A r~ A :sc ■^— .^ 5 — '. RE 2 GIO 6 . - i s LIBP 2 AR\ 8 =^^^ j> 4 . • HB 701 L25 • ■ 2$tfi» • ■■'■■ -^&^^s^v< 1915 NEW SERIES NO. 91 MARCH IS, 1010 BULLETIN OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY, ECONOMICS POLITICS AND HISTORY VOLUME IV NUMBER 2 THE PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF THE EARLY HEBREWS BY MARTIN ]OHN>AJjRlP , " V ^*'y <4 TgRfls ** ; APfl mm LIBRARY ■A < C PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY. KXft'A CITY ISSUED TWENTY-ONE TIMES DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR; "MONTHLY FROM OCTOBER TO JANUARY, WEEKLY FROM FEBRUARY TO JUNE. ENTERED AT THE POST OFFICE AT IOWA CITY AS SECOND CLASS MAIL MATTER IN THE SERIES OF RESEARCH BULLETINS OF THE UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND HISTORY PROFESSOR ISAAC ALTHAUS LOOS, LL.D., EDITOR THE PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF THE EARLY HEBREWS BY MARTIN JOHN LAURe' PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY. IOWA CITY THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL'S WRITTEN LAW * Covenant at Sinai MOSES Traditions Customs Precedents About 1200 B. C. J's Decalogue Ex. 34:10-26 C Code E's "Judgments" Ex. 21:1-22:17 E's "Words" Ex. 20; 22:18-23:19 800 B. C. D Code Original Deuteronomic code:Dt. 12-26; 28 700 B. C. Later Deuteronomic code : Dt. 4-11 ; 27 Supplemental (D's) additions 621 B. C. Josiah's reformation Ezekiel 's code 40-43 Holiness code Lev. 17-26 Priestly teaching Lev. 1-3; 5-7; 11-15; Num. 5; 6; 15; 19:14-22 600 B. C. P Code Priestly code proper Histories, precedents, and laws 500 B. C. Supplements to the P codes Precedents and laws 400 B.C. Adoption of new law book of Moses Oral or traditional law 300 B. C. Completion of canon of law Mishna or written version of the oral law 100 A. D. Gemara : fPalestinian Talmud i Babylonian Talmud 400-600 A. D. * After Kent, The messa/je of Israel's lawgivers, Tabular frontispiece. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Curious and interesting is the fact that the translators who gave us the English Authorized Version of the Bible did not find occasion to use the term "property" in the rendering of any word occurring in the Hebrew Scriptures. Scarcely less signifi- cant is it that notwithstanding the flood of critical literature upon the Hebrew Scriptures, one looks in vain for a treatise definitely dealing with the property notions among this ancient people. No article under the heading ' ' Property ' ' is found in any of the standard dictionaries or encyclopedias of the Bible. Nor is there, so far as the writer has been able to learn, a single work upon this subject in any of the modern languages. The enorm- ous critical activity expended upon the Old Testament has been confined almost entirely within historical and literary lines, treating the facts of the Hebrews' social life and economic con- ditions more as an incident than as a fundamental factor in the development of their great religious system. 1 Is it, then, that the ideas of property are wholly foreign to the Hebrews? The slightest acquaintance with the prophetic literature at once prevents such a conclusion. This literature is absolutely unique, and in no respect more so than with reference to the property notions there set forth. 2 Furthermore, it is well known that the outstanding historical characteristic of the He- brew race, second in importance only to their religious life, is their "keen appreciation of property." 3 What is the reason for this dearth of material ? "The Israelites possessed no developed theory or system of laws in regard to the possession of property. ' ' 4 This is undoubtedly one of the best answers that can be given to the question, especially because it 1 Popular and Critical Bible Encyclopedia, p. 861. S. v. "Inheritance." 2 Compare the interest of the Hebrew prophets in "the poor and needy" with the sentiments expressed in Plato's Re-public and Aristotle's Politics. 3 McCurdy, History, prophecy, and the monuments. Vol. 2, p. 208. 4 Kent, The messages of Israel's lawgivers, pp. 152-153. 4 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA indicates that "while they continued in the land of Palestine, economic and social conditions among the Israelites were ex- ceedingly simple. ' ' 5 But if we shift the emphasis from the theory itself to its development, we see that it is not the absence of property notions that accounts for the lack of interest in this field, but the condition of plasticity or flux in which we find these concepts. In the inquiry, however, into the genesis of property notions, these transitional changes which precede the final crystallization of a developed theory, are precisely what the student must look for. Therefore; this field ought to yield as rich a harvest as any other, presenting as it does the embryonic stages in the evolution of the concepts of property. Probably the most effective hindrance of a truly scientific in- terest in this line of inquiry is to be sought in the overwhelmingly theological and ecclesiastical coloring of everything connected with the Scriptures, and the strong bias with which investiga- tions have been carried on. 6 Still, while this has been going on and traditional authority has suffered, the inherent scientific value and the intrinsic merits of the Hebrew records have been revealed. 7 This is evident in the recent interest shown in the study of Hebrew history in its sociological aspect, where we are somewhat more fortunate in regard to available material than in the matter of their economy. The chief source of information in regard to the property con- cepts of the Hebrews is the Hebrew Scriptures. Such monu- ments as the Mesha Stone, dealing with Hebrew life in its form- ative period, are valuable. Assyriology and Egyptology, in such material as the Code of Hammurabi and the Tel-el- Amarna let- ters, throw light upon the social life in the ancient civilizations, but afford less direct evidence on the actual development of the property notions of the early Hebrews, and carry us back to a 5 Ibid. 6 It would be difficult to cull a more striking illustration of this fact than this : "Christian theology -with its bible has, for the last three centuries, been the worst enemy of science. . . It draws life on with a dose of stupidity not sufficient to kill it." Renan, History of the people of Israel, p. 50. 7 "The din and smoke of battle have hitherto almost completely concealed the con- tent and true significance of the Hebrew Scriptures. Attention has been focussed upon questions of date and authorship and the vital messages of the individual laws have been overlooked." Kent, op. cit. Preface. So also: "There is more material for biblical Sociology than for biblical Theology." Craft, Practical Christian sociology, p. 30. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OP EARLY HEBREWS 5 point where it is less easy to establish the exact connection be- tween economic concepts and social life. In the study of the relation and the interaction between social life and property concepts, it is absolutely necessary to accept the results of the modern critical study of the Hebrew Scriptures. Needless to say, without some hypothesis for use as a critical in- strument, to attempt the study of the development of the prop- erty concepts in the Hexateuch would be worse than useless. With such an instrument, however, the task is not impossible. This instrument is afforded by the developmental or documentary hypothesis. Based upon the generally accepted results of the so-called "Higher Criticism,'' this hypothesis embodies the re- search of centuries. Its validity is therefore assumed in the present inquiry. 8 Accordingly, the familiar sign, J., E., C, D., and P., indicative of the different document and codes, are adopt- ed. The order of their sequence is best seen in the accompanying chronological chart. The period, covered by this study, extends only to the D code, which it touches only in so far as it is neces- sary to substantiate conclusions not otherwise demonstrable. The absence of a fully developed property system among the Hebrews has an important bearing upon our study. It necessar- ily makes the investigation more fragmentary and elementary, but, compensating for this, also more fundamental. There is little doubt that the Hebrew notions of property take us as near the original source of the property concepts as those of any other peo- ple of which we know, and probably a little nearer. The Hebrew records and codes are not by any means the most ancient, since we have knowledge of codes, such as the "Code of Hammurabi," which in all probability antedate the Mosaic code by a thousand years. 9 But in this very document we have the fact clearly re- vealed that the antiquity of a code is no guarantee whatever of its primitivity. The Code of Hammurabi is very old in history ; it is very recent in the civilizational evolution. The Hebrew codes are late in history, compared with the Babylonian codes, but they are far more primitive as to their place in the evolu- tionary process. In no respect is this more evident than in the property concept. With the Hebrews we find it at first ex- 8 For a brief yet comprehensive summary of this hypothesis see Carpenter and Battersby, The Hexateuch, Vol. 1. 9 Most scholars place this code in the twenty-third century B. C. 6 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA pressed only in a custom; in Hammurabi in rigid statute law. The social usages whence that law sprang had been crystallized a long time before the compilation of this code, and it has no plas- ticity whatever. The legalistic rigor of the code of Hammurabi is as perfect as in the "twelve tables" of Roman law. But this is not all. The code of Hammurabi shows an almost absolute differentiation from ecclesiastical authority and ceremonial in- stitutions. And, most important of all, theocratic ideas, so fundamental in the truly primitive codes, have no room at all in the pure legalism of this code. The presence of a highly de- veloped industrial system is proved by its rigid laws of wages, iron laws, indeed, which are as noteworthy as they are conspicu- ous in this code. 10 The few volumes available on the subject of property in its genetic aspect deal with it mostly from the standpoint of physical and legal fact, rather than from that of its psychic origin and development in the social milieu. In the interest of such a dis- tinction the subject of this article was formulated ; singling out the concepts of property, rather than the mere physical reaction to economic conditions, which does not necessarily tell us much of the accompanying mental attitudes toward this phase of hu- man activity. The demand is for an elucidation of the property idea itself in early Hebrew society. That this can not be done without actual- ly tracing the owning-function as a physical fact is self-evident, but our aim is to distinguish, so far as possible, the psychical elements involved in the property-practices as they manifest themselves in the sources. This has long ago been done with reference to the God-idea of the Hebrews. Why should not the property idea found in the same sources deserve as close a study, especially since present-day civilization discloses to us the start- ling fact that the property-idea tends to a very large extent to supplant the real importance of the God-idea in practical life ?" 10 For a detailed study of this subject and the code in full, see Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible, Extra Vol., pp. 584-612. ill Compare with this the two-fold division of human society employed by Morgan in his Ancient society, the kinship and the territorial; that is, the bond of blood in early society is supplanted by the bond of property in civilization. This is his esti- mate of the importance of the property concept : "A critical understanding of the IDEA of property would embody in some respects the most remarkable portion of the mental history of mankind." P. 6. And W. Robertson Smith has this to say of the property idea, viewed from the standpoint of religion: '"We find . . . that as PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 7 If science be justified in tracing the mental content of the religi- ous concepts, it is surely its plain duty to try its hand at the disentanglement of one of the greatest problems in civilization, the property concept. Considering the fundamental nature of this subject in actual life, it may be well to give a concise definition of this concept. That of Professor Giddings is very satisfactory. "The idea"of\ possession, which originated in the instinctive assertion of own- erhip exhibited by animals, became in the primitive social mind the notion of property, or of property right, which is thus a pro- duct of two factors; namely, the assertion of possession on the part of the individual possessing, and the tolerance of his claim, or acquiescence in it, on the part of the community." 12 The purpose of the first six chapters of this study is to trace the development of the property concepts up to the Deuteronomic code. The seventh, or concluding chapter, is concerned with a correlation of this development with the changes in social life which occurred during this time, noting especially the influ- ences exerted upon these growing property concepts by changing social conditions. That changing economic conditions produced changes in social customs, traditions, thought, and institutions is not denied, but our chief concern is to show the influence of the complex of conditions briefly summarized under the term "social life" upon the property concepts, the belief of the writer being that other social factors, rather than the economic, play the predominant, part in the production of changed ideas con- cerning property. 18 This "intellectual factor'' in the institution of property, the following study is intended to illuminate. No apology is offered for considering the concept the most important element in this institution, 14 notwithstanding the fact that eco- nomic conditions furnish the only soil in which a property concept could develop, for "an entire science of abstract econom- soon as the notion of property gets firm footing, it begins to swallow up all earlier formulas for the relation of persons and things." — Religion of the Semites, p. 391. 12 Principles of sociology, p. 243. W In this position the writer is in hearty agreement with Professor Giddings. In his criticism of the phrase "subjective utility," defining this as "pleasure attributed to an external cause," Giddings says: "Unless this intellectual factor is included, the whole theory of utility, which has been constructed with so much labor, falls into ruin." 14 "This, then, is the key to the history of property as an institution — the growth of knowledge." Jenks, History of politics, p. 100. 8 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA ies cannot be regarded as precedent to sociology as a whole. Initial utility is antecedent to association, but association is ante- cedent to marginal utility, subjective cost, and subjective value. ' ' 15 Therefore, the tracing of the idea or the concept in this institution is of primary importance, for "whether or not notions of right and wrong begin to dawn in consciousness before any social relations are established, their development is the result of association." 16 15 Giddings, op. eit. pp. 44-45. 16 Ibid. CHAPTER II THE DIVINE PROPERTY-RIGHT The property notions that we meet in the traditional period are rather vague and obscure. One element, however, stands out in striking relief. This is the conception of Yahweh's property- right. It is prominent in the old ' ' Song of Deborah. ' ' 1 Here we find it asserted as the right of the victor over the captured. But the clear and unequivocal enunciation of this right we meet in the Little Book of the Covenant, 2 the oldest part of the C code. ' ' All that openeth the womb is mine e . . . . All the firstborn of thy sons thou shalt redeem. ' ' 4 This seems to be the first element of a definite property-right which has grown sufficiently articulate in the consciousness of the people, to be the fundamental stipulation in the epoch-making Covenant between Yahweh and the Hebrew tribes. Therefore, when we meet, in the E document, this divine command to Abra- ham: "Take now thy son, thine only son whom thou lovest, Isaac, .... and offer him for a. burnt-offering, " 5 it does not necessarily prove a universal custom of the sacrifice of the firstborn 6 but it does prove the recognized and unquestioned right of the deity to the firstborn of men. Hence the divine ownership of the firstborn is the most conspicuous element of the property- concepts and will serve as our point of departure. The development of Yahweh's property-right in the progeny of men may be traced from this earliest code. Here the com- mand is clearly expressed that the firstborn child belongs to Yahweh. It is probable that the story of Jephthah's sacrifice of 1 Judsr. 5:1 ff. 2 Ex. 34:10-26. 3 Note the simple mode of expression, "li," composed of the preposition with the pronominal suffix, meaning literally "to me." 4 Ex. 34:19-20. 5 Gen. 22:2. fi This is the view of Letourneau: Property, its origin and development, p. 206. "Jehovah himself, .... long exacted the sacrifice of the firstborn men, as well as of animals." 10 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA his daughter, 7 the slaying of the firstborn in Egypt, 8 and the child sacrifice of Ahaz 9 reflect the same conception. That this is a conception from a very early period in the history of the Hebrews is evident. In the last one of the above references, however, this practice is mentioned with reprobation. This change in the conception is further emphasized by the prophet Micah. ' ' Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul ? " 10 This question reveals two facts plainly. The one is the recognition of the old principle ; the other is the em- phatic reaction against it. Thus it proves the persistence of the practice down to the time of this prophet, and also the active agitation, on the part of the religious leaders of the people, against it. A little later the prophet Jeremiah speaks of this practice in more positive terms: "They have built the tower . . . . to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire ; which I commanded them not ; neither came it into my mind. ' ' " This is an entirely changed conception of the function of the sac- rifice of the firstborn. Indeed, the development has proceeded so far that the consciousness of the prophets revolts against the idea of offering to Yahweh any sacrifice whatever in the old an- thropomorphic sense. Therefore, we can say that the develop- ment of Yahweh 's property-right in the firstborn, so clearly set forth in the early code and in the traditional stories, has almost entirely faded out by the time of the pre-Deuteronomic prophets. The first distinctly expressed reference to Yahweh 's property- right in the captives of war and the devoted, occurs at the begin- ning of the conquest of Canaan. In a J document, the command is given by Joshua, in the name of Yahweh, to devote (sherem, to curse) the entire city and all that it contained to Yehweh, with the exception of one family. 12 A vivid description of the execu- tion of the command is given, and it is concisely stated that "they utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old." 13 In the same connection occurs the 7 Judg. 11:30 ff. 8 Ex. 11:4 ff. ; 12:29 ff. 9 2 Ki. 16:3. 10 Mie. 6:7. ii Jer. 7:31; 19:15. For a treatment of the Moleeh worship in general, see Hast- ings, Bible Dictionary, Vol. 3, pp. 415-417. 12 Josh. 6:17. 13 Josh. 6:21. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 11 J narrative of Achan's transgression and the punishment sub- sequently meted out to him, 14 which gives unmistakable evidence of the deep-rooted conviction of Yahweh's right to the captives and the spoil in war. For interfering with this right and violat- ing it Achan himself apparently becomes an object of it, and is consequently destroyed. In the period of the monarchy we meet the same fact. The divine command to the king, Saul, is even more explicit than the one we noted above. Here, the destruction of man and woman, " infant and suckling," is distinctly specified. 15 Saul spares King Agag and a great deal of the spoil alive and is therefore violently rejected from his kingship by Yahweh. Agag is "hewn in pieces before Jehovah," by the hand of Samuel. 16 A less drastic but equally significant reflection of this same right is seen in Saul's rash vow, which, but for the popularity of Jonathan, would have cost the latter his life. 17 Another illustration of this divine right is found in the narrative of the death of the seven sons of King Saul. 18 The divine oracle places the responsibility for a famine upon the sin of the dead Saul, in putting to death the Gibeonites, and as an atonement seven of his sons are de- manded by the wronged Gibeonites, who "hanged them in the mountain before Jehovah. ' ' 19 The divine right to the captives in war is fully conceded by the early prophets, 20 and in the late P code we find the principle formulated into a clearly expressed law : "No one devoted that shall be devoted among men, shall be ransomed ; he shall surely be put to death." 21 This would seem to indicate that Yahweh's right in men, captives, and those devoted increased among the Hebrews during our period. We may safely assume, however, that the clear line of demarcation between the Hebrews and the "nations" is operative in this concept so that the devoted person was either actually or fictitiously an alien. This is plainly indi- cated by the prophet Isaiah : ' ' For Jehovah hath indignation against all the nations, ... he hath delivered them to the 14 Josh. 7:20-25. 15 1 Sam. 15:3. 16 1 Sam. 15:26-33. 17 1 Sam. 14:24-45. 18 2 Sam. 21:1-9. 19 2 Sam. 21:9. 20 One exception is found in 2 Ki. 6:22. 21 Lev. 27:29. 12 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA slaughter. " — " For my sword . . . shall come down upon Edom, and upon the people of my curse.'' 23 Thus the "na- tions ' ' are in reality devoted, and the devoted person among the natives is one considered as "cut off" from his people and there- fore an alien. Besides, the enactment of the P code in this re- spect may owe much to the altogether new set of social conditions after the exile, in which the Judicial function existed apart from the property-right. Thus the difference between the develop- ment in the concept of the divine right to the firstborn and to the devoted is largely one of nativity and depends upon the growth of the national consciousness. The firstborn was always a He- brew ; the devoted a gentile. The divine right to animals is asserted in the Little Book of the Covenant. 24 The firstborn of ox, sheep, and ass, and all the males of the cattle are specified, with the requirement that the firstling of an ass shall be redeemed by a lamb or have its neck broken. In the Judgments of E 24a the commandment to give the firstborn of the ox and the sheep to Yahweh is repeated with the additional regulation that it is to be given first on the eighth day after birth. In the Words of E 25 this right is referred to in con- nection with the sacrifice of the burnt-offerings. This burnt-offer- ing, with its implied right of Yahweh to the sacrificial animal, is stated in the Noah story of J where Noah takes of every clean beast and of every clean fowl, to offer for a burnt-offering ; there- by causing Yahweh to smell a sweet savor, and also to abstain from cursing the ground in the future on man's account. 26 The same idea meets us in the miraculous sanction of the divine prom- ise to Abraham, 27 where the patriarch in offering simply obeys the divine command regarding the animal ; so, in the story of the sacrifice of Isaac, 28 he is represented as doing in regard to his son. At the opening of the conquest the right to the animals is placed in juxtaposition to the right in men. The ox, sheep, and ass are enumerated as the animals devoted, 29 and later we have the camel mentioned in addition to these. 30 22 Is. 34:2. 23 Is. 34:5. 24 See chart, p. 1. 25 Ibid. 26 Gen. 8:20-21. 27 Gen. 15:9 ff. 28 Gen. 22:1 ff. 29 Josh. 6:21. 30 1 Sam. 15:3. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 13 When, however, we pass to the preexilic prophets, we find the conception of the divine right to animals no longer obtaining in its old sense. Micah inveighs against this conception in the same way as against the proprietary right in the firstborn. "Will Jehovah be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousand rivers of oil?" 31 The same conclusion, therefore, is reached in thise case as was noted in the right to the firstborn ; namely, that a change had in- tervened between the early period and the prophetic age, during which the anthropomorphic property-right had faded out. A survival of this concept in a changed form is seen in the follow- ing : "I will take no bullock out of thy house, nor he-goats out of thy folds. For every beast of the forest is mine, and the cattle upon a thousand hills. . . If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine and the fulness thereof." 32 The only reference to Yahweh 's ownership of the land in the early codes is in the form of a command to let the land lie fallow every seventh year. 33 The vineyard and the oliveyard are to be treated in the same way. This refers, of course, more to the use of the ground than the actual possession of it. Still it is to be noted that it refers to soil under cultivation, and in so far differs from the early concept of pastoral land to be had for the mere occupancy. 34 Land in the sense of ' ' country ' ' is stated to be the property of Yahweh in the early traditions, in which Abraham is represented as receiving the promise of the possession of the land of Ca- naan. 35 Later it is referred to as an inheritance. 36 That Yahweh was not conceived as the possessor of the entire earth at this early period is seen from a reference to another deity possessing the land but being driven out by Yahweh. 37 But it is land in this general sense of territory rather than land as "real property'' that forms the conception of landed values in this early period. The C code remains practically silent upon this subject, but the prophets revive the conception of the divine right in land in the most emphatic manner. But it is no longer an immediate 31 Mic. 6:7. 32 Ps. 50:9, 10, 12. 33 Ex. 23:10-11. 34 Gen. 13:9. 35 Gen. 12:7. 36 Gen. 15:8. 37 Judg. 11:24. 14 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA right that they assert. It is rather a sort of feudalistic tenure idea of land-ownership under the dispensation of Yahweh, in favor of the poor and the needy. 38 This is the view expressed by Isaiah who refers to the nation and the country as the vineyard of Yahweh and pronounces a woe upon those who disregard his supreme dispensatory right. 39 The prophet Jeremiah speaks in the same strain, referring to the land as Yahweh 's "heritage," his "vineyard," and his "pleasant portion." 40 The idea of divine ownership has developed into a certain right of control such as we find in the P code : ' ' The land shall not be sold in perpetuity ; for the land is mine. ' ' 41 The practice of private property in land has arisen at the end of our period, sharply con- flicting with this more spiritualized conception of the divine right, and therefore unsparingly denounced by the prophets. Aside from those already mentioned the things and objects in general which are specified in the Little Book of the Covenant as belonging to Yahweh are "the first of the first-fruits of the ground. " 42 A more comprehensive property-right in things is suggested by the significant sentence: "None shall appear be- fore me empty. ' ' 43 The first-fruits, with the addition of liquors, are again mentioned in the Judgments of E, but with the some- what broader designation of ' ' first-fruits of thy labors. ' ' 44 Chiefly in connection with the devoted thing is the divine right to personal property asserted. The city of Jericho itself and its entire contents are devoted. 45 This devotion goes so far as to in- clude the man who should attempt to rebuild the city. "With the loss of his firstborn shall he lay the foundation thereof, and with the loss of his youngest son shall he set up the gates of it. " 46 A similar but less definite right is set forth in the nar- rative of Saul's sin, in which reference is made to "the chief of 38 Cp. McCurdy, 07). rit., Vol. 2, pp. 200-202. 39 Is. 5:1 ff. 40 Jer. 12:7-10. 41 Lev. 25:23. 42 Ex. 34:26. 43 Ex. 34:20. 44 Ex. 23:16. 4."> If doubt as to the nature of this content should persuade one to exclude personal property, one is set right by a detailed description of the objects that caused Achan's transgression. A mantle, silver and gold among a variety of the spoil are specific objects that leave little room for doubt as to Yahweh's actual right in things. 46 Josh. 6:26. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 15 the devoted things," 47 which should have been "utterly de- stroyed." The right appears to have been absolute. Little is said of this right during the monarchy, but the prophets, while rejecting the efficacy of "ten thousand rivers of oil" as an offering still insist on the property-right of Yahweh to the things in their possession. ' ' I will devote their gain unto Jehovah," 48 and "Thy treasures and thy substance will I give for a spoil without price." 49 Yahweh 's right, to things, there- fore, did not fade out, but assumed the form of a control rather than of an actual possession. This development followed closely the development of the ideas of the attributes of the deity, from the anthropomorphic to the ethical conceptions. In the earliest period, as shown in the book of Judges, 50 pros- perity is defined as success in war. Later it becomes synonymous with property, and finally we find the conception of prosperity much in the modern sense. Property, in its earliest form among the Hebrews, was attributed to Yahweh 's blessing. The Cov- enant Code is silent with reference to it, but in close connection with the Words of E the following occurs: "He shall bless thy bread and water ; and I will take away sickness from the midst of thee. There shall none cast her young or be barren 51 in thy land; the number of thy days, I will fulfill." The promise af- fixed to the fifth commandment is similar. 52 The patriarchal stories are full of these references. 53 In these passages, cited below, the explicit reference is to property. In all these cases the divine favor is the direct source of prosperity. Hence we find a great value set upon the parental blessing in Yahweh 's name. 54 A further development of this notion is seen in the idea enter- tained toward the close of our period of a time when it should be the good fortune of every Israelite to sit "under his own vine and 47 1 Sam. 15:21. 48 Mic. 4:13. 49 Jer. 15:13. 50 Judg. 4 :23. 51 This seems to be one of the most important elements of prosperity. Note the frequently recurring phrase "Jehovah opened her womb" (Gen. 29:31, 30:2, 22 ff.). Especially the angry retort to Rachel by her husband: "Am I in God's stead who hath withheld from thee the fruit of the womb." Compare with this also the exclama- tion of Eve: "I have gotten a man with [the help of] Jehovah" (Gen. 4:1). r.2Ex. 23:25-26. 53G*n. 12:2: 24:1, 35; 26:12; 27:27; 30:27. 54 Gen. 27:12, 38. 16 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA under his own figtree. " 55 In this idea the emphasis lies in the contrast between the independent possession of the family in- heritance and the amassing of large private possessions which made the old distribution of the land impossible. These indi- vidual fortunes are not considered as having their source in Yahweh's blessing. Instead, they are summarily condemned by the prophets. They are no longer a token of Yahweh's favor; they have become an object of his intense displeasure. Amos first gives expression to this changed view. Appearing at the seat of the royal sanctuary, probably at Bethel, and speak- ing of the confidence which the people have in Yahweh as the source of their great prosperity in war and in wealth, he says: ' ' Woe unto you that desire the day of Jehovah ! Wherefore would ye have the day of Jehovah? It is darkness and not light. ' ' 56 The reason for this is their luxury 57 made possible by fraudulent practices. 58 Hosea represents these financiers as hurling defiant boasts of their success in the face of Yahweh. 59 Yahweh, however, analyzes the case and pronounces sentence: "According to their pasture, so were they filled; they were filled, and their heart was exalted : therefore have they forgotten me. Therefore am I unto them as a lion ; as a leopard will I watch by the way; I will meet them as a bear that is bereaved of her whelps and will rend the caul of their heart ; and there will I de- vour them like a lioness ; the wild beast shall tear them. ' ' 60 Isaiah pronounces a curse upon the wealthy land-owner, 61 and Jeremiah hurls the charge of greed in the face of priest as well as prophet, 02 Thus we see a development from the idea that Yahweh pros- pers Israel in war and then in material possessions to the con- ception that Yahweh blesses his people in a political or social way rather than in their material possessions. 55 1 Ki. 4:25; 2 Ki. 18:31; Mie. 4:4. 56 Am. 5:18. 57 Am. 6:4-6. 58 Am. 8:5. 59Hos. 12:7-8. 60 Hos. 13:6 8. 61 Is. 5:8. 62 Jer. 8:10. CHAPTER III SLAVERY The most prominent institution in the social life of the Hebrews was the family, and the fundamental element of the family was slavery. 1 It is the tap-root of the economic life, and serves as a cornerstone for the Hebrew civilization. The two earliest forms of property recorded in Hebrew history are animals and men. Among the Hebrews these two forms of property existed side by side with very little distinction, as the common formula for prop- erty shows: "Flocks and herds, men-servants and maid-ser- vants. ' ' 2 Keeping this in mind, we can trace the development of slavery from its early, mild form in the nomadic and pastoral period, through the increasing harshness with the rise of landed prop- erty, to the reaction under the preexilic prophets resulting in the legislation of Deuteronomy. 3 The property-concept, in this early form of slavery, was not only fundamental but also comprehensive. It included practical- ly every person, aside from the heads of families, in the Hebrew 1 "The vicissitudes of national life which induce and perpetuate slavery, bring us to the very root and fibre of the social system in Israel." McCurdy, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 168. 2 Gen. 12:16; 20:14; 24:35: 30:43; 32:5. It has been argued that slavery among the Hebrews was essentially different from slavery among other peoples, upon the ground that the Hebrew designation of a slave (ebed) denotes merely a laborer and not a thing bound or captured as the Greek doulos or the Latin mancipium implies. (See Spencer, Descriptive Sociology, No. 7, p. 4.) But this view is un- tenable. The annotation may differ, but the connotation of the concept of slavery has been identical wherever slavery has existed. This is abundantly proved not only by the treatment of captives but even more explicitly by the legal term for slave, as expressed in the C code (Ex. 21:21). "He is his money" is the short and concise definition of the relation between the master and the slave. The word used for "money" is keseph which means "silver." It is to be noted that this definition is given in the case of a master killing his slave, and occurs immediately after a strict limitation upon the master's right, thereby establishing the fact that the strong hu- mane element in the Hebrew slave regulations had other sources than a fundamentally different concept of slavery itself. 3 If this late reaction is placed as the basis of the Hebrew conception of slavery, and the Deuteronomic legislation — not to speak of the Priestly regulations — is viewed as prior to the abuses which it aimed to correct, then no clear idea of the property-concept involved in the Hebrew institution of slavery is possible. 18 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA population under the principle of the patria potestas. The wife and the children were as completely a property of the husband and the father, so far as the right of acquisition went, as were the hapless captives in war. Differentiation with respect to the right of use and of disposition, however, was early introduced. In this period, practically all the labor was done by slaves. 4 In the early stages of the institution, the slave was a member of the family, 5 occupied positions of trust, and could even possess property and reach affluence. 6 Thus, slavery was looked upon as the normal condition of social relations and involved no disgrace. The first method of acquisition of human property is generally conceded to be the capture of human beings in time of war. The traditional stories, notwithstanding their idyllic portraits of patriarchal life, clearly reveal that capture in war is one of the primary methods in the acquisition of property in men. When Laban hurls the strongest accusation possible against Jacob for escaping with the wives which he had bought, he has no stronger invective to use than that Jacob had ' ' carried away his daughters as captives of the sword." 7 This shows that the captive was considered the object of the most absolute ownership. The rea- son is not far to seek. The captor had a perfect right to kill his prey, which is usually done among savages, and we find abundant evidence of this practice among the Hebrews. The C code has not one line of regulation, far less protection, for captives taken in war. It is first in the D code that we find any sign of such a protection. 8 Though the nomadic and pastoral life offered less occasion for this practice than the conquest, still this right is viv- idly reflected in such stories as the J narrative of the destruction of the inhabitants of Shechem. 9 At the period of the conquest Israel exemplifies the fierceness of this destruction of the captives that fell into their hands, just as other nations have done at that stage of development. The en- tire people is represented as apprehending this fate for them- selves. 10 Gaining the upper hand, however, they are consistent, 4Gen. 3:17; 18:7; 24:10, 20, 26:15, 19, 32. 5 Gen. 24:2; 1 Sam. 25 :14-17. 6 1 Sam. 9:7-8; 2 Sam. 9:9-10. 7 Gen. 31:26. 8 Deut. 21:10-14. 9 Gen. 34:25 flf. 10 Num. 14:3. "Wherefore doth Jehovah brin See Keller, Homeric Society, p. 3 90. 6 The amoeba shows food-takins reactions "only in response to edible substances." Washburn, The animal mind, p. 41. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 69 entire group sanction this right so as to punish violations of the same? When these questions are answered in the affirmative the institution of property can be said to exist, when they must be answered in the negative we can not speak of that institution. This consciousness of a property-right is nothing else than the idea or concept of property. When this is present, the conditions above noted are fulfilled. For when such a concept is formed, customs supporting it grow up pari passu with its development and these are eventually transformed into law. Hence this con- cept or consciousness is the one essential in the institution of property. So fundamental is this concept that the witty Linguet tells Montesquieu, "L 'esprit des lois, c'est l'esprit de la pro- prete. " 7 Another scarcely less celebrated writer goes even fur- ther when he says: "Where there is no property there is no injustice. ' ' 8 We are reminded of the words of a later student in this field, ' ' This then is the key to the history of property as an institution, — the growth of knowledge. ' ' 9 2. The origin of the property-concept is social and rests on taboo. Clearly enough this concept, presenting the most difficult prob- lems with which the human mind is called upon to grapple, can- not be attributed to animal, or to savage society. All that we can claim to know about this phenomenon in such a realm is that of conscious function. But as the conscious function of mating among animals never developed into an "institution of mar- riage" in animal society, even so the owning function never de- veloped into an institution of property. Individual conscious- ness alone, even though it be capable of conceiving the right of owning, is inadequate to explain this concept. An individual might claim the right, but what would insure the respect for his claim as a right ? What would bring about the universal sanc- tion? 10 For this result we must have something more than in- dividual consciousness, we must have a group of individuals with a consciousness of kind and also a consciousness of their like- mindedness in association. It is precisely at this point where the organism, social-contract-imitation-and suggestion-theories of so- ciety break down in the search for the origin of the institution of 7 Cited by Lafargue, Evolution of property, p. 58. 8 Locke, Essay on human under standing, Book 4, Ch. 3, Sec. 18. 9 Jenks. History of politics, p. 100. 10 Cp. Maine, Ancient law, pp. 243 ff. 70 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA property. If they contained all the truth, individual conscious- ness alone would suffice to explain every phase of the facts, but they leave out the very important element which alone can ac- count for the concept of property, namely, that likemindedness which, being neither instinctive nor rational but "formal" or traditional in its nature, is based upon unquestioning acceptance of customary actions and ideas without discussion, and therefore alone explains the universal sanction of the right of property. Hence we are forced to commit ourself at the outset to the theory of "formal" likemindedness, if we are to obtain any light at all upon the origin of this institution. Discarding the broad field of genetic psychology, the question of origin of the concept of property is narrowed to the precise point at which we find the idea of property appearing in the de- velopment of this formal likemindedness in human association. Fortunately sociology has advanced sufficiently to establish a certain order in the rise and development of the ideas involved in the different social institutions, whether these be religious, economic, or political. This generally accepted order is well summarized by Professor Giddings in his "primary, secondary, and tertiary traditions." X1 To the primary tradition belong the initial economic, juridicial, and political notions; to the second- ary, the animistic, or personal, and the religious ideas ; and to the tertiary traditions belong conceptual thought, metaphysical phil- osophy, and science. That these groups of notions overlap and interpenetrate each other need not be stated, though the tertiary traditions are confined to civilized society. Quite naturally the student searching for the origin of prop- erty ideas, at once concludes that they are to be found in the pri- mary traditions. But this is precisely what we are guarding against by the distinction between the function and the concept. For these primary traditions, economic, juridical, and political, embrace the entire conscious function, irrespective of the mental content. Again, the basis of these traditions is force, not right. And no amount of force is capable of creating mental structure. The primary traditions furnish the soil but not the actual germ of the concept of property. 12 For this potential idea we must turn to the secondary tradi- 11 Elements of sociology, p. 147. 12 See pp. 7-8, footnotes. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 71 tions. The first notion we meet there is the idea of personality. This is the germ of the property-concept. Giddings defines this idea as "the sum of man's beliefs about himself and other beings as consisting of body and soul." 13 Does it really need argument to show that "economics" would be unable to produce an institu- tion of property without the idea of personality ? Probably the best definition of property ever given is that, "Property is the extension of personality." 14 But we must take a further step. In this group of secondary traditions we find the religious ideas. Indeed, animism, or the notion of personality, is in its rise always of a religious or, if preferred, superstitious, nature. This is the vitalizing element in the notion of personality that is ultimately responsible for the rise of such a notion in human society as a property-right. We have only to trace the different steps in the development of these religious ideas, so far as known to us, and to establish the connection between these ideas and the function of ownership, and the theoretical part of our task is done. In this sphere we have in rising genetic order fetich-worship, totemism, and the taboo. Fetichism is the lowest and most primitive of all known superstitions, apparently utterly irrational. Totemism is the ad- vanced conception of a sacred ancestry, but its principle is found in the function of kinship and consanguinity, and sustains only remote relation, if any at all, to economic factors. The taboo on the other hand, takes definite cognizance of personality, both in its protective and prohibitive function and in its mental content. Furthermore it deals explicitly with objects of economic value. This is positively the first point in the development of the formal likemindedness where we can demonstrate the actual presence of a concept which beyond all question involves the universal sanc- tion. Since this is also precisely the point at which the vital connection between economic function and the mental concept of unchallenged right is made, the working hypothesis is com- plete : Taboo is the first embodiment of the concept of property and the origin of the institution of property. Anticipating the conclusion from concrete data, the most powerful and conclusive proof that can possibly be given for the fundamental truth of 1'3 Giddinsrs, Elements of sociolorr?/, p. 149. 14 See Underwood's admirable treatment of this subject in his definition of owner- ship in Distribvtion of ownership, pp. 10-15. 72 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA this statement is the simple fact that it has remained such to the present day. The age-long struggle of society in the rationaliza- tion and socialization of the institution of property only reveals the dominance of the taboo in the establishment of the property- concept in human affairs. This is the conclusion drawn from the study of the develop- ment of the concepts of property among the Hebrews. It is the only rational explanation of the clear and concise ideas of the divine property-right, which we found to be the primary as well as the dominating principle in the development of the concept of property. It also furnishes us with a key to the well-known fact that the best proof of its primitivity that we possess in social in- stitutions lies in the prevalence and dependence upon ceremonial rites and theocratic ideas. The student finds that, in spite of the advanced legalism of the Hammurabbic code, enough survivals of these ideas are to be found in it to prove the religious origin of the concept of property. 15 But probably the best proof of the universality of this origin of the concept of property is the con- clusion of a student of this same idea among the Romans. Fustel de Coulanges in his Ancient city thus sums up the evidences of the origin of the property concept among the makers of the mer- ciless "Twelve tables": "In the greater number of primitive societies the right of property was established by religion ; " 16 and again: "Religion and not laws first guaranteed the right of property. ' ' 17 There are certain supplementary considerations supporting the taboo origin of property. If the origin of the institution of property is to be found in taboo, What of the apparently opposite theories that this institution had its rise in the social practices of seizure by force, habitual use, or production ? The answer is that these theories instead of contradicting the taboo origin, simply pave the way for it and lead up to it as its inevitable consequence, because these theories have explored the rise of the primary tra- ditions, or the origin of the economic function only. Seizure by force is undoubtedly the primary mode of acquiring property. But this does not involve any right. Its basis is power versus 15 See Code of Hammurabi, Paragraphs 131, 132, pertaining to the sacred oath and the ordeal. 16 P. 85. 17 P. 86. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 73 right, for these two elements arc mutually exclusive. It is the rise and the recognition on the part of the community of a right opposed and superior to power which constitutes the property- concept. The phrase ' ' right of the stronger" is a contradiction of terms. The property-right is the mental force which established the "owner" versus the "stronger." In like manner habitual use alone shows us another phase of the original function of ownership which does not need to be even a conscious function, much less involve any mental content. That the production of a thing should involve the concept of ownership can not be seriously entertained, since we are aware of a general rule of early society that "those who work cannot own and those who own cannot work." 18 The property-right based upon production is the great ideal of the property concept ; its terminus ad quern but not its terminus a quo. These different theories contain more or less truth, however, in so far as they answer the question "how," that is, setting forth the method of the incipient practice of the function of own- ership. The point in which they fall short is that they do not tell us the "what" of the concept of property. To answer this question we must have animism and the notion of personality. And this personality must be acknowledged by the entire com- munity with a sacred significance. Then, when these practices become pervaded by the superstitious sanction we have the insti- tution complete but not before. To use a figure, these practices are the material form requiring the breath of the notion of per- sonality to make them living institutions. This is precisely what we have in the taboo. In the writings of the majority of recent students of this phase of sociological inquiry we meet a somewhat instinctive perception of the intimate relation between the taboo and the notion of prop- erty. The differences of opinion appear very wide, ranging from the view that the taboo itself is the result of the institution of property 19 to the view that the notion of property is of a very recent origin, far removed and even opposed to the original re- ligious ideas. 20 The point of value in this divergence of opinion isVeblen, The beginnings of ownership, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, p. 360. 19 Laf argue, Evolution of property, pp. 17 ff. 20 Smith, Religion of the Semites, pp. 140 ff. 74 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA is the substantial agreement upon two facts: first, the funda- mental importance of the taboo and of the institution of prop- erty; and second, the intimate and vital union of the two. In these two essentials the most conflicting extremes touch each other and fuse into one. Failure to distinguish between function and concept is responsible for the divergence. The demand at this point of our inquiry naturally would be to trace the rise of the mental content of the property-concept to its origin in the same way as we have indicated the rise of the function of ownership. But this would take us into the heart of the problem of the origin of religious ideas, 21 which is obviously altogether too far afield. Therefore w T e are forced to take the taboo as the fundamental historical fact for our purposes. Two elements are distinguished in this concept, the notion of a magical "charge" inherent in things themselves, 22 and then the notion of a deity whose will is to be obeyed. 23 The former element plainly shows a relation to fetich-worship, while the latter sustains more of a relation to the totemistic notions. Instead of viewing these two elements as different varieties of the taboo, we will not go far wrong if we take them to be logical steps in the development of the system of taboo. The view here entertained is that the taboo is the outcome of man's innate capacity for superstition, the "awe of the unknown," for the expression of which environ- mental phenomena can show a series of rising gradations, but for the content of which we must posit man's psychic activity. 24 21 Compare with the familiar theories of Spencer, Miiller, Tiele, Smith, and others, the view held hy King, who traces the origin of the "religious attitude" to a "con- sciousness of value," bearing directly upon the property-concept. Development of religion, pp. 44 ff. 22 "At an early period the notion [of taboo 1 has a magical content: the tabooed individual or object is possessed of a certain magical awfulness or sanctity, is per- vaded with a dangerous contaminating influence, is charged with a deadly electricity which may be automatically set free by physical contact." Webster, "The influence of superstition on the evolution of the property-right." American Journal of Soci- ology, Vol. 15, p. 795. 23 "In somewhat advanced states of culture the penalty for breaking the taboo is commonly regarded as the vengeance of an outraged deity, who visits with sickness, disease or death the guilty individual." Ibid., p. 795. 24 "Like all questions of the derivation of institutions it is essentially a question of folk-psychology, not of mechanical fact." American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, pp. 354-'5. "When these f mental forces! are once developed, they lead an indepen- dent existence and constitute a superorganic or psychical factor as distinguished from the purely physical or the biological factors." "The Economic Interpretation of His- tory," I. A. Loos, American Economics Association, Series 3, Vol. 3, p. 387. "There is no property until foresight, begins," Underwood, Distribution of property, p. 23. Cp. James, Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9, the relation between prevision and mentality. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 75 The taboo, as it is here used, is the developed system in which both the magical and the deistic ideas are present, 3. Application or applicability of the taboo theory of the origin of property to the social conditions of the life of the Hebrews The theory of the taboo origin of property is implied in the Hebrew property-concept. It is a direct result of the religious phase of the social life. Its immediate basis is the consciousness of kind. Yahweh reveals himself in the very earliest of the doc- uments, that of "the little Book of the Covenant" as an owner, speaking in definite terms of proprietary right, "the first- born .... are mine." This assertion could not by any means be an economic or natural right since the subject is the idea existing in the likeminded consciousness of his worship- pers. 25 This fact therefore proves to us the social nature of the first property-right. But additional proofs of this meet us in the forms which the expression of their worship assumed. These forms were the conscious articulation of their community life ex- pressed in terms of supernatural content. In their worship two rites stand out in striking relief. These are the sacrifice and the ban or curse. Around these the social life of the people centered. It is in connection with these customs that we are able to trace the property-notions of the people. It is therefore necessary to understand the principle upon which these customs depend. The ultimate principle of the customs is readily seen to be the notion of holiness attributed to the tribal deity. In this one word "holiness" we have summed up the chief mental content around which were arranged the ideas involved in their system of re- ligious observances. Now, we find that this central idea of holi- ness contains exactly the same elements as the taboo. Even more than this, in the miles of this holiness we see the actual taboo in operation. "We have not only the developed element of a personal deity, but we have in the early stories the primary notion of an inherent magical content in things themselves. Therefore we are forced to draw the conclusion that the two notions of holiness and taboo are in the last analysis inseparable or identical. 26 Can 25 Of the reality expressed by this idea we are not concerned in this inquiry of a psychosocial nature. 26 "The rules of Semitic holiness show clear marks of their origin in a system of taboo. . . It is impossible to separate the Semitic doctrine of holiness and un- cleanness from the system of taboo." Smith, Religion of the* Semites, pp. 450, 452. 76 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA a clearer case of taboo than the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil possibly be cited? And is there in all literature an illustration of the breaking of a taboo conceived to involve more far-reaching consequences than this one? It played, indeed, a striking part in the development of Hebrew ideas, and upon none of these does it bear with greater force than upon the concept of property. For the ' ' fall of man ' ' was a breaking of the divine right of property expressed by the taboo, and this principle re- mains an abiding constant, working itself out in practical life in the development traced in the concept of the divine property- right. The ceremonies of sacrifice, the curse, and the blood- revenge, all depend upon the divine right to which the worship- per owes acknowledgment. For all of these were distinctly re- ligious duties with specific reference to the deity and hence sacred. To understand the real meaning of the divine property-right we need only call to mind that in the search for the origin of the notion of property it is not the things owned which give us the clue, but it is the answer to the question, "Who was the first owner?" that will take us to our goal, for it is seen at a glance that the owner is the exponent of the concept of property. Among the Hebrews we find Yahweh the first owner with an ab- solute right. The mode of expression of this right was the taboo involving the idea of holiness in the two forms we have noticed, intrinsic magic and divine will. At first Yahweh 's right was ex- ercised only for his own sake, later this right was utilized by the prophets in the favor of the poor and needy. The facts will be quite clear when we remember that at this early period no nice distinctions were held between kindred no- tions, such as we have in our text-books of to-day. We are forced to realize a sort of nebular chaos in primitive mental life, in which superstition suffused every relation with the rays of sanc- tity, giving a religious significance to every phase of experience. "There was no separation between the spheres of religion and ordinary life. Every social act had a reference to the gods as well as to man, for the social body was not made up of men only but of gods and men." 27 It is in society thus composed that we find the idea that the tribal god was the first real owner. This he 27 Smith, Religion of the Semites, p. 30. See Ibid., Lecture 2, "The nature of the religious community and the relation of the gods to their worshippers," pp. 28 ff. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 77 was because of the universal respect for his taboo. 2H Appeal was made to him by means of the oath and the ordeal. He was the great executive, whose mandates were carried out by concerted action. 29 Here is the basis for the notion of theft which is but the nega- tive phase of the property-concept. 30 Such religious origin ex- plains the universal sanction of the right to own, or the respect of property even by those whose self-preservation would urge a violation of it. 31 This would seem to be the ultimate answer to Sir Henr\' Maine's question as to the creation of this respect, 32 for in the god-idea we have the most indisputable evidence of the consciousness of kind known to early society and as we now have seen the property-concept is inseparably bound up with it. 4. The connection oetween this idea of a divine owner with the things owned and the reciprocal influence of the one upon the other. This interdependence or reciprocal influence can now be shown on a basis of our foregoing analysis. If it be true that "nothing could more clearly have been property than articles given by the community to its favorite leaders, " 33 we are forced to add, ex- cept the articles given by the community to its deity. From the standpoint of logic no escape can be found from this conclusion, or from the synthesis of the facts of early Hebrew history. The monumental institution of the well-nigh universal ceremony of sacrifice among practically all primitive peoples proves the funda- mental nature of the notion of divine ownership. We know the elaborate system of this institution among the Hebrews well enough to preclude the necessity of enlarging upon it. 34 Every 28 Smith, op. cit., p. 456. 29 Cp. the inscription on the Mesha stone, lines 14-18. 30 "In the oldest type of society impious acts or breaches of taboo are the only offenses treated as crimes: e. fir., there is no such crime as theft, but a man can save his property by placing it under taboo, when it becomes an act of impiety to touch it." Smith, op. cit., p. 163. See also footnote same page. 31 Cp. Loria, Economic foundations of society, p. 19, footnote. 32 Ancient law, p. 243. 33 Giddings, Principles of sociology, p. 242. 34 With respect to the explanation of the sacrificial theory we are forced to take issue with the late W. Robertson Smith whose very refutation of the gift theory of sacrifice fairly bristles with facts which prove the powerful influence of ideas of property in the sacrificial system. In point of fact, he proves their presence by the controlling influence which he ascribes as a veritable "swallowing up" of all earlier formulas for the relations of persons and things (Religion of the Semites, p. 391) to 78 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA sacrifice is a conclusive acknowledgment of the right which the votary voluntarily accords the being to whom it is offered. From the offering at the grave of ancestors to the spirits of the dead, shown in early animism, to the elaborate sacrificial system of the Hebrews, this principle ruled. When this right is absent or un- acknowledged, evidently there will be no sacrifice. 35 However, Yahweh's right to the firstborn and to the sacrificial animal is not the earliest conception of his right, for the first- born child could be redeemed. We see this also in the later mod- ification of this right by the eighth century prophets, when this idea breaks down. By the biological law which causes the char- acteristic latest acquired to be lost first, we are led to believe that sacrifice of children to Yahweh was an imposition upon the pre- Mosaic religion contributed by the association with peoples who practiced it. The terrible guerilla warfare of the conquest and the period of the Judges did not tend to create respect for human life. The tribes fought each other with the same zeal that they fought their common enemies. Established in the land and in close contact with the Canaanites, they gradually learned to rec- ognize their own identity as a people. In other words, they de- veloped a deeper consciousness of kind. 36 The very core of this was their common worship. This consciousness reacted against every practice interfering with the welfare of the people as a whole. Sacrifice was questioned as a meritorious rite. The de- struction of Hebrew children was summarily condemned. Animal sacrifice itself and even the sacrifice of foodstuff is deprecated. such an extent that "the introduction of the ideas of property into the relation be- tween men and their gods seems to have been one of the most fatal aberrations in the development of ancient religion" (p. 395). Had these ideas not been present in the system of taboo — this living nexus of nascent ideas — they would not have been able immediately upon their appearance to "play a leading part both in religion and social life" (p. 390). For a full treatment of Professor Smith's view respecting this prob- lem, see Lectures 4, p. 140; 11, p. 388; and "Additional Note B," p. 446, in the work cited. 35 Cp. Wundt's chapter on "Das Tabu und der Ursprung der Siihnezeremonie," in his Vdlkerpsiicholofrie, Mythus, und Religion, Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil, pp. 300- 364. 36 A picture of such a process in a religious community is afforded in Dr. Gillin's sociological interpretation of the Dunkers. Aside from the absence of warfare the principles here outlined offer many parallels to what the development among the Hebrews inevitably must have been. "Proximity emphasized unlikeness that distance hid from view. But becoming aware of the fact that they were unlike the other social elements, the Dunkers became conscious of a social likeness among themselves. This contact with others, thus, developed a consciousness of kind." The Dunkers, p. 108. Note especially the conclusion, pp. 226-232. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 79 Yahweh is no longer the tribal deity. He is the national God of Israel who has established his place above all the nations. Every votary of his is valuable, sacred. The poor, the needy, and the oppressed, these are also his people. Whatever militates against any class of Yahweh's people militates against him. The wealthy oppressors have revolted from him. They oppress the poor, Yah- weh's people. And worst of all they have robbed the people of their common inheritance, Yahweh's land. Hence they, the wealthy aristocracy, are Yahweh's enemies, and the poor and needy are the ' ' righteous, ' ' his friends. Such are the results of this consciousness of kind among the Hebrews and its influence upon the concept of property. Over against this decrease of emphasis on the divine right to native sacrifice we saw the right to the captive and the devoted increase during the period of our study. This opposite develop- ment would seem to show a deeper origin for the right to the cap- tive and cursed than the sacrificial system. The explanation of this is not difficult. Sacrifice was the voluntary expression of the votary 's recognition of the right of the deity ; a right, moreover, which we noticed as greatly modified hy the time we have it re- corded. Then again this right to the sacrifice involved only the god and the worshipper. No question of the relative right be- tween man and man entered in this system. In the matter of the divine right to the captive, the devoted, and the spoil we enter into a different and more primitive situation. Here we have the entrance of the idea that man may share in the deity 's rights to these things. For let this be remembered, that while the first owner was the deity, no deity ever exercised such a function. The function arose biologically in the struggle for existence be- tween living beings and nature, and then between living beings themselves. So When we come to search for the first glimmerings of the right to property between man and man we must find it where man conceives that it is his privilege to share in Yahweh's right to property. The bridge over which the Hebrew was enabled to pass from the conception that all things belonged to Y r ahweh to the concep- tion that he could share with his god certain goods is to be found in the second great ceremonial institution among the Hebrews, the ban or curse. This curse in the name of the god is in reality 80 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA the basis of the almost universal practice among primitive peoples of the blood-revenge. It is easily seen to be also the primary element in the taboo, conveying invincible, utter destruction to its victim, either by its own inherent deathly magic or at the bidding of an outraged deity. The fate of Uzza who was struck dead be- cause of merely touching the ark of God with the good intention of saving it from falling is a case in point. 37 The ark was holy, that is, taboo. To break this meant instant death. The two sons of Aaron struck dead for an unintentional break of a simliar taboo is another instance. 38 And at the giving of the law the express command given is "whosoever toucheth the mount shall surely be put to death. ' ' 39 Other striking instances are found throughout the period, but these are sufficient to show the nature of this primary element in the taboo, the deadly electricity, as it were, of intrinsic magical holiness. It is to be noted, however, that these cases show immediate su- pernatural interference. The curse as observed in operation during the early period of the invasion is exercised by man in the name of Yahweh, that is, by human instrumentality. Two elements enter into this. It is not only pronounced by man, but it is also carried out by man. Here is precisely the point where man began to share the divine right. He Who could pronounce the ban in the name of Yahweh shared the divine right in so far as he could justify his action to the community. Hence we find it used by the judges, prophets, and kings against their enemies. It is difficult for us to grasp its enormous importance ; the right, however, was never questioned. No sooner was it placed than its efficacy was proved. It brought about concerted action, as no other known custom was able to do, even to the extermination of an entire tribe of Israel at a most tremendous sacrifice. 40 If placed upon an individual or a nation, a native, or a captive, liv- ing beings or inanimate objects, its effect was the same, utter de- struction in so far as it lay in the power of the people to accom- plish such a result. No right could possibly be more absolute than this one. "We know of no other method by which a thing or a person could be more effectively claimed as the absolute and 37 2 Sam. 6:6-7. 38 Lev. 10:2. 39 Ex. 19:12. 40 Judg. 20:1 ff. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY EEBREWS 81 exclusive possession of Yahweh than this ban or sacred taboo. In so far, therefore, as man could assert h over against his fel- lows, this right rather than bruit' force, protected his possessions. This arose for the simple reason that the universal sanction neces- sarily outweighs individual interest, as is shown in the case of the defeat of King Saul in the face of the attack of the prophet Samuel in the name of Yahweh. 41 We have an important development to notice in this In r< m, or ban. While in the early period it means only destruction, in a later period it means a separation for actual service of the sanc- tuary. As such, this Hebrew word is also translated "conse- crate" or "devote." 4 - Thus the original deadly influence of the inherent magical holiness of things has, under the influence of an intensified consciousness of kind, passed into a conception of divine right of control for the purpose of active service. The right is as binding and as absolute as ever, but it does not always involve utter destruction but rather life-long service to the deity. This explains the difficulty in the case of Jephthah's daughter. Whether she was actually sacrified as a burnt-offering 43 or not is immaterial; she was devoted to Yahweh whether in death on the altar or in sacred service, and this conception made her taboo to men. 44 Thus, this custom explains the "vows" as being noth- ing else than the modification of the original divine right of taboo. We have now traced the divine right as far back as we can, and, in order to come to the purely "economic" phase of our sub- ject, we must direct our attention to the connection of taboo with the fact of actual possession. 5. The function of ownership in early society leavened by the mental concept of a divine right thereby creating the concept of personal property including the private ownership of per- sons and things. Three theories of the function of ownership were mentioned, seizure, use, and production. Which of these is the primary? The sacred custom of the ban renders the answer. It was the captive taken in war. The right of Yahweh to the cap- 41 1 Sam. 15:23. 42 Josh. 6:18; Mic. 4:13. 43 Judg. 11:31. 44Judg. 11:39. 82 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA tive actually continued and even increased during our period. It is upon this practice of capture by force or "adverse posses- sion ' ' 45 that the divine right first sets its seal. The wars of Israel were all holy wars. The captives were the possession of Yahweh, for they were under his curse or taboo. There is noth- ing in our study which is more conclusive and well attested than this. It is the subject-matter of the entire historical part of the early records. The total absence of any effort upon the basis of this divine right to soften the light thrown upon the atrocious practices of the Hebrews is eloquent. So deeply ingrained is this original divine right to the hapless captives of war that their destruction is the criterion of faithfulness applied by Yah- weh to his people ; 46 and so powerful is it that when King Saul fails in its enforcement the old prophet himself wields the weapon of destruction in defense of the divine right. 47 Acquisition by capture or adverse possession therefore, is the biological fact and the economic function, into which the mental content of a sacred sanction of a divine right breathed the spirit of life, and henceforth the more or less unconscious function be- came a living institution of property. Its expression was the taboo. The early codes testify to this condition for without their theocratic power they would mean less than nothing, be- cause the divine Will is their only basis and the divine power their only support. That this was in reality only the expression of the consciousness of kind, of concerted will, volition, and ac- tion in terms of religion, we know but this knowledge was not in the possession of society three thousand years ago. 48 Man was the interested actor, and, though he speculated as little about his ideas concerning the deity as he did about the fact that he had any ideas at all, the notions were there to stay and to leaven further the economic functions of man into rational in- 45 See Blackstone, Book 2, Ch. 1. 46 1 Sam. 15:19 ff. 47 Ibid., 15:33. 48 This view does not invalidate the "law which may be regarded as practically universal, that the religious conceptions of a people are expressed in forms which are modelled, in large degree, on those political and social institutions which the econom- ical conditions of their situation have produced" (Barton. Semitic origins, p. 82), but it exposes the half-truth of the mechanical economic interpretation of society by emphasizing the essence of mental content without which it is an absurdity to talk of an '"institution" in human society. According to biology, animal society has been in the field of experimenting with "the economic condition of their situation" ages before man. Where are their religious conceptions? PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 83 stitutions. The divine property-right to the captive, the de- voted, and the spoil, became exercised by human agency in com- munion with the deity, and so became the basis of man's property- right. It remains only to trace the influence of the sacred taboo on economic concepts by showing its relation to particular notions of property. In this development we have to take into account not only the owner but the objects owned. The prevalent opinion is that personal property, such as weapons, ornaments, and imple- ments, were the first objects of property. This is not necessarily the case. 49 As will be shown later, so far as Hebrew history is concerned, the contrary is time, that personal property grew out of property in human beings. Here the task is to show how property in persons, that is, slavery, grew out of the taboo. As we have seen, the earliest conception of the "curse" re- vealed in our Hebrew sources was that all the enemy, young and old, were to be slain, as "devoted," or sacred to the deity, and therefore were taboo to men. With the growing Hebrew consciousness of one-ness with his tribal God, Yahweh, there developed as a result of the conflict with their enemies, the Canaanites, and later with their stronger and more dangerous en- emies, the Syrians and the Assyrians, the feeling that they w T ere representatives of Yahweh and could therefore themselves use some of these devoted persons. This feeling had a basis in their communion with Yahweh in partaking of part of the sacrifices, a Semitic practice which antedated Hebrew history by a long period. This feeling of sharing the devoted with Yahweh was helped along both by the practices of primitive magic and by some of the most fundamental instincts of man, some of them economic and others biological. Primitive magic had led the victor to kill the enemy in order that his deity and ultimately himself as the representative of his god might obtain the valor of the slain enemy. But to the primitive consciousness the living enemy appeared to be an even more valuable trophy than the dead enemy. In the predatory life of the primitive horde the captive served to solve the food 49 See Veblen, "The beginnings of ownership, " American Jourhial of Sociology, Vol. 4, pp. 352-365. "It is difficult to see how an institution of ownership could have arisen in the early dars of predatory life through the seizure of goods, but the ease is different with the seizure of persons." P. 361. 84 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA problem. The male captive, however, was dangerous and there- fore seldom spared. It was different with the female. If spared, at least temporarily she could supply another almost equally necessary demand in the captor, the satisfaction of the sex- im- pulse, and this without losing her food-providing capacity. She catered to the desire deeply rooted in human nature for novelty in sexual relations. 50 Moreover, if spared long, she could add future warriors to the horde. She was more submissive, less dan- gerous, eminently useful, and from all these considerations a much more valuable trophy than the slain enemy. Hence we conclude that the first object of property was woman taken in war. 51 While in the earliest period all were slain for the reasons just noted, it soon came to be a practice to spare some of the "spoil." It is significant that it was not women in general but maidens who had ' ' not known man by lying with him ' ' 52 that were spared. Of a piece with this is the fact that the sacred harlots attached to the temples are never married women. Here, then, are the elements of the basis of property in persons: (1) the conception that all captives are sacred to the god of the con- querors; (2) the strengthening of the consciousness of kind be- tween the deity and the votary; and (3) the recognition of the opportunity thus afforded to gratify impulse. But why, it may be asked, was it the virgin rather than the matron in Hebrew history who was spared? Because of the in- fluence of the taboo adapted to the sex relations. What was sacred to the deity was taboo to man. The mystery of repro- duction gathered about it the mysterious awe of primitive peo- ples, and the sexual relation had in it something of the divine. It was easy for primitive man to adapt his conception of the divine right in certain men and things to the sex relations, es- pecially when male jealousy developed by the patriarchal family inclined him strongly in that direction. What was sacred to one group of men was tabooed to another, and finally what was sacred to one man was tabooed to every other, except upon the exchange of a purchase price. Hence arose private property not merely in woman captives but in virgins. 50 See Westermark, Origin and developvient of the mo-ral ideas, p. 371. 51 The facts noted in Ch. 3 prove this conclusion. 52 "But all of the woman-children, that have not known man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves." Num. 31:18. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 85 This right maintained itself unquestioned throughout the period, so that it is first in the P code that we find it implied that she who had been humbled could not be sold. Yet upon this prac- tice we are forced to notice the effect of the taboo before we can talk of woman as the actual property of man. For where this is not present and where no marriage rite makes the captive woman taboo to some men in favor of others we have complete promis- cuity which is the ' ' sheer negation of marriage ' ' 53 and of owner- ship as well. With this sacred marriage taboo we have the ownership com- plete. For this taboo was placed only upon woman — ■ man was, as we well know, absolutely free from any restriction on its ac- count — branding her, figuratively speaking, as the property of one or more men to the exclusion of others. Such taboo placed upon the captive woman marks the first recognized property- right between man and man. She was more than trophy of the dead enemy; she was a distinct personality by herself, which could not by any magic be incorporated with the captor's per- sonality, except by an abstract right of the taboo placed upon her which the community respected. This taboo placed upon woman has its origin in the divine right to the captives. Its origin is prehistoric, yet we possess suffi- ciently clear survivals to prove the case. Even so late as in the P code the conception of Yahweh's right to the female captives is definite and concise. Out of thirty-two thousand virgin cap- tives, ' ' Yahweh 's tribute was thirty and two persons. ' ' 54 Fur- ther we have the sacred prostitutes, kedeshah, literally, "conse- crated" or "holy." This consecration or holiness is only an illustration of the consecration spoken of above for service at the sanctuary. 55 The word used to denote such a woman is the same word that expresses holiness, but what was the exact rela- tion obtaining between the deity and such a woman we are unable to determine. Several instances of these survivals occur, 56 but bevond these we have the well-attested conviction of the direct 53 "Where the marital relation becomes very loose we approach promiscuity, or the sheer negation of marriage, as between all who are not separated from each other by any taboo. If such taboo also fail we get complete promiscuity." Hobhouse, Morals in evolution, Vol. 1, p. 14. 54 Num. 31:40. 55 "Semitic temples were thronged with sacred prostitutes." Smith, Religion of the Semites, p. 455. 56 Gen. 38:21-22; 1 Sam. 2:22; Num. 25:1-3; Hos. 4:14. 86 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA dependence of pregnancy upon the divine influence, and finally the divine right to the first-born, all of these things lending tre- mendous weight to the explicit reference to the sexual inter- course between the ' ' sons of God and the daughters of men. ' ' 57 In general it is noteworthy that in our sources we have no con- demnation of sexual immorality which does not violate a sacred taboo. It need scarcely be pointed out that the whole regulation of "forbidden degrees" of relation for intermarrying and the elaborate system of "cleanness and uncleanness" in the marital relation are distinct taboos, deriving their power from the di- vine will and the dread of divine punishment. "Without these they would be meaningless. Property-right in woman by means of the sacred taboo took place early, in the prehistoric society, for we know of no society where absolute promiscuity without any sexual taboo has at all existed. But so long as the nomadic life continued there were strict limitations even to this kind of property. It required the functional soil of economic production to give the impetus to the concept. When captive woman could be put to productive work, the beginnings of actual slavery sprang up. Then men and women alike became a valuable asset and were spared for the work that they could perform. We witness this in the vic- torious conquest of Palestine by the Hebrews. There was a change from the pastoral to the agricultural mode of life. This made profitable the system of slavery not only of women for pro- creative purposes, but of both sexes alike for agricultural work. Such is the real import of the C code, the first and chief part of which is the regulation of this property-right in Hebrew slaves. Another element, however, is inevitable in a society of agri- cultural slavery. This is the armed power strong enough to quell uprisings. While we do not read of a revolt of Hebrew slaves, we have rather ample evidence of the revolts of the en- slaved Canaanites. Militarism marked the development of the property-right in human beings. The popular leader at first was chosen directly by the deity, and this power gave him pres- tige. Warriors were at first the entire fighting strength of the tribe, but with the rise of serfdom society was divided in distinct classes and the cleavage of society began. The old patriarchal household with its small distinction between wife and concubine, 57 Gen. 6:2. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 87 child and slave, and its manorial mode of life which it was the aim of the armed power to protect and perpetuate soon felt the influence of the power it had created for its protection. The ownership of man on a large scale, at first practised on the basis of the divine sanction, gradually developed tendencies of antag- onism to the patriarchal mode of life and to theocratic ideas. The kingship completed the breach. Military power by means of the ownership of men became a menace to the theocratic in- stitutions. The institution of the kingdom meant the rejection of Yahweh. 58 A struggle began in which the military power only gradually made itself independent. The first kings were humbled again and again by the prophets. The institution of the right of ownership developed into the right of control by means of this property-right. This struggle marks the passing of the divine right of property into a human right. One of the most momentous changes in economic conditions which accom- panied this change, was the rise of cities and of centers of pop- ulation. Along with this and the subsequent expansion of in- dustrial activity the ownership of men by means of the owner- ship of their subsistence entered society, and the idea of control by means of industrial slavery Mas developed. The dazzling reign of Solomon, who was capable of fusing the old and the new concepts together, marks a turning-point in the development of the property-concept in Israel. National glory blinds the nation for a moment to the hopeless chasm between the military nobility and the enslaved serfs. But under all this outward grandeur the population is being robbed by the aristocracy. Reaction comes against the boundless property-right assumed by the nobility. Commercial activity with the idea of profit finally brings its share to the enhancement of the institution of ownership, and then capping all, private ownership of Yahweh 's land completes the institution of property among the Hebrews, and marks the climax of the development of the practice of the property-right. But this development of the practice does not represent the actual development of the concept of property. We must face the element, of the divine right, the survival of the origin of the property-right itself. For it is precisely in the indignant reac- tion of the eighth-century prophets against these very practices 58 1 Sam. 8:7. 88 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA of the private right of property that we find the actual concept of property revealed. The extreme function of private property lacks the essential element, the divine sanction. We may refuse to believe such a view as this, but, if we do we are forced to deny the facts. For so fundamental was this menace of unre- strained, unsanctioned practice of the private property-right that the downfall of the nation stands as a monumental ruin in his- tory to testify to the destruction it wrought. The ownership of Hebrew slaves recognized in the early code was gradually modified so that in the following D code woman enjoyed the limit of seven years servitude, as well as the man, if sold into bondage as a free woman. With the rise of a power- ful nobility the military power prevented the capture of wives, and the price was paid which later developed into the mohar, or dowry. This naturally made a greater distinction between the chief wife and the concubines. Yet the growing national consciousness recognized the native individual, and to a certain extent broke down the property-right in Hebrew slaves. The right to the captive foreigner is as absolute as ever, and the prophets accord it unqualified divine sanction. But the agree- ment of the nobility in the reign of Zedekiah to liberate all the Hebrew slaves marks the change which was occurring in the prop- erty-concept of the time. Hitherto slaves had been the chief objects of ownership. With the development of consciousness of kind, however, that form of property had begun to fall into disrepute. Now a new social cleavage was beginning to ap- pear, caused not by social differences at first but by economic changes. The people had become agricultural. Property in things had begun to come in as a substitute for human chattels. Thence came commercial pursuits and the changed concept of property which challenged the attention of those social conser- vatives, the prophets. The bulk of the nation was with them. The newly rich were the innovators and as such both they and their commercial practices call forth the 'fierce denunciation of the prophets. The control of the necessities of life, ownership of things as a control of man, has its strict limitations. Com- mercial activity for profit is looked upon with disdain as con- temptible, and the private ownership of land is summarily con- demned by the Hebrew prophets. This was the actual property- PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 89 concept, and the divergence between it and the practices is clear- ly seen to involve the original element of the right of ownership, divine right. This was the basis for the views of the prophets. After the property-right was established in captives we can easily understand its extension to things. But, as noted above, it is undoubtedly false to believe the property-right in things prior to the right in persons. 59 Private property in the primitive horde is almost unthinkable, since it presumes a highly developed and clearly defined idea of the individual, and, more than this, an explicit right as operating between these individuals. In the absence of this it would involve speedy and inevitable extinction, since the horde, torn by the dissension w r hich always follows private property, would prove a house divided against itself. "When we know that association itself and the unity of concerted action is a result of the struggle for existence, this notion of an original property-right in personal belongings falls to the ground by its own weight. In the primitive horde the individual was merged in the group. The horde was the unit. The notion of personality was hazy and vague. Hence the view of personal belongings as being a. part of the personality of the captor or user is undoubtedly the true one, when we remember that the question is of the concept of property — not its function. 60 "With this explanation we have a clue to the historical fact of horde-communism. If the group was the unit so that the indi- vidual, to all practical purposes, disappeared in it ; so did also his personality and its appendages. For any thing to be ''his" the individual had to be pitted against the whole, and we know what that meant in savage society, instant destruction. Another con- sideration of conclusive importance in regard to the priority of property in persons or things is that while we have an abund- ance of historical evidence for communism in things, 61 we know 59 "The appropriation and accumulation of consumable goods could scarcely have come into vogue as a direct out-growth of the primitive horde communism, but it comes in as an easy and unobtrustive consequence of the ownership of persons." Veblen, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, p. 365. 60 "It is a question as to the light in which the savage himself habitually views these objects that pertain immediately to his person and are set apart for his habitual use." Ibid., p. 354. 61 "It is commonplace to remark that- among the lowest races most economic goods belong to the community as a whole. The individual has only a right of user which has not as yet passed into a recognized right of ownership." Webster, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 15, p. 795. 90 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA of no society with absolute communism in women, that is, with complete promiscuity and a total absence of all sexual taboos. The most valued of all personal possessions, the trophy, may have a different meaning from what we usually give it. In a state of society in which "life" is a mere annotation, and all its connotations or elements are bound up in the nebulous chaos of magic and mystery, lines of demarcation between men and things are not as clear as they are to-day. Might not the death- dealing weapon in the hand of the hero appear to the superstiti- ous mind of the savage as a part of the hero himself ? And may not this view obtain in regard to other things of daily use as well ? In all probability things interred with the dead were interred With him because they were, to the minds of the survivors, an integral part of the dead man himself rather than his possession. 62 This would explain the trophy as a share obtained by the votary in the divine property-right. The weapon, as well as the teeth or the scalp, would be part of the enemy himself, and as a token of prowess or, more probably, of divine favor the warrior would possess the person rather than his belongings. This fellow-being himself would be delivered to the owner by magical power and be possessed by the divine right of the sacred taboo. In this way the "zone of influence of the individual's personality," the "quasi personal fringe" and the "penumbra of a person's in- dividuality ' ' 63 may be explained, and the hero would not only possess the others, but be considered to have increased his own personality by the powers of the other persons whom he had killed. This would be an "extension of personality,'' the rea- sonableness of which might be much more clear to the savage than the conception of corporate ownership is to many minds to-day. If this was the belief of primitive man, we have an ex- planation of the rise of personal property in weapons, ornaments, etc., in the fact that they had been connected with a person who was "devoted" and therefore belonged to his deity. That it was persons rather than things which constituted the first objects of the proprietary right we are fairly sure. 62 "Weapons, tools, articles of ornament and clothing, are commonly regarded by early man as an Integral part of the owner's personality; they are HIM almost as much as his bodily members." Webster, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 15, p. 799. 63 Veblen, "The Beginnings of Ownership," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 4, p. 360. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OP EARLY HEBREWS 91 We conclude that the property right in persons is the basis of the later property-right in things. That this right, like the own- ership of persons, should be based upon the divine right of the sacred taboo may appear absurd ; yet such is the testimony of facts. In the communism of the early group everything belonged to the group. As soon as the magic had advanced sufficiently to invest things with a supernatural mysterious power, these things became taboo. This is in fact the taboo as we know it, though we have failed to see its far-reaching importance. Then, when animism had proceeded far enough to render this magic the ex- expression of a divine will, we have the holy things, which are tabooed to the people and set off from the common things by means of this universally respected divine right. In this early communism, therefore, we find the condition that "what is not taboo is common and in this antithesis lies the germ of the con- ception of property as applied to many persons and things. Thus taboo became in many cases merely an assertion of proprietary rights. . . Isolation was the first object of taboo and this was the first stage of owmership." 64 That this taboo in its last analysis invoices the divine right is the best attested fact of our entire study of the Hebrew property-concept from Yahweh's right to the first-born among men and animals, his right to the captives and the spoil, through the entire list of objects, to its in- fluence upon the view of wealth. This is, as we have seen, their only sanction and their compelling power. The curse derives its meaning from this fact. The case of Achan's breaking of this taboo illustrates the divine property-right to things, 65 and the curse uttered by Micah's mother shows this right exercised by man. 66 This condition, so striking in the social life of the He- brews, is so because of the undeveloped state in which we find the concept among them. But it is seen to obtain everywhere, when investigated. "Throughout the lower culture we have abundant evidence that the private property of the living is fre- quently protected by the imposition of taboos." 67 Even the advocates of the old theories of a functional origin of the prop- erty concept realize this predominating influence of the taboo. 64 International Enrijelopedia, s. v. "Taboo." 65 Josh. 7:1 ff. fie.Tude;. 17:1 ff. 67 Webster, "The influence of siiperstition on the evolution of the property ri»ht." American Jnvrhtal of Socioloap, Vol. 15, p. 794. 92 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA "Among many rude peoples the statement that the property de- pends upon the user must be qualified by the exception that it may also be secured by taboo. Thus the legal conception of user may be reinforced by the magical idea of taboo as a basis of property. ' ' 68 Westermark, who traces the development of the property-idea by means of the legal conception of theft, fills ten pages with illustrations of this divine property-right as it has been discovered among the different primitive peoples. 69 In early group life personal property played but a small part. Among the Hebrews it was chiefly ' ' flocks and herds, silver and gold." "Men-servants and the maid-servants" were by far the most important. Yet with the ownership in persons established, the settlement in a fertile country with comparatively unlimited capacity for the productivity of slave labor, property in things soon acquired prominence. Moreover the military power pro- tecting the right in persons also made personal property more safe. One of the best testimonies to the fact that the property- right in things became so prominent as to show its power in the control of men, we have in the complaint of the prophets of the eighth century concerning the corruption of the leaders. ' ' The heads [of Zion] judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money. ' ' 70 With the rise of cities and industrial activity commercialism marks the culmination of the property-right in things by the well-attested idea of profit condemned by the prophet as plain stealing. Hence this function of the property-right was far from a right which had gained the popular sanction and cannot, therefore, be said to be an established conception of the property-right. The prophetic view of wealth proves this contention. 6. Ownership in land, or real property, is the last item to come into the hands of the individual. Not a word of regulation as to the right of man against man is spoken in the early C code. Yet in the still earlier Covenant code we have the divine right to the land intimated. Conse- quently, any objection to the theory set forth in these pages that the divine right was a derivative from individual right falls to 68 Hobhouse, Morals in evolution, p. 332. 69 The origin and development of the moral ideas, Vol. 2, pp. 59-69. 70Mic. 3:11. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OP EARLY HEBREWS 93 pieces. The fact is that the land of Canaan was conceived to be Yahweh's land, just as the land of Moab was conceded to Che- mosh 71 not only by the Moabites but by the Hebrews as well.™ Another fact is that this divine right maintained itself intact throughtout our period with this modification that it was viewed as a divine control in favor of the common people. Private ownership of land was a robbery of Yahweh's land held in fief by the people. 73 Hence the popular belief of the fall of a dynas- ty as result of a violation of the family inheritance, 74 and the actual destruction of the nation by this unsanctioned practice of the Hebrew latifwndia, the large landed estates privately owned. That this property-right in land should have its origin in the sacred taboo does not surprise us, since we find that in this period the very practice of private property in land is unable to gain the necessary sanction, and common family ownership still obtains. The conception of the earliest home of man in the garden of Eden is a fact which can only be explained by the principle of divine ownership. An abundance of evidence meets us in our sources that places where theophanies occurred are considered as the dwelling places of the deity and therefore they are holy, or taboo. 75 At these places altars were erected, which we know were taboo in the very highest degree. Nothing could therefore be more logical than the idea that the land belonged directly to the deity. Other natural causes tended to confirm this view. The mysterious force of fertility seemed to prove it. 76 So also droughts, storms, and all agents of devastations were conceived as plagues sent by the owner of the land upon its inhabitants. Thus it came about that the first owner of land was not the man who was able to see the advantage of owning it and therefore persuaded his fellow men that the land he had fenced in was his, as Rousseau would have it, but the first owner 71 See inscription on Mesha Stone. Hastings, Bible Dictionary, Vol. 3, p. 404. 72Judg. 11:23-24. 73 Cp. McCurdy, History, prophecy, and the Monuments, Vol. 2, p. 201. "He as the head of the family was the tenant of the Owner of the soil." 74 1 Ki. 21:3. 75 Gen. 22:2, 14; 12:7; 28:16-17; 31:48 ff . ; 32:30; 35:7. See further Smith, Religion of the Semites, on the subject of "Holy Places." 76 Cp. Smith, Prophets of Israel, who holds that even as late as in Hosea's time the conception of Yahweh as the Baali, "my lord," "owner" was a conception of the deity as a principle of physical fertility." Pp. 170-174. 94 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA of a piece of land was the priest representing the people at the altar of the deity. As he held this spot by the taboo which by common consent forbade popular use, so the clan or tribe grad- ually came to regard their habitat as especially sacred to their com m unity, and the deity was expected to interfere in their behalf in case of danger to its own possession and the people's inheritance. This was as far as the proprietary right in land could advance in the pastoral stage, when communism perforce must rule. Only with increasing population in an environment of pastoral and agricultural activity combined could modification of the communistic occupation pass over into communal property with definite limits. Increasing agriculture caused an increased value of the land, and this necessitated more definite division of the groups to which a certain section belonged, and more precise boundaries. In Israel we know that at first the land was the common possession as a future home for all the tribes. Later there was a division according to the tribes individually, and then finally came the family inheritance which at the close of our period was the divinely sanctioned mode of ownership which was broken down by the powerful but unsanctioned and there- fore wicked practice of private ownership. 7. The concept of theft. Of the special concepts the rise and development of the notion of theft is the most important, This is but the negative side of the property-concept. It proves conclusively the difference be- tween the function of property and the universal sanction or the proprietary right. The notion of theft in other words takes the function as it exists, but while it sanctions one practice it con- demns another. The contention of this interpretation is that this sanction and not. the practice constitutes the concept of property. Seizure, use, exchange and production are nothing more or less than the function, and could not per se create the notion of right, the negation of which is theft. Imitation and suggestion of the individual consciousness is inadequate to explain the facts of a generally accepted right, Consciousness of kind is abso- lutely essential. Imitation and suggestion influence action and function, but are as incapable of creating mental content in hu- man society as they are in the society of animals. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF EARLY HEBREWS 95 This notion of theft goes further. In early society the only crimes recognized were the breaking of sacred customs. These customs were sacred because of man's belief in the supernatural. They were protected by universal sanction based upon the belief in a divine will. This was expressed by means of the taboo. The first act of theft therefore could only occur where a taboo was broken. And it could be theft only because the right vio- lated was a sacred, that is 1 , supernatural or divine right. It would be punished only in so far as the members of the group acted in unison in the belief that they were executing the divine will. The divine right plays the same part in the origin of the concept of property as the strong arm does in the origin of the function. Hence we can understand how Dr. Smith could labor so hard to rule out all ideas of property from the system of taboo and yet make this statement, which expresses the facts in a nutshell: "In the oldest types of societies impious acts or breaches of taboo are the only offences treated as crimes; e. g. there is no such crime as theft, but a man can save his property by placing it under taboo ,when it becomes an act of impiety to touch it." 77 This explains how the same act is in one case a crime and in another case a merit. We noted this in the case of spoil. To spoil the enemies was a meritorious act, and the only case of stealing which was recognized as such was the appropriation of the tabooed thing and later the things used by a kinsman to which the community had a common right. The individual taboo was first placed on the captive woman, and thus the corner- stone of the home and marital fidelity sustains a very close rela- tion to the institution of property. 78 From this taboo in slavery of women arose our individual property in human beings. This is the stage of the C code where we find that to steal a man meant death, 79 and to break the taboo protecting a father's property right in the daughter meant paying the price for her. 80 Along- side with property in human beings the taboo on things came into vogue as soon as their value became sufficiently important 77 See p. 77 footnote. 78 Cp. Sutherland, Origin and growth of the moral instincts, Ch. 9, "The Ideal of Chastity," pp. 190-232. See also Gen. 20:3 ff . ; 26:10. 79 Ex. 21:16. 80 Ex. 22:16-17. 96 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA in social life and stealing of things upon which a neighbor, that is, a kinsman, has placed his taboo, is forbidden. Yet while this development takes place, the right to take spoil remains and is as justifiable in the estimation of the prophets as it was by the early Judges. It is only when the nobility begins to violate the ancient divine right to Yahweh's land and to eject Yahweh's people from it that the crime of spoil, or robbery, is recognized because it is perpetrated against Israel, and not against the "cursed" nations. The notion of inheritance is, as we noticed, closely connected with the paternal blessing in the name of Yahweh. The divine right or sanction was eagerly sought, as the intrigues of nearly every one of the wives of the patriarch 's in favor of the inheri- tance of the favorite son, abundantly proves. 81 In this paternal blessing we probably see one of the clearest cases of the union of the divine and the human property-right. The father was the owner of his household in the name of Yahweh, who was the real and actual owner. 82 For only thus could the religious form- ula of the blessing carry with it any meaning. Under the de- veloping ideas of property as new situations arose through the complexity of social life the human right gained the ascendancy and the divine right had to be emphasized against the encroach- ment made by the aristocracy under military and regal power. Such origin and development must lie at the basis of the change of view in the matter of material possessions which is seen in our sources. The function of property in human society springs from the elements of suggestion and imitation on the basis of the struggle for existence, but the concept of the right to own and possess springs from man's belief in magic and the supernatural, which has its basis in the consciousness of kind. This was what made the taboo sacred and unquestionably accept- ed and what constituted its binding force. The right of the deity could not be violated. Then the individual who could impose these taboos by devoting or cursing things in the name of the deity, or could make a vow, perforce must share in this right. Therefore great posses^sions and divine favor went hand in hand. But this process had a limit. The right was used to the detri- 81 Gen. 21:10; 27:2 ff. ; 1 Ki. 1:15 ff. *2 Cp. Smith, The prophets of Israel, pp. 170-174. PROPERTY CONCEPTS OP EARLY HEBREWS 97 ment of the worshippers so far that what had been a means of strength in the struggle for survival became a menace. The con- sciousness of kind has developed and the divine will is seen to have changed. The sanction which gave the practice its life as an institution was withdrawn. The negative side of the right of property developed. Theft was punished as an act of impiety when practiced between kinsmen. Finally the wholesale plund- ering of the masses of a nation by a certain class is seen as a spoiling of Yah weh's people. This class constitutes the enemies of Yahweh, and their wealth is a token of this hostility. Thus a synthesis of the facts found in the analysis of the actual property concepts of the early Hebrews, shows the essential dif- ference between the function of ownerhip and the idea of prop- erty. It establishes the fact that the first notions of the right of property were inseparably bound up with primitive magic and superstition in animistic traditions, so that the first " owner,' ' whose right could command universal recognition and absolute respect was the deity of the tribe. The historical fact by means of which this right was expressed and its power exerted was the taboo. The basis for this development can be explained only by means of the ' ' elementary, generic social fact, ' ' 83 the ' ' conscious- ness of kind," or "formal likemindedness, " since an actual func- tion of a divine ownership never could have been exercised and could only exist in the conscious likemindedness of the group. In a society where men and gods were thought to be akin and to stand in close relation to one another with the divine right usually exercised by human agency, this right gradually came to be shared by man, chiefly by means of the act of "devoting," or tabooing to his deity the object over which control was desired. This was first directed against enemies for the purpose of de- struction ; later an individual taboo was placed upon the female captive, who, being spared for the purpose of satisfaction and service to the captor, became the first object of the human right of property through the sacred taboo. Personal belongings were thought to be an integral part of the owner's personality, and became objects of the property-right for the first time when the proprietary right in persons was fully developed, and the control of man by moans of the own- 83 Giddinars, Principles of Sociology, p. 10, Preface. 98 UNIVERSITY OF IOWA ership of their subsistence came to be understood. This gave rise to commercial activity, which resulted in the idea of profit and the practice of private ownership of land, which, conflicting with the religious origin of the concept of property is opposed by the same social factor, ' ' the consciousness of kind. ' ' STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY, ECONOMICS POLITICS AND HISTORY Vol. I. No. 1-2. Loos, I. A. Studies in the politics of Aristotle. 1899 Vol. II. No. 1. Merritt, F. D. The early history of hanking in Iowa. 1900 2. Kawakami, K. K. The political ideas of modem Japan. 1903 Vol. III. No. 1. Peirce, P. S. The freedmen's bureau. 1904 2. Plum, H. G. The Teutonic Order and its secularization. 1906 Vol. IV No. 1. Conner, J. E. The development of belligerent occupation. 1912 Vol. IV No. 2. Laure, M. J. The .property concepts of the early Hebreivs. 191.") The above volumes of the Studies in Sociology, Economies, Polities, and History have been published, and may be obtained by addressing: THE LIBRARIAN IOWA CITY, IOWA mini minimi"' ■»"■»■"■ AA 000 265 284 o THE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. pro . ot > W.-J"-i— ■' ■"■" ' ■ ■ '"^ "1 Series 9482