'A 1051 398
 
 A GUIDE TO SYLLOGISM, 
 
 OR, 
 
 A MANUAL OF LOGIC.
 
 LONCON; 
 Printed by C.Richards,lW,St. Martina-lane, Charhip-cross.
 
 A GUIDE TO SYLLOGISM, 
 
 OR, 
 
 A MANUAL OF LOGIC; 
 
 COMPREHENDING 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE MANNER OF DISPUTATION NOW 
 PRACTISED IN THE SCHOOLS AT CAMBRIDGE ; 
 
 WITH SPECIMENS OF THE DIFFERENT ACTS. 
 
 THE HIGHER FORMS IN GRAMMAR SCHOOLS, AND OF 
 JUNIOR STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY. 
 
 THE REV. CHARLES WESLEY, B.D. 
 
 Late of Christ's College, Cambridge. 
 
 r A Syllogism is a form of reasoning which serves to compress much 
 matter into a little compass, and helps to investigate truth with 
 certainty." Mishap Watson. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 HENRY G. BOHN, 4, YORK STREET, COVENT-GARDEN ; 
 DEIGHTON & SONS, CAMBRIDGE ; J. PARKER, OXFORD. 
 
 M.DCCC.XXXII,
 
 
 

 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE object of the compiler, in arranging these pages, 
 is to lead the student, by the shortest path, to an acquain- 
 tance with the more interesting and practical parts of 
 Logic. It appears to him, that there are many persons 
 who would decline the perusal of a treatise on Apprehen- 
 sion, the Divisions of Nouns, and the different sorts of 
 Predicables, who might be interested in examining the 
 nature of Propositions, and the principle on which an 
 Inference is conclusively drawn. 
 
 He is confirmed in this opinion, by having often ob- 
 served, that youths of an ingenious and intellectual turn, 
 disinclined as they might be to undertake the perusal of 
 a bulky volume upon Logic, are generally gratified when 
 an argument is set before them, in the brief and lucid form 
 of a Syllogism. 

 
 The Appendix contains a summary account of the 
 manner of syllogizing in the schools at Cambridge ; and 
 it is hoped that younger disputants, who are about to ap- 
 pear there, may derive some advantage from the following 
 pages. 
 
 To the Regii Professors in Divinity, Law, and Physic, 
 and to the Rev. Dr. Graham, Master of Christ's College, 
 Cambridge, the compiler has to offer his most grateful 
 thanks for the numerous obligations under which they 
 have laid him. 
 
 He has the honour also to confess himself indebted to 
 the learned and accomplished author* of the " Elements 
 of Logic," not only for the advantage of his published 
 writings, but for many acts of private courtesy. 
 
 The present Archbishop of Dublin.
 
 A GUIDE TO SYLLOGISM, 
 
 ire. c. 
 
 OF REASONING AND SYLLOGISM. 
 
 1. AN act of reasoning is performed by compar- 
 ing two ideas together by means of a third, that 
 must agree with one of them. If this third idea 
 agrees with the other two, those two, of course, 
 agree with one another; if it agrees with only one, 
 they, of course, disagree with one another.* 
 
 2. A syllogism (from <TuXXoytb^icu, to reason) 
 is an argument stated at full length, and in regular 
 logical form. 
 
 3. By an argument's being stated at full length, 
 is meant, that the application of the third idea to 
 
 * E. G. In reasoning on the character of Caesar, if I wished 
 to ascertain whether the idea of ' a good man ' agreed with 
 him, I might take, for a third idea, that of ' Tyrant.' On 
 finding this agree with ' Caesar,' and disagree with ' good 
 man,' I should say that the ideas of 'Caesar' and 'good man" 
 disagreed with one another ; or, in other words, that ' Cae- 
 sar was not a good man.' The third idea, thus employed 
 to assist us in forming a judgment, is called a middle term.
 
 2 OF REASONING AND SYLLOGISM. 
 
 the two others is expressed in terms, and that how- 
 ever obvious the application may be, in the case of 
 one of them, it is never, on that account, taken for 
 granted. 
 
 4. By an argument's being stated in regular logi- 
 cal form, is meant, its being so arranged, that the 
 conclusiveness of it is manifest from the mere force 
 of the expression, i. e. without considering the 
 meaning of the terms. Thus, 
 
 Every Y is X, 
 Every Z is Y, therefore 
 Every Z is X. 
 
 If you grant the two former assertions, (orpremises,) 
 you cannot deny the conclusion. 
 
 5. Syllogisms are divided into Categorical,( from 
 KctTiryoplw, I affirm,) and Hypothetical, (from VTTO- 
 Stcric, a supposition.) Categorical syllogisms are 
 divided into Pure and Modal ; hypothetical syllo- 
 gisms into Conditional and Disjunctive. Syllogisms 
 take their names from the different kinds of propo- 
 sitions employed in forming them. 
 
 OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 6. A proposition is a sentence that affirms or 
 denies. It consists of three parts, viz. the subject,
 
 OF PROPOSITIONS. 3 
 
 or thing spoken of; the predicate, or that which is 
 said of it ; and the copula, which must be the sub- 
 stantive verb, with or without a negative particle, as 
 the subject and predicate happen to agree or dis- 
 agree. 
 
 7. The subject and predicate are called Terms or 
 Extremes,* because, according to logical order, the 
 subject is placed first, the predicate last, and the 
 copula in the middle. 
 
 Subj. Cop. Pred. 
 
 Ex. I Vice I I is I I detestable. I 
 
 Subj. Cop. Pred. 
 
 I Virtue I I is not I I unrewarded. ' 
 
 8. The substantive verb alone is recognized by 
 logic ; all other verbs are resolvable into the sub- 
 stantive verb with a participle or adjective. 
 
 Ex. The summer approaches. 
 
 Subj. Cop. Pred. 
 
 I The summer I I is I I approaching. I 
 He does not know it. 
 
 Subj. Cop. Pred. 
 
 i He I I is not I I aware of it. I 
 9. As the copula is used merely to express the 
 agreement or disagreement of the terms, it is, or 
 
 * In speaking of a syllogism, the term " extremes " is 
 jften understood to imply the extremes of the conclusion. 
 B2
 
 4 OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 may be, always put in the present tense. Should 
 the tense of the substantive verb modify the sense of 
 the proposition, this circumstance must be viewed 
 as part of one of the terms.* 
 
 Ex. Troy is existent. 
 
 Troy was existent, i. e. 
 
 Suly. Cop. Pred. 
 
 I Troy I fisl I a place that was formerly existent. I 
 10. An adjective or participle, though it cannot 
 be the subject, may yet be the predicate of a pro- 
 position ; but even then a substantive appears to 
 be understood ; as, " Life is short," " Art is long." 
 In these two propositions, the word " thing " may 
 be supplied to each predicate. See SYNCATEGO- 
 REMATIC WORD, in the Index. 
 
 * The variety of expression allowable in language will 
 often occasion a proposition to appear in a form very dif- 
 ferent from that recognized by logic. To that form, how- 
 ever, all propositions are reducible; and the pupil should 
 be accustomed to bring into it with readiness, propositions 
 of a dissimilar construction. E. G. 
 
 " Of his kingdom there shall be no end." 
 " An end of his kingdom is that which shall not be." 
 ' In loftiness of thought Homer surpasses Virgil." 
 " Homer is a poet who surpasses Virgil in loftiness of 
 thought." 
 
 " It is the duty of youth to reverence age.'' 
 " To reverence age is the duty of youth."
 
 DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS. 5 
 
 11. Propositions are either Categorical, (and sub- 
 divided in to Pure* and Modal,) or Hypothetical (and 
 subdivided into Conditional and Disjunctive.) This 
 division is according to substance. They are either 
 Affirmative or Negative. This division is accord- 
 ing to quality (i. e. the quality of the expression.) 
 They are Universal or Particular. This division 
 is according to quantity.^ 
 
 * A pure proposition is sometimes called " propositio de 
 inesse," because it simply states that the predicate is, or is 
 not, (metaphysically,) in the subject. 
 
 j- Another division of propositions is into Singular and 
 Indefinite. A singular proposition is one of which the sub- 
 ject is an individual, (either a proper name, a singular pro- 
 noun, or a common noun with a singular sign.) E. G. "Cae- 
 sar overcame Pompey," " I am the person," "This fable is 
 instructive." But as these propositions predicate of the 
 whole of the subject, they fall under the rules that govern 
 universals. It is to be observed, that if the subject of a 
 proposition consist of a number of nouns collectively under- 
 stood, so that they are viewed as one single thing or body, 
 the proposition is singular. E. G. "All the books in Pto- 
 lemy's library amounted to 200,000 volumes," i. e. all to- 
 together. "Two and two make four." " Caesar, Pompey, 
 and Crassus, constituted the first Triumvirate." When the 
 word together can be added to the subject of the proposition, 
 or when the word each cannot be introduced, that proposi- 
 tion is singular. 
 
 An indefinite proposition is one that has no sign of uni- 
 versality or particularity affixed to it, but leaves us to
 
 6 DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 12. A categorical proposition declares a thing 
 [rar?}yopet] absolutely, as " I love," or " I am lov- 
 ing." " Man is not infallible." These are pure ca- 
 tegoricals, asserting simply the agreement and dis- 
 agreement of subject and predicate. " The wisest 
 man may possibly be mistaken." "A prejudiced 
 historian will probably misrepresent the truth." 
 These are modal categoricals, asserting the manner 
 of the agreement and disagreement between subject 
 and predicate. * 
 
 13. A hypothetical proposition consists of two 
 or more categoricals, united by a conjunction called 
 the Copula. It asserts, not absolutely but, under 
 an hypothesis or condition : such propositions are 
 denoted by the conjunctions used in stating them. 
 E. G. " If man is fallible, he is imperfect." This 
 
 jud<', from the nature of the connexion between the terms 
 or Extremes, (No.7,) whether it should be reckoned as uni- 
 versal or particular. See No. 19. 
 
 * The modality of a proposition is usually considered to 
 aft'ect the copula. Logical writers have selected, as most 
 worthy of remark, four modes of connexion between subject 
 ami predicate: viz. necessary, possible, impossible, and 
 contingent. E. G. "Man is necessarily an animal.'' "A 
 tflobe may possibly consist of water." ''It is impossible a 
 man should be a stone." "John may, or may not, be 
 learned."
 
 DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 is called a conditional proposition, denoted by the 
 conjunction "if." "It is either day or night." 
 This is a disjunctive hypothetical, and is denoted 
 by the disjunctive conjunction "either." 
 
 14. An affirmative proposition is one of which the 
 copula (No. 6.) is affirmative, A negative propo- 
 sition is one of which the copula is negative. There 
 is an example of each in No. 7. 
 
 15. A universal proposition is one of which the 
 predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole of the 
 subject. Its usual signs are "all," "every," "none," 
 &c. ;* or a universal proposition may have for its 
 subject a proper name, or a common name with a 
 singular sign. See note to No. 11. E. G. " All 
 tyrants are miserable," "No miser is rich," " Eng- 
 land is an island." A particular proposition is one 
 of which the predicate is affirmed or denied of only 
 part of the subject. Its usual signs are " some," 
 
 * To the signs of universality might be added " who- 
 ever," " each," " neither," " always," " every where," &c. 
 To those of particularity, "a few," "not every,'' "some- 
 times," "somewhere," &c. There are some particular signs 
 which make a near approach to a universal affirmative, as 
 " many," " very many," "almost all," "by far the greater 
 part," &c. Some, on the other hand, come very near to a 
 universal negative, as "few," "very few," "scarcely any,''
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS, ETC. 
 
 " many," "few," " several," " most," and " all " or 
 " every," if the copula be negative. E.G. "Some 
 islands are fertile." " Many worthy men have to 
 complain of ill fortune." "Most men are fond of 
 novelty." " All tyrants (or some tyrants) are not 
 assassinated." "None but" means "some, and 
 those only," or " one person, thing, or object, and 
 that only :" it is, therefore, the sign of a particular, 
 or a singular, proposition. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS, SYMBOLS OF QUANTITY 
 AND QUALITY, ETC. 
 
 16. In all universal propositions, the subject is 
 distributed; an expression which signifies that a 
 term is used in its fullest extent ; that it stands for 
 all its Significates, or the several things which it sig- 
 nifies : so that there is not an individual to which 
 the common term is applicable, that it does not em- 
 brace. As, in the example, " All tyrants are mi- 
 serable," the common term includes Dionysius, 
 Phraates, Nero, and every individual who is a ty- 
 rant. In all particular propositions, the subject is 
 undistributed ; it stands for only part of its signifi- 
 cates, and the common term then embraces only a 
 part of the individuals to which it is applicable :
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS, ETC. 9 
 
 as, in the example, "Some islands are fertile," the 
 common term " island," though applicable to Ice- 
 land and all barren islands, does not embrace them. 
 
 17. There are four kinds of pure categorical pro- 
 positions, distinguished by the symbols, A, E, I, O. 
 
 Universal affirmative, A. 
 Universal negative, E. 
 Particular affirmative, I. 
 Particular negative, O. 
 
 18. The connexion between the extremes of a 
 proposition is Necessary, Impossible, or Contingent. 
 
 19. To determine whether an indefinite propo- 
 sition should be viewed as particular or universal, 
 we must look to the connexion between the ex- 
 tremes ; L e. we must consider of the subject and 
 predicate, whether they necessarily agree, or ne- 
 cessarily disagree, or may, or may not agree. The 
 nature of the connexion between the extremes is 
 called the matter of the proposition. In necessary 
 and in impossible matter, an indefinite is understood 
 as a universal; as, " Birds have wings ;" i. e. all. 
 " Birds are not quadrupeds ;" i. e. none. In con- 
 tingent matter, i. e. where the terms sometimes 
 agree and sometimes not, an indefinite is under- 
 stood as a particular ; as, " Food is necessary to
 
 10 DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS, ETC. 
 
 life ;"* i. e. some kind of food. "Birds sing ;" i. e. 
 some birds sing. "Birds are not carnivorous ;" i. e. 
 some birds are not, or, all are not. 
 
 20. The rules for distribution are these : 
 1st. All universal propositions, and no particular, 
 distribute the subject. 
 
 2nd. All negative, and no affirmative, the predi- 
 cate, f 
 
 * The learner should observe that the term in question is 
 " a thing necessary to life," and not conclude, from the 
 word " necessary," that the connexion between the terms 
 " food " and " necessary to life" is a necessary connexion. 
 It is contingent ; because it happens that there are kinds of 
 food which are not necessary to life ; as it happens that 
 there are birds which do not sing, and birds which are car- 
 nivorous. Whereas it cannot happen that any creature 
 without wings, or that any quadruped, should be a bird. 
 It is necessary that a creature should have wings to con- 
 stitute it a bird, and impossible for a quadruped to be 
 one. 
 
 f Thus the distribution or non-distribution of the subject 
 of every proposition depends on its quantity; the distribu- 
 tion or non-distribution of the predicate, on its quality : 
 and note further, that if, in an affirmative proposition, the 
 whole of the predicate should agree with the subject, the cir- 
 cumstance is accidental, and not implied in the form of ex- 
 pression. In the propositions, "All men are rational ani- 
 mals,'' and "All men are animals," the form of expression 
 is the same; but in the one instance, it so happens, that 
 the whole of the predicate agrees with the subject, which is
 
 OF THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS. 11 
 
 21. Two propositions are said to be opposed, 
 when, having the same subject and predicate, they 
 yet differ in quantity, or quality, ov both. (See 
 Nos. 11, 14, 15.) The use of the rules of opposi- 
 tion is, that they immediately point out what we 
 may infer with regard to the truth or falsity of any 
 other proposition which has the same subject and 
 predicate as the proposition before us, but differs 
 from it either in quantity, or quality, or both. 
 
 22. There are four different kinds of opposition : 
 1st. between the two universals A and E, differ- 
 ing in quality only, and called Contraries. 2nd, 
 between the two particulars I and O, differing also in 
 quality only, and called Subcontraries. 3rd, be- 
 tween A and I, or E and O, differing respectively 
 in quantity only, and called Subalterns. 4th, be- 
 tween A and O, or E and I, differing respectively 
 both in quantity and quality, and called Contradic- 
 tories.* 
 
 not the case in the other. " All rational animals are men," 
 but "all animals are riot men.'' In a just definition, the 
 terms are always exactly equivalent, and therefore, conver- 
 tible. 
 
 * Four things are requisite to form a just contradiction ; 
 viz. that we speak of the same thing 1st in the same 
 sense ; 2nd, as to the same part ; 3rd, compared with the
 
 12 OF THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 23. The signs " no " and " none " imply both 
 universality and negation ; they are contradictory, 
 therefore, to the particular sign with an affirmative 
 copula. We cannot contradict " some are," by 
 " all are not." E. G. " Some monarchs are ty- 
 rants," " All monarchs are not tyrants," which are 
 subcontrary propositions, perfectly compatible, and 
 both particular. 
 
 24. Of subaltern propositions, the universal is 
 called subalternans, the particular, subalternate. 
 
 25. In necessary matter, all affirmatives are 
 trite, (as, " All islands are surrounded by water," 
 " Some islands are surrounded by water,") 
 and negatives false, (as, " No islands are sur- 
 rounded by water," " Some islands are not sur- 
 rounded by water.") In impossible matter, all ne- 
 gatives are true, (as, " No triangles are squares," 
 
 same thing; 4th, existing at the same time. By omitting 
 one of these conditions, is and is not may be compatible. 
 E. G. The carcass of a man is and is not a man ; for it is 
 a dead man, it is not a living one. 2nd. Zoilus is and t* 
 not black ; for his face is black, and his hair is not black, 
 but red. 3rd. Socrates has and has not a full head of hair ; 
 for he has, if compared withScipio, lie has not, if compared 
 with Xenophon. 4th- Nestor is and is not old ; for he is, 
 if you speak of his third age, he is not, if you speak of his 
 first.
 
 OF THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS. 13 
 
 "Some triangles are not squares,") and affirmatives 
 false, (as, "All triangles are squares," " Some tri- 
 angles are squares.") In contingent matter, all 
 univer sals are false, (as, "All islands are fertile," 
 "No islands are fertile,") and particulars true, (as, 
 " Some islands are fertile," " Some islands are not 
 fertile.") 
 
 26. In contingent matter, contraries are both 
 false, but never both true ; subcontraries both true, 
 but never both false; contradictories, always one 
 true and the other false.
 
 14 OF THE OPPOSITION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 97 <u v * * 
 
 t& ^ ? -3 w 
 
 P5 ^ ^ f eg CO p ^ 
 
 S *"" 3 +3 
 
 * ^/MO 6uuajffip 
 W sui9 ?l Bqn S Q 
 
 S 
 
 ^0 ffuU9jfftp 
 
 ill S a S 
 
 8 s 4 J . 
 
 * The truth or falsity of propositions is here seen to de- 
 pend on the matter. See No. 19. Propositions may be
 
 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 15 
 
 28. In subalterns, the truth of the particular, or 
 subalternate, follows from the truth of the 
 universal, or subalternans ; and the falsity 
 of the universal from the falsity of the particular.* 
 The opposition between contradictories is so perfect, 
 (since they differ both in quantity and quality, see 
 No. 22.) that if any proposition is true, we may be 
 sure its contradictory is false ; if false, its contradic 
 tory true, &c. 
 
 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 29. A proposition is said to be converted, when 
 the subject and predicate are made to exchange 
 places, as, "No triangles are squares," "No squares 
 are triangles." The use of conversion is to give a 
 ready insight into what may be inferred from an- 
 other proposition, that differs from the one before 
 us, by the terms being transposed. This change in 
 the position of the terms may be combined with 
 that of the quantity, or quality, or both, or neither, 
 
 framed in A, E, T, O, on the following subjects, and adapted 
 to the scheme by way of exemplification. 
 
 N. That islands should be surrounded by water. 
 
 I. That triangles should be squares. 
 
 C. That islands are fertile. 
 
 * If all islands are surrounded by water, it is plain that 
 some must be so. If that any one triangle is a square be 
 false, it nius t be false to say that all are sp.
 
 16 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 as the case may be. By conversion, a facility is 
 likewise afforded in effecting the reduction of syllo- 
 gisms, a process that will presently be explained. 
 
 30. The above is an instance of simple conver- 
 sion ; the subject and predicate being merely trans- 
 posed ; but as this can be done only when the 
 terms of a proposition are of exactly the same ex- 
 tent, two other methods are in use, which enable 
 us to convert, consistently with truth, every propo- 
 sition whatever: viz. 1st. the limitation of the pre- 
 dicate of the Exposita, (or proposition given,) from 
 universal to particular, which is called conversion 
 per Accidens, or by Limitation ; and 2ndly, the add- 
 ing not to the predicate of the exposita, and then 
 denying its agreement with the subject, which is 
 called conversion by Negation or Centra-position. 
 But in the case of O, (the particular negative,) con- 
 version by negation is effected by joining the nega- 
 tive particle of the copula to the predicate of the 
 exposita, and then transposing the terms, as if the 
 proposition had been I. 
 
 31. No conversion is employed for any logical 
 purpose, unless it be illative ; i. e. when the truth 
 of the converse is implied by the truth of the ex- 
 posita. (No. 30.) 
 
 32. Conversion is then only illative, when no
 
 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 17 
 
 term is distributed in the converse, which was not 
 distributed in the exposita ; else, you would em- 
 ploy a term universally in the converse, which, in 
 the exposita, was used only partially. (For " dis- 
 tributed" see No. 16.) 
 
 33. The following examples will shew how every 
 proposition (A, E, I, O,) may be illatively con- 
 verted, by some one of the three methods above 
 mentioned : viz. 1st, simply; 2nd, per accidens, 
 or by limitation ; 3rd, by negation or contraposi- 
 tion. E, I, simply; for E distributes both terms, 
 (No. 16, 20.) and I, neither (No. 16, 20.) ; they 
 are, therefore, of exactly the same extent (No. 30.), 
 and simply convertible. 
 
 (E) No triangles are squares ; therefore 
 No squares are triangles. 
 
 (I) Someislandsarefertileplac.es; therefore 
 Some fertile places are islands. 
 
 E, A, per accidens, or by limitation; E, because 
 the predicate being distributed as well as the sub- 
 ject, and admitting, therefore, of the sign of uni- 
 versality, (as is shewn by simple conversion,) it 
 must, as a universal, include the particular. 
 
 (E) No triangles are squares; therefore 
 Some squares are not triangles. 
 c
 
 18 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 (which follows from the truth of the simple con- 
 verse.) A is converted per accidens, or by limi- 
 tation ; because, since it does not distribute the pre- 
 dicate (No. 20.), that predicate will not admit of a 
 universal sign, and therefore requires a particular 
 one. 
 
 (A) All birds are animals ; therefore 
 
 Some animals are birds. 
 You could not say, " All animals are birds." 
 
 A, O, by negation ; A, because the subject 
 agrees universally with the predicate ; so that what 
 disagrees with the predicate cannot agree with the 
 subject.* 
 
 (A) All birds are animals ; therefore 
 
 What are not animals are not birds. 
 O, because, since you consider it as I, neither term 
 is distributed, and the process is that of simple, 
 conversion. 
 
 Cop. 
 
 (O) Some islands I are not I fertile places; (first 
 state this as I, by joining the negative to the pre- 
 
 * It is the same thing to affirm some attribute of the sub- 
 ject, and to deny the absence of iO; thus (A) "All birds are 
 animals," is equipollent to (E) " No birds are not-animals," 
 which is of course simply convertible ; " What are not 
 animals, are not birds."
 
 CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 dicate, thus, "Some islands are I not-fertile-places,") 
 therefore 
 
 Some places-not-fertile are islands. 
 
 You could not infer from the exposita, ("Some 
 islands are not fertile places,") that " Some fertile 
 places are not islands." Such a converse, indeed, 
 would accidentally he true, hut it would not follow 
 from the form of expression. This will he seen hy 
 substituting other terms. E. G. 
 
 Some men I are not I poets ; you cannot infer 
 " Some poets are not men," but you may infer 
 Some who are not poets are men. 
 
 34. To assist the memory in applying the two 
 former methods of conversion, (viz. simple, and per 
 accidens,} Aldrich, who does not notice conversion 
 by negation, gives the following mnemonic line ; 
 
 fEc! simpliciter, convertitur EvA per Acci. 
 For the last, we may say, 
 
 A sed, et O pariter, convertas usque Negando. 
 
 Or, 
 fAxO per Contra ; sic fit eonversio tota. 
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 35. The validity of a syllogism depends on this 
 axiom of Aristotle, " Whatever is predicated of a 
 
 c 2
 
 20 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 term distributed, (No. 16.) whether affirmatively 
 or negatively, may be predicated in like manner of 
 every thing contained under it." In the example 
 at No. 4, X is predicated of Y distributed, and Z 
 is contained under Y, (i. e. is its subject;) X is, 
 therefore, truly predicated of Z. 
 
 36. There are two canons of pure categorical 
 syllogisms ; 1st, Two terms that agree with one and 
 the same third, agree with each other ; 2nd, Two 
 terms, of which one agrees and another disagrees 
 with one and the same third, disagree with one an- 
 other. On the former of these canons rests the va- 
 lidity of affirmative conclusions ; on the latter, of 
 negative. 
 
 37. There are six rules for ascertaining whether 
 the canons have been strictly observed or not. 
 
 Rule 1st. Every syllogism has three, and only 
 three, terms ; viz. the middle term, and the two 
 terms of the conclusion, or question.* The sub- 
 ject of the conclusion is called the minor term;\ 
 its predicate, the major term; and the middle 
 
 * These are commonly called Extremes. 
 
 f Because generally of less extent than the major and 
 middle terms.
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 21 
 
 term is that with which each of them is separately 
 compared, in order to judge of their agreement or 
 disagreement with each other.* 
 
 Rule 2nd. Every syllogism has three, and only 
 three, propositions; viz. the major premiss, in 
 which the major term is compared with the middle ; 
 the minor premiss, in which the minor term is com- 
 pared with the middle; and the conclusion, in 
 which the minor term is compared with the major. 
 
 Rule 3rd. The middle term must not be ambi- 
 guous; f which is the case whenever it is equivocal, 
 or undistributed. An equivocal term is used in 
 different senses in the two premises ; E.G. 
 " Sage is a plant ; 
 
 A philosopher is sage ; therefore 
 A philosopher is a plant." 
 
 If a term be undistributed, as it then stands for 
 a part only of its significates, it may happen that 
 one of the extremes may have been compared with 
 one part of it, and the other with another part: E.G. 
 
 * If there were two middle terms, the extremes not being 
 both compared with the same, could not be conclusively 
 compared with each other. 
 
 f If the middle term is ambiguous, there are, in reality, 
 two middle terms in sense, though but one in sound.
 
 22 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 " Apples are fruit ; 
 
 Cherries are fruit ; therefore 
 Cherries are apples." 
 
 The middle term, therefore, must be distributed 
 once, at least, in the premises ; i. e. by being the 
 subject of a universal, or predicate of a negative. 
 
 Rule 4th. No term must be distributed in the 
 conclusion, which was not distributed in one of 
 the premises ; because you would then employ the 
 whole of a term in the conclusion, when you had 
 employed only a part of it in the premiss ; and 
 thus, in reality, introduce a fourth term. The vio- 
 lation of this fourth rule is called an illicit process 
 of the major or minor term ; E. G. 
 
 *" All apples are fruit ; 
 
 Cherries are not apples ; therefore 
 
 They are not fruit." Illicit process of the major. 
 
 " All beasts of prey are carnivorous ; 
 
 f All beasts of prey are animals; therefore 
 
 All animals are carnivorous." Illicit process of the 
 
 * This is A, and no affirmatives distribute the predicate. 
 The conclusion is E, and all negatives do distribute the 
 predicate. (No. 20.) 
 
 f This also is A, and does not distribute the predicate.
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 23 
 
 Rule 5th. From negative premises you can infer 
 nothing; for in them the middle term is pro- 
 nounced to disagree with both extremes, not to 
 agree with both, or to agree with one and disagree 
 with the other : therefore they cannot be compared 
 together; E.G. 
 
 " A fish is not a quadruped ;" 
 
 " A bird is not a quadruped/'* proves nothing. 
 
 Rule 6th. If one premiss be negative, the con- 
 clusion must be negative ; for in that premiss the 
 middle term is pronounced to disagree with one of 
 the extremes, and in the other premiss, (which 
 must be affirmative by the preceding rule,) to agree 
 with the other extreme; therefore, the extremes 
 disagreeing with each other, the conclusion is nega- 
 tive. To prove a negative conclusion, one of the 
 premises must be negative. f 
 
 " animals." The conclusion again is A, and doe* distribute 
 the subject, "animals." 
 
 * In order to shew the disagreement between the terms 
 " fish " and " bird," you must choose a middle term that 
 agrees with one of them. E. G, " A feathered creature is 
 not a fish ; a bird is a feathered creature ; therefore," &c. 
 Or, " No animal that inhabits the water is a bird ; a fish is 
 an animal that inhabits the water; therefore," &c. 
 
 f To prove that the sun is not a planet, you must not
 
 24 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 38. From these rules it is evident, first, that* 
 nothing can be proved from two particular pre- 
 mises ; and secondly, f that if one of the premises 
 be particular, the conclusion must be particular. | 
 
 take for a middle term " sphere," which agrees with both, 
 but a middle term that disagrees either with "sun" or 
 " planet." E. G. " Every planet describes an orbit ; the 
 sun does not describe an orbit ; therefore it is not a planet." 
 Or, " The sun is a fixed star ; a planet is not a fixed star ; 
 therefore it is not the sun." 
 
 * You will then have either the middle term undistri- 
 buted, or an illicit process. E. G. " Some animals are sa- 
 gacious ; some beasts are sagacious ; therefore, some beasts 
 are animals." Undistributed middle. This conclusion is 
 true, but does not follow from the premises. The argument 
 is of the same construction as the following absurdity : 
 " Some animals are black ; some hats are black ; therefore, 
 some hats are animals." Again, " Some animals are saga- 
 cious; some beasts are not sagacious; therefore, some 
 beasts are not animals." Here is an illicit process of the 
 major. " Some carnivorous creatures are tame ; some beasts 
 are not tame ; therefore, no beasts are carnivorous crea- 
 tures." This exhibits an illicit process of both the major 
 and minor term. 
 
 } E. G. " All who fight bravely deserve reward ; some 
 soldiers fight bravely ; therefore, some soldiers deserve re- 
 ward." If you were to infer, "All soldiers deserve, &c." 
 there would be an illicit process of the minor. 
 
 J The following mnemonic lines, from Aldrich, may as- 
 sist the student in applying these rules and remarks ;
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 25 
 
 39. From universal premises you cannot always 
 infer a universal conclusion ; E. G. " All gold is 
 precious; all gold is a mineral; therefore some 
 mineral is precious." But when you can infer a 
 universal, you are always at liberty to infer a par- 
 ticular. 
 
 OF MOODS. 
 
 40. The mood of a syllogism is the designation 
 of it according to the quantity (No. 11.) and qua- 
 lity (No. II.) of each of its three propositions, 
 which are denoted by the vowels A, E, I, O, (No. 
 17.). There are only eleven moods admissible, as 
 conforming to the rules laid down at No. 37. See 
 No. 44, below. 
 
 OF FIGURES. 
 
 41. The figure of a syllogism indicates the situ- 
 
 Distribuas medium (Rule 3.), nee quartus terminus adsit; 
 (Rule 1 & 2.) 
 
 Utraque nee prsemissa negans (Rule 5.)> nee particularis ; 
 (No. 38.) 
 
 Sectetur partem Conclusio deteriorem ; (Rule 6,& No. 38.) 
 Et non distribuat, nisi cum praemissa, negetve. (Rule 4 & 6.) 
 Logicians have attached to universal propositions an 
 imaginary superiority over particulars, and to affirmatives 
 a similar superiority over negatives. Hence the expression 
 " pars deterior," meaning a particular or a negative propo- 
 sition.
 
 26 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 ation of the middle term with regard to the ex- 
 tremes of the conclusion, or major and minor term. 
 (No. 37, Rule 1, and Note.) There are four fi- 
 gures.* In the first, the middle term is made the 
 subject of the major premiss, and the predicate of 
 the minor : in the second, the middle term is the 
 predicate of both premises: in the third, the sub- 
 ject of hoth : in the fourth, it is the predicate of 
 the major premiss, and the subject of the minor. 
 
 42. The major premiss of a syllogism is usually 
 placed first, although, of course, the validity of the 
 argument is not affected by the order of the two 
 premises. 
 
 43. Each of the moods alluded to in No. 40, as 
 admissible, will not be so in every figure ; since, 
 from the different position of the middle term, it 
 may violate some of the foregoing rules in one 
 figure, though not in another, f 
 
 
 
 * The first figure is the most natural and clear, and is at 
 oHce open to the application of Aristotle's dictum. (No.35.) 
 The last is, in all respects, the very reverse of the first. 
 
 f I, A, I, for instance, is allowable in the third figure; 
 because, in that figure, the middle term is made the subject 
 of both the major and minor premiss. (No. 41.) It is, there- 
 fore, regularly distributed in the minor proposition A, (No. 
 20,) and as neither term is distributed in the conclusion I,
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 27 
 
 44. Although but eleven moods were stated to 
 be admissible at No. 40, yet, since some of them 
 occur in more than one figure, (as E, I, O, which 
 
 (No. 16, 20,) there can be no illicit process. (No. 37.) But 
 I, A, I, is inadmissible in the first figure, because that figure 
 demands that the middle term be made the subject of 
 the major proposition I, and the predicate of the minor 
 A. But I distributes neither term, and A, only the subject. 
 (No. 20.) The middle term, therefore, being the subject of 
 a particular, and the predicate of an affirmative, would be 
 undistributed, contrary to rule, and no valid conclusion 
 could follow. E.G. 
 
 I. Some arrogant men are learned ; 
 
 A. All arrogant men are disagreeable ; therefore 
 
 I. Some learned men are disagreeable. 
 The above is in the third figure, and valid. In the first 
 figure, the same mood would be inadmissible, for the rea- 
 sons above stated. E. G. 
 
 I. Some learned men are Englishmen ; 
 
 A. The sages of Greece were learned men ; therefore 
 
 I. Some of them were Englishmen. 
 So A, E, E, would, in the first figure, have an illicit pro- 
 cess of the major; thus 
 
 A. Every fool is a sensualist; 
 
 E. No true philosopher is a.fool; therefore 
 
 E. No true philosopher is a sensualist. 
 The major term, "sensualist," is not distributed in the 
 major proposition, but is, in the conclusion. The same 
 mood, in the second figure, is valid, because the major term 
 " sensualist" is regularly distributed in the major proposi- 
 tion ; E. G.
 
 28 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 is found in all the four,*) each separate occurrence 
 is reckoned as a new mood. From this recurrence 
 of the same symbols in different figures, there are 
 reckoned nineteen moods. 
 
 A. Every sensualist is a fool ; 
 E. No true philosopher is a fool ; therefore 
 E. No true philosopher is a sensualist. 
 Again, A, A, A, is allowable in the first figure ; 
 A. All wicked men are miserable ; 
 A. All tyrants are wicked men ; therefore 
 A. All tyrants are miserable. 
 
 But, in the third figure, it would have an illicit process 
 of the minor ; 
 
 A. All wicked men are miserable j 
 A. All wicked men are tyrants; therefore 
 A. All tyrants are miserable. 
 
 The minor term, " tyrants," is not distributed in the mi- 
 nor premiss ; but is, in the conclusion. 
 * A A A. Barbara. AGO. Fakoro. 
 
 A A I. Darapti Bramant/p. E A E. Cesare, Celarent. 
 A E E. Camestr<?s,Cam<?nes. E A O. Felapton, Fesapo. 
 A E O. E I O. Terio, Festino, Fmso 
 
 AIL Dflrii, Datm. Fresison. 
 
 I A I. Disamis, Dimarts. O A O. Dokamb. 
 A, E, O, is valid in the second figure, but useless, be- 
 cause it has a particular conclusion when you might draw a 
 universal one in Camestres. E. G. (A.) Every X is Y. (E.) 
 No Z is Y. (O.) Some Z is not X. You might say, No Z 
 is X. (A.) " Every man is a sinner. (E.) No glorified spi- 
 rit is a sinner. (O.) Some glorified spirit is not a man."
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 29 
 
 45. The vowels in the four following mnemonic 
 lines are the symbols which denote the quantity 
 and quality of the propositions. The consonants 
 serve to keep in mind the figure of the syllogism. 
 
 Fig. 1. Barbara, Celarent, Dam, Fm'oque prioris; 
 Fig. 2. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Fakoro, se- 
 
 cundae ; 
 Fig. 3. Tertia, Darapti, Dzsaim's, Datisi, Felapton, 
 
 Dokamo, Feriso, habet ; quarta insuper addit 
 Fig. 4. Bramnt'p, Camenes, Dz'maris, Fesapo, 
 
 Fresz'son. 
 
 46. It will assist the experiment of syllogisms in 
 the different moods, if the letters X, Y, Z, are 
 used as representatives of the different terms. Let 
 X be the major, Y the middle, Z the minor. 
 
 1st Fig. 
 
 Y,X, 
 
 SCHEME. 
 
 2nd Fig. 3rd Fig. 
 
 X, Y, Y, X, 
 
 4<A Fig. 
 XV 
 > J-> 
 
 Z, Y, 
 
 Z, Y, 
 
 Y, Z, 
 
 Y, Z, 
 
 z, x, 
 
 Z, X, 
 
 Z, X, 
 
 Z, X. 
 
 You might say, "No glorified spirit," &c. The same may 
 be remarked of A, A, I, and E, A, O, in the first figure, and 
 of E, A, O, in the second, as well as of A, E. O, in the 
 fourth. See No. 39. These five moods, being useless, are 
 without names.
 
 30 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 By applying the moods Barbara, Celarent, fyc. 
 to the terms thus designated by the letters X, Y, Z, 
 you may construct a short syllogism in eveiy fi- 
 gure, and perceive how its validity is derived from 
 an accordance with the six rules laid down above. - 
 No. 37.* 
 
 * Thus Barbara, in which all the propositions are uni- 
 versal and affirmative, as the three A's denote. 
 
 Bar- " Every Y is X ; 
 
 -ba- Every Z is Y; 
 
 -ra. Every Z is X." 
 
 Celarent, in which the major is universal and negative, 
 the minor universal and affirmative, and the conclusion 
 universal and negative. 
 
 Ce- "NoYisXj 
 
 -la- Every Z is Yj 
 
 -rent. No Z is X.'' 
 
 Dam, in which the major is universal and affirmative, 
 the minor particular and affirmative, and the conclusion 
 the same. 
 
 Da- Every Y is X; 
 
 -ri- Some Z is Y ; 
 
 -i. Some Z is X." 
 
 Ferio, in which the major is universal and negative, the 
 minor particular and affirmative, and the conclusion par- 
 ticular and negative. 
 
 Fe- " No Y is X ; 
 
 -ri- Some Z is Y ; 
 
 -o. Some Z is not X. 
 
 Apply the other moods Cesare Camestres, &c. in the same 
 way to the second figure ; Darapti, &c. to the third ; Bra
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 31 
 
 47.* Eveiy proposition may be proved in the 
 first figure, and all the moods in the three other 
 figures reduced to it. See No. 53 et seq. belovr. 
 
 48. Four syllogisms, exemplifying one mood in 
 each figure, are subjoined. 
 
 mantip, &c. to the fourth ; carefully remembering the 
 force of the symbols A, E, I, O, (No. 17.) The position of 
 the Letters X, Y, Z, in the scheme, secures the learner 
 against any mistake in placing the terms of each figure. 
 
 * It will be seen that A, or the universal affirmative, can 
 be proved only in the first figure ; as the second proves 
 only negatives, (E, E, O, O,) the third only particulars, 
 (I, I, I, O, O, O,) and the fourth only particulars or nega- 
 tives. (I, E, I, O, O.) The first figure requires the major 
 premiss to be universal, and the minor affirmative; the 
 former, in order to distribute the middle term, and the lat- 
 ter, to avoid the fault of negative premises, (No. 37. Rule 5.) 
 or to produce an affirmative conclusion. (No. 37. Rule 6.) 
 The second figure proves only negatives, because the middle 
 term, being the predicate in both premises, would not be 
 distributed, unless one premiss were negative, (No. 20. Rule 
 2.) and therefore the conclusion must be negative. (No. 37. 
 Rule 6.) The third proves only particulars, because the 
 middle term being always the subject in the minor propo- 
 sition, and that minor proposition being always affirmative, 
 the minor term, as the predicate of an affirmative, cannot 
 be distributed in its premiss, and therefore cannot be dis- 
 tributed in the conclusion.
 
 32 OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 Barbara. Fig. 1. 
 
 TERMS. 
 
 Major (X) One who deserves punishment. 
 Minor (Z) Every blasphemous writer. 
 Middle (Y) Every one who injures the public 
 morals. 
 Bar- Every YisX; All who injure the public 
 
 morals deserve punishment ; 
 -ba- Every Z is Y ; All blasphemous writers in- 
 jure the public morals ; therefore 
 -ra. Every Z is X; All blasphemous writers de- 
 serve punishment.* 
 
 * The regular expression of the copula, t* and is not, may 
 always be preserved, if we disregard the clumsiness of the 
 language ; thus, the syllogism above may be stated as fol- 
 lows ; 
 
 Bar- All who injure the public morals are persons deserv- 
 ing of punishment j 
 -ba- All blasphemous writers are persons who injure the 
 
 public morals ; therefore 
 -ra. All blasphemous writers are persons deserving of pun- 
 
 Wiment. 
 
 Pupils should be able to state a proposition readily in this 
 strict form.
 
 OF SYLLOGISMS. 33 
 
 49. Camestres. Fig. 2. 
 
 TERMS. 
 
 Major (X) What is truly satisfactory. 
 
 Minor (Z) Guilty pleasures. 
 
 Middle ( Y) What is unattended with remorse. 
 
 Cam- Every X is Y; Whatever is truly satisfac- 
 tory is unattended with remorse ; 
 
 -es- No Z is Y; No guilty pleasures are unat- 
 tended with remorse ; therefore 
 
 -tres. No Z is X. No guilty pleasures are truly 
 satisfactory. 
 
 50. Dropt. Fig. 3. 
 
 TERMS. 
 
 Major (X) What is entitled to respect. 
 Minor (Z) What is often ridiculed. 
 Middle (Y) True piety. 
 
 Da- Every Y is X ; True piety is entitled to re- 
 spect; 
 
 -rap- Every Y is Z ; True piety is often ridi- 
 culed; therefore 
 
 -ti. Some Z is X. Something often ridiculed 
 is entitled to respect. 
 
 D
 
 34 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 51. Camenes. Fig. 4. 
 
 TERMS. 
 
 Major (X) A useful study. 
 Minor (Z) What is injurious to the morals. 
 Middle (Y) What is worthy of encouragement. 
 Cam- Every X is Y; All useful studies are worthy 
 
 of encouragement ; 
 
 -en- No Y is Z ; Nothing worthy of encourage- 
 ment is injurious to the morals; therefore 
 -es. No Z is X. What is injurious to the mo- 
 rals is not a useful study.* 
 
 52. The four moods of the first figure are called 
 feet; all the rest, imperfect. When a syllogism 
 in one of the imperfect moods is re-stated, and 
 brought into the first figure, it is said to be reduced. 
 
 OSTENSIVE REDUCTION. 
 
 53. In reducing a syllogism, it is allowable to 
 convert the premises illatively, (No. 31,) or to 
 transpose them. This liberty renders it always 
 possible to deduce, in the first figure, either the very 
 same conclusion as the original one, or another, 
 from which the original one is deducible by illative 
 conversion. 
 
 * The method of statement in this figure is so clumsy 
 and inverted, that it is seldom or never used. The propo-
 
 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 35 
 
 54. The initial letters of the imperfect moods 
 correspond with those of the four perfect ones, B, 
 C, D, F, and indicate into which of them the im- 
 perfect mood is capable of being reduced. Thus 
 Bramantip is to be reduced into Barbara, Cesare 
 and Camestres into Celarent, Festino into Ferio, 
 Iff. 
 
 55. The letter m, occurring in the name of an 
 imperfect mood, indicates that, in reducing it, the 
 premises are to be transposed ; s, that the proposi- 
 tion denoted by the vowel immediately preceding, 
 is to be converted simply (No. 33.); p, that it is to 
 be converted per accidens or limitation (No. 30.); 
 (except in the case of Bramantip, where p denotes 
 that the conversion of A per accidens has already 
 taken place ;*) k, that it is to be converted by ne- 
 gation. (No. 30. )f 
 
 sitions are easily reduced into the more natural arrange- 
 ment of the first figure. See No. 54. 
 
 * E. G. Bram- All blasphemous writers injure the pub- 
 lic morals ; 
 -an- All who injure the public morals deserve 
 
 punishment; therefore 
 
 -tip. Some who deserve punishment are blas- 
 phemous writers. 
 
 The conclusion is the converse per accidens oi the con* 
 elusion of the Syllogism in Barbara, No. 48. 
 
 f The Reductio ad impossibile I have not thought it ne- 
 
 D2
 
 36 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 56. A few examples of reduction may suffice : 
 Camestres is reduced to Celarent, as the initial let- 
 ter directs, by simply converting the minor, (as 
 is denoted by the s in <?,) and then transposing 
 the premises, (as is indicated by the m in Cam.) 
 The conclusion of the reduced syllogism is the 
 simple converse of the conclusion of the original 
 one. 
 
 CAMESTRES. See No. 49. 
 
 Reduced to CELARENT. 
 
 Ce- What is unattended with remorse is not a 
 
 guilty pleasure ; 
 -la- Whatever is truly satisfactory is unattended 
 
 with remorse ; therefore 
 
 -rent. Whatever is truly satisfactory is not a guilty 
 pleasure. 
 
 57. Fakoro is reduced to Ferio by converting 
 the major by negation, (No. 30.) and considering 
 
 cessary to explain. Its object is, to show that an absurdity 
 would follow from supposing the original conclusion to be 
 false. When this mode of reduction is adopted, Fakoro 
 and Dokamo are called Baroko and Bokardo, K being then 
 the sign of the Reductio ad impossibile. But conversion 
 by negation is by far the easier and more expeditious 
 process.
 
 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 37 
 
 the minor premiss affirmative ; i. e. attaching the 
 
 negative to the predicate instead of the copula. 
 
 (No. 30.) 
 
 FAKORO. 
 Reduced to FERIO. 
 
 Fak- Every sincere Christian is charitable ; 
 
 -o- Some professors of religion are not charit- 
 able; therefore 
 
 -ro. Some professors of religion are not sincere 
 Christians. 
 
 Fe- He who is not-charitable is not a sincere 
 Christian. 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 -ri- Some professors of religion are I not-charit- 
 
 able ; I therefore 
 -o. Some professors of religion are not sincere 
 
 Christians.* 
 
 * Fakoro may be considered as Festino, and stated ac- 
 cordingly, by placing an equipollent negative Proposition 
 for the major, (No. 33, Note,) and viewing the minor as an 
 affirmative. 
 
 Subject. Predicate. 
 
 Fes- I No sincere Christian I is I not-charitable ; 1 
 
 Predicate 
 -ti- Some professors of religion are I not-charitable ; I 
 
 therefore 
 -no. Some professors of religion are not sincere Christians.
 
 38 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 The minor premiss is here considered affirma- 
 tive, because you take "not-charitable" as the middle 
 term, and cannot separate the negative from it, 
 without introducing a fourth term, contrary to No. 
 37, Rule 1. 
 
 58. Darapti is reduced to Darii by converting 
 per accidens (No. 30.) the minor premiss. This 
 is denoted by the p in rap. (No. 55.) 
 
 Festino is reduced to Ferio by simply converting the ma- 
 jor ; " He who is not charitable is not a sincere Christian," 
 &c. 
 
 So Dokamo may be considered as Disamis, and stated 
 accordingly, by joining the negative to the predicate in- 
 stead of the copula, in the major and conclusion ; i.e. view- 
 ing O as I; 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 Dis- Some desires are I not-blameable ; I 
 
 -am- All desires are liable to excess ; therefore 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 -is. Some things liable to excess are I tiot-blameable. I 
 Disamis is reduced to Darii by simply converting the 
 major, and then transposing the premises. 
 Da- All desires are liable, &c. 
 -ri- Some things not blameable, &c.; therefore 
 -i. Some things not blameable, &c. as at No. 59.
 
 REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 39 
 
 . DARAPTI. See No. 50. 
 
 Reduced to DARII. 
 
 Da- True piety is entitled to respect ; 
 -ri- Something often ridiculed is true piety; 
 
 therefore 
 
 -i. Something often ridiculed is entitled to re- 
 spect. 
 
 59. Dokamo is reduced to Darii by converting 
 the major by negation, and then transposing the 
 premises. 
 
 DOKAMO. 
 Reduced to DARII. 
 
 Dok- Some desires are not blameable ; 
 -am- All desires are liable to excess ; therefore 
 -o. Some things liable to excess are not blame- 
 able. 
 
 Da- All desires are liable to excess ; 
 -ri- Some things not blameable are desires; there- 
 fore 
 
 -i. Some things not blameable are liable to ex- 
 cess. 
 
 This conclusion is the converse by negation of 
 the original one, (i. e. O converted into I,) and 
 therefore, simply convertible into it. (No. 33.)
 
 40 OF MODAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 60. Those syllogisms are called Modal, that con- 
 sist of modal propositions. (No. 12.) Modal pro- 
 positions may be considered as pure categoricals, 
 and stated accordingly. For this purpose, you 
 should attach the mode to one of the terms ; as, 
 " The wisest man may possibly be mistaken." 
 
 Suly. Cop. Fred. 
 
 I " The wisest man I I is I I one who may possibly 
 
 be mistaken." I " It is probable that Livy was 
 prejudiced ; i. e. 
 
 Subj. Cop. 
 
 I "Livy! I was I I probably prejudiced." I 
 
 61. When the mode expresses only the neces- 
 sary, impossible, or contingent connexion of the 
 terms, you may attach it to the subject, as " Man 
 is necessarily mortal ;" i. e. "All men are mortal." 
 " It is impossible for a bad man to be happy;" i.e. 
 "No bad man can be happy." 
 
 62. It is often, however, most convenient to af- 
 firm simply the agreement or disagreement of the 
 mode with the dictum, or assertion itself; as "I 
 am possibly mistaken," 
 
 That I am mistaken I
 
 OF HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 41 
 
 In these cases, the subject implies that an entire 
 act of judgment has previously taken place. 
 
 OF HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 63. A syllogism is called Hypothetical, when 
 it contains one, two, or three hypothetical pro- 
 positions ; E.G. "If he is wise, he is happy; 
 he is wise ; therefore he is happy." Or, " He who 
 is wise, is happy; if he is a philosopher, he is wise; 
 therefore, if he is a philosopher, he is happy." Or, 
 " If he is Avise, he is happy; if he is a philosopher, 
 he is wise ; therefore, if he is a philosopher, he is 
 happy." See No. 13. The hypothetical syllogisms 
 most in use are divided into Conditional and Dis- 
 junctive. E. G. 
 
 CONDITIONAL. 
 
 If man is fallible, he is imperfect ; 
 But he is fallible; therefore 
 He is imperfect. 
 
 DISJUNCTIVE. 
 
 It is either day or night; 
 But it is day ; therefore 
 It is not night. 
 
 64. In a hypothetical syllogism, the reasoning
 
 42 OF CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 turns on the hypothesis, and the conclusion is al- 
 ways categorical.* 
 
 The hypothetical premiss is called the major, 
 and the categorical one, the minor. 
 
 OF CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 65. It is to he observed of a conditional propo- 
 sition, that it contains two, and only two, categorical 
 propositions, whereof one results from the other; that 
 from which the other results is called the Antecedent;* 
 that which results from it, the Consequent (Conse- 
 quens.) The connexion between the two (ex- 
 pressed by "if") is called the Consequence (con- 
 sequentia.) 
 
 Consequentia. Antecedent. Consequent. 
 
 I " If I I man is fallible, I I he is imperfect." I 
 66. The truth or falsity of a conditional propo- 
 sition depends entirely on the consequence, or con- 
 
 * When a hypothetical conclusion is drawn from a hypo- 
 thetical premiss, the reasoning is, in effect, categorical. E.G. 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 Every conqueror is feither a hero or a villain ; I 
 Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 He was I either a hero or a villain. I 
 
 * The antecedent is sometimes placed after the conse- 
 quent. We might say, " Man is imperfect, if he is fallible.' '
 
 OF CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 43 
 
 nexion between antecedent and consequent. Both 
 antecedent and consequent may be false, yet if 
 there be such a connexion between them, that the 
 falsity* of the antecedent depends on the falsity of 
 the consequent, the whole proposition is valid. 
 E.G. 
 
 If I logic is useless, I 
 
 Consequent. 
 
 I it deserves to be neglected. I 
 On the other hand, both antecedent and consequent 
 may be true ; yet if there be no connexion between 
 them, so that the latter does not depend for its 
 truth on the former, the whole proposition is false ; 
 i. e. the consequent does not follow from the ante- 
 cedent. 
 
 Antecedent. 
 
 If I Virgil was a poet, I 
 
 Consequent. 
 
 I he wrote the JEneid. I 
 It is 'true both that Virgil was a poet, and that he 
 
 * If you deny the consequent, "Logic deserves to be ne- 
 glected," the falsity of the antecedent, "Logic is useless," 
 must follow. This will appear from a categorical statement 
 of the proposition. (A) " Whatever is useless is deserving 
 of neglect." Convert this by negation. (E) "Whatever 
 is not deserving of neglect is not useless. (No. 30.) Logic 
 is not deserving of neglect j therefore it is not useless."
 
 44 OF CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 wrote the ^Eneid, but it does not follow that because 
 he was a poet, he therefore wrote the JEneid. 
 
 67. There are two rules for drawing a conclu- 
 sion from a conditional proposition. Rule 1. The 
 antecedent being granted, the consequent may be 
 inferred; E. G. 
 
 " If A is B, C is D ; Major. " If rain has fallen, the 
 
 ground is wet ; 
 ButAisB; Minor. But rain has fallen; 
 
 therefore therefore 
 
 C is D." Conclusion. The ground is wet." 
 
 These syllogisms, in which the antecedent is 
 granted, are called Constructive. 
 
 Rule 2. The consequent being denied, the ante- 
 cedent may be denied. 
 " If A is B, C is D ; " If rain has fallen, the 
 
 ground is wet ; 
 ButC is not D; therefore But the ground is not 
 
 wet; therefore 
 
 A is not B." Rain has not fallen." 
 
 These syllogisms, in which the consequent is denied, 
 are called Destructive. 
 
 68. By denying the antecedent, or affirming the 
 consequent, nothing can be inferred, because the 
 same consequent may follow from other antece-
 
 OF DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 45 
 
 dents. *Rain may not have fallen, and yet the 
 ground may he wet ; or fthe ground may he wet, 
 and yet no rain have fallen ; hecause dew or an 
 inundation would produce the same effect, j 
 
 OF DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 69. To what has been said of a disjunctive pro- 
 
 * Here the antecedent is denied. 
 
 j- Here the consequent is affirmed. 
 
 J Conversion by negation (No. 30) is applicable to condi- 
 tional propositions ; i. e. the contradictory of the consequent 
 may be taken for the antecedent, and the contradictory of 
 the antecedent for the consequent. 
 " If rain has fallen, the ground is wet ; f 
 
 But rain has fallen ; therefore f Constructive. 
 
 The ground is wet." j 
 
 " If the ground is not wet, rain has not fallen 5} 
 
 But rain has fallen ; therefore > Destructive. 
 
 The ground is wet." J 
 
 By this conversion of the major premiss of a constructive 
 syllogism, (the minor, of course, remaining unchanged,) you 
 will reduce a constructive syllogism into a destructive, be- 
 cause you deny the consequent.You will reduce a destructive 
 syllogism into a constructive, because you affirm the ante- 
 cedent. E. G. 
 " If rain has fallen, the gound is wet ; } 
 
 But the ground is not wet; therefore?' Destructive. 
 
 Rain has not fallen." J 
 
 " If the ground is not wet, rain has not fallen ; ) 
 
 But the ground is not wet ; therefore f Constructive 
 
 Rain has not fallen." \
 
 46 OF DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 sition (No. 13) must be added, that it consists of 
 two or more categoricals so stated, as to imply that 
 some one of them, at least, is true, and generally 
 that but one can be true ; as, " It is either day or 
 night." 
 
 70. By denying one of the categoricals of a dis- 
 junctive proposition, if there be but two, you may 
 infer the truth of the remaining one ; as, " It is 
 either day or night : but it is not day ; therefore 
 it is night." By denying one of them, if there be 
 several, you may infer the truth of some one of the 
 remaining ones ; as, " It is either Spring, Summer, 
 Autumn, or Winter; but it is not Spring ; there- 
 fore it is either Summer, Autumn, or Winter.' 
 By denying all but one, you will infer the truth of 
 that one ; as, " It is neither Spring, Summer, nor 
 Autumn ; therefore it is winter." 
 
 7 1 . When it is implied that only one of the ca- 
 tegoricals can be true, by affirming one, you, of 
 course, deny the rest. As, " It is either Spring, 
 Summer, &c. ; but it is Spring ; therefore it is nei- 
 ther Summer, Autumn, nor Winter."* 
 
 * If both categoricals should be true, it is plain that the 
 affirmation of one cannot imply the denial of the other; as, 
 "Amphibious creatures live either on land or in the water."
 
 THE DILEMMA. 47 
 
 72. The dilemma* is a redundant conditional syl- 
 logism, with two or more antecedents in the major 
 premiss, and a disjunctive minor. 
 
 73. Dilemmas are either Constructive or Destruc- 
 tive. Of the constructive dilemma there are two 
 sorts, Simple and Complex. There is but one sort 
 of the true destructive dilemma. 
 
 74. The simple constructive dilemma has but 
 one consequent to each antecedent. The antece- 
 dents being disjunctively granted, in the minor, -the 
 common consequent is inferred. See No. 67. Rule 
 
 Major. 
 
 1. 1 " If A is B, C isD; and if E is F, C is D. ' 
 
 Minor. Conclusion. 
 
 I But either A is B, or E is F ; I I therefore C is D." I 
 " If a Christian be living, he is the Lord's servant; 
 and if he be dead, he is the Lord's servant ; but he 
 
 * As, in this kind of argument, there are generally, in 
 the major premiss, two antecedents, which, in the minor, 
 become two assumptions, it is termed a dilemma, from <?ic 
 twice, two, and \rjju/*a, an assumption. It is called by the 
 lexicographers, "Syllogismus ab utraque parte feriens ad- 
 versarium,'' and " Argumentum cornutum," because most 
 horned animals have two horns, and there are, in a dilemma, 
 in-o instruments of attack, furnished in the two assumptions. 
 So Cowley, "Both the horns of fate's dilemma wound."
 
 48 THE DILEMMA. 
 
 must be always either living or dead ; therefore he 
 is always the Lord's servant." (See Romans, xiv. 
 8.)* 
 
 75. The complex constructive dilemma has a 
 different consequent to each antecedent. The an- 
 tecedents are disjunctively granted, in the minor, 
 and the different consequents disjunctively inferred. 
 
 Major, 
 
 E.G. I " If A is B, C is D, and if E is F, G is H ; I 
 
 Minor. Con- 
 
 I but either A is B, or E is F ; I I therefore either 
 
 C is D, or G is H." I " If the Evangelists speak 
 truth, Christianity is of God, and if they do not 
 speak truth, the existence of Christianity is per- 
 fectly unaccountable ; but the Evangelists either 
 do or do not speak truth ; therefore Christianity is 
 either of God, or its existence is perfectly unac- 
 countable." 
 
 76f The true destructive dilemma has, like the 
 
 * The conditionals of the major premiss may be united 
 by the adverb "whether,'' so as to form one proposition ; 
 E. G. " Whether a Christian lives or dies, he is the Lord's 
 servant.'' 
 
 f There is a form of argument incorrectly styled a de- 
 structive dilemma, in which the consequents are wholly
 
 THE DILEMMA. 49 
 
 complex constructive, a different consequent to each 
 antecedent, in the major. The consequents are 
 disjunctively denied, in the minor, and the ante- 
 cedents disjunctively denied, in the conclusion. 
 E.G. " If A is B, C is D, and if E is F, G is H ; 
 but either C is not D, or G is not H ; therefore 
 either A is not B, or E is not F." " If a witness 
 be an honest one, he will not bear false testimony 
 
 instead of disjunctively, denied in the minor. This is, 
 however, a mere combination of simple conditional syllo- 
 gisms, two or more being expressed together. It may con- 
 sist either 1st, of one antecedent with several consequents; 
 or, 2ndly, of several antecedents with one consequent; or, 
 3rdly, of several antecedents with several consequents. 
 1st, If A isB, C isD; if A is B, E isF; if A is B, GisH; 
 but C is not D, E is not F, G is not H ; therefore A is not 
 B. 2ndly, If A is B, C is D ; if E is F, C isD ; if G is H, 
 C is D ; but C is not D ; therefore A is not B, E is not F, 
 GisnotH. 3rdly, If A is B, C is D ; ifEisF, GisH; 
 if I is K, L is M ; but C is not D, G is not H, L is not M ; 
 therefore A is not B, E is not F, I is not K. Should you, 
 in the first case, deny the consequents disjunctively instead 
 of categorically, you will not thereby make the argument a 
 dilemma ; for if all the consequents be not true, the one 
 antecedent must fall to the ground. E. G. " If A is B, C 
 is D; if A is B, E is F; if A is B, G is H; but either C is 
 not D, E is not F, or G is not H ; therefore A is not B. 
 But in the correct destructive dilemma there is always a 
 disjunctive conclusion.
 
 50 THE DILEMMA. 
 
 designedly ; and if he be a competent one, he will 
 not do so undesignedly : but a witness who speaks 
 false, does so either designedly or undesignedly ; 
 therefore he is either not honest or not competent." 
 
 77. The dilemma may always be reduced into 
 simple conditional syllogisms, by adding a catego- 
 rical minor to each antecedent and consequent of 
 the major premiss of the dilemma. On such a 
 statement, it will be seen that an opponent could 
 not deny both the minors, and that he must, there- 
 fore, admit one of the conclusions. 
 
 78. In a constructive dilemma, some one of the 
 antecedents is assumed to be true ; and, in a de- 
 structive, some one of the consequents assumed to 
 be false ; but which, is left undetermined.
 
 REDUCTION OF HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 79. To reduce a hypothetical syllogism into a 
 categoi-ical form, you must view every conditional 
 proposition as a universal affirmative, taking the 
 antecedent for the subject, and the consequent for 
 the predicate.
 
 52 ENTHYMEMES. 
 
 Camestres may, of course, be reduced to Celarent. 
 But even destructive conditionals may be stated in 
 Barbara, if you view them as constructive ; which 
 is done by converting by negation the major pre- 
 miss. (See No. 68, Note.) This process of re- 
 duction, however, is explained merely to show the 
 applicability of Aristotle's dictum to every form of 
 argument ; since the rules for hypothetical syllo- 
 gisms are a sufficient test of their validity. 
 
 ENTHYMEMES. 
 
 80. The Enthymeme is a syllogism, with one of 
 the premises omitted. This premiss is easily sup- 
 plied by comparing the middle term with that term 
 of the conclusion which is expressed only once. 
 E.G. 
 
 " Isaiah was a prophet ; therefore 
 He was inspired." 
 
 The middle term, of course, is that which does 
 not enter into the conclusion, viz. "Prophet." 
 " Isaiah," or the minor term, is expressed twice. 
 " Inspired," the major term, only once. Compare, 
 therefore, the middle term with the major, thus sup- 
 plying the major premiss ; E. G.
 
 OF THE SORITES. 53 
 
 " Every prophet is inspired ; 
 Isaiah was a prophet ; therefore 
 He was inspired." 
 
 If the minor premiss had been suppressed, the 
 minor term "Isaiah" could have occurred only 
 once. E. G. 
 
 " Every prophet is inspired ; therefore 
 
 Isaiah was inspired." 
 
 You must, in that case, have taken the minor 
 term "Isaiah" for comparison with the middle, 
 thus supplying the minor premiss.* 
 
 81. By taking the two propositions of an enthy- 
 meme for an antecedent and consequent, you may 
 form it into a conditional syllogism ; E. G. " If 
 Isaiah was a prophet, he was inspired." 
 
 OF THE SORITES. 
 
 82. A Sorites* is a brief form of connecting 
 several syllogisms in the first figure. In a sorites, 
 the predicate of the first proposition is made the 
 
 * This is the ordinary way of speaking and writing, and 
 in this concise form we continually reason in our minds, 
 iv 3v/zy. Hence the term Enthymeme. 
 
 f From (rupee, a pile ; because the propositions &TK piled. 
 as it were, one on another.
 
 54 OF THE SORITES. 
 
 subject of the next, and so on, to any length, till 
 finally the predicate of the last of the premises is 
 predicated, in the conclusion, of the subject of the 
 first. 
 
 A is B; Religion improves the morals; 
 
 B is C; What improves the morals is 
 
 beneficial to the community; 
 
 C is D; therefore What is beneficial to the com- 
 munity deserves encourage- 
 ment; therefore 
 
 A is D; Religion deserves encourage- 
 
 ment. 
 
 83. In a sorites, there are as many middle terms 
 as there are intermediate propositions between the 
 first and last ; the subject of each intermediate pro- 
 position being a middle term. A sorites may, there- 
 fore, be drawn out into as many separate syllogisms 
 as there are intermediate propositions. 
 
 84. In drawing out a sorites into distinct* syl- 
 logisms, you must take for your major premiss the 
 first intermediate proposition of the sorites, and 
 
 * By distinct and separate syllogisms, I mean those tn 
 form, with major, minor, and conclusion, into which the 
 sorites may be expanded.
 
 OF THE SORITES. 55 
 
 for your minor premiss, \hejirst proposition of it; 
 then draw your conclusion. The major proposi- 
 tion of your next syllogism must be the second in- 
 termediate proposition of the sorites, and your 
 minor proposition must be the conclusion of your 
 preceding syllogism; thence draw your second 
 conclusion. Proceed thus till you have formed as 
 many distinct syllogisms as the sorites contains 
 intermediate propositions, and have arrived at the 
 same conclusion. The sorites gives you only the 
 first minor premiss, viz. in its first proposition. 
 All the other minor premises consist of the con- 
 clusions of your separate syllogisms. All your. 
 major premises consist of the intermediate propo- 
 sitions of the sorites. E. G. 
 
 Intermediate Propositions. 
 
 " A is B, IB is C, C is DTD is E, I therefore 
 A is E." Here is a sorites with three intermediate 
 propositions, to be drawn out into three distinct 
 syllogisms. 
 
 Syll. 1. Syll. 2. Syll. 3. 
 
 BisC; CisD; DisE; 
 
 A is B ; therefore A is C ; therefore A is D ; therefore 
 
 AisC. AisD. A is E.
 
 56 OF THE SORITES. 
 
 85. In a sorites, the first proposition alone (ex- 
 cept, of course, the conclusion) may be particular ; 
 because the first proposition is made the minor of 
 the distinct syllogism (No. 84) and may be parti- 
 cular, according to rule, (either Darn, or Fen'o.) 
 The intermediate propositions being all majors of 
 the distinct syllogisms, must be universals. (Bar- 
 bara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.) 
 
 86. The last premiss of the sorites (viz. the last 
 intermediate proposition) is the only one that can 
 be negative;"* because the last premiss alone never 
 gives occasion to employ the conclusion of the dis- 
 tinct syllogism as the minor of a subsequent one. 
 Sho.uld any other premiss of the sorites but 
 the last be negative, it would lead to a negative 
 conclusion, (No. 37, Rule 6,) and that conclusion, 
 being made the minor of the following syllogism, 
 would violate the first figure, which does not admit 
 of a negative minor premiss. (Barbara, Celarent, 
 Darii, Fen'o.) 
 
 87. A hypothetical sorites consists of a series 
 of hypothetical syllogisms. In the constructive hy- 
 
 * Should a sorites appear to have a negative premiss before 
 the last, the succeeding premiss will shew that the negative 
 is, in reality, a part of one of the terms.
 
 OF THE SORITES. 
 
 57 
 
 pothetical sorites, you proceed from the establish- 
 ment of the first antecedent to the establishment 
 of the last consequent. E. G. 
 If A is B, C is D ; If it is the duty of a parent to 
 take care of his children, he 
 should keep them, as much 
 as possible, from vice ; 
 
 If C is D, E is F ; If he should keep them from 
 vice, he ought to teach them 
 what is virtuous ; 
 
 If E is F, G. is H ; If he ought to teach them what 
 is virtuous, he is bound to 
 instruct them in religious 
 knowledge ; 
 
 But A is B ; But it is the duty of a parent 
 
 therefore to take care of his children ; 
 
 therefore 
 
 G is H. He is bound to instruct them 
 
 in religious knowledge. 
 
 In a destructive sorites, you go back from the de- 
 nial of the last consequent, to the denial of the first 
 antecedent; " G is not H ; therefore A is not B." 
 " Jf Romish councils speak the truth, popery 
 should be credited ;
 
 58 OF INDUCTION. 
 
 If popery should be credited, protestantism is 
 fallacious ; 
 
 If protestantism is fallacious, the Scriptures 
 are not the rule of faith ; 
 
 But the Scriptures are the rule of faith ; there- 
 fore 
 
 Romish councils do not speak the truth." 
 
 OF INDUCTION. 
 
 88. Induction* is a kind of argument, which in- 
 fers, respecting a whole class, what has been ascer- 
 tained respecting one or more subdivisions of that 
 class ; or the drawing a general conclusion from as 
 many particular instances as can be brought in to 
 bear on the point in question ; as if, on perceiving 
 that the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and antelope, all ru- 
 minate, you should infer that all horned animals 
 ruminate. Inductive arguments, which are usually 
 stated as enthymemes,f (No. 80.) are, of course, 
 easily filled up, so as to become regular syllogisms. 
 
 * The term " Induction " is sometimes employed to de- 
 signate the process of investigating and collecting facts ; 
 which is not a process of argument, but a. preparation for it. 
 
 f The example given by Dr. Aldrich is inconveniently 
 stated for reduction into a syllogistic form, a circumstance
 
 59 
 
 EPICHIREMA. 
 
 89. One of the premises of a syllogism is occa- 
 sionally confirmed by an incidental proposition, 
 called a Prosyllogism. This proposition, with the 
 premiss it is attached to, form an enthymeme. (No. 
 80.) The incidental proposition is the expressed 
 premiss of the enthymeme, and the premiss it is at- 
 tached to is the conclusion. E. G. 
 "All sin is dangerous; 
 Covetousness is sin ; (for it is a transgression 
 
 of the Law ;) therefore 
 It is dangerous." 
 
 which, perhaps, occasioned his error, (pointed out by Dr. 
 Whately, ) in directing the student to supply the minor, in- 
 stead of the major, premiss of the enthymeme ; " Hie et ille 
 et iste magnes trahit ferrum j ergo omnis." The real sub- 
 ject here is, "ferrum trahere," the real predicate, "proprium 
 hujus et illius et istius magnetis." The term expressed but 
 once will be the major, "proprium omnis," which must 
 therefore be compared with the middle, (No. 80.) viz. "pro- 
 prium hujus, et illius, et istius magnetis." 
 
 Middle Term. 
 
 I " What belongs to this, that, and the other magnet, I is 
 
 Major Term. 
 I what belongs to all ; I 
 
 Minor Term. Middle 
 
 I The power of attracting iron I is I what belongs to 
 
 Term. 
 
 this, that, and the other magnet ; I therefore 
 
 Minor Term. Major Term. 
 
 I The power of attracting iron ! is I whatbelongstoall." I
 
 60 EQUIVALENTS, ETC. 
 
 The minor premiss is an enthymeme ; " Cove- 
 tousness is a transgression of the law ; therefore it 
 is sin." A syllogism with such a premiss is called 
 an Epichirema. (eTri^tiplw, I undertake to prove.) 
 
 EQUIVALENTS. 
 
 90. Equivalent terms are allowable for brevity's 
 sake, as the pronoun for the noun ; equivalent pro- 
 positions are also allowable, as the illative converse 
 for the exposita ; (No. 30 et seq.} and such equi- 
 valents as may be supplied by ranking species 
 under genus, &c. 
 
 IRREGULAR SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 91. The premises of a valid syllogism may ap- 
 pear negative, contrary to Rule 5, No. 37. One of 
 the premises should then be stated as an affirmative. 
 (See Note to No. 33, " It is the same," &c.) 
 
 " No one is wise who is not virtuous ; 
 No gamester is virtuous ; therefore 
 No gamester is wise." 
 
 The real middle term in this syllogism is, " not- 
 virtuous," and it is in Celarent. 
 
 " He who is not-virtuous is not wise ; 
 A gamester is not-virtuous ; therefore 
 He is not wise."
 
 IRREGULAR SYLLOGISMS. 61 
 
 92. From the variety of expression admissible 
 in language, the logical order of subject and predi- 
 cate is often inverted ; and this will occasion the 
 appearance of too many terms in the syllogism. 
 All that is requisite, in such cases, is to restore the 
 subject and predicate to their proper order. E.G. 
 " No irrational agent could produce a work 
 
 which manifests design ; 
 The universe is a work which manifests design ; 
 
 therefore 
 No irrational agent could have produced the 
 
 universe." 
 
 Strictly considered, this syllogism has five 
 terms, viz. 1. An irrational agent. 2. A being, 
 able to produce a work which manifests design. 
 3. The universe. 4. A work which manifests de- 
 sign. 5. A being, able to produce the universe. 
 
 Middle Term. Copula 
 
 I A work which manifests design I 1 could not 
 
 and Major Term. 
 
 be produced by an irrational agent ; I 
 
 Minor Term. Middle 
 
 I The universe I is I a work which manifests 
 
 Term. 
 
 design ; I therefore 
 
 Minor T. Copula and Major Term. 
 
 I It I I could not be produced by an irra- 
 
 tional agent."
 
 t>2 IRREGULAR SYLLOGISMS. 
 
 93. The above irregularity is sometimes accom- 
 panied with a transposition of the premises, as in 
 the following syllogism, which appears to be in the 
 second figure, and faulty, from an affirmative con- 
 clusion. (Note to No. 47.) 
 
 " Every true patriot is disinterested ; 
 Few men are disinterested ; therefore 
 Few men are true patriots." 
 It is, in reality, Barbara, with a transposition 
 of the premises, and of the terms of the major 
 proposition; for you do not predicate of "few men," 
 that they are " disinterested," but of " disinterested 
 men," that they are " few." 
 
 " Disinterested men are few ; 
 True patriots are disinterested men ; therefore 
 True patriots are few." 
 
 94. By the use of conversion and equipollent 
 propositions, such irregularities as the following 
 are easily reduced to form. 
 
 " None but candid men are good reasoners; 
 Few infidels are candid ; therefore 
 Few infidels are good reasoners." 
 The major premiss here is equipollent to " They 
 who are not candid men are not good reasoners," 
 which is the converse by negation of " All good 
 reasoners are candid men." (No. 30.) State your
 
 IRREGULAR SYLLOGISMS. 63 
 
 major proposition in A accordingly. The minor 
 premiss and the conclusion are equipollent to 
 " Most infidels are not candid ;" therefore " Most 
 infidels are not good reasoners." This will be a 
 regular syllogism in Camestres or Fakoro ;* or it 
 may be stated at once in Celarent, or Ferio. 
 "They who are not candid (or uncandid) 
 
 Copula 
 
 1 are not 1 good reasoners; 
 
 Most infidels I are I notcandid ; (or uncandid;) 
 therefore 
 
 Most infidels I are not I good reasoners."f 
 
 * I have said Camestres OR FAKORO, and Celarent OR 
 FERIO, because "most" cannot designate absolute univer- 
 sality, though the present case may be thought to amount 
 to a moral one. (See Note to No. 15, and UNIVERSALITY, 
 in the Index.) 
 
 f For the attainment of skill in syllogizing, as in every 
 other intellectual process, true it is, that "sapere est et 
 principium et fons." Without good sense and some com- 
 mand of expression, it will often be very difficult for a stu- 
 dent to state, inform, many arguments that are sufficiently 
 conclusive. On the other hand, some proficiency in logic, 
 as an art, is essential to the ready performance of this 
 exercise, however simple it may appear. Though good 
 sense and command of expression are indispensable, they 
 are not, of themselves, sufficient. A study, then, which 
 both tries the faculties of the mind, and calls into play the 
 resources of phraseology, is surely to be considered as 
 worthy of a place in the scheme of a liberal education.
 
 64 
 
 EXERCISES. 
 
 Add the proper Symbols to the following Pro- 
 positions. 
 
 1. All grief is mitigated by time. (No. 15.) 
 
 2. Some troubles happen to all. (No. 15.) 
 
 3. No deceit is justifiable. (No. 15.) 
 
 4. Reverence is due to God. (No. 19.) 
 
 5. Some virtuous men have been unfortunate. 
 
 6. A dissipated character is not estimable. 
 (No. 19.) 
 
 7. Many ingenious men have not acquired a 
 reputation. (No. 15.) 
 
 8. The rose soon fades. (No. 19.) 
 
 9. Alexander was the son of Philip. (No. 11, 
 note.) 
 
 10. Herodotus is not to be implicitly believed. 
 
 11. Few men are acquainted with themselves. 
 (No. 15, note.) 
 
 12. Sin is necessarily destructive of happiness. 
 (No. 12, note.) 
 
 13. Every animal is either rational or irrational. 
 (No. 13.) 
 
 14. There is no one free from faults. (No. 15.) 
 
 15. Rome was the mistress of the world.
 
 EXERCISES. 65 
 
 16. "Thou art the man." 
 
 17. Reading improves the mind. (No. 19.) 
 
 18. The Chinese are an idolatrous people. (No. 
 11, note.) 
 
 19. Romulus and Remus were twins. 
 
 20. If a man be a diligent student, he will be- 
 come learned. (No. 13.) 
 
 2 ] . Every mistake that a man makes is not a 
 sign of folly. (No. 15.) 
 
 22. All men have not great abilities. 
 
 23. None but classical scholars can fully appre- 
 ciate the beauties of ancient literature. (No. 15.) 
 
 24. " None is lost but the son of perdition.'. 
 
 State the Contraries and Contradictories of the 
 following Propositions. (No. 27.) 
 
 25. No men are immortal. 
 
 26. No conscientious person is deserving of 
 ridicule. 
 
 27. All falsehood is dangerous. 
 
 28. Every real Christian is charitable. 
 
 29. Dishonesty deserves to be punished. 
 
 30. Nothing past can be recalled. 
 
 31. All who know what is right are bound to 
 practise it.
 
 66 EXERCISES. 
 
 32. Not one of the enemy escaped. 
 
 How, in respect of quantity, is the contradictory 
 of each of the above propositions related to the 
 contrary ? 
 
 State the Subcontraries and Contradictories of 
 the following Propositions. 
 
 33. Some evils are inseparable from a state of 
 mortality. 
 
 34. Many apparent misfortunes are real blessings. 
 
 35. Several writers of merit have not been 
 popular. 
 
 36. All do not admire the same things. Hor. 
 
 37. Some men are eager for novelty. 
 
 38. Many critics are not candid judges. 
 
 39. Few can distinguish between what is really 
 good and evil. Juv. 
 
 40. All the hexameters of Virgil are not com- 
 pleted. 
 
 41. No miser is contented. 
 
 What is the symbol of this proposition ? (No. 17.) 
 Is its simple converse true ? (No. 33, or 34.) 
 
 42. Some misfortunes are unavoidable. 
 
 Add the symbol. What is the contradictory ? 
 Is it true or false ? (Nos. 26, 27, 28.) What is the
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 67 
 
 simple converse of the contradictory ? Is it true 
 or false ? What is the contradictory of the simple 
 converse ? How may this he changed into the 
 exposita ? (No. 30.) 
 
 43. No good man is a liar. 
 
 Add the symbol. What is the simple converse ? 
 Is it true ? (No. 33.) What is the subalternate 
 of the simple converse ? (Nos. 24, 27.) How 
 might the exposita be changed into this ? (No. 33.) 
 
 44. All earthly things are perishable. 
 
 Add the symbol. What is the subalternate ? 
 Is it true ? (No. 28.) What is the simple con- 
 verse of the subaltemate ? Is it true ? How 
 might the exposita be changed into it ? No. 30.) 
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 45. Swearing is forbidden by our Saviour; 
 swearing is practised in our Courts of Justice ; 
 therefore something practised in our Courts of 
 Justice is forbidden by our Saviour. 
 
 Is this fallacious ? See the Church Articles ; 
 also (Nos. 19 and 37, Rule 3.) 
 
 46. Hypocrisy is injurious to the interests of 
 religion ; ill-directed zeal is often taken for hypo- 
 crisy;' therefore it is injurious to the interests of 
 religion.
 
 68 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 Is the conclusion true ? Does it follow ? Why ? 
 (No. 37, Rule 1.) 
 
 47. Covetousness is idolatry ; to worship graven 
 images is idolatry; therefore it is covetousness. 
 (No. 37, Rule 3.) 
 
 48. No bribery is defensible ; bribery is not 
 idleness; therefore idleness is not defensible. 
 (No. 37, Rule 5.) 
 
 Is the conclusion true ? Does it follow ? Why ? 
 
 49. Mathematical study improves the reasoning 
 powers ; the study of logic is not mathematical 
 study ; therefore it does not improve the reasoning 
 powers. (No. 37, Rule 4.) 
 
 50. Whatever is sinful is productive of sorrow ; 
 fraud and revenge are sinful, and poverty deprives 
 us of many comforts; therefore fraud, revenge, 
 and poverty are all productive of sorrow. (No. 37, 
 Rule 2.) 
 
 51. Some sins are not malicious; calumny is a 
 sin ; therefore it is malicious. (No. 37, Rule 6, and 3.) 
 
 52. All luxury is sinful; all luxury is agreeable 
 to the bodily sense ; therefore whatever is agreeable 
 to the bodily sense is sinful. (No. 37, Rule 4.) 
 
 53. No religious man is factious; St. Paul was 
 a religious man ; therefore he was not factious. 
 
 What mood and figure ? (Nos. 41, 45.)
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 69 
 
 54. Some vicious pastimes are permitted by 
 law ; every vicious pastime is disgraceful to a 
 Christian; therefore something disgraceful to a 
 Christian is permitted by law. 
 
 What mood and figure ? How reducible ? 
 Could you say, " Every thing disgraceful to a 
 Christian is permitted by law ?" Why ? (No. 37. 
 Rule 4.) 
 
 55. No men are free from sin ; every one free 
 from sin is the servant of God ; therefore some 
 servants of God are not men. 
 
 What mood and figure, and how reducible ? 
 
 56. Whoever winneth souls is wise ; all who 
 preach the Gospel faithfully win souls ; therefore 
 some who preach the Gospel faithfully are wise. 
 
 Has this mood any name ? What conclusion 
 might you draw ? (No. 44, note.} 
 
 57. No wicked people enjoy peace of mind ; all 
 who have gained riches dishonestly are wicked 
 people; therefore some who have gained riches dis- 
 honestly do not enjoy peace of mind. 
 
 Is this valid ? What is the name of the mood ? 
 State the subalternans of the conclusion. (No. 44, 
 note, and No. 24.)
 
 70 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 58. If Roman history is credible, the Carthagi- 
 nians were a treacherous people ; Roman history 
 is credible ; therefore the Carthaginians were a 
 treacherous people. (No. 67.) 
 
 59. St. Matthew's Gospel is allowed to have been 
 first written either in Greek or Hebrew ; Erasmus 
 thought it was not first written in Hebrew; therefore 
 he thought it was first written in Greek. (No. 71.) 
 
 60. All parts of Scripture are written for our 
 learning; some dreadful narratives are parts of 
 Scripture ; therefore some dreadful narratives are 
 written for our learning. 
 
 What mood and figure ? 
 
 61. Every candid man acknowledges merit in a 
 rival ; every learned man does not acknowledge 
 merit in a rival ; therefore every learned man is 
 not candid. 
 
 What are the quantity and quality of the minor 
 premiss and the conclusion ? (No. 15.) What 
 mood and figure ? Reduce the syllogism. 
 
 62. All earthly projects are liable to disappoint- 
 ment ; nothing liable to disappointment should 
 engage our chief concern ; therefore something 
 that should engage our chief concern is not an 
 earthly project.'
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC, 71 
 
 Might you substitute the subalternans of the 
 conclusion ? In what mood and figure would the 
 syllogism then be ? 
 
 63. Immoral companions should be avoided; 
 some immoral companions are intelligent ; there- 
 fore some intelligent persons should be avoided. 
 (No. 19.) 
 
 State the mood, figure, and mode of reduction. 
 
 64. If the world were good, laws would be use- 
 less ; but laws are not useless ; therefore the world 
 is not good. (No. 67, Rule 2.) 
 
 65. If the world were good, laws would be use- 
 less ; but the world is not good ; therefore laws 
 are not useless. 
 
 Is this conclusive ? Why ? (No. 68.) 
 
 66. Make a disjunctive syllogism from 2 Samuel, 
 xxiv, 13. 
 
 67. What sort of proposition is it in Luke xvi, 
 30 ? Can you make of it a valid syllogism ? 
 Which is the Consequential P (No. 65.) 
 
 68. If I am blest with opulence, I have reason 
 to be thankful ; but I am not blest with opulence; 
 therefore I have no reason to be thankful. (No.68.) 
 
 69. If I am blest with opulence, I have reason
 
 72 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 to be thankful ; but I have reason to be thankful ; 
 therefore I am blest with opulence. 
 
 70. Every vicious amusement is unbecoming a 
 wise man ; no philosophical pursuits are unbecom- 
 ing a wise man ; therefore some philosophical 
 pursuits are not vicious amusements. 
 
 In what figure is this syllogism ? The mood ? 
 
 71. If a proposition be a particular affirmative, 
 shew to what sorts of propositions it cannot belong. 
 Prove this by a syllogism. (No. 71.) 
 
 72. The Helvetii, if they went through the 
 country of the Sequani, were sure to meet with 
 various difficulties ; and if they went through the 
 Roman province, they were exposed to the danger 
 of opposition from Caesar ; but they were obliged 
 to go one way or the other ; therefore they were 
 either sure of meeting with various difficulties, or 
 exposed to the danger of opposition from Caesar. 
 De Bella Galileo, lib. i. 6. 
 
 What sort of argument is this ? (No. 75.) Re- 
 duce it into simple syllogisms. (No. 77.) 
 
 73. This man has been proved treacherous; 
 therefore he is not to be trusted. 
 
 What sort of argument? supply the premiss. 
 (No. 80.)
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 73 
 
 74. If pain is violent, it should be borne with 
 patience, because it will be of short continuance ; 
 and if it be slight, it should be borne with patience, 
 because it is only a small evil ; but pain must be 
 either violent or slight ; therefore it should be borne 
 with patience. 
 
 What sort of argument ? (No. 74.) What do 
 you call the two incidental propositions in the 
 major premiss ? (No. 89.) 
 
 75. No woman of great mind would submit to 
 the indignity of being led in triumph ; therefore 
 Cleopatra would not. 
 
 What sort of argument ? Supply the premiss. 
 
 76. Our heavenly Father is merciful ; therefore 
 we should be merciful.* 
 
 77. Alexander was buried ; he who is buried 
 becomes dust ; what becomes dust is earth ; earth 
 is probably made loam ; what is probably made 
 loam might probably stop a beer-barrel ; therefore 
 Alexander might probably stop a beer-barrel. 
 See Hamlet, ActV, Scene 1. 
 
 * In supplying the deficient premiss, the strict form of 
 syllogism will be better preserved, if we state the above 
 propositions thus : ' To be merciful is a quality of our 
 heavenly Father; therefore it should be ours." (No. 80.)
 
 74 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 What sort of argument ? Into how many dis- 
 tinct syllogisms may it be expanded, and why ? 
 State it in this form. (Nos. 82, 83, and 84.) 
 
 78. None but pious men are fit for the priest- 
 hood ; some ignorant men are pious ; therefore 
 some ignorant men are fit for the priesthood. 
 
 Is this valid ? Why ? (No. 15, and No. 37, 
 Rule 3.) 
 
 79. None but the truly penitent are pardoned ; 
 the malefactor mentioned by St. Luke (ch.xxiii.) 
 was truly penitent; therefore he was pardoned. 
 
 Is this conclusion true ? Does it follow from the 
 premises P What major proposition does the con- 
 clusion require ? 
 
 80. If man is responsible for his actions, he 
 ought to live circumspectly ; if he ought to live 
 circumspectly, he should consider what is his duty ; 
 if he should consider what is his duty, it concerns 
 him to seek the will of God ; if it concerns him to 
 seek the will of God, he ought to study the holy 
 Scriptures ; but man is responsible for his actions ; 
 therefore it is incumbent on him to study the holy 
 Scriptures. 
 
 What sort of argument ? to which division does
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 75 
 
 it belong, and why ? (No. 87.) How could it be 
 changed, so as to fall under the other division ? 
 Would the proposition, in that case, be true ? 
 
 81. All great poets are men of genius; Cicero 
 was a man of genius ; therefore he was a great 
 poet. (No. 37, Rule3.) 
 
 82. Opulence is seen, in such a multitude of 
 instances, to harden the heart and to engross the 
 soul, that we might conclude, even without the 
 authority of Scripture, that the rich enter with dif- 
 ficulty into the kingdom of Heaven. 
 
 What sort of argument ? (No. 88.) 
 
 83. Whatever tends to withdraw the mind from 
 pursuits of a low nature deserves to be promoted ; 
 classical learning does this, since it gives us a taste 
 for intellectual enjoyments ; therefore it deserves 
 to be promoted. 
 
 What name is given to such a syllogism as this ? 
 Which is the prosyllogism ? Which premiss is of 
 itself an enthymeme ? (No. 89.) 
 
 84. A negro is a fellow-creature ; therefore he 
 who injures a negro injures a fellow-creature.* 
 
 * This kind of argument, though not formal, is so ob- 
 viously valid, that it were a waste of time to expand it into
 
 76 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 
 
 85. No virtuous man is malevolent; all de- 
 tractors are malevolent ; therefore some detractors 
 are not virtuous. 
 
 86. He is brave who conquers his passions : he 
 who resists temptation conquers his passions; there- 
 fore he who resists temptation is brave. 
 
 87. All the ships that sailed to Troy, contained, 
 probably, 100,000 men ; the ship of Nireus was 
 one of these; (II. B. 671.) therefore it probably 
 contained 100,000 men. (No. 37, Rule 3. See 
 FALLACY, in the Index.) 
 
 88. Somebody must obtain the high prize in 
 every lottery ; each individual who holds a ticket 
 is somebody ; therefore each individual who holds 
 a ticket must obtain the high prize. (No. 37, Rule 
 3.) 
 
 syllogisms. It will be found to rest upon the general prin- 
 ciple, that whatever stands in any relation to an individual 
 or species, bears the same relation to a part of any class or 
 predicable which comprehends that individual or species. 
 E.G. " What stands in any relation to the species ' Negro,' 
 bears the same relation to the predicable, 'Fellow-creature,' 
 which comprehends the species 'Negro;' he who injures a 
 ' Negro,' stands in a relation to the species ' Negro,' there- 
 fore he who injures a ' Negro,' bears the same relation to 
 the predicable, 'Fellow-creature,' which comprehends the 
 species ' Negro.' "
 
 EXERCISES ON SYLLOGISM, ETC. 77 
 
 89. Sticks are easily broken ; fagots are sticks ; 
 therefore fagots are easily broken. (No. 37, Rule 3. ) 
 See FALLACIES, in the Index. 
 
 90. Books are a source both of instruction and 
 pleasure ; the Iliad and Odyssey are books ; there- 
 fore they are a source both of instruction an 
 pleasure. (No. 19, No. 37, Rule 3.)
 
 78 
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 ABSOLUTE Noun, or Term, See TERM. 
 
 ABSTRACT Noun, or Term, See Term. 
 
 ABSTRACTION, the process by which we draw off, in 
 thought, from a notion, any circumstances we do 
 not purpose to consider. By this process generaliza- 
 tion is performed. 
 
 ACCIDENT, a predicable contingently joined to the es- 
 sence of the species, and which may, therefore, be 
 absent or present, the essence of the species remain- 
 ing the same ; as, "A man walking," "A man born 
 at Paris." The former is called a separable acci- 
 dent, because it may be separated from the indi- 
 vidual ; the latter is plainly inseparable. Accident 
 is predicated in Quale. See SPECIES. 
 
 ACCIDENTAL DEFINITION, See DEFINITION. 
 
 ANALOGOUS Words or Terms, See WORDS. 
 
 ANTECEDENT, No. 65. 
 
 APPREHENSION, Simple, one of the three operations of 
 the mind concerned in argument. The notion of 
 any object in the mind. It is either Incomplex or 
 Complex. See OPERATIONS. 
 
 APPREHENSION, Simple Incomplex, the notion of one 
 object, as, "A pen," or of several objects confusedly 
 and without any relation, as, " Pens."
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 79 
 
 APPREHENSION, Simple Complex, the notion of two or 
 more objects between which there is some relation, 
 as, " A pen in the hand." 
 
 ARGUMENT, an act of reasoning expressed in language ; 
 popularly speaking, the means by which some point 
 is proved. 
 
 CANONS of Syllogisms, No. 36. 
 
 CATEGOREMATIC Word, or CATEGOREM,from KarnyoptM, 
 I predicate, a word that may be employed by itself 
 as a term. Such words are also called Simple terms. 
 
 CATEGORIES of Aristotle, or Ten Predicaments. Ge- 
 neral heads, to one or more of which every term may 
 be referred, viz. ovaia, irocrov, irolov, irpoari, iroitiv, 
 irdffxsiv, TTOV, irore, KfloOai, tx eiv - Substance, quan- 
 tity, quality, relation, action, passion, (or suffering,) 
 place, time, situation, possession, (or covering.) 
 
 CAUSE, Divisions of, 1st. Efficient, (a qua,) either 
 Principal, as the shoemaker, by whom ' the shoe is 
 made ; or Instrumental, as the awl, knife, &c. with 
 which the shoe is made. 2nd. Material, (ex qua,) 
 either Proximate, as the leather of which the shoe is 
 made ; or Remote, as the skin of ivhich the leather is 
 made. 3rd, Formal, (per quam,) either Proximate, 
 as the shape or fashion of the shoe; (because the ma- 
 terial so shaped becomes a shoe ;) or Remote, as the 
 natural form of the leather (viz. that which is essen- 
 tial to its being leather) is the more remote form of 
 the shoe. 4th. Final ; (propter quam ;) denoting 
 the end for ivhich a thing is made or done ; either 
 Proximate, as the proximate end for which a shoe is 
 made, is the protection of the foot ; or Remote, as its 
 more remote end is the comfort and health of the 
 body.
 
 80 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 COMMON Term, See TERM. 
 
 COMPATIBLE Terms, see TERM. 
 
 COMPLEX Term, the same as PROPOSITION. 
 
 CONCLUSION of a Syllogism, No 37, Rule 2nd. 
 
 CONCRETE Noun, See TERM. 
 
 CONDITIONAL Propositions, Rules for drawing a con- 
 clusion from, No. 67. 
 
 CONDITIONAL Syllogisms, No. 65, et seq. 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE Conditional Syllogisms, No. 67. 
 
 CONTINGENT Matter, Nos. 18 and 19. 
 
 CONTRADICTION, in Logic, when any proposition is op- 
 posed by another, differing from it both in quantity 
 and quality, No. 22. 
 
 CONTRADICTORY Opposition of Terms, See TERM. 
 
 CONTRADICTORY Propositions, Nos. 22, 23, and 27. 
 
 CONTRARY Propositions, Nos. 22, 27. 
 
 CONTRARY Terms, see TERMS. 
 
 CONVERSE, Nos. 29, 31, 32. 
 
 CONVERSION of Propositions, No. 29. 
 
 CONVERSION Simple, No. 30. 
 
 CONVERSION per Accidens, or by Limitation, No. 30. 
 
 CONVERSION by Negation, or Contraposition, No. 30. 
 
 COPULA, No. 6. 
 
 DECOMPLEX, or doubly complex, Word or Term. The 
 same as SYLLOGISM, No. 2. 
 
 DEFINITION, such an explanation of a term, as separates 
 it, like a boundary, from every thing else. Defini- 
 tion is divided into, 1st. Nominal, which explains 
 only the meaning of the Term, by an equivalent ex- 
 pression that may happen to be better known, as 
 " Decalogue," " ten commandments ;" or 2nd. Real, 
 which explains the nature of the Thing. These di- 
 visions are again divided into Essential and Acci-
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 81 
 
 dental ; and essential definition is further divided 
 into physical and logical, (or metaphysical.) 
 
 DEFINITION, Essential, one which assigns the consti- 
 tuent parts of the essence or nature ; either the real 
 parts of the essence, which are actually separable, as 
 if, in denning " Plant," you should enumerate the 
 leaves, stalks, roots, &c. which is a physical defini- 
 tion ; or the ideal parts, which are separable only 
 in the mind, as when a plant is defined to be " an 
 organized being, destitute of sensation," which is a 
 logical or metaphysical definition. N. B. A logical 
 definition must always consist of the genus and 
 differentia. 
 
 DEFINITION, Accidental, commonly called a Descrip- 
 tion; that definition of a thing which is given by 
 assigning to it the circumstances belonging to its 
 essence; viz. Properties and Accidents; (causes, 
 effects, &c.) E.G. "Barometer," "A machine for 
 measuring the weight of the atmosphere." " Bal- 
 loon," " A silken ball, filled with gas, which causes 
 it to rise into the air." " Lion," " The fiercest and 
 most noble of quadrupeds," &c. 
 
 DEFINITION, three principal Rules for. 1st. A defini- 
 tion must be adequate, i.e. neither too narrow nor 
 too extensive. If it be too narrow, you explain a 
 part instead of a whole; if too extensive, a whole 
 instead of a part. 2nd. It must be of itself clearer 
 (i.e. consist of ideas less complex) than the thing 
 defined. 3rd. It must be couched in just a suffi- 
 cient number of proper words. Proper is here 
 used in opposition to metaphorical, which class of 
 words is excluded on account of their vague and 
 indefinite nature. H
 
 82 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 DESCRIPTION, see DEFINITION ACCIDENTAL. 
 
 DESTRUCTIVE Conditional Syllogisms, No. 67. 
 
 DICTUM of Aristotle, De omni et nullo, No. 35. 
 
 DIFFERENCE, Differentia, a Predicable expressing the 
 distinguishing part of the essence of a species, 
 " Rational" is the Difference of " Man." It is predi- 
 cated in Qualequid, see SPECIES. 
 
 DIFFERENCE, Generic, the difference of a subaltern 
 genus, and which may be predicated of all the 
 subordinate species comprehended in that genus. 
 " Having sensation" is the generic difference of 
 " Animal." 
 
 DIFFERENCE, Specific, the difference of an infima 
 Species, and which may be predicated of all the 
 individuals contained under it. " Rationality" is 
 the specific difference of " Man." 
 
 DILEMMA, Nos. 72, 73. 
 
 DILEMMA, Simple Constructive, No. 74. 
 
 DILEMMA, Complex Constructive, No. 75. 
 
 DILEMMA, Destructive, No. 76, and note. 
 
 DISCOURSE, the same as REASONING. 
 
 DISJUNCTIVE Syllogisms, Nos. 69, 70, 71. 
 
 DISTRIBUTED, Meaning of, No. 16. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION, Rules concerning, No. 20. 
 
 DIVISION, in Logic, is a metaphorical expression, and 
 means the distinct enumeration of several things 
 signified by one common name. You reverse the 
 process of generalization, and add on, instead of 
 drawing off, the differences by which things are dis- 
 tinguished. Thus, " Tree" is logically divided into 
 " Oak," " Elm," " Poplar." There is this difference 
 between logical and physical division. (See INDI-
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY 83 
 
 VIDUAL.) In the former ,you may predicate the divided 
 whole of every dividing member. Thus, " Weapon" 
 may be predicated of " Sword," " Pike," " Gun." 
 This cannot happen in the case of physical division. 
 " Gun" cannot be predicated of "the Lock," " the 
 Stock," or " the Ban-el." 
 
 DIVISION, Rules for logical, are three. 1st, Each of the 
 parts, or any, short of all, must contain less (i. e. 
 have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 
 "Weapon" could not be a division of the term 
 " Sword." 2nd. All the parts together must be exactly 
 equal to the thing divided. In dividing the term 
 "Weapon," into " Sword," " Pike," " Gun," &c. we 
 must not omit any thing of which " Weapon," can 
 be predicated, nor introduce any thing of which it 
 cannot. 3rd. The parts or members must be opposed ; 
 i. e. must not be contained in one another. " Book" 
 must not be divided into " Quarto," " French," for 
 a French book may be a quarto, and a quarto, 
 French. N. B. You must always keep in mind the 
 Principle of Division, with which you set out; E.G. 
 whether you begin to divide books according to their 
 size, language, matter, &c. 
 
 ENTHYMEME, Nos. 80, 81. 
 
 EPICHIREMA, No. 89. 
 
 EQUIVALENTS, No. 90. 
 
 ESSENCE, the nature of any being, whether actually 
 existing or not ; " Snow" has an essence in summer ; 
 in winter, it has existence also. 
 
 EXPOSITA, what, No. 30. 
 
 EXTREMES, No. 7, and note, and No. 37, note. 
 
 FALLACY, an argument, or apparent argument, profcss- 
 
 H2
 
 84 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 ing to decide the matter at issue, while it really does 
 not. 
 
 FALLACIA ./EQUIVOCATIONIS, arising from the use of 
 an equivocal word ; E. G. " The dog is an animal ; 
 Sirius is the dog ; therefore Sirius is an animal." 
 See No. 37, Rule 3rd. 
 
 FALLACIA AMPHIBOLIC, or doubtful Construction; E. G. 
 " Quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit ; columna 
 tangitur a Socrate ; ergo columna sentit." In the 
 major proposition, " sentit" means " he, i. e. Socrates, 
 feels." In the conclusion, the same word means 
 " feels Socrates." See No. 37, Rule 1st. 
 
 FALLACIA COMPOSITIONIS, when what is proposed in a 
 divided sense is afterwards taken collectively; E. G. 
 " Two and three are even and odd ; five is two and 
 three ; therefore five is even and odd." See No. 37, 
 Rule 3rd. 
 
 FALLACIA DIVISIONIS, when what is proposed in a 
 collective, is afterwards taken in a divided sense ; 
 E. G. "The planets are seven; Mercury and Venus 
 are planets; therefore Mercury and Venus are 
 seven." See No. 37, Rule 3rd. 
 
 FALLACIA FIGURE DICTIONIS, when, from any simili- 
 tude between two words, what is granted of one is, 
 by a forced application, predicated of another ; as, 
 " Projectors are not fit to be trusted, therefore he 
 who has formed a project is not fit to be trusted " 
 See Dr. Whately's Logic, ch. iii. 8. 
 
 FALLACIA ACCIDENTIS, when what is accidental is con- 
 founded with what is essential ; E. G. " What you 
 bought you have eaten ; raw meat is what you 
 bought ; therefore raw meat is what you have
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY, 85 
 
 eaten." In the major proposition, " What you 
 bought" means as regards its Essence; in the minor, 
 as regards its Accidents. See No. 37, Rule 3rd. 
 
 FALLACIA A DICTO SECUNDUM QUID AD DICTUM SIM- 
 PLICITER, when a Term is at one time used in a 
 limited, at another, in an unlimited sense, as, " The 
 Ethiopian is white as to his teeth ; therefore he is 
 white." See No. 37, Rule 1st. 
 
 FALLACIA IGNORATIONIS ELENCHI, an argument that 
 indicates ignorance of the point in dispute ; an irre- 
 levant conclusion ; as if any one, to shew the inu- 
 tility of the art of Logic, should prove that men 
 unacquainted with it have reasoned well. 
 
 FALLACIA A NON CAUSA PRO CAUSA, which is divided 
 into Fallacia a non vera pro vera, and Fallacia a non 
 tali pro tali. E.G. " A comet has appeared, there- 
 fore there will be war." " What intoxicates should 
 be prohibited, and wine intoxicates." The abuse 
 of it does. In replying, you should deny the false 
 cause, or assign the true one. 
 
 FALLACIA CONSEQUENTS, when that is inferred which 
 does not logically follow; as, " He is an animal; 
 therefore he is a man." 
 
 FALLACIA PETITIONIS f^i^civn, (begging the Question,) 
 when that is assumed for granted, which ought to 
 have been proved ; as when a thing is proved by 
 itself, (called Petitio statim,) " He is a man, there- 
 fore he is a man ;" or by a Synonym, as, " A sabre 
 is sharp, therefore a cymetar is ;" or by any thing 
 equally unknown, as, " Paradise was in Armenia, 
 therefore Gihon is an Asiatic river ;" or by any thing 
 more unknoivn, as, " This square is twice the size of 
 this triangle, because equal to this circle ;" or by
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 discoursing in a circle, i. e. when the disputant tries 
 to prove reciprocally conclusion from premises, and 
 premises from conclusion ; as, " Fire is hot, therefore 
 it burns ;" and afterwards, " Fire burns, therefore 
 it is hot." 
 
 FALLACIA PLURIUM INIERROGATIONUM, when two or 
 more questions, requiring each a separate answer, 
 are proposed as one ; so that if one answer be given, it 
 must be inapplicable to one of the particulars asked ; 
 as, " Was Pisistratus the usurper and scourge of 
 Athens ?" The, answer " No" would be false of the 
 former particular, and " Yes" would be false of 
 the latter. This fallacy is overthrown by giving to 
 each particular a separate reply. 
 
 FALSE, strictly, denotes the quality of a proposition 
 which states a thing not as it is.- 
 
 FIGURES, Nos. 41 and 48. 
 
 GENERALIZATION, the abstracting or drawing off, in 
 thought, the points of dissimilitude between several 
 objects which resemble each other in some part of 
 their nature, and the assigning to them one common 
 name expressive of the particulars in which they 
 all agree. Thus, " Pigeon," " Wren," " Eagle," 
 " Cassowary," differ in shape, plumage, size, &c. but 
 agree in being all feathered creatures. They come, 
 therefore, under the general head of " Fowl," or 
 " Bird." 
 
 GENERIC DIFFERENCE, See DIFFERENCE. 
 
 GENERIC PROPERTY, See PROPERTY. 
 
 GENUS, aPredicable,expressing the common or material 
 part of the species of which it is affirmed. " Animal" 
 is the genus of " Man." It is said to be predicated 
 in Quid. See SPECIES.
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 87 
 
 GENUS, Proximum, one that is the next remove from 
 a species. " Animal " is the proximum genus 
 of " Man." " Living thing" is the more remote 
 genus. 
 
 GENUS, Subaltern, one that is a species, if viewed with 
 reference to a higher or more comprehensive genus ; 
 thus " Bird," the genus of nightingale, is a species 
 of animal. 
 
 GENUS, Summum, that which is not a species of any 
 higher genus. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL Propositions, See PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL Syllogisms, No. 63, 64, 76, 87. 
 
 IDEA, the picture or representation of an object in the 
 mind ; the result of apprehension. 
 
 ILLATIVE, Meaning of, No. 31. 
 
 ILLICIT PROCESS, No. 37, Rule 4. 
 
 IMPOSSIBLE MATTER, Nos. 18 and 19. 
 
 INDEFINITE PROPOSITION, See PROPOSITION. 
 
 INDIVIDUAL, that which is incapable of logical division, 
 (see DIVISION,) and can be only physically divided 
 into its parts. E.G. "Man," being a species, can 
 be logically divided into individuals, as " Homer," 
 " Virgil," " Milton ;" but these, being individuals, 
 can be divided only physically, viz. into their com- 
 ponent parts. 
 
 INDUCTION, No. 88. 
 
 INFER, to draw a conclusion from granted premises. 
 
 INFIMA SPECIES, See SPECIES. 
 
 INFINITANT PARTICLE, " Not." 
 
 JUDGMENT, a decision on the agreement or disagree- 
 ment of two objects. It is either affirmative or ne- 
 gative. See OPERATIONS.
 
 88 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 LOGIC, the science which analyzes the process of the 
 mind in reasoning; the art which lays down rules 
 to secure the mind from erroneous inferences. 
 (From \6yof, reason.) 
 
 MAJOR PREMISS, No. 37, Rule 2 ; No. 64. 
 
 MAJOR TERM, No. 37, Rule 1. 
 
 MATTER of a Proposition, what, No. 19. 
 
 MIDDLE TERM, No. 37, Rule 1. No. 1, Note. 
 
 MINOR PREMISS, No. 37, Rule 2. No. 64. 
 
 MINOR TERM, No. 37, Rulel. 
 
 MODAL SYLLOGISMS, Nos. 60, 61, 62. 
 
 MOODS, No. 40, No. 48. 
 
 NECESSARY MATTER, Nos. 18 and 19. 
 
 NEGATIVE TERM, See TERM. 
 
 OPERATIONS of the mind, concerned in argument are 
 three; viz. Simple Apprehension, Judgment, Dis- 
 course, (or Reasoning.) 
 
 OPPOSITE TERM, see TERM. 
 
 OPPOSITION of Propositions, Nos. 21, 22, 27. 
 
 OPPOSITION of Terms, See TERMS. 
 
 PARS DETERIOR, what, No. 38, Note. 
 
 POSITIVE TERM, See TERM. 
 
 PREDICABLE, See TERM COMMON. Every Predicable 
 expresses either the whole essence of its subject, viz. 
 the species ; or part of its essence, viz. the genus or 
 the difference ; or something joined to its essence, 
 viz. a property or an accident. 
 
 PREDICATE, No. 6. 
 
 PREMISS, a proposition employed to establish some 
 conclusion, No. 4. 
 
 PRIVATIVE TERM, See TERM. 
 
 PROBLEM, the same as QUESTION.
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 89 
 
 PROPERTY, a Predicable expressing something neces- 
 sarily joined to the essence of the whole species ; 
 whatever may be considered as the accompaniment 
 or result of the differentia. " Risibility" is the pro- 
 perty of " Man." Property is predicated in Quale. 
 See SPECIES. 
 
 PROPERTY, threefold division of. 1st, Universal and 
 peculiar ; as, the faculty of laughter or of speech, to 
 man. 2nd, Universal, but not peculiar; as, the 
 being a biped, to man. Every man is a bijwd, but 
 fowls are bipeds too. 3rd, Peculiar, but not uni- 
 versal, as, the being a philosopher, to man. Man 
 alone can be a philosopher, but every man is not one. 
 This third division, however, is more truly an ac- 
 cident. 
 
 PROPERTY, Generic, the property of a subaltern genus, 
 and which may be predicated of all the subordinate 
 species comprehended in that genus. " Voluntary 
 motion" is the generic property of " Animal." 
 
 PROPERTY, Specific, the property of an infima species, 
 and which may be predicated of all the individuals 
 contained under it. " Risibility" is the specific 
 property of " Man." 
 
 PROPOSITIO DE INESSE, what, No. 11, Note. 
 
 PROPOSITION, an act of judgment expressed in lan- 
 guage, See No. 6. 
 
 PROPOSITION, Affirmative, Nos. 11 and 14. 
 
 PROPOSITION, Categorical, (pure and modal,) Nos. 11 
 and 12. 
 
 PROPOSITION, Hypothetical, (conditional and disjunc- 
 tive,) Nos. 11 and 13. 
 
 PROPOSITION, Indefinite, No. 11, Note. No. 19.
 
 90 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 PROPOSITION, Negative, Nos. 11 and 14. 
 PROPOSITION, Particular, Nos. 11 and 15. 
 PROPOSITION, Singular, No. 11, Note. 
 PROPOSITION, Contrary, Nos. 22 and 27. 
 PROPOSITION, Subconlrary, Nos. 22 and 27. 
 PROPOSITION, Contradictory, Nos. 22, 23, and 27. 
 PROPOSITION, Subaltern, Nos. 22 and 27. 
 PROPOSITION, Universal, Nos. 11 and 15. 
 PROSYLLOGISM, No. 89. 
 PROVE, to adduce premises which establish the truth of 
 
 some conclusion. 
 
 QUALITY of a Proposition, No. 11. 
 QUANTITY of a Proposition, No. 1 1 . 
 QUESTION, the Proposition to be proved ; called, after 
 
 proof, the conclusion or inference. 
 REASONING, the act of proceeding from one judgment 
 
 to another, founded on, or the result of it. 
 REDUCTION, Ostensive, Nos. 52, 53, 56. 
 REDUCTION of Hypothetical Syllogisms, No. 79. 
 RELATIVE NOUN or TERM, See TERM. 
 
 SlGNIFICATE, No. 16. 
 
 SORITES, Nos. 82, 83, 84, 85, 86. 
 
 SORITES, Hypothetical, No. 87. 
 
 SPECIES, a Predicable expressing the whole essence of 
 several things ; as, " Man," A species of animal. It 
 is said to be predicated in Quid, \. e. to answer to the 
 question What? as, " What is that ?" Answ. "A 
 man.' 1 N.B. By adding the difference to the 
 genus, you make up the species. 
 
 SPECIES INFIMA, one that cannot be considered as the 
 genus of any thing, and contains under it only indi- 
 viduals. *' Man," is an infima species, containing 
 under it, Caesar, Aristotle, Thomas, &c.
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 91 
 
 SPECIES SUBALTERN, the same as subaltern genus ; i.e. 
 one that is a genus, if viewed with reference to the 
 species into which it is divisible. " Bird" is a 
 subaltern species, being a species of animal, and the 
 genus of nightingale. 
 
 SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE, See DIFFERENCE. 
 
 SPECIFIC PROPERTY, See PROPERTY. 
 
 SUBALTERN PROPOSITIONS, See PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 SUBALTERNANS, No. 24. 
 SUBALTERNATE, No. 24. 
 SUBCONTRARY PROPOSITIONS, See PROPOSITIONS. 
 
 SUBJECT, No. 6. 
 
 SUBSTANCE of a Proposition, No. 11. 
 
 SYLLOGISM, No. 2, No. 35. 
 
 SyLLOGisMs^DmMon of, viz.Categorical,into Pure and 
 Modal; Hypothetical, into Conditional and Dis- 
 junctive. No. 5. 
 
 SYLLOGISMS, Irregular, Nos.91, 92, 93, and 94. 
 
 SYLLOGISMS, Rules for ascertaining the validity of, 
 No. 37. 
 
 SYMBOLS of Quantity and Quality, No. 17, No. 45. 
 
 SYNCATEGOREMATIC WORD, or SYNCATEGOREM,(<rvy:rt- 
 Tt)yopk(, I predicate together with,) a word that can 
 form only part of a term. Such are the particles of 
 a language, and substantives in an oblique case. 
 Adjectives and participles are generally accounted 
 Syncategorems. 
 
 TERM, an act of apprehension expressed in language. 
 Also, the subject or predicate of a Proposition, No. 7. 
 
 TERM, Absolute, one that is considered by itself, and 
 conveys no idea of relation to any thing of which it 
 is a part, or to any other part distinguished from it.
 
 92 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 TERM, Abstract, denotes the quality of a being, without 
 regard to the subject in which it is ; as, "Justice," 
 " Height," " Wisdom." Abstract terms are nouns 
 substantive. 
 
 TERM, Common, such as stands for several individuals, 
 which are called its Significates ; as "Man," "City." 
 Such terms, and such only, can be affirmatively pre- 
 dicated of several others, and they are therefore 
 called Predicables. 
 
 TERMS, Compatible or Consistent, express two views 
 which care be taken of the same object, at the same 
 time, as, " White and Hard." 
 
 TERM, Complex. The same as PROPOSITION. 
 
 TERM, Concrete, denotes the quality of a being, and 
 either expresses, or must be referred to, some subject 
 in which it is ; as,"Fool," "Foolish," "High," "Wise." 
 Concrete Terms are usually, but not always, nouns 
 adjective. 
 
 TERMS, Contradictory Opposition of, when they differ 
 only in respectively wanting and having the par- 
 ticle " not," or its equivalent. One or other of 
 such terms is applicable to every object. 
 
 TERMS, Contrary, come both under some one class, 
 but are the most different of all that belong to 
 that class ; as, " Wise" and " Foolish," both coming 
 under the class of mental qualities. There are some 
 objects to which neither of such terms is applicable ; 
 a Stone, for instance, is neither wise nor foolish. 
 
 TERM, Definite, (finitum,) one which marks out an 
 object or class of beings ; as, " Ca;sar," " Corporeal." 
 Positive Terms are called definite.
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 93 
 
 TERM, Indefinite, (infinitum,) one which does not 
 mark output only exclude an object, as,"Not-G'aesar," 
 " Incorporeal." Privative and negative Terms are 
 called indefinite. 
 
 TERM, Negative, denotes that the positive view could 
 not be taken of the object ; it affirms the absence of 
 a thing from some subject in which it could not be 
 present ; as, " A dumb statue ;" (you could not say, 
 " A speaking one.") " A lifeless corpse ;" (you could 
 not say, " A living one.") N. B. The same term 
 may be negative, positive, or privative, as it is viewed 
 with relation to contrary ideas. Thus " Immortal" 
 is privative or negative, viewed with relation to 
 Death, and positive, viewed with relation to Life. 
 TERMS, Opposite, express two views which cannot 
 betaken of one single object at the same time; 
 as, " White and Black." 
 
 TERM, Positive, denotes a certain view of an object, as 
 being actually taken of it ; as, " Speech," " A man 
 speaking." 
 
 TERM, Privative, denotes that the positive view might 
 conceivably be taken of the object, but is not; 
 " Dumbness," " A man silent ;" (you might say, "A 
 man speaking.") "An unburied corpse ;" (you might 
 say, ' A buried one.") 
 
 TERM, Relative, that which expresses an object viewed 
 in relation to the whole, or to another part of a more 
 complex object of thought, as" Half" and "Whole," 
 " Master" and " Servant." Such nouns are called 
 Correlative to each other ; nor can one of them be 
 mentioned, without a notion of the other being raised 
 in the mind.
 
 94 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 
 
 TERM, Simple. The same as CATEGOREMATIC WORD. 
 
 TERM, Singular, such as stands for one individual, as 
 " Socrates," " London," " This man," " That city." 
 Such terms cannot be predicated affirmatively of 
 any thing but themselves. 
 
 UNDISTRIBUTED MIDDLE, No. 37, Rule 3. 
 
 UNIVERSALITY of a Proposition. A Proposition is me- 
 taphysically or matliematically universal, when the 
 predicate belongs, without any exception, to every 
 particular contained under the universal subject ; 
 as, " All circles have a centre and circumference." 
 It is physically universal, when it always agrees, 
 unless in the case of some unnatural exceptions ; 
 as, " All men are rational." It is morally universal, 
 when it agrees in most instances, but not necessarily, 
 or in the course of nature ; as, " All the Cretans are 
 liars." 
 
 WORDS, any combination of, making one complex 
 apprehension, is, in logic, & simple word; as, " I The- 
 
 hope-of-reward I lls~l I the-solace-of-labour. I " Every 
 Proposition consists of three simple Words, viz. 
 subject, copula, and predicate. 
 
 WORDS, Various divisions of the manner of employing ; 
 whence a word is called Univocal, Equivocal, Ana- 
 logous, of the first Intention, or of the second Inten- 
 tion. 
 
 WORDS, Univocal, such as are confined to one mean- 
 ing, and signify but one sort of idea ; E.G. " Book," 
 " Lance," " Tomb." 
 
 WORDS, Equivocal, such as signify two or more ideas ; 
 E. G. " Light," " Moor," " Pen," "Post."
 
 INDEX AND VOCABULARY. 95 
 
 WORDS, Analogous, such as signify two or more things 
 that have no resemblance in themselves, but stand in 
 a similar relation each to its respective object ; E.G. 
 " Hand," " Foot," " Sweet." As the human hand 
 points to any object to which we would direct the 
 attention, so does the hand of a clock point to the 
 hour. As the foot of an animal is the lowest part of 
 it, so is the foot of a mountain with relation to the 
 mountain, &c. 
 
 WORDS, of the first Intention, such as are used in their 
 vague and common acceptation ; thus " Needle" 
 signifies, in popular language, the little steel instru- 
 ment used in sewing. 
 
 WORDS, of the second Intention, those to which a more 
 precise and limited meaning is given, proper to some 
 particular art, science, or system ; thus " Needle" 
 means, in the language of navigation, the little steel 
 bar in the manner's compass.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 
 
 THE Respondent, in a Disputation, being always 
 supposed to maintain a true proposition, the argu- 
 ment of the Opponent, whose province it is to sup- 
 port the contradictory, must be presumed to be 
 founded on some fallacy. 
 
 If the respondent, upon trying his opponent's 
 objection in the form of a categorical syllogism, 
 should find that it offends against any one of the 
 six rules in No. 37, by pointing out such a viola- 
 tion, he overthrows the opponent's argument. 
 
 Should the objection be hypothetical, the res- 
 pondent must examine the connexion between an- 
 tecedent and consequent, (No.66,) and whether the
 
 98 APPENDIX. 
 
 two rules at No. 67 have been observed. The detec- 
 tion also of any violation of the rules for drawing 
 a conclusion from disjunctive propositions (Nos. 
 70, 71,) will destroy a fallacy so supported. 
 
 Fallacies that consist in a violation of the express 
 rules of logic are more palpable than those which 
 depend on the ambiguity of the middle term ; by 
 an ingenious application of which to the terms of 
 the question, (No. 37, Rule 1,) fallacies are very 
 generally introduced. 
 
 Most frequently, therefore, the first business of 
 the respondent is to examine the middle term of 
 his opponent's argument ; and ascertain whether, 
 in his comparison of it with the terms of his con- 
 clusion, he has used it in exactly the same sense in 
 both instances. The first and second intention of 
 words, their being employed sometimes in a literal, 
 and sometimes in a metaphorical, sense, with other 
 considerations arising from the various meanings 
 attached to the same, or similar, terms, afford a 
 wide scope for the exercise of fallacy, and call 'for 
 acuteness, both natural and acquired, to detect it, 
 if skilfully concealed. 
 
 The opponent has the choice of many points of
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 99 
 
 attack ; for if he prove that the proposition advanced 
 by the respondent appears at all inconsistent with 
 any part of the system he is defending, or at va- 
 riance with any received principle of truth, &c. or 
 expressed in terms of too extensive a latitude, by 
 driving the respondent to explain such a difficulty, 
 he has fairly executed his task. 
 
 The Cambridge argument now practised by the 
 opponent at a public disputation in the schools, 
 generally consists of three constructive conditional 
 syllogisms (No. 67.) The consequent (No. 65) in 
 the first syllogism, is always, " Cadit qusestio." If 
 the respondent should deny the consequence, (or 
 conclusion,) then the consequent of the second syl- 
 logism will be, " Valet consequentia ;" on the con- 
 trary, if he should deny the minor, (No. 64,) the 
 consequent of the second syllogism will be, "Valet 
 minor." If the respondent should deny the conse- 
 quence of the second syllogism, the consequent of 
 the third will be, " Valent consequentia et argu- 
 mentum ;" if he should deny the minor of the 
 second, the consequent of the third will be, "Valent 
 minor et argumentum." 
 
 Whichever proposition the respondent has de-
 
 100 APPENDIX. 
 
 nied, (whether it be the minor or consequence,) the 
 opponent, in his next syllogism, affirms to be valid ; 
 taking for the consequent of his major proposition, 
 " Valet minor," or " Valet consequential as the 
 case may be. 
 
 Should the argument consist of only two syllo- 
 gisms, the former will have for its consequent 
 " Cadit qusestio," and the latter, either " Valent 
 consequentia et argumentum," or " Valent minor 
 et argumentum," according to the previous denial 
 of the respondent. Should it consist of more than 
 three, all, except the last, will have their consequent 
 in the same manner as the second ; either " Valet 
 consequentia," or " Valet minor." The consequent 
 of the concluding syllogism is always, "Valent 
 consequentia et argumentum," or, " Valent minor 
 et argumentum." It is not, however, advisable to 
 use more than three syllogisms in constructing an 
 argument for a disputation. 
 
 It is the duty of the respondent, at the close of 
 each syllogism, either to concede or deny the minor 
 proposition, as circumstances may require. If it 
 be evidently true, he must, of course, concede it, 
 but deny the consequence ; viz. that its truth inva-
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. fOl 
 
 lidates the question he is maintaining ; " Concede 
 minorem, et nego consequentiam." If the minor 
 be false, or doubtful, he denies it, ("Nego mi- 
 norem,") and the opponent, on the other hand, 
 must endeavour to establish it by some unques- 
 tionable medium of proof. 
 
 The following examples, exhibiting arguments 
 of three, four, and two syllogisms, and shewing the 
 mode of proceeding, as the minor or consequence 
 may be denied in different places, will facilitate the 
 application of the above remarks. The Form of 
 the argument being at present the point for consi- 
 deration, unmeaning symbols have been substituted 
 for terms. 
 
 An Argument of three syllogisms, with the minor 
 ofthejirst denied. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 MAJOR PROPOS. 
 
 Antecedent. Consequent. 
 
 1. Si I A sit B, I I cadit qua;stio ; ! 
 
 MINOR PROPOS. 
 
 Sed A est B ; 
 
 CONSEQUENTS. 
 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Nego minorem.
 
 102 APPENDIX. 
 
 Pergit Dominus OPPONENS ad syllogismum secundum. 
 
 2. Si C sit D, valet minor ; 
 Sed C est D ; 
 
 Ergo valet minor. 
 
 RESPONBENS. 
 Concede minorem, et nego consequentiam. 
 
 Pergit OPPONENS ad sylloyismum tertium. 
 
 3. Si E sit F,valent consequentia et argumentum; 
 Sed E est F ; 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 An Argument of three syllogisms, with the minor 
 of the second denied. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 1. Si A sit B, cadit quaestio ; 
 Sed A est B ; 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Concedo minorem, et nego consequentiam. 
 
 OPPONENS pergit ad syllogismum secundum. 
 2. Si C sit D, valet consequentia ; 
 Sed C est D; 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Nego minorem.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 103 
 
 OPPONENS pergit ad syllogismum tertium. 
 3. Si E sit F, valent minor et arguinentum ; 
 
 Sed E est F ; 
 
 Ergo valent minor et argumentum. 
 
 An Argument of four syllogisms, with the minor 
 
 of the second denied. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 1. Si A sit B, cadit qusestio; 
 Sed A est B ; 
 
 Ergo cadit quoestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Concede minorem, et nego consequentiam. 
 
 Pergit OPPONENS. 
 
 2. Si C sit D, valet consequentia ; 
 Sed C est D ; 
 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Nego minorem. 
 
 Pergit OPPONENS. 
 
 3. Si E sit F, valet minor; 
 Sed E est F ; 
 
 Ergo valet minor. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Concedo minorem, et nego consequentiam. 
 
 Pergit OPPONENS. 
 
 4. Si G sit H, valent consequentia et argumentum ; 
 Sed G est H ; 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.
 
 104 APPENDIX. 
 
 N. B. If the minor of the third syllogism had 
 been denied, the consequent and conclusion of this 
 last syllogism would have been, " Valent minor et 
 argumentum." 
 
 An Argument of two syllogisms, with the minor of 
 
 the first denied. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 1. Si A sit B, cadit quaestio; 
 Sed A est B ; 
 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Nego minorem. 
 
 Pergit OPPONENS. 
 
 2. Si C sit D, valent minor et argumentum ; 
 Sed C est D ; 
 
 Ergo valent minor et argumentum. 
 
 Should the minor of a concluding syllogism be 
 false, the respondent does not say, " Nego minorem," 
 but proceeds at once to his reply. 
 
 The antecedent, as may be seen in the preceding 
 examples, is first enunciated in the subjunctive, or, 
 at least, conditionally ; then affirmed, in the minor 
 premiss, in the indicative mood, and the consequent 
 accordingly established. 
 
 It may happen, that the three conditional syllo- 
 gisms admit of being reduced to the form of a single
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 105 
 
 categorical syllogism; to the major, minor, and 
 conclusion of which they severally correspond. 
 But even in instances of this kind, it is not neces- 
 sary that the three conditional syllogisms should be 
 placed in the same order as the three propositions 
 of the categorical syllogism, if the opponent thinks 
 that, by a different arrangement, his sophism will 
 be the better concealed. 
 
 The three conditional syllogisms of an opponent's 
 argument, when they do not correspond with 
 the three propositions of a categorical syllogism, 
 would require, in order to be stated in form, to be 
 expanded into two or more categorical syllogisms. 
 
 In responding to an opponent, it is by no means 
 necessary to unfold in one's mind the objections he 
 has adduced into as many strict categorical syllo- 
 gisms as will lead to his conclusion ; for this would 
 often be a trifling and tedious process to the res- 
 pondent ; though it is highly desirable to possess 
 the skill that would enable him, if required, to go 
 through it. 
 
 Should the respondent, from the subtlety of his 
 opponent's sophism, or any other cause, experience 
 great difficulty in discovering the pith of the objec- 
 tion, the Moderator usually assists him, by re-
 
 106 APPENDIX. 
 
 stating the opponent's argument in a more lucid 
 and intelligible form ; and sometimes directing his 
 attention to the quarter in which the fallacy is 
 hidden. 
 
 It has been already stated to be the opponent's 
 province, should the respondent deny the minor of 
 his syllogism, to confirm it by some medium of 
 proof. This, in the Divinity School, is generally done 
 by an appeal to texts of Scripture ; which, it may be 
 observed, are commonly cited without being called 
 for by the respondent, as they often afford ground 
 for critical animadversion on the part of the pro- 
 fessor, and opportunity for a further trial of the 
 skill and knowledge of the disputants. 
 
 It is usual for the professor to call on the respon- 
 dent for an interpretation into Latin of the more 
 abstruse and difficult texts of the New Testament, 
 that may happen to be quoted by the opponent. 
 For citations from the Old Testament, the Vulgate 
 is employed.* 
 
 When the respondent has replied to the oppo- 
 nent's objection,the moderator occasionally demands 
 
 * A copy of the Greek New Testament, and of the Vulgate 
 version of the Old, are placed on the desk of the respon- 
 dent's rostrum.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 107 
 
 of the latter his own solution of the sophism he has 
 constructed. 
 
 The following is the form of a divinity Act, with 
 a specimen of the style of argumentation, as prac- 
 tised in the University of Cambridge. The com- 
 piler, in conformity with the principles laid down 
 in the preceding part of this manual, has, at the 
 bottom of the page, unfolded each argument in a 
 categorical form. 
 
 The preliminaries of a divinity act, the formula 
 of the prayers, the habit of the respondent, &c. are 
 detailed in the " Ceremonies of the University of 
 Cambridge," edited by H. Gunning, Esq. 
 
 Eveiy one about to keep a divinity act first sub- 
 mits to the Regius Professor three or four ques- 
 tions, which should be on some important doctrine 
 of the Christian religion, or leading article of the 
 Protestant faith. The professor having selected 
 one of these questions, the respondent (that is to 
 be) makes it the subject of a Latin thesis : the de- 
 livery of which ought not to occupy more than 
 half-an-hour.* 
 
 * The Church Articles supply suitable subjects for dis- 
 putation. A good list of questions that have been already 
 discussed is to be found in the Preface to Bishop Watson's 
 Theological Tracts.
 
 108 APPENDIX. 
 
 About ten days before the act is kept, the res- 
 pondent should wait on the professor, in order to 
 obtain of him the second question. This is always 
 chosen exclusively by the professor himself, who, 
 when the disputation is ended, delivers a thesis 
 (called a Determination) upon it. It is the pro- 
 vince of the respondent to answer the arguments 
 brought against both questions.* 
 
 * It is greatly to be regretted, that many clergymen, after 
 entering on the public duties of their office, should often 
 neglect to cultivate the advantages conferred ou them by a 
 University education. Not that it is desirable, or even de- 
 fensible, that a minister of the Gospel should employ much 
 of his time either in classical or philosophical researches j 
 but some familiarity with theological Greek and Latin might 
 fairly be expected of every divine, however arduous the du- 
 ties of his parish may be. It is incredible how much time 
 may be snatched for improvement out of the busiest and 
 most laborious life. Erasmus wrote his "Praise of Folly," 
 while travelling on horseback into Italy; "ne totum illud 
 tempus quo equo fuit insidendum, illiteratis fabulis terere- 
 tur." 
 
 No one who has discontinued for many years a moderate 
 cultivation of Greek and Latin, can proceed to the higher 
 degrees at the University, without disagreeable anticipations 
 of embarrassment and disgrace, in the attempt to hold a 
 public disputation. 
 
 The writings of Limborch may be very useful to any one 
 preparing for a divinity act.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 109 
 
 On the professor having ascended his rostrum, 
 he directs the respondent to begin : " Agas, Do- 
 mine." The respondent then says, " Oremus," and 
 pronounces the prayer "Actiones nostras," &c. 
 He afterwards proposes the questions thus : 
 
 " Qu&stiones sunt : (exempli gratia :) 
 
 \. ' Oblatio Christi scmel facto, perfecta redemptio 
 est.' 
 
 2. ' Fides justificans non potest d, bonis operibus dis- 
 
 As the question on which the respondent has 
 composed his thesis is always proposed first, he 
 then says, " De priori," and proceeds to deliver 
 his thesis. 
 
 When the thesis is concluded, the first opponent 
 is directed by the professor to ascend the rostrum : 
 " Ascendat opponentium primus." 
 
 The opponent then reads the two questions, as 
 the respondent had done before, and proceeds to 
 his arguments. 
 
 To give as clear an idea as possible of the manner 
 of opposing and responding, the discussion of the 
 first argument is here exhibited in the form of dia- 
 logue.
 
 110 APPENDIX. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 Contra priorem. 
 
 1. Si Divus Paulus Christum appellet, "Agnum 
 nostrum paschalem," cadit quaastio ; 
 
 Sed Divus Paulus Christum appellat, "Agnum nos- 
 trum paschalem ;" 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 Provoco ad priorem Pauli Epist. ad Corinth, cap. 5 to . 
 com. 7 ra . 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Concede minorem, et nego consequential!!. 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 2. Si agnus paschalis non esset sacrificium piaculare, 
 valet consequentia ; 
 
 Sed agnus paschalis non erat sacrificium piaculare ; 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Nego minorem. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 Provoco ad Exodi cap. 12 mum -comm. 13 tio - et 14 to - 
 unde apparet sacrificium paschale primitus institutum 
 fuisse in id tantum, ut, sanguine foribus asperso, ange- 
 lus vindex domos Israelitarum agnosceret, et illaesas 
 praeteriret ; et in saeculis subsecutis observatum fuisse 
 in id tantum, ut majorum suoram ex ^Egypto libe- 
 rationem Judaei commemorarent. 
 
 Si dominus respondens nunc concedat minorem, 
 necesse est consequentiam neget : et opponens per- 
 git ad syllogismum tertium.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. Ill 
 
 3. Si igitur neque mors Christ! sit sacrificium pia- 
 culare, valent consequentia et arguraentum ; 
 
 Sed igitur mors Christi non est sacrificium piacu- 
 lare; 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Constat turn agni paschalis mactationem,tum Christi 
 mortem, fuisse revera sacrificia. Hoc unum comparatio 
 ab Apostolo instituta requirit. Esto, agni paschalis 
 mactationem nihil piaculare habuisse ; Christi tamen 
 mors, quippe quae sacrificium sit, hactenus agni pas- 
 chalis mactationi respondet ; licet vim majorem habeat, 
 quia sacrificium est piaculare. 
 
 Si vero dominus respondens non concedat mi- 
 norem in syllogismo secundo, tune moderatoris 
 erit judicium suum interponere. Si ille existimet 
 minorem valere,opponentem j ubebit ad syllogismum 
 tertium pergere. Contra ea, si pronuntiet minorem 
 non valere,tunc domino opponenti nihil restat,nisi ut 
 det manus, et ad argumentum aliud novum pergat. 
 
 In hoc argumento dubitari potest, agni Paschalis 
 mactatio sacrificium piaculare fuerit, necne. Certe 
 sanguis foribus aspersus vim mali avertendi habuit, 
 ideoque efFectum quendam piacularem. Sed agni 
 mactatio, in saeculis posterioribus quotannis repe-
 
 112 APPENDIX. 
 
 tita, nullam aliam vim habere videtur nisi comme- 
 morativam.* 
 
 When the respondent has replied to the first 
 objection, the professor either signifies his appro- 
 bation of the answer, or suggests another more ap- 
 propriate and satisfactory. He then directs the 
 opponent to proceed to his next argument ; "Pro- 
 bes aliter." 
 
 Second Argument. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 1. Si doctrina de redemptione humana hoc funda- 
 rnento nitatur, scilicet, necesse fuisse ut Divinse justi- 
 tise pro hominum peccatis satisfieret, cadit qusestio. 
 
 * The conditional syllogisms of which this objection 
 consists, correspond with the three propositions of a regular 
 categorical syllogism, and it may be viewed as Celarent with 
 the premises transposed; "Christ was the paschal lamb; 
 the paschal lamb was not a piacular sacrifice ; therefore 
 Christ was not a piacular sacrifice." 
 
 Ce- The paschal lamb was not a piacular sacrifice ; 
 
 -la- Christ was the paschal lamb ; therefore 
 
 -rent. Christ was not a piacular sacrifice. 
 In the major proposition, the middle term (the paschal 
 lamb) is used in its primary and literal sense ; in the minor 
 proposition, in its secondary and metaphorical sense. It is 
 not, therefore, fairly compared with the terms of the con- 
 clusion or question. This is, " Fallacia aequivocationis." 
 After all, the truth of the major proposition admits of 
 doubt.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 113 
 
 Sed doctrina de redemptione humana hoc funda- 
 mento nititur ; 
 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 2. Si, ut hoc eificeretur, pcense peccatis humanis 
 debits in Christum translator fuerint, unum inter 
 omnes a peccati labe purum, valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed, ut hoc efficeretur, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 Provoco ad Esaiae cap. 53 tiu m. com. 6 to - et ad priorem 
 Petri Epistolam, cap. 2 do - com. 24 to - 
 
 3. Si vero justitia? proprium sit, pcenas non nisi de 
 nocentibus exigere, valent consequentia et argumen- 
 tum. 
 
 Sed justitias proprium est, &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.* 
 
 * The punishment of the innocent for the guilty, says 
 the opponent, being repugnant to the principles of justice, 
 could not have satisfied Divine justice for the sins of men. 
 The innocence and vicarious punishment of Christ being 
 supposed to be conceded, the objection, stated in form, will 
 appear thus : 
 
 Ce- What is irreconcileable with justice, cannot sa- 
 tisfy Divine justice. 
 
 -la- To inflict the punishment of guilt on the innocent, 
 is irreconcileable with justice; therefore 
 
 -rent. It could not satisfy Divine justice. 
 
 Under the moral government which God exercises here, 
 the innocent very frequently suffer for the guilty. If, then, 
 we allow the moral government and attributes of God, vica- 
 rious punishment and the Divine justice will no longer be 
 
 K
 
 114 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 E Sacris Scripturis hoc unum colligendum est de re- 
 demptione humana; scilicet Christi mortem hunc 
 effectum habuisse, ut homines a peccati poena libe- 
 raret. Quod rationi satis consentaneum est. Vi- 
 demus enim rerum naturam a Divino Opifice et Rec- 
 tore ita constitutam, ut plurima nobis contingantbene- 
 ficiaaliorumope, qui seepe incommodavolentessubeunt, 
 in id tan turn ut nos adjuvent. Nihiligitur objicipotest 
 contra doctrinam de redemptione humana in Sacris 
 Scripturis traditam, quod non pan jure contra quoti- 
 dianum rerum humanarum et Divinae providentise 
 ordinem adhibeatur. 
 
 Third Argument. 
 
 1. Si Divus Paulus doceat coenam Dominicam idem 
 esse Christianis quod epulae sacrificales turn Judseis 
 turn Ethnicis, cadit quaestio. 
 
 Sed Divus Paulus docet, &c. 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 Provoco ad 1 Cor. x. 16 21. 
 
 2. Si igitur ccena Domini sit epulum ex oblatis, valet 
 consequentia. 
 
 Sed co3na Domini est, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 considered incompatible. The minor premiss of the cate- 
 gorical syllogism will be denied, in this case, to be uni- 
 versally true.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 115 
 
 3. Si igitur oblatio Christi ssepius repetatur, valent 
 consequentia et argumentum. 
 Sed oblatio Christi, &c. 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.* 
 
 * This argument may be stated categorically, thus, in 
 three syllogisms. 
 
 1. 
 
 Bar- What a sacrificial feast was to the Jews and Hea- 
 thens, is what the Lord's Supper is to Christians ; 
 -ba- A feast upon propitiatory offerings is what a sacrifi- 
 cial feast was to the Jews and Heathens ; there- 
 fore 
 
 -ra. A feast upon propitiatory offerings is what the Lord's 
 Supper is to Christians. 
 
 2. 
 Bar- A Christian propitiatory offering is the oblation of 
 
 Christ ; 
 
 -ba- What takes place in the Lord's Supper is a Chris- 
 tian propitiatory offering ; therefore 
 -ra. What takes place in the Lord's Supper, is the obla- 
 tion of Christ. 
 
 3. 
 Bar- What takes place in the Lord's Supper is frequently 
 
 repeated j 
 -ba- The propitiatory oblation of Christ is what takes 
 
 place in the Lord's Supper ; therefore 
 -ra. It is frequently repeated. 
 
 The middle term of the first syllogism is here taken in 
 
 different senses in the major and minor premiss. In the 
 
 major premiss, it means what a sacrificial feast was, with 
 
 regard to one particular, (viz. communion with the Deity,) 
 
 K2
 
 116 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 Non docet Paulus coenam Dominicam prorsus idem 
 esse Christianis quod Judseis atque Ethnicis Epulse 
 sacrificales. Affirmat quandam esse similitudinem, et 
 hac tantum parte, quod insit utrique sacrificantium 
 communicatio cum numine. Nee comparatio arctius 
 premenda est. Apostolus non affirmat Christianos, in 
 Eucharistia celebranda, et Ethnicos, in Epulis sacrifi- 
 calibus, in hoc similiter agere, quod oblatis vescantur ; 
 sed quod et Christian! vero cum Deo, et Ethnici cum 
 idolis suis, religiosam communicationem instituant. 
 
 Fourth Argument. 
 
 This and the following argument are against 
 the second question, according to the rules for 
 keeping a first opponency. 
 
 Contra Secundam. 
 
 1. Si fides justificationem antecedat, cadit quajstio. 
 Sed fides justificationem antecedit; 
 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 2. Si opera qualiacunque ante justificationem per- 
 acta rationem peccati habeant, valet consequentia. 
 
 and thus, in that particular, it agrees with the major term ; 
 in the minor premiss, it is taken simply, and thus, in 
 another particular, (viz. its propitiatory character,) it agrees 
 with the minor term. It is not, therefore, fairly compared 
 with the terms of the conclusion. This may be referred to 
 " Fallacia a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum sicipliciter."
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 117 
 
 Sed opera qualiacunque, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 3. Si igitur fides qua justificationem consequimur, 
 existere possit a bonis operilms disjuncta, valent conse- 
 quentia et argumentum. 
 
 Sed fides qua, &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.* 
 
 * The opponent contends, that as justifying faith pre- 
 cedes justification, and all works before justification are 
 sinful, therefore justifying faith may exist apart from good 
 works. The formal statement of this argument requires 
 four categorical syllogisms. 
 
 1. 
 
 Ce- Works that have in them the nature of sin are not 
 
 good works ; 
 -la- All works done before justification have iu them 
 
 the nature of sin ; therefore 
 -rent. No works done before justification are good works. 
 
 2. 
 
 Bar- Whatever is preceded by justification is preceded 
 
 by what precedes justification ; 
 
 -ba- Good works are preceded by justification ; therefore 
 -ra. They are preceded by what precedes justification. 
 
 3. 
 
 Bar- What precedes justification precedes good works. 
 
 (Equipollent to the conclusion of the last.) 
 -ba- Faith precedes justification ; therefore 
 -ra. It precedes good works.
 
 1 18 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 Cogitatione sola distingui possunt fides et opera 
 bona. Fides fons est, opera bona sunt fluenta ; fides 
 causa, opera bona effectus. Simul ac fides existat, 
 justificatio incipit, nullaque mora interposita, subse- 
 quuntur opera bona. Ut sol igitur ante radios solares, 
 ita fides ante opera bona ; sed fide existente, opera 
 bona proveniant necesse est. Neque magis disjungi 
 possunt a fide, quam lux a sole. 
 
 Fifth Argument. 
 
 1. Si operanti merces tribuatur non ex gratia sed 
 ex debito, cadit quaestio. 
 Sed operanti merces, &c. 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 Provoco ad Rom. iv. 4. 
 
 4. 
 
 Bar- Whatever precedes good works is distinct from 
 them; 
 
 -ba- Justifying faith precedes good works; therefore 
 
 -ra. It is distinct from them. 
 
 Faith may be separated from good works only in thought. 
 Faith is the fountain-head; good works, the streams that 
 ffow from it. Faith is the cause ; good works, the effect. 
 As soon as there is faith, justification begins, and good 
 works immediately follow. As, therefore, the sun must 
 have existed before the sunbeams, so faith must be previous 
 to good works. But if there be faith, good works are of 
 necessity produced ; nor can they any more be separated 
 from faith, than light can be parted from the sun.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 119 
 
 2. Si vero justificatio, quam per fidem consequimur, 
 sit ex gratia, valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed justificatio, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 Provoco ad Rom. iv. 5. 
 
 3. Si igitur opera bona, cum ea, qua justificamur, 
 fide uihil commune habeant, valent consequentia et 
 argumeutum. 
 
 Sed opera bona, &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.* 
 
 * The reward of him who works, says the opponent, is 
 shewn in Scripture to be not of grace, but of debt. But 
 our reward, viz. Justification by faith, is proved by Scrip- 
 ture to be of grace ; therefore it cannot be the reward of 
 him who works, nor is justifying faith connected with good 
 works. This argument, in order to be formally stated, re- 
 quires, like the last, four categorical syllogisms. 
 
 1. 
 
 Ce- That which is of debt is not of grace ; 
 -la- The reward of him who works is of debt ; therefore 
 -rent. It is not of grace. 
 
 2. 
 
 Ce- What is of grace, is not the reward of him who 
 
 works. 
 
 (Converse of the conclusion of the last syllogism, E.) 
 -la- Justification by faith is of grace ; therefore 
 -rent. It is not the reward of him who works.
 
 120 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 Fateudum est, justificationem nostram Diviua ex 
 gratia solummodo concessam esse ; non autem scqui- 
 
 3. 
 
 Ce- What is not the reward of him who works, has no 
 connexion with good works ; 
 
 Predicate. 
 
 -la- Justification by faith is I not-the-reward-of-him- 
 
 who-works ; I therefore 
 -rent. It has no connexion with good works. 
 
 4. 
 
 Ce- The instrumental cause of justification has no 
 more connexion with good works, than justifica- 
 tion itself has ; 
 
 la- Justifying faith is the instrumental cause of justi- 
 fication ; therefore 
 -rent. It has no more connexion with good works than 
 
 justification itself has. 
 
 The major proposition of the third syllogism is unduly 
 assumed. That which is not the reward of works may yet 
 have connexion with them in other respects. Though jus- 
 tification is a favour, not a reward of works, yet works may 
 be required as a condition of justification ; and in this re- 
 spect they may be inseparably connected. This circum- 
 stance does not diminish our debt of gratitude to God, to 
 whose grace, as the efficient cause, all spiritual blessings are 
 ascribable. 
 
 They who object to call good works, "Conditions of 
 salvation," may term them, the necessary fruits of the faith 
 whereby we obtain salvation ; although salvation itself must 
 be accounted a gratuitous benefit of God.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 121 
 
 tur, licet bona opera pro causa justificationis non La- 
 benda sint, nihil esse inter fidem et bona opera com- 
 mune. Fieri enim potest, quod Sacra; Scripturae rcvera 
 decent, ut opera bona sint conditiones salutis, quam 
 tamen Divinae gratia;, quasi causa; efficienti,acceptam 
 referre debemus. 
 
 Si nolis opera bona conditiones salutis appellari, tune 
 ea licet appelles, fructus necessarios fidei illius qua 
 salutem consequimur ; cum tamen salus ipsa sit Dei 
 beneficium gratuitum. 
 
 The opponent, when his last argument has been 
 answered by the respondent, descends from the 
 rostrum upon the moderator thus dismissing him ; 
 " Satis disputasti." 
 
 ACTS IN THE CIVIL LAW. 
 
 Before keeping an Act in the Civil Law, the 
 student submits, to the Regius Professor in that 
 faculty, a few questions, that he may fix on one of 
 them as a fit subject for a Latin thesis.* 
 
 * A candidate for the degree of LL.B. must submit to 
 the Professor the question he means to write upon, at least 
 one term before the aet is kept. A candidate for the de- 
 gree of LL.D. must do the same at least two terms pre- 
 viously to his act.
 
 122 APPENDIX. 
 
 A second question is also chosen by the professor 
 exclusively, who reads a Determination on it, when 
 the disputation is finished. 
 
 On the day of the exercise, the respondent 
 having occupied his rostrum, and the professor 
 being seated, the Father of the respondent's college 
 directs him to begin : " Domine respondens, 
 agas." 
 
 The following is a copy of the printed questions proposed 
 by the Professor in his examination paper of the present 
 year. Other questions in MS. are also given to each stu- 
 dent, according to the nature of the subjects proposed for 
 discussion in the Schools. 
 
 1. Explain the nature and utility of syllogisms in general. 
 
 2. Explain the nature of the syllogisms used in the law 
 schools. 
 
 3. State an instance of a Dilemma in favour of your first 
 question from 
 
 4. Prove your first question to be true by Induction from 
 
 5. Form an argument in two hypothetical syllogisms, in 
 favour of your first question, from 
 
 6. Form, in Latin, an argument m three hypothetical syl- 
 logisms, against your first question, from 
 
 7. Form, in Latin, an argument against your second 
 question, in three hypothetical syllogisms, from 
 
 Let the minor of the second syllogism be false. 
 
 8. Make a short statement, in English, of your first 
 question. 
 
 9. Make a short statement, in Latin, of your second 
 question.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 123 
 
 The respondent then proposes the questions, 
 placing that first on which his thesis is written. 
 
 Except when an opponency is kept for a Doctor's 
 degree, the Regius Professor is himself both oppo- 
 nent and moderator. He produces as many argu- 
 ments against each question as he thinks proper, 
 in the form of syllogism already explained. 
 
 It is the office of the respondent (as in the Divi- 
 nity School) to defend each question by an appro- 
 priate answer to the objections adduced by the op- 
 ponent. 
 
 If the answer of the respondent be satisfactory to 
 the professor, he signifies his approbation, and pro- 
 ceeds, in the capacity of opponent, to propose his 
 next argument. But if the answer of the respon- 
 dent be erroneous or inconclusive, the professor 
 (departing for the time from the character of op- 
 ponent) points out to the respondent the true solu- 
 tion of the difficulty : and this he does, not only 
 for the advantage of the respondent but, for the in- 
 struction of the auditors frequenting the law-school, 
 the majority of whom attend there expressly with 
 a view to prepare themselves for responding in a 
 disputation.
 
 124 APPENDIX. 
 
 In the course of the act, the professor, at his 
 discretion, tries the ability of the respondent, by in- 
 terrogatories on such subjects as are connected with 
 the question. 
 
 The following is a specimen of the nature of the 
 questions discussed, jfnd of the manner of arguing 
 against them. The student may easily collect, from 
 the references,* the nature and force of the argu- 
 
 Qutestiones sunt: 
 
 1. Decemviri creditoribus in debitorcs jus vita alque 
 necis non dederunt. 
 
 2. Romani primos Christianas non ideb pcrsecuti 
 sunt, quia ccetus nocturnos celebrabant. 
 
 Contra priorem. 
 
 1. Si in lege Decemvirali de debitore, poena capitis 
 non nisi de ultimo supplicio est accipienda, cadit 
 
 Sed in lege Decemvirali, &c. 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 2. Si dominis in servos jus erat vita; atque uecis, 
 valet minor. 
 
 * A copy of the Corpus Juris Civilis, is placed on the 
 rostrum of the respondent, and another on that of the 
 opponent.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 125 
 
 Sed clominis in servos, &c. 
 Ergo valet minor. 
 
 3. Si aeris convict! jure Decemvirali in servitutem 
 redigebantur, valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 Sed aeris convicti, &c. 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 The opponent then refers the respondent to the 
 following authorities in confirmation of his argu- 
 ment, and it is the duty of the respondent to make 
 his answer. 
 
 Ins. 1.8. 1. 
 
 D. 1.5.5. 
 
 Matt. 18. 25. 
 
 Liv. Hist. 6. 14. 
 
 Contra alteram. 
 
 1. Si causa persecutionum quibus primi Christian! 
 vexabantur, aut ab ipsa Christi religions aut ex 
 quadam ratione civili petenda est, cadit quaastio. 
 
 Sed causa persecutionum, &c. 
 Ergo cadit qusstio. 
 
 2. Si Roman! omnibus fere gentibus suam religio- 
 neni et suos ritus celebrare permitterent, valet conse- 
 quentia. 
 
 Sed Romani, &c. 
 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 3. Si igitur necesse est tit quaedam ratio civilis eos 
 excitaret ad Christianos v.exandos, valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed necesse est ut, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia.
 
 126 APPENDIX. 
 
 4. Si ista ratio fuit metus ne quid detrimenti caperet 
 respublica, valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 Sed ista ratio fuit, &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 Tac. Annal. 1, 73. 
 
 xii. Tab. 
 
 Leg. Gab. 
 
 SCT Marc. 
 
 D. 47, 22, 1. 
 
 D. 47, 11,2. 
 
 In the progress of this argument, the opponent 
 might, if occasion required, refer to the sacred 
 Scripture, as well as to the authorities above men- 
 tioned. 
 
 The respondent's answer will be suggested partly 
 from his own interpretation of these authorities 
 cited by the opponent, and partly from his own 
 view of the question in general. 
 
 ACTS IN MEDICINE. 
 
 A medical thesis may be composed on any prac- 
 tical, physiological, or pathological question. It 
 must be of such a length as not to consume more 
 than half-an-hour in the delivery.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 127 
 
 For the degree of M. B. the question must be 
 submitted to the professor, for his approval, six 
 weeks before the act is kept ; and, for the degree of 
 M. D., three months before. 
 
 The respondent has to defend two questions, of 
 which one is appointed exclusively by the professor; 
 as in the case of a Divinity Act. 
 
 The professor does not restrict the opponent from 
 extending the number of his arguments, if he 
 pleases ; but he must not produce fewer than five 
 in 'all ; i. e. three against the first question, and two 
 against the second. Each of these arguments may 
 consist of two, three, or four syllogisms. 
 
 There is but one opponent ; and if the act be 
 kept for a Doctor's degree, the opponent is most 
 frequently the professor himself. 
 
 The forms of keeping an act in Medicine, cor- 
 respond with those observed in keeping an act in 
 the civil law. 
 
 In a medical disputation, it does not always 
 happen that the respondent maintains the position 
 which the moderator holds to be true. The truth 
 may appear on the opponent's side, and the decision 
 be accordingly given in his favour. The following, 
 however, are specimens in which the position main- 
 tained is true, and the objections fallacious.
 
 128 APPENDIX. 
 
 Quaestioncs sunt: 
 
 1 . Ventcsectio primum et prcccipuum rcmedium cat 
 Enteritidis. 
 
 2. Bills e sanguine venoso secernitur. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 Contra priorem. 
 
 1. Si intestinorum inflammatio ab alvo diu astricta 
 et suppressa ssepe orlatur, cadit qua;stio. 
 
 Sed intestinorum &c. saspe oritur ; 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Concede intestinorum inflammationem cum alvo diu 
 astricta saepius conjunctam esse, et aliquando ex hac 
 origine exortam. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 2. Si alvum solvere et purgare primum et prxcipuum 
 sit hujus mali remedium, valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed alvum solvere, &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Concede quoque maximi esse moment! ut alvus as- 
 stricta solvatur. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 i 
 
 3. Si igitur intestinorum inflammatio ab alvo 
 aBtricta orta, optime curetur medicamentis purgantibus, 
 valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 Sed intestinorum inflammatio, &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 129 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 In hoc morbo res niaximi momenti est ut depellatur 
 inflammatio, id quod optime per venccsectionem 
 efiicitur. Animadvertendum quoque medicamenta 
 purgantia ssepe vim suam non exerere, nisi post de- 
 tractionem sanguinis. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 Contra alteram. 
 
 1. Si in omni alia glandula corporis, praBterquam 
 hepate, secretio humoris fiat e sanguine arterioso, 
 cadit qusestio. 
 
 Sed in onini &c. 
 Ergo cadit quaestio. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 
 Concedo minorem et nego consequential!!. 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 2. Si in rebus obscuris investigandis con Mere 
 necesse sit coniparatiom similitudinis vcl analogic, 
 valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed in rebus obscuris &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 RESPONDENS. 
 Concedo minorera &c. 
 
 OPPONENS. 
 
 3. Si igitur ab hac comparatione concludendum 
 sit, ut bilis e sanguine arterioso secernatur, valent 
 consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 Sed ab hac comparatione &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum.
 
 130 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESPONDENT 
 
 Argumento domini opponentis refragatur quidem 
 analogia, quum jecori, quod bilem secernit, sanguis 
 venosus suppeditetur, (ex Vena Portarum scilicet,) 
 simili modo quo cseteris glandulis sanguis arteriosus, 
 ex arteriis suis. 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 ACTS IN THE SCHOOL OF ARTS. 
 
 The Preliminaries of these Acts are, of necessity, 
 well known to all who are concerned in keeping 
 them. No one can oppose or respond in the School 
 of Arts, till he has resided seven Terms in the 
 University. A particular introduction to the 
 following questions would, therefore, be superflu- 
 ous. 
 
 QucBstiones sunt: 
 
 1. Recte statuit Newtonus in nona sua sectione libri 
 primi. 
 
 2. Recte sese habent Principia Calculi turn Differen- 
 tialis turn Integralis. 
 
 3. Recte statuit Paleius de Virtute. 
 
 Contra primam. 
 
 1. Si cum spiralis reciproca in antecedentia revol- 
 vatur eadem velocitate angulari qua corpus in conse- 
 quentia movetur, orbita in fixo spatio descripta fiat
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 131 
 
 linea recta in qua corpus motu uniform! ad centrum 
 accedit, cadit quaestio. 
 
 Sed cum &c. **** fit &c. *** accedit; 
 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 2. Si cum vis in spirali reciproca varietur -L, et 
 virium differentia in orbita quiescente et in orbita in 
 fixo spatio descripta varietur similiter ^, consequens 
 sit totam vim in orbita in fixo spatio descripta variari 
 ~, valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed cum vis, &c. * *'* * consequens est &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 3. Si vero cum vis varietur ^, corpus nequeat in 
 recta linea ad centrum descendere motu uniform!, 
 valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 Sed cum &c. * * * * nequit &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumeutum. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 Differentia virium centripetarum et centrifugarum 
 in orbita in fixo spatio descripta, eadem est ac in orbita 
 quiescente. Sed in spirali reciproca vires centripeta 
 et centrifuga sequales sunt. Ergo in recta linea qua; in 
 fixo spatio describitur aequales sunt ; ideoque corpus 
 nulla vi impulsum velocitate prima ad centrum 
 uniformiter accedit. 
 
 The first opponent produces two other similar 
 arguments against the first question. 
 Contra secundam. 
 
 1. Si inter limites x=a, x=b I ii&th.l. ., ca- 
 
 J x b 
 
 dit qusestio.
 
 132 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sed inter limites &c. 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 2. Si inter eosdem limites f x n ~\lx fiat ( ! 
 
 J 
 valet consequentia. 
 
 Sed inter &c. 
 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 c,. . . , rdx a b" 1 I 
 
 3. 01 igitur cum n=o, / nat - , sou - , 
 
 'J x o ' o ' 
 
 o, valent consequentia et argumentuin. 
 Sed cum &c. 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentuin. 
 
 KESPONSUM. 
 
 n+l~^ * n'+ikc. 
 
 . . a" 6 | A. 1. ah. I. b j . n-f&c. 
 
 -& C . ) 
 
 . - = A./, a A./. 6 
 
 =*.'- 
 
 Ergo valor fractionis ^ cum n=o non evanescit, 
 sed fit A. I. g ideoque nulla discrepantia existit. 
 
 The first opponent produces one other similar 
 argument against this question.
 
 ON ACADEMICAL DISPUTATION. 133 
 
 Contra tertiam. 
 
 1. Si Dei voluntas sit virtutis regula, cadit qusestio. 
 Sed Dei voluntas est, &c. 
 
 Ergo cadit qusestio. 
 
 2. Si Dei voluntas ideo nos astviugat quia prsemia 
 pajna;que vitae futurse ex Dei arbitrio pendent, valet 
 consequentia. 
 
 Sed Dei voluntas &c. 
 Ergo valet consequentia. 
 
 3. Si igitur, posito quod angelorum malorum prin- 
 ceps summo rerum iinperio potitus esset, voluntas 
 ejus nos pan jure astringeret, valent consequentia et 
 argumentum. 
 
 Sed, posito quod &c. 
 
 Ergo valent consequentia et argumentum. 
 
 RESPONSUM. 
 
 Ut alia taceam, Deus homines felices vult ; ange- 
 lorum malorum princeps, miseros ; huic ut resistamus, 
 illi ut obediamus, ratio et natura suadent. Priusquam 
 angelorum malorum princeps hominum felicitatem 
 velle possit, naturam suam se exuat necesse est. 
 
 Against the third question one argument only 
 is produced. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 
 
 TJ 
 
 . 
 
 '
 
 HENRY G. BOHN, 
 
 mow OF 
 No. 4, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN, 
 
 HAS JUST PUBLISHED 
 
 A CATALOGUE 
 
 OF 
 
 A VERY CHOICE COLLECTION OF BOOKS, 
 
 ENGLISH AND FOREIGN, 
 
 Partly selected during an extensive tour on the Conti- 
 nent, partly from fine private libraries in this country : 
 the whole offered at very moderate prices. The 
 Catalogue comprehends above 4,000 articles of the 
 first quality, in every department of literature^ 
 especially the fine arts, divinity, classics, and rare 
 books, a great portion of them in rich old morocco 
 bindings by De Rome, Desseuil, and Padeloup. 
 Among the black letter and Aldine editions are many 
 that have never before been heard of, and the Spanish 
 collection is the best in this country. The price of the 
 catalogue is 3s., but gentlemen sending their names, 
 and the country trade applying free of postage, may 
 obtain it gratis. It is particularly requested that the 
 address be observed.

 
 ' tf s t 
 
 i,-*U f. 

 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILIT 
 
 000 023 044 1