HISTORY 
 
 OF THE LATE 
 
 REVOLUTION 
 
 I N 
 
 SWEDEN: 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 An Account of the Tranfa6lions of the 
 Three laft Diets in that Country ; 
 
 PRECEDED BY 
 
 A fhort Abftraa of the Swedish History, 
 
 So far as was necefTary to lay open the true Caufes 
 of that remarkable Event. 
 
 B Y 
 CHARLES FRANCIS SHERIDAN, Efy, 
 
 OF tlNCOLN's-lNN, 
 
 And Secretary to the BritlJh Envoy in Sweden, at the Time 
 of the late Revolution. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for Edward and CharlbsDillv, 
 ^n jthe Poultry 
 
 li.DCC.LXXVUl.
 
 DL 
 
 E R J?. A T a: 
 
 F. 43, 1.J7, 
 F. 147, note U 2. 
 P. 176, note 1. I, 
 p. 
 
 189} 
 190}. 
 191 J 
 
 For 
 
 (onfidtrahU% 
 
 Ambo 
 
 Buidtnhroi* 
 
 Brake 
 
 Read 
 
 inconfidftai&i 
 
 Jho. 
 
 Muddeahoift 
 
 
 1. 
 
 ^y thejoittt laiours »f 
 the Englijb tai 
 Ruffian tninific%» 
 
 produced hy the laheurs 
 of the Englijb mini' 
 fier. 
 
 There are two inftances of falfe Paging ; one, where 356 Is 
 followed by 259 inftead of 257; and the other, where 322 ij 
 followed by 321 ; but the matter is right in both. 
 
 For Cbrifiierne, read Cbriftiant paffim. 
 
 Some other flight errors there may be, on account of tha 
 author's abfcnce in another Idngdom during the printiflg of 
 (bU work. 
 
 753333
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 TH E prefent almoft general fubverfion of 
 public liberty throughout Europe, furnifhes 
 but too ftriking and melancholy a proof, of the 
 numerous, and asitfhould feem irrefiftible caufes, 
 "which condudl men into a ftate of political flavery. 
 
 Hitherto however thefe caufes have been gra- 
 dual in their operation ; and the introdudion of 
 defpotifm among a free people, has, till now, be,en 
 a work of time, as well as the refult of an artful 
 and infidious policy. 
 
 Influenced by this confideration, a frcG people- 
 may often have been lulled into a falie fecurity, 
 with refpeft to their liberties, the lols of which 
 they may have conceived to be an event too re- 
 mote to difturb their prefent quiet ; however the' 
 fate of other nations may have given them reafon, 
 at fome period, to expcd it. 
 
 They may have flattered themfelves, they could 
 be in no immediate danger, till occurrences Ihould 
 happen of a fimilar nature, and the fame fyflcm of 
 policy be purfued among them, which had in other 
 countries been productive of the lofs of freedom* 
 
 B Forget-
 
 [ 2 ] 
 
 i^orgetful by what very different means the fai 
 ends may be accomplilhed, they might have bt 
 
 'held with the indifference of unconcerned fpefta- 
 tors, meafures in reality of the moft dangerous 
 tendency, yet whofe obje<5l they either miflook, or 
 would not be at the pains of difcovering j and, de- 
 ceived by an apparent refpeft paid to the forms of 
 their conftitution, tliey might have remitted that 
 
 jealous attention, with which fuch a people 
 fliould ever watch over their rights and privileges, 
 till they had fuffered the fpirit of it to have been 
 fo far lofl, as to awaken from' their lethargy, per- 
 haps to lament their folly, but too late to corredt 
 their error. 
 
 Nor is it furprifing, that the bulk of a people 
 fhould not be much alarmed at minute invafions 
 of their conftitution, made at feparate and pro- 
 bably diftant periods of time. Encroachm.ents 
 on their political, as long as their civil liberties 
 remain untouched, do not come fufficiently home' 
 to individuals, to awaken their refentmcnt, and 
 roufe that fpirit of oppofition, fo necefTary to ftop 
 the farther progrefs of the ufijrpations of power;' 
 while a judicious prince will not attempt any frefh" 
 innovations, till the nation is become reconciled to 
 thofe already introduced. Thus, together with 
 the alterations in the government, change alfo the 
 difpofitions of the people: the defigns of the 
 governors, and inclinations of the governed, go 
 hand in hand j and tyranny may fleal as it were 
 imperceptibly upon them, before they are aware 
 
 of their danger. 
 
 But
 
 [ 3 ] 
 
 But the late revolution in Sweden, which in one 
 day produced a change as total, as it was fudden 
 and unexpedled : which in one day converted a 
 government, fuppofed to be the moft free of any 
 in Europe, into an abfolute monarchy : which 
 was attended with a degree of facility in the exe- 
 cution, to be equalled only by the expedition with 
 which it was accomplifhed : yet accomplifhed by 
 means, in appearance fo inadequate to the im- 
 portance of the undertaking — This is an events 
 which, while it deftroys the grounds on which a 
 free people may hitherto have refted their fecurity 
 with refped to their liberties, muft, at the fame 
 time, prevent for the future their any longer con- 
 fidering the lofs of them as an objeft fo remote 
 as to admit of the fmalleft relaxation of that vigi- 
 lance, with which they fhould ever attend to their 
 prefervation. 
 
 An attention the more neceflary, as liberty, like 
 honour, when once loft, is, for the moft part, ir- 
 recoverably fo. 
 
 If we look into the Hiftory of Europe, many 
 are the inftances which occur of fl^ee ftates fub- 
 mitting, by degrees, to the yoke of defpotifm : 
 but we feldom, if ever, meet with an inftance of 
 a nation once completely enflaved, having reco- 
 vered their liberties. So that the commonly^re- 
 CeiVcd axiom in politics, that all governments 
 contain within themfelves the principle of their 
 deftrudlion, feems unfortunately to hold good 
 only with refpeft to thofe of a popular nature j 
 while fuch as eftablifti arbitrary power, appear, 
 B a in
 
 [ 4 1 
 
 in a rrtarinct, exempt from the fiuduation gene- 
 rally incident to human inftitutions j and to be 
 no otherwife afFedted by time, than to acquire 
 (lability in proportion to their duration. 
 
 The reafon of this is fo obvious, as fcarce to 
 need its being pointed out. A free government 
 fliould be the juft medium between the two ex- 
 tremes of defpotifm and licentioufnefs ; and 
 fhould equally avoid the oppreflion of the one, 
 and the tumult and diforders attendant on the 
 other. But as there is an almoft natural tendency 
 in the human mind to run into extremes/ it will 
 be found as difficult to obtain this juft medium, as 
 to preferve it when obtained : as fuch a govern- 
 Bnent forms a fyftem compofed of a variety of 
 parts, which ought to be duly fitted and propor- 
 tioned to each other, the maintaining of an equi- 
 librium among thefe parts, is a point as eflential 
 to its exigence, as it is difficult to eompafs. For 
 this purpofe, a free people fnould underlland as 
 well as love their conftitution ; ffiould know in, 
 what true liberty confifts, as well as poiTefs Ipirit 
 to defend her when attacked ; and have their 
 minds fufficiently enlightened to dired and mode-, 
 rate that zeal and ardour, v/hich fhould animate 
 dieir breafls in the caufe of freedom; but which, 
 i^^unreilrained, by carrying them too great 
 lengths, might rather endanger the lofs, thaik 
 fecure to them the poireflion of it. 
 
 Oa the other hand, defpotifm, more fimpie ia 
 its nature, more uniform in its operationsj is not 
 liable to thofe internal diforders, to which free 
 ,. , " govern--
 
 [ 5 I 
 
 governments fo often owe their ruin. To obey, 
 Ibms up the whole duty of thofe who are bound 
 JO live under it. Whilft fear, ignorance, and pre- 
 judice, qualities by no means rare among man- 
 Jcind, are, perhaps, as well calculated to render* 
 f hem good fubjefts of fuch a government, as the 
 contrary qualities of public fpirit, refolution, li-? 
 berality of mind, and freedom of fentiment, are 
 found to be neceflary in thofe, who are happy 
 enough to poflefs a conilitution, the objed of 
 which is political liberty. 
 
 It is not, therefore, to the complicated nature 
 pf a free, or hmplicity of a defpotic government, 
 that we are alone to afcribe the precarious dura- 
 tion of the formpr, or inability of the latter j but 
 Jikewifc to the number of qualities requifite in the 
 fubje<5LS of the one, in order to enable them to 
 preferve it ; v/hilft the other fpecies of govern- 
 ment will maintain its ground, whether thofe who - 
 are fubjedl to it are poiTeiTed pf fuch qualities or 
 pot. 
 
 But, at the fame time that thefe reafons may 
 ferve to account for the revolutions to which free 
 ftates have ever been fo peculiarly liable i they 
 might alfo teach us to expert, that liberty would 
 flouriili in proportion as the mind? of men become 
 enlightened : that in an age, in whi(^ the prin- 
 , ciples of fociety itfelf, have been confidered as a 
 fcicnce ; the nature of government analyzed, af- 
 certaincd^ and reduced in fomc meafure to a {yi- 
 tem : when, cpnfequently, in proportion to the 
 progrefs made in this fcience, and to the genera^ 
 B 3 increafp
 
 [ 6 3 
 
 increafc and diffufion of political knowledge 
 among mankind, the benefits refulting from free- 
 dom, muft not only be more univerfally known, 
 but likewife the means of acquiring or preferving 
 it, better underftood : in fuch an age, it might have 
 been expelled, that liberty would have had fomc 
 altars ere6led to her, where llie had been forgot- 
 ten or unknown before , and that flie would have 
 become doubly fecure among thofe, who, akeady 
 pofTefled of her, were well acquainted with her 
 value. On the contrary, we need only give a 
 glance over the prefent ftate of Europe, to per- 
 ceive, that the very reverfe of this has been the 
 cafe. We fhall find that liberty has been chafed 
 from fome of the few afylums Ihe had left; and 
 that in moll of the countries where monarchy was 
 eftablifhed, the regal power has, ever fince the 
 commencement of the fifteenth century, been 
 conftantly verging towards that defpotifm which 
 at prefent prevails fo univerfally throughout 
 Europe. So that arbitrary power .feems to have 
 rivetted her chains the more ftrongly on the major 
 part of the inhabitants of Europe, in proportion 
 as they became more fenfible of the advantages of 
 freedom. And they muft now content themfelves 
 with admiring the few monuments of public li- 
 berty yet extant ; while they muft patiently fub- 
 mit to that government, which the folly or igno- 
 rance of their anceftors, had fuffered to eftablifh 
 kfelf too firmly, to render the deftruftion of it, at 
 prefent, in any ftiap^ pradlicable. 
 
 Italy^
 
 [ 7 ] . . . 
 
 Italy, once filled with populous and independep,t 
 cities, the feats of conimerce, of riches, and of 
 liberty, is, in general, governed by the hand of 
 defpotifm. In the few ftates that flill retain the 
 name of Republics, the bulk of the people, in ge- 
 neral, fuffer a feverer degree of opprefTion, than 
 thofe are expofcd to who acknowledge but one 
 mafter. 
 
 The Swifs have indeed hitherto been indebted 
 for their freedom, to their mountains, their, po- 
 .verty, and their bravery. 
 
 The ineffeftual ftruggles for liberty of the 
 Cortes in Spain, at the commencement of the 
 reign of Charles the Fifth, anfwered no other pur- 
 pofe, than to give that monarch an opportunity 
 of laying the foundation of the abfolute power 
 which his fucceflbrs have fince acquired. 
 
 Portugal has Ihared the fame fate with Spain. 
 The laft revolution that happened in thatkingdonm, 
 only gave the Portugueze a new mafter, but pro- 
 duced no change in favour of liberty. 
 
 In France, the ableft and moft enterprizing of 
 her minifters, under one of the weakeft and moft 
 timid of her monarchs, unfortunately made the 
 deftruftioH of the fmall remnant of the liberties of 
 that kingdom, which had efcaped the artful and 
 infidious policy of Louis the XI th, one of the 
 chief objefts of a long adminiftration. He fuc.- 
 ceeded but too well; and whatever was left un- 
 done in this refpeft by Richelieu, was afterwards 
 cffeftually compleated by Colbert. 
 
 B4 T«
 
 [ « i 
 
 To' confider the little ceremony with which 
 the French monarchs, at this day, treat their par- 
 liaments, and the real infignificancy of thofe 
 %odies J which are become rather the inftruments 
 of the power of the fovereign, than the guardians 
 of the rights of the people; one could hardly 
 conceive, that thofe very parliaments were once 
 the reprefentatives of the ftates-gcneral of the 
 kingdom, in whom the fupreme power was lodged, 
 and who pofleffed an authority nearly fimilar to, 
 that once enjoyed by the ftates themfelves. 
 
 The prodigious fuperiority of the houfes of 
 Auftria and Brandenburg over every other power 
 in the empire, certainly places the liberties of 
 Germany, or rather the independence of the Ger- 
 man princes, on the mofl precarious footing. The 
 emperor, abfolute in his hereditary dominions, 
 (the generous fpirit of the Hungarians having been 
 Jong fince fubdued) feems to have no other bar- 
 riers to the increafe of his authority in the 
 empire, than what his own moderation may lay 
 down. It is certain, fhould their Imperial and 
 Prufllan majeflies think proper to unite, for the 
 purpofe of carrying any particular point, the com- 
 bined forces of the remainder of the Germanic 
 body, would be fcarcely capable of refilling 
 them. 
 
 The maintaining of a balance of power among 
 
 the different fl-ates of Europe, once confidered as 
 
 an obje<51: of fuch importance by them, feems, 
 
 . if we may judge from the partition of Poland, 
 
 jno longer to be held in the fame light : the ap- 
 
 prehenfion
 
 -t 9 3 
 
 prehenfion of the interference of any foreign 
 power, would confequently prove no obftacle cq 
 the views of the above-mentioned monarchs> 
 whenever ambition fhall prompt them, or niay 
 hereafter their fucceflbrs, to divide the fpoils of 
 che numerous petty princes of the empire. 
 
 The fate of Dantzick may likewife prove a lef* 
 fon to the free cities, and teach them what they 
 are one day to exped. 
 
 In Holland the government, it i§ true, nearly 
 retains its formj but, fince the office of ftadholder 
 has been rendered hereditary, it feems, in a great 
 rneafure, to have loft its fpirit. Attentive only to 
 their mercantile interefls, relying for their fafety 
 more on the divifions of their neighbours than 
 on their own ftrength, the Dutch appear no 
 longer to poflefs that martial and independent 
 fpirit which diftinguilhed their anceftors i their 
 attachment to liberty, which men feel Itrongeft 
 when fti€ is moft perfecuted, muft have abated 
 in a proportional degree ; fo that the authority 
 of the ftadholder bids fair to equal that of any 
 fovereign in Europe. 
 
 Poland, the nobility of which, at kaft, were 
 the freeft in the world, has fallen into the hands 
 pf two of the moft abfolute princes now exifting^ 
 and into thofe of a third, who may become Co 
 whenever he pleafes. 
 
 Denmark, a century fince, made a voluntary 
 furrender of its liberties into the hands of its 
 monarch. The dreadful defpotilrn of Ruflia is 
 well known. 
 
 And
 
 **'';Ahd now we behold a country, generally Tup- 
 pofed to have pofTcfTed one of the mofl free 
 governments that ever was eflablifhed amonc- any 
 people, which has in one day been deprived of 
 that government, and compelled to receive an 
 abfoiute monarchy in its room: Thus arbitrary 
 power feems, like a' plague, to have fpread it- 
 feif over almbll the whole face of Europe, 
 from the coafts of the Mediterranean to the fhores 
 of the frozen ocean j whilft in thefe iflands, liberty 
 ftill finds a fanduary, as if the fea had proved a 
 barrier to flop the progrefs of the contagion. 
 
 Such is the prefent ftate of Europe, and fuch 
 the progrefs made by defpotifm, among its inha- 
 bitants, hitherto, indeed, with a flow yet fteady 
 and perfevering ftep; but in this laft inftance with 
 a fudden ftride j notwithftanding there feems to 
 prevail, in theprefent age, a knowledge of the 
 nature of government, a freedom of fentiment, 
 and a liberality of mind, not to be met with in 
 any former period. 
 
 On the other hand, it was in an age of dark- 
 nefs and ignorance, compared to the prefent, 
 that political liberty was mod univerfally 
 diffufed throughout Europe i an age in which 
 men, more accuftomed to act than to re- 
 fled, poflefled more fpirit to defend their free- 
 dom, than judgment to lead them to the true 
 means of preferving it : in which they had 
 never confidered government as a fcience ; were 
 ignorant of the naiture and principles of power 
 and liberty • and uninftru6led by the fate of other 
 
 nations^
 
 [ " ] 
 
 nations, who, from having been free, had pafTed 
 under the yoke of flavery, they could not forefee 
 fuch confequenccs to themfelves, and therefore 
 could have had no idea of guarding againfl: 
 them. 
 
 The period I allude to is from the beginning 
 of the thirteenth to the clofe of the fifteenth 
 century *. To confider the forms of government 
 at that time eftablilhed in all the kingdoms of 
 Europe ; when the Spaniards told their fovereign 
 in fwearing allegiance to him : " We, who are 
 " each of us as good, and all together more 
 " powerful than you, promile obedience to your 
 " government, if you maintain our rights and 
 " privileges : if not, we do not." 
 
 When a king of France, in the prelude to one 
 of his ordinances, exprefles himfelf thus, " That 
 *' as all men were by nature free horuy and as 
 ** their kingdom was called the kingdom of the 
 " Franks, he determined it fhould be fo in reality 
 " as well as in name \" To confider, I fay, the 
 
 • Montefquieu, in fpeaking of the origin of the Gothic 
 government, fays, " Atfirft it was mixt with ariftocracy and 
 ^' monarchy ; a mixture attended with this inconveniency, 
 *' that the commpn people were bondmen. The cuftom af- 
 ** terwards fucceeded of granting letters of infranchifements, 
 '* and was foon followed by fo perfeft a harmony between 
 ** the civil liberty of the people, the privileges of the nobi- 
 " lity and clergy, and the prince's prerogative, that I really 
 ** think there never was in the world a government fo well 
 " tempered as that of each part of Europe, fo long as i^ 
 ♦ • lafted." Vol. i, book ii, chap. 8. 
 
 X Louis loth Ordon. torn. i. p. 583* 
 
 5 ,^ forms
 
 [ ^2 ] 
 
 forms of government then eftablilhed throughout 
 Europe, and which iafted for the fpace of more 
 |h^n two centuries, it muft afford matter of afto- 
 fiifhment, how it was poflible that nations once 
 pofTeffed of the mofl independent fpirit, and the 
 moft enthufiaftic love of liberty, Ihoiild afterwards 
 have degenerated into the tame fubje6ts of arbir 
 trary power. 
 
 I fhall beg leave to hazard a few refle<5lions to 
 account for thisi which I hope will not be deemed 
 foreign to the main defign of the prefent work, as 
 they will ferve to illuftrate what I fhall have to 
 fay hereafter, relative to the government of Swe- 
 flen, and t^^ various revolutions it has under- 
 gone. 
 
 Had the different fovereigns of Europe, ac- 
 quired abfolute authority over their refpeclive 
 fubjeds, during the courfe of the eleventh or 
 twelfth centuries, there are many reafons which, 
 vpon a fuperficial view, woul4 feem very naturally 
 to account for it. 
 
 At thofe periods, and for a confiderable time 
 previous to them, the feudal fyflem of govern- 
 ment, almoft univerfally eftabUIlied throughout 
 Europe, had degenerated into a multiplied ty- 
 ranny, and confequently the mofi: infupportabje of 
 any. The ufurpations of the feudal barons, had 
 ftripped their fovereigns of ^Imofl every prero- 
 gative, and reduced them to a ftate, in which 
 they could neither proteft a people groaning be- 
 neath the yoke of fervitude, nor punifh the petty 
 tyrants who lorded it over them with as much
 
 [ 13 1 
 
 rigour as authority*. It would not have appeared 
 in the leaft extraordinary, had the lower ordera 
 of a nation fo circumftanced, united to transfer 
 this authority from their refpedlive mafters to their 
 common fovereign, and to have afforded him all 
 the afliftance neceflary to enforce obedience to it. 
 By this means they would have delivered them-, 
 felves from the immediate oppreflion of their feu-, 
 dal lords (as tyranny is ever the more intolerable, 
 the nearer we are placed to its centre) and would 
 have had a fecret fatisfaftion, infpired by revengCj, 
 in reducing their oppreffors to a fituation fome'- 
 what fimilar to their own. However, when th& 
 human mind becomes dcbafed to a certain degree^ 
 by the depreflion of fervitude, men are rendered 
 not only incapable of executing any plan to refcuc 
 themfelves from fo miferable a ftate, but evea 
 of conceiving a remedy to the evils they labour 
 under. Happily for the generations who imme- 
 diately fucceeded them, and perhaps too^ for 
 thofe few nations flill poffeffed of freedom, the 
 expedient above-mentioned did not occur to the 
 opprefled people of thofe times ,i and it was ow- 
 ing to other caufes, none of which X)riginatedw;tifc 
 them, that they, at length, eirierged from that 
 wretched ftate of infignificance and obfcurityi^ 
 iit which they had fo long been plunged. 
 'Among thefe, as fet forth by a moft elegant and 
 judicious hiftorian 1|, the forming of cities into 
 
 ♦ At in Detraark, in the rtiiddlt of the laff ccftlflty. 
 11 Robmfba : in his view of the State of Europe. 
 
 cpmmunities.
 
 t 14 ] 
 
 communities, corporations, or bodies politic, 'RSd 
 granting them the privileges of municipal jurif- 
 didion, was one of the principal. 
 
 The inhabitants of cities, whether artificers or 
 merchants, would naturally, from the circumr 
 fiances of their fituation, be more independent 
 cf their lords than the peafants in the country, 
 who cultivated the fields. PofTeffed of the means 
 of acquiring riches, and united together, as it 
 were, in one body, their ftrength and confequence 
 muft have increafed with their commerces and 
 the feudal monarchs could not fail to perceive, 
 that they might, in time, be made very inftru- 
 mental in curbing the licentious fpirit of the 
 barons. 
 
 -•'Itwas with this view, that Frederick Barbarofla, 
 m Germany j Louis Legros, in France i and Hen- 
 ry tlie fecond, in England, adopted the plan of 
 Conferring certain privileges on the inhabitants of 
 cities- in their refpedive jurifdiflions. Thefe, un- 
 der fucceeding monarchs, acquired, in the perfons 
 of their deputies, a feat in the council of the na- 
 tion, and confequently a fhare in the legiflature 
 of their country. • ' .ji*/.:-- i : 
 
 ""Here then a third power arofe in the ftate, 
 which at its commencement would naturally con- 
 tribute to confer on the feudal monarchs, a fufH- 
 cient degree of confequence and authority, to ren-. 
 der the regal power a check upon the violence and- 
 opprelTxon before exercifed by the barons; but 
 to which, this point being compaffed, the latter 
 
 .23ijiaJJiXn.^ weight
 
 [ 15 ] 
 might in their turn have recourfe, in order to flop 
 the too great encroachments of their fovereigns. 
 Thus, as in England, Henry the fecond raifed the 
 people in order to deprefs the ariftocracy of the 
 nobles, fo under Henry the third the barons 
 who rebelled called in the afliftance of the peo- 
 ple, to infure their fuccefs againft the monarch. 
 
 Here then were three powers in the ftate, that, 
 by being alternately oppofed to each other, formed 
 a fpecies of balance; from which, during the 
 fpace of upwards of two centuries, mofl: of the 
 nations in Europe derived and enjoyed no incon- 
 fiderable degree of liberty. 
 
 But as chance had a greater Ihare than defign 
 in forming this balance; as the objedt of the fove- 
 reigns in taking thofe meafures to which it owed 
 its birth, had been only to increafe their own 
 power, not to eftablifh liberty among their fub- 
 jed:s ; fo it was maintained rather by the mutual 
 jealoufies that fubfifled among the. different orders 
 of the ftate, than from any convidtion in the minds 
 of the people, of its utility and importance. 
 
 Inftead of co-operating to form one fyftem for 
 the common benefit of the whole community, 
 thefe three powers adted more as rivals ; whofe 
 chief objed feemed to be rather to encroach upon 
 the rights and privileges of each other, than at- 
 tend to the prcfervation of their own. As theie^ 
 were not afcertained with exaftnefs, neither could 
 they be known with precifion ; confequently, as 
 that due proportion which fhould fubfift betweent 
 the xonftituent. parts of a free ftate, muft have 
 
 been
 
 [ i6 ] 
 
 ^en wanting ; the balance of power, on wliidh 
 the very exiilence of fuch ftates depends, could 
 hot be of long duration. 
 
 From the very nature of one of thefe three 
 powers, it had obvioufly many advantages over 
 the other two ; I mean that of the monarch ; 
 which, with fome other concurring circumftances, 
 operated by degrees to raife it fo far above, as 
 finally in fome manner to annihilate them, and 
 cftablifh itfelf in their room. 
 
 I ft. The firft and moft obvious difference be- 
 tween the power of the monarch, and that of the! 
 nobles and the people, was the unity of the for- 
 mer ; that is, its being poffelTed by one. 
 
 The clafhing of interefts and difference of opi- 
 ftion among the individuals of an affembly, (un- 
 acquainted with the true principles of govern- 
 ment, as in thofe days popular affemblies muft' 
 have been) although vefted with an authority 
 equal to that of the fovereign, might have render- 
 ed abortive the wifeft fchemes, and defeated the 
 beft-concerted meafures : the prince had only to 
 oonceive and to execute j he had but' one end in 
 view, that of irtcreafing his power : and, however 
 the hands which held the reins of government 
 might change, the fame fpirit would always con- 
 duct, them, though with various fuccefs, according 
 tei the different abilities of the monarchs. 
 
 A variety of circumftances were, on the cort-- 
 
 trary, neceffary, in order to give vigour and e!^* 
 
 £tSt to the operations of the other two orders of 
 
 the- ftate. Men, who had been fo lately galled 
 
 IQ hy
 
 t »7 ] 
 
 by the yoke of fervitude, could not but preferve 
 a fecret enmity towards their former tyrants j and 
 they would naturally more eafily unite with their 
 fovereign, to whom they were indebted for the 
 new importance they had acquired, in order to 
 deprefs the nobles, than join with thefe to check 
 the encroachments of the prince. 
 
 Yet, though it was to the; fuperiority they had 
 contributed to give to their fovereign over the ba- 
 rons, that the people were firft indebted for their 
 liberty j in order to fecure the prefervation of that 
 liberty, it was likewife neceffary to prevent the 
 too great deprefTion of the nobles, which would 
 have been the confequence of the too confiderable 
 increafe of power in the prince. 
 
 There was a point, at which, they fliould have 
 ceafed to augment the authority of tht- latter, at 
 the expence of the privileges of the former. At 
 which, they fhould even have afiifted the barons 
 againft their fovereign, in cafe he carried his pre- 
 tcnfions too far. 
 
 But independent of the difficulty of afcertaining 
 this point, which required, perhaps, greater jfkili,- 
 and more knowledge of the nature of government, 
 than the people could, at that time, have been 
 pofTefTcd of; in order to render fuch oppofition of 
 any efficacy, it was requifite there fhould be a 
 union of two very different orders oi^ men, be- 
 tween whom, there muft have fubflfted no fmaU 
 fhare of hatred and jealoufy on one fide, and aii 
 equal degree of contempt on the other. It would 
 have been unreafonable to have expedled unani- 
 
 C mity
 
 [ i8 ] 
 
 mity in an affembly (o compofedi and unanimity 
 alone could render them powerful. The meafures, 
 therefore, of the nobles and of the people were 
 neceflarily fluctuating, their objedt uncertain, and 
 purfued with caution and dillruft. 
 
 On the other hand, there were no fuch obfta- 
 cles to prevent the monarch's uniting with either 
 of the other two powers, as beft fuited his views 
 or convenience. 
 
 His meafures were not only fixed, ever tending 
 to one end, but he was likewife poflefled of a 
 greater variety of means, to profecute them with 
 cafe and certainty. To preferve an internal bal- 
 lance of power, with the' nature of which they 
 were but little acquainted, fhould have been the 
 objeft of the nobles and people j to overturn it, 
 was that of the monarch : It is not hard to deter- 
 mine which of thefe two was the mofb difficult 
 tafk. 
 
 2dly. Though one of the confequences of the 
 eftablilhment of the chriftian religion in Europe, 
 was the enfranchifement of the peafants, who had 
 before been flaves, fixed to the foil to which they 
 belonged i yet the corruption of that religion *, 
 
 from! 
 
 • When the chriftian religion, fays Montefquieu, two cen- 
 turies ago, became unhappily divided into Catholic and 
 Proteftant, the people of the North enibraced the Proteftant, 
 and thofe of the South adhered fiill to the Catholic : the rea- 
 fon is plain, the people of the North have, and will for 
 ever have, a fpirit of liberty and independence, which the 
 people of the South have not j and therefore a religion which 
 
 has
 
 [ 19 ] 
 
 from the abufes of Popery, contributec5, proba- 
 bly more than any other circumftance, to facilitate 
 the execution of the defigns formed by the Euro- 
 pean monarchs to acquire abfolute power. " The 
 " notion" (according to Lord Bolingbroke's obfer- 
 vation) " concerning the divine infli'tution and 
 " right of kings, as well as the abfolute power 
 " belonging to their office, have no foundation in 
 *' fad: or reafon, but have arifen from an old al- 
 ** liance between ecclefiaftical and civil policy." 
 
 This alliance fprung from the very nature of the 
 Catholic religion : a religion, which claimed and 
 obtained the moft abfolute empire over the con- 
 fciences of mankind, could not but be an excel- 
 lent inflrument in the hands of a monarch, to 
 eftablifh his authority by governing through the 
 minifters of it. Thefe, on the other hand, mud: 
 have perceived that their beft fecurity for preferv- 
 ing their dignities, wealth, and power, was 
 their giving the prince the fame authority over 
 the.perfons of their fubjed:?, that they had utfurp- 
 ed over their minds. 
 
 In return for the immunities, privileges, and 
 riches, conferred by their fovereigns on the cler- 
 gy, thefe preached the dodrines, of puflivc obe- 
 
 has novifible head, is more agreeable to the independency of 
 the climate, than that which has one. Vol, II. Book 24th. 
 Chap. 4. 
 
 The reafon given by Montefquicu, why the Protcilant re- 
 ligion is more favourable to liberty than the Catii'dlic, is not 
 the only one, though, perhaps, the only one he could venture 
 to aflign. 
 
 C 2 diencc.
 
 [ 20 ] 
 
 dicncc, non-refillance, &c. to the fubjefls of 
 their benefador j to whom they attributed a di- 
 vine right to govern without controul. 
 
 The priefts had likewife, perhaps, another mo- 
 tive for this condu6t: that fpirit of enquiry and 
 freedom of fentiment, which muft ever, in fome 
 degree, prevail among a people poffefTed of civil 
 liberty, might have extended themfelves, from 
 political to religious matters j and this they ap- 
 prehended would have fapped the foundation of a 
 fyftem, built upon ignorance, and fupported by 
 fuperftition. 
 
 The monarchs and priefts playing thus into 
 each other's hands, were enabled to dupe the reft 
 of mankind out ofwhatlhouldfeem their unalien- 
 able rights : and had not the reformation taken 
 place, and had thofe princes in Europe who pro- 
 moted it, known, how much it was their intereft 
 to prevent the introduftion of the new dodlrine 
 into their refpeftive realms, it is probable, there 
 would not be at this day, a fingle ftate in Europe, 
 poffeffed of the fmalleft fliare of political liberty* 
 Henry the Vlllth in England, and Guftavus 
 Vafa in Sweden, did not perceive, that by encou- 
 raging the reformation, they deprived their fuc- 
 cefforsof one of the chief engines with which they 
 were to acquire and maintain that abfolute power, 
 the foundations of which, they themfelves had 
 taken fuch pains to lay. Charles the Ift would 
 never have made fo tragical an exit, nor Sigif- 
 oiond of iSweden have loft his crown^ nor the 
 
 5 tales
 
 [ 41 ] 
 
 States of Holland have fhaken off the Spanlfh 
 yoke, if the Catholic religion had continued to 
 maintain its empire over the minds of men, with 
 the fame authority as it had done for many cen- 
 turies previous to thofe events. 
 
 The violent perfecutions the proteftants under- 
 went from fome of the European monarchs, and 
 the frequent attempts of thefe totally to extermi- 
 nate them, did not, perhaps, proceed fo much, 
 from fanaticifm, and a blind attachment to the 
 Catholic religion, as from forefeeing that the new 
 doftrine, by making men acquainted with reli- 
 gious, might likewife give them a tafte for civil 
 liberty : in the fame manner as the priefts might 
 have apprehended, that the definition of prejut 
 dices in politics, would probably be the forerun- 
 ner of that of fuperftition in religion. 
 
 Accordingly, we find that it was for the moft 
 part in thofe kingdoms where the monarchy had 
 acquired the greateft fhare of power, that the re- 
 formation met with the moft violent oppofition : 
 on the contrary, where the authority of the prince 
 was limited, it made its way with a proportional 
 degree of facility. 
 
 3dly. The introdu<5tion of ftanding armies 
 throughout Europe, finally fij^ed the authority of 
 the fovereigns on fo firm a bafis, as to render 
 any refiftance to it from the nobles and people, 
 altogether ineffe(5bual. 
 
 The luxury and love of cafe, confequent upon 
 the introduction of commerce and the arts and 
 
 C 3 iciencct
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
 fciences among the European nations, mufl: necef- 
 farily have greatly diminifhed that naartial fpirit 
 for which they had been before diftinguilhed, and 
 which made them difdain any other occupation 
 than that of war. Men who had tailed the fweets 
 of peace, learned the ufe of riches, and acquired 
 a relilh for the enjoyments they procure, would 
 naturally lofe in a great degree their ardour for 
 military expeditions : but, as from the feudal in- 
 llitutions, they were bound to attend their fove- 
 reign whenever he thought proper to fummon 
 them; this probably gave rife to the expedient of 
 paying him certain fums, in order to raife a mer- 
 cenary army, that they might be exempt from 
 perfonal fervice. 
 
 The feudal monarchs could not be averfe to a 
 fcheme, which, not only by rendering their troops 
 more obedient and more immediately dependent 
 on themfelves, enabled them to a6t with greater 
 vigour againft their enemies abroad j but which 
 likewife placed a force in their hands, that they 
 could render fubfervient to the maintenance of 
 their dignity, and augmentation of their authori- 
 ty at home. 
 
 Thus I have endeavoured to point out the na- 
 tural Heps by which the regal power has hitherto 
 increafed in moft of the kingdoms of Europe. It 
 is obvious from this view of them, that the igno- 
 rance of the true principles and nature of liberty, 
 which prevailed among the inhabitants of Europe 
 at the time when their refpeftive fovereigns firft 
 laid the foundation of that abfolute power, which 
 
 their
 
 [ 23 ] 
 their fucceflbrs now enjoy ; did not a little contri- 
 bute to enable thofe princes to carry their defigns 
 into execution. And had the minds of men been 
 equally enlightened at that period, as, from the 
 fpreading of literature, they are fince become; 
 had they then turned their thoughts to the princi- 
 ples of fociety, and underftood the true nature of 
 a free government ; it is probable, that for the 
 happinefs of mankind, the genial influence of li- 
 berty, would now have been felt over the whole 
 face of Europe, inftead of being confined to a few, 
 a very few, and, comparatively fpeaking, incon- 
 fiderable parts of it : but unfortunately, this 
 knowledge has come too late for the major part 
 of its inhabitants to derive any advantage from it. 
 Arbitrary power was already ellablifhed among 
 them on a foundation too firm to be eafily fliakcn, 
 and too well protefted to be attacked with impu- 
 nity. To them, therefore, it has, perhaps, an- 
 fwered no other end, than to make them fee the 
 defers of a government, to which they are, not- 
 withftanding, compelled to fubmit. 
 
 But the cafe is far otherwifc with a people ftill 
 pofifefled of freedom. To thefe a thorough know- 
 ledge of the true nature of a free government, and 
 of the principles of liberty, is not only ufeful, but 
 necefTary, in order to enable them to forefee and 
 guard againll the dangers to which a free confti- 
 tution muft be continually expofed. 
 
 This knowledge is to be acquired only from a 
 
 minute obfervation of the fads with which hiftory 
 
 C 4 makes
 
 [ fi4 ] 
 
 mikes us acquainted; an accurate examinatloH 
 of the various forms of government, which have 
 ^ourilhed at different periods, in different parts 
 of the globe, and of the various fate that has at- 
 tended them. A multitude of thefe fafts is to 
 ferve as the bafis on which to build a fyftem, thaf 
 will reduce the fcience of laws and government 
 to fome fixed principles. Every political event, 
 therefore, which tends to throw a new light on that 
 fcience ; which points out a new fpurce of dan- 
 gers to a free government ; and confequently, at 
 the fame time, indicates the precautions neceflary 
 to be taken, in order to guard againfl them, cer- 
 tainly merits from a people poffeffed of fuch a con-: 
 ftitution, the utmoft degree of attention: and more 
 real inftrudion is to bp derived from an event of 
 this nature, than from all the theories of their 
 rnoft able politicians : for whatever thefe may 
 apprehend to be the probable effects of particu- 
 lar caufes, or futi^re confequences of particular 
 me^furcs, their conje6lures muft ever be attended 
 with uncertainty : on the contrary, when the 
 event has taken place, it is pafy to trace effefts 
 back to their caufes, and their dependence upon 
 each other becomes as pbvipus thpn, a§ it was be- 
 fore difficult to be difcerned. 
 
 The late revolution in Sweden is undoubtedly tp 
 be confidered in thi^ light. A change fo imporr 
 tant in its object, produced by means fp inconfi- 
 ^erable J an attempt of fuch apparent difficulty in 
 tjiepry, yet attended with fuch facility in the exe- 
 cution ;
 
 [ 25 ] 
 
 cution ; prefenting us fc bold an ufurpation on 
 |;he one hand, and a fubmiiTion lb tame upon the 
 other, is not, perhaps, ic> be i;waieiled in any 
 hiftory ei.her ancient or modern f. 
 
 Where the objeft of a revolation has been 9 
 change of the fovereign only, not of the conftitu- 
 tion, it has, like this, fometimes been accom- 
 plilhed without difficulty or oppontion, The de- 
 pofition of one prince and advancement of another 
 to the throne, can in general, materially afFed: 
 thofe only who Immediately furround their pcr- 
 fons. To the bulk of the nation it is a matter of 
 fmall importance, whether an Alphonfo or a Pe- 
 dro, a Peter or a Catherine, wear the crown. 
 
 But where the object of the change is to overturn 
 ^he conftitution itfelf, and eftablilh a government 
 
 f Denmark, indeed, furniihes an inftance of a revolution 
 romewhat fimilar to this, both with refpeft to the objeft of 
 the change, and to the eafe and expedition with which it was 
 accompliftied ; but in other points it was widely different. 
 There th« meafure originating with the people, was pro- 
 pofed and carried into execution by the majority of the nation. 
 Here it originated with the prince, and his fubjedls were 
 compelled to acqulcfce, whether it was agreeable to their in- 
 clinations or not. — In the firft inftance, the only objcdl of 
 wonder is, that the greater part of what was fuppofed to be z 
 free people, could poffibly be induced to form fo extraordina- 
 ry a refolution, as that of making a voluntary furrender of 
 their liberties ; but this refolution once formed, the eafe and 
 expedition with which it was carried into execution, followed 
 of courfe. In the fccond, it was as natural to have expected 
 that fuch an attempt would have met with oppofition, as in 
 the firft cafe, it was morally impoffible there could have been 
 any, 
 
 of
 
 [ 2^ ] 
 
 of an oppofite nature in its room ; the queftlon no 
 longer relates to the partial interefts of a few indi- 
 viduals. '^" 
 
 The welfare of a nation is at flake, the ftate be- 
 comes convulfcd from the center to the remoteft 
 parts of it, and the whole fociety receives a 
 Ihock, which reaches from the greateft, to the 
 moft infignificant of its members : — a thoufand 
 obflacles feem to prefent themfelves to an enter- 
 prize, fo important in its confequences, fo exten- 
 five in its effefts j the power of opinion, the force 
 of habit, that predilection fo prevalent among 
 mankind for what they have been long accuf- 
 tomed to, might incline a people, even under 
 the worft of governments, to oppofe any attempt 
 to produce a change in that, which from their 
 childhood they had been taught to refped, and 
 were attached to, becaufe it was their's :[;. 
 
 But that predileflion for the eftablilhed form of 
 government, which, among thofe who are fub- 
 jeft to defpotic power, muft proceed from preju- 
 dice, and be maintained by ignorance j among 
 the more enlightened inhabitants of a free ftate is 
 founded on principle, and preferved, from the con- 
 viction of the fuperior excellence of their govern- 
 
 J When Schwiflcol was elefted by the Boyers (or nobles). 
 Czar of Ruflia, he offered of his own motion, to take an oath 
 by which he would bind himfelf, never to put any Boyer to 
 death without the confent of his peers. Upon this the whole 
 body of the Boyers threw themfelves at his feet, and fuppli- 
 cated him not to deprive the imperial crown of its juft rights. 
 
 ment
 
 ^ [ 17 ] 
 
 ment over any other. Their attachment then to 
 the conftitution is frequently blended with a zeal 
 for its fafety ; and their love of liberty, with a de- 
 gree of enthufiafm, of which the tame breads of 
 thofe fubjeft to arbitrary power, are not, nor can- 
 not be fufceptible. 
 
 If, therefore, the fudden change of any form of 
 government to one of a contrary nature, is in it- 
 felf an enterprize of fo difficult a nature, that it 
 might be expedted it would meet with oppofition 
 even from the fubjeds of an arbitrary ftate, who 
 could not but be benefited by fuch a change — 
 How are the difficulties multiplied, when the ob- 
 ject of the revolution is to deprive a people of 
 what it is to be prefumed their interefts, their in- 
 clinations, their reafon, and their paffions, at once 
 ftimulate them to defend ? An enterprize, one 
 would imagine, to be attempted only by a force 
 fuperior to the united ftrength of the nation, 
 whofe liberties were to be attacked, and to be ac- 
 compliffied only by (laughter and devaftaticn. 
 
 In one day, therefore, to complete fuch a 
 change -, in one day to deftroy the eftabljfficd con- 
 ftitution of a country, and ere6t its oppofite in its 
 room; • a conftitution that appeared to be 
 the moft guarded againft the poffibility of 
 fuch an event; at a time that the popular 
 branches of the legiflature were in the fuUeft 
 poflcffion of their powers ; at a time that the 
 hand which ftruck the blow, was moft limited, de- 
 prived by the conftitution of riches to corrupt, of 
 authority to awe, or of the difpofal of employ- 
 ments
 
 [ it ] 
 
 ments to influence : this is an event, which, pre- 
 vious to its arrival, would fcarcely have been con- 
 fidered as pofnble. Yet we now behold a young 
 prince of fix and twenty, at the head only of two 
 connpanies of guards, undertake to overturn the 
 conftitution and liberties of his country ; we be- 
 hold him accomplilh this defign, and eftablilh in 
 the room of the conftitution he had deftroyed, 
 that very government, againft the introduftion 
 of which, his fubjefts had laid down every barrier 
 that human wifdom could devife, and had taken 
 every precaution that human forefight could judge 
 efFeftual. And this brought about by means, in 
 jippearance, fo inadequate to the magnitude of the 
 objeft, by a force fo infignificant, compared to the 
 oppofition, it might have been prefumed, the un- 
 dertaking would have met with j that we fhould 
 be loft in admiration at the boldnefs of the 
 attempt, and the addrefs manifefted in the execu- 
 tion on the one fide ; did we not find much more 
 ample fubjecft for wonder in the tame fubmifllon 
 exhibited on the other. 
 
 Though the royal authority in Sweden, had cer- 
 tainly been, originally, too much limited by the 
 form of government eftablifiied there in 1720J yet, 
 from a ftriking defeft, in that form, the king was 
 not pofiefled of any conftitutional means of pre- 
 ferring the fmall ftiare of authority that had been 
 allotted him. 
 
 Accordingly, from the many alterations and in^ 
 novations afterwards introduced, the power of the 
 king of Sweden was almoft reduced to nothing. 
 
 One
 
 [ 29 ] 
 
 One would have been tempted to imagine, the 
 Swedes had defigned to revenge thcmfelves on the 
 royal dignity, for the infult offered them by Charles 
 the Xllth, who had threatened to fend one of 
 his boots to govern them^ they, in return, feem 
 to have been determined to render their monarch 
 of pretty nearly as much confequence, as the 
 mock governor that Charles faid he would impofe 
 upon them. 
 
 Without money, power, or influence, the empty 
 honours paid to his Swedifh majelly, by giving 
 him an apparent, confequence at one time, ferved 
 only to render his real infignificance the more 
 mortifying at another. 
 
 A crown that conferred no authority : the title 
 of king, with hardly the privileges of a fubjeft: 
 in appearance, the firft in the council of the na- 
 tion J yet the laft whofc inclinations were con- 
 fulted : expofed to all the mockery of an infolenc 
 obfequioufnefs, diftated to upon bended knees, 
 and compelled to obey the moft humble requells: 
 poffeffed of all the enfigns of royalty j furrounded 
 by every external mark of power ; yet fuffering 
 all the mortifications the real want of it could ex- 
 pofe him to : the firft could not but awaken am- 
 bition in a mind fufceptible of itj whilft the latter 
 could not fail to produce the moft ardent dcfirc 
 to fliake off reftraints of fo humiliating a nature. 
 
 Such wa$ the ftate of the king of Sweden : 
 every circumftance of his fituation was an incen- 
 tive to an undertaking, from the failure of which 
 be could lofe only fiix empty titles but whofe fuc-r^ 
 
 eels
 
 [ 30 ] 
 
 cefs infured him the higheft reward an ambitious 
 mind is capable of receiving. 
 
 It was not therefore the richnefs of the prize be- 
 fore him, or the luft of power, fo prevalent among 
 the generality of princes, which alone excited him 
 to undertake fo arduous a talkj no, it was to 
 emancipate himfelf from a ftate of thraldom, to 
 which even a fubjeft in a free country, would 
 fcarcely have fubmitted. It was to fhake off the 
 moft mortifying fhackles that ever the extreme of 
 jealoufy could have incited fubjedts to impofe ; or 
 to which the total impotency of the royal autho- 
 rity could alone have compelled a prince to fub- 
 mit : fhackles that at once deprived him of the 
 power of doing right, or of the pofTibility of pre- 
 venting wrong. 
 
 Thus ftimulated by whatever could roufe a gene- 
 nerous or inflame an ambitious mind, that his 
 Swedilh majefty fhould have made what muft feem 
 fo bold an attempt, will ceafe to appear extraor- 
 dinary. 
 
 But that he fhould have fucceededj that his 
 fubjefts fhould have fo tamely acquiefced; furren- 
 dered without a fhadow of oppofition, what they 
 muft have been taught to confider as the moft 
 invaluable of bleflings: this, on a fuperficial view, 
 cannot but appear wholly unaccountable. 
 
 This event is not therefore t3 be confidered 
 merely as an object of curious fpeculation : an 
 inveftigation of the caufes which produced it ; a 
 developement of the fccret fources of the aftoniih- 
 ing facility which attended the accomplifliment 
 I of
 
 [ 31 3 
 
 ©fit; and an exannination of thofe defedls in the 
 late Swedifh form of government, which contri- 
 buted to its fall ; the refult of fuch an enquiry 
 cannot fail to throw a new light on the fcience of 
 government and true nature and principles of 
 liberty: a fcience which fhould undoubtedly be 
 the peculiar ftudy of a free people. It may ferve 
 to redify many miftakes which fome politicians, 
 who polTefs more zeal than judgment, are apt to 
 fall into j and v/hilft we may learn from it whence 
 real danger is to be apprehended, it may quiet the 
 ill-grounded fears of fuch, who without being able 
 to comprehend in one view the whole of a fyflem, 
 are alarmed at the partial defects of the fmall and 
 feparate portions of it which fall beneath their 
 obfervation. And laftly, it v/ill teach us, that how- 
 ever well calculated a form of government may 
 originally have been, in order to produce the great 
 ends of political and civil liberty, the wifeft infti- 
 tutions will avail but little, unlefs the pofTeflbrs 
 have fenfe to preferve^ and fpirit to defend them. 
 
 THE
 
 THE 
 
 HISTORY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Revolution that happened in SwedeHy 
 
 ON THE I9TH OF AUGUST, I772. 
 
 PART L 
 
 Containing a review of the Hijlory of Sweden^ pre^- 
 vious to the efiablifhment of the late form of govern' 
 ment in 1720, as far as relates to any changes in 
 the conflitution of that country i 
 
 AMONG the events with which hillory 
 makes us acquainted, revolutions in go- 
 vernment and manners, are at once the moft 
 interefting and the moft inftruftive. The lives of 
 princes, a catalogue o{ their reigns, or detail of 
 their battles, victories, or defeats, are points ra:her 
 of curiofity than utility to the reader: but to con- 
 vert the fludy of hiftory to a ufeful purpofe, the 
 philofopher and politician will carefully fearch 
 into the nature of fuch great events, in the annals 
 of different countries, as have been productive of 
 any confiderable change in their conftitution, their* 
 cuftoms, or their laws. 
 
 D In
 
 [ 3* J 
 
 In proportion to the fuddennefs of llicli & 
 change, the example becomes more ftriking, at 
 the fame time that the developing of the caufes 
 which gave rife to it, appears more difficult. The 
 final deftru6tion of a building which gradually 
 decays, is forefeen ; and when the ruin at length 
 falls to the ground, it creates no furprize. 
 
 In the fame manneir, gradual alterations in the. 
 conftitution of a country, fcarcely attrad our no- 
 tice : in thefe, the progreflion of caufes and efFedts 
 is obvious, and the event expefted ; or we are 
 led to it by fuch infcnfible degrees, that though the 
 change may have become total in the end, it would 
 fbmetimes perhaps be hard to determine the pre- 
 cife point at which it commenced. But the de- 
 llrudlion of a government, accomplilhed with fuch 
 expedition, that none of thofe fteps preparatory ta 
 a change, and which give warning of the event, 
 appeared to have been previoufly taken, is like 
 the fudden fall of an edifice which was preceded 
 by no vifible fymptom of decay. Unable at firft 
 fight, to perceive the true caufes of fo furprifing 
 a revolution, we are apt to conclude that it mud 
 have been altogether produced by the policy and 
 defigns of thofe who were the apparent authors of 
 it; and to attribute to the abilities and deep-laid 
 fchemes of perfons, what was in faft either the 
 neceflary confequence of a peculiar fituation of 
 things i or the natural refult of latent caufes, 
 which, from being concealed, and frequently re- 
 mote, did not operate the lefs powerfully. 
 
 Upon
 
 [ 3J ] 
 
 Upon a nearer examination however, we IKall 
 find that it is impoflible for the ableft politician 
 to compafs a change of this nature, unlefs afTifted 
 by a certain concurrence of circumftances, which 
 indeed he may render fubfervient to his deligns, 
 but which he cannot create. 
 
 He may, it is true, haften the operation of thefe, 
 and bring forward effects which would not other- 
 wife have fo fpeedily taken place ; but this is all 
 he can do ; and he is in general, nothing more 
 than an a6tor in thofc fcenes, of which he appears 
 to be the author. 
 
 Had his prefent majefly of Sweden worn the 
 crown during the firft years of the eftabliflimcnt 
 of the late form of government of that country, 
 it is probable that neither his abilities, popularity, 
 or eloquence, would have obtained him the fuccefs 
 that has fince attended him. 
 
 What has been obferved here, does not in any 
 fliape derogate from the merit of thofe who, ac- 
 tuated by a noble love of freedom, have been the 
 chief inftruments of refcuing their country from 
 flaveryj or from the abilities of others, who 
 prompted by an ungenerous ambition, and invited 
 by opportunity, have accompliflied the dellrudion 
 of its liberties. Difcernment to feize the moment 
 beft fuited to the undertaking, and fl:ill to render 
 circumftances apparently unconnected with, fub- 
 fervient to the defign ; fagacity to guard againft 
 the obftacles it might meet with in the execution i 
 and fpirit to contemn the dangers with which it 
 might be attended, are without doubt requifitc 
 
 Da to
 
 [ 3^ ] 
 to thofe, who take an adive part in revolutions 
 of this nature. It only ferves to fhew, that in 
 order to difcover the true caufes of a fudden 
 change of the government of a country, it is not 
 fufficient to examine thofe meafures by which it 
 was immediately accomplifhed : it is likewife ne- 
 ceflary to enquire into the nature, origin, princi- 
 ples, and defe6ts of the government fo deftroyed i 
 to know how far it was founded in the inclina- 
 tions of the people who were poffefTed of it; how 
 far fupported by their opinions and prejudices ; 
 and laftly to become acquainted with the genius 
 and national character of thofe who had fo tamely 
 fufFercd themfelves to be deprived of it. 
 
 For thefe purpofes we mull go farther back into 
 their hiftory than might at firft fight appear ne- 
 ceflary in giving an account of fo recent an event 
 as the late revolution in Sweden ; and take a re- 
 trofpedtive view of thofe parts of it, which relate 
 to any of the above-mentioned points. 
 
 The fate of that country has been moft fingu- 
 larly various, both with refpedl to her revolutions 
 at home, and the figure fhe has made at diffe- 
 rent periods abroad. 
 
 The government of the hardy inhabitants of this 
 northern region has, like their climate, been ever 
 in extremes; licentioufly free, or bordering on 
 defpotifm. Whilft at one time their love of li- 
 berty fecms to be their diflinguifhing charac- 
 ter! {lie ; at another, they appear no lefs remarka- 
 able for the obfequioufnefs and fervility of their 
 fubmiflion to tl^eir monarchs. Impatient of re- 
 
 ftraint.
 
 [ 37 ] 
 
 ftraint, jealous to excefs of the regal authority, 
 and equally tanacious of their own rights j we 
 fometimes behold them tumultuoufly rife, and 
 like a torrent bearing down all before them, they 
 at once overthrow their fovereign, and every bar- 
 rier he had raifed to proted the fmall Ihare of 
 power he had been fuffered to poflefs. 
 
 At another, as if exhaufled by too violent ex- 
 ertions, every fpark of patriotifm has been ex- 
 tinguifhed among them: they appear patiently 
 to have fubmitted to every fpecies of opprefTion, 
 and to have been as refigned to flavery as if they 
 had never known the fweets of freedom. 
 
 In fhort, from fuch an apparent contradidion in 
 their national charadter, whoever contemplates 
 their hiftory, will be tempted to imagine that two 
 dillinft races of men had inhabited by turns the 
 fame country. 
 
 Nor is there a lefs ftriking variety in the de- 
 grees of confequence and confideration, pofTefled 
 by Sweden at different periods among foreign 
 powers. Now burfting from obfcurity, we behold 
 her prefcribing laws to the firft potentates : we 
 perceive her armies, in imitation of the Goths 
 their anceflors, over-running kingdoms and em- 
 pires, depofing monarchs and beftowing crowns. 
 We next view her funk into oblivion, if not con- 
 tempt : her conquefts reftored, her forces with- 
 drawn, we find the confequence fhe had acquired 
 as momentary, as her progrefs had before been 
 rapid. 
 
 D 3 The
 
 [ 38 ] 
 
 The fuperior genius of fome of her monarchs, 
 the bravery, the hardinefs, and above all the dif- 
 cipline of her foldiery, on many occafions infured 
 . a degree of fuccefs to her arms, of which there 
 are few examples in the hiftories of other coun- 
 tries. Her efforts, whenever fhe exerted herfelf, 
 were violent, and often irrefiftible i but as they 
 were difproportioned to her refources, they ferved 
 rather to exhauft her ftrength at home, than in- 
 cresfe her dominion abroad. 
 
 From the moft brilliant vi(fl:ories fhe reaped 
 little but honour j and after the moft important 
 conquefts, Ihe was frequently obliged in the end 
 to content herfelf with her native rocks. 
 
 The Swedifh hiftory may be divided into three 
 periods. 
 
 The firft, to conclude at the revolution, which 
 placed Guftavus Vafa on the throne 1523. 
 
 The fecond reaches from that event to the 
 death of Charles XII. in 1718; the third from 
 that period to the late revolution in 1773. 
 
 SECTION
 
 [ 39 ] 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Containing a review of the government, cujioms, and 
 manners of the Swedes , during thefirjl of thefe pe- 
 riods. 
 
 AT the time that moft of the governments in 
 Europe had begun to acquire a certain de- 
 gree of liability, that of Sweden ftill continued in 
 the moft fluduating ftate. The kingdom was 
 torn by civil dilTentions, wafted by internal wars, 
 and fucceflively a prey to the ufurpations of fo- 
 reigners, the ambition of its nobles, and the ty- 
 ranny of its fovereigns. 
 
 In other countries the abufes of the feudal (y- 
 ftem had been correfted or removed. The rife 
 and progrefs of commerce had in thefe, given 
 to the bulk of the people, a confequence and con- 
 fideration that enabled them in a great degree to 
 Ihake off" the yoke of the feudal barons, and to 
 acquire that rank in fociety of which they had 
 been fo long and fo unjuftly deprived. In 
 proportion as the rights of the people were af- 
 certained, the royal authority became fixed on 
 a more permanent foundation : from eleftive, 
 the crov/n was rendered hereditary j and as the 
 minds of men grew more enlightened, ideas of 
 public good, a fenfe of juftice, and the love of or- 
 der began to prevail, 
 
 D4 But
 
 [ 40 ] 
 
 But thefe great changes in the policy and man- 
 ners of moft of the European nations, begun 
 among them at the commencement of the twelfth 
 century, did not take place in Sweden till towards 
 the middle of the fixteenth : fo that even fo late as 
 at fhat period, Ihe prefented to the reft of Europe 
 a ftriking pidure of the diforders, confufion, and 
 anarchy, to which ail its inhabitants had been 
 formerly expofed. 
 
 The whole hiftory therefore of the period un- 
 '4er review, furnifhes only a detail of inteftine 
 commotions, rebellions, and revolutions, accom- 
 panied by all the calamities which thefe necefTa- 
 rily carry in their train. 
 
 Though perhaps it will not prove a grateful 
 tafk, to look back and contemplate fcenes of fo 
 difagreeable a nature, yet it is amidft the con- 
 fpfion and diforders thpre exhibited, that we are 
 to fearch for the origin of the late Swedifh form 
 of government. It is there we Ihall difcover the 
 genius and national charader of the Swedes, and 
 m them the true fources of the revolutions to 
 which their country has ever been fo fubjedt. It is 
 there too we fhall find, however remote they may 
 appear, fome of the caufcs of the .aftonilhing fa- 
 cility with which the laft was accompliflied. 
 
 When we take a view of the Swedifh form of go- 
 vernment, during the period we are treating of, 
 we fhould at firft fight be apt to give it the pre- 
 ference over any other at that time known. 
 
 Inftead of the rigour of an oppreffive arifto- 
 cracy, confpicuous wherever the feudal fyftem pre- 
 vailed.
 
 [ 41 ] 
 
 vailed, we perceive a conftitution in which the 
 body of the people poffefTed a Ihare lb confidera- 
 ble as to render them in a great degree independent 
 of their fuperiors. 
 
 We perceive the fupreme power neither lodged 
 in the hands of one, nor divided between the fo- 
 vereign and a few haughty barons, whilft an ab- 
 ject dependence was the portion of the reft of the 
 nation ; but placed, where it ought to be, in the 
 States General of the kingdom. 
 
 Into thefe ail ranks of men were admitted j and 
 the meaneft peafant, through his reprefentative, as 
 well as the proudeft noble, bore a part in the le- 
 giflature of his country. The ftates were com- 
 pofcd of four orders ; thofe of the nobility, the 
 clergy, the burghers, and the peafants. While 
 they were aflembled, the power of the fove- 
 reign was in a manner fufpended, or appeared 
 loft in theirs ; and after their feparation, a fenate, 
 in whom great authority was vefted, ftill continued 
 to a6t as the guardians of public liberty. 
 
 Such were the outlines of this conftitution, 
 which, when viewed at a diftance, like a palace 
 the walls of which only are finifhed, forms a fine 
 object, but upon a nearer infpeftion, we find it 
 anfwers none of the purpofes we were taught to 
 expeft from its appearance. Accordingly the in- 
 ternal government of Sweden was, as I have al- 
 ready obferved, more turbulent, more cxpofed to 
 diforder, anarchy, and confufion, than that of any 
 other country in Europe. 
 
 Many
 
 [ 42 ] 
 
 Many circumftances concurred to produce 
 thefe effefts in Sweden, and to prevent that civi- 
 lifation of manners from taking place there, which 
 mull neceflarily precede any improvement in go- 
 vernment. I ft. Previous to the eftablilhment of 
 the communication which commerce opens be- 
 tween the moft diftant countries, Sweden was, 
 from her northern fituation, in a great degree Ihut 
 out from the reft of the v/orld : and if the Swedes 
 were, on this account, exempted from taking any 
 part in thofe quarrels, in which the reft of Europe 
 was continually involved ; they were iikewife de- 
 prived of the advantages they might have reaped 
 from an intercourfe with nations, which had fo 
 confiderably got the ft art of them in the pro- 
 grefs they had made towards refinement. The 
 Ruflians certainly could not, on the one hand, con- 
 tribute to civilize them, whilft their conftant wars 
 with the Danes, a people as barbarous as themfelves, 
 ferved only, on the other, to increafe their natural 
 ferocity. 2dly, The nature of their country, 
 as well as that of their climate, are Iikewife very 
 obvious caufes of the wild licentious fpirit which 
 diftinguiftied thefe people. 
 
 Where the climate is temperate, and the foil 
 fertile, they invite to agriculture, by rendering 
 the life of a huft)andman both pleafant and profi- 
 table. Agriculture contributes greatly to foften 
 the manners of thofe who apply themfelves to it, 
 and has a natural tendency to promote the love of 
 order and tranquillity among mankind ; it difpofes 
 
 them
 
 [ 43 ] 
 
 them to peace, as without it, he who cultivates 
 his land, cannot hope to reap the fruits of his la- 
 bour. For the fame reafon, it introduces among 
 men, all thofe ideas concerning the fecurity of pri- 
 vate property and the rights of individuals, which 
 form the bafis of civil focieties. Where therefore 
 the climate is rigorous and the foil barren, as in 
 Sweden, the progrefs of the inhabitants towards 
 civiiifation will be proportionably flow. 
 
 The Swedes were however bythefe circumftances 
 inured to hardfhips, which rendered their minds 
 daring, and their bodies vigorous. 
 
 The firft infpired them with a love of indepen- 
 dence, which the latter enabled them to preferve. 
 Difcouraged by the nature of the climate, they 
 negledled agriculture; and the immenfe woods 
 which cover the face of their country, abounding 
 with game, afforded them a means of fubfiftencc 
 by hunting, more fuitable to their genius than the 
 milder occupations of hufbandry. 
 
 It is obvious how much fuch a mode of life muft 
 have contributed to maintain them in their native 
 ftate of barbarifm. That love of change and 
 reftlefnefs of difpofition which are the natural con- 
 fequences of it, are confpicuous in the condufl 6f 
 the Swedes, through all the early periods of their 
 hiflory ; and were no confiderable fources of the 
 convulfions which fo often Ihook the ftate. 
 
 It is true indeed, that the more fouthern pro- 
 vinces of Sweden, were neither unfertile nor alto- 
 gether uncltivated. But as thefe were continually 
 changing their matters, foraetimes belonging to 
 
 the
 
 [ 44 ] 
 
 the Swedes, fometimes to the Danes, they were 
 a conftant fubjeft of contention between the two 
 nations, and as conftantly the feat of war. This 
 circumftance muft therefore have in a great mea- 
 fure counteracted, among the inhabitants of thefe 
 provinces, the tendency which their applying 
 themfelves to agriculture would otherwife have 
 had towards foftening their manners. Such an 
 effed could hardly be expected to have become 
 either general, or of long continuance, in a coun- 
 try where every peafant was a foldier, and obliged 
 to ufe the fword more frequently than the plough. 
 
 3dly. From what has been faid in the preceding 
 article, it is evident, the peafants of Sweden muft 
 have been pofiefTed of the utmoft degree of inde- 
 pendency. 
 
 If we take a comparative view of the ftate of 
 fociety in Europe previous to the thirteenth and 
 fourteenth centuries, we fhall perceive the condi- 
 tion of the Swedifli peafantry was totally different 
 from that of the fame order of men, in other Eu- 
 ropean countries. In thefe they were reduced to 
 the moft abje6t ftate of fervitude, and were not 
 only deftitute of any weight or influence in the 
 government, but were, for the moft part, de- 
 prived of the natural rights of mankind. 
 
 In Sweden, on the contrary, the peafantry did 
 not content themfelves with having preferved their 
 independency, and with pofTefTing the peculiar 
 privilege of fending deputies of their own body 
 to the States General of the kingdom ; but they 
 likewife frequently aflumed to themfelves the di- 
 
 re(5bioii
 
 d 45 ] 
 .rc«5lio> of public affairs j took the lead in every 
 revolution ; and feemed to a6t on all occafions as 
 a diftinft body, which had views and interefts of 
 its own, feparate from thofe of the other members 
 of the (late. 
 
 It might naturally be expeded the greateft ad- 
 vantages would have refulted to liberty, and con- 
 fequently to fociety, from the bulk of the people's 
 being pofleffed of fo much weight and influence : 
 but the fame caufes to which they owed their im- 
 portance, not only rendered them incapable of 
 making a right, but for the moft part prompted 
 them to make a wrong ufe of it. 
 
 To their mode of life they were indebted for 
 that fpirit, with which they oppofed every inva- 
 fion of their rights. And if the Swedifh mo- 
 narchs appear feldom to have been awed into a 
 refpeft for privileges, w^hich the fierce difpofition 
 of their fubjeds rendered it fo dangerous to attack ; 
 at leaft, it was on this account that their attempts 
 to invade them, feldom proved fuccefsful in the 
 end. But this mode of life, at the fame time, 
 communicated to the people an impatience of 
 control, and fiercenefs of manners, that were in- 
 compatible v/ith any regular government*, and 
 
 equally 
 
 • The ancient law in Sweden, which ordained that a part, 
 or the whole, of the houfe of any one who had injured ano- 
 ther ihould be pulled down, and burned, in proportion to the 
 injury fuftained by the party aggrieved; furnifhes a ftriking 
 proof of the unfettled ftate of the government, which was ob- 
 liged to have rccourfe to fuch an expedient. This taw 
 
 hit
 
 [ 46 ] 
 
 equally repugnant to every principle of real free- 
 dom. If at one time, it infpired them with a 
 fpirit of refiftance, calculated to preferve their li- 
 berty J at another, by plunging them into anar- 
 chy, it expofed them to the lofs of it. When 
 they delivered themfelves from the oppreflion of 
 the few, they became expofed to the licentiouf- 
 nefs of the many: and continually fludluating be- 
 tween thefe two extremes, they never once flop- 
 ped at any intermediate point, where a balance 
 might have been eflablifhed between their rights 
 and the prerogative of their fovereign. Ignorant 
 of the true nature of liberty, as well as of that of 
 government, they neither perceived the neceffity 
 of fuch a ballance, nor did they pofTefs fkill to 
 have formed one if they had. Incapable of fore- 
 fight, and roufed only by what they felt, they op- 
 pofed the monarch, but knew not how to limit 
 the regal authority : and in all their ftruggles, 
 there feemed rather to be a perfonal quarrel be- 
 tween the king and the people, than a contention 
 between the popular branches of the legiflature 
 and the crown. 
 
 Union to concert, defign to form, or judgment 
 to execute any efFeftual meafures, to prevent or 
 
 has been confidered only as a mark of the fimplicity and ig- 
 norance of the age in which it was enacted ; but it may with 
 more juftice be attributed to the difHcuky of feizing the per/on 
 of an offender, among a people fo little accuftomed to order 
 and fubordination. It was, therefore, in that part of his />r«- 
 ferty only which it was eafy to come at, that there could bs 
 found ft means of puniihing him. 
 
 2 oppofe
 
 [ 47 ] 
 oppofe the conftant endeavours of their fovereigns 
 to acquire abfolute power, could not be expected 
 from men like thefe. 
 
 When they fought redrefs of their grievances, 
 their temporary efforts to obtain it, were diftin- 
 guifhed by that rafh zeal and blind imp€tuofity> 
 which chara6lerife the proceedings of all irregular 
 and tumultuous aflemblies of men; and which 
 feldom fail to defeat the very ends they have in 
 view : the oppreffor, indeed, often fell a lacri- 
 fice to their refentment -, but as they negleded to 
 guard againft the oppreffion, fubfequent princes 
 were almoft fure to give them the fame caufes of 
 complaint, and to compel them to have recourfe 
 to the fame mode of redrefs. 
 
 A ftriking proof of the unfettled ftate of the 
 government of the Swedes, and of the violence to 
 which both king and people muft frequently have 
 had recourfe, is to be found in an ancient cuftom of 
 theirs j that whenever one of their monarchs had 
 occafion to pafs through a province, the inhabi- 
 tants, before they would fuffer him to enter it# 
 compelled him to give hoftages for tlite fecurity of 
 their privileges i and he in return received the 
 fame from them for the fafety of his perfon f . 
 
 Whilft fuch mutual jealoufies fubfifted between, 
 a Swedilh monarch and his people; whilft neither 
 
 t So tenacious were the Swedes of this cuftom, that Rag- 
 wald, who reigned about the beginning of the thirteenth cen- 
 tury, loft his crown and life for not complying wilh it 
 BOTIN. p. 246, 
 
 his
 
 [ 48 I 
 
 his prerogatires, nor their rights were afcertained^ 
 and force alone decided their differences ; it was 
 not extraordinary that a fpirit ofopprefTion Ihould 
 have marked the condiid of the one ; or that a 
 pronenefs to revolt lliould have diftinguilhed 
 that of the other. 
 
 Here it may very naturally be afked. Whence 
 arofe, during the period we are treating of, this 
 flriking fuperiority difcernible in the condition of 
 the Swedilh peafantry, when compared to that of 
 the great body of the people in other countries 
 of Europe ? 
 
 The nature of the foil and climate of Sweden, 
 partly accounts for it : but this was neither the 
 only, nor the principal fource of it. 
 
 After the deftruftion of the Roman empire by 
 the invafion of the northern barbarians, thefe hav^ 
 ing eftablifhed themfelves on its ruins, and taken 
 pofTefllon of the countries they had fubdued, did 
 not exterminate, but affociated with fuch of the 
 ancient inhabitants as remained after the conqueft, 
 and even divided the lands with them in certain 
 proportions f. 
 
 If, therefore, we take a view of the ftate of 
 Europe at that time, we fhall perceive the GothS 
 or Vandals, Huns or Saxons, &c. fpread over 
 the whole face of it. 
 
 But then the native countries of thefe barba- 
 rians, which were thofe fituated to the North, 
 were inhabited only by themfelves, without any 
 
 X Efprlt de Loix. liv. 30. 7 and S. 
 
 inter-
 
 [ 49 ] 
 
 mtermixture of another people ; whereas the 
 Southern parts of Europe, which had before been 
 under the dominion of the Romans, were in the 
 joint poflefiion of the Barbarous nations, and of 
 their own ancient inhabitants. Thus, in the lat- 
 ter, we difcover two diRindt people, viz. the con- 
 querors, and the conquered, occupying it once 
 the fame country. In the former, on the contra- 
 ry, we meet only with the remaining part of thofe 
 fierce inhabitants, who, perhaps, lefs enterprizing 
 than their countrymen, inftead of fallying forth 
 in queft of new fettlements, had continued at 
 home contented with their native forefls. 
 
 Here then a. very important diftinftion has been 
 made, which I think will ferve fufficiently to ex- 
 plain, why the bulk of the people in Sweden con- 
 tinued free, at the fame time that all the lower 
 clafTes of men in other countries, funk into fer- 
 vitude. 
 
 Such parts of the Northern nations as had re- 
 mained at homcj it is to be prefumed, preferved 
 their ancient cuftoms and government : but thofe 
 who had acquired new pofleflions, in which the 
 former inhabitants ftill continued to refide, were 
 under the necefTity of devifing fome expedient, 
 which would enable them to guard againft fur- 
 prize, and fecure them from the fudden attacks, 
 to which fuch a fituation mull naturally have ex-^ 
 pofed them. 
 
 This it was that gave rife to the feudal fyftem, 
 •which we find eftablifhed by thefe bold invaders, 
 wherever they fettled. 
 
 E A fyftem
 
 [ JO 1 
 
 A fyftem fo peculiarly adapted to the circutn- 
 ftances in which they then found therafelves, to 
 thofe circumftances obvioufly owed its birth : nor 
 is it at all probable, that the feudal fyftem was 
 known to any of thefe people, previous to their 
 emigrations from their feveral countries §. 
 
 Though this fyftem did not immediately reduce 
 the vanquilhed inhabitants of the countries feized 
 upon by the northern intruders, to that wretched 
 ftate of (lavery into-^which the great body of the 
 people fhortly funk, wherever it was introduced; 
 yet it had an almoft unavoidable tendency to pro- 
 duce that effeft. 
 
 As its principles were founded in* conqueft, fo 
 the objedt of all its regulations, was the preferva- 
 tion of that conqueft. It would, therefore, have 
 been highly impolitic in the new proprietors of 
 countries, the ancient inhabitants of which were 
 ftill, perhaps, more numerous than themfelves, to 
 
 § There Is no trace of any Inftltution In Sweden fimilar to 
 the feudal, till the year 824, when Brant Anund caufed feme 
 lands to be cleared of the woods and cultivated, which he 
 gave to his fubje£ls, on condition they fhould ferve him in 
 the wars on horfeback, or pay a certain tribute. Hence 
 the peafants in Sweden were bound immediately to the 
 king, and the nobles had confequently no vaflals, till 
 fome of thefe Fiefs, as they may not improperly be called, 
 in courfe of time were alienated from the crown and fell into 
 their hands. But this was near three centuries after the de- 
 ibuftion of the Roman empire, and, confequently, a confi* 
 derable time after the feudal fyflem had been eilablifhed in 
 other countries. 
 
 have
 
 [ J' ] 
 
 have fufFered tliefe to be in a condition to difturb 
 them. If the vanquifhed people were allowed to 
 cultivate the lands that had been allotted to them, 
 it was all they could expe6t -, and as the ufe of arms 
 would certainly have been denied them, agricul- 
 ture would have become their only occupation. 
 
 When we confider, therefore, the encroaching 
 (pirit which ever attends thofe who are polTefled 
 of power J that here there was, on the one hand, 
 a body of men neceflarily defencelefs, whilft their 
 fierce conquerors were, on the other, always armed 
 and prepared for aftion : when we refleft too on 
 the contempt, in which, during thofe martial 
 ages, every man was held who was not a foldier ; 
 that among the ancient Germans, who difdained 
 every occupation but that of war, agriculture was 
 left entirely to their flaves* -, it will not, I think, 
 appear extraordinary, if they foon confidered, and 
 treated as fuch, all thofe who applied themfelves 
 to it. 
 
 Even if any of their own, people were, con- 
 trary to the ideas which generally prevailed among 
 them, induced by the fertility of their newly-ac- 
 quired pofTeflions, to apply themfelves to hufban- 
 dry J and, inftead of holding their lands by mili- 
 tary fervice, to return certain quantities of corn 
 pr cattle to their fuperior lord, they were foon re- 
 duced to a ftate little different from that of 
 flavery f . 
 
 • Fac. dt. fKor. Ger. 
 
 f DalrjmJ>le en feudal property, C. 2. p. 28. 
 
 E a. Thus
 
 t S'- ] 
 
 Thus In France, towards thexomntienccmeitt 
 of the firft race of kings, there was an infinite 
 nunnber of freemen, both among the Franks and 
 the Romans j yet the ftate of villanage incfeafed 
 to that degree, that at the beginning of the third 
 race, not only all the hufbandmen were become 
 bondmen J, but we find alfo, that at the fame pe- 
 riod, almoft all the inhabitants of towns Iikewife 
 were in the fame ftate : as thefe were for the moft 
 part Romans, this too is a proof, that though the 
 vanquifhed were not immediately reduced by their 
 conquerors to a ftate of flavery, yet from the na- 
 ture of their fituation, they infenfibly funk into it 
 afterwards. 
 
 Now as in Sweden, neither the foil nor the 
 climate were favourable to agriculture ; as its in- 
 habitants were compofed but of one nation, among 
 whom there were neither conquerors nor conquer- 
 ed ; fo thofe caufes v.'hich in other countries had 
 contributed to reduce the major part of their inha* 
 bitants to the fubjecflion of the reft, did not exift 
 among them. 
 
 It is true that the northern nations had their 
 flaves, previous to the invafion of the Roman em- 
 pire ; but they were few in number, and compofed 
 of fuch of their own people as had forfeited their 
 liberty by various means; of fuch as had been 
 made prifoncrs in battle, or had committed 
 certain crimes, or had^old themfelves ; a prac- 
 tice not uncommon among thefe barbarians. 
 
 X £/prit des Loixt b. 30. c. ii» 
 
 Hence
 
 [ 53 1 
 
 Hence they did not, properly fpeaking, form a 
 diftinft race of men, as muft happen when one 
 nation becomes enflaved by another -, and confe- 
 quently, as the line drawn between them and their 
 maflers was not fo diftinft as in the other cafe, 
 neither was it fo difficult for them to recover their 
 freedom. Befides, as they were chiefly employed 
 in the cultivation of the land, it follows, that where 
 the foil was leaft favourable to agriculture, fuch 
 flaves were lead wanted. Accordingly they were 
 enfranchifed in Sweden earlier perhaps than in any 
 other part of Europe*. Towards the middle of 
 the thirteenth century, Birgis Jarl rendered it un- 
 lawful for any Swede to fell himfelfj and in the 
 year 1335 the ftate of flavery was altogether abo- 
 lifhcd there by an ordinance of Magnus Ladulas. 
 
 4th, The want of great cities in Sweden was 
 likewife no inconfiderable fource of the diforder 
 and confufion which reigned fo long in that king- 
 dom. 
 
 Commerce is a great means of foftening the 
 manners of a martial people, and of corredling the 
 fiercenefs of that military ardour which renders 
 them equally fond of arms, and averfe to every other 
 occupation. Commerce prefents new objects to 
 the inclinations and pafTions of mankind. By 
 placing the productions of various climates and 
 
 * In Denmark, Poland, parts of Germany, and feme 
 other countries, where agriculture was more followed, the 
 flaves have never been enfranchifed, which is the reafon the 
 peafants of thofe countries are all Bon^mtn, 
 
 i ^*//«. /. 334- 
 
 E 3 countries
 
 [ 54 ] 
 
 countries within their reach, they acquire a relifh 
 for what they had no conception of before : with 
 that relifh they acquire too a tafte for arts for- 
 merly unknown to them j and as they apply them- 
 felves to thefe, their attachment to their ancient 
 mode of life muft likewife decreafe. But there is 
 a ftill more important confequence attendant on 
 commerce : as it neceffarily affembles mankind to- 
 gether, it becomes the principal caufe of the rife 
 and growth of cities ; and confequently the chief 
 means of introducing among them a regular form 
 of government. Without this it is impoflible for 
 any numbers of men to live together ; and there- 
 fore where fuch numbers are alfembled it is, that 
 a fenfe of juftice, the love of order, and defire of 
 public tranquillity, firft begin to prevail. It is 
 obvious therefore how much the want of great ci- 
 ties in Sweden muft have retarded the progrefs of 
 improvements in any of thofe points. This want, 
 owing to that of trade, may be placed among the 
 many difadvantages refulting to Sweden from her 
 northern fituation, and the nature of her foil and 
 climate. As commerce was firft introduced into 
 Europe through Italy, it was of courfe difFufed , 
 among theojtherEtiropean countries, in proportion 
 to their vicinity to ^he fource from whence it 
 flowed. But this was not all; thofe countries fitu- 
 ated in the temperate parts of Europe, were like- 
 wife the beft- calculated from the nature of their 
 produdions, for the eftablifhment and cultivatiort 
 of commerce among them. The rigour of the 
 climate and barrennefs of the foil of Sweden, were.
 
 [ 55 ] 
 
 on the contrary, by no means favourable to the 
 progrefs of trade. 
 
 The produce of their mines indeed, furnifhed 
 the Swedes with materials for it: but this branch of 
 commerce, the only one to which they applied 
 ihemfelves, is perhaps too the only one that has 
 no direft tendency to produce thofe good effefts, 
 which may in general be afcribed to the culti- 
 vation of commerce ; I mean the improvement of 
 manners and of government. The life of a miner 
 is not calculated, like the occupations purfued in 
 towns, to prornote this end : trades and manufac- 
 tures make men refort to cities j but they are in 
 general neceiTarily kept at a diftance from them 
 when employed in the ^ivorking of mines; and 
 they confequently remain unacquainted vath that 
 fubordination and order, which in cities mud 
 in fome degree always prevail. Accordingly we 
 find the miners of Sweden were the mofl refllefs 
 part of the nation, the moll ungovernable, and ever 
 among the foremoll to revolt. So ignorant were 
 the Swedes of every fpecies of manufafture, that 
 till towards the end of the fixteenth century, they 
 did not even know how to work their own iron i 
 but the ore was carried to Dantzick and other 
 parts of PrufTia, to be there forged into bars. 
 And at what a low ebb the trade of Sweden muft 
 in general have been, may be {een from the ex- 
 orbitant privileges granted by Guftavus Vafa to 
 jhe Lubechers*, 
 
 ' ' I have 
 
 • That they (hould pay no cuftoms for the commodities they 
 (hould bring into Sweden i that rUfey alent ihould have alt tbt 
 E f tratl»
 
 [ 5« ] 
 
 I have already had occafion to take notice of the 
 beneficial efFedls which have refulted to govern- 
 ment from the reprefentatives of cities gaining a 
 place in the legiflature. But though the Swedifh 
 cities had early the privilege of fending members 
 to the Diets, yet the number of thefe was very 
 inconfiderable, and their influence there pror 
 portionably fmall. And as the little trade carried 
 on in Sweden, was for the moft part in the hands 
 of foreigners *, they were neither fo deeply interr 
 <efled in what related to the government of that 
 country as natives would have been, nor could it 
 be expeded they would pay fimilar attention to 
 points in which they were not equally concerned. 
 
 The reprefentatives of the peafants being pof- 
 feffed of a feat at the Diets, was by no means an 
 equivalent for the want of a fufficicnt number 
 of the members fent by cities, nor produflive of 
 the like effedts. 
 
 When citizens acquired a voice In the councils 
 of the nation, they mull have retained in their new 
 capacity of legiflators, the fame ideas which pre- 
 vailed in the communities to which they be- 
 longed. 
 
 Thefe mull have been of the nioll pacific na- 
 ture, as merchants are more interelled in the 
 
 trade of that kingdom : and laftly, that they might trade at 
 Stockholm, Suderkoping, Calmar, an4 Aboo j not only with 
 the citizens but with the peafants. 
 
 • In the thirteenth century the inhabitants of the Swedifli 
 cities were moftly Germans : and even among the magiftratea 
 one half were allowed to be foreigners. Botin. /. 319. 
 
 prefervation
 
 cc 
 
 [ 57 1 
 
 prefervation of public tranquillity than any other 
 order of men j and, accuftomed to the fubcrdi- 
 nation and regular government which take place 
 in cities, they muft have communicated to the le- 
 giflature, in which they bore a part, a fpirit fome- 
 what fimilar to that of which they were themfelves 
 pofTefled. 
 
 On the contrary, the greater importance and 
 power the Swedifh peafants obtained in the flate, 
 the more turbulent and- diforderly they rendered 
 the government. For that impatience of reftraint; 
 and fpirit of independence, by which they were 
 diftinguilhed on all other occafions, muft have 
 had an equal influence on their conduct in their 
 Jegiflative capacity. 
 
 5th, The Swedifh nobles were by no means lb 
 formidable to the kings of Sweden, as in other 
 countries the feudal barons were to their mo- 
 narch s. 
 
 The former pofTefled neither the territories, 
 wealth, nor exorbitant privileges, which enabled 
 the latter to give law to their princes. The genius 
 of the feudal fyflem naturally led to an ariftocracy : 
 it had accuftomed men to behold extenfive do- 
 imains, great riches, and confiderable authority, in 
 the pofTefTion of a few : and as previous to the cor- 
 ruption of this fyftem, no vafTal could legally di- 
 minifh the value of a fief, which at his death was 
 to return to the fuperior lord ; fo it happened 
 here, as in many cafes where cuftoms have been 
 obferved to continue long after the caufes which 
 gave them birth have ccafed, that after fiefs 
 
 became
 
 [ 58 ] 
 
 became hereditary, the fame ideas of preferving 
 them intire ftill prevailed. 
 
 Hence proceeded the device of entails j a con- 
 trivance which put it out of the power of the pof- 
 terity of thofe who were poffefled of fuch fiefs, to 
 alienate any part of what was confidered by them 
 as neceffary to fupport the dignity of a feudal 
 chieftain. 
 
 In Sweden, on the contrary, as titles were un- 
 known there till the middle of the fixteenth cen- 
 tury, when Eric, the fon of Guftavus Vafa, firft 
 created, counts and barons : fo were the Swedes 
 ^ike ignorant of entails ; among them it had ever 
 been the cullom to make equal divifions of the 
 property of the father among the children*: the 
 eldeft fon was not on account of primogeniture 
 entitled to more than the others ; nor indeed did 
 there appear any reafon why a difference fliould be 
 made in his favour^ fince the title enjoyed by the 
 father defcended to all his children, alike. This 
 principle was carried fo far as to be extended 
 even to the crown j and the kingdom became fre- 
 quently divided among the fons of the laft king j 
 which contributed not a little to increafe the dif- 
 order and confufion into which it was at all timest 
 but too apt to be plunged. 
 
 It is evident, the above-mentioned cuftpm ne- 
 cefTarily prevented great riches from accumulating^ 
 or large eflates from continuing long in the fame 
 
 • That is, thefpns all fhared alike, as did the daughters, 
 but the former had double the portion of the latter. 
 
 lO. ' hands,
 
 [ ss ] 
 
 hands. It certainly occafioned a more equal di- 
 ftribution of property among the whole order of 
 the nobles ; but as it rendered the power of indivi- 
 d\iaU of that order very inconfiderable, it may be 
 reckoned a principal fource of the inftability of 
 the ^^ovcrnment of Sweden. 
 
 In other countries the fame power which ren- 
 dered z baron the little tyrant of his own domain, 
 ferved likewife to controul the authority of his 
 fovereign. Three or four feudal barons, at the 
 head of their refpedive vaflals and retainers, were 
 able to defeat any army he could bring into the 
 field. And as it was the intereft of thefe potent 
 chiefs to make jcommon caufe againft the crown, 
 ^y attack of the latter upon the privileges of thfr 
 former, was fure to meet with the moft immediate 
 and moft powerful o^/pofition. Hence the feudal 
 monarchs were compelled to reft, if not fatisfied, 
 at leaft apparently content with the degree of power 
 vefted in chem by the conftitution; or, where 
 (hey made the augmentation of their authority 
 their objeft, they had recourfe to an indirect and 
 concealed policy, which would not alarm the jea- 
 loufy of their barons, nor confequently excite com* 
 motions. 
 
 But the cafe was far otherwife with the Swedijfh 
 monarchs : when thefe were difpofed to infringe 
 the rights of their fubjeds, no immediate obftacle 
 prefented itfelf to their defigns. There was no 
 power in the ftate ready formed, and as it were 
 on the watch, as well as prepared to oppofe them, 
 like that of the feudal barons in other countries. 
 
 A general
 
 [ 6o ] 
 
 A general fpirit of liberty indeed exifted in the 
 nation, but the difficulty lay in direfting this fpi- 
 rit. The peafantry, for the moft part independent 
 of the nobles, were not, like the valTals of a chief- 
 tain, compelled to follow a ftandard that was to 
 lead them againft their fovereign. Among the 
 nobles *, the power and influence of each indivi- 
 dual were, from caufes I have already mentioned, 
 fo inconfiderable, that a union of numbers of 
 them, could alone enable them to defend their 
 rights againft the encroachments of the crown. 
 But it muft have been a point of great difficulty 
 to have formed a well-compa£ted confederacy, 
 v/here fo great a number of members were necef- 
 fary, and thefe fo little accuftomed to order and 
 fubordination^ Befides, from the nature of their 
 country, ccyvered with rocks, and ^onfequently 
 thinly inhabited, they were obliged to live at fo 
 confidcrable a diftance from each other, that it 
 would have been impoffible for them to aflemble 
 on any fudden emergency when immediate exertion 
 was necelTary. 
 
 But this was not all ; the Swediffi nobles were 
 not, nor indeed could they be, fo deeply interefted 
 
 • The power of the Swedifh nobles feems to have been at 
 its greateft heighth towards the end of the fifteenth century. 
 According to an aft of affurance of Chriflian Ift, in 1476, 
 every noble was to be king over his own peafants, or tenants, 
 ('vara konungof-vtr jina egna landt bonder) Botin. p. 572. But 
 when we confider the temper of the Swedifh peafantry, and 
 the independence to which they had always been accuftomed, 
 y/e cannot fuppofe they became very obedient fubjefts. 
 
 in
 
 I 6i ] 
 
 in the permanency of their government as the feu- 
 dal barons, whofe pofTefTions were fo confiderable, 
 muft have been in the prefervation of that confti- 
 tution by virtue of which they enjoyed them. 
 
 The poverty of the former made them perhaps 
 as fond of changes in which they might reap 
 fome advantage, as the wealth and privileges of 
 the latter muft have rendered them ayerfe to any 
 fuch chanpjes. Hence the endeavours of the 
 Swedifli monarchs to acquire a more abfolute 
 power, did not in the beginning meet with that 
 refiftance which was fure to attend fimilar endea- 
 vours of the feudal kings. For this purpofe it 
 was neceflary that the fpirit of the whole nation 
 fhould be roufed; which feldom happened till 
 their monarchs had perfifted fome time in the 
 fame conduft. Befides, the almoft conftant wars 
 between Sweden and Denmark, placed their 
 kings as conftantly at the head of an army; and 
 this not an army like that of a feudal monarch, 
 which was compofed of foldiers who were the vaf- 
 fals of their refpedive chiefs, to whom only they 
 thought themfelves bound to pay obedience; 
 but of men who acknowledged no fuperior lord 
 but their king, and who confequently were the 
 more likely to be at his devotion. 
 
 Hence the Swedifh monarchs not only never 
 defifted from their attempts to acquire arbitrary 
 power, but alfo carried them on without difguife ; 
 attempts from which no example could deter, 
 no danger intimidate them. Not even the fate 
 of their immediate predeceflbrs, who had perhaf)s 
 
 forfeited
 
 [ 62 ] 
 
 forfeited their crown, if not their lives, for having 
 purfued a fimilar condud. From the commence- 
 ment of the hiftory of Sweden to the elevation of 
 Guftavus Vafa to the throne, the firfl- objeft of 
 almoft all their princes feems to have been to in- 
 creafe their power at the expence of the liberties 
 of the people ; and to augment their revenues by 
 arbitrary taxes, impofed in direct violation of the 
 laws of the realm. And though fooner or later 
 they almoft all fell a facrifice to their ambition, 
 yet as many of them enjoyed their ufurpations a 
 confiderable time, before the people were fuffici- 
 .entiy i;oufed to ihake off by force of arms the yoke 
 that had been impofed on them j each allured by the 
 temporary advantages refulting to his predecefTors 
 on thefe occafions, was apt to overlook the fate 
 which had afterwards attended them -, and to flatter 
 himfelf either that he Ihould be more fortunate, 
 or, that poflfefTed of fuperior abilities, he fhould 
 be able to fucceed where they had failed. 
 
 But if many circumft]ances feemed to tempt 
 every Swedifh monarch, on his obtaining the 
 crown, to attack thofe privileges of his fubjedls, 
 which circumfcribed its authority within fuch 
 narrow limits -, there were likewife many caufes 
 which prevented fuch attacks from being long fuC' 
 cef&ful. 
 
 Among thefe, that of Sweden's continuing an 
 elective kingdom, during ail the period I am 
 fpe^iking of, was one of the principal. 
 
 Where the crown is eledive, it is impoflible a 
 teipdlar fyftem to increafe its prerogatives and 
 
 humble
 
 t 63 ] 
 
 humble a turbulent nobility, can be purfued for 
 any length of time. 
 
 One reign is hardly fufRcient to effed a changft 
 of this nature, where the body of the people is 
 averfe to it. And the death of a prince, to whom no 
 fucceflbr has been before appointed, neceflarily puts 
 a flop to any meafures however well concerted, 
 that were calculated to eftablifh the authority of 
 the fovereign on a more folid foundation. 
 
 Every new king on his eleftion, was obliged tq 
 fubfcribe to articles, which undid, at once, all that 
 his predeceffor had, during, perhaps, the courfe 
 of his life, been labouring to accomplifh ; and 
 which left him, in a manner, deftitute of au- 
 thority. 
 
 The jealoufy of the royal power among the 
 Swedes, led them intoanexcefs of precaution, 
 which made them imagine they could never re- 
 llrain it too much. A miilaken policy which de- 
 feats its own ends ; for when reftriflions are car- 
 ried beyond a certain point, they become infup- 
 portable ; and, therefore, frequently prompt 
 thofe whom they are meant to bind, to aim at the 
 very objefls, againft their obtaining of which, 
 thefe were defigned to be the barriers. 
 
 The fcantinefs of the revenues of the Swedilh 
 monarchs like wife formed no inconfiderable check 
 upon all their projefts. 
 
 Unable to reward their adherents with the or- 
 dinary income of the crown, they, for that pur- 
 pofe, ftripped it of almoft all its patrimonial ter- 
 ritories. When they had thus impoverifhed ir, 
 
 they
 
 f 64 ] 
 
 they were. In fome meafure, eompelled to mak^ 
 ufe of extraordinary methods of levying money, 
 in order to fupport their dignity, with any tolera- 
 ble degree of fplendor : at the fame time, their 
 favourites, who were rapacious in proportion to 
 the uncertainty of the tenure by which they held 
 their power, had no object in view but that of 
 enriching themfelves as expeditioufly as they 
 could. 
 
 Thefe, therefore, encouraged their fovereign, 
 in the purfuit of any meafure, however unpopular 
 or oppreflive, provided it would enable him, for 
 the prefent, to gratify their avarice or ambition. 
 Whilft he, on the other hand, galled by the 
 fhackles, which the jealoufy of his fubjedts had 
 impofed upon him, was already but too well in- 
 clined to follow counfels, which flattered him 
 with the hopes of Ihaking them off. 
 
 But the eagernefs with which the Swedifh mo- 
 narchs purfued thefe objed;s, by betraying their 
 defigns too foon, rendered them abortive. The 
 nation was alarmed in time, and confequently put 
 upon its guard againft attacks, to which a more 
 cautious condudl and artful policy would have in- 
 fured greater fuccefs. But to purfue fuch a con- 
 du6t, required more time, than it could be ex- 
 pe6ted an elective king, who naturally muft be 
 defirous to feize and make the mofl of the prefent 
 moment, would devote to it. Where a monarch 
 is certain his children are to fucceed him, he pro- 
 bably will be content, fhould he be able to lay 
 the foundation only of that power, which he ex- 
 
 pe6tst
 
 t 6s ] 
 
 pe6ts will be enjoyed by his pofterity. Regard 
 for his family will moderate his ambition, render 
 him cautious in the carrying on of his defigns, and, 
 perhaps, infpire him with a means of accomplifh- 
 ing them, not the lefs fure for being indire6t. 
 
 Unreftrained by this motive, the Kings of 
 Sweden, excepting in one or two inftances, pur- 
 fued a contrary conduft. Scarcely were they feat- 
 cd on the throne before they began to a6l in di- 
 re6"t violation of the laws. But their fchemes 
 were concerted without judgement, and conduced 
 without addrefs. They had recourfe to violence, 
 where artifice fhould have been employed j and 
 they never failed to roufe that jealous fpirit in the 
 pation, which it was their bufinefs to have lulled 
 to fleep. 
 
 Their fuccefs was anfwerable to the raflinefs of 
 their meafures. The liberties of the Swedes, dur- 
 ing the early period of their hiftories, previous to 
 the reign of Magnus Ladulas, though frequently 
 endangered, could never be overturned by attacks, 
 too open and dire6t not to render their tendency 
 obvious i and too ill fupported to overcome the 
 Ipirit of oppofition, which they were, for that 
 reafon, fure to create. 
 
 6thly. That order of men whofe peculiar pro- 
 vince it is to preach peace and concord to man- 
 kind, were in Sweden often the chief autliors of 
 infurredions, and the perpetual promoters of civil 
 dilfentions. During the early ages of chriftianity, 
 the clergy had in all countries ufurptd an autho- 
 rity, and claimed powers very inconfiftent with 
 
 F their
 
 [ 66 ] 
 
 their funclion. The ignorance and fuperftition of 
 thofe times had rendered their perfons facred; and 
 from the veneration in which they were held, as 
 well as from their immenfe property, a property 
 ever increafing, but incapable of being diminifhed, 
 they were become in all the kingdoms of Europe 
 the moll potent body in the ftate. Great as their 
 power muft, from thefe caufes, have every -where 
 been, the fame caufes rendered it flill more con- 
 fiderablc in Sweden, than in other countries. In 
 many of thefe, great part of the lands belonging 
 to the laity, was, in confequence of being entail- 
 ed, unalienable, as well as thofe in the pofleffion 
 of the clergy. Hence the biiliops, although for 
 the molt part the temporal lords of their epifco- 
 pal fees, were not, on that account, more powerful 
 than many fecular nobles ; and a kind of balance 
 'fubfifted between ecclefiaftioal, and temporal 
 property. 
 
 In Sweden, on the contraiy, the lands of the 
 clergy were alone unalienable : fuch as were in 
 the poffeflion of the laity, were, as has been be- 
 fore obferved, fubjecl to be divided and fubdivid- 
 ed into feparate portions, as the families of thofe 
 to whom they belonged, happened to be more or 
 lefs numerous. It is obvious what a prodigious 
 fuperiority the church muft have derived from 
 this fingle circumftance. 
 
 Accordingly the Swedilli prelates afFefted the 
 
 fliate of little fovereignsj they fortified their caf- 
 
 tles, and maintained garrifons in them ; were 
 
 ever attended by a numerous band of gentlemen 
 
 6 and
 
 [ 6? ] 
 
 arid foldlers ; were the abettors of every faction ; 
 and even forgot their chara6ber fo far, as frequent* 
 ly to appear themfelves at the head of their 
 troops. 
 
 Here, indeed, was a power which rtiight effec- 
 tually have oppofed any attempts of the Kings of 
 Sweden upon the liberties of the nation. A power, 
 hot only confiderable, but permanent i alike pre- 
 pared to receive or make an attack ; and which 
 might have been alone a fufficient obllacle to eve- 
 ry unconftitutional meafure, or defign to intro- 
 duce an arbitrary government. 
 
 We behold, however, in the Swedifh bifhops, 
 the ftrenuous protectors only of what they deemed 
 the rights of the church -, we frequently perceive 
 in them, the promoters of tyranny i but never 
 once find them the affertors of public liberty. 
 
 The popifh clergy, from their profefTion of ce- 
 libacy, form an order of men in the flate, flill 
 more diflind and feparate from the reft of the na- 
 tioni than even that of the military : the latter 
 may, by the ties of a family, be, in fome mea- 
 fure, linked to the body of fociety, and have a 
 general concern in the public welfare, indepen- 
 dent of their partial interefts as foldiers. But the 
 cafe is otherwife with the fonner. Among them 
 the citizen is loft in the prieft j and the interefts 
 of the nation forgot in thofe of the order. When, 
 therefore, the Swedifh bifhops oppofed their fove- 
 reign, the good of the public was not even made 
 ufe of as a pretext on the occafion* 
 
 Sometimes, it . proceeded altogether from the 
 F 2 licentious
 
 I 68 i 
 
 licentious and turbulent fpirit, by which all the 
 Swcdilh nobles were diftinguifhed, and which the 
 wealth and power of thefe prelates furnilhed them 
 naore particularly with the means of gratifying : 
 at others, it arofe from an apprehenfion of a de- 
 fign in the crown, to recover the lands which pro- 
 perly belonged to it, and which they had ufurped. 
 But as long as they imagined themfelves fecurc, 
 and that the fovereign had the policy to court 
 their friendfhip, he might, undifturbed by them, 
 have purfued any fchemes of oppreflion towards 
 the reft of his fubjefts, that he had ability to con- 
 du6l, or good fortune to render fuccefsful. 
 
 Thus, to take in at one view, the whole ftate 
 of Sweden, during this period j we perceive a na^ 
 tion, all the orders of which openly afpired at 
 independence -, who, by their fierce and intrafta- 
 ble fpirit, were rendered almoft incapable of any 
 political union ; who, from a conftitution, the 
 great objed of which was political liberty, derived 
 none of the advantages, which alone can render 
 fuch a conftitution valuable. The fole end of po- 
 litical, being the fecurity of civil liberty, the laws 
 which give perfonal fafety to individuals, and pro- 
 te6t private property, ought to be the fruits of a 
 free government; but thefe were unknown in 
 Sweden. The monarchical, ariftocratical, and po- 
 pular branches of the conftitution being ill adapt- 
 ed to each other, the limits of each undefined, 
 and the rights of all unafcertained, that concur- 
 rence of the whole, necefTary to give efFed to the 
 refolutions of a part, could feldom or never be 
 
 obtained ; 
 
 J
 
 [ 69 3 
 
 obtained ; and confequently no provifions could 
 be made for the interior order and tranquillity of 
 fociety. 
 
 We find then kings ever violently grafping at 
 a power, their obtaining of which was as con- 
 ftantly, and with equal violence, oppofed by their 
 fubjefts. A reftlefs and turbulent nobility, too 
 jealous of each other to fufFer the title and dignity 
 of King to belaidafidej too impatient ofreftraint 
 to render the kingly office, when retained, of any 
 ufe. A clergy, wealthy and potent, who were 
 perpetually either the abettors of tyranny, or pro- 
 moters of feditions and infurredlions, as it fuited 
 their intereft. — A fierce and independent peafan- 
 tryj without union among themfelves, and dif- 
 daining all fubordination to fuperiors ; obftinately 
 bent to defend privileges and cufloms which were 
 incompatible with any regular government j and 
 the burghers, the only order of men inclined to 
 promote public tranquillity, few in number, and 
 held in little eftimation. Such was for the moft 
 part, the ftate of Sweden, before, and at the com- 
 mencement of the fixteenth century. With fo 
 many fources of diforder and confufion, it cannot 
 appear extraordinary, that the kingdom Ihould 
 have been the conflant feat of civil wars, and re- 
 volutions ; of anarcliy or opprefiion. 
 
 Miferable as the fituation of this country mull 
 ever have been, it was rendered (till more fo by 
 an event which took place there in the year 1385. 
 
 This was the famous treaty of Calmar ; defign- 
 cd to eftablifli a lading union of the three Nor- 
 
 F 3 thern
 
 I yo ] 
 
 thcrn nations, but which, on the contrar)', 
 proved the fatal occafion of the moil bloody wars, 
 and tragical events to be found in the hiftory of 
 any people. 
 
 In order to comprehend what originally gave rife 
 to this treaty, it will be neceffary to take a view 
 of fome of the tranfaftions of the preceding reigns. 
 
 Magnus Ladulas, crowned in 1276, feems to 
 have been the firft king of Sweden who purfued a 
 regular fyflem to increafe his authority, and who 
 had recourfe to policy, where violence had fo of-^ 
 ten failed. That his predeceffors had pofleffed 
 fo inconliderable a fhare of power, was as much 
 owing to their poverty as to any other caufe. 
 
 Magnus, therefore, made the augmentation of 
 the revenues of the crown his firfb objeft. Motives 
 of ambition would have been alone fufficient to 
 have prompted him to this ; but he had likewife 
 other inducements, perhaps, equally powerful. 
 
 He was pofTelTed of a difpofition generous to an 
 extreme j and a talle for magnificence with which 
 theSwedifh monarchs feemed to have been hitherto 
 unacquainted. By thefe Magnus was hurried into 
 expences which the royal income was by no means 
 calculated to fupport ; but which it muft have 
 been highly mortifying to a prince of his temper 
 to have been compelled to "retrench. However, to 
 accomplifli his point, he did not follow the exam- 
 ple of former kings. The rock they had ever fplit 
 upon, was that of attempting to impofe taxes 
 without the confent of their fubjeds, and to leyy 
 them by force. This certainly might have apr 
 
 peared
 
 [ 7' ] 
 peared to them the moft fummary method of 
 raifing a temporary fupply. It was likewife that 
 which was beft fulted to the genius of princes; 
 who, more accuflomed to aft than to think, were 
 feldom capable of forming any of thofe fchemes, 
 which are the reflilt of much ait and deliberation. 
 But, if it was the moft fpeedy, it was at the fame 
 time the moft dangerous method, and generally 
 occafioned the ruin of thofe monarchs who had 
 adopted it. Magnus, perhaps the ableft prince 
 who had ever fat on the Swedifh throne, could not 
 fail to perceive this, and to regulate hia conduci; 
 accordingly. ...-^ --**., 
 
 He knew the Swedes had at all times been pe- 
 culiarly averfe to taxes, and were equally appre- 
 henfive of that increafe of the influence of the 
 crown, which would be the neceffary confequencc 
 of any augmentation of its income. To obviate 
 the oppofition to his defigns which he had reafon 
 to expert on both thefe accounts, he refolved in 
 the firft place to find fome expedient of raifing a 
 revenue without the impofition of taxes ; and, in 
 the next, to acquire fo far the confidence of his 
 people, that they fliould not be afraid of trufting 
 him with a revenue fo acquired. 
 
 Pofiefled of all the art and policy requifite to 
 condu6l with caution and fecrecy the plan he had 
 formed againft' their liberties, he was the more 
 dangerous, from having, at the fame time,afufficient 
 number of good qualities to conciliate their af- 
 feftions. If he gave occafion to awaken the jea- 
 loufy of his fubjeds, he likewife won upon their 
 
 F 4 hearts J
 
 [ 72 ] 
 
 hearts j fo that their judgment of his condud be- 
 came biafled by their attachment to his perlbn. 
 
 Confcious of the influence of the clergy over 
 the minds of the people, Magnus applied himfelf 
 moft afliduoufly to gain that body of men over to 
 his intereft. He paid his court to the monks, by 
 founding a number of monafteries j and to the 
 biftiops, by affecting to place the greateft confi- 
 dence in them, and by bellowing upon them the 
 firft offices of the ftate *, 
 
 When thi? artful monarch had by thefe means 
 created in the nation a difpofition which he judged 
 favourable to his defignsj having convened the 
 States of Stockholmf, he reprcfented to them the 
 fcantinefs of the revenues of the crown, which he 
 alledged were totally infufficient to fupport the 
 dignity of a fovereign. Ar^d fo great was his in- 
 fluence over the members who compofed the 
 ftates, that after three days deliberation, the whole 
 convention voted him all the mines of Sweden and 
 Gothland, the produce of the four great lakes f , 
 to which they added the incomes of ail the fiefs ||> 
 alienated from the crown by former kings, when 
 the leafes in being expired §, Thus Magnus at- 
 one ftroke rendered himfelf independent of his 
 people J who, whilft they were fo lavifh of thp i;- 
 
 • Botin. p. 271. t A. D. 1282. 
 
 X The Meier, Veter, Vener, and Hillnier. 
 
 II Thefe were the farmsj already taken notice of, which 
 had been granted by Brant Amund, to thofe who cleared them 
 of the woods. 
 
 % P^fFendorf. 
 
 grants
 
 [ 73 1 
 
 grants to the crown, forgot to have them accom- 
 panied by provilions for the fecurity of their liber- 
 ties. So that here was laid the foundation of a 
 power, the weight of which was afterwards moft 
 feverely felt by the Swedes, under fubfeqiient 
 monarchs. 
 
 But befide the augmenting of his revenue, in 
 which we perceive Magnus fucceeded fo well, this 
 prince had another object in view, of equal im- 
 portance towards eftablilhing his authority on a- 
 more folid foundation : this was, the humbling 
 of his nobles. 
 
 He had obfervedthat though the'^nomination to 
 the dignity of a fenator, and the difpolal of the 
 other^great offices in the kingdom, were branches 
 of the royal prerogative ; yet they had added but 
 little to the power of his predeceflbrs. Thefe of- 
 fices approached too near to the royal dignity, 
 where the authority of kings was fo much limited 
 as in Sweden, and rendered thofe who poflefled 
 them, the rivals rather than the fubjects of their 
 prince, The reafon of this was, that though the 
 king could make a fenator, the ftates only could 
 depofe him. Whoever, therefore, became a mem- 
 ber of the Senate, was immediately rendered inde- 
 pendent of his fovereign, Hence, the very per- 
 fons whom the king had raifcd to power and 
 confequence, frequently employed them againft 
 himfelf. As they had nothing farther to hope or 
 to fear from him, they could have no private inte- 
 reft in promoting, but would on the contrary, 
 from the fpirit of independence, and love of free- 
 dom
 
 [ 74 ] 
 
 dpnfi common to all the Swedes, oppofe any de- 
 figps h? might entertain againft the liberties of his 
 country. 
 
 To remedy this, Magnus boldly hazarded a 
 ftep, which a prince of lefs popularity durft not 
 have ventured. He had married Hidwig, daugh- 
 ter of the Duke of Holftein, and was the firft 
 ICing of Sweden who formed alliances with foreign 
 powe^rs. Relying on the affiftance he might re- 
 opiye from thefe, he refolved to bellow fomeof 
 the great offices of the flate upon foreigners. He 
 even went fo far, as to introduce many into the 
 fgijate. As thefe had no weight or influence in 
 th^ nation, but what they derived from their 
 mafter, and poflefled no intereft feparate frcgrt his, 
 he was fure that the power with which he entrufted 
 them would never be made ufe of to oppofe his 
 will'. Such a Gondudl was a direft violation of the 
 laws of the realm j and could not fail to excite 
 the utmoft degree of indignation and refentment 
 among the Swedifh nobles. But Magnus, fecure 
 of the afFedions of the body of his people, and 
 Ukewife powerfully fupported from abroad, paid 
 little attention to the murmurs and difcontents of 
 his nobility. 
 
 Their haughty fpirit could not, however, pa- 
 tiently fubmit to what they confidered as the high- 
 eft of indignities. Unfortunately this precipitat- 
 ed them into a meafure, which only ferved to give 
 the king a new and plaufible pretext for purfuing 
 the defigns he had fonned againft them, with 
 additional vigour. Nothing can exhibit a more 
 
 ftriking
 
 [ 75 1 
 
 flriking pifture pf the fayage temper of thofe 
 times, than the metho.ds taken by the Swedifh. 
 nobles, upon this occafion, to feek redrefs fQf x^ 
 grievance they complained of. 
 
 The queen going into Gothland to meet her 
 father, was attended by many of the Holfteiners, 
 who were the moft obnoxious to the male-con.- 
 tents. This prefented the latter with an oppor- 
 tunity they had long wiflied for. They refolved 
 to way-lay her majefly on her journey, and to' 
 malTacre all the foreigners that accompanied her. 
 They fpared only the life of the duke, father to the 
 queen, who had herfelf the good fortune to make 
 her efcape. 
 
 From the reluctance with which all nations are 
 apt to behold foreigners advanced among them 
 to polls of honour and profit, it i^ probable that 
 this action did not excite in the Swedes that in- 
 dignation, which its barbarity might otherwife 
 haVe raifcd. Magnus, however, was determined 
 to punifli with the utmoft feverity fo atrocious an' 
 offence. But in this he was obliged to proceed 
 with caution, and to employ his ufual addrel^. , . : 
 Having, by the moll artful conducb, lulled 
 thofe nobles who were chieily copcerned in tliij:^ 
 tranfadlion, into a falfe fecurity, vs(hich entirely, p,uv 
 them off their guard, he fgdtjcnly a/Temblied tl^e 
 Diet ; where accufing them of high-treafon, hel]ad 
 influence fufEcient to procure tlieir condemni^^jp^. 
 They were accordingly conveyed to StockhoJn?? 
 where they were executed. This w^s the, rnoii 
 fatal blow that the power and independence of.thc 
 
 Swedifh
 
 [ 76 ] 
 
 Swediili nobles had ever received. So vigorous an 
 exertion of the influence the king had been able 
 to acquire, awed them into fubmiflion during the 
 remainder of his reign j which concluded in the 
 moft perfedl tranquillity. 
 
 But it ended too foon for the completion of all 
 this prince's defigns. He had, indeed, governed 
 with far more authority than any of his predecef- 
 fors ; but he was indebted for this increafe of 
 power to his perfonal qualities, not to the throne 
 he occupied. It was Magnus^ not the King, who 
 was refpefted and obeyed. To transfer, however,: 
 an authority fo acquired, from the perfon of the 
 monarch, to the crown itfelf, fo as to render it part 
 of the conflitution, and enable him to tranfmit it 
 to his children, was by no means an eafy tafk. 
 Had Magnus lived longer he might, perhaps, 
 have effedted it. But the death of this prince, in 
 the prime of life, fortunately prevented the Swedes 
 from carrying their complaifance towards a favou- 
 rite fovereign too far i and the extreme youth of 
 his fucceflbr prevented, in fome meafure, thofe 
 immediate ill confequences to their liberties, of 
 which the artful policy of Magnus might other- 
 wife have been produdive. 
 
 I have dwelt the longer upon the tranfaftions 
 of this reign, as, during the courfe of it, the 
 grounds of the firft material change in the Swedifh 
 conflitution, from the time of its eftablifliment, 
 feem to have been laid. 
 
 So confiderable an augmentation of the reve- 
 nues
 
 [ 77 3 
 
 Hues of the crown was neceffarily followed by a 
 proportional increafe of the regal power; and 
 whilft by the fteady and vigorous exertion of this 
 power Magnus humbled the haughty fpirit of his 
 nobles, and created in the reft of the nation a refpe<5t 
 for the royal dignity, with which they appear to 
 have been before but little acquainted; he at 
 the fame time, by employing them only for the 
 public good, reconciled his fubjefts to a6l:s of au- 
 thority, which in former monarchs they would 
 have oppofed with the utmoft violence. 
 
 The charader and condu£t of this prince might 
 in fome meafure have juftified their acquiefcence 
 to his will ; but they either did not forefee or did 
 not guard againft the evil confequences of efta- 
 blifhing a precedent which opened a door for the 
 admifllon of arbitrary power under future mo- 
 narchs. Accordingly it is likewife in the tranfafti- 
 ons of this reign that thofe caufes originated, which 
 afterwards gave birth to the treaty of Calmar. 
 
 The fucceflbrs of Magnus imitated his exam- 
 ple only in aiming at the augmentation of the 
 royal authority, but did not employ, like him, 
 that authority for the good of the people. 
 
 It is the opinion of all the Swedifti hiftorians, 
 that had the fucceflbrs of this prince been pof- 
 fefled of equal abilities, the free conftitution of 
 Sweden would probably have been converted into 
 an abfolute monarchy. But at the death of Mag- 
 nus, his fon Birger was only eleven years oldj and 
 Terkel Canutfon, who was appointed regent du- 
 ring the minority of the young king, was not of a 
 
 difpofition
 
 [• 78 ] 
 
 Blfpofition to facrifice the liberties of his countty 
 at the Ihrine of the royal authority. 
 
 Magnus had likewife committed the fame er- 
 i-or of tvhich many of his predeceflbrs had beeii 
 guilty. He had given to his younger fon fepa- 
 tate portions of his dominions ; fo^ that though 
 Birger had the title of king, his brothers Eric and 
 Waldemar nearly equalled hinri in power and in 
 the Extent of their pofreffions. 
 
 This was productive of the fame fpirit of rival- 
 fhip, the fame jealoufies, and the fame civil diffen- 
 tions, which had ever been the confequence of 
 fuch a divifion of the Swedifh territories. 
 
 One advantage indeed refulted from it : the 
 king, engaged in continual contefts with his bro- 
 thers, could have neither leifure nor opportunity 
 to purfue that artful policy pradlifed by his fa- 
 ther, which had threatened the total ruin of the 
 Swedifh liberties, even had he pofleffed abilities 
 equal to the talk. 
 
 The fchemes of Magnus had been however too 
 deeply laid not to be produftive, after his death, 
 of many of the confequences which this fagacious 
 prince had forefeen. 
 
 By introducing a ftile of magnificence into the 
 Swedifh court, which had been before unknown 
 there, he not only indulged his natural difpofition, 
 but likewife forwarded by it his views of ambition. 
 The pomp and fplendour he difplayed, at once 
 gave new dignity to the crown, and in the opi- 
 nion of the people, too apt to be governed by ap- 
 pearances, ferved in a great meafure to diminilh 
 
 the
 
 t f'lj 
 
 the importance of the noble^." KS tfii }>i(e '|aifeed, 
 the other loft ground, with rfegird to the refpedt in 
 which they were till then held by the nation. And 
 Magnus, by infpiring his fubjeds with refpeft for 
 the perfon, prepared them ro fubmit to th6 
 authority of the king. In this his example 
 was followed by his fucceflbrs. They were in- 
 debted to him for the great augmentation of the 
 revenue of the crown, which gave them the mean^ 
 of doing fo ; whilft from his condud with refpe6t 
 to foreigners, they had been taught what advan- 
 tages they might reap from foreign alliances, arid 
 how efFeflually they might be fupported by thefe 
 againft their own fubje6ts. 
 
 Hence it was that tho' marty circumftances con- 
 tributed to prolong the d^te of the Swedilh liber- 
 ties, yet from the reign of this prince we find the 
 power of the crown gradually iricrealing, till at 
 length under Albert of Meclenberg, liberty fcems 
 to have been totally fubverted, and defpotifm efta- 
 bliftied in its room. 
 
 from the fame period too we may obferve that 
 a change in the temper and difpofition of the 
 Swedes began to take place j and that the eager- 
 nefs of their monarchs to ufurp authority, appears 
 hardly to exceed the abjed fubmiflion with which 
 they were fufFered to exercife it. 
 
 Not only Birger, but the two dukes his brothers, 
 loaded the people with taxes j who bore the heavieft 
 impofitions, with a patience that had never been 
 found in their anceftors on fimilar occafions. And 
 when this at length produced fome commotions, 
 
 they
 
 t 8° ] 
 
 they were quelled with unufual facility, and the 
 princes perfevered without obftacle in the fame line 
 of condu6b. The riches they obtained or rather ex- 
 torted from their fubjects, not only enabled them 
 to divide the nation into parties, but likewife to 
 maintain bodies of foreign troops, which were the 
 chief inllruments of their power. 
 
 We find however that a revolution Ihortly 
 takes place. Birger is dethroned, Mathas Kettle- 
 munfon declared protestor, and Magnus, fon of 
 duke Eric, an infant only three years old, advanced 
 to the throne. But we are not to attribute this re- 
 volution to the fpirit of liberty, which had on for- 
 mer occafions produced changes of afimilar nature. 
 Tl^at fpirit appears then to have been almoft ex- 
 tinj5t among the Swedes ; at Icaft it had been fo 
 m^ich enfeebled, that other motives feem to have 
 ixeen requifite to ftimulate the nation to refiftance. 
 Hence, though Birger had been guilty of greater 
 opprefTions than thofe for which many of his pre- 
 deceflbrs had forfeited their crown, yet other caufes 
 were afligned for taking arms againft him. Bir- 
 ger's two brothers Eric and Waldemar, had been 
 put to death in the moft treacherous and inhuman 
 manner, by his order. His unnatural cruelty to- 
 wards thefe princes, who perhaps deferved as little 
 of the public as himfelf, was the oftenfible reafon 
 for driving him from his throne and kingdom : fo 
 that this revolution is to be attributed rather to 
 the power and number of the partizans of the 
 murdered dukes, than to any remains of that fpi- 
 rit of refiftance, which at former periods the love 
 
 of
 
 [ 8i ] 
 
 of freedom had aever failed to excite among the 
 Swedes when they found themfelves opprcfled. 
 We proceed but a few fleps in the Swedifh hiftory 
 before we meet with another revolution : Magnus, 
 from the fame infatuation which h^d pbflefled 
 almoft every monarch that had hitherto fat on the 
 throne of Sweden, purfued the fame conduct in 
 encroaching on the liberties and trampling on 
 the rights of his people. And though this prince 
 poffelfed neither abilities to gain the refpedt, 
 nor virtues to acquire the love of his fubjecls, 
 he would probably have been fufFered to continue 
 his ufurpations, had he not unfortunately for him- 
 felf, employed the revenues appropriated to the 
 pope, in an expedition againft the Ruflians. Un- 
 able to reimburfe his holinefs, he was excommuni- 
 cated. The confequence was, that fuperftition ef- 
 fected what the love of freedom, no longer power- 
 ful among the Swedes, could not have done. Mag- 
 nus was dethroned, and the crov/n conferred on 
 his fon Eric. 
 
 Upon the death of Eric, who held the fceptre 
 but a fhort time, his father, the depofed Magnus, 
 having given the moft folemn aflurances that he 
 would corre6l the errors of his former reign, was 
 fuffered again to afcend the Swedilh throne. For 
 this perhaps he was principally indebted to his be- 
 ing the only remaining prince of the blood royal. 
 His conduft however anfwered but ill to his pro- 
 feflions; and he made no other ufe of the autho- 
 rity to which he had been reftored, than to gratify 
 his refentments, and to fatiate his revenge upon 
 
 G thofc
 
 [ 82 ] 
 
 thofe who had before contributed to his depo- 
 iition . 
 
 Wearied at length with his tyranny, the nobles 
 who had moft fuffered, or had moft to apprehend 
 from him, refolved to fhake off his yoke. But this 
 was by no means an eafy talk. Since the reign of 
 Magnus Ladulas, the power of the crown had 
 increafed in proportion as its revenues had been 
 augmented. 
 
 The Swcdifh monarchs had of late been enabled 
 to form to themfelves fo numerous a body of 
 partifans, that nothing but a very general dif- 
 affeftion among their fubjeds could fhake them 
 from their feat. The fpirit of liberty had fo much 
 decayed among the people as to have had little or no 
 lliare in the two laft revolutions. Thefe had not 
 been accomplifhed without difficulty and blood- 
 flied, and would probably have never taken place 
 but for fome other circumilances, which bore no 
 relation to thofe caufes which on former occafions 
 had been produftive of fimilar events. 
 
 In the prefent inftance no fuch circumftances 
 exifted. There was befides, as has been before 
 obferved, no prince of the royal race remaining to 
 whom they could offer the crown; and any fcheme 
 of the nobles to ele6t a new king out of their own 
 body would have been a point of the utmoft diffi- 
 culty. Not only their jealoufy of each other was 
 almoft an infuperable obftacle to this meafure, but 
 had they been able to have overcome it, and to 
 have chofen one from among themfelves, their 
 ability to fupport their choice was very dubious. 
 
 In
 
 t 83 ] 
 
 In this ftate of things they refolved upon an ex- 
 pedient, which was what firft prepared the way 
 for the acceffion of Margaret of Norway to the 
 throne of Sweden ; and which confequently imme- 
 diately led to the famous treaty of Calmar. They 
 refolved to offer their crown to fome foreign 
 prince, who from his connexions and alliances, 
 would be fufficiently powerful to make good the 
 title they were willing to confer upon him. They 
 imagined that fuch a prince, who lliould owe to 
 them alone the fcepter he bore, who could not, like 
 a native monarch, have had any opportunity of 
 forming to himfelf a body of partifans, dangerous 
 to the liberties of their fellow fubjedls; and who, 
 from the very circumftance of his being a foreigner^ 
 would be miftrufted by the people; would fcarcely 
 venture to invade the rights of men already on 
 their guard againft him* 
 
 Albert, fecond fon of the duke of Meclenburg, 
 was the prince made choice of on this occafion. 
 He was at firft proclaimed by the malecontents, 
 and having feized upon Stockholm, was afterwards 
 acknowledged fovereign by the whole nation. 
 
 Thus Magnus was a fecond time depofed, and 
 fo far the Swedes accomplifhed their wilhes. But 
 they foon found themfelves feverely difappointei 
 in every other view which had induced them to 
 place their crown on the head of a foreigner. One 
 might have been tempted to think that theSwedifli 
 throne was itfelf infedious, and neceflfarily com- 
 municated the love of defpotifm, like a difeafe, 
 to all who fat upon it. The fame power which 
 
 G 2 had
 
 [ H ] 
 
 had enabled Albert to fnatch the fccpter out of 
 the hands of Magnus^ was afterv/ards employed to 
 cnflave his new fubjefts. Certain of fupport from 
 the princes of Meclenburg, the earls of Holftein, 
 and the Hanfe towns, he refolved to carry his au- 
 thority to the utmoft extent. Pie bellowed all 
 polls of confequence upon foreigners. Thefe only 
 poflefled hi* confidence and fhared his favours -, he 
 introduced a number of Germans into the fenate, 
 in dired violation of the laws of the realm ; and 
 maintained a iflanding army of foreign mercena- 
 ries, by means of the oppreflive taxes v/hich thofe 
 militaiy colleflors enabled him to extort from, his 
 fubjetfls. 
 
 ^Gt content with having laid burdens on his 
 people already beyond their ability to bear, Al- 
 bert of a fudden demanded a third of all the reve- 
 nues of the kingdom, ecclefiaftical as v/eli as civil. 
 This the diet refufed to confent to : but the king, 
 who feems to have confulted them intirely for the 
 fake' of form, w^ithout intending to pay any regard 
 to their determinations, immediately feized by 
 force what he could not obtain by confent. So 
 much was the fpirit of the Swedifli nobles at 
 that time funk, that had Albert contented him- 
 felf with invading in this manner the property of 
 the laity only, it is probable he might have en- 
 joyed his ufurpations undiflurbed. 
 
 He betrayed however the utmoft folly as well 
 as rapacity, . by this attack on the property 
 of the church i which could not fail to ren- 
 
 5 der
 
 [ 85 ] 
 der fo powerful a body of men as that of the 
 clergy, his mortal enemies. 
 
 The whole nation fccms now to have . been for 
 once united, in order to free themfelves from his 
 tyranny. But if the depofition of Magnus had 
 proved a point of no inconfiderable difficulty, the 
 driving Albert from a feat in which he was fo well 
 fortified, muft have been a much more arduous 
 tafk. 
 
 The fame difficulties muft have occurred with 
 refpeft to the choice of a fucceiTor, arifing from 
 the fame caufe, the want of a prince of the ancient 
 blood royal, on whom they could beftow their 
 crown without creating mutual jealoufies among 
 the nobles. But then Albert was infinitely more 
 powerfully fupported than Magnus had been j and 
 the fpirit of liberty, already on the decline among 
 the Swedes under Magnus, had not certainly ac- 
 quired frefh vigour during the defpotic reign of 
 Albert. An army of foreigners in the heart of 
 Sweden ; all the fortreffes and ftrong holds of the 
 kingdom in the pofTefllon of thefe -, the chief part 
 of the Swedilh nobles in voluntary exile in Den- 
 mark, whither they had fled for protection ; and 
 the king, fecure of receiving numerous bodies 
 of troops from his allies abroad, the mo- 
 ment he fhould require them : thefe were 
 all ftrong barriers in the way of any attempt to 
 dethrone him. Thus circumftanced, the Swedes 
 were either too weak to endeavour by themfelves 
 to fhake off a yoke that was become intolerable, 
 or perhaps wanted courage to ex^rt the ftrength 
 
 Q 3 of
 
 [ 86 ] 
 
 of which they might ftill have been pofieiTed. 
 Determined however no longer to fubmit to Al- 
 bert, they rafhly refolved to offer their crown to 
 Margaret queen of Denmark and Norway. That 
 fagacious princefs, who had long beheld with a fe- 
 cret fatisfadlion the fitiiation to which the Swedes 
 were reduced, had too much ambition not to take 
 advantage of it. She accepted of their offer, but 
 upon her own terms. Terms which afterwards re- 
 duced Sweden to a more deplorable ftate of flavery 
 than had ever yet been experienced in that coun- 
 try. 
 
 This meafure was certainly as impolitic as it 
 was extraordinary. From the national antipathy 
 that had ever fubfifted between the Swedes and 
 the Danes, one would have imagined a Danilh fo- 
 vereign would have been the very laft who could 
 hope to afcend the Swedilh throne. And with 
 regard to the policy of it, the Swedes, without any 
 great degree of penetration, might have perceived 
 that a principal fource of their grievances was the 
 unconftitutional power which their monarchs had 
 fo frequently ufurped. They might have obferved, 
 that from the great augmentation of the revenue? 
 of the crown, which had been infured to it to per- 
 petuity, their kings had often been enabled to 
 form at home a party fufficiently confiderabie to 
 fecure them in the pofTefTion of it, though againft 
 the fenfe of the reft of the nation. How much 
 this fecurity had been increafed when a prince had 
 likewife refources from abroad, they had but too 
 well experienced in the perfon of Albert^ 
 
 To
 
 [ 87 ] 
 
 To beftow therefore their crown on the moft 
 potent fovereign of the north, who would not 
 pnly neceffarily fucceed to all the authority pof- 
 fefled by preceding princes, but would likewife 
 derive additional power from beisig already miftrefs 
 of two kingdoms, feems to have been an expe- 
 dient calculated only to incrcafe the weight of 
 thofe Ihackles, from which it was their ^bjeft to 
 free themfelves. Little could they exfpeft that 
 fo potent a princefs as the fovereign of Denmark 
 and Norway, would refped more their rights and 
 privileges than their native monarchs had done ; 
 who, not being pofTefled of the fame power, could 
 not infringe them with equal fafety. Yet fuch 
 was the hatred the Swedes bore to Albert, and fo 
 precipitate were they in purfuing any fteps which 
 might rid them of that tyrant, that they not 
 only acknowledged Margaret queen of Sweden, 
 but, in order to cut off every hope the depofed 
 king might entertain of ever remounting the 
 Swedifh throne, they waved one of thofe rights 
 of which they had hitherto been moft tenacious, 
 that of electing their fovereign j and fufFered 
 Margaret, a fhort time after her accelTion, to. no- 
 minate the prince who was to fucceed her. 
 
 While the Swedes were thus induftrioufly forg- 
 ing their own chains, Margaret meditated a ftroke 
 which had long been the objeft of her ambition. 
 Not content with uniting the three Northern 
 crowns in her own perfon, fhe aimed at rendering 
 that union perpetual. The treaty of Calmar was 
 dcfigned to efFed this purpofe : a treaty to which 
 
 G 4 her
 
 I 8S ] 
 
 her Swedifh fubjefts were either fo blind as to 
 grant their afient, or found themfeives unable to 
 refufe it. It was obvious they could never pro- 
 roife thenfifelves any thing better from this mea- 
 fure, than to fee their country become a province 
 to Denmark j but the requefts of their new fove- 
 reign carried with them the aythqrity of com- 
 mands i and as fhe poffefTed the power required 
 to exaft obedience to her will, flie was of a temper 
 toOj that would not brook oppofition. This event 
 opens in the Swedifh hiftory a new fcene of con- 
 fiifion, anarchy and diflraftion, arifing from frefh 
 caufes, and exceeding, if poiTible, all thediforders 
 jn,'hich had before prevailed in Sweden, although 
 the fources of thefe, were already fufficiently nu- 
 merous. 
 
 The Hate of this country previous to the reign 
 of Magnus Ladulas, has already been fufficiently 
 laid open. But that reign furniHies an epocha, 
 from \\'hich we rnay date f change both with re- 
 fped to the government of the Swedes, and to that 
 attachment to liberty, by which they were before 
 diftinguifhed. From that period* to the acceffion 
 of Margaret, we perceive the power of the crown 
 continually augmenting, at the fame time that thq 
 fpirit of the people feems proportionably to de- 
 cline. Other motives than the love of freedom, 
 vifibly influenced their condud, in the revolutions 
 which then occurred. And if the frequency of 
 thef^ prove them on fome occafions to have beer^ 
 
 • 1394- 
 
 mi
 
 [ 89 ] 
 
 fj:ill pofTefTed of their wonted reftleffnefs of dlfpo- 
 fition, the patience with which they fubmitted, 
 on others, to the feverefl opprefllon, fufficiently 
 evinces that their paflion for independence had 
 confiderably abated. But this alteration in their 
 national charadler was not produdive of any be- 
 neficial confequences to the tranquillity of the- 
 ftate. Of a temper too turbulent before to reap 
 the advantages of any form of government, they 
 then ran into the contrary extreme j and frequently 
 betrayed a degree of lubmifTion, as inconfiftent 
 with their former charafter, as it was adverfe to 
 their liberties. The firft not more repugnant to 
 true, than the latter was fubverfive of all freedom. 
 
 The kings who reigned at this period, appear 
 to have confidered this change of difpofition in 
 their fubjefts towards obedience, as "only a tran- 
 fient humour, of which they could not too 
 fpeedily take advantage, for the purpofe of aug- 
 menting their authority, and increafing their 
 exadions. Accordingly we find the latter enor- 
 mous, and the former almofb unlimited. But we 
 never fee them purfuing meafures of another kind, 
 which fuch a change of difpofition in the nation 
 placed equally in their power j I mean meafures 
 that would have contributed to the happinefs of 
 fociety. We meet no improvement in their in- 
 terior policy J no regulations to facilitate the ad- 
 miniftration of juftice ; to promote public order, 
 render private property fecure, or eftablifh per- 
 fonal fafety. None that tended to enlighten the 
 underftanding or foften the manners of the peo- 
 ple j
 
 I 90 1 
 
 pie ; among whom we can as yet difcover, no 
 knowledge of letters, no acquaintance with the 
 arts and fciences, and few if any attempts towards 
 the cultivation of commerce. If fuch was the 
 ftate of Sweden previous to her having acceded 
 to the treaty of Calmar, that treaty feems to have 
 been but ill calculated to correft the diforders, 
 which had fo long prevailed there. On the con- 
 trary, it at once opened an additional fource of 
 oppreflion, and became a frefh caufe of new dif- 
 fentions. Upon this were founded thofe claims 
 of the kings of Denmark upon the crown ofSwe^ 
 den, which at different periods were purfued by 
 thofe princes with various fuccefs ; but which for 
 upwards of a century plunged the two kingdoms 
 into the molt bloody wars that ever brought ruin 
 on a people. And it was this that divided the 
 nation into two of the moll violent parties that 
 were ever yet formed in it i the one, determined 
 to aflert the independence of their country j the 
 other equally refolved to abide by the terms of 
 the treaty i or under the pretext of abiding by 
 them, to oppofe, from motives of jealoufy or am- 
 iMtion, the patriotic views of thofe, who refufed 
 to admit the pretenfions of the Danilh monarchs. 
 
 It is true, that the Swedes, previous to their 
 confenting to the union of the three Northern 
 crowns, had taken every precaution againft the 
 inconveniencies which might arife from it, that 
 in their circumftances prudence could fuggeft. 
 Among other articles, they particularly flipulated, 
 that they Ihould retain their own laws, cuftoms, 
 
 and
 
 [ 91 ] 
 
 and privileges of every kind ; and that the fubjefts 
 of Denmark and Norway Ihould not be raifed to 
 polls of power or profit in Sweden. 
 
 Margaret, who had made no difficulty to con- 
 fent to thefe conditions, ufed as iittle ceremony 
 afterwards in totally difregarding them. Nor 
 was there one article of the whole treaty of union 
 adhered to by her fucceflbrs. Thefe having got 
 into their hands all the fortrefles of the kingdom, 
 feemed to have no objedt in view but to deprefs the 
 Swedifh nobles, to remove them from all public 
 affairs, and to reduce the people to fuch a flate of 
 fervitude as muft totally deprive them of the abi- 
 lity of redrefTing themfelves. But it was other- 
 wife with the clergy : to them was fhewn every 
 mark of favour and diftinftion. The Danilh 
 monarchs pofTefTed policy fufficient to perceive, 
 that without fecuring that body, they could never 
 pcpedt to tyrannize with fafety over the reft of the 
 nation. Accordingly monafleries were founded, 
 churches endowed, and the power and privileges 
 pf the bifhops augmented to the fullefl gratifica- 
 pon of their ambition. 
 
 Won by this condu6l, the Swedifh prelates 
 were ever the moft flrenuous advocates for abiding 
 hy the treaty of Calmar; and confequently the 
 moll violent oppofers of all who attempted to 
 refcue their country from the fhackles that treaty 
 had impofed upon it. In confequence, therefore, 
 of this fatal union of the northern crowns, the 
 majority of the Swedes found themfelves expofed 
 \o the worll of all opprefTions, that which flows 
 
 6 from
 
 [ 9i ] 
 
 from- fubjedion to foreign dominion j and what 
 rieudered their lituation fiiil more deplorable, was,, 
 that a confiderable number of their countrymen 
 were, interefted in promoting their oppreffion.' 
 tience they became a prey to the rapacity of 
 Danifh governors, whofe impofitions were exor-, 
 bitant, in proportion as they were certain ofplun- 
 4ering with impunity ; and • whdi not content 
 with feizing the property, often cruelly revenged 
 themfelves on the perfons of this unfortunate peo- 
 ple, for their inability to pay taxes that were im- 
 pofed with as little judgment as feeling. And 
 hence they fuffered no lefs frorn domeltic diflen- 
 tipns, than from the tyranny of foreigners. By 
 every tranfient refpite from the latter, they be- 
 came expofed to all the horrors of the former. 
 Wljen at any time enabled for a fhort-lived period 
 to fhake off the Danifh yoke, which happened not 
 unfrequently, the Swedes, diftra6led by party rage, 
 and ftimulated by all that bitternefs of rancour and 
 violence of anim.ofity which civil contefts ufually 
 infpire, ftill continued, in their difputes with each 
 other, to fhed frefh ftreams of that blood, with 
 which even the fword of the Danes had been al- 
 ready glutted. 
 
 Soon after the death of Margaret*, we find En- 
 gelbrecht, and Erik Packe, rife to refcue their 
 countrymen from the oppreffion of Erik her fuc- 
 cefTor. Animated by that enthufiaflic love of 
 Ireedom, which once charadterized the Swedilh 
 
 •A. D. 1415. 
 
 nttioii>
 
 nation, their efforts were generbus^and bold. The 
 ienate renounce their allegiance to King Erik, and 
 che adminiftration of affairs is put into the hands of 
 Charles Canutfon, grand Marefhal -of Sweden, 
 his birth and rank obtaining what was in jufticc 
 due to the fervices of Englebrechtarid Packe. 
 • The murder of the firft, and execution of the 
 latter, who had taken arms to revenge the death 
 of his friend, were the rewards they received at the 
 hands of Canutfon. Upon this the Swedes, as if 
 they had already forgotten all they had fuffered 
 from the Danifh government, appear defirous to 
 recall Erik. The people, difgufted at the feverity 
 with which the Marefhal exercifed his po\Ver-i 
 and the nobility, ftimulated by jealoufy at feeing 
 an equal placed above them -, determined to dip 
 appoint him in; his views* liptohth'e cfoWh, -td 
 which he now openly afpired. Erik having be^^ 
 depofed in Denmark and Norwa;y, as well as iii 
 Sweden; they, in conjunftion with thofe tw6* 
 countries, eled Chriftopher of Bavaria, who af- 
 cends the triple throne upon the fame terms as 
 Margaret and Erik. Chriftopher, uninftrufted by 
 the example of his predeceffor, follows his fteps ; 
 and would have met with a fimilar fate, had not 
 death, by ridding them of a tyrant, fpared the 
 Swedes the bloodlhed that muft have attended 
 another revolution. We now perceive, they have 
 again recourfe to the very man, whom they fo 
 (hortly before judged unworthy to poffefs any 
 authority. 
 On the death of Chriftopher, Charles Canutfon 
 
 is
 
 [ 94 1 
 
 Is clefted King by a great majority. But he^ did 
 not long enjoy his dignity. The intrigues of the 
 bifhops, and of the ^othcr partifans of Denmark, 
 together with fome tyrannical a6ts which the na-? 
 tural vehemence of his temper had made him com- 
 mit, in a fhort time occafioned a univerfal revolt 
 among his fubjedts; which ended in his depofi- 
 tion, a renewal of the treaty of Calmar, and the 
 cleftion of Chriftiern the Ift. It would be hard 
 to determine, in this tranfatflion, which we ought 
 moil to wonder at, the ficklenefs of the Swedes in 
 fo often changing their mailers, or their abfurdity 
 in again confenting to that union, from which a 
 dear-bought experience had moil feelingly taught 
 them they could expeft nothing but the fevereit 
 opprelTion. Chriiliern, indeed, foon gave them 
 reafon to repent of their folly ; and we fhortly 
 find Canutfon again feated on the Swediih throne. 
 But it was only to renounce it as fuddenly as he 
 became poiTefTed of it: and we next find him 
 compelled to fwear never more to afpire to 
 the crown, which he bound himfelf not to ac- 
 cept, even were it proffered to him. Notwith- 
 ftanding this, Charles again recovers the fceptre, 
 for the third time ; and his death, which happen- 
 ed foon after, we may prefume fpared him the 
 mortification of feeing it once more wreiled from 
 his hands. 
 
 The conduct of this prince was certainly more 
 Extraordinary than even that of any of his prede- 
 celTorsi and furnifhes a llriking proofof the little 
 
 attention
 
 [ 9S ] 
 
 attention paid at that time among the Swedes to 
 any ideas of order or principles of juftice. 
 
 If the princes who preceded Charles purfued an 
 arbitrary fyftem of policy, and exa6ted fuppliej 
 from their fubjedls with a rapacious feverity, at 
 leaft their power was previoufly eftablifhed on a 
 footing tolerably fecure, and their authority un- 
 difputed. But that Charles fhould have proceeded 
 upon the fame maxims, that he Ihould have been 
 guilty of the fame oppreflions, he, upon whom the 
 crown he wore had been beftowed by his coun- 
 trymen, only with a view to deliver them from a 
 tyrant j he, whofe authority had ever been dif- 
 puted by a confiderable number of his own fub- 
 jeds, who had all the power of Denmark continu- 
 ally in arms againft him, while the monarch of 
 that country claimed a right to the Swedifh 
 throne, a right fupported by a confiderable party 
 even in Sweden ; that Charles, inftead of concili- 
 ating the affeftions of his people, ihould in thefe 
 circumftances have afled as tyrannically as any of 
 his predeceflbrs, we Ihould be apt to attribute tQ 
 madnefs alone, did not the general condu6l of all 
 the Swedes at this time teftify, that the Ipirit of 
 anarchy had taken pofleflion of every breaft, and 
 that where all love for the conftitution was loft 
 among the fubjedts, an attention to their privi- 
 leges could be but little expeded from the fb- 
 vereign. 
 
 From the time * that Charles firft headed the 
 
 troops raifed by Englebrecht, to § the day of the 
 
 death of this prince, containing a fpace of 
 
 • A. D. 1434. S A. D. 1470. 
 
 thirty-
 
 [ 96 ] 
 
 thirty-fix years, nothing could be more dread- 
 ful than the ftate of Sweden. This indeed may 
 /eafily be conceived from the fummary view 
 I have given of the 'hiftory of this fhort period ; 
 a period in which there happened feven com- 
 plete revolutions, befides innumerable infurrec- 
 tions and revolts, that were quelled before they 
 had gained fufEcient ftrength to produce others. 
 And during which, the minds of men, continu- 
 . ally agitated by a fucceflion of reciprocal injuries, 
 maflacres, and all thofe outrages of which party 
 rage, when under no controul, never fails to be 
 produftive, appear wound ^ip to a pitch of fury 
 bordering on madnefs. 
 
 So unaccountably inconfiftent was the conduft 
 of the Swedes at this time -, fo replete with the 
 wildeft abfurdity -, and fo totally deftitute of any 
 apparent obje6b but the deftru6lion of each other; 
 that in thofe days of fuperftition, an indifferent' 
 ipedtator might have been tempted to conclude, 
 fome, daemon, intent on the ruin of the country, 
 had poITefTed its inhabitants. 
 
 Such were the fruits of the treaty of Calmar. 
 
 It were unnecefTary to dwell longer upon fcenes 
 
 of fo difagreeable a nature. It is fufficient to ob- 
 
 ferve, that excepting a few intervals, thefe difor- 
 
 ders continued to prevail in Sweden, till the hor- ' 
 
 rid maffacre of the nobility at Stockholm, under 
 
 Chriliiernll*, filled the meafures of the miferies 
 
 ©f this country. This was a cataftrophe well 
 
 fuited to the events which led to it; and all 
 
 that feemed wanting to complete the defolation 
 
 which 
 • A. D. 1520,
 
 C 97 ] 
 which thofe had already caufed. It was how- 
 ever, in a great meafure produ6bive of the well- 
 known revolution which foon- after placed Giifta- 
 vus Vafa on the throne. Before we proceed to 
 a review of that tranfaction, it may not be impro-. 
 per to make a few curfory remarks upon the ef- 
 fects which the treaty of Calmar, and its confe- 
 quences, muft have had upon the manners and 
 government of the Swedes, during a period of 
 more than a century, in the courfe of which that 
 treaty was occafionally adhered to. It is obvious 
 no improvement coiald poflibly have taken place 
 in either, during times of fuch univerfal anar- 
 chy, fuch cruel civil diflentions, and fo many 
 bloody foreign wars. On the contrary, the reft- 
 lefnefs of temper and ficklenefs of difpofition which 
 had ever been confpicuous in this people, muft 
 have been augmented in proportion as their go- 
 vernment had become more unfettled. Previous to 
 the union of the northern crowns, the vices of an 
 eleftive monarchy had been in a great degree 
 correfted, by the preference which in all their 
 elections, the Swedes conftantly gave to the line, 
 of their ancient kings. If difputes about tha 
 fucceflion fometimes occurred between different 
 branches of the royal family, at leaft all contention 
 for the crown among the reft of the nobles, was 
 by this means prevented. But the nation pro- 
 ceeded a ftep farther than merely to adhere to the 
 royal line. Upon the death of the father, the fon 
 was generally fure to fucceed, unlefs he had pre- 
 vioufly given fome caufe of difguft to thofe who 
 
 H were
 
 C 9S ]■ 
 were to eled hiim Hence the Swedifli kings Ccem 
 to have pofTefled a double right to the crown they 
 wore. The one, in virtue of their eledtion; the other,, 
 on account of their birth. This lail indeed was 
 not nor could not, in an eleclive government, be 
 veiled in them by the conftitution j but, which 
 amounted to the fame thing, it v/as founded irr 
 cuftom, and in the prediledion of the people for 
 the royal family. 
 
 This, to a nation fo reftlefs and turbulent as, 
 before the reign of Magnus Laudulaus, the 
 Swedes appear to have been, was productive of 
 many advantages ; whilft it cut off the fource of 
 thofe divifions, which in eleftive kingdoms feldom 
 fail to enfue upon the death of a monarch; k gave 
 to a Swedifli fovereign a degree of fecurity in the 
 poffeffion of the crown, which would not have been, 
 the cafe, had his fubjefts conlidcred him in no- 
 other light than that of being the creature of 
 their choice. Ever fond of change, as well as 
 prone to fedition, they would, upon the flighted 
 grounds for difcontent, have ufed but little cere- 
 mony in unmaking kings, who were devoid of any 
 other claim to the throne they occupied, than 
 what they derived from their elc61:ion. 
 
 Flyftuating therefore as the Swedifh govern- 
 ment was, this circumftance, without doubt, ren- 
 dered it lefs fo than it muft otherwife have been. 
 But when the treaty of Calmar took place, the an- 
 cient royal family of Sweden being then extin<5t> 
 it is obvious that the Swedes, far from pofTeffing 
 any prediledion for the princes, who in virtue of 
 
 5 that
 
 [ 99 ] 
 
 that treaty became their fovereigris, wouldj on the 
 contrary, from the national enmity that had ever 
 fubfifted between Sweden and Denmark, have na- 
 turally been difaffefted towards them. 
 
 Thefe princes then were not only deftitute of 
 what had formerly been the main prop of the 
 authority of their predeceflbrs, but likewife found, 
 in a national prejudice of their new fubjedls, a frefh 
 fource of difcontent among them, that was fure to 
 •augment that reftlefnefs of difpofition, which had 
 already rendered it fo hard a taik to govern them. 
 
 Accordingly, if we except Margaret, whofe fupe- 
 rior abilities preferved the fcepter in her hand* 
 till fhe died i and Chriftopher, whofe death pre- 
 vented a revolution : none of the Danilh fove- 
 reigns who fucceeded to the throne of Sweden, 
 could ever maintain themfelves in it, although 
 backed by all the power of Denmark and Norway. 
 And notwithftanding that Charles Canutefon was 
 a native monarch, yet as he pofTefled no right to 
 the crown but what he derived from his eleflion, 
 he feems to have been rendered the fport of the 
 caprice of his fubjedls, from the number of times 
 he was depofed and reinftated. 
 
 But the anarchy, confufion, and devaftation, 
 which muft neceflarily have attended fuch frequent 
 revolutions, were not the only evils refdlting 
 frpm the treaty of Calmar. Thefe indeed may 
 have increafed the natural turbulence of the 
 Swedes, and have revived that ferocity of manners 
 among them, which had begun to abate during 
 the reigns of Magnus Ladulaus and his immedi- 
 
 H 2 ate
 
 t loo ] 
 
 ate fucceflbrs. Other confequences, ftill mofe fa- 
 tal to liberty, enfued from that unfortunate mea- 
 fure. The quellion feemed no longer to be, how 
 the nation ought to be governed, but who was to 
 govern them. Whether a Dane or a Swede, a 
 king chofen according to the terms of the treaty of 
 Calmar, or in oppofition to that treaty. This was 
 the great objed to which every other appears to 
 have been fubordinate. 
 
 Hence the love of freedom was in Sweden con- 
 verted into the fpirit of party ; the generous en- 
 thufiafm of the one, funk into the violence and 
 rage of the other; and attachment to the confti- 
 tution, loft in the devotion to perfons. For the 
 fpace of near a century and a half, during which 
 this country was torn by inteftine commotions, it 
 was impoffible that any attention could have been 
 paid even to the forms of a free government ;— 
 and in fuch a government the forms are too inti- 
 mately connefted with the fpirit of it, to admit 
 of any fufpenfion of the former, without rifking 
 the lofs of the latter. Accordingly all fenfe of 
 oppreflion in the partizans of either fide of the 
 queftion, feems to have yielded to the fatisfadion 
 which each in their turn experienced from having 
 defeated their opponents ; and both parties fuf- 
 fered themfelves to be enflaved by the very per- 
 fons whofe caufe they had fupported at the expencn 
 of their blood. So that without having made one 
 flep towards the advancement of order and efta- 
 blilhment of public tranquillity, the only benefits 
 ^^hich can poffibly arrive from the lofs of liberty, 
 
 the
 
 [ '01 ] 
 the Swedes found themfelves at once deprived of 
 freedoni, and deftitute of any of the few advan- 
 tages which are fuppofed to belong to an abfolute 
 government. Such was their condition about the 
 middle of the fixteenth century, and luch were the 
 caufes of their being at this late period fo far be- 
 hind almoft every European nation, in the im- 
 provement of their policy and civilifation of their 
 manners. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Containing a review of the hifiory of Sweden^ from 
 the revolution effected by Gujiavus Vafa^ in the year 
 1^20, to the death of Charles XII, in 17 18. 
 
 AT no period of the Swedilh hiftory do we 
 meet with a junfture fo favourable 
 to the eftablilhment of an abfolute monarchy, 
 as that at which Guftavus Vafa afcended 
 the throne. During thofe bloody contefts for 
 power, which had lb long divided the nobles, har- 
 rafled the people, and defolated the country, we 
 have {^tn that the nation had in a great meafure 
 loft fight of liberty j and that their attachment 
 to rights and privileges, once fo dear to every 
 Swede, appeared to have decreafed in proportion 
 to the length of time they had been deprived of 
 them. 
 
 Nor was it extraordinary, that all love for the 
 
 conftitution fliould have been extinguifhed among 
 
 a people, who whatever might have been the 
 
 cafe with their forefathers, never had themfelves 
 
 H 3 experienced
 
 [ 102 ] 
 
 experienced any of thofe benefits which ought to 
 have refulted from it. 
 
 In fad, for upwards of a century previous to 
 the revolution brought about by Guflavus, the 
 ancient Sw^diih form of government had exifled 
 only in idea^ and confequently the ancient Swedifh 
 liberty could have little or no place in the recol- 
 ledion of thofe Swedes who were witnefles to that 
 event. On fhe other hand, we find they had been 
 long a prey to all the violences of party rage i 
 they had been long accullomed to devote them- 
 felves blindly to thofe who headed the different 
 faftions which diflraded the ftate, and whichever 
 fide prevailed, the people may be faid to have 
 been in fome degree trained to fubmifTion by the 
 defpotifm of thofe who directed the public af- 
 fairs. 
 
 . Thus circumftanced, thus prepared for (lavery, 
 their fate fcems to have been fufpended only be- 
 caufe they could not agree among themfelves in 
 the choice of a maflcr. There were fo many com- 
 petitors for power, that no one of thefe was ever 
 jpermitted by the reft to eftabliih his authority on 
 a more permanent foundation; and hence the 
 form of the government had not as yet been ren- 
 dered abfolute, although the temporary diredors 
 of the ftatc aded with an authority purely arbi- 
 trary. ^ 
 
 But Guftavus had none of thefe difficulties to 
 contend with. On the firft news of his revolt 
 Chriftiern gave orders to all the Danilh officers in 
 Sweden, to put to death indifcriminately every 
 
 Sweden
 
 [ 103 1 
 Swedllh gentleman within their reach, whether a 
 friend or an enemy. This horrid adion had been 
 preceded by the maffacre of the principal nobi- 
 lity at Stockholm. The Dane little imagined 
 that the very meafures by which he meant to fe- 
 cure himfelf on the Swedilh throne, in reality, 
 ferved only to prepare die way for the fuccefs of 
 his enemy. They left Guftavus without rivals for 
 the crown, and the people without leaders for 
 
 f aft ion. _ 
 
 Hence it gave to the one, the fecure pofTeffion ot 
 
 the kingdom; and to the other, that unanimity 
 
 without which they could never have fhaken off 
 
 the Danifli yoke. 
 
 Thus from the blackeft tranfaftions which ever 
 dilkraced the annals of a monarch, the moft bene- 
 ftc'al confequences refulted to the very perfons 
 whom this tyrant had devoted to deftruaion. 
 
 Here then we perceive that whatever had pre- 
 vented hitherto the eftablifhment of an abfolute 
 monarchy in Sweden, was completely removed at 
 the time Guftavus afcended the throne. But 
 this was not all. The Swedes beheld in this 
 prince, not only their fovereign, but likewife the 
 deliverer of his country. They faw in Guftavus 
 the man, who at the moment they were finking 
 beneath the weight of a foreign yoke, when they 
 were reduced to a ftate of wretchednefs too de- 
 plorable to allow them even to hope for relief 
 not only refcued them from that yoke, and all 
 the miferies it had occafioned; but by the wifdom 
 and lenity of his government prevented the return 
 
 H4 °^
 
 [ IP4 ] 
 of thofe civil diflenfions which had fo often dif" 
 tra6ted the nation -, and to whom therefore they 
 were indebted for tranquillity and peace, as well 
 as independence. 
 
 To fqch a prince, a grateful people, even fup- 
 pofing them poflefled of the fpirit of liberty^ 
 rr.ight; notwithftanding have been too apt to con- 
 fid^r the moft unreferved fubmiflioq on their part, 
 as only a jufl return for the ineftimable fervices 
 rendered on his. The moft implicit obedience in 
 a people fo circumftanced, however repugnant to 
 the principles of their conftitution, would wear 
 the appearance of a virtue : it would feem the 
 offspring of their gratitude for benefits which they 
 knew not otherwife how to repay. 
 
 The fame motives therefore, muft, if poffible, 
 have operated ftjll more powerfully on a people, 
 who, as was juft now obferved, had been previ- 
 oufly prepared for flavery. It was accordingly 
 not at all furprifing that the Swedes fhould have 
 fuffered Guftavus to lay the foundation of an ab- 
 folute monarchy; particularly as the amiable 
 qualities and conciliating manners of this prince, 
 were as confpicuous after he was feated on the 
 throne, as his courage and abilities had been in 
 raifing himfelf to it. 
 
 The fituation of Denmark alfo, left Guftavus 
 entirely at liberty to purfue his defigns. Chriftiern 
 had been driven from the throne of that country^ 
 hut he was ftill alive, and had ftill a number of 
 adherents. 
 
 His fijccefTor Frederick therefore, carefully 
 
 avoided
 
 [ «05 ] 
 
 liyoided creating to himfelf a new, while he had 
 any thing to apprehend from an old enemy. He 
 affumed accordingly a very different condudl from 
 that held by his predeceflTors ever fince the date 
 of the treaty of Calmar. 
 
 From that period the Danifli monarchs had 
 conftantly laid claim to the crown of Sweden. A 
 claim neceflarily unjuft, as it was folely derived 
 from a treaty, to no one article of which they had 
 themfelves adhered. But Frederick, far from at- 
 tempting to make good this pretended right, cul-^ 
 tivated the friendlhip of Guftavus with the ut- 
 moft afliduity ; fo that his Swedifh majefty found 
 an ally in that potentate, who had during the 
 courfe of more than a century proved the moft im- 
 placable enemy to his country. 
 
 Thus a nunaber of circumftances confpired to 
 give to this monarch a degree of power never 
 poflefled by any who had preceded him. How 
 firmly that power was eftablifhed, the change he 
 brought about in the religion of his fubjedls, fur- 
 nifhes a moft ftriking proof. The Swedifh pre- 
 lates, from their wealth, pride, and ambition, had 
 certainly had no inconfiderable fhare in reducing 
 their country to the deplorable ftate from which 
 it had been refcued by Guftavus. To diminifh 
 the riches and curtail the power of thefe haughty 
 priefts, were confequently objeds as defirable, as 
 they were hard to be obtained. Hitherto, the 
 fmalleft infringement of the rights of the clergy, 
 had often coft a Swedifti monarch his crown. To 
 attack therefore the religion itfelf, in order to 
 
 humble
 
 I 1^6 } 
 
 humble the minifters of it j to aim at extirpating 
 the fuperftition of the Romilh church, among a 
 people fo bigotted as the Swedes then were, was 
 an attempt well fuited indeed to the bold and en- 
 terprizing genius of Gullavus, but which only a 
 prince of his abilities, and who poflefled like 
 him the love of his fubjefts, could have accom- 
 pliihed. He iiicceeded. The reformation was 
 tomplete. They who had been the rivals of their 
 fovereign, who had even given law to the crown, 
 who had promoted fedition inftead of preaching 
 peace, and who with the moft rapacious ambition, 
 grafped at wealth as eagerly as they had done at 
 ffower, funk into their proper fphere ; and were 
 compelled to fulfil the long-negleded dudes of 
 their fun6lion. 
 
 Salutary as the confequences of this itiealurc 
 were, it was certainly rather a dangerous ■elxp'eri- 
 ment, for an eleflive King, at the commencement 
 too of his reign. 
 
 A lefs adventurous politician would probably 
 have deemed it more prudent to have paid court 
 to the clergy, and by gaining that body over to 
 his interefts, have fecured his authority, with re- 
 rpe6t to the reft of his fubjefbs. But Guftavus 
 had other views. The chief oppofition he had 
 met with in his glorious enterprize had proceeded 
 from the bifhops. He, therefore, not only dif- 
 dained difiembling with men, who muft certainly 
 have incurred his keeneft indignation, but he fore* 
 faw that as long a^ thefe prelates poffefTed th^ 
 
 temporal
 
 [ 107 3 
 temporal power *, which their influence over the 
 minds of the laity had enabled them to ufurpj 
 there could be no fecurity for the duration of the 
 public tranquillity, nor could the royal authority- 
 acquire any degree of permanency. 
 
 In order, therefore, to lefTen a power which had 
 been often exerted for the worit purpofes, he 
 judged it neceffary to diminifh too that influence, 
 in which it originated ; and this was only to bt 
 done by abolifhing popery. 
 
 On his acceiTion to the crown, GufVavus found 
 the public revenues totally exhaufted. The ruin- 
 ous Kate of a countn^ all the inhabitants of which, 
 excepting the clergy, had been long expofed to the 
 unfeeling rapacity of foreign collectors under an 
 infatiable tyrant, left Guftavus with but few re- 
 fources to repair the finances of the kingdom. He 
 thought the immenfe and fuperfluous wealth of 
 the church, could not be more ufefully employed 
 than for this purpofe ; and we may add too, that 
 the freedom and liberality of this prince's fenti- 
 ments, muft have made him behold with regret and 
 indignation, the manner in which the Romilh cler- 
 gy then impofed upon the credulity of the people. 
 
 Yet flill there was apparently fo much hazard 
 and danger in an undertaking of this nature, that, 
 perhaps, thefe motives would not alone have been 
 fufiicient to have determined Guftavus to venture 
 upon it. What he had already atchieved, proved, it is 
 true, that he was not to be deterred by difficulties. 
 
 • I have Ihewn on a former occafion, together with the 
 (aufcs of it, that the power, of the bifhops was greater ia 
 Jwedca ;haa in any other country. 
 
 But
 
 [ 108 ] 
 
 But then, previous to his enterprize againft 
 Chriftiern, his fituation was fuch, that whatever he 
 might gain, he at leaft rifked nothing by his at- 
 tempt, however wild and defperate it naight at 
 firft fight have appeared. And the meafures 
 he ufed to furmount the many obftacles he had 
 to contend with, were conceived with a pru- 
 dence that demonftrated he judged on all oc- 
 cafions as coolly, as he executed with fire and 
 vigour. That he, therefore, who was only an 
 cledbive monarch, Ihould involve himfelf in new 
 troubles at the moment he had begun to reap the 
 fruits of what he had already accomplifhed, agrees 
 well enough with one part of his chara6ter, but 
 does not by any means correfpond with the other. 
 The motives then, which on this occafion proba- 
 bly operated the moft powerfully on the mind of 
 Guftavus, was a defign he meditated, of rendering 
 the crown hereditary in his family ; and confe- 
 quently, he determined to give every poflible fe- 
 curity to a throne that was to be occupied by his 
 pofterity. In this defign he likewife fucceeded *. 
 The Swedes furrendered in favour of his ifTue, 
 the right of eleding their fovereign ; and by that 
 means relinquilhed any chance they might other- 
 wife have had, of being able, upon the death of 
 Guftavus, to ftipulate fuch conditions with his 
 fucceflbr, as might have brought back the confti- 
 tution to its priftine principles. 
 
 Such, however, were the moderation, juftice, 
 
 ♦ A. D. 1542.
 
 [ 109 ] 
 
 and wifdom of this prince, and fuch had been the 
 dreadful ftate of the kingdom during a long pe- 
 riod previous to his reign, that the Swedes far 
 from conceiving they had loft any thing by the 
 changes introduced by Guftavus, muft, on the 
 contrary, have looked upon every alteration as an. 
 advantage. They did not forefee what their coun- 
 try was one day to fufFer from the defpotifm of a 
 Charles the Xlth, or a Charles the Xllth. Inftead 
 of all the horrors of domeftic broils and civil wars, 
 fuperadded to the weight of a foreign yoke, they 
 found the independence of the kingdom recovered, 
 peace reftored, order eftablilhed, juftice duly ad- 
 miniftered, commerce protefled, and the arts and 
 fciences encouraged. They found this, and they 
 looked no farther. 
 
 It cannot, indeed, be faid with propriety, that 
 Guftavus either changed the government, or de- 
 ftroyed the liberty of his countrymen. In faft, 
 when he afcended the throne, they had been for 
 fome time as deftitute of the one, as they were ig- 
 norant, perhaps incapable, of the other. It is very 
 pofllble for a people to have occafional mafters, 
 and to be, at the fame time, without a govern- 
 ment. This had been long the cafe in Sweden ; 
 where even the forms of the conftitution had been 
 neglefted } the fpirit of it loft; the laws fallen 
 into difufe ; and the fword rendered the fole arbi- 
 ter in every difpute. 
 
 The being fooner or later fubjefted to an abfo- 
 lute power, muft have been the doom of a nation 
 fo cifcumftanced. And when we confider how 
 
 palatable
 
 [ no ] 
 
 palatable that power was rendered to them by 
 Guftavus, it will appear nowife extraordinary that 
 the Swedes, however in the early ages of their 
 hiftory they may have been attached to liberty, 
 Ihould have funk by degrees, from the reign of 
 this prince, into the ftate of flavery, in which we 
 beheld them under Charles the Xllth. 
 
 It is to be obferved, that Guftavus did not ac- 
 complilh all his fchemes, without oppofition : but 
 as this was produced by a fpirit of fuperftition, 
 not of liberty, it went no farther than to fuch of 
 his plans as related to religious concerns. 
 
 But the moft remarkable circumftance is, that 
 none of his fubjeds oppofed him in this point 
 with fo much violence, as the very men who had 
 been his firft and great fupport : thefe were the 
 palecarlians. There is fomething fo peculiar in 
 the charafter of this people, that to take fome no- 
 tice of them before we conclude with the reign of 
 Guftavus, will not I hope be deemed an unjufti- 
 fiable digreflion. 
 
 They inhabit one of the moft barren and moun- 
 tainous parts of Sweden. Perpetual fnows cover 
 the tops of their hills, and long dreary winters 
 whiten over their vallies too, for the greateft part 
 of the year. Their inhofpitable climate, fo far from 
 furniftiing any of the comforts, does not even af- 
 ford what the more Southern people of Europe 
 deem the neceflaries of life. For want of corn 
 they make bread of the bark of certain trees, and 
 of a piece with fuch nutriment, is their whole 
 mode of living. Every Dalecarlian ren^ec$ to hin\-
 
 [ "« 1 
 
 fclf all tliofe offices, which it is the province of 
 different trades to fupply in other countries. He 
 makes after his own rude fafhion whatever is re- 
 quilite for his cloathing ; the homelinefs of which 
 correfponds with the poverty of his diet. Igno- 
 rant of all thofe inferior arts which adminifter to 
 the conveniencies of life, and the nature of their 
 foil prohibiting agriculture, thefe people chiefly 
 follow the laborious occupation of miners. Thus 
 inured from their infancy to hardfhips of every 
 kind, the Dalecarlians form perhaps the mofl ro- 
 buft and hardy race of men in Sweden. If they 
 are unacquainted with the refinements of more 
 poliflied focieties, who dwell in gentler climates, 
 they are likewife ignorant of their vices. They 
 have ever retained their primitive fimplicity of 
 manners. Humble, yet brave, they are patient of 
 labour, but not of oppreffion : fubmifllve, where 
 they think fubmiflion due ; intradable, where they 
 conceive authority to be ufurped. Generous and 
 romantic in their untaught notions of honour> 
 and poffeffed of that fpirit of enterj>rize which 
 commonly accompanies great courage, they have 
 been perpetually volunteers in redrefling griev- 
 ances by which they were themfelves but little or 
 not at all affefted. Secure in their mountains, 
 they were left to the enjoyment of their own rude 
 cuftoms J and placed beyond the reach of tyranny^ 
 they felt not the yoke impofed, at different times, 
 upon the other inhabitants of Sweden : but when 
 thefe wanted fpirit to oppofe their tyrants, tie 
 Dalecarlians undertook the talk fgr them. They 
 
 fallied
 
 t 1.2 J 
 
 fallied from their rocks and forefts j they Allowed 
 the ftandard of an Englebrecht ; they fpilt their 
 blood in defence of a Sture ; they conquered un- 
 der the banners of a Guftavus. 
 
 Such were the virtues of thefe people : but then 
 their fimplicity was attended by its general com- 
 panion, credulity, as their ignorance was by fu- 
 perftition. 
 
 Hence a people poflefled of a difpofition that 
 ttiight have been direfted to the bell purpofes, 
 were often rendered the tools of defigning men tc^ 
 anfwer the worft j and, therefore, the Dalecarlians 
 appear to have been the moft turbulent of all th6 
 Swedes; wrought upon, on one occafion, by ari 
 impoftor, who perfonated the fon of the late ad- 
 miniftrator j at others, by their priefts, they re- 
 belled no kfs than fixl times againft Gullavus. 
 Three of the conditions which upon the laft of 
 thefe infurredbions, the Dalecarlians propofed to 
 this prince, at once give a full idea of their fpirit 
 of independence, their fuperftition, and their fiiii- 
 plicity. Thefe were, that he fhould never pafs 
 the boundaries of their province, without giving 
 them hoflages for the fecurity of their privileges ; 
 that whoever eat flefh on a fall-day Ihould be 
 burned ; and that both the king and his courtiers 
 fhould re-affume the old Swedilh habit, and never 
 afterwards borrow new drelTes and fafhions from 
 ftrangers. The laft article was that which they 
 moft infifted upon. 
 
 Guftavus treated this generous, though fimple 
 and credulous people, with all the tendernefs that 
 
 was
 
 [ 113 ] 
 
 \;fas confiftent with the tranquillity of his king- 
 dom, and fafety of his crown ; fo that towards the 
 clofe of this prince's reign, they, like their fellow- 
 fubjefts, had become reconciled to all his mea- 
 
 iares. 
 
 Thus when Erick afcended the throne of his 
 father, he fdund himfelf fovereign of a united and 
 contented people. No prince ever came to the 
 crown of Sweden with fuch advantages. He was 
 the firft who had taken pofTeffion of it in virtue of 
 hereditary right. The long happy reign of a 
 king, adored by his fubjefts, fecured to the fon 
 not°only the obedience, but in fome meafure the 
 attachment of the nation. Tired of fadion, and 
 bearing frefh in memory the horrors of civil dif- 
 fentioiTs, they ^vcre difpofed only to tranquillity, 
 and fubmiffion. They had, during the reign of 
 Guftavus, who was the patron of fcience and com- 
 merce, tafted the fweets and learned to cultivate 
 the arts of peace. The reformation had totally 
 cut off the fource of thofe difturbanccs, which the 
 wealth, pride, and ambition of the popilh prelates, 
 had formerly created in the Hate. Mofl of that 
 ancient nobility, whofe turbulence was wont to be 
 productive of continual revolution, had been cut 
 off either at the maffacre of Stockholm, or in the 
 courfe of civil wars. The race of nobles who 
 fucceeded them, had been brought up with new 
 ideas, and with notions fafhioned to the times. 
 The claims of the Kings of Denmark upon the 
 crown of Sweden were annihilated, as the ad which 
 tendered that crown hereditary, had cancelled the 
 treaty of Calmar. And finally, the royal revenues 
 
 I had
 
 , [ 114 ] 
 
 had for the- firft time, not only been rendered 
 amply fufficient to maintain the dignity of a 
 crowned head, but immenfe riches were lodged in 
 the treafury, which had accrued to Guftavus from 
 the fuppreflion of monafteries, and other confe- 
 quences of the reformation. 
 
 The tranquillity of Sweden appeared now to reft 
 on a bafis fuf?iciently firm. The boifterous fcenes 
 which fhe had long exhibited, had yielded to 
 others of a more pleafing afped ; and a variety of 
 circumftances feemed to promife that the conti- 
 nuance of thefe would have been lading. 
 
 It was not, indeed, to be prefumed, flie could 
 retain any part of her former liberty ; the founda-f 
 tions of arbitrary power had been too deeply laid, 
 and the fuperftrufture was too far advanced : it 
 might, however, have been expefbed, that freed 
 from public troubles, fhe would have funk peace- 
 ably at leaft, into the lap of defpotifm. 
 
 The event was, however, otherwife. In this 
 country, fated to revolutions, not only frefh com- 
 motions Ihortly break out, but the fpirit of liberty 
 appears once more to awake among its inhabi- 
 tants. 
 
 The infanity of Erick was the caufe of the firft ; 
 and the appearance of the latter originated in the 
 reformation. 
 
 Erick by his firft acts of authority gave "great 
 difguft to his nobles. But it feems to have been 
 a matter of little importance how he treated mep, 
 whofe abjed fervility furpaffed the utmoil turbu- 
 lence of their anceftors. This unTortunate prince 
 was not deftitute of good qualities ; but the dif- 
 
 order
 
 [ ^15 ] 
 t)rder in his undenlanding frequently made him 
 commit aftions equally unjuft and cruel. It is 
 truly aftonifhing with what Qavifli fubmifiion the 
 Once fierce and fpirited Swedes, bore with the 
 frantic violence of a lunatic*. Violences which 
 in his lucid intervals ilruck Erick himfelf with 
 horror, were fure to obtain the fan^ion of the 
 ilates, whofe decrees never failed to be a juftifica- 
 tion of his conduit. 
 
 The King's brothers, however, the dijkes John 
 and Charles, were not lb patient. The former had 
 been condem.ned to death by Erick, and had with 
 diOiculty efcapcd. Both the dukes, therefore, 
 were convinced there could be no fafety for them, 
 as long as Erick continued on the throne : they 
 determined to depofe him. Sweden was again 
 plunged into a civil war, but it was not of lono 
 duration. The caufe of the dukes was popular. 
 Erick was in a fhort time abandoned, dethroned 
 and imprifoned; and John affumed the fceptre 
 that had Been wrefted from his brother's hands. 
 
 ♦ Of this the two following inftattcds arc fufficlent : NIIus 
 Stare, of the family of the late Adminiftrators, had been long 
 an oijjea of the jealoufy and ill ufage of Erick, although this 
 prince had never had the fmalleft reafon to be offended with 
 him. The king, at Idngth, went fo far as to ftab Sture with 
 his own hand : Sture drew the poniard out of his fide, kiffed 
 it, and prefented it to Erick, who, notwithllanding, ordered 
 his guards to put him to death.— The other inllance is that of 
 fix and twenty nobles having been maffacred at once, upon 
 groandlefs fufpicions, and the ftates after their death con- 
 demned thofe perfons, whom it was impoffible they could have 
 tripd. 
 
 1 2 • We
 
 [ ii6 ] 
 
 We now once more behold tranquillity reftored 
 to Sweden. John fucceeded to all thofe advan- 
 tac^es already enumerated, of which Erick, at his 
 acceflion to the crown, had been poffefled. The 
 fource of ail the diforders of the laft reign no lon- 
 ger exifted: and the patience exhibited by the 
 people during the continuance of it, fufRciently 
 evinced that neither the love of freedom, nor the 
 fpirit of faction, were any longer fufficiently 
 powerful among them to be produdive of frefli 
 troubles. 
 
 It muft have been a point of fome difficulty to 
 have devifed any thing that could create new dif- 
 orders in a country, where a prince fo circum- 
 ftanced, reigned over a people fo difpofed. But 
 John Ihortly hit upon, perhaps, the only expedi- 
 ent, which had he wanted to plunge his fubje<5ts 
 into confufionj would probably have been attend- 
 ed with fuccefs. This was an attack upon the 
 religion which his father Guftavus had taken fuch 
 pains to eftablifh. It was this attack that once 
 more gave the Swedes an opportunity of reftoring 
 their country to liberty. An opportunity they 
 certainly did not improve as much as the circum- 
 ftances of the times feemed to allow, but by the 
 means of which the compleat introduftion of def- 
 potifm was for a fhort period retarded. 
 
 John had married Catherine daughter of Sigif- 
 mondking of Poland. This princefs, bigotted to- 
 the church of Rome, and pofTcfTed of great in- 
 fluence over her hufband, appears to have dire(5l:ed 
 that influence to no other object but the cqnver- 
 
 fioa
 
 [ "7 ] 
 
 fion of the king, and the re-eftablifhnnent of po- 
 pery in his dominions. 
 
 In the firft, Ihe feems to have fucceeded. In 
 the latter, her endeavours ferved only to plunge 
 the kingdom into confufion, and ultimately to de- 
 prive her fon of the fucceflion to the crown. 
 
 Duke Charles forefaw the confequences of the 
 fyftem purfued by the king at the inftigation of 
 Catherine; and regulated his conduit accordingly, 
 Men who have once fhaken off the papal yoke, 
 have feldom been weak enough to refume it 
 from motives of religion, however they might 
 from thofe of intereft ; and fince the reformation 
 the Swedes had held the church of Rome in ab- 
 horrence. Charles therefore could not have ren- 
 dered himfelf more popular, thart by oppofing 
 every meafure of his brother which tended to 
 rellore popery. 
 
 He accordingly did moft vigoroufly oppofe the 
 king on this occafion, and with a fuccefs that 
 laid the ground-work of his future elevation tu 
 the throne. 
 
 Sigifmond, the Ton and fucceffor of John, had, 
 under the tuition of his mother, imbibed all her 
 prejudices refpefting religion. This prince, fome 
 time previous to the death of his father, had been 
 eledled king of Poland, Secure therefore at all 
 events of one crown, he flattered himfelf he fhould 
 be fufficiently powerful to effefl in Sweden by 
 force, what the late king had in vain endea- 
 voured to accompliih by addrefs. His attempts 
 were however equally fruitlefs. The Swedes hav- 
 ing tafled the fweets, knew too well the value of 
 
 1 3 religious
 
 [ ii8 ] 
 
 i=eligioiis liberty ; and Charles oppofed his nephew 
 on the fame principles, and with the fame fpirit 
 and fuccefs, by which he had counteracted the 
 defigns of his brother. 
 
 During the courfe of thefe c^ntefts it was, that 
 a moft favourable juncture prefented itfclf for re- 
 ftpring the ancient conftitution of Sweden. 
 Charles, who had an eye upon the crown, per- 
 ceived the condu6t of Sigifmond would infallibly 
 place it foon within his reach. But it was necef- 
 fary for him to ho|d in the mean time a very deli- 
 cate and cautious conduft. 
 
 The catholic party in Sweden, however dimi- 
 nifhed, was not yet extind. Sigifmond had flill 
 no inconfiderable number of adherents there ; and 
 v/hat rendered him mofb formidable, was an army 
 of Poles, which he could at any time introduce 
 into the heart of the kingdom. 
 
 The reiidence of Sigifmond in Poland however 
 gave Charles great advantages, which this wife 
 prince did not fail to improve. It furnifhed hirn 
 with an opportunity of paying his court to the 
 Itates, and of flattering the pride of the fenate. 
 By the former, he was confidered as the guardian 
 of the proteftant religion ; and he wrought upon 
 the latter, by making an agreement with them 
 never to engage in any enterprize without having 
 firft confulted them and obtained their confent. 
 
 On the other hand, Sigifmond, in order to de- 
 feat the fchemes of his uncle, purfued, as nearly 
 as his fituation would permit, the fame policy. He 
 accordingly endeavoured to create a mifunder- 
 ftanding bet^veen the fenate and the dukej and 
 
 having
 
 [ "9 ] 
 
 having in fome degree fucceeded, he took the 
 firft opportunity to devolve the whole adnniniftra- 
 tion of affairs upon the former, totally excluding 
 the latter from any fhare in it, although he had 
 been appointed regent by the ftates. Sig'fmond 
 rightly judged that the mod effedtual method to 
 gain the fenators, was to inveft them with power. 
 And however dangerous it might prove to his own 
 authority to entruft too much of it in their hands, 
 he was compelled to adopt this meafure as the 
 only one by which he could counterad with any 
 profpeft of fuccefs the intrigues of his uncle. It 
 is obvious that this lituation of things put it am- 
 ply in the power of the Swedes to recover all 
 their ancient rights and privileges. The ftates 
 and fenate, from having been reduced to a degree 
 of infignificancy that rendered them little more 
 thai) an echo to the royal will, found themfelves 
 on a fudden fo circumftanced as to be able to make 
 their own terms between two contending princes ; 
 either of which with their confent would be fe- 
 cure in the throne, whilft neither could be fo with- 
 out it. But we do not find that they made a pro- 
 per ufe of an opportunity fo favourable to the re- 
 covery of their liberties. Unfortunately the fe- 
 nate was too fond of power, and the ftates were 
 too jealous of the fenate, to admit of their uniting 
 together for the purpofe of maintaining their com- 
 mon freedom. Accordingly, when the bigotted 
 Sigifmond was dethroned, and the crown was at 
 length placed on the head of Charles, though the 
 ^wedes had without doubt a right to impofc 
 what conditions they pleafed upon a prince who was 
 ^ 1 4 raifed
 
 [ I20 ] 
 
 raifed to the throne by their free choice, yet they 
 by no means provided againft further encroach- 
 ments of the royal authority, as effedually as upon 
 fuch an occafion they might have done. 
 
 Charles however had long been accuftomed to 
 make the fenfe of the nation the rule of his con- 
 du£tj and more anxious perhaps to fecure the 
 crown to his fbn, than for his own fake, to ex- 
 tend the regal power beyond thofe limits within 
 which he had himfelf endeavoured to confine it,, 
 during the reign of his immediate predeceiTors, he 
 governed in a manner that left his fubjefts a greater 
 fharc of liberty than they had had the prudence to 
 provide for themfelves. 
 
 This confirmed in the fenate that relilh for 
 power, which the chief adminiftration of affairs in 
 the abfence of the king during the late reign, muft 
 certainly have given them ; and though they had 
 not fufficiently guarded againfl an arbitrary con- 
 du(5t in their future monarchs, they were rendered 
 by this lefs likely to fubmit to fuch a condud. 
 
 The generous and noble nature of Guftavus A- 
 dolphus the fon of Charles the IXth, fecured to his 
 fubjecls the full enjoyment of whatever rights and 
 privileges they poffefTed on his coming to the 
 crown. The great aflerter of the liberties of Ger- 
 many would Icarcely have aimed at defpotifm at 
 home. This excellent prince, who united every 
 ibcial virtue to all the more brilliant qualitieis 
 which conftitute the hero; whofe pafTion for glory, 
 great as it was, did not exceed his piety j whole, 
 judgment equalled his bravery ; and who in 
 both furpaffed the generality of mankind, as much
 
 [ III 1 
 
 ^ he exceeded them in rank : he, I fay, only de- 
 firous to reign in the hearts of his people, w^ 
 fatisfied with the power he derived from their af- 
 feai€)ns, and never once checked that returning 
 foirit of freedom, which, previous to the depofi- 
 tion of Sigifmond, had begun to m^ke ^ts appear- 
 ance in Sweden. 
 
 The thirty years war however, confequent upoi> 
 Guftavus' invafion of the empire, had a ftrong ten- 
 dency to counteraa the effeds of this fpint. The 
 paffion for militarv fame, which animated their 
 mafter, caught hold of the nation. This paffioi^ 
 is certainly by no means favourable to liberty, 
 when the bulk of a people are under its influence 5 
 but it becomes very much the reverfe when a 
 monarch is himfelf the leader of his troops. Men 
 ^re too apt to lofe fight of liberty in the fubordi- 
 nation and difcipline of an army. The defpotifm, 
 which in all points refpefting the duties of a fol- 
 liier, muft neceffarily reign there, gives them a 
 habit of paying that fort of obedience to perfons, 
 which free men think only due to the laws. Ac- 
 cuftomcd to follow implicitly the orders of the 
 general, they are eafily brought to pay the fame 
 deference to the commands of the king. To obey 
 him in one capacity and not in another, is a dil- 
 tinftion perhaps too nice for a foldier. It will rea- 
 dily be conceived then what efFeft fo long a war 
 as that commenced by Guftavus in Germany, and 
 afterwards carried on by his fucceffor, muft have 
 hadupon thofewho had fpent the majorpart of their 
 lives in it. An efFeft which muft have been veiy 
 general, as the Swedifh nobles at that ^'^^ ,^'^'
 
 [ 122 ] 
 
 dained to foll6vv any othet profcfTion than that of 
 arms : and as they were all emulous of fharing the 
 glory as well as dangers pf fiich a general as Guf- 
 tavus, it nnay be prefumed that few of them re- 
 rnained idle fpec^lators of the exploits of their 
 fovereigns. The whole nation too, charmed and 
 ?iftonifhed at the fuccefs which attended this- 
 prince, and their pride highly gratified to find 
 they had of a fudden burft from obfcurity to hold 
 a mofl diflinguiihed rank in the eyes of Europe, 
 were too much dazzled by the luftre of thofe vic- 
 tories which placed them in fo elevated a point of 
 view, to give that attention to the more folid ad- 
 vantage of eftablifhing their conftitution in the 
 manner which the death of Guftavus and the in- 
 fant age of his llicceffor, afterwards afforded them 
 an opportunity of doing. Oxenfbierne indeed pre- 
 fented to the diet, affembled on that occafion, a 
 form of government faid to have been projedled 
 fey Guftavus j wl\ich was approved of, accepted^ 
 and ratified by tlie frates. But from the time the 
 fenate had acquired that confequence, which their 
 asking as arbiters between Sigifmohd and Charles 
 had procured them, the object of every effort no- 
 minally made in favour of liberty by the leading 
 men in Sweden, was in fact to ellablifh an ari- 
 ftocratic power, equally at the expence of dbe 
 royal authority and of the rights of the flatcv 
 •Had Guftavus lived to carry into execution him- 
 fclf the above-mentioned fo>m of government, he 
 would probably have fo framed it as that it Ihould 
 have curbed the ariftocratic fpirit of the nobles, 
 by confining the power of the fcnatc Aj^ithin fuch 
 
 limits
 
 [ 123 ] 
 limits that it would no longer have given un^^ 
 brage to the inferior orders of the ftate. But when 
 the framing of this form of government by which 
 the boundaries of the authority of the fenate were 
 %o be afcertained, fell to the lot of the very per- 
 fons who were themfelves to poflefs that autho- 
 rity when afcertained, it was not to be expected 
 that they fhould adopt a Hmilar condud. 
 
 Accordingly one article in this form of govern- 
 rnent, fufficiently evinced that the objed of thofc 
 who had planned ir, was rather to fecure power to 
 themfelves than give liberty to their country. 
 The article alluded to, was that which deprived 
 the ftates of the right of framing or propofmg 
 any lav/, or of debating upon any matter that was 
 not firfl communicated to them in writing by tlie 
 king or regency. Now this regulation effediually 
 took thofe who had the adminiftration of public 
 affairs from under the controul of the ftates j 
 which was perhaps the very defign of it, fincc 
 they who devifed it were to be regents during a 
 long minority. 
 
 The power qf the fenate created no difcon- 
 tent among the nobles, out of whofe order the fe- 
 nators were chofen ; but it was borne with fomc 
 degree of impatience by the other orders of the 
 ftate. Hence a foundation was laid for thofe jea- 
 loufies and divifions between the nobility on the 
 one hand, and the peafants and burghers on the 
 other; which ultimately brought flavery upon 
 all, and which enabled Chriftina to govern her 
 minifters with as much authority, and to exa6t as 
 
 implicit
 
 [ 124 ] 
 
 implicit an obedience from her people as if fhe had 
 been the mod abfolute monarch in Europe. 
 
 We are to obferve likewife, that in the courfc 
 of the two laft centuries, the temper and manners 
 of the lower order of men among the Swedes, 
 had undergone a total change. It has been fhewn 
 on a former occafion, that the reign of Magnus 
 Ladulaus was the point of time in which this 
 change was firft difcernibl^. From that period, 
 if we except the Dalicarlians, we Ihall fcarcely find 
 among the Swedifh peafantry, any traces of that 
 fpirit of independence and love of liberty by 
 which they were once diftinguilhed j and indeed 
 from the period juft mentioned, to the accefTion 
 of Guftavus Vafa, every occurrence in the Swedifh 
 hiftory was particularly calculated to debafe the 
 human mind, and deprefs every generous fenti-r 
 ment belonging to it. We fhall findthem therefore 
 under Chriflina, as henceforward we ever fhall find 
 them, a very different race of men from their an- 
 ceflors. Patient, laborious and fubmifTive, they will 
 appear pofTefTed of every quality an arbitrary mo- 
 narch could wifh to meet with in his fubjefta, 
 but deftitute of thofe without which rnen neither 
 can be free, nor defire to be fa *, 
 
 A people 
 
 • Whitelock, who was ambaflador In Sweden in the reign 
 of Chriflina, (and whofe account of the Swedes, I have been 
 affured by many Swedifh gentlemen well verfed in the hif^ 
 tory of their country, is moft perfeftly juft and accurate) 
 gives as one of the reafons of the fmall number of law-fuite 
 which occurred there in his tinie " That the boors and burg- 
 *' l^ers, and men of mean condition, are in fo much flavery of 
 
 «* their
 
 I "5 1 
 
 A people like thefe could have feconded but 
 ill any endeavours of their fuperiors to eftablilh 
 real freedom ; much lefs could they be wrought 
 «pon to give their afliftance to meafures, which, 
 without procuring one advantage to themfelves, 
 tended only to throw power into the hands of a 
 few of thofe, who already lorded it over them 
 with no fmall degree of infolence and pride. 
 
 Accordingly, when the vain and capricious 
 Chriftina, by taking the whimlical refolution of 
 abdicating the throne, gave the chief men in 
 Sweden a fair opportunity for carrying their de- 
 iigns into execution, they were not able to fucceed. 
 It appears from the reply made by this princefs 
 to the ftates upon their endeavouring to difiliade 
 her from quitting the crown, that ihe fufpedted 
 there were fome projeds on foot for new model- 
 ling the government at her death. But the no- 
 mination of Charles Guftavus to fucceed Chrif- 
 tina, a meafure taken fome time before her abdi- 
 cation, put a total Hop to thefe intrigues, and once 
 more deprived the Swedes of an opportunity of 
 guarding againft future defpotifm. 
 
 Nothing occurs in the ihort reign o( thi» 
 prince with refpecl to any alteration in the con- 
 ftitution. 
 
 He exercifed as much authority as his immediate 
 predeceflbrs had done, and received from his fub- 
 je(5ls the fame obedience. But his objcft feemed 
 10 be rather to emulate the condud of Guftavus 
 
 " their lords and great men, that they hardly dare conteft 
 *" with them upon a matter of right or title^ but fubmit tQ 
 
 " their will." 
 
 bf
 
 [ 1^6 ] 
 by the bolclnefs of his enterprizes and rapidity of 
 his conqiiefts abroad, than to endeavour to extend 
 his prerogative at home. The death of this prince 
 being followed by a minority which lafbed near 
 fixteen years, once more prefented a moft favou- 
 rable jun6!:iire to the flates for putting their go- 
 vernment on a footing that might fecure them 
 from the yoke of arbitrary power. Nothing how- 
 ever can furnilli a more llriking proof how to- 
 tally incapable of liberty the Swedes myfl have 
 been, than their having had after the death of 
 Guflavus Vafa, fuch frequent opportunities of re- 
 covering it without having once taken any effcc-^ 
 tual methods to fucceed in the attempt. 
 
 At the death of Charles indeed, the ftates fhewed 
 fome fpirit in their condu6t refpefting the regency 
 as fettled in his will. They deprived duke Adol- 
 phus, brother to Charles, of the guardianiliip of 
 bis nephew the young king, aligning as a reafon 
 for fo doing, that the will which had appointed 
 him to that office, had been drawn up witliout 
 their knowledge. And that fuch difpofitions as 
 related to the government of the kingdom were 
 never valid nnlefs they had received the approba- 
 tion of the flates. 
 
 Afterwards, when Charles XI. alTumed the reins 
 of goverruT!ent> they exa6led an oath from hirn> 
 which ferves to fliew in -what manner the Swedes 
 wifn to be governed, however little they undcr- 
 ftood the means of limiting their monarch to the' 
 degree they defired ; or however delicieryt they 
 might have been in the fpirit with which they 
 ihould have oppofed him, whenever he attempted 
 
 to
 
 [ 127 ] 
 to €kceed fuch limits. The oath was to the fol- 
 Jowing purpofe : 
 
 « —We fhall equally hold and obferve what- 
 ** ever the law of Sweden requires of us with re- 
 ** gard to the dates in general, and in particular, 
 " in the fame manner as we fhall condufl ourfelf 
 *' towards all our fubjefts, as well as each indivi- 
 ** dual, for their rights, privileges, and property 
 *' duly acquired, being willing to give as far as 
 ** depends upon us fatisfadlion to the kingdom— 
 " and in cafe it fliould be necefiary to make an/ 
 *' changes in what relates to the defence,, fafety, 
 " advancement, and wants of the kingdom, we 
 "** will in thefe cafes do nothing, nor firffer any 
 "*' thing to be done, without the advice of the fe- 
 ** natc, or without the knowledge and concurrence 
 ** of the ftates." 
 
 One w^ould hardly have imagined that within 
 two years after Charles the XI th had given this 
 aflurance to his fubjedls, he Ihould have become 
 eke moft abfolute prince that had ever fwayed the 
 Swedifli fceptre. 
 
 Thofe jealoufies and divifions which fubfuled 
 l)etween the nobles and the other orders of the 
 Hate, during the reign of Chriflijia, having been 
 fomented by that Princefs, were in no lliapc de- 
 creafed in the minority of Charles. The intrigues, 
 perhaps the money of France, had prevailed with 
 the regency to involve the kingdom in an expen- 
 five and fruitlefs war. Tiie taxes v/hich, in confe- 
 quence of this, the king found it neceflary to im- 
 pofc when he took the adminiftration of affairs 
 into his own hands, proved a fource of difputes 
 
 lo amona
 
 among his fubje£ls, which were produflive o^an 
 event nearly fimilar to that which happened in 
 Denmark a few years before ; when the clergy and 
 burghers, out of hatred to the nobility, united to 
 furrender into the hands of the king their own 
 rights, in order that the nobles might be deprived 
 of theirs. 
 
 The Swedilh nobles bore little of rio proportion 
 of the weight of thofe burdens, which fat heavy 
 on the burghers and peafants. The paying of 
 no taxes they confidered as one of the privileged 
 annexed to their order. A diftinftion that ex- 
 empted thofe from contributing towards the 
 exigencies of the ftate, who were beft enabled to 
 do fo, was in its own nature odious, as well as 
 highly unjuft: J but more particularly fo, when the 
 burden of taxes became fo heavy, that the reft of 
 the nation could no longer fupport it. 
 
 According to the Swcdifh conftitution, what 
 had been refolved by three of the orders. Was,- ex- 
 cepting in fome particular cafes, binding to the 
 fourth; however this laft might have refufed their 
 aflent to the meafures fo refolved upon, and had 
 the force of an a6t of all the ftates. This put it 
 in the power of any three of them, when they 
 thought proper to combine fof that purpofe, ta 
 pafs adls highly injurious to the interefts of the 
 diiTenting ftate. It is true, that whatever was 
 propofed relative to the rights and privileges of 
 each particular order, required the confent of all 
 before it could pafs into a law. But it was eafy 
 to avoid any direft attack upon an order confider- 
 ed in their legiflative capacity, and at the fame 
 
 time
 
 time to give a fatal blow to their interefls as 
 members of fociety. Accordingly Charles pro- 
 cured a decree, that all the lands which had been 
 difmembered from the crown, fincc the year 1609, 
 fhould be re-anncxed to it. This was a ftroke 
 altogether aimed at the nobles, in whofe favoir 
 every grant of this nature had been made, and by 
 which many of them were reduced to the utmoft 
 poverty and diftrefs. 
 
 But the inferior orders did not flop here. 
 
 The umbrage they had conceived at the power 
 which the ienate had of late afilimed, nearly 
 equalled the impatience with which the king had 
 borne it. They, therefore, contracted the autho- 
 rity of that body within fuch narrow limits, tliat 
 it altogether ceafed to be any check upon the 
 crown. The refolution of the flates upon this oc- 
 cafion was worded fo ambiguoudy, that the king 
 feems to have been left entirely at liberty, to 
 govern either with or without the advice of the 
 fenate. It is not hard to judge which was the 
 mod agreeable to fuch a prince as Charles the 
 Xlth. And finally, as if wholly regardlefs of 
 their own fate, provided they could gratify their 
 animofity againft the nobles, the inferior orders 
 came to the following extraordinary decifion : 
 
 * "The dates have decided, that all the forms 
 ** of government, with their additions, fhould no 
 ** longer be confidered as binding to the king; 
 *' but that he ought to be at liberty to change 
 ** them according to his good will and pleafurc. 
 
 • A. D. 1680. 
 
 K "And
 
 [ ijo ] 
 " And that it will be found necefTary for the well- 
 " being of the kingdom, that he fhould be bound 
 " by no form of government, but only by the laws 
 " and flatutes of Sweden ; and that if he governs 
 " his kingdom with the confent of his fenate, it is 
 " to be interpreted 9nly as depending upon his 
 " good and jull difcernment. So that his majefty, 
 " as a king vefted with fupreme power to govern 
 '' his kingdom according to the laws and flatutes, 
 ^' as his own inheritance v/hich God has given 
 " him, is refponfible for his actions to God alone." 
 
 What did net a nation deferve to fuffer from 
 tyranny, who were thus capable of forging their 
 own chains, and of eftablifliing defpotifm by law? 
 
 The two fovereigns of the north were now be- 
 come, from having been the moft limited, the 
 moll abfolute monarchs in Europe. But the means 
 by which they had arrived at their power, altho* 
 produ<5live of the fame effedls, were the very re- 
 verfe of thofe which had ferved to augment the 
 authority of princes in other countries. In each 
 of thefe it was the monarchs who endeavoured to 
 raife the people in order to balance the power of 
 the nobles : in Sweden and Denmark it was the 
 people who endeavoured to fink the nobles to a 
 level with themfelves. The confequence was, that 
 in the former, the people as well as the crown, were 
 benefited by what the nobles loll; whereas in the 
 latter, the crown alone was a gainer and the fitua- 
 tion of the people continued the fame. 
 
 This accounts for a greater degree of defpotifm 
 having prevailed at various times in the northern 
 kingdoms, than in the more fouthern countries. 
 
 As
 
 [ '3' ] 
 
 As in Sweden, the objed of the burghers and 
 •peafants had been to lower the nobles, fo that of 
 Charles the XTth feemed to be to deprefs the 
 whole nation. 
 
 Not content with bein^ the abfolute mafler of 
 their liberties, he appears to have confidered him- 
 jTelf as pofTefled of the fai-ne power over their pro- 
 perty. By his injuftice and rapacity half the in- 
 dividuals in- his idngdom were involved in ruin. 
 He liquidated, indeed, the public debts, and at his 
 ■death left a treafury well replenifhed to his fuc- 
 ceflbr ; but it was by means equally repugnant to 
 honour and humanity. Refiftanc^ on the part of 
 his fubjecls, was however vain. The fpirit of the 
 nation was broke j defpotifm was firmly eftablifh- 
 ed i and Charles the Xllth fucceeded to a crown 
 in the polTefllon of all that abfolute power which 
 was fo confonant to his difpofition. 
 
 The reign of this prince and the calamities he 
 brought upon his country are well known. A 
 prince, whofe ambition was madnefs ; whofe cou- 
 rage was ferocity ; and whofe chief claim to tlie 
 admiration in which mankind feemed to have held 
 him, was derived from the fingularity of his make, 
 from his being totally deftitute of all thofe feel- 
 ings, which are the parents of every facial virtue. 
 
 The Swedes had certainly little chance of re- 
 covering under this iron-hearted monarch, any of 
 thofe rights and privileges of which they had made 
 a voluntary facrifice to his father. Neither would 
 they probably have ever regained a fhadow of free- 
 dom, had not, at a very particular jundure, a 
 
 K 2 lucky
 
 [ 132 ] 
 
 lucky ball freed them from t|ie Ihackles in which 
 they were held by this extraordinary man. This 
 event took place at a time that the greateft difcon- 
 tent pervaded the nation; that all divifions among 
 them were at an end; that faflion had been 
 filenced by that ftill greater evil defpotifm ; that 
 all orders of men, forgetting their jealoufies and 
 animofities, concurred in one wilh, to fee their 
 country extricated from the miferies to which it 
 had been for fome time expofed ; and, which was 
 the moft important point of all, at a jundture when 
 there was no immediate heir to the crorwn, and 
 confequently they were left at liberty to new nao^ 
 del their government, 
 
 PART
 
 i t33 ] 
 
 PART II. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Containing the ft ate of Sweden at the death of Charles 
 XII ; and an account of the form of government 
 tftablifhed there focn after that event, 
 
 IN the two preceding fections I have endea- 
 voured to give fuch a fketch of the Swedish 
 hiftory, and fuch a view of the national charadler, 
 genius, and manners oif the Swedes, as were re-' 
 quifite to enable the reader to judge how far they 
 may hitherto have been juftly denominated a free 
 people, as well as how far they were in reality ca- 
 pable of being fo. 
 
 I fhall now proceed to give an account of the 
 form of governm.ent eftablifhed in Sweden upon 
 the death of Charles the Xllth, by which the 
 moft abfolute monarchy in Europe, was of a fud- 
 den rendered the moft limited ; as like wife to lay 
 open the caufcs which facilitated the accomplifli- 
 ment of fo great a change. 
 
 Nothing could be more deplorable than the 
 (tate to which the wild ambition and inflexible 
 temper of Charles the Xllth had reduced this 
 country. She had loft her beft provinces, thofe 
 fituated fouth of the Baltic, together with the ma- 
 jor part of Finland. Her commerce had been 
 annihilated, her armies and fleets deftroycd, and 
 
 K^ equally
 
 [ 134 I 
 
 equally drained of men and moneyi flie had been* 
 rendered incapable of maintaining the wars which 
 Charles had obftinately perfifted in renewing, un- 
 lefs fuch expedients, were made ufe of, as only the 
 fertile genius of a: Goertz could have devifed, or 
 which the callous heart of a Charles the Xllth- 
 could alone have confented to employ. Every fpe- 
 cies of opprefTion, every kind of extortion that a 
 cruel ingenuity could conceive, or defpotic power 
 carry into execution, were pradtifed on the Swedes, 
 to enable a mad man to purfue fantaftic fchemes, 
 ufelels to his country fliould they fucceed, but 
 certain to entail dellrudtion on it fliould they 
 ^il. It were endlefs to enter into a detail of 
 thefe ; it is fulHcient to obferve, that notwith- 
 ftanding his fubjefts fooliflily admired in Cliarles 
 thofe very qualities which were the fource of all 
 their miferies, yet their patience was well nigh ex- 
 haufted, when the death of this monarch left them 
 no farther occafion to exercife it. The execution 
 of the unfortunate Goertz, who paid the forfeit 
 of his life only for having ferved his mafter too 
 faithfully, fufficiently proves the latent refentment 
 and difcontents of the people during the preceding 
 reign ; although, awed into fubmiflion, they had 
 been compelled to fupprefs them. 
 
 Tkefe difcontents were not confined to any par- 
 ticular order of men in the flate ; they pervaded 
 the whole nation. The nobles ahd clergy, burgh- 
 ers and peafants, had all fufFered alike under one 
 common tyrranny. Wearied out with foreign 
 wars, and indeed hardly able to defend themfelves 
 at home, they now fought only fecurity and 
 
 peace.
 
 [ "35 ] 
 
 peace. But as they owed their misfortunes to thii 
 unlimited power with which their two laft mo- 
 narchs had been invefted; they were convinced, 
 that to obtain either of thefe ends, they muft no 
 longer fuffer fuch a power to continue in the 
 crown. They had experienced to their utmoft 
 height all tlie horrors of defpotifm, and had had 
 full leifure to lament their folly, in having 
 impofed upon themfelves that yoke by which they 
 were afterwards fo much galled. 
 
 The fenate had been tau ght a leflbn of modera- 
 tion. Deprived of all their authority by Charles 
 the Xlth, and by Charles the Xllth of the few 
 privileges which had efcaped the grafping policy 
 of his father ; they were perfuaded that their belt 
 fecurity for the prefervation of their own rights, 
 was, that the Itates fhould be maintained in the 
 full poflefiion Or theirs. The ftates, on the oth^r 
 hand, cured of their jealoufies of the fenate, per- 
 ceived how much miftaken they had been in hum- 
 bling that body to fuch a degree, as to have ren- 
 dered it no longer a check upon the crown. 
 
 Thus circumftanced, thus difpofed, the Swedes 
 likewife found themfelves at liberty to recur to 
 their ancient mode of eledting their fovereign. 
 One advantage had refulted to his fubje(5ts front 
 the favage temper of Charles the Xllth : incapa- 
 ble of every tender fentiment, this prince had ne- 
 ver ihewn any inclination to matrimony, and con- 
 fequently left no fon behind him to inherit a 
 defpotifm, which in that cafe, would probably 
 have been rendered perpetual. Upon the death 
 
 K4 o^
 
 [ 136 ] 
 
 of Charles, the fcnate refolved to place his fifler 
 Ulrika Eleanora, confort to the prince of Hefle.^ 
 upon the throne ; but they likewife determined 
 that it fliould only be in confequence of the free 
 eledion of the ftates, and upon the conditions 
 thefe fhould think proper to inapofe. 
 
 They feemed however to think it neceflary prc- 
 vioufly to invalidate all claim to the crown, which 
 this princefs might conceive fhe poffefled on the 
 fcore of hereditary right. But they appear pur- 
 pofely to have gone out of their way in fearch of 
 an objeftion to any fuch claim on her part, whilft 
 the mofl obvious one that could be, naturally pre- 
 fented itfelf to them. Ulrika was the yaungeft of 
 Charles's fillers; confequently the right of fuc- 
 ceeding to the crown upon the demife of that 
 prince, if lodged any where, muft have been in 
 his elder fifter ; or in cafe fhe had not furvived 
 him, in her offspring. The ftates however did 
 not chufe to make ufe of an argument with re- 
 gard to Uirika's title ta the crown, which would 
 have been acknowledging a good title to it in ano- 
 ther. They wifely judged, that a prince,, in whom 
 they Ihould either admit, or who had himfelf any 
 grounds to conceive he was poffeffed of an here- 
 ditary right to the crown, (as might probably have 
 been the cafe with the duke of Holftein, fon of 
 the elder fifter of Charles) would be too apt 
 to imagine he had likewife an hereditary right to. 
 all tlie authority enjoyed by his predeceflbrs. They 
 were therefore determined that the grounds upon 
 which they judged Ulrika devoid of any title of 
 tiiis fort, Ihould no wife relate to the objeftion 
 
 that
 
 [ 137 ] 
 that might be ftarted againft her, with regard to 
 her being the youngeft of the remaining branches 
 of the royal family. They aflerted that the laws 
 relating to the hereditary right of females to fuc- 
 ceed to the crown, exprefly declare, that a prin- 
 cefs, in order to be capable of fo fucceeding ought 
 to be unmarried*, and therefore as Ulrika was 
 married, fhe, on that account, had forfeited all 
 pretenfions to the fuccefllon. 
 
 Any title whatever to the crown being therefore 
 denied her, Ulrika could have no pretext to objeft 
 to the conditions upon which the Swedes might 
 offer to eled her their fovereign. Accordingly, 
 ihe implicitly followed in all things the advice of 
 the fenate, and confented to whatever changes i;^ 
 the conftitution they thought proper to propofe. 
 
 Before the diet could be aflembled, fhe pub- 
 lilhed a declaration, whereby (he renounced in her 
 own name and in that of her pofterity, all abfolutc 
 power, or what the Swedes call fovcreignty j as 
 well as every prerogative hitherto pofleffed by the 
 crown, which was not confiftent with the liberties 
 of the nation. 
 
 On the meeting of the ftates, their firft decla- 
 ration was, that they had voluntarily affcmbled 
 themfelves to ele6l a fucceffor to the vacant throne. 
 And they even exafted a written affurance from 
 Ulrika, by which fhe declared fhe was v/illing to 
 hold the crown in virtue of a free ele6lion, and 
 difclaimed all other title to it whatfoever. They 
 then thanked her majefly, " For having teflified 
 ** in her preceding declaration fo jufl and reafon- 
 
 * Reces des Etats. 
 
 able
 
 " able an averfiGti towards an abfolute or arbi- 
 *' trary power; the confequences of which (ad- 
 " ded they) have greatly weakened and much 
 " injured the kingdom, to the ah-noft irreparable 
 ** ruin of us all in general. So that we, the coun- 
 ** fellors and ftat^s of the kingdom affembled, 
 " having had this fad experience, have ferioufly 
 *' and unanimoufly refolved to abolifh entirely an 
 *' arbitrary power which has proved fo preju- 
 « dicial*.". 
 
 But however ferioufly and unanimoufly they 
 might have come to the foregoing refolution, it 
 was by no means an eafy tafli that they had im- 
 pofed upon themfelves. To tie up the hands of 
 z, fovereign who was to receive the crown from 
 them upon their own terms, appeared indeed no 
 difficult undertaking; but in order entirely to 
 abolilh arbitrary power, fimple conventions with 
 the pfinde would fcarcely have been found fufE- 
 cient. It was requifite for this purpofe that they 
 Ihould totally new model their government. It 
 was necefl^ary they fliould frame a confl:itution, 
 the objed of which was to be the immediate rc- 
 ftoration of liberty to a people, who had been 
 long accufliomed to a flavifli fubmifllon. In- 
 dependent then of the difficulty of framing fuch 
 a conftitution, which mufl: have required talents, 
 experience, and a depth of knowledge in tholc, 
 who on this occaflon, took upon themfelves the 
 office of legiflators, of which few men are pof- 
 fefled; it muft alfo have been a point of no lefs 
 
 • Recet dcs Etats. 17 19. 
 
 difficulty,,
 
 [ 139 ] 
 
 difficulty, to have cftablilhed fuch a conftitution, 
 when framed, upon any folid foundation. 
 
 Liberty is not a plant of fudden growth -, time 
 only can give it vigour. It will not take root, 
 but in a foil congenial to it ; and, to be rendered 
 flourilhing or lafling, it muft be cultivated with 
 care, and defended with unremitting attention 
 from the dangers which perpetually furround it. 
 But how to defend, and how to cultivate it, are 
 points which experience alone can teach mankind; 
 and with which, they who have been accuftomcd 
 to live under an abfolute monarchy, can fcarcely 
 have had an opportunity of becoming acquainted. 
 
 In vain, therefore, fhall a form of government 
 calculated to give liberty to a people, be cfta- 
 blilhed among them, unlefs thefe are prepared to 
 receive it. Emerging from flavery, they can hard- 
 ly be pofTefied of the freedom of fentiment, libe- 
 rality of mind, and manly Ipirit, which, perhaps, 
 only a fenfe of independence can infpire, and 
 which are all fo requifite to produce that confo- 
 nance between the genius of a people, and the na- 
 ture of a free government, without which fuch a 
 government cannot long fubfift. Let us fee then- 
 how far the Swedes were prepared for liberty, at 
 the time their late form of government was efta- 
 blilhed among them, as well as how far that go- 
 vernment was in reality calculated to render them 
 free. 
 
 It is to be remembered they had fo frequently 
 worn the yoke of defpotifm, that its effeds upo-n 
 their tempers, notions, and manners, mull have 
 been very confiderable. If they had feverely fuf- 
 
 fercd
 
 [ I40 J 
 
 fered during the reigns of their two laft princcfi 
 this might, indeed, have infpired them with a 
 dread of arbitrary power j but it could not have 
 communicated to them thofe qualities without 
 which men are incapable of becoming free. 
 
 The Swedilh peafantry no longer poffefled that 
 bold and independent fpirit which diftinguilhed 
 their anceftors : and as thefe had been often tur- 
 bulent and licentious in the higheft degree, fo 
 their pofterity, deprefled by fervitude, had now 
 funk into the contrary extreme of fervility and 
 fubmiflion. 
 
 The burghers, in thfe ruin of their commerce 
 confequent upon the wars of Charles Xllth, had 
 loft that influence and importance in the ftatcy 
 which it is fo requifit^ in a free conftitution, that 
 this order of men Ihould poflefs. 
 
 Many caufes had contributed to render the 
 nobles poor, and confequently dependent. 
 
 The cuftom of dividing the property of the 
 father equally among the children, without any 
 regard being paid to primogeniture j the frequent 
 refumption of the crown lands ; and the redutlion 
 of eftates throughout the kingdom by Charles the 
 Xlth* J all thefe had concurred to reduce that body 
 to a degree of poverty, which, together with their 
 
 • When Charles the Xlth refumed thofe lands which were 
 fuppofed to have formerly belonged to the crown , of which he 
 iimfelf was to be the judge, he fuffered the poffeffor to retain 
 to the value of about feventy pounds per annum, but at the 
 next aflembly of the ftates, even this fmall pittance was forced 
 dfrom the unfortunate proprietor and likewife annexed to' 
 xhs crown. 
 
 abfurd
 
 [ I4« ] 
 
 abfurd pride, that made them difdain any other pro- 
 feffion than that of arms, certainly rendered them 
 fitter to be the tools of an abfolute prince, than 
 the legiflators of a free country. Men trained 
 only to a military life, will fcarcely imbibe yilR- 
 ciples of liberty in a camp. 
 
 But the circumftances which muft have proved 
 on this occafion, as it ever had on all others, the 
 chief obftacle to the eftablifliment of true liberty 
 among the Swedes, was the divifion of the nation 
 into thofe diflindt clafles which were totally un- 
 connefted with each other, and never affociated 
 together. As in order to preferve a free conftitu- 
 tion, a certain degree of oppofition, to ufe the 
 words of a moft ingenious foreign writer*, fliould 
 on the one hand take place between the different 
 views and interefts of the feveral bodies that 
 compofe it J fo likewife, on the other, it mufl, in 
 a great degree, owe its fafety to a conjunflion of 
 views and interefts in the body of the nation at 
 large. 
 
 As members of different branches of the legif- 
 lature, each poffeffing diftind rights and privi- 
 leges, thofe entrufted with power ought recipro- 
 cally to be a check and control upon each other. 
 
 As members of the fame fociety, pofiefTing, in 
 faft, one common intereft in the general welfare 
 of their country, a people cannot be too much 
 united among themfelvesf, 
 
 But 
 
 • Mr. de Lolme, p. 201. 
 
 f This nowife relates to thofe party divlfions which mull 
 trcr take place among a free people ; thefe arife from a difFe- 
 
 renc<$
 
 [ 142 ] 
 
 But nothing tends fo much to prevent this 
 union from taking place, as thofe drftinft clafles in 
 fociety, which, without contributing to the good 
 order of it, or the fupport of government, ferve 
 chiefly to infpire one clafs of men with pride and 
 infolence, and another with jealoufy and envy. 
 
 No unnecefTary diftindions ftiould therefore be 
 admitted among a free people. Thofe only fliould 
 be allowed, which are requifite to create a degree 
 of oppolition between the views and interefts of 
 the component parts of the legiflature §. 
 
 None fhould be fuiFered to take place among 
 them merely for the purpofe of gratifying the 
 pride of individuals. 
 
 England is the only country in Europe where 
 the diftinftion, for inftailce of noble and not no- 
 ble, is carried no farther than the nature of the 
 government requires it fhould ; becaufe there the 
 nobility do not, as fitch y form a diftind clafs from 
 the reft of the nation. 
 
 rence of opinion, not of interefts; and confequently there is 
 among fuch a people but one common objedt, and the point 
 in difpute is only how that objeft is to be obtained. 
 
 % Thus if of two of the component parts of a free conftita- 
 tion, one is hereditary, and the other eledive, this circum-.. 
 ilance will naturally produce an oppofition between their inte- 
 refts ; were both eleftive, or both hereditary, they might unit* 
 for the purpofe of augmenting their common power at the ex- 
 pence of the liberties of the nation; but in the other cafe tire' 
 hereditary legiflators will be too fond of that diftinftion to fuf- 
 fcr the eleftive to ufurp it, and for that reafon, the latter 
 will not join with the former, in order to acquire an unconfti- 
 tutional power ; which, at a certain period, the reprefenta- 
 tive body know they ihall be obliged to furrender, whilft the 
 hereditary are to enjoy it to perpetuity. 
 
 As
 
 [ HJ ] 
 
 As it is only the head of each noble family, 
 who is there entitled to the honours and privilegesj 
 of the peerage, it is not the man who can count; 
 a long train of titled anceftors, but the hereditary 
 legiflator who is himfelf noble. 
 
 The younger branches of thefe families, as they 
 liave no fhare in the legiOature, are but little, if,, 
 by courtefy, at all diftinguifhed from their fellow- 
 fubje6ls i with whom they and their defendants 
 aflimilate, and are foon, if I may fo exprefs my- 
 felf, melted down into the general mafs of the 
 people. Hence thefe become a fort of link be- 
 tween the nobility and the commoners; a link 
 that, connecting their interefls, prevents all divi- 
 ijion between thefe two orders in their capacity of 
 ipembers of the fame fociety, and which forms of 
 that fociety a continued chain, no part of v/hich. 
 gaii be touched without afFe6ling, by an almoit 
 eiedrical communication, all the reft. 
 
 In other countries, where thofe who have^ been 
 once ennobled, tranfmit the honours and privi- 
 leges of nobility to all their pofterity alike, there- 
 in no link to conned the nobles to the reft of the- 
 nation; on the contrary,, a line is. drawn between, 
 them to perpetuity ; a, line which cuts, as it were, 
 the chain of fociety in two, the fevered ends of 
 which appear, rather to repel than attrad each 
 Qthef. TJhere, confequently, that conjundlion of 
 view? and interefts cannot. take place in the nation 
 at large, to which I have faid a free conftitution 
 muft, in a great degree, owe its fafcty: 
 
 It muft appear then pretty evident, from what 
 has been now alledged, that the divifion of, the- 
 
 Swedifh
 
 [ 144 ] 
 SwedilK nation, into thofe three diftind clafTes of 
 nobles, burghers, and peafants, whofe interefls 
 were perpetually clafhing, was a circumftance by 
 no means favourable to liberty. 
 
 But this will be placed in a more ftriking light, 
 by taking a fummary view of their late form of 
 government, as it was ellablifhed upon the death 
 of Charles the Xllth. 
 
 This confifted of fifty-one articles, which the 
 ftates prefented to Ulrika Eleanora, for her ap- 
 probation. Her majefty could not fail to approve 
 of them, as the condition of her ekflion was an 
 entire acquiefcence in whatever the diet thought 
 fit to ena6t. I fhall only take notice of fuch of 
 them as were defigned to be barriers to the royal 
 authority, or bulwarks of the liberties of the 
 nation. 
 
 The ftates were compofed, as formerly, of the 
 four orders of the nobles, clergy, burghers, and 
 peafants. 
 
 Thefe were to be aflembled every three years in 
 the middle of January, or oftener, if the king, or 
 (in cafe of his abfence, ficknefs, or deceafe) the 
 fenate found it neceflary to convoke them. 
 
 But if the king or fenate ftiould negledl to af- 
 femble them, at the end of three years, as the law 
 required ; or even fhould they not convoke them 
 on the very day the ftates had, the laft time they 
 were aflembled, chofen to appoint for their next 
 meeting, thefe fliould then have a right to aflem- 
 ble of themfelves j and whatever the king or fe- 
 nate ftiould have done in the mean time, was to 
 
 be confidercd as void. 
 
 The
 
 [ Hi ] 
 
 The time fpecified for the duration of the diet 
 •vfras three months; but as its rriembers alone had 
 the power of diffolving it, they confequently 
 could continue fitting as long as they judged 
 proper. 
 
 While the dates were afTembled, they were, in 
 fafl, pofielTed of the whole fupreme power. The 
 authority of the king and fenate was then fufpend- 
 ed : they became mere cyphers, having little or no 
 fhare in the public tranfadions, but what confifled 
 fimply in affixing their feals and fignatures, to 
 whatever the Diet fhould think proper to refolve, 
 whether agreeable to them or not. In iliort, the 
 ilates were veiled with the fame powers, indepen- 
 dent of the king and fenate, that in England the 
 two houfes of parliament poflefs only in conjunc- 
 tion with the king. 
 
 The legiQative power they referved at all times 
 wholly to themfelves. The king and fenate hav- 
 ing no Ihare whatever in it, did not even poflefs 
 SL negative on thofe refolutions of the Diet, which, 
 directly attacked the regal and fenatorial rights. 
 For the prefervation of thefe, they were entirely 
 to depend upon the moderation of a popular af- 
 fembly. The following powers were likewife 
 veiled in the Hates alone. Thofe of declaring 
 •war, or making peace. That of altering, the 
 ftandard of the coin. Whenever a vacancy hap- 
 pened in the fenate, that of prefenting to the king 
 tjiree perfons, one of whom his majefty was bound 
 to%make choice of to fill the vacant office 1| : fo 
 
 II We (hall fee in the fequel how even this privilege, incon- 
 £derable as it was;, became^ abridged. 
 
 L that
 
 ' [ 146 ] 
 that in cafe of the death of a fenator in tht inter- 
 val between the Diets, no one could be appointed ' 
 to fucceed him till the next meeting of the ftates. 
 And laftly, that of difmifling any member of the 
 fenate whofe condu6l they difapproved of, or of 
 allowing him, when he demanded it, permilRon 
 to retire. 
 
 The executive power during the fitting of the 
 IDiet, may be faid to have been, in a great mea- 
 fure, lodged in a certain number of perfons felefb- 
 ed from the three orders of the nobles, clergy, and 
 burghers, who conftituted what was denominated 
 th.Q fecret committee*. The reafon is plain why it 
 could not continue in the fenate, fince that body 
 was accountable to the ftates for their adminiftra- 
 tion during the interval of the diets, and was lia- 
 ble not only to be cenfured but depofed by them. 
 So that admitting the executive power to havs 
 ftill refided in the fenate, it would in that cafe 
 have been compelled to deftroy itfelf. With re- 
 gard to the judicial power, the ftates aftumed to 
 themfelves a right of exercifing that alfo, when- 
 ever they thought proper, by taking at pleafure 
 caules out of the ordinary courts of juftice, to 
 try them before d, temporary tribunal, ereded 
 
 • The ftanding fecret committee was chofen the firft of 
 any, at the diet, and continued all the time this lafted. 
 
 The number of which this committee was to be compofed, 
 was left to the option of each affembly, provided it was fo con- 
 trived, that there fhould be two npbles to one of each of the 
 ether orders. 
 
 by
 
 { '47 ] 
 
 by themfelves, and compofed of their own mem- 
 bers f . 
 
 Nothing could be more formidable than the 
 power of this court, or more fubverfive of liberty 5 
 as in reality it united within itfelf, at once, the 
 legiflative, judicial, and executive powers; and 
 as it was to decide principally in cafes of treafon, 
 what rendered this extraordinary jurifdidiion moft 
 prepofterous was, its being generally at the fame- 
 time both judge and party ||. 
 
 At the expiration of the diet, the executive 
 power was divided between the king and the fe- 
 nate, in fuch a manner, that but a very fmall fhare 
 of it fell to his majefty. 
 
 He was diftinguifhed from the fenators only in 
 having two votes, with this privilege, that if after 
 
 I There are three high courts of jiiftice in Sweden: 
 one at Stockholm, one at Jonkoping, and one at Ambo. Ac- 
 cording to the original form of government, no perfon could 
 be tried by any other courts than thefe, for matters which 
 concerned his life or hdtiour. But the flates difpenfed when 
 they pleafed with this article, not finding thefe courts fit in- 
 ftruments for party to make ufe of. They had therefore fome- 
 times recourfe to the ereftion of the temporary tribunal, above- 
 mentioned j in the fame manner as in France, the minillers 
 have at times appointed particular judges to try fuch men 
 as they had refolved to ruin. No Afiatic defpotifm could ex- 
 ceed that which fuch a court might exercife. 
 
 II This court too teok cognizance of all fuch publicatioos 
 as the ruling powers thought proper to deem libels upon the 
 government, and awarded the punifhmcnt of the authors of 
 thefe. 
 
 The liberty of the prefs could fcarcely have fubfilled, where 
 the offended party was to judge the offence, and condema 
 the olfcnder. 
 
 L a dividing
 
 [ 148 ] 
 
 dividing upon a qneflion, the numbers on both 
 fides fliould prove equal, the opinion the kino- had 
 embraced, v/as in that cafe to prevail. 
 
 The perfons of the fenators, as far as related to 
 the duties of their functions, were held inviolable j 
 fo that it was no lefs a penalty than death, to any- 
 one who fhould reproach or charge a fenator with 
 any thing defamatory refpefting the execution of 
 his office, unlefs fuch perfon was able to make his 
 charge good by legally proving it. ( Crim. Laws 
 of Sweden, ^th Chap. 2.) Or whoever faid or wrote 
 any thing againft a fenator in his public capacity, 
 was to afk pardon in public for his offence, as well 
 as to be condemned to pay a confiderable fine. 
 
 The fenate was likewife poffefTed of fo confide- 
 rable an influence with refpect to the difpofal of 
 all employments beneath the rank of a fenator, 
 that they were in fa6t, in a great meafure, enabled 
 to appoint whom they pleafed to every vacant of- 
 fice Ji and finally, what rendered them almofl: 
 
 wholly 
 
 % All employments, from a colonel to a field-marflial inclu- 
 fively, and fuch as were of the fame rank in civil departments, 
 were difpofed of in the following manner. The fenators 
 pitched upon three perfons, whom they prefentcd to the king, 
 he being obliged to make choice of one of them, although 
 all three might be equally obnoxious to him. 
 
 With regard to inferior employments, the different colleges 
 (that being the name given to public offices in Sweden) to 
 which they belonged, prefented what they called z. propojition 
 to the king, in prefence of two fenators, which propofition 
 contained the names of three perfons, for his majefty to make 
 choice of one of them, to fill any vacancy that fliould have 
 *»iDDened in a civil department : Ijut if the vacant employ- 
 ment
 
 [ 149 ] 
 
 vfholly independent of the king, was, that they 
 could aff^mble themfelves whenever they thought 
 proper, without having received any orders for that 
 puroofe from his majefty ; and even without his 
 being prefent, they could proceed to tranfaft the 
 moft important bufinefs of the nation. 
 
 They read, without confulting him, ^1 dif- 
 patches from foreign minifters; in Ihort, left him 
 nothing to do but to lign orders given without 
 his confent. 
 
 If fuch was the power of the ftates, and fuch 
 the authority of the fenate, it is obvious, no very 
 confiderable degree of either could have remained 
 in the hands of the king. 
 
 In reality he could not be confidered as a fo- 
 vereign himfelf, but only the reprefentative of the 
 majefty of the ftates ; and a reprefentative too fo 
 limited by his conftituents, as to pofTefs no will 
 of his own j or rather he appeared to be nothing 
 more than a ftate-puppet, v/ho upon fome gaudy 
 day«, was decorated with the trappings of royalty 
 to impofe upon the people, and make them ima- 
 gine they had a king. 
 
 We have {ccn that he was allowed no fhare in 
 the legiflature, not having a negative upon the 
 propofitions of the ftates. He was confequently 
 
 jncnt was in the military line, then the college of war (War- 
 oflicc) prefented only one perfon. and the fenate another; one 
 of which two the king was obliged to appoint to it. Some of 
 the higheft and moll confidential employments of the ftate, 
 were excepted from thofe regulations, and beftowcd in the ft- 
 jiatc, according to the majority of votes. 
 
 L 3 deftitute
 
 [ HO ] 
 
 deftitute of any means of prefcrving entire, the 
 few prerogatives he found annexed to his crown. 
 He could neither levy troops, equip fleets, or 
 build fortrelTes without the confent of the diet. 
 He therefore could neither make war or peace, 
 form treaties or alliances of his own authority. 
 He was dependent upon each aflembly of the 
 flates, for the revenues neceflary to fupport his 
 ordinary expences ; which were granted him with 
 fo fparing a hand, that there certainly was never 
 any fuperfluity in his finances, to enable him to 
 make up in influence what he wanted in power. 
 The ftates had taken as eff'eftual precautions 
 againft the crown's obtaining the one, as it had to 
 prevent its poflfefllng the other. We have feen 
 that the king was not allowed the unreft;rained 
 difpofal of €ven the mofl: infignificant employ- 
 ments. Nay, the very fervants of his houfhold 
 became Independent of him j and at one time he 
 could not difcharge a dom.eftick who Ihould havq 
 
 ofl'ended him. 
 
 Thus was the power of that crown retrenched, 
 
 which had been fo lately worn by Charles the 
 
 Xllch. The few prerogatives that remained to 
 
 the king, were fimply thefe : 
 
 ift, The office of king was hereditary, which 
 
 was not the cafe with any other oflice in Sweden. 
 2dly, The attribute of fovereignty or pre-emi-. 
 
 nence, with the outward pomp and decorations of 
 
 majefty. 
 
 3dly, His perfon was facred, fo that whoever 
 
 fpoke or wrote concerning the king, without due 
 
 relpeft
 
 [ '5' ] 
 
 rcfpe<5t for him, was liable to be punlfhed with the 
 lofs of life. 
 
 4thly, He was to be the only vifible foiirce of 
 honours; that is, he only could create counts and 
 barons, or introduce new members into the houfe 
 of nobles : but he was much reftricled in the ex- 
 ercifeofthis right, by one of the articles of the 
 form of government. 
 
 5thly, He only could pardon after fentence had 
 been pafled upon a criminal. The fenate was 
 however authorifed, to difTuade the king from ex- 
 ercifing this branch of his prerogative, when they 
 judged it would be improper i and the being fo 
 authorifed, amounted to their having a negative 
 upon the refolutions of his majefty on fuch occa- 
 fions. 
 
 6thly, and laftly, The king, as has been already 
 obferved, was allowed two voices in the fenate. 
 
 Such was the form of government eftabliflied 
 in Sweden, when Ulrika Eleanora fucceedcd her 
 brother Charles the Xllth, in the throne of that 
 country. 
 
 It is obvious, that the grand objefl of ^thofe 
 Swedes who framed it, was to guard againft all 
 poflibility of their monarchs ever again becoming 
 abfolute. 
 
 The retrenching of the regal power feems alone 
 to have occupied their thoughts; and blinded by 
 what they had fufTered from the defpotifm of the 
 two laft reigns, they not only did not perceive 
 that liberty may be liable to dangers from other 
 quarters, nearly equal to thofe fhe has to appre- 
 
 L 4 heocl
 
 [ J52 ] 
 hcnd from the ufurpations of the royal authority i 
 but they forgot, that when a prince finds himfelf 
 galled by the lliackles impofed upon him, he may 
 become defperate, and in order to free himfelf, 
 have recourfe to the moil fatal extremities. 
 
 Having feen monarchy of late only under its 
 moft frightful afpedt, that of defpotifm, they 
 would probably have wholly aboliilied it, but that 
 the bulk of the nation were Hill prejudiced in its 
 favpur. |f for this reafon they retained the king- 
 ly office, they feem to have treated it as men 
 would fome fierce and dangerous animal, which 
 they did not wiili to deftroy, but i,yere refolved to 
 fecure, by loading it with chains. 
 
 But was this form of government, from annihi- 
 Jating the regal power v/hilft it retained the of- 
 fice, the better calculated to give liberty to the 
 nation ? Was it in any refpe6l fuitqd to pro- 
 mote an end fo defirable, and fo hard to be ob- 
 tained ? Was it adapted to the genius, difpofition 
 and circumflances of the nation I Or were the 
 Swedes capable, at any rate, of reducing it to 
 practice ? 
 
 Thefc queflions I believe mufl all be anfwere4 
 in the negative. 
 
 The reader cannot but have perceived therq 
 were defedts interwoven in the very texture of this 
 government, v/hich indicated from the beginning, 
 where it muft fail. Thele, in afhorttime, infed:- 
 ing the whole mafs of the conftitution, before any 
 political principles, confonant to the new fituation 
 in' which they fpund themfelves, could poflibly 
 have fettled among the people, difdofed to the 
 
 publiq
 
 [ 153 3 
 public view, fuchTcenes of corruption, diil^ntions, 
 confufion and anarchy, that the nation had fcarcely 
 tailed liberty, when they began to be expofed to 
 all the diforders and. tyranny, of which the vio- 
 lence of contending factions, is in general pro- 
 
 dudive. 
 
 The principal and moft glaring defect in this 
 conftitution, a defed, which alone muft have 
 brouo-ht on its deftrudion, was the total want of 
 ^11 balance of its parts. For the very exiftence 
 of the executive power, depending upon the le- 
 giflative, this could arrogate to itfelf what autho- 
 rity it pleafed. 
 
 It confequently rpight unite in itfelf both 
 powers, and to them add the judicial likewife. 
 This we have feen it -aftually did in the cafe of 
 ereding thofe temporary tribunals I have already 
 taken notice of. For as the members of fuch 
 tribunals were perfons feleded out of,*and chofen 
 by the legiflative body, it amounted nearly to the 
 fame thing as if that whole body had formed itfelf 
 into a court of judicature. 
 
 The king's being totally deftitute of power was 
 certainly another very confiderable defed in this 
 form of government. 
 
 Nothing could have been more abfurd than the 
 idea of preferving the kingly office in a free con- 
 ftitution, without endeavouring to render that of- 
 fice fubfervient to the purpofes of freedom. 
 
 It was, ho\vever, very natural for thofe who had 
 RifFered fo feverely from defpotifm, to carry their 
 precau^ons againft thq royal authority too far, 
 
 whea
 
 [ IJ4 ] 
 
 when they found themfelves in a fituation which 
 enabled them to fet bounds to it. 
 
 They were not fufficiently acquainted with the 
 true principles of liberty, to know how to recon- 
 cile kingly power with national freedom ^ and 
 they were fo intent upon retraining the former, 
 that they forgot, as has bqen before obferved, to 
 guard the latter from dangers arifing from other 
 quarters. 
 
 Thus they rendered it impofiible for the crown 
 cither to influence or corrupt the ftates ; but, as 
 iliall be fhewn in the fequel, they left another door 
 open for a corruption of a more fatal nature, more 
 ruinous to the country, and more deftrudive of 
 liberty. 
 
 The only defign then of retaining the kingly 
 office in the late Swedifh form of government, 
 was, as I have already hinted, to comply with the 
 prejudices of the people, who were ftill attached 
 to monarchy ; and who, therefore, would not have 
 been fatisfied, unlefs feme perfon in the Hate was 
 allowed to bear at leaft the title of king. What 
 other end it could have anfwered, one muil be at 
 a lofs to conceive. 
 
 As that office made no part of, it could prove 
 no check upon the legiflative power : which, 
 therefore, could aflume to itfelf all the rights of 
 the executive power. Where thefe powers are 
 united, it is flowed that tyranny muft enfue; and 
 fuch a union is only to be prevented, by fuffering 
 the executive pcv/er to poffefs a fiiare in the legif- 
 lative, fuffirient to enable it to defeod it$ p^n pre-. 
 Togatives,
 
 [ >5J ] 
 
 The great ufc of eftablifhing a chief magiftrate 
 in a free government, is, that the executive power 
 may then be placed in the hands of one. But the 
 King of Sweden had only a very fmall fhare of 
 this power, \irfiich, as has been already fhewn, was 
 almoft wholly engrofled by the fenate. He there- 
 fore in no fhape whatfoever contributed to pre* 
 ferve a balance between the component parts of 
 the conftitution. He could neither on the one 
 hand, prevent the ariftocratical branches of it 
 from fo far encroaching on the others, as to con- 
 vert the government into an oligarchy ; nor could 
 he, on the other, check the progrefs of that licen- 
 tioufnefs, which muft ever prevail in popular af- 
 femblies when under no control. 
 
 The confequence was, that the Swedes became 
 alternately expofed to both thefe evils. While 
 the dates were affembled they experienced ail 
 thofe diforders, of which fa(5lion and party vio* 
 lence are produdlivej and during the intervals 
 between the diets, the fenate in its turn, made 
 them feel the rigour of that oppreflion which n?i- 
 turally flows from an oligarchy. 
 
 Thus without reaping one of the advantages 
 which a free government may derive from the 
 kingly office, when vefted with a due fliare of con- 
 ftitutional power, the Swedes were expofed to all 
 thofe dangers which muft have arifen to their li- 
 berties, from placing their prince in a fituation, 
 in which etnery thing was calculated to mortify 
 him on one hand, and on the other, to ftimulate 
 his ambition, or to infpire him with that pafTion^ 
 fhould he not naturally be under its influence. 
 
 Whilft
 
 [ 156 ] 
 Whflft, from the habitual refped: paid to the title 
 of majefty, and the influence of outward pomp 
 and decoration upon the minds of men, the peo- 
 ple continued to look up to him with the fame 
 reverence, with which they had been accuftomed 
 to behold their former fovereigns : and thus 
 . he was neceffarily pofleffed of a fure road to po- 
 pularity, as no mifconduft in public affairs, could 
 fever be attributed to one who had fo little fliare 
 in directing them. 
 
 " Next, when we confider of whom the flates were 
 compofedj- what were the fituation and condition 
 of thofe who were called upon to exercifc the 
 function of legillators, with a fupreme and almoll 
 unlimited authority; innumerable defefts will then 
 appear in this form of government, which at firft 
 jTight 'might efcape obferv^ation. 
 
 We have feen that the ftates were compofed of 
 the'nobles, clergy, burghers and peafants. 
 " ift. With regard to the nobles: .that body 
 formed in' Sweden, as in other countries on the 
 continent, a clafs entirely diflinft from the reft of 
 the. nation. The honours as well as property of 
 pach noble family defcended alike to all its 
 branches. Numerous therefore, proud, and needy, 
 tliey were certainly but ill calculated to have a 
 Ihare in a legiflature, which was defigned to 
 eflablifh liberty. Their poverty neceffarily ren-r 
 .dered them dependent, whilft their pride as necef- 
 farily kept them poor j fince they difdained by 
 means of commierce to.acquire that independency 
 with refpeft to fortune, which ought xq be an- 
 
 . , , , ' - nexe4
 
 t IS7 ] 
 nexed to the charafler of a legiflator. The lines 
 of diftinclion which divided them from the reft of 
 their countrymen were too ftrongly marked to be 
 overlooked, and too flattering to their pride to be 
 difregarded by them. 
 
 They feldom afTociated with thofe who did not 
 belong to their order, in general kept at a moft 
 abfurd diftance from them ; and retained under a 
 free government all that arrogance towards their 
 inferiors, with which nobles under abfolute mo- 
 narchies feem frequently to confole themfelves, 
 for the confcioufnefs of their ov/n infigniiicancy 
 with regard to their common mafter. 
 
 The head only of every family had a right to fit 
 in the houfe of nobles ; their body being too nu- 
 merous to admit of the whole being aflembled at 
 once. But the perfon pofTefled of fo important a 
 privilege, not being diftinguifhed from the reft of 
 his family in point of property, muft frequently 
 have been wholly deftitute of the means of exer- 
 cifing it; infomuch that it is literally a fa6l, that 
 a very confiderable number of thofe nobles, who 
 had a right to afiift at the diets, were fo poor, as 
 to be abfolutely unable to pay the trifling expences 
 attending their leaving their hoines, to refide ac 
 Stockholm for the Ihort time a diet was to laft". , 
 
 It is equally true, that the heads of the major 
 part of the moft ancient families in Sweden, of 
 thofe who held the firft rank among the nobles, 
 and were in the greateft confideration among the 
 people, had bona fide j no vifible means of fubfift- 
 cnc^, but what they derived from the poflTeffion qf 
 
 pofts
 
 [ f^« 3 
 
 |)ofts and employments under government : even 
 tli€ members of the fenate were frequently defti- 
 tote of any other income but that annexed to 
 their office r and as the fenators in cafe of their 
 being depofed, could never afterwards accept of 
 an inferior employment, they were compelled, in 
 a manner, to make ufe of every poflible means of 
 maintaining themfelves in power. The conftitu- 
 tion, by allowing nobles an hereditary ihare in the 
 legiflature, who were totally deftitute of property, 
 placed them in a fituation in which they were 
 equally expofed to be corrupted, and under the 
 neceffity of becoming fo : while the fenators were 
 binder the fame neceffity of making ufe of corrup- 
 tion, fince their very exiftence depended upon the 
 party they could form to themfelves in the ftates. 
 
 Such of the nobles as had a feat at the diet, 
 might, if they did not chufe, or could not afford 
 to attend themfelves, give full powers to any per- 
 fons of their own order not pofTefling a feat, to 
 adt and vote for them. 
 
 The perfons who received thefe fullmaghtSy as 
 they were called, became to all intents and puc- 
 pofes members of the diet, and were nowife ac- 
 countable to their principals for their condud 
 there. 
 
 Confidering the poverty of the Swedifh nobles, 
 it was not at all furprifing if many of them were 
 induced to part with th.tk fullmaghts, upon pecu- 
 niary confiderations. Neither did the purchafe 
 <jf a right amount to any thing confiderable, 
 which remaining in the hands of the owner, 
 9 would.
 
 [ '59 3 
 
 would, from his inability to exercife it, have been 
 uielels to him*. 
 
 This (fuppofing foreign interference out of the 
 queftion) would have furnifhed the fenators with 
 an opportunity of introducing into the houfe of 
 nobles, as many of their dependents and creatures 
 as were neceflary to fecure that body in their in- 
 terefts : and as the fen ate was in the pofTefTion of 
 its power for three years, and during that period, 
 had in a great meafure the difpofal of all the 
 pofts and employments in the ftate, whether civil 
 or military, it could by thefe means eftablilh an 
 interefl among the members that were to compofe 
 a future diet, not eafily to be overturned in th« 
 Ihort time this was affembled. It is obvious 
 therefore, that, putting foreign influence out of the 
 queftion, the genius of this government naturally 
 tended to an oligarchy, 
 
 2dly, With regard to the clergy. How far 
 that order of men Ihould be admitted to a fhare 
 in the legiflature of a free country, it may not at 
 prefent be neceflary to enquire. I Ihall only ob- 
 ferve, that from the nature of the church eftablilh- 
 ment in Sweden, it v/as not produftive of fo ma- 
 ny evil ccnlequences there as it might have been 
 in other countries J. 
 
 ^dly. As 
 
 • In a (hort time thefe fullmaghts became a fpecies of mcr- 
 Thandife to be fold to the higheft bidder ; it was neceflary, 
 however, that the purchafer fliould be rather cautious on thefe 
 occafions, as inftances might be produced where the fame 
 fullmaghts had been fold twice over, to the different agents of 
 the oppofite parties. 
 
 I The clergy in Sweden arc perhaps the pooreft in Eu- 
 rope,
 
 [ i6o ] 
 
 3dly, As to the burghers : thefe were cholen by 
 cities and corporate towns, nearly in the fame 
 manner as the members for cities and boroughs 
 are in England ; but then none but burghers, 
 literally fpeaking, and by no means nobles or 
 gentlemen were capable of being ele6led *. 
 
 This exclufive right in merchants and traders 
 of reprefenting cities and towns, feems well enough 
 calculated to give them a certain rank and confe- 
 quence in the ftatej but then it ferved to maintain 
 ' and continue with the utmoft precifion, the dif- 
 tinftion of noble and plebeian. 
 
 Had the younger branches of noble families, 
 been rendered by the conflitution eligible to a 
 feat among the order of burghers, this would 
 probably have' induced many of them to turn 
 their thoughts to commerce j and by that means 
 they might have acquired a property that would 
 have enabled them to becom.e independent mem- 
 bers of the legiflature, inftead of continuing in 
 a chara6ter, in which their poverty rendered their 
 titles and their pride equally ridiculous. 
 
 rope, fo that the nobles or gentry hardly ever think of the 
 church for their profefTions. But as the parifhioners in each 
 diftrift eleft their minifters, this prevents that fervility in the 
 4:lergy which a dependence on particular patrons may crea^f 
 among them in other countries. 
 
 * Burghers in Sweden does not at all convey the fame 
 idea as burgefs does in England ; it implies, literally fpeak- 
 ing, perfons who either are, or have been engaged in trade 
 or commerce : it no wife includes perfons of any other order, 
 who may be frqe of a city. 
 
 4thly, What
 
 t i6i i 
 
 4thly, What has been faid here with regard td 
 the order of burghers, is equally applicable to that 
 of the peafants. 
 
 Thefe too could ele6V their reprefentatives only 
 from their own order. Their deputies were, in 
 the literal fenfe of the word, to be peafants them- 
 felves. 
 
 Nothing furely could be more abfurd, than to 
 allow men a feat in the legiflature, and a voice 
 in the moft important affairs of the nation, who, 
 from their fituation in life> could not poflibly have 
 poflefTed the information requifite for fundions 
 of this kind j who muft have been too ignorant 
 either to devife meafures themfelves beneficial to 
 the ftate> or to judge of their expediency when 
 propofed by others : and laftly, who from the 
 lownefs of their condition, muft have been greatly 
 liable to corruption, as a bribe too infignlficant to 
 have tempted perfons in a more elevated ftation 
 to depart from their duty, might eafily have pre* 
 vailed upon peafants* 
 
 If there was apparently fo much reafoh to ob- 
 je6t to the perfons of whom the ftates were cOm- 
 pofed, there was equal reafon to objeft to their 
 mode of proceeding when aflfembled. The burg- 
 hers and peafants did not, like the knigtits of 
 (hires and burgefles in England, fit together, when 
 elefted, in one houfe ; but each aflfembled apart*. 
 The clergy and nobles had likev/ife their meetings 
 feparate from each other ; {o that the legiflature 
 was compofcd of four diftinfl houfes of parlia* 
 
 M mentj
 
 [ ^62 ] 
 
 ment, as thqr may be termed without impro- 
 priety. 
 
 The affent however of all the four was not ne- 
 cefTary to give force to a law -, that of three of 
 them was, as has been remarked upon a former 
 occafion, fufficient for this purpofe. Hence each 
 component part of the legiflature, did not fingly 
 pofTefs a negative upon the refolutions of the 
 other three, but was obliged to acquiefce in what 
 thefe fhould think proper to ena6b. 
 
 By this means queftions nvight be pafled in the 
 ftates, although the fenfe of the majority of all 
 the members, if taken coUedively, was obvioufly 
 againft them. For inftance, fuppofe one order 
 ftiould unanimoufly rejedt a meaflire, which in 
 each of the other three had been carried only by 
 a fmall majority. This majority might have con- 
 fifted of no more than one or two perfons in each 
 order, and put all together might not amount to 
 above half a dozen. In this cafe it is evident that 
 the votes of thefe half dozen perfons, would out- 
 weigh thofe of a whole order. 
 
 On this account too, it was in the power of a 
 party formed in any three of the ftates, to comie to 
 refolutions, and to ena6l laws, highly detrimental 
 to the intere"ft of the remaining Hate, as well as. 
 to pafe regulations, concerning points, in which 
 the latter only was interefted. 
 
 Thus the nobles who defpifed commerce, the 
 clergy who had no concern with it, and the pea- 
 fants who were totally ignorant of every thing re- 
 lating to it, might pafs a6U which would materir 
 
 ally
 
 t 
 
 t 163 ] 
 
 ally affed it, although the burghers fhould be 
 unanimous in rejecting them. Nor was it extra- 
 ordinary if the four orders when aflembled, appear 
 fometimes to have had little piques and refent- 
 ments towards each other to gratify, when we 
 refle<5t that they belonged to clafies entirely dif- 
 tin6l from each other j and, when the ftates were 
 feparated, feldom or never aflbciating in private 
 life. 
 
 Hitherto I have confidered only fome of the de-» 
 fe6bs of the form of government itfelf, and of the 
 objedlions which might with juftice be ftarted 
 againft the perfons in whofe hand? it placed the 
 legiflature* 
 
 But the great errof committed by the framers 
 of this conftitution> was, that while they paid io 
 much attention to political liberty, that is, to the 
 Ihare the nation was to have in the government j 
 they totally forgot that an equal attention was 
 due to civil liberty, or the freedom of individuals 
 €onfidered in their private capacity. 
 
 It is the full enjoyment of the civil, which at- 
 taches a nation to their political liberties. The in- 
 fluence of the former, extends itfelf over the whole 
 fociety, the meaneft member of whicli partakes 
 of the benefits it difFufes. The immediate advan- 
 tages refulting from the latter, fall to the lot of, 
 comparatively fpeaking, a very fmall portion of 
 the nation. 
 
 We are not however to attribute it altogether 
 to negledt, if the framers of the late Swedilh con- 
 ftitution did not pay the fame attention to the 
 private rights of individuals, as to the political 
 
 M 3 liberty
 
 [ J64 I 
 
 liberty of the nation. The latter had been efla* 
 bliihed of a fudden, or at leaft the form of govern- 
 ment was fo eftablifhed which was defigned to 
 introduce it. But thofe laws which have civil 
 liberty, or perfonal fafety and fecurity of private 
 property for their objects, cannot perhaps be de- 
 vifed and reduced to pra<5lice with equal expedi- 
 tion. Thefe are in general the refult of experi- 
 ence, and it is only after frequent trials that they 
 have been brought to a fufficient degree of per- 
 fedion to anfwer the purpofes for which they 
 were intended. 
 
 The immediate introdudlion therefore of fuch 
 laws, among a people not fitted to receive them, 
 was perhaps a talk which exceeded the abilities 
 of thofe who had framed the new conftitution of 
 Sweden j or, content with what they had done 
 towards eftablilhing political liberty, they feem 
 to have left private freedom to the care of their 
 pofterity. The confequence was, that the change 
 in that government, produced little or none in 
 the fituation of the great body of the people. 
 They ft ill found themfelves expofed to the fame 
 oppreffion as before, and could not therefore have 
 any reafon to be fatisfied with an alteration in the 
 one, which was productive of no improvement in 
 the other. 
 
 Befides, their prejudices were all in favour of 
 that government to which they had been accuf- 
 tomed. The number of great and able princes 
 who had fate upon their throne, by attaching 
 them to their monarch, infenfibly attached thera 
 to their monarchy likewife. Their national 
 
 vanity
 
 [ '6s ] 
 
 vanity had been flattered by the great reputation 
 many of their fovereigns had acquired i by the 
 luftrc thefe had given to the Swedifti arms j and 
 by the glory which they conceived the vidlories 
 of thefe princes had reftefted upon their country. 
 The miferies they had fuffered from the ambition 
 or defpotifm of their kings, were in a few years 
 forgotten. But their pride did not fuffer the ex- 
 ploits of a Guftavus Adolphus, or of a Charles 
 the Xllth, to fink into equal oblivion. 
 
 The memory of Charles is ftill rooted in the 
 mind of every Swede. He is known among them 
 only by the name of the great king : and thofe 
 who recolle(5t the having feen him in their child- 
 hood, ftill fpeak of him with tears in their eyes. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Progrefs of corruption^ and of the French influence 
 in Sweden j change of fyflem in the Diet of the 
 year 1738; and fome of the mofi remarkable 
 tr an factions of that held in 1756. 
 
 WE may have obferved in the preceding 
 fedion, that the framers of the late Swe- 
 difh conftitution, had not only confined the power 
 of the crown within the narrowed limits, but had 
 likewife taken every precaution that a dear-bought 
 experience could fuggeft to them, to guard againft 
 the influence it might acquire through corrup- 
 tion. 
 
 M J Bjr
 
 [ i«6 ] 
 
 By placing their liberties beyond the reach of 
 any attacks open or indiredt on the part of their 
 fovereigns, they innagined they had effeftually fe- 
 ' cured them, and quite forgot they had left a door 
 open for another fpecies of corruption, one equal- 
 ly fatal to liberty, but in its confequences infinite- 
 ly more ruiqous to the country j I mean that 
 proceeding from foreign powers. 
 
 Foreign corruption, while it is as fatal to the 
 liberties of a free people, as that proceeding from 
 their fovereign could be, is alfo more ruinous to 
 the interefls of the kingdom, and at the fame 
 time without a remedy. Who is to punifh cor- 
 ruption in fenators, or check the progrefs of it 
 ^mong them, if the executive is lodged in the fe- 
 nate ? Who is to punilh it in the members of the 
 ftatc, when the ftates themfeves are corrupted ? In 
 ^ limited monarchy, on the contrary, when pro- 
 perly conftituted, the prince not only is above be-^ 
 ing tempted by foreign bribes, but, however he 
 may be inclined to make ufe of corruption himfelf, 
 he certainly will not fuffer foreign powers to ac- 
 quire by that means an influence among fuch of 
 his fubjeds, as are members of the legiflature. 
 But what was the cafe in Sweden ? the king it is 
 true was there deprived of the means of corrupting 
 himfelf the members of the legiflature, but he 
 was likewife divefted of all power which could 
 enable him to prevent foreign corruption from 
 fpreading itfelf among them. While he was fo 
 ftreightened in his finances, as well as limited 'in 
 his authority •, while he had fo little fhare in di- 
 * reding
 
 tT 167 ] 
 
 rcfting the public meafures, and a portion fp 
 fmall of the advantages which might refult from 
 the profperity of the kingdom; there hardly feem- 
 ed to be a Tingle circumflance in his fituation, 
 which could ferve to conneft his interefls with 
 thofe of the nation. And at the fame time, the 
 poverty of thofe who were entrufted with a fhare 
 in. the government, was fuch, as naturally rendered 
 them open to corruption, from whatever cjuarter 
 it might come, and apologized for what they muft 
 otherwife have blufhed to own. 
 
 This ftate of affairs in Sweden could not re- 
 main long unobferved by foreign potentates; who 
 would naturally take all the advantages it afford- 
 ed them, for acquiring fuch a degree of influence 
 . in that country, as fuited their political views and 
 interefts. 
 
 Among thefe, France took the lead. The bufy 
 . reftlefs fpirit of intrigue which charadlerizes the 
 policy of the cabinet of Verfailles, was no-whcFc 
 more confpicuous in its effeds than in Sweden. 
 Having loft that weight in the fcale, and afcen- 
 dency in the affairs of Europe of which flie was 
 once pofleffed, it feems to be now the objedft of 
 France to acquire by artifice and corruption, that . 
 influence among the other European powers, 
 which her real fuperiority over them had former- 
 ly given her. 
 
 Hence her emiffaries at foreign courts are per- 
 petually carrying on intrigues there, fometimes in 
 order to effecfb internal revolutions; fometimes to 
 promote dilfentions between neighbouring powers, 
 
 M 4 and
 
 L i68 ] 
 
 * and by that means kindle a war ; but always fop 
 the purpofe of checking the profperity of fuch, 
 as are become the objefts of her jealoiify. 
 
 Never was a country more egregioufly duped 
 by another, than Sweden has been by France, 
 from the time of their being firft connefted. I 
 believe it would be fcarcely poffible to produce a 
 fingle advantage which has refulted to the former, 
 from her union with the latter j whilft the lofles 
 fhe has fuftained in confequence of it, have been 
 frequent and manifeft. Neither is it eafy to con- 
 ceive why France Ihould intereft herfelf fo much 
 in the affairs of this northern kingdom, but upon 
 the principle juft now mentioned, in order to be 
 able whenever flie {houid think proper, to create 
 an enemy to another northern potentate, whofe 
 rapid rife into power and confequence, fhe could 
 not behold without envy. 
 
 But if Sweden has been duped by France, the 
 latter country certainly has been no lefs miftaken, 
 in her policy with regard to the very objeft of her 
 alliance with the former. 
 
 The circumftances which might have once ren- 
 dered a connexion between thefe two countries 
 advantageous to both, have long ceafed to exift. 
 Since that time the face of affairs in the northern 
 part of Europe has undergone a total change; 
 and confequently, in the political interefts of the 
 countries fituated there, an equal alteration muft 
 have taken place. 
 
 It was in the reign of Guflavus Vafa, that the 
 firfl treaty of alliance between Sweden and France 
 
 took
 
 I 169 3 
 
 took place. I mention this, becaufe it is not at 
 all improbable that the opinion of fo great and 
 wife a prince as Guftaviis, with refped to the 
 choice of an ally, may have been the groundwork of 
 the preference afterwards given upon all occafions 
 by his countrymen to France. But nothing could 
 be more obvious than the reafons which induced 
 that prince to form a French alliance, nor any- 
 thing more evident than that they were only of a 
 temporary nature, and ought not confequently to 
 have been produdive of a connexion that was 
 to laft longer than thefe fhould fubfift. Charles 
 the Vth, emperor of Germany, had conceived the 
 defign of placing Frederic count Palatine upon 
 the northern thrones ; it was, therefore, very na- 
 tural that Guflavus lliould conned himfelf with 
 the Prince who was the declared enemy of Charles, 
 and fuch a one he found in Francis the Ift. A 
 union with England would certainly have ulti- 
 mately proved more advantageous to his country, 
 and Guftavus might probably have been of that 
 opinion ; but the ficklenefs of the temper of 
 Henry the Vlllth rendered him an ally by no 
 means to be confided in. 
 
 This m.onarch was befides clofely connecfted 
 with the emperor, at the time Guftavus wanted 
 to ftrengthen himfelf againft the attacks of the 
 Imperial power : and confonant to his wild fyf- 
 tem of politicks, Henry had aftually purchafed 
 Denmark, with which country Guftavus was then 
 in clofe alliance, of the Hanfe towns, (though 
 thefe only meditated the conqueft of it) and ad- 
 vanced
 
 [ i7d 1 
 -¥anced 20,000 crowns of what he had ftipulated 
 to pay when delivery Ihould be made. Thefe 
 reafons were therefore fufficient to determine 
 Guilavns in his choice of the French alliance, 
 which he conceived the fituation of his affairs 
 rendered it neceffary he fhould form. 
 
 Sweden next entered into a fubfidiary treaty 
 with France, in -the reign of Guftavus Adolphus. 
 
 The ot»je£l of France was, at that time, to hum- 
 ble the houfe of Auftria, and for this purpofe ihe 
 could not, as Europe was then circumftanced, 
 have pitched upon a fitter inftrument than the 
 Swedifh monarch. 
 
 When Guftavus invaded the empire, he was 
 the moft powerful fovereign of the north. Ruflla 
 ftill continued in a ftate of barbarifm, and confe- 
 quently of infignificance ; and the petty Elefto- 
 rate of Brandenburg, had not as yet ftarted up in- 
 to a potent kingdom. It was, therefore, perfedt- 
 ly confiftent with the ufual policy of Richlicu, to 
 form an alliance with, perhaps, the only power 
 then both willing and capable of abetting his 
 defigns againft the emperor. 
 
 But as the preference given to France as an 
 ally, by Guftavus Vafa, feems ever after to have 
 biafled the Swedes in favour of that country, fo 
 the fucceflbrs in office of Richlieu appear, with 
 refpe(fl to the Swedifti fyftem to have followed 
 -the example of that great minifter, and probably 
 for no other reafon than becaufe this was a fyftem 
 that had been adopted by him. Both parties for- 
 getting that different jun<5lures and new arrange- 
 ments
 
 [ 171 ] 
 
 -ments of power required their purluing a difFerent 
 •policy ; and that what was perfedly wife in one 
 •fituation of things, might become as abfurd in 
 another. 
 
 Thus when Sweden had nothing to dread from 
 
 Ruflia, and held the Eleftors of Brandenburg in 
 
 contempt, flie might have afforded to France thfe 
 
 moft powerful aid againfl: the encroaching fpirit 
 
 'of the Houfe of Aultria j and the Swedilh mo- 
 
 narchs, by mp\ns of French fubfidies, might have 
 
 'indulged their pafTion for war at ho great ex- 
 
 ' pence to their country. When this was the cafe, 
 
 -a union between Sweden and France was founded 
 
 'in the foundeft policy. 
 
 But when afterwards the fituation of the North 
 -of Europe had undergone a total change; when 
 Sweden from being the firft became one of the 
 jnoft infignificant of the northern powers ; when 
 the little electorate of Brandenburg, had become 
 a great kingdom, alone fufficiently potent to bar 
 ' the progrefs of the Swedes into Germany, beyond 
 "their own infignificant province of Pomerania ; 
 when an immenfe empire bordering upon Sweden, 
 • from which fhe had before little or nothing to ap- 
 prehend, burfting from obfcurity into power and 
 ' confequence, by the mofl rapid progrefs from 
 "barbarifm to civilization of which the hiflory of 
 mankind can furnifli an example, became an ad- 
 verfary to Sweden far too formidable for her de- 
 clining flrength i tin adverfary, with whom it was 
 impofTible that Sweden could alone contend, 
 while it was equally impoflible fhe could for that 
 2 purpofe
 
 I »72 1 
 purpofc receive any efFeaual afllftance from her 
 French ally: furely under thefe circumflances, 
 the connexion between France and Sweden could 
 not anfwer any of thofe ends, which either party 
 might formerly have expeded to obtain by it. 
 
 The idea which the cabinet of Verfaillcs might 
 have entertained of rendering Sweden a thorn in 
 the fide of Ruffia, was in itfelf a miftaken one j 
 for the fowing of diflcntion between thofe two 
 powers was, in fad, only giving the latter a pre- 
 text to make conquefts upon the former, and 
 therefore ferved but to augment the power of that 
 potentate, to reduce whofe ftrength and impor- 
 tance, could be the fole objedb of the immenfe 
 fums privately fpent by France in corrupting the 
 Swedes j whilfl the fubfidjes thefe publicly receiv- 
 ed, were both too infignificant, and too ill paid, 
 to compenfate for the lofTes the nation neceflarily 
 fuflained from being at enmity with Ruflia*. 
 
 • Notwithftanding the predileflion entertained by Chrlftina 
 for France, it was a maxim with that Princefs, as well as with 
 Charles the Xlth, that Sweden (hould no more form an al- 
 liance with that country. In a letter written by C harles to 
 the fenators, during an illnefs from which he did not expeft 
 to recover, he exprefles himfelf thus : — " As I am well in- 
 *' formed that among the fenators whom 1 have appointed 
 *' guardians to my fon thfi Prince Charles, as well as among 
 *• the remainder of the fenators, there are many who are en- 
 *• tirely devoted to France, I cannot refrain from exhorting 
 ** them to continue firmly attached to thofe alliances I have 
 ** concluded : as I find them the furefl and moll advantagc- 
 *• ous for Sweden. France has deceived me once, and I 
 *' would, therefore, never again have recourfe to her." 
 
 Hence
 
 t '73 1 
 
 Hence we may with juflice afErm, that if a 
 French alliance, proved on many occafions, highly 
 injurious to the interefls of Sweden, France was 
 in her turn equally miftaken in the policy, which 
 induced her to conned herfelf with that country. 
 In this policy however fhe ftill perfifted ; and from 
 the momen t the late Swedifh form of government 
 was eftablilhed, fhe bent all her endeavours to 
 create to herfelf fuch a parry in Sweden, as might 
 enable her to govern that country with the fame 
 eafe as fhe did one of her own provinces. 
 
 When the framers of the late Swedifh conflitu- 
 tion gave a new government to their country, 
 they at the fame time adopted a new fyflem with 
 refpefb to foreign politicks. They had opened 
 their eyes to the change wrought in the fituation 
 of fome of the powers which furrounded them. 
 The miferies they had experienced from the re- 
 cent wars of Charles the Xllth, rendered peace 
 abfolutely necefTary to the flate. They faw plainly 
 that the armies of RufTia were no longer com- 
 pofed of thofe foldiers, twenty thoufand of whom 
 after the battle of Narva, had furrendered at dif- 
 cretion to no more than eight thoufand Swedes. 
 They perceived the immenfe power that empire 
 had fuddenly acquired, to cultivate the friendfhip 
 of which, they confidered as the only means 
 of obtaining fecurity to themfelvcs. The power 
 too of PrulTia formed a new barrier againfl every 
 attempt they fhould make at recovering the lofTes 
 Sweden had fuflained on the fide of Germany. 
 Thus circumflanccd, they apprehended an alliance 
 widi France could be of no farther fervice to 
 
 them.
 
 [ 174 } 
 
 them, but might, on the contrary, plunge thprii 
 into freih difficulties. 
 
 To maintain therefore a clofe correfpondencei 
 with Ruflia, and to continue on good terms with 
 all their neighbours, appeared to count Horn * 
 and his coadjutors, not only, as the wifeft po- 
 licy they could purfue, but as that which 
 the diflreil ftate of their country had rendered it 
 abfolutely neceffary for them to adopt. 
 
 To this fyftem Sweden continued firm till the year 
 1738 : it was then that the fruits of the intrigues 
 of France, began firft to difcover themfelves, and 
 that a total, and moft certainly unfortunate change 
 in the politicks of the Swedes took place. 
 
 Thofe defefts in their form of government, of 
 which I have already taken notice, gave to France 
 but too favourable opportunities of employing 
 corruption among them in the moft eifedtual 
 planner. 
 
 The confequence of this corruption was, that 
 in the diet aflembled in 1738, a moft powerful 
 party appeared in favour of French meafures* 
 The perfons who compofed it went under the de- 
 nomination of Hats. The obje6t they held 
 out to the nation, was the recovery of fome of 
 the dominions yielded to Ruffia^ and confequently 
 the fyftem they were to proceed upon, was to 
 break with that power, and conned themfelves 
 with France. 
 
 The party direftly oppofite to them was headed 
 
 • Count Horn was the perfon principally concerned in the 
 tllabliilunent of the late conititution. 
 
 by
 
 [ '7ir 3 
 
 by count Horn, and thoie who had contributed 
 to eflablifh the new form of government. 
 
 Their obje6t was peace, and the promoting of: 
 the domeflick welfare of the nation. The fyftem 
 therefore which they adopted, was to maintainj 
 a clofe correfpondence with RuITia, and to avoid 
 all farther connedtion with France. Thefe were 
 ftiled the Caps. There was befides a third party, 
 called the Hunting Caps, compofed of perfon^ 
 who were as yet undetermined to which, of th<9> 
 other two they would join themlelves. 
 
 In this diet, which, contrary to cuftom, con- 
 tinued fitting eleven months, the Hats fbon 
 appeared to have a very great majority ; and the 
 event was, that an end was put to the virtuous 
 adminiftration of count Horn and his colleagues j 
 their pacific fyftem was overturned, and the 
 French party afiumed the whole direction of the 
 public affairs. 
 
 A war with Ruflia, as muft have been expelled, 
 foon afterwards enfued. This, from the begin-r 
 ning, was attended by nothing but lofles and mis- 
 fortunes J. 
 
 The 
 
 X The time at which the ruling party in Sweden, in its wl(^ 
 Jom, thought proper to commence hoftilities againft Ruflia, 
 was when the latter power was in profound peace, and confe- 
 quently at liberty to exert her whole ftrength to repel the 
 impotent attacks of the former. In order to delude the nation 
 into thia war, it was faid the fenate tranfmitted to the Swedifti 
 minifter at Peterfburg, ready-made minutes of the reports he 
 was to fend back to Sweden ; and thefe were fuch as were cal- 
 culated to create among the Swedes a belief that the armie* 
 of Ruflia had been almoft ruined by her late war with thp 
 
 Turks,
 
 [ 176 ] 
 
 The Swedilh army in Finland was totally de-* 
 ftroyed, and the whole of that country loft. The 
 unfortunate generals who commanded there^ 
 count Lewenhaupt and baron Buddenbrog paid 
 the forfeit of their lives j not for their own mif- 
 condudt, but for the madnefs and infatuation of 
 thofe who promoted a war, to which Sweden was 
 by no means equal ; and which confequently in a 
 fhort time, compelled the Swedes to fue for peace 
 upon whatever terms the enemy fhould think 
 proper to impofe. 
 
 Thefe were the firft fruits of the French influ- 
 ence in the Swedifh diets, after the eftabliih- 
 ment of the late form of government. 
 
 I fhall now haften to fome of the principal 
 tranfaftions of the diet 1756, as they will ferve to 
 give the reader a full idea of the manner in which 
 the Swedifh conftitution was adminiftred, of the 
 abufes that then crept into it, and of the encroach^ 
 ments by the Hats upon the royal authority ; au- 
 thority, which it has been already obferved, was 
 originally infufficient to anfwer any ufeful pur- 
 pofe to the government, but which, in this diet> 
 was reduced almoft to nothing. 
 
 After the ftates were aflembled, one of the firft 
 fubjedts of difpute between them and the king, 
 was of fo curious a nature, in itfelf fo trivial, 
 yet confidered by the diet as an affair of fo much 
 importance, that it merits a particular relation. 
 
 Turks. And baron Buddenbrog, who was fent into Finland 
 to infpeft the (late of that country, it may be prefumeJ, had 
 inftruftions to make fuch reprefentations of it as favoured th« 
 martial defigas of the perfons in power. 
 
 However
 
 [ 177 ] 
 
 However a people may be defirous of limiting 
 the authority of their fovereign, in thofe points 
 which relate to the prefervation of their liberties, 
 there are others properly belonging to his private 
 concerns, in which it were illiberal, if not indecent, 
 for his fubjefts to interfere. But the Swedes feem to 
 have thought otherwife, and they adled accordingly. 
 From the time that the French party in 1738, had 
 got pofleflion of the reins of government, they 
 appear to have confidered it as no wife incumbent 
 on them to keep any meafures with the court. Not 
 content with continually impofing frefh reflraints 
 upon the regal power, they refolved to reduce the 
 fituation of the king, to an abfolute ftate of pupil- 
 age, in which he was to have neither will nor pro- 
 perty of his own. 
 
 Early in the diet, the flates prefented a very 
 fingular addrefs to his majefly. The purport of it 
 was. That whereas by the thirteenth article of the 
 ordinance of the year 1723, the flates were to exa- 
 mine into the condition of the jewels and move- 
 ables belonging to the crown, as well fuch as 
 were in the king's treafury, as thofe that were pre- 
 fented to the queen || at Berlin, upon his majefly's 
 marriage, for the ufe of his royal confort; they 
 therefore begged to know when it would be con- 
 venient to her majefty, that the above-mentioned 
 jewels fliould be vifited by fome deputies from 
 their body, and compared with the inventories 
 made of them. 
 
 I) The late king married the princcfs Lquifa Ulrika, fiilcr 
 to the prefent kiog of PruiSa. 
 
 N i^
 
 [ 1^8 ] 
 
 It lis true by the article above alluded to, the 
 Hates were vefted with the power claimed by them 
 upon this occafion ; but it was a power which had 
 never beert'^^ercifed, and was probably never in- 
 tended to be foj but in cafe of a minority or a va- 
 cancy of the throne, when it was proper fuch a 
 power fhouM be lodged fomewhei-e, to prevent 
 the embezzlement of the effefts belonging to the 
 crown. At any other time to claim the exercife 
 of it furely betrayed the mofl illiberal fufpicions 
 on the part of the Itates, and placed the fovereign 
 in the molt humiliating point of view. But to ex- 
 amine into the ftate of thofe jewels which had been 
 given to her majefty as a marriage-prefent from 
 the king, was certainly a demand as much beneath 
 the dignity of the Hates, as it mufl have been 
 mortifying to the queen *. 
 
 Her majefty accordingly refufed to fubmit to 
 fuch a rewiew of the jewels, which, faidfhe, in her 
 anfwer to the requeft of the ftates, " fcems to arife 
 " from fome diftruft in the ftates of the kingdoms'* 
 but ftie added, " I ftiall let the two members of 
 *' the fecret committee know my thoughts, that I 
 " defign to have the jewels in queftion feparated 
 " from my own, and fo to deliver them up to the 
 " ftates, becaufe from that hour I account my- 
 " felf too good to wear them.'* 
 
 * The faft was with refpefl to thefe jewels, that Mr. Teffin, 
 the Swedlfh ambaflador at Berlin, had prefented them to the 
 queen only in the name of the king, and fhe confequently 
 confidered them as her own. It certainly never could 
 iiave occurred to a foreign princefs, that a marriage- 
 gift was to be confidered by the nation merely as a truft, of 
 wMch (he was upon demand to give an account. 
 
 -' \ This
 
 [ 179 ] 
 
 This was produdVive of a moft ferious remori- 
 ftrance on the part of the ftates, which I fhall give 
 here at full length, as it will ferve to convey a 
 perfeft idea of their mode of proceeding, and of 
 the fituation of the king. 
 
 *' The ftates cannot any longer conceal from 
 " your majefty, what they muft unavoidably have 
 " obferved, that the queen does not view them in 
 ** the light in which they ought to be confidered, 
 " as ftates in pofleflion of power, as well as faith- 
 " ful fubje6ls of your majefty ; and as thofe very 
 ** ftates that raifed your majefty to fo glorious a 
 " rank among kings, and who moft willingly offer 
 " for your majefty's and the kingdom's united 
 " goodj their lives and fortunes whenever occafions 
 " ftiall require. 
 
 *' The queen's carriage towards the ftates has 
 ** been accompanied likewife by a contempt for 
 ** the fenators and other officers of the king- 
 ** dom *, moft confpicuoufly ftiewn in a condud: 
 '* founded on caprice, and which pays no refpe6t 
 " to the dignity of peifons ; as if there were any 
 
 • This pretended contempt for the fenators and other officers 
 of the kingdom, was nothing more than an order given by 
 the king about a year before, that no coaches fhould drive 
 into the inner court of the palace, except thofe of the royal 
 family. The firft perfons who were Hopped were the fenators 
 ladies. The fenators were prudent enough not to complain 
 upon their own account, but they prevailed upon the French 
 ambaffador to attempt to drive in likewife, and upon his being 
 flopped, to make his complaint to the fenate ; who upon this 
 refolved, that all perfons of a certain rank then fpecified« 
 fhould enjoy that important priviUgt* 
 
 N 2 ' !* ©thgr
 
 [ i8o ] 
 
 " other fidelity and merit than obedience to the 
 " laws, or any other marks of dignity or reward, 
 " than thofe which your majelly's juftice diftri- 
 " butes among your faithful fubjeds. 
 
 " The general affembly of the ftates, as well as 
 *' the whole kingdom are convinced, that your 
 " majefty thoroughly diflikes thefe proceedings : 
 " they defire no happier government than what 
 " your majefty's kind and fatherly difpofition 
 "promifes them; but, when things contrary to 
 " this dilpofition are tranfa6led fo near the throne, 
 " it cannot but occafion refledtions among fo- 
 *' reigncrs, as well as uneafinefs and trouble within 
 " the realm. Your majefty's wifdom cannot fail 
 " to obferve, that examples thus imprinted upon 
 " the tender minds of the hereditary princes, who 
 ** inftead of acquiring a love for the nation, for a 
 ** free people, and an efteem for fidelity and merit, 
 " are. taught to look upon other men as born to 
 " be miferable for their plcafure ; and as happy or 
 " unhappy, well or ill intentioned, according to 
 ** the favours . or difgraces- they meet with at 
 " court. 
 
 " The queen came into this kingdom to be 
 ^' your majefty's confort, not to add to the weight 
 *^ of government. 
 
 , " This weight ought the more eafily to be borne 
 " by fo gracious and juft a king, as your majefty 
 ** pofTelTes the moft fovereign power and the 
 " fureft reward in the hearts of your fubjeds. 
 ^* When therefore by-ways are taken by any other 
 *' perfon, contrary to the engagements your ma- 
 **, jiefty has entered into before God and the king- 
 9 " dom,
 
 [ tu ] 
 
 " dom, and confequently againft your views and 
 '* intentions, they tend either to make two go- 
 " vernments in the kingdom, the one with, and the 
 " other without law; or a king without conftitu- 
 ** tional direftion, and laws without power. 
 
 " But of all that has appeared, nothing was 
 " more unexpedled, than that a declaration fhould 
 *' be made in writing by her majefty, in which fhe 
 " fays, that fhe looks upon the defire of the fecret 
 " committee to review the jewels, as the effeds of 
 " diftruft, and concludes with thefe words : That 
 " jfhe thinks herfelf too good to wear them for 
 " the future. 
 
 " It. is not cuftomary, nor indeed agreeable to 
 *' our form of government, to take notice of any 
 " communication or correfpondence between the 
 '' queen and the ftates of the kingdom, concern- 
 " ing the affairs of the diet. But when the 
 " ftates have done nothing to draw upon them- 
 " felves fuch expreflions from her majefty, and 
 " a writing falls into their hands, which con- 
 ''* tains fo public a contempt for the government, 
 " it does not become their dignity to be filent : 
 " though what the ftates ftiall in this cafe think fit 
 " to do, is not to be applied to other occafions, 
 " or to become a precedent hereafter, as the ge- 
 ** neral affembly of the ftates hopes, and will alfo 
 ** take care, that what now gives occafion to thefe 
 ** proceedings, ftiall never happen again." 
 
 After dwelling fome time upon their right to 
 make the review in queftion, their remonftrance 
 concludes thus : 
 
 " The ftates defire no change in your majefty's 
 N 3 "fentiments
 
 [ l82 ] 
 
 *' fentiments towards the queen your confort j but 
 " very much that her majefty fhould change her 
 *^ fentiments towards the kingdom. 
 
 " They afk nothing more than that your ma- 
 '* jefly may be left quietly to make your fubjefts 
 ** happy, and your reign glorious j and therefore 
 " wilh that a perfon whofe welfare is fo nearly 
 " connefted with your majefly's, might conftantly 
 '* poflefs their moll humble refped: and devo- 
 " tion. 
 
 ** With regard to thefe matters, the whole af- 
 *' fembly of the ftates humbly confide in your ma- 
 " jefty's paternal care, glad not to Jiand in need of 
 '* thofe means, which God and their right have 
 *' otherwife given them. 
 
 '* Your majefty 's engagements with the king- 
 " dom are your firft and moft important en- 
 " gagements j from the obfervance of them, a 
 *' whole nation is to exped its welfare i and upon 
 " that too depends the happinefs of pofterity. 
 
 " The conftitution muft be maintained j and 
 ** thus will your majefty be freed from a variety of 
 " cares i and the country and its inhabitants will 
 " then fully enjoy the fruits of fo worthy a 
 ** prince's government." 
 
 So ferious a remonftrance as this, required on 
 the part of the king, as ferious an apology for 
 what appeared to have given the ftates fo much 
 offence. 
 
 He aflured them of the fentiments of love and 
 cfteem which her majefty entertained for the 
 nation, and endeavoured to foften the harftinefs 
 of fome of the expreffions ihe had ufed in 
 
 her
 
 [ i«3 ] 
 
 her letter to the ftates, by attributing it to 
 their being made in a language flie did not fuf- 
 ficiently underftand : but he ftill infifted, that as 
 her majefty had worn the crown jewels for upwards 
 of ten years without fuch a review as that in 
 queftion, having ever been thought of by the 
 Hates during all that time, her majefty could not 
 but confider their conduct on the prefent occafion, 
 as arifing from a diftruft, which touched her ho- 
 nour in the moft fenfible manner. He farther 
 declared, that as to the jewels which had in his 
 name been given to her majefty at Berlin, Ihe 
 could not but look upon them as her own, ac- 
 cording to one of the articles of the marriage- 
 
 agreement. 
 
 One would have imagined this wretched af- 
 fair would have ended here i but upon receiving 
 this anfwer, the ftates fent up another remonftrance 
 to prove that the jewels prefented to her majefty 
 at Berlin as a marriage-gift, were jewels of the 
 kingdom, and therefore infifted on the review of 
 them. In this fecond remonftrance was the fol- 
 lowing curious paflage, reflefting on the fuppofed 
 influence of the queen : " The ftates beg that 
 " your majefty, without being difturbed, may be 
 *' mafter of your court, and king of your king- 
 *' dom ; and finally, they beg ( with humility ) 
 " that all farther correfpondence upon this and the 
 ** like matter may ceafe *. 
 
 N 4 Having 
 
 * The fecret hiftory of the ftates making the rcviewal of the 
 jewels fo fcrious an affair was this : The ruling party had 
 been informed, that fomc of the queen's jewels were pkdged 
 
 at
 
 [ i84 ] 
 
 Having carried this point, fo mortifying tJo the 
 king, the ftates proceeded to further exertions of 
 power, of a nature ftill more perfonally vexatious 
 to him. 
 
 His majefty had appointed a fub-governor to 
 the prince royal. He imagined, that with regard 
 to his own family at leaft, he might be at liberty 
 to chufe the'perfons that were to be immediately 
 about himfelf and his children. But this was 
 deemed too important a privilege to be intrufted 
 in the royal hands. The ftates Ihortly came to a 
 refolution, that the office of fub-governor to his 
 royal highnefs, Ihould be abolifhed. Their letter 
 to his majefty upon this occafion, is fufficiently 
 curious to be inferted here. Nothing can give a 
 more ample idea of the peremptory humility which 
 accompanied their requefts to the throne. It was 
 as follows : 
 
 ** Moft mighty and moft potent King, 
 
 *^ Having deliberated upon the affair of educa- 
 '■ tion, which is of fo much importance to your 
 *^ majefty and the kingdom, it has appeared to us, 
 " among other things, that the office of fub-go- 
 " vernor to his R. H. is unneceffary ; the ftates 
 " muft therefore, with fubmiffion, reprefent, that 
 ** fuch an eftabliffiment is altogether unufual in 
 " this kingdom^ and that what is praftifed in other 
 
 at Hamburgh, and their great objeft in obfiging her immedi- 
 ately to redeem them was, to deprive her by that means of the 
 money which they apprehended {he might be able to raife for 
 the fupport of the court party in the Diet. 
 
 A young lady about the queen betrayed the fecret of the 
 jewels, for which fhe got a penfion from the ftates. 
 
 " countries^
 
 t «8J ] 
 
 *' couatries, Sannot be applicable to a kingdom 
 *« which has different principles of government 
 *• from thofe countries. 
 
 " In the opinion of the ftates, as long as the 
 " governor is in health and vigour to perform what 
 *' is cntrufled to his care, the office of fub-gover- 
 *' nor can hardly be produftive of any advantage, 
 " but may very probably of fome inconveni- 
 *' ence. 
 
 " The ftates, in all fubmiffion, refpefl the carc- 
 " ful and tender views which have given rife to 
 ** this eftablifhnnent of your majefty's ; but they 
 " truft that they Ihew the fame refpedful and fub- 
 " miflive fentiments in giving their moft earneft 
 " advice, that the above-mentioned office of fub- 
 " governor, may be entirely fuppreffed for the 
 " future. 
 
 *' Befide which, the ftates moft humbly defire, 
 ** according to the right given them by the form 
 *' of government, that no new eftabliffiments may 
 ^' be made without their knowledge, in what re- 
 ^' lates to the education of the princes j and that 
 ** no perfons be changed otherwife than in the in- 
 ^* ftru<5tion to the governor." 
 
 The ftates had no fooner aboliihed the office of 
 fub-governor, than an addrefs appeared on their 
 part to his majefty, containing an order, in the 
 form of a requeft. That Mr. VonDalin ftiould be 
 difmifled from his office of preceptor to the prince 
 royal. They laid no particular crime to his charge, 
 and it ever continued a fecret what they had to 
 alledge againft him. But he was notwithftanding 
 for the future to be refufed all manner of inter- 
 
 courlc
 
 [ 1^6 ] 
 
 -courTc with his R. H. and to abftain rrom goings 
 to court till farther orders. Two days after this 
 another remonflrance was made to the king, in 
 confequence of his anfwer to a former one, on the 
 occalion of the fecret committee's having chofen 
 fenator SchefFer to be propofed to the ftates gene- 
 ral for the office of governor to the prince royal. 
 
 The purport of his majelly's anfwer was, that 
 though he was no lefs perfuaded than the ftates, 
 of the good qualities of the fenator Scheffer, yet 
 he could not confent, nor declare it to be his 
 pleafure, that the above-mentioned fenator fhould 
 be chofen governor to his fon, as the appointing to 
 that office, was a right, which by the third article 
 of the form of government was clearly vetted in 
 him. 
 
 Nothing can illuftrate more fully what I have 
 had occafion to obferve concerning this form of 
 government, than the reply of the fecret com- 
 . mittee. 
 
 ** The ftates of the kingdom, (faid they) are le- 
 ** giflators, and polTefs power i two qualifications 
 *' by which they are marked out in the form of 
 " government. 
 
 " But both the legiflature and the power would 
 « be without effeft, if obftacles or refiftance 
 " could prevent the execution of them j or if the 
 " fentiments of the legiilators were fubjed to the. 
 ** controul of any one elfe. His majefty has for 
 •* this reafon, obliged himfelf by a folemn oath, 
 ** always to agree with the ftates aflembled, ac- 
 " cording to the words of the fifth article of the 
 
 ** royal
 
 [ i87 1 
 
 ** royal aflurances j fo that their ads arc, or ought 
 " to be, his majefty's pleafure, &c. &c. 
 
 This is literally tranflated. It is obfcurely 
 worded, but the meaning of it is fufEciently evi- 
 dent, and I think requires no comment. 
 
 Accordingly the ftates proceeded not only to 
 appoint a governor to the prince royal, but like- 
 wife to nominate the attendants upon his royal 
 highnefs's perfon. The king was obliged on this 
 occafion, as on every other, to acquiefce. 
 
 After thefe inftances p( the plenitude of power 
 alTumed by the ftates, and of the impotence of 
 the royal authority, it might have feemed unne- 
 ceffary to lay any frefh reftraints upon an autho- 
 rity already fo confined. 
 
 But the object of the next ftep taken by the 
 flates, feemed to be totally to annihilate the rem- 
 nants of the few privileges the crown had hitherto 
 heen fufFered to poflefs. 
 
 Some time after the above-mentioned tranfac- 
 tions, they prefented an humble addrefs to his ma- 
 jefty, containing an humble requeft, that upon 
 fome occafions, where the king's fignature had hi- 
 therto been requifite to the difpatching of certain 
 affairs i inftead of fuch fignature, a ftamp left in 
 the hands of the fenators, Ihould for the future 
 be made ufe of. 
 
 This addrefs fet forth, that according to the 
 fixteenth article of the form of government, (hould 
 the king be upon a journey, or fo ill that he could 
 not be troubled with public bufmefs, in that cafe, 
 the fenators ought to fign fuch difpatches as do 
 not adn^it of any delay. That by the twentieth 
 
 articlt
 
 [ i88 ] 
 
 article of the ordinance of 1723, it was incum- 
 bent upon the fenators, if the king fhould defer 
 ligning longer than the importance of the bufinefs 
 could admit of, to lign themfelves, whatever the 
 ftates general fent to his majefty to be executed 
 by him. That there were more caufes t\i2,nfick- 
 Tiefs or ahfence which might prevent the king's 
 figning what was prefented to him for that purpofe i 
 and that there were other affairs befide thofe re- 
 folved upon by the ilates general, which were of 
 Sufficient importance to require their being fpee- 
 dily difpatched. For thefe rcafons it was the hum- 
 ble opinion of the ftates, " that for the future, in 
 " all affairs without exceptioriy which hitherto re- 
 " quired the fign Manual of the king, his majefty's 
 ** name might be affixed by a ftamp, whenever 
 ** the figning has not followed the firll or the 
 " fecdnd requeft of the fenate.'* 
 
 But it fhould not be forgot, that in one part of 
 this curious addrefs, the ftates feem fairly to con- 
 fefs, what they conceive to be the chief ufe of 
 having preferved in their form of government, the 
 kingly office. "The ftates general (it is there faid) 
 ** having a fcrupulous regard to this confideration, 
 "that the high name of the ^/»g-, renders com- 
 ** mands and expeditions more effeftual.*' That is 
 to fay, that in fad, the.bu]k of the people were 
 attached to monarchy, and that it would not have 
 been found an eafy matter to govern them, unlefs 
 at leaft a nominal king appeared to prefide in the 
 ftate. 
 
 In this manner did the Hat party, or the friends 
 %£ France, xob the crown of its conftitutional 
 
 rights.
 
 [ i89 ] 
 
 rights, under the pretext of fecuring the liberties 
 of the nation. It could little have been imagined 
 at that time, that the chiefs of the fame party, 
 fliould, in a very few years, adopt the oppofite fyf- 
 tem, and overturn the conftitytion itfelf, under 
 pretence of procuring a proper degree of power 
 to the king. 
 
 It was not however to be expefted, that no at- 
 tempts fhould be made on the part of the. king, 
 or his friends, to refift attacks fo fatal to the royal 
 authority. But the fuccefs of fuch attempts muft 
 have been very dubious. Force alone could ena- 
 ble his majefty to preferve or recover thofe rights 
 which the ftates had thought proper to allow him 
 no legal means of defending. A plot was accord- 
 ingly fet on foot by count Brake, baron Horn, the 
 marlhal of the court, and fome others ; the ob- 
 ject of which appears to have been, by means of 
 exciting an infurreftion among the people in fa- 
 vour of the king, and by corrupting the foldiers 
 and failors at Stockholm, to reftore his majefty 
 at lead to all the power he was poflefled of at the 
 firft eftablifliment of the form of government. 
 
 This confpiracy was difcovered at the moment 
 the confpirators'were going to carry their defigns 
 into execution. In confequence of which count 
 Brake and baron Horn, together with a number 
 of other fufpefted perfons, were arrefted by order 
 of the fecret committee. 
 
 Afiatic defpotifm could not on a fimilar occafion 
 have paid lefs attention even to the appearance of 
 juftice, than was confpicuous in the conduft of 
 the ruling party, with refped: to the trial of thefe 
 
 unfortunate
 
 [ I90 1 
 
 unfortunate men. This, as it nnight have been 
 prefumed would be the cafe, was referred to one 
 of thofe extraordinary courts of judicature, the 
 members of which were chofen by the Hates from 
 among themfelves. 
 
 The very title of thefe extraordinary courts, 
 proves them to have been little better than ftate 
 inquifitions. They were denominated /d-^r^^ high 
 courts of juftice, which is a contradiftion in terms. 
 Accordingly, no perfons except the parties con- 
 cerned, were allowed to be prefent at their pro- 
 ceedings. They were bound neither by law, form, 
 or precedent, but their own arbitrary will and 
 pleafure were to be the fole rule by which they 
 were to determine upon the lives and property of 
 their fellow fubjefts. 
 
 Before fuch a court were count Brake, baron 
 Horn, and their accomplices to appear. The 
 members of it being chofen by the ftates, amount- 
 ed in fa6t to the fame thing, as if they had been 
 nominated by the ruling party, from among them- 
 felves J and confequently thefe were compofed of the 
 very perfons againft whom the offence, with which 
 the prifoners were charged, was committed. In any 
 cafe where the charaders of judge and party arc 
 united, we muft have a better opinion of human na- 
 ture than experience perhaps will juftify, to expert 
 impartiality. But when the violence and heat of 
 faftion are fuperadded to the bias that felf-intereft 
 gives to the judgment, it were vain to hope even 
 for mercy. 
 
 All the confeflions made by the perfons that 
 were feized upon this occafion, were obtained by 
 
 jj torture.
 
 t J9« ] 
 
 tprnire, which horrid prafticc the ordinary courts 
 of juftice did not admit. 
 
 The chief thing proved againft count Brake 
 was, his having made balls and cartridges at his 
 country feat^ which the count alledged in his de- 
 fence, had been done by the king's immediate 
 order, and for his majefty's defence in cafe of an 
 unexpected attack. However, this unfortunate 
 nobleman, together with baron Horn and fix 
 others; were condemned to be beheaded, and were 
 executed accordingly. 
 
 The crime for which thefe men thus forfeit- 
 ed their lives, not only was by no means fuf- 
 ficiently proved againft them to juftify their 
 condemnation, but it was in itfelf of a very 
 dubious nature. It never appeared that their de- 
 lign had been to render the king an abfolute mo- 
 narch, but only to reinftate him in his conftitu- 
 tional rights. And, as in a free government, all 
 power that is ufurped, whether by the crown or 
 the popular branches of the legiflature, may be 
 equally dangerous to liberty ; refiftance in the one 
 cafe, may 'perhaps be as juftifiable as it is in the 
 other. 
 
 After the repeated vexations the king expe- 
 rienced during the courfe of this Diet, it may 
 eafily be conceived how much this laft blow muft 
 have afFe(fted him. 
 
 At the beginning of it he had feen himfelf in- 
 fulted by the treatment the queen met with from 
 the ruling party; a treatment as illiberal in the 
 authors of it, as it was humiliating to her ma- 
 jcft)\ The king next faw his domeftic peace and 
 
 tranquillity
 
 [ 192 ] 
 
 tranquillity broke in upon by the fame party; Ins 
 paternal and royal rights alike invaded ; his chil- 
 dren delivered into the hands of perfons chofen 
 againft his will ; while thofe in whom he con- 
 fided were banifhed from his prefence. His ma- 
 jefty afterwards beheld the ftates ftrike at the ve- 
 ry root of the finall fhare of power he had as yet 
 retained. He faw them fo loft to decency as to 
 render it legal to forge his fignature, and to prac- 
 tife the ridiculous farce of ifTuing ordinances in 
 his name, and to all appearance with his fign Ma- 
 nual annexed, againft the execution of which he 
 had probably protefted with all his might. Laftly, 
 he beheld his beft friends, for having formed a. 
 defign to refcue him from fuch a fituation, brought 
 to the fcaffold. 
 
 He beheld this without being able to ftretch 
 forth a hand to the afliftance of thofe who had 
 rifked every thing to ferve him. In vain did he, 
 as well as his royal confort, defcend to fupplicate 
 in the mo(l humiliating manner, thofe rigid judges 
 who had pafTed fa fevere a fentence, in order to 
 obtain fome mitigation of itj — they were harfhly 
 refufed, and in a ftyle as peremptory as it was dif- 
 refpectful. 
 
 Such was the fituation to which the late king 
 was reduced by the French, or Hat party, in the 
 Diet of 1756. 
 
 SECTION
 
 [ 193 1 
 
 SECTION III, 
 
 yiew of the political fyjlem of the Norths with refpeSi 
 to Sweden j and of the motives which induced Eng- 
 land, Rujia, and other foreign powers, as well as 
 France, to interfere in the Swedifh government, 
 during the three lafi Diets, 
 
 AS the objed of the French intrigues at 
 Stockholm, manifeftly was to difturb the 
 peace of the North, whenever they thought pro- 
 per, it was not to be fuppofed, that the powers 
 fituated in that part of Europe, would remain 
 inactive fpedtators of meafures which fo highly 
 concerned them. 
 
 Ruffia had often experienced the effedls of the 
 influence which the court of Verfailles had ac- 
 quired in the government of Sweden. She had, 
 in confequence of that influence, been engaged in 
 a mofl: unneceflTary war with the Swedes * ; and 
 though Ihe had no reafon to regret the event of 
 it, yet it could not be a matter of indiflnsrence to 
 the court of Petersburg, to behold fo near a neigh- 
 bour as Sweden, under the immediate diredlion of 
 a power, one of whofe principal objedls ever 
 fince Rufiia emerged from barbarifm, feems to 
 have been to check the rife, or oppofe the ag- 
 grandifement of that empire. 
 
 It was upon this principle, that through the 
 mediation of France, Sweden had m 1740, entered 
 
 • In 174a. 
 
 O into
 
 [ ^94 ] 
 
 into an alliance with the Porte ; an alliance evi- 
 dently defigned to operate againft RufTia, as it vas 
 only in cafe of a war with the laft-mentioned 
 power, that any advantage could refult from it, 
 to either of the contrading parties. 
 
 The king of PrufTia had alfo, during the late 
 war, felt the confequences of the French influence 
 in the Swedifh Diets; and though perhaps the 
 armies of Sweden never made fo contemptible a 
 figure as on that occafion, yet the part then taken 
 by the Swedes, muft have been fufficient to have 
 made his PrufTian majefty fee the neceffity of 
 overturning the French fyftem in a country, 
 which, pofTelTing in the province of Pomerania a 
 key to the heart of his dominions, was by that 
 means enabled exceedingly to annoy him when- 
 ever he fhould be engaged in a war with other 
 powers. 
 
 With regard to Denmark, the interefts of that 
 country relative to Sweden, have, in the courfe 
 of the prefent century, undergone a total change. 
 Peace between thofe two nations is now become 
 requifite to both. At variance with each other, 
 they have every thing to apprehend from their 
 pov/erful neighbours : united; if not formidable, 
 they are at leaft refpe6lable, and able to maintain 
 their independence. 
 
 France has long aimed at bringing about a 
 clofe alliance between them, in order to oppofc 
 their joint flrength to the power of RufTia, and 
 to render that empire open to an attack on one 
 fide, whenever the Turks fnould engage in a war 
 with it on the other. But an alliance, formed 
 
 with
 
 [ 195 1 
 
 with a view rather to difturb than ellablifh the 
 tranquillity of the North, however it may coincide 
 with the defigns of the French cabinet, could not 
 but be produvftive of the worft confequences both 
 to the Danes and Swedes. 
 
 If the natural antipathy, which unfortunately 
 ftill fubfifts in fome degree betv/een thofe two 
 nations, could be fo far fubdued as to allow of their 
 being connedcd by a clofe alliance, the objed of 
 it fhould be peace, not war j it Ihould be calcu- 
 lated to prcferve the friendlliip, not awaken the 
 jealoufy of RufTia. 
 
 The interefts of the different countries of Eu- 
 rope, are now fo interwoven with each other, that 
 no material change can take place in the political 
 fyilem of any one of them, without affcfting in fome 
 degree many others. Could France therefore have 
 fucceeded in her fcheme of uniting Sweden and 
 Denmark, with a view of producing a breach 
 between thofe powers and Ruffia ; whenever this 
 fhould have happened, it would probably have 
 involved Europe in a general war. 
 
 It is by fea only that Denmark and Sweden 
 could receive any effedtual afliilance from France : 
 the great maritime powers could not pofTibly fuf- 
 fer a French fleet to give law to the Baltick; 
 confequently either the Danes and Swedes would be 
 deprived of the only fuccours tliey could receive 
 from their Southern ally, or France muft on their 
 account engage in a war with the maritime 
 powers. In the one cafe, they would be \efz at the 
 mercy of Ruffiaj in the other, the ruin of their 
 trade and commerce would necefldrily enfue», 
 . O 2 V/hile
 
 [ 196 ] 
 
 While therefore it is the intereft of Denmark to 
 live in harmony with Sweden, it likewife highly 
 concerns her to cultivate the friendlhip of RufTia. 
 The obje(5t of the Danifh policy ought confe- 
 quently to have been (as previous to the late re- 
 volution in Sweden it for fome time had been) 
 to endeavour to overturn the French fyftem at 
 Stockholm, which always tended to hoflile mea- 
 fures ; and at the fame time to preferve, if pofli- 
 ble, the Swedilh form of government *. 
 
 That form was by no means calculated to ad- 
 mit of Sweden's making thofe fudden and violent 
 exertions of her ftrength, from which the Danes 
 had, on former occafions, fo often and fo feverely 
 fuffered : it confequently had proved much more 
 favourable to the repofe of the North, than the 
 unlimited authority before poflefTed by the Swedilh 
 monarchs. Accordingly a fecret article of a treaty, 
 concluded between the courts of Petersburg and 
 Copenhagen in 1766, exprefly fays, " Whereas it 
 " is of great importance to the two crowns, that 
 " the liberty and prefent conftitution of Sv/eden, 
 " ihould be preferved entire ; and whereas of late, 
 " by means of foreign influence, feveral changes 
 " have been brought about in that kingdom j fo 
 " that a war has been declared, and the people 
 " have been taxed, without the previous confent 
 " of the three eftates of the nation j by which 
 " changes the fundamental conflitution is, from 
 
 •The late king of Denmark has been heard to declare, 
 that he would fooner rifque the lofs of his crown, than fuffer 
 etiy material change to be made in the Swe4iih Sona of 
 government* 
 
 6 " one
 
 [ 197 ] 
 
 " one quarter or another, conflantly expored to 
 " be totally overturned : the two high contracting 
 " powers Ihall order their refpeflive minifters 
 " at the court of Sweden, to aft in concert 
 " and confidence at all future Diets, for the 
 " purpofe ©f maintaining the fundamental con- 
 *' ftitution of that kingdom; and for re-efta- 
 " blilhing it according to the true fpirit and true 
 '* fenfe of the law." 
 
 The very afbive part taken by England in the 
 three laft Swedilh Diets, remains to be accounted 
 for. 
 
 To deftroy the French influence in Sweden, was 
 certainly a point of fome importance to the Britifli 
 court. It was not however of itfelf confiderable 
 enough to juftify the expence which muft neceflarily 
 have attended it. But there were other objedts of the 
 firfl confequence connefted with it. A plan had 
 been formed to make a grand alliance in the 
 North, of which Great Britain and Ruflia were to 
 be the principal parties ; Sweden and Denmark 
 were to follow; and Pruflia was finally to be 
 invited into it. This would have ben an alli- 
 ance capable of ballancing that ftrid union 
 which then reigned, and flill continues among 
 the three great powers of the South. 
 
 As the paflions and inclinations of individuals 
 always influence public affairs more or lefs, this 
 project of demolilhing the French fyftem in Swe- 
 den, though it perfeflly coincided with the emprefs 
 of RulTia's general view of increafing her weight 
 in Europe, and particularly in the North ; yet 
 perhaps it owed it's origin to the manner in 
 
 O 3 which
 
 [ '98 ] 
 
 which the Court of France had behaved to- 
 wards herfelf and fome of her minifters. The 
 plan however v/as a grand one, and adnnirably 
 calculated to preferve the peace of Europe. The 
 pacific fyftem, with refpedl to this part of the 
 gldbe, together with a clofe connexion with 
 Ruflia, appear to have been ever fince his 
 majefty's acceffion, the two great objefts of 
 Britifh policy. It was natural therefore for the 
 Englifh miniftry, to enter into a fcheme which 
 tended to the obtaining of points, as beneficial to 
 England in particular, as they were advantageous 
 to the general interefts of mankind. 
 
 There were many caufes too which made it 
 necefTary for England to take a leading part in 
 this defign. 
 
 Independent of tne view of obtaining fome 
 commercial advantages, in a country where the 
 ballance of trade was, and is fo exceedingly againft 
 her J England was the only power among thofe 
 who united to deftroy the French fyRem in 
 Sweden, againft a clofe conneftion with which 
 the popular prejudices of the Swedes would not 
 have run exceedingly high. The natural antipa- 
 thy between Sweden and Ruflia, is not perhaps 
 inferior to that which fubfifts between Sweden 
 and Denmark; fo that, to prepare the minds of 
 the - Swedes for a total change of fyftem, with re- 
 fpe<fl to foreign politics, it v/as necefl!ary that the 
 engagements preparatory to fuch a change, ftiould 
 at firft be entered into with a power, againft 
 which the nation entertained no antipathy of this 
 fort. There might be perhaps other reafons of 
 lo a more
 
 [ 199 ] 
 a more private nature for the part taken by 
 England upon this occafion. 
 
 The French party had governed Sweden abfo- 
 lutely, without the alTiilance of the court ; and 
 we have feen, by the fummary account given of 
 the tranfadions of the Diet of 1756, to what a 
 wretched flate of infignificancy they had reduced 
 the king. Foreign money had enabled the Hats 
 to carry all their points againft the regal power; 
 his Swedifh Majefty therefore was juftified, in 
 having recourfe to the fame means, in order to re- 
 cover thofe prerogatives which had been wrefted 
 from him. 
 
 After the enormities committed by the Diet of 
 1756, the Swedifh court requefted and obtained 
 fome affiflance from England. The fituation of 
 the king and queen of Sweden was, about that 
 time, placed in a ftrong light, by a very great 
 perfonage at Stockholm. 
 
 According to the reprefentations of that per- 
 fonage, " all the endeavours of their Swedifh ma- 
 ** jefties to promote the true interefl of the na- 
 ^' tion, had been rendered ineffectual by the pow- 
 *' ers of corruption, which France had^ftirniflied 
 " to the partizans of her political fyflem. That 
 " fhe had drawn to her all the factions of the 
 " nation, who, partly for the fake of the money 
 " to be diflributed, and partly from views of pof- 
 " fefling the revenues and pofls of the kingdom, 
 " had employed their talents only for the fupport 
 " of their party; fo that France governed Sweden 
 " with the fame eafe that fhe did one of her own 
 " provinces. That the public treafury had been 
 
 O 4 " pillaged.
 
 t 200 ] 
 
 ♦* pillaged, the appropriation of the revenues 
 ♦' changed, the defence of the country neglefted, 
 *' and every branch of commerce ruined. That 
 *' in confequence of French influence, the ftates 
 " had trampled on the rights of their majefties, 
 *^ placing themfelves above the laws, even the 
 " fundamental ones. 
 
 *' That under the fame influence, they had en- 
 " tered into two ruinous wars one after another, 
 ^' which brought the kingdom to the brink of de- 
 " flru6lion j that every attempt of their majefties 
 ** to corre<-t thefe abufes, produced no other ef- 
 " feft but to augment them, Thefe attempts 
 ** were fet in a bad light j infinuations were 
 *' thrown out that fomething was meant againft 
 " liberty j innocent perfops were brought to the 
 ** fcaffold, the unhappy vidims of their love of 
 *' their country ; and royalty was robbed not only 
 " of the power which belonged to it, but even 
 *' of the rights and prerogative of majefty." 
 
 In this fituation it was natural for their Swedifli 
 majefties to have recourfe to England, and to 
 defire the interpofition of Great Britain, to take 
 them out of the trammels in which they had 
 been fo long held by France, This was not 
 however a point to be fuddenly or eafily ac- 
 compliftied. All intercourfe between the Bri- 
 tifti court and the ruling powers in Sweden, had 
 been cut off^ for a number of years ; and as the 
 renewal of it muft have been fatal to the intereft 
 of the French party in that country, it was obvi- 
 ous, that party would oppofe with all their might, 
 the admiffion of an Englifh minifter at Stockholm ; 
 
 an
 
 [ 20I ] 
 
 an oppofition, which coming from thofe who tlien 
 held the reins of government, could not fail to 
 prove an effectual bar to prevent fuch a meafurc 
 from taking place. 
 
 For this purpofe therefore, it became neceflary 
 to wait till fome favourable junfture Ihould occur, 
 in which either the Hats fhould ceafe to be all- 
 powerful in Sweden ; or the friends of the 
 court, and the Cap party, fhould acquire fufficient 
 influence with the fenate, to prevail upon that 
 body, to confent to the admifTion of a Britifh 
 minifler. 
 
 In the mean time it was thought proper in 
 England, to preferve a communication with the 
 Swedifli court, and with thofe Swedes who were 
 averfe to the French fyftem. This correfpond- 
 cnce was managed by Sir John Goodricke at 
 Copenhagen, till after the end of the war j the 
 French party in Sweden having prevailed fo far 
 ^s to refufe the receiving of a minifter from' 
 Great Britain during the war, under pretence of 
 their ftridb alliance with the French king, and 
 that of Great Britain with the king of Pruilia. 
 
 But in the latter end of the year 1763, juft as 
 Sir John Goodricke was leaving Copenhagen, 
 by orders from London, on account of the im- 
 proper behaviour of the Swedifh Court, he fell 
 into a negociation wfth Mr. Faxell, then charged 
 with the Swedifh affairs in Denmark, which 
 terminated in an agreement between Great 
 Britain and Sweden, to fend reciprocally mini- 
 fters to each other. 
 
 The re-eftablifhment of peace had left the fe- 
 nate
 
 [ 202 ] 
 
 nate of Sweden no excufe for declining any longer 
 to receive a minifter from the king of Great 
 Britain. Befides, the very iinjuflifiable length* 
 the Hat party had gone during the Diet of 1756, 
 had confiderably Ihaken the credit they had till 
 then maintained with the nation. 
 
 In proportion as the Hats loft the confidence 
 of the public, their antagonifts grew into popu- 
 larity. The bad fuccefs of the war againft the 
 king of PrulTia, into which Sweden had been hur- 
 ried by the Hat party ; the want of money occa- 
 fioned by the erroneous calculations of the ex- 
 pences of the armyj and the failure of France in 
 the payment of the arrears due to Sweden, had in 
 fom.e meafure opened the eyes of the nation, with 
 refped to the pernicious confequences of their 
 French connexions. 
 
 For thefe reafons, as well as the advantages ac- 
 cruing to them, on account of Sir John Good- 
 ricke's refidence at Copenhagen, the Swedifh court 
 began vifibly to gain ground during the Diet held 
 in 1760. The chiefs of the ruling party became 
 more circumfpeft in their conduct, and a fatal 
 blow might have been then given to the French 
 fyftem, if a great part of the money obtained by 
 the court for that purpofe, had not been thrown 
 away in order to gratify private refentment. 
 
 Little was done towards accomplifhing a change 
 of fyftem in the Diet of 1762 j but the affairs of 
 Sweden were then in fo critical a fituation, that 
 nothing but a change of meafures could preferve 
 them from immediate ruin. The arrears 
 of the French fubfidies amounted at this time to 
 
 between
 
 [ iOJ ] 
 
 between ten and eleven million of litres j the pay- 
 ment of which France had conftantly evaded, tho' 
 in confequence of the war undertaken at her infti- 
 gation by the Swediih miniiliy, they had run fo 
 confiderably in debt, as no; only no longer to be 
 able to carry it on, but even to provide for the 
 current expences of government. 
 
 At length a propofal came to them from 
 France *, too unreafonable to be digefled even by 
 the mod zealous of her partizans. 
 
 Inftead of fatisfying the demands of Sweden, 
 the court of Verfailles only offered to enter into a 
 new treaty with that country for ten yearsj by 
 which they propofed to give a million and a half 
 of livres per annum, on condition that the Swedes 
 fhould, during that time, allow them the ufe of 
 fix Ihips of the line and four frigates, all com- 
 pleatly armed and equipped. 
 
 A treaty of this nature highly concerned Eng- 
 land, as it tended to put the v/hole maritime 
 farce of Sweden into the hands of France. 
 
 In anfwer to this overture, the court of Sweden 
 replied, that it was impolTible for them to hearken 
 to any propofals on the part of France, till fhe 
 had previoufly paid at lead four millions of livres, 
 of the arrears fo long due to them ; and fo much 
 were they provoked at the delays and chicaneries 
 of the cabinet of Verfailles, that it was at the fame 
 time given out, that if France did not immedi- 
 ately comply with this demand, the Swedifh mini- 
 ftry would give their hearty confent that a Britilh 
 minifter Ihould be received at Stockhohn. 
 
 • A. D. 1763. 
 
 The
 
 [ 204 3 
 
 The anfwer from Paris to the requeft of Sweden 
 not being a fatisfaftory one, and the negociation 
 with Mr. Faxell, mentioned above, being happily 
 concluded before the end of 1763; in the 
 month of April 1764, Sir John Goodricke ar- 
 rived at Stockholm, with the charader of his 
 Britannic Majefty's Envoy Extraordinary to 
 that Court. 
 
 This was a great point gained towards over- 
 turning the French fyftem in Sweden, and pre- 
 paring the way for the intended grand alliance 
 in the North. 
 
 The Britifh minifler had notwithftanding many 
 difficulties to contend with j the tafk impofed upon 
 him was an arduous one; but his abilities were 
 equal to it, and his fucccfs was anfwerable to the 
 indefatigable zeal with which he exerted them. 
 
 Hitherto France had been unoppofed in all her 
 manoeuvres in Sweden : to deftroy therefore a fy- 
 ftem which had lafted eight and twenty years; 
 that was built upon the moft folid foundation ; 
 fupported by fubfidies, as well as by its being 
 rendered the private intereft of the leading people 
 in the country to preferve it, was evidently an 
 undertaking not eafily to be accompliflied. 
 
 The difordered ftate of the finances in Sweden, 
 "which it was impofTible to re(5tify without the 
 afTiftance of French fubfidies, increafed the diffi- 
 culty of fuch an undertaking ; while the appre- 
 henfions that thefe fubfidie* would be v/ithdrawn, 
 in cafe Sweden difgufted France by forming an al- 
 liance, or entering into too clofe connections with 
 England, feemed to form an infuperable bar to its 
 
 being
 
 [ !205 ] ■ 
 
 being accomplilhed. This was apparently to be 
 done only by an indemnification for the lofs 
 Sweden was to fuftain by the non-payment of the 
 arrears due to her from France ; but both Eng- 
 land and Ruflia were averfe to offering any fuch 
 indemnification to Sweden, which proved the 
 chief obflacle their refpedive miniflers had to fur- 
 mount. 
 
 On the other hand there were, at the time they 
 commenced their operations, fome circumflances 
 in their favour. Thefe were principally the ina- 
 bility or dilinclination of France at that jundure 
 to pay the arrears due to Sweden ; the total want 
 of internal refources in that country, to fupply 
 the deficiencies occafioned by the non-payment of 
 fo confiderable a fum ; and the unfettled ftate of 
 the parties, which were divided among them- 
 felves. 
 
 The firft of thefe had confiderably diminifhed 
 the partiality the bulk of the nation had hitherto 
 entertained for the French fyftem. The fecond 
 rendered the calling an extraordinary Diet a mea- 
 fure indifpenfably neceffary. And the laft dif- 
 pofed the minds of the people to a reformation 
 of the many abufes in the conflitution, of which 
 party violence had been produ6tive. 
 
 We may add here, that at this time the court of 
 Sweden gave frequent afTu ranees of their being 
 ftrongly attached to his Britannic majefty, and 
 the intereft of his crown ; and that nothing but 
 the lafl necefTity ihould make them confent to the 
 continuance of the engagements with France. 
 What change was afterwards made in thefe good 
 
 difpofitions
 
 [ 206 ] 
 
 difpofitions towards the court of London, we fhall 
 foon fee. 
 
 Upon the arrival of the Englifh minifter, his 
 firft objed was, in concert with count Ofterman, 
 the minifter from the court of Peterfburgh^ who 
 having affifted at the Diet of 1762, had all the 
 experience in Swedilh affairs, and all the know- 
 ledge of the perfons and charaders of thofe who 
 took the lead in the conduft of them which was 
 neceflary for the forming of a new fyftem, to pro- 
 cure the convocation of a Diet extraordinary, 
 as previous to this no fteps could be taken in the 
 intended changes in the adminiftration. The 
 leading fenators of the Hat party did not exert 
 their utmoft ftrength to defeat the endeavours 
 ufed for this purpofe, becaufe they faw that their 
 oppofition would be fruitlefs, and they were not 
 united among themfelves ; fo that a refolution 
 was carried in the fenate totally againft the in- 
 terefts of thofe who were devoted to he French 
 fyftem, that a Diet extraordinary fliould be held 
 in the January following. 
 
 The fuccefs of the Caps on this occafion, was 
 principally ov/ing to the fuperior abilities of count 
 Lowenhielm, who was the chief of that party in the 
 lenate, and the great promoter of the negociation 
 which brought the Engliili minifter to Stock- 
 holm. 
 
 Thus far matters were in as favourable a train 
 for the views of the Caps as they could wufh ; but 
 every thing depended upon the fuccefs of their 
 cledbions at the approaching Diet. In thefe too, 
 notwithftanding the great fums fpent by France 
 
 on
 
 [ 207 1 
 
 on the occafion, the Englifh and Rufllan mini- 
 fters took their meafures fo well, that the Cap 
 party appeared to have a confiderable majority in 
 the four orders. In confequence of which, when 
 the dates aflembled in 1765, the marfhal of the 
 Diet, and the fpeakers of the three inferior 
 orders, were all of that party, tho' the French 
 ambaflador was fuppofed, I know not with what 
 truth, to have laid out no lefs than four hun- 
 dred thoufand livres upon the eleftion of the 
 marfhal alone f . 
 
 The Cap party being now matters of the Diet, 
 the refolutions upon which they built their 
 plan of future operations were, firft, that the fub- 
 fidy paid by France, far from being ufeful to 
 Sweden, had been highly detrimental to the 
 kingdom, by engaging her in expences exceeding, 
 at lead, three times the amount of it, as well as of 
 the extraordinary additions made to it in the war. 
 
 Secondly, that the twelve millions of arrears, 
 which France could never be brought to liquidate, 
 had been reduced by different chicaneries, accord- 
 ing to the French accounts, to feven milliors. 
 
 Thirdly, that thofe feven millions, which per- 
 haps might not be paid in feven years, were not 
 an object that could be brought in competition 
 
 f The ofSce of marfhal of the Diet was of the greateft con- 
 fequence, not only from the diftinftion he had in all delibera- 
 tions in the Houfe of Nobles, but likewife from his privilege 
 of entering into and voting in all committees ; and above all, 
 tecaufe the Secret Committee could not be affembled without 
 him. 
 
 This laft circumftance proved to be of great confequence at 
 the time of the late revolution. 
 
 with
 
 [ 208 ] 
 
 with a new war, or with that of an interruption of 
 the beneficial commerce with England j one or 
 both of which would probably happen, if the 
 French treaty for fhips were to take place. 
 
 Fourthly, that the kingdom of Sweden had re- 
 fources within herfelf fufficient, if properly em- 
 ployed, to extricate her out of her prefent difficul- 
 ties, without the affiftance of any foreign power 
 whatever, provided that the crown could keep 
 clear of new engagments, or a foreign war for a ' 
 certain number of years. 
 
 With regard to the intended reformation of the 
 abufes which had crept into the conftitution, the 
 defign of the Cap party, was not in any way 
 to change the form of government of the 
 year 1720, but only to re-eftablilh the royal 
 authority in all its rights and prerogatives, 
 founded in the laws ; to regulate the fundtjons and 
 duties of the fenate ; and to put juft limits to the 
 power of the ftates. 
 
 It had been a favourite projed with France, to 
 gain a full power to the fenate, with regard to fo- 
 reign affairs. As fhe was fuppofed to diftributc 
 more in annual penfions to thofe who ferve her 
 in foreign countries, than any other court in Eu- 
 rope, fhe confcquently could always have the 
 majority in a body compofed but of fixteen per- 
 fons. 
 
 Other courts, lefs liberal in penfions to foreign- 
 ers, and who are fuppofed only occafionally to em- 
 ploy money in fecret fervice, thought it was their 
 general interefl to diminifh the authority of the 
 fenate in favour of the king and die ftates. This 
 
 point
 
 t !i09 } 
 point therefore, together with that of taking tht 
 adminiflration of affairs out of the hands of the 
 French party, were to be the chief objects of the 
 attention of the Englilh and Ruffian minifters, 
 during the courfe of the Diet. 
 
 But a change in the difpofition of the court> 
 which became very Ihortly vifible, rendered it ne- 
 cefTary to make an alteration likewife in the firft 
 part of this plan. 
 
 The friends of the court had hitherto voted 
 with the Caps : they feem however to have done 
 this only to fecure the admiffion of fome of their 
 number into the fecret committee, for fhortly after 
 that was formed, the Caps found they had loll 
 their majority in the houfe of nobles, which 
 fufficiently proved that the court had changed 
 fides. The explanation of this event furnifhes us 
 with a clue to the revolution which happened 
 feven years afterwards. 
 
 During the Diet 1762, two years before the ar- 
 rival of an Englilh miniller at Stockholm, the 
 court party finding themfelves difappointed in 
 the quantum of the refources they expelled, or 
 rather having expended thofe they had upon un- 
 cflential points, inltead of applying them to ca- 
 pital ones, refolved while their credit was good, 
 and before their opponents found out the weaknefs 
 of their finances, to enter into a compofition, de- 
 fired at that time by fome of the chiefs of the 
 French party, in order to clofe that Diet upoix 
 the beft terms they could. Their fears of Ruffia 
 then running very high, the perfons treated with 
 
 P on
 
 [ 210 ] 
 
 oh this occafion, agreed to pay fome of her majcf^ 
 ty's debtSy 'to repeal an a6t of the former Diet, 
 which was very offenfive both to the king and 
 queen, to reftore the credit of the court, by 
 admitting feveral of thofe who had been moft 
 zealous in that intereft to fome of the beft employ- 
 ments; and laftly, they promifed, on the firft 
 meeting of a Diet, that they would confent to new 
 interpretations being made of thofe paiTages in the 
 fundamental laws, the ienfe of which had been 
 perverted by former aflembiics, to the prejudice of 
 the royal authority. 
 
 The particulars of this agreement were only 
 known to trfew; but the confequences of it had 
 given difguft to many of the oppofers of the French 
 fyftcm, who were not pleafed to find two of its 
 principal advocates well received at court, and to 
 ail appearance in great confidence with the queen. 
 
 Their difapprobation of it was afterwards juftified 
 by the e^^-ent. From tha^t time, thofe of the French 
 party, wlio by this means had gained accefs to her 
 mrgefty, uled their utmoft endeavours to produce 
 a breach between the court and the Caps -, but 
 it was tiot till after the commencement of the 
 Diet of which we are now treating, that 
 t^e ' fbccefs of this attempt was publickly 
 known, though before the time that the 
 difafrer<5lioii of the court became vifible, fome 
 private informations were given to the leaders 
 of the Caps, that one of the chiefs of the op- 
 poli'te j^arty had engaged the French ambaffador 
 m a new treaty witK tlte -queen of Sweden, by 
 
 which
 
 [ 211 J 
 
 which he was to endeavour to peifuade his court, 
 that the only way of efie6tually breaking the 
 meafures. of thiP Gaps was, to beflow the fovereign 
 authority on the king of Sweden, upon condition 
 that the French alliance fhould be prefcrved. 
 
 Here then was at once unravelled the whole 
 myftery cyf the variations obferved in the conduct 
 of . the Swedilh court: which had now uhder- 
 taken to protect thofe perfons they had once de- 
 fired to remove from the helm of government, 
 and to fupport that fyftem which they had fo 
 openly declared againft from the beginning of the 
 Pruflian v/ar to that time. 
 
 Deferted by their Swedilh majefties, the Eng- 
 lilh and RufTian minillers, with whom the Pruf- 
 fian envoy had about this time received orders to 
 aft in cortcert, found themfelves obliged to pro- 
 ceed upon a new plan. 
 
 To increafe the regal power at the expence of 
 the fenate, could form no longer any part of it; 
 and all they had now to do was, to acquire as 
 great an influence in that body as France had for-, 
 merly poireiTcd there. 
 
 For this purpofe it was neceflary they fhould try 
 to obtain the difmiflion of thofe fenatorswho had 
 ever proved themfelves the moll ftrcnuous advo- 
 cates for the French fyftem, and to have their 
 places fupplied by fuch of the Cap party as were 
 well-wilhers to the courts of London and Peterf- 
 burgh. 
 
 In the mean time the partizans of France were 
 not idle. In order to ftop the clamours of the nation 
 
 P 2 refpcding
 
 I 212 ] 
 
 fcfpe<5bing the delay of the payment of the French 
 arrears, they had prevailed upon the court of Ver- 
 failles to make a new propofal to that of Sweden, 
 .by which they offered to pay twelve millions of 
 livres in eight years, at the rate of one million five 
 hundred thoufand per annum *. This propofal the 
 icnate thought proper to accept, however fhort it 
 had fallen of the juft- demands of Sweden upon 
 .France i but the diftreft flate of the fiiiances of 
 the kingdom, had rendered them eager to grafp 
 at any thing that they thought would extricate 
 them out of their prefcnt difhculties. 
 < The Hat party had likewife, by their being 
 united with the friends of the court, a confidera- 
 ble majority in the houfe of nobles j and the 
 French ambaffador fpared neither pains nor ex- 
 pence to detach the other orders from the Eng- 
 lilh fyftem. 
 
 The fecret committee however, in which the 
 Caps had entirely the afcendency, proceeded ac- 
 cording to the plan laid down by the leaders of 
 that party. In order to Ihew the French they had 
 loft their influence in the Diet, and to ftop the 
 fupplies for the purpofes of corruption, which 
 their ambaflador at Stockholm expected from 
 Paris, the committee voted it unneceffary to 
 keep an ambaffador at the court of France. 
 
 Their next refolution was, that no lefs than 
 feven of the fenators had abufed the confidence 
 that had been placed in them by the ftates, and 
 therefore were no lonjrer to be trufted. Thefc 
 
 f November aa, 1 764, 
 
 were
 
 [ 213 ] 
 were the chief fupporters of the French fyftem ; 
 and their difmifllon, in order to make room in 
 the lenate for the fame number of the oppofite 
 party, correfponded exadly with the views of the 
 Englilh and Ruffian minifters. 
 
 But a mod extraordinary change appeared 
 on this occafion in the difpofition of the Diet. 
 
 When the houfe of nobles divided on the quef- 
 tion, whether they fhould approve of the refolution 
 of the fecret committee, refpe6ling the difmiffion 
 of the fenators, without farther deliberation or 
 not, it was carried, as might have been expefled, 
 againft the Caps j but in the order of the clergy, 
 in which the Cap party had hitherto had the molt 
 decifive majority, to the great aftonifhment of the 
 leaders of that party, the votes upon the fame 
 queftion were equal, and it was agreed to refumc . 
 the debate another time. Among the burghers, 
 where too the Cap party had till then greatly the 
 afcendency, after much difputing, it was carried > 
 only by two votes, to approve of the refolution of 
 the committee. As to the peafants, they did not 
 take up the affair at all. 
 
 This fudden change among the orders in favour 
 of the Hats, was as alarming to the leaders of 
 the oppofite party, as it had been unexpedled by 
 them. The whole Diet appeared now to be 
 overturned j and all that the Englilh minifter 
 had been labouring to accomplifh, feemed to 
 be defeated in a moment. The French party, 
 imagining they had recovered the fuperiority, 
 immediately declared they would make a new 
 marfhal of the Diet, break the fecret committee, 
 
 P 3 reftore
 
 [ J14 V 
 
 rcftore two of the fenators who had refigned, fronh 
 the apprchenfions of the Caps, and totally undo 
 all that had been donfe. This event furnifhes a 
 moft: ftriking inftance of the dreadful corruption 
 which prevailed in the ftates, as the refult of it 
 does how bare-faced that corruption muft have 
 been*. . i 
 
 -'-The fad was, thfe day before the above-men- 
 tioned queftion waS to come on in the plenum, 
 the French ambaffador had fpent no lefs a fum 
 than'feven thoufand pounds, and his emiflarieS 
 were employed the whole night in diftributing 
 more among the different orders. The clergy 
 aJone were fuppofed to have had at lead three 
 thoufand pounds divided among them. 
 
 However the alarm of the Caps and the triumph 
 of their antagoniflrs upon this occafion, were 
 equally fhort-lived ; and the ambaffador had the 
 moftification to find that he had been at a great 
 expence without having carried his point. 
 
 Meafures were fo well taken by his opponents, 
 that tk€ clergy were regained the next day j and 
 when the fame queftion came on again before the 
 orders, it was carried in the three inferior 
 ones by no inconfiderable majority, to approve 
 
 • Some time before the meeting of this Diet, it was pub- 
 licity propofed in a club of burghers, that every man 
 Should take what money was offered, but vote according to 
 his own confclence notwithftanding. This was done to 
 frighten the French from corrupting, and it had the defired 
 efFeft ; for the Hat party thought it more fafe to make only 
 promifes ; and the afcendency of the Cap party among the 
 burghers was chiefly owing to this* 
 
 of
 
 [ 215 1 
 
 of the refolution of the fecret committee : fo that 
 the difmifiion of the fenators took place. 
 
 Shortly after this, count Lowenhielm, chief of 
 the Caps in the fenate, was chofen prefident of 
 the Chancery : and as twelve out of the fixtcen 
 fenators were now heartily oppofite to the French 
 fyltem, little more Teemed requifite to be done to 
 complete the deftrudion of the influence which the 
 court of Verfaiiles had fo long maintained , in 
 Sweden. 
 
 But the Englifh and Ruffian miniilers had ftill 
 one great difficulty to contend with, before they 
 could effisdlually ered a fyftem of their own in the 
 room of that they had been able to overturn. A 
 foreign alliance was abfolutely requifite to .give 
 ftabiiity to the new miniilry. To form an alliance 
 with Sweden was alfo the objed: of England and 
 Ruffiaj yet there was an almoft infuperable bar 
 to prevent this meafure from taking place ; this 
 was the conflant refufal of England to give any 
 fubfidies. Ruffia had likewife always -declared 
 againfl them : and indeed it would have been ac 
 that time a bold ftroke in the Caps to have ven- 
 tured upon accepting a fubfidy from Ruffia, even 
 had fhe been difpofed to give one, on account of 
 the jealoufy which has ever fubfifted between the 
 two nations j and the fear the Swedes had of giv- 
 ing the court of Peterfburgh any public influence 
 in their government. 
 
 Befides, another opinion prevailed among the 
 
 people, that if the French fubfidies were lofl, their 
 
 contributions muft on that account be incrcafed : 
 
 hence an alliance with England, unlefs produdtivc 
 
 P 4 of
 
 [ ii6 ] 
 
 of a fubfidy, could not fail to be an unpopular 
 idea. The fenate had therefore great apprehen- 
 fions with regard to defending their conduft in a 
 future Diet, ihould they rejedl fo confiderable a 
 fum due to them by the old fyftem, without 
 making fure of fome affiflance by means 
 of the new on'b ; and they efteemed it indif- 
 penfably neceflary for them to obtain fome ob- 
 je6t to prefent to the nation, which might be con- 
 fidered as a compenfation for the lofs of the ten 
 millions and a half of livres flill due to them from 
 France, and which the French court would not 
 fail to find a pretence for not paying, fhould any 
 alliance be made between England and Sweden. 
 
 In this fituation of things the principal leaders of 
 the Cap party judged that nothing would be more 
 expedient than a fimple treaty of friendfhip between 
 the two kingdoms ; the general intention of which 
 fiiould be to give no umbrage to France for the 
 prefent; and yet upon the foundation of this 
 treaty, the fecret committee might be able to 
 frame inftruftions for the conduct of the fenate, 
 between the Diets, in a manner that would break 
 the French fyftem entirely. This treaty met with 
 many difficulties in its progrefs, from the appre- 
 henfions entertained by the Swedilh miniftry of 
 forming any engagements where no fubfidy was 
 to be given. The abilities of the negociator how- 
 ever overcamiC them all, and it was figned the 
 Hxth of February 1766. The chief article of ic 
 was, that the fubje6ts of each nation were tq enjoy 
 reciprocally in their refpedlive kingdoms, portSjj 
 gr)d harbours, all the advantages and immunities 
 
 which
 
 [ ii7 ] 
 
 Which the moft favoured nation did then, or 
 might afterwards enjoy. InofFenfive as this treaty- 
 was, France pretended to be exceedingly difatis- 
 fied with it, as well as furprized at its being con- 
 cluded without having been previoufly comnnuni- 
 cated to her. She accordingly made ufe of it as 
 a pretext for putting off the payment of a part of 
 the fubfidies, which had been then fome time 
 due *. She further threatened, that in cafe Swed- 
 en entered iqto a defenfive alliance with England, 
 that fhe would deprive the Swedilh Ihips of all 
 the advantage they poflefled in the ports of 
 France. There is fomething in the French am- 
 bafTador's declaration to the Swedifh miniftry 
 on this occafion, which gives fo true an idea of 
 the dependence in which Sweden was held by 
 France, that it deferves a place here. 
 
 *' The true reafon, fays he, of the delay of the 
 *' payment of the fubfidies is, that his Moft C. M. 
 ** had made, in confequence of treaties which he 
 " religiouQy obferved, certain political arrange- 
 " ments relative to his interior affairs ; that one 
 " of thefe arrangements of his majefty, with re- 
 *' gard to the North was, that Sweden fhould con- 
 *' elude no treaty without his majefty's confent. 
 ** That in contempt of this engagement, the motive 
 
 • There was aq article in a treaty made between Sweden 
 end France in 1738, and renewed in 1758, by which they re- 
 fpeftively engaged not to enter into or renew any treaty, con-, 
 vention, or alliance, under any name whatever, with any 
 power whatever, but with a common confent. 
 
 France had however adhered tQ this only when /he thought 
 prpptr. 
 
 « of
 
 f 2i3: J 
 *• of the fubfidies of France to the Swedifh court, 
 " Sweden had made a treaty with a for-eign 
 •* power, without waiting for the confent of his 
 *• C. M. That Sweden, not attending to this en- 
 •* gagement, had deranged the political views 
 " of his majefty, as the non-payment of the 
 " fubfidies would derange the CEConomical viev/s 
 •« of Sweden.'* 
 
 It is time to take fome notice of the conduft of 
 the court. After the affair of the difmiiTion of the 
 fenators, they no longer kept any meafures v/ith 
 the Caps, or concealed their having entered into 
 the clofeft connexions with the French ambaffa- 
 .dor. 
 
 A treaty of marriage had been fome time on 
 foot between the Prince Royal of Sweden, and the 
 Princefs of Denmark. This was a point concern- 
 ing the fuccefs of which the Danes were exceed- 
 ingly anxious, but to which the Swedifli court had 
 ever appeared very much averfe. They, however, 
 made propofals to the Danifh minifters through 
 tlic French ambafiador, infinuating, that if the 
 court of Denmark would give fome money, and 
 join intirely with the French party, the court's 
 averfion to the marriage might be removed. This 
 obliged the Caps to make the marriage them- 
 felves, in order to keep Denmark firm to her en- 
 gagements with themj but by fo doing, they 
 greatly widened the breach that already fubfifted 
 betwe.en them and the court-party. 
 
 Thefe backed by France appeared, at lena;th, to 
 
 have come to a refolution to atte npt the re-efta- 
 
 3 blilhment
 
 t ai9 J 
 
 bliniment of an abfolute government In Sweden,y 
 The plan upon which they proceeded, was, to en- 
 deavour to create an open quarrel between the 
 houfe of nobles and the other orders -, to haften 
 the conelufion of the Diet ; and to work imme- 
 diately upon the means of obtaining another; to 
 decry in all the provinces what had been done by 
 the Caps in that Diet j to infmuate that they were 
 governed by RufTia; that Sweden would become- 
 a province to that empire j that the Swedifh ma- 
 nufafturers would be driven out of the country to 
 oblige England j and finally, that thefe diforder^ 
 could only be remedied by defiring the king to 
 interpofe his authority. 
 
 It was not long before there appeared proofs by 
 no means equivocal of the reality of fuch a 
 defign. 
 
 A perfon named Hoffman^ who pretended to 
 aft by the king's orders, excited an infurredion 
 in one of the provinces : but, upon his not being 
 able to produce thofe orders, he was delivered up 
 by the peafants, and brought to Stockholm. Up- 
 on his trial it appeared, that this had been a con- 
 certed plan J that an infurreftion was defigned at 
 the fame time in three other provinces -, and that 
 Hoffman had difconcerted the whole enterprize, 
 as well as ruined himfelf, by his precipitation in 
 not waiting for the day appointed for its being 
 carried into execution. 
 
 It is to be regretted that upon this occafion, 
 the Caps had recourfe to one of thofe odious 
 tribunals, of which an account has been already 
 given. 
 
 Its
 
 [ 220 ] 
 
 Its cftablifliment was violently oppofcd by the 
 Hat party ; who, forgetting what they did them- 
 felves in 1756, loudly proclaimed it to be an 
 inquifition fet up for perfecution ; and it muft be 
 owned the Cap party equally departed from the 
 maxims they then laid down, of having no extra- 
 ordinary tribunals for the future. Their conduft 
 was, however, very different from that of their 
 opponents in fimilar circumftances : they careful- 
 ly avoided carrying their inquiries too far, in or- 
 der to prevent much effufion of blood : and Hoff"- 
 man and two others only were condemned to be 
 beheaded. 
 
 As the court had kept of late no meafures with 
 the Caps, notwithftanding their being all power- 
 ful in this Diet ; fo that party, o|i the other hand, 
 appeared refolved to obferve none with the 
 court. 
 
 It was remarked, on a former occafion, that 
 the king's poflefllng fo fmall a Ihare of power, 
 was not only a great defeft in the Swedifh confti- 
 tution, but alfo a circumftance dangerous to the 
 liberties of the nation. 
 
 Hitherto the Caps appeared to have been of 
 this opinion j and we have feen that at the com- 
 mencement of the Diet, part of their plan was to 
 increafe the regal power, and diminilh that of the 
 fen ate. 
 
 But when the Swedifh court had thought pro- 
 per to throw themfelves entirely into the arms of 
 prance, it certainly became a point of fome diffi-* 
 culty to determine how the friends of England 
 3>nd of Ruflia were to aft. The offers of France- 
 Co
 
 [ ^ii ] 
 
 to their Swedifii majefties were of fuch a nature, 
 that the Cap party could hardly flatter themfelvcs 
 they fliould be able to detach the court from 
 the French intereft, by any propofals they could 
 juflify themfelves in making. 
 
 They, therefore, perhaps erroneoufly, thought 
 it fafeft, inftead of augmenting the regal power 
 as they had at firft projedied, to lay new re- 
 ftraints upon it. This they accordingly did in a 
 very material article. 
 
 The king, as it has been fhewn, was allowed 
 by the form of government to take his choice of 
 three perfons prefented to him by the Hates, any 
 one of whom he might appoint to the office of 
 fenator, whenever a vacancy happened in the 
 fenate : and by this means no perfon exceedingly 
 obnoxious to his majefty could be forced upon 
 him. But the Cap party now came to a refolu- 
 tion, that fhould a candidate for the fenatorial 
 office be three times prefented by the Hates to the 
 king and rejefted by him, the Hates might then, if 
 they thought proper, prefent him a fourth time 
 alone, in which cafe his majefty fhould no longer 
 have it |n his power to rcjed him. This certainly 
 was not the way to reconcile the king to a form 
 of government, the reftraints of which upon the 
 royal authority had already exhaufted his pa- 
 tience. 
 
 To counter-balance, however, this imprudent 
 ftep, the Cap parry caufed another refolution to 
 be palled in the diet, in which there appeared 
 much more wifdom than in the preceding one. 
 
 This was, that no change fhould be made ia 
 
 9 *»
 
 [ 222 ] 
 
 thjs fwAidsnti^ntal laws, unlefs it was propofed in 
 pnc diet and agreed p in another by all the four 
 iprders, . Nothing coiild be better calculated to 
 give, a degree of liability to the Swedilh govern- 
 ment, of which it was never before poflelTed. 
 
 Not only all fudden refolutions of the Hates rc- 
 •fpe(3:ing changes of this nature, frequently the ef- 
 fects of the heat of party or violence of faftiori, 
 were by this means guarded againfti but the na^- 
 tion had a further fecurity for their liberties, in 
 the negative here given tP any- one order, in all 
 conftitutional queftions, upon the propofitions of 
 -^e other three. 
 
 ' In confequence of the firft of thefe refolutions. 
 Baron Duben having been three times rejefbed by 
 the king, when prefented for the office of fenator, 
 the Hates appointed him to that office without 
 farther ceremony. 
 
 His majelly refufed to fign his patent, faying, 
 they might ftamp his name to it if they pleafed -, 
 and it was faid the queen would not fufFerthc 
 new fenator to kifs her hand, as was cullomary 
 on thofe occafions. 
 
 The king fliortly afterwards took a flill bolder 
 ftep. Upon three perfons being prefented to him 
 for the office of fecretary of Hate, he, of his own 
 authority, and contrary to the exprefs words of 
 the form of government, named a fourth to it. 
 This condu6t of his majefly fufficiently indicated 
 that he had Ibme fecret reliance upon his being 
 powerfully fupported in thefe attempts, and that 
 what had been done in the cpurfe of the diet 
 would not be of long duration. In the nican 
 , : time.
 
 [ 223 1 
 
 time, the marriage of the Prince Royal with the 
 Princefs of Denmark was concluded under the 
 aufpices of the Caps * : after which it was deter- 
 mined to put an end to the diet. 
 
 During the courfe of it, the French influcooc 
 would have been completely overturned, had 
 England or Ruflia authorized their minifterB ii> 
 offer a fubfidy : but, confidering the many diffi- 
 culties their not being allowed to make any iboh 
 offer threw in their way, the change they efFe«9icd 
 in the interior of Sweden, as far as related to the 
 adminiftration, the fenate, and the-difpofition of 
 the diet, was infinitely more than in their circund- 
 ftances there was any jneafon to icxpeft they could 
 4iave accompiifhed. •" ^>f'* '^n.; ,w'jfi 
 
 Count Lowenhielm, it this time a determiwed 
 oppofer of French meafufes, was now at the head of 
 affairs. Of the fixteen fenators, twelve were the faft 
 friends of the Englifh and Ruffian fyflemj and 
 the inftruftions franned by the iccpet committee to 
 regulate the cimduft of the fenate. Were evidently 
 
 * The &&tt$ gave many inflance$ 04 the occailon of tli^s 
 marriage, of that littlenefs and illib&rality of miad, wliicli it 
 muft be confefTed, too frequently marked their conduft. 
 
 They created a variety of difputes concerning the regulation 
 «f the KoS. triSing ceremoniei. The king had intended after 
 the marriage, to give an entertaiiuncnt at one of his cojlijtry- 
 houfes, but the fecret committee ordered him to give it at 
 Stockholm. 
 
 Upon the arrival of the Princefs, the ftates interfered fo far 
 as to(. nominaite even the ladies of the bed-chamber. Her 
 Royal Highnefs requefted that (he might be allowed to appoint 
 to that oiHce herfelf. It was at length refolvcd that this fhould 
 be left to the king. 
 
 calculated
 
 [ 224 ] 
 
 ' Calculated to give a final blow to French Influence^ 
 and promote a union between Sweden and Eng- 
 land. 
 
 By thefe the Swedilh miniftry were ordered to 
 declare to the Britifh envoy, that Sweden was at 
 prelent at liberty to liften to the propofals of 
 England for a defenfive treaty. 
 
 In cafe an alliance was formed in the North, in 
 confequence of the union of the South, the Swedifh 
 miniftry were to enter into it preferably to any 
 other fyftem ; whether by feparate, whether by ac- 
 ceflary treaties, they were to accept of no propo- 
 fition on the part of France, *till what was ftipu- 
 lated by the treaties of 1757 and 1758 was com- 
 pletely fulfilled, and the money due from her to 
 Sweden paid j and even then they were to enter 
 into no engagements with that crown, which 
 could prevent or check the great plan abovemen- 
 tioned. 
 
 Laftly, by the final refolution of the committee, 
 the public expences were provided for 'till 1770, 
 without reckoning upon the French fubfidies, 
 which was the principal point relied on by the 
 friends of France, for obliging the fenate to call a 
 new diet. 
 
 Such was the refult of the diet concluded the 
 iithof Odober 1776. 
 
 SECTION
 
 [ 225 ] 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Containing ajketcb of the tranf anions preceding the 
 calling of an extraordinary Diet in 1767, ahd of 
 the changes brought about during that Diet. 
 
 IN fo fluftuating a government as that of 
 Sweden, where venality and corruption had 
 arifen to a height fcarcely credible, and where the 
 total indifference of thofe entrulled with a Ihare 
 in the legiflature to the public good, could 
 be equalled only by their ignorance of the 
 true interefts of their country ; it could little 
 be expedled that the new fyftem of politics, pro- 
 duced by the labours of the Englilh minifter, 
 Ihould long refift the attacks that would certainly 
 be made upon it. 
 
 No fooner was this Diet difTolved, than th© 
 French and court parties fet all engines at work, 
 devifing to diftrefs the miniftry, and compel the 
 fenate to convoke another. 
 
 The miniftry attempted to get a loan from Ge- 
 hoa of a hundred and f\fty thoufand pounds fter- 
 ling 1 had they obtained it, the defenfive alliance 
 with England might poflibly have been concluded 
 without a fubfidy : but France, not content 
 with perfifting in her laft refufal to pay the ten 
 millions and a half of livres fhe owed to Sweden, 
 interfered alfo on this occafion. • The duke do 
 Choifeuil told the Genoefe minifter at Paris in 
 
 Q^ plain
 
 [ 2l6 ] 
 
 plain terms, that the king his mailer having rea- 
 fon to be difpleafed with the conduft of Sweden, 
 and having learnt that the fubjefts of the republic 
 Vere going to lend a large fum of money to 
 that country, he had his majefty's orders to ' 
 write to the regency to forbid any fuch loan. 
 In confequence of this, the government of Genoa 
 fcnt an order to the principal perfon concerned, 
 and to the bank, to put a Hop to all fardier pro- 
 ceedings, either with regard to the fubfcription *, 
 or the remittances. 
 
 It was fhortly made no fecret that the court of 
 
 Verfailles projedled to give more power to the 
 
 . king of Sweden. France offered the payment of 
 
 four millions and a half of livres, on condition 
 
 that Sweden renewed the treaty of 1738: and the 
 
 French party fpread reports all over the provinces 
 
 among the peafants, that if the money from 
 
 France was obtained, their contributions would be 
 
 taken off. This the Hats imagined would occa- 
 
 fion fuch clamours for an extraordinary Diet, as 
 
 it would be impoflible for the fenate to refill:. 
 
 In the mean time perfons were appointed by 
 
 - that body, to treat with the Englifh minifter on 
 
 ; the fubjed of the defenfive alliance. But the 
 
 . negociation went on flowly, as the determination 
 
 . in England, not to give any fubfidy, proved an 
 
 < infupera^le obftacle to its fuccefs. The neceflity 
 
 of doing fomething to ballance the above-men- 
 
 r -• This prohibition wis fame months afterwards taken off 
 by the Genoefe government, in confequence of the remon- 
 ftrances of the Swedifh minifter at Vienna. 
 
 8 tioned
 
 [ 227 ] 
 tioned offer of France, in the eyes of the people, 
 was obvious. The Swedilh demand upon Eng- 
 land was fifty thoufand pounds. The fenate pro- 
 pofed that this fubfidy fhould not commence 
 till the end of two years, and that it was to be 
 paid only during five, though the treaty was not 
 to expire in lefs than ten. The Britifh minifter, 
 in bis anfwer to this propofal, foftened as much. 
 as pofTible the refufal of the fubfidy : it was how- 
 ever too evident, that the fenate, although per- 
 fedUy well inclined to it, dared not proceed in the 
 bufinefs, without procuring fome indemnification 
 for the lofs Sweden would fuflain of the French 
 arrears, in cafe Ihe formed any connexions with 
 England. 
 
 While this affair remained in fufpence, the 
 French and court parties continued indefatigable 
 in their endeavours to diftrefs adminiflration. 
 
 They at length conceived a projeft, which they 
 juftly imagined could not fail to render an ex- 
 traordinary Diet abfolutely necelTaiy. This was, 
 that the king fhould declare to the fenate he was 
 refolved to abdicate the crown. The court and 
 French party were at the fame time to guarantee 
 to his majefly, that the flates, when called together, 
 Ihould requefl of him to refume it. 
 
 Agreeable to this projeft, the king produced 
 a written paper in the fenate, which he defired the 
 prince royal to read, and to deliver in order to 
 be inferted in the protocal. 
 
 It fet forth, " That the king had been called to 
 " the throne by the free choice of the flates. 
 '* That he had laboured for the happinefs and 
 0^2 for
 
 [ 11% ] 
 
 " for the liberty of his people ; but that as foon 
 " as the late king was dead, the ftates exacted 
 *' from his prefent majefty an aflurancei conceived 
 *' in nnuch ftronger terms than that which had 
 " been given by his immediate * predecefTor ; 
 " that afterwards the ftates had abridged his 
 " rights and prerogatives, fo as to render him 
 " only the firft flave in the nation. 
 
 " That in the preceding diet, they had again 
 " maide regulations prejudicial to his rights, to 
 ** which he declared he would never give his 
 ** confent ; nor to the appointment made by the 
 ** ftates of Count Pofle, to be about the perfon of 
 "hisfon." 
 
 Upon this two fenators were fent to the king, 
 with a reprefentation concerning the neccfllty of 
 putting the orders of the ftates into execution, as 
 well as of his figning the new regulations j but 
 his majefty abfolutely refufed to do it. 
 
 Nothing was in the mean time left undone by 
 the French party, to prepare the minds of the 
 people for the extraordinary ftep it was intend- 
 ed his majefty ftiould take of abdicating the 
 crown. 
 
 The prince royal, in a tour he made through 
 the kingdom, during which his winning addrefs 
 and amiable manners gained him great popu- 
 larity, colle6led a variety of complaints, to fliew 
 the neceflity of calling the ftates, in order to 
 redrefs the grievances which occafioned them. 
 
 All the governors in the French intereft were 
 prevailed upon to draw gloomy piflures of their 
 refpedive provinces j reprefenting that their ma- 
 nufactures
 
 [ 229 ] 
 
 nufafbures were ruined, and the people in the 
 greatefl nnifery. 
 
 The merchants likewife, who were for the mod 
 part in the fame intereft, endeavoured to lower 
 the courfe of exchange, in order tq put; a flop to 
 the working of the iron forges, 
 
 In Ihort, every nieafure was taken by the Hats 
 that could embarrafs adminiftration, however rui- 
 nous it might prove to the country. 
 
 The fenate, in order to defeat the main attack 
 of their oppofers, refolved not ta call an extra- 
 ordinary Diet upon any verbal declaration of the 
 king's i but only in cafe he figned a formal aft of 
 abdication, to which they imagined the queen 
 would never give her confent. 
 
 It is certain, their agreeing to call another 
 meeting of the Hates at that junfture, would in 
 fad have been to confent to their own depofition. 
 When the French party was overturned in the 
 preceding Diet, the nation expefted that the 
 Caps would have been able to have formed a 
 new fyftem abroad, as well as at homcj which 
 fliould they fail to accomplifh, it was impoffible 
 for that party to maintain themfelves in the admi? 
 niftration : they might then be accufed indeed 
 with fome juftice, of having thrown away the 
 fubfidies of France, and broke off all connexion 
 with that country, without having gained any 
 new ones to compenfate for the lofs of the 
 old. 
 
 - • Sometime in February 1768, the king, in pur- 
 suance of the plan of the French party, had pra- 
 pofcd to the fenators to call a new Diet. I'his 
 
 Q^ 3 propofal
 
 [ ajo ] 
 
 propofal was then rejefted by thirteen voices, only 
 one of the fenators voting with his majefty. The 
 Hats were however determined to renew the at- 
 tack on the firft favourable opportunity. The 
 death of count Lowenheihn, which happened 
 fhortly afterwards ; the war which broke out 
 about this time between RufTia and the Porte ; 
 and the arrival of a new French miniller at 
 Stockholm, feemed to have furnifhed them 
 with as favourable a one as they could have 
 r/defired.* 
 
 -r The death of the count was a fatal blow to' 
 the Gap party; v/hilft the war between the Ruf- 
 fians and the Turks gave new life and vigour to 
 the Hats. 
 
 It was now therefore determined to carry intq 
 execution the long-projeded plan of the king'5 
 i. abdication. 
 
 His majefly however, having fome apprehen- 
 fions on the occafion, previoufly fent to five of the 
 chiefs of the French party, and declared to thern 
 he thought the meafures propofed to him too ha- 
 zardous, without his having fome fecurity that the 
 promife made on their part Ihould be performed. 
 He therefore required a folemn engagement from 
 them, that the reft of (he plan of the court of 
 France, and of that formed for the change of go- 
 vernment, fhould be the firft bufinefs entered up- 
 on by the ftates in the enfuing diet, and finiflied 
 before any other was undertaken ; to which they 
 all agreed. 
 
 Encouraged by this, the king on the twelfth of 
 December 1768, having refufed to fign an a(5l 
 
 prefente^
 
 [ sj« 1 
 
 prefented him by the fenate, addrefled a letter to 
 that body ; the purport of which was, " that 
 " when, fometime before, the major part of the 
 " fenators objedled to the calling of the ftates, tho' 
 " his majefty had acquiefced in their refolution, 
 " yet it was without the leaft convidion, as to the 
 " principles on which their objedions were' 
 " founded. That fihce that time, the publicic 
 " diftrefs had daily increafed j for the truth of 
 " which he referred them to the many petitions 
 ** prefented to his fon -, to the fudden decay of 
 " the irbn works, trade, and manufadlures j and 
 " to the negledl even of the cultivation of the 
 " land. That his paternal heart could not but 
 " be afflided at the thoughts of the weight of 
 " the prefent taxes, and the unheard of diftrefTes 
 •* which the raifing of them occafioned. That 
 ** by the fudden fall of the courfe of exchange, 
 " his fubjeds had been forced to pay a third 
 " more than they had confented to give * j that 
 *' he was" obliged to take notice of this, as by his 
 " folemn oath he was bound to preferve his 
 ** fubjefts inviolably in the enjoyment of their 
 " rights and privileges. That he did not lay the 
 " fault of this illegal taxation on the fenate ; but 
 " from whatever caufe it had arifen, the nation 
 
 • There is hardly any fpecie in Sweden ; and though the 
 nominal value of the paper-money in that country continue* 
 always the fame, the current value of it is perpetually vary- 
 ing. It is by its «0w/«a/ value that the taxes are paid : hence 
 thefe may be faid to increafe in proportioa as its current 
 Talue incrcafcs, and vie* ver/a, 
 
 *' had
 
 [ ?32 ] 
 " had a right to examine whether they would 
 *f grant it or not -, that is to fay, the ftates muft 
 " be affenmbled as loon as poflible. If, added he, 
 " contrary to my expefbation, the fenate fhould 
 " ftill object to it, I am forced hereby to declare, 
 " that in that cafe I do renounce the burthen of 
 " government, which the tears of fo many of my 
 " diftrefled fubjeds, and the decaying flate of 
 ** my kingdom render intolerable to me j referv- 
 *' ing to myfelf, when my faithful counfellors 
 *' the ftates are affembled, to declare to them my 
 "' reafons for having till then laid down the go- 
 ** vernment. In the mean time I forbid moft 
 " ftriclly the ufe of my name in any of the refo- 
 ^^ lutions of the fenate. Signed, 
 
 Adolphus Frederic." 
 
 His majefty infifted on having an anfwer to 
 this in eight and forty hours. The fenate how- 
 ever declined giving one until fome days after ; 
 and in the mean time every thing was done by 
 the Britilh and RufTian minifters to keep them 
 firm. 
 
 On the fourteenth the king went to the fenate, 
 and demanded an immediate anfwer. They repre- 
 fented the impoflibility of examining in fo fhort 
 a time, all the reafons for and againft the aflem- 
 blingof an extraordinary Diet j and defired at leaft, 
 that they might be allowed till the following 
 Monday to confider of it : but as to what his 
 majetty iiad faid with refpe6t to laying down the 
 government, they hoped he would not purfue a 
 meafure fo contrary to the laws, and to his own 
 gracious aflurances. 
 
 The
 
 I ^33 'i 
 
 The king replied, that he looked upon this re- 
 prefcntation as a refufal -, declaring, that he would 
 from that hour, have nothing to do with the 
 regency j fo rofe from his chair and left the 
 ienate. 
 
 As foon as his majefty returned to his apart- 
 ment, he fenc the prince royal in a coach and 
 fix, attended by feveral of the officers of hisj 
 royal highnefs's houlhold, to the college of chan- 
 cery 3. where he n^ade a formal demand in the 
 king's name, to have the ftamp delivered up 
 to him, with which his majefty's fignature was 
 made. 
 
 The college declined complying with this de- 
 mand j and the prince went thence to all the 
 other colleges, declaring to them, that the king 
 his father had laid down the government, and 
 giving them a printed copy of his majefty's rca- 
 ibns for fo doing. ■-* " 
 
 In the mean time," t!ie fenate continuing affem- 
 bled, deputed four of their body to wait upon 
 the king, and to befeech him not to abandon 
 the regency. They received for anfwer, that 
 his majefty perfifted in his refolution. 
 
 On their return, baronTriefendorf vice-prefident 
 of the chancery, ftood up, and fet forth the great 
 confufion into which the whole country would 
 be thrown, in cafe the fenate pretended to carry 
 on the government for eighteen months (the time 
 before which, in the ordinary courfe of things, a 
 Diet would not be aflembled) without the king. 
 ^: That no idea was lefs popular in Sweden than 
 that of an ariftocracyV he therefore concluded, 
 
 that
 
 [ 234 ] 
 that two fenators Ihould be Tent to his majefty, 
 to acquaint him that there was feme appearance 
 of the fenate's conforming to his majefty's deilres, 
 and to entreat him to refume the reins of go- 
 vernment. 
 
 This proppfition was carried by a majority of 
 fix to three, nine being the whole number pre- 
 fent. The king's anfwer was; when the Di- 
 et is refolved upon, my refignation falls of it- 
 felf. 
 
 The ipeech made by baron Triefendorf in the 
 fenate, difcoveringthat their weak lide was fear, 
 eijcouraged their antagonifts to venture to en- 
 gage the colleges, the magiflrates, the clergy, in 
 Ihort, all the executive part of the government 
 that reiides at Stockholm, excepting the high 
 court of jullice, openly to take part with the 
 ly^.. The day after his majefty's abdication, 
 the fenate had iflued out a fpecies of proclama- 
 tion to the following purpofe, (The ufe made of 
 the king's name in it, in di^ed oppofition to his 
 own a<9: and deed, gives it an appearance truly 
 ludicrous.) 
 
 " Whereas his majefty in the fenate is informed, 
 " that the prince royal, by particular order, noti- 
 " fied yeflcrday to all the colleges, that the king 
 " would not concern himfelf any longer in the af- 
 ** fairs of the government, it becomes highly necef- 
 *lfary to remind the colleges how the kingdorn is 
 to be governed, according to the form of govern- 
 ment, FJlJph tliey are fvvorn to maintain ; a:nd 
 in confequence pf which, no other orders are to 
 be valid or Qbeyed. but thofe which are given 
 
 (C
 
 [ a35 ] 
 
 ff out in his majefty's name from the fenatc, ancl 
 f' properly counter-figned. His majefty having 
 f' that confidence in all thofe who ferve in the fe- 
 ^« veral offices of the kingdom, that in fuch pref- 
 f' fing and dangerous circumflances for the nation 
 *' and for liberty, they wijl conduct themfelve? 
 *' according to the form of government, fo ^ 
 ^' they may anfwer it to God, the Kingf and thp 
 f ftates." 
 
 The anfwer of the principal colleges was, that 
 as by the fundamental laws Sweden could not be 
 governed without a king, any more than without 
 a fenate, they mufl remain in inadivity till the 
 ftates were convoked. 
 
 The refufal of thofe, who had fo confiderable a 
 fhare in the executive part of the government, to 
 obey the fenate until a meeting of the ftates, ren- 
 dered this a meafure abfolutely necefTary. 
 
 The fenate accordingly were compelled to come 
 to the following refolution. " That whereas fe- 
 i* veral of the colleges have declared that they 
 " would not obey his majefty's orders from the 
 ^* fenate, till the ftates were convoked ; that the 
 ** exchequer had refufed to fupply money -, and 
 ?' that Colonel Ehrenfward and General Ferfen, 
 ** commanders of the two regiments quartered in 
 " this city, have declared that they could not an- 
 •* fwer for the obedience of the foldiers, the fenate 
 ** find themfelves obliged to call an affembly of 
 *' the ftates on the 19th of the enfuing April." 
 
 By this ftep an efFedual ftop was put to the 
 treaty of alliance with England, as the fenate durft 
 
 not
 
 [ ^:i^ ] 
 
 'not Kave'ventured to take it upon themfelves af- 
 ^t^r having convoked the ftates. Thefe would of 
 courfe have expe(5l:ed an affair of fuch importanqe 
 ihould have been deferred till the time of their 
 affembling, and confequently the precipitating of 
 this, point, would of itfelf have been in the eye of 
 the flates a fufEcient caufe of complaint againft 
 the fenate, independent of the light in which they 
 might view the treaty itfelf. 
 
 Thus the French party deftroyed at one blow 
 the new fyitem that the friends of England and 
 RuIIia had erected in Sweden during the laft diet. 
 A fyftem which had required great abilities, joint- 
 ed to the moft indefatigable zeal in thofe who in- 
 troduced it. 
 
 The king now returning to the fenate, expreffed 
 the infinite pleafure he received from the convo- 
 cation of the flates i and declared that he doubted 
 not to be able to Ihew how innocent his intentions 
 were in all the tranfa<5lions of the preceding days'; 
 adding, that he had the fulleft convidlion that 
 wliat he had done would be approved both then 
 and afterwards. 
 
 Thus ended the interregnum, and the confufion 
 that had prevailed for fome time in public affairs. 
 The meafures purfued by the Hats upon this 
 bccafion were the boldeft ever ventured upon 
 from the time of the commencement df the late 
 form of government. They were confequently a 
 convincing proof that the leaders of that party 
 were fecure of being fo powerfully fupported by 
 
 France 
 5
 
 t r ^37 ] 
 
 France at the enfuing diet, as to. have nothing to 
 apprehend on account of a conduct, which might 
 otherwife have brought fome of them to the 
 block, and realized the abdication of the king. 
 
 The fad was, France had refolved to light up a 
 war in the north. It is well known Ihe had a con- 
 fiderable fhare in promoting that in which Ruffia 
 was then involved with the Porte. It is like- 
 wife pafl a doubt that her ambaffador at Conftan- 
 tinople had been very liberal of his promifes to 
 the Turks, that the Swedes would make a diver- 
 fion in their favour by attacking Ruffia in the 
 north, while the Ottoman armies purfued their 
 operations in the fouth. 
 
 In the preceding Auguft * the Swedifh minifter 
 at the Porte, had an audience of the Reis EfFendi, . 
 who alked him, if what the French ambaffador at 
 Conllantinople had reported relative to the prepa- 
 rations making in Sweden was true, and how foon 
 they might expeft to fee hoftilities begun againft > 
 Ruffia. The Reis Effendi put him in mind, at 
 the fame time, of the generofity of the Turks in 
 remitting the debt of Charles the Xllth, and in- 
 filled upon a pofitive anfwer. 
 
 France, therefore, was apprehenfive of lofing 
 her credit at the Ottoman Porte, if fhe did not 
 engage the Swedes to perform the promifes fhe 
 had made for them to the Turks. For this reafon, 
 Ihe refolved to fpare no expence to recover her 
 former influence in Sweden, as well as to carry 
 
 • In 1767, 
 
 into
 
 [ 438 i 
 
 into execution/ at the approaching diet, the plan 
 Ihe had for fome time projected of changing the 
 Swedifh government. 
 
 ,The Diet of this year was confequently likely 
 t6 prove the moft critical, with refpeft to the fate 
 of the form of government, of any fince its efta- 
 blilhment j and, which was a point of much ' 
 greater importance, if France was to have remain- 
 ed unoppofed during the courfe of it, fhe would 
 probably have involved all Europe in a war. 
 
 All parties now applied themfelves vigoroufly 
 to purfue their feveral interefts in the eleftions for 
 the t)iet. The French minifter at this time had 
 a confiderable advantage over his opponents ; he 
 was the only one who had eventual orders, none 
 of thofe of the other courts knowing the fenti- 
 irients of their refpedive fovereigns in regard to 
 thefe extraordinary meafures. Reports were alfo 
 fpread, that he fhould fhortly have twelve millions 
 of livres at his difpofal to beftow in fubfidies, &c. 
 provided SWedeh would enter thoroughly into the 
 views of France i and advice was foon afterwards 
 received, that ten millions were adually depofited 
 in four different houfes at Amfterdam, to be made 
 ufe of by the French minifler fot this purpofe. 
 Even Spain, little as Ihe may feem concerned in 
 the affairs of Sweden, began, at the infligation of 
 France, to take a part in the tranfadlions going 
 forward in that country j and in order to detach 
 Denmark from the Englilh and Ruffian interefl, 
 offered the Danes to allow them to tranfport ne- 
 groes to the Spanifh Wefl Indies, Added to all 
 
 . this.
 
 [ 2j9 1 
 
 this, the Swedilh merchants entered into a large 
 fubfcription to fupport the friends of the French 
 party. 
 
 Such fomnidable preparations feemed to threaten 
 at once, the entire re-eftablifhment of the French 
 fyllcm in Sweden, and the total overthrow of the 
 Caps. 
 
 Thefe, however, were not idle. Ruflia was too 
 much intereiled in the event of the approaching 
 Diet, and too well informed of the machinations 
 of France, not to refolve upon giving that party 
 the warmeft fupport. 
 
 With regard to England, her minifler at 
 Stockholm was authorized to afiifl: the Caps in 
 obtaining a majority in the Diet ; and as to Den- 
 mark, Ihe then entered into thefe meafures with 
 as much zeal and vigour as Ruflla. 
 
 But the Hats had confiderably got the ftart of their 
 opponents in canvafllng for the eledions ; and the 
 fum faid to have been furnifhed them by the French 
 minifter for this purpofewasimmenfe. Accordingly, 
 on the opening of the Diet, the majority among 
 the nobles, clergy, and burghers appeared to be 
 greatly in favour of the French party. Among 
 the peafants indeed, the Caps retained their fupe- 
 riority. The ele6tions of the fpeakers of all the 
 four orders were likewife carried againft the Cap 
 party *. General Ferferi, one of the moft zealous 
 and able partizans of France, was elected marfhal 
 
 of 
 
 • The night before the day of clefting the fpeaker of the 
 peafiQtt, a report was propagated among them that the Capt 
 
 intend*
 
 t 240 ] 
 
 of the Diet J and the French party having the fe- 
 cret committee entirely at their devotion, as not a 
 fingle Cap had been chofen into it, they imme- 
 diately became pofTefled of the whole goverrr- 
 mentj and could, if they had thought proper, 
 have purfued every part of the plan laid down by 
 the court of Verfailles. 
 
 Fortunately for the Caps the friends of France 
 were divided into two parties j one of which en- 
 tered into all the prqjefts of the court for 
 rendering the government abfolutej while the 
 objeft of the other was, only to turn out the pre- 
 fent miniftry, and put themfelves in thdr placed ; 
 but they declared, that they were, at the fame 
 time, equally averfe with the Caps to any material 
 change in the conftitution. The former wefe 
 more particularly ftiled the court-party, and the 
 latter the old Hats. At the head of thefe laft was 
 colonel Pecklin, a man of the firft abilities, as well 
 as of the greateft influence in the Diets j and who, 
 may with juftice be faid, to have belonged to no 
 party, any farther than that party adhered to prin- 
 ciples from which he never fwerved himfelf. 
 
 The firft bufinefs entered upon in the fecret 
 committee, was, as might have been expefled, the 
 depofing of fuch members of the fenate as had 
 been introduced into that body through Englifh 
 and Rufiian influence. In this point all the Hats 
 were agreed, and indeed they had not fcrupled for 
 
 intended to depofe the king, which was the caufe of their 
 lofing the majority in that eleftion. 
 
 fom«
 
 [ 241 1 
 fome time before to tell thofe fenators openly that 
 they would be immediately depofed, to make room 
 for another adminiftration attached to the French 
 alliance. Nothing could be more frivolous or 
 worfe grounded than the charges brought againfl 
 them, and brought, it muft be prefumed, only for 
 the fake of form, as at all events they muft have 
 been difmifled by a Diet, of which the Hats were 
 mafters. 
 
 Accordingly their depolition took place Imme- 
 diately on the meeting of the ftates ; who came to 
 a refolution to reftore all the fenators removed by 
 the preceding Diet, and to make Cou:\t Eckebladt 
 again prefident of the chancery. 
 
 It was refolved likcwife in the houfe of nobles, 
 to prefent an addrefs to his majefty, to thank him 
 for his great goodnefs and love of his people, in 
 having determined to abdicate his crownj if the 
 fenate could not have been prevailed upon to af- 
 femble the ftates i and that the king fhould in his 
 turn thank the colleges for the refolution they 
 had taken not to proceed in any bufinefs, in cafe 
 of fuch abdication. 
 
 The foreign miniftcrs, who Supported the Cap 
 parry, were convinced of the little utility of oppo- 
 fing at this jundure the depofition of the fenate, 
 or change of the adminiftration, and therefore did 
 not attempt it j referving their whole ftrength for 
 the intended attacks upon the conftitution. 
 
 In the mean time the French minifter ufed his 
 utmoft endeavours to convince the Swedes of the 
 neceflity of their entering into the clofeft connec- 
 tions with his moft Chriftian Majefty. The ian- 
 
 K guagc
 
 [ 242 ] 
 guage held by the Hats, was, that Sweden wanted 
 fobfidies of all forts both publick and private ; 
 that France would give them, England v^oiild not; 
 that a thirty years friendfhip had lubfifted between 
 Sweden and France, who had now made offers to 
 the Swedes, highly advantageous to their com- 
 merce in the Mediterranean*. That England 
 was their rival in fhipping and manufaftures ; that 
 fhe fpoke openly of fupplying herfelf with iron 
 from her own colonies, and already took a great 
 quantity from RufTia, in order to have nothing 
 more to do with Sweden. 
 
 Thefe arguments might have had fome weight, 
 had they been backed by the immediate payment 
 of a part of the French arrears ; but this was not 
 to be done, unlefs the projeft of France with re- 
 gard to the conllitution fucceeded. - The Cap 
 party did not fail to take advantage of the delays 
 of France with refpeft to this point, to foment the 
 difcontents occafioned by them among the people. 
 They aiTerted, and with great juftice, that France 
 only wanted to involve them in a war with Ruf- 
 fia J that they had already fufficiently fuffered from 
 the two laft wars, in which they had been engaged 
 by the artifices of the court of Verfailles -, that the 
 fublidies granted them by that court were not only 
 altogether unequal to the expences which French 
 
 • The offer of France on this occafion was, that having 
 made a conqueil of the Lland of Corfica, Ihe was determined 
 it fliould be a free port ; that if Sweden would enter into a 
 ftrift alliance with his moH Chriilian Majefty, he would grant 
 fuch privileges to the Swedes, as would make that ifland a 
 maga2dne for all forts of Swedilh merchandize. 
 
 connexions
 
 [ 243 ] 
 connexions had ever led them into, but that fmall 
 as thefe were, they had been fo irregularly paid, 
 and fo much remained due, that they had brought 
 the country into the moft ferious diftrefs : finally 
 that at the prefent junfture, the finances, the mi- 
 litary eflablifliments, and the marine of Sweden, 
 were not in a condition to take any vigorous mea- 
 fures, fo that without injuring Ruflia, they might 
 ruin themfelves. 
 
 The arguments of the Cap party were too v/ell 
 founded not to have their due weight with the 
 nation, which, together with the divifion among 
 the Hats, enabled the friends of England and 
 RufTia to oppofe the views of France during the 
 remainder of the Diet, with a fuccefs they could 
 fcarcely have hoped for, from the alpedl of affairs 
 at its commencement. 
 
 After the depofition of the fenators in the Cap 
 interell, and placing the adminiflration in the 
 hands of the Hats, there ftill remained three 
 points to be accomplifhed by the French party ^ 
 without which all the expence France had before 
 been at, would have proved of little or no advan- 
 tage to her. 
 
 Thefe were, to effedb a change in the Swedilh 
 conftitution, to engage Sweden in a French alli- 
 ance, and to involve her in a war with RufTia. 
 With regard to the firft, the objeft of the court 
 of Verfailles, was principally to give to the king 
 and the fenate a power to expedite all affairs be- 
 tween the Diets, of whatfoever nature they innight 
 be i and to form alliances, or even make war 
 without alTembling the Hates. This would have 
 
 R 2 rendered
 
 L 244 ] 
 rendered France miftrefs of the whole military 
 force of Sweden, and confequently have enabled 
 her to purfue her favourite defign of attacking 
 Rufiia, in order to make a diverfion in favour of 
 the Turks. 
 
 The leaders of the French party did not how- 
 ever fucceed in their firft trial on this occafion, in 
 the manner they expefted. Having founded their 
 friends upon the quellicn of giving the difpofition 
 of the military employments as far as a lieutenant- 
 colonel inclulive, abfolutely to the king, without 
 any prefentation, it did not appear to be at all 
 relifhed by them. And when the affair was 
 brought before the Diet, the propofed changes in 
 the conilitution, were in three of the orders re- 
 jefted with great warmth and indignation, by a 
 confidcrable majority j the clergy alone decided 
 in their favour. 
 
 The French party having failed in this point, , 
 the intended treaty of alliance between the courts 
 of Stockholm and Vcrfailles met with no better 
 fuccefs. By one of the articles of it, Sv/eden was 
 to concliide no treaty with England, or with any 
 other power, without the participation of France. 
 She was likewife to obtain the recall of the Eng- 
 lilh minifter then at Stockholm, and to have no 
 other for the future from the court of Great 
 Britain, after this alliance fhould be concluded. 
 By another of the articles, Sweden was to keep 
 fifteen thoufand men in Finland, ready to march 
 on the fhorteft warning j fo that it is obvious a 
 war between Sweden and Ruflla would have been 
 the confequence, if France had fucceeded in her 
 
 defiga
 
 [ 245 ] 
 
 defignd uring the Diet. Upon the whole fhe had 
 gained nothing in the coiirfe of it, from all her 
 cxpence and trouble but a change of the admi- 
 niftration j and even this proved of but little ad- 
 vantage to her, on account of her partizans hav- 
 ing failed in their attempt to give a power to 
 the king and fenate, to cany on a defenfive war, 
 without affembling the itates; as well as becaufe 
 the fenate were forbid to tranfport any troops I 
 from Sweden to Finland, before the next meeting 
 of the Diet. 
 
 The inftruclions however of the fecret com- 
 mittee, which were to regulate the condu6b of 
 the fenate after the feparation of the frates, were 
 pretty nearly the reverfe of thofe formed only 
 two years before, by the fecret committee of the 
 preceding Diet. 
 
 The fubftance of thefe w.ts, that though ths 
 fenate was to maintain a good underftanding with 
 all the neighbouring courts, ir would not be pru- 
 dent to enter into any defenfive alliance with any 
 of them for the prefent ; but particularly not into 
 the northern league, which had been for fome time 
 in agitation. They declared that France and 
 the Ottoman Porte were the natural allies of 
 Sweden. Spain and Auftria, as being in an in- 
 timate union with France, were likewife recom- 
 mended as her natural friends. 
 
 They obferved that the objeft of England was, 
 to acquire the empire of the fea, and to augment 
 her commerce at the expence of other nations : 
 fhe could not therefore be looked upon as a well- 
 wifher to the profperity of Sweden; particularly 
 
 R 3 / as
 
 [ 246 ] 
 
 as fiie had fo lately an opportunity of entering 
 into a clofe connexion with Sweden, of which Ihe 
 did not chufe to avail herfelf by granting a fub- 
 fidy. The fenate were therefore to form no en- 
 gagements v/ith the Britilh court. 
 
 It was at the fame time infinuated to the 
 French minillry, that notwithilanding their 
 friends at Stockholm had found it impoflible 
 during this Diet to fatisfy the court of France, 
 according to former promifes, yet every means 
 fhould be ufed to put the kingdom in a proper 
 ftate of defence, and to prevent any extraordi- 
 nary Diet for the future. That the mifcarriage 
 of the affair of the conftitution fhould not im- 
 pede the execution of the plan of operations 
 formerly fettled, nor diminifh the difpofition of 
 the Swedifh miniflry to go through with it j pro- 
 vided the French arrears were paid, in order 
 to furnifh money for the preparations, which 
 fnould go on as foon as the Diet was finifhed. 
 
 It was likewife intimated to the Porte, that the 
 ftate of affairs in Sweden, would not allow of her 
 making any immediate diverfion in favour of the 
 Turks i but that it was notwithilanding her in- 
 tentions to embrace the firfl opportunity which 
 Ihould offer for this purpofe j and in the mean 
 time every neceffary preparation fhould be con- 
 tinued, that the Swedes might hold themfelves 
 in readinefs. 
 
 This was all that occurred worthy notice, in 
 the Diet concluded the thirtieth of January 
 1770, 
 
 SECTION
 
 [ 247 ] 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Containing an Account of the Revolutionj and of the 
 Steps which immediately led to it. 
 
 IN the preceding feftions, I have endeavoured 
 to give a fuccinft view of the ftate of affairs in 
 Sweden, during the two Diets immediately ante- 
 cedent to that in which the late Revolution was 
 accomplilhed. 
 
 The defigns of the court, the nature of the par- 
 ties, the intrigues of the foreign miniflers, and 
 the different obje6ls of the powers who employed 
 them, were all points with which it was necefTary 
 the reader fhould be made acquainted, in order to 
 enable him to fee into the true fources of the great 
 event which followed. 
 
 It may not be requifite to recapitulate thefe, 
 only let it be remembered, that the intention of 
 France had now for fome time been to overturn 
 the Conftitution of Sweden j that of England and 
 RufTia, to preferve it. 
 
 It did not, however, appear that the court of 
 Verfailles had as yet determined in what manner 
 this revolution was to be brought about. 
 
 During the preceding Diet the French party 
 had been foiled in all their attempts to effefl fuch 
 a change by means of the ftates themfelves. A 
 method, which from being the moft fecure, was 
 the mofl agreeable to the difpofition of the late 
 
 R 4 kin
 
 [ H8 ] 
 
 king. Thofe people who thought the members 
 of the Diet fufficiently corrupt to have been 
 bribed into any meafures, did not attribute to 
 their virtue the prefervation of their form of go- 
 vernment ; but imagined they had been as well 
 paid for doing their duty, as they could have 
 been for betraying their trufi:. 
 
 Defeated in her expeftation of being able to 
 accomplilh her point by means of corruption 
 alone, it became neceflary for France to make ufe 
 of fome other mode more likely to be attended 
 with fuccefs. That of effefting a revolution by 
 force, appeared, from the temper of the Swedes, 
 by no means impracfticable. But the gentle pa- 
 cific difpofition of Adolphus Frederick was ill 
 adapted to an undertaking of this fort. He was 
 befides a foreigner ; the nation would not confe- 
 quently have had that confidence in him, v/hich 
 they might have placed in a prince born and bred 
 among them. 
 
 PoiTelTed of every virtue which adorns private 
 life, but unacquainted with that ambition which 
 thirfts after power, he was devoid of the fpirit of 
 enterprize, which ufually accompanies it. Form- 
 ed for dpmeftick happinefs, his paternal feelings 
 would not have fuffcred him to take any ftep, 
 lyhich, if unfuccefsful, might involve his family in 
 ruin. It was only after much folicitation that 
 fome time before the laft Diet he had ventured 
 upon that of abdicating the crov/n ; and as he 
 advanced in years, he feemed anxious only for 
 
 tranquillity and repofe. 
 
 During
 
 [ 249 ] 
 
 During the life, therefore, of Adolphus Frede- 
 rick, the court of Vcrfailles could have little ex- 
 peftation of being allowed to attempt by force 
 any change in the conilitution of Sweden. 
 
 In the mean time a Ihew of military prepara- 
 tions was carried on there, in order to fulfil the 
 aflurances given by the Swedifli minifter at the 
 Ottoman Porte, and to deceive the Turks into an 
 idea of Sweden's making a diverfion in their fa- 
 vour; by which it was prefumed they would be 
 induced to prolong the war with Ruflia. 
 
 The delay at this time of the Danilh court in 
 fending back their minifter who had been abfent 
 nine months, gave the French party in Sweden 
 room to flatter themfelves with the hopes of a 
 change of fyftem in Denmark, which might bring 
 about the old French proje6b, mentioned on a 
 former occafion, of an alliance between the Swedes 
 and the Danes againft RuITia, under the diredtion 
 and fupport of France. 
 
 Great expectations were likewife formed by 
 them from the event of the Prince Royal's jour- 
 ney to Paris, which he had at this period under- 
 taken. A vifit that was then fuppofed to be made 
 at the exprefs defire of the duke de Choifeuil, in 
 order that the young prince might confer with 
 that minifter, upon means of changing the Swe- 
 difti government into a more abfolute one, as 
 well as to eftablifti a French fyftem there upon 9 
 more folid foundation. 
 
 On the other hand, the Caps having defeated 
 |:he chief objedls of their antagonifts during the 
 
 preced'
 
 C 250 ] 
 
 preceding Diet, were no wife alarmed either at the 
 prefent fituation of things, or at the fchemes which 
 the French party appeared to be meditating for 
 the future. 
 
 They were fenfible the difpofition of the late 
 king would, during his life at leaft, fecure the 
 conflitution from being overturned by violence ; 
 and though the Hats had put themfelves in pof- 
 feflion of the adminiftration, and of all the prin- 
 cipal pofts of the kingdom, yet the fenfe of the 
 nation was evidently againft them. 
 
 This was owing to two caufes. Firfl, Becaufe 
 the people were fully convinced of their own ina- 
 bility to fupport a war with Ruflia, which they 
 perceived the leading party, out of compliment to 
 France, aimed at producing : Secondly, Becaufe 
 they had been highly difgufled with the lafl men- 
 tioned power, on account of the chicaneries and 
 delays which the court of Verfailles had fo often 
 put in practice, with refpedt to the payment of 
 the arrears. 
 
 The Englifh and Ruffian minifters did not fail 
 to lay down a proper plan to improve this difpo- 
 fition in the nation, and to fecure the moft deci- 
 live majority in the next Diet that fhould be af- 
 iembled. 
 
 They obferved that France feemed ftartled at 
 the expence with which the conteft was likely to 
 be attended. And they judged it very probable 
 that if her party was not more fuccefsful at a fu- 
 ture Diet, than they had hitherto been with refpedt 
 to the points fhe was defirous of obtaining, Ihe 
 would altogether withdraw her fupport from that 
 
 party.
 
 [ 251 ]* 
 
 party, and watch for fome opportunity when Ihe 
 might efFed by force, what fhe was unable to ac- 
 complilh in a lefs hazardous way. 
 
 The defigns of France againft the conftltution 
 were well known, for they had been in fome mea- 
 fure avowed. This had awakened the jealoufy of 
 fuch of the Hat party as were defirous to preferve 
 the form of government entire, however they might 
 otherwife be attached to the French fyftem j and 
 it confirmed the Caps in the opinion, that they 
 had no other way of fecuring their conftitution 
 from the dangers with which it was threatened, 
 than that" of throwing themfelves into the arms of 
 England and Ruflia. 
 
 It was expefted that wrought upon by their 
 fears, the Cap party might be induced at the en* 
 fuing Diet, to accede to the alliance propofed to 
 them by the Englifh and Ruffian minifters, with- 
 out infilling upon the point of the fubfidy, which 
 hitherto proved the only obftacle to prevent that 
 alliance from taking place. 
 
 England and Ruffia were in that cafe to guaran- 
 tee to Sweden her form of government ; and the 
 grand northern league, the formation of which 
 was the undoubted intereft of Great Britain, would 
 probably have been the confequence of the union 
 of thefe three powers. 
 
 Such was the fituation of things in Swedett 
 when the death of the late king* gave a new face 
 to the affairs of that country. 
 
 • In February, I77»» 
 
 8 Thil
 
 [ 25* ] 
 , This event threatened to prove as fatal to 
 |he views of the Cap party, as it appeared fa- 
 vourable to thofe of the friends of France. It 
 removed the chief obftacle which had hitherto 
 prevented the cabinet of Verfailles from purfuing 
 the ob)e6t of effefting by force a change in the 
 Swedifh conftitution, and confequently deprived 
 the friends of England and Ruflia of their prin- 
 cipal fecurity, that no fuch attempt would be 
 made before they were fufficiently guarded 
 againfl: it. 
 
 The prince royal was at Paris at the time of 
 his father's death> where he was endeavouring 
 to obtain certain points from that court, con- 
 .cerning which the Swedifh adminiftration had 
 hitherto remonftrated in vain. The acquifition 
 of the regal dignity, by giving a new confequence 
 to the royal negociator, gave an uncxpefted 
 fuccefs to the negociation itfelf. 
 
 The French court agreed to pay Sweden a mil- 
 lion and a half of livres annually, and it was no 
 longer a queftion whether flie would furnifh mo- 
 ney to fupport her friends at the enfuing Diet.* 
 
 According 
 
 • Lieutenant General Count Scheifer, who on this occa- 
 "fion was difpatched by the fenate to compliment his ma- 
 jefty on his acceflion, by a piece of addrefs obtained from the 
 French court aconfiderable part of the arrears fo long due to 
 Sweden. 
 
 It was night when the count arrived at Verfailles, to 
 acquaint the late king of France with the death of Frederic 
 Adolphus; and as his majelly had retired to his bedchamber, 
 it was with fome difficulty the count gained admittance to 
 
 him :
 
 [ 253 ] 
 
 •According to the new form of governnticnt, t 
 new Diet was to be convoked within thirty 
 days from the death of the king j but on ac^ 
 count of the prince's abfence, and in order to 
 enable him to compleat whatever might remain 
 unfettled between him and the court of France, 
 the fenate did not appoint an aflembly of the 
 ilates till the June following. 
 
 This delay was fortunate for the Caps, as it 
 gave the Britilh and Ruflian minifters time to 
 exert themfelves during the abfence of the young 
 king, in order to procure a majority at the ap- 
 proaching Diet. 
 
 It was then obvious this diet was to deter- 
 mine the fate of the Swedifh form of government, 
 and that if the friends of France obtained an 
 afcendency in it, the partizans of England and 
 Ruflia would never again be able to mal^e a 
 (land againft the French intereft, fince the change 
 the court of Verfailles defigned to make in the 
 
 him: he then abruptly informed his majcfty of the death of 
 the king of Sweden. By the unexpeftednefs of the vifit at 
 fo unufual an hour, the old king was taken by furprize, be- 
 fore he could have any previous confultation with his 
 minifters ; and the nature of the intelligence appeared 
 highly to affeft him. Count Scheffer feized upon that mo- 
 ment to paint to his majefty the deplorable fituation of the 
 finances of Sweden, and the diftreffes confequent upon it, to 
 which that country had been reduced j adroitly infmuating 
 that this was altogether owing to the non-payment of the 
 French arrears. In the fituation of mind into which the king 
 had been thrown, the eloquence of the count could not fail 
 to have due weight ; and accordingly his majefty gave him 
 his word he would next day order his minifters to fatisfy the 
 Swedifh demande. 
 
 Swedilh
 
 [ 254 ] 
 Swedifh conftitution, would infallibly deprive 
 them of the means of oppofing that interefl for 
 the future. 
 
 Accordingly the Caps were fo ftrenuous in 
 their efforts on this occafion, and fo power- 
 fully fupported by the Britifh and Ruffian mi- 
 nifters, that after the elections had taken place, 
 there appeared among the three inferior orders a 
 confiderable majority of that party. 
 
 In the mean time the young king wrote in 
 the mod gracious terms to the fenate, approv- 
 ing of all the fteps they had taken, and repeat- 
 edly affijring them that he defigned to govern 
 according to the laws. 
 
 The language held by the French party, was 
 alfo that no attempt would be made upon the 
 conftitution ; that they only meant to procure 
 the payment of the arrears due to them from 
 France J but that they would do nothing to 
 obtain them which could juftly offend any other 
 power. 
 
 This was calculated wholly to abate the op- 
 polition made to them, and to keep themfelves 
 in the adminiftration till they had ruined the 
 other party, which would have fet them at liberty 
 to a6t afterwards according to the fuggeftions 
 of France. 
 
 His Swedifh majefty in his way from Paris 
 paid a vifit to his uncle the king of Pruffia, and 
 gave him the ftrongeft affurances of his pacific 
 intentions, and of his defire to govern according 
 to the laws of his country, without aiming in the 
 leaft at any augmentation of his authority. His 
 
 Pruffian
 
 [ 255 ] 
 
 Pruflian majefty expreffed the higheft fatisfafblon 
 at thefe declarations, and ftrongly recommended 
 it to his nephew to perfevere in thofe intentions :* 
 immediately afterwards the king fet off for 
 Stockholm, where he arrived about the end of 
 May. 
 
 Since the eftabliHiment of the late form of 
 government in the year 1720, the Swedes had 
 hitherto beheld only foreigners on the throne, 
 Frederic the Firft, and Frederic Adolphus; 
 princes who neither of them had any hereditary 
 claim to the crown^ and who both were confe- 
 quently indebted for the dignity they enjoyed 
 to the free eleftion of the people they governed : 
 who therefore could not conceive they poflefled 
 
 • It has been a generally received opinion that the king of 
 Pruflia had no inconfxderable fhare in bringing about the late 
 revolution. But the reverfe of this is the truth. 
 
 When the king of Sweden arrived at Brunfwick, on his 
 road to Stockholm, he wrote a letter to the king of Pruffia, ia 
 which he acquainted him, that he had come fo far in the in- 
 tention of paying his court at Berlin ; but that affairs were 
 fo preffing for his return to Sweden, that it would be impoJli- 
 ble for him to have that fatisfadlion. As foon as the king 
 of Pruffia received this letter, he fent to prince Henry, telling 
 him, that he fuppofed his nephew was diverted from feeing 
 him by the infinuations of France; that it muft appear ex- 
 traordinary in the eyes of all Europe, that he ihould have 
 been twice at Brunfwick without going to Berlin ; and there- 
 fore he recommended it to the prince, who knew the young 
 king's charadler better than he did, to write a proper letter 
 upon the occafion, which fhould be delivered into his Swedifli 
 majefty's own hand. 
 
 This was accordingly done, and on the receipt of tJw 
 prince's letter the king fet out for Potfdam, 
 
 any
 
 [ 256 ] 
 
 any right to a greater fhare of power than that 
 people had allotted to themj and who unexpeft- 
 edly finding a fcepter placed in their hands, muft 
 naturally have confidered the external honours 
 paid to royalty as an acquifition of no fmall im- 
 portance; an acquifition fufficiently dazzling to 
 thofe not accuftomed from their childhood to look 
 forwards to it, to make them forget in the fplen- 
 dor of a crown, how little real power that of 
 Sweden conferred upon the wearer. 
 
 It was to thefe circumftances perhaps that the 
 Swedilh conftitution partly owed its fafety during 
 the reigns of the above-mentioned monarchs ; but 
 from the temper and difpofitions of thofe princes 
 it likewife derived fecurity. 
 
 The charafter of Frederic Adolphus has been 
 already given ; and that of Frederic the Firlt fo 
 far bore a refemblance to it, that he was equally 
 incapable of any enterprize which required a fpi- 
 rit of intrigue to carry it into execution j and 
 equally averfe to difturb the tranquillity of his 
 reign, by any violent attempts to increafe his 
 authority. 
 
 It was perhaps only under two fuch monarchs 
 as thefe, that the Swedifh form of government^ 
 defective and corrupted as it was, could poflibly 
 have fubfifted fo long.— But in his prefent ma- 
 jefty of Sweden, the Ion and fucceflbr of Frederici 
 Adolphus, his fubjeds beheld a prince of a very 
 different genius. 
 
 Guftavus the Third was about five and twenty 
 when he was proclaimed king of Sweden. 
 
 From his mother, the prefent queen dowager, 
 
 filler
 
 [ "-59 ) 
 filler to the king of PrufTiaj he feems to inherit 
 the Ipirit and abilities of his uncle i from his fa- 
 ther, that benevolence of heart, which ftill ren- 
 ders the naemory of Frederic Adolphus dear to 
 the Swedes. 
 
 Born with talents that would have reflefted 
 luftre on any rank, but peculiarly fuited to the 
 exalted one he was deftined to hold ; his natural 
 endowments were cultivated to the higheft pitch, 
 by an education the moil finiflied, and moft 
 nicely adapted to a fituation, which would pro- 
 bably one day require their fulleft exertion. 
 
 By a graceful and commanding oratory, the 
 moft captivating manner and infinuating addrefs> 
 he caught the hearts of thofe who beheld him 
 only in public ; by an extent of knowledge and 
 depth of judgment, he excited the admiration -of 
 fuch as had an opportunity of being nearer hii 
 perfon. But neither of thefe could as yet fufpe^ 
 him of that genius for intrigue, of that bold and 
 enterprizlng fpirit which have fince diftinguifhed 
 him ; neither could hope that fuch a genius, 
 whilft it was exerted to promote the particular inte- 
 refts of the prince who pofTefTed it, Ihould yet never 
 lofe fight of the happinefs of the people j that 
 fuch a fpirit Ihould be under the diredlion of pru- 
 dence, and in its courfe be marked by a modera- 
 tion as amiable as it is rare. 
 
 Neglectful of pleafures, yet not averfe to them, 
 without being difTipated, he tafted the amufements 
 of a court i and in the midfb of the clofeft applica- 
 tion to ftudy, retained all that graceful eafe which 
 qualifies to Ihine in a circle. He cultivated with 
 
 & equal
 
 [ 26o ] 
 
 *^ual fuGcefs the arts of governing, and of pleaf- 
 ingj and knew alike how to gain the refpedt, 
 and win upon the afFeftions of his future fub- 
 je<5bs. 
 
 Under the appearance of the moft difinterefted 
 patriotifm, an ambition great as his talents, lay- 
 concealed : and covered by a zeal for the welfare 
 of his fubjeds, his defigns upon their liberties 
 might have efcaped the penetration of the moft 
 fagacious. 
 
 Such were the talents, fuch the ambition of a 
 prince deftined to wield a fceptre, that could af- 
 ford no fcope for the one, no gratification to the 
 other. Who, mafter of every popular art, was 
 in a popular government, to fubmit to the ca- 
 price of a fenate, or the dictates of a foreign mi-* 
 nifter : who, fully equal to the tafk of governing 
 others, was to be himfelf allowed no will of his 
 own; and who, poffefTed of the hearts of his 
 people, was to be their king only in name ; was 
 to content himfelf witH the gaudy trappings of 
 royalty, which he defpifed ; and was to refrain 
 from grafping at that power which formed the firft 
 objed of his wifhes. 
 
 Nothing could exceed the demonftrations of 
 joy teftified by the people at the arrival of 
 the king at Stockholm, but the amiable affa- 
 bility with which he received all who approached 
 him. No condufb could, be better calculated to 
 extend his popularity to the remoteft parts of his 
 dominions, than that which he adopted. 
 
 Three times a week he regularly gave audience 
 
 to all who prefented themfelves. It required 
 
 2 neither
 
 i "'6 1 1 
 
 hcitlier rank, fortune, or interefl to obtain accera 
 to him J it was fufficient to have been injured, 
 and to have a legal caufe of complaint to lay 
 before him. He liftened to the meaneft of his 
 fubjefts with the dignity of a fovereign indeed, 
 but at the fame time with the tendernefs of a pa- 
 rent. He entered into the minuteft details thac 
 concerned them; he informed himfelf of their 
 private affairs j and feemed to take all that in- 
 terefl in tl-keir happinefs which is fo grateful to 
 the unfortunate, and fo rarely to be met with in 
 perfons, w^hofe elevated flation place them in a 
 manner beyond the reach, or even the knowledge 
 of the fufferings of the lower claffes of man- 
 kind. 
 
 When a fovereign" condefcended to cares like 
 thefe, he could not fail to be confidered as the 
 father of his people. In the warmth of their 
 gratitude, they forgot that motives of ambition 
 might have had fome fhare in forming a condu6t 
 which to them appeared to proceed wholly from 
 the purell benevolence; a condufb, in which the! 
 tenor of his majefly's adions has indeed proved 
 he confulted his feelings, but which has likewife 
 been fince proved by the event> to have been the 
 wifeft he could have chofen for the purpofe of 
 carrying the defign he meditated into execu- 
 tion. 
 
 If his Swedifh majefly aimed thus fuccefsfully 
 at popularity, he likewife endeavoured to perfuade 
 the leading men of the kingdom into an opinion 
 of his fincere and inviolable attachment to the 
 conftitution of his country; of his being perfedly 
 
 S 2 fatisfied
 
 [ l62 ] 
 
 fatisfied with the fhare of power that conflitution 
 had allotted to him j and took every opportunity 
 to declare that he confidered it as his greateft 
 glory to be the firll citizen of a free people. 
 
 He feerned intent only on banifhing corruption, 
 and promoting union; he declared he would be 
 of no party but that of the nation ; and that he 
 would ever pay the mod implicit obedience to 
 whatever the Diet Ihould enad:. 
 
 Thefe profeflions created fufpicions among a 
 few, but they lulled the many into a fatal fecurity. 
 '^kole however who pofTeffed a greater fhare of 
 penetration, thought his majefty promifed too 
 much to be in earned j and notwithllanding he 
 maintained an outward appearance of impartiality, 
 they could not help obferving that all his favour- 
 ites were of the French party, as well as that the 
 whole adminiflration was at the beck of the court 
 of V'erfailles. 
 
 It was evident to the friends of England and 
 RuiTia^ that they had in Guftavus a more formida- 
 ble opponent to contend with than they had as 
 yet encountered, fince thofe powers firft inter-, 
 fered in the interior policy of Sweden. 
 
 Shortly after the king's arrival at Stockholm, 
 the court of France, which had lately employed 
 only minifters of the fecond order in Sweden, 
 now fent an ambaffador * thither, which was a 
 fufficient proof of the importance of the commif- 
 
 • Mr. de Vergennes who juft before had been Aixibaflador 
 at Conilantinople, a worthy and refpeflable man. He is now 
 minilter tor the department of foreign affairs at Paris. 
 
 iion
 
 [ ^63 ] 
 
 fion with which he was charged. A minifter from 
 Spain foon after made his appearance there : this 
 feemed to threaten the opening of a new fourcc 
 of afTiftance from Madrid, to fupport the caufe 
 and friends of France in the approaching Diet. 
 
 In the mean time the Englifh and Ruffian mi- 
 niflers were indefatigable in their endeavours to 
 guard againft thofe defigns of the Swedifh court, 
 which they had long known were in agitation, 
 and which from Hich formidable preparations ap- 
 peared to be haftening to maturity. 
 
 It was impofllble to oppofe thefe with effect, 
 but by a fpeedy conclufion of the treaty of alliance 
 between England, Ruflia, and Sweden, which was 
 to form the bafis of the projefted northern league. 
 As long as an adminiftration devoted to France,, 
 and warmly fupported by the king of Sweden 
 continued in power, no negociation for this pur- 
 pofe could be renewed. 
 
 The firft ftep therefore that it was neceflary 
 for them to take, v/as to procure the difmifllon 
 of a majority of the fenators, who were all in the 
 French intereft, and to place the adminiftration 
 in the hands of thofe who had proved themfelves 
 the Haunch friends of the Englilli and Ruffian 
 fyftem. 
 
 This being accomplifhed, they might leave the 
 remainder of their plan to be compleated by the 
 apprehenfions which the gradual difclofing of 
 the intentions of his Swedifh majefty could not 
 fail t© excite, not only among the Caps, but even 
 fuch of the Hats as were not difpofed, however 
 otherwifc attached to France, to purchafe a con- 
 
 S 3 nedioii
 
 C 264 ] 
 
 ne<^ion with that power at the cxpencc of their 
 (conftitution. 
 
 On the othpr hand, the king eafily penetrated 
 into the views of his opponents, and by the moft 
 artful policy endeavoured to defeat them. 
 
 On the opening of the Diet the Caps appeared 
 jto have the naofl decifive majority in the three 
 inferior orders. In the houfe pf nobles it is true 
 the Hats had the fuperiority, and of courfe the 
 marlhal of the Diet was of that party, which afr- 
 terwards proved a point of great confequencc 
 to the king, JBut in the fecret committee, all 
 the members taken from the order pf Burghs 
 prs were of the Cap party ; and there were only 
 four Hats among thofe chofen by the clergy. 
 
 That committee, as was obierved on a former 
 pccafion, pofTeffed abfolute power in what related 
 to foreign affairs, and in a great degree direded 
 all the operations of the ftates. Their refolutions 
 generally became the afts of the Diet ; and con- 
 fequently the Engliih and Ruffian intereft having 
 the afcendency in that body, the king muft have 
 foon perceived that his influence in it would be 
 proportionably fmall, 
 
 This fituation was certainly truly critical, 
 Should the Caps become matters of the Diet, an 
 event he had every reafon to apprehend, the dif- 
 miflion of all his friends aad partizans from every 
 office of truft and power, would be the infallible 
 confequence. This would probably be immedi^ 
 ately followed by the completion of that treaty 
 with Ruflla and England, by which his hopes of 
 Subverting the conftitution would be cut off for 
 
 ever.
 
 [ 26j ] 
 ever, as the contrading parties were to be guaran- 
 tees for its lafety. 
 
 The Hats indeed had a great majority in the 
 houfe of nobles, but even that party was by no 
 means at his Majeily's devotion. On the con^ 
 trary, inftead of having any reliance upon their 
 fupporting hiniy he appeared to derive his princi- 
 pal confequence from his adhering to them. 
 
 Their leaders had too long fed on the bounties 
 of France, to be eafily prevailed upon to yield 
 up their title to them, by confenting to any ma- 
 terial change in the conftitution. It was only 
 in virtue of the power which that conftitution 
 had vefted in them, that they pofTefled any claim 
 to the favours of the court of Verfailles. The 
 fubverfion of it would therefore deftroy all their 
 hopes of obtaining future emoluments from th« 
 fame quarter. 
 
 Only a few friends perfonally attached to the 
 king, were ready to co-operate with him in what- 
 ever he fhould undertake ; but their number was 
 fo fmall, they could hardly be denominated a 
 third party in the Diet ; neither did they aflume 
 the appearance of one, by adting in any manner 
 from themfelves. 
 
 Hardly feated on the throne, the affedions of 
 his fubjeds as yet untried, ignorant of the dilpo- 
 fition of the foldiery, and fome parts of his plan 
 not ripe for execution, his majefty was obliged to 
 zQi with all the caution and deliberation that tht 
 delicacy of his fituation required. 
 
 It was not fufficient for his purpofe that the 
 
 bulk of the nation had for fome time viewed the 
 
 S 4 conduct
 
 [ 1^^ 3 
 
 conduft of their governors with a filent and fullen 
 difcontent. It was neceflary to have their indig- 
 nation fufficiently kindled to make them take an 
 active part in favour of their fovereign, in cafe his 
 firft attempt fhouid prove abortive. In their af- 
 fedions only he might ground his future fecurity, 
 fhouid the blow he meditated to ttrike mifs it's 
 aim ; but it was by roufing their courage and 
 calling their zeal into a6tion, that he could alone 
 hope to be furnifhed with the means of repeating 
 it afterwards with more fuccefs. , 
 
 Patience and fubmifllon have been long the 
 •charafteriflics of the lower clafs of the Swedes. 
 They are not confcquently eafily moved to re- 
 fiftance ; and though it was probable they v/ould 
 not oppofe a change in their conftitution, it was 
 not to be expedtcd they would contribute to it, 
 unlefs their minds had been previoufly prepared 
 for the purpofe which would require both ma- 
 nagement and time to effeft. 
 
 Hence the king perceived, on the one hand, the 
 hazard he ran, Ihould he precipitate the execution 
 of his fchemes ; on the other, the afcendency the 
 friends of England and Ruflla had acquired in the 
 Diet, feemed to render delay equally dangerous. 
 
 Thus circumftanced, he purfu^&d the condudt 
 which might have been expefted from his pru- 
 dence, his judgment, and his penetration. A con- 
 du<5t which deceived all parties, and imperceptibly 
 promoted his own ends, as much as it was calcu- 
 lated to defeat theirs. 
 
 As the depofition of the fenate would be one 
 of the firft objefts of the Caps, it became necef- 
 
 fary
 
 [ 2t57 ] 
 fary for the king to endeavour to protra(5l, if he 
 could not prevent their fate. On this account it 
 was requifite that the Diet Ihould be rendered as 
 inadive as poflible, by throwing difficulties in the 
 way of every tranfaftion, which in the ufual 
 courfe of bufinefs was to precede that mea- 
 fiire. 
 
 One of the firft points gone into by the ftates 
 after their meeting was, that of regulating the 
 afllirarxces which were to be frgned by his majefly 
 previous to his coronation. 
 
 This created a difpute between the houfe of no- 
 bles and the other orders. A coolnefs had for. 
 fome time before fublifted between them, owing 
 to a very imprudent ftep taken by the fenatc the 
 preceding fummer. 
 
 Upon a particular occafion they had laid it down 
 "as a maxim, that all the great offices of the ftatc 
 were to be filled by the nobility only. The in- 
 ferior order aflerted that this was directly contrary 
 to the fundamental laws of the conftitution, and 
 that every man of merit of whatfoever rank, was 
 eligible to the higheft offices j and they were even 
 much difpofed to decide that a burgher might be 
 a fenator. 
 
 Contentions of this fort in a free ftate, have 
 been ever fatal to liberty ; and one great defect 
 in the Swcdifh form of government was, that in 
 its own nature it was peculiarly liable to them. 
 
 To widen this breach between the houfe of 
 nobles and the other orders, became evidently 
 the intcrefl of the court party, from its tendency
 
 f 268 ] 
 
 to create that Inadivity in the Diet, which was 
 fo favourable to the views of the King. 
 
 Notwithftanding that it is to be prefumed his 
 majefty fecretly fomented this difunion among the 
 ftates, he had the art however at once to reap 
 every advantage he could derive from it, and at 
 the fame time to acquire in the eyes of the na- 
 tion all the merit of endeavouring to heal divifi- 
 ons fo prejudicial to the flate. 
 
 With a paternal care he appeared folicitous 
 only to reconcile the different parties to each 
 other, whom he amufed by repeated propofals for 
 an accommodation between them, which he well 
 knew could not, nor never in reality wiflied fhould 
 take place : yet his difcourfes wore fuch an air 
 of fincerity, he feemed animated by fo warm a 
 zeal for the happinefs of his people, appeared fo 
 indifferent to his own interefls, and fo indefati- 
 gable in ufmg every means which could in any 
 ihape promote union among the members of the 
 Diet, that it was hardly poffible to penetrate into 
 his real intentions. 
 
 " If," faid he in the conclufion of one of his 
 fpeeches, " my intentions were lefs pure, lefs in-, 
 " nocent, lefs fincere ; if my heart was not filled 
 " with the mofl tender love for my country j for 
 " its independence, its liberty, its glory, and its 
 *' happinefs; I might quietly have watched my 
 ** opportunity, and after the example 'of other 
 " kings, my predeceffors, have feized the occa- 
 " fion to take advantage of their divifions, at 
 " the expencc of their liberty and their laws." 
 
 Suck
 
 [ 269 ] 
 
 Such was the language held by the king. He 
 even went a ftep farther. He fent to the Englifli 
 and Ruffian minifters, to know whether by their 
 means a union of the parties could not be 
 brought about. 
 
 His majefly likewife fet many negociations on 
 foot for this purpofe, which could anfwer no other 
 end than to expofe the condud of the ftates to 
 the nation, and place his own in the mofl amiable 
 point of view. By the one, he was fure to add 
 to his popularity J by the other, he hoped to 
 create among the people a diflike to their form of 
 government. 
 
 The point in difpute between the houfe of no- 
 bles and the other orders, was, whether any addi- 
 tion ihould be made to the aflurances which had 
 been figned by the late king in 175 1. 
 
 The latter aflerted that as many new laws had 
 taken place fince that period, it was necefla- 
 ry fome notice Ihould be taken of them in the 
 afTurances his prefent majefly was to give. The 
 former infifted that thofe Ihould remain as they 
 were. Both parties adhered pertinacioufly to their 
 opinion, and the confequence was that a flop was, 
 in a great meafyre, put to the proceedings of the 
 Diet. 
 
 The lower orders had certainly on this occafion 
 jufl grounds for complaint, and perhaps to fuf- 
 peft the fincerity of the king. What had been 
 refolved upon by three of the orders, could not, 
 according to the form of government, any longer 
 be confidered as a matter in difpute, but ought 
 immediately to have pafTed into a law. This the 
 
 nobles
 
 [ 270 ] 
 
 nobles had evaded by endeavouring to render the 
 prefent cafe, one of thofe in which the unanimous 
 confent of the four orders was requilite. 
 
 They aflerted that their privilege would be at- 
 tacked by fome of the additions which the infe- 
 rior orders propofed to mal<;e to the king's afTur- 
 ances. His majefty therefore by taking advantage 
 of this evafion, and refufing to fign the aflurances 
 without the concurrence of the nobles, rendered it 
 tolerably evident, that he was not altogether fo 
 anxious to fee union eftabliflied among the ftates, 
 as he endeavoured to have his fubjeAs imagine. 
 
 There was another reafon ftill ftronger for their 
 entertaining this opinion. The Caps had even in 
 the houfe of nobles a very eonfiderable party. 
 "The king's friends in that houfe could have turned 
 the majority in favour of the Cap party by aban- 
 doning the Hats. Confequently it was in his Ma- 
 jefty's power at any time to have had the concur- 
 rence of that houfe to the afTurances which he 
 declared himfelf fo ready to fign, if fuch concur- 
 rence could be obtained. 
 
 In this manner was the Diet rendered inactive, 
 and its operations fufpended ; fo that though the 
 Hates had been aflembled in June, it was not till 
 the February following, that is, till eight months 
 after, that the afTurances were finally regulated 
 and figned by his Majefly. 
 
 The obflinacy of the lower orders not to fuffer 
 any alteration to be made in them, together with 
 the inabilit)* of the leaders of the Caps to gain a 
 ftiajority in the houfe of nobles had even then ren- 
 dered this a point of the iJtmoll difficulty j and 
 
 its
 
 t 271 1 
 
 Its being at length accompllflied was altogether 
 owing to the prudence and moderation of a few 
 of the cliiefs of the Hat party, who becanne appre- 
 henfive of fome material breach in the conftitu- 
 tution, fhould the confufion in public affairs con- 
 tinue much longer. They therefore aflifted the 
 Caps on this occafion in carrying the aflurances 
 through the houfe of nobles. 
 
 But this confufion had already lalted fufficienfe* 
 ly long to make an imprefllon on the people ; to 
 expofe the defeats of the form of government ; to 
 fliew the influence that foreign powers had aC' 
 quired in the Diet, and to difplay the wifdom, the 
 difintereftednefs, and patriotifm of the king, who 
 had fo often, though in vain, offered his media-, 
 tion to accommodate the difputes which agitated: 
 the Diet. It had been of fuiEcient duration to 
 enable his majefty, fecretly to take many of thofe 
 fteps which were preparatory to the blow he in- 
 tended to ftrike. 
 
 No methods had been in the mean time left 
 untried to foment the jealoufies which fubfifted 
 between the different orders, and if polTible to 
 bring them to an open breach. There were emif- 
 faries likewife planted in every part of the king- 
 dom, for the purpofe of fowing difcontent among 
 the inhabitants j of rendering them difaffefted to 
 the eftabliflied government, and of exciting them 
 to an infurre<5tion. 
 
 The affair of the affurances being thus deter- 
 mined, the next point gone into by the flates, was, 
 an enquiry into the condu<^ of the fenate fince the 
 Uft Diet. The fecret deputation appointed for 
 
 this
 
 [ «72 ] 
 this purpofe did not finilh their exanrrmatldn till 
 the end 6f March ; the refult of which was, that 
 the fenators had forfeited the confidence of the 
 ftates, and the three inferior orders came to a rc- 
 folution, to depofe them all. 
 
 This was a refolution equally violent, impoli- 
 tic, and unjuft j and was entered into by the Cap 
 party, in diredb oppofition to the advice of the 
 wifeft of their own leaders, as well as that of the 
 foreign minifters who fupported them. In com^ 
 mon prudence they fhould have obferved fome 
 meafures with the Hats, and have difmifled fuch 
 a number of them only from the fenate j as would 
 be fufficient to fecure to themfelves a majority in 
 that body. It was certainly the height of folly 
 in them to render the other party defperate, at a 
 time they knew a defign was formed againft their 
 conftitution, and to make the Hats indifferent to 
 its fate by leaving them no intereft in its prefer- 
 vation. Had indeed this ftep been taken at the 
 commencement of the Diet, the confequences of 
 exafperating that party, might not then have beeir 
 equally fatal. But after a delay of ten months, 
 chiefly occafioned by the obftinacy of the three 
 lower orders J a delay of which the king had 
 taken every advantage to prepare for the execu- 
 tion of his plan, which he had now nearly brought! 
 to maturity; it was perhaps impofTible for the 
 Caps to have made choice of a condu6l better cal- 
 culated to accelerate the revolution they intended 
 to guard againft. This, therefore, may be con- 
 Adered as one of the principal caufes of the extra- 
 ordinary
 
 [ 273 ] 
 
 Ofdinary facility with which that Revolution was' 
 brought about. 
 
 The faft was, that the lower orders of the Cap 
 party, finding themfelves completely mafters of the 
 Diet, became intoxicated with their fuccefs. They 
 were no longer to be governed by the councils 
 which the abilities of the Britilh envoy and count 
 Ofterman had hitherto didlated to them,^ and to 
 which they were chiefly indebted for the fuperio- 
 rity they had obtained over their opponents. 
 
 Tranfported by their animofity towards the ad- 
 verfe party, by their greedinefs of emolument and 
 thirft for power, they fet no bounds to their de- 
 fires, no limits to their demands. Nothing lefs 
 would fatisfy them than the total exclufion of the 
 Hats from every office of profit, truft, or dignity. 
 In the violence of thefe purfuits they forgot there 
 was one point at leafl in which many of that par^ 
 ty coincided with them in opinion j namely, that 
 the conflitution Ihould be preferved. They for- 
 got the dangers with which that was threatened, 
 and how much they would fland in need of the af- 
 fiflance of the oppofite party to enable them to 
 avert the flroke by which it was likely to fall. 
 
 The king, whofe fagacity nothing could efcape, 
 whofe vigilance never failed to feize upon every 
 circumflance which could promote his ends, in- 
 llantly faw the folly of the Caps, and loft not a 
 moment to take advantage of it. 
 
 At that moment it furnilhed matter of furprize, 
 that the refolution of the three inferior orders rela- 
 tive to the depofition of the fenators, fhould b« 
 immediately agreed to by the houfe of nobles. It 
 
 was
 
 [ 274 I 
 was expected that this meafure would have been 
 Tiioft violently oppofed by the court party, and 
 the fuccefs of the Caps on this occafion in all the 
 four orders, was confidered as a final overthrow 
 of the French and Hat intereft. But it fhould 
 rather have been attributed to that refined policy 
 which directed the condudl of his Swedifli ma- 
 jefty. 
 
 The prefervation of a fenate in the Hat intereft 
 was now no longer an obje6l with the king, what- 
 ever it might have been at the commencement of 
 the Diet. It had been only neceflary for him to 
 prevent for a time the eftablifiiment of a Cap ad- 
 miniftration. In this he had fucceeded. The 
 more violent the Caps afterwards became in their 
 meafures againft the other party, the lefs likely 
 were his majefty's defigns to meet with the oppo- 
 fition he might otherwife have apprehended, from 
 fuch of the Hats as had hitherto declared them- 
 felves warm friends to the conftitution. To fee 
 them ftript of their offices, deprived of their 
 power, and in a manner profcribed by their anta- 
 gonifts, was what, perhaps, at the prefent junc- 
 ture, he would fecretly have wilhed. It could not 
 fail to render the Hats, in fome degrees, depen- 
 dent upon himfelf, and teach them to look up to 
 him alone for fupport. 
 
 Some fteps had indeed been already made ap- 
 parently with this view. In the preceding Decem- 
 ber it had been notified to the Hat party, that all 
 pecuniary afljftance v/as from that time to ceafe. 
 This naturally created great diflatisfadion among 
 them, as many of them had no other refource to 
 
 enable
 
 [ 275 ] 
 enable them to attend the Diet, but what they 
 derived from money given them by their leaders. 
 However, all poflible pains were taken to pacify 
 them, by promifes of favour and advancement 
 from the king. 
 
 The Hats then not only perceived themfelves 
 on the point of being deprived of all their power 
 and influence for the prefent, but that every future 
 expeftation of their being reftored to either would 
 infallibly be deftroyed, fhould the plan of the 
 Britifh and Ruffian minifters take place. They 
 forefaw that this would be the confequence of 
 their being fupplanted by a Cap adminiftration. 
 They knew that unfupported by France they 
 would be then left at the mercy of that party 
 which they had fo often opprelTed ; the leaders of 
 which they had on a former occafion brought to 
 the fcaffold : and of whofe animofity againft theni 
 they had now fuch convincing proofs. In fhort 
 they beheld their rivals rifing upon their ruin, 
 and ready to adopt a plan, calculated to exclude 
 them for ever, from any fhare in the govern- 
 ment; 
 
 Thus circumilanced the fears of the Hats for 
 the fa,fety of the conftitution muft naturally have 
 yielded to their apprehenfions for their own. Ac- 
 cordingly many of tliem became fecrctly inclined 
 to co-operate with the king in whatever he fhould 
 undertake j and fuch of them as had always declared 
 themfelves averfe to any meafures which dire6tly 
 tended to overturn the conftitution, retired from 
 Stockholm to their country feats ; there quietly 
 to wait the event. 
 
 T Among
 
 [ 176 3 
 
 Among thefe was field marfhal cdiint t'erfbn, 
 who was one of the atbleft of the leaders of the 
 Hat party, and who, though a zealous "partizan of 
 the court of France, had been ever conlidered as 
 warnnly attached to the eftabliihed form of go- 
 vernment. 
 
 The abftncd of the count, who was likewife 
 colonel of the guards, was a circumftance as fa- 
 vourable to the views of his majefty, as the mod 
 fanguine of his adherents could have wilhed. 
 
 After the dcpofition of the fenate had been re- 
 folved on by the ftates, they proceeded to the 
 choice of the perfons who were to form the new 
 adminiftration j but from the mode prefcribed by 
 the form of government on thofe occafions, it was 
 in the power of the court party to create fuch a 
 delay, as the ftate of his majefty's affairs might 
 ftill render neceflary j by which means, together 
 with the bufinefs of the coronation, the operations 
 of the Diet were fufpended as long as they judged 
 proper. 
 
 In the mean time, the king had aflembled a corps 
 of about one hundred and fifty officers, commanded 
 by lieutenant colonel Springporten, under pretence 
 of exercifing them in military manoeuvres j but 
 in fad to found their difpofitions, and to attach 
 them to his perfon. Thefe conflantly attended 
 him ; by his amiable affability he foon won upon 
 their afFeftions, and infpircd them with a zeal 
 to fupport his caufe. 
 
 The abilities of this prince knew how to render 
 the mofl cafual circumftances inftrumental in pro- 
 moting his defigns. 
 
 There
 
 [ 277 ] 
 
 There was at that juncture an accidental dearth 
 of corn in the kingdom, which had reduced the 
 inhabitants to the greateft difbrefs. The court 
 party took infinite pains to propagate an opinion 
 among the people, that the fcarclty was intirely 
 owing to the negligence of the Hates, in not hav- 
 ing provided againft it^ by encouraging the im- 
 portation of foreign corn. This was certainly a 
 groundlefs charge. The fa6l was, the flates had 
 ufed their utmoft endeavours to relieve the peo- 
 ple, and had for that purpofe fent no inconfider- 
 able quantity of corn to the governors of the dif- 
 ferent provinces to be difpofed of among the inha- 
 bitants of their refpedtive diftrifls. But the king's 
 party in order to foment the difcontents which 
 feigned in the nation, had the art to prevail upon 
 fuch of the governors as were devoted to his inte- 
 reft, to withhold from thofe over whom they 
 prefidedj the fupply which the Diet had pro- 
 vided for them j and thus by creating an artificial 
 want, to add to the diftrefles, which the failure 
 of the preceding crops had already created. No 
 meafure could have been bettei" calculated to irri- 
 tate the people againft the government, and it 
 Was attended with a fuCcefs equal to the policy by 
 which it was diftated. Complaints were echoed 
 from every quarter of the kingdom, and nothing 
 but the fubmiflive temper of the Swedes could 
 have prevented an open infurre6tion. 
 
 They became, however, by this means not only 
 prepared, but anxious for a change of their maf- 
 ters i and no means were left untried by the king's 
 
 T 2 friends.
 
 [ 27S ] 
 
 friends, which could tend to excite them to a 
 revolt. 
 
 Perfons were employed in every province, to 
 exhort the people to repair to Stockholm, and 
 lay their grievances before the throne ; fimilar at- 
 tempts were practifed even in the capital. And 
 if it was found difficult to prevail upon them, to 
 have recourfe to violence, they were taught, how- 
 ever, to behold without concern the fubverfion of 
 their conftitution. 
 
 "While iiis majefly, and thofe who had his con- 
 fidence, were thus occupied, an adminitlration was 
 at length formed, compofed of the friends of Eng- 
 land and Ruffia. The former negociation relative 
 to a treaty between Sweden and Great Britain was 
 immediately renewed -, and a new one fet on foot 
 to lay the foundation of another between Swe- 
 den and Ruflia. It might have been expefted 
 that at the prefent crifis thefe treaties would 
 have been concluded with that expedition which 
 the critical flate of affairs feemed to render fo 
 neceffAry. The fame difficulties which had 
 formerly prevented their being carried into execu- 
 tion were, however, again ftarted; the lofsof the 
 million and a half of livres received annually from 
 France, and the neceffity of obtaining a fubfidy in 
 lieu of them, were ftill infilled upon as ftrongly as 
 ever. The new adminiftration appeared much 
 more folicitous to deprive the Hats of every Ihare 
 of power, than to adopt the only meafure that 
 could give ftability to their own. 
 
 They were without doubt fully convinced of 
 
 the
 
 [ 279 3 
 the neceffity of that meafure ; and their true mo- 
 tives for throwing obftacles in its way were by no 
 means fo juilifiable as the oftenfible reafons they 
 gave for their condu6t. 
 
 They had early in July received intimations 
 from different authorities concerning' the reality 
 of the king's defigns againfl: the conititution, but 
 the mode by which thcfe defigns were to be car- 
 ried into execution was not known to them, and 
 divers conjecflures were formed upon that fubjeft. 
 Some on this account affeded to difbelieve it; 
 others confidered the different plans they had 
 heard of, as imprafticable ; and the greater 
 part imagined, that admitting any of them to 
 be attempted, they could with eafe defeat them. 
 
 Such was, at leaft, the various language held 
 upon the occafion. But in fad, fom.e of the mem^- 
 bers of the Diet were become fo deplorably cor- 
 rupt, that their content could not be obtained to 
 the points neceffary even to their own falvation. 
 
 The lower orders alfo triumphed too much in their 
 power of carrying points againfl the hcufe of no- 
 bles ; and their appetite for fnewing this p'Ower, 
 which, by the conftitution, belonged to the ma- 
 jority of three orders againft one, difgufced the 
 nobility, and was of great prejudice. 
 
 It was feen in the affair of depofing the fena- 
 tors, that they had loft all fenfe of their danger, 
 when they refufed to comply with the earneft and 
 repeated defires of the miniftcrs of thofe powers 
 who fupported them : It was alfo feen in the de- 
 lay of forming an alliance, on v/hich their very 
 exiftence depended. They trufted their fafety to 
 
 T 3 the
 
 [ 28o ] 
 
 the fqlicjtude thofe powers h^d teftified, to fee 
 fuch an alliance concluded 5 called loudly for 
 means to continue the Diet, while they negledted 
 tp take the fteps neceflary to preferve that form of 
 government, by which it was eftabliflied an4 
 upheld. 
 
 A month had thus elapfed in fruitlefs endea- 
 vours on the part of the minifters of Great Bri- 
 tain and Ruflia tp carry the affair of the treaties 
 through the different orders ; and the moment 
 drew nigh which was to decide the fatp of the 
 conflitution. 
 
 The apprehenfions of the ruling party were at 
 length roufed by an incident, which corroborate^ 
 too fully the intimations they had already receiv- 
 ed of defigns againft the conflitution, tq allow 
 them any longer to remain inadtive. 
 
 Hitherto the king's adherents had ufed fome 
 caution and fecrefy in their endeavours to foment 
 the difcontents of the people. A libel was now 
 found fluck up in the mofl: public parts of Stock- 
 holm, exciting the inhabitants to an infurredtion. 
 The leaders of the Caps immediately took the 
 alarm -, they alTembled and refolved to bring this 
 matter before the fecret committee, when fome 
 meafures of defence fhould be propofed to guard 
 againft furprize. 
 
 But the marlhal of the Diet, who was entirely 
 devoted to the king, refufed to let the committee 
 meet upon that day, and thus delayed a flep which 
 could not have been made with too much expe- 
 dition. 
 
 However when the committee did afTemble, 
 
 they
 
 [ 28i ] 
 they ordered a battalion of the regiment of Up- 
 land to hold itfelf in readinefs to march. Colonel 
 Springporten, of whom they had many reafons to 
 entertain the ftrongeft fufpicions, and of whofe 
 continuance at Stockholm, they were very appre- 
 henfive, received likewife orders to repair to Fin- 
 land i nominally for the purpofe of preventing a 
 tumult there, but in reality to keep him at a dif- 
 tance. General Rudbeck, grand governor of 
 Stockholm, upon whom the committee had a 
 thorough reliance, and who was likewife one of 
 the molt popular men in the kingdom, was dif- 
 patched into Scania, to Gottenbourg and Carlfe- 
 rona, to quiet the minds of the inhabitants, and 
 counteract the manoeuvres of the emiflaries of the 
 court J and general Pecklin the ablelt and boldeft 
 of the leaders of the Caps, was charged with the 
 direction of fuch meafures, as might be neceJGTary 
 for the tranquillity of the city during the gover- 
 nor*s abfence. 
 
 The commifTion appointing the general to this 
 truft, was fent the fame day to the king, who was 
 at one of his country houfes, for his lignature ; 
 which his majefty did not then think proper to 
 comply with, nor to take any notice of it after- 
 wards in the fenate : by which means the general 
 was prevented from entering into his office, till 
 the king judged it would be too late for him to 
 provide efFeftually againft the attack it was now 
 daily expeded his majefty would make upon the 
 ftates. 
 
 The chief difadvantage the adminiftration lay 
 
 under upon this occafion, was, that no meafures 
 
 T 4 could
 
 [• 282 ] 
 
 could be taken in the fenate without the king'3 
 knowledge, nor any carried into execution with- 
 out the approbation of the fecret committee ; 
 this rendered every fcheme of defence propofed 
 by the ruling party in a great degree dependent 
 on the will of the marfhal of the Diet j without 
 whofe confent that committee could not be aflem- 
 bled, and who, as we have already feen, wa§ ftrongly 
 attached to the interefc of his majefty. 
 
 The royalifts, however, feemed highly alarmed 
 at the precautions that were taken againlt them. 
 The king alone appeared unconcerned, and never 
 betrayed in his countenance or difcourfe the 
 fiighteft agitation of mind. 
 
 He ftill continued to difguife his intentions in 
 a, manner that deceived even thofe who had bter\ 
 moft caotioned againft them. 
 
 At this .very time he defired an interview with 
 the Ruflian miniftef j he informed him of his in- 
 tentions of vifiting the emprefs ofRuflia, imme- 
 diately after the conclufion of the Diet : adding, 
 that he would the following day declare his refo- 
 lution to the fenate j and obtain for this purpofe 
 the confent of that committee, which he fo Ihort- 
 ly intended fhould have no power either to grant 
 or refufe him any requeft. 
 
 The Caps now began to lament that the treaty 
 with Great Britain and Ruflla was in no greater 
 forwardnefs, and to be thoroughly inclined to ac- 
 cede to the propofals of thofe two pov/crs. But 
 this change of difpofition came too late. Some 
 time muft neceflarily elapfe before fuch a meafure 
 ^ould be accomplifhed, and his majefty v/as toq 
 
 wife
 
 [ 283 ] 
 
 ■wife not to take advantage of the delay. The king 
 now judged himfelf fecure of the major part of 
 the officers of thofe regiments which were quarter- 
 ed at Srockhohn. But he IJkewife conceived it 
 would be neceflary for him to have no inconfider- 
 able party among the provincial troops. 
 
 This was a point not eafily to be accomplifh- 
 ed. The Swedilli army confifls of a militia, 
 which is embodied only at certain times of the 
 year. It was impoffible to aflemble them out of 
 the ufual courfe without fome oftenfible reafon ; 
 and if the ftates fhould be before-hand with his 
 majefty, in giving orders for this purpofe, and ap- 
 point generals in the Cap intereft to command 
 them, the king forefaw there would be an infur- 
 mountable obftacle to his defign. To prevail 
 ijpon this militia to rife of their own accord in 
 order to promote his views; at once to ihake off 
 long habits of obedience, and turn their arms 
 againfl thofe from whom they were accuflomed. 
 to receive commands, was a meafure evidently 
 impracticable. 
 
 The king's brothers, prince Charles and prince 
 ]prederie, were at this jundufe in the province of 
 Scania, and Oftrogothia, where they had refided 
 Ibme time upon different pretences. 
 
 Their real objedt was to ingratiate themfelves 
 with the officers, the foldiers, and the people. 
 They prafbifed there the fame arts the king had 
 employed at Stockholm for fimilar purpofes, and 
 with nearly equal fuccefs. But (lill a pretext was 
 wanting to afTemble the provincial troops. The 
 princes had no legal authority over them j many 
 
 6 <#
 
 [ 284 ] 
 t^ the oiEcers were of the Cap party, and it was 
 not to be expeded they would pay obedience to 
 orders given by thofe who had no right to 
 command them. Such obedience indeed would, 
 according to the form of government, have been 
 confbrued into treafon. It became nectffzry 
 therefore to create a cafe, the exigency of which 
 ipight juftify the officers in departing from the 
 drift line of their duty, fiiould they be induced to 
 aflemble their refpedive corps at the fimple re- 
 queft of the king's brother, without waiting for 
 formal orders from the fecret committee. 
 
 A plan had been fome time formed for this 
 purpofe. Among the inferior officers with whom 
 the king had an opportunity of converfing, there 
 was a captain named Hellichius, who had at- 
 trafted his notice. Hellichius was pofTefTed of 
 that bold and daring fpirit, which;, when accom- 
 panied by ambition, prompts to the moll hazard- 
 ous undertakings. He had long afpired after the 
 honours of nobility, and was impatient for an op- 
 portunity to diftinguifh himfelf. The king faw 
 into his character, and refolved to make him one 
 of his principal inllruments in accomplilhing his 
 defigns. 
 
 Hellichius was accordingly trufted with the 
 fecret of the intended revolution, and inftruded 
 in the part he was to perform in it. Being com- 
 mandant of the fortrefs of Chriltianftadt, one of 
 the moll important in Sweden, it was fixed, 
 that on an appointed day he Ihould publilh a 
 manifefto againft the ftates, in which he Ihould 
 dwell upon the diilrefles of the people, the un- 
 ^ 5 heard
 
 C »35 1 
 
 heard of dearhefs of every neceflary of life ; and 
 attribute the whole to foreign influence, and the 
 corruption which reigned in the Diet, 
 
 He -vyas immediately afterwards to ejfcite the 
 troops under his command to revolt, to Ihut the 
 gates of the fortrefs, and prepare for its defence. 
 At the fame time he was to difpatch an oiEcer to 
 prince Charles, who, under pretence of having 
 made his efcape, was to acquaint the prince with 
 what had happened, and by that means enable 
 him to prevail upon the officers of the rieigh- 
 bouring regiments to aflemble their men, and 
 put themfelves under his command, for the often- 
 fible purpofe of fuppreffing the growing rebellion. 
 No plan could have been better conceived, none 
 could have been more fuccefsfully executed. 
 
 Hellichius fulfilled his inftrudtions to the mi- 
 nuteft article^ and the prince almoft immediately 
 appeared at the head of five regiments. 
 
 As thefe troops had thus voluntarily put them- 
 felves under the command of prince Charles, were 
 altogether unacquainted with his real intentions, 
 and ignorant of what was going forward at Stock- 
 holm, it was no difficult matter for him to create 
 among them fuch a difpofition as would be fa- 
 vourable to his defigns. Reports were fpread in 
 this army, that the conftitution was indeed in dan- 
 ger, but not from the quarter whence danger was 
 in reality to be apprehended. It was, on the con- 
 trary, whifpered that a defign was formed againft 
 the king, which perhaps aimed at more than de- 
 priving him of his crown j that it was intended 
 to eflablifh an ariftocratic form of government, 
 
 under
 
 [ 286 ] 
 tinder the direftion of Rufiia; againft which coun- 
 try the Swedes had entertained an ancient anti- 
 jpathy. Such reports, at that time out of the 
 reach of contradi6tion, could not fail to make im- 
 preflion. And had the king's attempt at Stock- 
 holm proved unfuccefsful, the meafures which the 
 jftates might in confequence of it have legally 
 purfued, would have been confidered as corrobo- 
 rating proofs of the truth of thofe reports. 
 
 Had the fenate then arrefted his majefty, it 
 would have been attributed, not to the necef- 
 fity he had himfelf laid them under of taking 
 that violent ftep, but to a premeditated defign, 
 correfponding with that of which they had been 
 accufed. 
 
 Thefe troops therefore thus prepared, and 
 headed by the brother of their fovereign, would 
 not have hefitated in fuch a cafe to have marched 
 to his relief. 
 
 Thus his majefty, though engaged in an enter- 
 prize in which fecrecy was fo requifite, that there 
 were not perhaps half a dozen perfons in the 
 kingdom privy to it, contrived to guard againft 
 every contingency which might happen. 
 
 Happily for the king, the event proved he had 
 no need of any other fupport than what he de- 
 rived from his talents and his popularity. 
 
 On the fixteenth of Auguft, general Rudbeck, 
 who in his tour thrqugh Scania, had attempted 
 to vifit the fortrefs of Chrifdanftadt, and had 
 therefore become acquainted with what was going 
 forward there, returned fuddenly to Stockholm 
 late at night j and the fecret committee being 
 
 aflembled
 
 [ 287 ] 
 
 aflembled next morning, he informed them of the 
 revolt of HelHchius. 
 
 Upoii this report the committee immediately 
 refolved, that a battalion of the regiment of Up- 
 land, and another of that of Sudermania, Ihould 
 be ordered into the city of Stockholm j and that 
 the cavalry of the burghers Ihould patrole the 
 ftreets every night. 
 
 They likewife refolved that two regiments of 
 cavalry fhould immediately inveft the fortrefs of 
 Chriftianfladt j and a deputation was fent to the 
 fenate to communicate to them the refolutions 
 that had been taken, and to have them carried 
 into execution. 
 
 The fenate at the fame time defired the king 
 to remain in town, and difpatched two couriers 
 to the princes his brothers, to order them to return 
 immediately. 
 
 Even now that the firft ftep towards the revo- 
 lution had in fa6t been taken, it would have been 
 ftill impoflible, from his majefty's conduft and 
 deportment, to have penetrated into his defigns, 
 had there been no other grounds for fufpeding 
 him. ■ 
 
 The furprize he was able to affecft at the news 
 of the revolt j the concern he fo well counter- 
 feited on the occafion j and his apparent readinefs 
 to concur with the fenate in every meafure they 
 thought requifite, not only in order to fupprefs 
 the rebellion, but to provide likewife for their 
 own fecurity, aftoniihcd the few who were not the 
 dupes of his behaviour, as much as it deceived the 
 many who were. 
 
 When
 
 \Vhen general ifLmibieck firft communicated thl^ 
 intelligence to the king, his majefty embraced 
 hitn, called him h'is brcft friendy and fo warmly 
 expreffed his aSligations to him, that the good 
 old general, although one of the chiefs of the Cap 
 party, left his majefty's prefence firmly perfuaded, 
 flt)t only that he had not been privy to the revolt 
 in Scania, but that it was impoffible the reports 
 C6uld be true concerning the king's defigns upon 
 the conftitution. 
 
 This ^as the more extraordinary, as the gene- 
 rkl had certainly a long time before fufpefted 
 thofe defigns. 
 
 It is probable the king now deferred giving the 
 fenal blow to the power of the ftates, only till he 
 hiafd received from prince Charles the news of his 
 having fucceeded in afTembling and putting him- 
 felf at the head of a confiderable body of the 
 provincial troops. In the mean time however he 
 gave a new proof of his ability in gaining over 
 to his intereH all he had an opportunity of oon- 
 Verfing with. 
 
 The cavalry of burghers, who had been ordered 
 to patrole the llreets, were accompanied by his 
 majefty in their rounds. The fenate could find 
 no pretext to objefc to this, as it certainly had the 
 appearance of nothing more than a laudable zeal 
 in his majefty to preferve the tranquillity of the 
 city. But the king knew how to make another 
 ufe of it. In the courfe of two nights only, thofe 
 very perfons whom the ftates had armed for their 
 defence, were, by the almoft fafcinating power his 
 majefty poffefted> converted into zealous well- 
 
 tvifhers
 
 t ^89 1 
 
 wlfliers of his caufe j and they were afterwards 
 among the foremoft to declare themfelves in his 
 favour. 
 
 When the king had received prince Charles's 
 letter, with the account of his being at the head 
 of five regiments, he immediately fent it to the 
 fcnate, who laid it before the fecret committee* 
 In this letter the prince exprefled a flrong defire 
 to be continued in the command of the troops he 
 had aflembled, taking an opportunity at the fame 
 time to declare his inviolable attachment to 
 liberty. The fenate however refiifed, as might 
 have been expected, to comply v/ith his requeft, 
 and appointed one of their own body to command 
 in the room of the prince. 
 
 The critical moment was now come, when de- 
 lay far from being any longer necelTary to the 
 king's defigns, muft, on the contrary, prove fatal 
 to them. 
 
 Only two days had elapfed fince the revolt in 
 Scania was known at Stockholm. We have (cen 
 how the king employed part of that time in gain- 
 ing the cavalry of ihe burghers ; during the re- 
 mainder of it his emiflaries were bufy in every 
 quarter of the town, talking and treating with 
 the foldiers of the guards, and the * artillery. His 
 
 • A private foldler gave on this occalion an inflance of 
 fidelity which deferves to be recorded. The night pre-» 
 ceding the revolution, the king being defirous of vifiting the 
 arfenal, went thither, and ordered the fcntinel to admit him. 
 The latter refufed. Do you know who you are fpeaking to f 
 cried the king. Yes, ajifwered the foldicr, but I likewifc 
 knew my duty. 
 
 majefty
 
 [ 2$0 ] 
 
 irtajefly likcwife affembled all the officers wKd' 
 were devoted to him ; and attended by them pa- 
 raded through the ftreets, not only for the purpofe 
 of fhewing himfelf to the people, but even for 
 that of converfing with all who approached him.- 
 The fenators and others, who were moft con- 
 cerned in their confequences, were advertifed of 
 thefe motions ; but fome trufted to the precau- 
 tions' already refolved upon, and on the point of 
 being carried into execution ; while others, and 
 much the greater part, intimidated by the king's 
 popularity, and the attachment the officers tefti- 
 fied to his perfon, were perfuaded, that if any 
 ftcps were taken towards confining his majefty to 
 his palace, or any open declarations were madd 
 of the ftates diftrufling him, that it would acce- 
 lerate the revolution, and bring it on before thd 
 regiments they had ordered into town for their 
 fafety, and which were then within a day's march^. 
 could arrive. 
 
 But the fame reafons which prevented the fe- 
 nate from adopting any violent meafure, previous 
 to the arrival of thofe regiments, rendered it in- 
 cumbent in his majefty to haften with all poffi- 
 ble expedition the execution of his plan. 
 
 Should we now give a glance back at the (late 
 of affairs in Sv/eden from the time when England 
 and Ruffia firft jointly oppofed the influence 
 France had acquired there, we muft perceive that 
 every defeft and vice in the government had, 
 during that period, arrived at full maturity. The 
 principles of corruption, interwoven in the ori^ 
 ginai frame of the conftitution, cultivated and 
 
 protedted
 
 [ 291 1 
 protected by the policy of France, had bcfofii 
 gradually expanded themfelves. But when other 
 powers adopted the fame policy, venality of a 
 fudden rofe to its utmoft height among the 
 Swedes. 
 
 Among the higher ranks of peoplCi their attach- 
 ment to theconftitution,oreventotheir country was 
 abated by the violence of parties, and diverted by 
 the eagernefs of gain. Among the lower ranks, the 
 Ipirit and character of the nation were degraded by 
 fervility and an abjeft fubmiflion, as well as the traf- 
 fic carried on in the Diets. The contagion of corrup- 
 tion had fpread itfelf from the capital to the moft 
 diftant provinces. That conftitution defigned to 
 cftablifh liberty, became, in the hands of thofe 
 whom it intriifted with any fhare of power, only 
 the inftrument of their obtaining foreign gold. 
 For the iaft nine years the government had con- 
 tinually Ihifted backwards and forwards into the 
 hands of two different fets of men, ofoppofite 
 interefts, purfuing oppofite fyftemsj fupported by 
 powers inimical to each other j by turns perfe- 
 cuting or perfecuted ; who, as each happened to 
 gain the fuperiority over their antagonifts, be- 
 came folicitous to revenge former injuries, or 
 guard againft future refentments. 
 
 It was not furprifing if a government fo con- 
 duced had loft the refped and confidence of the 
 people. 
 
 Should we next confider the policy with which 
 the king had turned all thefe circumftances to his 
 own advantage j with how much addrefs he had 
 fomented the difcontents which had at length be- 
 
 U gun
 
 [ 292 3 
 gtin to prevail among the people ; with how mucb 
 ability he had prepared their minds for the change 
 he meditated ; how well he had fucceeded in ex- 
 pofing the venality and corruption of the ftates, 
 by a conducb which had at the fame time gained 
 him the love of his fubjedls; and laftly, when 
 we refled that no nation in Europe entertain- 
 a higher veneration for the regal dignity than 
 the lower ranks of the Swedes have at all 
 times teftified : after taking this view, I fay, of 
 the ftate of affairs in Sweden at the junxflure we 
 are treating of, it might appear that the king, 
 ran little or no rifque in endeavouring to over- 
 turn at one blow, a fabric defedive in all its 
 parts; the foundation of which had been long 
 fapped; and which, by the depravity of thofe 
 whofe intereft it was to defend it, was left defti- 
 tute of fupport. 
 
 The fact was however otherwife. The circum- 
 ftances I have enumerated, did indeed operate 
 greatly in his favour: but it is likewife to be con- 
 fidered on the other hand, that the king was certain 
 of meeting with oppofition from a party which had 
 compleatly got the po(reflk>n of the reins of govern- 
 ment; that he himfelf had nolhare of the executive 
 power, and could not, unknown to the fenate, give 
 orders to a lingk company of his own guards with- 
 out abreachoftlieconftitution; that the fenate were 
 apprifcd of his intentions againft them, had taken 
 proper precautions, and that troops commanded 
 by officers warmly attached to the ruling party, 
 were within a few hours march of Stockholm. 
 Secure of the affections of the people, his ma- 
 
 jefty
 
 [ ^93 ] 
 jefty might perhaps have relied upon their not 
 oppofing him ; but their fubmifTive temper like- 
 wife precluded him from any expedation of their 
 taking an adive part in his favour. The whole 
 therefore turned upon this fingle point, viz. the 
 impreflion his firft harangue fhould make upon 
 the foldiers. Should they even hefitate to em- 
 brace his caufe, the tragical cataftrophe of the 
 year 1756, in confequence of an undertaking 
 fimilar to that in which he was embarked, imme- 
 diately prefented itfelf to his view. 
 
 Thus circumftanced his Swedilh majeftyi in 
 the morning of the nineteenth of Auguft, de- 
 termined to throw off the malic, and feize by force 
 upon that power which the ftates had fo long 
 abufed, or perifh in the attempt. 
 
 As he v/as preparing to quit his apartment, 
 fome agitation appeared in his countenance : but 
 it did not feem to proceed from any apprehenfions 
 for his own fate. Great as this prince's ambition 
 is, his humanity is not inferior to it. He drea,ded 
 left the blood of fome of his fubjeds might be 
 fpilt in confequence of an enterprize, which he 
 could not flatter himfelf to fucceed in without 
 having recourfe to violence. 
 
 His whole conduct during that day, as well as 
 after the revolution had taken place, juftifies this 
 conjecture. 
 
 A confiderable number of officers, as well as 
 other perfons, known to be attached to the royal 
 caufe, had been fummoned to attend his majefty 
 on that morning. Before ten he was on horfe- 
 back and vifited the regiment of artillery. As he 
 
 U 2 paffed
 
 [ 294 1 
 pafTed through the ftreets he was more than 
 ufually courteous to all he niet, bowing famili- 
 arly to the lowefl of the people. On the king's 
 return to his palace, the detachment which was 
 to mount guard that day being drawn up toge- 
 ther with that which was to be relieved, his ma- 
 jefty retired with the officers into the guard-room. 
 He then addrefled them with all that eloquence 
 of which he is fo perfe<5t a mafler ; and after infi- 
 nuating to them that his life was in danger, he 
 cxpofed to them in the ftrongeft colours, the 
 wretched ftate of the kingdom j the Ihacklcs in 
 which it was held by means of foreign gold ; and 
 the diflenfions and troubles arifmg from the fame 
 caufe, which had diftracled the Diet during the 
 courfe of fourteen months. He afliired them that 
 bis only defign was to put an end to thefe diforders ; 
 to banifh corruption, reftore true liberty, and revive 
 the ancient luflre of the Swedifh name, which 
 had been long tarnifhed by a venality as notorious 
 as It "was difgraceful. Then afluring them in the 
 ftrongeft terms that he difclaimed for ever all ab- 
 folut€ power, or what the Swedes call fovereignty» 
 he concluded with thefe words; " I am obliged to 
 " defend my ow^n liberty, and that of the king- 
 •* dom., againft the ariftocracy which reigns. 
 •* Will you be faithful to me as your forefathers 
 " were to Guftavus Vafa, and Guftavus Adol- 
 " phus ? I will then rifk my life for yottr wel- 
 " fare, and that of my country." 
 
 The officers, moft of them young men, of 
 whofe attachment the king had been long fe- 
 cure, who did not thoroughly perhaps fee into the 
 
 5 nature
 
 [ 295 1 
 nature of the requeft his majefty made them, and 
 Were allowed no time to refleft upon it, immedi- 
 ately confented to every thing, and took an oath 
 of fidelity to him. 
 
 Three only refufed. One of thefe, Frederic 
 Cederftrom, captain of a company of the guards, 
 alledged he had already and very lately taken an 
 oath to be faithful to the dates, and confequently 
 could not take that which his majefty then ex- 
 afted of him. The king, looking at him fternly, 
 anfwered, " think of what you are doing." " I 
 " do," replied -Cederftrom, " and what I think to- 
 " day I fhall think to morrow ; and were I ca- 
 " pable of breaking the oath by which I am al- 
 " ready bound to the ftates, I fhould be likewife 
 " capable of breaking that your majefty now re- 
 " quefts me to take." 
 
 The king then ordered Cederftrom to deliver up 
 his fword, and put him in arreft. 
 
 His majefty however, apprehenfive of the im- 
 prefTion which the proper and refolute condu6b of 
 Cederflrom might make upon the minds of the 
 other officers, fhortly afterwards foftened his tone 
 of voice, and again addrefling himfelf to Cederf- 
 trom, told him, that as a proof of the opinion he 
 entertained of him, and the confidence he placed 
 in him, he would return him his fword without 
 infifting upon his taking the oath, and would only 
 defire his attendance that day. Cederftrom con- 
 tinued firm J he anfwered, that his majefty could 
 place no confidence in him that day, and that he 
 begged to be excufed from the fervice. 
 
 While the king was ftiut up with the officers, 
 U 3 fcnator
 
 [ 296 ] 
 
 fenator Railing, to whom the command of thQ 
 troops in the town had been given two days be^ 
 fore, came to the door of the guard-room, and 
 was told that he could not be admitted. The fe-r 
 nator infifted upon being prefent at the diilribu- 
 tion of the orders, and lent into the king to de-s 
 fire it ; but was anfwered, he muft go to the fer 
 nate, where his majefty would fpeak to him, 
 
 The officers then received their orders frorr^ 
 the king; the firft of which was, that the two re- 
 giments of guards and of artillery fhould be imr 
 mediately aflembled, and that a detachment of 
 thirty-fix grenadiers Ihould be ported at the door 
 of the council chamber, to prevent any of the fe- 
 nators from coming out. 
 
 But before thefe orders could be carried into 
 execution, it was neceffary that the king fhoulcj 
 take another ftep ; a ftep upon which the whole 
 fuccefs of his enterprize was to depend. This was 
 to addrefs hjmfelf to the foldiers j men wholly 
 unacquainted with his defigns, and accuftomed to 
 pay obedience only to the orders of the fenate, 
 whom they had been taught to hold in the higheft 
 reverence. 
 
 As his majefty followed by the officers, was 
 advancing from the guard-room to the parade 
 for this purpofe, fome of them more cautious, or 
 perhaps more timid than the reft, became, on a 
 fhort refleflion, apprehenfive of the confequences 
 of the meafure in which they were engaged : they 
 began to exprefs their fears to the king, that un- 
 lefs fome perfons of greater weight and influence 
 ^han thernfelves were to take a part in the fame 
 
 caufcj,
 
 [ 297 ] 
 caufe, he could hardly hope to fucceed in his ert- 
 terprize. The king flopped a while,- and ap- 
 peared to hefitate — The fate of the revolution 
 hung upon that moment. A ferjeant of the 
 guards overheard their difcourfe, and cried 
 aloud — " It fhall fucceed-^— long live Guftavus," 
 His majefty immediately faid, " then I will ven- 
 " ture" — and ilepping forward to the foldiers, he 
 addreffed them in terms nearly fimilar to thofe he 
 had made ufe of to the oiiicers, and with the fame 
 fuccefs. They anfwered him with lou^ acclama- 
 tions ; one voice only faid, no i but it was not 
 attended to. 
 
 In the mean time fome of the king's emiffaries 
 had fpread a report about the town that the king 
 was arrefted. This drew the populace to the pa- 
 lace in great numbers, where they arrived as hi$ 
 majefty had concluded his harangue to the guards. 
 They teftified by reiterated fhouts their joy at fee- 
 ing him fafe i a joy which promifed the happieft 
 conclufion to the bufinefs of the day. 
 
 The fenators were now immediately fecured. 
 They had from the windows of the council-cham- 
 ber beheld what was going forward on the parade 
 before the palace j and at a lofs to know the 
 meaning of the fhouts they heard, were coming 
 down to enquire into the caufe of them, when 
 thirty grenadiers with their bayonets fixed, in- 
 formed them it was his majefty's pleafure they 
 fhould continue where they were. They began 
 to talk in a high tone, but were anfwered only by 
 having the door fhut and locked upon them. 
 
 The moment the fecret committee heard that 
 U 4 the
 
 [ 298 ] 
 
 the fenate was arrefted, they feparated of them-». 
 fdves, each individual providing for hrs owr^ 
 fafety. The king then mounting his hone, fol- 
 lowed by his officers with their fwords drawn, a 
 large body of foldiers, and numbers of the popu- 
 lace, went to the other quarters of the town 
 where the foldiers he had ordered to be affembled 
 were pofled. He found them all equally willing 
 to fupport his caufe, and take an oath of fidelity 
 to him. As he paffed through the ftreets, he 
 declared to the people, that he only meant ta 
 defend them, and fave his country; and that if 
 they would not confide in him., he would lay 
 down his Iceptre, and furrender up his kingdom. 
 So much was the king beloved, that the people 
 (fome of whom even fell down upon their knees) 
 with tears in their eyes implored his majefly not 
 to abandon them. 
 
 The king proceeded in his courfe, and in lefs 
 than an hour made himfelf mafter of all the mili- 
 tary force in Stockholm. 
 
 Powder and ball were diftributed to the foldi- 
 ers } feveral pieces of cannon were drawn from the 
 arfenal, and planted at the palace, the bridges^ 
 and other parts of the town, but particularly at 
 all the avenues leading to it. Soldiers flood over 
 thefe with matches ready lighted ; all communica- 
 tion with the country was cut oiF, no one without 
 a pafTport from the king being allowed to. le?ive 
 the city. 
 
 A paper intitled the king's declaration to his. 
 faithful fubjefls was then ftuck up in every ftreet; 
 v^'hich was to the following purpofe j " that his 
 
 " majefty
 
 [ 299 ] 
 ♦* majefly thereby exhorted all his faithful fub-* 
 " jects and the inhabitants of this capital city, to 
 ** remain quiet and refpeftful fpe£lators of the 
 " freps and meafures which muft be taken for the 
 " prefervation of the public fecurity, the inde- 
 ** pendency of the kingdom, and its true liberty ; 
 " fince his majefty has been obliged to make ufe 
 ** of the power that ftill remained to him, to free 
 " himfelf and the kingdom from the ariflocratic 
 " government which had now an intention more 
 ^ than ever to opprefs all his faithful fubjefts. 
 
 " His majefty orders alfo, gracioufly and ear- 
 " neftly, his faithful fubjefts and the inhabitants 
 *' of this city, to remain in their houfes, and to 
 " keep their doors Ihut to prevent diforders ; 
 *' being affured that any one high or low who 
 *' (hould oppofe his lawfully crowned king, or 
 ** Ihould tranfgrefs his oath or duty as a fubje<5t, 
 " will be puniftied inftantly, or according to the 
 " circumftances j therefore nobody is to obey any 
 ** other orders than thofe which will be given by 
 *^ his majefty, on pain of fuch coniequences as 
 ** would follow upon their difloyalty." 
 
 An officer was likewife difpatched with orders 
 to the regiments of Upland and Sudermania, 
 which were within a few hours march of Stock- 
 holm, to return to their quarters ; and that the 
 commanding officer, who was a violent Cap, 
 fliould inftantly repair to Stockholm. This was 
 executed without the fmalleft difficulty. The 
 precaution the king had taken:- not to fufFer any 
 perfon whatfoever to quit Stockholm, had nccef- 
 farily left thcfe troops in the dark refpeding the 
 
 tranfac-
 
 [ 300 ] 
 tranfaiftions going forward there. The orders 
 tifed on this occafion were in the ufual form, and 
 counterfigned by the fecretary of ftate ; fo that 
 it was impoflible for the commanding officer to 
 know whether they had been ilTued by the fecret 
 committee or not; confequently the moft pru- 
 dent ftep he could take was to pay an implicit 
 obedience to them. 
 
 d; An officer, however, who was fent after general 
 Pecklin, had not the fame fuccefs. The general 
 had his pafTport and orders figned by the king 
 the day before, to affemble his own regiment 
 and two others. With thefe he left Stockholm 
 before twelve o'clock. Other orders were given 
 the fame day to follow him and bring him back. 
 The officer who was charged with them, found 
 him fetting out from Suder Zelia about twenty 
 Englifh miles from Stockholm; he acquainted 
 the general with his errand, who afked him if he 
 had any orders in writing; and upon his anfwer- 
 ing, no i the general faid his own orders were in 
 writing, and he was not obliged to believe every 
 one that came to tell him a ftory. The officer 
 had no force to Hop him, and thus he got away 
 for the prefent. 
 
 ' Belide the fenators who were confined ip fepa- 
 rate apartments in the palace, general Rudbeck, 
 and all the leaders of the Caps, with many others 
 of inferior note, were put under arrell. No one 
 attempted to refift, to expoftulate, or to efcape ; 
 and the king, who that morning rofe from his bed 
 the moft limited prince in Europe, in the Ipace of 
 two hours rendered himfelf no lefs abfolute at 
 
 Stocks
 
 [ joi ] 
 Stockholm, than the French monarch is at Ver- 
 failies, or the Grand Seignior at Conftantinople. 
 
 The Hat party, in the fatisfaftion they felt at 
 the downfall of the Caps, feemed to forget that 
 what had overthrown their aiftagonifts, had at 
 the fame time deftroyed the conftitution. They 
 beheld with a foolifh exultation, power fnatched 
 from the hands of their rivals, without refle6ling 
 that they would themfelves be no gainers by the 
 event, but that the king alone was to reap the 
 advantage of it. 
 
 The Caps too diflrufling each other, the major 
 part of them being ignorant of the full extent of 
 the king's defigns, as well as how far the whole 
 Hat party might have entered into them, obeyed 
 without murmuring his majefly's orders. Many 
 of them, indeed, appeared folicitous to vie with 
 the Hats in paying their court to the king, and 
 exprefTing their fatisfadtion at what had happened ; 
 and they feemed for the moft part, lefs concerned 
 at having loft their liberty, than anxious to obtain 
 in lieu of it, a portion of the royal favour. The 
 lower rank of people, who were too infignificant 
 to be of any party rejoiced at the deftru6lion of a 
 government in which they had no fhare, and from 
 which they derived no advantages. They beheld 
 with the higheft fatisfadtion the power of an arifto- 
 cracy, from which they had experienced only info- 
 lence and oppreflion, transferred into the hand* 
 of a monarch, who was already mailer of their 
 afFedions. 
 
 Thus without a drop of blood being fpilt, a 
 
 blow
 
 [ J02 3 
 "blow ftruck, or even the flighteft appearance of 
 tumult or diforder, the inhabitants of Stockholnm 
 furrendered that conflitution, which their fore- 
 fathers had bequeathed to them after the death of 
 Charles the Xllth, as a bulwark againft the fu- 
 ture defpotifm of their future monarchs. 
 
 At the commencement of the revolution, the 
 king fent to the foreign minifters to requeft their 
 attendance at the palace. When they arrived 
 there, he addreffed them in thefe words : " It is 
 " for your own fafety, gentlemen, that I defired 
 " your attendance here. I fhould have been 
 *^ highly concerned if any thing difagreeable had 
 •* happened to you, and the criticalnefs of the 
 " prefent moment, did not allow me to anfwer 
 ** for the event. I Ihall fay nothing to you con" 
 ** cerning what is going forward j you muft 
 •* have forefeen it long fince. I have been com- 
 f*;pelled to it, and ihsXi be juftified by the cir- 
 •f cumftances. But I would not have you remain 
 *' in a moment's ignorance of one thing, which I 
 " defire you will immediately communicate to 
 *' your refpedtive courts, that what has happened 
 *^ does not in any fhape change my pacific incli- 
 " natrons, and that I fiiall carefully cultivate 
 " friendfliip and harmony with my neighbours 
 " and allies." 
 
 The remainder of the day his majefty employed 
 in vifiting different quarters of the town, to re- 
 ceive the oaths of the maglftrates, of the colleges, 
 and of the city militia. 
 
 His fuite increafed every moment, the officers 
 
 of
 
 r 303 ] 
 
 of both parties uniting to follow him. They all 
 tied round their left arm a white handkerchief, in 
 imitation of his majefiy, who at the commence- 
 ment of his enterprize had done fo himfelf, and 
 defired.his friends to diftinguifh themfelves by 
 that token, from thofe who might not be weli- 
 wifhers to his caufe. 
 
 The king likewife pafTed the whole night in 
 going the rounds through the city, during which 
 time the troops alfo continued under arms. 
 
 His majefty, not content with receiving the 
 oaths of all the civil and military officers, was re- 
 folved if poflible, to adminifter an oath of fideli- 
 ty to the whole body of the people. A meafure, 
 which, confidering the religious difpofition of the 
 lower clafles of the Swedes, would by no means 
 be without its utility. A report of the king's in- 
 tention having been fpread over the town, feveral 
 thoufands of the populace aflembled on the 20th, 
 in a large fquare. When the king arrived there, 
 a dead filence prevailed. His majefty on horfe- 
 back, with his fwojd drawn, advanced fome paces 
 before his attendants. He then made to the peo- 
 ple a long and pathetic difcourfe, in a voice fo 
 clear and diftin^t, that his auditory loft not a fyl- 
 lable that fell from him. He concluded his 
 harangue by declaring that his only intention was 
 to reftore tranquillity to his native country, by 
 fuppreflTing licentioufnefs, overturning the arifto- 
 cratic form of government, reviving the old 
 Swedifti liberty, and rcftoring the ancient laws of 
 Sweden fuch as they were before 1680,—" I rc- 
 
 " nouncc
 
 i 304 ] 
 
 " riounce now (added he) as I have already done 
 *' all idea of the abhorred abfolute power, or what 
 <f is called fovereignty^ efteeming it now, as be- 
 " fore, my greateft glory to be the firft citizen 
 " among a truly free people." 
 
 The populace, who had not heard their fove-" 
 reign fpeak Swedifh fince the reign of Charles the 
 Xnth, liftened to the king with all that admira- 
 tion which fo unul^jal an addrefs would naturally 
 excite in them. They frequently interrupted hint 
 with the loudeft acclamations, and many of thern 
 even Ihed tears of joy. The king then read the 
 oath he took to the people, and had that likewife 
 read which the people were to take to him. 
 
 In the mean time the heralds went through the 
 different quarters of the town, to proclaim an af- 
 lembly of the ftates for the following day. This 
 proclamation contained a threat that if any mem- 
 ber of the Diet fhould dare to abfent himfelf, he 
 Ihould be both confidered and punifhed as a traitor 
 to his country. 
 
 While his majefty was fo effeftually acc^om- 
 plilhing his point at Stockholm, he neglefted no- 
 thing that could infure equal fuccefs to his enter- 
 prize in the provinces. The regiments which 
 were in full march for the city, had, as was before 
 mentioned, returned quietly into their quarters. 
 The king's brothers were each of them at the 
 head of large bodies of troops ; Hellichius had 
 furrendered Chriftianftadt into the hands of Prince 
 Charles j prince Frederick had feized upon gene- 
 ral Pecklin, who was confined in the caftle of 
 Griplholm on account of a manifefto he had drawn 
 
 up,
 
 [ 3^5 ] 
 up, of which his majefty had got a copy ; and all 
 the orders to the governors of the fortrefles and 
 provinces, i^unning exaftly in the form prcfcribed 
 by the conftitution, thofe orders met with an im- 
 plicit obedience from .every quarter ; fo that all 
 things were conducted in the country with as lit- 
 tle tumult and oppofition, as had been met with 
 at Stockholm. 
 
 It is true the foldiers and people in the pro- 
 vinces were in a great meafure ignorant of what 
 had been tranfaded in the city j and the king ve- 
 ry prudently refolved that their firft authentic 
 intelligence relative to it, fliould not be till after 
 the ftates, afTembled in Diet, had ratified in the 
 moft folemn manner, the change he had intro- 
 duced. 
 
 For this reafon the king had by proclamation 
 appointed an aflembly of the ftates on the twenty- 
 firft, when the old form of government was to be 
 abolifhed by the ftates themfelves, and a new one 
 was to be produced by his majefty, to which care 
 would be taken that they ftiould fcarcely venture 
 to refufe their aflent. 
 
 A report was for this purpofe induftrioufly pro- 
 pagated, that a large body of troops, which the 
 king had ordered from Finland, were adually at 
 the gates of the city, and quarters were marked 
 out for them in the town, as if this had been ab- 
 folutely the fa6t. This could not fail to intimi- 
 date the ftates, and the more fo, as from the cir- 
 cumftance that no one could pafs through the 
 barriers of the town withiwt a paflport from the 
 
 king.
 
 [ 306 1 
 king, It was Impoflible for them to be Satisfied 
 as to the truth or falfhood of this report. 
 
 But his majefty did not flop here. In the 
 morning of the twenty-firft, a large detachment 
 of guards was ordered to take poflefTion of the 
 iquarc, where the houfe of nobles ftands. The 
 palace was invefted on all fides with troops, and 
 cannon were planted in the court facing the hall 
 where the ftates were to be aflembled. Thefe were 
 not only charged, but foldiers Hood over them 
 with matches ready lighted in their hands. 
 
 The feveral orders of the ftate were not on this 
 occafion allowed to afTemble themfelves in their 
 refpeflive halls, and march from thence in a body, 
 preceded by their fpcakers, as was cuftemaryj 
 but every individual was to make the beft of his 
 way to the palace, where they all entered without 
 obferving any form or ceremony, each being foli* 
 citous only to avoid the punilhment held out to 
 thofe who fhould abfent themfelves. It was re- 
 marked alfo, that the marllial of the Diet entered 
 the hall of the ftates without the ftaff, which was 
 the mark of hi's office. 
 
 The king being feated on his throne, furroiind- 
 ed by his guards and a numerous band of officers, 
 addrefled the ftates in an harangue, wherein he 
 painted the exceffes, the diforders and misfortunes 
 into which party divifions had plunged the nation, 
 in the moft glaring colours. He reminded them 
 of all the pains he had taken to heal thofe divi- 
 fions, and the ingratitude he had met with in re- 
 turn. He glanced at the infamy they had incur- 
 red
 
 [ 3^7 ] 
 
 r«d from their avowed venality, ahd the bafenejfs 
 of their having been influenced by foreign gold, 
 to betray the firft interefts of their country. Then 
 flopping fhort in the middle of his difcourfe — he 
 cried out, '^ if there be any one among you who 
 " can deny what I have advanced, let him rife 
 " and fpeak." 
 
 Circumllanced as the afTembly then was, it can- 
 not appear extraordinary that no member of it 
 ventured to reply to the king. There was howe- 
 ver fo much truth in what he faid, that perhaps 
 fhame did not operate lefs powerfully than fear, 
 in producing the filence they obferved on the 
 occafion. 
 
 When his majefty had concluded, he ordered a 
 fecretary to read the new form of government, 
 which he propofed to the ftates for their accept- 
 ance. Though it confifled of fifty-feven articles, 
 it will be necelTary only to take notice of four of 
 them, to give a compleat idea of the plenitude of 
 his Swedifh majefty's powers at this day. By one 
 of thefe, his majefty was to aflemble and feparate 
 the ftates whenever he pleafed. By another, he 
 was to have the fole difpofal of the army, the 
 navy, finances, and all employments civil and mi- 
 litary. By a third, though his majefty did not 
 openly claim a power of impofing taxes on all 
 occafions, yet fuch as already fubfifted were to be 
 perpetual, and in cafe ofinvafion or pr effing necef- 
 fityy the king might impofe fome taxes //// the 
 ftates could be aflembled. But his majelly was 
 to be the judge of this necefllty, and we have fecn 
 that the meeting of the ftates depended wholly «n 
 
 X hU
 
 [ 3o8 ] 
 
 his will and pleafure. By a fourth, when thefc 
 were aflembled, they were to deliberate upon no- 
 thing but what the king thought proper to lay 
 before them. 
 
 Thcfe articles require no comment. 
 
 After the form of government had been read, 
 the king demanded of the dates whether they ap- 
 proved of it. They made a virtue of neceflity, 
 and anfwered him only by a loud acclamation. It 
 was propofed indeed by one member of the order 
 of nobles, to limit the contributions to a certain 
 number of years : but the marfhal of the Diet re- 
 fufed to put the queftion without the confent of 
 the king j who exprefTed his wifhes that the no- 
 bles might have the fame confidence in his pater- 
 nal care, as had been teftified by the other or- 
 ders, where no fuch limitation had been pro- 
 pofed. 
 
 After this had pafled, the marfhal of the Diet 
 and the fpeakers of the other orders, figned the 
 form of government ; and the Hates took the 
 path to the king, which his majefly dictated to 
 them himfelf. The whole of this extraordinary 
 fcenewas then concluded in an equally extraordinary 
 manner. The king drew a book of pfalms from 
 his pocket, and taking off his crown, began fing- 
 ing te deum, in which he was moft devoutly join- 
 ed by the whole affembly. This at firft fight 
 may appear to border on the farcical , but his 
 majefty certainly did not mean to impofe upon 
 the ftates themfelves by an affected devotion 5 it 
 was obvioufly upon the people, who are in 
 Sweden of a very religious turn, that the 
 
 king
 
 [ 3^9 1 
 
 king defigned by this ceremony to make an im 
 preflion. 
 
 The revolution was now completed. The 
 princes Charles and Frederic had been regularly 
 informed of what pafTed at Stockholm, as foon as 
 the change in the government had received the 
 fandbion of the ftates. Thele princes aflembled 
 the officers of the troops under their command, 
 and reading the king's letters to them, command- 
 ed them to take upon the fpot the oath of fidelity 
 to his majefty. No one hefitated to comply with 
 the princes orders, when apparently backed by 
 the authority of the ftates i and it is to be pre- 
 fumed that thefe officers were not informed with 
 cxa6lnefs of the manner in which the confent of 
 the ftates had been obtained on this occafion ; or 
 of the true nature of the change the king had 
 brought about. 
 
 The princes next haftened with an expedition 
 equal to their zeal, into every town of confequence 
 in the provinces ; where they received in the 
 name of the king, the oath of fidelity to his ma- 
 jefty, from the inhabitants and the troops. So 
 that the revolution which had been eff'efted in 
 Stockholm in the fpace of a few hours, was in the 
 courfe of a few days, without oppofition or mur- 
 muring, fubfcribed to throughout the whole 
 kingdom. 
 
 The fenators and all thofewho had been arreft- 
 ed, excepting general Pecklin and another general 
 officer* in Finland, were now, upon taking the 
 
 • Thefe officers were likewife fct at liberty fome months 
 afterwards. 
 
 X 2 oath
 
 [ 3IO 3 
 
 oath, fet at liberty ; and the moft profound tran- 
 quillity and perfeft unanimity appeared to pre- 
 vail among the inhabitants of a country, which 
 but a week before was a prey to civil diflenfion, 
 and all the violence of party animofities. The 
 calm which on a fudden fucceeded to fcenes of 
 trouble and confufion ; the clemency, the wifdom, 
 the impartiality difplayed by the king on the 
 occafion ; the love the major part of his fubjedrs 
 bore him, and the admiration in which he was 
 held even by fuch as had been moft inclined to 
 oppofe him ; all contributed to render the change 
 he had effedled acceptable to the bulk of the 
 Swedes ; and to convince the few who loft by it, 
 how unequal they were to the tafk of ftemming 
 the popular current which ran fo much in favour 
 of their monarch. 
 
 Thus all acquiefccd, and the majority of the 
 nation viewed with pleafure, nay, even gratitude, 
 the condud of the king. A conduct which re- 
 fledled equal honour on his fpirit, his abilities, and 
 his humanity. Even on the nineteenth inftant, 
 in the midft of the poffibly dangerous, and cer- 
 tainly critical and weighty bufinefs in which he- 
 was engaged, he furniflied the moft ftriking proofs 
 of that benevolence which peculiarly marks his 
 charafter. Nothing; could be more amiable than 
 his attention to thofe, even during the hurry and 
 buftle of the day, who were under any appre- 
 Kenfions for the fate of their friends, whom his 
 majefty had caufed to be arrefted. He fent par- 
 ticular melTages to the wives and relations of 
 thefe, befceching them to quiet their alarms, and 
 
 6 affuring
 
 [ 3'> ] 
 
 tfluring them that every one who was confined 
 fhoiild in a fliort time have his liberty reflored to 
 him. General Rudbeck, who was among the 
 number of thefe, fent to the king a letter he had 
 written to his wife, requelling his majefty's per- 
 miflion to fend it to her. The king v/ith his own 
 hand added feveral lines to it, couched in the moft 
 gracious terms, and intreating her to be under no 
 uneafinefs for her hufband, to whom nothing 
 would happen but a confinement of a few days. 
 He even fent a mefTage to the children of a poor 
 curate, who had been laid under arreft, to afliire 
 them their father would be reftorcd to them in a 
 fhort time, and that they were to be under no un- 
 eafinefs on his account. Attentions like thefe, 
 at the moment when it might have been expefled 
 that his majefly's thoughts would have been en- 
 tirely abforbed by other matters of fuch high im- 
 portance to him, were the ftrongeft indications 
 of the goodnefs of his heart : and indeed, during 
 the whole of this tranfa6tion, the king appeared 
 Icfs anxious concerning the fuccefs of his enter- 
 prize, than folicitous to prevent any, even the 
 meaneft of his fubjeds, from fufFering the fiightelt 
 injury. 
 
 Though the treatment the royal family had met 
 ivith at the hands of fome of the leading men un- 
 der the late form of government, might polTibly 
 have juftificd fome degree of retaliation, after the 
 king had compleatly poflefled himfelf of the fu- 
 preme power; yet his majefly then feemed to 
 have no refentment to gratify, nor even partiali- 
 ties to biafs him. He appeared to have acquired 
 
 X J abfolute
 
 [ 312 ] 
 
 abfolute power only to difpenfe favo ur s and re- 
 wards, not to make his fubjedls feel the weight 
 pf his authority. Thofe who had been particu- 
 larly inftrumental in promoting his defigns, were 
 recompenfed with a generofity that exceeded their 
 moft fanguine expedations ; but with regard to 
 others, of whatever party, they all fhared the 
 royal favour alike. Many of the Caps were con- 
 tinued in offices of the higheft truft and emolu- 
 ment J to which were likewife advanced even 
 fome of thofe very perfons who had in the Diet 
 of 1756 trampled with fo much indecency upon 
 the rights of the crown, and who had with fo 
 much injuftice brought to the fcafFold the friends 
 of the late king. By a condudt fo impartial, fo 
 noble, he conciliated the minds of all, as much as 
 he had before gained the affecStions of the major 
 part of his fubje6ls. 
 
 '' One of his firft a6ts was to abolifh the horrid 
 praftice of putting criminals to the torture ; of 
 which we have {ten that the extraordinary courts 
 of juftice ufed frequently to furnifh inftances. 
 The king likewife iffued a proclamation to for- 
 bid the ufe of thofe names which diftinguifhed the 
 different parties, into which the Swedes had been 
 fo long divided, and which had brought fo many 
 misfortunes on their country ; a prohibition the 
 more likely to be produftive of beneficial effefls, 
 as the king himfelf firft fet the example of fhew- 
 ing that he confidered fuch diftindtions as now at 
 an end. 
 
 Shortly after the ftates had confented to the 
 
 cftablifhment of the new form of government, they 
 
 3 were
 
 [ 3^3 1 
 
 were again aflembled ; when they refolved to ad- 
 drefs the king, to thank him for having rifked the 
 fafety of his perfon in order to deliver the kingdom 
 from anarchy and confufion. The houfe of nobles 
 ordered a medal to be ftruck in commemoration 
 of the event, to the expence of which the three' 
 other orders requefled they might be allowed to" 
 contribute. On the 9th of September followirig, 
 the Diet was clofed ; when his majefty acquainted 
 the dates he fhould call a meeting of them in 
 fix years. 
 
 The difmifTion of the dates was all that was 
 wanting to put the finifhing ftroke to the bufinefs 
 he had fo happily atchieved. 
 
 The marlhal of the Diet and the fpeakers of 
 other orders, in their harangues on this oc- 
 cafion, were not content with beftowing the high- 
 eft encomiums on the king, but condemned them- 
 felves in a manner which rendered them truly 
 ridiculous. 
 
 Nor could there be a more ample juftification 
 of the king's condufb than what was publiflied by 
 the ftates themfelves, in an a6l called, ibe reces 
 of the Diet. They there declare, that " an ancient 
 " divifion in the nation had broken thofe ties 
 *' which Ihould unite fellow-fubje6ts in confidence 
 " and mutual love. Often did his majefty in his 
 ** gracious harangues endeavour to reconcile the 
 *' divifions which fubfiftcd among his fubjefts, 
 " and to reftore union, concord, and a patriotic 
 " zeal, the foundation of the happinefs and the 
 " ftrength of free nations : but our generous 
 " monarch, who perceived with regret, that his 
 X 4 ** benevolent
 
 C 314 ] 
 
 " benevolent endeavour muft prove abortive, aa 
 " long as the laws were not fixed, as long as there 
 «* was no balance of power in the government, and 
 " that liberty was daily abufedj at length created 
 " in the midft of the tempeft a moment of calm, 
 " to give us time to refled more maturely upon 
 *' our fituation, and upon that of our country. 
 
 " It would be unnecefTary to repeat here the 
 " change which took place in the government of 
 " the kingdom, when the Swedes confidered the 
 " royal power as too dangerous, and that we ra- 
 ** ther feared than loved him who reigned. A 
 *' long and painful experience has convinced us, 
 *^ that the fundamental laws have often undergone 
 ** changes, forced conftru(5tions, and improper re- 
 " flridions i • that ufurpations have been made up-? 
 ** on the royal power, the refult of which was, in- 
 *' numerable diforders. That the execution of the 
 ** laws was oftenentrufled to thofe very perfons who 
 *' were the authors of them. That the corruption of 
 " morals being become general, the laws had loft 
 ^' the refpeft, and the judges the obedience which 
 ** were due to them. That foreign views influenced 
 " the national deliberations. That the feeds of dif- 
 " cord were carefully cultivated in a foil already 
 ** prepared to produce an abundant crop. That ha- 
 ** tred and vengeance appeared in public pcrfecu- 
 " tions. That ambition and envy had caufed 
 " difcontents, troubles, and even the fhedding of 
 " blood. That an amendment of the conftitution 
 ~ " was indifpenfably necefiary to fupport a tottering 
 " edifice. That the public fafety rendered new 
 " laws necefiary ; in fliort, that the yoke of (tU 
 
 " low-
 
 [ z^s 1 
 
 •* low-citizens, at all times infupportable, had 
 " weighed down a people who ought to have ap- 
 " plied themfelves wholly to regain their ancient 
 ''^ ftrength and fplendour, by the recovery of true 
 *' liberty, under a king who made the laws the 
 " rule of his condud. 
 
 " This was referved to be the work of our 
 " dear king, the magnanimous Gujiavus the Hid. 
 " And it will be his immortal glory, that with 
 " the afllftance of Providence, by his own intre- 
 " pidity, and the courage and patriotic love of 
 " their royal highnefles the princes Charles and 
 " Frederick, he has faved the kingdom, which 
 ^* was on the brink of deftruftion. We acknow- 
 " ledge and revere the intrepidity and clemency 
 " of our king. We blefs the great work accom- 
 " plifhed by a king obedient to the laws, who 
 ** without being compelled to it, has abjured def- 
 " potifm, by a new oath, and a new afiurance. 
 <' We perceive the ancient liberty and fafcty of the 
 ^^ Swedes confirmed in a new form of government, 
 " which we for ourfelves, as well as for our de- 
 ** fcendents have accepted, approved of, and con- 
 " firmed by oath the twenty-firft of Augu(t of thi» 
 '' year ; and which we ultimately accept, approve 
 ^* of, and confirm, as if it was infcrted here word 
 *' for word. By this means Sweden has obtained 
 " a true king to fill her throne, and all the inha- 
 " bitants of the ftate may at prefent without 
 *' anxiety leave the adminiftration in the hands of a 
 *' king, to whom it belongs to govern and to pre- 
 " ferve it j who is king not for his own private 
 ^' advantage, but for that of his fubjefts ; and 
 
 " who
 
 [ 3i6 ] 
 
 " who places his greateft glory, in reigning over 
 " an independent people, and in being the firft 
 " citizen of a free fociety." 
 
 Such was the language now held by the ftates, 
 who but a few weeks before, were accuftomed to 
 fet, without ceremony, the king's fignature to re- 
 folutions, pafTed in diredl oppofition to his will. 
 And fuch was the final conclufion of a revolution, 
 by which on the one hand, the king reftored the 
 crown of Sweden to its ancient rights j and by 
 which, on the other, he banilhed from the king- 
 dom foreign corruption, foreign influence, and 
 party diffentions, 
 
 I have endeavoured in the former part of this 
 work, by giving a fuccin(^ view of fuch parts of 
 the Swedifh hiftory as tended to illuftrate the na- 
 tional charafter and genius of the Swedes, to fhew 
 " how far they were capable of being a free people. 
 I have alfo endeavoured to point out the defefts 
 of the late Swedifh form of government, and the 
 abfurd and corrupt conduct of thofe who admi- 
 niflered it. In the firfl, we perceive the founda- 
 tion of thofe revolutions to which Sweden has at 
 all times been fubje6l, as well as of that, which 
 fo lately happened. In the latter, we are enabled 
 to trace out the particular caufes of the extraordi- 
 nary facility with which the prefent king of Swe- 
 den accomplifhed the deflrudlion of the conflitu- 
 tion he has abolifhed. It were, perhaps, unne- 
 cefTary therefore to add here any comments upon 
 the tranfaftion I have defcribed. My objed was 
 to enable the reader to make them for himfelf. 
 
 I fhall only obferve that this revolution fur- 
 ^ nifhes
 
 f 317. 1 
 
 ftifhes us with a ftriking, and I may add a ufeful- 
 inftance, of the fatal efFedrs of corruption j for 
 even in Great Britain corruption has had its ad^^; 
 vocates. It fliews, that to refbrain too much the 
 power of the crown, or to deny to the lower or- 
 ders of the people a due iliare of the advantages 
 to be derived from a free conftitution, are equally 
 dangerous to liberty. It .proves, that to difguft 
 the nation with the popular branches of the legis- 
 lature, and to create in them a diilrufl of their 
 reprefentatives, is to undermine the government. 
 And laftly, the fuddennefs and facility with which 
 this revolution was accomplifhed, Ihould teach a 
 free people never to truft too much to the opinion 
 they may have been accullomed to entertain, re- 
 fpeding the fecurity of their liberties, nor to in- 
 dulge themfelves in the idea that no danger is 
 near, becaufe no danger is apparent. 
 
 With regard to the king of Sweden, I fhall 
 only remark, that if it were ever jullifiable in a 
 monarch to overturn the conftitution of his coun- 
 try, it was fo in the prefent inftance. 
 
 In fa(5b, he only deprived his fubjefbs of a form 
 p{ government, in its own nature incapable of 
 being well adminiftered, to give them another, 
 which may, and as long as he reigns, certainly 
 will be fo. Not to mention the allurements of 
 power to a young and ambitious mind ; allure- 
 ments that operated the more on account of the 
 irkfomenefs of the Situation in which the miftaken 
 policy of the Swedes had placed their fovcreigns ; 
 the influence foreign powers had acquired in the 
 government ; the vices and defeds of that j and 
 
 the
 
 [ 5«« 3 
 
 the abandoned venality of thofc who held the 
 reins of it, perhaps juftified as much his majefty's 
 attempt on the one hand, as the ufe he has fince 
 made of his power, has, on the other, proved 
 him worthy of the fuccefs which attended him. 
 
 If he deftroyed the conftitution, he preferved 
 the independence of his country. A conftitution 
 which had long anfwered no other purpofe, 
 but that of rendering Sweden fubfervient to the 
 views of its ambitious neighbours, or pretended 
 friends. 
 
 In fliort, fhould his Swedifh majefty continue 
 to reign as he has hitherto done, we Ihall fee the 
 wifh of my lord Bolingbroke accomplifhed. 
 ** We Ihall behold a king, the moll popular man 
 ** in his country ; and a patriot king at the head, 
 ^x>( a united people.'* 
 
 A P P E N-
 
 £ 315 1 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 The Speeches of the prcfent King of Sweden, 
 
 From the Time of his Acceffion to the Throne, till 
 the clofmg of the Diet 1772. 
 
 With fome other Pieces relative to the Revolution. 
 
 The KING'S SPEECH at the opening of the 
 Diet on the 25th of June, 177 1. 
 
 EVERY thing at this moment, even the place I 
 fill, recalls to me, as well as you, our great and 
 common lols. When the ftates of the kingdom 
 clofed their laft affembly, they beheld here a 
 tender and beloved father, a receded and mer- 
 ciful king, furrounded by affeftionate fubjedts ; 
 and his three fons, who contended with each 
 other for the advantage of giving him the ftrong- 
 eft proofs of their veneration and love. You 
 now behold, inftead of that pleafingly affedting 
 fight, three orphans overcome with grief, who mix 
 their tears with yours, and whofe wounds bleed 
 afrefh at the fight of thofe that pierce your 
 hearts. 
 
 The nobleft reward of a good king, is the 
 Jove of his fubjefts. The tears you flied are 
 the moft glorious monument that can be raifed 
 to his memory. To me, they are an incentive 
 to virtue, an encouragement to defcrve, after the 
 
 example
 
 [ 3^0 ] 
 
 example of a father fo flncerely lamented, yoii/. 
 love, and confidence, by clemency and goodnefs. 
 
 I need hot here mention to you the changes 
 that have happened in the government fince your 
 laft afTembly. You will be fufficiently informed 
 of them by the papers that will be laid before you. 
 My abfence prevented me from effeding any 
 thing for the goOd of th€ public. However, if we 
 now enjoy the happinefs of feeing peace flourifh 
 at home and abroad, a good underflanding pr'e- 
 ferved, and. confidence well eflablilhed with our 
 neighbours, and the ancient allies of the kingdom, 
 they are the fruits of the prudence and wifdom of 
 thofe who have had the cere of the adminiflra- 
 tion, and to whom I now wilh to give this public 
 teflimony of my gratitude. I need fay nothing 
 refpefting the obje(5t you now meet upon. You 
 know what the great change which has happened 
 in the Hate requires of you. You are apprized 
 of your rights, and it is that you might aflert theni 
 that you are here affembled. To that purpofe I 
 wifii you the blelTing of the Almighty, that peace 
 and unanimity may prefide over your counfels, 
 and prepare a happy ilTue to them. 
 
 Born and educated among you, I learned from 
 my early youth to love my country ; to confider 
 it as my greateft happinefs that I was a Swede ; 
 as my greateft glory, that I was the firft citizen, 
 of a free people. All my wifhes will be accom- 
 pliihed if the refolutions that you are about to 
 take, contribute to fecure the welfare, the glory, 
 and independence of the kingdom. To fee this 
 nation happy is my firft objedl ; to govern a free 
 
 and
 
 [ 3^1 ] 
 
 and Independent people, the height of my ambi- 
 tion. Do not fuppofe thefe are vain words, con- 
 tradicted perhaps by the fecret fentiments of my 
 mind. They are the true pidure of a heart 
 glowing with the moft ardent love for glory, 
 and for my country. A heart, too honeft to 
 didlate what it does not feel, too proud ever to re- 
 cede from an engagement, I have feen various 
 countries, and I have endeavoured to acquaint 
 myfelf with their manners, their government, the 
 advantages and difadvantages attending the fitu- 
 ation of the people. 
 
 I have obferved, that it is neither abfolute 
 power, luxury, magnificence, or treafures amafled 
 by too fcrupulous ceconomy, which make the fub- 
 jefts happy ; but unanimity, and the love of their 
 country. It is then in your own power to be 
 the happieft nation on the globe. May this 
 Diet be ever diftinguilhed in our annals for hav- 
 ing facrificed every private view, all perfonal 
 jealoufies and animofities, to the great intereft of 
 the public ! On my part, I fhall contribute in what- 
 ever depends on me, to reconcile your divided 
 opinions, to re-unite your hearts, alienated now 
 from one another, fo that this aflembly may, with 
 the blefling of the Almighty, be the sera of the 
 felicity of this kingdom. 
 
 The
 
 [ 3i2 ] 
 
 The KIN G*s ANSWER to the Deputies of 
 the Nobility, the 20th of June 177 1. 
 
 TH £ forrow expreffed by the nobility opens a 
 wound inrtiy bofom, that time can never per- 
 ^&ly heal. The tears with which the people have 
 bathed the tonib of fo good a king, encourage 
 me to follow his example. The welfare of the 
 king is fo clofely connected with that of the coun- 
 try and of the nobility, that you ought to be af- 
 fured I fhall negle<5t nothing which may contribute 
 to your happinefs. My firft attention fhall be to 
 fupport the laws and liberties of my people j to 
 prepare to ftrengthen and augment their union. 
 Defcended from a Swedilh gentleman, who merit- 
 ed the crown for having extinguifhed the fire of 
 difcord, and delivered his country from foreign 
 chains, I think I cannot hold his fceptre by a no-^ 
 bier tenure, nor give ftronger proofs of the 
 rexStitude of my intentions, than by following his 
 fteps. 
 
 Tho
 
 [ 321 ] 
 
 The KING^s ADDRESS to the fenatc 
 aflembled the 28th of November 177 1. 
 
 TH E melancholy profpe6l now before us, 
 which threatens an unhappy divifion in the 
 ftate, cannot, gentlemen, have efcaped your pene- 
 tration and zealous attention to ferve me and your 
 country. Experience fhews to what a height hatred 
 and civil difcord may be carried, particularly in 
 a free country; and of what fatal confequences 
 they are to the kingdom. Strongly imprefled 
 with thefe confiderations, I declared to the ftates 
 at the opening of the Diet, that my firll care 
 Ihould be to re-unite their hearts, and fubdue 
 thofe animofities which had fo long difturbed the 
 kingdom, under my two auguft predeceflbrs. My 
 confcience is the fureft warrant of the truth of my 
 fentiments, and what has pafTed in the courfe of 
 this Diet, and is known to all Sweden, will bear 
 an unequivocal teftimony that my actions have 
 been conformable to what I then promifed. 
 
 But the more pains I have taken to obtain 
 this falutary point, the more am I concerned to 
 perceive that the divifions of the two parties 
 have changed into a more dangerous diflenfion ; 
 I mean, a divifion among the orders themfelves. 
 I can no longer doubt it i I cannot even be fup- 
 pofed ignorant of it, fince an authentic memo- 
 rial, with the fandion of the orders of the ftate, 
 has informed the kingdom of their difagreemcnt. 
 But without fecking for remote cau fes, I need 
 
 Y only
 
 [ 3^2 ] 
 
 only confult my heart, which fufficiently tells me 
 the dangers of my country, and I confult it at 
 this moment. If my birth and duty had not in- 
 diflblubly conne6ted my happinefs with that of 
 the ftatc, if I did not confider it as the higheft 
 honour to reign over a free and independent peo- 
 ple, I fhould remain a quiet fpedator of the event, 
 or fecure to myfelf in future, a more fplendid fitu- 
 ation, at the expence of your liberty. My heart 
 is not fufceptible of fuch fentiments. I volunta- 
 rily promifed my people to be the guardian of 
 their liberties ; and as long as providence allows 
 me to hold this fceptre, I will be fo; it is in 
 confequence of this intention, gentlemen, that I 
 find myfelf obliged to make you the depofita- 
 ries of my uneafinefs. I do hot wilh to inter- 
 fere with the deliberations of the ftates, but I 
 think it as much your duty as mine to prevent 
 the confequences that the turbulence of inflamed 
 •fpirits may occafion on all fides, which may h^.-^e 
 fatal effefts, and prove deftruftive to the liberty 
 of the ftate. I have refolved to fend for the four 
 orators of the ftates, to reprefent to them the dan- 
 gers of our prefent fituation : the bufinefs of the 
 Diet almoft at a ftand ; my afTurances poftponed ; 
 the time of my coronation, which I had fixed for 
 the 24th of lall September, ftill undetermined. 
 How many feeds of diflenfion hourly fhoot up> 
 and what uneafinefs mull the kingdom feel in 
 contemplating thefe events ! Nothing can be 
 more interelling to us all. Our country Hands in 
 need, of a fpeedy fuccour, which it can receive 
 only from me and the ftates. All I mean to
 
 [ 3^:i 1 
 
 fay will, I hope, be conducive to their well-b^- 
 ing, and the fupport of the laws. I am theif 
 king, a child of the ftste ; who in confidera- 
 tion either of my rights or my duty, do not 
 belong more to one order than another ; and 
 confequencly am attached to all with the 
 fame degree of tendernefs. Such, gentlemen, is 
 the refolution I wifhed to communicate to you, 
 conformably to the laws of the kingdom. But 
 I am flill more induced to it, by the opinion I 
 have of your abilities, and your concern for youi* 
 country's good* 
 
 The KING'S SPEECH to the marflial of 
 the Diet, and the fpeakers of the different 
 ordersi the 28 th of Novembefj 1771^ 
 
 IT is now almoll three months fince I informed 
 the ftates, by an extrad from the regifters of 
 the fen ate, of my wilh to have the ceremony of 
 my confecration performed, in order to lay at the 
 feet of the Eternal, the crown of my anceftors, 
 which he has been pleafed to place on my 
 head. I have ever fince expeifled in filence an 
 anfwer from the ftates ; but the moil unexppfled 
 events have fmce happened, whofe fatal conle- 
 quenees give rtie the greateft uneafinefs. I fhould 
 not think 1 fulfilled properly not only the duties 
 of a king, but even thofe of a citizen, the ftrong- 
 eft and mofl: facred I ever contrafted fince my 
 birth, if I calmly beheld the prefent fituation of* 
 p«blic affairs* 
 
 Y a Fi-om
 
 [ 3H ] 
 
 From the moment in which, by the will of 
 providence, I found myfelf unexpectedly placed on 
 the throne, by the moft melancholy and unex- 
 pefbed event j my conftant care has been to reftore 
 harmony to my divided kingdom. My actions 
 are known to all, and by them you may judge of 
 the rectitude of my intentions. With thefe in- 
 tentions I received the ftates at the opening of 
 the Diet. I faid I would endeavour all in my 
 power to conciliate their differences, and re-unite 
 their hearts alienated from each other. I certainly 
 did not expeft to find before the clofe of the 
 Diet, the fpirit of party break out in altercations, 
 the moft deftruftive to liberty and the nation. 
 
 I confider the ftates too highly, and have too 
 much refpeft for the laws, to interfere in their 
 deliberations. Far be fuch a thought from my 
 mind. But when the danger is evident and pref- 
 fing, ""to remain a paffive fpeftator of it, would 
 be criminal. It would be but a bad proof of 
 attachment to my country, or love for my fellow- 
 citizens, to look on with indifference at events 
 that may lead them to the edge of a precipice. 
 Penetrated with thefe fentiments, I thought it 
 my duty to fend to you the marflial of the Diet, 
 and the three other fpeakers, to impart to you my 
 uneafinefs at the unhappy differences that now 
 fubfift among the four orders, which jointly com- 
 pofe the ftates of the kingdom. I can no longer 
 be ignorant of thefe differences, fmce they have 
 appeared properly authenticated in print j which 
 has excited* attention as much abroad, as in the in- 
 terior parts of the kingdom. 
 
 If
 
 L 3'^5 ] 
 
 If my intentions were lefs pure, lefs upright, 
 lefs innocent j if my heart was not imprefled with 
 the flrongeft love for my country, for its prof- 
 perity, its independence, liberty, glory, and hap- 
 pinefs, I might have calmly waite^i for events; 
 and after the example of other kings my prede- 
 cefTors, feized an opportunity of profiting by their 
 divifions, at the expence of the laws and liberty. 
 But when I firfl: faluted the ftates as their king, 
 I contracted an engagement with them, the more 
 facred as it was a free one j an engagement too 
 folemn to permit me ever to forget the duty which 
 my honour, and flill more, my feelings require 
 of me. I know that kings of tjiis countr)' have 
 been unfortunate enough not to have been al- 
 ways confidered as tender fathers formed to 
 unite the hearts of their children, but as foreign 
 powers with whom they were to capitulate. But 
 I feel myfelf actuated by lb fmcere a zeal for my 
 country, fo difengaged from all perfonal intereft, 
 or any views relative to my perfonal intereft, 
 that I hope to eftablifh that reciprocal confidence 
 betv/een the king and his fubjects, which pad 
 times have too much contributed to dellroy. 
 
 It is with thofe intentions which I this morn- 
 ing cominunicated to the fenate, that I have re • 
 quefted your attendance, in order to reprefent to 
 the ftates in the ftrongeft manner, the fatal confc- 
 quences they, as well as the kingdom in general, 
 have to fear, if they do not in time prevent them ; 
 and if they do not put a ftop to thofe fliocking 
 difagrcements, at this time moft particularly fo, 
 when a general want of money renders the conti- 
 Y 3 nuation
 
 [ 326 ] 
 
 nuatlon of a Diet very burthenfome j when a 
 bad harveft gives us caufe to fear famine, the 
 plague, or fome contagious diforder. All thefc 
 calamities which threaten us at once, require 
 fpeedy remedies, mature deliberations, animated 
 and vigorous refolutions. 
 
 Happy in being able to contribute my fhare, I 
 offer myfelf as a bond of concord between the 
 ftates, my dear fellow-citizens, and fubjects. I leave 
 it to them to determine how arid in what man- 
 ner they chufe to make ufe of my good intentions. 
 They may with fo much the more confidence in- 
 truft to me that falutary work, as I have already 
 declared to them, and I declare it again in pre- 
 fence of t'heir orators, that, fatisfied with the^ 
 claims they allow me, I alk nothing for myfelf, 
 I am the only perfon in the kingdom who, born a 
 child of the {late, do not belong in particular to 
 any one order j who love them all equally, and 
 whofe fate being ftrongly connected with the 
 true intereft of the ftate, am confequently the 
 only impartial perfon in this delicate bufinefs. I 
 wilh to lay all thefe confiderations before the 
 ftates, to whom I requeft the marfhal of the Di- 
 f t, and the other orators, may give an account of 
 this declaration, 
 
 The
 
 [ 327 ] 
 
 The KING'S ADDRESS to the States aflem- 
 bled the 21ft of Augull, 1772. 
 
 PEnetrated with the moft lively grief at the 
 fight of the fituation in which I now behold 
 my country, I find myfelf obliged to expofe the 
 truth in the ftrongeft light. The kingdom being 
 now on the verge of ruin, you ought not to be 
 furprized if I do not receive you at prefent with 
 the fame expreflions of joy, as my heart ufed to 
 didate when you approached the throne. I can- 
 not reproach myfelf with having concealed any 
 thing from you. I twice addreffed you with all the 
 truth my fituation required, with all the franknefs 
 honour infpires. The fame franknefs will now 
 dire<5b my words in the neceflary retrolpedl of paft, 
 in order to remedy prefent evils. 
 
 It is a mournful, but generally acknowledged 
 tmth, that hatred and civil difcord have diftradted 
 the kingdom. 
 
 For a long time the nation has been a prey to 
 the diflentions that have in a manner divided it into 
 two diftind fets of people, united only in injuring 
 their country. You know that this divifion has 
 produced hatred; hatred, revenge; revenge> per- 
 fecution ; and perfecution, new revolutions. 
 
 Thofe agitations occafioned by a few ambitious 
 
 men have Ihook the kingdom. Both parties have 
 
 Ihed rivers of blood, and the people have been 
 
 the unfortunate vidims of their difagreement ; in 
 
 y 4 whicli.
 
 [ 328 ] 
 
 which they were no otherwife interefted, than In 
 being the firfl to feel the unhappy confequences 
 of it. The only intention of their leaders, was, 
 to ftrengthen their own power. Every thing was 
 made fubfervient to that point, often at the ex- 
 pence of the citizens, and always tq the injury of 
 the kingdom. 
 
 ^When the fpirit of the law has been evident, 
 they have forced the letter of it to their own pur- 
 pofes ; when it abfolutely condemned their pro- 
 ceedings, it was broke through. Nothing was 
 held facred by a multitude urged on by hatred 
 and revenge. In Ihort, confufion was pulhed fo 
 far, that it became a generally received opinion 
 that plurality of voices was above law, and they 
 acknowledged no other rule of condud but thefe 
 arbitrary proceedings. 
 
 Thus it was that liberty, the nobleft right of 
 humanity, was transformed into a defpotic ari- 
 ftocracy in the hands of the ruling party; 
 which was itfelf overborne in its turn, and go- 
 verned by a few. The approach of a new Diet 
 occafioned a general confternation. Far from 
 confidering the means of conducing properly the 
 affairs of the kingdom, they were folely employ- 
 ed in getting over numbers to their party, in or^ 
 der to preferve themfelves from the culpable au- 
 dacity and violence of the other. If the internal 
 fituation of the kingdom was perilous, how hu- 
 miliating muft it have been abroad ? I am afhamed 
 to fpeak of it. Born a Swede, and King of Sweden, 
 it was almoft impoITible for me to fuppofe that 
 foreign views fhould govern Swedilh men 3 much 
 
 lefs
 
 [ 3^9 ] 
 lefs that fuch an influence fhould be obtained, by 
 the vileft and bafeft means; means odious to 
 every Swedifh citizen. You underfland what I 
 mean, though my delicacy wilhes to throw a veil 
 over the ignominy into which your diiTentions 
 have plunged the ftate. 
 
 Such was the fituation in which I found Sweden, 
 when by the decrees of Providence I received the 
 Swedifli fceptre. You yourfelves know that I 
 fpared no pains to bring about a reconciliation. 
 "When I addrelTed you from the throne as well on 
 this as on other occafions, I always recommended 
 unanimity, and obedience to the laws. I have fa- 
 crificed both my private intercft, and that of my 
 ftation ; I have refufed no engagement, no ftep 
 however painful, that might produce fo falutary 
 an eflfccl, for the national good. Whoever can 
 contradift this truth let him boldly do it. 
 
 I expected my endeavours would have freed you 
 from the chains, that foreign gold, mutual hatred 
 and licentioufnefs had forged for you ; and that 
 the example of other nations would be a terrifying 
 warning to you. All has been in vain. You 
 have been fcduced partly by your chiefs, partly 
 by your private animofities. All reftraints have 
 been thrown afide, all agreements broken 
 through. 
 
 Licentioufnefs has overleapt all bounds, and 
 has been the more ungovernable as it had been for 
 a time reprefs'd. The moll virtuous, worthy and 
 diftinguilhed citizens have been facrificed j ve- 
 Mcrable nriinifter:, degraded; whofe zeal and 
 
 fidelity
 
 [ 330 ] 
 fidelity have been at all times acknowledged. 
 Whole bodies of magiftrates depoled. Yes, the 
 whole people has been crufhedj the popular 
 voice fiienced j their complaints coniidered as 
 feditious j in ^ort their liberty bowed down un- 
 der the ariftocratic yoke. The Almighty has ma- 
 nifefted his anger at the injullice of thofe who 
 had ufurped dominion. The earth has clofed her 
 womb and refufes her gifts. Want, mifery, 
 calamities of all forts have opprelTed the country. 
 Far from feeking a remedy when I firfl: urged you 
 to it, you then appeared more particularly deter- 
 mined to gratify your private feelings, than to 
 relieve your conltituents. When neceflity drove 
 you at laft to take the means of relieving the fink- 
 ing nation, the remedy came almoft too late. 
 
 In this manner has a year pafled, during a mol^ 
 expenfive diet, in which nothing has been done 
 for the kingdom. All my remonflrances having 
 been ufelefs, and my care without efFed ; pene- 
 trated with grief for the fate of my dear country, 
 I have waited in filence to fee what the nation 
 would think of the condudl of their deputies to- 
 wards them and me. One part of the nation bore 
 the yoke with fighs and murmuring, but with 
 fubmiflion, not knowing how to obtain redrcfs, 
 nor how to fave their country. In another part of 
 the kingdom they were reduced to delpair. They 
 took arms. In this fituation the ftate, true liber- 
 ty, and public fafety being in the moll imminent 
 danger (not to mention that which threatened my 
 own life) I had no other refource than to adopt, 
 with the afliftance of the Almighty, thofe means 
 
 that
 
 [ 33i ] 
 
 that have delivered other brave hatibns, and lat- 
 terly Sweden herfelf under the banners of Gufta- 
 vus Vafa. God has bleft my undertaking ; my 
 people have been once more animated with fuch 
 a zeal for the good of their country, as once filled' ^ 
 the hearts of Engelbrecght and Guftavus Ericfon. 
 All has fucceeded to my wifh, and I have faved 
 myfclf and the kingdom, without any of the citi** 
 zcns having fuftained the leaft injury. 
 
 You are deceived if you fuppofe I intend any 
 thing prejudicial to your laws and liberties. I 
 promifed to govern a free people. A promife the 
 more facred as it was voluntary. "What I am now 
 about will not make me break a refolution, which 
 was not founded on neceflity, but my internal 
 convidion. I am far from wifhing to deftroy 
 liberty. I mean only to abolifh licentioufnefs ; 
 to fubftitute for the lawlefs and arbitrary proceed- 
 ings which have for fome time tyrannized over 
 the kingdom, a wife and well regulated form of 
 government J fuch as the ancient Swedilh laws 
 prefcribe, and to govern as my great predeceflbrs 
 have governed it. 
 
 The only end I have propofed to myfelf in all I 
 have done, is to eftablifh true liberty j it is this 
 alone, my dear fubjefts, which can render you 
 happy. I fliall eftablifh it by your fafety under the 
 laws ; by the fecurity of your property, by the en- 
 couragement of induftry ; by the prefervation of 
 good order in the town and country; by the moll: 
 attentive care to auginent general opulence, and 
 to enable you to enjoy it in peace and tranquil- 
 it lityi
 
 t 33^ 1 
 lity J and finally by promoting true piety without 
 hypocrify, and without fuperftition. 
 
 All this cannot be accompliihed, if the king- 
 dom be not governed by an invariable law, the 
 letter of which cannot be forced : by a law which 
 binds not only the king, but the ftates j which 
 can neither be abolifhed nor changed without the 
 free confent of both j which allows a king, zeal- 
 ous for the good of his country, to confult with 
 the ftates, without their confidering him as an ob- 
 je6t of terror i and which laftly unites the king 
 and ftates in one common intereft, the good of 
 the kingdom. 
 
 The law which is to bind me, as well as you, 
 is that which is now going to be read to you. 
 
 You will eafily perceive by what I have faid to 
 you, that far from having any private views, my 
 whole object is, the good of the kingdom. If I 
 have been forced to fhew you the truth in its 
 ftrongeft light, I have not done it from motives 
 of refentment, but wholly from a regard for your 
 true welfare. I nowife doubt but that you will 
 receive this with gratitude ^ and that you will 
 concur with me in placing upon a folid and inva- 
 riable foundation the edifice of public happinefs, 
 and of true liberty. 
 
 Illuftrious and immortal kings have borne the 
 fceptre which I hold in my hands. It would be 
 more than prefumption in me to compare myfelf 
 to them. But I emulate them alj in zeal and 
 love for my people. 
 
 If you have the fame regard for your country, 
 I hope the Swedifh name will recover the confc- 
 
 quence
 
 [ 333 3 
 
 quence and glory which it had acquired in the 
 days of our anceftors. 
 
 The Almighty, from whom no fecrets are hid- 
 den, fees at this inftant the fentiments of my heart : 
 may he deign to grant his grace and blefTing to 
 your councils and to your decifions ! 
 
 The KING'S SPEECH to the States on 
 the 25th ' of Auguft 1772. 
 
 IT is with the utmoft: gratitude towards the 
 Almighty, that I addrefs you this day with 
 that ancient confidence and Swedifh candour, prac- 
 tifed in the time of my anceftors. 
 
 After fo many troubles, after having been fo 
 divided in fentiment, we have at. length but one 
 objeft, the good of the kingdom. It is now time 
 to put an end to a Diet which has already lafted 
 fourteen months. On this account I have brought 
 the propofitions I have to make to you into as 
 narrow a compafs as poflible. 
 
 The wants of the ftate are confiderable. On 
 my part, oeconomy ftiall not be wanting. What 
 you (hall grant to me ihall be employed only to 
 your own advantage. 
 
 The
 
 [ 334 ] 
 
 The KING'S SPEECH to the States on 
 clofing the Diet the 9th of September 1772. 
 
 IN terminating this affembly of the ftates of the 
 kingdom, which will certainly be one of the 
 moft memorable of any that have diftinguifh- 
 ed our annals, I feel myfelf penetrated with the 
 moft lively gratitude towards the Almighty, who 
 has deigned to proteft our country, and diflipate 
 a ftorm which threatened deftrudion, not only to 
 the liberty of the inhabitants, but to themfelves. 
 
 This Diet began, in mourning for the lofs of a 
 goodking and a beloved father. Your deliberations 
 were interrupted by difcord and party hatred. It 
 ihouldfeem that Providence had defignedlyfufFered 
 the misfortunes which opprefled our anceftors, 
 to arrive at their utmoft height, in order the bet- 
 ter to evince the ftrength of his hand in the re-* 
 markable change which has juft taken place. 
 
 This happy revolution has, under the diredlion 
 of providence, applied an immediate remedy to all 
 the evils, which have harrafTed the kingdom for 
 upwards of a century. A nation before torn by 
 diflentions, it has rendered a united, free, power- 
 ful, and independent people, zealous for their 
 country's good. It is thus circumftanced that 
 the government of the kingdom pafles from youf 
 hands into mine. Liberty is confirmed j the laws 
 are fixed ; concord is reftorcd. 
 
 You can eafily conceive the tender fentiments 
 •with which I behold you this day affembled before 
 the throne. 
 
 The
 
 [ 33S ] 
 
 The few days that have pafled fince this great 
 change has taken place, have furnilhed me with the 
 fureft prpofs of your affeftion, and of your entire 
 confidence in tne. I have feen thofe virtues, thofe 
 greit qualities, by which your anceftors honoured 
 the age in which they lived, fpring forth anew 
 in your hearcs, and Ihew themfelves in your ac- 
 tions. They had only lain dormant in ' your 
 hearts j the prefent conjundion has called them 
 forth. 
 
 That courage, that attachment towards their 
 king and country, which once diftinguilhed the 
 Swedifh nobles, have been revived, and have fup- 
 ported me by the moft vigorous exertions. The 
 fubmiflion of the clergy to the decrees of provi- 
 dence, their zeal for the glory of God, their obe- 
 dience to fuperiors, their love of concord, and of 
 the public good, have re appeared. Be attentive 
 to infpire your abfent brethren with the fame fen- 
 timents. The zeal of the order of burghers for 
 the commerce of the kingdom, has been mani- 
 fefted, fmce they have acquired a juft fenfe of 
 their true intereft and real profperity. The re- 
 fpe6t of the order of peafants for God and the 
 government, has fhewn itfelf fully, as from the 
 time they were left to themfelves, they have con- 
 fulted only that love for their country, which has 
 at all times charadlerized the Swedifh people. 
 
 I feparate myfelf therefore from you at this 
 day, with a heart filled with gratitude and joy, 
 after you have concurred with me to re-eftablifh 
 upon the molbfolid foundations the ancient Swedifh 
 liberty j after you have regulated a form of go- 
 
 vernment
 
 [ 336 J 
 
 vernment which favours it^ after being united to 
 me by the ftrongeft ties, you may hope for times 
 more fortunate. 
 
 I affure you I fhall fet no bounds to my 
 cares, and attention to merit the confidence you 
 place in me. And if by mutual union, by oeco- 
 nomy and moderation, you fecond my labours for 
 the welfare of the kingdom, its aggrandizement 
 will be certain ; and I fhall fee my hopes fulfilled 
 of receiving you after fix years, as a faithful, hap- 
 py, united, free, and independent people. 
 
 The SPEECH of the MARSHAL of the DIET, 
 
 on the fame occafion. 
 
 IT was with the pureft joy, and mofl profound 
 veneration, that on the opening of the Diet, 
 the nobles teflified to your majefly in this place, 
 their fubmiflion, their zeal, and their everlafling 
 fidelity. It is with a fatisfadtion as pure and in- 
 exprefTible, that at the foot of the throne, they 
 this day reiterate to your majefly an afTurance of 
 thofe fentiments which they have ever teflified, 
 and Ihall ever preferve towards the facred perfon 
 of fo honoured and fo beloved a king. 
 
 During this Diet the nobles have given the 
 ftrongeft proofs of the regard they pay to your 
 majefly's rights, well knowing that the Swedifh 
 nobility, if feparated from the interefts of the 
 throne, might likewife bring themfelves to forget 
 their duty to their country, what they owed to 
 / . their 
 
 9
 
 [ 337 1 
 ^clr own body, and to their poftcrlty. They 
 have therefore concurred with your majefty in eve- 
 ry means which your patriotifm and enlightened 
 zeal had pointed out as proper to be adopted in 
 order to relieve the nation and to eftablifh its in-» 
 dependence. 
 
 It only remains for us, at the conclufion of 
 this affembly, to form the moft ardent vows for 
 the prefervation of your majefty; that the happi- 
 nefs of your fubjefts may continue as long as your 
 precious life; and that the nobles may contribute 
 hereafter to the ftrength and glory of this fortu- 
 nate reign, 
 
 SPEAKER of the CLERGY'S SPEECH. 
 
 WHEN, in obedience to your majefl:y*s or- 
 ders, the reprefentatives of the clergy 
 aflembled themfelves before the throne, for the 
 laft time during this Diet, their hearts are fiUdd 
 with fuch fentiments of veneration, of zeal, and of 
 gratitude, as no mortal tongue, much lels mine, 
 can adequately exprefs. 
 
 If this Diet forms an epocha the moft memo- 
 rable of any in the Swedifh hiftory, every think- 
 ing being muft perceive in it the hand of the Al- 
 mighty, and contemplate with holy veneration the 
 great defigns of Providence. 
 
 Every government is marked by the ftamp of 
 human weaknefs, that of being imperfect, incon- 
 ftant, and variable ; they have their beginning, 
 their growth, apd their end. 
 
 Z IJt
 
 [ 338 ] 
 
 Ift the faille manner that an individual by aii 
 irregular life, may himfelf abridge his days j a 
 people may alfo, by abufing their freedom, contri- 
 b'vfte to its defliTjfbion. 
 
 - Happy the people who in fuch a change can 
 preferv^e liberty, the foul of civil fociety ! — Hap- 
 py the Swedlfli people, who can behold your ma- 
 jfefty i^s the inftrument in the hands of the Lord, 
 to deliver the liberty of Sweden from what had 
 debafed and degraded it ! Happy the ftates of 
 Sweden, which, notwithllanding fuch a change, 
 may with the fame fecurity and freedom take leave 
 of a king, as gracious as when they firft beheld- 
 him ! 
 
 E^r.-nppmorable affembly ! during which the 
 ftates converted the tears that a jull grief caufed 
 them to fhed over the tomb of a much regretted 
 mor^archj into tears of joy, flowing at the 
 foot of the throne of a^ king born among us,; 
 who has fulfilled much fooner than could have 
 been expefted, the great hopes which his country 
 had formed of him, from the moment of his 
 birth. 
 
 The.f^t£s do. not now feparat^ without feeing 
 the CFOwn recover upon his head its ancient fplen- 
 dour i after the clouds that had been collected by 
 the viciffitudea of time to darken its lujftre, had 
 been fo wifely difperfed by your m.^»fty, nox 
 •with the violence o£ a Itorm, but by the gentkft 
 rjiys^ of br^Uftty> fparying. fj|9n[^_^jM^^.^.£eleftial 
 f^urce. V..,, - , 
 
 The clergy deem therafelves happy in having 
 j^cen witnefies to fo ex^traordinary an event -, the 
 
 accomplifliment
 
 MJ9 1 
 Jtticomplifhment of which providence had referved 
 for your majeflyj and by which the Alnnighty 
 has refolved to pour his grace and mercy upon 
 this afflifted kingdom, by making your majefty 
 inftrumental in bringing a remedy to thofe great 
 evils it laboured under, before they had had time 
 entirely to corrupt and deftroy it. 
 
 Blefled be your majefty, who fo often endea- 
 voured to reftore peace, tranquillity, and union, 
 to minds fo agitated and divided ! 
 
 May God grant that Difcord be by this means 
 fo totally vanquilhed, that flie fhall never again 
 dare to appear in Sweden, and draw upon us de*- 
 Jijrved punilhments from God ! 
 
 BlefTed may your majefty be in all you ft ill 
 meditate, in order to complete the great work be- 
 gan in the name of the Lord, that -of reftoring 
 tranquillity to the kingdom, of delivering and ex- 
 alting it i fo that your majefty fliall not facrifice 
 yourfelf in vain, for a people whofe love and fide- 
 lity are fallen to you as an inheritance along with 
 the crown. 
 
 The deputies of the clergy fdparate from each 
 other this day, rejoicing at what they have feen 
 accompliftied by the Lord. They will haften to 
 ipread among their brethren and their congrega- 
 tions, the praifes of God and of the king. They 
 will proclaim it in the kingdom, that your ma- 
 jefty has not only offered, but in reality expofed 
 your facred perfon in order to be the blefled bond 
 of union among your fubjedls. 
 
 .They will encourage the citizen, bending be- 
 neath the weight of mifery, with the gentle hope 
 
 Zi of
 
 [ 340 1 
 of better times. A hope which has never been 
 lb well founded as at prefent, when the great Guf- 
 .tavus has added to the lift of his royal titles, that 
 of firft citizen of a free people. They will be 
 continually at the feet of the heavenly father, of-, 
 fering the moft ardent prayers for your ma- 
 jefty, that you may never want that ftrengtk 
 which God infpires, to enable you to wear for a 
 length of years that crown which your majefty, 
 by your extreme love for your country, has 
 rendered more weighty than when you firft 
 received it. Yes, with the grace of God, they 
 will take every care to contribute to your ma- 
 jefty's fatisfa6lion in the execution of their func- 
 tions ; knowing that by fo doing they fulfil the 
 will of their heavenly mafter, and promote th« 
 good of his church. 
 
 SPEECH of the SPEAKER of the BURGHERS. 
 
 THE order of burghers lay at the foot of 
 your majefly's throne, their veneration and 
 gratitude, at the clofe of a Diet fo happily con- 
 cluded. 
 
 During this alTembly of the ftates, the moment 
 has arrived, from which the happinefs and inde- 
 pendence of the kingdom of Sweden, may date a 
 new epocha. 
 
 From the time of your majefly's accefTion to the 
 crown, you have continually ftrengthened the 
 foundations of government. 
 
 Your regard for the welfare of your fubje(5ls, 
 
 your ardent defire to contribute to the happinefs 
 
 5 of
 
 [341 ] 
 
 of your kingdom, and to follow without obftacle 
 the glorious example of your anceflors, have, to- 
 gether with wifdom, guided the fteps of your ma- 
 jefty in the road to glory j and the love of your 
 fubjcfts fecures as much as their oath and their 
 duty, your majefly's power and authority. 
 
 Your great qualities, your approved virtues, 
 and your fignal love for your country, would ren- 
 der all form of government unnecefTary. But your 
 majefty has wifely confidered times to come, and 
 the kingdom expe(5ls, under the fcepter of Vafa, 
 the height of felicity. 
 
 May the Almighty render your majefly's reign 
 long and happy j may we reap the fruits of peace j 
 and may liberty, that moft precious right of man- 
 kind, be aflifted and protedled by the laws, under 
 your majefly's fcepter. May licentioufnefs be for 
 ever buried, and virtue regain her empire. May 
 union and mutual concord, point to the true in- 
 terefts of the kingdom, and fuflain its dignity and 
 ancient fplendour. May difcord be for ever bar 
 nifhed from the hearts of the Swedes ; obedience 
 contribute to the objefts of good laws ; induflry 
 and diligence render the fubjefts happy; their 
 profperity become the firfl pleafure of your ma- 
 jefly ; and the welfare of the kingdom your 
 ^reatefl glory I 
 
 Zi SPEECHf
 
 [ 34ft ] 
 
 SPEECH of the SPEAKER of the ORDER 
 of PEASANTS. 
 
 AT the clofe of this Diet, as long in its dura- 
 tion, as happy in its conclufion, when the 
 drder of peafants approach the throne, they recol- 
 left with the higheft veneration, that it is by the 
 tender and zealous cares of your majefty, that the 
 kingdom has been faved, when even on the brink 
 ©f deftrucftion ; that a ballance of power, which 
 has been hitherto wanting to the form of govern- 
 ment has been eftablifhed, and that the ancient 
 Swedllh liberty and independence have been re- 
 ilored. Events which furpafled the hopes of the 
 Swedes, as much as they have aftonilhed Eu-* 
 rope. 
 
 ■ J want words to exprefs the very humble ve- 
 neration and the zealous attachment toward? 
 your majefty, which the order of peafants, and 
 their abfent brethren entertain. 
 
 The peafants believe they fulfil the defires 
 jof the abfent, in humbly laying at the foot of 
 the throne, fincere Swedilh hearts, as a pof- 
 fefllon to which your majefty from a love of 
 your country, has acquired the jufteft title. 
 
 The chains which galled free citizens, having 
 been broken j the rights and ancient fecurity 
 of the Swedes re-eft abliihed ; and the foundation 
 of the ftrerigth of the kingdom laid in fuch a 
 manner, that Sweden may hereafter recover her 
 ancient glory and fplendour^ a new epocha 
 
 commences
 
 [ 343 ] 
 
 ^commences from this day, which will animate die 
 induftrious, though hitherto opprefled mechanic j 
 which will render profperous manufadlures, before 
 fallen into decay ; and which will incline every 
 fiibjed to refped the government, to love his 
 pountry, and obey the laws. 
 
 ^fANIFESTO of CAPTAIN HELLI- 
 
 C H I U S, Commandant in the City of 
 Chriftianftadt. 
 
 IN order to inform you of the Intention of the 
 meafures which have been taken, to put this 
 town and fortrefs into a ftate of defence, and to 
 cftablifh a fufficient guard in them, this mani- 
 fefto is to declare that it is only on account of 
 .certain perfons having by violence and ftratagem, 
 at the expence of the laws and citizens, dared to 
 take upon themfelves moft unjuftifiably the name 
 p{ " States of the kingdom of Sweden /' that 
 they have exercifed the moft abfolute authority, 
 have deviated from the laws and limits of juftice, 
 and have banifhed integrity from all their adions, 
 and favoured foreign views. All which plainly 
 evinces that they have taken no precautions to 
 prevent the want of corn, and the mifery that 
 oppreffes and afflids the greateft part of the king- 
 dom, nor have they thought of any remedy, or 
 any means or refource for the fecurity of com- 
 merce, and the circulation of money. All our 
 bulwarks are negledled. The ruin of the king- 
 doni muft foon have followed. Public and pri- 
 vate
 
 [ 344- ] 
 vate fafety were fo far loft, that the reputation, 
 honour, and property, of the citizens, had no 
 defence. The moft violent attempts have been 
 made againft the juft and ligitimate power of the 
 king; all obedience, indeed, to his majefty has 
 been laid afjde, on all occafions. 
 
 From thefe confiderations it was, that the mi- 
 litary power of this town and fortrefs, fuppofed 
 that fuch a mode of governing tended to unlimit- 
 ed power; which each of you by virtue of your 
 oaths and engagements, are bound to rejeft and 
 prevent. On this account the garrifon refufe de- 
 ference and obedience to the pretended ftates, and 
 cpnfider and declare all they have done to be null 
 and void : and as the moft efficacious remedy to 
 .the general diforder, they are refolved to perfift 
 with firmnefs in the refolution they have taken, 
 not to lay down their arms till their views arc 
 jfully anfwered. 
 
 The work, my brave Swedes^, is at laft begun. 
 Remember what you owe your king and country ; 
 Ihev/ your zeal in your feveral ftations: let us 
 have but one intereft. It is the only way to fave 
 the kingdom from a Ihameful downfall, and per- 
 haps a foreign yoke j which if not yet ^uite cer^ 
 tain, we have the ftrongeft reafon to apprehend. 
 We protcft before God, in the face of the world, 
 that our intentions are pure, and free from any hid- 
 den defign. They only tend to the good of the 
 country, and are to anfwer no other purpofe, than 
 to give to God, what belongs to God j and to thq 
 Jiing, what belongs to the king. 
 
 At Chriftianftadt this ift of Auguft, 1772. 
 
 The
 
 t 345 3 
 
 The KING'S ORDINANCE relating to the 
 Factions that have troubled his Dominions. 
 
 OUR cares for your general union, having 
 had, by the powerful protection and blef- 
 fing of God, fuch happy fuccefs, that the ftates 
 of the kingdom have unanimoufly received, and 
 confirmed by oath, a new form of government, 
 by which the fafety of the fubje6l is eftablifhed in 
 the moft folemn manner, and which has at the 
 fame time put an end to all caufes of difcord and 
 divifion j we have room to hope, with good foun- 
 dation, that from this moment the ancient fpirit 
 of party, which had divided and torn the nation, 
 has intirely difappeared j and we fhall no longer 
 behold the father oppofed to the fon, the brother 
 to the brother, and every family a prey to the 
 moft fatal divifions, difgracing themfelves by 
 fuch anions, contrary to all the laws and ordi- 
 nances of God, as afflided all good people, who 
 could hardly conceive that fuch corrupt morals 
 could prevail in a chriftian country. 
 
 To accomplifli with the greater expedition our 
 defigns and hopes, we think ourfelves obliged to 
 give warning and order, that no reproach Ihall be 
 inferted in any writing, that might give offence 
 to the different parties that have heretofore pre- 
 vailed ; and that the contemptuous names which 
 have ferved till now to diflinguifh them, be never 
 again employed in the odious fenfe in which they 
 were accuftomed to be ufed. 
 
 The
 
 C 546 ] 
 
 The confidence with which the fidelity of out' 
 fubjefts infpires us, gives us hopes that what has 
 been faid and ordered with refpedt to thofe writ- 
 ings, and public difcourfes, will out of zeal and 
 love for the quiet and tranquillity of their coun- 
 try, be equally obferved in private converfations ; 
 fo that the laws and manners may equally coin- 
 cide to the fame purpofe, and render the Swedifh 
 people a nation happily united in their veneration 
 for God, their obedience and love for their coun- 
 try, and in the pradice of all the focial virtues. 
 
 Given at the caftle of Stockholm, the 24th of 
 Auguft, 1772. 
 
 GUSTAVUS. 
 
 Jean De Helano. 
 
 i:ho
 
 £ 3^7 1 
 
 the KING'S LETTER to Prince CHARLES. 
 
 GusTAVus by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, 
 &c. to the Serene Prince oi?r well-beloved and 
 dear Brorhtr Charles, Hereditary Prince of 
 Sweden, greeting i 
 
 Serene Prince, our well-beloved and deajp 
 Brother ; 
 
 WE are informed by your royal highnefs'jj 
 letter of the a4th of this month, of what 
 we already had forefeen, that captain Hellichiu& 
 had, upon the firft fummons of your royal high- 
 nefs, given up the fortrefs of Chriftianftadt, of 
 which he had for fome time been pofleflcd. It 
 has been proved to the public that he has not been 
 fcdittous, tliac this brave officer revolted only 
 againft licentioufnefs and party rage, but not in 
 any fort againft us, or againft the Country. 
 
 We mxne only him, as he was at the head of 
 the enterprize. We ftiall, however, always ten- 
 derly remember thofe who aftifted him, either 
 fuch as belonged to the garrifon, or any others. 
 They all rilk'd their lives, uncertain of fuccefs ; 
 they did not fear even tortures or the moft igno- 
 minious punifliments. True glory braves them 
 all. God knew their hearts,, that they were for 
 us, and for their country. Their vows were ac- 
 compliflied. True liberty is once more eftablifh- 
 cd. Opprefllon, perfecution, and all foreign 
 views, have difappeared i and we have recovered 
 
 3 the
 
 t 34t J 
 the royal authority, under which the kingdoi^ 
 might date its moll glorious times. The mor« 
 providential this revolution, the more are we in- 
 clined to declare to captain Hellichius, and to 
 thofe who have affilled him, or obeyed his 
 orders, our gracious acknowledgements, and the 
 pleafure that their courage, firmnefs, and loyal 
 condu6t, gave us. No one can teftify it to them 
 in a more honourable way than your royal high- 
 nefs 5 whofe ftriking exaimple of love for us, and 
 our country, is the fubjed of their veneration. 
 On which account it is we give this commiffion to 
 your royal highnefs ; afTuring you at the fame time 
 of our royal favour, and brotherly affeftion, and 
 recommending you to the holy care of the 
 Almighty. 
 
 2 i From the caftle of Stockholm, the 28th of 
 Auguft, 1772. 
 
 GUSTAVUSg 
 
 Charles Carlskiold,* 
 
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