THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OP CANADA, LTD. TORONTO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW, BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, Ph.D. PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI. AUTHOR OF "THE SOCIAL PROBLEM," "AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY," ETC. gorfe THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1922 All rights reserved PRINTED IX TIIF. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY Set up and electrotyped. Published April, 1922. FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY NEW YORK. CITY To my son, WALTER BRECKENBIDGE ELLWOOD, and to all of his generation, who have before them the heavy task of building a world of justice, good will, and peace. 4895 PKEFACE IN previous works the author has repeatedly said: "One of the greatest social needs of the present is a re- ligion adapted to the requirements of modern life and in harmony with modern science." x Since the beginning of the Great War a number of the most dispassionate and detached thinkers of our time have expressed the same general idea. Two eminent British sociologists have re- cently expressed themselves thus: "We are compelled to the admission (one hard for the student, the man of pure or applied science), that the essential problem of life is not material, but psychical. In a word, life needs to be eupsychic; or in an older word, religious." In May, 1916, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson said in a private conver- sation with the author, "If I should guess, I would say that the great need of the world, just at present, is more religion. Of course, I mean religion of the right sort; of religion of a certain sort there is a plenty, but not enough of the right sort." 3 Again, in March, 1915, the author had the pleasure of visiting with Mr. Frederic Harrison, the veteran leader of the English Positivists. Mr. Harrison forcefully expressed the opinion that the Great War was due to the decadence of ethical religion, and that the problem of world peace and order would never be settled until the religious question was settled. 1 See Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 273; The Social Prob- lem, Revised Edition, p. 217. 2 Branford and Geddes, The Coming Polity, p. 242. 1 See also the statements in his work, Religion: a Criticism and a Forecast. vii PKEFACE He has since expressed substantially the same view in recent books. 1 Unlike the last two social thinkers just cited, the pres- ent writer would find the religion needed by the modern world in a more rational, revitalized, socialized Chris- tianity. He agrees much more nearly with another emi- nent leader of Anglo-American ethical and religious think- ing, who, though like the two preceding in his detach- ment from conventional religious circles, yet has found it possible to say: "Christianity, as soon as it has become transfused with the spirit and transformed by the method of modern science, will bring about the Millennium." 2 The_tiies_i.a of this book, however, is rather that it is only a I Christianity of this sort which is equal to the task of saving modern civilization, and of harmonizing its war- ring interests, classes, nations, and races. To this extent the author is in accord with those thinkers who see in a religious awakening the only hope of bringing our world back to social sanity and good will. 3 But he would add that the religious spirit can be revivified only when re- ligion is brought into harmony with men's unquestioned scientific beliefs and with their social needs that is, into harmony with science and democracy. Intelligence rather ^f than emotion or tradition should guide, accordingly, in t the religious life. The modern world is completely torn asunder by con- flicting ideals of life. It will continue to remain in this condition until there is some unity in social doctrine. But there is hope in all this confusion that the mass of men are coming to see that it is impossible for either 1 See especially The German Peril, pp. 266-260. 1 Dr. Stanton Coit, The Soul of America, p. 247. 1 Sop especially Kidd, The Science of Power; also Patrick, The Psychology of Social Reconstruction, p. 286. viii >^^"T ( $ u > V < PREFACE individuals or nations to live together harmoniously upon the basis of the pagan and barbarous ideals of life which have been handed down in the traditions of our civilization and which some men, without adequate sociological knowl- edge, have endorsed. There is hope, in other words, that through calamity, if in no other way, men are slowly coming to a sense of the value of likemindedness and of good will among all men. Science, through its progres- sive demonstration of the truth in all fields of human interest, is slowly showing men how to achieve likemind- edness as regards the essential problems of human living. But the program of applied social science cannot be car- C ried out without good will among men; and herein lies the supreme importance of social religion. Religion con- cerns itself with social values. By intensifying and uni- versalizing them it gives rise to the life-mood of human beings and thus furnishes a control which is competent to achieve universal good will. This, in the opinion of the writer, is the solution of the problem of securing adequate motivation for a better social order, which is so much de- bated at the present time; and if correct, it obviously places a heavy responsibility upon the Church. The religious revolution of the last two generations, which undermined theological Christianity, however, has left the Church all but prostrate and powerless before the immense social task which now confronts it. It is the object of this book to help show how the breath of life may again be breathed into its nostrils, and how the Church can again become that "spiritual power" which the world needs to energize and harmonize its life. To be sure, a host of goodly books are attempting, at this mo- ment, to do the very same thing. The author would claim only the merit of a specific point of view that of ii PREFACE social science x in adding his work to the many that al- ready exist. It must be, however, the social sciences to which the world must look more and more for guidance and hence to which religion also must look. The signifi- cance of the social sciences for religion, he believes, is not yet appreciated, and his task is to attempt to disclose, in part, that significance. He does not attempt, accordingly, to discuss specifically the metaphysical and theological questions which are usually raised whenever religion is mentioned. He attempts to discuss the reconstruction of religion only from a sociological, not from a philosophical or theological viewpoint. It is true that in a few places in the book rather definite theological views have been expressed. If these are found by any one to be bad theology, it will not affect the argument of the book. For it cannot be too strongly asserted that neither the vitality nor the social power of religion is bound up with the fate of any specific theological doctrine. This truth, to which both history and anthropology abundantly testify, needs emphasis especially in a period of religious reconstruction like the present. Religion must be freed from the tram- mels of theological dogmatism if it is to be free to de- velop in such a way as to meet the requirements of mod- ern life. In brief, religion as a practical program for dealing with the world's ills must be based upon social science it must be ever guided by growing social knowledge. On the other hand, social science must find its completion in social religion. These two should become but different aspects of one fundamental attitude in all normal, edu- 1 The term, "social science," as used in this book, refers not only to sociology, luit to all the social sciences taken collectively, includ- ing Anthropology, social psychology, social ethics and social phi- losophy, so far as these latter are based upon sci PKEFACE cated minds. The writer is not unaware of the dangers and difficulties of such a position. In the present con- dition of both the scientific and the religious world it may seem mere rashness to affirm that completed science leads to religion and that the conclusions of social science, more- over, are practically at one with those of the new social Christianity. Such a position can scarcely be expected to please the conservatives in either science or religion. The writer is willing to accept the full consequences of this position, and, in the words of a great humanitarian states- man, "to play for the verdict of mankind." He would go further and say that beyond the merely descriptive tasks of science are its tasks of evaluation, and that upon the social sciences especially rests the responsibility of guiding ethical and religious evaluations. f It is the duty of the sociologist to aid in the solution of the religious problem. In a fully scientific world not only would a scientific man who had knowledge of the conditions of human living be expected to "preach" (as, indeed, we now expect our health experts to do), but "preaching" without scientific knowledge of human conditions would not be tolerated. Some misunderstanding may perhaps be avoided if we say that science that is, accurate, rationalized knowledge cannot, of course, be everything in religion. Science, at most, can furnish but one of the bases of religion. Science is not religion, nor can it become a substitute for religion. ^ Religion is and must remain essentially in the realm of faith; it necessarily transcends science, but it can and should become a rational faith, energizing men for better living both individually and socially, and seek- ing the aid of science, especially the social sciences, for the building of a better human world. That, again, in brief, is the practical plea of this book. xi PREFACE its. of The book is necessarily a book of value- judgments, oi conclusions rather than mere facts. The facts upon which the conclusions are based will be found scattered through- out the literature of the social sciences, especially of anthropology and sociology. A few of the sources have been indicated in the citations in the foot-notes, and they are more fully indicated in the author's other published works, of which this volume may be considered an elabo- ration on the ethical and religious side. It is hoped also that the foot-notes may be found useful by those who wish guidance for further reading. The central argument of the book will be found stated in Chapters II, III, V, and XL The other chapters elaborate or apply the view- points developed in these central chapters. As the book attempts a constructive application of the principles of sociology and social psychology to the re- ligious problem of our time, the theoretical principles made use of are naturally those stated in the author's Introduction to Social Psychology, and also, in a more brief and popular form, in his book, The Social Problem: A Reconstructive Analysis. The general philosophical background may best be found, by those who may be in- terested, in ITobhouse's Development and Purpose and his Morals in Evolution. No citations are made from the Bible, not because the author has not a deep appreciation of the value of that book for the religious life, but because he would not pro- fess to have any adequate equipment for technical New Testament interpretation, and even more because he wishes his work regarded solely as a work in applied social science. Such citations, it is believed, would add little, if anything, to the value of the book. The reality with which the sociologist is concerned is the objective Christian move- ment; and the animating principle of that movement is xii PREFACE the Christian tradition, the fountain head of which is the Bible, especially the Gospels. The great value of the Bible is, therefore, in denning and fixing the Christian tradition 1 ; and if the discussions in the following pages shall move any to examine carefully and open-mindedly the teachings of the Gospels in connection with the great problems of our time, then the author will be more than repaid for his labors. So many friends have helped in the preparation of this book by their suggestions and criticisms that it is impos- sible for me to acknowledge my indebtedness to all of them. I feel, however, particularly indebted to Professor George A. Coe of Union Theological Seminary, whose sug- gestions and criticisms have been invaluable to me. Also I am indebted to Professor Herbert 1ST. Shenton of Co- lumbia University who has read large portions of the manuscript. These kind friends should not, however, be held responsible for anything in the book, as that respon- sibility is solely my own. I am also indebted to a num- ber of my colleagues at the University of Missouri, espe- cially to Professor A. F. Kuhlman of my department, who has helped me in correcting both the manuscript and the proofs. CHAELES A. ELLWOOD. UNIVERSITY OF MISSOUBI, November 24, 1921. 1 For a full statement of the author's attitude toward the Bible, see pp. 145, 152 and 153. xiii CONTENTS CHAPTER PAQ 1. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION 1 . II. THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EELIGION . 33 .III. THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRIS- TIANITY 70 IV. OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION ... 93 .V. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY 119 VI. THE ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION . 161 VII. RELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE . . .188 VIII. RELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE . . . 210 IX. RELIGION AND POLITICAL LIFE . . . 243 X. RELIGION AND SOCIAL PLEASURE . .264 . XI. THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE CHURCH . 280 APPENDIX 307 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION "We have a rich harvest of science, a profusion ol ma- terial facilities, a vast collection of the ideas and products of past ages. . . . We need now only harmony, order, union; we need only to group into a whole these powers and gifts ; the task before us is to discover some complete and balanced system of life ; some common basis of belief ; some object for the imperishable religious instincts and aspirations of mankind; some faith to bind the existence of man to the visible universe around him ; some common social bond for thought, action and feeling." Frederic Harrison, The Meaning of History, p. 75. "I believe that before all things needful, beyond all else is true religion. This only can give wisdom, happiness, and goodness to men, and a nobler life to mankind. Noth- ing but this can sustain, guide, and satisfy all lives, con- trol all characters, and unite all men." Frederic Har- rison, The Creed of a Layman, p. 37. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW CHAPTER I THE EELIGIOUS BEVOLTJTION A CRISIS confronts religion in the modern world. A New Reformation is necessary within the Christian Church, if it is to survive, besides which the Protestant Reformation will seem insignificant. 1 Like all our other institutions, religion is in revolution. Either some new form of Christianity 2 or sheer atheism will soon become dominant in the more advanced nations, with agnostic scientific positivism as a third possibility. A fourth pos- sibility, of course, is that our whole civilization may re- vert to a lower level, and that older and cruder forms of religion may again appear and become common. But this could scarcely occur until the foundations of the higher forms of religion had become sapped; while for psycho- 1 See Fitch, Can the Church Survive in the Changing Order f, es- pecially pp. 69-79. a We shall use this term, unless qualified, to mean the religion of Jesus surely its proper sense. When educated people discuss the merits of Buddhism, they usually mean the religion of Gautama Buddha, not the hodge-podge which goes by that name in various lands. So in a scientific discussion of religion, it is only fair to let Christianity be the name for the religion of Jesus rather than the clutter of historical beliefs which have at one time or another assumed that name. 1 2 THE KECOIsTSTKUCTIOST OF KELIGION logical reasons (which we shall later discuss) any wide- spread dissemination and popular acceptance of an ag- nostic positivism is improbable. Practically, therefore, the alternatives before the modern world in a religious way would seem to be either radical irreligion or some more socialized and rationalized form of the religion of Jesus than has yet been attained. The final outcome of the religious revolution through which we are passing 1 is not yet discernible; but its possibilities are, and it is time for thoughtful men to choose among these possibili- ties while they are still j_rea to shape the future of religion. The crisis in tEe religious world has been brought about by the failure of existing religion to adapt itself to the two outstanding facts in our civilization science and democracy. The church must learn to adapF~itself to th"65e-two mighty forces which are building our civiliza- tion. Of these two, soiree is the more outstanding and dominant. It is the foundation of our views of life and of the universe, as well as of our material progress, and so it has largely created the conditions which have favored the rise of modern democracy. Yet the maladjustment of religion with science remains pronounced. Often are we assured by some one in the name of science that science can find nothing in religion except superstition, error, or "the will-to-power" of some privileged class; while, on the other hand, the representatives of religion not infre- 1 Says Professor E. G. Conklin (The Direction of Human Evolution, p. 244) : "To-day we are in the midst of a religious revolution, which is going on so quietly that many do not notice it, although it is a greater and more fundamental revolution than any since the early years of the Christian era." And, he asks: "Can Christianity become the religion of reason and science as well as of emotion and faith, and be made the power for individual and social progress which its founder intended?" The reader will note that the phrase "religious revolu- tion" is used in this book like the phrase "industrial revolution," not to indicate a violent change, but a great transformation. The Protestant Reformation was a religious revolution in this sense. THE KELIGIOUS REVOLUTION 3 quently proclaim it outside of the field of science and re- sent its scientific evaluation as a species of "sacrilege." Both attitudes have made difficult the attainment of ra- tional religion; that' is, a religion in accord with the estab- lished facts of human experience. 1 But if religion is a vital element in civilization (as we hope to show), then the attainment of a rational, ethical religion is one of the greatest and most fundamental of our social needs, and nothing could he more short-sighted and stupid than an irrational attitude toward religion, whether on the part of its defenders or of its critics. In the reconstruction of our civilization which we now face, it is time that scientific thinkers and the representatives of religion join hands in seeking to promote the develop- ment of rational religion as the world's supreme need. For we shall not be able to reconstruct our civilization without the reconstruction of religion ; and the first thing to be aimed at in the reconstruction of religion is to make it rational. 2 Science, as we have noted, is the outstand- ing and dominating fact in modern civilization. A re- ligion which is "adapted to the requirements of modern life" must first of all be adjusted to modern science. A religion which is not in harmony with modern science can- not possibly remain the religion of the thinking class of the future. The hope for religion, as for our social life generally, must lie in foil owing, reason, not in thwarting it. 1 Almost equally regrettable, because harmful to the true interests of religion, is the attitude of those religious people who resent all criticism of religious beliefs and institutions by scientific men, even when made with constructive intent. Constructive criticism should ahvays be welcome, for it is the normal method by which institutions grow. See my Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 149f. 8 For a critical discussion of all that is implied in this word and for the presuppositions of the argument of this book, the reader can- not do better than to consult Professor Hobhouse's recent work, The Rational Good, especially Chapters I and III. 4 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION ./ This may be evident, but there are difficulties in the way. Strangely enough, the defenders as well as the critics of religion have often held that to make it rational would be to destroy it. Ever since Immanuel Kant wrote his treatise on Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, there has been continual controversy between those whom we may call the rationalists in religion and those who have stood for some form of irrationalism, whether traditionalism, mysticism, or some other. 1 Without deny- ing that there are necessary elements of tradition and mys- tery in all religion (even science has these), it would seem that this conflict is no^ longer unres'oTvable. Scarcely any one would be willing to acknowledge that his particular re- ligious faith is unreasonable. Every one acknowledges, in one way or another, the supremacy of the human reason as the ultimate means of testing beliefs and actions. 2 The whole world has become rationalistic in the sense that it acknowledges that the validity of everything must ulti- mately be tested through rational processes ; 8 and religion 1 The solution o^/the problem of the relations of religion and science proposed in this book is, in a sense, the opposite of that proposed by Kant. Kant claimed that the problems of religion could not be approached through science or ordinary rational knowledge, but that religious beliefs were necessary, rational, postulates of the moral life. Thus he created a dualism in intelligence. s Even those persons, one may add, who use reason to refute reason or to show its limitations. For a statement of various anti-intellectual attitudes toward religion, see Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, Chap. 4. It may be well to state at the outset that no intellectualistic theory of religion is proposed in this book. AH that is proposed is to bring religion within the purview of science. This statement is true only when we critically judge the implica- tions of modern irrationalism. For a briof exposition of irrationaliam in modern science itself, see Hobhousp, The Rational Good, Chap. I. Much of the prevalent irrationallsm is due to misunderstanding the term "reapon." "Much of the prejudice ngninst reason," says Pro- fessor Hobhouse, "is due to a misconception for which its friends are as much responsible as its enemies. By l>oth nlike reason is often taken as a thing apart. On the side of knowledge, it is divorced from experience, on the side of conduct frqm feeling. In both cases the THE KELIGIOUS REVOLUTION 5 can scarcely hope that the processes which men make use of in judging other affairs of life will not be applied to it also. A religion which will meet the needs of modern life must accordingly be not merely remotely in some pos- sible harmony with science, but it must be directly indi- cated by science as a necessity for the development of "a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence." It may seem sheer audacity to declare that rational re- ligion is not merely reconcilable with science, but that developed and completed science is a foundation for ra- tional religion. Here, of course, it is necessary to guard oneself against being misunderstood. Fragmentary science, a science which sees the universe merely in bits, and which fails to recognize the social and spiritual life of man as subject-matter for its understanding, will see nothing in religion. Of such science there is an abun- dance in the world at the present time; but it would be as unfair to judge science by it as it would be to judge democracy by the pitiful examples of it also to be found . all too frequently in the modern world. A science which envisages the total of reality, which aims at accurate knowledge of everything which exists, including the total life of man, will surely neither leave religion out of ac- count nor be found antagonistic to rational religion. When we assert that science logically leads to, and will become a support of, religion, we only mean, therefore, that ac- curate knowledge of the universe and of the total life of man will do this. The more we know of the universe and of man, the more we shall know of God. dirorce is fatal to a true understanding" (p. 19). "The conception of reason," he says later, "is not one of a faculty prior to and apart from experience ... It is the conception rather of a principle oper&tire within experience the work of which is always partial and incomplete, . . . the process by which understanding deepens, error is repeatedly eliminated, and truth constantly enlarged." (pp. 73-75) 6 THE KECONSTEUCTION OF EELIGION But some one may say that science is only a method; that it is not coextensive with the term "accurate knowl- edge" ; and furthermore, that the accurate knowledge which we have or can get concerns such a small part of the universe or of human life that it cannot possibly have anything to do with religion ; * and that we must be con- tent, therefore, to keep our science in one compartment of our mind and our religion in another. Science and re- ligion have nothing to do with each other and should leave each other alone. The reply is that science is not merely a method; that it aims at accurate knowledge of everything which exists, including religion itself; and that while its work is far from complete, its trend, its general direction, is such that we are able to see, in part at least, which way we must go if we follow its lead. Science, indeed, is itself nothing but the rationalizing activity of the human mind brought to bear upon the tangible problems of life.^ ( It may, and does, regard its work as incomplete, wherever the evidence needed for a judgment upon those problems is incomplete. Thus it hands over to philosophy the work of formulating rational inferences regarding ultimate problems. But modern philosophy aims more and more to become scientific; and religion, if it is to survive in a scientific and rationaliz- ing world, must move along the same path. As a recent writer has well said: "If religion is nothing but the sub- 1 The arbitrary limitations put upon science both by its friends and by its critics at times, are as absurd as those put upon religion. Thus it is said that science is merely the method of measurement, or the tracing of casual mechanistic sequences; that it cannot take teleology into account, even though human purposes are a part of human experience, etc. The contrary assumption of this book is that the development of science can be limited only by human experience; that science is "a movement towards the knowledge of reality"; and that consequently everything within human experience may be brought to its tests. See Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, especially Part II, Chap. II. THE EELIGIOUS KEVOLUTION 7 mission to mystery, it is doomed. If it is the trembling register of fear, transmuted maybe into softened keys but always fear, if this is all there is in life that is religious, it is not enough to satisfy the rational intelligence. Yet that is what a theology based upon the irrational back- ground of life demands. In short, there must be religion of the head as well as of the heart, if the head is getting control of the situation or else religion will share the fate of the emotions in which it has been enthroned. It will be disbarred from directing the life of intelligence, both individual and social." * Another misunderstanding must here be guarded against; and that is that a rational religion will be a weakened, emasculated religion taking no account of man's impulses and emotions, but as arid and lifeless as the so-called "rationalism" of the eighteenth century. In- deed, a small group of people still exist who call them- selves "rationalists" who display as their chief justifica- tion for this self-bestowed appellation a negative attitude towards all religion. 2 Whether or not such persons are entitled to call themselves "rationalists" in any sense, it is evident that a religion adapted to the needs of human life cannot be a weak, colorless, largely negative intel- lectual belief, but it must enlist the whole nature of man. It must appeal to his impulses and emotions as well as to his most highly developed reason. A rational religion is one which can meet all of these tests. That, indeed, is the very mark and criterion of its rationality, that it is in harmony with the whole life of man; only in that life of man it finds the developed reason to be the final organ 1 Shotwell, The Religious Revolution of Today, p. 154. 'One writer (Benn, The History of Rationalism) has even gone BO far as to define rationalism as "the mental habit of using reason for the destruction of religious beliefs." 8 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION of adaptation, the highest and hence the ultimate guide. 1 It would be an irrational science which would fail to take account of the whole nature of man, and which considered him merely as an abstract intellectual creature motivated and controlled by "pure reason" ; so, too, it would be an equally irrational religion which would regard man as a creature of pure reason, or attempt so to appeal to him. Even Kant did not mean that man is a thing of pure reason. 2 What he meant rather was that religion so far as it was true and useful, like everything else true and useful, could be stated in rational terms; that is, that it could be rationalized, even though from its very nature it comprehended, in one sense, the whole life of man. Rational religion will still have its appeal to the emo- tions and to the impulses, as much as rational patriotism, or rational morality. It is the function of the reason, as the universal relating activity of mind, to harmonize everything in life, assigning to each factor its proper value in the whole process. 3 It is because of this, in- deed, that we trust the rationalizing mechanism in the human mind to be the final adaptive organ in the process 1 Says Professor Fitch (op. cit. p. 36): "Rationalism means dependence upon one of man's faculties alone, the reasoning one"; and he rightly adds, "It is as partial and dangerous as dependence upon feeling alone." This, however, was eighteenth century ration- alism; but neo-rationalism would make "experience as a whole the guide," only insisting that this should mean in final development, organized and verified experience in other words, approaching and settling every question in a scientific attitude of mind. "To the true rationalism," says Professor Hobhouse (Mind in Evolution], "tho supreme reason is no dry pedant living apart and blighting the free spontaneous life of impulse, but the animating spirit that interpene- trates experience and gives to its otherwise scattered fragments new and harmonious meaning." Kant'g famous definition of religion, "The perception of all of our duties as divine command-;," implies, of course, that in both man and religion there is somethi>'X other than the rational element. Compare Hobhous^' ., ntatement (The Rational Good, p. 75), "Reason is the principle of interconnection persistently applied." THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTIOtf 9 of human living. \Ye need to recognize fully, the worth of other elements in human nature, but we must realize that in the complex world in which we live these other elements cannot furnish the ultimate test of our values. It is reason which must lead us upward and on in our struggle to get a human life more completely adapted to the complex requirements of its existence. But it is not the reason of the individual by itself which we thus trust to lead us on to higher and better things. It is rather that developing reason in the whole life of society which we call "science." The individual reason, we all see, is narrow and limited ; but the possibilities of handing down and accumulating the tested product of the rational activi- ties of many individual minds, that is, accurate knowl- edge, from generation to generation are unlimited; and thus reason is bound to perfect itself in the race, 1 if not in the individual, provided of course that some great calamity does not interrupt its work. The modern faith in science is thus itself a faith in the rational and rests upon a secure foundation of knowledge. 1 Compare Spaulding, The New Rationalism; also Hobhouse, The Rational Good, Chapter III, and Hobhouse, Development and Purpose, p. 249. There is little or no ground for Kidd (Social Evolution] and other irrationalists limiting the function of reason to individual adjustments on the basis of self-interest, and finding all altruistic actions to be due to a supra-rational force. On the contrary, there are good psychological grounds for saying that when rational pro- cesses thus function they are imperfect or perverted by unsocial habits or impulses (see my Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects, pp. 120 and 274 ) . The accumulated effects of experience in social traditions and institutions, moreover, must be regarded as the work of reason; e. g., the development of the scientific tradition in society. Skepticism in regard to the work of reason and science, as of everything else, is of course possible. The reader will easily find abundant illustrations of the distrust of reason and science in modern literature and philosophy, but it may be pointed out that such distrust always ends, if not in mysticism, then in pessimism or reactionary traditionalism. No better refutation of such irrationalism will be found than that in Hobhouse's Development and Purpose, and, more briefly, in his recent work, The Rational Good, Chapters I, III and VIII. :oisr ; in re- 10 THE BECONSTKUCTION OF RELIGION It may be objected that there is another element ligion which gives us a surer foundation of certainty than any rationalizing process either in the individual or in the race can do; and that is the element of "inspiration," or "intuition," as modern philosophers prefer to call it. 1 Even if there is such an element, however, it is bound to work with and submit to the reason. This is shown by the fact that the reason has often undermined the re- ligious and moral "intuitions," or "inspirations," of other ages. ISFot that these intuitions or inspirations did not have a value for the particular time and occasion when they were delivered, but like everything else in life they were bound to submit to the criticism of the reason, and as a consequence many in time have been rejected. Those that we still accept we accept only because thus far they have been found to be rational when tested by critical reasoning. There are axioms and postulates in religion and morality, in other words, just as in science; but like those of science they must submit to rational tests if they are to remain accepted. 2 The critical method of science does not leave unexamined even its own postulates, much less can it leave those of morality and religion. In the one case, as in the other, we may rest assured that "the intuitions of common sense," however, will in the long run be seldom overthrown when they are well grounded in total human experience. The fundamentals of religion, like the fundamentals of life itself, are not 1 The most recent expression of this attitude is found in Borgson's works. A brief presentation of his point of view will be found in his Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by T. E. Hulme. While intuition is now generally recognized by psychologists as having a certain validity, there is no warrant in psychology for placing it above critical reasoning and scientific method. Compare Coe, The Psychology of Religion, p. 9. 'On the place of intuitions and postulates within the rational, see Hobhouse, The Rational Good, pp. 64-7 THE EELIGIOUS KE VOLUTION 11 going to be thrown out of the window by science in the name of reason, but rather will be tested by reason. If anything is finally rejected it will be because, being tested, it is found wanting. , Thus a rational religion which shall be far stronger in its hold upon human belief in the social future, because resting upon adequate and secure foundations, is clearly possible. Nevertheless, the struggle to secure a rational religion in the modern world has been accompanied by the most profound social disturbances. Men's beliefs, even in the things which were accepted as axiomatic by the past, have been undermined. The whole structure of values and standards by which civilization has been sustained from the stone age to the present has seemed at times about to j crumble and give way. Our whole modern life has been largely during the last two decades a scene of confused and conflicting values, ideals, and standards. 1 Now there can be no doubt that the main element disturbing the habits, standards, and beliefs of the past in the modern world has been science. The new knowledge which it has brought has often been difficult to assimilate with the old beliefs and standards. It has not only infinitely enlarged the world in which man lives, extending it even beyond the limits of his past imagination, but has even trans- formed the physical environment in which he lives. This transformation of the environment, or man's conquest and control over nature, has made his social life much more complex. 2 By furnishing a much larger food supply, it has multiplied human populations many fold, and so mul- tiplied and intensified social contacts between individuals. By inventing new means of controlling and harnessing 1 See The Social Problem, Revised Edition, 1919, Chapter I. 2 Ibid., pp. 77-85. 12 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION physical energies, it has made the world in which the civilized individual lives a world of machines. The in- vention of machines, moreover, has produced what is known as "great industry," and great industry demands such organization that the individual himself seems to be nothing but part of a vaster machine. New methods of transportation and of intercommunication made possible by these new mechanical inventions have brought about at the same time greater interdependence, contact, and intermingling of all the peoples of the world. The whole planet is now no larger than a good sized island was at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Race contacts and international contacts have vastly multiplied. Cul- tures * and civilizations so blend and overlap that it is beginning to become evident that one relatively uniform culture must finally 3ominate the world. In the religious world these changes in science, in in- dustry, and in the general social environment have pro- duced what has been aptly termed "the religious revolu- tion." Not only have old theological beliefs crumbled, but the theological way of looking at life and at things generally is seen to be of much less importance than for- mer generations supposed. The entire edifice of specu- lative theology has, indeed, been undermined, and by many scientific thinkers it is assigned to the same rank as the mythologies of primitive and barbarous peoples. Because of the identification, moreover, in the popular" mind of religion with theological beliefs, religion itself as a "control" over life has greatly suffered. Not only have religious beliefs and values changed, but they have been immensely weakened. Says an eminent English 1 The word "culture" is used in this book, as in sociology and anthropology generally, moaning civilization in the widest sense. In this sense all human societies, even savages, possess some degree of culture. For the stages of culture, see Chapter III. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION" 13 social and philosophical thinker: 1 "The influence of the Christian religion on daily life has decayed very rapidly throughout Europe during the last hundred years. Not only has the proportion of nominal believers declined, but even among those who believe the intensity of belief is enormously diminished." The truth of this statement, even though it is made by one avowedly hostile to Christianity, can scarcely be doubted by any one who knows fully the facts. 2 It would not be disturbing, however, if in the place of the tradi- tional Christianity which has existed in Europe during the last hundred years some socially higher form of re- ligion was manifestly emerging and becoming dominant; but instead we find manifest everywhere, as we shall see, a recrudescence of the ideas, values and standards of the religions which preceded Christianity in Europe, even in their cruder and more brutal forms. 8 1 Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 168. 1 In his well known Investigation on The Belief in God and Immor- tality, Professor J. H. Leuba concludes from a study of the opinions of nearly one thousand students in the leading American college! that "Christianity, as a system of belief, has utterly broken down, and nothing definite, adequate and convincing has taken ita place. Their beliefs, when they have any, are superficial and amateurish in the extreme." This confusion and uncertainty in religious beliefs is, of course, to be expected in an age of revolutionary religious changes. Many critics of Christianity would interpret such phe- nomena as signs of its passing. Thus Edward Carpenter in Pagan aud Christian Creeds (p. 257) says: "That Christianity can continue to hold the field of religion is neither probable nor desirable . . . The hour of its Exodus has come." Such critics usually mean by "Christianity" some form or forms of religion taught by the Christian Church rather than "the religion of Jesus," and usually have little or no idea of the social evolutionary significance of the latter as set forth in Chapter III. See Chapter IV. The recrudescence of pagan ethical and religious attitudes, discussed more fully as survivals in our civilization in Chapter IV, is pointed to here merely as evidence of the revolutionary changes which our ethics and religion are now undergoing confusion and reversion to earlier forms always being characteristic of revo- lutionary periods. 14 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KELIGION The confusion, doubt, and uncertainty which pervade our world of religious beliefs and values is not, then, an isolated phenomenon. It is only one manifestation of the general confusion which exists in the whole modern world as regards the values and standards of human liv- ing. In the new and complex social world in which we live the values and standards of simpler ages are often found totally unadapted to present conditions, and be- cause so many have been found wanting, doubt and un- certainty have spread to all. Even the most fundamental beliefs, values, and standards by which men hitherto have lived have come to be questioned. 1 All the institutions of the modern world may be said to be at the present time in the melting pot, being tested in the crucible of fiery criticism. Such confusion as we are now living in is to be ex- pected in all ages of transition ; for in the transition from one way of thinking to another, from one form of insti- tution to another, there is always a period of confusion and uncertainty. 2 ~No individual, to say nothing of a whole civilization, ever radically changes his habits with- out such a period. The danger in all such cases, how- ever, is that confusion and uncertainty may last too long, 'Says Professor Hudson (The Truths We Live By, p. 21) : "The standards of the home, even the criteria for the rearing of children, have broken down. The leisure occupations of youth, always symp- tomatic of any age, are not only unguidedly and frankly hedonistic, but across the borders of what was once considered decorous; not because of a new and liberalizing moral standard, as is sometimes pretended ; but because of the lack of any. The popularity of certain recent dances, formerly forbidden even in the "red-light" districts, is typical. So is much of our periodical reading matter and any number of 'movie' plays, over the edge of the decadently erotic." However, after a careful discussion of the present conflict and con- fusion of ideals, Professor Hudson rightly concludes: "The contra- dictions of our own day may mean . . . the advance toward a new moral order." See my book, The Social Problem, pp. 29-43 and 73-86. 3 See Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 163-1C4. THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTIOJST 15 and that instead of new and higher adjustments being made under the guidance of reason, human nature may fall back upon primitive and irrational adjustments. For adjustment upon the plane of animal impulse or rever- sion to old habits is always easier than adjustment upon a new and higher rational plane. To think out the prob- lems of life requires effort, and when ennui overtakes the popular mind in such periods of confusion, it is easier to fall back upon mere impulse or mere tradition. Thus I serious reversions may occur in the development of our general social life; * and such reversions are an ever present danger in our religious and moral life as well as in other phases of our social life. There is, however, no cause for despair in all this con- fusion, doubt and uncertainty regarding religious and other social values, provided we can get light upon the reconstruction in religion and in our social life generally which is needed to meet the requirements of modern life. A period of revolution and change gives opportunity for advance not less than retrogression. Whether we shall have advance or retrogression depends upon the ra- tional guidance which can be given to social movements at such a time. It is foolish to expect that in such a crisis religion and morality can escape the criticism which is being applied to all other institutions. Their friends can best serve their interests not by seeking to shield them from criticism but by seeking to guide criticism into ra- tional channels. Unless, however, the religious revolu- tion (or readjustment) through which the civilized world is now passing has rational, scientific guidance, the chances are wholly upon the side of readjustment upon a much lower social and mental plane than that of the i Ibid., pp. 184-187. 16 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF EELIGION traditional theological Christianity which our modern world is leaving hehind. There is unfortunately abundant evidence * just at present in the civilized world of reversion to a lower plane of moral and religious values than existed a gen- eration ago. It is true that there have also been made throughout the civilized world during the last few decades many efforts to lift both religion and morality to a higher social and to a more rational plane. But in the face of the world-wide conflicts of the present it would be foolish for even the most optimistic to believe that such efforts have been generally successful; for the conflicts between the classes, nations, and races of the modern world are only indicative of the fact that as yet no values, adequate for a basis of harmonious human living together, have been generally accepted. We must candidly face such facts; and while there may be many grounds for encour- agement, as the writer himself firmly believes, it is use- less to deny or to gloss over the facts which seem to indi- cate partial social, moral, and religious retrogression. 2 N 1 A part of this evidence will be found in Chapter IV. The com- plexity of our civilization, of course, makes impossible any generaliza- tion which will apply to all sections of our population, and the statements made are meant to express only general trejids. Leaders especially often advance while popular standards do not do so or revert. a The scientific student of society finds that periods of retrogression in certain lines of culture are not unusual in human history; indeed, that the very method of progress in the past at least has been by successive advances and retrogressions, just as the mind proceeds by the "trial and error" method. On the confusion, uncertainty and reversions which we are likely to find in periods of social transition, see my Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 162-164. Says one of the more penetrating popular religious writers: "Blind indeed are those who do not see the fact that a great change has come over men's thought on the subject of religion. . . . We have broken with the old historical conception of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, and we have not, as yet, taken hold of the new conception. We are out of the old house and not yet in the THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTION 17 It should be unnecessary to say that the scientific social thinker who is accustomed to the idea of progress is not disturbed by those specific changes in modern life which indicate a progressive rationalization of religion and morality. He raises the question of decadence only when he finds reversions toward forms which he knows belong to a lower rather than to a higher stage of social develop- ment. If, for example, he found the traditional Chris- tianity of the past being replaced by a form of religion which was evidently more adapted to the scientific knowl- edge and to the general requirements of the social life of the present, he would not be disturbed by such a state- ment as the following, made by a recent English writer: "Certainly during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war there were signs that sympathy with the Neo-Pagan spirit was deepening and becoming more widespread. In literature and art, in journalism, in phi- losophy, and even in the Church there were solitary in- dividuals and small groups of men and women who were beginning to make themselves heard. . . . The most potent element . . . was probably the increasing influence of Nietzsche." Too much in our social life may easily be ascribed to the influence of an individual ; but individuals often sym- bolize social tendencies. If Nietzsche were not profoundly new. Our state of mind is an unsettled state, our opinions being in the condition of the vines that have been torn from the wall to which they clung, without being given anything else to cling to. "I am sure that the new wall is in process of building, and that in due time the vines now trailing the dust will find upon it proper support. In a word, the rational that is to say true interpreta- tion of religion will come by and by, and when it does there will bo an abundant supply of men ready and willing to proclaim its uplifting truths." To this statement the author would heartily subscribe. 18 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION symptomatic of his age and of the present day, 1 if he were not a symbol, if he did not set the problem for us, it would be idle to mention him at all in our discussion. But from Machiavelli to Nietzsche there has been a constant succession of writers who have denied and derided the social ideals of Christianity. The attacks made upon theological Christianity left the social influence of the Church but little, if at all, weakened ; for original Chris- tianity, that is to say the teachings of Jesus, had had but little theology in it. The Church has often condemned men for their theological opinions; but Jesus never did. The profoundly significant thing in the religious revolu- tion, then, has been not the attack upon theology, but the attack upon and the gradual undermining of Christian ethical ideals; and in this movement Nietzsche not only marks the culmination but symbolizes and embodies what we must undoubtedly regard as one of the strongest tend-^ encies of modern civilization the movement back toward pagan ideals. This is the opinion not only of a host ci writers friendly to Christianity, but also of many of the avowed exponents of Neo-Paganism itself. For the pur- poses of our discussion, then, Nietzsche is merely a sym- bol to define our problem. If Nietzsche symbolizes so much in the spirit of our time, and especially the tendency to reversion to the pagan level, it will be well to present a few of his lead- ing ideas in brief quotations, even though the literature of the present is crowded ad nauseam with these. "I regard Christianity," says Nietzsche, "as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever yet existed." 2 "Sexu- 1 Despite the large literature upon Nietzsche, there is little that treats of him as a social phenomenon, a product of our civilization. An approach to this is found in Figgis, The Will to Freedom. a The Will to Power, translated by A. M. Ludovici, p. 163. This is the best single book to present .Nietzsche's ideas. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION" 19 ality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appear- ance and deception, great and joyful gratitude to Lifo and its typical conditions . . . these things are essential to ( all Paganism, and it has a good conscience on its side." "Poverty, humility, chastity, are dangerous and slander- ous ideals." 2 "Morality is a menagerie," concludes Nietzsche, "it assumes that iron bars may be more useful than freedom, even for the creature that it imprisons." In one respect Nietzsche was, of course, not symbolical of his age, or at least of no increasing party in it; and that was in his hatred of democracy and his exaltation of the aristocratic ideal of life. "The maintenance of the military state," he says in a characteristic passage, "is the last means of adhering to the great tradition of the past, or, where it has been lost, to revive it. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved, and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in states, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may on that account seem justified." 4 It will not do to dismiss Nietzsche's ideas with the re- mark that he was mentally abnormal, because the enlight- ened egoism, brute force, class aggrandizement, and gen- eral glorification of the brute in man which he preached have been altogether too prevalent in our civilization to admit disposing of Nietzsche's creed in such a manner. Indeed, three centuries ago Machiavelli said very much the same things, and he, too, was symptomatic of the reversion toward pagan ideals in his day. If his teach- ings do not appear to have had the influence which Nietzsche's teachings appear to have at present, it is only 1 Quoted by Figgis, op. cit., p. 277. 1 The Will to Power, p. 183. 8 Ibid., p. 348. * Quoted by Figgis, op. cit., p. 282. 20 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION because Nietzsche is more profoundly representative of certain tendencies of our age. Few in the English-speak- ing world even knew Nietzsche's name previous to the Great War; but that his practical followers even among English-speaking people have numbered millions, no one can doubt who has probed deeply into the spirit of our time, 1 though of course few of his unconscious followers have had the courage of conviction or the logical consist- ency which Nietzsche had. Whatever his madness, he did the world the invaluable service of showing what the movement back toward pagan ideals logically means in its final development. We have quoted from him, then, be- cause he sets the problem for us. The religion* problem of our day, in other words, is not a problem in metaphysics or theology; it is a problem in the practical values of hu- man living. This Nietzsche with characteristic insight clearly saw and emphasized. Already two generations ago Comte foresaw some such issue, when he declared that theological Christianity was dying and that the first task of social science was to find adequate scientific supports for Christian morality. Chris- tian morality, he feared, might disintegrate with the decay of Christian theology, with resulting calamity to civilization, unless science provided for the former a scientific basis. Only he failed to appreciate that there was little chance of preserving Christian morality without the "world's acknowledging the leadership of Jesus. Let us now turn, however, from the world of opinion to the world of action. There we find, if anything, even more tangible and startling proofs of the Renaissance of Paganism. 2 The worst in pagan morals found constant 1 See Chapter IV. 1 For fuller definition of "paganism," "pagan ideals," see Chapter IV. THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION 21 and reiterated expression in the Great World War. 1 The War itself was, indeed, at bottom nothing but the expres- sion of the development of pagan tendencies in the mod- ern world. These tendencies came to a head in modern Germany, and her ruthlessness in the War only fore- shadows the "terror" which the religious revolution may bring to the whole world unless we succeed in establish- ing a socialized religion and morality. While Germany undoubtedly led in paganizing the world, it would be foolish to fail to see that the same tendencies have been at work in a marked degree in every nation of Christendom. Machiavellian statecraft, making might and expansion the sole object of international poli- tics, and the power of one class over another the chief end of domestic politics, has been increasingly manifest for the last three or four decades among Western nations. Behind this Machiavellian statecraft has been a ruthless and predatory organization of certain business interests that aimed only at enormous profits, either from the ex- ploitation of natural resources within the nation, or of foreign markets. In the private concerns of life reversion to lower levels of conduct has been not less in evidence. Marriage and the family life have become exploited by individuals simply for their own happiness and pleasure. Divorces have become increasingly common, 2 venereal diseases have 1 For elaboration, see Chapter IV. 1 Already by 1016 the official statistics showed that the divorce rate in the United States (one divorce to nine marriages) exceeded that of Japan, which previously had had the highest divorce rate of any great civilized nation. For fifty years the divorce rate has increased in the United States nearly three times as fast as population^ The sociological significance of this movement is not generally appreciated. The family is not only the chief primary group, but it is the chief Creator and bearer of primary moral ideals. The disintegration of the family is, therefore, necessarily accompanied by moral disintegration. 22 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION doubled and trebled in the population, while free love, temporary marriages, and polygamy have found ardent advocates. In the realm of practical moral and religious move- ments, the religious revolution has already expressed itself in striking phenomena. Religious and moral agnosticism have become common in the sophisticated circles of so- ciety. It has become fashionable in some of these circles, indeed, to believe in nothing except mere negations. But among the less critically minded, lower forms of religion and ethics already have begun to appear. We find re- vivals of polytheism, of oriental mysticism, of sun wor- ship, and similar cults. 1 It is becoming evident, indeed, that if rational religion does not dominate in our civiliza- tion, in the long run irrational religion is bound to do so. 2 Nietzscheism itself may be regarded as but one of these irrational cults. It is scarcely necessary to mention that one of the striking phenomena of the Great War was the tendency it revealed to revert to lower forms of re- ligious beliefs and practises. Not only did the religion of fear tend to displace the religion of trust, and See my Sociology and Modern Social Problems, 1919 edition, Chapters IV and VIII. 1 In a recent editorial the editor of Nature (London), commenting; on the "remarkable recrudescence" of belief in amulets, mascots, and other forms of magic in present society rightly characterizes these as antisocial reversions to a wholly primitive mode of thought. Tie adds: "To the sociologist this phase of modern credulity is of the greatest moment. Religion, with the attendant moral codes, has, on th^ whole, proved one of the strongest factors in the pros.Tv.it ion of the social structure. . . . Should the place of (ethical ) religion be taken by a reversion on any extended scale to a wholly primitive mode of thought, the prospect affords faint hope of social security and progress." Of course, the same remarks would apply equally well to any of the other retrogressive movements mentioned. ' Says Professor Hobhouse: "The history of our time shows that if men no longer believe in God, they will make themselves gods of power, of evolution, of the race, the Nation or the State" (Meta- physical Theory of the State, p. 234). THE KELIGIOUS REVOLUTION 23 the religion of hate the religion of love, but tendencies were even in evidence to revert from true monotheism to "henotheism." * National deities were again invoked and found worshippers. Many questions connected with the religious revolution might here he raised. In the next chapter we shall try to show that religion and morality are the most profoundly significant things in determining the character of our social life, and that therefore such phenomena as those we have just discussed are of the utmost social import. But be- fore we attempt this it may be well to ask, whither are we going? What is to be the end of the religious revo- lution ? Is it to end in the negation of religion and, pos- sibly, of idealistic morality? Before any one draws such a pessimistic conclusion it would be well to remember that while the dangers of serious reversion are great in any period of social transi- tion and revolution, yet they are not insurmountable, and if met by rational intelligence they will probably be over- come and a higher stage of development ushered in. Hu- man history, indeed, gives us every encouragement to be- lieve that this will be the result in the present crisis, if the sensible and rationally-minded leaders in religion and ethics lay aside their minor differences, close up their ranks, and unite in leading civilization to a higher phase of religion and morality. For the world has passed through many religious revolutions in the past, or at least, through many great religious changes, and there can be no doubt that hitherto the vast majority of them have been for the better. Neither pessimism nor foolish optimism iThis word is used by students of religion to designate the nationalistic stage of religion preceding true monotheism. Se next chapter. 24 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION are warranted, then, in the present crisis in religion and ethics; but only determination on the part of religiously minded people, whether inside of or outside of churches, to meet the crisis with wisdom and rationality. Religion is a thing which is evolving, developing, like everything else in the world. 1 The type of religion which was .suited to yesterday will not be suitable for to-morrow; aiid yet the essence of religion remains the same, as we shall see, while it ascends to higher and higher forms. Like everything else in human culture it builds itself upon foundations laid in the past. There is no such thing in civilization as a new way of human living which is not rooted in the past. Progress consists rather in the inven- tion or building up of new elements, institutions, or ways of living, through a selection and re-combination of old elements. But if the new is to work well there must be careful and rational selection of the old. We must be careful to see that nothing of real value for the present or the future is lost. This is the true policy of social conservation, and it applies in religion and ethics as well as in all other social matters. If we follow this pathway of "conservating" progress, we can never go far astray. No less than seven distinct stages of religious evolu- tion, of man's conception of the divine, according to anthropologists, may be found in the past ; namely, manaism, animism, totemism, ancestor worship, poly- theism, henotheism, and monotheism. 2 Each stage has 1 Says Professor Conklin (The Direction of Human Evolution, p. 175) : "The fact of the evolution of religion is held by some to destroy its value and significance, hut one might as well hold that the develop- ment of the individual destroys the value or personality or that the evolution of man destroys his unique superiority over all other creatures." * These are dealt with more fully in the next chapter (pp. 48 f.). They are mentioned here merely to give background to the present stage of the general discussion. THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTIOST 25 meant a higher conception of the universal reality in which man lives, and moves, and has his heing. It has meant, also, a higher conception on the part of man of his own life and destiny and of his relationship to his fellow men. Thus far each new stage in the development of re- ligion has meant a new stage in civilization and vice versa. The question is, What is the next stage ? Is it "atheism," as so many * have said ? Whither does the religious revo- lution now lead? It hardly needs to be pointed out to the student of civili- zation that we have scarcely yet attained to a true mono- theism ; that we left henotheism behind but yesterday, and that still the peoples of the world are prone to relapse into it. It ought, also, to be unnecessary to point out that monotheism itself has many stages. "Deism," for exam- ple, the idea that God is a sort of super-engineer who made the universe like a great machine, was a favorite form of monotheism among those intellectualists of the eighteenth century who clung to some sort of attenuated religious belief. Curiously enough, we may remark in passing, it is the sort of religious belief which is com- monly ascribed to intelligent religious people by those who would reject altogether the idea of God. And it must be acknowledged that deism, as well as henotheism, still abounds in the religious life not only of so-called Chris- tian peoples, but even of members of Christian churches. 1 So Guyau in his Non-Religion of the Future. So also Miss Jane Harrison, author of several brilliant studies on the social origin and development of religion. So Eugenic Rignano, editor of the inter- national scientific review, Scientia, and many others of many schools of thought. In the study referred to above, Professor Leuba found agnosticism and atheism very prevalent among American men of science. The conventional attitude of some scientific men is typically expressed by Sellars, who says (The Next Step in Religion, p. 217) : "The truth is that mankind is outgrowing theism in a gentle and steady way until it ceases to have any clear meaning." 26 THE KECOXSTEUCTION OF EELIGION It would be strange, indeed, if, in accordance with the principles which we have just laid down, we should find civilization transcending monotheism before it had fairly attained to it. The appearances are rather those of re- version to a lower stage than of evolution into a higher stage. The monotheistic stage of religious evolution, we have every reason to believe "when we carefully examine the facts, has only just begun. Perhaps humanity may never attain fully to it ; but if not, it will surely fall back to a lower form of religion. The religious revolution which we are now undergoing, if it does not fail and lead to a reversion, concerns the transition from theological to ethical monotheism, from a metaphysical to a social and scientific conception of religion. Monotheism is not outgrown, for rationally understood, it can never be outgrown; we have not yet grown into it. We need a more social form of it; but we cannot escape the necessity for faith that the system of things is not alien to ourselves. If man is to have a vital, social re- ligion he cannot believe that the universe is a "fool's house" which will bring to naught his highest endeavors. He must be able to face the universal reality of which he is a part with confidence that it is on the side of hi3 highest endeavors. It is a part of his positive scientific knowledge that all that he is, all that he values, all that is highest and best in himself, has come from that one universal reality. 1 It would be irrational if he did not believe that he could put his trust in the ascending energy of the universe which has created him and made possible his works. No ; man will never cease to need a positive, constructive, trustful attitude toward the universe and the whole system of things. 2 He must have confidence in his 1 See Chapter V, pp. 134-140. 1 See Chapter II, pp. 59-64. THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTION 27 world, if he is not to despair. lie must believe in the possibilities and the value of life if his energies are to be fully released l if he is to function efficiently as a mem- ber of society, to the point, perhaps, of complete self- sacrifice. /He must be able, in other words, to confront the issues of life and death with a supreme faith ; but to do this he must project his social and personal values into the universal reality itself. J Even the most primitive forms of religion did this for the most primitive men. Their religion braced their vital feeling, gave them* confidence in themselves and in their world. The savage of to-day tells us that his religion, or, as in our superiority we would say, his superstition, makes him feel good, glad, gives him second sight, strength, suc- cess in war, and in all undertakings generally. More than this could scarcely be said, oftentimes, for the religion of even the most higHly civilized individual. In one great respect, however, apart from the content of theological belief, the religion of primitive man ap- parently differed from the religion of the modern man. The religion of primitive man apparently dominated his whole life, his government, his social organization, his family and sex life, his education, and even his food- getting. 2 This we know remained so even in mediaeval Europe ; and it has often been pointed out that one great characteristic of modern society is the complete divorce- ment of one social interest after another from religion. Thus industry, politics, education, science, family life, and 1 Says Professor Hobhouse: "If we believe the whole course of human evolution to be without significance . . . we shall place a lower estimate on all that makes for the control of natural conditions by the human mind, and a high one on all that leads to resignation and submission." (The Rational Good, p. 232.) 2 For elaboration, consult the work of Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, especially Chapters I-1V of Book II. 28 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION even morality itself, are said to have successively divorced themselves from their setting of religious feeling. In so far as this is a wholesome movement it may be questioned, however, whether the separation is not more formal than real. An industry, politics, education, science, family life, morality, which are absolutely divorced from religious feeling and values, must become in time intol- erable. The social life is such a unity that its values, as we shall try to show, must all be suffused with religious feeling if they are to come to the individual with the fullest sanction. The divorcement of politics, government, and the state from religion, for example, is not a divorce- ment which we need to fear, provided the individual citi- zen carries again his religious attitude back into these practical activities; but a government which is in no degree controlled by religious values would soon cease to be a government in accord with the conditions of man's life. The so-called secularization of many activities, there- fore, only means that these activities have been divorced from the formal control of ecclesiastical organization. So far from such secularization being opposed to the real interests of religion, those who believe in free or democratic society see in this movement only opportunity for the vital expansion of religion. The release of these great human interests from formal ecclesiastical control gives opportunity, in other words, for vital religion, as it expresses itself through the conscience of the individual, to pervade and truly moralize these activities. To take another example, it has not been found that charity has' lost any of its religious appeal or value through its being conducted by secular organizations or by branches of the state. On the contrary, by this very method the values of rational humanitarian religion have oftentimes been impressed more deeply upon the community as a whole. THE KELIGIOUS KEVOLUTION 29 Ecclesiastical control must not be confused with control by spiritual religion. Even religion itself has profited by escaping from a too formal ecclesiastical control. Still it would be foolish to overlook the fact that this secularization of one phase of our social life after another, if not accompanied by a deepening and broadening of the religious life of the individual, is fraught with many dangers. Thus we may easily get through such separa- tion purely official and brutalized charity, a paganized, Machiavellian politics, and a profits-at-any-price indus- try. Thus it comes about that the modern man with the immense complexity and specialization of his activities needs religion to safeguard his social life, if anything, even more than did primitive man. He needs it because he lives in a more complex, specialized world in which the difficulties of adjustment are greater. He needs it, also, because of his higher intellectual development which makes it more necessary for him to see a meaning in things beyond mere appearances if he is to adjust himself successfully to them. He needs it, finally, because stronger and more universal good will are necessary as social inter- dependence in a world-wide social life develops. As Comte said, then, man must become ever more religious, if he is to preserve that harmony of the inner with the outer which gives an abounding and satisfying life, whether in the group or in the individual. But there is no argument, some may say, for the truth of religion in the fact that man needs religion. If by this is meant that the truth of any particular religious belief is not demonstrated by its social utility, that we would admit. It is not our purpose to discuss in this book the question of the metaphysical truth of specific religious be- liefs, or even of the religious view of life in general. It 30 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION is rather our purpose to point out the personal and social value of religion. In both science and practical life, how- ever, we do judge the truth of propositions largely by the way they work out in practice by their practical value. If we find that we cannot act on a proposition that it will not work in practice a presumption is established against its truth. Science, then, no less than religion is positive in its attitude toward experience. It does not proceed wholly by doubt, but affirms to be true what is tested by experience. Faith in the world of human ex- perience, when taken as a whole and its errors allowed to cancel one another, is the supreme faith of science. Science rests upon this faith. It is even so with sane religion. It, too, builds itself up out of the experience of life. If it affirms to be true certain beliefs and values, it is because it finds these to be justified by their works in the lives of men and in the whole structure of human society. The chief difference is in their history, that science has kept the open mind and has revised its appraisals of truth as experience has widened ; while religion, becoming enmeshed in tradition- alism, has too often refused to do this; it has too often remained static while society has been evolving. It has too often failed to keep the open mind. But the religious revolution has now given religion the opportunity to become a dynamic rather than a static thing to become "experimental," as it were; at least, to base itself upon the experience and needs of men in a present world. Thus between positive, constructive science and rational, constructive religion opposition should lessen. When social science becomes fully positive and construc- tive, it will indeed lead to rational social religion. The THE BELIGIOUS HE VOLUTION 31 religious revolution need not, then, end in chaos and ir- religion. It can and should end, if guided by intelligence, in a new era of rational religious faith. 1 The great English painter, Watts, symbolized the faith, or rather the lack of faith, of the nineteenth century in his picture of Hope seated blindfolded upon the earth. But such a view of man's relation to the universal reality can hardly be taken as the final verdict of the rational mind. The absolute agnosticism and scepticism of the nineteenth century can scarcely be regarded as more than an ab- normal mental attitude brought about by the confusion and uncertainty of a transitional era in religious beliefs. The ages of faith are not past, as we are often told; for faith is of the very essence of normal human life. The ages of irrational faith, we may hope, are past or passing; but the age of a rational and understanding faith is still ahead. We need the maximum of faith, not the mini- mum; but it must be a faith built upon facts. To reach such faith, we cannot turn our backs on knowledge, science, and revert again to mysticism. We must not fear intel- ligence. Our safety must consist in following it in build- ing up, on the facts of life, a reasonable faith. Says Professor Smith : "Beneath the stirrings and seeth- ings of modern unrest, one discerns dimly the outlines of a religion which shall trust in the larger future instead of being bound literally to the past ; which shall glory in the capacity of man to use God's resources to remake this world instead of inculcating a passive dependence on supernatural forces which lie out of man's reach; which shall develop scientific control into a mighty instrument 1 Professor G. B. Smith is undoubtedly right in his contention (in his Social Idealism and the Changing Theology] that the world revealed by modern science is richer in possibilities of reasonable religious faith than the old supernatural world ever waa. 32 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION for the welfare of man instead of uttering warnings against the 'dangers' of scientific theories." * To sketch the outlines of such a religion, will be the task of the succeeding chapters. 1 Social Idealism and the Changing Theology, p. 154. CHAPTER II THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION "MORALITIES and religions," said Nietzsche with char- acteristic insight, "are the principal means by which one can modify men into whatever one likes," provided, he added, that one is given time enough in which to do it. Yet nothing is perhaps more openly questioned to-day than the social power of religion. It is not our purpose to go fully into the psychology and sociology of religion, but we must know something about the real nature of religion oefore we can understand its significance for the social life of man. This is the first thing necessary in consid- ering the reconstruction of religion. No one can doubt the power of religion in exceptional individual cases. St. Simeon Stylites lived at the top of a sixty foot pillar for thirty years without descending. The Hindu fakir holds his fist closed until the nails of his fingers grow through the back of his hand. Both these feats would seem incredible were they not well-authenti- cated facts; * and indeed thoy could only be possible through religious fanaticism. The power of "fixed ideas" is a familiar fact of abnormal psychology. The "religious psychosis," as we might call it, has produced more mira- N N/ 1 The scientific facts for the interpretation of religion are, of course, as broad as human history. The literature of anthropology especially abounds in them. Perhaps the best collection of scientific material on religion is to be found in the monumental Hastings: Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, though the articles are of unequal value. See especially the articlos on "Religion." "Animism," "Ancestor Wor- ship," etc. Good bibliographies accompany each article. 33 34 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION cles in human behavior than even the most enthusiastic advocate of religion has ever given it credit for. 1 Not only have, by means of it, drunkards and criminals been reformed, prostitutes been led to lead a pure life, sinners in general made to repent, the sick made well, but the character of whole communities has been radically altered, even transformed, in the course of a few years. Such facts as these are not open to even scientific doubt, because they are checked up by overwhelming evidence on the one hand, and by the general principles of normal and ab- normal psychology on the other hand. Indeed, when we examine the matter, we find that re- ligion has entered into the warp and woof of every civili- zation that the world has known. Sociology and anthro- pology show that this was not due to accident. What makes civilization is the mass of habits and traditions handed down with constant accumulations from generation to generation. But these habits and traditions cannot be thus passed on in human society without strong social sanctions attached to them. They are passed on, in other words, as customs, as traditional beliefs, values, and standards; in brief, as "mores." Now the mores of a people are all-powerful, but they are such only because they are embedded in religious sanctions. 2 They begin 1 Perhaps the best easily accessible collection of facts on the effect of religion on individual behavior is to be found in James's Varieties of Religious Experience, Lectures IV to XV inclusive. 8 Durkheim's view (set forth in his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life) that primitive religion is the original matrix out of which have developed government, law, morality, philosophy, science, art, etc., is, of course, correct if we enlarge our conception of religion BO that it means "the mores regarded as sacred." More narrowly, however, religion is a peculiar sanction given to the mores. For exposition of the sociology of the mores, see Sumner's classical work, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores and Morals, especially Chapters I and II. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 35 to crumble and disintegrate as soon as the particular re- ligious belief or sanction which accompanied them passes away. But with them crumbles and disintegrates the civi- lization of which they were a part. We have no record of a civilization which long endured which did not have this religious setting for its mores ; nor of any which endured long after this setting was dissolved. 1 The full reasons for this will become evident as we proceed. Our argu- ment, however, will be seen not to rest upon the uncertain foundations of an historical induction, but rather upon fundamental laws of human nature and human society. But, it may be said, the very illustrations just used show that religion is as frequently a power for evil as for good ; or even that it is reactionary, and belongs to the irrational in human life. That it has been very frequently in the past a power for evil and for unreason, no sane student of religion or of human society would deny. Our only contention is that religion is a real power in human life, and one that cannot be dispensed with in the more complex stages of social evolution, even though it may be made to serve the evil as well as the good. By the same token that it may become a power for evil it may be made a power for good. All human history, in one sense, indeed, has been a search for a rational and social religion. Very early even in primitive ages those religious beliefs and practices which did not meet with the approbation of the community as a whole were outlawed and branded as "black magic." 2 So to-day we still brand as magic or 1 Hubbard in The Fate of Empires, Part II, assembles some of the evidence. 3 See Marett: The Threshold of Religion, especially Chapter III; also his Anthropology, pp. 209-212. The general view of magic now held by a majority of anthropologists is that it sprang originally from the same fundamental processes in the primitive mind as religion. "The two fundamental concepts underlying both magic and religion are those of spirit and power." But magic and religion early ON 36 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION superstition forms of religion which are manifestly an- tagonistic to the welfare of the particular community which passes judgment upon them. Religion in the strictest sense, as sociologically distinguished from magic and superstition, has always been beliefs and practices which the community approves. 1 The struggle for a ra- tional and social religion in our new world of science and of complex social relations is still essentially to-day what it has been in the past: it is a struggle to find a religion adapted to the requirements of present life. But, again, it may be said that while religion has un- questionably been a power in the past social life of man, it is a dangerous power, seeing that it may work for the evil as well as the good, for reaction as well as for prog- ress; and so is one which civilization cannot too soon get rid of. We no longer need "the religious psychosis," with its tendencies toward fanaticism or "fixed ideas" in our present humanitarian civilization. We especially no longer need it if our social life is to become rationalized, because it is the antithesis of reason. 2 Statements like these, which we hear so frequently to-day, show a strange blindness to the actual facts of life, and remind one of that narrow "rationalism" of the eighteenth century which made man so entirely an abstract intellectual creature. j Men still need help in life as much as in the ages gone differentiated, magic becoming mechanical, impersonal, individualistic, while religion became spiritual, institutional, and congregational or collective. 1 For a different view of magic see Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion, Part II, especially Chapter IX. 'Compare, e.g., Bury's statement (Uistnrii of Freedom of ThouqJit, p. 229): "Religion is gradually becoming leas indispensable. The further we go back in the past, the more valuable is religion as an element in civilization; an we advance, it retreats more and more into the background, to be replaced by science." For full criticism of this view, see pages 59-64 of this book. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 37 by. They do not and cannot live by reason alone, as we have already pointed out, but need some sort of faith in unseen powers, which we term "religion." The end of all religion is in social and personal salvation, in help over the difficulties and redemption from the evils of life. Like the mind itself, religion exists to meet the needs of life, and it is essentially an adaptive device of life; like reason, it exists in particular to meet the needs of life in very complex situations, in "crises," where the lower processes of body and mind are inadequate to cope with the situation. 1 Exactly how it does this we shall see later. It will suffice now to point out that religion braces vital feeling, that it taps new levels of energy, and gives one thus strength, as we have seen, to perform deeds far be- yond what are commonly regarded as normal human powers. Now, so far as we can see, the time will never come when man will not have need of religion to release fully his energies, to brace his vital feeling, and to help him face the issues of life and death with confidence in him- self and in his world. The dream which the hedonistic philosophers of the nineteenth century had of a "pleasure economy," in which there would be no need of the help which religion can give, because the difficulties and evils of life would be all overcome, has been rudely shattered. Not only has the World War shown that there is as much need of faith, loyalty, and self-devotion in the world as 1 That religion is wholly a social matter, purely a social product, as Durkheim apparently claims (in his Elementary Forms of the Re- ligious Life), is a theory which will not bear close scientific scrutiny. On the contrary, like reason, religion has both individual and social roots and manifestations. A scientific view of religion must be found in a synthesis of Durkheim's sociological view and the psychological view, as set forth for example in James's Varieties of Religious Experience. For a criticism of Durkheim's view see Webb's Group Theories of Religion and the Individual, especially Chapters I-IV. 38 THE KECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION ever, but a deeper understanding of the nature of the social life itself has revealed that, whether mankind is at peace or at war, this will always be so. The nature of our social life, in other words, is such that if progress is to continue it demands constantly the service and sacrifice of individuals for the good of humanity. 1 Each generation builds, as we have seen, upon the work of previous generations, and it is only through a policy of social conservation and of productive, efficient social service that civilization can be preserved and continually advanced. In each new generation the increasing complexity of the social life will call for heroism, self-devotion, and self-sacrifice for the good of humanity as in previous generations. Crises in life will not cease through human progress, nor will man come ' to need less the power of self-sacrifice. The world will never cease to need, in other words, clean, high-minded, self-devoted, self-sacrificing human living. The "soft" view of life, which was so popular in the ease-loving and self-indulgent pre-war days, has proved itself to be an unworkable view. The hedonistic utopia of a "pleasure economy" just ahead, in which no one would have to work harder, or behave better, than he wanted to, is seen to be a chimera. Men will always need for efficient, worth- while human living, full command of their adaptive powers; and highest among these, standing side by side, as it were, yet often in these later days made strangely to antagonize each other, are religion and reason. For what is religion? Why do we compare it as an adaptive process in the human mind to reasoning itself? 1 See Novicow, Mechanism and Limits of Human Association (translation in American Journal of Sociology, November, 1017); also The Social /Vofc/rm, 1010 edition, pp. 273-280, and Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 323-328. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 39 Let us see what religion does, and then we shall perhaps in part understand it. But let us first distinguish re- ligion from theology on the one hand and ecclesiastical organization on the other. Theologies are products of re- ligion in interaction with man's reason and imagination, but they are not themselves religion. Theologies as intel- lectual attempts at the interpretation of religion, appear and disappear ; but religion remains. Religions have often existed without any well defined theological beliefs, though at other stages of the evolution of religion theological creeds may be the chief thing emphasized. While re- ligions always imply metaphysical or theological beliefs of some sort, no specific theological belief is an essential part of religion. 1 While religion affirms and univer- salizes personal and social values, it does so in a practical sense without necessarily developing them into theological or metaphysical dogmas. Neither must religion be confused with ecclesiastical organization, that is, with the church and its ritual. The church is the organized embodiment, the institutional expression, of religious life. It is probably necessary to the social expression of religion, but it is not itself re- ligion. .' Thus the Christian church, which we ordinarily call historical Christianity, must not be confused with Christianity itself. t But if religion is neither theology nor ecclesiastical organization, what is religion apart from these? And what does it do apart from the creating of theologies and ecclesiastical systems? In the first place, religion projects the essential values of human personality and of human society into the uni- verse as a whole. It inevitably arises as soon as man tries 1 For elaboration and qualification, see pages 45 and 46 and also Chapter V. 40 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION to take a valuing attitude toward his universe, no matter how small and mean that universe may appear to him. Like all the distinctive things in human social and mental life, it, of course, rests upon the higher intellectual powers of man. Man is the only religious animal, because through his powers of abstract thought and reasoning, he alone is self-conscious in the full sense of that term. Hence he alone is able to project his values into the uni- verse and finds necessity of so doing. Given, in other words, the intellectual powers of man, the mind at once seeks to universalize its values as well as its ideas. Just as rationalizing processes give man a world of universal ideas, so religious processes give man a world of universal values. The religious processes are, indeed, nothing but the rationalizing processes at work upon man's impulses and emotions rather than upon his percepts. [What the reason does for ideas, religion does, then, for the feelings. It universalizes 1 them ; and in universalizing them, it brings them into harmony with the whole of reality. For the mind to refuse thus to universalize its values is, in a sense, very much like the mind refusing to univer- salize its intellectual conceptions. There has always been, indeed, then, a close relation between irreligion and intel- lectual agnosticism, as all the world has long since ob- served. We are now prepared to see more exactly wkat religion is in psychological terms. It is primarily a valuing aiti- iude, universalizing the will and the emotions ~ rather than 1 So also it "socializes" them. The process of "universnlization" of course includes the process of "socialization," only the whole of reality, including the community of human beings, becomes the reality to which adjustment is m:id<>. Why the universe as well as humanity must always be included in religious valuations is set forth on page 46 nnd also in Chapter V. * This idea, that the psychological function of religion is to uni- versalize the will and the emotions, is, of course, a very old one, SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 41 the ideas of man. It thus harmonizes man, on the side of will and emotion, with his world. Hence, it is the foe of pessimism and despair. '""It encourages hope, and gives confidence in the battle of life, to the savage as well as to the civilized man. It does so, as we have said, because it braces vital feeling; and psychologists tell us that the reason why it braces vital feeling is because it is an adaptive process in which all of the lower centers of life are brought to reinforce the higher centers. The universalization of values means, in other words, in psycho-physical terms, that the lower nerve centers pour their energies into the higher nerve centers, thus har- monizing and bringing to a maximum of vital efficiency life on its inner side. It is thus that religion taps new levels of energy, for meeting the crises of life, while at the same time it brings about a deeper harmony between the inner and the outer. /t* When we thus understand religion scientifically we see that it is as natural to man, and almost as necessary, as sleeping, eating, or breathing. But we must qualify this statement by saying that religion is essentially a social rather than an individual matter. ike language it is not so much necessary for the life of the individual as for the life of society. This is because the values with which it deals, which it projects and universalizes, are not simply personal values; they are social values. They are values in which "an individual participates because he is a member of a group. They are values, in other words, which have been built up through the common life going back even to Greek and Hindu philosophy, but it is rarely found clearly stated. That the valuing attitude is the root of all religion is now one of the commonplaces of religious psychology. Sellars (The Next Step in Religion, p. 7) even goes so far as to define religion simply as "loyalty to the values of life." 42 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION of a group and transmitted .by tradition from generation to generation, because they have to do with the life of the group. Values and feelings have more need to be uni- versalized on the side of the social environment than on the side of the physical environment. It is one's human world to which one has to adapt himself first of all; and this adaptation is effected largely through the feelings or emotions. Then, again, the life of the group itself, sociology shows, is a unity. In confronting its environ- ment and the many foes which are often found there, the group must have unity of feeling, of values, if it is to have unity of action, among its members. The group as a whole needs not only such inner harmony on the side of feeling, but it must command the full energy, the unfailing devotion, of all of its members. Its values, its emphasis upon the meaning of life, of service, and of sacrifice, must be brought to the individual in the intensest way, with that absolute sanction which religion gives, if it is to command that self-effacing devotion of its members in times of crisis. The universalization of feel- !ing and will which religion effects is necessarily therefore a universalization which includes first of all the common I life which the individual shares with his fellows. In other words, it is a "socialization" of feeling and will. 1 The "second thing, then, which religion does is to act as an agency of social control, that is, of the group con- trolling the life of the individual, for what is believed 1 No writer lias worked out more clearly the interrelation of religion and social life than Professor Ames in his Psychology of Religious Experience. See especially Parts II and IV. His view that religion is "the consciousness of the highest social values" (p. VII), is one of the cornerstones of the sociology of religion. See also Miss Ilanison's Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion, especially pp. 482-40'J. "Religion," says Miss Harrison, "sums and rmbodies what we feel together, what we care for together, what we imagine together." SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 43 to be the good of the larger life of the group. Very early, as we have seen, any beliefs and practices which gave expression to personal feelings or values of which the group did not approve were branded as "black magic" or baleful superstitions; and if this had not been done it is evident that the unity of the life of the group might have become seriously impaired. Thus the almost neces- sarily social character of religion stands revealed. \Ve cannot have such a thing as purely personal or individual religion which is not at the same time social. For we live a social life and the welfare of the group is, after all, the chief matter of concern. It is evident that this function of religion as a means of social control over the individual needs to increase rather than decrease as social evolution advances. For social life becomes more complex with each succeeding stage of upward development, and groups have more need of commanding the unfailing Hevotion of their members if they are to maintain their unity and efficiency as groups. More and more, therefore, religion in its evolu- tion has come to emphasize the self-effacing devotion of the individual to the group in times of crisis. And as the complexity of social life increases, the crises in which the group must ask the unfailing service and devotion of its members also increase. Thus religion in its upward evolution becomes increasingly social, until it finally comes to throw supreme emphasis upon the life of service and of self-sacrifice for the sake of service; and as the group expands from the clan and the tribe to humanity, religion becomes less tribal and more humanitarian, until the supreme object of the devotion which it incul- cates must manifestly be the whole of humanity. Looked at from the point of view of the individual, in 44 THE KECOSTSTKUCTIOjST OF KELIGION the third place, then, religion means the consecration of individual life, at first for clan and tribal ends, but finally for humanitarian ends. 1 This consecration, or making "sacred," of life conserves the powers and ener- gies of the individual for social uses. It again unifies the group and makes it efficient in confronting every situation. We do not mean, of course, that it unerringly does so, because the ends to which the individual may be asked to consecrate his life may be mistaken ends. The values which are socially sanctioned may not be the highest values; they may be false altogether. Neverthe- less, by this consecration of life on the part of the indi- vidual to the ends or values of which the group approves, such efficiency as is possible for the group is attained. As the social life increases in complexity and expands from the clan and the tribe to humanity, it is evident that no less consecration of life on the part of the individual is demanded, but rather more. And we may so far antici- pate our conclusion as to point out that when the group becomes humanity, and social values become scientifically determined, the consecration of individual life which religion necessarily means may be more cheerfully given by the individual; for he will have the satisfaction of knowing that such consecration is for the highest pur- poses. Thus becomes evident, too, our meaning when we say that the individual must become increasingly re- ligious if he is to become increasingly social. Comte, as we have already seen, perceived this truth, though for 1 "The essence of religion," says Professor Cooley, "is the expansion of the soul into the sense of a Greater Life; and the way to this is through that social expansion which is of the same nature. /One who has developed a spirit of loyalty, service and sacrifice toward a social group has only to transform this to a largor conception in order to have a religious spirit." (Social Process, p. 75.)^ SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 46 various reasons it has escaped the perception of many later sociologists. A fourth phase of religion stands revealed as we come to understand what religion does. Religion, we have said, emphasizes values ; it universalizes them and brings them to the mind of the individual in the intensest way. But the values which it has come to sanction are social values, values which pertain to the larger life, and finally to the life of all humanity. Now these mental and social values, with which religion deals, men call "spiritual." 1 It is something which emphasizes, as we may say, spiritual values, that is, the values connected especially with the personal and social life. It projects these values, as we have seen, into the universal reality. It gives man a social and moral conception of the universe, rather than a merely mechanical one as a theatre of the play of blind, purposeless forces. While religion is not primarily ani- mistic philosophy, as has often been said, nevertheless it does project mind, spirit, life, into all things. 2 Even the most primitive religion did this; for in "primitive dynamism" there was a feeling of the psychic, in such concepts as mana or manitou. They were closely con- nected with persons and proceeded from persons, or things which were viewed in an essentially personal way. Religion, therefore, is a belief in the reality of spiritual < values* and projects them, as we have said, into the whole : 1 It will be observed that we use this word in the broad or philo- sophical sense, as practically synonymous with "psychic," not in the narrow sense of "pertaining to spirits." * Using "animism" in this broad sense (for the technical meaning of the term, see page 50), Carpenter very rightly says (Pagan and Christian Creeds, p. 260) : "Animism is a perfectly sensible, logical and necessary attitude of the human mind." Compare McDougall, Body and Mind. This again is a very old view of religion, reflected imperfectly in Tylor's celebrated minimum definition of religion, "Belief in spiritual 46 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION universe. All religion even so-called atheistic reli- gions 1 emphasizes the spiritual, believes in its domi- nance, and looks to its ultimate triumph. Materialistic and mechanistic philosophies, therefore, at least those . cruder forms which would deny altogether or explain away the reality of the spiritual element, are hostile to religion. They take a negative attitude toward the spiritual element in the universe and in human life, and therefore destroy the rational basis for that projection into universal reality of personal and social values which constitutes the essence of religion. Religion from its very nature cannot negate life or mind; it cannot take a negative attitude toward the universe. Its attitude is an attitude of faith, courage and confidence. 2 It em- phasizes, therefore, the reality of spiritual things; it is built up through belief in the reality of spiritual life. Mere animistic philosophy, to be sure, it is not; for it is always primarily a valuing attitude. But it is an affirmation of the reality of the spiritual, the mental, the social ; and only in a few cases has it denied the reality of the material and the physical. Thus we see that religion, springing as it does from the whole of human nature and the whole social life of man, beings," and implied in Eucken's works, especially in his Christianity and the New Idealism, Chapter I. Leuba (A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 52) is undoubtedly right in contending that religion pre- supposes belief in personal or non-personal psychic powers. 1 For example, Buddhism, Jainism, and Comte's Positivism. All these religions manifestly emphasize the reality and power of the spiritual in man. '"Religion," says Conklin (The Direction of Human Evolution, p. 102), "cultivates faith, hope and love" at least, we may add, when it is socially normal. We might add that religion in its normal aspects is a sort of idealization of the life process a kind of "cosmic optimism," so to speak. It mn-ssarily includes, therefore, "an im- plicit theory of tli> universe," as Webb points out (in Group Theories of Religion and the Individual). SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 47 is a many-sided phenomenon. (1) In one aspect it is par- ticipation in, and imiversalization of, the ideal values of the social life. (2) In another aspect it is a form of social control, constraining through supernatural sanction the individual to conform his beliefs and actions to those of his group. (3) In another aspect it is a consecration of individual life and energies to social ends. (4) Finally, it is an affirmation of the reality of "the spiritual," and a belief in its ultimate dominance and triumph in human life. We may, perhaps, accept as nearly synthetizing the truth in all of these conceptions of religion, the state- ment that "religion is man's attitude toward the universe regarded as a social and ethical force." 1 Some attitude of this sort, some religious attitude, in other words, is necessary to every thinking man who does not, ostrich- like, refuse to confront the reality in which he lives and moves and has his being. But the religious attitude, evidently, must undergo many changes with the develop- ment of man's mind and civilization. 'A detailed study of religious evolution would, of course, 1 Barton, The Religions of the World, p. 3. Compare Caird's definition (The Evolution of Religion, vol. I, p. 30): "A man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the universe, the summed up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things." The synthetic nature of religion as a cultural complex is what gives rise to the many one-sided conceptions of religion and its many various definitions. (For a brief survey of the various definitions of religion, see Leuba's Psychological Study of Religion, Appendix.) It is doubtful if even in its earliest beginnings religion can be reduced to simple psychological elements. From its very start it seems a synthesis (like so many other cultural complexes) of the individual psychic and the social. Thus Carpenter in criticizing the view of Miss Harrison (Themis, pp. 482-92) that religion is simply the reflection of the social conscience very rightly says (Pagan and Christian Creeds, p. 261 ) : "Religion has its origin not only from unity with the Tribe, but from the sense of affiliation to Nature." This may be implied even by Miss Harrison when she says (Themis, p. 482) : "It is not herd instinct, nor the collective conscience, not the social imperative that constitutes religion; it is the emphasis and representation of this collective conscience." 48 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION be necessary to reveal all of these changes and the full significance of religion in human society. That the limits of this work forbid ; but some sort of outline of the changes in religion and of the functioning of religion in the social life is necessary for a clear understanding of our subject. No one can understand religion, as has been well said, without understanding other religions than his own, any more than one can understand language without understanding other languages than his own. All religions are vitally related. 1 From the most highly developed to the most lowly there are intellectual clews running back which are of the utmost value for the under- standing of the relations of religion to civilization. Let us very briefly sketch, therefore, the evolution of re- ligion. If we take the commonly accepted seven stages of re- ligious evolution, namely, pre-animism, animism, totem- ism, ancestor worship, polytheism, henotheism, and mono- theism, it is not difficult to see that they not only embody man's valuation of his world but also the social values of the age which they represent. These seven stages are, of course, in human history not clearly delimited. 2 They overlap and even exist side by side ; but they mark, logic- ally, definite stages in the evolution of the religious con- sciousness. 1 See Marett, Anthropology, Chapter VIII. * The presentation of these seven types of the religious consciousness, as an evolutional scries, has been vigorously criticized of late (see Schleiter, Religion and Culture). In reality the series is psycho- logical rather than chronological. It is easy, therefore, to find peoples low in culture among whom several of these types of religious con- sciousness exist alongside of one another and more or less confused. This is, indeed, the usual situation. There are good psychological grounds, however, for believing that the psychological order of filiation is that hero presented though it is impossible to present inductive proof of this, as the rHigimis beliefs of even existing savages are an indefinite mixture of the first three or four types. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 49 Thus anthropologists tell us that there is every reason to believe that the earliest and most primitive stage of religion was the stage in which men simply believed in the pervasion of nature everywhere by a mysteri- ous wonder-working energy, such as the manitou of the American Indian or the mana of the Melanesian Is- landers. 1 It was in this stage, which may be desig- nated as that of pre-animism, or "manaism," that the conception of the "sacred" or "divine" arose. 2 This may be illustrated by the Melanesians' use of the word mana. This word was used by the Melanesians to signify a power or influence not visible, and in a way supernatural, show- ing itself in connection with both persons and natural objects. 3 Fear and reverence were always attached to any person or thing which manifested mana, and thus such persons or things were "taboo;" 4 and upon this idea of taboo the whole conception of the "sacred" as a means *Miss Ivy G. Campbell in her study of "Manaism" (American Journal of Psychology, January, 1918), concludes that "manaism as well as animism results from the tendency of the human mind to interpret things in terms of its own inner experience." Manaism, she says, therefore, is not prior to animism if animism equals "the read- ing of one's own experience into other things." Dr. Marett, however, using the word "animism" in its more exact sense, finds (The Threshold of Religion) that prior to animism proper there must have been a more primitive stage of animatism, that is to say, "manaism." So, too, Professor Boas says (Handbook of American Indians) that the fundamental concept of the religious life is "the belief in the existence of magic power which may influence the life of man and which in turn may be influenced by human activity." 3 Dr. Marett says (The Threshold of Religion, Second Edition, p. XXXIII) : "I do not hesitate to regard the general notion exempli- fied by mana as the category that most nearly expresses the essence of rudimentary religion." But he wisely adds, "What I would not be prepared to lay down dogmatically or even provisionally is merely that there was a pre-animistic era in the history of religion when animism was not." See also Chapter I of his book. 8 Codrington, The Melanesians, p. 118 following. * Marett rightly holds that "Tabu is the negative mode of the supernatural, to which mana corresponds as the positive mode." See The Threshold of Religion, Chapter IV, on "The Conception of Mana." 5 , :/ .js^to A^AJo- / ' *n " *> .* -4 c, **, ON 50 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION of social control seems to have been built up. The world was filled, in other words, with a mysterious, wonder- working energy which was the source of all success, luck, or good fortune, and which must be dealt with in a certain way in order to insure these desirable effects both for the individual and for the community. The American Indian had much the same conception in such words as manitou 1 and wcikonda? and among many other primi- tive peoples we find parallel conceptions. Nothing was more important for the individual or the community in this stage than to get into right relations with this mysterious, wonder-working power which assured good or bad fortune. Hence already, though there were no "gods," the whole mental and social machinery of re- ligion was at work with respect to the mores in the way which we have already described. The second stage of religion came when this mysterious, wonder-working power was conceived of as a "double" or a "spirit" which resided in men, animals, and things. This stage is technically known as "animism" in the strict sense. The mysterious, wonder-working power was conceived as able to exist apart from the object in which it resided. Thus was born the conception of the "soul," a conception which was bound to be reached by man's power of abstraction, but which was made easier through man's reflection upon the experiences of his dream-world. 8 Out of the dualism of the ordinary and the extraordinary, the natural and the supernatural, grew the further dualism 1 See the classical paper by Jones, The Algonkin Manitou, included in Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 683-692. * See articles, "Wakonda" and also "Orenda" in Handbook of American Indians. * For a brief critical discussion of animism, with a statement of divergent theories, see Leuba, Psychological Study of Religion, Chapters IV and V. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 51 of the physical and the spiritual; and the mysterious, wonder-working powers were identified with the spiritual beings, the "souls" or "doubles" of men, animals, and things. A further step in the development of religion is shown in animism, because man more definitely inter- prets his world in terms of himself, of his will, and of his values. This stage prepared religion to develop and emphasize the subjective element, and to make that the chief element in social control. A third stage of religious development was "totemism," in which ajiimals or plants became the chief objects of religious veneration. 1 The totemic stage arose naturally fromThe manaistic and the animistic, and marked a broadening of man's knowledge concerning his world. It was correlated with the hunting stage of economic devel- opment. Man was surrounded by animals, he hunted animals, he lived on animals, he thought in terms of ani- mals, and therefore, his main objects of religious venera- tion were animals. It was the zoomorphic stage of re- ligion. 2 The mysterious, wonder-working power was the 1 The controversy over the relation of totemism to religion has been prolonged and varied. Many writers (e.g., Frazer in his well-known work, Totemism and Exogamy, vol. IV, p. 27) have denied that totemism may be considered a form of religion at all. Durkhejm, on the other hand, in his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Book II, makes totemism the root or original form of all religion and identifies its fundamental concept with mana. The general view of anthropologists, however, is that there was a pre-totemic stage in which manaism and animism in various forms existed. On the relations of manaism and totemism, see Marett, op. cit. p. 20 f., and the article "Totem" by Hewitt in the Handbook of American Indiana. The best brief study of totemism is probably that by Professor A. A. Goldenweiser, "Totemism: An Analytical Study," in the Journal of American Folk Lore, vol. XXIII. For an extended discussion of totemism as a form of religion, see Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Book I, Chapter IV, and Book II. 1 Much animal and plant worship, however, exists independent of totemism. For criticism of the idea that totemism involves the worship of the totemic animal or plant, see Durkheim, op. cit. p. 139. 52 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION animal or plant which was regarded with religious rever- ence and conceived of as having some mysterious relation to the group, which usually bore its name. Kinship and religion now become definitely allied, and hence we may say that this was the first stage in which religion came to have an organized control over all the forms and relation- ships of social life. Art, educaton and food-getting, also, now come under well-defined religious control. The fourth stage of religious development, the hero- ancestor-worshipping stage, did not arise until the patri- archal family and pastoral industry, together with the power of the war chief, emphasized the human element. Thus the anthropomorphic stage of religious evolution was reached. 1 The mysterious, wonder-working powers were now conceived to be the souls of departed heroes or ancestors. Each family had its own gods and its own do- mestic worship. This stage fostered the development of the domestic virtues, accordingly, and of the social ideals derived from the domestic virtues; but it had a great drawback in that, by apotheosizing the departed ancestor, it emphasized too much the values of the past. Religion took on an ultra-conservative nature and made possible such static civilization as was, for example, illustrated In Chapters V-VII of Book II, Durkheim criticizes the idea that totemism is a development of animism. See also W. W. Thomas' article on "Animals" in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. 1 That is, the typical or developed anthropomorphism. Some degree of anthropomorphism is, of course, to be found in the earlier stages of religious development. Thus the attitude of the savage toward his totem animal is as personal as toward one of his tribesmen. Per- haps the groat significance of ancestor worship in religious and social development has never been better stated than in Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology, Part 1, though Spencer was mistaken in supposing ancestor worship to be primitive. The best picture of an ancestor-worshipping society is to be found in Fustel de Coulange's Ancient City. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 53 for centuries by the Chinese. The abuses of religion, from a social point of view, now begin to appear. When small ancestor-worshipping groups were welded into city-states or small nations, the gods of the different groups, who included not only the heroic ancestors of the past, but also many nature spirits whose worship had survived from animistic times, formed a "pantheon" and we have the stage of religion which is known as "poly- theism." In this stage there is a classification of gods. Not every blade of grass had a god, but there might be a god of the grass. Neither did every man have a god, but there was a god for practically every social activity of man, a god of war, a god of love, etc. All were highly personalized beings, and the community of gods was con- ceived as more or less like the community of men, though often idealized. This stage "was really transitional, and is marked by a confusion of ethical and religious concep- tions and values. There was in it, therefore, the oppor- tunity for the sanction of all sorts of practices, and the abuses of religion become more manifest, as seen, for ex- ample, in the various practices of idolatry. Out of polytheism slowly developed another interme- diary stage of religion known as "henotheism," in which one of the gods of the pantheon was chosen by a people as its particular national god, without their denying at first, however, the existence of other gods. Gradually the other gods came to be regarded as "false gods" and the national god as the true god. Most monotheistic peoples have passed through this henotheistic stage, though students of religion have sometimes failed to recognize it. The early Jews, for example, before the later prophets were unquestionably henotheistic. , This national stage of religion served greatly to unify peoples in strong nationalistic groups. It is a serious question whether 54 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION our civilization is not yet mainly in this stage of religion. Religion in this stage is crudely anthropomorphic, and the_deity_is ^thought of as ha.Yingjth^_na^onalj^aracter o|_^he^Dple-with._very definite humaiLjtraits. True monotheism is reached only when the mind of man sees that there is but one universal existence from whence lall things, including his own mind, have proceeded and of |which they are a part. Monotheism, in other words, is ithe recognition of the infinite as God, "the infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed and to which all things return." Monotheism itself has several distinct phases or stages of development. One of these, deism, we have already noticed as the crudest and most popular form of monotheism. Another, pantheism, tends to identify God with the impersonal forces of the universe. In our civilization, however, monotheism has tended to take a more social and spiritual form, known as ethical theism, and probably rightly, since mere "energism" satis- fies neither the emotions nor the intelligence of man. Under ethical theism, idealistic social values have been more readily given a religious sanction, that is, univer- salized or projected into the universe, than under any other form of religion. Thus through ethical theism, though it is a form of religious consciousness to which the masses even in Christian lands have only partially at- tained, social idealism has been stimulated as never be- fore in the history of civilization. Now this rough outline of the development of religion shows clearly enough that religion has evolved with the social and mental life of man; that it is a thing which changes with the whole cultural complex which we call "civilization;" and that changes in religion have been SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 55 correlated Avitli changes in man's social and cultural life in general. Clearly enough, too, human history has been, from one point of view, a struggle to attain to a rational and truly social religion such a valuation of all the ex- perience of life in terms of the universe as accords with man's reason and yet intensifies his social values. Only to an absolute skeptic would the great stages in religious evolution appear other than as steps in social and cultural progress. It is clear also that through all of its history religion has been a "control" over social life, an instrument of social adaptation; and we are now better prepared to understand its function in maintaining social order and in aiding social progress. How has it affected these vital matters in the social life of humanity in the past, and how may it influence them in the future? Let us take up first its influence upon social order. From the earliest ages, and through all the revolutions of religion, its chief social function has been to support the "mores" of the social group in which it has been found. Strictly speaking, all religions are ethical in the sense that they support the customary morality of their groups. 1 The inculcation and support of ethical ideals, or idealistic aims, is of course a late development in re- ligion, but even the most primitive religions support cus- tom. "The religion of a savage," says Dr. Marett, "is his whole custom so far as it appears sacred." 2 The primitive conception of the "sacred," as we have seen, was something which was forbidden, or "taboo." But the thing which was sacred or "taboo" was, in reality, some 1 Compare Ames, Psychology of Religious Experience, pp. 285-287. 'Anthropology, p. 213. 56 THE KECONSTKUCTIOlsr OF KELIGION custom or usage which the group desired to maintain ; a anything which was contrary to that custom was forbidde Thus the concept of the sacred became attached to the custom, or socially sanctioned usage, itself. Primitive "mores" thus became hedged around with "taboos" or with positive religious sanctions. Whatever the group found to conduce to personal and social safety came to have the sanction of religion attached to it. Now this early con- nection between primitive morals and primitive religion was not accidental; it was logically and psychologically necessary. ( The very conception of a superhuman, won- der-workin ; power in nature was largely obtained by the projection into nature of that psychic element in experi- ence which the social life had developed. The whole world of experience was thus made, so to" speak, socio- morphic. The wonder-working powers to be feared and propitiated were thus inevitably associated with the ac- tivities of the group. Those activities that were success- ful, that were accompanied by good luck, were in harmony, manifestly, with the superhuman power; that is, they had mana in them. On the other hand, those activities which did not succeed, or were accompanied by ill luck, had no mana, that is, were opposed to the superhuman power. Thus religious sanction came naturally to attach itself to those modes of conduct of which the group ap- proved; that is, to those which had been found safe and to conduce to group welfare. Hence social obligations became religious obligations even in the lowest forms of social life of which we have knowledge. From their very method of development, therefore, religious beliefs become early entangled with moral standards and ideals. They are built up from social experience and they function toward social ends. Almost any religious concept or belief will illustrate SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 57 this. Let us take, for example, the concept of God. 1 When we examine the concept of God among any people we find that invariably it is built up from their social ex- perience. In the earliest religions the gods are often zoomorphic, we have seen, because in the hunting stage of culture the experiences of the social life lead to a high valuation of the shrewdness, power, cunning, and perhaps, the helpfulness of the animal which is hunted. At a very much later date the concept of God represents particularly some personal trait or character which is valued by the group such as the power of the warrior, the wisdom of the judge, or the magnificence of the monarch. The idea stands, in other words, for the ideal of personal character which has come to be peculiarly appreciated by the group, such as the character of some ancestor or king. But the god is always thought of as a member of the group, and as in a peculiar way safeguarding its social life. The values found in the god-concept, thus are always derived from social experiences of one sort or another. As Pro- fessor Ames says, "The growth and objectification of the god goes hand in hand with the social experience and achievements of the nation." 2 This is well illustrated from the religious history of the Hebrew people. Their concept of Jehovah gradually expanded from that of a tribal, national god of patriarchal and kinglike character, who was lord of the tribal host, to that of a universal deity, father of all the nations of the earth, possessing not only the attributes of patriarch, but also those of a social redeemer and savior. Moreover, nearly all of the values which came to be attached to the 1 This whole chapter has more or less centered on the evolution of the idea of God, because this idea plays such a prominent part in religion that it illustrates well the development and functioning of the religious consciousness in general. 'Op. cit. p. 113. 58 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION god-concept among the Hebrews, it may be added, were directly derived from the social experiences of Hebrew family life. Jehovah as the father of his people came to be thought of not only as demanding obedience and service, but as representing a father's love and care, and so as becoming the redeemer of his people. Indeed, the reason for the superiority of the religious conceptions of the Hebrews is not far to seek. It was because Hebrew social life, particularly Hebrew family life, was of a high type, presenting at its best a unity and harmony which was scarcely attained by any other people of antiquity. Other religious concepts than that of the deity illustrate equally well the fact that they are built up from social experiences and psychologically are projections of social -values. The concept of the immortality of the soul, which we find more or less developed in all religions, is simply an indefinite extension of personal and social values. When we find a separation in the life after death of the souls of good and evil men, heaven, or the abode of the righteous, is pictured as an ideal society, such an ideal of course as the social life of the people of the time permits. Fin- ally, the concepts of personal responsibility and of indi- vidual freedom in working out one's own destiny which we find so generally associated with higher religions are clearly social values. Without the inculcation to some extent of the doctrines of personal freedom and respon- sibility, orderly social groups can scarcely exist. These illustrations suffice to show that among every people re- ligion is identified with the most intimate and vital phases of the social life; that the ideal values of each type of social development tend always to religious expression^ But why should social values express themselves re- 1 Ames, Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 283. V. (\ SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 59 ligiously, it may bo asked ? Is not the fact that they are social values, built up from real experiences, sufficient sanction for them, without attaching to them theological or mythological notions? This latter form of the ques- tion indicates, of course, a misunderstanding; for a re- ligious sanction given to social values, does not necessarily imply the attachment to them of definite theological no- tions it only implies that they are made universal, and, as it were, absolute. We have, accordingly, already an- swered the question why social values need the sanction of religion. It is because religion universalizes them and presents them to the mind of the individual as absolute values. Just as we cannot and do not act upon intellectual concepts without universalizing them, so the most funda- mental social values'tnust be universalized and made abso- lute, as it were, for the mind of the group before they will be acted upon with that unanimity which social order and solidarity demand. Of course it does not matter if minor social values are not thus universalized, because variations in minor details of conduct are usually of no great importance to group life. But the fundamental, intimate, vital values of the social life must be brought to individual consciousness in the intensest way, that is, they must be given religious expression, and so univer- salized, if the group is to preserve its harmony, efficiency, and capacity to survive as a group. To put the matter negatively, a religionless world would be one in which there were no absolute values. Values would thus tend to become individualized and be at the , whim and the caprice of the individual. But human societies cannot exist upon such a basis of the Absolute individualization of values. Certain values the group must have generally accepted to preserve its integrity at all. Such, for example, are the values connected with life, 60 THE KECONSTKUCTIOJST OF KELIGION with endurance and suffering, with loyalty to group in- terests, with good will among the members of the group, with mutual service, and with mutual sacrifice for the sake of mutual aid. Men everywhere, have to confront their world with hope and courage, and faith, on the one hand, and with loyalty, good will, and devotion to their fellows, upon the other hand, if human life is to be lived together successfully. Now religion by universalizing these values gives a fuller meaning to life, encourages hope, strengthens endurance and suffering, intensifies loyalty to the ideals of the group, prevents pessimism, despair, and degeneracy. Thus it increases stability of character in the individual which, in turn, makes for harmonious as well as stable relations among individuals. A religionless social world would be a social world of un- certainties, destitute of enthusiasm, and of vision, reduced to the dead level of individual expediency. It would be a social world in which neither harmony nor good will could long prevail. 1 This is not to say, of course, that morality of a high type cannot exist, in civilized human society, in non-re- ligious individuals. That is possible, because morality is so largely a thing of habit and of custom ; a non-religious individual living in a society which universalizes its social values might exemplify the moral ideals of his group in the fullest degree simply through customary imitation and the power of personal habit. 2 But to admit the pos- sibility of such highly moral individuals who are genuinely 1 Following another line of reasoning, Professor Conklin in The Direction of Human Evolution reaches substantially the same con- clusion, p. 168: "We shall never outgrow our need of religion, as we shall never outgrow our need of government and science." 'Ames, however, contends (op. cit. p. 359 f.) even that genuinely non-religious persons are always laeking in the sense of ideal values which constitutes the social conscience. ,< l^Ji^ > " ' r ^ f. +1 * * -"' SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 61 non-religious in a social life pervaded by high ethical standards is no proof that we can have whole civilizations highly moral and at the same time genuinely non-re- ligious. A religionless civilization presents an entirely different problem from a religionless individual. Such a civilization has never existed in the world and the reason should now be obvious why it cannot exist. Let us look a little more intimately, however, at the nature of human civilization and why it presupposes re- ligion for its development. The most careful studies of anthropologists and sociologists have shown that every civilization develops about certain "pattern ideas" or dominant social values. This is true even of the material aspects of life so far as they become rationalized and cul- tural. Thus in the making of stone implements we find primitive man following out a certain pattern and perfect- ing it until he comes to the point where he develops an- other pattern and perfects that, and so on. Thus civilized human society has been built up very much like the great mechanical inventions of the present time, say, for exam- ple, the steam engine. Without some "pattern ideas" in the mind to follow, manifestly the steam engine could not have been perfected. So, too, social organization and re- lationships have largely developed in the same way, upon the basis, of course, of the instinctive ends and needs of men. Thus, even in the most primitive times men apparently reflected upon their habits or ways of living with one another and approved of some and disapproved of others. Those usages or habits which were approved of and con- nected with the idea of the welfare of the group became the "mores," or customs, of the group. Thus certain pattern ideas, as regards social relationships, certain social 62 THE BECONSTBUCTION OF BELIGION values, became connected with the social life of the group. These were gradually perfected and systematized so that out of them social institutions arose. But the "mores," as we have seen, were imbedded in religious feelings and beliefs, that is, they became absolute social values, with a superhuman sanction attached to them. Without such a sanction these pattern ideas and social values, at least in so far as they concerned a supersensible world, would never have been copied by generation after generation. The "mores" would have broken down and social discon- tinuity would have resulted. Thus the social significance of religion has been, in the past, in the support which it has given, in all stages of human culture, to custom, moral standards, and moral ideals. It is easy enough to say theoretically that morality is something separate and dis- tinct from religion, but practically, they have always gone hand in hand. But it may be asked if science cannot take the place of religion in giving a "relatively absolute" or universal character to the social values or "pattern ideas" which we must follow for the development of our culture. It has done so in the material realm, where now we ask no further test of the value of an ideal than its practical utility. Why can it not do so in the social realm ? The reply is that the higher social values have a different character from these material values. They cannot be tested even by the experience of a single generation to say nothing of the experience of a single individual. The social sciences, therefore, cannot furnish the same test to the individual mind of their values as the physical sciences. Take the value of "good will," for example. It is evident that the individual in his experience may find it of very limited validity. Again, if we take such a value as SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 63 "self-sacrifice," even to the point of death, for the sake of one's country, or of humanity, it is evident that the indi- vidual can find no such validity in such an action as he would in adapting means to ends in physical nature. The social world is, if we may be allowed to use the expression, a world of transcendental * values, a world of supersensi- ble things and relations. Science alone, accordingly, can never give to social values, in the mind of the individual, that universal and absolute character which they need to possess; or rather, it can do so only in proportion as it transforms itself, as Comte said, into religion. , It is thus that social science instead of becoming a substitute for, and displacing religion, leads to the perception of its value; for it finds no other way of making absolute and unquestioned the fundamental values of our social life than through religion. Civilization, however, as we have seen, must be ac- quired by each generation. Its values have to be learned by each individual as he comes on to the stage of life. From the nature of these values, as we have just seen, they cannot be adequately tested by the experience of the individual. They must rather be accepted by him as coming from a source whose validity transcends even that of his own experience ; that is, they must be taken up by him from "the social mind," the store of ideas and values by which men have learned to regulate their conduct. But to learn such values thoroughly and to make them more powerful to regulate conduct than the sensuous experi- ences of life means that such moral values must have a religious sanction attached to them or else they will fail effectively to control conduct. Thus the "mores" of our age, not less than of previous ages, need the support of 1 We use the word to mean "transcending the experience of the individual." 64 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION religion. Idealistic social morality without any religion sanction, so far as social science can see, is an impossible dream ; and the more complex our social life becomes, de- manding more complex and difficult adjustments on the part of the individual, the more impossible a high social morality without a correspondingly high social religion becomes. The death of religion would accordingly mea the death of all higher civilization. n The social need and the social power of religion are now manifest. Let us, however, reiterate what we have al- ready said about the possibility of religion becoming a reactionary rather than a progressive force, a support for the evil in the social life rather than for the good. The religious problem is not simply the problem of the main- tenance of religion in human Ife. For reasons, which we have already seen, probably there is no such problem as that; for if we do not have a rational and ethical re- ligion, the mind of man is such, we have seen, that we are bound to have irrational and unethical religion if not a religion of social progress, then a religion of social re- trogression and barbarism. Religion may become at- tached to any of the mores of society, to any human institution, to any social order, no matter how barbarous it may be ; and when religious sanction has become attached ^to any social value it is more difficult to change that value. r Civilization might die from a barbarous or reactionary religion as well as from lack of religion. Hence the real religious problem of our society is to secure the gen- eral acceptance of a religion adapted to the requirements of continuous progress toward an ideal society, consisting of all humanity. In part, the backward tendency of religion, when it manifests itself, comes from its necessary function as a SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION 65 conservator of social values. It. is a means, as we have m*n, of conserving customs and habits which have been "found to be safe by the group, or which are believed to conduce to group welfare. It surrounds itself, accord- ingly, with prohibitions and "taboos" of actions of which the group, or its dominant class, disapproves. It lends itself easily, therefore, to maintaining a given social order longer than that order is necessary or even after it has become a stumbling block to progress. For the same reason religion is easily exploited by a dominant class in their own interests. It is in this way that religion has often become an impediment to progress and an instru- ment of class oppression. It is thus, also, that it has raised up enemies for itself who see nothing in it but its negative and conservative side. Writers of strong anti- religious bias emphasize this negative and conservative aspect of religion, but it is~not infrequently emphasized overmuch by the friends of religion. Now, however important the socially conservative nature of religion may be ; whether it be, as one writer declares, a reaction against social degeneracy; or as another writer says, "the force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its orbit," it is a mistake to think of religion mainly as negative and conservative in our social life. In a static society, which emphasizes prohibitions and the conservation of mere habit, religion will also, of course, emphasize the same things; but there is no necessity that it should do this. In a progressive society religion can as easily attach its sanctions to conduct and to ideals which are progressive as to those which are static. In other words, religion can as easily attach its sanctions to social ideals beyond the existing order of things a"s to the exist- ing order. Such an idealistic religion will, however, 66 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION have the disadvantage of appealing mainly to the pro sive and idealizing tendencies of human nature rather than to its conservative and reactionary tendencies. A socially progressive religion, to find "wide following and acceptance, presupposes a high development of intelligence in the mass of individuals. This is doubtless the reason why progressive religions are exceedingly rare in human history, taking it as a whole, and have appeared only in the later stages of cultural evolution. Nevertheless there is an intimate connection between social idealism and the higher religions. These religions have, for the most part, gotten their ideals from the family life; and sociology shows that social and moral ideals in general have come from the primary forms of association, such as the family. 1 Social idealism is an attempt to realize in the wider social life (that is, the life of classes, nations and races) these primary ideals which are gotten from primary groups ; the higher ethical religions got their ideals from the same source and have the same aim. They are, therefore, but manifestations of social idealism imbedded in religious feeling and ac- companied by more or less formal religious sanctions. In the higher stages of cultural revolution, then, re- ligion comes to reinforce and sanction social progress. Setting its seal of approval upon an ideal social life not yet realized, it gives to such a "pattern idea" a force and power which it could get in no other way. Religion thus becomes a powerful social dynamic and an instrument of progressive social order. It sets up a "utopia" which gives a goal and a meaning for the whole social life. If this utopia is in nationalistic terms it of course powerfully reinforces the national spirit. If, on the other hand, the 1 See Chapter VII. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 67 ntopia is in humanitarian terms it reinforces the humani- tarian trend of civilization. 1 Thus the goal sanctioned by religion may become a powerful social dynamic, trans- forming in time the whole social life. It is a matter of supreme importance, therefore, in our social life to see that religion sanctions right social ends. It is only a religion which stimulates a humanity-wide altruism in the individual which is adequate as a founda- tion for social progress. Through humanitarian religion, a religion which stimulates such a humanity-wide altruism, quite evidently class, tribal and national ethics can be transcended and replaced by humanitarian ethics. It may be said, of course, that humanitarian ethics does not need humanitarian religion, but all human ex- perience opposes such a conclusion, and we have seen reasons why this must be so. Indeed, humanitarian ethics demands more in the way of self -sacrifice from the indi- vidual than class, tribal, or national ethics. It makes, in other words, the least appeal of any system of morality to the natural egoism of the individual, because it con- cerns the largest possible human group, having to do with the welfare of many individuals of whose existence the average individual knows nothing directly through experi- ence, and concerning whose welfare he can have tangible ideas only through the exercise of the liveliest imagination. // humanitarian ethics is to succeed in overcoming the conflicts between classes, nations, and races, which are now tearing asunder our world, it must have the support of a religion of humanity. 2 x By humanitarianism, we mean, following Hobhouse (Morals in Evolution, Vol. II, p. 249), the doctrine which "makes the furtherance of the collective life of humanity the supreme object of endeavor." Hence similar meaning attaches to the phrases humanitarian re- ligion, humanitarian ethics, humanitarian civilization, etc. a It is just because religion supports, develops and completes ethics that developed religion, as Hobhouse says (Morals in Evolution, Vol. 03 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION Many religions have, of course, approached the humani- tarian viewpoint or developed humanitarian principles as incidental to their main teachings. Thus the great purpose of Buddhism is undoubtedly to put an end to human sorrow and suffering. To this end it not only counsels the avoidance of inflicting all pain or suffering upon living creatures, and pity, gentleness, and charity in all human relations, but also the cessation of all striving and desire on the part of the individual in order that the incidental suffering may be escaped. Buddhism is, in brief, a doctrine not only of selflessness, but of quietism. At first glance it would seem to be supremely humani- tarian, and it has often been thus represented. But its humanitarianism is negative rather than positive. Ita negative attitude toward life prevents it from developing a positive doctrine of the development of humanity. It seeks escape from life and its evils rather than the devel- opment of life through mastery over its conditions. Pas- sivity rather than activity is its goal. Its humanitarian- ism resembles closely the spurious humanitarianism of the present day "which regards all suffering as evil. The final judgment of science concerning Buddhism, despite its noble qualities, can only be that it is fundamentally non- social in its ideals and hence that it fails to furnish the religious values and ideals needed for a progressive civili- zation. Mohammedanism, also, in some of its later develop- ments, especially in Bahaism, 1 has shown a strong humani- tarian trend. But Mohammedanism, so far as it has raised itself above Semitic paganism, is based on Judaism II, p. 255), has its firmest root in ethics, and that "Ethics becomes the test to which religion must submit." (Ibid., p. 252.) 1 Bahaism in its origin was an offshoot of Mohammedanism, though many Bahaists in America regard themselves as Christians. See article, "Bab, Babism," in Hastings' Encyclopedia. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KELIGION 69 and Christianity. It was the religion of the later Hebrew prophets, which furnished the enduring base upon which has been built whatever is worthy in Christianity, Moham- medanism, and later Judaism. In the teachings of these men are found the first faint beginnings of that positive humanitarian religion and ethics which has become the hope of the world. It was not until Christianity burst the shell of Jewish nationalism, however, and became an international religion, that the movement to supplant the tribal and predatory traditions of the ancient world by a tradition of universal peace, good will, mutual aid, and brotherhood among men may be said to have been fairly launched. If what has been said in the preceding paragraph is correct, it is evident that the main stream of religious evolution must be sought in ancient Judaism and Christi- anity. That this is so, and the scientific reasons for it, we shall endeavor to set forth in the next chapter. For to understand the full social significance of religon, we must understand the social meaning of the Christian movement in particular. CHAPTER III THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY THE second thing to be considered in the reconstruc- tionoT religion is the social significance of Christianity, in the sense of the religion of Jesus/ We must strive to gain an insight into its place and meaning in social evo- lution. No historical movement has been more misunder- stood, alike by friend and foe, than Christianity. This is largely because of the lack of sociological and anthro- pological perspective and knowledge. Only the densest sociological ignorance would suppose that the Christian movement is an accident in human history. 1 On the con- trary, like its political counterpart (the movement toward democracy), it is of the very essence of later social and cultural evolution. It is an integral part of the historical process, an essential factor in social evolution. To under- stand what it means we must try to get a view of the move- ment of human history as a whole, as it is pictured to us by modern science. 'Anthropologists tell us that the whole culture history of man may be roughly divided into three stages sav- 1 Says Professor Case, in his valuable work on The Evolution of Early Christianity (p. 25) : "Christianity can be ultimately and com- prehensively conceived only in the developmental sense, as the product of actual persons working out their religious problems in immediate contact with their several worlds of reality." 70 SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 71 agery, barbarism, and civilization. 1 Savagery, in which man is a mere child of nature, living off of the wild fruits of the earth and the animals that he can kill and eat, making no attempt to control his own destiny, lasted for the race at least one hundred thousand years, archae- ological evidence shows, while some belated human groups still survive in that state. Barbarism, a traditional stage, in which man begins to cultivate the soil and raise domestic animals, but soon turns his attention to preying upon his fellowmen as an easier method of gaining a livelihood than the mastering of nature, began in Europe about eight or ten thousand years ago with the coming of neolithic man. Militancy and predatoriness were the chief social traits 1 This narrower use of the term "civilization" to designate a par- ticular stage of culture, namely, beginning with the keeping of historic records, as it is common both in ordinary and scientific language, should not confuse the reader. See definition of culture and civilization in the broad sense on p. 12. Some authorities would designate that part- of civilization which begins with universal literacy or education as the "stage of enlightenment." But there seems no good reason why it should not be regarded as a phase of civilization. The author, therefore, has preferred to keep the term "civilization" for the entire stage of cultural evolution which is characterized by control over the social tradition, dividing it into "semi-civilization" (beginning with the invention of writing) and "true or developed civilization" (beginning with universal education). The reader needs hardly to be warned that stages of culture are not sharply defined, that they overlap, and vary greatly in the different peoples. A different classification of the stages of human culture (or mental and social development) is proposed by Edward Carpenter in his Pagan and Christian Creeds: Their Origin and Meaning: namely, the stages ( 1 ) of Simple Consciousness, when man's consciousness is still animal-like; (2) of Self-Consciousness, which began in the barbarism of Neolithic times, and in which man consciously makes self the center of interest, and (3) of Universal Consciousness, a stage just beginning, in which self will no longer be the center, but humanity and the universe. This classification, while suggestive, seems to be based upon the fallacy of regarding "self-consciousness" as synony- mous with self-interest or selfishness. Man will probably grow mere self-conscious, but also more "social" or "altruistic." In any case, true Christianity (despite what Carpenter says to the contrary) might be regarded as marking the beginning of the third stage, "Universal Consciousness." 72 THE KEOONSTBUCTION OF KELIGIOtf of barbarism, and these in turn grew out of a narrow "group morality" and a limited "consciousness of kind." Civilization, in the strict sense, only began with the keep- ing of historic records, "with man's coming to social self- consciousness, and with his beginning of the control and conquest of the mental or spiritual element in his life. This stage of human history is, then, a thing of yester- day only in its beginnings, not more than four or five thousand years old for any people, and scarcely two thou- sand years old for most Europeans. We began to out- grow barbarism, in other words, but yesterday, and it should not be surprising that many of the traditions of barbarism still survive among us. Complete civilization will arrive with the full socialization of man. To the sociological imagination this development of human culture presents itself as a parabola, with human experience as the chief element at its focus. The lower part of the curve may be taken as representing the not less than one hundred thousand years of savagery, of brute-like ignorance and subjection to the blind forces of nature, through which the race has passed. The upper part of the curve may be taken as the one hundred thou- sand years or more of civilization, of mastery over phy- sical nature, and human nature, which, we may hope, lies ahead of our race. The remaining or vertical part of the curve will then represent that transitional stage of barbarism through which our race has passed on its way from animality to spirituality, from ignorance to knowl- edge, from the darkness of savagery to the light of civili- zation. We might rep 7 3sent this graphically by the fol- lowing diagram : * 1 This diagram, like 1 praphieal representations in the social sciences, mu*t not, of nirse, bo taken too seriously. It is only a rough, convenient mep "f representing an idea. If the curve were SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHKISTIANITY 73 Evidently we arc now just entering upon the upper part of the curve, with the real work and higher achieve- ments of true civilization still lying all ahead of us. MENTION Of WRITING -> LEVEL OF CONTROL Otfff THE PSYCWC THE CURVE OF HUMAN CULTURE. The typical institutions of barbarism, or predatory cul- ture, still survive, or but lately existed among us. Yes- terday we had slavery, and even to-day we are only trying drawn accurately it would be very irregular, as human history pro- ceeds by the "trial and error method," a succession of "ups" and "downs," advances and regressions, with progress resulting as a whole, hitherto. An entirely different graph from the parabola might, of course, be used to represent the general movement. Curiously enough, the parabola was selected by Henry Adams (The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, p. 302) to illustrate pessimistic conclusions which were based upon his attempt to trace physical laws in social movements. No such analogy with the physical is here implied. On the contrary, human history, as a process of learning through "trial and error," is essentially a psychological process. See my /**-/i- duction to Social Psychology. rvAT .74 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION to rid ourselves of polygamy, autocracy, militarism, class exploitation, and the debaucheries of barbarous self-indul- gence. We are still slowly and painfully learning the rudiments of true civilization. Let us recall again the method of cultural evolution and the importance of "pattern ideas," or "ideals," in the social life, this time not in the way of maintaining social order, but rather in furthering social progress. The tran- sition from lower to higher stages of civilization, anthro- pologists tell us, is intermediated by the formation of "pat- tern ideas," or "ideals." 1 By the principle of anticipation these ideas are often formed far in advance of the com- plete birth of the new civilization.^ The human mind jSees the need or the advantage, sets up an "ideal," a "pat- tern" of the thing to be realized, and then by various methods works towards its goal. Thus long before men invented the flying machine they formed the idea of the flying machine. Then they watched the flight of birds and other animals and studied the properties of physical nature until they found methods of realizing their idea or ideal of the flying machine. Thousands nf such illus- trations might be given. All of the important things in human culture, then, exist first as "pattern ideas" in the minds of men before they are realized in actual life; and they exist, as a rule, long before they are realized. "Now this principle applies to the great changes in re- ligion and morals, and so in civilization itself, not less than in the realm of mechanical invention. Such changes come through the starting of new pattern ideas or standards in the minds of men. These are reflected upon by the popular mind, and if accepted and approved 1 See an article by the author on "Theories of Cultural Evolution" in American Journal of Sociology, May, 1918, Vol. XXIII, pp. 779-800. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 75 they become the "mores/' the all-powerful standards, of a new culture. But the pattern ideas or standards of a new culture do not arise gradually out of those of the old culture or mix, in general, harmoniously with them. They arise suddenly as new inventions, new perceptions on the part of social leaders, and cultural evolution pro- ceeds by one type entirely supplanting another type. Thus the standards of the predatory type of culture known as barbarism must be completely supplanted by entirely different standards before we can have true civilization. Nevertheless, the ideals and standards of an older type of culture may persist for an indefinite time alongside of those of a new, while the new type is emerging. Thus arise conflicts between the old and the new; and this ex- plains in large measure the great moral conflicts in our human world. They are conflicts between old and new cultural patterns. As the ideas and standards of pre- datory culture were thousands of years dominant in our traditions, we must expect them to manifest themselves at times in their old power in the earlier stages ol a non- predatory civilization. Since the patterns of a new culture concern human re- lations they demand more than mere intellectual assent. They must become social values with compelling social sanctions. They need accordingly a decided emotional setting in order to overcome the native egoism of the in- dividual, since the break with old habits and the entering upon a new and higher form of social organization entails sacrifices in many cases. This emotional setting the new cultural patterns get through the sanction of religion, in accordance with the principles which we have discussed in the preceding chapter. Hence a revolutionary change in human culture, if it is a social advance, is always pre- ceded or accompanied by a religious reformation or re- 76 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION rival. The social significance of religious reformations, with their revival of intense religious emotions, is that they smooth the way for the. acceptance of new cultural patterns or social ideals. Thus the Protestant Reforma- tion prepared the way for the individual freedom of the modern world. The Methodist movement among English- speaking peoples again undoubtedly was a forerunner of nineteenth century democracy in Britain and America. But with those greater revolutions in culture which con- cern the most fundamental patterns and ideals of social life, a much greater religious movement is needed, more extended in time and more revolutionary in character. Religion functions, as we have seen, to meet the crises of life, and no crisis in social evolution exceeds that of the transition from one type of culture to another. World religions arise to mediate these transitions. 1 The adapta- tion of human society to a universal non-predatory type of culture would necessarily require a new religion of international, humanitarian character to broaden man's consciousness of kind. What Christianity is, from an anthropological and sociological point of view, should now be evident. /' Chris- tianity is a new set of "pattern ideas," marking the dawn of a new type of culture, a culture with a non-predatory morality on a humanitarian basis. It is an effort to 1 The historical conditions surrounding the origin of new world religions are not fully known, but in every case they seem to be those of great cultural change. This was especially true of Chris- tianity. Those who are familiar, with the social conditions of the early first century in Judea and in the Greco- Roman world generally tell us that there was a peculiar "ripeness" in these conditions for just such a social and cultural change as early Christianity at- tempted. A part of the conditions under which Christianity originated are vividly described by Simkhovitch in his Toward the Under- standing of Jesus. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 77 transcend predatory individual, class, tribal, and national ethics and to replace these with a universalized, social, in- ternational, humanitarian ethics. The beginnings of this movement are, of course, to be found in the many pre- cursors of Jesus, and especially in the later Jewish prophets. But in the life and teachings of Jesus these ideas first came to effective expression. He initiated the revolution in religious and moral ideas for which the whole of human history had been preparing. Only misunderstanding of human history and of the nature of religion could lead to the supposition that the Christian movement marks merely a stage in the evolu- tion of man's theological beliefs.^Christianity apparently started as a protest against Jewish formalism and par- ticularism. But as such a protest, it had to develop the spiritual and universal side of Judaism, already more or less explicit in the teachings of its later prophets. In Jesus we find the supreme development of this prophetic Judaism with its trend toward ethical and religious uni- versalism. Premising the supreme value of human per- sonality, his clear teaching was that the only possible way to serve God is thrmigh the service of men, no matter what their condition, occupation, or nationality might be. Thus he revolutionized both religion and ethics in humanizing both. The humanitarian impulse of the time, accord- ingly, attached itself to Christianity, which became an idealistic social movement .in the Greco-Roman world to supplant its predatory traditions by new ideals of peace, 1 Early Christianity, Case tells us (op. cit. Chapter I), cannot be conceived primarily as "an abstract quantity of doctrine, ethics, or ritual." Rather it was "a new religious awakening," which had its origin in "an outburst of spiritual energy on the part of Jesus and his followers, striving after new and richer attainments under the stimuli of a new and more suggestive environment." (p. 28.) 78 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGIOK good will, mutual aid, and brotherhood among men. 1 The distinctive note of Christianity was "redemption" not simply of the individual but of the world. For it looked to the establishment of a social order in which the divine will should be realized a kingdom of God an order which should make of humanity one large family with peace, justice, and good will among all its members. But this new social order was to be established not by 1 In an article in the American Journal of Theology, January, 1918, on "Primitive Christianity an Idealistic Social Movement," Prof. C. W. Votaw, of the University of Chicago, summarizes the socially idealistic aspects of primitive Christianity as follows: 1. Its comprehensive and supreme principle was love of man toward man brotherliness in feeling, action, and thought. 2. It inculcated the sacrifice of self for the good of others. 3. It made the common welfare the chief aim of life. 4. It sought to establish consideration and justice in the social relations of men. 5. It aimed to diminish the valuation and to check the pursuit of material things. 6. It sought to control and suppress sex immorality. 7. It elevated the marriage ideal and practice. 8. It forbade envy and strife, fraud and theft, drunkenness and reveling. 9. It condemned pride, ostentation, and hypocrisy. 10. It censured the self-complacency, arrogance, and selfishness of the better class. 11. It placed the social duties above the ritual duties, right con- duct and character above worship and ordinance. 12. It interpreted the will of God in the direction of reasonable living. 13. It made the individual free, autonomous, responsible. 14. It rebuked legalism in law and in social administration. 1,5. It sought to prevent the domination of the weak by the strong. 16. It opposed the use of force to accomplish social ends. 17. It undertook to replace the law and practice of retribution, i. e., revenge, retaliation, by the principle of returning good for evil and overcoming evil with good. 18. It created so high and free a conception of the right social relations as to disaffect the Christians toward the Roman Government. 19. It developed local groups of persons throughout the Empire bound together religiously and socially in close fellowship. 20. It unified Orientals and Occidentals in a real brotherhood, surmounting the barriers of race antipathy and national alignment. 21. It brought together on a common plane the rich and the poor, SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHKISTIANTTY 79 force or by authority, but by a new life within the indi- vidual soul a life redeemed from sin and in harmony with the divine will. Christianity * was thus not so much a mere "reform" movement in the external social order as a movement directed at a "revolution in culture," a complete change in the "mores." From the first it was so recognized and fought by the champions and defenders of the older order in which it originated. 2 the educated and the ignorant, the prominent and the obscure, the master and the slave. 22. It welded new social bonds, detaching people from previous groups and associations and uniting them on a higher basis. 23. It founded a solid, permanent social organization within the Roman Empire that was to survive the latter's decline and fall. 24. It made life idealistic, hopeful, joyful and courageous. 25. It assured men of eternal welfare and a perfect social order in an imminent new age. 1 The use of "Christianity" at times as a convenient term for the Christian movement the movement to establish the religion of Jesus will, it is hoped, cause no* confusion to the reader, as the context will indicate the meaning. 3 With penetrating clearness a scientific educationist has thus recently characterized the primitive Christian movement: "The Christian movement in its primitive aspects represents a distinct resurgence of life from its natural depths and sources, whatever those sources may be. It is of the nature of a genuine impulse life, energy, feeling, emotion, purpose welling up from within, out of the indi- vidual, out of man, out of the universe, overflowing the conventional channels of life and daring to live in ways that are not permitted by a machine-made age or civilization. ... It is the denial of the finality of a fixed and mechanical social order. It is the hope of a social order based on the inner and spiritual life and needs of society, an order in which the individual may find his own personal freedom, as a member of a social fellowship. It gives the direct challenge to all forms of intellectualisms, practicalisms, legalisms, literalisms, and militarisms. Plato had said, 'The world is made of ideas'; Jesus said, 'Build your world out of love and service and sympathy.' Roman militarism had said, 'Buttress your liberties with forts, arsenals, and legions of soldiers'; Jesus said, 'The truth alone can make you free. 7 The Scribes and Pharisees had said, 'Cursed is the man that knows not the law'; Jesus said, 'Love is the fulfillment of all law.' In place of the philosopher, the moralist, or the soldier, Jesus sets up a little child and says, 'Of such is the real social order of the future to be made.' In all these things the founder of this movement seems to be saying: 'Man is a part of the creative energy of the universe; he shall create his own moral order, his own spiritual 80 THE KECONSTEUCTION OF EELIGIO^ But why did such a movement originate in Judea? -.Why did it spring up within the confines of Judaism? Doubtless somewhat must be attributed to the fact that in Judea the cultures of the Occident and the Orient met, and that there was the point where new cultural ideals, or "patterns" embodying the best in both, could be most easily developed. The sociological principle of the "cross- fertilization of cultures" comes in here. Social develop- ments in the Greco-Roman world, especially Stoicism and increasing cosmopolitan practices, had done much to pre- pare the way for humanitarian ideas and ideals in religion and ethics. At the same time similar movements were starting in the Orient. That these should have come to focus in Judea is what we should scientifically expect when we clearly understand the nature of Judaism. 1 universe in which to live.' . . . All the way through the teaching of primitive Christianity the implication is plain that there is quite as much need of the salvation of institutions as of the salvation of individuals." Joseph K. Hart in Democracy in Education, pp. 121-124. Thus Dr. Hart finds an implication of that "social statesmanship" in early Christianity which some have denied as existing there. In later chapters he explains fully ho\r in the succeeding centuries Christianity was socially and politically "sterilized." It will be noted that both Votaw, a student of the New Testament, and Hart, a student of social and cultural conditions, agree with the writer that the early Christian movement aimed at a "revolution in culture," though this has often been denied by theologians. This is also the view of Simkhovitch. For discussion of the social conception of the kingdom of God, see page 176 in Chapter VI. 1 The amount of Greek and Hindu (or other Oriental) influences shown in Jesus's teachings has often been debated. It is sufficient for our purposes, perhaps, to note that while Jesus lived at a "cross- roads" of culture which was open to world-wide influences, yet hig main teachings were undoubtedly a clear development of those of the later Jewish prophets. It will be well to remember also that the Jews themselves had lived for centuries at this cross-roads of culture; that they had had much contact with other peoples. Through fully one thousand years of Semitic civilization (Jerusalem already at 1500 B. C., archcDology shows, was an important military stronghold and commercial center) they had accumulated much experience and SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 81 For the deeper reason for the development of Chris- tianity in Judea was the nature of ancient Judaism. Un- like many ancient religions it had not wandered off, so to speak, into religious by-paths, but had kept close to the main line of religious evolution as the development and spiritualization of social ideals and values. Psycho^ logically Judaism was an idealization and projection or, the values connected with the family life. All the re- 1 ligious and ethical concepts of Judaism were based upon) the family. All of the phraseology of the later prophets especially was borrowed from the domestic and social life. In other words, the ancient Jews had kept a relatively V , unspoiled family life as the center of their social life, and from the fraternity and idealism of this "primary group" had derived their religious and ethical concepts < and ideals. NowHsocfology shows that tlie original source of social idealism is in the social experiences in the "pri- mary groups," especially the family and the neighbor- hood. 1 All human history is in one sense a struggle to take the fraternity and democracy realized in these groups, when at their best, and make them humanity-wide. Thus Judaism in its development represented the main trend of religious and social evolution, and it only needed to break the shell of nationalistic particularism, as we have said, to become a universal and humanitarian religion. It was the work of Jesus to broaden thus the religious tradition and to point it to its final goal. Whatever view one may take of his personality, all must admit that the Christian movement received its initial form and impulse ' ' , were able to profit from the mistakes of themselves and other peoples in religious matters, as their prophets insist. All of this fitted them to be the chief bearers and refiners of the religious tradition in the ancient world. Cooley, Social Organization, Chapters III and IV. 82 THE KECONSTRUCTIOJST OF RELIGION from him. 1 It was his creative personality which finally focused all the idealistic trends in the religious and moral life of the time, and hrought them to the white heat of a new religion. This again accords with scientific socio- logical principles; for sociology has shown that the creative influence of personality is necessary in all human achievement, and that all human progress is achievement. 2 Masterful personal leadership is a necessary element, therefore, in every great social movement toward a higher plane of civilization ; and the personality of Jesus fur- nished, and has continued to furnish, such leadership for the religious and moral revolution which Christianity seeks to effect. Jesus_ was not an accident in human history,! nor is the recognition of his continued leadership of the Christian movement an accident. /"We must not look at early Christianity, however, as anything more than a beginning. It has been wrongly regarded by most Christians as marking the completion and perfection of religion and morality.^} But Christianity can be this only when the Christian movement has achieved its final development, and has succeeded in establishing a humanitarian civilization, a Christian state of society. Christianity is not a static thing. To regard Jesus himself as standing other than at the be- ginning of a great new movement in human culture is to misunderstand him culturally and historically. 4 Even the 1 A critical discussion will be found in Chapter V, pp. 145-149. **" * See The Social Problem, p. 71, also Introduction to Social Psy- chology, pp. 159-161; 219-220. * See Case, The Evolution of Early Christianity, Chapter I. This is not saying, of course, that Jesus did not enunciate certain final principles in religion and ethics. The whole argument of this book is in one sense an attempt to show that Jesus did. * Compare the words of Eucken in answering the question raised in the title of his book, Can M'c Still lie Christians? "We not only can but must be Christians only, however, on the condition that SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 83 words of Jesus, though they be together with his life the touchstone of the Christian spirit, mark only the begin- ning of the unfolding of a new conception of human re- lationships, a social life, non-predatory in character and patterned upon the ideals of good will, mutual service, and brotherhood among men. Christianity started, then, as a religion of love and of human service, and its permanent successes have largely come through its having this character. Even though the world was not ready to receive and to carry out its prin- ciples, and though its followers soon distorted them be- yond description, vetimpartiality must lead us to acknowl- edge that it_starteor as ari idealistic social movement in tEe Greco-Roman^ world, marking the dawn of a religion of humanity. Moreover, it is only fair to add that through all the centuries the best representatives of Christianity have always held to the idealistic social point of view. The place of Christianity in the evolution of religion and its social significance accordingly is clear. We have said that it is an endeavor to transcend tribal and national religion and ethics by a religion of the love and service of humanity as a whole. ^In other words, it is an endeavor to establish a world-wide^ ideal human society, in which justice and good will shall be realized, upon a religious basis. Its aim, as has been well said, is nothing less" than the creation of a a new world." x Christianity be recognized as a progressive historic movement still in the making, that it be shaken free from the numbing influence of ecclesiasticism and placed upon a broader foundation." (p. 218.) 1 A totally different view of Christianity is, of course, presented by the German theologians. Their views may be found best summed up in Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus. According to this view, the teaching of Jesus was eschatological and did not con- cern this world. This eschatological view of the teachings of Jesus will be discussed further in Chapters V and VI, but it may be pointed ^ Iu3 84 THE KECONSTKUCTIOX OF KELIGION The "Enthusiasm of Humanity," then, as Sir J. K. Seeley said in his Ecce Homo one of the first books to interpret rightly the religion of Jesus is the center and core of Christianity. Love was the characteristic virtue of the new religion, but love socially directed, the love of God being expressed and measured in terms of the love of man. Religious faith and enthusiasm were to release the energies of men and make them free to huild the divine society the "Kingdom of God" in which a redeemed humanity was to be realized. But before this could be done the bondage of the human soul to sin and selfishness, to cynical indifference and unbelief, must end ; man must become reconciled to God as Father and dedicated to his cause and kingdom. But Jesus did not conceive that this Utopia could be created merely by changes in individual aouls without moral conflicts in the external social order. On the contrary, the Christian life was to be a continual strife against the forces of evil, not only against those within, but also against the wickedness entrenched in the social order and maintained by those in authority. The Christian life was to have its militant side, though its weapons were not carnal. This was necessarily so, for, as Seeley says, "The Enthusiasm of Humanity creates an intolerant anger against all who do wrong to human beings, an impatience of selfish enjoyment, a vindictive enmity to tyrants and oppressors, a bitterness against sophistry, superstition, self-complacent heartless specula- out here that It was quite natural that such a view should grow up in Germany (especially) where for a long time any attempt to apply humanitarian ideals was regarded with disfavor by authorities in both church and state. It may also he proper to remark here that the central principle of Jesus the love and service of man becomes quite unintelligible (to a plain man) if he meant his teaching to be primarily "eicnatologlcal. The whole trend of Gorman theology, indeed, seems at bottom to be hostile to the social conception of Christianity. Compare Thomns, Ifclirfion Its. Prophets and False Prophets, especially p. VIII and Chapteri VI-VHI. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHKISTIANITY 85 tion, an irreconcilable hostility to every form of impos- ture, such as the uninspired inhumane soul could never entertain." But if this is the social meaning and aim of Chris- tianity, why, it may be asked, has historical Christianity accomplished so little during all the centuries to establish justice and good will among men? The answer to such a question, if it were to attempt completeness, would have to review not only the whole history of the Christian church, but the whole history of the world since the intro- duction of Christianity. The chief things in the past which have been obstacles to the achievement of a Chris- tian state of human society, however, may perhaps be summarized under six heads: The first is the fact that Christianity has in the main been Taken by professed Christians as a theological and metaphysical doctrine per- taining to the salvation of the soul in a life_beypnd rather than as ^pactical_etliical and social attitude. The world into which Christianity was introduced was dominantly theologically minded, 1 and it has remained in that state until very recent times. The second obstacle which Chris- tianity as a social and ethical system encountered was the pagan religions and morals of the ancient world, with their sanctions of barbarism, which, we shall try to show in the 1 Says Wells (Outline of History, Vol. I, pp. 591-592) : "Jesus had called men and women to a giant undertaking, to the renunciation of self, to the new birth into the kingdom of love. The line of least resistance for the flagging convert was to intellectualize himself away from this plain doctrine, this stark proposition, into complicated theories and ceremonies. . . . By the fourth century we find all the Christian communities so agitated and exasperated by tortuous and elusive arguments about the nature of God as to be largely negligent of the simpler teachings of charity, service and brotherhood that Jesus had inculcated." An excellent discussion of the reasons for the failure of the teachings of Jesus to be understood by his followers will be found in Thomas's Religion Its Prophets and False Prophets (Macmillan, 1918). 86 THE KECONSTRUCTION OF KELIGIOST next chapter, have very definitely survived even in the traditions of our present civilization. From the first, the pagan state of religion and morals forced Christianity in practical life to compromise ; and pagan habits of thought and feeling made it almost impossible for all except a few minds to comprehend the meaning of the social teachings of Christianity. 1 The third obstacle to the social success of Christianity has been the failure of its representatives to appreciate the importance of the material and -economic factors in the life of man. Man is not only a spiritual being with spiritual, that is, social and ethical, wants; but he is also a material being hemmed about by the forces of the material world^His spiritual life can only blossom and come to fruitage under favorable material and economic conditions^} If it is true, as Jesus said, that "man does not live by bread alone," it is also true that man cannot live without bread. The material wants of life must be satisfied, in other words, in some proper measure before the spiritual life can have a fair chance to develop. The social ideals of religion, if they are to be practical, cannot concern themselves ex- clusively with the immaterial things of life. The cry of the masses for bread must not be met by presenting them a stone, in the form of ethical truth regarding the value of a mind above the things of this world. Nor did Jesus so teach or so act, one cannot but remark. When religion develops this sort of other-worldliness, 2 it is bound to be- 1 See Glover, The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire. a Much of this "otherworldliness" of primitive Christians was, of course, due to their Millonarianism, and through all the Christian centuries Millenarianism has been an influence which has kept the church from undertaking its true task. See Chapter VI. Says Professor E. C. Hayes (Sociology and ElKics, p. 1): "The substi- tution of a mystic doctrine of the 'second coming' for the practical purpose for which the founder of Christianity lived and died is the most pathetic of all perversions of a noble teaching." SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 87 come a stumbling block to human progress, and to be accused of being merely a means to quiet the justifiable discontent of the suffering masses. Now the social failure of historical Christianity in the past has been largely due to the non-recognition of this truth ; and this is the main reason why some men have lost their faith in the social power of religion. A social and humanitarian religion cannot regard any- thing in human life as alien to itself. In a sense it is concerned as much with the material conditions of life as with the spiritual, 1 because it does not conceive that social redemption is possible without control, for the sake of the higher social values, over all of the conditions of life. In other words, it is quite as much the aim of social religion to transform the environment in which the indi- vidual must live as to bring to the individual soul re- demptive truth and spiritually uplifting influences; and it is the material, quite as much as it is the spiritual en- vironment which must be transformed, if social religion is to succeed in its great work of creating an ideal human society in which justice and good will shall be realized. To this point we shall return again. A fourth thing which has been an obstacle to the achievement of a Christian state of society during the last few centuries, has been the extreme individualisni of Protestant Christianity.. This has led to "an absence of the sense of responsibility for the social order which has, from the beginning, maimed and distorted Protestant Christianity." 2 It tended to render, in many cases, the religious life of Protestant peoples a socially sterile sub- jectivism and to narrow the object of religious enthusiasm 1 See Chapters VIII, IX and X. 2 Fitch, Preaching and Paga-nism, p. 67. Compare p. 113 of this book. 88 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION from the redemption of humanity to the redemption of a few individuals. Even yet some Protestant denomina- tions "Lave scarcely freed themselves from the blighting influence of such religious individualism. <; A fifth obstacle, closely akin to the last, to the realiza- / tion of Christian ideals in social life, has been the _un in- telligent use which Christians have made of the Bible, often taking all parts as equally inspired and on the same / plane. The result has been that the teachings of Jesus have been often neglected and that the actual Christianity t taught has been a strange mixture of Old Testament re- \ ligion and Pauline theology. 1 A sixth obstacle to the social success of Christianity has been ijs failure to ally itself with humane science. The church hitherto has failed to -see that the great enemy of mankind is ignorance. It has failed to understand that the redemption of humanity, the creation of an ideal so- ciety in which the divine will shall be realized/, can be compassed only through a full knowledge of all the forces which make or mar human life, both individually and collectively. Instead of devoting itself to the promotion of such knowledge, the church has often presented the i A professor of religious education in an orthodox school of religion A 5 writes me: "Preachers still pay more attention to Paul's theology than j l to the teachings of Jesus. There are two reasons for this: The orthodox notion of inspiration puts Paul's teachings on a par with those of Jesus; and this has made it easier to preach theology than to preach social Christianity because theology is in the realm of opinion, while social Christianity is in the realm of everyday life." For an interesting attempt to dissociate the teachings of Jesus from Pauline theology, though often crude and uncritical, see Singer's The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and Paul. Safer guides, however, will be found in such works os Kent's Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus, Chaps. XXV, XXVI, and his Work and Teach- ings of the Apostles; Smith's Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion (see especially Chaps. V and IX) ; King's Ethics of Jesus; and Mathew's The Social Teaching of Jesus. For a view the oppo- site of Singer's, see Bacon's Jesus and Paul, especially Lecture III. SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 89 sorry spectacle of opposing the advance of science, and especially its extension to human affairs. Not only must the failures of historical Christianity be fully recognized, but we must also recognize the fre- quent failure hitherto of all humanitarian religion for the reasons just mentioned. The social failure of religion, however, is like the social failure of science; it has been a failure at times to envisage the whole of the social reality and the whole of human life. In our rapidly changing and increasingly complex social world such failure is to be expected. Only a religious or scientific dogma which fails to see that religion is a growing, evolv- ing thing, still to be perfected, would throw aside religion because it has failed in the past and is still very far from meeting the full needs of our social life. All of our in- stitutions are failures in this sense. Yet one who would discard the family or government, for example, because they have failed in the past and still fall short of meeting the requirements of our present civilization, would be foolish. The most conspicuous failure of all, the candid scientific mind will readily admit, is science itself. For modern science until very recently has conspicuously failed to envisage human life as a complex whole, and even in many instances, indeed, to take cognizance of social reality at all. Yet the scientific mind does not lose faith in science because of the failures of science. On the con- trary, because of its method and its aim the very failures of science are an incentive to the further development of science. In the same way the failures of religion attest to its supreme worth and in all rational minds are an incentive to its further development. No human institution has grown in any other way than through successes and fail- 90 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGIOtf ures; and one must admit that the failures of institu- tions have more often contributed to their rational de- velopment than their successes. The hopeful thing in this world of ours is that human life and civilization are ever turning defeat into victory. It is time that those who see the social value of religion who see that religion is not less needed than science to meet the problems of our com- plex human living together should rally and turn what- ever defeats religion has sustained into victory. The development of humanitarian religion is only just begin- ning; * but it must be developed on a world-wide scale if humanitarian civilization is to go forward with its work. Moral renewal is now obviously the one thing most needed in Western civilization. ^"Only the development of vital, humanitarian religion can save Western civilization from defeat. J If this is so, there is urgent need of a re- valuation of Christianity. For, as a great secular news- paper has recently said, 2 one might as well forget the law of gravitation in the physical world as to ignore in the social world the ethical principles which Jesus enunciated. Humanity would be about as safe in the one case as in the other, as the recent history of the world sufficiently attests. Many social thinkers of the present see that the world needs a rebirth of vital religion, but many of these fail to see that a foundation was laid in religion and ethics by Jesus as stable as the foundation laid by Copernicus in astronomy or by Darwin in biology. They look for a new religion. In the autumn of 1914 the writer heard in London a great English social thinker say that he saw 1 Conservative scientific estimates place the duration of man's life upon earth at not less than 250,000 years. Compared with this long past, as has often been pointed out, Christianity has been at work only a few minutes. *The Nation, December 21, 1918 (Vol. 107, p. 762). SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHRISTIANITY 91 no way out of the present crisis in our civilization unless there should perchance again arise a religious leader of the simplicity, dignity, and exaltation of character of Jesus of Nazareth, who could lead the nations to peace, justice, and brotherhood. But with much more insight into our social and moral problems, as well as into the nature of Christianity, Henry C. Emery, formerly a pro- fessor of economics in Yale University, has said : "We are told by some writers that the world is waiting in an agony of expectation for some great social philosopher who shall bring to it the new message of salvation. If so, the world is wrong, for there is no message to bring it peace from its manifold ills, save that heard nineteen centuries ago from the profoundest of all social philosophers, the Man of Nazareth." x With dispassionate impartiality, Professor Ross, too, has said: "I suppose that all students of society would accept something like this as the formula for social prog- ress: The maximizing of harmony and co-operation and the minimizing of hostility and conflict. Now when you stop to think of it, is it not wonderful that in the Gospels we find provided just the religion which is best suited to realize the sociologists' ideal? From the point of view of improvement in human relations, humanity has in this religion an asset of indescribable value." 2 1 Quoted by Strong, The New World Religion, p. 479. In a public lecture before the University of Colorado, August 10, 1921, Dr. A. B. Wolfe, professor of economics and sociology in the University of Texas, whose entire detachment from all traditionalism is well known, similarly declared: "The Western world needs to be converted to Christianity almost as much as it needs conversion to science. By Christianity I mean precisely the ethics of Jesus." So, too, Professor Simkhovitch says: "Christ's insight was one which future generations may rediscover but can never upset." (Toward the Understanding of Jesus, p. 59.) 'Proceedings of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XIV (1919), p. 133. 92 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF EELIGION The fundamental principles of Christianity, in other words, are in harmony with the fundamental principles of social science, and the world needs only to develop and apply those principles to have a religion in accord with modern social science. That scientific knowledge of hu- man relationships should point to the same conclusions reached in religious development two millenniums ago will surprise no one who understands the principles of social evolution * which we have set forth in the preceding chapter. And the specific reasons why Jesus headed the movement for a social world patterned upon the relation- ships and values of the family life we have just indicated. If that movement was not a mistake, the world surely needs to acknowledge anew the leadership of Jesus, and this means that we need a rebirth of Christianity in the sense of the religion of Jesus. It is time that organized Christianity hecome synonymous with the religion of Jesus. ^JThe vision which Jesus had of a social life based upon love or good will is not an unrealizable dream. It is the only possible social future if the world is not going to turn back to barbarism. Men have never intelligently tried to realize it in their social life. Instead they have been satisfied with various cheap substitutes in the form of theological beliefs which have diverted their attention "from the true problems of the religious life or with formal pretensions which have thinly disguised their underlying paganism. 1 Similarly Wells (Outline of History, Vol. I, p. 584) says: "Though much has been written foolishly about the antagonism of science and religion, there is indeed no such antagonism. What all world religions declare by inspiration and insight, history, as it grows clearer, and science, as its range extends, display (as a reason- able and demonstrable fact) that men form one universal brother- hood, that they spring from one common origin, that their individual lives, their nations and races, interbreed and blend and go on to merge again at last in one common human destiny." CHAPTER IV OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION THE third thing which is needed for the proper recon- structiorT~of~~religion is the perception of the essential paganism and barbarity of our present civilization."^ "We must see our present so-called civilization," as justly says a recent writer, 1 "for what it is a thing of barbarism, feeding upon the life of the race in the poverties of peace as well as in the woes of war and get rid of it forth- with!" The immediate and momentous question before the world is what sort of civilization we shall aim to achieve; whether it shall be patterned after the ideals of the Christianity of the Gospels, or developed along other lines. Do we want a Christian world or not ? This has become the momentous question before our age because the ethical ideals of Christianity have been challenged in recent years as never before in the history of Western civilization, and pagan views of life have been openly ad- vocated. The trend in Western civilization as a whole for several years immediately prior to the breaking out of the Great War was unquestionably away from Chris- tian ideals. 2 1 Dr. John Haynes Holmes. Unscientific observers prior to the Great War were almost in- variably optimistic, as critical mindedness towards one's own civiliza- tion, if rational, requires considerable scientific detachment. This was particularly true of the daily press in the United States. But the war shattered the foundations of this uncritical optimism, and some at least were led to take a more critical attitude. The following paragraphs, taken from an editorial which appeared in one of the 93 94 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF RELIGION While this fact was appreciated by practically all care- ful students of Western civilization, whether they were sympathetic with Christian ideals or not, yet the Chris- tian church as a whole, and especially its leaders, re- mained strangely blind in the matter. In the autumn of 1913, for example, the writer spoke before a large church in one of our great cities, pointing out the trend in recent years towards a recrudescence of pagan ideals and prac- tices in our civilization. To his surprise he found the next morning not only that he was denounced in the news- papers as a "pessimist," but that also all except two of the Christian ministers of the city who had been inter- viewed upon the subject disagreed with him and appar- more ably edited metropolitan American dailies in February, 1919, illustrate this and form a valuable bit of testimony: "For many years before the war we in America had been hearing how much better the world was becoming. Outwardly there w r as some proof of it. Slavery had vanished as a human institution, the in- quisition and the rack had gone to shameful oblivion, religious intolerance was passing, w r oman w r as being lifted from the position of chattel to one of equality with man in fact, the superficial mani- festations of a better life were many. "Inwardly, however, we have been traveling the wrong road. Hypocrisy and sham were becoming national fetiches. Our most sublime institutions were being perverted to base commercial ends. Honesty was being measured by ability to keep out of jail, shady adroitness and border-line shrewdness in business were magnified as great virtues, while upright, unyielding honesty was sneered at as a concomitant of failure. "Even the very church was prostituted in the pursuit for money. Preachers in many instances contorted the word of God to meet the wishes of rich parishioners; others preached charity as the only real virtue, knowing that the wealthy in their congregation had money to give their fellow-man, but nothing else. Crooks and sharpers became deacons and pillars, for under the cloak of a religious life they found it much easier to fleece the widow and the orphan. "The money lust infected our courts, debauched our literature and our schools. The successful man was the rich man; others were failures. Children were taught to be good business men, good traders, honest if possible, but successful at all events. The Golden Calf had a place of honor in all the meeting places of men." The present tendency to attribute everything which we judge to be wrong with our civilization to the ellects of the war is, of course, entirely uncritical. OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 05 cntly thought that he was attacking the church. Within ii vrar, Imwcvcr, the atrocities of the German armies in a score of Belgian cities gave startling evidence to the world of the trend toward paganism in our civiliza- tion. The Great War, indeed, revealed the unpleasant fact that our civilization was still not far removed from barbarism. 1 Men began to ask many questions. Has Christianity as a social system proved a failure? Is a Christian society possible ? Is Christianity "irretrievably obsolescent" ? Are not human brotherhood, universal justice, and uni- versal good will but idle dreams, " a species of oriental mysticism," in a world ruled by force and swayed by in- dividual and group egoism ? In order to be honest, should we not frankly go back to paganism as our rule of life? 1 Destructive criticism is not a pleasant task, especially not to the writer of this book. He hopes that the reader will understand that such criticism is here undertaken with a constructive purpose, and undertaken only because twenty-five years of careful study of all phases of our civilization have convinced him of the substantial truth of the conclusions herewith presented. The main argument is not retrogression, but the survival in our civilization of pagan and bar- barous elements, which recrudesce in periods of change and confusion like the present. This allows, however, for some degree of real retrogression in certain respects. This, indeed, every scientific student of civilization expects, since history shows, not uniform progress, but an alternation of progress and regress with, of course, a balance on the side of progress in the long run. While the writer believes that he has presented a "true bill" against nineteenth century mores, he sees no cause for discourage- ment in the facts mentioned or in the present situation, if people can be awakened to the falsity of the standards by which they have tried to live. He would not even agree, therefore, with the relative pes- simism of Professor Santayana, who in his recent book on Character and Opinion in the United States, says (p. VI) : "Civilization is per- haps approaching one of those long winters that overtake it from time to time. A flood of barbarism from below may soon level all the fair works of our Christian ancestors, as another flood two thousand years ago levelled those of the ancients such a catastrophe would be no reason for despair under the deluge and watered by it, seeds of all sorts would survive against the time to come." 96 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION But what do we mean by "paganism ?" Fundamentally we mean the type of social life and the ethical ideals which Machiavelli and Nietzsche discovered, or thought they dis- covered, in the civilization of Greece and Rome previous to the advent of Christianity a type of society, in other words, in which power and pleasure are frankly avowed as the ends of individual and group action. Machiavelli found in pre-Christian Rome his great model. The career of that world-conquering state, he thought, showed that the only end of the state was power, that men were ex- clusively moved by pure self-interest or egoism, and that public policies could not be based upon Christian mo- rality. His ideal was that of the ruthless militant state, whose only aim was the expansion of its power and ulti- mately world dominion over other peoples. In much the same spirit Nietzsche discovered in pre-Christian Greece and Rome the foundation for his doctrine that power is the supreme aim of all life. It was Greece rather than Rome, however, which especially afforded Nietzsche his model. The Greeks, with their child-like joy in life, their love of pleasure and amusement, their sensuous aestheti- cism; the Romans, with their frank acceptance of power as the only end of public policy; the ancient Teutonic tribesmen, with their joy in battle and in the exercise of ruthless might, all these appealed to Nietzsche as so much in line with his social ideal, that the coming of Christianity to disturb this "natural order" seemed to him the greatest calamity in human history. Of course, the situation in the ancient world was not so simple as Machiavelli and Nietzsche pictured it. There was no single form of paganism ; there were many forms, and even in pre-Christian times there was a striving towards something higher than the immoral ism which Machiavelli and Nietzsche admired. Thus in Greece, OUK SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 97 Socrates, Plato, aud Aristotle attempted to refute the Sophists with their doctrines that "might makes right/' and that "pleasure is the good." But as Nietzsche says, the movement which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle stand for, was not truly representative of Greek life. Nietzsche regards them as corruptors of Greece, much as Chris- tianity was later of the whole world. 1 The true Greece of history, we must admit with Nietzsche, was the Greece of the Sophists and Epicureans. The true Rome was not that of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, but that of Caesar, Nero, and Trajan. The Roman Empire rested essentially upon the predatory use of hrute force, upon the subjuga- tion and exploitation of weaker peoples, with scarcely any aim beyond that of world dominion. Greece, with its sen- suous aestheticism, and Rome, with its brutal predatory militarism, have been perhaps the chief sources of cor- ruption in the traditions of our civilization ; but the Teu- tonic tribesmen of the north with their predatory tradi- tions might be considered as furnishing a third source of paganism almost as important as the first two, were it not for the fact that these tribesmen later accepted Greco- Roman civilization and largely supplanted the models of their culture by the models of Greece and Rome. On the whole, then, Machiavelli and Nietzsche were right in finding a distinct type of culture, antecedent to our present civilization, which the Christian movement tried to set aside. The student of civilization is familiar with that type of culture also among non-European peo- ples. He finds that it characterizes all peoples living in or just emerging from the predatory stage of culture which we have described as "barbarism." All barbarous peoples possess as one dominant characteristic of their culture crude ideals of power and pleasure as the proper ends 1 See The Will to Power, pp. 345-366. 98 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION for action of both individuals and groups. Indeed, other ends of action scarcely occur to them; and as these are the ends set before both individuals and groups, such peoples are possessed by illusions of advantage to them- selves in the domination, spoliation, or exploitation of others. "Paganism" is therefore simply the moral and religious equivalent of "barbarism" as a cultural term. "Paganism," or "barbarism," evidently underlay, in the main, the culture of Greece and Rome. It also evidently underlies the culture of the present, since it is that stage of culture "which lies back of our civilization and from which we are but just emerging. What is the relation of the religion of Jesus to the pre-Christian religions and morals which we have termed "paganism" ? It was an effort, as we have shown in the previous chapter, to transcend these and to furnish a new set of social patterns of a universalized humanitarian character with a religious sanction. The new pattern ideas of social relationships which the Christian move- ment initiated were in necessary conflict with those of the older predatory civilization in which they started; and this conflict has continued down to the present time. Even now, after two thousand years of slow emergence from barbarism, the world seems about to relapse back into it. Nor is this difficult historically to understand. From the first so-called Christian civilization has been a very mixed affair. Much even in the Christian church has been non-Christian, or rather stark paganism. 1 Through all so-called Christian centuries pagan ideals have been uppermost in politics and in business, and often in litera- ture, in art, in ethics, and in religion. The Greco-Roman 1 As one of my colleagues says, there are even yet so many pagan survivals in the church that effective religion often finds it necessary to express itself through other agencies and organizations. OUE SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 99 ideal of life lias more often triumphed over the Christian ideal than most Christians are willing to admit. Ever and again there has been a recrudescence of the pagan ideals of power and pleasure as the chief ends of life. The Renaissance was especially marked by the recrudes- cence of paganism. Indeed, as one impartial writer has put it, "The ideal of the Renaissance was to restore pagan standards in polite learning, in philosophy, in sentiment, in morals." x Not simply Machiavelli and Nietzsche, but a whole series of men of thought and men of action have at one time or another advocated the restoration of pagan standards in whole or in part in our civilization. Modern civilization has, indeed, been an inharmonious synthesis, or rather a continuous conflict, between these antagonistic views of our social and moral life. In the minds of some this has been interpreted to mean that the elements of worth in what we call "paganism" are so great that they must be given equal validity with the social values set up by Christianity. But it may be pointed out that there can be no compromise between a socialized morality and religion, and the ethics of power and pleas- ure for which paganism stands. There can be no com- promise between humanitarian civilization and barbarism, and therefore none between Christianity and individual or group egoism. This is not to deny that certain ele- ments in the pagan ideal of life may have worth. The self-culture, the happiness and joy in nature and in life, and even the love of power which paganism so stressed, have their place in a humanitarian civilization ; but theirs is not the first place. 2 The first place must be given to 1 Santayana, The Winds of Doctrine, p. 38. * The argument of this book is, of course, that the Christian ideal of service of mankind presents that synthesis of the Greek ideal of self-assertion and the oriental ideal of self-renunciation which Hob- house points out as necessary. (The Rational Good, p. XVIII.) 100 THE KECONSTKUCTIOST OF RELIGION the sense of social obligation, to the desire to serve and benefit mankind, not only all who now exist, but who may exist in the future. Such a social point of view must lead, moreover, to a policy of social conservation and of social self-realization rather than to one of self-gratifica- tion and self-culture. Service becomes the chief end of life for the individual, and also for groups, rather than power or pleasure. Pagan ideals will cease to be dan- gerous when they are definitely subordinated to the Chris- tian ideal of life, but only then. Our civilization needs a synthesis of its inharmonious elements, but it can get that synthesis only through accepting the fundamental Christian principle that the service of God must consist in the service of mankind. Modern civilization has been troubled by the recrudes- cence of pagan ideals only because it has not definitely accepted the Christian ideal of life. 1 Power and pleasure have remained its chief ideals. Even when these have not been held up as ends for individuals, they have been held up as ends for groups. We must not, of course, blame overmuch the influence of pagan antiquity for this. While the world has never succeeded in ridding itself of the ideals of barbarism, or rather in definitely subordinating them to higher ideals, the conditions of our own time, to- gether perhaps with certain tendencies of human nature, are even more responsible for this than the tradition of our pagan past. In other words, many conditions in the modern world have released and powerfully stimulated the original selfish impulses of human nature. During 1 Says Professor Conklin (op. clt. p. 170) : "When one reflects on the fact that for nineteen centuries so great a part of the world that professes to be Christian hna remained heathen at heart, and that to-day the teachings of Jesus are generally regarded by his so-called followers as too lofty to be practical, we may well wonder whether mankind is making any progress in religion." OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 101 the nineteenth century external authority of every sort declined to a minimum in Western civilization, and no new means of adequate social control were developed. The authority of the church, for example, reached its low ebb, and, under the assaults of criticism which was merely destructive, 1 the authority of the Bible waned. At the same time through invention and discovery and the open- ing up of unexploited regions of the earth, wealth in- creased to an extent beyond the dreams of previous ages. 3<>cn though the increase of wealth did not occur in all classes, the increase affected the standards of living and conduct in all classes. A greater number of individuals found it possible to devote themselves to selfish aims, to the getting of money, of power, or of pleasure than ever before, and the example of these individuals affected all classes. Thus by the decline of external authority and the in- crease of wealth human nature suddenly emerged in the nineteenth century from its swaddling bands, as it were. The flood gates of human selfishness were opened wider than they had ever before been opened to the masses of men. At the same time, a gospel of individual and na- tional success was preached everywhere. Material stand- ards of life came to dominate among the masses. All these things made a swing back toward paganism inevi- table in the later years of the nineteenth century and in the earlier years of the twentieth. 2 Literature began to 1 A fully scientific criticism would, of course, have been con- structive. See Chapter V. a We must always remember, as was pointed out at the beginning of Chapter III, that we began to outgrow barbarism but yesterday. In the early stages of civilization, in which we still are, we must expect frequent relapse into barbarism, as human history proceeds by the "trial and error method." Such relapses will continue until the mass of men have learned to discriminate between the pagan or bar- barous elements in our culture and the Christian. 1Q2 THE jaBOOStSTEUOTION OF RELIGION take on a pagan cast, such as it had not had even in the Renaissance. In commerce, in business, in polite society, and in amusements pagan standards came more and more to the front. A large element in the privileged classes refused to recognize or to conform to any standard at all save their own pleasure and their own wishes. They be- littled by contemptuous indifference, if they did not ridi- cule outright, Christian standards in living and in con- duct. Scandalous divorces and marriages became com- mon to an extent that the world had not seen since the decadent days of Rome. The wealthy set an example of extravagance, luxury, and fast living which inevitably demoralized the rest of society. But these were only straws upon the surface. The program of self-interest, material satisfaction and brute force came to extend through and through the fabric of Western civilization. 1 It was not simply the moral standards of the indi- vidual which were rebarbarized, but, as we now know, the life of whole nations. 2 It "was, indeed, in the realm of politics and of international relations, a realm which had never been greatly influenced by Christian standards, that 1 Says Bishop F. J. McConnell (Journal of Religion, Vol.1, p. 198) : "The whole atmosphere in which the present generation has been reared has made for individualism and for the search for as much personal profit as can be found anywhere. . . . The problem is that of the transformation of an entire social climate." 3 "A prominent and conservative university president recently said in public that the present age is the most decadent in history, with the exception of the days just before the fall of the Roman Republic and before the French Revolution. He mentioned 'dishonesty perme- ating public and private life alike, tainting the administration of justice, tainting our legislative halls, tainting the conduct of private business, polluting at times even the church itself.' In the same utterance, he averred that 'a source of infinite evil in every modern society is impurity of word and act.' He went on to assert that 'if there is to be social and political regeneration in our Republic and in the rest of the world, it must be by a tremendous regeneration of moral ideals.' " Hudson, The Truths We Live By, p. 22. OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 103 the recrudescence of paganism was chiefly to express itself. Strive to ignore it as we may, the real causes of the Great War were in the "mores" of Western civilization. And that these mores were fundamentally pagan or anti- Christian does not admit of doubt. In concrete terms, the causes of the Great War were pagan mores in political life, in business life, and in social relations in general. Anti- Christian politics, anti-Christian business, anti-Christian ideals of life, not pressure of population upon material resources, not geographical conditions, not biological neces- sities connected with race, were the real causes of the great conflict. These causes were everywhere in Western civilization, but they particularly came to a head in Ger- many. Germany can be blamed for the war only to the extent that Germany led in re-paganizing the world. The dominance in Germany of a militaristic tradition, the rise there of imperialistic commercialism, and the undermin- ing of Christian ideals of life among the Germans by these two causes and by the rise of a destructive criticism of religion and ethics and of a materialistic science, fitted Germany to bring to a focus all of the anti-Christian forces in modern civilization. She became the "scourge of God" to show the nations the evil of their ways. But, of course, anti-Christian or Machiavellian politics was not confined to Germany. Though Frederick II, Bis- marck, Treitschke, and a host of lesser German political thinkers formulated Machiavellian politics into an odious creed and justified it, yet their formulations were but little more than statements of the actual practices of many Eu- ropean states. At the very time, indeed, this odious pagan political philosophy was taking shape in Germany, Great Britain and Russia were permitting no ethical scruples 104 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION to stand in the way of their imperialistic ambitions. Eu- ropean nations in general, as a recent writer has said, whatever their attitude toward Christianity as a private faith, deliberately accepted the thesis of its social im- practicability. The statesmen responsible for the diplo- macy of various European countries took it for granted that self-interest must be the supreme law of nations, and public sentiment sustained them in this attitude. Practically all of the nations of Europe, indeed, played the game of "grab and get" through the whole of the nine- teenth century with seemingly little suspicion that it was destined to bring upon them the direst sort of punishment. Germany was the only one that had the hardihood to for- mulate this policy into a political creed and, as it were, officially to adopt it. In this Germany is especially to be blamed, for in a sense the individual or nation which de- liberately adopts a creed of anti-social conduct is more dangerous than the individual or nation which occasion- ally indulges in such conduct. Beliefs, ideals, standards ultimately determine the character of nations as well as of individuals. And Germany openly and unashamedly professed pagan political ideals while other nations, though often practicing them, yet disavowed them, and even just before the Great War in some cases seemed on the point of repenting their practice. But the evil spirit of Machiavelli with his doctrines that the only end of the state is power, and that in politics the end justifies the means, dominated the whole of Western civilization dur- ing the nineteenth century. Back of the anti-Christian politics of the modern world stood anti-Christian business. In an era of the world- wide expansion of industry and of the economic exploita- tion of the earth, it was easy for the economic doctrine OUK SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 105 to grow up and receive general acceptance, that business was for profits only. An imperialistic, capitalistic in- dustry grew up, which set before itself as its one end the domination of the world's markets for the sake of profits. This imperialistic capitalism found a ready tool in Machiavellian politics and in the growth of a hyper- nationalistic spirit. The whole commercial and industrial world of Western civilization became organized on essen- tially pagan lines. Profits, dividends, economic success, were aimed at, no matter what the expense to humanity. Self-interest was held to be the only possible basis for business enterprise, and this self-interest was usually in- terpreted to mean merely the interests of the business man as an individual. The obligations of business even to the community were overlooked, to say nothing of its wider responsibilities to humanity at large. Within the national life itself this anti-Christian spirit in the commercial and business world had a most disas- trous influence. The gospel of self-interest came to dominate not only industrial life but it spread to all other phases of the social life. Even the family life came to be looked upon as a matter of private convenience. No mat- ter how carefully the young were instilled with Christian ideals in the home and in the church, as soon as they got into the business world they felt compelled to lay aside these ideals and to adopt the pagan code of business morality, that in business self-interest alone must guide one's conduct. Consequently business paganized a part of their life insidiously before they knew it ; and gradually their whole moral life became weakened and undermined. The reactions of pagan business upon the public life of the nation were not less insidious and corrupting than upon its private life. Newspapers became filled with details how big business and little business did not scruple to do 106 THE KECONSTKUCTKXN" OF RELIGION anything to insure profits and dividends. Exploitation of the economically weak, cynical disregard of human rights, and even revolting inhumanities in industry alienated economic classes, thus sapping the foundations of democracy, while corporations often maintained they had the privilege of exploiting the public by graft and corruption. Municipal governments were corrupted in many cases, state legislative bodies were bribed, 1 and when the United States government in the early years of the twentieth century imdertook to insist, in even a slight de- gree, that business should be put upon the basis of public service, nearly the whole of the big business of the country threatened to go upon a "strike," so little did the patriotic, to say nothing of the Christian, spirit permeate the larger business interests of the nation. A reflex result was that self-interest and class interest became in the nineteenth century the maxims of the labor- ing class also. The ideal of public service in laboring class movements was subordinated or forgotten. As the gospel of self-interest dominated the relations of employer and employee, the interests of the two were held to be diametrically opposed. Consequently there grew up the doctrine of class war with at least an implied correlated doctrine of class hate. Christianity, rationality, and altruism were scouted and even scorned as possible means for the solution of economic problems. The only solution of the problem of the relations between economic classes, nineteenth-century popular socialism held, was the forcible overthrow of the capitalist class by the working class. It is not too much to say that Marxian socialism, in par- ticular, took as its immediate goal the inspiring of the working class with the desire to dominate and destroy 1 See R. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life. OUK SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 107 other social classes. As one of its most conspicuous ex- ponents has said in effect, its aim was to teach the work- ing class to "combine the old weapons of criticism with the new criticism of weapons." In other words, Marxian socialism openly advocated the settlement of economic grievances between classes by resort to force. By the end of the nineteenth century, accordingly, Western civiliza- tion was confronted by a well-organized movement among the laboring classes, which was openly atheistic, mate- rialistic, and consciously aimed at class domination. The disastrous results of developing working class movements upon the pagan basis of self-interest and class interests must now be sufficiently evident from the case of Russia. But it is well to remember that the adoption of the preda- tory standards of paganism by a part of the laboring classes in Western civilization has been largely, if not entirely, a reflex of the practices of the socially more for- tunate classes. In other words, anti-Christian business has been largely responsible for the anti-Christian phases of working-class movements. Deeper than anti-Christian politics or anti-Christian business were anti-Christian ideals of life in Western civilization generally. Civilization is made up of tradi- tions, and traditions are made up of thoughts. The thinking classes in any cultural group, therefore, are ulti- mately responsible for the guidance of its civilization. Back of them, to be sure, may lie traditions and objective circumstances which influence their thought, but this fact does not detract from their responsibility as the creators and leaders of civilization. To get at the real ideals which animate any civilization, we must turn, therefore, to its literature, its art, its science, its religion, in brief, to the ideals and standards of its educated and socially privileged 108 THE BECONSTKUOTION OF RELIGION classes. What were the ideals and standards of the edu- cated classes of Western civilization before the Great War began ? Were they dominantl j pagan or Christian ideals ? If we turn to literature first, we find that a large part of the literature of the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth century was totally regardless of Christianity, 1 that it derided or ignored Christian ideals. 2 We are not, of course, speaking of Christianity as a theology, but of Christianity as a system of ethics and of social life. European literature revelled in a purely destructive criti- cism of the traditional morality of Christendom in the family, in business, in general political and social rela- tions. The representatives of these tendencies were not a few minor literary men with no standing, but included the foremost names in the literature of the day. More- over, the writers who exploited these tendencies were usually the most popular ones, especially among the edu- cated classes. An indication of the moral condition of the intellectual classes may be found in the popularity in the later nineteenth century of the old Persian poet, Omar Khayyam, whose frankly pagan view of life seemed greatly ; to delight many intellectuals. But some found the rela- l ln an article on "Is Modern Literature Christless?" in The Christian Century, April 14, 1921, Dr. Joseph Fort Newton answers: "Much of it is. Most of it, indeed, is written as if Christ had never lived." It is invidious, of course, to single out examples, but to illustrate our meaning we might take Samuel Butler's The Way of All Flesh, a book which, while it justly satirizes a pseudo-Christian society, is itself purely pagan in its point of view. No book has been more popular among the intellectual classes during the past twenty years. 3 Says Professor E. C. Hayes (Sociology and Ethics, p. 2) : "Moral disintegration is by no means peculiar to Germany. A large part of our own popular fiction consists in the subtlest advocacy of a pseudo- scientific immorality. ... We are assured that nothing is wrong that is 'natural,' that in nature there is no higher and no lower, that altruism is only a form of selfishness and that reason has no prece- dence over the instincts that we share with the beasts." OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 109 tively luxurious and effeminate paganism of such writers as Omar Khayyam not sufficiently strong for their taste. They preferred writers whose works, as has been said, it was irrelevant to criticize as immoral because they in- tended to be immoral. 1 The whole decadent school of literature and art regarded the moral standards of Chris- tianity as the most worthless sort of rubbish. The most fearless, most consistent exponent of this school was, of course, the German philosopher, Nietzsche, whose writings would deserve further consideration at this point if we had not already sufficiently indicated their importance for the understanding of the deep pagan cur- rent in our civilization. Nietzsche cannot possibly be dismissed as an exceptional, aberrant type; nor was he peculiarly German. A host of kindred writers were grouped about him in every country of Western civiliza- tion. He was, therefore, profoundly symptomatic of the spirit of his time, and, indeed, as we have already indi- cated, he will become in the future either the leader of the re-paganization of the world, or else the last of the great pagans of the nineteenth century to pass into ob- livion. We cannot escape Nietzsche when we confront the problem of our civilization. Yet his influence was political only indirectly, and economic scarcely at all. Rather the influence of Nietzsche and his kindred spirits was upon the general ideals of our social life. That the influence of these writers was tremendously anti-Christian there can be no doubt. For, regard the Nietzschean philosophy as we will, it can be summed up in a single sentence, that the only obligations which the individual needs to concern himself about are those of his own self-interest, and that the teachings of Jesus are the 1 The New Republic, January 12, 1918, p. 312 (Vol. XIII). 110 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION chief source of weakness and corruption in the modern world. Though professional philosophers have professed to despise the philosophy of Nietzsche as that of a mere literary man, yet there can be no doubt that it was deeply rooted in the philosophical tendencies of the nineteenth century. The individualistic, naturalistic, and material- istic tendencies of that philosophy all found expression in Nietzsche. In him we see the worship of the natural man, of freedom as an end in itself, of the superior individual as the only value worth considering, as well as the wor- ship of power. The truth is that the philosophy of the nineteenth century was rooted in Greek philosophy, and scarcely more than Greek philosophy did it escape from the traditional point of view and valuations of bar- barism. The best of the nineteenth-century philosophical thinkers, to be sure, sought strenuously to transcend these, and to put philosophy upon a truly social and humani- tarian basis ; * but the more popular nineteenth-century philosophy remained enamoured of pleasure and power as the chief values of life. It sought for a standard of right in these abstractions and ignored the social life of man. It contended that the standard of right lay wholly within the individual, in his own happiness or self-development, and not in the interdependent life of all men. Such was the popular philosophy of the nineteenth century, and it is evident that it was more pagan than Christian. It made it impossible to discredit the predatory ethics of barbarism. It may seem hazardous for one writing in the name of science to assert that much science of the nineteenth cen- tury was even more anti-social, more anti-humanitarian, 1 E.g., T. H. Green, Friedrich Paulsen, Josiah Royce. OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 111 and so, more anti-Christian, than its philosophy; but \ve believe that this will be the judgment even of social science in the future. There is, of course, the excuse that mod- ern science is so recent in its development that it has not had time to become socialized. A great part of the science of the nineteenth century was, at any rate, socially nega- tive in its attitude. 1 It not only held that there was nothing in religion of serious scientific concern, but that the spiritual aspects of human life were outside of scien- tific reality ; 2 and even in many cases it held that there could be no social science at all. Science, that is accurate, systematized knowledge it was held, could alone concern itself with the material and the physical. If any social science existed it must rigorously exclude from its con- sideration the psychic or the spiritual, at least as having any real influence in human affairs. Everything must be interpreted as belonging to one big machine. That such a conception belongs to the infantile stage of scientific development needs hardly seriously to be argued. Chil- dren and savages, it is well known, are apt to take a similar view of things. AVith such ignoring of the spiritual and the social, it is little surprising to know that nineteenth-century science only very late began serious attempts at the construction of socialized standards in morals and made no successful 1 For illustration, see Henry Adams, The Degradation of the Demo- cratic Dogma, especially "A Letter to American Teachers of History." Refutation of this sort of science, so far as it attempted to base itself upon biological facts, will be found in Professor J. Arthur Thomson's System of Animate Nature and Professor William Patten's The Grand Strategy of Evolution: The Social Philosophy of a Biologist. 2 Thus one of my colleagues, though himself a religious man, holds that science has no purpose except "the quantitative statement of objective facts." This not only precludes the consideration of the psychic as such, but limits the field of science in a way not warranted by its history nor by the nature of the scientific attitude of mind. See p. 3. 112 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION attempt at all at the construction of an international morality. Science remained in the nineteenth century immersed in its beginning tasks, the exploration and understanding of physical nature, and scarcely arrived at seriously undertaking the exploration and understanding of human social life. Though there were many excep- tions, it is fair on the whole to say that nineteenth- century science was negative toward higher social values, and instead of tending to build up higher social stand- ards and ideals, in many cases it actually tended to destroy these. If it had addressed itself properly to the great problems of human living together in our civiliza- tion, in the spirit of the service of mankind, the Great War would probably have been averted. All of these spiritual tendencies of the nineteenth cen- tury naturally found expression in the universities in Europe and America. One should never forget that Nietzsche was a university professor, and that the apolo- gists for Machiavelli and Nietzsche in Europe and America were chiefly men who held university chairs. These men were not confined to Germany, as so many would fain believe. There were von Treitschkes and Nietzsches of lesser renown in many universities of West- ern civilization. This, indeed, could not be otherwise, because institutions of learning, in free societies at least, are necessarily places where all the spiritual tendencies of the time come to a head, and where the decisive spiritual battles are fought. One can only regret, not the appearance of such thinkers in academic life, but rather only that they seemed to be, previous to the break- ing out of the Great War, getting the upper hand, to such an extent, indeed, that in some university circles for a scientific man to express his belief in Christian social ideals was for him to be more or less discounted by OIJE SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 113 his scientific colleagues. In many cases the universities of Western civilization thus became the chief centers of neo-paganism. In Germany this happened to be par- ticularly true. Even the Christian church itself became subtly affected by the pagan tendencies of the times. 1 We do not refer to the growth of "worldiness" in the church (though "worldliness" is frequently only a euphemism for pagan- ism), nor to the growth of negative criticism, but rather to the whole spirit developed by nineteenth-century Protestant Christianity. As one of the most enlightened religious thinkers of the present has said: "There grew- up a conception of Christianity ... in principle largely self-centered and individualistic. The energies of Chris- tians found sufficient outlet in the preparation of the individual for the life after death, and the winning of new candidates for the citizenship of the future kingdom. Not transformation of this world, but escape from it, became the Christian message; not social leadership, but protest the function of the church." 2 Alongside of this comparatively common unsocialized type of Christianity existed less common, even more un- socialized types, such as so-called Christian mysticism. Since to the true mystic God is the only reality, he has no interest in the present world. 3 The mystic thus en- tirely inverts the Christian principle that the service of God must be sought in the service of man. 4 Mysticism, lp rhis in addition to the survival of pagan tendencies which we have already noted, (p. 86.) * W. Adams Brown, 7s Christianity Practicable?" pp. 25-26. Ibid., p. 28. * This is not true, of course, of those modified forms of mysticism in which the rational ethical elements of religion receive the main empha- sis, as among the Quakers. Some forms of mysticism of this sort, in- deed, approximate what we have called "positive 'Shristianity." Thus the creed of Florence Nightingale; "I believe ... in the service of man 114 THE EECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION in this individualistic sense, belongs to paganism rather than to Christianity; yet it was rampant in pretty nearly all branches of the Christian church during the nine- teenth century, greatly to the detriment of the church, because superficial thinkers took it to be one of the typical expressions of Christian religious life. Even nineteenth-century humanitarianism itself be- came largely perverted by the pagan tendencies of the age. It set up the soft and effeminate view of life too often; it seemed to make the pleasure and happiness of individuals now living often its only concern. The bar- baric standards of self-gratification and self-indulgence, rather than those of social conservation and social devel- opment, were all too frequently advocated in the name of humanitarian ideas. Thus the word in the minds of some became associated with hedonistic social ethics and with pampering social practices. It became opprobrious, therefore, to those who saw that right human living in- volved higher aims than mere relief from suffering and the accumulation of pleasant experiences. Thus it is evident that pagan ideas and ideals of life in general lay behind the anti-Christian politics and anti- Christian business of the nineteenth century. Our being the service of God, the growing into a likeness with him by love, the being one with him at last, which is Heaven" would appeal to many not as "mysticism," but as "the essence of common sense." It must be admitted that mysticism is a relative matter, as there is normally an element of mysticism in all religion, as was granted in Chapter I. It is only when the mystic element is ascendant that there is danger of irrationality and anti-social tendencies. Subordinated to rationality, it is as harmless in religion as the sense of mystery is in science. The terms "mystic" and "mysticism" should therefore be reserved for those cases in which the supremacy of intelligence and reason is denied. For discussions of the place of mysticism in re- ligion, see the works of Hocking and Lcuba above mentioned. For a careful, brief survey, see Coe, The Psychology of Religion, Chapter XVI. OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 115 analysis might go into further details to show how the taint of pagan barbarism clung to practically everything in nineteenth-century civilization ; but our object has been merely to show that that civilization was dominantly non- Christian in character, a conclusion which is a mere truism to those who know both what the Christian ideal of life is, and what nineteenth-century civilization was. With scientific fairness we can say that the ruling classes in Europe and America in the nineteenth, century ac- cepted a "conventional" Christianity, but that they rarely permitted it to interfere with the "mores" which con- trolled the practical affairs of their life. 1 They found it vastly easier to be conventional Christians than to be genuine followers of Jesus. In general they were careful not to let Christianity disturb the established order. And there is surely no evidence to show that as yet our civili- zation has changed its character. 2 We are still trying to 1 While perhaps not unbiased, the report of the Japanese Com- mission in 1919, which investigated religious conditions in the United States, that "there is little evidence that the Christian religion is regarded as important by most of the people," deserves consideration, as it tells us how our civilization appears to enlightened non- Christians. * In a remarkable manifesto issued in May, 1921, by such leaders of religious thought in Great Britain as Dr. L. P. Jacks, Dr. W. B. Selbie, Dr. John Clifford, and Dr. A. E. Garvie the utmost appre- hension is still expressed. If to American readers their tone seems too pessimistic, it should be borne in mind that British thinkers stand nearer to the hard problems of our civilization than we do. The manifesto in part follows: "No lover of mankind or of progress, no student of religion, of morals, or of economics, can regard the present trend of affairs without feelings of great anxiety. Civilization itself seems to be on the wane. . . . The nations are filled with mistrust and antipathy for each other, the classes have rarely been so an- tagonistic, while the relation of individual to individual has seldom been so frankly selfish. "The vast destruction of life by war and the acute suffering which the war created seem to have largely destroyed human sympathy. . . . Never was greater need of all those qualities which make the race human, and never did they appear to be less manifest. "It is becoming increasingly evident that the world has taken a 116 THE KECONSTRUCTION OF KELIGIOtf build our world upon the rotten foundations laid by the nineteenth century ! However, it is, of course, true that in the nineteenth century we find the dawn of a better civilization breaking practically everywhere. This was true even of Germany, where, in spite of militarism, Machiavellian state craft, and neo-pagan philosophy and literature, there were philosophers, educators, religious workers, and political leaders who stood firmly by humanitarian ideals. Indeed, it was only in the last few decades previous to the begin- ning of the Great War, that marked retrogression in cer- tain circles and classes toward pagan and barbarous ideals of life took place in Western civilization. But this re- kindling of paganism found a world poorly organized to resist its spread. Everywhere practically the forces of good were disorganized. Good men emphasized their dif- ferences, and instead of pulling together, pulled apart. This was especially true of the Christian church; but it was also true of the humanitarian forces outside of the church. Even among the most advanced social idealists there was such confusion and disagreement, oftentimes even with respect to fundamental principles, that they could not work effectively together. On the other hand, wrong turn, which, if persisted in, may lead to the destruction of civilization." In a similar spirit Professor L. T. Hobhouse expresses himself In the July, 1921, issue of The Sociological Review (p. 125) : "The ques- tion of the survival of civilization, which month by month becomes more doubtful and more urgent, does not depend upon political insti- tutions alone. Fundamentally, it is a question of the available amount of moral wisdom in mankind." One must add that the Treaty of Versailles and the lack of concern shown by the United States and the Allies for the rehabilitation of Russia and Germany are further grounds for apprehension. On the other hand, the seeming success of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament at Washington is ground for hope. Even if the Con- ference is successful, liowcvor, it is well to remember that it is "only the first motion toward the first step toward real disarmament." OUR SEMI-PAGAN CIVILIZATION 117 the sinister forces readily and easily combined, until their power much overmatched the forces which made for peace, good will, and solidarity among men. The result was the long swing back toward barbarism among the nations of Christendom which finally became visible in the Great War, and in the breaking out of civil strife between classes in some nations. Now this recrudescence of barbarism shows conclusively enough that our civilization can no longer remain half pagan and half Christian. It must soon become one or the other. We have come to the parting of the ways. Unless the world becomes speedily Christian, it is bound to become speedily pagan. We cannot tolerate pagan standards in business, in politics, in education, in art, literature and science without coming to repudiate the Christian ideal of life altogether. The half-and-half standards of our previous civilization will no longer work in the complex and tremendously dynamic social world of the present. If it be said that our civilization has always been half pagan and half Christian and that it will doubtless con- tinue to be so, it must be said in reply that the events of the last few years and our present situation show that it cannot remain so. "Nothing can prevent mankind," says a thoughtful writer, "from sinking beneath the tre- mendous temptations due to modern wealth and power save the creation of a strong religious life which shall lead us to consecrate our control over nature to the process of bringing in the Kingdom of God." * Modern physical science has now put such terrible agencies of destruction in the hands of man that good 'will is needed as never before if men are not mutually to destroy one another. We dare no longer live together upon the old basis of a 1 G. B. Smith, Social Idealism and the Changing Theology, p. 153. 118 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EELIGI01ST balance of power and of selfish interests. In the next war, we are told by experts, tanks as large as battleships will crush out our cities, while poison gases will stifle whole communities within a few hours. Mankind must end war or war will end civilization. 1 Yet war cannot come to an end until men get rid of their illusions that classes or nations can live together in peace without good will and justice. Only the restoration of the ideals of good will, justice, and brotherhood within nations, moreover, can prevent the breaking out of inter- minable civil strife among classes, such as Russia has presented to our gaze. Just as within the American union, therefore, there came a time when the nation could no longer exist half slave and half free, so in Western civili- zation the time has arrived when we can no longer remain half pagan and half Christian. Either we must proceed to develop our civilization speedily along the lines of the pattern ideas of justice, brotherhood, and good will of the Christianity of the Gospels, or the world will go back to barbarism. All other ideals of life have been tried and have failed. There is need, therefore, at the present moment of a stalwart religion, a Christianity which shall bend its energies to making our whole civilization conform to the Christian ideal of life. Such a Christianity must be necessarily non-theological, because theology remains a realm of speculation and of disputation and divides rather than unites men. Such a Christianity must be thoroughly social; it must consider none of the great fields of the social activity of mankind alien to its interest. Such a Christianity must base itself upon the facts of life, and ally itself with humanitarian science. 1 See Irwin, The Next War. An Appeal to Common Sense. CHAPTER V POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY TnEjfouxth thing needed for the reconstruction of re- ligion, so that it shall be adapted to the requirements of modern life, is that religion be based upon facts and^so brought into harmony with positive science. Aswe have already pointecTout, the outstanding and dominating thing in modern civilization is science. Much of the science of the present, however, is partial, incomplete, and not based upon facts, not at least upon all of the facts. When we speak of a positive religion which shall harmonize with positive science we mean a religion which is based not upon a few of the facts of man's life say, the phys- ical but upon all of the facts. A religion which has respect to all the facts of the total life of mankind will be in harmony with the spirit of true science. /When we have a religion which is truly positive and a science which i^ the same, there will be no longer any need of recon- ciling the two. The former will be simply the projection and universalization of the values found in the latter. ^fhe word "positive" we use in the same sense as used by Gomte* and by modern science in general, meaning, ""founded upon fact," not upon mere opinions or specula- tion. A^ positive religion, therefore, means one based upon experience, .iipn_objective realities. It means, ac- cordingly, something socially constructive, and affirmative rather than merely negative. ( It is not a religion of nega- tions or of mere prohibitions, but is practical, dealing with the actual facts of human life and experience as it | 119 120 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION finds them. It is not a religion of doubts, accordingly, but of affirmations. / It is, in short, a religion of sanity, insisting that man shall build his faith in his world and his ideal of life, his universal values, upon all the facts of his experience. And it insists that this experience is ajsocial experience and that his ideal must, accordingly, be a social ideal, his values, social values. Christianity if it is to survive must become a positive religion in the sense just indicated. " It must pass out of tjiejheological and speculative stage into the positive and social stage. It must be purged of its mythological ele- ments. When^Comte in the later years of his life came to appreciate the importance of religion in the social life of man, seeing that social reconstruction was impossible without enlisting on its side man's emotions, instincts, and will, that is, impossible without the essentially religious attitude of mind, he proposed a "Religion of Humanity." The religion which Comte established was essentially Christianity minus its theology. Comte accepted without qualification the essential etKics of Christianity. The highest command of his new religion was to be the law of service "live for others" which, as he himself rec- ognized, was manifestly but stating in modern vernacular the Christian law of service. / It is strange, indeed, that Comte did not perceive that the Christianity of the Gos- pels was in accord with the Religion of Humanity which he sought to set up. % ' But Christianity in Comte's mind was synonymous with the ecclesiastical and theological systems of his day, and it was, accordingly, impossible for him to see in Christianity the Religion of Humanity which he sought. He was unable to conceive that Chris- tianity itself might enter into the positive stage and be- come a real Religion of Humanity. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 121 Comte's Religion of Humanity failed to take root ami is now all but extinct. But organized Christianity, in the countries where it has had the freest development, in con- tact "with the social life on the one hand, and science and facts on the other, has steadily progressed toward the positive stage. It has more and more unfolded its latent capacities to become that true religion of humanity which Comte saw to be necessary to bring about any real and lasting social progress. As evidence of the progress of present Christianity toward the positive and humanitarian stage of development, the comments of two European-born observers on the development of religion in the United States are interesting. Says Henry Bargy in his La Religion dans la Societe aux Etats-Unis: l "As dogma has never seemed to Americans the vital part of religion, so has agreement upon dogma never seemed to them the condition of moral unity; they think that people may have the same country without having the same theology. They make fraternity, the actual form of which is social solidarity, the essence of Christianity. The moral unity for which they strive under the name of Christian unity is only the co-operation of all for the in- creased establishment of fraternity and solidarity. Higii above sects whose diversity seems a matter of indifference to them they organize a religion which pervades society throughout its length and breadth, and tends toward being only a social spirit touched by the evangelical feeling. At the time of the Puritans it was a religion of race, as it had been with the Hebrews a religion of tribe; in pro- portion as the conception of the race enlarges so as to 1 Pp. XVI -XVIII. This book, though it presents inspiring ideals rather than a careful survey, deserves translation into English (Li- brairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1902.) 122 THE KECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION extend to the entire human race, it becomes a religion of humanity. All the groups from all the points of thought find a basis of unity in the homage paid to human virtue and human progress. Positivism has consummated the moral unity of the nation. . . . "This moral unity is indeed a religious unity and a Christian unity; this positivism is a Christian positivism. American humanism has received from Christianity all the traditional, sentimental, and poetical elements which distinguish a religion from a philosophy. American posi- tivism is only a Christianity which has evolved. As the first colonists, in their zeal, had made God the servitor of their new-born society, and placed religion at the service of the ideal humanity which they believed them- selves to be organizing, contemporary humanitarian phi- losophy has encountered nothing contrary to it in the churches of the United States: it has made use of them 7 r*. as frames all ready for it to take form in./ The American religion may be called a Christian positivism, or a posi- tive Christianity. ' It has received from the past the tra- ditional and the evangelical spirit. Traditional, it pre- serves the names and the forms of the churches even when it changes their customs; it develops them from within. Evangelical, it keeps the figure of Christ before all, even when it does not recognize his divinity. American posi- tivism, so akin to that of Auguste Comte that Channing, after 1830, looked to France for the religion of the future, is distinguished for its religious character, and is con- ciliatory, not combative. In their tolerance for the past, from which they disengage the future, Americans deserve the title 'positivist' more than did Comte, since they not only neglect the discussion of metaphysics, but ignore them. While the disciples of Comte have been able to produce only a parody of religion, American positivism POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 123 i Las its temples, clergy, followers, which are no other than those of Christian churches. One may conceive a posi- tivism with a God, as one may conceive a republic with a . king; it is sufficient that the king be the servant of the people, and God, that of humanity." In a similar spirit a former student of the author, writ- ing of the American church from the point of view of the Jewish immigrant, says: "I had expected mysticism and had found common sense. In my half knowledge of the church on the one hand and the American ideal on the other, I had looked for another of those hypocritical exhibitions of which I had seen many in my native country, where men prac- tised one thing and pretended belief in the opposite. I had looked for humbug and had found the most perfect honesty. I had looked for self contradictions, for solemn professions of faith in far-away impracticable abstrac- tions, for pretenses of submission to an ideal of humility and non-resistance and supineness, and I had found what ? A clear-eyed, level-headed, sane body of principles such as a practical modern man could believe in. I had stum- bled upon a discovery. For the first time in human his- tory, as far as I knew, a people had evolved a creed that was in harmony with their lives and with their ambi- tions. . . . "The American religion, I saw, was a vital, practical religion. If it was ethical, it was concretely so, and cared nothing about the philosophical abstractions underlying good and evil. It asked people to be good in order that the good they craved might come to them. . . ." 1 These generous comments of disinterested observers of ) J M. E. Ravage in The Century, January, 1918. 124: THE RECONSTBTTCTION OF KELIGIOff our religions life are, however, more favorable than the facts altogether warrant. If the picture were entirely true, there would be no need of. this boojv. There is still, even in the United States, much religion of the narrow, ecclesiastical, and theological type, unadapted to the re- quirements of modern life; and in Western civilization, as a whole, organized Christianity is very far indeed from the socialized and positive type. While a humanized and socialized Christianity has been gradually rising during the last generation among the leading nations of Europe and America, organized Christianity, as yet, is only be-* ginning to enter upon the positive stage. It is our pur- pose to show how the development in this direction can be hastened, how Christianity may become such a religion of humanity as will subordinate the socially negative ele- ments in our culture and establish humanitarian civiliza- tion upon a firm basis. A word of caution is necessary here. Positive religion does not imply the agnostic and negative attitude which Comte maintained toward many of the essential elements in religious life. These agnostic and negative elements in Comte's teachings were the outcome of the spirit of his age and of his particular environment, rather than any necessary result of a positive, objective, scientific at- titude toward religion. Absolute agnosticism, or a nega- tive attitude toward ultimate reality which must be the supreme object of religion, so far from being consistent with the positive and scientific attitude of mind, is wholly inconsistent with it. 1 Comte, in other words, made the great mistake of thinking that religion could be an en- tirely subjective affair, and that man might take a nega- 1 The positive attitude in science and philosophy implies, not a subjectivism, as some critics have mistakenly maintained, but rather a critical realism. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 125 tive attitude toward his universe but retain a positive at- titude toward himself and his own destiny. This, as Caird has pointed out in his criticism of Comte, 1 was un- doubtedly a contradiction in terms. A purely subjective religion is an absurdity. 2 Such a religion would be very far from a positive religion, a religion based upon all of the facts of human experience. No such subjective re- ligion is here proposed. Rather our aim will be to show that a social and positive Christianity, will be a Chris- tianity robbed of none of its essential elements, though reduced to its purest form; and that such a Christianity v is the only religion which will meet the needs of the mod- ern world. ~~} Yet another word of caution is needed on the other side. While Comte was wrong in his subjectivism and agnosti- cism, yet all must admit that he was essentially right in saying that (it is psychologically impossible for man to worship anything but the highest and best which he finds in himself. Religion, in other words, as we have already pointed out, must draw all of its values from the social life of man, for psychologically it has QO other source^A from which to draw them. This is wholly the case with Christianity. Its doctrines of the divine fatherhood, of human brotherhood, of love, of service, of self-sacrifice for the sake of service, are all manifestly drawn from the higher experiences and values of social life. 3 What man must worship, therefore, in religion as Comte in- sisted, are those ideals of character and conduct, of per- sonality and society, which he has gotten from his social 1 The Social Philosophy of Comte, especially pp. 163-170. ' The religious consciousness, as has often been pointed out, de- mands objectivity quite as much as the scientific consciousness. See Chapter II, pp. 39-42. 126 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION A life. But these ideals cannot be worshipped as abstract, subjective values; they must be projected into the uni- In concrete livmg~personalities. Religion is imdelrmihecr^ for reasons~which we shall soon see, whenever this projection and universalization of social values is denied to the religious attitude of mind. The negative attitude toward life and the universe which we find often in materialistic speculation and in agnostic opinion is necessarily deadly to religion. Religion has a right to attack, in the name of humanity, such subjective metaphysics and socially negative doctrines which some- times masquerade under the name of science ; and in doing so religion performs a real service to science, because such doctrines are not only unproved, but are not in accord with what are the seeming facts of human experience. But positive religion does not deny that it derives its con- cepts and values from human experience, even though it projects and universalizes them. Thus it escapes from negative metaphysics on the one hand and from any at- tempt to erect a metaphysical system on the other hand. It simply bases itself upon the facts and needs of man's social life, universalizing social values so that they will come to individual consciousness in the intensest way and thus aid in making the more difficult adjustments re- quired of the individual in his social relationships. The general attitude of positive religion is, then, no different from positive science, except that it carries the process of universalization a step further on the side of human values. Its attitude is the frank, open-minded attitude of a progressive social idealism, that of a learner rather than that of a dogmatist. It is not on the defen- sive as regards positive science, a science based on facts rather than on speculations. The truths of science, if they are truths, positive religion holds will do religion POSITIVE CHKISTIANITY 127 good rather than harm in the long run. Indeed, they will be the very means by which religious ends of the right sort can be realized. For a truly positive science will also take into full account all of the facts and needs of man's life. It will also be humanitarian, not less than positive religion, and between humanitarian science and humanitarian religion there can be no conflict. Both will join hands for the conquest of nature and the redemption; of humanity. What then will be the distinguishing features of Chris- tianity when it has reached the positive stage of develop- ment? In brief, it will become "transfused with the spirit and transformed by the method of modern science." But what does this mean ? It means first of all that posi- tive Christianity will subordinate theological and meta- physical questions. This does not mean that it will take a wholly negative attitude, as we have already said, to- ward these constructions of the human intellect. Both are doubtless necessary rational disciplines, necessary intel- lectual tasks which the human mind must essay from time to time as it sees its fund of knowledge growing upon which to base inferences in regard to ultimate reality. 1 But positive Christianity will not stress the theological side of religion as the vital thing in the religious life; rather it will minimize it. The world is rapidly learn- ing that it can get along very well with a much smaller minimum of theology than it had formerly supposed, and perhaps it will soon discover that what is regarded at the present time as the minimum may be still further re- 1 For a recent attempt at a rational theology which dodges none of the issues involved and which recognizes frankly the results of modern science, see Professor E. W. Lyman's book, The Experience of God in Modern Life. 128 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION duced. We shall try to point out later what appears to be the requisite minimum of theological beliefs necessary even in a positive Christianity. The second characteristic of positive Christianity is that it will be concretely ethical. It will be social, in other words, rather than theological, fit will throw the emphasis in religion where Jesus threw it, upon the rela- tions of men to one another, rather than upon theological doctrine. 1 It will insist, as Jesus insisted, that religion and morality are not separable. Religion, as the right attitude toward universal reality, includes morality, the right attitude toward man. Religion is simply morality raised to its highest power, or universalized morality, while morality in the common acceptance of the term should be religion brought down to the practical, every day relations between men. This practical identification of religion and ethics will be a chief feature of socialized or positive Christianity, for as soon as ethics is allowed to become divorced from religion, as we have seen, it ceases to have power over the springs of character and con- duct in the mass of individuals. The social efficiency and strength of any religion has always been directly propor- tional to its power to enlist the religious nature of man upon the side of ethical ideals. This has always been the peculiar strength of historical Christianity in its periods of highest development. The subordination of theological questions to ethical questions in the teachings of Jesus was not an accident. It was rather the mark of the high- est possible evolution of religion. [" In this respect as in others positive Christianity will be in a sense a return to the religion of Jesus. , 1 It is said upon good authority that a single page will hold all that Jesus said upon such subjects as the soul, death, immortality, and eternity. "to e**^ - 5^7 ?"' L- W/fi* ' ' '" i ( POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 129 j A third characteristic of positive Christianity is that it wfll be collective rather than individualistic, It will emphasize the relations of men to one another in their concrete social life, the ^edeemoa community, the re- deemed world, the kingdom of God'^upon earth, rather than the redemption of individual souls. ) An ethical Christianity must necessarily make the community, in- deed, as much its concern as the individual, since the con- ditions of the community surely determine in greater or less degree the individual life. The world is the subject of redemption for positive Christianity. There is every warrant for believing that this was the attitude of Jesus. The kingdom of God which he announced he had come to establish is essentially a social conception, meaning an order of human society. 1 This does not mean, of course, that the individual is to be neglected by positive Christianity. On the contrary, a redeemed society presupposes redeemed individuals. As humanity is not something apart from individuals, it can only be saved through saving individuals. But positive Christianity will recognize that man leads a collective life and that the conditions of that life make or mar the char- acter of individuals. Individualistic methods of helping individuals will be preserved by positive Christianity, for they are indispensable in any right social life. It is the humane, the brotherly touch which does most to help under all conditions. Christianity can never neglect the per- sonal work of individuals for individuals; but as it be- comes more positive, it will see that the larger economic, political, and cultural conditions even more need to be controlled if the world is to be redeemed, to be made safe 1 This is not to deny, of course, that this expression also implied an inner, subjective, personal state. As a spiritual conception, it necessarily had both its personal and social sides. See further dis- cussion on page 17i. 130 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION for Christian living. While on the one hand positive Christianity will reaffirm the preciousness of every indi- vidual soul, the idea that every individual should be re- garded as an end in himself, it will lay its chief emphasis upon the need of creating an ideal human society, a king- dom of God upon earth. A fourth characteristic of positive Christianity is that it will be active toward all human things rather than merely contemplative. A Christianity which is mere be- lieT or faith cannot possibly be regarded as positive Chris- tianity. If religion is to be ethical and social in char- acter it must also be active. Positive Christianity must be in a very true sense a militant movement, directed against all the forces that oppress and degrade men. It is the moral substitute for war. It can have no patience with the idea that there is anything not subject to the Christian ideal of life. Positive Christianity is distinctly, therefore, a radical, even a revolutionary movement, not in the sense, of course, that it will rely upon force, or that it hopes to usher in the millennium by some sudden transformation of the social order. But it is revolu- tionary in its ideal of life, and it must be aggressive in its methods of dealing with evils that beset our social life. Positive Christianity can be no milk and water affair. Just as Jesus did not contemplate that love might mean merely a passive good will, so positive Christianity will insist that the fruit of the Christian ideal is aggres- sive effort to suppress the evil forces in our civilization, and to establish a society in which the ideals of justice, of fraternity, and of mutual service are realized. It follow^ from this that a fifth characteristic of posi- tive Christianity is that it will be constructive and affirma- tive gather than merely negative. Tt will not be so~much j a series of prohibitions as a definite positive program for POSITIVE CHKISTIANTTY 131 both individual and social life. It may have at times to destroy inrorderto'niako a place for the good, but it will destroy only for the sake of upbuilding something posi- tive. It will seek to replace the negative ethics of bar- barism and of early civilization by a constructive program of social betterment^ This again represents the attitude of Jesus. The negative attitude of the Old Testament he replaced by the positive, constructive social morality of the New. "^Positive Christianity cannot be an affair of "taboos." ^ The sixth characteristic of positive Christianity is that it will be cooperative in its spirit. It will recognize the fundamental sociological truth that ten men working to- gether can accomplish what one hundred cannot accom- plish working separately. It will believe in organized effort rather than in merely individualistic right living. The church, therefore, in positive Christianity must take a place of commanding importance, not as an end in itself, but as an indispensable means for realizing the ends of a social Christianity. The church, as the organized followers of Jesus' teaching, must enlist the enthusiastic service and loyalty of all who believe in the Christian ideal of life. This in no way places the church above criticism, but on the contrary renders it liable to the most searching criticism as to its efficiency as an instrument for the establishment among men of the Christian ideal. The church must be regarded strictly as a means, not as an end. Nevertheless, the idea of following the teachings of Jesus in secret and without the fullest co-operation with all those who believe in those teachings, is repugnant to the idea of a social and positive Christianity. Religion cannot be a private, individualistic affair if it is social and scientific. It will not hide itself, but will undertake 132 THE EECONSTEUCTIO^ OF KELIGIOST through organized effort along every fruitful line of en- deavor the redemption of mankind. But what shall be the attitude of positive Christianity toward the essential beliefs of all higher religions, the belief in God, the belief in immortality, and the belief in the reality of sin and of salvation from sin? The reply is that a positive Christianity will reaffirm these beliefs as a part of the universal religious consciousness of man- kind. They are not the peculiar beliefs of Christianity, but all higher religions have these beliefs in some form. What form will they take, then, in positive Christianity? Will positive Christianity, like Comte, accept as its Su- preme Being, humanity itself? As we have already pointed out, no religion can be subjective and at the same time positive; and to find in humanity the supreme reality, into harmony with which man must seek to come, is a species of subjectivism. 1 It, 1 Such religious subjectivism characterizes not only the Comtean positivists, but also the extreme pragmatists and some other schools at the present time. Thus Dr. A. E. Haydon in an article on "The Theological Trend of Pragmatism" (American Journal of Theology, October, 1019, p. 408) says: "Religion becomes enthusiasm for social Ideals. . . . Religion will still persist. . . . Its cult will be the web of civilization." So also Mr. H. G. Wells in God, the Invisible King (p. 61) : "He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will." Dr. G. Stanley Hall also declares (Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct, p. 354) : "Belief in God . . . must be subjectified." But many of these subjectivists in religion do not hold consistently to their subjectivism. Thus Dr. Hall says (op. cit. p. 35G) : "The supreme object of worship and service is the power, that in the beginning started the course of evolution and in the end became the power that makes for righteousness." Even Dr. Haydon in a later article (Journal of Religion, Vol. I, p. 196) speaks of religion as "just the way we orient ourselves to cosmic realities in the interests of our larger life." We safely conclude with Professor Brightman (Journal of Religion, Vol. I, p. 366) that "the need for objectivity is at the basis of science, philosophy, and religion." For further discussion, see the articles by Professors Ames and Hocking in the September, 1921, Journal of Religion (Vol. I, pp. 462-496). POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 133 indeed, denies the very purpose of religion, which is har- monious adaptation to all of the conditions of human life. To say that humanity is the sole object of religious ven- eration, worship, and love is like saying that humanity needs merely to adapt itself to itself. It divorces religion absolutely from science. Our religion cannot teach one thing and our science another; and if there is anything which modern science clearly teaches, it is that man is a part of nature, a part of a system of things immensely transcending himself, which has produced him and made possible all of his works. Man does not cease to stand in the midst of nature because he is, as an individual, the product largely of his civilization. The religious con- sciousness no more than the scientific consciousness can stop with man and his works. In a certain sense, man is incurably a nature worshipper ; that is, his reverence, his affection, his valuations rise from man to the ultimate reality which lies behind both man and physical nature. This is the logical as well as the instinctive thing for man to do; for if religion is an organ of adaptation, it must have reference both to man and to the universe in which he lives, moves, and has his being. 1 Indeed, in a certain sense, the universe must always loom larger in the religious consciousness than man, just as it does in the scientific consciousness. Not the self-sufficiency 1 "In naturalistic thought," said the late Professor Bowne, "nature Is the rival of God. Nature does a great many things and God does the rest. Traditional religious thought has shared the same view, and thus nature was continually threatening to displace God. God was not to be appealed to until nature had been shown to be inadequate. Hence the dismay in popular religious thought at each new extension of the realm of law. every such extension being regarded as subtracted from the control of God. But this dismay vanishes entirely when it is seen that God is the 'Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed'; or that, in Pauline phrase, 'in Him we live and move and have our being.' Now, nature is no rival of God, but the form of his manifestation." Hibbert Journal, July, 1910, p. 888. 134 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION of man, but the sufficiency of God is the real basis of re- ligion. Religion demands a reality beyond man, to whick not only the religious consciousness functions as a means of adjustment, but whose law and order compels adjust- ment. It demands a universe of law, not less than science does, a universe whose processes bring the foolishness and wickedness of men to naught. Where science, however, sees only the laws of physical necessity, religion sees a moral order, to which the life of man must conform itself, if it is to be in harmony with the infinite. To be sure, the superficial scientific thinking of the nineteenth century often went out of its way to deny that there were any moral implications in the law and order of the universe. It pointed to the flood, to the earth- quake, to the tornado, to the struggle for existence, as proof positive of the non-morality of nature and of the power which lies behind physical nature. Such views were, of course, based upon the assumption that the moral is synonymous with the pleasant and the agreeable. To such thinking there was no place for religion as a means of adapting man to the conditions of his life, of putting him in harmony with his universe. The moral according to this view is something not to be learned by careful thinking, but was immediately known by the subjective reactions of experience. Such views of religion and morality are, of course, not in keeping with the conclusions of scientific research ; and along with such views must vanish our conception of a non-moral universe. 1 The moral order to which human 1 Says Conklin (The Direction of Human Evolution, p. 228) : "The possibilities are almost infinity to one against the conclusion that the order of nature, the fitness of environment, and the course of pro- gressive evolution with all its marvellous adaptations are all the results of blind chance. ... In short, science reveals to us a univerge of ends as well as of means, of teleology as well as of mechanism, and in this it agrees with the teachings of philosophy and religion." POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 135 living must conform is after all but a segment of the cos- mic order. The laws of human living together are no less a part of the laws of the universe than the laws of physics or chemistry. And these laws of human living together, or rathei the perception of them, is what gives rise to human morality. The assumption of all sane religious thinking must be, accordingly, that "only man is vile." 1 Otherwise, indeed, a redemptive religion would be the most useless thing in the world. fj[f the universe is "vile," there is little need of a religious consciousness in man to adjust himself to it. ^ Without destroying religion, man cannot, then, believe that the universe is a "fool's house" which will bring his highest aspirations and his best endeavors to naught. Man must believe that there is a meaning in existence and in the system of things, and that that meaning, while he cannot fully comprehend it, yet in part he does appre- hend. He must believe that the universe is not alien to himself, if he is to have any basis upon which to adjust himself to life and to the ultimate reality which sur- rounds him. 'Nor does science in any way contradict or refute this reasonable faith. Science itself shows that man is a product of the universe, and to ask any one to believe that the universe is absolutely different from man is to deny that principle of continuity upon which science builds itself. If there is a spiritual element in man, it cannot have come out of nothing; neither can it be greater in man than in the universe, for that would be 1 The philosophy of the eighteenth century was wont to debate the question whether this was "the best of all possible worlds." From the hedonistic standpoint the debate was idle. But if the universe be judged as we have now learned to judge human institutions from their educative effect upon the individual and the race then some- thing might still be said in favor of the affirmative. 136 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION equivalent to saying that man is greater than the uni- verse. The negations of philosophical materialism are not, therefore, supported by the spirit and tendencies of mod- ern science. While science may he far from offering the full measure of support to man's religious life which we may wish, yet it is very far from destroying a reasonable faith in the system of things. On the contrary, in its investigations of nature it is coming slowly but surely to the perception of a Creative Evolution, which is imminent in all the processes of nature. 1 It is coming, in other words, to recognize that from the standpoint of man there is an ascending energy in the universe ; and this is, after all, the substance of all rational religious faith, that back of man and his works is an ultimate reality which makes human life, not an accident and meaningless in the scheme of things, but the supreme expression of an infinite reality. 2 Man's projection of his values into the universe in his religious attitudes has, therefore, a rational as well as an emotional basis, and it is scarcely probable that any religion based upon science will deny this ; for to deny it means to destroy that common sense which is the basis of both sound science and rational religion, and to plunge 1 Says Professor Hohhouse in his remarkable work, Development and Purpose, which perhaps presents more cogently than any other book the modern scientific argument for theism, though it seems little known to most theologians : "It is submitted, not in the least as a matter of faith, hut as a sound working hypothesis, that the evo- lutionary process can he best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions." (p 24.) These "limiting conditions," Professor Lyman points out rightly (op. cit. p. 130) are those inherent in the nature of a developmental process, not extraneous circumstances. * "If a purpose runs through the world-whole, there is a Mind of which the world purpose is the object." Hobhouse (op. cit. p. 365). "If the world process is di reeled toward harmony, we legitimately infer a Mind at its center." Ilobhouse, The Rational Good, p. 230. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 137 into the confusions and absurdities of an absolute agnos- ticism. But from another point of view one may say, with equal truth, that humanity looms larger in a rational religious consciousness than the universe at large. This is because man is the highest expression of the universe, and just as it would be insane on the part of science to try to under- stand the universe without taking man into account, so it would be insane on the part of religion to try to get a valuation of the universal reality without getting that valuation primarily through man. [ For man must ever be to both science and religion the highest revelation of the nature of the supreme reality. Indeed, in the practical religious consciousness it is the human element which plays the chief part; and this becomes increasingly so as religion becomes more ethical and social. It may be pos- sible to have a dehumanized science which takes account of nothing except physical nature; but it is scarcely pos- sible to have any longer a dehumanized religion. In this respect religion is more evolved than science. And it is characteristic of Christianity in particular that it throws its emphasis upon the human in religion rather than upon the non-human. It finds its revelation of the divine in the highest human. It finds, in other words, God in man, without denying, however, that God is in nature also. 1 It is the peculiar merit, then, of Christianity that it makes no dualism in the religious consciousness, by setting man off as something apart from the rest of the universe. It synthetizes objective and subjective religion. It reconciles the human and the cosmic, by finding the divine in both. 1 Says Dr. John Haynes Holmes (in Unity, January 13, 1921): "God is identified with 'humanity just as he is identified with nature; but he is also something more and infinitely greater than either of these worlds." This is precisely the doctrine" of Christian theiam. 138 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION ! But the divine in man is not so much realized as some- thing to be realized. It, thus, puts religion in the service of human evolution, and sets up a religion of humanity without destroying the religious attitude toward nature and the ultimate reality which lies behind nature. It makes religion primarily a means of human and social adjustment without making such adjustment a mere sub- jective matter -within humanity or an adjustment to an ultimate negation. Thus, positive Christianity has room for a very decided and positive belief in God, a God who manifests himself in nature, not only as creative evolution, but in human nature and in human society as the spirit leading towards all truth, all Tightness, and all brotherhood. Indeed, one must say, with the French author whom we quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that not only "one may conceive a positivism with a God," but that one can conceive a truly positive religion in no other way. BuMhe concep- tion of God which positive religion ar rices. .at. is very. dif- ferent from many of the_vagaries of speculative theology, iris more nearly in accord Avith the conception of God which Jesus held. When we turn to that conception in the pages of the first three*' Gospels, we find that it is the simple doctrine of the fatherhood of God. God, the ulti- mate reality, which has produced man and which is lead- ing us upward and onward toward a better life with our fellows, toward a fuller realization of his will, stands in relation to us, according to Jesus, even as a loving father stands in relation to his children. Thus again, positive Christianity marks a return to the simplicity ami humane- ness of the thought of Jesus. Instead of fine-spun theo- logical dogmas concerning God, it presents the simple s^ y " ^ POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 139 faitli that the creative force of the universe stands in a fatherly relation to us. 1 Positive Christianity will be characterized, then, by a positive and unequivocal belief in the reign of God, in a moral order permeating the universe to which men must conform if they are to be successful in their living to- gether. Just as men under a positive and scientific con- ception of nature know that in order to build bridges or sail ships successfully, they must understand and conform to the laws of physical nature, so under a positive con- ception of God men will know that in order to live rightly and happily, they must understand and conform to the laws of harmonious and successful living together. "Thus will positive Christianity replace arbitrary and mytho- logical conceptions of God by a conception which is at once moral and in conformity to the facts of experience. The "Santa Clans conception of God," as a mysterious being who interferes with the ordinary course of nature to bestow special favors on those who seek to please him, will be replaced by the conception of a universal moral reality which permeates all existence, both physical and social, and which is the creator and preserver of all the good that man has known or cajLJoipw. 2 The autocratic conception of God, as_a_forceroutside df the universe who rules by arbitrary will both physical nature and human history, will be replaced by the conception of a spirit im- minent in nature and in humanity which is gradually 1 Compare the statement of Hobhouse ( The Rational Good, p. 227 ) : "Reality is an interconnected system which develops in time, the principle of rational harmony or love being the permanent under- lying ground of development." "As we have already pointed out (p. 124), the soundest religious tradition has never attributed the evils or maladjustments of human life to God. ^ays Professor Hobhouse: "It is an error of the religious mind to identify Reality as a whole (i.e., both good and evil) with God." (op. cit. p. 229.) . ,,.. . . * 140 THE EECO^STEUCTIOX OF KELIGION" working out the supreme good in the form of an ideal society consisting of all humanity. The materialistic con- ception of God, if we may so call it, as a universe of meaningless play of energy, alien to the aspirations of man, will be replaced by a conception of God as realizing himself in the intelligence, welfare, and fraternity of all humanity. This is the God, as a modern religious thinker has happily said, "who strives within our striving, who kindles his flame in our intellect, sends the impact of hia energy to make our will restless for righteousness, floods our subconscious mind with dreams and longings, and always urges the race on toward a higher combination of freedom and solidarity." And, we may add, this is the God whom Jesus speaks of as a loving father. Such a human, personal, and social conception of God may seem inadequate to the scientific mind, but if it is inadequate, it is surely inadequate by way of defect and not by way of excess. 1 ; So, likewise, will positive Christianity reaffirm the be- lief in immortality.^ Both sound science and rational religion forbid the belief that death ends all for human personality. Sociology and anthropology have united in showing the importance of the individual life, not only as a carrier of civilization, but as a modifier of civiliza- tion. It is individual lives which make up our human world, in other words, and these human lives, both phys- ically and culturally, enter into the enduring life of hu- manity. In his religion of humanity Comte made much of this subjective immortality of the Individual, as he 1 We need also to remember, as Professor Spaulding pays (The New Rationalism, p. 517) : "If f?od is personality, lie is also more than personality, even as the moral situation among men is more than personality." In the same spirit Hobhouse rightly speaks of God aa "guper-personal." (op. cit. p. 228.) POSITIVE CILRISTIANITY 141 called it. According to him, all the good who have ever lived, live again in lives made possible and better because of their existence, while the bad are gradually but surely eliminated from the life of humanity. Since Comte, science has demonstrated this subjective immortality of the individual to be, we might almost say, an appalling fact appalling because the elimination of bad influences is probably not so easy or so certain as Comte seemed to imply. But is this "immortality of influence" the only im- mortality which positive Christianity will teach? No doubt the non-theologically minded Christian would in most cases at the present day be entirely satisfied if he could be sure that all the good which he tried to do would live on after him in the enduring life of humanity./ The true Christian is not very much concerned about his per- sonal fate in a world beyond death if he has lived rightly in the present world. The selfishness of that peculiar type of Christian who foregoes pleasures in this world in order that he may selfishly enjoy them in another life of longer duration does not appeal to him, and he recognizes it as quite alien to the spirit of Jesus. ( For Jesus con- cerned himself but little with the question of existence after death. ^ Jesus simply took for granted the principle of continuity in the spiritual world. "In my father's house," he says, "there are many rooms, and if it were not so, I would have told you." Yet, the belief in personal immortality cannot be dis- missed by merely saying that the true Christian attitude in this matter is that of trust. A purely subjective im- mortality, such as Comte taught, is, after all, a contradic- tion in terms, and positive religion cannot remain satis- fied with such a statement as a complete and reasonable religious faith. The life of humanity, science plainly 142 THE KECOISTSTEUCTION OF EELIGIOJST teaches, is a process limited in time. A subjective im- mortality is, therefore, an immortality limited by the life of the race; and this raises the much bigger problem whether the life of humanity is itself a meaningless process. For a process which begins in a blank and ends in a blank is surely meaningless. The whole conception., therefore, of a subjective immortality without an objec- tive correlate is antagonistic to a positive conception of the universe and of existence. The positive conception of God, which we have just stated, necessitates belief in immortality as an objective as well as a subjective fact. In what precise form this personal immortality is realized, will not concern positive Christianity. t No scientific demonstration of the existence of the soul after the death of the body is necessary for the purpose of positive Chris- tianity, and it will refuse to waste time in quest of proof of that which, if proved, would add nothing of value to the Christian life. Here again, then, positive Chris- tianity is in harmony with the scientific spirit. On the other hand, there is nothing in positive science which forbids a reasonable faith in personal immortality. Indeed, the evidence of positive science, so far as it has been able to get ascertained facts, seems to point to the conclusion that the principle of continuity reigns in the spiritual as well as in the physical realm; but no dog- matic conclusion has been reached by science, and this is, perhaps, well in the present stage of human development. The overemphasis upon personal immortality has fre- quently led to very unfortunate results in both religion and ethics. T Positive Christianity here as elsewhere will not attempt to set up dogmas upon uncertain; foundations. In this matter, it will be content to affirm that the facts of science are not such as in any way to undermine a reason- able faith. It will avoid such attempts as have often POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 143 been made by the church to depict the exact form in which personal immortality will be realized attempts which all 'sane mi mis now see must be regarded as horrible or ludi- crous caricatures of what a rational religious faith should be. Rather positive Christianity will, as we have already said, return in this matter to the simple, trustful, and affirmative attitude of Jesus, which is a sufficient founda- tion for the Christian life. The attitude of positive Christianity towards sin and salvation will be unequivocal. The theological conception of sin is that it is rebellion against God. To this state- ment there can be no objection, if we remember that the service of God must consist in the service of humanity; therefore, rebellion against God is disloyalty to humanity. In simplest terms, sin is essentially selfishness; it is dis- loyalty to the claims of humanity, whether that humanity be our fellow human beings around us or those in distant lands or future ages. The conception of sin in positive Christianity, in other words, will be social and humani- tarian. Sin will be the failure to recognize in all of one's fellow beings ends rather than mere means, or to act, as Kant said, so that the principle upon which one acts may be made into a universal law. But this is simply the Christianity of the Gospels. Tin this case again positive Christianity will mean a return to the simple teachings of Jesus. *} The elaborate definitions of sin formulated by the creeds of the church will be thrown into the discard ; but sin will not become, on that account, a less direfully significant fact in the religious life. Because sin is dis- loyalty to humanity, makes it no less rebellion against God and robs it of none of its terror or degradation to the true Christian mind. The true Christian conception of salvation is that it is "4' <. . <. ---' - 144 THE KECONSTKUCTIOlSr OF KELIGION salvation from sin. This is the conception of the Gos- pels, but in the theological ages of the Christian church, salvation was often represented to mean, essentially, escape from punishment and assurance of bliss in a life beyond the grave. Thus, the whole conception of salva- tion was degraded to a refined sort of selfishness and other- worldliness. Positive Christianity will furnish a social conception of salvation in contrast to the medieval theo- logical notions which have prevailed down to the present. It will not deny that human souls may be lost and in torment on account of sin; for that would be to deny an obvious fact of moral and religious experience. But it will emphasize that salvation means, not only deliverance from sin, but entrance into the joy of a life of love, of service, and of right relations with one's fellow men, and of a consequent right attitude toward Godlt will point out that for the individual, salvation consists, essentially, in identifying himself with the highest aspirations and wel- j fare of his race. Actively, salvation will reveal itself by participation in all those movements and activities which are designed to redeem humanity. For groups of indi- viduals, salvation will consist in accepting the spirit of Jesus, the spirit of seeking to serve God through the service of humanity. Such groups as the church and the family, and, possibly, also the state when it shall become Christian, are the necessary and natural media by which individuals are saved ;j^nd hence positive Christianity will preach a salvation for groups as well as for individuals. For ultimately it seeks a redeemed world not less than redeemed individuals. But it may be said that the crucial question has not yet been answered. What is the attitude of positive Chris- tianity toward Jesus ? Does it accept Ids claims, and is it "^V ". Q.k- . i / ? ' t POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 145 in accord with the tradition of the Christian church ? The answer, again, is unequivocal. {"Positive Christianity will cept Jesus for what he claimed to be himself J especially as his words are reported in the first three Gospels; but it will not accept what theologians have claimed him to be. Theological disputation, it is almost notorious, has obscured the simple and sublime figure of the Gospels. 1 Scarcely any two theologians have agreed in regard to eir claims as to Jesus, and certainly no two Christian sects. It is time surely that the Christian church should mphasize what Jesus said of himself, and not what men ave said of him. The historical credibility of the main 'eatures of the Gospel story seem beyond reasonable .oubt. 2 (^Indeed, the principles of sociology and anthro- ology are such that even though we had no supporting ocuments from the early Christian centuries, the credi- ility of the Gospel story could scarcely be doubted in the ight of subsequent historical social developments a point hich some critics have often overlooked. Social move- ents do not originate without social leaders, and great istorical movements which have profoundly affected ivilization require personalities which bring to a focus, jas it were, certain social tendencies, thus giving a new Impetus and direction to social development. The principles of psychology also aid in giving cer- kainty to the essential truthfulness and historicity of the figure of Jesus. This has impressed practically all stu- dents who have brought an open mind to the question. |If such sociological, psychological, and anthropological 1 For example, see Schweitzer's review of the work of the German theologians from Reimarus to Wrede in his The Quest of the His- torical Jesus. The results, as Schweitzer himself acknowledges, are mainly negative. 1 Such credibility would surely never have been questioned had not Ithe teaching of Jesus been involved in partisan disputation. 146 THE EECON^TKUCTION OF KELIGION principles be rejected, we are left without any positive science of human history and plunged into the absurdities of absolute historical skepticism. 1 We may, therefore, accept the essential truth, even upon a purely scientific basis, of the account of Jesus' teach- ings and life contained in the Gospels. ^Reasonable faith built upon these scientific principles will, of course, go much further and say that the burden of proof obviously rests upon those who would reject the account of Jesus' teachings and life contained in the Gospels. What, then, did Jesus say concerning himself? What were the claims which he himself made upon his fol- lowers? That they were no inconsiderable claims the Gospel record, as well as the history of the Christian church, bears witness. Jesus was conscious in the highest degree of his world mission. He believed himself sent by God, not only to redeem his people, but all the nations of the earth. He proclaimed himself the Messiah fore- told by the Prophets, 2 sent to redeem Israel and establish God's kingdom upon earth. He spoke of himself, how- ever, not so much as representing his own people as man- kind in general, namely as "the Son of Man" ; 3 only 1 The extreme to which such skepticism may go is also seen in the case of Buddha, whose historic existence has been doubted by one school of writers. Compare Glover, The Jesus of History, pp. 5-9. a Some careful New Testament scholars think that Jesus never proclaimed himself as the Messiah. See Case, The Millennial Hope, p. 114 f. This term has caused endless controversy among the critics. See articles in Encyclopedia Biblica (Vol. IV) and in Hastings Diction- ary of the Bible. While the term in Jewish apocalyptic writings was used as one of the titles of the Messiah, it is improbable that Jesus used it in this sense. As Bishop Westcott said : "It is inconceivable that the Lord should have adopted a title which was popularly hold to be synonymous with that of the Messiah while he carefully avoided the title of Messiah itself." In other words, it is improbable that Jesus used the term generally in the apocalyptic sense, but rather in the simpler sense the term had in the Aramaic which Jesus spoke, POSITIVE CHKISTIANITY 147 twice in the records of his ministry do "we find him speak- ing of himself as representing God, namely as "the Son of God." Nevertheless, he does not hesitate to say, on several occasions, many things which indicate clearly his sense of his mission as a redeemer of mankind. "I am the way, the truth, and the life," he says. Again, "No man cometh to the Father except through me." * Now, we cannot possibly dismiss these hold claims which Jesus made for himself even though they are similar to the claims which have been made by the jfounders of other religions. The question still remains, was Jesus a religious fanatic ? Was he insane, or was he profoundly sane? It may be pointed out, in the first place, that all of the greatest leaders of mankind, not only in religion, but in art, in science, and in state- craft have usually been highly conscious of what they have accomplished and of their gifts. The so-called extrava- gant claims of Jesus could be paralleled many times, for example, by the great claims put forth by men of science for their discoveries. It is no more to be wondered at that r Jesus was highly conscious of the supreme worth ^of his discoveries in the moral and religious realm than that a Kepler or a Galileo was conscious of the worth of their discoveries. *! Again, all of the great active leaders of man- namely, "the man," or "the representative of man." See especially article by Professor Schmidt above referred to in the Encyclopedia Biblica. 1 These strongest statements attributed to Jesus are from the fourth Gospel, which is generally recognized by scholars in all branches of the church to be of uncertain authorship. They are, however, in line with some other sayings of Jesus, and in substantial harmony with the spirit of the first three Gospels. That the ideas which they express were a part of the early Christian tradition seems, therefore, probable. They are purposely cited here as examples of the extreme Christian tradition. Even so, if taken in a practical rather than in a theological sense, they are not irrational, but accord with, Christian experience. .-. &lv^ ^^^/V c --.-- * " '< .-'' '' '. , & -~- ,,7 - 148 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION kind have been more or less conscious of the convergence of social and historical forces in their own personality and in their life work. It is not surprising, then, that Jesus showed this consciousness to the highest degree. He lived at a period when the contending forces of the social and religious life of the Jews, and, for that matter, of the Greco-Roman world, were coming to a head. His soul rose superior to the petty, reactionary, particularistic tendencies of his time in religion and ethics, and he felt himself commissioned to realize the nobler dreams and aspirations of his people, especially, those of the later prophets. His was the pure and sensitive soul in which the noblest traditions of Jewish religion and ethics be- came intensified and still further idealized. Passing through his transcendent personality the best in Jewish traditions underwent a new synthesis, creating a new re- ligious and ethical attitude, fitted, as we have already said, to mediate the transition from the standards of barbarism to those of higher civilization. (jThus, Jesus became tho spiritual leader and savior of mankind, the initiator of a new age which would in time establish the reign of God among men even as it was already established in the rest of the universe.'"] Taking into account Jesus' position in time and his work, his consciousness of his mission and of the truth of his teachings, his claims for himself were not extrava- gant. 1 Indeed, no one who accepts his leadership and his 1 Says Professor Sirakhovitch: "There is no question in my mind that Christ's deep conviction that his is the Way and the Truth was based on knowledge, intellectual knowledge, scientific knowledge, if you please. Before he felt that he was the Redeemer, he knew himself to be the great Discoverer. ... To me, personally, it seems childish not to see in Christ's teachings an overwhelming intellectual system. The towering parts that are its components are parts of the same system, not independent units. The truth of the insight, the cohesion of the system were self-evident to Christ; so much BO that he knew POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 149 teachings can do anything but acknowledge that in a pro- found sense he is the way, the truth, and the life, and that no man can come to the Father except through his spirit, through belief in him and the acceptance of his leadership and so of his saviorship. Jesus' life and teaching was characterized, then, by the highest sanity, not by the sanity of a low prudence or of a false humility, but by the sanity of an exalted mood, such as has characterized all of the greater leaders of mankind. Positive Christianity will recognize fully these facts, and in accepting the leader- ship of Jesus will take him at his own valuation. It will recognize that in these statements and claims of Jesus there is the best evidence of his fitness for spiritual leadership. For men must have leaders in order to accomplish any- thing great in any line; and this is particularly true of the social world, of ethical and religious matters where great vision and deep enthusiasm are needed to lead ef- fectively. No human cause can be successful until it crystallizes, so to speak, about one or more personalities. Not until the cause, the movement is embodied in one or more masterful personalities who lead the mass is there any chance of the success of the cause. This is as true of bad causes as it is of good ones. Men are not sufficiently motivated by abstract ideas ; it is rather loyalty to a con- crete personality, or rather to a series of such person- alities, which sways them. It is thus that men are saved ; that they had an absolute quality; that is, coming from God." Toward the Understanding of Jesus, pp. 57 and 71. Perhaps no scientific student of society has treated Jesus's consciousness of his mission with such lucidity and penetration as Professor Simkhovitch. The book from which we have just quoted has rightly been said to give "a more realistic grasp of the entire situation and a more intimate understanding of the aims and methods of Jesus than a entury of minute literary criticism of New Testament documentg has been able to discoyer." 150 THE RECONSTKUCTION OF RELIGION and it is in this sense that the rational Christian finds in Jesus his personal savior. The experience of Christians through the centuries, and even of many outside of the church, testifies to the essen- tial truth of the claims which Jesus himself put forth. In his life and teachings men have found not simply their best comprehension of the divine and of personal redemp- tion from low and mean social tendencies, hut an unfail- ing source of aspiration and enthusiasm for a better social order. "Each new crusade in the long strife for human betterment," Professor Eitch truly says, "looks in sublime confidence to him as its forerunner and defense. " None can deny accordingly that Jesus as an ideal figure has, as a matter of fact, established his leadership of all who look for a human society based upon love. 1 There is no hope of the realization of a social life dominated by love without Jesus, for there is no one to whom the world would turn for such a vision if his leadership were de- nied. 55 ' And in making himself the moral and social leader of mankind he has surely become the redeemer and savior of his fellowmen. } These facts must be acknowledged by all who would pass judgment upon the claims of Jesus; 1 It is, of course, true that the central figure of the Christian movement is not the historical Jesus alone, but a growing symbol, to which are attached, as they develop, our highest spiritual aspirations. The same tiling is true of any other great historical leader, as, e. g., Lincoln. To this extent, but to this only, can we agree with those who would minimize the importance of the historical Jesus. We may perhaps nearly agree with Schweitzer, despite his eschato- logical views, when he says (op. cit. p. 401): "Not the historical Jesus, but the spirit which goes forth from Him" is the thing of supreme importance in religion. 1 Surely not liuddha and Buddhism, for Buddhism is essentially a pnhenie of individual salvation and presents no ideal society as its goal Self-mastery, not service, is its ideal individual salvation, and not a redeemed world. Whatever its merits on the individual side, its inculcation of passivity, quietism and asceticism throw it out of harmony, not only with modern civilization, but also with social needs and hence with social science. See p. 68. POSITIVE CHKISTIANITY 151 and they arc the chief scientific ground for recognizing the validity of his claim to be in a spiritual sense the savior of mankind. And until mankind recognizes the validity of this claim and acknowledges him as savior and leader, it will remain barbarous and lost in sin. 1 Positive Christianity, accordingly, instead of groping in the dark to find some great, simple soul who will lead the world out of its present chaos, will point to Jesus without any spirit of religious mysticism as the ample and sufficient leader of mankind. It awaits and expects no other leader. It knows that the~FnowTecIge as well as tho heart of mankind will testify to the adequacy of his leadership in ethical and religious matters. It knows that a benighted and barbarous world has yet to accept his social saviorship. It knows that a world fully awake to true social and religious values will say, as a modern rationalist outside of the church has said : " Jesus Christ, come back ! The tones of your voice have not yet died away. In spite of false creeds and wizard priests, through craft and rant, the heart of our age still turns to you. Touch the sorcery of our time and wake us from the vile enchantment of fear and foolish hate. Come ! Deliver us from the doom of dead things. Bring life from the grave where faith lies bound. Jesus iKvcn a hostile, though fair, critic of Christianity (Sellars: The Xext Step in Religion, p. 96) is compelled to acknowledge: "In the figure of Jesus, ethical and aesthetic idealization guided by religious emotion has created a personality of a peculiarly appealing type, well fitted to remain as an ideal to foster and strengthen the noblest tendencies." Compare also the appreciative statement of Rabbi H. G. Enelow, which may be taken as typical of the liberal Jewish attitude: "Among the great and tho good that the human race has produced, none has even approached Jesus in universality of appeal and sway. ... He has become the most fascinating figure in history." (A Jewish View of Jesus, p. 181.) 152 THE KECONSTBUCTION OF RELIGION Christ, come back! Bring dreams and let dreams come true! Bring love that knits all hearts into one." And yet, positive Christianity will emphasize, not so much an emotional attachment to Jesus 7 person, impor- tant as that may be, as a rational understanding and ac- ceptance of Jesus' teachings. Of emotional Christianity the world has had enough and has proved its utter in- adequacy, except when it is accompanied by a thorough comprehension and radical acceptance of the teachings of Christianity's leader. It is probably safe to say that not one out of four of those whom the church has persuaded emotionally to accept Jesus as their savior can give any rational account of Jesus' teachings. 1 This, of course, has been one of the main reasons for the failure of Chris- tianity to become socially effective. A thorough under- standing of the practical social meaning of the teachings of the Master will not detract from the reverence and love of his person, and it will add greatly to the effectiveness of Christian ideals in practical life. These statements bring us, naturally, to a consideration of the importance for positive Christianity of the study of the Bible and, especially, of Jesus' teachings. 'No one would expect to complete an education along artistic lines, or to become an artist, without the study of the work of great masters. No one would expect to become a worth while scientific worker or thinker in any line without study of the great scientific masterpieces in that line. So, it is idle to think that any one can become moral and re- 1 It is, of course, the spirit of Jesus' teachings, rather than letter which Christians need to understand. Says Professor Coe (A Social Theory of Religious Education, p. 315) : "The most daring and most unflinching social teaching will never cease to look back to Jesus. But if it sees Jesus, it will look with him to the future. It will breathe his spirit, but it will not stop with his words." See also Chapter XI of this book. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 153 ligions in a rational way without the study of the great masterpieces in ethics and religion. Now, by the common consent of all the great religious thinkers of our civiliza- tion the supreme religious masterpieces of our cultural tradition are embodied in that unique collection of litera- ture which we term the Bible. The ethical and religious value of the Bible, especially of the Gospels, for the estab- lishment of Christian civilization cannot be doubted. | t)ther things being equal, a people will be Christian di- rectly in proportion to the attention which they pay to the teachings of Jesus as found in the Bible.^) One of the best evidences of the decay of the hold of Christian ideals upon our civilization is the small attention given to the Bible at the present time. It is idle to suppose that these ideals can become socially prevalent mental patterns with- out continued attention and study, especially on the part of the young. / However much our religious life must be based upon the actual facts of experience, it still remains true that/Christian principles and ideals can best be under- stood by studying them in the original sources.) While these sources should not be regarded with superstition, but should be subject to the same standards of criticism which we would apply to any other original sources, yet it must be recognized that we find in the Bible the original "source material" for the rise, development, and meaning of the Christian movement. It is not an accident, there- fore, that Christians have discovered in this great collec- tion of literature the chief inspiration for their own ideals and practical living. Positive Christianity, freeing the Bible from superstition and misunderstanding, will give it its proper place in the religious life as the great source- book of religious idealism. The uncritical use of the Bible like the uncritical use of any other classic, however, 154 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION will be condemned as not in accord with the scientific spirit. 1 Its use will he to reveal the origin, development, and nature of the Christian ideal. The attitude of positive Christianity toward prayer will also he unequivocal. All religions, except the very low- est, are characterized by the use of prayer, or by what , amounts to the same thing, introspective meditation. It is indeed in this way that the religious attitude of mind functions as a sort of moral equilibrator. Without it the full energies of the moral and religious life are scarcely 1 Some statement of the attitude of the author toward the Biblical criticism of the nineteenth century may be helpful in order to avoid misunderstanding. In general, critical scholarship is to be welcomed along every line of human interest for reasons which were briefly noted at the very beginning of this book. But there are many reasons why the critical movement in religion and theology of the nineteenth century, especially as developed in Germany, cannot be considered the acme of scholarship. In the first place, criticism to be truly pro- ductive must be constructive. It should not be mere destructive skepticism. Institutions as well as individuals have a right to demand that criticism be constructive. In the second place, the importance of documentary criticism may be easily exaggerated, and such criticism itself become a sort of scholasticism^* While the Bible is infinitely precious for the Christian movement, yet the Christian movement exists independent of the Bible and would probably con- tinue to exist were there no Bible.^This is not always appreciated by some schools of critics and hence fney have had often an exaggerated idea of the importance of their work. It is not too nuich to say that a great deal of it has been irrelevant to the great issues of religion. The entire documents of Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Buddhism might conceivably be lost; yet the problem of the Christian move- ment, the Mohammedan movement, the Buddhist movement, would remain essentially the same for the world. Crowing out of the scholasticism of the critics there has been, in the third place, often a failure among them to appreciate the bearing of nearly related sciences upon their work. They have failed, in other words, in synthetic scholarship in many cases. The astounding archaeological, anthropological, sociological, and psychological errors of some of them must of course be attributed in part to the time in which they wrote, but also in part to lark of synthetic scholarship. All of which shows that the ideas of the critics must not be taken for scientific truth, and that much of their work needs to be done over in a different spirit, more constructive, nmn- synthetic, moro scientific. British and American scholars are now doing this. POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY 155 capable of control and direction. 1 It is through prayer in every religion that the worshipper and the deity come into communion. It establishes a social and personal re- lationship between them, and the social efficacy of religion is secured through this mental comradeship of the human and the divine. God becomes the Great Companion only to the extent tliat conversation with him is maintained. Inasmuch as prayer means the social energizing of the personality through a sense of communion with the divine, it is something which increases with the higher evolution of religion rather than decreases. 2 In Christianity the ideal is that the whole life shall become a prayer, in the sense that the inner personal life shall ever be kept in constant communion with the divine. At the same time it is evident that when prayer becomes thus an attitude pervading all practical living on a high religious plane, it must lose the magical character which it once had, not only in the religions antecedent to Christianity, but also often in theological Christianity itself. It must become a rational religious practice. r~~ What then must be the conception of prayer in rational religion? Surely not that the order of the universe is changed by it. This violates the fundamental principle which we laid down in the beginning, that religion and religious practices are for the sake of adaptation. Prayer is simply one method by which the religious attitude se- cures the adaptation of the individual to life and its en- vironing forces. It secures this adaptation not through changing the order of the universe, but through changing 1 For a brief psychological statement of the effect of prayer, see Hall : Morale, p. 350 ; for a fuller psychological discussion, see Jamea : Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 463, 477 and 528. James calls prayer "the very soul and essence of religion." See also Coe: The Psychology of Religion, Chapter XVII. * Prayer in the strict sense is relatively rare in the lower religions. 156 THE EECONSTEUOTION OF KELIGION the attitudes of men to their ideals, to one another, and to the great forces of life and the universe. But this change in the human attitude is the thing that is su- premely necessary to bring about the benefits which re- ligion seeks. There is, therefore, no necessary element of self-delusion in prayer. On the contrary, if the assump- tion of sane religion must be what we have said, that "only man is vile," then only man needs to be changed, not God or the order of the universe. 1 ^ Salvation, both personal and social, can come to man only through the change in his inner life ; and it is grayer which is the effective agency of bringing about these changes and in controlling them so that ideals shall be realized. The experience of religious persons testifies universally to the efficacy of prayer and no positive religion based upon the facts of life will deny this. On the contrary, it will give not only a more rational place to prayer in the religious life, but a larger one than mere superstition can pos- sibly do. We must always remember that motivation, energizing of the will, is in one sense the supreme function of re- ligion, and that the practice of prayer, like the beliefs in Gid, immortality, and salvation, plays here a great part. The problem is how to make all these work in the right direction. It must be admitted that many of the prayers of religious people are neither rational nor ethical, and this a positive social Christianity must correct. In part, no doubt, prayer is often instinctive, a mere cry for help to the superhuman forces of the universe. Even when it has become partly rational it still frequently remains grossly unethical, as in the prayers not only of children 1 The moral order being necessarily cooperative, it is, of course, as right to conceive that God needs man's help as that man needs God's help. Man and God are co-partners in a common task. But the imperfections in this cooperation are on man's side, not on God's. POSITIVE CIIEISTIANITY 157 and criminals, but also sometimes of respectable church members. There is too much prayer which is pagan and selfish. Obviously prayer can be tolerated in a social re- ligion only as it is directed toward spiritual ends and accords with the higher social values. This does not mean, however, that there should be any sort of social censorship upon prayer or the forms of worship. The right of the individual to worship as seems bestToTiim and to appeal to God over the decisions of the mass of his fellowmen is salutary. This freedom, which the individual may claim, of direct communion with, and appeal to, the deity is one of the most precious achieve- ments of the higher ethical religions. But in reality the recognition of this right of free access of every individual to God and of freedom of worship is in accord with the highest social values ; for it makes the individual religious attitude directly creative, not only of personal character, but also of social order. It is therefore really in accord with the general principle which we have laid down, that rational religion must demand that prayer and religious practices in general be directed to spiritual and social ends ; for freedom in these matters, experience has shown, best conduces to higher spiritual and social development. Positive Christianity will be tolerant, not only in these matters, but in all matters of religious belief and prac- tice ; for with science it will share the supreme faith that all that truth needs to establish itself is a fair field and no favors. The world understands the absurdity of trying to establish scientific truth by any degree of coercion. It should see the equal absurdity of trying to secure the acceptance of religious and moral truth by any coercion. The appeal of a positive religion, like that of science, will be to the facts of life and to intelligence. Hence a posi- 158 THE RECONSTEUOTION OF KELIGION tive Christianity "will be tolerant even of non-Christian religions. It will welcome whatever they have to give which is of value. It will he willing to judge them by their fruits, and especially by their effects upon social life and human culture. But the toleration of positive Christianity can, no more than that of science, be a toleration of error. It asks that all religious sects submit their beliefs to the tests of ex- perience and reason. ]^"o doubt a large liberty will always be tolerated in transcendental beliefs, but when such be- liefs vitally affect human relations their truth or falsity must be judged by their fruits. To be tolerated in a rational and social world they must be such as to serve mankind. In the long run, at the least, they must show that they will result in a better human world in increas- ing rather than diminishing human fellowship. For re- ligion exists for man, not man for religion. To this extent positive Christianity will agree with Comte that in its values and judgments religion must be anthropo- centric; that is to say, it must be developed in harmony with social science. This is only reiterating, however, our fundamental principles that religion is an adaptive process, that it should be redemptive, and that humanity is the ultimate subject of its redemption. Many proposals are being put forth for the creation and establishment of a new religion, since Christianity, it is asserted, is hopelessly discredited. But the religion of Jesus has not been discredited ; it is only the practices of so-called Christians and Christian churches. Apart from the difficulties of such an enterprise under the complex conditions of modern life, a new religion would surely defeat its very purpose. For what our world needs most at the present time is to acknowledge the social and moral POSITIVE CHKISTIANITY 159 leadership of Jesus. The most idealistic religious move- ment that neglected this element of personal leadership would defeat itself. If there be those to whom the word "Christian" is an offense on account of misrepresentations of the Christian spirit and life, yet who sincerely desire a Christian world, one dominated by active good will, then the rational thing for all who call themselves Chris- tians is to demonstrate what the true Christian spirit is. When this is done, and when moreover people understand that scientifically the work of Jesus in religion and ethics is comparable to the work of the great founders of modern sciences, then there will be no more objection to Christian religion than to Copernican astronomy. Intellectually one will be as readily accepted as the other. The solution which positive Christianity proposes of the religious problem of our time, then, is simple. Let the religious leaders of our day grasp the full social signifi- cance of religion, drop their theological disputations, give religion the positive, humanitarian trend which civiliza- tion demands, recognize that their essential work is the maintenance and propagation of rational social values, and teach clearly, as Jesus did, that the only possible service of God must consist in the service of men regard- less of their race, class, or condition. Let also the recog- nized basis of religious fellowship become full consecra- tion to the service of mankind. If this were done, not only would the churches forget their traditional differ- ences, but they would rally to their support all good men everywhere and eventually overcome all their active op- ponents. 1 This is not advocating something novel. Al- 1 Again we may quote Conklin (op. cit. p. 244) : "The time may come sooner than some of us expect when in all things except spirit and purpose, religion may once more be a personal matter; when churches will welcome all men of good will; when love of God and love of fellow men will be the one requirement for mutual fellowship 160 THE EECOJSTSTKUCTION OF BELIGION ready this movement is well under way in the more advanced Christian churches. But the time has come to take seriously in hand the reconstruction of our religious life along humanitarian lines. For it is only an actually realized humanitarian religion, sanctioning and enforcing a humanitarian ethics and working in harmony with mod- ern social science which can guarantee peace and good will among classes, nations, and races, and prevent the collapse of our civilization. On the other hand if such a religion of human service becomes generally accepted all of the irrational, unsocial, and unprogressive elements in our re- ligious life would disappear, and actual Christianity would become "the religion of humanity." and service. When that time comes, religion and science will be at one." For a simple outline of such a Christianity in harmony with modern science, see Ames, The New Orthodoxy. CHAPTEE VI THE ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL, BELIGIOBT WE have outlined the great general principles which we must follow if we are to reconstruct religion so as to meet the requirements of modern life. 'Now we must try to see the social implications of all this, both in general ancf in particular. What social principles, in other words, does social science * indicate as essential for a positive social religion ? If institutions are to be saved as well as individuals, what is the doctrine of social salvation? How shall we build our social world ? If we build it in accordance with modern social science, will it turn out to be the world of Jesus' vision, a "kingdom of God ?" 2 These questions we shall try to answer in the succeeding chapters of this book. In part we have already indicated the answers. We have seen, for example, that social science demands a religion which will release the creative energies of man; which will not only inspire faith and hope in individual life, but enthuse communities for progress; which will not 1 The term "social science," it should be remembered, is used in this book to include not only the "pure" social sciences, but also social ethics and the applied social sciences. See foot-note in Preface, p. x. 2 A number of writers following Coe (see his Social Theory of Religious Education) prefer such a term as "the democracy of God," or "the commonwealth of God," as the New Testament "kingdom of God" is thought no longer properly to convey the meaning intended. The exact term employed is, of course, immaterial, provided the proper social content is given to it, corresponding to the content given to the New Testament term by Jesus. 161 162 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION only strengthen and uplift individuals, "but send them forth to build a new and better social world. We have seen that such a religion must depend practically upon knowledge of all the forces which make or mar human life, whether in its individual or in its collective aspects; that is, it must ally itself with science. A positive social religion and social science will be accordingly in practice inseparable. We have seen finally that such a religion will blend religion and ethics by giving a social direction to religious practices, recognizing that the only possible service of God must consist in the service of men the fundamental principle, as we have so often reiterated, of the religion of Jesus. The postulate of such a religion of human service must, of course, be the supreme worth of men, no matter what their race, class, or condition may be, so that even the humblest service done for men takes on a new dignity, because it is a service rendered to God. This is the cen- tral teaching of all social religion, and of the religion of Jesus in particular. Is it the teaching of social science? Modern social science shows beyond question that all the wealth of the world really resides in men; that there are no values of any sort apart from men; and that all the values which we know are their creation. Human 1 beings, in other words, are not only the sole sources of value, but they are the supreme values. The develop- ment of the resources which are in men, therefore, is the only way in which the world can be permanently enriched along any line. 1 Hence the greatest concern of human society must be the production of men who can take their 1 This truth, now accepted by all economists, received early and vigorous championship by such economic writers as Richard T. Ely in America and J. A. Hobson in England. Compare Carver, Principles of Political Economy, Chapter VI. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 163 place in our human world and help to carry on its life in the best ways possible. But it is not men in isolation that social science dis- covers to be valuable. Men create values only by coming into relationships with other men, and they create them directly in proportion as they work together successfully at the tasks of life. The collective life of men which we call society, in other words, is carried on by the continual exchange of services between men. It is by mutual service that men live. It is this reciprocity of service which is the basis of all human institutions and all civilization. The more intense this exchange of services is, the more social values are produced and the more social life is built up; and the more equal the exchange is, the more satis- fying and harmonious is the social life. 1 In other words, social science finds co-operation to be the inner, construc- tive principle of group life; and the wider and the more harmonious this co-operation is, the richer and the more perfect is the social life of mankind as a whole. 2 Civili- zation and all its values, then, depend upon the continu- ance and development of co-operation among men. Obvi- ously a social religion must aim to maximize co-operation, and it will be successful in doing this only as it teaches the value of mutual service. The inculcation in the in- 1 See Novicow, "Mechanism and Limits of Human Association" (in American Journal of Sociology, November, 1917), especially Chapters II and III. 1 Practically all modern sociology of scientific standing has united to demonstrate this truth. See, e. g., Small, General Sociology, p. 710; Ross, Principles of Sociology, Chapter XXI ; Todd, Theories of Social Progress, p. 41. On the biological side evidence will be found in such writers, among many others, as J. Arthur Thomson, David Starr Jordan, Vernon Kellogg, and William Patten. Professor Patten's recent work, The Grand Strategy of Evolution: The Social Philosophy of a Biologist, is especially interesting as showing that the conflict philosophy of society is without adequate biological foundation. See especially Chapter I. 164 THE KECONSTKUCTIOJST OF KELIGICXN" dividual of the attitude of service toward his fellows must, ihen, be the primary aim of a social religion. If a social religion must first of all teach social service the question still remains what sort of service shall it be. Assuming always that the service is intelligent, is it to be rendered chiefly in a material or in a spiritual way ? Is the most social religion the one which will maximize eco- nomic co-operation and economic production? Or will it pay even more attention to the production of non-economic values? Moreover, is service to be rendered indifferently to the strong and to the weak, or will social religion em- phasize especially service to those in need of help ? There can be no doubt that social religion as well as social science must teach the fundamental importance of producing material goods and of satisfying the economic wants of men. Feeding the hungry and clothing the naked are obviously the primary services needed by human beings. Services rendered to meet the material needs of men, especially when these needs are great, are of the highest social, and so, ethical and religious, value; for until these needs are satisfied there can be no development of the higher, spiritual life of men. We must all agree that in this sense "the greatest service of all is the service of food." * But material goods, as Aristotle long ago remarked, though living in a pagan world, have a limit to their social utility; and that limit is their power to promote the de- velopment of the higher, spiritual life of men. Too great an abundance of material goods, so far from aiding higher social and moral development, becomes an impediment to it. This is true, so far as we know, even if material 1 For further discussion of the relations of religion and material needs, see Chapter VIII. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 165 goods are evenly distributed in society. No matter how evenly distributed, too great an abundance of material goods would be sure to undermine the higher spiritual life of men and lead to besotted materialism, in the moral sense of the term. It is true, of course, that the danger of too great a general abundance of material goods is relatively remote in our civilization, and that which ap- pears to be such a danger is really due to the concentra- tion of wealth in the hands of a few. But this fact cannot obscure the truth of the general principle that the social utility of material goods is limited, not only for any one social class, but for all social classes. It is not an accident, then, that the higher religions quite generally condemn too great accumulation of such goods, and invariably counsel contentedness with small means. This is not merely to secure the distribution of such goods to the unfortunate, nor is it usually for the sake of mere asceticism, as is so often alleged. The reason is more simple; for as social science shows, the energy of society at a given time being a fixed quantity, energy devoted to the production of material goods after neces- sities are met cannot be devoted to building up family life, government, religion, art, science, and education. If we want the higher life of society in art, science, educa- tion, religion, government, and the family to develop, then, the energy devoted to the production of material goods must be limited. To be sure, what are material necessities and what is ;over-abundance of material goods, social science would isay, are relative matters, dependent upon the stage of social culture. But this does not detract from the force of the conclusion just stated, and it is evident therefore that it is not sufficient for social religion merely to teach 166 THE EECONSTBFOTION OF KELIGIOST that men render service when they work in the economic sense and are good producers. Society needs services beyond these economic services. The services rendered by individuals as fathers and mothers, as brothers and sisters, as friends and neighbors, as members of communities, through the family, government, art, religion, science, and education, in the production of healthy, happy, intelligent, unselfish men and women, may be dominantly non- economic; but they are the services which count most in the building of civilization ; and in proportion as men put energy into these services, after material necessities are provided, in that proportion is the ideal of social life realized. The production of men, not commodities, must be the aim of sound social religion. The end of all social service should, therefore, be spiritual. It would, indeed, be quite unnecessary to say these things if the prevailing materialism of our time had not obscured these truths and even often denied them. 1 When social religion demands the complete consecration of the individual to the service of his fellowmen, there- fore, it is calling him to a spiritual service. It is not the service of making men happy and contented animals, but rather of developing them into truly human, intelligent, loyal members of an ideal society a redeemed humanity. And in this, social religion is one with the religion of Jesus, which, while recognizing the fundamental character of the needs of men in a material way, looks to their sal- vation into a spiritual social order as the end. Is the human service, which social religion enjoins, to be rendered indifferently to the strong and the weak, or will it emphasize the service of those who are in need of help ? Modern social science discovers that human com- 1 See again Chapter VIII. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 167 munities progress very largely in proportion as they raise the general level or average of their total life; and this level is raised not by producing a few superior indi- viduals, hut by raising the weak, developing the unde- veloped, and fitting as many as possible for the best pos- sible life. Human societies, in other words, progress not through producing supermen, but through the diffusion of welfare and intelligence among the masses of mankind. It is in the undeveloped personalities and characters of men that society has its chief potential resources. Whenever the ignorant can be made intelligent, the vicious good, the physically weak the physically strong, society has added to the strength of all; for the strength of human groups consists in extending and intensifying their power to co-operate. All civilized human groups, therefore, strive to fit not only as many as possible of their members to survive, but for the best possible living. A sound social religion will, therefore, emphasize service to the needy and the weak. 1 Its emphasis will not be so much upon the fraternity of the strong as upon showing fra- ternity toward those who need help. This we have seen is a distinctive mark of Christianity. As a social religion its peculiar note has been the redemp- tion of the vicious, the helping of the needy, and the strengthening of the weak. In our world, so far as we can see, for a long time to come, social religion will have to emphasize this redemptive work. Its main practical preoccupation will have to be bringing knowledge to the ignorant, virtue to the vicious, health to the sick, wealth 1 A further sociological reason for this is the impossibility under modern conditions of maintaining in the same community two dif- ferent levels of civilization without gravitation toward the lower level. No community, in other words, can rise far above its worst socially tolerated conditions. Vice or typhoid, e. g., in one section of the community endangers all the rest. This ie a familiar sociological principle. 168 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION to the poverty stricken, and strength to the weak of every sort. It will seek to do this, to be sure, by prevention, wherever possible, rather than by cure; but the chasms which exist in modern society must be bridged, and they cannot be bridged by levelling men down, but only by helping them up to higher levels whenever and wherever that is possible. A religion which is adapted to the re- quirements of our present world must very evidently be a socially redemptive religion. But service which is rendered under compulsion, even though it be only the compulsion of religious and moral precepts, soon becomes slavery. Only a service which is spontaneous, which springs from inner motives, can con- tinue to be rendered gladly. A social religion that merely teaches service as an outward form is not enough. Social religion must above all, therefore, cultivate the inner attitudes and motives which issue in service. A genuinely social religion must teach emotional attitudes which naturally, spontaneously, issue in social service. It must, as we say, touch the heart of man. In other words, a social religion must kindle the sympathetic emotions. Service must be motivated by love to have the highest social value. Religion must become a great device to accumulate, diffuse, and transmit altruism in society. It must inculcate the love of man as man. It must develop a sense of human brotherhood throughout humanity. It must cultivate love, not simply towards a few men, to- wards one's own social set, or nation, or race, but towards all men. 1 This is not "oriental mysticism," as it is so often said 1 Compare the argument in Hohhouse. The national Good, especially Chapter VI. The word "love" is used in this chapter and throughout the book, of course, in the ethical sense, meaning active good wiV or devotion to the welfare of others. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION 169 to be by the "hard" school of social thinkers; nor is it impracticable. On the contrary, social experience shows that the only secure foundation of co-operation in human groups is active good will based upon the sympathy and understanding of all their members, and that human co- operation has widened in proportion as sympathy and the consciousness of kind have widened. 1 Wherever the attempt has been made to base co-operation upon mere self-interest, there an unstable social situation has resulted, which sooner or later has issued in open conflict. Only good will based upon active sympathy has proved equal to producing lasting social solidarity. This is natural, some may say, in small human groups such as the family, the local community, the ancient city- state, and even in modern social classes; but it is impos- sible where there are wide differences among men, and especially differences in material interests; there it be- comes "mysticism." But social investigation shows that there has been a constant expansion of sympathy and good will in human history to larger and larger groups, and that we cannot set limits to this expansion, which appar- ently depends entirely upon the education of individuals. 2 1 Roe the author's Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 255-256. Compare also Professor Giddings's statement of the same conclusion in his Descriptive and Historical Sociology, pp. 298-300, 303-305, 352-355. J Says Professor Cooley (Social Organization, p. 203) : "The mind, in its best moments, is naturally Christian; because when we are most fully alive to the life about us, the sympathetic becomes the rational ; what is good for you is good for me because I share your life: and I need no urging to do by you as I would have you do by me. Justice and kindness are matters of course, and also humility, which comes from being aware of something superior to your ordinary self. To one in whom human nature is fully awake, Hove your enemies and do good to them that despitefully use you' is natural and easy, because despiteful people are seen to be in a state of unhappy aberration from the higher life of kindness, and there is an impulse to help them to got back." But all this depends, as Todd points out (Theories of Social Progress, Chapter V), upon the cultivation and development of a sympathetic or socially efficient imagination. 170 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION It shows, moreover, that religion especially has proved able to break down the differences between men and unite the most diverse in bonds of sympathy and good will, or love. This, indeed, we have seen to be the essential social function on the feeling side of humanitarian religion. By universalizing sympathetic feeling, or love, it makes pos- sible the widest possible mutual service and co-operation. Hence the first and great commandment of social religion must be universal love, or good will, extending even to enemies, and reconciling all men to one another. To be- come dynamic, to affect human motives, a social religion must promote human fellowship and so must teach men to cultivate sympathy, love. We have said much about the need of intelligence in social relations and even of the need of the control of emotions by intelligence. But, even from the standpoint of social science, we must admit the equal need of good will to build an ideal society. In our present human world with its seemingly hopeless division into hostile groups of all sorts, we would seem to be more in need of good will, indeed, than of intelligence ; for until good will has laid a basis for some approach there would seem to be little opportunity for intelligence to function. When one contemplates the strife and hate of our present world, one might be pardoned if he claimed that the world needs good will more than science or art, yes, even more than food and shelter.. For knowledge can be secured and na- ture conquered by men co-operating in the work of life; but knowledge and material goods avail nothing if good will is lacking. Moreover, good will appears equally necessary "with science for overcoming strife, crime, pov- erty, and ignorance. For man lives a collective life; he shares his fate with his fellow-men around him, and so ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 171 of necessity he lives in and through good will. No man lives to himself alone. We are all members one of another. If any, even the humblest, is made to suffer, every one of us, whether or not we recognize the fact, is thereby injured. These assertions are not mere senti- ment; they are a part of the perceptions of sound social science. "The whole human problem," as Comte said, "consists in establishing unity, personal and social, by the constant subordination of selfishness to altruism." It is here, of course, that science discovers the special need of social religion if ever co-operation is to take the place of the world-wide strife of the present; for only social religion can universalize love, or good will, in our world. Material interests and a thousand other things divide men. It is religion, as we have seen, which uni- versalizes social values. Sane science recognizes that it alone cannot bridge the chasms which exist in our human world. Men's hearts must be touched. To bridge the chasms which now separate in so many cases classes, na- tions, and races a religion of universal love is alone ade- quate. This is true even oftentimes in small communi- ties. Even in them our imperfectly developed civiliza- tion often premits chasms in their sympathies to grow up between men which make real unity impossible in social living, and which only a religion that cultivates social sympathy, or love, can effectively bridge. But even more do we need a social or humanitarian religion in the relations of the greater groups of men, such as classes, nations, and races. Here the need of reconciliation is most apparent, for here strife is at its maximum. It is group egoism which particularly dis- turbs our world at present, and menaces its future even more. If the world wants peace, it must find a way of breaking down the barriers of misunderstanding and 172 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION selfishness which now separate classes, nations, and races, and of realizing universal human fellowship. Science can aid here by showing the essential identity and universal interdependence of all men. But fellowship is realized not simply through understanding, but even more through sympathy and active good will. Manifestly, where there are so many possibilities of misunderstanding through differences of place, of interests, and of condition, there is especial need of a religion which shall cultivate uni- versal sympathy and good will, or love, and shall inter- mediate between such great groups. This is especially so in the case of nations and races, for here the traditional attitude has been not only one of egoism and isolation, but also one of fear, distrust, and hate. No mere peace treaties, or league of nations, or "balance of power" can under such circumstances success- fully put an end to strife. Rather the whole spirit of nations must be changed. A basis for enduring reconcilia- tion must be found. Group egoism as a policy and prac- tice must be discredited; and in place of fear, distrust, and hate must come understanding, confidence, and good will. Now, as Gautama Buddha said long before Jesus, "Hatred does not cease by hatred, but by love." It is love, in other words, which overcomes hate and reconciles men to one another. This is as true of groups of men as of individuals. Manifestly "the healing of the nations" requires a religion of humanity, which shall teach the love and service of all men. Only thus can the foundations of enduring peace be laid. No scientific social thinker doubts that the cessation of strife and the coming of durable peace is the great im- 1 Rhys-Davids, Buddhism, p. 128. The exact quotation is, "For never in this world does hatred cease by hatred; hatred ceases by love; this is always its nature." ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION 173 mediate need of our world ; for peace is an indispensable condition for all the constructive work of civilization. 1 It is not simply international peace, however, which is needed, but rather general social peace; for at bottom all war is but a symptom of an egoistic, predatory spirit in civilization in general. Now, a religion of the love and service of all men would lay a foundation for lasting social peace, because, first of all, it would repudiate force and selfishness as bases for human relations and with them the whole pagan philosophy that might is right or can make right, that human beings can profit by living at the expense of other human beings, that to dominate is the end of existence. It would place in the stead of these anti-social doctrines, patterns of good will, of mutual service, of solidarity, of sacrifice for the good of all, taken from the family life. Such patterns, accepted as the su- preme social values, would shatter group egoism and open up the way for the establishment and maintenance of normal, helpful, co-operative relations in the great groups of men, because the conciliatory attitude would then be held in honor, as it is now in the normal family; and when a wrong has been done, it would point the way to the restoration of social unity. Groups would no longer seek to remedy injustice by returning wrong for wrong, evil for evil, but by finding means of mutual conciliation. Their whole spirit would be changed, because their stand- ards of conduct would be different and their attention would be centered upon co-operation rather than upon con- flict. This is the only pathway to permanent social peace among men. But how far, it may be asked, is this principle of active 1 For elaboration, see the author's discussion of "War and Social Evolution," Chapter III, in America and the New Era, edited by E. M. Friedman. 174 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION good will, or love, to be carried ? Is it practicable unless it is accepted as the guiding principle of conduct by all ? Is it not, in a world so largely ruled by egoism as ours, apt to be nothing more than a mere hypocritical, and even dangerous, sentiment? The reply is that social science has discovered no way in which the world can be trans- formed from a world of egoism and strife to one of fel- lowship except by the leadership, and if necessary the suffering, of those who have the vision of a better human world. Men are imitative creatures. They are prone to treat others as they are treated by others. But they are also intelligent creatures, and they usually select as pat- terns for imitation conduct which experience shows to work best with themselves and with others. Hence while strife breeds strife, and hate breeds hate, kindliness also breeds kindliness, and love, love; but the superior satis- factions in the latter case are evident even to the dullest mind. There can be no question that kindliness and love would soon win out if this were a fully intelligent world. But strong, brutal passions persist, and traditions of selfishness and strife are hard to uproot. However, to wait till all accept the principle of love as the guide of their conduct would be to postpone indefinitely progress toward a world of universal good will. Rather it is evi- dent that the world must be redeemed by growing love as well as by growing intelligence. "Hatred does not cease by hatred, but by love." A positive social religion must teach love or good will, therefore, a$ an absolute principle. Love must be extended to all, even to the lowest and meanest of mankind. Otherwise it must fail as the prin- ciple of social redemption. Love breeds love, good will, and because it is socially right it overcomes hate, just as truth, because it is right, overcomes error. It harmonizes, ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION 175 because it adjusts individuals, so far as motives are con- cerned, to the requirements of social life. It is particularly necessary that good will be main- tained toward enemies; otherwise there will be no basis for reconciliation and the restoration of genuine social relations. Plainly the duty of forgiveness is a clear corollary to the doctrine of universal good will. But this does not mean that we are to condone wrong-doing and meanness. Nor does it mean that we are to offer no impediment to the wrong-doer in his wrong-doing. But it does mean that we are to distinguish between the wrong-doer and his evil deed. While society must combat wrong-doing, its duty is always to reclaim the wrong-doer, if that is possible. Whatever it does to the wrong-doer must be dictated by good will, and must be for his social redemption as well as for the benefit of all. If physical force is to be employed, its use must be controlled by good will. The pattern here, as everywhere in the social life, is the family. There we do not reprehend the use of physical force under certain circumstances, provided that its use is controlled by intelligence and love. Its use is indeed necessary at times in the case of abnormal and un- developed individuals, and is in no way inconsistent with the principle of love. So in society at large the use of physical force to stop wrong-doing when necessary is in no way inconsistent with the principle of universal love, provided its use is controlled by intelligent good will. Such, for example, is, or should be, the use of its police powers by an enlightened government. Indeed, as we shall see, good will, in order to be socially effective, must always be organized both negatively, to repress evil, and positively, to promote the good. Social science does not find, therefore, that there is any 176 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION necessary sentimentality or moral flabbiness connected with the principle of universal love; nor does it find any such taint attached to the concept of redeeming love. Love as a social principle does not mean "coddling" ; nor does readiness to forgive encourage evil, as is sometimes claimed. Rather it is the only method of reclaiming and restoring the socially erring. This world is filled not only with undeveloped individuals and peoples who need help, but also with individuals and groups who have erred and socially lost their way. Indeed, since sin is a social mat- ter the outcome of social as well as individual conditions practically the whole world presents this condition at the present time. A religion which is going to be any good in such a world must stress a sacrificial, redeeming love toward all men as the supreme need a love which will lead men to sacrifice themselves without stint or limit in order to serve mankind; to die, if necessary, in order that the world may be freed from sin and error. Sacrifice as an end in itself cannot be justified by either sound religion or sound science; but sacrifice as a means of human service is an altogether different matter. Social religion regards sacrifice when prompted by love and made for the sake of human service the supreme measure of the ethical and religious spirit; and social science sees in such enthusiasm of humanity the height of social passion and, when guided and controlled by adequate intelligence, the best promise of the world's ultimate redemption. But the sacrificial love which social religion inculcates has a more common, everyday significance, science dis- covers, apart from great socially redemptive movements. For men live together, social science reveals, not merely by the exchange of services, but also by the exchange of sacrifices that is, by rendering services to one another ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 177 for which no like service is, or can he, rendered in return. The very conditions of human life necessitate this. Every generation of men, for example, must stand, so to speak, upon the shoulders of the preceding generations. Un- counted toil and suffering of hundreds of generations have made possible whatever we enjoy to-day ; but we too must toil and suffer if the world to-morrow is to live a nobler life. But our imperfect social development necessitates even more that we live by the exchange of sacrifices. The wealth of the world, for example, is very inadequate to meet even reasonable human needs, and if the economic income of even the richest nations were equally divided, it would still be inadequate to maintain a proper standard of living for each family. But it is socially unwise and impossible to divide a society's economic income equally. Hence many must sacrifice and suffer that the life of the group may continue and social evolution go on. While we rightly strive to lessen this sacrifice, yet no one can escape the conclusion that human progress in the past has rested, and at present rests, largely upon vicarious suffer- ing suffering for the sake of producing a better human world. "If we succeed without suffering, it is because some one has suffered before us; if we suffer without suc- cess, it is because some one will succeed after us." Thus the active good will which a social religion must seek to develop in men is one which will ever be ready to sacrifice self for the sake of service; for we can have an ideal so- ciety only when every person volunteers to sacrifice him- self for the good of the whole. Says Professor Small: "When men fully understand the world, they will understand that Jesus was right about sacrifice. They will understand that sacrifice is loss only so long as it is exceptional and forced. When we face 178 THE RECONSTKUCTIOjtf OF EELIGION sacrifice loyally, when we join in a general economy of sacrifice, when we refuse knowingly to gain except by in- tending a gain for somebody else,, the balance of the total transactions with sacrifice will have passed from the debit to the credit side of the world's account. This is a vicari- ous world but not as stupidly conceived by the mediaeval theologians who located the one vicarious act of impor- tance in the death on the cross. Life is vicarious in that its processes begin and continue and end with exchanges of sacrifices, wherever there are moral beings/' Here becomes evident the inadequacy of the ideal of justice, as ordinarily conceived that is, "fair dealing" as the basic principle of social life. To be sure, we are so far from having achieved justice that to many it seems an adequate social ideal. ISTor is it to be criticized as in- consistent with the principle of love. On the contrary, justice could not long exist in human relations without good will, and active good will is the surest guarantee of justice among men. Justice as a social principle is to be criticized as inadequate only in the sense that it is socially insufficient in such a world as ours. Active good will must go further than mere justice in its work of saving men and redeeming the world. Men need mercy as well as justice. Deep compassion for men, intense social feel- ing, cannot be satisfied with the virtue of the market place, "fair dealing/ 7 but only with the unstinted service which we find in the family when the motive is love. And such service alone, as we have seen, is adequate to build a right social life. It is no mistake, therefore, when the New Testament has little to say about justice and much to say about love, for justice as a social principle is in- cluded in and subordinate to the principle of love. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 179 Even more does the inadequacy of self-interest as a social principle become evident. Upon this pagan prin- ciple, as we have seen, our forefathers sought to build their political and economic life; and as a result our political and economic structures are tumbling about us. The question is not one of the legitimacy of self-interest; the question is one of the adequacy of self-interest. No one would deny that self-interest is legitimate up to a certain point; but to allow self-interest to dominate means to weaken and negative the social spirit, social unity, social co-operation. If it be true that hitherto "the chief mo- tive power in the development of civilization has been intelligent selfishness," then that is one reason why our civilization is giving us so much trouble. For self-interest as a dominant motive is bound to result in social failure. Even in the economic sphere it is bound ultimately to fail. "When it dominates, the worker will cease to work, will "curtail production," as soon as his selfish interest is satisfied; the employer will "retire" when his "pile" is made, unless he has in the meantime acquired an over- mastering greed. Our world cannot hope to go forward to a social life that is harmonious and worth while on such a basis. It is noteworthy indeed that even in the barbarous business of war, while group selfishness is usually ap- pealed to, the appeal is rarely to the self-interest of the individual soldier, but rather to the spirit of unselfish, patriotic service. Now, peace has tasks which require equal discipline and devotion to unselfish ends for their successful completion. It is idle to think that the vic- tories of peace can be won without the domination of the spirit of service and self-sacrifice. This is the whole secret of "morale," whether for peace-time or for war- 180 THE KECONSTEUCTION OF KELIGION time. Social science finds self-interest totally inadequate as a social principle for the construction of a high and stable civilization. It agrees, then, with social religion in condemning self-interest as a dominant motive and assigns it only a subordinate position in a properly de- veloped social life. The unselfish service in the building of a better human world, which social religion would make the immediate end of endeavor for both individuals and groups, how- ever, leaves plenty of room for all legitimate self-interest. No man can serve humanity unless he develops the best that is in himself. No man can give unless he has some- thing to give. The highest possible self-development for the sake of service is plainly a corollary of the ideal of service. But it is self-development for the sake of service, and not self -development as an end in itself. Indeed, the latter ideal has no meaning, if we accept the truth taught by social science that men necessarily live a collective life and achieve lasting good only through the development of this collective life. Self-interest subordinated to com- munity interest and ultimately to the interest of humanity, self-development for the sake of aiding the development of humanity, is the plain teaching of both social science and social religion. Nor does social science find this ideal inculcated by social religion at all impracticable? Nature has furnished man with both egoistic and altruistic impulses. While the egoistic impulses of the "natural" man are no doubt the stronger, yet which impulses will predominate in the character of the mature adult is altogether a matter of education. It depends upon which are cultivated from childhood up. It depends, then, upon the "morale" of the group in which the individual grows to maturity. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGIOIST 181 Hence, again, the need of a social religion wliick will teach individuals to cultivate a spirit of unselfish service altruism rather than egoism. It must be mainly through an essentially religious attitude that any high social morale is attained. For reasons which we have already fully explained, social religion is the great aid to a high social morale. But when a high morale is attained, when the social spirit is fully developed, there is no limit to the unselfish service of individuals which a group may command. If humanitarian religion, then, is given proper recognition as a means of social control, there is no need of individual and group selfishness running riot in our human world. In drawing this discussion of the essential principles of a completely social or humanitarian religion to a close, it is scarcely necessary to point out that the principles which we have found to be essential are those of the re- ligion of Jesus. Service of all men, even of the least, in material needs as well as in spiritual, in little things as well as in great, springing from love, or a social, brotherly spirit, 1 carried, if need be, to the point of complete self- sacrifice such was plainly his teaching. 2 Coupled with this teaching was a profound conviction of the alienation of men from God, of their sinfulness and need of social and spiritual redemption. It is no mystery, as we have pointed out, why Jesus so taught. The mystery, if any, is why the world has not accepted his teaching. For his a The Greek agape, usually translated in the New Testament by the word "love," meant ethical love, or love enjoined as a duty, or active good will. See Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament. 3 Professor Harry F. Ward (The New Social Order, p. 334) sum- marizes the fundamental social principles of Christianity as three: "the value of personality, the necessity of brotherhood, the law of service." 182 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION social principles are so plainly the only ones by which men can satisfactorily live together that they might just as well forget the law of gravitation as forget these prin- ciples. When one forgets the principles of gravitation, one must expect some hard bumps. So when our human world forgets these principles of right living together, it must expect some hard lessons such as it has been re- ceiving. There is, however, of course this significant difference between the working of the principle of gravitation and these social principles that the ignoring of the first prin- ciple entails immediate punishment experienced by the immediate individuals concerned, while the ignoring of the latter entails a more or less remote punishment which may be experienced by quite other individuals than those immediately concerned. This, in part, explains the psy- chological difficulties of men in learning and understand- ing social principles. But to the eye of science as well as to the eye of religion the remoteness of the results makes no difference. To both, the social world, like the physical world, is a realm of law. Men reap what they sow in a social way, though the men that reap may not be the same as those who sowed. Nor did Jesus make the mistake of teaching his social principles as abstractions. If he had done so, we could understand more easily the slowness of men in learning them. For men apprehend more quickly the concrete and give their loyalty more readily to persons than to abstract principles. A social religion which awakens the en- thusiasm of men must present a vision of an ideal society and center about loyalty to a personal leader. Jesus was careful to demand this personal loyalty from his followers and to present to them a concrete ideal, the Kingdom of ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL KELIGION 183 God a social order in which God's will should be done which was to be the first thing to be sought by his disci- ples and the chief object of their desire. It has often been said that "personality" is the highest term of religion, and that Christianity is "a religion of personality." This is surely correct only in a limited sense. We find Jesus saying little concerning individual personality, but much concerning his ideal society. While he regarded each human soul as of infinite worth, yet it was of worth because it was part of an ideal society, a part of a spiritual kingdom, which was to come fully only when the world was redeemed and God's will was done upon the earth. An ideal human world was to him the goal of religion. 1 It would be quite as correct, then, to say that the highest term of religion is "humanity," and that Chris- tianity is "a religion of humanity." Only if such is the fact can Christianity be in accord with social science. For social science discovers that it is the Great Com- munity of humanity to which men have to adjust them- selves, and by which all their values must finally be tested. A social religion accordingly must make humanity its highest category on the human side and the supreme ob- ject of loyalty. And this is loyalty to no abstraction. It is loyalty to the living human world, as the object of redemption. It is loyalty to all in religion, science, art, industry, government, or education which works toward that redemption. It is loyalty to the best that men have realized or aspired to anywhere. It is loyalty to that ideal human world which is to be. This is surely not far from the thought of Jesus. When he asks loyalty to himself and to God it is surely for the sake of the redemption of mankind. When he demands 1 See Chapter III and the various references there cited, also the foot-note on the next page. 184 THE KECOSTSTKUCTKW OF KELIGION that loving service be rendered to the least of men as unto God, it is surely for the sake of the redemption of all men. When he commands his followers to seek first the estab- lishment of the Kingdom of God, this is clearly his thought. For this phrase, at one time perverted by theo- logians to a supermundane or even ecclesiastical mean- ing, has been shown by modern scholarship on the whole to have reference to a social order upon this earth * an order, however, not of mere brotherhood for brothers may be co-conspirators in crime but one in which God is acknowledged as father and his will is realized through the loving obedience of men to all his laws, especially to the laws of mutual love, mutual service, and mutual self- sacrifice for the sake of human service. This is the 1 No social order that is merely external, of course, is meant, but one which is an expression of an inner life in harmony with God's will. A purely subjective individualistic interpretation of this phrase, however, is scarcely warranted by its historical setting (its back- ground being the expected Messianic kingdom of Judaism). More difficult to deal with is the extreme apocalyptic interpretation of this phrase (by Schweitzer and others). Regarding this interpretation, Professor Fitch justly says (in Christian Century, March 17, 1921) : "All these considerations regarding the way of the appearance and actual organization of the kingdom are relatively beside the point. Whatever may have been the historical truth or falsity of Jesus' notion of the nature, the time, the method of the coming of the kingdom, the deeper question is what was his notion of man which underlay it? ... As one reads the synoptists, there cannot be much doubt that Jesus, in his few months of public utterance, proclaimed some kind of a social gospel. It is true that he was primarily con- cerned with individuals rather than organizations, but equally true that he selected and trained these individuals as a sort of charter members for a society soon to be. It is true that it was thus the spiritual redemption of men and women, not the improvement of existing institutions, for which he labored. But that was because he regarded those present institutions as essentially hopeless and about to perish, not because he did not have the vision of a better and perfected state. As a matter of fact, he did live for a new and purged society. So while by the very nature of his genius he was not so much a reformer as a revealer, not an agitator with a plan, but an idealist with a vision, nevertheless it was a social vision and a group salvation which he foresaw." For a bibliography on this controversy, see Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION 185 Utopia of Jesus his vision of a perfect human society, on which he bade his followers fix their gaze, and to the realization of which they should consecrate their lives. And to be vital social religion must have such a concrete social ideal. But this social ideal of Jesus is not a cut and dried formula for a fixed social order for a static human world. It is rather a mere outline, based upon funda- mental social principles, to be filled in by the intelligence according to the human needs brought about by special situations. And in this it accords with the requirements of social science. It makes the work of social science, in order to fill in details and to determine methods and standards in special instances, not an adventitious and external aid to social religion, but rather an indispensable, vital part. To ascertain by careful investigation the needs of men in their economic, political, and intimate social life thus becomes a necessity of religion. For such in- vestigation must furnish to social religion guidance in all the special problems of human life and alone can render religious values concrete and vital. Obviously, a social religion must concern itself with ends rather than means, and the evaluation of the latter must be left to science. Obviously, too, a social end or ideal should be elastic enough to leave room for definite knowledge to fill in the details. It should be a vision of vitalizing principles rather than of a definite organization; and such was Jesus' vision of the kingdom of God. Just what social science indicates of the specific organi- zation needed in our day in the family, in industry, and in political life to realize the Christian ideal, we shall consider in the immediately following chapters; but one 186 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION constant implication of our argument remains to be ren- dered explicit. And that is, that the perfect human society which social religion aims to create must necessarily be a world-wide society. The events of our day show clearly enough that no particularistic society, confined to one people, country, or race, can live and perfect its own life by itself on our globe. The very idea is self -contradictory and facts make it impossible. Any ideal social order that is to endure must be developed on a world-wide scale. It follows that a social religion must be a missionary re- ligion, carrying enlightened social values, social patterns, civilization as fully as it has developed, to all peoples. It was no accident, therefore, that Jesus, if his religion was truly social and humanitarian, as we have argued, commanded his followers to go and make disciples of all nations. 1 Neither is it an accident that historical Chris- tianity at its best has always been a missionary religion. Whatever may have been the mistakes of Christian mis- sions in the past, as long as the condition of the world remains as it is with races and peoples alienated and misunderstanding each other a positive social religion must continue to exalt missionary effort; for its ultimate objective must be a redeemed world, and this cannot be obtained without the teaching of social and religious truth to all peoples and the illustration of that truth by personal service and sacrifice. Social religion with its passion for the redemption of mankind would suffuse the whole re- ligious life accordingly with a missionary spirit ; and this, too, would be the spirit of Jesus. Social religion would, in a word, make it the conscious end of all men's lives to have a share with God in the 1 While many critics regard this command in the first gospel with its variant in the second as interpolations, yet they must have been a part of the early Christian tradition and would seem to go back to some probable sayings of Jesus. ESSENTIALS OF A SOCIAL RELIGION 187 building of a world. Not personal pleasure or power, not mere self-development or self-culture, but the creation of an ideal buman world would thus become, if it were accepted, the controlling aim of all men's endeavor. 1 i Compare the statement of Professor Hocking (Human Nature and Its Remaking, p. 425) : "The destiny of the human will is to co- operate, in some degree of present awareness with the central power of the world ; and so far to perceive in present experience the quality of 'union with God.' In their complete meaning our human actions . . . are creative in an actual, but unfinished world." CHAPTEE VII RELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE A RELIGION adapted to the needs of modern life must have a positive and unequivocal doctrine concerning the family. If the first business of religion is the production of men, then its first concrete social task must be the con- struction of a family life which is capable of producing fully socialized individuals. Just as the primitive Chris- tian church found in its attempt to reconstruct its world that its first task was to create a stable, moral family life, so social religion to-day in reconstructing our world must begin with this primary group. As the reasons for this are not always appreciated by the social and religious thinkers of our time, let us see briefly what they are. Professor Charles Horton Cooley's doctrine of the func- tion of primary groups in human society * is almost as important in modern social science as Darwin's doctrine of evolution by natural selection in modern biology. Pro- fessor Cooley shows beyond a doubt that what he calls "primary groups" are the primary builders of human social life. By primary groups he says he means the simple face-to-face groups which are characterized by in- timate, personal relations, such as especially the family and neighborhood. These groups are primary, he shows, not simply because they are primitive and universal forms of human association, but because they are the primary 1 Social Organization, Chapters III-V. 188 RELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 189 builders and bearers of the social values of men every- where and in all ages. They are this, first of all, because they are the primary socializing agencies. They first stimulate and call forth the expressions of the social in- stincts; they first build up habits of co-operation; they first give rise to social consciousness. It is in the family in particular that the individual first learns what social life means, gets his earliest development of social im- pulses and habits, and first learns to say "we." More- over, in all stages of social evolution since human life began, these primary groups have been the bearers of all social traditions. In them the child learns the first lan- guage and with his language he gets his whole social in- heritance in a spiritual way. He receives especially from his family his ideas, beliefs, and standards concerning in- dustry, government, law, art, morals and religion. In brief, he receives from the family life practically every- thing which makes him a man as distinct from a brute; for human culture, or civilization, as we have already seen is a complex built up of acquired habits and these habits are intermediated and controlled by a mass of ideas, beliefs, and standards, which make up social tradition. Inasmuch as the primary groups are the chief carriers of this social tradition, they are also the chief carriers of culture or civilization. They are usually carriers, more- over, of the appropriate customs which express the various traditions, and hence they impart the social tradition to the child, not in an abstract, intellectual istic way, but as part of a living, organic whole, oftentimes with social compulsion as well as with social illustration. The consequence is that the child gets his main social education his fundamental social attitudes and values in the primary groups. Primary groups must accord- ingly be regarded as the most important educative agencies 190 THE RECOKSTKUCTION OF EELIGIOtf of human society, so far as the social character of indi- viduals is concerned. This they must doubtless continue to be, for they must always furnish the immediate social environment of individuals, and it is this environment which is more largely responsible for the social character of individuals than all other factors combined. This is especially true of the family; for it furnishes the im- mediate environment of the child during its most tender and plastic years. It is, moreover, the natural environ- ment to which the race has become adjusted through thou- sands of generations and to which all the child's instincts and capacities are adapted and most readily respond. In a word, science finds that the family is the normal en- vironment of the child and that there is no adequate sub- stitute for a good home. If the first concern of religion is the production of men, then social religion would be supremely interested in the family, even if there were no deeper reason than its moulding of character in the young. But there is a deeper reason; and that is that the family life is the original fount in society of altruism, of love, which becomes the main content, as we have seen, of ethical religion. It is in the family that the child develops his altruistic in- stincts, learns what love means, and, if the family is normal, acquires habits of service and self-sacrifice. Family affection, in other words, is the natural root of altruism in society at large. The amount of altruism in society, therefore, has a close relation to the quality of its family life. 1 But upon altruism depends largely both social order and social progress. We cannot maximize 1 For elaboration, consult the author's text, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, 1919 Edition, Chapters 1V-VI1I, and the references there cited. KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 191 co-operation among men unless we can increase their good will as well as their intelligence. Hence religion's in- terest in the family must be proportionate to its interest in altruism or good will. Family affection is the indis- pensable root of social religion as well as of altruism. The close connection between the family life and re- ligion among practically all peoples is, therefore, not an accident. Both are concerned with the socialization of the individual, that is, with overcoming his natural egoism. While the family as a purely natural group does this in a very limited way, and while social religion attempts to do it in a universal way, this should not obscure the fact that the very values with which social religion works have their origin in the natural affections developed by the family. If these values will not work in the family life, they surely will not work in society at large. It is useless to teach universal love and good will and the maximization of co-operation if these cannot be realized in the face-to-face group which gave them birth. The interest of social religion in the family is not an interest in some remote source of its ideals, but rather in it as a living generator of altruism even though still for the most part to be perfected. However, that the family was the original source of the chief social values which religion exalts is a fact of the greatest social and religious significance. Social religion obtained its very concepts, its "patterns," from the family life. It is the great merit of Professor Cooley's doctrine of primary groups that it has revealed clearly to us the original sources of our social ideals. Professor Cooley has shown that the pattern ideas for all essential human relationships come from the experiences and satisfactions of primary groups. It is especially the family which by its very structure and relationships has furnished the 192 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION main moral patterns for society at large. 1 Such ideals as love, service, self-sacrifice for the sake of service, brother- hood, motherhood, fatherhood, obviously have been derived from experiences in the family. Civilization has taken these patterns and attempted to make them work also in the larger groups of men. From one point of view all human history has been a struggle to transfer the altruism and solidarity of the family when at its best to suc- cessively larger and larger groups of men. The ideal of social unity, as Professor Cooley remarks, has been the mother of all social ideals; and social unity was first realized in the family. In brief, the family life has always been social life at its maximum. In it human association has been, and always will be, at its maximum intensity. In it are gen- erated both the forces which make for good and those which make for evil in our social life. Controlling as it does both the birth and rearing of children, it necessarily has the chief part in socializing the child and in giving him his social traditions, standards and ideals. In fact, the family not only reproduces the race, but it reproduces human society and human culture. Within it are con- tinually renewed not only life itself, but the very ideals and values by which men live a human life. It is the perpetual fountain of youth for the idealism of the race. Idealistic social religion especially gets from the family the ideals, the very goals, which it sets before men to realize in their relations at large. That there is an up- ward urge in the family life when normal is evidenced, therefore, by the fart, that it has furnished the main pat- terns for civilization and for religion. Thus the family has been truly the cradle of civilization. 1 See p. 207. KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 193 It has furnished the very ideals which men have striven to realize in their wider social life. Religion has found in it the values which it seeks to universalize. This is true, especially, in the case of hoth Judaism and Chris- tianity. /Judaism, as we have seen, got its lofty moral tone froril the projection, idealization, and spiritualizatioii of the values found in the ancient Jewish family. The concepts and phraseology of Judaism can, indeed, bo understood only through understanding the ancient Jew- ish family. Christianity only carried the process a step further, universalizing such concepts as fatherhood and brotherhood, and such ideals as love, service, and sacrifice. Historically and psychologically the intimate relations between the family and ethical religion are, therefore, necessary and inevitable. Destroy one and sooner or later you will have destroyed the other. It follows that a normal family life for all men must be a prime object of a scientific social religion. Yet what is the condition of our family life? Nowhere have the pagan and destructive forces of our civilization had a more disastrous effect. 1 Marriage and the family have tended more and more in certain classes to become mere matters of individual convenience. Taught by the modern romantic novel, the modern sex drama, and the modern newspaper, young people have come more and more to regard family life as something for personal gratification and for personal pleasure. Self-gratification rather than social conservation has been made the end of the family life. Nothing could illustrate the essential paganism of our civilization more clearly than the widespread preva- lence of this attitude toward the family. Our "mores" with reference to marriage and the family are individual- 1 See also the statements in Chapters I and IV. 194 THE BECONSTEITOTION OF KELIGION istic, they are not socialized. They are not even demo- cratic; they are rather anarchistic. The attempt to build our family life upon a basis of self-interest and personal happiness that is to say, upon selfishness has, of course, been a failure. In the coun- tries where divorce is free, as in the United States, the number of divorces grows by leaps and bounds, until un- stable families threaten at no distant date to predominate. In 1916 there were 112,036 divorces granted in the United States, but the homes whose bonds were practically dissolved and whose life disintegrated by our pagan mores in the family must have been nearly as many more. In some cities and states there is already one divorce to every two marriages. In 1916, it is reliably estimated, there were more than 150,000 children involved in these di- vorces; and as every child needs a good home and two parents, the social welfare of many children must have suffered. Yet some wonder at the increase of juvenile delinquency and adolescent crime among us! Not convinced by facts like these that personal hap- piness is an inadequate basis for the family, we have those in plenty who would definitely abandon the standard of permanency in family relationships and permit divorce to become a private act brought about at any time by mutual consent. Thus the ideal of permanent monogamy itself appears endangered by our individualism. Scientific social religion must meet an issue like this. It cannot dodge it. While the family is not an end in itself, any more than any other social group, yet it is, as we have seen, indispensable to humanity. If social re- ligion is to teach the service of mankind, and the full consecration of individual life to that service, then it must condemn unequivocally selfish standards of happiness in RELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 195 the family. It must ask that the larger life of humanity be not impeded in its flow through this institution, and that the family life be such as to contribute to that larger life. It must, in a word, demand that the family life become fully socialized. To this end it must seek (1) the subordination of material conditions to the social and spiritual values of the family; (2) the subjection of the animal nature of man to the service of mankind through family relations; (3) the basing of the family life itself upon some specific form of unselfish service which is peculiarly its own. (1) The present instability and demoralization of OUTJ family life is undoubtedly rooted in the relation of that life to material conditions. We have allowed material conditions to dominate the family. Business and indus- try, formerly developed as adjuncts to the family, have now become more important in the eyes of many than the family life itself. Not only do private employers and industrial corporations put interests of their business ahead of the domestic interests of their employees, but even families themselves in many cases regard their busi- ness life as much more important than their home life. Business and industry, in other words, have come to be dominating interests which do not recognize their reason- able and socially necessary subordination to the family for the sake of the higher interests of society. The re- quirements of the family for the good birth and proper rearing of children are sacrificed for the sake of business or industry. Thoughtless employers with self-interest standards in their business rarely inquire into the home life of their employees. Indeed, the wages which they pay to their male workers are often quite insufficient for the worker to maintain a home and rear a family, and even in some cases tend to become merely the wages of 196 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION single men. The heartlessness of modern business, and particularly of some industrial corporations, in employing men, women, and children under such conditions and for such hours and wages as tend to destroy their home life is one of the blackest stains upon modern civilization. Social religion must recognize this, and must insist that industrial and business considerations shall be subordi- nated to the considerations of the welfare of parents and children in the family group. The labor of immature children outside of the family, whether upon the street, in factories, in shops, or in stores, under such conditions as impede their physical, mental, and moral development, must especially be fought by social religion as an unmiti- gated evil. The drafting of children of school age into industry is perhaps as clear an example as we have of the materialism and paganism of our civilization. Yet mil- lions of children in Christian nations who should be in school are thus drafted and made parts of the industrial machine. The labor of women also outside of the home if not carefully safeguarded may easily become subversive of the higher values of the family. If they are permitted to labor under such conditions that normal home life be- comes practically impossible, then again the family is sac- rificed to material considerations. Their hours of labor, their conditions of labor, and the kind of labor which they are permitted to do should all be regulated by the consideration of the requirements for a normal home life. Even in the case of young unmarried women, this should be so; for while they may have no specific home duties, yet their life should not be such as to unfit them for the home and the family. In all cases it must be insisted that the duties of the home are paramount to those of business. Adequate KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 197 wages, reasonable hours, wholesome conditions of work in industry are not so much the demands of the self-; interest of the workers, as of the socialized conscience of all men who see human values in their right rela- tions; for, in a word, they mean that our business and industrial life should be organized about our family life rather than our family life about our business and in- dustry. Social religion should create a public conscience in every community that will demand that not only industry but all other material conditions should be such as to favor the upbuilding of family life. Scarcely less important than the relations of the family to industry are, for example, housing conditions and sanitary conditions. Our cities too frequently have not been built for homes, but for financial returns. In their poorer quarters families have been crowded together under such conditions that their children have had practically no chance, condemned, in effect, by their environment to lives of misery, vice, or crime. Social religion will seek to correct all this, not by rescuing a few individuals, but by preventing such conditions by providing model dwellings, building "garden cities," and so far as practicable making possible the ownership of individual homes by families of all classes. These material things and all others which social science finds to be necessary or desirable for normal family life, must become the vital concern of a social religion which seeks to create men through the instrumentality of the family. (2) Equally important is the subjection of the animal nature of man to the requirements of a normal family life for the sake of the higher interests of society. Men and women who suffer from the encroachments of business and 198 THE KECO^STKUCTION OF KELIGION industry upon their family life usually readily admit tha the family should be put ahead of such material inter- ests. But these same men and women sometimes fail to see that their own animal impulses should also be subordi- nated to the requirements of the family. Sex and sex life are made so much of in our literature and on our stage that the gratification of sex impulses looms in many minds, if not as the chief value, at least as the most imperious need of life. Yet to all who have not been swept off their feet by pagan individualism, and its resulting animalism, this appears as one of the most stupid blunders which sociological ignorance permits to exist. While the family is founded on the biological fact of sex, its main function is not the gratification of sex impulses. That is a short- sighted illusion indulged in only by those who are desti- tute of social understanding. Social science finds that the chief function of the family, as we have already said, is to reproduce both human life and human society with all its values. Sex is the indispensable means for the performance of this function; but as soon as we make it the end, we revert to a life which is lower even than that of the brutes. Unscientific ethical religion has long seen this, and for ages has attempted the control of sex impulses. But too often it has adopted a merely negative and repressive policy toward the sex element. 1 A scientific social re- ligion, while aiming not less at control of this element, will adopt a positive and constructive attitude toward it. This is the more easy, because science finds this element to be the very organic foundation, not simply of the 1 Christianity has often been accused of taking this attitude, and it certainly has often been the attitude of certain branches of the Christian church. Even Carpenter, however, who repeats the charge, is forced to admit (Pagan and Christian Creeds, p. 180) that there is nothing to ghow that Jesus himself adopted any such attitude. KELIGION AKD FAMILY LIFE 199 family, but of social life itself, and hence of all the higher spiritual life of man. It has been a favorite theory of certain writers in the psychology of religion that most of the phenomena of religion spring from sex and sex im- pulses. Science finds at least this much truth in such theories, namely, that sexual reproduction is undoubtedly the chief organic basis of the social process and its re- sulting co-operation and altruism. However, it is not mere sex, but rather parental care, 1 which is the founda- tion of intimate social life and of altruism. From this root, too, springs, as we have already seen, the social phases of religion. Nature has used sex, in a word, as a chief means for the higher evolution of life. Surely human intelligence also can make sex to serve the higher interests of the race. Science shows clearly enough how this can be done. It is by controlling sex impulses in the interest of a sane and wholesome family life. As long as repressive con- trol was regarded as an end in itself, it was impossible for religion to take a constructive attitude toward sex. But as soon as such control is seen to be for the sake of the family and for the service of humanity through the family, then controlled sex impulses are welcomed as a basis of family affection, and the social religious ideal becomes, not celibacy, but a pure and lasting family life. Chastity for both the married and the unmarried takes on a new meaning a social meaning and it is seen to be preeminently the virtue by which men and women can live together on a human plane, and it is honored as such. As a necessary social virtue it is held to apply to both men and women equally. The whole social life is purified 1 See Sociology and Modern Social Problems, 1919 Edition, p. 95; also Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 37. See p. 204 of this chapter. 200 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION and ennobled, because sex is subordinated to the family, and not family life to sex. In a word, sex is made to serve the higher values of the social life instead of being merely repressed. Thus social religion as well as social science will find in sex a potential basis for the highest social values. Such control of sex impulses in the interest of the family will mean their control in the interest of the child and the race. Modern biology has shown the extreme im- portance of heredity to man ; and obviously the control of heredity must come through the control of sex relations. The modern science of eugenics; is as far from endorsing promiscuity in sex relations^as ethical religion itself. Lax standards of sex morality would make impossible the realization of eugenic ideals. Eugenics demands that we control marriage in the interests of the race, but this in turn implies the control of all sex relations. If eugenics is ever to become practical, it can be only through the development of much higher standards of sex morality than we have yet attained. Eor it implies the triple control of sex m the interest of the family, the child, and the race, though upon rational analysis these are seen all to mean the same thing. It implies that marriages shall be based upon the good health, good character, and the intelligence of the two stocks concerned. It implies that families that have these socially valuable qualities as hereditary endowments and have in addition a normal en- vironment should feel a social obligation to produce more than their proportion of children. It implies negatively that those who are not normal in their hereditary endow- ments should refrain from marriage, and that those who for any reason do not marry should lead lives of conti- nence. Finally, eugenics implies that all who are so ab- KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 201 normal that they cannot be controlled by the moral stand- ards of society should be segregated in institutions and supported at public expense. It is a counsel of perfection which modern science has given us in the doctrines of eugenics; but like all such counsels it is socially valuable and is obviously closely allied with idealistic social religion. If eugenics were ever made the basis of a code of minute legislative pre- scriptions regarding marriage and reproduction, doubt- less it would become an intolerable tyranny. But as the basis for social ideals regarding marriage and the birth of children, it is invaluable. Social religion, not less than eugenics, is interested in securing wise marriages and in making sure that every child is well-born. Social religion, too, should emphasize the social service which parents render to society in the birth and rearing of normal chil- dren. It, too, should set up the ideal that the physically strong, the intelligent, and the economically fortunate families should have more than their proportionate share of children, because the children born in such families will obviously have the best chance to grow up into useful members of society. Thus a truly social religion will encourage marriage and parenthood among the socially normal. It will insist that no service to society which men ordinarily render is greater than the birth and rear- ing of normal children in a normal home, and that this is the production of men in the primary sense. It will make the birth of children in the family welcome in pro- portion as there is health and strength and economic means to give them a fair start in life, and it will con- demn the selfish individualism which shirks the obliga- tions of parenthood. Finally, it will seek to create in the young a eugenic conscience which will safeguard marriage and the birth of children. Only thus can the ideals of 202 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EELIGIOIST eugenics stand any chance of realization, as Sir Francis Galton, the founder of the movement, himself recognized. Here again we see the essential identity of interest of ap- plied social science and social religion. But a eugenic conscience and eugenic ideals are not enough in themselves to assure that sex impulses will he- come socialized and used always and only for the good of mankind. In this age of medicinal prophylactics and widespread knowledge of means of preventing conception insidious temptations present themselves to many, and the broader view is necessary. To the ignorant vice and immorality appear to have been rendered "safe." Unless the whole level of sex life is lifted to a rational social plane and sex is made to contribute to the higher social values to the nobler affections, sentiments, and emotions there still is danger of sex impulses brutalizing char- acter and conduct. To avoid this danger social religion must unite with social science in demanding scientific ethical instruction for the young in all matters pertaining to sex. Such in- struction, if vitally related to social obligations in the family and in the community, would save the young from many pitfalls. Ignorance in this matter, as in other social matters, is probably one of the chief sources of present social evils, and in no case is it a protection to society. But such instruction, to be socially effective, must be rightly given with the proper ethical background. Sociol- ogy rather than physiology is the basis of the higher sex moralities. It is absurd to think that sex morality can be inculcated upon the basis of selfishness, since no social order, as we have seen, can long endure upon such a basis. The control of sex impulses must rather be sought through the development of social conscience and an altruistic social spirit in the young. Hence idealistic social religion KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 203 should be joined with science in all sex education. It alone can give an enduring motive for the self-control which will result in the highest social control. If religion sought the aid of social science, and if science sought the aid of social religion, this age-long problem would no longer prove impossible of solution. The purity of life already attained by the more highly socialized elements of society would be found to be possible for all normal men and women. The venereal diseases which so disgrace our civilization would be more easily stamped out than the measles; for chastity in both men and women and a resulting pure family life would be found to be their effectual preventives. An enlightened social world two centuries hence may wonder, indeed, why we had not already accomplished this; and the only answer is that both our science and our religion are still too imperfectly developed on the social side. (3) But most of all, must social religion demand a complete change in our "mores" with reference to mar- riage and the family. Instead of regarding these as mat- ters of individual convenience, social religion must teach that they are social responsibilities and also opportunities for human service. The whole family life must be put upon an ethical instead of a selfish basis. Marriage itself should come to symbolize, both in the minds of the con- tracting parties and of the community, full consecration of life to the service of the race. Its basis should be not mere fancy or passion, nor even romantic affection, but an unselfish love which leads to a full and free consecra- tion of life to the promotion not only of the welfare and happiness of the parties themselves, but also of society. The bonds of such a marriage must be not fear or coercive authority, but love and respect and the sense of social 204 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KELIGION obligation. If the ideal of the service of humanity is to dominate marriage and the family, however, society in general must value the service of humanity through mar- riage and the family, and must make it possible for each normal individual to have such a family life. But such a high social valuation of marriage and the family cannot be attained and kept unless there is some specific service which the family renders to society that is of the utmost social value. What is that service ? Is it to the community? Indirectly, yes; but it cannot be to the physical, economic, and moral welfare of the com- munity at large, because other institutions could perform such service better than the family. Is it simply to min- ister to the comfort, happiness, and welfare of the mar- ried pair? This would be, however, such a narrow and selfish service that it would warrant no higher social valuation of the family than is already customary. In- deed, our low valuation of marriage and the family is precisely due to the fact that so many people consider these to be institutions whose chief end is to serve private individual comfort, happiness, and welfare. But social science reveals that the chief end of mar- riage and the family is the child. The chief service which the family is called upon to render to society, accordingly, is the service of the child. The child, in a word, is the center of gravity in normal family life the child that is born or that may be born. It is the child and its needs which lifts marriage and the family from the basis of selfishness and makes it possible to put them both upon the basis of the widest possible service to humanity. For the child stands for society and the race. The service of the child is preeminently the service of the race. If humanity is to continue to live and to work out a better KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 205 future, the welfare of every child is of the highest im- portance. In the great structure of civilization the one concrete problem "which looms everywhere as of supreme impor- tance is the problem of child welfare; for there is oppor- tunity to improve human life only as new lives enter to make a fresh start. Child welfare is the central problem of civilization and social science shows that it is impos- sible of solution without a normal family life. It is this which gives the family, as we have already seen, its com- manding importance in human society. The child's heredity, its physical care, its early mental education, and its moral character are all largely determined by its family life. The attempt to work out the problems of child welfare without reference to the family, social sci- ence finds, is as absurd as the attempt to make perpetual motion without a perpetual source of energy. The first condition of child welfare is a normal home life, for the reasons which we pointed out at the beginning of the chapter and because all other child-care agencies which may be devised by philanthropy are inadequate substitutes for a normal home. If humanity is to progress, there- fore, the whole of human society has to be so organized as to maximize the number of normal homes in which children can be properly cared for and given a fair start in life. Social religion, accordingly, would put the little child in the midst. It would make our social values concerning marriage and the family center about the child. All the questions which men raise regarding the family would then find answer. It would be evident, for example, that only a stable home, one which is characterized by endur- ing, unselfish love and loyalty can best serve the interests 206 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION of the child. It would be evident that the atmosphere of the home should be one of altruism, illustrating in the mutual devotion of its members that spirit of unselfish service which is the most effective means of educating the child socially and religiously. It would be evident that the family should be dissolved only when the interests of the child demand such a dissolution. Upon such a basis there could be little talk of divorce being in accord- ance with ethical ideals. It would be recognized as like surgery in medicine an attempt to deal with a desperate situation which cannot be dealt with in any other way than by a last-resort remedy. But with a truly social religion men and women would no longer think of entering upon marriage with the idea of possible divorce; they would look upon marriage as a religious, because a necessary social, bond. Nor would they ask for the right of divorce by mutual consent. They would recognize that the rights of society and of the child are in all cases paramount. Nor would couples to whom no children happened to be born ask for any different treatment than those with children. They would recog- nize that social standards have to apply to all alike and cannot be based upon those exceptional cases in which there are no children in the family either by birth or by adoption. In short, a social religion in harmony with scientific social knowledge would reinstate the ideal of the family as a lasting union, a community, whose bonds should be broken only by death. It would do so not only because the responsibilities assumed in family relations normally end only with death, but also because sound social science finds the social value of all institutions not in their immediate effect upon per- sonal comfort and happiness, but rather in their educative influence upon personality. And it is evident that if we KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 207 want a social personality characterized by tolerance and good will that will minimize conflict and maximize co- operation in all the relations of life we must have a stable family life as our standard. Only with such a family life can there be the highest possibilities of de- veloping altruism in the character of the individual. Only such a family life can help to build a better human world which will be increasingly based upon love. While the great concrete end of the family is the service of the child, the satisfaction of its physical wants and the development of its social character, yet this implies that the larger social purpose of the family is the creation of an ideal social world. It is because it is the primary agency for the accomplishment of this purpose that social religion must have such a supreme interest in the family. With- out the family the flame of spirituality could not be kept burning in our world ; and in proportion as the family is permeated by unselfish love, and so is made pure and stable, the flame of spirituality will mount higher. 1 It is scarcely necessary to add that in stating the doc- trines regarding the family which social science requires of a social religion, we have outlined what is essentially the Christian ideal. The religion of Jesus is character- ized by the central place which it gives to the child and to the family. It is, indeed, as we have seen essentially an idealization and projection of the social values experi- enced in the family, such as love, service, sacrifice, brother- hood. These values could scarcely serve as patterns for the relations of men at large if the family failed to illus- trate them. Love as a social principle finds the initial 1 See Professor Felix Adler's Marriage and Divorce, especially Chapter I. It is noteworthy that this clear presentation of the Christian ideal of marriage and the family is made by one outside of the Christian church. 208 THE EECONSTEUCTION OF KELIGIOST test of its practicability in the family group, and this Jesus seems to recognize when he demands that husbands shall not put away their wives, or wives their husbands, and marry again. The relations of husband and wife, he seems to teach, are not different in principle from the re- ! lations between parents and children. They are provided for in the nature of things and involve responsibilities which when once assumed cannot normally be laid aside. It is Jesus' teaching concerning the child, however, which helps us to understand clearly his teaching con- cerning the family. He makes the child the center of gravity in his system of concrete values not less clearly than does modern social science. So great is the value of the child, he tells his disciples, that an offense to a child is among the worst of sins, while the slightest service, even the giving of a cup of cold water, is a re- ligious act of the highest significance. He tells his disci- ples further that whoever receives a little child in his name receives him, and that to children belongs the king- dom of God. It is no wonder with such teachings that the early church took up child care as one of its primary social functions. Clearly also these teachings of Jesus concerning the social and spiritual importance of the child must be correlated with his teachings concerning marriage and divorce. These latter have often been interpreted as resting upon ethical rigorism, but when they are corre- lated with his teachings regarding human relations in general and regarding the child in particular, they are seen rather to be an expression of his religious humani- tarianism. However, it is not our purpose here, or anywhere, to attempt a critical interpretation of Jesus' teaching, but rather merely to point out that a humanitarian religion based upon the principles of social science is func KELIGION AND FAMILY LIFE 209 mentally in harmony with the Christianity of the Gos- pels. The family is society in miniature. If men can- not be socialized in those primary relations of life which it represents, it is idle to think that they can be in the wider, more complex relations of larger groups. The ideals of love, loyalty, service, sacrifice, forgiveness, and conciliation must be found adequate controls over the be- havior of men in the family if they are to be found prac- ticable in the larger relations of life. The indispensable preliminary to a Christian society is a Christian family life. CHAPTER VIII RELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE A RELIGION adapted to the needs of human life must have a scientifically sound and unequivocal doctrine con- cerning the material conditions of life especially con- cerning those conditions under which men live and work, that we term "economic." Social religion must fearlessly oppose anything immoral or unjust in the economic system in which men must work and live, because such evil will make impossible the realization of a satisfactory moral character in individuals and of a satisfactory order in society. Injustice in these fundamental conditions of life is bound to have effects in the religious and moral life. While there is no scientific warrant for a doctrine of com- plete economic determinism, yet all progress in the social sciences has served to reveal more and more clearly the importance of the economic element both in individual and in social life. The social environment as a whole, both material and spiritual, science shows, plays the prepon- derant part in the determination of the moral character of the mass of individuals. Now, economic conditions are the chief material elements in the social environment. It is idle, therefore, to think that religious ideals can be realized if economic conditions hostile to those ideals are permitted to exist. 1 1 It surely needs no argument to show, e. g., that food is so funda- mental in human life and the conditions under which it can be secured are so precarious and complicated that religion must play a leading part in controlling these conditions if it is going to redeem the lives of men. See above p. 164. 210 KELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 211 Now if the aim of social religion is the production of men, of the values connected with human personality, then one of its first tasks must be to help devise a system of business and industry, of work and material reward, which will be in harmony with that aim. Eeligion dare not be merely a system of abstract ideals and values out of relation with real life. That, as we have seen, is one of the causes of its social failure. It must be a set of prac- tical attitudes toward practical problems. It is idle to talk of the kingdom of God, of an ideal social order in which the divine will is realized, as long as an essentially pagan economic system persists. The economic life must become suffused with the highest spiritual values ; it must be dominated by humanitarian ethics, if ever such an order is to be realized. Such an economic life is not im- possible. Yet it can become general only if the economic system be such as to make possible a normal life for all, only if it emphasizes the values in men rather than the values in things, respects personality, and serves the phys- ical and moral welfare of all. Such a system must mani- festly be not only in accord with the principles of liberty and justice, but such as to maximize co-operation and to minimize hostility and conflict among all men. It is clearly the duty of religious people to make the realiza- tion of such an economic order a prime object of the practical religious life. 1 1 Steps have been taken in this direction by leading denominations by the adoption of "The Social Creed of the Churches" and similar declarations (see appendix). Concerning these, Professor Ward (The New Social Order, p. 350) well remarks: "The meaning of these programs has not yet been perceived by millions of persons belonging to the organizations which have written them." This is seen in such incidents as that at Pittsburgh, Pa., in 1920, when the Y. W. C. A. was refused support by business men's organizations because it had adopted "The Social Creed of the Churches." In general, religion haa been too "other-worldly" to concern itself until very recently with economic conditions. See Chapter III of this book. 212 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EELIGIOIST Yet no phase of life has come less definitely under the influence of ethical religion than the economic. It is in the economic sphere that we expect selfishness to be most in evidence; and it was the observation of the economic life of the nineteenth century which built up the phi- losophy which proclaimed that self-interest rules all men in all things, and even that action upon any other basis than self-interest is inconceivable. It is in the economic! sphere, in a word, that the baldest selfishness, greed, and inconsiderateness of others is to be found. We have al- ready seen how even at the present time, in a part of our business and financial world, predatory pagan standards prevail almost as they did before the Christian movement began. 1 Rich and poor, employer and employee, alike too often hold that they are entitled to all they can get and can keep, regardless of the service rendered. Instead of seeking only just compensation for service rendered, both working man and business man too often seek to get as much as they can and to give as little in return as pos- sible. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the passion to get "something for nothing" dominates modern eco- nomic life, in the sense that it gives color and tone to its most characteristic features. In a word, we have an economic system, as one abl< economist has pointed out, which emphasizes rights, privi- leges, and rewards, instead of functions, obligations, and service. 2 The result is that instead of a fair exchange of 1 See Chapter IV. * Tawney, The Acquisitive Society, Chapter II. Similarly, Professor Small has pointed out that in the economic process as described by the classical economists and they were describing actual facts wealth was the end and inrn irrrr the means. While economic theory has become more humanistic, economic practice too often has remained as the classical economists descril>ed it, which is proof, not that they were right in their theories, but that we are still wrong in our practices. RELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 213 goods and services being sought by all, the greatest pos- sible private gain is usually sought; and this works out in practice, not in that equal exchange of services which we have described as the very essence of happy and har- monious social living, but in a tendency to exploitation. Naturally it is the weak who get exploited under such circumstances. The employer who makes private profit his standard considers it merely "good business" to hire labor in as cheap a market as can be found, and to pay the laborer only what is barely necessary. Regarding labor as a "commodity," he naturally treats the laborer as a "hand," and regards him simply as a means to the pro- duction of so much wealth. Similarly the merchant or corporation that makes private profit the standard con- Aiders it fair to get out of the consumer as much as pos- sible. The consequence is that society is divided not simply into normal economic classes, but into abnormal classes, exploiters and exploited, who regard each other with sus- picion and hostility. Our civilization, as a further con- sequence, is forever on the verge of class war, and even at best is so divided into distrustful and egoistic groups that no high efficiency is possible. Even at the present moment when our world so sorely needs to be united in the tasks of restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, instead of being united in the work of life, over one-half of our potential energy is dissipated through misunder- standing, mistrust, and conflict. Like slavery, the system is equally bad for the privi- leged and the non-privileged. The economically fortunate often live luxuriously, and without serious labor of their own, upon the proceeds of the labor of others. Hence, they too frequently develop selfish, arrogant, unsympa- thetic social attitudes, and devote themselves to lives of 214 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGION sensuality and self-indulgence. The man who labors, on the other hand, is too often degraded, not only because through exploitation, he remains poor and ignorant, but because he is in a class which is looked down upon and which has but little chance to rise. He either loses ambi- tion to rise, or, accepting the materialistic standards of the rich, develops an envious, sullen, shirking attitude and renders the least service he can if indeed he does not become a violent enemy of the existing order. It is thus that modern society has become a divided household. Eminent economists and statisticians have often set forth the main economic facts of the situation. They have pointed out that even in the United States "two per cent of the population possesses the lion's share," that is, almost sixty per cent of the wealth, while "the poorest two-thirds of the people own but a petty five or six per cent of the wealth," 1 and nearly one-half of all families have no taxable property. Of the poorer half of the popu- lation, a large fraction (in the United States, at least ten per cent of the total population even in prosperous times) have not sufficient income to provide themselves with the necessities of life, and live constantly, as we say, below the poverty line. 2 This is not surprising when we learn that "it is certain that at least one-third and pos- sibly one-half of the families of wage earners employed in manufacturing and mining earn in the course of the year less than enough to support them in anything like a comfortable and decent condition." 3 Similarly we find 1 King: The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States, pp. 80-82. This book is invaluable for the study of the problem of the le distribution of wealth. 1 Parmelee, Pov( * Keport Commi 64th Cong., p. 22. 3 Parmelee, Poverty and Social Progress, p. 105. * Keport Commission on Industrial Relations, Senate Doc. No. 415, EELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 215 that in 1915 careful study showed that more than one- half of the families of the United States received less than $800 as an annual income, although that amount was esti- mated by experts ahout the same time to be the minimum amount necessary to support an average family. While wages rose greatly during the war, especially in the skilled occupations, the cost of living rose so much that in 1919 experts estimated that the minimum amount necessary to support a family of five was, in many places in the United States, above $2,000 a year. The rewards of capital meanwhile had so increased that by 1917, the banner year for profits, capital received in profits, in addition to in- terest, more than twenty-five per cent of the entire amount added to the value of the products of industry by labor, though in ordinary times profits usually amount to less than half that per cent. 1 The net result of the war seems indeed to have been to turn more wealth into the hands of the fortunate few, while the economic position of the masses, in the United States as well as in Europe, has probably been rendered more precarious. Accompanying this poverty and low wages there have been often too long hours of work, the labor of children and married women outside the home, and much unem- ployment. It has been shown that the wage earners in the principal industries in the United States lose on the average from one-fifth to one-fourth of their working time during a normal year. If this is so, high wages by the day or the week may not look so high when the loss of time through unemployment is taken into account. In periods of industrial depression unemployment frequently rises to staggering proportions. During the summer of 1921 the number of the unemployed in the United States 1 Friday, Profits, Waget, and Price*, pp. 124-130. 216 THE KECONSTKUCTIOST OF KELIGIOtf was variously estimated to be from four million to six million. Much of this unemployment is simply due to industrial maladjustments in the relations of employer and employee. Indeed, a majority of the waste connected with our industrial system seems to be a direct result of the basis of selfishness upon which business is carried on. Strikes and lockouts, low wages and long hours, exploita- tion and sabotage, friction and bickering of every sort, are certain evidences at least that the spirit of co-opera- tion does not rule in our economic life. And it is from these things that the greatest losses in time, in energy, in wages, and in productiveness in industry spring. Indeed, it is not so much the poverty and inequalities produced by our present economic system which lead to its condemnation by the most thoughtful as the ineffi- ciency and conflict which result from it. Says a leading economist, 1 "There is one, and only one, test by which to measure the soundness of any movement in social life, in industry, or in politics. Does it make for peace or for violence ? Does it extend the field of voluntary agree- ment among free citizens, or does it extend the field of authority? Does it enlarge the opportunities of those who inspire fear, or does it enlarge the opportunities of those who prosper through good will?" Judged by this test, which we accept, our present economic system must surely be found wanting, for it breeds misunderstand- ings, hatreds, and violence. Moreover, fear more often than love is the motive to which it appeals, and too often it forgets to safeguard the liberty of the individual. In its ignoring of personality and of human brotherhood, in its too frequent denial of liberty and justice and social responsibility, in its emphasis upon self-interest, and in its scouting of love and of service for the common welfare 1 Professor T. N. Carver, of Harvard University. KELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 217 as possible and practicable economic motives, it is essen- tially a pagan system and must be fearlessly opposed as such by all who wish a Christian world, that is to say a world of peace, good will and universal co-operation. No revolution in social and industrial organization will remedy the evils of such an economic system ; for its evils are not external, but in its spirit and inner nature. Mod- ern capitalism has often been accused of being pagan in its ethics, and the most searching, most impartial, most scientific investigation has practically substantiated this charge. 1 Indeed we could not well expect it to be other- wise in our semi-pagan civilization. The problem is not one merely of a change in an external order. A change which is nothing less than climatic, as we have already said, is needed in our whole social and economic life if the primacy of human values in industry is to be effectively recognized. The whole spirit of our business and finan- cial world must be changed our economic "mores" as a whole must be transformed. Doubtless this means cor- responding changes in our methods of business and in our industrial organization; but the change in the spirit and purpose of our economic life must come first, or else mere external changes may prove but a new means of exploita- tion. On the other hand, old forms of business and in- dustry may make impossible the success of a new, more Christian, more humane spirit in our economic life. Evi- dently here, as everywhere in social life, changes in inner spirit and aim must be accompanied by changes in ex- ternal methods and order if any lasting betterment is to 1 See Tawney (op. cit.). For a brief, dispassionate statement, see Professor J. H. Tuft's article on "Ethics of Capitalism" in Dictionary of Religion and Ethics (published by The Macmillan Company, 1921). 218 THE KECOSTSTKUCTIOX OF RELIGION be effected. What then are the changes necessary? And how may they be brought about ? It is certain that while social science may indicate the means and even outline the concrete details of a new order, social religion enthusiasm for humanity must furnish the driving motive if ever such order is to be realized. The task is of such magnitude that it requires the combined resources of science and religion. Humani- tarian enthusiasm and the ethical ideals which it inspires may guide up to a certain point; but adequate scientific knowledge can alone furnish the means of solving the real difficulties of the problem. Here we must agree with those religious conservatives who hold that religion has no right to meddle with social problems without adequate knowledge based upon scientific investigation of facts. We must agree because manifold experience in the past has shown that mere good intentions will not do. But on the other hand, social religion cannot stand aside when the welfare of human beings is at stake. Evidently there is only one way out of the dilemma, and that is for social religion to ally itself with science. Religious people can get the facts if they wish them, and any worthwhile social religion will insist that it is a supreme duty to secure the facts concerning every social situation which affects the welfare of human beings and to give them full pub- licity. The absolute dependence of social religion upon social science for concrete guidance here emerges. Re- ligion must take sides on questions which affect human welfare; but, when the question is a controverted one, it can do so intelligently only after the full facts are before it. Before social religion can guide aright, for example, in the great industrial and economic problems of the present, it must square itself with the facts of eco- nomic science, and build its program for the redemption KELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 219 of our economic life in accordance with scientific princi- ples. The social ideal which religion sets up must be within the limits of the economically possible. What then are the limitations 1 which social and eco- nomic science impose upon the religious ideal ? To dis- cuss this matter fully would be to review all the princi- ples of modern sociology and economics. It will suffice for our purposes to point out four limitations which science imposes upon ethical and religious ideals in their relations to the economic life. In the ftrst^ place anything / like pure communism is impossible in civilized society. Even so-called primitive communism restricted the prog- ress of the peoples who practised it and was largely re- sponsible for such peoples remaining in an undeveloped condition. In the complex conditions of modern society communism is much more impossible. Every experiment in a communistic organization of society for the last two thousand years has failed and the recent experiment in Eussia can have no other outcome. The most elementary understanding of the principles of sociology and eco- nomics points to this conclusion. Individual functions and functioning, individual rights and responsibilities, divi- sion of labor, control over production and consumption, economic rewards and penalties, all presuppose private property in a complex society. Property and personality, in other words, are closely linked in their development, and so also property and civilization. Private ownership 1 Broadly viewed, economic truths, of course, are not "limitations" upon social religion, but are rather aids in defining a practicable social ethics upon a basis of facts. They are, therefore, opportunities, if rightly utilized, for religion to be of the largest service to men. Strictly speaking, then, science does not place limitations upon religion (unless calling it from the world of dreams to the world of realities be a limitation), but comes to its aid by giving a basis of scientific facts and laws for a social ethics. 220 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF KELIGIOtf in some sense has been, and is, as necessary for human society of any developed type as the private family. So- cieties in order to have any high degree of efficiency must harness about equally the egoistic and altruistic impulses of human nature. It has often been said that private property develops only the egoistic impulses; but it is evident that if rightly used it may develop equally the altruistic impulses. Idealistic morality, indeed, pre- supposes private property. Any one who has read the Ten Commandments carefully knows that private prop- erty is written in between their lines. 1 In brief the in- stitution of private property has been one of the founda- tions of all culture and of all progress, and the tradition of private property, purified of pagan abuses, must be preserved as one of the cornerstones of our civilization. While communism is impossible on any large scale in our society, still this does not mean that something of the spirit of communism may not be necessary for the highest development of civilization. In the primitive com- munism of the Eskimo, anthropologists tell us, a whole village of Eskimo may perish from starvation but a single Eskimo never, because as long as any food remains it will be divided, when necessity demands, equally among all the members of the group. Surely something of this spirit must pervade every human group that is rightly organized and has the right standards of living. The private property which the Eskimo have (and they have considerable) does not prevent this in their case, nor should it prevent it in ours. Again, while communism as a form of economic organization is impossible, this does not mean that public ownership is thereby con- 1 Compare the similar statement by Professor Small in Between Era* from Capitalism to Democracy, p. 366. The book is a strong indictment of modern capitalism with a plea for the subordination of property rights to human values. KELIGION AND ECONOMIC LIFE 221 demned. Public and private ownership have existed side by side through all the centuries of human history, their proportions varying according to the circumstances and needs of the social life, and they will doubtless continue so to exist. 1 There may be a large place for public owner- ship even if communism is impossible. These questions will be taken up again later. Another limitation which modern social and economic scienc dian^c of emphasis 'which we need. How many of us who left tho theological M-hool a quarter of a century ago had any hard training in the social sciences?" He concludes that theological faculties need experts on social reconstruction. OPPOKTUlsriTY OF THE CHUKCH 299 says Professor Coe, "must be a critic of social organiza- tion and process, and particularly of the human product. ... To what extent does this social order aim to produce and succeed in producing the best sort of men and women ?" * The Christian movement will develop its full power only when it allies itself with social science and u-lien it seeks and diffuses the fullest scientific knowledge of social conditions. It is regrettable, therefore, that the church as a whole has as yet so little faith in the social sciences; for scientific social knowledge could help it, more than wealth or temporal power, to make this world Christian. The church needs conversion to modern science almost as much as the "world needs conversion to Chris- tianity. To be sure, there is much so-called science to-day, even among social scientists, which lacks common sense, is materialistic, and even anti-Christian; but so far as this is not merely incidental to the undeveloped condition of the social sciences, it is largely due to the lack of interest of the churches in these sciences. The temperance move- ment, we have seen, will win out through its alliance with science. So it will be with practically every phase of the Christian movement if it seeks alliance and guidance from science. If the church is to create public opinion upon social problems its first duty is to be intelligent ; and it cannot be intelligent without adequate scientific knowl- edge of the facts and principles of human living together. The church has vital need of the social sciences. It needs more knowledge of the facts and forces which make or mar the lives of men; and there can be no doubt that these facts and forces are mainly social. On the other hand, the social sciences, though they exist to make a better human world, lag behind in their development because the 1 Journal of Religion, January, 1921, p. 27. 300 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION church demands so little from them and gives them so little support. The social sciences need the help of the church; and the church needs the help of the social sciences. There should be an alliance, therefore, between these two. A practical step in this direction would be the establishment of chairs of sociology, politics, and eco- nomics in all schools of religion and in all Christian col- leges. Then the church might become socially intelligent and marshal its hosts effectively; for the redemption of the world. What methods, then, may the church legitimately em- ploy to form and guide public opinion? This question we have already answered by implication, but a few con- crete measures may be specified. First of all, there is oral discussion. Church members should realize that one of the first duties of the Christian life is to create public opinion and public conscience on social matters. This they can do by discussing these matters with friends and neighbors in the light of Christian principles. Habits and opportunities favoring oral discussion are falling into disuse, however, in modern society. The church might overcome this tendency to a certain extent by organizing "discussion groups" and "open forums" for the discussion of social matters. Sermonizing by ministers on social questions, no matter how excellent, is by itself inadequate, if there is not discussion of these sermons by the church members; for effective public opinion is always the co-operative product of the interaction of many individual minds. A second agency, which the church should employ to form and guide public opinion is the press, which in our civilization has become the chief factor in the making of OPPORTUNITY OF THE CHURCH 301 public opinion. Here indirect action will probably be most effective. If those church members connected with the press as managers or editors did their full duty in creating Christian public opinion, our civilization would soon become Christian. They are not wholly to blame, however, for failing to carry Christianity into their busi- ness; for the church thus far has failed to insist that a supreme duty of its lay members is to create public con- science regarding social matters. The church should in- sist, therefore, that editors and managers of the press have in their business the greatest opportunity for Chris- tian service and therefore the utmost responsibility. Direct methods of working through the press to reach public opinion should, of course, also be employed by the church. The most powerful agency is undoubtedly the daily and weekly secular newspapers; but the religious periodical might be made scarcely second in importance. Telling articles along every line of the work of the church and of social conditions might bring Christian responsi- bility home to church members in ways which would be effective for the creation of Christian public opinion and public conscience. The church, too, should not neglect to advertise prop- erly its activities and movements. Psychologically, the whole matter of controlling and guiding public opinion may be said to be a matter of effective advertising. The most righteous program of the ages cannot succeed, we should remember, unless in some way it can be made to secure the serious and thoughtful attention of the mass of men. Sensational methods, of course, discredit them- selves and bring reproach upon the Christian cause; but the church has been too timid in employing proper methods to champion the Christian program and to bring it to the attention of the public. 302 THE KECONSTKUCTION OF EELIGIOX We come again to the teaching work of the church as the thing which is fundamental both in the creation of individual Christian character and in the creation of Christian public opinion. The education of the young, as we have seen, must be peculiarly the method of the church. In the long run, the education of the young is also the most effective method of controlling public opinion. The overwhelming American opinion against the liquor traffic was undoubtedly largely the result of introducing temperance instruction into the public schools. The church should use its influence to get adequate in- struction on all social matters introduced into our public schools. It should insist that public education is for the sake of creating good citizens. If it cannot yet succeed in getting instruction in the public schools on social mat- ters directly connected with the consideration of Chris- tian principles, it can at least do so in its own schools and study classes. In the church's Sunday school espe- cially there should be instruction given regarding social matters in direct and vital connection with Christian principles; but the average Sunday school will have to be remodelled before this can be done effectively. Says one of the leaders of religious education in the United States : * "We find that the prevailing method of religious educa- tion in America cannot claim the name of system. It has no intelligent curriculum. It uses much unsuitable mate- rial, while it neglects a mine of wealth. It neglects the present condition of the world, the religious movements of our day, and the duties of the hour. It neglects the revelation of God in the Universe as disclosed by modern science. It neglects what social science has discovered in the ways of doing good to men. It imparts no sane method of ascertaining truth and deciding duty. The Dr. W. G v . Ballantine. OPPORTUNITY OF THE CHUECH 303 only method it uses is a capricious exegesis of ancient texts." While many of the best Sunday schools in our cities have gotten to a much higher plane, it is still true that the average Sunday school too often teaches the Bihle or Christian principles abstractly with little or nothing said about the concrete social situations in our civilization. This is probably the reason why the religion of so many church members fails to function when they come into practical contact with the labor problem, the negro prob- lem, the divorce problem or some other concrete social situation. Something more than the Bible and Christian principles should be taught in our Sunday schools; and that is knowledge of actual social conditions in compari- son with Christian ideals. There is no good reason why good books on social and economic problems, written with a Christian background, should not be used in our Sun- day schools along with the Bible. 1 A text book in sociology, with a Christian viewpoint, is no more out of place in a Sunday school room than a book in Christian theology. The advanced classes should, indeed, be study- ing such books in connection with a study of the Gospels. The vital study of Christian ideals in relation to real life could do more to Christianize public opinion than probably any other means. If the Sunday school was thus vitalized through study of the concrete problems of Christian liv- ing, there would probably be no lack of interest in it on the part of either children or adults. 1 Says Professor Coe (A Social Theory of Religious Education, p. 315) : "The spirit of Jesus is so forward looking, so creative, go inexhaustible, that the Bible cannot possibly be a sufficient text-book of Christian Living. To tie religious education down to it, a3 dogmatism desires to do, would make us like those who are ever learning, but never able to come to the truth ever learning to love, but ever permitting the social order to defeat love." 304 THE KECONSTKUCTIOJST OF KELIGION To sum up ; if the church is to create a Christian world, it must control in larger measure public opinion "which is the ruling force of our time and the real sovereign of democracy. But to do this, the whole method and ma- chinery of the Christian church must be modernized. The church must make a larger use of scientific sociological and psychological knowledge of every sort. The church must be profoundly interested in promoting and diffusing social knowledge. The world is perishing for lack of knowledge of the way in which human beings should live together. The church holds one key to this knowledge, the social ideals of Jesus, and the social sciences the other. In the formation of an effective public opinion to create a Christian world, the church must use not only the key of Christian ideals, but also the key of scientific social knowledge. Thus the church might permeate institutions as well as individuals with the Christian spirit and create a Christian social environment, in which, as we have said, the Christian life would seem as "natural" as the life of greed and selfishness now seems. Thus the Christian spirit might permeate and gradually transform, in the ways we have already indicated, the family life, the po- litical life, the life of pleasure, and even the economic life. The radical program of social Christianity now stands revealed. That it is more Utopian and revolu- tionary than the program of some revolutionists cannot be denied; for it seeks to base human society upon love and reason and would fearlessly follow these in building a new social order. That it is a program which will be unacceptable to those who wish to live a self-seeking life, to those who are unwilling to surrender self in service, also cannot be denied. How then is it practicable ? What motives are powerful enough to put such a program into OPPORTUNITY OF THE CHURCH 305 practice ? The new social Christianity, it is said, will not work, because it lacks strong motives. The old theological Christianity appealed to men's fear and self-interest the strongest, it is claimed, of human motives. If the new social Christianity is the religion of Jesus, then it is a religion which will not work. The reply is, that self-seeking impulses are not the strongest human motives, even though they are most in evidence in our present social system. Self has never been able to inspire the devotion which unselfish ends have called forth. All the higher religions, and not simply Christianity, attest that devotion to an ideal is potentially the strongest of human motives. In social Christianity this devotion naturally divides itself into devotion to its leader and devotion to the cause. "The heart of all re- ligion," says a Japanese Buddhist, "is the faith that binds the soul to its Lord." So in Christianity, belief in, love of, and loyalty to Jesus is the primary motive in the re- ligious life. That has been the foundation of all of its forms, and so must remain as long as the name itself endures. The church must continue to emphasize this motive. Personal leadership and personal loyalty are at the heart of every great movement in human society. But beyond this personal loyalty to Jesus, social Christianity sees the loyalty to the cause which he represents. The supreme motive in Jesus himself was the love of hu- manity it was redeeming love and this must also be the supreme motive of every genuine follower of his. This love of humanity must be the moving impulse of any religion which seeks the redemption of the world. It is clearly the impulse of Jesus himself. The church must throw its supreme emphasis, then, upon the love of, and the loyalty to, the Great Community humanity. This 306 THE KECONSTKUCTIOtf OF KELIGIOJST means loyalty to all truth, to all right, to all betterment, and so to God himself. This is the motive to which the church must make appeal in its work of creating a public conscience which shall make possible a Christian world. It is no impracticable motive. It is the motive which has inspired the greatest and best of our race, from Jesus down to the present ; it is the motive of every great move- ment to which we can give our whole-hearted assent. It is this motive, which is growing ever larger and more powerful with the passing years, upon which social re- ligion would build its idealistic faith. The Christian church undertakes no impossible task. It summons men to devotion to no impracticable ideal. A Christian world is not only practicable; in the long run it will be found that no other sort is practicable. APPENDIX "THE SOCIAL CEEED OF THE CHURCHES" THE following statement was adopted by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America in 1908, and has since been adopted by the leading Protestant denomi- nations, the Y. M. C. A., and the Y. W. C. A. This creed reads as follows: (1) Equal rights and justice for all men and in all stations of life. (2) Protection of the family by the single standard of purity, uniform divorce laws, proper regula- tion of marriage, proper housing. (3) The fullest possible development of every child, especially by the provision of education and recreation. (4) Abolition of child labor. (5) Such regulation of the conditions of toil for women as shall safeguard the physical and moral health of the community. (6) Abatement and prevention of poverty. (7) Protection of the individual and society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor traffic. (8) Conservation of health. (9) Protection of the worker from dangerous ma- chinery, occupational diseases and mortality. (10) The right of all men to the opportunity for self- maintenance, for safeguarding this right against encroachments of every kind, for the protection 307 308 APPENDIX of workers from the hardships of enforced un- employment. (11) The right of employees and employers alike to organize, and for adequate means of conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes. (12) Suitable provision for the old age of the workers, and for those incapacitated by injury. (13) Release from employment one day in seven. (14) Gradual and reasonable reduction of hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest human life. (15) A living wage as the minimum in every industry, and for the highest wage that each industry can afford. (16) A new emphasis upon the application of Christian principles to the acquisition and use of property, and for the most equitable division of the product of industry that can ultimately be devised. At the meeting of the Federal Council in 1919 the fol- lowing four amendments were added to the above "creed." Facing the social issues involved in reconstruction: RESOLVED: That we affirm as Christian Churches, (1) That the teachings of Jesus are those of es- sential democracy and express themselves through brotherhood and the co-operation of all groups, ^v. We deplore class struggle, and declare against all class dominion, whether of capital or labor. Sym- pathizing with labor's desire for a better day and an equitable share in the profits and management of industry, we stand for orderly and progressive social reconstruction instead of revolution by violence. ^ APPENDIX 309 (2) That an ordered and constructive democracy in industry is as necessary as political democracy, and that collective bargaining and the sharing of shop control and management are inevitable steps in its attainment. (3) That the first charge upon industry should be that of a wage sufficient to support an American standard of living. To that end we advocate the guarantee of a minimum wage, the control of un- employment through government labor exchanges, public works, land settlement, social insurance and experimentation in profit sharing and co- operative ownership. (4) We recognize that women played no small part in the winning of the war. We believe that they should have full political and economic equality with equal pay for equal work, and a maximum eight-hour day. We declare for the abolition of night work by women, and the abolition of child labor; and for the provision of adequate safe- guards to insure the moral as well as the physical health of the mothers and children of the race. At the meeting of the Federal Council in Chicago, De- cember 16, 1921, the following declaration of Interna- tional Ideals was adopted : (1) We believe that nations no less than individuals are subject to God's immutable moral laws. (2) We believe that nations achieve true welfare, greatness, and honor only through just dealing and unselfish service. (3) We believe that nations that regard themselves as Christian have special international obligations. (4) We believe that the spirit of Christian brother- 310 APPENDIX liness can remove every unjust barrier of trade, color, creed, and race. (5) We believe that Christian patriotism demands the practice of good will between nations. (6) We believe that international policies should se- cure equal justice for all races. (7) We believe that all nations should associate them- selves permanently for world peace and good will. (8) We believe in international law, and in the uni- versal use of international courts of justice and boards of arbitration. (9) We believe in a sweeping reduction of armaments by all nations. (10) We believe in a warless world, and dedicate our- selves to its achievement. Essentially similar statements have been promulgated by the Administrative Committee of the National Catholic War Council in America and by the Central Conference of American Rabbis. A critical summary of the various social programs of different religious bodies will be found in Ward, The New Social Order, Chapter XL INDEX Abnormal classes, help of, 167; marriage of, 200, 201. Abstraction, power of, 40, 50. Acquired character, 63, 189, 190, 192, 266. Adams, Henry, cited, 73, 111. Adaptation, 8, 9, 37, 38, 41, 133, 155; religion as an organ of, 37, 38, 41, 55, 133, 155. Addams, Jane, cited, 267, 268, 270. Adler, Felix, cited, 207. Advertising, church, 301. Agnosticism, 1, 22, 25, 31, 40, 124, 125, 127. Altruism, 9, 67, 106, 168-178, 181, 190, 191, 199, 207. Ames, E. S., cited, 42, 57, 58, 60, 160. American Indians, 49, 50. American religion, 13, 25, 115, 121-124, 287. American social conditions, 21, 22, 94, 102, 106, 112, 115, 194, 214, 215, 287. Amusements, social, 102, 264- 279. Ancestor worship, 24, 48, 52. Animatism, 49, note. Animism, 24, 45, 46, 48-51. Anthropology, x, xii, 34, 49, 61, 70, 71, 76, 140, 145, 220, 259. Anthropomorphism, 52, 140. Applied social science, ix, xi, 161. Archaeology, 71, 80. Aristotle, cited, 97, 164. Art, 52, 98, 109, 117, 276, 277. Asceticism, 165, 198, 208, 270, 271, 278, 279; definition of, 270. Atheism, 7, 25, 46, 250. 311 Attitudes, social, 40, 46, 161-186, 189, 213, 226; negative, 46, 111, 112, 124; religious, 26, 40, 47, 120, 126, 154, 155, 211. Authority, external, 100, 101, 251. B Bacon, B. W., cited, 88. Bahaism, 68. Ballantine, W. G., cited, 302. Barbarism, definition of, 71, 97; traditions of, in modern society, 72, 73, 86, 97, 110, 293; re- crudescence of, 75, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, 116, 117, 193, 212, 244, 266, 294. Bargy, Henry, cited, 121. Bartlet, J. V., cited, 221. Barton, G. A., cited, 47. Batten, S. Z., cited, 290. Behavior, human, 34, 37, 60, 149, 182, 266, 293, 305. Beliefs, religious, 4, 11, 13, 14, 16, 22, 34-69, 104, 130, 132. Bergson, H., 10. Bible, place of, in Christianity, xii, 152-154; proper use of, 88, 153, 154; criticism of, 101, 154. Biological elements in human life, 111, 163, 198-203, 265. Bismarck, 103. Boas, F., cited, 49. Bowne, Borden P., cited, 133. Branford, Victor, cited, vii. Brightman, E. S., cited, 132. Brown, W. Adams, cited, 113. Buddhism, 1, 46, 68, 146, 150. Bury, J. B., cited, 36. Butler, Samuel, 108. Business, anti-Christian, 21, 102- 107, 114. 312 INDEX Caird, Edward, cited, 47, 125. Capitalism, 105, 217, 227. Carpenter, Edward, cited, 13, 45, 47, 71, 198, 262. Carver, T. N., cited, 162, 216, 236. Case, S. J., cited, 70, 77, 82, 146. Catholic church, 284, 285, 310. Channing, W. E., cited, 122. Character, individual, how formed, 104, 189, 190, 210, 243, 264, 293; importance of, 253, 287, 291. Charity, 28, 167. Chastity, 199, 203. Child, sociological significance of, 204-206; and Christianity, 207, 208. Chinese, 53. Christ, see Jesus. Christian democracy, 263. Christian ideals, see Ideals. Christian movement, the, 70, 77, 82, 83, 299. Christianity, definition, 1, 70; origin of, 70-82; social signifi- cance of, 70-92; social charac- ter of, 76-81, 84, 01, 137, 181- 187; Greek element in, 80; re- lation to Judaism, 69, 77, 80, 87; to Oriental religions, 80; humanitarian nature of, 76-92, 183-187; historical, 39, 85-89, 186; in Western civilization, 83-89, 90, 93, 99, 108, 115, 118; positive, 119-160; essentials of, 78-84, 181-187; and the family, 194, 207-209; and industry, 211-213, 241, 242; and politics, 245, 262, 263 ; and amusements, 267, 278, 279; revolutionary character of, 77, 79, 130, 304. Church, present condition of, ix, 1, 2, 113, 282; opportunity of, 280-306; union of, 283-285; membership, 159, 286; Pagan- ism in, 86, 92, 98, 114, 286; and religion of Jesus, 13, 85-88, 08, 282, 286; social necessity of, 131, 280, 281; and public opinion, 290-304; and religious education, 287-289, 302, 303; social function of, 131, 280- 290. Churches, Federal Council of, in America, 291, 307; social creed of, 211, 291, 307. Civilization, definition, 71, 72; nature of, 34, 61-63, 71-74, 107; relation to religion, 34, 54-64, 75; reversions in, 16, 73, 95, 117; problem of our, 93, 100; present condition, 93-118, 193, 293; reconstruction of, 3, 93, 291; Christian, 93, 117, 118, 290-304. Class strife, 106, 107, 171-173, 257, 258. Classes, social relations of, 106, 171, 222; social necessity of, 221, 222. Codrington, R. H., cited, 49. Coe, G. A., cited, xiii, 10, 114, 152, 155, 161, 287, 298, 303. Coit, S., cited, viii. Communal character of religion, 36, 43, 47, 280. Communism, 219, 220, 225-227. Community life, 129, 161, 167, 169, 171, 182, 189, 274, 305. Comparative religion, 48. Comte, Auguste, cited, 20, 29, 44, 63, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 132, 140, 141, 158, 171. Conflict, necessity of minimizing, 91, 117, 171, 216, 246, 256, 258; between classes, 16, 67, 106, 171, 213, 216, 230, 246, 256-258; between nations, 16, 103, 172, 246, 259-261 ; between races, 16, 67, 172, 259; between Christianity and paganism, 18, 75, 76, 79, 86, 98-101, 117, 118. Conflicting ideals of our civiliza- tion, viii, 11-16, 75, 98-118; 293. Confusion of the present, 11-17, 99, 100. Conklin, E. G., cited, 2, 24, 46, 60, 100, 134, 159. INDEX 313 Consciousness, religious, 48-55, 125, 126, 132, 133, 137. Consciousness of kind, 72, 76, 169. Consecration, in religion, 44, 47, 117, 159, 166, 203, 286. Conservation of social values, 24, 38, 60, 65, 114, 193. Conservative tendencies of re- ligion, 52, 55-65. Consumption of wealth, 239, 240. Control, social, religion as a means of, 12, 42, 47, 50, 52, 55, 56-63, 87, 101, 203, 268, 270, 291; need of more, 29, 43, 64, 291, 292. Conversion, religious, 289. Cooley, C. H., cited, 44, 81, 169, 188, 191, 192, 250, 262, 266, 292. Co-operation, maximization of, 91, 163-169, 171, 173, 231, 232; be- tween classes, 167, 222, 225, 230-235; among churches, 121, 131, 283-285. Creative evolution, 136, 138. Crime, 170, 175, 190. Crises, function of religion in, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 76. Criticism, social function of, 3; destructive, 95, 101, 103, 108, 113, 154. Criticism, higher, 145, 146, 153, 154. Cultural evolution, 16, 61, 70-75; function of religion in, 55-64, 75-77. Culture, definition, 12, 71; rela- tion of religion to, 34, 54-64, 75, 76; see also Reversions in culture. Custom, definition, 61; relation of religion to, 34, 35, 55, 61- 63. Darwin, Charles, 90, 188. Deism, 25. Democracy, origin of, 81, 248; in social life, 247, 252-259; in in- dustry, 232-234, 258; in poli- tics, 249, 251-263; and Chris- tianity, 71, 81, 248, 262, 263; and religion, viii, 2, 248-251, 257, 262. "Democracy of God," 161. Denominations, relations of, 283, 297. Determinism, economic, 210; mechanistic, 111. Dickinson, G. Lowes, cited, vii. Discipline, social, see Morale. Discussion, public, 254, 296-298, 300. Distribution of wealth, 214-216, 222, 223, 227-229, 236, 239. Divorce, 21, 102, 206, 208. Dogma, theological, 39, 121, 126, 142. Doubt, 14, 30, 120. Durkheim, Emile, cited, 27, 34, 37, 51, 52. E Ecclesiasticism, 29, 39, 83, 120. Economic conditions, 11, 86, 104, 210-242; and Christianity, 86, 105, 212, 217, 241, 242. Economic determinism, 210. Economics, 163, 164, 210, 212, 214, 219, 221, 223, 241. Education, social, 202, 253, 254, 265, 269, 274, 302; see also Re- ligious education. Educational conditions, 107, 116, 234, 240, 254, 265, 274, 288. Educational function of the church, 287-289, 302-304. Egoism, 19, 67, 75, 96, 99, 174, 179, 180, 191, 220; see also Group egoism. Egoistic theory of human nature, 96, 105, 179, 212, 268, 305. Elhvood, C. A., cited, xii, 3, 9, 11, 14, 16, 25, 38, 73, 74, 169, 173, 190, 238, 290, 292. Ely, R. T., cited, 162. 221. Emery, H. C., cited, 91. Emotional element in religion, 314 INDEX viii, 7, 8, 40, 42, 75, 136, 152, 168, 170, 296, 305. Emotionalism, 152, 289, 296. Eneloe, H. G., cited, 151, 284. Enthusiasm of humanity, 84, 218, 259. Environment, influence of, 87, 190, 210, 264; social, 87, 190, 210, 293, 304; Christian, 294, 304. Epicureans, 97. Equality, 233, 247, 248, 250; of opportunity, 223, 233-236, 239, 247. Eschatological view of Jesus' teaching, 83, 84, 150, 154. Eskimo, communism of, 220. Ethical Religion, 26, 54, 55, 64, 66, 77, 128. Ethics and religion, 55, 56, 62, 64, 128, 161, 162; see Humani- tarian religion. Eucken, R., cited, 46, 82. Eugenics and religion, 200-203. Europe, religious condition of, 13, 112, 115. Evil, problem of, 68, 134, 135, 143, 156. Evolution, social, 24, 35, 54, 71- 76, 81, 92, 138; cultural, 16, 61, 70-75; religious, 24-27, 47- 54, 69, 75, 81, 83. Exchange of services, 163-167, 176, 213; basis of social life, 38, 163, 176. Experience, as a basis of religion, 3, 8, 30, 58, 119, 120. F Faith, xii, 27, 30, 31, 46, 60, 130, 135, 142, 146, 161, 305. Family, the importance of, as a primary group, 21, 188-193; source of religious ideals, 66, 81, 191, 193; present condition, 21, 105, 108, 193-203; and so- cial religion, 188-209. Fear, 22, 31, 172, 216, 244, 246, 305. Feeling element in religion, see Emotional element. Fellowship, human, 79, 138, 143, 163, 170-177, 230. Figgis, J. N., cited, 18, 19. Fitch, A. P., cited, 1, 8, 87. Follett, Mary P., cited, 248, 291. Food, importance of, 164, 210. Force, limits of use, 153, 172, 173, 174, 175, 243, 259-261. Forgiveness, 174-176, 209. Fraternity, 78, 118, 121, 125, 167, 168-173, 181, 184, 192, 216, 232, 248, 250, 255, 262. Frazer, J. G., cited, 51. Free society, 28, 112, 157, 247- 263. Freedom of though t and speech, 157, 247, 254, 255, 296-298. 300. French Revolution, 102. Friday, David, cited, 215. Function of religion, 34-47; 55- 66; of early religion, 27, 49- 52; in the life of the individ- ual, 27, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44; in social control, 42, 55-65; social progress, 66, 67, 74-76. Future life, see Immortality. Galton, Francis, cited, 202. Gautama Buddha, 1, 146, 150, 172. Geddes, P., cited, vii. German civilization, 21, 84, 104, 109, 112, 116, 245. German higher criticism, 83, 84, 154. German theology, 83, 84. Germany, in the Great War, 21, 24, 103, 112; rehabilitation of, 116, note. Geographic influences, 80, 103. Giddings, F. IT., cited, 169, 292. Glover, T. R., cited, 86, 146. God, definition, 54, 136, 137; Christian conception of, 84, 137, 138-140; subjective con- INDEX 315 ception of, 125, 132, 133; and nature, 133-137; and humanity, 132, 137-140; philosophical necessity of, 26, 135, 136; origin of idea, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57. GoUK'iiweiser, A. A., cited, 51. Good will, social importance of, ix, 29, 60, 62, 170-175, 254, 261 ; between classes, 172, 255, 257; between nations, 172, 246, 248, 261 ; and religion, ix, 29, 60, 62, 83, 168-176, 261; Chris- tianity, a religion of, 78, 83, 92, 118, 159, 168, 181. 'Gospels, Christianity of, xii, 93, 118, 143, 145, 147, 153, 184. Government and religion, 28, 34, 65, 104, 243-263. Great Britain, 103, 116. Greece, ancient, civilization, 96; philosophy, 97, 110; influence on modern world, 98, 100. Greek Catholic Church, 284. Greek ideals of life, 96, 97, 110. Group, importance of, 42, 60, 66, 81, 129, 144, 188, 189, 243, 290; organization, 243, 246, 247, 252. Group egoism, 95, 171, 172, 256- 258. Group morality, 72, 77, 83. Group salvation, 80, 83, 144, 161, 184. Groups, primary, 21, 66, 81, 188- 192, 248. Guyan, J. M., cited, 25. Habit, influence of, 14, 15, 34, 60, 61, 75, 266; and civilization, 34, 61, 64, 189, 267. Hall, G. Stanley, cited, 132, 155. Harrison, Frederic, cited, yii, xviii. Harrison, Jane E., cited, 25, 42, 47. Hart, J. K., cited, 80, 81. Hastings' Encyclopedia of Reli- gion and Ethics, 33, 52, 184. Hatred, 170, 172, 174, 216. Haydon, A. E., cited, 132. Hayes, E. C., cited, 86, 108. Health, 200, 235, 265, 272, 287. Hebrews, see Jews. Hedonistic ethics, 14, 37, 38, 114, 194, 267, 269. Henotheism, 23, 25, 26, 48, 53. Heredity, control of, 200-202. Hero worship, 52. Historical Christianity, 39, 85- 89, 186, 270. Historical influences, 76, 81, 85- 89. History, human, nature of, 16, 73, 95. History of religion, 24, 48-54, 68, 69. Hobhouse, L. T., cited, xii, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 22, 27, 67, 99, 116, 136, 139, 168, 221, 225, 248. Hocking, W. E., cited, 4, 114, 186. Holmes, J. H., cited, 93, 137. Hostility, minimizing, 91, 172, 246, 248, 258. Hubbard, A. J., cited, 35. Hudson, J. W., cited, 14, 102. Humanitarianism, definition, 67, 68; relation to Christianity, 76, 77, 83, 84, 121-124, 160, 208 ; in the nineteenth century, 114, 116. Humanitarian ethics, 43, 67, 77, 80, 81, 99, 100, 116, 160, 176, 180, 211, 251, 272. Humanitarian religion, 43, 67, 68, 69, 77, 80, 87, 89, 120-160, 170, 172, 181, 208, 218, 246, 250, 261, 272, 305; see also Hu- manity, religion of. Humanity, definition, 67; unity of ethical valuations, 43, 44, 180, 183; religion of, 67, 89, 120, 121, 124, 160, 172, 180. Human nature, definition, 206; I S^ j influence of, 15, 100, 253, 2f.- 268; theories of, 96, 105, 169, >> 174, 179, 212, 305. 316 INDEX Idealism, social, 66, 81, 126, 192, 257, 262, 281; relation to re- ligion, 42, 54, 66, 77, 83, 193, 281. Ideals, social function of, 61, 74, 89, 90, 104; conflict of, 11, 14, 75, 85, 98, 99, 100, 101, 117; sources of, 21, 66, 81, 188, 191. Ideals, Christian, 18, 77-84, 99- 103, 108, 115, 117, 118, 125, 128, 130, 153, 155, 185. Ideas, pattern, 61, 66, 74, 98, 173, 191, 248. Idolatry, 53. Ignorance, sociological, 70, 88, 202. Imitation, influence of, 60, 174. Immoralism, 96, 108, 243. Immortality, belief in, 132, 140- 143; origin of idea, 51, 58; necessity of idea, 58, 142; per- sonal, 142, 143. Impulse in religion, 7, 8, 79, note. Impulses, animal, 15, 197, 198, 202, 266, 267, 268, 270, 275. Income, 214, 229, 237; of peo- ple of United States, 214, 222, 223, 240. Individual as a social factor, 17, 43, 82, 100, 129, 145; value of, 77, 82, 129, 145, 166, 167, 180, 183, 287; relation of religion to, 27, 29, 34, 36, 40, 41, 44, 62, 129, 131, 166, 183, 287. Individualism in modern civiliza- tion, 19, 87, 88, 101, 102, 110, 113, 129, 131, 193, 194, 198, 207, 208, 212, 224, 244, 255, 267. Industry, modern, and Christian- ity, 12, 21, 104-107, 195-197, 210-242. Infinite, the, as God, 54, 133. Inspiration, 10, 88. Institutions, social, 14, 62, 64, 73, 80, 89, 161, 163, 184, 206; Church as an, 39, 131, 280-305. Intellectual element in rolipion, 3-11, 31, 38, 40, 75, 127-152, 159, 218, 288, 289, 298, 299, 302-304. Intellectualistic theories of re- ligion, 4. Intelligence and social progress, 3, 7, 24, 74, 88, 170; in reli- gion, 3, 7, 31, 64, 75, 92, 114, 148, 218, 298; see also Reason and Social Science. Interdependence, social, 12, 29, 38, 163, 171; international, 12, 171-173, 186, 246, 260. International relations, 12, 24, 102, 112, 115, 117, 118, 171- 173, 186, 245, 246, 259-261. Intuition, 10, 11. Invention, 11, 24, 61, 74. Irrationalism, 4, 7, 9, 15, 22. James, William, cited, 34, 37, 155. Jastrow, Morris, cited, 284. Japanese, 21, 115. Jesus, religion of, 1, 77, 82, 84, 146; personality of, 82, 147- 149; founder of Christianity, 77, 82, 146; historicity of, 145, 146; as a social philoso- ?her, 91, 159; as a thinker, 48, note, 159; as Messiah, 146; as moral leader and savior of mankind, 82, 91, 92, 143, 147-152, 181-186, 207- 209, 241, 242, 262, 263, 285, 305. Jewish ethics, 69, 81, 148. Jewish opinion, modern, 123, 151, 284, 310. Jewish synagogue and Christian church, 283, 284. Jews, religious genius of, 69, 80, 81. Judaism, 69, 77, 80; and Chris- tianity, 77, 80, 81. Justice, social, 78, 83, 85, 95, 130, 178, 230, 233, 234, 249, 261 ; necessity of, 210, 233, 242, 261; inadequacy of, 178. INDEX 317 Kant, Immanuel, cited, 4, 8, 143. Kent, C. F., cited, 88. Kidd, Benjamin, cited, viii, 9. King, W. I., cited, 214, 222. King, H. C., cited, 88. Kingdom of God, definition, 78, 184; a social conception, 78, 84, 129, 161, 182-185, 263; a spiritual ideal, 129, 184. Kinship, sentiment of, 52, 255. Labor, modern condition of, 106, 213-216, 236; social worth of, 228, 229; exploitation of, 106, 213, 216, 236; and Christian- ity, 229, 241, 242; creative, 228, 229, 237. Labor movement, 106, 107, 232, 235, 307, 308. Laissez-faire attitude, 255. Law, social, 62, 90, 134, 135, 159, 182. Laws of nature, 134, 139, 182. Leadership, social, 75, 82, 149, 159, 298, 305; religious, 82, 113, 149, 276, 282, 290, 305; of Jesus, 82, 92, 149, 150, 151, 159, 182, 305. League of Nations, 172, 260. Li'iiba, J. H., cited, 13, 25, 36, 47, 50, 114. Likemindedness, social value of, ix, 42, 59, 170, 174, 251, 254, 255, 259, 261. Literature, modern, 101, 107, 108. Love, definition, 168, 181; as an ethical principle, 78, 84, 92, 168-176, 207; of humanity, 83, 84, 169-176, 183, 305; sacri- ficial, 172-178, 305; sexual, 197-207, 208; parental, 199, 204, 208 ; as central principle of Christianity, 78, 83, 84, 92, 125, 150, 181, 304, 305. Loyalty, as an ethical principle, 39, 42, 60, 131, 143, 149, 182, 183. Luxury In modern life, 102, 165, 213, 236, 240, 241, 269. Lyman, E. W., cited, 127, 136. M Machiavelli, Niccolo, 18, 19, 96, 97, 99, 104, 112, 244. Machiavellian politics, 21, 29, 103, 104, 116, 244. Magic, 22, 35, 36, 43. Maladjustments, social, 167, 168, 194, 195-197, 202, 213-216, 234- 236, 249. Man, religious nature of, 26, 29, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 47, 64, 66, 135; social nature of, 42, 71, 170, 171. Mana, 45, 49, 56. Manaism, 24, 49-51. Manitou, 45, 49. Marett, R. R., cited, 35, 47, 48, 49, 55. Marriage, 22, 102, 193-208. Marx, Karl, 106. Material conditions, 86, 164, 165, 195-197, 210-242. Materialism, 46, 103, 111, 112, 126, 136, 140, 165, 196, 225, 250. Materialistic standards, 14, 19, 101-103, 213, 214, 250; see also Materialism. Mathews, Shailer, cited, 88. McConnell, F. J., cited, 102, 298. Mechanistic conceptions in science, 6, 45, 46, 111, 134, 136. Mecklin, J. M., cited, 248, 293. Metaphysics, 20, 29, 39, 111, 122, 126, 127. Metaphysical problems, I, 26, 111, 124, 126, 132-143. Methodist movement, 76. Methods, in science, 6, 30. Militarism, effects of, 103, 104, 118, 245, 259-261; origin of, 71, 74, 79. Millenarianism, 86. Mind, social, 63, 252, 295, 296; see also Public opinion. Minimum wage, 235. 318 INDEX Missions, Christian, 186. Mohammedanism, 68, 154. Monogamy, 194-207. Monotheism, 23, 25-27, 54. Moral confidence, 26, 37, 41, 135. Moral conflicts, see Conflict. Moral ideals, see Ideals, social. Moral order, see Order, moral. Moral standards, 56, 62, 75, 102, 104, 110, 114, see also Ideals; of Christianity, 78, 84, 91; of Paganism, 96, 99, 110. Morale, social, 179, 180, 181, 253, 268-271. Morality, idealistic, 64, 66, 67; customary, 55, 56, 60, 62. Morality and religion, 55, 56, 62, 64, 67, 128, 161, 162. Mores, the, definition, 34, 61 ; so- cial power of, 34, 75, 103, 293; relation to religion, 34, 55, 56, 62, 79; re-making of, 75, 292, 293, 294. Motivation, social, ix, 149, 156, 170, 305, 306. Mysticism, definition, 113, 114; danger of, 7, 31, 113, 114; place in religion, 4, 114, 123. Mythological elements in religion, 59, 120, 139. N National egoism, 24, 104, 105, 171-173, 245, 256, 259-261. National groups, 16, 24, 102-104, 115, 118, 172, 243-263. National stage of religion, 23, 25, 53. Natural laws, see Laws of Na- ture. Natural science, 11, 111, 117, 11!>, 136, 139; see also Science. Nature, as related to God, 133, 134, 137, 138; worship of, 53, 133; see also Human nature. Nature of civilization, see Civili- zation. Nature of society, see Society. Negative social attitudes, see At- titudes, negative. Neighborhood group, the, 188. Neo-Paganism, 17, 18-21, see Paganism. Neo-Rationalism, see Rational- ism. Newton, J. F., cited, 108. Nietzsche, Friedrich, 18, 19, 20, 33, 96, 97, 99, 109, 110, 112, 262. Normal life, 193, 195-197, 205, 211, 234-236, 244, 247, 265, 279. Novicow, J., cited, 38, 163. Objectivity, demanded by re- ligion, 125, 132, 133, 134. Obligations, social, 56, 100, 203, 212, 224, 227, 241, 256. Optimism and religion, 23, 41, 46. Order, social, 55, 61, 65, 84, 115; and religion, 55, 61-65, 78, 84, 130, 183-185. Order, moral, 134, 139, 156. Organization, social, 61, 243; of religious life, 131, 180-305; of good will, 175, 255, 260, 261. Origin of religion, 34-55, 66. Paganism, definition, 96, 98; moral element in, 96, 99, 100; recrudescence of, 13, 22, H 117; survival of, 95-117, 244; in politics, 103, 104, 244, 261; in business, 102-107, 114; in literature, 101, 107, 108; in philosophy, 99, 110; in science, 110-112; in the church, 86, 92, 98, 114, 286. Pantheism, 54. Parental love, 199, 204, 208. Parenthood, 204-208. Passivity, social, 68, 130, 150. Pathological social conditions, see Maladjustments, social. Patrick. G. T. W., cited, viii. Patriotism, 8, 179, 246. Patten, W., cited, 111. INDEX 319 'attcrn ideas, 61, 74, 98, 173, 191, 248. 'aul, 88. >eace, social, 171, 173, 216, 248, 258, 260; international, 118, 172, 173, 260, 261. 'ersonality, as an ethical con- cept, 77, 143, 162, 181, 183, us a social influence, 82, 126, 129, 149, 167, 182. essimism, 15, 16, 23, 24, 41, 60, 95. hilosophy, modern, 6, 110. hilosophy, social, x. hysical elements in human life, 86, 164, 197-202, 210-242, 265. lato, cited, 79, 97. lay, function of, 264-279; necessity of, 265; degradation of, 266-269. leasure, as an ethical end, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 110, 114, 193, 267. leasure, social, 99, 101, 264- 279. olitical corruption, 106, 245. olitical life, 105, 243-263. Political organization, 243-263; importance of, 243, 246; demo- cratic form of, 247-263; and Christianity, 248, 250, 262, 263. Politics, anti-Christian, 103, 104, 114, 244, 245. Polygamy, 22. Polytheism, 53. Positive, defined, 119. Positive Christianity, 119-160. Positive religion, 119-126, 127, 138, 139. Positive science, 30, 119, 126, 127, 139. Positivism, Comtean, 1, 46, 122, 132. Power, as an ethical end, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 110, 173, 244, 246, 267. Power, the will to, 2. Poverty, moral effects of, 213, 214, 216, 235; elimination of, 234-239, 240. Pragmatism, 132. Prayer, 154-157. Press, freedom of, 254, 297; power of, 300, 301; religious, 301. Predatory traditions, 71, 75, 76, 97, 98, 107, 110, 212. Primitive man, 27, 71, 72; re- ligion of, 27, 49-53, 55, 56. Production, economic, 164, 222, 223, 230. Progress, social, 24, 38, 61, 73, 74, 95, 167, 170, 190, 229; re- ligion and, 64, 65-67, 75, 161, 190; Christianity and, 75, 76, 78, 83, 138. Progressive religion, 30, 66, 126. Profits, business for, 21, 29, 105. Property, private, necessity of, 219, 220, 224; abuses of, 102, 105, 212-214, 240; and Chris- tianity, 211, 218, 227, 241; socialization of, 220, 226. Prophetism, 290. Prophets, the Jewish, 69, 77, 80. Protestant Reformation, 1, 76. Protestant Christianity, 87, 113, 283-285, 286, 291. Psychic nature of culture, 61-63, 74, 107; of human society, vii, 11, 38, 61, 74. Psychology, human, 33, 34, 41, 145, 289, 301; see also Be- havior, human. Psychology of religion, 33, 40-42, 199. Public conscience, 197, 276, 290- 293, 301. Public discussion, see Discussion, public. Public health, see Health. Public opinion, definition, 252, 294, 296; power of, 290, 291- 293; formation of, 252-254, 294-303; guidance of, 253, 290, 296-303. Public ownership, 221, 231, 232. Public sentiment, 296. Public worship, see Worship. Puritanism, the new, 271. 320 INDEX Quakers, mysticism of, 113. R Races, antagonism of, 16, 67, 171, 186, 259, 265. Racial egoism, 172, 250, 259. Rational, defined, 3. Rational religion, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 30, 31, 35, 55, 63, 92, 119-160. Rationalism, the new, 4, 8, 9, 31, 136; eighteenth-century, 7, 8, 36. Ravage, M. E., cited, 123. Reason, definition, 5, 8, 9; func- tion of, 8, 9, 38; in religion, 4, 7, 8, 9, 31, 38, 40. Reconciliation, doctrine of, 169, 170, 172, 173, 247, 283. Reconstruction of religion, 3, 15, 33, 70, 93, 119, 161, 210, 243, 264, 282. Reconstruction, social, 3, 15, 93, 213; of the family, 188-209; of industry, 210-242; of govern- ment, 243-263 ; of social amuse- ments, 264-279; of the church, 280-305. Recreation, social, necessity of, 265 ; as an element in social pleasures, 272, 274, 295; and the church, 275-277. Redemption, social, 78, 144, 166- 168, 176, 242, 276, 290. Redemptive religion, 78, 84, 87, 127, 129, 144, 145, 158, 167, 181, 183, 186, 242, 276, 290. Reformation of criminals, 170, 175. Reformation, the New, 1. Reformation, Protestant, 1, 76. Religion, definition, 47, as an ob- ject of scientific study, 3, 5, 33 ; reconstruction of, 3, 92, 120- 264; in revolution, 1-31; and science, 2-32, 92, 120-160; and reason, 4, 7-9, 37, 38, 40; origin of, 34-55, 66; evolution of, 24, 47-54, 69, 75; primitive, 27, 49-53, 55; ethical, 26, 55, 64, 66, 77, 128; theistic, 25, 54, 136, 137; function of, 34-47, 55- 66; psychology of, 33, 40-42, 199; revival of, viii, 75, 282; social significance of, 33, 37, 38-69, 75; and social control, see Control; and social order, see Order; and social progress, see Progress; and social values, see Values; of Jesus, 1, 77, 82, 84; and Christianity, see Christianity; positive, 119-160; and the family, 188-209; and business, 210-242; and politics, 243-263; and amusements, 264- 279; see also Church. Religious education, 269, 279, 287-289, 302-304. Religious problem, the, 20, 26, 64. Religious psychosis, 33, 36. Religious Revolution, the, ix, 1, 2, 12, 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 26, 31, 131, 304. Religious unity, 282-286. Renaissance, the, 99, 102. Renunciation, doctrine of, 68, 85, 99, note. Revivals of religion, 75. Reversions to barbarism, 75, 95- 117, 193, 212, 244, 266, 294; to paganism, 13, 20, 22, 93- 117; in culture, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23. Revolutions, 15, 76, 77, 130, 217; see also Religious Revolu- tion. Rhys-Davids, cited, 172. Rights, scientific view of, 223, 224, 255, 256. Ritual, 157. Roman civilization, 79, 80, 96- 102. Rome, ethical influence of, 96- 102; political influence of, 96, 97. Ross, E. A., cited, 91, 264, 265. Rowntree, B. S., cited, 230. Royce, J., cited, 110. Russell, Bertrand, cited, 13. INDEX 821 Russia, 103, 118, 219; rehabili- tation of, 116, note. S Sacred, the, defined, 49, 65; aa primitive element in religion, 49. Sacrifice, self, in religion, 38, 42, 43, 60, 63, 67; in Christianity, 78, 174-178, 181, 184, 209. Sacrificial love, 174-178, 305. Salvation, 37, 132, 143, 150, 156; social conception of, 143, 144. i Santayana, George, cited, 95, 99. ! Savagery, 27, 48, 55, 71-73. Savage mind, the, 27, 49-51, 55. Schleiter, F., cited, 48. Schweitzer, A., cited, 83, 145, 150. Science, definition, 6, 9; nature of, 6, 9; effects of, 2, 5, 12, 107, 117; and reason, 6, 37, 40; and religion, viii, 2-32, 33-40, 60, 62, 92, 110-112, 119-160; see also Social science. Scientific method, 6, 30. School, and religion, 288, 292, 303; and the church, 288, 302, 303. Secularization, 28, 29. Seeley, J. R., cited, 84. Self-assertion, 99. Self-consciousness, 40, 71, note. Self-culture, 99, 100, 187. Self -development, 110, 180, 187. Self-gratification, 100, 114, 193, 267. Self-indulgence, 38, 114, 240, 267. Self-interest, 102-107, 109, 169, 194, 212, 216, 261; inadequacy of, 169, 179, 180, 194. Self-realization, social, 100. Self-sacrifice, see Sacrifice. Sellars, R. W., cited, 25, 41. Service, human, as practical principle of Christianity, 77, 120, 159, 162, 181, 262; as an ethical ideal, 38, 43, 60, 77, 83, 100, 105, 120, 125, 163-168, 170, 171, 176, 181, 191, 209; as an economic principle, 227-229. Sex and religion, 199-203, 29, 271, 275. Sex education, 201, 202. Sexes, relations of, 198-203; Christian ideal of, 208, 209. Shenton, Herbert N., cited, xiii, 238 Shotwell, J. T., cited, 7. Simkhovitch, V., cited, 76, 80, 91, 148, 149. Sin, defined, 143; social concep- tion of, 143, 144, 176. Slavery, 73, 213. Small, Albion W., cited, 163, 212, 220, 229. Smith, G. B, cited, 31, 32, 117. Sport, 269, 273. Social adaptation and religion, see Adaptation. Social attitudes, see Attitudes, social. Social control, see Control, social. Social development, see Evolu- tion, social. Social education, see Education, social. Social environment, see Environ- ment, social. Social groups, see Group. Social justice, see Justice. Social ideals, see Ideals. Social intelligence, see Intelli- gence and social progress. Social leadership, see Leadership. Social mind, 63, 252, 295, 296. Social obligation, see Obligations, social. Social order, see Order. Social organization, see Organiza- tion, social. Social progress, see Progress. Social reconstruction, see Recon- struction. Social religion, defined, 43, 67, 162; essentials of, 128-131, 161- 187; genesis of, 42, 43, 44, 66; and Christianity, 76, 77, 81, 83, 84; and social science, 162- 180; and the family, 188-209; and amusements, 264-279; and politics, 243-263; and economic 322 INDEX conditions, 210-242; and the church, 280-305. Social retrogression, 15, 16, 17. Social science, defined, x, 161; as a support of religion, xi, 5, 30, 41, 90-92, 159, 162-180, 299; and the teachingg of Jesus, 90- 92, 166, 177, 181-186, 207-209, 241, 262, 278, 298-300. Social values, see Values. Socialism, Marxian, 106, 107, 226. Socialization, 40, 163, 168, 189, 226, 254; of property, 226. Society, human, nature of, 38, 163, 171; Christian, 82, 83, 87, 92, 115, 118, 184, 209, 263, 306. Sociology, x, xii, 33, 34, 42, 61, 70, 72, 76, 80, 91, 140, 145, 259, 293, 300, 303. Sociology of religion, 33. Socrates, 97. Son of Man, 146. Sophists of Greece, 97. Spaulding, E. G., cited, 9, 140. Spencer, Herbert, cited, 52. Spending, ethics of, 239, 240. Spiritual, defined, 45; reality of, 45, 46, 111, 135, 136. Spirits, see Animism. State, pagan idea of, 96, 103, 243, 244, 261. Stoicism, 80. Strong, Josiah, cited, 91, 285. Subjectivism in religion, 125-127, 132, 133, 140-142. Suffering, human, 60, 68, 87, 114, 167, 176, 177. Sunday school, the, 287, 292, 302, 303. Sunday observance, 277, 278. Supernatural in religion, 31, 49, 56. Superstition in religion, 2, 22, 36, 43. Sympathy, social importance of, 168-173, 254-258; in Christian- ity, 78, 84. Taboo, 49, 55, 65, 131. Tawney, R. H., cited, 212, 224, 227. Taxation in Christian socie 238-240. Teutonic tradition, 97. Theism, 25, 54, 136, 137. Theological Christianity, it, 1( 18, 118, 286, 305. Theological element in religion, x, 12, 27, 39, 59, 77, 85, 118, 126, 127-159. Theology, 7, 12, 13, 18, 20, 26, 39, 59, 85, 88, 118, 120, 121, 127, 128, 138, 143, 145. Thomas, J. B., cited, 84. 85. Thomas, W. I., cited, 50. Thomson, J. Arthur, cited, 11] 163. Todd, A. J., cited, 163, 169. Toleration, religious, 157, 158. Totemism, as a form of religion, 25. Tradition, social importance 63, 107; transmission of, 34, 62, 63 ; conflicts in, 75, 99, 1( 101, 117. Tradition in religion, 4, 34, 42, 62, 147, 186. Tribal ethics, 72, 77, 83. Tufts, J. H., cited, 217. U Unearned incomes, 228, 237-239. Unemployment, 215, 216, 234, 235. Understanding, social importance of, 169-172, 255-258. Union of the Churches, 282-280. Universe, the, in religious con- sciousness, 6, 26, 40, 46, 54, 133-137. Universities and religion, 112, 300. Values, social, Ix, 11, 15, 34, 39, 41, 42-45, 54, 5"9, 62-67; moral, 14, 16, 53, 62; religious, 13, 14, INDEX 323 18, 20, 39, 40-47, 53, 58, 62, 65. Vicarious suffering, 178. Vice, 167, 202, 269. Votaw, C. W., cited, 78, 80. W Wages, low, 195, 214-216, 235. War, and social evolution, 71, 118, 173; and democracy, 259- 261; the stopping of, 116-118, 171, 172, 173, 261; moral sub- stitute for, 130. War, the Great, causes of, vii, 21, 103-117; effects of, 22, 37, 94, 115, 118, 246. Ward, Harry F., cited, 211, 235, 310. Ward, Lester F., cited, 244. Wealth, proper use of, 100, 212, 239-242; distribution of, 222, 223, 227-230, 236, 239. Webb, C. C. J., cited, 37, 46. Wells, H. G., cited, 85, 92, 132. Will, the, see Good will. Wolfe, A. B., cited, 91. Woman, position of, 196, 247. World, as subject of redemption, 129, 144, 158, 186, 290. Worship, 157, 300, 303. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. 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