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THE RECIPROCITY TREATY 
 
 HAWAII 
 
 SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 AGAINST ITS ABROGATION 
 
 WITH 
 
 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TREATY. 
 
 BY 
 
 GEO. S. (BOUT WELL, 
 
 Counsel to Hawaiian Legation. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 JUDD & DETWEILER, PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS. 
 1886. 
 
THE RECIPROCITY TREATY 
 
 H AWAI I 
 
 SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 AGAINST ITS ABROGATION 
 
 WITH 
 
 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TREATY. 
 
 BY 
 
 GEO. S. BOUTWELL, 
 
 l\ 
 
 Counsel to Hawaiian Legation. 
 
 WASHINGTON : 
 
 JUDD & DETWEILER, PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS. 
 1886. 
 
HP/73 
 6 
 
 INDEX TO APPENDICES. 
 
 I'A'tK. 
 
 Keport of House Committee on Foreign Aifairs, 1883, . . . 
 
 Report of commission to investigate alleged frauds under Hawaiian Reciprocity 
 
 Treaty, . . . .11 
 
 Extract from report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1883, . . .17 
 
 Extract from letter of the Hawaiian Minister, . . . . . 1!) 
 
 Extract from letter of the Secretary <>f State to Senate Committee on Foreign 
 
 Relations, ......... 
 
 Report of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1884, .... 
 
 Letter of American Minister at Honolulu, with table, showing ownership of 
 
 Hawaiian plantations, ...... . :{() 
 
 Statement of political value of treaty, . . . . . .31 
 
 Abstract of Hawaiian and New York laws regarding labor. . . i 
 
RECIPROCITY TREATY WITH HAWAII. 
 
 No measure ever had stronger or higher endorsement by states- 
 men of both political parties of the United States than the Recipro- 
 city Treaty between Hawaii and the United States. It opened a very\ 
 profitable trade to citizens of the United States, more particularly of 
 California, creating a free market for productions and manufactures i 
 of the United States, ranking third in importance to the trade of 
 San Francisco, leading to the building of between forty and fifty 
 vessels, steam and sailing, in American ship-yards, and their constant 
 employment till one-fourth of all the arrivals and departures of vessels 
 under the American flag in foreign trade to and from San Francisco are 
 engaged in that trade. It led to the building of large sugar re- 
 fineries in San Francisco to supply the Pacific slope and contiguous 
 territories with refined sugar, to a profitable investment of American ; 
 capital in planting commercial, banking, and trading enterprises in 
 Hawaii and California to an amount of over thirty millions of dollars, 
 and all of this without injury to any other American interest. The ' 
 amount of sugar upon which these enterprises depend 80,000 to 
 90,000 tons does not amount to (7 %) seven per cent, of the con- 
 sumption of the United States, and a commission of investigation 
 have shown that 100,000 tons would be the maximum production 
 of the islands. 
 
 The treaty gives profitable employment to the laboring classes in 
 Hawaii, aids the prosperous development of that kingdom, makes 
 permanent its political independence, and thus saves the United 
 States from the serious complications which would arise from any 
 attempt on the part of any other power to establish itself in those 
 islands. 
 
 These results would not seem of themselves to constitute a valid 
 reason for the abrogation of the treaty. But while the treaty could 
 make possible these benefits, it could not regulate the distribution of 
 the profits, which depended, as a matter of course, upon the enterprise, 
 vigor, and perception of the individuals who first availed themselves 
 of its advantages, and it was not provided that it should terminate 
 for the reason that American citizens found it profitable. 
 
 The rivalries, jealousies, and sharp competitions of trade, how- \ 
 ever, have led to charges against and opposition to, the treaty itself ; 
 
 M152378 
 
which, though groundless and wrong, have once imposed on a com- 
 mittee of the House of Representatives. (See Appendix A.) 
 
 That committee, however, did not recommend abrogation, as it 
 recognized the great national interests involved and the importance 
 of the treaty to the country in the future development of the com- 
 merce of the Pacific. It only recommended investigation of the 
 alleged " evils" to see if amendments were desirable. 
 
 An investigation was ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 Hon. Chas. J. Folger, who appointed a commission of inquiry, which 
 reported that the allegations against the treaty were groundless. 
 (See Appendix B.) Mr. Folger, in his report as Secretary of the 
 Treasury for 1883, alluded to the commission and its report which 
 (see Appendix C), showed how the committee had been misled. The 
 report was not regarded as wholly fair by Hawaiian officials, as is 
 shown by a letter of the Hawaiian minister in transmitting it to his 
 government, a part of which was published in the Hawaiian papers. 
 (See Appendix D.) 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury shows that many classes of Amer- 
 ican citizens are benefited by the treaty. It should be remembered 
 that American goods are made free of duty in Hawaii by the treaty 
 while goods of other nations are subject to duty. Allusion is made 
 by him to a monopoly in sugar which then existed in California as 
 not being a result of the treaty. That monopoly no longer exists; 
 on the contrary, there is in San Francisco at the present time a 
 " sugar war between the rival refineries, which has reduced the price 
 of sugar to " a point cheaper than ever before. 
 
 Efforts are being again made to procure the abrogation of the 
 treaty, and much stress is laid upon the loss of revenue to the United 
 States, which is figured (at an exaggerated rate) upon the duties 
 which would be leviable upon the grades and quantities of sugar 
 imported under the present favorable conditions of trade. It would 
 seem more fair to take, as a basis, the duties upon the grades and 
 quantities which would probably be introduced if the treaty were 
 abrogated. To claim that the same trade would exist without the 
 advantages of the treaty would be to give away the case of the oppo- 
 sition by showing that there were no great advantages given by the 
 treaty. 
 
 When the treaty was made the Secretary of the Treasury pointed 
 out that the remission of duty would not occasion any loss of reve- 
 nue, but that it would, to a small extent, reduce the increase of reve- 
 nue growing out of the increased consumption of sugar. As a matter 
 of fact, the entire importation of sugar rom Hawaii does not now 
 
amount to much over 15 per cent, of the increase alone in the con- 
 sumption of the United States since the treaty was negotiated. 
 
 Of course the trade has grown. What else was expected when the 
 treaty was made? Of course Hawaii has been benefited. What 
 statesman would wish otherwise ? If it had not, what profit would 
 there be in trading with that country? But when complaint is made 
 that the importations from Hawaii to the United States have in- 
 creased fivefold, why not remember that the exports of the United 
 States to Hawaii have also increased fivefold? If the United States 
 has relinquished duties so also has Hawaii. 
 
 Much is said of the balance of trade. It has been said that the 
 duties remitted equaled the cost of exports on the assumption that 
 $3,000,000 in duties were remitted. No such sum is remitted (see Mr. 
 Folger's report) ; and if it were, it is also true that the cost of 
 carriage, the freights, commissions, insurance, and profits on the 
 goods inure to citizens of the United States. What pays the cost of 
 maintaining the commerce employed, interest on capital, &c. ? Let 
 one illustration show. The cost of rough lumber appears in the 
 statistics at $8.00 per thousand ; it sells at Honolulu for $20.00 per 
 thousand! That is to say, it takes in the ordinary course of trade 
 s^O.OO of imports of sugar to pay for $8.00 exports of lumber. The 
 fact that many of the exports to Hawaii are bulky articles, such as 
 lumber, hay, grain, agricultural implements, &c., is alluded to by 
 Secretary Folger in his report. Let it be remembered that the 
 duties collected in case the treaty should be abrogated would not 
 necessarily nor probably equal the duties remitted. See also the 
 letter of Secretary Frelinghuysen to the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations of the Senate, Appendix E ; and the report of Senate com- 
 mittee, Appendix F. 
 
 It has been said that the treaty brings the product of cheap labor 
 into competition with American labor. As a matter of fact farm 
 labor is as dear in Hawaii as in California or Louisiana ; but how 
 can competition be possible in sugar when all the sugar raised in 
 Hawaii makes less than 7 per cent, of the importation into the 
 United States? It is true that the Eastern refiner may claim that he 
 meets the products of San Francisco refineries in the territories con- 
 tiguous to California, but that is a natural and beneficial result of. 
 the competition of trade. The San Francisco refiner has free sugar 
 from Hawaii. The Eastern refiner has all the free sugar of Louis- 
 iana and the benefit of the drawback on sugars exported, which, in 
 1885, amounted to twice the whole product of Hawaii. While the 
 Eastern refiner has nine-tenths of the whole market of the country 
 
6 
 
 to himself it would not seem too much to allow the Pacific slope the 
 trade of Hawaii, which naturally belongs to it, if not drawn away to 
 Australia or Canada by the abrogation of the treaty. The Pacific 
 States have powerful rivals to contend with in competing for the 
 trade of the Pacific in Canada and Australia, and this treaty is a 
 great factor in the struggle. 
 
 Says the San Francisco Commercial Herald and Market Review, 
 January 28, 1886: 
 
 Again, for the hundredth time, Hawaiian Reciprocity is threat- 
 ened, but we hope that in this the power of the General Govern- 
 ment will not be exercised to our detriment, as are the steamship 
 subsidy and silver questions. The trade with the Hawaiian Islands 
 has grown into gigantic proportions under the fostering influence 
 of this treaty; in fact it is, proportionately to the population of 
 the islands, the greatest trade that America enjoys with any foreign 
 nation, and in the sugar refining industry of this city it has devel- 
 oped one of the most prosperous manufacturing occupations in the 
 United States. 
 
 Alread} r the line of American steamers built in Philadelphia to 
 run to Honolulu has extended its route to New Zealand, under a 
 subsidy from the government of that colony and of Hawaii. The 
 cable routes on the Pacific will centre at Honolulu, and the opening 
 of a ship canal or railway across the isthmus will inure largely to the 
 benefit of the country holding the commerce of those islands. What 
 considerations for abrogation are shown which are not dwarfed in 
 the minds of statesmen by such considerations as these? General 
 Garfield, in advocating the treaty, said : "Mr. Chairman, there are 
 two reasons why I specially desire the passage of this bill in rela- 
 tion to the treaty. The first is on the ground of the duty which the 
 nation owes to the Pacific coast; the second is on the ground of the 
 general good of the whole country. * * * If we do not make 
 this treaty schemes of annexation will vex us from year to year till 
 we shall be obliged to annex these islands as a matter of self-pro- 
 tection." 
 
 It is alleged that Hawaii is or will become a Chinese colony. The 
 fact is that the emigration of Chinese to Hawaii is forbidden by an 
 imperial edict by China, and their landing is restricted by law in 
 Hawaii. The Hawaiian government considers the present number 
 (17,000) as large as is consistent with its best interests, and immigra- 
 tion of other nationalities is encouraged. 
 
 It is not here intended to enter upon a discussion of the political 
 questions involved in the abrogation of the treaty. In the appendix 
 
will be found some extracts upon the subject. (See Appendix G.) 
 Suffice it to say that they are more important than they were 
 when the treaty was made or when the committee of the House of 
 Representatives reported that the political stipulations of the treaty 
 were believed to be of "essential importance to this country." 
 
 The abrogation of the treaty would destroy a valuable trade and 
 commerce built up under its' guarantees by American energy, enter- 
 prise and capital, cause a loss of millions to American citizens, and 
 open possibilities of evil results to both Hawaii and the United States. 
 The amounts of money involved in the discussion of the treaty are 
 insignificant compared with the political importance of the treaty, 
 or the amounts which might be involved in case the islands are 
 cast adrift to seek other alliances contrary to the interests of the 
 United States and the security of the Pacific States. 
 
 Much is said of extending American commerce, and of maintain- 
 ing the Monroe doctrine by the peaceful operations of trade yet it 
 is now proposed to abrogate a treaty which promises great com- 
 mercial development in the future. 
 
 As it has been charged that the Hawaiian Islands have a system 
 of peonage, an abstract of the laws of Hawaii and New York is 
 added in Appendix H. 
 
 The United States having declared that it was its settled policy to 
 exclude other nations from all interference in the affairs of Hawaii, 
 could that position be maintained consistently after the abrogation 
 of the treaty and Hawaii prevented from entering into reciprocal 
 arrangements with Australia or Canada? 
 
APPENDICES. 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 Treaty with Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 January 16, 1883, Mr. KASSON, from the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs, submitted the following report : 
 
 The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 
 (H. R. 2924) to terminate the convention or treaty of June 3, 1875, 
 with His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, report here- 
 with a substitute for the same, and recommend its adoption by the 
 House. 
 
 The committee have heard somewhat voluminous arguments and 
 many conflicting statements touching the facts involved with the 
 question of the total abrogation or modification of the treaty of the 
 United States with the Hawaiian government, which went into 
 operation on the 9th of September, 1876. There are certain facts, 
 however, which admit of no difference of opinion. The relative ad- 
 vantages to the people of the two countries appear to have essen- 
 tially changed since the treaty went into effect. The change of 
 these relations has been chiefly effected by the very large increase 
 in the production of sugar and other products of the sugar-cane in 
 the Hawaiian Islands, and which have been exported therefrom to 
 the United States under the treaty in question. ^In round numbers 
 the quantity of sugars so imported into this country free of duty, 
 under the reciprocity clauses of the treaty, has increased from 
 30,000,000 pounds in 1877 to 106,000,000 pounds in 1882. It is 
 alleged, and your committee is of opinion that it is truly alleged, 
 that the intent of the treaty in this respect has been violated by the 
 introduction of grades of sugar, under the Dutch standard of color, 
 which are not within the description of the treaty, to wit : " Musco- 
 vado, brown, and all other unrefined sugar, meaning hereby the 
 grades of sugar heretofore commonly imported from the Hawaiian 
 Islands, and now (1875) known in the markets of San Francisco 
 and Portland as Sandwich Island sugar, sirups of sugar-cane, me- 
 lada, and molasses." This result has been accomplished by recent 
 processes introduced for imparting an artificially debased color to 
 the finer qualities of sugar, which render the Dutch standard no 
 longer a just method for determining the quality and grade of the 
 sugar imported. It appears that out of a total of 106,000,000 pounds 
 coming to the Pacific coast from Hawaii in the last fiscal year 
 98,000,000 pounds came properly within the Dutch standard of 
 numbers 10 and 16, inclusive, while in purity the average range is 
 
 (9) 
 
10 
 
 above 95 per cent. There is no question that this result is entirely 
 without the intent of the contracting parties at the time the treaty 
 was made. There can be also no question, therefore, that in this 
 respect the treaty has ceased to be fair and reciprocal, and should be 
 modified, or, in case that is impracticable, should be denounced 
 under the right given to each government by its terms. There are 
 also other modifications, which your committee believe it practica- 
 ble to make, which will secure a more perfect reciprocity between 
 the governments and the people of the two countries. The treaty, 
 however, contains other stipulations in favor of the United States, 
 the retention of which is believed to be of essential importance to 
 this country. The effect of the treaty has already been to give to 
 this Government the benefit of a satisfactory political influence with 
 the government of the Hawaiian Islands, and to enable it in all 
 cases to secure the just rights of its citizens who have already very 
 large pecuiary interests in Hawaii. It is desirable to retain this 
 condition as well with reference to our future as to our present 
 national interests. 
 
 These islands are the nearest among the groups of the Pacific 
 ocean to our western coast, and are the most important in their re- 
 lations to our growing commerce with Asia and Australia. This 
 commerce is only in the beginning of its development, and the 
 Hawaiian Islands furnish a point on the route so valuable and so 
 controlling that the traditional policy of this Government is firmly 
 established against their domination by any foreign government, 
 and against any undue influence exercised over the same, or acqui- 
 sition of special rights therein, by any foreign power. Your com- 
 mittee believe that policy should be maintained, and that extraordi- 
 nary measures on the part of our own Government to prevent such 
 foreign domination might justly be taken. The treaty in question 
 was made with a view to the maintenance of our influence there, 
 and to the naval as well as commercial security of our interests in 
 the Pacific. The situation of the United States gives to them a nat- 
 ural priority in the commerce between the American and Asiatic 
 coasts. It would be folly to take any step which might lose to us 
 the most important key to the commercial and naval situation. 
 Without going further into the development of these considerations 
 your committee are firmly of the conviction that the treaty should 
 not be wholly abrogated, with the consequent loss of all its provis- 
 ions for our rights and security, but rather that modifications should 
 be introduced which shall obviate the evils which have given just 
 grounds of complaint. 
 
 They therefore report to the House a resolution in accordance 
 with the views above expressed, and recommend its passage. 
 
11 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 Report of Commission Appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to In- 
 vestigate Alleged Frauds under the Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1883. 
 
 SIR : The undersigned, appointed by you a commission to investi- 
 gate certain charges "made in Congress and in the public prints 
 that, under color of the treaty between the United States and the 
 Sandwich Islands, June 3, 1875, sugars have been imported from 
 those islands into ports of the United States which were not entitled 
 to exemption from duty thereunder," respectfully submit the follow- 
 ing report : 
 
 Upon receipt of your instructions, dated May 10, 1883, we pro- 
 ceeded directly to San Francisco and commenced the investigation 
 in that city. 
 
 Upon examination of the report of the Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs of the House of Representatives, dated January 16, 1883, 
 and the "views of the minority" accompanying the same, dated 
 January 29, 1883, together with " notes of hearings before said com- 
 mittee on the bill (H. R. 2924) to terminate the convention or 
 treaty of June 3, 1875, with his Majesty the King of the Hawaiian 
 Islands," and also the report on the same subject from the Commit- 
 tee on Finance of the Senate, dated February 27, 1883, we found 
 the charges above referred to to consist mainly of two 
 
 First. That the class of sugars imported since the treaty went into 
 effect differs from that contemplated in the language of the treaty 
 itself and from the importations from the Hawaiian Islands prior to 
 said treaty; that, in fact, the process of manufacture in the islands 
 had radically changed, vacuum-pans and centrifugals having been 
 substituted for the open kettles and ordinary methods of purging 
 muscavado sugars. 
 
 Second. That sugars from other countries were imported into the 
 Sandwich Islands and fraudulently exported to the United States as 
 Hawaiian sugars. 
 
 The treaty went into effect September 9, 1876, and is to remain in 
 force for seven years from that date, " and further, until the expira- 
 tion of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties 
 shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same." 
 
 It provides for the .admission free of duty into the United States, 
 among other articles grown and manufactured in the Hawaiian 
 Islands, of u rice, * * * muscovado, brown, and all other unrefined 
 sugar, meaning hereby the grades of sugar heretofore commonly 
 imported from the Hawaiian Islands and now known in the mar- 
 kets of San Francisco and Portland as ' Sandwich Island sugar ; ' 
 syrups of sugar-cane, melado, and molasses." 
 
 In the absence of samples of the sugars imported prior to the 
 treaty, none of which appear to have been preserved, it was evident 
 
12 
 
 that the answer to so much of the first charge as relates to the class 
 of sugars admitted was to be found mainly in the records of the 
 custom-houses of San Francisco and Portland, and only to be ascer-. 
 tained by a careful comparison of the classifications of sugars im- 
 ported from the islands during the years immediately preceding the 
 treaty with those subsequently imported. 
 
 Inasmuch as the statistics of sugars imported from the islands 
 heretofore made up and reported were based upon estimated classi- 
 fications and not upon the appraiser's returns, the collectors of those 
 ports, at our request, caused statements to be prepared from the in- 
 voices of each importation, showing the classification according to 
 the appraiser's report and the number of pounds of each grade 
 from July 1, 1873, to June 30, 1883, inclusive. 
 
 The work of compiling these statistics was done under our super- 
 vision, and we are satisfied that they furnish a true exhibit of the 
 classifications. 
 
 From these statements we have made up the accompanying table 
 (marked "A") which shows the quantity of each grade, the percent- 
 age of each for the several yea'rs, and the total quantity for the three 
 years prior to and the seven years since the treaty, with the aver- 
 age percentage of each grade for the same periods. A second table 
 (marked "B") shows the total invoice values of sugars imported 
 each year, and the average value per pound prior to and since the 
 treaty, together with the average and total amount of duties remitted 
 thereunder. 
 
 These figures show a remarkable increase in the percentage of the 
 lower grades imported into San Francisco from July 1, 1875, to Sep- 
 tember 9, 1876 while the treaty was pending as compared with 
 previous and subsequent years. During that period the proportion 
 of sugars below No. 10, Dutch standard, was 62.53 per cent., against 
 an average of the same grades of 15.28 per cent, in the fiscal years 
 of 1874 and 1875, and an average of 14.52 per cent, from January 
 1, 1877, to June 30, 1883. 
 
 It appears that up to 1875 most of the better grades of Sandwich 
 Island sugars were sold in the markets of the Pacific coast directly for 
 consumption. Early in that year the San Francisco refiners made con- 
 tracts to purchase the greater part of the crop of the islands, and ar- 
 ranged with the planters to make as large a proportion as possible 
 dark in color, to meet the then-existing tariff. After the treaty was 
 promulgated, the proportions of the several grades became about the 
 same as before said arrangement was entered into. \Vith this excep- 
 tion, it does not appear that there is any substantial difference in 
 the character of the sugars imported prior to and since the treaty, 
 nor is there any evidence that the importations under the treaty 
 were not such sugars as were " commonly imported and known as 
 Sandwich Island sugars " prior to 1876. 
 
 Information obtained from a large number of merchants and cus- 
 toms officials in San Francisco and Portland familiar with the sub- 
 ject was also to the effect that no material change had taken place 
 in the character of the sugars imported. 
 
13 
 
 It is worthy of notice that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
 1883, there have been no importations at Portland of Sandwich Island 
 sugar. It appeared from the statements of merchants in Portland 
 that the direct trade between Portland and the islands, which be- 
 fore the treaty had supported regular lines of vessels, taking out as- 
 sorted cargoes of merchandise and bringing back cargoes of sugar, 
 (which was sold for direct consumption without refining,) has been 
 broken up, the business being entirely controlled by the San Fran- 
 cisco refinery. Such vessels, being thus left without return freights, 
 have been withdrawn, and direct shipments of American goods from 
 Portland have been discontinued. 
 
 As the remaining charges could only be investigated satisfactorily 
 in the islands, in accordance with telegraphic instructions, we pro- 
 ceeded to Honolulu, where we arrived on the 17th of June. A delay 
 of a week in the sailing of the steamer shortened our stay in the 
 islands to fifteen days, during which, however, we visited a large 
 number of the sugar estates in the three Islands of Hawaii, Maui, 
 and Kauai, and obtained, by actual inspection of the various mills, 
 full information as to the character of the machinery in use, and, 
 from the managers of the plantation, details as to the average yield 
 of cane, possible increase of production, &c. We also saw the pro- 
 cess of manufacture and the character ,of the sugar made, taking 
 samples of the various grades. From data thus secured, which were 
 also confirmed and completed by statements made by the agents in 
 Honolulu of the various estates, we ascertained the following facts : 
 
 No muscovado sugar had been made in the islands for more than 
 twenty years prior to the treaty. Centrifugals were manufactured 
 and introduced in the islands as early as 1850 or 1851, and have 
 been in use exclusively for purging sugars ever since that date. 
 Vacuum-pans were also generally used as early as 1865, and in 1870 
 but few planters boiled their sugars in the open train. In 1875 
 there was but one, or possibly two, mills which retained the open 
 train, and every mill started since that date has been equipped with 
 vacuum-pans and centrifugals. The process of sugar-making is, 
 therefore, unquestionably the same as prior to the treaty, and ac- 
 counts for the fact, previously ascertained, that the quality of the 
 sugars was substantially the same before as since the treaty. 
 
 The second charge made is, that sugars are imported from the 
 East Indies and China into the Sandwich Islands, and thence re- 
 shipped to the United States as of Hawaiian growth and manufacture. 
 This subject has been fully discussed by the American minister and 
 United States consul at Honolulu, in reports of recent date, to which 
 attention is called. After a thorough examination of the matter, 
 we are convinced of the utter impracticability of such operations. 
 The formation of the islands is such as in itself to forbid the success- 
 ful smuggling of sugar. There is but one port in the kingdom 
 where a vessel can lie with safety, viz., Honolulu. All the others 
 are open roadsteads, at which landings must be made in boats, and 
 at some of them this is attended with no little risk, even at the most 
 favorable season. The landing of sugar at either of these ports in 
 
14 
 
 boats through the surf would be a tedious operation, and, from the 
 nature of the coast, must be conducted by daylight. In a state of 
 society such as exists on the islands, where every new arrival or un- 
 usual event attracts universal attention, the presence of a sugar- 
 laden vessel and the landing of her cargo would of necessity involve 
 such publicity as to preclude the possible success of the venture, to 
 say nothing of the necessary after-handling and reshipment to the 
 United States. This could only be accomplished by collusion be- 
 tween the shippers and the United States and Hawaiian officials, of 
 which there is no evidence nor ground for suspicion. 
 
 It is a significant fact that, while vague charges of frauds of this 
 nature are made, no specific case has ever been brought to the knowl- 
 edge of either Government. The allegation seems to have no other 
 foundation than the fact that there has been a large increase in the 
 quantity of sugars sent to the United States since the treat}' ; but 
 this increase can be otherwise accounted for. It is the legitimate 
 result of the treaty itself. 
 
 The total imports of sugar from the Hawaiian Islands for the fiscal 
 year ending June 30, 1875, according to table herewith , were 17,063,133 
 pounds, and from that date to September 9, 1876, when the treaty 
 went into effect, 21,414,074 pounds. The quantity imported during 
 the fiscal year ending June 30, 1883, was 115,325,077 pounds. 
 
 Immediately on the consummation of the treaty, which transferred 
 the duty of fifty or sixty dollars per ton from the United States 
 Treasury into the pockets of the planters, a great impetus was given 
 to the sugar industry of the islands. The acreage of old plantations 
 was at once increased and new plantations started. From statistics 
 obtained in the islands it appears that three new plantations went 
 into operation in 1875, five in 1876, eight in 1877, nine in 1878, 
 eight in 1879, four in 1880, and one in 1882, bringing into cultiva- 
 tion over 20,000 acres of land additional, with a new capital invest- 
 ment of about ten million dollars. 
 
 The total yield of the several estates since the treaty corresponds 
 with and accounts for the importations into the United States, as 
 shown by the accompanying tables. 
 
 Among the papers referred to us in connection with the charges 
 before named was a memorial of the eastern sugar refiners and mer- 
 chants. A hearing was given to the representatives of the refiners 
 of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia upon the allegations con- 
 tained in said memorial. They presented no testimony, but rested 
 their charges upon the language of the treaty itself, claiming " that 
 it provides only for the admission of muscovado, brown, and unre- 
 fined sugars, whereas no muscovado sugars have been imported 
 under the treaty, while large quantities have been received of what 
 are known commercially as 'semi-refined' sugars, such as are, by 
 reason of their color, fit for consumption without refining." They 
 further claimed that " No. 13, Dutch standard, is the clearly-estab- 
 lished dividing line between raw or unrefined and refined sugar, 
 and that this principle was recognized by Congress in its recent leg- 
 islation on the sugar tariff." In the absence of any knowledge of 
 
15 
 
 Sandwich Island sugars in the eastern markets, the refiners and 
 merchants were doubtless justified in the inference that the term 
 " muscovado" was introduced because the islands produced drained 
 sugars of this character. The non-importation under the treaty of 
 this class of sugar naturally led to the belief that the process of 
 manufacture had undergone a change. The fact is, however, as 
 before stated, that for twenty years or more prior to the treaty no 
 muscovado sugar had been made in the islands. Why the term 
 " muscovado" was used we are not informed. It certainly had no 
 place in the treaty, and has tended to mislead since, if not at the 
 time of its adoption. 
 
 We took occasion while in the islands to procure from official 
 sources accurate statistics and information on some minor points 
 relating to the workings of the treaty, which have formed part of 
 the discussion of these charges of fraud, and which appeared to us 
 relevant to the subject under investigation. 
 
 One of the prominent points in this discussion has reference to 
 the prospective large increase in the sugar production of the islands. 
 There is, unquestionably, a large amount of arable land fit for sugar 
 cultivation ; but as, except upon the Island of Hawaii, the planters 
 depend largely upon irrigation, the extent of the water supply fixes 
 the limit of cultivation, which for this reason, it is estimated, can- 
 not be increased beyond thirty to forty per cent. The yield per acre 
 varies greatly, and is also largely controlled by the water supply. 
 Some estates produced the past year five and a half tons per acre, 
 while others yielded but two to two and a half tons, the average 
 being probably less than three tons. It should be understood that 
 it requires an average of eighteen months for cane to mature in the 
 islands, and that not more than two-thirds of the acreage cultivated 
 is cut in any one year. We are convinced that the output of all the 
 islands, under the most favorable circumstances (unless by a better 
 system of cultivation), would not exceed one hundred thousand tons 
 of sugar per annum. 
 
 The rapid increase of sugar production created a corresponding 
 demand for labor, which could only be met by drawing upon other 
 countries. The laborers on the sugar plantations are native Ha- 
 waiians, Portuguese, Chinese, Germans, and Norwegians, with a few 
 of the natives of the South Sea Islands and New Hebrides, and are 
 generally esteemed in the order named. There having been no re- 
 striction upon the importation of the Chinese, the number of these 
 who have come to the islands is greater than all other nationalities 
 combined. The "Planters' Monthly," a magazine largely devoted 
 to the consideration of the labor question in the islands, estimates 
 the Chinese population in June, 1883, at 20,000. These are nearly 
 all adult males, and outnumber the native population of the same 
 class. We failed to find, however, any ground for the charges of ill- 
 treatment of the laborers. Many of them, it is true, are imported 
 under contracts running three or five years, but these contracts are 
 fair to the laborer (see forms of contracts herewith, marked "G"), 
 and are impartially enforced by the courts if violated. Official in- 
 
16 
 
 vestigation of the condition and treatment of the laborers has been 
 made by the German and Portuguese governments, with the finding 
 that the laborer is well cared for and the contracts respected by the 
 planters. It is certainly true that the laborers as a class are con- 
 tented, and either renew their contracts or engage in day labor, with 
 an assurance of steady employment, good treatment, and pay aver- 
 aging from twenty-two to twenty-six dollars per month of twenty- 
 six days of ten hours each. 
 
 Statistics furnished by the agents in Honolulu show that the 
 greater part of the sugar machinery purchased for the islands since 
 the treaty has not come from the United States, but from England 
 and Scotland, or was manufactured in Honolulu. 
 
 The statement which has been frequently made that the greater 
 proportion of the sugar planters are American citizens we found to 
 be without foundation. Careful inquiry on this point regarding 
 each of the estates on the islands shows that, aside from the Plawaiian 
 Commercial and Sugar Company (a company organized in San 
 Francisco), less than one-fourth of the owners of sugar estates and 
 persons engaged in the sugar business are citizens of the United 
 States. With a few exceptions, the business is in the hand of Ger- 
 man and English citizens or Hawaiians. Among the latter are some 
 who were born in the United States and, have renounced allegiance 
 to our Government, or who, born in the islands of American parent- 
 age, claim Hawaiian citizenship. 
 
 Conflicting statements having been made as to the relative values of 
 imports into the island from the United States and other countries, 
 we append a table (marked "F") compiled from the Hawaiian 
 official records, showing the values of such imports for the years 
 1874 to 1882, inclusive, and the percentage of same from the United 
 States. 
 
 It came to our notice during the investigation that American re- 
 fined sugar consumed in the islands is manufactured of duty-paid 
 raw sugar, and is exported from San Francisco to Honolulu with 
 benefit of drawback. Thus, under the operation of the treaty and 
 existing laws, the United States not only allows the Hawaiians the 
 full amount of duty on the sugars they produced, but also on the 
 American refined sugar they consume, such sugar being sold in 
 Honolulu cheaper than in San Francisco. 
 
 The rice culture in the islands has been stimulated by the treaty 
 even more than that of sugar. According to the Hawaiian official 
 statistics (see Table C), the total exports of rice to the United States 
 in 1873 were 892,720 pounds; in 1874, 885,646 pounds, and in 1875, 
 1,461,835 pounds. The admission of this staple into the United 
 States free of duty has resulted in the increase of its production 
 until, in 1882, according to the Hawaiian figures for the calendar 
 year, there was exported to the United States 12,135,074 pounds, 
 being the entire exports of rice from the islands, except 34,401 
 pounds, which went to other countries. The benefit of the duty re- 
 mitted on rice goes almost entirely to the Chinese, who, either by 
 purchase or lease of lands, have secured control of the rice cultiva- 
 tion. 
 
17 
 
 It is charged that the treaty has created a sugar monopoly on the 
 Pacific coast and increased the price to the consumer, but we did not 
 find this statement warranted by the facts. It is true that the re- 
 mission of the duty by the United States has not inured to the bene- 
 fit of the consumer on the Pacific coast ; but, as before stated, the 
 duty, which, were there no treaty, would go into the United States 
 Treasury, now goes to the planter, and not to the refiner who buys 
 nearly the entire product of the islands. The increased cost to the 
 consumer on that coast of refined sugars, as compared with the price 
 paid by consumers in the Eastern States (from 2 to 2J cents per 
 pound), is not the result of the treaty, but grows out of a monopoly 
 of the refining business in San Francisco, coupled with the still 
 greater monopoly of railroad transportation. 
 
 In concluding this report, we desire to express our appreciation of 
 the courtesies shown and assistance afforded us by Hawaiian officials, 
 planters, merchants, and others in the prosecution of our inquiries. 
 
 We are also indebted to Mr. J. D. Power, of the special agent's 
 office, San Francisco, who accompanied us to Honolulu, for valuable 
 services rendered in the preparation of Hawaiian statistics while we 
 were engaged in visiting the plantations upon the several islands. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 0. L. SPAULDING. 
 JNO. E. SEARLES, JR. 
 A. K. TINGLE. 
 
 Hon. CHAS. J. FOLGER, 
 
 Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1883. 
 
 Charges of fraud and irregularity in the administration of the 
 law enacted to carry out the treaty with Hawaii, so far as concerns 
 the exemption of sugar from duty, having been made both in public 
 bodies and public prints, I appointed a commission of three trust- 
 worthy persons (one of whom was nominated by prominent repre- 
 sentatives of the sugar trade in New York) to go to San Francisco 
 and Portland, Oregon, and, if necessary, to the Hawaiian Islands, to 
 fully investigate the matter. 
 
 They were given the fullest latitude to examine into all branches 
 of the subject, and have executed the commission with intelligence, 
 fidelity, and thoroughness. Their report, which will be duly trans- 
 mitted to Congress, fails to show that such charges have any founda- 
 tion. It tends strongly to prove that the character of the sugar im- 
 ported from these islands since the treaty went into operation is 
 essentially the same as that which was imported prior to the treaty, 
 both as regards the grade of sugar admitted and its country of 
 origin, and that the treaty has been fairly executed. The statement 
 
18 
 
 in the report that the sugar interest is largely other than American 
 lias called forth from the Hawaiian government a counter-statement, 
 with a table showing that of $15,886,800 of assessed plantation prop- 
 erty over $10,000,000 is owned by American citizens. This large 
 interest, it is claimed, is growth from the treaty, and that it is profit- 
 able to the owners, many of whom are residents in this coun- 
 try. 
 
 The industry and the free market opened have given rise to a trade, in 
 its nature and effects, like our inter-State trade, covering a wide range of 
 articles, affecting profitably tJte American farmer, grocer, and manufac- 
 turer of small articles of household and farm use, as well as the larger 
 manufacturers in metals and of machinery and cottons. The exports in 
 these commodities have so grown that the trade of San Francisco 
 with the Hawaiian Islands is third in its importance, being equaled 
 only by that with Great Britain and China, and exceeding that with 
 Mexico, Australia, or British Colombia. 
 
 Many of the articles of this trade, such as hay, grain, lumber, 
 &c., are so bulky that they employ a shipping large in proportion to 
 their value, and much of this is American. 
 
 The impetus given to Hawaiian inter-island commerce has also 
 inured to the benefit of Americans, in calling for coasting steam- 
 ers and sailing vessels which have been built in American 
 ports. 
 
 The balance of trade growing from the earnings of American 
 commerce the commissions of merchants and bankers and the 
 profits of American citizens is believed to be in favor of this 
 country, as the course of exchange, as this Department is informed, 
 is constantly against the Hawaiian remitter to the extent of from 
 1J to 2 per cent. To reconcile this with the statements of the values 
 of exports from this country to Hawaii, and of the imports into this 
 country from that, which show an excess of imports, the fact must 
 be weighed that the commodities landed there from here have an 
 added value when they reach therefrom the cost of carriage which 
 adheres to them. The carriage is by American vessels mostly, and 
 the cost of carriage earned by our citizens should be put to that 
 side of the account. 
 
 The report of the commission shows that but for the free entry 
 awarded by the treaty the revenue on the sugar imported would have 
 been about $3,000,000, computed at an average duty of $3.18 per 100 
 pounds.* Yet there is a countervailing benefit to our citizens. The 
 increase in value of Hawaiian sugar has been but $1.57 per 100 
 pounds. 
 
 As the sugar comes in free it may not have been as strictly classified as 
 that on which duty is assessed. That the consumer has received some 
 benefit is thus shown, and this notion is confirmed by the market 
 price of sugar in San Francisco before and since the treaty, being an 
 average of 1J cents per pound in favor of the consumer since the 
 
 * This amount is much exaggerated, being based on $3.18 per 100 pound'; duty, 
 n sucl) sugars \\ n \\- (1886), would be about 81.80 per 100 pounds. 
 
19 
 
 treaty. Thus the loss of revenue is on a trade which might not exist 
 but for the beneficent operations of the treaty. 
 
 The portions of the report now italicised are worthy of particular 
 attention. 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 HAWAIIAN LEGATION, 
 
 WASHINGTON, Sept. 13, 1883. 
 
 SIR: I was to-day shown, through the courtesy of the Honorable 
 Secretary of the Treasury, proof of the report of the commission to 
 investigate the alleged frauds in the Hawaiian sugar trade. The 
 report is both fair and unfair. It treats fairly of the questions of 
 fraud and frankly states that the allegations are without any founda- 
 tion in fact, either as regards the admixture of foreign sugars or the 
 quality of Hawaiian sugars, but it dwells with peculiar unction upon 
 the benefits the Hawaiian planter receives without making mention 
 of the exemption from duty of American goods in Hawaiian ports. 
 It states that the sugar consumer gets no benefit, but does not point 
 out that the American producer and manufacturer does. The report 
 seems to breathe a tone of lament that any advantages should have 
 accrued to Hawaii in the bargain. It contains an apologetic ex- 
 planation by the Eastern refiners as to how they came to make 
 charges which proved so groundless, which, they say, came from the 
 use of the word muscavado in the treaty. This I may say, from 
 personal knowledge, was because it had been the term used in some 
 other treaties or proposed treaties, and it was owing to the vagueness 
 which had become attached to this term that the explanatory form 
 or clause was added which really determined the grades intended. 
 The report fairly and clearly disposes of the charge that the treaty 
 is responsible for the high price of refined sugar on the Pacific coast, 
 which it ascribes to a local monopoly and not to any effect of the 
 treaty. 
 
 On the whole you will observe that the report is a manly admis- 
 sion that the alleged frauds did not exist, which is all the more 
 creditable, as one of the commission had strenuously insisted that 
 they did exist. 
 
 The statements in the report regarding the proportion of American 
 citizens among the planters may be an unintentional error or may 
 refer to the laborers. So far as the ownership of and capital employed 
 in the sugar productions is concerned I think the report is wrong, 
 and beg you to furnish me with late statistics touching this subject. 
 
 Had the commission, when it went beyond the questions of fraud 
 to inquire into the benefits to Hawaiians of the treaty, also alluded 
 to benefit to American commerce and trade, it would have made the 
 report more comprehensive and satisfactory. 
 
APPENDIX K. 
 
 Extracts from a Letter from the Late Secretary of State, Mr. Frelingliuysen, 
 to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U. S. 
 Senate, of February 12th, 1885, on the Trade Relations of the United 
 States with Several Countries on this Continent. 
 
 Your attention may be here invited to the working of the reci- 
 procity treaty with Hawaii, which may be taken as illustrative of 
 what similar treaties would effect in our trade relations with the so- 
 called " inferior nations." 
 
 The trade between the United States and Hawaii in 1876 and in 
 1884 was as follows : * 
 
 Years. 
 
 Exports to 
 Hawaii. 
 
 ]1 "K;!r" ToteU , 
 
 187G _ __ 
 
 $809,000 
 
 SI, 383,000 $2,192,000 
 
 1884 - . _ 
 
 3,523,000 
 
 7,926,000 11,449,000 
 
 
 
 
 I no reuse _ ._ _ 
 
 2,714,000 
 
 <;,.">43.000 9,257.000 
 
 
 
 
 Of the total commerce between the United States and Hawaii 
 during the year 1884 about 95 per cent, was effected in American 
 vessels, showing that their trade, with all its profits, freights, insu- 
 rance, commissions, &c., as well as the regular profits on the mer- 
 chandise imported and the manufactures exported, is in American 
 hands. In this connection it may be stated that the whole round 
 of our trade relations presents no other such favorable conditions. 
 
 The latest Hawaiian returns at hand are for the calendar year 
 1883. According to these the total imports into the Kingdom 
 amounted to $5,624,000. The imports of American goods admitted 
 free under the reciprocity treaty amounted to $3,169,000. 
 
 The imports of Hawaii subject to duty amounted to $2,187,000, 
 of which American goods constituted $813,000 and British goods 
 $939,000. 
 
 :^,The importation of free goods under the general treaty amounted 
 to $267,000, in which American gocds must have held their full 
 share. It thus appears that out of a total import amounting to 
 $5,624,000 American products and manufactures amount to 
 $4,000,000. 
 
 The population of Hawaii is estimated at 70,000; our exports 
 thither in 1884 amounted to $3,523,000 ; this shows a per capita 
 consumption of American goods as they leave our ports of a fraction 
 over $50. 
 
21 
 
 The following statement shows the per capita consumption of 
 American products and manufactures in the several countries on this 
 continent, British North America excepted : 
 
 Countries. 
 
 Hawaii. 
 
 Mexico 
 
 Central America 
 
 Tnited States of Colombia 
 
 Vene/uela 
 
 The Guianas 
 
 Brazil 
 
 Uruguay 
 
 Argentine Republic 
 
 Chili 
 
 Bolivia 
 
 Peru 
 
 Ecuador 
 
 Spanish AVe-t Indies 
 
 British West Jndies 
 
 French Wot Indies 
 
 Hayti 
 
 San Domingo 
 
 Population. 
 
 Exports from Amounts 
 the I'nited per 
 
 States. capita. 
 
 70,000 s:;.5L>:j.ooo 
 
 00 
 
 9,300,000 
 
 12,744,000 
 
 1 36.] 
 
 2,660,000 
 
 3,608,000 
 
 1 36" 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 6,380,000 
 
 2 09 
 
 2,075,000 
 
 2,427,000 
 
 1 17 
 
 295,320 
 
 2,: SOB, 000 
 
 7 82 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 S, (595, 000 
 
 72.1 
 
 500,000 
 
 1,368,000 
 
 2 74 
 
 2,500,000 
 
 ">,075,000 
 
 2 03 
 
 2,500,000 
 
 3,267,000 
 
 1 :51 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 
 
 ' 2,700,000 
 
 1.071,000 
 
 40 
 
 1,000,000 
 
 029,000 
 
 63 
 
 2,307,000 
 
 13,135,000 
 
 5 69 
 
 1,133,000 
 
 8,849,000 
 
 7 98* 
 
 384,000 
 
 1,821,000 
 
 4 7--." 
 
 572,000 
 
 2,760,000 
 
 4 82 
 
 290,000 
 
 1,294,000 
 
 4 46 
 
 Total . 
 
 45,216,320 
 
 75.389,000 
 
 1.668 
 
 In 1876 the consumption of American goods in Hawaii amounted 
 to $12.66 per capita. The increase under the reciprocity treaty has, 
 therefore, been $37.34 per capita. 
 
 It is not intended in this communication, even for illustrative 
 purposes, to create the impression that any system of reciprocity 
 treaties must produce such favorable results in the foregoing coun- 
 tries as has been produced in the case of Hawaii, although the stim- 
 ulus which reciprocity treaties would give to the development of the 
 resources of many of the smaller countries, and the consequent in- 
 crease in the consumption of our products and manufactures, would, 
 undoubtedly, result in a marked enlargement of the total volume of 
 trade. 
 
 As in the case of Hawaii, our trade fostered and developed by re- 
 ciprocity treaties would be largely in American hands, in the buy- 
 ing and selling, in the handling and shipping, as well as in the pro- 
 duction and manufacture thereof and it should be remembered 
 that in international trade the handling, carrying, and shipping are 
 secondary only to production, manufacture, and preparation in- 
 deed, it may be questioned whether the com mission men, handlers, 
 and ocean carriers do not realize as much thereon as the producers. 
 
99 
 
 APPENDIX F. 
 
 January 24, 1884, Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign- 
 Relations, submitted the following report : 
 
 The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred Senate 
 joint resolution No. 27, " as to giving notice to terminate the con- 
 vention of June 3, 1875, with His Majesty the King of the Ha- 
 waiian Islands," have had the same under consideration, and report 
 the same back with the recommendation that the resolution be in- 
 definitely postponed. 
 
 As the resolution invokes the action of the Senate to reverse, by 
 the vote of a majority of the body, the solemn judgment of more 
 than two-thirds of the Senate expressed with reference to this con- 
 vention in 1875, the grounds on which this reversal is demanded 
 j-equire investigation. 
 
 A report from the Committee of Finance, made to the Senate on 
 February 27, 1883, embodies the leading objections that have been 
 urged to this convention. 
 
 The Committee on Foreign Relations, not being able to concur in 
 the arguments stated or the conclusions reached in that report, state 
 the following reasons in support of the opposite conclusions : 
 
 If it could be shown (as your committee have failed to discover 
 that it has been) that the commerce or the revenues of the United 
 States have not been adequately compensated by the advantages of 
 actual trade with the Hawaiian Islands, under the convention of 
 1875, there are other and perhaps higher considerations than the 
 relative money value of that trade to the people ol the United 
 States, which establish the wisdom of the Senate in ratifying and 
 of Congress in legislating to carry into effect this convention. 
 
 Since the opening of the Suez canal the great commercial nations 
 of Europe, notably England and France, have exhibited great 
 energy and activity in building up trade and extending and con- 
 solidating their influence and power along the western shores of 
 the Pacific Ocean and in the islands of the South Pacific. We have 
 also extended our treaty relations to Corea, Siam, Persia, and Mada- 
 gascar, with a view to a future profitable trade with all of the 
 countries of Asia and Australasia. 
 
 Our transcontinental railroads have greatly increased our trade 
 with all these countries, and have earned large sums of money in 
 the transportation of mails and freights and passengers. When an 
 isthmian canal shall have furnished quicker and cheaper carriage 
 by steam vessels for freights and passengers, we will find powerful 
 rivals in the field both by way of the Isthmus of Darien and at 
 Puget Sound, in British Columbia. This competition will also ex- 
 tend along the coasts of Mexico and of the Central and South Ameri- 
 can States. 
 
 The stimulus thus given to commerce on the Pacific Ocean will 
 increase rapidly the interchange of productions between all these 
 great countries until that trade will equal, if it does not exceed, the 
 value of the commerce across the Atlantic. 
 
The Hawaiian Islands afford the only stopping place, in a dis- 
 tance of 20,000 miles, between our coasts and those of Japan, Corea, 
 and China ; and from Panama to the heart of those countries they 
 are in almost the direct line of travel. They are east of the 
 meridian which touches the western shore of Alaska, and may be 
 said to be properly within the area of the physical and political 
 geography of the United States. They are nearer to us than to any 
 other great power. 
 
 Influences of a social and religious character, through which 
 these islands were, in fact, opened up to modern civilization, have 
 drawn those people closely to us, and they feel that they have greatly 
 profited by the sympathy and consideration of the American people 
 for their well-being as a nation. This feeling has been greatly 
 strengthened since 1875. Our liberal reciprocity with them has 
 confirmed a mutual feeling of regard, which has never been chilled 
 by any unpleasant event. 
 
 Hawaiian trade, investment, population, and policy have been 
 greatly influenced by the convention of 1875 so much so that 
 almost every public act relating to commerce has direct reference to 
 that treaty. American population there has increased considerably 
 since 1875, and, of the entire value of sugar-lands in the islands, 
 estimated at $15,886,800, as is shown in the letter of Mr. Daggett, 
 our minister to that country, of October, 15, 1883 (which is here- 
 with submitted), $10,235,464 belong to Americans. (See Appendix 
 A.) These close and cordial relations between the people of the 
 two countries, in respect to which the Governments also are in 
 earnest sympathy, strongly forbid that we should abandon our re- 
 ciprocal commerce, or avert our attention, or withdraw our sympa- 
 thies from the Hawaiian people. 
 
 Whether in an honorable and peaceful rivalry for the commerce 
 of the countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, or in the protection 
 of our commerce or our coasts in case of war with any great mari- 
 time power, our relations with the government of Hawaii, consistently 
 with its independence and autonomy, could not become too intimate 
 for our own welfare. 
 
 A single fact, of many, will suffice to illustrate this proposition. 
 The kingdom of Hawaii is the only government in the North Pacific 
 Ocean that is not a colonial dependence of some great power in 
 Europe or Asia, and it is therefore the only neutral power in the 
 North Pacific Ocean. 
 
 In the treaty of Washington, in 1871, the United States and Great 
 Britain agree between themselves that as neutral powers they will 
 not in future permit either belligerent to make use of their ports or 
 waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the 
 purpose of the renewal or augumentation of military supplies or 
 arms, or the recruitment of men ; and they agree to bring this rule, 
 with others, to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to in- 
 vite them to accede to them. This law of neutrality we would be 
 bound to enforce against the Hawaiian government in case of war 
 between the United States and any maritime power; but, in doing 
 
24 
 
 so, we would deprive our war vessels of the right to take coal at the 
 Hawaiian ports for a longer journey than 2,000 miles, while the 
 ships of England or of any other European power would be entitled 
 to take coal for a journey of 15,000 miles. This rule would permit 
 them, in fact, to coal at Honolulu and harass our coasts and com- 
 merce with the greatest possible advantage, while it would cripple 
 us essentially. 
 
 The supremacy of England or any great maritime power in the 
 Hawaiian Islands would make of this rule, on which we in part relied 
 for compensation in respect of the Alabama claims, a most formida- 
 ble difficulty in the way of the defense of our Pacific coast and com- 
 merce. 
 
 The very liberal concessions made by the Hawaiian government 
 in favor of our whalers and war ships, in article 7 of the treaty of 
 1849, followed by the agreement, in the treaty of 1875, that " the 
 King will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon 
 any port, harbor, or other territory of his dominions, or grant any 
 special privileges or rights of use therein, to any other power, state, 
 or government, nor make any other treaty by which any other nation 
 shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any 
 articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States," present 
 the strongest possible evidences of good will towards us on the part 
 of that government, and disclose its confident reliance on our pro- 
 tection against any serious aggression or disturbance from any for- 
 eign powers. These concessions have not been disputed by any 
 power, and when we accepted them we also accepted the moral duty 
 of an equivalent protection of the independence and security of that 
 kingdom. This close relation of amity is, in relative degree, as nec- 
 essary to our welfare as it is to that of the people of the Hawaiian 
 Islands, and should be maintained in strict good faith. 
 
 The importance of the Hawaiian treaty, in its political bearings 
 upon the United States, has been recognized by Presidents Tyler, 
 Polk, Lincoln, Johnson, Grant, and Arthur, as indicated in messages 
 to Congress. Our Secretaries of State have uniformly insisted, since 
 the Hawaiian government assumed treaty relations with other 
 countries, that the United States must stand in a nearer relation 
 with that kingdom than any other nation can occupy. 
 
 The material advantages of the treaty of January, 1875. to the 
 people of the United States consist in the furnishing of useful and 
 lucrative employment to them, in increasing the supply and lessen- 
 ing the cost of many articles of general use, and enlarging the market 
 and increasing the demand for their productions. 
 
 Under the first head, of furnishing lucrative employment to our 
 people, the advantage has been very great. 
 
 Many Americans have gone to the Hawaiian Islands, and, with 
 their industry, skill, and capital, have engaged in agriculture, mer- 
 cantile pursuits, navigation, banking, printing, and many minor 
 mechanical industries, from which they have realized fair returns. 
 The transportation of articles of commerce has been chief! y carried 
 on by Americans in American ships. 
 
25 
 
 The statement of Mr. Daggett, already referred to, estimates the 
 amount of American capital invested in the Hawaiian Islands in 
 sugar production alone at $10,235,464 in 1883. Mr. Frederick H. 
 Allen, former charg6 d'affaires of the Hawaiian government, in a 
 statement which has been' presented to the committee, makes the 
 following estimate of loans and investments by Americans, as they 
 were in 1882, viz : $3,200,000 in ships and wharves, $3,300,000 in 
 loans; and he mentions other lines of American steamers that were 
 then about to be put into that trade, so that American capital to 
 the extent of at least $20,000,000 has found profitable and perma- 
 nent employment in the Hawaiian Islands since the treaty of 1875 
 went into effect. The interest and profit on this sum will average 
 10 per cent, per annum, yielding $2,000,000 to our people. 
 
 Since the treaty San Francisco is, practically, the only direct 
 market for the productions of these islands. Mr. Comly, then our 
 minister resident at Honolulu, writing to the Secretary of State on 
 the llth April, 1881, says: 
 
 The showing for American shipping is gratifying. Not only have our shipbuilders 
 furnished nearly all the new steamers and other vessels introduced, and our owners 
 also transferred most of the bottoms which have changed register to the Hawaiian flag 
 under Hawaiian owners, but the bulk of all the trade between the two countries has 
 been carried under the American flag. Excluding whalers, out of 235 merchant vessels 
 and steamers visiting Hawaiian ports 179 were American, leaving 60 only of all other 
 nations; total tonnage, 141,906 ; American, 99,619 ; all others, 42,302. These state- 
 ments include also all Hawaiian vessels sailing, foreign. The Hawaiian flag covers 
 coasting sail vessels, 42 ; steamers, 8; sailing, foreign, 14 ; tonnage, 10.148. Nearly 
 all these vessels are of American build. 
 
 He writes again, June 6, 1881 : 
 
 The influence of the reciprocity treaty upon the increase of our carrying trade be- 
 tween the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific coast, and upon the still larger increase 
 of our shipbuilding for Hawaiian owners, has been one of its most gratifying results. 
 ' * Three years and a half ago, when I first reported for duty at this post, there 
 was but one island steamer; now there are eight, and more ordered, every one of them 
 but one American built. The increase in sailing vessels has been still large]-. * * * 
 It is but fair and just to admit that probably all this increased demand for American 
 ships and shipbuilding grew out of the reciprocity treaty, and would never have ex- 
 isted except for its generative power. This generative power is reflex as well as direct. 
 It creates a magnificent increase of island products ; this creates, both demand and 
 capacity for a large increase of the import trade from the United States ; and these 
 combined create the demand for carriers under the American flag, and for American 
 factors, agents, bankers, insurers, and producers of almost every kind. 
 
 The trade with the islands is but a drop in the bucket. But compare the total 
 amount of her exchanges between the Hawaiian Islands with those between all other 
 countries and the United States ; then apply to this last the same ratio of increase in 
 our carrying trade and shipbuilding which we have gained here; the result, it seems 
 to me, would show that, under like conditions of prosperity everywhere, all fear of 
 the American flag disappearing from the sea might be abandoned. * * * 
 
 If our commercial policy with the Sandwich Islands is to be taken as only part of 
 a great system intended to take in and bind together all the two great continents and 
 their adjacent islands on our side of the world, it seems to me that there are such 
 grand possibilities to the near future of the United States in such a scheme as would 
 make the reciprocity treaty with these islands a conspicuous landmark in our com- 
 mercial history. 
 
 The number of steamers running between the islands has increased 
 since that date to ten or more. 
 
 The report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the year ending 
 June 30, 1883, states that the total value of all imports into the 
 
26 
 
 United States of articles free of duty was $206,913/289.47, and of this 
 sum there were admitted free of duty from the Hawaiian Islands, 
 under the treaty of 1875, imports to the value of $8,029,835.18. 
 
 Our exports to those islands for the same period were $3,811,913, 
 of which $35,848 were coin and bullion, while our imports of coin 
 and bullion were $42,847, showing nearly an equal export and im- 
 port of coin and bullion. 
 
 There appears, therefore, an excess of imports over exports of 
 $4,217,922.18. This is practically the sum that we admit free of duty 
 from the Hawaiian Islands, the rest having been set off by the im- 
 portation, free of duty, into that country. 
 
 The revenue on this small balance is an inconsiderable item when 
 compared with the $206,913,298 of annual importations which we 
 have put on our free list for the bettering of the condition of our 
 people at large. 
 
 But this apparent balance in the exchange of commodities in sub- 
 stance represents only the profits and gains of our own people em- 
 ployed in agriculture, navigation, and in trade and financial deal- 
 ings with the Hawaiian people. 
 
 The interest and profits on the $20,000,000 of investments in those 
 islands, and in wharves and ships and loans, calculated at a rate 
 lower than is in fact obtained, are $2,000,000. The freights, insur- 
 ance, and handling of produce interchanged, mostly of heavy com- 
 modities, amounting in value to $11,841,748, at 10 per cent., which 
 is far below the actual cost, are $1,184,174, and the commissions, 
 earned almost exclusively by our own people, at 5 per cent., are 
 $592,087.40, and, if the profits to our merchants are only 5 per cent., 
 that sum is $592,087.40 ; in all, $4,368,348. 
 
 This is the actual state of trade, which accounts for the fact that 
 with an apparent annual balance against us of over $4,000,000 we 
 are not called upon to ship coin or to transmit exchange to Hawaii 
 to pay it. It is paid to our own people. The reverse of this is true 
 of our trade with England. During the last fiscal year the apparent 
 difference in our favor between the value of exports and imports to 
 England was $197,047,224 ; but England transported 85 per cent, of 
 our commerce, and the freights, insurance, and other charges which 
 we paid to her people reduced the actual balance of trade in our 
 favor to less than $100,000,000. What we export to Hawaii is con- 
 sumed there, and amounts to $45.44 per capita, while our imports 
 from that country amount to 60 cents per capita of our population. 
 
 These advantages of trade, which we gain through our control of 
 the commerce of these islands, are of much greater value to us than 
 the amount of revenue we could have possibly collected on the goods 
 admitted under this treaty free of duty. This trade, including ex- 
 ports and imports, was in 1875 $1,922,555. In the absence of the 
 treaty there is no reasonable ground for supposing that it would 
 have increased greatly, if at all ; but in 1883 it has increased to 
 $12,004,526, and the treaty is justly entitled to be credited with 
 nearly the entire increase. 
 
 If we take the trade of 1883 as the basis on which to estimate the 
 
loss of revenue, instead of the trade of 1875, which would be about 
 the true basis, still this loss of revenue enriches our own people, both 
 because we are the creditor country and handle this commerce and 
 because the taxes we remit are upon articles that are consumed by 
 our own people. 
 
 If these islands furnish one-tenth of the sugar we consume, being 
 admitted free of duty, it creates competition to that extent, which 
 should correspondingly reduce the price. The necessity of reducing 
 our present excessive revenues has earnestly engaged the attention 
 of Congress for some time past, and if the entire customs duties 
 which we could derive from articles of prime necessity imported 
 from the Sandwich Islands should be remitted, the policy would be 
 exactly in line with that which our redundant revenue is compelling 
 us to adopt. 
 
 The most urgent complaints against this treaty are that it admits 
 sugar and rice free of duty, these being productions that are grown 
 to some extent in the United States. 
 
 A sufficient answer to these objections is found in the fact that 
 there are no sugar or rice lands of any consequence in the United 
 States west of the Rocky Mountains, and it is at least just to that 
 important region that it should enjoy the means of obtaining these 
 supplies on equal terms with the country east of those mountains. 
 
 The overland freights on Louisiana sugars exclude them from 
 California and Oregon, and the Pacific States are therefore com- 
 pelled to look to the Hawaiian Islands for their chief supply. With- 
 out this treaty they must import their sugars, under a heavy duty, 
 from Hawaii, the nearest and cheapest market, and pay for them in 
 money or in goods also taxed in that country, while the States east 
 of the Rocky Mountains can exchange their untaxed commodities 
 with Louisiana for all the sugar that State can produce. 
 
 Louisiana, in 1880, produced 171,706 hogsheads of sugar, and the 
 other States 7,166; total, 178,872. In 1883 the entire sugar produc- 
 tion from cane is estimated at 180,000 hogsheads, or 180,000,000 
 pounds, which is equal to about 3.25 pounds per capita. Add to 
 this the importations from Hawaii, 106,181,858 pounds, and the 
 total of untaxed cane sugar consumed by our people is 286,181,858 
 pounds. The amount per capita is 5.20 pounds. The per capita 
 consumption of sugar in the United States is about 36 pounds, so 
 that only one-seventh of the amount is on the footing of home pro- 
 duction, for which we pay with our other productions. The other 
 six-sevenths cost us $91,406,717, and the duty added of $46,172,378.85; 
 total cost, $137,579,095. 
 
 To pay for this we send to Cuba $50,440,831 in money, that being 
 the excess of our imports over our exports, and we send money in 
 about the same proportion to all other sugar-producing countries. 
 
 The entire balance of trade against the United States in all the 
 countries from which we imported sugar was, on the 30th of June, 
 1882, $113,674,356. Of this entire sum nothing was paid for with 
 our own productions except $4,295,519, the balance in favor of Ha- 
 waii, and all of that was paid to our own people except $958,000, 
 
28 
 
 which was paid to Hawaii in foreign exchange bought from our 
 bankers. 
 
 These statements establish the fact that, in proportion to its amount, 
 the Hawaiian trade is far the most profitable that we have with any 
 country. 
 
 In the report of the Committee on Finance to the Senate, made 
 on the 27th February, 1883, complaint is made of violations of the 
 Hawaiian treaty by the importations of sugars from other countries 
 through that country, and that sugars have been fraudulently im- 
 ported of higher grade than are described in the treaty as 
 
 Muscovado, brown, and all other unrefined sugars commonly imported from the 
 Hawaiian Islands and now (1875) known in the market of Sari Francisco and Port- 
 land as Sandwich Island sugars. 
 
 It is our fault, and not that of the treaty, if we permit it to be 
 violated by our own officers in our own ports. But these accusa- 
 tions, whether against the Hawaiian Government or our own, have 
 been thoroughly disproved by the report of the commission sent out 
 to the Hawaiian Islands in May, 1883, by our Secretary of the Treas- 
 ury. The sugar refiners of the Eastern States, who were most earnest 
 in these complaints, selected one of the three members of that com- 
 mission, and, as they all agreed in their report, it is presumably a 
 full and fair statement of the facts. 
 
 As to the importation of sugar through the Hawaiian Islands from 
 other countries the commission say : 
 
 After a thorough examination of the matter, we are convinced of the utter im- 
 practicability of such operations. The formation of the islands is such as in itself to 
 forbid the successful smuggling of sugar. 
 
 The tables showing the quantities of sugar imported from the Ha- 
 waiian Islands, which accompany the report of the commissi9ners, 
 establish the fact which they state, that 
 
 It does not appear that there is any substantial difference in the character of the 
 sugars imported prior to and since the treaty, nor is there any evidence that the im- 
 portations under the treaty were not such sugars MS were "commonly imported and 
 known as Sandwich Island sugars " prior to 1876. 
 
 It is gratifying to find that our commissioners, after the most care- 
 ful examination of the grounds of these complaints, both in our own 
 custom-houses and in the islands, have been constrained to bear 
 testimony to the honorable conduct of the Hawaiian government 
 in the execution of the treaty of 1875. 
 
 The King of Hawaii has been earnest and faithful in his efforts 
 to remove all embarrassments that have stood in the w r ay of his 
 treaty engagements w r ith the United States. The remission of 15 
 per cent, of the duties fixed by the general tariff laws of Hawaii, to 
 satisfy Great Britain, was a severe draft on the revenues of the king- 
 dom. By this and other means our special treaty relations with 
 Hawaii have been recognized as being rightful and satisfactory to 
 other countries. 
 
 This kingdom, without any decided support from the United States, 
 has vindicated the principles of the treaty of 1875 in the following 
 
article in her treaty with the German Empire of 19th September, 
 1879: 
 
 SEPARATE ARTICLE. 
 
 Certain relations of proximity and other considerations having rendered it impor- 
 tant to the Hawaiian government to enter into mutual agreements with the Govern- 
 ment of the United States of America, by a convention concluded at Washington the 
 80th day of January, 1875, the two high contracting parties have agreed: that the 
 special advantages granted by said convention to the United States of America, in 
 consideration of equivalent advantages, shall not in any case be invoked in favor of 
 the relations .-auctioned between the two high contracting parties by the present 
 treaty. 
 
 More recently the Hawaiian government has made a treat} 7 witli 
 Portugal containing a like declaration. 
 
 It sufficiently appears from the facts thus briefly presented in out- 
 line that to abrogate our treaty of 1875 the Hawaiian government 
 would release these engagements with the other powers, and we would 
 abandon the concessions of principles so favorable to us in respect 
 of our peculiar political and commercial relations with the kingdom 
 of Hawaii, which are now firmly established. We would thereby 
 open the door to similar agreements between those countries and 
 Hawaii, under which they would eagerly seize the advantages which 
 we would throw away. 
 
 If we abandon the treaty we must also abandon the attitude we 
 assumed when it was ratified, that our national interests are so 
 identified with those of Hawaii that we cannot permit any other 
 nation to gain such control in that country as will endanger our 
 western coast, or seriously impede our commerce on the Pacific 
 Ocean. 
 
 Australia is anxious to gain the trade we enjoy with Hawaii, and 
 is but little further from those islands than we are. That continent 
 of great islands needs the productions of Hawaii as much as we need 
 them, and has many of the productions that we send to Hawaii. 
 
 The completion of the Canadian Pacific railroad from Lake Su- 
 perior to Puget Sound would induce the Dominion of Canada to 
 make most favorable terms with the Hawaiian government for the 
 trade of those islands. 
 
 A canal through the Isthmus of Darien would cause the Hawaiian 
 trade to seek better markets in Europe than we can offer for the pur- 
 chase of the goods she needs; so that every new route of transpor- 
 tation leading to Europe will put in jeopardy our trade with the 
 Hawaiian Islands, unless we continue and make permanent our ex- 
 isting treaty agreement. 
 
 Whatever objections have so far been found to the workings or 
 the results of this treaty are greatly overbalanced by the advantages 
 we have acquired in a national sense, and by the benefits to our 
 people of a profitable trade with the Hawaiian people, and by the 
 duty we owe the people of both countries to give certainty and per- 
 manence to the gratifying prosperity which this treaty has created. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 No. '.i2.J 
 
 LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 HONOLULU, October 13, 1883. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inclose herewith, from the Saturday Press of this date, a 
 statement of the principal sugar plantations on the Hawaiian Islands, embracing their 
 estimated value and the nationalities of their proprietors. It will he observed that 
 of the sixty-nine plantations named forty-eight are credited mainly to American own- 
 nership, with a valuation of $10,235,464, out of an aggregate valuation of $15,886,800. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ROLLIN M. DAGGETT. 
 Hon. FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN, 
 
 Secretary of State.. 
 
 [Inclosure in No. 92. From the Saturday Press, October 13, 1883.] 
 Statement of Sugar Plantations on the Hawaiian Islands, 1883. 
 
 Name of plantation. 
 
 Value. 
 
 American. 
 
 British. 
 
 German. 
 
 Hawai- 
 ian. 
 
 Chinese. 
 
 Hawaiian Agricultural Company 
 Planting interests 
 
 $Goo.ooo 
 
 150,000 
 10(1,1)00 
 50,000 
 240,000 
 170,000 
 200,000 
 175,000 
 360,000 
 100,800 
 600,000 
 :$oo,ooo 
 250,000 
 000,000 
 120,000 
 300,000 
 40,000 
 300,000 
 150,000 
 
 $565,000 
 50,000 
 98,000 
 30,000 
 240,000 
 170,000 
 110,100 
 175,000 
 324,750 
 62,300 
 500,000 
 151,000 
 250,000 
 428,514 
 120000 
 67,500 
 40,000 
 279,000 
 
 $35,000 
 
 
 
 $100,000 
 400,000 
 
 Halawa Sugar Company 
 
 2,000 
 20,000 
 
 $89,900 
 
 3,750 
 
 27,300 
 
 171,486 
 232,560 
 
 $27,000 
 7,000 
 
 21,000 
 
 123,140 
 
 51,000 
 
 
 Onomea Sugar Company 
 Paukaa Sugar Company 
 
 Honomu Sugar Company 
 
 
 "'"iisoo" 
 
 4,200 
 149,000 
 
 Wailuku Sugar Company 
 East Maui Plantation 
 Makee Sugar Company 
 Kilauea Sugar Company 
 
 Kealia Plantation 
 Lihue Plantation 
 
 Planting interests 
 Koloa Sugar Company 
 
 
 
 Planting interests 
 Prinoeville Plantation 
 
 Eleele Plantation 
 
 75,000 
 
 75,000 
 20,000 
 93,750 
 
 50,000 
 
 12,360 
 60,000 
 
 Planting interests 
 Kekaha Plantation 
 Planting interests 
 Waialua Plantation 
 Waimaualo Sugar Company 
 Olowalu Sugar Company 
 
 20,000 
 150,008 
 50,000 
 160,000 
 216,000 
 100,000 
 200,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 400,000 
 250,000 
 100,000 
 125,000 
 100,000 
 250,000 
 500,000 
 
 500,000 
 250,000 
 200,000 
 250,000 
 100,000 
 2,000,000 
 250,000 
 30C,000 
 200,000 
 300,000 
 500,000 
 200,000 
 50,000 
 150,000 
 150,000 
 120,000 
 80,000 
 200,000 
 200,000 
 
 
 56,250 
 
 
 
 
 150,000 
 6,000 
 49,000 
 
 74,500 
 
 Hitchcock Brothers & Co 
 
 200,000 
 500,000 
 
 Haiku Sugar Company 
 Pepeekeo Plantation 
 
 Alexander & Baldwin 
 Planting interests 
 
 250,000 
 100,000 
 
 '""r^ooo" 
 
 50,000 
 449,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 125,600 
 33,000 
 175,000 
 51,000 
 
 *250,00() 
 12,000 
 
 24,000 
 125,000 
 
 Kipahulu Plantation 
 
 Planting interests 
 Ookala Sugar Company 
 
 Kohala Sugar Company... 
 Pioneer Mill Company and plant- 
 ing interests 
 
 Grove Ranch 
 
 183,250 
 250,000 
 100,000 
 2,000,000 
 125,000 
 300,000 
 150,000 
 240,000 
 375,000 
 26,000 
 50,000 
 
 4,250 
 
 Waihee Sugar Company 
 
 Makee Plantation 
 Hawaiian Commercial Company 
 Waikapu Plantation 
 Hakalau Plantation 
 
 50,000 
 60,000 
 125,000 
 94,000 
 
 150,000 
 150,000 
 120,000 
 80,000 
 200,000 
 100,000 
 
 80,000 
 
 Star Mill 
 
 Hilea Sugar Company 
 
 
 Honokaa Sugar Company 
 
 Hawi Mill . . 
 
 Planting interests 
 
 
 Union Mill 
 
 Planting interests 
 
 
 Spencer's Plantation 
 Paauhau Mill Company 
 
 100,000 
 
 
 '250,000, Danish. 
 
:\\ 
 
 nf Siff/xr plantations^ <\<". Continued. 
 
 Name of plantation. 
 
 Value. American, j British. German. H f a " 1 al " Chinese. 
 
 
 $100 000 
 
 
 
 $100000 
 
 
 Wainaku Plantation 
 
 75,000 
 
 $37,500 
 
 $37,500 
 
 
 
 
 101) (Kill 
 
 39,000 
 
 25,000 
 
 $28,000 8,000 
 
 
 W Lidgate & Co 
 
 400,000 
 
 
 400,000 
 
 
 
 
 ICiO OIK) 
 
 . 
 
 160,000 
 
 
 
 
 250 000 
 
 
 250,000 
 
 
 
 Niulii Mill 
 
 80,000 
 
 
 80,000 
 
 
 
 
 ."JO 000 
 
 20000 
 
 
 ;JO,000 
 
 
 
 60 000 
 
 
 
 
 $60 000 
 
 Kamaloo Plantation 
 
 50,000 
 
 50,000 
 
 
 
 
 Meyer's Plantation 
 
 10,000 
 
 
 
 10,000 
 
 
 Waianae Sugar Company 
 
 170,000 
 
 96,800 
 
 ,1,000 
 
 :),500 t'>4,7oo i 
 
 
 Laie Plantation 
 
 75,000 
 
 75,000 
 
 
 
 
 Heeia Sugar Company 
 Reciprocity Sugar Company 
 
 200,000 
 80,000 
 
 100,000 
 10000 
 
 100,000 
 10,000 
 
 C>0 000 
 
 
 Huelo Plantation Mill and plant- 
 ing interests 
 
 150,000 
 
 
 100,000 
 
 
 50,000 
 
 Estimated value sugar interests in ; 
 the kingdom . 
 
 15,880,800 
 
 10,235,464 
 
 3,180,050 
 
 970,046 641,240 \ 
 
 560,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 October, 18*:;. 
 
 APPENDIX G. 
 
 Political Value of the Hawaiian Treaty. 
 
 The peculiar interest of the people of the United States in the 
 Hawaiian Islands dates back to 1820, when the first band of Ameri- 
 can missionaries went out to that then benighted country. 
 
 Through the unaided efforts of American missionaries the Gov- 
 ernment was brought up to a standard never reached by any other 
 savage race, and by their advice and influence the rulers were re- 
 strained and guided in the right way until it became a constitutional 
 monarchy in the family of nations. In the interim of passing from 
 ignorance and idolatry to knowledge and Christianity, the islands 
 were more than once threatened with and barely saved from the fate 
 of so many of the Pacific groups. Both England and France viewed 
 them with longing and jealous eye, and officials and subjects of both 
 those countries tried to force the native King into committing some 
 act which might be made an excuse for seizing the sovereignty. It 
 was due to the vigilance an dun tiring energy of the men who com- 
 posed that little band of American laborers in the cause of religion 
 and civilization that the schemes and intrigues of these designing- 
 foreigners were baffled and brought to naught. 
 
 When, in 1839, the French required of the King a deposit of 
 S20,000 as security for certain claims made by them, it was the 
 American merchants who furnished the money, and thus prevented 
 the seizure of the islands. And when, in 1843, Lord George Paulet, 
 in command of Her British Majesty's frigate Carysfort, demanded a 
 " voluntary" cession of the islands at his cannon's mouth, it was the 
 sage advice and admirable diplomacy of Dr. Judd, an American 
 missionary, which thwarted the object of the ambitious Englishman 
 and saved the little kingdom. 
 
A glance at the map of the North Pacific Ocean should be enough 
 to convince any one of the political and commercial importance of 
 these islands to the United States. If they were situated in the At- 
 lantic as they are in the Pacific, and the center of political and com- 
 mercial influences equally important to our Eastern coast, secured 
 by a treaty that had been acquiesced in by the great European 
 powers, would any American statesman propose to abrogate such 
 treaty and cast them adrift because of the remission of duty upon 
 fifty thousand tons of sugar per annum? 
 
 How much did it cost this country and prolong the civil war that 
 Nassau and other islands in the Atlantic were under foreign con- 
 trol? 
 
 The growing importance of American commerce in the Pacific 
 was well expressed by Mr. Seward in his speech in the Senate on 
 that subject: 
 
 " Who does not see that henceforth, every year, European com- 
 merce, European politics, European thought, and European activity, 
 although actually gaining greater force, and European connections, 
 although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless ulti- 
 mately sink in importance, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its 
 islands, and the vast region beyond will become the chief theatre of 
 events in the world's great hereafter." 
 
 This political importance has been conceded by the opponents as 
 well as friends of the treaty. Hon. Philip A. Thomas, of Maryland, 
 in a speech in opposition to the treaty, said : 
 
 "Great Britain, they say, will seize upon these islands if the treaty 
 does not become the supreme law of the land." * * * " They 
 forget that the 'Monroe Doctrine' is still extant in this Govern- 
 ment, and that that doctrine will be enforced against Great Britain 
 or any other power that may seize upon or attempt to hold these 
 islands. If the presence of any one of them there should prove to 
 be a standing menace to the vital interests of the United States on 
 the Pacific coast, or if possession were held with hostile intent 
 towards our country or its people, the policy of this Government, in 
 such an emergency, was foreshadowed by Mr. Webster, as Secretary 
 of State, in the administration of President Tyler, when, in reference 
 to these very islands, he wrote that 'the Government of. the United 
 States would look with displeasure upon any effort of any other gov- 
 ernment to acquire any preponderating influence over the govern- 
 ment of the Hawaiian Islands.' And, referring to the rumor then 
 current that the French would probably take possession of the 
 islands, he said that he ' trusted that they would not take possession, 
 but if they did they would be dislodged if it took the whole power 
 of the Government to do it.' Rest assured, Mr. Speaker," said Mr. 
 Thomas, " that the same policy will be pursued whenever Great 
 Britain or any other foreign government, with intent to destroy the 
 peace or menace the interests of our Pacific States, shall undertake 
 to assert dominion over the Sandwich Islands. They will be dis- 
 lodged if it takes the whole power of the Government to do it." 
 
 Did the gentleman count the difference in cost between holding a 
 
position gained and in dislodging another from such a position? 
 The Virginias naval demonstration alone cost five millions of dol- 
 lars. What would it have cost to dislodge Spain from Cuba? 
 
 The treaty was earnestly recommended by many of the officials 
 of the United States who had represented their country at the islands, 
 and by General Schofield, of the army, who had visited the islands, 
 and made a careful examination of their position and condition, as 
 will be seen by his letter, which is incorporated in the speech of Mr. 
 Wood, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. He writes 
 to the Hon. Mr. Luttrell, a member of the House, as follows: 
 
 ' "HK.MHjrAKTKKS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC, ' 
 
 "SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., December 30, 1875. 
 
 "DEAR SIR: Knowing your interest in the' subject, I venture to give you my views 
 in respect to the Hawaiian treaty, which is soon to come Before Congress for legislative 
 action. 
 
 The Hawaiian Islands constitute the only natural outpost to the defenses of the\ 
 Pacific coast. 
 
 "In the possession of a foreign naval power, in time of war, as a depot from which! 
 to fit out hostile expeditions against this coast and our commerce on the Pacific Ocean, j 
 they would afford the means of incalculable injury to the United States. 
 
 " If the absolute neutrality of the islands could always be insured, that would suffice ; 
 but they have not, and never can have the power to maintain their own neutrality, 
 and now their necessities force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve 
 their embarrassment. 
 
 "The British Empire, through its North Pacific and South Sea colonies, stands ready, 
 to enter into such an alliance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Aus-| 
 tralia to British Colombia. We cannot refuse the islands the little aid they need, and 
 at the same time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when we 
 must secure forever the desired control over those islands, or let it pass into other hands. ^ 
 
 "The financial interest to the United States involved in this treaty is very small, 
 and if it were much greater it would still be insignificant when compared to the im-1 
 portance of such a military and naval station to the national security and welfare. 
 " I am, dear sir, yours, very truly. 
 
 ."J. M. SCHOFIELD. 
 HON. J. K. LUTTRELL, M. C., 
 
 "Was/ihiytrm. I). C. 
 
 " Admiral Porter addresses a letter to the Hon. Mr. Wood, which 
 is incorporated in his speech in support of the treaty, in which he 
 fully sustains the views of General Schofield. The naval officers 
 who have visited the islands have been in accord on the subject of 
 intimate commercial relations with the islands, always bearing in 
 view their future destiny. 
 
 " The London Times thus refers to a harbor at the islands : 
 
 " The maritime power which holds Pearl River Harbor, and moors her fleet there] 
 holds the key of the North Pacific. 
 
 " Sir George Simpson, in his travels around the world, says : 
 
 " That this archipelago is far more valuable on this account that it neither is nor can 
 ever be shared by a rival. 
 
 ''These are the only islands which can form an outpost to the de- 
 fenses of the Pacific States. There are no others. They have no 
 rival ; and in this consists their great value. They are totally un- 
 like a single island in the West Indies as an outpost of defense. 
 
:U 
 
 " The following is an extract of the minority report of the Com- 
 mittee on Ways and Means, made in the House of Representatives 
 on the Hawaiian treaty : 
 
 "Much stress is laid bv the report of the majority upon the importance to the United 
 States of obtaining a foothold upon those islands in the interests of our Pacific com- 
 merce with the continent of Asia, and of our safety in case of future wars with any 
 great naval power. 
 
 " The undersigned are not insensible to these considerations. No European power 
 should he permitted to obtain the sovereignty of the islands, or to gain such influence 
 in them as to menace our security. To allow this would he contrary to the well-es- 
 tablished canons of American policy, sanctioned by nearly a century of traditions and 
 by the conceded maxims of international law. No European power can deny to us the 
 peculiar right to exclude them from possessing what would he a standing menace of 
 danger t<> its, and the possession of which, by us, would be no menace to them. 
 
 " The following extract from a recent report of Commodore R. W. 
 Shufeldt, of the United States Navy, on the commercial importance 
 of the Corea, present and future, in its relation to America, will be 
 found to be of great interest : 
 
 " The acquisition of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the treaties with Japan, Sand- 
 wich Islands and Samoa, are only corollaries to the proposition that the Pacific Ocean 
 is to become at no distant day the commercial domain of America. The Atlantic, 
 either by forceofcircumstanc.es or national indifference, has been given over to foreign 
 flags, backed by the immense weight of European capital, but under natural laws the 
 flow of comrnerce ; as of emigration, is from the east toward the west, and the geographical 
 position of the Tinted Stales, in conformity with this law. points to the Pacific Ocean 
 as the main highway of trade, and our country as the source from which the Oriental 
 nations must obtain whatever they need in the way of commercial exchange. In all 
 probability, within the next half century, the Tinted States will find its largest market 
 in Asia rather than Europe. 
 
 "The London Times of August 25, 1882, publishes a naval letter 
 from Hong-Kong, under date of December 19, thus: 
 
 ' It having been reported that a large extension of the Russian naval station was in 
 progress at Vladivostock, the place has been visited by Vice-Admiral "Willes, and 
 what he there saw has apparently made so much impression upon him that a long dis- 
 patch has been transmitted to the admiralty upon the subject. A new dock for repair- 
 ing ships and a slip for constructing small" armed crafts' are in hand. A factory for 
 the manufacture of torpedoes and additional batteries to strengthen the defense of tin* 
 place is employing several hundreds of hands in its construction. The Siberian flotilla. 
 instead of comprising, as in the past, two aged schooners and three obsolete gun-ves- 
 sels, now consists of two floating batteries, four schooners, and five gunboats of the 
 newest description. For the moment Russia appears to have abandoned her hostile 
 intentions upon Corea, but she seems to be none the less determined to constitute her- 
 self the leading naval power in the North Pacific. 
 
 "There are three powerful commercial nations that have large in- 
 terests in the North Pacific besides the United States, viz., Great 
 Britain, Russia, and China. France and Germany are a power in 
 the South Pacific. Jarvis, the historian of Hawaii, says: 
 
 t{ That they hold the key of the Pacific Ocean, for no trade could prosper or even 
 exist while a hostile power, possessing an active and powerful marine, should .-end 
 out its cruisers to prey upon commerce ; but once firmly established on them it mi^ht 
 put at defiance any means of attack which could be brought to bear against, them. 
 Hence the commercial countries have been jealous lest some of them should have a 
 superior influence. 
 
"General Grant, in a letter from China, during his visit around 
 the world, wrote: 
 
 " My belief is that in less time from uo\v than half a century Europe, will he com- 
 plaining of the rapid advance of China. 
 
 -:;- -::- # -::- -::- * -:;- 
 
 President Lincoln, in reply to an accredited minister from 
 Hawaii, said : 
 
 In every light in which the State of the Hawaiian Islands can he contemplated, I 
 it is an object of profound interest for the United States. Virtually it was once a \ 
 colony ; it is now a near and intimate neighbor. It is a haven of shelter and refresh- \ 
 ment for our merchants, fishermen, seamen, and other citizens, when on their lawful j 
 occasions they are navigating the Eastern seas and oceans. The people are free, and 
 its laws, language, and religion are largely the fruits of our own teachings and ex- ! 
 am pies. 
 
 But it may be argued that in face of the protest of the United 
 States no nation would take possession or strive to acquire superior 
 rights in the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 Suppose the commercial supremacy which Australia was rapidly 
 gaining in 1872-'3 had been permitted to go on unchecked by the 
 treaty negotiated in 1874, and the islands had become as thoroughly 
 Anglicized, as they are now Americanized, with what grace could 
 the United States have objected to British influence and control? 
 Great Britain always contended that she did not desire to annex the 
 Fiji Islands, but was compelled to do so to protect British commercial 
 interests that had grown up spontaneously. And with how much less 
 grace could the United States protest if they deliberately abrogate a 
 treaty which has given form and shape to the policy insisted upon 
 by American statesmen for forty years! Such an abrogation would 
 be a virtual acknowledgment that the policy was deliberately aban- 
 doned, after which it would not lie in the mouth of the United States 
 to protest against any other nation taking up what she had by a solemn 
 act abandoned. Such a retreat from the position now gained, espe- 
 cially in view of the completion of an isthmian canal, would be para- 
 mount to an abandonment of any hopes of commercial supremacy 
 in the Pacific. 
 
 If statesmen of the past had the prescience to foresee and claim for 
 the United States the advantages lying in the control of this group 
 of islands, with how much more emphasis should such control be 
 claimed by statesmen in this day when a canalis being made by 
 foreign capital which will debouche in the face of this group on which 
 the commerce of the East, which seeks the canal, must rely for a 
 port of supplies and repair ! 
 
 No new treaty which now could be negotiated would be likely to 
 receive the sanctions the present treaty has gained, and become a 
 part of the international law regarding Hawaii. 
 
 Says the Oakland, California, Times, December 18, 1883: 
 
 " On our Atlantic coast all of the near lying islands are controlled 
 by other governments. England dominates Jamaica and the Baha- 
 mas, Spain possesses Cuba, and Denmark St. Thomas, while Hayti 
 
36 
 
 is semi-barbarous. But on that coast our own Government is strong 
 enough in equipment, fortification, and resources to be more indiffer- 
 ent to such environment than it can afford to be here. Driven out 
 of friendly relations, which thrive on reciprocal trade with Hawaii, 
 our coast line will be naked to the ocean and defenceless, with not 
 
 a friendly port in the sea where an American ship can cast anchor. 
 #"* # * # * * 
 
 " The abrogation of the Hawaii treaty means the greatest contri- 
 bution in our power to offer to England's monopoly of the traffic, 
 the industry, the profits of the whole globe. We have stood guard 
 over those islands while they underwent the pangs of transforma- 
 ion from barbarism -to civilization. Commerce, under our protec- 
 tion, has transfigured them, and now they are in the last stage of 
 development in which they approximate our features and take on 
 the form of absolute assimilation, and we are asked to abandon them 
 and drop the profitable and ripened results of a third of a century's 
 care and culture into the waiting lap of England! 
 
 " The completion of the Canada Pacific railroad sharpens Eng- 
 land's anxiety to supplant us in Hawaii. She covets the island trade 
 for that Sound port which is to be the terminus of her Pacific road. 
 She seeks near our shores a naval station where her war ships may 
 shelter and her merchant marine find profit and protection. 
 
 " We have by wrong commercial policies abandoned the rest of 
 the world to England. We have given over to her the seas where 
 once we disputed her supremacy. Coast after coast and island after 
 island has been nailed to her empire until she has coiled herself 
 around the world like a serpent." 
 
 It may be asked, " How does this treaty secure to the United 
 States these advantages ?" The interpretation of treaties always 
 involves something more than the meaning of particular and iso- 
 lated articles and clauses. No statesman or diplomat can read this 
 treaty without recognizing at once the force and effect, the scope 
 and intent, of the treaty as a whole. It was more than a mere 
 commercial treaty. It truly puts the commerce of the two countries 
 on a satisfactory basis without embarrassing the revenue of Hawaii 
 to too great an extent, and is and will be so long as the high tariff 
 on sugar is retained somewhat favorable to Hawaii. If it were not 
 so there would be no excuse for the fourth article, which applies 
 only to Hawaii, restraining her from admitting free of duty the 
 goods of other countries, or permitting any other country to get any 
 territory or right to use territory therein. It is this fact that Hawaii 
 had a temporary advantage in the other articles of the treaty that 
 gives the fourth article its great force. This article was not carelessly 
 worded by the prudent and sagacious American statesman who 
 framed it. It was not intended to be offensive to the Hawaiian 
 king. Its effects were carefully calculated. . It was based upon the 
 idea of interfering as little as possible with Hawaiian independ- 
 ence so long as that could be maintained, but providing for the 
 direction in which the control of the islands should go when it was 
 no longer possible to maintain it. 
 
37 
 
 No greater testimony to the importance of the % treaty could be 
 given than that it was at once recognized by the quick appreciation 
 of British, French, and German statesmen, who made strenuous pro- 
 tests against it, Great Britain going so far as to say to the Hawaiian 
 government that they "could not allow" its provisions to come 
 into force. The Hawaiian government was involved in a long and 
 tedious diplomatic negotiation, extending over four years, with, how- 
 ever, very favorable results, Great Britain agreeing to the termina- 
 tion of one article of her treaty which was thought to be infringed, 
 and Germany agreeing that so long as this treaty lasted she would 
 not claim the same rights and privileges. It follows, therefore, that 
 so long as this treaty lasts the superior rights of the United States 
 have and enjoy the formal recognition of the powers abrogate it and 
 the powers would doubtless claim equal rights again. How far 
 these governments were influenced in yielding to the diplomatic rep- 
 resentations of Hawaiian statesmen by the hope that Congress would 
 abrogate the treaty cannot be told ; but that they would regard its 
 abrogation as a great gain to them there is no doubt. 
 
 In the volume of Foreign Relations of the United States, of 1878, 
 will be found an account of the difficulties met by the Hawaiian 
 government. There is no doubt, however, of the scope and intent 
 of the treaty in the minds of practiced diplomats. 
 
 Aside from this diplomatic view the treaty undoubtedly does foster 
 the silent but potent forces which mould a nation arid fix its destiny, 
 as it was anticipated it would do. Read in the light of to-day the 
 following remarks of Hon. Elijah Ward, of New York, in the Forty- 
 fourth Congress, on the subject of the treaty, show a wise and far- 
 seeing statesmanship as to how the treaty was to secure the advan- 
 tages aimed at : 
 
 " Mr. Speaker : I have observed with much pleasure that the con- 
 vention for the extension of the trade of the United States with the 
 Hawaiian Islands was advised in the Senate b} T the triumphant ma- 
 jority of 51 against 12 votes, and has been sent to this House for its 
 approval and appropriate legislation. It has become incumbent on 
 Congress to do whatever is fairly in its power to open or extend 
 markets abroad. This is one of the direct results which will be ac- 
 complished by the proposed treaty, and hence it should be sup- 
 ported by the representatives of the people without distinction of 
 
 party. 
 
 ******** 
 
 " The purchase of a preponderating interest in the Suez canal has 
 justly been regarded as a masterpiece of statesmanship and far-see- 
 ing policy on the part of Great Britain. Its object is to maintain 
 for that country its supremacy in oriental trade. I regard the treaty 
 with the Hawaiian Islands as scarcely less important to our people 
 than the control of the Suez canal is to British subjects. China and 
 Japan are among the chief fields for our commercial and manufac- 
 turing enterprise, and it is of the utmost importance that we should 
 possess adequate naval stations in the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 " For these reasons I regard the Hawaiian Islands, although no 
 
38 
 
 part of tliis continent, yet as commercially, politically, and in fact 
 as part of its appurtenances, and to be properly included in the ap- 
 plication of the Monroe doctrine, prohibiting* the intervention of 
 European powers in them. Of this it was well said by President 
 Johnson in his ruessage of December 5, 1865, that it has as law been 
 ' sanctioned by time, and by its good results has approved itself to 
 both continents.' 
 
 " It appears to me that however just and proper and gratifying to 
 an honorable national pride the Monroe doctrine in itself may be, 
 it is imperfect and little more than a barren ideality, unless, in an 
 enlightened self-interest, we associate it with a friendly care for the 
 commercial and material prosperity of the States we have so far 
 taken under our protection. If we prohibit the interference of Eu- 
 ropean nations with the States of this continent, shall we stop at 
 that point and cultivate no further increase of friendly relations 
 with them ? " 
 
 The activity of the partisans of British influence in the Hawaiian 
 Islands to endeavor to induce the Hawaiian government to with- 
 draw from its present engagements and accept the boon of cheap 
 East India coolie labor (now denied them), under British protection, 
 in place of the free market of America, shows that they still enter- 
 tain hopes of the abrogation of the treaty, the importance of which 
 British diplomats do not fail to see. Apropos of this the American 
 minister, General Comly, reported in 1881, under date August 29, 
 to the United States Government: 
 
 " I have had occasion formerly to report to the Secretary of State 
 the discomfort felt by the British Commissioner and other residents 
 here on account of the predominance of United States influence and 
 interests in the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 " The watchfulness of the Commissioner to find means of under- 
 mining this influence has been constant. 
 
 " There has been a systematic and indomitable struggle to force 
 the Hawaiian government into a convention for the importation of 
 East India coolies, so as to give the English a separate judicature 
 and furnish innumerable opportunities for meddlesome interference 
 with the internal affairs of this Government." 
 
 This warning called forth from Secretary Blaine two dispatches, 
 which laid down the position of the United States Government as 
 follows : 
 
 In Dispatch of November 19, 1881. 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 " But if negotiations such as you describe are really in progress, 
 you will ask for an interview with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
 and make the following representation of the views of the United 
 States : 
 
 " The Government of the United States has, with unvarying con- 
 sistency, manifested respect for the Hawaiian Kingdom and an 
 earnest desire for the welfare of its people." * * * 
 
30 
 
 " The Government of the United States has always avowed, and 
 now repeats, that under no circumstances will it permit the transfer 
 of the territory or sovereignty of these islands to any of the great 
 European powers. It is needless to restate the reasons upon which 
 that determination rests. It is too obvious for argument that the 
 possession of these islands by a great maritime power would not only 
 be a dangerous diminution of the just and necessary influence of 
 the United States in the waters of the Pacific, but, in case of inter- 
 national difficulty, it would be a positive threat to interests too large 
 and important to be lightly risked." 
 
 Again, more fully, under date of December 1, 1882: 
 
 " SIR : My late instructions, and especially that of the 19th ult., 
 will have shown you the deep interest with which the United States 
 observes the course of events in the Hawaiian Islands. The ap- 
 parent disposition to extend other influence therein on lines parallel 
 to or offsetting our own must be watched with care and considerable 
 firmness. The intelligent and suggestive character of your recent 
 dispatches naturally leads me to a review of the relationship of the 
 Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States at a somewhat greater 
 length than was practicable in the limited scope of my instruction 
 of November 19th. That dispatch was necessarily confined to the 
 consideration of the immediate question of possible treaty engage- 
 ments with Great Britain which would give to that power in Hawaii 
 a degree of extra territory of jurisdiction inconsistent with the rela- 
 tions of the islands to other powers, and especially to the United 
 States. With the abandonment of a feudal government by King 
 Kamehameha III in 1839, and the inauguration of constitutional 
 methods, the history of the political relations of Hawaii to the world 
 at large may very properly be said to begin. The recognition of 
 independent sovereignty by the great powers took place soon after, 
 which act on the part of the United States dated from 1844. Even 
 at that early day, before the United States had become a power on 
 the Pacific coast, the commercial activity of our people was mani- 
 fested in their intercourse with the Islands of Oceanica, of which the 
 Hawaiian group is the northern extremity. In 1848 the treaty of 
 Gaudalupe Hidalgo confirmed the territorial extension of the United 
 States to the Pacific, and gave to the Union a coast line on that 
 ocean little inferior in extent and superior in natural wealth to the 
 Atlantic seaboard of the original thirteen States. In 1848-49 the 
 discoveries of gold in California laid the foundation of the marvelous 
 development of the western coast, and that same year the necessi- 
 ties of our altered relationship to the Pacific Ocean found expression 
 in a compromise treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with 
 the sovereign King of Hawaii. 
 
 "Hawaiian interests must inevitably turn toward the United States 
 in the future as the present as the natural and sole ally in conserv- 
 ing the dominion of both in the Pacific trade. This Government 
 has on previous occasions been brought face to face with the ques- 
 tion of a protectorate over the Hawaiian group. It has, as often as 
 
40 
 
 it arose, been set aside in the interest of such commercial union and 
 such reciprocity benefits as would give Hawaii the highest advan- 
 tages, and at the same time strengthen its independent existence as 
 a sovereign State. In this I have summed up the whole disposition 
 of the United States toward Hawaii in its proper condition. The 
 policy of this country with regard to the Pacific is the natural com- 
 plement of its Atlantic policy. The history of our European rela- 
 tions for fifty years shows the zealous concern with which the United 
 States has guarded its control of the coast from foreign interference, 
 and this without the extension of territorial possessions beyond the 
 mainland. It has always been its aim to preserve the friendly neu- 
 trality of the adjacent States and insular possessions. 
 
 " The United States was one of the first among the great nations 
 of the world to take active interest in upbuilding Hawaiian inde- 
 pendence and the creation of political life for its people. It has con- 
 sistently endeavored, and with success, to enlarge the material pros- 
 perity of Hawaii. On such an independent basis it proposes to be 
 equally unremitting in its efforts hereafter to maintain and develop 
 the advantages which accrued to Hawaii, and draw closer the ties 
 which imperatively unite her to the great body of the American 
 commonwealth. In this line of action the United States does its 
 simple duty both to Hawaii and itself, and it cannot permit such 
 obvious neglect of national interest as would be involved by silent 
 acquiescence in any movement looking to a lessening of those ameni- 
 ties, and the substitution of alien and hostile interests. It firmly 
 believes the position of the Hawaiian Islands, as a key to the do- 
 minion of the American Pacific, demands neutrality, to which end 
 it will earnestly co-operate with the native government; and if, 
 through any cause, the maintenance of such position, neutrality, 
 should be found b}^ Hawaii impracticable, this Government would 
 then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking avowedly 
 an American solution of the grave issues presented." 
 
 This latter exposition of the attitude of the United States towards 
 Hawaii corresponds with the earlier announcement by Daniel Web- 
 ster, quoted in the statement by Hon. E. H. Allen, and with the 
 following extracts from the messages of Presidents Fillmore and 
 Johnson : 
 
 Extract from President Fillmore's Message of December 2, 1851. 
 
 * * :'f * * * # 
 
 " It is earnestly to be hoped that the differences which have for 
 some time past been pending between the government of the French 
 Republic and that of the Sandwich Islands may be peaceably and 
 durably adjusted, so as to secure the independence of these islands. 
 
 " Long before the events which have of late imparted so much 
 importance to the possessions of the United States on the Pacific 
 we acknowledged the independence of the Hawaiian government. 
 
 " This Government was first in taking that step, and several of 
 the leading powers of Europe immediately followed. We were in- 
 fluenced in this measure by the existing and prospective importance 
 
41 
 
 of the islands as a place of refuge and refreshment for our vessels 
 engaged in the whale fishery, and by the consideration that they He 
 in the course of the great trade which must at no distant day be 
 carried on between the western coast of North America and Eastern 
 
 Asia." * * * 
 
 Extract from President Johnson's Message of December 9, 1868. 
 
 * # * * # # # 
 
 "The attention of the Senate and of Congress is again respectfully 
 invited to the treaty for the establishment of commercial reciprocity 
 with the Hawaiian Kingdom, entered into last year, and already 
 ratified by that government." 
 
 # * * * * * * 
 
 "It is known and felt by the Hawaiian government and people 
 that their government and institutions are feeble and precarious; 
 that the United States, being so near a neighbor, would be unwill- 
 ing to see the islands pass under foreign control. 
 
 ' Their prosperity is continually disturbed by expectations and 
 alarms of unfriendly political proceedings, as well from the United 
 States as from other foreign powers. 
 
 "A reciprocit}^ treaty, while it could not materially diminish the 
 revenues of the United States, would be a guaranty of the good will 
 and forbearance of all nations, until the people of the islands shall 
 of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission 
 into the Union." * * * 
 
 There is probably little reason to fear that a policy of so long 
 standing is to be abandoned, but there may be clanger that the influ- 
 ence of sugar producers (who cannot be injured in the least by the 
 importation of the amount of sugar raised on the Hawaiian Islands) 
 may win votes enough to weaken the moral force of the treaty and 
 keep alive the intrigues of those who seek to undermine the influ- 
 ence and interest of the United States in the Pacific. 
 
 APPENDIX ' H. 
 
 The following abstract of Hawaiian and New York law r s will in 
 terest those who wish to see a comparison of the two codes : 
 
 HAWAIIAN LAW. 
 
 Civil Code, $ 1397- All minors above 
 the age of ten years may be bound as ap- 
 prentices or servants; if temales, to the age 
 of 18 years, or to the time of their marriage 
 with that age ; or if males, to the age of 20 
 
 NEW YORK LAW. 
 
 2 R. S., 3d ed., \ i, p. 215. Every male 
 infant and every unmarried female under the 
 age of eighteen (iS) years, with the consent 
 qf the persons or officers hereinafter men 
 tioned, may, of his or her own free will, I ind 
 
 years, in manner following : i himself or herself, in writing, to serve as clerk. 
 
 1. By the father of such minor, or if he apprentice, or servant in any trade, profes- 
 be dead or be incompetent, &c., then i sion, or employment, if a male, until the age 
 
 2. By the mother, &c. ' of 21 years, and if a female until the age of 
 
 3. By the guardian, &C. 1 8 years, or for any shorter time, and such 
 
 4. By the governor of the Island in which binding shall be as effectual as if tlie infani 
 such minor may reside were of full <i^, such consent must be given 
 
 4 
 
42 
 
 1. By the father of the infant. If he be 
 dead, or be not in a legal capacity to give 
 consent, then 
 
 2. By the mother. &c.; then 
 
 3. Then by the guardian, &c.; then 
 
 4. By the overseers of the poor or any two 
 justices of the peace or any county judge of 
 the county. 
 
 2 R. S., 3d ed., \ 28. If any person law- 
 fully bound, &c., willfully absents himself 
 without leave, he must serve double the time 
 of such absence unless he shall otherwise 
 make satisfaction, but such additional service 
 cannot extend beyond three years next after 
 the original term. 
 
 2 R. S., $ 29. If any person refuses to 
 serve, any justice of the peace of the county, 
 or the mayor, recorder, or any alderman of 
 the city where he shall reside, has the power 
 to commit him to jail. 
 
 2 R. S., $ 30-32. If any apprentice be 
 guilty of any misdemeanor or ill behavior, or 
 any master be guilty of any cruelty, &c., or 
 of any violation of the terms of the inden- 
 ture, complaint may be made to any two jus- 
 tices of the peace, or to the mayor, &c.. who 
 will summons the parties before them, and 
 examine into the grounds of complaint, and 
 if the same be well founded they may either 
 commit the apprenticed solitary confinement 
 in the common jail of the county for a term 
 not exceeding one month, there to be em- 
 ployed at hard labor, or discharge the offend- 
 ing apprentice from his service and the mas- 
 ter from his obligations; or, in case of ill- 
 usage by the master, discharge the apprentice 
 from his obligations of service. 
 
 2 R. S., 3d ed., 21 and 42. Upon the 
 death of any master, &c., the executors or 
 administrators may, with the consent of the 
 person bound to service, signified in writing 
 and acknowledged, &c., assign the contract 
 of such service to another person. If the 
 person so bound, &c., refuses to give such 
 consent, such assignment may be made un- 
 der the sanction of the court of sessions of 
 the county, &c., and when so made will be 
 as valid and effectual as if the consent had 
 ! been given in the manner aforesaid. 
 
 It is evident from the above that the framers of Hawaiian labor 
 laws were guided almost entirely by the New York laws in compiling 
 them, and in many cases adopted the exact words. 
 
 Civil Code, $ 1317. Any person who has 
 attained the age of twenty years may bind 
 him or herself by written contract to serve 
 another in any art, trade, profession, or other 
 employment for any term not exceeding five 
 years. 
 
 \ 1419. -If any person lawfully bound to 
 service shall willfully absent himself from 
 such service without the leave of his master, 
 &c., he shall be compelled to serve not to 
 exceed double the time of his absence, &c., 
 &c., provided always that such additional 
 service shall not extend beyond one year next j 
 after the end of the original term of service. 
 
 1872, Chapter XXXI." He shall be paid 
 wages for such extra time at the rate stipu- 
 lated for in the contract." 
 
 1876, amending \ 1420. If any such per- 
 son shall refuse to serve, &c., masters may 
 apply to any district or police justice, who 
 may fine such offender not exceeding five 
 dollars for the first offense, and for every sub- 
 sequent offense not exceeding ten dollars ; 
 and in default of payment thereof such of- 
 fender shall be imprisoned at hard labor un- 
 til such fine with costs are paid. 
 
 1872, XXIV. If any master shall be 
 guilty of any cruelty, &c., or violation of any 
 of the terms of the contract, &c., such per- 
 son shall be discharged from all obligation of ' 
 service, and the master shall be fined not less i 
 than five nor more than one hundred dollars, 
 and in default of payment thereof be impris- 
 oned at hard labor until the same has been 
 paid. 
 
 $ 1424. No contract of service made in 
 pursuance of sections 1417 and 1418 shall 
 bind the servant after the death of the master. 
 
 1872, Chapter XXXI. No contract of a 
 married woman to serve another shall be 
 valid in law, &c., and in case any woman 
 contracts marriage while under contract to 
 serve another, the marriage shall operate to 
 annul said contract of service. 
 
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 THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY 
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