I mm i a g i H m "'. . . Hi '..' , - JTJBISPKTJDENCE Relation to the Social Sciences, DENIS CAULFEILD HERON, Q.C., Member of Parliament for the County of Tipperary. SAN FRANCISCO : SUMNER WHITNEY & COMPANY. NEW YORK : KURD & HOUGHTON. GKFTOF Bancron LIBRARY CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PAGE Introduction The Social Sciences 1 CHAPTER II. Ethics in relation to Jurisprudence 19 CHAPTER III. Political Economy in relation to Jurisprudence 30 CHAPTER IV. Jurisprudence 46 Distinction between Ethics and Jurisprudence 51 Limits of Jurisprudence 54 Development of Sympathy 60 Definitions in Jurisprudence historically considered 68 The Scientific Definitions in Jurisprudence 82 Political Jurisprudence 91 Province of Government Taxation 100 Taxes on Justice 116 Duties of Government Education 121 Divisions of Jurisprudence 129 Codification 138 The Study of Jurisprudence 145 CHAPTER V. Historical Review . . ... 154 861334 CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Jurisprudence is the Science of Positive Laws. It has been observed that laws are by the public considered as something distinct from common life, and the common affairs of society. Yet, to one truly reflecting upon the nature of laws, few sub- jects ought to be more interesting. The whole fabric of society rests chiefly on the law. The social and political life in which we live, the free- dom which we enjoy, all result from the labors of the wise and good in this department of human in- telligence. And the Science of Jurisprudence con- cerns not individuals, but the community. The pleasures of knowledge, the glories of the refined arts, are known to few. Laws are praised or cursed by every fireside. Each nation lives in the cottage as well as in the castle. And unless the beauty of legislation and the excellence of statesmanship dwell in the feelings and condition of the people, government acts like the Epicurean gods, who en- joyed their existence careless of humanity. The object of a History of Jurisprudence is to exhibit the circumstances which have attended the establishment of existing positive laws. But the exposition of the dead laws which have been super- JURISPRUDKffCE 1. - INTRODUCTION. K'(k<- is : n:v;-aral>h- interwoven with that of the living laws which have superseded them. And in this investigation are furnished the great examples for the art of legislation. Bolingbroke has observed, that to enable one to take a commanding view of the field of law and legislation, there arc two principal vantage grounds on which it is necessary to mount history and metaphysics. The road is smooth and flowery to that vantage ground offered by history. There has been no want of those who have ascended to it, and taken post upon it. To that which belongs to the region of metaphysics, the road is rugged and full of thorns. Few have attempted to gain it ; fewer have succeeded in placing themselves in a position whence a view at once clear and extensive could be obtained. Many of the definitions which I shall adopt may be controverted. They are attempts to give some precision and accuracy to the most difficult department of Social Science. Lord Bacon has said that civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which, above all others, is most immersed in matter the hardest to be reduced to axiom. Aristotle, in the Politics, condemns the pursuit of a delusive geometrical accuracy in moral reasoning. Still, the first principles of Jurisprudence arc maxims of reason which pervade all human laws, and the ob- servance of which is discovered by experience to be essential to happiness and security. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 3 I have attempted to sketch an outline of the sub- jects and divisions of Jurisprudence, its limits and province. The word " law," in its widest sense, is used to designate those natural principles which are incident to and govern all things, animate and inanimate. The entire of physical nature is subject to certain laws the laws of gravitation, of light, of heat. In the Institutes of Justinian, the term " law " is ex- tended to the instincts of animals, and natural law is therein defined to be that which nature has implanted in all living things. " For this is not proper to men exclusively, but belongs to all animals, whether produced in the earth, in the air, or in the water." Hooker says : " That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a law/' All nature obeys certain rules, and animals are governed by fixed instincts. The bee and the beaver have built for thousands of years with the same degree of perfection. The celestial bodies have from the period of creation rolled in their or- bits, subject to the laws of matter. And the term " law," in its general philosophical sense, is no less applicable to the phenomena of the mind than to the phenomena of matter. The processes of the mind are as uniform as the processes of matter. The mode in which the mind arrives at a conclusion is as 4 INTRODUCTION. fixed and unalterable as the mode in which an apple falls to the ground. But, in Jurisprudence, the meaning of the word law is limited. Law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed and enforced by the State. A science is a collection of the fundamental truths concerning the same subject-matter, arranged in methodical order. Philosophy is the explanation of the phenomena of the universe. The objects of philosophy arc the discovery of what is true and the practice of what is good. The explanation of a phenomenon is the reference of the fact to be explained to some known principle. The properties and motions of matter form the subject of natural philosophy and its subdivisions : thus, the science of astronomy treats of the laws which govern the heavenly bodies ; the science of mechanics treats of the laws of weight and motion. Similarly, mental philosophy treats of the laws which regulate the power's, faculties, and affections of the human mind and its development. Mental philosophy has been divided into two parts : one treats of man in his individual capacity, the other of man as a member of society. But these parts are divided by an uncertain line, and each encroaches upon the distinct province of the other. The first branch of mental philosophy dis- s the individual mind, its intellectual as well as THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 5 its moral and active powers, the faculties of the un- derstanding, and those of the will. The second branch of mental philosophy treats of the social de- velopment of the human race, and has been termed the Political Science, or the Social Science, or So- ciology. Moral Duties, Exchanges, and Laws are the three subjects of the Social Science. Ethics, Political Economy, and Jurisprudence form the three divisions of the Social Science. Notwithstanding considerable progress has been made in some of the physical sciences, especially in astronomy, still, of many common occurrences in nature, the laws are either unknown, or at least are not reduced to that precision to which science ought to aspire. Prevision is- the test of science. Few branches of knowledge as yet can bear that test. But the possibility of a science which can treat of the laws of society is denied. Even in the nine- teenth century our writers maintain the exploded doctrines of the ancient Sophists, and insist that, in the domain of laws and politics, there exist no laws of laws leges legum. Mr. Hallam says : " If it is meant that any systematic science, whether by the name of Jurisprudence or Legislation, can be laid down as to the principles which ought to determine the institutions of all nations, or that, in other words, the laws of each separate community ought 6 INTRODUCTION. to be regulated by any universal standard in mat- ters not depending upon eternal justice, we must demur to receiving so very disputable a proposi- tion." 1 This passage is obscure. If the term " eternal justice " be intended to apply only to those principles of right which can be enforced in the most advanced state of society, then the doctrine is erroneous. Many things are right in one state of society which are wrong in another. Slavery appears to have been suited to some ancient systems. Trial by jury is adapted for a people, honest, fair-dealing, tolerant, and free; it does not produce unmixed good amongst a people divided into fanatical parties, hostile to one another. Trial by jury, although right, cannot be introduced into every country. Slavery, although wrong, cannot be at once abol- ished. Similarly, Professor Sedgwick, in his discourse on the Studies in the University of Cambridge, says : "If, in moral reasoning, it be mere mockery to use the language of abstraction, and to build up systems by trains of a priori reasoning, it is assuredly not hsurd to affect the forms of inductive proof in political speculation. Every political as well as every moral principle practically involves the de- termination of the will, and thereby becomes at once 1 Literature of Europe, Vol. 2, p. 586, 3d Ed. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 7 separated from that class of investigations in which we consider the immutable relations of physical phenomena." l The various causes of obstruction to the progress of the scientific cultivation of laws have been frequently enumerated. Modern jurists have fallen into confusion, vagueness, and obscurity of thought from not having distinguished at the outset ethics or morals from compulsory human law ; and they have considered both under one gen- eral appellation. They have adopted a kind of a priori method of investigation, instead of the in- ductive method ; they have assumed general prin- ciples, not warranted by actual observation of facts ; they have invented systems of law and government by inductions from careless or imperfect observa- tion, or even by the mere force of imagination, and then adapted the facts of history to these ideal or fictitious systems. However, it is a great step in the progress of sci- ence that the existence of laws is admitted in those operations of nature which form the subject of the physical sciences. But, even where men have the choice of different modes of action, certain con- sequences follow from adopting one course of action or the other. Nor are such laws observable merely in the conduct of the individual. They are more to be observed in the conduct of multitudes, and in. the 1 5th -EcL 1850, p. 81. 8 INTRODUCTION. rise and fall of great nations, in the records of crimes, and the annals of justice. If an army be marshaled confusedly if the general have no sym- pathy with his soldiers if they do not obey him with promptitude, zeal, and fidelity, there will be but an unsuccessful campaign against the force where order, discipline, and enthusiasm prevail. Faith, labor, honesty, and perseverance have, as" they always had, their power to elevate in the scale of humanity the men and nations which adopt them. At the present period of philosophy, therefore, it is not pretended that the Science of Society is in a very advanced state. It is easier for the astronomer by observation to ascertain the rules of celestial me- chanics it is easier for the geologist to discover the history of the earth's mutations than for the jurist to trace those circumstances in human affairs which guide men to truth in politics and laws. In all hu- man probability, Sociology will be the last science to be perfected. Of its three component parts, the domain of Ethics alone has been scientifically culti- vated by the greatest intellects for a long period in history. But Adam Smith, late in the eighteenth century, gave the first great impulse to the study of Political Economy. Benthain and Savigny, names of very recent memory, have, in the present genera- tion, analyzed and historied Jurisprudence. Yet, though the Physical Sciences have been THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 9 first cultivated with some degree of success, the study of the Social Sciences appears more important with regard to human progress. Most of the pro- cesses of nature, the subjects of the Physical Sci- ences, are beyond the dominion of man ; and though he may be affected by their result, still he cannot control them. The earth sweeps through space round the sun, careless of the populations which it bears ; the sun revolves round some distant and un- known center of gravitation ; the causes of light and heat are mysteries. The earth, with all its mil- lions of the human race, inspired by love, genius, and ambition, is in creation but a whirling speck of dust ; and were it at this moment to vanish into nothingness, its loss would be unfelt, unseen by the galaxies which throng the firmament. But most of the subjects of the Social Sciences are within our dominion ; and with ourselves alone it rests whether we will use and combine the materials of civilization, or leave those materials unused, and remain in ig- norance, poverty, and misery. It is therefore idle to declare an aversion to Po- litical Science : in so doing, persons state their in- difference to the happiness of mankind. It is true that the moral and legal sentiments of mankind are various in different stages of civilization. At the present day, in every country, all opposing parties, Conservatives and Progressists alike, contest the first principles upon which Political Science is 10 INTRODUCTION. founded? but a similar strife has occurred in the infancy of all sciences. What varied theories have existed in astronomy! The boundaries between the virtue of justice and the other virtues are not yet so distinctly defined as to fix the limits of com- pulsory law. Time will fix thosd limits. In legis- lation, the historical and analytical schools have hitherto been opposed. But it is the business of science to unite them, for actual legislation ought always to be a compromise between history and philosophy. Since all our external actions react upon our fellow-men, we ought to strive to regulate them according to the laws of human association, by the aid of those very Political Sciences which some persons despise. All legitimate interests are in harmony, and the healthful prosperity of one promotes the prosperity of all. The study of the Social Sciences will foster disinterestedness, sympa- thy, patriotism, enthusiasm for all that is good and great. Even if the study of the Political Sciences were prohibited, their practice could not for a single moment be suspended. There arc nations in which the theory of government lias never been the sub- ject of reflection or discussion ; nevertheless, they are governed. If, then, the Social Sciences be ob- scure, let us throw light upon them ; if they be un- certain, let us endeavor to fix them; if they be speculative, let us establish them upon reason and experience. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 11 In every science the principles are natural and fixed. Very few principles as yet have been dis- covered in any science. There are natural and fixed principles of legal right and illegal wrong, as there are natural and fixed principles of gravitation. If the laws of exchanges were properly understood, legislative interference would no more attempt to control the rise and fall of prices than the rise and fall of the barometer, or of the tides. If the true principles of Jurisprudence were acted upon, absurd and wicked legislation would disappear. The study of Jurisprudence is so intimately con- nected with its kindred branches of Sociology, that it is necessary to compare and define their several limits. The three Social Sciences, Ethics, Political Economy, and Jurisprudence, are so united that it is difficult to treat of their subjects without the equal assistance of the jurist, the economist, and the moral philosopher. The object of the Science of Jurisprudence is the discovery of the relations which ought to be estab- lished by the Positive Law, and the best means to enforce such relations. The object of Political Economy is the discovery of the laws which regulate the exchangeable value of commodities, and the discovery of the best means to determine the distribution of wealth. Thus, each science, as to its own subject-matter, strives to attain the true objects of philosophy, the discovery of truth and the practice of good. 12 INTRODUCTION. Many kindred branches of knowledge assist these studies. Of all the sciences which aid the progress of Sociology, the most important is Statistics. Statistics is the science of social facts expressed in numerical terms. It is most intimately allied to the three Social Sciences. All have for their end the amelioration of the social state. All guide, by the light of an exalted reason, administrative and political powers. But the Social Sciences pro- ceed with boldness into the most elevated region of o speculative systems, whilst Statistics is a science of facts, which in rapid figures enumerates the wants of nations, their daily progress, and all the fortunate or unhappy individualities of their destinies. The Science of Statistics aids the practice of the Social Sciences in detailing the population of a country, its fertility, its means of communication and defense. This science fixes the numbers of the army which guarantees the independence of the State. It assists in the just imposition of taxes. It tells the quantity and value of the productions of agriculture and manufactures. It traces the prog- ress of the national education, which makes men better 'by enlightening them. It gives the details of the machinery and cost of justice. It traces the history and causes of disease, and points out the true course for sanitary -reform. It illustrates, by novel and exact truths, a crowd of objects which arise from day to day, agitate public opinion, and exhibit problems to be solved by the Social Science. THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 13 "Working steadfastly at these subjects, wise men have developed the Social Sciences, and the human race has progressed in civilization. Civilization is that condition of social life possessed by a moral, educated, and wealthy community, enjoying public security and liberty under the protection of law. The first requisite of society is security. When property is not secure from foreign ambition or civil commotion, or from crime, accumulation cannot proceed, nor can wealth remain in that degree which is necessary to provide persons with the lux- uries and decencies of civilized life. No one would till the earth unless under the certainty that a rea- sonable share of the harvest would be enjoyed by himself. No one would voluntarily live and work in that country which is continually ravaged by foreign armies. Public liberty is as essential an in- gredient of civilization as public security or order. By public liberty I mean freedom of discussion, freedom of action, including absolute personal lib- erty, 'a free press, and a representative government. But wherever there is tolerable security, even without any high degree of liberty, morality, or knowledge, wealth may still accumulate. Still, morality, or the sense of right, is the essential ingredient of a high order of civilization, and exercises the most remark- able influence on the prosperity of nations, and their success in art and war. Facility of communication is also an important part of advanced civilization. 14 INTRODUCTION. A country cannot be considered united, nor can it possess the stability of centralized government, un- less there be easy and ready means of communicat- ing from the capital to the different parts of the empire. The Romans were well aware of this AY lien they constructed the roads which remain to the present day memorials of the Roman greatness. But the recent triumphs of mechanical science have surpassed the rude efforts of ancient times ; and the railway, the steamboat, and the electric telegraph are among the most important agents in the diffu- sion of knowledge and the maintenance of freedom. In nothing, however, have the civilized nations of modern times more surpassed the civilization of the ancients than in the knowledge and education of the people. Hence, it is reasonable to entertain a hope that our present civilizations will not be lost, like those of Egypt, Greece, or Rome. The first liter- ary State was Athens, possessed of the little terri- tory of Attica, containing a population inferior to that of some English and Irish counties. Although books then were enormously dear and it is re- corded of Plato that he once paid 300 for an in- different volume still there was in Athens a popu- lar education of a high order. Thus, Homer and th*e Rhapsodists publicly recited their poems ; the plays of ^Eschylus and Sophocles were performed in the presence of 30,000 spectators ; the history of Herodotus was read at the Olympic games ; the THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 15 odes of Pindar were sung at Delphi ; ^Escliines and Demosthenes addressed the people in the assembly ; the glorious statues and temples of the Ionian race were another and a splendid part of their edu- cation. In Eome, there was no popular literature. The military aristocracy encouraged the people in their warlike spirit by wild-beast shows and gladia- torial combats. The early Romans organized gov- ernment and war, but left art for other races. The northern conquerors of the Roman Empire despised learning. The great majority of their kings, counts, and dukes were unable to write their names. Their signature was a seal, signum, impressed on their deeds. In effect, the improvement of the mechan- ical arts, the invention of printing, and the general use of paper first rendered a cheap literature and popular education possible. There is a great differ- ence between the first Gazette published at Venice, and the Times of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The first Gazette contained fragments of doubtful news ; now, more than by anything else in England, the people are educated by the newspapers, that with such industry collect, and with such rap- idity disperse, information every morning to the working intelligence of the empire. The education of the people is increasing every day among all the nations most advanced in civilization. It was even recently the fashion to discuss whether education ought to be extended to the people ; but, whilst 16 INTRODUCTION. learned men discussed these things, the laboring classes have become comparatively educated, and are an element in society. And, by the aid of printing and the diffusion of education, one clever man can now speak to tens of thousands more than Demosthenes ever electrified in the popular assembly. Such are the present prospects of civilization. It is plain that if the civilized nations of Europe and America were left to themselves, untrammeled by the feudal forms, and freed from despotism, whether monarchical or democratic, a long career of progress would be before us. But the same cause which has so often checked civilization for centuries may again devastate Europe. War is the greatest foe of progress. War has often annihilated the most mag- nificent civilizations. Foreign aggression ruined Egypt. A foreign war destroyed Carthage ; and the northern coast of Africa has never recovered from the devastations committed two thousand years ago by the Eoman soldiers. Rome, by war, de- stroyed the Grecian civilization. The northern barbarians annihilated the Roman Empire. The Mahometans conquered the civilization which, un- der the Greek emperors, a second time arose on the banks of the Hellespont. In every country the ruins of lost civilizations appear, destroyed by war. The project of perpetual peace was prominently brought forward by Kant toward the close of the eighteenth century. Some of the articles of his the- THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 17 oretical treaty of a perpetual peace are essential to study. One of the most important is the disband- ing of those vast armies which now consume the wealth of the most powerful States. Standing armies miles perpetuus ought to disappear en- tirely with time. For these, appearing always ready for the combat, incessantly threaten other powers with war, and incite States to surpass one another in the number of their troops. This rivalry is a source of expense, which ends by rendering peace more burdensome than a short war. National debts ought not to be contracted for the purpose of interests external to the State. This system of credit is a treasure always ready for war. The only security for the preservation of universal peace is in the freedom of the constitution of each State. Where citizens are free, and have in their own hands the government, they hesitate to declare against themselves the calamities of war ; but where the subjects are not citizens, the sovereign and the gov- erning classes, having little to fear for their personal comforts, may declare war upon the most frivolous reasons. The abolition of standing armies, the restriction of national debts, and the independence of repre- sentative constitutions are considered by Kant to be the only guarantees of peace. But these are most doubtful topics. Republics have been the fiercest aggressors in history. And the standing armies JURISPRUDENCE 2. 18 INTRODUCTION. and police of Europe are necessary, as well against the foreign enemy as against the internal sedition which, like Communism in France, attacks order, re- ligion, and property. CHAPTER H. ETHICS IN RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. Ethics is the Science of Moral Duties. The purpose of the Physical Sciences throughout all their provinces is to answer the question, " What is ? " They consist only of facts, arranged accord- ing to their likeness, and expressed by general names given to every class of similar facts. The purpose of the Moral Sciences is to answer both the ques- tions, " What is ? " and " What ought to be ? " They aim at ascertaining the rules which ought to govern voluntary action, and to which those habitual dis- positions of mind which are the source of voluntary action ought to be adapted. The possibility of erecting Ethics into a science can be consistently disputed by those only who ques- tion the veracity of that consciousness which im- mediately shows to us the existence and operation of a moral faculty. The arguments against the existence of a moral faculty are generally founded upon the gross in- sensibility to moral distinctions exhibited by unedu- cated children, or savage nations ; or upon instances of persons who, from various causes, have counted those things right which we deem wrong, or es- 20 ETHICS IN RELATION teemed actions as praiseworthy which we regard with abhorrence. But such exceptional and anom- alous cases are nothing to the purpose. When we are told of the absurdities and self-contradictions believed, or at least professed, by whole nations as certain truths when we are reminded that children and uneducated peasants do not readily assent at first hearing to the very axioms of science we arc not apt to be greatly disconcerted by such cavils against the existence of reason. The case is similar with respect to imperfect or diseased manifestations of our moral nature. Moral blindness, if it really exist at all, is a phenomenon far too rare to be taken into account in the psychology of man. The goitre is indeed a melancholy instance of the evil results of a depressing physical condition ; the Chinese woman's foot displays remarkably the power of bad training; but the anatomist of healthy humanity does not describe goitres and club-feet as our nor- mal condition. Hume, who industriously trav- ersed the history of our race to collect all the instances of aberration which have resulted from neglect or imperfect study of the moral conscious- ness, is constrained to conclude *that the principles upon which men reason in morals are always the same, though their conclusions are often very differ- ent ; and Dugald Stewart observes, no less beauti- fully than ingeniously, that the histories of hum an imbecility are, in truth, the strongest testimonies TO JURISPRUDENCE. 21 which can be produced to prove how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental principles of morality over the belief, when they are able to sanctify in the apprehension of mankind every extravagant opinion which early education has taught us to associate with them. Such are their opinions. Though the obscure character of psychological law, the influence of predominating passions, or the capricious action of human volition may interfere with the inferential process in morals and though the peculiar difficul- ties by which the moral philosopher is embarrassed, arising from the unavoidable use of a terminology impressed with the laxity of colloquial language, may render futile the attempt to compete with the geo- metrician in the simplicity and lucidity of his deduc- tionsyet his process is identical with the geometri- cal method. Could we, indeed, shut out human volition, and the action of disturbing fancies, man- kind would no more differ about the conclusions to be drawn from the primary elements of Ethics than about the deductions from geometrical postulates and definitions. Nor are the Moral Sciences alone exposed to the uncertainty arising from disturbing influences. There are elements in meteorology and in the laws of the tides which are unaccountable, and for which allowance must be made in the cal- culations which compute their effects in any given instance. We are not, then, to relinquish, on ac- count of these disturbing influences and great 22 ETHICS IX RELATION obstacles, the erection of an imposing group of Moral Sciences on grounds quite as solid as those which refer to the material world. We find a scientific basis furnished to Ethics in the laws of our moral constitution ; their nature, value, and the truths guaranteed by them can be determined only by inductive investigation the common method of " The Athenian Yerulam and the British Plato." It is quite evident that Bacon meant his method to be applicable to psychology and morals as well as to physics. In the one branch of philosophy, as in the other, there should be an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by analysis, or, as he expresses it, the necessary exclusions of things indifferent. This should be followed by a process of generaliza- tion, in which we seize on the points of agreement. The only essential difference between the two lies in this, that in the one we take the senses, and in the other consciousness, as our informant. The only question of any difficulty respecting an inductive treatment of morals, seems to be this : does such a treatment mean that there are no a priori or intuitive principles of moral guidance, which, in- stead of deriving their authority from experience, are fitted and intended to sanction experience ? Does not such a procedure expose us to the danger of substituting empirical generalizations and accidental associations for necessary truths and eternal princi- ples? of confounding, like the Athenian sophists, TO JURISPRUDENCE. 23 an average morality with an absolute standard of rectitude ? This objection is based on a misapprehension of the scientific process. To identify ethical trutli with vulgar credence, or to adjust it to the fluctuating standard which the popular market supplies in every age to the demands of each succeeding generation, would be fatal to the very idea of a real moral law. A series of facts brought forward to show the gen- eral acknowledgment among men of a moral truth, must be carefully distinguished from an induction of a physical law from facts observed. The princi- ples operate a priori, and independently of experi- ence ; they cannot become known to us, or be em- ployed as philosophic principles, till we have de- termined their nature, rules, and limits by method- ized observation. The distinction between moral good and evil the obligation to shun the evil and do the good are laws which, like the laws of logic, man discovers in his own nature, and which have their origin in himself, as they have their application in his actual life. Moral laws are put into a man's soul or mind as into a treasury or repository some in his very nature, some in after actions, by educa- tion and positive sanction. The moralist refers for judgment on the necessary truths he enounces, not to voluminous statistics, however undeniably useful such records may be as a definite expression of cer- tain facts in our social economy, and entitled as they 24 ETHICS IX RELATION are to an intermediate place between morals and politics; lie bids the student descend into h is own consciousness the depths of his own personality and observe what .he finds there. Mental laws thus inductively determined are henceforward to be regarded as primary principles, and are open at once to the sweeping range of direct deduction. And again, experience has its part, in which there is an immensity to be done, not in the way of invading the domain of the exact science, but in that of extending our knowledge of the facts to which it is to be applied. Where the science of intuitive morals ends, there the science of the ex- perimentalist meets it; and, by a process which modern logicians have named traduction, we pass from one order of reasoning to the other, and com- plete a Science of Ethics practically applicable to every detail of life. And thus, a method, con- structed after the aphorism of Bacon, secures to the experimental as well as to the purely rational ele- ment its own approximate value, assigns to each its own place, and shows how the two are inseparably united, and how they mutually confirm and illus- trate each other. The preceding general views may be illustrated by the following passage from Kant : " It is more particularly in the region of morals that Plato dis- covers his ideas. Moral truth rests upon liberty, and liberty is under the government of laws which TO JURISPRUDENCE. 25 spring from the reason itself. Whoever would rest the idea of virtue upon experience, and establish as a model that which can scarcely serve as an ex- ample in any important practical application, would render virtue altogether uncertain, make it depend- ent upon time and circumstances, and render the formation of any rules impossible. Every one, on the contrary, can see that if any person were held up to him as a model of virtue, it is only in himself that the true type exists, to which the proposed model might be compared, and, consequently, ap- preciated. Now, this type is the idea of virtue ; the objects of experience may, indeed, serve as examples to show that what the reason demands is, up to a certain point, possible in practice ; but the arche- type itself is not there. Because a man never acts in accordance with the pure idea he has of virtue, it does not follow that the idea itself is a mere chimera ; for it is only by means of this idea that moral judgments are formed at all ; it is, con- sequently, the foundation of moral perfection, so far at least as this is possible, considering the obstacles which human nature presents, which are, however, indeterminate. The Republic of Plato has become proverbial as the expression of an imag- inary perfection ; and Brucker ridicules the notion that a prince could never govern well unless pene- trated by the theory of ideas. But, instead of throwing aside Plato's thought as useless, under the 26 ETHICS IN RELATION pretext that it is incapable of realization, would it not be better to attempt a development of it, and by renewed efforts draw it from the obscurity in which that excellent genius has left it? The obstacles arise less, perhaps, from the inevitable evils attached to human nature than from a neglect of these verit- able ideas in legislation. There can be nothing more unworthy of a philosopher than to appeal to an experience which is acknowledged to be in con- tradiction to these ideas ; for what would have been the experience itself if the institutions in question had been established under happier auspices, conform- ably to ideas, and if, instead, other ideas, gross and rude, just because they are derived from experience, had not rendered every good design useless ? In all that has reference to the principles of morals and legislation, where ideas alone render experience possible, Plato possesses a merit that is peculiar to him, and which we are prevented from recognizing only because we judge according to empirical rules, whose value as principles is as nothing compared with that of ideas. In reference to external nature, experience may, indeed, furnish rules, since, in this case, it is the source of truth ; but in reference to morals, experience is the mother of illusion ; and it is altogether error to reason from that which is done, or attempt to limit it by laws which have especial reference to that which ought to be done." The historical method of inquiry has been recom- TO JURISPRUDENCE. 27 mended by some, as by Schleiermacher, with whom Ethics is an investigation of human nature in its forms and tendencies developing itself in history. It must be conceded that history supplies to Ethics its most valuable illustrations ; but as human action is always presented in history as a complex web, in which good and evil are mixed together, it is need- ful to have a test to determine which is the one and which the other. We are thus brought back to the inductive investigation of man's moral constitution as the only method of constructing a scientific Ethics in reference to Jurisprudence. A most successful illustration of this inductive treatment of moral phenomena will be found in the ethical writings of Butler : " There are two ways," writes Butler, "in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things ; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or con- stitution i from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is which is correspondent to this whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things; in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature." Of the former method, the system of Clarke that virtue is a conformity with the relations of things ; and that of Wollaston that virtue con- 28 ETHICS IX RELATION sisted in acting according to truth, arc the most eminent examples. These systems, which were recommended by the intellectual spirit of the age in which they were produced, when the splendid dis- coveries of Descartes, of Leibnitz, and of Newton had so dazzled the mind of Europe, have now be- come obsolete. The latter procedure was universally employed by the ancient moralists ; and Butler, sys- tematically applying it, " occupying the unassail- able ground of an appeal to consciousness," has es- tablished, by reasons superfluously conclusive, not merely the existence, but also the authoritative char- acter and the implicit sanction of the moral law. It is as invested with these majestic attributes of eternity, immutability, and universal authority, that the greatest masters of philosophy and eloquence, both in ancient and modern times, have loved to contemplate and depict the moral faculty. Thus, Cicero says : Right reason is itself a law congenial to the feelings of nature, diffused among all men, uniform, eternal, calling us imperiously to our duty, and peremptorily prohibiting every violation of it. Nor does it speak one language at Rome and another at Athens, varying from place to place, or from time to time ; but it addresses itself to all nations and to all ages, deriving its authority from the common Sovereign of the universe, and carrying home its sanctions to every breast by the inevitable punish- ment which it inflicts on transgressors. Seneca TO JURISPRUDENCE. 29 says : There is a holy spirit throned within us, of our good and evil deeds the Guardian and the Observer. As he is treated by us, even so he treats us. Fene- lon says : Le Maitre interieur et imiversel dit tou- jours et partout les memes verites. Under the same aspect the moral law is presented by Kant, when he calls it the Categorical Imperative, whose absolute rule is, Act according to a maxim which would ad- mit of being regarded as a general law for all acting beings. And Lord Brougham says : There is a law above all the enactment of human codes the same throughout the world the same in all times it is the law written by the finger of God upon the heart of man. CHAPTER III. POLITICAL ECONOMY IX RELATION TO JURISPRU- DENCE. Political Economy is the Science of Exchanges. The bountiful earth, under the varying influences of soil and climate, produces different things useful and agreeable to man. In tropical climates, nature turns every field into a garden : there trees of beau- tiful form bear rich fruits ; there grow the shrubs from which we obtain our spices, and variegated flowers bloom in wanton profusion. The organic richness and abundant fertility belonging to such districts enable them to produce the luxuries of civilized life. Countries more temperate afford vines and wheat. Some places abound in iron and coal ; others in gold and silver. All civilized nations re- quire to exchange some of their own productions for those of others, and upon such exchanges does the very existence of civilized life depend. Between one country and another obstacles exist seas, mountains, rivers, forests. These things throw difficulties in the way of transit ; and to facilitate the operations of commerce, the ingenuity of man invents speedy and safe modes of conveyance. Canals are made, harbors widened, rivers deepened, POLITICAL ECONOMY. 31 navigation improved. Rapid steamers triumph against the winds ; railways tunnel the Alps and bridge the Mississippi and the Ganges. Political Economy shows how inconsistent it is that States should undergo the greatest expense, by building magnificent railways to facilitate intercourse, and at the same time should check intercourse by commer- cial restrictions and taxes which artificially raise prices. All the phenomena which occur in the free inter- changes of the productions of one place for those of another the rise and fall of prices, and the rea- sons for the respective values of commodities, all the questions connected with capital and labor, everything relating to exchanges it is the province of Political Economy to investigate. No subjects can be more important ; and the investigation of them upon sound principles, now proceeding in most of the civilized nations of Europe, must eventually produce important results on the commerce, the prosperity, the progress of the world. At first, when this science began to be extensively cultivated, objections were made to it, on the grounds that wealth is not a proper subject for our study, for with it increase also corruption and vice. Persons have derived ideas of this kind from the early study of the Greek and Roman writers ; the minds of classical students retain through life the ideas of Cincinnatus nobly poor, and the black broth upon 32 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN which Leonidas and his Spartans lived. The Ro- man writers praised sumptuary laws, and declaimed with all the strength of their powerful language against the degeneracy of their fellow-citizens from the old Republican times, ere they knew the refined arts of Greece, or enjoyed the plundered riches of the East. But no fatal union necessarily exists between na- tional wealth and national corruption. Greece at the time of her greatest material prosperity flour- ished most in eloquence, in arts, and arms. The Netherlands, in the time of Charles V, were the most industrious and, for their amount of territory, the wealthiest nation in the world they exhibited no want of devoted heroism, no want of fiery inde- pendence. And although England, like ancient Tyre, has her merchants who are princes, her traf- fickers who are the honorable of the earth, she still sits very glorious in the middle of the seas, and en- riches the kings of the earth with the multitude of her riches and her merchandise. We may banish, then, the idea that the abundant returns of in- dustry, the fruits of genius, the boundless extent of commerce, the exuberance of wealth, and the culti- vation of the liberal arts are enervating to the na- tional spirit or dangerous to the national liberty. Liberty depends upon the structure of the govern- ment, the administration of justice, and the intelli- gence of the people. It has little to do with wealth, or poverty, or soil, or climate. RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 33 The Science of Political Economy is of recent origin. In the first stages of society, wealth, in the pres- ent popular meaning, can scarcely be said to exist. The wandering tribes of savages live by hunting arid fishing ; their habitations are formed of the bark of trees ; their wealth consists of the skins which they wear, their weapons of the chase, and their canoes. In the progress of society, the next step to this is the pastoral state, in which tribes of men, united under the patriarchal system of government, have flocks, and live upon their produce. From this, the transition to the agricultural state is easy, in which there are more opportunities for accumulating wealth, and in which civilization rap- idly progresses. Next in history arise the civilized nations of antiquity of which we have authentic record. In Egypt and many other Oriental nations there was great wealth ; but they labored under oppres- sive despotisms. The bulk of the population was in slavery. The government, owning all the land of the country, was enabled to compel the cultivators to labor, and then to deprive them of the produce. The Pyramids of Egypt have often been mentioned with wonder, as evidences of the greatness of that civilization which was able to leave such great memorials. To me, on the other hand, reflecting JURISPRUDENCE 3. 34 POLITICAL ECONOMY IX that they were raised by forced unpaid labor of thousands of miserable beings perishing at the task, they have always seemed to exhibit only proofs of the senseless vanity of tyrants, who dragged so many of their subjects together, and forced them unpaid to raise useless heaps of stones, when those unhappy persons would have been better em- ployed in building comfortable though perishable houses for themselves, and living there with their families. In Egypt, the sacerdotal caste alone attended to intellectual affairs, whilst the rest of the population was sunk in ignorance. The entire system of castes was strictly enforced. These castes still prevail throughout the East ; and the system this moment may be seen in full vigor in parts of India, where Brahmins and their children's children must be priests forever where the descendants of soldiers must always be soldiers where none of the natives who live strictly according to the tenets of their religion, can leave the trade or business which their fathers followed. In modern civilized societies there are many ex- amples of men of humble birth raising themselves to the highest position and the greatest fortunes. Under the ancient tyrannies it was impossible for the phenomena attending the free competition of capital and labor to arise ; it was impossible for the principles of taxation to be discussed, since taxes RELATION TO JURI^PKUDEXCE. 35 were nothing but plunder taken by the powerful from the humble. In these old times the universal reign of rapine prevented the study of the Social Sciences from nourishing ; notwithstanding that, some nations suc- cessfully cultivated literature and the arts. Things now only practiced by the outcasts were then the pursuits of the leaders of society. Thus, Homer introduces Nestor asking Telemachus whether he and his friends were pirates or merchants : " Say, what the cause "why, traversing the main, Steer you from port to port in quest of gain ? Or to and fro, like roving pirates stray, "Who, injuring others, cast their lives away ? " Odyssey, Book III. The writer evidently did not consider that pro- fession dishonorable which now is punished by the rope, and to destroy which civilized nations now offer head-money for slain pirates. Athens, in the time of Pericles, flourished in wealth ; her poets and orators hold still a foremost place amongst the intellects of the world ; her archi- tecture is still a model for us ; her art is still con- templated by all succeeding time with admiring de- spair. Rome, under the later Republic, and in the time of the Emperors, accumulated such wealth as London now can scarcely rival, and in taste and art surpassed the Paris of the Napoleons. Why, then, did not those countries cultivate the science which 36 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN treats of the operations that bring the produce of one climate to another, and enable the inhabitants of any district enjoying a fair share of wealth to possess the luxuries of the most remote zones, with- out the discomforts attending their production? One reason was, the utter contempt with which trade was regarded by the classic times. The citi- zens of the ancient States, even those enjoying the highest degree of freedom, all despised trade. Those branches of commercial and manufacturing industry which have raised our modern civilization to so great a height, and without which it would at once disappear, were scorned by the warlike citizens of Greece and Rome. Plato excluded tradesmen from his Republic. Cicero, although in most respects so far in advance of his age, thought commerce only not very despicable " hand admodumvituperanda." He says also : " I do not wish the same people to be the ruler and the carrier of the world " " Nolo eundem populiwn imperatorem, et portitorcm esse terrarum." Yet it has been the boast of Venice, Holland, and England, in succession, to be the carrier of the world. The Romans prohibited com- merce to persons of birth, rank, and fortune, and no senator was allowed a vessel larger than a boat sufficient to carry his wine, corn, and fruits. The military aristocracy of Rome, without trade or commerce, sought wealth in the only manner which can take the place of production plunder. The RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 37 wealth of Rome was plunder taken openly from the countries successively overrun by the victorious Roman armies ; the principal taxes by which in latter times the Roman govarnment subsisted were tributes drawn from conquered provinces. The very sense in which the word tributum came to be used shows how unfair was this one of the earliest taxes in Rome. It was called tributum, be- ing paid by the thirty plebeian tribes instituted, as has been supposed, by Servius Tullius. It derived its subsequent meaning from being a partial tax, not paid by the patricians, and a badge of servitude upon the plebeians. I am aware that it is a moot- point amongst historians whether these tribes in- cluded the patricians or not ; but I consider that the sense in which the word tributum came to be used finally is upon this question decisive. The wealth of Rome was principally plunder drawn from conquered countries. As each partly civilized nation in turn yielded to the terror of the Roman armies, its wealth, accumulated for centu- ries, was transferred to Rome and spent in a season. While nations thus afforded plunder, Italy flour- ished in wealth, and was covered with the most magnificent public and private edifices. But when no more new countries could be overcome, and when the tributes could no longer be exacted from the in- habitants of the provinces, the resources of Italy were not sufficient to keep those magnificent edifices POLITICAL ECONOMY IN from mouldering to decay. The ancient world had within it the fatal principles of decay the despot- ism of the government, the tyranny of the governing races, the slavery and ignorance of the masses of the people. The old civilization fell to pieces upon the invasion of the hardy barbarians of the north, and the Dark Ages for a time covered Europe with a cloud. When learning began again to be cultivated, and when the European universities were founded, the old prejudice against trade and commerce still sur- vived. The feudal system nourished. The princi- ple of the feudal system was, that a dominant race tyrannized over a subjected one. The feudal lords extorted from the serfs their property, and insisted on their labor without paying them for it. No man could possess the absolute property of the land. The greatest contempt was manifested for trade. Warriors, in the early ages, contemned the rights of property in all unable to protect themselves by arms. No nobleman or gentleman in the feudal times would sully himself by embracing any profession, except that of arms or the church. As a proof of the great contempt for trade which once existed in En- gland, now the first commercial nation upon the earth, the most lucrative and flourishing branches of trade were there permitted to fall into the hands of despised strangers the Jews and Lombards. The Jews invented bills of exchange, without which, or RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 39 some similar documents, the vast mercantile opera- tions now based upon credit could not be conducted. The Lombards invented shipping insurances. In this state of society none of the phenomena could prominently appear which arise from the free dis- tribution of property, and from the unrestrained competition of capital and labor. None would con- sider about the cheapest and best mode of taxation, whilst taxes were the property of governing races, who consumed them all for their own benefit, and were careless about the welfare of the producers. War was then the great business of nations, and the attention of government in matters of taxation was directed merely to the most effectual means of rais- ing the supplies to meet the expenses of continual warfare. The best statesman was he who raised most taxes with least trouble from the oppressed common people. The great discoveries of the fifteenth century be- gan to destroy feudalism. The invention of gun- powder caused the castles and armor of the barons to be useless, by means of which they had been enabled so long to prevent and defy any general law of the realm, and to live upon the plunder of the poor. It was found that a regiment of laborers, dis- ciplined for six months, and armed with the weapons introduced by this wonderful discovery, were supe- rior in the battle-field to the bravest knights, mounted on splendid horses, and clad in costly armor. But 40 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN the new weapons were expensive ; there, again, the wealth of the towns was of more use than the chiv- alry of the castles. The great invention of print- ing diffused knowledge amongst all. The great geographical discoveries gave a new impetus to com- merce, which, from its wealth and extended opera- tions, began no longer to be despised. Slavery by degrees vanished from the whole of Western Eu- rope. Thus, with the decline of the feudal system, arose that commercial and manufacturing spirit which is now beginning to be one of the great mov- ing powers of the world. Once, therefore, that the settled conditions of modern society began to arise in Western Europe, the serfs, emancipated from the feudal system, were enabled to dispose of their labor at the price which they considered sufficiently remunerative for them ; merchants, under the protection of the law, no longer feared that their property would be taken from them at the will of some baron ; wealth rapidly accumu- lated, and some men, instead of working with their own capital, began to live upon the profits of their capital lent to others. In consequence, all the nice and complicated questions connected with capital, labor, wages, and taxation began to attract the at- tention of learned men, and from their studies and writings upon these important subjects has arisen the modern science of Political Economy. The ori- gin of this science is cotemporaneous with the spread RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 41 of modern civilization, the increase of commerce, the rise of public liberty. And briefly reviewing the history of Western Europe, we may see that the march of civilization has been steady and progressive. First, the serfs are emancipated, then trade becomes honorable, and from these conditions, combined with some others, has arisen the great middle class, displaying the highest social activity, and cultivating the greatest spirit of industry ever witnessed in the world. Having ac- complished so much, the spirit of progress now directs its efforts to solve the social difficulties of society; and in this, one of its chief aids is the Science of Political Economy. Some have despaired of continual progress, and assuredly all over the earth we behold the ruins of lost civilizations. In Central America, amidst for- ests a thousand years of age, the traveler beholds ruins of statues and temples that rival Athenian art and Egyptian architecture. They lie, broken and defaced, memorials of great and civilized nations, whose very names ages ago perished from human memory. Babylon, Nineveh, Carthage, once were great cities, and now are either heaps of ruins or effaced from the earth. Still, we may anticipate that progress may have a long career. Sometimes for centuries it has been interrupted, yet since the dawn of history there is evidence of its continuance. "VYe behold upon the earth places like the impassable 42 POLITICAL ECONOMY IX morasses of the Amazon, breathing forth devastat- ing epidemics, and affording to the few creatures in human form that linger there, the means of drag- ging on but a dull and joyless existence, without usefulness or dignity. Comparatively recent history informs ns that when the Athenian civilization flourished, the greater part of Europe, and now its most flourishing and civilized part, bore the same character. When Pericles lived his glorious exist- ence, those countries which, under the names of France and Germany, are covered with rich corn- fields and beautiful vineyards, and have produced so many great and good men, were disfigured with rocks and marshes, and were inhabited by uncivil- ized men not very superior to the present New Zealanders. The rivers, which then formed noisome swamps, have been taught to keep their channels, and are covered with steamers ; the rocks arc built into libraries and cathedrals, and the descendants of the savages who dwelt there have been brought under the dominion of law, and into the habits of peaceful life. So also, in the North and South Americas, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific and Southern Oceans, savage life is everywhere be- ing replaced by civilization. In the popular liberty which has enabled so many men of humble birth in modern times to raise them- selves to the honorable positions which they have RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 43 adorned, we see the best proofs of the high charac- ter of our modern civilization. In the development of society, civilized nations have arrived at that stage where commerce is free, where industry is honored. The fruits of labor are protected by the law, its exertions are respected. The study of the Social Sciences has aided to pro- duce these sentiments, beginning to pervade the heart of modern society. I have always considered that the study of the Social Sciences, such as Juris- prudence and Political Economy, should form a part of the general education of all, the poorest as well as the richest in the land. The sciences may be placed in two divisions. Some of necessity need to be known only to those who practice them professionally. We all can enjoy the fullest benefit of the mechanical sciences, notwith- standing our ignorance of them. Few are acquainted with the mechanism of the steam-engine, yet millions enjoy the benefits of railway traveling. But sci- ences, like Morality, Jurisprudence, Medicine, and Political Economy, derive their efficacy, not from the knowledge concentrated in particular professions, but from the general correct knowledge of them diffused through the public ; and these sciences have this striking peculiarity, that no one confesses his absolute ignorance of them. Every one every day practices Morality, Jurisprudence, Medicine, and Po~ 44 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN litical Economy, let them be good or bad and they are often very bad. Hence arises the importance of general education upon these subjects. And as re- gards Political Economy, I may say there are no subjects more interesting than those about which this science is conversant. They are those which concern every individual in the community ; they are those upon which, in a very great measure, individ- ual and national prosperity depend. There is no one who does not buy and sell, who does not pay taxes, " who does not employ labor or is employed. And there cannot be upon earth a study of more extended dignity and usefulness, more becoming to philan- thropy and patriotism, than the requisite and practi- cal reform of the social institutions of the country the solution of the social difficulties of the day. It is right to cultivate this social knowledge. By the study of these liberal sciences we shall the more assist the diffusion of the sentiments now spreading throughout the world, and by means of which all enlightened men regard the human race, without distinction, as one family aspiring to one common aim the development of the faculties with which they have been endowed. The Social Sciences are of no one country, they belong to the entire world. Those who cultivate them, though separated by dis- tance and by language, yet understand one another. Fellow-countrymen in thought, they form one vast intellectual society of citizens of the world, pursu- RELATION TO JURISPRUDENCE. 45 ing the same end, the discovery of universal truth animated by one feeling, the patriotism of civili- zation. CHAPTER IV. JURISPRUDENCE. The term Jurisprudence has been used in very different senses. Originally, it meant the science of right. Afterward, it was used to mean knowledge of the principles of law, or skill in its practice. In the Institutes of Justinian, Jurisprudence is defined to be the knowledge of what is just and unjust. Upon the revival of learning in Europe, in the six- teenth century, Jurisprudence was used to signify knowledge of the Roman law. The term has also been used, in a sense borrowed from the French, to imply a collection of the principles belonging to particular branches of law thus, Equity Juris- prudence, Maritime Jurisprudence. The term has also been used to signify the whole body of the law of a State thus, the Jurisprudence of England. The philological meanings of legal terms best il- lustrate legal history. There are three phases in the development of law the religious, technical, and scientific. In the origin of society, every dis- puted question in law is referred to the decision of God. In all languages the legal terms of pleading causes originally imply the idea of prayer. Trials are by ordeal and by battle amongst all nations in an early state of civilization. JURISPRUDENCE. 47 In the second phase of law, nations, by means of pre-appointed evidence and forms of a minute and cumulative nature, endeavor to attain certainty. Seven Roman citizens were originally necessary to attest a Roman will. Under the English law, twelve jurors must unanimously find a prisoner guilty before he can receive punishment. Justice, under such a system, becomes minute and technical. The judges often knowingly do what is unjust in carrying out the letter of the law. The maxim of this second phase is, " Let justice be done though the heavens should fall " -fiat justitia mat codum. Jus- tice and the corresponding terms in this phase of law mean equality of division in all languages. Finally, men begin to perceive that there are nat- ural principles of right and wrong ; and, in the third phase of law, endeavor to attain truth and justice by the aid of reason and experience. Whilst the first and second phases prevail amongst a nation, law cannot be scientifically cultivated. In the third phase, the possibility is admitted of arriv- ing at a complete science of law or science of right. In other words, the possibility is admitted of col- lecting and arranging in methodical order the fund- amental principles which explain the origin of laws and their development toward perfection. Some term is necessary to denote the science of law. Ju- risprudence has been the word adopted. No science can possibly be developed without method, nonien- 48 JURISPRUDENCE. clature, and classification. " Nomina si pereant, perit et cognitio rcrum." Method facilitates com- prehension, abridges labor, assists the memory, and trains the intellect to accurate judgment. In every species of knowledge, disorder in language is at once the effect and the cause of ignorance and error. Nomenclature can only be perfected in proportion as truth is discovered. The classification of laws has never yet been adopted upon the grand scale demanded by Jurisprudence. If a system of law were correctly framed, and if codes of laws were drafted on one true principle by all civilized nations, the language of each race would serve as a glossary by which all systems of Positive Law might be ex- plained ; whilst the matter in each code would afford a test and standard by which all might be tried. Thus classified and illustrated, the practice of every nation might be a lesson to every other, and man- kind might carry on a mutual intercourse of ex- perience and improvements as easily in law as in every other domain of art and science. By law is here understood Positive Law- that is, the law existing by position, or the law of human enactment. Jurisprudence is the Science of Positive Laws, and, as such, is the theory of those duties which are capable of being enforced by the public authority. Jurisprudence, so treated, may take its place as one of those inductive sciences in which, by the observation of facts and the use of reason, JURISPRUDENCE. 49 systems of doctrine have been established which are universally received as truths among thoughtful men. But Jurisprudence, in its investigation of the ori- gin, principles, and development of law, obviously furnishes rules which teach men to acknowledge and select good laws, to shun evil laws, and to practice the existing laws and apply them skilfully. Hence, Jurisprudence is not only the Science of Positive Laws, but is also the art of legislation and the prac- tice of advocacy. A jurist may state principles of law in his study, enact laws in the senate, or ad- vocate rights in the forum. A science is a collection of truths ; an art is a collection of rules for conduct. The end of science is truth. The end of art is work. Since science is conversant about speculative knowledge only, and art is the application of knowl- edge to practice, Jurisprudence, when applied to practice, whether in making of laws as in legislation, or in the actual working of the law as in advocacy, is an art ; but Jurisprudence, when confined to the theory of law, is strictly a science. The same term may be strictly applied to both the science and its corresponding art, as logic is not only the science of thought, but is also the art of reasoning. So that I may give an example taken from the practice of the law conveyancing is the JURISPRUDENCE 4. 50 JURISPRUDENCE. science and also the art of alienation. If, by an in- vestigation of the laws of property, we elicit and systematize the principles which govern its dis- position, we arc then forming the science. If we apply this knowledge in the alienation of property, we are skillful in the art. The art may exist without the corresponding science having arrived at any degree of cultivation. If the knowledge applied to practice be merely ac- cumulated experience, it is empirical ; but if it be illustrated by history and philosophy, and brought under general principles, it becomes a science. Thus, Sir Edward Coke was an empirical lawyer ; his writings are a chaos of ill-digested learning. Judge Story was a scientific jurist of a high class, who in his works rises from rules of practice to the principles of eternal justice. In every age and country different laws produce different results, the same laws generally producing the same results. Observing, then, the actions of mankind differing in the different grades of civiliza- tion, it is possible to estimate what rules for human conduct in civil society produce the most beneficial effects. If the Physical Sciences regard what is, and the Mental Sciences both what is and what ought to be so the jurist, in the investigation of the science of right, should strive to make the actual law ap- proach the ideal of legal perfection. ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE. 51 DISTINCTION BETWEEN ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE. Thus, Jurisprudence as an art, or legislation, lias the same ratio to Jurisprudence as a science which the rules of practical morality bear to the Science of Ethics. Bentham has correctly denned the limits between the provinces of Ethics and Jurisprudence. 'Ethics exhibits the rules of three classes of human actions prudence, probity, and beneficence. Legislation interferes directly by means of punishment only. Punishment 1 should not be applied when it is ground- less, inefficacious, unprofitable, or needless. The cases where the punishment would be un- profitable constitute the great field for the exclusive interference of Ethics. Punishment as applied to guilt may be unprofita- ble in both or either of two ways : by the expense to which it would amount, even supposing it to be confined altogether to delinquency ; or by the danger there may be of involving the innocent in the fate designed for the guilty. Of the rules of moral duty, those which stand least in need of the assistance of the legislator are the rules of prudence. If one err in respect of prudence, it must arise either from some inadvertence or misapprehension with regard to the circumstances on which his happiness depends. The rules of pro- 52 ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE. bity are those which, in point of expediency, stand most in need of legislative assistance. The idea of right is the bond between Ethics and Jurisprudence. Practical morality has been defined to be the art of directing the actions of individual men to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness by means of such motives as offer themselves. The art of legislation teaches how a multitude of men composing a community may be disposed to pursue that course which is most con- ducive to the happiness of the entire community by means of motives which are applied by the legisla- tor. Ethics and Jurisprudence differ in the means which they employ. They coincide in one general ultimate end, the happiness of mankind by the reg- ulation of human action. The distinction between Ethics, or the Science of Moral Duties, and Jurisprudence, or the Science of Positive Laws, is compulsion by public authority. And thus discussing Positive Laws upon the in- ductive method examining the different legislative systems of different nations, and their results upon the happiness of mankind comparing slavery with freedom, ignorance with knowledge, accordingly as these have been checked or developed by the great forces which have swayed human destinies we, by the observation of facts and the use of reason, se- lecting the good, eloigning the bad, may gradually arrive at that system of law which is most in con- formity with natural justice. ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE. 53 But the duties of the jurist and the legislator are perfectly distinct. The business of the jurist is merely to state those general principles which are true in all times and under all circumstances. The legislator must regard the historical development of the people. And it cannot be too often repeated that all actual legislation must be a compromise between history and philosophy. No two nations ever ex- isted having precisely the same standard of morality embodied in their laws. In no nation is the moral standard the same at different periods of its devel- opment. The law is always below the moral standard of the best citizens, and above that of the worst. The legislator must take heed that his leg- islation coincides with the public opinion of the mass, or the enforcement of a law becomes impossi- ble. Thus, dueling where the issue was fatal was murder, punished with death by the common law of England, but the law could not be enforced until late in the nineteenth century. There is not in the whole compass of human af- fairs so noble a spectacle as that which is displayed in the progress of Jurisprudence, where we may contemplate the cautious and unwearied exertions of a succession of wise men through a long course of ages, withdrawing every case as it arises from the dangerous power of discretion, and subjecting it to inflexible rules of Positive Law. 1 1 Mackintosh. 54 LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. What can be more instructive than to search out the first obscure and scanty fountains of that Juris- risprudencc, which now waters and enriches whole nations w^ith so abundant and copious a flood ; to observe the first principles of right springing up, in- volved in superstition and polluted by violence, un- til, by length of time and favorable circumstances, it has worked itself into clearness ; to view the laws, sometimes lost and trodden down in the con- fusion of wars and tumults, and sometimes over- ruled by the hand of power then victorious over tyranny, growing stronger and more decisive by the violence they have suffered enriched even by those foreign conquests which threaten their entire de- struction softened and mellowed by peace and religion, and improved and exalted by commerce, by 'social intercourse, and that great opener of the mind, ingenuous science. 1 LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. Justice alone of the virtues can be enforced by the public authority. Jurisprudence considers what range of human actions may come within the cog- nizance of justice, and what rights are capable of being protected by the Positive Law. Gratitude and benevolence are virtues, but incapable of being enforced by legal means, whereas, if one citizen take 1 Edmund Burke. LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. 55 the property of another, there is compensation, or punishment, or both. The true objects of the Science of Jurisprudence are the knowledge of the legal relations which ought to be established by the Positive Law, and the ascer- tainment of the best means to enforce such rela- tions. These true principles of Jurisprudence are at the very base of the science of politics, and the due ascertainment of the province of government is perhaps the most important question of modern times. But the province of government is solely concerned with those human actions which are capable of being enforced by the public authority. It is idle for a government to try to enforce those duties which are incapable of being enforced by it. Duties such as these are not easy of definition, but an idea of them may be obtained by an exhaustive process of reasoning. There are certain virtues of exalted character which can be attained only by persons of the most splendid moral and physical organization, placed in circumstances where these innate qualities have been developed to the highest pitch of excellence. When Leonidas died for liberty and civilization in the pass of Thermopylas, he performed a duty to mankind ; but what law could enforce the self-devotion of which we read the famous examples in ancient history ? 56 LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. That I may take a recent example : During the battle of Paris, in 1848, when the Archbishop of Paris advanced with the crucifix in his hand to meet the terrible Faubourgs St. Antoine and Marceau, careless about death, provided he brought peace, lie was performing a duty, but a duty incapable of en- forcement. The most exalted virtues, exemplified in the great actions which ennoble humanity, are attainable by few, and are beyond legislation. There is another class of virtues manifested in external action, impossible to be enforced by legis- lative authority. Virtues such as these are less difficult to attain, and are more generally diffused, but still are abhorrent of compulsion. Such is the virtue of benevolence. Vincent de Paul devoted his life to the comfort of the afflicted. Las Casas toiled for years in the cause of the oppressed Indians. Howard visited all Europe, not to survey the sumptuousness of palaces or the stateliness of temples ; not to make accurate measurements of the remains of ancient grandeur, nor to fornva scale of the curiosity of modern art; not to collect medals, nor to collate manuscripts : but to dive into the depths of dungeons, to plunge into the infections of hospitals, to survey the man- sions of sorrow and of pain, to take the gauge and dimensions of misery, depression, and contempt, to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. 57 to visit the forsaken, and to compare and collate the distresses of all men in all countries. 1 Nor is this exalted benevolence confined to such eminent persons. In our own time, Florence Night- ingale organized a band of Sisters of Charity, who braved pestilence in the distant hospitals of Scutari, that they might afford relief to the agony of our wounded soldiers. A name in the page of history and the public thanks of a nation are great rewards for such services. But many abandon the splendor of a patrician life, the ties of family and home, and the luxuries of the civilization of the nineteenth century, in order, living an obscure existence, to console misery in the abodes of the poor. Benevo- lence, like friendship and gratitude, is beyond legis- lation. Again, that we may proceed from the virtues which are shown in relations with other persons to those virtues which chiefly concern the individual the law cannot enforce prudence, caution, self-control from vice, or a proper disposition in the expenditure of money. Within recent memory, in England, some gentlemen spend hundreds of thousands in supporting the Italian opera, others lavish hundreds of thousands on the turf. But the State cannot as- sume with success the guardianship of fortune. Next to the Crown lands, the worst managed prop- erty possessed by the English community is under 1 Edmund Burke. 58 LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. the Receivers of the Court of Chancery. The law cannot enforce wisdom in managing one's own, or beneficence in dealings with others; such things must be left to the discretion of individuals, to the progress of education, and to the results of an en- lightened public opinion. So, Positive Law appears to be powerless against the vice of intoxication, and can only punish the wretched drunkard who publicly offends against decency and order. The vice of drunkenness de- pends upon the will. In recent times, two great aids have been discovered to assist the drunkard's will the use of a limited period in abstinence, and sympathy or fellow-feeling in abstinence. The greatest drunkards can abstain from drink if the time of abstinence be definitely fixed, so that they can look forward to a period when they can use their liberty again. Next comes the aid of sym- pathy. Men can do together and in company what they cannot do by themselves. Anything that is difficult to do, any exertion of resolution, any kind of self-denial, is made easier by the aid of sympathy, by knowing that other persons are feeling and doing the same thing. Father Mathew and other leaders of the temperance movement in England and Ireland well understood this principle of human nature when they organized the votaries of temperance into an army with medals, bands, and banners. But LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE. 59 no law has ever been successful in preventing the vice of drunkenness. Now, if it be impossible to enforce by public authority, first, the most exalted virtues ; secondly, dispositions toward others, such as benevolence and friendship ; thirdly, virtues belonging to the class of prudence and self-control, how much more im- possible must it be to force the individual sentiments of the mind into the particular form ordained by any human law. Yet in this last particular how many governments have erred ! But the individual acts of the mind are independ- ent, and belief of anything rests upon the amount of evidence offered in respect of the fact to be proved, and the natural capacity of the mind for judgment. Belief is independent of the will. At present, by the universal consent of civiliza- tion, what is involuntary deserves neither reward nor punishment at the hands of the magistrate ; but through the history of all nations, in the examples of religious persecution is seen the fearful amount of misery caused by persons invested with the supreme power attempting to enforce belief a thing incapable of being enforced. And this alone is suf- ficient to show the importance of ascertaining the province of government the importance of the Science of Jurisprudence. 60 DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY The end of government is the security of rights. The natural rights of man are life, liberty, and prop- erty. To protect these rights has been the professed and real object of all the systems of civil polity that ever illumined the world with a ray of freedom. These rights, in the first beginnings of civilization, are not only practically insecure, but, even in theory, are imperfectly acknowledged. Where slavery still exists these rights are imperfect. The aggressive wars of our own times show that the rights of stran- gers to their lives and property are not yet perfectly admitted by the civilized States of the world. The theory of Hobbes is not wholly wrong, that, agreeably to the lowest law of nature, man aims at the injury of his neighbor when a stranger to him. To savages, all strangers are enemies; everything unknown is an object of fear Omne ignotum pro horribili. In all languages, the same word originally signified both stranger and enemy. But the more persons know one another, they generally love one another the more. During the progress of civilization the sympathy of man for his fellow-creatures extends in an ever- widening circle. At first, none but immediate rel- atives are held entitled even to the common rights of life and property. Slaves are without rights. But in the advanced nations a poor-law provides for DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 61 even the outcasts of society, and humane legislation prevents cruelty to animals. The first nucleus of society must have been the family, although nowhere in savage life has an isolated family been discovered unconnected with others by language or kindred. The existence of language proves that everywhere men exist in in- tellectual communities. The family develops into the tribe. *Men, whilst in the stage of the tribe, fanatically regard its inter- ests beyond anything else. They do not yet recog- nize the positive rights of other men, belonging to other tribes v to their lives, liberties, and properties. They do not hesitate to rob and murder persons even belonging to neighboring tribes, speaking the same language, and having the same national origin. Thus, the Arabian tribes were engaged in mutual war before Mahomet for a time united them. The right of private war between the feudal barons was one of the most difficult to be abolished. The clans of the Scottish Highlands, up to the time of their disorganization, maintained the right of private war. The Indian tribes of North America still massacre one another when opportunity may offer. The petty tribes and nations of Africa still are engaged in deadly mutual strife, scarcely interrupted by their common danger from the superior arms and civiliza- tion of the Europeans. Yet during this phase the tribes of the same race in process of time regard one 62 DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. another with less animosity than they regard persons belonging to other races. The Berbers of Northern Africa are sometimes mutually at peace, but toward Christians they entertain perpetual hostility. They rob and murder Christians whenever an opportunity may offer ; nor do they perceive that they violate any natural right, or transgress any natural duty. Sympathy develops from the tribe to the nation, and thence to the race. The word dy/uos originally means parish; democracy now means the govern- ment by a people. In ancient Greece, though piracy at first was not a dishonorable profession, the rights of all Hellenes were finally recognized ; but the rest of mankind were still considered barbarians, perpet- ual enemies, without natural rights to life, liberty, or property. The Roman citizen united many nations, but warred upon the rest of the ancient world. The Proconsul in the Roman theater applauded the sen- timent: "Homo sum,) Jiumani nil a me alien um puto" but he disregarded it in the foreign province. Still the acknowledgment of the rights of humanity, and the consequent fusion of races, unceasingly pro- ceed. In modern Europe, the different States of France, once independent, fiave coalesced into one. The old kingdoms of Spain are now under one government. The British Islands, in which have existed such diversities of races and language, arc now a United Kingdom. Most of the Sclavonic races have coalesced under the Empire of Russia. DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 03 The disorganization and re-organization of Europe simultaneously proceed. The equilibrium of States is overthrown, whilst the harmony of nationalities is constituted. Italy is under one government. The Germans have obtained national unity under their Empire. Such is the development of sympathy proceeding upon the more ancient idea of the bond of union existing between family, tribe, nation, and race, both for aggressive and defensive purposes. Another development of sympathy, more based on reason, arises from the recognition of the equal rights of all men, as citizens of the world, to share in the gifts of providence. Commerce and emigra- tion are the two great agents by which, in modern times, the clannish distinctions of nation or race are obliterated. Amongst the races of men whilst in an imperfect state of development, the tie of country is so strong that nothing but the most positive evils of war, pes- tilence, and famine will compel them to abandon their native land. In civilized countries, the poor may be divided in- to three principal classes. The first and least nu- merous is composed of those wretched beings, who, from organic deformity, whether manifested in mind or body, are unable to earn their bread ; with them may be comprised the aged and infirm. The next class is composed of the wicked and idle, who refuse 04 DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. to labor for their subsistence, and who, not possess- ing realized property of their own, are supported by the labor and charity of their friends. The third and most numerous class consists of the great masses of mankind, descendants of savages, who as yet have scarce emerged from primitive barbarism, and who, through ignorance of the methods of life, linger always upon the verge of starvation. The last division includes the great majority of the poor in every country. Ignorance has been the great check to prevent the poor from emigration. Men rather bear the ills they have than fly to others they know not of. But education has dissipated much of old prejudice. The German, English, and Irish poor know that be- yond the Atlantic exists a continent where laws similar to their own are better and more cheaply administered, and where there is plenty of good land to be had at a low rate. The more go v the more will go, until the rate of wages and the rent of land will approximate in Europe and America. The beneficial effects of the great European emi- gration to America and Australia in the nineteenth century can scarcely be overrated. Through this emigration millions emerged from poverty into the position of wealthy citizens. The next great ad- vantage to the human family must spring from the fusion of races. The more the population is mixed the more prosperous will be the country. This re- DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 65 suit arises from the principle of the division of la- bor. Individual races excel in some qualities, and are deficient in others. The French, Italians, Ger- mans, Sclaves, and English of the present day each have their different qualities in which they severally surpass the rest ; and if they were fused into one community of the United States, would each apply themselves solely to those departments of human skill and industry in which they are superior. This principle has long since been perceived, and termed the territorial division of labor. But it never can be completely developed whilst men remaining un- der different governments are separated by interna- tional tariffs, custom-houses, and wars. In effect, pure races, like the Turks, languish and become etiolated. The most flourishing communi- ties, like the city of Romulus, have sprung ex collu- vione gentium. In the mythical story of the foun- dation of Rome, Livy tells us that the founder opened an asylum for fugitives the political refu- gees of the neighboring petty States of Etruria and Latium. All the young men for whom society in those States provided no employment, and who be- came its enemies in consequence, as naturally as the sparks fly upward, fled to the protection of the seven hills of Rome. England has owed much of her greatness to being a similar asylum. Hither have fled the artisans of the Netherlands and France from the terror of the Duke of Alva and Louis JURISPRUDENCE 5. G6 DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. XIV, whilst the modern Englishman is the result of the Celt, the Roman, the Saxon, and the Norman. In thus mentioning different races, I do not insist upon the intrinsic superiority of one race over an- other ; nor do I use the term " race " to denote differ- ence of origin. At the present time, certain aggre- gations of individuals have developed peculiar mental and physical qualities, and use different lan- guages. So they are termed races. To a great ex- tent, intellect and beauty depend on the advantages of good food and climate. Some races are at the height of prosperity ; others in the lowest depths of degradation. The primitive causes of these things we know no more than the causes which have sunk Atlantic continents into the seas, and raised the Alps from the abysses of some primeval ocean. But St. Paul said at Athens, " God hath made of one blood all mankind to dwell upon the face of the earth." In the lowest Australian savage exists the germ of the intellect of Socrates, of Caesar, of Ba- con, of Newton, of Napoleon. From the most un- sightly Esquimaux at the pole, or negro of the tropics, may, in the process of centuries, be devel- oped forms of godlike strength and beauty, like the living models of the Athenian sculptor. Even in recent historical memory, the splendid Magyar aris- tocrat came from Asia a Tartar savage his lan- guage and origin the same as those of the Lap- landers and Ostiaks. The Daco-Romans of Trail- DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 67 sylvania are the descendants of the Romans who conquered and colonized the ancient world. But a thousand years of prosperity have changed the Magyar into one of nature's finest types of man. Under a thousand years of oppression the Rouman peasantry have much degenerated from the type of the ancient Roman 'legionary. For the polished Athenian, for the Roman citizen, for the feudal lord, sympathy with mankind did not exist. The stage of civilization at which no nation has yet arrived to which all nations have a slow but certain tendency is that in which men shall en- tertain the same sympathy toward all mankind which has been felt by them for family, tribe, na- tion, race ; in which the crime of killing a stranger in aggressive war shall be regarded as murder is now regarded ; in which the liberty of the individ- ual shall be completely developed, and in which the absolute power of individual governments disap- pearing under international systems, men, true citi- zens of the world, shall possess over the earth their rights, and by the law the means of enforcing them. Still, although all human races upon the earth are in a state of progress tending toward the same legal civilization, there need be no apprehension that the nations of the world will so fall into one sink of level avarice. The gifts of nature are va- riously scattered amongst the children of great national families, and the brilliant variety of genius. 68 DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. taste, and imagination in races constitutes the splen- dor of mankind. The types of nationalities disap- pear with difficulty, and there is in nature one uni- form variety. Grandeur and beauty would vanish from the earth if it were smoothed into level plain- ness. As the soldiers of all civilized nations use the same arms, so once that the laws shall be dis- covered under which we best may live in happiness, all nations in a similar state of civilization will adopt them. But the glorious diversity of man- kind must ever still proceed. DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED. Jurisprudence embraces a great portion of what has been considered by various writers under the heads of Ethics, Polity, Political Philosophy, and Political Economy. Writers on Political Economy, in particular Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, have discussed in their economical works many of the subjects of Jurisprudence. But Political Econ- omy is only the science of exchanges. It has de- veloped the great principle that exchanges should be free. Political Economy, starting from this principle, teaches as its corollaries that the perma- nent and regular increase of human comfort is grounded upon the absence, so far as depends on law, of all favored classes, professions, and pursuits ; DEFINITIONS IN JUKISPEUDENCE. 69 in the equal protection afforded by the law to every citizen, and the unrestricted liberty of spending as he pleases his honest earnings. It teaches that the machinery of trade and commerce should be left free ; that every system of restrictions or prohibi- tions on commercial intercourse cuts off the foreign market, diminishes the number of our buyers and the demand for our produce, and so checks produc- tion. It teaches that all men should be permitted, without the interference of their government, to produce whatever they consider it most to their in- terest to produce; that they should not by law be prevented from producing one thing, or by law be bribed to produce another ; that they should, so far as is consistent with public morality, be left alone, and allowed to follow their own interests as they please. But law has been only recently illustrated by its kindred sciences ; very recently the existence of a science of society has been suspected ; but recently has Political Economy or Jurisprudence been taught in the universities of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. However, the general prog- ress of society has told upon the progress of Juris- prudence in the British Islands. Our criminal law has made wise and merciful progress from the time when trial by ordeal and battle existed from the time when mute prisoners were pressed to death from the time when Sir Edward Coke prosecuted 70 DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. Sir TTalter Raleigh from the time of Chief Jus- tice Jeffrey's bloody western assize from the time when prisoners were not allowed counsel to speak in their defense. So from the period when Lord Mansfield presided in the King's Bench, the doc- trine and practice of our commercial law have been rapidly extended and improved. From the reign of William IV, the law of real property in England is undergoing a process of wise and bene- ficial reform. Independently of legal science, the progress of the nation in wealth and the arts intro- duces new species of property, and necessitates cheap and expeditious forms of procedure. Still science aids the progress of society, and a knowledge of law is incomplete without the knowledge of what Bacon terms the law of laws leges legum. One of the chief uses of Social Sci- ence is to teach clever men to do rapidly what ages with difficulty accomplish by the involuntary action of mankind. As Sir Edward Coke says, the reason of the law is the life of the law for although a man can tell the law, if he knows not the reason thereof he shall soon forget his own superficial knowledge. But when he finds the right reason of the law, and so brings it to his natural reason that he comprehends it as his own, this will not only serve him for the understanding of that particular case, but of many others. The knowledge of law is complicated. To know is properly to understand DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. 71 a, thing by reason, and through its causes : Cognitio legis est copulata et complicata. Scire autem est proprie rem ratione et per causam cognoscere. It has been maintained by many that politics and laws cannot be reduced into a science : the ancient Sophists were of opinion that there were no such things as right and wrong by nature, but only by con- vention. That which appears just and honorable for each city is so for that city so long as the opin- ion is entertained, was one of their maxims. The opinions of the Sophists may have been exaggerated by their great opponent, Plato : still, I believe they did protest energetically against the possibility of metaphysical science, whilst Plato, against them, maintained in the doctrine which Pope has poet- ically translated : "All nature is but art unknown to thee; All chance, direction which thou canst not see; All discord, harmony not imderstood; All partial evil, universal good." The possibility of metaphysical science, and, in particular, of the complete development of a science of law and government, is now admitted. The great system of Jurisprudence, says Sir William Jones, like that of the universe, consists of many subordinate systems, all of which are connected by nice links and beautiful dependencies, and each of which is reducible to a few plain elements. If law be a science, and really deserves so sublime a name, 1'2 DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. it must be grounded upon principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason ; but if it be merely an unconnected series of decrees and ordin- ances, its use may remain, though its dignity may be lessened ; and he will become the greatest law- yer who has the greatest natural or artificial mem- ory. So Edmund Burke has said that we are all born in subjection, all born equally, high and low, gov- ernors and governed : in subjection to one great immutable and predestined law prior to all our de- vices and prior to all our contrivances paramount to all our ideas and all our sensations antecedent to our very existence, by which we are knit and con- nected with the eternal frame of the universe, out of which we cannot stir. And he has described the Science of Jurisprudence as the pride of the intel- lect, the collected wisdom of ages combining the principles of original justice with the infinite vari- ety of human concerns. So, also, Vico considered that the development of society, like the heart of man, was subject to one constant, universal, and divine law ; the variable application and progress of which depended upon the uncertain will and erring nature of man ; and he hence conceived the hope of discovering the eternal principles of the natural law. In Jurisprudence, a law, properly so-called, is a rule of conduct addressed to creatures capable of DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. 73 feeling an obligation by means of reason ; or a law may be defined as a general command given by one intelligent being to another. St. Thomas Aquinas defined law as a certain rule and measure according to which any agent is led to act or restrain from acting : Lex est qucedam regula et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vet ab agenda retrahitur. This definition is plainly too indefinite and extensive. Suarez gives another description, and says a law is a certain measure of moral acts, of such a kind that by con- formity to it they are morally right ; by discordance with it, morally wrong : Lex est mensura qucedam actuum moraliam, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam rectitudinem moralem Jiabeant^ et si ab ilia discordent obliqui sunt. Up to the present time, four great divisions of law have been enumerated by jurists : Divine Law, Natural Law, International Law, and Positive Law. With the pagan philosophers, following Plato, the Divine Law was the sovereign reason existing in the mind of God. The doctors of the Middle Ages termed this principle of nature the Eternal Law. The Divine Law, with Plato, is the governing reason existing in the mind of the Universal Deity, which theologians also acknowledge, but call the Eternal Law. Lex ergo divina apud Platonem est ratio gubernatrix universi in Dei mente existens, quam legem etiam 74 DEFINITIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE. TJieologi agnoscunt serf leg cm wtcrnam appellant* The Positive Divine Law is that which has been immediately promulgated by God. Lex posit mi divina dicitur, quce ab ipso Deo immediate lain c*t ct toti Icyi naturali addita. Our duty as to the Di- vine Law is simply to know it and obey it. The Natural Law, according to Grotius, consists in certain principles of rectitude of reason, which enable us to know whether an action is morally right or wrong according to its congruity with a reasona- ble and social nature. Jus naturale est d let < it urn rectce rationis indicans actui alicui, ex ejn* cotircni- entia vel disconvenientia cum ipsd naturd rution