or the word, particularly that of the Veda, 
 depends again, as we should say, on a previous 
 inference by which the authority of the word, more 
 particularly the revealed word, has first been estab- 
 lished. Imperfect as this analysis of our instru- 
 ments of knowledge may seem, it seems to me 
 highly creditable to Indian philosophers that they 
 should have understood the necessity of such an 
 analysis on the very threshold of any system of 
 philosophy. How many misunderstandings might 
 have been avoided if all philosophers had recognised 
 the necessity of such an introductory chapter. If 
 we must depend for all our knowledge, first on our 
 senses, then on our combinatory and reasoning 
 faculties, the question whether revelation falls under 
 the one or the other, or whether it can claim an
 
 OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE. 49! 
 
 independent authority, can far more easily be settled 
 than if such questions are not asked in limine, but 
 turn up casually whenever transcendental problems 
 come to be treated. 
 
 Objects of Knowledge. 
 
 The objects of knowledge, as given by the Nyaya, 
 comprehend omne scibile, such as body, soul, organs 
 of sense, qualities, cognition, mind, will, fault, 
 death, enjoyment, pain, and final freedom. These 
 objects are afterwards discussed singly, but have of 
 course little to do with logic. Doubt and purpose 
 mark the first steps towards philosophical discussion, 
 instances and established truths supply materials, 
 w r hile premisses and reasoning lead on to the con- 
 clusion which disputants wish to reach. From Nos. 
 10 to 1 6, we have rules for dialectic rather than for 
 logic. We are taught how to meet the artifices of 
 our antagonists in a long argumentation, how to 
 avoid or to resist sophistry, wrangling, fallacies, 
 quibbles, false analogies, and downright misstate- 
 ments, in fact, how to defend truth against unfair 
 antagonists. 
 
 If from our point of view we deny the name of 
 logic to such problems, we should be perfectly 
 justified, though a glance at the history of Greek 
 philosophy would show us that, before logic became 
 an independent branch of philosophy it was likewise 
 mixed up with dialectic and with questions of some 
 more special interest, the treatment of which led 
 gradually to the elaboration of general rules of 
 thought, applicable to all reasoning, whatever its 
 subject may be. 
 
 It is quite clear that these sixteen topics should
 
 492 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on no account be rendered, as they mostly have 
 been, by the sixteen categories. Categories are the 
 praedicabilia, or whatever can be predicated, and 
 however much the meaning of this term may have 
 been varied by European philosophers, it could never 
 have been so far extended as to include wrangling, 
 fallacies, quibbles and all the rest. We shall see 
 that the six or seven Padarthas of the Vaiseshikas 
 correspond far more nearly to the categories of the 
 Aristotelian and afterwards of European philosophy 
 in general. 
 
 Padartha, Object. 
 
 Nothing shows so well the philosophical character 
 of the Sanskrit language than this very word Pad- 
 artha, which has been translated by category. It 
 means in ordinary Sanskrit simply a thing, but 
 literally it meant Artha, the meaning, the object, 
 Pada, of a word. What we should call objects of 
 thought, they called far more truly objects of words, 
 thus showing that from the earliest times they 
 understood that no thought was possible except in 
 a word, and that the objects of our knowledge 
 became possible only after they had been named. 
 Their language passed through an opposite process 
 to that of Latin. Latin called every kind of know- 
 ledge or all known things gnomina, from y]nosco, 
 to know ; but after a time, and after the initial y 
 had been dropped, as we drop it involuntarily in 
 gnat, their ynomina became nomina, and were then 
 supposed to be something different from the old and 
 forgotten ynomina ; they became nomina, i. e. mere 
 names.
 
 MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OF NYAYA. 493 
 
 Six Padarthas of Vaiseshika. 
 
 According to the Vaiseshikas, we have six Pad- 
 arthas, i. e. six general meanings, categories or pre- 
 dicates, to which all words i. e. all things can be 
 referred. All known things must be either sub- 
 stances (9), qualities (24), or motions, the last 
 meaning, however, more than mere local movement, 
 so as to correspond in fact to our activity or even 
 to our becoming (Werden). Knowledge (Buddhi) 
 is here treated as one of the qualities of the soul, 
 which itself is one of the substances, so that many 
 things which with us belong to psychology and logic, 
 are treated by the Vaiseshikas under this head. 
 
 The next two, the general and the particular, com- 
 prehend what is shared in common by many objects, 
 and what is peculiar to one, and thus distinguishes 
 it from all others. 
 
 Samavaya or intimate connection is a very useful 
 name for a connection between things which cannot 
 exist one without the other, such as cause and 
 effect, parts and the whole, and the like. It comes 
 very near to the Avinabhava, i. e. the Not-without- 
 being, and should be carefully distinguished from 
 mere conjunction or succession. 
 
 The seventh category, Abhava, or negation, was 
 added, it would seem, at a later time, and can be 
 applied to previous, to present or to subsequent 
 non-existence, or even to absolute Abhava. 
 
 Madhava's Account of Nyaya. 
 
 In order to see what, in the eyes of native 
 scholars, the Nyaya-philosophy was meant to achieve, 
 it may be useful to look at an account of it given
 
 494 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by the great Madhava/iarya in his Sarvadarsana- 
 sa?ttgraha, the compendium of all the systems of 
 philosophy. ' The Nyaya-sastra,' he says, ' consists 
 of five books, and each book contains two daily 
 portions or Ahnikas. In the first Ahnika of the 
 first book the venerable Gotama discusses the 
 definitions of nine subjects, beginning with " proof" 
 (Pramana), and in the second those of the remaining 
 seven, beginning with discussion (Vada). In the 
 first daily portion of the second book he examines 
 doubt (8), discusses the four kinds of proof, and 
 refutes all objections that could be made against 
 their being considered as instruments of right know- 
 ledge ; and in the second he shows that " presump- 
 tion " and other Pramanas are really included in the 
 four kinds of " proof" already given. In the first 
 daily portion of the third book he examines the 
 soul, the body, the senses, and their objects ; in the 
 second, "understanding " (Buddhi) and mind (Manas). 
 In the first daily portion of the fourth book he 
 examines activity (Prav?"itti), faults (Dosha), trans- 
 migration (Pretyabhava), fruit or reward (Phala), 
 pain (Du/ikha), and final liberation (Apavarga) ; in 
 the second he investigates the truth as to the 
 causes of the " faults," and also the subject of 
 "wholes" and "parts." In the first daily portion 
 of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds of 
 futility (Giiti), and in the second the various kinds 
 of objectionable proceedings (Nigrahasthana).' 
 
 After having held out in the first Sutra the 
 promise of eternal salvation to all who study his 
 philosophy properly, Gotama proceeds at once to 
 a description of the steps by which the promised 
 Ni//.vreyasa, or highest happiness, is to be attained,
 
 MADHAVAS ACCOUNT OP NYAYA. 495 
 
 namely by the successive annihilation of false know- 
 ledge, of faults, of activity, and, in consequence, of 
 birth and suffering. When the last or suffering has 
 been annihilated there follows ipso facto freedom, 
 or blessedness (Apavarga), literally abstersion or 
 purification. This process reminds us strongly of 
 some of the links in the PadM^a Samuppada of the 
 Buddhists. This is generally translated by Chain 
 of Causation, and was meant to sum up the causes 
 of existence or of misery, the twelve Nidanas. It 
 really means origin resting on something else. The 
 first step is Avidya or that cosmic Nescience which 
 was so fully elaborated in the Vedanta-philosophy. 
 According to the Buddhists there follow on Avidya 
 the Samkharas ] , all the varieties of existence ; on 
 these Vi(/?lana, sensation ; on this Namarupa, 
 names and forms ; on these the Shac/ayatana, the 
 six organs of perception. Then follow in succes- 
 sion Sparsa, contact, Vedana, sensation, THstma, 
 desire, Upadana, attachment, Bhava, state of exis- 
 tence, 6rati, birth, (^aramarana, decay and death, 
 /S'oka, sorrow, Parideva, lamentation, Du^kha, suf- 
 fering, Daurmanasya, grief, and Upayasa, despair 2 . 
 
 This chain of successive states proclaimed by 
 Buddha has formed the subject of ever so many 
 commentaries, none of which seems quite satisfac- 
 tory. The chain of Gotama is shorter than that of 
 Gautama, but the general likeness can hardly be 
 mistaken. Who was the earlier of the two, Gotama 
 or Gautama, is still a contested question, but what- 
 ever the age of our Sutras (the sixteen topics) may 
 
 1 Cf. Garbe, Samkhya-Philosopliie, p. 269 seq. 
 
 2 Cf. Childers, s.v.
 
 496 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be, a Nyaya-philosophy existed clearly before the 
 rise of Buddhism. 
 
 I. Pramawa. 
 
 Gotama proceeds next to examine each of the 
 sixteen topics. 
 
 The first topic or Padartha is Pramana, which is 
 said to consist of four kinds, all being means or 
 measures of knowledge. They are in the Nyaya 
 as in the Vaiseshika, (i) Pratyaksha, sense-percep- 
 tion ; (2) Anumana, inference ; (3) Upamana, com- 
 parison; and (4) /Sabda, word. 
 
 Perception or Pratyaksha. 
 
 1. Perception (Pratyaksha) is explained as know- 
 ledge produced by actual contact between an organ 
 of sense and its corresponding object, this object 
 being supposed to be real. How a mere passive 
 impression, supposing the contiguity of the organs 
 of sense with outward objects had once been estab- 
 lished, can be changed into a sensation or into a 
 presentation (Vorstellung) , or what used to be called 
 a material idea, is a question not even asked by 
 Gotama. 
 
 Inference or Anumana. 
 
 2. Inference (Anumana), preceded by perception, 
 is described as of three kinds, Purvavat, proceeding 
 from what was before, i.e. an antecedent ; *Seshavat, 
 proceeding from what was after, i. e. a consequent ; 
 and Samanyato Dn'shYa, proceeding from what is 
 constantly seen together. Though, as we saw, 
 the A7irvaka rejects every kind of Anumana or 
 inference, he, as Vaaspati Mi.sra remarks very 
 acutely (Karika 5), in attacking his antagonists for
 
 INFERENCE, OR ANUMANA. 497 
 
 their mistaken faith in inference, does really himself 
 rely on inference, without which he could not so 
 much as surmise that his antagonists held erroneous 
 opinions, such erroneous opinions being never brought 
 into contact with his organs of sense, but being sup- 
 posed to exist on the strength of Anumana. 
 
 The meaning of the three kinds of inference differs 
 considerably according to different commentators. 
 It is generally explained that a Purvavat, preceded 
 by or possessed of a prius, refers to the mutual 
 relation between a sign and what is signified by it, 
 so that the observation of the sign leads to the 
 observation or rather inference of what is universally 
 associated with it or marked by it. This uncon- 
 ditional association is afterwards treated under the 
 name of Vyapti, literally pervasion of one thing by 
 another. Examples will make this clearer. When 
 we see a river rising we infer as its Purva or prius 
 that it has rained. When we see that the ants 
 carry their eggs, or that the peacocks are screaming, 
 we infer as the $esha or posterior that it will rain. 
 (Nyaya S. II, 5, 37). It is true that in all these 
 cases the reason given for an inference may what 
 is called, wander away, that is, may prove too much 
 or too little. In that case the fault arises from the 
 conditioned character of the Vyapti or the pervasion. 
 Thus the rising of a river may be due to its having 
 been dammed up, the carrying off their eggs by the 
 ants may have been caused by some accidental dis- 
 turbance of their hill, and the screaming of the 
 peacocks may really have been imitated by men. 
 The fault, however, in such cases does not affect the 
 process of inference, but the Vyapti only ; and as 
 soon as the relation between the sign and the 
 
 Kk
 
 498 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thing signified has been rectified, the inference will 
 come right. Each Vyapti, that is each inductive 
 truth, consists of a sign (Linga), and the bearer 
 of a sign (Lingin). The bearer of the sign is called 
 Vyapaka or pervading, the sign itself Vyapya, what 
 is to be pervaded. Thus smoke is the sign (Linga, 
 Vyapya), and fire is what pervades the smoke, is 
 always present when there is smoke, is the sine qud 
 non of smoke, is therefore Lingin or Vyapaka. 
 
 But everything depends on whether the two are 
 either absolutely or only conditionally related. These 
 conditions are called the Upadhis. Thus the rela- 
 tion between fire and smoke is conditioned by damp 
 firewood ; and there are other cases also where fire 
 exists without smoke, as in a red-hot iron ball. 
 
 The third kind of inference, the Samanyato 
 Drishta, based on what is constantly seen together, 
 is illustrated by our inferring that the sun is moving 
 because it is seen in different places, everything 
 that is seen in different places being known to have 
 moved. Here the Vyapti, on which the ancient 
 logicians depended, had to wait till it was corrected 
 by Copernicus. 
 
 Even a deaf man may infertile existence of sound 
 if he sees a particular conjunction of a drumstick 
 with a drum. It requires but a certain amount of 
 experience to infer the presence of an ichneumon 
 from seeing an excited snake, or to infer fire from 
 perceiving the heat of water, nay to infer the exis- 
 tence of an organ of touch from our feeling any 
 animated body. In all such cases the correctness 
 of the inference is one thing, the truth of the con- 
 clusion quite another, the latter being always condi- 
 tioned by the presence or absence of certain Upadhis.
 
 INFERENCE, OR ANUMANA. 499 
 
 Different from this very natural explanation of 
 the three kinds of Anumana is another, according 
 to which >Sesha is not supposed to mean subsequent 
 effect, allowing us to infer its invariable cause, but 
 is to be taken in the sense of what is left. This is 
 illustrated by an example, such as ' Earth is dif- 
 ferent from all other elements, because it alone pos- 
 sesses the quality of smell,' that is to say, earth is 
 left over, being separated from all other elements 
 by its peculiar quality of smell. One might have 
 inferred from the fact that the element of earth 
 possesses smell, that all elements possessed the same. 
 But this is wrong, because it is Aprasakta, i.e. does 
 not apply. It would be no better than if we were 
 to infer that smell must belong to other qualities 
 and actions also, which would be simply absurd. 
 But as earth is different from all other substances, 
 we may infer that smell does not belong to anything 
 that is not earth, except artificially, as in scented 
 articles. This is the residuary inference, or method 
 of residues. 
 
 In the same manner we are told that Purva, the 
 prius, should not be taken in the sense of antecedent 
 cause, but as a general concept the properties of which 
 have been formerly comprehended as known. Thus 
 from smoke on a hill we should infer the presence of 
 a particular fire on the hill, falling under the general 
 concept of fire as belonging to the genus fire. 
 
 The third, or Sarnanyato Drishta, inference, is 
 illustrated by our inferring the existence of senses, 
 which are by themselves imperceptible (Indriya/a 
 Atindriyani), because we do perceive colour &c., and 
 as no actions can take place without instruments 
 we may infer the existence of senses as instruments 
 
 K k 2
 
 500 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for our action of seeing, &c. Samanyato Dn'shte, thus 
 becomes very like the seeing of a general concept. 
 It is inference from the sensible to the supersensible. 
 
 With all respect for native commentators, both 
 ancient and modern, I must confess that I prefer 
 the more natural explanation of the three kinds of 
 inference being based on cause, effect, and associa- 
 tion, nay I find it difficult to understand why this 
 view should have been given up by the modern 
 Naiyayikas. 
 
 Among these three inferences, the first and last 
 are called Vita or straightforward, the second Avita, 
 or not straightforward ; but this only if we adopt the 
 second explanation of the three kinds of Anumana. 
 
 We shall have to deal again with Anumana 
 when we come to consider the seventh Padartha, 
 the Avayavas or Premisses, or what we should 
 call the members of a syllogism. 
 
 Comparison or Anumana. 
 
 3. Next follows Comparison (Upamana) or re- 
 cognition of likeness, explained as an instrument 
 for ascertaining what has to be ascertained by means 
 of similarity with something well known before. 
 For instance, having been told that a Gavaya (bos 
 gavaeus) is like a cow, and seeing an animal like 
 a cow, but not a cow, a man may infer that it is 
 a Gavaya. 
 
 Word or Sabda. 
 
 4. Word ($abda) is explained either as a pre- 
 cept of one worthy to be trusted, or as a right 
 precept. It refers, we are told, either to visible or 
 invisible objects. It is curious to see that among 
 the people to be trusted (Apta) the commentator
 
 FRAME YA. 501 
 
 should mention not only Rishis and Aryas, but 
 MleMAas or barbarians also, provided they are well 
 informed. Strictly speaking the Veda would not 
 come under abda, unless it can be proved to be 
 AptavaA-ana, the word of one worthy to be trusted. 
 
 II. Prameya. 
 
 The second Padartha or topic is Prameya, that is, 
 all that can be established by the four Pramanas, 
 or what we should call omne scibile. Twelve 
 such objects are mentioned: (i) Self or soul, (2) 
 body, (3) senses, (4) sense-objects, (5) understand- 
 ing, (6) mind, (7) activity (will), (8) faults, (9) trans- 
 migration, (10) rewards of deeds, (u) suffering, (12) 
 final beatitude. The first six of these are called causa- 
 tive, the other six caused. Gotama next proceeds 
 to define each of these Prameyas, by enumerating 
 the characteristics peculiar to each. 
 
 1. The characteristics of the Self are desire, 
 hatred, will, pleasure, pain, and knowing (Buddhi). 
 
 2 . Body is defined as the seat of action, of the senses, 
 and what they intimate, that is, their objects 1 . 
 
 3. The senses or organs of sense are defined as 
 those of smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing. They 
 are supposed to arise from the elements. 
 
 4. These elements (from which the senses draw 
 their origin and their perceptions) are earth, water, 
 light, air, and ether ; while the objects of the senses 
 are the qualities of earth, &c., such as odour, savour, 
 colour, touch, and sound. It is essential to re- 
 member that of the elements the first four are both 
 
 1 According to the commentary the sensations, and according 
 to the next Sutra, the qualities of the objects of sense, which 
 alone can be perceived.
 
 502 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 eternal and non-eternal, while the fifth, Akasa, which 
 we translate by ether, is eternal only, and hence 
 not tangible. The non-eternal substances are either 
 inorganic, organic, or sensitive, but always related 
 to the sense, so that the sense of light perceives or 
 sees light only. The sense of scent perceives odour 
 only, and so on. 
 
 5. As to Buddhi, understanding, it is by the 
 Naiyayikas explained as being the same as appre- 
 hension or knowledge, and as being twofold, notion, 
 Anubhava, and remembrance, Smarana. 
 
 6. Mind (Manas) is different from understanding, 
 and is explained as that which prevents more than 
 one notion from arising at the same time, that is to 
 say, it prevents the rushing in of all sorts of sensuous 
 impressions at once, and regulates them in our con- 
 sciousness. It is sometimes called the gatekeeper 
 or controller of the senses. The transformation of 
 sensations into percepts, and of percepts into con- 
 cepts, a subject little cultivated by Indian philo- 
 sophers, would naturally fall to the Manas. Little 
 attention, however, is paid by Hindu logicians to 
 this subject, which has assumed such large propor- 
 tions with us. Even the distinction between percepts, 
 Vorstellungen, and concepts, Bcgriffe, lias never been 
 fully realised by Indian logicians. 
 
 Manas or mind is considered as A/m or an atom, 
 and the question has been fully discussed how Manas, 
 being A?m, can be united with Atman, which is Vibhu, 
 or infinitely great. If, with the Mimawsakas, it 
 were admitted that the two could unite, then there 
 could never be any cessation of knowledge, such as 
 we know there is in sleep, for the union of Atman 
 and Manas, if once effected, would be indissoluble.
 
 PRAMEYA. 503 
 
 It is held by the Naiyayikas that when Manas 
 enters a particular region of the body called Puri- 
 tat, the effect of the union of Atman and Manas is 
 neutralised, and sleep ensues. If Manas were sup- 
 posed to be co-extensive with the body it would 
 be Anitya, non-eternal, and be destroyed with the 
 body, and we should lose that which retains the 
 impressions of acts done in the body, nay we should 
 be unable to account for a future life and the in- 
 equalities of birth in any future life ; we should 
 have to admit, in fact, effects without a cause. 
 The Naiyayikas hold, therefore, that the Manas is 
 both Anu, infinitely small, and Nitya, eternal (Tarka- 
 kaumudi, p. 4, n. 24), while Manas, like Atman, is 
 eternal and numerous, differing, however, from 
 Atman by being atomic in dimension. 
 
 7. Activity (will) is the effort of body, of the 
 understanding working through the mind (Manas), 
 and of the voice. 
 
 8. Faults cause acts, and acts bear fruit, good or 
 bad 1 . 
 
 9. Pretyabhava is transmigration. 
 
 10. Rewards are results produced by faults, in 
 the most general sense, and by actions consequent 
 on them, so that they are sometimes explained as 
 consciousness of pleasure and pain. 
 
 1 1 . Pain is characterised by vexation ; and as 
 pleasure also involves pain, both pain and pleasure 
 are here treated together under pain. Entire de- 
 liverance from pain and pleasure is 
 
 12. Apavarga or final beatitude. 
 
 Having thus examined all that can form the 
 
 1 See I, 20, Pravnttidosha<7anitartha/i phalam.
 
 504 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 object of our knowledge, the Pramanas or measures 
 of knowledge, and the Prameyas, we now enter on 
 the third of the sixteen topics. 
 
 III. Samsaya. 
 
 Sa?nsaya or doubt. Doubt, we are told, arises 
 from our recognition of various attributes opposed 
 to one another in one and the same object, as 
 when we recognise in a distant object the quali- 
 ties of a man and of a post. The definition given 
 of doubt shows that the ancient logicians of India 
 had carefully thought about the different causes of 
 doubt, so that they were led to the admission of 
 three or even five kinds of it. 
 
 IV. Prayo^rana. V. Dnsh^anta. VI. Siddhanta. 
 
 But these disquisitions, as well as those referring 
 to (IV) Prayo^ana, purpose or motive ; (V) D?*ish- 
 anta, example, familiar case ; (VI) Siddhanta, tenets, 
 contain nothing that is of peculiar interest to the 
 historian of philosophy, except so far as they offer 
 once more the clearest evidence of a long continued 
 previous study of logic in the ancient schools or 
 settlements of India. 
 
 VII. The Avayavas, or Members of a Syllogism. 
 
 Much more important is the next subject, the 
 so-called members, that is, the members of a syllo- 
 gism. To us a syllogism and its structure are so 
 familiar that we hardly feel surprised at meeting 
 with it in the schools of logic in India. Yet, unless 
 we are inclined to admit either an influence of 
 Greek on Indian, or of Indian on Greek philosophy, 
 neither of which has as yet been proved, the coin-
 
 INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. 505 
 
 cidences between the two are certainly startling. 
 As to myself I feel bound to confess that I see no 
 evidence of any direct influence, either on one side 
 or on the other ; and though I am far from denying 
 its possibility, I keep to my conviction, expressed 
 many years ago, that we must here also admit the 
 existence of undesigned coincidences to a much 
 larger extent than our predecessors were inclined 
 to do. We must never forget that what has been 
 possible in one country, is possible in another also. 
 
 At the time when the different systems of Indian 
 philosophy became first known to the scholars of 
 Europe everything that came from the East was 
 looked upon as of extreme antiquity. There had 
 been vague traditions of ancient Indian philosophy 
 even before the time of Aristotle. Alexander him- 
 self, we are told, was deeply impressed with that 
 idea, as we may gather from his desire to communi- 
 cate with the gymnosophists of India. 
 
 Indian and Greek Logic. 
 
 One of these gymnosophists or Digambaras seems 
 to have been the famous Kalanos (Kalyana T), who 
 died a voluntary death by allowing himself to be 
 burnt before the eyes of the Macedonian army. It 
 was readily admitted, therefore, by European scholars 
 that the Hindu systems of philosophy, and particu- 
 larly Indian Logic, were more ancient than that of 
 Aristotle, and that the Greeks had borrowed the 
 first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. 
 
 The view that Alexander might actually have 
 sent some Indian philosophical treatises to his tutor 
 at home, and this even at a time when, as far as we 
 know at present, manuscripts in India were still
 
 506 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 unknown, and that Aristotle might have worked 
 them up into a system, inconceivable as it now 
 seems to us, was taken up and warmly defended by 
 men like Gorres and others. Gorres undertook to 
 prove that the Greeks had actually retained some 
 technical terms taken from Sanskrit. For instance, 
 as Indian philosophers admit five elements, the fifth 
 being called Akasa, ether, Gorres, without giving 
 any reference, quoted a passage from Aristotle in 
 which he speaks of a fifth element and calls it 
 dKa.T-ov6fj.aTov, i. e. akds-nominatum, this being prob- 
 ably an ingenious conjecture for aKarovo^aa-Tov \ It 
 is quite true that one such verbal coincidence would 
 settle the whole question, but even that one coin- 
 cidence has not yet been discovered. No doubt 
 there were many points of coincidence between 
 Greek and Indian logic, but none in technical 
 terms, which, like proper names in Comparative 
 Mythology, would have clinched the argument once 
 for all. 
 
 But does it, on the other hand, show a higher 
 power of historical criticism, if Niebuhr and others 
 stood up for the opposite view and tried to derive 
 Indian philosophy from Greece ? Niebuhr is reported 
 to have said in his Lectures on Ancient History, 
 ' If we look at Indian philosophy we discern traces 
 of a great similarity with that of the Greeks. Now 
 as people have given up the hypothesis that Greek 
 philosophy formed itself after Indian philosophy, we 
 cannot explain this similarity except by the inter- 
 
 1 Plutarch, De Placit. Philos., quotes Epicurus us to the 
 HOU! being a mixture of three elements, fire, air, and water, 
 
 <Uld & fourth UKUTOVO/AaOTOV, O r/V UVTU> CUCT^TIKOV.
 
 INDIAN AND GREEK LOGIC. 507 
 
 course which the Indians had with the Graeco- 
 Macedonic kingdom of Bactra.' 
 
 Is that really so ? To Niebuhr and to most 
 Greek scholars it would naturally seem next to 
 impossible that Greek philosophy, which can be 
 watched from its first childhood, should have been 
 of foreign origin, a mere importation from India. 
 They know how Greek philosophy grew up gradually, 
 how its growth ran parallel with the progress of 
 Grecian poetry, religion, art, and civilisation. They 
 feel it to be a home-grown production, as certainly 
 as Plato and Aristotle were Greeks and not 
 Brahmans. 
 
 But they ought not to be surprised if Sanskrit 
 scholars have just the same feeling with regard to 
 Indian philosophy. They also can show how in 
 India the first philosophical ideas, as yet in a very 
 vague and shadowy form, show themselves in the 
 hymns of the early poets of the Veda. They can 
 trace their gradual development in the Brahmanas 
 and Upanishads. They can show how they gave 
 rise to discussions, public and private, how they 
 assumed a more and more definite form, and how 
 at last they were fixed in different schools in that 
 form in which they have reached us. They, too, 
 are as certain that philosophy was autochthonous in 
 India as that Gotama and Ka?iada were Brahmans 
 and not Greeks. 
 
 What then remains ? It seems to me that until 
 it can be proved historically that the Greeks could 
 freely converse with Indians in Greek or in Sanskrit 
 on metaphysical subjects or vice versa, or until 
 technical philosophical terms can be discovered in 
 Sanskrit of Greek, or in Greek of Sanskrit origin,
 
 508 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it will be best to accept facts and to regard both 
 Greek and Indian philosophy as products of the 
 intellectual soil of India and of Greece, and derive 
 from their striking similarities this simple conviction 
 only, that in philosophy also there is a wealth of 
 truth which forms the common heirloom of all man- 
 kind, and may be discovered by all nations if they 
 search for it with honesty and perseverance. 
 
 Having once learnt this lesson we shall feel less 
 inclined, whenever we meet with coincidences of 
 any kind, to conclude at once that they cannot be 
 explained except by admitting a historical contact 
 and a borrowing on one side or the other 1 . No 
 doubt there are the Vaiseshika categories = Padar- 
 thas, there is Dravya, substance, Guna, quality ; 
 there is genus = Samanya, and species = Visesha, 
 nay, even syllogism = the Avayavas ; there is induc- 
 tion = Vyapti, and deduction = Upanaya, both in 
 Sanskrit and in Greek. But why not ? If they 
 could be developed naturally in Greece, why not 
 in India ? Anyhow, we must wait and not hamper 
 the progress of research by premature assertions. 
 
 VIII. Tarka. 
 
 But before we enter into the intricacies of the 
 Indian syllogism, it will be best to finish first what 
 remains of the sixteen topics of the Nyaya. After 
 the five members follows VIII, Tarka, which is ex- 
 plained as refutation, or reasoning from the fitness 
 of the case, as when a person, though seeing smoke 
 on a hill, does not see that there must be fire, and is 
 
 1 See M. M., On Coincidences, a paper read before the Royal 
 Society of Literature, 1896.
 
 NIRA 7 AYA, ETC. 509 
 
 thereupon made to see that if the hill were without 
 fire, it would of necessity be without smoke. It is 
 meant to be a reductio ad absurdum. 
 
 IX. Nirwaya. 
 
 The next topic to be considered is IX, Nimaya, 
 ascertainment. 
 
 X-XVI. Vada, alpa, Vitawda, Hetvabhasa, ati, 
 , Nigrahasthana. 
 
 Then follow the paragraphs connected with 
 rhetoric or eristics rather than with logic, such as 
 X, Vada or argumentation, consisting of objections 
 and answers, both disputants, however, caring for 
 truth only ; next XI, (ralpa, sophistical wrangling 
 or attacking what has been established, by means 
 of fraud ; XIV, 6rati, futility, arising from false 
 analogies ; XV, Kh&la,, quibbling ; and XVI, Nigra- 
 hasthana, unfitness for discussion. In the last five 
 cases disputants are supposed to care for victory 
 only, and not for truth. 
 
 If this wrangling is devoid of any attempt at 
 really establishing an opposite opinion, it is called 
 XII, Vitanc&i, cavilling. 
 
 We next come to XIII, Hetvabhasas, or specious 
 arguments, that is, paralogisms and sophisms. These 
 are SavyabbiMra, arguments that prove too much, 
 Viruddha, that prove the reverse, Prakaranasama, 
 that tell equally on both sides, Sadhyasama, that stand 
 themselves in need of proof, and Kalatita, mistimed. 
 
 As to XV, Khsila,, fraud in using words in a 
 sense different from what is generally understood, 
 and XIV, (7ati, futility arising from change of class, 
 they have been mentioned before. It is difficult to
 
 510 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 understand why 6rati, i. e. birth or genus, should 
 mean a futile argument, unless it meant originally 
 a transitio in alterum genus, as when, in answer to 
 an argument that a man is unable to travel, because 
 he has a fever, it should be answered that he is able 
 to travel, because he is a soldier. Here the same 
 man is referred first to the class of those who suffer 
 from fever, and then to that of soldiers who are 
 always supposed to be able to march. 
 
 The last, XVI, Nigrahasthana, unfitness for dis- 
 cussion, is when a man by misunderstanding or not 
 understanding, yet continuing to talk, renders him- 
 self liable to reproof. 
 
 This may seem a long list, though in several cases 
 there are subdivisions which have here been left out, 
 and yet at the end of the list Gotama actually 
 apologises and says that there are many more sorts 
 of futility, &c., which have been passed over by him, 
 but will have to be discussed hereafter. 
 
 Judgments on Indian Logic. 
 
 If we were to look upon this list of the sixteen 
 topics, as some have done, as an abstract of Gotama's 
 whole philosophy, or with others, as his table of the 
 categories, European philosophers would no doubt 
 be justified in saying what Hitter said in his 
 History of Philosophy that the exposition of the 
 Nyaya is tedious, loose, and unmethodical. It is 
 certainly mixed up with subjects which have nothing 
 to do with pure logic, but so was Greek logic in its 
 beginning, in the school of Zeno, for instance. It 
 may be also too minute for our taste, but it cannot 
 be called loose at the same time. It is equally 
 unfair to charge the Nyaya and all the other
 
 JUDGMENTS ON INDIAN LOGIC. 5! I 
 
 systems of Indian philosophy, with being un- 
 practical and with entirely ignoring all the problems 
 of ethics. We must remember that philosophy in 
 India had very different antecedents from what it 
 had with us. We ourselves can hardly conceive 
 a philosophy which in the end is not to be of 
 practical usefulness, and which ignores all questions 
 of morality. But we must learn to take philo- 
 sophers as they are. Morality with the Brahmans 
 depends either on prescriptive sacra (Dharma), or on 
 what is called Samaya, the agreement of good people. 
 But its strongest support is a firm belief in the soli- 
 darity of life here and hereafter, and a firm conviction 
 that nothing can ever be lost. The popular mind of 
 India seems never to have doubted the fact that 
 every good or every evil thought or deed will grow 
 and bear fruit, and that no one can ever escape from 
 the consequences of his own acts and thoughts. 
 Whether such a belief is right or wrong is not the 
 question, but it produced at all events a deep sense 
 of responsibility. Instead of complaints about the 
 injustice and cruelty of God, people were taught 
 that what seemed undeserved misfortunes, were 
 fully deserved, were in fact the natural conse- 
 quences of previous acts, and in one respect the 
 safest means of paying off all debts. Philosophy 
 at the same time held out a hope that in the end 
 this net of consequences might be broken through, 
 and the Self, enlightened by true knowledge, return 
 to whence it came, return to himself and be himself ; 
 that is, be again the Universal Self, free for ever 
 from the chains and pains of this transient episode 
 of life on earth. 
 
 That highest freedom and beatitude, according to
 
 512 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Indian views, depended on philosophy or knowledge ; 
 it could not be acquired by good works or good 
 thoughts alone. This again may be right or wrong, 
 but I can discover no looseness of reasoning in it, 
 nor in Indian philosophy in general. We must not 
 forget that, from a Hindu point of view, this life on 
 earth is but an episode that may be very important 
 in itself, but is a mere nothing compared with what 
 lies behind and before, the eternal life of the soul. 
 If they hold that a knowledge of the true relation 
 between man and the world, and between man and 
 the Author of the world, is essential to true freedom 
 and tine happiness, are they so far wrong ? And what 
 is true in the case of the Vedanta, the Samkhya and 
 Yoga systems of philosophy, is true in a certain sense 
 of the Nyaya also. It may be said that the funda- 
 mental points of this philosophy are contained in what 
 can be known, Prameya, and the means of knowing, 
 Prama?ia, that is to say, it seemed necessary to 
 Gotama to establish, first of all, the limits of the two, 
 just as Kant began his philosophy with his Critique 
 of Pure Reason, that is, the tracing of the limits of 
 Pure Reason. But this being done in full detail under 
 his sixteen headings, Gotama too, like Badaraya?ia 
 and Kapila, enters on an explanation of the process 
 by which it was possible to destroy ignorance or 
 Mithyar/mina, which, as he holds, is the true cause 
 of error or sin, ' which is the cause of activity, which 
 is the cause of birth, which is the cause of suffering ' 
 (I, 2). This, whether right or wrong, is at all events 
 perfectly coherent, nor does it betray any looseness of 
 reasoning, if indirectly the whole Nyaya-philosophy 
 is called the cause of final freedom or blessedness. 
 Modern Nyaya is almost entirely confined to Pramana.
 
 PBATYAKSHA, PEECEPTION. 513 
 
 The Later Books of the Nyftya. 
 
 In this way the first book of the Nyaya-Sutras 
 gives us indeed a fair outline of the whole of 
 Gotama's philosophy, while the following three 
 books enter into a more minute examination of its 
 details. Thus the second book treats more fully of 
 the Prama?ias, the third and fourth of the Prameyas, 
 the fifth treats of all that comes under the head of 
 paralogisms. Some of the questions discussed in 
 these books show quite clearly that they must have 
 formed the subject of lively and long-continued 
 controversy, for though some of the objections 
 raised may seem to us of little importance, they 
 prove at all events the conscientiousness of the 
 early Naiyayikas. 
 
 Pratyaksha, Perception. 
 
 That sensuous perception should be a Pramarca 
 or authority would hardly seem to us to have re- 
 quired further proof. But Gotama or his opponent 
 starts the question, on what ground the evidence 
 of the senses can claim such authority, or who 
 is the authority of its authority. This is an idea 
 that anticipates an important element of modern 
 philosophy. As a balance may serve to weigh 
 a thing, but must also be weighed or tested itself, 
 it might be said that the authority of the senses 
 also requires to be established by another authority, 
 and so on ad infinitum. In answer to this Gotama 
 uses what seems to be an ad hominem argument, 
 namely, that if there is no authority anywhere, 
 there can be none on the side of the objector either. 
 The objector would cut away the ground under his 
 
 Ll
 
 514 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 own feet, and thus would himself have no locus 
 stanch for offering any objections (II, 13). 
 
 But admitting that sensuous perception has 
 authority just as a lamp has light to light up the 
 things around it, the next question is whether the 
 definition of sensuous perception, that which results 
 from contact of sense with its object, is not in- 
 complete, because for real perception there must be 
 contact not only with the organs of sense, but like- 
 wise between the senses and the mind (Manas), and 
 between the mind and the Self (Atman). This is 
 not denied by Gotama, he only defends himself by 
 saying that everything cannot be said at the same 
 time, and that his definition of perception, though 
 it dwells only on what is essential (the contact of 
 sense and object), does by no means exclude that 
 between mind and Self, on the contrary takes it 
 here for granted. He also admits that contact 
 between sense and object does not invariably pro- 
 duce perception, that in fact there may be sensation 
 without perception, as when we are so absorbed in 
 listening to music that we do not perceive the 
 objects around us, from want of attention. This 
 again reminds us of modern philosophy. Even such 
 questions as to whether there is any interval of time 
 between our hearing the sound of a word and our 
 realising its meaning, are alluded to by Gotama and 
 his school, and the question whether several impres- 
 sions can be taken in at the same time is negatived 
 by a reference to the running of a pin through 
 a number of sheets of a MS. Here the piercing 
 seems simultaneous, yet we know that it can only 
 be successive. Another question also which has 
 lately occupied our psycho-physiologists, whether
 
 TIME PRESENT, PAST, FUTURE. 515 
 
 perception does not involve inference, is discussed 
 by Gotama (II, 31), particularly in cases where our 
 senses can apprehend a part only of their object 
 when perceiving, for instance, a tree, of which one 
 side only can be seen at the time, while the rest has 
 to be supplied by memory or inference. This leads 
 him on to another question whether there really is 
 such a thing as a whole, and as we can in reality 
 never see more than one side at a time, he tries 
 to account for the process by which we take a part 
 for the whole. No one, for instance, has ever seen 
 more than one side of the moon, yet taking it as 
 a whole, and as a globe, we postulate and are con- 
 vinced that there is another side also. The illustra- 
 tion given by Gotama to show that a tree is a whole, 
 namely, because when we shake one branch of it, the 
 whole tree trembles, may seem childish to us, but it 
 is exactly in these simple and so-called childish 
 thoughts that the true interest of ancient philo- 
 sophy seems to me to consist. 
 
 Time Present, Past, Future. 
 
 The next problem that occupies Gotama is that 
 of time of present, past, and future. The objector, 
 and in this case, it seems, a very real objector, for it 
 is the opinion of the Buddhists, denies that there is 
 such a thing as present time, because the moment 
 w r e see a fruit falling from a tree, we see only that 
 it has fallen or that it has still to fall, but never 
 that it is falling. Here the answer is that past 
 and future themselves would be impossible, if the 
 present did not exist, and on the objector's admit- 
 ting such a possibility, Gotama remarks that in 
 that case perception and all that springs from it 
 
 Ll2
 
 516 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 would be altogether impossible, because it can only 
 depend on what is present. 
 
 Upamana, Comparison. 
 
 Passing over what is said in this place about the 
 validity of inference, because we shall have to return 
 to it hereafter, we find Gotama bent on establishing 
 by the side of it, by the side of Anumana, his 
 next instrument of knowledge, namely Upamana, 
 analogy or comparison. And here Gotama seems in 
 conflict with Kawada who, as we shall see, declines 
 to accept Upamana, comparison, as one of the 
 independent authoritative evidences, or, at all 
 events, as essentially different from Anumana, in- 
 ference. We might feel tempted to conclude from 
 this that Gotama must have been later in time than 
 Kawada. But first of all, Kanada's name is not 
 mentioned here nor that of his system, Vaiseshika ; 
 and secondly, we know that this question of the 
 Pramanas had been discussed again and again in 
 every school of Indian philosophy, so that a mere 
 reference to the subject cannot be used as deter- 
 mining the seniority either of the opponent or of 
 the defender. All we can say is that, whenever we 
 see Upamana appealed to as a means of valid know- 
 ledge, we know that we have to deal with followers 
 of the Nyaya school ; but the Vaiseshika, though 
 denying it an independent place among the Pra- 
 manas, would by no means reject it, if presented as 
 a kind of Anumana. 
 
 Sabda, the Word. 
 
 We now come to the various kinds of verbal 
 testimony. Testimony is said to be conveyed by
 
 SABDA, THE WORD. 517 
 
 words, and by a sentence, consisting of many words, 
 conveying the meaning of each word in its relation 
 to the other words. Though the meaning of words 
 is admitted to be conventional, yet opinions differ 
 because some consider such conventions to be 
 eternal or divine, while others take them to be non- 
 eternal or human. The chief authority for deter- 
 mining the meaning of a word is admitted to be the 
 usage of trustworthy persons, but it is argued that 
 as the highest authority is Brahman or God, and 
 as the Veda is the word of Brahman, it follows 
 that every word of the Veda possesses the highest 
 authority. This, however, as we know, does not 
 satisfy the Mimamsakas, who assign eternity to the 
 $abda itself, the word or the sound of a word. 
 
 In the examination of the validity of /Sabda or word, 
 we find again the same question started as before, 
 whether it deserves a place by itself, or whether it 
 should not rather be treated as a kind of inference. 
 Then, after Gotama has shown the difference be- 
 tween ' I know ' and ' I infer,' between acceptance of 
 the word of an authority (Aptopadesa) and reliance 
 on an inference, he enters on new problems such as 
 the association of sense with sound, a question which 
 is intimately connected with the question of what 
 authority is due to the Veda as the Word par 
 excellence. Here we meet with a number of argu- 
 ments in defence of the supreme authority of the 
 Veda with which we are familiar from the Purva- 
 Mima?nsa, but which again, though clearly referring 
 to (raimini, must not be taken to prove the ante- 
 riority of 6raimini's Sutras to those of Gotama's, and 
 certainly do not enable us to admit more than the 
 contemporaneous activity of the various schools of
 
 518 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Hindu philosophy during the centuries intervening 
 between the close of the Vedic age and the rise and 
 spread of Buddhism. 
 
 The Eight Pramaflas. 
 
 Having defended the teaching of the Nyaya, that 
 there are four Prama/ias, neither more nor less, 
 Gotama proceeds to criticise the four additional 
 Pramawas of the Mimamsakas, and shows that their 
 number is superabundant. They include, as we 
 saw, Aitihya, tradition, not necessarily authoritative, 
 Arthapatti, assumption, Sambhava, probability, and 
 even Abhava, non-existence, because they hold that 
 there can be knowledge arising from not-being or 
 from absence, as when we conclude from the fact 
 that Devadatta is not in his house, that he must 
 have gone out. Of these four Prama/ias the first is 
 referred by Gotama to $abda, Word, the others to 
 Anumana, inference, while /iesh^a, or mere gesture, 
 as supplying knowledge, may, it is added, be classed 
 either under Word, like written letters, or under 
 Anumana. The Pramanas seem to have formed a 
 subject of prominent interest to the Nyaya philo- 
 sophers ; in modern times they have absorbed the 
 whole of Nyaya. 
 
 We are told that Nagaiv/una, before he became a 
 Buddhist, was a zealous student of the Nyaya-philo- 
 sophy. He wrote a work, called Prama/ia-samuK'aya, 
 which was, however, supposed to be lost, till Sarat 
 Chandra discovered a Tibetan version of it in the 
 library of the Grand Lama at Lhassa (Journal of 
 Buddhist Text Society, IV, parts iii and iv, p. 17) '. 
 
 1 This would prove at the same time the study of the Nyaya - 
 philosophy in the first century of our era ; see p. 480.
 
 THE EIGHT PRAMAA T AS. 519 
 
 Here follow long discussions as to the nature of 
 words, the difference between sound (Dhvani) and 
 words, till we arrive again at the question whether 
 the word is eternal, and therefore a Pram&na by 
 itself, or not. Similar questions occur in most of 
 the Indian philosophical systems, and as I passed 
 them over before, it will be necessary to examine 
 them more fully in this place, where we meet with 
 them again as worked out by Gotama. Though 
 they deal with such purely grammatical questions 
 as whether a vowel such as i can ever be changed 
 into the semi-vowel y, in fact whether any letter 
 can ever become another letter, these disquisitions 
 branch out very far, and we shall be surprised to 
 see how intimately in the minds of Hindu philo- 
 sophers they are connected with some of the greatest 
 problems of philosophy, such as the existence of 
 a Creator and the relation between the cause and 
 the effect of our created world. 
 
 The oftener we read these discussions on the 
 eternal character of sound, on words and their true 
 nature, and at last on the divine, nay transcendental 
 character of language, the more we shall feel the 
 difference between Eastern and Western philosophy. 
 The true problem of language has been almost 
 entirely neglected by Greek philosophers and theii 
 disciples in Europe, for all the discussions about the 
 (f>vo-L or Secret origin of language touch only the very 
 hem of the question, as it presents itself to Indian 
 philosophers. The way in which the problem of 
 language is handled by them will no doubt be dis- 
 missed as childish by modern philosophers, and I do 
 not mean to deny that some of their remarks on 
 language are really childish. But we shall see that
 
 520 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the whole question is treated by Hindu philosophers 
 in a very serious and searching spirit. Students of 
 philosophy should overlook what may seem strange 
 to them in the manner of treatment, and always 
 try to keep their eye on what is important and has 
 often been overlooked even by the greatest thinkers 
 among us. Language has been to most of us so 
 familiar a subject that we have hardly perceived 
 what is behind it, and have scarcely asked the 
 questions which it has cost so much effort to Indian 
 philosophers to answer. We have already on a former 
 occasion examined some of the views on language, 
 as expressed in the philosophical hymns, Brahma??as, 
 and Upanishads of the Vedic period. We have now 
 to follow up these views as they are presented to us 
 in a more systematic form in the Sfttra-period. 
 
 Thoughts on Language. 
 
 If I was right in tracing the word B?*ih, speech, in 
 Brihas-pati, back to the same root as that of 
 Brahman, the connection of the two ideas, Word 
 and Creator, would carry us back even beyond what 
 we call the Vedic period. At all events the idea 
 that Brahman was the Word, and that the world 
 was created by the Word, existed, as we saw, long 
 before the rise of philosophical systems. It was 
 shadowed forth in the very language of India, but 
 it received its full development in the Sutras only, 
 more particularly in the Vedanta-Sutras, to which 
 we must return for our present purpose. We read 
 in Sutra I, 3, 28 : ' We refute his objection on the 
 ground that (the world) originates from the Word, 
 as is shown both by perception and by inference.' 
 Perception is here taken in the sense of /S'ruti, scrip-
 
 THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. 52! 
 
 ture, and inference in the sense of Smn'ti, tradition. 
 An objection had been started that the Veda could 
 not be considered as eternal, if it contained names 
 of non-eternal things, and as even the gods, the 
 Devas, were looked upon as non-eternal, having been 
 proved to be subject to birth and rebirth, it followed 
 that the Veda, as containing their names, could not 
 possibly be ante-temporal or eternal. Against this, 
 though readily admitting the non-eternal character 
 of the gods, the Devas, /Samkara argues, that in 
 spite of that, the gods and other beings, nay the 
 whole world, must be admitted to have originated 
 from the Word or the Veda, and that this Word is 
 Brahman. Only, he adds, it is not the individuals, 
 nor this or that Deva, not this or that cow or horse, 
 that had their origin in the Word, but the genus to 
 which they belong, that is, the fify (Akritis). It is 
 with the genus that words are connected, not with 
 individuals, for these, as being infinite in number, 
 are not capable of entering into that connection. 
 Hence all individual things, and individual gods 
 also, are allowed to have had an origin, but not the 
 genus to which they belong, which was thought and 
 uttered at first by Brahman. Nor must it be sup- 
 posed that the Word constitutes the material cause 
 of things ; this, as shown before, lies in Brahman 
 only, which is therefore more than the Word. The 
 word of the Veda is simply the expression of what is 
 permanent and eternal in all things (universalia in 
 rebus), and as all individual things are created in 
 accordance with it, they are rightly said to have 
 their true origin in the Veda and in Brahman. This 
 is afterwards confirmed by passages from /Stuti and 
 SmHti, such as BHh. Ar. Up. I, 2, 4 : ' Then with
 
 522 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his mind he united himself with Speech.' The Word 
 therefore, or Speech, existed before creation, as we 
 read in the Burnt i also, e. g. the Mahabharata XII, 
 8534: 'He who exists by himself let first stream 
 forth the Word, the eternal, without beginning or 
 end, the Divine Word which we read in the Veda, 
 whence proceeded the evolution of the world ; ' and 
 again, Mahabh. XII, 8535 : 'God in the beginning 
 created the names and forms of things, and the 
 continuous process of their works.' 
 
 If we read such passages carefully, it is easy to 
 see that Veda, which is identified with the words 
 of creation, or the ideas or logoi of the world, was 
 meant for more than what was afterwards called 
 the three Vedas, the Samhitas, and Brahma^as. 
 Veda stands here for Logos or Sophia, and compre- 
 hends all named concepts, necessary for the creation 
 of all created things. 
 
 In order to show that there is nothing strange 
 in this, $amkara remarks that even we ourselves, 
 when we mean to do anything, have first to think 
 of the word for what we mean to do. In the same 
 manner the words of the Veda had to be present 
 to the mind of the Creator, Pra^apati, before he 
 could have created the things corresponding to 
 them. And thus it is said in the Veda (Taitt. Br. 
 II, 2, 4, 2): '"This is the earth," he said, and 
 created the earth.' This will sound strange to 
 many readers, as, I confess, it sounded strange 
 to me when I first came across these thoughts, so 
 full of Neo-platonic reminiscences, nay even to such 
 (). T. thought as '(Jod spake, Let there be light, 
 and there was light.' Of course, if we can bring 
 ourselves to say that the Logos of the Alexandrian
 
 THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. 523 
 
 philosophers had no antecedents in early Greek 
 philosophy l , there would be an end of the whole 
 question, and we should simply have to admit that 
 Brahmans came to Alexandria, and indoctrinated 
 pagan and Christian philosophers with their ideas 
 of Va& or Speech. But as every Greek scholar 
 knows that the very opposite is the case, and I have 
 tried to show this on several occasions, the question 
 requires a very different solution from that pro- 
 posed by Professor Weber, if indeed it admits of 
 any. Why will people not see that it is far more 
 scholarlike to confess our ignorance than to give 
 an answer, however hesitatingly, and thus to dis- 
 courage further research ? 
 
 Hindu philosophers have treated this whole ques- 
 tion with so much care that we can see at least 
 that they truly cared for it, and had fully perceived 
 its intimate connection with some of the highest 
 problems, both religious and philosophical, which 
 were nearest to their heart. 
 
 They begin with the beginning and try first to 
 make it clear to themselves what /Sabda is. $abda 
 means word, but it also means sound, and they 
 therefore begin with asking what sound is. We have 
 seen already that they actually postulated a fifth 
 element Akasa, which we translate by ether, and 
 which was meant to be the vehicle of sound and 
 of sound only. The existence of this fifth element 
 was altogether denied by the materialists, the 
 Barhaspatyas, because it is supersensible, but it was 
 admitted as an independent element by the other 
 schools of thought, even by the Buddhists, because 
 
 1 See Anathon Aall, Gescluclite der Logosidee, 1896, pp. 218 seq.
 
 524 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 they held that air could not possibly be the vehicle 
 of sound. Its loudness might depend on it, but not 
 its quality. The Vaiseshika-philosophy, for instance, 
 which takes a special interest in the question of the 
 elements, explains sound as the object apprehended 
 by the sense of hearing (II, 2, 21). It then declares 
 that sound is neither substance nor action, but a 
 quality (cf. I, i, 6 com.), having Akasa or ether for 
 its substance. The opinion that sound exists always 
 and eternally, and is only made manifest by each 
 speaker, which is held by the Mimamsakas, is re- 
 jected by Kanada, sounds and words being accepted 
 as momentary manifestations only of eternal sound. 
 This is illustrated by the striking of a drum with 
 a drumstick, where we can clearly see that sound is 
 produced by a conjunction between a drum and a 
 drumstick, and that it is only carried along by the air. 
 All these arguments are clearly directed against 
 the Mima/msakas who for reasons of their own re- 
 quire >Sabda, whether sound or word, to be eternal. 
 It must be said, however, to their honour that 
 they allow full credit to the Purvapakshin who 
 opposes the eternal character of sounds and words. 
 ' No,' he says *, ' sound cannot be eternal, because we 
 see (i) that it is a product, (2) that it passes away, 
 (3) that it is made (the very letters being called 
 A-kara, Ka-kara &c., A-making, Ka-making &c.). 
 We see (4) that it is perceived by different persons 
 at once, (5) that it changes (as Dadhi Atra changes 
 to Dadhy Atra), and (6) that it is augmented by 
 the number of those who make it. But to all these 
 
 1 Cf. Ballantyne's Mimawm-Sutras, p. 8 ; Muir, Orig. Sansk. 
 Texts, III, pp. 70 seq.
 
 THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE. 525 
 
 difficulties the Mima/msaka has a ready answer. 
 The word is eternal, he says, and though the per- 
 ception of sound is the same on both sides, we are 
 right in looking on sound as eternal and as always 
 present, only not always manifested on account of 
 the absence of an utterer or an exciter. The letter 
 k, now heard, is the same which has always been 
 heard. If it is said that sound is made, that only 
 means that it is employed, and if it is perceived at 
 the same time by many, the same applies to the 
 sun. As to the modification of sound, it is not 
 the same letter modified, but it is another letter 
 in the place of a letter, and as to the increase of 
 noise, that is due to the increase of the number 
 of conjunctions and disjunctions of the air. 
 
 (raimini's reasons in support of the eternal char- 
 acter of sound are that, though the sound may 
 vanish, it leaves its traces in the mind of the 
 hearer or learner ; that it is everywhere at the 
 same time ; that, if repeated, it is the same, and 
 that we have 110 right to suppose that it is ever 
 annihilated. If it should be supposed that sound 
 is a mere modification of air, the answer is that the 
 ear does not simply hear the air, but is sensitive 
 only to what is intangible in sound, the quality. 
 Besides, there are the definite words of the Veda 
 which tell us of an eternal Voice. 
 
 Having thus established to his own satisfaction 
 the eternity of sound, (raimini proceeds to defend 
 the sounds or words of the Veda against all possible 
 objections. These arguments were examined by us 
 before, when the authorship of the Veda had to be 
 discussed, and when it was shown that the author 
 of the Veda could not have been a personal being,
 
 526 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but that the Veda could only have been seen by 
 inspired Rishis as revealed to them, not as made 
 by them. We may therefore at once proceed to 
 the next point, namely, to the question, as to what 
 constitutes a word, and what according to Indian 
 philosophers is its real character. Though these 
 discussions are of a grammatical rather than of 
 a philosophical character, they deserve our atten- 
 tion, because they show how keen an interest the 
 ancient philosophers of India had taken in the 
 Science of Language, and how clearly they had 
 perceived the intimate relation between language 
 and thought, and in consequence between the 
 Science of Language and the Science of Thought 
 or Philosophy. 
 
 How well the Hindus understood that the study 
 of language forms an integral part of philosophy, 
 we may gather from the fact that they actually 
 admitted Panini, their greatest grammarian, among 
 their representative philosophers. They had evi- 
 dently perceived that language is the only pheno- 
 menal form of thought, and that, as human beings 
 possess no means of perceiving the thoughts of 
 others, nay even their own thoughts, except in the 
 form of words, it was the duty of a student of 
 thought to inquire into the nature of words before 
 he approached or analysed the nature of what we 
 mean by thought, naked thought, nay skinned 
 thought, as it has been truly called, when divested 
 of its natural integuments, the words. They under- 
 stood what even modern philosophers have i'ailed to 
 understand, that there is a difference between Vor- 
 steUurifj (presentation or percept) and Bcgriff (con- 
 cept), and that true thought has to do with conceptual
 
 SPHOTA. 527 
 
 words only, nay that the two, word and thought, are 
 inseparable, and perish when separated. M&dhava 
 in his survey of all philosophies, assigns a place 
 between (7aimini's Purva Mim4msi and Kapila's 
 Samkhya to the Panini Darsana, what we should call 
 the grammatical system of Pamni. Other systems 
 also treat most fully of linguistic questions, as, for 
 instance, the Purva-Mimamsa when treating of the 
 question whether sound, the material element of 
 words, is eternal or not. 
 
 Sphofo. 
 
 Hindu philosophers have actually elaborated an 
 idea which does not exist in any other philosophy, 
 that of Sphofa. It is true that in Pamni's own 
 Sutras the word Sphoa does not occur, but the 
 name of a grammarian whom he quotes (VI, i, 123), 
 Spho^ayana, shows that this peculiar word Sphofci 
 must have existed before Pawini's time. Derived 
 as it is from SphuZ, Sphoa must have meant origin- 
 ally what bursts forth. It has been translated by 
 expression, notion, concept or idea, but none of 
 these renderings can be considered as successful. 
 It really means the sound of a word as a whole, and 
 as conveying a meaning, apart from its component 
 letters. The subject has been well treated by 
 Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-sa??igraha. Here, 
 when examining the P4mni Darsana, he shows first 
 of all that the /Sabda or word which Pamni pro- 
 fesses to teach in his $abdcanusasana, or grammar, 
 is really the same as Brahman. ' The eternal word/ 
 he writes, ' which is called Spho^a, and is without 
 parts, is the true cause of the world/ is in fact 
 Brahman, and he adds thereupon some lines from
 
 528 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Bhartn'hari's BrahmakawcZa, where that grammarian 
 (died 650 A.D.) says : 
 
 ' Brahman, without beginning or end, the in- 
 destructible essence of language, 
 
 Which developed in the form of things, and 
 
 whence springs the creation of the world.' 
 What more could be said of the Neo-platonic 
 Logos ? 
 
 In answer to some who deny the existence of 
 such a Sphofa, it is maintained that it is actually 
 an object of perception, for all men, on hearing the 
 word ' cow,' know it as distinct from the letters 
 composing it. This shows, as we knew already from 
 the Pratisakhyas, that the Hindus had elaborated 
 the idea of letters, nay even of vowels and con- 
 sonants, long before they became acquainted with 
 the written letters of a Semitic alphabet, and I only 
 wonder that those who believe in an ancient indi- 
 genous alphabet, should never have appealed, though 
 vainly, to the discussions of Spho^a, in support of 
 their opinion. And if it were said that cognition 
 arises from the separate letters of a word, we ask, 
 he says, whether these letters are supposed to pro- 
 duce cognition in their collective or in their separate 
 form. It cannot be in their collective form, because 
 each letter, as soon as pronounced, vanishes, and 
 therefore cannot form a whole ; nor can it be in 
 their separate form, because no single letter has the 
 power of producing cognition of the meaning of any 
 word. As therefore the letters, whether in their 
 single or their united form, cannot produce cogni- 
 tion, there must be something else by means of 
 which knowledge is produced, and that is the 
 Splio^a, the sound, distinct from the letters though
 
 SPHOTA. 529 
 
 revealed by them. He then quotes from Patan^ali's 
 Mahabhashya : ' Now what is the word Cow ? It 
 is that by which, when pronounced, there is pro- 
 duced in us the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, 
 tail, hump, hoofs, and horns.' Kaiyate, explains this 
 more fully by saying : ' Grammarians maintain that 
 it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which 
 expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed 
 it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second 
 and following ones (as the first would already have 
 conveyed all that is wished). It is therefore some- 
 thing distinct from the single letters which conveys 
 the meaning, and that is what we call the Sphoa.' 
 
 The objector, however, is not silenced at once. 
 He, too, asks the question whether this Sphoa is 
 manifest or non-manifest. If it required no mani- 
 festation, it would always be there, but if it requires 
 manifestation, this could be by its letters only, when 
 they are pronounced ; and thus the same difficulties 
 which were pointed out before as to the collective 
 or single action of letters, would arise again. This 
 dilemma is put forward by Bha^a in his Mima??isa- 
 sloka-varttika : ' The grammarian who holds that 
 Spho^a is manifested by the letters as they are 
 severally pronounced and apprehended, though 
 itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape 
 from a single difficulty.' 
 
 On this point Panini (I, 4, 14) seems to have 
 given the right solution, by laying it down as a 
 principle that letters can never form a word unless 
 they have an affix at the end, while the letters, as 
 they are apprehended, simply help to convey the 
 meaning by means of a conventional association 
 (0ecrei). This shows that the conventional character 
 
 M m
 
 53 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the relation between sound and meaning was 
 fully recognised in India, whether that sound was 
 called $abda or Spho^a. Nor is it enough that the 
 letters should be the same, they must also follow 
 each other in the same order, otherwise Vasa and 
 Sava, Nava and Yana, &c., would carry the same 
 meaning, which they do not. 
 
 All this was meant to show that the admission 
 of a Spho^a was unnecessary ; but we now get the 
 orthodox answer, namely, that the admission of 
 Spho^a is necessary, and that all the objections are 
 no more than a catching at a straw by a drowning 
 person, because separate letters would never be a 
 word, as little as flowers without a string would 
 be a wreath. And as the letters cannot combine, 
 being evanescent as soon as they have been pro- 
 nounced, we are asked to admit a Sphoa, and to 
 accept the first letters, as revealing the invisible 
 Sphote, whereas the following letters serve only to 
 make that Spho^a more and more manifest and 
 explicit. 
 
 Words express the Summum Genus. 
 
 After having thus in his own way established the 
 theory of a Spho^a for every word, our philosophical 
 grammarian takes another step, trying to prove that 
 the meaning of all words is ultimately that summum 
 genus (Satta), namely pure existence, the charac- 
 teristic of which is consciousness of the supreme 
 reality. And lest it should be thought that in that 
 case all words would mean one and the same thing, 
 namely Brahman or being, it is remarked that in 
 one sense this is really so ; but that, as a crystal 
 is coloured by its surroundings, Brahman, when con-
 
 WORDS EXPRESS THE SUMMUM GENUS. 53! 
 
 nected with different things and severally identified 
 with each, stands afterwards for different species, 
 such as cow, horse, &c., these being first of all 
 'existence' (Satta) or the highest genus, as found 
 in individuals, and then only what they are in this 
 phenomenal world. In support of this another 
 passage of Bhartrihari's is quoted: 'Existence being 
 divided, as found in cows, &c., is called this or that 
 species by means of its connection with different 
 objects, and on it all words depend. This they call 
 the meaning of the stem, and the meaning of the 
 root. This is existence, this is the great Atman 
 (or Brahman), expressed by affixes such as Tva, 
 Tal, &c., which form abstract nouns, such as Go-tva, 
 cow-hood, &c. For existence, as the summum genus, 
 is found in all things, in cows, horses, &c., and there- 
 fore all words, expressive of definite meanings, rest 
 ultimately on the summum genus, existence, differen- 
 tiated by various thoughts or words, such as cows, 
 horses, &c., in which it resides. If the stem-word, 
 the Pratipadika, expresses existence, the root ex- 
 presses Bhava, a state, or, as others say, Kriya, 
 action.' 
 
 This will remind us of many of the speculations 
 of Greek as well as medieval logicians ; and it is 
 exactly what my late friend Noire tried to establish, 
 that all words originally expressed action, to which 
 I added the amendment that they expressed either 
 an action or a status. If this true kernel of every 
 word is by Hindu philosophers called the Great 
 Atman (Mahan Atma), and Satta, the summum 
 genus, we must remember that, according to the 
 Vedanta, Brahman is the true substance of every- 
 thing. This is stated again by Bhartrihari : 
 
 M m 2
 
 532 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ' The true reality is known under its illusory 
 forms, by words under untrue disguises; the true 
 reality is named (for a time), like the house of 
 Devadatta, so called for a vanishing reason (that 
 is, only so long as Devadatta is the possessor of 
 the house) ; but by the word house, pure house- 
 hood 3 only is expressed.' 
 
 Words Expressive of Genera or Individuals? 
 
 But while the meaning of all words is thus ad- 
 mitted to be Brahman, we meet with two schools, the 
 one of Va^apyayana, maintaining that our ordinary 
 words mean a genus, the other, of Vyat/i, who holds 
 that they mean individual things. Pamni holds 
 both views as true in grammar, for in one place, 
 I, 2, 58, he shows that 'a Brahman' may mean 
 many Brahmans, as when we say, that a Brahman 
 is to be honoured ; in another, I, 2, 64, he states 
 that the plural Ramas means always Kama, Rama 
 and Rama, i.e. so many single Ramas. 
 
 All Words mean TO QV. 
 
 The idea that all words in the end mean Brah- 
 man, the one Supreme Being, was necessitated by 
 the very character of the Vedanta-philosophy, which 
 admits of no duality except as the result of nescience. 
 Hence it is said : The Supreme Being is the thing 
 denoted by all words, and it is identical with the 
 word ; but the relation of the two, while they are 
 ultimately identical, varies as it does in the case of 
 the two Atmans, the Paramatman and the 6rivatman, 
 the highest or universal, and the living or individual 
 
 1 Read Gnhatvam instead of Grihitam?
 
 V if 
 
 ALL WORDS MEAN TO OV. 533 
 
 soul, the difference between the two being due to 
 Avidyd or temporary nescience. As early as the 
 Maitrayana Upanishad we meet with verses to the 
 same effect, and of an earlier date than itself, such 
 as (VI, 22), 'Two Brahmans have to be meditated 
 on, the Word and the Non-word, and by the Word 
 alone is the Non-word revealed.' In this way the 
 grammatical philosophers endeavoured to prove that 
 grammar or exposition of words, as it was called 
 by Pata%ali ($abdanusasana), is, like every other 
 system of philosophy, ' the means of final beatitude, 
 the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases 
 of language, the purifier of all sciences, the science 
 of sciences ; it is the first rung on the ladder that 
 leads up to final bliss, and the straight royal road 
 among all the roads that lead to emancipation.' 
 
 This may be accepted as representing the views, 
 if not of Panini himself, at least of his followers ; and 
 I must say that if his explanation of a word as a 
 number of letters ending in a suffix had been ac- 
 cepted, there would have been no necessity for the 
 admission of a Sphoa. It was evidently not seen 
 by the inventors of this Spho^a that letters have no 
 independent existence at all, and can be considered 
 only as the result of a scientific analysis, and that 
 words existed long before even the idea of letters 
 had been formed. Letters, by themselves, have no 
 raison d'etre. Sphoa is in fact the word before it 
 had been analysed into letters, the breaking forth 
 of a whole and undivided utterance, such as Go, 
 ' cow,' conveying a meaning which does not depend 
 on any single letter nor on any combination of them. 
 Though from our point of view the idea of such 
 a Sphoa may seem unnecessary, we cannot help
 
 534 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 admiring the ingenuity of the ancient philosophers 
 of India in inventing such a term, and in seeing 
 difficulties which never attracted the attention of 
 European philosophers. For it is perfectly true that 
 the letters, as such, have no reality and no power, 
 and that every word is something different from its 
 letters, something undivided and indivisible. In such 
 a word as Va&, Vox, we have not a combination of 
 three letters v, a, k, which would be nothing, but we 
 have an indivisible explosion, expressive of its mean- 
 ing in its undivided form only, and this may be raised 
 to the status of a word by means of a grammatical 
 suffix which, as we should say, makes an organised 
 whole of it. All this is true and recognised now by 
 all students of the Science of Language, though never 
 even suspected by the philosophers of other countries. 
 Still more important is the idea that all words 
 originally meant Brahman or TO 6V, and receive their 
 special meaning from their relation to the genera or 
 logoi in the mind of Brahman, as creative types. 
 Words are not names of individuals, but always of 
 classes or genera, and as genera they are eternal. 
 These logoi existed before the creation of the world, 
 nay, rendered that creation possible. This is the 
 much-despised Neo-platonic philosophy, the basis of 
 the Christian theory of creation; and that we should 
 find it so fully elaborated in the ancient world of 
 India is surely a surprise, and, I should add, a wel- 
 come surprise. And can we suppose that ideas which, 
 in Greece, required so many evolutions of thought 
 till they reached the point which they reached in 
 Alexandria, and afterwards in Palestine, should have 
 sprung up in India suddenly or, as it were, casually ? 
 Do we not rather see clearly here also how long and
 
 V it 
 
 ALL WORDS MEAN TO OV. 535 
 
 how continuous a development of thought must 
 have taken place south of the Himalayas before such 
 fruits could have ripened ? Would any Greek 
 scholar dare to say that all this was borrowed from 
 Greece ? Would any Sanskrit scholar be so intrepid 
 as to hint that the Greeks might possibly have 
 learnt their Logos from the Vedic V&k ? Even if we 
 do not accept the last results of this Indian line of 
 thought, which ended where Greek philosophy ended, 
 and where Christian philosophy began, nay even if 
 we should put aside as unintelligible the beginning 
 words of the fourth Gospel, ' In the beginning was 
 the Word,' we can at least admire the struggle which 
 led up to this view of the world, and tried to establish 
 the truth that there is a Logos, thought, that there 
 is Rhyme and Reason in the world, and that the 
 whole universe is full of Brahman, the Eternal and 
 the Divine, not visible to the human eye, though 
 visible to the human mind. That mind, according 
 to Indian philosophy, has its true being in the 
 Divine Mind, in which it lives and moves, in which 
 alone it has its true Self or Atman, which Atman is 
 Brahman. To have mounted to such heights, even 
 if we have to descend again frightened and giddy, 
 must have strengthened the muscles of human 
 reason, and will remain in our memory as a sight 
 never to be forgotten, even in the lower spheres in 
 which we have to move in our daily life and amidst 
 our daily duties. Speaking for myself, I am bound 
 to say that I have felt an acquaintance with the 
 general spirit of Indian philosophy as a blessing 
 from my very youth, being strengthened by it against 
 all the antinomies of being and thinking, and nerved 
 in .all the encounters with the scepticism and ma-
 
 536 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 terialism of our own ephemeral philosophy. It is 
 easy, no doubt, to discover blemishes in the form 
 and style of Indian philosophy, I mean chiefly the 
 Vedanta, and to cite expressions which at first sight 
 seem absurd. But there are such blemishes and 
 such absurdities in all philosophies, even in the most 
 modern. Many people have smiled at the Platonic 
 ideas, at the atoms of Democritus, or at the location 
 of the soul in the pineal gland or in certain parts of 
 the brain ; yet all this belongs to the history of 
 philosophy, and had its right place in it at the right 
 time. What the historian of philosophy has to do 
 is first of all to try to understand the thoughts of 
 great philosophers, then to winnow what is per- 
 manent from what is temporary, and to discover, if 
 possible, the vein of gold that runs through the quartz, 
 to keep the gold, and to sweep away the rubbish. 
 Why not do the same for Indian philosophy ? Why 
 not try to bring it near to us, however far removed 
 from it we may seem at first sight. In all other 
 countries philosophy has railed at religion and re- 
 ligion has railed at philosophy. In India alone the 
 two have always worked together harmoniously, 
 religion deriving its freedom from philosophy, philo- 
 sophy gaining its spirituality from religion. Is not 
 that something to make us think, and to remind us 
 of the often-repeated words of Terence, Humani 
 nihil a me alienum puto ? A rich kernel is often 
 covered by a rough skin, and true wisdom may be 
 hiding where we least expect it. 
 
 Vedanta on Sphote. 
 
 We have now to see what the other systems of 
 philosophy have to say on this subject, for it is quite
 
 VEDANTA ON SPHOTA. 537 
 
 clear that the idea of a Spho^a, though known to 
 them, was not accepted by all. $amkara, as repre- 
 senting the Vedanta-philosophy, is entirely opposed 
 to the admission of a Sphoa. He fully admits that 
 earth and all the rest were created according to the 
 words earth, &c., which were present to the mind of 
 the Creator, but he asks, how were these words 
 present ? Beginning as usual with the Purva- 
 pakshin l or opponent, he produces as arguments in 
 favour of the admission of a Sphoa, that the letters 
 cannot convey the meaning, because as soon as they 
 are pronounced they perish, because they differ ac- 
 cording to the pronunciation of each speaker, because 
 they possess neither singly nor collectively any 
 significative power, because not even the last letter 
 with the impression left by the preceding letter in 
 our memory, would convey to us the sense of a word. 
 Hence something different from the letters must be 
 admitted, the Sphotfa, the outburst of the whole 
 word, presenting itself all at once as the object of 
 our mental act of apprehension. That Sphoa is 
 what is eternal, different therefore from perishable 
 and changeable letters, and it is that Spho^a from 
 which whatever is denoted by it was produced in 
 creation, and which in conversation conveys to 
 others what is in our own mind, but always clothed 
 in sound. 
 
 /Samkara himself, however, considers such an 
 admission of a Sphoa entirely unnecessary, and, 
 in order to prove this, he goes back and calls to 
 
 1 Ved. Sutras I, 3, 28. This is one of the cases where the 
 Purvapaksha, the opponent's view, has been mistaken for 5am- 
 kara's own final opinion, or for the Siddhanta.
 
 538 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his aid an old Vedantist, Upavarsha, whom he 
 refers to elsewhere also (III, 3, 53) 1 . This Upa- 
 varsha argues that the letters by themselves con- 
 stitute the word, because though they perish as 
 fast as they are pronounced, they are always 
 recognised again as the same letters, not only as 
 belonging to the same class, but as actually the 
 same. Thus when the word cow is pronounced 
 twice, we do not think that two words have been 
 pronounced, but that the same word has been 
 pronounced twice. And though two individuals 
 may, no doubt, pronounce the same word differently, 
 such differences are due to the organs of pro- 
 nunciation, and not to the intrinsic nature of the 
 letters. He holds that the apprehension of difference 
 depends on external factors, but that their recog- 
 nition is due only to the intrinsic nature of the 
 letters. The sound which enters the ear (Dhvani) 
 may be different, strong or weak, high or low, but 
 the letters through all this are recognised as the 
 same. And if it be said that the letters of a word, 
 being several, cannot form the object of one mental 
 act, this is not so, because the ideas which we have 
 of a row, or a wood, or an army, show that things 
 which comprise several unities can become objects 
 of one and the same act of cognition. And if it 
 be asked why groups of letters such as Pika and 
 Kapi should convey different meanings, viz. cuckoo 
 and ape, we have only to look at a number of ants, 
 which as long as they move one after another in 
 
 1 Here amkara charges Sabarasvamin, the famous commen- 
 tator on the Purva-Mimamsa, I, i, 5, with having borrowed an 
 argument from Badaraya/za.
 
 YOGA AND SAMKHYA ON SPHOTA. 539 
 
 a certain order, convey the idea of a row, but cease 
 to do so if they are scattered about at random. 
 
 Without adducing further arguments, *Samkara 
 in the end maintains that the admission of a Sphoa 
 is unnecessary, and that it is simpler to accept 
 the letters of a word as having entered into a 
 permanent connection with a definite sense, and as 
 always presenting themselves in a definite order to 
 our understanding, which, after apprehending the 
 several letters, finally comprehends the entire 
 aggregate as conveying a definite sense. We never 
 perceive a Sphoa, he argues, and if the letters 
 are supposed to manifest the Sphoa, the Sphoa 
 in turn would have to manifest the sense. It would 
 even be preferable to admit that letters form a 
 genus, and as such are eternal, but in either case 
 we should gain nothing by the Sphoa that we 
 could not have without it, by the admission of 
 eternal words from which all non-eternal things, 
 such as gods, cows, and horses, originated. Hence 
 we see that, though the theory of the Spho^a is 
 rejected by the Vedanta, the eternal character of 
 the words is strenuously retained, being considered 
 essential, as it would seem, in order to maintain 
 the identity of Brahman and the Word, and the 
 creation of the world by Brahman in accordance 
 with the eternal words. 
 
 Yoga and Sawkhya on Sphofa. 
 
 The Yoga-philosophy accepted the theory of the 
 Sphoa, nay it has been supposed to have first 
 originated it 1 , for, according to the commentary, 
 
 1 Garbe, Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 1 1 1 n.
 
 54 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it was against the Yoga-philosophers, rather than 
 against the Mimarasa, that Kapila's objections con- 
 cerning the Sphoa were directed. What Kapila 
 says about Sphote, is of much the same character 
 as what he had said about Isvara, the Lord, namely 
 that its existence cannot be proved, not that it does 
 not exist. If Sphoa, he says, is meant for the group 
 of letters forming a word, then why not be satisfied 
 with this, and simply speak of a word (Pada), as 
 manifesting its sense ? Why invent something 
 which has never been perceived, and which exists 
 as little apart from the letters as a forest exists 
 apart from the trees, what is in fact entirely 
 gratuitous (V, 57). 
 
 Nor are the letters, from Kapila's point of view, 
 eternal (V, 58), because, as Badarayana also re- 
 marked, we can witness their production ; and our 
 being able to recognise them as the same, proves 
 no more than their belonging to one and the same 
 genus, but not their being eternal. 
 
 It is curious to observe the elaborateness with 
 which what seems to us a purely grammatical ques- 
 tion is discussed in the various schools of Indian 
 philosophy. The Sphoa, however, is to Indian 
 thinkers not merely a grammatical problem ; it is 
 distantly connected with the question of the eternity 
 of the Veda. This eternity is denied by Kapila 
 (Sa??ikhya V, 46) because the Vedas speak of them- 
 selves as having been produced in such passages as : 
 ' He became heated, and from him, thus heated, the 
 three Vedas were produced.' Eternity of the Veda 
 can therefore, according to Kapila, mean no more 
 than an unbeginning and unbroken continuity, 
 so that even at the beginning of a new creation
 
 YOGA AND SAJlfKHYA ON SPHO^A. 54! 
 
 the order of words in the Veda remains the same 
 as before. But if, as Nyaya and Vaiseshika main- 
 tain, this Veda was the work of a personal being, 
 such as tsvara, this is declared impossible by Kapila, 
 because, as he holds, such an Isvara has never been 
 proved to exist. For he holds that the Lord or 
 Isvara could only have been either a liberated or an 
 unliberated Purusha. Now a liberated Purusha, such 
 as Vislmu for instance, could not have composed 
 this enormous Veda, because he is free from all 
 desires, nor could an active, non-liberated Purusha 
 have been the author, because he would not have 
 possessed the omniscience required for such a work. 
 But we must not conclude that, because we know 
 of no possible personal author, therefore the Veda 
 is eternal, in the same way as germs and sprouts. 
 What is called the w T ork of a personal being always 
 presupposes a corporeal person, and it presupposes 
 a will. We should not call the mere breathing of 
 a person in sleep, a personal work. But the Vedas, 
 as we read, rise spontaneously like an exhala- 
 tion from the Highest Being, not by any effort 
 of will, but by some miraculous virtue. It must 
 not be supposed that the words of the Veda are 
 manifested, like the notes of birds, without any 
 purpose or meaning. No, they are the means of 
 right knowledge, and their innate power is proved 
 by the wonderful effects which are produced, for 
 instance, by medical formulas taken from the 
 Ayur-veda. This is the same argument which was 
 used in the Nyaya-Sutras II, 68, as a tangible 
 and irrefutable proof of the efficiency of the Vedas. 
 Here all would depend on the experimental proof, 
 and this the Hindus, ancient or modern, would find
 
 542 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it difficult to supply ; but if the Hindus were 
 satisfied, we have no reason to find fault. 
 
 Nyaya on Sphola. 
 
 If now we turn to the Nyaya-philosophy we find 
 that Gotama also denies the eternity of sound, 
 because, it is argued, we can see that it has a 
 beginning or cause, because it is an object of sense- 
 perception, and because it is known to be factitious. 
 Besides, if sound were eternal, we should be able 
 to perceive it always, even before it is uttered, 
 there being no known barrier between the ether 
 and our ear (II, 3, 86). This ethereal substratum 
 of sound is, no doubt, intangible (II, 3, 104), but 
 it is nevertheless a something perceptible by one 
 of our senses, that of hearing, and hence it must 
 be non-eternal. The true eternity of the Vedas 
 consists, according to Gotama, in the unbroken 
 continuity of their tradition, study, and employment, 
 both in the Manvantaras and Yugas which are past 
 and those that are still to come, whilst their au- 
 thority depends on the authority of the most 
 competent persons. This is the same with secular 
 words '. This last admission would of course be 
 strongly resisted and resented by Vedanta philo- 
 sophers, but it si iows at all events the freedom 
 with which all Indian philosophers were allowed to 
 handle the ancient Sacred Books of the country. 
 
 1 Vatsyayana's Commentary on the Nyaya, p. 91, ed. 
 Biblioth. Indica, Muir, 0. S. T.. Ill, p. 115.
 
 VAISESHIKA ON SPHOTA. 543 
 
 Vaiseshika on Spho/a. 
 
 The Vaiseshikas lastly do not differ much from 
 the Naiyayikas as to whether the Veda is eternal 
 or not, is authoritative or not, but they follow their 
 own way of reasoning. The very last Sutra of the 
 Vaiseshika-Sastra, X, 2, 9, says: ' It has been declared 
 that authoritativeness belongs to the Amnaya (Veda) 
 because it is uttered by Him ' ; and this declaration 
 is found likewise in the third Sutra of the first book 
 to which the final Sutra refers. But though this 
 Sutra is given twice, there attaches some uncertainty 
 to its meaning, because, as pointed out by the native 
 commentators, the words ' because uttered by Him,' 
 may also be translated by ' because it declare's it,' 
 i. e. ' because it teaches duty (Dharma).' But in 
 either case there are objections, the same as those 
 with which we are familiar from the Purvapa.ksha 
 in the Vedanta and Mimamsaka-Sutras, such as 
 self-contradictoriness, tautology, and the rest dis- 
 covered by some critics in the text of the Vedas. 
 Thereupon the eternal character, too, of the Veda is 
 called in question, and whoever its author may have 
 been, whether human or divine, it is doubted whether 
 he can justly claim any authority. 
 
 In answer to this sweeping condemnation the Vaise- 
 shika points out VI, i , i , ' that at all events there is 
 in the Veda a construction of sentences consequent 
 upon intelligence/ or as we should say, the Veda 
 must at least be admitted to be the work of a rational 
 author, and not of an author of limited intelligence, 
 because no merely rational author could propound 
 such a rule as ' He who desires paradise, should 
 sacrifice.' Such matters could not be known in their
 
 544 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 causes and effects to men of limited knowledge like 
 ourselves. Whatever we may think of this argu- 
 ment, it shows at all events the state of mind of the 
 earliest defenders of revelation. They argued that, 
 because the author must at least be admitted to 
 have been a rational being, he could not possibly 
 have declared things that are beyond the knowledge 
 of ordinary rational beings, such as the rewards 
 of sacrifices in another world, and other matters 
 beyond the ken of experience. The Vaiseshikas 
 admitted a personal author of the Veda, an Isvara, 
 but this by no means involved the eternity of the 
 Veda. With the Vaiseshikas, also, the eternity of 
 the Veda meant no more than its uninterrupted 
 tradition (Sampradaya), but some further supports 
 to its authority were found in the fact that, besides 
 being the work of a rational being, in this case of 
 Isvara, the Lord, it had been accepted as the highest 
 authority by a long line of the great or greatest men 
 who themselves might safely be regarded, if not as 
 infallible, at least as trustworthy and authoritative. 
 
 Prameyas, Objects of Knowledge. 
 
 If now, after an examination of the various opinions 
 entertained by the Nyaya and other Hindu philo- 
 sophers of the significative power of words, we 
 return to the Sutras of Gotama, we find that, in his 
 third book, he is chiefly concerned with the Prameyas, 
 that is, the objects of knowledge, as established by 
 the Pramanas ; and the first question that meets us 
 is whether the senses or Indriyas, the instruments 
 of objective knowledge, should be treated as different 
 from the Atman, the ISelf, or not.
 
 SARIRA, BODY. 545 
 
 Indriyas, Senses. 
 
 Gotama holds that they are different from the 
 Atman ; and in order to prove this, he argues, that 
 if each sense could perceive by itself, each sense 
 would perceive its own object only, the ear sound, 
 the eye colour, the skin warmth, &c. ; and that 
 therefore what perceives all these impressions to- 
 gether, at the same time and in the same object, 
 must be something different from the several senses, 
 namely the Atman, or, according to other systems, 
 the Manas or mind. 
 
 /Sarira, Body. 
 
 Next follows the question whether the body is 
 the same as the Atman, a question which would 
 never occur to a Vedantist. But Gotama asks it 
 and solves it in his own way. It cannot be, he says, 
 because, when the body has once been destroyed by 
 being burnt, the consequences of good and evil deeds 
 would cease to pursue the Self through an endless 
 series of births and rebirths. A number of similar 
 objections and answers follow, all showing how much 
 this question had occupied the thoughts of the 
 Nyaya philosophers. Some of them suggest difficul- 
 ties which betray a very low state of philosophical 
 reasoning, while other difficulties are such that even 
 in our own time they have not ceased to perplex 
 minute philosophers. We meet with the question 
 why, with the dual organ of vision, there is no 
 duality of perception ; why, if memory is supposed 
 to be a quality or mode of the Self, mere remembrance 
 of an acid substance can make our mouth water. 
 After these questions have been, if not solved, at 
 least carefully considered, Gotama goes on to show 
 
 N n
 
 546 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that if the body be not Atman, neither can Manas, 
 mind, be conceived as the Atman. 
 
 Manas, Mind. 
 
 The Self is the knower, while the mind or Manas 
 is only the instrument (Kara?ia) of knowledge by 
 which attention is fixed on one thing at a time. 
 The Self is eternal, not of this life only, without 
 beginning and therefore without end. And here a 
 curious argument is brought in, different from the 
 usual Indian arguments in support of our previous 
 existence, to show that our Self does not begin 
 with our birth on earth, because, as he says, the 
 smile of a new-born child can only arise from memory 
 of a previous experience. While our modern psycho- 
 physiologists would probably see in the smiles or 
 the cries of a new-born child a reflex action of the 
 muscles, our Indian objector declares that such 
 movements are to be considered as no more than 
 the opening and closing of a lotus-flower. And 
 when this view has been silenced by the remark 
 that a child does not consist of the five elements 
 only, is not in fact, as we should say, a mere 
 vegetable, a new argument of the same character 
 is adduced, namely the child's readiness to suck, 
 which can only be accounted for, they say, by the 
 child having, in a former life, acquired a desire for 
 milk. When this again has been rejected as no 
 argument, because we see that iron also moves 
 towards a magnet, Gotama answers once more that 
 a child cannot be treated like a piece of iron. And 
 when, as a last resource, desire in general, as mani- 
 fested by a child, is appealed to as showing a child's 
 previous existence, arid when this also has once
 
 MANAS, MIND. 547 
 
 more been answered by the remark that a child, 
 like every other substance, must be possessed of 
 qualities, Gotama finally dismisses all these objectors 
 by maintaining that desires are not simply qualities, 
 but can arise from experience and previous im- 
 pressions (Samkalpa) only. 
 
 The consideration of the body and of the sub- 
 stances of which it consists, whether of earth only, 
 or of three elements, earth, water and fire, or of 
 four, earth, water, fire and air, or of five, because it 
 displays the qualities of the five, is naturally of small 
 interest in our time. The final solution only deserves 
 our attention, in so far as it clearly shows that the 
 Nyaya also recognised in some cases the authority 
 of the Veda as supreme, by stating that the body 
 is made of earth, and why ? ' /Srutiprama^yat,' 
 * because scripture says so/ 
 
 What follows, the discussion of sight or of the 
 visual ray proceeding from the eye, and the question 
 whether we possess one general sense only, or many, 
 may contain curious suggestions for the psycho- 
 physiologist; but there is little of what we mean 
 by really philosophic matter in it. The qualities 
 assigned to the objects of perception are not very 
 different from what they are supposed to be in the 
 other systems of philosophy, and they may be passed 
 by here all the more because they will have to be 
 considered more fully when we come to examine the 
 VaLs'eshika system. 
 
 More interesting is the discussion which occupies 
 the rest of the third book. It is chiefly concerned 
 with the nature of Self (Atman), the mind (Manas), 
 the difference between the two, and their relation 
 to knowledge. Here we should remember that, 
 
 N n 2
 
 548 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 according to I, 15, Buddhi (understanding), Upa- 
 labdhi (apprehension), and 6rn4na (knowledge) are 
 used synonymously. Though there are many mani- 
 festations of Manas, such as memory, inference, verbal 
 testimony, doubt, imagination, dreaming, cognition, 
 guessing, feeling of pleasure, desire, and all the rest, 
 yet its distinguishing feature, we are told, is what we 
 should call attention, or as Gotama explains it (1, 16), 
 ' the preventing of knowledge arising altogether.' 
 This is declared to be due to attention, and in many 
 cases this would be the best rendering of Manas. 
 Manas is therefore often called the doorkeeper, 
 preventing sensations from rushing in promiscuously 
 and all at once. If therefore we translate Manas 
 by mind, we must always remember its technical 
 meaning in Indian philosophy, and its being originally 
 different from Buddhi, understanding, which might 
 often be rendered by light or the internal light that 
 changes dark and dull impressions into clear and 
 bright sensations, perceptions, and knowledge in 
 general, or by understanding, at least so far as it 
 enables us to transform and understand the dull 
 impressions of the senses. 
 
 The difference between the philosophical nomen- 
 clatures in English and Sanskrit for the Manas and 
 its various functions is so great that a translation 
 is almost impossible, and I am by no means satisfied 
 with my own. It should also be remembered that 
 the same Sanskrit term has often very different 
 meanings in different systems of philosophy. 
 
 The Buddhi of the Nyaya philosophers, for instance, 
 is totally different from the Buddhi of the Sa7?<khyas. 
 Their Buddhi is eternal, while the Buddhi of 
 Gotama is distinctly declared to be non-eternal.
 
 MEMORY. 549 
 
 The Buddhi of the Sarakhya is a cosmic principle 
 independent of the Self, and meant to account for the 
 existence of the light of reason in the whole universe ; 
 while in the Nyaya-philosophy it signifies the sub- 
 jective activity of thought in the acquisition of 
 knowledge, or in the lighting up and appropriating 
 of the inert impressions received by the senses. 
 This knowledge can come to an end and vanish 
 by forgetfulness, while an eternal essence, like the 
 Buddhi of the Samkhyas, though it may be ignored, 
 can never be destroyed. 
 
 Atman. 
 
 In answering the question, What is knowledge, 
 Gotama declares in this place quite clearly that real 
 knowledge belongs to the Atman only, the Self or 
 the soul. It cannot belong to the senses and their 
 objects (Indriyartha), because knowledge abides even 
 when the senses and what they perceive have been 
 suppressed. Nor does knowledge belong to the 
 Manas, which is but the instrument of knowledge, 
 but it arises from the conjunction of Atman (Self) 
 with Manas (attention), and on the other side of 
 Manas with Indriyas (senses). Manas is the instru- 
 ment, and the wielder of that instrument, like the 
 wielder of an axe, must be some one different from 
 it ; this, according to the Nyaya, can only be the Self 
 who in the end knows, who remembers, who feels 
 pain and pleasure, who desires and acts. 
 
 Memory. 
 
 Memory, Snm'ti, has not received from Indian 
 philosophers the attention which it deserves. If it 
 is treated as a means of knowledge, it falls under 
 Anubhava, which is either immediate or mediate,
 
 550 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and then called Smn'ti. Every Amibhava is sup- 
 posed to leave an impression or modification of the 
 mind, which is capable of being revived. There is 
 another manifestation of memory in the act of re- 
 membering or recognising, as when on seeing a man 
 we say, This is he, or This is Devadatta. Here we 
 have Anubhava, knowledge of this, joined with some- 
 thing else, namely he or Devadatta, a revived 
 Samskara, impression, or Smriti. The subject of 
 memory is more fully treated in III, 113, and the 
 various associations which awaken memory are 
 enumerated as follows : 
 
 1. Attention to an object perceived ; 
 
 2. Connection, as when the word Prama/ia, proof, 
 recalls Prameya, what has to be proved ; 
 
 3. Repetition, as when one has learned a number 
 of things together, one calls up the other ; 
 
 4. A sign, as when a thing recalls its sine qud 
 'iion ; 
 
 5. A mark, as when a standard reminds one of its 
 bearer ; 
 
 6. Likeness, as when one body recalls a similar 
 body; 
 
 7. Possession, as when a property reminds us of 
 its owner ; 
 
 8. Belonging, as when royal attendants remind us 
 of the king ; 
 
 9. Relation, as when a disciple reminds us of the 
 teacher, or kine of a bull ; 
 
 10. Succession, as when the pounding of rice re- 
 minds one of sprinkling ; 
 
 1 1. Absence, as of a wife ; 
 
 12. Fellow-workers, as when one disciple reminds 
 us of the co-disciples ;
 
 MEMOKY. 551 
 
 1 3. Opposition, as when the ichneumon recalls the 
 snake ; 
 
 14. Pre-eminence, as when investiture with the 
 sacred string recalls the principal agent, the Guru 
 or teacher ; 
 
 15. Receiving, as when a gift reminds one of the 
 giver ; 
 
 1 6. Covering, as when a sword reminds one of the 
 sheath ; 
 
 1 7. Pleasure and pain, each of which recalls the 
 occasioner of it ; 
 
 1 8. Desire and aversion, reminding us of their 
 causes ; 
 
 19. Fear, reminding us of what is feared, such as 
 death ; 
 
 20. Want, which makes us think of those who can 
 supply our wants ; 
 
 2 1 . Motion, as when a shaking branch reminds us 
 of the wind ; 
 
 22. Affection, reminding us of a son, &c. ; 
 
 23. Merit and Demerit, which make us reflect on 
 joys and sorrows of a former life- 
 Such lists are very characteristic of Hindu philo- 
 sophy, and they show at the same time that it is a 
 mistake to ascribe them exclusively to the Samkhya- 
 philosophy. Though they do not add much to our 
 knowledge of the fundamental tenets of Indian 
 philosophy, they show once more how much thought 
 had been spent in the elaboration of mere details ; 
 and this, as we are told in this case by the commen- 
 tator himself, chiefly in order to stir up the thoughts 
 of the learners, *Sishyavyutpadanaya, to independent 
 activity.
 
 552 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Knowledge not Eternal. 
 
 The important point, however, which Gotama 
 wishes to establish is this, that knowledge, though 
 belonging to the eternal Self, is not in itself eternal, 
 but vanishes like any other act. He also guards 
 against the supposition that as we seem to take in 
 more than one sensation at the same time, as in 
 eating a cake full of different kinds of sweets, we 
 ought to admit more than one Manas ; and he ex- 
 plains that this simultaneousness of perception is 
 apparent only, just as the fiery circle is when we 
 whirl a firebrand with great rapidity, or as we 
 imagine that a number of palm-leaves are pierced 
 by a pin at one blow, and not in succession, one after 
 the other. Lastly, he states that the Manas is Ami, 
 infinitely small, or, as we should say, ari atom. 
 
 More Prameyas. 
 
 While the third book was occupied with the first 
 six of the Prameyas, or objects to be known and 
 proved, including the whole apparatus of knowledge, 
 such as Atman, Self or soul, Indriyas, senses, Manas, 
 mind, central sensorium, Buddhi, understanding, and 
 /Sarira, body, and therefore gave rise to some im- 
 portant questions not only of metaphysics, but of 
 psychology also, the fourth book which is devoted 
 to the remaining six Prameyas, such as (7) Pravritti 
 (activity), (8)Dosha (faults), (9) Pretyabh&va (trans- 
 migration), (10) Phala (rewards), ( i i) DuAkha (pain), 
 and (12) Apavarga (final beatitude), is naturally of a 
 more practical character, and less attractive to the 
 student of the problems of being and thinking. 
 Some questions, however, are treated in it which
 
 EXISTENCE OF DEITY. 553 
 
 cannot well be passed over, if we wish to give a full 
 insight into the whole character, and the practical 
 bearing of the Nyaya-philosophy. 
 
 Though this philosophy is supposed to represent 
 Indian logic only, we have already seen enough of 
 it to know that it included almost every question 
 within the sphere of philosophy and religion, and 
 that its chief object was the same as that of all 
 the other systems of Indian philosophy, namely 
 salvation. 
 
 Life after Death. 
 
 One of the seven interesting subjects treated 
 here is Pretyabhava, literally existence after having 
 departed this life, and this is proved in a very short 
 way. As the Self has been proved to be eternal, 
 Gotama says (IV, 10) it follows that it will exist 
 after what is called death. Some of the objections 
 made to this tenet are easily disposed of, but nothing 
 is said to establish what is meant by transmigration, 
 that is being born again in another world as either 
 a human or as some other animal being, or even 
 as a plant. 
 
 Existence of Deity. 
 
 Another important subject, if it is not passed 
 over altogether, is treated by Gotama, as it was by 
 Kapila, incidentally only, I mean the existence of a 
 Deity. It comes in when a problem of the Buddhists 
 is under discussion, namely, whether the world came 
 out of nothing, and whether the manifestation of 
 anything presupposes the destruction of its cause. 
 This is illustrated by the fact that the seed has to 
 perish before the flower can appear. But Gotama 
 strongly denies this, and reminds the opponent that
 
 554 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 if the seed were really destroyed by being pounded 
 or burnt, the flower would never appear. Nor could 
 it be said that the flower, if it had not existed pre- 
 viously, destroyed the seed, while, if it had, it would 
 have owed its existence to the simple destruction of 
 the seed. Therefore, he continues, as nothing can 
 be produced from nothing, nor from an annihilated 
 something, like a seed, the world also cannot have 
 sprung from nothingness, but requires the admission 
 of an Isvara, the Lord, as its real cause. And this 
 admission of an Isvara, even though in the capacity 
 of a governor rather than of a maker of the world, 
 is confirmed by what was evidently considered by 
 Gotama as a firmly established truth, namely, that 
 every act of man invariably produces its result, 
 though not by itself, but under the superintendence 
 of some one, that is, of Lsvara. ' We then meet with 
 a new argument, different from that of the Mimam- 
 sakas, namely that, if work done continued to work 
 entirely by itself, the fact that some good or evil deeds 
 of men do riot seem to receive their reward would 
 remain unaccounted for. This is certainly a curious 
 way of proving the existence of God by the very argu- 
 ment which has generally been employed by those 
 who want to prove His non-existence. Gotama's 
 real object, however, is to refute the Buddhist theory 
 of vacuity (6'unya), or of Nothing being the cause of 
 the world, and afterwards to disprove the idea that 
 effects can ever be fortuitous. And as Gotama 
 differs from Gautama in denying the origin of the 
 world out of nothing, he also differs from the Sawkhya 
 philosophers, who hold that all tilings, as developed 
 out of Prakriti, are real only so long as they are 
 noticed by the Purusha. He holds, on the contrary,
 
 CAUSE AND EFFECT. 555 
 
 that some things are real and eternal, but others are 
 not, because we actually see both their production 
 and their destruction. If we were to doubt this, we 
 should doubt what has been settled by the authority 
 of all men, and there would be an end of all truth 
 and untruth. This l is a novel kind of argument for 
 an Indian philosopher to use, and shows that with 
 all the boldness of their speculations they were not 
 so entirely different from ourselves, and not entirely 
 indifferent to the Securus judicat orbis terrarum. 
 
 Cause and Effect. 
 
 If, however, we call the Nyaya-philosophy theistic, 
 we should always remember that such terms as 
 theistic and atheistic are hardly applicable to Indian 
 philosophy in the sense in which they are used 
 by Christian theologians. With us atheistic implies 
 the denial of a supreme and absolute Being ; but 
 we saw that even the so-called atheism of the 
 Samkhya-philosophy does not amount to that. It 
 is simply the denial of an Isvara, as an active and 
 personal creator and ruler of the world. 
 
 And even such a personal God is not altogether 
 denied by the Samkhyas ; they only deny that He can 
 be proved to exist by human arguments, and if He 
 exists as such, they hold that in the eyes of philo- 
 sophers He would be but a phenomenal manifesta- 
 tion of the Godhead, liable to change, liable even 
 to temporary disappearance at the end of each aeon, 
 and to reappearance at the beginning of a new 
 aeon. It is this kind of a divine being, a personal 
 Isvara or Lord, that is taken for granted by the 
 
 J Sarvalaukikapramatva.
 
 556 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Nyaya philosophers, and, it may be added at once, 
 by the Vaiseshika philosophers also l . 
 
 In the Tarka-Samgraha, for instance, it is distinctly 
 stated that 'the Atman or Self is twofold, the 
 (rivatman (personal Self), and the Paramatman 
 (the Highest Self).' It must not be supposed, 
 however, that Lsvara, the omniscient Lord, is Param- 
 atman, which is one only, while the (rivatman is 
 separate for each individual body, all-pervading and 
 eternal. Though Paramatman is Isvara, Isvara is 
 not Paramatman, but a phenomenal manifestation 
 of Paramatman only. The argument which we met 
 with before is fully stated in Gotama's Sutras, 
 IV, 19-21. The actions of men, it is said, do not 
 always produce an effect. Good actions do not 
 always produce good results, nor bad actions bad 
 results, as they ought, if every act continued to 
 act (Karman). Hence there must be another power 
 that modifies the continuous acting of acts, and that 
 can be Isvara only. It is not denied thereby 
 that human actions are required, and that no effects 
 would take place without the working of human 
 agents, only they are not the sole cause of what 
 happens, but we require another power, an Lsvara, 
 to account for what would otherwise be irrational 
 results of human actions. 
 
 Phala, Rewards. 
 
 We now come to the tenth of the Prameyas, 
 Phala ; and here the same subject is treated once 
 more, though from a different point of view. It is 
 
 1 Bullantyne, Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, 
 p. 12 ; Muir, 0. S. T., vol. iii, p. 133.
 
 EMANCIPATION. 557 
 
 asked, how are effects, rewards or punishments, pos- 
 sible in another life ? As both good and evil works 
 are done in this life, the cause, namely these works, 
 would have ceased to exist long before their fruit 
 is to be gathered. This objection is met by an 
 illustration taken from a tree which bears fruit 
 long after it has ceased to be watered. The ob- 
 jector is not, however, satisfied with this, but, on 
 the contrary, takes a bolder step, and denies that 
 any effect either is or is not, or is or is not, at the 
 same time. Gotama is not to be frightened by 
 this apparently Buddhistic argument, but appeals 
 again to what we should call the common-sense view 
 of the matter, namely, that we actually see pro- 
 duction and destruction before our very eyes. We 
 can see every day that a cloth, before it has been 
 woven, does not exist, for no weaver would say that 
 the threads are the cloth, or the cloth the threads. 
 And if it should be argued that the fruit produced 
 by a tree is different from the fruit of our acts, 
 because there is no receptacle (Asraya) or, as we 
 should say, no subject, this is met by the declara- 
 tion that, in the case of good or bad acts, there is 
 a permanent receptacle, namely the Self, which 
 alone is capable of perceiving pain or joy in this 
 or in any other state of existence. 
 
 Emancipation. 
 
 After examining the meaning of pain, arid ex- 
 pressing his conviction that everything, even plea- 
 sure, is full of pain, Gotama at last approaches the 
 last subject, emancipation (Apavarga). He begins 
 as usual with objections, such as that it is impossible 
 in this life to pay all our moral debts, that certain
 
 558 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sacrificial duties are enjoined as incumbent on us 
 to the end of our lives, and that if it is said that 
 a man is freed from these by old age, this does not 
 imply that, even when he is no longer able to per- 
 form his daily duties, he should not perform certain 
 duties, if in thought only. If, therefore, good works 
 continue, there will be rewards for them, in fact there 
 will be paradise, though even this would really have 
 to be looked upon as an obstacle to real emancipa- 
 tion. Nothing remains but -a complete extinction 
 of all desires, and this can be effected by knowledge 
 of the truth only. Therefore knowledge of the truth 
 or removal of all false notions, is the beginning and 
 end of all philosophy, and of the Nyaya-philosophy in 
 particular. The first step towards this is the cessa- 
 tion of Ahamkara, here used in the sense of personal 
 feelings, such as desire for a beautiful and aversion 
 to a deformed object. Desire therefore has to be 
 eradicated and aversion also ; but before he explains 
 how this desire, which arises from false apprehension 
 (Mithyagtfiana) can be eradicated, Gotama is carried 
 back once more to a subject which had been dis- 
 cussed before, namely whether the objects of desire 
 exist as wholes or as parts. And this leads him on 
 to what is the distinguishing doctrine both of the 
 Nyaya and of the Vaiseshika-philosophies, namely 
 the admission of Anus or atoms. If wholes are 
 constantly divided and subdivided, we should in 
 the end be landed in nihilism, but this is not to be. 
 There cannot be annihilation because the A?ius or 
 the smallest parts are realities (IV, 8-82), and, 
 according to their very nature, cannot be further 
 reduced or compressed out of being. Against this 
 view of the existence of what we should call
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF IDEAS, NOT OF THINGS. 559 
 
 atoms, the usual arguments are then adduced, 
 namely that ether (or space) is everywhere, and 
 therefore in an atom also, and if an atom has figure 
 or a without and a within, it is of necessity 
 divisible. In reply, ether is said to be intangible, 
 neither resistant nor obstructing, that is, neither 
 occupying space against others, nor preventing 
 others from occupying space ; and in the end an 
 appeal is made to a recognised maxim of Hindu 
 philosophy, that there, must never be a regressio 
 in infinitum, as there would be in attempting to 
 divide an atom. 
 
 Knowledge of Ideas, not of Things. 
 
 And now the opponent, again, it would seem, 
 a Buddhist, makes a still bolder sweep by denying 
 the existence of any external things. All we have 
 is knowledge, he says, not things ; nothing different 
 from our knowledge, or independent of our know- 
 ledge, can exist for us. Gotama objects to this 
 (Vidyamatra) doctrine, first of all because, if it were 
 impossible to prove the existence of any external 
 things, it would be equally impossible to prove 
 their non-existence. And if an appeal were made 
 to dreams, or visions produced by a mirage, or by 
 jugglery, it should be remembered that dreams also, 
 like remembrances, presuppose previous perception 
 of things ; and that even in mistaking we mistake 
 something, so that false knowledge can always be 
 removed by true knowledge. After granting that, 
 one more question arises, how that true knowledge. 
 if once gained, is to be preserved, because we saw 
 that knowledge is not eternal, but vanishes. And 
 here the Nyaya suddenly calls the Yoga to its aid,
 
 560 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and teaches that Samadhi or intense meditation 
 will prove a safe preservative of knowledge, in spite 
 of all disturbances from without, while the Nyaya- 
 philosophy retains its own peculiar usefulness as 
 employed in the defence of truth against all comers, 
 in which case even such arts as wrangling and 
 cavilling may prove of service. 
 
 This may seem a very humble view to take with 
 regard to a system of philosophy which at the very 
 outset promised to its students final beatitude as the 
 highest reward. But considering the activity of philo- 
 sophical speculation, of which we have had so many 
 indications in the ancient as well as in the modern 
 history of India, we can well understand that philo- 
 sophers, skilled in all the arts and artifices of reason- 
 ing, would secure for their system that high position 
 which the Nyaya certainly held and still holds ' 
 among the recognised systems of orthodox philo- 
 sophy. It would be useless to go once more over 
 the topics from ati, futility, No. XIV, to No. XVI, 
 Nigrahasthana, objectionable proceedings, which are 
 fully treated in the fifth book. 
 
 Syllogism. 
 
 There is one subject, however, which requires some 
 more special consideration, namely the Syllogism, 
 or the Five Members, treated as VII. This has 
 always excited the special interest of European 
 logicians on account of certain startling similarities 
 which no doubt exist between it and the syllogism of 
 Aristotle and the schoolman. But from a Hindu 
 point of view this syllogism or even logic in general 
 
 1 Cowell, Report on the Toles of Nuddea, 1867.
 
 SYLLOGISM. 561 
 
 is by no means the chief object of the Nyaya-philo- 
 sophy, nor is it its exclusive property. It has been 
 fully discussed in the Vedanta and Samkhya systems, 
 and once more in the Vaiseshika ; but as it forms 
 the pride of the Nyaya, it will find its most appro- 
 priate place here l . 
 
 As we saw colour mentioned as the distinguishing 
 quality of light, we found knowledge put forward as 
 the characteristic feature of Self. The Nyaya looks 
 upon knowledge as inseparably connected with the 
 Self, though in the larger sense of being the cause 
 of every conception that has found expression in 
 language. Knowledge, according to the Nyaya, is 
 either perception or remembrance. Perception 
 again is twofold, right or wrong. Right perception 
 represents a thing such as it is, silver as silver. 
 This is called truth, Prama. Wrong perception 
 represents a thing as it is not, mother-of-pearl as 
 silver. 
 
 This right perception, according to the Nyaya- 
 philosophy is, as we saw, of four kinds, sensuous, 
 inferential, comparative, and authoritative, and is 
 produced by perception, by inference, by com- 
 parison, and by revealed authority. Here we are 
 brought back to the Prama/was again which were 
 discussed in the beginning, but among which one, 
 Anumana or inference, receives here a more special 
 treatment. We are thus obliged, in following 
 the Sutras, to go over some of the ground again. 
 Different systems of philosophy differed, as we saw, 
 
 1 See M. M., Appendix to Archbishop Thomson's Laws of 
 Thought ; also Die Theorie des indischen Rationalisten von 
 den Erkenntnissmitteln, von R. Garbe, 1888. 
 
 O O
 
 562 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the number of Prainanas which they admit, ac- 
 cording to what each considers the only trust- 
 worthy channels of knowledge. 
 
 Pramanas in different Philosophical Schools. 
 
 One, Perception : AUrvakas. 
 
 Two, Perception and inference : Vaiseshikas and 
 Buddhists. 
 
 Three, Perception, inference, arid word (revela- 
 tion) : Sa?>ikhyas. 
 
 Four, Perception, inference, revelation, and com- 
 parison : Naiyayikas. 
 
 Five, Perception, inference, revelation, comparison, 
 and presumption : Prabhakara (a Mimamsaka). 
 
 Six, Perception, inference, revelation, comparison, 
 presumption, and not-being : Mlmamsakas. 
 
 Others admit also Aitihya, tradition, Sambhava, 
 equivalence, AeshZa, gesture. 
 
 After sensuous knowledge, which takes cognisance 
 of substances, qualities, and actions, has been 
 examined, the question arises, how can we know 
 things which are not brought to us by the senses ? 
 How do we know, for instance, that there is fire which 
 we cannot see in a mountain, or that a mountain 
 is a volcano, when all that we do see is merely 
 that the mountain smokes ? We should remember 
 that there were three kinds of Anumana (Nyaya- 
 Sutras II, 37) called Purva vat, having the sign before, 
 or as the cause, $eshavat, having the sign after or as 
 the effect, and S4manyatodri'shZa, keen together. In 
 the first class the sign of past rain was the swelling 
 of rivers ; in the second the sign of coming rain was 
 the ants carrying off their eggs ; in the third the 
 sign of the motion of the sun was its being seen
 
 PRAMAJVAS IN DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS. 563 
 
 in different places. Knowledge of things unseen, 
 acquired in these three ways, is called inferential 
 knowledge (Anumana), and in order to arrive at it, 
 we are told that we must be in possession of what is 
 called a Vyapti. This, as we saw, was the most im- 
 portant word in an Indian syllogism. Literally it 
 means pervasion. Vyapta means pervaded ; Vyapya, 
 what must be pervaded ; Vyapaka, what pervades. 
 This expression, to pervade, is used by logicians in 
 the sense of invariable, inseparable or universal con- 
 comitance. Thus sea-water is always pervaded by 
 saltness, it is inseparable from it, and in this sense 
 Vyapya, what is to be pervaded, came to be used for 
 what we should call the middle term in a syllogism. 
 Vyapti, or invariable concomitance, may sometimes be 
 taken as a general rule, or even as a general law, in 
 some cases it is simply the sine qud non. It is such 
 a Vyapti, for instance, that smoke is pervaded by 
 or invariably connected with fire, or, as the Hindus 
 say, that smokiness is pervaded by fieriness, not, 
 however, fieriness by smokiness. We arrive by 
 induction at the Vyapti that wherever there is 
 smoke, there is fire, but not that wherever there is 
 fire, there is smoke. The latter Vyapti in order to 
 be true would require a condition or Upadhi, viz. 
 that the firewood should be moist. If we once are 
 in possession of a true Vyapti as smokiness being 
 pervaded by fieriness, we only require what is called 
 groping or consideration (Paramarsa) in order to 
 make the smoke, which we see rising from the 
 mountain, a Paksha or member of our Vyapti, such 
 as ' wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' The 
 conclusion then follows that this mountain which 
 shows smoke, must have fire. 
 
 002
 
 564 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 All this may sound very clumsy to European 
 logicians, but it would have been easy enough to 
 translate it into our own more technical language. 
 We might easily clothe Ka?iada in a Grecian garb 
 and make him look almost like Aristotle. Instead 
 of saying that inferential knowledge arises from 
 discovering in an object something which is always 
 pervaded by something else, and that the pervading 
 predicate is predicable of all things of which the 
 pervaded predicate is, we might have said that our 
 knowledge that S is P arises from discovering that 
 S is M, and M is P, or with Aristotle, 6 o-yAXoytoyioy 
 Sia TOV fj.crov rb axpov rS> rpiTcp Seixvvo'ii'. Wliat 
 Kanada calls one member of the pervasion, Paksha, 
 e. g. the smoking mountain, might have been trans- 
 lated by subject or terminus minor ; what pervades, 
 Vyapaka or Sadhya, e. g. fieriness, by predicate or 
 terminus major ; and what is to be pervaded, 
 Vyapya, i. e. smokiness, by terminus medius. But 
 what should we have gained by this ? All that is 
 peculiar to Indian logic would have evaporated, and 
 the remainder might have been taken for a clumsy 
 imitation of Aristotle. Multa jiunt eadem, sed 
 aliter, and it is this very thing, this aliter, that 
 constitutes the principal charm of a comparative 
 study of philosophy. Even such terms as syllogism 
 or conclusion are inconvenient here, because they 
 have with us an historical colouring and may throw 
 a false light on the subject. The Sanskrit Anumana 
 is not exactly the Greek o-u/zTrepacr/za, but it means 
 measuring something by means of something else. 
 This is done by what we may call syllogism, but 
 what the Hindus describe as Paramarsa or groping 
 or trying to find in an object something which can
 
 ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 565 
 
 be measured by something else or what can become 
 the member of a pervasion. This corresponds in fact 
 to the looking for a terminus medius. In Kapila's 
 system (I, 61) the principal object of inference is 
 said to be transcendent truth, that is, truth which 
 transcends the horizon of our senses. Things which 
 cannot be seen with our eyes, are known by in- 
 ference, as fire is, when what is seen is smoke only. 
 Gotama therefore defines the result of inference 
 (I, JQI) as knowledge of the connected, that is, as 
 arising from the perception of a connection or a law. 
 But, again, the relation of what pervades and what 
 is pervaded is very different from what we should 
 call the relative extension of two concepts. This 
 will become more evident as we proceed. For the 
 present we must remember that in the case before 
 us the act of proving by means of Anumana con- 
 sists in our knowing that there is in the mountain 
 something always pervaded by, or inseparable from 
 something else, in our case, smoke always pervaded 
 by fire, and that therefore the mountain, if it smokes, 
 has fire. 
 
 By this process we arrive at Anumiti, the result 
 of Anumana, or inferential knowledge, that the 
 mountain is a volcano. So much for the inference 
 for ourselves. Next follows the inference for 
 others. 
 
 Anumana for Others. 
 
 What follows is taken from Annambha^a's Com- 
 pendium. ' The act of concluding,' he says, ' is 
 twofold, it being intended either for one's own 
 benefit or for the benefit of others. The former is 
 the means of arriving at knowledge for oneself, and 
 the process is this. By repeated observation, as in
 
 566 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the case of kitchen hearths and the like, we are 
 reminded of a rule (Vyapti), such as that wherever 
 we have seen smoke, we have seen fire. We now 
 approach a mountain and wonder whether there 
 may or may not be fire in it. We see the smoke, we 
 remember the rule, and immediately perceive that 
 the mountain itself is fiery. This is the process 
 when we reason for ourselves. 
 
 But if we have to convince somebody else of what 
 we, by inference, know to be true, the case is 
 different. We then start with the assertion, The 
 mountain is fiery. We are asked, Why? and we 
 answer, Because it smokes. We then give our 
 reason, or the major premiss, that all that smokes 
 is fiery, as you may see, for instance, on a kitchen 
 hearth and the like. Now you perceive that the 
 mountain does smoke, and hence you will admit 
 that T was right when I said that the mountain is 
 fiery. This is called the five-membered form of 
 exposition, and the five members are severally 
 called l , 
 
 (1) Assertion (Prati^fta), the mountain has fire ; 
 
 (2) Reason (Hetu 2 ), because it has smoke ; 
 
 (3) Instance (Udaharana or Nidarsana), look at 
 the kitchen hearth, and remember the Vyapti 
 between smoke and fire ; 
 
 (4) Application (Upanaya), and the mountain has 
 smoke ; 
 
 (5) Conclusion (Nigamana), therefore it has fire 3 .' 
 
 1 Nyaya-Sutras I, 32. 
 
 2 Synonyms of Hetu are Apadesa, Liwga, Prainawa, and 
 Karawa. Vaiseshika-Sutras IX, 2, 4. 
 
 3 The Vaiseshika terms are (i) Prati^na, (2) Apadesa, (3) 
 Nidarsana, (4) Anusamdhana, (5) Pratyamnaya.
 
 ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 567 
 
 In both cases the process of inference is the same, 
 but the second is supposed to be more rhetorical, 
 more persuasive, and therefore more useful in con- 
 troversy. 
 
 What is called by Annambha^a the conclusion 
 for oneself, corresponds totidem verbis to the first 
 form of Aristotle's syllogism : 
 
 All that smokes is fiery, 
 The mountain smokes ; 
 Therefore the mountain is fiery. 
 
 We must not forget, however, that whatever 
 there is of formal Logic in these short extracts, has 
 but one object with Gotama, that of describing 
 knowledge as one of the qualities of the Self, and 
 as this knowledge is not confined to sensuous 
 perceptions, Gotama felt it incumbent on him to 
 explain the nature and prove the legitimacy of the 
 inferential kind of knowledge also. It is not so 
 much logic as it is noetic that interested Kamida. 
 He was clearly aware of the inseparability of induc- 
 tive and deductive reasoning. The formal logician, 
 from the time of Aristotle to our own, takes a 
 purely technical interest in the machinery of the 
 human mind, he collects, he arranges and analyses 
 the functions of our reasoning faculties, as they fall 
 under his observation. But the question which 
 occupies Gotama is, How it is that we know any 
 thing which we do not, nay which we cannot 
 perceive by our senses, in fact, how we can justify 
 inferential knowledge. From this point of view we 
 can easily see that neither induction nor deduction, 
 if taken by itself, \vould be sufficient for him. 
 Deductive reasoning may in itself be most useful 
 for forming Vyaptis, it may give a variety of
 
 568 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 different aspects to our knowledge, but it can never 
 add to it. And if on one side Gotama cannot use 
 deduction, because it teaches nothing new, he cannot 
 on the other rely entirely on induction, because it 
 cannot teach anything certain or unconditional. 
 
 The only object of all knowledge, according to 
 Gotama, is absolute truth or Prama. He knew as 
 well as Aristotle that tirayayri in order to prove the 
 oAo>y must be Sia TrdvTtov, and that this is impossible. 
 Knowledge gained by epagogic reasoning is, strictly 
 speaking, always e?n TO 77-6X1;, and not what Gotama 
 would call Prama. The conclusion, f. i., at which Aris- 
 totle arrives by way of induction, that animals with 
 little bile are long-lived, might be called a Vyapti. 
 He arrives at it by saying that man, horse, and mule 
 (C) are long-lived (A) ; man, horse, and mule (C) 
 have little bile (B) ; therefore all animals with 
 little bile are long-lived. Gotama does not differ 
 much from this, but he would express himself in 
 a different way. He would say, wherever we see 
 the attribute of little bile, we also see the attribute 
 of long life, as for instance in men, horses, mules, &c. 
 But there he would not stop. He would value this 
 Vyapti merely as a means of establishing a new 
 rule ; he would use it as a means of deduction and 
 say, 'Now we know that the elephant has little bile, 
 therefore we know also that he is long-lived.' Or 
 to use another instance, where Aristotle says that 
 all men are mortal, Ka?^ada would say that humanity 
 is pervaded by mortality, or that we have never seen 
 humanity without mortality ; and where Aristotle 
 concludes that kings are mortal because they belong 
 to the class of men, Gotama, if he argued for himself 
 only, and not for others, would say that kinghood is
 
 ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 569 
 
 pervaded by manhood and manhood by mortality, 
 and therefore kings are mortal. 
 
 It would be easy to bring objections against this 
 kind of reasoning, and we shall see that Indian 
 philosophers themselves have not been slow in 
 bringing them forward, and likewise in answering 
 them. One thing can be said in favour of the 
 Indian method. If we go on accumulating instances 
 to form an induction, if, as in the afore-mentioned 
 case, we add horses, mules, men, and the like, we 
 approximate no doubt more and more to a general 
 rule, but we never eliminate all real, much less all 
 possible, exceptions. The Hindu, on the contrary, 
 by saying, ' Wherever we have seen the attribute 
 of little bile, we have observed long life,' or better 
 still, ' We have never observed long life without the 
 attribute of little bile,' and by then giving a number 
 of mere instances, and these by way of illustration 
 only, excludes the reality, though not the possibility, 
 of exceptions. He states, as a fact, that wherever 
 the one has been, the other has been seen likewise, 
 and thus throws the onus probandi as to any case 
 to the contrary upon the other side. The Hindu 
 knows the nature of induction quite well enough 
 to say in the very words of European philosophers, 
 that because in ninety-nine cases a Vyapti l or rule 
 has happened to be true, it does not follow that 
 it will be so in the hundredth case. If it can be 
 proved, however, that there never has been an 
 instance where smoke was seen without fire, the 
 mutual inherence and inseparable connection of 
 
 1 ' Satasah sahafcaritayor api vyabhiMropalabdhe/i.' Anu- 
 manakhawcZa of TattvaJtintaniani.
 
 570 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 smoke and fire is more firmly established than 
 it would be by any number of accumulated actual 
 instances where the two have been seen together. 
 
 The conditions (Upadhis) under which it is allow- 
 able to form a Vyapti, that is to say, to form a uni- 
 versal rule, have greatly occupied the thoughts of 
 Hindu philosophers. Volumes after volumes have 
 been written on the subject, and though they may 
 not throw any new light on the origin of universals, 
 they furnish at all events a curious parallel to the 
 endeavours of European philosophers in defence 
 both of inductive and deductive thinking. 
 
 It seems hardly time as yet to begin to criti- 
 cise the inductive and the deductive methods as 
 elaborated by Hindu philosophers. We must first 
 know them more fully. Such objections as have 
 hitherto been started were certainly not unknown 
 to Gotama and Ka?^ada themselves. In accordance 
 with their system of Purvapaksha and Uttara- 
 paksha, every conceivable objection was started 
 by them and carefully analysed and answered. 
 Thus it has been pointed out by European philo- 
 sophers that the proposition that wherever there 
 is smoke there is fire, would really lose its universal 
 character l by the introduction of the instance, ' as 
 on the kitchen hearth.' But the Hindu logicians 
 also were perfectly aware of the fact that this 
 instance is not essential to a syllogism. They look 
 upon the instance simply as a helpful reminder for 
 
 1 Ritter, History of Philosophy, IV, p. 365, says that 'two 
 members of Kamda's argument are evidently superfluous, 
 while, by the introduction of an example in the third, the 
 universality of the conclusion is vitiated.'
 
 ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 57! 
 
 controversial purposes, as an illustration to assist 
 the memory, not as an essential part of the process 
 of the proof itself. It is meant to remind us that 
 we must look out for a Vy4pti between the smoke 
 which we see, and the fire which is implied, but not 
 seen. It is therefore in rhetorical syllogisms or 
 syllogisms for others only that the instance has 
 its proper place. In Sutra I, 35 Gotama says, 
 ' The third member or example is some familiar 
 case of the fact which, through its having a 
 character which is invariably attended by that 
 which is to be established, establishes (in con- 
 junction with the reason) the existence of that 
 character which is to be established.' It is Indian 
 rhetoric therefore far more than Indian logic that 
 is responsible for the introduction of this third 
 member which contains the objectionable instance ; 
 and rhetoric, though it is not logic, yet, as Whately 
 says, is an offshoot of logic. 
 
 The fact is that Gotama cares far more for the 
 formation of a Vy4pti, pervasion, than for the 
 manner in which it may serve hereafter as the basis 
 of a syllogism, which must depend on the character 
 of the Vyapti. A Vyapti was considered as three- 
 fold in the school of Gotama, as Anvaya-vyatireki, 
 Kevaldnvayi, and Kevala-vyatireki. The first, the 
 Anvaya-vyatireki, present and absent, is illustrated 
 by such a case as, Where there is smoke, there is 
 fire, and where fire is not, smoke is not. The 
 second, or Kevaldnvayi, i. e. present only, is illus- 
 trated by such a case as, Whatever is cognisable 
 is nameable, where it is impossible to bring forward 
 anything that is not cognisable. The third case, 
 or Kevala-vyatireki, is illustrated by a case such
 
 572 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as, Earth is different from the other elements, 
 because it is odorous. Here we could not go on 
 and say, all that is different from the other 
 elements has odour, because the only case in 
 point (Udaharana) would again be earth. But 
 we have to say, what is not different from the 
 other elements is not odorous, as water (by itself). 
 But this earth is not so, is not inodorous, and 
 therefore it is not not-different from the other 
 elements, but different from them, q. e. d. 
 
 Much attention has also been paid by Hindu 
 philosophers to the working of the Upadhis or 
 conditions assigned to a Vyapti. Thus in the 
 ordinary Vyapti that there is smoke in a mountain, 
 because there is fire, the presence of wet fuel was 
 an Upadhi, or indispensable condition. This Upadhi 
 pervades what is to be established (Sadhya-vyapaka), 
 in this case, fire, but it does not pervade what 
 establishes (Sadhana-vyapaka), i. e. smoke, because 
 fire is not pervaded by or invariably accompanied 
 by wet fuel, as, for instance, in the case of a red- 
 hot iron ball, where we have really fire without 
 smoke. Hence it would not follow by necessity 
 that there is fire because there is smoke, or that 
 there is no fire because there is no smoke. How 
 far the Indian mind may go in these minutiae of 
 reasoning may be seen from the following instance 
 given by Dr. Ballantyne in his Lectures on the 
 Nyaya-philosophy, founded chiefly on the Tarka- 
 saragraha, p. 59 : 
 
 ' To be the constant accompanier of what is to 
 be established (Sadhya-vyapakatva) consists in the 
 not being the counter-entity (Apratiyogitva) of any 
 absolute non-existence (Atyantabhava) having the
 
 ANUMANA FOR OTHERS. 573 
 
 same subject of inhesion (Samanadhikara?ia) as 
 that which is to be established. To be not the 
 constant accompanier of the argument (Sadhana- 
 vyapakatva) consists in the being the counter- 
 entity (Pratiyogitva) of some absolute non-existence 
 [not impossibly] resident in that which possesses 
 [the character tendered as an] argument.' 
 
 The credit of this translation belongs not to me, 
 but to the late Dr. Ballantyne, who was assisted 
 in unravelling these cobwebs of Nyaya logic by the 
 Nyaya-Pandits of the Sanskrit College at Benares. 
 Such native aid would seem to be almost indispen- 
 sable for such an achievement.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 VAISESHIKA PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Date of Stltras. 
 
 IT is fortunate that with regard to the Vaiseshika 
 philosophy, or rather with regard to the Vaiseshika- 
 Sutras, we are able to fix a date below which their 
 composition cannot be placed. In the year 1885 
 Professor Leumann, well known by his valuable re- 
 searches in 6raina literature, published an article, 
 ' The old reports on the schisms of the (rainas,' in 
 the Indische Studien, XVII, pp. 9 i-i 35. Among the 
 various heresies there mentioned, the sixth, we are 
 told, p. 121, was founded by the author of the Vai- 
 sesiya-sutta of the Chaulti race, and hence called 
 Chauluga 1 . If there could be any doubt that this is 
 meant for the VaLseshika-Sutras it would at once be 
 dispersed by the 144 so-called points of that system, 
 as mentioned by the author, 6'inabhadra. (7ina- 
 bhadra's date is fixed by Professor Leumann in the 
 eighth century A.D., and is certainly not later. This, 
 it is true, is no great antiquity, still, if we consider 
 the age of our Samkhya-Sfttras, referred now to the 
 thirteenth century A.D., even such a date, if only 
 certain, would be worth having. But we can make 
 another step backward. Haribhadra, originally a 
 
 1 Could this be meant for Auluku ?
 
 DATE OF SUTRAS. 575 
 
 Brahman, but converted to (rainism, has left us 
 a work called the ShacMarsanasamuMaya-sutram, 
 which contains a short abstract of the six Darsanas 
 in which the Vaiseshika-darsana is described as the 
 sixth, and in that description likewise we meet with 
 the most important technical terms of the Vaiseshika. 
 This short but important text was published in the 
 first volume of the Giornale della Societa Asiatica 
 Italiana, 1887, and Sanskrit scholarship is greatly 
 indebted to Professor C. Puini for this and other 
 valuable contributions of his to 6raina literature. 
 The author, Haribhadra, died in 1055 of the Vira-era, 
 i.e. 585 Samvat, that is 528 A.D. This would give 
 us an attestation for the Vaiseshika-Sutras as early 
 as that of the Samkhya-karikas, if not earlier, and it 
 is curious to observe that in Haribhadra's time the 
 number six of the Dar.sanas was already firmly 
 established. For, after describing the (i) Bauddha, 
 (2) Naiyayika, (3) Samkhya, (4) traina, (5) Vaiseshika, 
 and (6) (raiminiya systems, he remarks, that if some 
 consider the Vaiseshika not altogether different 
 from the Nyaya, there would be only five orthodox 
 systems (Astika), but that in that case the number 
 six could be completed by the Lokayita (sic] system 
 which he proceeds to describe, but which, of course, 
 is not an Astika, but a most decided Nastika system 
 of philosophy. It is curious to observe that here 
 again the Vedanta-philosophy, and the Yoga also, 
 are passed over in silence by the Grainas, though, for 
 reasons explained before, we have no right to con- 
 clude from this that these systems had at that time 
 not yet been reduced to a systematic form like the 
 other four Darsanas. What we learn from this passage 
 is that early in the sixth century A.D. the Nyaya,
 
 576 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Samkhya, Vaiseshika, and Purva-Mimamsa systems 
 of philosophy formed the subject of scientific study 
 among the (rainas, and we may hope that a further 
 search for (zaina MSS. may bring us some new dis- 
 coveries, and some further light on the chronological 
 development of philosophical studies in India. 
 
 Dates from Tibetan Sources. 
 
 Whenever we shall know more of the sources from 
 which Tibetan writers derived their information 
 about Indian literary matters, more light may possibly 
 come from thence on the dates of the Indian philo- 
 sophical systems of thought also. It is true that the 
 introduction of Buddhism into Tibet dates from the 
 eighth century only, but the translators of Sanskrit 
 originals, such as /Santi Kakshita, Padma Sambhava, 
 Dharmaklrti, Dipa??ikara ^Sri^fiana and others, may 
 have been in possession of much earlier information. 
 In an account 1 of King Kanishka (85-106 A.D.) and 
 his Great Council under Vasumitra and Purnaka, 
 we read that there was at that time in Kashmir a 
 Buddhist of the name of Sutra who maintained a 
 large Buddhist congregation headed by a sage 
 Dharmarakshita, and he is said to have belonged to 
 the Vaiseshika school 2 . This would prove the 
 existence of the Vaiseshika philosophy in the first 
 century A.D., a date so welcome that we must not 
 allow ourselves to accept it till we know what 
 authority there was for the Tibetan writers to adopt 
 it. It is taken from Sumpahi Choijung, and the 
 same authority states that after the death of 
 
 1 Journal of Buddhist Text Society, vol. I, p. i soq. 
 
 2 Ibid., vol. I, part 3, p. 19.
 
 KAtfADA, 577 
 
 Kanishka, a rich householder of the name of Jati 
 who lived at Asvaparanta in the north, invited 
 Vasunetra, a monk of the Vaiseshika school, from 
 Maru in the west, and another, Gosha Samgha from 
 Bactria, and supported the native clergy, consisting 
 of three hundred thousand monks, for a period of 
 ten years. 
 
 Kawada. 
 
 Although Nyaya and Vaiseshika have been often 
 treated as sister philosophies, we must, after 
 having examined Gotama's philosophy, give, for the 
 sake of completeness, at least a general outline of 
 Ka^ada's system also. It does not contain much 
 that is peculiar to it, and seems to presuppose much 
 that we found already in the other systems. Even 
 the theory of Anus or atoms, generally cited as its 
 peculiar character, was evidently known to the 
 Nyaya, though it is more fully developed by the 
 Vaiseshikas. It begins with the usual promise of 
 teaching something from which springs elevation or 
 the summum bonum, and that something Kanada 
 calls Dharma or merit. From a particular kind of 
 merit springs, according to Kanada, true knowledge 
 of certain Padarthas, or categories, and from this 
 once more the summum bonum. These categories, 
 of which we spoke before as part of the Nyaya- 
 philosophy, embrace the whole realm of knowledge, 
 and are : (i) substance, Dravya ; (2) quality, Gu/ia ; 
 (3) action, Karman ; (4) genus or community, Sa- 
 manya, or what constitutes a genus ; (5) species or 
 particularity, Visesha, or what constitutes an indi- 
 vidual ; (6) inhesion or inseparability, Samavaya ; 
 (7) according to some, privation or negation, Abhava. 
 These are to be considered by means of their mutual 
 
 pp
 
 578 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 similarities and dissimilarities, that is, by showing 
 how they differ and how far they agree. Here we 
 have, indeed, what comes much nearer to Aristotle's 
 categories than Gotama's Padarthas. These cate- 
 gories or predicaments were believed to contain an 
 enumeration of all things capable of being named, 
 i. e. of being known. If the number of Aristotle's 
 categories was controverted, no wonder that those 
 of Kanada should have met with the same fate. It 
 has always been a moot point whether Abhava, 
 non-existence, deserves a place among them, while 
 some philosophers were anxious to add two more, 
 namely, $akti, potentia, and Sadmya, similitude. 
 
 Substances. 
 
 I. The substances, according to the Vaiseshikas, 
 are : (i) earth, P?*ithivi ; (2) water, Apa/i ; (3) light, 
 Terras ; (4) air, Vayu ; (5) ether, Akasa ; (6) time, 
 Kala ; (7) space, Dis ; (8) self, Atman ; (9) mind, 
 Manas. These substances cannot exist without 
 qualities, as little as qualities can exist without sub- 
 stances. The four at the head of the list are either 
 eternal or non-eternal, and exist either in the form of 
 atoms (Anus) or as material bodies. The non-eternal 
 substances again exist as either inorganic, organic, or 
 as organs of sense. The impulse given to the atoms 
 comes from God, and in that restricted sense the 
 Vaiseshika has to be accepted as theistic. God is 
 Atman in its highest form. In its lower form it 
 is the individual soul. The former is one, and one 
 only, the latter are innumerable. 
 
 Qualities. 
 
 II. The principal qualities of these substances are : 
 (i) colour, Ilupa, in earth, water, and light ; (2)
 
 ACTIONS. 579 
 
 taste, Easa, in earth and water ; (3) smell, Gandha, 
 in earth ; (4) touch, Sparsa, in earth, water, light, 
 and air ; (5) number, Sawkhya, by which we per- 
 ceive one or many ; (6) extension or quantity, Pari- 
 mana ; (7) individuality or several ty, PHthaktva ; (8) 
 conjunction, Samyoga ; (9) disjunction, Yiyoga ; (10) 
 priority, Paratva ; (ii) 1 posteriority, Aparatva ; 
 (12) thought, Buddhi ; (13-14) pleasure and pain, 
 Sukha-duAkha ; (15-16) desire and aversion, IM/ia- 
 dveshau ; (17) 2 will, effort, Prayatna. 
 
 Actions. 
 
 III. The principal actions affecting the substances 
 are : (i) throwing upwards, Utkshepawa ; (2) throw- 
 ing downwards, Avakshepana (or Apa) ; (3) con- 
 tracting, Akun&ana ; (4) expanding, Utsarana (or 
 Pras-) ; (5) going, Gamana. These actions or move- 
 ments are sometimes identified with or traced back 
 to the Samskaras, a word difficult to translate, and 
 which has been rendered by dispositions and instincts, 
 as applied to either animate or inanimate bodies. 
 These Sawskaras 3 have an important position both 
 in the Samkhya- and in the Bauddha-philosophies. 
 In the Tarkadipika Sawskara is rendered even by 
 (7ati (g&tih samskaratmika bhavati), i.e. nature or 
 inborn peculiarity ; and in the Tarkasamgraha it is 
 
 1 Here follow in some lists as n to 15, gravity, fluidity, 
 viscidity, and sound. The remaining Guwas are said to be 
 perceptible by the mental organ only, not by the organs of 
 sense. 
 
 2 Here again some authorities add Dharma, virtue, and 
 Adharma, vice, Samskara, faculty or disposition, and Bhavana, 
 imagination. 
 
 8 See Garbe, Samkhya, p. 269 seq. 
 
 P p 2
 
 580 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 represented as threefold (VegaA, Bhavana, and 
 SthitisthapakaA). 
 
 In the Sutras which follow, Kanada tries to 
 point out certain features which the three categories 
 of substance, quality, and action share in common, 
 and others which are peculiar to two, or to one only. 
 In the course of this discussion he has frequently to 
 dwell on the effects which they produce, and he 
 therefore proceeds in the next lesson to examine the 
 meaning of cause and effect, and likewise of genus, 
 species, and individuals. It may be that the name 
 of Vaiseshika was given to Ka?iada's philosophy 
 from the differences, or Viseshas, which he estab- 
 lishes between substances, qualities, and actions, 
 or, it may be, from Visesha as a name of individual 
 things, applicable therefore to atoms. But this, in 
 the absence of decisive evidence, must for the 
 present remain undetermined. 
 
 Cause. 
 
 As to cause and effect, Kawada remarks that cause 
 precedes the effect, but that, in order to be a true 
 cause, it must be a constant antecedent, and the effect 
 must be unconditionally subsequent to it. There is 
 an important and often neglected difference between 
 Karana and Kara?<a. Karawa, though it may mean 
 cause, is properly the instrumental cause only, or 
 simply the instrument. An axe, for instance, is the 
 Kararza, or instrument, in felling a tree, but it is not 
 the Kara?ia, or cause. Causes, according to Kanada, 
 are threefold, intimate, non-intimate, and instru- 
 mental. The threads, for instance, are the intimate 
 cause of the cloth, the sewing of the threads the non- 
 intimate, and the shuttle the instrumental cause.
 
 QUALITIES EXAMINED. 581 
 
 Qualities Examined. 
 
 In the second book Kanada examines the qualities 
 of earth, water, &c. He, like other philosophers, 
 ascribes four qualities to earth, three to water, two 
 to light, one to air (Akasa). These are the principal 
 and characteristic qualities, but others are mentioned 
 afterwards, making altogether fourteen for earth, 
 such as colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, 
 individuality, conjunction, disjunction, genus, species, 
 gravity, fluidity, and permanence (II, i, 31). Quali- 
 ties ascribed to Isvara, or the Lord, are number, 
 knowledge, desire, and volition. In the case of air, 
 which is invisible, he uses touch as a proof of its 
 existence, also the rustling of leaves ; and he does 
 this in order to show that air is not one only. 
 Curiously enough Kanada, after explaining that 
 there is no visible mark of air (II, 1,15) but that its 
 existence has to be proved by inference and by reve- 
 lation (II, i, 17), takes the opportunity of proving, 
 as it were, by the way, the existence of God (II, i , 1 8) 
 by saying that ' work and word are the signs of the 
 substantial existence of beings different from our- 
 selves.' This, at least, is what the commentators 
 read in this Sutra, and they include under beings 
 different from ourselves, not only God, but inspired 
 sages also. It seems difficult to understand how 
 such things as earth and the name of earth could be 
 claimed as the work of the sages, but, as far as God 
 is concerned, it seems certain that Ka^ada thinks 
 he is able to prove His existence, His omnipotence 
 and omniscience by two facts, that His name exists, 
 and that His works exist, perceptible to the senses. 
 
 Immediately afterwards, Ka^ada proceeds to
 
 582 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 prove the existence of Akasa, ether, by showing 
 that it must exist in order to account for the 
 existence of sound, which is a quality, and as 
 such requires the substratum of an eternal and 
 special substance, as shown before. The question 
 of sound is treated again more fully II, 2, 21-37. 
 
 A distinction is made afterwards between charac- 
 teristic and adventitious qualities. If a garment, 
 for instance, is perfumed by a flower, the smell is 
 only an adventitious quality of the garment, while 
 it is characteristic in the case of earth. Thus heat 
 is characteristic of light, cold of water, &c. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Time, which was one of the eternal substances, 
 is declared to manifest its existence by such marks 
 as priority, posteriority, simultaneity, slowness, and 
 quickness. The arguments in support of the sub- 
 stantiality of air and ether apply to time also, 
 which is one, while its division into past, present, 
 and future, hibernal, vernal, and autumnal, is due 
 to extrinsic circumstances, such as the sun's revolu- 
 tions. Time itself is one, eternal, and infinite. 
 
 Space. 
 
 Space, again, is proved by our perceiving that 
 one thing is remote from or near to another. Its 
 oneness is proved as in the case of time ; and its 
 apparent diversity, such as east, south, west, and 
 north, depends likewise on extrinsic circumstances 
 only, such as the rising and setting of the sun. 
 Like time it is one, eternal, and infinite. 
 
 So far Kamida has been chiefly occupied with 
 external substances, their qualities and activities,
 
 MANAS. 583 
 
 and he now proceeds, according to the prescribed 
 order, to consider the eighth substance, viz. Atman, 
 the Self, the first in the list of his sixteen 
 Pad4rthas. Like Gotama, Kanada also argues 
 that the Atman must be different from the senses, 
 because while the senses apprehend each its own 
 object only (i) the sense of hearing, sound ; (2) the 
 sense of smelling, odour ; (3) the sense of tasting, 
 savour ; (4) the sense of seeing, colour ; (5) the 
 sense of feeling, touch ; it follows that there must 
 be something else to apprehend them all, the work 
 which in other philosophies was ascribed to Manas, 
 at least in the first instance. Besides, the organs 
 of sense are but instruments, and as such uncon- 
 scious, and they require an agent who employs 
 them. If we see a number of chariots skilfully 
 driven, we know there must be a charioteer, and 
 we know also that chariots and horses are different 
 from the charioteer. The same applies to the senses 
 of the body and to the Self, and shows that the 
 senses by themselves could not perform the work 
 that results in cognition. In defending this argu- 
 ment against all possible objections, Ka?mda, follow- 
 ing the example of Gotama, is drawn away into 
 a discussion of what is a valid and what is an 
 invalid argument, and more particularly into an 
 examination of what is a Vyapti, or an invariable 
 concomitance, fit to serve as a true foundation for 
 a syllogism. 
 
 Manas. 
 
 But he soon leaves this subject, and, without 
 finishing it, proceeds to a consideration of Manas, 
 the ninth and last of the Dravyas or substances.
 
 584 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This, too, is to him much the same that it was 
 to Gotama, who treats it as the sixth of the 
 Prameyas. In this place, as we saw, Manas 
 might be translated by attention rather than by 
 mind. 
 
 Anna or Atoms. 
 
 What is thought to be peculiar to Kawada, nay 
 the distinguishing feature of his philosophy, is the 
 theory of Anus or atoms. They take the place 
 of the Tanmatras in the Samkhya-philosophy. 
 Though the idea of an atom is not unknown in the 
 Nyaya-philosophy (Nyaya-Sutras IV, 2, 4-25), it is 
 nowhere so fully worked out as in the Vaiseshika. 
 Ka?iada argued that there must be somewhere a 
 smallest thing, that excludes further analysis. 
 Without this admission, we should have a regressus 
 ad infinitum, a most objectionable process in the 
 eyes of all Indian philosophers. A mountain, he 
 says, would not be larger than a mustard seed. 
 These smallest and invisible particles are held by 
 KaTiada to be eternal in themselves, but non-eternal 
 as aggregates. As aggregates again they may be 
 organised, organs, and inorganic. Thus the human 
 body is earth organised, the power of smelling is the 
 earthly organ, stones are inorganic. 
 
 It is, no doubt, very tempting to ascribe a Greek 
 origin to Kanada's theory of atoms. But suppose 
 that the atomic theory had really been borrowed 
 from a Greek source, would it not be strange that 
 Kanada's atoms are supposed never to assume visible 
 dimensions till there is a combination of three 
 double atoms (Tryamika), neither the simple nor 
 the double atoms being supposed to be visible by
 
 ANUS OK ATOMS. 585 
 
 themselves. I do not remember anything like this 
 in Epicurean authors, and it seems to me to give 
 quite an independent character to Kanada's view of 
 the nature of an atom. 
 
 We are told that water, in its atomic state, is 
 eternal, as an aggregate transient. Beings in the 
 realm of Varuwa (god of the sea) are organised, taste 
 is the watery organ, rivers are water inorganic. 
 
 Light in its atomic state is eternal, as an aggregate 
 transient. There are organic luminous bodies in the 
 sun, sight or the visual ray is the luminous organ, 
 burning fires are inorganic. 
 
 Air, again, is both atomic and an aggregate. 
 Beings of the air, spirits, &c., are organised air ; touch 
 in the skin is the aerial organ, wind is inorganic air. 
 Here it would seem as if we had something not very 
 unlike the doctrine of Empedocles, Taty ^er yap ycuav 
 , vSari 8' v8a>p AiQtpi <$' aid f pa 8lov, drap rrvpl 
 . But though we may discover the same 
 thought in the philosophies of Kanada and Empe- 
 docles, the form which it takes in India is character- 
 istically different from its Greek form. 
 
 Ether is always eternal and infinite. The sense 
 of hearing is the ethereal organ : nay, it is supposed 
 by some that ether is actually contained in the ear. 
 
 As to atoms, they are supposed to form first an 
 aggregate of two, then an aggregate of three double 
 atoms, then of four triple atoms, and so on. While 
 single atoms are indestructible, composite atoms are 
 by their very nature liable to decomposition, and, 
 in that sense, to destruction. An atom, by itself 
 invisible, is compared to the sixth part of a mote 
 in a sunbeam.
 
 586 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Samanya. 
 
 IV. As to Samanya, community, or, as we should 
 say, genus, the fourth of Kanada's categories, it is 
 supposed to be eternal, and a property common to 
 several, and abiding in substance, in quality, and in 
 action. It is distinguished by degrees, as high and 
 low ; the highest Samanya, or, as we should say, the 
 highest genus (6rati) is Satta, mere being, afterwards 
 differentiated by Upadhis, or limitations, and de- 
 veloped into ever so many subordinate species. The 
 Buddhist philosophers naturally deny the existence 
 of such a category, and maintain that all our ex- 
 perience has to do with single objects only. 
 
 Visesha. 
 
 V. These single objects are what Kanada compre- 
 hends under his fifth category of Visesha, or that 
 which constitutes the individuality or separateness of 
 any object. This also is supposed to abide in eternal 
 substances, so that it seems to have been conceived 
 not as a mere abstraction, but as something real, 
 that was there and could be discovered by means of 
 analysis or abstraction. 
 
 Samavaya. 
 
 VI. The last category, with which we have met 
 several times before, is one peculiar to Indian philo- 
 sophy. Samavaya is translated by inhesion or in- 
 separability. With Ka/iada also it is different from 
 mere connection, Samyoga, such as obtains between 
 horse and rider, or between milk and water mixed 
 together. There is Samavaya between threads and 
 cloth, between father and son, between two halves 
 and a whole, between cause and effect, between sub-
 
 ABHAVA. 587 
 
 stances and qualities, the two being interdependent 
 and therefore inseparable. 
 
 Though this relationship is known in non-Indian 
 philosophies, it has not received a name of its own, 
 though such a term might have proved very useful 
 in several controversies. The relation between 
 thought and word, for instance, is not Samyoga, but 
 Samavaya, inseparableness. 
 
 Abhava. 
 
 VII. In addition to these six categories, some 
 logicians required a negative category also, that of 
 Abhava or absence. And this also they divided into 
 different kinds, into (i) Pragabhava, former not- 
 being, applying to the cloth before it was woven ; 
 (2) Dhvamsa, subsequent non-being, as when a jar, 
 being smashed, exists no longer as a jar; and (3) 
 Atyantabhava, absolute not-being, an impossibility, 
 such as the son of a barren woman ; (4) Anyonya- 
 bhava, reciprocal negation, or mutual difference, 
 such as we see in the case of water and ice. 
 
 It may seem as if the Vaiseshika was rather a 
 disjointed and imperfect system. And to a cer- 
 tain extent it is so. Though it presupposes a 
 knowledge of the Nyaya-system, it frequently goes 
 over the same ground as the Nyaya, though it does 
 not quote verbatim from it. We should hardly 
 imagine that the Vaiseshika-Sutras would argue 
 against Upamana, or comparison, as a separate Pra- 
 mana, in addition to Pratyaksha (sense) and Ariumana 
 (inference), unless in some other school it had been 
 treated as an independent means of knowledge ; and 
 this school was, as we saw, the Nyaya, which is 
 so far shown to be anterior to the Vaiseshika-phi-
 
 588 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 losophy. Kanada denies by no means that com- 
 parison is a channel through which knowledge may 
 reach us, he only holds that it is not an independent 
 channel, but must be taken as a subdivision of 
 another and larger channel, viz. Anumana or infer- 
 ence. He probably held the same opinion about 
 $abda, whether we take it in the sense of the Veda 
 or of an utterance of a recognised authority, because 
 the recognition of such an authority always implies, 
 as he rightly holds, a previous inference to support 
 it. He differs in this respect from the ./Tarvaka 
 secularist, who denies the authority of the Veda out- 
 right, while Kawada appeals to it in several places. 
 
 A similar case meets us in Gotama'sNyaya-Sutras 
 (I, 1 6). Here, apparently without any definite 
 reason, Gotama tells us in a separate aphorism that 
 Buddhi (understanding), Upalabdhi (apprehension), 
 and 6rftana (knowing) are not different in meaning. 
 Why should he say so, unless he had wanted to 
 enter his protest against some one else who had 
 taught that they meant different things ? Now this 
 some one else could only have been Kapila, who 
 holds, as we saw, that Buddhi is a development of 
 Prakmi or unintelligent nature, and that conscious 
 apprehension (Samvid) originates with the Purusha 
 only. But here again, though Gotama seems to 
 have had the tenets of the Samkhya-school in his 
 eye, we have no right on this ground to say that our 
 Samkhya-Sutras existed before the Nyaya-Sutras 
 were composed. All we are justified in saying is 
 that, like all the other systems of Indian philosophy, 
 these two also emerged from a common stratum in 
 which such opinions occupied the minds of various 
 thinkers long before the final outcome settled down,
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 589 
 
 and was labelled by such names as Sawkhya, or 
 Nyaya, Kapila, or Gotama, and long, of course, before 
 the Samkhya-Sutras, which we now possess, were 
 constructed. 
 
 The Six Systems. 
 
 It must have been observed how these six, or, if 
 we include the Barhaspatya, these seven systems of 
 philosophy, though they differ from each other and 
 criticise each other, share nevertheless so many things 
 in common that we can only understand them as 
 products of one and the same soil, though cultivated 
 by different hands. They all promise to teach the 
 nature of the soul, and its relation to the Godhead 
 or to a Supreme Being. They all undertake to 
 supply the means of knowing the nature of that 
 Supreme Being, and through that knowledge to 
 pave the way to supreme happiness. They all share 
 the conviction that there is suffering in the world 
 which is something irregular, has no right to exist, 
 and should therefore be removed. Though there is 
 a strong religious vein running through the six so- 
 called orthodox systems, they belong to a phase of 
 thought in which not only has the belief in the 
 many Vedic gods long been superseded by a belief 
 in a Supreme Deity, such as Praf/apati, but this 
 phase also has been left behind to make room for a 
 faith in a Supreme Power, or in the Godhead which 
 has no name but Brahman or Sat, ' I am what 1 am.' 
 The Hindus themselves make indeed a distinction 
 between the six orthodox systems. They have no 
 word for orthodox ; nay, we saw that some of these 
 systems, though atheistic, were nevertheless treated 
 as permissible doctrines, because they acknowledged 
 the authority of the Veda. Orthodox might therefore
 
 59 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be replaced by Vedic ; and if atheism seems to us 
 incompatible with Vedism or Vedic orthodoxy, we 
 must remember that atheism with Indian philo- 
 sophers means something very different from what 
 it means with us. It means a denial of an active, 
 busy, personal or humanised god only, who is called 
 Isvara, the Lord. But behind him and above him 
 Hindu philosophers recognised a Higher Power, 
 whether they called it Brahman, or Paramatman, or 
 Purusha. It was the denial of that reality which con- 
 stituted a Nastika, a real heretic, one who could say 
 of this invisible, yet omnipresent Being, Na asti, ' He 
 is not.' Buddha therefore, as well as B?'ihaspati, the 
 ./Tarvaka, was a Nastika, while both the Yoga and 
 the Samkhya, the former Sesvara, with an Isvara, 
 the other Amsvara, without an Isvara, the one 
 theistic, the other atheistic, could be recognised as 
 orthodox or Vedic. 
 
 The Hindus themselves were fully aware that 
 some of their systems of philosophy differed from 
 each other on essential points, and that some stood 
 higher than others. Madhusudana clearly looked 
 upon the Vedanta as the best of all philosophies, 
 and so did >Samkara, provided he was allowed to 
 interpret the Sutras of Badarayana according to the 
 principles of his own unyielding Monism. Madhu- 
 sudana, as we saw, treated the Samkhya and Yoga 
 by themselves as different from the two Mima/?isas, 
 Nyaya and Vai.veshika, and as belonging to Snrn'ti 
 rather than to /S'ruti. Vu//hina-Bhikshu, a philo- 
 sopher of considerable grasp, while fully recognising 
 the difference between the six systems of philosophy, 
 tried to discover a common truth behind them all, 
 and to point out how they can be studied together,
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 59 1 
 
 or rather in succession, and how all of them are 
 meant to lead honest students into the way of truth. 
 
 In his Preface to the Samkhya-Sutras, so well 
 edited and translated by Professor Garbe, Vi^fiana- 
 Bhikshu says : "If we read in the BHhadaranyaka 
 Upanishad II, 4, 5, and IV, 5, 6, that the Self must 
 be seen, must be heard, must be pondered and medi- 
 tated on, hearing and the rest are evidently pointed 
 out as means of a direct vision of the Self, by which 
 the highest object of man can be realised. If it is 
 asked how these three things can be achieved, Snmti 
 or tradition answers : ' It must be heard from the 
 words of the Veda, it must be pondered on with 
 proper arguments, and, after that, it must be medi- 
 tated on continuously. These are the means of the 
 vision of the Self.' 
 
 ' Meditated on/ that is, by means proposed in 
 Yoga-philosophy. Three things are known from 
 passages of the Veda, (i) the highest object of man, 
 (2) knowledge essential for its attainment, (3) the 
 nature of the Atman or Self which forms the object 
 of such knowledge. And it was the purpose of the 
 Exalted, as manifested in the form of Kapila, to 
 teach, in his six-chaptered manual on Viveka or 
 distinction between Purusha and Prakriti, all the 
 arguments which are supported by $ruti. 
 
 If then it should be objected that we have already 
 a logical treatment of these subjects in the Nyaya 
 and Vaiseshika systems, rendering the Samkhya 
 superfluous, and that it is hardly possible that both 
 the Samkhya as well as the Nyaya and Vaiseshika 
 could be means of right knowledge, considering that 
 each represents the Self in a different form, the 
 Nyaya and Vaiseshika as with qualities, the Sam-
 
 59 2 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 khya as without, thus clearly contradicting each 
 other, we answer No, by no means ! Neither is the 
 Sa?>ikhya rendered superfluous by the Nyaya and 
 Vaiseshika, nor do they contradict each other. They 
 differ from each other so far only as Nyaya arid 
 Vabeshika treat of the objects of empirical know- 
 ledge, but the Sa??ikhya of the highest truth. The 
 Nyaya and Vai.seshika, as they follow the common- 
 sense view that it is the Self that feels joy and pain, 
 aim at no more than at the first steps in knowledge, 
 namely at the recognition of the Atman as different 
 from the body, because it is impossible to enter per 
 saltum into the most abstruse wisdom. The know- 
 ledge of those preliminary schools which is attained 
 by simply removing the idea that the Self is the 
 body is no more than an empirical comprehension of 
 facts, in the same manner as by a removal of the 
 misapprehension in taking a man at a distance for 
 a post, there follows the apprehension that he has 
 hands, feet, &c., that is, a knowledge of the truth, 
 yet purely empirical. If therefore we read the 
 following verse from the Bhagavad-gita III, 29 : 
 
 ' Those who are deceived by the constituent Gu?ias 
 of Prak?*iti, cling to the workings of the Gunas 
 (Sattva, Rac/as, and Tamas). Let therefore those 
 who know the whole truth take care not to distract 
 men of moderate understanding who do not as yet 
 know the whole truth ;' 
 
 we see that here the followers of the Nyaya and 
 Vaiseshika systems, though they hold to the false 
 belief that the Self can be an agent, are not treated 
 as totally in error, but only as not knowing the 
 whole truth, if compared with the Samkhyas, who 
 know the whole truth. Even such knowledge as
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 593 
 
 they possess, leads step by step by means of the 
 lower impassiveness (Apara-vairagya) to liberation ; 
 while the knowledge of the Samkhyas only, as com- 
 pared with the lower knowledge, is absolute know- 
 ledge, and leads by means of higher impassiveness 
 (Paravairagya) straight to liberation. For it follows 
 from the words quoted from the Bhagavad-gita that 
 he only who knows that the Self is never an agent, 
 can arrive at the whole truth, and from hundreds of 
 true Vedic texts, such as BHh. Ar. Up. IV, 3, 22 : 
 ' Then he has overcome all the sorrows of the heart' ; 
 thinking that desires, &c., belong to the internal 
 organ (Manas) only ; or Bn'h. Ar. Up. IV, 3, 7 : 
 ' He, remaining the same (the Self), wanders 
 through both worlds, as if thinking, and as if 
 moving (but not really) ' ; or Bri'h. Ar. Up. IV, 3, 
 1 6 : ' And whatever he may have seen there he is 
 not followed (affected) by it ' ; and likewise from 
 hundreds of similar passages in the Smrtti, such 
 as Bhag. Ill, 27:' All works are performed by the 
 constituents of matter (the Gunas of Prakriti) ; he 
 only who is deceived by Ahamkara or subjectivation 
 imagines that he is the agent ' ; and such as V. P. 
 VI, 7, 22 : 'The Self consists of bliss (Nirvana) and 
 knowledge only, and is not contaminated (by the 
 Gunas). The qualities (Gunas) are full of suffering, 
 not of knowledge, and they belong to PrakHti, not 
 to the Self from all such passages we say that it 
 is clear that the knowledge proclaimed by Nyaya 
 and Vaiseshika with regard to the highest subject 
 is overcome. 
 
 By this, however, we do not mean to say that 
 Nyaya and Vaiseshika are not means of right 
 knowledge, for their teaching is not superseded by 
 
 Q q
 
 594 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Sawkhya so far as regards that portion which 
 treats of the difference between Self and the mate- 
 rial body. Here we must follow the principle (laid 
 down in the Purva-Mimamsa), that what a word 
 (chiefly) aims at, that is its meaning ; (and apply 
 it to the systems of philosophy). The Nyaya simply 
 repeats the popular idea that joy pertains to the 
 Self, without referring to any further proofs ; and 
 this chapter therefore is not to be considered 
 as really essential (or as what the Nyaya chiefly 
 aims at). 
 
 But admitting that there is here no difference be- 
 tween Nyaya- Vaiseshika and the Samkhya systems, 
 is there not a clear contradiction between the Sam- 
 khya on one side and the Brahma-Mimams& (Ve- 
 danta) and the Yoga on the other ? The former 
 denies the existence of an eternal Isvara, the two 
 others maintain it. Surely it cannot be said that 
 here also the contradiction between these systems, 
 the atheistic and theistic, can be removed by simply 
 admitting, as before, two points of view, the meta- 
 physical and the empirical, as if the theistic doctrine 
 existed only for the sake of the worship of the multi- 
 tude. Such a decision would here be impossible. 
 The atheistic view that an Isvara is difficult to know 
 and therefore non-existent, may well have been 
 merely repeated by the Samkhyas, as a popular 
 idea, and in order to put an end to the desire of 
 men for acquiring a divine status and divine honours 
 (by means of penance, &c.), as in the case of the 
 Naiyayikas when they say that the Self possesses 
 qualities (which must be taken as merely a pro- 
 visional remark). In the Veda or elsewhere l.svara, 
 the anthropomorphic deity, is never explicitly denied,
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 595 
 
 so that one could say that theism should be taken 
 as the common popular view only. 
 
 In spite of all this we hold that here too these 
 different views are really due to empirical or to 
 metaphysical conceptions. 
 
 For as works like the Bhagavad-gita (XVI, 8) 
 when saying: 
 
 ' Those say that the world is unreal, without 
 
 support, without an Isvara,' 
 
 condemn the atheistic doctrine, we may very well 
 suppose that the Samkhyas simply repeated a 
 common popular view that there is no Isvara, in 
 order to discourage the striving after a divine status 
 (so common among Saints), or for some similar pur- 
 pose. They would naturally think that if they, so 
 far following the materialists, did not deny the ex- 
 istence of an active Isvara, the acquisition of the 
 discriminating knowledge (of the Samkhyas, between 
 Prakriti and Purusha) would be impeded, because 
 those who believe in an infinite, eternal and perfect 
 Isvara, have their thoughts entirely absorbed by 
 this Isvara (so that they might not attend to the 
 essential doctrine of the Samkhyas). No attack is 
 made anywhere on theism, so that the theistic doc- 
 trine of the Vedanta should be restricted to sacri- 
 ficial and similar purposes only. But from passages 
 like Mahabh. XII, 1167: ' No knowledge is equal to 
 that of the Samkhya, no power to that of the Yoga,' 
 and again XII, 1 1 198 : ' Let there be no doubt, the 
 knowledge of the Samkhya is considered the highest,' 
 we should learn the excellence of the Samkhya know- 
 ledge as superior to other systems, though only with 
 regard to that portion which treats of the distinction 
 of Self and PrakHti, and not with regard to the 
 
 Q q 2
 
 596 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 portion that objects to an Lsvara. Furthermore from 
 the consensus of Parasara also and all other eminent 
 authorities, we see that theism alone is absolutely 
 true. And from Parasara's Upa-pura/?a and similar 
 works the truth of the Brahma-Mimamsa in its 
 chapter on the isvara is perfectly manifest. There 
 we read : 
 
 ' In the systems of Akshapada and Kawada (Nyaya 
 and Vaiseshika), in the Samkhya and in the Yoga, 
 whatever portion is in conflict with the Veda, that 
 has to be rejected by all to whom the Veda is the 
 only law/ 
 
 ' In the systems of (raimini and Vyasa (in the 
 Purva and Uttara-Mimamsa) there is nothing in 
 conflict with the Veda ; for these two in their know- 
 ledge of the meaning of the Veda have by means of 
 the Veda fully mastered the Veda.' 
 
 From other passages also the superior authority 
 of the Brahma-MimamSca may be gathered, at least 
 with regard to that portion which treats of Isvara. 
 Thus we read in Mahabh. XII, 7663 seq. : 
 
 ' Manifold philosophical doctrines have been pro- 
 pounded by various teachers ; but cling to that only 
 which has been settled by arguments, by the Veda, 
 and by the practice of good people.' 
 
 From this passage of the Mokshadharma also 
 (XII, 7663), and on account of the practice of 
 Para-s-ara and all eminent authorities, it follows that 
 the proof of the existence of an Tsvara, as proclaimed 
 by the Brahma-Mimamsa, the Nyaya, Vaixeshika and 
 other systems, is to be accepted as the strongest ; 
 and likewise because by passages in the Kurma and 
 other Pura^as the ignorance of the Sawkhyas with 
 regard to an Isvara has been clearly pronounced by
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 597 
 
 Narayana and others ; e. g. ' Take thy refuge with 
 the beginningless and endless Brahman, whom the 
 Samkhyas, though strong as Yogins, are unable to 
 perceive.' 
 
 Besides, that Isvara alone is the principal object 
 of the Brahma-Mimamsa is proved by the very first 
 words and by other indications. If then it had been 
 refuted on that principal point, the whole philosophy 
 (the Brahma-Mimamsa) would no longer be a means 
 of right knowledge, according to the principle, men- 
 tioned before, that what a word chiefly aims at, that 
 is its meaning. The chief aim of the Sawkhya, on 
 the contrary, is not the denial of an Isvara, but the 
 highest object to be obtained by the Self by means 
 of the discrimination between body and Self which 
 leads to it. Hence, though it be superseded in that 
 part which treats of the denial of the Isvara, it will 
 remain as a means of right knowledge, and this once 
 more according to the principle that what a word 
 chiefly aims at, that is its purport. The Samkhya 
 has therefore its proper sphere, and is vulnerable in 
 that part only which treats of the denial of the 
 Isvara, the personal and active god. 
 
 Nor would it be right to say that in the Brahma- 
 Mimamsa Isvara may indeed be the principal object, 
 but not its eternal lordship or godhead. For, as 
 the objection raised in the Purvapaksha as to its 
 (the Mimamsa's) allowing no weight to the other 
 Smritis cannot be sustained, it is clear that Isvara 
 can only be the object of the Brahma-Mimamsa, pro- 
 vided he is characterised by eternal lordship. 
 
 If it is said that the first Sutra of the Brahma- 
 Mimamsa does not say ' Now then a wish to know 
 the highest Brahman/ and that therefore it does
 
 598 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not by the word Brahman mean the Parabrahman, 
 we must not on account of the Sarakhya denial of 
 an Isvara suppose that the Vedanta and Yoga 
 systems likewise refer only to an evolved Isvara (a 
 Karyesvara, a product of Prakrfti), for in that case 
 the whole string of Sutras from II, 2, i, directed 
 against the Samkhya and showing that mindless 
 matter, being incapable of creating, cannot be 
 established by mere reasoning, would be absurd ; 
 for if the God of the Vedanta were a made God, 
 or a product of matter, the Samkhyas would have 
 been right in teaching an independent matter 
 (Prakriti). Lastly, the eternal character of Isvara 
 is quite clear from such Yoga-Sutras as I, 26, ' He 
 (God) is the Guru even of the oldest sages, because 
 he is not limited by time,' and likewise from 
 Vyasa's commentary on that Sutra. It is clear 
 therefore that as the Sa?7ikhya means to deny the 
 common popular anthropomorphic view of Isvara 
 only, whether as a concession, or as a bold assertion, 
 or, for some other reason, there exists no real con- 
 tradiction between it, and the Brahma-Mimawisa, 
 and the Yoga. 
 
 Such concessions are found in other authoritative 
 works also, as, for instance, in the Vish/m-Purana, 
 I, 17, 83:- 
 
 ' O Daitya, these various opinions have I declared 
 for those who admit a difference (who are not yet 
 monists), by making a concession (to dualism). Let 
 this abstract of mine be listened to.' 
 
 Nay it is possible that in some accredited systems 
 also opinions should have been put forward in 
 contradiction with the Veda in order to shut out 
 bad men from a knowledge of the truth. Such
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 599 
 
 parts would of course not be means of right know- 
 ledge, but the other and principal parts only, which 
 are in harmony with $ruti and Snm'ti. Hence we 
 see that in the Padma-Purana fault is found with 
 all systems except the Brahma-Mima???si and Yoga. 
 Here we see God ($iva) saying to Parvati : 
 
 ' Listen, goddess, I shall in succession tell you 
 the heretical theories by the mere hearing of which 
 even sages lose their knowledge. 
 
 First of all, I myself have taught the $aiva, 
 Pasupata and other systems, and afterwards others 
 have been promulgated by Brahmans, who were 
 filled by my powers. Kanada has promulgated the 
 great Vaiseshika doctrine, Gautama the Nyaya, 
 Kapila the Samkhya. The Brahman 6raimini has 
 composed a very large work of atheistic character, 
 the first of the two Mimamsas, which treat of the 
 meaning of the Veda. Then, in order to destroy 
 the demons, Dhishawa (Bn'haspati) propounded the 
 altogether despicable TTarvaka system ; and Vishmi, 
 under the disguise of Buddha, propounded the er- 
 roneous Bauddha system which teaches that people 
 are to go naked, and should wear blue or other 
 coloured garments, while I myself, O goddess, under 
 the disguise of a Brahman (i.e. of $amkara) have 
 taught in this Kali age the doctrine of illusion 
 (Maya) which is false and only a disguised Bud- 
 dhism. It is spread far and wide in the world, and 
 attributes a false meaning to the words of the 
 Veda. In it it is said that all works should be 
 relinquished, and after surrendering all works, com- 
 plete inactivity is recommended. 
 
 I have taught in it the identity of the highest 
 Self and the individual Self, and have represented
 
 600 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the highest form of Brahman as entirely free from 
 qualities ; and this in order to destroy the whole 
 world in this Kali age. This extensive, non-Vedic, 
 deceptive doctrine has been propounded by me, as 
 if it presented the true meaning of the Veda, in 
 order that all living things might perish.' 
 
 All this and more has been explained by me in 
 the commentary on the Brahma-Mima/msa, and it is 
 wrong therefore to say of any of the admittedly 
 orthodox systems of philosophy that it is not the 
 means of right knowledge or that it is refuted by 
 others. For in reality none of them is contradicted 
 or refuted in what constitutes its own chief object. 
 
 But, if it be asked whether the Sa?wkhya-philo- 
 sophy has not likewise made a mere concession 
 with regard to the multiplicity of souls, we answer 
 decidedly, No. For on that point there is really 
 no contradiction (between the two, Samkhya and 
 Vedanta) because it is shown in the chapter which 
 begins at Brahma-Sutras II, 3, 43, and declares that 
 the individual self is a part of the Highest Self, be- 
 cause the multiplicity is stated (in the Veda) ; that 
 the Brahma-Mirna?^sa also recognises a multiplicity of 
 Atman. But that the individual souls, as conceived 
 by the Sa???khya, are Atman is certainly denied by 
 the Vedauta, for it follows from Sutra IV, 1,3: 
 ' They know him and teach him as Atman,' that to 
 the Vedantins, from the standpoint of absolute truth, 
 the highest soul only is Atman. Nevertheless the 
 Samkhya does not thereby lose its authoritative char- 
 acter, because, it is not superseded by the Vedanta 
 in what constitutes its own characteristic doctrine, 
 namely that for the individual soul, the knowledge 
 of its being different from everything else, constitutes
 
 THE SIX SYSTEMS. 6oi 
 
 the true means of liberation. There is no contradic- 
 tion therefore, because the concepts of the manifold 
 Atman and of the one Atman, so well known from 
 Veda and tradition, can be fully reconciled according 
 as we take an empirical or metaphysical view, as has 
 been explained by ourselves in the Commentary on 
 the Brahma-Mimamsa Sapienti sat." 
 
 I have given here this long extract from Vigwana- 
 Bhikshu, though I have to confess that in several 
 places the thread of the argument is difficult to 
 follow, even after the care bestowed on disentangling 
 it by Professor Garbe. Still, even as it is, it will 
 be useful, I hope, as a good specimen of the Indian 
 way of carrying on a philosophical controversy. Nay, 
 in spite of all that has been said against Vi^fiana- 
 Bhikshu, I cannot deny that to a certain extent 
 he seems to me right in discerning a kind of unity 
 behind the variety of the various - philosophical 
 systems, each being regarded as a step towards 
 the highest and final truth. He certainly helps 
 us to understand how it came to pass that the 
 followers of systems which to our mind seem directly 
 opposed to each other on very important points, 
 managed to keep peace with each other and with 
 the Veda, the highest authority in all matters 
 religious, philosophical and moral. The idea that 
 the largely accepted interpretation of the Vedanta- 
 Sutras by $amkara was a perversion of the Veda 
 and of Badarayana's Sutras, not much better than 
 Buddhism, nay that Buddhism was the work of 
 Vishwu, intended for the destruction of unbelievers, 
 is very extraordinary, and evidently of late origin. 
 Nay, nothing seems to me to show better that these 
 Pura^as, in the form in which we possess them, are
 
 602 INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of recent origin, and certainly not the outcome of 
 a period previous to the Renaissance of Sanskrit 
 literature, than passages like those quoted by Vi#- 
 rlana-Bhikshu, representing the gods of the modern 
 Hindu pantheon as interfering with the ancient 
 philosophy of India, and propounding views which 
 they know to be erroneous with the intention of 
 deceiving mankind. Whatever the age of our philo- 
 sophical Sutras may be, and some of them, in the 
 form in which we possess them, are certainly more 
 modern than our Puranas, yet the tradition or Pa- 
 rampara which they represent must be much older ; 
 and in trying to enter into the spirit of the Six 
 Systems, we must implicitly trust to their guidance, 
 without allowing ourselves to be disturbed by the 
 fancies of later sects.
 
 INDKX. 
 
 ABDAYASES, nephew of K. Gon- 
 daphores, found on Indo- Par- 
 thian coins, 83. 
 
 Abhassara, spirits, 23. 
 
 Abhava, 587. 
 
 not-being, 266, 518. 
 Abhibuddhis, the five, 348. 
 Absorption, no part of the Yoga 
 
 system, 405. 
 Actions, 579. 
 Adhibhautika, pain from other 
 
 living beings, 360. 
 Adhidaivika, pain from divine 
 
 agents, 360. 
 Adhikara-vidhis, 262. 
 Adhyatma, Adhibhuta, and Adhi- 
 
 daivata, 346. 
 Adhyatmika, pain from the body, 
 
 360. 
 
 Adhyavasaya, determination, 227. 
 Adi-purusha, the First Self, 431. 
 
 a first Purusha, 434. 
 
 Aditi, identified with sky and air, 
 
 the gods, &c., 52. 
 Adityas, seven in number, 50. 
 
 later raised to twelve, 51. 
 Adnshte or Apurva, 364. 
 
 Agra, doubtful meaning of, 103. 
 
 Agama,^used by Patangrali instead 
 of Aptava/rana, 442. 
 
 Agatasatru and Balaki, 18, 35. 
 
 Agratasatru, K. of Kasi, son of Vai- 
 dehi, 31. 
 
 Aghora, not terrible, 329. 
 
 Agrita Kesakambali, teacher men- 
 tioned in Buddhist annals, 1 1 7. 
 
 A.5rivaka,Go.sali, originally an, 117. 
 
 Afirivakos, 315. 
 
 A<;/7anavada, Agnosticism, 25. 
 
 Agni as Indra and Savitri, 52. 
 
 Ahawtkara, subjectivation, 326, 328, 
 382. 
 
 a cosmic power, 327. 
 
 modifications of the, 327. 
 
 Ahawzkara, mental act, 327. 
 
 of three kinds, 346. 
 
 the cause of creation, 371. 
 
 personal feelings, 558. 
 Aisvaryas, or superhuman powers, 
 
 296. 
 
 Aitihya, tradition, 518, 562. 
 Akasa, fifth element, vehicle of 
 
 sound, 523, 582. 
 Akhyayikas, or stories, 294, 319. 
 
 absent in the Tattva-samasa and 
 
 the Karikas, 319. 
 
 reappear in the Sawkhya-Sutras, 
 
 3!9- 
 
 A/cit, matter, 246. 
 Akn'tis, species, 331. 
 Aksha, organ, 33 1 . 
 Akshapada and Kanada, 596. 
 Alara Kalama, 26. 
 Alberuni, 290-1. 
 Alexander and Indian philosophy, 
 
 55- 
 
 Alexandria, known as Alasando, 
 saec. Ill, 83. 
 
 Brahmans did not borrow ideas 
 
 from, 196. 
 
 did Brahmans come to ? 523. 
 
 Logos-idea, no antecedents of it 
 
 in Greek philosophy, 74. 
 Aliwga, i.e. Prakriti, 447 n. 
 American Indians, their sweating 
 
 processes, 409. 
 AmurfAa, not stupid, 329. 
 Ananda, or bliss in the highest 
 
 Brahman, 487. 
 Anarabhyadhita, 263. 
 Anathapindika, 33. 
 Aniruddha, 246. 
 
 Ann'ta, unreal written letters, 121. 
 Antanantikas, 24. 
 Anugraha-sarga, 356. 
 Anumana, or inference, 189. 
 
 applied by Badarayawa to Smriti, 
 
 tradition, 193.
 
 604 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Anumana, for others, 565. 
 Anus, or atoms, 558, 577, 584. 
 Anusaya, Anlage, 232. 
 Anusravika, revealed, 444. 
 Anuttamambhasika, 352. 
 Anvaya-vyatireki, 571. 
 Anvikshiki, old name of philosophy, 
 99. 
 
 bifurcation of the old system of, 
 
 475- 
 
 Anyatva, 355. 
 
 Apara, lower knowledge, 215. 
 
 Apara-vairagya, lower impassive- 
 ness, 593. 
 
 Apaurusheyatva, non-human origin 
 of the Vedas, 271. 
 
 Apavarga, or final beatitude, 503, 
 
 55 2 - 
 
 bliss of the Nyaya, 488. 
 Apotheosis, 366. 
 Application, Upanaya, 566. 
 Apramoda, 353. 
 Apramodamaiia, 353. 
 Apramudita, 353. 
 Aprasuta, not produced. 322. 
 Apratiyogitva, 572. 
 
 Apta, not to be translated by aphis, 
 
 191. 
 
 Aptavafcana, the true word, 305. 
 Apta-vafcana, 359. 
 Aptopadesa = AptavaArana, 190. 
 Apurva-pririciple, 276. 
 
 miraculous, 276. 
 
 Ararfa, teacher of Sawkhya-philo- 
 
 sophy, 311, 312. 
 Arambha-vada, theory of atomic 
 
 agglomeration, 106. 
 Aranyakas, distinction of parts of, 
 
 into Upanishads and Vedantas, 
 
 1 1 1. 
 
 Arasya, 353. 
 Arfra&, the, 157. 
 Artabhaga, 15. 
 
 Arthn, objects of the senses, 214. 
 Arthapatti, assumption, 518. 
 Arthavadas, glosses, 274. 
 A.sakti, weakness, 351. 
 A.santa, not-pleasurable, 329. 
 Asat-karyavada, peculiar to Nyaya 
 
 and Vaiseshika, 2o<S. 
 Asatpramuditam, 353. 
 A.saya, Anlage, 419. 
 Asiddhis and Siddhis, 352. 
 Asmarathya, referred to by Bilda- 
 
 rayana, 1 1 9. 
 Asmita, different from Ahamkara, 
 
 44911. 
 
 Asoka, King, 263 B.C., 34. 
 Asrama, not found in tlie classical 
 
 Upanisbads, 310. 
 Asramas of the Buddhists, only 
 
 two, Grihins and Bhikkhus, 
 
 3io. 
 
 Asramas, stations in life, 133. 
 .Asramin in the Maitray. Up., 310. 
 Assertion, Pratigr/ia, 566. 
 Astitva, reality. 355. 
 Asumarifrika, 352. 
 Asunetra, 352. 
 Asupara, 352. 
 Asura, name given to Tvashtrf, and 
 
 to his son Visvarupa, 58. 
 Asuri, 386. 
 Asutara, 352. 
 Asvaghosha's Buddha-fcarita, first 
 
 cent. A. D., 31 1. 
 Asvala, 15. 
 
 Asvalayana Gn'hya-Sutras, 313. 
 Asvapati Kaikeya, 19. 
 Atara. 352. 
 Ataratara, 353. 
 Atheism of Purva-Mimawsa, the 
 
 supposed, 275. 
 
 of Kapila, 395. 
 
 attributed to the Vaiseshika and 
 
 Nyaya and Purva-Mimamsa, 
 428. 
 
 Ativahika-sarira formed of eighteen 
 elements, 395. 
 
 Atma-anatma-viveka, 374. 
 
 Atmadarsanayogyata,ntness for be- 
 holding tlie Self, 468. 
 
 Atman, taught by Kshatriyas, 19. 
 
 ' in every created thing,' 93. 
 
 etymology of, 94. 
 
 = breath in Veda, the life, soul. 
 
 94- 
 
 the name of the highest person, 
 
 95- 
 
 and Purusha, 374. 
 not cognitive, 432. 
 
 Atom, invisible, sixth part of a 
 
 mote. 585. 
 Atoms, Greek origin of, theory of, 
 
 584. 
 Atreya, referred to by Badarayana, 
 
 119. 
 
 Atushd and Tush/i, 352. 
 Atyantabhava, 57.'. 
 Au</ulomi, referred to by Badara- 
 
 yawa, 1 19. 
 Avapa, 265. 
 Avayavas, or Premisses, i. o. the 
 
 members of a syllogism, 500, 
 
 504. 
 
 Avidya, history of, 211. 
 - changed t<> a .S'akti or potenlia 
 
 f Brahman, 221. 
 
 not to be acconntoil for, 225. 
 
 applied to Kant's intuitions of 
 
 sense and his categories, 226. 
 
 and Mithytu/Sana, 243.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 605 
 
 Avidya, Nescience, 351, 373. 
 
 an actual power, Sakti, 368. 
 
 origin of, 378. 
 
 Avijra, not having a seed, 448. 
 Avinabhava, Not-without-being. 
 
 493- 
 
 Aviruddhakos, 315. 
 Avisesha, subtle elements, 447 n. 
 Aviveka, 373. 
 
 Avividisha, carelessness, 348, 349. 
 Avrtshri, 352. 
 Avyakta, 247. 
 
 producing, Prasuta, 322. 
 
 doubtful meaning of, 103. 
 
 chaos, 321. 
 
 Awake, state of being, 229. 
 Ayur-veda, 541. 
 
 BABARA PRAVAHAAT:, signi- 
 
 ficative name, 273. 
 Babylonian hymns, more modern 
 
 in thought than those of Rig- 
 
 veda, 45. 
 Badarayana, author of one of the 
 
 Mimawsas, in, 153, 167. 
 
 referred to by, 119. 
 
 identified with Vyasa, 148. 
 
 quotes Gnimini, 259. 
 
 Badari. referred to by Badarayana, 
 
 119. 
 
 Bahutva, 355. 
 
 Bawa knows Kapilas, Kanadas, 316. 
 Bawa's Harsha/carita, 600 A. D., 316. 
 Bandha, bondage, 357. 
 Bandhas, or bindings. 457. 
 Bante, Buddhist title. 21. 
 Barhaspatya, studied by Buddha, 
 
 127. 
 Bathing, (graduating) the pupil, 
 
 269. 
 
 Berkeley, 254. 
 Bhadrasana, 457. 
 Bhagavatas, followers of Krishna, 
 
 41. 
 Bhartn'hari, date of death, 650 A.D., 
 
 118, 444, 531. 
 
 refers to the Darsanas, 1 1 8. 
 Bhatfa, 529. 
 
 Bhava, the real world, the cause 
 
 of Samadhi, 450. 
 Bhikkhu, name of, 309. 
 Bhikshafcarya, or begging, 309. 
 Bhikshafcarya and Bhaikshafcarya, 
 
 39> 3 10 - 
 Bhikshu-Sutras, loss of, referred to 
 
 by BhaskaraA'arya. 113. 
 -- Parasarya, the author, 127. 
 -- same as Vedanta-Sutras, 154. 
 Bhikshus, mendicants, 32, 41. 
 Bhuta-sarga, 356. 
 Bhutadi. 327, 328. 
 
 Bhutatman, elementary Atman, 
 
 341- 
 
 Bimbisara, 21, 35. 
 Boar legend that it brought forth 
 
 the earth, allusions in Brah- 
 
 mawas, 96. 
 Bodda, name found among followers 
 
 of Mani, 84. 
 Boddo (on coins), name of Buddha, 
 
 36. 
 
 Bodhayana, 153, 301. 
 Body, a subtle and a gross, 393. 
 
 Sarira, 545. 
 
 is it the same as Atman, 545. 
 Brahma, creator, with Buddhists, 
 24. 
 
 called Vasudeva, 246. 
 Brahmadatta, 22. 
 Brahma-grala-sutta, 21. 
 Brahman, various meanings, 68. 
 
 identified with speech, 85. 
 
 is the sun, 185. 
 
 is Manas, 185. 
 
 is food, 185. 
 
 is Vifirfiana, 185. 
 
 as the Word, the first creation 
 
 of divine thought, 190. 196, 197, 
 520. 
 
 or Vafc or Bn'h, eternal, 197. 
 
 is everything, 226. 
 
 as the Kantian Ding an sich, 
 
 226. 
 
 is the world, 367. 
 
 may become to us Brahma, 368. 
 of the Vedanta, 374. 
 
 is Anirva/caniya. undefinable, 378. 
 
 Brahmawa, a social title, 22. 
 
 Brahmawas consist of Vidhis, in- 
 junctions and Arthavadas, 
 glosses, 262. 
 
 Brahmans, two, Saguna and Nir- 
 
 guna, 220. 
 Bn'h, parallel form of Vn'dh, 71. 
 
 = to grow, c. p. Latin verbum 
 
 and German wort, 72. 
 
 speech, 520. 
 
 Bn'haspati, synonymous with VaA-as- 
 pati, lord of speech, 71. 
 
 Sutras, lost, 113. 
 
 philosophy, 123. 
 
 Laukya, 124. 
 
 Arigirasa, 124, 125. 
 Budh, means to awake, 371. 
 Buddha, a Kshatriya, 14. 
 
 guru, identified with Pythagoras, 
 
 79- 
 
 works studied by, 127. 
 
 did not borrow from Kapila, 1 36. 
 
 subjects known to, 151. 
 
 borrowed from Kapila no evi- 
 
 dence that, or vice versa, 389.
 
 6o6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Buddha, later than the classical 
 Upanishads, 411. 
 
 declared against Yoga tortures, 
 
 4i3- 
 Buddha's mother, name of. 122. 
 
 denial of an Atman or Brahman, 
 
 414. 
 Buddhi, intellect, 322, 502. 
 
 or Mahat, in a cosmic sense, 
 
 323. 
 
 the lighting up of Prakriti, 370. 
 
 of Nyaya different from that of 
 
 the Samkhyas, 548. 
 
 Buddhindriyas, five, 330. 
 
 Buddhism, subsequent to Upani- 
 shads, 309. 
 
 in Tibet, eighth century A. D., 
 
 576. 
 Buddhist-Suttas, reduced to writing 
 
 in the first century B.C., 312. 
 Buddhists support Asatkaryavada, 
 
 208. 
 
 derive the real from the unreal, 
 
 397- 
 
 paid little attention to the two 
 
 Mimamsas, 478. 
 
 deny present time, 515. 
 
 Butta (first Greek mention of 
 Buddha by Clement of Alexan- 
 dria^, 36. 
 
 CALF, the new-born year, 67. 
 Case, five members of a (Adhi- 
 
 kararta), 267. 
 Caste, Portug. casta, n. 
 Castes, origin of, in India, 12. 
 Categories of the Nyaya, 577. 
 Causal state of Brahman, 247. 
 Cause and effect, Vedantist theory 
 
 of, 203. 
 with them are the same thing, 
 
 seen from different points, 203. 
 Causes, are intimate, non-intimate, 
 
 and instrumental, 580. 
 Chronology of thought, 158. 
 Cleanthes and Boethius, 422. 
 Clement of Alexandria, 36. 
 
 knows name of Butta, 81. 
 
 Coining money. So. 
 Colebrooke on the Guwas, 344. 
 Comparison. Upamana, R.OO. 
 Conclusion, Nigamana, 566. 
 Conditions, Upadhis, of forming 
 
 a Vyapti, or universal rule, 
 
 57p- 
 
 Con-scientia. Saw-vid, 470. 
 Consideration, Paramar.sa, 563. 
 Creation, or causation, 203. 
 
 the result of Nescience, 203. 
 
 proceeds from Brahman, 206. 
 
 caused by Maya or AvidyA, 251. 
 
 Cripple who could not walk, and 
 cripple who could not see, 396. 
 
 DAKSHA, force, one meaning of 
 
 Brahman, 92. 
 Dakshina-bandha, bondage, 306. 
 
 gifts to priests. 357. 
 Damascius says Brahmans lived at 
 
 Alexandria saec. V, 81. 
 
 Dandasana, 457. 
 
 Darsanas, or systems, the six all 
 orthodox, 377. 
 
 Death, state of, 229. 
 
 Deity, existence of a, 553. 
 
 Deussen, Professor, theory of evo- 
 lution of Word and Brahman, 
 92. 
 
 Deva, supreme, never asserted by 
 Kapila, 396. 
 
 Devadhammikos, 315. 
 
 worshippers of the Devas, 316. 
 
 Devas, thirty-three in number, ac- 
 cording to Rig-veda and A vesta, 
 difficulty of filling up this 
 number, 50. 
 
 Devayana, path of the gods, 231. 
 Devotion to the Lord, one of many 
 
 expedients, 418. 
 Dharma, duty, 261. 
 Dharmakirtti, seventh century, 478, 
 
 479> 57 6 - 
 
 Dharmamegha, cloud of virtue, 471. 
 
 Dharmarakshita, a sage, 576. 
 
 Dharmottara, ninth century, de- 
 fended Dharmakirtti, 479. 
 
 Dhatri, maker, name given to the 
 one god, 62. 
 
 Dhishawa (Brzhaspati), 599. 
 
 Dlm'ti, energy, 348. 
 
 Dhyanas (GMna\ four, 26. 
 
 Dignaga, the logician, 476, 477. 
 
 Digniiga's writings lost, 479 n. 
 
 Nyaya-samufrA-aya, a Tibetan 
 translation of, 479 n. 
 
 Dipawtkara Sriflnana, 576. 
 
 Distinction of good and evil, 236. 
 
 Diviikara, a sage, 600 A. D., 40. 
 
 Divine thinker, every word an act 
 of a, 196. 
 
 Divyadasa Datta, living Vedantist, 
 203, 216. 
 
 Dosha, faults, 552. 
 
 Dreaming, state of, 229. 
 
 Drishfcim. what is seen, 359. 
 
 Drtshfcinta, example, 504. 
 
 Drumstick and drum together con- 
 vey, even to the deaf, the idea 
 of sound, 498. 
 
 Dual gods, two or three gods work- 
 ing together, tendency towards 
 unity among the gods, 52.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 607 
 
 Duftkha, pain, 552. 
 Duftkhanta, or Nirvana, 142. 
 
 EFFECT, an, only a new manifesta- 
 tion, dogma characteristic of 
 the Sawkhya, 208. 
 
 Ekagrata, concentration, 468. 
 
 Emancipation, Apavarga, 557. 
 
 Eschatology, 229. 
 
 Esse is percipi or percipere, 382. 
 
 Eternal punishment, 362. 
 
 Evolution, Pariwama, 367. 
 
 of works, the independent, 434. 
 Exercises, Abhyasa, 443. 
 Exposition, five-membered form of, 
 
 566. 
 
 FABLES in the Sutras, 399. 
 Fa-hian visits India, 399-414 A.D., 
 
 36. 
 
 Fancy chiefly due to words. 442. 
 Fetishism or Totemism, did they 
 
 precede the Aryan theogony ? 
 
 48. 
 Fifth element, called d/caT-oi/ojuaroi', 
 
 506. 
 First and last inference, Vita, or 
 
 straightforward, 500 
 Fivefold division of the vital spirit, 
 
 228. 
 Four or five elements, the, 131. 
 
 states, the, 229. 
 
 Pramawas, according to Gotama, 
 
 490. 
 Freedom from passions, Yairagya, 
 
 443- 
 
 or beatitude depends on philo- 
 
 sophy, 512. 
 Frog-wife, the, 401. 
 
 GAIMINI, author of one of the 
 MimarMsas, 1 1 1 . 
 
 referred to by Badarayawa, ny. 
 
 his work atheistic, 599. 
 
 and Vyasa, 596. 
 
 Sutras, contents of, 263. 
 Gaina literature, 574. 
 Gainas, in white robes, 41. 
 Galpa, sophistical wrangling, 509. 
 Gamgesa Upadhyaya, fourteenth 
 
 century, 479. 
 Gamaka, king of Mithila, the Vide- 
 
 ha, 14, 16, 34. 
 
 Ganganatha Jha, of Bombay, 416. 
 Gargi Vafcaknavi, 15. 
 Gati, kith and caste, 13. 
 - birth or genus, a transitio in 
 
 cdterum genus, 510. 
 
 futility, 509-510. 
 Gatilakos, 315. 
 Gauc&ipada, date of, 292. 
 
 Gauri-Samkar, Mount, 241. 
 
 Ghora, fearful, 331. 
 
 Ginabhadra, eighth century, 574. 
 
 Givanmukti, 236. 
 
 Gnanayoga, 407. 
 
 G/iatiputra, teacher mentioned in 
 
 Buddhist annals, the Nirgran- 
 
 tha, founder of Gainism, 1 1 7. 
 Gnomina, nomina, 492. 
 God in the beginning created 
 
 names and forms of things, 
 
 522. 
 Gods of the Veclic people, the 
 
 agents postulated behind the 
 
 great phenomena of nature, 47. 
 Gondaphoros, king, authenticated 
 
 as Gondophares, 83. 
 GSrres on Sk. terms retained by the 
 
 Greeks, 506. 
 
 Gosha-Samgha, from Bactria, 577. 
 Gosaliputra, teacher mentioned in 
 
 Buddhist Annals, 117. 
 Gotama, philosophy of Kawada. 
 
 philosophy of, 105. 
 Gotamakos, 315. 
 Greek accounts of India, 34. 
 Guwas, constituents of nature, 146. 
 
 the three, 146, 282, 334, 335, 344, 
 
 468. 
 
 as Dravyani, matter, 345. 
 
 equilibrium of the three, 345. 
 
 of Prakriti, 445. 
 
 not qualities, but substantial. 
 
 468. 
 Gyotishtoma sacrifice, 274- 
 
 HAMMER OF FOLLY, Mohamud- 
 
 Haribhadra, his Sha/darsana-sam- 
 ufcfcaya-sutram, 575. 
 
 died, 528 A.D., 575. 
 Harihara, 336, 410. 
 Harsha, King, 600 A. D., 36. 
 
 history of, by Bawa, 40. 
 
 court of, 478. 
 
 HaMa, or Kriya-yoga, 451, 453. 
 Head, forfeited in disputations, 17. 
 Heart, seat of consciousness, 467. 
 Hegel's thesis, antithesis, and syn- 
 
 thesis, 345. 
 Henotheism = phase in which God 
 
 is addressed as if the only god 
 
 in existence, with forgetfulness 
 
 of all others, 53. 
 Herbart's Selbsterhaltung des Realm. 
 
 209. 
 
 philosophy, 228. 
 Hetvabhasas, specious arguments, 
 
 four kinds, 509. 
 
 Hiouen-thsang, Buddhist pilgrim, 
 visits India, 629-645 A. D., 36.
 
 6o8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Hiouen-thsang, did not translate 
 
 the Vaiseshika-Sutras by Ka- 
 
 nada, 317. 
 
 Hirawyagarbha, 336, 410. 
 Holenmerian theory of Plotinus 
 
 and Henry More, 227. 
 Homoiousia, 421. 
 Human souls reborn in animal and 
 
 vegetable bodies (in Upani- 
 
 shads), 137. 
 
 Hume's view of causality, 208. 
 Hyades, stars marking time of rain, 
 
 49- 
 
 Hylobioi, forest-dwellers, 35. 
 Hymn to the Unknown God, 60. 
 Hymns, adaptations of, 264. 
 Hypnotic states, how produced, 465. 
 Hypnotism, 458. 
 
 ICHNEUMON AND SNAKE, 498. 
 Idealism, is Samkhya ? 384. 
 Identity, Sabhavyam, 232. 
 Idolatry, a necessity of our nature, 
 
 216. 
 
 Ignorance, or Mithyagmana, 512. 
 Immortality of the soul, 138. 
 India, a nation of philosophers, 9. 
 
 early philosophers in, 10. 
 Indian coinage, 80. 
 
 leaven in our thoughts, 255. 
 
 philosophy, books on, 481-483. 
 Individual soul is Brahman, not 
 
 vice versa, 102. 
 Indra, the miner, 46. 
 Indriyajraya, subjugation of senses, 
 
 468. 
 Indriyas, five senses, 213. 
 
 sense, 227. 
 Indu, the rain, 46. 
 Inference, Anumana, 496. 
 
 three kinds of, 497, 500. 
 
 Snrn'ti, 52 1. 
 Instance. Udaharana, 566. 
 Inward-turned thought, Pratyak- 
 
 fcetand, 424. 
 
 I.svara exists phenomenally only, 
 222. 
 
 the Lord, 246. 
 
 Krishna, 293. 
 
 or personal Lord, denial of, not 
 
 in the original Samkhya, 302. 
 
 not a popiilar name for God, 418. 
 
 a Purusha, 419. 
 
 one of many souls, 426. 
 
 perception of the, 429. 
 fsvara, a maker, a Sat-kara, 430. 
 Isvaras, not many, 420. 
 
 JATI, of Asvaparanta, 577. 
 KAIVALYA, aloneness, 389. 
 
 Kaivalya-pada, 438. 
 
 means isolation of the soul, 438. 
 Kaivalya, 455, 471. 
 
 Kaiyate, 529. 
 
 A'akrapravartana, the turning of 
 the wheel, 32. 
 
 Kakuda Katyayana, teacher men- 
 tioned in Buddhist annals, 
 117. 
 
 Kalanos (Kalyawa) gymnosophist, 
 
 505- 
 Kalidasa, alludes to the logician 
 
 Dignaga, 477. 
 Kawada, 577. 
 Jfandrakanta Tarkalankura, author 
 
 of Sanskrit treatise, 1 14. 
 Kanishka, King, 85-106 A. D., 576. 
 
 his Great Council, under 
 
 Vasumitru and Purwaka, 576. 
 iTan-ti, not a good Chinese scholar, 
 
 291. 
 
 Kapila and Patangrali, 402. 
 Kapila and Buddha, existence side 
 
 by side of their systems, 414. 
 Kapila appeals to the Veda, 428. 
 Kapila's atheism, 395. 
 Kapila, did Buddha borrow from ? 
 
 3'4- 
 
 Kapila did not borrow from Buddha, 
 136. 
 
 Kapila-Sutras, age of, 288. 
 
 Kapila revived the Samkhya, 319 n. 
 
 Kapila-vastu or vastu, birthplace 
 of Buddha, 312. 
 
 Kapya Patanfcala, 402 n. 
 
 Karana and Karawa, difference be- 
 tween, 580. 
 
 Karawavastha, causal state of Brah- 
 man, 144, 247. 
 
 Karman, 143. 
 
 or deed, 224. 
 Karmans, theory of, 432. 
 Karmatmans, 328, 350. 
 Karmayoga, 407. 
 Karmayonis, five, 348. 
 Karmendriyas, five, 330. 
 Karshn%ini, referred to by Badara- 
 
 yawa, 119. 
 
 .KTirva, synonym of Buddha, 130. 
 Xarvaka, 130. 
 system, 599. 
 Juirvakas admitted but one source 
 
 of knowledge, 1X7. 
 
 sensualists, 113. 
 
 Karya-kAranabheda, the non-differ- 
 ence, or substantial identity, 
 of cause and effect, 204. 
 
 Kuryesvara, 598. 
 
 KA.sakntsn.i, referred to by Badara- 
 
 yana, 1 19. 
 Kasawara of Japan, died, 292.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 609 
 
 KatantraAMandaAprakriya, modern 
 Sanskrit treatise in Sutras, 114. 
 
 Kanaka, author of the, 273. 
 
 Kauthuma, author of the, 272. 
 
 Xesha, gesture, 518, 562. 
 
 Kevalanvayi, 571. 
 
 Kevala-vyatireki, 571. 
 
 Jt/tala, quibbling, 509. 
 
 Khyati, discrimination, 325. 
 
 A'invat bridge, had antecedents in 
 the Veda, 83. 
 
 jfiTit, Supreme Spirit, 246. 
 
 jKtta, 440. 
 
 work of the Manas, 470. 
 Klamaths, a N. American race, their 
 
 view of creation, 83. 
 Knowledge alone leads to Moksha, 
 217. 
 
 true, or Samyagdarsana, 235. 
 
 arises from conjunction of At- 
 
 man with Manas, 549. 
 
 not eternal, 552. 
 
 of ideas, riot things, 559. 
 
 characteristic feature of Self, 
 
 561. 
 Kramamukti, slow advance towards 
 
 freedom, 215. 
 Krishna, the hero of the Bhagavad- 
 
 gita, of Kshatriya origin, 39. 
 
 similarity of name with Christos, 
 
 81. 
 
 Dvaipayana, name for Badara- 
 
 yana, 153. 
 Kn'ttikas, the time for mowing, no 
 
 star-worship in India, 49. 
 Kriyaphalas, the four, 270. 
 Kriyayoga, 465. 
 - working Yoga, 453. 
 Krypto-buddhists, 401. 
 Kshatriyas, as philosophers, n. 
 Kumarila Bhafta, 276. 
 Kusuruvindu Auddalaki, 273. 
 
 LAKSHA.ZVA, secondaryapplication 
 
 of a word, 232. 
 Language, thoughts on, 520. 
 Laukayatika, 124. 
 Laukayatikas, materialists, 113. 
 Letters, idea of, elaborated by the 
 
 Hindus before they knew the 
 
 Semitic alphabet, 528. 
 
 have no raison d'etre, 533. 
 Limgamatra, i. e. Buddhi, 447 n. 
 Logos, the result of Avidya, 240. 
 
 or Sophia, 522. 
 
 Lokayata, used by Buddhists for 
 philosophy in general, 130. 
 
 or world-wide system, 130. 
 
 atheistic, 276. 
 Lokayatikas, atheists, 41. 
 
 Lokayatikas, or Laukayatikas, here- 
 tics, 129. 
 Lokayita system, 575. 
 
 MADHAVA'S account of Nyaya, 
 
 493- 
 
 Madhusudana, 590. 
 Madhyamika Vritti by Sandra 
 
 Kirtti, 479. 
 Madras, the, 274. 
 Magandikos, 315. 
 
 Mahabharata, as a law-book, 28, 39. 
 Mahabhutas. 331. 
 Mahat is not Phenician Mot, 340. 
 Maitrayawa Upanishad, 147. 
 Manas, central organ of perception, 
 
 213, 383- 
 
 mind, 227, 330, 546. 
 
 train, 383. 
 
 point of attention, 383. 
 
 a mere instrument, 383. 
 
 is cognitive, 432. 
 
 different from Buddhi, 441. 
 
 or mind, as Ami or atom, 502, 
 
 53, 55 2 - 
 
 as nitya, eternal, 503. 
 
 eternal and numerous, 503. 
 
 many manifestations of, 548. 
 
 ninth and last of the Dravyas, 
 
 583- 
 
 Manifestation or intuition, 186. 
 
 Manu, 403. 
 
 Maruts, eleven, help to make up 
 the thirty-three Devas, 50. 
 
 Maurya, name of, doubtful, 157. 
 
 Maya, or Mayadevi, name of Bud- 
 dha's mother, 122. 
 
 not mentioned in the old Upani- 
 
 shads, 123. 
 
 illusion, 206, 212, 243, 368. 
 
 sometimes called Sumvriti, 481. 
 
 doctrine, a disguised Buddhism, 
 
 599- 
 Meaning of a word, the, is that 
 
 which it chiefly aims at, 594. 
 Meditation with or without an 
 
 object, 447. 
 
 Bhavana, 448. 
 Megasthenes, description by, 305 
 
 B.C., 35. 
 Memory, 549. 
 Menancler, Greek king, converses 
 
 with Buddhist philosophers, 84. 
 Meru, 359. 
 Metaphors, 255. 
 Metempsychosis, Sawsara, 137. 
 Milinda (Menander) and N:\gasena, 
 
 dialogues, importance of, 84. 
 Mimawsa, quoted in Upanishads, 6. 
 
 use of, in Upanishads, in. 
 
 method, 275. 
 
 R r
 
 6io 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Mimamsas, two, 403. 
 
 Nyaya and Vaiseshika, 590. 
 Mimawsaka, Darsana, referred to 
 
 by Bhartnhari, 118. 
 Mimamsakas require Sabda to be 
 
 eternal, 524. 
 
 maintained the superhuman 
 
 origin of the Vedas, 271. 
 Mind, relation to language, 88. 
 
 dispute with speech, 91. 
 
 for Manas, 441, 502. 
 
 modified by objects perceived, 
 
 453- 
 
 Miracles, 462. 
 Misdeos, name for Vasu Deva on 
 
 Indo-Parthian coins, 83. 
 Mnemonic literature in India, 4, 
 
 121, 268. 
 of India, reduced to writing, 
 
 154- 
 
 Moksha, highest aim of Kapila, 358. 
 Mokshadeva, or Master of the Tripi- 
 
 iaka, Sanskrit name of Hiouen- 
 
 thsang, 38. 
 Mokshadharma, 596. 
 Monotheism, Monism, tendencies 
 
 working together produce idea 
 
 of supreme personality, 53. 
 Morality depends on prescriptive 
 
 sacra or on Samaya, 511. 
 More, Henry, Holenmerian theory 
 
 of, 227. 
 
 t/Ludha, stupid, 331. 
 Mudrus, 457. 
 Mukhya-Prana, 228. 
 
 vital spirit, as first Upadhi, 213. 
 
 the vital spirit, 394. 
 Miilikurthas, 354. 
 Munrfasavako.s, 315. 
 Murdhanya Nadi, capital vein, 231. 
 
 NACHE1NANDER AND NEBEN- 
 
 EINANDEK, 308. 
 Nagarsruna, author of the Madhya- 
 
 mika-Sutras, 480. 
 
 first century A.D., 480. 
 Nai>hWtika, 30. 
 
 Naiyayiku derives what is not yet 
 
 from what is, 3^7. 
 Naiyuyikas believe in God as a 
 
 Creator, 41. 
 
 hold the Veda to be non-eternal, 
 
 4/o- 
 Namadha, name-giver, name given 
 
 to the one God, 62. 
 Namadheya, technical name of each 
 
 sacrifice, 262. 
 Narnai iipa. 206. 
 Narna rupas, the, vanish with each 
 
 Kalpa, -'42. 
 Nfiruyawa is Brahman, 185. 
 
 Nasadiya hymn, 64. 
 
 Nastika, heretics, 129. 
 
 Nastika or .Karvaka system, 1 29. 
 
 Nate-Sutras, Silalin author of, 127. 
 
 Nebeneinander, truer key to growth 
 of philosophical ideas than the 
 Nacheinander, 97. 
 
 Nescience, cosmical, 201. 
 
 Newton's system, and Darwin's 
 theory of evolution, 427. 
 
 Niebuhr's derivations of Indian 
 philosophy from Greece, 506. 
 
 NiganWias, 315. 
 
 Nigrahasthana, unfitness for dis- 
 cussion, 509-510. 
 
 Niranumana, 327, 328, 351. 
 
 Niratisaya, nonplus ultia, 421. 
 
 Niratman (selbstlos^, 343. 
 
 Nirnaya, ascertainment, 509. 
 
 Nirodha, restraint, 441. 
 
 Nirvana, 388. 
 
 also Nirvata/;, 488. 
 
 not a technical term in Pamni's 
 
 time, 488. 
 
 the blowing out of passions, 489. 
 Nirvana, or Du^khanta, 142. 
 Nirvikalpa, one kind of Pratyaksha, 
 
 1 88. 
 
 Nirvitarka, 454. 
 Nishedas, or prohibitions, 260. 
 Northern Kurus, 359. 
 Notion, Anubhava, 502. 
 Nyasa. writing (Vyasa?\ 154. 
 Nyaya, derivation of, 69. 
 
 not found in Upanishads, ill. 
 
 modern, confined to Pramana, 
 
 512. 
 
 later books of the, 513. 
 Nyaya-miila-vistara, 272. 
 
 Nyaya and Vai.seshika represent 
 Self endowed with qualities, 
 
 377- 
 
 a first step towards truth, 
 
 37 s ' 43- 
 
 systems, 434. 
 
 relation between, 474. 
 Nyaya-philosophy, history of, 476, 
 
 484. 
 
 also applicable to the Purva- 
 
 Mimamsa, 484. 
 
 studied first century A. n., 518 n. 
 Nyaya on Spho^a, 542. 
 
 rccoRiii>e(l the Veda, 547. 
 
 calls Yoga to its aid, 559. 
 
 OM, 422. 
 
 contraction of Avam, 423. 
 Organic body, the, 213. 
 
 PADANI, appliances, 331. 
 Padurtha, not categories, 99.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Padartha, the meaning of a word, 
 
 492. 
 Padarthas of Kanada, the five, 
 
 190. 
 
 (ornne scibile), 475. 
 Padma-Purana, 599. 
 Padma Sambhava, 576. 
 Padmasana, 457. 
 Pain, nature of, 361. 
 
 meaning of, 389. 
 
 Paksha, or member of a Vyapti, 
 
 563- 
 
 or terminus minor, 564. 
 Pakshilasvamin, 477. 
 Palm-leaves pierced, 552. 
 Panini, lost Sutras known to, 
 
 127. 
 Pawini's principle as to letters 
 
 forming a word, 529. 
 Pan&adasi, 281. 
 
 author of the, quotes the Madh- 
 
 yamikas, 480. 
 Pajifcaratra, account of system in 
 
 Prasthana Bheda, 106. 
 Pan/caratras, 41. 
 Pawfcasikha, philosopher referred to 
 
 in Sarakhya-Sutras, 1 1 8, 386. 
 Pantaenus in India, one of the 
 
 teachers of Clement, 82. 
 Para, higher knowledge, 2 1 5. 
 Parables, Buddhist love of teaching 
 
 by, 401. 
 
 Para gati, the highest goal, 32. 
 Parama-lsvara, highest Lord, 439. 
 Paramartha, a law teacher, A. D. 
 
 557-589, 2 9 T - 
 Paramartliika, real, 480. 
 Paramatman is Isvara, but Isvara 
 
 is not Paramatman, 556. 
 Parampara, tradition, as handed 
 
 down orally, 97. 
 
 mnemonic literature, 285. 
 
 of the Brahmans, 401. 
 Parasara, 596. 
 
 Parasarya (Vyasa), author of Bhik- 
 shu-Sutras, 127, 154. 
 
 Paravada, controversies, 294. 
 
 Paravairagya, higher impassive- 
 ness, 593. 
 
 Paribhagakos, 315. 
 
 Parikshit, old King, 15. 
 
 Pariwama, evolution, 243. 
 
 Parinama-vada, theory of evolu- 
 tion, 107. 
 
 Parivragraka, or Bhikshu, 32. 
 
 an itinerant friar, 33. 
 
 (mendicants , 41. 
 
 Pasupata, account of system in 
 Prasthana-Bheda, 106. 
 
 Pa<aliputra, Buddhist Council at, 
 276 B.C., 34. 
 
 Patangali, author of Yoga-Sutras, 
 and PataiZgrali, author of the 
 Mahabhashya, 156. 
 
 the grammarian, age of, 1 56. 
 
 by no means settled, 157. 
 
 second century B. c., 288. 
 
 the philosopher may be the 
 
 same as the grammarian, 410. 
 
 called Phanin, or Sesha, 410. 
 
 date of, only constructive, 41 1. 
 
 called a portion of Sankarshawa 
 
 or Ananta, 412. 
 
 histheistic Samkhya- philosophy. 
 
 417. 
 
 P&tikka, Samuppada, 495. 
 Perception, Pratyaksha, 496. 
 
 contact of sense with its object, 
 
 5H- 
 
 contact of the senses and mind, 
 
 SH- 
 
 contact of mind and the Self, 
 
 514- 
 
 Sruti, 520. 
 
 Perceptions, always perceived as 
 perceptions of something, 211. 
 
 Pessimism, 139. 
 
 Phala, rewards, 556, 562. 
 
 Phanibhartn, 412. 
 
 Pha?in, name for Patanc/ali, 410. 
 41 2. 
 
 Phenomenal and fictitious, differ- 
 ence between, 243. 
 
 Philosophical ideas common, 137. 
 
 systems, parallel development 
 
 of, 307. 
 
 sects at the time of Buddha, 315. 
 Philosophies and Sutras, relative 
 
 age of, 286. 
 
 Philosophy, different ways of study- 
 ing, 239. 
 
 Pin run through sheets of a MS. 
 seems simultaneous, but is 
 successive, 514. 
 
 Pit/iyawa, path of the fathers, 231. 
 
 Pleiades, the return of calmer 
 weather, 49. 
 
 Plotinus, Holenmerian theory of, 
 227. 
 
 Postures, Yogangas, 455. 
 
 and tortures, 466. 
 Prabhakara. commentator on the 
 
 Mimamsa, 276. 
 
 a Mimamsaka, 562. 
 Practical life (Vyavahara), 386. 
 
 purposes (Vyavaharartham), 210. 
 Pradhana, Prakn'ti, 413. 
 Pradyumna, 246. 
 
 Pragrapati, supreme god, 55. 
 
 attains more personal char- 
 acter, 59. 
 
 a, called Visva, &c., 341. 
 
 R r 2
 
 6l2 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Pra<7apati, 403. 
 
 Pragrwa, or Giva, individual soul, 
 
 283, 341. 
 Prakaranasama, arguments telling 
 
 on both sides, 509. 
 Prafci, previous, 258. 
 Prakriti, nature, potential matter, 
 
 206. 
 
 not the author of creation, 
 
 206. 
 
 wrongly translated by nature, 
 
 207. 
 
 nature, known as Maya (magic), 
 
 212. 
 
 or Urstoff, 369. 
 
 is not at work when not perceived 
 
 by a Purusha, 370. 
 
 - different from nature, <pucrir, 
 
 380. 
 
 Prakasa, or light, 381. 
 
 first wakened to life by disturb- 
 
 ance of its three constituents, 
 381. 
 
 in all her disguises, Purusha and 
 
 the dancer, 387. 
 Prakriti-purusha-viveka, 374. 
 Prakn'tilaya, 325. 
 
 absorbed in Prakriti, 448, 449. 
 Prakritis, eight, 380. 
 Prakriti's unselfishness, 392. 
 Pralaya, the idea of, recent, 145. 
 Pralayas, absorptions of the whole 
 
 world, 144. 
 
 Prama?ia, only one admitted by the 
 Lokayatas, 130. 
 
 instrument of measuring, 188. 
 Pramana, 496. 
 Pramawa-samu/cfcaya, the Tibetan 
 
 version, 518. 
 Pramanas, 187. 
 
 three essential, 188. 
 
 the three go back to one, 190. 
 
 authoritative sources of know- 
 
 ledge, 265. 
 
 of Gaimini, 265. 
 
 - three, 358. 
 
 eight, 518. 
 
 in different Philosophical 
 Schools, 562. 
 Pramoya, 501. 
 Prameyas, objects of knowledge, 
 
 544- 
 Prana = breath, name given to the 
 
 one god, 62. 
 
 Prilwas, vital spirits, 227. 
 Pranava, 422. 
 the inner guide, 439. 
 Pranayamas, 451. 
 Pras<'n;i;/it, 35. 
 Prasthana-bheda, treatise on philo- 
 
 sophical literature, 98. 
 
 Pratipathi-karmani, 263. 
 Pratisakhyas, 285. 
 PratisawArara is dissolution, 345. 
 Pratitya, dependent or conditioned. 
 
 480. 
 
 Pratityatva, 480. 
 Pratiyogitva, 573. 
 Pratyahara, complete abstraction, 
 
 458. 
 Pratyaksha, sense perception, 188. 
 
 two kinds of, 188. 
 
 perception and Anumana in- 
 
 ference, ignored by Badara- 
 yawa, 191. 
 
 applied by Badarayana to Sruti 
 
 (revelation), 193. 
 
 perception, 513. 
 Pravn'tti, activity, 552. 
 Prayoga-vidhis, 260. 
 Prayoj/ana, purpose, 504. 
 Presumption (Arthapatti\ 266. 
 Pretyabhava, transmigration, 552, 
 
 553- 
 
 Primeval waters, existing apart 
 from Prajrapati, 96. 
 
 Punarukti, useless repetition, 296. 
 
 Purawa Kasyapa, teacher men- 
 tioned in Buddhist annals. 
 117. 
 
 Puratana, 403. 
 
 Purchas, 1613, mentions castes of 
 Banians, n. 
 
 Purusha man, name given to the 
 one god, 62. 
 
 (soul) does not migrate, but tin- 
 
 Sukshma-sarira, subtle body. 
 138. 
 Purusha, 331. 
 
 name of supreme deity, 332. 
 
 one or many? 335. 336. 
 
 never the material cause of the 
 
 universe, 375. 
 
 state of, when free, 387. 
 
 rendered by Self, not by man, 
 
 407 n. 
 Purushas of the Samkhya, many. 
 
 374- 
 
 Purushottama, 431. 
 Purva. the prius, 469. 
 Purvafraryas, 301. 
 Purva-Mimawisa, the first st<'p. 
 
 iS 4 . 
 Purva-Mimiimsa, 258, 263, 265. 
 
 and Uttara-Mimamsa, 279. 
 
 charged with athei.--in, 434. 
 Purvapaksha, 267. 
 
 Purvavat preceded by a prius. 497. 
 J'ytliagoras, identified witli Bud- 
 dha-guru, 79. 
 
 claimed a subtle covering for 
 
 the soul, 393.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 613 
 
 QUALITIES, 578. 
 
 Quality, intangible in sound, 525. 
 
 EAGAGRIRA, Buddhist Council at, 
 
 477 B. c., 34. 
 
 Ragra-yoga, true Yoga, 453. 
 Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa, 272. 
 Rahu, head of, 442. 
 Eaikva and Ganasruti, 1 8. 
 Rajendralal Mitra, 425. 
 Ramanuga, lived twelfth century 
 
 A.D., 243. 
 
 his view of universe, 367. 
 Ramanugra's system called Visishfo- 
 
 Advaita, 245. 
 Real and the phenomenal, differ- 
 
 ence between the, 211. 
 Reason, Hetu, 566. 
 Receptacle, Asraya, or subject, 557. 
 Religion and philosophy have 
 
 worked together harmoniously 
 
 in India alone, 536. 
 Religious persecution, Buddhists 
 
 and Brahmans, 38. 
 Religious and Popular Poetry of 
 
 Vedic Age, not one hundredth 
 
 part of it remains, 54. 
 Remembering is not wiping out, 
 
 443- 
 Remembrance, Smarawa, 502. 
 
 can make our mouths water, 
 
 545- 
 
 Ittddhis, or Aisvaryas, 458. 
 
 Rig-veda, a fragment only, does not 
 represent whole of Vedic my- 
 thology and religion, 54. 
 
 7?/tambhara, truth-bearing, 454. 
 
 Hitter, his contempt of the Nyaya, 
 
 99- 
 
 Root expresses Bhava, or Kriya 
 action, 531. 
 
 , the word, 516. 
 
 or word, a Pramana, 1 90. 
 Sabdanusasanam, 415 n. 
 Sabhapati Svamy, 462, 463. 
 Sacrifice was Karman, work, 259. 
 Sadhana-pada, 438. 
 
 Sadness cleaves to all finite life, 
 
 39- 
 
 Saiva and Pasupata systems, 599. 
 Sakalya, 17. 
 /Sakayanya, a Saka, 19. 
 Safc-Aid-ananda, being, perceiving, 
 
 blessed, Brahman called, 221. 
 Sakshatkara, or manifestation, 186. 
 ,Sakti, power, 206. 
 Samadhi, obstacles to, 424. 
 
 meditation or absorption, 438. 
 
 or Samapatti, 453. 
 Samadhi, ApragSata, 454. 
 
 Samanya, 586. 
 
 Silmanyato Drislita, constantly seen 
 
 together, 498, 499. 
 Samashti, 370. 
 Samavaya, intimate connection, 
 
 493, 5 8 6. 
 Sambhava, probability, 518. 
 
 equivalence, 562. 
 Samgati, connection, 267, 269. 
 Saww/aya-Vaira^i-putra, teacher 
 
 mentioned in Buddhist annals, 
 
 117. 
 
 Samgiti, a council (symphony), 5. 
 Samkara, literary works referred to 
 by, 150. 
 
 his contempt of ritualism, 216. 
 
 lived eighth century A. D., 243. 
 
 and Ramanuga, points of differ- 
 
 ence, 250. 
 
 no better than Buddhism, 428. 
 
 opposed to Sphofci, 537. 
 Samkarshana, 246. 
 Samkarshawa-kimcZa, consists of four 
 
 chapters, 102. 
 Samkharas, the, 495. 
 Samkhya, distinguished from other 
 
 Vedanta-philosophies, 105. 
 Samkhya-yoga, name occurs in 
 
 Upanishads, in. 
 Sawkhya-Darsana, referred to by 
 
 Bhartrzhari, 118. 
 Samkhya, mentioned in Buddhist 
 
 texts, 122. 
 
 and Yoga systems are Snm'ti, 
 
 193. 
 
 dogma of effect, 208. 
 
 the dualistic, 209. 
 
 philosophy, 281. 
 
 ideas, influence of, 283. 
 
 atheistic, yet orthodox, 303. 
 
 title of two systems, Samkhya 
 
 and Yoga, 343 n. 
 
 immortality of the, 398. 
 
 parables, 399. 
 Sarwkhya-Yoga, 402. 
 
 Samkhya as Satkaryavada the op- 
 posite of the Buddhist view of 
 the world, 481. 
 
 and Yoga treated by Madhusu- 
 
 dana as different from the two 
 Mimawzsas, 590. 
 
 knowledge, superior to other 
 
 systems, 595. 
 
 Samkhya-karikas, the, 290. 
 exist in a Chinese translation . 
 
 292. 
 Samkhya-Sutras, date of, 1380 A. P., 
 
 no. 
 
 fourteenth century A. D., 288. 
 
 Samkhya-yogins, the, 439. 
 Sawikhyas, followers of Kapila, 41. 
 
 R r 3
 
 614 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sawkhyas derive what is not, from 
 
 what is, 397. 
 SamkoAita, 247. 
 Samradhanam, accomplishment, 
 
 222. 
 
 Samsara, can ))e stopped, 363. 
 Sawsaya, 267. 
 
 or doubt, 504. 
 Samskara, instincts, 419. 
 Sawskaras and Vasanas, 469. 
 
 impressions, 469. 
 Sawvn'tika, 480. 
 
 Sarwyama constituted of Dharana, 
 Dhyana and Samadhi, 459. 
 
 leads to Siddhis, perfection. 459. 
 Sunanda, joyous, 449. 
 Sanaiidana Afcarya, philosopher re- 
 ferred to in Sawkhya-Sutras, 
 118. 
 
 San/cara is evolution, 345. 
 Sanskrit proper names, 410. 
 Santa, pleasurable, 331. 
 Santi Rakshita, 576. 
 Sanumana, 327, 328. 
 
 with inference, 351. 
 Sarira, body, 227. 
 Sarmanas, 35. 
 
 Sasmita, with false conceit, 449. 
 
 Sastra, the, 379. 
 
 Sat-karyavada, every effect pre- 
 exists, 208. 
 
 Sat-karyavada, 396. 
 
 Saurnanasya. serenity, 468. 
 
 Savage tribes, their philosophy, 7. 
 
 !-avig>a. with a seed. 448. 
 
 Savikalpa, one kind of Pratyaksha, 
 188. 
 
 Savifcara, deliberative, 449. 
 
 and Nirvi/cara, 454. 
 Savitarka, argumentative, 449, 453. 
 Savitri (Asura , the enlivener, one 
 
 of the agents of recurring 
 events of nature, spoken of in 
 Veda, 46. 
 
 Schopenhauer on the Persian 
 translation of the Upanishads, 
 
 25. 7 .- 
 Science of Language, and Science 
 
 of Thought," 526. 
 Second century is.<;.. 411. 
 
 inference, A vita, not straight- 
 
 forward, 500. 
 Securus jut Heat orbis ttrrarum, .Sar- 
 
 valaukikapramatva, 555. 
 Seed must perish before tlie flower 
 
 can appear, 553. 
 Self of God and man, the same, 
 
 254- 
 Self, characteristics of the, 501. 
 
 does not begin with birth on 
 
 earth, 546. 
 
 Sensation without perception, 514. 
 
 Senses, Indriyas, 545. 
 
 Sesha, name for Patajjgrali, 410. 
 
 or posterior, 497, 499. 
 Shashd-tantra, 298. 
 
 the Sixty-doctrine, 355. 
 Siddhanta, 267. 
 
 tenets, 504. 
 
 Siddhis, perfection, 459-461. 
 
 miraculous powers, 466. 
 Sign, Linga, or Vyapya, 498. 
 
 bearer of a, Lingin, 498. 
 Siladitya Harshavardhana, com- 
 monly called Sri-Harsha of 
 Kanyakubgra, 610-650, 37. 
 
 Silalin, author of Nafa-Sutras, 127. 
 Similarity, Samyam, 232. 
 Sita, daughter of Ganaka, 14. 
 Siva, found on earliest Mauryan 
 
 coins, 80. 
 
 Six systems of philosophy, 589. 
 Sixteen Topics, or Padarthas, 489. 
 Sixty-two systems of philosophy, 
 
 22, 27. 
 
 Skambha, support, name given to 
 the one god, 62. 
 
 - the universal support, one 
 meaning of Brahman, 92. 
 
 Skanda found on earliest Mauryan 
 
 coins, 80. 
 Sleep, state of, 229. 
 
 comes when Manas enters Pura- 
 
 tati, 503. 
 Smrt'ti includes philosophy, 4. 
 
 reduced to writing, 121. 
 
 Srnn'tis of the Sawkhya-yoga, ob- 
 jections to convergence of the 
 Vedanta passages on Brahman. 
 103. 
 
 - philosophies of Gotama and 
 Kanada treated as, 105. 
 
 Souls, multiplicity of, 600.^ 
 
 Sound, a quality, having Akasa or 
 ether for its substance, 524. 
 
 Space, 582. 
 
 Sphofci, 'the eternal word -Brah- 
 man,' 85, 90. 527. 
 
 Vedanta on, 536. 
 
 Yoga and Sawkhya on, 539. 
 
 Nyaya on, 542. 
 
 Vaiseshika on, 543. 
 
 sound, distinct from the letters. 
 
 528. 
 
 Sphoiayana, 527. 
 .Sradilha, faith, 348. 
 ;-Tiiti and Srrm'ti, 3. 
 
 or revelation, the only evidence 
 
 invoked by B&darftyana, 191. 
 
 and Apta-va/cana, difference be- 
 
 tween, 307. 
 
 inspiration, 325.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 State religion in India, 34. 
 
 Statistics, to be used with caution, 
 60. 
 
 Stem and root, meaning of, 531. 
 
 Sthiila- and Sukshrna-sarira, 227, 
 228. 
 
 Subhashitas, 445. 
 
 Subject and object, as real or phe- 
 nomenal, 201. 
 
 identity of, 223. 
 Subject! vation, 372. 
 Substances, 578. 
 
 Subtle body, according to the Ve- 
 
 danta, 394. 
 
 Sukha, bliss, 348, 349. 
 Sukshma-sarira, migrates after 
 
 death, 228. 
 
 subtle body, 394. 
 
 the Linga-sarira of the Sara- 
 
 khya-philosophy, 395. 
 Summum lonum, the Ni&sreyasa of 
 
 Gotama, 484. 
 
 of the six systems, 485-48$. 
 Sunya, not altogether nothing, 
 
 481. 
 Sunyavada, nihilism, 29. 
 
 doctrine of emptiness, 210. 
 
 emptiness doctrine, 242. 
 
 nihilism, 480. 
 Suppiya, 22. 
 
 Supreme Being acting from com- 
 passion, 433. 
 Sutara, 352. 
 Sutra style, 4, 266. 
 Sutra, a Buddhist. =,76. 
 Sutra-vn'tti by Bodhayana, 245. 
 Sutras known to Buddhists, 20. 
 
 their style, 121. 
 
 now lost, known to Pawini, 
 
 127. 
 
 ascribed to Bn'haspati, 127. 
 
 style of the, 285. 
 
 of Kapila, called Manana-sastra, 
 
 institute of reasoned truth, 
 
 379- 
 
 fables in the fourth chapter, 
 
 399- 
 
 the philosophical, later than 
 Buddha, 412. 
 
 date of, 574. 
 
 Suttas (Sutras), name of part of 
 
 Buddhist Canon, 112. 
 Suvarwa-Saptati-sastra, the, 291. 
 Svabhasa, self-illuminated, 470. 
 Svastikasana, 457. 
 Svetaketu, 485. 
 ,Svetasvatara Upanishad, the three 
 
 Gunas found first in the, 282. 
 
 Upanishad, 343. 
 Syadvada, 25, 29. 
 Syllogism, 560. 
 
 Systems of philosophy, the Six, ex- 
 isting during period from Bud- 
 dha, fifth century, to Asoka, 
 third century, 119. 
 
 TAD EKAM, that One, the neuter 
 
 Supreme Being, 63. 
 Taifirasa, 327, 328, 341. 
 Taittiriya, author of the, 273. 
 Takakusu, Dr., 292. 
 Tamasalina, 352. 
 Tanmatras, five, 328. 
 
 (this only). 382. 
 
 Tantra, cumulation of concurrent 
 
 rites, 264, 265. 
 Tapas of the Hindus, 409. 
 Tarka, old, 475. 
 
 refutation or reasoning, 508. 
 Tat vam asi, Thou art that, 160. 
 
 Thou art it, 485. 
 Tattva-samasa, 294. 
 
 the, 318. 
 
 Tattvas, the twenty-five, 320. 
 Technical terms in Upanishads, 6. 
 Tedanrfikos, 315. 
 Tennyson, quoted, 205. 
 
 ancient sage, 255. 
 Terebinthos, pupil of Scythianos, 
 
 name famed among followers 
 of Mani, 84. 
 Terminus minor, Paksha, 564. 
 
 major, Vyapaka, 564. 
 
 medius, Vyapya, 564, 565. 
 Terms used in Hindu philosophy, 
 
 not the same as we use, 203. 
 Theodicee, the Hindu, 225. 
 
 an ancient, 278. 
 Third place, the, 235. 
 
 Third Valli of Katfza Upanishad, 
 
 177- 
 
 Three couples of philosophical sys- 
 tems, 403. 
 
 Time, 582. 
 
 Time, present, past, future, 515. 
 
 Titthiyas. or Tirthakas, 313. 
 
 Traigunya, 343. 
 
 Tranquillity (Santi N ( , 388. 
 
 Triad, Dharma, Artha and Kama, 
 
 79- 
 
 of elements, 131. 
 Tripifaka, date of, 19. 
 
 Trithen, Dr., and Prasthana Bheda 
 
 99- 
 
 Truth better than sacrifice, 473. 
 Prama, 561 . 
 
 Tryawuka, three double atoms, 384. 
 
 Tushrts and Siddhis, 353, 353 n. 
 
 TvasbJn, the maker, not real crea- 
 tor, of all things, 57. 
 
 Two Brahma iis, the word and the 
 non-word, 533.
 
 6i6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 UDDALAKA, 26. 
 Uddyotakara, not Udyotakara, 477. 
 Urfulomas, 29. 
 Untiersalia in relus, 521. 
 Upadana, material cause, 207. 
 Upadhi, condition, 563. 
 Upadhis, limiting conditions of 
 name and form, 207. 
 
 five, 213. 
 
 conditions, impositions, 213. 
 
 or conditions, 227. 
 
 conditions, 498. 
 Upalabdhi, perception, 227. 
 Upamana, comparison, 516, 587. 
 
 belongs to the Nyaya school, 516. 
 Upanishad-period, 700 B. c., 6. 
 Upanishads, known to Buddhists, 
 
 28. 
 
 existence of, recognised in Bud- 
 
 dhist Canon, 112. 
 
 translation of, published 1879, 
 
 1884, 179. 
 
 character of the, 182. 
 
 contain the seeds of later philo- 
 
 sophy, 183. 
 
 and Vedanta, something between 
 
 the, 187. 
 
 Upiisakas, laymen, 33. 
 Upavarsha, teacher of Panini, 153. 
 
 the Vedantist, 538. 
 
 Upayas, means of attaining Sama- 
 
 dhi, 451. 
 Uposhadha, 310. 
 Utpatti-vidhis, original injunctions, 
 
 262. 
 Uttarapaksha, 267. 
 
 VAGAPYAYANA, words, mean a 
 
 genus, 532. 
 
 Vaikarika, 327, 328, 350. 
 Vaikhanasa-Butras, loss of ; referred 
 
 to by Bhnskarafciirya, 1 13. 
 Vairagya - sataka of Gaina/earya, 
 
 445- 
 Vaisuli, Buddhist council at, 377 B.C., 
 
 34- 
 
 Vaiseshika, word not found in 
 Upanishads, ui. 
 
 on Splio/a, 543. 
 
 philosophy, 574. 
 Vaiseshikas, followers of Kaw'ida, 
 
 41. 
 
 creation and dissolution accord- 
 
 ing to, 145. 
 Vaishnavas (Ramanuga), theory of, 
 
 contrasted with that of Brah- 
 
 mavadins, 107. 
 Va/r, direction taken in Veda by 
 
 thoughts connected with 
 
 speocli, 8(5. 
 VaAaspati-Misra, on Buddhi, 324. 
 
 VaA-aspati-Misra, tenth century. 479. 
 Valkala, dress of bark, 35. 
 Vanaprasthas, 13, 35. 
 Vanijr = Banian, n. 
 Varaha-Mihira mentions Kapila 
 
 and Ka?iabhu<7, 316. 
 Varna, colour and caste, 13. 
 Vasanas, impressions, 229, 419. 
 
 dispositions, 469. 
 Vasso, from Varshas, 310. 
 Vasubandha, knew the six Tirthya 
 
 philosophies, 478. 
 Vasunetra of the Vaiseshika school, 
 
 577- 
 Vasus, seven in number, can be 
 
 distinguished, =,0. 
 Vaftagamani, So B. c., Tripi/aka 
 
 written, 5. 
 Vayus, winds, 350. 
 Veda, infallibility of the, 146. 
 
 the, wants no proof, 195. 
 
 meaning of, 195. 
 
 acquisition of the mere sound. 
 
 meritorious, 268. 
 
 superhuman origin of the, 270. 
 
 authority assigned by Kapila t<> 
 
 the, 305. 
 
 cannot prove the existence of a 
 
 Supreme Being, 435. 
 
 the word of Brahman, 517. 
 Vedadhyayana, learning the Veda 
 
 by heart, 184. 
 
 Vedanta, word does not occur in 
 old Upanishad, in. 
 
 or Uttara-Mimamsa, 148. 
 
 the first growth of philosophical 
 
 thought, 151. 
 
 followers of the, called Aupani- 
 
 shadas, 152. 
 
 - fundamental doctrines of thr. 
 159. 
 
 resume of the, 160. 
 
 philosophies, two, 252. 
 
 monism of, 283. 
 
 iirst occurs in the Svetasvatara, 
 
 288. 
 
 and Sawzkhya, early relation Iw- 
 
 tween. 338. 
 
 the, monistic, 369. 
 
 on Sphota, 536. 
 Vt-danta-Siira, 281. 
 Vedanta-Sutras and Badaniya/ia. 
 
 earlier than tins Bhagavad-gita, 
 
 '49- 
 
 and Bhagavad-gita, relative ag<- 
 
 of, 155. 
 
 methodical, 184. 
 
 Vedantins, followers of Upanishad.s. 
 
 41. 
 Vedantist, a, does not really jnin 
 
 Brahtnan, 404.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 617 
 
 Vediintists derive the unreal from 
 
 the real, 397. 
 
 Vedas, authority of the, 195. 
 sound of, eternal, 273. 
 
 words of the, supernatural, 273. 
 Vedic gods, three classes (i) of 
 
 the sky; (2) of the mid-air; 
 (3) of the earth, 48. 
 Vedic hymns, date for, 2000 B. c. or 
 5000 B.C., little gained by this, 
 
 44- 
 Vedic Vafr, a feminine, 74. 
 
 coincidence with Sophia of 0. T., 
 
 76. 
 
 Vedo*dhyetavyaft, 269. 
 Verbal symbols, 216. 
 Vibhuti-pada, 438. 
 Vibhutis, powers, 458. 
 Videhas, bodyless, 448, 449. 
 Vidhatn, arranger, name given to 
 
 the one god, 62. 
 Vidvan-moda-tarahgini, 278. 
 Vidyamatra, knowledge only, 210. 
 
 doctrine, 559. 
 Vijrwana-Bhikshu, supposed to have 
 
 composed the Sutras, 289. 
 
 - 373, 377, 59- 
 
 Vikaras, sixteen, 330. 
 
 Vikasa, or higher enlightenment, 
 
 144. 
 
 Viniyoga-vidhi, 262. 
 Virasana, 457. 
 Virtue, a preliminary of Moksha, 
 
 218. 
 Viruddha, arguments proving the 
 
 reverse, 509. 
 Visakha found on earliest Mauryan 
 
 coin, 80. 
 
 Visesha, gross elements, 447 n., 586. 
 Vishamatvam, unevenness, 147. 
 Vishaya, 267. 
 Vishnu, 410. 
 
 disguised as Buddha, 599. 
 Vishjju-I'urawa, 598. 
 Visish&i-Advaita, Ramanug'a's sys- 
 tem, 245. 
 
 Visva, or Vaisvanara, 341. 
 Visvakamma, later development of 
 
 Visvakarman, 59. 
 Visvakarman, described, vague and 
 
 uncertain character, 59. 
 
 maker of all things, adjective 
 
 showing germs that were to 
 grow into supreme deity, used 
 as substantive, 57. 
 Visve, or All-gods, represent first 
 attempt at comprehending the 
 various gods as forming a class, 
 
 5 1 - 
 
 Vitanrfa, cavilling, 509. 
 Vivarta, turning away, 243. 
 
 Vivarta-vada, theory of illusion, 
 
 107. 
 
 Vivasvat, 403. 
 Vivekananda, 279. 
 Vividisha, desire of knowledge, 348, 
 
 349- 
 
 Viyoga or Viveka, 407. 
 Vn'ha or Vn'dh-a, possibly Sanskrit 
 
 words, 72. 
 Vn'shadeva received Samkara? 292. 
 
 king of Nepal, A.D. 630, 292. 
 Vyarfi, words mean individual 
 
 things, 532. 
 Vyakta, 247. 
 Vyapaka, or sine qua non, 189. 
 
 what pervades, 563. 
 
 or Siidhya, terminus major, 
 
 564. 
 
 Vyapta, pervaded, 563. 
 Vyapti, universal rule, pervasion, 
 
 5 6 3, 57- 
 
 a, may be true in ninety-nine 
 
 cases, yet not in the hundredth, 
 569. 
 
 threefold, 571. 
 
 Vyapya, what must be pervaded, 
 
 563- 
 
 terminus medius, 564. 
 
 Vyasa, identified with Badarayana, 
 148. 
 
 lived at the end of the Dvapara 
 
 age, 148. 
 
 never named by Sawikara as the 
 
 author of the Sutras, 148. 
 
 the father of Suka, 1 49. 
 
 called Parasarya, 154. 
 
 and Harihara, 336. 
 
 commentary on Yoga-Sutras, 410. 
 Vyashd, 370. 
 
 Vyavaharika, phenomenal, 481. 
 
 WEBER, A., Professor, 73, 40211. 
 
 Whole, is there a? 515. 
 
 Women, present at philosophical 
 
 discussion, 14. 
 Wood-architecture, previous to 
 
 stonework, So. 
 Word, the, as a creative power, 
 
 87. 
 
 or Sabda. 500. 
 
 Words, meaning of, conventional, 
 
 5i7- 
 
 express the summum genus, 530. 
 
 not names of individuals, bxit <>f 
 
 classes, 534. 
 
 World, phenomenal reality of the. 
 202. 
 
 created by the Word, 520. 
 Worlds, the, created from the Word. 
 
 197. 
 Worship (Upasana), 215.
 
 6i8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Writing, allusions to, 121. 
 
 when first attempted, in India, 
 
 285. 
 Written letters called unreal, 121. 
 
 YAGJVAVALKYA, 15. 
 
 and Ganaka, 17. 
 Yafckafc, anybody, 333. 
 
 Yama and Yami, usually identified 
 with Adam and Eve, children 
 of Tvashfrt, but childless them- 
 selves, 58. 
 
 Yoga, quoted in Upanishads, 6. 
 
 distinguished from Vedanta- 
 philosophies, 105. 
 
 not union, 222. 
 
 in the Taittiriya and Katfia 
 
 Upanishads, 288. 
 
 and Sawkhya, 402. 
 
 meanings of the word, 404. 
 
 Yoga, is Samatva, equability, 404. 
 
 not union, but disunion, 405. 
 
 means really Viyoga, 406. 
 
 steadying of the mind, 440. 
 
 Taraka, or ferry across the world, 
 
 467. 
 
 is it Nihilism ? 471. 
 
 and Sawkhya. on Sphote, 539. 
 Yoga-Sutras, 438. 
 Yogafraras, 29. 
 
 Yogarigas, helps to Yoga, 456. 
 
 accessories of Yoga, 458. 
 Yoganusasanam, 415 n. 
 Yoga-sara -samgraha, abstract of the 
 
 Yoga, 416. 
 Yogins in Maitray. Up. VI, 288. 
 
 perceptions of the, 429. 
 nine classes of, 450. 
 
 ZARADES (Zoroaster), name found 
 among followers of Mani, 84. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 OXFORD: IIORACK HART, PKIXTKK TO THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 UNIV. OF CALIF. L1CRARY. LOS ANGELES
 
 -<& 
 
 
 3 115801175 0535 
 
 A 001322230 2 
 
 -',. 
 
 77