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AUG 81 1922 
 
 
 NAVAL FO^M^""^ 
 
 AS OUTLINED IN 
 
 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 From 1790 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1922 
 
AMERICAN 
 NAVAL POLICY 
 
 AS OUTLINED IN 
 
 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
 . THE UNITED STATES 
 
 From 1790 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1922 
 
• • I 
 
 1 • • * 
 
 
 ADDITIONAL COPIES 
 
 OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE PROCURED FROM 
 
 THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. ' 
 
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 5 CENTS PER COPP 
 
THE NAVAL POLICY OF AMERICA AS OUTLINED IN MESSAGES OF THE 
 PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE 
 PRESENT DAY. 
 
 The following references ^ by Presidents of the United States to 
 the urgent need of the United States possessing a proper Navy, cor- 
 responding to the Nation's position as a great power, and ready at 
 any time for efficient service in war, could be multiplied a thousand- 
 fold from the speeches and writings of almost all the statesmen who 
 have striven disinterestedly and intelligently for the true honor and 
 greatness of America. By no means all of the references made by 
 the Presidents themselves have been taken. Many of them, such 
 as President Taylor's urgent appeals for the establishment of a 
 retiring list and pension list, and the improvement of the personnel 
 of the Navy, or the recitals of the glory gained and conferred by the 
 Navy in the War of 1812 and the Civil War, are omitted because 
 they do not bear on the problem of the present day, which is, in my 
 own opinion, to further strengthen the Navy, both in materiel and 
 personnel, in battleships, in torpedo boats, in dry docks, in numbers 
 of officers and men. 
 
 Fortunately the quality of the ships and guns and of the officers 
 and men that we have is excellent. 
 
 The utterances of the Presidents here quoted tell in outline the 
 groAvth of the Navy. Washington first advocated its formation for 
 reasons which apply now as forcibly as they applied when he wrote, 
 over a century ago. What he said shows well how, on this as on all 
 other questions, the greatest of Americans approached every problem 
 of vital interest to America in a spirit of the broadest patriotism and 
 statesmanship, combined with clear appreciation of the needs of the 
 present and keen insight into the greater needs which the future 
 would develop. 
 
 Under the elder Adams the Navy which Washington advocated 
 was actually begun, and even in its infancy it accomplished feats 
 of note. The work of building it up was unwisely stopped, and 
 the War of 1812 showed clearly the vital benefits conferred upon the 
 
 * Where necessary they are slightly condensed. 
 
 482GG9 
 
2 ;.\ ; ;•• • ^•jjp^^^ict^ij^ ?JV\'4ii* policy. 
 
 Nation by the little Navy which it possessed, and the terrible loss 
 and damage caused by the fact that in size this Navy was but a small 
 fraction of what it should have been. The utterances of Monroe, 
 the younger Adams, and Andrew Jackson show that the lesson was 
 at least partially learned, and our Navy, though never brought up 
 quite to the standard it should have been in point of size, was never- 
 theless maintained in a condition not wholly out of proportion to the 
 needs and the honor of the Nation. 
 
 Especial attention should be paid to the third quotation from 
 Andrew Jackson. The victor of New ' Orleans had that " instinct 
 for the jugular " which is possessed by every great fighter. All that 
 he says applies to the present day, fpr, as he points out so clearly, 
 the only effective defensive is the offensive ; the only way to defend 
 our own seacoast properly is to attack our enemy instead of wait- 
 ing for him to attack us. It is for this reason that we can not afford 
 to rely purely upon torpedo boats or upon any kind of mere coast - 
 defense vessels. Though it is, of course, absolutely necessary to 
 have an abundance of torpedo boats, we must also possess a powerful 
 fleet of ships able to hold the seas, able to make long voyages, to stand 
 rough weather, and to meet and overcome in the shock of actual fight 
 any enem3^'s fleet ; for it is the enemy's fleet which should be the true 
 objective in naval war. Fortifications are indispensable, but they in 
 no sense equ^d, or supply the place of, a fighting Navy. 
 
 The effect of bringing the Navy up to something like a proper 
 standard was shown in the inestimable services it rendered during 
 the Civil War. It is characteristic of Lincoln's farseeing statesman- 
 ship and loving care for the welfare, ultimate as well as immediate, of 
 the people for whom he was soon to lay down his life, that in the 
 midst of the iron stress of the Civil War, when the problems of the 
 present would have wholly absorbed any lesser man, he should yet 
 have thouirht of the future in connection with our Navv, and should 
 have advocated the building of those seagoing battleships which, 
 though not needed in civil strife, would most assuredly be indispen- 
 sable if the honor and renown of America were to be upheld against 
 foreign powers. 
 
 After the close of the Civil War there came a period of reaction 
 and decline. In spite of President Grant's repeated warning and 
 protests, a spirit of economy prevailed, and our Navy was suffered to 
 sink below the level of that of even the third-rate powers. Then, in 
 the middle of President Arthur's administration, the turn came ; the 
 people and their representatives awoke to what was demanded by 
 national self-respect, the foundations of our present Navy were 
 laid, and ever since then under every administration the work of 
 building it up has gone steadily on. 
 
In point of efficiency our ships need fear comparison with those of 
 no foreign nation, and though they are not as numerous as they 
 should ultimately be, yet long strides in the right direction have been 
 taken. If we continue to build up our Navy for a few years to come 
 along the lines we have followed for the 15 years immediately past, 
 we shall, within a comparatively short period, place the United 
 States where she should be, among the naval powers of the world 
 Such a Nav}^ would be, as all of our great leaders from the days of 
 Washington and the elder Adams to our own have pointed out, the 
 surest guarantee of peace ; and if by any unlucky chance we were to 
 have war it would not merely save us from material disasters, but 
 what is of incalculably more moment, it would prevent that loss of 
 national honor which would be felt as keenly in the farthest interior 
 of the countrv as on the seaboard of the Atlantic or the Pacific. 
 
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 
 
 Assistant Secretary. 
 
 (I'.ronght up-to-date, 1922.) 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON. 
 
 Jamiary, 8. 1790. 
 
 To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of 
 preserving peace. 
 
 Annual Address. 
 
 Decemher 7, 1796. 
 
 To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized 
 and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even 
 prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent 
 powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral 
 party as may, first or last, leave no other option. 
 
 These considerations invite the United States to look to the means 
 and to set about the gradual creation of a Navy. 
 
 However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought 
 never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for 
 emergencies. This lack would impair the energy of its character 
 and hazard its safety or expose it to greater evils when war could 
 not be avoided; besides that, war might often not depend upon its 
 own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims 
 might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of 
 the military art ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting, 
 by proper establishments, the knowledge of that 'art. The art 
 
4 /•*•. ; ;•**: ^•>ri:er(l^x^ tx.\V4T/ policy. 
 
 of war is at once comprehensive and complicated. It demands 
 much previous study, and the possession of it in its most improved 
 and perfect state is alvrays of great moment to the security of a 
 nation. 
 
 JOHN ADAMS. 
 
 Maij 16, 1797. 
 Naval power is the natural defense of the United States. 
 
 December 8, 1798. 
 
 In demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war for the 
 necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room 
 to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. Efficient preparation 
 for war can alone insure peace. 
 
 The beneficial effects of the small naval armament provided under 
 the acts of the last session are known and acknowledged. Perhaps 
 no country ever experienced more sudden and remarkable advan- 
 tages from any measure of policy than we have derived from the 
 arming of our maritime protection and defense. We ought without 
 loss of time to lay the foundation for an increase of our Navy to a 
 size sufficient to guard our coast and protect our trade. Such a naval 
 force would afford the best means of general defense. 
 
 Decemher 3, 1799. 
 
 A steady perseverance in a system of national defense commensu- 
 rate with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious 
 dictate of wisdom, for nothing short of the power of repelling 
 aggression will secure to our country a rational prospect of escap- 
 ing the calamities of war or national degradation. 
 
 November 27, 1800. 
 
 A Navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient 
 defense of this country against all foreign hostility. 
 
 JAMES MADISON. 
 
 May 25, 1813. 
 
 The brilliant achievements of our infant Navy claim the highest 
 praise and the full recompense provided by Congress. 
 
AMERICA]^ 'xxviiL fxtt^;^:/. \\\ \ /-, 5 
 
 December -5, 1815. 
 
 The signal services which have been rendered by our Navy and the 
 capacities it has developed for successful cooperation in the national 
 defense will give to that portion of the public force its full value 
 in the eyes of Congress. To preserve the ships we now have in a 
 sound state, to complete those already contemplated, to provide 
 amply for prompt augmentations, is dictated by the soundest policy. 
 
 JAMES MONROE. 
 
 January SO 182Jf. 
 
 In the late war our whole coast was either invaded or menaced with 
 invasion. There was scarcely a harbor or city on any of our great 
 inlets which could be considered secure. In whatever direction the 
 enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops, 
 our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to 
 them. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of 
 the sea only but every bay and great river throughout its whole 
 extent. In entering these inlets and sailing up them with a small 
 force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the 
 whole population on each side and to keep it in -the field while the 
 squadron remained there. The expense and exposure of the inhab- 
 itants and the waste of property may readily be conceived. These 
 occurrences demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we 
 can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights, and 
 that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong 
 naval power the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, 
 considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, 
 unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval 
 force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late 
 war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establish- 
 ment of an adequate naval force: The first to prevent war so far 
 as it may be practicable ; the second to diminish its calamities when 
 it may be inevitable. No government will be disposed to violate our 
 rights if it knows we have the means and are prepared and resolved 
 to defend them. 
 
 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. 
 
 December 6^ 1825. 
 
 A military marine is the only arm by which our power can be esti- 
 mated or felt by foreign nations, and the only standing military 
 force which can never be dangerous to our own liberty. A perma- 
 
6 /. : *.;: •A2vifiMf;j\.N: i^^AVAL policy. 
 
 nent naval peace establishment, adapted to our present condition and 
 adaptable to that gigantic growth with which the Nation is ad- 
 vancing in its career is among the subjects which have already occu- 
 pied the foresight of the last Congress. Our Navy, commenced upon 
 a scale commensurate with the incipient energies, the scanty re- 
 sources, and the comparative indigence of our infancy, was even 
 then found adequate to cope with the powers of Barbary and with 
 one of the principal maritime powers of Europe. 
 
 At a period of further advancement, but with little accession of 
 strength, it has not only sustained with honor the most unequal of 
 conflicts but covered itself and our country with unfading glory. 
 But it is only since the close of the late war that by the numbers and 
 force of the ships of which it was composed it could deserve the name 
 of a Navy. 
 
 ^December 5, 1826. 
 
 We have 12 line-of -battle ships,^ 20 frigates, and sloops of war in 
 proportion, which, with a few months of preparation, may present 
 a line of floating fortifications along the whole range of our coast. 
 Combined with a system of fortifications upon the shores themselves, 
 it has placed in our possession the most effective sinews of war and 
 has left us at once an example and a lesson from which our own 
 duties may be inferred. The gradual increase of the Navy was the 
 principle of which the act of 29th April, 1816 was the development. 
 It was the introduction^ of a system to act upon the character and 
 history of our own country for an indefinite series of ages. It was 
 a declaration of that Congress to their constituents and to posterity 
 that it was the destiny and the duty of the United States to become 
 in regular process of time and by no petty advances a great naval 
 power. 
 
 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 March ^, 1829. 
 
 The increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant 
 climes our skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preserva- 
 
 2 Relatively to our siae, and to the navies of other nations, this was a much larger 
 naval force than we have now ; and at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 we were 
 still relatively more powerful at sea than we are now. As regards men to draw on for 
 manning our ships, we no longer have the great maritime commerce and fishing fleets 
 we then had ; but we now have, what we then did not, the men who work on the waters 
 of the Great Lakes, and even of the rivers of the West, on whom we can also draw largely ; 
 and though our men must still be seamen to be efllcient on board ship, and though they 
 require a longer time than ever to learn their duties as men-of-warsmen, the gap between 
 the seaman and the man ashore is no longer so wide as it was. 
 
AMERic a'^^ > ^^Ay^x \ y^bLit^l '. '^ - '^ ^' ^ '^ 7 
 
 tion of our forts, arsenals, and dock yards ; and the introduction of 
 progressive improvements in the discipline and science of both 
 branches of our military service, are so plainly prescribed by pru- 
 dence that I should be excused for omitting their mention sooner 
 than for enlarging on their importance. 
 
 December 8, 1829. . 
 
 Constituting, as the Navy does, the best standing security of this 
 country against foreign aggression, it claims the especial attention 
 of Government, and should continue to be cherished as the offspring 
 of our national experience. 
 
 March i, 1837. 
 
 No nation, however desirous of peace, can hope to escape occasional 
 collisions with other powers, and the soundest dictates of policy re- 
 quire that we should place ourselves in a position to assert our rights 
 if a resort to force should ever become necessary. Our local situa- 
 tion, our long line of seacoast, indented by numerous bays, with deep 
 rivers opening into the interior, as well as our extended and still 
 increasing commerce, point to the Navy as our national means of de- 
 fense. It will in the end be found to be the cheapest and most 
 effectual, and now is the time, in a season of peace, that we can year 
 after year add to its strength without increasing the burdens of the 
 people. It is your true policy, for your Navy will not only protect 
 your rich and flourishing commerce in distant seas, but will enable 
 you to reach and annoy the enemy, and will give to defense its great- 
 est efjiciency hy meeting danger at a distance from home.^ It is im- 
 possible by any line of fortification to guard every point from attack 
 against a hostile force advancing from the ocean and selecting its 
 object, but they are indispensable to protect cities from bombard- 
 ment, dockyards and naval arsenals from destruction, to give shelter 
 to merchant vessels in time of war and to single ships or weaker 
 squadrons when pressed by -superior force. Fortifications of this 
 description can not be too soon completed and armed and placed in 
 a condition of the most perfect preparation. The abundant means 
 we now possess can not be applied in any manner more useful to 
 the country, and when this is done and our naval force sufficiently 
 strengthened we need not fear that any nation will wantonly insult 
 us or needlessly provoke hostilities. We shall more certainly pre- 
 serve peace when it is well understood that we are prepared for war. 
 
 ' The italics are my own, 
 104147—22 2 
 
8 :• •. : ;•• ; A'i^^siti??:^. •^•aVav policy. 
 
 JOHN TYLER. 
 
 Decemher 7, 18 Jf.!. 
 
 Every effort will be made to add to the efficiency of the Navy, and 
 1 can not too strongly urge upon you liberal appropriations to that 
 branch of the public service. Our extended and otherwise exposed 
 maritime frontier calls for protection, to the furnishing of which 
 an efficient naval force is indispensable. We look to no foreign con- 
 quests, nor do we propose to enter into competition with any other 
 nation for supremacy on the ocean; but it is due not only to the 
 honor but to the security of the people of the United States that no 
 nation should be permitted to invade our waters at pleasure. Parsi- 
 mony alone would suggest the withholding of the necessary means 
 for the protection of our domestic firesides from invasion and our 
 national honor from disgrace. I would most earnestly recommend 
 the increase and prompt equipment of that gallant Navy which has 
 lighted up every sea with its victories and spread an imperishable 
 glory over the country. 
 
 JAMES K. POLK. 
 
 December ^, ISJ^o. 
 
 Our reliance for protection and defense on the land must be mainly 
 on our citizen soldiers, who will be ever ready, as they ever have 
 been ready in time past, to rush with alacrity, at the call of their 
 country to her defense. This description of force, however, can not 
 defend our coast, harbors, and inland seas, nor protect our com- 
 merce on the ocean or the lakes. These mvist be protected by our 
 Navy. 
 
 Considering an increased naval force, and especially steam ves- 
 sels, corresponding with our growth and importance as a nation, 
 and proportioned to the increased and increasing naval power of 
 other nations, of vast importance as regards our safety, and the great 
 and growing interests to be protected by it, I recommend the subject 
 to the favorable consideration of Congress. 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 Decemher 8, 186S. 
 
 The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during 
 the year, and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have 
 been discharged with fidelity and eminent success. 
 
AMERICA:^ NAVAL j^i^cyI} :\: ;/ 9 
 
 The events of the war gi\e an increased interest and importance 
 to the Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself. 
 
 Ihe armored vessels in our Navy, completed and in service, 
 or which are under contract and approaching completion, are be- 
 lieved to exceed in number those of any other power. But while 
 these may be relied upon for harbor defense and coast service, others 
 of <i:reater strength and capacity will be necessary for cruising pur- 
 poses and to maintain our rightful position on the ocean. 
 
 No inconsiderable embarrassment, delay, and public injur^^ have 
 been experienced from the want of governmental establishments 
 (sufficient in number and adequate in character) for the construction 
 and necessary repair of modern naval vessels. I think it my duty 
 to invite your special attention to this subject. Satisfactory and 
 important as have been the performances of the heroic men of the 
 Navy, they are scarcely more wonderful than the success of our me- 
 chanics and artisans in the production of war vessels which have 
 created a new form of naval power. 
 
 I commend to your consideration the policy of fostering and train- 
 ing seamen for the naval service. 
 
 U. S. GRANT. 
 
 December 5, 1870. 
 
 The appropriations made for the last and current years were evi- 
 dently intended by Congress, and are sufficient only, to keep the 
 Navy on its present footing by the repairing and refitting of our 
 old ships. This policy must, of course, gradually but surely destroy 
 the Navy. It can hardly be wise statesmanship in a Government 
 which represents a country with over 5,000 miles of coast line on 
 both oceans, exclusive of Alaska, and containing 40,000,000 of pro- 
 gressive people, with relations of every nature with almost every 
 foreign country, to rest with such inadequate means of enforcing any 
 foreign policy either of protection or redress. Separated by the 
 ocean from the nations of the Eastern Continent, our Navy is our 
 only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for the 
 enforcement of any foreign policy. 
 
 December 2. 1872. 
 
 Unless early steps are taken to preserve our Navy, in a very few 
 years the United States will be the weakest nation, upon the ocean, 
 of all great powers. With an energetic, progressive, business people 
 like ours, penetrating and forming business relations with every part 
 
10 >\: >': k^feKl*QA::^^.J]$^AY4V POLICY. 
 
 of the known world, a Navy strong enough to command the respect 
 of our flag abroad is necessary for the full protection of all tWs^r 
 rights. 
 
 December 2, 1873. 
 
 The distressing occurrences which have taken place in the waters 
 of the Caribbean Sea, almost on our very seaboard, illustrate most 
 forcibly the necessity always existing that a Nation situated like ours 
 hhould maintain in a state of possible efficiency a Navy adequate to 
 its responsibilities. Congress should provide adequately not only 
 for the present preparation but for the future maintenance of our 
 naval force. 
 
 CHESTER A. ARTHUR. 
 
 December 6, 1881. 
 
 I can not too strongly urge upon you my conviction that every con- 
 sideration of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively de- 
 mands a thorough rehabilitation of our Navy. 
 
 With a full appreciation of the fact that this must involve a large 
 expenditure of the public moneys, I earnestly recommend such appro- 
 priations as will accomplish an end which seems to me so desirable. 
 
 Nothing can be more inconsistent with true public economy than 
 withholding the means necessary to accomplish the objects intrusted 
 by the Constitution to the National Legislature. One of these ob- 
 jects, which is of paramount importance, is declared by our funda- 
 mental law to be the provision for the " common defense." Surely 
 nothing is more essential to the defense of the United States and of 
 all our people than the efficiency of our Navy. 
 
 If we heed the teachings of history we shall not forget that in the 
 life of every nation emergencies may arise when a resort to arms can 
 alone save it from dishonor. 
 
 Deceinber 4, 188S. 
 
 The work of strengthening our Navy by the construction of mod- 
 ern vessels has been auspiciously begun. 
 
 That our naval strength should be made adequate for the defense 
 of our harbors, the protection of our commercial interests, and the 
 maintenance of pur national honor is a proposition from which no 
 patriotic citizen can withhold his assent. 
 
AMERICAX XAVAL POLICY. 11 
 
 Decemher 1, ISSJ^. 
 
 I can not too strongly urge the duty of restoring our Navy as 
 rapidly as possible to the high state of efficiency Avhich formerly 
 characterized it. As the long peace that has lulled us into a state of 
 fancied security may at any time be disturbed, it is plain that the 
 j)olicy of strengthening this arm of the service is dictated by con- 
 siderations of wise economy, of just regard for our future tranquility, 
 juid of true appreciation of the dignity and honor of the Republic. 
 
 GROVER CLEVELAND. 
 
 Decemher 8, 1885. 
 
 All must admit the importance of an effective Navy to a Nation 
 like ours. Yet we have not a single vessel of war that could keep the 
 seas against a first-class vessel of any important power. Such a con- 
 dition ought not longer to continue. The nation that can not resist 
 aggression is constantly exposed to it. Its foreign policy is of neces- 
 sity weak, and its negotiations are conducted with disadvantage 
 because it is not in condition to enforce the terms dictated by its 
 sense of right and justice. 
 
 BENJAMIN HARRISON. 
 
 Decemher 9, 1891. 
 
 When ]t is recollected that tlie work of building a modern Navy 
 was only initiated in the year 1883, that our naval constructors and 
 shipbuilders were practically without experience in the construction 
 of large iron and steel ships, that our engine shops were unfamiliar 
 with great marine engines, and that the manufacture of steel forg- 
 ings for guns and plates was almost wholly a foreign industry, the 
 progress that has been made is not only highly satisfactory, but fur- 
 nishes the assurance that the United States will before long attain, 
 in the construction of such vessels, with their engines and armaments, 
 the same preeminence which it attained when the best instrument of 
 ocean commerce was the clipper ship, and the most impressive exhibit 
 of naval power the old wooden three-decker man-of-war. The offi- 
 cers of the Navy and the proprietors and engineers of our great pri- 
 vate shops have responded with wonderful intelligence and profes- 
 sional zeal to the confidence expressed by Congress in its liberal 
 legislation. 
 
12 AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 There should be no hesitation in promptly completing a Navy of 
 the best modern type, large enough to enable this country to display 
 its flag in all seas for the protection of its citizens and its extending 
 commerce. It is essential to the dignity of this Nation and to that 
 peaceful influence which it should exercise on this hemisphere that 
 its Navy should be adequate, both upon the shores of the Atlantic 
 and of the Pacific. 
 
 December 6, 1892. 
 
 I earnestly express the hope that the work w^hich has made such 
 noble progress may not now be stayed. The wholesome influence for 
 peace and the increased sense of security which our citizens domiciled 
 in other lands feel when these magnificent ships under the American 
 flag appear is already most gratefully apparent. The United States 
 is again a naval power. 
 
 GROVER CLEVELAND. 
 
 December S. 1894. 
 
 If we are to have a Navy for war-like operations, ofl'ensive and 
 defensive, we certainly ought to increase both the number of battle- 
 ships and torpedo boats. 
 
 December 3, 1894. 
 
 During the past fiscal year there has been an unusual and press- 
 ing demand in many quarters of the world for the presence of vessels 
 to guard American interests. 
 
 December 7, 1896. 
 
 The War College has developed into an institution which it is be- 
 lieved will be of great value to the Navy in teaching the science of 
 war, as well as in stimulating the professional zeal in the Navy, and it 
 will be especially useful in the devising of plans for the utilization, 
 in case of necessity, of all the naval resources of the United States. 
 
 Discipline among the officers and men of the Navy has been main- 
 tained to a high standard, and the percentage of American citizens 
 enlisted has been very much increased. 
 
 The Naval Militia, which was authorized a few years ago as an 
 experiment, has now developed into a body of enterprising young men, 
 active and energetic in the discharge of their duties and promising 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. ' 13 
 
 great usefulness. This establishment has nearly the same relation 
 to our Navy as the National Guard in the different States bears to 
 our Army, and it constitutes a source of supply for our naval forces, 
 the importance of which is immediately apparent. 
 
 WILLIAM McKINLEY. 
 
 December 6, 1897. 
 
 The great increase of the Navy which has taken place in recent 
 years was justified by the requirements for national defense, and has 
 received public approbation. The time has now arrived, however, 
 when this increase, to which the country is committed, should for a 
 time take the form of increased facilities commensurate with the 
 increase of our naval vessels. It is an unfortunate fact that there 
 is only one dock on the Pacific coast capable of docking our largest 
 ships, and only one on the Atlantic coast, and that the latter has for 
 the last six or seven months been under repair and, therefore, in- 
 capable of use. Immediate steps should be taken to provide three or 
 four docks of this capacity on the Atlantic coast, at least one of the 
 Pacific coast, and a floating dock in the Grulf. This is the recom- 
 mendation of a very competent board, appointed to investigate the 
 subject. There should also be ample provision made for powder 
 and projectiles and other munitions of war, and for an increased 
 number of officers and enlisted men. Some additions are also neces- 
 sary to our navy yards, for the repair and care of our large number 
 of vessels. 
 
 March ^, 1897. 
 
 Commendable progress has been made of late years in the upbuild- 
 ing of the American Navy, but we must supplement these efforts 
 by providing as a proper consort for it a merchant marine amply 
 sufficient for our own carrying trade to foreign countries. The 
 question is one that appeals both to our business necessities and the 
 patriotic aspirations of a great people. 
 
 December 5, 1899. 
 
 The expense is as nothing compared to the advantage to be 
 achieved. The reestablishment of our merchant marine involves 
 in a large measure our continued industrial progress and the ex- 
 tension of our commercial triumphs. I am satisfied the judgment 
 
14 AMERICAN XAVAL POLICY. " 
 
 of the countr3r favors the policy of aid to our merchant marine, 
 ^vhicli will broaden our commerce and markets and upbuild our 
 sea carrying capacity for the products of agriculture and manufac- 
 ture; which, with the increase of our Navy, means more work and 
 wages to our countrymen, as well as a safeguard to American 
 interests in every part of the world. 
 
 The Navy has maintained the spirit and high efficiency which 
 have always characterized that service, and has lost none of the 
 gallantry in heroic action which has signalized its brilliant and 
 glorious past. The Nation has equal pride in its early and later 
 achievements. Its habitual readiness for every emergency has won 
 the confidence and admiration of the country. The peoi)le are 
 interested in the continued preparation and prestige of the Navy 
 and will justify liberal appropriations for its maintenance and im- 
 provement. The officers have shown peculiar adaptation for the 
 performance of new and delicate duties which our recent war has 
 imposed. 
 
 December 3, 1900. 
 
 American vessels during the past three years liave carried about 
 9 per cent of our exports and imports. Foreign sliips should carry 
 the least, not the greatest, part of American trade. The remarkable 
 growth of our steel industries, the progress of shipbuilding for the 
 domestic trade, and our steadily maintained expenditures for the 
 ^^avy have created an opportunity to place the United States in the 
 first rank of commercial maritime powers. 
 
 Besides realizing a proper national aspiration this will mean tlie 
 establishment and health}^ growth along all our coasts of a dis- 
 tinctive national industry, expanding the field for the profitable 
 employment of labor and capital. It will increase the transporta- 
 tion facilities and reduce freight charges on the vast volume of 
 products brought from the interior to the seaboard for export, and 
 will strengthen an arm of the national defense upon which the 
 founders of the Government and their successors have relied. In 
 again urging immediate action by the Congress on measures to 
 promote American shipping and foreign trade, I direct attention 
 to the recommendations on the subject in previous messages, and 
 particularly to the opinion expressed in the message of 1899 : 
 
 I am satisfied the jiidj^ruifiit of the oonntry favors the policy of aid to our 
 merchant marine, which will broaden our conunerce and markets and upbuihi 
 our sea carrying capacity for the i)roducts of ajiriculture and manufacture, 
 which, with the increase of our Navy, mean more work and A\affes to our 
 countrymen as well as a safeguard to American interests in every part of the 
 world. 
 
 I commend also the establishment of ;i national naval i-eserve. * ■' * 
 
AMKHICAX NAVAL POLICY. 15 
 
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 
 
 Deceniber 3. 1901. 
 
 The work of upbuilding the Navy must be steadily continued. No 
 one point of our policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than 
 this to the honor and material Avelfare, and, above all, to the peace 
 of our Nation in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must 
 henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than 
 international rights. Even if our flag were hauled down in the Phil- 
 ippines and Puerto Kico, even if we decided not to build the Isth- 
 mian Canal, we should need a thoroughly trained Navy of adequate 
 size, or else be prepared definitely and for all time to abandon the 
 idea that our Nation is among those whose sons go down to the sea 
 in ships. Unless our commerce is always to be carried in foreign 
 bottoms, we must have war craft to protect it. 
 
 Inasmuch, however, as the American people have no thought of 
 abandoning the path upon which they have entered, and especially 
 in view of the fact that the building of the Isthmian Canal is fast 
 becoming one of the matters which the whole people are united in 
 demanding, it is imperative that our Navy should be put and kept in 
 the highest state of efficiency, and should be made to answer to our 
 growing needs. So far from being in any way a provocation to war, 
 an adequate and highly trained Navy is the best guaranty against 
 war, the cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The cost of 
 building and maintaining such a navy represents the very lightest 
 premium for insuring peace which this Nation can possibly pay. 
 
 Probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace 
 as we are. There is not a single civilized power which has anything 
 whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is 
 peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same 
 respect for our rights from others which we are eager and anxious 
 to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair treatment to us 
 commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people. 
 
 Our people intend to abide by the Monroe doctrine and to insist 
 upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western 
 Hemisphere. The Navy offers us the only means of making our in- 
 sistence upon the Monroe doctrine anything but a subject of derision 
 to whatever nation chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace 
 which comes as of right to tiie just man armed; not the peace granted 
 on terms of ignominy to the craven and the weakling. 
 
 It is not possible to improvise a Navy after war breaks out. The 
 ships must be built and the men trained long in advance. Some 
 auxiliarv vessels can be turned into makeshifts which will do in de- 
 
16 AMERICAN XAVAL POLICY. 
 
 fault of any better for the minor work, and a proportion of raw men 
 can be mixed with the highly trained, their shortcomings being 
 made good by the skill of their fellows; but the efficient fighting 
 force of the Navy when pitted against an equal opponent will be 
 found almost exclusively in the warships that have been regularly 
 built and in the officers and men who through years of faithful per- 
 formance of sea duty have been trained to handle their formidable 
 but complex and delicate weapons with the highest efficiency. ' In the 
 late War with Spain the ships that dealt the decisive blows at Manila 
 and Santiago had been launched from 2 to 14 years, and they were 
 able to do as they did because the men in the conning towers, the 
 gun turrets, and the engine rooms had through long years of prac- 
 tice at sea learned how to do their duty. 
 
 While awarding the fullest honor to the men who actually com- 
 manded and manned the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea 
 forces in the Philippines and in Cuba, we must not forget that an 
 equal meed of praise belongs to those without whom neither blow 
 could have been struck. The Congressmen who voted years in ad- 
 vance the money to lay down the ships, to build the guns, to buy the 
 armor plate; the department officials and the business men and 
 wageworkers who furnished what the Congress had authorized; the 
 Secretaries of the Navy who asked for and expended the appro- 
 priations; and finally the officers who, in lair weather and foul, 
 on actual sea service, trained and disciplined the crews of the ships 
 when there was no war in sight — all are entitled to a full share in 
 the glory of Manila and Santiago and the respect accorded by every 
 true American to those who wrought such signal triumph for our 
 country. It was forethought and preparation which secured us the 
 overwhelming triumph of 1898. If we fail to show forethought 
 and preparation now, there may come a time when disaster will 
 befall us instead of triumph; and should this time come, the fault 
 will rest primarily, not upon those whom the accident of events 
 puts in supreme command at the moment, but upon those who have 
 failed to prepare in advance. 
 
 There should be no cessation in the work of completing our Navy. 
 So far ingenuity has been wholly unable to devise a substitute for 
 the great war craft whose hammering guns beat out the mastery of 
 the high seas. It is unsafe and unwise not to provide this year for 
 several additional battleships and heavy armored cruisers, with 
 auxiliary and lighter craft in proportion; for the exact numbers 
 and character I refer you to the report of the Secretary of the Navy. 
 But there is something we need even more than additional ships, 
 and this is additional officers and men. To provide battleships and 
 cruisers and then lay them up, with the expectation of leaving them 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 17 
 
 unmanned until they are needed in actual war, would be worse than 
 folly : it would be a crime against the Nation. 
 
 To send any warship against a competent enemy unless those 
 aboard it had been trained by years of actual sea service, including 
 incessant gunnery practice, would be to invite not merely disaster 
 but the bitterest shame and humiliation. Four thousand addi- 
 tional seamen and one thousand additional marines should be pro- 
 vided; and an increase in the officers should be provided by mak- 
 ing a large addition to the classes at Annapolis. There is one small 
 matter which should be mentioned in connection with Annapolis. 
 The pretentious and unmeaning title of "naval cadet" should be 
 abolished; the title of "midshipman," full of historic association, 
 should be restored. 
 
 Even in time of peace a warship should be used until it wears out, 
 for only so can it be kept fit to respond to any emergency. The 
 officers and men alike should be kept as much as possible on blue 
 water, for it is there only they can learn their duties as they should 
 be learned. The big vessels should be maneuvered in squadrons con- 
 taining not merely battleships, but the necessary proportion of cruis- 
 ers and scouts. The torpedo boats should be handled by the younger 
 officers in such manner as will best fit the latter to take responsibility 
 and meet the emergencies of actual warfare. 
 
 Every detail ashore which can be performed by a civilian should 
 be so performed, the officer being kept for his special duty in the sea 
 service. Above all, gunnery practice should be unceasing. It is 
 important to have our Navy of adequate size, but it is even more 
 important that ship for ship it should equal in efficiency any navy 
 in the world. This is possible only with highly drilled crews and 
 officers, and this in turn imperatively demands continuous and pro- 
 gressive instruction in target practice, ship handling, squadron tac- 
 tics, and general discipline. Our ships must be assembled in squad- 
 rons actively cruising away from harbors and never long at anchor. 
 The resulting wear upon engines and hulls must be endured ; a battle- 
 ship worn out in long training of officers and men is well paid for by 
 the results, while, on the other hand, no matter in how excellent con- 
 dition, it is useless if the crew be not expert. 
 
 We now have 17 battleships appropriated for, of which 9 are com- 
 pleted and have been commissioned for actual service. The remain- 
 ing 8 will be ready in from two to four years, but it will take at least 
 that time to recruit and train the men to fight them. It is of vast 
 concern that we have trained crews ready for the vessels by the time 
 they are commissioned. Good ships and good guns are simply good 
 weapons, and the best are useless save in the hands of men who know 
 how to fight with them. The men must be trained and drilled under 
 a thorough and well-planned system of progressive instruction, while 
 
18 AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 the recruiting must be carried on with still greater vigor. Every 
 effort must be made to exalt the main function of the officer — the 
 command of men. The leading graduates of the Naval Academy 
 should be assigned to the combatant branches, the line and marines. 
 
 Many of the essentials of success are already recognized by the 
 General Board, which, as the central office of a growing staff, is mov- 
 ing steadily toward a proper war efficiency and a proper efficiency of 
 the whole Navy, under the Secretary. This (leneral Board, by fos- 
 tering the creation of a general staff, is providing for the official and 
 then the general recognition of our altered conditions as a Nation 
 and of the true meaning of a great war fleet, which meaning is. first, 
 the best men, and, second, the best ships. 
 
 The Naval Militia forces are State organizations and are trained 
 for coast service, and in event of war they will constitute the inner 
 line of defense. They should receive hearty encouragement from the 
 General Government. 
 
 But in addition we should at once provicie for a National Naval 
 Reserve, organized and trained under the direction of the Navy De- 
 partment and subject to the call of the Chief Executive whenever war 
 becomes imminent. It should be a real auxiliary to the naval sea- 
 going peace establishment and offer material to be drawn on at once 
 for manning our ships in time of Avar. It should be composed of 
 graduates of the Naval Academy, graduates of the Naval Militia, 
 officers and crews of coast-line steamers, longshore schooners, fishing 
 vessels, and steam yachts, together with the coast population about 
 such centers as life-saving stations and lighthouses. 
 
 The American people must either build and maintain an adequate 
 Navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary 
 position in international affairs, not merely in political but in com- 
 mercial matters. It has been well said that there is no surer way 
 of courting national disaster than to be '' opulent, aggressive, and 
 unarmed." 
 
 December 2. 1902. 
 
 There should be no halt in the work of building up the Navy, pro- 
 viding every year additional fighting craft. We are a very rich 
 country, vast in extent of territory, and great in population; a 
 country, moreover, which has an Army diminutive indeed when com- 
 pared with that of any other first-class power. We have deliberately 
 made our own certain foreign policies which demand the possession 
 of a first-class Navy. The Isthmian Canal will greatly increase the 
 efficiency of our Navy if the Navy is of sufficient size ; but if we have 
 an inadequate nav3% then the building of the canal would be merely 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. . 19 
 
 givin<r a hostage to any power of superior strength. The Monroe 
 doctrine should be treated as the cardinal feature of American foreign 
 policy ; but it would be worse than idle to assert it unless we intended 
 to back it up, and it can be backed up only by a thoroughly good 
 Navy. A good Navy is not a provocative of war. It is the surest 
 guaranty of peace. 
 
 Each individual unit of our Navy should be the most efficient of 
 its kind as regards both material and personnel that is to be found 
 in the world. I call your special attention to the need of providing 
 for the manning of the ships. Serious trouble threatens us if we 
 can not do better than we are now doing as regards securing the 
 services of a sufficient number of the highest type of sailormen, of 
 sea mechanics. The veteran seamen of our warships are of as high 
 a type as can be found in any navy which rides the waters of the 
 world; they are unsurpassed in daring* in resolution, in readiness, 
 in thorough knowledge of their profession. They deserve every con- 
 sideration that can be shown them. But there are not enough of 
 them. It is no more possible to improvise a crew than it is possible 
 to improvise a warship. To build the finest ship, with the deadliest 
 battery, and to send it afloat with a raw crew, no matter how brave 
 they were individually, would be to insure disaster if a foe of average 
 capacity were encountered. Neither ships nor men can be im- 
 provised when war has begun. We need a thousand additional offi- 
 cers in order to properly man the ships now provided for and under 
 construction. The classes at the Naval School at Annapolis should 
 be greatly enlarged. At the same time that we thus add the officers, 
 where we need them, we should facilitate the retirement of those at 
 the head of the list whose usefulness has become impaired. Promo- 
 tion must be fostered if the service is to be kept efficient. 
 
 The lamentable scarcity of officers and the large number of recruits 
 and of unskilled men necessarily put aboard the new vessels as they 
 have been commissioned has thrown upon our officers, and especially 
 on the lieutenants and junior grades, unusual labor and fatigue 
 and has gravely strained their powers of endurance. Nor is there 
 sign of any immediate let-up in this strain. It must continue for 
 some time longer, until more officers are graduated from Annapolis 
 and until the recruits become trained and skillful in their duties. 
 In these difficulties incident upon the development of our war fleet 
 the conduct of all our officers has been creditable to the service, and 
 the lieutenants and junior grades in particular have displayed an 
 ability and a steadfast cheerfulness which entitles them to the un- 
 grudging thanks of all who realize the disheartening trials and 
 fatigues to which they are of necessity subjected. 
 
 There is not a cloud on the horizon at present. There seems not 
 the slightest chance of trouble with a foreign power. We most 
 
20 AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 earnestly hope that this state of things may continue ; and the way 
 to insure its continuance is to provide for a thoroughly efficient Navy. 
 The refusal to maintain such a Navy would invite trouble, and if 
 trouble came would insure disaster. Fatuous self-complacency or 
 vanity, or shortsightedness in refusing to prepare for danger, is 
 both foolish and wicked in such a Nation as ours ; and past experience 
 has shown that such fatuity in refusing to recognize or prepare for 
 any crises in advance is usually succeeded by a mad panic of hys- 
 terical fear once the crisis has actually arrived. 
 
 December 7, 1903. 
 
 I heartil}'- congratulate the Congress upon the stead}^ progress in 
 building up the American Navy. We can not afford a let-up in this 
 great work. To stand still means to go back. There should be no 
 cessation in adding to the effective units of the fighting strength of 
 the fleet. Meanwhile the Navy Department and the officers of the 
 Navy are doing well their part by providing constant service at sea 
 under conditions akin to those of actual w^arfare. Our officers and 
 enlisted men are learning to handle the battleships, cruisers, and tor- 
 pedo boats with high efficiency in fleet and squadron formations, and 
 the standard of marksmanship is being steadily raised. The best 
 work ashore is indispensable, but the highest duty of a naval officer 
 is to exercise command at sea. 
 
 The establishment of a naval base in the Philippines ought not to 
 be longer postponed. Such a base is desirable in time of peace; in 
 time of war it would be indispensable and its lack would be ruinous. 
 Without it our fleet would be helpless. Our naval experts are agreed 
 that Subig Bay is the proper place for the purpose. The national 
 interests require that the work of fortification and development of 
 a naval station at Subig Bay be begun at an early date, for under the 
 best conditions it is a work which will consume much time. 
 
 D^eceinber 4, WOJ^. 
 
 In treating of our foreign policy and of the attitude that this 
 great Nation should assume in the world at large, it is absolutely 
 necessary to consider the Army and the Navy, and the Congress, 
 through which the thought of the Nation finds its expression, should 
 keep ever vividly in mind the fundamental fact that it is impossible 
 to treat our foreign policy, whether this policy takes shape in the 
 effort to secure justice for others or justice for ourselves, save as con- 
 ditioned upon the attitude we are willing to take toward our Army, 
 and especially toward our Navy. It is not merely unwise, it is con- 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 21 
 
 temptible for a nation, as for an individual, to use high-sounding 
 language to proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are 
 ridiculous if unsupported by potential force and then to refuse to 
 provide this force. If there is no intention of providing and of 
 keeping the force necessary to back up a strong attitude, then it is 
 far better not to assume such an attitude. 
 
 The strong arm of the Government in enforcing respect for its 
 just rights in international matters is the Navy of the United States. 
 I most earnestly recommend that there be no halt in the work of 
 upbuilding the American Navy. There is no more patriotic duty 
 before us as a people than to keep the Navy adequate to the needs 
 of this country's position. We have undertaken to build the Isthmian 
 Canal. We have undertaken to secure for ourselves our just share 
 in the trade of the Orient. We have undeHaken to protect our 
 citizens from improper treatment in foreign lands. We continue 
 steadily to insist on the application of the Monroe doctrine to the 
 Western Hemisphere. Unless our attitude in these and all similar 
 matters is to be a mere boastful sham, we can not afford to abandon 
 our naval programme. Our voice is now potent for peace, and is so 
 potent because we are not afraid of war. But our protestations 
 upon behalf of peace would neither receive nor deserve the slightest 
 attention if we were impotent to make them good. 
 
 December 5, 1905. 
 
 We can not consider the question of our foreign policy without at 
 the same time treating of the Army and the Navy. 
 
 But it is, of course, true that the man behind the gun, the man in 
 the engine room, and the man in the conning tower, considered not 
 only individually, but especially wnth regard to the way in which 
 they work together, are even more important than the weapons with 
 which they work. The most formidable battleship is, of course, 
 helpless against even a light cruiser if the men aboard it are unable 
 to hit anything with their guns; and thoroughly well-hafidled 
 cruisers may count seriously in an engagement with much superior 
 vessels if the men aboard the latter are ineffective, whether from lack 
 of training or from any other cause. Modern warships are most 
 formidable mechanisms when well handled, but they are utterly 
 useless when not well handled, and they can not be handled at all 
 without long and careful training. This training can under no cir- 
 cumstances be given when once war has broken out. No fighting 
 ship of the first class should ever be laid up save for necessary re- 
 pairs ; and her crew should be kept constantly exercised on the high 
 
22 AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 seas, so that she may stand at the highest point of perfection. To 
 put a new and untrained crew upon the most powerful battleship 
 and send it out to meet a formidable enemy is not only to invite 
 but to insure disaster and disgrace. To improvise crews at the out- 
 break of a war, so far as the serious fighting craft are concerned, is 
 absolutely hopeless. If the officers and men are not thoroughly 
 skilled in and have not been thoroughly trained to their duties, it 
 would be far better to keep the ships in port during hostilities than 
 to send them against a formidable opponent, for the result could 
 only be that they would be either sunk or captured. 
 
 Decemher 3, 1906. 
 
 The United States Navy is the surest guarantor of peace which this 
 country possesses. It is earnestly to be wished that we would profit 
 by the teachings of history in this matter. A strong and wise people 
 will study its own failures no less than its triumphs, for there is 
 wisdom to be learned from the study of both, of the mistake as well 
 as of the success. For this purpose nothing could be more instructive 
 than a rational study of the War of 1812, as it is told, for instance, 
 by Capt. Mahan. There was only one way in which that war 
 could have been avoided. If during the preceding 12 years a Navy 
 relatively as strong as that which this country now has had been 
 built up, and an Army provided relatively as good as that which 
 the country now has, there never would have been the slightest neces- 
 sity of fighting the war; and if the necessity had arisen the war 
 would under such circumstances have ended with our speedy and 
 overwhelming triumph. But our people during those 12 years refused 
 to make any preparations whatever regarding either the Army or 
 the Navy. They saved a million or two of dollars by so doing ; and 
 in mere money paid a hundredfold for each million thus saved during 
 the three years of war which followed — a war which brought untold 
 suffering upon our people, which at one time threatened the gravest 
 national disaster, and which, in spite of the necessity of waging it, 
 resulted merely in what was in effect a drawn battle, while the bal- 
 ance of defeat and triumph was almost even. 
 
 I do not ask that we continue to increase our Navy. I ask merely 
 that it be maintained at its present strength; and this can be done 
 only if we replace the obsolete and outworn ships by new and good 
 ones, the equals of any afloat in any navy. To stop building ships 
 for one year means that for that year the Navy goes back instead of 
 forward. The old battleship Texas^ for instance, would now be of 
 little service in a stand-up fight with a powerful adversary. The 
 old double-turret monitors have outworn their usefulness, while it 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 23 
 
 was a waste of nomey to build the modern single-turret monitors. 
 All these ships should be replaced by others ; and this can be done by 
 a well-settled program of providing for the building each year of at 
 least one first-class battleship, equal in size and speed to any that any 
 nation is at the same time building; the armament presumably to 
 consist of as large a number as possible of very heavy guns of one 
 caliber, together with smaller guns to repel torpedo attack; while 
 there should be heavy armor, turbine engines, and, in short, every 
 modern device. Of course, from time to time, cruisers, colliers, tor- 
 pedo-boat destroyers, or torpedo boats will have to be built also. All 
 this, be it remembered, would not increase our Navy, but would 
 merely keep it at its present strength. Equally of course the ships 
 will be absolutely useless if the men aboard them are not so trained 
 that they can get the best possible service out of the formidable but 
 delicate and complicated mechanisms intrusted to their care. The 
 marksmanship of our men has so improved during the last five years 
 that I deem it within bounds to say that the Navy is more than twice 
 as efficient, ship for ship, as half a decade ago. The Navy can only 
 attain proper efficiency if enough officers and men are provided, and 
 if these officers and men are given the chance (and required to take 
 advantage of it) to stay continually at sea and to exercise the fleets 
 singly and above all in squadron, the exercise to be of every kind and 
 to include unceasing practice at the guns, conducted under conditions 
 that will test marksmanship in time of war. 
 
 In both the Army and the Navy there is urgent need that every- 
 thing possible should be done to maintain the highest standard for 
 the personnel, alike as regards the officers and the enlisted men. 
 I do not believe that in any service there is a finer body of enlisted 
 men and of junior officers than we have in both the Army and the 
 Navy, including the Marine Corps. All possible encouragment to 
 the enlisted men should be given, in pay and otherwise, and every- 
 thing practicable done to render the service attractive to men of the 
 right type. They should be held to the strictest discharge of their 
 duty, and in them a spirit should be encouraged which demands not 
 the mere performance of duty, but the performance of far more than 
 duty, if it conduces to the honor and the interests of the American 
 Nation; and in return the amplest consideration should be theirs. 
 
 Decemler 3, 1907. 
 
 I think it is only lack of foresight that troubles us, not any hos- 
 tility to the Army. There are, of course, foolish people who de- 
 nounce any care of the Army or Navy as "militarism," but I do not 
 think that these people are numerous. This country has to contend 
 
24 AMERICAN XAVAL POLICY. 
 
 now, and has had to contend in the past, with many evils, and there is 
 ample scope for all who would work for reform. But there is not one 
 evil that now exists, or that ever has existed in this country, which is, 
 or ever has been, owin^ in the smallest part to militarism. Decla- 
 mation against militarism has no more serious place in an earnest 
 and intelligent movement for righteousness in this country than 
 declamation against the worship of Baal or Astaroth. It is decla- 
 mation against a nonexistent evil, one which never has existed in 
 this country, and w^hich has not the slightest chance of appearing 
 here. We are glad to help in any movement for international peace, 
 but this is because we sincerely believe that it is our duty to help 
 all such movements provided they are sane and rational, and 
 not because there is any tendency toward militarism on our part 
 which needs to be cured. The evils we have to fight are those in 
 connection with industrialism, not militarism. Industry is always 
 necessary, just as war is sometimes necessary. 
 
 It was hoped The Hague Conference might deal with the ques- 
 tion of the limitation of armaments. But even before it had as- 
 sembled informal inquiries had developed that as regards naval 
 armaments, the only ones in which this country had any interest, 
 it was hopeless to try to devise any plan for which there was the 
 slightest possibility of securing the assent of the nations gathered 
 at The Hague. No plan was even proposed which would have had 
 the assent of more than one first-class power outside of the United 
 States. The only plan that seemed at all feasible, that of limiting 
 the size of battleships, met with no favor at all. It is evident, there- 
 fore, that it is folly for this Nation to base any hope of securing 
 peace on any international agreement as to the limitation of arma- 
 ments. Such being the fact it would be most unwise for us to stop 
 the upbuilding of our Navy. To build one battleship of the best and 
 most advanced type a year would barely keep our fleet up to its pres- 
 ent force. This is not enough. In my judgment w^e should this year 
 provide for four battleships. But it is idle to build battleships unless 
 in addition to providing the men and the means for thorough train- 
 ing, we provide the auxiliaries for them, unless we provide docks, 
 the coaling stations, the colliers, and supply ships that they need. 
 We are extremely deficient in coaling stations and docks on the 
 Pacific, and this deficiency should not longer be permitted to exist. 
 Plenty of torpedo boats and destroyers should be built. Both on the 
 Atlantic and Pacific coasts fortifications of the best type should be 
 provided for all our greatest harbors. 
 
 We need always to remember that in time of war the Navy is not 
 to be used to defend harbors and seacoast cities; Ave should perfect 
 our system of coast fortifications. The only efficient use for the Navy 
 
AMERICAN XAVAL POLICY. 25 
 
 is for offense. The only v^aj in which it can efficientl}' protect our 
 own coast against the possible action of a foreign navy is by destroy- 
 ing that foreign navy. For defense against a hostile fleet which 
 actualty attacks them, the coast cities must depend upon their forts, 
 mines, torpedoes, submarines, and torpedo boats and destroyers. 
 All of these together are efficient for defensive purposes, but they 
 in no way supply the place of a thoroughly efficient navy capable of 
 acting on the offensive; for parrying never yet won a fight. It can 
 only be won by hard hitting, and an aggressive seagoing Navy alone 
 can do this hard hitting of the offensive type. But the forts and 
 the like are necessary so that the Navy may be foot-loose. In time 
 of war there is sure to be demand, under pressure of fright, for 
 the ships to be scattered so as to defend all kinds of ports. Under 
 penalty of terrible disaster, this demand must be refused. The ships 
 must be kept together, and their objective made the enemies' fleet. 
 If fortifications are sufficiently strong, no modern navy will venture 
 to attack them so long as the foe has in existence a hostile navy of 
 anything like the same size or efficiency. But unless there exists 
 si^ch a navy then the fortifications are powerless by themselves to 
 secure the victory. For, of course, the mere deficiency means that 
 any resolute enem^^ can at his leisure combine all his forces upon 
 one point with the certainty that he can take it. 
 
 lentil our battle fleet is much larger than at present it should never 
 be split into detachments so far apart that they could not in event 
 of emergency be speedily united. Our coast line is on the Pacific 
 just as much as on the Atlantic. The interests of California, Oregon, 
 and Washington are as emphatically the interests of the whole Union 
 as those of Maine and New York, of Louisiana and Texas. The 
 battle fleet should now and then be moved to the Pacific, just as at 
 other times it should be kept in the Atlantic. When the Isthmian 
 Canal is built the transit of the battle fleet from one ocean to the 
 other will be comparatively easy. Until it is built I earnestly hope 
 that the battle fleet will be thus shifted between the two oceans 
 eA'ery year or two. The marksmanship on all our ships has improved 
 phenomenally during the last five years. Until within the last two 
 or three years it was not possible to train a battle fleet in squadron 
 maneuA'ers under service conditions, and it is only during these last 
 two or three years that the training under these conditions has be- 
 come really effective. Another and most necessary stride in advance 
 is noAv being taken. The battle fleet is about starting by the Straits 
 of Magellan to visit the Pacific coast. Sixteen battleships are going 
 under the command of Rear Admiral Evans, while eight armored 
 cruisers and two other battleships will meet him at San Francisco, 
 whither certain torpedo destroyers are also going. No fleet of such 
 size has ever made such a voyage, and it will be of very great edu- 
 
26 AMEKICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 cational use to all engaged in it. The only way by which to teacli 
 officers and men how to handle the fleet so as to meet every possible 
 strain and emergency in time of w^ar is to have them practice under 
 similar conditions in time of peace. Moreover, the only way to find 
 out our actual needs is to perform in time of peace wiiatever ma- 
 neuvers might be necessary in time of war. After war is declared 
 it is too late to find out the needs ; that means to invite disaster. 
 
 It must be remembered that everything done in the Navy to fit It 
 to do well in time of war must be done in time of peace. Modern 
 wars are short ; the}^ do not last the length of time requisite to build 
 a battleship ; and it takes longer to train the officers and men to do 
 well on a battleship than it takes to build it. Nothing effective can 
 be done for the Navy once war has begun, and the result of the war, 
 if the combatants are otherwise equally matched, will depend upon 
 which power has prepared best in time of peace. The United States 
 Navy is the best guaranty the Nation has that its honor and interest 
 will not be neglected; and, in addition, it offers by far the best 
 insurance for peace that can by human ingenuity be devised. 
 
 April 14, 1908. 
 
 I advocate that the United States build a Navy commensurate with 
 its powers and its needs, because I feel that such a Navy will be the 
 surest guaranty and safeguard of peace. We are not a military 
 nation. Our Army is so small as to present an almost absurd con- 
 trast to our size, and is properly treated as little more than a nucleus 
 for organization in case of serious war. Yet we are a rich Nation, 
 and undefended wealth invites aggression. The very liberty of 
 individual speech and action which we so prize and guard renders 
 it possible that at times unexpected causes of friction with foreign 
 powers may suddenly develop. At this moment we are negotiating 
 arbitration treaties with all the other great powers that are willing 
 to enter into them. These arbitration treaties have a special useful- 
 ness because in the event of some sudden disagreement they render 
 it morally incumbent upon both nations to seek first to reach an 
 agreement through arbitration, and at least secure a breathing space 
 during which the cool judgment of the two nations involved may get 
 the upper hand over any momentary burst of anger. These arbitra- 
 tion treaties are entered into not only with the hope of preventing 
 wrongdoing by others against us, but also as a proof that we have no 
 intention of doing wrong ourselves. 
 
 Yet it is idle to assume, and from the standpoint of national in- 
 terest and honor it is mischievous folly for any statesman to assume, 
 that this world has yet reached the stage, or has come within measur- 
 able distance of the stage, when a proud nation, jealous of its honor 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 27 
 
 and conscious of its great mission in the world, can be content to rely 
 for peace upon the forbearance of other powers. It would be equally 
 foolish to rely upon each of them possessing at all times and under 
 all circumstances and provocations an altruistic regard for the rights 
 of others. Those who hold this view are blind indeed to all that 
 has gone on before their eyes in the world at large. They are blind 
 to what has happened in China, in Turkey, in the Spanish posses- 
 sions, in Central and South Africa during the last dozen years. 
 For centuries China has cultivated the very spirit which our own 
 peace- at-any-price men wish this country to adopt. For centuries 
 China has refused to provide military forces and has treated the 
 career of the soldier as inferior in honor and regard to the career 
 of the merchant or of the man of letters. There never has been so 
 large an empire which for so long a time has so resolutely proceeded 
 on the theory of doing away with what is called "militarism." 
 Whether the result has been happy in international affairs I need 
 not discuss; all the advanced reformei^ and farsighted patriots in 
 the Chinese Empire are at present seeking (I may add, with our 
 hearty good will) for a radical and far-reaching reform in internal 
 affairs. In external affairs the policy has resulted in various other 
 nations now holding large portions of Chinese territory, while there 
 is a very acute fear in China lest the Empire, because of its defense- 
 lessness. be exposed to absolute dismemberment, and its well-wishers 
 are able to help it only in a small measure, because no nation can 
 help any other unless that other can help itself. 
 
 The State Department is continually appealed to to interfere on 
 behalf of peoples and nationalities who insist that they are suffering 
 from oppression — now Jews in one country, now Christians in an- 
 other ; now black men said to be oppressed by white men in Af rica* 
 Armenians, Koreans, Finns, Poles, representatives of all, appeal 
 at times to this Government. All of this oppression is alleged to 
 exist in time of profound peace ; and frequently, although by no 
 means always, it is alleged to occur at the hands of people who are 
 not very formidable in a military sense. In some cases the accusa- 
 tions of oppression and wrongdoing are doubtless ill founded. In 
 others they are well founded; and in certain cases the most appall- 
 ing loss of life is shown to have occurred, accompanied with fright- 
 ful cruelty. It is not our province to decide which side has been 
 right and which has been wrong in all or any of these controversies. 
 I am merely referring to the loss of life. It is probably a conserva- 
 tive statement to say that within the last 12 years, at periods of pro- 
 found peace and not as the result of war, massacres and butcheries 
 have occurred in which more lives of men, women, and children 
 have been lost than in any single great war since the close of the 
 Napoleonic struggles. To any public man who knows of the com- 
 
28 AMERICAN XA\'AL POLICY. 
 
 plaints continually made to the State Department there is an ele- 
 ment of grim tragedy in the claim that the time has gone by when 
 weak nations or peoples can be oppressed by those that are stronger 
 without arousing effective protest from other strong interests. 
 Events still fresh in the mind of every thinking man show that 
 neither arbitration nor an}- other device can as yet be invoked to 
 prevent the gravest and most terrible wrongdoing to peoples who 
 are few in numbers or who, if numerous, have lost the first and 
 most important of national virtues — the capacity for self-defense. 
 
 When a nation is so happily situated as is ours — that is, when it 
 has no reason to fear or to be feared by its land neighbors — the fleet 
 is all the more necessary for the preservation of peace. (Jreat Britain 
 has been saved by its fleet from the necessity of facing one of 
 the two alternatives — of submission to conquest by a foreign power 
 or of itself becoming a great military power. The United States 
 can hope for a permanent career of peace on only one condition, and 
 that is on condition of building and maintaining a first-class Navy ; 
 and the step to be taken toward this end at this time is to provide 
 for the building of four additional battleships. I earnestly wish 
 that the Congress would pass the measures for which I have asked 
 for strengthening and rendering more efficient the Army as well as 
 the Navy ; all of these measures as affecting every branch and detail 
 of both services are sorely needed, and it would be the part of far- 
 sighted wisdom to enact them all into laws, but the most vital and 
 immediate need is that of the four battleships. 
 
 To carry out this policy is but to act in the spirit of George Wash- 
 ington; is but to continue the policies which he outlined when he 
 said, " Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Culti- 
 vate peace and harmony with all. * * * Xothing is more essen- 
 tial than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular 
 nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded 
 and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toAvard all 
 should be cultivated. * * * 
 
 "I can not recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment 
 of our duties to the rest of the world without again i^ressing upon 
 you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of com})lete 
 defense and of exacting from them the fulfillment of their duties 
 toward us. The Ignited States ought not to indulge in persuasion 
 that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep 
 at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history 
 of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United 
 States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, 
 by the reputation of Aveakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must 
 be able to repel it : if Ave desire to secure peace, one of the most 
 
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 29 
 
 powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be -known 
 that we are at all times ready for w^ar." 
 
 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT. 
 
 March 4, 1909. 
 
 AVhat has been said of the Army may be affirmed in even a moro 
 emphatic way of the Navy. A modern Navy can not be improvised. 
 It must be built and in existence when the emergency arises which 
 calls for its use and operation. My distinguished predecessor has in 
 many speeches and messages set out with great force and striking 
 language the necessity for maintaining a strong Navy commensurate 
 with the coast line, the governmental resources, and the foreign trade 
 of our Nation; and I wish to reiterate all the reasons which he has 
 presented in favor of the policy of maintaining a strong Navy as 
 the best conservator of our peace with other nations, and the best 
 means of securing respect for the assertion of our rights, the defense 
 of our interests, and the exercise of our influence in international 
 matters. 
 
 December 7, 1909. 
 
 'ihe return of the battleship fleet from its voyage around the 
 world, in more efficient coi^dition than Avhen it starteei, Avas a note- 
 worthy event of interest alike to our citizens and the naval authori- 
 ties of the woi-ld. Besides the beneficial anel far-reaching effect on 
 our personal and diplomatic relations in the countries wdiich the 
 fleet visited, the marked success of the ships in steaming around the 
 world in all weatheVs on schedule time has increased respect for our 
 Navy and has added to our national prestige. 
 
 Decemher 6, 1912. 
 
 In the past 15 years the Navy has expanded rapidl}-, yet far less 
 rapidly than our country. From now on reduced expenditures in 
 the Navy means reduced military strength. The world's history has 
 shown the importance of sea power both for adequate defense and 
 for the support of important and definite policies. 
 
 WOODROW WILSON. 
 
 Decemher 8, 191 k. 
 
 A powerful Navy we have always regarded as our proper and 
 natural means of defense; and it has alw^ays been of defense that 
 
30 AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. 
 
 we have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall 
 tell us now what sort of a Navy to build ? We shall take leave to 
 be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past ; and there will 
 be no thought of ofPense or of provocation in that. Our ships are 
 our natural bulwarks. When will the experts tell us just what kind 
 we should construct, and when will they be right for 10 years 
 together, if the relative efficiency of craft of different kinds and uses 
 continues to change as we have seen it change under our very eyes 
 in these last few months ? 
 
 But I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There is no 
 new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it 
 because some amongst us are nervous and excited. We shall easily 
 and sensibly agree upon a policy of defense. The question has not 
 changed its aspect because the times are not normal. Our policy 
 will not be for an occasion. It will be conceived as a permanent 
 and settled thing, which we will pursue at all seasons, without haste 
 and after a fashion perfectly consistent with the peace of the world, 
 the abiding friendship of States, and the unhampered freedom of 
 all with whom we deal. Let there be no misconception. The coun- 
 try has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national 
 defense. We are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting 
 upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experi- 
 ence and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be ade- 
 quately done. 
 
 Decemher 7, 1915. 
 
 But armies and instruments of war are only pai*t of what has to 
 be considered if we are to provide for the supreme matter of national 
 self-sufficiency and security in all its aspects. There are other great 
 matters which will be thrust upon our attention whether we will or 
 not. There is, for example, a very, pressing question of trade and 
 shipping involved in this great problem of national adequacy. It is 
 necessary for many weighty reasons of national efficiency and de- 
 velopment that we should have a great merchant marine. The great 
 merchant fleet we once used to make us rich, that great body of 
 sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag into every sea, and who 
 were the pride and often the bulwark of the Nation, we have almost 
 driven out of existence by inexcusable neglect and indifference and 
 by a hopelessly blind and provincial policy of so-called economic pro- 
 tection. It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our 
 commercial independence on the seas. 
 
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