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 MEMOIRS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 WAR IN SPAIN. 
 
 VOL. I.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY G. SCHULZE, 13, POLAND STREET. 
 
 in— 1 
 
 C-l*~l~ It i***- L*Cs
 
 Horace Verne t pi-ni.?" 
 
 M S-aTia iicii-j 
 
 DUKE. D'AXBUFEP-A 
 
 ! J ubLiskf.d. bit /Imry Colbun ■ •■ ' ' 
 
 . : - 1 : - - . I I
 
 MEMOIRS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 WAR IN SPAIN, 
 
 FROM 1808 TO 1814, 
 
 11V 
 
 MARSHAL SUCHET, 
 
 DUKE D'ALBUFEKA, 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. I. 
 
 LONDOiN : 
 
 HENRY COLBURN, NEW BURLINGTON STREET. 
 
 1829.

 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 Vaje 
 
 Introduction ix 
 
 CHAPTER I.— Battle of Maria. — Situation of the 
 French armies in Spain. — Departure of the 5th corps of 
 the grand army from Silesia and its arrival in Arragon. 
 — Siege of Saragossa. — Occupation of Jaca and Mon- 
 zon. — Departure of Suchet's division for Castille — Ge- 
 neral Suchet relieves the duke d'Abrantes in the com- 
 mand of the 3rd corps. — Situation of that corps.— State 
 of Arragon. — Arrival of general Blake in Arragon and 
 of general Suchet at Saragossa. — Attack of Alcafiiz. — 
 Retreat upon Saragossa. — Re-organization of the troops 
 and preparations of defence. — Battle of Maria. — Battle 
 of Belchite. — Occupation of the line of the Guadalupe 
 and the Cinca. I 
 
 CHAPTER II — Battles in Arragon. — Glance at the 
 condition of Spain. — Organization of the Guerillas. — 
 Various engagements. — Actions fought at San Juan de 
 la Peha and at Nuestra Sehora del Tremedal. — Capture 
 of Venasque.— Successive occupation of Arragon. 42 
 
 CHAPTER III. — Expedition to Valencia. — Occu- 
 pation of Andalusia by the French armies. — Improve-
 
 VI CONTENTS. 
 
 ment of the public mind in Arragon. — Disturbances in 
 Navarre — The younger Mina. — General Suchet orders 
 him to be pursued — He repairs to Pampelona. — Uncer- 
 tainty respecting the future destination of the 3rd corps. 
 — The king orders a movement upon Valencia — March 
 towards that city. — Battle of Alventosa. — Arrival before 
 Valencia. — Return to Arragon. — Mina is taken pri- 
 soner. 77 
 
 CHAPTER IV. — Siege of Lerida. — Preparations for 
 the siege of Lerida. — Investment of the place. — De- 
 tails concerning it. — State of the fortifications. — Tem- 
 porary junction with the army of Catalonia. — Approach 
 of the Spanish army commanded by Henry O'Donnell. 
 — Battle of Margalef. — Fruitless attack upon the re- 
 doubts of Garden — Opening of the trench. — The bat- 
 teries are established. — First opening of the fire. — Re- 
 newal of the fire from the batteries, and opening of the 
 breaches. — Capture of the redoubts of Garden. — As- 
 sault and taking of the town. — Capitulation of the 
 castle and of the fort Garden. 110 
 
 CHAPTER V. — Taking of Mequinenza. — Regula- 
 tions adopted subsequent to the taking of Lerida. — 
 Skirmishes during the siege of that place. — Investment 
 of Mequinenza. — Opening of the trenches. — Taking of 
 the town.— Establishment of the batteries. — Opening of 
 the fire upon the fort. — Capitulation. — Capture of the 
 fort of Morella in the kingdom of Valencia 156 
 
 CHAPTER VI. — March on the lower Ebro. — Ge- 
 neral view of Catalonia. — The 3rd corps receives orders 
 to besiege Tortosa. — Opening of a road from Mequi- 
 nenza to that city. — Supplies drawn from Arragon. —
 
 CONTENTS. vn 
 
 Military organization of the province during the siege. 
 — Head quarters established at Mora — Investment of 
 the tete-de-pont at Tortosa. — Sorties of the garrison.— 
 Movements of the Spaniards against the forces of the 
 besiegers. — The French army of Catalonia approaches 
 the 3rd corps. — Junction of the duke of Tarentum with 
 general Suchet at Lerida. — First convoy by the Ebro. — 
 Death of general Laval. — Partial actions. — The army 
 of Catalonia returns to Barcelona 1 79 
 
 CHAPTER VII.— Blockade of Tortosa.— Suspen- 
 sion of the operations of the siege of Tortosa. — Espoz y 
 Mina in Navarre. — Affairs at Alventosa and Fuente- 
 Santa. — Continuation of the blockade. — Meeting of a 
 junta at Mora — Battle at Falset. — Battle at Ulldecona. 
 — Arrival of the 7th corps and marshal Macdonald .... 217 
 
 CHAPTER VIII.— Siege of Tortosa.— Description of 
 Tortosa. — Investment of the fortress. — Opening of the 
 trenches. — Operations of the breaches. — Occupation of 
 the tete-de-pont. — Descent of the ditch — The fortress 
 offers to capitulate. — The firing re-commences. — Gene- 
 ral Suchet enters the town, and compels the governor to 
 capitulate 235 
 
 CHAPTER IX — Taking of the col de Balaguer. 
 
 Taking of the fort of San-Felipe at the col de Balaguer. 
 — Return of the army to Arragon. — The Arragonese 
 are favourably disposed towards the army. — Partial 
 engagements — Preparations of defence at Valencia 
 and Tarragona. — Various actions on both banks of the 
 Ebro 262
 
 VIII CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 CHAPTER X. — Administration of Arragon. — 
 The 3rd corps ceases to be a burden to France. — Ex- 
 hausted state of Arragon. —Statistical details respecting' 
 that province. — The Arragonese are called to take a 
 share in the administration of the country. — Ordinary 
 contributions — Extraordinary contribution. — Payment 
 of the troops. — Removal of the extraordinary contribu- 
 tion. — Organization of the district of Tortosa — Imperial 
 canal in Arragon.— Hospitals ; police. — Supplies col- 
 lected in Arragon during the sieges. — Meat market. — 
 Arrival of an intendant-general from Paris. — Results 
 of an administration of two years' duration 290 
 
 Explanatory Documents 337
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Marshal Suchet wrote his Memoirs during 
 the latter period of his life, when the return 
 of peace enabled him to indulge without restraint 
 in the meditations of his riper years. He had 
 caused numerous extracts to be made from his 
 official correspondence, and personally superin- 
 tended the selection ; by so doing he not only 
 reviewed the principal facts, but the details with 
 which they were connected, in order to record 
 every circumstance deserving of notice. As com- 
 petent a judge of the plan of action as at the 
 time when he had an immediate control over it, 
 he held the thread of his operations, placed them 
 in their proper light, exhibited their real motives, 
 developed their results, and bestowed a due meed 
 of praise upon all who had distinguished them- 
 selves under his orders. His Narrative was prin- 
 cipally written for military men ; and we should 
 fail in giving a just description of his character, 
 were we to omit noticing, as a peculiar feature in it, 
 that whilst penning these Memoirs, he always had 
 present to his mind the individuals composing
 
 X INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the army of Arragon. No chief ever displayed 
 so ardent a wish to extol the merits of those 
 who seconded his views. His narrative teems 
 throughout with an earnest anxiety to do justice 
 to every one acting under his orders. This may 
 have occasioned a certain prolixity, of which 
 the reader may perhaps complain when he 
 finds the series of events interrupted by the detail 
 of partial engagements. In justice, however, to 
 the author, he should bear in mind the following 
 points : 
 
 1st. — Marshal Suchet was perpetually an- 
 noyed by a petty warfare on his flanks and 
 in his rear, in the midst of those important ope- 
 rations which drew ofT his attention during the 
 progress of the sieges and battles in which he 
 was engaged ; and that his narrative, whilst re- 
 tracing this incessantly reviving opposition, the 
 bare perusal of which excites the reader's im- 
 patience, exhibits a picture, which from that very 
 circumstance, bears a closer affinity to truth. 
 
 2ndly. — The marshal only succeeded in con- 
 quering that difficulty by instilling into every 
 individual belonging to the army under his orders 
 the feelings by which he was animated. The 
 Spanish war was more calculated than any other 
 to develop, in the inferior ranks of the service 
 those talents which lead to celebrity, because it 
 often compelled military men to depend upon
 
 INTRODUCTION. XI 
 
 their own resources. It will be seen from 
 these Memoirs that the commander of the army 
 of Arragon, after having formed so many valuable 
 officers, could not resist the impulse which in- 
 duced him to record their praises, and that his 
 grateful heart was acquitting a kind of debt by 
 associating them with the narrative of his cam- 
 paigns. This is what he expresses in an affecting 
 manner at the commencement of the 7th chap- 
 ter, in the following language : "If some 
 of those petty actions appear to have lost 
 much of the interest that belonged to them, it 
 should be remembered that the commander-in- 
 chief endeavoured to persuade every individual 
 in his army, that on whatever station he was em- 
 ployed, and whatever duty he was called upon 
 to perform, a degree of importance was necessa- 
 rily attached to his conduct, the eyes of others 
 were upon him, and his services were duly ob- 
 served and appreciated ; nor was he disappointed 
 in the object of his endeavours. He takes a delight, 
 even at the present day, and after so long a lapse 
 of time, in making known that he has not for- 
 gotten his companions in arms, and that their 
 services are ever present to his mind." We ven- 
 ture to hope that many of those who may read 
 these reflections will feel disposed, through a 
 feeling f kindred justice or benevolence, to ex- 
 cuse and even applaud the part adopted by mar-
 
 Xll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 shal Suchet of recording in his Memoirs the 
 names of many officers, and the particulars of 
 many trifling engagements. 
 
 The Memoirs of marshal Suchet are as much 
 the offspring of his own mind as the campaigns 
 which he describes : the spirit in which they 
 were composed may be gathered from what we 
 have just premised. He derived enjoyment and 
 relaxation from the task ; his active imagination 
 delighted in the recollection of the past, amidst the 
 pleasing distractions of a domestic life, and during 
 the painful intermission of his last illness. His in- 
 timate friends drew from his conversation a faithful 
 commentary on his work ; he pointed out the final 
 modifications to be made, which rather consisted 
 in curtailments from than in additions to it, and 
 he sought with their assistance the explanatory 
 documents that were to accompany the publica- 
 tion. Much time was required for effecting this 
 careful revision, for checking the accuracy of 
 figures and dates, drawing up statements, and 
 appending notes or documents intended to eluci- 
 date, explain, or develop the text. 
 
 The perusal of the work cannot fail to justify 
 the general regret occasioned by the death of 
 marshal Suchet. Nothing is left of the exploits 
 which have illustrated the whole of his career 
 beyond the recollection of them ; but this will 
 endure the longer as it is connected with the re- 
 membrance of the many virtues that have adorned
 
 INTRODUCTION. XUl 
 
 his character. To history will devolve the task 
 of treasuring up the memory of our hero ; it will re- 
 cord that he owed his elevation solely to his merit; 
 that every mark of distinction which he acquired 
 was strictly his due ; that having been unexpect- 
 edly forced to adopt the career of arms, at the 
 period when the youth of France were summoned 
 to the defence of its territory, he brought to the 
 profession that natural aptitude which is always a 
 sure presage of distinguished talents; that having 
 already reached the rank of chef de bataillon du- 
 ring the campaign in Italy, he was a colonel at 
 twenty-six years of age, chief of the staff at 
 twenty-seven, and lieutenant-general at twenty- 
 nine ; that his name was connected with the glo- 
 rious achievements on the banks of the Var and 
 the Mincio, in the fields of Austerlitz and Jena, 
 under the walls of Lerida, Saguntum, and Tarra- 
 gona, which achievements he sometimes ra- 
 tified with his blood ; that, always skilful and 
 fortunate, successful in fields of battle and in 
 sieges, he attained by a series of brilliant 
 deeds the very first rank in the army. History, 
 however, whilst recording those deeds, will not 
 fail to exalt their splendour, and to stamp a peculiar 
 lustre upon them in the eyes of philosophy and 
 humanity, by adding that, wherever he carried his 
 arms, he successfully exerted his endeavours to 
 mitigate the calamities of war. Without at 
 any time losing sight of the principal object of a
 
 XIV INTRODUCTION'. 
 
 commander-in-chief, that of leading his soldiers to 
 victory, his first care was to procure them the 
 means of subsistence (a task often attended with 
 serious difficulties,) and to provide for their wants. 
 In return, however, he enjoined the strictest ob- 
 servance of discipline ; and by maintaining order 
 in his army, easily brought the inhabitants of 
 the country to a sense of justice. This was the 
 aim of his praiseworthy endeavours, which were 
 accordingly crowned with success. He was no 
 sooner appointed commander-in-chief, than he 
 manifested the soundness of his judgment and his 
 elevation of soul by the character of his govern- 
 ment. He was directed to feed the war by the 
 war; and his mission was to vanquish and conquer. 
 He did more : he increased his power by the 
 prudence of his measures, and diminished the 
 obstinacy of resistance by the justice which 
 guided him in the prosecution of them. The 
 most enlightened Spaniards were selected to 
 exercise public functions in their respective 
 provinces. Land-owners, deputies from chap- 
 ters, merchants, lawyers, all met together for 
 the purpose of decreeing and apportioning with 
 the strictest impartiality the burdens entailed by 
 the war ; and every year, when fresh demands 
 were made, a statement was invariably presented 
 of the appropriation of the preceding contribu- 
 tions, which was always guided by the rules of 
 justice, prudence, and economy, and super-
 
 INTRODUCTION. XV 
 
 intended by the commander-in-chief. By this 
 course of proceeding, which afforded the clearest 
 indication of a well regulated mind, he applied 
 the system of budgets to a victorious army and a 
 conquered country ; carried conviction to all the 
 inhabitants, and persuaded them to refrain from 
 further resistance. It may therefore be said that 
 whilst carrying on the war in Spain he had suc- 
 ceeded in conquering the esteem and winning the 
 hearts of the people, a triumph which is even 
 more honourable to him than the conquest of 
 Arragon and of the kingdom of Valencia. 
 
 Marshal Suchet has confined his Memoirs to his 
 campaign in the Spanish Peninsula. Although his 
 whole career exhibits a series of brilliant achieve- 
 ments, it is more particularly deserving of notice 
 since he acted in the capacity of commander-in- 
 chief. A military man who never attains the 
 highest rank, does no more than obey the orders 
 of his superiors ; he can never claim as his own 
 those acts, the first impulse of which originates in 
 the mandates of another. His life, unless it be 
 considered in some peculiar point of view, 
 seldom affords examples sufficiently striking to 
 serve as a lesson and a model to all, or to entitle 
 him to hold a distinguished place in the pages of 
 history. Marshal Suchet was never wholly un- 
 fettered in his actions until he found himself 
 placed at the head of the army of Arragon ; he 
 then had it in his power fully to develop his
 
 XVI INTRODUCTION". 
 
 talents and his character, which had not yet been 
 displayed in all their brilliancy. Nevertheless, 
 his fame stood already conspicuous in the list of 
 French heroes ; his first outset had afforded a 
 presage of what time would bring to light. At 
 the period of the campaign in Italy, he had, in 
 his capacity of chef de bataillon in the 18th regi- 
 ment of the line, taken part in almost every cele- 
 brated engagement at Loano, Castiglione, Lo- 
 nato, Rivoli, Trent, Bassano, and Areola. Raised 
 to the rank of colonel after the passage of the 
 Tagliamento and the engagements at Tarvis and 
 Neumarkt, he shortly afterwards accompanied ge- 
 neral Brune, the commander-in-chief, to Helvetia, 
 was the bearer of twenty-three pair of colours to 
 the directory, was raised to the rank of a general 
 officer, and although appointed to accompany the 
 expedition to Egypt, was sent back to Italy as chief 
 of the staff of general Brune, at a moment when 
 fresh preparations of war were in progress against 
 Austria. 
 
 Suwaroff, the hero of Russia, was at this 
 time on his way to join the Austrian army in 
 Italy, whilst another Russian corps d'arm^e was 
 on the point of co-operating with the English 
 army in Holland. General Brune was with- 
 drawn from the south to encounter in the 
 north the duke of York, whom he com- 
 pletely routed at Alkmaer at a later period ; 
 and general Joubert supplied the place of
 
 INTRODUCTION. XVII 
 
 general Brune in Italy. Each of these officers 
 was to have been accompanied by his own staff; 
 Joubert, however, who had arrived at Milan with- 
 out any retinue, was in momentary expectation of 
 being overtaken by his staff ; and pressed by cir- 
 cumstances, requested that general Brune would 
 allow general Suchet to remain for the present, 
 in attendance upon him. A few days were suf- 
 ficient to enable him to form a just estimate of 
 that officer's merits ; he was not long in discover- 
 ing his talents, his activity, his thorough know- 
 ledge of the country and of the army, and re- 
 quested of the directors that he might be allowed 
 to keep him near his person as a man whose ser- 
 vices were indispensable in that field of action. 
 He succeeded in his application; soon afterwards, 
 however, having been found in direct opposition 
 to some of the views of government, he was 
 punished in his capacity as chief of the staff. By 
 a decree of the directory, Suchet received orders 
 to return to France within three days, under pain 
 of being included in the list of emigrants ; a mea- 
 sure hitherto unexampled towards a military man 
 who was exposing his life in defence of his coun- 
 try : he had no other course left but to obey. 
 Joubert resigned his command, and was relieved 
 by general Scherer. 
 
 The campaign of the year VII or of 1799, 
 although it turned out extremely disastrous to 
 France, was conceived on a bold and compre- 
 
 vol. i. b
 
 XV1I1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 hensive plan, the basis of which was the occu- 
 pation of Switzerland. This measure, which 
 was rather of a military than a political cha- 
 racter, entered into the course of defence which 
 it became incumbent on the republic to adopt, 
 feeling as it did how incompatible was its ex- 
 istence with that of the rest of Europe. The 
 Swiss alone had a right to complain of that mea- 
 sure ; and yet they have been divided in opinion 
 on the subject : in spite, however, of the censure 
 which has been heaped upon it, even by some 
 Frenchmen, it is easier to account for it than to 
 justify the assassination committed at Radstadt, 
 or the burning of the fleet at Copenhagen. Our 
 two grand armies were to oppose the Austrians 
 in the plains of Swabia and Italy, whilst other 
 corps were to proceed from the country of the 
 Grisons and of the Valteline, and to take posses- 
 sion of the sources of the Inn and of the Adige, 
 with a view to command the position of the Tyrol, 
 and to threaten the flank and rear of the Austrian 
 forces, previously to the arrival of the Russian 
 army. Two generals were chosen for that impor- 
 tant operation, general Lecourbe, one of our offi- 
 cers, who was celebrated for his skill in carrying- 
 on a mountain warfare, and general Dessolle.* 
 
 * The Valteline had acquired celehrity in the days of the duke 
 de Rohan, at the commencement of the seventeenth century. 
 Towards the close of the eighteenth, general Dessolle raised a
 
 INTRODUCTION. XIX 
 
 Both generals fulfilled, in a most brilliant manner, 
 the tasks assigned to them. But the loss of the 
 battle of Stockach and of two battles fought on the 
 Adige, completely overturned the original plan of 
 campaign. The consequence of this was, the 
 loss of Germany and Italy; and had it not 
 been for Massena's vigorous defence in Swit- 
 zerland, France itself must have been invaded at 
 that early period. 
 
 General Suchet having been summoned to 
 Paris, felt no difficulty in refuting the frivolous 
 accusations brought against him ; he was sent 
 to the army of the Danube, thenceforward called 
 the army of Helvetia. Massena appointed him 
 to the command of a brigade, on a detached 
 service in the country of the Grisons, where he 
 
 trophy to the renown of our army. He penetrated, at the head of 
 a brigade of 4, .000 men, through almost inaccessible mountains 
 as far as Tauffers, where Laudon was intrenched with a strong- 
 division. General DessoIIe did not hesitate to attack the Austrian 
 general, out-manoeuvred him with great skill, cut off his retreat 
 upon Glurens, and compelled him to quit the valley of the Adige, 
 after leaving his artillery and upwards of 4,000 prisoners in the 
 hands of the French. Prince Charles, our enemy, who was a 
 good judge in these matters, alluded to this achievement in the 
 following words, in his work on the campaign of 1799 : The 
 boldness displayed by general Dessolle in the execution of 
 his plan corresponded with the soundness of his judgment, 
 and manifested the determination of a man, who entertaining 
 no doubt of success, proceeded in full confidence to the ac- 
 complishment of the object he had in view. 
 
 b 2
 
 XX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 resolutely defended the positions of Davos, Ber- 
 gen, and Splugen, which the enemy attacked 
 in regular succession. But the loss of the fort 
 of Luciensteig having separated him from the 
 rest of the army, he was surrounded by superior 
 forces, and threatened to be enclosed in the 
 valley of Dissentis without any prospect of ef- 
 fecting his retreat. His resolution and firmness 
 extricated him from this dangerous position. 
 He crossed a frozen lake at Ober Alp, re-en- 
 tered the valley ofUrseren, restored the commu- 
 nications with Lecourbe's division at Airola, which 
 had been interrupted, and brought back into 
 line with the army his detachment which had, 
 for several days been looked upon as completely 
 destroyed. I felt quite confident, exclaimed Mas- 
 sena, that Suchet would bring me back his brigade ; 
 shortly afterwards, Cherin, the chief of the gen- 
 eral staff was killed ; Suchet was appointed to 
 take his place, and thus became in a brief space 
 of time, to second an officer who then held 
 the command of the principal French army. 
 
 By a plan of operations on as splendid and 
 comprehensive a scale as that of Dumourier in 
 Champagne, though far more rigorous in its mode 
 of execution, Massena, from the position he oc- 
 cupied in Switzerland saved France and broke 
 the coalition by winning the battle of Zurich, 
 and defeating general Suwaroff. Suchet had 
 not the good fortune to share in that brilliant
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXI 
 
 triumph. An internal revolution which went by 
 the name of the 12th floreal, brought about a 
 change in a portion of the directory. Joubert 
 was immediately appointed to command the 
 army of Italy. His first condition was, that 
 Suchet, his chief of the staff, should be restored 
 to him with the rank of general of division. Su- 
 chet hastened to join his friend, and reached 
 Genoa in his company. Moreau, whose modesty 
 kept pace with his talents, had fought under 
 Scherers orders, and happily for the safety of 
 the army, had received the command of it on 
 the field of battle of Cassano at the moment 
 of its being defeated, and on the point of 
 being utterly annihilated, had not a more skil- 
 ful hand undertaken to direct its movements. 
 Providence was once more placing it in the 
 power of the same man, and under precisely 
 similar circumstances, to rescue the army of 
 Italy from impending ruin. Joubert had orders 
 to fight a battle. Moreau, whose services were 
 deemed indispensable by the directory, was on the 
 point of returning to Paris, where a new com- 
 mand was held in reserve for him, and where 
 his advice was eagerly looked for. Joubert was 
 a man of too noble and too elevated a mind to 
 entertain any views that had not the welfare of 
 France for their object. He urged his prede- 
 cessor to remain in Italy and retain the com- 
 mand. Moreau, who was at all times prepared to
 
 XX11 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 devote himself for the sake of his country, con- 
 sented to serve by the side of his colleague in 
 the character of his aid-de-camp until the close 
 of the engagement. This contest of generosity 
 proved a fortunate circumstance for the service, 
 general Joubert having been killed by the 
 first fire of musketry from Novi. On the occur- 
 rence of this event the whole army, without any 
 previous order or concert, applied to general 
 Moreau for instructions for its guidance ; he main- 
 tained the honor of our arms ; Gouvion Saint-Cyr 
 secured the retreat ; the defeated army resumed 
 its position, and retained possession of Genoa. 
 
 General Suchet paid the tribute of regret to 
 the memory of his friend, general Joubert, and 
 received orders, in his capacity of chief of the 
 staff, to await the arrival of general Championnet, 
 who was appointed to command in Italy. During 
 the interval of a month, which elapsed until the 
 appearance of the latter, general Moreau found 
 himself in immediate and daily intercourse with 
 Suchet ; instantly discovered in him those quali- 
 ties which had won the esteem of general Jou- 
 bert a twelvemonth before, and said, with evident 
 satisfaction, to a friend of Suchet, for whom he 
 entertained a regard : Your general is one of the 
 first staff officers in the French army. This enco- 
 mium possessed a peculiar value, as it emanated 
 from the distinguished chief who was then on the 
 point of proceeding to take the command of the
 
 INTRODUCTION. XX111 
 
 army on the Rhine, with which he performed 
 such wonderful achievements the following year, 
 and whose chief of the staff was general Des- 
 solle, an officer who holds so conspicuous a place 
 in our military annals. 
 
 Championnet had scarcely reached the river 
 of Genoa, when he died at Antibes of a conta- 
 gious disorder ; heart-broken at witnessing the 
 state of utter destitution and misery to which 
 the army was reduced. The soldiers were 
 not only in want of pay, clothing, and shoes, 
 but even of bread and ammunition. Whole 
 regiments were completely disorganized ; the 
 men were deserting in a body, leaving un- 
 protected and alone, at the advanced posts 
 in front of the enemy, their officers and su- 
 balterns, who, from a sense of honor still clung 
 to their colours. They then repaired to the 
 frontier of France, to demand the means of sub- 
 sistence, and observed the strictest discipline 
 on the road, listened without a murmur to the 
 voice of their generals who exerted themselves 
 to check them in their progress, but continued 
 their march with a sombre resolution, muttering 
 these expressions: "Give us shoes, bread, and 
 cartridges, and we are willing to return." Such 
 were the last difficulties general Suchet had to 
 contend with at the close of the painful campaign 
 of the year VII. The accession of Napoleon to 
 power, and Massena's mission to Italy with fresh
 
 XXIV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 troops, had the effect of arresting the discourage- 
 ment which that state of affairs had produced, 
 and soon brought about a change of fortune. 
 
 At this period the army witnessed, for the first 
 time, the appointment of lieutenant-generals who 
 were to be placed in command of several divisions. 
 General Suchet, chief of the staff of generals Jou- 
 bert and Championnet, finding himself, in conse- 
 quence of their death, free from all military 
 duties, was returning to France, when the con- 
 queror of Zurich arrived from Switzerland to 
 assume the command of the army of Italy, with 
 general Oudinot as his chief of the staff. Mas- 
 sina met Suchet at Frejus; he had long been ac- 
 quainted with the latter, and he now kept him un- 
 der his orders, by giving him the command of the 
 centre, whilst he was on the point of proceeding 
 with his right to shut himself up in Genoa, the 
 defence of which city he protracted in a manner 
 that redounded so much to his glory. Lieute- 
 nant-general Suchet found himself at the head 
 of two or three weak divisions, which were 
 scarcely adequate, in point of numbers, to an 
 efficient one, and was directed to defend the river 
 of the Ponent, and the French territory. There 
 was every reason to apprehend that a reverse 
 of fortune would bring the Austrians to our fron- 
 tier, an event which actually came to pass. The 
 lieutenant-general commanding the centre, was 
 separated from Genoa and his commander-in-
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXV 
 
 chief, and had to sustain, during a whole month, 
 the attacks of the numerous Austrian corps of 
 troops under general Elnitz, who, after several 
 hard-fought engagements, succeeded in occupy- 
 ing the principal positions, and compelled the 
 French to evacuate Nice. General Melas, the 
 commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces, deemed 
 this a favorable opportunity for penetrating into 
 France, and advanced in person to the Var. 
 General Suchet having been thrown back upon 
 that point, could no longer receive any assistance, 
 except from the reinforcements that might be 
 sent to him from the left wing, or the corps 
 d'arm^e of the Alps ; he lost no time in applying 
 for them to the first consul ;* and also 
 resolved to defend, to the last extremity, 
 
 * His aid-de-camp, Ricard, (now a lieutenant-general), who 
 was the bearer of despatches for Paris, was under the necessity 
 of going to Dijon, Geneva, and Lausanne, in quest of the first 
 consul. At length he was enabled to fulfil, at the latter place, 
 the object of his mission, and described the perilous position 
 of the weak corps which protected the department of Provence 
 from invasion. The army of reserve was already in full march 
 to cross the Saint- Bernard. Relying upon Suchet's determina- 
 tion to defend the Var, Napoleon saw, with evident satisfaction, 
 that Melas was penetrating more and more into the maritime 
 Alps, and leaving the plains of Lombardy open to him. He 
 folded the despatch, and listened to the aid-de-camp's report 
 with the utmost composure. A minister having entered the 
 apartment at this moment, Napoleon came up to him saying, 
 with a smile, / hold Melas in my pocket.
 
 XXVI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the defile of the bridge of the Var against all the 
 enemy's forces. His corps scarcely amounted 
 to 7 or 8,000 men ; but they were for the most 
 part well disciplined and well officered. He 
 had under his orders generals Clausel, Pouget, 
 Rochambeau, Gamier, Beaumont, Bardenet, 
 Dambarrere, the gallant Jablonowski, Seras, Cam- 
 pana, Roguet, and Sernele , colonel Preval was 
 chief of the staff, and general Campredon directed 
 the operations of the engineer department. A 
 tete-de-pont was hastily constructed on the left 
 bank of the Var, armed, and placed in a state of 
 defence ; batteries were erected on the right 
 bank, and mortars placed near the entrance of 
 the river, where English vessels were anchored. 
 Having assumed this defensive attitude, general 
 Suchet boldly awaited the attack of the Aus- 
 trians. Three desperate attempts, which were 
 obstinately repeated, and assisted by the formi- 
 dable means of annoyance at the enemy's com- 
 mand, proved wholly abortive ; the enemy could 
 make no impression upon our intrenchments, or 
 upon the firmness of our troops. The attacks 
 suddenly ceased, and the fleet sailed. Ge- 
 neral Suchet had left a garrison in the fort of 
 Montalban, an elevated point which has a full 
 command of Nice, and by the successful trial 
 of a resource, which had not yet been general- 
 ly adopted, kept up a telegraphic correspon- 
 dence with the commandant of the fort. He was
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXV11 
 
 thus soon apprized of the movement of the 
 Austrian army, which was resuming the road 
 to Piedmont. Unconscious, as yet, of the 
 cause of this unexpected retreat, his natural pe- 
 netration suggested to him, that this was the 
 moment for striking a blow. He followed in 
 close pursuit of general Elnitz, succeeded, by 
 the rapidity of his movements, in attacking and 
 defeating him on several occasions, occupied 
 the river of Genoa, crossed the mountains, and 
 entered the valley of the Bormida, after having 
 taken six standards, thirty-three pieces of can- 
 non, and nearly 15,000 prisoners. Genoa was 
 in the act of surrendering at this time, after the 
 most heroic resistance; but the good fortune of 
 France was at the same moment triumphing on 
 the field of Marengo. The advanced guard of ge- 
 neral Suchet proceeded as far as Acqui ; Melas 
 being thus threatened in his rear, was under the 
 necessity of detaching a corps of troops in that 
 direction, a fact which is borne out by the Aus- 
 trian reports. Meanwhile, the commander-in- 
 chief, general Massena, who was on his return 
 to France in pursuance of the convention agreed 
 upon at Genoa, issued formal and repeated orders 
 for the central corps of the army to re-enter 
 Savona. That corps was sent thence to re- 
 sume possession of the city of Genoa, which 
 had fallen into the hands of the French sub- 
 sequently to the battle. The defence of the
 
 XXV111 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Var formed a conspicuous event in the life of 
 marshal Suchet ; the minister Carnot, who held 
 the seals of the war department, wrote to con- 
 gratulate him upon his conduct, and compared 
 the defence of the bridge of the Var to that 
 of Thermopylae. He had, in fact, saved the 
 south of France on this occasion, and contri- 
 buted his full share to the immortal victory 
 which restored to our arms the ascendency in 
 Italy. 
 
 The following year still found him in command 
 of the centre, consisting of Gazan's and Loison's 
 divisions ; lieutenant-general Dupont was sta- 
 tioned on his right, with the divisions of generals 
 Monier and Watrin. General Brune, the com- 
 mander-in-chief, contemplated to cross the Min- 
 cio in presence of the Austrian army, under the 
 orders of general Bellegarde. The preparations 
 for effecting the passage were masked from the 
 enemy by various demonstrations along the line, 
 and were definitively laid down at Monzambano. 
 A bridge was constructed at this place, in front 
 of Salionzo, on the 24th of December 1800.* 
 The whole army was ordered to assemble at 
 Monzambano at day-break. The advanced guard, 
 the left wing, and the reserve, were at a very short 
 distance from that place ; the centre was to over- 
 
 * That was the day on which the infernal machine blew 
 up at Paris. The 25th December 1800, corresponds with the 
 3rd nivose, year 9.
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXIX 
 
 take them on breaking up from its position on 
 the Volta, and on its march to make a feint 
 attack upon Borghetto. The right alone, instead 
 of following the general movement, was to relieve 
 the centre in front of the Volta, throw a bridge 
 across the river, and effect a passage at the point 
 opposite Pozzolo, with a view to divide the 
 enemy's attention. These preparatory arrange- 
 ments were punctually carried into effect ; owing, 
 however, to some cause which has never been 
 properly ascertained, the whole movement was 
 arrested, when near its completion, by a counter- 
 order which directed the troops to resume their 
 positions until the following day. It happened, 
 fortunately for us, that our marches and coun- 
 ter-marches were partly concealed from the 
 enemy by a thick cloud. General Suchet, on 
 passing a second time before Borghetto, brought 
 away the troops which he had left engaged 
 against the enemy at that place, and resumed 
 the road towards the Volta with his two divi- 
 sions. A sharp firing along the borders of the 
 Mincio attracted his attention ; he rode up to 
 general Dupont and informed him of the coun- 
 ter-order. The latter, in conformity with the 
 first arrangements laid down, had effected a 
 passage ; all his troops were engaged with the 
 enemy on the left bank, and were threatened 
 by the main body of the Austrian army, the latter 
 having hastened to the spot for the purpose of
 
 XXX INTRODUCTION'. 
 
 opposing the charge, which was at first intended as 
 a feint, but had been subsequently converted into 
 a real attack. General Dupont represented to his 
 colleague, that so far from having it in his power 
 to retire, he stood in need of support to extri- 
 cate himself from the hazardous position in which 
 he found himself. There are instances upon 
 record of general officers having, on the plea 
 of want of instructions, or even in spite of formal 
 orders, hesitated to compromise their safety in 
 an attempt to relieve their comrades from immi- 
 nent danger. General Suchet, however, was 
 too much attached to his country to behold, 
 without emotion, his fellow countrymen exposed 
 to the enemy's attacks, and remain a mere 
 spectator of the scene, when he could act a 
 useful part in it. He promised general Du 
 pont that he would never desert him ; they mu- 
 tually agreed to communicate the state of affairs 
 to the commander-in-chief, urging him to repair 
 to the spot, or to send his orders to them, 
 and concerted measures for resolutely with- 
 standing the approaching attack. One of the 
 brigades of the centre had scarcely reached the 
 opposite bank of the Mincio, when the Austrians 
 made a desperate attack against the bridge, the 
 object of which was defeated by our artillery 
 on the heights of the right bank. This was the 
 critical moment ; the loss of the bridge would 
 have compelled the whole of the French troops
 
 I N I iil) I) UCTIO \ . XXXI 
 
 on the left bank to rush into the water, or lay 
 down their arms. The above-mentioned brigade 
 was followed by two more ; and although ge- 
 neral Dupont was still inferior in numbers, not- 
 withstanding these reinforcements, he not only 
 opposed a successful resistance to the enemy's 
 forces, but compelled them to retreat after leav- 
 ing us in possession of the field of battle and of 
 4,000 prisoners. It would be difficult to form 
 an idea of the friendship which the soldiers 
 of the right and of the centre contracted for 
 each other on this occasion, and which subsisted 
 during the remainder of the campaign and of the 
 war. 
 
 Raised to the rank of lieutenant-general 
 before he had attained his thirtieth year, mar- 
 shal Suchet had already begun to act the 
 part of commander-in-chief; for the rank of 
 lieutenant-general was equivalent to that of 
 general in command of the wing of an army. 
 It has already been seen that whilst he pre- 
 viously acted in the capacity of general of bri- 
 gade and general of division, he had been chief 
 of the staff under the successive orders of Brune, 
 Joubert, Moreau, Championnet, and Massena. 
 General Suchet was possessed of all the qua- 
 lities requisite in a major-general ; when, there- 
 fore, he was appointed commander-in-chief, his 
 duties as chief of the staff were considerably 
 lightened. He was, however, more particularly
 
 XXX11 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 distinguished by the possession of two qualities, 
 which are either opposed to each other, or sel- 
 dom found combined in the same individual. 
 He who is bound to defer to the ideas of another, 
 and merely fashions them to his own views, can- 
 not be said to possess the most energetic of hu- 
 man faculties, that of originating a measure and 
 of giving it effect. To remain thus habitually 
 in the second rank, is not the way to attain 
 the first ; and in the case of a man of ordinary 
 capacity, it might eventually be the means of 
 unfitting him for it. Nature had implanted in 
 General Suchet that ambition which is the lead- 
 ing stimulus in every profession in life, and may 
 often be characterized as the instinct of talent feel- 
 ing confident in its own strength. He knew that 
 the capacity to command an army is the first requi- 
 site in the art of war, that duty affording the only 
 field for the species of instruction which is founded 
 upon facts, as well as the most signal opportu- 
 nities for obtaining celebrity. After having acted, 
 towards the close of the first war, as chief of the 
 staff to the armies of Italy and Helvetia, and 
 as inspector-general of infantry of France during 
 the interval of the first peace, he wished to for- 
 get that he had been a lieutenant-general, and on 
 a footing of equality with his chiefs, and solicited 
 the command of a division. Marshal Soult had 
 just been appointed to the chief command of the 
 army at the camp of Boulogne ; Suchet' s division
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXX111 
 
 was particularly noticed by its appearance, its 
 excellent discipline, the correctness of its evolu- 
 tions in the midst of an army which might be 
 considered as a model, and had secured to itself 
 an ample share of the triumphs of the grand 
 army in Germany and Poland. That division con- 
 sisted of five regiments of infantry, the 17th light 
 regiment, the 34th, 40th, 64th, and 88th of the 
 line, led by colonels Vedel, Dumoustier, Legen- 
 dri, Chauvel, and Curial, and successively com- 
 manded by generals Compans, Valhubert, Beker, 
 Claparede, Keille and Girard. It afterwards 
 ranked as the 1st division of the 5th corps, 
 under the orders of marshal Lannes, duke de 
 Montebello, in whom the emperor reposed his 
 chief confidence on the field of battle. General 
 Suchet had long possessed the esteem of marshal 
 Lannes; and proved himself well worthy of it 
 by his gallant conduct at the head of his division 
 against the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian 
 armies. 
 
 At Ulm, when the French army, which had by 
 the most skilful manoeuvre concentrated itself 
 round general Mack, attacked the town where 
 this officer allowed himself and the whole of his 
 forces to be thus hemmed in, that division car- 
 ried the intrenchments of the Michelsberg, and 
 a part of the 17th regiment, with colonel Vedel 
 at its head, boldly penetrated into one of the 
 enemy's advanced works. 
 vol. i. c
 
 XXXIV INTRODUCTION. 
 
 At Austerlitz, the 5th corps constituted the 
 left wing of the army, and forming- itself into two 
 lines of infantry, occupied the high road from 
 Brunn to Olmutz, with the 17th regiment de- 
 tached to the Santon, the hussars and chasseurs 
 in front, and the dragoons and cuirassiers in 
 the rear. The efforts of the Austrians, of one 
 of the wings of the Russian army, and of 
 the whole of the cavalry were exerted against 
 marshals Murat and Lannes in that direction. 
 Suchet's division perceived that the enemy's 
 cavalry were beginning to penetrate in the inter- 
 vals between his battalions, and in imitation of 
 the Mamelukes in Egypt, were either mowed 
 down or put to flight by the infantry who steadily 
 awaited their attack. By a bold change of front 
 our two marshals separated the enemy's centre 
 from his right, which was thrown back, defeated, 
 and pursued beyond the field of battle, whilst 
 marshal Soult was gallantly securing the victory 
 at the other extremity of the line. 
 
 At Saalfeld, the same division again formed 
 the advanced guard of the 5th corps, and struck 
 the first blow against the Prussian army by de- 
 feating the corps under prince Louis, who was 
 killed by a private of one of our regiments of 
 hussars. 
 
 Three days afterwards, on the eve of the 
 battle of Jena, that division was the first to secure 
 a position at the entrance of the narrow plateau
 
 INTRODUCTIOX. XXXV 
 
 that we were compelled to attack in presence of 
 the Saxo-Prussian army, which had deployed in 
 its rear. Napoleon, like a second Archimedes, 
 only wanted a single point whereon to rest his 
 lever ; thence it was that he shook Europe to its 
 very foundations. At night, it became necessary 
 to open a road for the artillery by torch-light. 
 The emperor bivouacked in the midst of the 40th 
 regiment ; he remained for two hours alone with 
 general Suchet, going over the lines of the ad- 
 vanced posts. Early on the 14th of October, 
 he again made choice of the same division for 
 attacking the plateau, which was defended by the 
 whole of the enemy's advanced guard. General 
 Suchet broke down the gates of the field of battle, 
 if we may be allowed the expression, and the 
 other corps d'arm^e followed and formed in order 
 of battle preparatory to the general attack. On 
 this occasion also he fought as second in command, 
 and captured during the engagement twenty-eight 
 pieces of cannon. Towards evening, whilst the 
 firmness of marshal Davoust was triumphing 
 at Auerstadt over the duke of Brunswick and 
 the king of Prussia, who was present at the en- 
 gagement, the cavalry under the grand duke of 
 Berg came up to the emperor, and was ordered 
 to complete the rout of the prince of Hohenlohe, 
 who had been defeated and was in full retreat 
 towards Weimar. The infantry under general 
 Suchet followed this movement, and descended 
 
 c 2
 
 XXXVI INTItODUCTIOX. 
 
 into the plain. A first column of prisoners, 
 amounting to 5 or 6,000 men, passed him on the 
 high road, and a superior officer who marched at 
 its head, and whose face exhibited many sabre- 
 cuts and was covered with blood, laid hold of 
 his boot, and addressed him in these words : 
 " General, I beg the favor of your answering this 
 single question : have we fought as well as the Aus- 
 tria/is did at AusterlitzV 
 
 The battle of Pultusk on the 26th of De- 
 cember, was one of those in which valour and 
 consummate skill are arrested by fortune and 
 the elements. General Beker's division of ca- 
 valry, and four regiments of Suchet's division 
 were opposed during part of the day to 40,000 
 Russians commanded by general Kaminski, and 
 succeeded in keeping them in check, whilst 
 the emperor was marching with the main body 
 of his army towards Golymin and Makow, for 
 the purpose of defeating the corps under Bux- 
 hovden, and of turning the corps under Kaminski's 
 orders. Suchet's division suffered severely in 
 this long and unequal struggle ; Gazan's divi- 
 sion on the right, and Gudin's on the left to- 
 wards evening reinforced and enabled him to 
 maintain his ground ; and the Russians com- 
 menced their retreat at night-fall. But the em- 
 peror's manoeuvre had failed of success. Torrents 
 of rain which had fallen for the preceding eight 
 days, rendered the roads altogether impassable.
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXVU 
 
 We were, therefore, unable to reach the corps 
 under general Buxhovden ; had it not been for 
 that circumstance, the campaign would perhaps 
 have ended on the banks of the Narew by the 
 destruction of a whole army. Less fortunate 
 than marshal Davoust at Auerstadt, marshal 
 Lannes had, however, like him the honor of the 
 fight, and of retaining possession of the field of 
 battle : but his isolated action formed no part 
 of a general and decisive victory, and the glory 
 won at Pultusk was in some respects incom- 
 plete. 
 
 At Ostrolenka, Suchet's division arrived in its 
 turn to support Gazan's division in an engage- 
 ment which cost the gallant general Cam pan 
 his life, and in which the son of Suwaroff was 
 wounded as he was advancing with his troops in 
 close columns against the battery of captain 
 Rainder, who waited until the enemy came 
 within a distance of twenty paces, defeated him, 
 and put the whole detachment to flight. 
 
 The fifth corps was summoned to Spain at the 
 close of 1808, and general Suchet again found 
 himself under the orders of the duke de Monte- 
 bello, on occasion of the siege of Saragossa ; it 
 was this marshal who pointed him out to the 
 emperor as most worthy to hold the chief com- 
 mand in Arragon, on his departure for the 
 campaign in Germany, where a glorious death 
 awaited him on the field of Essling.
 
 XXXVUl • INTRODUCTION. 
 
 This rapid glance at the principal military 
 achievements in the first part of marshal Suchet's 
 career is sufficient to show what he had been pre- 
 viously to becoming commander-in-chief of the 
 army of Arragon. A perusal of his own narrative 
 of his later campaigns will afford a proper estimate 
 of his conduct in them, and point out the extent 
 of his claims to public esteem. The friends to 
 military glory and to French honour will not fail 
 to discover that the virtues which adorn a pri- 
 vate character and the talents of a warrior were 
 combined in his person. Whilst they admire his 
 successes, they will not overlook the difficulties he 
 had to contend with. On his first arrival in Ar- 
 ragon, every thing stood in need of being re-or- 
 ganised or created anew ; he had in some measure 
 to alter the composition and spirit of his army ; 
 but first of all he had to conquer the enemy and 
 procure the means of subsistence. This two-fold 
 necessity was perhaps the severest trial he had 
 to undergo at the very outset. Accordingly, the 
 battle of Maria, and the period which immediately 
 preceded it, form the critical moment, and as it 
 were the main difficulty among the events describ- 
 ed in these Memoirs. The commander-in-chief 
 found himself beset at once with all kinds of em- 
 barrassments, even before he could collect him- 
 self or become acquainted with his new duties ; 
 had he given way under those obstacles, he never 
 could have recovered from the fall, and the career
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXIX 
 
 which had just been opened would have closed 
 upon him for ever. But his firmness was proof 
 against the difficulty he had to encounter at set- 
 ting out, and succeeded in overcoming it. This 
 first step was decisive of his future fate; from this 
 moment commenced the series of brilliant suc- 
 cesses with which his operations in Spain have 
 been uninterruptedly crowned. 
 
 It is an interesting spectacle to behold him 
 upon achieving the conquest of Arragon, after the 
 double victory of Maria and Belchite, securing 
 the possession of that province by wholesome ad- 
 ministrative measures, and thereby paving the 
 way for the conquest of the adjoining provinces. 
 He was accordingly prepared to move forward as 
 soon as the emperor commissioned him to subdue 
 the towns of Catalonia. He succeeded in taking 
 them by means of those memorable sieges, the 
 details of which afford information no less varied 
 than useful. He began with an immediate invest- 
 ment of Lerida, after which, he quietly awaited the 
 approach of Henry O'Donnell, who was advancing 
 prematurely to the relief of the place ; he defeated 
 this general, and accelerated from that moment 
 the works of the siege, carried the town by storm, 
 and by a manoeuvre no less expeditious than skil- 
 ful, compelled the castle to capitulate without 
 firing a shot. What perseverance did he not dis- 
 play in his preparations for the siege of Tortosa, 
 what vigour in his operations, what boldness in
 
 xl INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the catastrophe ! his personal firmness brought 
 about the surrender of the garrison at the very 
 moment when it appeared ready to dispute the 
 orders of its governor. At Tarragona, success 
 was already half secured, previously even to the 
 siege, by the decisive conduct of the general, who 
 availed himself of the proper moment for advanc- 
 ing against the place ; this was when the town 
 of Figueras had fallen into our power. By this 
 movement he disconcerted at one blow the gar- 
 rison and the relieving army. The attack and 
 defence of Tarragona are of a nature which bor- 
 ders upon the marvellous and gigantic ; the ope- 
 rations partake of many sieges in one ; they pre- 
 sent a combination and a series of heroic efforts, 
 of courage, perseverance, obstinacy and fury, 
 which terminated in a splendid and terrific feat 
 of arms, and bring to our recollection the fall of 
 ancient Numantium. The narrative of those ope- 
 rations, which successively pave the way for and 
 second each other, exhibits a combination of the 
 highest military qualities in the chief who directed 
 them. One of these is of a nature to shine forth on 
 frequent occasions, and will be duly appreciated-; 
 consisting as it does in the art of rendering a first 
 success subservient to the attainment of another. 
 General Suchetwas eminently gifted with the talent 
 of instantly securing all the advantages which any 
 given position held out to him. He had scarcely 
 defeated general Blake at Maria, when he fol-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xli 
 
 lowed in pursuit, overtook him at Belchite, and 
 dispersed or annihilated his army. He no sooner 
 entered Lerida, than he sent a body of troops to in- 
 vest Mequinenza ; and whilst this fort was still en- 
 gaged in discussing the terms of capitulation, his 
 attention was directed towards Tortosa, and he 
 sent to occupy Morella on the frontier of Catalonia 
 and Valencia. Thus it happened, that whilst the 
 government on receiving the report of an opera- 
 tion just terminated was giving directions for un- 
 dertaking a fresh one ; its orders had been antici- 
 pated, and frequently even carried into effect at 
 the moment of their arrival. From Tortosa, gene- 
 ral Habert proceeded immediately to the col de 
 Balaguer, took possession of the fort of San-Felipe, 
 and cleared the road leading to the city of Tarra- 
 gona. Lastly, the province of Catalonia still re- 
 sounded with the report of the fall of Tarragona, 
 taken by assault on the 28th of June, when on the 
 29th of the same month marshal Suchet was al- 
 ready on his way to Barcelona ; he sent some of 
 his columns in the direction of Vich, surrounded 
 the Mont Serrat, carried that formidable position, 
 and completed the submission of lower Catalonia. 
 In holding up this mode of proceeding to public 
 admiration, we must observe that it called for a 
 display of skill as well as of activity. He was 
 free from the reproach made to Hannibal, viticcre 
 scis, victoria uti nescis, and entitled himself to the
 
 xlii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 praise bestowed upon Ceesar, Nil actum reputam, 
 si quid supcresset agendum. 
 
 The marshals narrative bears the stamp of 
 truth on the face of it. When his efforts failed 
 he was far from disguising the circumstance, 
 but rigidly stated the facts as they occurred. 
 On his first arrival in Arragon, he was foiled in 
 an attempt against Alcahiz ; his perseverance 
 under this disappointment was the more creditable 
 to him, and the success with which it was crowned 
 was equally honourable to his character and to his 
 military skill. He no sooner reached Saguntum 
 than the orders which he received, induced him 
 with reference to the time and circumstances, to at- 
 tempt an immediate assault, which was frustrated 
 by local obstacles and the valour of the besieged. 
 General Blake, however, having advanced to offer 
 battle, the French general defeated him as com- 
 pletely as he had done at Maria, owing to the su- 
 periority of his manoeuvres, and compelled Sagun- 
 tum to surrender. His army was as familiar with 
 grand military evolutions as it was formidable by 
 its courage ; he surrounded and hemmed in within 
 the walls of Valencia a whole hostile army, with a 
 precision which was by no means the effect of 
 chance. He purposely resorted to a bombard- 
 ment, with a view to strike terror into the Va- 
 lencians, and to spare himself the necessity of 
 forcing open their gates, by compelling them to
 
 INTRODUCTION. xliU 
 
 admit us into the city. On the occasion of this 
 victory, a circumstance occurred which shed as 
 much lustre over his fame as the victory itself. 
 Valencia was a rich and populous city ; the soldiers 
 of the army of Arragon had entered many places 
 not by capitulation, but by force of arms ; the 
 conqueror felt desirous of obviating this and of 
 making it impossible for them to commit acts of 
 plunder. He stopped at the gates of the city, 
 remained three days in camp with his soldiers, 
 whilst the public authorities were consolidating 
 themselves within the city under his immediate 
 care and protection. As soon as he was satisfied 
 with the result of these prudent arrangements, he 
 made his entry at the head of his troops, and, 
 as the just reward of his humanity, was re- 
 ceived by the inhabitants with joyful acclama- 
 tions. 
 
 The occupation of the kingdom of Valencia 
 brought the army of Arragon into contact with 
 an Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army ; English troops 
 effected a landing at Alicant, with a view to 
 co-operate with the Spaniards in the movements 
 which lord Wellington was directing against the 
 principal French armies. Marshal Suchet eagerly 
 sought opportunities for trying his strength against 
 these invaders. He overtook them at Biar, 
 and compelled them to retreat ; in this engage- 
 ment, he could not refrain from noticing the re- 
 gularity with which they deployed, and the ra-
 
 Xliv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 pidity of their firing. He attempted to surround 
 them at Castalla on the following day, but could 
 not succeed in his object. Fortune remained 
 nearly balanced between both chiefs. Shortly 
 afterwards, however, sir John Murray landed be- 
 fore Tarragona, and ventured to lay siege to it. 
 Suchet followed him with extraordinary rapidity, 
 and being seconded by a movement of the army 
 of Catalonia, compelled him to relinquish his 
 enterprise, to re-embark, and leave his cannon 
 behind him. The marshal attached some value to 
 this success ; after having won many battles, and 
 taken many places, some by capitulation, and 
 others by force of arms ; defeated armies who 
 came to relieve them, and persisted in the sieges 
 he had undertaken ; he felt a pride in having 
 compelled the raising of a siege. He was, never- 
 theless, ambitious of coming to another engage- 
 ment, and defeating, on a field of battle, the 
 English corps opposed to him. This triumph 
 was reserved for him at Ordal ; but he was de- 
 tained before Villafranca, by some unexpected 
 delays in the manoeuvring of his troops ; and 
 lord William Bentinck, with whom he hoped to 
 measure his strength, took advantage of the 
 circumstance to avoid a general engagement. 
 
 Marshal Suchet, whilst in command of the army 
 of Arragon, far exceeded the expectations which 
 his fame led us to anticipate. His five cam- 
 uaigns invariably display the skill and penetra-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlv 
 
 tion of a great captain. His continued series 
 of successes forms as it were a brilliant epi- 
 sode, and often a striking contrast to the vicis- 
 situdes of the Spanish war. He not only de- 
 served a civic crown from his army and his 
 country ; but he obtained one from his very ene- 
 mies. Such a result was still more calculated than 
 victory to terminate a war, the object of which 
 was to give a new government to Spain. It 
 is always rendering a signal service to France, 
 to cause the French name to be respected and 
 cherished by foreigners. This was the emperor's 
 opinion at the time, since he had the following- 
 article inserted in the Journal de V Empire of the 
 28th of January 1812. 
 
 " The victories achieved by marshal Suchet 
 had no doubt afforded a presage of the fall of 
 Valencia. But the long duration of the siege 
 of Saragossa, and the obstinate defence of Tar- 
 ragona, might have warranted an apprehension 
 that the triumphant advance of the army of Ar- 
 ragon would experience a temporary check, and 
 that a city fortified by so many works, and the 
 asylum of so many soldiers, could only be 
 occupied at the cost of sacrifices proportioned 
 to its importance. The news of its fall has, 
 therefore, excited a deep sensation in Paris. 
 
 " The capitulation of Valencia has effected, 
 at the same time, the surrender of a whole army, 
 the only one the insurgents could command in
 
 Xlvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the eastern provinces ; it consisted of their best 
 generals, and of all the regular troops remaining 
 in Spain. 
 
 " The insurrectionary spirit has inconsequence 
 abated, and will very shortly disappear ; a re- 
 sult owing not only to the success of marshal 
 Suchet's arms, but also to the sound judgment 
 which has marked his conduct, the moderation 
 which has characterized his measures, and the 
 firmness he has evinced in carrying them into ef- 
 fect. He has not only conquered, but pacified the 
 provinces. His arrival in Arragon has restored 
 to it the blessings of tranquillity. In his progress 
 from Saragossa to Valencia, peace has constantly 
 followed in the train of victory. No insurrection 
 has compelled the commander-in-chief to retrace 
 his steps; no fortress has successfully resisted 
 his attacks. Lerida, the rock against which the 
 efforts of a great captain had proved unavailing, 
 opened its gates to him ; Tarragona felt the 
 weight of his well- merited vengeance ; Me- 
 quinenza and Tortosa appeared to retard his pro- 
 gress merely to afford him leisure to husband his 
 resources. The battle of Saguntum, like that 
 of Almanza, brought about the submission of 
 the kingdom of Valencia ; but he did not, in 
 imitation of the duke of Orleans, arrive the 
 day after the engagement ; and whether he was 
 more fortunate, or more talented, than the duke 
 of Berwick, the advantages he obtained followed
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlvii 
 
 each other in more rapid succession, and exerted 
 a more direct influence over the destinies of 
 Spain. The campaign of the duke d'Albufera 
 may, accordingly, find its parallel, with greater 
 semblance of reason, in the campaign of the 
 duke de Vendome, although the theatre of its 
 operations was different. Nevertheless, the ob- 
 stacles encountered by the conqueror of Villa- 
 viciosa, cannot be placed in comparison with 
 those which marshal Suchet either warded off 
 by his prudence, or overcame by his courage. 
 He had, indeed, long afforded proofs of his 
 combining, in his own person, those two 
 qualities, which are so seldom found united. 
 His name is coupled with the most celebra- 
 ted victories of his majesty's reign ; at Aus- 
 terlitz, Jena, and Pultusk, as well as in a count- 
 less number of actions, Suchet's division has 
 obtained honorable mention; already, on the 
 occasion of the siege of Genoa, this general had 
 arrested on the Var the invasion meditated by 
 foreign armies, and seemed to be then affording 
 a prelude to the brilliant victories which have 
 since gained him the admiration of his country, 
 and the favour of his sovereign. The splendour 
 of the dignities conferred upon him, are reflected 
 back upon the troops serving under his orders." 
 During the progress of his military career, the 
 duke d'Albufera was always ambitious of the 
 praises of Napoleon. At the time of the campaign
 
 lvii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 in Italy, the commander-in-chief had already no- 
 ticed the chef-de-bataillon, Suchet, honorably wound- 
 ed, says the bulletin, at Cerea, whilst Jig h ting at the 
 head of his corps. He ever since followed him in 
 his gradual rise in the service, formed a just 
 estimate of his merits, employed him on various 
 occasions in preference to other officers, and 
 evinced the most friendly esteem for him. He no 
 sooner tried him in the capacity of commander- 
 in-chief than he congratulated himself on the 
 selection he had made. He was repeatedly 
 heard to bestow encomiums on his measures, 
 his conduct, and his reports, and was wont to 
 speak of him in these words : " What he writes is 
 still better than what he says, and what he does is 
 better than what he writes; with many others, the 
 inverse is the case" Ever since his first en- 
 trance into Spain, towards the close of 1808, 
 the war kept him at a distance from Paris and 
 from France ; it was during this interval that 
 he rose to the ranks of commander-in-chief, 
 marshal of the empire, duke d'Albufera, colonel- 
 general of the guard, and commander of the two 
 armies of Arragon and Catalonia. Accordingly, 
 when the emperor saw him for the first time 
 after seven years' absence, he greeted him in 
 these words : Marshal Suchet, you are much 
 grown since we last met. He expressed the 
 same sentiment at a later period, when he 
 said, " Suchet was a man whose judgment and
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlix 
 
 character had wonderfully improved." (Extract 
 from the Memoirs of Las Cases.) 
 
 The opinions of a great man are said to be an 
 anticipation of those which posterity forms, and 
 it is also said that no language is so solemn and 
 powerful as that which is spoken by the dying. 
 Napoleon, long before his death, was already 
 out of the world, and as it were in an Elysium, 
 where France and Europe passed in review be- 
 fore him, and where he delighted to converse of 
 the men and events of his own times. O'Meara's 
 Memoirs contain the following passage : "I then 
 asked Napoleon which of the French generals 
 was, in his opinion, the most skilful ? ' I should 
 find it difficult,' he replied, ' to decide ; but 
 I am inclined to name Suchet ; Massena was 
 formerly the most skilful ; but we may now con- 
 sider him as no longer in existence ; Suchet, 
 Clausel, and Gerard are, I think, the best French 
 generals.' " 
 
 We close these quotations with an observation 
 of Napoleon, which is related in madame Cam- 
 pan's Memoirs. 
 
 " He said, that if he had had two such mar- 
 shals in Spain as Suchet, he not only would have 
 conquered the Peninsula, but likewise retained 
 possession of it. The soundness of his under- 
 standing, his conciliating disposition, his habits 
 of business, his military skill and bravery had 
 enabled him to achieve unheard of successes. 
 
 vol. i. d
 
 1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It is a pity, he added, that sovereigns cannot 
 form men of that stamp." 
 
 When to such testimonies we may add those 
 bestowed by foreigners, marshal Suchet's fellow- 
 countrymen may well be proud of a national 
 fame so justly acquired. Italy, the scene of 
 his first exploits, where his talents were first 
 brought into play, possesses imperishable re- 
 collections of them. His name has been given 
 to a public walk in Saragossa; when the news 
 of his death reached that city, which he inhabited 
 for a long time, several Spaniards immediately 
 evinced their regret at his loss, and caused a 
 solemn dirge to be performed for the repose of 
 his soul. When the course of events brought 
 the French back to Spain under the command 
 of the prince who is to inherit the throne of 
 France which rests her best hopes upon him, 
 they found the provinces of Arragon and Valencia 
 still cherishing a lively recollection of marshal 
 Suchet, and heaping every blessing upon his 
 memory. 
 
 It is stated in the XXth chapter of these Me- 
 moirs, that after the battle of Ordal in Catalonia, 
 marshal Suchet received a letter of thanks from 
 general Clinton for the kind treatment expe- 
 rienced by the wounded British prisoners in the 
 hospital at Barcelona. We think it right to in- 
 sert in this place, the very words used by general 
 Clinton on that occasion :
 
 I XTRODUC TION. 
 
 " I cannot close this letter without availing 
 myself of the opportunity it gives me to express 
 to your excellency the great satisfaction I felt 
 in hearing the report made by colonel Otto, of 
 the extremely considerate treatment our wounded 
 soldiers, prisoners in your hands, met with in the 
 French hospitals ; a line of conduct so highly 
 creditable to the great nation your excellency 
 serves, and bespeaking that noble generosity of 
 sentiment which has been the distinguishing cha- 
 racteristic of both our countries in our most ob- 
 stinate wars, whenever the circumstances of the 
 service have appeared to admit the alleviation of 
 the sufferings and hardships of individuals. 
 
 " Your excellency will also be pleased to ac- 
 cept my acknowledgments for the great civili- 
 ty and attention shown by your excellency, 
 personally, and by all those around you, to co- 
 lonel Otto during his late visit to Barcelona, 
 which the colonel has not failed to speak of in 
 
 terms the most grateful." 
 
 Signed, W. Clintox. 
 
 Tarragona, September 28th, 1813. 
 
 Nothing could be more natural and proper than 
 the civility and attention shown at the French 
 head-quarters to so distinguished an officer as 
 colonel Otto. With respect to general Clinton's 
 letter, it was clearly dictated by the report he had 
 just received, a report which was but an echo of 
 
 d2
 
 Hi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the language spoken by the English soldiers to 
 colonel Otto, as he visited them one after the 
 other in their beds. Colonel Otto himself was 
 warm in his expressions of gratitude on leaving 
 the hospital and on calling to take leave of mar- 
 shal Suchet ; he not only returned him thanks 
 on behalf of the wounded soldiers, but also as- 
 sured him, in his own name and in that of his ge- 
 neral, of the high sense which his government, as 
 well as the British nation, would entertain of 
 such generous conduct. We feel convinced that 
 the English and French will read with equal 
 pleasure in the above accurate extract an au- 
 thentic and positive declaration, which is alike 
 honourable to the general from whom it ema- 
 nated and the general to whom it was directed. 
 
 Those testimonies of general esteem have been 
 completed and crowned by the most august of all. 
 In a private audience, the king condescended to 
 address words of consolation to the family of 
 marshal Suchet on occasion of his death, and as- 
 sured them, that he felt happy at having it in his 
 power to say that every information received from 
 Spain proved to him how much the duke d'Al- 
 bufera had deserved and won the gratitude of the 
 inhabitants by his considerate conduct. When a 
 warrior prematurely summoned to pay the debt 
 of nature, after a life rendered illustrious by his 
 exploits, descends to the tomb accompanied by
 
 INTRODUCTION. Hit 
 
 encomiums and sorrows, as unbounded as they 
 are sincere, by the fame of his good actions and 
 of his spendid achievements, we may venture to 
 assert that he will live in the hearts of every 
 friend of humanity, and of every admirer of mi- 
 litary glory. 
 
 Marshal Suchet was born on the 2nd of March, 
 1770, and died on the 3rd of January, 1826, hav- 
 ing scarcely attained his fifty-sixth year, and being- 
 yet in all the vigour of manhood. He was tall 
 in stature, with a dignified though mild counte- 
 nance ; his eyes were indicative of the utmost 
 kindness of disposition, and his physiognomy 
 expressed the sentiments of benevolence with 
 which his heart overflowed. He possessed great 
 sensibility of feeling, a quick perception, and 
 amongst other qualities, a sense of justice and 
 a disposition which never allowed him to repay 
 a service by ingratitude or to be inexorable for a 
 fault committed. It may, perhaps, be said that 
 no man ever combined in so great a degree the 
 impulse of a tender heart with proper exercise of 
 authority. He entertained the highest regard for 
 his soldiers. To form a just estimate of that at- 
 tachment to the service which induces a military 
 man to undergo at all times the severest privations, 
 and to be prepared at a day's, nay, a moment's 
 notice, to sacrifice his life, a sacrifice which em- 
 braces every other, would require a practical 
 and intimate knowledge of the trials of obe-
 
 liv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 dience, of sufferings, of fatigues, and of dan- 
 gers which beset him from the moment of his 
 entering the army until that of his quitting it. 
 The French soldier distinguishes himself by a 
 brilliant quality which no other soldier in Eu- 
 rope possesses in so eminent a degree ; he has 
 a soul-stirring spirit within him. His bravery is 
 not that of a mere automaton; it does not require 
 the impulse of caning, or of ardent spirits ; 
 it is deeply impregnated with the moral influence 
 of his inward feelings ; and if this peculiarity is 
 not unattended with inconvenience when fortune 
 deserts him, it affords on the other hand the 
 surest assistance to a chief who is familiar with 
 the road by which he may lead him to victory. 
 Marshal Suchet was intimately acquainted with 
 the soldiers, by having so long lived amongst 
 them ; he sympathized in some degree in their feel- 
 ings, and had the talent of persuading and of turn- 
 ing them to his views. He was greatly attached 
 to them, and they were so to him in return ; whe- 
 ther he commanded a division or a corps d'armee, 
 all served him from affection, and readily exceeded 
 the strict limits of their duty when it was a ques- 
 tion of pleasing him. His soldiers no sooner saw 
 him at a distance during the marches he perform- 
 ed by day, or heard and recognised his voice in the 
 night marches, than they collected round him 
 with the greatest eagerness, and put familiar 
 questions to him ; confidence, joy, or resignation
 
 INTRODUCTION. lv 
 
 spread from rank to rank, on the soldiers receiving 
 his answers, which were always lively, kind, 
 and at the same time cheerful and full of wit. 
 His engaging* manners joined to the ascendency 
 of his character, enabled him to lessen the ri- 
 valry subsisting among his troops, and the jea- 
 lousy between nations, and to prevail upon 
 Frenchmen, Italians, Poles, Germans, and even 
 the Spaniards composing his army, upon all 
 parties, in short, to concur with zeal towards 
 the furtherance of the common object. His 
 reputation in the French army was in some 
 measure of a popular kind ; those who were 
 under his orders were apprehensive of leaving 
 him ; others who were acquainted with him, 
 or had heard reports of his character, were 
 most anxious for an opportunity of serving 
 under him. In his domestic intercourse he 
 was kind, and confiding ; he was grateful for 
 any mark of attachment shewn to him ; the 
 display of zeal in the service, the success of 
 any undertaking, was treasured up in his me- 
 mory and rewarded at a fitting opportunity ; he 
 felt the utmost reluctance to direct reproaches 
 against any one ; and when they were called 
 for, he listened with patience and impartiality 
 to any observations that might be offered. The 
 advancement and welfare of his military family 
 were sources of deep interest to him ; he de- 
 lighted in contributing to its promotion when
 
 lvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 it had claims upon his support, a circumstance 
 which was not productive of their mutual separa- 
 tion ; with few exceptions, therefore, it consisted 
 of the same officers during a long series of years ; 
 and in so far resembled his private family, as 
 that they both lost a father when he paid the 
 debt of nature. 

 
 MEMOIRS 
 
 OF 
 
 MARSHAL SUCHET. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Situation of the French armies in Spain. — Departure of the 
 5th corps of the grand army from Silesia and its arrival in 
 Arragon. — Siege of Saragossa. — Occupation of Jaca and 
 Monzon. — Departure of Suchet's division for Castille. — 
 General Suchet relieves the duke d'Abrantes in the com- 
 mand of the 3rd corps. — Situation of that corps. — State of 
 Arragon. — Arrival of general Blake in Arragon and of 
 general Suchet at Saragossa. — Attack of Alcafiiz. — Retreat 
 upon Saragossa. — Reorganization of the troops and pre- 
 parations of defence. — Battle of Maria. — Battle of Belchite. 
 — Occupation of the line of the Guadalupe and the Cinca. 
 
 In the early part of 1808, Spain was occupied by- 
 several French corps d'armee, which, havingcrossed 
 the Pyrenees, established themselves in the fron- 
 vol. i. b
 
 2 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 tier fortresses and penetrated to Madrid, and 
 even as far as Andalusia; a French squadron was 
 at anchor in the roadstead of Cadiz, and we had 
 likewise an army at Lisbon. At the close of the 
 same year the greater part of the Peninsula had 
 been evacuated in consequence of political and 
 military events already sufficiently known ; the 
 different corps d'armee retained possession of St. 
 Sebastian, Pampelona, Barcelona and Figueras, 
 and were concentrated behind the line of the 
 Ebro. They were exclusively composed of young 
 conscripts who were not in a condition to stand 
 the test of a first reverse of fortune, nor to combat 
 the Spanish insurrection. Napoleon was under 
 the necessity of detaching a portion of his veteran 
 troops from the grand army stationed in Prussia 
 and in Poland. He came in person with the im- 
 perial guard, in the month of November, to place 
 himself at the head of the forces he had collected 
 upon the upper Ebro. By a comprehensive and 
 rapid movement with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th corps, 
 he routed the Spanish armies at Espinosa, at 
 Burgos, and at Somosierra, whilst marshal Lannes, 
 with the 3rd and 6th corps, was defeating generals 
 Castanos and Palafox at Tudela. The army of 
 the latter general, amounting to 30,000 men, took 
 shelter within the walls of Saragossa. Having 
 obtained possession of Madrid, the emperor im- 
 mediately directed the 6th corps to join him, in
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. d 
 
 order that he might march with imposing forces 
 upon the English general Sir John Moore, who 
 was advancing too late to the relief of the capital. 
 In the situation in which Napoleon had placed 
 himself, his coming up with an English army and 
 destroying it on a field of battle would have been 
 a triumph better calculated than any other to pro- 
 mote his interests. But he had scarcely moved 
 in the direction of Benevento, when the warlike 
 preparations of Austria compelled him to return 
 to France ; marshal Soult was directed to con- 
 tinue the pursuit of the English. Indepen- 
 dently of the 2nd corps which was under his 
 immediate command, the 6th corps under the 
 orders of marshal Ney was placed at his disposal 
 with the view to insure the success of that expe- 
 dition. 
 
 In the meanwhile, the 1st corps under marshal 
 Victor was taking possession of Estremadura, 
 and the 4th under general Sebastiani was oc- 
 cupying La Mancha ; marshal Moncey was in 
 Arragon at the head of the 3rd, and general 
 Gouvion St. Cyr in Catalonia with the 7th corps. 
 Although king Joseph had returned to Madrid, 
 nevertheless he held no power over the surround- 
 ing country. All the inhabitants had taken up 
 arms at the breaking out of the insurrection ; and 
 in spite of our unexpected successes in the very 
 first campaign, in which they had been signally 
 
 b 2
 
 4 ' MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 defeated, they were making fresh preparations 
 for a general resistance ; armies were forming in 
 all directions*. Their numbers were more im- 
 posing than their discipline, and they exhibited 
 all the defects of a precipitate organization ; but 
 they were in the highest state of excitement, and 
 derived their chief strength from the national en- 
 thusiasm. The new king could only establish his 
 sway by the aid of the French armies, of which 
 he was the generalissimo, in his capacity of lieu- 
 tenant of the emperor his brother. The rein- 
 forcements arrived from the grand army had just 
 reinstated him into his capital ; but it required 
 much greater ones, and often repeated efforts, 
 before the whole kingdom could be brought 
 under subjection. 
 
 The 5th corps, commanded by marshal Mortier, 
 had quitted Silesia on the 8th of September. It 
 crossed the Bidassoa on the 1st of December, 
 and was marching to Burgos, when it received 
 orders to proceed to Arragon for the purpose of 
 replacing the 6th corps. The defensive prepara- 
 tions carrying on at Saragossa called for various 
 and powerful means of attack ; and although 
 marshal Moncey had with the 3rd corps under 
 his command several troops of artillery and en- 
 gineers, and a large besieging train, he stood in 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 1.
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. O 
 
 need of a more numerous body of infantry be- 
 fore he could attempt to invest and lay siege to so 
 extensive and populous a city, which was well 
 supplied with provisions, was determined to de- 
 fend itself, and had arrested the progress of the 
 French a few months before, and compelled them 
 to retreat, although they had come up to its 
 gates, and forced their way into the very streets 
 and squares of the city. 
 
 The 3rd and 5th corps advanced on the 21st of 
 December upon that capital by a combined move- 
 ment. Marshal Moncey took possession of Monte- 
 Torrero, a position which commands the whole 
 town. Marshal Mortier caused the suburb on 
 the left bank of the Ebro to be invested by the 
 2nd division of the 5th corps. The 1st division, 
 which was under the orders of general Suchet, 
 shared at first in the attacks on the right bank 
 against the castle of Aljuferia or of the inqui- 
 sition, and against the western side of the town. 
 Shortly afterwards, general Junot replaced mar- 
 shal Moncey in the command of the 3rd corps ; 
 and marshal Lannes came to take the chief com- 
 mand of both corps, and of the operations of the 
 siege. On his arrival, he directed general Suchet 
 to act with his division as a corps of observation, 
 and to disperse the troops that were successively 
 forming at Calatayud, and on various other 
 points of Arragon. It manoeuvred on both banks
 
 6 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of the Ebro, during the months of January and 
 February. At Licinena, colonel Perena, who had 
 brought together four or five thousand men in a po- 
 sition of some strength, experienced a signal de- 
 feat. General Suchet then drew nearer to Sara- 
 gossa, which afforded a signal manifestation of 
 Spanish obstinacy. Palafox had summoned to 
 arms the vigorous and ardent portion of the in- 
 habitants of Arragon. Pent up in the capital, it 
 carried on a daily struggle from house to house, 
 and wall to wall, disputing every inch of ground, 
 and fighting man to man, notwithstanding the 
 skill, the perseverance, the unbending valour of 
 our soldiers, and of our undaunted sappers and 
 engineers who led the way for them. The de- 
 tails of that memorable siege, to which no other 
 can present a parallel, should be read in the ac- 
 count given of it by general Rogniat. On the 
 18th of February, the artillery opened a formi- 
 dable and well combined fire against a convent of 
 the suburb, which covered the entrance of the 
 bridge. The capture of that point, of the whole 
 suburb, and of its garrison, and our advance in 
 another direction into the very heart of the town 
 deprived the defenders of Saragossa of all further 
 hope of relief or safety. The junta proposed 
 a capitulation on the 2 J st of February : and was 
 compelled to surrender at discretion. Marshal 
 Lannes required it to take the new oath of alle-
 
 BATTLE OF MAKIA. / 
 
 giance, and Mariano Dominguez, the head of the 
 junta, an old man full of energy, said upon taking 
 it : we have done our duty against you, by defend- 
 ing ourselves to the last extremity ; we will hence- 
 forward keep our new engagements with no less con- 
 stancy ; a highly honourable language, the sin- 
 cerity of which was proved by his subsequent 
 conduct. 
 
 It would be impossible correctly to describe 
 the spectacle which was then presented by the 
 unfortunate city of Saragossa. The hospitals 
 could no longer admit any more sick or wounded. 
 The burying grounds were too small for the 
 number of dead carried thither; the corpses 
 sewed up in cloth bags were lying by hundreds 
 at the doors of the several churches. A con- 
 tagious fever had created the most frightful rava- 
 ges. The number of deaths in the interior of 
 the city during the siege, including those who 
 were killed by the enemy, has been estimated at 
 upwards of forty thousand human beings. 
 
 With a view to take advantage of the ter- 
 ror and dejection to which the country was a 
 prey in consequence of the fall of Saragossa, 
 the adjutant commandant Fabre, chief of the 
 staff of Suchet's division, was sent to Jaca with 
 the 34th regiment ; he took possession of that 
 town, as well as of the citadel in the early part 
 of the month of March. During the same month,
 
 8 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 general Girard's divison drove the enemy from 
 the left bank of the Cinca, and took possession 
 of the fort of Monzon. At the end of April, the 
 6th corps received orders to resume the road to 
 Castille, and proceeded through Burgos towards 
 Valladolid. General Suchet was in full march 
 with his division, when he received a courier 
 which brought him orders to assume the chief 
 command of the 3rd corps in the room of general 
 Junot, duke d'Abrantes. 
 
 Suchet's division, the formation of wiiich dated 
 from the time of the camp at Boulogne, and which 
 consisted of the 17th regiment of light infantry, and 
 of the 34th 40th 64th and 88th regiments of infantry 
 of the line, resembled in all respects a Roman 
 legion ; animated by one spirit, united under a 
 chief to whom it was strongly attached, it had 
 grown to be a well disciplined, a skilful, and an 
 indefatigable body of men. It had taken a glo- 
 rious share in the battles of Ulm, of Austerlitz, 
 and of Iena, and being the advanced guard of the 
 5th corps, it had bore the brunt of the attacks 
 at Saalfeld and at Pultusk. General Suchet 
 felt the deepest regret at separating from it. 
 With the view of protecting his return to Sara- 
 gossa, he took with him the rear guard of his 
 division, consisting of a company of skirmishers 
 of the 40th regiment and of a battalion of the 64th, 
 who proved of the greatest utility to him, not
 
 BATTLE OF JIAHIA 
 
 only by their services, but also by the ex- 
 ample of discipline and good order they exhi- 
 bited to the 3rd corps, which was at that time 
 wholly a stranger to that military spirit, of 
 which it presented so perfect a model at a 
 later period. 
 
 That corps d'armee, which had at first entered 
 Spain under the denomination of the 2nd corps of 
 the army of observation of the Gironde, had been 
 trained under marshal Moncey in the best 
 school for valour and good discipline, and had 
 honourably distinguished itself at Madrid, before 
 Valencia, as well as in Navarre. But the young 
 soldiers of whom it was principally composed 
 stood in need of fresh lessons of discipline and 
 experience. The corps was originally formed of 
 two veteran regiments, the 14th and 44th of the 
 line, of a battalion of the 5th regiment of light 
 infantry, of sixty companies of infantry of the 
 depots of the army, organised into five legions, 
 which were soon formed into the 114th, 115th, 
 116th, 117th and 121st regiments, and of four- 
 teen squadrons of cavalry, in like manner con- 
 verted into the 13th regiment of cuirassiers. It 
 had afterwards been reinforced by a Polish le- 
 gion, organised into three regiments, of two 
 battalions each, called the 1st, 2nd and 3rd regi- 
 ments of the Vistula, and by a squadron of Polish 
 lancers. To these must be added the 4th re-
 
 10 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 giment of hussars and the companies of engineers 
 and artillery which had been collected in con- 
 siderable numbers for the siege of Saragossa; 
 they consisted of three companies of miners, six 
 of sappers, eight of artillerymen, one of these 
 being a company of horse artillery, and of eight 
 companies of the train. The field artillery did 
 not exceed twenty pieces of cannon. 
 
 The government seemed impressed with the 
 idea that the whole strength of the 3rd corps did 
 not fall far short of twenty thousand men. Never- 
 theless, the losses experienced during the siege, 
 the great number of sick and wounded, the dis- 
 persion of the 121st regiment of the line and of 
 the 3rd regiment of the Vistula over the surface 
 of Navarre ; and, above all, the removal of the 
 116th and 117th regiments which had been sent 
 to Valladolid from Bayonne, where they had es- 
 corted a number of prisoners ; these causes had 
 actually reduced the number of fighting men 
 then under arms, and available for service, to 
 about 10,000 men, exclusively of the companies 
 of artillery and engineers, as may be seen by the 
 sketch of our situation towards the month of May, 
 1809.* 
 
 The 3rd corps had suffered considerably at 
 the siege of Saragossa. The infantry was much 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 2
 
 BA.TTLE OF MARIA. 11 
 
 weakened ; the newly formed regiments in par- 
 ticular were in a deplorable condition, owing to 
 the defects necessarily attendant upon a recent 
 and hasty organisation, and the inexperience of 
 the soldiers who were young in the profession. 
 Nearly all the men belonging to the artillery 
 had left for Germany, and were replaced by others 
 drawn from the infantry, and, generally speak- 
 ing, very ill clad. The recruiting of the corps 
 was incomplete ; the pay was in arrears, the 
 military chests were without funds, and the re- 
 ceiver of the province had fled ; the means of 
 subsistence were barely adequate to its wants; 
 nor did there exist either magazines or establish- 
 ments of any kind in the midst of a country 
 wholly exhausted by the ravages of war. 
 
 In so discouraging a state of things, that army 
 was far from compensating by its moral strength 
 for the dangers to which it was exposed by its 
 numerical weakness. White and blue uniforms 
 of different shapes, which presented to the eye 
 the offensive remains of a variety of alterations 
 recently attempted to be introduced in the dress of 
 the troops, actually occasioned in the ranks a con- 
 fusion of colours which banished all sense of mili- 
 tary consideration from the minds of an already 
 desponding and weak soldiery. The appearance of 
 misery degraded them in their own estimation, 
 at the same time that it encouraged the pride
 
 12 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and boldness of a hostile population. They 
 deeply lamented the state of destitution into 
 which they had been thrown, and complained of 
 an act of injustice from which their gallantry 
 should have protected them. After having taken 
 a principal share in the labours and dangers of 
 the siege of Saragossa, they had seen the cus- 
 tomary rewards bestowed upon soldiers of the 
 5th corps, whilst they alone had failed to receive 
 such rewards ; owing to an untoward misunder- 
 standing between the chiefs. The unity of com- 
 mand was broken by the departure of marshal 
 Lannes for Paris. A great number of general 
 officers and others, who were anxious to be en- 
 gaged in the campaign about to be opened in 
 Austria, solicited and obtained the favour of pro- 
 ceeding to that country. The duke d'Abrantes 
 himself had solicited leave of absence on the 
 score of ill health. 
 
 General Suchet was aware of these circum- 
 stances, and the increase of difficulties which 
 necessarily await a new chief, when he is un- 
 acquainted with the men he is appointed to 
 command, was calculated to discourage the most 
 undaunted spirit. This consideration would no 
 doubt have justified, on the score of reason and 
 of prudence, a refusal to take the command. 
 Guided, however, by his zeal, and by a love of 
 gl ory, satisfied moreover, that a failure of success is
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 13 
 
 not unattended with honour, when all the means 
 which courage and perseverance are wont to sup- 
 ply have fallen short of their object, he did not 
 shrink from the responsibility which was im- 
 posed upon him. Nevertheless, in taking charge 
 of fresh troops, he felt anxious, before leading 
 them into action, to pass them in review, to 
 address and become acquainted with them, form 
 them to his views, train them to military ma- 
 noeuvres, raise their moral courage, revive their 
 confidence, and restore order and discipline 
 amongst them. He had every reason to expect 
 that the opportunity for so doing would not be 
 wanting to him in the new position he was 
 about to enter upon. Arragon, in fact, appeared 
 to be subdued by the fall of its capital, under 
 the ruins of which lie buried its choicest troops 
 and inhabitants ; every thing, therefore, pre- 
 sented an appearance, at least, of tranquillity 
 in that quarter. Levies of troops had taken 
 place at Valencia and in Catalonia, as well as in 
 the other provinces ; but hitherto their exer- 
 tions had been confined to the defense of their 
 respective territories. In Catalonia, the forces 
 which the Spaniards had succeeded in organ- 
 ising were kept in check by the 7th corps of 
 the French army. There did not exist, there- 
 fore, the slightest indication of the proximate 
 entrance of a Spanish army into Arragon ; and
 
 14 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 general Suchet entertained the more hopes of 
 beino- enabled to organise at leisure the 3rd 
 corps, as the events subsequent to Napoleon's 
 departure, the re-embarkation of the English at 
 Corunna, and the battles of Medellin and of Vails 
 had given to our affairs in general a favourable 
 aspect throughout the Peninsula. 
 
 Notwithstanding, however, that the capture of 
 Saragossa had, in the first instance, compelled 
 Arragon to submit to us, our position in that pro- 
 vince, so far from improving, was beginning to 
 assume a dangerous turn ; for the 3rd corps, 
 which was already weak and insignificant in point 
 of numbers, had again experienced a great reduc- 
 tion by the removal of the 5th regiment. The 
 inhabitants, even when they did not resist us, 
 were perseveringly bent upon counting our num- 
 bers.* They had quickly discovered the secret 
 of our weakness, and the insurrectionary govern- 
 ment was already preparing to take advantage 
 
 • In the month of January, 1809, a period when the national 
 animosity against the French was at its height, a battalion of 
 the 34th regiment of the line, belonging to Suchet's division, 
 was sent from Calatayud 10 a neighbouring town for the 
 mere purpose of reconnoitering, and with strict injunctions not 
 to commit any act of hostility. It met, on its arrival, the in- 
 habitants who, according to their custom, were basking in the 
 sun outside the walls of the town, and, wrapped up in their 
 cloaks, silently bent th Q ir looks upon the troop as it filed along. 
 The chief of battalion on perceiving a numerous population col-
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 15 
 
 of it. General Blake received the command of 
 the troops and provinces of the eastern part of 
 the kingdom. Having collected, within a short 
 space of time, a corps d'arm^e on the frontiers of 
 Valencia, he flattered himself with the hope of 
 defeating the 3rd French corps, of driving it back 
 to Navarre and the Pyrenees, and advancing 
 upon the grand line of communication from 
 Bayonne to Madrid, in order to separate from 
 their basis of operations the French armies which 
 had penetrated into the heart of the Peninsula. 
 The same void which was occasioned in Arragon 
 by the departure of the 5th corps, had been felt 
 all over Spain when the emperor returned to 
 France with his guard, on his way to Germany. 
 Engaged in a remote war against Austria, he was 
 struggling with fortune at Essling, during the 
 month of May, the very period when Sir Arthur 
 
 lected together, very prudently kept his troop under arms, sent 
 for the alcalde, and after some preliminary arrangements, en- 
 tered the town. On arriving at the alcalde's house, the com- 
 mandant demanded provisions for his battalion. It was the 
 general practice of officers to exaggerate a little their numerical 
 strength, either with the view of over-awing, or of securing a 
 more abundant supply for the detachment. He called for a 
 thousand rations of provisions and a hundred rations of forage. 
 I urn aware, said the alcaide to him, that I must supply rations 
 to your troop ; I shall order you to receive 780 rations of 
 provisions aud 60 rations of forage. This was in fact the 
 precise number of men and horses.
 
 16 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Wellesley was bringing the English army back to 
 Portugal, and commencing operations with the 
 view of driving us out of that country, and of 
 afterwards attacking us in the heart of Spain. 
 Blake was therefore seconded by circumstances, 
 the effects of which were only developed at a 
 later period. He did not venture upon an imme- 
 diate attack of the French corps which defended 
 Arragon ; he prepared the way by again stirring 
 up and arming the population. His efforts were 
 crowned with a prompt and a widely extended 
 success. Numerous partisans were organised on 
 both banks of the Ebro, and commenced a petty 
 warfare which unceasingly annoyed the 3rd corps 
 in all its operations, and especially whilst it was 
 engaged in any siege. General Suchet, there- 
 fore, though he af* wards succeeded in con- 
 quering far more formidable obstacles, had always 
 to make head against those partial but annoying 
 attacks, the origin of which dates from this 
 period, and has its rise in the impulse then given 
 to the nation at large. 
 
 When he arrived at Saragossa on the 19th of 
 May, for the purpose of taking upon himself the 
 chief command of the 3rd corps, the 1st division, 
 which was established in a line running at right 
 angles to the Ebro from Barbastro to Alcaniz, occu- 
 pied along the Cinca and the Guadalupe, a line 
 upwards of twenty leagues in extent. This line
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 17 
 
 divided in two by the stream which could be 
 crossed by means of a bridge at Saragossa, 
 that is to say, at a distance of twenty leagues 
 in the rear, was still more dangerous by the vici- 
 nity of Mequinenza, a town defended by a Spanish 
 garrison. The 2nd division occupied Saragossa 
 and the adjoining country. The 3rd division 
 which was partly employed in Navarre, had five 
 of its battalions detached from the main body, 
 and could afford no assistance in case of need. 
 
 The dispersion of the troops, over so weak a 
 position, greatly favoured the views of general 
 Blake, who bore down, towards the middle of 
 May, upon the 1st division commanded by 
 general Laval, drove back his advanced posts 
 from Beceyte and Val de Alforja, forced him 
 to quit Alcaniz on the 18th, and compelled him to 
 retreat towards Sanper and Ixar. General Ha- 
 bert, who was stationed at Barbastro, having at 
 the same time received orders from the duke 
 d'Abrantes to recover possession of Monzon, which 
 had been imprudently abandoned after the de- 
 parture of the 5th corps, sent, on the 16th of 
 May, eight companies of choice troops, and thirty 
 cuirassiers to the left bank of the Cinca. One of 
 those sudden risings so frequently occasioned by 
 the melting of the snow, or by violent falls of 
 rain, which have at all times made this a dan- 
 gerous river, suddenly compromised the safety of 
 the detachment, by separating it from Habert's 
 
 vol. i. c
 
 18 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 brigade; the cuirassiers alone succeeded in swim- 
 ming back with their horses. The eight com- 
 panies were surrounded by an armed population, 
 and by regular troops from Lerida ; and after 
 gallantly fighting for three days, they found 
 themselves without provisions or cartridges, or 
 any means of retreating ; and being considerably 
 reduced in numbers, they laid down their arms 
 and were taken prisoners. 
 
 This unpleasant intelligence reached the duke 
 d'Abrantes at Saragossa, on the 20th of May, at 
 the moment when he was surrendering the com- 
 mand of the 3rd corps to general Suchet. This 
 new chief therefore found, on his first arrival, his 
 army engaged in difficulties ; his career opened 
 with the very danger he had most apprehend- 
 ed ; and he saw, as it were, every thing es- 
 caping from his grasp before he could lay hold 
 of it. It became necessary to march, in the first 
 instance, to the relief of general Laval. Being- 
 invested with the chief command, general Suchet 
 quitted Saragossa on the 21st of May, only 
 leaving a few troops in the town for the purpose 
 of maintaining order, of guarding the parks of 
 artillery, and of securing the communications. 
 He sent orders to general Habert to abandon the 
 left bank of the Ebro, and to proceed to cross 
 that river at Fuentes, so as to be made available 
 as corps of reserve. He advanced in person, 
 with the disposable part of the 2nd division, to-
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 19 
 
 wards the banks of the Guadalupe, and overtook 
 Laval's division on the heights in the rear of 
 Ixar. He soon perceived that those troops, being 
 dejected by recent events, did not deem themselves 
 safe in that position. Nevertheless, he passed all 
 the corps in review, reminded them of the glory 
 they had acquired in the trenches of Saragossa, 
 and the hope which their native country placed 
 in their valour : he announced to them his firm 
 resolution, now that he had quitted one of the 
 finest and most gallant divisions in the whole 
 army, thenceforward to unite himself irretrievably 
 to them by a common fate, to extricate them from 
 the deplorable condition in which they appeared, 
 and to leave no exertion untried that might be 
 calculated to secure to them a glorious career for 
 the future. 
 
 In his anxiety to lose no time in reconnoitring 
 the enemy and trying the mettle of his own troops, 
 he ordered the 1st and 2nd divisions to march in 
 the night of the 22nd of May, and on the morning 
 of the 23rd he appeared before Alcahiz, where 
 Blake occupied a position at the head of his 
 forces. In our approach we took an advanced 
 guard of thirty men prisoners. 
 
 On a close examination of the position, it was 
 hoped that by seizing upon the hill of Las Horcas, 
 which from its situation before the defile of the 
 bridge and the outlets of the town, covered the 
 enemy's line, it would require no effort to silence 
 
 c 2
 
 20 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the wings, by which means we should take a 
 great number of prisoners. Two movements were 
 accordingly directed towards the extreme lines, 
 in order to keep in check the forces of which 
 they consisted and to engage their attention, 
 whilst general Fabre at the head of the 114th 
 of the line and the 1 st regiment of the Vistula, 
 advanced in a column of attack towards the hill 
 which was defended by some pieces of artillery 
 and a line of infantry. The troops, animated by 
 the example of their chiefs, showed at first great 
 steadiness, and, notwithstanding a brisk and mur- 
 derous fire, they reached the foot of the hill. A 
 broad ravine, which had lately been dug in this 
 place, suddenly arrested the progress of the co- 
 lumn, which soon began to waver and to fall back 
 in a state of disorder. All efforts made to recall 
 it to the charge proved ineffectual. The general 
 suspended the action, and in sight of the enemy 
 he rallied his troops within a short distance from 
 the spot, on the line of ground where they had 
 been drawn up previously to the attack. They 
 maintained a calm attitude until evening, when 
 they carried off the wounded, and at nightfall 
 they retired, a battalion of the 64th regiment 
 forming the rear-guard. 
 
 The non-success of this attack was tantamount 
 to an absolute defeat in the eyes of troops, which 
 were already a prey to fear and dejection. Never- 
 theless, it was not without its advantage for the
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 21 
 
 general who obtained, by means of a few prisoners 
 taken in the morning, some information respecting 
 the numbers and character of the troops against 
 which he had to contend, his efforts having hi- 
 therto failed in acquiring any positive knowledge 
 on this subject. In all other respects the attempt 
 upon Alcafiiz proved abortive, and we were com- 
 pelled to resign to the enemy, independently of 
 the moral effect attending a victory, an advanta- 
 geous position which the slowness of our retro- 
 grade movement fortunately induced him not to 
 relinquish for the prospect of harassing us in our 
 retreat. 
 
 We had already distanced the Spaniards by 
 nearly five leagues, when the 1st division, which 
 formed the advance, was seized with a sudden 
 panic. The terrified soldiers fancied that the 
 enemy was close at their heels. The alarm ra- 
 pidly spread under favour of the darkness ; they 
 fired upon each other and took to flight in the 
 utmost confusion. Men, horses, caissons, and 
 field-equipages were hurried along pell-mell to- 
 wards the point of retreat, and reached the village 
 of Sanper, to which the general-in-chief, who had 
 been slightly wounded in the foot, was proceeding 
 with the intention of establishing a camp. The 
 light of clay, however, had the effect of dispelling 
 the phantoms which the night had created ; the 
 soldiers, ashamed of their cowardice, rallied again 
 and resumed their ranks. The events of that
 
 22 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 night and of the preceding day confirmed the ge- 
 neral in the painful conviction that the moral cha- 
 racter of the 3rd corps had received a severe 
 shock. In his anxiety to repair it, he seized the 
 opportunity of exercising one of those acts of 
 severe and prompt justice which are from time to 
 time called for in a camp life. A drummer had 
 spread the cry of alarm, by declaring that he had 
 seen the Spanish cavalry charging the 2nd regi- 
 ment of the Vistula, and the latter surrendering to 
 them. The arrival of that regiment proved the 
 falsehood of his report. The drummer was 
 brought before a military commission which was 
 formed on the instant, and he was condemned 
 to be shot in front of the army. This example 
 proved quite sufficient, and order and tranquillity 
 were immediately restored. After waiting two 
 days for the enemy in front of La Puebla de Ixar, 
 the army continued its movement of retreat to the 
 very walls of Saragossa, where it took up a posi- 
 tion on the 30th of May, six days after the unsuc- 
 cessful attack upon Alcahiz. 
 
 Notwithstanding the perfect order and the 
 slowness of our march, our retreat was, never- 
 theless, considered by the whole country as the 
 prelude to our complete evacuation of Arra- 
 gon. We were, in fact, involved in difficulties, 
 which might be attended with consequences of 
 the most decisive nature. The general in chief 
 was a prey to a very painful state of uncer-
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 23 
 
 tainty as to the course which it was most ad- 
 visable to adopt. Entertaining, as yet, very little 
 confidence in his troops, he feared that if the 
 enemy should make a rapid advance upon him, 
 he might not have it in his power to resist any 
 determined attack from forces so far superior in 
 numbers. Nevertheless, if at the moment of his 
 assuming the command, he evacuated Saragossa, 
 the siege of which had been spoken of all over 
 Europe, and exposed himself to compromise by 
 his retreat the position of all the French armies 
 in the centre of Spain, such a course of pro- 
 ceeding was equivalent to a complete defeat. 
 He accordingly adopted the resolution which 
 would most redound to his honour, and was most 
 consistent with his character. Stopping before 
 Saragossa, he concentrated his small army on 
 that solitary point, the preservation of which 
 was well worth the risk of a battle. He deter- 
 mined that if Blake allowed him some respite, 
 he should there wait the arrival of the 1 lGth and 
 117th regiments, which he was led to expect 
 would shortly return to join him. The 1st di- 
 vision was placed in advance of the Carthu- 
 sian convent of the Conception, the 2nd division 
 on the heights of Monte-Torrero. The soldiers 
 no longer quitted the camp ; they were made 
 to take up arms every morning at three o'clock, 
 and they remained in a fighting position until 
 the return of the reconnoitring parties which were
 
 24 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 sent to look out for the enemy. The general in 
 chief, who was engaged in the two-fold object 
 of re-organizing his army and regulating its plan 
 of defence, passed the regiments in review, and 
 attended to the most trifling details of their ac- 
 coutrements and their wants. He thus acquired 
 a knowledge of the causes to which the bad spirit 
 prevailing in some corps was to be ascribed, dis- 
 tributed praises and punishments, and dismissed a 
 few officers for neglectful or culpable conduct. In 
 the meanwhile, we were constructing intrench- 
 ments and redoubts on the Monte-Torrero, and 
 along the canal ; the castle was put in a state 
 of defence, with a view to our retaining pos- 
 session of it, even in the event of our evacu- 
 ating the town. The suburb was barricadoed, 
 the artillery and baggage which could be 
 dispensed with were sent off to Tudela and 
 Pampelona, as well as the sick and wounded, 
 in order that the army should remain perfectly 
 unfettered in its movements, whether it con- 
 fined itself to manoeuvring, or ran the hazard 
 of a battle. 
 
 The inhabitants who kept a close watch upon 
 us for the purpose of discovering our projects, 
 drew no other inference from our movements, 
 than that we were anxious to conceal our im- 
 mediate retreat. The general, however, was 
 fully rewarded for his exertions and penetrating 
 foresight by the improvement which took place
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 25 
 
 in the moral character of the soldiery. Sur- 
 prised at finding themselves the object of such 
 assiduous attentions, at the frequency of the re- 
 views, at the exercises at firing and the ma- 
 noeuvres on an extensive scale, which now en- 
 gaged the greater portion of their time, as if they 
 were in a profound peace, they felt at once the 
 improvement of their condition, and the revival 
 of their expiring sense of valour and self-im- 
 portance. Their being recalled to discipline and 
 good order, had the effect of restoring their con- 
 fidence in each other and in their chiefs. Fifteen 
 days thus employed, whilst the troops were on 
 the alert, and expecting every moment to be 
 called into action, proved sufficient to accom- 
 plish this metamorphosis, and placed the 3rd 
 corps in a condition to march up to the enemy 
 and attack him in the open plain, instead of 
 watching his approach under protection of their 
 lines of defence. 
 
 If general Blake had moved rapidly forward af- 
 ter the action of Alcaniz, without allowing time for 
 the 3rd corps to recover from its defeat, he would, 
 perhaps, have compelled it to evacuate Arragon. 
 It is probable, however, that this general was 
 unwilling, by too much precipitancy, to com- 
 promise a success which he considered as almost 
 infallible. He was expecting some reinforce- 
 ments from Valencia, and with a view to pro- 
 mote his intended operation, he accelerated on
 
 2G MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 various points the breaking out of local insurrec- 
 tions. In consequence of the impulse thus given 
 by him, colonel Ramon-Gayan approached Al- 
 munia and the valley of the Xalon with two 
 thousand men. Brigadier-general Perena who 
 had been defeated four months before, had re- 
 appeared with his troops, and pushed detach- 
 ments forward as far as the bridge of the Gallego. 
 On the left bank of the Ebro, we only occupied 
 the fort of Jaca and the suburb of Saragossa. 
 General Blake did not determine upon the move- 
 ments he should adopt until the beginning of 
 June, when he put his army in motion. Instead of 
 advancing along the Ebro by the road of Fuentes, 
 he proceeded towards Belchite at the head of 
 twenty-five thousand men. He felt convinced 
 that the troops which had been defeated at Al- 
 cahiz would decline fighting before Saragossa, 
 and that by approaching the valley of the Huerba, 
 and threatening the road of Alagon, he would 
 compel us to retreat. Such, however, was not 
 the intention of general Suchet, who waited for 
 his antagonist ; leaving his cavalry for the pre- 
 sent at El Burgo, he divided his infantry between 
 Monte-Torrero, and the convent of Santa-Fe on 
 the road from Saragossa to Madrid ; and de- 
 tached a body of twelve hundred men to Villa-de- 
 Muel, under the orders of general Fabre, for the 
 purpose of scouring the country to the right of 
 the army, and obtaining timely information of
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 27 
 
 the grand movement which the enemy indi- 
 cated an intention of carrying into effect. 
 
 The main body of the Spanish army, under 
 the orders of lieutenant general Arizaga, took up 
 a position at Botorita on the 13th of June, whilst 
 general Blake, the commander in chief, moved 
 with the remainder of his forces from Carinena 
 to Longares and Villa-de-Muel, which were oc- 
 cupied by general Fabre. On crossing the 
 Huerba, general Arizaga captured a convoy of 
 provisions and cut off general Fabre from Sara- 
 gossa ; the latter being attacked in two different 
 quarters at the same time, opposed as much re- 
 sistance as his position allowed him, and effected 
 his retreat upon Placencia without experiencing 
 any loss. General Suchet ordered the 2nd divi- 
 sion, commanded by general Musnier, to advance 
 to the support of general Fabre, but the approach 
 of night prevented him from extricating that 
 officer and restoring the communication. On the 
 14th, Musnier's division again attacked the ene- 
 my's advanced guard, compelled it to re-cross the 
 Huerba, and was preparing to pursue it in order 
 to seize upon the position of Botorita, when it 
 was compelled to retire, owing to the arrival of 
 the forces from Villa-de-Muel under Blake's im- 
 mediate orders. The main body of the Spanish 
 army having crossed to the left bank of the 
 Huerba, and threatened our line of retreat, it 
 now became necessary to arrest its progress ;
 
 28 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 general Suchet accordingly determined to op- 
 pose him, and adopted for the action of the 15th 
 a new order of battle. The 44th regiment and 
 the 3rd of the Vistula, remained in the camp 
 of Monte-Torrero. Habert's division and the 
 2nd division were drawn up in a line, and en- 
 camped partly at the convent of Santa-F£, partly 
 on the heights to the right. The battalion of the 
 64th regiment was stationed in the rear upon the 
 main road ; this reserve of veteran soldiers, of 
 the old division of general Suchet, though weak 
 in point of numbers, maintained by its steady 
 attitude and discipline, an imposing appear- 
 ance in the midst of the 3rd corps. The brigade 
 of cavalry commanded by general Wattier was 
 placed contiguous to it. An officer was sent off to 
 Alagon the same night, for the purpose of acce- 
 lerating the return on the next morning of general 
 Fabre, who on leaving Placentia, had descended 
 the banks of the Xalon, and of hastening the 
 march of the HGth and 117th regiments, which 
 were on their way from Tudela to join the army. 
 
 The battle was about to commence almost un- 
 der the walls of Saragossa. It was of the utmost 
 consequence that the command of that important 
 city should be confided to an officer of acknow- 
 ledged merit, whose vigour and firmness of cha- 
 racter might make up for the inadequacy of the 
 troops left under his orders, with a view to pre- 
 vent all popular movements, and arrest the pro-
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 29 
 
 gress of the Spanish corps on the left bank. The 
 general-in-chief selected colonel Haxo of the en- 
 gineers who had displayed great military talents 
 during the siege of that city. He placed at his 
 disposal the several corps of engineers, and a 
 thousand infantry. 
 
 On the 15th of June, general Blake deployed 
 his army in front of the small rivulet, over which 
 runs the main road, by means of a bridge near 
 the village of Maria ; his right extended to the 
 Huerba, of which he occupied the banks, and 
 prolonged his centre and left as far as the heights, 
 which he lined with infantry and artillery. These 
 arrangements were slowly carried into effect ; 
 and although the two armies were at a very short 
 distance from each other, the morning was con- 
 sumed in a mere firing of advanced posts which 
 was kept up by the 2nd regiment of the Vistula, 
 and afterwards by the 115th regiment, until 
 noon-day. General Suchet, who only sought 
 to gain time until the arrival of his two de- 
 tachments, shewed no impatience to commence 
 the action. General Laval's two regiments on 
 the Monte-Torrero, which was separated by the 
 Huerba from the field of battle, were considered 
 as a detached corps, and so kept for the purpose 
 of watching the road to Fuentes. Our safety 
 depended in some measure on their retaining 
 possession of the commanding point which they 
 occupied ; for if the enemy had seized upon it,
 
 30 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the presence of the latter would have sufficed to 
 drive the population of Saragossa to arms, and 
 place us in a most dangerous position. Thus it 
 happened, that from the nature of the ground, 
 and in spite of the measures which he had long 
 been planning with the view of collecting his 
 scattered forces, the general-in-chief found him- 
 self compelled to run the risk of a pitched battle, 
 with thirteen battalions of infantry, seven squa- 
 drons of cavalry, and twelve pieces of cannon, 
 forming together a force of less than nine thou- 
 sand men. He was at last apprised towards noon, 
 that colonel Robert had reached the neighbour- 
 hood of Saragossa, with the 1 16th and 117th re- 
 giments ; and he sent him instructions to proceed 
 without halting towards the convent of Santa- 
 F6. He immediately ordered the first reserve to 
 advance and form into line, and general Wattier 
 was brought nearer to the left, commanded by 
 general Habert. Musnier's division was spread 
 upon the heights, forming the centre and right, 
 the extremity of which was flanked by the 
 squadron of lancers under the orders of the Polish 
 colonel Kliski. The general-in-chief, finding that 
 the enemy remained motionless in his position, 
 had hitherto allowed a part of his troops to take 
 rest, and the horses to be kept unbridled, in 
 order to increase the confidence of his small 
 army, which was beginning to long for the bat- 
 tle, and demanded to be led to the charge.
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 31 
 
 The order for attacking was given at two 
 o'clock. The movement commenced along the 
 whole line, ;\t the very instant when the Spanish 
 army put itself in motion, and extended its left 
 as if with the intention to outflank us. General 
 Suchet proceeded at once to the extreme right, 
 for the purpose of preventing this manoeuvre ; he 
 detached the lancers and two hundred skirmish- 
 ers to the flank, whilst a battalion of the 114th 
 marched direct upon the enemy in a column of 
 attack. Their charge threw into disorder the 
 Spanish battalions, which were just putting them- 
 selves in motion ; they fell back upon their line 
 of battle, and had only time to assume an atti- 
 tude of defense. The general-in-chief did not 
 hesitate a moment in causing an immediate at- 
 tack upon the whole left and centre of general 
 Blake. The contending armies were separated 
 by a ravine, which Musnier's division had orders 
 to cross without firing, and with their arms shoul- 
 dered. Colonel Chlopiski, at the head of the 
 1st regiment of the Vistula, formed in columns, 
 forthwith marched up to the steep position of the 
 Spaniards; the 114th and 115th regiments, which 
 had deployed, made a similar movement un- 
 der a murderous fire of artillery, which colonel 
 Valee vigorously returned.* General Blake not 
 
 * General Val£e commanded at that time the artillery of the 
 3rd corps, with the rank of colonel.
 
 32 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET. 
 
 only sustained the attack, but drew reinforce- 
 ments from his right, and moved his line for- 
 ward against the 115th regiment, which the ob- 
 stacles of the ground towards the centre, and the 
 violence of the enemy's line had compelled to 
 stop. The efforts of general Boussard and co- 
 lonel Dupeyroux succeeded in rekindling its 
 ardour. The general-in-chief sent forward the 
 2nd regiment of the Vistula, and the battalion of 
 the 64th regiment, without, however, bringing 
 them into close action. He detached general 
 Harispe, his chief of the staff, with a hundred 
 grenadiers ; that officer rushed into the ravine, 
 and though wounded in the first onset, he brought 
 his soldiers back to the charge, and restored the 
 chances of the battle. A violent storm, which 
 had burst over the two armies, almost concealed 
 them from each other, though they were a very 
 short distance apart. 
 
 The movement attempted by general Blake on 
 his extreme left, and the charge just made on the 
 centre of the Spaniards, though apparently for- 
 tuitous and the effect of mere chance, were highly 
 favourable to the views of the general in chief. 
 On considering the plan of the battle, it will 
 appear that the Spanish general, by establish- 
 ing himself on the heights sloping down to the 
 left bank of the Huerba, with ravines in his front 
 and rear, had no means of retreat, if his positions 
 should be forced, except by the road and the little
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 33 
 
 bridge of Maria behind the extreme right of his 
 line, thus evidently compromising the safety 
 of his left and centre, and in particular of the artil- 
 lery with which they were lined. This defective 
 arrangement on the part of the enemy naturally 
 pointed out the course we had to adopt. General 
 Suchet feigned at first to neglect his left, and 
 even avoided a display of the cavalry he was col- 
 lecting on that point, whilst his centre and right 
 were engaged. He no sooner found the contest in 
 this quarter at its height, than he rapidly flew to 
 the left. The Spanish cavalry, supported by 
 a battery and by a small body of infantry, 
 was stationed beyond the bridge. He ordered 
 general Habert to send forward the 14th regiment 
 of the line, preceded by the battalion of the 5th 
 light regiment as riflemen. He then suddenly 
 directed general Wattier, who commanded the 
 4th hussars and the 13th regiment of cuirassiers 
 to gain the start of the infantry, make a rapid 
 charge, drive in the enemy's right, and take pos- 
 session of the bridge. This manoauvre could not 
 fail to be decisive of the contest, and it was 
 executed with the quickness ot lightning. The 
 Spaniards being thrown into disorder by the sud- 
 denness of the shock, took to flight, and their 
 cavalry was completely routed. We remained 
 masters of the ground, the bridge and the battery. 
 Although deprived of the assistance of his right, 
 general Blake did not abandon his position Col- 
 
 VOL. I. D
 
 34 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Jecting his masses of infantry and redoubling the 
 fire of his artillery, he boldly stood his ground 
 and waited the attack which he saw was prepar- 
 ing against him. General Suchet profited by the 
 advantage he had just obtained on the flank of 
 the enemy's last position. He sent general Ha- 
 bert against him in an oblique direction with the 
 battalion of the 5th light regiment and the 14th 
 of the line, whilst Musnier's division advanced in 
 front to the charge. The contest was severe 
 and obstinately maintained ; but when French 
 soldiers are once borne on the wing of victory, it 
 is difficult to resist them. The enemy's infantry 
 was driven back ; it rushed into the ravines, and 
 eluded our pursuit under favour of the darkness 
 and of the raging storm. Twenty-five pieces of 
 cannon and three standards fell into our possession. 
 General Blake succeeded, notwithstanding the 
 natural obstacles of the ground, in reaching the 
 banks of the Huerba, and rallying the fugitives at 
 Botorita, leaving a greater number of killed than 
 of prisoners behind him. Amongst the latter was 
 general O'Donohu, who commanded the cavalry, 
 and colonel Menchaca, inspector of the infantry. 
 Our loss consisted of about six or seven hundred 
 killed and wounded. General Harispe's wound de- 
 prived the army for some time of the services of 
 that gallant officer, who already held the rank of 
 chief of the staff of the army. 
 
 The enemy having completely retreated during
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 35 
 
 the night, the general in chief felt desirous of im- 
 mediately availing himself of those troops whose 
 only duty during the battle had been to occupy 
 the Monte-Torrero, and to display from a distance 
 to the hostile general that he could dispose of 
 another corps of reserve against him. He sent 
 orders to general Laval to move forward to Torre- 
 cilia by the plateau of Fuentes, for the purpose of 
 threatening the enemy's rear guard. The general 
 in chief came the same night to Saragossa in order 
 to direct some important arrangements in that 
 city, from which it was his intention to absent 
 himself for a short time. At night, the city was 
 surrounded at a distance by Perena's bivouacs on 
 the left bank of the Ebro, this officer having ima- 
 gined that he could by mere demonstration pro- 
 mote the success of his cause and of the engage- 
 ment ; but the inhabitants who during the action 
 had exhibited no other feeling than one of mere 
 curiosity, altogether free from agitation or hostile 
 indications, remained in a state of tranquillity and 
 obedience, a prudent deportment on their part, 
 from which they never swerved on any future 
 occasion. 
 
 On the morning of the ICth, general Suchet 
 beheld with surprise the army of general Blake 
 still occupying its position at Botorita. Being- 
 still sanguine in his expectations of the effect 
 which general Laval's march was calculated to 
 produce, lie reiterated his instructions to that. 
 
 d 2
 
 36 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 officer ; and in order to second him, he confined 
 himself to the object of diverting the enemy's 
 attention by movements on the left of the Huerba, 
 approaching his position without attacking him, 
 and pushing forward detachments on the road of 
 Villa-de-Muel and Carinena. He thus acquired 
 a certainty that no Spanish corps had retreated 
 in that direction. This was an additional motive 
 for expecting the result which he had anticipated 
 from his manoeuvre. General Laval, however, 
 having been led astray by improper guides, found 
 it impossible to reach the appointed spot on the 
 16th. Blake broke up his camp the following 
 night, and his rear guard alone could be come up 
 with at Tordecilla on the 17th; general Laval 
 took a battalion of marines and a few camp-equi- 
 pages. The general-in-chief commenced in per- 
 son the pursuit of Blake on the morning of the 
 17th, and pushed on as far as Puebla d'Alborton. 
 On the 18th in the morning, the two armies were 
 again in presence of each other at Belchite. They 
 immediately prepared for action ; but their re- 
 spective situations were greatly altered both in 
 regard to their materiel and to the moral character 
 of the soldiers. General Blake found himself 
 compelled, after the loss of his artillery, to aban- 
 don all idea of conquering Saragossa, and was 
 now on the point of fighting to secure his retreat. 
 General Suchet having been enabled to assemble 
 the greater part of his forces, presented himself
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 37 
 
 to the contest with twenty-two battalions and 
 eight squadrons animated by their recent victory; 
 he aimed at destroying, or dispersing at least, the 
 enemy's army, with a view to complete his vic- 
 tory and to remain in undisturbed possession of 
 Arragon. 
 
 Blake having been reinforced in the night 
 by four thousand men of the army at Valencia, 
 had taken up a position on the heights of Bel- 
 chite. His right was stationed towards the height 
 of the Calvario, with some cavalry in front in 
 the direction of the road to Saragossa ; his centre 
 leaned upon the town and the convent of Santa- 
 Barbara; his left extended across the heights 
 towards the hermitage of El Poyo in several 
 lines, with reserves in the rear and some pieces 
 of artillery regularly drawn up. Those lines 
 were connected by barns, loop holed houses and 
 intrench ments. The whole ground in advance 
 of our front, and especially of our centre, was 
 lined with olive trees intersected by ditches and 
 canals for irrigation which rendered it of difficult 
 access. General Suchet deemed it sufficient 
 to cause the centre to be watched by light troops 
 supported by a few reserve battalions ; he di- 
 rected Haberfs brigade and the 13th regiment 
 of cuirassiers to turn, from a distance, the ene- 
 my's right between Codo and Belchite, and 
 personally superintended the main attack against 
 the left. General Musnier received orders to
 
 38 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 march in columns by battalion, and to charge 
 as soon as the artillery should have made an im- 
 pression upon the line. This movement was 
 executed by the 114th regiment, the 1st of the 
 Vistula and the 4th hussars, whilst the 115th 
 was advancing still further to the left. The 
 Spaniards abandoned the hermitage of El Poyo ; 
 their wing retired in a body and took up a con- 
 centrated position round Belchite and Santa 
 Barbara. They now opened a brisk fire of artil- 
 lery ; formed themselves into imposing columns of 
 attack and with the support of their cavalry they 
 advanced to meet us. General Wattier, however, 
 succeeded in checking their movement, and ge- 
 neral Musnier resolutely persisted in bearing 
 down upon the infantry. The action was gra- 
 dually becoming obstinate on both sides, when 
 two pieces of our light artillery, which lieutenant 
 Auvray had brought forward, directed their fire 
 against the artillery of the enemy's army, with 
 so much boldness and precision, that a howitzer 
 shell falling upon a caisson set fire to it. Several 
 caissons blew up, and spread terror in the Spa- 
 nish ranks ; the flight of one battalion caused the 
 retreat of the remainder. Both wings followed 
 the example of the centre, rushed through Bel- 
 chite, and precipitately fled in the utmost con- 
 fusion through the plains beyond the town. The 
 defile leading to it, and the distance of the 
 cuirassiers, who had not yet had time to come up
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 39 
 
 by the left, prevented our taking advantage of this 
 dispersion of the enemy, or taking a considerable 
 number of prisoners. The 1st regiment of Va- 
 lencia was the only corps which succeeded in ral- 
 lying at the distance of two leagues from the 
 field of battle ; it was instantly charged and taken 
 prisoner. Nine pieces of cannon, which were 
 the only artillery remaining to the Spanish 
 army, a standard, twenty three caissons, and 
 a quantity of small arms and baggage fell into 
 our power. General Blake's army was com- 
 pletely dispersed. 
 
 On the following day, the 19th, we occupied 
 Calanda, Alcaniz and Caspe, where we found 
 stores and provisions in abundance. The gene- 
 ral in chief sent four columns in pursuit of the 
 enemy in all directions ; one of these approached 
 Tortosa, another entered Morella, a town situated 
 in the kingdom of Valencia. General Musnier 
 was left in command of the troops on the Gua- 
 dalupe, with orders to place the castle of Alcaniz 
 in a state of defense. 
 
 The general-in-chief crossed the Ebro at Caspe 
 on the 23rd of June, caused a reconnoitring to 
 be made in the environs of Mequinenza, ad- 
 vanced upon Fraga, crossed the Cinca, and took 
 possession of the fort of Monzon. Another re- 
 connoitring was also affected in the direction of 
 Merida; which so alarmed its governor that he 
 shut himself up in the place, at the very moment
 
 40 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 when, according to common report, he was pre- 
 paring to proceed to the relief of Gerona ; the 
 danger, with which he was now threatened, com- 
 pelled him to renounce all idea of a distant 
 operation, and to confine himself to the defense 
 of his post. General Habert remained on the 
 Cinca with the 3rd division. 
 
 The general-in-chief having completed these 
 military arrangements, which were intended to 
 protect the 3rd corps from danger, and to promote 
 the success of his future operations, he crowned 
 them by a first attempt at introducing a system 
 of justice and moderation, which he calculated 
 would enable him, whilst he held possession of 
 Arragon, to subdue the animosity of its popula- 
 tion. He exerted himself at Alcaniz and Caspe, 
 two influential towns on the right bank, to calm 
 the apprehensions of the inhabitants, and to 
 hold out to them a prospect of future prosperity 
 after the unavoidable disorders of a state of war- 
 fare, from which they were about to emerge. 
 The same language and conduct were productive 
 of a salutary effect at Barbastro and Huesca, chief 
 towns of the principal corregimientos on the left 
 bank, through which he passed on his way back 
 to Saragossa. In this capital, in particular, he 
 endeavoured to pave the way for the success of 
 his plans by the most cautious conduct. The 
 clergy, the public authorities, and a crowd of 
 inhabitants, came to meet him at the bridge of
 
 BATTLE OF MARIA. 4i 
 
 the Gallego, and received him with every de- 
 monstration of joy and confidence. Rejoicings 
 spontaneously took place in this city during* seve- 
 ral successive days ; an unlooked for spectacle, 
 well worthy of attracting attention, occurring as 
 it did in the midst of the ruins of a siege, still 
 exhibiting its appalling effects in every direction. 
 In the principal street, along the Cosso, were 
 heaped and guarded the guns lately belonging to 
 Blake's army, and now become the trophies of 
 the battles fought at Maria and Belchite. This 
 sight, which was calculated to impose upon 
 ardent imaginations, was tempered by the no less 
 imposing spectacle of the religious ceremonies 
 which were celebrated in all their splendour in 
 the venerated church del Pilar ; and the general - 
 in-chief made it his duty to contribute to it by 
 the pomp of military display. This harmony 
 had the effect of impressing the inhabitants with 
 the idea that all further resistance on their part 
 would be unavailing, and that it behoved them 
 to submit to a regular order of things, which held 
 out a prospect of peace and security. Upon these 
 sentiments of the inhabitants of Saragossa ge- 
 neral Suchet built his hopes of improving the 
 condition of the 3rd corps d'armee and of Arragon 
 itself.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 View of the condition of Spain. — Organization of the Gueril- 
 las. — Various engagements. — Actions fought at San Juan 
 de la Pena and at Nuestra Seriora del Tremedal. — Capture of 
 Venasque. — Successive occupation of Arragon. 
 
 General Suchet having returned to Sara- 
 gossa on the 1st of July, he bent his endea- 
 vours, within the limits of his command, to the 
 object of availing himself of the local and still 
 recent influence created by the events which 
 have just been related. But his efforts were 
 counteracted by the general reaction of the 
 public mind throughout the Peninsula. The 
 Spaniards are, of all men, the most susceptible of 
 excited feelings, consequently the most credu- 
 lous, and at the same time the most prone to doubt 
 or disbelieve ; they readily placed dependence 
 upon reports, and as readily rejected them accord- 
 ing as they favoured or ran counter to their hopes 
 and wishes. The candid account given by general 
 Blake of his defeat at Belchite, compelled them 
 to admit that the French had just obtained a
 
 BATTLES IN AKRAGON. 43 
 
 signal success in Arragon. The central junta 
 of Seville attempted to revive the spirits of the 
 nation by accounts of a more cheering- nature. 
 The victory of Eckmiilh, the capture of Ratisbon 
 and of Vienna had failed to make due impres- 
 sion; but the battle of Essling, the breaking- 
 down of the bridges on the Danube, and the ne- 
 cessity in which the French army was placed of 
 halting on the bank of that river, afforded, as 
 they alleged, a sure presage of its proximate and 
 unavoidable destruction. At the same period of 
 time, and on a less distant scene of action, the 
 successive evacuation of Portugal, Gallicia and 
 Asturias, the hope of recovering possession of 
 Madrid, and the combined march of the English 
 and Spanish armies for the purpose of effecting 
 a junction on the banks of the Tagus, excited 
 the Spaniards to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, 
 and accelerated the organization of the nume- 
 rous levies which were arming- against us in 
 every part of the Spanish Peninsula. 
 
 The victories of Maria and Belchite had not 
 wholly eradicated from Arragon the effect 
 produced in that province by the circumstances 
 just adverted to. Blake's army had disappeared; 
 his materiel and magazines had fallen into our 
 hands ; he had no longer any grand depot or 
 point of junction. It must, however, be admit- 
 ted that, notwithstanding its numerical strength, 
 and the great pains bestowed to the object of
 
 44 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 giving it a formidable appearance, that army 
 was a mere auxiliary in the cause it came to de- 
 fend ; and the insurrection, profiting by the losses 
 of the regular army, soon became far more dan- 
 gerous to the enemy. The remains of Blake's 
 army having returned home or dispersed itself 
 through the country, served to keep up and re- 
 inforce the Guerilla bands already formed, which 
 were thus recruited by the accession of expe- 
 rienced officers and of well-trained soldiers. They 
 re-appeared more formidable and numerous than 
 before : armed bands, the existence of which 
 was hitherto unknown, sprung up amongst the 
 mountains of Calatayud, and in the defiles ad- 
 joining Huesca and Barbastro. There it was 
 that this new system of resistance was brought 
 into action in the north of Spain, which was 
 afterwards so skilfully wielded by some of its 
 chiefs, and which defended the country in a far 
 more effectual manner than the regular war 
 carried on by disciplined armies, because it was 
 more consistent with the nature of the country 
 and the character of its inhabitants. This is a 
 truth which the geographical form of Spain places 
 beyond a doubt, and which is borne out by her 
 history from the time of Sertorius to the present 
 day. 
 
 Considered in a geographical and physical 
 point of view, Spain is in many respects as 
 much connected with Africa as with Europe ;
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAG0X. 45 
 
 there can exist no doubt of the fact, when 
 glancing at a map of the Mediterranean we be- 
 hold near the peninsulas of Greece and of Italy 
 the Spanish Peninsula stretching out her hand 
 as it were, to join the extreme point of Africa, 
 which seems to be a mere continuation of the 
 territory of Spain, notwithstanding the dissimi- 
 larity of names and the strait which separates 
 them. On consulting all historical accounts, it 
 will be seen that the fate of both countries pre- 
 sents a resemblance no less striking than their 
 territory. The Romans went so far as to confound 
 them under a common denomination. That por- 
 tion of Africa which borrowed from Tingis 
 (Tangier) the name of Tingitana, has sometimes 
 received the appellation of Hispania transfretana 
 (Spain beyond the strait). The Phoenicians and 
 Carthagenians were attracted from Africa by the 
 wealth of Boetica ; the Vandals, who are said to 
 have left their name to the province of Andalusia, 
 and afterwards the Goths crossed the strait for 
 the purpose of establishing themselves on the op- 
 posite coast of Africa ; and, at a later period, the 
 Moors or Saracens again brought rulers from Africa- 
 to exercise their sway over Spain, from whence 
 they were banished by the last revolution which 
 that country underwent less than three cen- 
 turies ago. 
 
 If we next direct our attention to those coun- 
 tries, not as they formerly were, but as they are
 
 4G MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 at the present day, we cannot avoid discovering 
 many traits of resemblance between them. 
 Through the difference which the religion, the 
 government, and the laws have created in the 
 manners, the costume, and the language of their 
 respective inhabitants, we find that the physical 
 and terrestial affinities, the soil, the water, the 
 system of agriculture are still the same in two 
 neighbouring countries which a long series of 
 events have estranged from each other. Thus 
 it is, that the same burning sun parches the 
 coast of Barbary, as well as Andalusia, and the 
 Algarves. The mountains, barren of trees, no 
 longer attract the clouds or storms. The plains, 
 and frequently the vallies, are visited with 
 droughts. It is no doubt true, that wherever the 
 ressources of art have been combined with fer- 
 tilising streams, the result has been highly suc- 
 cessful in bringing forth abundant harvests. Ad- 
 joining these fertile tracts, however, we find im- 
 mense deserts, or else desplobados* the extent of 
 which the eye vainly attempts to measure ; and the 
 mind gives way to despondency at the aspect 
 of a space equally barren and dreary in every 
 direction. If we proceed to the summit of some 
 of those mountains which traverse Spain from one 
 
 * Depopulated spots of ground are so common in Spain, 
 that the inhabitants have a substantive, which specially de- 
 fines them ; they call them despoblados.
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 47 
 
 extremity to the other, we find under a constantly 
 burning sun, high lands devoid of culture, and 
 barren slopes, of which no animated object ever 
 breaks the uniformity. Nothing arrests the eye 
 except a river or a brook, which is seen in the 
 distance winding its course at the bottom of a 
 valley, and is lined with a verdant border, 
 along which the beholder traces the crops, the 
 plantations and the dwellings of man. A co- 
 loured map representing the form of every val- 
 ley, the blue waters, the borders of rivers lined 
 with a green tint of varied breadth, would exhibit 
 a faithful picture, and point out the real con- 
 dition of that territory, which, although nearly 
 equal in extent to France, scarcely contains and 
 supports a third part of our population. One 
 might thus embrace at a glance, and, as if by 
 anatomical process, the veins and arteries of that 
 immense body, which, though lacking plump- 
 ness, still retains all its nerves and muscles, if 
 such a comparison may be allowed, and pre- 
 sents in its structure a work evidently formed 
 for grace and vigour. 
 
 The Spanish peninsula, in fact, leaning as it 
 does upon solid foundations, is covered with lofty 
 chains of mountains extending in all directions, 
 and appears like a vast promontory between the 
 two seas that wash its shores. Gently de- 
 clining towards the east and west, it naturally 
 divides itself into two unequal slopes, the one to-
 
 48 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 wards the Ebro, and a few small rivers flowing 
 in the direction of the Mediterranean, the other 
 carrying to the ocean, the waters of the Guadal- 
 quivir, the Guadiana, the Tagus and the Douro. 
 Proceeding inland from the sea-shore, some low 
 plains of admirable fertility and cultivation, form 
 the basis of this amphitheatre. One ascends 
 through vallies cultivated as huertas below the 
 waters, and as secanos above them,* thus reaching 
 the first chain of mountains. Beyond these moun- 
 tains, however, there is no descending as usual 
 into a valley ; one enters into immense plains 
 supported by the internal plateau of country. 
 Whole provinces, the two Castilles, La Mancha, 
 and all the centre of Spain, are placed in that 
 elevated region. The centre is further crowned 
 by other chains, bearing to the very clouds their 
 snow-capt tops, which a summer of six months' 
 duration will not always melt away. 
 
 The result of this conformation is, that the waters 
 must sink deep into the ground, before they can 
 
 * Water is valuable in Spain, owing to its great scarcity. 
 Almost every brook has been turned from its course, for pur- 
 poses of irrigation. The lower parts of the land take the 
 name of huertas, (gardens ;) they are principally used for the 
 cultivation of rice, Indian corn, olive-trees, &c. But owing 
 to the fertility of the soil, and the genial warmth of the climate, 
 advantage is taken of many parts of the country not sus- 
 ceptible of being watered, which are called secanos (dry 
 fields ;) these are reserved for corn, vines, See.
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 49 
 
 force their way to the sea. Whilst the rivers in 
 the north of Europe reach their mouths after a 
 long course through the country, and across 
 lakes and swamps, the rivers in Spain, together 
 with the streams flowing into them, rush down 
 by rapid descents from deep and rugged gullies, 
 presenting picturesque and wild scenery, and 
 narrow and difficult passes at every step of their 
 progress. It is impossible to travel the distance 
 of a few leagues in that country, without meeting 
 one or many of those defiles, like the Thermo- 
 pilae, or the Caudine forks, in which two or three 
 hundred men would be sufficient to arrest the 
 march of whole armies. The ravines are ge- 
 nerally dry, and yet impassable. The large rivers 
 present no means of communication ; navigation 
 is frequently interrupted by various obstructions. 
 A few canals, dug in the midst of popular oppo- 
 sition,* are seldom used except for purposes of 
 
 * In Arragon, the canon Pignatelli, a man of comprehensive 
 views and of elevated mind, formed the plan, during the 
 last century, of completing the canal called the imperial canal, 
 which was first commenced by Charles V, and which he after- 
 wards abandoned. This canal was intended to be supplied 
 by the waters of the Ebro, taken on the right bank below 
 Tudela in Navarre, and was to convey them along the barren 
 hillocks which border the valley of the river, as far as Caspe, 
 where the mountains approach each other, and prevent the 
 continuation of a lateral canal. The result would have been an 
 increase in the means of irrigation, and moreover, an easy 
 mode of conveyance for exporting the produce of Arragon, 
 VOL. I. E
 
 50 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 irrigation. Two royal main roads, connected by 
 a small number of inferior causeways, run from 
 the capital to Bayonne, Valencia, and Barcelona. 
 They cross over streams and brooks by means of 
 handsome bridges, and are neither injured by the 
 rains nor by the rolling of vehicles, in a country 
 
 or importing that of Catalonia, Castille and Navarre, an in- 
 calculable advantage in a country where the most useful com- 
 modities often lose their value for want of means of sale. 
 The utility of such a plan stands not in need of demonstration 
 to the man who has the simplest notions of agriculture, of 
 commerce, or of political economy. Nevertheless, its execution 
 was opposed in every way by numberless obstacles, by cla- 
 mour, prejudices, and calumny. Pignatelli, the friend of a 
 minister, (count d'Aranda,) who, like himself, was a native of 
 Arragon, and yielded not to him in his anxiety and zeal for the 
 public welfare, stood in need of protection, and of the utmost 
 perseverance to avoid being discouraged, and to bring his vast 
 undertaking to a successful close. He had the satisfaction of 
 finishing the canal, the bridges, the sluices, the drains, as far as 
 Saragossa, in other words, of realising one half of his plan. 
 The Spanish Riquet embarked at the Bocal, a spacious basin 
 where the river is turned from its course. During the whole 
 of his voyage, he beheld waters issuing from the canal, and 
 spreading life and abundance in the country about the Ebro ; 
 and with his boat, a perfect triumphal car, he reached the 
 Casa Blanca, a handsome large mill, standing at the same 
 elevation with the Monte-Torrero, above Saragossa. On ar- 
 riving at that spot, he erected a fountain on the main road, 
 with the following inscription, which I still read at the com- 
 mencement of the siege of Saragossa, but which I afterwards 
 sought for in vain: — Viatorum commotio, et incredulorum 
 convictioni.
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 51 
 
 where every thing is transported on the backs 
 of mules, and where the service of post horses is 
 scarcely known. In every other direction, the 
 communications are extremely difficult, the pro- 
 vinces are isolated from each other, the towns 
 and villages separated by immense distances, 
 and built upon heights, or inclosed within walls, 
 surrounded by splendid forests of olive-trees, but 
 rarely by cottages or country houses. Whole 
 tracts of land are covered with broom and heath. 
 Those uncultivated spots serve, no doubt, to feed 
 immense flocks of sheep, whose fine wool is a 
 source of wealth to the Spaniards, though they can 
 only render it available by the aid of foreign indus- 
 try; but the really useful cultivation, that which 
 contributes to support and increase the population, 
 is confined within very narrow limits. The hand 
 of man disdains to plant ; combustible materials 
 are wanting in the midst of numberless and still 
 unexplored coal-mines ; and in a fertile country 
 which is favourable to every species of produc- 
 tion, and where the numerous poor are without 
 means of subsistance, the potatoe is neglected ; 
 nor is any attempt ever made to introduce, or 
 propagate it. 
 
 It will readily be admitted that a country so 
 peculiarly adapted to a defensive warfare, inha- 
 bited as it is, by men no less remarkable for their 
 active and sober habits than for their courage and 
 intelligence, can with difficulty be conquered, 
 
 e2
 
 52 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Various nations have successively invaded it. 
 History exhibits them seizing upon Spain after 
 long and sanguinary wars, establishing their 
 dominion on various points, without being able 
 wholly to subdue the Spaniards, and defeated at 
 last, or driven out as much by the constancy of 
 the inhabitants as by the usual inconstancy of 
 fortune. 
 
 The spirit of the ancient Celtiberians still ani- 
 mated their descendants, when the emperor Na- 
 poleon, after having wounded their pride, at- 
 tempted to conquer their obedience. It is well 
 known that a people determined to defend them- 
 selves on their own soil present a mass of strength 
 and a power of opinion, the absence of which 
 would prevent hastily formed armies from offering 
 any effectual resistance to an invading power. 
 The armed and disciplined youth sustained with 
 steady constancy a national struggle against the 
 French armies on fields of battle and especially in 
 besieged towns. But the greater part of the popu- 
 lation, sometimes without any distinction of age or 
 of sex, embarked in that active and obstinate spe- 
 cies of contest which brought enemies upon us in 
 all directions and exhausted us far more than regu- 
 lar engagements. Each district formed as it were 
 its own Guerilla for the purpose of protecting its 
 territory and co-operating in the common defence. 
 Peasants, land owners, fathers of families, priests 
 and monks, unhesitatingly abandoned their dwell-
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 53 
 
 ings in which the greater part scarcely enjoyed 
 more of the comforts of life than in the open coun- 
 try, in order to swell the Guerilla bands that 
 were forming against us. Prepared to undergo 
 every sacrifice, free from the wants of a luxurious 
 life as well as from the attachment so generally 
 felt for uniforms, for the mode of service or the 
 peculiar nature of the weapons, they met in 
 irregular bodies, selected their own chiefs, car- 
 ried on operations according as their caprice 
 dictated, never failed to attack when numbers 
 and a favorable opportunity promised them suc- 
 cess, fled without disgrace when they were the 
 weakest, and occasionally, by a general dis- 
 persion planned before hand disappeared, so 
 that it became difficult to discover any trace 
 of them. These Guerilla parties naturally fell 
 under the controul of a few enterprising chiefs, 
 the remains of the numerous smugglers who 
 covered the frontiers of each province of Spain. 
 This is one of the traits of the national cha- 
 racter which their celebrated Cervantes had 
 no hesitation in pointing out as peculiar to 
 them. The habit of bearing arms and of using 
 them on the high roads too often made rob- 
 bery an auxiliary to patriotism, and led us, 
 with some colouring of justice, to confound them 
 under the same denomination and in the same 
 predicament when they violated the laws of hu- 
 manity and of nations. We must acknowledge,
 
 54 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 however, that the chiefs of the Spanish army made 
 it a point to repress the excesses of these bands 
 and punish them with as much rigour as it was 
 in their power to exercise towards them. 
 
 Their isolated efforts were sufficient, se- 
 riously, to molest the 3rd corps in its occupation 
 of Arragon. They assumed a greater degree of 
 activity and became more formidable to us by 
 the common impulse which was given to them. 
 The insurrectionary juntas of the provinces and 
 the central government assumed a controul over 
 them, and ably combined their movements so as 
 to render their services still more available to 
 the common cause. General Suchet having es- 
 tablished his forces on the Guadalupe and the 
 Cinca, as well as in Saragossa, felt it necessary 
 to take a wider range in order to occupy and 
 organize the country. But his authority being- 
 confined within a small circle around those points, 
 met with obstacles in every direction. 
 
 The corps of colonel Ramon-Gayan, as well 
 as the one which had been raised in the princi- 
 pality of Molina had united, and occupied the 
 valley of the Xiloca, Daroca, the mountains of 
 JVlontalvan, and the environs of Carihena. The 
 advanced guard had stationed itself at the con- 
 vent of Nuestra Senora del Aguila, near Paniza, 
 at the distance of seven or eight leagues from 
 Saragossa. A camp for three thousand men sur- 
 rounded that spacious edifice placed as an eagle's
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 55 
 
 nest at the summit of a high mountain ; it was 
 intrenched, loopholed and barricadoed, and was 
 provided with considerable supplies of ammunition 
 and provisions. Aranda and Calcena at the foot 
 of the Moncayo also became points of junction 
 for those bands which infested Tarragona, the 
 valley of the Ebro, and our line of communication 
 with Navarre. A French regiment which had been 
 for a long time in possession of Soria, had at first 
 kept the country in check to a certain distance ; 
 but it was recalled to Madrid, and the regiments 
 of Soria and of the Princeza, having been detached 
 from the corps of La Romana, came to establish 
 and organise themselves in the vicinity of Cala- 
 tayud. Their force did not amount to less than 
 three thousand men who became the nucleus of 
 the corps of Villacampa, an active Guerilla leader 
 who maintained himself in Arragon during nearly 
 the whole war. 
 
 The bands which had formed on the left bank 
 of the Ebro were perhaps more dangerous still. 
 The insurrection of the upper vallies of Arragon 
 which prided themselves in never having been 
 conquered, was planned with a view to facilitate 
 general Blake's operations. They had received 
 money, arms and proclamations. The forced re- 
 cruitings, the junction of several scattered bands, 
 and the arrival of many officers sent from Lerida 
 to command them, gave a character of steadiness 
 to those armaments. One of these officers was
 
 56 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Renovales, who after signalising himself in the de- 
 fense of Buenos Ayres against the English, had re- 
 cently been taken prisoner in the assault of St. 
 Joseph during the siege of Saragossa. Whilst 
 they were conducting him into France, he de- 
 serted from Pampelona where at his own re- 
 quest he had been allowed to stop, and was left 
 free on his parole. He repaired to Lerida and 
 obtained the command of all the vallies to the 
 westward of Jaca. In organising that insurrec- 
 tion, he displayed all the activity and zeal which 
 an officer could bestow on a cause in behalf of 
 which he had not hesitated to break his word of 
 honor. The convent of San Juan de la Pena, 
 situated in a formidable position, became a prin- 
 cipal depot which the enemy endeavoured to 
 protect with intrenchments, and which served as 
 a rallying point for all the bands of the neigh- 
 bourhood of Jaca. To the eastward of this place, 
 towards the frontiers of Catalonia, colonels Pe- 
 rena, Pedroza, Baget, Sarraza, and father Theo- 
 baldo were posted with their troops upon the 
 mountains above Huesca and Barbastro and in 
 the vicinity of the Cinca, thus surrounding, al- 
 though at a distance, our camps or cantonments ; 
 and communicating with the marquis de Lavalle 
 the governor of Lerida. 
 
 These numerous bands, spread over so vast a 
 circumference, began to operate in a simultaneous 
 and uniform manner. They destroyed our strag-
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 57 
 
 glers, and frequently even our detachments when 
 they were in small numbers and off their guard ; 
 they spread terror throughout the country, har- 
 rassed our partisans, compelled all young men to 
 re-enlist in the Spanish armies, intercepted the 
 couriers, arrested the convoys, and obstructed the 
 return of the contributions or provisions we had 
 raised. On the approach of our troops, those 
 bands withdrew without fighting, so that they 
 made their appearance at every spot we did not 
 occupy, and offered no opportunity for making a 
 serious attack upon them in any position ; there 
 existed no means of coming up with or even see- 
 ing them, unless we could succeed in taking them 
 by surprise. 
 
 The numerical weakness of the 3rd corps, which 
 had no means of repairing its daily losses, gave 
 additional activity to the daily increasing influence 
 of the insurgents. A reinforcement of fresh troops 
 would from that moment have been requisite to 
 repress that dangerous spirit, but the government 
 of Madrid was equally in need of troops, and 
 looked for them in vain ; it was not in a condition 
 to relieve the threatened provinces. Though 
 alarmed at Blake's movement upon Arragon in 
 the months of May and June, it had not done 
 any thing to enable the 3rd corps to conquer 
 in the struggle. Navarre was nearly barren of 
 troops ; the public service in that quarter was 
 carried on by means of that corps d'armee which
 
 58 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 was compelled to keep up detachments in every 
 direction for the purpose of collecting provisions 
 and securing its communications. General Caro 
 had assumed the command of the kingdom of 
 Valencia, and was engaged in reorganising its 
 army, the strength of which began to exhibit an 
 imposing appearance. With respect to General 
 Blake himself, as soon as he had collected at Tor- 
 tosa the remains of his defeated army, he aban- 
 doned his views upon Arragon, rallied the garrison 
 of Tarragona, and manoeuvred for the purpose of 
 relieving Gerona, the siege of which would have 
 been greatly protracted by a timely succour. 
 
 General Suchet, after having, on his return 
 from Saragossa, thrown a glance at his position, 
 perceived that the most urgent operation was that 
 of relieving Jaca, which was blockaded as it were 
 by the insurgent bands. This fortress secured 
 our shortest communication with France. The 
 operation was effected with great rapidity, and in 
 order that he might be free from any further un- 
 easiness respecting the safety of so important a 
 post, he supplied it with provisions for ten months. 
 He resolved at the same time to make an imme- 
 diate effort against the hostile corps which were 
 forming in all directions, in order that he might 
 establish his authority over all the points of Ar- 
 ragon which he might have it in his power to 
 overrun with his troops. He was aware that in 
 endeavouring to act with vigour in one direction,
 
 BATTLES IN AHRAGON. 59 
 
 he would be compelled to diminish his forces in 
 another ; it would be necessary to attack the in- 
 surgent bands one after another, notwithstanding 
 the disadvantage of such a kind of warfare. Being- 
 unable, however, to augment the number of his 
 soldiers, he resolved multiply them by the rapi- 
 dity of their movements ; and their activity and 
 courage thus supplied the place of the reinforce- 
 ments of which he stood in need. 
 
 He began by occupying Almunia and Carinena. 
 The works which were intended to give addi- 
 tional strength to the castle of Alcaniz were ac- 
 tively urged forward. The corps of Perena and 
 Pedroza, which had come to threaten Barbastro 
 and Huesca, were driven back ; general Habert 
 suddenly fell, on the 19th of July, upon the camp 
 of the former chief, took possession of his head- 
 quarters, was on the point of carrying him off, 
 and compelled him to fly for shelter to Viescas, 
 situated in the midst of inaccessible mountains 
 covered with perpetual snow. The general-in- 
 chief advanced in person, during the night from 
 the 19th to the 20th, to Carinena, where he had 
 suddenly assembled four battalions and a hundred 
 cuirassiers. Before day-break, he caused Paniza 
 and the position of Nuestra Senora del Aguila to 
 be surrounded. Gayan's corps, which was sta- 
 tioned there, offered a very slight resistance, and 
 evacuated the position without allowing us time 
 to enclose him. He abandoned his camp and
 
 CO MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 provisions, which were destroyed as well as the 
 entrenchments erected in the convent. The ge- 
 neral-in-chief returned the same night to Sara- 
 gossa with the news of his successful expedition. 
 The inhabitants, who scarcely had time to notice 
 his absence, learned with surprise that it had only 
 cost him a few hours to seize upon a position 
 which they had considered impregnable. 
 
 Several corps had been sent from Paniza in 
 pursuit of the corps of colonel Gayan, there being 
 always some advantage in driving to a greater 
 distance an enemy whom it was found impossible 
 to destroy. Colonel Kliski occupied Daroca, 
 brought the inhabitants under subjection, and 
 took possession of a depdt of arms. The enemy 
 rallied on the mountain of Uzed with some insur- 
 gents of Calatayud and Molina ; he marched for- 
 ward, defeated and drove them to the frontiers of 
 Castille. 
 
 General Laval was dispatched to Calatayud 
 and dispersed the bands assembled in that quar- 
 ter; he also cleared the environs of Moncayo. 
 A small corps of troops was likewise detached to 
 the Cincovillas, a district, the possession of which 
 is important from its adjoining Saragossa on the 
 one side, and the frontiers of Navarre on the 
 other.* Wherever our troops established them- 
 
 * The inhabitants of Sos, Castillo, Sadava, Exea, and 
 Tauste, on the frontier of Navarre, along the left bank of the 
 Ebro, displayed great attachment to Philip V in the war of the
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 61 
 
 selves, the general-in-chief began to put in prac- 
 tice the system of administration which he was 
 laying down for Saragossa. 
 
 At this period of time, intelligence was brought 
 to Spain of the crossing of the Danube, of the 
 battle of Wag-ram and of the armistice of Znai'm. 
 These events were communicated very oppor- 
 tunely to counteract the first impression created 
 by the battle fought at Talavera on the 28 th of 
 July ; the Spaniards claimed it as a victory over 
 us ; but the advance of marshal Soult having 
 compelled the English to retreat towards the 
 Tagus, and general Venegas having been defeated 
 at Almonacid, Madrid was thereby relieved from 
 the danger that threatened it. It became evi- 
 dent that the French army in the Peninsula 
 would be no match for the English united to the 
 Spaniards, unless they received those reinforce- 
 ments which the war with Austria had hitherto 
 rendered impossible : the change of circum- 
 stances henceforward justified the expectation of 
 their being shortly sent to our relief, and the 
 French government lost no time in announcing 
 their proximate arrival. 
 
 If the Spaniards were not at first much dis- 
 
 succcssion. He granted them, as a reward, the title of Villa 
 (which is of greater consequence than pueblo, a village, and of 
 less consequence than ciudad, a city) ; and he erected these 
 villages, under the name of Cinco-Villas, into a distinct corregi- 
 miento, of which Sos is the chief town.
 
 C2 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 couraged by appearances so unfavourable to 
 their cause, the French, on the contrary, en- 
 tertained the sanguine hope that fresh com- 
 binations of a more effectual character than the 
 former ones, would soon bring the war to a 
 close. General Suchet determined to complete 
 the pursuit and destruction of the Guerilla bands 
 of Arragon, in order that he might afterwards dis- 
 pose of his corps d'arm^e for any other opera- 
 tions he might be called upon to undertake. 
 
 He had succeeded in throwing provisions into 
 the fortress of Jaca, but not in relieving it alto- 
 gether ; for the armed bands which had collected 
 in the neighbourhood, had resumed the blockade, 
 and the garrison was in some measure pent up 
 within its walls. The consequence was, that 
 the communication with France was intercepted, 
 and there was ground for apprehending that 
 some treachery or surprise might deprive us of 
 that highly important point. The insurgents oc- 
 cupied in front of Jaca, and at a short distance 
 from it the convent of San Juan de la Pena, 
 a commanding position of very difficult access, 
 which contained a garrison, ammunition, and 
 provisions, and was placed in a good state of de- 
 fense. Popular superstition and enthusiasm com- 
 bined to attach great importance to that convent. 
 In former wars, the rock of San-Juan de la 
 Pena had always remained in the power of 
 the christians, who carried on an interminable
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 63 
 
 struggle against the Moors in the mountains 
 of Arragon. Its church contained the tombs 
 of twenty-two kings of Arragon. The central 
 junta, in its instructions to the inhabitants of 
 the left bank of the Ebro, exhibited San-Juan de 
 la Pena as the palladium of their independence. 
 It was accordingly the rallying point for all the 
 armed bands of the vicinity, who found there a 
 safe asylum after their frequent excursions into 
 the valley of the Gallego. Two detachments of 
 twenty men each, who escorted thirty men be- 
 longing to the band of the 1 1 5th regiments, hav- 
 ing stopped at the village of Bernues during the 
 night of the 23rd of August, and failed to keep 
 a proper watch, were surprised by Sarraza's 
 band, and nearly all put to death. It was essen- 
 tial to prevent similar disasters for the future, 
 and to destroy the den which allowed of their 
 being committed with impunity. General Mus- 
 nier was entrusted with this expedition ; he as- 
 sembled under his command a battalion of the 
 5th light infantry, another of the 64th, a third 
 of the 1 15th of the line, and part of the garrison 
 of Jaca. With these forces he attacked the po- 
 sition of San-Juan de la Pena on three sides at 
 once, on the 26th of August. It was carried 
 after a sharp resistance ; the garrison was killed 
 or taken prisoners, and every part of the convent 
 which presented any means of defense, was 
 either set on fire or destroyed. After this opera-
 
 64 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 tion, general Musnier proceeded with one co- 
 lumn to the vallies of Echo and Anso, whilst 
 colonel Plicque penetrated with the remainder of 
 his troops into the valley of Roncal. Renovales 
 kept all those mountains in a state of insurrec- 
 tion, and fomented the movements which per- 
 petually alarmed that portion of the frontiers. 
 The vallies were subdued, disarmed, and pu- 
 nished ; that of Roncal capitulated after a rather 
 obstinate defense. The general-in-chief left two 
 battalions there for some time, as a detached 
 corps, in order to secure the return of the corn 
 and cattle which were required of the inhabitants 
 for the support of the army. He gave directions 
 at the same time, not only that the church of 
 San-Juan de la Peha should be preserved, but 
 that a fund should be specially set apart for 
 the preservation and service of the tombs of the 
 kings of Arragon. He thought it right to evince 
 that mark of respect for an object held in vene- 
 ration by the people of Arragon ; and the esteem 
 they bore him in return, shewed their gratitude for 
 his endeavours to prevent, after a victory, those 
 dilapidations which the chances of war render 
 almost unavoidable. 
 
 Those successes, which had cleared the fron- 
 tier of Arragon adjoining Navarre, led us to pro- 
 ceed on a similar plan of operations towards the 
 frontier of Catalonia. The 117th regiment re- 
 turned to the Cinca, whilst a part of the gar-
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 65 
 
 rison of Jaca drove back in the same direction 
 the bands of Broto and of Fiscal. Perena, Pe- 
 drosa, and Baget rallied their troops between the 
 Cinca and the Noguera. Renovales overtook 
 them and assumed the chief command. It was 
 of importance that we should oppose the forma- 
 tion of such an assemblage of troops near our 
 own lines. General Habert was ordered to at- 
 tack it, and advanced towards Fonz on the 23rd 
 of September. Colonel Robert, whilst marching 
 to the enemy, felt it necessary to resort to a 
 stratagem, in order to induce him to quit his 
 unassailable position. After a few weak at- 
 tempts, he feigned a retreat, and drew the in- 
 surgents after him, when rapidly turning round, 
 he overtook them and put the greater part to the 
 rout : general Habert was advancing at the same 
 time upon the village of Fonz, and taking pos- 
 session of it at the point of the bayonet. The 
 bands were almost completely dispersed ; and 
 the chiefs returned to Lerida and Mequinenza. 
 The whole left bank of the Ebro was restored 
 to order and submission, and the French army 
 was enabled to extend its cantonments and its 
 influence. 
 
 The general in chief availed himself of the 
 circumstance to form a secure establishment 
 on the Cinca. He caused Fraga and Monzon 
 to be occupied by general Habert. The 
 
 VOL. I. f
 
 66 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 first of these towns had a wooden bridge 
 over the Cinca, which facilitated a passage 
 at all seasons. This was rendered an import- 
 ant position, owing to the vicinity of Lerida 
 and Mequinenza ; it was accordingly fortified 
 with some field works on the height of the 
 left bank which commands the bridge and the 
 town. At the distance of a few leagues above 
 Fraga, and on the same side of the river, stands 
 the town of Monzon, commanded by a castle, 
 which the French had occupied the preceding year, 
 and had afterwards abandoned, it being of no 
 advantage for their operations ; but its situation 
 now gave it far more importance. It was in a 
 good condition, had several buildings bomb-proof, 
 and solid ramparts. A small garrison was placed 
 in it with the necessary ammunition and pro- 
 visions ; and as the river was at some distance, 
 a tete-de-pont was constructed on the left bank, 
 by the establishment of a flying bridge. This 
 operation, and the result of the engagement at 
 Fonz, enabled us to make preparations with a 
 view to our taking possession of Venasque and 
 of the corregimiento of Benavarre, the last 
 in the province of Arragon, in a north eastern 
 direction. The Catalonians having joined a 
 great number of dispersos from Arragon, made 
 an attempt to defend the town; they moved 
 towards Graiis which was occupied by colonel
 
 BATTLES IN AHRAGON. 67 
 
 Lapeyrolerie, with nine hundred mountain chas- 
 seurs. That officer advanced in person to attack 
 them without a moment's delay. 
 
 He commenced his march through Roda, on 
 the 17th of October, reascending the Isavena, 
 drove them on that and on the following day, 
 from one position to another, and came up to 
 their main body on the 19th. But the fires of 
 the bivouacs were no sooner lighted, than he dis- 
 covered that the insurgents were collecting very 
 considerable forces, and that he was hemmed in 
 on all sides, as if in a trap, in the midst of 
 the numerous defiles which he had before and 
 behind him. He immediately determined upon 
 the course he was to adopt. Persuaded that ir- 
 regular troops never display much intrepidity 
 or watchfulness during the night, he resolved to 
 open himself a passage by forcing at the point 
 of the bayonet the enemy's line which pre- 
 vented his retreat, and to avoid firing a single 
 shot. He took up arms at the hour of two 
 in the morning, and in the utmost silence, 
 formed his troops into columns, and sent for- 
 ward as an advanced guard colonel Roque- 
 maurel, with four companies of chasseurs of the 
 Pyrenees. This daring officer forced his way 
 through the Spaniards, who were taken by sur- 
 prize and driven in ; terror spread amongst 
 them to a certain distance. In the first mo- 
 ment of alarm, they fled instead of rallying ; 
 
 f2
 
 68 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and the column passed through, and rapidly 
 moved off without losing a single man. Colonel 
 Lapeyrolerie brought the whole of his troop back 
 to Graiis. He had the satisfaction to find that 
 his sick and wounded had remained undisturbed ; 
 during his absence, the inhabitants of the town 
 had saved them from the fury of an armed 
 band of the vicinity, which had come up with 
 the intention of putting them to death. This 
 trait of humanity was often renewed in Arragon 
 after that period. 
 
 Fraga and Candasnos, into which we had just 
 thrown small garrisons, were attacked by Gue- 
 rilla bands from Mequinenza ; but their at- 
 tempts proved abortive. At the same time, the 
 Spanish general Lavalle collected fourteen hun- 
 dred men at Batea, and on the 16th of October 
 he marched upon Caspe, which colonel Dupey- 
 roux occupied with a battalion of the 115th re- 
 giment. The Spanish advanced guard immedi- 
 ately seized upon the Capuchine convent, a com- 
 manding position at the entrance of the town. 
 Whilst the battalion was taking up arms, colonel 
 Dupeyroux resolutely advanced against the con- 
 vent with no other troops than the company of 
 grenadiers, and took possession of it before the 
 Spaniards could find time to recover from their 
 surprise, or to stand their ground ; he then in- 
 stantly repaired to the head of the enemy's co- 
 lumn, threw it into disorder, and compelled it
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 69 
 
 to retreat. He was, however, severely wounded 
 on the occasion. 
 
 A band of smugglers who were spreading terror 
 through the country in the neighbourhood of Bel- 
 chite, was surprised at Lecera during the night, 
 and completely roused by captain Monnot of the 
 artillery. 
 
 General Chlopiski had been sent towards Da- 
 roca with the 1st regiment of the Vistula, part of 
 the 2nd regiment and the cuirassiers. He de- 
 feated on the 12th of October the troops of Molina, 
 which had formed a junction with the regiments 
 of Soria and of the Princeza. Colonel Kolinow- 
 ski pursued and drove them beyond Ojos-Negros; 
 general Chlopiski pushed forward as far as Molina. 
 
 General Buget marched upon Arnedo and So- 
 ria, for the purpose of dispersing the armed bands. 
 Returning afterwards to Navarre, he went in pur- 
 suit of young Mina, who at the head of two hun- 
 dred men stopped the convoys on the road to Pam- 
 pelona, and afforded a prelude of the part in 
 which he since acquired so much celebrity. 
 
 In Spain the churches and convents are, gene- 
 rally speaking, vast and solid edifices which, if 
 standing in an advantageous position, offer great 
 resources for a defensive warfare. After the fall 
 of Paniza and of Nuestra-Senora del Aguila, the 
 insurrectionary troops on the right bank of the 
 Ebro formed a junction in the church of Nuestra 
 Senora del Tremedal, situated on an almost inac-
 
 70 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 cessible mountain, which Villacampa had occupied 
 and intrenched, beyond the town of Molina, in the 
 heart of the Sierra d'Albarracin, near the sources 
 of the Tagus, the Xucar and the Guadalaviar. The 
 troops thus collected experienced the same re- 
 verses as the armed band of San Juan de la Peiia; 
 colonel Henriod received orders to make himself 
 master of the position. He left Daroca on the 
 23rd of November with his regiment, the 14th of 
 the line, eight companies of the 2nd regiment of 
 the Vistula, the 13th of cuirassiers, two pieces 
 of cannon, a howitzer, and one hundred and fifty 
 Arragonese conductors of carts and mules loaded 
 with provisions. These forces did not exceed 
 1,700 men. He came to bivouac on the 24th at 
 dusk, in the village of Ojos Negros, the defile of 
 which he found occupied by some of Villacampa's 
 troops. A few companies of skirmishers, which 
 he detached upon his flank during the night with 
 orders to gain the woody summit of the mountain of 
 Villar de Saz, determined the enemy to abandon 
 the defile on the 25th at day-break, to fall back 
 upon Origuela, and from thence upon the position 
 oftheTremedal. The Spanish forces amounted to 
 nearly 5,000 regular soldiers, besides a number of 
 armed peasants, who had been collected at the 
 sound of the tocsin, and who lined all the adjoining 
 woods, with a view to threaten our rear and sur- 
 round us, if our attack should fail of success. 
 They entertained no doubt of the victory, general
 
 BATTLES IN ARftAGON. 71 
 
 Villacampa having availed himself of the advan- 
 tages of the position to excite confidence in his 
 troops. The mountain of the Tremedal forms a 
 kind of crescent three quarters of a league in 
 length ; it rises upwards of 600 feet above the 
 Molina and the small town of Origuela, built 
 upon its bank in a narrow gorge at the extremity 
 of a barren plain two leagues in extent, which 
 runs in the direction of Villar de Saz. The nearest 
 branch of the crescent terminates in a circular 
 platform, on which spot stands the monastery 
 and its appendages. The summit is surrounded 
 with needles and rocks, forming as it were a pa- 
 rapet with embrasures. Its flanks lined with fir- 
 trees give a sombre and imposing appearance to 
 that isolated mountain. The roads of Albarracin, 
 Daroca and Molina meet at the town of Origuela, 
 where a bridge has been constructed ; the con- 
 vent has no other communication than a by-way 
 winding in the rear of the mountain and termi- 
 nating at the road of Albarracin, and a steep path 
 which descends in a direct line to the bridge and 
 the town. Moats had been dug and abatis formed 
 in every direction. 
 
 On reaching that position at eleven o'clock in 
 the morning, colonel Henriod despaired of carry- 
 ing it by main force in the open day, and deter- 
 mined to manoeuvre for obtaining possession of it. 
 He first attacked the extremity of the mountain, 
 which he made a feint to turn by the road leading
 
 72 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 to Albarracin, with the greatest part of his troops. 
 This attack, which he did not seriously intend to 
 follow up, was continued during the whole day ; 
 its only object being to induce the enemy to 
 withdraw his forces from the convent and send 
 reinforcements to the opposite side. Towards 
 dusk, the colonel marched upon Origuela with 
 six companies of choice troops moving in column, 
 with a piece of artillery and a howitzer, rapidly 
 passed through the town which had been deserted 
 by its inhabitants, crossed the bridge, established 
 himself on the plateau beyond it at the foot of the 
 declivity, compelled all the troops that had de- 
 scended from the convent into the by-road to 
 return from whence they came, and opened a 
 brisk fire from his two field-pieces, whilst by the 
 aid of the lights which he had ordered to be kept 
 up in the bivouacs in his rear, our baggage and 
 line faced about and took the road to Daroca. 
 This movement could not fail to deceive the ene- 
 my, and to persuade him that we were taking ad- 
 vantage of the night to effect our retreat. 
 
 At this moment the six companies, being formed 
 into three columns, without cloaks or knapsacks, 
 and with their muskets slung in their shoulder 
 belts, as they had been strictly enjoined not to fire, 
 clambered up in silence by that side of the moun- 
 tain most difficult of access, against which no de- 
 monstration had been made, and which its rug- 
 gedness must have led the enemy to consider be-
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 73 
 
 yond the reach of attack. On arriving at the 
 summit, they stopped to regain breath, and waited 
 for the signal agreed on. The firing had com- 
 pletely ceased on both points of attack ; the Spa- 
 niards imagined we were in full retreat, and were 
 rejoicing at their fancied success. On a sudden 
 the six companies, headed by captain Parlier, 
 rushed through the embrasures or spaces between 
 the rocks, charged the Spaniards at the point of 
 the bayonet, and converted their acclamations of 
 victory into cries of terror. Those who escaped 
 death fled in every direction. Villacampa at- 
 tempted in vain to rally a few soldiers ; they 
 were deaf to his entreaties; his sword was broken 
 in the struggle, and he was hurried along by the 
 fugitives. The provisions with which the build- 
 ings were abundantly supplied fell into our power. 
 But we could neither remove them nor remain in 
 the position we had just wrested from the enemy; 
 and our safety required that we should destroy 
 them. The church contained a considerable 
 quantity of powder and fire works ; the explosion 
 was tremendous. The sparks were thrown to a 
 great distance, set fire to some parts of the neigh- 
 bouring woods, and even reached the town itself 
 which might have been burned to ashes had not 
 our soldiers, in the absence of the inhabitants, 
 arrested the progress of the flames. This volcano, 
 which threw its glare over the surrounding moun- 
 tains to a considerable distance, was a signal for the
 
 74 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 dispersion of all the armed bands which had col- 
 lected amongst them. The enemy lost nearly 
 500 men ; on our side we had only to deplore the 
 loss of a few gallant soldiers, so completely were 
 the Spaniards taken by surprise and panic-struck. 
 The success was owing to the skill of colonel Hen- 
 riod. The circumstance which most attracted the 
 notice of the general-in-chief was that without be- 
 ing arrested in his progress by the strength of the 
 position or the superiority of numbers, he never- 
 theless did not allow himself to be carried away 
 by that inconsiderate ardour which overlooks all 
 obstacles ; he did not purchase by torrents of 
 blood, as is too often the case in a state of warfare, 
 the possession of a barren rock, which he would 
 have to abandon as soon as it should fall into his 
 hands. His measures were, on the contrary, 
 marked by wisdom as well as valour, and he made 
 up by skilful manoeuvring for the smallness of his 
 forces. 
 
 Other engagements of minor importance took 
 place on various points of Arragon ; and although 
 we omit to notice them, they were attended with 
 honour and utility to us, as they had the effect of 
 establishing the superiority of the soldiers of the 3rd 
 corps, and daily impressed the minds of the inhabi- 
 tants with that fact, which they were now taught by 
 their own experience, the only monitor to whose 
 dictates they paid any deference. This tedious 
 petty warfare was attended with the advantage
 
 BATTLES IN ARRAGON. 75 
 
 of forming good officers, and inuring them to the 
 duty of acting on detached services ; and had 
 the effect of developing those talents which 
 subsequently raised many of them to the ranks 
 of distinguished generals. 
 
 In the month of November, general Suchet 
 completed the submission of Upper Arragon, by 
 the capture of the town of Venasque. Captain 
 Roquemaurel was sent against it with the bat- 
 talion of the 64th and the chasseurs of the 
 Ariege ; he forced the positions in the valley, 
 penetrated into the town, surrounded the fort, 
 the garrison of which, being intimidated by the 
 inhabitants, compelled the governor to open his 
 gates. This success afforded fresh means of 
 communication with France, and enabled us to 
 disarm the vallies of Venasque, Gistain, and 
 Bielsa ; a depot of ammunition was destroyed in 
 an adjoining convent on the frontier of Catalonia. 
 
 With a view to secure a similar result on the 
 right bank of the Ebro, the general-in-chief 
 availed himself of the approach of an expedi- 
 tionary corps sent under general Milhaud from 
 Madrid to Cuenca, in the mountains of Castille. 
 He repaired in person to Teruel with a division 
 on the 25th of December, and sent some troops 
 forward as far as Ruvielos, where the insurrec- 
 tionary junta had taken shelter in its flight towards 
 Valencia. Teruel and Albarracin were the only 
 parts of Arragon to which the 3rd corps had
 
 76 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 not yet penetrated. The occupation of those 
 two influential towns operated as a complete 
 triumph over Spanish incredulity. The appear- 
 ance of our troops, their deportment and dis- 
 cipline, their language and acts of authority filled 
 the inhabitants with astonishment, and made them 
 curse Villacampa and the juntas who drove them 
 into a war, and were unable to aiford anv as- 
 sistance in the struggle. This part of the country 
 surrendered a quantity of arms and ammunition, 
 and we imposed upon it the same contributions 
 as we had established in the remainder of 
 Arragon. In this manner we secured by degrees 
 the neutrality, and eventually the obedience of 
 the inhabitants. Their proud spirit, which could 
 neither bend to arbitrary conduct nor brook an 
 insult, was not insensible to the value of a go- 
 vernment in which power was tempered by justice, 
 and they resigned themselves with a good grace 
 to the burdens entailed by a state of things 
 which it was not in their power to avert.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Occupation of Andalusia by the French armies. — Improvement 
 of the public mind in Arragon. — Disturbances in Navarre. — 
 The younger Mina. — General Suchet orders him to be pur- 
 sued. — He repairs to Pampelona. — Uncertainty respecting 
 the future destination of the 3rd corps. — The king orders a 
 movement upon Valencia. — March towards that city. — Battle 
 of Alventosa. — Arrival before Valencia. — Return to Ar- 
 ragon. — Mina is taken prisoner. 
 
 The year 1810 opened under the most favour- 
 able auspices. The events which had preceded 
 it led the way for the most brilliant period of 
 the Spanish war, and held out the most flat- 
 tering hopes for the future. 
 
 The war in Germany which had attracted the 
 whole attention of France, during the year 
 1809, and called for the exertions of its resources, 
 had been honourably concluded. By the treaty of 
 peace signed at Vienna, on the 14th of November, 
 that portion of the continent had again been re- 
 stored to tranquillity, and France had acquired an 
 alliance that could not fail to augment her power
 
 78 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET. 
 
 and influence. The evacuation of Walcheren by 
 the English, on the 24th of the same month, 
 relieved the emperor from all uneasiness respect- 
 ing a diversion which would have absorbed the 
 means he intended to direct against the Spanish 
 Peninsula. The armistice of Znai'm had no sooner 
 been concluded, than reinforcements were sent 
 thither, which did not amount, at the close of 
 the year, to less than thirty thousand men. 
 
 By the arrival of those first troops, the army 
 of Madrid obtained fresh successes, for which 
 we were still more indebted to the misunder- 
 standing between the English and Spanish ge- 
 nerals. Ever since they had separated on the 
 Tagus, and the English had fallen back upon 
 the Guadiana, the two Spanish armies of Estre- 
 madura, and La Mancha, amounting together to 
 50,000 men, under the command of general Ari- 
 zaga,* having again moved towards the Tagus, in 
 the direction of Madrid, came to offer battle in 
 the plains of Ocana, where they were completely 
 routed on the 16th of November, whilst the Eng- 
 lish army was in its cantonments round Badajos, 
 and remained indifferent to the movements and 
 the defeat of its allies. 
 
 The armies of Galicia and of Asturias, under 
 the command of the duke del Parque, were de- 
 
 * The same who commanded a division of Blake's army at 
 Maria and Belchite.
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 79 
 
 feated on the 28th, by general Kellermann, in the 
 position of Alba de Tonnes, near Salamanca. 
 
 Gerona had capitulated on the 10th of Decem- 
 ber, and by the termination of that obstinate 
 siege, the 7th corps, the command of which had 
 just been transferred from general Gouvion-Saint- 
 Cyr, to marshal Augereau, was left at liberty to 
 undertake other operations in Catalonia. 
 
 These repeated successes induced the govern- 
 ment of Madrid to send the French army into 
 Andalusia, which the total absence of fortified 
 places seemed to hold out to us as an easy con- 
 quest. At this period, the English themselves 
 had abandoned the Guadiana and the environs 
 of Badajos. On the 1st of January 1810, the 
 whole of their army had re-entered Portugal, 
 where it took up a position near Almeida in the 
 province of Beira. The remains of the Spanish 
 army defeated at Ocana, defended the passes of 
 the Sierra- Morena. They were attacked and 
 routed on the 20th of January; the French entered 
 Grenada on the 28th, and Seville on the 1st of 
 February ; on the 5th they reached Chiclana, 
 opposite Cadiz, where they stopped. Andalusia 
 was compelled to submit ; but the island of 
 Leon was in a state of defense. The Spanish 
 army retreated to it, and was reinforced by an 
 English division, under the orders of general 
 Graham. In vain were summons to surrender 
 sent into Cadix, which had become the asylum
 
 80 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of the central junta, and of the insurrectionary go- 
 vernment. This resistance prevented the com- 
 plete occupation of Spain. 
 
 The 3rd corps had also obtained a share, how- 
 ever small, of the reinforcements arrived from 
 France. In the early part of January 1810, it 
 amounted to nearly twenty thousand men, of 
 which number, 4,000 soldiers of all arms had 
 been detached to garrison the castles of Sara- 
 gossa, Alcahiz and Monzon, and to occupy the 
 districts of Jaca, Venasque, and Tudela. Se- 
 veral detachments coming from the depots in the 
 interior of France, and whole battalions belong- 
 ing to the 3rd corps, were marching to join it, 
 and the minister announced their arrival in re- 
 gular succession. As this augmentation of forces 
 was no longer required against Guerillas which 
 were daily defeated, notwithstanding their num- 
 bers, and their obstinate resistance, general Su- 
 chet had it in his power to undertake the sieges 
 of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, the neigh- 
 bourhood of which proved very harassing to the 
 province of Arragon, by favouring along the 
 frontiers a spirit of insurrection, and the incur- 
 sion of armed bands. 
 
 In other respects, the presence of a disciplined 
 army, and the organization of a regular system of 
 internal administration had considerably improved 
 the condition of the province. The inhabitants 
 gradually resumed their peaceful occupations, and
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 81 
 
 appeared to yield ready compliance to our wishes. 
 We had no other enemies to apprehend than the 
 bands of Guerillas or organized corps formed beyond 
 the frontiers of Arragon, which were sheltered by 
 the three above mentioned towns, and found in 
 them a secure asylum after their defeat, it being 
 impossible to destroy them without first adopting 
 serious operations against those fortresses. Three 
 corps in particular, which acted with steadiness, 
 and in common concert, presented to us on three 
 points of the frontiers of Arragon, a system of re- 
 sistance occasionally of an offensive, but mostly 
 of a defensive character ; the first corps, under 
 brigadier-general Perena, on the left bank of the 
 Ebro, occupied the line of the Noguera, and 
 manoeuvred round Lerida ; the second on the 
 right bank, under brigadier-general Garcia Na- 
 varro, manoeuvred in advance of Tortosa, and pre- 
 served the line of the Algas ; the third, or left 
 corps, under general Villacampa, overran the 
 mountains of Albarracin and Cuenca. Those 
 chiefs bent their endeavours to the object of 
 keeping up by forced recruitings the nucleus of 
 regular corps, which they had been enabled to 
 collect and organize. Out of 40,000 soldiers who 
 had been raised and equipped in Arragon, at the 
 commencement of the insurrection, there scarce- 
 ly remained 7 or 8,000 ; of this residue, 2,000 
 had been carefully drafted by Villacampa into 
 the regiments of Soria, and of the Princeza, 
 VOL i. g
 
 82 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 2,500 into the battalions of the line, or of 
 volunteers at Tortosa, 800 into the regiment of 
 America, which maintained possession of Me- 
 quinenza, and the remainder into Doyle's re- 
 giment at Lerida. 
 
 Nevertheless, the position of the 3rd corps in 
 Arragon rendered all attempts against the inte- 
 rior of the province wholly unavailing. Teruel 
 and Daroca were occupied by general Laval 
 with the 1st division, Alcaniz and Caspe by ge- 
 neral Musnier with the 2nd division, and Fraga, 
 Monzon and Barbastro by general Habert, with 
 the 5th light infantry, and the HGth and 117th 
 regiments. The Spanish generals, though always 
 in the presence of our troops, and ready to take 
 advantage of the least neglect on <our part, 
 were in the two first months of 1810 losing a 
 portion of their activity, or of their influence. 
 A great number of young men quitted their 
 standards, and came to re-people the villages 
 where our protection was extended to them. 
 Our partizans were proportionably on the increase. 
 The corregidors and alcaldes, whom we made re- 
 sponsible for the maintainance of public tran- 
 quillity, ventured at last to give open support to 
 an administrative system, which was gradually 
 gaining ground, and a government far less ephe- 
 meral than it had been represented to them. A 
 former chief of a band of smugglers, belonging 
 to Barbastro, was the first to set this example
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 83 
 
 of confidence, by binding himself to afford a 
 more effectual support to the French cause. He 
 solicited permission to raise at his own expense 
 a company of foot gendarmes, and offered, as a 
 pledge for his good conduct, his family, and a 
 fortune of 2,000,000 of reales. Notwithstanding 
 the danger of placing arms in the hands of 
 the people, general Suchet determined to accept 
 this offer, persuaded that such a company, if well 
 organized, led by a proper chief, thoroughly ac- 
 quainted with the country, and having a natural 
 intercourse with it, would render more effectual 
 services than a whole battalion, and be the ter- 
 ror of all the armed bands of the interior of the 
 province. In a short time, those small scattered 
 corps, chiefly composed of malefactors, were un- 
 able to conceal any of their movements from our 
 knowledge. Daily reports enabled us to follow 
 them in their most secret places of resort. Se- 
 veral were surprised at Alvalate, and at other 
 points round Barbastro and Monzon. This cir- 
 cumstance, and the severe measures resorted to 
 against the recruiting parties who excited the 
 young men to return to the Spanish armies, pro- 
 duced a salutary impression, the effect of which 
 would, no doubt, have been more lasting and 
 extensive, had it not been for the fresh cause 
 of disturbance which manifested itself on the 
 frontier of Navarre. 
 
 This province, through which the 3rd corps 
 
 g 2
 
 84 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 had kept up its communications with Paris and 
 Madrid had enjoyed such perfect tranquillity 
 during the first year of the war, that its roads were 
 completely unobstructed, and the artillery was 
 transported from Pampelona, for the siege of Sara- 
 gossa, without escort, or the smallest opposition 
 from the inhabitants. But whether owing to a vi- 
 cious administration, and the weakness or venality 
 of its agents, to the misunderstanding which 
 subsisted between the superior authorities of Pam- 
 pelona, the insufficiency of the troops left at their 
 disposal, or perhaps to all these causes combined, 
 the spirit of insurrection had gradually gained 
 ground in that province. Without fortresses, 
 without depots, or any ostensible means of sup- 
 port, armed bands were formed in the interior, 
 augmented their numbers with impunity, and 
 spread themselves in every direction ; at this 
 period, they intercepted the roads and carried 
 off our couriers ; it may be said, in short, that 
 the authority of the governor of Navarre did not 
 extend beyond the glacis of his capital. 
 
 A young student of the name of Mina, who 
 had left that city in 1809, was the first promoter 
 of these scenes of disorder. He at first placed 
 himself at the head of a few armed men, obtained 
 some slight advantages, which stimulated him to 
 fresh exertions, and he succeded in bringing many 
 prisoners to Lerida. His activity and zeal attracted 
 the attention of the governor of that town, who
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 85 
 
 supplied him with arms, ammunition, and re- 
 inforcements. Shortly afterwards, his commis- 
 sion of appointment to a command, and the pair 
 of colours which he received from the junta of 
 Seville, were the means of his raising a regular 
 band of soldiers, with which he continued his 
 warlike exertions and his system of annoyance. 
 Avoiding every serious engagement, and never at- 
 tacking unless his position and his numbers pro- 
 mised him the advantage, he was shortly enabled 
 to measure his forces with large detachments, and 
 to seize upon our convoys. His activity, his energy, 
 the rigid severity he exercised towards every Spa- 
 niard convicted or accused of having rendered us 
 the slightest service, however compulsory it might 
 have been, enabled him to assume a formidable 
 attitude, and ensured the secrecy of all his ope- 
 rations. Whether he placed himself in am- 
 buscade at the Carrascal, a dangerous wood be- 
 tween Tafalla and Pampelona, where he often 
 attacked us, or marched forward to surprise our 
 advanced posts, or retreated to elude our pur- 
 suit ; he was dreaded and treated with deference 
 wherever he appeared, but never discovered or 
 betrayed. He soon acquired so much power over 
 the country, that in the month of January the 
 government of Navarre deemed itself justified 
 in entering into a negotiation with him, as with 
 a regular general, for the exchange of prisoners,
 
 86 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and even admitted some officers into Pampelona, 
 who were the bearers of his flags of truce. 
 
 This alarming success in a province adjoining- 
 France, soon attracted the attention of the French 
 government, who were thereby thwarted in their 
 projects of sending forward the 3rd corps. The 
 destruction of so troublesome a Guerilla chieftain 
 became a preliminary measure of the utmost con- 
 sequence. General Suchet accordingly received, 
 at the same time with a commission which invested 
 him with full powers, an order to commence im- 
 mediate operations in Navarre, with a view to quell 
 the disturbances to which it was a prey. 
 
 He sent general Harispe in pursuit of Mina, 
 with the 114th regiment of the line. This 
 officer proceeded towards the Cinco- Villas in 
 the beginning of January, and advanced upon 
 Mina, who occupied Sanguessa, whilst 400 Polish 
 soldiers quitted Tuclela, moved in the same di- 
 rection, and a column of 800 men left Pampelona 
 for the purpose of co-operating in that move- 
 ment. As Mina had already on some occasions 
 approached the frontiers of Catalonia, two bat- 
 talions were despatched to the upper vallies 
 towards Ainsa and Medianoz, in order to deprive 
 him of that retreat, with directions to attack or 
 drive him back wherever he might present him- 
 self, and in any case to intercept him on his 
 way to the Cinca. The general in-chief repaired
 
 EXPEDITION' TO VALENCIA. 87 
 
 in person to Huesca, in order to secure the due exe- 
 cution of those measures; but they proved un- 
 necessary, Mina declined to fight, and left San- 
 guessa a short time before the arrival of general 
 Harispe and his junction with the Polish troops. 
 He feigned to take up a position at Monreal ; he 
 was favoured by the delay in the arrival of the co- 
 lumn expected from Pampelona, and when general 
 Harispe moved forward to surround and attack 
 him, Mina, whose rear was unobstructed, escaped 
 by a rapid march, and boldly advanced to the 
 attack of Tafalla with 1 ,000 infantry and 200 
 cavalry, at the moment when his appearance was 
 least expected. He felt no difficulty in obtaining 
 possession of the town : but the weak garrison 
 established in a barrack resolutely defended it, 
 and resisted his summons and his attacks ; he 
 withdrew the following morning in another di- 
 rection, after having occupied during a whole 
 day our line of communication. 
 
 This bold attempt induced us to redouble our 
 exertions. General Harispe availing himself of 
 the circumstance that a division had just arrived 
 from France under the command of general Loi- 
 son, who occupied Logrono and the upper Ebro, 
 directed the column to join him which had quit- 
 ted Pampelona, and occupied, by means of his de- 
 tachments, the towns of Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, 
 and Puente la Reyna, as well as the principal 
 passes of the Arga, of Arragon, and of the Ebro.
 
 88 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 He scoured the country with several moveable co- 
 lumns, provided with small pieces of mountain 
 cannon, which were carried on the backs of mules, 
 allowed Mina's troop no respite, followed it wher- 
 ever it took up a position, pursued it in its retreat, 
 and finally drove it into the mountains, where the 
 difficulty of subsisting, and the severity of the 
 season, compelled it at last to disperse. This 
 chieftain concealed the arms of his men, sent the 
 greater part back to their homes, effected his 
 own escape by wandering from one sheepfold 
 to another, was on the point of being taken 
 with seven men who formed all his escort, and 
 only escaped by assuming a disguise. Shortly af- 
 terwards, he exhibited a trait of his adventurous 
 character, by posting himself, in the garb of a 
 peasant, on the high road near Olite, and in the 
 midst of a group, for the purpose of seeing ge- 
 neral Suchet, who was on his way from Sara- 
 gossa to Pampelona. 
 
 This general reached the capital of Navarre on 
 the 20th of January. There had long existed 
 a fatal misunderstanding between the military 
 governor and the duke de Mahon, the vice- 
 roy sent from Madrid. The clashing of their 
 respective authorities was the cause or the oc- 
 casion of it ; and the want of system, resulting 
 from this misunderstanding, gave rise to great 
 remissness and disorder in every branch of the 
 service. The avarice of the agents of a vicious
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 89 
 
 administration took advantage of these circum- 
 stances. Any further endurance of the evil would 
 compromise the very safety of the place, where 
 treachery was imperceptibly finding its way. 
 Musket shots were every day fired upon the 
 glacis, and in the very residence of the vice-roy, 
 whom it was attempted to intimidate. The gene- 
 ral-in-chief began by removing the civil autho- 
 rities, and enjoined such measures as he deemed 
 best calculated to check the hostile feelings of 
 the inhabitants. He issued severe regulations, 
 the object of which was, to disarm the adjoining 
 country, and to prevent fresh levies of young 
 men. The dispersion of Mina's troop was fa- 
 vourable to the success of those measures ; it 
 was hoped they would restore to Navarre that 
 state of tranquillity which it had for upwards of 
 a year, uninterruptedly enjoyed. 
 
 Another and a no less important motive for the 
 visit of the general-in-chief to Pampelona, which 
 was even the secret object of it, was one of para- 
 mount consideration with him, connected as it 
 was with the future operations of the 3rd corps. 
 This was, the inspection of the parks of artillery, 
 and of every thing requisite for carrying on a 
 siege. He found the arsenal in good condition, 
 a numerous artillery in readiness for use, and 
 the gunpowder and other manufactories in full 
 activity. We were indebted for those efforts to 
 the exertions of colonel d'Auguereau of the artil-
 
 90 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 lery, the success of which was mainly promoted 
 by the vice-roy's zeal. 
 
 General Suchet, however, had scarcely orga- 
 nized the administration of Navarre, when general 
 Regnier entered Spain with a corps of troops, 
 and with directions to occupy that province, and 
 to complete its pacification. The troops of the 
 3rd corps returned to Arragon, in order to make 
 way for Lagrange's division. Colonel Plicque 
 having been despatched to upper Arragon, a part 
 of the country familiarly known to him, he over- 
 took and dispersed Sarraza's band in the direc- 
 tion of Ainsa. About the same time, general 
 Habert, who was stationed on the Cinca with the 
 3rd division, was engaged in superintending the 
 works of the fort of Monzon, and the repairs of 
 the bridge of Fraga. Colonel Rouelle of the 
 116th regiment, having been attacked at the 
 latter point b^ the garrison of Mequinenza, gal- 
 lantly defeated it. Shortly afterwards, general 
 Verges, who was stationed at the same spot with 
 the 121st regiment, sustained a similar attack at 
 the head of four companies of chosen troops, 
 who drove the Spaniards back as far as Torriente, 
 and compelled them, after a running fight, to 
 re-enter the fortress. General Musnier, who was 
 placed along the line of the Algas, brought up 
 the 115th regiment against a few battalions of 
 the garrison of Tortosa, which had advanced as 
 far as Orta, and put them to the rout, after
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 91 
 
 giving them a lesson well calculated to render 
 them more circumspect for the future. 
 
 Such was the situation of Arragon and of Na- 
 varre at the moment when general Suchet, hav- 
 ing returned to Saragossa, was preparing to 
 carry those orders into effect, which were about 
 to give a new direction to his future operations. 
 Happy had it been if uniformity and singleness 
 of purpose had distinguished it ! No sooner had 
 the emperor returned to Paris, than the prince of 
 Neufchatel, whose attention had been absorbed 
 by other objects during the campaign of Wa- 
 gram, resumed the title and functions of head of 
 the staff of the French armies in Spain. There 
 still existed, however, a regulation which left the 
 chief command in the Peninsula to king Joseph. 
 Thus, on the one hand, general Suchet was still 
 bound by the ties of obedience to the court of 
 Madrid in whatever related to military matters ; 
 and, on the other, he had secret orders to ren- 
 der an account of the financial administration 
 of Arragon to the prince and the French mi- 
 nisters only. He was not to make those instruc- 
 tions known at Madrid, unless he should be under 
 the necessity of revealing them. 
 
 The first letters of the prince of Neufchatel re- 
 lated to the operations of the 3rd corps beyond 
 the frontiers of Arragon. The emperor had, no 
 doubt, imagined that, after the capture of Gerona, 
 the 7th corps was fully competent to reduce the
 
 92 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 other fortresses of Catalonia ; he therefore pointed 
 out to general Suchet the conquest of Valencia 
 as the next object of his operations. With a 
 view to this distant expedition, the 3rd corps was 
 to be raised to thirty thousand men. In conse- 
 quence of those orders, a considerable supply of 
 biscuit was got in readiness ; we bestowed our 
 attention to the forming of magazines, and raising 
 the means of transport ; reports were sent to 
 Paris relating to the personnel and the materiel of 
 the artillery and the engineer corps ; an additional 
 supply of several field-pieces, of reserves, and 
 of artillery horses, was forwarded to Laval's divi- 
 sion at Teruel. These arrangements were com- 
 pleted by the end of January, when general Su- 
 chet, on leaving Pampelona, received from the 
 head of the staff an intimation that he was to 
 prepare for a different course of operations. The 
 prince appeared to have indefinitely postponed 
 the expedition to Valencia, and left the general- 
 in-chief at liberty to lay siege to Lerida or Tor- 
 tosa, the choice of either being left to his own 
 judgment; the 7th corps was to approach the 
 lower Ebro, and the 3rd corps was to proceed 
 to meet it, whilst the 8th corps would occupy 
 Logrono and the upper Ebro. The latter 
 corps, however, which was organizing under the 
 orders of the duke d'Abrantes, shortly quitted 
 Navarre, on its way to join the army of Portugal; 
 and it will be seen, that the corps in Catalonia,
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 93 
 
 the movements of which were wholly unknown 
 to us, effected its junction at a very late period, 
 in a very imperfect manner, and only for the 
 space of a few hours. This affords a fresh proof, 
 if any such were necessary, of the difficulty and 
 danger of distant co-operations during a war. 
 
 It was neither an easy nor a ready task for 
 general Suchet to countermand and reframe all 
 his preliminary arrangements. He sent advice to 
 Madrid and Paris at the same time, what were 
 his movements or his views, what means of 
 action he had at command, or what obstacles to 
 encounter. He was aware that the king was in- 
 formed by the emperor of the various measures 
 enjoined to the 3rd corps ; and in this kind of un- 
 certainty in which he was then thrown by ex- 
 isting circumstances, he fancied that the French 
 government had not yet laid down a definitive 
 plan. The instructions which he received, par- 
 took more of the character of projects for his con- 
 sideration, than of orders for carrying them into ex- 
 ecution. He was in immediate expectation of their 
 being confirmed and followed up, when an unfore- 
 seen occurrence came to add to his state of per- 
 plexity, which a circumstance of great weight 
 had the effect of removing. King Joseph being 
 desirous of availing himself of the influence which 
 the rapid successes obtained in Andalusia were 
 calculated to exercise over the minds of the in- 
 habitants, and of the secret intercourse which
 
 94 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET'. 
 
 he kept up in the city of Valencia, conceived 
 the design of taking possession of that capi- 
 tal, and of the province. The head of the king's 
 staff, the marshal duke of Dalmatia, by a des- 
 patch dated Cordova the 27th of January, which 
 reached Saragossa on the 15th of February, 
 ordered general Suchet to advance upon Va- 
 lencia by rapid marches, in two columns, the one 
 by Teruel and Segorbe, the other by Morella, 
 San-Mateo, and the road along the sea-shore. 
 The despatch added, that the army of the south 
 would send a detachment towards Murcia, for 
 the purpose of co-operating in the principal move- 
 ment ; and it expressed a sanguine expectation, 
 that Valencia would open its gates. 
 
 On the receipt of such precise orders, general 
 Suchet had scarcely any alternative left to him. 
 He had not yet received any instructions from 
 Paris which relieved him from the obligation of 
 obeying the commander-in-chief of the army in 
 Spain. True it is, that at the same time an im- 
 perial decree of the 8th of February had raised 
 Arragon into a separate government, placed the 
 province in a state of siege, and directed that all 
 the military and civil powers should centre in the 
 governor -general. This very decree, however, 
 although it gave an almost absolute authority to 
 general Suchet, did not in any manner infringe 
 upon his intercourse with Madrid, the orders 
 emanating from thence being imperative upon him
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 95 
 
 in respect to 'purely military operations, agreeably 
 to an explanatory letter of the prince of Neufchatel, 
 under date of the 9th of February. But the cou- 
 rier who was the bearer of the despatch, contain- 
 ing the decree and the letter, was taken prisoner 
 on his way through Navarre, a very common oc- 
 currence, which was, however, on this occasion, 
 attended with very unexpected consequences. 
 The positive orders from the French government 
 to the chief of the 3rd corps only arrived at a 
 later period, and at a moment when insurmounta- 
 ble obstacles stood in the way of their being car- 
 ried into effect. Not obtaining from Paris the 
 replies to his despatches which he had so ear- 
 nestly solicited, and having moreover been called 
 in by repeated orders from Cordova, general 
 Suchet deemed it incumbent upon him to under- 
 take the expedition to Valencia, whatever doubts 
 he might entertain of its successful issue, since 
 he was about to proceed without any besieging 
 train, and was leaving armed bands in his rear 
 which were on the watch to intercept his commu- 
 nications. 
 
 Being anxious to clear as much as possible his 
 line of march, he gave orders to general Laval, on 
 the 16th of February, to attack Villacampa's 
 corps, and drive it out of Arragon. That general 
 came up with the enemy's advanced posts at 
 Villastar, within a short distance of Teruel, and 
 soon afterwards with all his forces at an in-
 
 96 MEMOIRS OF BUCKET. 
 
 trenched position near Villel in front of the Gua- 
 dalaviar. He immediately caused him to be at- 
 tacked by general Chlopiski, whilst colonel 
 Kliski was manoeuvring with four companies 
 along the heights of Villel. The intrenchments 
 were carried ; the Spaniards took to flight and 
 escaped by re-crossing the river ; a great number 
 were drowned, others taken prisoners, and the 
 remainder dispersed amongst the mountains of 
 Castille. 
 
 Immediately after this engagement, which 
 would keep off Villacampa for a time, the gene- 
 ral-in-chief repaired to Teruel on the 26th of 
 February. He collected at this place Laval's 
 division with Paris' brigade, amounting in all to 
 twelve battalions, as well as the regiment of cui- 
 rassiers, two squadrons of hussars and one of 
 lancers. General Habert brought at the same 
 time six battalions and 150 hussars from Mon- 
 zon to Alcaniz. He was ordered to repair to Mo- 
 rella on the 27th of February, and proceed by 
 San Mateo and Cabanis to Villareal orNules, either 
 of which two places he was to reach on the 2nd 
 of March. General Musnier was left with eight 
 battalions and 250 horse to occupy Saragossa and 
 keep Arragon under subjection; general Verges 
 was on the line of the Cinca, and general Buget 
 on the right bank of the Ebro. 
 
 The castles of Saragossa, Alcaniz, Monzon, 
 Venasque, and Jaca were provided with garrisons,
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 97 
 
 arms, and every kind of ammunition ; the towns 
 of Saragossa and Tudela were protected by 
 some field-works, and rendered proof against a 
 coup-de-main. Our affairs were thus left in a 
 promising condition during the absence of the 
 army, our line of communication being alone 
 liable to attack. At this period, however, ten 
 battalions were on their march from France under 
 the order of general Montmarie, who brought a 
 reinforcement of conscripts for each of the regi- 
 ments of the 3rd corps. Instructions were left 
 behind, directing that column, consisting of about 
 4,000 men, to push on as far as Daroca, in order 
 to maintain the communication of the army with 
 Arragon during the march to Valencia. Forti- 
 fied barracks were established at Teruel ; and 
 colonel Plicque, with a detachment of infantry, 
 was directed to maintain that post and to protect 
 the convoys and couriers from obstruction on 
 their way through the country. 
 
 Our columns had left Teruel ; general Habert, 
 who had the longest march to perform, had 
 already proceeded a considerable distance on 
 his way, and was no longer in communication 
 with the army, when on the 1st of March, at 
 the moment of quitting Teruel, the general-in 
 chief received the duplicate of the decree of the 
 8th of February, with a despatch bearing date 
 the 18th of that month, enjoining him to lay 
 siege to the towns of Lerida and Mequinenza 
 
 vol. i H
 
 98 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 This order came too late; the movement which 
 the king had directed was already in a course 
 of execution. It is an undeniable truth that in 
 time of war, more than under any other circum- 
 stance, a knowledge of the existing state of 
 things is so indispensably requisite, that without 
 such knowledge, it is utterly impossible to fix the 
 moment of acting, and equally so to form a just 
 estimate of that state of things, at a distance 
 of 200 or 300 leagues from the scene of action. 
 The first law for an army being the law of self- 
 preservation, it is absolutely necessary, on all 
 occasions, to submit to whatever course that 
 paramount condition may dictate. General Su- 
 chet could neither order general Habert to fall 
 back, nor leave him unsupported in the heart 
 of the kingdom of Valencia. He therefore de- 
 termined to continue his movement, and resigned 
 himself to the chances of an enterprise which it 
 was no longer in his power to recall. 
 
 The first march of our troops brought them 
 to Sarrion, and in front of Alventosa, where the 
 Valencian army had taken up a position behind 
 the deep ravine through which runs the small 
 stream called the Minjares. It had the appear- 
 ance of an immense ditch intersecting the plain, 
 and was only seen on coming close up to its 
 sides, which rose perpendicularly, and within half 
 a gun-shot of each other. The road cut along the 
 declivity of the left bank, and connecting the
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 99 
 
 elevated lands of Sarrion with the bridge of 
 Alventosa, was interrupted by a ditch thirty feet 
 broad, and was protected by the musketry of the 
 right bank. On the other side of the Minjares, the 
 village of Alventosa was grouped round an isolat- 
 ed rock, crowned by the ruins of an old castle, 
 which, together with the village, were occupied by 
 the enemy and formed their advanced guard. The 
 Valencian army, covered by this natural intrench- 
 ment and advanced post, was drawn up on the 
 plateau in the rear. It had on its right the bridge 
 and village of Puenseca, and Manzanera on its left. 
 That army might have amounted to 10 or 12,000 
 men ; in spite, however, of its formidable atti- 
 tude and well-chosen position, we were fully con- 
 vinced that it would not risk a battle on the fron- 
 tier, at a time when general Habert's column was 
 marching along the sea-shore, on its way to 
 attack Valencia. It was much more proba- 
 ble that it would confine itself to watch or 
 obstruct our movements, and hold itself in rea- 
 diness, under every circumstance, to cover the 
 threatened capital. These considerations deter- 
 mined the general-in-chief to manoeuvre in such 
 a manner as would at least enable him to force 
 the Valencian army from its position, if he should 
 not succeed in bringing it to an engagement. 
 
 He had remarked, on his arrival, that the left 
 of the Spaniards was inadequately supported, 
 and that on approaching the source of the Min- 
 
 ii 2
 
 100 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 jares, the valley presented less difficulties for an 
 advanced movement ; he determined to direct his 
 principal attack to that point. On the 2nd of 
 March, he ordered general Laval to attack before 
 day-break the passage of the Manzanera, whilst 
 generals Harispe and Paris would draw off the 
 enemy's attention by a false attack upon his 
 right, and by demonstrations and a heavy fire 
 of artillery against the centre ; the ditch was 
 to be filled up as soon as the enemy should 
 be dislodged from the village of Alventosa. 
 Agreeably to these arrangements, general La- 
 val forced the passage of the Manzanera ; he 
 then marched in a direction to enable him to 
 out-flank the enemy, by reaching the plateaus 
 of the right bank. The 4th regiment of hussars 
 having descended into the valley, forded the 
 river near the bridge of Alventosa, and rapidly 
 gained the height at the moment when general 
 Laval's movement was inducing the enemy to 
 retreat. The cavalry availed itself of their he- 
 sitation to rush upon the village ; the enemy's 
 advanced guard evacuated it in the utmost haste, 
 as well as the castle, which was defended by 
 six pieces of heavy artillery. The retreat, or 
 to speak more correctly, the flight of the Valen- 
 cians was the immediate consequence of this 
 success, and four field-pieces fell into our hands. 
 The enemy was pursued as far as Las Barracas ; 
 another piece of artillery and some baggage were
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 101 
 
 taken at the defile of Xerica ; we also found 
 four pieces of cannon at Segorbe, which was 
 completely deserted, the inhabitants having eva- 
 cuated the town on our approach. 
 
 In our advance upon Murviedro on the 3rd 
 of March, we quitted the barren country which 
 separates Arragon from the kingdom of Valencia. 
 On leaving those dreary table-lands, that dry 
 atmosphere, those rugged and wild roads, a 
 delightful country opened to our view, where 
 an almost perpetual spring, a highly produc- 
 tive vegetation, a state of cultivation which rivals 
 the natural fecundity of the soil, combined to 
 excite our admiration. We were at last entering 
 the plains of Valencia, where orange and lemon- 
 trees present the most cheerful picture, and em- 
 balm the air with their perfume. General Habert 
 reached Villareal at the same time. He had 
 marched across mountains covered with snow, 
 routed a corps of 4,000 Valencians at Morella, 
 and seized upon the fort, in which he found 
 1,500 muskets. On the 3rd, he placed himself 
 in communication with the general-in-chief ; but 
 the junction of both columns could only be 
 effected at the spot where the two roads meet 
 which lead to Valencia, the one along the sea- 
 shore, the other by Teruel and Segorbe. When 
 we entered Murviedro, a delightful little town si- 
 tuated at the foot of the rock of ancient Saguntum, 
 a deputation came to present us with the keys.
 
 102 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and to announce the submission of the inhabitants. 
 We visited with all the eagerness of curiosity 
 those celebrated ruins which so strongly recalled 
 the days of Rome and of Hannibal. The object 
 most worthy of notice was an old theatre in a 
 good state of preservation, which the Spanish 
 government carefully kept in repair. But no 
 military works had yet been erected on the rock 
 of Saguntum. We found here and there, amongst 
 aloes and fig-trees, some vestiges of ruined 
 walls, fragments of altars and sculptured stones, 
 but not the least trace of defensive preparations. 
 There was nothing to indicate that two years 
 afterwards this position would offer to the same 
 army an obstinate resistance, of which a siege 
 and a battle would be the consequence. 
 
 The junction of the troops having taken place 
 at Murviedro, they would have found no insuper- 
 able difficulty in marching back to Arragon, to 
 which province they were re-called by the or- 
 ders received from Paris. But the expectation 
 which the despatches from Cordova had held 
 out, of the friendly feelings of the inhabi- 
 tants, was considered by the general-in-chief as 
 making it imperative upon him to advance to 
 the very ramparts of a city towards which he 
 had already made so much progress. The re- 
 ports which he received from other quarters, 
 represented that a movement in favour of the 
 French, within the walls of Valencia, was highly
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 103 
 
 probable as soon as their forces should come in 
 sight of it. The example of Madrid and of Se- 
 ville, might find its imitators ; he did not, how- 
 ever, wholly indulge this flattering hope ; neither 
 would he expose himself to the reproach of hav- 
 ing caused the failure of the expedition ; a re- 
 proach he could not have escaped, if after having 
 entered upon the attempt, he had not endea- 
 voured to follow it up. 
 
 Murviedro is at the distance of only four 
 leagues from Valencia. General Habert took the 
 lead, and advanced as far as the suburb of Sera- 
 nos. After compelling all the Spanish out-posts 
 to retreat into the city, he seized upon the left 
 bank of the Guadalaviar. The chief of battalion 
 Matis, of the 117th regiment, was sent to the 
 port, called the Grao and took possession of it, as 
 well as of the stores of English and Spanish 
 merchandise collected there. General Laval es- 
 tablished himself at Benimamet on the right. 
 Valencia is situated on the right bank, with an 
 enclosure of ramparts flanked with towers ; the 
 bridges were protected with intrenched heads, 
 excepting the two that communicated from the 
 suburb of Seranos to the town. Our reconnoi- 
 tring parties, as they approached, were met a 
 all points by a heavy fire of artillery. 
 
 The 3rd corps remained for the space of five 
 days before that extensive city, which it could 
 neither invest nor attack. No favourable move
 
 104 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 ment manifested itself in the interval, and the 
 letters and summons addressed by the general- 
 in-chief to the governor, were wholly unattended 
 to. We soon learned, on the contrary, that the 
 popular excitement was displaying itself in an 
 opposite sense. The archbishop and a number 
 of persons suspected of favouring us, were ar- 
 rested. Three gallows were erected in the great 
 square for the purpose of striking terror into the 
 people, and a colonel baron de Pozzoblanco was 
 hung under pretence of being a traitor. The news 
 of the advance of a French corps upon Murcia, 
 had indeed been announced from Seville ; but 
 that movement did not take place ; the same 
 spirit, moreover, which had broken out in Va- 
 lencia, manifested itself in its vicinity. General 
 Suchet accordingly adopted the determination 
 not to prolong his absence from Arragon. Pre- 
 viously, however, to his return, he resolved to 
 chastise the armed bands which were collecting 
 around him ; and although he had not one half 
 of the 3rd corps before Valencia, to maintain a 
 bold attitude in the midst of that hostile popula- 
 tion. 
 
 Colonel Henriod marched upon Liria with the 
 14th regiment, and quelled every disturbance. 
 General Boussard was sent on the 8th of March 
 to Castellon de la Plana with 200 cuirassiers and 
 300 chosen foot soldiers. He met 2,000 armed 
 peasants at the bridge of Villareal, behind the
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 105 
 
 Minjares, and instantly ordered a charge ; a great 
 number were killed, and the remainder took to 
 their heels. 
 
 The army broke up its encampment on the 
 10th of March, at the entrance of the night, and 
 forming itself into a single column, resumed the 
 road to Segorbe and Teruel, which was already- 
 threatened or intercepted by hostile detachments. 
 So early as the 7th of March, general Villacampa 
 deeming the moment to be favourable when the 
 army was at a distance, had proceeded towards 
 Teruel and penetrated into the town. The gar- 
 rison of 400 men, under the orders of colonel 
 Plicque, had been under the necessity of shut- 
 ting itself up in the fortified barracks of the 
 seminary. 
 
 Villacampa was informed that a detachment 
 of 150 men, escorting four pieces of mountain 
 artillery and some boxes of ammunition had left 
 Daroca on its way to join the army. He imme- 
 diately detached some of his forces to surround 
 it. The convoy thus attacked in an extensive 
 plain, a league from Teruel, and having a very 
 inefficient commander, retreated in disorder to 
 a venta, where the whole were taken, with the 
 exception of a few horsemen, who escaped 
 to Torremocha. Shortly afterwards, Villacampa 
 caused an attack to be made upon a company 
 of Polish soldiers who occupied the post of 
 Alventosa ; the commanding officer, who had
 
 106 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 had nothing else to do but to shut himself up 
 in the old castle, or retreat to the adjoining post 
 of Las Barracas, adopted the very worst course, 
 that of defending himself in the open country, 
 on the plateau of the right bank of the Min- 
 jares; his handful of soldiers were surrounded 
 and taken prisoners. 
 
 In the meanwhile, the castle of Teruel was 
 closely blockaded. In the absence of artillery, 
 the enemy resorted to other means, such as send- 
 ing summons, keeping up a regular fire of mus- 
 ketry, and demonstrations of an under-ground 
 attack. The seminary and an adjoining con- 
 vent, forming together the barracks were si- 
 tuated on the wall of enclosure. The position 
 on the country side was highly advantageous, 
 owing to the declivity of the ground on 
 which these buildings were erected. On the 
 side of the town they were completely isolated, 
 excepting at one extremity, where the convent 
 came in contact with a large square tower, the 
 lower part of which served as a gate to the 
 town, and the upper part as a steeple to the 
 church of St. Martin. This tower had a full com- 
 mand of the barracks, and of all the adjoining 
 streets ; it ought therefore to have formed part 
 of the system of defence. It communicated, 
 through the first story, with the church by the 
 organ gallery, which should have been occupied 
 and barricadoed ; but this precaution was neg-
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 107 
 
 lected. We had allowed the clergy the full 
 use of the church, which was the chief parish 
 church of the town, and divine service continued 
 to be celebrated there as usual. Availing them- 
 selves of this circumstance, the enemy contrived 
 to enter the church, and scaled the organ gallery. 
 They were now about to seize upon the tower, 
 and the internal defense of the barracks would 
 accordingly have become useless, had it not been 
 for captain Leviston of the engineers, who rushed 
 upon the Spaniards at the head of a few sappers, 
 drove back all those who were in the gallery, 
 and in the church, and either killed or took 
 prisoners those who had found their way to the 
 steeple. The siege was now changed for a se- 
 cond time into a blockade, and on the 12th of 
 March, the head of the column of general 
 Paris, forming the advanced guard of the army 
 returning from Valencia, was descried beyond 
 Sarrion. Villacampa now determined to retreat. 
 The arrival of the general-in-chief on the follow- 
 ing day, the 13th, completely restored our line 
 of communication. He repaired on the 1 7th to 
 Saragossa, to which place the artillery, Habert's 
 division, and part of the cavalry, directed their 
 march. Paris' brigade proceeded to Montalvan; 
 and Laval's divison was left to occupy Teruel, 
 Daroca and Calatayud, as well as to oppose the 
 forces of Villacampa and of the Valencians, during 
 the operations which were about to engage the
 
 108 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 attention of the 3rd corps on the left bank of the 
 Ebro. 
 
 Availing himself of the moment when the line 
 of the Cinca had been left unprotected, Perena 
 had advanced along both banks to the attack of 
 Monzon, and of the tete-de-pont ; general Verges, 
 however, having arrived from Fraga, defeated and 
 compelled him to retreat. This was a fortunate, 
 though a casual occurrence ; the movement of ge- 
 neral Verges was the effect of a concentration of 
 forces, which had been ordered by the general- 
 in-chief in conformity with the plan of operations 
 he had laid down for the siege of Lerida. The 
 enemy then occupied Fraga, destroyed a few in- 
 trenchments we had raised there, and set fire 
 to the bridge. 
 
 In the meantime, the successive departure of 
 the French troops from Navarre had enabled 
 Mina to rally his followers, renew his incursions, 
 and again advance towards the Cinco Villas in 
 Arragon. The general-in-chief sent general 
 Harispe against him with fresh troops drawn 
 from Saragossa, whilst the chief-of-battalion 
 Deshorties quitted Jaca with the battalion of 
 chasseurs of the Ariege, and advanced by way 
 of Verdun, to bar the entrance of the upper 
 vallies. Thus driven back to the right bank 
 compelled to quit Arragon, and fly for shelter to 
 Navarre, where general Dufour, the successor of 
 general Regnier, had taken possession of all the
 
 EXPEDITION TO VALENCIA. 109 
 
 passes, and being hemmed in on all sides, Mina, 
 early in April, fell in the midst of the French 
 advanced posts, was taken prisoner and sent to 
 France.* 
 
 This event relieved the French army from the 
 annoyance of a very enterprising Guerilla leader, 
 and calmed for some time the disturbances in 
 Navarre. We shall soon find his uncle Espoz y 
 Mina succeeding him, and gradually taking a still 
 higher flight than the young student his nephew 
 had ever done. 
 
 * Some years afterwards he went to America, where he 
 perished in a premature attempt to accomplish the indepen- 
 dence of Mexico.
 
 CHAPTER IV, 
 
 Preparations for the siege of Lerkla. — Investment of the 
 place. — Details concerning it. — State of the fortifications. — 
 Temporary junction with the army of Catalonia. — Approach 
 of the Spanish army, commanded by Henry O'Donnell — 
 Battle of Margalef. — Fruitless attack upon the redoubts of 
 Garden. — Opening of the trench. — The batteries are esta- 
 blished. — First opening of the fire. — Renewal of the fire 
 from the batteries, and opening of the breaches. — Cap- 
 ture of the redoubts of Garden. — Assault and taking of the 
 town. — Capitulation of the castle and of the fort of Garden. 
 
 The excursion of the 3rd corps to Valencia, 
 which excited the displeasure of the French go- 
 vernment, without accomplishing the views of 
 the government of Madrid, had been for general 
 Suchet the almost necessary consequence of his 
 position. Having returned to Arragon after that 
 movement beyond the limits of his own province, 
 and being on the point of resuming, by the siege 
 of Lericla, the course of operations which were 
 within his immediate sphere of action, his whole 
 attention was now directed to the object of ra- 
 pidly pushing the siege forward, and repairing
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. Ill 
 
 lost time. With the reinforcements it had just 
 received, the 3rd corps then consisted of thirty- 
 three battalions, and nine squadrons, amounting, 
 in all, to about twenty-two thousand effective 
 soldiers.* Nearly one third of these forces would 
 necessarily have to remain in Arragon for the 
 purpose of keeping up our establishments in that 
 province, and of defending it either against the 
 detachments from Navarre, and upper Catalonia, 
 or against Villacampa, who remained towards the 
 frontiers of Valencia and Castille, with a corps 
 of three or four thousand men. The rest of the 
 army was very inadequate, in point of numbers, 
 to undertake such an operation as the siege of 
 Lerida, in presence of the Spanish army of Cata- 
 lonia, commanded by Henry O'Donnell, after- 
 wards count del Abisbal. But the government 
 had ordered marshal Augereau to assist in the 
 siege of Lerida, and to move the 7th corps to- 
 wards the Ebro, for the purpose of affording aid 
 to the 3rd corps. This was a prudent combina- 
 tion, the execution of which did not present any 
 serious difficulty. Nevertheless, it proved unavail- 
 ing, though not from any delay on the part of 
 the 3rd corps. Our army of Catalonia had 
 certainly acquired a greater freedom of action 
 since the capitulation of Gerona ; it was, how- 
 ever, under the necessity of never absenting itself 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No S.
 
 112 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 for any length of time from Barcelona and its 
 vicinity, and was kept in check by tbe move- 
 ments of Henry O'Donnell ; we shall, accord- 
 ingly, find that it had scarcely come within sight 
 of the lower Ebro, when it was compelled to 
 resume its position near Hostalrich. 
 
 On arriving at Saragossa, general Suchet im- 
 mediately directed his attention to the completion 
 of his warlike preparations at Monzon and of 
 sending thither his besieging train. His troops, 
 in the meanwhile, were resuming their march 
 towards the centre, or towards some point of the 
 circumference of Arragon. The 3rd division, 
 under the orders of general Habert, moved from 
 Saragossa to the Cinca which it had quitted a 
 month before. General Laval, who was formerly 
 stationed at Teruel with the 1st division, left 
 general Chlopiski on the Xiloca and proceeded in 
 person towards Saragossa with Montmarie's bri- 
 gade. General Musnier, who commanded in 
 Arragon during the march of the army to Va- 
 lencia, had already a brigade of the 2nd division 
 at Fraga under general Verges. He overtook his 
 other brigade at Caspe and Alcahiz, where it was 
 returning with general Paris from Teruel through 
 the mountains of Montalvan. He crossed the line 
 of the Guadalupe at the latter end of March, 
 threatened Tortosa and compelled all the troops 
 to fall back which were covering the defense 
 of that place. He was ordered^ after this feint
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 113 
 
 movement, to re-ascend the lower Ebro as far as 
 Mora and Flix, by taking* possession of the boats 
 and thereby securing the passage of the river, 
 and to open, if possible, a communication with 
 marshal Augereau's army. 
 
 The destruction of the bridge of Fraga had 
 contributed to secure the town of Lerida from 
 any immediate danger. Whilst that bridge was 
 in existence, it had the advantage for us of being- 
 situated on the high road from Saragossa to Le- 
 rida, and of affording at all times a passage over 
 the Cinca; it was therefore the most direct line 
 of operations. With reference however to the 
 siege of Lerida, it had the serious disadvantage of 
 being too near Mequinenza where the Spaniards 
 had a garrison of 1,500 men, which might 
 easily be reinforced by troops from Valencia. 
 In other respects moreover, the road through 
 Alcubiere did not appear so liable to objection ; 
 it was less exhausted of forage, and it led in a 
 direct line to Monzon, where we established an 
 hospital, ovens, magazines, and the besieging train 
 which was to consist of forty pieces of cannon, 
 each of them with a supply of seven hundred balls. 
 A battalion of the Vistula took up a position at 
 Candasnos, with a view to protect this communi- 
 cation ; and four squadrons of horse and foot 
 gendarmes who were on their way from France, 
 were immediately distributed, with some de- 
 tachments of troops of the line, amongst our 
 
 VOL. I I
 
 114 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 positions at Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, 
 Pina, Bujaralos, and along the left bank of the 
 Ebro. Whilst these preparations were in pro- 
 gress, general Habert engaged the attention of 
 the enemy in front, by various movements be- 
 tween the Cinca and the Segre. 
 
 The commander-in-chief was aware that the Spa- 
 nish brigadier-general Perena had stationed him- 
 self with four battalions at Balaguer, a position on 
 the Segre, surrounded with old fortifications, and 
 deriving great importance from its stone bridge ; 
 he resolved to take possession of it. General 
 Habert approached the place on the 4th of April 
 with a portion of his troops. Perena shewed at 
 first an intention of opposing him, until he was 
 informed that colonel Robert had crossed the 
 Segre at Camarasa with the 117th regiment, 
 when becoming apprehensive of an attack from 
 both banks, he precipitately withdrew to Al- 
 coletge, where he crossed the river by the bridge 
 of Lerida and returned to take up a position at 
 Corbins on the bank of the Noguera. 
 
 General Suchet finding that he could command 
 a passage over the Segre, immediately accele- 
 rated his arrangements ; and leaving general 
 Laval in Arragon, transferred his head quar- 
 ters to Monzon on the 10th of April, taking with 
 him Verges' brigade and the 13th regiment of cui- 
 rassiers, six companies of artillery, one of pon- 
 toonmen, another of miners, and two companies of
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 115 
 
 sappers. From Monzon he advanced on the 13th 
 towards Lerida by the road of Almacellas, and 
 established himself within view of the place. 
 General Habert descended from Balaguer by the 
 right bank of the Segre. The hussars led by 
 lieutenant Monvel forded the Noguera under the 
 enemy's fire. After a smart engagement, Perena 
 retreated into the town, and general Habert took 
 up a position on the heights of San-Rufo. On 
 the same day, general Paris, who led the 
 advanced guard of general Musnier, after having 
 crossed the Ebro at Flix, made his appearance 
 on the left bank of the Segre which he had re- 
 ascended, and drove back all the enemy's troops 
 that he found beyond the tete-de-pont. With 
 the view of supporting his operations on that 
 bank, General Harispe proceeded thither on 
 the 14th, with three battalions and a portion of 
 the 4th hussars. This regiment was greatly 
 reduced in numbers, having left several de- 
 tachments in Arragon ; but the 13th cuiras- 
 siers formed, an excellent reserve of cavalry. Al- 
 though it had been newly raised, it had made 
 such rapid strides under the skilful management 
 of colonel d'Aigremont as to vie in experience 
 with the oldest regiments; its appearance always 
 inspired the French soldiers with confidence, and 
 the Spaniards with a degree of terror which a 
 most brilliant feat of arms soon proved to be well 
 
 warranted . 
 
 l 2
 
 116 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 The name of Lerida recalls to the mind a va- 
 riety of recollections which the history of ancient 
 and of modern wars has stamped with celebrity. 
 Passing over the part which Ilerda acted during 
 the campaigns of the Scipios, in the second Punic 
 war, it is equally well known that, at the com- 
 mencement of the civil war, Caesar besieged or 
 rather kept in check, within the walls of this town, 
 Afranius and Petreius, the two lieutenants of Pom- 
 pey, who, notwithstanding they had five legions 
 under their command, a number equal to his own 
 forces, and had the advantage over him of being 
 in possession of the town and of its bridge on the 
 Segre, sufTered themselves at last to be hemmed 
 in while attempting to manoeuvre, and basely laid 
 down their arms. In modern times, Lerida has 
 held a place in the narrative of every campaign in 
 Catalonia. In 1644, Don Felipe de Silva attacked 
 the town, which was defended by 3,6'00 French- 
 men and 2,000 Catalonian peasants, and after 
 a blockade of upwards of two months, drove 
 it, rather by cutting off its supplies than by force 
 of arms, to the necessity of capitulating. In 1646, 
 the French, under the command of count d'Har- 
 court, attempted to starve Lerida into submission ; 
 but their lines were forced, and the town relieved 
 after a protracted blockade. In 1647, the great 
 Cond6 opened a trench against the north side 
 of the castle ; this isolated attack was delayed 
 by the difficulties of the ground, and by the
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 117 
 
 numerous sorties made by the garrison ; and 
 after a lapse of twenty days, the siege was 
 raised, in consequence of the approach of the 
 Spanish army with a determination to relieve the 
 place. 
 
 During the war of the succession in 1707, the 
 duke of Orleans finding himself master of Valen- 
 cia and of Arragon, in consequence of the battle 
 of Almanza, came to besiege Lerida, in spite of 
 Lord Galloway's army, which was neither in suf- 
 ficient strength nor adventurous enough to com- 
 pel him to raise the siege.* The investment took 
 
 * Marshal Berwick, at the head of a corps of observation, 
 kept lord Galloway in check. The duke of Orleans had no 
 part of his army diverted from the siege. According to M. de 
 Quincy's report, his forces were distributed in the following 
 manner : 
 
 At Monzon 5 battalions. 
 
 Benavarre ,, 13 squadrons. 
 
 Alfaraz 1 1 ,, 20 „ 
 
 Castellon de Farfana . 12 ,, ,, 
 Balaguer, the head- 
 quarters of the duke 
 
 of Orleans 5 ,, 21 ,, 
 
 Total 33 battalions 54 squadrons. 
 
 The greater part of the cavalry was detached with eight 
 battalions to the left bank of the Segre, in order to complete in 
 that direction the investment of the place ; a duty which de- 
 volved upon lieutenant-general d'Avaray. 
 
 After the taking of the town, and whilst the siege of the
 
 118 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 place on the 13th of September ; the trenches 
 were opened on the night of the 2nd of Oc- 
 tober, in front of the upper Segre, and an at- 
 tack directed against the bastion of the Carmen, 
 where the present enclosure came in contact with 
 an old projecting wall, lined with towers, but 
 without ditches, which wall is no longer in ex- 
 istence. The works were retarded by the rains 
 and the frequent sorties ; on the 12th, however, 
 at nightfall, every thing was in readiness to storm 
 the breach and to form a lodgment in it. On the 
 14th, the French obtained possession of the town* 
 the plunder of which was directed by general 
 orders and carried into effect, agreeably to cer- 
 tain regulations, during the space of eight hours, 
 by two soldiers appointed from each company in 
 the army. On the 16th, the castle was attacked 
 from the country side. This second siege was 
 longer and more difficult than the first, owing to 
 the hardness and declivity of the ground. The 
 artillery could scarcely open a breach ; after 
 twenty-five days' exertions, the wall being under- 
 mined in two places, and every thing in readi- 
 ness, the assault was ordered for the night of 
 the 10th of November, when the prince of Darm- 
 
 castle was proceeding", lord Galloway advanced as far as Bor- 
 jas-BLaneas. But he confined himself to mere demonstra- 
 tions, and withdrew, notwithstanding- the signals of distress 
 from the castle.
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 119 
 
 stadt, governor of the castle, finding it impossible 
 to protract the defence any longer, beat a parley. 
 The duke of Orleans caused fort Garden to be 
 surrendered to him as well as the castle, and al- 
 lowed the garrison to remove to Barcelona with all 
 the honours of war. They had been reduced to 
 2,000 men. Thirty-three pieces of cannon, several 
 mortars, 30,000 cannon balls, 10,000 pounds of 
 gun-powder, and other ammunition, were found 
 in the place. 
 
 Lerida is situated on the borders of the Segre, 
 and on the main line of communication between Ar- 
 ragon and Catalonia, twenty-five leagues from Bar- 
 celona and as many from Saragossa ; it has a stone 
 bridge, and stands at ashort distance from theEbro 
 and the Cinca ; it exercises a powerful influence 
 by its population, consisting of from 15 to 18,000 
 inhabitants, and by its position which commands 
 a great extent of country. The town, properly 
 so called, is built along the right bank of the 
 Segre. The greater part is defended by the river 
 itself; and a tete-de-pont had just been con- 
 structed on the left bank, consisting merely of a 
 lunette surrounded with a ditch, and intrenched 
 by a square building. The enclosure of the town 
 on the land-side was formed by a wall without any 
 ditch or covered-way, partly terraced and fortified 
 with bastions, and partly flanked with towers. Its 
 real strength, however, consists in the castle, 
 which protects nearly the whole town, and com-
 
 120 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET. 
 
 mands it from the summit of a hill rising about 
 seventy metres above the river. On the ridge of 
 the hill stands a turret of great height, round 
 which are grouped several large and well-con- 
 structed buildings. The fortification which sur- 
 rounds the castle is an irregular square, measur- 
 ing 250 metres in its external dimensions, flanked 
 with strong bastions of twelve or fourteen metres 
 in steepness. The western front alone is de- 
 fended by a ditch ; every other part of the walls 
 is unprotected ; but their base is so elevated 
 above the surrounding country that the besieger 
 finds no favourable spot for placing his cannon 
 and battering in breach. The south and east 
 fronts, looking towards the Segre and the road to 
 Balaguer, are built upon almost inaccessible de- 
 clivities. The north front, which might be termed 
 the relieving front, as it is the only one immedi- 
 ately connected with the country, is also very 
 difficult of access, owing to its great elevation 
 and the nature of its approaches, the ground being 
 chiefly rocky. The west front alone presents a 
 rather gentle slope, which might be approached 
 by a regular attack ; but the besiegers must 
 first be in possession of the town, and of 
 fort Garden, the rear of which would have a 
 full view of the trenches. Garden is built on 
 the top of a plateau, commanding the western 
 extremity of the town, and standing at an eleva- 
 tion of 600 metres ; Petreius and Afranius were
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 121 
 
 encamped on this spot when Caesar laid siege 
 to the place. The Spanish engineers having 
 considered that this fort was too weak and too 
 inconsiderable for securing to the garrison of 
 Lerida the enjoyment of the gardens and pas- 
 ture-grounds which line the river in that direc- 
 tion, as well as the possession of the plateau 
 itself, had attempted to drive the besiegers to a 
 greater distance. With this view, they had pro- 
 tected it by an extensive horn-work, which lined 
 the declivity on its right, and was connected, on 
 the left, with an old redoubt. Its ditches were 
 dug in a very hard stony ground, and presented 
 a perpendicular scarp and counterscarp, five or 
 six metres high, which might be deemed proof 
 against any open attack. They had also raised 
 at the other extremity of the plateau two large 
 redoubts, the one named del Pilar, the other 
 San-Fernando, at a distance of upwards of 1,500 
 metres from the town, and 700 only from the new 
 horn- work. 
 
 These fortifications were all in good condition, 
 and contained a garrison and an artillery fully 
 adequate to prolong the defence, which was 
 confided to the major-general Garcia Conde, a 
 young and active officer, who indulged the 
 hope of making the siege of Lerida last as 
 long as that of Gerona, where he distinguished 
 himself by introducing a convoy of provisions into 
 the place. Independently of the regular troops,
 
 122 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the town contained a population excited to the 
 highest pitch of enthusiasm, and a great number 
 of the neighbouring peasantry, who, animated 
 with the same sentiments, had hastened to 
 bring arms and provisions into the place. It oc- 
 curred to general Suchet, that during a popu- 
 lar war, such means of defence might turn to 
 the advantage of the besiegers, if he could suc- 
 ceed in creating in the minds of the besieged an 
 impression calculated to accelerate the surrender 
 of the town. 
 
 Previously to quitting Mora, general Musnier 
 could only come in contact for a few moments 
 with the corps of marshal Augereau, which held 
 temporary possession of Vails and Reuss to- 
 wards the close of the month of March. The 
 enemy having broken up their encampment 
 under Tarragona, and carried off a French bat- 
 talion at Villafranca, on the 3rd of April, marshal 
 Augereau felt apprehensive lest they should re- 
 lieve Hostalrich which was on the point of sur- 
 rendering for want of provisions ; he attempted 
 to approach Barcelona, and gave up all idea of 
 forming a junction with the army of Arragon.* 
 Spanish armed bands immediately afterwards 
 made their appearance along the lower Ebro, a 
 circumstance which confirmed us in the opinion 
 that the 7th corps had retired, at the very 
 moment when the 3rd corps was effecting the 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 4.
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 123 
 
 investment of Lerida. Thus it was, that general 
 Suchet, instead of receiving any support in his ex- 
 pedition, was compelled to rely exclusively upon 
 his own forces. This unforeseen position made 
 him determine not to accelerate the opening of the 
 trench, nor the arrival of the besieging train 
 stationed at Monzon, but to keep his troops in 
 reserve for a short time longer. He more par- 
 ticularly bestowed his attention to the object of 
 forming a passage across the Segre, above Lerida, 
 and within a league of that town. He directed, 
 at the same time, some engineer officers to recon- 
 noitre the approaches, and ordered all the pre- 
 liminary works in the camp, such as gabions, 
 fascines, &c. to be immediately begun. Of the 
 twenty-two battalions of the 3rd corps which were 
 collected on the frontiers of Catalonia, two were 
 left at Monzon, and another was doing duty at 
 Balaguer. The remaining nineteen were stationed 
 as follows : on the right, general Verges, with 
 three battalions of the 121st regiment covered 
 the roads leading to Mariola and Varcalas ; and 
 as the extensive plateau of Garden had a dis- 
 tant command of the road to Fraga, a battalion 
 of the ] 14th regiment was placed on the Sierra 
 de Canelin, and erected at this place an intrench- 
 ment, with two pieces of cannon. General Buget 
 with two more battalions of the 1 14th of the line, 
 and one battalion of the 3rd regiment of the Vis- 
 tula, was stationed on the road to Monzon.
 
 124 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Towards the left and somewhat in the rear, was 
 the engineer corps, at the windmill of Gualda, 
 facing the village of Villanueva del Picat, the ge- 
 neral-in-chiefs head quarters. Still further to the 
 left, towards the heights of San-Rufo, the two bat- 
 talions of the 5th light regiment, and two more 
 belonging to the 116th of the line, under the 
 orders of general Habert, intercepted the road 
 leading to Balaguer and Corbins. On the left 
 bank, three battalions of the 117th regiment, be- 
 longing to Habert's division, but on a detached 
 service with general Harispe, surrounded the 
 tete-de-pont. The general of division, Musnier, 
 was at Alcoletge, in the rear of general Harispe, 
 as well as generals Paris and Boussard, with the 
 115th of the line, the 1st regiment of the Vistula, 
 and the cavalry ; these troops formed the corps 
 of observation. 
 
 It thus appears that the investment of the town 
 was not complete above the bridge. The com- 
 manding position of Garden, over both banks, 
 compelled the besiegers to keep at a distance from 
 the river ; it would have been impossible to cover 
 the whole interval without giving a considerable 
 extension to our line of troops. General Suchet 
 confined himself to the object of causing the low 
 grounds which adjoin that part of the Segre, to 
 be constantly watched, night and day. The 
 space occupied by the reserve was determined 
 by the nature of the country at Alcoletge to-
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 125 
 
 ■J 
 
 wards those points, which are either open 
 grounds, or cover the roads leading to Barcelona 
 and Tarragona. Independently of this circum- 
 stance, generals Harispe and Musnier, from 
 the position which they occupied, not only pro- 
 tected our passage across the Segre between 
 the fields along the banks, but also had every 
 facility for retreating towards the bridge of Ba- 
 laguer, which presented a safe passage in the 
 event of the overflowing of the river, an accident 
 which the season of the year and past experience 
 naturally led us to apprehend. 
 
 The investment was scarcely completed, when 
 a Spanish superior officer was taken prisoner by 
 the advanced posts of the left bank. His object 
 appeared to be to obtain admission into the place, 
 and he represented himself as the bearer of a pro- 
 posal for an exchange of prisoners, which enabled 
 him to come over to us in the character of a flag of 
 truce. Some suspicion seemed to attach to his 
 errand; the commander-in-chief was not therefore 
 in a hurry to send him back, being impressed 
 with the idea, that he might have it in view to 
 make some communication to the garrison. A 
 rumour was gaining ground that general Henry 
 O'Donnell was assembling forces at Mon- 
 blanch ; Campoverde had approached Cervera 
 with a division of troops ; and armed peasants 
 had made their appearance on the upper Segre. 
 General Musnier was ordered to proceed with
 
 12G MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the reserve to Balaguer on the 19th of April. 
 The garrison, fancying that the moment was fa- 
 vourable, made a sortie in considerable numbers, 
 and attacked general Harispe, who vigorously 
 drove them back into the place. 
 
 The commander-in-chief had also proceeded on 
 the same day towards Balaguer, which he was 
 desirous of reconnoitring, as he deemed its posi- 
 tion to be of the highest importance to him. On 
 his arrival, he directed a few works to be con- 
 structed for the protection of the bridge, and or- 
 dered the castle to be placed in a state of defence; 
 he also ordered some artillery to be planted on the 
 ramparts, and the bridge of Camarasa, at the dis- 
 tance of a league from the town, to be destroyed. 
 From thence he advanced on the 21st as far 
 as Tarrega, for the purpose of reconnoitring 
 and procuring intelligence respecting the army 
 of marshal Augereau, and O'Donnell's ma- 
 noeuvres. We had great difficulty in employing 
 spies in a country so new to us, in which every 
 inhabitant was our enemy. We were every where 
 hated and every where deceived, unless when 
 pride or the confidence of success in the enemy led 
 them involuntarily to betray their intentions. In 
 general, however, all promises or threats were 
 equally unsuccessful in eliciting any secret that 
 one might turn to advantage. The French gene- 
 ral was indebted to mere chance for the know- 
 ledge which he acquired of O'Donnell's march.
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 127 
 
 He was secretly informed of that officer's having 
 quitted Tarragona, at the head of two divisions, 
 and proceeded in the direction of Monblanch. 
 If general O'Donnell should be joined by Cam- 
 poverde's division, this manoeuvre on his part 
 would place him in a condition to obstruct, and 
 even to prevent the siege. General Suchet 
 doubted the truth of the report, as he could 
 not persuade himself that the 7th corps had 
 completely retired ; nevertheless, it behoved him 
 not to overlook such important intelligence. He 
 hastened to bring his column back to the camp 
 by forced marches ; and on the evening of the 
 22nd, he placed general Musnier at Alcoletge, 
 together with the cavalry of general Boussard, 
 as a corps of reserve. 
 
 The Spanish general had actually encamped at 
 Vinaxa on the 22nd, with the divisions of gene- 
 rals Yvarola and Pirez, amounting in all to 
 about 8,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry, being the 
 choicest troops of his whole army. He re- 
 ceived there a note from the governor of Le- 
 rida, announcing that part of the French in- 
 fantry, and nearly the whole of their cavalry, 
 had made a movement, and quitted their en- 
 campment before the place. Deceived by this 
 information, which was no longer correct at the 
 moment of his receiving it, O'Donnell accelerated 
 his march at an early hour on the 23rd. He 
 halted at Juneda at ten o'clock, started again
 
 128 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 at noon at the head of his 1st division, and of 
 his cavalry, and proceeded in the direction of 
 Lerida, through the plain of Margalef, in the 
 utmost security, not suspecting that his flanks 
 were threatened in an open country where he 
 could not discover the slightest trace of an 
 enemy. Nevertheless, he formed his troops into 
 three columns ; the first consisting of light in- 
 fantry, advanced by the high road ; the other 
 two on the right and left, but somewhat in the 
 rear of the first, and preceded by sharp-shooters. 
 The light infantry, on approaching the place, met 
 our advanced posts, which fell back. On the 
 first report of musketry, general Harispe mounted 
 his horse, placed himself at the head of the 
 4th hussars, and followed by some companies 
 of skirmishers belonging to the 115th and 
 117th regiments, proceeded to meet the enemy, 
 when he discovered that their advanced guard 
 alone had come up. It sometimes happens in 
 war, that decisive moments are not slow in pre- 
 senting themselves ; a bold charge of hussars 
 on that head of column, did not allow it time 
 to form or to recover from its surprise. Being 
 suddenly compelled to stop, and to fall back, it 
 lost one half of its men, who were cut down or 
 taken prisoners ; and the relieving army no sooner 
 arrived in sight of the place, than it found itself 
 separated from it. The garrison was, at the 
 same instant, endeavouring to debouch from
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. ] 29 
 
 the tete-de-pont, under cover of a general dis- 
 charge of artillery from the castle, as well as from 
 the town, and encouraged by the acclamations 
 and other joyful demonstrations of the inhabitants, 
 who were eye witnesses of an engagement in the 
 result of which they were so deeply interested. 
 Colonel Robert who was prepared to oppose the 
 sortie, kept the enemy in check with the 117th 
 regiment, and when he perceived that the garrison 
 was dispirited by general Harispe's success, he 
 instantly charged, and compelled it to re-enter 
 the place. 
 
 In the meanwhile, general Musnier had 
 marched from his position at Alcoletge, and 
 having discovered the object of the enemy's 
 movement, instantly adopted the wisest course 
 he could resort to in the existing emergency. 
 Instead of proceeding to join general Harispe, 
 he took the direct road through which O'Donnell 
 was approaching. His infantry accelerated its 
 march in order to keep up with the cuirassiers, 
 who were advancing in all haste under the orders 
 of general Boussard, and without meeting with 
 any obstacle to impede their progress. O'Donnell 
 was at a short distance in one of the houses of 
 Margalef, an old village, or rather the ruins of 
 one, which had been destroyed in former wars. 
 He ordered the 2nd division to halt, which was but 
 just leaving Juneda, and the first to fall back. 
 The light infantry, of which general Navarro's 
 
 VOL. I. k
 
 130 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 brigade consisted, had already lost its batta- 
 lion of advanced guard, in consequence of general 
 Harispe's charge ; it had barely sufficient time, 
 on its return, to form in column near Dupuig's 
 brigade, which was ranged in order of battle on 
 the high road, having the artillery on its right, 
 and the cavalry on its left. The 13th regiment 
 of cuirassiers deployed in presence of that line, 
 and under its fire ; our artillery hastened to draw 
 up, and briskly returned the enemy's fire. The 
 Spanish cavalry made a demonstration of moving 
 forward ; but the cuirassiers did not allow them 
 time to try that movement ; they rapidly closed 
 with and defeated them. The Spanish cavalry 
 fell back in disorder on the light infantry, and 
 on the line of battle, which was beginning to 
 waver. The cuirassiers did not slacken their 
 charge ; the Walloon guards in vain attempted 
 to form into a square : the whole Spanish infantry 
 being taken in flank, in consequence of our fol- 
 lowing up the charge, were surrounded, and, 
 after a fruitless resistance, laid down their arms. 
 Our cuirassiers met, at the further extremity of 
 the field of battle, a Swiss battalion just arrived, 
 and forming the advanced guard of the division 
 of general Pirez, and made it share the fate of 
 the eight battalions of the 1st division. General 
 O'Donnell was hurried along by the fugitives, who 
 only rallied on coming up to the 2nd division ; he 
 there restored order amongst his troops, and has-
 
 SI EOF. OE LER1DA. 131 
 
 tened his retreat. Notwithstanding the sharp pur- 
 suit directed by the commander-in-chief, and car- 
 ried by the chef-d'escadron, Saint-George, as far 
 as Borjas-Blancas, general O'Donnell retreated in 
 good order, and reached before night-fall some po- 
 sitions on the road to Monblanch, where he found 
 shelter from the enemy.* 
 
 The action fought at Margalef was, like all 
 cavalry engagements, as sudden as it was quickly 
 decided ; the credit of it was chiefly due to the 
 13th regiment of cuirassiers, which happening to 
 occupy a favourable position, resolutely took ad- 
 vantage of it. Our wounded exceeded the num- 
 ber of our slain, and we had only to deplore 
 the loss of one officer, young d'Houdetot, a lieu- 
 tenant of cuirassiers. He had received two bayo- 
 net wounds, which were not at first considered 
 desperate ; but as we were re-crossing the Se- 
 gre on the following day, the commander-in-chief, 
 who was in conversation with him in the boat, and 
 entertained sanguine hopes of his recovery, from 
 the calmness and confidence which he displayed 
 in the midst of his sufferings, had the mortifi- 
 cation of witnessing the dying moments of this 
 interesting and highly promising young officer, 
 who, at the age of eighteen, had already won 
 the cross of the legion of honour on the field 
 of battle. The Spaniards lost three pieces of 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 5- 
 
 K 2
 
 132 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 cannon, a pair of colours, three standards, a great 
 number of muskets, and, independently of their 
 slain, 5,617 prisoners, including general Dupuig, 
 eight colonels, and 27 1 officers. They were sent 
 over to the right bank of the Segre, on the 24th 
 of April, in the open day, and brought within 
 sight of the place, on their way to the head- 
 quarters of Villanueva del Picat. They were 
 then passed in review in the presence of the 
 Spanish officer who had been detained as the 
 bearer of a suspicious flag of truce, although he was 
 treated with becoming consideration ; he was im- 
 mediately afterwards restored to liberty, and dis- 
 missed by the road to Cervera. 
 
 On the night after the action, general Su- 
 chet, who still adhered to his first idea of 
 making an impression upon the minds of the 
 garrison, and was fully persuaded that the armed 
 population, being more ardently excited than 
 the regular troops, would also be sooner dis- 
 couraged, ventured upon a double attack which 
 was not attended with the success he anticipated. 
 
 He first sent orders for general Verges to 
 advance against the redoubts of San-Fernando 
 and del Pilar, which greatly obstructed our in- 
 vesting the place, to make a sudden attack, 
 and take possession of them. At midnight, a 
 battalion of the 1 14th regiment boldly came up 
 to the redoubt del Pilar, and established itself 
 in it, the enemy, who was taken by surprise,.
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 133 
 
 having abandoned their post, after a very trifling 
 resistance. A battalion of the 121st regiment 
 found greater difficulty in penetrating into the 
 redoubt of San-Fernando ; it was larger, and 
 in a better condition than the other, and was 
 defended by fifty resolute men, who had just 
 been put upon their guard by the attack of the 
 114th regiment. On finding the gate shut, our 
 soldiers instantly rushed into the ditch ; but 
 they were unprovided with hatchets and ladders, 
 and must have suffered a severe loss in that 
 position, if the ditches had been better flanked, 
 or if the Spaniards had not been in want of 
 grenades. Owing to the impossibility of coming to 
 close quarters, or of injuring each other, a kind 
 of armistice ensued, during which a parley took 
 place. The Spaniards, apprehensive that a last 
 effort of our gallant troop might be fatal to 
 them, offered, on their word of honour, not to 
 fire, if it would consent to withdraw. This proposal 
 was accepted, and our men returned before 
 day-light to the camp. The redoubt del Pilar, 
 which could not have withstood the commanding- 
 fire of the redoubt of San-Fernando, was also 
 evacuated ; a twelve-pounder, which was found 
 there, and which it was impossible to remove, 
 was hurled down the declivity. The Spaniards 
 resumed possession of the redoubt on the following 
 day. 
 About the same time, the commander-in-chief ad-
 
 134 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 dressed a letter to the governor of Lerida, and 
 in order to add some positive fact to the common- 
 place language of every summons, which is a mere 
 expression of a desire to avoid any useless effu- 
 sion of blood, he proposed that the governor 
 should send one or more commissioners to the 
 field of battle of Margalef, and to the head- 
 quarters, in order that he might satisfy himself 
 as to the number of killed, wounded, and pri- 
 soners. The reply was truly laconic, and faith- 
 fully pourtrays the character of a nation which 
 cannot be denied the possession of dignified and 
 elevated sentiments. It was, word for word, as 
 follows : 
 
 Lerida, 24th April, 1810. General, this town 
 has never reckoned upon the assistance of any army. 
 I beg to assure you of my distinguished consideration. 
 Signed Jayme Garcia Conde. 
 
 If the result had corresponded with this lan- 
 guage, and if the characters who appear on the 
 public scene could be judged at the tribunal of 
 history by the words they have spoken, the 
 above might be worthy of being quoted at the 
 same time with the remarkable expressions which 
 Rome and Sparta have handed down to our ad- 
 miration. General Suchet perceived that other 
 means should be resorted to for accomplishing 
 his object, and thenceforward endeavoured to 
 make a prompt and vigorous display of them. 
 The prisoners were sent to Monzon under a
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA 135 
 
 strong escort, and from thence, by way of Sara- 
 gossa and Jaca, to the frontiers of France. Their 
 march through Arragon had a salutary influence 
 over the inhabitants, who became more quiet 
 and submissive when they had ocular demon- 
 stration of O'Donnell's defeat. The battering 
 train was immediately procured from Monzon, 
 moveable hospitals were formed, every means 
 got in readiness to afford assistance to the 
 wounded, and we were enabled to open the 
 trenches at the end of the month of April. 
 
 The regular siege of a town was at that period 
 a novel operation for most military men. Never- 
 theless, the 3rd corps had served its appren- 
 ticeship at Saragossa, and the general-in-chief 
 expected much from the courage and attach- 
 ment of his troops. He more particularly relied 
 upon the talents of the two officers who com- 
 manded the artillery and the engineers ; a right 
 understanding between the heads of those two 
 important branches of the service is an indis- 
 pensable condition for carrying on a siege with 
 any prospect of success. General Val^e united 
 to the practice of his art a scientific knowledge 
 of the duties of an artillery officer and a military 
 man ; for the formation of a battering train, and 
 the keeping it in good order, we were wholly 
 indebted to him. On the other hand, colonel 
 Haxo, of the engineers, had caused tools to be 
 made in Arragon, with the assistance of some
 
 136 MEMOIRS OF SUCKET. 
 
 funds for which he had applied to the commander- 
 in-chief. This measure of precaution, so useful 
 in a country where all resources of the kind 
 were to be created, mainly contributed to the 
 success of the siege. During the events which 
 had occurred from the investment of the place, 
 he bestowed his attention on every preparatory 
 measure. He caused the canals to be closed 
 which communicated with the town, and inun- 
 dated a part of the ground where the attack 
 was to be carried on ; and he requested that 
 orders might be given for driving back into the 
 town the last advanced posts which the garrison 
 still held outside the gates. Accordingly, during 
 the night from the 26th to the 27th of April, 
 some companies of skirmishers boldly approached 
 the front of the Magdalen, without firing a shot ; 
 several of the men even came close up to the 
 wall. The enemy's advanced posts took to flight, 
 and a sharp fire of musketry was kept up by 
 the contending parties. The same operation 
 having been repeated during the two following 
 nights, and round the whole enclosure of the 
 town, the besieged relinquished all further at- 
 tempts to retain possession of their out-posts, a 
 circumstance which enabled the engineer-officers 
 to approach the place, and minutely reconnoitre 
 the front of attack, as well as the access to it. 
 The attack was proposed to be made on that 
 front which had been assaulted by the duke of
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 137 
 
 Orleans, when he carried the town 103 years 
 before ; a course which was adopted on the pre- 
 sent occasion. The trench was to begin on the 
 right, near the road of the Cross, and in front 
 of a rivulet or azequia ; to run across the 
 road to Balaguer, and to extend nearly as far 
 as the Segre to the left, so as to embrace and 
 surround the whole of that front, from the bas- 
 tion of the Magdalen to the bastion of the Car- 
 men. The breach was to be made in the latter, 
 on two sides at once. 
 
 In the evening of the 29th of April, sixteen 
 hundred armed soldiers without knapsacks, each 
 man provided with a pick-axe and shovel, were 
 assembled behind the extremity of the back part 
 of the trench, terminating at the post called the 
 Cross, and standing within about four hundred 
 toises of the place. At nightfall, they were suc- 
 cessively led from thence by the engineer officers 
 to the site where the work was to be carried on, 
 which they immediately commenced. Although 
 so closely exposed to the enemy's fire, without 
 any other protection than the darkness of the 
 night, and the silence which they maintained, 
 they exerted themselves with the greatest 
 alacrity to get the work in a sufficient state 
 of forwardness to afford them complete shelter 
 by day-break. Two select companies, divided 
 into four sections, were placed beyond the pio- 
 neers, flat on their faces with centinels kneeling
 
 138 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 before them with crossed bayonets. Another select 
 company occupied a flank position on the left 
 bank ; and a reserve battalion in the rear was to 
 march rapidly forward, and afford assistance to any 
 point where our soldiers might be attacked or 
 give way. Every chief, every officer of a company, 
 was acquainted with the general instructions as 
 far as they concerned him ; and the soldier him- 
 self, in his perilous situation, was apprised of the 
 duty he had to perform, and of the assistance 
 there was at hand, on the first signal that might 
 be given. During this first siege, general Su- 
 chet endeavoured to put in practice all those ar- 
 rangements for carrying on the service of trenches, 
 which the wisdom of old regulations had estab- 
 lished, and of which reflection, as well as expe- 
 rience, had confirmed the utility. All the nineteen 
 battalions encamped before Lerida, supplied in 
 turn every day, either as pioneers or as guards of 
 the trenches, a certain number of men, in one or 
 more companies, each consisting of eighty men, 
 commanded by their respective officers. These mi- 
 nute precautions were productive of a salutary ef- 
 fect. The commander-in-chief feeling satisfied that 
 a company may be animated, as well as a regiment 
 or a battalion, by the esprit-de-corps, that lever 
 which operates so powerfully amongst soldiers, 
 gave by that arrangement, to those who were em- 
 ployed at the trenches, a greater degree of solidity 
 and steadiness than is usually found in an or-
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 139 
 
 dinary service performed by detachments. He also 
 deemed it preferable to select for pioneers the sol- 
 diers of the centre companies, in order to reserve 
 for the grenadiers and skirmishers the special 
 duty of keeping watch over the works, an honour- 
 able commission which belonged to their primi- 
 tive institution. The general order regulated 
 every morning the service of the following day, in 
 such a manner, however, as that the time for 
 working and for taking rest should, as nearly as 
 possible, be equally apportioned to all. It is 
 well known that the infantry is the main source 
 from whence all other branches of the service are 
 supplied. The respective corps which composed 
 it had already furnished pioneers, to be incorpo- 
 rated with the sappers ; the artillery had ap- 
 plied for several companies of infantry, to do 
 duty as auxiliary artillery-men ; other services, 
 which did not admit of being suspended, fre- 
 quently required detachments and excursions. 
 All those measures stood in need of being closely 
 inquired into and placed in harmony with each 
 other. If order and regularity are always useful 
 in war, they are at no time more so than during 
 a siege.* 
 
 The opening of the trenches, which was super- 
 intended by colonel Haxo and the officers and 
 soldiers of the engineer corps, was effected 
 
 1 See notes and explanatory documents, No. G.
 
 140 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 under the orders of general Buget, assisted by 
 colonel Rouelle, captain Meyer, first aid-de- 
 camp of the commander-in-chief, the major of the 
 trench Douarche, &c. The night operation was 
 successfully carried on ; the enemy discharged 
 a few fire balls and grape shot, but at random 
 and with very little effect. They had an oppor- 
 tunity of perceiving at day break from their ram- 
 parts the development of the works, which already 
 placed the besiegers beyond their reach. The 
 parallel was atl40toises from the place; it was 
 completed during the night of the 30th of April, 
 and could be made instantly available to the 
 construction of batteries. Of these three were 
 originally erected. The first, consisting of four 
 eight-inch mortars on the extreme right of the 
 parallel, was intended for the purpose of annoy- 
 ing the batteries of the castle. The second, 
 of four pieces of cannon, twelve long pounders, 
 was to destroy, or at least to batter down the right 
 flank of the bastion of the Magdalen, so as to 
 render the contiguous flank unavailing for the 
 defence of the bastion of the Carmen. The third, 
 which was of six pieces of cannon, sixteen 
 pounders, was to effect a breach on the left face 
 of the bastion of the Carmen, through which it 
 was intended to penetrate into the town. The 
 trenches were inundated with rain ; it required 
 great exertion to drain off the water, by leading 
 them to a canal, the course of which was turned
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 141 
 
 off. Two cheminements were commenced on the 
 bastions of the Magdalen and of the Carmen ; the 
 parallel was extended on the right towards the 
 foot of the castle, and on the left by a new che- 
 minement towards the bastioned intrenchment, 
 forming the projection of the Carmen. The 
 second trench of the left cheminement served to 
 erect a fourth battery, of two pieces of can- 
 non, sixteen pounders, and two six-inch how- 
 itzers, the object of which was to batter in 
 front the upper and lower right face of the 
 bastion of the Carmen, and on the back part of 
 the trench, the left face of the same bastion, as 
 well as the adjoining curtain. Some Spanish 
 sharp-shooters, who were gliding along the left 
 bank of the Segre, annoyed by their fire the left 
 of the parallel, by attacking it in the rear. The 
 1 17th took up more advanced positions, drew toge- 
 ther its posts, and put an end to the enemy's petty 
 excursions. The garrison had not yet made any 
 attempt upon our works. At five o'clock in the 
 evening of the 4th of May, after an uninterrupted 
 fire from all the batteries of the castle and of the 
 town, 5 or 600 men sallied forth from the battery 
 of the Carmen ; they rapidly moved towards the 
 left of the parallel and the battery No. 4, which 
 had not a moment's time to place itself in a state 
 of defence. The pioneers and two companies of 
 the trench guard retreated to the point where the 
 first night's work had terminated. Captain Bugeon
 
 142 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of the 121st regiment, rallied at this place his com- 
 pany of grenadiers, attacked the enemy who were 
 in possession of the left of the works, and com- 
 pelled them to fall back. An obstinate engagement 
 took place, in which captain Bugeon ran his sword 
 through the body of a Spaniard, who was engaged 
 in a personal contest with the lieutenant of sap- 
 pers, Leclerc ; our pioneers of the centre and our 
 reserve having instantly advanced, the Spaniards 
 took to flight, and re-entered the town in the 
 utmost confusion by the gate of the Carmen, 
 after having had to sustain the fire of all our 
 infantry. A few Spaniards had shewn them- 
 selves at the same time outside the gate of the 
 Magdalen ; but we were on our guard, and the 
 firm attitude shewn by our troops at this point of 
 the trench, prevented the enemy from attacking 
 them. 
 
 On the 5th and 6th of May, a trench was 
 opened on the left between the battery No. 4 
 and the river, as a substitute for a place d'armes 
 in case of any sortie. As some straggling sharp- 
 shooters still succeeded in annoying our pioneers 
 from the bank of the Segre, with a view to get 
 rid of them, we determined to open a cheminement 
 on the left of the Segre, so as to obtain possession 
 of the bank ; three winding trenches were pushed 
 forward ; advantage was taken of a canal for 
 irrigation which crossed the road to Barcelona, 
 and after having dried it up and cleared it, we
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 143 
 
 converted it into a parallel against the tete-de-pont. 
 The company of horse-artillery encamped with the 
 1 17th regiment commenced on that side a battery 
 for an eight-pounder and a howitzer; the Spa- 
 niards had some field-pieces on the bridge which 
 this battery was destined to attack. The right 
 of the parallel was extended to the foot of the 
 castle, as far as a small hill, under cover of which 
 we placed a platoon of soldiers to defend that 
 much exposed point. It was found necessary 
 to employ a quantity of gabions in this work, 
 and to bring earth in baskets for the purpose of 
 filling them. We were thus enabled to foresee 
 what difficulties we should have to contend with 
 in any future attack, if we had to besiege the cas- 
 tle when the town should have fallen into our 
 hands. 
 
 At 5 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of May, 
 the artillery opened its fire ; the batteries No. 2, 
 3, and 4 soon dismounted four of the pieces of 
 cannon which defended the bastions of the Carmen 
 and of the Magdalen. The battery No. 1 threw 
 shells into the castle ; two field howitzers, placed 
 on the extreme right in front of the camp of the 
 12 1st regiment, and facing the gate of St. Martin, 
 opened upon the town, whilst our light artillery on 
 the left bank returned the fire of the artillery 
 which the enemy kept up from the bridge over the 
 Segre. But the fire from the castle was now direct- 
 ed against our batteries Nos. 2 and 3, dismounted
 
 144 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 three pieces of cannon, and left twenty artil- 
 lery-men hors de combat ; this circumstance 
 compelled us to slacken our fire. The enemy's 
 fire became more active in consequence ; the four 
 pieces dismounted in the bastions of the town 
 were replaced, the howitzers belonging to the 
 121st regiment were silenced ; captain Brador, 
 commanding the battery No 1, was killed by a 
 cannon ball, and soon afterwards that battery 
 was thrown into confusion by the bursting of a 
 shell in the midst of it. The besieged were en- 
 couraged by this success, which suspended for a 
 time the progress of our attack ; 300 men sallied 
 out of the town through the new gate that very 
 night, glided along the wall as far as the right of 
 the parallel, surprised and drove back the platoon 
 of soldiers on duty. They afterwards penetrated 
 into the trenches as far as the road leading to the 
 gate of the Magdalen. But the pioneers having 
 quickly taken up their arms, rallied behind a cur- 
 tain which bordered the road, and some chasseurs 
 of the 5th light infantry advanced against the 
 enemy's left flank. The Polish chef de bataillon 
 Schutz, and lieutenant Regnault of the 114th 
 regiment, came up in haste with a reserve 
 consisting of a handful of gallant soldiers ; the 
 enemy fled and was pursued beyond the trenches, 
 which he precipitately evacuated. In this impru- 
 dent pursuit, the company of the 114th lost an 
 officer and several grenadiers, owing to the enemy's
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 145 
 
 t 
 
 fire of grape-shot ; and lieutenant Bordieres, an 
 aid-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, and an 
 officer of uncommon bravery, received a severe 
 wound, of which he died a few days afterwards. 
 The Spaniards lost nine men taken prisoners, 
 and eight killed, amongst whom was an artillery- 
 man, who had provided himself with four fire- 
 lances, which were intended to set fire to our 
 mortar battery. 
 
 On the following day captain Monnot, who 
 commanded the artillery of the left bank, was 
 struck dead by a cannon ball. The continuance 
 of the rains, and the effects produced by the fire 
 from the castle, which was levelled at our works, 
 did not however arrest their progress. General 
 Valee repaired the injury we had sustained, re- 
 stored the batteries, and re-armed them, in order 
 that we might batter in breach with more success 
 than we had hitherto done. Two new batteries 
 were erected, the one denominated No. 5, on the 
 left of the road to Balaguer, consisting of four 
 mortars recently sent to us, the other, No. 6, con- 
 sisting of two howitzers, and placed between 
 battery No. 4 and the Segre. A second parallel 
 was opened between the cheminement of the two 
 recently-attacked bastions, with the double ob- 
 ject of getting nearer to the points where a breach 
 was to be effected, and of pushing forward 
 the batteries Nos. 2 and 3, in order to screen 
 them from the fire of the castle, which became 
 
 vol. i. l
 
 146 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 less dangerous in proportion as it took a more 
 downward direction. But as the latter operation 
 would necessarily take up some time and pro- 
 tract the siege, it was determined not to under- 
 take it, unless it were absolutely called for. The 
 number and calibre of our battering train were 
 augmented. A last battery of four howitzers, 
 denominated No. 7, was added to the rest, in a 
 position where the ground offered a natural shel- 
 ter. The object of it was to multiply the cross- 
 fires directed against the castle, and thereby to 
 afford to the batteries in breach, the means of 
 producing the effect which was expected of them. 
 These works of the artillery and engineer corps 
 were carried on from the 8th to the 12th of May. 
 The commander-in-chief encouraged them by his 
 presence, and by the distribution of rewards 
 amongst the pioneers. He caused the breast- 
 works to be lined with bags of earth, especially 
 those in the second parallel, and ordered that 
 sharp-shooters should be stationed behind the 
 battlements, in order to keep up a constant fire 
 against the artillery-men of the enemy's bat- 
 teries. 
 
 At nine o'clock in the morning of the 12th 
 our batteries, eight in number, consisting of 
 fifteen pieces of cannon, and nineteen mortars or 
 howitzers, re-commenced firing. The front of the 
 castle and the bastion of the Ascension, supported 
 by field-pieces established on the bridge, warmly
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 147 
 
 returned to the fire of our battery No. 4, though 
 for a very short time and without success. Our 
 artillery, which was served with great steadi- 
 ness and precision, obtained the advantage, dis- 
 mounted the cannon of the bastions of the Mag- 
 dalen and of the Carmen, and quickly opened 
 breaches ; each gun fired upwards of a hundred 
 shot in the course of the day. A case of howit- 
 zers and grenades in the bastion named Lou- 
 vigny, burst with a loud explosion ; the con- 
 fusion which this accident occasioned in the cas- 
 tle, afforded us a decided advantage. Towards 
 evening, the two breaches of the Carmen appeared 
 to be wide and accessible ; some Swiss deserters 
 penetrated through them during the night, and 
 repaired to our trenches : we learned from them 
 that trenches were cut, and batteries erected in 
 the streets of the town, in anticipation of our 
 making an assault. 
 
 This circumstance attracted the particular atten- 
 tion of the commander-in-chief. Contrary to the 
 expectation he had entertained at the commence- 
 ment of the siege, he saw that the governor, in- 
 stead of isolating himself and preparing for the 
 defence of the castle, persevered in defending the 
 town, although the moment had arrived when it 
 behoved the latter to come to terms of capitula- 
 tion. This was, no doubt, the effect of the in- 
 fluence exercised over his councils by the armed 
 population, who, acting under an excitement 
 
 i. 2
 
 148 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of feelings very inconsistent with prudence, 
 served as auxiliaries to the garrison. The French 
 general accordingly determined to carry, with- 
 out any further delay, the two redoubts, and the 
 horn-work erected on the plateau of Garden, 
 to which we have already had occasion to allude. 
 The extensive space of ground which they co- 
 vered, might, at tne moment of the assault 
 of the town, have become an asylum for the 
 inhabitants, whereas, his intention was to com- 
 pel them to seek refuge in the castle, for the 
 express purpose of shortening the siege and of 
 lessening its calamities. In the night of the 12th 
 general Verges, with a battalion of the 114th, 
 four select companies of the 121st, and 100 
 pioneers armed with tools, was directed to carry 
 the redoubts of San-Fernando and del Pilar ; ge- 
 neral Buget, with six select companies, and a few 
 sappers, led by captain Foucaud, was ordered to 
 attack the horn-work, by penetrating through a 
 breach which had been discovered on the right 
 branch, and which it was possible to approach 
 under cover of a ravine ; the chef-de-bataillon 
 Plagniol, of the engineer corps, was to advance at 
 the same time towards the front of that work, with 
 two select companies, and 400 pioneers. At mid- 
 night, the three columns began to move, notwith- 
 standing the brightness of the moon rather ob- 
 structed their operations; some engineer officers 
 sappers were proceeding with them, and ladders
 
 SIEGE OF LEKIDA. 149 
 
 had been provided for the occasion. The redoubt 
 del Pilar was instantly carried, as it had been on 
 the former occasion; the enemy hastily withdrew, 
 and flying towards the horn-work, fell upon the 
 column of the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol who 
 charged them, followed in pursuit, and came up 
 to the ditch of the work, which only contained a 
 very small guard of soldiers. Our men planted 
 their ladders for the purpose of descending, and 
 immediately prepared to scale the redoubt. The 
 sappers proceeded to force the entrance gate; 
 sergeant Maury mounted on the back of a gre- 
 nadier, got over the gate, and broke it open 
 with his axe and both columns penetrated into the 
 work; for the corps of general Buget having lost 
 its way in the ravine, had returned to the 
 point occupied by the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol. 
 The Spaniards endeavoured in their retreat to 
 rally behind a corps-de-garde; but they were 
 forced to retreat to the covered way of fort Gar- 
 den. In the meanwhile, the redoubt of San- 
 Fernando had made a more protracted resis- 
 tance. Two companies of the 121st succeeded 
 at first in establishing themselves on the coun- 
 terscarp, and kept up a continued fire to prevent 
 the enemy from showing themselves above the 
 parapets ; two other companies rushed into the 
 ditch and fixed the ladder to the scarp. After 
 an obstinate struggle, in which captain Montau- 
 ban of the engineers received a mortal wound,
 
 150 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 our soldiers penetrated into the redoubt, but they 
 could only obtain possession of it after having 
 put the garrison to the sword, they having per- 
 sisted in making a desperate resistance after they 
 were driven back and deprived of all hopes of 
 escape ; at last however, a lieutenant and twenty 
 men laid down their arms. Our loss consisted 
 of about 100 men killed or wounded. Of the 300 
 Spaniards, not more than sixty escaped destruc- 
 tion ; we took five pieces of cannon. The en- 
 gineer officer hastened to secure the position of 
 our soldiers in the works they had just succeeded 
 in carrying by this nocturnal attack. The com- 
 mander-in-chief, who watched its progress and 
 directed every movement, instantly gave the re- 
 quisite orders on the spot, for our ulterior opera- 
 tions; and on the approach of day he returned to 
 the trenches, for the purpose of striking the deci- 
 sive blow. 
 
 The artillery had continued firing upon the cas- 
 tle during the night; on the 13th it resumed its 
 attack against the Carmen, and endeavoured to 
 widen the breaches. With a view to facilitate the 
 assault, the corps of engineers contrived to cut 
 steps in the second parallel, in order that the 
 troops might the more easily rush forward, and 
 collected on the back of the trench the necessary 
 materials for the lodgments to be formed on 
 the breaches, as soon as they should have been 
 carried. The enemy, on the other hand, made
 
 SIEGE OF LEHIDA. 151 
 
 preparations for a general sortie, for the purpose 
 of retaking the horn-work of Garden that very 
 night ; but they were not allowed time to carry 
 their intention into effect. 
 
 In the afternoon, the order was given for the 
 assault, and general Habert, who jointly with 
 colonel Rouelle commanded the trench, received 
 the plan of the intended attack. The select com- 
 panies of the 5th regiment of light infantry, of 
 the 116th sappers, and the pioneers of the 115th 
 regiment, and of the 1st regiment of the Vistula, 
 were assembled in the second parallel ; the com- 
 mander-in-chief placed himself, with the reserves, 
 at the central point of the trenches. At the 
 hour of seven, which was shortly before nightfall, 
 he ordered the signal to be given by four bombs 
 fired at the same time. Our firing instantly ceased, 
 and the troops rushed forward. Some of the 
 companies were to penetrate through the princi- 
 pal street which runs parallel with the quay and 
 the river, others on the right, towards the gate of 
 the Magdalen, whilst some miners should pro- 
 ceed in the same direction, along the outward 
 wall, for the purpose of blowing up the gate, and 
 thereby giving admittance to as many troops as it 
 might be found necessary to introduce. 
 
 The impetuosity of the assailants at first bore 
 down all resistance on the breaches. Presently, 
 a dreadful fire of musketry played upon the 
 heads of our columns, in conjunction with the
 
 152 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 guns from the castle and the bridge ; they were 
 at first thrown into confusion, but general Habert 
 hurried them along by beating the charge. Co- 
 lonel Rouelle received a bayonet wound in the 
 attack on the main street. The lieutenant of 
 miners, Romphleur, had great difficulties to en- 
 counter before he could succeed in forcing open 
 the gates of the Magdalen. On the left, captain 
 Vallentin of the engineer corps, moved rapidly 
 forward along the projection of the Carmen, 
 towards a gate which separated him from the 
 quay, and which it was necessary to pass un- 
 der the fire of grape shot from a piece of ar- 
 tillery on his flank, and the musquetry from 
 the houses. The sergeant of sappers, Baptiste, 
 regardless of almost certain death, climbed the 
 gate, and threw it open to the troops, who 
 rushed upon the quay. The Spaniards who were 
 defending the trenches cut in the main street, 
 found themselves completely turned. At the 
 same moment, general Harispe, who had orders 
 to act as soon as we should be masters of the 
 breach, and the engagement should have been 
 transferred to the interior of the town, at- 
 tacked the tete-de-pont on the left bank. The 
 commander-in-chief sent forward the reserves, 
 and personally crossed the breach in order to 
 direct the movement. This display of force did 
 not allow the Spaniards to persist any longer in 
 their defence, and put an end to a sanguinary
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 153 
 
 strife, which would thenceforth have been car- 
 ried on in the dark. The bridge, the quay, and 
 the streets were left covered with dead bodies, 
 and the garrison began to retreat towards the 
 castle. 
 
 The commander-in-chief aimed at a much more 
 important result than his efforts and the gal- 
 lantry of his troops had just achieved. It would 
 have been an infinitely more useful object to 
 avoid, if possible, the necessity of besieging the 
 castle. He made colonel Robert enter the town 
 through the bridge with the 1 17th regiment, and 
 sent him in the direction of the gate of Saint- 
 Anthony. From that moment, all the troops, by 
 a simultaneous movement towards the centre, 
 and a well-sustained fire of musketry, endea- 
 voured to drive the garrison and the inhabitants 
 from street to street and house to house, towards 
 the elevated part of the town and towards the 
 castle, in which latter it was our object to com- 
 pel them to seek shelter. The firing from the 
 castle upon the town, by increasing the danger 
 and the terror of the inhabitants, contributed to 
 hurry them along pell-mell with the troops, to- 
 wards the ditches and bridges. Pursued by our 
 soldiers, they hastened to reach the enclosure and 
 to shut themselves up in it, the governor not hav- 
 ing had time to order their being driven back, or 
 courage to enforce such an order. Our mortars 
 and howitzers never ceased firing the whole of
 
 154 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the night nor during the morning of the following 
 day. Each bomb being aimed at the narrow sp?K>e 
 in which this crowd had taken refuge, fell upon 
 groups of soldiers and unarmed men all huddled 
 together, and spread destruction and disorder 
 among them. It was natural that the efforts of 
 the governor and of the most determined men 
 should be checked by the presence of the women, 
 the children, the aged men, and the unarmed 
 peasantry, who suddenly fell from the height of 
 popular phrensy into discouragement and a dread 
 of death. These measures were attended with 
 as prompt and decisive an effect as general 
 Suchet had anticipated. A white flag was hoist- 
 ed on the turret at noon of the 14th ; and 
 shortly afterwards, the bearer of a flag of truce 
 came to propose the surrender of the castle and 
 to sue for terms of capitulation. The comman- 
 der-in-chief sent general Valee and colonel St. 
 Cyr Nugues of the staff, to the castle, and colonel 
 Haxo of the engineers, to fort Garden, for the pur- 
 pose of concluding and signing that capitulation, 
 by which both garrisons were to be allowed the ho- 
 nours of war. They filed off through the breach, 
 laid down their arms, and remained prisoners. 
 
 By the conquest of Lerida we obtained pos- 
 session of 133 pieces of cannon, 1,000,000 of 
 cartridges, 100,000 pounds of gunpowder, 10,000 
 muskets, ten standards, and a great number 
 of magazines. But the trophy which of all
 
 SIEGE OF LERIDA. 155 
 
 others, was of the highest value to the con- 
 queror, was the setting at liberty thirty-three 
 French officers of the army of Catalonia, who 
 were found in the castle, and who embraced their 
 deliverers in a transport of joy which will easi- 
 ly be accounted for. The besieging* army lost 
 about 200 killed and 500 wounded, either in the 
 works and the assault, or in the engagements 
 which took place from the 12th of April, the day 
 on which the town was invested, until the 14th 
 of May, when we took possession of it. 
 
 The loss of the garrison during the siege, was 
 estimated at about 1,200 men. The prisoners 
 amounted to 7,748 soldiers and officers, according 
 to the statement which was drawn up, and which 
 accompanied the despatch conveying the official 
 report and the capitulation.- 
 
 * 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 7.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Regulations adopted subsequent to the taking of Lerida. — 
 Skirmishes during the siege of that place. — Investment of 
 Mequinenza. — Opening of the trenches. — Taking of the 
 town. — Establishment of the batteries. — Opening of the 
 fire upon the fort. — Capitulation. — Capture of the fort of 
 Morella in the kingdom of Valencia. 
 
 The establishment of order in Lerida, and the 
 occupation of that portion of Catalonia which is 
 under its influence, were the first objects that oc- 
 cupied the attention of general Suchet. He 
 halted for several days in the town, during which 
 he gave the requisite directions for filling up the 
 trenches, repairing the breaches, and putting 
 every part of it, once more in a complete state 
 of defence. Several houses that were built close 
 to the walls had suffered greatly from fire, and 
 from the shells thrown into the town, and of this 
 circumstance the general took advantage to for- 
 bid Iheir being re-built. He made it his special 
 study to restore confidence to the inhabitants, to
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 157 
 
 whom he promised every protection, both in re- 
 spect to their persons, and their property, and 
 he not only protected the clergy from injury, but 
 restored them to the exercise of their sacred 
 functions. There had been a central junta es- 
 tablished in the town, which had served to fo- 
 ment the excitation among the people of the 
 province, and to such a height had that excita- 
 tion been carried, during the siege, that when we 
 entered the town, we found nailed to one of the 
 gates, the heads of two artillery officers who had 
 been massacred on suspicion of keeping up a 
 correspondence with the French The comman- 
 der-in-chief assembled the members of the cen- 
 tral junta, and assured them, that these two 
 officers had been innocently put to death, since 
 not one of the whole besieging army knew any 
 thing about them ; he stated to them at the same 
 time, that a great many of the inhabitants had 
 demanded, that they should be put on their 
 trial, as guilty of numerous acts of cruelty and 
 of barbarity, but he added, that faithful to his 
 engagements, which he had agreed to in signing 
 the capitulation, he would not allow any act of 
 revenge to be attempted against them. He 
 required from them, however, in the course of 
 fifteen days, a general statement of their receipts 
 and expenditure during the siege, that it might be 
 printed and published, to satisfy the numerous 
 complaints of the inhabitants. By this measure,
 
 158 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and by their temporary detention in their respec- 
 tive houses, the commander-in-chief preserved 
 the lives of these, over whom the capitu- 
 lation had extended its inviolable shield. At 
 the same time, he selected a corregidor, and a 
 new junta from among the most respectable 
 people in the place, and lastly, he nominated 
 baron Henriod, colonel of the 14th regiment of 
 infantry of the line, a man of firm and prudent 
 character, governor of the town, the forts, and 
 the province at large. The preservation of our 
 first conquest in Catalonia deserved to be the 
 more carefully attended to, that at the very time 
 of the assault of the 13th May, several mas- 
 ses of troops and of Somatem* were advancing 
 on Segre Alto, and Noguera, for the purpose of 
 disturbing our operations, or in the hope that by 
 pressing upon us during a somewhat lengthened 
 siege, we might be straitened in provisions. 
 
 The upland vallies of Catalonia are quite a 
 nursery of bold and active soldiers, and it was 
 necessary to disperse as speedily as possible a 
 considerable body of troops, to which the vicinity 
 of general Campoverde with a corps of regulars, 
 gave courage and support. Even previous to 
 
 * Somaten properly signifies troops raised for the defence 
 of a province or city — local militia. — Miquelcte is a name 
 given to the mountain troops of Catalonia ; neither of these 
 descriptions of troops are enrolled in regiments, or brigaded.
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 159 
 
 the 18th of May, 800 miquelete had marched 
 against Venasque, when they were repulsed, and 
 driven back into the valley of Aran. The chef-de- 
 bataillon, Renouvier, who commanded at Jac'a, 
 directed at the same time an expedition upon 
 Arens, where he took 1 50 prisoners ; and general 
 Habert marched to Talarn and Tremps, where 
 the main body of the Somatens was stationed, and 
 against Campoverde, who occupied the moun- 
 tains of Lliniana. Colonel Robert, who had 
 orders to attack the Somatens with the 117th re- 
 giment, turned the Col. d'Ares, though very 
 strongly defended, advanced rapidly on the 
 bridge at Tremps, which he turned, routing the 
 enemy that defended it, and taking a great 
 many arms, and a large quantity of ammunition. 
 Thus, instead of being in a condition to support 
 the insurgents, Campoverde found his retreat 
 menaced by the march of general Habert, who 
 had directed his troops on Pons and Lentorn y 
 and interposed between him and Cervera ; he 
 retreated rapidly in the direction of Cardona, 
 Colonel Robert, who, to his merits as a soldier, 
 united talents of another order, was charged with 
 the pacification of the country, and he speedily 
 contrived to render this fertile province one of 
 the most valuable resources of the 3rd corps- 
 darmde. 
 
 During the siege of Lerida, Arragon also was 
 the object of fresh attempts on the part of the
 
 160 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 enemy. The marquis of Lazan, brother to general 
 Palafox, took possession of Alcahiz early in May, 
 and pressed hard on the citadel there. Captain 
 Wikoski, with his small garrison of 300 men, 
 made an honourable defence. The enemy had 
 driven a mining gallery close to the walls, when 
 a soldier of the 114th, named Roland, got him- 
 self lowered by a rope from one of the em- 
 brasures, with a view to roll a howitzer shell 
 into the gallery ; he was fortunate enough to get 
 into the fort again, without being hurt, though 
 exposed to a very sharp fire of musketry. The 
 explosion destroyed the Spanish works, and thir- 
 teen of their men perished under the ruins. 
 The brave Roland received the cross of the 
 legion of honour for this action. General Laval 
 immediately sent general Montmarie to the 
 succour of the castle of Alcahiz. The latter, 
 with 1,500 men of the 14th and 3rd of the Vis- 
 tula, 500 cavalry, and three field-pieces, did not 
 hesitate to attack 5,000 men, though intrenched 
 behind the bridge, and in the houses of the 
 town, the walls of which were regularly loop- 
 holed. He passed the stream* with the water 
 to the cartouch belts, charged the Spaniards, 
 and drove them from street to street, whilst the 
 cavalry wheeled round to attack them in the 
 rear. They would have been surrounded, had 
 
 * The Gu ad a lope, a tributary of the Ebro.
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA 161 
 
 they not saved themselves by a prompt re- 
 treat. 
 
 On the side of Calatayud, on the 13th May, 
 the chef de bataillon, Petit, at the head of 315 
 men of the 14th, and thirty-two gendarmes 
 while guiding- a convoy of provisions to Sara- 
 gossa, was attacked by Villacampa who had 
 received information of his movements, and who 
 by an exceedingly rapid march, succeeded in 
 shutting him up in the defile of el Frasno. Petit 
 saw the impossibility of forcing a passage in the 
 face of forces ten times more numerous than 
 his own ; he therefore drew up his men in close 
 column, and making a bold push towards the 
 left, he arrived at the village of Paracuellos, in 
 good order. The convoy of 300 mules was 
 necessarily abandoned. The Spaniards pressed 
 on him from all sides, but he contrived not- 
 withstanding that he was himself wounded, a 
 circumstance which damped neither his firm- 
 ness nor intrepidity, to struggle through a fight 
 not more unequal than obstinate, until he 
 gained Savihan. The Spaniards kept firing fu- 
 riously at the two flanks of the column, and 
 charging it now in the front, now in the rear, 
 and every moment his little handful of men 
 was becoming less, by the dropping of some 
 of its number ; at length these brave fellows 
 having exhausted all their powder, dashed through 
 the Xalen, charged the village of Arandij a, which 
 
 VOL. I. AI
 
 162 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 they took at the point of the bayonet, and there 
 maintained their position, notwithstanding a final 
 and furious attack, until they saw their enemies 
 retire in despair of carrying it. The loss they 
 had sustained was extremely great ; their brave 
 commander, Petit, had been thrown from his 
 horse, and falling beyond the line of the column 
 was taken, and along with him 141 of these 
 gallant men, among whom were twelve of the 
 gendarmes, who perished, or were taken. The 
 commander-in-chief bestowed a just and merited 
 eulogium on the conduct of the 194 soldiers 
 who returned, the greater part severely wounded, 
 and took immediate measures for getting Petit, 
 their leader, exchanged ; but what was his 
 extreme affliction, when he learned that that 
 gallant officer had been assassinated ! On the 
 evening of the combat, he was sitting by a fire 
 in the camp of the enemy, and getting his wounds 
 dressed, while a crowd of Spanish officers who 
 surrounded him, were looking on him with ad- 
 miration, when a ruffian taking advantage of 
 the darkness, approached him from behind, and 
 stabbed him through the body with a bayonet. 
 The officers who witnessed this act of cowardice 
 inflicted the most summary punishment on the 
 perpetrator, the just reward of a deed that no- 
 thing could excuse, but which they could neither 
 foresee nor guard against. Navar alcalde, of el 
 Frasno, a respectable old man, who had followed
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 163 
 
 the French column, and who also fell into the 
 hands of the Spaniards, was burned alive ; — this 
 may serve as a specimen of the fury that ani- 
 mated our enemies. 
 
 General Chlopiski, from Daroca, had pursued 
 Villacampa as soon as he ascertained that he was 
 in motion, and having sent back his artillery to 
 Carineno, that he might be less encumbered, 
 arrived at el Frasno on the 14th, the morning 
 after the battle. Villacampa had then moved, but 
 he resolved to follow him without delay ; he di- 
 rected colonel Lafosse, with the 44th regiment, 
 upon Catalayud and Setina, while he himself 
 marched on Xarava, with forty hussars and fifty 
 cuirassiers ; (his infantry could not keep up with 
 him) and got up with Villacampa's rear-guard 
 there, and took 174 prisoners. On the 17th he 
 marched on Campillo, and thence on Molina ; 
 he then took the direction of Cuenca, but it 
 was found impossible to trace the fugitives any 
 further. A manufactory for arms was destroyed 
 at Molina, and a great number of gun-barrels, 
 some blacksmiths' vices, and some bar-iron, were 
 carried to Saragossa. Every report went to 
 prove that the army of Villacampa was in a 
 state of complete dispersion, and 600 of his 
 soldiers, who had fled from the ranks, and aban- 
 doned their arms, presented themselves before 
 Calatayud. This was the sixth time that the 
 young fellows had been seen coming back to 
 
 - m 2
 
 164 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 their homes, and yet even then it was impos- 
 sible to reckon on their resolution to remain 
 there. It must be confessed that the means 
 adopted by the chiefs of the bands to make 
 them join the army again, surpassed in vexatious- 
 ness and cruelty any thing that can be imagined. 
 About the same time at Ayerba, forty foot 
 gendarmes of the 9th battalion, who, like all the 
 stations for communication on either bank of the 
 Ebro, occupied an intrenched post, which they 
 had orders to defend to the last extremity, were 
 unexpectedly attacked by 300 men coming from 
 Navarre. After sustaining with great coolness 
 the attack of their assailants, they shut them- 
 selves up, and thus repulsed all their assaults. 
 The Spaniards succeeded in setting fire to their 
 barracks, but the gendarmes retired into a small 
 building that was fortunately isolated, and there, 
 as in a redoubt, maintained themselves with 
 invincible steadiness, until the enemy, vanquished 
 by the resolution of these forty gallant fellows, 
 thought fit to retire. The commander-in-chief took 
 pleasure in the orders of the day, to advert to the 
 numerous proofs of courage that were displayed 
 by the soldiers of the 3rd corps ; nor did he fail 
 in all such cases, to make known the names of 
 every commander, officer, and soldier that merited 
 that distinction. Such a publicity produced the 
 happiest effect on the minds of the soldiers, and 
 on those of the natives also.
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 16. J 
 
 The morning after his entry into Lerida, general 
 Suchet had directed the 121st regiment to march 
 by the left bank of the Segre towards Mequi- 
 nenza. The siege of this fort and that of Lerida 
 were so intimately connected, that two months 
 before the French government had directed them 
 both to be undertaken at the same time. The 
 means of accomplishing this were, however, 
 wanting ; and motives that were easy to be ap- 
 preciated had determined the commander-in- 
 chief to begin with the siege of Lerida. As soon 
 as the troops began to approach Mequinenza, 
 as a preliminary he despatched his aid-de-camp, 
 captain Ricard, who was instructed to offer very 
 advantageous terms of capitulation, but they were 
 rejected, although the fall of Lerida must have 
 naturally discouraged the little garrison, by taking 
 away all hopes of being relieved. 
 
 In the interval between the 16th and 20th of 
 May, the 114th regiment and the 1st of the 
 Vistula, set out from Fraga and Torriente for the 
 purpose of investing Mequinenza : general Mus- 
 nier was appointed to command the forces and to 
 direct the siege. 
 
 The elevated plateau that supports the Mon- 
 negro, and which is traversed by the route that 
 leads from Saragossa to Fraga, by Bujaralos, 
 Penalva, and Candasnos, terminates at the 
 Cinca and the Ebro ; it sinks very rapidly as 
 it approaches the banks of those rivers, but an
 
 166 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 elevated counter-ridge extends not only to the 
 point where they form a junction, but for 600 
 feet farther down the bank of the combined 
 streams. The little town of Mequinenza, which 
 is shut in between the rocky foot of this ridge and 
 the bank of the river, forms a kind of port on the 
 Ebro, which is no longer navigable at Saragossa 
 or above that town, and only begins to be so 
 when joined by the Segre and the Cinca. Thus 
 Mequinenza, without being in any of the lines of 
 land communication, forms the key of the Ebro as 
 far as Tortosa and the sea. This important posi- 
 tion, which is mentioned by Csesar under the 
 name of Octogesa, and which has figured in 
 almost all the Spanish wars was, when be- 
 sieged, in a respectable state of defence. At 
 the extremity of the counter-ridge already alluded 
 to, stands an old castle surrounded by a terraced 
 inclosure, which follows all the bends and turns 
 of the rock on which it is situated. The rock, 
 which is very precipitous on three sides, extends 
 towards the west to the breadth of about J 50 
 toises. This is the only point that admits of 
 a regular attack ; it is defended in front by 
 bastions faced with stone, and has a ditch cut in 
 the solid rock, and a very good covered way, pa- 
 lisadoed. Some old walls built in the times of 
 the Moors, which extend from the fort to the 
 bank of the river, except in those parts where the 
 rock is perpendicular, connect the defences on
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 167 
 
 the heights with those below, and thus cover the 
 town, the two ferries, and the roads that lead to 
 them. Intrenchments and out- works had been 
 formed and batteries added, chiefly on the Fraga 
 road, which is the only one by which guns can 
 be transported. The part to be attacked was 
 soon determined on, for it was impossible to force 
 the approaches unless on the side of the plateau. 
 The principal difficulty was to bring up the ar- 
 tillery. It was necessary to construct a road 
 from Fraga to within gun-shot of the works, and 
 our four reconnoissances had not enabled us to 
 discover the means of effecting it. In the month 
 of November preceding, colonel Haxo, taking 
 advantage of the movement of a detachment of 
 our troops between Fraga and Candasnos, had 
 advanced very near to Mequinenza, and had 
 examined the ground in its neighbourhood He 
 accompanied general Musnier, when the latter 
 went over it at the head of the troops, and by 
 his directions the road was traced out, which 
 after all, it was necessary to open from Torriente. 
 For about two leagues the troops had merely to 
 follow the plateau, which served, with a very few 
 repairs, for their purpose. When they had ad- 
 vanced about 1,200 toises the difficulties began 
 to increase. The peasantry were employed as 
 labourers, and it was found necessary to cut out 
 a path in the steep declivity, and to blast the 
 rock in a number of places, in order to reach the
 
 168 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 lower plateau : this work continued until about 
 the 1st of June. 
 
 So early as the 20th May, whilst these preli- 
 minaries were in progress, general Musnier had 
 driven in a number of the enemy's advanced posts, 
 and established his camps. A part of the 12 1st 
 appearing sufficient for the left bank of the Segre, 
 the remainder crossed to the right bank, and thus 
 formed the left of our line ; they took up their po- 
 sition behind a small hillock within gun-shot of 
 the Fraga road. The 114th and the 2nd of the 
 Vistula, with the artillery and sappers, occupied 
 the plateau by which the attack was to be made, 
 while several companies of voltigeurs were as far 
 in advance as the banks of the Ebro, to which the 
 want of water compelled our soldiers to have con- 
 stant recourse, although the road was long and 
 difficult, and very much exposed, at least in the 
 beginning of the siege, at which period general 
 Montmarie, who had orders to march from Alca- 
 niz, in order to complete the investment of the 
 place, had not yet arrived. On the 28th May he 
 took up a position on the heights on the right 
 bank, and the Spaniards, who had dragged a 
 cannon thither, threw it into the river and re- 
 tired. The 2nd of the Vistula, which was des- 
 tined for the attack on the town, was stationed on 
 the brink of the stream at the foot of the slope of 
 the left bank and an embranchment was added 
 to the road, in order to facilitate the communica-
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 169 
 
 tions between the river and the camps. The 
 park of artillery remained on the height where the 
 new road had been cut ; it consisted of eighteen 
 pieces of cannon, six of which, twenty -four 
 pounders, were provided with every thing neces- 
 sary for 800 discharges each. On the day of the 
 30th May the general of engineers arrived from 
 France. He brought with him a brigade of offi- 
 cers of the same corps two companies of sap- 
 pers and one of engineers. Of nine companies of 
 miners or sappers that had been collected in 
 Arragon the previous year, only three now re- 
 mained with the 3rd corps. The reinforcement 
 brought by general Rogniat was extremely useful 
 in the sieges to which this division of the army 
 was successively directed. General Rogniat's 
 fame, which had been acquired at Dantzig and at 
 Saragossa, had preceded his arrival, he crowned 
 it afterwards by the sieges he directed while 
 with the army of Arragon in the east of the Pe- 
 ninsula. 
 
 This same 30th May our main guard, by favour 
 of a cover, pushed forward to within 300 toises of 
 the outer wall. The enemy commenced a brisk 
 cannonade next day, and even attempted a sortie 
 with great appearance of resolution ; 300 volti- 
 geurs, however, who firmly awaited the attack of 
 the 800 Spaniards that composed it, soon checked 
 their advance by a close and well directed dis- 
 charge of musketry ; our advanced post in con-
 
 170 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 sequence maintained the position it had taken up. 
 The enemy had still an outer post on a hillock 
 about 100 toises in advance of the castle; on the 
 night of the 2nd June they were driven from it 
 by the voltigeurs of the 114th. Advantage was 
 immediately taken of this to open a parallel, and 
 500 men were employed under general Haxo in 
 effecting that purpose. The ground was difficult, 
 and the sound of the pickaxes on the rock having 
 directed the attention of the enemy to the spot, 
 they kept a smart and uninterrupted fire of grape 
 shot on the labours during the whole of the night. 
 As they were very close to the place and crowded 
 together, they suffered a good deal before they 
 succeeded in covering themselves. Fifty men 
 were killed and wounded on the occasion, and 
 the chef-de-bataillon, Seve, was also hurt ; the 
 parallel was finished notwithstanding, as well as a 
 communication to the rear on the right side. 
 
 During the night of the 2nd an attempt was 
 made against the town, as it was considered 
 most important to close up and isolate the garri- 
 son as much as possible, in order to cut off the 
 chances of escape by water. To effect this 
 object, a battalion of the Vistula attacked and 
 carried a Spanish fortified post, about eighty 
 toises from the wall of the town, and a trench 
 was immediately cut at that distance in the nar- 
 row slip of land that stretches from the hill to the 
 river. At the same time general Montmarie es-
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 171 
 
 tablished on the right bank some strong posts of 
 infantry. They occupied a position close to 
 the river in trenches, so constructed as to protect 
 them from the fire of the castle ; but before 
 these dispositions could be completed or could 
 produce any effect, eleven vessels suddenly left 
 the town for the purpose of sailing down the 
 Ebro. In spite of every effort of our soldiers, who 
 were very disadvantageously situated for pursuing 
 them, only two of them were captured. They 
 were found to be laden with inhabitants of the 
 town, who were endeavouring to escape from the 
 inconveniences of the siege, and who were carry- 
 ing away all their effects along with them. This 
 trifling event served to convince us still more of 
 the necessity of getting speedy possession of the 
 town. 
 
 During the night of the 3rd the attack on the 
 fort was continued ; the parallel was completed 
 and was prolonged for a score of toises to- 
 wards the left. The artillery began immediately 
 to construct their batteries upon the very stub- 
 born piece of ground where the breaches had 
 first been opened. We succeeded in forming- 
 some battlements, by means of bags filled with 
 earth, for the purpose of cannonading the em- 
 brasures of the enemy, and we forced him in 
 consequence to keep them closed the whole of 
 the day with bags of wool ; our pioneers were 
 no longer disturbed in their operations. On the
 
 172 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 town side we advanced forty toises, but it was 
 found difficult to cover ourselves from the fire of 
 the castle, and still more from that of a small in- 
 trenched post, which was within fifty toises of 
 the fort and took in flank the whole of our works 
 all the way along the stream. It was found im- 
 possible to get a position for erecting a battery 
 against the town, on one hand, because of the 
 narrowness of the slip of ground between the 
 hill and the river, and on the other, because of 
 the fire of a piece placed on a square tower, 
 which terminated 'the outer wall of the town 
 on the side next the water : the musketry 
 of general Montmarie was directed against this 
 fort. 
 
 On the evening of the 4th the engineers pushed 
 forward on the right of the parallel by a zigzag 
 of thirty toises long, and the branches and com- 
 munications were completed. The miners, 
 meanwhile, continued to blast the rocks, which 
 they could not contrive to get round ; Mary, 
 lieutenant of the engineers, was wounded. Ge- 
 neral Rogniat, perceiving that the fire of our light 
 troops from the right bank of the Ebro had com- 
 pelled a portion of the defenders of the square 
 tower to abandon it, and to retreat to the castle, 
 and imagining that he perceived some hesitation 
 in those who remained, immediately ordered 
 forward a company of the sappers, under the 
 command of captain Foucauld, and a company
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 173 
 
 of the grenadiers of the Vistula, led on by the 
 chef de bataillon, Chlusowitz, supported at some 
 distance by the whole battalion. Our men rushed 
 forward to the tower, scaled the walls, and the 
 adjacent iotrenchments which were only eight 
 feet in height, and by nine o'clock in the even- 
 ing succeeded in establishing themselves in the 
 tower, and in the houses adjoining to it. The 
 enemy instantly retired to the fort, abandoning 
 the town to us at discretion, with eight pieces 
 of cannon, four hundred muskets, and some am- 
 munition. The sappers as soon as the town had 
 surrendered, busied themselves in securing by 
 epaulements, our communication between the 
 streets and squares that were commanded by 
 the castle, while the battalion of the Vistula took 
 up its station in the town, in order to ensure 
 possession of it, and began to loop-hole the 
 walls of the houses that looked towards the 
 ramps of the fort, in order to prevent the ene- 
 my from debouching by those points. It was, 
 however, difficult to imagine that they would 
 attempt a coup-de-main by a way which was 
 both steep and narrow, and up which, if driven 
 back, their retreat must be so full of danger. 
 In fact, they contented themselves with throw- 
 ing shells, and rolling down stones, from the 
 effects of which the townspeople suffered more 
 than we did. 
 
 Our artillery constructed three batteries, the
 
 174 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET. 
 
 first of which consisted of four mortars, and 
 which was placed in the rear of the parallel, 
 about two hundred toises from the place it was in- 
 tended to bombard — the turret of the castle. The 
 second was erected on the right of the pa- 
 rallel, within one hundred and twenty toises of 
 the covered way ; it consisted of two twenty-four 
 pounders, and two six inch howitzers and was 
 intended to batter the right face of the bastion on 
 the left of the horn-work, and also to throw 
 howitzer shells into the continuation of the faces 
 of that work. The battery No. 3 contained 
 four twenty-four pounders, and two sixteens ; 
 it was placed in the parallel towards the left 
 and was within one hundred and ten toises of 
 the covered way ; it was destined to batter the 
 curtain and the left face of the bastion on the 
 right. These different works which were began on 
 the 4th, were finished during the night of the 5th 
 of June. In the mean time the engineers pushed 
 forward the zigzag on the right, which they had 
 begun the evening before, and under favour of a 
 hollow way, advanced to within thirty toises 
 of the wall, and began to form there a place of 
 arms. In the night of the 6th forty grenadiers of 
 the 114th, were commanded to carry the small in- 
 trenchment, called the horse shoe, which the Spa- 
 niards still kept as an outwork, and whence they 
 very much incommoded our attack from below. 
 They carried it like thorough-bred soldiers, with
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 175 
 
 vigour and rapidity, and maintained themselves 
 there, notwithstanding a keen fire from the 
 fort. 
 
 The commander-in-chief, who had been called 
 to Saragossa by the affairs of Arragon, arrived in 
 the camp on the 7th in the morning, and im- 
 mediately proceeded to visit the trenches, the 
 whole of which, as well as the town, he nar- 
 rowly examined. Sixteen guns were at that 
 time in battery, and of these he confided the 
 command to the artillery chef-d'escadron, Raffron, 
 an officer of the highest courage ; the fire was 
 opened, by his direction, on the 8th of June, at 
 four in the morning. Our superiority was for 
 some time disputed, and three pieces of the bat- 
 tery No. 3, were dismounted by the enemy, but 
 such were the skill and intrepidity of our gunners, 
 that this accident but redoubled their efforts, and 
 the advantage was speedily seen to be on our 
 side. About nine o'clock two large masses of 
 the parapet had tumbled in, four embrasures 
 were rendered useless, and the fire of the fort 
 was nearly silenced. The enemy endeavoured, 
 by keeping up a very sharp fire of musketry, to 
 conceal the check sustained by his artillery, and 
 at the same time he endeavoured to re-mount his 
 guns ; but our shells, which occasioned yet more 
 terrible effects on the turret than our bullets did 
 on the ramparts, speedily threw the whole gar- 
 rison into disorder and alarm.
 
 176 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 At ten o'clock the governor ordered a parley 
 to be beaten and terms of capitulation were im- 
 mediately entered on ; the commander-in-chief 
 authorized general Musnier to sign the articles, 
 by which the garrison became prisoners of war. 
 It was, when the fort surrendered, 1400 strong, 
 besides seventy-eight officers. We found within 
 the castle forty-five pieces of ordnance, 400,000 
 cartridges, 30,000 weight of powder, an immense 
 quantity of cast-iron, and provisions for three 
 months. 
 
 The fall of Mequinenza completed our posses- 
 sion of all the fortified places in Arragon. By its 
 conquest we took away from the enemy the last 
 dep6t for stores, the last retreat for his troops, 
 when defeated, on the left bank of the Ebro ; 
 and lower Catalonia lost in it an advanced post, 
 of which it could at any time make use to dis- 
 turb the peace of Arragon, by pouring into it its 
 bands and armed corps, whenever a favourable 
 opportunity presented itself. The capture would 
 have been attended with still more valuable con- 
 sequences to our arms, had the forts of Cardona, 
 Berga, and Seu d'Urgel been in their turn oc- 
 cupied by our army in Catalonia ; for in that case 
 we might have completed the entire submission 
 of the mountain-valleys between the Ebro and the 
 Pyrenees. It was not so ordered, however, and 
 the result was that, during the whole of the war, 
 the mountains, either of Arragon or of Catalonia,
 
 TAKING OF MEQUINENZA. 177 
 
 were continually receiving instructions, arms, and 
 ammunition, for the purpose of harassing or 
 attacking our troops. 
 
 At all events, it was most important to 
 take advantage of the moment when the enemy- 
 was discouraged, and therefore the commander- 
 in-chief, only two hours after the surrender of 
 Mequinenza, gave orders to general Montmarie to 
 assemble his brigade, to penetrate into the king- 
 dom of Valencia, and take possession of Mo- 
 rella. This movement was executed with great 
 celerity, for on the 13th of June our troops enter- 
 ed the castle of Morella, in which they found but 
 eight pieces of cannon, and these in an indifferent 
 condition, and without ammunition ; the enemy 
 had neglected that post, though an advantageous 
 one, and capable of being well defended. 
 The commander-in-chief resolved to put it 
 in a respectable state, on account of its pos- 
 sessing the two-fold advantage, that with it he 
 could cover Arragon and threaten Valencia ; the 
 Spaniards felt, when it was too late, the im- 
 portance of occupying this fort. General O'Do- 
 nohu,* at the head of a body of troops be- 
 longing to Valencia, advanced upon the fort at 
 the end of June, and began to take up a posi- 
 tion as if he meant to surround the French 
 
 * The same who had been wounded and taken at Maria, and 
 who, like Renovalis, had made his escape from Pampelona. 
 
 VOL. I. N
 
 178 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 troops, and to cut oft' their supplies. General 
 Montmarie, with his brave 14th regiment and 
 3rd of the Vistula, did not, however, allow him 
 to complete that manoeuvre ; on the contrary, he 
 marched boldly out against him, routed him, and 
 put him to flight. Our possession of Morella was 
 not disputed after this ; the army of Arragon 
 established a garrison there in the first instance, 
 which a good while afterwards received some 
 reinforcements ; and, with this assistance, our 
 soldiers maintained their position there until the 
 complete evacuation of the kingdom of Valencia. 
 Following the example of the Moors, who long- 
 waged war in the same quarter, we took pos- 
 session of all the rising grounds in the neighbour- 
 hood, and fortified them, in order to place our 
 stores, both of provisions, and ammunition, in 
 security, but more especially for the purpose 
 of enabling us to exercise an influence over 
 the population, which, even in those places 
 where it had been subdued, frequently exhi- 
 bited symptoms of hostility or of discontent. 
 They were, indeed, ever disposed to deny alto- 
 gether, or at least to undervalue any advantages 
 we might obtain in fighting on plain ground, but 
 the capture of a station, or of a fort, was a po- 
 sitive and indisputable result, the traces of which 
 were not to be erased, and which consequently 
 beat down opinionativeness however obstinate, 
 and silenced incredulity however sceptical.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Our march on the lower Ebro. — General view of Catalonia. — 
 The 3rd corps receives orders to besiege Tortosa. — Opening 
 of a road from Mequinenza to that city. — Supplies drawn from 
 Arragon. — Military organization of the province during the 
 siege.— Head quarters established at Mora. — Investment of 
 the tete-de-pont at Tortosa. — Sorties of the garrison. — 
 Movements of the Spaniards against the forces of the be- 
 siegers. — The French army of Catalonia approaches the 3rd 
 corps. — Junction of the duke of Tarentum with general 
 Suchet at Lerida. — First convoy by the Ebro. — Death of 
 general Laval. — Partial actions. — The army of Catalonia 
 returns to Barcelona. 
 
 About this period of the war in Spain, namely, 
 in the summer of 1810, the grand French army- 
 took possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, 
 and penetrating into Portugal under the orders 
 of marshal Massena, advanced against the lines of 
 Torres Vedras. The provinces of the north and 
 of the centre were occupied ; the army of the 
 interior held Andalusia from Grenada to the walls 
 of Cadiz. The Spanish regency, which was shut 
 up in this last asylum, not only defended them- 
 
 n 2
 
 180 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUC MET. 
 
 selves there with the greatest obstinacy, but 
 cherished most carefully, through the medium of 
 Carthagena and Alicante, the spirited resistance 
 the provinces in the east. 
 
 No province in the Peninsula, in a military 
 point of view, is so well organized as Catalonia. 
 The number of strong places it contains is very 
 great, — Roses, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Seu 
 d' Urgel, Cardona, Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, 
 and in the centre, Barcelona, the capital, whose 
 dimensions and strength not undeservedly allow 
 it to rank among the first fortified towns in 
 Europe. This vast province presents such nu- 
 merous obstacles both natural and artificial, that 
 a French army entering by Perpignan, unless it 
 were numerous and abundantly provided, can 
 never make any efficient progress in it, either in 
 the interior, or even on the coast by the grand 
 route, unless it be supported by a fleet, or by 
 another French corps d'arm^e operating on the 
 lower Ebro. The 7th corps which was com- 
 manded in the first instance by general Gouvion 
 St. Cyr, and afterwards by marshal Augereau, 
 and which, at the period of which we are treating, 
 had been confided to marshal Macdonald, had 
 little or no communication with our other forces 
 in the Peninsula. Its position in a mountainous 
 tract and in the midst of fortresses which it 
 was impossible to take, or to keep when taken, 
 but by the assistance of magazines, compelled
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBUO. 181 
 
 them to remain perpetually in sight of France, for 
 the purpose of drawing- supplies from it. The 
 sea meanwhile was shut against them, and land 
 convoys, which are ever so slow, so difficult, 
 and so insufficient, were necessarily to be re- 
 sorted to for the provisioning of Barcelona alone. 
 Until that task was completed, the military 
 operations of the 7 th corps were limited to a very 
 narrow circle, which was every day more and 
 more contracted by the attacks of the enemy. 
 Whilst the junta of the Manresa continued pro- 
 pagating insurrections throughout the whole of 
 the province, the Spanish army, commanded by 
 Henry O'Donnell, manoeuvred with the utmost 
 facility at every point where it could hamper or 
 interrupt our movements. O'Donnell was ad- 
 vantageously posted at Tarragona, an ancient city 
 where new defences had been raised and old 
 ones strengthened at a very great expence, and 
 whose maritime position gave it additional impor- 
 tance in a war which the English, by their coope- 
 ration, cherished and maintained. Round Tarra- 
 gona and at a short distance from it, are several 
 wealthy and industrious towns, such as Vails and 
 Reuss ; the country, generally, is extremely fer- 
 tile, well cultivated, and thickly inhabited, and 
 the whole of its produce was deposited in safety, 
 and as a resource in case of necessity in that city. 
 Having his troops concentrated in this spot, as in
 
 182 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 an intrenched camp, with a formidable redoubt 
 to protect it, O'Donnell could push forward his 
 squadrons in any direction, as circumstances re- 
 quired, towards Tortosa by the Col de Balaguer ; 
 towards Lerida, by Monblanch by Villafranca 
 and Montserrat, by Cardona, or Seu d'Urgel; 
 in a word, by the centre or the extremities of the 
 provinces, as he saw fit. If at any time the 7th 
 corps succeeded in penetrating to the environs 
 of Tarragona it was only when combined and in 
 force ; such approaches were merely temporary, 
 and the army in making them, carried along 
 with it neither the means nor had they any 
 intention of undertaking a siege. O'Donnell in 
 these cases, immediately divided his forces and 
 made his escape from our troops by retreating in 
 various directions, and in a short time the want 
 of provisions compelled the French to withdraw 
 once more to the neighbourhood of Barcelona. 
 The Spaniards, in that case, were again left free 
 to operate as they pleased ; to seize or to avail 
 themselves of opportunities for attacking us 
 where we happened to be weakly defended or 
 on disadvantageous ground ; all which occasions 
 they regularly employed whenever they occurred, 
 and though our men, when they could grapple 
 with the enemy, maintained their wonted supe- 
 riority in the fair field of battle, yet, in the long 
 run, this painful, tedious, and petty warfare, ac-
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 
 
 183 
 
 coinpanied with so many privations, was fre- 
 quently attended with unfavourable and mortify- 
 ing results. 
 
 On the 13th May, the same day on which Le- 
 rida was assaulted, Hostalrich fell into the hands 
 of the army of Catalonia. The coincidence of 
 dates and the distance between the two places 
 prove that marshal Augereau, so far from being 
 able to carry on the siege of Lerida, had not the 
 means of co-operating in it, although in reality 
 it was the business not less of the 7th than of 
 the 3rd corps. Lerida was the point d'appui of 
 Mequinenza ; it is a strong and commanding po- 
 sition which, although lying without the confines 
 of Arragon, forms as it were a headland in that 
 portion of the Arragonese frontier, and by its in- 
 fluence may easily disturb a country that has al- 
 ready submitted or is ready to do so. When general 
 Suchet became master of it he saw himself fully 
 secured in the occupation of the province of which 
 he was governor, and in a condition to afford as- 
 sistance to the provinces in his neighbourhood. 
 The government, however, did not, as was the 
 case in February, leave him for any length of 
 time in doubt or ignorance of its intentions. On 
 the 29th May the head of the imperial staff' 
 wrote to him in the following terms : " The em- 
 peror supposes that you are now master of Me- 
 quinenza ; in that case you will take immediate 
 measures for getting possession of Tortosa also.
 
 184 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 The marshal duke of Tarentum will at the same 
 time direct his forces on Tarragona. Take care in 
 the meanwhile to collect all your artillery and 
 to adopt every measure necessary for marching 
 on Valencia and for storming that city ; we must, 
 however, in order to undertake that operation 
 have Tortosa and Tarragona in our power." 
 
 When this mandate reached general Suchet, he 
 was already master not only of Mequinenza but 
 of Morella, and consequently in a condition to 
 act as he was directed. His only fear, and 
 that was strengthened by his recent experience 
 at Margalef, was, that he should not be supported 
 in so nice an operation as the siege of Tortosa ; 
 the objection was removed by a promise of as- 
 sistance on the part of the army of Catalonia. 
 The sole object then contemplated by the general 
 was to hasten the execution of his orders, well 
 persuaded that the capture of Tortosa was the 
 first and most important result at which he 
 could aim. This city, by its situation close 
 to the grand route and to the mouth of the 
 Ebro, served not only as a point d'appui but as 
 a connecting link with the Spanish forces of Va- 
 lencia and Catalonia. To isolate these forces was 
 to weaken them ; and in consequence they com- 
 bined most perseveringly in their efforts to prevent 
 the fall of Tortosa ; as they were favoured by cir- 
 cumstances they succeeded in doing so or at 
 least, for a long time in retarding that event.
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 185 
 
 As we have already stated, the fertile plains of 
 Urgel, which were subject to the influence of Le- 
 rida, offered a resource against the wants of 
 the 3rd corps ; and one of the first cares of the 
 commander-in-chief had been to levy requisitions 
 there on the coming crop, and thus to ensure a 
 considerable store of provisions for the operations 
 to which he was destined. At the same time, 
 general Vallee was instructed to prepare a bat- 
 tering train, which was accordingly formed of a 
 selection of our own artillery, and of that which 
 had been taken from the Spaniards, and when as- 
 sembled, it amounted to more than fifty pieces 
 of cannon of different calibres. Mequinenza was 
 the principal entrepot for our ammunition and 
 provisions. Between that town and Tortosa there 
 exists a communication by the Ebro, but the 
 course of that river is interrupted in numerous 
 points by bars, and these it is very often impos- 
 sible to pass over, unless when the river is ac- 
 cidently swollen by rains, or by the melting of 
 the snows. The communications by land are 
 yet more difficult in a country where the hills 
 are so numerous and become more and more 
 precipitous, in proportion as you advance from 
 Caspc or Mequinenza towards Favares, Batea, 
 Gandessa and Mora, and thence towards Pinel, 
 Las Armas, Xerta and Tortosa. A road by which 
 the operations of an army could be conducted, 
 had in consequence almost to be created ; although
 
 186 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 there existed some traces, or rather recollections, 
 of that which had been formed, it was said by 
 the duke of Orleans in the war of the succession.* 
 
 * Many of the rivers in Spain, like the Rhone above 
 Seyssel, appear to have been forced to hollow out for 
 themselves an issue through the mountains, that perpen- 
 dicularly bar their free passage, in order to reach the 
 vallies that open on the plains beneath, and from thence 
 to the ocean. It is in this way that the Ebro enters by 
 a gully near Haro, into the broad uniform level which forms 
 its bed in Arragon, and when it approaches ATequinenza 
 the river there again finds itself closed in, narrowed, and 
 obstructed by innumerable obstacles in that chain which it is 
 obliged to traverse in its course to Tortosa, previous to its 
 disemboguing near Amposa. This tract, in which are united 
 the limits of the three provinces of Arragon, Catalonia and 
 Valencia, presents a chaos of mountains where the people, 
 like their streams, have only succeeded in effecting routes, 
 by offering violence, as it were, to nature. The passage 
 of Las Armas between Pinel aud Xerta, is in this way, one 
 of the most formidable defiles in Spain ; it has received its 
 name from the circumstance of a rock of great height, having 
 been rudely chisseled into the shape of a scutcheon, with a coat 
 of arms on it. The latter is that of the keys of Arragon, and 
 the tradition of the country is, that king Jayme, surnamed 
 the Conquistador, (the conqueror) who was so celebrated for 
 his exploits against the Moors, on his return from one of 
 his expeditions into the kingdom of Valencia, was carried on a 
 litter, because of the sickness he then laboured under, and died 
 at the very spot where this monument has been erected to his 
 memory. The following is the account given in an old his- 
 tory, touching this defile, and the passage that the duke of 
 Orleans effected through it : — " From Tortosa to Mequinenza , 
 passing through Las Trincheras, — what is now called Las
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 187 
 
 On the 21st June, general Paris, with a brigade 
 of infantry, was sent forward in that direction to 
 occupy the principal points, and the villages, to 
 disperse the parties that infested the country, 
 and at the same time to repulse the troops of 
 the line, who still kept the field in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Tortosa. General Rogniat des- 
 patched some officers of engineers and sappers 
 after this brigade with implements to trace and 
 open a road : the infantry furnished daily from 1,000 
 to 1,200 men as labourers for that purpose. 
 
 The soldiers who had been accustomed to this 
 sort of work, entered on it with great zeal, quit- 
 ting from time to time the pick- axe for the 
 musket, chasing the enemy and routing them, and 
 then returning cheerfully to their task. It was 
 
 Armas — you cross the Ebro by the bridge and proceed 
 to Xerta ; at a little distance you leave the road that comes 
 from Flix, the same that leads to Mora by the bank of the 
 Ebro, conducts the pass called Las Trincheras ; and this way 
 you go to Pinel, Campocinas, Cervera, and by the right 
 to Gandessa. After passing a small stream (the Algas) you 
 then enter Arragon, and get to Favara, and leaving the road 
 that goes to Caspe, on your left, you journey on until you 
 reach the bank of the Ebro, which you pass by means of a 
 boat, and so get to Mequinenza. The whole of this route may 
 be pursued by carriages ; it was so arranged by the duke of Or- 
 leans in 1708, the year in which he took Tortosa. It is how- 
 ever, very much exposed to danger from the rains, and by for- 
 tifying the pass of Las Trincheras, it would be easy to slop 
 an entire army."
 
 188 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 both a long and tedious operation, to re- 
 establish a road for great guns, which had been 
 abandoned for nearly 100 years, and that for a 
 length of nearly twenty leagues across preci- 
 pitous mountains and deep vallies, and in 
 some places entirely destroyed by land slips or 
 torrents from the mountains. The burning 
 heat of summer, added to the fatigue of the 
 men ; they suffered severely from thirst, and 
 what was in no degree less tormenting, although 
 those who do not know warm climates by actual 
 experience may not easily comprehend it, from 
 the frightful clouds of gnats which were generated 
 in swarms by the stagnation of the air and of the 
 water in certain spots, and which pounced on the 
 men, settled on various parts of the body espe- 
 cially on their faces, and prevented them, in a 
 great degree, from acting, from seeing, or almost 
 from breathing. Every precaution that human 
 prudence could suggest was adopted in order to 
 avoid these inconveniences, and in addition wine 
 and vinegar were served out to the soldiers, and 
 their day's labour was paid in the same manner 
 as if they had been working in the trenches, so 
 that over and above their rations, and their or- 
 dinary pay, they had wherewith to procure, 
 so far as money could, whatever might be useful 
 or agreeable to themselves in such a case. 
 
 Arragon was now the field for general 
 Suchet's army. The civil authorities of this
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. ISO 
 
 province had been instructed beforehand to make 
 provision for facilitating the distant operations 
 that were in contemplation ; their physical re- 
 sources, however, would have been insufficient, 
 had they not been backed by the good-will of the 
 people, which it was found necessary to conci- 
 liate. Brute force is, indeed, limited in its applica 
 tion, and is of little avail ; and therefore, whenever 
 it is practicable, persuasion ought to be made to 
 take its place. The species of anarchy, partly 
 military, partly civil, which harassed Catalonia 
 and Valencia, joined to a pretty marked spirit 
 of rivalry that exists in Spain between the dif- 
 ferent provinces, rendered the Arragonese, by 
 degrees, more and more inclined to submit to, 
 and even to confide in general Suchet. In order 
 to bring about this most desirable end, he de- 
 signedly moderated the use of his authority, by 
 committing it to the hands of Spaniards, men 
 whom he knew to be most capable of exercising 
 it with intelligence, and with equity. He sup- 
 ported and encouraged their zeal, by his friend- 
 ship, and noticed their useful services both at 
 Madrid and at Paris. Under these circum- 
 stances, he was able to reckon when he removed 
 to a distance from Arragon, upon all the resources 
 which he had been careful to husband there. 
 He succeeded not only in forming magazines, 
 but what was far more difficult, in organizing 
 means of transport. Alcahiz and Caspe, as well
 
 190 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHF.T. 
 
 as Mequinenza, became the stations for most 
 important d6pots, whence wheat, flour, oats, and 
 biscuit, were regularly conveyed to the troops 
 by convoys of mules, with Spanish conductors, 
 or by the bat horses attached to the army. 
 Saragossa, and all the rest of Arragon, poured 
 in upon those points the provisions necessary for 
 the supply of our men. 
 
 The commander-in-chief confided the care of 
 the province to general Musnier, with whom 
 he left general Buget, who was stationed 
 at Huesca, in order to watch the left bank of 
 the Ebro, with twelve squadrons of foot gen- 
 darmes, and a couple of battalions of infantry. 
 General Verges was posted at Daroca with four 
 battalions, and 100 horse, and covered the right 
 bank, as well as occupied Teruel and Calatayud. 
 In addition to the forces that were left at Sara- 
 gossa, as well as the garrisons of Lerida, 
 Mequinenza, Jaca, Monzon, and Venasque, a 
 connected series of fortified posts, or of strong 
 barracks, had been established along all the 
 principal roads, which served at the same time 
 as lines of operation, and of communication. 
 The object of these stations was to ensure the 
 safety of troops that had charge of the passage 
 of couriers, and to protect the posts of isolated 
 and detached parties, as well as to see to the 
 furnishing of provisions, the collection of con- 
 tributions, and the due obedience of the Cor-
 
 11 ARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 191 
 
 regidors and alcaldes, who were intrusted with 
 the execution of the general's orders. This 
 system was pursued in every possible di- 
 rection ; on the right bank of the river at 
 Alagon, Mallen, Tudela, Boya, Taracona, Epila, 
 Almunia, Maria, Villa de Muel, Carinena, 
 Fuentes, Zeila, Sanper, Alcaniz ; and on the 
 left bank, at Pina, Bujaralos, Candasnos, Fra- 
 ga, Zuera, Ayerbe, Anzanigo, Canfranc, and 
 several of the Cinco Villas. The officers com- 
 manding these fortified points, together with a 
 garrison, and a supply of ammunition and pro- 
 visions proportionate to their wants, had in- 
 structions to be most vigilantly watchful in every 
 case, to defend themselves to the last ex- 
 tremity against any party that might attack 
 them, and to keep up a frequent communication 
 with the posts in their neighbourhood, and with 
 Saragossa, in order that they might be able to 
 give every information of any movements, or 
 reported movements, that might come to their 
 knowledge. The whole of this army of stations, 
 which we were compelled to leave in our rear, 
 did not amount to much less than 12,000 men, 
 of every description, scattered to a certain de- 
 gree over the country ; but all of them occupying 
 essential points, and supported by sufficient re- 
 serves, to act promptly and combinedly, should 
 circumstances render it necessary. 
 
 These dispositions being made, general Suchet
 
 192 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 proceeded first to Alcaniz and then to Caspe, in 
 order to direct the movement upon Tortosa with 
 such a portion of his acting forces as he had des- 
 tined for the siege of that place. In the com- 
 mencement of July, general Habert assembled 
 the 3rd division at Belpuig in the plain of Urgel, 
 and after a demonstration, the object of which 
 was to induce a belief that he was about to take 
 the direction of Barcelona, he suddenly turned off 
 to the right, directing his march to the banks of 
 the Ebro by Garriga, and arrived on the 5th at 
 Garcia, without being for a moment disturbed or 
 even followed in his movements. He had under 
 his command eight battalions and a part of the 4th 
 hussars, and received orders to hold himself in 
 readiness to proceed to Tivenis and Tortosa by 
 the left bank of the Ebro, and in the mean while 
 to keep his men together and in a proper state to 
 meet the enemy should any make their appear- 
 ance. 
 
 Laval's division, which was 6,000 strong, left 
 Alcaniz at the end of June, after placing a garri- 
 son in the fort of Morella and ensuring the de- 
 fences and provisioning of that point. They ad- 
 vanced from that place on San Mateo, followed 
 by general Boussard, who commanded a battalion 
 of infantry, 500 cuirassiers, and six pieces of light 
 artillery. General Laval, after proceeding for 
 some time in the direction of Valencia, pushed 
 directly and rapidly forward upon Tortosa. The
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 193 
 
 chef-d'escadron Mesclop, who commanded the 
 advanced guard of the cavalry, pressed close up to 
 the place by the banks of the river, and surrounded 
 in so doing a part of the Spanish troops that re- 
 mained without the town and made several pri- 
 soners. All the remaining Spaniards retreated 
 into the place by the tete-de-pont, before 
 which general Laval had taken up his position. 
 On the 3rd July the investment was formed on the 
 right bank, and on the 4th he extended his right 
 as far as Amposta, and took possession of the ferry 
 on the high road from Barcelona to Valencia, his 
 left the meanwhile touching on Xerta. General 
 Boussard, with his corps of observation, was sta- 
 tioned on the Cenia, in order to serve as an ad- 
 vance guard against the Valencians. 
 
 During the double movement of the 1st and 
 3rd divisions, the general of brigade, Paris, had 
 advanced as far as Mora, at which town the 
 commander-in-chief fixed his head quarters on 
 the 6th of July. Without waiting for the comple- 
 tion of the new road, he proceeded to occupy 
 Miravet, Pinel and Las Armas, and thus placed 
 himself in communication with general Laval, 
 and also arranged so as to communicate with 
 the troops of general Ilabert. Two flying bridges, 
 which general Vallee caused to be brought clown 
 from Mequinenza, were established at Mora and 
 Xerta for the purpose of connecting the one bank 
 of the river with the other. The general im- 
 
 vol. r. o
 
 194 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 mediately had a tete-de-pont constructed at each 
 of these points and the whole of the vessels on 
 the river, from Mora and above, as far as the 
 mouth were seized. An attempt was made to 
 burn the bridge of boats at Tortosa, by sending 
 down during the night, by favour of the current, 
 some barks laden with fascines which were 
 smeared with pitch and fired, but without suc- 
 cess. The works on the road were carried on 
 with the utmost activity, and the formidable de- 
 file of Las Armas was at length rendered prac- 
 ticable. Had the army of Catalonia been in a 
 condition to act as that of Arragon was, it ought 
 at this time to have been in front of Tarragona, 
 or at least on the way to it ; general Suchet was 
 led to hope that such would be the case from the 
 despatches of the prince of Neufchatel, but he 
 had no certainty that it would. The delay was 
 beginning to render him uneasy, although it was 
 readily explained by the difficulty of direct com- 
 munication, when on the 9th of July he received 
 through an emissary the positive intelligence that 
 marshal Macdonald with his corps d'arm^e was 
 before Gerona. 
 
 From that moment the position of general 
 Suchet before Tortosa, was no longer the same ; 
 he even regretted that he had been tempted to 
 invest it, but as he felt persuaded that a retreat 
 might be attended with fatal consequences, he 
 determined to maintain himself where he was,
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 195 
 
 and to endeavour, by redoubling his efforts, to 
 resist the attempts which he was sure O'Donnell 
 would not fail to make against him. That ge- 
 neral had under his command an army of 22,000 
 men, and it was more than likely as he was 
 left free to act as he pleased, that he would di- 
 rect on the Ebro a portion of his forces, and that, 
 aided by the garrison of Tortosa, and by the 
 army of Valencia, he would disturb the opera- 
 tions of the siege, which from that time was ne- 
 cessarily converted into a mere blockade of the 
 right bank. 
 
 From the 6th to the 8th of July, Laval's divi- 
 sion had been occupied in intrenching them- 
 selves, although interrupted in their labours by 
 two sorties of the garrison, which they re- 
 pulsed with equal vigour and firmness. On the 
 10th, a division of the enemy encamped at Falset, 
 attacked our posts at Tivisa, and surprised the 
 rear guard of one of our reconnoitring parties, 
 which were returning after taking some thirty 
 prisoners. Lieutenant Adoue, who commanded 
 this rear-guard, kept his ground intrepidly for 
 several hours, although completely surrounded 
 on all sides, and thus gained time for succour to 
 be sent to him ; he lost the half of his little 
 troop, but he brought back the remainder to the 
 camp. The next morning the attack was re- 
 newed on the troops that we had at the t£te- 
 de-pont at Mora. Colonel Kliski, who was sent 
 
 o 2
 
 196 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 with ninety-six lancers to support the infantry 
 that were opposed to a greatly superior force, 
 charged the Spaniards boldly, drove them back, 
 and killed a great many of them. On the 12th 
 the commander-in-chief directed general Paris to 
 attack them in front, whilst general Habert ma- 
 noeuvred by the mountains on their flanks. In 
 order to get a fixed position before this division 
 of the enemy, which constituted general O'Don- 
 nell's advanced guard, general Habert, together 
 with the brigade of general Abb£, established 
 himself at Tivisa, an advantageous post in ad- 
 vance, on the left bank of the Ebro, and com- 
 municating both with Mora and Ginestar, on the 
 route to Xerta. On the same day (the 12th) a 
 fresh sortie was made by the garrison of Tortosa 
 by about 1,500 men ; they forced back the ad- 
 vanced posts of our blockading corps that lay 
 before the hamlets of Jesus and Roquetta. Ge- 
 neral Laval, at the head of the 4th regiment, 
 soon checked this attempt of the enemy, and 
 he was so well seconded by general Chlopiski 
 with the grenadiers of the Vistula, that the Spa- 
 niards, after being driven back to their palisades, 
 were forced to fall back precipitately into the town, 
 leaving several dead and prisoners behind them, 
 and having a great many wounded, whom they 
 carried off. 
 
 The object of these three sorties of the gar- 
 rison of Tortosa, made in such rapid succession,
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER E15RO. 197 
 
 was to harass our blockading corps, by keep- 
 ing them in constant motion, whilst the enemy's 
 forces from Tarragona and Valencia, made de- 
 monstrations and planned movements for the 
 purpose of attracting our attention to other quar- 
 ters. The commander-in-chief thought it advi- 
 sable in consequence, to strengthen the t&te-de- 
 pont at Xerta, for the purpose of facilitating the 
 manoeuvres of the troops from the one bank to 
 the other ; he fitted it up accordingly for the 
 reception of several battalions. In the mean- 
 while the Valencians thought fit to advance 
 against Morella, under the orders of general 
 O'Donohu, but general JVlontmarie, who was de- 
 tached for that purpose, speedily raised the 
 blockade of the fort, and at the same time re- 
 victualled it. 
 
 Soon after this, a note from general La- 
 combe St. Michel, governor of Barcelona, an- 
 nounced that marshal Macdonald was busily 
 occupied in making dispositions for the siege 
 of Tarragona, and thence it was fair to con- 
 clude that the Spaniards would speedily make a 
 last and grand effort to raise the blockade of 
 Tortosa before Macdonald's approach. In fact, 
 on the 30th of July, Henri O'Donnell marched 
 to Falset with the regiment of Antequerra, the 
 Walloon guards, and 300 of the cavalry of Sant' 
 Jago, with that view. Having collected about 
 10,000 men he attacked general Habert at Ti-
 
 198 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 visa about noon. The number of French in pos- 
 session at that place, was about 5,000 only, but 
 they were ably commanded and habituated to 
 victory; they repulsed the attack without the 
 slightest confusion, and compelled O'Donnell to 
 retreat. He lost a great number of his men, but 
 did not the less attend to another part of his de- 
 sign, which was to march on Tortosa. This 
 officer, who had been nominated commander-in- 
 chief of the army of Catalonia, and who was 
 invested with very extensive powers, was a man 
 of great energy, and possessed, at the same time, 
 much activity and courage ; in his army he was 
 lavish in promoting and cashiering, and was in 
 the habit of conferring rank and decorations on 
 the field of battle. 
 
 On the 3rd of August, having drawn up in 
 Tortosa some columns of picked men, to whom 
 he addressed, in the presence of the people of 
 the town a speech, in order to stir up their en- 
 thusiasm, he sallied out by the tite-de-pont at four 
 o'clock in the afternoon, and marched straight 
 forward on our intrenchments without firing a 
 musket. Our advanced posts were drawn in by 
 this brisk attack, but they soon recovered from 
 their surprise ; the men in the camps hastily took 
 up their arms ; general Laval put himself at the 
 head of the troops, and while the several points 
 attacked were sustaining themselves as well as 
 they could, he led a column straight against the
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 199 
 
 enemy's centre, and thus threatened his retreat by 
 the tete-de-pont. This bold manoeuvre changed 
 in a moment the aspect of the contest ; the 
 Spaniards fell back, and were pursued with great 
 vigour. They were pressed on every side, and 
 got back to the town in complete disorder, leaving 
 behind them a great number of killed and 
 wounded, besides 220 prisoners, almost all of 
 them cavalry. 
 
 A letter found on the person of a colonel of 
 the regiment of Grenada, who had been taken 
 prisoner on the 6th of August, in the environs of 
 Lerida, confirmed the reports of Uldecona, which 
 had led us to fear, about the same time, a new 
 movement on the part of the Valencians.* The 
 combination of these efforts though tardily made, 
 appeared to general Suchet, who constantly 
 reckoned on the immediate march of the duke of 
 
 * Tarragona, 1st August, 1810. 
 O'Donnell set out yesterday for Tortosa, taking with him the 
 cavalry of Sant'Jago and two regiments of infantry. I believe 
 he intends to make some attack in that quarter. This move- 
 ment has taken place in consequence of the arrival of Rodrigues, 
 aid-de-camp to Caro, the commander of the troops of Valencia, 
 who arrived here yesterday morning early. He told me that 
 his commander, Caro, was at San Mat£o, and that he had with 
 him 20,000 men ; one half of them troops of the line, and one 
 half Somatcns. We shall soon see what is to be the result of 
 all this, and if it be fortunate I shall let you know. Tell me all 
 that is passing in your quarter, and believe me to be your friend, 
 
 Signed Cevallos.
 
 200 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Tarentum, to indicate an intention of preventing 
 the junction of two French armies. He resolved, 
 in consequence, to make a powerful effort to get 
 rid of the Valencians also, after having repulsed 
 O'Donnell. With the 12,000 men that he had 
 under his command, all of them old soldiers and 
 full of confidence, he found himself perfectly able, 
 if not to undertake the siege of Tortosa without the 
 assistance of the army of Catalonia, at least to 
 make head both in manoeuvring and in fighting 
 against the 30,000 Spaniards, who, from Tarra- 
 gona and Valencia were continually harassing him 
 and interrupting his operations with more obsti- 
 nacy than concert. We had not begun any works 
 at the spot where we lay ; we had no battering 
 train collected near the town, and could march, in 
 consequence, without difficulty and without fear 
 against any enemy, whether on the right or on 
 the left of the Ebro. To engage the troops that 
 were destined to succour Tortosa was, besides, 
 the best preparatory step that the general could 
 adopt for ensuring the success of the siege. 
 
 In consequence of this resolution, he des- 
 patched general Harispe with some troops of re- 
 serve to the 1st division, gave the head quarters at 
 Mora in charge to general Rogniat, and appointed 
 general Paris to the command of the tete-de-pont ; 
 the whole of general Habert's division was re- 
 moved to Xerta, and he himself set out on the 13th 
 of August to join the division of Laval. He left
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 201 
 
 to the blockading corps what troops were neces- 
 sary for that purpose, and taking with him eleven 
 battalions, partly of the 1st and partly of the 3rd 
 division, 800 horse that had been assembled on 
 the 14th at Uldecona, marched to meet the 
 army of Valencia. General Caro, who com- 
 manded that army, instead of making the attack 
 which he had contemplated was encamped at 
 Cervera ; as soon as he heard of our troops 
 having abandoned the blockade in order to attack 
 him, he immediately took up a position and 
 awaited our approach. A reconnoitring party of 
 100 hussars routed his advanced guard and pur- 
 sued them as far as Vinaros ; the hussars were 
 commanded by the chef d'escadron, Galbois, an 
 officer belonging to the staff of his highness the 
 major-general. At Vinaros there was a keenly- 
 contested rencontre, in which we lost captain 
 Charron of the 4th hussars, who was run through 
 the body with a lance ; we took fifty-two pri- 
 soners and a stand of colours. 
 
 General Caro's position was well chosen. The 
 approach to it was difficult; his right rested on 
 Benecarlo, and his left on San-Mateo, in such a 
 way as to render him master of the two grand 
 communications with Valencia. General Suchet 
 was in hopes that the enemy would wait for him 
 there, and with these hopes he advanced by Calig 
 with ten battalions and his field train, while at 
 the same time, he kept his cavalry ready to act
 
 202 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 as occasion required. The enemy, however, on our 
 approach, withdrew on Alcala de Chisvert, whither 
 we followed him, leaving a few troops before 
 Peniscola to watch the garrison. General Harispe 
 succeeded in coming up with his rear guard, on 
 which the army once more presented itself in 
 array drawn up in two lines, and we began to 
 form in order to attack it : but without waiting for 
 the completion of our dispositions, the Spa- 
 niards dispersed, and continued their retreat 
 rapidly, but without disorder, in different direc- 
 tions. We made a few prisoners, and but a few. 
 It was useless to prosecute farther a movement 
 the object of which was no longer attainable; our 
 troops, therefore, took once more the route to 
 Tortosa, and on the 20th of August the com- 
 mander-in-chief re-entered his head quarters at 
 Mora. An aid-de-camp of marshal Macdonald 
 arrived there at the same time from Reuss, by 
 way of Falset ; he stated that the enemy had 
 precipitately abandoned those two points, and the 
 whole of the neighbouring country on the ap- 
 proach of the army of Catalonia. Had the duke 
 of Tarentum intended to commence the siege of 
 Tarragona, it would have been necessary to take 
 with him his battering train, and he should have 
 had magazines established beforehand, instead 
 of which, his troops found the plain of Tarra- 
 gona so completely exhausted that they had the 
 greatest possible difficulty in subsisting even
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 203 
 
 for a few days. O'Donnell had carried off all the 
 grain, and as soon as he saw the 7th corps esta- 
 blishing themselves at Reuss and in the environs, 
 he took up a position for starving them by occu- 
 pying, with the troops he commanded, Tarragona 
 Vails, and the Col de Ribas, in such force, that 
 although he could not at any of these points stand 
 a general attack, yet he could check detachments 
 and intercept convoys. 
 
 The duke of Tarentum was by no means dis- 
 posed to remain for any length of time in this 
 troublesome position, and with the brave troops 
 that he commanded, he could cut his way in 
 any direction that it was required to direct his 
 operations. The government had instructed him 
 to advance on Tarragona, in order to assist in 
 the siege of Tortosa ; but as he himself was not 
 in a condition to besiege the first of these two 
 places, he adopted the resolution of marching 
 to Lerida, in order to communicate with the 
 army of Arragon, and to concert measures with 
 its commander. On the 25th of August, accord- 
 ingly, he set out with his whole force, which 
 was previously assembled. His advanced-guard 
 took in the first instance the route of the Col 
 de Balaguer, but afterwards changed the di- 
 rection of its march for the defile of Ribas and 
 Monblanch, where the French and the Italian 
 infantry had a most brilliant affair; the army 
 arrived before Lerida on the 29th of August. Ge-
 
 204 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 neral Suchet was informed of this movement by 
 the aid-de-camp of the marshal, and left Mora 
 on the 23rd, passed through Mequinenza, and ar- 
 rived at Lerida before the duke of Tarentum, in 
 order to receive him at that city. The two generals 
 had no difficulty in agreeing as to what was ad- 
 visable, and what was practicable in the state 
 of affairs. Before considering those more dis- 
 tant operations, contemplated by the government, 
 it was absolutely necessary to occupy Tarragona 
 and Tortosa, agreeably to the instructions of the 
 prince of Neufchatel himself.* Prudence, however, 
 
 * Rambouillet, 17th July, 1816. 
 General count Suchet, the emperor has directed me to 
 inform you, that his wish is, as soon as you have made your- 
 self master of Tortosa, you should place that fortress in the 
 hands of the duke of Tarentum ; and that you should then 
 concentrate your forces in Arragon, in order to be in a con- 
 dition to second the expedition, which the emperor will then 
 be ready to direct upon Portugal, an expedition which he 
 intends to make as soon as Tortosa and Tarragona are cap- 
 tured. You will there receive the last instructions of his 
 majesty to divide your troops into two corps d'arm£e, to march 
 with the first, composed of about 15,000 men, upon Valladolid, 
 manoeuvring in such a way as to support the general opera- 
 tions until the English are beaten, and compelled to embark. 
 While thus employed, you will leave a corps of 12,000 men 
 in Arragon ; and as soon as the English are driven from 
 Portugal, you will return to Arragon with your 15,000 men ; 
 and having united the two corps d'armee, advance upon 
 Valencia, at the same time that the army of Catalonia will 
 direct a division by way of Tortosa ; and the duke of Dal-
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 205 
 
 demanded that they should begin by the siege 
 of Tortosa, and that they should mutually aid 
 each other in that operation. General Suchet found 
 himself quite capable of undertaking it with his 
 own forces, provided he were supported, and Mar- 
 shal Macdonald in a condition to protect the 
 operations of the siege, if he were furnished with 
 provisions, of which he stood much in want. 
 It was arranged, therefore,, that the former 
 should hasten the arrival of his artillery before 
 the fortress ; and that the latter should occupy 
 Lerida, in order to collect the produce of the 
 
 matia will co-operate with your expedition, on his part by 
 marching with a corps of 15 or 20,000 men. 
 
 In the mean time, it is absolutely necessary to take Tortosa ; 
 and to attend as soon as that is done, to the re-assembling of 
 your men, that you may be ready to execute the emperor's 
 orders. You must, of course, take counsel from events as 
 they occur ; but you must not, after the capture of Tortosa, 
 quit the country without the emperor's orders. 
 
 Signed Alexandre. 
 
 Paris, 26th July, 1810. 
 General count Suchet, agreeably to the last orders trans- 
 mitted to the duke of Tarentum, he is to march upon Tarra- 
 gona, while you lay to siege Tortosa. The duke de Feltre, 
 minister of war, has had instructions to inform the duke 
 of Tarentum of the arrangements which I ordered in my letter 
 from Rambouillet, of the 14th June. 
 
 Signed Alexandre.
 
 206 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 harvest and form magazines. General Suchet 
 gave up to the marshal the amount of the requi- 
 sitions for provi sions agreed to by the communes 
 of the plain of Seu d'Urgel, which is looked 
 on as the granary of Catalonia. He did more ; 
 he placed at his disposal 10,000 quintals of 
 wheat, the stores of the 3rd division, which 
 had been collected with great labour at Monzon 
 and at Barbastro. By this distribution, which 
 necessity demanded, he deprived himself of all 
 the stores he might otherwise have procured 
 from Mequinenza and the left bank, and limited 
 his supplies to the remainder of Arragon. The 
 environs of Tortosa offered nothing of the kind 
 for his use ; the division of Laval had consumed 
 the whole crop of the left bank, after having got it 
 cut down and thrashed out, and the left bank 
 presented nothing but arid mountains and 
 marshes. The army was in consequence com- 
 pelled to draw its substance from Saragossa, 
 Teruel, and a number of points in Arragon, at 
 a distance from Tortosa of more than sixty 
 leagues. The difficulty of getting transports very 
 much enhanced the difficulty of provisioning 
 the troops, for at Mequinenza there were but a 
 very small number of barks, which had been 
 collected for the use of the artillery. This 
 service, which was become one of the highest 
 importance, was attended with numerous diffi-
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 207 
 
 culties, arising out of the season of the year and 
 circumstances which were well calculated to 
 render the general uneasy. 
 
 The waters of the Ebro are generally low 
 during the summer, and the enormous cargoes 
 that we had to transport to Tortosa, might, it was 
 foreseen, be detained for a long time on the voyage, 
 or in the port where they then lay. Moreover, 
 the march and the stay of the army of Catalonia, 
 in the neighbourhood of Lerida, as they again 
 left the Spanish army at liberty to manoeuvre be- 
 tween Tarragona, Monblanch, and Tortosa, made 
 the navigation of the river extremely perilous. 
 Previous to his quitting marshal Macdonald, 
 who departed early in September, first for Agra- 
 mont, and then for Cervera, general Suchet took 
 advantage of a moment of security and of a rise 
 of the stream, to despatch the first convoy of ar- 
 tillery from Mequinenza, under the protection of 
 a Neapolitan division of 2, 500 men whom the mar- 
 shal placed for the time under his orders. This 
 corps was composed of a set of fine fellows, but 
 they were badly armed, worse clothed, and 
 had been spoiled, in consequence of incor- 
 porating with them most imprudently, a mixture 
 of vagabonds and of persons who had been con- 
 demned, or who had been punished as criminals. 
 The discipline of the division felt the effect of 
 this, and the example which was displayed of pil- 
 lage and of desertion at times, was most fatal,
 
 208 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 although the valour of the great mass of the men, 
 and the excellent conduct of the officers, fre- 
 quently redeemed all their faults. The marshal 
 proposed to the general to dove-tail, as it were, 
 this division, which was commanded by prince 
 Pignatelli, into the main body of his army, and to 
 endeavour to derive some advantage from them, 
 by giving them a stationary position, which is 
 more calculated for supervision, and for the main- 
 tenance of order, than marching and counter- 
 marching are. The division sometimes displayed 
 the good effect of the pains employed in its behalf, 
 but without entirely losing those vices which were 
 inherent in its constitution. By marching from 
 Lerida down the banks of the Ebro, by way of 
 Llardican, they ensured the safe passage of a 
 convoy of twenty-six breaching cannons of large 
 calibre, which arrived by water at Mora, and 
 were transported thence to Xerta, on the 5th 
 September and there parked. The Neapolitan di- 
 vision was afterwards established at Garcia. On 
 the 3rd the commander-in-chief retired to his head 
 quarters at Mora. General Habert once more 
 took up his old station at Tivisa, and Mas 
 de Mora continued to be occupied by the re- 
 serve. As soon as the army of Catalonia had 
 retired from Reuss, the Spaniards again esta- 
 blished themselves in force at Falset. 
 
 General Laval who had been ill for nearly 
 twenty days, died on the 16th September; he
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 209 
 
 was deeply regretted by the army and left behind 
 him a reputation of courage and probity, which 
 did honour to his memory. His division, during 
 his absence had been confided to the brave gene- 
 ral Harispe, an experienced campaigner, who 
 knew well, not only how to lead his men, but, 
 by the force of his authority and of his example, 
 to make them follow him. The commander- 
 in-chief was of opinion that he could not commit 
 into more steady hands the command of La- 
 val's division and the charge of the blockade 
 of Tortosa; he accordingly requested, and ob- 
 tained for that officer the rank of general of divi- 
 sion, which he well merited by his services and 
 his wounds. General Harispe was replaced in 
 the duties of chief of the army-staff, by the ad- 
 jutant commandant St. Cyr Nugues, who had 
 filled the office of sub- chief, from the month of 
 May, 1809. He had been formerly an aid-de- 
 camp, the friend and companion in arms of the 
 commander-in-chief, who entertained a real affec- 
 tion for him, and entirely confided in him. Rights 
 so acquired to confidence and esteem, are per- 
 haps with a general, who has charge of an 
 army, the chief merit of the person whom he 
 selects to be his second, before whom, and with 
 whom, he meditates his plans and prepares his 
 operations, and on whom he reposes for ordering 
 their execution when he has matured them for 
 that purpose by counsel and meditation. 
 vol. i. p
 
 210 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 As the Valencians whose army had not been 
 subdued, were continually watching an opportu- 
 nity for advancing to disturb the blockade, count 
 Suchet determined to leave a portion of the bri- 
 gade of Montmarie, in conjunction with the troops 
 commanded by general Boussard at Ulldecona, 
 and placed this army of observation under 
 the command of the general of division, Musnier, 
 whose place at Saragossa he directed to be oc- 
 cupied by general Paris ; general Verges came to 
 Mas de Mora. Colonel Kliski, with whose ac- 
 tivity the commander-in-chief was well ac- 
 quainted, received the command of the de- 
 tached corps that covered the right bank of 
 the Ebro, alternately at Teruel, Montalvan, 
 Daroca and Calatayud, to defend that portion 
 of Arragon from the incursions of Villacampa. 
 That indefatigable partizan was watching, on 
 the frontiers of Castille, for an opportunity 
 of disturbing the operations of the army of 
 Arragon. He kept up a constant correspon- 
 dence in Saragossa, which compelled the com- 
 mander-in-chief to take measures of precau- 
 tion, and occasionally to employ both severity 
 and menaces. He obstructed wherever his in- 
 fluence extended, the supply of provisions 
 to the French, and especially the requisitions 
 of cattle necessary for the subsistence of 
 the troops assembled on the banks of the 
 Ebro. On the 7th of August at Las Cuevas,
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 211 
 
 colonel Plicque, who was bringing G,000 sheep 
 with a detachment of the 114th regiment and of 
 the 14th hussars, was surrounded and attacked 
 by nearly four thousand men. He maintained an 
 obstinate fight, in which he lost three officers 
 and a number of soldiers, and only got back 
 to Alcaniz by leaving his convoy behind him. 
 The following evening captain Cantiloube, 
 a brave officer, who commanded a detach- 
 ment that was conducting some cattle, was sur- 
 rounded and taken at Andorra, on the side of 
 Montalvan. About the same time the Guerilla? 
 of Navarre, under the direction of general Reilly, 
 who had just assumed the command in that 
 quarter, penetrated into Cinco Villas, where they 
 surprised and killed the war-commissary, Gon- 
 doin, who with a detachment of gendarmes, 
 was occupied in collecting provisions. These 
 several losses affected us very sensibly. The 
 army of Arragon, which had been master of a 
 fertile province, above all things in wheat and 
 wine, had yielded to an auxiliary corps the whole 
 of its magazines. It could neither send out to 
 seek for provisions, nor bring them safely in 
 when obtained ; it was, in consequence, in immi- 
 nent hazard of wanting food altogether, was re- 
 duced to drink water for want of boats to bring 
 wine, and had, in fact, nothing on which it 
 could safely reckon but its rations of bread, 
 which were procured with great difficulty, and 
 
 p 2
 
 212 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 by efforts that were constantly to be repeated 
 Chief commissary Bondurand, who had, for a 
 long time, been attached to Suchet's division 
 in the grand army, at length arrived, and took 
 charge of the administration of the 3rd corps. 
 His probity and intelligence were known to the 
 commander-in-chief, who had requested his ser- 
 vices as head commissary, and who had after- 
 wards the highest reason to congratulate him- 
 self on having obtained them. By thus sur- 
 rounding himself with men who merited his con- 
 fidence, and whose only aim was to justify his 
 good opinion, he obtained advantages which his 
 position, very frequently, did not entitle him to 
 expect. The privations endured by the army 
 were rare, and never arose out of impru- 
 dence or disorder, and when they were inevita- 
 ble, the devotedness of the men, rendered them 
 light, from the courage and patience with which 
 they were borne. 
 
 General Suchet had soon an opportunity which 
 he eagerly seized of repairing the injury in- 
 flicted by Villcampa, in carrying off his sheep. 
 That partizan, in the month of September, ad- 
 vanced towards Montalvan with his troops, which 
 were greatly augmented by recruits and armed 
 peasants, and threatened to disturb the tran- 
 quillity of a part of Arragon. In the hope of 
 getting up with, and defeating him, general 
 Habert was detached from the camp before
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EURO. 213 
 
 Mora, with the 5th regiment of light infantry. 
 By a rapid movement, he rallied round him the 
 troops which colonel Plicque had at Alcahiz, and 
 those of Kliski at Muniessa, and marching 
 straight upon Villacampa, the latter was com- 
 pelled to disperse, and to re-cross the frontiers of 
 Cuenca and Valencia. A general search that 
 took place, in consequence of this event, gave us 
 back the sheep we had lost, and furnished the 
 army with the provisions they so much re- 
 quired. 
 
 The only thing that especially pressed on the 
 attention of the commander-in-chief after this 
 success, was, the transport of the artillery that had 
 been used in the siege of Mequinenza, and that 
 was now to be employed in that of Tortosa. At 
 the former place every thing was ready : guns, 
 ammunition, gabions, fascines, and every other 
 requisite. An attempt was made to float another 
 convoy of artillery, but the water was so low that 
 it was found impossible, and the commander-in- 
 chief determined to begin the transport of the 
 guns by land. The new road, though exceed- 
 ingly well made, traversed rugged hills and a 
 desert uninhabited country, which presented no 
 resources for the purpose ; a single convoy by 
 water would have brought down more in three 
 days than 15 or 1,800 horses could in a month. 
 But perseverance consists in always advancing
 
 214 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 towards its object speedily if possible, but if not 
 at least steadily though slowly. Several convoys 
 of guns were brought by land ; some of the Va- 
 lencians and Catalonians attacked one that was 
 passing through the defile of Las Armas on the 
 29th ; but captain Claudot of the 1 1 7th regiment, 
 who commanded in that quarter, defended it 
 with as much intelligence as courage, and no- 
 thing was lost. 
 
 During the months of September and October 
 the army of Catalonia continued to occupy the 
 plain of Urgel to considerable purpose, but not- 
 withstanding a large quantity of grain it af- 
 forded them, they were not yet in a condition to 
 approach the army of Arragon and to co-operate 
 with it, and our corps in consequence found them- 
 selves shut up in the lower Ebro without the 
 power of effecting any thing. The only chance of 
 the commander was in a rise of the waters and in 
 the assistance that circumstances might render 
 him ; his expectations were deceived. On the 
 28th of October marshal Macdonald wrote to him : 
 ■' The governor of Barcelona has announced to 
 me the approaching departure of a convoy from 
 Perpignan between the 2nd and the 4th of Novem- 
 ber, and he presses me in the name of general 
 d'Hilliers to favour its advance. Were this con- 
 voy taken or dispersed, Barcelona might be lost, 
 and there can be no doubt that the enemy will
 
 MARCH ON THE LOWER EBRO. 215 
 
 try every means of intercepting it. My presence 
 alone can ensure its safety, and you are well 
 aware that even were the chances equal, we 
 could not expose ourselves to this hazard which 
 if it happened to be against us would be without 
 remedy." The preservation of Barcelona was an 
 object before which all others must of necessity 
 yield. The passage of a convoy by Figueras, 
 Gerona, and Hostalrich, might have appeared to 
 be sufficiently assured by the body of troops 
 which the duke of Tarentum had left in upper 
 Catalonia, but that corps had recently met with 
 a check at Abisbal, which rendered it a matter of 
 prudence not to leave it unsupported by the efforts 
 of O'Donnell's army on so important an occasion. 
 O'Donnell had by a bold coup-de main just suc- 
 ceeded in cutting off general Schwartz and the 
 men he commanded on the sea coast between 
 Palamos and the mouth of the Ter ; in the action 
 he had received a severe wound which incapaci- 
 tated him from acting, but not from commanding, 
 and the vigour and activity of his men seemed 
 rather increased than diminished by the accident. 
 General Suchet who, with a view to soften the 
 rigours of war, never allowed an opportunity to 
 escape him of establishing honourable connexions 
 with the generals of the enemy, sent a messenger 
 to request the exchange of a wounded officer who 
 had been taken prisoner, young Detchatz, lieu-
 
 216 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 tenant of the 5th light infantry, and at the same 
 time to make an offer to general O'Donnell of 
 a surgeon. The Spanish commander did not 
 accept it ; but he expressed extreme gra- 
 titude on account of it, and sent back the officer 
 on his parole.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Suspension of the operations of the siege of Tortosa. — Espoz y 
 
 Mina in Navarre. — Affairs at Alventosa and Fuenta Santa. 
 
 — Continuation of the blockade. — Meeting of a junta at 
 
 Mora. — Battle at Falset. — Battle at Ulldecona. — Arrival of 
 
 the 7th corps and marshal Macdonald. 
 
 The removal of the army of Catalonia once more 
 postponed the opening of the siege of Tortosa, 
 and in relation to the subsistence of the army, very 
 much augmented the difficulty of that operation. 
 The two months which subsequently passed away 
 were not destitute of incidents, in the province 
 of Arragon, on the one side and on the other ; in 
 the army of the lower Ebro there were a number 
 of military events which, as they are directly 
 connected with our future narrative we shall 
 briefly describe. If some of those affairs in detail 
 appear to have lost their interest, it must be recol- 
 lected that the commander-in-chief made it his 
 study and had succeeded in persuading all the 
 individuals under his command wherever they 
 were or however posted, that every one of them
 
 218 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 was of sufficient importance to be watched and 
 appreciated. Even now, though so long a time 
 has since elapsed, it constitutes a large portion of 
 his enjoyment to let them know that he has never 
 forgotten them, and that their services are ever 
 present to his recollection. 
 
 At the period of the equinox some rains fell, 
 which appeared to favour the navigation of the 
 Ebro. On the 17th September, we attempted 
 to put in motion a convoy of boats laden with 
 artillery, with a view to their conveyance from 
 Mequinenza to Xerta. The Neapolitan battalion 
 which was established at Flix, was sent to the 
 left bank, to protect the passage of the guns, 
 where it was attacked by a strong column of the 
 enemy. The soldiers of the battalion did not 
 stand the attack, although the nature of the 
 ground offered every facility of resistance or 
 retreat. They allowed themselves to be sur- 
 rounded, and then threw down their arms. Their 
 commander, Labrano, made every effort in his 
 power to prevail on them to fight, but in vain ; he 
 himself, with all his officers, was taken, after being 
 wounded in the action ; fortunately the convoy, 
 from want of water, had not been able to leave 
 the port. On the 21st it was detained by the 
 same cause, at the moment its safe transit was 
 ensured by a new disposition. The commander- 
 in-chief was willing to afford to the remainder of 
 Pignatelli's brigade an opportunity of wiping out
 
 BLOCKADE OF TOUTOSA. 219 
 
 the affront that they had suffered in the presence 
 of an army accustomed to conquer, and where a 
 generous spirit of emulation animated the whole 
 corps, both Frenchmen and foreigners. Eight 
 hundred Neapolitans, joined to 800 of the soldiers 
 of the 116th, attacked the enemy, who occupied 
 in force the heights on the left bank ; the Nea- 
 politans took the lead in the attack, and showed 
 the greatest courage ; the Spanish positions were 
 carried, and the enemy put to flight. 
 
 About this time, 30,000 men coming from 
 France, entered Biscay and Navarre. Gene- 
 ral Reilly intended at first to profit by their 
 stay, for the purpose of destroying the bands, 
 and to clear the frontiers of Arragon of their 
 visits, but he had no time to effect his purpose, 
 as these troops were almost all sent into Por- 
 tugal. A new partisan, Espoz y Mina, the uncle 
 and successor of the younger Mina, who has 
 since become much more celebrated than his 
 nephew, by the high talents which practice ra- 
 pidly developed, had just assumed the command 
 of the whole of the Guerillas of Navarre, and 
 had taken up his station in the Cinco Villas. 
 From that moment none of our strong posts re- 
 mained unthreatened, and frequent attacks com- 
 promised the small garrisons who occupied them. 
 Afterwards, however, the chef d'escadron of the 
 gendarmerie at Exea, and the Polish captain, Ven- 
 zesky, at Tarracona tried what a stand would
 
 220 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET 
 
 effect, they resisted Mina successfully. The 
 12th and 14th squadrons of gendarmerie, which 
 were attacked at Graiis and at Benavarre, de- 
 fended themselves most bravely, and general 
 Buget, at Fuente-Montanana, routed and dis- 
 persed the chiefs of the party Cantarero and 
 Solana, who were perpetually making incursions 
 into that part of the frontiers. A more serious 
 movement than these petty attacks was, however, 
 in preparation on the right bank of theEbro. Ge- 
 neral Suchet had received information that the 
 regency of Cadiz intended to assemble on the 
 frontiers of Castille, a junta, consisting of the count 
 of Sastago, the marquis of Aguelar, the bishop of 
 Barcelona, and two canons of Saragossa, in order 
 that they might there do their utmost, by fa- 
 vour of the influence their vast estates in Ar- 
 ragon gave them, to produce an insurrection 
 in the province. General Carabajal had also 
 joined Villacampa, had assumed the chief com- 
 mand, and rallied under his colours all the 
 troops and bands of the country. It was es- 
 sential to prevent this combination or to rout 
 them before their numbers were formidable. 
 General Chlopiski was taken from the block- 
 ading camp for that operation, which was one 
 that demanded as much activity as vigour. After 
 a rapid march, he reached Teruel on the 30th, 
 at 5 o'clock in the evening, with seven battalions 
 and 400 horses, driving before him the corps
 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 221 
 
 of Villacampa ; general Carabajal had hardly- 
 arrived at the place when he was compelled to 
 retreat; he left Teruel with his artillery at 
 2 o'clock. General Chlopiski, whose infantry 
 required a few hours of repose, made a halt for 
 a short time in the town. He, in the meantime, 
 greatly to their satisfaction, sent away 1,000 pea- 
 sants not yet armed, who had been compul- 
 sorily levied for the purpose of serving in the 
 Spanish army. At midnight he re-commenced his 
 march, and on the 31st, at 9 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, he got up with the rear guard of the enemy 
 beyond the great ravine of Alventosa. The whole 
 success of his expedition depended on its rapidity, 
 he therefore charged the enemy the moment he 
 came up with them, captured six field pieces, six 
 caissons with their harness, and took prisoners at 
 the same time, a company of light artillery. 
 One hundred chests of cartridges were exploded, 
 and eighty horses and mules taken with the 
 cannon which they drew, were sent to join our 
 artillery. The dispersion of the enemy was com- 
 plete, notwithstanding, in a few days, Villa- 
 campa, who had retired upon the mountain of 
 Fuente Santa, rallied his troops afresh ; Cara- 
 bajal and the other chiefs hastened to join him 
 there, and brought reinforcements of every kind. 
 The prospect of raising an insurrection in Ar- 
 ragon was again entertained, and general Chlo- 
 piski saw that if he was to clear the coun-
 
 222 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 try, and obey the instructions given to him, 
 he must get up with Villacampa, and defeat 
 him. 
 
 On the ]2th of November, he drove in the 
 vanguard of the Spaniards to Villastar, which is in 
 advance of Villel, and established himself before 
 the Fuente Santa, which the enemy occupied in 
 force, his position being intrenched and his corps 
 echeloned and leaning on the Guadalaviar, and 
 upon a series of inaccessible precipices. About 
 one o'clock of the day, after having drawn up 
 his troops he gave the signal for attack. Two 
 battalions of the 121st, commanded by colonel 
 Millet, with the voltigeurs and grenadiers of the 
 1st of the Vistula, conducted by the chef de 
 bataillon, Fondzelski, marched in array under the 
 orders of colonel Kliski, having for their second 
 line colonel Kozinowski, with the fusileers of the 
 second of the Vistula; the rest of the troops 
 were kept in the rear, in order to be used as a 
 reserve for the troops that attacked, and to assist 
 them if necessary. The fire of the enemy was 
 terrible ; the Spaniards, indeed, always opposed 
 us most obstinately from behind intrenchments, 
 or in positions where they could not be turned. 
 Colonel Millet had no sooner arrived at the 
 bottom of the hill than his horse was shot under 
 him ; he then led his troops on foot, and in so 
 doing a ball carried away a finger of his right 
 hand ; his advance was not checked by that
 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 223 
 
 accident, but in a minute or two after, a ball 
 struck him and knocked him down ; it was at 
 first thought he was killed, but he speedily 
 scrambled up again and put himself at the head of 
 his men, who despite of every obstacle, continued 
 to clamber up the steep under a most tremendous 
 fire. The Poles, meanwhile on the right, dis- 
 played a degree of courage not less exemplary. 
 Neither the precipitous ascent, nor the resistance 
 of the enemy could keep back our intrepid fel- 
 lows, who, after a most sanguinary contest, took 
 possession of all the positions of the enemy, and 
 reached the top of the mountain as conquerors. 
 Terror and route led to the immediate disappear- 
 ance of the Spanish army ; they threw down 
 their arms with precipitation and made for the 
 bridge of Libras in great disorder. The bridge 
 which was encumbered with the fugitives, broke 
 down under their weight, and a large number of 
 them were drowned. The loss of the vanquished 
 was very considerable, and ours was not less 
 than 130 men disabled, and a Polish officer and 
 five men of the 121st were killed. Colonel Millet, 
 who had just obtained the command of this regi- 
 ment, made, it will be perceived, a most brilliant 
 debut ; and the regiment as well as its leader, 
 were thenceforth to the end of the war, well 
 worthy of being ranked among the brave of the 
 army of Arragon. 
 
 After this rapid expedition, general Chlopiski
 
 224 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 returned with his brigade to Tortosa, while colonel 
 Kliski remained in charge of 1 ,200 men, to defend 
 the right bank of the stream against Villacampa. 
 While these engagements were taking place, on a 
 sudden on the 1st of November, after having been 
 so long and anxiously waited for, the waters of the 
 Ebro began to rise. We were eager, of course, to 
 take advantage of this circumstance, and to em- 
 bark atMequinenza the remainder of the materials 
 required for the siege. Seventeen barks set 
 out on the 3rd at six o'clock in the morning, 
 escorted by a body of troops on each bank of the 
 stream. In a short time, however, the rapidity 
 of the current, in spite of every attempt that 
 could be made to retard the advance of the convoy, 
 hurried it on, and when it came before Ribaroya it 
 had drifted a great way ahead of the escorts : it 
 was, in consequence, attacked by 700 Spaniards in 
 a narrow defile, before our troops had time to over- 
 take it. Compelled to give way to the fire of the 
 enemy, the boats steered for the right bank, but 
 two of them were caught in the current, and 
 drawn by its violence within the powers of the 
 enemy, and the gunners who were on board were, 
 in consequence, made prisoners. Lieutenant 
 Jauney, a distinguished pupil of the polytechnic 
 school, saved himself by swimming, and regained 
 the right bank. The enemy meanwhile continued 
 their attack on the convoy. Colonel Raffron and 
 captain d'Esclaibes, aid-de-camp to general
 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 225 
 
 Valine, displayed as much presence of mind as 
 bravery; fifty artillery men, who were ably 
 posted for the purpose, returned for two hours the 
 fire of the musketry on the left bank until the ar- 
 rival of the escorts, and also of general Abb6, who 
 marched up the stream from Garcia with a 
 column of troops. The Spaniards burnt the two 
 boats and then retreated ; the mortars that formed 
 their lading were, however, got out of the river, 
 in the course of the next and following day, 
 without damage. In this affair sixteen artillery 
 men were killed or taken, and one Neapolitan sol- 
 dier was killed and ten wounded ; some of the 
 Arragonese boatmen were wounded ; during 
 the contest they had displayed as much zeal as 
 courage. 
 
 From the 4th to the 7th the recession of the 
 waters again placed the convoy in a hazardous 
 situation. The commander-in-chief determined 
 on a diversion from Mora to succour it. General 
 Abbe was reinforced, and by several sharp at- 
 tacks kept the enemy at a distance from the 
 river; general Habert, with the same object, 
 was directed on Falset with 1,500 men, to 
 occupy the attention of the Spanish troops. 
 Habert surprised two of the enemy's camps 
 as well as a flying hospital. Lieutenant du 
 Fillion, with eighty carbiniers of the 5th light 
 infantry, stood repeated charges of the Spanish 
 cavalry, and on every occasion drove them 
 vol. i. Q
 
 226 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 back. Under favour of these efforts, the con- 
 voy kept descending, although not without 
 difficulty, (in passing the bar at Flix, two more 
 boats were wrecked, although their cargoes were 
 saved) and at length arrived at its destination. 
 Thus, on the 9th of November, the artillery and 
 the engineers found themselves, in spite of all the 
 obstacles, that had been opposed to them, in 
 possession at Xerta, partly by water carriage, 
 partly by land carriage, of every thing that 
 was necessary, and were ready whenever they 
 were called on, to commence the siege. 
 
 While matters were in this state of forwardness, 
 however, the governor of Barcelona, in a letter 
 dated 20th of November, informed the commander- 
 in-chief that general Macdonald had gone to Ge- 
 rona. The situation in which these impediments 
 placed the besieging army, became daily more dif- 
 ficult, for although we had contrived, up to that 
 date, by very great efforts to ensure subsistence for 
 our soldiers, it appeared quite impossible to make 
 provision for the lack of forage for our horses 
 employed in the cavalry, artillery, and in the trans- 
 port service. A combination of events augmented 
 our difficulties, at the moment when we conceiv- 
 ed we had arrived at the end of them. During the 
 forced stagnation, which arose out of this state of 
 things, general Suchet convoked at Mora, a junta 
 consisting of the principal authorities of Ar- 
 ragon, among whom were the heads of the 

 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 227 
 
 clergy, who next to the grandees of Spain, are 
 the richest proprietors in that kingdom, and 
 in concert with this junta, concerted such mea- 
 sures, as well for the pressing necessities of the 
 army, as for its future wants, as will be more fully 
 detailed in the following chapter. With a view 
 to second the approach of the army of Cata- 
 lonia, which was from day to day expected, the 
 commander-in-chief determined on an expedition 
 against Falset ; this took place on the 19th No- 
 vember; general Habert proceeded directly thither, 
 with the 115th, and the hussars of the 4th, whilst 
 general Abb6, with the 116th, advanced against 
 the right of the position, and the chef de batail- 
 lon, Avon, who was posted at Garcia, marched 
 against its left, for the purpose of engaging 
 the enemy's attention, and dividing his force. 
 This manoeuvre should have procured us a great 
 number of prisoners, but the rapidity of the at- 
 tack on the centre, did not leave us time for 
 that purpose. The camps were carried after a 
 sharp but brief resistance, in which the enemy had 
 fifty men killed ; but the combat was terminated 
 by the approach of general Abbe towards the route 
 of Reuss. The enemy was pursued into Falset, 
 and beyond it ; their magazines, ammunition, 
 and a great number of muskets fell into our 
 hands, as well as three hundred petty officers and 
 soldiers, besides fourteen superior officers among 
 
 q2
 
 228 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 whom were the count de Canada, mayor of Gre- 
 nada, and brigadier Garcia Novarro, ex-governor 
 of Tortosa. In one of the cavalry charges con- 
 nected with this affair, there was an individual 
 contest between the leaders of the two troops, 
 that is not undeserving of notice. The officer 
 of the Spanish cavalry, a man of lofty stature, 
 menacingly challenged the lieutenant of hussars, 
 Pate, a brave soldier, who had previously lost 
 an eye during the war. The challenge was 
 accepted, and the combat between the two 
 troops, was for a moment, as if by tacit accord, 
 suspended, in order that its issue might be the 
 better observed. In a very short time the two 
 leaders were hand to hand, and fortune favour- 
 ing the Frenchman, the Spaniard was thrown 
 from his horse, and our hussars charging at that 
 instant, routed and dispersed the detachment of 
 Spanish cavalry. 
 
 On the 26th of November, a flotilla that had come 
 from Peniscola, advanced to attack our posts at 
 Rapita and Alfaques, whilst the governor of Tor- 
 tosa, with whose knowledge it took place, made 
 also some demonstrations as if he meant to disturb 
 us at Amposta and at the mouth of the Ebro. On 
 the night of the 26th the commander-in-chief of 
 the Valencian army, general Bassecourt, advanced 
 to attack general Musnier at Ulldecona. A co- 
 lumn of infantry was directed on Alcanar, for
 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 229 
 
 the purpose of attacking Ulldecona on the right ; 
 another set out from Traiguera, and marched be- 
 hind the mountains in order to take up a po- 
 sition at LasVentallas, in the rear of the road that 
 leads to, and so cutting off our communication with 
 Tortosa. The mass of the attacking force advanced 
 direct upon Vinaros in front, and when it was 
 near, a fresh column of infantry was detached 
 to the left, to occupy the height that commanded 
 Ulldecona. General Musnier had just received, 
 by the return of his reconnoitring parties on the 
 right, information of the approach of the enemy, 
 and was issuing orders to the troops at Ullde- 
 cona, to stand to their arms when general Basse- 
 court, who hastened the march of his cavalry, 
 during the obscurity of the night arrived at the 
 camp of a battalion of the 14th which covered the 
 town, having previously driven in our advanced 
 posts. Our men immediately sallied out of 
 their barracks, drew up in the twinkling of an 
 eye, and without any direction, and merely 
 the cry of "'the Spaniards!'' checked the ad- 
 vance of the enemy by an admirably kept up 
 fire. The colonel of the queen's regiment with 
 a great number of others were wounded, and 
 remained abandoned by their companions, who 
 fell back to take up a more distant position. 
 At the same moment, general Musnier, together 
 with generals Boussard and Montmarie, ad- 
 vanced with the hussars, the cuirassiers, and
 
 230 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the 114th regiment of the line; day beginning 
 to dawn, discovered to us the whole of the 
 heights in the neighbourhood on the right 
 and left covered by the enemy. Colonel 
 Esteve of the 14th of the line, with one of his 
 battalions, was immediately directed against an 
 old tower on the summit of the hill, of which the 
 Spaniards had taken possession. His assault 
 was so impetuous, that he dislodged them from 
 their position. He had with him but a mere handful 
 of hussars, he made his soldiers cast off their 
 knap-sacks, and dashing onwards with great swift- 
 ness overtook the Spaniards, put them to the 
 rout, and made 300 prisoners. The detach- 
 ment of the enemy that had been placed in 
 the rear of Ulldecona, at Las Ventallas, was 
 no sooner aware of this, than it withdrew in 
 the direction of the mountains. Meantime, 
 general Montmarie marched in the direction of 
 Alcanar, and general Boussard, at the head of 
 the cuirassiers, advanced by the high road. The 
 Spaniards now retired, and took up a position 
 behind Cenia, but it was not difficult to perceive 
 that, although they had thus rallied, they could 
 not withstand a vigorous attack. General Mus- 
 nier therefore combined his forces, and advancing 
 directly upon the enemy he threw the cuirassiers 
 by a rapid movement into the road from Venaros 
 to Benecarlo. The cuirassiers got to their sta- 
 tion in good time to intercept and pick up the
 
 BLOCKADE OF TORTOSA. 231 
 
 fugitives, for the dispositions we had made 
 speedily converted the retreat of the Spaniards 
 into a complete rout. They immediately dispersed, 
 threw away their arms, and the majority of them 
 escaped by favour of the woods and ravines ; 
 more than 1,500 were however taken by the 
 cavalry. General Bassecourt sought an asylum in 
 Peniscola. 
 
 Whilst our advanced guard was thus en- 
 gaged, general Harispe, who lay before Tortosa, 
 being informed of the movements of the enemy 
 by sea, had sent captain Sieyes with a detach- 
 ment and some artillery to the succour of the 
 posts of Rapita ; that officer ably acquitted him- 
 self of this commission. The enemy's vessels, 
 kept in check by our howitzers, were afraid 
 to attempt any thing, and ultimately retired in 
 the direction of Peniscola. The garrison and 
 population of Tortosa expected a happy issue 
 of their double assault, and the fort during the 
 whole day kept up a brisk fire on our camps, 
 without however attempting a sortie. 
 
 A rather numerous column of prisoners who 
 had been taken in the different affairs, in the end 
 of November were sent to France by way of 
 Saragossa and Jaca, under the escort of a party, 
 commanded by Haxo general of engineers, who 
 had been summoned to Paris by government. 
 This officer, who had assisted general Laval in the 
 arrangements for the blockade of Tortosa, left
 
 232 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 with the commander-in-chief, when he set out 
 a plan of attack, which at a later period was put 
 in practice. 
 
 The commander-in-chief, having succeeded in 
 transporting the whole of this artillery to Tortosa, 
 was anxious to employ the same means which 
 had been used in doing so, to ensure a supply of 
 provisions for the army of Catalonia, and to form 
 magazines for it at Mora. On the 27th of Novem- 
 ber thirteen boats laden with grain started from 
 Mequinenza to descend the Ebro. Fearful of 
 not being able to keep pace with the convoy, the 
 detachments appointed to escort it, got before it, 
 and general Abb6 with the 1 1 6th, marched up to 
 the left bank from Vinebre, as high as Flix and 
 Ribaroya. Six hundred Spaniards who had con- 
 cealed themselves in the neighbourhood of Mequi- 
 nenza, contrived to elude our soldiers, notwith- 
 standing all their precautions, and to attack the 
 boats before they could get up with the escorts. 
 Sixty-six men belonging to the garrison of Mequi- 
 nenza, partly gunners, and partly infantry, had been 
 placed in eschelon at a little distance merely 
 to ensure the safe departure of the boats. They 
 were commanded by captain Cory of the 121st, 
 and by lieutenant Guillardin of the artillery. 
 These brave fellows, notwithstanding the inequa- 
 lity of their numbers, rushed forward to protect 
 the boats which had pushed over to the right bank, 
 under the protection of the musketry, of their
 
 BLOCKADE OF TOHTOSA. 233 
 
 directors who had landed for that purpose. The 
 whole of the Spanish attack was then turned 
 against the handful of men on the left bank. 
 An obstinate combat was the consequence, which 
 lasted for several hours ; our men bravely de- 
 fended themselves with the butt ends of their 
 muskets, and with their bayonets, until both 
 their ammunition and their strength were ex- 
 hausted. At length the Spaniards having received 
 news of the near approach of onr reinforcements, 
 and irritated at their losses, made a last attempt ; 
 the officer of artillery was killed, together with 
 fifteen men, and captain Cory and the whole of 
 the detachment, the greater portion of them 
 wounded and disabled, were taken, except one or 
 two who threw themselves into the river and 
 escaped by swimming. The convoy was saved 
 and arrived at Mora next morning ; even this ad- 
 vantage however did not console the general for 
 the loss of brave men who were well worthy of 
 a better fate. 
 
 At length, after such long expectation, gene- 
 ral Suchet saw the moment at hand, when 
 his army, which had lain six months before Tor- 
 tosa, might commence the siege of that place. 
 In order to acquire a new title to glory, our sol- 
 diers had only to exert their wonted courage. On 
 the 2d of December marshal Macdonald apprised 
 them that he had got a large convoy safely con- 
 ducted to Barcelona, that he had left in that place
 
 234 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 a garrison of 6,000 men, and that general Ba- 
 raguey d'Hillier was at Gerona, and Figueres 
 with 14,000 the greater part of whom were 
 effective, and ready to take the field ; and lastly, 
 that he himself was on the eve of marching to- 
 wards the Lower Ebro, with 15,000 men : in 
 fact, the marshal arrived at Mora on the 13th. 
 
 General Suchet had made every preparatory 
 arrangement ; Habert's division was close to 
 Xerta, together with the reserves of the artillery 
 and engineers ; the army of Catalonia on arriving 
 at the position which we had occupied, imme- 
 diately established itself there, and general Su- 
 chet having concerted with the duke of Tarentum 
 the measures he intended to pursue, removed 
 his head-quarters to Xerta.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Description of Tortosa. — Investment of the fortress. — Opening 
 of the trenches. — Operations of the breaches. — Occupation 
 of the tete-de-pont. — Descent of the ditch. — The fortress 
 offers to capitulate. — The firing re-commences. — General 
 Suchet enters the town, and compels the governor to ca- 
 pitulate. 
 
 The fortress of Tortosa is washed by the Ebro 
 and its rear rests on a chain of hills that rise 
 behind it. It is defended by an outer wall fur- 
 nished with bastions, part of which takes in the 
 elevated ridges of the Col d'Alba, which termi- 
 nates in the town itself; the other part encloses a 
 portion of the plain which extends up and down the 
 river between the foot of the heights to the bank. 
 On the south side stand the two bastions of San 
 Pedro and San Juan, united by a curtain with- 
 out terraces which is covered by the half moon 
 battery of the Temple. The outer wall then 
 rises on the plateau of rocks where the 
 three bastions of Santa Cruz, San Pablo, and 
 San Juan are situated. On quitting the last named 
 bastion, the outer wall descends into a deep
 
 236 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 ravine, and joins a precipitous rock on which the 
 castle is situated. The space that remains be- 
 tween the castle and the river is shut up by a 
 very narrow front, and the whole of this side, 
 from the bastion as far as the suburbs and the 
 Ebro, is enclosed by another wall of which only 
 a few parts are terraced. The approaches to 
 the castle are defended by works connected 
 with the outer wall. The north side, moreover, 
 is protected by a horn-work called the Ten- 
 axas, placed on a height over the suburbs, and 
 commanding both the plateau and the plain. 
 
 In the war of the succession the duke of Orleans 
 took Tortosa by an attack in front, but the side 
 thus assaulted was strengthened after the siege by 
 the construction of a fort to which the name of 
 Orleans is still attached. This fort is composed 
 of a lunette with a ditch cut in the solid rock and 
 a covered way, and of an irregular work on the 
 right which descends and takes'an opposite direc- 
 tion towards the plain of the lower Ebro. The 
 town, which lies wholly on the left bank of the 
 Ebro, communicates with the right bank, by means 
 of a bridge of boats covered by a tete-de-pont, well 
 defended and sheltered from all attempts at insult. 
 The increase of the defences and the combination of 
 the whole rendered the place much more difficult 
 of capture than in 1708, especially when we consi- 
 der that the duke of Orleans, who was supported 
 in Catalonia by the duke de Noailles as we were
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 237 
 
 by the duke de Tarentum, possessed an advan- 
 tage which we did not. Not only had he nothing 
 to fear on the side of the sea, but he had been 
 master of the country of Valencia from the period 
 of the battle of Almanza, and it was thence that 
 he drew his principal means of attack, the corps 
 of the chevalier d'Asfeld and its artillery. 
 
 Placed in a very different situation, general 
 Suchet was obliged to leave the corps of general 
 Musnier, for the purpose of observation at Ull- 
 decona, during the whole course of the siege, 
 because he had every reason to fear that the 
 Valencian army, by some manoeuvre, would en- 
 deavour to disturb his operations. On the 16th 
 of December, general Abbe, with the 114th and 
 115th regiments, relieved at Roquetta, in front 
 of the tete-de-pont, a part of the division of 
 general Harispe. The latter, who left the 3rd 
 of the Vistula there, took with him the 2nd 
 of the Vistula, and the 44th of the line ; and 
 on the night of the lGth instant, reached 
 Xerta, where there were three battalions of the 
 117th. In the course of the same night, general 
 Habert, who had with him the 5th light infantry, 
 the 110th, and 300 hussars, occupied the con- 
 vent of the desert, whence he had driven some 
 parties as far as Perello, and advanced by the 
 mountains upon the Col d'Alba, a commanding- 
 position, where the Spaniards were at the time 
 intrenched. He was ordered to take possession
 
 238 MEMOTRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of it as soon as possible, to capture or drive 
 out the troops that held it, to establish a strong- 
 post there, and afterwards to come down upon the 
 town with his division. Before day-break the 
 commander-in-chief crossed over with all the 
 forces that were assembled at Xerta to the left 
 bank of the Ebro. Having assembled eight bat- 
 talions on the tete-de-pont, together with the 
 sappers, and 150 hussars, he formed his columns, 
 and marched forward by the route of Tivenis and 
 Biten, which runs along the Ebro, and the foot 
 of the hills, directing his course towards the 
 fort of Las Tenaxas, on the north side of the 
 place. The 117th, which was in advance, 
 having arrived in view of the fort, began the in- 
 vestment on the right. A battalion was left in 
 reserve, to cover the road of Xerta, and another 
 was established in the ravine that approached 
 nearest to the fort, observing at the same time 
 the bank of the river ; the third, which sup- 
 ported the right of the second, was placed at 
 those points which commanded the fort, and the 
 advance to the castle. General Harispe followed 
 the movement of the 117th, across ravines and 
 precipices that were very difficult to pass. 
 He continued to prolong his march round the 
 place, and was on the point of capturing a 
 column of Spaniards that was coming down the 
 mountain, and which was close pressed by ge-
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 239 
 
 neral Habert. The latter, who was now master of 
 the Col del Alba, advanced to fill up the interval 
 on the left of the 117th, and occupied with the 
 5th light infantry and the 1 1 6th, a very favour- 
 able position, whilst general Harispe completing 
 the same work, and finishing the investment to 
 the bank of the Ebro below the town, estab- 
 lished his camp near the road to Amposta, which 
 forms the grand communication with Tortosa, 
 and joins the royal road of Barcelona and 
 Valencia. A few reserves, the cavalry, the camps 
 of the battering train and of the sappers, were 
 placed in the rear of the camp of general 
 Harispe ; in front, on the right bank, were 
 those of the 3rd of the Vistula, and of the 
 114th and 115th regiments, commanded by gen- 
 eral Abbe. 
 
 The first care of the commander-in-chief was 
 to establish communications between the two 
 banks of the stream ; unfortunately, the two or 
 three boats and the pontoons that the army had 
 in its possession, were not sufficiently numer- 
 ous for the construction of a bridge. Ge- 
 neral Vallee provided, however, for this service 
 with great celerity. On the night of the 15th, 
 three flying bridges were established above and 
 below the place, and the number was ultimately 
 augmented to four. It was in fact necessary 
 to ensure considerable means of transit, for 
 almost all the guns, fascines, gabions, tools,
 
 240 ME MO IKS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and provisions had to be brought down 
 behind the Roquetta, and in the front of the 
 camps of general Harispe, and thence to be 
 carried over from the one bank to the other, at 
 a spot where the stream was at least 100 toises 
 wide. Neither the fire of the garrison, the 
 shallowness of the waters, nor the violence 
 of the winds, all of which they had occasionally to 
 encounter, could weary out the constancy, or con- 
 quer the courage of our pontoon-men. 
 
 The 16th and 17th were employed in rectifying 
 our positions, in driving in the enemy's ad- 
 vanced posts, and sending reconnoitring par- 
 ties towards divers points of the place, both by 
 day and by night. The commander-in-chief pub- 
 lished the regulations to be observed by the 
 working parties, and the price to be paid for 
 the digging of the trenches, as well as for the 
 shells and balls that might be picked up, and 
 brought to the depot of the artillery, and ap- 
 pointing the means for carrying off, and for 
 attending to the wounded. On the 18th, after 
 all the various reports had been given in, and 
 the respective generals had been consulted, 
 he determined to commence the siege, by the 
 demi-bastion of San Pedro, conformably to the 
 design left by general Haxo, of which we have 
 already spoken. In fact, the surrounding surface 
 presented a soil easy to be dug for our trenches, 
 and by that point we could get at the outer wall,
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 241 
 
 without being called on to take any ad- 
 vanced work. This bastion, as well as the 
 half-moon battery in its neighbourhood, is com- 
 manded and enfiladed by the heights, in ad- 
 vance of fort Orleans ; it was, therefore, an in- 
 dispensable preliminary of the attack, to occupy 
 those heights, where the enemy himself would 
 otherwise have enjoyed over us, that very ad- 
 vantage which it was absolutely necessary that 
 we should possess against them. They had al- 
 ready designed some works on these heights, 
 but they were not sufficiently firm and com- 
 pact to admit of being defended. On the 19th 
 we took possession of them, and on the evening 
 of the same day, the trenches were opened 
 against fort Orleans by 500 labourers, sup- 
 ported by 400 grenadiers, or voltigeurs, who 
 were protected by a flying sap and posted within 
 eighty toises of the covered way, in a line ex- 
 tending about 180 toises. At every point how- 
 ever the solid rock was met with, and it was 
 necessary, in consequence, to employ the mi- 
 ner, and to form parapets with bags of earth. 
 Next morning, this very imperfect work was found 
 to have suffered greatly by the fire of the fort ; 
 but no ground was lost in consequence. 
 The chef de bataillon, Plagniol, who directed 
 the assault, displayed great energy, and by his 
 personal example, greatly encouraged his men ; 
 
 VOL. I. R.
 
 242 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the captain of engineers, Sea, was on this occa- 
 sion killed by a shot in the head. 
 
 On the 20th of December the principal attack 
 against the demi-bastion of San Pedro com- 
 menced. Under favour of a violent wind and hazy 
 weather, which kept the enemy from hearing or 
 seeing, 2,300 workmen and twenty select compa- 
 nies, under the orders of the general of brigade, 
 Abb6, colonel Robert of the 1 17th, and colonel 
 Meyer, first aid-de-camp to the commander-in- 
 chief, were led to the ground arranged for the open- 
 ing of the trench under the direction of the officers 
 of engineers. The parallel was opened from the 
 rear as far as the foot of the heights in front of 
 fort Orleans, and terminated on the right, 
 opposite to the left end of the trench that had 
 previously been opened by the chef de bataillon, 
 Plagniol. The whole work was 280 toises in 
 length ; towards the left it approached within 
 about eighty toises of the salient angle of the place 
 of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro. We 
 opened at the same time two communications; 
 one, on the right of the parallel of 160 toises, 
 terminating in a ravine, called the ravine of the Ca- 
 puchins ; a natural shelter of which it was thought 
 right to take advantage, and the other on the left, 
 which ran in a straight line to a hollow way about 
 800 toises in the rear, which connected our camps. 
 These works, which were as bold as they were
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 243 
 
 simple, were planned and directed by general 
 Rogniat, and saved us a great deal of time, 
 which the approaches would otherwise have cost 
 us. The execution of them was confided to the 
 chef de bataillon, Henry, who conducted the 
 attack on the centre. The chef de bataillon, 
 Chulliot, on the right bank with 400 labourers, 
 supported by 300 grenadiers, caused at the same 
 time a trench to be opened against the tete-de- 
 pont, at 100 toises distance, with a communication 
 in the rear. Next day these works were con- 
 tinued and completed. General Valee had the 
 marking out of the batteries, and a large portion 
 of the labourers was placed at his disposal. 
 
 Whilst our preliminary works were in progress 
 at Tortosa, the duke of Tarentum marched on the 
 1st upon the village of Perello, to cover the 
 siege and to stop any movements of the enemy 
 from Tarragona. The difficulty of procuring a 
 sufficient means of carriage to enable his 
 army to subsist in the midst of a sterile and 
 desert country, determined him, however, to 
 return to Ginestar, whence he despatched a divi- 
 sion of infantry to act under the command of 
 count Suchet, commanded by general Frere, con- 
 sisting of 6,000, which formed part of the Palom- 
 bini Italian brigade, together with a regiment of 
 cavalry, the 24th dragoons. This was a real 
 service rendered to the besieging army. General 
 Suchet placed these troops in the rear of the di- 
 
 r 2
 
 244 MEMOIRS OF Sl'CHET. 
 
 vision of general Harispe on the Amposta road, 
 by which the enemy, when coming from Tarra- 
 gona must have advanced. Being thus placed 
 in a condition to meet the enemy wherever he 
 showed himself, and being at liberty to em- 
 ploy the whole of his infantry in the very fa- 
 tiguing service of the trenches, his thoughts 
 were now wholly bent on the means of accele- 
 rating the fall of Tortosa. 
 
 On the 22nd the parallel of fort Orleans being 
 in a great measure finished, we debouched by a 
 passage of twenty-five toises in length, executed 
 by flying sap with an amorce of the second pa- 
 rallel on the edge of the ravine. We attempted to 
 debouch in a similar manner on the right, but the 
 ground was so difficult and so bare of earth that 
 during the day the guns of the fort destroyed the 
 works, and compelled us to abandon them. In the 
 attack on Saint Peter we opened two trenches, 
 by which to push forward, the one opposite the 
 half moon of the temple, where we gained about 
 thirty toises in advance, by means of a zig-zag of 
 eighty ; and the other, which was forty toises, and 
 which lay opposite to the demi-bastion of San 
 Pedro. By these several approaches, we got 
 within forty toises of the place of arms. During 
 the night the enemy threw a number of fire balls 
 on our men, and kept harassing us by showers 
 of grape and musketry from the covered ways. 
 On the right we were obliged to suspend our
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 245 
 
 operations in consequence of these interruptions ; 
 and in the centre, several attempts at sorties 
 were repelled. The labourers of the 2nd and 
 3rd of the Vistula rendered themselves conspi- 
 cuous for their bravery on thess occasions and 
 fought under the command of the captains of 
 engineers, Hudry and Foucauld, as guards of the 
 trenches. The two sides of the second parallel 
 were amorced at thirty toises only from the de- 
 mi-bastion, but at fifty toises from the half moon, 
 in order to protect it, in the latter case, from the 
 destructive fire of the castle of Orleans. On the 
 left bank the enemy attempted a sortie by means 
 of the tete-de-pont, but were checked by the 
 114th and 115th. As the left of our trench ad- 
 mitted of being turned, it was strengthened with a 
 redoubt ; and in the meantime the erection of the 
 batteries was carried on with the utmost activity. 
 Those on the right had to be established on a 
 piece of rocky ground, and frequently on the 
 rock itself, and thus demanded much painful 
 labour ; a great number of our men were wound- 
 ed in the course of their erection, as the Spaniards 
 did not fire less than 1,000 or 1,200 balls in 
 the course of a day. 
 
 On the night of the 25th, about eleven o'clock, 
 a tremendous fire opened from the fortress, and 
 under cover of it a sortie was directed against 
 the second parallel of attack at San Pedro's bat- 
 tery. This sortie was met and repulsed by the 
 soldiers of the 44th. The fire then re-commenced,
 
 24G MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and our trenches were inundated with showers 
 of grape, grenades and stones, and at one o'clock 
 in the morning another sortie was made. But 
 the enemy was hemmed in by our works, and 
 found it impossible to open his ranks ; the guards 
 of the trenches in consequence, and the labour- 
 ers themselves, repulsed his attempts and com- 
 pelled him once more to enter the fort. The 
 captain of engineers, Poussin, took advantage 
 of this moment to advance by sap from the se- 
 cond parallel, and pushing forward upon the 
 place of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro, 
 succeeded in arriving within twelve toises of 
 the palisadoes. We debouched also upon the 
 capital of the half moon of the Temple by a 
 double sap, the one straight and the other tra- 
 versing; in front of the fort Orleans also, we 
 lengthened the second parallel as far as the re- 
 verse of the plateaux, and continued to work 
 it deeper in the rock on the right bank : in the 
 meanwhile we had finished the parallel and the 
 redoubt on the left. At day-break on the 26th, 
 the fire of the enemy was much less brisk than 
 usual, in consequence of the second parallel be- 
 ing lined with sharp-shooters, stationed behind 
 bags of earth with loop-holes, who, by the un- 
 interrupted fire kept up, very much annoyed the 
 Spanish gunners, and compelled them to close 
 their embrasure. General Val6e, who had charge 
 of the construction of the batteries, distributed 
 the command of them according to the number
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 247 
 
 of points to be attacked between the chefs-de-ba- 
 taillon, Ricci, Capelleand Duchaud ; Ricci taking 
 those on the right, Capelle the centre, and Duchaud 
 the left, which were situated on the right bank of 
 the Ebro. The batteries Nos. 1 , 2 and 3 were in- 
 tended for the attack on fort Orleans and the works 
 of the place which lay in the rear of it ; Nos. 4, 5, 
 6, 7 were directed against the town, but principal- 
 ly against the demi-bastion of San Pedro, which 
 was the real object of our attack ; Nos. 8,9, 10* 
 were to second the attack on the demi-bastion and 
 to fire at the same time on the bridge and quays of 
 the town. The battery No. 1 could not be com- 
 menced until after the labours of the engineers 
 had advanced to the very spot fixed on, and it was 
 commenced in open day and without any cover, 
 at length within fifty toises of fort Orleans. These 
 various works were prosecuted with the constancy 
 that is peculiar to the artillery. The gunners set 
 the example, and the officers and chiefs who 
 conducted the attack, excited to the utmost 
 the zeal of every one engaged, while the com- 
 mander-in-chief sustained the spirits of the 
 men by his presence and the encouragement 
 he held out to them. The advance upon the 
 place of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro, 
 was continued by sap from the 26th till the 27th. 
 The enemy, who had thrown an immense num- 
 ber of grenades from the salient angle of the demi- 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 10.
 
 248 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 bastion suddenly passed through the palisadoes of 
 the covered way, and falling pell-mell on the head 
 of the sap, threw our workmen into confusion. 
 Clause, a sergeant of the sappers, a brave fellow 
 who bore the cross of the legion of honour, 
 stood firm as a rock, and kept the Spaniards that 
 charged him at bay by his solitary opposition, 
 until he was struck down severely wounded. The 
 captain of the sappers, Foucauld, with his cus- 
 tomary activity, placed himself at the head of the 
 troops of the trenches, drove the Spaniards back 
 to the place of arms, followed them thither, and 
 chased them from it. We made immediately every 
 exertion to finish, by flying sap, a communica- 
 tion as far as the salient angle of the place of arms, 
 where our brave fellows had effected a lodgment. 
 In this sharp action captain Foucauld was struck 
 by a ball, and Lemercier, the lieutenant of engi- 
 neers, received one through his arm ; we had, be- 
 sides two officers, twenty-five men — infantry — 
 killed, and a number of others, as well as many of 
 our sappers, wounded. The work was, notwith- 
 standing, finished and the enemy finally driven 
 from the place of arms. The advance on the ca- 
 pital of the half moon was prosecuted during 
 the same night, and we gained about fourteen 
 toises ; but at day-light, the artillery of the ene- 
 my so harassed the heads of our sap that we 
 were compelled to suspend our labours. 
 
 Next day we followed up the crown-work of the 
 place of arms by flying sap, but our workmen were
 
 SIEGE OF TOttTOSA. 249 
 
 in so doing, received by so sharp a fire of mus- 
 ketry, that they first hesitated and then fell back 
 in disorder, although the captain of engineers, Tar- 
 divi, by his firmness, and the officers of infantry, 
 by their example, at length succeeded in restoring 
 order among them. We did not, however, push 
 this crown-work farther, lest we should impede 
 the fire of the artillery, which was then ready to 
 open against the place. The advance upon the 
 half-moon was continued for ten toises farther, 
 and we amorced a demi-place of arms in order 
 to support, if necessary, the heads of our saps, 
 which were now at a considerable distance from 
 the second parallel. 
 
 The Spaniards, alarmed at the increasing ra- 
 pidity of our works, and perceiving our batte- 
 ries rising all along the front of attack, de- 
 termined to prevent their effect. On the 28th, 
 about four o'clock in the afternoon, they 
 made a sortie by the gate of Rastro to the 
 number of 3,000 men, who advanced to attack 
 our works on the height, whilst other columns 
 in the plain marched directly up our central 
 intrenchments. A shower of bullets, bombs, 
 and howitzer shells preceded the attack, by 
 one of which we lost the brave captain of en- 
 gineers, Ponsin, an officer of great merit. In 
 an instant they darted forward against our 
 works and burst into them, and in the first mo- 
 ment of the assault we were completely driven 
 from the crown of the covered way. It was in
 
 250 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 vain that the lieutenant of engineers, Jaquard, 
 attempted to withstand their fury with a handful 
 of his sappers ; this gallant young officer, whom 
 nothing could induce to abandon his post, was 
 killed by a bayonet wound. A few of the 
 Spaniards even penetrated as far as the second 
 parallel, where they were immediately cut down. 
 Our labourers had now assumed their arms and 
 rushed forward to the point where the enemy 
 was making a grand effort ; a general Abbe 
 had put himself at the head of the reserves of the 
 44th, who formed the guard of the trenches, 
 on observing the Spaniards arrive at the 
 parallel, boldly quitted the trenches, marched 
 directly upon them with fixed bayonets, and 
 first checked and then drove them back. In the 
 mean time, general Habert on the right took the 
 select companies of the 5th light infantry and 
 of the 116th, and without a moment's hesitation, 
 threw himself on the flank of the Spanish columns 
 that had issued by the gate of Rastro. A most 
 sanguinary melee was the consequence, and at 
 length the enemy, who was routed before he was 
 able to attain his object, retired towards the town 
 in the greatest disorder. Captain Bugeaud, of 
 the grenadiers of the llb'th, and captain Guille- 
 min, of the engineers, rendered themselves par- 
 ticularly conspicuous by the intrepidity with 
 which they followed the flying foe to the last 
 moment. The Spaniards at length got back to
 
 S1EGJE OF TORTOSA. 251 
 
 the town again, leaving about 400 dead and 
 wounded in the fosse and upon the glacis. 
 During the short period they had possession 
 of our trenches, they had been busily employed 
 in setting fire to our gabions, and had suc- 
 ceeded in overturning a portion of the works, 
 principally in the crown of the place of arms ; 
 the night of the 28th was set apart for the repair 
 of the damages. At this point a second commu- 
 nication was formed parallel with the first, and a 
 trench was opened from the extremity of the 
 approach against the half- moon as far as the 
 place of arms at San Pedro, which trench be- 
 came the third parallel ; the object of this was to 
 shut up the enemy within the half-moon, and thus 
 to guarantee the safety of the crown-work of the 
 place of arms that projected from the covered way. 
 The moment so impatiently expected by the 
 whole of the army, and which the commander-in- 
 chief had daily, by every means in his power, 
 endeavoured to accelerate, at length arrived. 
 Our batteries, on both banks of the stream, were 
 finished and armed ; forty-five pieces of cannon* 
 were now in a condition to commence the work 
 of destruction ; and, on the 29th of December, at 
 day-break, the fire opened, The demi-bastion of 
 San Pedro, was in a few hours reduced to silence, 
 as was also the half-moon. The fort, and advanced 
 batteries of Orleans, still retained a few servicea- 
 ble pieces, and the bastion of San Juan possessed 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents No. 10.
 
 252 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 one, and one only, in its flank ; but the embra- 
 sures of the demi-bastion were destroyed, and 
 there was an open breach in the curtain. If 
 our batteries on the right bank had not been 
 very solidly constructed, they would, doubtless, 
 have been destroyed by the combined effects of 
 the whole fire of the castle, of the quays, and 
 of the tete-de-pont, but they withstood all. Our 
 artillery men succeeded, in the meantime, in 
 sinking five of the boats of the bridge, the floor 
 was in consequence detached, and floated on 
 the water, but it still afforded a road to indivi- 
 dual passengers. 
 
 Taking advantage of the tenth night, namely 
 that of the 29th, a double crown-work of the 
 covered way was formed in the place of arms, 
 and a lodgment effected in the plain of that 
 work, on a line of twenty-nine toises. The pa- 
 rallel begun the evening before, was also com- 
 pleted, and this communication, which was one 
 hundred toises in length, completely secured 
 us against sorties, and also connected our dif- 
 ferent points of attack. The superintendent of 
 the attack, had in tracing these works, never 
 failed to display the most eminent proofs of ta- 
 lent and intrepidity. 
 
 On the 30th, at day-light, our batteries re- 
 commenced firing, and soon almost silenced the 
 few pieces of the front attacked, which had 
 still continued to be served. The artillery of 
 fort Orleans was rendered completely useless,
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 253 
 
 the breach which had been begun in the body of 
 the place was rendered practicable, and the para- 
 pets on the two faces of the demi-bastion, were 
 entirely destroyed. The site of a new battery 
 which formed No. 11, was traced out that same 
 day in the rear of the battery No. 8 ; it was 
 composed of a couple of mortars, and was de- 
 signed to play on the castle only. It was finished 
 by the next morning, and its fire at break of 
 day was conjoined with that of the batteries pre- 
 viously erected. 
 
 The eleventh night, namely, that of the 30th, 
 was occupied in crowning with a lodgment the 
 counterscarp of the fosse of the right face of 
 the demi-bastion from the entrance angle of the 
 place of arms to the point opposite the flank. 
 It was found that this portion of the counterscarp 
 was not faced, and we took advantage of that 
 defect in the fortification, to trace out at once, a 
 descent into and passage of the ditch, in order 
 that the miners might be brought in contact with 
 the foot of the counterscarp. But this attempt 
 was not successful, in consequence of a brisk 
 fire from a couple of pieces, that were placed 
 on the flank of masonry which defended the fosse, 
 and after driving out the sappers that had taken 
 possession of it, by shells and grenades, which 
 were thrown from the top of the ramparts, they 
 sent down fascines pitched and lighted which 
 set fire to our gabions. From the moment of our 
 being driven out, we limited our endeavours to
 
 254 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the consolidating of our lodgment on the coun 
 terscarp, to form the amorces of the descent 
 into the fosse, and to connect the two lodg- 
 ments by a communication. During this night 
 our mortar and howitzer batteries continued to 
 fire on the castle, and on that portion of the town 
 that surrounded it, and several parts of both were 
 set on fire in consequence. 
 
 At break of day the other batteries again 
 opened, although their fire had greatly slackened, 
 the enemy no longer returning it. The open 
 breaches in the advanced works of fort Orleans 
 and in the body of the place were considerably 
 widened. 
 
 We now established ourselves in the tete-de- 
 pont, which the enemy had evacuated during the 
 night, after burning all that was combustible ; we 
 found in it only three pieces of cannon. Our 
 batteries on the right bank had succeeded in de- 
 stroying the flank which defended the right face 
 of the demi-bastion and in dismounting a couple 
 of pieces. The fosse was no longer defended, 
 and we began the descent of it immediately; this 
 was promptly completed. We defended ourselves 
 in the bottom of it by an epaulement of gabions 
 and bags of earth; the miners then placed against 
 the scarp of the bastions pieces of wood in the 
 form of a pent-house, which they covered with 
 sheets of tin plate to prevent them from being set 
 on fire, that under the shelter of this covering
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 255 
 
 they might work the mines in safety. This dan- 
 gerous operation cost a great number of these 
 poor fellows their lives. The artillery next com- 
 menced the construction of the breaching battery 
 No. 12 in the covered way, and in the counter- 
 scarp of the right face of San Pedro's bastion at 
 about ten toises from the face ; it was furnished 
 with four twenty-four pounders. 
 
 On the night of the 31st of December we 
 strengthened the epaulement, and the passage 
 of the fosse, which had been marked out the 
 preceding evening as far as the adit which was 
 forming by the miners. The old masonry of the 
 scarp was found by the latter to be harder than 
 the rock itself; they advanced in consequence but 
 slowly, although they were relieved every half 
 hour. We now pushed forward towards the place 
 of arms, situated at the entrance angle of the 
 half-moon by a double trench, one cut direct and 
 the other traversing, and established a circular 
 lodgment in that work, in order that we might 
 take advantage of the breach in the curtain, on 
 the day that was appointed for the assault. In 
 this operation captain Hudry of the engineers was 
 killed. On the right bank at the same time we 
 completed a communication in order that we 
 might get with security at the abandoned tete-de- 
 pont. 
 
 The gradual widening of the breaches, the 
 labours of the miners, and the impatience of the
 
 256 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 troops who were clamorous for the assault, ap- 
 peared seriously to alarm the garrison, and accord- 
 ingly on the 1st of January, 1811, at ten o'clock 
 in the morning the white flag was displayed. 
 The commander-in-chief immediately ordered the 
 firing of the batteries to cease but the works to be 
 continued. Two officers instructed to make pro- 
 posals were conducted to his presence ; they pro- 
 posed, in the name of the count Alacha, governor 
 of Tortosa, a suspension of arms for fifteen days, 
 after which, unless they should be succoured, they 
 should surrender, on condition of being conducted 
 to Tarragona, with their arms, baggage, and four 
 pieces of cannon. The commander-in-chief re- 
 fused these conditions, but consented to permit 
 the chief of his staff, the adjutant-commandant, 
 to accompany the flag of truce into the city. He 
 was instructed to propose to the governor and the 
 council intrusted with the defence the plan of a 
 capitulation which should ensure to the chiefs and 
 officers their swords and baggage, but in virtue of 
 which the whole garrison should be made pri- 
 soners of war and sent to France. As it very 
 often happens in difficult cases during war, the 
 council discussed the matter for a long time and 
 yet came to no resolution, and their indecision 
 produced such doubt and embarrassment in the 
 governor that he could send back no positive 
 answer. He kept colonel St. Cyr for a long
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 257 
 
 time in the fortress, whilst he remained in this 
 state of suspense, as to the course which it 
 behoved him to adopt; and that officer was 
 unable to return to the camp until a late hour 
 in the night. 
 
 The miners continued their labours during 
 that night between the 1st and 2nd of January, 
 beinof the thirteenth since the commencement 
 of the siege, and the last of its continuance ; 
 the new battery, No. 12, which was erecting for the 
 purpose of its being opened against the breach, 
 was completed, armed, and placed in a con- 
 dition to act, Orders were issued for redou- 
 bling the fire in every quarter, and for directing 
 it, with such unerring aim, as to widen the 
 breaches already made. The necessary prepa- 
 rations had been completed for setting fire to 
 the mine, and the commander-in-chief had also 
 drawn up his troops for the assault. After the 
 lapse of a short time, three white flags were 
 seen flying over the town and forts. But as 
 the governor had resorted to this expedient on 
 the preceding day, for the purpose of making 
 proposals which were wholly inadmissible, the 
 commander-in-chief would not allow the firing 
 to be suspended. The officers who were the 
 bearers of the flag of truce were sent 
 back to the place, and he required as a con- 
 dition which must precede every arrangement, 
 vol. i. s
 
 258 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 that a French garrison should be immediately 
 admitted into one of the forts, his object in 
 adopting this course, being to avoid the pos- 
 sibility of the enemy taking him by surprise, as 
 well as to secure his victory, and save the 
 town from the misfortunes which are the un- 
 avoidable consequences of an assault. 
 
 It was evident, however, that the state of 
 doubt and hesitation manifested by the besieged, 
 could only be ascribed to unusual and extraor- 
 dinary causes. The governor had it intimated 
 to the commander-in-chief of the besieging 
 army, that he could place no dependence on 
 the willingness of the garrison to abide by the 
 course he might determine to adopt, that the 
 bonds of discipline were broken or about to be 
 broken, and that no capitulation was yet signed. 
 It was of importance, notwithstanding, to take ad- 
 vantage of the day-light, for the purpose of collect- 
 ing and disarming a numerous and dispersed gar- 
 rison, and such a case demanded one of those 
 bold measures which a moment of exigency 
 prompts and which success justifies. The French 
 troops were under arms, and the commander-in- 
 chief, accompanied by his generals and the officers 
 of his staff, marched up to the advanced work of the 
 castle, followed by only a single company of the 
 grenadiers of the 116th, and addressing the sen- 
 tries told them that hostilities had ceased . He left 
 a few grenadiers at the first Spanish post, and ad-
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 259 
 
 vancing, commanded the officer of the works to 
 conduct him to the governor. This old man, who 
 was not without apprehensions of mutiny among 
 his soldiers, and who entertained unpleasant 
 doubts himself, was not a little astonished on 
 beholding the commander-in-chief of the enemy 
 enter the castle. The garrison was meanwhile 
 under arms, the gunners had their matches in 
 their hands ready to fire, when the word was 
 given, and their countenances plainly indicated 
 that there was not a moment to lose. The com- 
 mander-in-chief assumed a high tone, complained 
 loudly of the delay in delivering up to him one 
 of the forts. He stated that he could with diffi- 
 culty restrain his soldiers, who burned with 
 impatience to penetrate through the breaches, 
 and threatened to put the whole garrison to the 
 sword, if, after having offered to capitulate, they 
 hesitated to do so conformably to the laws of 
 war, large breaches being opened in the walls 
 and the mines ready to explode the moment he 
 gave the signal. Whilst he was thus addressing 
 the Spaniards, general Habert led on the grena- 
 diers, and the governor, who was intimidated 
 and struck dumb, determined to lay down his 
 arms. He commanded his soldiers to obey no 
 voice but his own, and promised to execute at 
 once the brief capitulation which was drawn up 
 
 s 2
 
 "CO MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 and signed on the carriage of a gun. The 
 custody of the fort was immediately given up 
 to our grenadiers and the news of this event 
 being conveyed into the town, the whole of the 
 troops obeying the orders of the governor, took 
 their arms for the purpose of filing out and piling 
 them. General Abb6, who was nominated 
 governor of Tortosa, immediately placed sen- 
 tries at the gates of the town, and at the 
 breaches, and entering at the head of six hundred 
 grenadiers, established picquets and patroles, 
 occupied the squares, the magazines, and the 
 public edifices. The commander-in-chief then 
 came down from the castle, saw the garrison file 
 out, and after depositing their arms, directed 
 them to be immediately marched to Xerta, 
 whence they were passed to France. 
 
 Without including a sort of half blockade of 
 about six months, Tortosa sustained a siege of 
 exactly seventeen days, during thirteen of which 
 the breaches were opened, and for five of which 
 the batteries were employed against it. The 
 garrison, previous to the commencement of the 
 siege, was eleven thousand strong, but when 
 the place surrendered, it had been reduced by 
 about sixteen hundred, the number of prisoners 
 being nine thousand four hundred and sixty-one*. 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 1 1.
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 261 
 
 We captured at Tortosa one hundred and eighty- 
 two cannons mounted, thirty thousand shells and 
 balls, one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of 
 powder, two millions of musket cartridges, and 
 lead sufficient for making a million more, from ten 
 to eleven thousand muskets, and nine standards. 
 The besieged had fired twenty thousand cannon 
 shots, and we had fired, in the course of the five 
 days, three hundred shots per gun. In the course 
 of thirteen nights, we had dug a trench of not less 
 than about two thousand three hundred toises in 
 length. 
 
 To the officers and men of the artillery and 
 engineers belonged the chief merit in the cap- 
 ture of Tortosa. The distinguished talent and 
 persevering activity of general Val6e were very 
 eminently displayed in the midst of numerous 
 obstacles which he contrived to overcome. The 
 labours of the engineers were conducted by gen- 
 eral Rogniat with a skill and rapidity of execu- 
 tion which greatly contributed to our success. 
 On the seventh night from the opening of the 
 trenches, before it was possible to fire a single 
 gun. he had finished the crown-work of the co- 
 vered way of the body of the place. The officers 
 that conducted the attack in both branches of 
 the service, also merited especial notice. 
 
 The soldiers of the 3rd corps knew as well as
 
 262 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 did those of the Roman legions, how to labour and 
 to fight with equal zeal. Our ordinary troop offi- 
 cers, both French and Polish, were beginning to 
 understand perfectly the principles of a siege. 
 The whole of the infantry were animated with 
 the liveliest emulation, and longed for orders 
 to storm, as affording an opportunity of dis- 
 playing their valour, and of enabling them to 
 rival the services of the officers of the ar- 
 tillery and of the engineers. The auxiliaries, 
 commanded by general Frere, shewed a si- 
 milar devotedness ; and the Italians when placed 
 amidst Frenchmen, differed in nothing from our 
 veteran bands. If the enemy had attempted to 
 raise the siege, the corps of observation would 
 not have failed to reap its fair share in the gen- 
 eral glory. But the position taken up by the 
 duke of Tarentum checked all serious attempts 
 on the part of the Spanish army of Catalonia, 
 which contented itself with sending forward 
 two convoys of provisions, with a view to in- 
 troduce them into Tortosa, in which object they 
 did not however succeed. Their commander- 
 in-chief, Henri O'Donnell, in consequence of 
 his wound, was obliged to give up the command 
 of the army to general Campoverde, and some 
 new projects were planned by the latter to suc- 
 cour the town ; but its fall infused a spirit of in-
 
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA. 263 
 
 activity and discouragement into the Spanish 
 troops generally, and gave a fatal blow to the 
 combination formed against the French army by 
 the Valencians and Catalonians.* 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 12.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Taking of the fort of San-Felipe at the col de Balaguer. — 
 Return of the army of Arragon. — The Arragonese are fa- 
 vourably disposed towards the army. — Partial engagements 
 — Preparations of defence at Valencia and Tarragona. — 
 Various actions on both banks of the Ebro. 
 
 The inhabitants of Tortosa were in the highest 
 possible state of excitement, and the military 
 chiefs had taken advantage of it, to prepare the 
 requisite measures for defending the town ; a 
 whole suburb, and upwards of 10,000 olive or 
 carob trees, forming the principal wealth of the 
 small province of Tortosa, which lies isolated as 
 it were, in the midst of a desert, had not only 
 been destroyed without a murmur, but the popu- 
 lation had even assisted with alacrity in the work 
 of devastation. General Suchet availed himself 
 in his turn of the aspect of affairs, and strictly 
 enjoined that neither dwelling houses nor planta- 
 tions of trees should be replaced within such a 
 distance as he deemed requisite for the unob- 
 structed defence of the place. A thousand pea- 
 sants were immediately employed in removing 
 our trenches and batteries.
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 265 
 
 Several of the inhabitants who had fled to the 
 country for shelter, re-appeared at Tortosa as soon 
 as they found a prospect of returning order. The 
 clergy, flattered by the protection extended to 
 them, manifested indications of a friendly feeling. 
 Upwards of 150 of the neighbouring peasantry, 
 belonging to the armed bands who infested the 
 country, returned within three days, laid down 
 their arms, and took a solemn oath never to re- 
 sume them against us. The public coffers were 
 empty ; one of the first cares of the commander-in- 
 chief was to re-organise the local administration. 
 The general of division, Musnier, was named go- 
 vernor of the province. He was well calcu- 
 lated for the command, by his strength of mind 
 and his acquaintance with the Spanish lan- 
 guage. 
 
 Whilst making these arrangements, general 
 Suchet conceived the idea of attempting to sur- 
 prise the fort of San-Felipe at the col de Bala- 
 guer, by availing himself of the first moment of 
 terror which the fall of Tortosa had created in 
 the minds of the Spaniards. He thereby hoped 
 to avoid laying siege to that post, which com- 
 mands and intercepts the road leading from Tor- 
 tosa to Tarragona. General Habert, who was 
 stationed at Perello with the 3rd division received 
 orders to make the attempt, and acquitted him- 
 self of the mission with no less skill than bravery. 
 He proceeded at night with the 5th regiment
 
 266 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of light infantry and the 117th, advanced close 
 up to the fort, in spite of the passages cut through 
 the road, and erected a battery of four howitzers 
 under a fire which killed or wounded five of his 
 soldiers. After making these preparations for an 
 attack, he sent an officer with a flag of truce to 
 the commandant of the fort, in order to sound 
 his intentions by proposing a capitulation. The 
 latter asked for a delay of four days, promising 
 to surrender if, in the interval, he should not re- 
 ceive any relief. The proposal was rejected; our 
 fire was immediately opened, and our skirmishers 
 rushed upon the soldiers, doing duty at the out- 
 posts, who partly escaped into the ravines instead 
 of returning to the fort. Our howitzers soon 
 set fire to a powder magazine, and the garrison 
 betrayed evident symptoms of indecision. General 
 Habert seized this favourable opportunity, and 
 ordered his men to cross the palisadoes ; a few 
 ladders had been brought, which were planted 
 against the walls ; our soldiers penetrated into 
 the fort ; part of the garrison fled along the road to 
 Tarragona ; others escaped to the bastions, whi- 
 ther they were pursued and thought fit to capitu- 
 late. The commandant of the fort, thirteen offi- 
 cers, ninety soldiers, eighteen artillery men, 
 eleven brass pieces of cannon, and 100,000 
 cartridges fell into our power. General Habert, 
 in his report of this expedition, made particular 
 mention of captain Doria, and of lieutenants Bore
 
 TAKING OF THE COL D£ BALAGUER. 267 
 
 and Pepin of the 117th regiment, as well as of 
 lieutenants Crouzet of the artillery, and Guillemin 
 of tl\e company of miners. 
 
 General Suchet set a high value on this little 
 conquest, of which he had justly estimated the 
 consequences, as will be proved in the sequel. 
 He deemed himself warranted in laying aside for 
 a moment all ordinary considerations of prudence, 
 for the purpose of making an impression upon 
 the minds of the Spaniards, a nation that quickly 
 gives way to despondence on the first reverse of 
 fortune, and as quickly recovers from it with re- 
 newed energy, and resumes its wonted obsti- 
 nacy of disposition. At a later period, that 
 regular little fort would only have been taken 
 after a siege. A fortunate act of resolution 
 spared us much loss of time and as well as the 
 resources we should have consumed in the opera- 
 tion. 
 
 The Spanish flag was left waving over the 
 walls of the fort of San-Felipe, and on the follow- 
 ing morning, a captain and fifteen men who were 
 the bearers of instructions for the garrison, ap- 
 proached the shore in full confidence and landed 
 at the foot of the rock adjoining the fort. They 
 were ignorant of the recent occurrence, which 
 the fugitives had, doubtless, made known at 
 Cambrils, whither they had proceeded by 
 land. They were allowed to approach, and 
 were made prisoners on their entrance into the
 
 268 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 fort. Two English gun-boats came close to the 
 shore and were immediately fired upon. 
 
 General Musnier, who was left in the com- 
 mand of Tortosa, was especially directed to pro- 
 vide for its defence, to close the breaches, to repair 
 the bridge and the tete-de-pont, and to collect 
 immediately a quantity of ammunition suffi- 
 cient to enable 3,000 men to sustain a six 
 months' siege, besides a supply of meat, vege- 
 tables, and all kinds of provisions requisite for 
 the army. It was natural to foresee that Tortosa 
 would now become the pivot of our operations 
 either against Tarragona or Valencia. The be- 
 sieging artillery brought from Mequinenza having 
 been added to the artillery captured at Tortosa, 
 this place was intended to be our depot, and the 
 point at which the horses for the train were to be 
 assembled. The commander-in-chief ordered a 
 large quantity of straw to be collected. This is the 
 only forage of the country, and is most difficult 
 to store up, not only from the delay in trans- 
 porting it, owing to its bulk, but also because 
 a great part is consumed by the beasts of bur- 
 den who bring it into the town ; so that it is in- 
 dispensable to be provided with an ample 
 supply before any organization can be given to 
 the system of transport. Prudence required that 
 we should lay in a stock long beforehand. Two 
 hospitals were also ordered to be established, for 
 the reception of 1,000 to 1,200 sick.
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 26& 
 
 The port of La Rapita was intrusted to the 
 command of captain Pinot of the engineers, 
 an officer of great merit ; every measure was 
 adopted for placing it in a state of defence, for 
 taking possession of the tower of San-Juan, and 
 becoming master of the mouths of the Ebro. 
 The fort of San-Felipe was immediately put in 
 proper repair. The corps of observation which 
 had been stationed during the siege at Ulldecona 
 was withdrawn, as no longer necessary at that 
 place, and Musnier's division was directed to 
 occupy the corregimientos of Albarracin, Teruel, 
 Morella, Tortosa, and Alcaniz, with its principal 
 advanced posts in the towns of Teruel, Morella, 
 and Tortosa, for the purpose of intimidating and 
 watching the country in the neighbourhood of 
 Valencia. The Neapolitan division was left at 
 Mora and on the Ebro, to secure the naviga- 
 tion and requisite transports for the army of 
 marshal Macdonald, whilst engaged in carrying- 
 on operations against Tarragona. In order to be 
 in readiness to assist him in his enterprise, Ha- 
 bert's division remained at Tortosa and at 
 Perello, so as to be available for manoeuvring 
 on the left bank of the Ebro. With the exception 
 of the 14th regiment, which took the road to 
 Mequinenza and Lerida, for the purpose of ac- 
 celerating the collection of corn and the forma- 
 tion of the magazines intended for the use of the 
 army under the command of the duke of Taren-
 
 270 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 turn ; all the troops of the 2nd division were 
 marched towards Saragossa, and escorted to the 
 frontier the garrison of Tortosa as prisoners of war. 
 This general had withdrawn Frere's division 
 on the 5th of January, and proceeded across the 
 mountains in the direction of Reuss with the 
 main body of his army. He approached Tarra- 
 gona on the 10th of January, and found, as usual, 
 the country completely laid waste. Campoverde 
 occupied with his forces the position of Vails ; 
 the marshal advanced to meet him, drove him 
 back, and afterwards moving towards Monblanch, 
 returned to Lerida for the purpose of making pre- 
 parations for the siege of Tarragona, and collect- 
 ing the means necessary for such an undertaking. 
 He preferred occupying Lerida and its de- 
 pendencies, although the government had as 
 signed to him the command of Tortosa ; and gene- 
 ral Suchet shewed the utmost readiness to accede 
 to his wishes. He went further ; whilst waiting 
 for instructions from Paris, he offered to place at 
 his disposal the troops of artillery and engineers 
 belonging to the 3rd corps with part of the infan- 
 try The marshal accepted this proposal. Having 
 established himself at Lerida and in the plain 
 of Urgel, he directed his utmost care to the forma- 
 tion of a large supply of provisions. He soon 
 afterwards received and communicated to general 
 Suchet the information that twelve ships which 
 had sailed from Toulon under the escort of three
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 271 
 
 frigates and a smaller vessel, had just entered 
 Barcelona with 29,000 quintals of corn, 1,500 
 quintals of rice, and 50,000 pounds of gunpowder. 
 This fortunate circumstance removed all further 
 uneasiness respecting the fate of that important 
 city, and was calculated to facilitate our opera- 
 tions in lower Catalonia. 
 
 General Suchet on his part had returned to 
 Saragossa, where some objects of importance re- 
 quired his presence. He recollects, with feelings 
 of the liveliest gratitude, the proofs of attach- 
 ment bestowed upon him in his journey through 
 the province, by the inhabitants of the towns, 
 and the country people, and the friendly recep- 
 tion given to his soldiers at their stations and 
 cantonments.* He deemed himself fortunate 
 
 * On the road between Tortosa and Saragossa, at Sanper, 
 at Caspe, and many other places, the inhabitants assembled on 
 the arrival of the commander-in-chief, for the purpose of greeting 
 him with their acclamations and performing before him certain 
 dances possessing a peculiarly national character. Ten or 
 twenty young men, dressed in some ancient costume, of a light 
 and brilliant appearance, and holding short sticks in their 
 hands, mixed together, separated, formed different groups> 
 and a variety of figures, without any vocal or instrumental 
 music, but striking their sticks against each other, in perfect 
 cadence, and thereby offering a pleasing picture of a battle 
 converted into a sport. At Caspe, and at Saragossa, whilst 
 the clergy and public authorities repaired to the geueral's re- 
 sidence, for the purpose of receiving him on his arrival, the 
 masquerade of the giants and dwarfs (gigantcs y cabczutos)
 
 272 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 in finding so friendly a disposition on the part of 
 the Arragonese, and availed himself of it to 
 
 perambulated the town, in the midst of a crowd no less ani- 
 mated than peaceful in their demeanour, who gave a free vent 
 to their sentiments, and kept up their extemporary serenades 
 until a late hour of the night. La Jota is a national air peculiar 
 to the people of Arragon, consisting of a single bar, which 
 they sing in a tone not altogether devoid of melody, the per- 
 petual repetition of which is somewhat monotonous, but at 
 the same time expressive; and each singer, may, with his guitar 
 in hand, attach to the tune whatever ideas he thinks proper. 
 The Arragonese, in a series of couplets following each other in 
 rapid succession, sang in this manner, the praises of the count 
 and countess Suchet, of the generals, the chiefs, and officers 
 who happened to be the guests or private friends of each per- 
 former. General Suchet, who had been lately married, and 
 could fully appreciate domestic happiness, had availed himself 
 of his situation of commander-in-chief, in a country adjoining 
 the frontiers of France, to send for his wife to join him. She 
 may be said to have exhibited an extraordinary degree 
 of courage ; she accompanied him in most of his excursions, 
 and was constantly by his side during the expedition to 
 Tortosa. This was an interesting spectacle for the whole po- 
 pulation of Arragon. The intercourse which was naturally 
 formed with the ladies of the country not only proved a source 
 of satisfaction aud enjoyment, but was productive of advan- 
 tage ; and this circumstance, no doubt, had some influence 
 over the public mind, in its friendly disposition towards us, the 
 consequence of which was, that the whole of Arragon sub- 
 mitted, by degrees, to the authority of the French governor 
 who commanded in that province. 
 
 The habit of residing together familiarized the 3rd 
 corps with the inhabitants, a circumstance which acted 
 reciprocally upon both. The 11 5th regiment, for instance,
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 273 
 
 counteract, by the most energetic measures, the 
 system of famine which the enemy were bringing 
 
 had occupied Caspe at the commencement of the war, and 
 was, thenceforth, almost always cantoned in that place. It 
 would be difficult to form an adequate idea of the attachment 
 which sprung up between that regiment and the inhabitants. 
 The French soldier, to be correctly estimated, should be known 
 in his private habits ; the greater his ardour and impetuosity, 
 previous to, or during an engagement, the more sociable and 
 mild he becomes, when restored to his natural composure. 
 Generally quartered upon the poor, where he can recall to 
 mind the picture of his own family, he lays down, when he 
 enters the dwelling of his host,thehaughty manners, the tone of 
 authority ; whatever, in short, is known by the name of la furia 
 francese. He pays every attention to the master and mistress 
 of the house, caresses and plays with the children, volun- 
 tarily offers his services, and exerts them with no less goodwill 
 than disinterestedness. Colonel Dupeyroux had established a 
 paternal discipline in the 115th regiment; the inhabitants had 
 occasion to discover and applaud it. Each of them knew his 
 officer or soldier in the regiment, greeted him as a friend, 
 offered up prayers for his safety when he was called away on 
 duty, waited for, and without either billet, request, or order, 
 never failed to welcome him on his return. When the 3rd 
 corps took the name of the army of Arragon, and that army 
 obtained a run of successes in Catalonia, and in the kingdom of 
 Valencia, the circumstance was almost hailed by the Arra- 
 gonese with satisfaction. They felt a growing affection for 
 the general and his troops, from the habit of seeing and be- 
 coming familiar with them. Los nuestros they always said when 
 speaking of us, not only in contra-distinction to other French 
 forces that penetrated through Arragon, on their way from 
 Catalonia and Navarre, but what is still more remarkable by 
 way of comparison, with some of the Spanish armies. They
 
 274 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 into operation against him. The regency and 
 the juntas of Castille and Valencia, were exerting 
 every endeavour to carry off all the corn from the 
 province of Arragon. This project, which 
 was entertained for the first time when it was 
 found that our army was concentrating on the 
 lower Ebro, was no longer a mystery. The 
 gazettes of Valencia loudly proclaimed it, and 
 its effects were beginning to be felt. The price 
 of corn had already rapidly increased in Sa- 
 ragossa. It was found necessary to compel the 
 monopolisers, who naturally endeavoured to 
 profit by the high prices, to pay the contribu- 
 tions in kind. Arragon was a complete granary 
 to us ; it fed our army whilst besieging the towns 
 of Lerida and Tortosa ; from Arragon we had 
 it in our power to procure the means of sub- 
 sistence for the troops on the lower Ebro, or 
 before Tarragona, which were destined to sup- 
 port marshal Macdonald's operations. Notwith- 
 standing the severest injunctions, we had failed, 
 up to the 30th of January, in procuring any 
 rations from the administrative authority of Tor- 
 tosa. The impossibility of finding a single quintal 
 
 considered our steady and regular occupation as a means of 
 escaping the frequent inroads of Mina and Villacampa, which 
 from the very circumstance of their being of a transitory na- 
 ture, were attended with disorder, and only left evil con- 
 sequences behind them, without being productive of any sa- 
 lutary result.
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 275 
 
 of straw, within a circuit of ten leagues round 
 the place, greatly impeded our means of trans- 
 port, which were already circumscribed and 
 nearly exhausted. The presence of the comman- 
 der-in-chief at Saragossa, and that of the troops on 
 the principal points of the province were soon 
 productive of a salutary influence, by preventing 
 the grain from being removed out of the country, 
 and by supporting the local administrations, 
 whilst they carried into effect the orders that 
 emanated from the French authorities. 
 
 This was more particularly the period at which 
 the system of administration, established by 
 the commander-in-chief, improved by expe- 
 rience, and strengthened by the submission or 
 assent of the inhabitants, assumed that solidity 
 which was indispensable towards providing for 
 the exigencies of a corps d'armee destined to pro- 
 ceed upon remote operations. It will not, in 
 our opinion, be superfluous to develop it in 
 some of its details, as an event claiming 
 a share of importance amongst those which we 
 have undertaken to describe : this will there- 
 fore, form the subject of the succeeding chapter. 
 We will first conclude the narrative of some 
 military occurrences which took place in the 
 interval that elapsed between the sieges of Tortosa 
 and Tarragona. 
 
 On the 19th of December Villacampa, who 
 was collecting all his forces on the side of Ojos- 
 
 VOL. I. T
 
 276 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Negros, had met with a severe check. Colonel 
 Kliski being informed that a detachment of cavalry 
 had advanced as far as Blancas, set out from 
 Daroca during the night with a column of lancers 
 and cuirassiers, and two battalions of the 121st 
 regiment of the line, and of the 1st regiment of 
 the Vistula, led by colonel Kozinowski. By a 
 rapid march of ten hours, which was effected 
 without the knowledge of the enemy, he routed 
 the advanced posts and surprised their detach- 
 ment in the village. The Spaniards had barely 
 time to mount their horses ; a few were killed 
 and wounded ; and the remainder, amounting to 
 150 men, including seven officers, fell into our 
 hands with their horses, arms, and baggage. 
 This dexterous coup-de-main was the more 
 honorable to colonel Kliski, as we had seldom 
 had the good fortune to take any Spanish cavalry 
 prisoners in the open country during the whole 
 course of the war, so circumspect was their mode 
 of attacking us. Villacampa retreated; since 
 the month of January, however, FEmpecinado, 
 another chieftain who had obtained some suc- 
 cesses in Castille, had approached the province of 
 Arragon, and forming a junction with the corps of 
 Villacampa, had taken up a position at Checa, be- 
 tween Molina and Albarracin. These fresh forces 
 amounted to about 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, 
 and although they were on the other side of 
 the frontier, might have greatly annoyed us in
 
 TAKING OF THK COL DE BALAGUEH. 277 
 
 Arragon, had not a part of our troops been ren- 
 dered available by the fall of Tortosa, and re- 
 turned back to that province as we have already 
 mentioned. General Suchet despatched general 
 Paris from Saragossa with a column of troops 
 against those two chiefs ; and with a view to en- 
 sure the success of this operation, sent orders 
 at the same time for general Abbe, to break up 
 from Teruel for the purpose of outflanking the 
 position of Checa, and prevent, if possible, the ene- 
 my from dispersing as heretofore without coming 
 to an engagement. 
 
 General Paris reached l'Empecinado within 
 a few leagues of Molina, ordered the cuirassiers 
 to charge, and completely routed his advanced 
 guard. The enemy retreated towards Villa- 
 campa's position ; general Paris followed with 
 the determination to bring him to an engagement, 
 overtook him on the 31st of January, and inr 
 stantly prepared to attack, without waiting the 
 arrival of general Abbe, and regardless of the 
 numbers of the enemy and of the advantageous 
 position which he occupied on the mountain in 
 advance of the village. At day-break, the co- 
 lumn, preceded by sharp-shootere, marched up 
 to the position in spite of the snow and ice which 
 impeded their progress ; during the night, a de- 
 tachment had made a flank movement towards 
 the village. The 121st regiment and the 1st 
 
 t 2
 
 278 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 of the Vistula, displayed no less gallantry 
 than at Fuente Santa ; and the Polish lancers 
 vied with the cuirassiers in steadiness and 
 bravery. The Spaniards being forced from 
 their position, and finding themselves cut off from 
 the village, which was their natural place of 
 retreat, disbanded and took to flight. Generals 
 Paris and Abbe only effected a junction at Frias 
 on the 4th of February ; when they continued 
 together in pursuit of the retreating enemy, for 
 the space of two days, without allowing them 
 any respite. They afterwards separated for the 
 purpose of giving effect to an important part of their 
 instructions. General Abbe marched against the 
 Empecinado, who was at Cuenca, kept posses- 
 sion of this town during forty eight hours, cap- 
 tured some stores, drove before him general 
 Carbajal and his staff who had retreated to Moya, 
 put to flight the insurrectionary junta of Arragon, 
 and destroyed a considerable depot of arms. 
 General Paris, on the other hand, pursued Villa- 
 campa in the direction of Alvalate de las 
 Nogueras and of Canaveras, was on the point 
 of surprising him, by a forced march, in the night 
 from the 7th to the 8th February, proceeded 
 towards Beteta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, places si- 
 tuated amongst the mountains, and containing 
 manufactories of arms, which had been kept 
 constantly at work ever since the breaking out
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 279 
 
 of the war.* He destroyed and burned the 
 arms and tools, and broke up the establishments. 
 This expedition, which kept two of our brigades 
 in the province of Castille for a period of twelve 
 days, was only productive of a few hundred 
 prisoners ; but the destruction of the manufac- 
 tories of arms was of more real service to us 
 than the momentary dispersion of the two hostile 
 corps of troops. Continually did those numerous 
 bands of Guerillas by which we were surrounded, 
 re-appear in the open plain ; they were rather 
 dispersed than defeated, and never yielded to 
 despondency. 
 
 After the fall of Tortosa, the Spaniards did 
 not fail to perceive that Tarragona or Valencia 
 would soon be attacked by one or other of our 
 armies. The Valencians had, accordingly, given 
 up all idea for the present of molesting the army 
 of Arragon, and directed their whole attention 
 to the defence of their territory and of their 
 capital. They were carrying on very import- 
 ant works at Murviedro upon the rock of an- 
 cient Saguntum, were mounting guns upon 
 
 * This elevated region is the highest point in the Spanish 
 Peninsula. In this spot are the sources of the Tagus on the 
 one hand with several of the rivers running into it, and on the 
 other of the Xiloca, which uniting itself with the Xalon, 
 discharges its waters into the Ebro, and of the Guadalaviar, 
 the Cabriel and the Xucar, which flow towards the Mediter- 
 ranean, after passing through the kingdom of Valencia.
 
 280 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the castle of Oropesa, and cutting broad 
 and deep ditches in the roads and principal 
 defiles. Valencia had become a point of still 
 greater importance for the regency since the in- 
 vestment of Badajos and the fall of Tortosa. 
 Nevertheless, although we might not then have 
 found much difficulty in obstructing the defensive 
 preparations making by the inhabitants of Va- 
 lencia, which might prove so seriously detri- 
 mental to us at a later period, we were unable 
 to undertake any thing in that quarter, until 
 Tarragona should have fallen into our hands. 
 Experience had demonstrated the necessity of 
 prudence and harmony in all our operations, in 
 order to triumph over a people who are elated at 
 the least success, and never depressed but for a 
 short time by the most signal reverses of fortune. 
 Catalonia was exerting the most strenuous 
 efforts to expedite and complete the immense 
 fortifications undertaken at Tarragona. The 
 whole attention of the two French generals 
 was justly directed to this city ; the marshal 
 duke of Tarentum had reconnoitred it in the 
 month of January. During the night from the 
 7th to the 8th of February, general Habert 
 proceeded by a rapid march from the col de 
 Balaguer with a hundred hussars and a few com- 
 panies of skirmishers, made some prisoners 
 within three leagues of Tarragona, obtained in- 
 formation respecting Campoverde's army which
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 281 
 
 occupied Reuss, Villaseca and Canonge, and 
 returned without allowing the enemy time to 
 pursue or overtake him. This little piece of 
 bravado excited the spleen of general Campo- 
 verde who shortly afterwards made an attempt 
 against fort San-Felipe, and endeavoured to 
 drive colonel Robert in his camp from Perello. At 
 four o'clock in the morning of the 3rd of March, 
 six thousand men made an attack upon two 
 thousand, who retreated with great steadiness 
 notwithstanding their being surrounded, and 
 repelled several charges of cavalry. Generals 
 Habert and Bronikowski having received timely 
 notice of this circumstance, came in all haste from 
 Tortosa with the 1 16th regiment, the cuirassiers, 
 and some pieces of cannon. The gallant 117th 
 regiment maintained an unequal fight until their 
 arrival ; but the Spaniards no sooner saw the 
 reinforcement than they rapidly retreated. 
 During this engagement, a rear guard of 2,000 
 men had been left by general Campoverde before 
 the fort of San- Felipe, and had lost no time in 
 erecting a battery which kept up a brisk fire 
 against the fort; but the latter returned thefire,and 
 soon silenced the battery. This circumstance did 
 not prevent the enemy from sending an officer 
 as the bearer of a flag of truce, who had the 
 audacity to offer the chef-de-bataillon, Durand, 
 the commandant of the fort, a sum of 60,000 
 francs in gold, with a promise that he should be
 
 282 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 conveyed in safety to England, where he would 
 not fail to be employed, provided he would con- 
 sent to open the gates. Such a proposal implied 
 a thorough ignorance of the high sense of honour 
 which animated the French army. The bearer 
 of the flag of truce was dismissed with scorn, 
 and was wholly indebted for his safety to the 
 respect shewn to his character, and to the rights 
 of nations. Campoverde with all the forces he had 
 brought with him for this coup de main, returned 
 to Tarragona without obtaining any result from 
 their movement. 
 
 The fort of la Rapita having been placed in a 
 state of defence, did not disappoint the expec- 
 tations entertained of it, and rendered us at this 
 time the essential service of securing to us the pos- 
 session of the mouth of the Ebro. Two priva- 
 teers, one of which was armed at Tortosa, the 
 other at Barcelona, captured and brought in 
 some vessels laden with rice and other pro- 
 visions. 
 
 Called upon to fight at all the points occupied by 
 the3rd corps, our soldiers were constantly engaged 
 in isolated encounters, the success of which was 
 determined by the advantage of position or of num- 
 bers, more or less vigilance or activity of the 
 officers, and occasionally even by the mere ef- 
 fect of chance ; nor did victory uniformly reward 
 their courage. We will not disguise the fact that the 
 enemy obtained the advantage over us on several
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 283 
 
 occasions. It is by speaking in an impartial man- 
 ner, that we hope to give a correct idea of the 
 war in Spain, so different from what we had 
 waged for the last twenty years in every other 
 part of Europe. 
 
 The Spanish armies had, for some time past, 
 received a fresh impulse and activity by the 
 recruiting system, or by being supplied with 
 men, horses, funds, and ammunition ; in Arra- 
 gon, we could not fail to discover on all hands 
 that the local effect of our successes was fast 
 diminishing. Notwithstanding the fall of Badajoz, 
 which the marshal duke of Treviso had taken 
 after a glorious siege of thirty-five days, a far 
 more serious event, the evacuation of Portugal 
 by the prince of Essling, restored confidence to 
 the Spaniards, revived their hopes, and excited 
 them to renewed efforts at resistance, with the 
 aid of the English army. The inhabitants of 
 Arragon, and of some other provinces which 
 were tired of the war, of its burdens, and its 
 vicissitudes, took very little part in such mea- 
 sures. The heads of armies, however, as well 
 as the Guerilla leaders, either received or con- 
 veyed the impulse with the greatest alacrity, and 
 availed themselves of the opportunity to augment 
 their forces, and extend their operations. Mina, 
 who had been unable to molest the 3rd corps 
 during the three sieges we had lately undertaken, 
 re-appeared in Arragon on the 7th of April, and
 
 284 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 advanced towards the Cinco-villas. The com- 
 mandant of the small town of Sos, sent to Sa- 
 dava for assistance, as he had only a squadron 
 of gendarmerie to defend himself. 12G foot and 
 23 mounted gendarmes, were sent to him 
 on the 8th. This small troop met, within 
 half a league of Sadava, 900 of the enemy's 
 troops. Yielding to the impulse of courage, they 
 charged the enemy, routed and pursued them for 
 an hour, until Mina having come up to the sup- 
 port of his advanced guard, and perceiving that 
 our detachment was inferior in numbers, and un- 
 supported by any reserve, assumed the offen- 
 sive. Animated with the confidence with which 
 they were inspired by their recent success, our 
 brave gendarmes instead of retreating, resolutely 
 withstood the attack. But they were soon sur- 
 rounded and overwhelmed by superior numbers ; 
 they were annihilated after three hours' fighting, 
 all those who were not killed having been taken 
 prisoners. General Suchet regretted the loss of 
 those gallant and choice men, but he lauded 
 their courage, and held it up to the army as 
 an example worthy of imitation. With a view 
 to avert such disasters, he ordered general 
 Chlopiski to proceed in pursuit of Mina, 
 with a column of 200 hussars and ] ,000 grena- 
 diers or skirmishers of the 114th regiment and 
 of the 2nd regiment of the Vistula. This officer 
 discovered Mina on the 15th of April at Biota,
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE 15ALAGUER. 285 
 
 followed him in the direction of Sofuenles and 
 Castillescar, and still driving that chief before 
 him as far as Coseda, pressed him so closely 
 that the band of Navarrese dispersed in disorder, 
 throwing- away their arms and ammunition, and 
 withdrew from our frontiers considerably weak- 
 ened in numbers, and in the utmost conster- 
 nation. 
 
 In the beginning of February, a detachment 
 of the garrison of Fuentes, consisting of fifty 
 men of the 1st and 2nd regiments of the Vistula, 
 was employed in collecting supplies at the village 
 of Azuera, near Belchite. Milawski, the officer 
 who commanded the detachment, having neg- 
 lected to adopt the usual military precautions, 
 was surprised in bed at one o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, by a daring Guerilla chieftain, who was ho- 
 verino- in the very centre of the province of 
 Arragon. The fifty men were all carried off, ex- 
 cept two who succeeded in effecting their escape. 
 Such an occurrence had never before taken place 
 in the 3rd corps. Our detachments had, some- 
 times, yielded to superior numbers ; but they 
 never allowed themselves to be taken by sur- 
 prise, so indispensable was watchfulness admitied 
 to be on all hands, and so habitual had it be- 
 come to us. The order of the day addressed to 
 the army on the 12th of February, was couched 
 in the following language : The commander-in-chief 
 signifies to M. Milawski his displeasure at this officer
 
 286 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 having omitted to adopt proper military precautions, 
 and occasioned the loss of forty -eight gallant men of the 
 3rd corps, by such culpable neglect ! This was the 
 first, and it also proved the last time that count 
 Suchet was under the necessity of publicly noti- 
 cing the fault of a Polish officer, whilst he was 
 daily called upon to congratulate the generals of 
 that gallant nation, on the courage and zeal dis- 
 played by their officers and soldiers. 
 
 On the 11th of April, a column had been sent 
 from Ulldecona, where we had a cantonment of 
 cavalry, to Vinaros and Benicarlo, in order to 
 enforce obedience to some requisitions for sup- 
 plies. A body of the enemy's cavalry, supported 
 by infantry, advanced through San-Mateo, and 
 attempted to surprise 100 horsemen who had 
 remained at Ulldecona in perfect security. Lieu- 
 tenant Delmart, at the head of a few hussars, 
 made a rapid movement against the enemy's ad- 
 vanced guard, charged, and completely routed 
 it. The chef d'escadron, Rubichon, with eighty 
 cuirassiers, followed the hussars, and suddenly 
 found themselves in the presence of 500 Spa- 
 nish cavalry, who broke up their ground with 
 the intention of coming up to them. This 
 officer immediately cried out to his troops to 
 charge, without reckoning the numbers of the 
 enemy. The encounter was alike sudden and 
 desperate. The Spanish horsemen could not 
 resist the shock ; they were broken in ; lost in
 
 TAKING OF THE COL DE BALAGUER. 287 
 
 a few moments about fifty of their number, and 
 betook themselves to flight. The enemy's in 
 fantry was pursued for some time across the 
 woods and mountains. The cuirassiers of the 
 13th regiment uniformly sustained their character 
 for boldness and decision ; this occasion furnished 
 a fresh proof of it, which was highly honour- 
 able to M. Rubichon, their commander. 
 
 On the 4th of April, colonel Dupeyroux, of 
 the 1 15th of the line, being on his way from Teruel 
 to Morella, with 1,000 soldiers of his regiment, 
 learned that 1,500 Valencians had advanced 
 as far as the small town of Cantavieja, in the 
 heart of the mountains. He marched against 
 the enemy without a moment's hesitation ; found 
 them posted in a narrow defile in front of Can- 
 tavieja, and resolutely attacked them, without 
 allowing them time to recover from their sur- 
 prise : he had ordered, at the same time, the 
 position to be turned by 150 skirmishers, who, 
 crossing some steep heights, proceeded to place 
 themselves on the flank and in the rear of the 
 Valencians. This was the signal for their re- 
 treat ; they dispersed, and were pursued for up- 
 wards of six leagues. Colonel Cevallos, their 
 commander, did not bring back twenty men of 
 the corps to Castellon de la Plana. 
 
 The 3rd corps d'arme'e, after having pacified Ar- 
 ragon, and entered upon the work of bringing
 
 288 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 lower Catalonia under subjection, by the cap- 
 ture of Lerida and Tortosa, had still to con- 
 tend against the different armed bands by 
 which it was surrounded, whilst waiting until 
 the operations for the siege of Tarragona 
 could be carried into effect. The marshal 
 duke of Tarentum had returned to Barcelona 
 to which place he was recalled by the general 
 aspect of affairs in Catalonia. The Catalo- 
 nian mountaineers attempted to establish them- 
 selves in the town of Balaguer, at the gates 
 of Lerida ; Colonel Henriod directed captain 
 Lecomte, of the grenadiers of the 14th regiment, 
 with 500 men of his battalion, twenty dragoons, 
 and a four-pounder, to drive them from that 
 position, which possessed some importance, on 
 account of its bridge over the Segre. This 
 officer ordered the occupation, during the night 
 from the 30th to the 31st of March, of the 
 roads through which the Catalonians would 
 have to retreat, and made a brisk attack upon 
 the town before day break. After an obstinate 
 defence, the Catalonians were defeated and 
 found themselves involved in a fresh encounter 
 during their flight. The dragoons with lieu- 
 tenant Bignon, their commander, greatly dis- 
 tinguished themselves. We collected 600 mus- 
 kets ; a great number of Spaniards were either 
 killed or taken prisoners, and scarcely 2 or
 
 TAKING OF THE COL D E BALAGUER. 289 
 
 300 succeeded in effecting their escape. This 
 event restored tranquillity, for a short time, to 
 the vicinity of Lerida, and the fertile plains of 
 Urgel, the resources of which it was of such 
 vital interest for us to preserve, with a view 
 to provide for the subsistence of the army.
 
 CHAPTER X.* 
 
 The 3rd corps ceases to be a burden to France. — Exhausted 
 state of Arragon. — Statistical details respecting that pro- 
 vince. — The Arragonese are called to take a share in the 
 administration of the country. — Ordinary contributions. — 
 Extraordinary contribution. — Payment of the troops. — Re- 
 moval of the extraordinary contribution. — Organization of 
 the district of Tortosa. — Imperial canal in Arragon. — Hos- 
 pitals ; police. — Supplies collected in Arragon during the 
 sieges. — Meat market. — Arrival of an intendant-general 
 from Paris. — Results of an administration of two years' 
 duration. 
 
 It has been asserted, that the art of conquering 
 is of no avail, unless combined with the art of 
 procuring means of subsiste?ice for the troops. This 
 
 * This chapter embraces a connected series of administra- 
 tive operations, comprising a period of thirty months, that is 
 to say, a part of 1809, and the years 1810 and 1811. Never- 
 theless it has found a place between the siege of Tortosa 
 and that of Tarragona, though subsequent to the latter in 
 chronological order. The order of matters has, however,
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 291 
 
 is a truth which cannot be denied, when we 
 consider of what those mighty assemblages of 
 men denominated armies consist ; what con- 
 sumptions of all kinds are called for by a state 
 of war; how advantageous it is for the inha- 
 bitants of a country, that the soldiers should 
 be furnished with what they might otherwise 
 forcibly seize upon, and how it behoves a 
 general to preserve them in health, strength, 
 and courage, on which, in the day of battle, 
 may possibly depend the success of an en- 
 gagement which might decide the fate of a cam- 
 paign. We trust that we shall be able to furnish 
 a fresh proof of this, and to establish the fact, 
 that the regular administration of an army, and 
 the proper application of the resources of the 
 country which it retains under its sway, should 
 be considered as its most powerful auxiliaries. 
 The administration of the English armies 
 during the war in the Peninsula, has been 
 
 appeared lo claim the preference on this occasion, over that 
 of dates. Whilst the army of Arragon was concentrated 
 at a distance, and in front of a city on the point of being 
 besieged, it stood more particularly in need of being- 
 supplied with provisions, since it could no longer pro- 
 ceed in quest of them. The administration of Arragon 
 was, therefore, from that moment, the basis on which it 
 relied for its successes, and for its very existence. We have 
 no doubt that the sieges undertaken by that army will be 
 better understood, if attention be first bestowed upon this 
 chapter. 
 
 VOL. r. U
 
 292 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 quoted as a model worthy of imitation. It is, 
 indeed, an undoubted truth, that they pene- 
 trated into Portugal and Spain without being- 
 burdensome to the inhabitants ; they distributed 
 a profusion of money on their way : provisions, 
 means of transport, every thing was paid for. 
 But their position did not bear the slightest ana- 
 logy to ours ; they acted in the character of 
 allies, and had the advantage over us of pos- 
 sessing a fleet which held undisputed possession 
 of the ocean and of the coasts. By this means, 
 they received from England every kind of as- 
 sistance which a wealthy and powerful go- 
 vernment could supply ; or else they felt no 
 difficulty in procuring, at an exorbitant rate, 
 whatever they stood in need of. At the same 
 time, their administration, whilst it paid for 
 every thing that was consumed by the troops, 
 had the power of introducing, through every 
 harbour of the Peninsula, the produce of En- 
 glish industry or commerce ; the supply of 
 arms, clothing, and equipments for the Por- 
 tuguese and Spanish armies, enabled it to re- 
 ceive and export more money than it had 
 occasion to expend, or at least to make its 
 allies debtors for very considerable sums. As 
 France possessed no such means of drawing 
 from the Peninsula the treasures which it laid 
 out in the country for the maintenance of its 
 armies, French coins were seen every where
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 293 
 
 in circulation, whereas English money was sel- 
 dom to be met with. The British government, 
 by this wise mode of proceeding, has obtained 
 an important result; its land forces, after many 
 signal defeats, have succeeded of late years in 
 almost rivalling the glory acquired by its fleets, 
 and claim a distinguished rank among Euro- 
 pean armies. 
 
 Our situation in Arragon was materially diffe- 
 rent ; we were, from the very outset, surrounded 
 by a hostile population, and could not venture 
 to send a boat down the Ebro without an 
 escort of soldiers. At that very period, however, 
 the French government, instead of upholding our 
 administrative measures, left them to their fate 
 and to the resources which the country itself might 
 afford. Notwithstanding these difficulties, if 
 general Suchet, without failing in the mission 
 assigned to him of defeating and conquering his 
 opponents, succeeded on the one hand in paci- 
 fying an oppressed and exasperated country, and 
 on the other in providing for the pay and sub- 
 sistence of the army, laying siege to several 
 fortified places, and lodging a sum little short of 
 8,000,000 of francs in the public treasury at 
 Madrid, we are warranted in maintaining that the 
 system of administration, to which these successes 
 were mainly to be attributed, need not shrink 
 from a comparison with that pursued by the 
 English armies. The various circumstances 
 
 u 2
 
 294 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 which tended to promote their successes in Spain, 
 so far from proving of any advantage to general 
 Suchet, actually proved serious obstacles to 
 his progress. The following details will show 
 what persevering efforts were required to over- 
 come them. 
 
 In the spring of 1809, the calamities of the 
 war pressed heavily upon Arragon, which had 
 been groaning under them for nearly a twelve- 
 month ; the destructive siege of Saragossa had 
 diminished the population, ruined commerce and 
 industry, deprived agriculture of its crops and of 
 its cattle. To fill the measure of distress, a 
 numerous Spanish army debouched towards Al- 
 caniz, drove back one of our divisions, and threat- 
 ened Saragossa. Such was the state of affairs 
 on the 19th of May, when general Suchet came 
 to assume the command of the 3rd corps. His 
 attention was at first limited to the object of 
 rallying the troops, reviving their drooping spi- 
 rits, infusing into them a proper discipline, 
 and afterwards leading them against the enemy 
 whom they succeeded in defeating and expelling 
 from the province of Arragon. 
 
 After having happily terminated this first expe- 
 dition, he endeavoured to calm the public mind, 
 to restore order in every branch of the adminis- 
 tration, and to repair, to the best of his power, the 
 evils attendant upon the war. Ever since our 
 entrance into Spain, France had sent the funds
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 295 
 
 requisite for the payment of the troops and the 
 general exigencies of the service ; it had supplied 
 every article of clothing and field equipment ; 
 the country which we occupied had only pro- 
 vided us with the bare means of subsistence ; 
 and if we interfered in the civil administration, 
 we confined ourselves to the promoting the 
 collection of the contributions imposed on ac- 
 count of the Spanish government. 
 
 On a sudden, an order directing that war 
 should feed the war, effected a change in the 
 state of our relations with a province which 
 was just struggling to repair its ruins. On 
 the 9th of February, 1810, the commander-in- 
 chief received from the prince major-general the 
 following letter : — 
 
 " General Suchet, — The emperor desires me to 
 ' make known to you his intention that you 
 " should employ the revenues of the country, 
 " and even impose extraordinary contributions, 
 " if necessary, with a view to provide for the 
 " pay and subsistence of your corps d'armee, 
 " it being no longer in the power of France 
 " to defray these expenses. France is impo- 
 1 verished by the removal of the enormous 
 " sums of money which the public treasury is 
 " constantly sending to Spain ; the country which 
 " you occupy, and which is possessed of abundant 
 " resources, must henceforth supply the wants 
 " of your troops."
 
 296 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 This letter was accompanied with another of 
 the same date and of the following tenor : — 
 " General, I transmit to you an extract of the 
 emperor's decree relative to the formation of 
 the government of Arragon, of which his ma- 
 jesty confides the command to you, with the 
 title of governor. You will lose no time in 
 officially communicating the clauses of this de- 
 cree to the several local authorities, and from 
 that moment you will conform to the emperor's 
 orders therein contained. You will make 
 known to me the period at which you shall 
 have entered upon the exercise of your new 
 functions. His majesty relies upon your 
 wonted energy which will enable you to derive 
 from the national resources all the advantages 
 that may fairly be expected from them, and 
 especially to prevent their becoming, in the 
 smallest degree, available to the insur- 
 gents. 
 
 " Agreeably to the emperor's intentions, you 
 are to continue addressing to the staff of the 
 army your reports respecting military opera- 
 tions, and the situation of the provinces be- 
 longing to your government ; but with regard 
 to the systems of local administration, justice, 
 police, and finances, you can only receive 
 orders from the emperor, which it will be my 
 duty to transmit direct to you. Consequently, 
 &c. &c."
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF AURAGON. 297 
 
 It was easy to foresee the numerous obstacles 
 that would necessarily oppose the execution of 
 such a system ; but there was no course left but 
 to obey. The commander-in-chief thenceforth 
 used all his endeavours to acquire a correct 
 knowledge of the resources he could apply to the 
 pay, subsistence, and other wants of the army. 
 
 Previously to the invasion, Arragon derived 
 from its soil a sufficient quantity of corn, wine, 
 and oil, to meet its demands ; it even exported 
 to Catalonia and Navarre a considerable portion 
 of those articles. Oppressed, however, for nearly 
 two years by the requisitions of several national 
 and foreign armies, that province was impoverish- 
 ed; agriculture was considerably impaired ; a great 
 number of vines and olive trees had been de- 
 stroyed ; the enormous consumption of sheep, the 
 only species of cattle which offers a means of sub- 
 sistence in that country, had nearly exhausted 
 all the breed. Albarracin was the only place in 
 the whole province where a manufactory of 
 coarse cloths was to be seen ; not a single loom 
 was at work ; there still existed a tan-pit ; but 
 a pair of shoes could not be had under nine 
 francs, nor a pair of boots under fifty. 
 
 The financial condition of the province was 
 still more deplorable ; as money was considered 
 the sinew of war, the Spanish government had 
 not neglected measures that were calculated 
 to remove it from general circulation. The
 
 298 
 
 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 exintendant of the province had carried away to 
 Seville 3,000,000 of francs, the proceeds of pa- 
 triotic donations and contributions collected pre- 
 viously to the siege of Saragossa. The wealthiest 
 families had emigrated, and removed all the 
 ready money they could obtain. A million 
 of reales, and 3,000 marks of plate, derived 
 from the suppressed convents, had just been 
 transmitted to count Cabarrus, the minister of 
 finances at Madrid. The royal treasury of Spain 
 was indebted 500,000 reales for expenses, 
 and did not possess a single real wherewith 
 to face its engagements. All taxable objects 
 were fast disappearing ; the local adminis- 
 trations were partly dissolved ; several sources 
 of public wealth were dried up ; and the 
 annual pay of the army alone required 8,000,000 
 of francs, for which we had to call upon 
 a country which, in its most prosperous days, 
 never paid more than 4,000,000 to the Spanish 
 government. 
 
 The above is a faithful picture of the state of 
 affairs. The decree respecting the formation of the 
 military governments was scarcely made known, 
 when every one began to comment upon it ; and 
 the most intelligent Spaniards fancied they could 
 discover through the clauses upon which the 
 official object of that act principally relied a 
 motive of far greater importance. It was sup- 
 posed that a misunderstanding existed between
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 299 
 
 the cabinets of Madrid and of the Tuileries, and 
 that the emperor contemplated the extension of 
 the boundaries of France to the banks of the Ebro. 
 Those fears could only add to the embarrassment 
 of our position; had the commander-in-chief 
 considered it of a transient nature, he might 
 easily have provided for the wants of the moment 
 by the most expeditious course, a compulsory one, 
 and instantly seize upon the main resources of the 
 country. Nevertheless, having been appointed 
 governor of Arragon, he felt the necessity of acting 
 upon a different principle. It behoved him not 
 only to avoid exhausting the province, but even 
 to retrieve its resources by his fostering care ; his 
 first object was, accordingly, to restore public 
 confidence. He acted in this respect with more 
 prudence than the Spanish government. In con- 
 sequence of the repeated orders of M. Cabarrus, 
 the minister of finance the plate of Nuestra-Se- 
 nora del Pilar was to be sent off to Madrid. This 
 church which was held in veneration by the 
 Spaniards, and enriched with the gifts of many 
 sovereigns, possessed a great number of vases, 
 candlesticks, and statues, in massive gold or 
 silver. The people of Saragossa set a great value 
 on their being preserved ; and the commander- 
 in-chief took upon himself not to allow of their 
 removal. This first feature of an administration 
 which indicated a respect for property, was duly 
 appreciated by the Arragonese. The commander-
 
 300 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 in-chief s conduct, on this occasion was not 
 thrown away upon them ; it greatly contributed 
 to calm the excitement of a province agitated by 
 political convulsions, and by the wants which were 
 inseparable from a state of warfare, at a time when 
 the very laws of war had been trampled upon.* 
 
 * A few traits will afford some idea of the rage and excite- 
 ment with which the Spaniards were animated against us 
 during this war, whether these feelings arose in their own 
 breasts or were instigated by their chiefs, who have not only 
 repeatedly violated the laws of God and man, but even com- 
 manded and rewarded such violation. 
 
 It has already been seen that generals O'Donohu and 
 Renovales, who were prisoners upon their parole, effected their 
 escape by abusing the confidence reposed in their good faith. 
 A multitude of Spanish officers followed their example. How 
 could such conduct create astonishment ! A regulation was 
 printed at Cadiz by the order or with the sanction of the su- 
 preme regency, which promised promotion to every military 
 man amongst the Spaniards who should thus effect his escape 
 from the hands of the French. 
 
 In a catechism which was also printed and circulated in 
 every direction, questions were laid down of the following 
 nature : 
 
 •* What duty do we owe our neighbour? We are bound to 
 " love him, and to do him all the good in our power. What is 
 " meant by our neighbour? All mankind excepting French- 
 " men. Are we at liberty to kill the French ? Not only we 
 " may, but it is our duty to do so." 
 
 At the time when Sarraza, the Guerilla leader, infested the 
 frontier of Navarre, an alcalde appointed by the French was 
 publicly assassinated in a village ; the murderers were known, 
 and openly boasted of their crimes , we succeeded in seizing 
 two of them, who were hung at Pampelona. Sarraza issued on
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 301 
 
 With a view the more correctly to illustrate 
 the following statement, it has appeared to us 
 that some historical and statistical details re- 
 specting the province of Arragon would not be 
 superfluous in this place. 
 
 Arragon is the ancient Celtiberia of the Romans. 
 The Goths converted it into a province of Spain. 
 When that part of the kingdom submitted to the 
 Moorish yoke, the inhabitants retreated to the 
 Pyrenees, and established amongst those moun- 
 tains a petty state, known under the name of So- 
 
 this occasion a proclamation which was published, and contained 
 the following- phrase : because some honest men have killed 
 such a one, as they were justly warranted in doing, the 
 French governor has presumed to resort to a measure of re- 
 prisals! ( ' Porque algunos hombres de bicn, con todo derecho 
 y toda justicia, mataron a fulanoj Sec. ; upon this ground he 
 devoted the governor of Navarre to public vengeance. 
 
 The same Guerilla leader said, in a letter which was inter- 
 cepted, that he was on the look out for the wife of general 
 Suchet, who was returning to France by way of Jaca ; adding, 
 that he was the more anxious to fall in with that lady as 
 she was said to be in the family way, (which was the fact) so 
 that the child would perish with its mother. 
 
 However horrible these facts, as they bear a close affinity 
 to what civil or revolutionary wars seldom fail to exhibit, we 
 are not so much shocked at them as at the depravity of ideas 
 and sentiments of which they afford a melancholy instance. 
 
 The above details will furnish some estimate of the diffi- 
 culties we had to contend with before we could succeed, after 
 conquering the inhabitants of that country, in bringing them 
 to the opposite extreme, of cherishing and esteeming their 
 conquerors.
 
 302 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 brarve, which was afterwards incorporated with 
 the kingdom of Arragon.* 
 
 At a later period, the provinces of Catalonia and 
 Valencia were under the dominion of that king- 
 dom; the former was annexed to it in 1 137, by the 
 marriage of Raymond de Berenger, count of Bar- 
 celona, with Petronilla, the daughter of king Don 
 Ramiro, and heiress of the crown of Arragon. 
 The latter was taken from the Moors by king 
 Don Jaime, in 1238. Those three provinces 
 formed, with the Balearic islands, what was called 
 La Coronilla, or the small crown. On the occa- 
 sion of the marriage of Ferdinand of Arragon with 
 Isabella of Castille, they were annexed to the 
 crown of Spain. 
 
 Arragon Proper was divided into thirteen cor- 
 regimientos, or districts, named as follows : 
 
 Tarrazona, Borja, Calatayud, Daroca, Albar- 
 racin, Teruel, Alcaniz, Benavarre, Barbastro, 
 Huesca, Jaca, Cincovillas, and Saragossa. 
 
 Each corregimiento was under the superin- 
 tendence of a magistrate, called corregidor, whose 
 various functions afford too clear a proof of the 
 confusion which existed in Spain at that period, 
 w r ith respect to the distribution of powers. We 
 shall convey a sufficient idea of this fact by 
 observing, that the duties devolving upon that 
 functionary comprised the several branches of 
 justice, police, finances, and war, and that 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. I3>
 
 ADMINISTRATION' OF ARRAGON. 303 
 
 the titulary magistrate was dependent upon the 
 governor of the province as well as upon the 
 real audiencia, or court of appeal. 
 
 Saragossa was an archbishoprick, which had for 
 suffragans the bishops of Albarracin, Barbastro, 
 Huesca, Jaca, Tarrazona, and Teruel. 
 
 The court of appeal, called the real audiencia, 
 held its sittings in Saragossa. It consisted of two 
 civil courts and a criminal one. Justice was admi- 
 nistered in the first instance under the presidency 
 of the corregidors, by the alcaldes of towns and 
 villages, who were in many instances appointed 
 by the lords of the manor. 
 
 In former times, the provinces of Arragon, 
 Catalonia, and Valencia were subjected to a 
 system of contribution known by the name of pro- 
 vincial revenues. Philip V substituted the land 
 tax for it, better described by the name which 
 it bears of un'ica contribuciun . Those three pro- 
 vinces are indebted for their subsequent pros- 
 perity to an alteration imposed upon them by 
 way of punishment. This contribution is founded 
 upon the basis of an estimate of the produce of 
 lands and of property in general. It might, in 
 most respects, have been compared with our 
 rental book, had it not included in its provisions 
 the income derived from commerce, from manu- 
 facturing industry, and even the amount of the 
 profits, or the wages of the manufacturer and 
 daily labourer.
 
 304 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 The administration of the customs and the 
 general revenue comprised the collection of im- 
 port and export duties upon certain merchandise, 
 and the exclusive sale of such things of 
 which the government had reserved to itself a 
 monopoly ; such as tobacco, lead, sealing wax, 
 sulphur, gunpowder, playing cards, stamped 
 paper, salt, and even papal bulls. The revenues 
 derived from the post office and from couriers were 
 established on the same footing as in France. 
 The government received one and a half per cent 
 upon the revenues of corporations, consisting of 
 the privilege of farming out the right to grind 
 corn, to make oil, to establish tolls upon rivers, 
 and to retail bread, wine, meat, and other articles 
 of primary necessity; lastly, by a pontifical decree 
 of the month of October, 1801, Pius VII had 
 granted to Charles IV the ninth part of the 
 church tithes. The total amount of these taxes 
 in the province of Arragon was estimated, in 1787, 
 at fifteen millions nine hundred thousand reales 
 de vellon, or about four millions of francs. The 
 real is the fourth part of a peceta, the current 
 coin of the kingdom, which is worth rather more 
 than the livre of twenty sols. 
 
 These data, respecting the public revenue in 
 ordinary times, may serve as points of comparison 
 from which to estimate the sums collected by the 
 French administration, notwithstanding the sup- 
 pression of several taxes effected in favor of local
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 305 
 
 industry, and the exhaustion of other productive 
 means which the war had swept away. 
 
 According to a census made by order of the 
 government, in 1776, Arragon contained at that pe- 
 riod twelve cities, two hundred and forty boroughs, 
 nine hundred and ninety-five villages, and a hun- 
 dred and sixty-eight hamlets ; and its population 
 amounted to a hundred and seventeen thousand 
 one hundred and twelve heads of families,* 
 equivalent to five hundred and twenty-seven thou- 
 sand and four individuals, exclusively of four 
 thousand five hundred secular priests, four thou- 
 sand monks, and fifteen hundred religious women. 
 
 Another census made in 1788, rates the popula- 
 tion of the province at six hundred and twenty- 
 two thousand three hundred and eight individuals. 
 A comparison between the two statements would 
 indicate that the population of Arragon has in- 
 creased, a result which is confirmed by several 
 writers, who estimate at nearly two millions of indi- 
 viduals, the general increase of population through- 
 out Spain, from the close of the war of the suc- 
 cession to the commencement of the reign of 
 Charles IV. Dating however from the lattei 
 period, it has been uniformly on the decrease. 
 
 There are, besides, in Arragon, 149 villages, 
 
 * In order to ascertain the number of individuals, it is neces- 
 sary to multiply by four and a half the number of heads of 
 families, who, in this point of view, are called vecivos.
 
 306 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 long since deserted, and 393 villages in which 
 very few houses are left standing. Nothing, 
 therefore, is so common as to travel a distance of 
 five or six leagues, without meeting with a single 
 habitation. 
 
 We have already stated, that the wheat harvest 
 was not only sufficient for the subsistence of the 
 inhabitants, but admitted, moreover, of being 
 exported in quantities which, in ordinary years, 
 amounted to 50,000 cahices for Catalonia, and 
 20,000 for the kingdom of Valencia. The culture 
 of the vine produced an excess of 80,000 nie- 
 tros.* The growth of olives, likewise, afforded 
 a very considerable surplus, which was chiefly 
 exported to Castille or Navarre. The corregi- 
 miento of Alcaniz alone produced what far ex- 
 ceeded the wants of the province of Arragon. 
 
 The flocks, which amounted to upwards of 
 2,000,000 of sheep, furnished about 35,000 quin- 
 tals of wool, of which only one third was re- 
 quired by the manufactories of the country. 
 
 This was also the case with respect to hemp, 
 the crop of which was calculated at 100,000 
 arrobas, Castillian weight. About 30,000 arro- 
 bas were consumed in the province ; the re- 
 mainder was sent to the sea-ports, for the service 
 
 * The cahice of Arragon, containing twelve barchillas, is a 
 measure nearly equivalent to 180 litres and a^half; the nietro 
 contains sixteen cantaros, equal to sixteen litres each.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 307 
 
 of the king's navy. The arroba is the fourth 
 part of a quintal. 
 
 The annual produce of silk amounted to200,C00 
 pounds, one half of which was sent to Catalonia. 
 
 We might easily quote many other articles 
 of produce. The soil and climate of that beau- 
 tiful province yield an abundant harvest to labour; 
 the latter alone is wanting to one of the finest 
 countries in Europe. 
 
 It can hardly be said that commerce was 
 considered as a distinct profession. Every one 
 sold the excess of his crop. Even the export 
 trade was generally carried on by means of mer- 
 chants of the provinces of Catalonia and Navarre, 
 who sent their agents every year to collect the 
 rich tributes of raw materials. 
 
 With respect to manufacturing industry, it was 
 confined to a very limited number of manufac- 
 tories, the work of which was of the coarsest kind. 
 
 Arragon had two universities, the one at Sara- 
 gossa, the other at Huesca ; but they imparted 
 neither solid nor brilliant instruction : it was 
 much more calculated to keep youth in the dark- 
 ness of ignorance, than to extend their natural 
 genius. This defect, however, was common all 
 over Spain. 
 
 Although there existed no colleges, nor public 
 schools, teachers of Latin were to be met 
 with in every direction ; the poorest work- 
 man could easily, and at a cheap rate, procure 
 
 vol. i. x
 
 308 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 his children a knowledge of that language, 
 which was sufficient for the admission into a 
 convent of monks. This mode of education is 
 evidently owing to the wealth and preponderat- 
 ing influence of the clergy. 
 
 The observer's attention is more particularly 
 attracted to the fact, of the extensive knowledge 
 possessed by the very limited number of those 
 who are really informed, in the midst of so 
 general a state of ignorance. In Spain, there 
 are so many obstacles to conquer on the road 
 to instruction, that none but minds of a very 
 superior order are likely to overcome. There 
 is no limit to the success of those who have 
 once fairly started in the course ; the rest keep 
 in the beaten track of antiquated customs. 
 
 The Arragonese are proud, obstinate, jealous 
 of their liberty, and take it for granted that their 
 country surpasses every other in the world. The 
 still powerful influence of their primitive insti- 
 tutions on the national character, raises them in 
 the scale above the other inhabitants of Spain 
 in respect to political customs. In society, they 
 are silent and reserved ; their exterior deport- 
 ment is grave, cold, and pensive ; but they are 
 religious observers of their promise. 
 
 The rivalries between one province and another 
 subsist, perhaps, in a greater degree in Spain 
 than in any other country. The Arragonese 
 fancy that they possess more physical strength,
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 309 
 
 and spring from nobler blood, than the Castil- 
 lians, because they are less inclined to bend to 
 their superiors. They are vain of a circum- 
 stance that distinguishes them from their neigh- 
 bours, which is, that the Catalonians and Va- 
 lencians have a dialect peculiar to their province, 
 whereas in Arragon all classes of the people 
 speak the purest Spanish. 
 
 In no part of Spain is the cause of justice 
 more loudly advocated. The native of Ar- 
 ragon spontaneously yields obedience to what 
 he considers right, but revolts against any arbi- 
 trary act. This characteristic feature, added to 
 a natural enthusiasm for glory, explains the 
 conduct of the Arragonese towards the French 
 army during the war of invasion. The name of 
 Saragossa recalls the first and the most strenuous 
 resistance ever offered to the French ; and it 
 also exhibits the first example of candid and 
 sincere submission to the government which the 
 law of necessity had compelled that city to ac- 
 knowledge. They exerted in their defence every 
 effort that might be expected from a heroic 
 people ; but after they had been reduced to 
 the most dreadful extremity, and had lost all 
 hopes of relief, they opened their gates to the 
 conqueror, and yielded, without reserve, to all 
 the consequences which their situation entailed 
 upon them. Their feelings were of far too digni- 
 fied a nature to warrant their indulgence of those 
 
 x2
 
 310 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 revengeful acts which exceed the bounds of a 
 legitimate defence, and are alike disowned by 
 the laws of war and of humanity. 
 
 The invasion of the Peninsula by the French 
 army had, from a combination of circumstances, 
 been the means of introducing extraordinary 
 changes in the situation of Arragon, such as we 
 have just described it. On the one hand, the 
 inhabitants had made the most determined re- 
 sistance ; on the other, the necessity of conquer- 
 ing by force of arms had led us into excesses 
 which it was unhappily beyond our power to 
 avoid. During the siege of Saragossa, the bands 
 of discipline had become relaxed ; the military 
 administration was in the utmost disorder, the 
 hospitals without provisions, the distribution of 
 supplies uncertain, and attended with difficulties. 
 The abuses arising out of this state of confusion 
 recoiled upon the inhabitants, and the excite- 
 ment of the public mind was gradually increasing 
 in consequence of the daily vexations to which 
 the people were subjected. Accordingly, all the 
 young men of Arragon, who had assembled at 
 Saragossa, were preparing to second general 
 Blake's army whenever it should make its ap- 
 pearance under the ramparts of the city. Not- 
 withstanding this prevalent feeling, it was no 
 sooner perceived, after the defeat of general 
 Blake, that the governor was endeavouring to 
 establish a regular system of administration and
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGOX. 
 
 311 
 
 discipline, than confidence revived, and a dispo- 
 sition to submit again became manifest. This 
 was the time when the commander-in-chief was 
 called upon to give effect to the emperor's orders. 
 Unwillingly compelled to embark in an attempt 
 which he had at first considered wholly imprac- 
 ticable, general Suchet drew around him the few 
 men of talent who had remained in the province, 
 and upon whose uprightness of conduct he could 
 place some reliance. Foremost in the list was 
 the titulary bishop of Saragossa, afterwards 
 bishop of Huesca, and appointed archbishop of 
 Seville, the truly venerable father Santander, 
 whose persuasive eloquence instilled a peaceful 
 and conciliatory disposition into his flock. This 
 prelate pointed out the means to be adopted 
 with the view of securing to the clergy a portion 
 of their revenues, and the protection to which 
 they were entitled. At his recommendation, the 
 commander-in-chief appointed to the vacant place 
 of dean of the metropolitan chapter of Saragossa, 
 the curate of Val de Algorfa, don Ramon Segura, a 
 man no less distinguished by his virtues than by his 
 mental accomplishments. The military ex-inten- 
 dent of general Palafox, don Mariano Dominguez, 
 had recently displayed consummate ability in the 
 defence of Saragossa; he was well acquainted 
 with all the resources of the province, and by 
 attaching himself to France he rendered us very 
 signal services. Villa y Torre, the president of
 
 312 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the real audiencia, who had received his appoint- 
 ment from Charles IV, was retained at the head 
 of the department of justice ; he was entitled to 
 general esteem by his profound knowledge, and his 
 attachment to his country. The chief accountant 
 of the province had acquired much practical ex- 
 perience in the mode of apportioning the contri- 
 butions, and was also retained in his situation. 
 The governor selected for that of general secre- 
 tary to the government, M. Larreguy the elder, 
 a Frenchman of Spanish origin, and a highly 
 talented and zealous young man, who greatly 
 distinguished himself in that capacity. 
 
 We also succeeded, though not without some 
 difficulty, in obtaining the accession of don 
 Agustin de Quinto, one of the lawyers of the 
 province, the most distinguished by his knowledge 
 and the general confidence he enjoyed. He was 
 one of those few individuals in whose person 
 talents and virtue are combined in an equal 
 degree. To the enlightened councils of those 
 meritorious men, the governor is indebted for his 
 having conquered public opinion in the very 
 exercise of the rigorous measures which he was 
 directed to carry into effect. Fully considering 
 the situation of the country, they accepted 
 the honorable mission of interposing moderation 
 and justice, in the intercourse between the inha- 
 bitants and the soldiery, and watched the in- 
 terests of their fellow countrymen with a per-
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARHAGON. 313 
 
 severance which never relaxed in the pursuit of 
 that object. If any odium has attached to the 
 administration, we owe it to ourselves to de- 
 clare that their character ought to stand un- 
 blemished in the minds of the nation ; the blame 
 should be ascribed to no other cause than un- 
 foreseen circumstances, or the errors into which 
 we may have involuntarily fallen. 
 
 General Blake's army had scarcely been de- 
 feated in the plains of Maria and of Belchite, when 
 it became necessary to advance against Lerida; 
 but the commander-in-chief resolved not to quit 
 the capital of Arragon, until he had first regulated 
 the march of the public administration during his 
 absence. 
 
 The order of judicature remained unchanged; 
 a watchful and active police was established ; no 
 alteration was yet introduced in the mode and 
 principle of collecting taxes. 
 
 A contribution in kind having been imposed, 
 with a view to secure the subsistence of the army, 
 and the provisioning of the fortresses, a director of 
 supplies residing in Saragossa was appointed to 
 the duty of opening an account against each 
 district; and the statement of the deliveries made 
 in the province, was compared, each month, 
 with the effective strength of the respective corps. 
 
 It was of importance to concentrate the receipts 
 and expenditure, and to confine the latter within 
 proper limits ; a general receiver and a general
 
 314 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 paymaster for the army were installed in Sara- 
 gossa. These two agents, who had been sent to 
 the army by count Mollien, minister of the im- 
 perial treasury, had assistants under their orders 
 who represented them in the local districts ; 
 from that moment all the revenues found their 
 way to one and the same chest, just in the 
 same manner as all the expenses were defrayed 
 by only one agent, upon regular orders and 
 within the limit of the credit which had been 
 assigned for the service. 
 
 The old contadoria was a kind of office of 
 accounts, and justly enjoyed the confidence of 
 the inhabitants. It was however divided in such 
 a manner that each administrator had his separate 
 accountant. With a view to concentrate the 
 mode of superintendence, and simplify the ma- 
 chinery of that useful establishment, all the 
 private accountants were united under the direc- 
 tion of the accountant of the province, and 
 this functionary, in virtue of fresh powers, was in- 
 vested with the right of deciding upon every 
 difficult question, of investigating the abuses 
 which might obstruct the progress of the collec- 
 tion of the revenue, and of securing a more 
 effectual assessment of the public burdens. 
 
 Monopoly, which exercises an arbitrary con- 
 troul over the wants or tastes of the people at large, 
 and checks the natural tendency of commerce 
 to satisfy them, had secured to itself every chan-
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 315 
 
 nel of public consumption and closed all the ave- 
 nues to industry ; it was partly suppressed. 
 
 Afterhavins: thusbroken some ofthe chains which 
 curbed the faculties of the people, and confided 
 to the Spaniards themselves the care of watching 
 over their interests, the commander-in-chief took 
 his departure in the month of April, 1810, for the 
 purpose of attacking Lerida, and left the public 
 mind, hitherto so much agitated, more favour- 
 ably disposed towards us. Having obtained 
 possession of Lerida on the 14th of May, he im- 
 posed upon that town and upon the 149 villages, 
 forming its corregimiento, a war tax of four mil- 
 lions of reales, and lost no time in organising the 
 departments of justice, police, and finances upon 
 the same footing as in Arragon, a uniformity of 
 system which had become indispensable to the 
 government over both provinces. 
 
 The public revenues, however, yielded no re- 
 turns ; the arrear was daily increasing, and it be- 
 came necessary that we should take advantage 
 ofthe moment for creating new resources. 
 
 On the 12th of June an extraordinary contribu- 
 tion of 3,000,000 of reales per month was imposed 
 upon Arragon. It was painful to resort to this 
 extremity ; but whilst we were before Lerida, 
 numerous Guerilla bands had penetrated into the 
 province, and prevented the collection of the re- 
 gular taxes. The privations to which the army 
 was exposed afforded a ready excuse for a mea-
 
 31G MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 sure which was moreover founded upon the wants 
 created by a state of warfare. The basis adopted 
 for the apportioning of this tax was the land tax, 
 which extended to all classes of people without 
 any distinction. The clergy being called upon 
 to contribute towards it, fixed their own quota, 
 and displayed on this occasion a disinterestedness 
 highly creditable to them. 
 
 But it was not sufficient to impose fresh taxes, 
 and to compel the people to pay them. It was 
 of importance that the money with which they 
 were obliged to part should return to them, 
 and that a constant circulation should prevent 
 any stagnation, and supply the wants of the mi- 
 litary chests without uselessly encumbering them. 
 The commander-in-chief ordered that the pay of 
 the troops should be issued every five days : 
 soldiers are not slow in disbursing the money 
 they receive. The inhabitants were soon con- 
 vinced that the tax levied upon them was no 
 more than an advance, which would shortly re- 
 vert to their hands by their bringing supplies to 
 our cities and camps. Upon the same principle, 
 every article manufactured in the country for the 
 clothing or equipment of troops, was carefully 
 sought and paid for to the furnishers in ready 
 money. 
 
 At the end of every month, when an account 
 of the pay of the army was drawn up, the retired 
 allowances and the pensions to widows of military
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF AURAGON. 317 
 
 men, such as they had been granted by the 
 former government, were punctually liquidated. 
 The salaries of those who were employed in the 
 various branches of the administration, almost 
 exclusively composed of Spaniards, were paid 
 with the same regularity and at the same period. 
 These arrangements produced all the good ef- 
 fect that might be expected ; industry and com- 
 merce revived ; the circulation of money became 
 more rapid than before, and the recovery of taxes 
 was no longer attended with the same difficulties. 
 
 At the end of 1810, the commander-in-chief 
 solicited of the French government an indemnity 
 for the supply of 10,000 quintals of corn, which 
 he was obliged to give up to the army of Cata- 
 lonia, and for replacing to a certain extent the 
 resources of which he was now deprived by the 
 cession of the corregimiento of Lerida. He only 
 obtained 300,000 francs ; nevertheless this relief, 
 however small, was not wholly without its in- 
 fluence, by increasing the amount of coin in cir- 
 culation. 
 
 The siege of Tortosa, which was undertaken in 
 the month of June, having been suspended until 
 the month of December, the commander-in-chief 
 attempted to turn this compulsory delay to the 
 advantage of the administration. He summoned 
 to his head-quarters at Mora, on the Ebro, the 
 principal authorities of Arragon, in order to regu- 
 late, in concert with them, the budget of 1811, to
 
 318 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 consider of the means best calculated for facili- 
 tating the collection of taxes, and to grant to the 
 inhabitants whatever relief might be compatible 
 with the existing state of affairs. 
 
 In furtherance of this object, indispensable alte- 
 rations were effected in the division of the territory, 
 and in the civil and judicial functions. Fraga, 
 which derived from Philip V the prerogatives 
 attached to a chief town, was created into a corre- 
 gimiento. The fourteen corregimientos, of which the 
 province of Arragon at that time consisted, were 
 separated into two grand divisions, the one on the 
 right, the other on the left bank of the Ebro. 
 M. Menche, a man of high character, who had 
 been sent to Madrid as intendent of Arragon, was 
 retained in his situation, with the title of head 
 commissioner of the province. MM. Dominguez 
 and Quinto, in their capacity of superior commis- 
 sioners, were respectively entrusted with the duty 
 of superintending the administration of both banks. 
 The judicial powers were withdrawn from the 
 corregidors and alcaldes, who remained invested 
 with the civil authority only, whilst the principal 
 alcaldes were exclusively charged with the duty 
 of administering justice under the direction of the 
 regent of the audiencia. The corregidors of dis- 
 tricts received the appellation of principal cor- 
 regidors, and the alcaldes that of corregidors 
 of communes. 
 
 A correct idea may be formed of these various
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 319 
 
 functions by observing that the superior com- 
 missioners might be compared to our prefects, 
 the principal corregidors to our sub-prefects, 
 the corregidors of communes to our mayors, 
 the principal alcaldes with the judges of 
 first instance, and the real audiencia with the 
 courts of appeal. These changes tended to estab- 
 lish a clearer line of distinction between the 
 several powers, and to give a more efficient im- 
 pulse to the administration. 
 
 At this period, all the acts of the government 
 were promulgated in the emperor's name, without 
 any indication being given by the Spaniards of 
 their feeling dissatisfied at the change. 
 
 We had yet to perform the task of framing the 
 budget of 1811, and doing away with taxes that 
 were either unnecessary, or opposed by their very 
 nature to the public welfare, as well as to re-model 
 upon fresh bases those administrations which had 
 only been imperfectly organized. 
 
 The lottery was suppressed : the manufactur- 
 ing and disposal of those articles, of which the 
 Spanish government had reserved to itself the 
 exclusive monopoly, having been declared free and 
 open to all, a reduction took place amongst the 
 persons hitherto employed in duties no longer re- 
 quired of them. It had been proved by expe- 
 rience, that the extent of power given to the 
 contadoria of the province had presented solid 
 guarantees to the communes against arbitrary
 
 320 MEMOIRS OF SUCfJET. 
 
 taxation, and secured to them the regular pay- 
 ment of all the supplies which they had furnished; 
 to its functions was accordingly added the duty of 
 examining and passing the accounts of all public 
 accountants. The dilapidations detected by that 
 fostering administration were repressed by mea- 
 sures of severity, and led to important restitutions 
 of funds. 
 
 The customs were organized on a principle 
 similar to that which prevailed in France ; and out 
 of regard for the Arragonese, as well as for our- 
 selves, the corps of custom-house officers was 
 principally composed of veteran Spanish officers 
 and soldiers, who had voluntarily tendered their 
 services. The administration of national domains 
 was likewise definitively settled, and the small 
 districts were authorised to work on their own 
 account the estates which it was found impossible 
 to farm out, under the condition of their paying 
 three fourths of their former produce. With a 
 view, in short, to complete these measures, the 
 receiver and paymaster were directed to furnish 
 every month to the contacloria a statement of 
 receipts and expenditure, and to make it public, 
 in order to satisfy the inhabitants that the govern- 
 ment rigidly and exclusively devoted the pro- 
 duce of the revenues to the service of the army 
 and the administration of the province. 
 
 The governor-general soon had occasion to con- 
 vince himself that the inhabitants of Arragon
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 321 
 
 had appreciated his good intentions, and relied 
 upon his justice. Such was the happy influence 
 of these arrangements upon the state of our 
 finances, that it enabled him to lighten the burden 
 of the extraordinary war contribution, of five hun- 
 dred thousand reales per month. 
 
 During the month of September 1810, the 
 emperor directed that all British merchandise 
 found in Arragon should be confiscated and burnt. 
 The commander-in-chief represented that such an 
 order, if carried into effect, would prove a fatal blow 
 to commerce, which was barely reviving and com- 
 mencing a new existence ; he proposed that a duty 
 of fifty per cent should be levied upon those goods, 
 according to what had been done in Holland, rather 
 than that he should arbitrarily take them from 
 their rightful owners. His proposal, however, was 
 not attended to ; all British merchandise found 
 in commercial warehouses was consigned to the 
 flames, in the public square of Saragossa, where 
 a similar act of authority had formerly been exer- 
 cised by command of Charles IV. Articles of 
 colonial produce not having been specifically 
 named in the emperor's decree, a tax was imposed 
 upon them, the produce of which, though incon- 
 siderable, contributed towards the resources of 
 the public chest. No means were neglected that 
 were in any way calculated to soften down, in the 
 mode of execution, the odium and the arbitrary
 
 322 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 character which attached to such a measure in the 
 minds of commercial men. 
 
 The capture of Tortosa opportunely occurred, 
 to crown the first year of the existence of the 
 government of Arragon, and to hold out to us a 
 brighter prospect for the future. During the 
 course of this siege, which lasted until the 2nd of 
 January, 1811, our expenses were increased by 
 the necessity we were under of maintaining a 
 corps of six thousand men, which the marshal 
 duke of Tarentum had placed at our disposal. 
 On entering Tortosa, our funds were ex- 
 hausted ; the country was so completely drained 
 of provisions and money, that we were com- 
 pelled to draw from Arragon, during several 
 months, the means requisite for the pay and 
 subsistence of the troops. As soon as tranquillity 
 was restored, an extraordinary contribution of 
 three millions of reales was imposed upon that 
 corregimiento, which contained no more than 
 thirty-two villages ; but a considerable time 
 elapsed ere we could succeed in obtaining the 
 money so levied. 
 
 With a view to afford relief to the indigent 
 class of the population of Arragon, extensive 
 works had been undertaken in that province. 
 Immense plains, which must have remained 
 barren and uncultivated had it not been for the 
 advantage they derived from irrigation, were
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 323 
 
 wholly indebted for their fertility to the impe- 
 rial canal, so called from its having been com- 
 menced in the reign of Charles V. The sluices, 
 the dykes, and the large basin of the Monte- 
 Torrero, which served the purposes of a port, 
 had been destroyed by the army ; means were 
 adopted for repairing all the damage done to the 
 canal, and in a short time it was restored to 
 commerce and agriculture. Works were also 
 undertaken for the beneficial object of supplying 
 water to the city of Saragossa, which possessed 
 no public fountains. The requisite level was 
 taken, and measures were employed for the pur- 
 pose of conveying water through the basin of 
 the Casa-Blanca to a fountain which was erected 
 in the public square, near the ruins of the con- 
 vent of San-Francisco, in the middle of the 
 Cosso. The quarter between that part of the 
 city and the gate of Santa Engracia was wholly 
 uninhabited since the siege, and a mere heap of 
 ruins. A plan was adopted for clearing the 
 ground, and opening a broad street, planted with 
 trees ; it was carried into effect at a later period, 
 to the manifest satisfaction of the inhabitants. 
 
 The hospital of the Misericordia was repaired ; 
 the revenues of that establishment were re- 
 stored, and 700 foundlings, who had found an 
 asylum in it, were engaged in the dressing of 
 wool, the tanning of leather, and the manufac- 
 turing of cloths. The hospitals of Huesca and 
 
 VOL. I. Y
 
 324 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Teruel were likewise re-established, and juntas ap- 
 pointed to superintend the administration of them. 
 The spacious and elegant civil hospital of Sara- 
 gossa, the existence of which bore witness to 
 the generosity of the inhabitants, was also 
 restored to its former condition, together with 
 all the revenues annexed to it ; and was likewise 
 used as a military hospital. 
 
 The artillery stood in need of saltpetre for 
 the manufacturing of gunpowder. This object 
 was attended to, and afforded means of subsist- 
 ence to many families. The circus destined for 
 bull-fights had been partly destroyed ; it was 
 repaired, and the population of the neighbour- 
 hood flocked to the city, in order to witness 
 some of those national amusements. The aca- 
 demy of the Friends of the Country was revived ; 
 funds were applied to the school for drawing, 
 architecture, and mathematics, which was daily 
 attended by 150 youths of the province.* 
 
 The city of Saragossa was secured against a 
 coup-de-main, by the construction of several 
 works made of earth or masonry. The fortifi- 
 cations of the castle were extended and im- 
 proved, so as to place the capital of Arragon 
 in a condition to defend itself, at a moment 
 when the army might be called away to other 
 points. With a view to give the Arragonese a 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents No. 14.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF AR11AGON. 325 
 
 more direct interest in the success of our opera- 
 tions, and to find employment for those Spanish 
 officers who had attached themselves to our cause, 
 the commander-in-chief formed four companies 
 of fusileers, and two of gendarmes ; they were 
 soon clothed, equipped, and armed for service ; 
 the soldiers were all able-bodied men, indefa- 
 tigable, and excellent guides. They were paid 
 and subsisted like the rest of the army, and 
 claimed our warmest praise by the zeal and 
 valour they displayed on several occasions. 
 
 The regulations laid down by the principal 
 corregidor, don Mariano Dominguez, and his per- 
 sonal activity, were the means of keeping up an 
 excellent police in the capital. During a period 
 of sixteen or eighteen months, there never ex- 
 isted the slightest disturbance, not even when 
 the course of military operations had compelled 
 us to leave a very weak garrison in the town. 
 Not a single assassination was committed, whilst 
 at a former period, according to the extracts 
 from the registers, upwards of 300 were com- 
 puted to have occurred every year, in a time 
 of profound peace. A great number of distin- 
 guished families, who had fled from the province 
 in consequence of their political opinions, or 
 from the fear of military events, had voluntarily 
 returned, and the sequestration laid upon their 
 property had been accordingly set aside. 
 
 Whilst these improvements were taking place, 
 
 y 2
 
 326 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 the commander-in-chief learned with considerable 
 astonishment, on the 19th of March 1811, that 
 in virtue of a decree of the emperor, he was 
 directed to lay siege to Tarragona, and that lower 
 Catalonia was placed under his orders, as well 
 as the active portion of the army then assembled 
 in that province. By an increase to his forces 
 of 18,000 men, and the management of an 
 important siege, he was, no doubt, afforded 
 the means of honourably serving his country ; 
 but he had also fresh difficulties to surmount. 
 The troops of the army in Catalonia had been 
 paid, and in a great measure subsisted by France ; 
 but the pay of several corps was eight months 
 in arrear, whilst others were paid to the day. 
 The state of the public funds did not afford the 
 means of at once bringing up those arrears. The 
 high price of corn increased the disadvantages 
 of our position. The monopolising system, fa- 
 vored by the English, had raised the price of 
 wheat from sixteen to thirty-two francs per quin- 
 tal. These circumstances called for the utmost 
 exertions on our part; the requisite orders were 
 immediately issued. 
 
 Three extensive depdts of provisions were to 
 be formed at Lerida, Tortosa, and Mora. Eight 
 battalions of infantry were directed to scour the 
 mountains and collect all the sheep they could 
 find. Our regiments had commenced their march 
 from the different points of Arragon for the pur-
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 327 
 
 pose of forming new divisions of the army, 
 when the news which arrived on the 21st of April 
 of the capture of Figueras, compelled the com- 
 mander-in-chief instantly to proceed to Lower 
 Catalonia. 
 
 As the course of events no longer admitted of 
 a moment's delay, he ordered the principal d6p6ts 
 of provisions to be established at Mora ; first, 
 because that point presented to us the shortest 
 though the most difficult road for transporting 
 corn to Reuss ; in the second place, because the 
 road from Tortosa to Tarragona was reserved for 
 the artillery ; and, lastly, because the road to 
 Lerida did not offer sufficient security, as the 
 Catalonians always kept the open field. Not- 
 withstanding the inclemency of the season, we 
 succeeded in a short time in collecting 9,500 
 quintals of corn and flour at the town of Mora, 
 11,000 at Mequinenza, 6,000 at Caspe, 12,000 at 
 Saragossa, and 4,000 at Huesca. Regular and 
 safe convoys were organized by the active vigi- 
 lance of the director, Bondurand ; 4,000 quintals 
 of flour, a quantity of biscuit, every thing requi- 
 site for an hospital, and medicines of all descrip- 
 tions, followed our first columns. Numerous 
 means of transport were collected between 
 Mora and Reuss, and if the enemy should fail 
 in an attempt to break our line, we were in 
 hopes of meeting, for some time, all the wants 
 of the besieging army.
 
 328 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 We had subsisted until now without resorting 
 to the ruinous system of contracts ; this was an 
 incalculable advantage in our situation ; for the 
 whole of the sums destined for paying the troops 
 would have proved inadequate to satisfy the de- 
 mands of contractors. Our resources were 
 very nearly exhausted. Upwards of 120,000 
 sheep and 1,200 head of cattle of a small size, 
 procured from Lower Catalonia, Valencia, and Ar- 
 ragon, had been consumed in the vicinity of Tor- 
 tosa during the last six months. We had to guard 
 against the danger of a scarcity of meat in the midst 
 of our siege operations. Yielding to the urgent 
 representations of the authorities of Arragon, and 
 compelled, moreover, to give way to necessity, 
 the commander-in-chief authorized, for the first 
 time, the director, M. Bonclurancl, to make a 
 public contract for the supply of the cattle re- 
 quired, for the service of the army. In virtue, 
 however, of a special clause in the contract, the 
 cattle were to be brought from France and dis- 
 tributed alive. 
 
 It is right that we should enter into some 
 explanation on this subject. Experience had 
 long taught us that in a hostile country, the 
 service of supplies which is so essential to the 
 success of an army, might be usefully en- 
 trusted to military accountants. The fellow- 
 feelings they entertained for their comrades, 
 their sense of discipline, the tastes and habits
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF AltRAGON. 329 
 
 of a military life which support them in the 
 midst of danger, render them better calcu- 
 lated to protect the trust confided to their care ; 
 whereas civil employes, whose presence in the 
 corps is not only accidental, but also fails to hold 
 out the same guarantees, generally enter upon 
 the temporary exercise of their functions with 
 views of self-interest, which compromise the 
 safety of the service. Such were the conside- 
 rations which led the commander-in-chief to di- 
 rect that the cattle should be distributed alive 
 to the respective regiments. Owing to this ar- 
 rangement, the heads of corps were charged with 
 the duty of superintending the proper distribu- 
 tions to their soldiers, and requiring that they 
 should be always provided with meat for two 
 days' consumption. The consequence was, that 
 the cattle being thus divided amongst the 
 troops, could subsist with less difficulty, were 
 more effectually watched, never occasioned any 
 delay in our movements, and that, on reaching 
 his bivouac, the soldier was not obliged to quit 
 his quarters or to go out marauding in quest 
 of food. This plan, which was followed dur- 
 ing the whole campaign, proved no less advan- 
 tageous than economical to us. If the regula- 
 tions of the service were to establish its adop- 
 tion in the different situations in which our 
 army might be placed in an enemy's country, it 
 might be attended with the advantage of faci-
 
 330 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 litating the movements of the troops, of securing 
 at a less expensive rate a main branch of the sub- 
 sistence of an army, and of preventing the sys- 
 tem of plunder which every where spreads deso- 
 lation. 
 
 Towards the end of April, 1811, baron Lacu^e, 
 master of requests in the council of state, who 
 was sent to fill the office of intendant-general 
 to the army, arrived at our head-quarters at Sa- 
 ragossa. He was accompanied by six auditors, 
 MM. Combes Sieyes, Dumees, d'Arthenay, de 
 Montigny, d'Hautefort, and d'Arlincourt. One of 
 them remained attached to the general adminis- 
 tration ; the other five were to be employed in 
 the provinces. 
 
 This fresh organization did not in any man- 
 ner affect the system of administration we had 
 adopted ; the commander-in-chief continued to 
 unite .in his own person the civil and military 
 powers; he was specially entrusted with the high 
 police of the province, and his superintendence 
 extended over whatever constituted the intendant- 
 general's duties.* 
 
 On the 3rd of May, 181 1, the whole army had 
 reached the camp in front of Tarragona. 
 
 On the 28th of June, after a most obstinate 
 defence, Tarragona fell into our hands. During 
 the progress of this operation, Arragon con- 
 
 * See notes and explanatory documents, No. 15.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF AIIHAGON. 331 
 
 tinued to furnish supplies to the army. We 
 have known some of the peasantry of Teruel to 
 have travelled to the town of Mora, a distance of 
 fifty leagues, in order to bring their quota of pro- 
 visions. A great number of communes had soli- 
 cited and obtained arms to enable them to resist 
 the inroads of the Guerillas; others had requested 
 that French garrisons might be left to protect 
 them. The municipalities, curates, and public 
 functionaries had shown the utmost zeal in 
 pointing out the places of retreat of malefactors 
 and of the enemies of public tranquillity; private 
 individuals had given precise information respect- 
 ing the approach of armed bands. In short, many 
 traits of humanity had been shewn towards 
 our stragglers, who had been picked up by the 
 peasantry and kept concealed from the fury of the 
 Spanish guerillas These were no equivocal 
 signs of the general feeling ; they held out to the 
 administration a prospect of improvement in the 
 minds of those whom it was appointed to 
 govern. 
 
 After taking possession of several places in Ca- 
 talonia, the commander-in-chief had returned to 
 Saragossa in the beginning of August. Eighteen 
 months had elapsed since he was directed to feed 
 the war by the war, to draw from the country 
 whatever was required for the subsistence of the 
 army, and he had in that space of time succeeded 
 in clearing off fourteen months' arrears of pay, of
 
 332 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 general charges, and of extraordinary allowances. 
 The expenses of the artillery and of the corps of 
 engineers, the extraordinary requisites for a siege 
 and for the hospitals, the horses required for 
 the cavalry, and the cost of transport had all been 
 liquidated. The charges of administration, of 
 justice, of the police, of finances, the expenses of 
 public works, the ecclesiastical pensions, those 
 assigned to widows, and the retired allowances of 
 military men, had been paid with no less punc- 
 tuality. Upwards often millions of francs, either 
 proceeding from the old taxes laid in the time of 
 the Spanish government, from extraordinary war 
 contributions, from national domains or the private 
 domains of the crown, had been lodged in the mi- 
 litary chest, which still contained a reserve fund 
 exceeding 600,000 francs. The army and the 
 fortified towns had been provisioned by requisi- 
 tions of corn, wine, brandy, oil, and cattle. 
 
 Public order had never been disturbed, notwith- 
 standing the collision produced by a state of war; 
 the inhabitants of the country had resumed their 
 labours as they were wont to do in profound 
 peace ; commercial industry, being no longer fet- 
 tered, had considerably extended its speculations; 
 manufactures had been established in Saragossa ; 
 the ruins of that splendid city were beginning to 
 disappear, and public walks or establishments of 
 general utility were substituted for them. These 
 results far exceeded our expectations.
 
 ADMINISTRATION OF ARRAGON. 333 
 
 It is no doubt an easy task to levy contribu- 
 tions and to incur expenses ; but to allay almost 
 on a sudden the hatred of a people enthusias- 
 tically attached to their country, to modify their 
 institutions, usages and habits, and whilst over- 
 burdening them with taxes, to acquire such an 
 ascendency over their minds as to induce them to 
 second our enterprises without the slightest ma- 
 nifestation of further resistance on their part, 
 without our revolting the national pride, such was 
 the success at which it behoved the superior admi- 
 nistration of the government of Arragon to aim, 
 and it was beginning to indulge the hope that it 
 had nearly accomplished so desirable an object. 
 We shall find it perseveringly adhering to the 
 same system in the province of Valencia, at a 
 later period, and obtaining a similar result. 
 
 <*
 
 NOTES 
 
 AND 
 
 EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS.
 
 NOTE 1. 
 
 PAGE 4, VOL. I. 
 
 EXTRACT FROM THE SPANISH WORK ENTITLED : 
 
 HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPAL 
 MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES IN THE 
 PENINSULA, DURING THE WAR CARRIED ON BY SPAIN AGAINST 
 BONAPARTE ; 
 
 DRAWN UP BY THE SECTION OF MILITARY HISTORY. 
 
 Being one of the sections composing the commission of generals and 
 officers established at Madrid under the superintendence of the minister 
 of war. 
 
 The Spanish armies received, in the first instance, the names of the 
 provinces or districts in which they were organized ; but the central 
 junta had no sooner met, than they gave them an organization and 
 names analogous to the points of the frontier where they were called 
 upon to act against the enemy. 
 
 The annies of Asturias and of Gallicia, as well as the troops which 
 came from the north of Europe, under the orders of the marquis de la 
 Romana, formed the army of the left. It occupied the left of the 
 line of battle held by the allied troops, and operated upon the upper 
 Ebro, and in the Biscayan provinces. 
 
 The armies of Castille, Estremadura and Andalusia composed the 
 central army, which operated on the centre of the general line in the 
 provinces of Burgos, la Rioja and Navarre. 
 
 The armies of Arragon, Valencia and Murcia formed the army of
 
 338 MEMOIRS OF SUCIIET. 
 
 reserve, which leaned upon the immortal city of Saragossa, took up a 
 position in Arragon, and shared with the central army the battle 
 of Tudela. 
 
 Lastly, the army of the right was composed of the troops from 
 Catalonia and the Balearic islands, of those which had arrived from 
 Lisbon, of some detachments from Arragon and of a division from 
 Grenada ; this army was constantly engaged in Catalonia. 
 
 The above organization and names were retained from the beginning 
 of November 1808, until December 1810. 
 
 In the month of December 1810, the regency of Spain and of the 
 Indies divided the Spanish troops engaged in the Peninsula into six 
 corps d'arm6e, in the following manner. 
 
 The army of the right formed the first army ; the second army was 
 composed of the troops which were in Valencia and Arragon ; the third, 
 of the army of the centre occupied in Murcia ; the fourth of the army 
 of Estremadura with the troops stationed in the island of Leon, at the 
 camp of Gibraltar and in the condado de Niebla ; the fifth, of the 
 army of the left which operated in Estremadura and had some detach- 
 ments as far as the lines of Torres Vedras ; the sixth, of the troops 
 belonging to the said army which were employed in Gallicia and in 
 the Asturias. Soon afterwards, the regency decreed the formation 
 of a new corps, composed of the troops of Porlier, Mina and Longa, 
 under the denomination of the seventh army ; the several bands of 
 Guerillas and the free corps were likewise destined to form part of the 
 above mentioned forces. 
 
 In December 1812, a final organization was given to the Spanish 
 troops in the Peninsula, and it was determined that the seven corps 
 d'armee composing them should be re-modelled into six corps, in the 
 following manner. 
 
 The first army retained its name. 
 
 The second was formed out of the second and third armies. 
 
 The fourth took the name of the third army ; and out of some of 
 its corps was formed the army of reserve of Andalusia, to which were 
 added some other detached troops drawn from different points. 
 
 The fifth, six and seventh armies were united for the purpose of 
 forming the fourth corps ; and o'ut of the detachments of different 
 corps was formed the army of reserve of Gallicia. 
 
 The only remarkable changes that occurred in the Spanish armies, 
 since that period were the following : 
 
 The first army did not quit Catalonia.
 
 EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS. 339 
 
 The second constantly remained in the kingdom of Valencia. 
 
 The third passed from Andalusia to the kingdom of Valencia, for 
 the purpose of replacing the Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army in May 1813. 
 In the month of July, it repaired to Catalonia and afterwards advanced 
 towards France through Arragon, Navarre and Biscay, with a view to 
 join lord Wellington's army. 
 
 The reserve of Andalusia quitted that province in May 1813, and 
 proceeded through Estremadura and Castille to Navarre, to join the 
 forces commanded by lord Wellington, duke of Ciudad Rodrigo. 
 
 The fourth army, which had sent some of its divisions on detached 
 operations, broke up from its positions, and marched to the frontiers of 
 France, where it acted in conjunction with the Anglo-Portuguese army 
 until the termination of the war. 
 
 Lastly, the reserve of Gallicia remained stationary in that province. 
 
 The British army quitted England in July 1808, and in August 
 following landed in Portugal, in the bay of the Mondego, whence 
 it commenced its operations, which were brought to a close during the 
 same month by the capitulation of Cintra. Although that army had 
 been placed under the orders of general Dalrymple, sir Arthur Wellesley 
 assumed the immediate command in the engagement at Roleia and Vimi- 
 era, because neither general Dalrymple nor general Burrard, the second 
 in command, had yet arrived when the operations commenced. 
 
 After the convention of Cintra, and the evacuation of Portugal by 
 the French troops under the order of general Junot, the English army 
 in that kingdom was placed under the command of Sir John Moore 
 in September 1808, and advanced in four columns towards Spain in 
 the month of October following, for the purpose of acting in concert 
 •with the Spanish armies. 
 
 The English army being overpowered by the superiority of forces 
 which the French had set in motion against them, and being compelled 
 to retreat, effected this movement towards Corunna, and after the 
 memorable battle of that name, which was fought in January 1809, and 
 in which its commander-in-chief was killed, that army embarked for 
 England; in consequence of this event, there was only left in the Pe- 
 ninsula a small corps of English troops, which remained in Portugal 
 under the orders of general Cradock. 
 
 In the month of March of the same year, a British army re-landed 
 in Portugal, and further troops continued to arrive until the month of 
 
 VOL. I. 7.
 
 340 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 April following. Sir Arthur Wcllesley, their new commander-in- 
 chief, landed, and assumed at once the command of all the forces 
 of the kingdom. The English army compelled Soult who was 
 stationed at Oporto, to evacuate Portugal in the month of May ; and 
 having fallen hack upon Abrantes in June, marched from that point 
 along the right bank of the Tagus towards Talavera, where it formed 
 a junction with the Spanish army of Estremadura, and fought the 
 memorable battle of Talavera at the end of July in the same year. 
 
 In the month of August after that battle, the English army 
 fell back upon Badajoz ; towards the end of September it returned into 
 Portugal, crossed over to the right bank of the Tagus, and took up a 
 position in the province of Beira, where it remained until the middle of 
 the following year 1810; it then effected a movement towards" the frontier 
 of Spain, whilst Massena's army was laying siege to Ciudad-Rodrigo. 
 
 On the surrender of this fortress, the English army placed itself 
 in the rear of Almeida ; and after the taking of the latter place, it 
 commenced its retrograde movement towards the lines of Torres-Vedras 
 with the Portuguese army, which was then completing its organi- 
 zation. It fought the battle of Busaco in September 1810, whilst 
 carrying on this operation. 
 
 In the month of February of the above year, a corps of British and 
 Portuguese troops proceeded from Portugal to Cadiz and to the Island of 
 Leon, under the orders of general Graham, for the purpose of assisting 
 in the defence of those important points. 
 
 The Anglo-Portuguese army, which was gradually increasing in 
 number, remained within the lines of Torres-Vedras from October 
 1810 until March 1811. Massena commenced his retreat towards 
 Spain at the latter period, and the English army having then formed 
 itself into two divisions, the first under the orders of lord Wellington 
 marched through Beira and Castille in pursuit of Massena, the second 
 under Beresford proceeded to Spanish Estremadura. The former 
 fought several engagements with Massena's retreating army ; the 
 latter took part in the battle of Albuera, in conjunction with the fifth 
 Spanish army and with the expeditionary army. 
 
 Those two divisions remained separated during the remainder of 
 that year and the first ten months of 1812, frequently sending re- 
 inforcements to each other ; for instance, during the siege of 
 Badajoz in February 1812, and on various other occasions. It was 
 only after the memorable events which took place that year in Old 
 Castille, that they formed a junction on the river Tormes, subsequently
 
 EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS. 341 
 
 to the movements they had effected from Burgos and Madrid in the 
 month of November 1812. In October, the Anglo-Portuguese 
 division, forming part of the garrison of Cadiz and of the Island of Leon, 
 joined the second Anglo-Portuguese corps under general Hill's orders. 
 
 During the remainder of the war, the Anglo-Portuguese army 
 carried on its operations in a body, without any further separation of 
 importance. In 1813, it quitted the position which it had taken 
 up in 1812, moved to the left of the position on the upper Ebro ; and 
 penetrating into France, as far as Bordeaux and Toulouse, in the year 
 1814, brought the war to a close by the celebrated battle fought near 
 the latter city. 
 
 The other English army, which was denominated the Anglo- Spanish 
 Sicilian army, in consequence of its being formed of a Spanish and a 
 Sicilian division, landed at Alicant in July 1812, under the orders of 
 general Maitland, and was successively commanded by generals 
 Murray, Bentinck and Clinton. That army occupied Alicant and 
 its vicinity until May 1813, when it embarked for Catalonia. It 
 attempted in vain to take possession of Tarragona, and re-embarked 
 in June following on its way back to the kingdom of Valencia, 
 whence it returned by land to Catalonia, and followed Suchet's 
 movements in that province. The Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army 
 remained in Catalonia until April 1814, at which period it separated 
 from the Spanish division, and marched across the provinces of 
 Arragon, Navarre and Biscay, on its road to join the British army 
 commanded by the duke of Ciudad-Rodrigo. 
 
 The French armies which invaded the Peninsula, also experienced 
 frequent variations in the names which they bore, and in their 
 organization. 
 
 In the first campaign, the name of army of Portugal was given to 
 the corps of troops under Junot's orders which took possession of that 
 kingdom ; the name of second corps of observation of the Gironde, to 
 the army commanded by Dupont which invaded Andalusia ; of army 
 of the lower Pyrenees, to the army which entered Spain with Moncey, 
 and which was soon divided into two corps respectively commanded 
 by that marshal and by Bessieres under Murat's orders ; and of army 
 of the eastern Pyrenees, to the army which entered Catalonia 
 under the orders of Duhesme, and established its head-quarters at 
 Barcelona. In June 1808, fresh troops entered Spain, and proceeded 
 
 z 2
 
 342 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 to lay siege to Saragossa, at first under the orders of Lefebvre, and 
 afterwards of Verdier. The remains of the French squadron which 
 had fought at Trafalgar were in the bay of Cadiz. This squadron, 
 which was commanded by vice-admiral Rosilli, was captured by the 
 Spaniards in June 1808, and in July following, the corps d'armoe 
 commanded by Dupont experienced the same fate after the glorious 
 battle of Baylen. In the month of August, the troops commanded by 
 Moncey, Bessieres and Verdier retreated to Biscay and Navarre, where, 
 having been reinforced by the corps d'armee under marshal Ney, 
 formed the three corps of the right, the centre and the left under 
 the orders of Joseph and of Jourdan his major-general. 
 
 The army of Duhesme retained its position and its name. 
 
 In October and November 1808, considerable reinforcements of 
 French troops entered Spain ; they formed the materials of the 
 grand army commanded by the emperor Napoleon in person. This 
 army was divided into different corps in the following manner : 
 the first was under Victor, and consisted of recent reinforcements ; the 
 second, under Soult, had formerly been the army of the centre ; the 
 third, under Moncey, formerly the army of the left ; the fourth, under 
 Lefebvre, consisted of troops which had just entered Spain ; the fifth, 
 under Lannes, was of the like description ; the sixth, under Ney, was 
 formerly the army of the right ; lastly, the imperial guard, commanded 
 by Bessieres, which entered Spain with the emperor Napoleon. 
 
 In the month of November of the same year, a corps of troops, 
 under Bonnet, made excursions to the mountains of Santander, and to 
 other parts of Asturias. French troops were left to defend the provinces 
 of Navarre and Biscay. 
 
 During the same month, general Gouvion-Saint-Cyr entered Cata- 
 lonia with a considerable reinforcement, which, added to the remains 
 of the old army of the eastern Pyrenees, formed the seventh corps. 
 
 The French army retained, for a long time, this organization, subject 
 to the following variations : 
 
 In February 1809, the emperor returned to France with the imperial 
 guard. 
 
 In the same month, Joseph's royal-guard was first formed at Madrid, 
 which proceeded in the month of June following, to reinforce the 
 French armies subsequently engaged at Talavera. 
 
 In January of the same year, Sebastiani replaced Lefebvre in the 
 command of the fourth corps. 
 
 In the same month, Lannes was appointed to the chief command
 
 EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS. 343 
 
 of the third and fifth corps, under the orders of Junot and Mortier, and 
 carried on the siege of Saragossa at the head of these forces. In April 
 following, Suchet relieved Junot in the command of the third corps. 
 
 In November 1809, the first, fourth, and fifth corps formed a junc- 
 tion under the orders of Joseph, who had appointed Sou It his major- 
 general, and proceeded to carry on operations upon the Tagus against 
 the Spanish army of the centre. Merle temporarily relieved Soult in 
 the command of the second corps, which was shortly afterwards 
 assigned to Regnier. 
 
 In May 1810, the French armies in Spain changed their names and 
 mode of organization. 
 
 The first, fourth, and fifth corps, which had invaded Andalusia 
 under Joseph's command, formed the army of the south, and were 
 assigned to Soult, with Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier under his 
 orders. 
 
 In the same month was formed the army of the centre, which was 
 placed under Joseph's immediate orders, and consisted of his royal - 
 guard, of a few corps organized for his service, and of the French 
 garrisons along the points occupied by that army. 
 
 The second and sixth corps, as well as the eighth, which entered 
 Spain under Junot's orders in the month of January, formed the army 
 of Portugal, the chief- command of which was assigned to Massena. 
 
 The third corps assumed the name of army of Arragon ; and the 
 seventh, in the command of which Augereau had relieved Saint-Cyr in 
 October 1809, was called the army of Catalonia. 
 
 In December 1810, the ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, 
 entered Spain, and proceeded to reinforce the army of Portugal. 
 
 In January and February 1811, some troops arrived belonging 
 to the imperial guards, which being united to those in the provinces of 
 Asturias, Santander, Biscay, and Navarre, and in a part of Old 
 Castille, formed the army of the north, the command of which was at 
 first assigned to Bessieres, and afterwards to Dorsenne in July 1811. 
 
 In June 1810, marshal Macdonald relieved Augereau in the com- 
 mand of the army of Catalonia, and was relieved in his turn by 
 Decaen in December 1811. 
 
 In May 1811, marshal Ney assumed the temporary command of 
 the army of Portugal, which he soon resigned to marshal Marmont ; 
 and a corps of that army proceeded, under Drouet's orders, to reinforce 
 the army of the south. Ever since that period, the army of Portugal 
 was no longer organized as a corps d'arme'e.
 
 344 MEMOIRS OF SUCHET. 
 
 Jourdan resumed the command of the army of the centre in 
 August 1811. 
 
 In 1812, Marmont was relieved by Clause! in the command of the 
 army of Portugal, after the celebrated battle of Salamanca ; and a few- 
 days afterwards, Souham relieved Clausel in this command, and Dor- 
 senne in the command of the army of the north. 
 
 In November of the same year, the armies of Portugal, of the 
 north, the centre and the south, commanded by generals Souham, 
 Cafarelli, Soult and Jourdan, under Joseph's orders, effected ajunction 
 on the Tormes ; this organization lasted until the middle of 1813, 
 without any other change than Gazan's relieving Soult in February of 
 that year, in the command of the army of the south, which had ceased 
 to possess the organization of a corps d'armee ever since the month of 
 August 1812. 
 
 Lastly, in July 1813, the armies of Portugal, of the north, the 
 centre, and the south, which had carried on joint operations since the 
 battle of Vittoria, formed what was denominated the army of Spain, 
 the command of which was conferred upon Soult ; and in the month of 
 September following, the armies of Arragon and Catalonia were united 
 into one under the orders of Suchet, and were thenceforward called 
 the army of Arragon and Catalonia.
 
 
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