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 ELEMENTS OF INTERPRETATION 
 
 TRANSLATEj^^ROJJ THE. LATMC OF 
 
 J, A. E^^ESTI 
 // 
 
 ACCOMPANIED BY NOTES ; 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM MORUS 
 BECK AND KEIL 
 
 By MOSES STUART 
 Associate Prof, of Sac. Lit, in the TheoL Seminary at Andovev 
 
 ANDOVER : 
 
 FLAGG AND GOULD, PRINTERS, 
 
 1822. 
 

PREFACE. 
 
 1 HE publication of the following work, in its present form, 
 originated from the want of a text-book, in our country, on the 
 science of interpretation. But few copies of Ernesti's Institutio 
 Interpretis have yet been imported ; and the Library of the The- 
 ological Seminary, with which the Translator is connected, con- 
 tains by far too few for classic use among the students. 
 
 The importance of regular scientific instruction in the Princi- 
 ples of Interpretation, has been long acknowledged, by the best 
 Biblical and classical scholars of Europe. A multitude of books 
 within a few years have been published, with a view to present 
 a regular digest of the principles and rules of Hermeneutics. Of 
 these, some are much too copious to admit of publication in our 
 country. Others are mere text books of particular lecturers, 
 and formed upon a plan not adapted to our circumstances. The 
 work of Ernesti, now re-published, has been through several edi- 
 tions in Europe, and has been more extensively used as a class- 
 book, than any publication of this nature. 
 
 It may be asked, why it is not now republished in the original 
 form. My reasons for making an English translation are, (1) 
 That the original Latin, though sufficiently pure in respect to the 
 choice of words, is arranged very much according to the idiom 
 of the German language, the vernacular tongue of Ernesti. It is 
 therefore difficult to be understood by any young man, who has 
 read Latin only in the Roman Classics. (2) Repeated trials, by 
 using the work as printed in Latin for a class book, have satisfied 
 me that comparatively little profit is gained in reading it, by most 
 who are entering upon their theological studies. For the work is 
 not only difficult, but from its brevity and technical form, it soon 
 becomes dry and uninteresting to a beginner. (3) I wished to add 
 some explanations for the sake of perspicuity, and if possible, 
 of creating additional interest in the study of interpretation. (4) 
 An edition in Latin, with the mere text, would hardly meet with 
 sale enough to defray the necessary expenses of publication. 
 
 The edition, from which I have made the translation, is that 
 published at Leipsic, in A. D. 1809, and edited by Dr. Aramon, 
 who has interspersed many notes of his own. Of these I have 
 made but little use. My reason for this is, that I did not regard 
 them as being of much value. Besides, they not unfrequently 
 partake of the extravagancies of the author ; who, in his Preface, 
 among various improvements recounted by him as introduced 
 since the time of Ernesti, mentions one, which may serve as a spe- 
 cimen of many others ; viz. that when Jesus is said by the Evan- 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 gelist to have walked upon the sea^ the interpreter can new give 
 the real uieaning;, which is, that he wAded as far as the shoal ua- 
 ter would permit^ and after that began to swim. 
 
 I do not deny that Dr. Ammon is learned ; but that sobriety 
 and discretion, which are the first characteristics of a good inter- 
 preter. I am unable to find in him ; at least to such a degree as 
 to make his opinions worthy of special consideration. 
 
 Besides ; ! have found a much better commentator on Ernesti, 
 from whose labours I have reaped great advantage. I refer to 
 Morus ; whose Hermeneuiica is a system of Lectures on Inter- 
 pretation, of which Ernesti's Institutioia the basis or text-book. 
 This work of Morus I prize so highly, that ( have, at the close 
 of almost every Section of Ernesti, referred to the corresponding 
 part, in his Commentator. The notes which I have added to the 
 work, contain, for the most part, a summary of what Morus has 
 said. For the fidelity of this summary, and for the matter of 
 some of the notes, specially of the longer ones, I am responsible. 
 The notes are distinguished from the text, by being printed in 
 smaller type. Any more distinction was thought unneceissary. 
 
 Morus is an author too copious for republication in our coun- 
 try, but may easily be imported. The Student cannot fail to 
 read him with great profit. The Latin is uncommonly easy ; and, 
 if I may judge by ray own feelings, very pure and classical. 1 
 would earnestly recommend it to every student, to compare Mo- 
 rus with Ernesti, in all the places where reference in the follow- 
 ing work is made to him. 
 
 The works of Keil, Beck, and Seller, to which reference is 
 made at the head of most of the chapters, are very useful Manu- 
 als of the Science of Interpretation, and can be procured at a 
 very moderate expense. In point of arrangement, and in the ex- 
 clusion of matter which does not belong to the proper province 
 of Hermeneutics, they have some advantages over Ernesti. I 
 believe, however, that Ernesti has exhibited the essential part of 
 the science in question, more fundamentally, and in a more con- 
 vincing and instructive way, than either of these authors. Still, 
 as they are more recent, and have been much used by those who 
 study interpretation, I thought it might be acceptable to refer to 
 them. 
 
 Other books are occasionally referred to, but not often, with 
 the exception of Morus. It would have been easy to add a mul- 
 titude of references to books, on every subject, and every ramifi- 
 cation of subjects, throughout the work. But I am not persuad- 
 ed of the utility of this method, with beginners. The mind is 
 overwhelmed with the endless task, which the reading of so ma- 
 ny writers would occasion. There may be a shew of learning 
 in a writer, who makes his references so copious; but the real 
 profit to the student is comparatively small. A few oi the best 
 books are of more importance than the undistinguished mass, 
 
which presents a mere catalogue of what has been published. 
 Beck is not free from this fault; and even Keil has not made his 
 *' select literature" sufficiently select. 
 
 My reasons for omitting some parts of the original work of Er- 
 nesti, are stated at the end of the Introduction, It is sufficient 
 here merely to say, that as Ernesti's work was one of the first 
 respectable efforts, to reduce the principles of interpretation to 
 a science, it is not a matter of any surprise, that he has included 
 in it much more than appropriately belongs to this subject. Sub- 
 sequent writers hare marked out the limits of the science, with 
 more accuracy. I have omitted what is now commonly omitted, 
 in works of this nature. 
 
 There are some topics, belonging to Hermeneutics, on which 
 the work of Ernesti has not touched. I have omitted them in 
 this work, because it is not my object to appear as an original 
 writer here, on these subjects. It is proper however to say, that 
 the topics omitted are much less the subject of precept or rule, 
 than those inserted ; and that the principles of several of them 
 are very far from being settled, to the satisfaction of critics. 
 What is most useful will be found in Ernesti. The rest experi- 
 ence will supply ; or the iustructer, who uses Ernesti, and con- 
 sults the books referred to, will be able to give the student some 
 adequate views of them. As my duty leads me to read lectures 
 in this department of science, to those whom I am called to ia-"^ 
 struct, it will be my aim, so far as I am able, to supply deficien- 
 cies of this nature ; in order that no topic may be neglected, 
 which may be useful to those, who are beginning the study of 
 interpretation. 
 
 To PART III. of this work, which treats of translating from one 
 language into another, I have added the greater part (#f an excel- 
 lent Dissertation of Morus, which comprises liiis topic. In or- 
 der to do this, I have omitted a part of the chapter in Ernesti, 
 pertaining to this subject; as I thought it far less useful, than 
 what is inserted from iMorus. 
 
 Part iv. contains a summary of the laws of criticism, which 
 are to regulate the judgment of those, who form opinions about 
 the genuine text of the Scriptures. Exceptions might be made 
 to some of these laws ; but I have not thought them of sufficient 
 importance to be urged here, where every thing is designed to 
 be a mere summary of general Maxims. Beck has given a more 
 brief view of the subject of criticism, than I have been able else- 
 where to find ; and the Biblical student should not be altogether 
 ignorant of it, as cases of controversy may arise about the text, 
 where ignorance of this nature would subject him to serious dis- 
 advantages. 
 
 Fart v. consists of a chapter from Keil, on the Qaalificalions 
 of an Interpreter. It is so much more brief and comprehensive 
 than the corresponding chapter in Ernesti, that I could not hesi- 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 tate to prefer it. A list of some of the best books, on the topics 
 to which the chapter adverts, will be found at the close of the re- 
 spective Sections. 
 
 In regard to the manner of the following Translation, it may- 
 be proper to state here, that my first attempt was to make a close 
 version of Ernesti, and publish it in this simple form. I proceed- 
 ed through the work of translating, with this design in view. 
 When 1 began to review my labour, I found that there was so 
 much of Latinism in it ; the sentences were so long and involv- 
 ed ; the connecting particles and words of this nature so few and in- 
 definite ; and the form in general so technical and uninviting, that 
 I abandoned the design of publishing it in this way ; renewed 
 my work of translating ; broke up sentences, or sections as be- 
 came necessary for the sake of perspicuity ; supplied connect- 
 ing words where they seemed to be wanting; added parts of sen- 
 tences for the sake of explanation, and in a few cases, whole sen- 
 tences and even paragraphs have been added for the sake of ex- 
 planation or connexion. I have not wittingly changed or per- 
 verted the sentiment^ in any case ; but 1 have taken the liberties 
 of a free translator, who is more concerned to make his book 
 perspicuous and useful, than to represent the exact style and man- 
 ner of his Original. 
 
 Instead of the subdivision of Sections under each chapter in Er- 
 nesti, they are here numbered continuously through the work ; 
 which is by far the most convenient method. The titles of the 
 parts and chapters have also received some alteration. 
 
 After all, such is the excessive difficulty of putting English 
 costume upon Ernesti, that I cannot flatter myself that the book 
 does not still contain many Latinisms, which may be unpleasant 
 to a reader, who is not acquainted with the original. Q^uod pot^ 
 ui^fecL Without absolutely abandoning the idea of being a trans- 
 lator, and making a new book, I could not in general well do 
 more than I have done. 
 
 At the commencement of each Section of the text, I have pTa- 
 ced a very brief notice of the Contents ; which, for convenience 
 to the reader, in order to find easily any subject after which he is 
 seeking, has been printed in Italics. These summaries belong 
 not to the original work ; I am respnosible for them. 
 
 If the Manual shall prove to be intelligible and useful, my wish- 
 es and highest expectations will be gratified. It is possible, if this 
 endeavour to promote a knowledge of the science of Interpretation 
 should meet with approbation, it may excite an efibrt on my part, 
 at some future period, to give the whole work a new form, more 
 specially adapted to the circumstances of this country. At pres- 
 ent, official duties are too numerous and urgent, to admit of such 
 an effort. 
 
 M. STUART. 
 
 Andover, Theol^ Seminary^ Jan. 22. 1822. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 Introduction . . • . . . 1 
 
 Part I. general principles of language. 
 Chap. I. Of the meaning of words . . 7 
 Chap. II. Of the kinds of words, and their vari- 
 ous use 21 
 
 Part II. rules of interpretation. 
 Chap. I. Introductory Remarks ... 32 
 Chap. II. On finding the usus loquendi in the dead 
 
 languages ...... 34 
 
 Chap. 111. Subsidiary means of finding the usus 
 
 loquendi . . . . . . 45 
 
 Chap. IV. On finding the usus loquendi of the 
 
 New Testament 56 
 
 Chap. V. Rules in respect to tropical language 71 
 Chap. VI Rules respecting emphasis . 93 
 
 Chap. VII. On reconciling apparent discrepancies 89 
 
 Part III. on translating. 
 Maxims to be observed by a translator . 91 
 
 appendix. 
 
 Morus^ on the general principles of translating 100 
 
 Beck^ on the general principles of criticism 111 
 
 Keil^ on the qualifications of an interpreter 119 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL. 
 
 {With this introductory chapter, may be compared Keil, Herm- 
 eneutica, pp. 1 — 14. Beck, Monogramm. Herm. pp. 1 — 22. 
 Seller, Hermeneutik, H 9 — Jl.] 
 
 § 1. JVecessity and utility (if it. The interpretation of 
 the sacred books is the highest and most difficult task 
 of the theologian. This may be shown from the na- 
 ture of the case, from experience, and also from the 
 consent of all enlightened periods. All solid knowl- 
 edge and judicious defence of divine truth, must origi- 
 nate from a right understanding and accurate interpre- 
 tation of the Scriptures. The purity of the Christian 
 religion has shone brighter or been obscured, in pro- 
 portion as the study of sacred interpretation has flour- 
 ished or decayed. 
 
 Finally, those have always been reckoned as the 
 most distinguished theologians, who have excelled in 
 this kind of learning. (Compare Morus, Hermeneuti- 
 ca, p. 3. I.) 
 
 As Christian doctrine is preserved only in written records, the 
 interpretation of these is absolutely essential to a knowledge of 
 it ; and unless we know what Christianity is, we can neither 
 maintain its purity nor defend its principles, to the best advan- 
 tage. 
 
 § 2. Difficulties attending interpretation. The science 
 of interpretation in general is difficult ; because it re- 
 quires much learning, judgment, and diligence. Not 
 unfrequently, a felicity of talent, or a more than usual 
 degree of understanding, is requisite to manage an exe- 
 getical inquiry with success. But the interpretation of 
 1 
 
^ INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the sacred books is, from various causes, (a) still more 
 difficult; as the general consent of the learned, and the 
 wonderful paucity (6) of good interpreters fully evince. 
 (Morus, p. 4. II.) 
 
 a) These causes are, their antiquity ; the peculiar dia- 
 led of the Scriptures, which greatly differs from that of the 
 western laneuages ; the manners, customs, education, style, 
 modes of thinking and expression, situation, government, cli- 
 mate, &c, of the authors, in many respects so very dissimilar to 
 ours ; the fewness of the hooks written in the Scriptural dialect ; 
 and the want of commentators and lexicographers to whom 
 the language was vernacular. To these causes may he addt d, 
 the authority and influence which many erroneous commentaries 
 of distincuished men have had, over the Christian world. 
 
 6) 1 he paucity of siood interpreters, who, unbiassed by par- 
 ty sentiments, have pursued the interpretation of the Scrip- 
 tures in A Pimple philological mi^nner, and been consistent through- 
 out in the application of principles i)urely exfgetical, is much 
 greater than anj one will be disposed to believe, until experi- 
 ence, acquired by consulting Commentaries, shall have convinced 
 him. 
 
 § 3. Definitions. The art of interpretation is the 
 art of teaching what is the meaning of another's lan- 
 guage ; or that faculty, which enables us to attach to 
 another's language, the same meaning as the author 
 himself attached to it. (Morus, p. 6. 111.) 
 
 It is better to define interpretation as an act than as an art. 
 To interpret a passage is to shew or declare the sense of it, or 
 •imply to explain tHe meaning, 1. e. the meaning which the 
 author himself of the passage attached to it. Any other mean- 
 ing than this, can never be called, with propriety, the meaning 
 of the author. 
 
 Interpretation, strictly speaking, may be called grammatical, 
 when the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, is made out 
 from the usus loquendi and context ; historical, when the mean- 
 ing is illustrated and confirmed by historical arguments, which 
 serve to evince that no other sense can be put upon the passage, 
 whether you regard the nature of the subject, or the genius and 
 manner of the writer. 
 
 § 4. Requisites of a good interpreter. The act of in- 
 terpretation implies two things ; viz., a right percep- 
 tion of the meaning of words, and a proper explanation 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 of that meaning, (a) Hence a good interpreter must 
 possess a sound understandings and be skilful in explana- 
 tion, (Morns, p. 8. IV.) 
 
 a) The words of Ernesti are, Subiilitas intelligendi ft explican- 
 di ; a phrase which would convey a meaning quite foreie;n to his 
 intention, if literally translated into F.n^lish, or, at niost, convey 
 his idea very imperfectly. His meaning is, that the interpre- 
 ter, who eX' rcises a sound under^anding, or possesses subiilitas 
 initUigendi^ must demand satisfactory reasons for believing in any 
 parliciilar exegesis, and build his opinion, in respect to the 
 meaning: of any passage, on such reasons. These reasons are 
 founded on the usus loquendi, the context, the nature of the sub- 
 ject, the design of the writer, &c. An interpretation supported 
 by none of these, cannot be admitted by a sound understanding. 
 
 The subiilitas explicandi, which I have referred to skill in tX' 
 planalion^ consists generally in the accuracy of explanation. To 
 constitute such accuracy, in its proper sense, a right use must be 
 made of all the means of interpretation, so as to gain precise 
 and definite views of the author's meaning ; then, every thing 
 should be so defined and expressed, as to exclude all ambiguity 
 and uncertainty; and lastly, the vvh<»le should be exhibited in 
 the proper order, which the nature of language and of reasoning 
 demands. 
 
 § 5. Suhtilitas intelligendi. A sound understanding is 
 exhibited in two ways ; first^ in discerning whether we 
 really understand a passage or not, and, in case we do 
 not, in discovering the difficulties that lie in the way of 
 rightly understanding it, and the grounds of those diffi- 
 culties ; secondly^ in finding out, by a proper method of 
 investigation, the sense of those passages which are 
 difficult. (Morus, p. 10. V.) 
 
 § 6. Means by which difficulties and their causes are 
 detected, A good degree of talent or capacity is requi- 
 site for this ; for men of small capacity frequently as- 
 sent to things which seem to be taught, without any 
 good reasons for so doing ; and often believe themselves 
 to understand, what they do not understand. To a good 
 degree of talent, must be joined a careful habit of dis- 
 tinguishing ideas of things from mere words or sounds ; 
 (a) for we ought always to inquire, in respect to any 
 word, whether we have a distinct perception of the 
 
4 INTRODUCTlOJr. 
 
 thing or idea, which it is meant to designate, and not t# 
 regard merely the sound of the word. (Morns, p. 10. 
 VI.) 
 
 o) Specially should this be done, where language is employed 
 to designate any thing, that is not the object of our senses, but is 
 of an intellectual or metaphysical nature. Habit as well as care 
 will do much in these cases. Translating from one language in- 
 to another, is an excellent exercise to form a habit of nice dis* 
 tinctioQ ; for when we come to express the ideas of an author in 
 another language, we often find that we had only an indefinite 
 perception ol them. The employment of teachiug, also, is well 
 adapted to promote the same purpose; as is the study of logic^ 
 or any science which leads to nice discrimination. 
 
 § 7. Aleans of removing these difficulties. The first 
 means is, a just and accurate knowledge of languages, 
 (a) The next^ an acquaintance with the principles of 
 interpretation. Not that no one can interpret, at all, 
 without a scientific knowledge of these principles ; but 
 because they assist men of moderate talents, and guide 
 them, as it were, in the right way, so that they are not 
 left to depend on chance rather than reason. Besides, 
 they are, in this way, supplied with a common rule for 
 judging, in controverted cases. (6) Finally^ as in detect- 
 ing difficulties, exercise and habit are important; so 
 here, they are of so much consequence, that all other 
 advantasres will be of little use without them. (Morus, 
 p. 12—19. VII. Nos. I. II. HI.) 
 
 a) An accurate knowledge of grammatical principles and of the 
 tisus loquendi is here intended ; for what authority can an inter- 
 pretation have, which violates rules of grammar and the usages 
 of speech ? 
 
 b) Precepts for interpretation, well grounded, clearly under- 
 stood, and judiciously applied, very much facilitate the task of 
 the interpreter, and render the result of his labours more worthy 
 of confidence. He who acts by well established rules is more 
 certain that he acts right, than if he fo!iov/ed his own opinion 
 merely, in nil cases of difficulty and doubt. And in controversies 
 of an exegetical or doctrinal nature, to what can the appeal be 
 made, in the ultimate resort, but to the principles of interpreta- 
 tion, i. e. the precepts or rules which it prescribes ? Nor are 
 these principles useful only to men of moderate talents, (as Er- 
 nest! would seem to iDtimate,) but to men of the highest talents 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and best acquisitions. Men may, indeed, learn them by usage 
 in the interpretation of authors, without the scientific study of 
 them ; but the latter is the easier method, and guards most effec- 
 tually against mistakes. 
 
 In addition to these helps for removing difficulties, a knowledge 
 of history, geography, chronoiogy, antiquities, iic, is of high im- 
 portance. 
 
 § 8. Exercises and habits adapted to overcome the dijffi' 
 culties of interpretation. First, we should attend the in- 
 structions of a g"ood interpreter; next, we should read 
 those works where exegetical knowledge is displayed in 
 the best manner, and reflect much upon them, for in 
 this way we may be led to the imitation of them ; and 
 lastly, those books, which we desire to interpret, must 
 be assiduously and constantly perused. (Morus, p. 19, 
 
 In the two first exercises, example serves both to excite and to 
 guide our efforts. The habit of readif g, oftt n and assiduously, 
 the book which we desire to interpret, is of more importance 
 than any, or perhaps than all, other means within our power. Ev- 
 ery new perusal will suggest to an intelligent and inquisitive mind 
 many ideas, frequently very important ones, which he had not 
 before entertained. This practice cannot, therefore, be too 
 strongly recommended to the student. 
 
 § 9. Subtilitas explicandi^ i. e. skill in explanation. This 
 is exhibited, by expressing the sense of an author, ei- 
 ther in words of the same language which are more 
 perspicuous than his, or by translating into another lan- 
 guage, and explaining by argument and illustration, (a) 
 In addition to an accurate knowledge of the language 
 which we translate, skill in explaining requires that we 
 should exhibit purity of diction ; still preserving, so far 
 as may be, the features of the original, lest the mode 
 of reasoning should be obscured, which sometimes de- 
 pends on the /or w of the words. (Morus, p. 20. VIII.) 
 
 d) VVe explain by arsnment^ when we exhibit reasons dfawn 
 from the grammar and idiom of the lans:uage, the contest, and 
 the design of the writer. We illustrate^ when we cast Jig'ht upon 
 the meaning of an aurhor, which is borrowed from history, chro- 
 nology, antiquities, kc. Purity and brevity of style should char- 
 acterize both these modes of explanation. 
 1* 
 
J6f introdi.ctio:n'. 
 
 §10. Definition of Hermeneutics. {a) Hermeneiitics is 
 the science which teaches to find, in an accurate and ju- 
 dicious manner, the meaning of an author, and appro- 
 priately to explain it to others. (Morus, p. 21. IX.) 
 
 (a) Modern usage distinguishes between Hermeneutics and 
 Exegesis. Hermeneutics is the theory or scievce of interpre- 
 tation ; it comprises and exhibits the principles and rules of 
 this art. Exegesis is the practical application of these rules ; 
 the act of carrying them into execution. The etymology of the 
 two words would lead to the conclusion, that both are of the 
 same meaning ; but usage has assigned a different signification 
 to them. 
 
 § 11. Division of Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, con- 
 sidered as the art of finding the sense of words, (so far 
 as it is an art, and is the proper subject of precepts,) 
 consists of two parts, viz. the theoretical and preceptive. 
 (a) The first comprises general principles^ in respect 
 to the meaning of words and the various kinds of them. 
 On these principles, the rules of interpretation and the 
 reasons of them are grounded. The second consists of 
 rules, which are to guide us, in investigating the sense 
 of an author's words. Both of these parts are essential; 
 for on the one hand, principles^ without any rules de- 
 duced from them, would be inadequate to guide our 
 philological inquiries ; and on the other, rules can nei- 
 ther be perspicuous, nor well grounded, which are not 
 established upon principles. (Morus, p. 22. X.) 
 
 (a) Exegesis differs from the preceptive part of Hermeneutics, 
 inasmuch as it is the act of carrying the precepts into execution, 
 and not the precepts themselves. 
 
 § 12. Division of the work. It may be divided into 
 three parts ; the first contains the principles and pre- 
 cepts of Hermeneutics ; the second has respect to the 
 making of translations and commentaries ; and the third 
 treats of the various kinds of hermeneutical Apparatus, 
 and of its proper use, in the interpretation of the New 
 Testament. 
 
 Of these three parts, the fi'-st is translated fhrouffhout, and so 
 much of the second as seemfd to be particularly useful. The 
 third part is essentially comprised in the first, so far as it prop- 
 
OF THE MEANING OF WORDS. V 
 
 criy belops^s to the province of Flermeneutics ; and therefore may 
 well be dispensed with, in an elementary treatise like this. So 
 far as the third part contains any thing not substantially com- 
 prised in the first, it properly belongs to the province of sacred 
 literature, and specially to literary history, or Introductions, (as 
 they are called) which are designed to give the student a sjptdal 
 view of the various authors, books, versions, &;c, of the Scrip- 
 tures. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 fCompare with this chapter, Keil, H 5 — 8. Seller, k) 41 — 46.] 
 
 OF THE MEANING OF W^ORDS. 
 
 § 13. Design of this chapter. The design of the fol- 
 lowing' remarks upon the meaning of words, is to ex- 
 hibit the ground or principles, whence all certainty in 
 the interpretation of language arises. If from the na- 
 ture and use of language, certain principles may be 
 clearly deduced, which will serve as a guide to explain 
 it, then, it is evident, the essential part of the theory of 
 Hermeneutics consists of these principles. (Morus, p. 
 27. I.) 
 
 § 14. Every word must have some meaning. To 
 every word there ought to be assigned, and in the 
 Scriptures, there is unquestionably assigned, some idea 
 or notion of a thing ; which we call the meaning or 
 sense of the word, (a) (Morus, p. 28. II.) 
 
 a) Otherwise words are useless, and have no more significa- 
 tion than the inarticulate sounds of animals. 
 
 § 1 5. Definitions. The literal sense of words, is the 
 sense which is so connected with them, that it is first 
 
8 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 in order, and is spontaneously presented to the mind, 
 as soon as the sound of the word is heard, (a) The lit- 
 eral sense does not differ, among- the older and valuable 
 writers, from the sense of the letter ; although some ig- 
 norant persons, in later times, have very erroneously 
 made a distinction. Era^^mus and his cotemporaries use 
 both phrases promiscuously. Literal means the same 
 as the Greek lo yfy^a(.i}ievov^ or the Latin 5cn/>/w//i / 
 whence the phrases scriptum sequi^ and scriptum inter- 
 pretari. 
 
 a) The literal sense is the same as the primitive or original 
 sense ; or, at least, it is equivalent to that sense which has usurp- 
 ed the place of the original one, e- ^. the original sense of the 
 word tragedy has lona^ ceased to be c urrent, and the literal sense 
 of this word, now, is that which has taken the place of the orig- 
 inal one. 
 
 § 1 6. The meaning of words conventional. Words con- 
 sidered simply as sounds, have no meaning; for they 
 are not natural and necessary signs of things, but con- 
 ventional ones, (a) Usage or custom has constituted a 
 connexion between words and ideas. (Morus, p. 28. III.) 
 
 a) InteTJections or exclamations may, perhaps, be considered 
 as a kind of exception to this reiiiark. Words also which the 
 Greeks call Ovo^aTOnenocri^ieva^ i e. words the sounds of 
 which imitate the sense, are also considered by many as an ex- 
 ception. But there is so much of fancy in the construction of 
 these words, and *'.jey are so ditferently formed in different lan- 
 guaj^es, that no solid proof of their being an exception can fairly 
 be made out. Great efforts have been made, in former times, 
 to shew that every syllable and even letter of a word, in the He- 
 brew laneuaire, had a special sis:nifi<ancy attached to it. F. M, 
 Helmont published a work entitled Jiiphabetum JS^aturale^ the ob- 
 ject of which was to sh^'W, that everydifferent opening of the mouth 
 in order to pronounce different lette rs,was significant of some idea. 
 To illustrate this, he caused a great number of plates to be en- 
 graved, which he insert^^d in the work ; so thrit his book, as Vlo- 
 rus pa)s, is mira capitiim humanorum collection quae admodum 
 distorta ora ostendat. Caspar iVeumann, in his Exodus Lin juae 
 Sonctae^ followed much the same path, but with more modera- 
 tion ; and V. E. Loescher, in his De caussis Lin<r, Heh. exhibits 
 the same principles. E. g. in the word Vl.fi< N says hr, indi- 
 cates motion; 'n<j eruption; !lfe, violence. The whole word Y'^M 
 then, signifies something in which motion bursts forth with vio- 
 
ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 9 
 
 hnce. The stuileut may smile at this egregious trifling ; but the 
 time has been, when the word of God was explained by leading 
 men in the churches, in connexion with such wretched puerili- 
 ties. (Morus, p. 3]. IV.) 
 
 § 17. The connexion beiweoi rvords and ideas now ren- 
 dered necessary^ by usage. Such is the fact, whatever 
 may have been the case, at first. This does not mean, 
 however, that a word is susceptible of only one mean- 
 ing-; for usage contradicts this. But from this princi- 
 ple, we learn (1) That neither in using or interpreting 
 a word, are we at liberty to, afiix to it an arbitrary 
 sense, (a) (2) That the sense of a word cannot be di- 
 verse or multifarious, at the same time, and in the same 
 passage or expression. (6) (Morus, p. 33. V. VI. VII.) 
 
 a) The fact, that usage has attached any particular meaning 
 to a word, lilte any other historical fact, is to be proved by ade- 
 quate testimony. This testimony may be drawn from books in 
 v/hich the word is employed, or from daily use io conversation. 
 But the fact of a particular meaning being attached to a word, 
 when once established, can no more be changed or denied, than 
 any liistoricai event whatever. Of course, an arbitrary sense 
 can never, with propriety, be substituted for a real one. 
 
 b) All men, in their daily conversation and writings, attach but 
 one sense to a word, at the same time and in the same passage ; 
 unless they design to «peak in enigmas. Of course, it would be 
 in opposition to the universal custom of language, if more than 
 one meaning should be attached to any word of Scripture, in 
 such a case. Yet many have done so. See H 21. 22. 
 
 § 18. Signification of words multiplied in process of 
 time. Although a word can have but one meaning, at 
 the same time and in the same place, usage has gradu- 
 ally assigned many meanings to the same word, (a) lest 
 words should be indefinitely multiplied, and the diffi- 
 culty of learning a language become too great. (Mo- 
 rus, p. 39. VIII.) 
 
 a) The question then for an interpreter is simply this ; which 
 one of the significations thnt a woid has, is connected with its 
 use in any particular instance ^ 
 
 § 19. How can the meaning iti each case be found ? (l) 
 From the general manner of speaking, i. e. commoa 
 
10 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 usage. (2) From the proximate words or context. (Mo- 
 rus, p. 41. I. II.) 
 
 That is, the usual and obvious raeaniuG: is attached to the 
 word; or t- Ise one which the context render? riecesDiry. In ad- 
 dition to the aid drawn from these s -urces, an interpreter r«iay 
 sometintes obtain assistance ^rom th(^ scope or design of the wri- 
 ter, or ffom history, antiquities, the nature of the sulject, k.c. 
 (Morus, p. 42. III. IV.) 
 
 § 20, Ambiguify of words arises from various causes. 
 (1) From the faiiit oi' writers, (a) (?) From neglect m 
 the construction and necessary coiHiexions oi" words 
 and sentences ; proper care not having been taken to 
 guard the reader against uncertainty^, and to afford him 
 the best means for tinding the true sense. (6) (3) From 
 the manner in which common usage often forms lan- 
 guage ; which, not being guided by philosophy or re- 
 fined knowledge, is frequently deficient in respect to 
 accuracy. (^c) (Morus, p. 44. X. I — V.) 
 
 a) When they are ignorant of the rules for writing with accu- 
 racy and perspicuity. 6) E. g. the answer of the Delphic oracle, 
 Aio tc Romanos vinctre posse., which may be rendered, with equal 
 prf»bability, that the Romans would conquer lyrrfius, or P>r- 
 rhus the Komans. c) No other proof of this is needed, than what 
 the perusal of a conuposition by an illiterate person will afford. 
 
 Besides the causes of ambiguity above enumerated, we may- 
 reckon, ignorance of the usus loquendi. If the interpreter is not 
 acquainted with this, (and in respect to words which are ana^ 
 XeyOfA€va^ he must of course be ignorant of it, in many cases, )he 
 is 1» ft in doubt, unless the context decides for him. As this is 
 not always the case, there is room here for ambiguity. 
 
 § 21. Conclusions from what has been said. From what 
 has. already been said, in this chapter, about the use of 
 words, we may discover the ground of all the certainty 
 which attends the interpretation of language. (a) For 
 IJiere can be no certainty at all, in respect to the inter- 
 pretation of any passage, unless a kind of necessity com- 
 pel us to affix a particular sense to a word ; which 
 sense, as I have said before, must be one ; and, unless 
 there are special reasons for a tropical meaning, it must 
 be the literal sense. (&) (Morus, p. 47. XI .) 
 
ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 11 
 
 a) If any one should deny that, the above principles lead to 
 certainty, when strictly observed, be vrouJd deny the possibility 
 of finding; the meaning of language with certainty, b) The sec- 
 ondary or figurative sense of words is as often necessary, as the 
 literal sense. Many words have even ceased to convey a literal 
 meaning. The obvious sense of a word, therefore, in any par- 
 ticular connexion, is the necessary one ; and a conviction that 
 the sense in any case is necessary, will be in exact proportion to 
 the degree in which it is felt to be obvious. Hy obvious here, is 
 not meant what is obvious to an illiterate or hasty interpreter; 
 but to one who has learning, and good judgment, and makes use 
 of all the proper means of interpretation. 
 
 § 22. Error of those^ who assign many meanings to a 
 word^ at the same time and in the same place. Such an 
 opinion is to be rejected ; although the practice is very 
 old, as Augustine testifies, Confess. Xll. 30, 31. The 
 opinion probably originated from the variety of inter- 
 pretations given to ambiguous passages ; several of 
 which appeared probable, and were recommended by 
 a sentiment of reverence towards the authors of them. 
 A principle of this nature, however, must introduce 
 very great uncertainty into exegesis ; than which noth- 
 ing can be more pernicious. (Morus, p. 35. VII.) 
 
 § 23. Error of those^ who affirm that the words of Scrip- 
 ture mean all that they possibly can -mean. This <iprung 
 from the Rabbinical schools, and passed from them, in 
 early times, to Christians. The transition is very 
 easy from this error, to every kind of licence in the in- 
 troduction of allegory, prophecy, and mystery into eve- 
 ry part of the Bible ; as the experience of the Jews, of 
 the ancient Fathers, the scholastic divines, and the fol- 
 lowers of Cocceius demonstrates. 
 
 The Rabbinic maxim is ; On every point of the Scripture, hang 
 suspended mountains of sen«e. The Talmud says, God so gave 
 the Law to Mos< s, that a thing can be shewn to ne clean and 
 unclean in 49 different ways. Most of the Fathers, and a mul- 
 titude of Commentators in later times, were infected with these 
 principles. Little more than a century ago, the celebrated Coc- 
 ceius, of Leyden, maintained the sentiment, that all th^ possible 
 meanings of a word in the Scripture are to be united. By his 
 learning and influence, a powerful party were raised up, in the 
 
12 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 Protestant church, in favour of such a principle. The mischiefs 
 resulting from it have not yet ceased to operate. 
 
 § 24. The sense of words -properly considered^ is not al- 
 legoricaL Alleg-ory is rather an accommodation of the 
 sense of words ^ or an accommodation of things, to the il- 
 lustration of some doctrine. Moderately used, and well 
 adapted, it may be of some profit which is entitled to 
 regard. But when resorted to by the unlearned and 
 those of an uncultivated taste, it commonly degenerates 
 into empty and ridiculous trifling, (Comp. Morus, Dis- 
 sertt. Tom. I. p. 370, &c.) 
 
 It is impossihle adequately to describe the excesses and ab- 
 surdities, which have been committed, in consequence of the al- 
 eporizing spirit. From the time of Ori8:en, vtrho converted into 
 allegory the account of the creation of the world, the creation 
 and fall of man, and multitudes of other simple facts related in 
 the Bible, down to the Jesuit, who makes the account of the 
 creation of the greater light to rule the day to mean the Pope, 
 and the creation of the lesser light and the stars to mean the 
 subjection of kings and princes to the Pope, there have been 
 multitudes in and out of the catholic church, who have pursued 
 the same path. The most sacred doctrines of religion have of- 
 ten been defended and assailed by arguments of equal validity 
 and of the same nature, as the exposition of the Jesuit just men- 
 tioned. The spirit which prompts to this may, in some cases, 
 be commendable ; but as it is a mere business of fancy connect- 
 ed with no principles of philology, and supported by no reasons 
 drawn from the nature of language, so it is, for the most part, not 
 only worthless, but dangerous. And of what possible use, in the 
 end, can a |)rinciple be, which can prove the most important 
 doctrine, either of Judaism or Christianity, as well from the first 
 verse of the first chapter of Chronicles, as from any part of the 
 Bible ? Or rather, of what use can the Bible be, if it may be in- 
 terpreted by such principles ? 
 
 § 25. Properly speakings there is no typical sense of 
 words. Types are not words hut things^ which God has 
 designated as signs of future events. Nor is any spe- 
 cial pains necessary for the interpretation of them. 
 The explanation of them, which the Holy Spirit him- 
 self has given, renders them intelligible. Beyond his 
 instructions on this subject, we should be very careful 
 never to proceed. As for those, who maintain a typi- 
 
ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 13 
 
 cal design in all parts of the Scripture, they certainly 
 display very little judgment or consideration ; for they 
 lay open the way for the mere arbitrary introduction 
 of types into every part of the Bible. The design of 
 the Holy Spirit, in the mention of this or that thing 
 in the Scriptures, can be understood only so far as he 
 himself has explained it, or afforded obvious grounds of 
 explanation. 
 
 If it be asked, How far are we to consider the Old Testament 
 as typical? I should answer, without any hesitation ; Just so 
 much of it is to be regarded as ty{)ical, as the New Testament 
 affirms to be so ; and \o more. The fact, that any thing or 
 event under the Old Testament dispensation was designed to pre- 
 fjg:ure something upder the New, can be known to us only by 
 revelation ; and, of course, all that is not designated by divine 
 authority as typical, can never be made so, by any authority 
 less than that which guided the writers of the Scriptures. 
 
 § 26. Danger resulting from the spirit of multiplying 
 allegories and types. That sentiment, which through 
 imprudence or want of knowledge fell from some of 
 the ancient Fathers, and was echoed by many of the 
 Romish doctors, viz. that some passages of Scripture have 
 no literal sense^ (a) is dangerous beyond description. I 
 presume they meant to affirm this of those passages 
 which they did not understand. Such a sentiment has 
 been recently defended by Wittius on the Proverbs of 
 Solomon ; and Thomas Woolston, taking advantage of 
 this, has converted the narrations of our Saviour's mir- 
 acles into mere allegories. (6) 
 
 a) By literal sense here, Ernesti means a sense not allegorical 
 or mystical ; for to these literal is here opposed, and not to trop- 
 ical., as it commonly is. There are a multitude of passages in 
 Scripture, which have only a tropical meaning, and which, nev- 
 ertheless, are neither allegorical nor mystical, 
 
 h) This shews how dangerous it is, to set the adversaries of 
 religion an example of perverting the interpretation of the Scrip- 
 tures. 
 
 § 27. *The sense of words depends on the vsus loquendi. 
 This must be the case, because the sense of words is 
 conventional and regulated wholly by usage. Usage 
 then being understood, the sense of words is of course 
 understood. 
 
 2 
 
H #N THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 § 28. Usus loquendi determined in a variety of ways. To 
 determine it, respect must be had to time, (a) religion, 
 (6) sect, education, common life, (c) and civil affairs ; (e) 
 all of which have influence on an author's language, 
 and characterize it. For the same word is employed 
 in one sense respecting the things of common life ; in 
 another, respecting the things of religion ; in another 
 still, in the schools of Philosophy, and even these are 
 not always agreed in the use of words. (Morus, p. 48. 
 XII— Xlil.) 
 
 a) The ancient and modern sense of many words differs. 6) 
 rictim^ sacrifice^ law^ &c, in the Old Testament, are ofien em- 
 ployed in a sense, which differs from that of the same words ia 
 the New Testament, c) Thus to perceive in common life is to 
 feel or experience ; in philosophy, l9 form an id'^a in the mind ; 
 amon^ the Academic sect, it means to know a thing vrith certain- 
 iy, in opposition to mere conjecture. So XdOa^lfff^og^ O^Cf^J, 
 &;c, differ in meaninj^, when employed by a heatlien, a Jew, or a 
 Christian, c) The technical and peculiar sense of law-language, 
 is too well known to need illustration. 
 
 To these causes, which operate upon the usus loquendi^ may 
 be added, the style of a writer. We must inquire whether he 
 "wntes poetry or prose ; and whether the writer himself is fervid 
 or cool, turgid or dry, accurate and polished or the reverse. 
 Every writer has his own particular usus loquendi; and most 
 writers, provincialisms; and every one is influenced bj his own 
 peculiar circumstances. What writers can be more unlike, in 
 respect to style, than Isaiah and Jeremiah, Paul and John? An 
 interpreter must make himself thoroughly acquainted with all 
 these various circumstances. 
 
 § 29. Grammatical and historical sense. The ob- 
 servance of all these matters belongs, in a special man- 
 ner, to grammarians, whose business it is to investigate 
 the sense of words. Hence the literal sense is also call- 
 ed the grammatical ; literalis and grammaticus havmg 
 the same meaning. It is also called the historic sense ; 
 because, like other matters of fact, it is supported by 
 historic testimony. (Morus, p. 66. XVII. Comp. § 3, 
 note, supra.) 
 
 The grammatical sense is made out by aid of the principles of 
 grammar, liberally and philosophically, not technically consider- 
 ed. The historical sense, is that wldch is built^oo the grammati- 
 
ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 1 5 
 
 ual one, but modified by historical circumstances. Interpreter* 
 now speak ofthe true sense of a passage, by calling it the gram^ 
 matico-historical sense ; and exegesis founded on the nature of 
 language, is called grammatico- historical. The object, in using 
 thi<? compound name, is to shew that both grammatical and his- 
 torical considerations are employed, in making out the sense of 
 a word or passage. 
 
 § 30. The grammatical sense the only true one. Those 
 who make one sense grammatical^ and another logical^ 
 do not comprehend the full meaning" of grammatical 
 sense. We are not to look, therefore, for a sense of 
 words, which varies, (in its nature, or simply consider- 
 ed as the sense,) with every department of learning, 
 or with every diverse object. For if this were the 
 case, words would have as many kinds of senses, as ob- 
 jects are multifarious. (Morus, p. 67. XVllI.) 
 
 In regard to the term grammatical^ see the Note above. The 
 meaning of Ernesti, in this Section, is, that the laws of language 
 are the same, in whatever department of writing or speaking it 
 is employed ; i. e. the meaning of it is to be investigated by the 
 usus loquendi^ &c, and not that logic, or philosophy can deter- 
 mine what the sense of words must be, in such a way, that the 
 sense may be called logical^ philosophical^ &c. 
 
 But when he says, as in 5 29, that the literal and grammatical 
 sense are the same ; and in ^ 30, that the grammatical sense is 
 the only true one ; he does not mean by literal^ that which is 
 opposed to tropical, (for the tropical meaning, in thousands of 
 cases, is the grammatical one,) but he means by it, the same as 
 the grammaiico-hislorical sense above described. 
 
 § 31. The principles of interpretation are common to 
 sacred and profane writings. Of course, the Scriptures 
 are to be investigated by the same rules as other books. 
 Those fanatics, therefore, are not to he regarded, who, 
 despising literature and the study of the languages, re- 
 fer every thing merely to the influence of the Spirits 
 Not that we doubt the influence of the Spirit; or that 
 men truly pious and desirous of knowing the truth, are 
 assisted h}^ it in their researches, specially in those 
 things that pertain to faith and practice. (Morus, p. 69. 
 XIX.) 
 
 If the Scriptures be a revelation to men, then are they to be 
 
16 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 read and understood by men. If the sanae laws of language are 
 not observed in this revelation^ as are coiamon to men, then they 
 have no guide to the right understandins; of the Scriptures ; and 
 an interpreter needs inspiration as much as the original writer. 
 It follows, of course, that the Scriptures would be no revelation 
 in themselves, nor of any use, except to those who are inspired. 
 But such a book, the Scriptures are not ; and nothing is more 
 evident, than that ^' id hen God has spoken to men^ he has spok- 
 en in the language of men^ for he has spoken by men^ and for 
 
 § 32. Language can he properly interpreted only in a 
 philological way. Not much unlike these fanatics, and 
 not less hurtful, are those, who from a similar contempt 
 of i\\Q languages and from that ignorance of them which 
 breeds contempt, depend, in their interpretations, rath- 
 er on things than on words. (a) In this way, interpreta- 
 tion beconies uncei'tain ; and truth is made to depend 
 merely on the judgment of men, as soon as we depart 
 from the words, and endeavour to decic'e upon the 
 sense, by the use of means not connected with them. 
 Nor will this mode of exegesis at all avail to convince 
 gainsayers ; who themselves boast of interpreting, in 
 like manner, by things^ i. e. either by their own princi- 
 ples and opinions before formed, or by the sentiments 
 of philosophers. Hence arises the abuae of reason, in 
 the interpretation of the Scriptures. 
 
 a) The meaning is, that they decide from that knowledge of 
 things, which they suppose themselves already (o possess, rather 
 than from the words of the author ; they decide by what they 
 suppose he ought to mean, rather than by what he says. 
 
 § 33. *)hiy method of interpretation not philological^ is 
 fallacious. Moreover, the method of gathering the sense 
 of words from things is altogether deceptive and falla- 
 cious; since things are rather to be known, from point- 
 ing out the sense of words in a proper way. it is by the 
 words of the Holy Spirit, only, that we are led to un- 
 derstand what we ought to think respecting things. 
 Said Melancthon very truly ; The Scripture cannot be 
 understood theologically^ until it is understood grammal- 
 
ON THE MEANING O^ WORDS. 1 7 
 
 ically. Luther also avers, that a certain knowledge of 
 the sense of Scripture, depends solely on a knowledge 
 of the words. 
 
 This section repeats, in another form, the idea of ihe preced- 
 ing one. In both, Ernesti means to deny the possibility of truly 
 interpreting any book, by other means than those which are phi- 
 lological. By things, he means the application of our previous 
 views of things to the words of an author, in order to elicit his 
 meaning ; instead of proceeding to our inquiries, in the way of 
 grammatico-hiatorical exegesis^ Not that our previous knowl- 
 edge of things can never aid us ; for it often does so ; bat that 
 this can serve for nothing more than an assistant to our philolog- 
 ical efforts, as the following section shews. 
 
 § 34. The analogy of faith or doctrine not to guide our 
 interpretation. Things^ therefore, and the analogy of 
 faith^ or doctrine^ (as they call it,) assist an interpreter 
 only so far, that when words are ambiguous, either from 
 variety of signification, from structure, or any other 
 cause, they may lead us to define the signification of 
 them, or to select some one particular meaning. But 
 here we must take good care, that the considerations 
 which we use for explaining, should he deduced from 
 the plain, perspicuous, well understood language of oth- 
 er passages, and that the words which we are endeav- 
 ouring to explain do not contradict them. For when 
 we investigate the sense in any other way than by a 
 grammatical method, we effect nothing more, than to 
 make out a meaning, which in itself perhaps is not ab- 
 surd, but which lies not in the words, and therefore is 
 not the meaning of the writer. (Morus, p. 253. XVI — 
 XIX.^ 
 
 Very much has been said both for and as:ainst the analogy of 
 faith, as a rule of interpretation. I may safely add, that on this 
 subject, as well as on many others, very much has been said 
 amiss, for want of proper definitions. What is the analogy of 
 faith ? It is either simply Scriptural or sectarian. By Scriptu- 
 ral analoiiy, 1 mean, that the obvious and incontrovertible sense 
 of clear passages of Scripture affords a rule, by which we may 
 reason analogically concerning the meaning of obscure passag- 
 es ; or at least, by which we may shew, what obscure passages 
 cannot mean. F.. g. God is a spirit, is omniscient, supreme, the 
 creator and governor of all things, &Cj are truths so plainly anil 
 2* 
 
I 8 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 incontrovertibly taught in the Scriptures, that all the passages 
 whicli would seem to represent liinti as material, local, limited 
 in his knowledge or power, &c, are to be interpreted a,2;reeabl3' 
 to analogy with the former truths. The same thing holds true 
 of other doctrines taught in the same perspicuous manner. We 
 explain what is doubtful or obscure, by the application to it of 
 what is plain. 'I his rule is not appropriate to the Scriptures on- 
 ly. It is adopted by all good interpreters of profane authors. 
 It is a rule which common sense prescribes ; and is therefore well . 
 grounded. 
 
 If the question then be asked, whether Scriptural analogy of 
 faith is a rule of interpretation ; the answer must readily be giv- 
 en in the affirmative. 
 
 But the analogy of the faith or creed of any /jar^^/ of Christians, 
 taken without abatement, cannot be applied as a rule of exege- 
 sis, unless it can be assumed, that the whole creed of that party 
 is certainly correct. If a Romanist, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, or 
 a Unitarian avers, that the Scriptures are to be construed 
 throughout, in accordance with the respective Symbols of each ; 
 whom are we to credit? The creed of one partj-, in seme re- 
 spects, contradicts that of the others. Is the Scripture then to 
 have a contrndiclory exegesis put upon it? If not, the analogy of 
 party-faith cannot be our rule of interpretation. 
 
 In Ihe contest about the analogy of faith being the guide of in- 
 terpretation, both parties have usually been in the right, in some 
 respects ; and in the wrong, in others. Comp. Campbell's Gos- 
 pels, Prelim. Dissert. IV. H 13. 14. 
 
 § 35. The sense of Scripture not arbitrary. Allowing' the 
 above principles to be correct, it is plain that the me- 
 Ibod of investigating the sense of words in the Scrip- 
 tures, is not more arbitrary than the method used in ex- 
 plaining other books ; but equally regulated by laws 
 deduced from the nature of language. Those then act 
 very absurdly, who subject the interpretation of the 
 holy Scriptures to mere human opinion ; for example, 
 to the decision of a Roman pontiff, as if this could deter- 
 mine such a matter. (Com. § 31. Note.) 
 
 § 36. We must not hastily conclude any sentiment of the 
 Scriptures to be unreasonable. The meaning*, which ac- 
 cordmg to grammatical principles should be assigned to 
 any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on ac- 
 count of reasons derived from things or previously con- 
 
ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 19 
 
 ceivcd opinions; for, in this way, interpretation would 
 become uncertain. In books merely human, if reason 
 and the nature of the subject are repugnant to the ap- 
 parent sense of the words, we conclude there must have 
 been either a fault in the writer, or an error in the 
 copyist. In the Scriptures, if any sentiment does not 
 agree with our opinions, we must remember the imbe- 
 cilitj^ of human reason and human faculties ; we must 
 seek for conciliation^ and not attempt a correction of 
 the passage without good authoritj^ It is wonderful, 
 that in this matter more reverence should be paid to 
 mere human productions, than to the sacred books. 
 
 In ancient authors, when any difficult}^ occurs, we 
 seek for correction or conciliation ; as if they must be 
 rendered avaf.tagTrjTOc^ faultless. But occasion is often 
 taken of carping at the writers of the Scriptures, or of 
 perverting their meaning or the doctrines v/hich they 
 teach. 
 
 Nothing can be more appropriate to the present times, than 
 the caution of Ernesti, not to conclude hastily against the reason- 
 ableness of Scriptural sentinaent. Many set the Scriptures at va- 
 riance with reason, because they do not attain the real meaning 
 of them. Others decide, independently of the Scriptures, what 
 must be true ; and then, whatever is found in the sacred books, 
 which thwarts their opinions, they reject as unreasonable. The 
 prudent and pious interpreter will suspend his judgement, in cases 
 of difficulty, and investigate with great patience and caution, be- 
 fore he decides. Multitudes of passages in sacred writ have been 
 satisfactorily elucidated by critics of this character, which have 
 been given up as unreasonable by those of «fi diiferent character. 
 The time is coming, (I cannot doubt it,) when all the dark pla- 
 ces of the Bible will be elucidated, to the satisfaction of intelli- 
 gent and humble Christians. But how ntar at hand that blessed 
 day is, I do not pretend to know. '' The Lord hasten it, in its 
 time I" 
 
 § 37. Interpretation should rather be grammatical than 
 doctrinal. In comparing reasons for the exegesis of 
 particular passages, greater weight should be attribut- 
 ed to grammatical than doctrinal ones. A thing may be 
 altogether true in doctrine, which yet is not taught by 
 some particular passage. Books of theology exhibit 
 
20 ON THE MEANING OF WORDS. 
 
 many doctrinal interpretations, consentaneous indeed 
 with Christian principles, but not deduced from the 
 words interpreted ; doctrinally true, but not grammati- 
 cally. 
 
 It is really matter of regret, to find in most of the old and dis- 
 tinguished writers on theology, such a multitude of passages ad- 
 duced as proof-texts, which, when hermeneutically examined, 
 proved to be in no wise adapted to esta!/lish the doctrine, in con- 
 firmation of which they were cited. It mu«t be acknowledged, 
 that (he pleasure of reading many very valuable work?> of this 
 Dature, is greatlyabated by the study of sacred interpretation, 
 which teaches more correct exegesis. This loss, however, is 
 more than compensated, by the deep conviction which springs 
 from the examination of genuine proof passages. 
 
 § 38. Real contradiction does not exist in the Scriptures, 
 As the books of Scripture were written by men divine- 
 ly inspired, it is evident there can be no real contradic- 
 tion in them. God is not incapable of seeing what is 
 consistent, and what is contradictory ; nor can he for- 
 get, when he speaks, what was said on former occa- 
 sions. If fl^/3are?if contradictions then occur, a proper 
 method of conciliation is to be pointed out ; of which, 
 in another place. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 1 — 49.) 
 
 § 39. Every interpretation should harmonize with the de^ 
 sign of the writer^ and with the context. For the very 
 reason that these books are inspired, every interpreta- 
 tion ought to agree with the design of the writer, or 
 harmonize with the context. We admit this principle 
 in the interpretation of profane writers ; much more 
 ought we to admit it in respect to the Scriptures. Mere 
 men, through negligence or want of knowledge, may 
 insert some things that disagree with their principal de- 
 sign ; but not so the Holy Spirit. Hence, the certain- 
 ty of any exegesis is connected with the design and se- 
 ries of the discourse. Rules of caution, however, are 
 important here, as, in its proper place, will be shewa 
 (Morus, ut supra.) 
 
21 
 
 PART I. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 or THE KINDS OF AVORDS AND TITEIIl VARIOUS USE. 
 
 [V\ ith this chapter may be compared, Keil $ 43, and H 73 — 
 84. Beck, pp. 129—131. Seller }; 41—64. Lowth on lieb. Fo- 
 etrv, Lect. V— 12.] 
 
 § 40. Design of the following chapter. The former 
 chapter treated of the connoxion between words and 
 ideas, and deduces from that connexion, several funda- 
 mental principles for the interpretation of language. 
 The present chapter is appropriated to the considera- 
 tion of words as used in a literal or tropical, emphatic 
 or unemphatic sense. It also treats of words as em- 
 ployed in antithesis ; and of abstract words as employed 
 for concrete ones. 
 
 All these things belong to the nature of languas^e. as employed 
 (o communicate our ideas ; and therefore are properly classed, 
 by ErR(;sti, among the principles of language, on which the sci- 
 ence of Hermeneutics is built. Morus has thrown this chapter 
 into his preceptive part, and thus confounded principle with />r«- 
 cept. The rules, which grow out of the principles here develop- 
 ed, are exhibited in Part il. Chapters V. VI. 
 
 § 41. Importance of the following considerations. It is 
 of great importance, in respect to finding the sense of 
 words, to be acquainted with those distinctions which af- 
 fect the sense, and alter or augment the meaning*. 
 
 6 42. Words proper and tropical. The first impor- 
 tant division or distinction of words, in respect to their 
 meaning, is into proper and tropical^ i. e. literal and fig- 
 urative, or (better still) primary and secondary. (Com- 
 pare Morus, p. 260. II.) 
 
22^ OF THE KINDS OF WORDS 
 
 A proper word is a definite name given to a certain thing ; and 
 as such, may be explained by adverting to the proper names of 
 persons. A tropical word is one used out of its proper \. e. orig- 
 inal sense ; e. g. rosyface^ snov)y skin^ v/here rosy and «noM?i/ can- 
 not be lilerally or ;7ro/?er/y predicated of the skin. The names trope 
 and tropical come from the Greek word rgonog^ inversio^conver- 
 sio. 
 
 Tropes arise (1) From similitude^ real or supposed. E. g. 
 The vine creeps. This is called metaphor. (2) From conjunc- 
 tion ; which is either physical or inlelleciualy (i. e. supposed, be- 
 lieved.) Physical or real, where a part of a house is put to sig- 
 nify the whole; or the container for the thing contained, as to 
 offer tkecup^ viz. to offer what is contained in it, i. e. the wine. 
 The conjunction is intellectual or supposed, when the cause is put 
 for the effect, and vice versa^ (e. g. blushing for modesty ;) the 
 sign for the thing signified ; or the subject lor the attribute. 
 From conjunction arises that species of trope, which is called 
 metonymy, 
 
 § 43. Words first used in their proper sense. Original- 
 ly, words were undoubtedly used in their proper sense ; 
 for they were invented to indicate things,, and by these 
 things they raight be easily explained, without any am- 
 biguity. A small number of words sufficed, at an ear- 
 ly period ; because there were, in the age of simplicity, 
 but few objects about which speech could be employ- 
 ed. (Morus, p. 262. III.) 
 
 What Ernesti says, here and in the following section, about 
 the mode of forming tropical language may he true ; but there are 
 no facts to sup{)ort it. On the contrary, the most rude and bar- 
 barous languages, abound most of all in words used figuratively. 
 As we can trace no languai,^e back to its original, it is clear that 
 the propositions advanced l)y Ernesti are incapable of direct 
 proof; and analogy, so far as we can go back, is against him. 
 PJothing can be more destitute of proof, than a great part of the 
 speculations of philosophizing gramfiiarians, about the original 
 stale of language. One tells us that the language of barbarians 
 has but few words, and very few varieties in declension ; another, 
 that they are filled with 0l>0}.iaT0nen0i7ifAeva ; another, that the 
 roots of all w.jrds are verba; anottier, that they are nouns; 
 another, that all the original words are monosyllabic, &c. Some 
 of these things may be true of some languages ; but what can all 
 such speculators say, when they come to know the state of lan- 
 guage among our Aborigines? A state which puts at defiance 
 all their theories ; for in minutiae of declension they surpass the 
 Greek or even the multiform Arabic ; and in niost respects they 
 
AXD THEIR VARIOUS USES. 23 
 
 differ widely from that state, which the above theory would teach 
 us to be necessary. 
 
 §44. Mode of forming tropical words. But in pro- 
 cess of time, objects being multiplied, there arose ane- 
 nessity of using words in various senses. For men now 
 began to think and speak concerning those things which 
 had hitherto been neglected ; and of course to form 
 ideas of them in their minds, or to describe them in 
 words. New objects also were invented or discovered, 
 to describe which, words became necessary. To serve 
 this necessity, men resorted to two different expedients. 
 Either new words were coined, or old ones were appli- 
 ed to new objects. In those languages, that were 
 spoken by a people ingenious and devoted to science, 
 or in those which by nature or art were flexible and 
 fitted for the coining of new words, new ones were 
 most usually coined. Yet this usage was not without ex- 
 ceptions; for had new words been coined on every oc- 
 casion, the number of them would have been multipli- 
 ed without end. In languages of a character differ- 
 ing from that just mentioned, there was a greater ne- 
 cessity of applying the same word to the designation of 
 several things. Hence it is, that a language, poor as to 
 variety of words, either in general or in particular parts 
 of speech, employs the more frequently the same words 
 in different senses. (Morus, p. 262. III.) 
 
 § 45. Tropical words sotnetirnes become proper ones. But 
 there are several different points of light, in which trop- 
 ical words are to be viewed For^first^ the primitive 
 or proper signification, strictly understood, often be- 
 comes obsolete, and ceases for a long period to be us- 
 ed. In this case, the secondary sense, which original- 
 ly would have been the tropical one, becomes iheprop- 
 er one. This applies specially to the names of things. 
 Hence, there are many words, which at present never 
 have their original and proper sense, such as etymolo- 
 gy would assign them, (a) but only the secondary sens- 
 es, which may in such cases, be called the proper sense. 
 (Morus, p. 264. IV.) 
 a) E. g. In English, tragedy, comedy, villain, pagan, knave, &c. 
 
24 OF THE KIXDS OF WORDS 
 
 § 46. Usage sometimes converts tropical words into prop- 
 er ones. Secondly^ in like manner, the tropical sense of 
 certain words has become so common, by usage, that it 
 is better understood than the orig-inal sense. In this 
 case too we call the sense proper ; although, strictly 
 and technically speaking, one might insist on its being 
 called tropical. If one should by his last will, give a li- 
 brary [bibliothecam] to another, we should not call the 
 use of bibliotheca tropical ; although strictly speaking it 
 is so, for bibliotheca originally meant the shelves or places 
 where books are deposited. (Morus, ibid.) 
 
 § 47. Tropical names become proper by transfer. So 
 thirdly^ when names are transferred to things destitute 
 of them, they become in respect to these things, the 
 same as proper names ; as when we predicate luxurious' 
 7iess of a crop, (a) For although we in fact use the 
 word luxuriousness metaphorically, in respect to the 
 crop, yet in this case the word may be called a proper 
 one. The same holds true of perception and liberty^ 
 when predicated of the human mind; and so of many 
 other things. (Morus, ibid.) 
 
 a) So the Latin acies^ ala^ corny,, spoken of an army ; t»nd, in 
 the 8aaie way, /oo/ of a mountain^ head of a river,, or bed if a riv- 
 er,, &c ; all originally proper nouns !i««ed in a very different sense, 
 but now they have become proper as thus used, by transfer. 
 
 § 48. Tropical words used for the sake of variety in 
 expression. Words, moreover, are frequently used in a 
 tropical manner, without any necessity arising from the 
 occurrence of new objects. For it is not necessity only, 
 to which we must attribute the use of tropical words, 
 but suavity and agreeableness of style occasion their in- 
 troduction. To the genius and habits of writers much 
 also is to be attributed. For, first, tropes are used for 
 the sake of variety in expression,^ so that the same word 
 may not often and always recur. To this species of 
 tropical language belong metonymy, syecdoche, and 
 other smaller tropes. In every thing, variety is de- 
 manded ; and without it, tedium quickly follows. No 
 person, desirous of writing elegantly and with suavity, 
 
AND THEIR VARIOUS USE. S5 
 
 will fail to discern, that an inriportant part of a good 
 style consists in using variety of language. (Morus, p, 
 266, [.) 
 
 Examples ; heaven is used for God^ sleep for death% threshold 
 for house^ uncircumcision for Gentiles, Sec. 
 
 § 49. Tropical words used for ornament. But se- 
 condly, tropical words, specially metaphors, are used, 
 for ornament. In metaphors, which are the most coni- \ 
 mon speciefs of tropes, there is contained a similitude, .\ 
 reduced to the narrow compass of a single word ;* and-j| 
 the mind is delighted with metaphors, because we are?/ 
 so formed as to be pleased with similitudes and im- ^ 
 ages, specially with those which are derived from ob- 
 jects that are splendid and agreeable. (Morus, p. 267, 
 
 11.) 
 
 § 50. Tropes used specially for ornament.) by poets and 
 orators. The more desirous a writer is of ornamenting 
 his discourse, the more frequently does he use tropical 
 language ; as is evident from the style of poets and or- 
 ators. And it is with the special design that their style 
 may be ornate, that w^e concede them the liberty of 
 frequently employing tropical language. 
 
 § 51. The frequency of tropes depends much on the ge- 
 nius of the writer. It should be observed, however, 
 that the genius of a writer, and the subject on which 
 he writes, are intimately connected with this. Those, 
 who possess great fervour of imagination and vivid con- 
 ception, more frequently use tropes, even bold ones, 
 and, as it often seems to others, harsh ones also. This 
 results from the fact, that they easily perceive and frame 
 similitudes, and by their temperament, are excited to 
 make comparisons. Hence they often content them- 
 selves with slight similitudes. But great subjects, by 
 their importance, naturally excite most men to the ase 
 of tropes, and sometimes of splendid ones. (Morus, p. 
 288. HI. IV. Lowth, Lect. V— XII.) 
 
 Frorn the object of employina: tropeg, as above described, we 
 may conchide that he abuses them, who interprets them etymo- 
 3 
 
26 OF THE KINDS OF WORDS 
 
 logically, or seeks any thing more in them except variety and 
 ornament, or urges too far exactness in estimating the limits of 
 meaning in tropical phrases. 
 
 § 52. Tropes used from necessity differ from those em- 
 ployed for variety or ornament. From these principles 
 we may understand, that in ail books, but specially in 
 the Scriptures, tropical language used from necessity 
 differs much from that which is used on account of oth- 
 er reasons. In the first case, a thing has a definite name, 
 by which it is called : in the other, the trope is used 
 either for pleasure or ornament. The former is gram- 
 matical ; the latter rhetorical. In the first, the reason 
 of the trope lies in analogy of nature; in the second, 
 it lies in some similitude. And since every thing must 
 have some name, either peculiar or common, and that 
 name belongs to the thing grammatically, it follows 
 that the proper sense of words is not lost in a grammat- 
 ical trope, but only in a rhetorical. (Morus, p. 270. VI.) 
 
 §63. The sense of tropical words is grammatical. But, 
 as may be easily understood from what has been said, 
 since the meaning of all tropical words as well as proper 
 ones, is deduced from the purpose and design of those, 
 who employed them to designate certain things, (as is 
 plain from observation ;) it appears that this meaning is 
 grammatical or literal, and that they are in an error, 
 who, with Jerome, have thought differently. Interpre- 
 tation is of the same name nature^ whether it is applied 
 to words tropical or proper. (Morus, p. 271. VII.) 
 
 § 54. Origin of synonymous words. From the custom 
 of using tropical language, flow synonymous words. In 
 respect to these, the interpreter must beware, lest he 
 seek for diversity of meaning, where none really exists ; 
 which not unfrequently hajjpens. Usually, in the same 
 dialect of the same nation and age, proper words are 
 not synonymous ; but when synonymes exist, (as, for ex- 
 ample, they do in Greek,) they originate from differ- 
 ent dialects or from difterent ages. The greatest num- 
 
AND THEIR VARIOUS USE. 27 
 
 ber of sj^nonymes arises from tropical words, which, for 
 the sake of variety and ornament, express the same 
 idea by various names. (Morus, p. 271. VIII.) 
 
 The interpreter should not seek for any definite distinction be- 
 tween !»ynon3'naes, (1) Where they are introduced for the sake 
 of variety. (2) Where usage conjoins two words ; as /wcfc and 
 fortune^ peace and quietness^ long and lasting^ &LC. (3) Where 
 they are used for the sake of ornament. (4) Where excited feel- 
 ing produces a repetition of the same idea, while different words 
 fire employed. And, (5) Where it is the habit of an author to 
 employ synonyraes ; e. g. Cicero. 
 
 The Hebrew poetry affords the most striking exhibition of sy- 
 nonymes, in its synonymous parallelisms ; where, from the na- 
 ture of the composition, the second GTt^og or stanza is expect- 
 ed, in general, to exhibit the same sense as the first. An inter- 
 preter would mistake the essential part of his office, if he should 
 here endeavour to exhibit a difference between the sense of words, 
 which the nature of the composition requires to be regarded as 
 synonymes. 
 
 GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS. 
 
 § 55. Definition of emphasis. In the use of language, 
 cases arise, where the ordinary signification of a word 
 receives, if I may so speak, accession or augmentation. 
 This may be effected in two ways ; the first of which 
 consists in the use of a word in an honorary or in a de- 
 grading sense, e. g. verba svcf^^iag et dvoqjrjficag^ of 
 which it would Jbe irrelevant to treat here. The second 
 class of words are those, which receive augmentation in 
 their extent or force of meaning. These constitute what 
 may with propriety be called emphatic words. Emphasis 
 then may be defined ; An accession to the ordinary signi- 
 fication of a word^ either as to the extent or the force of its 
 meaning. (Morus, p. 321. II.) 
 
 Emphasis comes from e^KfCCvetv, which signifies to shcw^ op 
 make conspicuous. It is to language, what a nod or a sign is to 
 looks; i.e. it makes more significancy. Examples: when the 
 Jews speak of Moses by the appellation of the Prophet ; or the 
 Greeks say, the Orator^ the Philosopher ^ the Poet, meaning De- 
 mosthenes, Plato, and Homer; these respective appellations ar© 
 emphatic. 
 
28 GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS. 
 
 § 56. JVo word of itself emphatic. It may be easily 
 seen, then, that no word of itself is emphaiic. Each 
 word has by itself a certain power, and designates a de- 
 finite idea of a thing either small or great, in which 
 there can be no emphasis. It is not because a word 
 designates any thing, which is very grv^at or very small, 
 that it is emphatical. Were this the case, then such 
 words as God^ the world^ the sun^ the king^ would be al- 
 ways emphatical ; which surely no one will assert. 
 (Morus, p. 322. III.) 
 
 If emphasis be an occasional accession of force to a word, then 
 the ordinary/ meaning of the word, be the signification ever so 
 important or forcible, of course is not emphatic. 
 
 § 57. Kinds of emphasis. Emphasis is either occa^ 
 sional^ or constant. We call it occasional^ when it is 
 connected with words, in some particular place, or at a 
 certain time. From the animated feelings of the speak- 
 er, or from the importance of the subject, a word is 
 chosen to express more than its ordinary import. Con- 
 stant emphasis is that, which usage makes invariably so, 
 by employing a word continually in an emphatic, rather 
 than in the ordinary sense. (Morus, p. 323. IV.) 
 
 Constant emphasis, if admitted, wouM destroy the very defini- 
 tion which Ernesti has sjiven of emphasis. That no word of it- 
 seh" is emphatic ; and that emphasis is an accession to the or- 
 dinary force of a word, is what he very rightly teaches us. What 
 then is that emphasis which is constant .^ 
 
 § 58. Emphasis^ how known. Occasional emphasis 
 must be known by the context, and from the nature of 
 the discourse. (Morus, p. 324. V.) 
 
 I have retained Ernesti's lansfuage here, in respect to the term 
 occasional or temporary as he calls it. But as occasional empha- 
 sis is really all, which from the nature of the thing can ever ex- 
 ist, ! shall not hereafter make any distinction, but speak simply 
 of emphasis. 
 
 The nature of the subject and the context are the only means 
 of knovving whether a word is to be regarded as emphaiic ; for 
 these must shew that more or less force is to be given to particu- 
 lar terms. As a general rule, we may say that emphasis is re- 
 
GENERAL NATURE OF EMPHASIS. .^9 
 
 quired whenever a frigid, incongruous, or inept sense would be 
 made without it. Thus 1 John iii. 9. He that is born ofGodsin* 
 netk not^ which the writer does not mean to assert, understand- 
 ing the word sinneik in a common and general way ; but he 
 means to say that such an one does not sin^ in the peculiar sense 
 of which he is speaking. 
 
 As to constant emphasis^ (which Morus and his editor have ad- 
 mitted,) the rule for determining it is said to be the usus loquen- 
 di. The rule is good, if the principle be admitted. The ex- 
 amples given to support this species of emphasis are such as the 
 names Jehovah applied to God, and Son of man applied to ( hrist. 
 But these prove no more, than that these appellations, ap- 
 plied in certain circumstances, have a significant and exalted 
 meaning ; which is true of very many words, where no real em- 
 phasis is to be found. But see and compare Morus, p. 325. VI. 
 VII. 
 
 § 59. No ground for dividing emphasis into real and 
 verbaL Some rhetoricians divide emphasis into real and 
 verbal: the former of which, consists in the greatness 
 and sublimity of things ; the latter consists of words 
 adapted to express their qualities. But this division is 
 erroneous. To things belongs sublimity ; to words^ em- 
 phasis. Nor, as we have above said, does a word, de- 
 signating a great object, therefore become emphatic. 
 (Morus, p. 328. VIll.) 
 
 § 60. Tropical words are not of course^ and from their 
 nature^ emphatic. Those also err, who make every 
 tropical, specially metaphorical word, emphatic. In 
 necessary tropes, or those used for the sake of variety, 
 it i& clear there can be no emphasis. Ornamental tropes 
 depend on mere similitude, which serve to render the 
 discourse agreeable. Flagrare cupiditate means no more 
 than vehementer cupere ; and no one gets a different idea 
 from using it. If then there be no emphasis in the lat- 
 ter expression, there is none in the former. The er- 
 ror arises in this way, that some understand^aorare cu- 
 piditate to be used instead of cupere ; and thence con- 
 clude, that there is an accession of meaning. Hence we 
 learn, that the emphasis of tropical words is to be found 
 3* 
 
30 OP ANTITHESIS. 
 
 in the same waj as that of proper words. (Morus, p. 
 329. IX.) ^ 
 
 § 61. Words in one language do not always correspond 
 exactly to those in another. It may be proper to repeat 
 here a well known, though very important and neces- 
 sary observation, viz. that every language has words 
 and phrases, to which none in any other language, or at 
 least in that into which we are interpreting, ea;aci/z/ cor- 
 respond. Of this nature are many words and phrases, 
 both in the Greek and Hebrew Testament. The rea- 
 son of this lies not solely in the difference of objects, 
 peculiar to every nation; such as pertain for example, 
 to laws, religious rites, manners and customs, k ; but 
 also in the variety of minds, which are not all affected 
 in the same manner ; and lastly, in an arbitrary forma- 
 tion of notions, respecting those things which do not 
 pertain to substance and essence. (Campbell, Diss. II.) 
 
 OF ANTITHESIS. 
 
 § 62. Where antithesis exists^ if the sense of one part 
 can be founds the other may be easily known. Finally, as 
 ideas are often contra distinguished from each other, 
 so the language corresponds. Therefore, as when 
 ideas are repugnant to each other, if you understand the 
 one, of course you must understand the other which is 
 the opposite, (for what one asserts the other denies ;) 
 so in antithetic language^ whether the subject or predi- 
 cate of a sentence, the rule is obvious, that the inter- 
 pretation of the one part must be directed by that of 
 the other, which is understood either from the usus lo- 
 qiiendi., or, v/here this is various, from the context. E. 
 g. when multi and pauci occur in the same sentence, 
 and it iS evident, that jnulti means cf//, it is, of course, 
 evident, that pauci cannot here have its ordinary sense, 
 but means non omnes^ without limiting the idea to feW' 
 ness of numbor. Of a like kind, are aa^^ and uviVfiu; 
 ygufifia and nvevfiUp in which the interpretation of the 
 
ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS. 31 
 
 one is to be accommodated to that of the other. (Morue, 
 p. 167. XIV. 1— II.) 
 
 a) But if multi mpans a//, does not panci (the opposite of it) 
 mean none? In Hebrew, irb and b^ ^^b nriean all and none ; 
 and tb i<)r is equivalent to non omnes^ in such a case. 
 
 ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE WORDS. 
 
 § 63. Abstract words used for concrete. Nor must the 
 interpreter neglect the distribution of words into ab- 
 stract and concrete. All languages, specially ancient 
 ones, often use abstract terms for concrete ones. Gen- 
 erally abstract terms are most frequently employed. 
 
 Abstract words are the names of qualities or attributes ; con- 
 crete, of thin2:s or subjects. E. g. Divinity '\s an abstract word, 
 meaning the quality of divine nature ; but God is a concrete 
 term, meaning the divine agent or beings The former is, bj 
 usage, often put for the latter. 
 
 § 64. The use of abstracts for concretes arose from ne» 
 cessity. This method of speaking is employed, (1) From 
 necessity. Those languages, which have but a few con- 
 crete terms, necessarily employ abstract ones ; e. g. the 
 Hebrew and its cognate dialects, in which abstracts are 
 often used in the place of concretes. Such usage being 
 once established by necessity, it often extended itself 
 where necessity did not require it. 
 
 § 65. (2) From a desire to render the subject spoken 
 of prominent. When an abstract is put for a subject 
 with its pronoun, or for the subject itself, it directs the 
 mind to that very thing on account of which the predi- 
 cate is asserted. No one will deny that this mode of 
 expression is energetic. 
 
 § 66. (3) The purpose of ornament is subserved, not 
 only by the prominence of which I have just spoken, 
 but by a certain elevation and grandeur of style, con- 
 Bected with this mode of speaking. 
 
32 RULES OF INTERPRETATION. 
 
 § 67. Popular and learned use of words. Finally, to 
 some words, popular use attributes one meaning, the 
 usage of the learned another. Not that words natural- 
 ly Signify one thing in common life, and another in a 
 treatise of science ; but that they are used less skilfully 
 in the one case, and with more skill and accuracy in the 
 other. Interpreters who confound these usages, of 
 course pervert the sense of words. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 RULES OF INTERPRETATIOIT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introductory Remarks, 
 
 § 68. Design of Part 11. Thus far we have beea 
 employed in considering the general nature of language, 
 the various kinds of words in use, and also the meaning 
 appropriate to each class. Having taken this general 
 view of the nature and properties of words, we may 
 now proceed to deduce from the principles already es- 
 tablished, various Rules of Interpretation^ by which the 
 efforts of the interpreter are to be directed. The con- 
 sideration of these rules, with their various classes and 
 ramifications, will constitute the second part of the 
 present Treatise on Hermeneutics. 
 
 § 69. What are Rules of Interpretation ? They are 
 directions or formulas, which explain and define the 
 mode of rightly investigating and perspicuously repre- 
 senting the sense of words, in any particular author. 
 
 §70. Origin of these rules. They are deduced from 
 the nature of language, as above explained ; and deduc- 
 ed, not by logical subtleties, but by observation and ex- 
 perience. 
 
RULES OF L\TERPIlETATIO^^ 33 
 
 § 71. Object of Rules. These rules serve not only 
 to assist in finding- the sense of words, but also in judg- 
 ing" whether any particular sense put upon words be 
 true or false. By them too one may not only be assist- 
 ed to understand why a particular sense is erroneous, 
 but also why the true one cannot be discovered. 
 
 § 72. Rules of exegesis connected with the usus loquen' 
 di. We have seen above, that the sense of words de- 
 pends on the usus loquendi. Proper rules then for find- 
 ing the sense, or judging of it, ought to have special 
 respect to the usus loquendi^ and to show how it is ap- 
 plied to every particular case. 
 
 § 73. Usus loquendi general and special. The usus 
 loquendi^ considered at large, has respect to a language 
 generally ; specially considered, it has respect to some 
 particular writer. To the common usage of words, al- 
 most every writer adds something that is peculiar to 
 himself; whence arise the idioms of particular writers. 
 
 § 74. Order in which the subject will he pursued. The 
 natural method of treating the usus loquendi will be 
 followed : so that we shall first consider the method, in 
 general, of findmg the usus loquendi in the dead languag- 
 es ; and then the method of finding it in any particular 
 authors, and specially in the writings of the N. Test. 
 
54 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI GENERALLY IN THE DEAB 
 LANGUAGES. 
 
 [Compare Keii, H 25—34. Beck pp. 131 — 136. Seiler, H 236— 
 254.] 
 
 § 75. Usus loquendi is known by testimony. If the 
 vsus loquendi is mere matter of fact, it may be known, 
 in the dead languages, by the testimony of those, who 
 lived when these languages were flourishing and in 
 common use, and who well understood them. This tes- 
 timony is direct or indirect. (Morus, p. 74. II.) 
 
 By the usus loquendi is meant, the sense which usage attaches 
 to tlie vfords of any language. It is surprising that any attempts 
 should ever have heen made to find the sense of words in a dead 
 languag:e, by mtaus different in their nature from those which we 
 employ, to find the sense of words in a livins: language. The 
 meaning of a word must always be a simple matter of fact ; and 
 of course, it is always to be estahlished by appropriate and ade- 
 quate testimony. Yet how very different a course has been pur- 
 sued, I will not say by many Rabbinic, Cabbalistic commenta- 
 tors merely, nor by monks and zealots for the ilomish hierarchy ; 
 but by many Protestants, who have had great influence, and who 
 deserve, on many accounts, the hig:hest respect. Witness the 
 exegetical principles of Cocceius and his followers; and read, if 
 the statement just made be doubted, many of the articles in Park- 
 hurst's Heb. Lexicon. 
 
 § 76. How to obtai7i direct testimony. Direct iesti- 
 mony may be obtained. Firsts from those writers, to 
 whom the language investigated, was vernacular ; 
 either from the same authors whom we interpret, 
 or from their contemporaries. JVcaV, from those who, 
 though foreigners, had learned the language in ques- 
 tion, (a) Thirdly^ from Scholiasts, Glossographers, and 
 
OP FINDING THE USUS LOQITENDI 35 
 
 Versions made while the language was spoken and by 
 those who were acquainted with it. But these must be 
 severally treated. 
 
 c) Thus the writinsrs of Marcus Antoninus a Ronaan emperor, 
 and of Philo and Josephus who were Jews, may be used to ilhis- 
 trate the meaning of Greek words, because, although foreigners, 
 they well understood the Greek language. 
 
 § 77. Testimony of cotemporary writers. The most 
 important aid is afforded by writers of the first class ; 
 for their testimony is particularly weighty. This tes- 
 timony may be drawn from three sources. (1) From 
 the definitions of words. (2) From examples and the 
 nature of the subject. (3) From parallel passages. 
 (Morus, p. 79. V.) 
 
 § 78. (1) Definitions, In regard to these, nothing 
 more is necessary, than to take good care that the de- 
 finition be well understood ; and to consider how much 
 weight, the character of the writer who defines may 
 properly give to it. 
 
 § 79. (2) Examples and the nature of the subject. In 
 regard to these, it may be said, that a good understand- 
 ing and considerable practice is necessary to enable 
 one to judge well, and to make proper distinctions, 
 (Morus, p. 81. VII.) 
 
 By examples is meant, that the writer who uses a particular 
 word, although he does not directly define it, yet gives, in some 
 one or more pasaagt s, an fxample of what it meafjs, by exhibit- 
 ing its qu.'^lities. or shewing the operation of it. Thus,"Paul uses 
 the words orocysia tov xoojaov, at first, without an explana- 
 tion. But w. have an exarnpje uf the meaning of it in Gal. iv. 9. 
 Thus TCVOTvg is illustrated b^ examples in Heb xi ; and so, of 
 m^ny other words. 
 
 The nature nf the subject^ in innumerable places, helps to 6e- 
 fine which meaning of a word the writer attaches to it, m any 
 particular passage E. g XaQig is pardon of sin^ divine benev- 
 olence, divine aid^ temporal blessings^ !^c» Which of these senses 
 it bears in any particular passage,^ is to be determined from the 
 nature of the subject. 
 
36 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 
 
 § 80. (3) Comparison of parallel passages. Great 
 caution is necessary here, in order to find tne true sense 
 of those passages which are to be compared and judg- 
 ed of, with a view to throw light on some more obscure 
 place. Unless such caution is used, the object cannot 
 be well accomplished. On this account, the prin- 
 ciple in question ought to be well understood ; es- 
 pecially, as all who are skilled in interpretation agree, 
 that this principle of exegesis is very broad, and ap- 
 plies not only to the Scriptures^ but to all other books. 
 (Morus, p. 79. VIII.) 
 
 § 81. Parallelisms are Verbal and Real (1) Verbal. 
 This occurs, when a word is ambiguous and doubtful, 
 (because neither the subject nor the context affords 
 matter of illustration,) and this same word, (a) or its 
 synonyme, (6) is repeated in a similar passage, with 
 those attributes by which it may be defined, or with 
 some plain adjunct, or intelligible comment, (c) (Mo- 
 rus, p. 85. X. XI.) 
 
 The sense of many words is so plain, that investig^ation by 
 parallelism, i. e. the like use of them in other passages, is un- 
 necessary. But comparison is specially necessary to illustrate 
 words (1) Which belong to the Hellenistic or Hebrew-Greek 
 idiom. E. %. fCpOi^OVPTO navTsg is often said, when the event 
 to which it relates is some special favour. The language here 
 may be compared with the Hebrew ^?'l'^ and TiHS, or the syno- 
 nyriies {^avjuaocci and -O^a^l^rjOai ; by which it appears that 
 6(fO^OVVTO^ in such cases, u»eans admiration^ astonishment. (2) 
 Words shuuld be compared, which have a kind of technical re- 
 li2:ious use. E.g. fAVGTTjQtOV. romp. Rom. 16: 24, Colos. 1:27, 
 Eph. 3 : 45. So mOTig, dixaioovprjj fxtxavoia, Kaivri 
 KriGtg, &c. (3) Words of unfrequent occurrence. The neces- 
 sity of this is obvious. (4) Words which are ambiguous. For 
 words which are so in one place, frequently are plain and easy 
 to be understood in another, from the connexion in which they 
 stand. 
 
 a) E. g. Christ is frequently called a stone of stumbling. In 
 1 Pet. 2: 8, those who stumble are said anSidsLV rot Ao/w, to 
 
eE]<JERALLY fN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 37 
 
 ye/cc/ or disobey the gospel of Christ. (Jb) F. s:. 2 Cor. 1:21, 
 XQLGag f]fA(xg 6 Seog ; I John, 2t 20 X9*'^M^ ^^ ^^^^ *^ ^® 
 instruction in the truth, (e) Coinp 2 Cor. 4: 10 wiUi v-rse 11th. 
 Parallelisms, appropriately so called, are of this nature ; ihe 
 one often serving to explain the other These are very numerous 
 in the Old Testament, and considerably so in the New. Comp. 
 Matt. 1:20 with Luke 1:35. 
 
 To the cases already mentioned may be added, {(f) Renewed 
 mention with explanation. Comp. 1 Cor. 7: 1 with verse 26. 
 Also (c) Renewed mention with antithesis. Comp. dccvaxog 
 in Rom. iii. iv. and v. with Chap. 6: 23. 
 
 § 82. Real Parallelism. This means, that there is a 
 parallelism of object or sentioient, although the words 
 are not the same ; or to describe it in a manner some- 
 what different, it occurs, when the same thing- or senti- 
 ment is expressed in other words more perspicuous, or 
 with fuller and more numerous words, the meaning of 
 which is plain. 
 
 Real parallelism may respect a/ac/, or a doctrine, related or 
 taught in different passages. Examples of the former are abund- 
 ant in the Gospels, which, in very numerous instances, relate to 
 the same facts. So in the books of Samuel and Kings, compared 
 with the Chronicles. 
 
 Paralleh'sm of doctrine or sentiment is where the same princi- 
 ples are taught, in both passages. To this head of parallelism 
 belong repetitions of the same composition; e.g. Ps. 14 and 
 53; Ps. 96 and I Chron. 16; Ps. 18. and 2 Sam 22 ; some of 
 Jude and 2 Epistle of Peter; with many other such passages. 
 On the faithful, skilful, and diligent comparison of the different 
 parts of Scripture, which treat of the same doctrine, depends, in 
 a great measure, all our right conclusions in regard to the real 
 doctrines of religion ; for in this manner, and this only, are they 
 properly established. Most of the mistakes m^de about Chris- 
 tian doctrine, are made in consequence of partial exe2;esi8, di- 
 rected not unfrequently by prejudices previously imbibed. The 
 student cini never feel too deeply the importance of a thorough 
 comparison of all those parts of Scripture^ which pertain to the 
 same subject. 
 
 Besides the verbal and real parallelism considered above, there 
 is another species of parallelism, which constitutes one of (he 
 principle features of Hebrew poetry. This consists in a corres- 
 pondence of two parts of a verse with each other, so that words 
 answer to words, and sentiment to sentiment. This runs through- 
 out the books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Canticles, and most of 
 the Prophets. See Pa. 1. 2. 19. 119. Is. 1: 2—5. 40. et passim. 
 4 
 
38 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI 
 
 This style, so predominant in the language of the Old Testament, 
 has passed into many parts of the New, which strictly speaking 
 are not poetical ; but which receive their hue from the influence 
 that Hebrew poetry had produced on the lang-uag^e of the Jew* 
 ish nation. See Luke 1; 35. 1: 46, &;c. 11 : 27; and many parts 
 of the Apocalypse, which is a kind of poem. The attentive and 
 experienced observer, will find these characteristic idioms of He- 
 brew poetry, in a greater or less degree, in almost every chap- 
 ter of the New Testament. 
 
 The appropriate method of studying this part of exegesis con- 
 sists, of course, in attention to Hebrew poetry. How great as- 
 sistance may be derived from a thorough knowledge of this id- 
 iom, one can scarcely imagine, who has not made the experi- 
 ment. I cannot dwell upon it here, except merely to observe, that 
 the student will be in no great danger of overrating the benefit to 
 be derived from a thorou§;h acquaintance with it; and that he 
 will find the advantages very perspicuously stated by Schleusner, 
 De paiallelismo membroram egregio interprelationis subsidio. 
 
 As Ernesti has failed to consider the appropriate maxims of 
 exegesis, in regard to the kind of parallelisms now in question, I 
 will add a few considerations, that may be useful. (I) In par- 
 allelism of this kind, seek for the principal idea, that lies at the 
 ground of both parts of a distioh. (2) lie not anxious to avoid 
 the same sense or meaning in both parts, as though it would be 
 tautological, and unworthy of the sacred writers ; for sameness 
 of meaning, in innumerable cases, constitutes the very nature of 
 the idiom, or mode of expression. (3) Inquire whether one 
 member of the parallelism is explanatory; or whether it is add- 
 ed for the sake of ornament; or is a repetition or amplification, 
 which result from excited feeling, or from mere custom of speech. 
 This inquiry will enable one to know how mucli exegetical aid 
 may be derived from it. If one member be explanatory or ex- 
 egetical of the other, it will comprize synonymous or antithetic 
 words ; or one member will be in tropical, and the other in prop- 
 er language ; or one will enumerate species, which belong to the 
 genus mentioned in the other. Instructive on the above subject 
 is Morus, pp. 96—107. 
 
 But the student must not fail here, to read Lowth's Lectures on 
 Hebrew Poetry^ or the Preface to Lowllis Commentary on Isaiah. 
 With much profit, may be read, on this very interesting and im- 
 portant branch of a sacred interpreter's knowledge. Herder, 
 Geist der Heb, Poesie, B. I. s. 22, Sec. De Wette, Ueber die 
 Psalmen, Einleitun^. Meyer, Hermeneutik^ B. II. s. 
 
 § 83. Parallel passages to be read continuously and fre- 
 quently. A good interpreter, therefore, must speclalljr 
 attend to those passages of an author, which resemble 
 
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 39 
 
 each other, when he finds occasion to doubt in respect 
 to the meaning of any one of them. He should read 
 them over continuously, or at short intervals. For in 
 this way, while the passages are fresh in his mind about 
 which he doubts, or with which others are to be com- 
 pared, he will more easily trace the real resemblances 
 between them. (Morus, p. 107. XVIII.) 
 
 § 84, Similarity of passages should be real, in order to 
 be compared^ and not merely verbal. By this is meant, 
 that the same idea is presented by both, and not mere- 
 ly that the language of each may be the same. For real 
 likeness between them cannot exist, unless the idea of 
 each be the same ; nor, of course, can the one throw 
 any true light upon the other, except there be a real 
 similarity. But when this point is settled, the inter- 
 preter must consider which of the two is the most per- 
 spicuous and definite, and regulate the exegesis of the 
 more obscure passage by that which is the more per- 
 spicuous. Explanation, in this way, often becomes very 
 obvious. (Morus, p. 107. XIX.) 
 
 But is there not a kind of VGxeQOv uQOreQOV, in this direc- 
 tion ? Morus has indeed admitted the propriety of the rule ; but 
 still there seems to me to be difficulty in it. In order to deter- 
 mine whether two passages may be properly compared, (one of 
 which \^ obscure) you musi first determine whether there is real 
 similarity between them, i. e. whether they both contain the 
 same idea. But to determine this, of course, implies a previous 
 knowledge of what the obscure passage contains ; otherwise yea 
 cannot tell whether the idea is the same in both. You have al- 
 ready determined, then, how the obscure passage is to be inter- 
 preted, and so need not the comparison after which you are la- 
 bouring ; or else you assume the interpretation, and then build 
 your exegesis on that assumption. In either way, the rule would 
 seem to amount to little or nothing. 
 
 But to relieve the difficulty, in some measure, it may be said 
 with truth, you determine what idea is conveyed in each of the 
 passages to be compared, from the context, and the design of the 
 writer, or the nature of the case. Having made this determina- 
 tion about each passage, independently of the other, you then 
 bring them together, and the one, being expressed more fully or 
 with more explanatory adjuncts than the other, confirms the less 
 certain meaning of the other. A comparison of passages, then, 
 which is real^ (that of ideas) and not merely verbal, can never 
 
40 OF FINDING THE tSUS LOQ.UENDI 
 
 be made to any purpose, where the obscurity of either is so ^reaf, 
 tiidt you can attain no tolerable degree of satisfaction about the 
 meaning. It can never be used, therefore, for any higher degree 
 of evidence, than for the confirmation of a sense not improbable 
 in itself, find not contradicted by the context. 
 
 This subject, in such a view of it, becomes fundamental, in 
 regard to the validity of testimony to the meaning of ^^ords, af- 
 forded by what are called parallel passages. The nature t*nd 
 strength of the evidence, and the proper mode of its application 
 are ali illustrated by the above considerations. Unless the stu- 
 dent forms ideas of this subject, n^hich are correct, and ground- 
 fed upon principle that will bear examination, he is liable to be 
 carried about '* by every wind of doctrine" in Hermeneutir's, and 
 to be cast upon the opinion, or conceit, or merely confident as- 
 sertion of every commentator or lexicographer, who has over- 
 rated the authority of passages called parallel, in deciding upon 
 some particular word or phrase, or who has no definite views of 
 the exact nature and application of the evidence in question. 
 
 § 85. The exercise of comparison should he often re- 
 peated. To the observance of these principles, fre- 
 quent practice must be added, so that the interpreter 
 may easily discern what passages are similar, and how 
 he maj rightly compare them, and judge of them. It 
 will be very useful, here, to consult good interpreters^ 
 not only of the Scriptures, but of profane authors; that 
 where they carry these principles into practice, and 
 plainly make a right and skilful application of them, 
 we may learn to imitate them, by attentively consider- 
 ing the manner in which they attain to the understand- 
 ing of things which are obscure or ambiguous. By/re- 
 quently renewing this exercise, we may learn to go in 
 the same path, in which they have travelled. 
 
 The books of the New Testament present more inducement to 
 repeat this exercise very frequently, than any other books. For 
 (I) They are of all books the most important. (2) They are 
 not only all of the same idiom in general, but they have refer- 
 ence to the same subject, viz. the developeraent of Christianity. 
 They originated too from cotemporary writers, possessed of views, 
 feelinj^s, and lanjruage that were alike. Hence, comparison has 
 more force in illustrating the N\ Testament, than in the illustra- 
 tion of either Greek or Latin authors; many of whom, that agreed 
 with each other in all the circumstances just stated, cannot be 
 found. But (3) To all who admit that the same Holy Spirit guided 
 the authors of the New Testament, and that their views ofrelig- 
 
GENERALLV IiV THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 41 
 
 it)n, ID consequence of this, must have been harmonious^ the in- 
 ducement to comparison of various parts and passages with each 
 other, in order to obtain a correct view of the wliole, must be 
 very great; and the additional force of the evidence arising from 
 comparison, on account of the really harmonious views of the 
 writers, must make this exercise an imperious dutj of every 
 theologian. 
 
 § 86. Many parallel passages should be compared. To 
 compare one passage only, is often insufficient, wheth- 
 er you are endeavouring to find the usus loquendi by 
 the aid of parrallel passages, or by testimony derived 
 from the nature of the subject and from examples. 
 (Comp. § 77.) Specially is this the case, when we are 
 investigating the sense of words, that have a complex 
 or generic meaning, made up of various parts. In this 
 case, comparisons should be made from numerous pas- 
 sages, until we perceive that what we are seeking is 
 fully and entirely discovered. (Morus, p. 109. XX.) 
 
 Suppose the word niGTcg occurs in a particular passage, where 
 you are doubtful what sense should be applied to it. First, you 
 call to mind, that niGTigis a generic word, having several mean- 
 ings related to each other, but still diverse, as species under the 
 genus. You wish to determine how many species of meaning 
 ncaig has ; and in order to accomplish this, many passages where 
 it is used must be compared, in order that you may know wheth- 
 er all the species are found. This being done, you proceed to 
 compare them with the passage under investigation, and see 
 which will fit it. And in this way all generic words must be in- 
 vestigated, before the generic idea can be determined. 
 
 § 87. Testimony of Scholiasts respecting the usus loqueu' 
 di. It was said, § 76, that testimony to linguistic usage 
 might be derived from Scholiasts ; and this testimony is 
 either given by themselves, or it is cited by them from 
 others. It is valuable, in proportion as the time in 
 wrhich they lived approximates to the age of the author 
 whom they interpret; (a) and also in proportion to ^ 
 their knowledge of the language in which he wrote. (&) 
 The latter must be judged of by men of learning and 
 practical skill ; although to judge of it is not a matter 
 of special difficulty. (Morus, pp. 113 — 115.) 
 
42 OF FINDING THE US US LOQ.UENDI 
 
 Scholia means short notes upon any author, either of an exe- 
 |:etical or graoimatical nature. On all the distinguished ancient 
 Greek authors, SchoHa have been written in more recent times ; 
 many volumes of which are still extant, upon Homer, Thucydidea, 
 Sophocles, Aristophanes, &c. In like manner, a multitude of 
 Scholia, from the ancient Christian Fathers, specially of the 
 Greek Church, have come down tons in their works. Orij^inally, 
 they were brief remarks, occasionally made in their commenta- 
 ries and other writings. Afterwards, thrse were extracted and 
 brought together, and^ they now form what is called Catena Pa-^ 
 trum. Many Scholia also are found on the margin of MSS. or in- 
 terlined, or placed at the end of a book. 
 
 a) This is too generally expressed ; for surely an ignorant 
 Scholiast of the second century would not be more valuable than 
 Chrysostom in the fourth ! In short, antiquity adds nothing to 
 the value of a Scholiast, except as it renders it more probable, 
 ceteris paribus, that he may have a better knowledge of ancient 
 manners, customs, history, &:c, than a modern writer would 
 have. 
 
 b) Almost all that is important in this subject turns on *his 
 point. The simple question always is. Is the author well, skil- 
 fully interpreted ; not, when or where the Commentator lived. 
 
 § 88. Glossaries. In a similar way is the testimony 
 of Glossographers to be estimated ; which testimony is 
 by no means to be despised. Its credit depends on its 
 antiquity, and on the learning either of the Glossogra- 
 phers themselves, or of others whom they cite. 
 
 § 89. Nature of* Glossaries. But here we must be 
 cautious, not to suppose the Greek Glossaries to be 
 like our modern Lexicons. They explain only partic- 
 ular passages, or words ; especially nouns that are in 
 an oblique case, or verbs that are not in the Infinitive, 
 nor first person of the Present Tense. An ignorance 
 of this construction of the Glossaries, has often been 
 the occasion of ridiculous errors. 
 
 Glossarium is a book or writing comprehending yXcaooag. 
 Among the Greeks, ykwOGU meant either zrfeowmhc f/'orrf,peculiar 
 to a certain dialect only, and itnknown in others ; or obsolete word; 
 or obscure one. Glossary means a hook, coutaininer explanations 
 of obscure and difficult words. Of course, a Glossary extends 
 only to a few of the words and phrases of any author. It is not 
 to be used at a lexicon ; for it is only a commeat ou particular 
 
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 43 
 
 passages. It differs, therefore, in nothing except mere form, from . 
 very brief Scholia, 
 
 As to the authority of Glossaries, it is regulated by the same 
 principles as that of Scholia ; mere antiquity of itself adding no- 
 thing important to its weight, which is proportioned to the phi- 
 lological knowledge and accuracy of its author. 
 
 The principal ancient Glossaries published, are those of He- 
 sychius, Suidas, Phavorinus, Cyrill, Photius, Et^mologicon Mag- 
 num. Compare, on this note and the two preceding Sections, 
 Morus, pp. 115--130. 
 
 § 90. Testimony of Versions, The testimony of Fer- 
 sions is to be estimated by their antiquity, and by the 
 knowledge of the Original which the translator pos- 
 sessed. In order to judge of the latter, the Version must 
 be compared in many places with the original, in passa- 
 ges where the sense is certain. But here, we must well 
 understand the language of the Version itself, lest we 
 should err in judging of it, and rashly suppose the Trans- 
 lator has not hit the true sense, (which has often hap- 
 pened to those who have passed sentence on the Sept. 
 Version, and on the quotations from the Old Test., that 
 are to be found in the JSTew ;) or lest we should under- 
 stand the words which are nicely chosen, in a low and 
 vulgar sense. Boyce has shewn, that even Erasmus and 
 Beza have erred here. (Morus, p. 130. XXXV.) 
 
 Here again, antiquity is to be regarded only as conferring 
 more advantage on a translator, in respect to a knowledge of 
 ancient customs, history, &c. In some cases, too, the translator 
 may have lived before the languaere which he translates had 
 ceased to be vernacular. But in either of these cases, an igno- 
 rant man could not be recommended as a translator, because he 
 preceded, by one, four, or ten centuries, an intelligent, thorough 
 philologist. The credit of any Version turns on its fidelity and 
 ability. No ancient Version, either Sept., Vulgate, Italic, Syri- 
 ac, Chaldaic, &c, will bear any comparison in respect to either 
 of these characteristics, with many recent versions, made by the 
 finished Oriental scholars of the present day. 
 
 §91. Other similar testimonies. Similar to the helps 
 just mentioned, are those writers, who have explained 
 to their readers, words and obscure expressions taken 
 from another language. E. g. Cicero explains many 
 Oreek words, and Dionysius Halicar. many Latin ones. 
 
44 ©N FINDING THE USlTS LO^UENDI 
 
 Of the same class, are writers who have inserted trans- 
 lations from another language ; e. g. the Latin poets 
 and historians, from the Greek ; the writers of the New 
 Testament, from the Hebrew of the Old. (Morus, p. 
 131. XXXVI.) 
 
 Passages cited from the Old Testament, are frequently ex- 
 plained in the New, either by the connexion in which tiiey stand, 
 the language in which they are expressed, (Comp. Is. 40:13 with 
 Rom. 11: 34) or by some adjuncts or direct explanation. 
 
 § 92. Knowledge of the peculiar style and all the civ 
 cumstances of an author necessary. The principles of in- 
 terpretation, thus far, apply to writers of all ages and 
 nations. But in addition to these, there are some prin- 
 ciples peculiar and appropriate to certain writers, of 
 a particular age, nation, or sect. This peculiar usus lo- 
 quendi may be known, (l) From the writer's own testi- 
 mony, either express or implied.(a) (2) From the cus- 
 toms and principles of the sect to which he belongs, (6) 
 whether philosophical or religious ; and these customs 
 and principles may be known, from the testimony of 
 those who belonged to the same sect, or have explained 
 its principles. (3) The interpreter must have a knowl- 
 edge of the manners and customs of the age, to which 
 his author alludes ; (c) and this is to be obtained by con- 
 sulting those, who have given information on these top- 
 ics, {d) (4) The interpreter should have a general 
 knowledge of writers of the same age. (Morus, pp. 
 132—141.) 
 
 a) If an author have a manner of expression wholly suigeneriSf 
 then his own writings are the only legitimate source of informa- 
 tion in respect to it ; and in them, testimony may be either di-_ 
 rect, where the author himself gives explanations ; or indirect, 
 where the explanations are to be drawn from adjuncts, or the 
 context. (6) Every religious sect has terms used in a sense pe- 
 culiar to itself. Of course, a writer belonging to this sect may be 
 supposed to use its language ; and an explanation ofitislobe 
 found, as Ernr sti directs, (c) F.very age has its own peculiar 
 language, customs and sentiments, in some respect or other. 
 Consequently a knowledge of these peculiarities is necessary, in 
 order to explain language that is predicated upon them. Hence 
 
GENERALLY IN THE DEAD LANGUAGES. 45 
 
 it is plain, (rf) That cotemporary authors are the most probable 
 source o/' illustration, next to the writings of an author himself; 
 as they were conversant with the same manners, customs, lan- 
 guage, sentiments, <StC, as the author. 
 
 The question, To what nation did the author belongs, is of 
 great moment, oftentimes, in explainmg his niethod of using lan- 
 guage. E. g. What can be more diverse, than the Jewish, and 
 Roman and Attic method of writing, in a great variety of re- 
 spects ? 
 
 § 93. The nature of composition should be specially 
 reg-arded in the interpretation of it History is one 
 thing; poetij, another; oratory, another, (a) Partic- 
 ular periods have their special characteristics in each 
 of these modes of composition; which frequently arises 
 from a fashion of writing- or speaking, introduced by 
 some distinguished person. (Morus, p. 141 — 147.) 
 
 History therefore is to be interpreted as history, not as alle- 
 gory, or mythic fiction ; poetry is to be construed as possessing 
 its own peculiar characteristics ; and so of the rest. No one 
 circumstance more displays an interpreter's knowledge and crit- 
 ical acumen, than a judicious regard to the kind of composition, 
 and the age, circumstances, and idiom of the author. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OTHER MEANS TO ASSIST IN FINDING THE SENSE OP WORDS, 
 BESIDES THE USUS LOQUENDI. 
 
 [Compare Keil, pp. 45—80. Beck, pp. 127—141. Seiler, H 250 
 —256.] 
 
 § 94. Design of the following chapter. The preced- 
 ing chapter treated of the method of finding the usus la- 
 quendi^ i. e. the meaning which usage has attached to 
 words, by direct testimony. This testimony, it was 
 
46 SUBSIDIARY MEAN* 
 
 shewn, might be deduced from three sources; viz, 
 from the author interpreted, or his cotemporaries ; 
 from foreigners who understood his language ; and from 
 Scholia, Glossographies, and Versions. With these was 
 united a knowledge of the peculiar style, idiom, coun- 
 try, circumstances, &c, of the author, as also the kind 
 of compositions, which is to be interpreted. We come 
 now to treat of indirect testimony, to which we must 
 frequently resort, in order to iind the meaning of words. 
 
 § 95. JVecessity of indirect testimony. The usus lo- 
 quendi cannot always be found, with sufficient certainty, 
 by those means which have been pointed out. Proper 
 evidence respecting it is sometimes wanting ; some- 
 times usage is variable or inconstant, even in the same 
 age, or in the same writer ; or there is an ambiguity of 
 language, or of grammatical forms; or an obscurity 
 covers the subject or thing treated of; or novelty of 
 language occurs ; or a neglect of the usus loquendi^ which 
 sometimes happens even in the most careful writers. 
 Other means therefore must be used, by which the true 
 sense can be elicited. (Morus, p. 148. I.) 
 
 § 96. Scope of a writer the first and best means. The 
 most important of these means for discovering the sense 
 of any particular passage, is found in resorting to the 
 general tenor of the discourse. The design or scope of 
 the discourse in general, is to be compared with the 
 passage investigated. (a) The ground of this rule is, 
 that we ought not to suppose a good and judicious writ- 
 er has said what is inconsistent with his design. Abso- 
 lute certainty, however, is not always attainable, in this 
 way; for it sometimes happens, that several interpre- 
 tations may agree with the scope of the writer. Hence, 
 there are cases in which only a probability in favor of 
 a certain meaning is to be found ; and even cases, where 
 not so much as this can be attained. (Morus, p. 149. 
 III—V.) 
 
 o) But how is this scope of the writer to be ascertained ? (1) 
 From the express statement of the M'riter, E. g. John 20:31. 
 
OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 47 
 
 Rom. 3; 28. (2) From the occasion or circumstances, which 
 originated the discourse. E. g. the parables of Christ, and many 
 passages in the Epistles. (3) From history, i. e. authentic ac- 
 counts of facts, that would very naturally give rise to the dis- 
 course in question, and would serve to explain it ; e. g. the epis- 
 tle of Jude is directed against teachers, who lived licentiously. 
 2 Cor. almost throughout, has reference to facts which existed at 
 that time. If none of these things cast sufficient light on the 
 scope of the writer, the whole must be perused and re-perused 
 carefully ; by which, unexpected light often breaks in. 
 
 But some caution, in respect to the rule in Section 96 is proper. 
 All parts of a discourse have not, invariably, a strict connexion 
 with its general scope. iVIany things are often said, which are 
 wholly irrelevant to it, and which are mere obiter dicta. These 
 are not to be interpreted by the general scope of the discourse, 
 but agreeably to the subject thai is treated of, in the place where 
 they occur. Recurrence to this principle is very important, in 
 many parts of the New Testament. 
 
 § 97. Caution in regard to the rule above. In regard 
 to this means, then, of attaining the sense, we must take 
 care not to trust too much to it, nor to rely solely upon 
 it. Nor must we rest satisfied with only some tolera- 
 ble agreement of the sense given, with the general 
 scope of the writer. This the unlearned are v.ery apt 
 to do, for want of skill in the languages ; whence have 
 arisen many idle conjectures. We must insist upon an 
 evident and necessary connexion with the scope of the 
 discourse. 
 
 But how shall we know when it is evident, and necessary^ (1) 
 "Where a meaning plainly contradicts the tenor of a discourse, it 
 is to be rejected. (2) When it violates the principles of paral- 
 lelism, and the conclusions drawn from them, as to the sense of 
 a passage. (See H 80 — 86.) (3) Reject a meaning, which 
 gives an inept and frigid sense. By a frigid sense, is mf ant one 
 which contributes neither to argument, nor perspicuity, nor or- 
 nament. 
 
 A meaning which infringes upon none of these negative pre- 
 cepts, will be found to harmonize with the subject of which the 
 author is treating, unless he has violated all the rules of language 
 and reasoning. 
 
 § 98. Second caution^ in regard to the scope of the dis- 
 course. Another caution is, that we compare the mean- 
 
48 SUBSIDIARY MEANS 
 
 ing, as discovered by the scope of the writer, with that 
 which the asus loqucndi affords, and see whether they 
 can be niade to agree. In other words, we must see 
 whether the usus loquendi will tolerate any particular 
 sense given to the passage by the scope of the dis- 
 course, specially in respect to words which have vari- 
 ous meanings; or whether there be a repugnance to it. 
 Occasionally, the meaning derived from the scope of 
 the writer, will lead to a knowledge of something 
 which may serve to establish its harmony with the usus 
 loquendi. 
 
 But to interpret solely from the supposed scope of a 
 writer, without the aid and consent of the usus loquendi^ 
 and even in opposition to it, belongs rather to rash con- 
 jecture, than to interpretation by rule. Wherefore this 
 help is not to be used, unless in cases of ambiguity, or 
 of words which are dna'S, Ifyof-ievcc, and generally in 
 cases where the best testimony to the meaning of words 
 is either wanting, or is insufficient to determine the 
 sense.(a) (Morus, p. 168. VII. and VIII.) 
 
 a) The reason why (he scope of a discourse is not to be re- 
 sorted to, except in cases where anibiguity arises, is, that the 
 usus loquendi is the best evidence which can be liad of the mean- 
 ins: of a passH^e, and nothing can be admitted which shall con- 
 tradict it, where it can be established by adequate testimony. 
 iBut in case one doubts what meaning the usus loquendi would 
 assign, or at least allow, to any word or phrase, secondary or 
 subsidiary means, i. e. the scope of the discourse may be resort- 
 ed to, for the sake of obtaining the desired illustration. 
 
 § 99. Use of the context in interpretation. Of more 
 limited extent,(a) but rather more evident, is the rule, 
 to have recourse to the antecedents and consequents of 
 a passage, i. e. the context, in order that you may de- 
 termine its meaning. This is done for two reasons : ei- 
 ther that we may choose out of several meanings, one 
 which does not disagree with the usus loquendi ; or that 
 the meaning of an uncommon word, not explained by 
 the usus loquendi^ may be discovered. Here, however, 
 we must guard against proceeding be} ond probability ; 
 and to do this, we must observe the same cautions, as 
 have been just given above. (IVIorus, p. 160. IX.) 
 
GF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 49 
 
 a) In the original, angustius ; by which Ernesti probably 
 meant, of less importance^ or confined within narrower limits. 
 But I cannot accede to the propriety of this sentinrient ; for the 
 inamediate context, either preceding, succeeding, or both togeth- 
 er, is a rule for judging of the meaning of words, of the \eTy 
 broadest extent. I might say that even the evidence of the usus 
 hjquendiy is, in very many cases, built upon iae context. We 
 adopt the opinion, that the usus loquendi sanctions this or that 
 particular sense, because the context clearly shews that such a 
 meaning is to be assigned to it, and that no other can be given 
 without rendering the sense frigid and inept. Moreover, the 
 general scope of an author does not forbid the admission of a 
 great variety of arguments, illustrations, and episodes (if I may 
 be indulged in the use of such a word here) into the intermediate 
 parts of a discourse ; so that one is far more certain of giving 
 a sense that is congruous, by consulting the immediate contexty 
 than by merely consulting the general scope of the whole. Both, 
 no doubt, are to be regarded ; but of the two, the former is by 
 far the most important means of assistance. 
 
 Indeed, I should doubt whether there is any one rule, in the 
 whole science of Hermeneutics, so important, and of so much 
 practical and actual use, as the one in question. Great care in- 
 deed, is necessary, to decide with certainty what sense the con- 
 text requires that a word should have ; specially when the im- 
 mediate subject is briefly stated. But this carets as easily prac- 
 tised, as any other rule is, which Hermeneutics prescribes in dif- 
 ferent cases. Violence must not be done to words, by forcibly 
 subjecting them to the context, against etymology, analogy, the 
 rules of grammar, and the nature of language. But in every 
 thing short of this, all good Lexicographers and Commentators 
 adapt the meaning of words to the context, in cases too numerous 
 to need any specification. Comp. Morus ut supra. 
 
 § 100. Various comparisons useful., in order to discov- 
 er the m.eaning of words. Of similar utility ibr finding 
 the sense of ambiguous or obscure words is the compar- 
 ing of subject and attribute ; of nouns and adjectives ; (a) 
 of words accompanied by other words that qualify them, 
 which may consist of adverbs, or of nouns joined to the 
 word investigated by prepositions and constituting a 
 kind of adverbial periphrasis; {b) or finally of disjunc- 
 tives.(c) (Morus, p. 163. XI— XIV.) 
 
 ^ a)Quah'a sint subject a ^ ialia sint attributa, is the old rule of 
 the Schools and of philosophy, founded upon the common sense 
 of mankind. In accordance with this, we understand as tropica! 
 
->0 SUBSIDIARY MEANS 
 
 language, all those expressions which ascribe hands, feet, eyes, 
 ascent, descent, &:c, to God, who is a Spirit. The principle in 
 question is of vast extent in construing the figurative language of 
 the Scriptures ; and it also extends to manj expressions that are 
 not strictly tropical. Too much certainty however, should not 
 be ascribed to it ; for some cases occur, where the subject is im- 
 perfectly known, and of course, we are unable to pronounce, with 
 confidence, what attributes may be ascribed to it. 
 
 b) E g. ^ar oxpcv agcGcg' Kax o\pcv serves merely the 
 purpose of an adjective, qualifying agiGl^Q^ and shewing that 
 judgment from external appearance only is meant. 
 
 b) By disjunctives are meant, words placed in antithesis. E.g. 
 Heaven, earth ; spirit, Jiesh; &c. The rule for finding the sense, 
 in such cases, is obvious, provided the meaning of either term 
 can be found. For whatever meaning one term has, the other has 
 the opposite ; so that if certainty be acquired as to the one, it is 
 of course acquired as to the other, which is to be construed as a 
 real antithesis. Compare ^ 62. 
 
 § 101. Analogy of languages a means of interpreta- 
 iion. Analogy of languages may also assist, in judging" 
 of the meaning of words. This is of different kinds. 
 The first is analogy of any particular language, (i. e. the 
 same language with that to be interpreted, which anal- 
 ogy was treated of in a former chapter, and shewn to 
 be useful in ascertaining the usus loquendi,) the princi- 
 ples of which are developed by the precepts of gram- 
 marians. It is necessary here only to touch upon this 
 analogy. (Morus, p. 168. XV.) 
 
 Analogy means similitude. E. g. From the meaning attach- 
 ed to the forms of words, their position, their connexion, &c, in 
 one or rather many cases, we argue to establish a similarity of 
 meaning, where the phenomena are the same, in another. This 
 analogy is the foundation of all the rules of Grammar, and of all 
 that is established and intelligible in language. 
 
 § 102. Grammatical analogy useful not only in finding 
 the usus loquendi^ but applicable to some doubtful cases. 
 E. g. when the kind of meaning generally considered, 
 is evident, (by comparing other similar words, and me- 
 thods of speaking concerning such things, appropriate 
 to the language,) we may judge of the special force or 
 power of the word, by aid of grammatical analogy : as, 
 
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 51 
 
 1 Pet. Y. 5, where many critics have attached to eyy^Ofx- 
 6(aaa(56uv an emphatic sense, we must compare the oth- 
 er Greek phrases, which relate to clothings or investing. 
 And thus we shall see, that the prepositions, neQi, af,iqt, 
 ev are used in composition, without any accession of 
 meaning to the verb thereby ; and consequently that 
 fyao^SojoaGdac is no more than evdvoccoOac^ with which 
 it is commuted, in Clemens Rom. Ep. I. p. 39. A good 
 interpreter should be well versed in such comparisons. 
 (Morus, p. 170. XVI.) 
 
 §103. Analogy of kindred languages. Another ctwai- 
 ogy is that of kindred' languages ; either as descended 
 from one common stock, as Hebrew, Syriac, Chaldee 
 and Arabic ; or derived the one from the other, as Latin 
 and Greek. The former kind of analogy Schultens has 
 explained, and often had recourse to it, in his Origines 
 Ling, Heb.^ and in his various Commentaries. 
 
 Morus, on this section, sajs, thai dialects differ only in the mode 
 of declining, in the pronunciation and forms of words, &c ; and 
 ranks the Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic, among the dialects of the 
 Hebrew ; while he calls the Latin and Greek, cognate languages. 
 General usage, however, is against him ; for cognate languages 
 of the Hebrew is almost the appropriate name of those which he 
 calls dialects. 
 
 § 101. Use of this analogy. This analogy is of use 
 to the interpreter, not only in assisting him by the aid 
 of one dialect, to restore roots which have perished in 
 another that is the subject of his investigation, and thus 
 opening a way of access to the signification of words; 
 but still more useful as a means of illustrating and con- 
 firining that sense of words, which the scope of the dis- 
 course commends. 
 
 This is a subject deeply interesting to every student of the 
 original languages of the Bible, especially of the Hebrew. 
 Analogy, moderately and judiciously used, is of great worth ; 
 but pushed too far, it degenerates into a violation of all the fun- 
 damental rules of Interpretation. Comp. Morus, p. 176. XIX — 
 XXII, where several valuable cautions may be found. Better 
 still may be found in the admirable Preface of Gesenius to hie 
 
5^ SUBSIDIARY MEANS 
 
 Hebrew Lexicon, Preface to Part I. pp. 4 — 6. Part II. 4 — 14. 
 See also Jahn on the study of the original languages of the Scrip- 
 tures, pp. 19, 20, and Note G. 
 
 §105. Etymology an uncertain guide. The fluctuat- 
 ing use of words, which prevails in every language, 
 gives rise to frequent changes in their meaning. There 
 are but few words in any language, which always re- 
 tain their radical and primary meaning. Great care, 
 therefore, is necessary in the interpreter, to guard 
 against rash etymological exegesis ; which is often very 
 fallacious. Etymology often belongs rather to the his- 
 tory of language, than to the illustration of its present 
 meaning ; and rarely does it exhibit any thing more 
 than a specious illustration. 
 
 See an admirable illustration of this, in Canapb. IV. H 15 — 26. 
 
 § 108. Expressions which convey a similar meaning are 
 to be compared^ although in respect to etymology they may 
 differ. That analogy is particularly useful to an inter- 
 preter, which leads him not only to compare similar 
 words and phrases, and so cast light from the one upon 
 the other; but also to compare expressions, which 
 though dissimilar in respect to etymology^ are employed 
 to designate the same idea. Of this nature are TcenQafxa' 
 vog V7T0 Tf]p dfAaQTiuv compared with the Latin addictus 
 alicui^ and ojg dta 7n;()0^ compared with amhustus ; when 
 the Latin words are used tropically. So we may com- 
 pare the Hebrew l3']b^'n "JS^ with the Greek enTiodcov. 
 For as the Greeks clearly use ennodajv where the Lat- 
 ins say, e medio ; so iTtnodcov and D'^blJ'^ 'jS^ are so 
 much alike, that the Greek would almost seem to be 
 made out of the Hebrew phrase. Hence we may see 
 that the sense of fi'^b^^ )7iJ2 is c medio. (Morus, p. 180. 
 XXI.) 
 
 § 107. Foundation of analogy in all languages. No 
 one can doubt that men are affected in nearly the same 
 way, by objects of serise. Hence, those who speak of 
 the same objects, perceived and contemplated in the 
 
OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI. 53 
 
 same manner, although they may use language that dif- 
 fers in respect to etymology, yet must be supposed to 
 have meant the same thing; and on this account, the 
 one maybe explained by the other. (Morus, p. 178. 
 XX.) 
 
 Men are physically and mentally affected in the same manner, 
 by very many objects ; and of course, it may be presumed that 
 they entertain and mean to express the same ideas concerning 
 these objects, however various their language may be. Besides, 
 modes of expression are often communicated from one people 
 to another. Of the use to be made of these facts, the following 
 Section treats. 
 
 § 108. Use of the above general principle. In general, 
 this principle is of great extent, and of much use to the 
 interpreter, in judging of the meaning of tropical lan- 
 guage, and in avoiding fictitious emphasis. According- 
 ly, we find it resorted to, now and then, by good inter- 
 preters, with great profit. But it needs much and ac- 
 curate knowledge of many tongues to use it discreetly ; 
 whence it is not to be wondered at, that its use is not 
 very common among interpreters. (Morus, p. 181. 
 XXII.) 
 
 The following general cautions, on the subject of comparing 
 words and languages with each other, may be of some utility, 
 (1) The meaning in each or any language is not to be resolved 
 into the authority of Lexicons, but that of good writers. (2) 
 Words, phrases, tropes, &c, of any ancient language are to be 
 judged of by the rules of judging among those who spoke that 
 language, and not by those which prevail in modern times, and 
 have originated from different habits and tastes. (3) Guard 
 against drawing conclusions as to the meaning of words, in the 
 same or different languages, from fanciful etymology, similarity 
 or metathesis of letters, &c. (4) "When the sense of words can 
 be ascertained in any particular language, by the ordinary means, 
 other languages, even kindred ones, should not be resorted to; ex- 
 cept for the purpose of increased illustration or confirmation. 
 (5) Take good care, that real similitude exists, whenever com- 
 parison is made. See Morus, pp. 182 — 184. 
 
 § 109. Interpretation by appeal to the nature of things^ 
 the common sense^ views ^ and feelings of men^ &c. We 
 *5 
 
^*i SUBSIDIARY MEANS 
 
 must also resort to the nature of things, and the analo- 
 gy of the sentiment, which a writer is inculcating, that 
 ^ve may find the true meaning of his words, and not at- 
 tribute to them more nor less than he did. Every wri- 
 ter, spontaneously or from education, feels that his read- 
 ers must understand what he is saying, so that there is 
 no danger of misapprehension. It happens, not unfre- 
 quently, that on this accoui-t he uses language which is 
 not altogether accurate, if it be judged of by the rules 
 of logical precision. Of this nature are catachresis, hy- 
 perbole^ hypallage^ and those phrases which assert gen- 
 erally what is true of only a part, or of some particular 
 kind. These and other like modes of speech are in- 
 troduced by vulgar custom into every language, spe- 
 cially into the Oriental ones. They abound in poetry 
 and oratory. Nor is there any particular reason, that 
 a writer should take special pains to avoid them. It is 
 necessary, therefore, in these cases, to have recourse, 
 for the sake of interpretation, to the nature of things, 
 (a) to innate conceptions, common sense, and the plain 
 elements of knowledge, {b) Moreover, we must avoid 
 urging mere verbal criticism too far, or introducing far 
 fetched etymologies, or hastily concluding that the ex- 
 pression of the author is faulty. Language is made by 
 prevailing usage ; nor can that be faulty language, which 
 agrees with the usage of those who are well skilled in 
 it. Wherefore grammatical anomalies are not only free 
 from fault, when predominant usage sanctions them, but 
 they become a part of the language, so that one who 
 departs from them may be said to write inaccurately. 
 
 a) E. g. The mind is injlamed ; in interpreting which expres- 
 sion, we resort to the nature of the mind, to show that the sense 
 of inflamedmxi^i he tropical. So when the sun is said to rise^ go 
 down^ &c ; God to ascend, descend, &c, we resort to the real na- 
 ture of the subjects in question, in order to explain the language. 
 So in explaining prophetic language, if the event prophesied have 
 come to pass, we resort to the history of the event, to cast ligiit 
 on the language which predicts it. 
 
 b) E. g. Pluck out thy right eye; cut off thy right hand. In 
 construing this, our views of the worth of life, and of our mem- 
 bers ; our views of duty as to the preservation of life and use- 
 
Ol> FINDING THE USUS I.OqL'F.NDI. 5i) 
 
 fulness, and our knowledge of the nature of the Christian relig- 
 ion in general, all conspire to lead us to reject the literal expo- 
 aition, and to give the words a tropical sense. So when Christ 
 tells his disciples to salute no one by the way^ Sec ; and in like 
 manner, in innumerable other cases. 
 
 As to the various figures of speech, mentioned in the section 
 above, can it be doubted, whether they occur in the Scriptures? 
 Catachresis is the use of a word, so as to attribute to a thing, what 
 cannot be really and actually predicated of it. When the heav- 
 ens then are said to listen ; the floods to clap their hands ; the 
 hills to skip ; the trees of the forest to exult ; what is this but ca- 
 tachresis of the boldest kind ? Hyperbole magnifies a thing be- 
 yond its real greatness. When the Saviour says. It is easier for 
 a camel to go through the eye of a needle^ than for a rich man to 
 enter into the Kingdom of God; which is afterwards explained 
 as merely meaning, How hardly shall they that have riches, be 
 saved ; was not his language hyperbole ? Hypallage means a 
 change of appropriate language for other terms unappropriate. 
 E.g. Luke 1:64, his mouth and his toiigue ^v£C0)^6f]. The 
 student, however, must not be content with a meagre note, on 
 this great subject. Let him peruse and re-peruse Lowth's Lec- 
 tures on Hebrew poetry, where the nature, design and extent of 
 figurative language in the Scriptures, is better unfolded, than in 
 any other book, of which I have any knowledge. Comp. also 
 Glassii Fhilol. Sac. ed. Dathii, Vol. II. (Morus, pp. 185—194.) 
 
 In regard to that usage, by which the whole is put for a part, 
 and a part for the whole ; it is by no means uufrequent in the 
 Scriptures. How often do we meet with nccQ or navreg, when 
 only a large or considerable number is intended. On the other 
 hand, a part is put as the representative of the whole, in very 
 many passages ; e. g. Ps. 8: 7, 8. Rom. 8: 38, 39. Surely in 
 the last example here, the apostle does not mean to say that the 
 things which he particularizes, are the only things which are un- 
 able to separate us from the love of Christ. He means to say, 
 that nothing whatever can efifect a separation. In all such cases, 
 the extent, the nature of the subject, and scope of the discourse, 
 must determine the latitude in which the words are to be taken. 
 
 Especially must common sense^ as Ernesti says, be appealed to 
 in the interpretation of parables, allegories, and all kinds of fig- 
 urative language, proverbial expressions, &.c. Every writer ad- 
 dresses himself to the common sense of his fellow men. 
 
 § 110. The error of pressing etymologies too far not 
 unfrequent. The fault of pressing etymologies too far, 
 is more general than we should be, apt to imagine. For 
 not only they are guilty of this fault, who explain all , 
 
56 ON FINDING THE USUS lOQUENDI 
 
 words by tracing them to their primitive meaning, 
 (which is very common ;) but those also, who always 
 insist too strenuously on the ordinary and grammatical 
 Force of a word. Hence arise many false interpreta- 
 tions and fictitious emphases. But of this, more here- 
 after. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ON FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 
 
 [Keil, pp. 46—60. Beck, pp. 131—136. Seiler, H 236—257.] 
 
 § 111. What has been said thus far in this Treatise, 
 has respect to the laws of Interpretation generally con- 
 sidered. We come now to treat of our subject, with 
 reference to the exegesis of the JN'ew Testament. 
 
 § 112. Knowledge of the JV. Testament dialect impor- 
 tant. In the first place, we must inquire concerning the 
 kind of language, or dialect in general, which the writ- 
 ers of the N. Testament use ; for a knowledge of this 
 is highly important, in order that we may be able to 
 find and judge of the sense of the words ; as will speedi- 
 ly be shewn. 
 
 § 1 1 3. The question to be here investigated. This sub- 
 ject in general is comprised in a single question ; viz. 
 Is the N. Testament, in its words, phrases, and form of 
 language, pure (a) classic Greek ; or does it partake of 
 the Hebrew idiom ? 
 
 The former is defended by Pfochen, Stolberg, E. 
 Schmidt, Blackwall, Georgi, and a few others, not 
 very eminent for their knowledge of Greek ; the lat- 
 ter, by Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon, Camerarius, Beza, 
 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 57 
 
 Drusius, Casaubon, Glass, Gataker, Solan, Olearius, 
 V^orstius, and many others who were well skilled in the 
 Greek language ; with whom also, Origen and Chrys- 
 ostom agree. (Morus, p. 195. 11. Vide etiampp. 217— 
 222.) 
 
 a) We call that a pure style, which has neither barbarisms nor 
 solecisms in it. 
 
 § 1 14. What belongs not to the present question. If this 
 question may be rightly understood and judged of, we 
 must premise, that the inquiry is not, whether some 
 have not mistaken or do not still, mistake, pure Greek 
 expressions for Hebraisms. We may readily concede 
 this; for error may bo, and has been committed here; 
 and there are some modes of speech, which are com- 
 mon to all languages. (Morus, p. 201. IV. I.) 
 
 § 115. Still further defined. Nor is the question, 
 whether the same Greek words and phrases^ occurring 
 in the N. Testament, may be found in good Greek au- 
 thors. This we may often concede. Nor do we in- 
 quire whether some phrase, apparently a Hebraism, 
 may be found in some sublime or tragic poet, e. g. in 
 Eschylus or Sophocles, and used in the same sense ; as 
 ^tjQu for the main land. For poets, specially these and 
 Lyric ones, say many things in an unusual way, which 
 are not to be imitated in common usage. They even 
 intermix foreign expressions; and sometimes use anti- 
 quated phrases. IVIany such things Stanley has noted 
 in Eschylus, and Zwingle in Pindar, whose preface to 
 fhis author should be read. The same is the case in 
 Sophocles. (Morus, pp. 203—209.) 
 
 §116. The same subject continued. Nor is it incon- 
 sistent with the purity of N. Testament Greek, that 
 certain words are found, which designate objects un- 
 known to the Greeks, and are therefore to be under- 
 stood in a manner different from Greek usage, because 
 they borrow their meaning from the Hebrew manner of 
 speaking. Of this kind are ncaiig^ fUTupoia^ and other 
 words. (Morus, p. 209. IV.) 
 
68 OP FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI 
 
 § 117. The question directly stated. The question, as 
 to the idiom of the N. Testament, turns on the use of 
 those words and phrases, which designate those objects 
 that the Greeks are accustomed to designate ; and the 
 inquiry here must be, whether such words in the N. 
 Testament are used in the same sense which the Greeks 
 attach to them ; and whether phrases not only have the 
 same syntax as that of classic Greek, but also the same 
 sense as in the Greek authors : for this is essential to 
 the purity of language. E. g. diaaioovvr] used for liber- 
 ality ; £vXoyia ior plenty ; "Aotvov ior profane. So also, 
 dc^aiog evmniov rov Geov, agrov qayetv, na^aOT7]vcct 
 svoiTiLOv Tii/og^ &c, have a peculiar sense, in the JNT. 
 Testament. Morus, pp. 196. 197.) 
 
 § 1 18. With what kind of Greek is the JV. Testament to 
 be compared ? In regard to the writers with whom the N. 
 Testament Greek is to be compared ; we must see that 
 they themselves are pure, i. e. ancient, prosaic authors, 
 who have not derived any thing in their style from the 
 Scriptures or the N. Testament ; and then historical 
 writers must be compared with historical ; doctrinal 
 with doctrinal; poetical with poetical, (a) (Morus, pp. 
 208. 209.) 
 
 a) Several hymns in the New Testament, and the Apocalypse, 
 with occasional quotations from the poetry of the Old Testament, 
 are poetical in their nature^ though not in their form ; at least, 
 they are not in the form of Greek poetry. 
 
 § 119. JVew Testament Greek not pure. The ques- 
 tion being thus stated and defined, we deny, without 
 hesitation, that the diction of the New Testament is 
 pure Greek; and contend that it is modeled after the 
 Hebrew, not only in single words, phrases, and figures 
 of speech, but in the general texture of the language. 
 This can be established by clear examples, more nu- 
 merous than even those who agree with us in opinion 
 have supposed. For Luke himself, who is usually 
 thought to be the most pure in his style, has innumera- 
 ble Hebraisms. The very beginning of his Gospel, af- 
 ter a short preface of pure Greek, immediately goes 
 
©F THE NEW TESTAMENT. 59 
 
 into the use of the Hebrew idiom so exactly, that it 
 seems to be translated literally from a Hebrew original. 
 
 § 120. Some phrases are common to Greek and He- 
 hrczv. To prove that Hebrew-Greek is the language 
 of the New Testament, by citing examples here, would 
 be superfluous ; as these may be found in abundance, 
 by consulting the works of Olearius, Vorstius, Leusden, 
 Glass, and others. It may be proper however to re- 
 mark, that although certain phrases may be found in 
 pure Greek, yet they may also be Hebraisms. For 
 it may happen, that a writer, in translating a Hebrew 
 expression, may adopt words used by a good Greek 
 writer ; which is an observation sanctioned by the au- 
 thority of Gataker, Hemsterhuis, Raphel, and others. 
 E. g. yaiQav yatQeiv^ rnetum metuere^ which are good 
 Greek and Latin, but also literal translations of the He- 
 brew ^tiD ins. 
 
 § 121. Arguments to support the sentiment expressed in 
 § 1 19. It is no small argument for the Hebraistic style 
 of the New Testament, that many parts of it can be 
 more easily translated into Hebrew, than into any other 
 language, as Erasmus Schmidius confesses, though a 
 strenuous defender of the classic purity of the New 
 Testament. Nay, many parts of the New Testament 
 can be explained in no other way, than by means of the 
 Hebrew. Moreover, in many passages, there would 
 arise an absurd or ridiculous meaning, if they should be 
 interpreted according to a pure Greek idiom ; as ap- 
 pears from the examples produced by Werenfels, and 
 by me, in my Essay De difficidtt, interpr. gromm. A''. 
 Test, § 12; to which many others might easily be add- 
 ed. Theology would have been freed from many er- 
 rors, that have crept in, if Hebraisms had not been in- 
 terpreted as pure Greek ; as Melancthon in his Com- 
 mentaries has frequently shewn. (Morus, p. 198. III.) 
 
 122, Additional argument. It is another argument in 
 
60 ©F FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI < 
 
 favor of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, that 
 former Greek and Latin interpreters, who have follow- 
 ed the manner of classic Greek, in their interpretations, 
 have often tortured the sense, and made it plainly in- 
 ept. E. g. in explaining GvpdeofAco TilHOTt]Tog, as Me- 
 Jancthon remarks. The same thing has happened to 
 modern interpreters, who are ignorant of the Hebrew 
 idiom ; while, to those who are acquainted with it, such 
 passages are very plain. But mistakes, on such ground, 
 could not be made, if the Apostles had written pure 
 Greek. (Morus, p. 199.) 
 
 § 123. Objections answered. We need not be under 
 any apprehension, that the dignity of the New Testa- 
 ment will suffer, by the admission that Hebraisms may 
 be found in its style. Tr?/^/i cannot injure religion ; and 
 many reasons, moreover, may be given, why the He- 
 brew-Greek style was proper and necessary for the 
 New Testament writers. 
 
 For 1, The writers of the New Testament could not 
 spontaneously write Greek well, ina-smuch as they were 
 born and educated Hebrews ; nor did they learn Greek 
 in a scholastic way, nor were they accustomed to the 
 reading of Greek authors. This is true of Paul as well 
 as the others. For although he was born at Tarsus, 
 where schools of rhetoric and philosophy were estab- 
 lished, it does not follow that he attended them; nor 
 that he was familiar with the Greek poets, because he 
 quotes a single verse from one of them. Greek taste, 
 style, and literature were plainly foreign to a man, who 
 belonged to the most rigid of the sect of the Pharisees, 
 and was brought up at the feet of Gamaliel. 
 
 2. Nor was it congruous, that the Holy Spirit should 
 inspire the Apostles to write pure Greek. For pass- 
 ing by the consideration, that if they had written classic 
 Greek, no critic would now admit that they were the 
 authors of the books ascribed to them, we may say that 
 the Apostles themselves would not have understood 
 their own language, unless by additional inspiration giv- 
 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. . ^1 
 
 en for this very purpose. Much less would the com- 
 mon peo[>le among the Jews have understood it ; for 
 whom these books, for the most part, w^ere primarily 
 written; and who, through hatred of the Greeks and 
 of Grecian eloquence, would not have approved of a 
 classic style, it being so contrary to the diction of the 
 Septuagint, and so diverse from the Hebrew Scrip- 
 tures. 
 
 Finally^ as the New Testament is built upon the old, 
 the same diction ought to be preserved throughout. 
 (Morus, pp. 210—217.) 
 
 § 124. Hehrcw-Greek idiom does not necessarily make 
 the style of the JVew Testament obscure. Nor does the 
 Hebrew idiom of the New Testament injure its perspi- 
 cuity. Every writer has special reference to his own 
 times ; to those for whom he primarily writes ; not to 
 future times, so as to neglect his cotemporaries. The 
 obscurity which arises ft:om this mode of writing is not 
 a necessary one ; but results merely from the change 
 which time makes in languages. It is an obscurity 
 common to all good ancient writers ; for the ground of 
 it lies in the ignorance of later readers, and not in the 
 writers. 
 
 § 125. Language of the Kew Testament is Hebrew^ 
 Greek. Hence the style of the New Testament may 
 justly be named, Hebrew-Greek, if any, with Scaliger and 
 Drusius, Choose to call it Hellenistic^ let them not, with 
 Heinsius, understand by this a peculiar^Z)ia/ec( ; which ^^^ 
 Salmasius has sufficiently refuted. Nor would I name 
 it the Alexa?idrine Dialect ; for the Jews, in other 
 places, wrote in the same style. The Alexandrine dia- 
 lect, concerning which there is extant a little book of 
 one Irenaeus an Alexandrine grammarian, respects 
 merely peculiarities of language appropriate to the Al- 
 exandrians ; such for example, as existed among the 
 Attics, lonians, &c. Some choose to call it the Mace- 
 donian dialect, becauj^e many words in the New Testa- 
 6 
 
 / 
 
62 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDi 
 
 ment are peculiar to the Macedonians, and the language 
 agrees more with that of Polybius, Diodorus Siculu5<, 
 &c, than with that of the ancient Greek writers. (Mo- 
 rus, pp. 222—234.) 
 
 § 126. It also comprizes Latinlsms. Nor is all, which 
 is not pure Greek, of course to be named Hebraism ; 
 for some words are of Latin derivation, occasioned by 
 intercourse with the Romans ; and others are of the 
 Syriac, Chaldee, or Rabbinic dialect. Vide Olearius 
 de Stylo Nov. Test. Sect, didac. ii. iii ; et Wetsteni- 
 um ad N. Test. Acta. 13. 48. (Morus, pp. 235.-238.) 
 
 Besides Fiatinisms, as (Sne^OvXaxMQ zovGreodia, and such 
 phrases as XajLi^ai^eiv OV^^OvXcov consilium capere^ e^yaocvcv 
 dovi/av operam dare, &c, there are Persian words to be Ibund in 
 the New Testament, as Aa^a^, fiayov, ayyaQevetv. Sjriasms, 
 as A^^a. MaQav ylda. Also Chaldaisms and llabbinisms. 
 See Marsh's Michaelis, on the New Testannent idioms. 
 
 § 127. Method of finding the usus loquendi of the A''ew 
 Testament not difficult. These things being settled re- 
 specting the general nature of the New Testament 
 diction; it will be easy to point out the method of 
 ascertaining the usus loquendi, and of drawing aid 
 from it, in the interpretation of particular passages', so 
 as to assist the interpreter. 
 
 § 128, Rules for finding the usus loquendi. First ^ the 
 interpreter should be well skilled in the Greek and 
 Hebrew idioms ; so that he can distinguish between 
 pure Greek, and that method of writing which is de- 
 rived from another language. This is necessary in order 
 rightly to interpret either. In regard to good Greek, 
 he must specially consult not only the writers, who 
 have used the popular language, but writers of a proxi- 
 mate age, who have imitated the Attic diction, though 
 not studiously. Among these are Polybius, Diodorus 
 Siculus, and Artemidorus ; in which authors are many 
 words common to the New Testament, either not used 
 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 63 
 
 at all by the old Greeks, or else used in a different 
 sense. (Morus, p. 238.— 240.) 
 
 § 129. Much caution necessary to decide what is classic 
 and what is Hebrew-Greek ; Sept. and Hebrew to be com- 
 pared. In all places, therefore, let him carefullj' ex- 
 amine whether the diction he pure Greek, or not ; in 
 which there is more difficulty than one mi«;ht be apt to 
 suppose. Where the diction departs from pure Greek, 
 let him resort to the Hebrew. To do this properly, he 
 must not only be acquainted with the genius of the He- 
 brew, as it is developed in the forms and tenses of 
 words, in the construction of them, and in the junction 
 of the members of a sentence, (which however will 
 often be sufficient,) but he must also know in what 
 Greek words the Jews were accustomed to express 
 Hebrew things, when they spoke in the then common 
 Greek style, without aiming, like Philo and Josephus, 
 at elegant classic diction. In this way, by a proper 
 comparison with the Hebrew, he may elicit the sense. 
 
 Sometimes there is no better method, than to trans- 
 late the Greek directly into the Hebrew ; which often- 
 times may be easily done by a tolerable Hebrew scholar, 
 both as it respects single words, and also phrases. But 
 at other times, this is difficult on account of the rare 
 occurrence of words, or the obscurity of them, or the 
 dissimilar etymology. The Septuagint, therefore, must 
 often be consulted ; and the interpreter should be so 
 familiar with it, as readily to know in what way Hebrew 
 expressions are translated into Greek. For as the origin of 
 speaking and writing in Greek, concerningsacred things, 
 took its rise from that Version, so it is evident, that 
 
 THIS VERSION MUST BE THE BASIS OF ACQUAINTANCE WITH 
 THE HEBREW-GREEK. 
 
 It will be useful, also, to be well acquainted with 
 writers on the Hebraisms of the New Testament, in 
 general ; such as Vorstius, Leusden, and specially 
 Gataker, the most learned of them all. (Morus, p. 241. 
 ii.) 
 
64 
 
 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI 
 
 § 130. Aquila and Symmachus to be studied. It will 
 be proper, moreover, to study the remains ofAquila's 
 Greek Version, which exhibits a similar diction ; as he 
 was not very remote from the age of the apostles, and 
 has some things in his Version, which ma}^ be of special 
 use here. The Version of Symmachus should also be 
 read, who, by translating into pure Greek, has made the 
 understanding of Hebrew more easy. 
 
 In addition to the Hebrew-Greek mentioned in H 128 — 130, 
 the Apocrypha is of special use in the attainment of this idiom. The 
 apocryphal books of the New Testament, also, and several of 
 the apostolic Fathers exhibit a style, in many respects partak- 
 ing of this idiom. Comp. Morus, p. 241 — 245. 
 
 § 131. When the Hebrew idiom is to be preferred. It 
 is a sound maxim, also, that when the same word or 
 phrase is Hebraistic, and also good Greek, and a 
 meaning not at all incongruous may be assigned to it, as 
 used according to either idiom, we should prefer that 
 sense which accords with the Hebrew idiom. For it is 
 more probable that Hebrew writers used the latter 
 idiom ; especially if the phrase, understood as classic 
 Greek, should be of the more polished and refined 
 kind. Accordingly I should explain xaraffohjv GuiQ^a- 
 TOQ^ Hebrews 1 1 : 11 . by the Hebrew in Genesis 4 : 25, 
 rather than from the Greek idiom. So (xnoOrjOicecv iv 
 cifiaQTLag^ John 8 : 24, by the Greek idiom would mean, 
 you will persevere to the end of life in sinning ; by the He- 
 brew, you will be condemned on account of your sins. 
 (Morus, p. 246. XI.) 
 
 § 152. In the doctrines of religion^ the Hebrew idiom te 
 he specially regarded. An interpreter should particu- 
 larly observe, that when things appropriate to religion, 
 specially to the Christian religion, are* spoken of, the 
 idiom should be referred to the Hebrew ; because in 
 speaking of religious matters, the writers of the New 
 Testament were accustomed to use the phraseology of 
 the Hebrew Scriptures. The interpreter will be mu ch 
 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 65 
 
 assisted here by analogy of doctrine; with which he 
 ought to be familiar, lest the words of the New Testa- 
 ment should be drawn to a sense alien from that which 
 the authors desired to express, and different from the 
 essential points of religion. (Morus, p. 246. Xll.) 
 
 § 1 33. Specially is Hebrew idiom to he' regarded in respect 
 to thefortns^ tenses^ and numbers of words. Nor should 
 the maxims here inculcated be applied only to the 
 meaning of words and phrases, but also to the forms and 
 tenses of verbs, and also to the number of both nouns 
 and verbs. In respect to these things, the idiom of 
 the New Testament, not unfrequently, departs A-om 
 classical Greek, and follows the Hebrew. An interpre- 
 ter, who neglects this, will fall into great difficulties, 
 and commit many surprising and almost ridiculous mis- 
 takes. (Morus, p. 248.) 
 
 § 134. Other idioms to he consulted,^ in certain cases. 
 When the Hebrew idiom fails us, in the explication of a 
 passage or word, we must then have recourse specially 
 to the Syriac, Chaldee, or to Rabbinic. All concede that 
 we should have recourse to the Syriac and Chaldee ; 
 but all do not rightly understand the nature of this 
 comparison; as is evident from the attempts of some, 
 who have endeavoured to cast light upon the Greek of 
 the New Testament, by comparing the Sj'riac version 
 of it. The right method of proceeding is, to have re- 
 course to the Syriac, when we find ourselves deserted 
 by the Hebrew. If we find the idiom to be Syriac, 
 then we can attain to the meaning of the phrase or 
 word, when we have attained a right understanding of 
 the Syriac, which corresponds with it. This may be 
 more easily and certainly attained, provided the Syri- 
 ac be still a living language ; which, however, 1 find to 
 be doubted. 
 
 The same may be said of the Chaldee and Rabbinic. 
 But he who expects aid different from that which has 
 just been described, will seek and hope for it in vain. 
 *6 
 
66 
 
 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDl 
 
 He will either labour to no purpose, in heaping up 
 what will be useless ; or will abuse, to a bad purpose, 
 a help in exegesis which is by no means to be despised. 
 At most, he will only be able to determine, whether the 
 Syriac interpreter has rightly translated or not. (Mo- 
 rus, p. 249. XIII.) 
 
 § 135. Direct testimony not always sufficient. Thus 
 far, we have been describing the method of discovering 
 the usiis loquendi in particular passages of the New 
 Testament, by evidence which we call direct. But al- 
 though this evidence is important and goes very far, 
 yet alone, it is not always sufficient. There are many 
 things in the New Testament, which are described in a 
 novel way, because the things themselves are new. 
 Not that a religion absolutely new is taught ; but an- 
 cient doctrines are delivered in language more per- 
 spicuous, appropriate, and distinctive, the veil of 
 figures and allegories being removed. New words 
 were therefore necessary, in order to describe new 
 things ; among which words are many, that are adapt- 
 ed to designate certain things, on account of some simi- 
 litude to them. These words, by the way, were not 
 invented by the Apostles, and could not have been ; 
 for such invention is a thing that belongs to minds 
 trained up by literary discipline, and not to unlet- 
 tered men. We may conclude, therefore, that terms 
 of such a kind were suggested by the Holy Spirit ; 
 which is an argument in favour of the divine inspiration 
 of the Scriptures. Of this nature are such words as 
 dat^fiOvcC^ffdaiy TOiQza^ogj avayevvav, and others. ^Mo- 
 rus, p. 249. XIV.) 
 
 § 136. J\'ew words to be explained by testimony direct 
 and indirect. Such words cannot be explained from the 
 more ancient usus loquendi; but have an interpretation 
 peculiar to themselves, yet not less certain than the other 
 which is gathered from ancient usage. This interpre- 
 tation depends on the direct testimony of the writers. 
 Hence it must be gathered from the collation of similar 
 
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 
 
 passages ; as we have already taught above. (Mo- 
 rns, p. 251.) 
 
 § 137. Greek Fathers to be consulted. Nor is the tes- 
 timony of the ancient Greek Fathers of the Church by 
 any means to be neglected, which has respect to the 
 meaning of words and phrases ; whether it be the testi- 
 mony of professed interpreters, or of other writers. 
 Respecting a choice of interpreters among the Fathers, 
 and the use to be made of them, we shall hereafter 
 treat. I would merely observe here, that in those au- 
 thors, who are not direct interpreters, passages of the 
 New Testament now and then occur, in such a connex- 
 ion, or with such adjuncts, that we may clearly per- 
 ceive what meaning the age attached to them. Such 
 interpretations we find in Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, 
 Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and others. The in- 
 terpreter, in reading such authors, should diligently 
 attend to this. (Morus, p. 251. III.) 
 
 § 138. These may exhibit interpretations of the primitive 
 age of Christianity. In writers of very early times, 
 there may, not improbably, be interpretations that have 
 come down from the apostolic age ; certainly if they 
 are consentaneous with apostolic doctrines, they are not 
 lightly to be rejected. It is one mark that they are 
 worthy of our approbation, if they are of a character 
 appropriate to the apostolic style, formed and moulded 
 after the genius and idiom of the Hebrew, {a) (Morus, 
 iibi supra.) 
 
 a) But who will venture to decide upon this, except by the 
 use of common means of interpretation ? 
 
 § 139. Glossaries. The ancient Glossaries maybe of 
 use here, specially that of Hesychius ; in which is found 
 many things pertaining to certain passages of the Nevy 
 TeMament, that were deduced from the most ancient in- 
 terpreters of it, and which are of a character by no 
 means to be despised. 
 
le 
 
 G8 OF FINDING THE USUS LOQUENDI 
 
 Similar to these are a few of the Glossaries of Sui- 
 das, and also of Photian ,• both of which are to be used 
 with that caution, in respect to any particular word, 
 which requires us well to ascertain, whether the word 
 in the Glossary really belongs to the passage, which 
 we desire to interpret. 
 
 In regard to all these things, good judgment is requi- 
 site in order to determine what is useful, and what is 
 worthless, and to distinguish between them ; which is 
 done, much in the way that has been above described. 
 (Morus, p. 252. IV.) 
 
 § 140. Glosses. Even the glosses in some MSS. that 
 have crept into the text of the New Testament in place 
 of the true reading, may be used to assist the interpre- 
 ter, either to understand the true text, or to find means 
 for illustrating or contirming the true interpretation 
 Thus, for €Q6vi/7]oov^ in John 7 : b, Chrysostom has the 
 reading eQMxrioov^ Homil. 51, and explains it by ^aOe^ 
 TOVTO yuQ iOTtv eQ(OTr}Gov. These glosses may have 
 flowed from the ancient schools, instructed by Origen ; 
 although some, indeed, may have proceeded from the 
 Latin Commentaries. (Morus, ubi supra.) 
 
 §141. Context. When all the above described means 
 fail, we must then resort to the context, and to the well 
 known nature of the things themselves. (Morus, p. 
 25^. V.) 
 
 §142. Analogy of faith. The analogy of Scripture 
 and of Christian doctrine should be always before our 
 eyes, so that the interpretation may be guided b}^ it ; 
 i. e. that it may so far be guided by it, that no explana- 
 tion contrary to it should be adopted ; and in the ob- 
 scure phrases, where the meaning may be doubtful, 
 the sense may be accommodated to the analogy of 
 Scripture sentiment. 
 
 This rule need not be wondered at, as common 
 sense has sanctioned it, and applied it to the interpre- 
 tation of other books ; all of which are to be explained, 
 
OF THE XEW TESTAMENT. 69 
 
 generally, and in particular passages, agreeably to the 
 analogy of that doctrine which they contain. 
 
 Analogy of doctrine or faith does not consist in 
 the doctrine which is approved by any particular body 
 of men, as uncandid or unskilful persons assert ; for then 
 it would be various and inconstant. Grammatical analo- 
 gy is the rule of speaking, or form of speech, constitut- 
 ed by the laws of the language, which is opposed to 
 anomaly or a method of speaking in opposition to usage, 
 or varying from it. la like manner, the analogy of 
 sacred doctrine or faith consists in the summary of re- 
 ligion, and the rules plainly taught in the Scriptures ; 
 whence the Latin Church called it Regula Fidei. To 
 this analogy all things are to be referred, so that noth- 
 ing may be discordant with it. And when this is done, 
 the analogy of faith is said to be preserved. Nor, as to 
 faith and practice, does analogy of Scripture differ 
 from analogy of doctrine. Examples of analogy, and 
 of judgment agreeably to analogy, may be found in 
 Galatians 6: 15, 10. 1 Corinthians 15:3 — 11, &c. 
 where the writer calls that analogy rcJ uQMTa, In all 
 the departments of learning, analogy of such a kind has 
 the force of a rule, both in our judgment and interpre- 
 tation of a passage. (Morus, p. 253. XVI.) 
 
 In a special .manner, must we betake ourselves to 
 analogy, in those passages which seem to speak what 
 disagrees with that which is plainly taught in other 
 parts of the Scriptures, and with common sense, con- 
 cerning divine and human things. For it is common to 
 all uninspired writers, although eloquent, and thinking 
 and writing with acuteness and subtilty, that when they 
 are not composing a summary of doctrine, or the ele- 
 ments of it, nor treating designedly of any head of 
 doctrine, they exhibit the common views and elements 
 of learning, as taught by the usual discipline and in- 
 struction. Nor do they always speak of things in such 
 a way as a subtile and scholastic method of discipline 
 would demand ; but often use the more vulgar and 
 popular methods of expression. The same traits of 
 style are found in the works of the sacred writers \ 
 
70 OF FINDlNeJ THE USUS LOQlTENDl 
 
 who, in all respects, desired to speak, and must have 
 spoken, in order to be understood, more humano ; the 
 Holy Spirit so guiding them, that they differed as little 
 as posssible from the usuhI method of speaking. It is 
 not therefore to be wondered at, if we find in their ex- 
 pressions some things seemingly harsh, since this is 
 characteristic of the oriental genius and method of ex- 
 pression. (Morus, pp. i£55 — 259.) 
 
 Respecting the subject of analogy, compare $ 34. 
 
 § 143. Difficult idioms to be specially studied. The 
 student, who aspires to the faculty of interpreting, 
 should be familiar and well acquainted with the more 
 difficult forms of speech, in the sacred writers, or those 
 forms which differ from the idioms of our own language, 
 and are not adapted to express, with simplicity and lo- 
 gical accuracy, principles of any doctrine. A right 
 understanding of these he must by all means attain ; so 
 that he may not be impeded in his inquiries, or thrown 
 into embarrassment, by them. E. g. many things are 
 affirmed simply and without any limitation^ which how- 
 ever, are to be understood as having only a particular 
 and partial application. Specially is this the case, in 
 moral propositions. In like manner, active verbs do 
 not always indicate action or efficiency, properly con- 
 sidered ; which Glass in his Philol. Sac, Calovius de 
 persona Christi p. 527, and Turretine de interp. Sac. 
 Lilt., have already noted. (Morus, p. 256. I. 11.) 
 
 §144. Difficult forms in profane writers to he studi- 
 ed. It will be very useful, also, to attend to such forms 
 of speech in common books, or classics; for there is 
 scarcely any form of speech in the Sacred books, which 
 is not found in other writings. Nor can there be any 
 doubt, that an interpreter will understand the Scrip- 
 tures with much more facility, if he be familiar and 
 well acquainted with the difficulties and obscure forms 
 of speech in other books. Those things which ap- 
 pear to be somewhat hard, or clogged, in the writings 
 of Paulj will not be wondered at, nor give offence, if 
 
OF TftE NEW TESTAMENT. 71 
 
 ©ne goes from the study of Thncydides to the interpre- 
 tation oftbe Apostle. Nor will such an one l>e ahumed 
 at fatHts, which seem hardly to be compatible with the 
 dio^nity and sanctity of the Scriptures ; nor at transpo- 
 sitions, apparent want of consistf my in construction, en- 
 allages, and the like things. This has, indeed, offen 
 happened to some good men; hut they were not well 
 ^skilled m the languages. Such an alarm is rather the 
 result of unlearned superstition, than of a J!idicious 
 reverence for the word of God ; a** Melancthon has 
 justly observed. Dedic. Epist. ad Romanos. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE* 
 
 [Keil, pp. 115—128. Beck, pp. 129—136. Seiler, H 50— 78.'] 
 
 5 145. Design of this chapter. Having explained the 
 method of finding the sense of the New Testament by 
 the usus loquendi^ or other artificial aids, we come now, 
 to treat separately of certain things which usually are 
 not enough explained, nor made sufficiently explicit m 
 regard to theory or practice. The first of these re- 
 spects tropes ; the second, emphasis ; the third, apparent 
 contradictions^ or discrepancies. Of these in their order. 
 
 § 146. Duty of an Interpreter^ in respect to tropical 
 language. In respect to tropical language the office 
 of the interpreter is two fold. Firsts he must rightl}'' 
 distinguish it from language not tropical, so as not to 
 mistake the one for the other, (as formerly the disci- 
 ples of Jesus, and the Jews did, in respect to some of 
 
72 RULES IN RESPECT 
 
 the Saviour's discourses,) (a) and so as not to pervert 
 the proper sense of words by a tropical interpretation. 
 Secondly^ he must rightly interpret tropes, and give 
 their true sense. For it often happens, that men think 
 Ihey have attained the tropical sense of words, when 
 they understand only the literal one ; and they are de- 
 luded by an empty shadow, or pervert the trope by an 
 etymological interpretation. To avoid these faults, it is 
 proper to give rules, drawn from the nature of tropical 
 diction as learned from use and observation, by which 
 the interpreter may be guided in the judging and in- . 
 terpreting of figurative language. (Morus, p. 274. IX.) 
 a) E. g. John 6; 52. John 4; 11. Matt, 16: 6—12. 
 
 § 147. Certain rules respecting tropical diction examin- 
 ed. In order to judge of diction, whether it should be 
 taken in a literal or tropical sense, the vulgar maxim is, 
 JVot readily to depart from the literal sense. But this max- 
 im is neither strictly true^ nor perspicuous, nor adapt- 
 ed to use. (Morus, p. 320.) 
 
 JVot easily (non facile,) if you rightly understand the 
 phrase, means almost never., very rarely. This is errone- 
 ous ; for tropes in the sacred writings are very common ; 
 so much so, that Glass has filled a large volume with 
 them. It is ambiguous; for it describes no certain 
 mark or characteristic by which ^ropicflHanguage may 
 be distinguished from that which is to be literally under- 
 stood ; which is certainly a great fault, in a rule. 
 
 Danhauer, Tarnoff, and Calovius have stated the 
 principle in question with more distinctness, when they 
 aver, that the literal meaning is not to be deserted^ i^ithout 
 evident reason or necessity. No one will deny, that 
 where there is plain and necessary reason for departure 
 from the literal sense, we may admit the tropical. But 
 some apparent repugnance of things, or facts, is not 
 hastily to lead us to reject the literal seme. The older 
 writers regard the phrase proper sense., as meaning the 
 same as the literal or historic sense; and rightly teach, 
 that we should not depart from the customary signification 
 
s 
 
 TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 73 
 
 of a word without a weighty and sufficient reason. That 
 we may sometimes depart from it is evident, from the 
 fact, that the sacred writers themselves do, beyond all 
 doubt, sometimes depart from it. And indeed, in re- 
 spect to many words, the tropical sense is the customary 
 or usual one. (Morus, p. 320.) 
 
 § 148. How to examine whether language is tropical. 
 We may commonlj understand, at once, whether a 
 word is to be taken tropically or not, by simply exam- 
 ining the object spoken of, either by the external or 
 internal senses, or by renewing the perception of the 
 object. To judge of figurative language, in such cases, 
 is very easy ; and in uninspired writings, it very rarely 
 happens that there is any doubt about it, because the 
 objects spoken of are such as may be examined by our 
 senses, external or internal, and therefore it may be 
 easily understood, (a) 
 
 In the Scriptures, however, doubts have frequently 
 arisen from the nature of the subjects there treated ; 
 which are such as cannot be subjected to the examina- 
 tion of our senses. E. g. The divine nature, {b) divine 
 operations, &c, are subjects beyond the scrutiny of our 
 senses ; and the question whether the language that 
 respects such things is to be undersood literally or 
 tropically, has given rise to fierce controversies, which 
 are still continued.(c) In these, the parties have often 
 disputed about tropical diction, in a way which savoured 
 more of metaphysical or diaiectical subtilty than of 
 truth. (Morus, p. 275. XI.) 
 
 a) E. g. Inflamed mind we understand tropically, by repeating 
 the perception of the idea of minc?,and taking notice that the lite- 
 ral meaning of inflamed is incongruous with it. In interpreting 
 the phrase, snowy locks., we appeal to the external senses, which 
 determine that the meaning of snowy here must be tropical. 
 
 b) To the language which respects God and his operations, may 
 be added all that respects the invisible things of a future state ; 
 whatever respects heaven, hell, &c. The controversy, whether 
 descriptions of this nature are to be literally or tropically under- 
 stood, is by no means at an end. One of the things which the hu- 
 man raind learns very slowly, is to detach itself from conceptions 
 
 7 
 
74 RULES IN RESPECT 
 
 that arise from material objects, and to perceive, that in all the de- 
 scriptions of a future state, words are of absolute necessity em- 
 ployed, which originally have a literal sense, because language 
 affords no other. Even the internal operationsof our own mind, 
 we are obliged, for the same reason, to describe in language that 
 of necessity must be tropically understood. Almost all men, in- 
 deed, now allow that most of the language employed to describe 
 God and his operations, is necessarily to be understood as tropic- 
 al. Most men will allow that the language which respects the hea- 
 venly world may be so considered ; but what regards the day of 
 judgment, or the world of woe, they would strenuously contend, 
 must halileraUy understood. There is, indeed, sufficient in con- 
 sistency in this, and it betraj^s no small degree of unacquaintance 
 with the nature and principles of interpretation ; but as it is pro- 
 ductive of no consequences specially bad, the error is hardly 
 worth combating. The motive, no doubt, may be good, which 
 leads to the adoption of this error. The apprehension is, that if 
 you construe the language that respects the day ©rjudgment, or 
 the world of woe figuratively, you take away the reality of them. 
 Just as if reality did not, of course, lie at the basis of all figura- 
 tive language, which would be wholly devoid of meaning with- 
 out it. But how inconsistent too is this objection ! The very 
 person who makes it, admits that the language employed to de- 
 scribe God, and liis operations, and also to describe the heavenly 
 world, is tropical ; that it must of necessity be construed so. 
 But does this destroy the reality of a God, and of his operations, 
 and of the heavenly world ^ 
 
 c) Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have 
 arisen, about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of pas- 
 sages in the Sacred Writings ? Almost all the enthusiasm and ex- 
 travagance, that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have 
 had no better support, than gross material conceptions of figura- 
 tive language ; or, not unfrequently, language that should be 
 properly understood, has been tropically construed. There is no 
 end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to en- 
 thusiasts and fanatics. They develope themselves not unfrequent- 
 ly in the writings of men, grave, pious, excellent, and in other 
 parts of theological s'^ience very learned. Indeed, it is but a re- 
 cent thing,that it has come to be considered as a science, and a spe- 
 cial and essential branch of theological science — to study the na- 
 ture of language, and above all the nature of the oriental, bibli- 
 cal languages. Long has this been admitted in respect to the 
 Classics, and all works of science in ancient languages. But in 
 regard to the Bible, the most ancient book in the world, and 
 written in a language, the idiom of which is exceedingly diverse 
 from our own, it seems to have been very generally taken for 
 granted, that no other study was necessary to discover its mean- 
 
TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 75 
 
 ing, than what is devoted to any common English book. At 
 least, a Bible with marginal references, studied by a diligent and 
 careful use of these references, might surely be understood, in a 
 most satisfactory manner. In very many cases, the Jirst thing 
 has been to study theology ; the second^ to read the bible in order 
 to find proofs of what had already been adopted as matter of 
 belief. This order is now beginning to be reversed. The nature 
 of language, of Scripture language, of figurative language, and 
 of interpretation, is now beginning to be studied as a science, 
 the acquisition of which is one of the greatest ends of study ; 
 as it is the only proper mode of leading a theologian, to the know- 
 ledge of what the bible really contains. Here too is a common 
 arbiter of the disputes that exist in the Christian world. The 
 nature of language and of tropical words, thoroughly understood, 
 will prostrate among all intelligent and candid men, who really 
 love the truth, a great part of all the diversities of opinion that 
 exist. 
 
 § 149. Certain words not tropical. Those words are 
 not to be regarded as tropical which have lost their 
 original and proper signification, and are ysed no longer 
 in any but a secondary sense ; as we have already 
 shewn. 
 
 § 150. Words tropical^ where the subject and predicate 
 disagree. Beyond all doubt those phrases are tropical, 
 the subject and predicate of which are heterogeneous ; 
 as where corporeal and incorporeal, animate and inani- 
 mate, rational and irrational are conjoined ; (a) and also 
 species of a different genus. Things that cannot possi- 
 bly exist in any particular subject, cannot be logicallj^ 
 predicated of it; for the fundamental rules of logic, in 
 respect to this, are inherent in the human mind. If 
 then such things appear to be predicated, the phrase 
 must be tropically understood. (Morus, p. 278. XII.) 
 
 By this rule, the language of the New Testament 
 should be interpreted, which respects the person of 
 Jesus, to whom divine and human qualities are attribut- 
 ed. For the latter are attributed to him as a man ; 
 the former, as a divine person united with the human ; 
 and therefore they may be properly understood. 
 
 a.) E. g. The Jields smile^ the stones cry oitty ihe floods clap their 
 hands ^ &c. 
 
76 RULES IN RESPECT 
 
 § 13K Laws^ history^ didactic works^ seldom admit 
 tropes. As the customary use of language *hews the 
 above principle to be correct, so the same use also 
 shews, that tropical language is rarely employed in 
 several cases now to be mentioned, if you except words 
 which have lost their primary signification, or such as 
 constitute very easy tropes. Legislators in their sta- 
 tutes ; historians in their narations of facts, where they 
 aim simply at the declaration of them, (for some narra- 
 tions are designedly ornate, and decorated to please the 
 fancy ;) and those who teach any hrauch of science, 
 where the direct object is teaching, and not merely oc- 
 casional allusion ; all these employ tropes very seldom. 
 Hence it follows, that in writings of such a kind, tropes 
 are not to be acknowledged, unless it can be clearJy 
 shewn, that either by general usage, or by the use of 
 the writer, certain tropical words are appropriated to 
 designate particular things. Of this nature, are several 
 words of the New Testament, e. g. those which signi- 
 {y illumination^ regeneration^ &c. (Morus, p. 281. XIY.^ 
 
 The principle laid down in this section needs more explana- 
 tion, it is not correct, that in the Mosaic Law, for example, 
 and in the Gospels and Epistles, there are not a great abundance 
 of tropical words. But still, it is true that these compositions, so 
 far as they are mere precept, mere narration, and mere lan- 
 guage of instruction, comprize as few tropes as the nature of the 
 case will admit, and these mostlj of the easier and more obvious 
 kind. 
 
 The importance of the principle thus defined, is very great. 
 Some interpreters, in ancient and modern times, have turned into 
 allegory the whole Jewish ceremonial Law. So, formerly and re- 
 cently, the history of the creation of the world, the fall of man, 
 the flood, the account of the tower of Babel, &c, have been ex- 
 plained either as fxvOov, or as philosophical allegories, i. e. phi- 
 losophical speculations on these subjects, clothed in the garb of 
 narration. By the same principles of exegesis, the gospels are 
 treated as ^ivdot, which exhibit an imaginary picture of a per- 
 fect character, in the person of Jesus. In a word, every narra- 
 tion in the Bible, of an occurrence which is of a miraculous na- 
 ture in any respect, is fJLvdog ; which means, as its abettors say, 
 that some real fact or occurrence lies at the basis of the story, 
 which is told agreeably to the very imperfect conceptions and 
 
TO TKOPICAL I^ilNGUAGB. 77 
 
 philosophy of ancient tinies, or has been augmented and adorn- 
 ed by tradition and fancy. 
 
 But that such liberties with the language of Scripture are ut- 
 terly incompatible with the sober principles of interpretation, is 
 sufficiently manifest from the bare statement of them. The ob- 
 ject of the interpreter is, to Jind out uhat the sacred writers 
 meant to say. This done, his task is performed. Party philoso- 
 phy or scepticism cannot guide the interpretation of language. 
 Comp. Morus, pp. 281—291. 
 
 § 152. Usus loquendi in regard to things^ which cannot 
 he examined by our feelings and conceptions. In regard 
 to divine things, which can be known merely by reve- 
 lation, and cannot be examined by the test of our own 
 feelings or views, we can judge only from the nsus lo- 
 quendi of the sacred writers, whether their language is 
 to be understood literally or tropically. 
 
 This usage can be known only from the comparison 
 of similar passages ; which is done in various ways. 
 (1) When different words are employed, in different [)as- 
 sages, respecting the same thing, it is easy to judge 
 wiiich are tropical. E. g. Thie phrase to he born of 
 water^ John 3 : 5, is tropical ; for the same thing is lit- 
 erally expressed in Mark 16 : 16. (a) (2)Whenthe same 
 word is used every where, respecting the same thing, it 
 has a proper sense. (6) (3.) VVhen the same method of 
 expression is constantly used respecting divers things, 
 which are similar, or which have some special con- 
 nexion, it is to be understood literally, (c) (Morus, p. 
 291. XV.) 
 
 a) So the JH'^n^ covenant which God made with Abraliam, is 
 explained in Gal. S\ 16, as meaning a promise, I'he latter, as be- 
 ing plain, is to direct us in the interpretation of the other. 
 
 b) E.g. avaaruGig ve^QO)i', eyatQeruo Ob)(.ia, ^Monoteirao 
 are constantly used in respect to what is to take place at the end 
 of the world, and therefore are not tropical. 
 
 c) Which rule requires some abatement. E. g. God gave 
 the Israelites bread from heaven,, and Christ gives his disci- 
 ples bread from heaven. The latter is very different from manna. 
 In fact, the latter case is plainly an instance of tropical language. 
 The context, then, or nature of the subject treated of, is to be 
 our guide in such cases. 
 
 7* 
 
78 RULES IN RESPECT 
 
 § 153. Jidjuncis useful in determinmg 'when xoords art 
 tropical. We may also form a judgment respecting 
 tropical language, from the adverbs, epithets, or other 
 limitations expressing the manner or nature of things. 
 (Morus, p. 295. XVI.) 
 
 This case resolves itself substantially into the principle of the 
 following Section. 
 
 § 154. Context to be consulted. The context also 
 will frequently assist us. For when the whole passage 
 19 allegorical, we must acknowledge a trope in particu- 
 lar parts that are connected with the w^hole allegory. 
 E. g. TivQog in 1 Corinthians 3 : 13, which relates to 
 '^vXa and ^^qtov in the context. In like manner 
 the language is to be regarded as tropical, when al- 
 though the preceding context is to be literally under- 
 stood, there is a manifest transition to allegory. (Mo- 
 ras, ubi supra. Compare also § 99.) 
 
 Thus far, respecting the means of distinguishing 
 what is tropical. 
 
 § 155. Sources of tropical interpretation. In regard 
 to interpreting tropical language, we may observe, that 
 there are two sources of aid. The one is, the subject 
 itself; the other, the usiis Uquendi, The interpreta- 
 tion by the aid of the subject is easy, when the nature 
 of it affords an obvious similitude; e. g. qjojTCOfiog is 
 easily understood as used tropically. 
 
 In regard to the usus loquendi ; the general usage of 
 the Hebrew tongue in respect to tropical words must 
 be first understood, as in words corresponding to fojt;, 
 i'O'avciTOv^ Tifxri, ^o|?;, &c ; then Greek usage in general. 
 Passages must also be compared, in which the same 
 thing is expressed by a proper word, or in which such 
 proper word is employed in the context, so that the 
 sense is obvious. Here too, we may use the com- 
 parison of words that are conjoined and similar; exam- 
 ples of which will hereafter be produced. 
 
 § 166. Caution to he used in judging from etymology. 
 
TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. 79 
 
 Vfe must be very cautious, however, not to judge of 
 tropes from mere etymology ; as this is very fallacious. 
 E. g. OQQoTO^eiv, 2 Tim. 2: 15, some have interpret- 
 ed as implying a distinction between the law and the 
 gospel, which is mere trifling. For loyog ah]6etag in 
 the context, means {\\q. gospel ; the law is not the sub- 
 ject of discourse here. Analogy of the language might 
 have taught them, that oQQoro^ieiv here means io pos- 
 sess right views of the gospel^ and correctly to communi- 
 cate these to others. So the ancients understood it, and 
 among the moderns, Gerhard ; oqOoto^uc:, being an- 
 ciently commuted with ooOodolta, and nacvoro^ecv be- 
 ing used to signifj^, entertaining and disseminatmg novel 
 opinions respecting religion, (Morus, p. 298. XIX.) 
 
 § 1 57. Method of determining whether a trope is adequate- 
 ly understood. It is one proof that you understand tropical 
 language, if you can substitute proper words for tropical 
 ones. Not that a person, who can do this, always right- 
 ly understands the words ; but, if he cannot do it, he 
 certainly does not understand them. The sacred wri- 
 ters themselves sometimes subjoined proper words to 
 tropical ones, e. g. Col. 2 : 7. The best Greek and Latin 
 writers frequently do the same thing. 
 
 It is useful also to make the experiment, whether, 
 when the image presented by the tropieal expression is 
 removed from the mind, any idea still remains in it, (dif- 
 ferent from the image itself,) which can be expressed 
 by a proper word. This experiment is specially to be 
 made, when words designating sensible objects are 
 transferred to the expression of intellectual ones, (e.g. 
 BavaTog., fw?;, diaOi^virj, &c ;) i\\ respect Io which it is 
 easy to l3e deceived. (Morus, p. 300. XX.) 
 
 The context, the nature of the subject, and parallel passages 
 are the most eifectua] means of ascertaining this. 
 
 OF ALLEGORIES. 
 
 [Compare Keil, pp. 115—120. Beck, p. 129. 11. Seller, $§ 
 41 — 78. Much more satisfactory will be Morus, Dissert, 
 de causis Allegorm explicandis, in bis Disserit. Theol. philoL 
 Vol. I. pp. 370—393.] 
 
80 ALLECORILS. 
 
 § 158. Allegories hoii) interpreted. As allegories fre- 
 quently occur in the sacred books, which abound in 
 tropical diction, it seems proper to say something here 
 of the method of interpreting them. First of all, the 
 general design of the allegory is to be ascertained ; 
 which is easily done when it is connected with a con- 
 text explanatory of its design. For the most part, 
 however, it is expressly declared. (Morus, p. 301. 
 XXI.) 
 
 ^XhiywQta is derived from cdXo ayoQiiraiy i. e. a 
 different thing is said from that -^vhich is meant. It differs from 
 metaphor, in that it is not confined to a word, but extends to a 
 whole thought, or, it may be, to several thoughts. Allegory may 
 be expressed, moreover, by pictures, Kzech. 4:1; by ac- 
 tions Ezech. III. IV. V. Luke 22 : 30, or by any significant thing. 
 
 One most important principle in explaining allegories, is omit- 
 ted by Ernesti. 1 refer to the rule, that coniparison is not to be 
 extended to alt the circumstances of the allegory, "^I'hus in the 
 parable of the good Samaritan, the point to be illustrated is, 
 the extent of the duty of beneficence. Most of the circum- 
 stances in the parable go to make up merely the verisimilitude 
 of the narration, so that it may give pleasure to him who hears 
 or reacts it. But how differently does the whole appear, when 
 it comes to be interpreted by an allegorizer of the mystic school ? 
 The man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho is Adam won- 
 dering in the wilderness of this world ; the thieves v^^ho robbed 
 and wounded him are evil spirits ; the priest who passed by 
 on the one side without relieving him, is the Levitical law; the 
 Levite is good works ; the good Samaritan is Christ ; the oil 
 and wine are grace. Sac, What may not a parable be made to 
 mean, if imagination is to supply the place of reasoning and phi- 
 lology ? And what riddle, or oracle of Delphos could be more 
 equivocal, or of more multifarious significancy, than the Bible, if 
 such exegesis be admissible .'' It is a miserable excuse, which 
 interpreters make for themselves, that they render the Scrip- 
 tures more edifying and significant, by interpreting them in this 
 manner. And are the Scriptures then to he made more signifi- 
 cant than God has made them ; or to be mended by the skill of 
 the interpreter, so as to become more edifying than the Holy 
 Spirit has made them ? If there be a semblance of piety in such 
 interpretations, a semblance is all. Real piety and humility ap- 
 pear to advantage, in receiving the Scriptures as (hey are, 
 and expounding them as simply and skilfully as the rules of lan- 
 guage will render practicable, rather than by attempting to 
 amend and improve the revelation which God has made. 
 
ALLEGORIES. 81 
 
 § 169. This being done, the primary word is to be 
 sought for, and the force of it expressed by a proper 
 word. Other tropical words are then to be explained, 
 agreeably to this, {a) In this way, the explanation of 
 particular things will be rendered more easy, and we 
 may avoid errors. The design of the exhortation in 
 the form cf allegory, found in 1 Corinthians 5 : 6, is, 
 that the Corinthians should be purified from vitious in- 
 clinations, and the faults springing from them. Zvfit], 
 therefore, here means vice ; cc^vfiog free from vice^ viz. 
 to be a true Christian. ^EoQxa^eLv^ consequently, is 
 not to celebrate a feast, (according to its proper signi- 
 fication,) for a tropical meaning is required. It means 
 to serve God^ to worship God^ to he a Christian^ to be 
 free from former vices ^ and worship him in purity. 
 
 It is altogether incongruous to understand one part 
 literally and another tropically, in the same allegory ;(6) 
 as those do, who take nvQog^ in 1 Corinthians 3:15, 
 literally, when all the context is to be understood tro- 
 pically, Indt?^d the expresdon wV ^^« tivqq^ pnakes 
 it plain, that the word is to be figuratively understood, 
 (Morns, p. 309. XXV.) 
 
 (a) The meaning of the author is, that trie word which desig- 
 nates the leading design of the allegory being explained, the re- 
 mainder is to be interpreted in conformity with it. 
 
 (6) This rule is of great importance, and of wide extent. I 
 wish I could add, that it is not every day transgressed, by multi- 
 tudes who expound the Scriptures. 
 
 To the brief precepts here given by Eraesti, may be added 
 from Morus, (1) That we must sometimes resort to history, in 
 order fully to explain allegory. E. g. The kingdom of God is 
 likened to leaven, which gradually ferments the whole mass into 
 which it is put ; and to a grain of mustard seed, v/hich gradual- 
 ly springs up and becomes a large plant. History shews that 
 the Church has arisen from small beginnings, and is extending 
 itself through the earth. (2) The nature of the subject wiU fre- 
 quently direct the interpretation of the allegory. E. g. Ye art 
 the salt of the earth, &c, Matthew 5:13. The subject is, the in- 
 structions to be given by the disciples. The leading word (salt) 
 in the allegory means instruction ; and the sentiment of the passage 
 is. Ye are the teachers, by whom others are to be preserved from 
 corruption, i. e. destruction, See Morus, pp. 311. — 313. 
 
82 ALLEGORIES. 
 
 § 160. Parables. Not unlike to the method of inter- 
 preting allegories, is that of explaining parai/es ; which 
 often contain allegory. We must guard here against 
 urging too far the meaning of all parts of a parabolical 
 narration ; and refer the particular parts to the gener- 
 al design, so that all may be accommodated to it. It is 
 a very common fault of interpreters to urge the expla- 
 nation too far ; but it is a very great fliult. Therefore, 
 in Luke 15: 11, &c, we are not to seek for a doctrinal 
 meaning in (jroXfj^ fioo)^og, du^Arvhog, &c. Such cir- 
 cumstances are commonly added to complete the form 
 of the narration, and to make it a more finished picture 
 of what might be supposed to have happened; as is 
 commonly done in stories, fables, and other things of 
 like nature. (Morus, pp. 314 — 320.) 
 
 Parable^ in Greek usage, means any comparison introduced in^ 
 to a discourse. It may be called an example, taken from things 
 real or fictitious, designed tor special and graphical illustration. 
 The means of explaining it are, the context, the subject, the 
 occasion, &ic, as in allegory. The caution suggested by Ernesti, 
 against interpreting all the minute circumstances of a parable so 
 as to give them a mystic significancy, is very important. 
 
 It should be added here, that allegory differs from parable only 
 in the style, and mode of expression. Take an allegory and ex- 
 press it in the historic style, and you convert it into a parable. 
 Hence, the same rules of exegesis apply to both. Comp. Beck, 
 p. 134. Keil, H 78—81. Seiler, 71—78 and ^ 183. But spe- 
 cially worthy of thorough study, is Storr''s Comment, de parabolis 
 Chrisli, Opuscula. Vol. 1 . p. 89. See also Lowlh's Lectures on 
 Allegory and Parables, Lect. x— xii. 
 
83 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 itVLES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 
 
 [Keil, $ 42. Beck, p. 130. III. Seller, }J 65—70.] 
 
 § 161. Errors respecting emphasis very frequent. In 
 no part of an interpreter''s business, are errors 
 more frequently committed, than in judging of empha- 
 sis. The reason of this is, that many are too prone to 
 find emphasis every where ; supposing that by so doing, 
 they exhibit the sacred writers as speaking in a manner 
 more worthy of themselves, and the divine origin of the 
 Scriptures. However, nothing can have dignity attach- 
 ed to it, which has not truth for its basis. 
 
 §162. Ground of these errors. The ground of this is 
 want of skill in the knowledge of the original Scripture 
 languages; for many who interpret, are obliged in 
 general, to depend merely on the definitions of Lexi- 
 cons, and are ignorant of the analogy of languages, be- 
 cause they have not been sufficiently accustomed to 
 these studies. It is comjnon for men of this sort, to 
 push etymologies, specially tropical ones, to an exces- 
 sive length ; from which very little that is useful can be 
 extracted. Yet tVom these, they form notions which 
 never entered the minds of the sacred writers. They 
 form, moreover, rules respecting Emphasis, indepen- 
 dently either of any reason drawn from the nature of 
 things and of language, or of the usus loqucndi. 
 
 Mistakes such as these may be very easily com- 
 mitted, in respect to the Hebrew language, in regard to 
 those forms of speech in the New Testament, which are 
 
S4 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 
 
 deduced from the Hebrew ; because this idiom is so 
 unlike the occidental languages of modern Europe. 
 
 § 163. JVeed of rules to direct us in judging of empha- 
 sis. On this account, there is the more need of well 
 grounded precepts, drawn from the nature of human 
 language and of things, that we may judge correctly of 
 emphasis ; so that we may neither pass by those which 
 are real, nor follow after those which are imaginary. 
 Erasmus, (on 1 Corinthians, 7:1.) thinks this may be 
 endured in hortatory and consolatory preaching; but 
 for myself, I had rather every thing should have a solid 
 foundation ; as there is no need of any thing fictitious. 
 In serious argument, fictitious emphasis is intolerable. 
 Indeed it is nothing less than to sport with that which 
 is sacred. 
 
 § 164. Insufficient rules. The vulgar rule, which 
 bids us beware of making fictitious emphasis or of ne- 
 glecting real ones, although good sense, is in fact no 
 rule ; as it does not serve at all to direct the mind in 
 judging where emphasis really exists. No one believes 
 himself to make Jic^i^io?i5 emphasis. There are some 
 other maxims concerning emphasis, which are not form- 
 ed with good judgment, nor worthy of refutation here. 
 
 § 165. Kinds of writing., where emphasis is rare. To 
 proceed with precepts. First^ It is clear, that in re- 
 gard to subjects which are to be explained with great 
 nicety ; in perspicuously exhibiting the precepts that 
 respect any branch of the sciences; in laws ; in simple 
 narrations of facts, &c, emphasis can scarcely find place. 
 For emphasis is, in a certain sense,tropical or figurative ; 
 and this kind of language does not belong to writings of 
 the classes just named, as I have already shewn, §151, 
 and as all concede. (Morus, p. 330. XI.) 
 
 That is,simp!e narration, simple instruction, simple legislation, 
 for the most part is destitute of emphases, except such as are 9( 
 the lower and more usual kinds. But in the Pentateuch, Gospels, 
 
RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 85 
 
 and Epistles, for example, which are specimens of the different 
 kinds of composition in question, are intermixed many parts 
 which contain words that are emphatic. 
 
 § 166. Ao word of itself is emphaiical. Secondly, 
 We must guard against finding emphasis in any word of 
 itself, whether used properly or tropically ; because, 
 as has been already shewn, no word used either figura- 
 tively or literally, has of itself an emphasis. Emphasis 
 implies an accession of meaning to the ordinary significa" 
 tion of a word, 
 
 § 167. Emphasis not to be taught by etymology^ or re- 
 curring to the original sense of words. Thirdly. Empha- 
 sis should not be deduced from the etymology of a 
 word, (which often misleads as to the proper sense of 
 it;) nor in tropical expressions should, we recur to the 
 proper sense of the words to deduce emphasis from it; 
 as has sometimes been done in respect to the word 
 eQBvvav. Tropically used, this word does not signify 
 to seek with great exertion and diligence ; for the Ho- 
 ly Spirit is said eQevvav ra fiaOrj xtjg OiorriTog, to whom 
 this emphatic meaning surely will not apply. The 
 ancient interpreters used SQfvvav in the same sense as 
 ycvcoonet^v. In both of the above points, errors are very 
 frequent. (Moras p. 331. XII.) 
 
 § 168. Prepositions in composition do not always make 
 any accession of meaning to a word. In Greek words, 
 moreover, we are to take special care not to make any 
 accession of signification to the word, simply because 
 it is compounded with a preposition. E. g. ava, ccno, 
 TiQOf xnvVf £x, TitQt, compounded as in ccvugtccvqovv 
 avavrideiv, ovfifxapTv^ecv, nQoyivojGiiecv, &c. Many are 
 accustomed to build arguments on such imaginary em- 
 phasis, and oftentimes very incongruously ; while use 
 and observation teach us, that these prepositions do not 
 always change the meaning of simple words ; nay, 
 they very commonly are redundant, as in Polybius. 
 
86 RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 
 
 The custom of the language, in such cases, must be 
 well studied. (Morus, p. 331. Xlll.) 
 
 § 169. Emphasis not to be deduced merely from the 
 plural number. We must be Cdutious, also, that we do 
 not deduce emphasis merely from the use of the plural 
 number, supposing that where the plural is put instead 
 of the singular, it necessarily denotes emphasis. This 
 is not correct, either in regard to Hebrew {a) or Greek. 
 With good reason, Melancthon blames Origen, for mak- 
 ing a distinction between ovgavov and ovQuvovg, A 
 similar mistake Origen also made, in regard to ot^yiviQ- 
 (iio7g in Romans 12 : 1 ; which many have incautiously 
 imitated : as Bengel has the former error. (Morus, p. 
 332. XIV.) 
 
 a) If all that is meant here, be simply that some nouns have only 
 a plural form ; that others are used both in the singular and plu- 
 ral, with the same meaning ; and that in neither of these cases is 
 emphasis to be found ; all this may readily be conceded. But 
 Ernesti, and his commentators, Morus and Eichstaedt, have 
 stated the assertion in the absolute form, that the plural has no 
 emphasis, even in the Hebrew language. I have softened this as- 
 sertion in the translation : and add here, It is so far from be- 
 ing correct, that the Pluralis excellenticB, (e. g. in D^^biN^ d^jl^ 
 B'^^ii'.a, &c,) is formed on the very basis that the Fiural is em- 
 phatic, in such cases. This principle extends to many cases of 
 the Hebrew ; e. g. Their inward part is ni^llTT depravities^ i.e. 
 very depraved. It is a principle, however, which no grammari- 
 an has yet sufficiently defined and established, 
 
 § 170. Abstract words not of course emphatic^ when 
 used for concrete ones. In like manner, we must beware 
 of attaching emphasis to an abstract word, which mere- 
 ly stands for a concrete one. Seme learned men have 
 done this ; and even Glass himself admits that it may 
 properly be done, as do many others, who have follow- 
 ed his example. But they have neither given any good 
 reason for this, nor shewn the origin or cause of the 
 pretended emphasis ; so that it seems to be rather 
 a thing which they wish, than one which they can in- 
 telligibly teach. The true ground of using abstract 
 
RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 87 
 
 words in the room of concrete ones, is either/rojn ne- 
 cessity^ or for the sake of perspicuity ; not on account of 
 Emphasis. In the sacred books, the necessity of it 
 springs from the Hebrew dialect, which often employs 
 abstract words in this manner, because it has only a 
 few concrete ones. The mistake of the interpreters 
 in question, arises from the infrequency of the practice 
 in the Latin, and in their own vernacular tongue. But 
 dissimilarity of idiom does not constitute, as a thing of 
 course, any real emphasis. The ground above taken 
 is quite clear also, from another circumstance, viz. that 
 in the same forms of expression, abstracts and concretes 
 are commuted for each other. Comp. Col. 1 : 13 and 
 Matthew 3:17. Also Ephesians 5 : 8 and 4:18, &c. 
 (Morus, p. 332. XV.) 
 
 fi 
 § 171. Emphasis must not be deduced merely from ori- 
 ental idioms. In the sacred books, and specially in the 
 Hebraisms of the New Testament, we must take care 
 not to seek for and recognize emphasis, merely in the 
 idiom which is so very dissimilar to ours. Many 
 persons, though acquainted with the Hebrew, have oft- 
 en made this mistake. But nothing is more fallacious. 
 In the oriental languages, many things appear hyperbo- 
 lical, (if you translate them literally, that is, merely by 
 the aid of common Lexicons and etymology,) which are 
 not in reality hyperbolical. E. g. In Lamentations, it is 
 said, My trouble is great as the sea ; which is simply 
 equivalent to the Latin expression, Malamea sunt maxi- 
 ma, (Morus, p. 335. XVI.) 
 
 § 172. How to discover emphasis in doubtful cases. If 
 there be no adequate testimony to shew that any word 
 has a constant emphasis, we must consult usage. And 
 here we should first inquire, whether in all the passages 
 where the word is found, emphasis would be congru- 
 ous. Next, whether in the same passage or a similar 
 one, another word may be substituted in the room of 
 this, which other contains a special designation ofinten* 
 
tS RULES RESPECTING EMPHASIS. 
 
 sity. If neither of these be the case, but the word in 
 question may be commuted for others, which are plain- 
 ly unemphatic ; or in some of the passages where the 
 word occurs, a special designation of intensity is made, 
 by adding some other word for this purpose ; then 
 there is no emphasis to be recognized in the word in 
 question. E. g. Some have attached emphasis to ctno- 
 xa^adoitiag, in Romans 8: 19; but in Phil. 1: 20. it 
 would be incongruous. There it is used as a synonyme 
 with iXnvdi^ (as it is also by the LXX,) and in fact, 
 commuted with it, in verse 22. Nor is emphasis al- 
 ways attached to such phrases as ^apuv %aLQeLv ; (a) 
 for such phrases are often used, when another word is 
 added to \n(\'\c:,^\e intensity^ (e- g» Matt. 2: 10.) This 
 would be useless if the}' indicated intensit}^ of them- 
 selves. ^ 
 
 a) But in Hebrew, it is admitted by the best oriental scholars, 
 not only that such forms as b^I^pD !:Nlp2 admit of emphasis, but 
 that this is the prevailing usus 'loquend'i. The imitation of this, 
 in Greek, may consequently be emphatic. 
 
 § 173. Further rules to discover emphasis. The usual 
 or temporary emphasis, arising from the affection of the 
 speaker, or some other cause, may be recognized with- 
 out difficulty, by the following mark ; viz. if the ordi- 
 nary signification of the word is far below the manifest 
 intensity of the affection which the speaker or writer 
 feels, or is incompetent to describe the greatnes of the 
 object. If emphasis be not admitted, in such cases, the 
 discourse would be frigid ; which fault is certainly 
 very foreign from the style of the sacred writers. 
 
 § 174. Continued, Another rule for finding whether 
 a word or phrase is emphatic, is this. If the usual 
 force of the word or phrase would give a frigid mean- 
 ing, when, on the other hand, an apt one would arise, 
 if some intensity were given to the word, there is a 
 plain necessity of emphasis ; which is the best guide 
 for finding it. So in 1 Cor. 4 : 3, 4, avaKQiveiv is con- 
 
ilttLEfe ilESiPECl'lKG EMPHASIS. 89 
 
 stantly emphatic; meaning either to he tried by the 
 judgment of another^ or to take to one'^s self the right 
 of trying and judging^ or, to have the right of judging^ or, 
 to he able rightly to judge. But if you translate it sim- 
 ply to judge^ a frigid jsense would be given to it, not at 
 all adapted to the context. In like manner, nvorvv in 
 Col. 1 : 4, is used, as the context shews, to denote 
 the constancy^ greatness^ or fruitfulness of faith. For 
 Paul was not necessitated to know, by report, that 
 the Church at Colosse had simply Chritian faith, 
 since he had founded that Church. So in Rom. 1 : 8, 
 that faith must have been special^ which was celebrated 
 throughout the world. Also in Matt. 4 : 2, ^nfi^vaas 
 must imply intensity, from the circumstances of the 
 case. 
 
 § 175. Emphasis must not contradict the usus loquendi. 
 In this however, the usus loquendi is not to be neglected. 
 It must be so far consulted, as to see that the emphasis 
 implies nothing repugnant to it. 
 
 PART 11. 
 
 CHAPTER VIL 
 
 MEANS OF HARMONIZING APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 
 
 [Keil, 5 102. Beck, pp. 192—194.] 
 
 § 176. If two passages contradict each other^ the text 
 of one must he faulty. If it could be plainly shewn, that 
 two passages of Scriptures are so repugnant to each 
 other, that no method of conciliation is practicable, it 
 must then necessarily follow, that one of the readings in 
 the usual copies must be faulty. Consequently, an emen- 
 dation of the text must be sought. Of this nature, per- 
 haps, is the passage John, 19 : 14, compared with 
 
^0 MEANS OF HARMONIZING 
 
 Matthew, 27: 45, and Mark 15: 25. Also, as many- 
 think, Luke 3 : 36, compared with Genesis 10: 24; 
 thoagh this is not clear, in my view. Some add Mat- 
 thew 27: 9, compared with Zechariah 11: 12,13. 
 (Morus, Vol. II. p. 3. I.) 
 
 § 177. If the text of both he genuine^ then Gonciliation 
 is to be sought^ where apparent discrepancies exist. If the 
 text of both passages plainlj^ appears to be genuine, so 
 that it cannot fairly be questioned, then it must be un- 
 derstood, that there is a mere appearance of inconsisten- 
 cy : which should be removed, and the passage concili- 
 ated by a proper interpretation. (Morus, Vol. II. 
 p. 7. II.) 
 
 § 178. Discrepancies doctrinal and historic. The ap- 
 pearance of inconsistency sometimes occurs in passages 
 of a doctrinal, and sometimes of a historical kind. The 
 writers of the New Testament sometimes appear to be 
 at variance with themselves ;(a) sometimes with each 
 other ;(6) and occasionally with the writers of the Old 
 Testament.(c) Many writers have laboured to harmonize 
 these apparent discrepancies ; some devoting them- 
 selves to the consideration of a particular class of them, 
 and others treating of the whole. A catalogue of these 
 writers may be found in Le Long, Pfaff, Fabricius, and 
 others. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 8.) 
 
 o) E. g. 1 Cor. 8: 1 comp. verse 7. (b) E. g. Paul as- 
 serts that a man is justified by faith and not by works ; James, 
 that he is justified not by faith only, but also by works, (c) E. g. 
 In many passages cited from the Old Testament, by the writers 
 Qf the New Testament. 
 
 § 179. Causes of apparent discrepancy in doctrinal pas- 
 sages. In doctrinal passages, an apparent contradiction 
 that is to be removed, arises, for the most part, either 
 from the style of the authors, which is rather of the 
 popular kind, than that of nice refinement ; or from the 
 genius of the oriental languages, which differs so wide- 
 ly from that of the western ones. An apparent con- 
 tradiction, in respect to doctrines plainly taught, (which 
 
APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 91 
 
 has often been objected to our religion by impious and 
 profane men, e. g. Julian in Cyril's works, who says, 
 that it is expressly taught there is but one God, and yet 
 Matthew xxviii. ascribes Divinity to three,) is to be 
 removed by theologians, in the way of explaining 
 things^ rather than words merely; and so comes not di- 
 rectly wiihin the province of the interpreter. (Morus, 
 Vol. II. p. 9.) 
 
 § 180. Method of harmonizing apparent doctrinal dis- 
 crepancies. The method of harmonizing doctrinal pas- 
 sages may be regulated by the following maxims. An 
 obscure passage, i. e. one in which is something ambi- 
 guous, or unusual, should be explained in accordance 
 with what is plain and without any ambiguity.(a) 
 Again, a passage in which a doctrine is merely touched, 
 or adverted to, is to be explained by other passages, 
 which present plain and direct exhibitions of it. (6) 
 
 We must however, be careful to harmonize apparent 
 discrepancies, if it can be done, by recourse to the usus 
 loquendi ; so that all occasion of doubt or cavilling may 
 be removed. For it is very desirable, that the usus lo' 
 quendi should justify that sense, v/hich we put on any 
 doubtful passage, from having compared it with passages 
 that are plain and clear. (Morus, Vol II. p. 9. and 10.) 
 
 (a) E. ^. We explain all antbropopathic expressions in regard* 
 to God, by the plain truth that his nature is spiritual. 
 
 (6) E. g. The subject of justification in Rom. lU. is design- 
 edly treated at large ; of the resurrection, in 1 Cor. XV. Such 
 passages are called classic, (loci classici,) and by them other ex- 
 pressions, which simply occur obiter, are to be explained, 
 
 181. Continued, It is very important to remember, 
 that many things of a doctrinal nature are simply and 
 absolutely declared, agreeably to common usage in all 
 languages, which still have only a relative sense. This 
 may be accounted for from the fact, that there are parts 
 of religion which are cornmonly known and understood ; 
 therefore such parts do not need accurate limitations. 
 E. g. That we are saved byfaith^ is one of the elementa- 
 
92 MEANS OF HARMONIZING 
 
 ry principles, of the Christian religion. The sacred 
 writers, therefore, do not, on every mention of any 
 duty, reniind ws of this principle ; as they expect us to 
 keep it in memory. When they say, therefore, that 
 almsgiving is acceptable to God, they expect to be un- 
 derstood as meaning, if it he accompanied by faith. In 
 this way apparent discrepancies may be reconciled ; and 
 the reconciliation becomes the more probable, as the 
 reason for it can be given. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 11.) 
 
 Apparent discrepancies, arising from oriental style or manner 
 of expression, ($ 179.) are pretty numerous. E. g. Pluck out the 
 eye that offends thee ; It is easier for a camel to go through the 
 eye of a needJe, &:c ; To follow Christ, one must hate parents, 
 &c, Luke 14 : 26. The context, passages similar as to the sub- 
 ject, the nature of the style, the subject itself, &c, are the means 
 of finding the true sense of such places ; and then the harmony of 
 them with other passages is obvious. (Morus, Vol. II. pp. 
 11-~14.) 
 
 Apparent discrepancies between various writers, or between 
 different parts of the same author, not unfrequently occur. E. g. 
 Rom. Ill, and James II, in respect to justification. The mode 
 of conciliation is simply to obtain a complete view of the meaning 
 of each writer. It will then be seen, for example in this case, 
 that Paul is arguing against those who would establish meritori' 
 ows justification ; James, against Antinomian views of the gospel. 
 WorkSf in Paul's epistle, means complete obedience to the law ; 
 in James, it means such obedience as must be the necessary conse- 
 quence of Christian faith. The object of both Apostles being 
 fully understood, all discrepancy vanishes. In like manner, the 
 advice of Paul in I Cor. VII, respecting matrimony, is only pro 
 tempore ; dictated merely by the present exigencies of the times ; 
 for the apostle, in many other places of his writings, has express- 
 ed a different sentiment. (Morus, pp. 14 — 17.) 
 
 Similar to the apparent discrepancy just mentioned, is the 
 case where different predicates are apparently asserted of the 
 same subject. £. g. Rom, 3 : 20, it is said that a man cannot 
 be justified by works; but in 2:13, it is stated, that the 
 jiov^iat doers of the law shall be justified. Here one verse states 
 the rule of legal justification ; the other asserts that no man can 
 claim it on the ground of that rule. Again where we are said to 
 he justified byfaith^ the meaning is that we receive pardon on the 
 ground of gratuity ; but justification.^ as applied to the doers of 
 the law, means reward on the ground of merit or perfect obedi- 
 ence. (Morus, Vol. 11. p. 17. VI.) 
 
 Discrepancies seem to exist, at times, between the writers of 
 the Old Testament and the New, merely from the different man- 
 
APPAP.ENT DISCREPANCIES. 93 
 
 ner in which they express themselves on the same subjects; 
 when this is rather to be attributed to different degrees of iight 
 which the writers had, and to the differences in the eras, man- 
 ners, habits, &c, of each. E. g. The subject of war ; of loving 
 enemies ; of benevolence to the Gentiles; of God's equal and pa- 
 ternal regard to them, of gratuitous justification ; &c. A repre- 
 sentation less perfect, in the Old Testament, need not be under- 
 stood as contradicting one more perfect in the New. (Moras, 
 Vol. II. p. 18. VI!.) 
 
 Finally; in every case of apparent doctrinal discrepancy, the 
 rule to guide the interpreter is simple ; viz. Find the true mean- 
 ing of each writer ; take every thing into view, which the prin- 
 ciples of interpreting language requires ; the subject, scope, con- 
 text, design, age, habits, style, object, &c, of the author ; and 
 when the meaning is found of each writer, the passages may be 
 brought together, without fear of any real discrepancy. 
 
 § 182. Origin of apparent historical discrepancies. Ap- 
 parent discrepancies of a historical nature, originate 
 from a difference of design and manner in narrating the 
 same thing ; as often happens in the Gospe-lc. For a 
 diversity of design varies the choice of circumstances. 
 Many circumstances differ, after all, in nothing important 
 as to designating the ideas, which the authors in com- 
 mon mean to designate ; and oftentimes they may be 
 either commuted for each other, or omitted. It is of 
 no importance, sometimes, whether a thing be asserted 
 in a generic or specific form. Hence, appearances of 
 discrepancy have frequently arisen. (Morus, Vol. II. 
 p. 22. IX.) 
 
 § 183. Continued. But far more frequently, an ap- 
 pearance of discrepancy arises from the mere manner of 
 expression ; which seems, at first view, to imply a dif- 
 ference in the things described, while it is merely a 
 difference in the mode of describing them. It is very 
 evident, that the best and most careful writers do not al- 
 ways exhibit the same precise and accurate method in 
 respect to the names of things, persons, or places 5(a) 
 in regard to numbers,(6) dates, (c) years, &c. Nor 
 are they usually blamed for this, nor ought they to be. 
 Hence, where several names of the same object exist^ 
 
94 MEANS OF HARMONIZING 
 
 they sometimes exhibit one, and sometimes another. 
 
 In regard to the manner of expressing time, places, and 
 
 numbers, sometimes they tise the more vulgar and in- 
 
 \ distinct method, and sometimes the more nice and accu- 
 
 jp'ate one. in designating time, they vary. They sometimes 
 
 / put genus for species, and vice versa. Examples of such 
 
 a nature occur in common histories ; and also in the 
 
 Gospels. 
 a) E. g. Mat. 17 : 14, comp. Luke 9: 38. Gadarene and Ger- 
 
 gasene, Matt. 8 : 28, comp. with Mark 5. 2. Matt. 5.1' 
 
 comp. Luke 6: 17. 6) Matt. 27: 44. comp. Luke 23:39. 
 
 Matt. 8: 5—9 comp. Luke 7:1—10. Matt. 8: 28. comp. 
 
 Mark 5 ; 2. Acts 7:14 comp. Gen. 46 : 27. Acts 7 : 6 comp. 
 
 Gal. 3 ; 17. c) Luke 2; 2. comp. with history of Syrian Pro- 
 
 consuls. 
 
 § 184. We should be conversant with conciliations of 
 passages in the best classic authors. With these usages in 
 vfriting history, we ought to be well acquainted, either 
 by our own study of the classics, or from the remarks 
 of skilful interpreters ; e. g. Perizonius in Animadverss. 
 hist, et al. lib. ; Duker on Livy ; Wesseling on Herodotus 
 and Diodorus. An acquaintance with these, will enable 
 us promptly to obtain aid from them, when it is needed, 
 for harmonizing passages, which seem to disagree ; for 
 it is plain, that the difficulty of harmonizing passages 
 arises, for the most part, from want of skill in this ex- 
 ercise. (Morus, Vol. II. p. 28. XIIL) 
 
 § 185. Historical Facts not to be confounded because of 
 a slight similitude ; nor to be represented as different^ on 
 account of some slight discrepancy. In historic discrepan- 
 cies, we must guard against confounding things which 
 really ditfer, merely because they have some similitude ; 
 or deducing discrepancies thence, as has often happen- 
 ed, in the interpretation of profane authors. On the 
 other hand, we must not rashly multiply facts because 
 there are some slight discrepancies in the narration of 
 them. The reading of history, and of good commen- 
 taries upon different authors, is very important to assist 
 one here. 
 
APPARENT DISCREPANCIES. 95 
 
 On the subject of harmonizing the narrations contained in the 
 Gospels, it is difficult to say any thing here, which will give even 
 a faint representation of the efforts that have been made. Sever- 
 al hundred harmonies have been published. Some have chosen 
 one Gospel as exhibiting the regular order of time, and conform- 
 ed the rest to it ; others have rejected the supposition of perfect 
 chronological order in any. Some have made the number of 
 facts related as small as possible, and forced the language to a 
 harmony ; others, have multiplied the number of facts, so that 
 every narration comprising a single circumstance of discrepancy 
 from others, has been supposed to contain a history of a similar but 
 still of a separate fact. Some have supposed the public ministry of 
 Christ to have continued for three years ; others for more than 
 seven. 
 
 Dispute about the sources of the Gospels has been multiplied 
 almost without bounds, among the German critics. By different 
 writers, each of the first three Evangelists has been considered as 
 the source of the rest ; while others allow that there are two in- 
 dependent writers, and the rest are compilers. Many others 
 suppose that original Hebrew, or rather Syro-Chaldaic docu- 
 ments existed in writing, from which the first three evangelists 
 drew in common. Hence their resemblance to each other in re- 
 spect to diction. But different copies of sucli' documents, they 
 suppose, were used by the Evangelists, which had been interpo- 
 lated or augmented. Hence their discrepancies. Some assert 
 a perfect harmony between the Evangelists even in the minutest 
 circumstances ; while others maintain discrepancies, which 
 amount to absolute contradictions. — Where shall the young in- 
 terpreter go, to find any refuge from such a chaos of doubts and 
 difficulties, as are here presented? If I may venture to express 
 an opinion, which is not the mere result of speculation, I would 
 say ; Let him go to the diligent, thorough, repeated study of the 
 gospels, with a candid mind, united to a life of prayer and faith. 
 Let him carry with him to this study, a fundamental knowledge 
 of the nature of language, that he may not be embarrassed with 
 the mere forms of words. I will venture to add, that he will find 
 it necessary to believe with Jerome, that the Scripture consists in 
 the sense of a passage^ and not in the words only ; which are the 
 mere costume of the sense. Notions of I'crfea/inspiration may be, 
 and''often have been such, as to render the conciliation of the 
 Evangelists a desperate undertaking. That notion, which at- 
 taches absolute perfection to ihe form of language^ as well as to 
 the sense which it conveys, makes the reconciliation of them im- 
 possible. In some cases, two, three, or even the four Evange- 
 lists, relate the same thing in different words. Now if the form 
 of the words in one is absolutely perfect^ what is to be said of 
 
96 MEANS OF HARMONIZING 
 
 the other thrfee, who have adopted different forms ? And if the 
 form of a narration in Luke, with two, three, or more circum- 
 stances interwoven is absolutely perfect, what become of the 
 narrations in Matthew and Mark, where one, or more of these 
 circumstances are omitted ? 
 
 . It is a fact whicli admits of no doubt, that,the sacred writers 
 differ from each other as much, in respect to the mode of writing, 
 as profane authors. The proper question always is. What is the 
 meanings which they design to convey r What is their principal 
 or special object, in conveying it ? These questions being an- 
 swered, it matters not in what garb this meaiiing is clad ; nor 
 whether more or fewer circumstances accompany it, that are not 
 essential to the main point. 
 
 Considerations of this nature will help to remove the apparent 
 discrepancies of the Gospels ; as they are now presented to us. 
 And as to speculations about the origin of them, very little terra 
 firma has yet been won, by all the adventures that have been un- 
 dertaken. 
 
 The Student may read with some profit, Morus, Vol. II. pp. 
 24 — 49; and many of Newcome's Notes, printed at the end of 
 his Harmony, are the result of good sense joined with much criti- 
 cal experience. 
 
 § 186. Doubtful passages to he interpreted by plain ones. 
 In harmonizing passages, it is very inoportant to deter- 
 mine which is to be accommodated to the other. We 
 ought to have some rule here, lest we should wander 
 from our way. The rule is thfs ; if one passage be 
 plain and accurately expressed, so as to admit of no 
 doubt, it cannot admit of any accommodation. The 
 doubtful one must be accommodated, then, to the plain 
 one. 
 
 § 187. A perfect Harmony not to he expected. After 
 all, I should admit, with PfaiT, that a perfect Harmony 
 of the Gospels can hardly be made by rule. Conjec- 
 ture must sometimes be applied to the rules of harmo- 
 nizing, and to the use of them in particular cases. But 
 A it is well to observe here, that the subject respects 
 merely occasional historical facts; of which one may 
 be ignorant, without endangering his salvation. Nay, 
 better submit to be ignorant here, than to torture one's 
 brain to find out what is not of essential importance. 
 
ON TRANLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 97 
 
 PART III. 
 
 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 
 
 § 188. An interpreter should not only understand the 
 Scriptures^ but be able to explain thetn well^ so as to give 
 an exact delineation of the original. An interpreter 
 should not only possess a thorough understanding of the 
 Scriptures, but also the faculty of interpreting and ex- 
 plaining them well. On this subject, it may be proper 
 to say a few things. 
 
 The object of interpretation is to give the sense of 
 an author, without addition, diminution, or change. Aver- 
 sion ought to be an exact image of the original or arche- 
 type, in which image nothing should be drawn either 
 greater or less, better or worse, than the original ; but so 
 composed that it might be acknowledged as another ori- 
 ginal itself. It follows, that a translator should use those 
 words, and those only, which clearly express a// ^/ie mean- 
 ing of the author.^ and in the same manner as the aiithor. 
 But this needs illustration. 
 
 § 189. The words of the version ought to correspond as 
 exactly as possible to those of the original. First, as the 
 same meaning must be conveyed, those words are to be 
 selected, the force of which plainly corresponds to that 
 of the original, and which are not ambiguous, but of a 
 plain and established meaning, among those for whom 
 the translation is made. Those words are to be pre- 
 ferred, (if such can be found,) which correspond alto- 
 gether with the words of the author, in respect to 
 etymology, tropical use, and construction. But great 
 caution is necessary here, in judging whether the usage 
 
98 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 
 
 of the two languages agrees. Otherwise no version c^n 
 be made, which can be well understood by those who 
 are ignorant of the original language ; but rather an 
 obscuration of the author, and not unfrequently a per- 
 version of him. For men will understand the words of 
 a Latin version, according to the Latin usus loquendi^ 
 (and so of a German translation ;) when they ought to 
 be understood, if the rule above be violated, according 
 to the Greek or Hebrew idiom. Or perhaps the un- 
 learned reader will not understand them at all, although 
 from the habit of hearing and using the words, he may 
 think he understands them. A frequent case, indeed, 
 among the unlearned ; and 1 may add, among their 
 teachers also ! 
 
 § 190. When one cannot translate ad verhum^ he must 
 translate ad sensum. But if appropriate words, as above 
 described, cannot be selected, on account of the differ- 
 ence of idiom between the two languages, (the original, 
 and that of the translator,) which often express the 
 same things by words that do not correspond in their 
 etymology or their proper signification, (specially is this 
 the case with the oriental and occidental languages, so 
 that a literal translation of the former would be often 
 unintelligible in the latter,) then we must relinquish 
 the design of translating ad verbum^ and content our- 
 selves with merely giving the sense of the original, 
 plainly designated. 
 
 § 191. A knowledge of Hebrew as well as Greek^ neces- 
 sary to translate the New Testament. This can be ef- 
 fected only by one, who has an accurate knowledge of 
 both languages. To accomplish this in respect to the 
 New Testament, a man, besides the knowledge of his 
 vernacular tongue, must have an accurate knowledge of 
 both Greek and Hebrew. This is necessary, not only- 
 to understand the original, but to judge of what is pe- 
 culiar to each language, and to express the sense of the 
 original, in a manner adapted to the genius of his own 
 language. 
 
ON TRANSLATING THE SCKIPTURES. 99 
 
 § 192. Cases where we must adhere to the mode of trans- 
 lating ad verbum. But various causes operate, to pre- 
 vent a translator from strictly following the rule in 
 § 190. For Jirst^ when the form and manner of the 
 Greek words has such a connexion with the things sig- 
 nitied, and the method of arguing, that those things 
 cannot he well understood, nor the argument proceed 
 well, if a translation ad verbum he not made, then we 
 must sacrifice the idiom of our own language, and ad- 
 here to that of the Greek. This frequently happens, 
 in respect to the epistles of Paul ; e. g. 2 Cor. III. in re- 
 gard to the words y^a^fAarog and nvev^arogj also do^rig ; 
 add Gal. 3 : 16 ; and m respect to allegories, John X. 
 
 § 193. Continued, Antithesis, Paronomasia, and the 
 like figures of speech, also require a modification of the 
 rule in § 190. For the grace and beauty of these 
 perish, when the language is changed. Paul has many 
 of these figures. But they cannot always be preserved; 
 as another language will not always admit them. E. g. 
 in Matt. 16: 18. nexQog and ittrQa^ the paronomasia 
 can be preserved in Latin, but not m English. 
 
 § 194. Continued. Another class of words, which 
 must be literally rendered, are those, for which no 
 equivalent Ones can be found, in the language of the 
 translator, so as fully and unambiguously to express 
 the idea. E. g. the word fcoi? ; and others, as nioxig, 
 f-uravoca, &;c. 
 
 § 193. Continued, In very difficult and doubtful passa- 
 ges, also, a literal translation must be given, because a 
 version ad sensum would be assuming that one definitely 
 understood the real meaning of the passage. This 
 might do in a commentary, but not in a translation. 
 With propriety, says Castalio, on 1 Pet. 4: 6, "This 
 1 do not understand ; therefore I translate it ad verbum, 
 
 § 196. In translating^ we ought to lean towards our own 
 vernacular idiom. A good acquaintance with these maxims 
 
106 ON TRANSLATING THE SCRIPTURES. 
 
 of translation, specially a practical acquaintance, will 
 enable any one to judge whether a version has pre- 
 served the right method in regard to purity of language, 
 or introduced too many of the idioms of the original. 
 As versions, however, are not made for the learned, 
 who can read the original, but for others, and specially 
 for the common people, it is better to incline to the idi- 
 om of our vernacular tongue, (even in cases where 
 you might with some propriety adhere to the original 
 idiom,) for the sake of rendering the translation more 
 intelligible. It was well said by Jerome to Pammachius, 
 wh<»n speaking of the best mode of interpretation, '' Let 
 others hunt ?ii\er syllables and letters ; do you seek for 
 the sense." 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 Extract translated from a Dissertation of Dr, Morus^ 
 late Professor of Theology in the Univerity of Leipsick^ 
 entitled de discrimine sensus et significationis in inter- 
 PRFTANDo, and contained in his Dissertationes theol. et. 
 philol. VoL I. JVo, IL^ 
 
 To the above rules of Ernesti, the object of which is to guide 
 the translator, in making a version of the original Scriptures in- 
 to his own vernacular language, I have thought it would he ac- 
 ceptable and useful to those for whom this little volume of the 
 Elements of Hermeneutics is designed, to subjoin an extract from 
 the dissertation of Morus just mentioned, which appears to be 
 very judicious and instructive. To the business of teaching Her- 
 meneutics, Morus was peculiarly attached and devoted ; and 
 few men have understood it better, or left behind them more use- 
 ful precepts, on this interesting subject. Equally removed from 
 the recent latitudinarianism of many German interpreters, and 
 
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 101 
 
 from the mystic and technical method of the older interpreters, 
 he formed and nurtured a school, which has produced great dnd 
 lasting influence upon the science of interpretation ; and the 
 principles of which, for the most part, must commend them- 
 selves at once, when well understood, to every intelligent and 
 unbiassed mind. 
 
 The dissertation in question commences, with pointing out the 
 impossibility of translating ad verbum out of one language into 
 another, in every case that ooay occur. The reason of this is 
 grounded in the different modes in which men of different nations 
 view the same objects, and express themselves in respect to them. 
 The age in which writers live, their different manners, customs, 
 culture, temper, manner of life, knowledge, &c, all concur in 
 producing these differences. In consequence of the operation of 
 causes so diverse, there is in one language much of rude antiqui- 
 ty, in another a high or a partial state of cultivation ; in one, 
 the connexions and transitions are circuitous, in another, short 
 and easy ; in one ellipsis abounds, in another it is unfrequent ; 
 one is profuse in allegories and tropes, another, dry and jejune in 
 expression ; one abounds with equivocal and indefined phraseolo- 
 gy, another, with definite and certain words ; the one is fitted 
 for expression in respect to the arts and sciences, the other, des- 
 titute of such means of expression ; the one is copious, the other 
 furnished with a scanty stock of words. 
 
 In consequence of these diversities, and the differences of idiom 
 which spring out of them, it becomes impossible always to 
 translate ad verbum from the one to the other. In such cases, 
 Morusjustlj^ contends, that the translator, abandoning a literal 
 version, should aim at exactly communicating the sense, E. g. 
 the literal translation of xaxw? ^X^f'V is to have badly ; but what 
 idea could an English reader attach to this translation ? Leaving 
 then the version ad verbum^ we must translate it, to be sicky which 
 conveys the exact sense of the Greek phrase, in an intelligible 
 form. And this instance may serve to illustrate what iVforus 
 means, by the phrase, difference between the signification and the 
 sense of words. The former is the literal and primary meaning 
 of the words, simply considered ; the sense^ is the idea conveyed 
 by the words, in the phrase, or in the connexion where they stand. 
 
 What is said of words may also be applied to phrases and 
 sentences, for the same reasons, and from the same causes, la 
 all these cases, where the sense cannot be given by a literal 
 translation, we must phoose other words which will designate it ; 
 and where particular^ words are wanting in "our own language to 
 do this, we must have recourse to circumlocution. 
 
 Having discussed these principles of translating, Morus pro- 
 ceeds to descant upon the method of applying them to practice. 
 As this subject is a matter of importance to all, who are to ex- 
 9* 
 
102 MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 pound the word of God in their own vernacular tongue, I shall 
 here present it, in a translation oi'the author's words. 
 
 \ It is proper here, to point out the duty of the inter- 
 preter, in reference to the above principles. In regard 
 to the first case, namely, where we abandon a literal 
 version, and use a word which will convey the sense of 
 the original, [ may say, in general, that the word substi- 
 tuted should approximate as nearly as possible, in its 
 signification, to that of the original word which it repre- 
 sents. On accuracy of this kind, depends, in a high de- 
 gree, the excellence of any version. 
 
 But, as it rarely suffices to give merely general di- 
 rections, I will descend to particulars. A version, then, 
 should exhibit a trope, where the original does, wheth- 
 er it be used for the sake of ornament, or variety ; an 
 energetic word, where there is one in the original. 
 Let the translator avoid tropes, where the diction of 
 the original is not figurative ; let him avoid technical 
 expressions, where those of common life should be used, 
 e. g. Tilatov should not be rendered perfection^ but pro- 
 bity^ uprightness. Let him not commute genus for spe- 
 cies; nor antecedent for consequent. In respect to 
 words which depend on an excited state of mind, such 
 as reproachful terms, and those of complaint, lamenta- 
 tion, and indignation; also proverbs, and proverbial 
 phrases ; let him compare these most carefully with the 
 practice of common life ; and what men are wont to 
 say on such occasions, let him express in his version, 
 and not rest satisfied with some kind of general meaning, 
 nor make a version which is cramped by its diction. 
 In general, let him take care to form a right estimate 
 of subjects from the nature ©f the predicates attached 
 to them 5 which is a matter of great importance, where 
 there is a departure from a literal version. It will also 
 afford an antidote against negligence and error. 
 
 It is sufficient to have given these few hints ; and he 
 who wishes for more accurate knowledge of the laws 
 of translating, must inquire into the grounds or reasons 
 
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 103 
 
 of these laws. These reasons are, the desire to translate 
 closely and not paraphrastically ; a wish to give an ex- 
 act idea of the thing designated by the original words, 
 so that the reader may understand it ; the necessity of 
 exhibiting the external beauty of the original diction ; 
 and the design of so exhibiting the writer's thoughts in 
 our own language, as to make it apparent, that if the 
 writer himself had used our language, he would have 
 expressed this proverb, that exclamation, that formula 
 of speech, just as the translator has done. 
 
 In regard to the second case, viz, where circumlocu- 
 tion is to be employed, one rule may be given to guide 
 the translator. Let him use words, if possible, which 
 do not express entirely an idea that is composed of many 
 parts in the original, and some of which are not desig- 
 nated exactly in the passage which is translated ; but 
 let him choose terms, ivhich are as exactly equivalent to 
 the original as possible. Where doubt may hang over 
 the expression, he may explain it by notes ; but he 
 should not be blamed for not expressing definitely in a 
 translation, what is indefinite in the original ; and while 
 he avoids doing this, he cannot be accused of obtruding 
 his own views upon the author whom he translates. 
 
 Thus far in respect to translating ad sensum rather 
 than ad verbmn^ when single words are to be explained 
 or translated. Let us come now to sentences and pro- 
 positions ; in regard to which, when they cannot be 
 literally translated without obscuring instead of illus- 
 trating the sense, we must, in like manner as before de- 
 scribed, substitute the meaning of the words instead of 
 the words themselves. In merely explaining a passage, 
 which contains the sign of some particular thing, the 
 interpreter may substitute the thing signified for the 
 sign of it. E. g. when God is said to come from heaven^ 
 an interpreter in merely explaining, may say. This 
 means God as performing some illustrious work^ or doing 
 any thing in general ; or God as taking cognizance of any 
 things or as propitious^ or unpropitious^ just as the context 
 requires. Or when Christ is presented as sitting at the 
 
104 MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 right hand of God^ the meaning is, that Christ is partici- 
 pating in divine sovereignty. So when, in the oriental 
 writers, the sun is represented as darkened, the moon 
 obscured, and the stars as shaken, these are images of 
 distressing times ; and therefore, when it is said that 
 these things will happen, the simple meaning is, that 
 times of great distress will follow, in which, as it were, 
 all nature seems to threaten ruin. To this class of 
 passages, moreover, belong all those, in uhich God, as 
 future judge, is represented as visible; the forms of 
 speech being taken from the customs of men. The 
 meaning of such passages is, that God will render to eve- 
 ry one according to his deeds^ as it is plainly expressed in 
 Matt. 16 : 27. 
 
 In the mere explanation of these formulas of language, 
 every one sees that the sense is to be given ; but our 
 translator has a work of more ditBculty. For where 
 the object of enumerating many signs of the nature de- 
 scribed above, is to render the description more vivid 
 and impressive, (as in Matt. 24 : 29, 30,31. Joel 3:1. 
 Dan. 7 : 9.) every thing must be closely translated. 
 The translator would mutilate the diction of the author, 
 if he should abridge the description and give only the 
 general meaning ; for it was not the design of the wri- 
 ter, merely to present to the mind the thing summarily 
 and literally declared, but as it were, to place it before 
 the eyes in a picture or painting of it. For if the ver- 
 sion, by preserving these special traits, is not liable to 
 produce an erroneous impression in the reader's mind, 
 but every one who reads will easily understand that the 
 whole is to be considered as figurative expression, (as 
 those things are, which are spoken of God avdQMiio- 
 nadcag,) then there is no good reason why the version 
 should be changed into a paraphrase or explanation. 
 Who would doubt, or be at loss, what was meant, if 
 men, in a state of suffering and wretchedness, should be 
 described as approaching the throne of God, for the 
 purpose of supplication? But if a translation, as it 
 stands in our vernacular tongue to be read by the un- 
 
5I0RUS ON TRANSLATION. 105 
 
 learned, necessarily leads to wrong views of the senti- 
 ments of the author, by being literal ; or communicates a 
 sentiment opposite to his ; or makes no sense ; 1 see oo 
 reason why we should fear to substitute the sense instead 
 of the literal signification o( the words; specially when 
 an argument follows, which does not depend on the 
 wo7^ds but on the sense^ and which no one can understand, 
 who does not attend to the sense rather than the words. 
 Of this nature are such expressions as making interces- 
 sion for men; sitting at the right hand of the king; 
 Christy who was rich^ becoming poor that men might be 
 made rich ; Christ being received into the heavens^ &c ; 
 which last phrase clearly means, to be most exalted^ to 
 have supreme dominion. Had some critics understood 
 this, they might have spared themselves the trouble of 
 inquiring, whether Christ contains the heavens, or the 
 heavens him; nor would they have thought of the ma- 
 jesty of Christ as suffering degradation, by being includ- 
 ed in a place ; nor would Beza have written such a 
 note as he has, on this subject. The meanings the 
 meaning only is to be sought for ; and not the mere lite- 
 ral signification of the words. 
 
 In other cases, what the sacred writers have applied 
 only to a part or species, interpreters have sometimes 
 applied to the whole, or the genus ; and vice versa. 
 Contemplated in the light where they have placed it, 
 the thing appears obscure, or difficult, or as needing to 
 be softened down ; but in the other light, it is plain, 
 easy, and accurately described. What David, in a 
 certain place, imprecates upon his enemies, (and there- 
 fore the enemies of Christ) viz, that their habitation 
 might be desolate and deserted^ Peter applies to Judas 
 the betrayer of Christ, and declares that it happened to 
 him. (Acts, 1 : 20.) But if a literal application of it is to 
 be made to David's enemies, it is not to be applied, iu 
 the same sense in which it is to Judas. How will it be 
 shewn, that the habitation of Judas became desolate 
 and deserted? Surely violence must be done to the pas- 
 sage, if any one determines to understand it literally. 
 
106 MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 We rnay, therefore, see whether the passage cannot be 
 translated ad sensum, E. g". if in uttering an imprecation 
 against one, we say, let his house become desolate, 
 our meaning is, in general, that he may be erAirpated^ 
 thai he may utterly perish. Many imprecations are of 
 this nature, that the object of them is evil in general, by 
 which some one is to be overwhelmed or crushed ; and 
 to the mere form of the words themselves we are not 
 scrupulously to adhere. For the language of impreca- 
 tion is of such a nature, that it designates, by its vehe- 
 mence or moderation, the more vehement or moderate 
 affection of the mind, and also the weight or lightness, 
 the abundance or fewness, of the evils which are to be 
 inflicted. 
 
 Similar to the imprecations, of which I have just been 
 speaking, is that of wishing that any one may he extirpat- 
 ed.^ or, to express it rhetorically, that his house may be 
 deserted; which is the image of destruction or extirpa- 
 tion. This expression, logically considered, means a 
 species of destruction ,• and in the language of common 
 life, it would stand for an example of destruction. If 
 now the words above applied to Judas are considered 
 as simpl}^ designating the idea. Let him perish^ and are 
 urged no farther, all this most truly happened to Ju- 
 das ; and this entirely agrees with the sense put upon 
 the words, in Peter's discourse. For, as Peter argues, 
 if Judas has perished, there is need of a successor in 
 his office. But if the passage be literally understood, 
 the conclusion is not valid ; for it would not follow, that 
 because the house of Judas is deserted, a successor to 
 his office is needed. We may conclude, therefore, that 
 Peter cites one of the many imprecations contained in 
 a long poem, not because this imprecation only is to be 
 regarded literatim et syllabatim^ but merely to shew to 
 whom all imprecations of that nature attach, and to 
 whom they may be referred. 
 
 But still further to confirm this exegesis; does Paul, 
 I would ask, when he cites a part of the imprecations in 
 the same poem, insist upon and urge the literal 
 
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 107 
 
 meaning^ of them? (Rom. 11: 9, 10.) Does he apply 
 the tropical language of it, to some particular kind of 
 suffering, as poverty, for example, or sickness ? Not at 
 all ; but plainly teaches us, that the language of the 
 Psalmist metms generally to express the imprecation, 
 Let the enemies of God he wretched ! 
 
 But still, in translating passages of this nature, it is 
 not enough to give the sense in general. We must pre- 
 sent the same images as the author does, and of course 
 express his words.' If we neglect to do this, our read- 
 ers may indeed know, in general, the meaning of the 
 author ; but they will remain ignorant of what language 
 he employs, and how much force and ornament he ex- 
 hibits. 
 
 I come next to allegory, or where similitudes are 
 employed for the sake of illustration. The use which 
 we should make of allegories in interpretation, is, to 
 deduce from them the general sentiment, in which is 
 summarily and properly contained, that which the wri- 
 ter wished to illustrate by his similitudes. In explain- 
 ing allegories, it is surely proper to have respect to the 
 design of the author in writing them. But all men, 
 who make use of allegories, expect their readers to re- 
 gard the general sentiment inculcated by them, rather 
 than the similitudes themselves ; or, which amounts 
 to the same thing, not to dwell upon the language mere- 
 ly, but to consider the design of it. For example ; 
 When Christ was asked why he did not enjoin it upon 
 his disciples oftener to fast, according to his usual cus- 
 tom ; he answered by allegories, using these three 
 similitudes, viz,that while the bridegroom was present, it 
 was not proper for the wedding-guests to be sad ; that 
 a new patch should not be sewed upon an old garment; 
 and that new wine should not be put into old bottles. 
 (Matt. 9 : 14 — 18.) In these similitudes, is doubtless 
 contained one general sentiment, which being under- 
 stood, the force of Jesus' reply is manifest. That senti- 
 ment, as it appears to me, i:i this ; that no one in common 
 life is wont to do those things^ which are incongruous with 
 
108 MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 the iime^ place^ and occasion. For if any one should be 
 sad at a wedding feast, or put new wine into old bottles, 
 or sew a new patch upon an old garment, would he not 
 act foolishly, and be regarded as one destitute of a sense 
 of propriety ? It is as much as to say, in common life such 
 things are incongruous. Whether, therefore, we advert 
 to all these similitudes, or only to one of them, the same 
 meaning is, and ought to be, deduced from the passage. 
 
 The amount of the whole is, that Christ being asked 
 why he permitted his disciples so much indulgence irt 
 regard to fasting, replied, by making use of similies, to 
 shew that no one in common life would do that which is in- 
 congruous ; and therefore, he would not compel his dis- 
 ciples to do that, which neither the time nor the occa- 
 sion required. For certainly it would have been incon- 
 gruous for the disciples, while Christ was with them as 
 their guide and teacher, to spend their life in sadness, 
 and to devote themselves to rites of this nature ; espe- 
 cially when Christ was soon to be taken from them, and 
 they were to be assailed by many calamities and dis- 
 tresses. Now if Christ, who knew this would be their 
 lot, had forbidden them their present enjoyments, and 
 prematurely loaded them with burdensome rites, which 
 were incongruous with their present circumstances, and 
 with the indulgence of his affection for them, he would 
 have done that, which would be like being sad at a 
 wedding-feast, or sewing a new patch upon an old gar- 
 ment, or putting new wine into old bottles, i. e. he 
 would have done an incongruous, unseemly thing. 
 
 But he, who, overlooking the fact that so many words 
 are employed in the designation of one general senti- 
 ment, thinks this mode of explanation does not exhaust 
 the whole meaning of the similies, will, after the man- 
 ner of many ancient and modern expositors, explain 
 every part ijy itself; so that the bridegroom is made the 
 husband of the church, the wine is the gospel, the old 
 and the new are Pharisaical and Christian doctrine, &c. 
 For myself, I am wont to follow the usage of common 
 life, in explaining similitudes ; for this is the voice of 
 
MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 109 
 
 nature, and can easily be known, from the usual method 
 of allegory, fable, and simile. I could wish that the 
 language, opinions, and customs of common life, were 
 more frequently regarded in the interpretation of an- 
 cient authors. 
 
 If it be true, that whatever pertains to the art of ex- 
 pression is drawn from the observation of nature and 
 common life, how shall we judge that we have learned 
 not the mere opinions and speculations of others about 
 language, but the real art of language, which agrees 
 with the practice of common life, unless we compare 
 what we have learned with the results of common and 
 every day's experience ? If it be true, that any book is 
 simply the language of the author as it were addressed 
 to us, can we persuade ourselves that we have attained 
 the sense of it, if, when we read it, we construe every 
 thing in a different manner from what we should, had 
 we heard it spoken ? If we understand language, against 
 all the usages of common life ? If we seek in the very 
 syllables of a writer mountains of sense^ which no one, in 
 the language of common life, looks for or suspects ? If 
 we deny to an author the right of being reasonably 
 construed, and not to have his words urged beyond their 
 proper bounds^ a thing we always concede in conver- 
 sation, and which is indeed a fundamental rule of ex- 
 plaining language that is spoken ? If we suppose an 
 author to have written merely to afford us an occasion 
 of indulging our ingenuity, and while he walks upon the 
 earth, to mount ourselves upon the clouds ? Only think 
 how many errors, phantasies, and difficulties have been 
 introduced, by those, for example, who have comment- 
 ed on the ancient poets, and setting nature at defiance 
 as exhibited in common life, have undertaken to inter- 
 pret from their own fancy ! How much grave wisdom 
 has been obtruded upon Homer, against his will, where 
 his words breathed simple nature and common life ! 
 Think with what anxiety of mind many have handled the 
 sacred writings, while they seemed to forget, that al- 
 though the authors were inspired, yet they were men, 
 10 
 
no MORUS ON TRANSLATION. 
 
 they used human language, and so wrote it, that others 
 for whom it was designed could understand it in the 
 usual way, that is by the application to it of their know- 
 ledge of the idiom in which it was composed. It may 
 happen, indeed, that pursuing this plain beaten path we 
 may seem to be unlearned, because we do not profess to 
 know all which others think they know ; but we shall 
 be more than compensated by the abundant satisfaction 
 of having every thing around us, all that common life 
 comprizes, testifying in our favour, and that the mean- 
 ing of language must be scanned by the rules which we 
 have brought to view. Some perhaps may think too, 
 that we do not exhibit much modesty or diffidence in 
 regard to the sacred books, and that we are too liberal 
 and studious of neology. Still, our satisfaction will be 
 very great, if the reasons of our interpretation depend 
 on precepts drawn from common life and usage, which 
 carry along with them a convincing weight of evidence 
 in their favour, and are not repugnant to the nature and 
 genius of all languages. Such incongruous principles, 
 Turretine has very ably refuted, in his book, De Sac. 
 Script, inter pretatione, I do not mean to say, that 
 acuteness or subtilty in philology is to be neglected. 
 By no means ; for without these, no doctrine can be 
 well understood. He who heaps together much, is not 
 therefore a learned man ; but he who arranges, defines, 
 fortifies with arguments. Who would be satisfied with 
 being deprived of all the advantages of subtilty, or nice 
 discrimination, which enables us more certainly, briefly, 
 clearly, and orderly to learn any thing ? But when 
 we have so learned it, all is to be brought to the test 
 of common life, so that it may appear what we have 
 learned for ourselves, what for others ; what for the 
 schools, and what for every day's use. 
 
 [As related to the general subject of translating, and specially 
 of trans] atins: the New Testament, the reader will not fail to 
 compare with the above remarks, Campbell's excellent observa- 
 tions, comprized in the Preliminary Dissertations to his Transla- 
 tion of the Gospels, Diss. II. VIII. X.] 
 
GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM, 111 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM IN RESPECT TO THE NEW 
 TESTAMENT. 
 
 [Translated from Beckii Monogramnaata Hermeneutiees Li- 
 brorum Nov. Testanaenti, edit. 1803, Lipsiae, Sectio III. pp. 
 117, &;c.] 
 
 § 1. Criticism is divided into lower and higher^ (terms 
 not altogether adapted to express a proper division of 
 it;) each of which is again subdivided into grarnmatico' 
 historical^ and conjectural. 
 
 § 2. The authenticity of a book, the genuineness of 
 a passage, and the goodness of a particular reading, 
 are established by arguments external and internal. The 
 latter kind of arguments are deduced from the nature 
 of things treated of, the sentiments, and the language. 
 
 § 3. Lower or verbal criticism is regulated by the fol- 
 lowing general principles; viz, That reading is prefera- 
 ble, respecting which it may be probably shewn, that it 
 bears the stamp of the author, and from which it may 
 appear that all the varieties of readings have proceeded. 
 Hence all the errors of copyists should be noted; as 
 they often furnish means of finding out the true reading 
 and the origin of various readings. 
 
 § 4. Common laws of lower criticism^ zvhich apply to 
 books in general^ whether sacred or profane, 
 
 1. That reading is to be regarded as true, which is 
 supported by far the greater number of copies and wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 But still, readings supported by a few books are not 
 
112 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM 
 
 entirely to be disregarded ; [specially when they har- 
 monize with the usus loquendi of the author.] 
 
 2. That reading which the better copies exhibit, un- 
 less special reasons prohibit it, is to be preferred to the 
 one which thepoorer copies exhibit, although most nu- 
 merous. What copies are of the better knid, is a ques- 
 tion to be discussed in another place, where inquiry is 
 made respecting the genius of the N. Test, writings. 
 Neither the antiquity nor propriety of a reading, solely 
 considered, always proves it to be a true one ; [unless 
 the antiquity should extend back to the autograph ; or 
 the propriety should be shewn to be exclusive.] 
 
 3. That reading which is more harsh, obscure, diffi- 
 cult, unusual, or delicately chosen, if supported by the 
 authority of a proper witness, is preferable to one which 
 is plain, easy, usual, and common. Difficulty sometimes 
 exists in respect to a whole passage, and its connexion ; 
 sometimes in regard to the ambiguity of particular 
 words and phrases ; sometimes in respect to the gram- 
 matical forms, historical and doctrinal passages, Sic. 
 But 
 
 4. That reading which approaches nearest to the 
 popular and famihar method of speaking, if it be sup- 
 ported by external testimonies, is preferable to one 
 more artificial and subtile. 
 
 5. The shorter reading, when supported by testimo- 
 ny of importance, and not incongruous with the style 
 and design of the writer, is preferable to a more verbose 
 one. Still there are eases, where the more copious 
 reading is to be preferred. 
 
 6. That reading which gives the best sense, is pecu- 
 liarly preferable. But to determine this, the nature of 
 the whole passage, the genius of the writer, and not the 
 mere opinions and sentiments of particular interpreters, 
 are to be consulted 
 
 7. The reading which produces a worthless or an in- 
 congruous sense, is to be rejected. Good care however 
 must be taken, not to condemn a reading as worthless 
 or incongruous, which a more correct grammatical and 
 
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 113 
 
 historical investigation would prove to be a true read- 
 ing", or at least a probable one. 
 
 8. A reading which agrees with the usus loquendi of 
 the writer, is preferable to that which disagrees with 
 it. It must be remembered, in judging here, that the 
 style of an author sometimes varies, with increasing 
 age. 
 
 9. A reading is to be rejected, in respect to which 
 plain evidence is found, that it has undergone a design- 
 ed alteration. Such alteration may have taken place,(a) 
 From doctrinal reasons. (6)From moral and practical 
 reasons. (g) From historical and geographical doubts; 
 Matt. 8 : 28, comp. Mark 5:1. {d)From the desire of 
 reconciling passages apparently inconsistent with each 
 other. (e)From desire to make the discourse more in- 
 tensive. Hence many emphatic readings have originat- 
 ed. (/) From the comparison of many MSS, the readings 
 
 *of which have been amalgamated. (^)From a compari- 
 son of parallel passages. 
 
 Corrections of the more celebrated MSS. have been 
 sometimes detected. 
 
 10. Various readings are to be rejected^ which spring 
 from the mere negligence of copyists, and from those 
 errors, which are very common in all kinds of books. 
 To these belong, (rt)The commutation of forms in the 
 Macedonico-Alexandrine dialect, and also other unusu- 
 al forms, for those of the common dialect. The Alex- 
 andrine and common forms, however, have the prefer- 
 ence over others in the New Testament ; and the 
 Alexandrine dialect itself also admitted some Attic 
 forms. (6)The commutation of single letters and sylla- 
 bles, by an error of either the eye or the ear ; the 
 former resulting from obscure and compendious meth- 
 ods of writing, [the latter, from copying after the read- 
 ing of one, who was misunderstood, or who read erro- 
 neously.] (c) The commutation of synonymes. (c^)Froaa 
 transferring into the text, words written in the margin 
 of copies, and thus uniting both readings, James V. 
 2. (e)From the omission of a word or a verse, by an 
 
 10* 
 
114 OExVERAL RULES Of CRITICISM 
 
 error of (he sight. (/)From the transposition of words 
 and passages-, whence it may have happened, that some 
 error has crept into most of our books. (g)From words 
 which ended with the like sound, or appeared alike ; 
 and from proximate words, one ending and the other 
 beginning with the same syllable. (/i)From incorreclty 
 uniting or separating words ; which naturally resulted, 
 in some cases, from the ancient method of continuous 
 writing. (i)From an erroneous interpunction and dis- 
 tinction of passages. 
 
 11. A reading is to be rejected, which plainly be- 
 trays a gloss or interpretation. This may be a word 
 or a whole passage. Sometimes these glosses are unit- 
 ed to the true text, and sometimes they have thrust it 
 out. Not all interpretations, however, are spurious 
 glosses ; [for authors themselves sometimes add them, 
 in order to explain their own language.] 
 
 12. Readings deduced from versions or the commen- 
 taries of interpreters, are to be rejected. In judging of 
 them, however, great prudence and much skill is neces- 
 sary. 
 
 [The maxims, thus far, are comprized within the province of 
 lower criticism. But higher criticism may be, and ought to be 
 employed, in order to assist in lorming a judgment of the genu- 
 ineness of many passages. Here follows from the same writer, 
 a Synopsis of the] 
 
 § 5. Laws of higher criticism^ respecting the establish- 
 ment of a pure text. 
 
 1. The sentiment, declaration, passage, book, or 
 part of a book of an}' author, which on account of its 
 nature, form, method, subject, or arguments, does not 
 appear to have originated from him, is either spurious, 
 or at least very much to be suspected. 
 
 Imitations of authors, made with design, or for the 
 sake of practice in writing, or from other reasons, may 
 easily be ascribed to the a.uthors tliemselves, though 
 they are supposititious. 
 
 2. A passage which manifestly disagrees with the na- 
 ture and connexion of the context, and interrupts! it, is 
 to be regarded as spurious. 
 
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 1 1 5 
 
 3. A passage which appears in another place, either 
 in the same words or with little variation, and seems to 
 be more properly and commodioiisly placed there, 
 may be suspected of having been transferred to the 
 place where it stands with less propriety, and may be 
 removed from thence. 
 
 But here great care is requisite, lest we judge rash- 
 ly, or form our opinion rather from the taste and style 
 of the present day, than from the genius of the author, 
 his design and style, or the subject and argument of the 
 discourse. As an example, one might appeal to the 
 disputations about the Apocalypse, and to the x\ppendix 
 of John's Gospel in chap. XXI. 
 
 4. Passages which are manifestly interpolated, by the 
 comments of interpreteis or from any other cause, are 
 to be rejected from the text. 
 
 But great caution is necessary here, to judge rightly. 
 In general, internal arguments alone are not to be relied 
 on, as sufficient evidence. 
 
 5. Parts of books, which appear incoherent, and yet 
 clearly exhibit the genius and style of the author, may 
 be reduced to better order, by separation, and making 
 a different arrangement. [Great caution here too is 
 necessary.] 
 
 6. If numerous and very diverse readings of a book 
 are found in the best copies, we may conclude, either 
 that the book has gradually received various accessions, 
 or has been re-published by a later hand, or has been 
 edited a second time by the author, and corrected, so 
 as to give occasions for the introduction of such various 
 readings. 
 
 § 6. Laws proper to guide our judgment, in respect 
 to the true reading of passages in the New Testament, 
 spurious additions, the books themselves, or the au- 
 thors of them, may be deduced from the peculiar nature 
 of the things described, and the style of the books. 
 They may also be deduced from the nature of the 
 sources, whence the various readings come, and from 
 the testimony of witnesses. Such are the following. 
 
116 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM 
 
 1. Passages are to be regarded as spurious, at least 
 are to be suspected, (if any such there are,) whioh dis- 
 agree with the nature of the Christian religion, the his- 
 tory of it, or the mode of teaching and deciding appro- 
 priate to any sacred writer ; or if they appear trifling, 
 inapt, or jejune, when compared with the force of the 
 doctrine exhibited, or the gravity of the author who 
 exhibits it. Specially are they to be suspected, if his- 
 torical reasons concur to render them suspicious. 
 
 The importance of subjects, the force of precepts 
 and narrations, and other things of this nature, are to be 
 estimated by the manner, judgment, and usage of those 
 times, in which the books were written. In judging of 
 doctrines, special caution is to be used. 
 
 We must be watchful against the pious frauds (as they 
 are called) of ancient Churches, committed in the in- 
 terpolation of books, and in giving new forms to pas- 
 sages of them. The special causes of interpolations 
 were tradition, apocryphal writings, the desire of ex- 
 plaining, augmenting, correcting, &c. On the other 
 hand, some passages were ejected as spurious, which 
 seemed to be unworthy of the authors of them. E. g. 
 Luke 22 : 43, vide Paulus, Commentary, p. 613. 
 
 2. In general, the reading which savours of Hebra- 
 ism or Syro-Chaldaism, is preferable to that which sa- 
 vours of classical Greek. [Ceteris paribus^ it is always 
 preferable.] 
 
 Some of the writers of the New Testament, however, 
 as Paul and Luke, approach negrer to the Greek style. 
 
 The conjecture of some critics, that the books of the 
 New Testament were originally written, for the most 
 part, in Syro-Chaldaic, and afterwards were translated 
 into Greek, by an interpreter who has committed many 
 errors, can, at most, be extended to but very few books. 
 
 3. Since the New Testament was commonly used, 
 both in public and private, and certain parts of it were 
 selected for ecclesiastical use, inquiry must be made, 
 whether any portion of it has bet^n interpolated, either 
 from the parallel pa^^sages of the Old Testament, or 
 from the Church Lectionaries. 
 
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 117 
 
 4. As many copies, versions, and fathers of the an- 
 cient Churches, are found nearly always to have fol- 
 lowed the same text, those which belong to the same 
 class are not to be separately numbered, but rather to 
 be regarded as standing ift the place of one witness. Still 
 less are we to trust solely to any one copy, however an- 
 cient, critical, or carefully written. JNor is any copy, 
 which may be erroneously written, or recent, or occa- 
 sionally interpolated, to be rejected as altogether use- 
 less. 
 
 5'. In respect to any reading, the first inquiry is. To 
 what recension or edition does it belong ? 
 
 The age and country of copies and readings, is to be 
 examined by careful comparison. 
 
 No copy extant is perfectly free from error in all the 
 books, or uniformly follows any one uncorrupted recen- 
 sion. We must judge, therefore, from the consent of 
 many things of the same kind, and from internal evi- 
 dence, what recension is followed, either generally, or 
 in particular passages. Some copies are thought to fol- 
 low various recensions in particular parts. A few cop- 
 ies of the most ancient classes of manuscripts are ex- 
 tant ; but the majority of copies are more modern. If 
 an ancient copy has been propagated through many edi- 
 tions, it may have been exposed to vary from the an- 
 cient recension, or have been corrupted by new er- 
 rors. of the copyist, more than if a recent copy were 
 directly taken from the ancient one. 
 
 6. That reading in which all the recensions of the 
 best copies agree, is the most correct, certainly the 
 most ancient. Slight deviations are unimportant. 
 
 7. Readings supported by the authority of the most 
 ancient classes of mannscripts, and of the more credi- 
 ble witnesses, are to be preferred to others. But a re- 
 gard must be had to the internal goodness of a copy. 
 
 8. The Alexandrine class of manuscripts is sometimes 
 preferable to the occidental, and sometimes of less au- 
 thority. In the conflicting claims of various classes, 
 special regard must be had to historical and internal 
 means of judging of a reading. 
 
118 GENERAL RULES OF CRITICISM 
 
 9. Manuscripts are of the highest authority ; but nei- 
 ther the ancient versions, nor the exegetical and other 
 books of the Fathers are to be neglected. 
 
 10. In collecting and judging of the ancient versions, 
 (I) Regard must be had to those made directly from 
 the Greek. Among these, the Latin, Syriac, and Goth- 
 ic deserve special mention. (2) We must use a cor- 
 rected text of these Versions. (3) We must inquire 
 whether the translator has rendered literally or ad sen- 
 sum ; whether the errors in the version arise from the 
 fault of the translator's copy, or from other causes ; 
 and finally whether the version has been corrected or 
 not. (4) Those versions, which from comparison are 
 found to belong to the same family of manuscripts, are 
 to be regarded as standing in the place of one ancient 
 witness. (5) No reading derived merely from versions, 
 and destitute of other support, can be received ; but the 
 consent of all the ancient v6rsions and fathers in a par- 
 ticular reading, which varies from that of manuscripts, 
 renders the latter suspicious. 
 
 11. In regard to the readings derived from the writ- 
 ers of the ancient churches, we must see (1) That they 
 are drawn from a correct and not a corrupt edition of 
 the Fathers. (2) We must diligently consider the au- 
 thors, their descent, age, erudition, subtilty of judging, 
 temerity in emendation, the nature of the copies which 
 they used, and the creed of the churches to which they 
 belonged. (3^ We must consider, in what kind of book 
 or passage or ecclesiastical writers, various readings 
 are found. (4.) Inquiry must be made, whether the vari- 
 ations are supported by real and direct testimony of the 
 fathers ; or whether changes were occasioned in the 
 text by lapse of memory, or a designed accommoda- 
 tion ; or whether merely opinions or conjectures are 
 proposed. It seems to be very unjust to ascribe all the 
 variety found in the ecclesiastical fathers, either to er- 
 ror of the memory, or to temerity in accommodation, 
 or a fondness for emendation. (5.) The omission of 
 some passage, in the Commentaries of the Fathers, does 
 not always shew that it was wanting, in the copy which 
 
IN RESPECT TO THE NEW TESTEMENT. 119 
 
 the writer had. Silence however, concerning an impor- 
 tant passage, renders it suspicious. 
 
 12. The fragments of heretical writings are not to 
 be overlooked, in the search for various readings ; for 
 the supposition is rash, that they generally corrupted 
 the text of all parts of the sacred writings. 
 
 13. That interpunction, and distinction of verses and 
 chapters, which is most consonant with the argument, 
 sentiments, connexion of discourse, and usus loquendi of 
 the sacred writers, is to be regarded as the best. 
 
 § 6. In the criticism of all ancient books, it is well 
 understood, that particular readings are not required to 
 be established by most certain and irrefragable argu- 
 ments, but only that a probability be shewn that they 
 approximate, at least, very near to the original read- 
 ings ; and the judgment is to be made up, in view of 
 what appears to be most probable. So in respect to 
 the New Testament ; no more should be required than 
 can, from the nature of the case, be performed. Every 
 thing on all sides should be considered, before the 
 judgment is made up. And if, in judging of the text of 
 profane authors, gravity and modesty are rightly com- 
 mended ; surely in judging of the sacred books, we oiight 
 most scrupulously to abstain from all rashness and levi- 
 ty, as well as from all favoritism and* superstition. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER. 
 
 [The followinff Chapter is extracted from KeiPs Elementa Her- 
 meneutices, translated from the orig^inhl O'einjan into l.atin by 
 C. A. G. Emmerling, and published at Leipzick in 1811. Although 
 it contains several things that seem to be a repetition of the ideas 
 advanced in various places hy Ernesti. as exhibileJ in the fore- 
 going pages ; yet as the object is lo describe the qualifications of 
 
120 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 the interpreter himself^ in respect to knowledge^ and as it is a very 
 brief and well digested summary, it appears desirable that the 
 student, who aspires to the place of an interpreter, should have 
 the qualifications of one definitely and separately described, as 
 here, in order that he may direct his special attention to this sub- 
 ject, unembarrassed by other considerations.] 
 
 § 1. He who desires to understand and interpret the 
 books of the New Testament, must,^r5^ of all^ acquire 
 some historic knowledge of the author of each book ; 
 of the state of things existing when it was written ; of 
 the body or collection of the New Testament books ; of 
 the particular history of its ancient versions, editions, 
 and parts in which it was written ; and other things of 
 this nature. To this must be added a knowledge of the 
 principles of criticism, in respect to the text of the New 
 Testament. 
 
 Books to be read for information on these topics : Marsh's trans- 
 lation of Michaelis' Introduct. to the N. Test.; and Haenlein 
 Handbuch der Einleitung in die Schriften des N. Testaments. 
 
 § 2. Of the second kind of knowledge^ preparatory to 
 the understanding and interpretation of the JY, Testament, 
 
 (1) The interpreter must understand the language in 
 which the books are written. As the diction is not pure 
 classic Greek, but the Hebrew idiom here and there in- 
 termixed with classic Greek, and as vestiges of the Chal- 
 dee, Sj^iac, Rabbinic and Latin languages occur ; it fol- 
 lows, of course, that the interpreter should not only be 
 acquainted with pure Greek, but with its various dia- 
 lects, specially the Alexandrine. Above all, he ought 
 to be well versed in the Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, Rab- 
 binic, and Latin idioms. 
 
 Vorstius de Hebraismis N. Test., cura Fischeri. 1778. Leus- 
 den de Dialectis N. Test. edit. Fischeri. 1792. Maltaire Dc Di- 
 alectis. Ling. Graec. Sturtz De Dialecto. Macedonica et Alex- 
 andrina, 1808. Pfannkuche, Ueber die Palaestinische Landes- 
 sprache in dem Zeitalter Christi ; im Eichhorn's Allgemeine 
 Bibliothek, B. viii. s.365, &c. 
 
 (2.) The interpreter mtist possess a knowledge of the things^ 
 respecting which the books treat. These are partly his- 
 torical^ and partly doctrinal. The explanation of them 
 must be sought, primarily, from the books themselves ; 
 
OF AN INTERPRETER. 121 
 
 and, secondarily, from those writings of more recent au- 
 thors, which may be subsidiary to the attainment of this 
 knowledge. 
 
 § 3. As to the historic matter of these books. It is of 
 great importance to the interpreter to be well versed 
 in sacred geography, chronology, civil history, and ar- 
 chaeology ,' i. e. to understand those things which re- 
 spect the situation and climate of the countries, where 
 the events referred to happened ; as well as those which 
 serve to define the times when they happened ; and al- 
 so the history of the nation among whom they took 
 place, and of other nations mentioned in this his- 
 tory, with their condition, manners, and customs. 
 
 (1) Geographical knowledge. The geography of Pal- 
 estine and the neighbouring countries should be well 
 understood, (a) as also their natural productions, (b) 
 To this must be added a knowledge of many countries 
 in Asia, and of some in Europe ; also of the Roman em- 
 pire, as it then existed, divided into provinces. 
 
 a) Wells' Sacred Geography. Relandi Palaestina. Bachiene 
 histor, und geograph. Beschreibung von Palaestina, Tom. vii. 
 8vo. 1766. Hamelsfeldt biblische Geographic, 3 Theile. 1796. 
 Specially, Bellerman's biblical Geography, now in the course of 
 translation by Messrs. R. C. Morse and James Marsh, Alumni of 
 the Theol. Sem. at Andover ; a classical and excellent work. 
 
 6) Celsii Hierobotanicon, 1745. Bocharti Hierozoicon, edit. 
 Rosenmueller, 1776. Tom. iii. Supp. to Calmet's Dictionary, 
 Vols, iii — V. Harmar's Observations edited by A. Clarke. 
 
 (2) Chronology, The interpreter should have not on- 
 ly a knowledge of technical chronology, but of the Ro- 
 man mode of reckoning aburbe condita^ and of the Greek 
 Olympiads ; (on which subjects he may study authors 
 well deserving of credit;) but in respect to historical 
 chronology, he should know in what order of time the 
 events related in the Old Testament happened ; when 
 and where the first Roman emperors, the various kings 
 and princes that sprung from the house of Herod the 
 Great, the Roman Consuls at the beginning of the em- 
 pire of the Caesars, the Jewish high priests (and the 
 number of them) in our Saviour's time, and the Roman 
 
 11 
 
n 
 
 ON THE QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 magistrates, specially in the provinces of Syria and Ju- 
 dea, succeeded each other. 
 
 Petavii Opus de doctrina temporum, 1703. Scaliger de emen- 
 datione temporum, 1629. Usherii Annales Vet. et N. Test. 
 Franckii Novum Systeraa Chronol. fundamentalis. Goelting. 1778. 
 
 (3) History civil and Political. In regard to the his- 
 tory of events among the nations mentioned in the sa- 
 cred books, and also their forms of government, it is 
 important for the interpreter to make himself acquaint- 
 ed, ^r^^, with the ancient history of the Jews. In study- 
 ing this, he is not to confine himself merely to the Old 
 Testament ; he must also consult the traditionary ac- 
 counts, which were extant in the time of Christ and the 
 Apostles, (a) Secondly^ he must study the history of the 
 Jews under the Herods, and that of these princes. 
 Thirdly^ the condition and circumstances of the Jews in 
 Palestine, while under the dominion of the Romans ; and 
 also of the Jews living in other countries. Finally, the 
 history of the Roman Emperors at that period, and of 
 the Roman Prefects over the Asiatic Provinces. 
 
 a) Shuckford's Connexion. Prideaux' Connexion. Krebsius, 
 Decreta Romanorum pro Judaeis, e Joseph© collecta, 1 vol. 8vo. 
 1763. Wesselingii Diatribe de Judaeorum Archontibus, 1 vol. 
 8vo. 1738. Benson^s History of the first planting of the Chris- 
 tian religion. Josephi Opera, edit. Havercarapii. Jahn, Ge- 
 schichte der Juden in Archaeologie der Hebraer, Vol. I. 
 
 (4) Manners and customs. In regard to these, (a) A 
 knowledge of Hebrew antiquities in general is necessa- 
 ry. (6) A considerable knowledge of the Greek and Ro- 
 man Antiquities, (c) A knowledge of the ecclesiastical 
 rites and customs of the primitive churches ; both those 
 which they received from the Hebrews, and others 
 which w^ere introduced by Christians themselves. 
 
 Opera Philonis Alex, et Josephi. Warneknos Entwurf der 
 Heb. Alterlhuemer, 1 vol. 8vo. Specially, Jahnii Archaeologia 
 Biblica in compendium redacta, now in a course of translation 
 by Mr. T. C. Upham, an Alumnus of the Theol. Sem. at Ando- 
 ver, and soon, it is hoped, to be published, for the use of biblical 
 students in our country ; a vsrork, which combines brevity with 
 perspicuity and good order, and comprizes the substance of all 
 the preceding publications on this interesting subject. 
 
 Of Roman Antiquities, Adams' work is a very useful Compend ; 
 and of the Greek, Potter remains not only the best, but almost 
 
OF AN INTERPRETER. 1 23 
 
 the oniy respectable one. Ecc. .;4n^igfM^7^c5. Bingham, Orig.Ecc. 
 Also Roealer Bibliothek, der Kircheavaetern. 
 
 § 4. Doctrinal contents of the sacred books. That part 
 of the New Testament, which is directly concerned with 
 faith and practice, will be rightly understood, when the 
 interpreter rightly understands what each particular 
 writer has inculcated. As there are many passages 
 which relate to the Jews ; and as the writers of the New 
 Testament and their first readers were of Jewish ex- 
 traction ; it will be important, 
 
 (1) To know the sentiments of the Jews of that peri- 
 od, in regard to religion ; specially of those, who used 
 the Hebrew-Greek dialect, and of the three great sects 
 among which the Jews were divided, viz. the Pharisees, 
 Sadducees, and Essenes. 
 
 Joseph! et Philonis Scripta. An admirable view of Philo's 
 Sentiments has been published by Schreiter, in Analekten der 
 exeget. Theologie, Band i. ii. Fabricii Codex Pseudepigraphus 
 Vet. Test., et Codex Apocryphus Nov. Test. Grabii Spicile- 
 gium Sanctt. Patrum, saec. i. ii. iii. 2 vols. 8vo. On the right 
 use of these sources, see Mori Hermeneut. Vol. ii. p. 172, &c. 
 Brettschneider, systemat. Darstellung der Dogmat. und Moral 
 der Apocryph. Schriften des A. Test. 1805. Staeudlin, Theulo- 
 giae Moralis Ebraeorum ante Christum Historia, 1794. De tri- 
 bus Judaeorum Sectis, delph. 1703, 4to. comprizing the works of 
 Serrarius, Drusius, and Scaliger, on this subject. 
 
 (2) The precepts of the Christian religion. What was 
 adopted from the Jewish religion, what rejected, and 
 what was added anew to Christianity, must be understood 
 in order to explain the New Testament properly. But 
 knowledge of this nature, that is certain^ can be drawn 
 only from the sacred writings themselves. 
 
 The Biblical Theology of Storr, Reinhard, Doederlein, Zach- 
 aria, Leun, Muntinghe, (and for some purposes, of Ammon and 
 Bauer,) may be used with profit. But the student is not to be 
 guided by any system, except so far as the author shows it to fee 
 built upon a satisfactory interpretation of the word of God. 
 Flatt's edition of Storr, translated into German, and accompani- 
 ed by the notes of the Editor, is a fundamental book in the study 
 of Biblical Theology. 
 
 (3) The doctrines of heretical Sects* It is important to 
 know the opinions of early heretics, because, it is prob- 
 able, some passages of the New Testament have a spe- 
 cial reference to them. 
 
124 QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER. 
 
 The best book, by far, is Walch's Entwurf einer vollstaend. 
 Geschichte der Ketzereien, Sic. 11 vols. 8vo. Vol. i. contains an 
 account of the earliest heresies. Titmanni de vestigiis Gnosti- 
 corum in Nov. Test, frustra quaesitis, will well repay the labour 
 of perusal. 
 
 § 5. In enumerating the qualifications of an inter- 
 preter, we must not omit a knowledge of grammar, rhet- 
 oric, and philosophy. 
 
 (1) Grammar. Not only a general knowledge of its 
 principles is necessary, but also a special technical 
 knowledge of both etymology and Syntax. The inter- 
 preter must be acquainted with the various forms of 
 words, and understand how the significations are con- 
 nected with the forms ; he must understand the manner 
 in which words are connected in a sentence ; the use of 
 the particles; and also of the grammatical figures, as 
 they are called, such as ellipsis and pleonasm. 
 
 Vigerus, de idiotismis Ling. Graecae, edit. Hermann^ ISO'S. 
 Hoogeveen, Doctrina partic. Graec. edit. Schutz, 1806. Bos, 
 Ellipses Graecae, edit.Schaefer,1808. Weiskii, Pleonasmi Grae- 
 ci, 1807. 
 
 (2) Rhetoric. A knowledge of this is necessary, not so 
 much to judge of rhetorical figures, as to find out the 
 meaning of them, or the sentiment which they are de- 
 signed to convey. 
 
 (3) A knowledge of Philosophy. Not that of some par- 
 ticular school or sect merely, but that which pertains 
 to the cultivation of the mental powers, and to nice psy- 
 chological discrimination. Such a knowledge is requi- 
 site, in order to form clear conceptions in the mind, and 
 accurately to define our ideas ; to discern what is simi- 
 lar in different things, and what is distinct; to judge of 
 the connexion of thought and argument, and finally, to 
 qualify one perspicuously to represent the opinions of 
 an author to others. Great caution, however, is neces- 
 sary here, lest the interpreter intrude upon his author, 
 his own particular philosrphy. 
 
 Ernesti, Opuscula Philol. de Vanitate Philosophantium, &e. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
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